Affirmed and Opinion Filed July 23, 2021

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-20-00011-CR

SEBASTIAN CARLOS ROMAN, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 397th Judicial District Court

Grayson County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 071029

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Pedersen, III, and Goldstein

Opinion by Justice Partida-Kipness

A jury convicted appellant Sebastian Carlos Roman of murder by 

intentionally or knowingly causing the death of his wife, Maria Romano Ortiz 

Enriquez, by shooting her with a firearm. The trial court sentenced Roman to 

ninety- nine years’ confinement. In two issues, Roman complains of the admission 

of certain extraneous offense evidence admitted over his objections at trial. We 

overrule Roman’s issues and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

BACKGROUND

Maria Romano Ortiz Enriquez died on June 26, 2018, after being shot in the 

head at close range with a .22 rifle. Roman was charged and indicted for causing 
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Maria’s death. The indictment alleged two counts of murder and one count of 

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon causing serious bodily injury to a family 

member. Roman pleaded not guilty, and the case proceeded to a jury trial on October 

29, 2019. 

Before trial, the State filed its “Notice of Intent to Offer and Introduce 

Evidence of Extraneous Offenses.” The Notice provided a list of extraneous offenses

the State intended to introduce at trial. The list included information regarding an 

extra-marital affair Roman had with Rebeca Soria Billar, and incidents of abuse by 

Roman on Maria that purportedly occurred in the six months before Maria’s death. 

Roman filed written objections to the admissibility of the extraneous offenses, a 

motion for limiting instruction pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the rules of evidence, and 

a motion in limine as to the extraneous offenses. Before voir dire, Roman objected 

to the State’s offer of the extraneous offense evidence. The trial court overruled 

Roman’s objections but granted his request for a limiting instruction. The State 

offered testimony from several witnesses regarding extraneous offenses during its 

case in chief. On appeal, Roman complains of the following testimony:

• Roman and Maria’s youngest daughter, MDJ

MDJ described Maria’s relationship with Roman as “like, just criticizing, 

angry” because Roman “would be criticizing at her [Maria] and angry.” MDJ further 

testified that she had concerns about Maria’s safety and her own safety around 
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Roman. Although Roman “always” had a critical attitude toward Maria, MDJ 

testified that the situation got progressively worse. 

• Roman’s former mistress, Rebeca Soria Billar

Billar testified she had an affair with Roman for more than six months in 2017. 

At the time, Roman and his family were renting a home from Billar. She testified 

that Maria discovered the affair and asked to meet with Billar. She described Maria 

as upset, sad, and crying when the women met in person in December 2017. Maria 

wanted Billar to end the affair, and Billar told Maria it was already over. After that 

meeting, Billar evicted Roman and his family from the rental home. 

• Roman and Maria’s eldest daughter, Lindsay

Lindsay told the jury that a month before Maria died, she heard her parents

arguing outside. When Maria came back inside the house, she was screaming, 

crying, and holding her stomach. Maria told Lindsay that Roman had punched her. 

Lindsay wanted to keep her mom safe and away from Roman, so they went into 

Lindsay’s room and locked the door. Initially, Maria told Lindsay to call the police, 

but after she calmed down, she told Lindsay not to call the police because she was 

afraid for her to call. Lindsay also told the jury that she had a concern for her mom’s 

safety around Roman. 

• Roman and Maria’s daughter-in-law, Nicole Brown

Brown testified about two similar incidents of violence that occurred before 

Maria’s death. Brown is married to Roman and Maria’s son, Freddie. At the time of 
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Maria’s death, Brown, Freddie, and their child lived with Roman and Maria. 

According to Brown, about a month before Maria died, Maria and Roman went to 

the store to buy beer. Brown and Maria shared their locations with each other through 

their phones and, on that day, Brown noticed that Maria’s phone had been sitting at 

one location on a nearby road for “a really long time.” When Maria returned home, 

she was “really scared” and told Brown that Roman “was choking her and she was 

scared that she was going to die.” Maria did not want Brown to call the police. 

Then, on June 16, 2018, Brown received a phone call from Maria. Brown and 

Freddie were on vacation in Broken Bow, Oklahoma, when she received the call. 

Maria told Brown that she was scared, that Roman “was scaring her, that he was 

going to hurt her,” and she asked if Brown and Freddie could come home because 

“she was really scared.” 

• Roman and Maria’s son, Freddie

According to Freddie, about a month before Maria died, Roman asked him if 

police officers could track a bullet to a specific gun. Roman asked how bullets could 

be tracked, and how a bullet would be identified. Freddie did not have an answer to 

his father’s questions, so he just gave Roman his own opinion of what he thought 

the answers were.

Each time the State proceeded to offer a portion of the testimony described 

above, Roman objected on Rule 404(b) and article 38.36 grounds and requested a 

limiting instruction. He also objected based on Rule 403 to all of the testimony listed 
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above except for Freddie’s testimony regarding Roman’s questions about bullet 

tracking. The trial court overruled each objection and each time admonished the jury 

as follows:

Ladies and gentlemen, the State has introduced, or may introduce, into 

evidence some acts or acts other than the ones charged in the 

indictment. With reference to those other acts you are instructed that 

that evidence is admitted only for the purpose of showing, if it does, the 

motive, intent, absence of mistake, or previous relationship between the 

accused and the deceased, along with all relevant facts and 

circumstances to show the condition of the mind of the defendant at the 

time of the offense. You cannot consider said testimony for any purpose 

unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 

committed such other act, or acts, if any were committed. If you so find 

beyond a reasonable doubt, you can consider the evidence only for the 

purpose allowed. The evidence may not be considered to prove the 

character of the defendant in order to show that he acted in conformity 

therewith on the occasion in question.

The jury charge also included a limiting instruction consistent with the instruction 

the trial judge orally provided during trial:

The State has introduced evidence of extraneous crimes or bad acts 

other than the one charged in the indictment in this case. With reference 

to those other acts, you are instructed that the evidence was admitted 

only for the purpose of showing, if it does, the motive, intent, absence 

of mistake or previous relationship between the accused and the 

deceased, along with all relevant facts and circumstances to show the 

condition of the mind of the defendant at the time of the offense. You 

cannot consider the testimony unless you find and believe beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the defendant committed such other act or acts, if 

any were committed. If you so find beyond a reasonable doubt, you can 

consider the evidence only for the purpose allowed. The evidence may 

not be considered to prove the character of the Defendant in order to 

show that he acted in conformity therewith on the occasion in question.

The jury found Roman guilty of murder as charged in the indictment and did not 

answer the jury questions regarding manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, 
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and aggravated assault family violence. Per Roman’s election, the trial judge 

determined punishment. No additional evidence was presented during the 

punishment phase. The trial court sentenced Roman to ninety-nine years’ 

confinement. Roman filed a motion for new trial, which was denied by written order 

without a hearing. This appeal followed. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review the trial court’s admission of extraneous offense evidence under 

an abuse of discretion standard.” Prible v. State, 175 S.W.3d 724, 731 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2005). If the trial court’s ruling falls within the “zone of reasonable 

disagreement,” there is no abuse of discretion and we will uphold the ruling. Robledo 

v. State, No. 05-17-00064-CR, 2018 WL 1391377, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 

20, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Id.). “If the trial 

court’s evidentiary ruling is correct under any applicable theory of law, an appellate 

court should not disturb it, even if the trial court gave a wrong or insufficient reason 

for the ruling.” Delacerda v. State, AP-77,078, 2021 WL 2674501, at *12 (Tex. 

Crim. App. June 30, 2021) (citing Johnson v. State, 490 S.W.3d 895, 908 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2016)). “Whether extraneous offense evidence has relevance apart from 

character conformity, as required by Rule 404(b), is a question for the trial court.” 

Delacerda, 2021 WL 2674501, at *12 (quoting De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 

343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)). 
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APPLICABLE LAW

In two issues, Roman contends the trial court abused its discretion by 

admitting evidence of extraneous offenses or wrongful acts under rule 404(b) of the 

Texas Rules of Evidence and article 38.36 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. 

Article 38.36 of the code of criminal procedure provides:

(a) In all prosecutions for murder, the state or the defendant shall be 

permitted to offer testimony as to all relevant facts and circumstances 

surrounding the killing and the previous relationship existing between 

the accused and the deceased, together with all relevant facts and 

circumstances going to show the condition of the mind of the accused 

at the time of the offense.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.36(a). In some situations, prior acts of violence 

between the victim and accused may be offered to illustrate the nature of the 

relationship. Garcia v. State, 201 S.W.3d 695, 702 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). “These 

specific acts of violence must meet the requirements of the Rules of Evidence in 

order to be admissible.” Id.; Smith v. State, 5 S.W.3d 673, 679 (Tex. Crim. App.

1999) (evidence admitted under article 38.36 is still subject to rules 403 and 404(b) 

of the Texas Rules of Evidence).

The State may not introduce evidence of a defendant’s prior crimes, wrongs, 

or other acts for the sole purpose of showing his character and that he acted in 

conformity with that character on a particular occasion. TEX. R. EVID. 404(b); Smith, 

5 S.W.3d at 678. The evidence may be admissible, however, if it is offered for a 

purpose other than character conformity. Smith, 5 S.W.3d at 678. Permissible 

purposes listed in rule 404(b) include motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
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knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. TEX. R. EVID. 404(b); 

Smith, 5 S.W.3d at 678. But “this list is not exhaustive.” Garcia, 201 S.W.3d at 703.

“[A]lthough rules [of evidence] 403 and 404 limit the admissibility of some 

article 38.36(a) relationship evidence, this does not mean that the statute and the 

rules are in conflict with each other.” Garcia, 201 S.W.3d at 703. It means that the 

State is prohibited from presenting evidence if the probative value is substantially 

outweighed by unfair prejudice, or “for the sole purpose of showing that the accused 

acted in conformity with his bad character and murdered the victim.” Id. “While 

Rule 404(b) limits the admissibility of specific acts used to show only the 

defendant’s character, and may keep a prosecutor from trying the case not on the 

charged offense but on the past acts of the accused, it certainly does not block the 

admission of all relationship evidence.” Id. “For example, in cases in which the prior 

relationship between the victim and the accused is a material issue, illustrating the 

nature of the relationship may be the purpose for which evidence of prior bad acts 

will be admissible.” Id. “What issues are material will depend on the theories of the 

prosecution and the defense.” Smith, 5 S.W.3d at 679 n. 13 (citing Fielder v. State, 

756 S.W.2d 309, 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)); Bailey v. State, No. 05-13-01536-

CR, 2015 WL 1649946, at *9–10 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 13, 2015, no pet.) (mem. 

op., not designated for publication).

“[I]f a defendant makes timely 404(b) or 403 objections, before a trial court 

can properly admit the evidence under Article 38.36(a), it must first find the non-
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character conformity purpose for which it is proffered is relevant to a material issue.” 

Smith, 5 S.W.3d at 679. “If relevant to a material issue, the trial court must then 

determine whether the evidence should nevertheless be excluded because its 

probative value is substantially outweighed by the factors in Rule 403.” Id. In other 

words, even when evidence is admissible under rule 404(b), it may be excluded if 

its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, 

confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting 

cumulative evidence. TEX. R. EVID. 403 (“although relevant, evidence may be 

excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice.”); Hernandez v. State, 390 S.W.3d 310, 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); 

Mozon v. State, 991 S.W.2d 841, 846–47 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Harris v. State, 

572 S.W.3d 325, 334 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, no pet.). “The probative force of 

evidence refers to how strongly it serves to make the existence of a fact of 

consequence more or less probable.” Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363, 372 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2018).

Relevant evidence is presumed to be more probative than prejudicial. 

Santellan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 155, 169 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). All evidence 

against a defendant is, by its nature, designed to be prejudicial. See Pawlak v. State, 

420 S.W.3d 807, 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Rule 403 does not exclude all 

prejudicial evidence; it focuses instead on the danger of unfair prejudice. State v. 

Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Evidence is unfairly 
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prejudicial if it has the capacity to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground 

other than proof specific to the offense charged. Manning v. State, 114 S.W.3d 922, 

928 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). A trial judge has substantial discretion in balancing 

probative value and unfair prejudice. See Powell v. State, 189 S.W.3d 285, 288 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2006). When undertaking a rule 403 analysis, a trial court balances:

(1) the inherent probative force of the proffered item of evidence along 

with (2) the proponent's need for that evidence against (3) any tendency 

of the evidence to suggest decision on an improper basis, (4) any 

tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the main 

issues, (5) any tendency of the evidence to be given undue weight by a 

jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the probative force of the 

evidence, and (6) the likelihood that presentation of the evidence will 

consume an inordinate amount of time or merely repeat evidence 

already admitted.

Gonzalez, 544 S.W.3d at 372 (quoting Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641–

42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). As the court noted in Gigliobianco, however, “these 

factors may well blend together in practice.” Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 642; 

ANALYSIS

In his brief, Roman acknowledges article 38.36 and recognizes that the trial 

court is given “substantial discretion” when balancing the evidence’s probative value 

with the risk of unfair prejudice. Roman nonetheless contends that the State “should 

have been allowed to offer only evidence concerning the specific alleged murder and 

aggravated assault charges in said Amended Indictment.” We disagree and conclude

it was well within the zone of reasonable disagreement for the trial court to have 
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found that the disputed evidence was admissible for a non-character-conformity 

purpose.

With respect to the applicability of article 38.36(a), we conclude the 

challenged testimony of MDJ, Lindsay, and Brown illustrates the nature of the 

relationship between Maria and Roman. Thus, the requirements of article 38.36(a) 

have been met as to that testimony. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.36(a); see 

also Garcia, 201 S.W.3d at 703–04. The testimony was not offered for the sole 

purpose of showing Roman had a violent character and acted in conformity with that 

character in murdering Maria. Rather, the relationship between Roman and Maria 

was itself a material issue. The circumstances surrounding the relationship of Roman 

and Maria at the time of Maria’s death is relevant evidence under article 38.36(a), 

and the testimony of MDJ, Lindsay, and Brown regarding the arguments between 

Roman and Maria, the physicality associated with their arguments, and Maria’s fear 

of Roman as a result is admissible under rule of evidence 404(b) for the purpose of 

illustrating the nature of their relationship. See Garcia, 201 S.W.3d at 704; see also 

Smith, 5 S.W.3d at 679; Bailey, 2015 WL 1649946, at *9–10. As for Freddie’s 

testimony that, a month before the murder, Roman was contemplating whether and 

how law enforcement can track or trace a bullet to a certain gun is probative of intent 

and of the condition of Roman’s mind at the time of the offense. Similarly, Billar’s 

testimony regarding the affair, her discussion with Maria about the affair, Maria’s 

request that Billar end the affair, and Billar’s decision to evict the Roman family 
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following that discussion was probative to show not only the relationship between 

Roman and Maria prior to her death, but also to illustrate a motive and the condition 

of Roman’s mind at the time of the offense.

Moreover, Roman made intent an issue by presenting the theory that an 

unknown third party killed Maria. Evidence of previous injuries Maria suffered at 

the hands of Roman was, thus, material to that issue and admissible to rebut the 

defense theory. See Garcia, 201 S.W.3d at 704; see also Robbins, 88 S.W.3d 256, 

262 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (holding evidence of previous injuries to victim while 

in appellant’s care material to issue of intent where appellant presented the theory 

that the injuries to the victim at the time of her death were caused by efforts to 

resuscitate her).

With respect to rule 403, we cannot conclude the probative value of any of the 

challenged testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice. The nature of Roman’s relationship with Maria in the weeks and months 

leading up to the murder was inherently probative of the circumstances surrounding 

her death, and the disputed evidence was needed to demonstrate that relationship. 

See Garcia, 201 S.W.3d at 704. There is no reason for us to believe that the disputed 

evidence confused or distracted the jury from the main issues, suggested the jury 

make its decision on an improper basis, or was given undue weight by the jury. See 

Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641. The disputed evidence involved incidents

substantially less serious than the murder at issue, and the presentation of the 
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disputed evidence did not consume an inordinate amount of time or merely repeat 

evidence already admitted. See id. Accordingly, we conclude the evidence at issue 

met the admissibility requirements of rule 403. TEX. R. EVID. 403; see also Sanders 

v. State, No. 05-09-01337-CR, 2011 WL 1843508, at *12 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 

16, 2011, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

CONCLUSION

We overrule Roman’s two issues. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment. 

200011f.u05

Do Not Publish

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)

/Robbie Partida-Kipness/

ROBBIE PARTIDA-KIPNESS

JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

SEBASTIAN CARLOS ROMAN, 

Appellant

No. 05-20-00011-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 397th Judicial 

District Court, Grayson County, 

Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 071029 Ct 1.

Opinion delivered by Justice PartidaKipness. Justices Pedersen, III and 

Goldstein participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 23rd day of July, 2021.