# FILED
March 8, 1996 Cecil W. Crowson Ap pellate Cou rt Clerk IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE WESTERN SECTI ON AT NASHVILLE

______________________________________________ JACK LLOYD BEATY, SR., ) ) Petitioner/Appellee, ) ) Williams on Chance ry No. 166 91-R2 v. ) ) C.A. No. 01A01-9507-CH-00325 MARY JOYCE SCOTT BEATY, ) ) Responde nt/Appell ant. )

APPEAL FROM THE WILLIAMSON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT THE HONORABLE

HENRY DEN

MARK BELL, C HANCELLOR
Lisa M. Carson Franklin, Tennessee Attorney For Appellee

Thomas W. Hardin Hardin & Parkes Columbia, Tennessee Attorneys for Appellant

REVERSED A ND REMAN DED

OPINION FILED:

WILLIAM H. W ILLIAMS, SENIOR JUDGE

CONCUR: HIGHERS, J. FARMER, J.

The sole issue

present ed in this a

ppeal is w

hether t he Wife /Appella nt is e ntitled t o postjudgmentinterest on a judgment of $50,000 awarded her by the decree of divorce enter ed December1

28, 1992. The pertine

nt facts a re that this matter arose out of a divorce action from the W illiamson County Chancery Court. The divorce decree , inter alia , awarded the residence to the Husband a nd
a business known as Franklin Jewelry and Loan Company, Inc. The tri al court awarded the Wife certain real estate upon

which were located three apa rtments and as part of the equalization of the equities betwee

n the par ties, a money judgment against the Husband of $50,000 cash. Wife appealed
on two issues: (1) the award of the marital residence to t he Hus band, and (2) the duration of the rehabilitative alimony. She raised n o issue concerning the $50,000 judgment. Husband did not appeal; however, he did petition the trial court subsequently to allow sale of the residence awarded to him by the j u dgment. The court held it lacked jurisdiction due to the pending appeal by Wife. On October 7, 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed the t rial co urt's ruling in the divorce decree. Subseque ntly on December 14, 1994, Hus band file d a petition to requi re Wife to comply w ith divorce decree by executing a quitcla im deed to

the resid ence and to trans fer stoc

ks she owned in the jewelry and loan company to the Husband. Husband concur rently paid into the court the $50,000 award. Wife filed a counter-pe tition asking, inter alia , post-judgment interest from the date of the divorce decree, Decemb er 28, 19 92, until date the $50,000 was paid into court, December 13, 1994. On March 15, 1995, the trial court heard the petition and counter-petition and filed a memorandum that denied the Wife's claim for post-judgment interest among other things. The pertinent portion of the ch ancello

r's ruling dealing w ith the pos t-judgmen t interes t claim of

the Wife is as follo ws: T.C.A. § 47-14-122 relied upon by Mary Beaty sets out the method of computat

ion of inte

rest in judg ments. It does not provide that interest runs on all judgments
.2 From a consideration of the definition of 'interest' in T.C.A. § 47-14- 102(7), the rationale set

out in Price v. Price , 472 S.W.2d 732, and all the circumstances in this case, the court is of t he opinio n that the $50,000 judgment d

id not bear interest at any time prior to the filing of Jack Beaty's petition and the concurrent payment to the clerk and master of the $50,000 principal amount. The petition and counter-petition as amended were dismissed by the cha ncellor. The Husband supports the chancellor's decision and argues that the $50,000 w as awar

ded to the Wife for the purpos e of equalizing the equities between the parties. But the payment by the Husband of the $50 ,000 was c ontingent upon the W

ife exe cuting a q

uitcla i m deed to the marital residence awarded to the Husband and her transfe rring to him ce rt ain stocks she owned in the jewelry and loan company also awarded to the Husband. That because she appe aled the

judgment, thus delaying the execution of the judgment, she was not entitled to the immediate use of the money from the date of entry and unde r author ity of Price , id ., she is no t entitled to post-jud

gment inte

rest. We respectfully disagree and re verse. T.C.A. § 47-14-12 2 provide s: Intere st on judgme

nts -- Computation. -- Interest shall be computed on every judgment from the day on which the jury or the court, sitting without a jury, returned the verdict without regard to a motion for a new trial.
T.C.A. § 47-14-12 1 provide s: Intere st on judgmen

ts -- Rate . -- Inte

rest on ju dgments, i ncludin g decree s, shallbe computedat the effective rate of ten per cent (10%) per ann um, exce pt as may be otherwise provided or permitted by statute; provided, that where a judgment isbased on

a note, c ontract , or other writing fixing a rate of interest within the limits provided in § 47-14-103 for that particular category of transaction, the judgment shall bear interest at the rate so fixed.
T.C.A. § 47-14-10 2(7) pro vides: 'Intere st' is compensation for the use or detention of, or forbearance to collect, money over a period of time, and does not include compensation for

other purposes, including, but not limited to, timeprice d ifferentials, loan charges, brokera ge commissions, or commitmentfees. For

example , when you

borrow mo ne y, you pay the lender simple interest (w hich i s like rent) for the use of the money. The amount o f intere st you pay d epends o n: (A) The principa l, which isthe amoun

t you borr ow; (B) The rate, which

is a percent based on a

period of time, usually one (1) year; and3 (C) The number of periods of time that you have the use of the money. . . . Essentially, as we understand the trial court's memorandum, the trial court re lying on Price , id ., ruled that

the Wife was not entitled to post-judgment interest because she appealed the dec ree of divorce and

was, therefore, not entitled to immediate use of the money. This reasoning is plainly stated in the trial court's memorandum of findings of fact and conclusions of law whe re it said: This provision in the marital property division and the dur ation of rehabilitative alimony were the parts of the decreewhich Ma

ry Beaty sought to have changed o n appea l. The pro perty division sough

t b y Mary B eaty wou ld not have involved an award of the $50,000 equalizing judgment in her favor. Her c onduct in n ot seekin g to collect the $50,000 judgment and refusing to exec ute a quitclaim deed was entirely consistent with the relief shehoped to r eceive on appea l. Although there was no stay order, the parties by their conduct treated the trial cou

rt's dec ree as stayed pending appe al (emph asis ours). Otherwise, Mary Bea

ty would sim

p l y not have had a meaningful appellate review.
As previously shown, the trial court's memorandum went on to consider the definition of interest pursuant to T.C.A. § 47-14-102(7) and the rationale set out in Price v. Price , id ., and denied and dismissed the counter-petition of the Wife in which she had moved the court for post-judgment interest
. The Husband 's petition was also dismissed. We think that the trial court's reliance upon Price is misplaced. In Price , id ., the appellant/wife was denied statutory post-judgment interest becau s e the divorce decreeawarded

a money judgment as alimony in solido payable in future installments and she was not entitled to the use of any of the money represented by the judgment until each installment was due. All installments were paid when due. The Supreme Court noted in Price , id ., at 734: In the greater number of

cases de aling with

the question, interest has been allowed on unpaid alimony. Thus, where the problem arose in respective judgments for alimony in gross, interest has been allowed from the date payment was due under the judgment until payment was made , and, as to unpaid installments interest has been allowed from the date the particular installment matured. Likewise, interest has been allowed

on unpaid

installme nts of alim

ony again st

the esta te of the de ceased

divorce d spouse. The theo ry upon wh

ich inter est is allowedin these cases is that a judgment awarding alimony is in the nature of a money judgment. The same result has been reached even where the judgment o

r installme

nt becam e due an d payable

pending an appeal o f the judg ment awa rding th e alimo ny on the theory that the party awarded a

lim ony should not be deprived of it by the prosecu tion of an appeal. (emphasis ours).4 We do not beli eve that Price is analogous to the facts in this case. Here, the divorce decree awarded a cash money judgment to the Wife. She was entitled to immediate use of the money upon entry of the judgment on December 28, 1992. However, she e xercised her right to appeal t he judgmentof di vorce. The trial court denied jurisdiction pending the appeal. Wife's appe al was subseque ntly dis misse d by this Court and the $50,000 judgment was paid into the trial court on December

14, 1994. We think t

he case of Inman v. Inman , 840 S.W.2d 927 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992), is dispositive of this issue. The Inman facts were that pending wife's appeal the husband withheld, inter alia , payment of a $100,000 cash award to the wife by a judgment of

divorce. Subsequently, upon the appe al becom

ing final, the wife

by motion mo ved the tr

ial cour t for post- judgment in

terest from the date of the entry of the divorce decr e e until the $100,000 be paid. Her motion was dismissed by the trial court. This Court, after citing T.C.A. § 47-14-121, stated:

Clearly, the plaintiff is entitled to interest at 10% on the $100,000 cash from the date of the decree until paid. * * * * The judgment of

the Trial Court

'dismissing' (striking or overruling) the motion of plaintiff is reversed. Inman , at 931, 933. Rule 41, T. R.A.P., sta

tes: INTEREST ON J

UDGMENTS If a judgment f

or money in a civil c ase is af firmed or the appe al is dismissed, whatever intere st is allowed b y law sha ll be paya

ble computed from the date of the verdict of the jury or the e quivale nt determination by the court in a non-jury case, which date shall be set forth in the judgment en tered in the trial court. If a judgme

nt is modified or reve

rsed with a direc tion that a

ju dg ment for money be entered in the tria

l court, th e mandat e shall con

taininstructi ons with respect to allowance of interest.
The intent of t

his rule iscrystal c le ar: whet her the appeal is affirmed, modified, or dismissed, whatever interest allowed by law ( see , e.g . T.C.A. § 47-14-121 and -122) shall(emphasis ours) be payable from date of jury verdict or the equiva lent determination in a non-jury case. We reverse the trial court and hold that appellant, Mary Joyce Scott Beaty, shall be paid by the appellee, Jack Lloyd Beaty, Sr., post-judgment interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per
annumupon the money judgment in this cause of $50,000 from the date of the original judgment on5

December

28, 1992 until it was paid on December 13, 1994, for whi ch let executi on issue if necessary. The Husband/

Appellee insists tha

t if the Wi fe is enti

tled to pos t-judgmen

t interes ton the $50,000 judgment, then the Husband is entitled to offset alleged interest owed to hi m on the ass ets that the Wife refuse d to trans fer pen ding the a ppeal. T his claim i s, of cour se, subje ct to possib le proof offered at a hearing befor e the trial court for

that purpose. We do not decide this issue, but remand the case to the trial court for such ac tion that it deems proper. The cause is r emand ed to the trial court for enforcement of this judgment and any other proceedings. Costs are assessed against the appellee, Ja ck Lloyd Beaty, Sr., for6

which let execution issue for judgment and costs, if necessary.

____________

__________________________ ______ _ WILLIAM H. WILLIAMS, SENIOR JUDGE
CONCUR:

______________________________________ ALAN E. H

IGHERS, J.

_______________________________________ DAVID R. FARMER, J.