NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

DEVIN ANDRICH, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

JEROME FRANCIS MEYERS, JR., et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 18-0755 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2018-000376

The Honorable James D. Smith, Judge

APPEAL DISMISSED

APPEARANCES

Devin Andrich, Phoenix

Plaintiff/Appellant

Singer Pistiner, PC, Scottsdale

By Jason Pistiner, Robert S. Singer

Counsel for Defendants/Appellees

FILED 11-12-2019
ANDRICH v. MEYERS, JR., et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge David D. Weinzweig 

joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Devin Andrich appeals the superior court’s ruling denying 

leave to amend his complaint to add tort and contract claims against

various defendants, including Jerome Francis Meyers, Jr. and Lisa Freeman 

Meyers (“the Meyers”). Because we lack jurisdiction, we dismiss the 

appeal. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 Andrich represented the Meyers in several legal proceedings 

between 2012 and 2014. In February 2014, Andrich was indicted on 

allegations that he misappropriated client funds, and several weeks later 

“the Presiding Disciplinary Judge of Arizona” issued an interim order 

“suspending Andrich from practicing law and freezing [his] bank 

accounts.” 

¶3 Shortly thereafter, Andrich contacted the Meyers and asked if 

they would store some of his property. The Meyers agreed to do so.

Andrich also lived at the Meyers’ home for approximately six months in 

2014 until the Meyers asked him to leave. Jerome Meyers then filed a bar 

complaint against Andrich. 

¶4 In December 2014, Andrich asked a third party to retrieve his 

laptop computer, server, and clothing from the Meyers’ home. A short time 

later Jerome Meyers told the third party that Andrich’s clothing possessions 

had been donated to charity. The Meyers declined to return Andrich’s 

laptop and placed his server at the end of their driveway for pickup. The 

third party retrieved the server but later determined that the hard drives

had been removed. In April 2015, Andrich served the Meyers with a court

order compelling the production of the laptop and server hard drives. The 

Meyers, then represented by attorney Jason Pistiner of the law firm of 

Singer Pistiner, P.C., did not comply with the court order. 
ANDRICH v. MEYERS, JR., et al.

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¶5 Andrich entered into a plea agreement in his criminal case in 

which he would serve a prison term and pay restitution. He was released 

from prison in September 2017 and unsuccessfully petitioned for postconviction relief, challenging the restitution order. We denied Andrich’s 

petition for review. State v. Andrich, 1 CA-CR 18-0600 PRPC, 2019 WL 

150497 (Ariz. App. Jan. 10, 2019), rev. denied (July 30, 2019). 

¶6 A year before we decided his post-conviction relief matter, 

Andrich sued the Meyers, Jason Pistiner, his wife Kristina Keating, Singer 

Pistiner P.C., and 855 FASNPAK, Inc. Andrich alleged fraud against the 

Meyers, seeking damages and an injunction ordering the return of his 

property. The superior court dismissed his complaint, finding that it stated 

no allegations to support his claim against 855 FASNPAK and that the claim 

against the other defendants was time-barred. 

¶7 Andrich moved to set aside the ruling. The court treated his 

motion as one for reconsideration and entered an order “granting Plaintiff 

leave to file an amended pleading” except as to 855 FASNPAK. Andrich

filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint, attaching a proposed 

amended complaint that alleged in part the following claims against

Pistiner, Keating, Singer Pistiner P.C., and the Meyers: negligence per se

based on A.R.S. § 13-2809, tortious interference with Andrich’s plea 

agreement, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress,

conversion, and negligently destroying Andrich’s laptop, server hard 

drives, and personal possessions.

1 He also alleged the following claims 

against the Meyers alone: negligence, fraud, breach of a written or oral 

lease, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory 

estoppel, and unjust enrichment. In an unsigned minute entry, the court 

rejected all of his claims—except promissory estoppel against the Meyers—

and ordered Andrich to file a second amended complaint including only 

that claim. 

¶8 Andrich appealed from that minute entry, but we dismissed 

the appeal because the superior court’s order was not a final judgment. 

Before we issued our dismissal order, however, the court sua sponte entered 

a final judgment under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 54(b) in 

1 In his proposed amended complaint, Andrich alleged similar claims 

against Robert Singer, a lawyer with Singer Pistiner, P.C., and Singer’s wife, 

Heather Kirka. Neither Singer nor Kirka were named in the original 

complaint. Because we are dismissing this appeal for lack of jurisdiction, 

we need not elaborate on those alleged claims. 
ANDRICH v. MEYERS, JR., et al.

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favor of 855 FASNPAK, Inc., Pistiner, Keating, and Singer Pistiner P.C., but 

not the Meyers. Andrich filed a second notice of appeal. 

JURISDICTION

¶9 Although neither party raises the issue, we have an 

independent obligation to determine whether we have appellate 

jurisdiction. Dabrowski v. Bartlett, 246 Ariz. 504, 511, ¶ 13 (App. 2019). We 

must dismiss an appeal over which we lack jurisdiction. Id.

¶10 Our jurisdiction is limited to final judgments that dispose of 

all claims and all parties, leaving no questions open for judicial 

determination and clearly fixing the parties’ rights and liabilities. See Decker 

v. City of Tucson, 4 Ariz. App. 270, 272 (1966); Musa v. Adrian, 130 Ariz. 311, 

312 (1981). An exception to this rule is Rule 54(b), which authorizes the 

superior court to certify a final judgment disposing of fewer than all claims 

or parties “only if the court expressly determines there is no just reason for 

delay.” We lack jurisdiction, however, when a Rule 54(b) certification is not 

“substantively warranted.” Sw. Gas Corp. v. Irwin ex re. County of Cochise, 

229 Ariz. 198, 202, ¶12 (App. 2012). We review the propriety of Rule 54(b) 

certification for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 201, ¶7. 

¶11 Rule 54(b) judgments “should not be entered routinely,” but 

are instead limited to “the infrequent harsh case as an instrument for the 

improved administration of justice.” S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Peabody W. Coal 

Co., 194 Ariz. 47, 53, ¶ 19 (1999) (quotation omitted) (explaining that Rule 

54(b) represents “a compromise between the policy against interlocutory 

appeals and the desirability, in a few cases, of an immediate appeal to 

prevent an injustice”). The superior court should not certify a partial 

judgment under Rule 54(b) if (1) “a significant factual overlap” exists 

between the dismissed and surviving litigation, Davis v. Cessna Aircraft 

Corp., 168 Ariz. 301, 305 (App. 1991) (citation omitted), or (2) the appellate 

court would need to “decide the same issues more than once,” GM Dev. 

Corp. v. Cmty. Am. Mortg. Corp., 165 Ariz. 1, 9 (App. 1990) (citation omitted).

¶12 Rule 54(b) certification was not proper here. First, Andrich’s 

proposed tort claims at issue in this appeal arise out of the same factual

allegations as his remaining claims against the Meyers. Davis, 168 Ariz. at

305 (“[T]wo distinct claims are but one for purposes of Rule 54(b) if they 

have a ‘significant factual overlap.’”). Andrich contests the superior court’s 

judgment dismissing his claims against defendants Pistiner, Keating, and 

Singer Pistiner, P.C. In particular, he argues the court erroneously denied 

his motion for leave to amend his complaint and assert various tort claims 
ANDRICH v. MEYERS, JR., et al.

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against these defendants. The proposed tort claims are premised, however, 

on the Meyers’ alleged retention of Andrich’s laptop, server hard drives,

and personal possessions. For example, his proposed tort claims against 

Pistiner, Keating, and Singer Pistiner P.C.—intentional interference with 

contractual relations, intentional infliction of emotional distress, conversion 

and negligence—allege these defendants were responsible with the Meyers

for “withholding . . . or otherwise destroying” his laptop, server hard 

drives, and personal possessions. 

¶13 Second, the superior court’s Rule 54(b) judgment will likely 

require this court to address the same facts, issues and arguments when a 

final Rule 54(c) judgment is entered on Andrich’s surviving promissory 

estoppel claim against the Meyers. See Cont’l Cas. v. Superior Court, 130 Ariz. 

189, 191 (1981) (“[A] claim is separable from others remaining to be 

adjudicated when the nature of the claim already determined is ‘such that 

no appellate court would have to decide the same issues more than once 

even if there are subsequent appeals.’”). Arizona courts have long 

disfavored piecemeal appeals because they tend to undermine judicial 

efficiency. See Musa, 130 Ariz. at 312. We therefore conclude the superior 

court abused its discretion in certifying the judgment under Rule 54(b) and 

dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

¶14 Andrich’s appeal is dismissed. The superior court may 

consider whether to award reasonable attorney fees or costs incurred in this 

appeal at the conclusion of the case.