The Advanced Turboprop Project:
Radical Innovation
in a Conservative Environment

by Mark D. Bowles and Virginia P. Dawson

In 1987, a Washington Post headline read, "The aircraft engine
of the future has propellers on it."1
To many this statement was something like heralding "the reincarnation
of silent movies."2 Why would an "old
technology" ever be chosen over a modem, new, advanced alternative? How
could propeller technology ever supplant the turbojet revolution? How could
the 'Jet set mind-set" of corporate executives, who demanded the prestige
of speed and "image and status with a Jet," ever be satisfied with a slow,
noisy, propeller-driven aircraft? 3
A Washington Times correspondent predicted that the turbojet would
not be the propulsion system of the future. Instead, the future would witness
more propellers than Jets and if "Star Wars hero Luke Skywalker ever became
chairman of a Fortune 500 company, he would replace the corporate jet with
a ... turboprop."4 It appeared that
a turboprop revolution was underway.

NASA Lewis Research Center's Advanced Turboprop Project (1976-1987)
was the source of this optimism. The energy crisis of the early 1970s served
as the catalyst for renewed government interest in aeronautics and NASA
launched this ambitious project to return to fuel saving, propeller-driven
aircraft. The Arab oil embargo brought difficult times to all of America,
but the airlines industry, in particular, suffered and feared for its future
in the wake of a steep rise in fuel prices. NASA responded to these fears
by creating a program to improve aircraft fuel efficiency. Of the six projects
NASA funded through this program, the Advanced Turboprop Project promised
the greatest payoffs in terms of fuel savings, but it was also the most
conceptually radical and technically demanding.

The project began in the early 1970s with the collaboration of two engineers,
Daniel Mikkelson from NASA Lewis, and Carl Rohrbach of Hamilton Standard,
the nation's last major propeller manufacturer. Mikkelson, then a young
aeronautical research engineer, went back to the old NACA wind tunnel reports
where he found a "glimmer of hope" that propellers could be redesigned
to make propeller-powered aircraft fly faster and higher than those of
the mid to late-1950s.5 Mikkelson and
Rohrbach came up with the concept of sweeping the propeller blades to reduce
noise and increase efficiency and NASA received a joint patent with Hamilton
Standard for the development of this technology. At Lewis, Mikkelson sparked
the interest of a small cadre of engineers and managers. They solved key
technical problems essential for the creation of the turboprop, while at
the same time they attracted support for the project. After a project office
was established, they became political advocates, using technical gains
and increasing acceptance to fight for continued funding. This involved
winning government, industry, and public support



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322 THE ADVANCED TURBOPROP PROJECT

|Photo of an advanced propeller on a test arm in the supersonic tunnel.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|An advanced propeller swirl recovery model is shown
in the NASA Lewis Research Centers 8 x 6 foot supersonic wind tunnel. Propeller
efficiencies and noise are measured at cruise much numbers up to 0. 80
and at takeoff and approach conditions. Vane pitch angles and propfan-to-vane
axial spacings are varied. The testing was part of the Advanced Turboprop
Project, with the goal of providing the technology base to enable the U.S.
development of quieter, fuel efficient turboprop engines with a comfortable
aircraft interior environment. (NASA photo no. 90-H-78).



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FROM ENGINEERING SCIENCE TO BIG SCIENCE 323

for the new propeller technology. Initially the project involved only
Hamilton Standard, but the aircraft engine manufacturers, Pratt & Whitney,
Allison, and General Electric, and the giants of the airframe industry,
Boeing, Lockheed, and McDonnell Douglas joined the bandwagon as the turboprop
appeared to become more and more technically and socialIy feasible. The
turboprop project became a large, well-funded, "heterogeneous collection
of human and material resources" that contemporary historians refer to
as "big science."6 At its height it
involved over forty industrial contracts, fifteen university grants, and
work at the four NASA research centers, Lewis, Langley, Dryden, and Ames.
The progress of the advanced turboprop development seemed to foreshadow
its future dominance of commercial flight.

The project had four technical stages: "concept development" from 1976
to 1978; "enabling technology" from 1978 to 1980; "large-scale integration"
from 1981 to 1987; and finally "flight research" in 1987.7
During each of these stages, NASA's engineers confronted and solved specific
technical problems that were necessary for the advanced turboprop project
to meet the defined government objectives concerning safety, efficiency
at high speeds, and environmental protection. NASA Lewis marshaled the
resources and support of the United States aeronautical community to bring
the development of the new technology to the point of successful flight
testing. In 1987, these NASA engineers, along with a wide-ranging industry
team, won the coveted Collier Trophy for developing a new fuel efficient
turboprop propulsion system.8 The winning
team included Hamilton Standard, General Electric, Lockheed, the Allison
Gas Turbine Division of General Motors, Pratt & Whitney, Rohr Industries,
Gulfstream, McDonnell Douglas, and Boeing certainly the largest, most
diverse group, to be so honored in the history of the prize.

Despite this technical success, the predicted turboprop revolution never
came, and no commercial or military air fleet replaced their jets with
propellers. The reason for this failure was socio-economic, not technical.
Throughout the project, social issues influenced and defined the status
of the advanced turboprop. From the beginning it was the perception of
an energy crisis, not a technological innovation, that spurred the idea
of the project itself. The Cold War and the existence of Soviet high-speed
turboprops played a key role in convincing Congress to fund the project.
As the project progressed, within each technological stage, the engineers
used distinctive and creative approaches to deal with the complex web of
government, industry, and academic contractors. More often than not, the
main question was not does the technology work, but how can we get government,
industry, and the public to accept this technology? In the end it was a
socioeconomic issue again which shelved the program. The reduction of fuel
prices ended the necessity for fuel conservation in the skies and today
the advanced turboprop remains a neglected, or "archived" technology.

This is not to imply that the technical achievements were unimportant.
Each distinct technical stage of the project determined a corresponding
social action. During the concept development stage, creative advocacy
was necessary to sell the government and industry on this radical idea.
During the enabling technology stage, engineers used complex project management
skills to ensure that this massive team would function effectively. During
the large-scale integration stage, NASA had to deal with a competitor that
surprised them by introducing its own high-speed turboprop. Finally, during
the flight research stage, NASA became aware that no current airlines would
adopt the advanced turboprop and thus the



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324 THE ADVANCED TURBOPROP PROJECT

engineers waged a battle to win the Collier Trophy to try and gain positive
status and recognition for their technical achievement.

The relationship between these technical and social spheres was never
either a simplistic story of social construction or technological determinism.
Rather, the relationship was one of interdependence. At times the project
advanced on its technical merits; at others, it progressed through political
persuasion. At each stage, only after NASA engineers and their industrial
and academic partners solved both the social and technical problems holding
it back, was the advanced turboprop project able to obtain funding and
move forward. But ultimately, the socio-economic issue of petroleum price
and availability managed to scuttle NASA's technical success.

Thomas Hughes, a prominent historian of technology, has argued that
the research and development organizations of the twentieth century, no
matter whether they are run by a government, industry, or members of a
university community, stifle technical creativity.9
In these organizations there can be found "no trace of a flash of genius."10
In contrast, the late 19th century for Hughes was the "golden era" of invention
a time when the independent inventor flourished without institutional
constraints. Recently, David Hounshell has challenged Hughes's contention
that industrial research laboratories "exploit creative, inventive geniuses;
they neither produce nor nurture them."11
Not only can the industrial research laboratory nurture a creative individual,
but collectively, people engaged in research and development contribute
to making an invention a commercial reality. In his study of the organization
of research at Du Pont, Hounshell paid tribute to the individual brilliance
of the organic chemist Wallace H. Carothers, but he argued that the real
"genius of nylon was in the organization that developed it into one of
the most successful and profitable materials of the twentieth century."12
In our view, the NASA Advanced Turboprop Project represents another case
in which organizational capabilities, not individual genius alone, create
the opportunity for significant innovation. The organization that supported
the development of the turboprop was far more complex than the research
laboratory of an industrial firm, yet it responded to the energy crisis
to advance a radical idea. As Donald Nored, who headed the office at NASA
Levis Research Center that managed the three aircraft energy efficiency
projects remarked, "The climate made people do things that normally they'd
be too conservative to do."13 The
history of the advanced turboprop demonstrates how a radical innovation
can emerge from a dense, conservative web of bureaucracy to nearly revolutionize
the world's aircraft propulsion systems.

The Conservative Team Environment

Although NASA won several Collier trophies for innovations related to
the space program, it had produced no winners in aeronautics since the
founding of the agency in 1958. NASA's predecessor organization, the National
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), had received five Collier trophies
for contributions to aeronautics between 1929 and 1958. These trophies
paid tribute to the individual creativity and the unique research environment
of the NACA's research laboratories. James R. Hansen has described in this
volume how engineer Fred E. Weick used the NACA's unique wind tunnel facilities
to develop



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FROM ENGINEERING SCIENCE TO BIG SCIENCE 325

the NACA low-drag cowling. Succeeding Collier trophies awarded under
the institutional aegis of the NACA followed a similar pattern. Lewis A.
Rodert won it for developing a thermal ice prevention system for aircraft
(see the essay by Glenn E. Bugos, this volume), John Stack won it twice
for his contributions to supersonic theory and the development of the transonic
wind tunnel, and Richard Whitcomb carried off the prize for his discovery
and empirical validation of the area rule. What made the award garnered
by the NASA/industry team in 1987 different was that it recognized the
collective talents of government engineers from four NASA research centers,
academic researchers, and contractors from the propeller, engine, airframe,
and airline industries.

The history of the turboprop project is interesting from an institutional
standpoint because it took root and flourished within NASA's conservative,
bureaucratic environment. It was modeled, not on NASA's small-scale aeronautical
research projects (typically carried on by former NACA laboratories), but
on the large-scale projects of the space program. The NASA Lewis Research
Center adopted an administratively complex team approach that depended
on input not simply from other NASA Centers, but also from numerous industrial
and university contractors. Essentially, NASA Lewis Research Center became
the center of an extensive government-industry-academic complex. At each
stage in the project, the management team determined what needed to be
done and sought the appropriate help both from within and outside NASA.

With its expertise in propulsion technology, the NASA Lewis Research
Center was ideally suited to manage the turboprop project. Set up in Cleveland,
Ohio, during World War II as an aircraft engine research laboratory, Lewis
became the third laboratory of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics.
Lewis engineers pursued aircraft engine research in the national interestoften
over the objection of the engine companies who perceived the government
as interfering with the normal forces of supply and demand. During the
early years of the Cold War, the laboratory participated in engine research
and testing to assist the engine companies in developing the turbojet engine.
After the launch of Sputnik, the laboratory focused on a new national priority-rocket
propulsion research and development. Almost all work on air-breathing engines
ceased for nearly ten years.

The return to aircraft engine research coincided with drastic reductions
in staff, mandated by cuts in NASA's large-scale space programs.14
The mass exodus of nearly 800 personnel in 1972 sparked an effort to redefine
the center's mission and find new sources of funding. The following year,
OPEC's oil embargo galvanized the Center's director, Bruce Lundin, to look
for ways to use its propulsion expertise to help solve the energy crisis.
In 1974, Lewis received $1.5 million for a wind-energy program from the
National Science Foundation and the Energy Research and Development Administration
(ERDA). A program in solar cell technology development followed on its
heels with increasing funding of various energy-related programs by ERDA
and its successor, the Department of Energy. The changing focus of the
Center's activities prompted rumors-emphatically denied-that it would become
part of ERDA. The new emphasis on energy efficient aircraft, unlike the
ERDA projects, promised to keep Lewis strongly in NASA's fold.15
Moreover, it brought high visibility to the aeronautics side of NASA, long
overshadowed by the enormous budgets and prestige of the space program.

Although it shared similarities in management with NASA's space projects,
the turboprop project differed in significant ways. First, although the
advanced turboprop was the reincarnation of an old idea, it involved the
creation of cutting-edge technology. Space



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326 THE ADVANCED TURBOPROP PROJECT

projects involved rigorous oversight, but generally relied on existing
technology. When necessary, NASA contracted with industry to produce whatever
new technology was needed for a particular mission. The turboprop project
tapped the creative talents of engineers at NASA in ways that were reminiscent
of the NACA tradition of in-house research, though in management scope
it transcended the narrow institutional boundaries of NASA's research centers.
Second, though all NASA projects of the early 1970s needed to be "sold"
to an increasingly tight-fisted Congress, the controversial nature of the
turboprop meant that NASA Lewis had to build support both at Headquarters
and within the aviation community. What NASA referred to as "advocacy"
needed to be vigorous and continuous throughout the life of the project.

The Energy Crisis and the Politics of Funding

The OPEC oil embargo of 1973 awakened the United States to the degree
of control outside nations had over the lives of every American. The increased
price of oil affected all areas of the economy, but none more than the
airlines industry.16 Earl Cook, noted
geographer and geologist, has argued, "Whoever controls the energy systems
can dominate the society."
17 An extension
of this argument is, whoever possesses the fuel supply controls the energy
systems. Five sources of energy, including petroleum, natural gas, coal,
hydropower, and nuclear, accounted for all fuel consumption in the United
States during 1973. Of these five sources, America was most dependent upon
petroleum, consuming approximately seventeen million barrels of oil a day.18
At no other time in American history was Cook's aphorism more evident than
in 1973 when the United States imported six million barrels of oil a day,
64 percent of which came from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC).19 The concern in the United
States was that since OPEC controlled the petroleum, could they dominate
American society?

In response to the energy crisis, in 1973 the airlines industry initiated
its own fuel-saving program which reduced fuel consumption by over one
billion gallons per year.20 But these
measures were not enough. jet fuel prices jumped from twelve cents to over
one dollar per gallon and total yearly fuel expenditures increased by one
billion dollars, or triple the earnings of the airlines. Prior to 1972,
fuel accounted for one-quarter of the commercial airlines' total direct
operating costs.21 During the crisis,
fuel represented over half of the airlines' operating costs. The result
was a reduction in the number of flights, the grounding of some aircraft,
and the "furloughing" of some 10,000 employees. If the situation in the
early 1970s seemed bad, prospects for the future appeared even worse. Linking
the fate of the airlines, the cost of jet fuel and the prosperity of the
nation as a whole, airlines industry lobbyists rushed to their congressmen.
The politicians, in turn, appealed to NASA.



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FROM ENGINEERING SCIENCE TO BIG SCIENCE 327

Pie Chart of US Energy Sources. Petroleum climbs from 14 to 46% from 1920-1973 Opec imports account for 65.5% of total 1973 imports.

Why was jet fuel so important to our national interest? Clifton F. Von
Kann, senior vicepresident of the Air Transport Association of America,
pointed out in a 1975 Senate statement that airlines were "more than just
another means of transportation ."22
He asserted they played a major part in the economic and military success
of the nation. They also



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328 THE ADVANCED TURBOPROP PROJECT

provided the infrastructure for the mail system, the national export
system, and the $60 billion tourist industry. jet fuel was the "life-blood"
of the airlines, but it was also their Achilles heel. He warned a failure
to control the rising cost of fuel might result in either the nationalization
or the withering away of the "basic building block in the structure of
the U.S. economy."23 Senator Barry
Goldwater linked this crisis to the possible "loss of a large part of our
world supremacy."24 The fuel crisis
created an opportunity for NASA at a time when Congress had drastically
cut funding for the space program. Aeronautics, the first "A" in NASA,
had long taken a back seat to the spectacular space missions of the Apollo
years. Now the agency was ready to reassert its role as the nation's premier
institution for research and development in civil aeronautics.

In January 1975, James Fletcher, the NASA Administrator, received a
letter from Senators Barry Goldwater and Frank Moss. 25
The letter suggested a massive technology project involving NASA and industry
to help ease the burden on the airlines caused by the energy crisis. Its
goal was the realization of a new generation of fuel-efficient aircraft.
Goldwater and Moss asked NASA to propose a plan, develop the technology,
and facilitate the "technology transfer process" to industry.26
Technology transfer later became a particularly thorny issue in the debate
over whether the government should carry development to the point of costly
flight testing, or leave that phase to the manufacturers who stood to benefit
handsomely from this government-generated technology.
In February 1975, NASA formed the Intercenter Aircraft Fuel Conservation
Technology Task Force to explore all potential options .27
Sixteen government scientists and engineers from NASA, the Department of
Transportation, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Department
of Defense took part in the seven-month study. 28
James Kramer, the task force leader, called for any new ideas that would
satisfy government criteria, even those that might be considered "unusual."
The task force defined six major areas with the potential for significant
impact on aircraft fuel efficiency. It recommended the creation within
NASA of the Aircraft Energy Efficiency (ACEE) Program, the administrative
umbrella for six new aeronautics projects three related to the airframe
and three to the propulsion system.29

NASA assigned management of the three propulsion projects to the NASA
Lewis Research Center. The first of these propulsion projects focused on
improving existing turbofan engines through the redesign of selected engine
components. It was the least technically challenging of the three projects
and aimed for a five percent increase in fuel efficiency within a few years.
The second project, the Energy Efficient Engine (E3), involved
building 11 a brand new engine from scratch" and offered a far greater
payoff an increase in fuel efficiency of ten to fifteen percent. In essence,
NASA proposed to assume the risk for developing an "all new technology
in an all up engine."30 With a new
"recoupment program" in place, the government expected to get back some
of its investment out of the profits of the engine manufacturers, General
Electric and Pratt & Whitney.



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FROM ENGINEERING SCIENCE TO BIG SCIENCE 329

In contrast to these two relatively conservative projects, the advanced
turboprop offered dramatic increases in fuel efficiency. NASA planners
believed that an advanced turboprop could reduce fuel consumption by twenty
to thirty percent over existing turbofan engines with comparable performance
and passenger comfort at speeds up to Mach 0.8 and altitudes up to 30,000
feet. (It should be noted that commuter turboprop-powered aircraft in current
use fly at far slower speeds and lower altitudes.) The ambitious goals
of the turboprop project made it controversial and challenging both from
a technical and social point of view. Technically, studies by Boeing, McDonnell
Douglas, and Lockheed pointed to four areas of concern: propeller efficiency
at cruise speeds, both internal and external noise problems, installation
aerodynamics, and maintenance costs.31
Socially, the turboprop also presented daunting problems. Because of the
"perception of turboprops as an old-fashioned, troublesome device with
no passenger appeal," the task force report noted, "the airlines and the
manufacturers have little motivation to work on this engine type."32
Clifton Von Kann succinctly summed up these concerns to Barry Goldwater
during his Senate testimony when he said that of all the proposed projects,
"the propeller is the real controversial one."33

What made the government willing to assume the risk for such a difficult
project? Proposed fuel savings was one important factor. However, the task
force report indicated another significant and related issue the Soviet
Union had a high speed "turboprop which could fly from Moscow to Havana."34
The continuing Cold War prompted the United States to view any Soviet technical
breakthrough as a potential threat to American security. During the energy
crisis, the knowledge that Soviet turboprop transports had already achieved
high propeller fuel efficiency at speeds approaching those of jet-powered
planes seemed grave indeed and gave impetus to the NASA program. During
the government hearings, NASA representatives displayed several photos
of Russian turboprop planes to win congressional backing for the project.35
The Cold War helped to define the turboprop debate. No extensive speculation
on the implications of Russian air superiority for American national security
seemed necessary. The Soviet Union could not be allowed to maintain technical
superiority in an area as vital as aircraft fuel efficiency. Thus, the
report included the demanding Advanced Turboprop Project as part of the
ten-year, $670 million Aircraft Energy Efficiency Program to improve fuel
efficiency.

Concept Development and Early Advocacy

Industry resistance and NASA Headquarters' sensitivity to the public
relations aspect of this opposition were among the key reasons that of
the six projects within the Aircraft Energy Efficiency (ACEE) program,
only the advanced turboprop failed to receive funding in 1976. John Klineberg,
later director of Lewis Research Center, recalled that it was delayed "because
it was considered too high risk and too revolutionary to be accepted by
the airlines."36



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330 THE ADVANCED TURBOPROP PROJECT

If the advanced turboprop was so important to the national welfare,
why did it encounter such opposition from the airframe and aircraft engine
manufacturers? Donald Nored, the division chief in charge of the three
propulsion projects at Lewis, remarked that his engineering peers in industry
were "very conservative and they had to be." They were "against propellers"
because they had "completely switched over to jets." Because of their commitment
to the turbojet, they continually cited problems that they believed resulted
from propellers. This included noise, maintenance, and the fear that the
"blades would come apart." Nored recalled each problem had to be "taken
up one at a time and dealt with."37
It appears the government's revolutionary vision of the future frightened
the aircraft industry with its large investment in turbofan technology.
Aircraft structures and engines are improved in slow, conservative, incremental
steps. To change the propulsion system of the nation's entire commercial
fleet represented an investment of mind-boggling proportions. Even if the
government put several hundred million dollars into developing an advanced
turboprop, the airframe and aircraft engine industries would still need
to invest several billion dollars to commercialize it. Revolutionary change
did not come easily to an established industry so vital to the nation's
economy.

Turboprop advocates encountered not only the opposition of industry
representatives, but the hesitation and timidity of NASA Headquarters.
By default, the advocacy role fell to NASA Lewis engineers, though the
public relations aspect of technology funding had never been the Cleveland
laboratory's strong suit. Lewis had a reputation for being more conservative
and technical than the other NASA Centers.38
One Lewis engineer remarked that when other Centers sent five representatives
to important meetings, Lewis sent one. Moreover, research engineers from
the aeronautics side of NASA had little experience managing major contracts.
Yet the energy crisis and the need for projects to sustain the Center's
viability within NASA galvanized a small cadre of Lewis engineers into
action. They used their technical and new-found managerial creativity to
sell NASA Headquarters and industry on a revolutionary new propulsion system
one that might forever ground all existing subsonic turbojets.

Technically, the entire future of the advanced turboprop project initially
depended on proving whether a model propfan could achieve the predicted
fuel efficiency rates.39 If this model
yielded successful results, then project advocates would be able to lobby
for increased funding for a large research and development program. Thus,
even during its earliest phase, the technical and social aspects of the
project worked in tandem.

Lewis project managers awarded a small group of researchers at Lewis
and Hamilton Standard a contract for the development of a two-foot diameter
model propfan, called the SR-1 or single-rotating propfan. Single-rotating
meant that the propfan had only one row of blades, as opposed to a counter-rotating
design with two rows of blades, each moving in opposite directions. This
model achieved high efficiency rates and provided technical data that the
small group of engineers could use as ammunition in the fight to continue
the program.

At the same time that they proved the technology using small-scale models,
Lewis engineers built a consensus for the project, defending it against
objections of skeptical segments of industry and government advisory committees.
Advocacy is essentially "marketing" or "selling" to gain government funding
and industry backing for new programs like the advanced turboprop. Funding
government programs is neither scientific nor entirely rational, but depends
on people and how they navigate a complex bureaucracy,



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FROM ENGINEERING SCIENCE TO BIG SCIENCE 331

Slide showing Lewis as the center project advocate between management, government, academic, and other lab interests.

while avoiding numerous political entanglements. During the Apollo years,
NASA had what amounted to a blank check to land a human being on the Moon
within a decade. Not needing to spend time and energy fighting for funding,
engineers had greater freedom to focus on building and testing hardware
and managing space missions. But to keep the programs of the 1970s alive,
even those that responded to a national crisis, required effort in non-technological
spheres of activity.

Lewis was fortunate that Donald Nored, a maestro of project management,
played a strong role in building a constituency in support of the project.
Unlike most of the other Lewis engineers involved in advanced turboprop
development, he hailed from the space side of NASA's house. He had worked
on chemical rockets and high power lasers prior to taking up his post as
head of the Aircraft Energy Efficiency Program Office at Lewis in 1975.
He helped to show aeronautical engineers, more at ease with in-house research,
how to negotiate the system to win funding. In 1981, with Frank Berkopec,
Nored attempted to demystify the advocacy process by laying down guidelines
for others within the Aeronautics Directorate. They disabused their order-seeking
engineering colleagues of the notion that advocacy could be compressed
into a series of well-defined steps. Rather, they wrote, it is



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332 THE ADVANCED TURBOPROP PROJECT

Slide showing the workflow of proposals and funding through the Lewis Research Center Advocacy Process.





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"basically informal, unstructured, and quite often confusing."40
Since only a few of the proposed NASA programs received funding each year,
they argued, the advocacy process had become essential and activities related
to it should receive a "high priority."41

The advocacy guidelines indicated that the interactions with "industry,
advisory groups, and especially Headquarters will often require rapid,
comprehensive, and in-depth respondents [sic] to requests."42
One early request of the turboprop project centered on the aircraft industry's
concern over the safety of propellers. An aircraft accident advisor raised
a question during a meeting of the Industrial Advisory Board at NASA Headquarters
concerning the "safety aspect of propellers breaking away from the engine
and the damage caused by their impingement into the fuselage."43
Lewis engineers quickly launched their own study into propeller safety
and commissioned similar studies at Hamilton Standard and Detroit Diesel
Allison. The results were overwhelmingly positive. Lewis examined over
12,000 accident reports from 1973 to 1975 and found no instance where a
propeller blade broke away from its engine.44
Hamilton Standard reported that after fifty million hours of propeller
flight time there had never been an instance of structural failure.45
While after twenty million hours, Detroit Diesel Allison found one structural
failure; they were quick to point out that "the aircraft landed routinely
without further incident and no one was injured in the aircraft or on the
ground."46 This example typifies not
only the early skepticism and resistance by industry to the idea of returning
to propeller aircraft but also the "rapid, comprehensive, and in-depth
responses" of NASA to industry's concerns. The advocacy process required
to "market" and "sell" the radical turboprop project was in full swing.
It continued to effectively diffuse the concerns of skeptics.

Enabling Technology and Project Management

Successful advocacy brought the formal establishment of the Advanced
Turboprop Project in 1978 and initiation of the enabling technology phase.
As the lead Center for the project, NASA Lewis had full responsibility
for the management of its increasingly far-flung and complicated pieces.
Before this phase began, NASA engineers devised a detailed "management
approach" and the plan was approved in 1977. Officially, Lewis was to have
"responsibility to execute all detailed project planning documentation,
develop and implement the procurement of components and systems, provide
technical direction to contractors, perform contract administration, perform
engineering functions, coordinate the related in-house research and technology
programs, and exercise the usual project review reporting and control functions."47
These interrelated activities put Lewis in the middle of an intricate web
of government (other NASA Centers), industry, and academic contracts. Project
managers were responsible for assigning the technology contracts. They
also had the equally important function of ensuring that both the public
and the government viewed the ATP positively.



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334 THE ADVANCED TURBOPROP PROJECT

Flowchart showing Project Management



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FROM ENGINEERING SCIENCE TO BIG SCIENCE 335

Map of US showing ATP academic contacts and locations.

Once the management structure was in place, the technology studies could
begin. Technically, this phase dealt with four critical problems: modification
of propeller aerodynamics, cabin and community noise, installation aerodynamics,
and drive systems.48 Propeller aerodynamic
work included extensive investigations of blade sweep, twist, and thickness.
The late 1970s was the first time that engineers used a high speed computer
to analyze the design of a propeller. Computers were not yet in widespread
use when the turbofan replaced propeller-powered planes in the 1950s. Lewis
programmers used their Cray supercomputers to develop the first three-dimensional
propeller aerodynamic analysis, A further structural and aerodynamic achievement
was to use thinner titanium blades to reduce the flutter problems associated
with the steel propeller blades used in the 1940s and 1950s.

The advantage of propellers to save fuel had to be balanced against
the potential harm to the environment their noise caused.49
New computer-generated design codes not only contributed to improved propeller
efficiency, but contributed to solving problems associated with noise.
Engineers closely monitored the effect of propeller noise on both cabin
occupants and people on the ground. To study propeller acoustics, they
mounted propeller models on a JetStar aircraft fuselage at the NASA Dryden
facility. Microphones located on the airframe and also on a Learjet chase
plane provided data at close range and at a distance. After reviewing the
sound pattern data, they concluded that substantial



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336 THE ADVANCED TURBOPROP PROJECT

noise reduction technology was necessary to meet the established goals.
Eventually, they achieved a reduction of sixty to sixty-five decibels of
noise through a combination of structural advances and flight path modifications.

The final two technical problems of the enabling phase dealt with installation
aerodynamics and the drive system. Numerous installation arrangements were
possible for mounting the turboprop on the wing. Should the propeller operate
by "pushing" or "pulling" the aircraft? How should the propeller, nacelle,
and the wing be most effectively integrated to reduce drag and increase
fuel efficiency? Wind tunnel tests were able to reduce drag significantly
by determining the most advantageous wing placement for the propeller.
Engineers also examined various drive train problems, including the gearboxes.

Solutions to all the enabling phase technical problems was still not
enough to guarantee the continued funding of the program. Key social questions
were still associated with this controversial technology. A vital concern
for the advanced turboprop project managers was the social question concerning
passengers: how receptive would they be to propeller-driven aircraft? In
1975, a government panel reported that they were "generally opposed to
the turboprop aircraft, primarily because they felt that there would be
little or no public acceptance." 50
If the public would not fly in a turboprop plane, all the potential fuel
savings would be lost flying empty planes across the country.

In response to this concern, NASA and United Airlines initiated an in-flight
questionnaire to determine customer reaction to propellers. Both NASA and
industry were aware of the disastrous consequences for the future of the
program if this study found that the public was against the return of propeller
planes. As a result, the questionnaire de-emphasized the propeller as old
technology and emphasized the turboprop as the continuation and advancement
of flight technology. The first page of the survey consisted of a letter
from the United Airlines vice president of marketing to the passenger asking
for cooperation in a "joint industry-government study concerning the application
of new technology to future aircraft."51
This opening letter did not mention the new turboprops. The turboprop,
inconspicuously renamed the "prop-fan" to give it a more positive connotation,
did not make its well-disguised appearance until page four of the survey
where the passenger is finally told that "'prop-fan' planes could fly as
high, as safely, and almost as fast and smooth as jet aircraft." This was
a conscious rhetorical shift from the term "propeller" to "prop-fan" to
disassociate it in peoples' minds from the old piston engine technology
of the pre-jet propulsion era. Brian Rowe, a General Electric vice president
with oversight of the advanced propeller projects, explained this new labeling
strategy. He said, "They're not propellers. They're fans. People felt that
modern was fans, and old technology was propellers. So now we've got this
modern propeller which we want to call a fan."52
The questionnaire explained to the passenger that not only did the "'prop-fans'
... look more like fan blades than propellers," they would also use twenty
to thirty percent less fuel than jet aircraft.

The questionnaire then displayed three sketches of planes-two were propeller
driven and the third was a turbofan. The passenger had to choose which
one he or she would "prefer to travel in." Despite all the planes being
in-flight, the sketches depicted the propellers as simple circles (no blades
present), while the individual blades of the turbofan were visible. These
were all subtle and effective hints to the passenger that the "prop-fan"
was nothing new and that they were already flying in planes powered by
engines with fan blades.



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FROM ENGINEERING SCIENCE TO BIG SCIENCE 337

Not surprisingly, the survey yielded favorable results for the turboprop.
Of 4,069 passengers surveyed, fifty percent said that they "would fly prop-fan,"
thirty-eight percent had "no preference," and only twelve percent preferred
a jet.53 If the airlines could avoid
fare increases due to the implementation of the turboprop, eighty-seven
percent of the respondents stated they would prefer to fly in the new turboprop.
Relieved and buoyed by the results, NASA engineers liked to point out that
most of the passengers did not even know what propulsion system was currently
on the wing of their aircraft.54 According
to Mikkelson, all the passengers wanted to know was "how much were the
drinks, and how much was the ticket."55
Equally relieved was Robert Collins, vice president of engineering for
United Airlines, who concluded that this "carefully constructed
passenger survey ... indicated that a prop-fan with equivalent passenger
comfort levels would not be negatively viewed, especially if it were recognized
for its efficiency in reducing fuel consumption and holding fares down."56

At times project management also involved informing and changing government
opinion. Aeronautics programs within NASA, because of the low levels at
which they were traditionally funded, had never required close oversight
by the General Accounting Office (GAO). The large budget and greater visibility
of the Aircraft Energy Efficiency Program (ACEE) suddenly brought it unwanted
attention. The first draft of the General Accounting Office's 1979 review,
though generally favorable toward the ACEE program, was highly critical
of the advanced turboprop project. It concluded with the statement that
the "GAO believes that much of the fuel savings under ACEE attributed to
the turboprop will not be realized. "57

The draft's "negative tone" and "misleading and distorted view of the
program" deeply concerned NASA Lewis project managers who feared the repercussions
it would have on funding decisions.58
They quickly went on the attack. Center Director John Klineberg heatedly
responded that the GAO had treated the turboprop project unfairly in comparison
with the other aircraft efficiency projects, calling the GAO ignorant of
the project's "inherent uncertainties."59

NASA Lewis project managers prevailed in the battle against the negativity
of the GAO draft report. The final publication specifically contained a
retraction. The "GAO carefully reevaluated its presentation and made appropriate
adjustments where it might be construed that the tone was unnecessarily
negative or the data misleading." An example of these "appropriate adjustments"
is apparent in a comparison of how one sentence changed from the draft
to the final version. In the draft, the sentence appeared as: "The Task
Force Report shows that in 1975 there was considerable disagreement on
the ultimate likelihood of a turboprop engine being used on commercial
airliners."60 In the final publication,
the GAO amended the same sentence to: "The possible use of turboprop



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338 THE ADVANCED TURBOPROP PROJECT

engines on 1995 commercial aircraft is still uncertain, but has gained
support since 1975."61 These editorial
changes giving the report a positive spin indicate the effectiveness of
project managers in changing public opinion. Everyone, it seemed, had begun
to associate the advanced turboprop technology with the possibility of
bringing about an aeronautical "revolution," a paradigm shift, or as Forbes
magazine headlined in 1984, "The Next Step." As surely as 'jets drove propellers
from the skies," the new "radical designs" could bring a new propeller
age to the world.62

It is important to underscore how important the interpersonal skills
of the project managers were to continuation of the program throughout
this enabling technology phase. They were responsible not only for managing
the project's technology, but also for enabling, proving, maintaining,
and adjusting support for the turboprop. They continued to push this controversial
technology against the conservative interests of the government, industry,
and the public. Their consistent success paved the way for the third stage.

Large-Scale Integration and Competition

After two years of work, the advanced turboprop idea began to attract
greater commercial interest. As a result of NASA's advocacy efforts, news
articles began to predict the coming propeller "revolution." All indicators
pointed to the introduction of the new turboprops on commercial aircraft
by the 1990s. With the small-scale model testing complete, a data base,
and an acceptable design methodology established, the project moved into
its most labor and cost intensive phase that of large-scale integration.
The project still had serious uncertainties and problems associated with
transferring the designs from a small-scale model to a large-scale prop-fan.
Could engineers maintain propulsion efficiency, low noise levels, and structural
integrity with an increase in size? The Large-Scale Advanced Prop-fan (LAP)
project initiated in 1980 would answer these scalability questions and
provide a database for the development and production of full-size turbofans.

As a first step, NASA had to establish the structural integrity of the
advanced turboprop.63 Project managers
initially believed that in the development hierarchy performance came first,
then noise, and finally structure. As the project advanced, it became clear
that structural integrity was the key technical problem.64
Without the correct blade structure, performance could never achieve predicted
fuel savings. NASA awarded Hamilton Standard the contract for the structural
blade studies that were so crucial to the success of the whole program.
In 1981, they began to design a large-scale, single-rotating prop-fan made
of composite material. Five years later they completed construction on
a 9-foot-diameter design very close to the size of a commercial model.
The model was so large that no wind tunnel in the United States could accommodate
it. The turboprop managers decided to risk the possibility that the European
aviation community might benefit from the technology that NASA had so arduously
perfected. They shipped the large-scale propeller, called the SR-7L, to
a wind tunnel in Modane, France, for testing. In early 1986, researchers
subjected the model to speeds up to Mach 0.8 with simulated altitudes of
12,000 feet. The results confirmed the data obtained from the small model
propeller designs. The large-scale model was a success.



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FROM ENGINEERING SCIENCE TO BIG SCIENCE 339

Chart of crude oil prices 1972 to 1992 shows a peak triple the average price at 1984 before coming back to around 125% pre peak values.

Success spawns imitators. While NASA continued to work with Allison,
Pratt & Whitney and Hamilton Standard to develop its advanced turboprop,
General Electric (GE)Pratt & Whitney's main competitor was quietly
developing an alternative propeller system. A feature of radical inventions
is that competitors often introduce alternative forms of a similar technology
before one form can prevail over another. Historians of technology have
shown many cases of "interpretative flexibility" when "two or even more
social groups with clearly developed technological frames [artifacts] are
striving for dominance in the field."65
This happened when General Electric introduced its own radical alternative
to NASA's advanced turboprop project-the Unducted Fan (UDF). GE sprang
the unducted fan on NASA completely by surprise.

In NASA's design, the propeller rotated in one direction. This was called
a single rotation tractor system and included a relatively complicated
gearbox. Since one of the criticisms against the turboprop planes of the
1950s (the Electra, for example), was that their gearboxes required heavy
maintenance, GE took a different approach to prop-fan design. Beginning
in 1982, GE engineers spent five years developing a gearless, counter-rotating,
pusher system. They mounted two propellers (or fans) on the rear of the
plane that literally pushed it in flight, as opposed to the "pulling" of
conventional propellers. In 1983, the aircraft engine division of General
Electric released the unducted fan design to NASA shortly before flight
tests of the NASA industry design were scheduled. Suddenly there were two
turboprop projects competing for the same funds. Nored recalled: "They
wanted us to



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340 THE ADVANCED TURBOPROP PROJECT

drop everything and give them all our money and we couldn't do that."66
NASA Headquarters endorsed the "novel" unducted fan proposal and told NASA
Lewis to cooperate with General Electric on the unducted fan development
and testing.

Despite NASA's initial reluctance to support two projects, the unducted
fan proved highly successful. In 1985, ground tests demonstrated a fuel
conservation rate of twenty percent.67
Development of the unducted fan leapt ahead of NASA's original geared design.
One year later, on August 20, 1986, GE installed its unducted fan on the
right wing of a Boeing 727. Thus, to many NASA engineers' dismay, the first
flight of an advanced turboprop system demonstrated the technical feasibility
of the unducted fan system a proprietary engine belonging entirely to
General Electric, rather than the product of the joint NASA/industry team.
Nevertheless, the competition between the two systems, and the willingness
of private industry to invest its own development funds, helped build even
greater momentum for acceptance of the turboprop concept.

NASA engineers continued to perfect their single-rotating turboprop
system through preliminary stationary flight testing.68
The first step was to take the Hamilton Standard SR-7A propfan and combine
it with the Allison turboshaft engine and gearbox housed within a special
tilt nacelle. NASA engineers conducted a static or stationary test at Rohr's
Brown Field at Chula Vista, California, where they mounted the nacelle,
gearbox, engine, and propeller on a small tower. The stationary test met
all performance objectives after fifty hours of testing in May and June
1986. This success cleared the way for an actual flight test of the turboprop
system. In July 1986 engineers dismantled the static assembly and shipped
the parts to Savannah, Georgia, for reassembly on a modified Gulfstream
II with an eight-blade, single-rotation, turboprop on its left wing.69
The radical dreams of the NASA engineers for fuel efficient propellers
were finally close to becoming reality. The plane contained over 600 sensors
to monitor everything from acoustics to vibration. Flight testing-the final
stage of advanced turboprop development-took place in 1987 when a modified
Gulfstream II took flight in the Georgia skies. These flight tests proved
the predictions of a twenty to thirty percent fuel savings (made by NASA
in the early 1970s) were indeed correct.

On the heels of the successful tests, of both the GE and the NASA-industry
team designs, came not only increasing support for propeller systems themselves,
but also high visibility from media reports forecasting the next propulsion
revolution. The New York Times predicted the "Return of the propellers"
while a Washington Times headline read, "Turboprops are back!"70
Further testing indicated that this propulsion technology was ready for
commercial development. As late as 1989, the U.S. aviation industry was
"considering the development of several new engines and aircraft that may
incorporate advanced turboprop propulsion systems."71
But the economic realities of 1987 were far different from those predicted
in the early 1970s. Though all the technology and social problems standing
in the way of commercialization were resolved, the advanced turboprop never
reached production, a casualty of the one contingency that NASA engineers
never anticipated that fuel prices would go down. (See figure 5) Once
the energy crisis passed, the need for the advanced turboprop vanished.



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FROM ENGINEERING SCIENCE TO BIG SCIENCE 341

Environmental Contingency and Insufficient Momentum

One of the main difficulties in the development of a radical new technology
is the potential project threatening problems that arise. If they are left
unsolved they can destroy an entire project. Historian of technology Thomas
Hughes called these problems "reverse salients." Hughes argues that all
large technological systems (of which the turboprop is an example) include
political, economic, social, and technological components.72
These system components are interrelated so that if one of the components
is changed or altered in any way, the rest of the system will also be affected.
The systems themselves grow and gain momentum by the process of removing
"reverse salients," which arise and could potentially cause the system
to fail. An example will help clarify the importance of solving these critical
problems. In 1878, Thomas Edison encountered a technological reverse salient
in his attempt to develop his electric-lighting system. This problem was
the short-lived filament of the incandescent bulb. Edison realized that
even if he solved this problem, a further economic reverse salient remained.
The expense of the copper wire needed to link the entire system together
was cost prohibitive for potential wide-scale acceptance. If Edison could
not reduce the amount of copper needed for his electric system, then gas-lighting
systems would become the more attractive alternative to the problem of
street lighting. What is important to understand is that either the technological
or the economic reverse salient could have caused the Edison system of
electric-lighting to fail.73

Like Edison, the managers of the turboprop project also confronted a
variety of critical problems. These problems included economic (the necessity
of maintaining a favorable ratio of cost to implement turboprop technology
versus savings in fuel efficiency), political (how to receive funding for
a long-term project), social (how to implement a technology which the public
could perceive as a "step backward"), institutional (how to successfully
manage the government, industry, and academic relations), and technical
(how to actually build a turboprop that improved fuel efficiency by twenty
to thirty percent). Each of these problems had the potential to sabotage
the entire system. NASA engineers had their own, more practical and direct
term for "reverse salient" a "showstopper." In 1984, engineers listed
a number of technical show-stoppers that threatened to derail the project
if left unsolvedfor example, unacceptable levels of cabin noise.74

As system-builders solve critical problems, the system itself generates
momentum. This momentum continues to increase and build until, according
to Hughes, either a conversion, a catastrophe, or a contingency occurs.
Conversions and catastrophes break momentum through either a change in
societal belief, like a religious conversion, or a massive technological
failure, like a nuclear-reactor catastrophe. But, it is the role of contingency
which interests us here as the key factor in the current neglect of the
advanced turboprop technology. Hughes identified one particular "contingent
environmental change" that altered the course of the entire automobile
industry the energy crisis. He argues, "The oil embargo of 1973 and the
subsequent rise in gasoline prices ultimately compelled U.S. automobile
manufacturers to change substantially an automobile design that had been
singularly appropriate to a low-cost-energy environment."75



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342 THE ADVANCED TURBOPROP PROJECT

The development and subsequent neglect of advanced turboprop technology
is the result of this same environmental contingency. In the early 1970s,
the energy crisis created a situation which made it a national necessity
for the government to explore new ways to conserve fuel. What the managers
of the Advanced Turboprop Project (ATP) did not anticipate and could not
control was a decrease in the cost of fuel. As the energy crisis subsided
in the 1980s and the fuel prices decreased, there was no longer a favorable
ratio of cost to implement turboprop technology versus savings in fuel
efficiency. As John R. Facey, advanced turboprop program manager at NASA
Headquarters, wrote, "An all new aircraft with advanced avionics, structures,
and aerodynamics along with high-speed turboprops would be much more expensive
than current turbofan-powered aircraft, and fuel savings would not be enough
to offset the higher initial cost."76
In the case of the ATP, its managers overcame all of their critical problems.
However, when contingent economic conditions changed so that fuel cost
was no longer a critical problem, regardless of the technical success of
the project, the advanced turboprop lost its potential market in the industrial
world.

Yet Keith Sievers, at that time the manager of the ATP, along with a
handful of project staff, was convinced that the NASA industry team had
made a significant contribution to aviation that ought to receive recognition.
To win the Collier Trophy, he again summoned up the advocacy skills that
had proved so valuable in bringing the controversial advanced turboprop
to the point of technical feasibility. He used them to lobby for the prestigious
Collier Trophy among the wide aeronautical constituency that had participated
in advanced turboprop development. NASA Headquarters initially expressed
some reluctance to lobby for awarding a prize for technology that was unlikely
to be used at least in the near future. But the timing was perfect. There
was little competition from NASA's space endeavors since staff in the space
directorate were still in the midst of recovering from the tragic Challengerexplosion.
As a result, the National Aeronautic Association awarded NASA Lewis and
the NASA Industry Advanced Turboprop Team the Collier Trophy at ceremonies
in Washington, DC. Today, the technology remains "on the shelf," or "archived,"
awaiting the time when fuel conservation again becomes a necessity.77

Despite the current neglect of the advanced turboprop, this case study
demonstrates how radical innovation can emerge from within a conservative,
bureaucratic government agency. The governmentnot industryassumed the
risk for developing the new technology. It used taxpayers' money to advance
a radical idea to the point of technical feasibility. Engineers involved
in the project used advocacy to build a consensus among the members of
the aeronautical community that the advanced turboprop would prove a viable
alternative to the far less energy efficient turbofan technology. Indeed,
the technical and social achievements of the project were convincing enough
to drive General Electric to invest its own funds to develop a competing
design. This competition was evidence of wide acceptance for the turboprop
concept.

The Collier Trophy in 1987 was presented to the "Lewis and the NASA
Industry Advanced Turboprop Team.'' The team, defined in its widest possible
context, included General Electric's independent contribution of the UDF
and its subsequent flight testing by NASA. In contrast to previous Collier
trophies in aeronautics won by the NACA, no individual received special
mention. Certainly, throughout the eleven years of its existence the project
had encouraged inventiveness of individuals in a variety of disciplines,
from highly theoretical contributions in blade design and acoustics to
more routine testing.



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FROM ENGINEERING SCIENCE TO BIG SCIENCE 343

Participants in the project ran the gamut from government, university,
and industry researchers. But what the prize recognized above all was the
project's management genius. NASA Lewis managers did not simply manage
contracts. They kept the project alive. They used advocacy to win industry
participation and cooperation, as well as stimulate competition. They pushed
both the technical and the social aspects of the project to create the
system's momentum. Yet once the energy crisis passed, this momentum was
insufficient to dislodge the massive technological momentum of the existing
turbofan system.

NASA engineers involved in the ATP project still remain confident that
the future economic conditions will make the turboprop attractive again.
When fuel becomes scarce and fuel prices begin to rise, the turboprop's
designs will be "on the shelf' ready to respond with tremendous fuel-efficient
savings. But, technological neglect is not the enthusiastic success on
which NASA engineers built their careers. Donald Nored wistfully reflected
on the project and said, "We almost made it. Almost made it."78
78. Noted interview.



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