IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 09–0418

Filed May 14, 2010

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee,

vs.

MICHAEL LEROY ANDERSON,

Appellant.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, Carl D. 

Baker, Judge.

Appellant appeals district court decision delaying implementation 

of a special sentence under Iowa Code section 903B.2. DISTRICT 

COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH 

INSTRUCTIONS.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Reynolds, 

Assistant Appellate Defender, and Jordan T. Smith, Student Legal Intern,

for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, William A. Hill, Assistant 

Attorney General, and Jennifer Miller, County Attorney, for appellee.
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STREIT, Justice.

Michael Anderson was ordered to serve a special sentence of ten 

years pursuant to Iowa Code section 903B.2. He argues this sentence 

should have begun to run when he discharged the sentence for the 

offense that triggered imposition of the special sentence. The State 

argues the special sentence should not begin to run until Anderson 

discharges a concurrent and separate prison sentence. Based on the 

language of the statute, the special sentence should have begun when 

Anderson discharged the sentence for the underlying criminal offense, 

regardless of his concurrent and unrelated sentence.

I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.

Michael Anderson pled guilty to sexual exploitation of a minor in 

violation of Iowa Code section 728.12(3) (2007) in Marshall County. He 

was sentenced to two years in prison, with the sentence to run 

concurrently with two consecutive five-year sentences imposed in Story 

County. In Story County, Anderson had been convicted of two counts of 

enticing away a minor in violation of Iowa Code section 710.10(2) (2005)

and was sentenced to two sentences of up to five years in prison, to be 

served consecutively.

Based on the Marshall County conviction, Anderson was also 

ordered to serve a special sentence of ten years pursuant to Iowa Code 

section 903B.2 (2007). Section 903B.2 imposes a special sentence for 

certain offenses and requires that the special sentence be served “under 

supervision as if on parole.” Essentially, section 903B.2 requires 

Anderson to serve an additional ten-year period of parole. Violation of 

parole may result in a two-year revocation for the first offense and a fiveyear revocation for subsequent violations.
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Anderson discharged the Marshall County two-year sentence while 

he still had time remaining on the two consecutive five-year Story County 

sentences. Anderson filed a motion with the district court asking the 

court to order the State to implement the ten-year special sentence 

because Anderson had discharged the underlying Marshall County 

sentence. The district court first ordered that the sentence be 

implemented, but on a motion for reconsideration by the State, held it 

should not be implemented until after Anderson discharged the 

concurrent Story County sentences. Anderson appealed.

II. Scope of Review.

“ ‘We review the district court’s construction of [a] statute for 

correction of errors at law.’ ” State v. Booth, 670 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Iowa 

2003) (quoting In re Detention of Swanson, 668 N.W.2d 570, 575 (Iowa 

2003)).

III. Merits.

Anderson was sentenced to a ten-year special sentence pursuant 

to Iowa Code section 903B.2.

Section 903B.2 states:

A person convicted of a misdemeanor or a class “D” 

felony offense under . . . section 728.12 shall also be 

sentenced, in addition to any other punishment provided by 

law, to a special sentence committing the person into the 

custody of the director of the Iowa department of corrections 

for a period of ten years, with eligibility for parole as provided 

in chapter 906. The special sentence imposed under this 

section shall commence upon completion of the sentence 

imposed under any applicable criminal sentencing provisions 

for the underlying criminal offense and the person shall begin 

the sentence under supervision as if on parole. The person 

shall be placed on the corrections continuum in chapter 

901B, and the terms and conditions of the special sentence, 

including violations, shall be subject to the same set of 

procedures set out in chapters 901B, 905, 906, and 908, 

and rules adopted under those chapters for persons on 

parole. The revocation of release shall not be for a period 
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greater than two years upon any first revocation, and five 

years upon any second or subsequent revocation. A special 

sentence shall be considered a category “A” sentence for 

purposes of calculating earned time under section 903A.2.

Iowa Code § 903B.2 (2007) (emphasis added).1

Both parties focus on the italicized sentence. Anderson argues 

that under section 903B.2, the special sentence should have begun when 

he discharged the sentence for the underlying offense in Marshall County 

that led to imposition of the special sentence. He argues the statutory 

language “underlying criminal offense” is unambiguous and compels the 

court to order that the special sentence be implemented from the date on 

which Anderson discharged the two-year Marshall County sentence.

The State argues the special sentence should not begin to run until 

Anderson discharges the separate and longer concurrent sentences from 

Story County. The State first argues the language of the statute is 

unambiguous because it refers to “any applicable criminal sentencing 

provisions” and should therefore be interpreted as applying to any 

concurrent sentences. In the alternative, the State argues the statute is 

ambiguous, and, therefore, this court must look to legislative intent. The 

State points to the court of appeals decision in Popejoy v. State, 727 

N.W.2d 383, 387 (Iowa Ct. App. 2006), which held a similar statute 

imposing a two-year special sentence did not require imposition of the 

special sentence when the sentence for the underlying offense was 

completed, but instead when the defendant was released from prison

after serving any longer, concurrent sentence.

 1Iowa Code section 903B.2 was amended during the 2009 legislative session to 

clarify that the special sentence may also be served on work release, in addition to 

parole. The amendment added the sentence, “The board of parole shall determine 

whether the person should be released on parole or placed in a work release program.” 

2009 Iowa Acts ch. 119, § 60 (codified at Iowa Code § 903B.2 (Supp. 2009)). The 

amendment also added the words “or work release” after all references to parole. Id.
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In interpreting section 903B.2, “our primary goal is to give effect to 

the intent of the legislature.” In re Detention of Betsworth, 711 N.W.2d 

280, 283 (Iowa 2006). “That intent is gleaned from the language of ‘ “the 

statute as a whole, not from a particular part only.” ’ ” Id. (quoting State 

v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 630 N.W.2d 778, 781 (Iowa 2001)). “In determining 

what the legislature intended . . . we are constrained to follow the 

express terms of the statute.” State v. Byers, 456 N.W.2d 917, 919 (Iowa 

1990). “When a statute is plain and its meaning clear, courts are not 

permitted to search for meaning beyond its express terms.” State v. 

Chang, 587 N.W.2d 459, 461 (Iowa 1998). In determining plain meaning, 

“[s]tatutory words are presumed to be used in their ordinary and usual 

sense and with the meaning commonly attributable to them.” State v. 

Royer, 632 N.W.2d 905, 908 (Iowa 2001).

If the language of a statute is ambiguous, “ ‘the manifest intent of 

the legislature is sought and will prevail over the literal import of the 

words used.’ ” State Pub. Defender v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 633 N.W.2d 280, 

283 (Iowa 2001) (quoting State v. McSorley, 549 N.W.2d 807, 809 (Iowa 

1996)). We also note the rule of statutory construction that penal 

statutes “are to be strictly construed, with any doubt resolved against the 

State and in favor of the accused.” Byers, 456 N.W.2d at 919.

The language of Iowa Code section 903B.2 is unambiguous. The 

statute states the ten-year special sentence “shall commence upon

completion of the sentence imposed under any applicable criminal 

sentencing provisions for the underlying criminal offense and the person 

shall begin the sentence under supervision as if on parole.” Iowa Code 

§ 903B.2 (emphasis added). The words “underlying criminal offense” are 

a specific reference to the offense which led to the imposition of the tenyear special sentence, here, the Marshall County conviction. The only 
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way this sentence could be read to allow the special sentence to begin 

after Anderson completes the concurrent Story County sentences would 

require this court to ignore the words “underlying criminal offense.”

The State argues the words “any applicable criminal sentencing 

provisions” suggest section 903B.2 be read to apply to any concurrent 

sentences. However, these words are modified by the phrase “for the 

underlying criminal offense” and therefore are limited to any sentencing 

provisions “for the underlying criminal offense,” here, the Marshall 

County sentence.

The State questions how one can be in prison and on parole at the 

same time. Iowa Code section 906.1 defines parole as “the release of a 

person . . . , which release occurs prior to the expiration of the person’s 

term, is subject to supervision by the district department of correctional 

services, and is on conditions imposed by the district department.” 

Although the language of section 903B.2 indicates the special sentence 

should be served on parole, the specific language states it should be 

served “as if on parole.” Iowa Code § 903B.2 (emphasis added). Use of 

the phrase “as if” allows the State to formulate a special sentence of 

parole, although the defendant is not necessarily being released from 

another sentence early. Similarly, the legislature’s use of the words “as if 

on parole” indicate the requirement is compatible with a special sentence 

beginning while a defendant is serving a separate concurrent offense. 

This clarifies that the “special” parole contemplated could be served while 

in prison—it is “as if” the inmate is on parole.

The State also argues the statute’s references to parole 

demonstrate the legislative intent for the special sentence to begin after 

any concurrent sentences. We disagree. We must determine legislative 

intent based on the language chosen by the legislature. Byers, 456 
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N.W.2d at 919; see also Carolan v. Hill, 553 N.W.2d 882, 887 (Iowa 1996) 

(“[W]e should not speculate as to the probable legislative intent apart 

from the wording used in the statute.”). The legislature’s use of the 

words “as if on parole” could suggest two alternate interpretations of the 

legislature’s intent. First, as the State suggests, the intent behind 

section 903B.2 could be “to provide a controlled, gradual, supervised 

release into the community.” Popejoy, 727 N.W.2d at 387. In Popejoy, 

the court of appeals held a two-year special sentence would begin to run 

only after the defendant served a separate concurrent sentence. Id. 

Popejoy considered Iowa Code section 709.8 (2001), a different statute 

than section 903B.2. Although the two are similar because both created 

a special sentence, the language used by the legislature is not identical. 

Section 709.8 referred to the “preceding sentence,” which the court of 

appeals interpreted to include a concurrent sentence, id., whereas

section 903B.2 refers to the “underlying criminal offense.”

The second potential rationale behind section 903B.2 is that those 

required to serve a special sentence be supervised for an additional tenyear period. As this court stated in State v. Tripp, 776 N.W.2d 855, 858 

(Iowa 2010), “Parole is a lenient form of punishment that monitors a 

person’s activities to ensure the person is complying with the law.” If a 

defendant begins to serve the ten-year sentence while still imprisoned on 

a separate concurrent sentence, the defendant will still be supervised 

and monitored during that time.

Given the two possible rationales behind section 903B.2, we must

rely on the language chosen by the legislature. The language of section 

903B.2, which states that the special sentence “shall commence upon 

completion of the sentence imposed under any applicable criminal 

sentencing provisions for the underlying criminal offense and the person 
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shall begin the sentence under supervision as if on parole,” cannot be 

read to include a separate and concurrent sentence. We hold the tenyear special sentence should have begun to run when the sentence for 

“the underlying criminal offense,”—Anderson’s Marshall County 

sentence—was completed.

IV. Conclusion.

Iowa Code section 903B.2 requires that a special sentence begin to 

run when the sentence for the underlying criminal offense is discharged, 

even if the defendant is serving a longer concurrent sentence. 

Anderson’s ten-year special sentence should be calculated as if it began 

when he discharged the Marshall County sentence—the sentence for the 

underlying criminal offense.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE 

REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.