## In the Court of Appeals Sec ond Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Wo rth

___________________________ No. 02

- 20

- 00186

- CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 67th District Court Tarrant County, Te xas Trial Court No. 067

- 304035

- 18
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Womack, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack 

### E DGAR 

### W

ASHINGTON 

### , F LORENCE 

### H ILL 

### , AND 

### C HRISLYN 

### H ILL 

### , Appellants

V



### . S TATE 

### F ARM 

### M UTUAL 

### A UTOMOBILE 

### I NSU RANCE 

### C OMPANY AND



### C HRYSLER 

### C APITA L 

### LLC , Appellees2 MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. I NTRODUCTION After a drunk driver struck their parked car, A p pell ants Edgar Wash ington,
F lorence Hill, and Chrislyn Hill

— proceeding pro se

— sued Appel le e s State Farm
Mutual A u tomo bile Insu rance Co mp any (the drunk driver ’ s insurance comp any) and Chrysler Cap ital LLC (the l ienholder on Appellants ’ vehicle )

. The trial court granted
State Farm ’ s and Chrysler Capit al ’ s motio ns for summary judgment, and Appe llan ts

a ppealed. I n their pro se brie f , Appel lants assert six issues with numerous complaints

. We hold that Appellants have not shown error and affirm the trial court ’ s judgment s . II. B ACKGROUND
A. Appellants ’ Live Plea d ing According to A ppellants ’ “ A me nded Comp lain t

– Number 3, ” in late
O ctober 2016, while dr iving un der the influence of alcohol, Kyle Colem an dro ve i nto their pa rked vehicle , a 2 012 Hon da C ivic , pushed it over a curb , and crashed it into four other parked veh icles. Police later impounded the Honda

. A s further alleged in the pleadings, Chrislyn , a c o

- signer on the H onda ’ s note and the vehi cle ’ s primary driver , no w found herself with out trans por tation. 1 Edgar ,

1 Because F lorence H ill and Chrislyn H ill share the sa me s urname, and bec ause K yle C oleman and Monte Coleman, who is ref erenc ed belo w , also share t he same surnam e , we refer t o them by their first name s to avoi d confusion

. A nd to be
c onsistent, we r e fer to Edgar Was hington by his first name too

. See In re Gu ard i anship of Jones , No

. 20

- 04 39, 2021 WL 4228048, at *1 n.1 (Tex. Sept

. 17, 2 02 1).3

Chrislyn ’ s stepfather and the other co

- signe r on the note, found himself with a severely dama ged car an d , a ssu m i ng payments on the car were stopped, a threat to his
credit. Florence , Chrislyn ’ s mother an d Edgar ’ s spo use, worried about her daug hter ’ s

w ell

- being

. Appellants notified their ve hicle’s li enho lde r , Chrysler Capital , that their Honda had been damaged, was undri veable, and had been impounded by the police.
Accord ing to Appell ants, Chrysler Capital gave them no instructions about whether it expected them to continue making pay ments o r abou t what would happen if they stopped making payments. 2
The vehicle that Kyle drove was owned by h is father , Monte Colem an , an d insured by Monte ’ s insur ance co m pany, State Farm

. 3 According t o Appell ants, State
Farm had “ accepted liab ility ” for all five da maged vehi cles. A State Farm adjuster met with App ellants, and Edgar si gne d a release a nd gave it to the adjuster with the unde rstanding that the adjuster would give the release to Copart Towing Company so that State Farm could move the Hon da to i t s s alv age

2 Appellant s ’ com plaint stop ped short of stating how they re sol v ed this d ile m ma , but the y provide d the answer in dire c tly w hen later acknowledging that C hrysler Capital h ad “ ret r ieved the vehic le fro m the police impound.” In Chr y sler Cap it al ’s a n swer and c ounterc laim , it alleged that Edgar an d Chrislyn h a d bre ached th e ir retail instal lment sales contrac t when they s t oppe d making monthly payments

.

3 Ap p ellan ts named M onte a s a defendant in their fi rs t complaint but thereafter dropped h i s na me from t heir subse quent c omplaints ; by doi n g so, they eff ectively dismiss e d any c laims they had agai nst hi m. See Spellmann v. L ove , 53 4 S .W.3d 685, 690 (Tex

. A p p.

— Cor pus Chris ti 201 7, pet. denied)

.4

yard for inspection. Edgar a n d Florence asse rt ed that th ereafter State Farm
represent atives had assured them on multiple occasions that State Farm had taken
p ossession o f the H onda and that the Honda was in State Farm ’ s s alva ge yard

. Acco rding to Edg ar and Florence , however, those assu rances proved fal se. They
mainta ined tha t the H onda had been accumulat ing daily impound fees because Chry s ler Capital ha d delayed taking action ; they as serted that Chrysler Capit al had only “ retr ieved the vehicle from t he police imp oun d to avoid the 45 [

- ]day a uc tion
rule

. ”
Acc ording to Ap p ellants , because of State F arm ’ s mismanagement, al l three of
them

— as well as three other individ uals in their hous ehold

— we re witho ut transpor t ation

. Initially , they r esorted to renti ng c ars, but even tually they purchased
another vehicle to replace the Hon da. They maintain ed t hat th ese new expen ses caused them undue f

inancial har dships

. M eanwhile, after Ch rysler Cap ital retrieved the Honda fro m the police
i mpound , it de signated the Ho nda ’ s status as “ repo/t otaled ” and dem anded a
property

- damage payment from State Fa rm . State Farm promp tly paid. According to Appel lants, C hr y sler Capital then tu rned around and filed a claim with Appellants ’
insuranc e car rier for non payment , but th eir i nsur ance car rier denied Ch rysler C apital ’ s demand

. Appellants maintain that State Farm had paid Chr ysler Capital $3,624.53 and
the n closed th e claim, leaving them witho ut any remedy for their loss of5

tran sportation or for their mental and ph ysical dama ge s . State Farm inform ed Appe l lants that they could retrieve the “ repairable ” H ond a f rom Ma nheim Auction in
Dallas b y paying the impound and any other app licable fees , but accor ding to Appel lants, this constituted “conspiratorial and erroneous actions” th at caused “harmful personal injury” to them. Appellants maint aine d tha t Sta te Farm and Chry sler Cap ital had consp ired to benefit themsel v es to App ellant s ’ detri ment and

not e d that State Farm had lis ted the Honda as totaled for Chr ysler Capit al ’ s purposes bu t as repairable for Ap pellants ’ purposes
. 4
N ot al l of Appellant s ’ co mpla ints went unhe eded. A fter A ppellants fil e d a
comp laint with the Texas De partm ent o f Insurance, State Farm pa id the Honda ’ s impo und fees.
A ll thr ee Appellants maintained that the y we re legally disabled and tha t the

stre ss o f thi s matter had exacerbated Florence ’ s disability and h ad resul ted i n trips to the emergency roo m, su r gery, a nd the “ loss of an or gan . ” As for Edgar , Appellants
averred that he was “ very overwhelmed by this e nt ire ma tter (worsening his health as

4 A repairable vehicle a nd a totaled vehic le are n ot ne ce ssari ly mutua l l y ex clusi ve. “ T otaled” vehicles are those for which rep ai rs w ould be too costly compared t o t he v ehicl e ’s value

. C a nal In s. Co. v. Hopki

ns , 238 S.W.3d 549, 564 (Tex. App.

— Tyler 2007, pet. denied) (op. on re h ’g) ; see St ate Farm Fire & Cas

. Co. v . Mowe r , 9 17 S .W.2d 2, 4 (Tex. 1995)

. A “t otal loss” occur s in th os e si tuations where a reasonably p rud ent uninsured owne r , d e siring to resto re the property to its pre

incident condition, would not utilize t hat proper ty fo r such restoration. Canal I ns. C o. , 238 S

. W.3d at 564

. Generally, a reas onably prudent uninsured ow ner would not repair a vehicle wh e n the repair co sts e x c ee d ed the vehicle ’ s pre

- incident fair market value ; t h erefore, a “totaled” vehicle w ould also be a “total loss.” Id.6

witnessed and do cumented).” F inally, havin g no mea ns of t ransport ation, Appellants
lamented that t heir entire holi day season had been ruined

. 5 Thereafter, M anheim Auction in Dallas s old the Hon da at auction without
ch anging the vehicle registration. The fa ilure to change the vehicle registration me ant that w hen t he Drug Enforcement Administration later linked the H onda to a sting operation, DEA agents traced the Hond a back t o Appellants , who quickly found
themselves t argeted as s usp ect ed d rug de a ler s . After “getting the necessary
documents to [the] DEA,” A ppellants su c cessfully warded of f the DEA ’ s suspic ions
but not without cost ; the y averred that th e event distressed, humiliated, and d egraded
them.
F ram ing their c omplai nts i n t erms of cog nizable causes of action, Appellants alleged that St ate Farm and C hrysler Capital were negligent and grossly negligent a nd
were liable for the in t entional inflict ion of emotio nal distr ess . As a result of the
acti ons described in t heir ple adings , Appellants sought the following damages: ( 1 ) $25,000 from Chrysler Capital to cover “the cost of an unplanned vehicle purchase”; ( 2 ) $2,500 each from Chrysler Capital for damages to their credit ratings; ( 3 ) $2,500 each from C hrysler Ca pi tal for being “unethic ally mistreated as customers”;

5 Beca us e the accident occurred in late Octo ber 2016, Appell ants appeared to be
r eferring to their 2016 holiday seas on.7

( 4 ) $25,000 from State Farm for its “ mishandl ing o f said insurance claim, mistreatment and tota l inconsideration of [Appellants’] hardships”; ( 5 ) $54,000 for Edgar and $50,000 for Florence from Chrys le r Capi tal due to their “insurance claim of bodily injury and property damages being ‘irrepa rably’
a nd ‘e gregiously’ harmed”; ( 6 ) $10,000 eac h from State Farm for their “pain and suffering”; ( 7) $5,000 each from State Farm for its “failu re of standard d ut y” while handlin g the insurance claim; (8) $54,000 for Edgar and $50,000 for Florence from State F arm d ue to their “insurance claim of bodily injury and property damages being ‘irreparably’ and ‘egregiously’ harmed”; (9) $5,000 each from Chrysler Capit al for its “failure of standard duty”; and (10) punitive damages from State Farm and Chrysle r Capita l for the “serious and adverse alter ing of [Appellants’] quality of life and health.”
B. Chrysler Capital ’ s claims aga inst Edgar and Chrislyn
In additi on to Appellants’ claims against State Farm and Chrysler Capital, Chrysler Capi tal had clai ms ag ainst Edgar and Chrislyn . But Chrysler Capital’s claims against them took a circuit ous and somewhat convol uted route. Initially, Chr

ysler Ca pital filed a count er claim against Edgar and Chrislyn for
breach of the retail installment sales c ontract. At the time, though, Chrislyn was not yet a plai ntiff. Technically, Chrysler Capital could not file a counterclaim against Chrislyn

. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 97 ( A “ count erc lai m ” is a claim “ against any opposing
party [.] ” ) ; Complaint

/ Counter

- Complaint , Black’s Law Dictionary ( 1 1 t h ed. 20 1 9 ).8

Recogniz ing its error, Chrysler Capital later sought and was granted leave to file
a third

- party claim against Chrislyn for bre ach of the i nstal lment contract. Chrislyn ’s

nom enclature went from a counter

- defendant to a third

- party defendant. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 38; Complaint

/ Third

- Party Complaint

, Black’s Law Dictionary ( 1 1 th ed. 20 1 9 ). But shortly thereafter, Edgar and Florence filed their third complai nt and
adde d Chrislyn as a plaintiff. Thus, a few weeks later, Chrysler Capital again filed a counterclaim against Edgar and Chrislyn for breach of the sales co ntrac t.
C. S ta te Far m ’ s and Chrysle r Ca pit a l ’ s Motions for Summary Judgm ent
Sta te Far m ’ s and Chrysle r Capit al ’ s motions for summary ju dgment dispos ed of Appellants ’ c laims aga inst the m in two s teps
. 1. S tep One First, i n Ja nuary 2019, State Farm fil ed a traditiona l motion for summary judgment base d on Texas n ot being a direct

- action stat e . St at e Far m argued that

“ [r] egardless of the nature of the relief sought, a suit brought directly against an insurer before l

iabil ity has been determined is subje ct t o dismissal. ” See In re E ssex Ins.
Co. , 450 S.W.3d 524, 526

– 28 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding)

. State F arm e laborat ed
that “ [i] n Texas, an injured party generally has no di rect claim against the tortfeasor ’ s ins urer until the insured tortfeasor is determined li able to th e tort claimant. ” See Sta te
Farm C n ty. Mut. Ins. Co. of Te

x. v. Ol lis , 768 S. W .2d 722, 7 23 (Te x. 1989) ; Grea t Am. Ins. Co. v. Murray , 43 7 S.W.2d 264, 265 (Tex. 196 9) (orig. proceeding )

. I n support of State9

Farm ’ s motion, it relied on the plead ings

— Appellants ’ complaint and Sta te F arm ’ s

answer.
I n May 2019, the tria l court grant e d State Fa rm ’ s motion in part and denied it in part

. The t rial court (1 ) grant ed su mmary judgment aga inst Appellants on their
claims based on the damages that Kyle c ause d the H onda , and (2) denied summary judgment on App ellant s ’ clai ms bas ed on S tate Farm ’ s conduct while han dling Appellants ’ claims.
2. Step Two
Sec ond, in February 202 0, St ate F arm filed a traditional and no

- evidence
moti on for summary judgment. Also in February 202 0, Chrysler Cap ital fi le d a
traditional and no

- evidence motion for summary judgment. In May 2020 , t he t rial court granted both State Farm ’ s and Chrysler Capital ’ s motions. A pp ellants ’ claims against State Farm were “ denie d in their entirety and [were ] dismissed w

ith pre ju dice. ” In similar fashion, A ppel lan t s were ordered to t ake
nothi ng fro m Chrysler Cap ita l , and their ca uses of actio n against it were dis missed with prejudice.
III. Finality
After the trial court granted State Farm ’ s and Chrysler Cap ital ’ s motions for
summary judgment in May 2020 , Appella nts filed their not i ce o f app eal

. T h e trial

court

— c oncerned that the ju dgment m ight be interl ocutory

— asked the parties to

a ddres s finality

. St ate Far m r esponded that Appellan ts ’ claims ag ain st Kyle

— who had10

b een named in Appellants ’ complaints but who had never been served

— h ad been

e f fectively disconti nued , and Ch rysler C apital r esponded by fili ng a motion to nonsuit
it s counterclaim a gainst Edgar and Chrislyn

. A day after Chrysler Cap ital filed its

m otion to nonsuit , the trial court granted it

. O n appe al, State Farm

— perh a ps antici pating challenges t o the judgment ’ s finality

— addressed that issue in its brief and concluded that the judgment was final

.

“ Whe ther a judgment is final impacts jurisdic tion

. . . . ” Shetewy v. M edi at ion I nst. of N. Tex., LLC , 624 S.W.3d 285, 287 (Tex. App

. — Fort Worth 2021 , no pet.)

. Ap pellate courts are obli gated to review sua s pont e issues affecting jurisd i ction.
M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape , 139 S.W.3d 671, 6 73 (Tex. 2004 )

. “ [F] inality is

. . . a l ega l
que st ion that we review de novo. ” Sh et ewy , 62 4 S.W.3d a t 287. Becau se Ap pellants ’ judgment was not the product of a conventi onal trial on the merits, for the j udgment
to be final , it must dis pos e of al l the claims of all t he parties

. See In re A.S

. , No. 02

- 18

- 00400

- CV, 2019 WL 59 96981, at *2 (Tex. A pp
. — Fort W orth Nov. 14, 20 19, no pet.) (mem. op.)

. S ta te Far m ’ s May 2019 and May 202 0 summary j udgme nts and Chrysle r Capit al ’ s May 2020 summary ju dgment dispos ed of Appe llants ’ c laims a ga inst the m . These summ ary judgment s , however, did not prod uce a fina l judgment

. State Farm’s May 2019 and M ay 2020 summary judgment s did not have any la ng uage suggesting
that the court intended to dispose of all the claims of all the parties

. See Lehmann v.
H ar
- Con Corp. , 39 S.W.3d 191, 206 (Tex. 2001) ( “ A statement like , ‘ This ju dgment11

finally disposes of all par ties an d all claims and is appealable ’ , would leave no doubt

a bout the court ’ s in tention. ” )

. I n contr ast, Chrysler Capital’s May 2 020 su mmary judgment had the wor d “final” in its title and con tained a Mother Hub b ar d claus e ( a clause den ying all other relief no t expressly granted)

. Id. at 192. B ut b ecause the
summary judgment was not the product of a conventio nal tr ial o n the merits, n eit h er the “ fina l ” in the t

itle nor the Mother H ubbard c lau se made the judgmen t final. See id.

at 205 ( “ An ord er does not dispose of all cl aims and all parties merely because it is
entitled ‘ final ’ , or becau se the word ‘ final ’ appear s el s ewhe re in the order .

. . . ” ) ; id.

at 20 6 ( “ The Mother Hubbard clause proved to give no i ndic at i on of fin ality not just
bec ause it found its way into every kind of order, but because it was inhe rently ambig uous . . . . ” ) ; see also A. S. , 2019 WL 5996981, a t *2

. I n the trial court ’s finality inquiry, it specifically asked about Ky le

. In Appellants ’ th ird co m pla int, they ident if ied thr ee defendan ts: (1) Kyle , (2) Stat e Farm, and (3) Chrysler Capital

. State Farm r es ponded that Kyle had never b e e n s erved an d
had ne ver appea r ed, so the Ap pellants ’ claims against him had effectively b een disco ntin ued. W e agree. S o far as c an be determined from the record, Kyle was

ne ver served wi th citation and d i d no t answer, and there is nothin g to indi cate th at Appellants ever expected to obtain service on him. In t hese circum stan ces , the case

st ands as if there ha d bee n a d iscontinuanc e as to Kyle

. See Youngst own Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Penn , 363 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. 1962) ; Slater v. Nat ’ l Med. E nters. , 962 S .W.2d 228, 232 (Tex. App

. — Fort Worth 1998, pe t. denied ) ; see also Tex. R. C i v . P

. 161.12

Chr y sler Cap i tal respon d ed to a s econd finality con cer n

— its counterclai m against Edgar and Chrislyn

— b y f i l i n g a motion t o nonsuit

. T he trial court promptly granted the m oti on, and n o other c laim s or parties rem ained.
W e conclude that the judgment is final.
IV. D IS CUSSION On ap p eal, Appe l lants rais e six issue s : (1) t hey attack the trial court ’ s May 2019 summary judgme nt : The 67th District Court abused its dis cretion when it failed to give a fa i r an d ‘final judgme nt rul ing’, based on Appellants’ facts and la w, with the DENIAL o f App ellee State Farm’s Tradition al Motion for Summary Judgment hearing in May of 2019, where Appellee Chrysler Cap ital LLC

‘ fully ’ agre ed with State Farm’s Traditional Mo t ion for Summary Jud gment for dismissal of the case. This said C ourt also ruled agai n s t g iving ‘anym ore’ time to any parties on the case [;] 6 (2) t hey contend that the trial court abu sed its discretion by not taking judicial

no tice o f newl y dis covere d evidenc e : Th e 67th District Court abused its discretion when it fa iled to h ear a nd rul e on Appel lants’ M otion for Judicial Notice that exposed newly discovered medical evidence for Appel lant Edgar Washington at a deposition held in Dec 2019, i n wh ich medical sym ptom s were exacerbated by Counsel for Chrysler Capital LLC, (Der ek Fe ibel) , due t o the unp r ofession al ‘and’ unlawful conduct of his [;] (3) t hey complain about the tr ial court ’ s failure t o send their cas e to mediat ion : Th e 67t h District Cour t abus ed its discretion by its failure to Order all parties to mediation, as r equested by the Appe llant s , agreed to by presiding court Judge Cosby , and not objected to by said Appe llees’

6 We have m ade n o at t empt to edit t h e six q u oted issues

.13

counsel presen t at a Nov 2019 hearing, for reso lu t ion of said case, f urther delaying and harming Appellants’ case [;] (4) (a) unde r the secti ons entitle d, “ State m ent of th e Facts ” and “ Argument and Authorities for Judgment , ” Appellant s allege in their fou rth issue that a court coordinat or f

orge d the trial jud ge ’ s s ignatures on the May 2020 summary judgments : The Appellants allege th at th e Final Summary J udgment O r ders were ‘not’ signed by the 67th Court Judge (due to the ‘appearance’ of alleged forgery by the 348th & 67th Court Coordinator s Mic hele Rayburn & Becky Holland , on said Orders instead of the ruling authority Judge Cosby , and bot h Coo r dinators also ‘ c oin c identally ’ cease d employment within the same time

- frame) [ ; ] ( 4)(b) but unde r another p ortion of Appellants ’ br i ef e nt itled, “ Issue s Pres ented , ” they assert as their fourth issue that the trial court erred by r u ling on State
Farm ’ s an d C hrys ler Capit al ’ s motions for sum mary j udgment without a hearing:
The 67t h District Court abus ed its discretion by ‘apparently’, y et
‘ questionably’ d ismiss ing ‘ all claims ’ against Appellees State Farm and Chrysler Capital , LLC ‘wi th pr ejudice’ in Ma y, 2 020, without the be n e fit of th e Appel lants being heard on the matter at a Final Judgment hear ing, violating Appell ants’ rights to due process t o be heard , their ‘ t rust ’ in the judici a l in tegrity and com petenc e in their case, ‘and’ equal protection of the l aw [;] (5) t h ey a r g

ue that t he tr i al court abused its discretion by not granting th eir
post

- judgme nt motions : The 67th District Co urt abused its discretion by failin g t o Grant Appellant ’s Mot

ions to Vacate Judgment or Motion for Reconsideration based on issues raised by s a i d motions , in the interest of ‘goodness & fairness’, especial ly considering MAJOR ‘unlaw ful’ errors made by A ppellees State Farm & Chrysler Capi t al , LLC w ith regards to the ha ndling of the insurance claim [;]14

and ( 6) t hey ma intain th at the tria l co ur t

— e xhibi tin g racial pr ejudice

— abused its discretion by not filing fin dings of fact s and conclusions of law : The 67th District Court abuse d its discretion by failin g to respond with findings and/or grounds after (3) requests for ‘Finding of Fact s and Con cl u si ons o f Law’ were filed by the Appellants, making it d ifficult to
u nderstand the Court’s Final Judgme nt granted in ‘full favor’ of the A p pell ees, showing th e ‘ful l’ appearance and maltreatment of ‘racial’ bias & prejudice against a civil case (with mer it ) a s pre sented by all African

- American Appellant pro se litigants. For the reasons giv en below, we hold that Appell ants h a v e n ot show n revers ible e rror. A. The May 201 9 Su m mary J ud gment In Appellants ’ first issu e, the y argue that the t rial c ourt err ed to the e xten t that it granted State Farm ’ s tradit ional motion for su mma ry judgment and

— t o the e xtent the trial co urt denied Sta t e ’ s Fa r m ’ s motion

— i t did not enter judgmen t in their favo r on th e rem aining claims. Appellants ’ first issue fo cuses stri ctly on t he tr ial court ’ s May 2 019 summary judgment , i n whi ch t he trial court granted State Farm’s motion on
all of Appellants’ claims against State Farm based on Kyle’s conduct because the no

direct

- action rule applied [ 7 ] b ut denied State Farm’s motion on all of A ppel la nts’

7 State Farm filed it s moti on for su mmar y judg ment w he n Appel lants’ “Amended Compl ain t

– Numbe r 1” was their live pleading

. This complaint, like th e later compla ints, alleged that State Far m had “accepted liabi l ity” for all five vehicles. When t he trial court ruled on S tate Fa rm’s motion , “ [ Appe llan ts’ ] ‘Corrected’ Amended Complaint

– Numb er 2” w as their l ive pleadin g . Like their first and t hi rd
c omplaint s , Appe ll ants alleged that State Farm had “accepted l iab i lity ” for all five damaged vehi cle s.15

claims against State Farm based on State Farm’s own conduct while resolving Appellants’ insurance dispute with it , during which Appellants alleged that State Farm
had mistreated and harmed them “ separate and apart ” from anythi ng that Kyle had
do ne. We review a summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. v. J o achi m , 315 S.W.3d
8 60, 86 2 (Tex. 2010). W e consider the evidenc e presented in the light most fav orable
to the nonmo vant, crediting evidence favorable to th e non movant if r easonable jurors

co uld, a nd disregarding evi d ence cont rary to the nonmovant unless r easo nable j urors

co uld no t. Mann Frank

for t Stein & L

ipp Advisor

s, Inc. v. Fielding

, 289 S.W.3d 8 44, 84 8 (Tex. 2009) . We indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the

nonm ovan t’ s favor. 20801, In c . v. Park er

, 249 S.W.3d 392, 399 (Tex. 2008 ). A
d efendant that conclusively n ega tes at leas t on e essen ti al element of a plaintiff’s cau se of action is ent itled to summary judgment on that claim. Fro st Nat’l Ba nk v. Fernandez , 31 5 S. W. 3d 494, 508 (Tex. 2 0 10); see Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(b), (c).
1. The Den ial App ella nts con tend that t o the ext ent the tri al court deni ed Sta te Farm ’ s

mot ion, the trial court ’ s deni al implicitly recognized that their cl aims had meri t, so t he
trial court e rr ed by no t renderin g jud gment on those claims in their favor

. However, a
denial of a motion fo r summary judgment d oes no t result in a disp osition on t he
merits. See Har

t ford Acc ident & Indem. Co. v . Buckland , 8 82 S.W.2d 4 40 , 44 2 (Te x. A p p.

— Dallas 1 994, w r it denie d).16

Al thou gh A p p ell a nts fi le d th eir own motion for summary judgment , and although they acknowledge d tha t the tria l court had denied it, apart fr om alleging that
the tria l court did n ot read their motion , they d id not file a c ross

- appeal or a rg ue why

— even if it were true that the trial court did not read their motion

— th e trial court
erred ; their argument remain ed the same, that is, the natural consequence of denying
State Farm ’ s motion should have been the g ranting of theirs

. See Holmes v. Morales , 924 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Te x. 1996 ) ( “ When both parties move for summary judgment,
the non

- prev ailin g party ma y appe al both the prevailing party ’ s motion as well as its

own. ” ). We will not raise issues on behal f o f t he parti es. See San Jacinto River Auth. v. Duke , 783 S.W.2d 209, 209

– 10 (Tex. 1990) ; De Los Sant o s v. Hel denfe ls Enter

s . , Inc. , N o. 0 8

- 19

- 0 0113

- CV, 2020 W L 4782308, at *4 (Tex. App.

— El Paso A ug. 18, 2020, no pet.) ; C

antu v. Cantu , 556 S.W.3d 420, 434

– 3 5 ( Tex. App

. — Hou ston [1 4th Dist.]
2 018, no pet.). Denying State Farm ’ s motion meant that State F arm had not persuaded the trial cou rt that State Farm had met its summary judgment burde n ; d en ying State Farm ’ s m otion did not mean that Appellants had persuad ed the trial
court that they had met the ir summary judgment burden.
2
. The Grant
T o the ext ent that th e trial cour t g r an ted St ate Fa rm ’ s motion, Ap p ella n ts

c ontend tha t t he trial cour t erred because State Farm had already acknowledg ed
liab ility for a ll five vehicles th at Kyle had damage d , so th e no

- dire ct

- action rule did17

not apply

. 8 But i t do es n ot fo llow that State Farm ’ s accep t a nce of liabili ty fo r the
property damage to the H onda correl ated to St ate Farm ’ s acceptance of any liability to Appellants. App e l lan ts ’ underlying assumption is that the Honda that Kyle damaged belonged to them

. But A p p e l lant s ’ co mplaints consistently allege d and the summary

judgment evidence established that C h r ysle r Cap ital had r e p osse ssed t he Honda. 9
And Appellan ts ’ compla ints al so consistent l y alleged and the summary

- judgment
evidence established that State Farm had paid a se ttlement to Chrysle r Cap ita l

. 10

8 In Texas, the ge neral rule is that an injured part y can not sue the tortfea sor ’ s ins ure r dir ec tly u ntil the tortfeasor ’ s liability h as b een finall y det ermine d by agree ment or judgment

. Essex Ins. Co. , 450 S.W.3d at 5 2 5.

9 In a n affi davit s up porting Stat e Fa rm ’s later

- filed traditio nal an d no

- evidence motio n for su mm ary judgment, State Farm a llege d that Chrysler Capital had repossessed the vehicle : 2 0. O n or about Dece mber 7 , 2 0 1 6, t h e vehicl e was repossessed by the lienhol der San tander/ C hr ysl er Ca pital.
2 1 . On Decembe r 8, 2016, Chrysler Capital advi sed [Appellants] they had t heir ve hicle becau s e [Appellant s] br ok e pro mises in the agreement. Chrysler Ca p ital further ad vised that th e y p la nned to s ell the vehicle , but [Appell ants] could p u r chase th e vehicle back by paying the amount that they owed.
T he name “ Chrysler Capi tal ” is a d/b/ a; in its or igi n al ans wer, it i den tif ied itsel f as
“ Santander Consu mer USA Inc. d/b /a Chrysler Cap ita l

. ”

10 I n the sa me affidavit supporting S tate Farm’s tr a diti onal and no

- evidence motion fo r s ummary judgment, State Farm con firmed that it ha d pa id the lienh old e r . In the affi d avit, a Stat e F a rm r epresenta tive related,18

To overcome the no

- direct

- actio n rule, A pp ellan ts had t o s how that Sta te Farm
had admitted that Kyle wa s obl i gated to pay d amages to the m. See S tate Farm , 768 S.W.2d at 723 (sta ting that when an insured and h er insu re r pa id the c laimant
money without admitting liability for the claiman t ’ s release of all c l aims a r i sing out of
th e accident , the c laiman t ’ s assign e e
— t he doctor who h ad tre a ted th e c l aimant for injuries sustained in the a ccident

— could n ot show a judgm ent or agreement establishing that the insured was obli gated to pay the claima n t ’ s dama ges ). A t be st , Appel lants all eged that State F arm had admitted that Kyle was oblig ated t o pay C h r y sler Capital for damages to the H onda.
3. Other Matte rs With in this f

irs t issue, App ellants also co mplain abou t th e trial court ’ s g i ving
State Farm an d Ch r ysler Ca pit al more time for disc overy after hav ing s aid earl ie r that
it would no t g

iv e any additi onal time. Appellants do no t argu e that th ey opposed

1 0 . There have been several paym ent s made by State F arm in conne ction with [A ppellants ’ ] ve h icle. Enterprise was pai d directly fo r a re ntal car for [Appellants] . Further, lien holder Santander wa s paid because t h ey we re the ow n e r of the vehi cle.
1 1. We beli eve Santander/Chrysler are ess ent ia lly the same en tity. Techn ically, the e ntity is “ Sant a nder Consumer USA, Inc. d /b/a Chry sl er Capit al ” [ ] but is referred to in the claim fi le by the names not e d.
Sta te Farm also asse rted that it had paid $695 t o En terp rise on App ellant s ’ behalf b ut h ad s topped pay

i ng for Appellants ’ rental car after Chrys l er C api t al repossessed the Ho nda.19

granting more time

. See Boon

- Chapman v. Patterson , 625 S.W.3d 526, 529

– 30 ( T ex. Ap p.

— Houston [1 4 th Di st.] 2021, no pet .). To p reserve a complaint for review, an appellan t must make a ti m ely motion or objection to the trial court that state s th e grounds for the ruling that t he c o mplaining party sought from the trial court with

su f fici en t specificity to ma ke the trial cour t a ware o f the complaint, unless the spec ific ground s were apparent f rom the co ntex t. Lopez v. Rocky Creek Partners, LLC , 623 S.W.3d 510, 514 (Tex. App.

— San Ant o nio 2021, no pet.) ; see Boon

- Chapman , 62 5 S.W.3d at 529

– 30

. App ellants hav e not shown tha t th ey have p reserved this complain t for our review. Se e Tex. R. App. P

. 33 .1(a).
W e o verrule Appel lant s ’ fir st issue.
B. Jud ici al Notice In Appellants ’ se cond iss u e , they argue that the trial court erre d by not taking j ud i c i al noti ce of n ewly d isc overed evi den ce. S ee Tex. R. E vid. 201. Appellants r efer
to their Dec ember 20 19 “ Motion for Judicial Notice ” in which they allege d that Edgar
had been b adgered and bullied duri ng his deposition t o the point t hat Florence , who

was present at the d epo sition, feared that her husban d mi g ht s uffer a h eart a ttack. In
their prayer to th is “ Motion f or Jud i cial N otice, ” they asked the t r ial cou rt to order
their c ase to mediation , t o consider sanction s, a nd to r esol ve the i r cas e qu ic kly
bec au se the proceeding s were compromisin g the ir health

. T he trial court could not properly take jud ic ial not i ce of wha t ha d ha ppened a t Edgar ’ s d eposition

. See In re J.L. , 1 63 S.W .3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005) ( s tating that cour t20

should no t hav e taken judicial n ot ic e of t estimony co ncer ning d isputed facts)

. The
f acts surrounding the depositi on are su bject to re ason a ble di spu te , are not generally
kno w n w i t hin the trial court ’ s territorial jurisdiction , and cannot be accurately an d readily d eter mined from sources wh os e accu racy cannot rea sonabl y be questioned.
See Tex. R. Evid. 20 1(b) ; In re Allen , 359 S.W.3d 284 , 28 9 , n.5 (Te x. App.

— T exarkan a 2012, orig. proc eedi ng

) (op. on r eh ’ g) ( “ No judicial notice could have been t aken of [th e affidavit ’ s] content because the c on t ent [ e x pla ining the j usti ficati on for removing
the c h i ld] was not a s ubject matter for judicial n otic e. ” )

. By no t takin g ju dic ia l n o ti ce , the tr ial court did not err. We overrule Appellants ’ second issue.
C. Mediati on and A

rbi trati on In Appellant s ’ th ir d iss ue, t h ey c omplai n that th e tria l court did not send t heir
case to med iation. Within this iss ue, they also add ress a rbitration.
O ur review of the clerk ’ s record shows that (1) on Septem b er 2 6, 2019 , Appell ants f

ile d a “Motion to the Court for Re fe rral of the Above

- Referenced Case for (ADR) Alternati

ve Disp ute Resolution ” ; (2) o n November 13, 201 9, Chrysler Capit a l f iled a response to Appellants’ motion in which it argue d that the partie s21

sh ould c omplete discovery be fore proceeding to mediation ; a nd (3) App ell ants filed a November 18, 2019 reply to Chrysler Capital’s response

. 11 Thereafter, at a Novemb er 22, 2019 hearing, the trial court granted Appellant s ’
moti on fo r mediation bu t d elayed media tio n un til after th e parti es had engaged in
discover y . The trial cour t tol d Appell a nts that me diation would occur at lea st thirty days before tri al. Appellants did not ob ject to d elayi ng medi ation until after the parties had conducted d i sc ove ry. See Wh eeler v. Gree ne , 194 S .W.3d 1, 6

– 7 (Tex. App.

— Tyler 2006, no pet. ) ( “ If a pa r ty fails to obt ain a ruling, error is not pre served and the complaint on appeal is waived. Here , since t he re c ord do es not indicate that
the trial court ever mad e a ru ling on [th e appellant ’ s ] m otio n for m edi ation, we hold
that [ the appellant] has fa i led to preserve err or. ” ( citation omitted) ).
As o f November 22, 2019, s ome of Appellan t s ’ claims had already been disp ose d of in the trial court ’ s May 2019 summary judgm e n t , so m ediati on was not neede d f or thos e c laims. I n Fe bruary 2020 , both State Farm and Chrysler Capital filed
the ir tradi tional and no

- evidence m otio n s for summary judgment , an d i n May 2020,

t he tr ial court granted b oth motions

. Thus, m ediat io n was no long er needed for those
claims

. Th e summary judgm e nt s ha d effec tiv ely mooted the need for m ediation on Appellant s ’ r e maini n g cl aims

.

11 As not ed ea rlier, t he prayer to App ella n ts ’ Dec em ber 2 3, 2019 “ Motion for Judicial Notice ” ask ed the trial court to send t he case to mediat ion, but the body of th is motion does not mention mediati on.22

In Appel lants ’ b rief, they also cite a r bitrati on aut hority , wh ich, they note , is binding on the parties

. Yet they make no reference to any cont ra ct con tain ing a bi nding arbit ration agreement. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). “ A party see ki ng to
comp el arbitration must establish the existence of a va lid arbit r a ti on a greemen t a nd
that t he cl aims at issue fall within the scope of tha t agr eement. ” Henry v. Ca sh Biz, LP , 551 S. W.3d 111, 115 (Tex. 2018)

. T he record does not show a mo ti on to compel
arbitra tion or a n or de r denyi ng a re ques t t o have the c a se sent to arb itra tion. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.02 1

. T hese complaints ap pea r for the first ti me

on appeal

. Therefore, Appellants have not prese rve d the m for ap pellate re vi ew. See
T ex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).
W e ov errule Appellan ts ’ thi rd i s sue. D. For ge d Signa t ure s
I n A ppe ll ant s ’ fou r th issue, they contend that a cou rt c oordina tor forg ed the signatures on the summ ary judgme n ts
. 12 Appellants do not sho w us wher e t hey rai sed this complaint in t h e trial court and, therefore , hav e n o t pres erved thi s c omp laint for

our review

. See Tex. R. App . P. 3 3.1

.

12 Althou gh no t artic ulated in Appellants’ brief, they mig ht h ave been referring to the use of sta mped si gnatu res . A judge’s stamp ed sign ature is per missible and valid. See In re Barbe r

, 982 S.W.2d 364, 367 (Tex. 199 8) (o rig. proc e eding) (“ [A] judge may sign a document by directing another person wh o is under the j udge’s immediate authority to affix the j ud g e ’s signature using a rub ber sta mp.”)

.23

In addi tion to the general forgery alle gation in their f ourth issue, Appellants
also contend that the tri al co ur t vio lated t heir constitutional rights b y granting State
Farm’s and C hry s ler Ca pital’s t rad iti on al a nd no

- evi dence motio ns for summa ry ju dgment without a hearing. App ellants did not brief this conten t ion at all. See Tex.
R. A pp. P. 38 .1(i). N ot b rie fi ng an argument waives the complaint. Eagle Oil & Gas
C o. v . Shale Expl., LLC

, 5 4 9 S.W.3d 256 , 286 (

Tex. Ap p.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 201 8 , pet . dism’d)

. Regardless, t rial courts may decide motions for su mmary judgment on submission without a rgument by cou ns el or the parties

. Martin v. Martin, Martin &
Richards , I n c. , 9 8 9 S.W.2d 357, 3 5 9 (Tex. 1998 ); Green v. Midland Mor t g. Co

. , 342 S.W. 3 d
6 86 , 692 (

Tex. App.

— H ouston [14th Di st.] 2011, no pet.); Guereque v. Thompson , 953 S.W.2d 458, 465 (Te x. App.

— E l Pa so 19 97, pet. denied). “ [T]he rule allowing for summary jud gme n t when properly follo w ed neither v iolates one’s right to a jury trial,

nor due p r ocess.” Crampton v. Com m’n f or L awy er Discipline , 545 S.W.3d 593, 606 (Tex. App.

— El Paso 2016, pe t. denied ).
We o verrule Appellants ’ fourth is sue. E. Post j udgme nt Motions
In A ppellant s ’ fift h i ssu e, they a rgue that the trial cour t abu sed its disc retio n b y

no t g rantin g the ir p ost j udgme nt m o ti ons (a “ Motion for Rec onsid erati on of Final Judgme n t , Granting

. . . St at e Farm [ ’ s ]

. . . and Chrysler Capital[ ’ s] Traditional & N o

E v idence M otions for Su mm ary Judgment ” and a “ Motion to Vacat e Jud gm ent ” )

.24

R ely ing on “ goodnes s & fa ir ness , ” Appellants refer to their ea rli er argument th a t when t he tria l cour t denied Stat e Far m ’ s traditional motio n for summary jud g ment , that ru ling shou ld ha ve t r ansl a te d in to a judgment in their fa vor on the mer i ts
. W e re v iew a trial court ’ s denial of a motion for reconside rati on f or an a b use of
discre tion. See Hermosillo v. K. Ho vnania n Hom es DFW, LL C , 3 29 S.W.3d 181, 185 (Tex. App.

— Dall as 2 010 , no pet.). A trial court abus es its dis cr etion when it acts
wi th o ut re ga rd t o any guiding rules or principles. Cire v. Cummings , 134 S. W .3d 835 , 838

– 39 (Tex. 2004).
A s part of Appellants ’ f

i r s t issu e, we have alr ea dy addr essed this cont entio n and
rul ed against Appellants

. See Har t fo rd , 882 S.W. 2d at 44 2

. We cannot c o nclud e that
the trial court ruled with out regard to guiding rule s a n d princ i ples.
W e ove r rule Appellant s ’ fifth issue.
F. Fi nding s of Fac t and Conclusions of Law In Appe llant s ’ s ixt h is sue , they maintain that the tr ial court abused its discretion by n ot fi li ng an y f

indings of fact a nd conclu sion s of law. The recor d shows th a t Ap p ellants f

iled a r eque st for fi ndings of fact and conc l u sion s of law and, late r, a

no t ice of p ast

- d ue findings of fact and conclusions of la w. The reco rd a lso shows
that the t rial co urt d eni ed b oth A p pellant s ’ reque st and notice , and i n both ord ers, the

t rial court cited case law for the prop ositi o n tha t f in di ng s of fa ct and conclusions of law are inappropriate after a co urt render s a s ummary judgment

. S e e IKB Indus. v. P ro
L i ne Co rp

. , 93 8 S.W. 2d 440 , 441 (Tex. 1997 ); Linwood v. NCNB Tex

. , 885 S.W. 2d 102 ,25

10 3 (T e x. 1 994

)

. Th e t ri a l cou rt i s corr ect. See I K B In d us. , 938 S.W.2d at 441; Linwood , 885 S .W.2d at 103

. Therefore, Appellants have not shown t hat t h e trial co urt ab used
it s discretion. Appellants also allege th at the t rial co ur t exhibited racial prejudice. This
al l egation also la cks an y record support. “Appell ate grounds are the best way to

atta ck ad ve rse r ulings; us ing a dverse ru lings as evidence o f judicial bias is a hard er sale.” Song v . Kang

, No. 02

- 18

- 00375

- CV, 2020 WL 1 808487, at *7 (Tex. App.

— Fort
Worth Ap r . 9, 2020, pet. denie d) (mem. op.).
We overrule Appellants ’ sixth iss ue. V. C ONCLU SION
Ha ving overruled Ap pe llant s ’ s ix issues, we affir m th e trial court ’ s judgme nt s .
/s/ Dana Womack
Dana Womack J ustice
De livered : October 2 8 , 20 21