1

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A13-1820

Court of Appeals Gildea, C.J.

Dissenting, Page, J.

In the Matter of the Welfare of the 

Child of: R.D.L. and J.W., Parents.

Filed: September 10, 2014

Office of Appellate Courts

________________________

William Ward, Chief Hennepin County Public Defender, James A. Kamin, Assistant 

Public Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant. 

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Cory A. Carlson, Assistant County 

Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent. 

Bruce Jones, Lariss Jude, Faegre Baker Daniels LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Shirley Reider, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for Guardian Ad Litem.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S

1. Because the right to parent is a fundamental right, statutes that infringe on 

this fundamental right are subject to strict scrutiny under the equal protection provisions 

of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions.

2. Assuming, without deciding, that a strict scrutiny analysis applies and that 

within that analysis a claimant must show at the threshold that he or she is “similarly 

situated” to challenge a statute on equal protection grounds, parents facing a subsequent 
2

petition to terminate their parental rights, whether those rights were terminated 

voluntarily or involuntarily, are similarly situated.

3. The rebuttable statutory presumption of parental unfitness found in Minn. 

Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2012), is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 

government interest, and therefore does not violate the equal protection provisions of the 

United States and Minnesota Constitutions.

Affirmed.

O P I N I O N

GILDEA, Chief Justice. 

The question presented in this case is whether Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, 

subd. 1(b)(4) (2012), which provides that parents who previously have had their parental 

rights to children involuntarily terminated are presumed to be palpably unfit to parent 

other children, violates the equal protection provisions of the United States and 

Minnesota Constitutions. The juvenile court and the court of appeals found that the 

statute does not violate either constitutional provision. Because we conclude that the 

presumption is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest, we affirm.

On September 15, 2011, respondent Hennepin County Human Services and Public 

Health Department filed a Petition for Children in Need of Protection or Services 

(“CHIPS”) on behalf of four children of parents J.W. (father) and appellant R.D.L. 

(mother). The petition alleged, among other things, that the mother was engaging in 

prostitution out of a Brooklyn Center hotel in the children’s presence, that the father had 

physically abused the mother in front of their children, and that the mother used illegal 
3

drugs in front of the children. The juvenile court found that the children were in need of 

protection and services and issued an order placing them in foster care. 

Eight months later, on May 3, 2012, the County filed a petition to terminate the 

parents’ rights to the four children, alleging that the parents failed to comply with the 

case plans designed to reunite them with their children. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, 

subd. 1(b)(5) (2012) (a petition to terminate parental rights may allege, for a child in 

foster care, that “reasonable efforts . . . have failed to correct the conditions leading to” 

that placement); see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 1 (2012) (requiring an out-ofhome case plan for a child placed in foster care that provides for reunification). The case 

plans required that the parents follow recommendations made after chemical dependency, 

mental health, and parenting assessments; provide random urine tests to demonstrate 

sobriety; and obtain safe, stable, and suitable housing. The mother’s case plan required 

her to cut off contact with the father, and the father’s case plan required that he seek 

anger management treatment. The mother took advantage of some of the services the 

County offered, but ultimately did not complete any components of her case plan. The 

father also did not comply with the case plan, and he refused to accept any of the 

services. 

A few weeks after the County filed its petition to terminate the parents’ rights to 

the four children, the mother gave birth to a fifth child, who is the subject of this action. 

On July 27, 2012, less than a week before trial began on the County’s petition to 

terminate parental rights to the four older children, the County made an offer to the 

mother concerning her fifth child. The County proposed to agree “on the record” that if 
4

the mother would seek to voluntarily terminate her rights to the four older children, the 

County would not use that termination as a basis to seek termination of parental rights to 

her newborn child, “absent a separate reason for child protection involvement.” The 

mother rejected the County’s offer. 

After a two-day trial, the juvenile court terminated the parents’ rights to the four 

older children.

1

 Minnesota Statutes § 260C.301, subd. 1(b) (2012), provides that parental 

rights can be involuntary terminated if the court finds that at least one of nine conditions 

exist. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable efforts had 

failed to correct conditions leading to the children’s out-of-home placement, under Minn. 

Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5), and terminated the parents’ rights. The mother appealed, 

and the court of appeals affirmed the termination.2

 In re Welfare of Children of R.D.L., 

No. A12-1758, 2013 WL 869950 (Minn. App. Mar. 11, 2013), rev. denied (Minn. 

Apr. 16, 2013). 

Two days after the juvenile court’s decision, the County filed a CHIPS petition on 

behalf of the fifth child, the newborn. After the County located and placed the baby into 

 1 The father was found to be in default because he did not attend the hearing. In re 

Welfare of Children of R.D.L., Nos. 27-JV-11-8351, 27-JV-12-4240, Order at 2 (Henn. 

Cnty. Dist. Ct. filed Aug. 28, 2012).

2 The juvenile court also found that two other statutory grounds for termination 

existed: that the mother substantially, continuously and repeatedly neglected to comply 

with the duties imposed upon her by the parent-child relationship, under Minn. Stat. 

§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), and that the children were neglected and in foster care, under 

Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(8). But the court of appeals upheld only the finding 

under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5). In re Welfare of Children of R.D.L., 

No. A12-1758, 2013 WL 869950, at *2-3 (Minn. App. Mar. 11, 2013), rev. denied

(Minn. Apr. 16, 2013).
5

protective care, the County filed a petition to terminate the parents’ rights to the newborn, 

alleging that four of the statutory grounds for termination existed, including, as relevant 

here, that the mother was “palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child 

relationship.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4). A parent is presumed to be 

“palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child relationship” if “the parent’s parental 

rights to one or more other children were involuntarily terminated.” Id.3

At a subsequent hearing, the father offered some, “albeit scant,” evidence in an 

effort to overcome the presumption. The mother offered no evidence to rebut the 

presumption. Instead, she argued that the statutory presumption, Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, 

subd. 1(b)(4), is unconstitutional. The mother argued that the presumption of unfitness 

violates due process and equal protection under the United States and Minnesota 

Constitutions because the presumption applies only to parents whose parental rights are 

terminated involuntarily, and excludes those parents who voluntarily agree to terminate

their parental rights.

The juvenile court rejected the mother’s constitutional challenge and found that 

the father failed to overcome the presumption. The court found by clear and convincing 

evidence that both parents failed to overcome the presumption of unfitness and that it was 

in the child’s best interests to terminate their parental rights. The court of appeals 

 3 The original petition alleged these grounds against only the mother, noting that 

paternity “had not been established” for the child yet. Because the father’s paternity was 

established by the time of the hearing, the juvenile court then considered the allegations 

against both of the parents. 
6

affirmed. In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., No. A13-1820, 2014 WL 1272408, at *3 

(Minn. App. Mar. 31, 2014). 

The mother filed a petition for review with our court, arguing that the presumption 

of palpable unfitness found in Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4), violates the Equal 

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 

Article I, Section 2, of the Minnesota Constitution. We granted review.

4

 On July 15, 

2014, we issued an order affirming the court of appeals with this opinion to follow. 

I.

The question presented in this case is whether the statutory presumption in Minn. 

Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4), violates equal protection guarantees in the United States

and Minnesota Constitutions. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment guarantees that no state can “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 

equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The equal protection 

provision of the Minnesota Constitution guarantees that “[n]o member of this state shall 

be disfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen 

thereof, unless by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers.” Minn. Const. art. I, 

§ 2. Although the text of the provisions is different, claims made under them are 

analyzed using the same principles. Scott v. Minneapolis Police Relief Ass’n,

615 N.W.2d 66, 74 (Minn. 2000). Both guarantees begin with the mandate that all 

similarly situated individuals must be treated alike. Schuette v. City of Hutchinson, 

 4 The father is not a party to this appeal.
7

843 N.W.2d 233, 239 (Minn. 2014). Whether a statute violates the Constitution is a 

question that we review de novo.5

 Gretsch v. Vantium Capital, Inc., 846 N.W.2d 424, 

428 (Minn. 2014).

A.

The court of appeals determined that the mother could not make a successful equal 

protection claim because “parents who voluntarily terminate their parental rights are not 

situated similarly to those who have their rights terminated involuntarily.” In re Welfare 

of Child of R.D.L., No. A13-1820, 2014 WL 1272408, at *2 (Minn. App. Mar. 31, 2014) 

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court found that the two sets of 

parents are not similarly situated because a parent who has had parental rights 

involuntarily terminated has been “ ‘adjudicated as failing to adequately provide for the 

child’s health and safety,’ ” while a parent who has voluntarily terminated rights “ ‘has 

not been so adjudicated.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Child of P.T., 657 N.W.2d 577, 589 (Minn. 

App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 15, 2003)). The mother argues that the court of 

appeals erred because “[i]t is simply not correct to say that any articulable difference 

 5 The County contends that we do not need to address the constitutional question 

because relying on the presumption of unfitness in Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4), 

is unnecessary. Specifically, the County argues that we can and should affirm the 

termination of the mother’s parental rights without using the statutory presumption of 

unfitness due to “other substantial evidence” that the County contends is “sufficient” to 

support the juvenile court’s decision. The juvenile court, however, relied on the 

presumption to terminate the mother’s parental rights to the fifth child. Affirming the 

termination order without relying on the presumption would require us to go beyond the 

findings of the juvenile court and engage in our own fact-finding, a function that our 

court does not undertake. Dunn v. Nat’l Beverage Corp., 745 N.W.2d 549, 555 (Minn. 

2008) (“[A]ppellate courts may not ‘sit as factfinders,’ and are ‘not empowered to make 

or modify findings of fact.’ ” (citations omitted)). 
8

between the two groups renders them ‘not similarly situated’ for equal protection 

purposes.” Rather, she says, the differences between the two classes “must be relevant to 

the state interest being asserted.” The County and the Guardian Ad Litem (GAL), on the 

other hand, argue that the two groups of parents are not similarly situated, and therefore, 

the mother’s claim fails before it can even get over this “threshold” question. 

We have required that a party establish that he or she is similarly situated to 

persons who have been treated differently in order to support an equal protection claim. 

See, e.g., State v. Cox, 798 N.W.2d 517, 521 (Minn. 2011). We have explained that “the 

Equal Protection Clause does not require the state to treat things that are different in fact 

or opinion as though they were the same in law.” Id. (citations omitted) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). In order to determine whether two groups are similarly 

situated, we focus on whether the groups are alike in all relevant respects. Id. at 522. 

As discussed below, we subject the statutory presumption in Minn. Stat. 

§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4), to strict scrutiny, rather than rational basis, review. Supreme 

courts in two neighboring states have expressed concern about using the “similarly 

situated” threshold within the strict scrutiny framework. See Varnum v. Brien,

763 N.W.2d 862, 884 n.9 (Iowa 2009) (expressing reservations about “similarly situated” 

analysis as a threshold test); In re Mental Commitment of Mary F.-R., 839 N.W.2d 581, 

596 (Wis. 2013) (declining to apply a “similarly situated” threshold analysis).

In this case, the parties do not squarely present the question of whether the 

“similarly situated” threshold test should be applied when the statute at issue is subject to 

strict scrutiny review. Instead, the parties appear to assume that the mother must be 
9

similarly situated to the parents to whom she seeks to compare herself for purposes of the 

equal protection question, regardless of the level of scrutiny applied. We therefore have 

no occasion in this case to determine, as a matter of law, whether the “similarly situated” 

threshold is applied in strict scrutiny cases.

Nevertheless, if we assume, without deciding, that the “similarly situated” 

threshold applies, we disagree with the court of appeals’ analysis and conclude that 

parents who have lost parental rights previously, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, are 

similarly situated for the purposes of the equal protection claim before us. Minnesota 

Statutes § 260C.001, subd. 2 (2012), provides that “[t]he paramount consideration in all 

juvenile protection proceedings is the health, safety, and best interests of the child.” Id.,

subd. 2(a). The statute also declares that one purpose of juvenile protection proceedings

is “to provide judicial procedures that protect the welfare of the child.” Id., subd. 2(b)(2). 

Accordingly, when addressing whether the two groups are alike in all relevant respects, 

we must address whether they are similarly situated in a way that is relevant to protecting 

the welfare and best interests of the child. See Cox, 798 N.W.2d at 522. We conclude 

that the parents at issue here are similarly situated.

Minnesota Statutes § 260C.301 (2012), which addresses the termination of 

parental rights, undoubtedly classifies parents into two different groups. A parent can 

“voluntarily” terminate parental rights by giving written consent supported by “good 

cause.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(a). By contrast, a court can involuntarily 

terminate a parent’s rights if it finds clear and convincing evidence that at least one of 

nine statutory factors is present. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b). These factors 
10

include that the parent has abandoned the child, or that the parent has substantially, 

continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon 

him or her by the parent and child relationship. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, 

subd. 1(b)(1)-(2); see Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 39.05, subd. 2(a). 

Despite these differences, we conclude that the two groups of parents before us are 

similarly situated, at least with respect to the purposes of Minn. Stat. § 260C.301. When 

we focus on the best interests of the children, which is the “paramount consideration” 

under the statute, id., subd. 7, the two classes of parents are the same. This is true 

because in both circumstances, whether parental rights were terminated voluntarily or 

involuntarily, the juvenile court must have concluded that the best interests of the 

children required termination. See id.

B.

Concluding that the two sets of parents are similarly situated, we next consider 

what level of scrutiny the statute, Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4), must satisfy if it 

is to survive an equal protection challenge. We have held that statutory classifications 

are generally permissible as long as they rationally further some legitimate state purpose. 

See Kolton v. Cnty. of Anoka, 645 N.W.2d 403, 411 (Minn. 2002). If, however, a statute 

classifies based on a suspect class or impinges on fundamental rights, the classification 

must meet strict scrutiny, meaning that it must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 

government interest. See Greene v. Comm’r of Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs., 

755 N.W.2d 713, 725 (Minn. 2008).
11

The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized the fundamental nature of parental 

rights. In Santosky v. Kramer, the Supreme Court noted that the “fundamental liberty 

interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not 

evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary 

custody of their child to the State.” 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). We have similarly held 

that a parent’s right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or 

her children is a protected fundamental right. SooHoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815, 820 

(Minn. 2007).6

 Because the right to parent is a fundamental one, we will subject the 

statute at issue, Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4), to strict scrutiny. 

C.

Once a statute is subject to strict scrutiny, it is “not entitled to the usual 

presumption of validity.” San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 

(1973). Rather, the County must carry a “heavy burden of justification,” id. (citation 

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), to show that the classification is narrowly 

tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Greene, 755 N.W.2d at 725 (citation 

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. 

 6 Although these cases involve the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment, fundamental rights are protected by both the Due Process and Equal 

Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 

629, 638-39 (1883) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment “prohibits a State from 

depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or from 

denying to any person the equal protection of the laws,” and that the Amendment 

furnishes a guarantee to citizens “against any encroachment by the States upon the 

fundamental rights which belong to every citizen as a member of society” (citation 

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
12

Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (“[S]trict scrutiny of the classification . . . is 

essential . . . .”). 

In the due process context, we have held that the government has a compelling 

interest in its role as parens patriae in promoting relationships among those in recognized 

family units in order to protect the general welfare of children. SooHoo, 731 N.W.2d at 

822. The government also has a compelling interest in “identifying and protecting 

abused children,” R.S. v. State, 459 N.W.2d 680, 689 (Minn. 1990), and in “safeguarding

the physical and psychological well-being” of children, Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 

109 (1990) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The mother does not dispute that the government has a compelling interest in 

protecting children. But she argues that the government interest served by the 

presumption at issue here is not generally to protect children, but rather to “conserve 

litigation resources and spare the County the time and expense of an actual trial,” and she 

contends that such an interest is not compelling. We disagree. Proceedings involving 

endangered children are not expedited so that the government is able to conserve

government resources. These proceedings are expedited because a quick resolution is 

essential for the best interests of children who are in need of protection. See In re 

Welfare of J.R., 655 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2003) (“Each delay in the termination of a 

parent’s rights equates to a delay in a child’s opportunity to have a permanent 

home . . . .”); see also Chief Justice Kathleen Blatz, The State of the Judiciary 2001, 

58 Bench & B. of Minn. 27, 30 (Aug. 2001) (noting that children in the child protection 

system are not just battling the experience of abuse and neglect, but the experience “of 
13

being caught up in the cogs of a bureaucracy for years upon years, longing for a family 

who will love them and hating how long it takes to find one”). In fact, that resources are 

saved through operation of the statutory presumption in Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, 

subd. 1(b)(4), is merely a byproduct of the overarching objective of the child protection 

system—protecting the best interests of children by extricating them from dangerous 

situations quickly. See, e.g., In re Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 

1990) (“Advancing the child’s best interests is the state’s paramount goal even when 

circumstances require intervention.”). 

The statutory presumption directly serves the compelling government interest of 

protecting children because it facilitates the more expeditious resolution of cases 

involving children in need of protection. The principle that child protection cases are to 

receive priority and be resolved quickly is a thoroughly engrained policy that both the 

legislative and executive branches endorse and support. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.151, 

subd. 1 (2012) (“The court shall give docket priority to any child in need of protection or 

services . . . .”); Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (“In any proceeding under this section, 

the best interests of the child must be the paramount consideration . . . .”); Minn. R. Juv.

Prot. P. 1.02(f), (i) (noting that the purpose of the juvenile protection procedural rules is 

to provide a “just, thorough, speedy, and efficient” determination of each juvenile 

protection matter, and to “reduce unnecessary delays in court proceedings” (emphasis 

added)); Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 1.02 advisory comm. cmt. 1999 (amended 2014) (noting 

that the “overall objective” of Minnesota’s juvenile courts is to “move expeditiously

toward a resolution of the matter in such a way as to secure that which is in the best 
14

interests of the child while ensuring due process for all of the parties” (emphasis added)); 

see also Minn. Jud. Council Policy 601 (“It is the policy of the Judicial Branch that 

juvenile protection cases receive docket priority as required under Minn. Stat. 

§ 260C.151, subd. 1, and be expedited in conformance with state and federal 

requirements with the goal of serving the best interests of children.”); Chief Justice 

Kathleen Blatz, The State of the Judiciary 2001, 58 Bench & B. of Minn. 27, 30

(Aug. 2001) (noting that the purpose of the Children’s Justice Initiative is to ensure that 

“every Minnesota child, regardless of location, has the best possible chance for a safe and 

permanent home, at the earliest possible time” (emphasis added)). Under our law, 

children are not to be kept waiting, uncertain who will raise them or where they will grow 

up. See, e.g., In re Welfare of J.J.B., 390 N.W.2d 274, 279 (Minn. 1986) (“We have 

previously observed the importance of emotional and psychological stability to a child’s 

sense of security, happiness and adaptation, as well as . . . the fundamental significance of 

permanency to a child’s development.”). The statutory presumption in Minn. Stat. 

§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4), which provides a mechanism to shorten a termination trial in 

the narrow instance in which clear and convincing evidence supported a previous finding 

that a child’s best interests required termination, directly serves the compelling 

government interest of protecting these children. 

But, the mother argues, the statutory presumption cannot survive strict scrutiny 

because it is not narrowly tailored to serve the government’s compelling interest in 

protecting children. To survive strict scrutiny, a statute can be neither overinclusive nor 

underinclusive; rather, it must be “precisely tailored to serve the compelling state 
15

interest.” See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666 (1990), 

overruled on other grounds by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 

(2010). The Supreme Court has repeatedly sought to “dispel the notion that strict 

scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’ ” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 

515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (citation omitted). And the Court has held that narrow tailoring 

“does not require exhaustion of every conceivable . . . alternative,” nor does it require a 

“dramatic sacrifice” of the compelling interest at stake. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 

306, 339-40 (2003), superseded by constitutional amendment as recognized in Schuette v. 

Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).

The mother argues that the statutory presumption in Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, 

subd. 1(b)(4), does not meet the narrow tailoring requirement because it is underinclusive 

in that there are “demonstrably unfit” parents who voluntarily terminated their rights, but 

in a subsequent termination proceeding are not subject to the operation of a presumption 

of parental unfitness. She argues that the government’s compelling interest “is at least as 

compelling when a palpably unfit parent voluntarily terminates as when a palpably unfit 

parent chooses to litigate.” No matter how “abusive or neglectful a parent may have 

been,” she says, the parent avoids later application of the presumption by choosing to 

voluntarily terminate his or her parental rights. The mother’s argument is not convincing. 

To be sure, the presumption of unfitness in Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4),

does not apply to those parents who voluntarily seek to end their parent-child 

relationship. It is also true that parents may seek to terminate their rights for any number 

of reasons that may have nothing to do with their fitness to be parents. That the 
16

“palpably unfit” presumption in subdivision 1(b)(4) does not apply to such parents 

therefore does not equate to a conclusion that the statute is not narrowly tailored. The 

purpose of the narrow tailoring requirement is to “ensure that the means chosen fit th[e]

compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the 

classification was illegitimate.” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 (citation omitted) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The statutory classification at issue here is closely tied to the 

government’s goal of protecting children, and it meets the narrow tailoring requirement. 

A natural parent is presumed to be suitable “to be entrusted with the care of his 

child” and it is “in the best interest of a child to be in the custody of his natural parent.” 

In re Welfare of Clausen, 289 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Minn. 1980). When, however, the 

government has, in an initial proceeding, overcome that presumption of fitness through 

clear and convincing evidence that a parent cannot be entrusted to care for his or her 

children, see Minn. Stat. § 260C.317, subd. 1, the statutory presumption of unfitness in 

Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4), relieves the government of its burden to again 

overcome the natural parent’s presumption of fitness, at least until the parent produces 

evidence warranting a finding of fitness. See, e.g., Jacobson v. $55,900 in U.S. Currency, 

728 N.W.2d 510, 522 (Minn. 2007) (stating that a presumption “control[s] the burden of 

going forward with the evidence,” and once rebutted, the other party, “in order to prevail, 

must meet its burden of persuasion” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 

omitted)); see also In re Welfare of Child of J.W., 807 N.W.2d 441, 445-46 (Minn. App. 

2011) (explaining that the presumption is overcome with evidence sufficient to “ ‘justify 

a finding of fact’ that he or she is not palpably unfit” (quoting Minn. R. Evid. 301 comm. 
17

cmt.—1977)), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). In other words, Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, 

subd. 1(b)(4), is narrowly drawn to operate only when the juvenile court has already once 

concluded based on clear and convincing evidence establishing one or more of nine 

specific statutory reasons, that the actions of the parent warrant severing the parent-child 

relationship. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b) (listing nine “conditions” that could 

support involuntary termination of parental rights); id., subd. 1(b)(4) (presuming that 

parent is unfit if parental rights to other children were terminated “involuntarily”). Given 

the presumption’s limited operation, “there is little or no possibility that the motive for 

the classification was illegitimate.” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333. 

We recognize that the statutory presumption, standing alone, may not meet the 

heavy burden of narrow tailoring. The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that “[p]rocedure 

by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized determination,” and has 

said that in family law matters, presumptions that foreclose individual determinations on 

determinative issues can “needlessly risk[] running roughshod over the important 

interests of both parent and child.” Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972). But 

the presumption we are faced with today does not forsake an individual determination. 

To the contrary, several factors establish that even when the presumption in Minn. Stat. 

§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4), operates, an individualized determination is still required and 

still made. 

First, termination of parental rights is always discretionary with the juvenile court. 

Language throughout the juvenile protection laws emphasizes that the court “may,” but is 

not required to, terminate a parent’s rights when one of the nine statutory criteria is met. 
18

E.g., Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1 (“The juvenile court may upon petition, terminate 

all rights of a parent to a child . . . if it finds that one or more of the following conditions 

exist . . . .” (emphasis added)); Minn. Stat. § 260C.317, subd. 1 (2012) (“If, after a 

hearing, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the 

conditions set out in section 260C.301 exist, it may terminate parental rights.” (emphasis 

added)). Accordingly, even if the presumption of unfitness in Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, 

subd. 1(b)(4), operates and is not rebutted, termination of parental rights is still a matter 

of discretion for the juvenile court. 

Second, the presumption is easily rebuttable. The court of appeals has held that 

when the presumption of unfitness applies, a parent rebuts the presumption by 

introducing evidence that would “ ‘justify a finding of fact’ that [the parent] is not 

palpably unfit,” and whether the evidence satisfies the burden of production is 

determined on a case-by-case basis. In re Welfare of Child of J.W., 807 N.W.2d at 445-

46 (quoting Minn. R. Evid. 301 comm. cmt.—1977), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012); 

see also Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 623 (Minn. 1988) 

(explaining that once a presumption arises, the “burden of producing evidence then shifts 

to the [other party] to . . . produce sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact”). 

This standard, which is a much lower bar than the “clear and convincing” standard

shouldered by the County, Minn. Stat. § 260C.317, subd. 1, is the appropriate standard. 

For the statute to survive under a strict scrutiny analysis, the burden imposed by the 

presumption cannot be a heavy one. Rather, the parent needs to produce only enough 

evidence to support a finding that the parent is suitable “to be entrusted with the care” of 
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the children. In re Welfare of Clausen, 289 N.W.2d at 156; see also Minn. Stat. § 645.17 

(2012) (providing that courts should presume that “[t]he legislature does not intend to 

violate the Constitution of the United States or of this state”). 

Third, we have made clear that an involuntary termination of parental rights is 

proper only when at least one statutory ground for termination is supported by clear and 

convincing evidence and the termination is in the child’s best interest. In re Welfare of 

Children of R.W., 678 N.W.2d 49, 54-55 (Minn. 2004). Here, while the juvenile court 

relied on the presumption of parental unfitness in its order terminating the mother’s rights 

to her fifth child, the court also separately found “[c]lear and convincing evidence” that it 

was “in the best interests of the child that any and all parental rights be terminated.” This 

separate statutory requirement for a best-interests consideration, Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, 

subd. 7, ensures that a termination is not ordered simply because a parent introduces no 

evidence to overcome the presumption. In other words, and to be clear, just as 

termination based solely on the child’s best interests is improper, R.W., 678 N.W.2d at 

54-55 (stating that “[t]ermination of . . . parental rights solely on the basis that 

termination would be in the children’s best interests” ignores the “clear statutory 

directive” requiring a statutory basis in addition to a best interests finding), termination 

based solely on a statutory presumption is improper. The juvenile court also must 

independently find in each case, even with a presumption of unfitness, that termination is 

in the child’s best interests. 

Together, these procedural protections ensure that the Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, 

subd. 1(b)(4), is narrowly tailored, that the child’s best interests remain the paramount 
20

consideration, and that the presumption does not improperly encompass those who have 

had their parental rights terminated previously merely because those parents are not able 

to present evidence establishing that they are fit parents. See, e.g., Fla. Dep’t of Children 

& Families v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602, 609-10 (Fla. 2004) (finding that a rebuttable 

presumption in the child welfare context meets the narrowly tailored requirement when 

the court has to find in each case that (1) there is a substantial risk of significant harm to 

the current child; and (2) the termination of parental rights is the least restrictive means of 

protecting the child from harm). 

Based on our analysis, we conclude that Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4), is 

narrowly tailored to serve the government’s compelling interest. We therefore hold that 

the statute does not violate the equal protection provisions of the United States or 

Minnesota Constitutions

Affirmed.
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D I S S E N T

PAGE, Justice (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. I do so because I conclude that the presumption of palpable 

unfitness in Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2012), does not survive strict scrutiny.

R.D.L. faced a termination of parental rights hearing with respect to her four 

oldest children because she was engaging in illegal activity in their presence and failed to 

comply with her case plan. In re Welfare of Children of R.D.L., Nos. 27-JV-11-8351,

27-JV-12-4240, Order at 2 (Henn. Cnty. Dist. Ct. filed Aug. 28, 2012). Before the 

hearing, R.D.L. gave birth to another child. Hennepin County proposed that it would not 

use the termination proceeding relating to the four oldest children as a basis for 

terminating R.D.L.’s parental rights to her newborn child if R.D.L. agreed to voluntarily 

terminate her parental rights to her four oldest children. R.D.L. rejected the County’s 

proposal and, after the hearing, had her parental rights to the four oldest children 

involuntarily terminated. Subsequently, the County filed a petition to terminate R.D.L.’s 

parental rights to the newborn. At trial, the County, relying on Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, 

subd. 1(b)(4), alleged that R.D.L. was “palpably unfit” to parent her newborn. Section 

260C.301, subdivision 1, provides that a parent is presumed to be palpably unfit if the 

parent’s rights to another child were previously involuntarily terminated. In response, 

R.D.L. moved to declare the statutory presumption unconstitutional under the equal 

protection provisions of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. The district 

court denied the motion and terminated R.D.L.’s parental rights to the newborn. The 

court of appeals affirmed. Here, R.D.L. contends that Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, 
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subd. 1(b)(4), which does not apply to demonstrably unfit parents who voluntarily 

terminated their parental rights, is not narrowly tailored because the statute is 

underinclusive. R.D.L. also contends that this classification does not serve a compelling 

government interest.

I.

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant 

part, “No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 

the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Article I, Section 2, of the Minnesota 

Constitution provides, “No member of this state shall be disfranchised or deprived of any 

of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land or 

the judgment of his peers.” “Both clauses have been analyzed under the same principles 

and begin with the mandate that all similarly situated individuals shall be treated alike, 

but only ‘invidious discrimination’ is deemed constitutionally offensive.” Scott v. 

Minneapolis Police Relief Ass’n, 615 N.W.2d 66, 74 (Minn. 2000) (citation omitted). We 

typically review equal protection challenges under the rational basis standard. Id. If the 

classification involves a suspect class or fundamental right, however, we apply the strict 

scrutiny standard. Greene v. Comm’r of Dep’t of Human Servs., 755 N.W.2d 713, 725 

(Minn. 2008). Because this case involves a fundamental right—the right of parents to 

make decisions on “the care, custody, and control” of their children—strict scrutiny 

applies. SooHoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815, 820 (Minn. 2007). Strict scrutiny is the 

most rigorous standard applied in equal protection cases. Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 

815, 831 (Minn. 2005); see Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., 
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concurring) (“ ‘[S]trict scrutiny’ . . . is strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”). To survive 

strict scrutiny, the statute “must be ‘narrowly tailored and reasonably necessary to further 

a compelling governmental interest.’ ” Greene, 755 N.W.2d at 725 (quoting Hennepin 

Cnty. v. Perry, 561 N.W.2d 889, 897 n.7 (Minn. 1997)). Strict scrutiny in the context of 

fundamental rights focuses on whether the classification itself serves a compelling 

government interest, not whether the statute as a whole serves such an interest. See 

Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942).

II.

Here, the classification is between parents who have in the past voluntarily 

terminated their parental rights and parents who have previously had their parental rights 

involuntarily terminated. Under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4), parents in the 

latter group are presumed to be palpably unfit to parent their children while no such 

presumption applies to parents in the former group. The court identifies the compelling 

government interest in having the presumption as the prompt and permanent removal of 

children from unsafe parents. The court concludes that the classification is narrowly 

tailored because the district court retains discretion over whether to terminate parental 

rights, the parent can easily rebut the presumption, and the presumption does not shift the 

burden of proof from the County. Essentially, the court reasons that because the impact 

of the presumption is what the court concludes is minimal and, because procedural 

protections are in place, the statute is narrowly tailored. The court ignores the fact that 

encompassed within the narrowly tailored requirement is the additional requirement that 

a statute can be neither overinclusive nor underinclusive. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of 
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Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United v. 

Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).

R.D.L. argues that the classification in Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4), is 

underinclusive because it does not include parents who have voluntarily terminated their 

parental rights to other children. A statute is “overinclusive” if it “burden[s] more 

persons than necessary to cure the problem.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1279 (10th ed. 

2014). A statute is underinclusive if it excludes persons that it should not. See Orr v. 

Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 272 (1979) (“In every equal protection attack upon a statute 

challenged as underinclusive, the State may satisfy the Constitution’s commands either 

by extending benefits to the previously disfavored class or by denying benefits to both 

parties . . . .”).

I conclude that the classification in Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4), is 

underinclusive because there is no compelling reason to exclude from the presumption of 

palpable unfitness parents who have in the past voluntarily terminated their parental 

rights. First, many parents who voluntarily terminate their rights satisfy the standards for 

involuntary termination.1

 In such cases, the only distinction between the two classes of 

parents is that parents whose rights were involuntarily terminated invoked their right to a 

hearing. See Murphy v. Comm’r of Human Servs., 765 N.W.2d 100, 107 (Minn. App. 

2009) (“In theory, there is a difference between a voluntary and involuntary termination 

of parental rights, but in actual practice, exactly the same conduct by a parent toward a 

 1 The children of these parents have no less a need for protection.
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child can lead to either a voluntary or an involuntary termination . . . .”). Second, it is not 

uncommon that parents voluntarily relinquish their rights to a child for reasons that 

would support an involuntary termination. See, e.g., In re Welfare of D.D.G., 

558 N.W.2d 481, 486 (Minn. 1997) (concluding that good cause existed for voluntary 

termination because of the parents’ abusive relationship and drug use); In re Welfare of 

Children of D.F., 752 N.W.2d 88, 92, 95 (Minn. App. 2008) (holding that good cause 

was present because the parents had not completed their case plans and were chemically 

dependent); In re Welfare of Child of R.A.S., No. A07-297, 2007 WL 2367554, at *2 

(Minn. App. Aug. 16, 2007) (concluding that abandonment constitutes good cause).

Perhaps the best example of the lack of distinction between the two classifications 

as it relates to the asserted government interest in creating the two classes is R.D.L. 

herself. Had R.D.L. agreed to Hennepin County’s proposal and voluntarily waived her 

parental rights to her four older children, the statutory presumption of palpable unfitness 

would not have applied to her newborn child. But having rejected the offer, the 

presumption applied. In both cases, however, the facts with respect to R.D.L.’s ability to 

parent her newborn are exactly the same. Thus, I can see no compelling reason or 

government interest in treating the two classifications of parents differently. Indeed, it 

would appear that the only reason for treating the two classes of parents differently is to 

put pressure on parents to voluntarily terminate their parental rights rather than asserting 

their right to a hearing and putting the government to its proof. Put another way, R.D.L. 

could have fit into either classification without any impact on her parental fitness or 

circumstances. This illustrates that the principal distinction between parents who 
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voluntarily terminated their parental rights and parents, like R.D.L. here, whose rights are 

involuntarily terminated, is that parents in the latter group simply refuse to voluntarily 

terminate their rights. Because the distinction between the two classes of parents is 

marginal at best, the presumption of palpable unfitness in Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, 

subd. 1(b)(4), should apply to parents who have voluntarily terminated their rights. Since 

it does not, the presumption is underinclusive.

III.

Even if a statute is underinclusive, “ ‘perfection is by no means required.’ ” Vance 

v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108 (1979) (quoting Phillips Chem. Co. v. Dumas Indep. Sch. 

Dist., 361 U.S. 376, 385 (1960)). The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld an underinclusive 

or overinclusive statute if the statute otherwise meets the appropriate level of scrutiny. 

See id. (“We accept such imperfection because it is in turn rationally related to the 

secondary objective of legislative convenience.”). As indicated above, the applicable 

level of scrutiny here is strict scrutiny, which requires that the classification be narrowly 

tailored and reasonably necessary to meet a compelling governmental interest. Greene v. 

Comm’r of Dep’t of Human Servs., 755 N.W.2d 713, 725 (Minn. 2008).

According to the court, the compelling government interest served by the statutory 

presumption at issue is “protecting children” by “facilitat[ing] more expeditious 

resolution of cases involving children in need of protection.” While the protection of 

children is a compelling government interest, the court ignores the well-recognized 

principle that the classification itself, not the statute, must serve a compelling government 

interest. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). Thus, 
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the County must articulate a compelling government interest that is furthered by applying 

Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4), to one class of parents and not the other. I surmise 

that if the State has a compelling interest in quickly removing children from parents 

whose rights have been involuntarily terminated, the State has an equally compelling 

interest in quickly removing children from parents who voluntarily terminated their rights 

since parents who voluntarily terminate their rights often satisfy the standards for 

involuntary termination. This case illustrates why the State’s interests do not change 

simply because a parent has voluntarily terminated her parental rights. The juvenile court 

presumed R.D.L. to be palpably unfit to care for her newborn because R.D.L.’s parental 

rights with respect to her oldest children had been involuntarily terminated. The County 

advocates that it had a compelling government interest in expeditiously protecting the 

newborn from an unsafe situation. But, had R.D.L. accepted the County’s offer to 

voluntarily terminate her parental rights to her oldest children, the palpably unfit 

presumption would not have applied with respect to her newborn. Nevertheless, if the 

newborn needed protection from an unsafe environment, that need would not have 

dissipated simply because R.D.L. had agreed to voluntarily terminate her parental rights 

to her other children. R.D.L.’s history and parental fitness, and the newborn’s need for 

protection, were the same irrespective of how R.D.L.’s rights to her other children were 

terminated. Thus, if the State has an interest in protecting children when the presumption 

applies, I see no reason for the State’s interest to be any less simply because a parent had 

in the past accepted the County’s offer to voluntarily terminate his or her rights to other 

children. Since the State has an equal interest in quickly removing children from parents 
D-8

who voluntarily terminated their rights to other children, there is no compelling 

government interest that is furthered by applying Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4), 

to one class of parents and not the other.

Moreover, despite the articulated goal of expediting the removal of children in 

need of protection, the classification simply does not accomplish that goal. Here, R.D.L. 

faced two separate termination proceedings, one relating to her four oldest children in 

which the presumption was not applicable and one relating to her newborn child in which 

the presumption was applicable.

With respect to R.D.L.’s four oldest children, the County filed a child in need of 

protection or services (CHIPS) petition on September 15, 2011. The court terminated 

R.D.L.’s parental rights to her four oldest children on August 28, 2012, 11 months after

the petition was filed. With respect to R.D.L.’s newborn child, the County filed a CHIPS 

petition on August 30, 2012. At this point, the County had the benefit of having already 

gathered ample evidence regarding R.D.L.’s parental fitness, and the County could rely 

on Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4), to help prove that R.D.L. was palpably unfit to 

care for her newborn child. However, even with sufficient evidence and with the 

presumption in place, the process of terminating R.D.L.’s parental rights was anything 

but prompt. The hearing to consider the termination of R.D.L.’s parental rights did not 

occur until July 31, 2013, and R.D.L.’s parental rights were not finally terminated until 

August 16, 2013, one year after the petition was filed. Given the fact that it took longer 

to terminate R.D.L.’s parental rights to her newborn with the presumption in place than it

did to terminate R.D.L.’s parental rights to her older children without the presumption, it 
D-9

is fair to say that neither the statutory presumption nor the classification did anything to 

expedite the termination of R.D.L.’s parental rights to her newborn child. Thus, it is clear 

that the classification as applied to the presumption is not reasonably necessary to meet a 

compelling government interest.

Finally, I note that the court holds that to rebut the presumption “the parent needs 

to produce only enough evidence to support a finding that the parent is ‘suitable to be 

entrusted with the care’ of the children.” The court characterizes this standard as “a 

much lower bar than the ‘clear and convincing’ standard” the County must meet. If a 

parent is easily able to rebut the presumption of palpable unfitness, parents will often 

succeed in meeting this burden; therefore, the presumption will frequently be of little 

utility to the County. If the presumption often has little utility, then there is no 

compelling government interest.

IV.

While the court is correct that strict scrutiny applies to the classification at issue 

and that parents whose parental rights are involuntarily terminated are similarly situated 

to parents who voluntarily terminate their parental rights, the court’s conclusion that the 

classification survives strict scrutiny is erroneous.