United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 12, 2017∗

Decided May 12, 2017

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

No. 16-1888

NATHANIEL JACKSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ALTON ANGUS, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 12-CV-1084

Michael M. Mihm,

Judge.

O R D E R

This is the third time Nathaniel Jackson has sued staff at the Pontiac and Dixon 

correctional centers claiming that temporary transfers to Dixon for mental-health 

treatment violated his constitutional rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court 

concluded that this action is precluded by two earlier suits Jackson brought in the Illinois 

courts and, on that basis, granted summary judgment for the defendants. Because we 

conclude that those earlier suits are not preclusive as to all defendants and claims, we 

vacate the judgment in part and remand for further proceedings.

 

∗ We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 16-1888 Page 2

Jackson was involuntarily transferred to Dixon for mental-health services several 

times, though in his federal suit he focuses on the most recent transfers, occurring in 

March 2011 and July 2012. In his complaint he says he was treated for mental illness 

without consent and that prison authorities never provided a written statement detailing 

the evidence they relied upon in deciding he needed to be involuntarily transferred and 

treated. Moreover, he alleges, prison staff at the two prisons conspired to forcibly 

transfer and treat him in retaliation for previous grievances and civil-rights complaints 

about earlier incidents of forced treatment. And during the July 2012 transfer, Jackson

says, the Pontiac tactical team beat him over the head with a shield, smashed his head 

against a wall, twisted his wrist, and repeatedly sprayed his genitals with pepper spray. 

The first of Jackson’s earlier lawsuits in Illinois, filed in Livingston County in 

March 2011, alleged that earlier that month several employees at Pontiac and Dixon had 

conspired to move him to Dixon for forced mental-health treatment, including 

unwanted psychotropic medication, in retaliation for submitting grievances and without 

following the requisite procedural safeguards. See Jackson v. Angus, et al., No. 11-MR-33, 

slip. op. (Ill. Cir. Ct. Jan. 12, 2012). Jackson named as defendants Alton Angus, a 

psychologist at Pontiac, as well as Jamie Lynn Chess and Andrew Kowalkowski, both

psychiatrists at Dixon. The second suit, filed in Lee County in November 2012, repeated 

those allegations about the March 2011 transfer and added similar allegations about the

July 2012 transfer and mentioned the beating that occurred during that transfer. 

See Jackson v. Chandler, et al., No. 12 MR 109, slip op. (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 5, 2013). In that suit 

Jackson again named Kowalkowski, but not the others, and added Curt Eubanks and 

Lawrence Weiner, both administrators at Dixon. In both state cases, even when invited

to amend his complaints, the only relief Jackson requested was criminal prosecution of 

the named defendants. That relief was unavailable, of course, and for that reason both 

suits were dismissed. The presiding judge in the Lee County case clarified that he was 

“not stopping” Jackson from filing an appropriate civil complaint against the 

defendants. But Jackson said he did not want to pursue that option and insisted that he 

had a right to demand criminal prosecution of the defendants.

Jackson then filed the federal action underlying this appeal. In his amended 

complaint he repeats the allegations from his state cases about the 2011 and 2012 

transfers and the beating. He again asks that the defendants be prosecuted but also 

includes a request for damages. The named defendants include some of the persons sued 

previously, along with first-time defendants John Garlick and Jose Matthews, both 

psychiatrists at Pontiac; Michael P. Melvin, the superintendent of Pontiac; and members 

of Pontiac’s tactical team, including guards Kevin Edens, Brian Maier, Matthew Taylor, 

and William Zimmerman, who, Jackson alleges, inflicted the beating.
No. 16-1888 Page 3

At screening, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court ruled that Jackson’s 

complaint states a claim that defendants Angus, Chess, Eubanks, Garlick, Kowalkowski, 

Matthews, Melvin, and Weiner denied him due process in connection with the forced 

transfers and mental-health treatment. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 

(1990) (holding that inmates have liberty interest in avoiding unwanted administration 

of psychotropic drugs); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491–96 (1980) (holding that 

involuntary transfer of prisoner to mental-health hospital implicates liberty interest and 

requires, among other things, advance written notice to prisoner and written statement 

by factfinder as to evidence relied upon and reasons for transfer). And, the district court 

continued, Jackson’s complaint also states a claim for excessive force against the 

members of Pontiac’s tactical team. Finally, the district court concluded that the 

complaint states claims of conspiracy and retaliation against all defendants. (Although 

in its screening order the district court inadvertently omitted the conspiracy claim from 

its list of claims allowed to proceed, the court corrected that oversight in a later order.)

To the extent that Jackson challenges the district court’s decision that his complaint does 

not state additional claims, we agree with the district court’s analysis and will say no 

more about them.

The suit proceeded slowly, and Jackson several times asked the district court to 

recruit counsel. Each time the court declined with the explanation that Jackson could 

competently litigate the case himself. Indeed, Jackson twice had persuaded the district 

court to reopen the case—first, successfully arguing that the court had erred in deeming 

him to have three strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (the court had confused him with two 

other litigants named Nathaniel Jackson) and, second, convincing the court that his 

original complaint states a claim. In ruling on Jackson’s last request for counsel, the court 

granted leave to ask again after its ruling on a pending dispositive motion.

That motion was the defendants’ request for summary judgment on the sole 

ground of claim preclusion, which the court granted. The judge reasoned that both state 

cases had ended with a final judgment on the merits and presented the same causes of 

action as the federal suit because they involved the same series of events. The court also 

accepted the defendants’ contention that everyone named in the federal suit had been 

sued previously or is in privity with the defendants in the state cases. 

On appeal, Jackson argues that the Illinois suits do not preclude his federal case 

because, he contends, neither judgment was on the merits and also because he is asking

for a different remedy and has named different defendants. He also argues that the 

district court erred in not recruiting a lawyer for him.
No. 16-1888 Page 4

We begin with the issue of claim preclusion. Illinois law governs our analysis, 

since Illinois courts issued the judgments sought to be given preclusive effect. See Hicks 

v. Midwest Transit, Inc., 479 F.3d 468, 471 (7th Cir. 2007). Illinois gives preclusive effect to 

a prior lawsuit if (1) a court of competent jurisdiction rendered a final judgment on the 

merits, (2) the new lawsuit involves the same “cause of action” as the old, and (3) there is 

an identity of parties or their privies between the suits. Arlin-Golf, LLC v. Vill. of Arlington 

Heights, 631 F.3d 818, 821 (7th Cir. 2011). If these elements are met, the prior judgment 

will preclude even claims that could have been, but were not, litigated in the first suit. Id.

Different claims will constitute the same “cause of action” if they “arise from a single 

group of operative facts, regardless of whether they assert different theories of relief.” 

River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 703 N.E.2d 883, 893 (Ill. 1998); see Huon v. Johnson 

& Bell, Ltd., 757 F.3d 556, 558 (7th Cir. 2014). 

We agree with the district court that the state suits ended in a final judgment on 

the merits. In Illinois, “[u]nless the order of dismissal or a statute of this State otherwise 

specifies, an involuntary dismissal of an action, other than a dismissal for lack of 

jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join an indispensable party, operates as 

an adjudication upon the merits.” ILL. S. CT. R. 273; see Richter v. Prairie Farms Dairy, Inc.,

53 N.E.3d 1, 8–9 (Ill. 2016). The dismissal in each suit was involuntary and does not fit 

any exception in the rule. Jackson argues that the judgments were not on the merits 

because the courts simply ruled that the relief he wanted was unavailable and did not 

address the allegations underlying his claims. He cites Foreman v. Martin, 325 N.E.2d 378, 

379–80 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975), which holds that a judgment is not on the merits if the 

plaintiff was seeking “a form of remedy which turns out to be unavailable” and “is not 

precluded from subsequently maintaining an action in which he seeks an available 

remedy.” Yet in both state cases Jackson was allowed to amend his complaint, and, at 

least in the second suit, the judge clearly explained that Jackson might have a civil cause 

of action. Both times Jackson persisted in asking only for criminal prosecution. This was 

not “a misconception of the remedy” but rather, even if ill considered, a “tactical 

decision to split the lawsuit into separate actions to be brought in separate venues,” 

which is impermissible in Illinois. Thorleif Larsen & Son, Inc. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 532 N.E.2d 

423, 426–27 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); see Quintas v. Asset Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 917 N.E.2d 100, 103

(Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (noting that Illinois courts adhere to “general rule against the splitting 

of claims or causes of action”).

But we must proceed with caution as to the next two elements because Jackson’s 

complaints in the state suits are not identical to each other or to his federal complaint.

Obviously the Livingston County suit could not have any preclusive effect as to causes 

of action arising from Jackson’s transfer in July 2012, which had not yet occurred. The 
No. 16-1888 Page 5

Lee County suit, however, does involve the same causes of action as the federal suit, 

despite the different relief requested. See Dookeran v. Cnty. of Cook, Ill., 719 F.3d 570, 576 

(7th Cir. 2013). Even if the state suits can be characterized as mandamus actions, as at 

least one of the state judges thought, Jackson still could have brought a claim for 

damages in the same action. See Wozniak v. Cnty. of Dupage, 845 F.2d 677, 681 (7th Cir. 

1988) (“Under Illinois law, the [plaintiffs] not only could but should have joined their 

damage claim under Section 1983 with their mandamus claim in state court.”); Charles

Koen & Assoc. v. City of Cairo, 909 F.2d 992, 998–99 (7th Cir. 1990) (same).

The significant wrinkle, though, is that not all of the federal defendants were 

named in the state cases. The Illinois rule against claim splitting does not preclude 

separate actions against separate defendants, see 1 NICHOLS ILL. CIV. PRAC. § 5:20; 

Handley v. Unarco Indus., Inc., 463 N.E.2d 1011, 1017 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984), so Jackson was 

not required to name all defendants in one suit. This would not matter if, as the district 

court thought, all of the defendants were in privity with those sued in state court.

But they were not. Privity exists between parties representing the same legal interest.

See People ex rel. Burris v. Progressive Land Developers, Inc., 602 N.E.2d 820, 825–26 (Ill. 

1992). Each defendant in the federal case is sued in his individual capacity (as is 

necessary for a damages claim under § 1983). Their legal interests and defenses may very 

well differ; when a defendant is sued in his individual capacity, he is held responsible 

only for his individual wrongdoing. See Lewis v. Clarke, No. 15-1500, 2017 WL 1447161, at 

*7 (U.S. Apr. 25, 2017). And it does not make a difference that the Department of 

Corrections employs many of the defendants—old and new—or that they might be

covered by the State Employee Indemnification Act, 5 ILCS 350/2, and be represented by 

the same state agency. See id. at *6 (explaining that in determining legal interest the 

“critical inquiry is who may be legally bound by the court’s adverse judgment, not who 

will ultimately pick up the tab”); Conner v. Reinhard, 847 F.2d 384, 395 (7th Cir. 1988) 

(adverse judgment in city employee’s suit against city for retaliatory discharge did not 

preclude subsequent suit against two city officials in their personal capacity); Beard v. 

O’Neal, 728 F.2d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1984) (concluding that prior suit against one FBI agent 

did not preclude later suit against his supervisor regarding same incident because both 

were sued in personal capacity and thus were not privies).

Therefore, each state suit is preclusive only as to the defendants named and the 

actions alleged in that suit. The Lee County suit, which encompassed all causes of action 

included in the federal suit, precludes all claims against Weiner, Eubanks, and 

Kowalkowski. But because defendants Angus and Chess were named only in the 

Livingston County suit, the only claims precluded against them are those arising from 

the March 2011 transfer. And because Garlick, Matthews, Melvin, and the members of 
No. 16-1888 Page 6

the Pontiac tactical team were not named in either of the state suits, none of Jackson’s 

claims against them are precluded.

We note that the defendants misleadingly assert that several more of the federal 

defendants were previously sued in the Livingston case; but they were named only in a 

proposed amended complaint, which the court denied leave to file. They were thus 

never added to the suit and cannot claim any preclusive effect from it.

Finally, we turn to Jackson’s contention that the district court erred in not 

recruiting counsel. The court correctly considered whether Jackson was competent to 

litigate his particular case, see Romanelli v. Suliene, 615 F.3d 847, 854 (7th Cir. 2010); Pruitt 

v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654–55 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc), and its conclusion was reasonable. 

Jackson twice successfully persuaded the court to reopen his case. Moreover, the court 

stated it would reconsider Jackson’s request should the case proceed, so on remand 

Jackson may resubmit his motion.

We have considered Jackson’s remaining arguments, and none has merit. 

Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment as to defendants Angus, Chess, Edens, 

Garlick, Maier, Melvin, Matthews, Taylor, and Zimmerman and REMAND for further 

proceedings consistent with this order. In all other respects, we AFFIRM the judgment.