1 Chatman and Palmer we re never marri ed. THI RD DIVI SION BA RN ES , P. J ., BOG GS and B RANC H, JJ. N OTIC E: Motionsfor r econs ider

ation m ust be physic ally received

in ou r cle rk’s office w ithin ten days of the

date of dec ision to bedeem ed tim ely f iled. http:/ /www .gaapp eals.us/ru les/ July 11, 2014



# In the Co urt o f A pp eals of G eo rgia
A14 A05 96. CHAT MAN v. PAL MER. B OGGS , Ju dge. Kim be rly Cha tman app eals from the trial court’s orde r transferringprimary phy si cal custody

of her so n to his father, Da vid Palmer. She a lso ap pea ls from the tr i al
cour t’s order gr ant i ngPal mer ’s moti on f or at tor ney f ees an d l i ti gat i on ex

pense s un der OCGA § 9-1 5-14 . Be caus e the trial co urt wa s w ithout authority to mo dify perma nent custody un der a f ami l y v i ol ence protec tive order, w e revers e. W e also va cate the aw ard of att orn ey f

ees an d rem and t

hi s case t o tri al cour

t t o reco nsi derthe aw ard in li ght of
ou r re ve rs al. The record reveals that the c hil d w as b orn on August 15, 2003 , an d th at Pal

mer hadlegitimated him. 1 In a 2007 “Fi nal Order of Custo dy an d Visi

tat i on, ” th e tri al court2

awardedthe pa rties joint legal cus tody o f the child with C hatman b eing name d th e primary physical custodi an. The order also se t fort h Palmer’s schedule of vi sitati on. The pres ent action b egan w ith Chatma n’s J une 22, 200 9 pe tition for a prote ctive order th atalleged Palmer pushe d her, grabb ed he r by the thro at, a nd cho ked her. S he
assertedth at sh e was i n f earof Pal mer becau se he h ad th

reat ened h er an d oth ers, had “alcohol or d ru g pr obl ems, ” dang erou s weapons, a criminal record, an d had b een violent in the prese nce of chi l dren . Th e tri al cour

t enter ed a “ Family Violence Ex Pa rte Prote ctive Ord er” e njoining Palmer from ap proa ching Cha tman or the child and orde ring that Pa lmer not have any conta ct w ith the child. Follow ing a heari ng , th e tri al court ent ereda “ Family Violence Tw elve M onth Pro tective O rd er ,” effe ct ive unt il Ju ly 2, 2010, whi ch allowe d Pa lmer only supe rvised visits w ith the child once a pe rson to supervise was found and agreed upon. On No vember 1 0, 2010 , foll ow ing a hearing on Chatman’s reques t for a perma nent prote ctive or de r, the co urt en te re d a “ Th re e Y ea r/P er ma ne nt F am ily Viol ence Prot ective Ord er” pu rsu ant to OCGA § 19-1 3-4 (c ), aw arding C ha tma n full custo dy of the c hild and pro viding that Palm er coul d have n o vi sit ati on w ith t he ch ild unt il a therapist

“states in wri ting t

hat [ the] chi ld can

vi sit with out f

ear of physi cal or3

mental injury.” The therap ist arrange d sup ervised visits with Pa lme r and th e c hild beginni ng on April

22, 201 1. In November of

2011, Ch atm an m oved to tem porari l y su spend

th e supe rv i sed

v isitati on alleging that the thera pist had left the child unsupe rvised w ith Palmer, a nd duri ng t hat tim e Palm er hi

t th e chi ld. Palm er deni ed the alleg ati ons in hi s response to the mot i on an d characteri zed Chat man ’s moti on as “st

rat egi c and re taliatory.” In December

20 11 , t he tria l co urt ap po in ted t he child a gua rdian ad litem to ass ist the court i n “rea chingrel evant deci si ons co ncer ningcust ody, vi si tat i on, maint enan ce, educati on an d gen eral

welf are of th e chi l d rai sed i n thi s acti on. ” In Febru ary 2012, Chatman fi led a m ot ion fo r contem pt of th e threey e ar/pe rmanent protectiv e order. Palm er respon ded and f il ed hi s own moti on f

or conte mpt. The trial court hel d a heari ng on those m oti ons over

the cou rse of two days (April 9th and 13th , 2012), an d on Apri l 13, 2012, i t ent ered a “Temporary Order of Custodyand Vi si tat i on” t o r em ain i n ef f ect u nt i l th e expi

rat i on of th e “Thr ee Ye ar/Pe rmanent Fam i l y Vi ol ence Pro te ct ive O rd er ” o r o the r o rd er of t he co urt . T his tempora ry order grant ed the par ti es joint cu stody of

the ch il d and nam ed Ch atm an primary phy si calcust odi an ( as was ori ginal l y awar ded inthe 200 7 fi nalorder of custod y). In

f i ndingth at t

her e was no cred ible evidence that Pa lmer was violent toward4

the child, the c ourt grante d Pa lmer “tra nsitional supe rvised visita ti on” requiring super vi sed visitation for only the tw o sc heduled visits following the date o f the order, with the remaining vi sitati on to be unsupervised at Palmer’s home. In Se pt em be r 2 01 2, C ha tma n file d an “ Emerg ency Ex -part e Motion f or Suspensi on or Modif

ication of Vi sit ati on” as set forth in the April 201 2 tempo rary order. She asserted t

hat th e chi l d’s psy chi atri st was of the op inion that “it is not in the chi l d’s best inte re st to co ntin ue uns up er vis ed vis ita tio n w ith h is Fat her ,” an d th at su ch conti nu ed un super

vi sed vis ita tio n w ou ld pos e a s afety risk to the child be caus e of the chi l d’s allegations of “ve rbal, e motional, a nd phys ical abus e” b y Palmer. The trialcourt decl i nedto h ol d an em ergenc y he aring on the m oti on, but nev erth eless conducted a hearing on “a ny and all non-jury i ssues ” on Oct ober 3 0, 2012 ( conti nu ed to Nov ember 27). The he aring included the testimony o f Chatma n, Palmer, the child’s psyc hiatrist, the guardi an ad lit em, a psychologist, a f amil y consultant , and a w itn ess for Palmer. On No vembe r 27, 201 2, the trial court ente red a tempo rary ord er gra nting Pa lme r full te mp or ar y c us to dy of t he ch ild and p rohibiting Chatma n from having any vi sit ati on with the c hild pending the ent ryof th e cour t’s f i nal order . On Decem

ber11, the tri al cou

rt en tered a“Final O rder o f Custo dy and Visitation” aw arding C hatman a nd Pal mer joint physica l custod y of the child and naming Palmer the primary phy si ca l5

custo dian. The co ur

t n oted t hat “it s earli er f

i nding s of

f ami l y v i ol ence may have been improvi dent,” th atChatman “seeks every o ppo rtunity to purpo sely interfere with the relationship b etw een [P almer] a nd [his ] s on ,” an d t ha t th e o nly r em ed y is a c ha nge in custody. It is f

rom thi s order that Chatman app eals. 1. Chat man asserts t hat th e tri al co urt er re d in “ ch an ging cu st od y in thi s acti on for modification of visitation in a pe rmanent p rotec tive order.” Chatm an i s correct t hat in order to seek a chang e in primary physi cal cu stody, pursu ant to OCG A § 19-9-23 (a), Pal mer

wa s require d to f

il e an acti on in DeKalb Coun ty, Chatman ’s count

y of resi dence . See Jones v. Jones , 256 Ga. 742, 74 3 (352 SE2d 754) (1987 ). T hat Code secti on provi des that

(except in cases not

ap plic ab le her e) “af

ter a cour t h as det erm i ned who i s to be th e l egal

custodi an of

a chi ld, any co mplaint see king to ob tain a cha nge of l egal cust ody of

th e chi l d shall be bro ug ht as a sep arat e acti on in th e count y of resi dence of

th e l egal cust odi an of t

he chi ld. ” Moreover, a com plai nt f or custody cann ot be made a s a count ercl ai m or i n “res ponse to an

y ot her ac tion or mo tion see king to enf orce a child cus tody o rder. ” O CG A § 1 9-9-2 3 (c). “T his statute wa s ena cted by the Legislature to cu rta il th e prac ti ce criticized in Ma tthews v. M atthe ws , 238 Ga. 201 (232 SE2d 76) (19 77) allo wing the n oncustodial

parent to relitig ate custody in hi s own2 On Ap ril 1 3, 20 12 , in the hea ring on visitation under the three-ye ar/pe rmanent

prote ctive order, Pal mer testified that he wa nted “ joint physica l custod y toda y.” In the Novem ber 201 3 hea ring, Cha tman’s couns el state d that P almer’s couns el “ha s no w rai sed the i ssue th at th ey are m oving f orward onthei

r motion trying to see k a c hange of primary physi cal cu stody. ” But Pal mer’s cou

nselmade no su ch m oti on n or was there a petiti on for a change in permanent custody pending. Itapp ears from th e record t hat t he trial court also believ ed a change in permane nt custody was properly before i t. At the con clu sion of t he Apri l 13t

h hearing on visitation, the court noted that the guardian ad litem’s rep ort stat ed th at “th e f ath ersays he wa nts ful l cu st od y. ” T he co urt ex pla ine d t ha t it w as te mp te d t o g ive Pa lme r full custody “because that ’s how stron gly I believ e that the m other

has do ne h er bes t to alienate the f

ath er an d son. ” In

awardingPal mer

primar y physi cal custody

of t he chi ld, the court re lied heavily on the te stimony of a ps ychologist w ho did no t examine the ch ild but co ncluded that a chang e in custody is a remedy i

n th e case of

a child suffering from Parental

Ali enation Syndrome. 6 jurisdi cti on.” ( Citation

omitted.) Kapur v. Roac h , 272 Ga. 767, 768 (534 SE2d420) (2000 ). Although Pa lme r d id no t file a se para te ac tion for custo dy, the trial court, c iting Daust v. Daust , 204 Ga. App. 29 (41 8 SE2d 409) (1992 ), f oun d th at Chatm an waived any defen se of l ack of j uri sdiction or impr oper

ven ue. Id. at 31. But

even assumi ngth at Pal mer properl y assert ed a chang e in

custody2 and th at Chatm an waived t he def enses of lack of jurisdi cti on and i

mproper venu e, th e tri al cou

rt was wit

hout auth ori ty to make a cha nge in perma nent cus tody in this temp orary p rotec tive orde r action.3 See, e.g, Andersen v

. Farringt on , 291 Ga. 775 (731 SE2d 351) ( 2012) (action for contem pt of di vor ce decr ee th at set

f ort h per man ent cust ody awar d and a

ppend ed moti on f orchange in custod y); Kapur , su pra, 272 Ga. at 767 (action for contem pt of di vor ce dec ree that se t forth permanent custod y aw ard and pe titi on for sole custo dy); Daust , supra (a ction for contempt of orde r that set forth permane nt custody a wa rd).

4 OCG A § 19- 13-2 p rov i des th at t he su per ior court o f the county w here the respo ndent re sid es sh all h av e j uris dic tio n o ve r p et itio ns se ek ing r elie f fro m fa mily vi ol ence. As Pa lme r re sid ed in Co bb C ounty, the su pe rio r c ou rt o f tha t c ou nty pr op er ly had jurisdiction over the matter. 7 Th is ac tio n w as initia te d n ot by a c om pla int o r p et itio n f rom a f i nal order dete rmining

perma nent cus tody, 3 but by a peti ti on f

ora temp orary p rotec tive orde r. The tr i al court entered a tempo rary protec tive order, and later a permane nt protective ord er, based on allegations of f amily violence. The c ourt wa s autho rized to do s o purs uant to OCGA § 19-13-4. 4 Subs ection (a ) provide s that “ to bring ab out a ces sation o f acts of f am ily violence, ” the trial co urt may, up on pe tition, grant a p rotec tive orde r. The court’ s ord er may: (1) Direct t

he respon dent to ref

rain f rom su ch acts; (2) Gra nt to a p arty po sse ssion o f the res idence or hous ehold o f the parti es and excl

ude th e other

party from th e resi dence or h ousehol d; (3) Re quire a p arty to p rovide s uitable alterna te hous ing f or a spo use, former sp ouse , or p arent a nd the p arties’ child or children; (4) Aw ard temp orary custo dy of minor chil dren and estab li sh tempo rary vi sit ati on ri ght s;8

(5) Ord er the e viction of a pa rty from the re sidenc e or ho u seho ld and order as sis ta nc e t o t he vic tim in re tur ning to it, or or de r a ss ist an ce in retrieving personal

propert y of the vi ctim i f

th e resp onden

t’s ev i cti on h as not been ordered; (6) Order ei ther

party to make pay

ment s for the su pport of a minor ch ild as r equ i r edbyl aw; (7) Ord er either party t o make paym ent s f or t he su pport of a spou se as r equ i r edbyl aw; (8) Provi de for

possession

of per sonalpropert

y of the par ti es; (9) Ord er the re spo ndent to refrain from hara ssing or interfering w ith the victim; (10) A wa rd co sts a nd atto rney’s fees to either pa rty; and (11) Ord er th e r espondent to recei

ve appropriat e psychi atri c or psychol ogi cal ser

vi ces as a fu

rth er measu

re to prevent

the recurrence of f ami l y v i ol ence. OCGA § 19-13 -4 (a). Subse ction (c) gives the court discre tion to convert a temp orary orde r to a p ermane nt one up on motion o f the petitioner a nd following a he aring. As subs ection (a ) (4) pro vides, the tri al cou rt m ay award temporary custody or establ ish temporary visitation righ ts. See, e.g., Baca v. B aca , 256 Ga. App. 514, 516- 517 (2) ( 568 SE2d 746) (2002) . OCG A § 19-13-4 con tains no provi sion

for the aw ard of permanent cust ody, howev er, and as th e tri al cour t ackn owl edge d, “ genera lly the Fa mily Violenc e Ac t canno t be the vehicle use d to mo dify custod y.” W e find no9

authority all owing

for a chan ge in per

man ent cust ody u

nder th ese circumst ances . Had the l egi sl atu

re int ended

to incl ude achange in permane nt custo dy in the list of options
av aila ble to t

he trial court u nder OCGA § 19-13-4 (a) , i t coul d have don e so spe cifically. We th er ef or e h ol d th at

t h e c our t wa s w itho ut a uth or ity to mo dify perma nent custo dy unde r the pro tective o rder no twithsta nding any waiv er of perso nal jurisdi cti on and venue. Cf. Perlman v. Perlman , 318 Ga . Ap p. 7 31, 731 -733 (1) and 738 (4) ( 734 SE2d 560) ( 2012) (f ath er f i l ed pet i ti on f

or ch ang e i n cu stody

as well as petitions for

famil y vi olen ce protectiv e orders; discu ssing di stincti on between remedy in custody ac tion and remedy o f protective orde r). The tri al court d id have the discre tion, how ever, to mod ify the permane nt prote ctive orde r or to terminate the orde r returning the pa rties to the sta tus quo of the 2007 fi nalorder of

custody . See, e.g ., Ma ndt v . Lo vell , 293 Ga. 807, 809-810 ( 750 SE2d 134) ( 2013) (tri al cour t h as di screti on t o decr ease durat i on of prot ective o rde r whenapp ropriate and to terminate such order when m ateri al chan ge in circumst ances
occ urs). W hile the court ma y ha ve co rre ct ly c on clu de d t ha t th er e w as ev ide nc e o f a
ma te ria l ch an ge in condi ti on af fecting th e welf

are of the ch il d, it simply cannot gra nt
a chang e in

perman ent cu stody based on that factua l fi

nding, but must

rath er exercise5 W e note th at Pal mer di d not seek f ees pursu ant to OCG A § 19-13-4 ( a) (10) (aw ard of co sts and attorney fees pursuant to a protec tive order). 10 i ts broad discre tion pursua nt to the p ermane nt prot ective order. If Pal mer sti l l desi res a cha nge in perma nent cus tody, he must file a se para te ac tion in DeK alb C ounty. We the re for e v ac at e t ha t p or tio n o f t he t ri al cour t’s order awar di ngPal mer primary physica l custod y of the chi ld, and rem and th is case f or an order on t he m att er
cons istent w ith this opinion. Chatm an’s remai

ningargum ent

i s ren dered

moot by ou r r ever salher e. 2. Chat man al so chal len ges th e tri al cou rt’s award of

attor ney f ees to Pa l mer . Pal mer sought a ttorney fee s and liti gation exp ense s purs uant to OCGA §§ 19-9-3, 19- 6-2, and 9-15- 14. Fol lowing a h earing, the t ri al cou rt awarde d fee s p urs ua nt t o o nly OCGA § 9-15-14, fi

nding t hat Chat man’s “cl aim s a nd po sitions as serte d lack ed a ny jus tic iab le issu e of l aw or fact that coul d be reasonabl

y be l i eved, ” and t

hat Chatm an “b rought these allegations before the Cour t f orpurposes o f harassment of [Palmer].” 5 W hile the t

ri al cou rt is au thorized to award fees u nder OCGA § 9-15-14 f or frivolous cl ai ms an d def enses i n an

action involving a family viol ence p rotective orde r,
see genera lly Dalenberg v. Dalenberg , 325 Ga. App. 833, 834-836 ( 1) (755 SE2d 228) (2014 ), and ma y have p rope rly done so here, i t incor porat ed by r ef

eren ce i ts f

i nal order11

of cu st od y, an d w e h av e h eld i n Di vi si on 1 t hat the cou rt was wit

hout auth ori ty to make
a perman ent cu stodyruli ngi n thi s case. Un der t hese c i rcu

mst ances , out of

an abun dance of

ca ution, we vacat e th e award of att orn ey f

ees an d rem and t o th e tri al court for fu rth er consi derati on in l ight of our h oldi

ng i n Div isi on 1. Judgment rev ers ed in par t, vac ated in part, and case remanded wi th direction. Barnes, P. J. , and Branch, J., concur
.