J-A10009-16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

RICHARD AND TINA-MARIE COLLIER, 

INDIVIDUALLY AND AS HUSBAND AND 

WIFE 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 

v. 

JEFFREY BALZER PUBLIC ADJUSTERS 

D/B/A NORTHERN PUBLIC ADJUSTERS 

AND JEFFREY BALZER 

 Appellant No. 329 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Judgment Entered January 27, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Civil Division at No(s): GD 14-011740 

RICHARD AND TINA-MARIE COLLIER, 

INDIVIDUALLY AND AS HUSBAND AND 

WIFE 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellants 

v. 

JEFFREY BALZER PUBLIC ADJUSTERS 

D/B/A NORTHERN PUBLIC ADJUSTERS 

AND JEFFREY BALZER 

 No. 330 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Judgment Entered January 27, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Civil Division at No(s): GD 14-011740 

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PANELLA, J. 

JUDGMENT ORDER BY PANELLA, J. FILED JULY 15, 2016
J-A10009-16 

- 2 - 

 In these consolidated cross appeals, Richard and Tina-Marie Collier and 

Jeffrey Balzer Public Adjusters d/b/a Northern Public Adjusters and Jeffrey 

Balzer appeal from the declaratory judgment order entered by the Honorable 

Alan Hertzberg, Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. We affirm. 

 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural 

history of the case. For a recitation of the facts and procedural history of this 

matter, we direct the reader to the opinion of the trial court. See Trial Court 

Opinion, 4/27/15, at 1-3. 

 “In reviewing a declaratory judgment, we are limited to determining 

whether the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion or error of 

law.” Vanderhoff v. Harleysville Ins. Co., 78 A.3d 1060, 1065 (Pa. 2013) 

(citation omitted). “The grant or denial of a declaratory judgment is a matter 

lying within the sound discretion of the court of original jurisdiction.” 

Lowther v. Roxborough Memorial Hosp., 738 A.2d 480, 489 (Pa. Super. 

1999) (citation omitted). “An appellate court may not substitute its 

judgment for that of the trial court if the determination of the trial court is 

supported by competent evidence.” Vanderhoff, 78 A.3d at 1065 (citation 

omitted). 

 We have reviewed the briefs of the parties, the certified record, and 

the trial court opinion. The trial court, the Honorable Alan Hertzberg, has 

authored an opinion that ably disposes of the issues presented on appeal. 

We affirm based on that opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/27/15, at 4-11. 

 Order affirmed. 
J-A10009-16 

- 3 - 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 7/15/2016 
1 63 P.S. ~1601 defines "public adjuster" as: Any person advertising, soliciting business or holding himselfout to 

the public as an adjuster of claims for losses or damages arising out of policies of insurance, surety or indemnity 

upon property, persons or insurable business interests within this Commonwealth, and receiving any compensation 

or reward for the giving of advice or assistance to the insured in the adjustment of claims for such losses, or who for 

compensation or reward, whether by way of salary or commission or otherwise, directly or indirectly, solicits 

business, investigates or adjusts losses or advises the insured with reference to claims for losses on behalf of any 

other person engaged in the business of adjusting losses. The term does not include an agent or employee of an 

insurance company, association or an exchange, through whom a policy of insurance was written, in adjusting loss 

or damage under such policy, nor does it include an insurance producer acting as an adjuster if the services of the 

insurance producer in the adjustment are without compensation. 

and about a month after the tornado shuck, they decided to hire public adjuster Jeffrey Balzer. 

and its contents. Homesite refused Mr. and Mrs. Collier's requests for additional compensation, 

damaged their home. Homesite paid Mr. and Mrs. Collier $94,548 for the damage to the home 

notified their homeowners insurer, Homesite Insurance Company, that the tornado severely 

Westmoreland County that was in the path of a tornado. Mr. and Mrs. Collier immediately 

In March of 2011 Plaintiffs Richard and Tina-Marie Collier owned a home in 

homeowners insurer. 

This is a dispute over the amount owed to a "public adjuster?' for obtaining funds from a 

Alan Hertzberg, Judge Date Filed: April 27, 2015 

OPINION 

Defendants. 

JEFFREY BALZER PUBLIC ADJUSTERS 

d/b/a NORTHERN PUBLIC ADJUSTERS 

and JEFFREY BALZER, 

CASE NO. GD 13-21486 

Superior Court Nos. 329 WDA 2015 

and 330 WDA 2015 

vs. 

Plaintiffs, 

RICHARD AND TINA-MARIE COLLIER, 

individually and as husband and wife, 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

CIVIL DIVISION 

Circulated 07/08/2016 09:58 AM
2 

2 The terms of the settlement are confidential pursuant to the "Confidential Full Release and Settlement Agreement" 

Mr. and Mrs. Collier signed on 10/29/2013. See GD 13-21486, Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint filed 4/1/2014 

at Exhibit 4. Based on this confidential settlement that they signed, the file (electronic and paper) at docket no. GD 

13-21486 is sealed with redacted copies of all documents from it maintained in an unsealed file at docket no. GD 14- 

11740. This opinion might be too confusing if I maintained the terms of the confidential settlement and filed it at 

no. GD 14-11740. Therefore, it is being filed under seal at no. GD 13-21486. 

the $1,050,000 settlement attributed to the homeowners insurance policy. Mr. Balzer then filed a 

Mr. and Mrs. Collier informed Mr. Balzer they would only pay him 20% of the portion of 

bad faith, he sent Mr. and Mrs. Collier an invoice for 20% of the entire $1,050,000 settlement. 

proceeds paid by the insurer, and, believing he is entitled to 20% of the amount attributable to 

to Homesite's bad faith. Mr. Balzer's public adjuster compensation is 20% of all settlement 

portion of the $1,050,000 owed pursuant to the insurance coverage from the amount attributable 

payment much greater than the policy's limits. The settlement, however, did not delineate the 

clear the settlement by payment of an additional $1,050,000 required Homesite to make a 

structures and $179,900 personal property) and Hornesite had previously paid $260, 159, it is 

the relevant limits on the Homesite policy total $462,600 ($257,000 dwelling, $25, 700 other 

resolved by a settlement that required Homesite to pay an additional $1,050,0002• Considering 

referred to hereinafter as the "bad faith claim." In September of 2013 the bad faith claim was 

et seq.), intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent underinsurance; that lawsuit is 

contained counts against Homesite for acting in bad faith, unfair trade practices (73 P.S.§201-1 

the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County. This Westmoreland County lawsuit 

Late in 2011 Mr. Gelman filed suit on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Collier against Homesite in 

Pa.C.S.§8371. 

attorney Bruce Gelman to sue Homesite for acting in bad faith toward them. See 42 

there still were covered losses Homesite refused to pay. Therefore, Mr. and Mrs. Collier hired 

Defendant Jeffrey Balzer did obtain $165,611 in additional compensation from Homesite, but 
3 

charging lien in the Westmoreland County proceedings. Mr. and Mrs. Collier then commenced 

this proceeding in Allegheny County (their agreement with Mr. Balzer requires dispute 

resolution in Allegheny County) by a complaint for a declaratory judgment of the amount owed 

Mr. Balzer. Late in November of 2013, Mr. and Mrs. Collier persuaded the Honorable Gary 

Caruso in Westmoreland County to order Mr. Balzer to sign the insurer's $1,050,000 settlement 

check, to pay $19,000 from it to Mr. Balzer, to make a partial payment from it of $273,000 to 

Mr. and Mrs. Collier and to deposit the $758,000 balance into an interest bearing escrow 

account. In January of 2014, in this proceeding the Honorable Judith Friedman ordered an 

additional payment of $448,000 be made to Mr. and Mrs. Collier from the escrow account, 

leaving a balance in it of $310,000 plus interest. 

In February of 2014 Mr. and Mrs. Collier filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

in this declaratory judgment proceeding. I granted the Motion by limiting Mr. Balzer's 

compensation to 20% of the property damage from the tornado. In July of 2014 the docket 

number in this proceeding was changed from GD 13-21486 to GD 14-11740. See footnote 2. 

After presiding over the non-jury trial of the remaining issues in the declaratory judgment 

proceeding, in January of 2015 I determined the balance owed Mr. Balzer is $38,642.97 while 

Mr. Balzer owed Mr. and Mrs. Collier $48,860.75 primarily for prevailing party attorney fees 

under the Public Adjuster Contract. 

Mr. and Mrs. Collier as well as Mr. Balzer filed Motions for Post Trial Relief, which I 

denied. Both sides also then appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. This opinion will 

next address the errors the parties allege I made in their respective concise statements of errors 

complained of on appeal. See Pa. R.A.P. No. l 925(a). I first will address the errors Mr. and 

Mrs. Collier allege that I made. 
4 

$38,642.97. See Collier Concise Statement.jl no. 3. The starting point for my analysis of the 

Mr. and Mrs. Collier next contend I made an error by determining they owed Mr. Balzer 

correctly declined to limit Mr. Balzer's claim to $2,500. 

elsewhere in the contract, the liquidated damages provision cannot apply. Id. Therefore, I 

Since damages were easily calculated by using the 20% of settlement proceeds formula set forth 

A.2d 26 (1960) and Com., Dept. ofTransp. v. Mitchell, 517 Pa. 203, 535 A.2d 581 (1987). 

damages is difficult to ascertain. See, e.g., Laughlin v. Baltaden, Inc., 191 Pa. Super. 611, 159 

only permits application of such a "liquidated damages" provision to cases where the measure of 

hereafter), pp. 361 and 363. This interpretation also is consistent with Pennsylvania law that 

also interprets the provision this way. See transcript of non-jury trial, December 4-5, 2014 ("T." 

Balzer the option to collect his fee under the formula, but not requiring him to do so. Mr. Balzer 

be entitled to collect. .. $250.00 per hour ... or $2,500.00 .... " I interpret the language to give Mr. 

$2,500. However, the contractual language is that upon unilateral termination Mr. Balzer "shall 

Trial Exhibit 3) and argue this unilateral termination therefore limits Mr. Balzer's claim to 

sent Mr. Balzer a letter on October 21,2013 notifying him of"contract termination" (Non-jury 

Non-jury trial Exhibit 1 ("Public Adjuster Contract signed April 26, 2011). Mr. and Mrs. Collier 

In the event the Insured/Claimant elects to either withdraw its claim and/or 

otherwise breaches the terms of this contract by actions which include, but are 

not limited to, fraud, unilateral termination of this contract outside the 

revocability period as set forth by Pennsylvania Statutes, or impeding the claims 

resolution process by failing to cooperate fully with Northern Public Adjusters, 

etc., then Northern Public Adjusters, shall be entitled to collect from the 

Insured/Claimant a fee which shall be $250.00 per hour for any and all time 

incurred assisting the Insured/Claimant or a minimum recovery of $2500.00 

whichever is greater. 

$2,500 (See Collier Concise Statement, ,i no. 2) under this provision in the Contract: 

Mr. and Mrs. Collier first contend I made an error by not limiting Mr. Balzer's claim to 
5 

3 In the Collier Concise Statement, the document entitled "Collier v. Balzer, Property Damage Coverage," is 

attached as Exhibit 2. 

Mr. and Mrs. Collier owed Mr. Balzer $38,642.97 was correct. 

and 210) and Mr. Balzer requesting an additional $210,000. Therefore, my determination that 

abandoned the concept with Mr. and Mrs. Collier offering Mr. Balzer $30,000 (See T., pp. 146 

paid before his involvement, around the time of the $1,050,000 settlement both parties 

3. While there is evidence Mr. Balzer initially made a verbal offer to waive his fee on amounts 

amounts paid by the insurance carrier prior to his involvement." Collier Concise Statement, ir no. 

Coverage B. Finally, Mr. and Mrs. Collier assume Mr. Balzer is not "entitled to any fee for 

Coverage C. However, they fail to then give Mr. Balzer credit for the fees he earned under 

and Mrs. Collier agree Mr. Balzer's fees are determined using the limits of Coverage A and 

total of $52,122.28. Based on my April 11, 2014 Order granting partial summary judgment, Mr. 

ACTUALLY EARNED" column when addition of each number in that column does not yield a 

an incorrect assumption. They begin by utilizing the $52,122.28 total in the "BALZER 

Mr. and Mrs. Collier's argument that I made an error is premised on miscalculations and 

$38,642.97. 

(20% of6,580.04), 283.04 (20% of 1,415.18) and 1,543.28 (20% OF 7,716.42). The sum is 

20% of the portions of the amounts just subtracted that are attributed to Coverage B, 1,316.01 

1,543.28 from the $87,380 which reduces the amount to $35,500.64. From that amount, I add 

"BALZER ACTUALLY EARNED,"2,710.72, 7,453.16, 22,958.39, 8,957.21, 8,256.60 and 

two coverages. I then utilize the same document Mr. and Mrs. Collier reference, "Collier v. 

Balzer, Property Damage Coverage"? (Id.). I subtract each amount in the column entitled 

$179,900, which totals $436,900. Mr. Balzer's 20% fee results in him earing $87,380 on those 

amount owed Mr. Balzer is the limit for Coverage A, $257,000, and the limit for coverage C, 
Mr. and Mrs. Collier's final contention is that I made an error in the amount of their 

counsel fee award. See Collier Concise Statement, ,i no. 4. They complain that, even though 

Mr. Balzer submitted no response to the Affidavit of Bruce Gelman in Support of A ward of 

Counsel Fees, my verdict was for a lesser amount than requested. The trial court, however, has 

authority to consider "whether the fees claimed to have been incurred are reasonable, and to 

reduce the fees claimed if appropriate." McMullen v. Katz, 603 Pa. 602, 615, 985 A.2d 769, 777 

(2009). This authority does not vary because the opposing party neglects to respond to an 

attorney's fee affidavit. The attorney's skill, the amount of work performed and the character of 

the services rendered are among the factors a trial court examines to determine whether a counsel 

fee claim is reasonable. Id., citing In re Estate of LaRocca, 431 Pa. 542, 246 A.2d 337 at 339 

(1968). Counsel for the Colliers claimed fees and costs of$55,270.75. After a reasonableness 

examination, I awarded $48,860.75. I did so because attorney Gelman and his law clerk's time 

spent on enforcing the Confidential Settlement Agreement, sealing docket no. GD 13-21486 and 

opposing Defendant's Motion to Unseal was unnecessary. Mr. Gelman instead should have 

redacted the confidential information from the start. I also reduced the law clerk's rate from 

$85.00 to $50 per hour on the balance of his time because no information ever was provided 

concerning the law clerk's education, experience and other qualifications", Therefore, the 

amount of the counsel fee award was correct. 

The errors that Mr. Balzer alleges I made are addressed next. 

Mr. Balzer first contends that my decision to grant Mr. and Mrs. Collier's Motion for 

Partial Summary Judgment "violated the doctrine of coordinate jurisdiction" because another 

judge in this court "was deliberating the same issues .... " Balzer Statement of Matters on Appeal, 

,i no. 1. However, I was aware that a colleague had taken Mr. Balzer's Motion for Distribution 

4 I reduced Mr. Gelman's fee from $35,805 to $34,540 and the Jaw clerk's from $9,690 to $4,475. 

6 
7 

5 Mr. Balzer also argues Judge Friedman's order is contrary lo the law of"mutually concurrent conditions." Balzer 

Statement of Matters on Appeal, ii no. 2. Where performance of contractual duties is to be concurrent by both sides, 

neither party may recover without having tendered performance. See Weichardt v. Hook, 3 W.N.C. 488, 1877 WPL 

13201 (Pa. 1877). 1t is not apparent to me what contractual duty Mr. Balzer believes to be a mutually concurrent 

condition, but if it is seeking to reach an agreement on the amount of the settlement owed Mr. Balzer, Mr. and Mrs. 

Collier did so. · 

preclude him from recovering 20% of the portion of the $1,050,000 attributable to the bad faith 

Mr. Balzer next contends I made an error by interpreting the Public Adjuster Contract to 

erroneous. 5 

be a payee on settlement checks was fulfilled. Therefore, Judge Friedman's order was not 

was greater than the amount Mr. Balzer claimed he was owed, the purpose of having Mr. Balzer 

Collier from not paying Mr. Balzer for his services. Since the $310,000 remaining in escrow 

Mr. and Mrs. Collier and Mr. Balzer. The purpose of the provision is to prevent Mr. and Mrs. 

the parties. Instead, the contract simply requires that settlement payments be made payable to 

Matters on Appeal, ,r no. 2. There is no evidence of such a provision in the agreement between 

Adjuster Contract "required that all parties ... be paid, or no parties be paid." Balzer Statement of 

payment from the interest bearing escrow account to Mr. and Mrs. Collier because the Public 

Mr. Balzer next contends that Judge Friedman made an error by ordering the $448,000 

coordinate jurisdiction rule. 

violated. Therefore, my decision to grant partial summary judgment did not violate the 

other judge had not yet made a decision, the coordinate jurisdiction rule could not have been 

Yudacufski v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 499 Pa. 605, 454 A.2d 923 ( 1982). Since the 

should follow decisions on the same facts made previously by another judge in the district. See 

have violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule. That is because the rule is judges in a district 

on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. But even had I not received approval, I would not 

of Funds to Defendant under advisement and received approval from that colleague to rule first 
8 

Mr. Balzer also contends that neither public adjuster legislation nor the rule prohibiting 

unauthorized practice of law prevents him from receiving 20% of the bad faith claim. Balzer 

Statement of Matters on Appeal, ,i nos. 4, 6 and 7. Mr. Balzer argues that 63 P.S. 1605(c)'s 

specific prohibition of public adjuster actions in relation to claims for personal injury or 

automobile property damage means they are not prohibited from acting in bad faith or other 

unspecified claims. Id. While the legislation does not explicitly bar payment to Mr. Balzer from 

the bad faith claim, the prohibition of the unauthorized practice of law set forth in 42 P.S. §2524 

does bar such payment. In Dauphin County Bar Association v. Mazzacaro, 465, Pa. 545, 351 

not erroneous. 

claim. See Balzer Statement of Matters on Appeal, ,i no. 3. In taking this position, he focuses on 

this language in the Public Adjuster Contract," ... Adjuster will receive a fee equal to 20% of all 

settlement proceeds ... ," and argues other language in the Contract unsupportive of this position 

is inapplicable. Id. However, a description in the Contract of what Mr. Balzer was hired to do, to 

assist in negotiation of claims with the insurance carrier "for sustained damages/losses," is 

clearly applicable ( emphasis added). This description of damages in the past tense at the very 

least creates an ambiguity as to whether Mr. Balzer was hired for assistance with a future claim 

arising from the insurance carrier's bad faith. The first sentence in the Contract, authorizing Mr. 

Balzer to negotiate claims resulting from "damages sustained to the Insured/Claimant's 

property," also is relevant ( emphasis added). The portion of the $1,050,000 that is compensation 

for the insurer's bad faith certainly is not the damage to Mr. and Mrs. Collier's property for 

which Mr. Balzer's involvement is authorized. Going outside the Contract, Mr. Balzer testified 

he did not tell Mr. and Mrs. Collier he would "take 20 percent of their bad faith money." T., pp. 

39-40. This additional evidence strongly supports my interpretation of the Contract, which was 
9 

6 To the extent Mr. Balzer may argue he should be paid from the bad faith claim for his expert assistance in those 

proceedings, the contingency of his fee invalidates his argument. See Belfonte v. Miller, 212 Pa. Super. 508, 243 

A.2d 150 ( 1968). 

Concerning the question presented for declaratory judgment, each of the six counts in the 

findings were sufficient as they were what I believed necessary to support the verdict. 

fact .... "), the argument that those I filed are insufficient is meritless. In any event, my factual 

not to file findings of fact ("trial judge may include as part of the decision specific findings of 

no. 4. Since Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure No. 1038(h) gives the trial judge discretion 

question presented for the declaratory judgment. See Balzer Statement of Matters on Appeal, 1 

Mr. Balzer also contends I made insufficient factual findings and did not answer the 

would be required for Mr. and Mrs. Collier's bad faith claim, Mr. Balzer's involvement similarly 

would be the unauthorized practice oflaw.6 

Id., 465, Pa. 545, 554, 351 A.2d 229, 233-234 (footnote omitted). Since legal judgments also 

While the objective valuation of damages may in uncomplicated cases be 

accomplished by a skilled lay judgment, an assessment of the extent to which that 

valuation should be compromised in settlement negotiations cannot. Even when 

liability is not technically 'contested', an assessment of the likelihood that liability 

can be established in a court of law is a crucial factor in weighing the strength of 

one's bargaining position. A negotiator cannot possibly know how large a 

settlement he can exact unless he can probe the degree of unwillingness of the 

other side to go to court. Such an assessment, however, involves an 

understanding of the applicable tort principles (including the elements of 

negligence and contributory negligence), a grasp of the rules of evidence, and an 

ability to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the client's case vis a vis that 

of the adversary. The acquisition of such knowledge is not within the ability of 

lay persons, but rather involves the application of abstract legal principles to the 

concrete facts of the given claim. As a consequence, it is inescapable that lay 

adjusters who undertake to negotiate settlements of the claims of third-party 

claimants must exercise legal judgments in so doing. 

crosses the boundary into the unauthorized practice oflaw as follows: 

unauthorized practice of law, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained when a public adjuster 

A.2d 229 (Pa. 1976), in affirming an injunction against a public adjuster engaged in the 
10 

the winner, including "situations where a party receives less relief than sought or even nominal 

Since the Contract does not define "prevailing party," it means the party the fact finder declared 

In the event of any action or proceeding relating to the interpretation or 

enforcement of this agreement or any breach hereof, the prevailing party in such 

action or proceeding shall be entitled to recover from the other party all court 

costs, expenses and reasonable attorneys' fees (including all pre-trial, trial and 

appellate proceedings) incurred by the prevailing party in that action or 

proceeding, in addition to any other relief to which the prevailing party may be 

entitled. 

of Matters on Appeal, ,r no. I 0. The Public Adjuster Contract states: 

Mr. and Mrs. Collier lost the battle to limit Mr. Balzer's claim to $2,500. See Balzer Statement 

fees was erroneous because Mr. Balzer won the majority of the legal issues and decisions and 

Mr. Balzer's final contention is that my decision to award Mr. and Mrs. Collier counsel 

Collier and Mr. Gelman to be credible witnesses who did not defraud Mr. Balzer. 

difficult for me to formulate any further response except to say that I generally found Mrs. 

limited importance. Without Mr. Balzer specifying how they allegedly defrauded him, it is 

fraud (or anything else) and Mr. Gelman is not a party, whether they defrauded Mr. Balzer is of 

Statement of Matters on Appeal, ,r no. 9. However, since Mr. Balzer made no counterclaim for 

Mr. Balzer next contends "Plaintiffs and counsel for Plaintiffs defrauded" him. Balzer 

settlement proceeds" is ambiguous. Therefore, parole evidence was correctly admitted. 

only a few general terms. As explained above, the provision giving Mr. Balzer "20% of all 

Appeal, ,r no. 8. However, the Public Adjuster Contract lacks an integration clause and contains 

parole evidence therefore should have been prohibited. See Balzer Statement of Matters on 

Mr. Balzer next contends the Public Adjuster Contract is "fully integrated" and that 

Verdict. 

amended complaint were addressed in the January 8, 2015 Declaratory Judgment, Findings and 
11 

+: _li_t-,--+-l-~l_l~_, ! c_j___ ···" ,J. 

ll ( 

BY THE COURT: 

my decision to award Mr. and Mrs. Collier counsel fees was correct. 

was entitled to 20% of the bad faith claim recovery, they were the prevailing party. Therefore, 

declared Mr. and Mrs. Collier the winner of the primary matter in dispute, whether Mr. Balzer 

party. Instead, the analysis simply is to determine the party I declared the winner. Since I 

that is not the appropriate way to determine whether Mr. and Mrs. Collier were the prevailing 

disagree with Mr. Balzer's conclusion that he won the majority of the legal issues and decisions, 

relief .... " Profit Wize Marketing v. Wiest, 2002 PA Super 380, 812 A.2d 1270, 1275. While I 

I '