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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

ADOPTION OF: K.J.-L.B., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.I.B., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1381 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Decree Entered September 28, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s): 

2021-0136a

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: K.B.L.B., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.I.B., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1382 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Decree Entered September 28, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s): 

2021-0138a

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: K.J.-L.B., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: K.B.B., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1383 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Decree Entered September 28, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s): 

2021-0136a

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: K.B.L.B., A 

MINOR

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: K.B.B., FATHER

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: No. 1384 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Decree Entered September 28, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s): 

2021-0138a

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: MAY 4, 2022

Appellants J.I.B. (Mother) and K.B.B. (Father) collectively, (Parents)

appeal1from the decrees granting the petitions of the York County Office of 

Children, Youth and Families (CYF, or the Agency) and involuntarily 

terminating their parental rights to their minor children, K.B.L.B. (born June 

2019) and K.J.-L.B. (born June 2020) (collectively, the Children), pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b). We affirm.

On January 3, 2021, Parents brought six-month-old K.J.-L.B. to the 

emergency room at Hanover Hospital, stating that he had been fussy and 

“went limp” when Father picked him up. See Order of Adjudication, 2/8/21, 

at 1-3. K.J.-L.B. had one complex skull fracture along the entire length of the 

____________________________________________

1 Both Mother and Father filed separate appeals from the decrees involuntarily 

terminating their parental rights to the Children. However, both Parents are

represented by Ashley A. Messoline, Esq., on appeal, and their briefs present 

identical arguments. Accordingly, we address Mother’s and Father’s appeals 

from the decrees terminating their parental rights to K.B.L.B and K.J.-L.B. in 

a single memorandum.
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right side of his skull, and a second fracture from the top-right to top-left side 

of his skull. Id. After transfer to Hershey Medical Center, K.J.-L.B. was 

examined again. Id. The large fracture was a few weeks old, and the smaller

fracture was new. Id. K.J.-L.B. had hemorrhaging behind both eyes and 

hematomas in his spine, indicative of shaken baby syndrome. Id.

On January 6, 2021, the orphans’ court issued an order for emergency 

protective custody. See Order for Emergency Protective Custody, 1/6/21, at 

1. The orphans’ court issued a shelter care order on January 8, 2021 and 

placed the Children with a kinship resource parent.

2

 See Shelter Care Order, 

1/8/21, at 1; See Order of Adjudication, 2/8/21, at 1-3.

Following an adjudicatory hearing on February 8, 2021, the orphans’

court declared the Children dependent and found that K.J.-L.B. was a victim 

of child abuse. See Order of Adjudication, 2/8/21, at 3. The Order suspended 

visits between Parents and the Children. Id.

On February 10, 2021, a CYF caseworker completed a home visit with 

the family. See Status Review Order, 4/7/21, at 2. Mother showed the 

caseworker child’s toys, explaining that K.B.L.B. could have dropped the toys 

on K.J.-L.B. to cause the injuries. See Status Review Order, 4/7/21, at 2. 

Visitation remained suspended. Id.

____________________________________________

2 Maternal Grandparents separately initiated a custody action, in which they 

were granted standing, and sought leave to intervene in the instant 

dependency matter. See Response to Pet. to Intervene, 5/10/21, at 1-3. At 

the time the Children were placed, they had not been approved as potential 

kinship foster parents. Id.
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On February 21, 2021, Mother and Father were arrested and charged 

with aggravated assault – attempt to cause serious bodily injury with extreme 

indifference; endangering the welfare of a child; aggravated assault – victim 

less than six-years old; and simple assault.

3

On April 7, 2021, the orphans’ court held a status review hearing and 

entered an order noting that Mother had admitted that the Parents shook K.J.-

L.B. and demonstrated the movement “rapidly and aggressively,” but the 

Parents claimed they did not think they shook the baby hard enough to cause 

shaken baby syndrome. See Status Review Order, 4/7/21, at 1-2. The

orphans’ court made findings that K.J.-L.B.’s treatment team at Hershey 

Medical Center determined that his injuries were the result of non-accidental 

blunt force trauma to the skull and were consistent with “a violent amount of 

force to [the Child’s] skull by striking it against a hard object and then shaking 

his body in the process.” Id. K.J.-L.B. was in the sole care of Mother and 

Father at the time the injuries occurred. Id. The injuries were not consistent 

with accidental trauma and neither Parent could provide an explanation for 

the injuries consistent with the medical findings. Id. Visitation remained 

suspended. Id.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the orphans’ court entered a finding of 

aggravated circumstances against the Parents, because K.J.-L.B. was the 

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3 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2702(a)(1), 4304(a)(1), 2702(a)(8), and 2701(a)(1),

respectively.
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victim of physical abuse resulting in serious bodily injury. See Agg. 

Circumstances Order, 4/7/21, at 1-2; N.T. Term. Hr’g, 9/28/21, at 8. The 

Order provided that no efforts were to be made to preserve the family and 

reunify the Children with their Parents. Id.

On May 5, 2021, the orphans’ court held a permanency review hearing, 

and found that the Parents had been in minimal compliance with the 

permanency plan. See Permanency Review Order, 5/4/21, at 1. On June 5, 

2021, following a permanency review hearing, the orphans’ court changed the 

Children’s permanency goal to adoption. N.T. Term. Hr’g at 9. On June 14, 

2021, Maternal Grandparents filed petitions for adoption and petitions to 

confirm consent to adoption of the Children. See Pet. for Adoption, 6/14/21, 

at 1-3. On July 7, 2021, CYF filed petitions seeking to involuntarily terminate 

the parental rights of Mother and Father.

On September 28, 2021, the orphans’ court held a termination hearing.4 

Mother and Father did not attend the hearing because Mother had severe 

abdominal pain and was taken to a local hospital. N.T. Term. Hr’g at 5. Mother 

was not admitted to the hospital; rather, she was given a note that she could 

return to work and follow up with her primary care physician. Id. at 10. The 

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4 Gillian Woodward, Esq., represented the Children during the dependency 

proceedings as guardian ad litem and appeared at the termination hearing to 

argue the Children’s best interests. N.T. Term. Hr’g at 4. Daniel Worley, Esq., 

served as Children’s legal counsel during the termination proceedings, and 

appeared at the hearing on their behalf. Id.; see also, e.g., In re Adoption 

of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1236 (Pa. 2020).
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court stated on the record that there was no reason Mother could not attend 

the hearing in person or remotely. Id.

Attorney Janine Vinci, representing both Parents at the hearing, filed a 

motion for special relief the day before the hearing, requesting a continuance 

so that she could present witnesses. Id. at 3-4. She argued that K.J.-L.B. 

had a vitamin B deficiency which could have caused a bone density issue, 

resulting in the severe injuries. Id. at 4. CYF responded that neither Parent 

had requested a continuance prior to the hearing or appealed the adjudication 

of dependency or goal change. Id. at 9. Accordingly, the circumstances 

leading to the placement of the Children, including the finding of child abuse, 

were res judicata. Id. at 9. The orphans’ court denied the Parents’ motion

for a continuance. Id. at 14. The orphans’ court incorporated the dependency 

records into the termination hearing record, and CYF presented the testimony 

of Alexis Torres, a CYF caseworker. Id.

Ms. Torres testified that she is a reunification and permanency 

caseworker for CYF. Id. at 17. As the assigned caseworker for the Children, 

she worked with the family for eight months. Id. at 19. As of the date of the 

termination hearing, Mother’s and Father’s criminal cases related to the abuse 

of K.J.-L.B. remained unresolved. Id. at 19-20.

Both Mother and Father signed a family service plan. Id. Parents’ 

original goals were to ensure that the Children’s basic needs were being met, 

which included cooperating with Early Intervention and attending medical 
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appointments, as well as cooperating with various treatment programs and 

evaluations. Id. at 32. Initially the reunification goal was “return to parent 

or guardian,” but as noted above, following the aggravated circumstances 

determination, the goal was changed to adoption. Id. at 31.

Beyond completing adult alternatives to violence evaluations, neither 

Parent completed any objectives or goals in the plan. Id. at 19-20. Further, 

neither Parent provided a required “formal addendum” of the evaluation. Id.

at 39-41. In addition, neither Parent followed through with any 

recommendations provided in those evaluations. Id. at 34. Nor did either 

Parent complete a “threat of harm” evaluation. Id. at 36-42. One of Mother’s 

goals was to take her medication as prescribed by medical professionals, but 

she indicated to a caseworker that she had stopped taking her medication. Id.

at 36. Mother did not complete a required psychiatric evaluation. Id. at 36-

37. Neither Parent complied with the goal to complete individual mental 

health counseling. Id. at 38-41. Nor did either Parent provide documentation 

of parenting classes focusing on discipline, coping skills, and stress 

management prior to the termination hearing.5 Id.

Both Parents were living with the woman who had been Mother’s foster 

mother when Mother was a minor but did not provide any documentation of 

____________________________________________

5 Although there was some discussion that both Parents had attended 

parenting classes and informed Ms. Torres of this fact on the morning of the 

termination hearing, they did not provide written documentation showing that 

they had completed the parenting classes. N.T. Term. Hr’g at 38-39.
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their own residence, contribution to household expenses, or lawful source of 

income. Id. at 20-22. Neither Parent provided any cards, gifts, or presents 

to the Children while the Children were in kinship placement. Id. at 27. Nor 

did either Parent request increased visitation with the Children, such that the 

last visit for both Parents occurred around January or February of 2021. Id.

at 22-23. Both Parents did contact CYF about the Children’s progress with 

dental, medical, or therapeutic services at the beginning of the case, but as 

of the date of the involuntary termination hearing, Ms. Torres had not been 

contacted by either Parent for “about five months.” Id. at 27-28. Ms. Torres 

testified that Mother and Father did not have the parental capacity to care for 

the Children. Id. at 30.

Ms. Torres testified that the Children were not bonded with Mother or 

Father. Id. at 24. She testified that there were attempted supervised Zoom 

visitations, but the result was chaotic. Id. at 33. K.B.L.B. wanted “nothing 

to do with the phone” but would scream and cry if Parents gave attention to 

K.J.-L.B. Id. at 33.6 Parents were not able to calm the Children. Id. Ms. 

Torres could not specify how many visits occurred. Id. at 35.

The Children are developmentally on target, and K.J.-L.B. is receiving 

physical therapy services due to concerns regarding his mobility. Id. at 29. 

Neither of the Children have requested to visit Parents. Id. at 43. Both 

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6 During the COVID-19 pandemic, all supervised visits occurred via Zoom. Id.

at 35.
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Children have an excellent bond with the resource family and are very close 

with them. Id. at 25. The Children view the kinship resource family as 

parental figures. Id. A pre-adoptive resource has been identified for the 

Children.7 Id. at 27. In Ms. Torres’ opinion, the Children would not suffer 

long-term negative impacts if the orphans’ court granted the petitions to 

terminate the Parents’ parental rights. Id. at 30.

Attorney Worley, as legal counsel for the Children, stated that he had 

had the opportunity to meet with them at the kinship home and they seemed 

very bonded to the kinship resource. Id. at 45-46. He testified that the 

Children needed permanency, and that the petitions should be granted. Id.

at 45-46. Attorney Woodward, as guardian ad litem for the Children, also 

stated that it was in the Children’s best interests for the petition to be granted. 

Id. at 46. At the conclusion of the hearing, the orphans’ court terminated the 

parental rights of both Parents pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), 

and (b).

Both Parents timely appealed and simultaneously filed concise 

statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i). The orphans’ court issued a responsive opinion.

On appeal, Parents raise the following issue for our review:

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7

It is unclear from the record whether the pre-adoptive resource was the 

kinship resource family or the Maternal Grandparents, who filed a petition for 

consent to adoption. See, e.g., Pet. for Adoption, 6/14/21, at 1-3.
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1. Whether the court erred in finding that Children and Youth 

Services proved the elements of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), 

and (b) through clear and convincing evidence?

Mother’s Brief at 5; Father’s Brief at 5 (formatting altered).

We begin by stating our standard of review:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). “[T]he trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and 

resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re Q.R.D., 214 A.3d 233, 239 (Pa. 

Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

The burden is on the petitioner “to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that [the] asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid.” In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). We 

have explained that “[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is 

defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 
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enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the 

truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We note 

that we need only agree with the orphans’ court as to any one subsection of 

Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), to affirm an order terminating 

parental rights. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en 

banc).

Section 2511(a)(2) provides, in relevant part, as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his 

physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of 
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the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2).

To satisfy the requirements of [Section] 2511(a)(2), the moving 

party must prove (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal caused the child to be without essential parental care, 

control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied. The 

grounds for termination are not limited to affirmative misconduct, 

but concern parental incapacity that cannot be remedied.

In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations and quotation 

marks omitted).

Further, this Court has explained:

The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section 

2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, 

are not limited to affirmative misconduct.

Unlike subsection (a)(1), subsection (a)(2) does not emphasize a 

parent's refusal or failure to perform parental duties, but instead 

emphasizes the child’s present and future need for essential 

parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or 

mental well-being. Therefore, the language in subsection (a)(2) 

should not be read to compel courts to ignore a child’s need for a 

stable home and strong, continuous parental ties, which the policy 

of restraint in state intervention is intended to protect. This is 

particularly so where disruption of the family has already occurred 

and there is no reasonable prospect for reuniting it.

Thus, while sincere efforts to perform parental duties, can 

preserve parental rights under subsection (a)(1), those same 

efforts may be insufficient to remedy parental incapacity under 

subsection (a)(2). Parents are required to make diligent efforts 

toward the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental 

responsibilities. A parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period 

of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of 

services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.
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In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117-18 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted and 

formatting altered).

Further, this Court has stressed that “a child’s life cannot be held in 

abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume 

parenting responsibilities.” Interest of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 914 (Pa. 

Super. 2020) (citation omitted and formatting altered).

Section 2511(a)(2)

Parents argue that CYF did not prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the statutory grounds under Section 2511(a)(2) were met. Mother’s Brief 

at 16; Father’s Brief at 16. The Parents contend, specifically, that the evidence 

was insufficient to prove that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied, because there is nothing in the record 

to support that conclusion. Id. Parents argue that the court relied on 

outdated information from nearly five months prior to the hearing and used 

the wrong standard of proof because it found that Parents were “unlikely” to 

remedy their incapacity. Id. at 16-17. Finally, Parents argue that due to the 

finding of aggravated circumstances and lack of services provided, it was 

“absurd” to expect that they could remedy the incapacity. Id. at 18.

Prior to examining the merits of Parents’ claim, we must determine 

whether they have preserved their claims for purposes of appeal. While 

Parents cite generally to the statute, they make no meaningful citation to, nor 

discussion of case law in support of their arguments regarding Subsection 
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2511(a)(2). This Court has held that “[w]here an appellate brief fails to 

provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to 

develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim 

is waived.” In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations 

omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (providing that the argument section of 

appellate brief shall contain discussion of issues raised therein and citation to 

pertinent legal authorities). Because the Parents have failed to provide any 

support or relevant authority supporting their claim of error, we conclude that 

this claim is waived. Therefore, on this record, no relief is due. 

However, even if we did not find waiver, the Parents would not be 

entitled to relief on the merits. The orphans’ court discussed its findings under 

this subsection as follows:

[I]t is clear from the record that CYF offered clear and convincing 

evidence that the incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal by the 

parents have caused the children to be without essential parental 

care necessary for their mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect, and refusal will not be 

remedied by the parent. As stated above, K.J.-L.B. suffered abuse 

consistent with shaken baby syndrome. The baby suffered from 

neglect and abuse while in Mother and Father’s care, experiencing 

trauma from physical abuse. Six-month-old K.J.-L.B. presented 

to the emergency room with two skull fractures, one newer and 

one older, a subdural hematoma, retinal hemorrhaging, and 

bleeding around his spine. As a result of this “non-accidental, 

blunt force trauma,” the child may suffer from long-term 

impairment of cognitive, neurological, and ocular functioning. 

Mother and Father’s explanation of how K.J.-L.B. sustained such 

injuries was not consistent with the medical findings. Parents 

asserted that minor child, two-year old K.B.L.B., may be the cause 

of both of the baby’s skull fractures and other injuries. A month 
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into the investigation, Mother and Father admitted that they both 

shake K.J.-L.B. to quiet him.

On February 10, 2021, [CYF] caseworker completed a home 

visit to the mother and father’s home to review the family 

service plan with the two. During the visit, mother showed 

the caseworker various toys that she thought [K.B.L.B.] 

could have dropped on [K.J.-L.B.’s] head to cause the

injuries. Mother stated during the home visit that both she 

and father would shake [K.J.-L.B.] to calm him down; she 

demonstrated the shaking movement and moved her body 

left and right rapidly and aggressively. She also indicated 

that they shook in the car seat in the car to calm him down 

too. She said this is the only thing that could have caused 

his brain to bounce around from shaking, but then said she 

didn’t think that was what caused the injuries. As present 

during this discussion and indicated that he had Googled 

how hard one must shake a child to cause these types of 

injuries and that it would have had to have been 40 miles 

per hour and he did not believe they shook him that hard.

[See Status Review Order, 4/7/21, at 1-2.] 

Mother and Father blame two-year-old [K.B.L.B.] for [K.J.-L.B.’s] 

newest fracture. Mother even made a video of [K.B.L.B.] saying, 

“I boomed baby, I’m sorry.” Also Mother and Father blame 

K.B.L.B. for K.J.-L.B.’s older fracture as well. No objection was 

raised for the admission of these exhibits on the record during the 

Permanency Review hearing on May 5, 2021. An Aggravated 

Circumstances Order was entered on April 7, 2021. Given this, 

no efforts were made to reunify the children with Mother and 

Father. Since Mother and Father continue to blame two-year-old 

K.B.L.B. for his brother’s shaken baby syndrome, it is unlikely that 

the condition and causes of the abuse will be remedied by Mother 

and Father. CYF has provided sufficient evidence . . . that the 

Mother and Father’s incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal has 

caused the child to be without essential parental care necessary 

for [their] well-being and the conditions and causes of the abuse, 

neglect, and refusal will not be remedied by Mother or Father.

Orphans’ Ct. Op. at 6-8 (some citations omitted and formatting altered).
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Were we to reach the merits of this issue, we would find no abuse of 

discretion or error of law in the orphans’ court’s conclusion that the Agency 

presented clear and convincing evidence to support termination of Parents’

parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2). See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267; see 

also R.N.J., 985 A.2d at 276. The record reveals that Ms. Torres testified 

that an initial family service plan was provided to Parents, and that Parents 

did not complete the majority of their goals. See N.T. Term. Hr’g at 35-41. 

The sole goal completed was attendance at an anger management evaluation, 

but Parents failed to complete the required formal addendum. See id. While 

the aggravated circumstances order meant that CYF was not required to 

provide services, Parents could have arranged for services on their own but 

did not. See id. As a result of their failure to follow through with these 

recommendations, Ms. Torres testified that neither Parent had the capacity to 

care for the Children. See id. at 30.

Additionally, we agree with the orphans’ court that Parents’ continuing 

unwillingness to accept responsibility for K.J-.L.B.’s injuries is troubling and 

indicates a continuing incapacity that they are unwilling to remedy. See, e.g., 

Orphans’ Ct. Op. at 6-8. Rather than acknowledging the harm caused to K.J.-

L.B., who was in their sole care, Parents continually minimized the harm to 

him or blamed K.B.L.B. for the injuries, despite a finding of abuse and 

aggravated circumstances that they did not appeal. Neither Parent appeared 

at the termination hearing nor attempted to attend the hearing via Zoom. 
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These considerations in combination with Parents’ refusal to complete 

parenting classes or other programs to help alleviate safety concerns for the 

Children if they were returned to the care of Parents, is sufficient to prove by 

clear and convincing evidence such an incapacity and Parents’ unwillingness 

to remedy it. See Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1117-18.

For these reasons, were we to reach the merits, we would conclude that 

the orphans’ court properly found that the termination of Parents’ parental 

rights best served the needs and welfare of the Children pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(2).

Section 2511(b)

We next review the orphans’ court’s conclusion that involuntarily 

terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights best serves the Children’s

developmental, emotional, and physical needs and welfare pursuant to Section 

2511(b), which states:

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). 
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“[T]he focus in terminating parental rights is on the parent, under 

Section 2511(a), whereas the focus in Section 2511(b) is on the child.” In re 

C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). We have 

explained:

While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major 

aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is 

nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally 

emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider 

the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability 

the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally, . . . the 

trial court should consider the importance of continuity of 

relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond can be 

severed without detrimental effects on the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations

and quotation marks omitted). “Common sense dictates that courts 

considering termination must also consider whether the children are in a preadoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.” 

T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268. 

“In cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent 

and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of any bond 

analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular 

case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008). The question 

is whether the bond between the parent and the child “is the one worth saving 

or whether it could be sacrificed without irreparable harm to” the child. Id.
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at 764. “Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding evaluation” and 

caseworkers may offer their opinions and evaluations of the bond. Z.P., 994 

A.2d at 1121 (citations omitted).

In weighing the bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), 

“courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind. Children are 

young for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation to see to their 

healthy development quickly. When courts fail, . . . the result, all too often, 

is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id. Finally, we reiterate that the 

court may emphasize the safety needs of the child. In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 

95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011).

Parents argue that CYF did not prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that termination is in the best interest of the Children. Mother’s Brief at 24; 

Father’s Brief at 24. Specifically, they contend that the caseworker was not 

able to witness the parent-child relationship in person, and thus, based on the 

testimony and evidence presented, it is impossible to conclude that severing 

the parent-child bond would be in the best interest of the Children. Id.

The orphans’ court observed:

In regard to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b), it is clear from the record that 

CYF offered clear and convincing evidence for the [c]ourt’s 

consideration that the developmental, physical, and emotional 

needs and welfare of the children are best served by terminating 

parental rights. The [C]hildren in this case have no bond with the 

biological parents.

K.J.-L.B. is now about a year old and has not seen Mother or 

Father for the past eight months. K.B.L.B. has also had no contact 

in the past eight months. The [C]hildren’s caseworker testified 
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that the [C]hildren “have an excellent bond with the resource 

family.” The [C]hildren view the resource parents as their 

parental figures. K.B.L.B. is developmentally on target. He was 

evaluated through Early Intervention and is not in need of 

services. K.J.-L.B. has special needs and is receiving physical 

therapy through Early Intervention for concerns regarding his 

mobility. His other medical needs have been addressed. CYF has 

provided sufficient evidence under 23 [Pa.C.S.] § 2511(b) that the 

termination of parental rights best serves the interest of [the 

Children].

Orphans’ Ct. Op. at 13-14 (citations to the record omitted).

On this record we agree with the orphans’ court’s finding that the 

Children have no bond with the Parents. During visitation with the Parents, 

both Children appeared upset and “chaotic,” and throughout the pendency of 

the case neither of the Children has inquired about or mentioned either Parent. 

See N.T. Term. Hr’g at 33-35. Ms. Torres testified: 1) neither of the Children 

has a bond with either Parent; 2) both Children are bonded with their foster 

parents; and 3) severance of the bond would not cause long-term harm to the 

Children. See id. at 24-25, 30. Thus, it was reasonable for the orphans’ court 

to conclude within its discretion that no bond exists. See K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 

762-63; see also Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121.

Finally, we note that the record reflects that neither Parent has accepted 

responsibility for K.J.-L.B.’s injuries, and that both have continually minimized 

or blamed K.B.L.B. for the injuries. See, e.g., Status Review Order, 4/7/21, 

at 2. Neither Parent has completed any required program or treatment for

mental health issues, stress management, or parenting, and accordingly, the 

safety of the Children cannot be assured. On this record, severance of the 
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bond is in the best interests of the Children due to these safety concerns. See 

C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219. 

For these reasons we conclude that the record supports the orphans’

court’s conclusions that there was no bond between the Children and the 

Parents, and that the resource family is fulfilling parental roles for the 

Children. Likewise, the record supports the orphans’ court’s determination 

that the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights served the best 

interests of the Children. See C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1009-10. 

In sum, we conclude that the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion 

in terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Children. See id.

Accordingly, we affirm.

Decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 05/04/2022