J-A03003-22

J-A03004-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

CHAD BATTERMAN 

Appellant

v.

SILVIA SANTO

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1532 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered June 16, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County 

Civil Division at No: 2019-06877

CHAD BATTERMAN 

Appellant

v.

SILVIA SANTO

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1703 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered July 16, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County 

Civil Division at No: 2019-06877

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JUNE 10, 2022

Chad Batterman (“Father”) appeals pro se from the child custody orders 

entered on June 16, 2021, and July 16, 2021. In the June 16, 2021 order, 

the trial court ruled on a dispute involving a dance recital Father scheduled for 

one of the parties’ children and a vacation Silvia Santo (“Mother”) scheduled 

for the same time. The court further denied Father’s request to find Mother 

in contempt. In the July 16, 2021 order, the court made a final custody award, 
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maintaining sole legal and primary physical custody of the parties’ children 

with Mother and adjusting Father’s partial physical custody schedule. The 

court again denied Father’s request to find Mother in contempt. In reviewing 

these matters, we also consider Father’s pro se “Motion for Reconsideration” 

of our order consolidating his appeals. We affirm the June 16, 2021, and July 

16, 2021 orders and deny Father’s motion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case has a lengthy and tortuous history. For the sake of brevity, 

we note only that Father and Mother married in November 2014 and separated 

in November 2017. The parties had two children together, C.B., a female born 

in October 2015, and D.B., a male born in October 2017 (collectively, “the 

Children”). Mother commenced divorce proceedings, but our review of the 

record does not disclose whether those proceedings remain ongoing.

The parties’ custody litigation began in Philadelphia County. Pursuant 

to a custody order entered by the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas,

dated March 6, 2019, Mother received sole legal and primary physical custody 

of the Children. Father received partial physical custody on the first, third, 

and (if available) fifth weekend of each month, from Thursday at 4:00 p.m. 

until Monday at 9:00 a.m. During weeks that Father would not have weekend 

custody, he received partial physical custody on Thursday from 4:00 p.m. until 

8:00 p.m. The Philadelphia trial court entered an amended custody order, 

dated May 3, 2019, which made no substantive changes to this schedule.
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Meanwhile, venue over the dispute transferred to Montgomery County,

because Mother lived there, and neither party continued to live in Philadelphia 

County. Extensive litigation ensued over the next two years, due in large part

to Father’s myriad court filings and discovery disputes he initiated with two 

police departments and a pediatrician’s office. 

Relevant for purposes of this appeal, the trial court entered an order on 

October 15, 2020, pursuant to which the parties agreed to resolve all custody 

issues between them by withdrawing their outstanding pleadings and leaving 

the existing May 3, 2019 order in place. This resolution of the parties’ dispute 

lasted only fleetingly, as Father filed pro se petitions for contempt on October 

23, 2020, October 26, 2020, and October 30, 2020, followed by two pro se

amended petitions for contempt on December 9, 2020. Father filed a pro se

petition to modify custody on November 25, 2020, in which he requested sole 

legal and primary physical custody of the Children. He then filed yet another 

pro se petition for contempt on February 26, 2021.

The trial court conducted a consolidated hearing on Father’s pleadings

over five days, on January 25, 2021, January 26, 2021, February 19, 2021,

March 15, 2021, and March 16, 2021. Following the hearing, on March 17, 

2021, the court entered an order indicating that it was taking the matter under 

advisement. 

While the trial court’s resolution remained pending, yet another dispute 

arose between the parties. On May 12, 2021, Father filed a pro se “Emergency 
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Motion Regarding Dance Recital,” averring that a conflict had arisen between 

a dance recital he arranged for C.B. and a vacation Mother planned for June 

2021. Father later filed a pro se amended version of this pleading on June 2, 

2021, and a pro se “Emergency Motion for Special Relief for the Denial of 

Mother’s Vacation and Contempt” on June 4, 2021. He filed a pro se amended 

pleading requesting special relief and contempt on June 15, 2021. Generally, 

Father requested that the court prohibit or limit Mother’s planned vacation or, 

in the alternative, find her in contempt of the May 3, 2019 order for failing to 

provide him with start and end dates of her vacation thirty days in advance. 

The trial court conducted a hearing on June 16, 2021, and entered an

order that same day, which denied as moot Father’s request to ensure C.B.

participated in her dance recital by precluding Mother’s vacation. The court 

granted Father’s request to limit Mother’s vacation in part, in that it directed 

Mother to return Child to Father by 6:00 p.m. on June 19, 2021. Further, the 

court granted Father three days of makeup custody time during the summer 

of 2021. The court denied Father’s request to find Mother in contempt. 

On July 12, 2021, Father filed a pro se motion for reconsideration of the 

June 16, 2021 order. The trial court denied reconsideration on the same day.1

Father timely filed a pro se notice of appeal on July 13, 2020, along with a 

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1 Curiously, the motion for reconsideration continued to appear as a pending 

pleading on scheduling orders for months afterward. See, e.g., Amended 

Order – Scheduling, 9/16/21. 
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concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.

2

 This Court assigned 

Father’s appeal docket number 1532 EDA 2021.

While the parties litigated their dispute regarding the dance recital and 

Mother’s vacation, the trial court had not yet entered an order resolving the 

five-day custody hearing from January to March 2021. In addition, the parties

continued to file new pleadings. Mother filed an emergency custody petition 

on June 25, 2021, averring Father was refusing to return the Children to her 

care pursuant to the May 3, 2019 order. She filed a praecipe to withdraw the 

emergency petition on June 29, 2021. Father filed a pro se petition for special 

relief on July 13, 2021, requesting sole legal custody and that the Children be 

enrolled in a camp program his family operates.

3

At last, the trial court entered its final custody order on July 16, 2021. 

The order maintained sole legal and primary physical custody of the Children 

with Mother and adjusted Father’s partial physical custody award. The order 

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2 The June 16, 2021 order is appealable, as it denied Father’s request for a 

finding of contempt with respect to the May 3, 2019 final order. See Schultz 

v. Schultz, 70 A.3d 826, 828-29 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“[A]n order refusing to 

find an individual in contempt is appealable only where the respondent failed 

to comply with a prior final order.”). To the extent portions of the June 16, 

2021 order not dealing with contempt were interlocutory and unappealable at

the time Father filed his notice of appeal, the subsequent entry and appeal of 

the final custody order, described below, rendered those portions reviewable. 

In re Bridgeport Fire Litigation, 51 A.3d 224, 229 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citing

Quinn v. Bupp, 955 A.2d 1014, 1020 (Pa. Super. 2008), reargument denied 

(Sept. 19, 2008), appeal denied, 989 A.2d 918 (Pa. 2009)).

3 The parties also filed a slew of contempt petitions against each other between 

June 25, 2021, and August 14, 2021. These petitions remained pending at 

the time this Court received the certified record.
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awarded Father partial physical custody every Tuesday from 8:00 a.m. until 

Wednesday at 7:00 p.m. and every other weekend from Friday at 5:00 p.m. 

until Monday at 8:00 a.m. Moreover, the order explained, although “certain 

actions of each of the parties ha[ve] risen to the level of contempt,” the court 

was “choos[ing] to look forward and not back” and denied the outstanding 

contempt petitions, with the aspiration that the parties would resolve their 

differences more amicably going forward. Order, 7/16/21, at 8-9. The court

issued separate findings of fact, which further explained its decision.

In essence, the trial court’s findings focused on the parties’ inability to 

coparent and hostility toward each other. While the court found Mother was 

not without fault for this situation, it concluded Father bore the greater share 

of the blame, due primarily to his excessive litigiousness. Findings of Fact, 

7/16/21, at 2-5, 9. The court expressed hope that the parties would improve 

their coparenting in the future but reasoned that their present combativeness

precluded a more equal custody award. Id. at 4, 11-12.

Mother filed a motion for reconsideration of the July 16, 2021 order on 

August 13, 2021. Father then filed timely pro se notice of appeal on August 

16, 2021,4 along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. 

He filed a pro se amended concise statement on August 17, 2021, which made

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4 Thirty days after the trial court entered its order was Sunday, August 15, 

2021. Therefore, Father timely filed his notice of appeal on Monday, August 

16, 2021. See Pa.R.A.P. 903, Note (observing our Rules of Appellate 

Procedure incorporate 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908 “relating to . . . the omission of the 

last day of a time period which falls on Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.”).
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only superficial wording changes to the claims he was presenting. It does not 

appear that the trial court ruled specifically on the motion for reconsideration. 

This Court assigned Father’s second appeal docket number 1703 EDA 2021.

5

 

FATHER’S APPEAL AT 1532 EDA 2021

We begin by considering Father’s appeal at 1532 EDA 2021. He presents 

the following claims for our review:

Did the trial court err[] as a matter of law by the following:

1. by failing to find [Mother] in contempt of the May 3, 2019 

custody order,

2. by modifying the May 3, 2019 custody order without prior 

notice,

3. by modifying the May 3, 2019 custody order at a contempt 

hearing when there was no pending petition to modify custody 

heard at the hearing, and

4. by allowing [Mother] to submit their exhibits late, not in 

compliance with the June 7, 2021 scheduling order[?]

Father’s Brief (1532 EDA 2021) at 6 (emphasis and unnecessary capitalization 

omitted) (unnumbered pages).

6

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5 We entered an order consolidating Father’s two appeals on January 11, 2022. 

Father filed a pro se “Motion for Reconsideration” of our consolidation order 

on January 25, 2022. Because consolidation eases our review and disposition 

of Father’s appeals and causes him no prejudice, we deny his motion.

6 We note with disapproval that Father does not divide the argument section 

of brief into subsections corresponding to his statement of questions involved. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (“The argument shall be divided into as many parts as 

there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part--in 

distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed--the particular point treated 

therein[.]”).
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In Father’s first claim, he challenges the trial court’s finding that Mother 

was not in contempt of the May 3, 2019 order by going on vacation with the 

Children rather than facilitating C.B.’s participation in the dance recital that 

he arranged. We review the court’s finding pursuant to an abuse of discretion 

standard of review. Garr v. Peters, 773 A.2d 183, 189 (Pa. Super. 2001). 

To support a finding of civil contempt,7 a court must determine “(1) that the 

contemnor had notice of the specific order or decree which she is alleged to 

have disobeyed; (2) that the act constituting the contemnor’s violation was 

volitional; and (3) that the contemnor acted with wrongful intent.” Harcar v. 

Harcar, 982 A.2d 1230, 1235 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

Father argues Mother was in contempt of the May 3, 2019 order because 

she did not provide him with notice of her vacation thirty days in advance with

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7 A trial court may order civil or criminal contempt. In the Interest of E.O., 

195 A.3d 583, 586 (Pa. Super. 2018) (quoting In the Interest of C.W., 960 

A.2d 458, 466 (Pa. Super. 2008)). If the court’s dominant purpose in finding 

contempt is to coerce compliance by the contemnor, the adjudication is civil 

in nature. Id. If the court’s dominant purpose is to punish disobedience by 

the contemnor, the adjudication is criminal in nature. Id.

We apply the standards applicable to a finding of civil contempt here, as 

this case involves a private party requesting contempt in an ongoing action to 

obtain relief for his own benefit. See Warmkessel v. Heffner, 17 A.3d 408, 

414 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 34 A.3d 833 (Pa. 2011) (quoting Stahl 

v. Redcay, 897 A.2d 478, 486 (Pa. Super. 2006), reargument denied (May 

18, 2006), appeal denied, 918 A.2d 747 (Pa. 2007)) (discussing factors 

“generally said to point to a civil contempt”). In addition, Father sought civil 

contempt in his petitions or included language in his petitions asking the trial 

court to enter an order “compelling [Mother] to comply[.]” See, e.g., Petition 

for Contempt and Enforcement, 10/23/20, at 2-3; Emergency Petition for Civil 

Contempt, 10/26/20, at 1.
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the specific start and end dates. Father’s Brief (1532 EDA 2021) at 7-9. He 

further maintains Mother was in contempt because her vacation caused an 

extension of her custody time and reduction of his custody time. Id. at 8-11. 

Father’s claim relies on the vacation provision of the May 3, 2019 order, which 

provides, in relevant part, that the parents would each “be entitled to two [] 

non-consecutive weeks of vacation with the Children upon thirty [] days 

written notice to the other parent. A week is defined as seven [] days, which 

shall not be used to extend their regular custodial time.” Order, 5/3/19, at 4 

(unnecessary capitalization omitted).

The trial court explained in its opinion that it declined to find Mother in 

contempt because it did not believe that she acted with wrongful intent. Trial

Court Opinion (1532 EDA 2021), 9/13/21, at 7-9. The court cited Mother’s 

testimony regarding her numerous attempts to compromise with Father after 

the parties discovered the conflict between the vacation and the dance recital. 

Id. In addition, the court reasoned that the vacation provision of the May 3, 

2019 order was ambiguous. Id. While the order provided that Mother could 

exercise two nonconsecutive weeks of vacation with Child each year, it further

provided Mother’s vacation could not “extend [her] regular custodial time.” 

Id. at 6 (quoting Order, 5/3/19, at 4) (capitalization omitted). This made it 

impossible for Mother to exercise a full week of vacation with Child without 

violating the order, the court observed, since Father was entitled to regular 

custody of Child under the order at least once per week. Id. at 6-7.
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We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s analysis. The record 

indicates that Mother first notified Father she would be taking a vacation on 

the same weekend as the June 2021 dance recital on April 23, 2021, more 

than thirty days in advance. N.T., 6/16/21, at 57, 85; Supplemental Record, 

12/6/21.

8

 Further, Mother testified she attempted repeatedly to compromise 

with Father to resolve the parties’ disagreement. N.T., 6/16/21, at 86-90. 

These attempts at compromise included a proposal Mother sent Father on May 

4, 2021, which included specific start and end dates for her vacation. See

Supplemental Record, 12/6/21 (“I would start our vacation . . . Sunday, June 

13th to Sunday, June 20th, [C.B.] would be here to do the recital[, and] the 

kids still get a great vacation, seems like a win win. Are you ok with this?”). 

This again was more than thirty days in advance. While Mother did ultimately 

act contrary to the May 3, 2019 order by taking a vacation that extended her 

regular custodial time, this evidence supports the court’s finding that she did 

not act with wrongful intent.

It was also reasonable for the trial court to weigh the ambiguity of the 

May 3, 2019 order against a finding of contempt. As the court observed, the 

order provided that the parties would have seven-day periods of vacation but

also that vacation could not extend a party’s regular custody time. This caveat

made it impossible for Mother to have a seven-day vacation, since Father 

____________________________________________

8 This Court received a supplemental record on December 6, 2021, containing 

exhibits from the June 16, 2021 hearing, but the exhibits are not individually 

labeled. 
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would always have custody of the Children at least once per week. See Sutch

v. Roxborough Memorial Hosp., 142 A.3d 38, 67 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal 

denied, 163 A.3d 399 (Pa. 2016) (quoting Stahl, 897 A.2d at 489) (“Because 

the order forming the basis for civil contempt must be strictly construed, any 

ambiguities or omissions in the order must be construed in favor of the 

defendant. In such cases, a contradictory order . . . will not serve as the basis 

for a finding of contempt.”).

Next, Father argues in his interrelated second and third claims that the 

trial court impermissibly modified the May 3, 2019 custody order following the 

contempt hearing without prior notice and when there was no pending custody 

modification petition.9 He contends the court had no power to deviate from 

the terms of the May 3, 2019 order and simply should have enforced it as it 

was written, which would have meant limiting Mother to less than a full seven 

days of vacation and ordering her to return the Children to him for his regular 

custody time beginning on Thursday, June 17, 2017. Father’s Brief (1532 EDA 

2021) at 11-13. Father maintains that the court instead modified the order 

by directing Mother to return the Children on the evening of Saturday, June 

____________________________________________

9 We note that different trial judges entered the two orders on appeal in this 

matter. The Honorable Richard S. Haaz entered the order on appeal at 1532 

EDA 2021, relating to the dance recital and Mother’s vacation, while the 

Honorable Melissa S. Sterling entered the order on appeal at 1703 EDA 2021, 

resulting from the five-day modification hearing. Thus, while there actually 

was a modification proceeding pending at the time Judge Haaz entered the 

June 16, 2021 order, Judge Haaz had not been involved.
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19, 2019, resulting in Father exercising only part of his regular custody time.

Id. 

Our case law is clear a trial court may not modify custody at a contempt 

hearing without explicit notice to the parties that custody rights are at stake. 

J.M. v. K.W., 164 A.3d 1260, 1267-70 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en banc). In this 

case, by contrast, the record demonstrates contempt was not the only matter 

at issue when the court entered its June 16, 2021 order. The court addressed 

two of Father’s outstanding pleadings when entering its order, which included 

his “Amended Emergency Motion for Special Relief Regarding Dance Recital” 

and “Amended Emergency Motion for Special Relief for the Denial of Mother’s 

Vacation and Contempt.” In the pleadings, Father asked that the court ensure

C.B.’s participation in her dance recital and prevent Mother from continuing 

her vacation into his custody time. At the time of the hearing, Father did not 

dispute that his request to ensure C.B.’s participation in her dance recital was 

moot, since the recital had already occurred. N.T., 6/16/21, at 6. He asked, 

nonetheless, that the court order Mother to return from her vacation early, so 

that it would not continue into his custody time. Id. at 7. Therefore, because 

Father himself placed custody at issue by requesting that the court enter an 

order resolving the parties’ vacation dispute, no relief is due.

10

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10 It was permissible for the trial court to enter the custody portion of its order 

pursuant to our Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide, “[a]t any time after 

commencement of the action, the court may on application or its own motion 

grant appropriate interim or special relief. The relief may include, but is not 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Father’s fourth and final claim at 1532 EDA 2021 is that the trial court

erred by permitting Mother to submit exhibits late and not in compliance with 

its June 7, 2021 scheduling order. Father argues the court’s scheduling order 

required the parties to submit exhibits three business days prior to the hearing 

scheduled for Wednesday, June 16, 2021, at 9:30 a.m. Father’s Brief (1532 

EDA 2021) at 14. Father insists Mother violated the order by submitting her 

exhibits on Sunday, June 13, 2021, at 5:35 p.m. Id.

We agree with the trial court that Father waived this claim by failing to 

make a timely and specific objection at the hearing, as the following excerpt 

from the record reveals:

THE COURT: All right, [Father]. You have the floor.

[Father:] Just some housekeeping, just a normal record. I 

am not sure if you are aware, pursuant to your June 17 [sic] 

scheduling order, we had to submit exhibits by three business 

days, which is Friday. [Mother’s counsel] sent it on Friday 5:30 

p.m., which would only by two business days before. I would like 

to note that on the record. I object to them being --

THE COURT: Okay. If he moves them in, you make an 

objection and I will make a ruling at that time. 

[Father:] Okay. . . .

***

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limited to, the award of temporary legal or physical custody[.]” Pa.R.C.P. 

1915.13; see also J.M., 164 A.3d at 1269 (explaining, “that absent an award 

of special relief under Rule 1915.13 . . . it is an abuse of discretion for the trial 

court to transfer custody from one party to the other as a contempt sanction”).
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THE COURT: . . . . [Mother’s counsel], do you have anymore 

evidence to present?

[Mother’s counsel:] No. Just move the admission of Exhibit 

M-1 through M-4?

THE COURT: Any objection to M-1 through M-4?

[Father:] No. No objection.

THE COURT: They are admitted into the record.

N.T., 6/16/21, at 9, 125.

As we have explained, failure to make a timely and specific objection in 

the trial court will result in waiver on appeal. In the Interest of L.V., 209 

A.3d 399, 418 (Pa. Super. 2019) (quoting In re S.C.B., 990 A.2d 762, 767

(Pa. Super. 2010)). “[O]ne must object to errors . . . at the earliest possible 

stage of the adjudicatory process to afford the jurist hearing the case the first 

occasion to remedy the wrong and possibly avoid an unnecessary appeal to 

complain of the matter.” Id. Because Father stated expressly on the record 

that he did not object to the admission of Mother’s exhibits, he is not entitled 

to relief. 

Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude Father’s appeal at 1532 

EDA 2021 is meritless, and we affirm the June 16, 2021 order.

FATHER’S APPEAL AT 1703 EDA 2021

We next direct our attention to Father’s appeal at 1703 EDA 2021. His 

brief presents the following claims:

The [trial] court erred in its Order of July 16, 2021, for the 

following reasons:
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1. The [trial court] erred as a matter of law by awarding Mother 

primary physical custody of the parties’ children.

2. The [trial court] erred as a matter of law by awarding Mother 

sole legal custody of the parties’ children.

3. The [trial court] erred as a matter of law by failing to rule on 

contempt petitions before the court, failing to find [Mother] in 

contempt and failing to award make-up time and filing fees to 

[Father].

4. The [trial court] erred as a matter of law by failing to enter an 

order regarding the [C]hildren’s school and summer camp 

consistent with the [C]hildren’s best interest and best options 

available to them.

5. The [trial court] erred as a matter of law by failing to equitably

distribute the financial obligations and holiday time between the 

parties’. [sic]

6. The [trial court] erred as a matter of law by denying [Father’s]

motion to allow more time for contempt’s [sic] to be fully heard 

and stay all pending matters.

7. The [trial court] erred as a matter of law by substantially 

limiting the custody hearing, evidence, subpoenas and witnesses, 

including experts, presented by [Father].

8. The [trial court] erred as a matter of law by refusing to recuse 

herself from the parties’ case despite [Father’s] petition for 

recusal.

9. The [trial court] erred as a matter of law by denying Father’s 

motion in limine to exclude reference or evidence of [Father’s]

driver’s license.

10. The [trial court] erred as a matter of law by denying Father’s 

motion in limine to exclude reference or evidence of support.

Father’s Brief (1703 EDA 2021) at 11-12 (unnecessary capitalization omitted)

(unnumbered pages).
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Preliminarily, we address Father’s noncompliance with our law regarding 

appellate briefs. Pa.R.A.P. 2135(a)(1) provides that a principal brief generally 

should not exceed fourteen thousand words, and that a typed principal brief 

over thirty pages in length must contain a certificate of compliance. Father’s 

principal brief at 1703 EDA 2021, excluding supplementary matter, is ninetyseven pages long and does not include a certificate of compliance. According 

to a word processor, the brief includes nearly forty thousand words, excluding 

the same supplementary matter.11 Father again fails to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(a), in that he organizes the argument section of his brief in a manner 

inconsistent with his statement of questions involved. Cf. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) 

Further, Father fails to develop several claims with citation to legal authority. 

See In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465 (Pa. Super. 2017) (explaining that 

this Court will not review a claim unless it is developed in the argument section 

of an appellant's brief and supported by citation to relevant legal authority). 

While Father is proceeding pro se, we must emphasize this status does 

not relieve him of the obligation to comply with our appellate rules. Jiricko 

v. Geico Ins. Co., 947 A.2d 206, 213 n.11 (Pa. Super. 2008), appeal denied, 

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11 As a further example of Father’s extreme prolixity, we note that Mother filed 

only a short appellee’s brief in this Court indicating she was relying on the trial 

court’s explanation of its decision. In response, Father filed a seventy-page 

reply brief. Cf. Pa.R.A.P. 2135(a)(1) (directing that, generally, “a reply brief 

shall not exceed 7,000 words . . . . A party shall file a certificate of compliance 

with the word count limit if the . . . reply brief is longer than 15 pages when 

prepared on a word processor or typewriter.”).
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958 A.2d 1048 (Pa. 2008). Although this Court is willing to construe Father’s 

pro se materials liberally, “pro se status confers no special benefit upon [an] 

appellant. To the contrary, any person choosing to represent himself in a legal 

proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, assume that his lack of expertise 

and legal training will be his undoing.” In re Ullman, 995 A.2d 1207, 1211-

12 (Pa. Super. 2010), reargument denied (July 13, 2010), appeal denied, 20 

A.3d 489 (Pa. 2011) (citations omitted).

Given Father’s noncompliant principal brief, we could dismiss his appeal

in its entirety. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101 (“[I]f the defects are in the brief . . . of 

the appellant and are substantial, the appeal or other matter may be quashed 

or dismissed.”); Krauss v. Trane U.S. Inc., 104 A.3d 556, 584 (Pa. Super. 

2014) (“When deficiencies in a brief hinder our ability to conduct meaningful 

appellate review, we may dismiss the appeal entirely or find certain issues to 

be waived.”). Nevertheless, in the interest of justice, and mindful that this is 

a Children’s Fast Track appeal, we will endeavor to address Father’s claims to 

the extent we are able to discern them. 

We review the custody order pursuant to an abuse of discretion standard 

of review. V.B. v. J.E.B., 55 A.3d 1193, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2012) (quoting 

C.R.F. v. S.E.F., 45 A.3d 441, 443 (Pa. Super. 2012)). This Court must defer 

to the trial court’s credibility and weight of the evidence determinations, as 

the court was able to view and assess the witnesses’ testimony firsthand. Id. 
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We must accept the court’s factual findings if the record supports them, but 

we need not accept the court’s deductions or inferences from its findings. Id. 

When entering a custody order, the trial court must base its decision on 

the child’s best interests. S.W.D. v. S.A.R., 96 A.3d 396, 400 (Pa. Super. 

2014) (citation omitted). The factors that courts must consider when ordering 

custody are set forth at 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a), as follows:

(a) Factors.--In ordering any form of custody, the court shall 

determine the best interest of the child by considering all relevant 

factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors which

affect the safety of the child, including the following:

(1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit 

frequent and continuing contact between the child and 

another party. 

(2) The present and past abuse committed by a party 

or member of the party’s household, whether there is 

a continued risk of harm to the child or an abused 

party and which party can better provide adequate 

physical safeguards and supervision of the child. 

(2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a) 

(relating to consideration of child abuse and 

involvement with protective services).

(3) The parental duties performed by each party on 

behalf of the child. 

(4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s 

education, family life and community life. 

(5) The availability of extended family. 

(6) The child’s sibling relationships. 

(7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based 

on the child’s maturity and judgment. 

(8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against 

the other parent, except in cases of domestic violence 
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where reasonable safety measures are necessary to 

protect the child from harm. 

(9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, 

stable, consistent and nurturing relationship with the 

child adequate for the child's emotional needs. 

(10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily 

physical, emotional, developmental, educational and 

special needs of the child. 

(11) The proximity of the residences of the parties. 

(12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or 

ability to make appropriate child-care arrangements. 

(13) The level of conflict between the parties and the 

willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with 

one another. A party’s effort to protect a child from 

abuse by another party is not evidence of 

unwillingness or inability to cooperate with that party. 

(14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or 

member of a party’s household. 

(15) The mental and physical condition of a party or 

member of a party’s household. 

(16) Any other relevant factor. 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a).

In his interrelated first, second, and fourth claims, Father challenges the 

trial court’s credibility determinations and findings of fact, arguing the court 

should have viewed the evidence differently and awarded him primary physical 

and sole legal custody of the Children. Father contends, in essence, that he 

has supported the Children’s relationship with Mother, while Mother has tried 

to limit the Children’s relationship with him. Father’s Brief (1703 EDA 2021) 

at 12-23. He also maintains the Children want to spend more time with him. 
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Father criticizes Mother’s parenting in various ways, alleging she mistreats the 

Children. Id. at 16-19. He complains that Mother has made poor decisions 

with respect to the Children’s education, and that the Children should attend 

the preschool and camp program that his family operates as well as a school 

district where he resides.

12

 Id. at 14, 17-21, 83-87. Regarding the award of 

sole legal custody in particular, Father contends that Mother does not consult 

him or keep him informed but acts out of animosity and has used the award

to exclude Father from the Children’s major life decisions. Id. at 24-27.

As we summarized above, the trial court considered the Section 5328(a) 

factors in its findings of fact, focusing on the parties’ inability to coparent and 

hostility toward each other. While the court found Mother bore some blame, 

it concluded that Father was the party most responsible for the situation, due 

primarily to his excessive litigiousness. Findings of Fact, 7/16/21, at 2-5, 9. 

While the court expressed hope the parties coparenting would improve in the 

future, it reasoned that their present combativeness precluded a more equal 

award of custody. Id. at 4, 11-12. The following is illustrative of the court’s 

findings:

While ordinarily this might be a case for a 50/50 sharing of 

custody, and we hope that may someday be the case, Father’s 

behavior is and has been his own worst enemy. He files pleading 

after pleading, not only against Mother, but against her parents,

against the local police departments where custody exchanges 

take place, and against the doctors who provide medical care for 

____________________________________________

12 Father indicates in his brief that he “does have residency” in three different 

school districts. Father’s Brief (1703 EDA 2021) at 84. 
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his [c]hildren. We find particularly sad the fact that Father has 

badgered (with over 30 emails) the very professionals who 

provide care for his [c]hildren until, although they would like to 

continue to provide that care, they cannot do so due to Father’s 

repeated impositions on their staff in his search for the most 

minute and irrelevant details on the relationship between Mother 

and the pediatric practice which have nothing to do with his 

[c]hildren’s care. 

***

. . . [W]e must be guided by what is in the best interest of the 

Children. Constant court battles over custody, support, discovery, 

vacations, religion and a plethora of other issues are destructive 

to these [c]hildren who are regularly exposed to the stress . . . 

and cannot be unaffected by this. While Mother is not without 

blame and Father has presented many legitimate issues to the 

[c]ourt, we find that Father’s unending litigious nature and need 

to win precludes us from finding the parties equal . . . . Fighting 

over every perceived slight is not a way to show a parent’s love 

for their [c]hildren or to create a healthy environment in which 

they can grow. 

***

We do not make our decision today lightly, particularly given

the four-year, non-stop battle over these small children and the 

continued abuse of court time and resources. It appears to us 

that their spiteful litigation has almost become a full-time job for 

these parents. We know Father seeks an equal parenting role, 

but we do not believe that would be the correct decision at this 

time. These parents must learn to co-parent as peacefully as they 

possibly can. Once they reach that state of mind – that their 

children are more important than their battles – we are hopeful 

that they will be able to jointly make the right decisions for the 

Children. But for now, one parent must have the ability to make 

final decisions on critical issues such as health and education and, 

having heard 5 days of testimony, reviewed both parties’ exhibits 

and considered all the evidence before us, we believe the Order 

we have issued today is the fairest we can provide.

Id. at 4-12.
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Our review of the record supports the trial court’s decision. Tellingly, 

the hearing began on January 25, 2021, with argument addressing Father’s 

ongoing discovery disputes with third parties, which included his attempt to 

subpoena records from the pediatrician’s office that the Children attend. The 

office’s counsel appeared at the hearing and maintained she and the office’s 

staff had spent “untold hours communicating” with Father. N.T., 1/25/21, at 

21. Counsel indicated that Father received the Children’s medical records, as 

well as records of her personal communications with Mother. Id. at 22-23.

Father still was not satisfied, counsel explained, and sent her “what looked 

like interrogatories with . . . 30, 40 questions that he was demanding that I 

answer, and I didn’t respond, and now he subpoenaed me to be here today.” 

Id. at 23. She cautioned the office “can’t afford to stay in these battles. And 

so if [Father] is permitted to keep serving subpoenas and to keep harassing 

[the office] and to keep harassing me, they’re going to have to say they can’t 

care for these children anymore.” Id.

The record indicates Father’s litigious tendencies manifest even outside 

of court in personal communications with Mother. The parties send messages 

to one another using the “Our Family Wizard” electronic system. During her 

testimony, Mother reported Father had sent her approximately two thousand 

one hundred messages since the parties began using Our Family Wizard in 

February 2018, which amounted to an average of fifty-eight messages per 

month. N.T., 2/19/21, at 141-42. The messages were often lengthy. Father
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acknowledged that his messages sometimes contain twenty or more questions 

for Mother to answer. Id. at 220; 1/26/21, at 191-92; N.T., 3/15/21, at 261. 

The parties’ custody evaluation, which the trial court admitted into evidence, 

and some of which Mother read while testifying, described Father’s messages 

as “very inappropriate and not conducive to reciprocal communication. His

questions are often demanding, numerous, numbered, have an accusatory 

tone, and contain deadlines by which [Mother] is to provide the information. 

His communication style can be described as nothing short of adversarial.” 

N.T., 3/16/21, at 236-37. While Father sometimes invites Mother to joint 

activities, the evaluation added, the invitations to these activities frequently 

appear “in lengthy messages that are replete with accusations, insults, and

demeaning language.” Id. at 239.

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of Father’s litigiousness is the way in 

which he has attempted to use the courts to impair Mother’s relationship with 

the Children. The record reveals that Father filed a series of unfounded child 

abuse reports against Mother, apparently prior to the entry of the final May 3, 

2019 order in Philadelphia. N.T., 3/16/21, at 147-49, 221-225, 239-40. The 

May 3, 2019 order is replete with findings regarding these reports. See, e.g.,

Order, 5/3/19, at 6 (“Father has repeatedly abused child protective services 

. . . in attempts to secure tactical advantages in this custody litigation and to

attempt to circumvent interim custody orders. All child protective services

. . . have found allegations of abuse unfounded.”) (unnecessary capitalization 
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omitted). Father persisted, nevertheless, in defending this behavior and 

characterizing Mother as an abuser during the hearings in the matter at bar. 

See N.T., 3/15/21, at 18-21; N.T., 3/16/21, at 76, 270. Even before this 

Court, Father asserts in his brief and reply brief that Mother engaged in abuse. 

See Father’s Brief (1703 EDA 2021) at 7, 16, 37, 78; Father’s Reply Brief

(1703 EDA 2021) at 11-12, 36-38, 51, 58 (unnumbered pages). 

Ultimately, Section 5328(a)(13) directs that trial courts consider “[t]he 

level of conflict between the parties and the willingness and ability of the 

parties to cooperate with one another” when rendering a custody award. 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a)(13). Our review of the record amply supports the court’s 

conclusion that this is a high-conflict case with poor cooperation between the 

parties, due primarily to Father’s litigiousness. Thus, it was within the court’s 

discretion to award sole legal and primary physical custody of the Children to 

Mother. See P.J.P. v. M.M., 185 A.3d 413, 420 (Pa. Super. 2018) (affirming 

the trial court’s award of primary physical custody to the appellee where the

record supported the court’s finding that “the high level of conflict between 

[the parties’] would make a shared custody arrangement untenable. . . . The 

record confirms that they struggle to communicate with each other, and have 

been unable to resolve their interpersonal disputes.”).13

____________________________________________

13 In the July 16, 2021 order, the trial court granted Father’s request that the 

Children attend his family’s preschool and camp program in part, in that it 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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In Father’s third claim, he contends that the trial court erred by failing 

to rule “meaningfully” on his contempt petitions, by failing to find Mother in 

contempt, and by failing to award him “make-up time and filing fees.” Father’s 

Brief (1703 EDA 2021) at 11, 28. The first portion of Father’s claim fails, as

the court expressly denied his contempt petitions. See Order, 7/16/21, at 8-

9 (“[W]e are denying all petitions for contempt . . . . This order resolves all 

outstanding pleadings . . . filed by either of the parties . . . before the date of 

this order[.]”) (unnecessary capitalization and emphasis omitted, italics in 

original). We conclude Father waived the remainder of this claim by failing to 

develop it a manner capable of appellate review.

Here, Father filed four contempt petitions and two amended contempt 

petitions, which were at issue when the trial court entered its order of July 16, 

2021. He fails to specify in the argument section of his brief, however, which 

of his several petitions his argument pertains to, what the relevant allegations 

of contempt were, and how the evidence at the hearing was such that the 

court abused its discretion by not finding contempt. Instead, Father indicates 

____________________________________________

directed that the Children attend the camp program at least three weeks each 

summer and be allowed to attend the preschool during Father’s custodial time. 

Order, 7/16/21, at 3. Father appears to argue, in relevant part, that the court 

should have ordered the Children to attend the camp for eight weeks each 

summer and to attend the preschool full time. Father’s Brief (1703 EDA 2021) 

at 81-87. Given the court’s observations regarding the parties’ high-conflict

relationship, and its award of sole legal and primary physical custody to 

Mother, we discern no abuse of discretion by the court in deciding to limit the 

amount of time the Children would need to spend at the preschool and camp 

program Father’s family operates.
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that he will provide “some highlights of Mother’s contemptuous behavior” and 

then goes on for roughly fifty pages listing, often with repetition, seemingly 

everything he can think of that Mother has done to upset him since the parties

separated. Father’s Brief (1703 EDA 2021) at 29-81. Father’s contempt claim 

is incomprehensible, and this Court will not act as his counsel by scouring the 

record, comparing his myriad contempt allegations against the five days of 

testimony in this case, and developing a clear argument for him. See Krauss, 

104 A.3d at 584; Schenk v. Schenk, 880 A.2d 633, 639 (Pa. Super. 2005)

(quoting Hayward v. Hayward, 868 A.2d 554, 558 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“‘[I]t 

is not the duty of the Superior Court to scour the record and act as appellant’s

counsel, and we decline to do so.’”). 

Father argues in his fifth claim that the trial erred by failing to “equitably 

distribute” the parties’ “financial obligations and holiday time” in its July 16, 

2021 order. Father’s Brief (1703 EDA 2021) at 11. Father complains Mother 

does not earn a significant income but works for free at a daycare in exchange 

for the Children’s attendance as well as part-time for a caterer. Id. at 87-91. 

Because of this, Father argues, he is burdened with child and spousal support

obligations, provides the Children’s health insurance, and pays other expenses 

as well. Id. at 89-91. Father also requests changes to the order’s holiday 

schedule, asserting primarily that he should receive additional holiday time 

with the Children, and that Mother’s holiday time should be reduced. Id. at 

91-94.
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It is important to emphasize the only matter presently before this panel 

is the parties’ child custody dispute. To the extent Father complains about his 

child or spousal support obligations, the order on appeal does not govern those 

matters, and we may not consider them. Further, to the extent he complains 

about his financial burdens in this custody case, the only burden the July 16, 

2021 order appears to impose on Father is that he provide the Children with

health insurance. See Order, 7/16/21, at 8. Father did not oppose providing 

insurance for the Children at the custody hearing and complained that Mother 

was using her own health insurance for the Children rather than his. See N.T. 

2/19/21, at 136 (Father testifying, “her not using my private health insurance 

is another way of restricted parenting and not giving access so I don’t get the 

summaries of the appointments.”). Therefore, the health insurance provision 

in the July 16, 2021 order essentially grants relief that Father requested during 

these proceedings.14

As for Father’s complaints regarding the holiday schedule, our review of 

the trial court’s order reveals the court crafted a reasonably balanced division 

of holiday time. The parties alternate all secular holidays. Regarding religious 

____________________________________________

14 We also note that Father’s complaint regarding Mother’s failure to earn a 

significant income is perplexing, given Father does not appear to earn any 

income at all. Father testified he suffered injuries in 2019, which impair his 

ability to work as a software developer. N.T., 3/16/21, at 54, 68. According 

to Father, these include injuries to his elbow, wrist, and back, which prevent 

him from sitting and typing for long periods. Id. at 65-68. Father conceded, 

despite this, that he had not earned “any money from working” since 2014, 

long before the injuries occurred. Id. at 21.
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holidays, Father is Jewish, while Mother is Catholic. Thus, the court awarded 

Jewish holidays to Father and Catholic holidays to Mother. The court awarded 

more time to Mother during each Catholic holiday than it did to Father during 

each Jewish holiday and provided Catholic holidays would take precedence if 

a Catholic holiday and Jewish holiday coincide.

15

 The apparent reason for this 

disparity is that there are more Jewish holidays on the schedule than Catholic 

holidays. Specifically, the court awarded Father Passover, Rosh Hashanah, 

Yom Kippur, and Hanukkah, while awarding Mother Easter and Christmas. If

no holidays coincide, this results in Father having one hundred and forty-four 

hours of religious holiday time during a given year, and Mother’s having one 

hundred and fifty-one hours of religious holiday time. As the holiday schedule 

is generally equitable, we discern abuse of discretion.

Next, Father’s interrelated sixth and seventh claims are that the trial 

court erred by denying his “Motion to Extend Time for Contempts,” and limiting 

his presentation of evidence during the hearing.

16

 The substance of Father’s 

claims is that the five-day custody hearing the court conducted in this matter

____________________________________________

15 More precisely, if Christmas and Hanukkah coincide, Christmas would take 

precedence, but Father would receive an extra day of custody during the 

noncoinciding portion of Hanukkah. If Easter and Passover coincide, Easter 

would take precedence, except that Passover would take precedence over 

Mother’s custody on Easter Monday. 

16 Father filed his “Motion to Extend Time for Contempts” during the hearing

on February 19, 2021, and the trial court denied the motion on the record. 

N.T., 2/19/21, at 137.
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was inadequate for him to present his case. Father’s Brief (1703 EDA 2021) 

at 94-96. Father waived these claims by failing to develop them in his brief 

with citations to relevant legal authority. See M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d at 465.

Even if Father had not waived these claims, we would conclude they are 

meritless. It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to admit or exclude 

evidence. In re A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d 1157, 1166-67 (Pa. 2018). Our Rules 

of Evidence direct, moreover, that courts “should exercise reasonable control 

over the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence so 

as to[,]” in relevant part, “(1) make those procedures effective for determining 

the truth; [and] (2) avoid wasting time[.]” Pa.R.E. 611(a)(1)-(2). 

Here, we see no basis to conclude the five-day hearing in this matter 

was inadequate for the trial court to hear the relevant evidence and reach an 

appropriate decision. What Father fails to acknowledge in his brief is that the 

hearing was originally scheduled to last only two days. See Amended Order 

– Triage Resolution, 12/23/20 (scheduling the parties’ dispute for “a two [] 

day protracted hearing”). At the hearing, the court cautioned Father it would 

not grant excessive continuances. See N.T., 1/26/21, at 115 (“But I’m just 

telling you now, I’m not scheduling this hearing out three or four more days.”). 

The court later relented and extended the matter for an additional three 

days to accommodate Father. Of the five-day hearing that resulted, Father 

spent about four days presenting evidence, while Mother spent about one. 
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Although Father may have preferred to have an even longer hearing, it was 

well within the court’s discretion to limit the case to five days.

In Father’s eighth issue, he argues that the trial court erred by declining 

to recuse itself. Father does not develop this argument in his brief but merely 

directs our attention to argument he presented in his petition for recusal.17

Father’s Brief (1703 EDA 2021) at 96-97. Thus, Father has waived this claim. 

See M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d at 465; Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12 A.3d 291, 

343 (Pa. 2011) (“[O]ur appellate rules do not allow incorporation by reference

of arguments contained in briefs filed with other tribunals, or briefs attached 

as appendices, as a substitute for the proper presentation of arguments in the 

body of the appellate brief.”) (footnote omitted).

Had Father not waived this claim, it would be meritless. We review the

trial court’s decision not to recuse for an abuse of discretion. In the Interest 

of D.R., 216 A.3d 286, 292 (Pa. Super. 2019), affirmed, 232 A.3d 547 (Pa. 

2020) (quoting In re A.D., 93 A.3d 888, 892 (Pa. Super. 2014)). Our review 

of the court’s decision is “exceptionally deferential.” Id. We recognize that 

the court itself is the best judge of its own impartiality, and that a court should 

recuse “only if a doubt exists as to [its] ability to preside impartially or if 

impartiality can be reasonably questioned.” Id.

____________________________________________

17 Father also filed this petition during the hearing on February 19, 2019. The 

trial court denied it on the record. N.T., 2/19/21, at 137-40.
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We have thoroughly reviewed the record in this case and have no reason

to believe that the trial court harbored any partiality against Father. Father’s 

argument in his petition for recusal consisted generally of complaints that the 

court made rulings or was conducting the matter in a way he did not like. This 

Court has stated, contrary to Father’s position, that “simply because a judge 

rules against a [party] does not establish bias on the part of the judge against 

that [party].” Lewis v. Lewis, 234 A.3d 706, 722 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. McCauley, 199 A.3d 947, 951 (Pa. Super. 2018)). Our 

review confirms the court treated Father respectfully, granted him latitude 

throughout the hearing, and demonstrated exemplary patience. As discussed 

above, the court even held a hearing that was more than twice its originally

scheduled length to accommodate Father’s presentation of his case. This 

resulted in Father’s taking roughly four days to present evidence and Mother’s

taking roughly one. Father’s suggestion that the court conducted the matter 

in a way that was biased against him is baseless.

Finally, Father maintains in his interrelated ninth and tenth issues that 

the trial court erred by denying his motions in limine to exclude any evidence 

regarding his suspended driver’s license and failure to pay spousal or child 

support. See Father’s Brief (1703 EDA 2021) at 97-100. Father waived these 

claims by failing to develop them in his brief with citations to relevant legal 

authority and relying in part on arguments he made in his motions in limine.

See M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d at 465; Briggs, 12 A.3d at 343.
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We would conclude once again, however, that Father’s claims lack merit 

even if he had not waived them. “When reviewing a trial court’s determination 

on motions in limine, we apply an abuse of discretion standard.” Davis v. 

Borough of Montrose, 194 A.3d 597, 606 (Pa. Super 2018) (citing Turner 

v. Valley Hous. Dev. Corp., 972 A.2d 531, 535 (Pa. Super. 2009), 

reargument denied (June 23, 2009)).

Father argued in his motions in limine that his suspended driver’s license 

and failure to pay support had no relevance to the custody proceedings. See

Pa.R.E. 401 (“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact 

more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact 

is of consequence in determining the action.”). Alternatively, he argued unfair 

prejudice, confusion of the issues, and the potentially misleading nature of the 

evidence warranted its exclusion. See Pa.R.E. 403 (“The court may exclude 

relevant evidence if its probative value is outweighed by a danger of one or 

more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading 

the jury[.]”). Father further proposes in his brief that his legal counsel in

other matters instructed him not to disclose his failure to pay support, and 

that forcing him to do so violated his right to due process and attorney-client 

privilege. Father’s Brief (1703 EDA 2021) at 98.

Father’s argument is disingenuous. Father filed his motions in limine on

March 12, 2021. Strikingly, though, Father himself first introduced evidence 

of his suspended license, and the fact that it resulted from a support issue, 
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one-and-a-half months earlier on the first day of the hearing, January 25, 

2021. Father raised his suspended license in his opening statement and then 

presented extensive testimony addressing the issue. See N.T., 1/25/21, at

85, 89-158, 166-77. Father’s motions in limine advanced the argument, in 

effect, that he should be allowed to present evidence as to his suspended 

license and failure to pay support, but Mother should not. 

It is important to add that the admission of evidence regarding Father’s 

suspended driver’s license worked in his favor. In its findings of fact, the trial 

court observed that Mother had acted vindictively by notifying the police at a

custody exchange that Father’s license was suspended when she knew this

resulted from failure to pay support and not from a safety issue. See Findings

of Fact, 7/16/21, at 4-5. The court used this incident as an example of how

Father was “not alone” in his failure to coparent, and why Mother was also to 

blame. Id.

Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude Father’s appeal at 1703 

EDA 2021 is also meritless, and we affirm the July 16, 2021 order.

CONCLUSION

After review of the lengthy record in this matter, we conclude the trial 

court did not commit an error of law or abuse of discretion. We, therefore, 

affirm the June 16, 2021, and July 16, 2021 orders. We also deny Father’s 

“Motion for Reconsideration” of our order consolidating these appeals. 
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Orders affirmed. Motions for reconsideration denied.

18

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/10/2022

____________________________________________

18 We previously disposed of Appellant’s Applications for Relief and Amended 

Application for Relief filed on December 9, 2021, and December 13, 2021. 

See Order, 3/21/22. 

On March 29, 2022, Appellant filed an Application for Emergency Relief, which 

we addressed in our April 4, 2022 Order. In our 4/4/22 Order, we directed 

Appellant to provide four flash drives containing copies of Appellant’s exhibits. 

Appellant timely complied. 

Based on our review of the record, it appears the “missing” exhibits are in fact 

part of the official record forwarded to us by the trial court. See 2019-06877-

0253 Petition and accompanying exhibits, and 2019-06877-0266 Emergency 

Family Petition and accompanying exhibits. Additionally, Appellant attached 

the same missing exhibits to his reply brief. Thus, the record is complete. To 

the extent some of the exhibits are missing, as Appellant claims, the 

incompleteness of the record is attributable to Appellant’s inability to comply 

with the trial court’s clear instructions regarding introduction of evidence, and 

the confusion resulting from overwhelming the trial court with a plethora of 

filings, all affected by excessive verbosity, and unnecessary redundancy.