This memorandum opinion was not selected for publi cation in the New Mexico Reports. Please see 1 Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please 2 also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other 3 deviations from the official paper version file d by the Court of Appeals and does not include the 4 filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6 WENDY ROZZELLE, 7 Plaintiff-Appellant, 8

v. NO. 30,220 9 PAULETTE STEENSEN-JACOBS, individually; 10 HEATHER GUARINO, individually; and PREMIER 11 PROPERTIES VACATION RESERVATIONS, LLC, 12 a New Mexico Limited Liability Company, 13 Defendants-Appellees. 14 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TAOS COUNTY 15 Sam B. Sanchez, District Judge 16 Jane B. Yohalem 17 Santa Fe, NM 18 for Appellant 19 David Henderson 20 Santa Fe, NM 21 for Appellees 22

MEMORANDUM OPINION 23 BUSTAMANTE, Judge. 242 After the district court dismissed Plaintiff Wendy Rozzelle’s case under Rule 1 1-041(E)(2) NMRA for failure to prosecute, Rozzelle moved to reinstate. We hold 2 that the district court applied the wrong le gal standard in denyi ng the motion, and that 3 to the extent that it applied the correct standard, its ruling was clearly contrary to the 4 facts and circumstances of this case. Accordingly, we reverse. 5 I. BACKGROUND 6 After approximately one year during which no filings took place in this case, 7 Defendants filed a motion to dismiss fo r failure to prosecute under Rule 1-041. 8 Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that although she had made no filings, she had 9 made numerous phone calls to counsel inan attempt to continue settlement 10 discussions. Plaintiff alleged that these calls were never returned. The district court 11 granted the motion to dismiss. 12 On October 13, 2009, within the thirty -day limit imposed by Rule 1-041(E)(2), 13 Plaintiff filed a motion to reinstate the case. Plaintiff argued that, except for the two 14 depositions that the district court had st ayed, she was ready to proceed to trial. 15 Plaintiff also made arguments explaining the delay. Quoting Rule 1-041(E), the 16 district court noted that Plaintiff had not “taken any significant action to bring this 17 matter to completion.” The motion was denied. 18 II. DISCUSSION 193 When a party timely moves for reinstatement after dismissal for failure to 1 prosecute under Rule 1-041(E)(2), “[u]pon good cause shown, the court shallreinstate 2 the case.” Id. (emphasis added). Good cause exis ts when “a party can demonstrate 3 to the court that he is ready, willing, and able to proceed with the prosecution of his 4 claim and that the delay in the prosecution is not wholly without justification.” Vigil 5 v. Thriftway Mktg. Corp. , 117 N.M. 176, 180, 870 P.2d 138, 142 (Ct. App. 1994) 6 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 7 We review the district court’s decision on a motion to reinstate for abuse of 8 discretion. Summit Elec. Supply Co. v. Rhodes & Salmon, P.C. , 2010-NMCA-086, 9 ¶ 6, 148 N.M. 590, 241 P.3d 188. “[T]he trial court abuses discretion when it applies 10 an incorrect standard, incorrect substantive law, or its discretionary decision is 11 premised on a misapprehension of the law.” Aragon v. Brown , 2003-NMCA-126, ¶ 12 9, 134 N.M. 459, 78 P.3d 913. “[E]ven when we review for an abuse of discretion, 13 our review of the application of the law to the facts is conducted de novo.” New 14 Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson , 1999-NMSC-028, ¶ 7, 127 N.M. 654, 15 986 P.2d 450 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, “[a]n 16 abuse of discretion occurs when a ruling is clearly contrary to the logical conclusions 17 demanded by the facts and circumstances of the case.” Sims v. Sims , 1996-NMSC18 078, ¶ 65, 122 N.M. 618, 930 P.2d 153. 194 Our leading case on motions to reinstate is Vigil . There, a workers’ 1 compensation case was delayed when the worker developed additional symptoms 2 prior to trial. 117 N.M. at 177-78, 870 P.2d at 139-40. After the worker’s attorney 3 investigated the new symptoms, he requested that a trial be set. Id. at 178, 870 P.2d 4 at 140. Only then did the worker discover that the case had been dismissed several 5 months earlier without notice to the worker. Id. Upon receiving the order of 6 dismissal, the worker petitioned to reinstate the case, but the petition was denied. Id. 7 On appeal, this Court reversed, noting that the district court “should have 8 determined whether [the w]orker had s hown ‘good cause’ for his lack of action; 9 ‘compelling excuse’ is not the correct standard under [Rule] 1-041(E)(2).” Vigil , 177 10 N.M. at 179, 870 P.2d at 141. We held that th e correct standard is whether the party 11 is “ready, willing, and able to proceed withthe prosecution of his claim and that the 12 delay in the prosecution is not wholly without justification.” Id. at 180, 870 P.2d at 13 142 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The purpose of the rule is to 14 allow “trial courts to evaluate the intentions of parties and their counsel and to rid 15 their dockets of cases that should not be carried as active cases,” id. at 179-80, 870 16 P.2d at 141-42, not to “penalize plainti ffs . . . who have lax attorneys.” Id. at 180, 870 17 P.2d at 142. Furthermore, we observe d that the good cause requirement for 18 reinstatement “should be construed liberally.” Id. 195 As in Vigil , the district court appears to have based its ruling on an incorrect 1 standard of law. In rendering its oral deci sion, the district court concentrated on the 2 fact that Plaintiff had not “taken any significant action to bring this matter to 3 completion.” This language ec hoes that found in Rule 1-041( E)(1), and sets forth the 4 standard applicable to a motion to di smiss for failure to prosecute. As Vigil makes 5 clear, the standard for a motion to reinstate is different. To the extent that the written 6 order was based on the standard articulated by the district court inits oral ruling, it 7 was based on an incorrect standard of law and was therefore an abuse of discretion. 8 To the extent that the district court’ s order may have been based on the correct 9 legal standard, the order was “clearly contrary to the logical conclusions demanded 10 by the facts and circumstances of the case.” Sims , 1996-NMSC-078, ¶ 65. Defendant 11 does not appear to argue that Plaintiff wa s not “ready, willing, and able to proceed.” 12 Indeed, this argument would be difficult given that Plaintiff stated below that 13 “[d]iscovery in the form of interrogato ries and requests for production has been 14 performed extensively,” that “[t]he only di scovery remaining is the deposition of the 15 two main [D]efendants,” and that Plainti ff requested as relief “that depositions be 16 taken and this case be set for trial.” 17 Defendants instead appear to argue th at the delay was not wholly without 18 justification. The basis of this argument is that there were steps Plaintiff could have 196 taken but did not and that, once it became obvious that counsel for Defendants would 1 not return her phone calls, Plaintiff was obligated to take one or more of these steps. 2 This argument confuses the standard for dismissal with the standard for reinstatement. 3 As reasons for her delay, Plaintiff stated that she had repeatedly made phone calls to 4 defense counsel which went unreturned. Pl aintiff maintained th at she had delayed 5 asking for trial out of a desire to avoid th e costs of litigation and out of her belief, 6 allegedly induced by representations madeto her by defense counsel’s firm, that 7 counsel for defense was simply busy and woul d eventually get back to her. Under 8 these circumstances, to the extent that th e district court implicitly found either that 9 Plaintiff was not ready, willing, and able to proceed or that the delay in this case was 10 without justification, its conclusions were contrary to the logical conclusions 11 demanded by the facts and circumstances of the case. 12 III. CONCLUSION 13 The district court’s order is reversed. Weremand with directions to set aside the 14 order of dismissal and to reinstate the case on the court’s docket for further 15 proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17

18 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 1978 WE CONCUR: 1

2 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 3

4 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 5