NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

RANDY LEIGH HASTINGS, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 18-0385 PRPC

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

Nos. CR2009-005473-001

CR2011-149772-001

CR2012-008366-001

The Honorable David B. Gass, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix

By Diane M. Meloche

Counsel for Respondent

Randy Leigh Hastings, Tucson

Petitioner

FILED 11-8-2018
STATE v. HASTINGS

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Jon W. Thompson joined.

W I N T H R O P, Judge:

¶1 Randy Leigh Hastings petitions this court for review of the 

dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Arizona 

Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 32. We have considered the petition for 

review and, for the reasons stated, grant review but deny relief.

¶2 In Maricopa County Superior Court Case Number (“Case No.”) 

CR2009-005473-001 (“the 2009 case”), Hastings pled guilty to possession or 

use of dangerous drugs, and the superior court placed him on probation for 

three years. While on probation, Hastings pled guilty to possession of 

dangerous drugs for sale in Case No. CR2011-149772-001 (“the 2011 case”). 

Based on the guilty plea in the 2011 case, the court revoked Hastings’ 

probation. Approximately three months after his guilty plea in the 2011 case, 

Hastings pled guilty to another count of possession of dangerous drugs for 

sale in Case No. CR2012-008366-001 (“the 2012 case”). Consolidating the three 

matters for purposes of sentencing, the superior court imposed concurrent 

prison sentences, the longest being ten years flat time.

¶3 More than five years after sentencing, Hastings filed a “Motion

To Correct Error And To Clarify Record Pursuant To Rule--24.4, Ariz. R. Crim. 

Proc.” (“the Motion”), challenging a calculation by the Department of 

Corrections (“DOC”) regarding the community supervision term to be served 

upon Hastings’ release. Hastings argued that, because the sentencing minute 

entries only indicated a term of community supervision after the 2.5-year 

sentence in the 2009 case, DOC had improperly calculated a term of 

community supervision based on the ten-year sentence imposed in the 2012 

case. For relief, Hastings requested the court issue a nunc pro tunc order 

specifying Hastings’ community supervision term be determined solely on the 

sentence in the 2009 case.

¶4 After the superior court failed to rule on the Motion within sixty

days, Hastings sought special action relief in this court. We accepted 

jurisdiction but declined Hastings’ request to rule upon the merits of his 

Motion. Instead, we noted the Arizona Constitution requires the superior 

court to rule on matters submitted for decision within sixty days, see Ariz. 
STATE v. HASTINGS

Decision of the Court

3

Const. art. 6, § 21; Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 91(e), and we directed the court to rule on 

Hastings’ Motion.

¶5 Two days after this court’s order, the superior court addressed 

the Motion and treated it as a request for post-conviction relief under Rule 32. 

See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.3(a). In denying relief, the court recognized the plea 

agreements in all three cases include a stipulation that Hastings will “serve a 

term of community supervision equal to one-seventh of the prison term to be 

served consecutively to the actual period of imprisonment.” The court also 

determined community supervision following a prison sentence is mandatory

under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 13-603(I). See State v. 

Jenkins, 193 Ariz. 115, 119, ¶ 11 (App. 1998) (“The plain language of A.R.S. 

section 13-603(I), read in conjunction with the related statutes, indicates the 

Legislature’s intent to require a term of community supervision for all 

prisoners, whether or not they are eligible for early release.”). Finally, 

although the court agreed with Hastings that the sentencing minute entries in 

the 2011 and 2012 cases did not contain terms of community supervision, the 

court observed that it did impose such terms verbally at the sentencing 

hearing. Concluding that the absence of community supervision terms in the 

sentencing orders resulted from a clerical mistake, the court amended the 

applicable minute entries nunc pro tunc to reflect community supervision is 

imposed in the 2011 and 2012 cases pursuant to § 13-603(I). This timely 

petition for review followed.

¶6 On review, Hastings argues the superior court lacked 

jurisdiction to amend the minute entry rulings nunc pro tunc. Also, relying on 

State v. Dawson, 164 Ariz. 278 (1990), Hastings argues the State’s failure to 

respond to his Motion “waived the opportunity to amend sentence.”1 We are 

unpersuaded by either argument.

¶7 Hastings presumes the superior court’s nunc pro tunc order 

modifies his sentence. It does not. Rather, by amending the minute entry 

rulings, the court corrected the record. See State v. Hanson, 138 Ariz. 296, 305 

(App. 1983). “The judgment of conviction and sentencing on the judgment are 

complete and valid at the time the court orally pronounces them in open 

 

1 Misapprehending the special action relief this court granted, Hastings 

also incorrectly asserts this court ordered the superior court to grant his 

Motion.
STATE v. HASTINGS

Decision of the Court

4

court.”2 Ariz. R. Crim. P. 26.16; see also Hanson, 138 Ariz. at 304-05 (“Where 

there is a discrepancy between the oral sentence and the written judgment, the 

oral pronouncement of sentence controls.”). And the court clearly had 

authority to ensure the sentencing minute entries correctly reflected the 

court’s pronouncement of sentence. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.4 (“The court on 

its own or on a party’s motion may, at any time, correct clerical errors, 

omissions, and oversights in the record. The court must notify the parties of 

any correction.”); see also Black v. Indus. Comm’n, 83 Ariz. 121, 125 (1957) (“We 

have consistently held that the function of an order or judgment nunc pro tunc 

is to make the record speak the truth and that such power is inherent in the 

court. . . . It is to record now for then an order actually made or a judgment 

actually rendered which through some oversight or inadvertence was never 

entered upon the records of the court by the clerk or which was incorrectly 

entered.” (citations omitted)), overruled on other grounds by Estate of Hash v. 

Henderson, 109 Ariz. 174, 177, modified on other grounds, 109 Ariz. 258 (1973).

¶8 Regarding the State’s purported “waiver,” Hastings’ reliance on 

Dawson is misplaced. Dawson addressed whether this court, when the State 

does not appeal from the sentence, has the authority to modify an illegally 

lenient sentence imposed after a jury trial. 164 Ariz. at 279-80. Here, not only 

did Hastings agree to community supervision in all three cases, but his 

sentence—as verbally pronounced by the court—is lawful. In any event, 

regardless of the State’s ostensible waiver, the superior court had the authority 

under Rule 24.4 to sua sponte correct the record to properly reflect Hastings’ 

terms of community supervision.

¶9 To the extent Hastings challenges the superior court’s findings 

and legal conclusions, the court’s dismissal order clearly identified and 

correctly ruled upon the merits. Further, the court did so in a thorough, wellreasoned manner that will allow any future court to understand the court’s 

rulings. Under these circumstances, no useful purpose would be served by 

this court rehashing the superior court’s correct ruling in a written decision. 

State v. Whipple, 177 Ariz. 272, 274 (App. 1993). Therefore, we adopt the 

superior court’s reasoning.

 

2 We presume the court’s finding that it verbally imposed terms of 

community supervision is supported by the sentencing transcript, which is

not included in the record on review. See State v. Zuck, 134 Ariz. 509, 513 (1982) 

(“Where matters are not included in the record on appeal, the missing portions 

of the record will be presumed to support the action of the trial court.”

(citation omitted)).
STATE v. HASTINGS

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¶10 For the foregoing reasons, we grant review but deny relief.