COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Willis and Elder 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

LEONARD SHELTON JACKSON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0036-96-2 CHIEF JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON 

 NOVEMBER 4, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

James B. Wilkinson, Judge 

 Maureen L. White (Theodore Tondrowski; 

Grennan & Tondrowski, on brief), for 

appellant. 

 Marla G. Decker, Assistant Attorney General 

(Richard Cullen, Attorney General; Steven A. 

Witmer, Assistant Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Leonard Shelton Jackson ("Jackson") was convicted of 

possession of cocaine with an intent to distribute and 

distribution of cocaine, both in violation of Code § 18.2-248. 

Jackson contends that the cocaine on which his conviction rests 

was illegally seized and, thus, the trial judge erred in 

declining to suppress that evidence. Finding no error, we affirm 

the convictions. 

 On May 9, 1995, police officers received a tip from an 

informant who had previously provided the police with reliable 

information. The informant identified Jackson by name, claimed 

he was selling drugs, and predicted where he would be found and 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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the car he would be using. The officers drove to the location 

identified by the informant and saw both Jackson and the car 

identified by the informant. The officers saw Jackson and Nelson 

Washington ("Washington") get into the car, with Washington 

driving. 

 The officers checked the car's license plate number and 

discovered that the plates were for a different car owned by 

Washington. They also learned that Washington's license was 

suspended. The officers stopped the car and told Washington that 

his plates were wrong and his license had been suspended. They 

also told him that they had been told that the car he was driving 

was being used to transport drugs. 

 An officer asked Washington to consent to a search, and he 

consented. The officer discovered cocaine on Washington. The 

officer then told Jackson why they stopped the car and that they 

had information that Jackson was transporting drugs. The officer 

asked Jackson to consent to a search, and he consented. The 

officer began searching Jackson, but when he reached to search 

his pants leg, Jackson ran. The officers apprehended Jackson and 

arrested him, discovering cocaine in his pants leg. 

 In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, 

the appellant has the burden to show that, considering the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the 

ruling constituted reversible error. Fore v. Commonwealth, 220 

Va. 1007, 1010, 265 S.E.2d 729, 731, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1017 

(1980). "`Ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and 
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probable cause to make a warrantless search' involve questions of 

both law and fact and are reviewed de novo on appeal," McGee v. 

Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 197-98, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) 

(en banc) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 

116 S. Ct. 1657, 1659 (1996)), but "we are bound by the trial 

court's findings of historical fact unless `plainly wrong' or 

without evidence to support them, and we give due weight to the 

inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local 

law enforcement officers.'" Id. at 198, 487 S.E.2d at 261 

(citing Ornelas, ___ U.S. at ___, 116 S. Ct. at 1663). 

 Although the initial search of Jackson was consensual, his 

flight implied a withdrawal of consent. Once consent is 

withdrawn, the Fourth Amendment is implicated and police are 

required to have probable cause to search further. Camden v. 

Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 725, 727-28, 441 S.E.2d 38, 40 (1994); 

see Payne v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 86, 88, 414 S.E.2d 869, 

870 (1992) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991)). 

 After verifying the reliable informant's identification of 

Jackson, his location, and the car he was using, the officers 

searched Jackson's companion, Washington, and found cocaine. 

Jackson then consented to a search. When Jackson fled, he 

impliedly withdrew consent. Nevertheless, the officers' 

verification of the informant's information, their discovery of 

Washington's possession of cocaine, and, most importantly, 

Jackson's flight, together gave the officers probable cause to 

search Jackson. Compare McGee, 25 Va. App. at 203, 487 S.E.2d at 
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264 (holding that police lacked probable cause to search because 

informant was an anonymous tipster, no evidence established the 

reliability of the tipster, and the police did not observe any 

suspicious conduct), with James v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 98, 

101-02, 379 S.E.2d 378, 380 (1989) (noting that flight helps 

support a finding of probable cause), and Quigley v. 

Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 28, 33 nn.5-6, 414 S.E.2d 851, 854 

nn.5-6 (1992) (noting that fight alone may constitute 

"`"reasonable suspicion" when made in the face of lawful 

authority'" and can "`color[] conduct which hitherto had appeared 

innocent'") (quoting United States v. Lane, 909 F.2d 895, 899 

(6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1093 (1991)). 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. 

 Affirmed.