alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Street *v.*Mullin and Another.

If a plea professing to set up, in bar of the action, a total failure of consideration, show a partial failure only, it is bad on general demurrer. .' , ■

*Tuesday, June*1.

APPEAL from the *Union*Circuit Court.1

Sullivan, J.

Assumpsit on'a promissory note. The defendants pleaded nine pleas. The first and fifth were withdrawn,Issues to the country were 'made on the second, third, fourth, and ninth. pleas,' and general, demurrers were filed to the sixth, seventh, and eighth. The demurrers were overruled and judgment" was given for the,'defendants. The only question is whether the pleas demurred to, or either of them, were a bar to the plaintiff’s action? 1 - ‘

The sixth plea' states, that the. note in- the declaration mentioned was given-in part consideration of a lease by the plaintiff to Mullin, one of the defendants, of a certain tract of land, sáw-mill, and buildings owned, &,c., for the term of three years, &c., and for no other consideration whatever; that the plaintiff, at the time,.&c., warranted the said.mill to be.in good condition,.and' to do good work; but defendant, avers that it was not then, in - good • condition and would not do good work,' but was wholly'useless; wherefore the consideration of said note has wholly failed, ,&c. The seventh plea alleges, that the note was given'* in consideration of a. lease to *Mullin*by the plaintiff of a certain tract of land, *564saw-mill,'and buildings; that at the time of the execution of said lease, plaintiff falsely and fraudulently represented the said saw-mill to be in á condition to do good' and profitable business, &c.; in consequence of which said false and fraudulent representation, the said defendants executed "the said promissory note in part.consideration of the rent aforesaid; that the said saw-mifl, at,- &c., was not in ,a condition to do a good and profitable business,' but was worthless, &c.; wherefore the consideration of said note has wholly failed, &c. The eighth plea-is substantially the same as the sixth.

/. *Ryman,*for the appellant.'

*C. H. Test,*for the appellees.

//■If the-rent of the saw-mill had been fhe only consideration of the note sued .on; we might have had some hesitancy in deciding'against the validity of the pleas’., But in addition to •the mill, a tract of land on which other buildings were *erected*was a part of the consideration. The land and buildings constituted, for aught that appears, a large part of the consideration of the note, and the defendants do not plead that *they*were of no value. • As to that part of the .consideration ,thé pleas are silent. A plea that professes to answer the whole declaration, and answers part only, is bad on -general demurrer. 1 Ch. Plead. 554. In this case the pleas do not answer all they a'ssume to answer., - They .profess to set up a total failur'e.of the-consideration, and show a.partial failure only-. The defence -is not a bar to the whole, action. *Wynn et al.*v. *Hiday,*2 Blackf. 123, and note; The Court, therefore, erred in overruling the demurrers to -the pleas.- •

*Per Curiam.*

The judgment is -reversed with costs. Cause-remanded, &c.
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. BRIAN BARBARVECH.

April 28, 1987.

Petition for certification denied.
#### Campbell and Another *v.*Woolen.—In error.

*Tuesday, May*21.

IN case of a judgment by default in a suit on a delivery-bond, the damages must be assessed by a jury, unless the parties, by agreement, submit the matter to the Court.

The judgment against the defendants in such suit, cannot be for more than the value of the property agreed to be delivered, the costs, and ten *per cent,*damages.
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 24 (Friday, February 5, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 6060]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-2630]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION

[USITC SE-10-001]


Government in the Sunshine Act Meeting Notice

Agency Holding the Meeting: United States International Trade 
Commission.

Time and Date: February 12, 2010 at 11 a.m.

Place: Room 110, 500 E Street, SW., Washington, DC 20436, Telephone: 
(202) 205-2000.

Status: Open to the public.

Matters to be Considered: 
    1. Agenda for future meetings: none.
    2. Minutes.
    3. Ratification List.
    4. Inv. Nos. 701-TA-474 and 731-TA-1176 (Preliminary) (Drill Pipe 
from China)--briefing and vote. (The Commission is currently scheduled 
to transmit its determinations to the Secretary of Commerce on or 
before February 16, 2010; Commissioners' opinions are currently 
scheduled to be transmitted to the Secretary of Commerce on or before 
February 23, 2010.)
    5. Outstanding action jackets: None.
    In accordance with Commission policy, subject matter listed above, 
not disposed of at the scheduled meeting, may be carried over to the 
agenda of the following meeting.

    By order of the Commission.

    Issued: February 2, 2010.
William R. Bishop,
Hearings and Meetings Coordinator.
[FR Doc. 2010-2630 Filed 2-3-10; 11:15 am]
BILLING CODE 7020-02-P
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 205 (Monday, October 25, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 65515-65516]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-26904]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employment and Training Administration

[TA-W-73,301]


Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corporation, A Subsidiary of AMG, 
Newfield, NJ; Notice of Affirmative Determination Regarding Application 
for Reconsideration

    By application dated August 29, 2010, a worker requested 
administrative reconsideration of the negative determination regarding 
workers' eligibility to apply for Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) 
applicable to workers and former workers of the subject firm.

[[Page 65516]]

The determination was issued on July 30, 2010, and the Notice of 
determination was published in the Federal Register on August 13, 2010 
(75 FR 49532). The workers provide storage services.
    The negative determination was based on the finding that a shift of 
production to Canada in 2006 did not contribute importantly to 
separations at the subject firm because, during the period of the 
investigation, the subject firm did not produce an article; rather, the 
subject firm provided storage services for other subsidiaries of AMG, 
the parent company, and those storage services were shifted to an 
affiliate domestic facility. In addition, the subject firm did not 
supply services to a firm that employed a worker group that is 
currently eligible to apply for TAA.
    The request for reconsideration alleges that the workers did not 
supply the services identified in the determination. The worker also 
states that the subject firm is in the process of permanently 
decommissioning and shifted operations to various facilities throughout 
the United States as well as Canada, Brazil, England, and Mexico.
    The Department has carefully reviewed the request for 
reconsideration and the existing record, and has determined that the 
Department will conduct further investigation to determine if the 
workers meet the eligibility requirements of the Trade Act of 1974, as 
amended.

Conclusion

    After careful review of the application, I conclude that the claim 
is of sufficient weight to justify reconsideration of the U.S. 
Department of Labor's prior decision. The application is, therefore, 
granted.

    Signed at Washington, DC, this 7th day of October 2010.
Del Min Amy Chen,
Certifying Officer, Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance.
[FR Doc. 2010-26904 Filed 10-22-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-FN-P
1 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 01-50312

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

OSIEL VALLEJO-OCAMPO,

 DefendantAppellant.

--------------------------------------------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. A-00-CR-275-ALL-SS

--------------------------------------------------------

November 20, 2001

Before DAVIS, BENAVIDES and STEWART, Circuit Judges:

PER CURIAM:1

Osiel Vallejo-Ocampo appeals his sentence following his guilty-plea conviction for illegal

reentry into the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He argues that the district court erred

in increasing his base offense level by 16 levels pursuant to the aggravated-felony enhancement in

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) based on his prior Texas convictions for cocaine possession. Vallejo

contends that his prior convictions do not meet the definition of an aggravated felony as set forth in

the current version of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). He additionally maintains that the rule of lenity

requires that 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) be interpreted in his favor.
Vallejo’s argument that his Texas convictions for possession of cocaine do not qualify as

aggravated feloniesfor purposes ofU.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) isforeclosed byour decision inUnited

States v. Hinojosa-Lopez, 130 F.3d 691, 693-94 (5th Cir. 1997). See United States v. HernandezAvalos, 251 F.3d 505, 508 (5thCir. 2001), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Aug. 9, 2001)(No. 01-5773).

Vallejo’s argument that Hinojosa-Lopez is not controlling because the current version of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(43)(B) does not refer to subsection two of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is unpersuasive. The

current version of 18 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) providesthat an aggravated felony includes “any drug

trafficking crime as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18” (emphasis added). The definition of the

term “drug trafficking crime” is found specifically at subsection two of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). See 18

U.S.C. § 924(c)(2). Moreover, by deleting the reference to subsection two of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c),

Congress expanded the definition of aggravated felony to include all subsections of 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c). See Notes following 8 U.S.C. § 1101 regarding 1994 amendment; see also United States

v. Valenzuela-Escalante, 130 F.3d 944, 946 (10th Cir. 1997).

Vallejo’s argument that the rule of lenity must be applied is foreclosed by our recent decision

in United States v. Rivera, ___ F.3d ___, 2001 WL 1025808 at *1 (5th Cir. Sept. 7, 2001)(No. 00-

20953).

AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 32.1 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. {section} 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Annual Report of Pacific Land and Coffee Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the period ending March  31, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Tyrus C. Young, Chief Financial  Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge: (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.  Dated:  September 22, 2010
By  /s/ Tyrus C. Young
-----------------------------
     Tyrus C. Young
     Chief Financial Officer
    (Principal Financial Officer)
Exhibit 32.1

SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION - CEO

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Plains Exploration & Production Company (the Company) on
Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, James C. Flores, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

To the best of my knowledge,
after reasonable investigation:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dated: November 9, 2006.



/s/James C. FloresJames C. FloresChief Executive Officer


The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure document.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or
other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and will be retained
by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
DISMISS and Opinion Filed October 31, 2013.

S

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-13-00567-CV

GARRETT COLE, Appellant

V.

SHERRY KNICKERBOCKER, Appellee

On Appeal from the 192nd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-06-04924

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Moseley, Lang, and Brown 

Opinion by Justice Moseley

Before the Court is appellant’s unopposed motion to dismiss the appeal. Appellant has 

informed the Court that the parties have settled their differences. Accordingly, we grant 

appellant’s motion and dismiss the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(a)(1).

130567F.P05

/Jim Moseley/

JIM MOSELEY

JUSTICE
–2–

Court of Appeals

S

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

GARRETT COLE, Appellant

No. 05-13-00567-CV V.

SHERRY KNICKERBOCKER, Appellee

On Appeal from the 192nd Judicial District 

Court, Dallas County, Texas.

Trial Court Cause No. DC-06-04924.

Opinion delivered by Justice Moseley. 

Justices Lang and Brown, participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the appeal is DISMISSED.

Subject to any agreement between the parties, it is ORDERED that appellee, SHERRY 

KNICKERBOCKER, recover her costs of this appeal from appellant, GARRETT COLE.

Judgment entered this 31st day of October, 2013.

/Jim Moseley/

JIM MOSELEY

JUSTICE
1 Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit

No. 96-30019 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

JEFFERY R. ACKLEN

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Louisiana

(93-CV-1043) August 9, 1996

Before SMITH, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 1

Acklen pleaded guilty to distribution of methamphetamine and

conspiring to manufacture methamphetamine and was sentenced on the

basis of d-methamphetamine. His motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was

denied by the district court; and we vacated that judgment and2 United states v. Acklen , 47 F.3d 739 (5th Cir. 1995).

2 remanded. 2 On remand, the district court again denied relief. We

affirm.

Originally Acklen claimed trial counsel was ineffective for

failure to contend at sentencing that the drug involved was lmethamphetamine and not d-methamphetamine. He made only conclusory

allegations however. We remanded stating:

On remand, Acklen should tender some specific, verified

basis or evidence, beyond his mere naked assert ion or

belief, that the drug was in fact l-methamphetamine. If

Acklen makes such a showing, he may be enti tled to

limited discovery and an evidentiary hearing.

On remand, Appellant made no such showing. He simply argued

that since the isomer of the drug could not be identified the rule

of lenity required that the drug be regarded as l-methamphetamine.

The district court recognized that the motion could be denied on

that basis alone and so held. However, it allowed Appellant an

evidentiary hearing at which the evidence established that the drug

involved was made with a precursor chemical that would have

produced a 50-50 mixture of d-methamphetamine and lmethamphetamine. Accordingly, the district court correctly found

that Acklen had failed to show that he had been prejudiced by his

attorney’s failure to raise the issue.

Going even further, the district court held that Acklen also3

failed to demonstra te prejudice because even had trial counsel

raised the issue, there was no reasonable probability that the

court would have been persuaded to adopt what would have been a

novel argument at that time, citing United States v. Seyfert

, 67

F.3d 544, 549 (5th Cir. 1995). We see no error in this holding.

AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THE SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE
TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> US DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               APR-01-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                          11,719
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    9,228
<ALLOWANCES>                                       684
<INVENTORY>                                      3,895
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                28,547
<PP&E>                                          10,954
<DEPRECIATION>                                   8,875
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  34,456
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            5,977
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             9
<OTHER-SE>                                      28,470
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    34,456
<SALES>                                         11,601
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                11,601
<CGS>                                            4,945
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   11,281
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               (134)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    454
<INCOME-TAX>                                        20
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                434
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       434
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .05
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .05


</TABLE>
1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 42297

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

DONALD RAYMOND SMITH,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

2015 Unpublished Opinion No. 492

Filed: May 15, 2015

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Kootenai County. Hon. Fred M. Gibler, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction and unified fourteen-year sentence with a minimum 

period of confinement of two years for grand theft, affirmed.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Kimberly E. Smith, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

Before MELANSON, Chief Judge; LANSING, Judge;

and GUTIERREZ, Judge

________________________________________________

PER CURIAM

Donald Raymond Smith was found guilty of grand theft, Idaho Code § 18-2403(1), with a 

persistent violator enhancement. The district court imposed a unified fourteen-year sentence 

with a minimum period of confinement of two years. Smith appeals, contending that his

sentence is excessive.

Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the 

factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and 

need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-

15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 
2

1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing 

the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 

722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record 

in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.

Therefore, Smith’s judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. JOHN J. CROWLEY.

November 10, 1986.

Petition for certification denied.
Filed: July 15, 1996

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-6470

(CA-95-397-1)

James D. Haburn, Sr.,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

North Carolina Attorney General, et al,

Respondents - Appellees.

ORDER

The Court amends its opinion filed June 6, 1996, as follows:

On the cover sheet, section 3 -- the district court information is corrected to read "Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.

William L. Osteen, Sr., District Judge. (CA-95-397-1)"

On page 2, line 7 of the opinion -- "E.D.N.C." is corrected to

read "M.D.N.C."

For the Court - By Direction

/s/ Bert M. Montague

Clerk
2
3

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-6470

JAMES D. HABURN, SR.,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

NORTH CAROLINA ATTORNEY GENERAL; W. K. JONES,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle

District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, Sr.,

District Judge. (CA-95-397-1)

Submitted: May 16, 1996 Decided: June 6, 1996

Before RUSSELL, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James D. Haburn, Sr., Appellant Pro Se. Clarence Del Forge, III,

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH CAROLINA, Raleigh, North

Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
4

PER CURIAM:

Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying

relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988) petition. We have reviewed

the record and the district court's opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find no reversible error.

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss

the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. Haburn v. North

Carolina Attorney General, No. CA-95-397-1 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 7, 1996).

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court

and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED