alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Godfrey and Another *v.*M’Culloch.—In error.

*Tuesday, November*19.

A WRIT in debt was issued in favour of *MdCulloch*against *Godfrey*and *Bertholet,*the plaintiff having declared against the defendants on a joint cause of action. The writ *179was served on *Godfrey,*and returned “not found” as to *Bertholet.*Another writ was afterwards issued on of the plaintiff, but it was against *Bertholet*alone, to answer to the suit of *McCulloch,*without any reference to Godfrey, or to a joint action against him and *Bertholet.'*Service of the last-named writ having been proved, *Godfrey*and *Bertholet*were called and made default; whereupon a joint judgment was rendered against them.

This judgment was held to be erroneous. *Bertholet*had no notice of the suit against *Godfrey*and himself: the process served on him purported to be in a different action.
Exhibit 31.2 CERTIFICATION I, Robert F. Amweg, certify that: 1.

          I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Freedom Capital Corporation; 2.

          Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 3.

          Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4.

          The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: a.

          Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; b.

          Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and c

          Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and 5.

          The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): a.

          All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and b.

          Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting. Date: March 18, 2016 /s/ Robert F. AmwegRobert F. AmwegChief Financial Officer
EXHIBIT
32.2




CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER




PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,




AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO




SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the Amendment No. 1
on Form 10-KSB/A to the Annual Report of Scivanta Medical Corporation (the
“Company”) on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ended October 31, 2008, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Thomas S.
Gifford, Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Secretary of the
Company, do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to
§906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:




(1)         the
Report fully complies with the requirements of §13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §78m or 78o(d), and,




(2)         the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




May
      29, 2009
              By:
              /s/ Thomas S. GiffordThomas
      S. GiffordExecutive
      Vice President,Chief
      Financial Officer andSecretary
Exhibit 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report of American Consolidated
Management Group, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending
September 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
date hereof (the "Report"), I, George Mappin, Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and result of
                  operations of the Company.


/s/ George Mappin
--------------------------
George Mappin
Chief Financial Officer
November 12, 2004
#### BENJAMIN SUROWIEC v. RUSSELL W. EVERETT, JR., ET AL.

February 27, 1987.

Petition for certification denied.
#### Hildreth *v.*The State.

*Tuesday, May*21.

*A.*and *B.*entered into a recognizance, by which they acknowledged themselves indebted to the state in the sum of 1,000 dollars each. *Meld,*that the recognizance was several, and not joint and several. *Meld,*also, that a joint *scire facias*will not lie, in such case, against the recognizors.

ERROR to the *Jefferson*Circuit Court.

Dewey, *J.*

Rufus *Hildreth*and *Henry Hildreth*entered into a recognizance, by which they “acknowledged themselves to owe and stand indebted to the state of *Indiana*in the sum of 1,000 dollars each,” provided default should be made in the condition thereof. The recognizance was forfeited by their default; upon which a joint *scire facias*issued against both.

*Henry*Hildreth, the plaintiff in error, appeared and demurred to the *scire*facias, assigning for cause of demurrer, that the recognizance was several, and would not sustain a joint *scire facias.*The Court overruled the demurrer, and rendered judgment of execution against him.

*81*J. G. Marshall*and *C. Cushing,*for the plaintiff.

*W. Quarles,*for the state.

We think the decision was wrong. The recognizance was several, and not joint and several. Each recognizor undertook for himself only to pay 1,000 dollars. Were the recognizance joint and several, the state could hold either of the recognizors to the payment of the aggregate sum for which both were bound. This, we think, would be doing violence to the letter and spirit of the recognizance.

In the case of *Collins et al.*v. *Prosser et*al., the Court of King’s Bench held a bond by which the obligors bound themselves in these words — “ We bind ourselves and *each*of us for himself for the whole and entire sum of 1,000/. each,” to be a several, and not a joint and several bond. 3 D. &R. 112.

As the recognizance was several, each recognizor was severally liable ; but a joint *scire facias*will not lie upon a several recognizance. *Thompson et al.*v. *The State,*4 Blackf. 188.

There was another cause of demurrer assigned which cannot be sustained.

*Per Curiam.*

The judgment is reversed, and the proceedings subsequent to the demurrer set aside. Cause remanded, &c.
115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 965 

AN ACT 

To redesignate the Saint-Gaudens National Historic Site as 

the ‘‘Saint-Gaudens National Historical Park’’, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

•HR 965 EH

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Saint-Gaudens Na3 tional Historical Park Redesignation Act’’. 

4 SEC. 2. DESIGNATION OF SAINT-GAUDENS NATIONAL HIS5 TORICAL PARK. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Saint-Gaudens National His7 toric Site shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Saint8 Gaudens National Historical Park’’. 

9 (b) AMENDMENTS TO PUBLIC LAW 88–543.—Public 

10 Law 88–543 (78 Stat.749) is amended— 

11 (1) by striking ‘‘National Historic Site’’ each 

12 place it appears and inserting ‘‘National Historical 

13 Park’’; 

14 (2) in section 2(a), by striking ‘‘historic site’’ 

15 and inserting ‘‘Saint-Gaudens National Historical 

16 Park’’; 

17 (3) in section 3, by— 

18 (A) striking ‘‘national historical site’’ and 

19 inserting ‘‘Saint-Gaudens National Historical 

20 Park’’; and 

21 (B) striking ‘‘part of the site’’ and insert22 ing ‘‘part of the park’’; and 

23 (4) in section 4(b), by striking ‘‘traditional to 

24 the site’’ and inserting ‘‘traditional to the park’’. 

25 (c) REFERENCES.—Any reference in any law, regula26 tion, document, record, map, or other paper of the United 
3 

•HR 965 EH

1 States to the Saint-Gaudens National Historic Site shall 

2 be considered to be a reference to the ‘‘Saint-Gaudens Na3 tional Historical Park’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives October 2, 

2017. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 
115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 965 

AN ACT 

To redesignate the Saint-Gaudens National Historical Park’’, and for other purposes. toric Site as the ‘‘Saint-Gaudens National His-
<PAGE>


                                                                    Exhibit 23.1

INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement Nos.
333-92495, 333-92497, 333-92499, 333-75610, and 333-81410 of Huttig Building
Products, Inc. on Form S-8 of our report dated January 24, 2003, except for Note
14, as to which the date is March 6, 2003, (which report expresses an
unqualified opinion and includes an explanatory paragraph relating to the change
in method of accounting for goodwill to conform to Statement of Financial
Accounting Standard No. 142, Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets) appearing in
this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Huttig Building Products, Inc. for the year
ended December 31, 2002.

/s/ DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP


St. Louis, Missouri
March 18, 2003
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-83,405-01

EX PARTE JOSEPH MARTIN HERNANDEZ, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. 14-1167-CR-C-A IN THE 25 DISTRICT COURT TH

FROM GUADALUPE COUNTY

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte

Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of delivery of a

controlled substance and sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment. He did not appeal his conviction.

Applicant contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Applicant has alleged

facts that, if true, might entitle him to relief. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Ex

parte Patterson, 993 S.W.2d 114, 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). In these circumstances, additional

facts are needed. As we held in Ex parte Rodriguez, 334 S.W.2d 294, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960),
2

the trial court is the appropriate forum for findings of fact. The trial court shall order trial counsel

to respond to the ineffective assistance of counsel claims set out in this application. The trial court

may use any means set out in TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07, § 3(d).

If the trial court elects to hold a hearing, it shall determine whether Applicant is indigent. 

If Applicant is indigent and wishes to be represented by counsel, the trial court shall appoint an

attorney to represent him at the hearing. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.04. 

Afterreviewing counsel’s response, the trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions

of law as to whether counsel’s conduct was deficient and Applicant was prejudiced. The trial court

shall also make any other findings of fact and conclusions of law that it deems relevant and

appropriate to the disposition of Applicant’s claim for habeas corpus relief.

This application will be held in abeyance until the trial court has resolved the fact issues. The

issues shall be resolved within 90 days of this order. A supplemental transcript containing all

affidavits and interrogatories or the transcription of the court reporter’s notes from any hearing or

deposition, along with the trial court’s supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law, shall

be forwarded to this Court within 120 days of the date of this order. Any extensions of time shall

be obtained from this Court. 

Filed: June 24, 2015

Do not publish
#### DeGraaf, Vrieling & Company (a corporation) v. Adeline L. Mulick, James M. Travis, and Amelia P. Ives.

*Mechanic’s lien*— Appeal.

The bill in this case was filed to enforce a mechanic’s lien, and the questions raised are questions of fact, and the conclusions of the circuit judge are not disturbed.

Appeal from Kent. (Grove, J.)

Argued May 7, 1891.

Decided June 5, 1891.

*235Bill to enforce a mechanic’s lien. Defendant Travis appeals.

Decree affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

*Montgomery é Bundy*and *P. H. Travis,*for complainant. .

*Earle S Hyde,*for appellant.

McGrath, J.

The bill in this case was filed to enforce a mechanic’s lien for materials furnished by complainant, a corporation, in the construction of a building on lot 2, Dolbee’s addition to the city of Grand Bapids.

Defendant Adeline L. Mulick was the owner of the lot when the building was constructed. 4 Amelia P. Ives is the mortgagee, and James M. Travis, who appeals, is the grantee, of defendant Mulick.

The court below found that the contract for the materials was entered into with defendant Mulick, through her husband, William W. Mulick, who was, her general-agent, thereunto authorized. The defense -was that the building was constructed by William W. Mulick under a contract with his wife, Adeline L. Mulick; but the court found that no contract for the construction of said building was ever in good faith entered into between the said William W. Mulick and his. wife. The court further found that defendant Travis was a purchaser with notice; that the defendant Ives had a prior lien; and ordered a sale of the premises subject to the Ives mortgage to satisfy complainant’s lien.

The questions raised are questiohs of fact, and, after a careful examination of the record, we find no reason to disturb the conclusions arrived at by the trial judge.

The decree is affirmed, with costs to complainant, and the record remanded for further proceedings.

The other Justices concurred.
# Sitemap

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#### James D ROBISON, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS HOUSTON HEALTH SCIENCE CENTER, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 03-20179.

Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Sept. 2, 2003.

James Robison, Pro se, Pasadena, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Megan M. Hare, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Texas, Austin, TX, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, EMILIO M. GARZA, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM*

James Robison appeals dismissal of his medical malpractice and false imprisonment claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.

The district court did not err in finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Robison’s claims. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and, absent jurisdiction conferred by statute or the Constitution, lack the power to adjudicate claims.1 Federal courts have subject mat*401ter jurisdiction only where a question of federal law is involved or where there is diversity of citizenship between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.2 The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests on Robison.3 Robison’s complaint asserts several causes of action, none of which rest on questions of federal law. Likewise, there is no diversity of citizenship. Therefore, because neither a federal question or diversity of citizenship exists, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this cause of action and it was properly dismissed.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.

1

. *See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,*511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994).

2

. *See*28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.

3

. *See Ramming v. United States,*281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir.2001).
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     ART. 5 FDS FOR 3RD QUARTER 10-Q
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                          0000891531
<NAME>                        Marta Jones
<MULTIPLIER>                        1,000
<CURRENCY>                              1
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               JUN-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                  JAN-1-1998
<PERIOD-END>                    MAR-31-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                 1
<CASH>                          24,100
<SECURITIES>                    0
<RECEIVABLES>                   320,100
<ALLOWANCES>                    0
<INVENTORY>                     107,100
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                533,300
<PP&E>                          474,300
<DEPRECIATION>                  136,100
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  1,671,800
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           55,800
<BONDS>                         0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>           0
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<COMMON>                        400
<OTHER-SE>                      23,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    1,671,800
<SALES>                         968,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                968,000
<CGS>                           837,400
<TOTAL-COSTS>                   837,400
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                444,100
<LOSS-PROVISION>                0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>              63,700
<INCOME-PRETAX>                 (374,400)
<INCOME-TAX>                    (54,300)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>             (325,800)
<DISCONTINUED>                  0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                 (700)
<CHANGES>                       0
<NET-INCOME>                    (326,500)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                   (9.92)
<EPS-DILUTED>                   (9.92)
        




</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 94-5622

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

ROGER LEWIS SMYRE, a/k/a Red,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Graham C. Mullen,

District Judge. (CR-93-36)

Submitted: April 15, 1996 Decided: April 22, 1996

Before ERVIN and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and CHAPMAN, Senior Circuit

Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

David Wall Minor, Statesville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Mark

T. Calloway, United States Attorney, H. Thomas Church, Assistant

United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Roger Lewis Smyre pled guilty to distributing crack cocaine.

He was sentenced to 140 months incarceration, four years of supervised release, and a $50 special assessment. Smyre noted a timely

appeal. Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,

386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that in his view there exist no

meritorious grounds for appeal. Smyre filed a supplemental brief

claiming that the district court erred by denying his request to

substitute his counsel due to an alleged conflict of interest and

he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Smyre's claims

cannot be reviewed on direct appeal. United States v. DeFusco, 949

F.2d 114, 120-21 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 997

(1992).

We have examined the entire record in this case in accordance

with the requirements of Anders, supra, and find no meritorious

issue for appeal. Counsel has moved to withdraw from further representation. The court requires that counsel inform his client, in

writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United

States for further review. If the client requests that a petition

be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court at that time for leave to

withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must state that a

copy thereof was served on the client. We therefore deny counsel's

motion to withdraw at this stage of the proceedings. We further

deny Smyre's motion to substitute his attorney. We affirm the

district court's judgment order. We dispense with oral argument
3

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED
EXHIBIT 32.1

SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION - CEO

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Plains Exploration & Production Company
(the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, James C. Flores, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

To the best of my
knowledge, after reasonable investigation:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dated: August 7, 2007



/s/ James C. FloresJames C. FloresChief Executive Officer


The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure document.

A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. JOHN W. BIDDLE.

March 24, 1987.

Petition for certification denied.