alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. MICHAEL STAITI.

March 10, 1987.

Petition for certification denied.
​

Exhibit 23.1​

 

[MISSING IMAGE: lh_tgmgroup.jpg]

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

The Board of DirectorsMB Bancorp, Inc.

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (No. 333-212357) on Form S-8 of MB Bancorp, Inc. of our report dated March 5, 2018, with respect to the consolidated 2017 financial statements of MB Bancorp, Inc. which report appears in MB Bancorp, Inc.’s 2017 Annual Report on Form 10-K/A.

[MISSING IMAGE: sg_tgmgroup.jpg]

Salisbury, MarylandApril 2, 2018

[MISSING IMAGE: ft_tgmgroup.jpg]

---
Our comment regarding subject proposed rule is the following:

PAGE PROVISION COMMENT RECOMMENDATION

18660 Proposed 5 

C.F.R. § 

1201.57(c) 

Timeliness and jurisdiction 

are not always inextricably 

intertwined. Consequently, 

we believe that the 

Appellant is required to do 

more than make a 

nonfrivolous allegation that 

the appeal was timely filed 

– i.e. the preponderance of 

the evidence standard 

should apply to timeliness 

issues.

Please replace first part 

with the following text: 

“Except for matters 

described in paragraphs 

(b)(1), (2), and (3) of 

this section...."

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment.

Respectfully,

Carmen Livoti

Senior Labor & Employee Relations Advisor

MGMT/OCHCO/ HCPP

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
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#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. WILLEY F. MILEY.

January 28, 1987.

Petition for certification denied.
Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed September 15, 2021.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D21-0965

Lower Tribunal No. 20-473

________________

L.F.P. Jr., a juvenile,

Appellant,

vs.

The State of Florida,

Appellee.

An appeal conducted pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Orlando A. Prescott, 

Judge.

L.F.P. Jr., a juvenile, in proper person.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, for appellee.

Before EMAS, LINDSEY, and GORDO, JJ. 

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
Exhibit 99.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




     In connection with the Quarterly Report of Berkeley  Technology  Limited on
Form 10-Q for the period  ended June 30, 2003 as filed with the U.S.  Securities
and Exchange  Commission  (the  "Report"),  I, Arthur I.  Trueger,  as Executive
Chairman of the registrant,  certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted
by ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

(1)  The  accompanying  Quarterly Report fully complies with the requirements of
     Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and

(2)  The information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
     respects,  the  financial  condition  and  results  of  operations  of  the
     registrant.



Date:  August 6, 2003                            By:    /s/  Arthur I. Trueger

                                                        Arthur I. Trueger
                                                        Executive Chairman
#### EDDY ZEIBENBERG, M.D. v. IGNACIO CRUZ, M.D.

April 28, 1987.

Petition for certification denied.
#### The State, ex rel. Lipman, *v.*Mack, Judge.

(No. 6128

Decided April 13, 1942.)

*Messrs. Rosen & Rosen*and *Mr. Sol Goodman,*for relator.

*Messrs. Graydon, Lackner, Head & Ritchey*and *Mr. August A. Rendigs, Jr.,*for respondent.

*406Ross, J.

This is an original action in this court, whereby the relator seeks to compel a judge-of the Court of Common Pleas to enter judgment of dismissal of an action without prejudice to future proceedings. The action might properly be termed procedendo, hut the Supreme Court has recognized mandamus as a proper remedy under the instant circumstances. *State, ex rel. Cash,*v. *Rose, Judge,*136 Ohio St., 143, 24 N. E. (2d), 455. The issues are of law created by demurrer to the petition.

The difficulty between relator and respondent grows out of a precedent stipulation imposed by the court upon relator requiring the payment of costs before the entry of dismissal would be entered. No such discretionary power lies in the court prior to submission of the cause to court or jury. See Section 11586, General Code; *State, ex rel. Cash,*v. *Rose, Judge,*supra; and *State, ex rel. Strong,*v. *Cook, Clerk,*124 Ohio St., 478, 179 N. E., 352, 79 A. L. R., 684.

“A judgment for costs may, of course, be rendered.” *State, ex rel. Cash,*v. *Rose, Judge, supra,*at page 147.

The absence of any requirement as to the prepayment of costs in cases similar to that here involved is made noticeable by such requirement under other procedural steps in litigation. Section 11361, General •Code, provides:

“Within ten days after a demurrer is filed, the adverse party may amend, without leave, on payment of ■costs since filing the defective pleading. Notice of filing an amended pleading shall be forthwith served upon the other party, who shall have the same time thereafter to answer, or reply thereto, as to an original pleading.”

And in Section 11363, General Code, the court is given discretion to permit amendment “on such terms as it deems proper.”

*407In Section 11360, General Code, amendment is permitted without leave, and no reference is made to prepayment of costs.

It would therefore seem clear that the Legislature-fully appreciated the propriety and justice of requiring-prepayment of costs under certain*circumstances, and., that its failure to so require prepayment was not due to-mere oversight, but was studied and purposefully intended to operate only in the instances where such prepayment is specifically required. j

For these reasons, the demurrer is overruled.

*Demurrer*overruled.'

Matthews, P. J., and Hamilton, J., concur.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

GREG ABBOTT 

The Honorable Ryan Guillen 

Chair, Committee on Culture, 

Recreation & Tourism 

Texas House ofRepresentatives 

Post Office Box 2910 

Austin, Texas 78768-2910 

Dear Representative Guillen: 

November 25,2013 

Opinion No. GA-l 027 

Re: Whether landowners may be liable for 

the actions of law enforcement officers that 

occur on the landowners' property or for 

livestock that escape due to actions over 

which the landowners have no control 

(RQ-1127-GA) 

You ask whether existing law protects landowners, lessees and occupants of agricultural 

land from liability in different circumstances. 1 Specifically, you ask about liability in the context 

of human smuggling and law enforcement actions surrounding those activities. Request Letter at 

1. You also ask about liability for the escape of livestock due to "external actions over which the 

[landowners, lessees, and occupants] have no control, such as trespassing, firefighting activities, 

game warden activities, poaching and vandalism." !d. at 1. The question of liability in particular 

circumstances involves issues for a court to determine and is thus outside the purview of an 

attorney general opinion. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0430 (2006) at 4 (declining to opine 

about potential liability "[b ]ecause the merits of any particular lawsuit would be determined by 

the specific facts involved and because this office does not resolve fact questions"). We can 

generally advise you that under a set of facts in which there is no fault attributable to an owner, 

lessee, or occupant of land, a court is unlikely to impose liability on the owner, lessee, or 

occupant. Cf Goode v. Bauer, 109 S.W.3d 788, 792 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, pet. 

denied) ("liability for a violation of the stock laws has always required more than the presence of 

the defendant's animals in a forbidden place"). As a result, we are unable to answer your 

questions as a matter of law. 

1

See Letter from Honorable Ryan Guillen, Chair, Comm. on Culture, Rec. & Tourism, to Honorable Greg 

Abbott, Tex. Att'y Gen. at 1 (May 17, 2013), http://www.texasattomeygeneral.gov/opin ("Request Letter"). 
The Honorable Ryan Guillen - Page 2 (GA-1027) 

SUMMARY 

Whether any particular set of circumstances will result in 

liability is a fact question beyond the purview of an attorney 

general opinion. 

DANIEL T. HODGE 

First Assistant Attorney General 

JAMES D. BLACKLOCK 

Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel 

VIRGINIA K. HOELSCHER 

Chair, Opinion Committee 

Charlotte M. Harper 

Attorney General of Texas 

Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee
##### 



EXHIBIT 32 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. § 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002* In connection with the Quarterly Report of Cronos Global Income Fund XIV,
L.P. (the Registrant) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30,
2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), the
undersigned, Dennis J. Tietz, the President and Chief Executive Officer of
Cronos Capital Corp., the General Partner of the Registrant, and John Kallas,
the Chief Financial Officer of Cronos Capital Corp., certify, based on their
knowledge, that:  (i)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements
of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934; and(ii)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
and results of operation of the Registrant. August 12, 2004 By
    
    /s/ Dennis J. TietzDennis J. Tietz, President and Chief ExecutiveOfficer of Cronos Capital Corp.,General Partner of the Registrant/s/ John KallasJohn Kallas, Chief Financial Officer of
CronosCapital Corp., General Partner of the
Registrant
 A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to
the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.   *
    
    This certification, required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, other than as required by Section 906, shall not be deemed to be
filed with the Commission or subject to the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commission under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
as amended, or to the liabilities of Section 18 of said Act.
EXHIBIT 31.1



CERTIFICATION



I, Luke L. Alvarez, certify that:



| | 1. | I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of Inspired Entertainment, Inc.; and
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Date: January 29, 2018



| |  | /s/ Luke L. Alvarez                                                        
| |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |  | Luke L. Alvarez                                                            
| |  | President and Chief Executive Officer
        (Principal Executive Officer)
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

June 13, 2012

No. 11

- 1654

MICHAEL ALEXANDER NELSON,

Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED

STATES, Respondent

(Agency No. A044

- 843

- 940)

Present: VANASKIE, BARRY and CU DAHY, Circuit Judges

Motion by Respondent to Publish the Opinion Dated 05/22/2012.

Respectfully,

Clerk/pdb for smw

_________________________________ORDER________________________________

The foregoing motion is GRANTED

By the Court,

/s/Maryann e Trump Barry

Circuit Judge

Dated: July 10, 2012

S mw/ cc: Jeffrey L. Menkin, Esq.

Kristen Sawicki, Esq.

Richard H. Frankel, Esq.

Jonathan O'Boyle, Esq.
---

## Ed Hengeveld



---



Ed HengeveldBorn in 1956, Ed Hengeveld is a spaceflight historian who lives with his wife and son in the Netherlands, where he works for the Dutch television news. He has written numerous articles for Spaceflight and Quest, as well as for various Dutch newspapers and magazines.

His interest in spaceflight began with the Apollo-8 mission around the moon in 1968 and has grown ever since. In 1981 he was at the Kennedy Space Center to witness the launch of STS-1 and he was also present at the Dryden Flight Research Center when Columbia landed there two days later. While at Dryden, he also met various people involved in the X-15 and lifting body progams, resulting in a special interest in this area of flight research.

Ed Hengeveld is a member of the British Interplanetary Society. In his spare time he enjoys painting, especially scenes from the Apollo program. His paintings have been published in various magazines around the world and his portrait of the twelve moonwalking astronauts earned him praise from Apollo-12 lunar module pilot Al Bean, himself an artist.  Astronauts Dick Covey and John Glenn own portraits of themselves, painted by Ed Hengeveld.

Journal Contributor Ed Hengeveld writes: The photo of me in an Apollo-type suit was made here in the Netherlands. The replica suit was made by Philipp van Stratum, a model maker who specializes in space models and has also made several spacesuits, US and Russian. It gave me a good feel of what it must have been like to work in that suit.



---



### Moment of Reflection

##### (click on the image for a larger version)
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE

F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER ON M OTION FOR R EHEARING

Appellate case name: In re 8650 Frisco, LLC d/b/a Estilo Gaucho Brazilian Steakhouse,

Mandona, LLC, Galovelho, LLC, Bahtche, LLC, Claudio Nunes, and

David Jeiel Rodrigues

Appellate case number: 01

- 1 5

- 00 423

- CV

Trial court: 133rd District Court of Harris County

Date motion filed: July 23 , 201 5

Party filing motion: Relators

It is ordered that the relators’ motion for rehearing is denied

.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Russell Lloyd

Acting for the Court

Panel consists of Justices Keyes

, Huddle , and Lloyd

Date: September 3, 2015
#### JOHN TOMASIN v. KENNETH BLANE, ET AL.

November 10, 1986.

Petition for certification denied.
**Edward Higgins White, II**

***Personal***: Born November 14, 1930, San Antonio, Texas. Died January 27, 1967 in the Apollo 204 fire at Cape Kennedy. Was married, two children.

***Education***: B.S., U.S. Military Academy, 1952.

 M.S. in aeronautical engineering, University of Michigan, 1959.  
***Spaceflights***: Pilot,  Gemini 4 (1965).    Chosen with the second group of astronauts in 1962. Was pilot of Gemini 4     (first American to make a spacewalk), backup command pilot for Gemini 7, and     had been selected to be command module pilot for the first Apollo flight.  
Virgil Grissom | Roger       Chaffee

Updated August 4, 2006       Steve Garber, NASA History Web Curator       For further information E-mail histinfo@hq.nasa.gov
#### Friedly, Appellant, *v.*Schmidlin, Appellee.

(No. 4024

Decided February 14, 1944.)

*Mr. Thomas N. Bierly*and *Mr. U. G. Denman,*for appellant.

*Mr. Thomas J. Mattimoe,*for appellee.

Carpenter, J.

On August ‘20, 1943, plaintiff filed, under Section 11334, General Code, a petition in the short form in which he alleged by copy a promissory note made to him by defendant on January 1,1921, due on or before January 1, 1924, for $380, with interest. It is also alleged that “there is one endorsement on said note as follows: ‘Apr. 25, 1934, paid $20,’ ” and that “there is now due and owing on said note, from defendant to plaintiff” $840, for which plaintiff prayed judgment.

Defendant filed a demurrer to the petition, on the ground that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. The demurrer was sustained and the petition dismissed. Plaintiff appeals on questions of law.

The question is: Was there a sufficient allegation of payment by the defendant of the $20? If not, the action not having been begun within fifteen years from the due date, was barred. Section 11221, General Code. *328If there was, the petition was good on demurrer. Section 11223, General Code.

Section 11334, General Code, in part provides:

> “In an action '* * * upon an instrument for the unconditional payment of money only, it shall be sufficient for a party to set forth a copy of the * * * instrument, with all credits and the indorsements thereon, and to state that there is due to him, on such * * * instrument, from the adverse party, a specified sum which he claims, with interest.”

The petition here is a substantial compliance with that section, and it is fair to infer that plaintiff charged that the twenty-dollar payment was made by the defendant. If such payment is denied, the burden will be upon the plaintiff to prove that it was so made. Such was the construction given that statute in paragraph one of the syllabus in *Dykeman*v. *Johnson,*83 Ohio St., 126, 93 N. E., 626. On page 133 in the opinion in that case, it is said:

> “By the enactment of this statute the Legislature obviously intended that the statements therein prescribed, when adopted by the pleader, should be held the equivalent of, and should imply and- import all that it would otherwise be necessary to specifically allege in the statement of a sufficient cause of action.”

The decisions in the promissory note cases cited and relied upon by the defendant relate to the proof of payment required and not to the sufficiency of the allegation of payment in the petition.

The demurrer should have been overruled. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to do this, and for further proceedings.

*Judgment reversed and cause remanded.*

Lloyd and Stuart, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>                      
                              THE   SCHEDULE    CONTAINS    SUMMARY    FINANCIAL
                              INFORMATION   EXTRACTED   FROM  THE   CONSOLIDATED
                              FINANCIAL  STATEMENTS  AND  IS  QUALIFIED  IN  ITS
                              ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
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<MULTIPLIER>                  1,000
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<S>                           <C>
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<PERIOD-START>                                  JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                    SEP-28-1996
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                           1
<CASH>                                               28,291
<SECURITIES>                                              0
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<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     52,248
<PP&E>                                                7,986
<DEPRECIATION>                                        4,828
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                       55,848
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<PREFERRED>                                               0
<COMMON>                                                  8
<OTHER-SE>                                           46,695
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                         55,848
<SALES>                                              38,287
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     38,287
<CGS>                                                15,736
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        33,510
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                          0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                          0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                        0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                       5,363
<INCOME-TAX>                                          1,906
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                   4,777
<DISCONTINUED>                                            0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                           0
<CHANGES>                                                 0
<NET-INCOME>                                          3,457
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                          0.42
<EPS-DILUTED>                                          0.42
        

</TABLE>
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. EARL MORRIS, JR.

January 20, 1987.

Petition for certification denied.
#### COMMITTEE FOR A RICKEL ALTERNATIVE AND LINDEN MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION v. CITY OF LINDEN AND SUPERMARKETS GENERAL CORPORATION.

March 24, 1987.

Petition for certification granted. (See 214 *N.J.Super.*631)
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM DATA RACE,
INC. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF AND FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED SEPTEMBER 30,
1999, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                           6,329
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      152
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                        167
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 6,648
<PP&E>                                           4,117
<DEPRECIATION>                                  (2,933)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   7,858
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                              881
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                      1,540
<COMMON>                                        47,130
<OTHER-SE>                                     (41,693)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     7,858
<SALES>                                            536
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   536
<CGS>                                              345
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    3,016
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (2,379)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (2,379)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (2,379)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (0.12)
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</TABLE>