[Cite as Colonial Village, Ltd. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision, 123 Ohio St.3d 268, 2009-

Ohio-4975.] 

COLONIAL VILLAGE, LTD., APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE, v.

WASHINGTON COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL.,

APPELLEES AND CROSS-APPELLANTS. 

COLONIAL TERRACE APARTMENTS, APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE, v.

WASHINGTON COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL.,

APPELLEES AND CROSS-APPELLANTS. 

COLONIAL TERRACE APARTMENTS II, APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE, v.

WASHINGTON COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL.,

APPELLEES AND CROSS-APPELLANTS. 

[Cite as Colonial Village, Ltd. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision, 

123 Ohio St.3d 268, 2009-Ohio-4975.] 

Real estate taxation — Valuation of subsidized housing — BTA’s duty to make 

independent valuation — Burden of proof on appeal to the BTA — 

Multiple tax years and consistency — Law-of-the-case doctrine.

(Nos. 2008-0443, 2008-0559, 2008-0560, and 2008-0561 — Submitted 

August 11, 2009 — Decided September 29, 2009.) 

APPEALS AND CROSS APPEALS from the Board of Tax Appeals, Nos. 2004-A-574, 

2005-A-987, 

2005-A-992, and 2005-A-993. 

____________________ 

Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} The appellants and cross-appellees in these consolidated appeals 

are affiliated entities that own adjacent tracts of federally subsidized low-income 

housing in Washington County. In Colonial Village Ltd. v. Washington Cty. Bd. 

of Revision, 114 Ohio St.3d 493, 2007-Ohio-4641, 873 N.E.2d 298 (“Colonial 

Village I”), we reviewed the determination of value for tax year 2003 rendered by 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2 

the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) for one of the tracts at issue. In that case, the 

BTA had found that the owner’s appraisal did not constitute probative evidence of 

value, and as a result, it adopted the value assigned by the auditor and affirmed by 

the Washington County Board of Revision (“BOR”). On appeal, we reversed and 

remanded. Relying on the property record card, we concluded that the auditor 

had valued the property based on a cost approach, and we held that the BTA had 

contravened our precedents by using a cost valuation, given the entire record in 

the case. 

{¶ 2} The BTA’s decisions in the consolidated cases before us 

demonstrate the influence of our holding in Colonial Village I. The first of the 

consolidated cases, No. 2008-0443, addresses the BTA’s decision on remand of 

Colonial Village I. The second, No. 2008-0559, concerns the very same tract but 

addresses the valuation for tax year 2004. The third and fourth appeals, Nos. 

2008-0560 and 2008-0561, concern the value of two separate tracts improved 

with government-subsidized housing that are owned by different but affiliated 

entities. The tax year at issue in Nos. 2008-0560 and 2008-0561 is 2004. 

{¶ 3} For convenience, we will refer to No. 2008-0443, which addresses 

the BTA’s decision after we remanded in Colonial Village I, as the “2003 tax-year 

case” or more simply the “2003 case.”1 We will also refer collectively to Nos. 

2008-0559, 2008-0560, and 2008-0561 as the “2004 tax-year cases” or more 

 

1. When a case has been appealed from the BTA to a court and the court has remanded to the 

BTA, we have observed that the BTA’s “order following the mandate” of the court was “not a 

final determination to be appealed under R.C. 5717.04.” Columbus Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. 

Bd. of Revision (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 344, 346, 639 N.E.2d 25, citing Rowland v. Lindley (1979), 

58 Ohio St.2d 15, 12 O.O.3d 8, 387 N.E.2d 1367 (the “journal entry which the Tax Commissioner 

issues only in order to carry out the expressed mandate of this court is not a final determination 

within the purview of R.C. 5717.02”). These cases cause no concern about our jurisdiction over 

No. 08-443, however, because we have not hesitated to entertain an appeal from a later BTA 

decision if that appeal contests additional findings and conclusions that the BTA rendered 

pursuant to the remand order. See United Tel. Co. of Ohio v. Tracy (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 506, 

705 N.E.2d 679 (noting that the case “is again before the court after having been reversed and 
January Term, 2009 

3 

simply the “2004 cases.” As for the three different but affiliated property owners, 

we will use the term “Colonial” to refer to all of them collectively and each of 

them individually. 

The 2003 tax-year case 

{¶ 4} As noted, the 2003 case – No. 2008-0443 in this court – calls upon 

us to review the BTA’s decision after remand of Colonial Village I. Our 

instruction to the BTA was to perform an independent valuation of the property 

based on the evidentiary record that had been developed in the case. The evidence 

before the BTA did not change. First, Colonial had presented to the BOR an 

owner’s opinion of value consisting of an income approach, along with the 

testimony of Colonial’s Randall Palmer. Second, Colonial had presented the 

testimony and appraisal report of Charles Snyder to the BTA. 

{¶ 5} The owner’s opinion of value notes that the improvements 

constitute a Section 8 federally subsidized housing project where tenants pay 30 

percent of their adjusted gross income as rent, with the federal government paying 

the remainder of a specified monthly rental fee. The federal government also 

specifies a utility allowance that helps pay utility bills, and the amount of these 

allowances is paid to Colonial to be remitted to the tenants. At Colonial Village, 

each apartment is separately metered, and tenants pay electric bills separately, but 

other utilities are apparently provided by the landlord. There are a total of 45 

apartments, of which 35 are two-bedroom and 10 are three-bedroom units. 

{¶ 6} In Colonial Village I, we briefly summarized the valuation 

methods pursued by both the owner’s opinion of value at the BOR and the 

appraisal at the BTA. Colonial Village I, 114 Ohio St.3d 493, 2007-Ohio-4641, 

873 N.E.2d 298, ¶ 17, 18. As for the owner’s opinion of value, the BOR’s 

technical advisors stated that (1) the capitalization rate was “too high,” and (2) the 

 

remanded to the [BTA] in United Tel. Co. of Ohio v. Limbach (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 369, 643 

N.E.2d 1129”). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

4 

expenses were “not based on market” and were “not realistic.” On appeal, the 

BTA impugned Snyder’s sales-comparison approach by faulting (i) the 

appraiser’s limited inspection of the comparables, (ii) the disparate use of location 

adjustments, and (iii) the extrapolation from five comparables, of which three 

were determined to be valued at over $24,000 per unit, to a value of $22,000 per 

unit for Colonial Village. With respect to the income approach, the BTA found 

that both the vacancy-loss figures and the expense estimate lacked factual support. 

Because of these flaws, the BTA found the appraisal unreliable, and it affirmed 

the county’s valuation of the property. 

{¶ 7} As noted, we reversed in Colonial Village I because, based on our 

reading of the property record card, we determined that the county had used a 

cost-based approach, which is inappropriate for government-subsidized 

properties. Colonial Village I, 114 Ohio St.3d 493, 2007-Ohio-4641, 873 N.E.2d 

298, ¶ 19, 22. As we have more recently explained, our subsidized-housing case 

law seeks to prevent the affirmative benefits of government subsidies from unduly 

inflating the value of the property for tax purposes. Woda Ivy Glen Ltd. 

Partnership v. Fayette Cty. Bd. of Revision, 121 Ohio St.3d 175, 2009-Ohio-762, 

902 N.E.2d 984, ¶ 29. Reliance on a cost approach tends to run afoul of this 

precept because the subsidies allow developers to incur costs that ordinary market 

rents would not support. See Oberlin Manor, Ltd. v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Revision

(1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 56, 57, 543 N.E.2d 768. Nor have such subsidies been 

understood as pertaining directly to the value of the realty – we have excluded 

consideration of the effect the subsidies have on value on the theory that they 

constitute an “encumbrance” that should be disregarded, or alternatively, because 

they appear to constitute separable intangible benefits accorded in connection 

with the government program. Compare Alliance Towers, Ltd. v. Stark Cty. Bd. 

of Revision (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 16, 523 N.E.2d 826, paragraph one of the 

syllabus, with Woda Ivy Glen, ¶ 29, fn. 4. Additionally, we discerned in Colonial 
January Term, 2009 

5 

Village I that the record contained sufficient evidence to permit the BTA to 

perform an independent valuation, thereby obviating the need to adopt a costbased approach. Id., ¶ 24. 

{¶ 8} On February 1, 2008, the BTA issued its decision on remand in the 

2003 tax-year case. In that decision, the BTA carried out this court’s instruction 

by (1) marshaling evidence from the record whose validity had not previously 

been impugned and (2) deriving an income approach from that evidence. 

Colonial Village Ltd. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision (Feb. 1, 2008), BTA No. 

2004-A-574, at 11. The BTA’s income approach derives the gross potential 

income, reserves for replacement, and capitalization rates from the Snyder 

appraisal, and the vacancy and collection loss from the owner’s opinion of value. 

Id. After computing net operating income and applying the capitalization rate and 

a tax additur, the BTA derived a rounded figure of $1,171,930. The BTA then 

subtracted $9,000 for furniture, fixtures, and equipment and concluded that the 

value was $1,162,930. Id. 

{¶ 9} Both Colonial on appeal and the county on cross-appeal 

characterize the BTA’s valuation as unsupported by the evidence. We address 

their objections as follows. 

{¶ 10} First, Colonial states that the 40 percent expense ratio used by the 

BTA lacks support. We disagree. The BTA forthrightly stated that it derived the 

ratio by examining the expenses associated with properties “that appear to be 

similar to the subject in size, configuration, and age, as contained in [Snyder’s 

appraisal] report under the sales comparison and the capitalization rate section.” 

Colonial Village (Feb. 1, 2008), BTA No. 2004-A-574, at 11, fn. 3. Snyder’s 

appraisal report discloses the data to which the BTA refers and bears out the 

propriety of the figures that the BTA used. In particular, two properties appear on 

both the list of Snyder’s sale comparables and the capitalization-rate 

determination. The expense ratios for those two are 37 percent and 42.2 percent. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6 

Additionally, these two parcels have expense ratios that are close to the highest 

and lowest on the list of properties in the capitalization-rate section. 

{¶ 11} Accordingly, the 40 percent figure that the BTA adopted is 

supported by the information adduced in the very appraisal report upon which 

Colonial itself would have the BTA rely. See AP Hotels of Illinois, Inc. v. 

Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 118 Ohio St.3d 343, 2008-Ohio-2565, 889 N.E.2d 

115, ¶ 16 (even where appraiser’s conclusion of value could not be used, his 

certification of the truth of statements of fact in the appraisal report justified the 

BTA in treating those statements as evidence). Indeed, as between the BTA’s 

estimation and the analysis of Colonial’s appraiser (who derived what amounted 

to a 51 percent expense ratio from actual expenses provided by the owner), the 

BTA’s number certainly appears to be the more tenable of the two. See Colonial 

Village, Ltd. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision (Apr. 21, 2006), BTA No. 2004-

A-574, at 7, reversed and remanded, 114 Ohio St.3d 493, 2007-Ohio-4641, 873 

N.E.2d 298.

{¶ 12} Second, Colonial faults the BTA for not adopting Snyder’s 

vacancy- and collection-loss figure. This argument is barred by the law-of-thecase doctrine: the BTA already decided that Snyder’s 8 percent figure lacked 

credibility, and we deferred to that finding on appeal. Colonial Village (Apr. 21, 

2006), BTA No. 2004-A-547, at 7, reversed and remanded on other grounds, 114 

Ohio St.3d 493, 2007-Ohio-4641, 873 N.E.2d 298, ¶ 18, 19; see Columbus Bd. of 

Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 344, 345, 639 N.E.2d 

25. In carrying out the instruction of this court on remand, the BTA looked to 

other evidence in the record: the owner’s opinion of value that Colonial presented 

to the BOR. From that document, the BTA derived the 5 percent figure it used in 

its February 1, 2008 decision. Colonial Village (Feb. 1, 2008), BTA No. 2004-A574, at 11, fn. 2. That action by the BTA in no way qualifies as unreasonable or 

unlawful under the circumstances. 
January Term, 2009 

7 

{¶ 13} Third, Colonial similarly argues that the BTA should ignore its 

previous ruling and adopt Snyder’s sales-comparison approach for 2003. Once 

again, the law-of-the-case doctrine bars this argument. 

{¶ 14} Fourth, Colonial in various places argues that the record and 

disposition of the 2004 tax-year cases should affect the disposition of the 2003 

tax-year case. In particular, Colonial compares the expense ratios for tax year 

2003 and 2004 and argues that the 2003 tax-year determination must be incorrect 

in light of that comparison. These objections are mistaken. Quite simply, the 

record developed in the 2004 tax-year cases differs from the record in the 2003 

tax year case – and the evidence adduced for one tax year may not be considered 

with respect to another year if it is not made a part of the record in the case 

pertaining to that other year. 

{¶ 15} Indeed, we have recently had occasion to consider and reject the 

argument that the BTA’s determination of value as to one tax year is subject to 

legal constraints of consistency to its determination of value as to other tax years. 

Olmsted Falls Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 122 Ohio St.3d 134, 

2009-Ohio-2461, 909 N.E.2d 597, ¶ 19, 23–25. Of particular importance is our 

holding that “[a]s a matter of both case law and elementary principles, each tax 

year should be determined based on the evidence presented to the assessor that 

pertains to that year.” Id., ¶ 20. This holding of Olmsted Falls bars many of 

Colonial’s contentions in its appeal from the BTA’s decision regarding the 2003 

tax year. 

{¶ 16} Like Colonial, the county lodges sweeping objections to the BTA’s 

determination of value for the 2003 tax year. All of these objections run afoul of 

the law-of-the-case doctrine: quite simply, the BTA carried out our explicit 

instruction for tax year 2003, and the county’s attempt to return to the status quo 

before our Colonial Village I decision has no legal basis. Moreover, to the extent 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8 

that the county asks us to overrule Colonial Village I, we decline to do so because 

the decision correctly applied the law to the record before us in that case. 

{¶ 17} For the foregoing reasons, we find that the BTA acted reasonably 

and lawfully in carrying out our instruction on remand. We therefore affirm the 

BTA’s decision in No. 2008-0443. 

The 2004 tax-year cases 

A. The evidentiary record 

{¶ 18} The record in the 2004 tax-year cases differs from the record in the 

2003 tax-year case. Both at the BOR and at the BTA, the 2004 cases were tried 

on a consolidated basis. The owners offered three appraisal reports, one for each 

of the properties, along with the testimony of Charles Snyder at the BOR. After 

the BOR rejected the owner’s position in each of the 2004 cases, the owners 

appealed to the BTA, which held a hearing on August 14, 2006. Colonial 

subpoenaed the BOR’s consultant, Fred W. Westbrook, to the hearing and 

examined him as on cross-examination. 

{¶ 19} Westbrook was executive vice president of Barry R. Ankney, Inc., 

and in that capacity served as the overall project manager for Washington 

County’s 2004 revaluation of real property. Of greatest significance for the 2004 

tax-year cases is Westbrook’s testimony that although the county’s appraisal of 

Colonial’s properties is set forth as a cost approach on the property record cards, 

the actual underlying approach reflects a “composite of those three approaches,” 

that is, sales-comparison, income, and cost. More specifically, Westbrook 

testified that the valuation of the Colonial Village tract for the 2004 tax year 

constituted a mix of “market” and cost approaches, whereby the “market” 

approach constitutes an income approach. As for Colonial Terrace and Colonial 

Terrace II, Westbrook’s testimony establishes that an income approach 

constituted the sole approach as to those tracts for tax year 2004. 
January Term, 2009 

9 

B. Because the record in the 2004 tax-year cases showed that 

the county did not rely exclusively on a cost approach, 

 the BTA erred in regarding Colonial Village I as controlling 

its disposition of the 2004 cases. 

{¶ 20} In evaluating the record in the 2004 tax-year cases, the BTA 

plainly accorded controlling significance to our decision in Colonial Village I. In 

each case, the BTA devoted an abbreviated review to the appraisal of Charles 

Snyder that Colonial presented to the BOR, identified certain deficiencies in the 

appraisal, cited Colonial Village I, and proceeded to perform an independent 

income-approach valuation of the tract at issue. Although the BTA in each of the 

2004 cases recited the testimony of Fred Westbrook, the BTA attached no 

particular significance to it. 

{¶ 21} As part of its cross-appeal, the county contends that the BTA erred 

in the 2004 tax-year cases because “[t]here was no ‘trigger’ as set forth in 

[Colonial Village I] that would authorize or allow the BTA to create its own value 

for the three properties.” By “trigger,” the county refers to our determination in 

Colonial Village I that “the record in this case contains sufficient evidence to 

trigger the BTA’s duty to undertake an independent valuation of the property.” 

Colonial Village I, 114 Ohio St.3d 493, 2007-Ohio-4641, 873 N.E.2d 298, ¶ 24. 

We agree in part with this contention: unlike the situation in the 2003 tax-year 

case, the BTA’s duty to perform an independent valuation was not triggered in the 

2004 tax-year cases. That is so not because of the quantum of appraisal evidence 

presented by Colonial, but because the record in the 2004 cases – unlike the 

record in the 2003 tax-year case – establishes that the county did not rely 

exclusively on a cost-based valuation. 

{¶ 22} Our reasoning on this point begins with our decision in Colonial 

Village I, in which we relied upon an analysis of the case law that is more fully set 

forth in our contemporaneous decision in Dayton–Montgomery Cty. Port Auth. v. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

10 

Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision, 113 Ohio St.3d 281, 2007-Ohio-1948, 865 

N.E.2d 22. In Dayton–Montgomery, the taxpayer contested the auditor’s costbased determination of value and presented actual-cost evidence that (1) 

corroborated the initial figure the auditor arrived at by consulting his cost 

schedules but that (2) tended to negate the auditor’s use of a 1.6 “grade factor 

adjustment” that increased the valuation by 60 percent. Dayton–Montgomery, ¶ 

13, 14. The BTA held that the actual-cost analysis was incomplete, and because 

the board of revision had not explained its decision to order a modest departure 

from the auditor’s determination, the BTA adopted the auditor’s valuation that 

used the 1.6 grade factor. On appeal, we reversed. 

{¶ 23} In Dayton–Montgomery, we acknowledged the rules that usually 

apply. The first rule is that the party challenging the board of revision’s decision 

at the BTA has the burden of proof to establish its proposed value as the value of 

the property. Dayton–Montgomery, ¶ 15; Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. 

v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 564, 566, 740 N.E.2d 276 

(“When cases are appealed from a board of revision to the BTA, the burden of 

proof is on the appellant, whether it be a taxpayer or a board of education, to 

prove its right to an increase or decrease from the value determined by the board 

of revision”). The second rule is that the board of revision (or auditor) bears no 

burden to offer proof of the accuracy of the appraisal on which the county initially 

relies, with the result that the BTA is justified in retaining the county’s valuation 

of the property when an appellant fails to sustain its burden of proof at the BTA. 

Dayton–Montgomery, ¶ 15; Simmons v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1998), 81 

Ohio St.3d 47, 48, 689 N.E.2d 22 (failure to sustain burden of persuasion justified 

approving the board of revision’s valuation of the property even though the 

county offered no proof of the validity of its determination); W. Industries, Inc. v. 

Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision (1960), 170 Ohio St. 340, 342, 10 O.O.2d 427, 164 
January Term, 2009 

11 

N.E.2d 741 (a taxpayer who appeals to the BTA “is not entitled to the deduction 

claimed merely because no evidence is adduced contra his claim”). 

{¶ 24} In spite of these general principles, Dayton–Montgomery came 

within a narrow exception to their usual application. We discerned that exception 

in Amsdell v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 572, 635 

N.E.2d 11, and Columbus Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (1996), 76 

Ohio St.3d 13, 665 N.E.2d 1098. In both of those cases, as in Dayton–

Montgomery, the developed record before the BTA affirmatively negated the 

validity of the county’s valuation of the property. See also AP Hotels, 118 Ohio 

St.3d 343, 2008-Ohio-2565, 889 N.E.2d 115, ¶ 17, 18 (affirmative evidence of 

owner’s appraiser that September 11 terrorist attacks had depressed demand for 

hotel rooms negated the county’s valuation). 

{¶ 25} In Colonial Village I, we confronted the same type of situation: 

the property record card affirmatively indicated that the county had relied on a 

cost-based approach in valuing the property, and our precedent disfavored the cost 

approach in the valuation of government-subsidized properties. Colonial Village

I, 114 Ohio St.3d 493, 2007-Ohio-4641, 873 N.E.2d 298, ¶ 19, 20. This conflict 

triggered the legal duty of the BTA to determine whether the record as developed 

by the parties contained sufficient evidence to permit an independent valuation of 

the property. We concluded that it did and directed the BTA on remand to 

perform such a valuation. 

{¶ 26} Reciting this background allows us to articulate the BTA’s error in 

deciding the 2004 tax-year cases. Because the uncontroverted testimony of Fred 

Westbrook established that the county did not rely exclusively on a cost-based 

approach for any of the tracts in tax year 2004, the exception that applied in 

Dayton–Montgomery and Colonial Village I does not apply to the 2004 tax-year 

cases. Quite simply, there was no impediment in the 2004 cases for the BTA to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

12 

approve the BOR’s determination of value if it found that Colonial had failed to 

discharge its burden to show the value of the property. 

{¶ 27} Moreover, our review of the BTA’s decisions in Nos. 2008-0559, 

2008-0560, and 2008-0561 leads us to conclude that the error we have just 

identified pervaded the decisions and truncated the BTA’s consideration of the 

appraisal evidence offered by Colonial at the BOR. Because of this, we conclude 

that the proper course of action is to vacate the BTA’s decisions in Nos. 2008-

0559, 2008-0560, and 2008-0561 and remand to the BTA. Additionally, this 

disposition renders moot the more specific objections raised by Colonial and the 

county to the BTA’s decisions in the three cases. 

C. On remand, the BTA has authority to determine the probative 

value of the evidence before it for each tax year, and the 

county does not have the burden to prove the accuracy of 

the appraisal upon which it relies. 

{¶ 28} It is important in this context to clarify that the BTA on remand 

possesses plenary authority to review the decisions of the BOR and determine the 

value of the property in the 2004 cases. In this regard, the first point is the one 

just made: there is no legal bar to the BTA’s approving the BOR’s valuation in 

those cases. 

{¶ 29} Second, in the 2004 tax-year cases, the BTA is not bound by law to 

arrive at the same conclusions concerning the probative value of Snyder’s 

appraisal that it reached in the 2003 case. We recently rejected the contention that 

a legal constraint of consistency binds the BTA as to how it evaluates evidence 

from one tax year to the next. Olmsted Falls Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 

Revision, 122 Ohio St.3d 134, 2009-Ohio-2461, 909 N.E.2d 597, ¶ 24, 25. That 

principle will apply to the BTA’s consideration of the 2004 tax-year cases on 

remand. 
January Term, 2009 

13 

{¶ 30} Moreover, we reiterate that the county does not have the 

affirmative burden to establish as a general matter the accuracy of any appraisals 

that underlie its valuation of the property. See W. Industries, Inc., 170 Ohio St. 

340, 342, 10 O.O.2d 427, 164 N.E.2d 741. In Colonial Village I, the county’s 

omission consisted not in failing to discharge such a burden, but merely in failing 

to show that the property record card was wrong in indicating exclusive reliance 

on a cost approach. See Colonial Village I, 114 Ohio St.3d 493, 2007-Ohio-4641, 

873 N.E.2d 298, ¶ 22, fn. 2. Accord Dayton–Montgomery, 113 Ohio St.3d 281, 

2007-Ohio-1948, 865 N.E.2d 22, ¶ 30 (county auditor could have prevailed by 

showing the basis for using the 1.6 grade factor). In other circumstances, the 

board of revision or auditor may be called upon to present evidence as a rebuttal 

as to some particular factual matter. See id. at ¶ 20 (county could have presented 

evidence negating the probative value of aspects of the owner’s actual-cost study 

but did not); Cummins Property Servs., L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 

117 Ohio St.3d 516, 2008-Ohio-1473, 885 N.E.2d 222, ¶ 45 (county could have 

developed and presented evidence of an improvement after an arm’s-length sale 

but before the tax lien date but did not). 

{¶ 31} But unlike a school board or a property owner that seeks to depart 

from the county’s valuation of the property, the board of revision and the auditor 

do not themselves acquire the burden of proving the general accuracy of the 

appraisals on which they initially relied. Compare Mentor Exempted Village Bd. 

of Edn. v. Lake Cty. Bd. of Revision (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 318, 319, 526 N.E.2d 

64 (once school board presented probative evidence of value, owner had the 

burden to present contrary evidence of value), with Simmons, 81 Ohio St.3d 47, 

48, 689 N.E.2d 22 (once BTA found that owner who had appealed did not 

affirmatively show value, BTA properly affirmed the county’s valuation even 

though the county had presented no evidence). This distinction arises because of 

the settled principle that “when a county auditor acts ‘within the limits of the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

14 

jurisdiction conferred by law,’ the auditor’s action is ‘presumed, in the absence of 

proof to the contrary, to be valid and to have been done in good faith and in the 

exercise of sound judgment.’ ” Dayton–Montgomery, 113 Ohio St.3d 281, 2007-

Ohio-1948, 865 N.E.2d 22, ¶ 13, quoting Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Evatt (1944), 

143 Ohio St. 71, 28 O.O. 21, 54 N.E.2d 132, paragraph seven of the syllabus. 

The county’s appraised value thus forms in most cases a default valuation that 

must be preferred and adopted if the appellant before the BTA fails to prove a 

different value of the property, and our review of the record in the 2004 tax-year 

cases persuades us that this principle applies in these cases. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 32} For the reasons set forth, we affirm the decision of the BTA in No. 

2008-0443. In Nos. 2008-0559, 2008-0560, and 2008-0561, we vacate the BTA’s 

decisions and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Judgment accordingly. 

 MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, and CUPP, JJ., 

concur. 

 O’DONNELL, J., concurs in judgment only. 

 PFEIFER and LANZINGER, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part. 

__________________ 

 PFEIFER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 

{¶ 33} In Colonial Village Ltd. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision, 114 

Ohio St.3d 493, 2007-Ohio-4641, 873 N.E.2d 298 (“Colonial Village I”), at ¶ 23, 

we stated, “The BTA must ‘ “independently weigh and evaluate all evidence 

properly before it” ’ in order to ‘ “make an independent determination concerning 

the valuation of the property at issue,” ’ ” quoting Columbus Bd. of Edn. v.

Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 13, 16, 665 N.E.2d 1098, 

quoting Black v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1985), 16 Ohio St.3d 11, 13, 16 

OBR 363, 475 N.E.2d 1264. In this case, the Board of Tax Appeals reviewed all 
January Term, 2009 

15 

the evidence before it, including testimony of the qualified appraisers used by 

both parties. Based on that review, the BTA concluded that neither the appraisal 

offered by Colonial Village nor the appraisal offered by the BOR accurately 

reflected the value of the various parcels for the various tax years. Accordingly, 

the BTA made specific reasonable adjustments to the appraisals, including 

adjusting expense ratios, vacancy rates, and credit-loss rates to reflect market 

averages, and arrived at its own valuation. As in Colonial Village I, “[t]he record 

contains ample information for the BTA to ‘determine the taxable value of the 

property,’ ” and I would defer to the conclusions reached by the BTA. Id. at ¶ 24, 

quoting R.C. 5717.03. 

{¶ 34} Furthermore, the majority opinion states that the county’s 

valuation is presumptively valid. I would not go that far. In many instances, 

including here, the county auditor does nothing more than make a percentage 

adjustment to the property record card. In many instances, including here, that 

property record card has a valuation that was not the result of an appraisal by a 

qualified appraiser. When the county auditor has not conducted a reasonable 

appraisal, its valuation should not be entitled to deference. 

{¶ 35} Because the BTA properly applied the relevant case law, including 

Colonial Village I, it did not commit error in independently valuing the properties, 

and I would affirm the decisions of the BTA in all four cases before us. 

 LANZINGER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 

__________________ 

 Karen H. Bauernschmidt Co., L.P.A., and Karen H. Bauernschmidt, for 

appellants and cross-appellees. 

 James R. Gorry, for appellees and cross-appellants. 

__________________