NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RAJVEER MUTTI, AKA Rajpal Singh, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 20-70798 

Agency No. A097-744-673 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted October 7, 2021**

Portland, Oregon

Before: W. FLETCHER, IKUTA, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Rajveer Mutti (also known as Rajpal Singh), a citizen of India, seeks review 

of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision denying his untimely and 

numerically barred motion to reopen his immigration proceedings, in which Mutti 

sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

OCT 13 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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Torture (CAT). We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion 

and may grant relief only if the BIA’s decision was “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary 

to law.” Agonafer v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1198, 1203 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Singh 

v. INS, 295 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002)). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252 and deny the petition.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mutti’s second motion to 

reopen based on changed country conditions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 

C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). To show that he was entitled to reopening on that basis, 

Mutti had to:

(1) produce evidence that conditions have changed in the country of 

removal; (2) demonstrate that the evidence is material; (3) show that 

the evidence was not available and would not have been discovered or 

presented at the previous hearings; and (4) “demonstrate that the new 

evidence, when considered together with the evidence presented at the 

original hearing, would establish prima facie eligibility for the relief 

sought.”

Agonafer, 859 F.3d at 1204 (quoting Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th 

Cir. 2008)).

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Mutti failed to show 

that conditions had materially worsened in India since his original immigration 

proceedings more than a decade earlier. The BIA could reasonably conclude that

Mutti’s participation in a rally in New York was a change in personal circumstances. 

See Rodriguez v. Garland, 990 F.3d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing Chandra v. 
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Holder, 751 F.3d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that, although “personal 

circumstances may be relevant to a motion to reopen based on changed country 

conditions,” a petitioner must “provid[e] sufficient evidence of related changed 

country conditions”)).

The BIA also reasonably concluded, based on an Immigration Judge’s prior 

adverse credibility determination and the contradictions between Mutti’s motion to 

reopen and his earlier testimony, that Mutti’s allegations of changed country 

conditions were “inherently unbelievable.” See Agonafer, 859 F.3d at 1203 (quoting 

Limsico v. INS, 951 F.2d 210, 213 (9th Cir. 1991)). Mutti had previously testified 

before an Immigration Judge that he was not politically active in India, which 

contradicted Mutti’s new claim that he had been “abused, tortured, and threatened 

in the past for fighting for” his beliefs. Evidence in the record also supported the 

BIA’s determination that circumstances had not changed in ways material to Mutti 

since his original removal proceedings. The materials Mutti submitted in connection 

with his motion to reopen did not require the BIA to conclude otherwise.

For substantially the same reasons, the BIA also did not abuse its discretion 

or apply an incorrect legal standard in concluding that Mutti had not established a 

prima facie case for asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT protection. See Silva 

v. Garland, 993 F.3d 705, 718–19 (9th Cir. 2021). On this record, the BIA could 

conclude that Mutti did not meet his “heavy burden of proving that, if proceedings 
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were reopened, the new evidence would likely change the result in the case.” Young 

Sun Shin v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted).

We reject Mutti’s argument that the BIA failed to consider his arguments or 

explain its decision. The record does not support Mutti’s assertions. We further 

reject Mutti’s argument that the BIA mischaracterized the evidence, because even 

assuming the BIA committed any such error, it was harmless.

PETITION DENIED.