In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 00-2448

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

PERCY Z. GILES,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 99 CR 69--Elaine E. Bucklo, Judge.

Argued February 13, 2001--Decided April 9, 2001

 Before MANION, KANNE, and EVANS, Circuit Judges.

 EVANS, Circuit Judge. Percy Z. Giles, a Chicago

alderman for 15 years, appeals his conviction,

after a 2-week jury trial, on 13 counts of

racketeering, mail fraud, extortion, and

understating the income on his federal tax

returns.

 In essence, the indictment charged that Giles,

in addition to some minor shenanigans involving

his official expense account, pocketed $10,000 in

cash bribes from a government mole and extorted

an additional $81,000 from a company operating an

illegal dump in his aldermanic ward. The tax

counts, naturally, involve not highlighting this

illegal activity on his tax returns. Giles, who

is serving a 39-month sentence, appeals, raising

questions regarding an important element of

extortion under the Hobbs Act, the sufficiency of

the evidence on some counts, and whether certain

alleged evidentiary errors and instruction

shortcomings require that a new trial be ordered.

 Giles was born to a very poor family in rural

Arkansas. To his credit, he got an education,

graduating from the University of Arkansas in

1974. The degree took him to Chicago and into the

management training program at Walgreens.

Eventually he became involved in civic affairs,

including either organizing or joining the "West

Side Business Improvement Association" in
Chicago’s 37th aldermanic ward, a group he became

the paid executive director of in 1983. That led

to politics, and Giles won a special election to

the post of 37th ward alderman in 1986. He won

reelection to 4-year terms in 1987, 1991, 1995,

and 1999, the last despite the fact that he was

under the dark cloud of the indictment in this

case./1

 We first turn to the facts, which we must view

in the light most favorable to the jury’s

verdict. We may reverse Giles’ conviction, absent

some compelling, prejudicial legal error, only if

there is no evidence, regardless of how it is

weighed, from which a rational jury could have

found the elements of the charged offenses proven

beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Bond,

231 F.3d 1075 (7th Cir. 2000).

 An industrial section of the 37th ward at

Division Street and Cicero Avenue contained a 15-

acre site belonging to Belt Railway Company. In

1992 Belt began negotiating for the sale of the

site to the Niagra Group. While Niagra’s offer to

purchase was being considered, Giles wrote to

Belt, on his official stationary, congratulating

the company on the sale because Niagra’s proposed

development would be beneficial to the citizens

of the ward. But, instead of developing the site,

Niagra used it as a dump for construction debris,

causing complaints from other businesses,

especially Helene Curtis (now Unilever), a

neighboring company located next door. Complaints

about the situation fell on Giles’ deaf ears even

when dumping eventually caused the grade of the

site to be 40 feet above the Helene Curtis

parking lot, compelling Helene Curtis to spend

$290,000 for a drainage system. Neighborhood

meetings were held regarding the site at which

Peter Valessares, a long-time friend of Giles,

continued to assert that Niagra planned to

develop the site into an industrial park. This

dumping-and-false-promises routine went on for a

number of years.

 In 1992 Niagra was ticketed by an inspector for

Chicago’s Department of the Environment for

operating a dump without a permit. Giles

prevailed upon the commissioner of the

environment to drop the ticket. He did. The

dumping continued. The Department of Zoning

issued a notice of violation because the site was

zoned for manufacturing, not dumping. Giles

intervened in these matters as well. At a May

1994 meeting attended by Giles, representatives

of Niagra, of businesses neighboring the site,

and of several city departments, Giles stated

that Niagra would get the site cleaned up and was

on the verge of getting its proposed development

started. The head of the building department was
skeptical, saying that Niagra had done nothing it

had promised to do so far to clean up the site.

By September 1994 the planning department

recommended denying a special use permit for

Niagra because the debris at the site exceeded 30

feet above grade, the limit for a landfill. But,

with Giles’ help, the site remained unchanged as

late as 1999.

 James Blassingame was a political consultant who

worked on Giles’ campaigns and served as

president of the 37th Ward Regular Democratic

Organization. He also served on an organization

Giles founded--the 37th Ward Trust Fund. Another

organization formed for "charitable" purposes was

the 37th Ward Improvement Fund.

 In 1992, shortly after the Belt sale to Niagra,

Blassingame talked with Giles about Niagra. Giles

said Niagra was going to contribute $5,000 to the

ward’s Trust Fund and that his son, who was in

college, had a summer job with Niagra that paid

$3,470 for June through August. All in all, from

May 1992 through October 1994, various Niagrarelated entities wrote checks totaling $81,200 to

the two 37th ward organizations under Giles’

control.

 Giles also had dealings with John Christopher,

a corrupt contractor and paid informant to the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, who taped a

number of meetings with Giles and Blassingame.

And a word about Christopher is appropriate. As

Giles’ very capable counsel, Walter Jones, put

it, he’s a scoundrel. We might add that he

appears to be a notorious con man and a

professional manipulator. But he’s the person the

FBI used to get to alderman Giles, and we’ll have

to leave the judgment on whether that’s kosher to

others. At any rate, Giles did business with

Christopher, and as the trial judge said at

sentencing, "If you lie down with dogs, you will

get fleas."

 Christopher, wired and working undercover with

the FBI, professed to Giles an interest in

getting a contract for his construction company,

Teka, to work on a shopping mall to be built in

the 37th ward. During the taped conversation,

Giles said that he had honored his deal with

Niagra: "I have put my ass out on the chopping

block for them."

 As the election of 1995 approached, Giles

talked to Blassingame about raising $10,000 for

the campaign. Giles told him to call Christopher

about raising the money. Christopher said he

could do it. In turn, he wanted help getting work

for Teka on the proposed shopping mall. After

making sure that Teka could not be traced to
Christopher because it was in someone else’s name

and appeared to be a minority-owned business,

Giles agreed to help for "ten." But, he said,

there should be no check that would show "on the

sheets" as a campaign contribution. Later, in a

rear, private area of Edna’s restaurant, a soul

food diner on Chicago’s west side, Christopher

handed Giles an envelope containing $5,000 in

cash. When interviewed by the FBI, Giles denied

ever receiving cash of any kind from Christopher

and, in fact, said that the largest cash

contribution he received was $500. To the State

Board of Elections, Giles said that neither he

nor his organizations had raised more than $1,000

in a 12-month period.

 The indictment also contained certain aldermanic

voucher allegations involving the expense account

provided to aldermen. The account, which was over

$20,000 per year, was to be used for expenses

incurred in the performance of official duties,

including parking fees, gasoline, insurance,

repair and maintenance of a motor vehicle, but

not for personal, political, or campaign-related

expenses. To access the account, an alderman

submits a direct payment voucher to the city

comptroller’s office. It describes the expense

and identifies the vendor to whom payment should

be made. Giles submitted vouchers for expenses

for his own car, which he used on city business,

but also expenses for his wife’s Volvo. In

November 1995 he submitted vouchers for $1,440 in

parking tickets going back to 1988, issued to

three different cars, including his wife’s.

 In 1993 Giles submitted a $1,500 voucher for

"public service paid by an alderman’s office."

The actual vendor was the Patrick Media Group, a

billboard company. The billboards were to

announce the opening of a new store in the ward.

Giles rented two billboards at a public service

discount rate of $750 each. He paid the $1,500

with a check drawn on the 37th Ward Trust Fund

account and was reimbursed by Goldblatt’s with a

check to the 37th Ward Improvement Fund. Despite

the Goldblatt’s payment, Giles submitted a

voucher to the city for the billboards, listing

the 37th Ward Regular Democratic Organization as

the vendor.

 Giles also submitted a voucher for $4,977 for

catering expenses for needy families. The vendor

was Mac’s Plus, which was not, in fact, a caterer

but a record store, owned by a friend of his who

had loaned Giles $2,600 to sponsor a Thanksgiving

turkey giveaway. Giles repaid Mac’s Plus with a

money order. Three days after the $4,977 voucher

was submitted for Mac’s Plus, the FBI came

calling, and the next day after that, the voucher

was cancelled, but it was too late as the check
had already been cut. Giles’ administrative

assistant went to the comptroller’s office and

retrieved the supporting documents which had been

attached to the voucher.

 The tax counts, as we mentioned, charged Giles

with making false statements about his income in

1994 and 1995--not claiming as income the expense

account money used for personal expenses and not

claiming money contributed to ward organizations

that went to personal use (his son’s college

tuition, a home improvement loan, etc.).

 The racketeering count in the indictment

involves the Division Street site operated by

Niagra; the allegations include extortion and

bribery. The core of Giles’ contentions is that

to prove extortion the government must show that

Niagra made payments in exchange for a quid pro

quo--a specific promise to perform or not perform

an official act. It is the alleged failure to

prove a quid pro quo that Giles claims requires

a judgment of acquittal on the Rule 29 motion he

filed after the trial. He also claims that the

jury was not properly instructed regarding the

necessity of a quid pro quo.

 Extortion is defined in the Hobbs Act, 18

U.S.C. sec. 1951, as the "obtaining of property

from another, with his consent, induced by

wrongful use of actual or threatened force,

violence, or fear, or under color of official

right," and this is an "under color of official

right" case. In such a case, it is wellestablished after McCormick v. United States, 500

U.S. 257 (1991), that in order to obtain a Hobbs

Act conviction based on an official’s acceptance

of campaign contributions, the government must

show that the "payments are made in return for an

explicit promise or undertaking by the official

to perform or not to perform an official act."

Id. at 273. See also United States v. Allen, 10

F.3d 405 (7th Cir. 1993). The Court explicitly

stated that its holding in McCormick did not

apply to payments made to nonelected officials or

payments made to elected officials but which are

determined not to be campaign contributions.

 Because the bulk of the payments Niagra made to

Giles were not campaign contributions, the issue

before us is whether an extortion conviction

under the Hobbs Act requires that payments which

are made "under color of official right" but

which are not campaign contributions must also be

shown to have been paid in exchange for a

specific promise to perform an official act.

Giles argues that the district judge mistakenly

interpreted Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255

(1992), when she concluded that the quid pro quo

requirement applies only to cases where the
suspect funds are campaign contributions. Giles

says that Evans extends the requirement for a

quid pro quo to cases which do not involve

campaign contributions. On the other hand, the

government contends that it doesn’t matter in

Giles’ case because there was evidence to support

the existence of a quid pro quo. Furthermore,

according to the government, the instructions, in

fact, informed the jury that a quid pro quo was

required.

 Evans involved both campaign contributions and

other payments. The issue was whether a public

official must have taken an affirmative act of

inducing the payment-- whether he must have taken

the initiative. The Court decided that the

official need not have been the initiator:

We hold today that the Government need only show

that a public official has obtained a payment to

which he was not entitled, knowing that the

payment was made in return for official acts.

At 268. The statement can be read to imply that

all illegal payments must involve a promise that

the official will take a specific action. Justice

Kennedy read the majority opinion as a clear

indication that the quid pro quo requirement set

out in McCormick applied to all Hobbs Act

prosecutions:

Readers of today’s opinion should have little

difficulty in understanding that the rationale

underlying the Court’s holding applies not only

in campaign contribution cases, but in all sec.

1951 prosecutions. That is as it should be, for,

given a corrupt motive, the quid pro quo, as I

have said, is the essence of the offense.

At 278. The dissenters, Justice Thomas joined by

Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, also

read the opinion as requiring a quid pro quo in

all cases, but they were somewhat less happy

about the requirement, saying "[t]his quid pro

quo requirement is simply made up." At 286.

 Although not all courts of appeals that have

considered the issue have found the Evans holding

entirely clear, see United States v. Blandford,

33 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 1994), several have

determined that the quid pro quo requirement

does, in fact, apply to all Hobbs Act extortion

prosecutions. See, e.g., United States v.

Collins, 78 F.3d 1021 (6th Cir. 1996); United

States v. Hairston, 46 F.3d 361 (4th Cir. 1995);

United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d 543 (11th Cir.

1994); United States v. Garcia, 992 F.2d 409 (2nd

Cir. 1993). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit deftly sidestepped the issue by not quite

actually saying that a quid pro quo is required
but finding that

even applying the quid pro quo requirement to

non-campaign contributions, and viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the

government, there is more than sufficient

evidence of a quid pro quo to support the

extortion convictions here.

United States v. Tucker, 133 F.3d 1208, 1215

(1998).

 We are not convinced that Evans clearly settles

the question. And we recognize a policy concern

which might justify distinguishing campaign

contributions from other payments. After all,

campaign contributions often are made with the

hope that the recipient, if elected, will further

interests with which the contributor agrees;

there is nothing illegal about such

contributions. To distinguish legal from illegal

campaign contributions, it makes sense to require

the government to prove that a particular

contribution was made in exchange for an explicit

promise or undertaking by the official. Other

payments to officials are not clothed with the

same degree of respectability as ordinary

campaign contributions. For that reason, perhaps

it should be easier to prove that those payments

are in violation of the law.

 However, it is our view that this policy

concern is outweighed by language in Evans,

which, although not entirely clear, can easily be

read to lend support to an inference that the

quid pro quo requirement applies in all extortion

prosecutions under the Hobbs Act--not to mention

that four of the Justices read the language to

include the requirement. We therefore join the

circuits that require a quid pro quo showing in

all cases. That said, we also agree with the

Ninth Circuit in Tucker that the government need

not show an explicit agreement, but only that the

payment was made in return for official acts--

that the public official understood that as a

result of the payment he was expected to exercise

particular kinds of influence on behalf of the

payor. The Court stated in Evans:

The official and the payor need not state the

quid pro quo in express terms, for otherwise the

law’s effect could be frustrated by knowing winks

and nods. The inducement from the official is

criminal if it is express or if it is implied

from his words and actions, so long as he intends

it to be so and the payor so interprets it.

At 274.

 Unfortunately for Giles, he wins the battle but
loses the war. His case was actually tried, we

think, as a quid pro quo case. The district judge

found that the evidence supported a finding that

a quid pro quo existed. She said that Giles

argues that evidence of extortion was

circumstantial and no witness testified that Mr.

Giles expressly agreed to do Niagra favors in

exchange for money. But a reasonable jury might

have concluded that he did from the

circumstantial evidence presented. This included

his taking more that $81,000 from Niagra while

intervening with the city to help its Division

Street dump, and his taped statements that he had

a "deal’ with Niagra, as well as Niagra’s hiring

his son.

Giles began promoting Niagra’s interests with his

May 5, 1992, letter to Belt Railway; 2 weeks

later, on May 19, 1992, a Niagra division wrote

a $5,000 check to the Trust Fund. In July 1992

Giles met with the commissioner of the

environment to persuade him not to enforce a

ticket issued to Niagra; on July 7, 1992, a

$6,000 check was paid to the Regular Democratic

Organization. On December 18, 1992, Niagra was

issued another ticket, and the same day a $4,000

check went to the Improvement Fund. In 1993 and

1994 Giles pushed for the zoning variance and

stalled enforcement of the environmental and

zoning ordinances. During that time Niagra’s

payments totaled $47,500. Giles repeatedly told

city regulators that Niagra intended to clean up

the site and build an industrial park on it--even

displaying an artist’s rendering of what the

development would look like. But nothing

happened. Also, the tapes confirm what was going

on. A rational jury could determine that payments

were made in return for official acts.

 Giles objects to the extortion jury instructions

as not informing the jury of the quid pro quo

requirement and, of course, he’s right as those

words of art were not mentioned. But although the

magic words quid pro quo were not uttered, a

simplified version of the concept, the idea that

"you get something and you give something," was.

The instructions stated that an official commits

extortion when he

obtains money or property to which he is not

entitled, knowing or believing that the money or

property is being, or would be given, to him in

return for the taking, withholding or other

influencing of official action.

Extortion requires a "specific exercise of his

official power." Another instruction says,

if a public official conspires to obtain, or
attempts to obtain, or obtains money or property,

knowing or believing that it is or would be given

in exchange for a specific requested exercise of

his official power, he has committed extortion .

. . .

These instructions, we find, sufficiently inform

the jury that the payments must be made with the

expectation that a specific official act will be

taken. And so, the concept of quid pro quo was

adequately presented to the jury.

 Next, Giles contends that the evidence is not

sufficient to support the mail fraud convictions.

To obtain a conviction for mail fraud, the

government must show that the defendant acted

with intent to defraud. He must act with the

specific intent to deceive or cheat the victim,

either for financial gain or to cause financial

loss. The scheme must be reasonably calculated to

deceive persons of ordinary prudence. United

States v. Paneras, 222 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2000).

 Giles argues that his vouchers were not

fraudulent. He could have been using his wife’s

car on official business. He might not have

intended to deceive. However, the government

notes that he submitted vouchers for 3 years for

insurance on his wife’s car; and also submitted

vouchers on lease payments, insurance, and

maintenance for his Chrysler. The payment for the

Goldblatt’s billboards involved submitting a

voucher for an expense Giles had already been

compensated for. The route the payments took--

paying $1,500 out of the Trust Fund to Patrick

Media, getting $1,500 back to the Improvement

Fund from Goldblatt’s, and naming the RDO as the

vendor on the voucher--allows an inference that

the conduct was intentional. In addition, the

Mac’s Plus payment, even though it was not

charged in the indictment, also supports the

verdict.

 Giles’ final contention is that the district

court committed evidentiary errors which require

a retrial. We review evidentiary decisions for an

abuse of discretion. United States v. Wesela, 223

F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2000); cert. denied, ___ S.

Ct. ___ (February 20, 2001). Although at first

glance it is easy to see why Giles thinks the

rulings unfair, we find that they comply with the

Rules of Evidence and do not constitute an abuse

of discretion.

 A number of taped conversations between Giles

and informant Christopher were admitted to

support the government’s case. However, a tape

from February 11, 1995, which Giles said was

exculpatory, was excluded. Giles argues that it

should have been admissible under Rule 803(3) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence to show his thenexisting mental state. He also says that it was

admissible under Rule 106, the rule of

completeness. The judge disagreed and ruled that

the tape was hearsay and not admissible to show

his mental state because the crime was complete

when Giles took the first payment on January 20.

The 3-week interval between the two taped

conversations, said the judge, left too much time

for reflection and fabrication by Giles. The

completeness argument was rejected for much the

same reason, and also the statements were seen as

self-serving and lacking in circumstantial

guarantees of trustworthiness under the catch-all

provision in Rule 807.

 We think the February 11 tape should have been

admitted, especially in this case where Giles was

going to (and did) testify. The government’s

argument that the tape was a product of Giles’

reflection--an attempt to cover his tracks in

case he got caught--should have been made to the

jury, not the judge. On a close evidentiary call

like this, we think it’s best to err on the side

of inclusion rather than exclusion if an error at

all is to be made. But all that said, we can’t

say the decision to keep the tape out was so

outside the zone of reasonableness so as to be an

abuse of discretion by the trial judge. And even

if it were, unfortunately for Giles, given the

strong evidence of his guilt, the error would be

viewed as harmless.

 In a related issue, Giles wanted to call

Christopher, who is in the federal witness

protection program, as a trial witness (the

government didn’t put him on, as the taped

conversations came in through Blassingame) and

question him about whether the government

scripted his conversations with Giles. But it

seems clear here that the true defense reason

(and we can understand the desire to do it) for

wanting to put Christopher on the stand was to

expose his warts to the jury and float the

inference that the FBI should not play footsie

with a sleazeball. But because it’s clear that a

party may not call a witness for the sole purpose

of impeaching him, United States v. Webster, 734

F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1984), and further because no

offer of proof was presented as to the substance

of the testimony Giles believed in good faith

Christopher would give, we again can find no

clear abuse of the trial judge’s discretion to

prevent the defense from putting Christopher on

the stand.

 For these reasons, the judgment of the district

court is AFFIRMED.
/1 In the old days, an indictment charging 13

felonies would have been the kiss of death for a

politician. Apparently that is no longer the

case.