DAN MORALES 

‘.4rrORNEY GENERAL 

QBffice of tty Bttornep 

&date of Qexas 

March 31.1993 

Qheral 

Honorable James W. Carr 

Lfivaca County Attorney 

Box 576, Second Floor Courthouse 

HallettsviUe, Texas 7796d 

DedrMr.cflr 

Opinion No. DM-213 

Re: whether a wmmissioners court may limit 

the number of monthly supplemental workcrr’ 

compensation payments to county employees 

already receiving such payments @Q-23 1) 

You inform us that in 1986. the Commissioners Court of Lavaca County adopted 

an order authorizing supplemental compeasation for au disabled county employees. The 

order provided that during the period of the employee’s total disability the employee 

would receive payments which, when combmed with standard workers’ compensation 

herds, would equal the employee’s regular salary. In 1991. the commissioners court 

adopted an order that limited the amount of such supplemental payments to ten monthly 

-s. 

You state that two county employees were injured in 1988 and 1990, respecdveiy, 

and were granted supplemental henefits pursuant to the 1986 order. You ask whether the 

~mmissioners court may, on the hasis of the 1991 order, limit the mtmber of 

supplemental payments to these employees.’ We con&de that the wmmissiollers courl 

was not autholixed to limit the mmlber of supplemaltf4 payments made to these 

anplOY= 

The injuries to the employees in question occurred prior to the &ctive date of the 

Texas Workers’ Compensation Act of 1989. Acts 1989,7&t Leg., 2d C.S.. ch. 1. That 

act states that, with the exception of a few provisions not relevant here, the act takes 

&ctonJanuuyl, 1991,andthatthechangeinthelawmadebytheactappliesonlyto 

injuries which occur on or after this date. Id. 5 17.18(a), (c), at 122. The Texas Workers’ 

Compensation Commission is directed to process claims for injuries occurring before the 

p. 1128 
Honorable James W. Carr - Page 2 (DM-213) 

e!Tective date in accordance with the law in effect on the date the injury owurred.2 Id. 

3 17.18(d), at 122. We therefore limit tbis opinion to situations involving the payment of 

supplemental compensation in conjunction with the payment of workers’ compensation 

benef3s under the former workers’ wmpensation laws. 

Counties are authorixed to provide workers’ wmpenmtion insurance for county 

anp~oyees under article IU, section 60 of the Texas Comtitution. Tbis office has 

previously determined that political subdivisions were not rewired to carry workers’ 

compensation coverage under the laws in effect prior to the effective date of the Texas 

Workers’ Compenmtion Act of 1989. Attorney General Opiion H-338 (1974)s Also, 

while the worked wmpensation laws in effect prior to 1991 did not speciScaUy rewire or 

authoriz wwties to pay injured employees supplemental workers’ wmpensation 

bendits, Attorney General Opiion Jh%447 (1986) concluded that a wunty could 

provide such benefits on a prospective basis as an element of county employees’ 

wmpensation. 

Accordingly, with respect to employees &red prior to 1991. the commissioners 

court was authorized to provide supplemental wmpensation on a prospective baais 

pumant to its authority to set the wmpensation of county employees. Local Gov? Code 

5 152.011; see Attomey General Opiion Jh4447 at 34. So long as no vested right is 

impaired, and in the absence of a wnstitutionaJ or statutory prohibitiou the power to set 

salary and compensation obviously inchtdes the authority to increase or reduce 

wmpensation. See Ci@ of Lkdhs v. Trammeli, 101 S.W.2d 1009 (Ta. 1937); Attorney 

General Opiion JM-910 (1988). 

This does not, however, mean the Lavaca County Commissioners Court 

newsady was Itee to limit the amount of supplemental wmpensation payable to 

employees injured prior to the adoption of the second order reducing these. beneftts. The 

case of DeHqvos v. Cig of Beeville, 742 S.W.Zd 735 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987. 

writ denied), ilhtstrates this point. The case wncerned a city’s attempt to temtinate 

supplemental benefits paid by the city to an injured employee who wncurrently was 

receiving workers’ compensation bet&s for the injury. The supplemental benefits were 

%tkIc 8309h. V.T.C.S., amotly mqoirca political soWvisions of the me (tncludtng 

calmtie) to provide such awerage either by self-ioaoling, plrchasine inswane, or amtmcting with other 

acIf-insorus. See V.T.C.S. art. 83094 08 l(l), 2(a); A~toracy General Opiion DM-180 (1992). 

‘In amtmst, the 1989 wmkc~* compmdon legislation qwificdy authoke political 

mbdividoos to plovidc two kinds of suppkmcnIal tenetits to injurea employees racivin8 worn’ 

compsaioo Lmcflts. See V.T.C.S. arts. 8308d.W. 83094 p§ 3(a)(4), S(c). . 

p. 1129 
Honorable James W. Can - Page 3 @4-213) 

paid pursuant to a provision in the city personnel manual that stated that an injured 

employee would receive, during the period of time provided for under workers’ 

wmpensation insuranw, compensation in an amount reflecting the ditTere.nce bchvew the 

employee’s regular rate of pay and the amount of workers’ wmpensation beneSts. The 

court concluded that this provision not only created a duty to pay workers’ compensation 

be&its, but also obligated the city to pay the ditTerence between salary and bet&s for 

the period the employee was legally entitled to workers’ compensation beneftts. 

Although the court in LW@os did not explicitly couch its holding in these terms, 

it appears to have determined that the personnel manual wnstituted a part of the contract 

of employment which could not unilaterally be changed by the employer subsequent to a 

wmpensabte injury. An employee injured during the e&ctive period of the policy, 

therefore, could claim a vested right to the benefits promised by policy. The city would be 

prohibited from impairing this right by unilaterally limiting or eliminating these benefits. 

The term of the 1986 order granting supplemental benefits to employees of 

Lavaca County authorized supplemental payments “during the period of total disabiity.” 

Because the payment of supplemental benefits pursuant to the order is conditioned on the 

receipt of workers’ compensation benefits by an injured employee, we assume that “period 

of total disabii cotresponds to the period during which an injured employee receives 

workers’ wmpensation benefits. Accordingly, we believe, on the strength of the DeHoyos 

case and the terms of the wmmissioners court’s order, that the Lavaca County 

Commissioners Court was prohibited from limiting or reducing the amount of 

supplemental benefits paid to the two individuals described in your request letter. 

SUMMARY 

The Commissioners Court of Lavaca County may not reduce the 

number or amount of supplemental wmpensation payments made to 

a county employee injured prior to January 1. 1991, pursuant to a 

policy that obligates the wunty to pay, for the period the employee 

mccives worked wmpensation benefits, the difference between 

workers’ compensation benefits and the employee’s regular wages or 

&arY. 

DAN MORALES 

Attorney General of Texas 

p. 1130 
Honorable James W. Cur - Page 4 (DM-213) 

WILL. PRYOR 

Fbst Assistant Attorney General 

MARYKELLER 

Deputy Attorney General for Litigation 

RENEAHICKS 

State Solicitor 

MADELEINE B. JOHNSON 

Chair, Opinion hmittcc 

Pmpared by Steve Amgh 

-AttorneyGenaal 

p. 1131