J.A13033/14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

BARBARA SCHADER, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

RANDOLPH SCHADER, :

: No. 2492 EDA 2013

Appellee :

Appeal from the Order Entered June 20, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County 

Domestic Relations Division No(s).: 94-7374

BEFORE: ALLEN, MUNDY, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 10, 2015

Appellant, Barbara Schader (“Wife”), appeals from the order entered in 

the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas in this equitable distribution 

case. In her counseled appeal, Wife contends the trial court abused its 

discretion in refusing to impose sanctions against Appellee, Randolph 

Schader (“Husband”), for his noncompliance with the court’s March 1, 2013 

discovery order.1 She claims the court should have (1) continued the 

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The discovery order was not a final and appealable order. See Pa.R.A.P. 

341(b)(1) (stating final order is any order that disposes of all claims and of 

all parties). On August 27, 2013, the trial court entered the decree in 

divorce. Our Supreme Court has stated that issues are reviewable after 

entry of the divorce decree. Fried v. Fried, 501 A.2d 211, 215 (Pa. 1985). 

“Once an appeal is filed from a final order, all prior interlocutory orders are 
J. A13033/14

- 2 -

equitable distribution hearing and (2) imposed a negative inference 

regarding Husband’s financial status. We affirm.

Wife and Husband were married on October 12, 1985, and have four 

emancipated children. The parties formally separated on August 17, 2007. 

On March 1, 2013, the court entered the order which is the subject of the 

instant appeal. The order provided:

1. Counsel for [Husband] shall provide to counsel for 

[Wife] all documents and information pertaining to the 

estates of Byron and Gay Schader [(“Husband’s parents”)] 

and all information contained in or obtained from such 

documents or information concerning the financial status 

of the estates of [Husband’s parents.]

2. All documents and information produced to [Wife] 

and her counsel in this litigation pertaining to the estates 

of [Husband’s parents] and all information contained in or 

obtained from such documents or information concerning 

the financial status of the estates of [Husband’s parents] 

shall be used by the parties and their counsel only, solely 

for the preparation, evaluation, negotiation and trial in this 

divorce action and related proceedings and for no other 

purpose or publication. Except as provided for in this 

Order, such documents and information may be disclosed 

by the parties or their representatives, only to counsel for 

[Husband], counsel for [Wife], the staff of said counsel and 

experts and their staff retained or consulted by said 

counsel in connection with this action, who agree in writing 

to be bound by this Order provided that said person to 

whom such documents or information may be disclosed 

shall not include any relatives and/or friends of [Husband] 

and/or [Wife].

3. This Order shall be without prejudice to [Wife’s] or 

[Husband’s] right to seek discovery, subject to the 

 

subject to review.” Bird Hill Farms, Inc. v. U.S. Cargo & Courier 

Service, Inc., 845 A.2d 900, 903 (Pa. Super. 2004).
J. A13033/14

- 3 -

relevant legal objections and subject to the terms of this 

Order. This Order shall not be admissible into evidence at 

any further discovery proceeding expect to the extent 

necessary to enforce the terms of this Order.

4. In the event that the terms of this Confidentiality 

Agreement have allegedly breached, [Husband] may 

pursue any and all claims as the law may permit.

6. [sic] This Order is not intended to make the parties 

guarantors of nondisclosure, but rather, merely to ensure 

that they act in a reasonable prudent manner and do not 

disclose such documents or information except in 

accordance with the terms of this Order.

Order Regarding Confidentiality of Estates of Byron and Gay Schader, 

3/4/13, at 1-2 (unpaginated).

The trial court subsequently held an equitable distribution hearing on 

March 6, 2013. On May 30th, the court entered an equitable distribution 

order. Wife and Husband filed motions for reconsideration. On June 19th, 

the court entered an order granting in part and denying in part the motions 

for reconsideration. On August 26th, the court entered a decree in divorce. 

On September 30th, Wife filed a notice of appeal.2 Wife filed a court-

 

2 We note the docket reflects two notices of appeal were filed on June 26, 

2013, within three hours. The certified record contains only one of the 

notices of appeal. Wife’s notice of appeal filed on June 26, 2013 at docket 

number 1832 EDA 2013 was discontinued.
J. A13033/14

- 4 -

ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal.3

The trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion.

Wife raises the following issue for our review:

A: Whether the Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In 

Refusing To Impose Sanctions Against [Husband] When 

[Husband] Intentionally Refused To Comply With The Trial 

Court’s Discovery Order Directing Him To Provide Financial 

Documents Regarding The Estates Of His Deceased Parents 

And [Wife] Was Severely Prejudiced As A Result Of Said 

Refusal.

Wife’s Brief at iv.

As a prefatory matter, we consider whether Wife waived the issue 

raised on appeal based upon her Rule 1925(b) statement. The trial court 

opined:

 

3 We note that on September 13, 2013, without first obtaining leave of 

court, Wife filed an amended statement of errors complained of on appeal. 

Rule 1925(b)(2) provides:

Upon application of the appellant and for good cause 

shown, the judge may enlarge the time period initially 

specified or permit an amended or supplemental 

Statement to be filed. Good cause includes, but is not 

limited to, delay in the production of a transcript necessary 

to develop the Statement so long as the delay is not 

attributable to a lack of diligence in ordering or paying for 

such transcript by the party or counsel on appeal. In 

extraordinary circumstances, the judge may allow for the 

filing of a Statement or amended or supplemental 

Statement nunc pro tunc.

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(2). Because the amended Rule 1925(b) statement is 

virtually identical to the court-ordered Rule 1925(b) statement, any issue of 

compliance with Rule 1925(b)(2) is of no moment.
J. A13033/14

- 5 -

[T]he Statement of Errors is fifteen pages long. An in 

depth review of this document reveals that the first three 

pages, or paragraphs 1-24, are a recitation of the 

background of the parties’ marriage, married life, and 

current residences. . . . This [c]ourt believes . . . that the 

Statement of Errors submitted by [Wife] impedes this 

[c]ourt’s ability to properly respond to the allegation of 

error.

 * * *

[Wife’s] fifteen-page Rule 1925(b) Statement included 

sixty-six (66) issues that it purportedly sought to raise on 

appeal once this [t]rial [c]ourt waded through the first 

three pages, or paragraphs 1-24 of factual recitations of 

the case. Additionally, we note that many of the issues 

identified by [Wife] also included sub-issues.

 * * *

[Wife] has deliberately circumvented the meaning 

and purpose of Rule 1925(b) by raising such a 

voluminous amount of issue of error and has effectively 

precluded appellate review of the issues she now seeks to 

raise.

In this case, [Wife] presented sixty six or more issues 

for her appeal. This has forced this [c]ourt to guess which 

issue [Wife] is actually pursuing on appeal. . . .

 * * *

Based upon the Statement of Errors presented to this 

[c]ourt by [Wife], the [c]ourt is unable to provide a 

comprehensive analysis of the issues presented to this

[c]ourt. Due to the preposterous number of issues 

identified by [Wife] for this [c]ourt to address all 

sixty six (66) issues would impeded [sic] the ability 

of this [c]ourt’s [sic] to undertake a meaningful 

review of the issues raised on appeal. Accordingly, 

the Superior Court must conclude that [Wife] has failed to 

preserve any of her issues for appellate review.

Trial Ct. Op., 9/17/13, at 2, 5, 6, 8 (emphasis added).
J. A13033/14

- 6 -

In PHH Mortg. Corp. v. Powell, 100 A.3d 611 (Pa. Super. 2014), 

this Court declined to quash the appeal based upon a prolix Rule 1925(b) 

statement. Id. at 614. This Court reasoned:

The [pro se appellants’] Rule 1925(b) statement fails in 

most respects to comply with the requirements of the 

Rule, including, most notably, that it is not concise. The 

[appellants’] Rule 1925(b) statement includes 40 separate 

paragraphs and is 10 pages in length. As such, the 

[appellants] plainly made no attempt to winnow 

appropriate issues for appeal. On the other hand, Rule 

1925(b)(4)(iv) provides that “the number of errors raised 

will not alone be grounds for finding waiver.” Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b)(4)(iv). Moreover, in Eiser v. Brown & 

Williamson Tobacco Corp., . . . 938 A.2d 417 ([Pa.] 

2007), our Supreme Court instructed that with respect to 

lengthy Rule 1925(b) statements, no violation is 

sufficient to find waiver of issues unless the trial 

court finds that the appellant acted in bad faith. Id.

at 420–21.

Id. (emphasis added).

In the case sub judice, the trial court found that Wife acted in bad faith 

by deliberately circumventing Rule 1925(b) in raising a preposterous number 

or issues impeding the ability of the court to undertake any meaningful 

review of the issues.4 Therefore, pursuant to PHH Mortg., the issue is 

waived. See id. 

 

4 The trial court also opined that this appeal should be quashed. Trial Ct. 

Op. at 8. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: 

An appeal is “quashed” when the court lacks jurisdiction 

over the appeal in the first instance. When the appellant 

has failed to preserve issues for appeal, the issues are 
J. A13033/14

- 7 -

We further find Wife has waived her claim for non-compliance with 

Rule 2119, which provides:

(c) Reference to record. If reference is made to the 

pleadings, evidence, charge, opinion or order, or any other 

matter appearing in the record, the argument must set 

forth, in immediate connection therewith, or in a footnote 

thereto, a reference to the place in the record where the 

matter referred to appears (see Rule 2132) (references in 

briefs to the record).

See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c). 

The Rules of Appellate Procedure require a petitioner to set forth the 

location in the record where the issue was raised and preserved below. See

Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c) (requiring statement of case in appellate brief to identify 

place and manner in which issues were raised and preserved below), 

2119(e) (requiring argument in appellate brief to identify where issues were 

raised below). “Failing to direct this Court to specific portions of the record 

in support of an argument violates Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c) [and for] that reason 

alone, we could conclude this issue is waived.” Commonwealth v. 

Fransen, 42 A.3d 1100, 1107 n.11 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal denied, 76 

 

waived, and the lower court’s order is more properly 

“affirmed.” 

In re K.L.S., 934 A.2d 1244, 1246 n.3 (Pa. 2007) (citations omitted). “As 

an appellate court, we may uphold a decision of the trial court if there is any 

proper basis for the result reached; thus we are not constrained to affirm on 

the grounds relied upon by the trial court.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. 

Fleming, 924 A.2d 1259, 1269 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2007), abrogated on other 

grounds, Gillard v. AIG Ins. Co., 15 A.3d 44 (Pa. 2011).
J. A13033/14

- 8 -

A.3d 538 (Pa. 2013);5see also Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12 A.3d 291, 

343 (Pa. 2011) (“The briefing requirements scrupulously delineated in our 

appellate rules are not mere trifling matters of stylistic preference; rather, 

they represent a studied determination by our Court and its rules committee 

of the most efficacious manner by which appellate review may be conducted 

so that a litigant’s right to judicial review as guaranteed by Article V, Section 

9 of our Commonwealth’s Constitution may be properly exercised.”). 

Wife states that her counsel requested “a continuance until [Husband] 

could be compelled to comply with the discovery order.” Wife’s Brief at 4. 

In support, she cites, “See Transcript of March 6, 2013 Hearing.” Id. Wife 

avers that in her Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, she 

requested the court to “impose a negative inference that the estates of 

[Husbands’ parents] were collectively valued at $27 million to $30 million 

and that [Husband] had inherited half of those estates.” Id. In support, 

she cites, See Transcript of March 6, 2013 Hearing; and Appellant’s 

Proposed Findings of Fact and conclusions of Law at ¶¶ 66, 97.6 Id. 

 

5 We note “[s]ince the Rules of Appellate Procedure apply to criminal and 

civil cases alike, the principles enunciated in criminal cases construing those 

rules are equally applicable in civil cases.” Lineberger v. Wyeth, 894 A.2d 

141, 148 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2006)(citation omitted).

6 We note there is no docket entry for Appellant’s Proposed Findings of Fact 

and Conclusions of Law. The reproduced record includes the Proposed 

Findings of Fact, however, it is not signed or time stamped. This is of no 

moment because Wife did not file a motion for sanctions. See infra.
J. A13033/14

- 9 -

Neither paragraph 66 nor paragraph 97 refers to the filing of a motion for 

sanctions before the trial court. See infra. 

The notes of testimony from the March 6th hearing comprise 499 

pages. “[I]t is not the responsibility of this Court to scour the record to 

prove that an appellant has raised an issue before the trial court, thereby 

preserving it for appellate review.” Schultz v. MMI Prods., 30 A.3d 1224, 

1230 (Pa. Super. 2011).

Wife has not referred to the specific portions of the notes of testimony 

in support of her claim that the court should have imposed sanctions against 

Husband for failure to comply with the discovery order either in her 

statement of the case or in the argument section of the brief. Therefore, the 

issue is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c), 2119 (c), 2119(e); Fransen, 42 

A.3d at 1109 n.1; Schultz, 30 A.3d at 30.

Finally, we hold Wife has waived her claim concerning the court’s 

alleged refusal to impose sanction because she did not file a motion for 

sanctions pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 4019. 

In Cove Centre, Inc. v. Westhafer Const., Inc., 965 A.2d 259 (Pa. 

Super. 2009), this Court addressed the issue of whether the trial court could 

impose sanctions without convening oral argument in accordance with 

Pa.R.C.P. 208.3 and 4019. Id. at 263. 

Rule 208.3 provides:

(a) Except as otherwise provided by subdivision (b), the 

court shall initially consider a motion without written 
J. A13033/14

- 10 -

responses or briefs. For a motion governed by this 

subdivision, the court may not enter an order that 

grants relief to the moving party unless the motion 

is presented as uncontested or the other parties to 

the proceeding are given an opportunity for an 

argument.

Pa.R.C.P. 208.3(a) (emphasis added).

Rule 4019 provides:

(a)(1) The court may, on motion, make an appropriate 

[sanctions] order if

 * * *

(viii) a party or person otherwise fails to make 

discovery or to obey an order of court respecting 

discovery.

Pa.R.C.P. 4019(a)(1)(viii) (emphasis added).

This Court in Cove “conclude[d] that both Rule 208.3 and Pa.R.C.P. 

4019 effectively mandate oral argument whenever a discovery motion is 

neither uncontested nor facially meritless.” Cove, 965 A.2d at 263. 

In the case sub judice, Wife did not file a motion for sanctions, 

consequently there was no hearing. Therefore, the court could not impose 

sanctions. See id.

Order affirmed.
J. A13033/14

- 11 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/10/2015