UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 95-5356

SOPHIA PERCH,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

J. Frederick Motz, Chief District Judge.

(CR-94-466-JFM)

Submitted: December 19, 1995

Decided: January 8, 1996

Before ERVIN, Chief Judge, HAMILTON, Circuit Judge,

and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

James K. Bredar, Federal Public Defender, Beth M. Farber, Assistant

Federal Public Defender, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant.

Lynne A. Battaglia, United States Attorney, Ira L. Oring, Assistant

United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

After pleading guilty to bank embezzlement under 18 U.S.C.A.

§ 656 (West Supp. 1995), Sophia Perch appeals her sentence of restitution. She claims that the district court failed to make necessary

factual findings before ordering restitution and impermissibly delegated judicial duties to a probation officer. Finding no reversible

error, we affirm.

Perch pled guilty to a one-count information charging her with

bank embezzlement under 18 U.S.C.A. § 656. The presentence report

estimated the loss at approximately $97,000, and detailed her financial resources, her and her dependents' needs, and other relevant factors. See United States v. Molen, 9 F.3d 1084, 1086 (4th Cir. 1993),

cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 62 U.S.L.W. 3722 (U.S. May 2, 1994)

(No. 93-7805). The court set restitution at $30,000 pursuant to the

Victim and Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3663, 3664 (West

1985 & Supp. 1995), and ordered Perch to pay that amount "at the

rate to be determined by the Probation Officer."

Perch failed to raise the issues presented here during the proceedings below, where they should have been presented in the first

instance.* Thus, her appeal is subject to the plain error standard of

review. United States v. Olano, ___ U.S. ___, 61 U.S.L.W. 4421

(U.S. Apr. 26, 1993) (No. 91-1306); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).

To constitute plain error, the claim (1) must be an error, (2) clear

under current law, (3) affecting substantial rights, and (4) seriously

affecting the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Olano, 61 U.S.L.W. at 4421.

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*We note that Perch's attorney failed to raise objections below despite

having notice of the issues. The day before Perch's sentencing, her attorney filed a brief in this court in another case raising the same issues.

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The district court did not err by imposing restitution because it

adopted a presentence report that included the necessary factual findings. See Molen, 9 F.3d at 1086. Additionally, the court did not commit plain error by delegating its duties to a probation officer. While

a district court may not delegate to a probation officer the final

authority to determine the amount and timing of installment payments, United States v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 806, 808-09 (4th Cir. 1995),

the court's error is not cause for reversal because it does not implicate

every element of the plain error test. See Olano , 61 U.S.L.W. at 4424.

Perch has not established that her substantial rights are prejudiced by

the error--the only matters left to the probation officer's discretion

are the amount and timing of the installments, not the amount of restitution. Further, we cannot say that the fairness and integrity of the

proceedings are implicated by the court's error. See United States v.

Castner, 50 F.3d 1267, 1277-78 (4th Cir. 1995).

Accordingly, we affirm Perch's sentence. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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