J-S19004-19

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WILLIAM LAWSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1095 EDA 2018

Appeal from the PCRA Order March 9, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0609631-1997

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.

JUDGMENT ORDER BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED APRIL 22, 2019

William Lawson appeals, pro se, from the order, entered in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, dismissing as untimely his fourth

petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546 

(PCRA). We affirm.

On January 9, 1998, following a bench trial before the Honorable Lisa A. 

Richette, Lawson was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life 

imprisonment. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence, 

but remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether counsel had 

improperly prevented Lawson from testifying on his own behalf. 

Commonwealth v. Lawson, 748 A.2d 772 (Pa. Super. 1998) (unpublished 

memorandum). Following a hearing, the trial court concluded this claim was 

meritless. On appeal, this Court affirmed. Commonwealth v. Lawson, 789 

A.2d 252 (Pa. Super. 2001).
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Lawson filed his first PCRA petition, pro se, on October 30, 2002. The 

PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition. On May 11, 

2004, the PCRA court denied relief. On appeal, this Court affirmed and the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on December 29, 

2005. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 885 A.2d 578 (Pa. Super. Aug.15, 

2005) (Table), allocatur denied, 892 A.2d 822 (Pa. Dec. 29, 2005) (Table).

Lawson filed a second pro se PCRA petition on February 15, 2008, and 

an amended pro se petition on March 19, 2008. The PCRA dismissed this 

petition as untimely. On appeal, this Court affirmed. See Commonwealth 

v. Lawson, 990 A.2d 48 (Pa. Super. Dec. 24, 2009) (Table). Lawson did not 

seek review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 

On April 21, 2010, Lawson filed filed a third pro se petition, and an 

amended pro se petition on July 13, 2010. The PCRA court dismissed this 

petition as untimely on February 6, 2010. Lawson did not file an appeal.

In his instant petition, filed pro se on March 25, 2016, Lawson claims 

the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 

136 S.Ct. 718 (2016), renders his petition timely under the “newly-recognized 

constitutional right” exception to the PCRA time bar. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9545(b)(1)(iii). In Montgomery, the Supreme Court held Miller v. 

Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), which prohibited mandatory life sentences

without possibility of parole for juveniles as a violation of the Eighth 

Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments,” applies 

retroactively to cases on collateral review. 
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The PCRA court found Miller inapplicable because Lawson was not under 

the age of eighteen at the time of his offense. Lawson was born on November 

5, 1977; at the time of the murder, on November 7, 1996, Lawson was 

nineteen years old. Lawson concedes Miller does not apply, but argues it 

should extend to defendants who were over the age of eighteen at the time 

of their crimes based on developments in neuroscientific research –the ”virtual 

minor” or “immature brain” studies. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 

(2005) and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).

Because Lawson was over the age of eighteen at the time he committed 

the murder, the PCRA court properly dismissed his petition as untimely. See 

Commonwealth v. Lee, 2019 PA Super 64 (filed Mar. 1, 2019) (en banc) 

(holding prohibition in Miller on mandatory life-without-parole sentences for 

juvenile offenders as cruel and unusual punishment did not extend to 

defendant who was over age of 18 at time of her commission of murder, but 

who had alleged characteristics of youth that rendered her categorically less 

culpable under Eighth Amendment, and thus defendant could not invoke 

Miller as exception, for newly-recognized constitutional right, to timeliness 

requirements of PCRA, despite argument that “immature brain” studies would 

have established defendant’s brain was underdeveloped at time of her crime; 

express age limit was essential to orderly and practical application of law). 

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/22/19