[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-10260

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RENZO WILLIAM ALEGRE, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 0:21-cr-60041-RKA-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10260

Before LUCK, LAGOA, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Renzo Alegre appeals his sentence of forty-eight months’ 

imprisonment and twenty years’ supervised release for possession 

of child pornography. He argues that his sentence is procedurally 

unreasonable because the district court failed to properly consider 

the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, selected the sentence based on 

clearly erroneous facts, and failed to explain why it chose a 

twenty‐year term of supervised release. He also argues that his 

sentence is substantively unreasonable because the court failed to 

afford consideration to relevant § 3553(a) factors due significant 

weight, improperly weighed its unfounded opinion on recidivism, 

and applied unreasonable supervised release conditions. Finally, 

he argues that his supervised release computer restriction is unconstitutional because it burdens substantially more speech than is 

necessary. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.

I. 

In July 2020, law enforcement officers working in an undercover capacity identified a computer on BitTorrent that was associated with a torrent file believed to contain files depicting the sexual exploitation of children. This investigation led to officers executing a search warrant at Alegre’s residence, where the officers 

seized Alegre’s desktop computer and cell phone after preliminary 

forensic examinations showed they contained more than 100 and 

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200 child pornography videos, respectively. Alegre waived his Miranda rights and agreed to speak with law enforcement, to which 

he admitted that he was using the seized desktop computer to receive and download child pornography for the previous year. Alegre, who was nineteen years old at the time, was subsequently arrested, and a federal grand jury indicted Alegre on one count of 

possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2). 

Alegre, without a plea agreement, pled guilty to the indictment. At the change of plea hearing, the district court denied a 

motion Alegre filed to modify a bond condition that precluded him 

from maintaining an email account. In doing so, the court stated 

that “the statistical evidence that [it had] reviewed” showed “that 

child pornography offenders recidivate at a higher rate than the 

general criminal population” and that, in its own experience, it had 

seen many child-pornography offenders reoffend while on release. 

 A probation officer prepared a Presentencing Investigation 

Report (“PSI”) and calculated Alegre’s guidelines sentence range 

based on the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The PSI set a 

base offense level of 18 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(a)(1). Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(2), the PSI applied a two-level increase 

because the material Alegre possessed involved a prepubescent minor. The PSI applied a two-level increase for Alegre knowingly engaging in distribution pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F). The 

PSI also applied a four-level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. 

§ 2G2.2(b)(4) because the offense involved material portraying 

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“sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions of violence” or 

“sexual abuse or exploitation of an infant or toddler.” The PSI applied a two-level increase because the offense involved the use of a 

computer pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(6). And because the offense involved 600 or more images, the PSI increased the offense 

level by 5 under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(7)(D). The PSI decreased the 

offense level by 2 under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) because Alegre demonstrated acceptable of responsibility, and by an additional level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b) because he timely notified authorities 

of his intent to plead guilty. Overall, the resulting total adjusted 

offense level was 30. 

The PSI assigned Alegre a criminal history category of I because he had zero criminal history points. The PSI calculated the 

imprisonment range for Alegre as 97 to 121 months, with a supervised release range of 5 years to life. As a special condition of supervised release, the PSI recommended that Alegre should not possess or use a computer except for authorized employment. And, in 

an addendum to the PSI, the probation office noted that the offense 

conduct “involved material that portrayed sadistic or masochistic 

conduct, as well as toddlers.” 

Alegre filed a motion for a downward variance, requesting a 

sentence of five years of probation with a special condition of one 

year of home detention “and all the recommended conditions of 

supervision contained in the [PSI].” Alegre noted that the United 

States Sentencing Commission had recommended that § 2G2.2 be 

revised to eliminate outdated enhancements. He also noted that 

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the Commission’s 2021 Child Pornography Report found that the 

overall recidivism rate for non-production possession of child pornography was 27.6 percent. In support of a downward variance, 

Alegre presented four cases from the Southern District of Florida 

where the district courts sentenced the defendants to terms of imprisonment significantly below their advisory guideline ranges. He 

then argued that the facts of his case were virtually identical to 

those cases and his personal history and characteristics justified a 

downward variance. And, in requesting a non-incarceration sentence, Alegre argued that the PSI’s recommended conditions of supervised release, including the computer restrictions, promoted respect for the law and provided just punishment for the offense. 

Alegre attached various documents in support of his motion, e.g., 

a speech impediment evaluation report, school transcripts, a psychological examination conducted by Dr. Michael Brannon, character letters, and a polygraph examination.

Alegre also objected to the two-level § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) enhancement. The government acknowledged it would not seek that 

enhancement because it would be unable to meet its burden of 

proof at sentencing. 

In response to the downward variance request, the government agreed that a downward variance was appropriate given Alegre’s documented mitigating circumstances but argued that a sentence that did not include imprisonment would not align with the 

§ 3553(a) sentencing factors. The government noted: that possession of child pornography was not a victimless crime; that Alegre 

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had made concerning statements to the police regarding being “addicted” to child pornography; that, despite telling Dr. Brannon he 

was not sexually attracted to prepubescent children, Alegre’s collection of pornography gave rise to almost every sentencing enhancement that applied to the charge; that Dr. Brannon found Alegre’s “judgment, problem-solving skills, and insight were good,” 

suggesting he was aware of and understood his actions; and Alegre 

was knowledgeable about computers and software, given he was 

enrolled in college to pursue a degree in software engineering. Accordingly, the government requested a 48-month sentence of imprisonment followed by a “lengthy” term of supervised release. 

At sentencing, Alegre called Dr. Brannon, who testified as 

follows. Alegre scored a 2 out of 7 on the Child Pornography Offender Risk Tool (“C-PORT”) because he had two recidivism-risk 

factors: his age—offenders under 35 reoffend at a much higher 

rate—and his hebephiliac interest—arousal by material depicting 

prepubescent children. Offenders with any type of sexual offense 

(either child pornography or a touch offense) with any two recidivism risk factors reoffend within the next five years at a rate of 

about ten percent. There are no research studies showing that the 

number of images or videos, the content of those videos, or the age 

of the children increase the risk that an individual will reoffend. 

The C-PORT does not account for individuals who say they are 

addicted to child pornography, and Alegre’s belief that he was unable to stop made him more of a risk for reoffending. However, 

Alegre was in treatment and was candid and forthright about his 

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presentation, which has a modest effect on reducing reoffending. 

But the younger an offender is, the more likely they are to reoffend. 

In response to the district court’s questioning, Dr. Brannon 

stated that the recidivism rates only account for those who are 

caught reoffending, and child pornography offenders are less likely 

to be caught because the offense is less likely to be detected than 

most other crimes. In response to the district court’s question of 

whether extreme content would make a difference in whether a 

person is likely to commit antisocial crimes in the future, Dr. Brannon stated that “anyone who reaches to the extremes of behavior 

like sexual interactions with an infant we can expect to have more 

antisocial type of traits” and the “more you have extremes from the 

norm, the more concerned you become.” But he stated there is no 

research showing that the age of the victim predicts any type of 

increase in reoffending, especially committing contact offenses. 

 Before determining Alegre’s sentence, the district court 

stated it reviewed the PSI and its addenda, Dr. Brannon’s report 

and testimony, Alegre’s motion for a downward variance and his 

objections to the PSI, the government’s response to Alegre’s motion and objections, a letter on Alegre’s treatment progress, and 

letters from his friends and family. The court sustained Alegre’s 

objection to the two-level enhancement for distribution, resulting 

in an advisory guideline range of 78 to 97 months’ imprisonment. 

Neither party objected further to the sentencing calculation. 

The government recommended 48 months of incarceration, 

as a sentence of only probation and treatment would be wholly 

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insufficient. The government argued that imprisonment was necessary to deter others, particularly for a defendant who had admitted to being addicted and unable to stop. Alegre responded that his 

statement to the police, “I think it is too late,” should not be interpreted as an admission he was unable to stop but, instead, as a reference to the fact he was caught. He also argued that he was unlikely to reoffend because he had not violated his bond conditions 

and because he would continue to be supervised during his period 

of supervised release. He also argued that the Guidelines were too 

stringent given his personal history and that Congress intended for 

some non-incarcerative sentences for possession of child pornography, given that there was no statutory minimum. 

 After statements from several of Alegre’s family members, 

Alegre spoke to the court. He stated that he “made bad decisions 

because of [his] lack of maturity and curiosity at 19 years old,” but 

did not know that he was doing something illegal. He also stated 

that he was sorry and ashamed and promised to never do it again. 

The district court then stated it had considered all the parties’ statements and the § 3553(a) factors. First, it stated that it had 

considered the nature and severity of the offense and that the offense was extremely serious because of the continuous effect child 

pornography has on its victims and because Alegre had 244 videos 

and 4,000 photos, “the vast majority of which involved . . . bestiality 

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or sadomasochism or infants and penetration.”1 The district court 

disagreed that Alegre did not deserve a prison sentence because it 

was his first offense and argued that, even with prison time, he 

would still have a second chance to finish college.

Second, the district court considered Alegre’s history and individual characteristics. The district court found that his youthful 

age supported an upward variance because Dr. Brannon testified 

that younger offenders are more likely to reoffend. The court also 

found that Alegre’s “too late” statement, in context, implied that 

he could not stop his addiction. The district court noted that Alegre’s lack of criminal history was already factored into the guideline 

range and was not “driving the penalties” that he was facing, and 

so, it did not support a downward variance. And the district court 

found that varying downward based on his lack of criminal history 

would create unwarranted sentencing disparities with similarly situated defendants. The district court found Alegre’s compliance 

with bond conditions was an important factor that would “vary 

down” but explained it was not “an independent reason to vary 

down significantly in this case.” The district court stated that “the 

lower recidivism rate that the Guidelines and the C-PORT score 

ascribe to defendants like Mr. Alegre” is a “manifestation of the fact 

that this crime is committed alone” and unlikely to be brought to 

the attention of law enforcement. As to the cases Alegre presented 

1 Although the PSI did not mention bestiality or infants, Alegre did not object 

to this characterization during sentencing nor on appeal.

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as a comparison with his, the court stated that it would consider 

them for what they were “worth in that regard.” The district court 

stated that his family members’ letters did not justify a downward 

variance and that the effort Alegre put into his treatment would 

vary the sentence downward “slightly.” 

Third, the district court addressed the need to provide specific deterrence and to protect the community from further crimes 

of the defendant. The district court stated that it had concerns 

about recidivism rates for sex offenders as young as Alegre, his addiction, and his amassing of a huge collection of extremely disturbing material made it unsure that a non-incarcerative sentence, or 

even a below-range sentence, would protect the public. 

The fourth and fifth factors that the district court considered 

were the need to provide general deterrence and the need to impose a sentence that provided just punishment and promoted respect for the law. Sixth, the district court considered the need to 

avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, noting that “a non-incarcerative sentence especially would create unwarranted sentencing 

disparities” but that it was “not inclined’ to impose a sentence of 

imprisonment higher than the sentence the government sought, 

even though the court found the appropriate sentence in this case 

was “probably 78 months.” 

As to Alegre’s argument related to the Commission’s comments on the current Guidelines, the district court noted that most 

federal judges continue to adhere to the Guidelines architecture, 

including the enhancements applied to Alegre and that it was not

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clear if the Commission would ultimately decide the enhancements were inappropriate. And the court explained that the number of images and videos was an excellent predictor of whether Alegre would reoffend “when it comes to looking, if not touching,” 

and that the “kinds of videos . . . demonstrate[d] a radical departure 

from societal norms that, again, [was] a good predictor of future 

conduct even if not for touching and only for looking.” 

The district court then imposed a sentence of 48 months’ 

imprisonment to be followed by 20 years of supervised release, including the computer restriction recommended in the PSI. As to 

the computer restrictions, the sentence provided that Alegre could 

“not possess or use any computer; except that the defendant may, 

with the prior approval of the Court, use a computer in connection 

with authorized employment.” Neither party made any further 

objections. This appeal ensued.

II. 

We “review all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or 

significantly outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential 

abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 

41 (2007). But if a party does not raise a procedural sentencing argument before the district court, we review only for plain error. 

United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1222 (11th Cir. 2010). Under plain error review, we may exercise our discretion to correct 

an error when the defendant demonstrates: (1) an error occurred; 

(2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious; and (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights. Rosales-Mireles v. United 

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States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1904–05 (2018). To satisfy the third condition, a defendant ordinarily must “‘show a reasonable probability 

that, but for the error,’ the outcome of the proceeding would have 

been different.” Id. (quoting Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 

U.S. 189, 194 (2016)). If those three conditions are met, we will

correct the error if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 1905.

In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we first consider whether the district court committed a procedural error, such 

as failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence 

based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain 

the sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The district court must “make 

an individualized assessment based on the facts presented.” Id. at 

50. It may base its factual findings on, among other things, facts 

admitted in the defendant’s guilty plea, undisputed statements in 

the presentence investigation report, or evidence presented at the 

sentencing hearing. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A); see United States 

v. Martinez, 584 F.3d 1022, 1027 (11th Cir. 2009).

If the sentence is of the kind and within the range recommended by the Guidelines, and that range exceeds 24 months, the 

district court must state in open court the reasons for imposing that 

sentence at a particular point within the range. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(c)(1). When a defendant fails to properly object to a district 

court’s failure to comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1), we still review 

that challenge de novo. United States v. Bonilla, 463 F.3d 1176, 

1181 (11th Cir. 2006).

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Pursuant to § 3553(a), the district court must impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to reflect 

the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide 

just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, protect the public, 

and provide the defendant with any needed correctional treatment 

or training. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The district court must also 

consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history 

and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the kinds of sentence and sentencing range established by the 

applicable Sentencing Guidelines provision, any pertinent policy 

statement issued by the Sentencing Commission, and the need to 

avoid sentencing disparities between similarly situated defendants. 

Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)–(7).

The district court also must “set forth enough to satisfy the 

appellate court that [it] has considered the parties’ arguments and 

has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking 

authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). However, it need not state on the record that it has explicitly considered 

each of the § 3553(a) factors or to discuss each factor. United States 

v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013). Instead, an acknowledgment by the district court that it considered the § 3553(a) 

factors is sufficient. United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1281 

(11th Cir. 2007).

A defendant’s argument that he should be granted a downward variance based on a challenge to the Guidelines themselves is 

a “non-starter.” United States v. Carpenter, 803 F.3d 1224, 1235 

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(11th Cir. 2015). Although Sentencing Commission reports have 

concluded that the current Sentencing Guidelines for possession of 

child pornography warrant revision, they do not “render the nonproduction child pornography guidelines in § 2G2.2 invalid or illegitimate.” United States v. Cubero, 754 F.3d 888, 898, 900 (11th 

Cir. 2014). Those reports also do “not alter the district court’s duties to calculate the advisory guidelines range” nor “require the district court to vary from the . . . guidelines range.” Id. at 900.

Here, Alegre has failed to show that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable. Because Alegre did not object to the sentencing procedure below, we review for plain error. See McNair, 

605 F.3d at 1222. And the district court did not plainly err in considering the § 3353(a) factors because it conducted an individualized assessment and walked through a detailed and exhaustive explanation of each factor. Nor do we find any error in the district 

court’s consideration of Alegre’s lack of criminal history or of sentencing disparities.

Additionally, Alegre has not shown plain error in the district 

court’s fact-finding, as the findings of fact he challenges on appeal 

are supported by the record. Further, the district court’s thorough 

discussion of the § 3353(a) factors was more than sufficient to explain the term of supervised release. Accordingly, we affirm as to 

this issue.

III.

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We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 

The district court abuses its discretion if it “(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight; 

(2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or 

(3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) 

(quoting United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121, 1174 (11th Cir. 

2006) (en banc)). We will vacate a sentence “if, but only if, ‘we are

left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court 

committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.’” Id. at 1190 (quoting United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008)).

A district court’s careful consideration of the § 3553(a) factors is not unreasonable simply because the defendant disagrees 

with the court’s assessment of those factors. United States v. Valnor, 451 F.3d 744, 752 (11th Cir. 2006). We do not apply a presumption of reasonableness to sentences within the guideline 

range, but we ordinarily expect such a sentence to be reasonable. 

United States v. Stanley, 739 F.3d 633, 656 (11th Cir. 2014). A sentence imposed well below the statutory maximum is an indicator 

of a reasonable sentence. Id.

Alegre has failed to show that his sentence is substantively 

unreasonable. Although the district court was not swayed by all of 

Alegre’s mitigating arguments, it thoroughly considered them,

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along with the § 3553(a) factors. Additionally, the court’s consideration of Alegre’s recidivism risk was not improper because it was 

supported by Dr. Brannon’s testimony. Further, the twenty-year 

term of supervised release was well below the lifetime statutory 

maximum, especially considering Alegre’s young age, and thus indicates the term’s reasonableness. See Stanley, 739 F.3d at 656. We 

therefore affirm as to this issue.

IV.

We ordinarily review questions of constitutional law de 

novo. United States v. Whatley, 719 F.3d 1206, 1213 (11th Cir. 

2013). However, objections or arguments that are not raised at the 

district court are reviewed for plain error. United States v. Peters, 

403 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2005) (reviewing a challenge to the 

constitutionality of a statute of conviction for plain error). But we

will not review an argument, even for plain error, when the party 

invited the error that he complains of on appeal. See Carpenter, 

803 F.3d at 1236–37 (holding that invited error precluded review of 

a defendant’s challenge to a lifetime of supervised release because 

he affirmatively argued in favor of it in the district court proceedings).

“A district court does not commit plain error by imposing a 

computer restriction as a special condition of supervised release, 

even if the term of supervised release is life.” United States v. 

Bobal, 981 F.3d 971, 976 (11th Cir. 2020) (concluding that the condition of supervised release that prohibited the defendant from using a computer except for work and with prior permission of the 

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district court was not plainly unconstitutional), cert. denied, 141 S. 

Ct. 2742 (2021).

Here, Alegre invited the district court’s ruling when he affirmatively requested and argued for his computer restriction in requesting a sentence of non-imprisonment. But even reviewing for 

plain error, his claim fails, as it is precluded by our decision in 

Bobal. Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.

V.

For all these reasons, we affirm the district court’s sentence.

AFFIRMED. 

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