## Korolev, Sputnik, and The International GeophysicalYear

####  Asif A. Siddiqi

From the point of historical inquiry, the institutionaland political machinations behind the genesis of Sputnik haveremained a largely ignored area of scholarship. Embellished byspeculation and fueled by Soviet secrecy, the story behind Sputnikhas assumed the form of a parable, cobbled together from rumorsand mythology, and colored by an eagerness to fill in the blanksof what we did not know. Thus, while the post-mortem effects ofSputnik have been the subject of much scholarly debate, the originsand motivations that led to the launch of the first artificialsatellite have remained, to a large degree, in the realm of conjecture.In recent years, with the dissolution of the Soviet state in 1991,mythology came into confrontation with reality. Declassified primarydocuments have provided a rich resource and incentive to lookback again at an event which had such a profound impact on thecourse of events in the latter part of the twentieth century.

#### Conception

Sputnik would not have been possible without thecombined contributions of two men who had consistently advocateda commitment for a space program to a reluctant Soviet government.Sergey Pavlovich Korolev, the younger of the two, had become absorbedin dreams of space exploration during his short tenure as a memberand eventual leader of an amateur Soviet rocketry group in theearly 1930s. 1  It was there that he befriended Mikhail KlavdiyevichTikhonravov, another former glider pilot. Their paths divergedduring World War II and in its aftermath they were working indifferent institutions, both contributing to the new long-rangeballistic missile effort. Korolev had the auspicious title of'Chief Designer,' by dint of his official title as head of theDepartment No. 3 of the Specialized Design Bureau at the ScientificResearch Institute No. 88 ('NII-88' in its Russian abbreviation). 2Stalin had established the NII-88 (pronounced 'nee-88') in 1946to serve as the leading engineering organization in Soviet industryto develop long-range missiles.

During the following decade, Korolev's department,which eventually became an independent organization, the ExperimentalDesign Bureau No. 1 (OKB-1), focused efforts on a series of ballisticmissiles for the Soviet armed forces. Since the primary thematicthrust of Korolev's group was military missiles, there was negligiblework on projects which had purely scientific utility. Dedicatedwholly to the grand ideals of space exploration, Korolev did makea few spurious efforts to interest the leadership in artificialsatellites in the late 1940s, but none of these ever proved tohave any results until he combined his lobbying with Tikhonravov'sindependent work at the NII-4, an unrelated military institutiondedicated to research on applications of ballistic missiles. Afterauthoring several important R&D reports on the possibilityof space launch vehicles and artificial satellites in the late1940s and early 1950s, Tikhonravov emerged in 1954 with a detailedtechnical exposition entitled "Report on an Artificial Satelliteof the Earth." 3   It was at the same time, on 20 May 1954, thatthe Soviet government formally tasked Korolev's Design Bureauto develop the first Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile(ICBM), the R-7. Korolev did not waste time. Just six days later,he sent Tikhonravov's satellite report to the Soviet governmentwith an attached cover letter stating:

- I draw your attention to the memorandum of ComradeM. K. Tikhonravov, "Report on an Artificial Satellite ofthe Earth," and also to the forwarded materials from theU.S.A. on work being carried out in this field. The current developmentof a new product [the R-7 ICBM] makes it possible for us to speakof the possibility of developing in the near future an artificialsatellite...It seems to me that in the present time there is theopportunity...for carrying out the initial exploratory work ona satellite and more detailed work on complex problems involvedwith this goal. We await your decision.  4   

If Korolev's goal was to elicit a formal decree forhis proposal, his appeal was not very successful. However, hisrequest appears to have been passed on through various levelsof the government and reached the office of missile and nuclearindustry chief Vyecheslav A. Malyshev, officially the Ministerof Medium Machine Building. Prompted by Korolev's persuasive arguments,Malyshev, along with three other top defense industry officials,submitted a proposal to Soviet leader Georgiy M. Malenkov askingpermission to carry out "work on the scientific-theoreticalquestions associated with space flight." 5   No doubt interestedin the military applications of Tikhonravov's satellite, Malenkovapproved the idea. Armed with a modicum of support, Korolev commenceda modest research project at his Design Bureau coordinated withTikhonravov's own work at the NII-4. Incredibly, as this researchwas ongoing, the satellite issue remained divorced from furthergovernmental involvement, as Korolev was diverted to more importantmatters relating to work on military missiles such as the R-7ICBM. It was, however, the very first intervention by the Sovietgovernment on an issue related to space exploration.

Korolev's satellite work may have continued at aleisurely pace through the mid-1950s with lukewarm governmentalsupport were it not for some surprising and well-publicized eventsoutside of the USSR. In the spring of 1950, a group of Americanscientists led by James van Allen met in Silver Springs, Marylandto discuss the possibility of an international scientific programto study the upper atmosphere and outer space via sounding rockets,balloons, and ground observations. Strong support from WesternEuropean scientists allowed the idea to expand into a worldwideprogram timed to coincide with a period of intense solar activity,1 July 1957 to 31 December 1958.  The participants named this periodthe International Geophysical Year (IGY) and created the *Comitéspeciale de l'année géophysique internationale*(the 'Special Committee for the International Geophysical Year'or 'CSAGI') to establish an agenda for the program. Soviet representatives,including Academy of Sciences Vice-President Academician IvanP. Bardin, served on the Committee, but do not appear to havehad any significant contribution to its proceedings. In fact,the May 1954 deadline for submissions for participation in theIGY passed without any word from Soviet authorities. At a subsequentmeeting in Rome on 4 October 1954, Soviet scientists silentlywitnessed the approval of a historic U.S.-sponsored plan to orbitartificial satellites during the IGY. 6                The satellite proposal clearlysurprised the Soviet delegation, and perhaps had repercussionswithin the USSR Academy of Sciences. In the fall of 1954, theAcademy established the Interdepartmental Commission for the Coordinationand Control of Work in the Field of Organization and Accomplishmentof Interplanetary Communications, a typically longwinded titlewhich obscured its primary role, a forum for Soviet scientiststo discuss space exploration in abstract terms, both in secretand in public. 7

The existence of the Commission was announced on16 April 1955 in an article in a Moscow evening newspaper; AcademicianLeonid I. Sedov, a relatively well-known gas dynamics expert waslisted as the Chairman of the Commission. 8     Unlike the title ofthe body, the primary duty of the Commission was stated with unusualexplicitness: "One of the immediate tasks of the Commissionis to organize work concerning building an automatic laboratoryfor scientific research in space." In hindsight, it is clearthat the Commission, a part of the Astronomy Council in the Academy,had very little input or influence over *de facto*decision-makingin the Soviet space program, although one of its functions wasto collect proposals from various scientists on possible scientificexperiments which could be mounted on future satellites. Sedovhimself played a major role as Chairman by appearing at numerousinternational conferences talking in very general terms on thefuture of space exploration. None of its members had any directconnection or contact with the missile and space program, althoughthey were clearly aware of the broad nature of Korolev's work.The latter appears to have had little to do with the formationor work of the Commission. He evidently attended one meeting in1954 to inquire about the group's work. 10

While this Commission had little real authority,its Chairman Sedov may have played a crucial role in connectingKorolev's satellite efforts with the International GeophysicalYear. The chain of events was set off on 29 July 1955 by U.S.President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Press Secretary James C. Hagertywho announced at the White House that the United States wouldlaunch "small Earth-circling satellites" as part ofits participation in the IGY. 11     It was at this same time that theInternational Astronautical Federation was holding its Sixth InternationalAstronautical Congress at Copenhagen, Denmark. Heading the Sovietdelegation was Sedov and Kirill F. Ogorodnikov, the editor ofa respected astronomy journal in the USSR. The two were calledinto action by an announcement on 2 August by Fred C. Durant III,the President of the Congress, who reported the Eisenhower Administration'sintentions of launching a satellite during the IGY. Not to beoutdone, Sedov convened a press conference the same day at theSoviet embassy in Copenhagen for about 50 journalists during whichhe announced that "In my opinion, it will be possible tolaunch an artificial Earth satellite within the next two years."He added that "The realization of the Soviet project canbe expected in the near future." 12

It is quite unlikely that Sedov was speaking on hisown authority, and possibly had taken cues from highly-placedParty officials who were aware of the government's approval inAugust 1954 of exploratory research on space issues. Perhaps aParty or Academy of Sciences official back in Moscow had decreedthat Durant's statement warranted a response from Sedov. Certainly,there had been much discussion on the possibility of Soviet satellitesby that time, although no single project had received approval.What is known is that the two pronouncements, one by the EisenhowerAdministration, and the one by Sedov, were the subject of relativelyintense scrutiny by the press all over the world. This responseappears to have been critical for Korolev.

By coincidence, it was on 16 July 1955 that Tikhonravov,along with OKB-1 engineer Ilya V. Lavrov as co-author, finishedhis latest study on artificial satellites. 13     Based on work originatingfrom the May 1954 document, the two suggested a reduced mass of1,000-1,400 kilograms for an automated satellite. They also proposedthe formation of a group of 70-80 people to carry out the taskof designing and building the satellite and to work on futurepiloted spacecraft (Korolev wrote in the margins: "Too many,30-35 people."). The Chief Designer, more attuned to thepolitical reality of such a project, also added that "thecreation of [a satellite] would have enormous political significanceas evidence of the high development level of our country's technology." 14In a move symptomatic of Korolev's relentless perseverance ofthe space issue since the early 1950s, Korolev also had one ofhis sector chiefs at the OKB-1 prepare a technical report on thepossibility of sending a probe to the Moon using modified versionsof the R-7 ICBM.

The activity on the space front reached its zenithon 30 August 1955 when Korolev attended two different meetings,one with the defense community, and one with the scientific community,to discuss the new satellite report. The former was at the officesof the powerful Military-Industrial Commission, the coordinatingmechanism for management of the entire Soviet defense industry.Presiding over the meeting was the Commission's new Chairman VasiliyM. Ryabikov. Also in attendance were Academician Mstislav V. Keldysh,a noted scientist involved in research and development on severalhigh profile military programs, and Col.-Engineer Aleksandr G.Mrykin, a senior artillery officer responsible for overseeingthe procurement of new ballistic missiles for the Soviet armedforces. 15     At the meeting Korolev spoke of both his satellites andlunar probes. Notorious for his legendary short temper and larger-than-lifepersonality, Mrykin was not receptive to Korolev's old argumentsof the possibly great political importance of a Soviet satellite.The artillery officer told Korolev in no uncertain terms thatonly when the R-7 had completed its flight testing would theyconsider a satellite. Fortunately for Korolev, he had the Keldysh'ssupport, and that may have tipped the scales. While details ofthe deliberations remain extremely sketchy, it appears that Ryabikovapproved the use of an R-7 ICBM for a modest satellite program.Lunar probes were not considered. There were probably two factorsworking in Korolev's favor: the possible use of a satellite formilitary purposes; and the demonstration of Soviet science andtechnology during the IGY.

Armed with Ryabikov's approval, Korolev attendeda second secret meeting the same day at the offices of the 'chiefscholarly secretary' of the Academy of Sciences Gennadiy V. Topchiyev.Many other scientists and designers including Keldysh, Tikhonravov,and rocket engine specialist Valentin P. Glushko were present.Korolev reported to the distinguished assemblage that the Councilof Chief Designers at a recent meeting had conducted a detailedexamination on modifying the original R-7 into a vehicle capableof launching a satellite into orbit. No doubt, he also spoke ofthe government's interest on the matter. At the end of his speechhe formally proposed to build and launch a series of satellitesinto space, including one with animals, and for the Academy toestablish a formal commission to carry out this goal. The ChiefDesigner had a specific timetable in mind. He told his audience,"As for the booster rocket, we hope to begin the first launchesin April-July 1957...before the start of the International GeophysicalYear." 16    If earlier, Korolev's satellite plans had been timedfor the indefinite future, the Eisenhower Administrations announcementin July 1955 completely changed the direction of Korolev's attack.Not only did it imbue Korolev's satellite proposal with a newsense of urgency, but it also gave him a specific timetable toaim for. If the United States was planning to launch during theIGY, then the Soviets would launch one a few months *before*the beginning of the International Geophysical Year, guaranteeinga first place finish. The attending scientists at the meetingaccepted the new proposal, and at Korolev's recommendation Keldyshwas designated the Chairman of the commission. Korolev and Tikhonravovwould serve as his deputies.

The following day, on 31 August, a smaller group,including Korolev, Tikhonravov, and Keldysh met to discuss someof the proposals for satellite instruments which many scientistshad submitted to Sedov's Commission in the past year. A few dayslater Tikhonravov and Keldysh convened with some prominent Sovietscientific scholars to explain details of the satellite designand how their instruments were being considered. Korolev himselfapproved a preliminary scientific program in September 1955, aprogram which included the study of the ionosphere, cosmic rays,the Earth's magnetic fields, luminescence in the upper atmosphere,the Sun, and its influence on the Earth, and other natural phenomena.The detailed development of a scientific program was left in thehands of the two existing commissions of the Academy headed byAnatoliy A. Blagonravov and Leonid I. Sedov. 17

The approval by the Academy to conduct a purely scientificresearch program accelerated matters considerably. In the ensuingmonths, several important meetings were held, both by Keldysh'scommission and by the Council of Chief Designers, which elaboratedthe details of the project. Between December 1955 and March 1956,Keldysh consulted a huge number of distinguished scholars to refinethe scientific experiments package. They included numerous famousSoviet scientists, many of whose names were public knowledge unlikethose who were actually developing the spacecraft. 18      It was a large-scaleoperation with a single coordinating mechanism which, becauseof its 'civilian' nature, had little precedent. Korolev himselfwas very conscious of the fact that an official decree on theproject had yet to be issued, which meant that a rocket was stillnot officially available for the project. The magnitude of theimmediate tasks, however, obscured that important issue for thetime being. There were continuous problems with the program, especiallysince many who were cooperating did not share Korolev's enthusiasmfor the project.

It took about four months for Ryabikov's spoken approvalin August 1955 to translate into a formal decree of the Sovietgovernment. As a purely scientific project managed by the Academyof Sciences, it was not considered a top priority. In fact, theSoviet government probably viewed the satellite project in muchthe same manner as they viewed the continuing series of scientificrocket flights into the upper atmosphere which also used militarymissiles for 'civilian' purposes. They were relatively inexpensive,unobtrusive, and ignored by the political leadership. Consequently,the USSR Council of Ministers issued a decree, number 149-88ss,on 30 January 1956, calling for the creation of an unorientedartificial satellite. The document approved the launch of a satellite,designated the 'Object D,' in 1957 in time for the InternationalGeophysical Year. As per Tikhonravov's previous computations,the mass of the satellite was limited to 1,000 to 1,400 kilogramsof which 200 to 300 kilograms would be scientific instruments.Apart from the Academy of Sciences, five industrial ministrieswould be involved in the project. The responsibility for preparinga Draft Plan for the Object D fell on the shoulders of SergeyS. Kryukov, at the time a Department Chief at the OKB-1. Tikhonravovserved as the 'chief scientific consultant. 19      Korolev had his promise.It was now too late to turn back.

#### Labor

The Object D (or D-1) was so named since it wouldbe the fifth type of payload to be carried on an R-7, ObjectsA, B, V, and G being designations for different nuclear warheadcontainers. 20      The satellite was a complex scientific laboratory,far more sophisticated than any other IGY proposal from the period.While Kryukov's engineers depended a great deal on Tikhonravov'searly work on satellites, much of the actual design was a journeyinto uncharted territory for the OKB-1. There was little precedentfor creating pressurized containers and instrumentation for workin Earth orbit, while long-range communications systems had tobe designed without the benefit of prior experience. The engineerswere aware of the trajectory tracking and support capabilitiesfor the R-7 missile, and this provided a context for determiningthe levels of contact with the vehicle. The fact that the objectwould be out of contact with the ground for long periods of time(unlike sounding rockets) meant that new self-switching automatedsystems would have to be used. The selection of metals to constructthe satellite also presented problems to the engineers, sincethe effects of continuous exposure to the space environment wasstill in the realm of conjecture. The experiments and experiencefrom sounding rocket tests provided a database for the final selection.

Technical work on the vehicle officially began on25 February 1956 with actual construction beginning on 5 March.Tikhonravov's group at the NII-4 and Korolev's Design Bureau atthe NII-88 were the two most active participants in this process,but numerous other organizations provided various elements ofthe complete satellite. By 14 June, Korolev finalized the necessarychanges to the basic version of the R-7 ICBM in order to use itfor a satellite launch. The new booster would incorporate a numberof major changes including the use of uprated main engines, deletionof the central radio package on the booster, and a new payloadfairing replacing the old one used for a nuclear warhead. 21       A monthlater, on 24 July 1956, Korolev formally approved the initialDraft Plan for the Object D. The document was co-signed by hissenior associates Tikhonravov, Konstantin D. Bushuyev, SergeyO. Okhapkin, and Leonid A. Voskresenskiy. 22

By mid-1956 the Object D project was beginning tofall significantly behind schedule. Some subcontractors were particularlylackadaisical in their assignments, and parts were often deliveredwhich did not fit the original specifications. On 14 September,Keldysh made a personal plea at a meeting of the Academy of SciencesPresidium for speeding up work, invoking a threat all would understand:"we all want our satellite to fly earlier than the Americans." 23Events in the satellite program took an abrupt turn in the waningmonths of 1956. Actual test models of the Object D, expected tobe ready by October, remained unfinished. By the end of November,Korolev began to suffer from great anxiety, no doubt compoundedby his extraordinarily busy plans, traveling from Kaliningradto Kapustin Yar to Tyura-Tam to Molotovsk and back several timesto oversee various projects. 24       Part of this anxiety was due to seriousconcerns that his project would be suddenly preempted with a satellitelaunch from the United States. He had been informed of a September1956 launch of a missile from Patrick Air Force Base at Cape Canaveral,Florida which according to his erroneous information was a failed attempt to launch a satellite into orbit. 25       A secondconcern were the results of static testing of the R-7 engineson the ground. Instead of the projected specific impulse of 309-310seconds, the R-7 engines would not produce more than 304 seconds,too low for the heavy Object D satellite. He realized that perhapshe was making this effort too complicated. Why not attempt tolaunch something simpler on the first orbital attempt insteadof a sophisticated one-and-a-half-ton scientific observatory?

At the end of November Tikhonravov was perceptiveenough to detect Korolev's anxiety and verbalized it: "Whatif we make the satellite a little lighter? 26       Thirty kilograms orso, or even lighter?" Keldysh was at first opposed to theidea, but eventually ceded to the strong-willed Korolev. Thistime Korolev would not depend on dozens of other subcontractors:he made sure that the smaller satellite would be designed andmanufactured completely in his own Design Bureau with the helpof only two outside organizations: the Scientific Research Instituteof Current Sources under Nikolay S. Lidorenko for the design ofthe on board batteries, and the NII-885 under Chief Designer MikhailS. Ryazanskiy for the radio-transmitters. On 5 January 1957, Korolevsent off a letter to the government which described his revisedplan. He asked that permission be given to launch two small satellites,each with mass of 40-50 kilograms, in the period April-June 1957immediately *prior* to the beginning of the IGY. This planwould be contingent upon the timetable for the R-7 program whichKorolev admitted was behind schedule; the first launch of themissile was set for March 1957 at the earliest. Each satellitewould orbit the Earth at altitudes of 225 X 500 kilometers andcontain a simple shortwave transmitter with a power source sufficientfor 10 days operation. Korolev did not obscure the reasons forthe abrupt change in plans:

-  ...the United States is conducting very intensiveplans for launching an artificial Earth satellite. The most well-known project under the name "Vanguard" uses a three-stagemissile...the satellite proposed is a spherical container of 50 centimeters diameter and a mass of approximately 10 kilograms.In September 1956, the U.S.A. attempted to launch a  three-stagemissile with a satellite from Patrick Base [sic] in the stateof Florida which was kept secret. The Americans  failed to launchthe satellite...and the payload flew about 3,000 miles or approximately4,800 kilometers. This flight was  then publicized in the pressas a national record. They emphasized that U.S. rockets can flyhigher and farther than all the  rockets in the world, includingSoviet rockets. From separate printed reports, it is known thatthe U.S.A. is preparing in  the nearest months a new attempt tolaunch an artificial Earth satellite and is willing to pay anyprice to achieve this  priority.  27   

While Korolev's information on U.S. plans may havebeen in error, his instincts were not that far off. The UnitedStates could have launched a satellite by early 1957, but variousinstitutional and political obstacles precluded such an attempt.

By 25 January 1957, the Chief Designer approved theinitial design details of the satellite, now officially designatedSimple Satellite No. 1 (PS-1). 28       Although there was some token resistanceto Korolev's revised plan, primarily from Keldysh, his letterappeared to have adequately invoked the specter of U.S. eminencein the field of military technology. On 15 February, the USSRCouncil of Ministers formally signed a decree (no. 171-83ss) entitled"On Measures to Carry Out in the International GeophysicalYear," approving the new proposal. 29       The two new satellites,PS-1 and PS-2, would weigh approximately 100 kilograms and belaunched in April-May 1957 after one or two fully successful R-7launches. Eisenhower's plan to launch an American satellite duringIGY was *the* deciding factor on a launch date. The ObjectD launch, meanwhile was pushed back to April 1958. Focused ona more modest objective, Korolev wasted little time. He quicklysent out technical specifications for the initial satellite PS-1to the two subcontractors. By this time there was an impressivesight at the Tyura-Tam launch base in Soviet Central Asia: thefirst flight article of the magnificent R-7 was on the launchpad.

The first three launches of the R-7 ICBM in May-July1957 were all failures, completely disrupting Korolev's scheduleto launch a satellite before the beginning of the IGY. The daysfollowing the last failure were the lowest point for Korolev andhis associates. Suddenly everything they had labored for overthree years had been put into doubt. There was severe criticismfrom higher officials and even talk of curtailing the entire program.For Korolev, the headaches were compounded by the cumulative delaysof his Simple Satellite project. It was now a month *into*the IGY and the R-7 itself had not flown a successful mission.His dreams, his position, his status were all in jeopardy, andthis began to affect his temperament. In mid-June he had writtento his wife, "Things are not going very well again,"adding with a note of optimism, "Here, right here and now,we must strive for the solution we need!." By July thingsbegan to deteriorate. On the 8th he wrote "We are workingvery hard," but after the second launch failure, he wroteon the 23th "Things are very, very bad." 30       Korolev's biographerwrote in 1987, "In all the postwar years, no days were morepainful, difficult, or tense for Sergey Pavlovich Korolev thanthose of that hot summer of 1957." 31

Apart from competition from the United States, Korolevhad to unexpectedly deal with a different kind of threat at thetime, one from within the USSR in the person of Chief DesignerMikhail K. Yangel of the Experimental Design Bureau No. 586 (OKB-586).In the first quarter of 1957, Yangel's Design Bureau at Dnepropetrovskin Ukraine, on orders from ministerial boss Dmitriy F. Ustinov,had begun to explore the possibility of modifying their R-12 intermediaterange ballistic missile into a satellite launch vehicle. 32       The missileitself, fueled by storable hypergolic propellants unlike the R-7,was the subject of a five year long development program, at firstunder Korolev's tutelage, but later transferred to Dnepropetrovsk.Prodded by the unending delays in the R-7 program, Yangel evaluated"the possibility of the *immediate* launch of a similarsatellite [as Korolev's] using the simplest of booster rocketsbased on the strategic R-12 missile." 33       Although analysis provedthat a hastily modified two-stage R-12 could be used for thisgoal, it did not seem likely that a first launch could be carriedout prior to either the R-7 or the Americans. To Korolev's relief,the plan was shelved.

Back at the launch range of Tyura-Tam, the fourthR-7 launch on 21 August 1957 was successful. The missile and itspayload flew 6,500 kilometers, the warhead finally entering theatmosphere over the target point at Kamchatka. Korolev was sosubsumed by euphoria that he stayed awake until three in the morningspeaking to his deputies and aides about the great possibilitiesthat had opened up, the future, and mostly about his artificialsatellite. 34       It was extremely unusual for the Soviets to publicizesuccesses in any military field, so it was all the more odd whensix days after the R-7 launch, the official news agency TASS releaseda brief communiqué:

-   A few days ago a super-long-range, intercontinentalmultistage ballistic missile was launched. The tests of the missile were successful; they fully confirmed the correctness of thecalculations and the selected design. The flight of the missile took place at a very great, hitherto unattained, altitude. Coveringan enormous distance in a short time, the missile hit the  assignedregion. The results obtained show that there is the possibilityof launching missiles into any region of the  terrestrial globe.The solution of the problem of creating intercontinental ballisticmissiles will make it possible to reach  remoteregions without resorting to strategic aviation, which at thepresent time is vulnerable to modern means  antiaircraft defense. 35

Clearly it did not have the intended effect on theU.S. public or media, since for the most part, little attentionwas given it. Those that did pay lip service to the announcementspoke only to dismiss the claim, a stance justified partly bythe black hole of information on Soviet ballistic missiles. Itwould take 38 more days before the entire world would take noticethat a new age had arrived, heralded by that same intercontinentalballistic missile.

#### Birth

Work on the 'simple satellite' PS-1 had continuedat an uneven pace since development of the object began in January1957. Between March and August, engineers carried out computationsto select and refine the trajectory of the launch vehicle andthe satellite during launch. These enormously complicated computationsfor the R-7 program were initially done by hand using electricalarithrometers and six-digit trigonometric tables. When more complexcalculations were required, engineers at the OKB-1 were offeredthe use of a 'real' computer recently installed at the premisesof the Academy of Sciences at Keldysh's request. The giganticmachine filled up a huge room at the department and may have beenthe fastest computer in the USSR in the late 1950s: it could performten thousand operations per second, a high-end capability forSoviet computing machines of the time. 36

There were many debates on the shape of the firstsatellite, with most senior OKB-1 designers preferring a conicalform since it fit well with the nose cone of the rocket. At ameeting early in the year, Korolev had a change-of-heart and suggesteda metal sphere at least one meter in diameter. 37       There were sixmajor guidelines followed in the construction of PS-1:

- the satellite would have to be of maximum simplicity and reliabilitywhile keeping in mind that methods used for the spacecraft wouldbe used in future projects;
- the body of the satellite was to be spherical in order todetermine atmospheric density in its path;
- the satellite was to be equipped with radio equipment workingon at least two wavelengths of sufficient power to be trackedby amateurs and to obtain data on the propagation of radio wavesthrough the atmosphere;
- the antennae were to be designed so as to not affect the intensityof the radio signals due to spinning;
- the power sources were to be onboard batteries ensuring workfor two to three weeks; and
- the attachment of the satellite to the core stage would besuch that there would be no failure to separate.  

The five primary scientific objectives of the missionwere:

- to test the method of placing an artificial satellite intoEarth orbit;
- to provide information on the density of the atmosphere bycalculating its lifetime in orbit;
- to test radio and optical methods of orbital tracking;
- to determine the effects of radio wave propagation throughthe atmosphere; and
- to check principles of pressurization used on the satellite.  38   

The satellite as it eventually emerged was a pressurizedsphere, 58 centimeters in diameter made of an aluminum alloy.The sphere was constructed by combining two hemispherical casingstogether. The pressurized internal volume of the sphere was filledwith nitrogen at 1.3 atmospheres which maintained an electro-chemicalsource of power (three silver-zinc batteries), two D-200 radio-transmitters,a DTK-34 thermo-regulation system, a ventilation system, a communicationssystem, temperature and pressure transmitters, and associatedwiring. The two radio transmitters operated at frequencies of20.005 and 40.002 megacycles at wavelengths of 1.5 and 7.5 meters.The signals on both the frequencies were spurts lasting 0.2 to0.6 seconds, providing the famous 'beep-beep' sound to the transmissions.The antennae system comprised four rods, two with a length of2.4 meters each and the remaining two with a length of 2.9 meterseach. Tests of this radio system were completed as early as 5May 1957 using a helicopter and a ground station. 39       The total massof the satellite was 83.6 kilograms of which 51.0 kilograms wassimply the power source. The lead designer for PS-1 was MikhailS. Khomyakov. Oleg G. Ivanovskiy was his deputy. 40

Korolev, of course, kept close tabs on the developmentof PS-1 and continuously saw to it that the spherical satellitewas kept spotlessly clean and shiny not only for its reflectivequalities, but perhaps also for its overall aesthetic beauty.On one occasion he flew into a rage at a junior assembly shopworker for doing a poor job on the outer surface of a *mockup*of the satellite. "This ball will be exhibited in museums!,"he shouted. 41       An aide from Moscow telephoned Korolev at Tyura-Tamon 24 June to inform him that he had just signed the documentspecifying the final configuration of the satellite. The launchvehicle earmarked for the satellite was a slightly uprated versionof the basic R-7 ICBM variant. The modifications included: theomission of a 300 kilogram radio-package from the top of the corebooster; the changing of burn times of the main engines; the removalof a vibration measurement system; the use of a special nozzlesystem to separate the booster from the satellite installed atthe top of the core stage; and the installation of a completelynew payload shroud and container replacing the warhead configuration. 42The length of the booster with the new shroud was 29.167 meters,almost four meters shorter than the ICBM version.

The Council of Ministers had formally approved thesimple satellite program in February 1957. With one R-7 successunder his belt, Korolev now needed final permission from the StateCommission to proceed with an orbital launch after a second successfullaunch. Despite the *official governmental sanction*, thisprocess appears to have been fraught with difficulty, suggestingthat even at this late stage, there were individuals on the Commissionwho were not interested in the satellite attempt. At a State Commissionmeeting soon after the August launch, Korolev formally asked forpermission to launch a satellite if a second R-7 successfullyflew in early September. Convincing the Commission proved to bemuch harder than expected and the meeting ended in fierce argumentsand recriminations. Not easily turned away, Korolev tried againat a second session soon after, this time using a political ploy:"I propose let us put the question of national priority inlaunching the world's first artificial Earth satellite to thePresidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Letthem settle it." 43       It worked. None of the members wanted totake the blame for a potential miscalculation, and Korolev gotwhat he wanted. A final document for launch, "The Programfor Carrying Out a Test Launch of a Simple Unoriented ISZ (theObject PS) Using the Product 8K71PS," was later signed by:

-  Vasiliy F. Ryabikov (Military-Industrial Commission); 
-  Mitrofan I. Nedelin (Ministry of Defense); 
-  Dmitriy F. Ustinov (Ministry of Defense Industries); 
-  Valeriy D. Kalmykov (Ministry of Radio-TechnicalIndustry); and  
-  Aleksandr N. Nesmeyanov (Academy of Sciences).  44  

The subsequent launch of the R-7 on 7 September wasas successful as the one in August, and the R-7 ICBM flew acrossthe Soviet Union before depositing its dummy warhead over theKamchatka peninsula. 45       In the summer, Korolev and the other ChiefDesigners began to informally target the satellite launch forthe one hundredth anniversary of spaceflight visionary Tsiolkovskiy'sbirth on 17 September, but achieving this date proved increasinglyunrealistic. Instead of being at Tyura-Tam for a space launchon that day, Korolev and R-7 rocket engine designer Glushko wereboth in attendance at the Pillard Hall of the Palace of Unionsin Moscow for a special celebration of the great visionary's birthday.In a long speech to the distinguished audience, Korolev, whosereal job was not revealed, prophesized that, "in the nearestfuture the first test launches of artificial satellites of theEarth with scientific goals will take place in the USSR and theUSA." 46       The audience had little idea of the accuracy of theprediction.

On 20 September Korolev was at Moscow for a meetingof the State Commission for the PS-1 launch. 47       Chairman Ryabikov,Korolev, Keldysh, and Marshall Nedelin were the principle participantsand established 6 October as the target date of the launch basedon the pace of preparations. At the same meeting, the Commissiondecided to publicly announce the launch of PS-1 only after completionof the first orbit. A communiqué to this effect was writtenup by Ryabikov himself on 23 September. 48       The frequencies for trackingby amateurs had already been announced earlier in the year inthe issues of the journal *Radio* although details of theprogram had obviously been omitted. Korolev himself flew intoTyura-Tam on 29 September staying in a small house close to theprimary activity area near site two.

The preparations for launching were for the mostpart uneventful save for the last minute replacement of one ofthe batteries on the flight version of PS-1. Still apprehensiveover a last minute U.S. launch, Korolev abruptly proposed to theState Commission that the launch be brought forward two days.His concerns were apparently prompted by plans for a conferencein Washington, D.C. in early October as part of IGY proceedings.On the 6th, the day of PS-1's scheduled launch, a paper entitled"Satellite Over the Planet" was to be presented by theAmerican delegation. He believed that the presentation was tobe timed to coincide with a hitherto unannounced launch of a U.S.satellite. 49       Local KGB representatives assured Korolev that thiswas not so, but Korolev was convinced that a launch of Army JupiterC might be attempted. In the end, the schedule for PS-1's launchwas moved forward two days to the 4th; Korolev signed the finalorder for launch at four in the afternoon on the 2nd and sentit to Moscow for approval. 50

The R-7 was transported and installed on the launchpad in the early morning of 3 October escorted on foot by Korolev,Ryabikov, and other members of the State Commission. Fueling beganearly the following morning at 0545 hours local time. 51       Korolev,under a great amount of pressure, remained cautious throughoutthe proceedings. He told his engineers, "Nobody will hurryus. If you have even the tiniest doubt, we will stop the testingand make the corrections on the satellite. There is still time..." 52Most of the engineers, understandably enough, did not have timeto ponder over the historical value or importance of the upcomingevent. PS-1's deputy designer Ivanovskiy recalled "...Nobodyback then was thinking about the magnitude of what was going on:everyone did his own job, living through its disappointments andjoys." 53

On the night of the 4th, huge flood lights illuminatedthe launchpad as the engineers in their blockhouse checked offall the systems. In the command bunker accompanying Korolev weresome of the senior members of the State Commission. All launchoperations for Sputnik were handled by two men, a civilian anda military officer. Representing the civilians was Korolev's deputyLeonid A. Voskresenskiy, one of the most colorful characters inthe history of the Soviet space program. A daredevil motorcyclistwith a legendary penchant for taking risks, he had been with theprogram since the early days in 1945 when the Soviets had scouredGermany for the remains of the A-4 missile. Lt.-Col. AleksandrI. Nosov represented the military. Both men were 44 years oldat the time. The actual command for launch was entrusted to thehands of Boris S. Chekunov, a young artillery forces lieutenant.He later recalled the final moments as the clock ticked past midnightlocal time: "When only a few minutes remained until lift-off,Korolev nodded to his deputy Voskresenskiy. The operators froze,awaiting the final order. Nosov, the chief of the launch controlteam, stood at the periscope. He could see the whole pad. 'Oneminute to go!,' he called." 54       Another senior engineer in thebunker recalled:

-  With the exception of the operators, everybody wasstanding. Only N. A. Pilyugin and S. P. Korolev were allowed tosit  down. The launch director [Nosov] began issuing commands.I kept an eye on S. P. Korolev. He seemed nervous although  hetried to conceal it. He was carefully examining the readings ofthe various instruments without missing any nuance of  our bodylanguage and tone of voice. If anybody raised their voice or showedsigns of nervousness, Korolev was instantly  on the alert to seewhat was going on.  55   

The seconds counted down to zero and Nosov shoutedthe command for lift-off. Chekunov immediately pressed the lift-offbutton. At exactly 2228 hours 34 seconds Moscow Time on 4 October,the engines ignited and the 272,830 kilogram booster lifted offthe pad in a blaze of light and smoke. The five engines of theR-7 generated about 398 tons of thrust at launch. Although therocket lifted off gracefully, there were problems. Delays in thefiring of several engines almost resulted in a launch abort. Additionally,at T+16 seconds, the System for the Simultaneous Emptying of theTanks (SOBIS) failed, which resulted in higher than normal keroseneconsumption. A turbine failure due to this resulted in main enginecut-off one second prior to the planned moment. 56       Separation fromthe core stage, however, occurred successfully at T+324.5 seconds,and the 83.6 kilogram PS-1 successfully flew into a free-fallelliptical trajectory. The first human-made object entered orbitaround the Earth inaugurating a new era in exploration.

With most State Commission members still in the bunker,engineers at Tyura-Tam awaited confirmation of orbit insertionfrom the satellite in a van set up about 800 meters from the launchpad. As a huge crowd waited outside the van, radio operator VyecheslavI. Lappo from the NII-885, who had personally designed the onboardtransmitters, sat expectantly for the first signal. The Kamchatkastation picked up signals from the satellite and there was cheeringbut Korolev cut everybody off: "Hold off on the celebrations.The station people could be mistaken. Let's judge the signalsfor ourselves when the satellite comes back after its first orbitaround the Earth." 57       Eventually the distinct 'beep-beep-beep'of the craft came in clearly over the radio waves and the crowdbegan to celebrate. Chief Designer Ryazanskiy who was at the vanimmediately telephoned Korolev in the bunker. The ballistics expertsat the Coordination-Computation Center in Moscow had determinedthat the satellite was in an orbit with a perigee of 228 kilometersand an apogee of 947 kilometers, the latter about 80 kilometerslower than planned due to the early engine cut-off. Inclinationof the orbit to the Earth's equator was 65.6 degrees while orbitalperiod was 96.17 minutes. 58       Experts at the Moscow Center also ascertainedthat the satellite was slowly losing altitude, but State CommissionChairman Ryabikov waited until the second orbit was over priorto telephoning Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev.

Khrushchev's reaction to the launch was unusuallysubdued for an event of such magnitude and perhaps indicates thathe, like many others, had not grasped the true propaganda effectof such a historic occurrence. He later related:

-  When the satellite was launched, they phoned methat the rocket had taken the right course and that the satellitewas  already revolving around the earth. I congratulated the entiregroup of engineers and technicians on this outstanding  achievementand calmly went to bed.  59   

The official Soviet news agency TASS released thecommuniqué Ryabikov had authored on the morning of 5 October.Published in the morning edition of *Pravda*, it was exceptionallylow-key and was not the headline of the day:

-  For several years scientific research and experimentaldesign work have been conducted in the Soviet Union on the c creationof artificial satellites. As has already been reported in thepress, the first launching of the satellites in the USSR  wereplanned for realization in accordance with the scientific researchprogram of the International Geophysical Year. As a  result ofvery intensive work by scientific research institutes and designbureaus the first artificial satellite in the world  has beencreated. On October 4, 1957, this first satellite was successfullylaunched in the USSR. According to preliminary  data, the carrierrocket has imparted to the satellite the required orbital velocityof about 8,000 meters per second. At the  present time the satelliteis describing elliptical trajectories around the Earth, and itsflight can be observed in the rays of  the rising and settingSun with the aid of very simple optical instruments (binoculars,telescopes, etc.).  60   

The Soviet media did not ascribe a specific namefor the satellite, generally referring to it as 'Sputnik,' theRussian word for 'satellite,' often also loosely translated as'fellow traveler.'

As the media tumult over Sputnik began to mount inthe West, the Soviet leadership began to capitalize on the utterpandemonium pervading the discourse on the satellite in the UnitedStates. On 9 October, *Pravda* published a long report anonymouslyauthored by Korolev and other designers detailing the constructionand design of the satellite. 61       The parties responsible for thisgreat deed were, of course, not named. Having been involved inthe defense industry, the real job titles of the members of theCouncil of Chief Designers had always remained secret, althoughTikhonravov and others had freely published under their own namesthrough the 1950s on topics of general interest. This suddenlychanged as their names disappeared from official histories. Beginningwith the launch of Sputnik, of the four major contributors tothe success of Sputnik, Korolev, Glushko, and Keldysh were referredin the open press as the Chief Designer of Rocket-Space Systems,the Chief Designer of Rocket Engines, and the Chief Theoreticianof Cosmonautics respectively. The fourth, Tikhonravov, did noteven have a pseudonym for himself.

The titles not only hid their identities, but alsoadded an element of attraction and enigma to the men behind theworld's first space program. New editions of histories of Sovietrocketry published prior to 1957 ceased to carry Korolev's name,and Soviet encyclopedias now merely listed him as heading a laboratoryin an unspecified 'machine building' institute in the USSR. Glushkomeanwhile was now said to be laboratory chief at the Moscow Instituteof Mineral Fuels. 62       Korolev, certainly in recognition of the keyrole he played, was allowed to write in no less an important newspaperas *Pravda*, but under the pseudonym 'Professor K. Sergeyev.'His first article titled "Research into Cosmic Space"was published on 12 December 1957. Khrushchev claimed at the timethat as the years went by "the photographs and names of theseillustrious people will be made public," but that for themoment "in order to ensure the country's security and thelives of these scientists, engineers, technicians, and other specialists,we cannot yet make known their names or publish their photographs." 63

****Conclusion****

The timing of the Sputnik launch was motivated by a single reasoning: Korolev's drive to preempt a U.S. satellite launch attempt during the International Geophysical Year. At first, it was a competition with Vanguard. Spurred by the July 1955 announcement of U.S. satellite plans for the IGY, Korolev, joined by Tikhonravov and Keldysh, convinced both the government and the Academy of Sciences within a month to proffer support for a complex Soviet satellite project timed for launch before the IGY. A second jolt came as a result of miscommunication about a U.S. Army missile launch in September 1956. Putting the heavy scientific satellite on the backburner, Korolev's engineers put together a much simpler satellite to beat any American attempt. Once again, they timed it for launch before the start of the IGY. This 84 kilogram ball, although delayed several months, lifted off into orbit on 4 October 1957 and opened a new era.

	The political and cultural shock bequeathed by Sputnik set events in motion that eventually gave rise to Apollo, perhaps the central artifact of the so-called 'space race' of the Cold War. Conventional wisdom suggests that the race began on 4 October 1957 and ended on 20 July 1969 with the Moon landing. But as we begin to dig deeper into the origins of the space race, it is clear that that race began long before the launch of Sputnik, in 1955, with the Eisenhower Administration's famous announcement on satellites. And perhaps fortunately for the Soviet Union, it was a race in which one of the participants, the United States, did not even know it was running until it was too late.

****