[Cite as State v. Johnson, 2016-Ohio-8084.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 LUCAS COUNTY 

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-15-1220 

 

 Appellee Trial Court No. CR0201501174 

v. 

Romell Johnson DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: December 9, 2016 

* * * * * 

 Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and 

 Frank H. Spryszak, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

 Lawrence A. Gold, for appellant. 

* * * * * 

 SINGER, J. 

{¶ 1} Appellant, Romell Johnson, appeals the July 20, 2015 judgment of the Lucas 

County Court of Common Pleas convicting him of two counts of rape in violation of R.C. 

2907.02(A)(1)(b) and (B), felonies of the first degree. For the reasons that follow, we 

affirm. 
2.

Assignment of Error 

{¶ 2} Appellant sets forth the following assignment of error: 

 The trial court committed error to the prejudice of appellant by 

imposing the costs of prosecution without consideration of appellant’s 

present or future ability to pay. 

Background Facts

{¶ 3} On January 29, 2015, appellant was indicted on two counts of rape. On 

February 5, 2015, appellant appeared for his arraignment and was determined to be 

indigent. 

{¶ 4} On July 2, 2015, appellant pled guilty to both counts. The trial court 

accepted the plea and the matter was referred to the Pretrial/Presentence Department for 

preparation of a presentence investigation report (PSI). 

{¶ 5} On July 16, 2015, appellant was sentenced to serve a mandatory term of 

seven years for each count. These sentences were ordered to be served consecutively, for 

a prison term of 14 years. It was further ordered appellant would be subject to five years 

mandatory postrelease control for each count. 

{¶ 6} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court considered the evidence, including 

the PSI, and presented appellant with an acknowledgement form pursuant to R.C. 

2947.23, which contained appellant’s signature. The trial court did not assess court costs 

in open court, but did include costs in its judgment entry journalized July 21, 2015. 
3.

{¶ 7} The July 2015 entry pertinently stated: 

 Defendant found to have, or reasonably may be expected to have, the 

means to pay all or part of the applicable costs of supervision, confinement, 

assigned counsel, and prosecution as authorized by law. Defendant ordered 

to reimburse the State of Ohio and Lucas County for such costs. This order 

of reimbursement is a judgment enforceable pursuant to law by the parties 

in whose favor it is entered. Defendant further ordered to pay the cost 

assessed pursuant to R.C. 9.92(C), 2929.18 and 2951.021. Notification 

pursuant to R.C. 2947.23 given. 

{¶ 8} It is from this judgment appellant now timely appeals. 

Standard of Review 

{¶ 9} “An appellate court may vacate or modify a felony sentence on appeal only 

if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the trial 

court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” 

See State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 23; see 

also State v. Farless, 6th Dist. Lucas Nos. L-15-1060, L-15-1061, 2016-Ohio-1571, ¶ 4 

(“Our standard of review on this issue is whether the imposition of costs and financial 

sanctions was contrary to law.”). 

Legal Analysis 

{¶ 10} In the sole assignment of error, appellant argues imposing costs of 

prosecution, appointed counsel and confinement, without considering present and future 

ability to pay, was reversible error. Appellee asserts the record amply supports the trial 
4.

court’s imposition of costs because appellant had or will reasonably have the means to 

pay. 

Cost of Prosecution 

{¶ 11} For cost of prosecution, R.C. 2947.23(A)(1)(a) mandates, “[i]n all criminal 

cases * * * the judge or magistrate shall include in the sentence the cost of prosecution.” 

The trial court must impose court costs pursuant to R.C. 2947.23, despite whether 

defendant is indigent. State v. Rohda, 6th Dist. Fulton No. F-06-007, 2006-Ohio-6291, 

¶ 13. 

{¶ 12} “R.C. 2947.23(C), effective March 22, 2013, provides that the trial court 

retains jurisdiction to address the waiver, suspension, or modification of the payment of 

costs after sentencing.” State v. Pultz, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-14-083, 2016-Ohio-329, 

¶ 61. 

{¶ 13} Therefore, the argument related to the cost of prosecution is not well-taken. 

Cost of Appointed Counsel 

{¶ 14} Payment of court-appointed attorney fees is governed by R.C. 2941.51(D), 

which states in relevant part: 

The fees and expenses approved by the court under this section shall not be 

taxed as part of the costs and shall be paid by the county. However, if the 

person represented has, or reasonably may be expected to have, the means 

to meet some part of the cost of the services rendered to the person, the 

person shall pay the county an amount that the person reasonably can be 

expected to pay. 
5.

{¶ 15} There must be “evidence in the record that the court considered the 

defendant’s ability to pay the cost of confinement and appointed counsel.” See Farless, 

6th Dist. Lucas Nos. L-15-1060, L-15-1061, 2016-Ohio-1571, at ¶ 11. 

{¶ 16} Here, appellant receives social security payments totaling $733 a month, 

completed school to 11th grade, and was 26 years old at the time of his rape convictions. 

This information was presented throughout the proceedings and was also contained in the 

PSI that was reviewed at the July 16, 2015 sentencing hearing. Therefore, we hold the 

trial court did not err when determining appellant has, or is reasonably expected to have, 

the ability to pay his court-appointed attorney fees. 

{¶ 17} Appellant’s argument regarding the cost of appointed counsel is not welltaken. 

Cost of Confinement

{¶ 18} “R.C. 2929.18(A)(5)(a)(ii) requires that the trial court impose against all 

convicted defendants a financial sanction for the cost of confinement in a state institution 

to the extent he is able to pay.” Farless at ¶ 9. “R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) also requires the trial 

court to consider the defendant’s present and future ability to pay any financial sanction.” 

Id. 

{¶ 19} “[A] sentencing court is not required to hold a hearing when determining 

whether to impose a financial sanction under this provision[.]” State v. Bowman, 6th 

Dist. Lucas No. L-11-1300, 2014-Ohio-3851, ¶ 34. 
6.

{¶ 20} Here, as stated above, the trial court did not err in determining appellant 

has or will have the ability to pay costs and financial sanctions, including cost of 

confinement. 

{¶ 21} Appellant’s third argument has no merit and, accordingly, his sole 

assignment of error is not well-taken. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 22} The judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24. 

Judgment affirmed. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4. 

Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________ 

JUDGE 

Arlene Singer, J. 

_______________________________ 

Stephen A. Yarbrough, J. JUDGE 

CONCUR. 

_______________________________ 

JUDGE