No. 83-473 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1984 

IN RE THE PIARRIAGE OF 

ROSALYN H. PETERSON, 

2etitioner and Respondent, 

and 

ROBERT C. PETERS014 , 

Respondent and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Yellowstone, 

The Honorable Diane G. Barz, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Jock B. West, Billings, Montana 

For Respondent : 

Linda L. Harris, Billings, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: March 23, 1984 

Decided: June 28, 1984 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

This appeal is from a distribution of property made by 

the District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, in a 

proceeding to dissolve the marriage of the parties. 

Appellant Robert C. Peterson objects to several aspects of 

the property distribution. We affirm the ruling of the 

District Court with a slight modification. 

Robert C. Peterson, hereinafter husband, and Rosalyn 

H. Peterson, hereinafter wife, were married on November 17, 

1978 in Worland, Wyoming. Both parties were employed during 

the entire course of the marriage. Husband was employed by 

the United States Postal Service with a net pay of $626.13 

every two weeks. At the time of the dissolution 

proceedings, wife was employed as a secretary with a net pay 

of $361.43 every two weeks. 

No children were born of this marriage. However, wife 

had two minor sons from prior marriages who lived with the 

parties during the marriage. Husband did not adopt the 

children, but all of the financial support for their needs 

came from the combined income of the parties. Wife 

collected none of the support payments due for the children, 

which she testified amounted to approximately $10,000 over 

the term of the marriage. 

The focus of this dispute is on the mobile home in 

which the parties resided and the ten acres of real property 

upon which it sits. The real property was purchased by the 

husband in 1974, at a purchase price of $12,500. A down 

payment of $2,500 was made and the remaining $10,000 

financed through Valley Credit Union. Fifty-five monthly 
payments were made by husband until the parties opened a 

joint checking account. Prior to the marriage, husband 

improved the property by drilling a well, building a barn, 

corral and fences, running electricity and water lines to 

the trailer and installing a septic tank. The total cost of 

these improvements was $3,810, which was paid by husband. 

During the marriage, a garage was constructed on the 

property at a cost of $3,400 to the parties. The mobile 

home was purchased in April 1977 by husband, at a cost of 

$15,741. A $2,500 down payment and sixteen monthly payments 

were made by husband prior to the marriage. 

The parties each brought certain livestock to the 

marriage. Husband brought two geldings to the marriage, 

which were sold and the proceeds used to buy two brood 

mares, "Sis" and "Leo's Rapid Cat." Wife brought two horses 

to the marriage, "Justin" and "Blondie." During the 

marriage Blondie had two colts, "Whiskey" and "Peaches." 

Also during the marriage five horses were purchased, 

"Bonny," "Rita," FOX^," "Star Jet," "Sis" and "Rio." 

To consolidate payments, the parties borrowed $10,000 

from the Billings U.S. Employees Credit Union. In September 

of 1981, $3,859.61 of this was paid to Valley Credit Union 

to satisfy the mortgage on the real property. Approximately 

$2,100 was used to purchase a Fiat automobile, and $200 for 

a camper. The remainder of the $10,000 was used to purchase 

the above listed horses and to cover other miscellaneous 

expenses. 

The wife filed a petition for dissolution of the 

marriage in the District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial 

District on September 21, 1982. The decree of dissolution 
and judgment were entered on June 16, 1983. The marital 

property was distributed between the parties as part of the 

judgment. Wife received, among other items, the Fiat 

automobile, and the horses, Sis, Rita and Bonny. Husband 

was also required to pay wife $12,633.45 for her interest in 

the mobile home and real property. Husband received the 

camper, the horses Star Jet, Rio and Foxy and was to assume 

the obligation for the remaining balance of the $10,000 loan 

and the remaining balance of the loan for the mobile home. 

The respective balances of these two are $6,989.20 and 

$9,379.10. From this distribution appeal is taken. 

Three issues are raised by the husband: 

(1) Did the District Court err in not finding that the 

wife made a negative contribution to the marriage? 

(2) Did the District Court err by failing to give 

reasons for selecting the wife's expert's appraisal of the 

real property? 

(3) Did the District Court err in failing to assess to 

the wife the value of certain real property received by her? 

The husband's first contention is that the District 

Court did not properly consider the nature of the wife's 

contibution to the marital estate. Specifically he contends 

that she should not receive any distribution representing 

the appreciation in value of either the real property or the 

mobile home, because of what he terms her "negative 

contribution" to the maintenance of the property. He 

alleges this "negative contribution" occurred because the 

wife and her two sons consumed 3/4 of the marital income, 

yet she only contributed 1/3 of the income. Thus he 

theorizes that any appreciation of the marital assets 
resulted not because of but in spite of the wife's efforts 

and she should not receive any benefit therefrom. 

In dividing marital property, the District Court is to 

take into consideration, "[Tlhe contribution or dissipation 

of value of the respective estates and the contribution of a 

spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit." Section 

40-4-202(1), MCA. Obviously this consideration will depend 

on the extant facts. The determination of the value of such 

contribution or dissipation is thus a question of fact for 

the trial court. In such a case we will defer to the 

discretion of the lower court unless it has exercised an 

abuse of discretion. Eschenburg v. Eschenburg (1976), 171 

Mont. 247, 557 P.2d 1014. 

In the present case, the trial court considered both 

the monetary and non-monetary contributions of the parties. 

It specifically found, 

"That other than as herein provided, the 

parties to this action contributed 

equally to the acquisitions of interests 

in real and personal property during the 

course of their marriage. A1 though 

Respondent's income exceeded that of the 

Petitioner during the course of their 

marriage, Petitioner's contribution [was] 

equal to that of the Respondent." 

There is nothing in the scant record of this case to 

dispute the above finding. The husband alleges in his 

appeal brief that, "No authority need be cited to establish 

that two minor boys will cause wear and tear to the home, in 

addition to the consumption (of marital income)." 

While this may be true as a general rule, trial courts 

do not consider generalities as dispositive of fact 

questions in individual cases. Each must be examined on its 

own merits and disposed of on the prevailing facts. In 
Montana a married person is not bound to support his 

spouse's children by a former marriage. However, if he 

receives them into his home and supports them, it is 

presumed that he does so as a parent and thus they are not 

liable to him for their support nor he to them for their 

services. See Section 40-6-217, MCA. The husband presented 

his arguments to the District Court, though he made nothing 

more than assertions that the wife and her children did not 

contribute to the maintenance of the property. The wife 

admitted that it cost more than she was earning to feed and 

clothe the children, but testified that her non-monetary 

contributions to the household made up the difference. The 

husband's evidence did not rebut the presumption that his 

support was given as a parent. This being the case, the 

District Court clearly acted properly in finding that the 

parties contributed equally to the acquisition of interests 

in the mobile home and real property during the marriage. 

The husband next contends that the District Court 

erred by not giving reasons for adopting the appraisal of 

the real property and improvements submitted by the wife. 

The wife testified that she had the property appraised at 

$57,000, and listed the factors the appraiser had 

articulated in arriving at that figure. The husband 

testified that he had the property appraised at $30,000 

without the improvements which cost over $7,000. The 

husband asserts that this discrepancy is sufficient to 

mandate the District Court to give express reasons for 

choosing one appraisal over the other. 

The husband's argument is based on certain language 

contained in In re the Marriage of Peterson (1981), 195 
Mont. 157, 636 P.2d 821. Peterson involved the valuation of 

a marital estate where the District Court adopted one 

appraisal over another without expressing its reasons. In 

remanding for specific findings we stated: 

"The District Court is free to follow one 

appraisal and reject another. However, 

here there is a wide disparity in 

valuation, and we are unable to review 

for abuse of discretion in the absence of 

findings by the trial court supporting 

the valuation selected. 

". . . Upon review of the record, we 

cannot say the District Court properly 

exercised its discretion in selecting the 

value it did without some indication of 

its reasons for doing so." 195 Mont. at 

162, 636 P.2d at 823-4. 

However the failure to articulate reasons for adopting 

one appraisal over another does not automatically require a 

remand of the case to District Court. It was the lack of 

supporting evidence in the Peterson record which made a 

remand necessary. As was explained in Frazier v. Frazier 

(Mont. 1984), 676 P.2d 217, 41 St.Rep. 233, when we review 

findings of fact where the lower court adopts one appraisal 

over another, "It is not the lack of specific findings which 

constitutes reversible error, but the lack of substantial 

evidence to support the judgment. We look both to the 

District Court's express reasoning and the evidence in the 

GJ7 6 

record to determine whether ample evidence exists." J,3&gi. 

P.2d at 219-20, 41 St. Rep. at 233. 

The record in the present case clearly shows why the 

wife's appraisal was adopted. The husband's appraisal was 

for the real property only, excluding the improvements. He 

testified to the cost of the improvements, but the bare cost 

of the improvements and their value once they are set in 

place are different. This is especially true where he 
testified that he did almost all the labor himself. The 

wife's appraisal was clearly more reliable because it 

considered the property as a whole the way it existed. 

Finally, the husband points to several items of 

personal property which he contends were inequitably 

distributed by the trial court. With two exceptions, these 

allegations of error are a thinly veiled attempt to seek a 

de novo distribution of the marital property by this Court. 

We have reviewed each and find ample evidence to support the 

trial court's distribution. "The apportionment made by the 

District Court will not be disturbed on review unless there 

has been a clear abuse of discretion as manifested by a 

substantially inequitable division of the marital assets 

resulting in substantial injustice." In Re the Marriage of 

Brown (1978), 179 Mont. 417, 587 P.2d 361. No substantial 

injustice has been done here. 

However, two adjustments must be made by the District 

Court. First, the parties agree that the proper amount of 

the wife's equity in the mobile home is $1,365.03, not 

$2,110.45 as originally calculated by the District Court in 

its finding of fact number 15. Finding number 15 should be 

changed accordingly. Second, the District Court improperly 

valued the parties' life insurance policy. The husband 

testified that they owned an insurance policy, which was 

whole life as to himself, but term as to the wife and her 

two children. He estimated its cash value was approximately 

$400. The wife, who was unable to testify as to the type of 

policy, estimated its cash value was approximately $2,500. 

However the District Court ignared both estimates and found 

its value to be $0, distributing it to the wife. This 
finding is clearly wrong, and must be corrected on remand. 

If additional evidence is needed, the District Court should 

require submission of such evidence from the parties. After 

the proper value is found, any necessary adjustments in the 

distribution of marital property should be made. 

Affirmed in part, modified in part, and remanded for 

valuation of the life insurance policy. 

We concur: 

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