NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: DUSTIN ROGER CHANTEL; 

ELIZABETH DARLENE CHANTEL, 

Debtors.

______________________________ 

DUSTIN ROGER CHANTEL; 

ELIZABETH DARLENE CHANTEL, 

Appellants, 

 v. 

WILLIAM E. PIERCE, Chapter 7 Trustee, 

Appellee.

No. 15-60054 

BAP No. 14-1511 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the Ninth Circuit

Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

Pappas, Jury, and Kirscher, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding

Submitted July 11, 2017**

Before: CANBY, KOZINSKI, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

Chapter 7 debtors Dustin Roger Chantel and Elizabeth Darlene Chantel 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUL 18 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 15-60054 

appeal pro se from a judgment of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) 

affirming the bankruptcy court’s order, following a two-day trial, determining that 

assets held in a trust belonged to the bankruptcy estate and denying the debtors a 

discharge. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo 

decisions of the BAP and apply the same standard of review that the BAP applied 

to the bankruptcy court’s ruling. Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re 

Penrod), 611 F.3d 1158, 1160 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.

The bankruptcy court properly concluded that assets held in the trust were 

property of the bankruptcy estate because the trust’s assets were in the possession, 

custody or control of the debtors and the trust was used as the debtors’ “personal 

asset repository.” See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1); Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 1219, 

1225-26 (9th Cir. 2004) (all legal or equitable interests of a debtor in property 

become property of the bankruptcy estate upon the commencement of a bankruptcy 

case). 

The bankruptcy court did not commit clear error in determining that the 

debtors knowingly and fraudulently made material false oaths when they failed to 

disclose in their bankruptcy schedules their interest in property purportedly held by 

the trust. See Retz v. Samson (In re Retz), 606 F.3d 1189, 1196, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 

2010) (bankruptcy court’s factual findings reviewed for clear error, giving great 

deference to a bankruptcy court’s determinations about the credibility of 
3 15-60054 

witnesses). Thus the bankruptcy court properly denied the debtors’ discharge 

under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A). See id. at 1196-99 (requirements for denying a 

debtor a discharge under § 727(a)(4)(A)).

The bankruptcy court did not commit clear error in finding that the debtors 

also concealed and transferred property of the estate with the intent to hinder, 

delay, or defraud creditors, and hence properly denied the debtors’ discharge under 

11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A), (B). See id. at 1200 (requirements for denying a debtor 

a discharge under § 727(a)(2)).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued 

in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

We reject as unsupported by the record the debtors’ contention that the 

bankruptcy court demonstrated bias.

The debtors’ “motion to grant default judgment under Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure 55” (Docket Entry No. 20) is denied.

AFFIRMED.