An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-794

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 4 February 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. Robeson County

Nos. 06 CRS 013731, 013733 

JOHN DARREN BULLARD

Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 5 June 2012 by 

Judge Robert F. Floyd, Jr. in Robeson County Superior Court. 

Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 November 2013.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General 

Mary Carla Hollis, for the State.

Kevin P. Bradley, for defendant-appellant.

HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.

John Darren Bullard (“Defendant”) appeals from judgments 

after a jury trial finding him guilty of second-degree murder 

and of discharging a weapon into occupied property. Defendant 

contends that the trial court committed reversible error in 

denying his request for a jury instruction on self-defense and 

in making other evidentiary decisions at trial. For the 

following reasons, we disagree and find no error. 
-2-

I. Factual & Procedural History

On 5 June 2012, Defendant was convicted of second-degree 

murder and of discharging a firearm into occupied property. The 

evidence presented at Defendant’s trial tended to show the 

following.

On 17 September 2006, Officer Greg Chavis (“Officer 

Chavis”) of the Pembroke Police Department was dispatched to 

investigate a reported shooting at the Spirit gas station in 

Pembroke. Upon arrival, Officer Chavis received information 

that a person had been shot and that the person was at a nearby 

McDonald’s. When Officer Chavis arrived at the McDonald’s, he 

observed Defendant pacing back and forth outside of a Hummer, 

acting belligerent, and using profanity with someone on a cell 

phone. Defendant was shirtless and had pellet wounds on his 

upper torso. Defendant told the person on the other end of the 

line that “he didn’t care how much money that it took, . . . he 

was going to kill somebody.” Officer Chavis testified that 

Defendant was “very mad” and “pissed off,” and that Defendant 

kept saying that he was going to kill somebody.

Raymond Hunt (“Hunt”), who was with Defendant during the 

shooting, testified that he and Defendant had pulled into the 

Spirit gas station that night and encountered Christopher 
-3-

Locklear1 (“Locklear”) and his entourage. Hunt testified that 

Locklear and Defendant got into an argument that resulted in 

Locklear’s group pulling guns out and “closing in” on Defendant.

Fearing for his and Defendant’s life, Hunt testified that he 

grabbed an AK-47 from the back of the Hummer and sprayed a 

couple of rounds into the air and told Locklear’s group to back 

off. Defendant and Hunt then got into the Hummer, which Hunt 

testified was subsequently shot up by Locklear and his 

entourage. Defendant and Hunt both sustained injuries from 

birdshot during the incident. Thereafter, Defendant and Hunt 

drove to the McDonald’s and called an ambulance. Locklear’s 

testimony regarding the incident generally confirmed that there 

was an argument with Defendant, but Locklear denied shooting at 

Defendant and claimed that Defendant and Hunt were the 

aggressors.

Locklear indicated that problems with Defendant started on 

the night before the Spirit gas station incident. Specifically, 

Locklear testified that he was riding in a car with Defendant’s 

ex-girlfriend when Defendant stopped the car and attempted, 

 

1 Persons identified in this opinion with the surname “Locklear” 

have no familial relationship with one another. To avoid 

confusion, other Locklears will be introduced using their full 

name and abbreviated subsequently using their first name or 

initials.
-4-

unsuccessfully, to take his ex-girlfriend with him. Testimony 

indicated that one of Defendant’s friends, Cashley Scott 

(“Scott”) fired shots into the air as Locklear’s car was driving 

away. Locklear testified that the incident with Defendant’s exgirlfriend precipitated the argument at the Spirit gas station.

Notwithstanding these incidents, the animus between 

Defendant and Locklear was allegedly settled. Sometime after 

the shooting at the Spirit gas station, Locklear testified that

he ran into Defendant at McDonald’s where the two discussed what 

had happened and attempted to resolve their conflict.

Nearly a month after the shooting incident at the Spirit 

gas station, in the early morning hours of 15 October 2006, 

Locklear was cruising in Pembroke with a group of friends 

including his girlfriend, Kayla Deese (“Deese”), his friends 

Billy Hammonds (“Hammonds”) and Tommy Kurt Lloyd (“Lloyd”), and 

Lloyd’s girlfriend, Crystal Locklear (“Crystal”). Hammonds 

drove Locklear’s 1999 GMC Envoy. Locklear was riding in the 

front passenger seat while Lloyd, Crystal, and Deese rode in the 

backseat. Everyone in the group had been drinking.

On the same night, Defendant was also driving through 

Pembroke with some friends in a Cadillac Escalade. Defendant, 

Hunt, Scott, and Joshua Locklear (“J.L.”) had been to the 
-5-

Player’s Club in nearby Lumberton with a group of women and were 

on their way back home. Defendant was driving, J.L. was in the 

front passenger seat, and Hunt and Scott rode in the backseat.

The women rode behind the Escalade in a Cadillac CTS sedan. On 

their way home, the women lost sight of Defendant and the 

Escalade, so they pulled off to make a telephone call and to use 

the bathroom.2

Meanwhile, as Defendant drove the Escalade into Pembroke, 

he passed Locklear’s Envoy on Union Chapel Road. Deese

testified that when Locklear and the group riding in the Envoy 

saw Defendant’s Escalade, Hammonds said “[t]here’s that truck, 

you all. There’s them boys.” Deese testified that upon hearing 

Hammonds’ words, Locklear said, “No, it’s straight. We got it 

straight with them.” Locklear testified that he thought 

everything was “cool” with Defendant because they had come to an 

agreement with each other during their previous discussion.

Upon seeing Locklear, however, testimony indicated that 

Defendant and Hunt became angry and “a little rowdy.” Defendant 

turned the Escalade around, and using back roads, doubled back

 

2 Testimony at trial revealed that the women were not present for 

the ensuing events and that they rejoined Defendant’s group at a 

later point in time.
-6-

through town in the direction that Locklear’s Envoy was 

traveling.

Locklear’s Envoy eventually reached the edge of town, so 

Hammonds turned around at a convenience mart to head back into 

Pembroke. When Locklear’s group turned around, they noticed 

Defendant’s Escalade sitting at a stop sign right off the main 

road. Locklear testified that he was “shocked” to see 

Defendant’s Escalade sitting at the stop sign and thought there 

might be trouble. Locklear testified that because of the police 

presence in Pembroke, it would be better to head back into town.

Deese testified she told Crystal “let’s get down.” Hammonds 

testified that he was scared because he didn’t know what 

Defendant’s group was capable of.

Locklear testified that after they passed by Defendant, 

Defendant’s Escalade pulled out and got behind their vehicle.

As Defendant’s Escalade got closer, Locklear began to hear 

bottles hitting the road near the Envoy. Locklear testified 

that they turned off the main road and began to hear gunshots.

Thereafter, the Envoy’s back window shattered and Lloyd and 

Crystal were shot. Locklear testified that he grabbed a .25 

caliber pistol, stuck the gun out of the window, and fired 

several rounds to let Defendant know that he was armed and to 
-7-

prevent Defendant from ambushing the Envoy. After Locklear 

returned fire, he testified that Defendant’s Escalade fled the 

scene.

Deese testified similarly. She recalled hearing the 

bottles shatter outside the Envoy, turning off the main road, 

coming to a stop, and hearing gunshots. Deese testified that 

after the Envoy sustained gunshots the group checked to see if 

anyone was harmed, at which point Crystal said “[i]’ve been 

shot,” and fell over into Deese’s lap. Deese testified that she 

didn’t see anyone in the Envoy return fire on Defendant’s 

Escalade.

Likewise, Hammonds also testified that the Envoy sustained 

gunshot fire as he turned onto the side road. Hammonds 

indicated that when the shots began, he ducked down to avoid 

injury. Hammonds did not see Locklear return fire on the 

Escalade.

Lloyd testified that Defendant’s Escalade got right behind 

the Envoy and that Defendant’s group was hanging out of the 

Escalade attempting to throw beer bottles at them. When the 

gunshots began, Lloyd looked back and the back windshield 

shattered in his face. Lloyd was shot in the arm and reported 
-8-

being in shock. As a result, he was unable to recall whether 

Locklear returned fire.

Hunt, Scott, and J.L., who were riding with Defendant in 

the Escalade, also testified about the shooting.3 Hunt testified 

that after seeing Locklear’s Envoy, Defendant stated something 

to the effect of “I ought to shoot these boys” or “I want to 

shoot them” or “you think I’ll shoot them[?]” Hunt testified 

that he then heard gunfire from two different guns. When the 

gunshots began, Hunt testified that he laid down in the Escalade 

to avoid injury. Hunt did not report seeing any gunfire, but 

indicated that the shots he heard were “[v]ery, very close.”

Scott testified that after the Escalade got behind the 

Envoy, he heard gunshots coming from inside his vehicle and saw 

Defendant’s arm hanging out of the window with a gun in his 

hand. On cross-examination it was revealed that Scott 

previously told law enforcement that he could not tell who shot 

first because he heard the gunshots “all together.”

J.L. testified, “[Defendant] grabbed a gun out of the 

middle of the console and I heard gunshots. There was gun fired 

out [sic] my truck. My truck got hit. And I just—when I seen a 

gun, I just laid down in the passenger side.” When asked when 

 

3 Hunt, Scott, and J.L. were the State’s witnesses. Defendant 

did not testify and produced no witnesses on his behalf.
-9-

the Escalade was hit with gunfire, J.L. said “[d]uring when all 

this was going on. It was like, you know, pretty much when all 

this was going on—the shooting and everything was going on.”

Evidence collected at the scene indicated that both vehicles 

sustained gunshot damage.

After the shootout, Locklear’s group attempted to get 

Crystal medical attention, but she stopped breathing on the way 

to the hospital. The medical examiner testified that Crystal 

died of a single gunshot to the right side of her back that had 

lodged in her chest.

Officer Tony Locklear (“Officer T.L.”) was in the area 

during the shootout and heard the shots being fired. Upon 

hearing the shots, Officer T.L. pulled out of the parking lot he 

was in, radioed dispatch, and headed toward the area where he 

heard the shots. While en route, Officer T.L. passed 

Defendant’s Escalade heading in the opposite direction. Officer 

T.L. recognized the Escalade as the vehicle that Defendant 

normally drove. Over Defendant’s objection, Officer T.L.

testified that he notified Officer Chavis that Defendant “just 

passed me” and that Defendant had “probably been involved in 

some type of shooting.”
-10-

Based on the foregoing evidence, defense counsel requested 

a jury instruction concerning self-defense and voluntary 

manslaughter. The trial court denied defense counsel’s request.

Following his convictions, Defendant gave notice of appeal in 

open court.

II. Jurisdiction

Defendant’s appeal from the superior court’s final 

judgments lies of right to this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. 

Stat. §§ 7A-27(b), 15A-1444(a) (2013).

III. Analysis

Defendant’s appeal raises three questions for this Court’s 

review: (1) whether the trial court erred in refusing to 

instruct the jury on theories of perfect and imperfect selfdefense; (2) whether the trial court committed reversible error 

in allowing testimony by Officer T.L. that Defendant had 

“probably been involved in some type of shooting;” and (3) 

whether the trial court committed reversible error by not 

allowing Defendant to impeach Officer T.L.’s testimony by 

inquiring into his termination from the police department. We 

address each in turn.

A. Failure to Provide Jury Instructions on Self-Defense
-11-

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing 

to instruct the jury on theories of perfect and imperfect selfdefense and in refusing to submit voluntary manslaughter as a 

lesser-included offense.4 “[Arguments] challenging the trial 

court’s decisions regarding jury instructions are reviewed de novo 

by this Court.” State v. Osorio, 196 N.C. App. 458, 466, 675 

S.E.2d 144, 149 (2009). “‘Under a de novo review, the court 

considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment’ 

for that of the lower tribunal.” State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 

632–33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (quoting In re Greens of Pine 

Glen, Ltd. P’ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003)).

“The [trial court] is required to charge [the jury] on all 

substantial and essential features of a case which arise upon the 

evidence even absent a special request for the instruction.” State 

v. Deck, 285 N.C. 209, 214–15, 203 S.E.2d 830, 834 (1974); see also

 

4 Defendant’s requested submission of voluntary manslaughter as a 

lesser-included offense is predicated on his imperfect selfdefense theory. See State v. Ross, 338 N.C. 280, 283, 449 

S.E.2d 556, 559 (1994) (“There are two types of self-defense: 

perfect and imperfect. Perfect self-defense excuses a killing 

altogether, while imperfect self-defense may reduce a charge of 

murder to voluntary manslaughter.” (internal citation omitted)). 

Thus, whether the trial court erred in refusing to submit 

voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense depends on 

whether the evidence supports Defendant’s imperfect self-defense 

theory. Cf. State v. Millsaps, 356 N.C. 556, 561, 572 S.E.2d 767, 

771 (2002) (“An instruction on a lesser-included offense must be 

given only if the evidence would permit the jury rationally to find 

defendant guilty of the lesser offense and to acquit him of the 

greater.”).
-12-

State v. Bogle, 324 N.C. 190, 195, 376 S.E.2d 745, 748 (1989) 

(“Failure to instruct upon all substantive or material features of 

the crime charged is error.”). “When supported by competent 

evidence, self-defense unquestionably becomes a substantial and 

essential feature of a criminal case.” Deck, 285 N.C. at 215, 203 

S.E.2d at 834. Furthermore, “[w]hen determining whether the 

evidence is sufficient to entitle a defendant to jury instructions 

on a defense or mitigating factor, courts must consider the 

evidence in the light most favorable to defendant.” State v. 

Oliver, 334 N.C. 513, 520, 434 S.E.2d 202, 205 (1993) (quotation 

marks and citation omitted).

Thus, the question presented to this Court is whether, viewing 

the facts in a light most favorable to Defendant, the evidence at 

trial was sufficient to invoke the doctrine of self-defense and 

support a jury instruction on that doctrine. For the following 

reasons, we hold that Defendant was not entitled to an instruction 

on either perfect or imperfect self-defense and find no error with

the trial court’s decision.

A defendant is entitled to an instruction on perfect selfdefense as an excuse for a killing when it is shown that, at the 

time of the killing, the following four elements existed:

(1) it appeared to defendant and he 

believed it to be necessary to kill the 

deceased in order to save himself from 

death or great bodily harm; and
-13-

(2) defendant’s belief was reasonable in 

that the circumstances as they appeared 

to him at the time were sufficient to 

create such a belief in the mind of a 

person of ordinary firmness; and

(3) defendant was not the aggressor in 

bringing on the affray, i.e., he did 

not aggressively and willingly enter 

into the fight without legal excuse or 

provocation; and

(4) defendant did not use excessive force, 

i.e., did not use more force than was 

necessary or reasonably appeared to him 

to be necessary under the circumstances 

to protect himself from death or great 

bodily harm.

State v. Williams, 342 N.C. 869, 873, 467 S.E.2d 392, 394 (1996) 

(quotation marks and citations omitted). 

On the other hand, if defendant believed it 

was necessary to kill the deceased in order 

to save [himself] from death or great bodily 

harm, and if defendant’s belief was 

reasonable in that the circumstances as they 

appeared to [him] at the time were 

sufficient to create such a belief in the 

mind of a person of ordinary firmness, but 

defendant, although without murderous 

intent, was the aggressor in bringing on the 

difficulty, or defendant used excessive 

force, the defendant under those 

circumstances has only the imperfect right 

of self-defense, having lost the benefit of 

perfect self-defense, and is guilty at least 

of voluntary manslaughter.

State v. Wilson, 304 N.C. 689, 695, 285 S.E.2d 804, 808 (1982)

(quotation marks and citations omitted).
-14-

An imperfect right of self-defense is thus 

available to a defendant who reasonably 

believes it necessary to kill the deceased 

to save himself from death or great bodily 

harm even if defendant (1) might have 

brought on the difficulty, provided he did 

so without murderous intent, and (2) might 

have used excessive force. Imperfect selfdefense therefore incorporates the first two 

requirements of perfect self-defense, but 

not the last two.

State v. Mize, 316 N.C. 48, 52, 340 S.E.2d 439, 441–42 (1986). 

However, if the defendant brings on the difficulty with

murderous intent—that is, “ with the intent to take life or 

inflict serious bodily harm[—]he is not entitled even to the 

doctrine of imperfect self-defense; and if he kills during the 

affray he is guilty of murder.” Id. at 52, 340 S.E.2d at 442 

(quotation marks and citations omitted).

Here, Defendant is not entitled to an instruction on 

perfect or imperfect self-defense. The only permissible 

inference from the evidence presented at trial is that Defendant 

instigated the 15 October 2006 shootout with murderous intent. 

After the incident at the Spirit gas station, Officer Chavis 

heard Defendant tell someone over the phone that “he didn’t care 

how much money that it took, . . . he was going to kill 

somebody.” Moreover, the collective testimony by the occupants 

of Locklear’s Envoy and Defendant’s Escalade establish that upon 
-15-

seeing Locklear’s Envoy, Defendant got “a little rowdy,” turned 

the Escalade around, and used back roads to pursue Locklear.

Uncontroverted testimony also indicated that Defendant pulled 

the Escalade up behind Locklear’s Envoy and that bottles were 

thrown in the Envoy’s direction. 

Furthermore, Defendant did not testify or produce witnesses 

on his behalf and none of the State’s evidence suggests that 

Locklear fired at Defendant first. Testimony by Locklear, 

Deese, Hammonds, and Lloyd indicated that Defendant fired first, 

injuring Lloyd and fatally injuring Crystal in the process. 

Nevertheless, Defendant directs our attention to testimony by 

Hunt, Scott, and J.L., who indicated that they heard two guns 

being fired and that the shots seemed to occur “all together.”

However, even in isolation, this testimony does not permit the 

inference that Locklear instigated the shootout. At best, the 

evidence fails to establish who fired first. Furthermore, other 

testimony by Hunt, Scott, and J.L. suggests that Defendant shot 

first. Hunt testified that upon seeing Locklear’s Envoy, 

Defendant stated something to the effect of “I ought to shoot 

these boys” or “I want to shoot them” or “you think I’ll shoot 

them[?]” and then Hunt immediately heard gunfire. Scott 

indicated that after the Escalade got behind the Envoy, he heard 
-16-

gunshots coming from inside his vehicle and saw Defendant’s arm 

hanging out of the window with a gun in his hand. When asked if 

there had been any altercation that night between the occupants 

of Locklear’s Envoy and Defendant’s Escalade prior to Defendant 

shooting, J.L. said “[n]ot that night, no.”

In summary, the evidence presented at trial showed that 

Defendant instigated the 15 October 2006 shootout with murderous 

intent. Furthermore, Defendant presented no evidence on his 

behalf to rebut such evidence. Accordingly, the trial court did 

not err in refusing to instruct the jury on theories of perfect 

and imperfect self-defense nor in refusing to submit voluntary 

manslaughter as a lesser-included offense.

B. Evidentiary Objection to Officer T.L.’s Testimony

The second question presented to this Court by Defendant’s 

appeal is whether the trial court committed reversible error 

when it allowed testimony from Officer T.L., over Defendant’s 

objection, that Defendant had “probably been involved in some 

type of shooting.” Defendant contends that there was no 

foundation for Officer’s T.L.’s statement and that he was 

speculating regarding an event to which he had no personal 

knowledge. We disagree.
-17-

“[W]hether a lay witness may testify as to an opinion is 

reviewed for abuse of discretion. A trial court abuses its 

discretion if its determination is manifestly unsupported by 

reason and is so arbitrary that it could not have been the

result of a reasoned decision.” State v. Sharpless, ___ N.C. 

App. ___, ___, 725 S.E.2d 894, 898 (2012) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted) (alteration in original). Furthermore, “we 

consider not whether we might disagree with the trial court, but 

whether the trial court’s actions are fairly supported by the 

record.” Id. at ___, 725 S.E.2d at 899. A defendant is 

prejudiced by evidentiary errors when he can demonstrate that 

there “is a reasonable possibility that, had the error in 

question not been committed, a different result would have been 

reached at the trial out of which the appeal arises.” N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 15A-1443(a) (2013).

Under our rules of evidence, a witness “may not testify to 

a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a 

finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter.” N.C. R. 

Evid. 602. “The purpose of Rule 602 is to prevent a witness 

from testifying to a fact of which he has no direct personal 

knowledge. [P]ersonal knowledge is not an absolute but may 

consist of what the witness thinks he knows from personal 
-18-

perception.” State v. Cole, 147 N.C. App. 637, 645, 556 S.E.2d 

666, 671 (2001) (quotation marks and citations omitted)

(alteration in original). See also N.C. R. Evid. 701 (requiring 

lay opinion testimony to be “rationally based on the perception 

of the witness”).

 Here, Officer T.L., who was in the area at the time of 

the shooting, testified as follows:

[Officer T.L.:] I know when I heard the 

shots with my windows 

being down and the 

buildings behind to the 

left and to the right of 

me, I knew it was on my 

side in my general area. 

I wasn’t sure if it come 

[sic] from the left side 

or the right side.

[Questioner:] And so what did you do?

[Officer T.L.:] I immediately got on the 

radio and notified 

dispatch and any other 

officers that were 

listening, whether it be 

campus police or 

Sheriff’s Department and

[Officer] Chavis that it 

had been shots fired and 

I’d be attempting to 

locate over on Union 

Chapel Road.

[Questioner]: So what did you do?

[Officer T.L.:] I pulled out and made a 

left, went to the end of 
-19-

Union Chapel Road to the 

stop sign, made a Uturn, didn’t see any 

traffic, made a U-turn, 

come back up Union 

Chapel Road. At that 

time I had passed a 

black Cadillac Escalade 

and a Cadillac car which 

was following the 

Escalade. I notified 

[Officer] Chavis that 

the vehicle that 

[Defendant] normally 

drove, which was the 

Cadillac, had just 

passed me, he’d probably 

been involved in some 

type of shooting, and I 

was riding down Union 

Chapel Road--

[Defense Counsel:] Objection. Move to 

strike. There’s no 

foundation for that from 

this witness.

Upon review of this record, we find no error with the trial 

court’s decision to allow this testimony. First, as is clear 

from the form of the question, Officer T.L. was recounting what 

he did in response to hearing gunshots in his general vicinity. 

As such, Officer T.L. was not offering a lay opinion as to 

Defendant’s guilt. Second, assuming arguendo that Officer 

T.L.’s testimony was admitted in error, Defendant cannot 

establish that such error was prejudicial. At most, Officer 
-20-

T.L.’s testimony indicates an uncontroverted fact—that Defendant 

was involved in the shooting.

Accordingly, Defendant’s evidentiary objection is without 

merit and we find no error with the trial court’s decision to 

allow Officer T.L.’s testimony into evidence.

C. Attempt to Impeach Officer T.L.’s Testimony

The third and final question presented to this Court by 

Defendant’s appeal is whether the trial court committed 

reversible error by not allowing Defendant to impeach Officer 

T.L.’s testimony by inquiring on cross-examination into his 

termination from the police department.

5 During a voir dire 

offer of proof, it was revealed that Officer T.L. was terminated 

from the Pembroke Police Department in 2009 for allegedly 

mishandling evidence.6 Defendant contends that mishandling 

evidence is relevant to Officer T.L.’s character for 

truthfulness. We disagree.

Pursuant to N.C. R. Evid. 608(b):

[s]pecific instances of the conduct of a 

witness, for the purpose of attacking or 

supporting his credibility, . . . may not be 

proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, 

 

5 The State’s objection to this line of questioning was sustained 

by the trial court.

6 Specifically, Officer T.L. indicated that he was disciplined 

due to “missing evidence.”
-21-

however, in the discretion of the trial 

court, if probative of truthfulness or 

untruthfulness, be inquired into on crossexamination of the witness (1) concerning 

his character for truthfulness or 

untruthfulness . . . .

“As the rule provides, it is within the trial court’s discretion 

to allow or disallow cross-examination of a witness about his 

specific acts if the acts are relevant to his character for 

truthfulness or untruthfulness.” State v. Hunt, 339 N.C. 622, 

658, 457 S.E.2d 276, 297 (1994). “Evidence that a witness has 

attempted to deceive others is among the types of conduct most 

widely accepted as being indicative of one’s character for 

truthfulness or untruthfulness.” State v. Baldwin, 125 N.C. 

App. 530, 535, 482 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1997) (quotation marks and 

citation omitted).

Here, we hold that a police officer’s termination for 

mishandling evidence, without additional evidence of deceit, is 

not probative for truthfulness. Officer T.L. was terminated 

from his position with the Pembroke Police Department “due to 

missing evidence” in an unrelated case. The trial transcript 

reveals that defense counsel had no further information 

regarding Officer T.L.’s termination and no factual basis to 

continue questioning him about it. Moreover, even assuming 

error, Defendant has not established that there is a reasonable 
-22-

possibility that a different result would have occurred at 

trial. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(a). Accordingly, we find 

no error in the decision of the trial court denying Defendant

the opportunity to question Officer T.L. about his termination 

from the Pembroke Police Department.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we find no error with the 

judgments of the trial court.

No Error.

Judges ROBERT C. HUNTER and CALABRIA concur.

Report per rule 30(e).