Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 1 of 33

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Leanna Weissmann

Lawrenceburg, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Russell Goodman,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Stephanie Goodman,

Appellee-Petitioner.

March 6, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

77A04-1706-DR-1300

Appeal from the Sullivan Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Lakshmi Reddy, 

Special Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

77C01-1502-DR-117

Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 2 of 33

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Respondent, Russell Goodman (Husband), appeals the trial court’s 

Order dissolving the marriage between Husband and Appellee-Petitioner, 

Stephanie Goodman (Wife). 

[2] We affirm.

ISSUES

[3] Husband presents us with seven issues on appeal, which we restate as: 

(1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by deviating from the 

presumption of an equal division of marital assets;

(2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by omitting to offset the 

value of certain marital assets already in Wife’s possession from the 

marital estate;

(3) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by including goodwill as a 

marital asset;

(4) Whether the trial court abused its discretion when valuating certain

assets of the marital estate;

(5) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by awarding physical 

custody of the minor child to Wife; 

(6) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Husband to pay 

child support retroactively; and 

(7) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Husband to pay 

a portion of Wife’s attorney fees.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 3 of 33

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] When divorce proceedings span more than half a decade, it is reasonable to 

assume that this was not an amicable breakup. Exploiting the judicial system to 

its fullest, the parties caused the trial court to enter two hundred and thirty-six 

entries in the chronological case summary since March 9, 2015 alone. Over the 

last two years, the trial court issued ninety-two orders and ten income 

withholding orders. Instead of aiding the trial court in reaching its decision by 

submitting the customary excel spreadsheet with the proposed allocation of 

assets, the trial court had to wade through a box of loose exhibits and puzzle 

together the parties’ marital estate. We are very grateful for the detailed 

findings of fact and conclusions thereon issued by the trial court which brought 

this herculean task to an end. 

[5] Husband and Wife married on June 24, 1995, and both had children from 

previous relationships. While no children were born during the marriage, the 

parties adopted Husband’s natural granddaughter, K.G., born on November 5, 

2006. Around March 2012, Wife and K.G. moved out of the marital residence 

and Wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on March 12, 2012. On 

May 30, 2012, the trial court entered a joint temporary restraining order. On 

July 26, 2012, the parties submitted a Provisional Agreed Order, which was 

approved by the trial court on July 31, 2012, and which included the following 

provisions:

a. [Wife] with primary custody of [K.G.] and [Husband] to 

exercise parenting time pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 4 of 33

Guidelines. [Husband] to pay child support in the amount of 

$110.00/week.

b. [Husband] to have temporary possession of the marital 

residence at 7834 S. Pleasant Main, Carlisle, Indiana 47838 and 

shall not be permitted to allow any other individuals to reside 

within the marital residence until further order by the court.

c. [Husband] shall be responsible for all debts in his name 

individually and all debts associated with the business A1 

Affordable Goodman’s Tree Service. [Wife] shall be responsible 

for all debts in her name individually and any joint debts shall be 

allocated at the final hearing.

d. [Wife] was to be paid $9,500.00 for the Chevy Camaro within 

ten (10) days from July 5, 2012, and if she was not paid, then the 

parties were to trade and/or sell said vehicle to a dealership for a 

vehicle of [Wife’s] choosing and [Wife] was to maintain full 

possession and title of the new vehicle of her choosing. If any 

financing was required, [Wife] would be responsible for the debt 

associated with the new vehicle.

e. The parties were to inventory the personal items within the 

marital residence and amicably divide temporary possession of 

the personal property and if they were unable to agree, then the 

property was to remain in the marital residence. [Wife] was 

entitled to her clothes, [K.G.’s] toys, and [K.G.’s] bedroom suite.

f. [Husband] shall be responsible for the operation and expense of 

A1 Affordable Goodman’s Tree Service. [Husband] shall be 

entitled to temporary possession of all assets of A1 Affordable 

Goodman’s Tree Service in order to dutifully operate said 

business.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 5 of 33

(Trial Court’s Order, p. 5).

[6] For the next five years, the parties engaged in fierce and relentless litigation, 

filing more than one-hundred-and-seventy pleadings resulting in the issuance of 

ninety-two orders. Finally, by agreement, the marriage was dissolved on 

December 2, 2015, with bifurcation of the issues regarding the division of 

marital assets, apportionment of marital debt, and establishment of custody, 

parenting time, and K.G.’s support arrangements. On December 4, 2015, Wife 

filed a Verified Motion for Order to Produce Documents, contending that 

Husband failed to respond to discovery requests and produce the requested 

documents. Wife alleged that she requested discovery on August 14, 2015 and 

on August 24, 2015, but each time Husband produced the same non-responsive 

and handwritten responses without attaching the supporting documents. The 

discovery dispute was never resolved as Wife continued to indicate that she did 

not receive all the documents requested and Husband argued that he properly 

responded and produced all documents in his possession.

[7] The trial court conducted a final hearing over seven non-consecutive days: 

May 15 & 27, 2016, August 22 & 23, 2016, December 14, 2016, and February 

22, 2017. During these hearings, the trial court received evidence concerning 

Husband’s one-hundred-and-six pleadings filed over the past two years and 

Wife’s sixty-four pleadings filed in the same time period. The evidence 

presented during the proceedings reflected that during the marriage, Husband 

and Wife both worked in their tree trimming business. Despite receiving an 

income from the business, the family was on government health insurance, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 6 of 33

received food stamps, and qualified for free/reduced school lunches and 

textbooks. Testimony suggests that Husband had complete and total financial 

control during the marriage over the parties’ personal and business possessions, 

with ownership of all property placed in his name. 

[8] Both Husband and Wife were gamblers: they often purchased lottery tickets 

and visited the casino in Evansville. Over the years, Husband accrued 

significant winnings from gambling. In 2009, Husband won a scratch off 

lottery ticket in the amount of $100,000. While Wife testified that there was at 

least $70,000 left in a lock box at the time of filing the divorce proceeding, 

Husband claimed that he and Wife lost all the money gambling, eating in five 

star restaurants, and purchasing a $20,000 Camaro for Wife. Family members 

stated that Husband would often hide money in shoe boxes and mattresses and 

kept a very low balance in a checking account. 

[9] Despite having received parenting time in accordance with the Indiana 

Parenting Time Guidelines, by February 2015, Wife was always present during 

Husband’s parenting time. The Guardian ad Litem (GAL) noted, in a 

February 2015 report, that the parties frequently did things together as a family. 

Wife indicated that she attended the visits because K.G. was afraid to stay 

alone. However, after two in camera interviews of K.G., the trial court did not 

find evidence that K.G. was fearful of Husband, “but did determine that [K.G.] 

has been coached and influenced by [Wife].” (Trial Court Order, p. 28). The 

trial court clarified that “[m]uch like [Husband] has engaged in a pattern and 

behavior of hiding financial assets, the [c]ourt believes that [Wife] has been less 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 7 of 33

than truthful in [K.G.’s] feelings towards her father and has tried to discourage 

and prevent a meaningful relationship between [K.G.] and [f]ather.” (Trial 

Court’s Order, p. 29). 

[10] On May 16, 2017, after receiving evidence for seven days, the trial court issued 

its Order, spanning forty-nine pages, including one-hundred and sixty findings 

of fact and ninety conclusions of law. The trial court concluded, in pertinent 

part, as follows:

6. This [c]ourt deviates from the presumption of equal division of 

assets because there is such a large disparity of income and 

because [Husband] has engaged in dissipation of assets. While 

[Husband’s] income tax returns for several years provide that his

income was nominal and a net income of less than $20,000, this 

[c]ourt finds that to be contrary to the evidence presented. 

Documentation submitted by [Wife] for the year 2013, 

demonstrates that [Husband] was receiving checks in large 

amounts written in his individual name and that [Husband] 

cashed these checks at the payor’s bank, rather than depositing 

into his business account. [Husband] did not provide any bank 

statements to rebut this or to show where these checks were 

deposited and how the money was used. The [c]ourt also 

believes that [Husband] engaged in dissipation of assets because 

he has no real good explanation of what happened to all his 

lottery and casino winnings or engaged in dissipation of assets by 

using such large amounts of discretionary income to gamble 

rather than paying debts, timely paying child support, or have 

some type of savings for their future. In addition, the [c]ourt 

believes that [Husband] has engaged in a pattern of hiding assets 

and not turning over documentation that was reasonably 

requested on numerous occasions and the [c]ourt believes that 

there are assets that [Husband] has not disclosed and so an 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 8 of 33

unequal distribution seems only reasonable and fair under the 

circumstances.

7. For the foregoing reasons, the [c]ourt awards [Wife] Sixty 

Percent (60%) of the assets and [Husband] Forty Percent (40%). 

[Husband] can continue to earn tremendous income through his 

business as he has done for decades and/or through his gambling 

efforts which he appears to be very successful at based upon his 

income tax returns. His income tax returns are not reflective of 

all his gambling winnings and may not be reflective of any lottery 

winnings. Any and all debts in [Husband’s] name and any and 

all business debts shall be the responsibility of [Husband] as the 

[c]ourt finds no reasonable explanation for these debts not to 

have been paid when he had so much discretionary income to 

gamble.

* * * *

24. The total value of marital assets to be allocated is Three 

Hundred Thirty Two Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty Nine and 

00/100 Dollars ($332,839.00). In order to provide [Wife] with 

60% of the marital assets, [Huband] will have to make an 

equalization payment to [Wife] in the amount of One Hundred 

Ninety Nine Thousand Seven Hundred Three and 40/100 

Dollars ($199,703.40). Because this matter has been pending for 

five (5) years, the [c]ourt believes that the best course of action 

and to conserve judicial economy so the parties are not 

constantly returning to [c]ourt for collection purposes, the [c]ourt 

hereby reduces this property settlement to a judgment . . . 

* * * *

31. [] A trial court has discretion to make a modification of child 

support relate back to the date the petition to modify is filed, or 

any date thereafter. The [c]ourt sees no reason to use any other 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 9 of 33

date for child support modification other than the date that 

[Wife] filed her Petition to Modify. Accordingly, the child 

support is modified retroactive to May 24, 2013. 

* * * * 

33. Accordingly, [Husband’s] child support payment of 

$320/week is modified retroactive to the date of filing, which is 

May 24, 2013. Because it took the parties so long to reach the 

point where they could litigate this issue, [Husband] now has a 

substantial arrearage. As stated already, the reason for this long 

delay rests with the actions of both parties. [Husband] repeatedly 

failed to fully respond to discovery requests and provide 

necessary financial information, which to this day has still not 

been produced. [Wife] was not diligent on numerous occasions 

on bringing the matter to the [c]ourt’s attention until just days 

before a scheduled hearing making it too late to attempt to 

remedy the dispute before having to continue and reschedule 

hearings. Additionally, [Husband] made efforts to hide assets 

and/or dissipate assets and knowing how much income he was 

earning, [Husband] should have known all along that his child 

support should have been significantly more than the $110/week. 

* * * *

51. [Wife] is hereby awarded sole legal custody due to the 

inability of the parties to communicate in any reasonable and 

effective manner. However, [Husband] has the right to all 

information regarding [K.G.] and [Wife] is to follow the 

recommendations of GAL [] to insure that [Husband] has all 

such information and that the school and medical providers have 

his contact information. [Wife] is hereby cautioned that it will 

reflect negatively on her if the [c]ourt discovers that [Wife] is 

failing or refusing to provide school, medical, extra-curricular or 

relevant information regarding [K.G.] to [Husband]. It would be 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 10 of 33

in [K.G.’s] best interest if someday these parties reach a point 

where they can better communicate and both be involved in 

important decisions regarding [K.G.]. 

52. [Wife] is hereby awarded primary physical custody.

* * * *

59. The [c]ourt believes that it is time for [Husband] to have 

unsupervised parenting time with [K.G.] as there does not appear 

to be any basis for supervised parenting time to continue. That 

there has been the opinion of the GAL which the [c]ourt has 

adopted. However, much time has lapsed and the [c]ourt 

provides for a short transition period. The [c]ourt EXPECTS 

[Wife] to cooperate and allow this relationship to be rebuilt and 

not to engage in action that causes [K.G.] to be in fear of her 

father. Children thrive when they have a relationship with both 

parents and they both chose to adopt [K.G.] together and must 

now figure out how to co-parent effectively and successfully.

* * * *

64. [Husband] submitted an Affidavit for Attorney Fees in the 

amount of over Fifty Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($50,000.00) 

requesting reimbursement. [Husband] also filed a Notice of Lien 

of Attorney Fees for over $27,000.00. The [c]ourt DENIES 

[Husband’s] request for attorney fees.

65. [Wife] submitted an Affidavit for Attorney Fees in the 

amount of over One Hundred Fifty Thousand and 00/100 

Dollars ($150,000.00) requesting reimbursement. The legal fees 

expended by [Wife] are significantly high in comparison to the 

assets available to the parties and the [c]ourt could not possibly 

award fees in that amount. The legislative purpose behind 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 11 of 33

authorizing a [c]ourt to order one party to pay another party’s 

attorney fees is to ensure that party to a dissolution proceeding 

has access to an attorney who would not otherwise be able to 

afford it. In determining whether to award one party attorney 

fees, the court looks at the economic circumstances of the parties, 

the ability of the parties to engage in gainful employment to earn 

adequate income, and any other pertinent factors. In this 

circumstance, [Wife] has no income by which she could have 

afforded an attorney and would not have been able to present her 

case without an attorney. [Husband] complicated and delayed 

the process by not producing proper discovery responses and 

documents. However, the [c]ourt must be reasonable in the fees 

awarded and the [c]ourt takes into account that she has been 

awarded a property settlement. Based on the foregoing, the 

[c]ourt awards [Wife’s] attorney’s fees in the amount of TwentyFive Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($25,000.00) and those fees 

shall be reimbursed by [Husband]. [Husband] shall have one 

hundred and twenty (120) days to reimburse [Wife’s] counsel. 

[Husband] is instructed that he needs to find a good method of 

keeping track of his payments, such as utilizing checks or 

cashier’s checks rather than cash that cannot be accounted for.

(Trial Court’s Order, pp. 30-31, 34, 35, 36, 40-41, 42, 43).

[11] Husband now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Standard of Review

[12] After the final hearing, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions 

thereon regarding the parties’ dissolution proceedings. In reviewing an order in 

which the trial court makes findings of fact and conclusions thereon, our 

standard of review is well-settled. First, we determine whether the evidence 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 12 of 33

supports the findings and second, whether the findings support the judgment. 

Troyer v. Troyer, 987 N.E.2d 1130, 1134 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. In 

deference to the trial court’s proximity to the issues, we disturb the judgment 

only where there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to 

support the judgment. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence, but consider only 

the evidence favorable to the trial court’s judgment. Id. Challengers must 

establish that the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous. Findings are 

clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us firmly convinced a 

mistake has been made. Id. Additionally, a judgment is clearly erroneous 

under Indiana Trial Rule 52 if it relies on an incorrect legal standard. Id. We 

evaluate questions of law de novo and owe no deference to a trial court’s 

determination of such questions. Id. Thus, on appeal, we “shall not set aside 

the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 

to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” 

Ind. Trial Rule 52(A).

II. Division of Marital Property

[13] Challenging the trial court’s division of marital property, Husband contends 

that the trial court improperly based its deviation from an equal division on its 

findings that he dissipated marital assets and the disparate income between the 

parties. A trial court has broad discretion in dividing the marital estate, and we 

will reverse a trial court’s decision only for an abuse of discretion. O’Connell v. 

O’Connell, 889 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). The “party challenging the 

trial court’s division of marital property must overcome a strong presumption 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 13 of 33

that the trial court considered and complied with the applicable statute, and that 

presumption is one of the strongest presumptions applicable to our 

consideration on appeal.” Id. On review, we will neither reweigh evidence nor 

assess the credibility of witnesses, and “we will consider only the evidence most 

favorable to the trial court’s disposition of the marital property.” Id. 

[14] In dissolution proceedings, the trial court is required to divide the property of 

the parties “in a just and reasonable manner.” Ind. Code § 31-15-7-4(b). This 

division of marital property is a two-step process. See O’Connell, 889 N.E.2d at 

10. First, the trial court must ascertain what property is to be included in the 

marital estate; second, the trial court must fashion a just and reasonable 

division of the marital estate. Id. The “one-pot” theory—i.e., that all property 

acquired before or during the marriage is to be included in the marital estate—

ensures “that all assets are subject to the trial court’s power to divide and 

award. Id. While the trial court may ultimately determine that a particular 

asset should be awarded solely to one spouse, it must first include the asset in its 

consideration of the marital estate to be divided.” Id. at 11 (quoting Hill v. Hill, 

863 N.E.2d 456, 460 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). 

[15] In determining how to divide a marital estate, the trial court “shall presume that 

an equal division of the marital property between the parties is just and 

reasonable.” I.C. § 31-15-7-5 (emphasis added). However, this is a rebuttable 

presumption, and a party may present relevant evidence to establish that an 

equal division would not be just and reasonable. I.C. § 31-15-7-5. The trial 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 14 of 33

court may consider evidence of the following factors in concluding whether it 

would be appropriate to deviate from the presumption of an equal division:

(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the 

property, regardless of whether the contribution was income 

producing.

(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each 

spouse:

(A)Before the marriage; or 

(B) Through inheritance or gift.

(3) The economic circumstances or each spouse at the time the 

disposition of the property is to become effective, including 

the desirability of awarding the family residence or the right to 

dwell in the family residence for such periods as the court 

considers just to the spouse having custody of any children.

(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to 

the disposition or dissipation of their property.

(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to:

(A) A final division of property; and

(B)A final determination of the property rights of the parties.

I.C. § 31-15-7-5. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 15 of 33

[16] Here, the trial court found that Wife rebutted the presumption and awarded 

60% of the marital estate to her. In support of its decision to deviate from the 

presumption of an equal division, the trial court relied on the evidence littered 

throughout the proceedings that Husband dissipated the marital estate by 

gambling and the extensive documentation and testimony that Husband was 

not completely forthcoming in reporting his income, including in his lottery and 

casino winnings. 

1. Dissipation of Marital Assets

[17] We have previously stated,

Fault is not relevant in dissolution proceedings except as related 

to the disposition or dissipation of marital assets. One spouse’s 

claim of improvident spending by the other spouse can be a 

powerful weapon in an attempt to secure a larger share of the 

marital estate.

In re Marriage of Coyle, 671 N.E.2d 938, 942 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). “Waste and 

misuse are the hallmarks of dissipation. Our legislature intended that the term 

carry its common meaning denoting ‘foolish’ or ‘aimless’ spending. Dissipation 

has also been described as the frivolous, unjustified spending of marital assets 

which includes the concealment and misuse of marital property.” Id. at 943. 

Factors to consider in determining whether dissipation has occurred, include: 

(1) whether the expenditure benefited the marriage or was made for a purpose 

entirely unrelated to the marriage; (2) the timing of the transaction; (3) whether 

the expenditure was excessive or de minimis; and (4) whether the dissipating 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 16 of 33

party intended to hide, deplete, or divert the marital asset. Goodman v. 

Goodman, 754 N.E.2d 595, 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). 

[18] Although both parties did gamble during the marriage, the evidence establishes 

that Husband had complete and total financial control over all assets, including 

the gambling winnings. Wife submitted documentary evidence that between 

2006 and 2010, Husband earned $140,961 in gambling winnings. After Wife 

filed for divorce in 2012, Husband’s gambling winnings through 2015 

amounted to $200,639. Yet, during the marriage, Husband had complete 

control over the finances and only allocated a little bit of money to Wife on a 

weekly basis to help with the household expenses. The family was on 

government health insurance, received food stamps, and K.G. received a 

free/reduced lunch and textbooks at school. After the separation and 

institution of an initial child support order, Husband failed to contribute to the 

payment of the marital debts and incurred a significant debit on his child 

support obligations. Instead, Husband testified that while he was in prison 

from December 2012 through May 2013, he helped other inmates buy supplies 

and pay their attorney fees. A more egregious example of dissipation would be 

hard to come by.

2. Disparate Income

[19] Husband also claims that no true earning disparity exists between him and his 

Wife. Focusing on the tax returns, he asserts that his reported income is barely 

higher than Wife’s annual earnings of $30,368. However, the record is littered 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 17 of 33

with testimony of Husband’s attempts to hide his assets. Several witnesses 

testified about Husband’s habits of carrying large sums of cash with him and 

counting wads of money on the kitchen island. At times, this cash alone 

amounted to $16,000. In his business dealings, Husband would encourage 

customers to pay cash or make checks payable in his name. Husband would 

then cash the check at the customer’s bank so the income was never shown in 

his business records or deposited in his business bank account. Another witness 

testified that Husband had informed him that the business income in 2014 was 

$420,000, and $480,000 in 2015. Based on the exhibits submitted by Wife and 

witness testimony, we agree with the trial court’s finding that “it is reasonable 

to conclude that in 2013, [Husband] cashed checks and received cash payments 

in the amount of $160,458.12,” which he failed to report as income. (Trial 

Court’s Order, p. 13). 

[20] Without any supporting references to the voluminous record, Husband asserts 

that the trial court also failed to account for the payments made to his business 

partner, which would reduce his purported business income. However, our 

review indicates that Husband’s business partner is his adult daughter from a 

previous marriage, who testified that even though she is the half-owner of the 

business on paper, she received no income from the business but instead relies 

on public assistance to meet her own living expenses.

[21] Considering the evidence most favorable to the trial court’s division of marital 

property, and the wealth of evidence that Husband was less than forthcoming 

about his income, we conclude that Wife rebutted the presumption of an equal 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 18 of 33

division of marital assets and a deviation from an equal split was warranted. 

We affirm the trial court’s award of 60% of the marital estate to Wife. 

III. Offsetting the Value of Certain Assets

[22] Next, Husband contends that the trial court abused its discretion by omitting to 

offset the value of certain assets to Wife in its calculation of the respective 

shares of the marital estate. Pointing to the Agreed Provisional Order entered 

into by the parties on July 5, 2012, Husband argues that the trial court failed to 

credit Wife’s share of the marital estate with the value of the Camaro and the 

personal property in her possession.

[23] With respect to the Camaro, the Provisional Agreed Order provided Husband 

with the option to either keep the Camaro himself and pay Wife $9,500 to 

purchase a vehicle or to sell or trade in the Camaro, allowing Wife $9,500 from 

the sale or trade to purchase a vehicle. During the final hearing, Wife testified 

that Husband elected to trade in the vehicle and pay off the balance of 

$18,759.67 on the car loan. Husband affirmed that he was able to pay off the 

balance with the trade-in amount received for the Camaro and had only $500 

left over. Although the parties never explicitly testified to it, a reasonable 

inference can be made that in light of the high debt still remaining on the 

vehicle at the time of trade-in, Wife never received the $9,500 she was due to be 

paid after trading in the Camaro, or received a vehicle of her choice.

[24] Husband makes a similar argument with respect to the personal property valued 

at $13,510. The Provisional Agreed Order alluded to a future amicable division 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 19 of 33

of the marital property with the exception of Wife’s clothing, and K.G.’s toys 

and bedroom suite which were awarded to Wife in 2012. The Agreed Order 

required the parties to inventory the personal items remaining within the 

marital residence and if the parties were unable to agree about their ownership, 

the property was to remain in the marital residence, which was temporarily 

awarded to Husband. Despite a prohibition to remove the personal property

from the marital residence, Husband admitted to having relocated some of the 

property. Nevertheless, during the final hearing, Husband submitted an 

appraisal of the personal property left in the marital residence in the amount of 

$13,510. Absent any other evidence submitted by either party, and based on the 

fact that Husband had control over the marital residence, the trial court could 

reasonably infer that this personal property was in Husband’s possession and 

should properly be credited to him. 

IV. Goodwill

[25] With respect to the division of the business assets, Husband contends that the 

trial court abused its discretion by including the business’ goodwill into the 

calculation of the marital estate and by assigning him the totality of the 

business’ debts. 

[26] In Yoon v. Yoon, 711 N.E.2d 1265, 1268-69 (Ind. 1999) (internal citations 

omitted), our supreme court analyzed the issue of goodwill as follows:

Goodwill has been described as the value of a business or 

practice that exceeds the combined value of the net assets used in 

the business. Goodwill in a professional practice may be 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 20 of 33

attributable to the business enterprise itself by virtue of its 

existing arrangements with suppliers, customers or others, and its 

anticipated future customer base due to factors attributable to the 

business. It may also be attributable to the individual owner’s 

personal skill, training or reputation. This distinction is 

sometimes reflected in the use of the term “enterprise goodwill,” 

as opposed to “personal goodwill.”

Enterprise goodwill “is based on the intangible, but generally 

marketable, existence in a business of established relations with 

employees, customers and suppliers.” Factors affecting this 

goodwill may include a business’s location, its name recognition, 

its business reputation, or a variety of other factors depending on 

the business. Enterprise goodwill is an asset of the business and 

accordingly is property that is divisible in a dissolution to the 

extent that it inheres in the business, independent of any single 

individual’s personal efforts and will outlast any person’s 

involvement in the business. It is not necessarily marketable in 

the sense that there is a ready and easily priced market for it, but 

it is in general transferrable to others and has a value to others.

* * * *

In contrast, the goodwill that depends on the continued presence 

of a particular individual is a personal asset, and any value that 

attached to a business as a result of this “personal goodwill” 

represents nothing more than the future earning capacity of the 

individual and is not divisible. * * * *

The General Assembly has determined that the “relative earning 

power” of the parties is not a divisible asset because it is not 

property, but may be considered in determining the percentage of 

property to be given to each. Accordingly, we join the states that 

exclude goodwill based on the personal attributes of the 

individual from the marital estate.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 21 of 33

[27] In its identification and quantification of enterprise goodwill, the trial court 

concluded that:

As the parties were married for nearly seventeen (17) years before 

the date of filing and the testimony was clear that [Wife] 

participated heavily in the administrative side of the business 

which was a significant role and she continued to participate in 

the business on occasion through 2015, this [c]ourt believes it is 

appropriate to assign some value to goodwill, especially when 

there is no business valuation, no true inventory of business 

assets along with value, and so much dispute as to what the 

business is worth. 

The parties did a poor job of reporting income and keeping track 

of income and business expenses. It is difficult to ascertain how 

much of a role [Wife] played independently or whether she was 

coerced into this business practice, but it appears that [Husband] 

has continued to engage in the same business practice after the 

date of filing. He continued to purchase business equipment in 

his individual name, sometimes he places title in his children’s 

names, and often pays cash. This [c]ourt really does not have an 

accurate way to value the business so has determined that the 

best it can do is take what it believes to be the annual net income 

and divide that in half to assign a goodwill value to the business. 

[Wife] would then he entitled to 60% of that figure. 

(Trial Court’s Order, p. 33) (footnote omitted).

[28] In an effort to challenge the trial court’s conclusion of enterprise goodwill, 

Husband contends that the survival of the business is dependent on his 

continued presence. In support of his argument, he focuses on his habit to title 

business assets in his personal name, pay his employees in cash, and accept

customer checks written to Husband personally instead of the business entity. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 22 of 33

We find that this evidence rather establishes Husband’s propensity to 

intermingle personal and business assets and points towards an inference of 

hiding assets.

[29] To the contrary, we find that the record supports the trial court’s conclusion. 

As noted by the trial court, Wife continued her involvement with the 

administrative side of the business for several years after filing for dissolution. 

Wife’s adult son from a previous marriage testified that he worked in the 

parties’ business for about ten years in a supervisory position with financial 

responsibilities. Likewise, Husband’s adult daughter from a previous marriage 

informed the trial court that Husband at times would place business assets in 

her name and even though she was made co-owner of the tree trimming 

business she received no income. Accordingly, as the business was 

“transferable” to other family members and thus “independent” of Husband’s 

“personal efforts,” we affirm the enterprise goodwill in the amount of $76,748. 

See Yoon, 711 N.E.2d at 1268. 

[30] Continuing to dispute the trial court’s division of the parties’ business, Husband 

claims that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that “Husband must 

pay business debt totaling $46,438.00 because he should have been paying off 

debt during the marriage instead of gambling.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 34). The 

record indicates that after the marriage, Wife became a homemaker and 

assisted Husband’s business by soliciting work, scheduling jobs, and accounting 

services. Even after she filed for dissolution, Wife continued her involvement in 

Husband’s tree trimming business. While Wife worked in the business for more
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 23 of 33

than twenty years, she received no income. Considering the evidence in the 

record that Husband interpreted the business to be his own personal fiefdom in 

which he could intermingle personal and business assets as well as the absence 

of any salary for Wife’s employment in the business, we find that the 

assignment of all business debt to Husband was “just and reasonable.” Crider v. 

Crider, 26 N.E.3d 1045, 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Although the trial court 

based its finding on a different ground—Husband’s gambling habit—we will 

not reverse the trial court’s Order with respect to the business debts as it does 

not amount to a prejudicial error. Riehle v. Moore, 601 N.E.2d 365, 369 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1992) (“[W]e may reverse a trial court’s judgment only if its findings 

constitute prejudicial error. A finding of fact is not prejudicial to a party unless 

it directly supports a conclusion of law adverse to him.)

V. Valuation Date

[31] Husband’s final argument with respect to the marital property relates to three 

specific assets, which, according to Husband, were not in existence on the 

valuation date and therefore should not have been included in the marital pot. 

[32] Generally, the marital pot closes on the day the petition for dissolution is filed. 

Sanjari v. Sanjari, 755 N.E.2d 1186, 1192 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). The date of 

filing is defined by statute as the date of “final separation.” I.C. § 31-9-2-46. 

When dividing property in a dissolution proceeding, the court shall include 

property owned by either spouse prior to the marriage, acquired by either 

spouse in his or her own right after the marriage and before the final separation 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 24 of 33

of the parties, or acquired by the joint efforts by the spouses. I.C. § 31-15-7-

4(a). 

[33] After identifying the marital assets, the trial court has discretion to set any date 

between the date of filing the dissolution petition and the date of the hearing for 

their valuation. Eyler v. Eyler, 492 N.E.2d 1071, 1074 (Ind. 1986). “The 

selection of the valuation date for any particular asset has the effect of allocating 

the risk of change in the value of that asset between the date of the valuation 

and date of the hearing. Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 103 (Ind. 1996). We 

entrust this allocation to the discretion of the trial court. Id. 

[34] Husband first contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it included 

the marital residence and the real estate on which it is located in the marital 

estate even though the property was owned by Husband’s adult daughter from a 

previous marriage. The evidence reflects that even though ownership of the 

residence and real estate was in name transferred to Husband’s daughter, 

Husband and Wife continued to reside in the house for several years, Husband 

continued to pay the taxes, and remodeled the property several years after Wife 

filed for dissolution. Husband’s daughter testified that she never claimed the 

residence as her own nor paid its taxes and in fact was living in subsidized 

housing. Although Wife moved to join Husband’s adult daughter into the 

proceedings on December 7, 2015, the trial court denied the motion, ordering 

Husband’s daughter to be called as a witness. Instead, viewed in light of the 

overwhelming evidence in the record of Husband hiding assets, we agree with 

the trial court that the property transfer was “just a scheme to keep assets from” 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 25 of 33

Wife. (Trial Court’s Order, p. 32). Therefore, it was properly included in the 

marital pot. 

[35] In 2009, Husband won $100,000 with a scratch off ticket. Husband claims that 

the entire winnings were expended prior to the dissolution and should not have 

been included in the marital assets in the amount of $70,000. Husband testified 

that the lottery winnings, which had been placed in a lockbox, purchased 

Wife’s Camaro for $20,000, with the remainder spent on gambling and eating at 

five star restaurants. Mindful of the Camaro’s purchase price and the parties’ 

other expenditures, we conclude that the trial court’s valuation of the asset at 

$70,000 was reasonable and we will not disturb its decision.

Lastly, Husband disputes the trial court’s inclusion of his 2013 gambling 

winnings in the amount of $42,694. He claims that because the dissolution was 

filed in 2012, the 2013 winnings are not part of the marital assets. However, 

Husband intermingles the identification of marital assets with their valuation. 

The record is overflowing with references to the parties’ gambling during the 

marriage. Wife submitted documentary evidence that between 2006 and 2010, 

Husband earned $140,961 in gambling winnings. As these amounts were 

“acquired after the marriage and before the final separation of the parties,” they 

are part of the marital estate. I.C. § 31-15-7-4(a). As they are part of the marital 

pot, the valuation of these gambling winnings falls within the discretionary 

province of the trial court, which we will not disturb absent an abuse of 

discretion. See Quillen, 671 N.E.2d at 103. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 26 of 33

[36] The trial court valued the gambling winnings at their 2013 amount and 

reasoned that 

[t]he [c]ourt does not utilize [Husband’s] 2012 tax return as that 

is the only year in which he had negative income and the [c]ourt 

questions whether this was intentional due to the fact that the 

Petition for Dissolution was filed in the year 2012. This 

conclusion is based on the evidence of [Husband’s] attempt to 

hide assets and observations of him over the course of seven (7) 

days for [f]inal [h]earings and a few other hearings. Accordingly, 

the [c]ourt used information from 2013.

(Trial Court’s Order, p. 33). “So long as there is sufficient evidence and 

reasonable inferences to support the valuation, an abuse of discretion does not 

occur.” Id. at 103. Nevertheless, Husband now posits that the trial court 

omitted “to account for gambling losses and tax consequences.” (Appellant’s 

Br. p. 38). However, the trial court noted that “Father did not introduce 

evidence that these losses needed to be deducted from the winnings. He also 

did not introduce evidence of the amount of all his other winnings because 

testimony revealed [Husband] could have had winnings not included in the

W2G total.” (Trial Court’s Order, p. 15). “Where the parties fail to present 

evidence as to the value of assets, it will be presumed that the trial court’s 

decision is proper.” Id. at 103. We affirm the trial court.

VI. Custody of K.G.

[37] Moving away from the marital assets and now turning towards the minor child, 

Husband advocates for a change in custody. He advances that the trial court 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 27 of 33

abused its discretion by awarding physical custody of K.G. to Wife as Wife 

“has actively tried to poison K.G. against her [f]ather,” and her best “interests 

would be served by being in the custody of her [f]ather.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 

46). 

[38] Pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8, the trial court shall determine 

custody and enter a custody order in accordance with the best interests of the 

child. In determining the best interests of the child, there is no presumption 

favoring either parent; instead, the court shall consider all relevant factors, 

including the following:

(1) The age and sex of the child.

(2) The wishes of the child’s parent or parents.

(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the 

child’s wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.

(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:

(A)The child’s parent or parents;

(B)The child’s sibling; and 

(C)Any other person who may significantly affect the child’s 

best interests.

(5) The child’s adjustments to the child’s:

(A)Home;

(B) School; and

(C)Community.

(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either 

parent.

(8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto 

custodian, and if the evidence is sufficient, the court shall 

consider the factors described in section 8.5(b) of this chapter.

I.C. § 31-17-2-8. As our supreme court has held:

The court must consider factors that are relevant, including but 

not limited to those explicitly listed in the statute. Although a 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 28 of 33

court is required to consider all relevant factors in making its 

determination, it is not required to make specific findings. A trial 

court’s custody determination is reviewable only for an abuse of 

discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is 

clearly against the logic and effect of the evidence before the 

court.

Russell v. Russell, 682 N.E.2d 513, 515 (Ind. 1997) (footnote and citations 

omitted). 

[39] Out of the 160 findings made by the trial court, 24 deal with the custody issue; 

and out of the 90 trial court conclusions, 14 involve K.G.’s custody. Even 

though Husband contends that Wife maintained a persistent pattern of 

preventing his parenting time and tried to discourage a relationship with his 

minor child, the record and Order—including two in camera interviews with 

K.G.—both demonstrate that the trial court carefully considered these 

allegations, as well as a multitude of others, in ensuring that its custody decision 

would be in K.G.’s best interests. Husband now merely asks that we reweigh 

all this evidence in his favor. As the trial court’s order clearly reflects that it 

gave proper consideration to the statutory facts when determining the custody 

arrangement that was in K.G.’s best interests, we conclude that the trial court 

acted within its discretion in awarding primary physical custody to Wife. 

VII. Child Support

[40] Next, Husband challenges the trial court’s increase of his child support 

obligation and its retroactive application to the date of filing for the 

modification of child support on May 24, 2013. Despite evidence that Husband 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 29 of 33

gave the family barely sufficient money to support the basic necessities to 

survive, Husband now incredibly claims that “[t]he [r]ecord reveals this child 

lived in a manufactured home, attended public school and relied on social 

services for basic needs. Far from living a lifestyle of the rich and famous, K.G. 

ha[d] a normal middle-class existence.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 55) (internal reference 

omitted, emphasis added). As such, Husband maintains that the current weekly 

support obligation of $330 is too high compared to the standard of living K.G. 

enjoyed during the marriage of the parties. 

[41] As part of the divorce proceedings between two parents of a child, the trial 

court may order either of them “to pay any amount reasonable” for the child’s 

support. I.C. § 31-16-6-1. A trial court’s calculation of child support is 

presumptively valid and its decision will only be reversed if it is clearly 

erroneous or contrary to law. Young v. Young, 891 N.E.2d 1045, 1047 (Ind. 

2008). Child support calculations are made utilizing the income shares model 

set forth in the Indiana Child Support Guidelines. Sandlin v. Sandlin, 972 

N.E.2d 371, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). The guideline approach is promulgated 

in Indiana Code section 31-16-6-1, which considers, among other things, the 

standard of living the child would have enjoyed if the marriage had not been 

dissolved and the financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent. 

Nikolayev v. Nikolayev, 985 N.E.2d 29, 33 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). 

In making its calculation, the trial court concluded

31. [Wife’s] petition of modify child support was filed on May 

24, 2013 and a hearing was never conducted on that Petition nor 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 30 of 33

was a decision ever rendered. It could not have been issued any 

earlier without the introduction of evidence which took place 

during the days of the [f]inal [h]earing. Perhaps if [Husband] had 

been transparent about his gambling winnings and income 

generated but not shown as business income, the issue of child 

support could have been resolved much earlier. []

32. Because the most accurate information that the [c]ourt has is 

related to 2013 and [Wife’s] Petition to Modify was filed on May 

24, 2013, the [c]ourt utilizes income information for 2013 in 

calculating child support. As stated above, [Husband’s] business 

income in 2013 was $153,495. However, child support is based 

on all income received and the gambling/lottery winnings are 

income. By adding the $42,694.00 gambling winnings in 2013, 

[Husband’s] income in 2013 was $196,189.00 which is the 

equivalent of $3,772.86/week. [Wife] was working as a waitress 

at that time and her income is imputed at minimum wage. 

Attached in a child support obligation worksheet identified as 

Exhibit B which includes what the [c]ourt most accurately 

reflects the parties’ income in 2013 and shows that [Husband’s] 

child support in 2013 would have been $320/week.

(Trial Court’s Order, p. 36).

[42] Acknowledging that this new child support order represents a considerable 

increase from the temporary 2012 order of $110/week, the trial court 

emphasized Husband’s efforts to hide assets and the overwhelming evidence 

that Husband earned far more than disclosed in his tax returns. During the 

marriage, Husband controlled the purse strings, forcing the family to survive on 

food stamps, rely on government health care, and free school lunches while he 

went gambling, played the lottery, and had large amounts of cash in his 

possession. Even though Husband “never gave [Wife] money and she may not 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 31 of 33

have been living at a standard commensurate with the amount of income that 

[Husband] was generating, [] that should not deprive [K.G.] of now being able 

to live at a standard that is commensurate with the earnings of the parties.” 

(Trial Court’s Order, p. 38). 

[43] In light of Husband’s challenge to the retroactive application of the trial court’s 

child support order, we note that it is well established that “the trial court has 

the discretionary power to make a modification for child support relate back to 

the date the petition to modify is filed or any date thereafter chosen by the trial 

court.” Laux v. Ferry, 34 N.E.3d 690, 695 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Here, the trial 

court elected to relate Husband’s obligation back to May 24, 2013, the date the 

petition to modify was filed.

[44] Trial courts make case-by-case determinations regarding weekly gross income

from self-employment and impute income for the purpose of computing child 

support based on specific circumstances as they exist or are presented to the 

court. Our standard of review is flexible enough to permit the trial court to 

fashion a child support order that is tailored to the circumstances of the 

particular case before it and consequently reflects its best judgment. Given 

Husband’s propensity to hide his assets, his discretionary money to gamble 

extensively while not paying child support, and his business dealings, we 

conclude that the trial court properly calculated Husband’s child support 

obligation. 

VIII. Attorney Fees
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 32 of 33

[45] As a final issue, Husband contends that the trial court abused its discretion 

when ordering him to reimburse $25,000 out of Wife’s incurred attorney fees in 

the amount of $150,000.

[46] Indiana Code section 31-15-10-1 provides that a trial court may order a party to 

pay a reasonable amount to the other party for the cost of maintaining or 

defending any action in dissolution proceedings. We review a trial court’s 

award of attorney fees in connection with a dissolution decree for an abuse of 

discretion. Hartley v. Hartley, 862 N.E.2d 274, 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). When 

making such an award, the trial court must consider the resources of the parties, 

their economic condition, the ability of the parties to engage in gainful 

employment and to earn adequate income, and other factors that bear on the 

reasonableness of the award. Id. Consideration of these factors promotes the 

legislative purpose behind the award of attorney fees, which is to insure that a 

party in a dissolution proceeding, who would not otherwise be able to afford an 

attorney, is able to retain representation. Id. The trial court need not, however, 

give reasons for its determination. Hartley, 862 N.E.2d at 287. 

[47] Where, as here, “one party is in a superior position to pay fees over the other 

party, an award of attorney fees is proper.” Ratliff v. Ratliff, 804 N.E.2d 237, 

249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Despite Husband’s contention, other evidence found 

credible by the trial court suggests that the business generated $420,000 in 2014, 

and $480,000 in 2015. Viewed in light of the particularized circumstances of 

this case, we conclude that the disparity of the parties’ earnings, Husband’s 

dissipation of marital assets, and his “misconduct that directly result[ed] in 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018 Page 33 of 33

additional litigation expenses” justified the trial court’s decision to award 

attorney’s fees to Wife. Hanson v. Spolnik, 685 N.E.2d 71, 80 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1997), trans. denied.

CONCLUSION

[48] Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in (1) dividing the marital estate between the parties; (2) awarding custody of 

K.G. to Wife and calculating Husband’s child support obligation; and (3) 

granting attorney fees to Wife.

[49] Affirmed. 

Mathias, J. and Brown, J. concur