Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack, Chief Justice

David F. Viviano,

Chief Justice Pro Tem

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh,

Justices

Order 

July 31, 2019

156458

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 156458

COA: 332734

Eaton CC: 15-020176-FH

JAMES DAVID URBAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On March 6, 2019, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to 

appeal the August 31, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the 

application is again considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting 

leave to appeal, we VACATE that part of the Court of Appeals opinion holding that the 

language used in the laboratory report that “ ‘it can be concluded to a reasonable degree 

of scientific certainty that the DNA profile . . . is from the same individual,’ ” met the 

requirement from People v Coy, 243 Mich App 283, 301 (2000), of “some analytic or 

interpretive evidence concerning the likelihood or significance of a DNA profile 

match . . . .” The Coy standard requires that when DNA evidence is introduced, it must 

be accompanied by some qualitative or quantitative interpretation.1

 Id. at 302. The 

descriptive phrase, “to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty” offers neither. The 

phrase is a legally created term of art that is unused by scientists outside of courtrooms. 

Kaye, The Double Helix and the Law of Evidence (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 

2010), p 82. Because the phrase is meaningless and potentially misleading, the United 

States Attorney General has directed United States Department of Justice forensic 

laboratories to ensure that it is not used in reports or testimony. United States 

Department of Justice, Memorandum for Heads of Department Components, 

Recommendations of the National Commission on Forensic Science; Announcement for 

NCFS Meeting Eleven (September 6, 2016), available at 

<https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/891366/download> (accessed July 18, 2019) 

[https://perma.cc/9JLK-ZGH9]; see also National Commission on Forensic Science, 

Views on the Commission—Use of the Term “Reasonable Scientific Certainty” (March 

22, 2016), available at <https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/file/839726/download> 

(accessed July 18, 2019) [https://perma.cc/GK4P-K7J9] (encouraging the Attorney 

General to abandon the phrase because it has “no place in the judicial process” for many 

 1 Because neither party argues Coy should be overruled, we do not address whether it is 

the appropriate standard and simply apply it here. 
2

reasons, including that it lacks scientific meaning, is misleading, and is without any realworld significance to the scientific fields represented by expert testimony).

We nonetheless AFFIRM the result reached by the Court of Appeals on this issue 

because we agree with its conclusion in the alternative that admission of the DNA 

evidence did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights and therefore does not require 

reversal. The forensic expert performed a quantitative analysis to generate the report she 

presented as evidence. That analysis revealed that the blood that matched the victim’s 

DNA did so within a frequency of no fewer than 1 in 53.85 octillion (53.85 × 1027) and 

the defendant’s matched within a frequency of no fewer than 1 in 18.62 nonillion people 

(18.62 × 1030). The defendant did not object to the admission of the report summarizing 

that the match was “to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty,” and one reason may 

have been because that description was less harmful than one showing these quantitative 

probabilities. But even had he objected to the lack of a supporting foundation for the 

DNA evidence as required by Coy, the defendant could not show he was prejudiced. The 

purpose of the DNA evidence was to confirm that the defendant and the victim were at 

the scene of the altercation and that both shed blood. The defendant’s theory of the case 

admitted as much; during closing arguments, the defense described the altercation as a 

“brawl” with the victim. In all other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED, because we 

are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this 

Court.

MARKMAN, J. (concurring).

While I would also affirm the result reached by the Court of Appeals, I would not 

do so on the basis of the harmlessness of the error asserted by the majority; rather, in my 

judgment, no error occurred at all. In particular, I do not believe that the report of the 

prosecutor’s expert that the DNA match here was supported to a “reasonable degree of 

scientific certainty” breached People v Coy, 243 Mich App 283, 302 (2000), given that 

the genetic analysis in this case revealed that the blood that matched the victim’s DNA 

did so within a frequency of no fewer than 1 in 53.85 octillion people and the blood that 

matched defendant’s DNA did so within a frequency of no fewer than 1 in 18.62 

nonillion people. As concluded by the Court of Appeals, the expert’s articulation fully 

satisfied the requirement of Coy that either a “qualitative or quantitative” interpretation of 

the evidence be provided. People v Urban, 321 Mich App 198, 203-205 (2017). 

Identifying the evidence in this case as possessing a “reasonable degree of scientific 

certainty” constitutes a fully compliant description as it pertains exactly to the “quality or 

kind” of the DNA match. See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed) 

(defining “qualitative” as “of, relating to, or involving quality or kind”). Moreover, as 

recognized by Maryland’s highest court: “When the random match probability is 

sufficiently minuscule, the DNA profile may be deemed unique. In such circumstances, 

testimony of a match is admissible without accompanying contextual statistics . . . [, and] 

the expert may testify that in the absence of identical twins, it can be concluded to a
I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 July 31, 2019

s0730

3

Clerk

reasonable scientific certainty that the evidence sample and the defendant sample came 

from the same person.” Young v State, 388 Md 99, 119-120 (2005) (emphasis added).

ZAHRA, J., joins the statement of MARKMAN, J.