The Human Touch: The History of
the Skylab Program

by Donald C. Elder

On February 8, 1974, astronauts Gerald P. Carr, Edward G. Gibson, and
William R. Pogue, after an eighty-four-day mission in outer space aboard
an orbital laboratory named Skylab, boarded an Apollo command module
and returned to earth. Their splashdown marked the end of a venture involving
three separate crews that had set twenty-five International Aeronautical
Federation world records and had managed to complete ninety major scientific
experiments.1 It therefore surprised
no one when two months later the Collier Committee announced that it had
selected the Skylab program as the recipient of the 1973 Robert
J. Collier Trophy. The official announcement of the award duly noted the
importance of "the production of data of benefit to all the people on Earth,"
but had prefaced that praise by asserting that Skylab had proved
"beyond question the value of man in future explorations of space."2
The Skylab program, then, had a great immediate impact in aiding
the expansion of scientific knowledge, but also offered the long-range
benefit of demonstrating the importance of the continuance of the human
component in the American space program.

This essay examines the history of Skylab. The story begins with
the first suggestions for a laboratory in outer space, then turns to a
discussion of how such an idea gained official acceptance from the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Each of the missions will
be considered, and the results they yielded will be assessed. Throughout
the story, I will analyze how various groups competed with each other to
control the design, timing, and function of the project. Although stressing
the role technological innovation played in the eventual success of the
Skylab
program, I will demonstrate how the human element was crucial at every
stage of this "exceedingly complex enterprise."3
Finally, I will suggest the ways in which the program resonated with, and
still influences, the goals and objectives of NASA.

The Promise of a New Day

The idea of placing a vessel with a human crew into Earth orbit first
appeared in 1869 when an American, Edward Everett Hale, wrote a short story
about launching a brick structure large enough to house a crew of thirty-seven
into outer space. During the first half of the twentieth century individuals
from the scientific community, including Konstantin Tsiolkovsky and Hermann
Oberth, took up the subject. The possibility of placing such an object
into orbit seemed remote at that time, however, due to the absence of a
viable launch vehicle.4



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|Photo of Skylab over clouds and open ocean.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|The Skylab space station cluster in orbit.
Note the solar shield, deployed by the second crew, which shades the Orbital
Workshop. The OWS solar panel on the left side was lost on launch day.
NASAs Skylab program, with special recogwition to program director
William C. Schneider and the Skylab astronauts, received the Collier
Trophy in 1973, for the production of scientific data about long-term spaceflight.
(NASA photo no. 74-H 98).

The prospects for an orbiting Space Station improved remarkably with
the success of the German V-2 rocket program during the second World War.
In the postwar years, the United States Army combined German technology
with work done during the war by the jet Propulsion Laboratory to create
successively more powerful rockets. Aware of the progress in this area,
individuals from a number of countries soon made detailed proposals to
take advantage of the launch capabilities rockets now offered. But in spite
of the fact that launch vehicles by the mid-1950s had demonstrated great
potential for lifting payloads into outer space, no government proved willing
to commit itself to backing a venture to place an object into Earth orbit.
A manned orbital laboratory therefore remained a distant goal.

But official interest in the concept of a Space Station soon came in
the wake of the launching of Sputnik I in October 1957. To develop
and guide a systematic American response to the Soviet accomplishment,
in 1958 Congress passed a law which created a civilian space agency, the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Shortly after NASA became
operational, T. Keith Glennan, the agency's first administrator, announced
that the United States would launch a person into outer space as part of
its program of operations.5 Encouraged
by this development, certain individuals at NASA soon began to explore
the possibility of placing a Space Station and operations crew into Earth
orbit.



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FROM ENGINEERING SCIENCE TO BIG SCIENCE 215

This groundswell of interest soon found support from the higher echelons
of the space agency. Appearing before the Senate Committee on Aeronautical
and Space Sciences on February 20, 1959, NASA Deputy Administrator Hugh
L. Dryden and Assistant to the Director of Space Flight Development DeMarquis
Wyatt discussed the missions the agency eventually hoped to accomplish;
a Space Station and an orbital manned laboratory figured prominently in
their plans.6 Indeed, NASA would request
two million dollars for fiscal year 1960 to conduct a feasibility study
regarding the building of a space laboratory. By the spring of 1959, NASA
had definitely embraced a concept which two years earlier had seemed quite
remote.

Other groups also began to express an interest in the idea. As part
of a program to investigate the possibility of creating a military base
on the moon, Wernher von Braun of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency, in
June 1959, suggested that a necessary step in such a venture would involve
first building an orbital Space Station. As a "quick fix" to accomplish
this first step, von Braun proposed using the final stage of a launch vehicle
which had achieved orbit as the foundation upon which to build such a vessel.
Although the Army would never implement such a program, von Braun's idea
would figure prominently in shaping the thinking about the configuration
of Skylab.7

One month after von Braun submitted his proposal, a meeting took place
at NASA's Langley Research Center to define the goals of the space agency
for the orbital space laboratory that Dryden and Wyatt had testified about
in April. At this conference, held on July 10, 1959, the participants agreed
that such a venture should serve three purposes. First, it should allow
scientists to study "the psychological and physiological reaction" of a
human being in outer space over a long period of time. Second, it would
permit technicians to analyze how materials, power sources, and control
mechanisms would function "in a true space environment." And third, a space
laboratory would provide a test of "communication, orbit control, and rendezvous"
techniques, and would allow the evaluation of a person's ability to gather
terrestrial and astronomical information while in orbit.8

The minutes of this conference clearly indicate that by the end of 1959
NASA had taken significant steps toward creating a program to place a laboratory
and crew in orbit. But the record also shows the agency recognized even
at that early date that landing a person on the Moon might rank as a higher
priority program in the American space program. Indeed, the participants
at the July 10 meeting noted that they envisioned the space laboratory
"as one of the initial steps in the actual landing of a man on the moon
in 10-15 years."9 This focus suggests
that from the beginning the agency saw an orbital laboratory as merely
a component of a larger mission, rather than as a program which could stand
on its own technical merit.

This evaluation of the potential priorities of the space agency seemed
to be born out in the next three years. In 1960, NASA Administrator T.
Keith Glennan favored making a lunar expedition the priority of his agency
after the completion of Project Mercury; in May 1961, President John F.
Kennedy announced his goal of placing a person on the Moon by the end of
the decade. Wernher von Braun and others argued for adopting a



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216 THE HUMAN TOUCH: THE HISTORY OF THE SKYLAB PROGRAM

mission configuration which would use an orbital vehicle as a staging
base for a lunar mission; such a vessel, they reasoned, could also serve
as a space laboratory between lunar missions.10
In June 1962, however, NASA officials opted for a plan involving a command
module placed in orbit around the Moon. Such a scheme did not require a
vessel and crew as a way station in Earth orbit, thus effectively shelving
von Braun's concept for at least the duration of the lunar program (known
as Apollo).11

Although disappointed by the decision, proponents of a permanent laboratory
in space remained hopeful that NASA would eventually embrace that concept,
and continued to plan for such an eventuality. On October 17, 1962, Joseph
F. Shea, Deputy Director for Systems, Office of Manned Space Flight, asked
the agency's centers to submit opinions on how NASA could use and benefit
from an orbital vessel capable of sustaining a crew. The Manned Spaceflight
Center (MSC) quickly responded to Shea's request, putting together a proposal
detailing the areas on which private contractors would have to do studies
to determine the feasibility of such a venture. By March 4, 1963, work
completed in this area allowed Hugh Dryden to testify before Congress that
a manned laboratory in Earth orbit had become an "obvious candidate" for
a place in the space agency's program (named the Apollo Extension System)
after the completion of Apollo. 12

Reflecting the optimism of the deputy administrator, the MSC in June
1963 engaged the Douglas Aircraft Company and the Boeing Company to do
studies on possible configurations for such a vessel. Additional support
for the concept of an orbital space laboratory came in October 1963, when
officials from the Department of Defense and NASA agreed to explore the
possibility of jointly developing plans for such a vessel. Although nothing
ever came of this proposal, it did aid NASA officials in more clearly defining
their aspirations regarding such a program.13

Up until this point, all of the work done on projects to succeed Apollo
had a classification of "advanced study programs." But these feasibility
studies and reports, suggesting the potential benefits from such efforts,
soon began to change the perspective of the space agency. Moreover, the
realization that without concrete plans in the very near future much of
the Apollo workforce would be idle for a significant period of time prodded
the NASA hierarchy to consider immediate steps to provide continued work
for them. Accordingly, in August 1965 NASA officials decided to change
the status of the post-Apollo program to that of "project definition."
As part of this process, one month later the agency changed the name of
the project to the Saturn-Apollo Applications Program (AAP).

George E. Mueller, NASA Director of the Office of Manned Space Flight
(OMSF), had known for some time that the future of his Apollo workforce
depended in large measure on the viability of the plans which would come
out of this office. He also had seen the erosion of support in Congress
for a continued space program on the scale of Apollo. Quickly recognizing
that an orbital space laboratory represented the proposal of the AAP with
the best chance of earning congressional approval, he began to accelerate
work on finding an acceptable configuration for this idea.14



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FROM ENGINEERING SCIENCE TO BIG SCIENCE 217

Mueller considered a number of possibilities, but soon chose an idea
suggested jointly by the Douglas Aircraft Company and the Marshall Space
Flight Center (MSFC). Ironically, it involved embracing the idea, first
suggested by Wernher von Braun, of making a laboratory out of the final
stage of a launch vehicle that had expended its fuel and had gone into
orbit. A second launch vehicle would take a crew of astronauts into outer
space to rendezvous with the spent stage; these individuals would then
flush any residue out and put in the components of the laboratory. The
concept, known as the "wet workshop," had technical merit, but also had
an economical appeal as well. Mueller recognized that the rapid progress
on the Apollo program meant that NASA would not need all the Saturn rockets
it had originally ordered, therefore freeing him from the necessity of
purchasing additional launch vehicles for the AAP. At a time when the financial
demands of the Vietnam War had just started to compete with NASA's budgetary
requests, such potential savings from AAP had great appeal to the agency.
NASA Associate Administrator Robert C. Seamans gave Mueller his approval
for the proposal in March 1966, and in November Mueller made a formal presentation
to NASA Administrator James E. Webb.15
Official backing came when Congress, acting upon Webb's recommendation,
appropriated approximately $450 million for the AAP in the 1968 Fiscal
Year budget.

With initial funding secured, Mueller then turned to the task of deciding
what scientific experiments to conduct aboard the orbital laboratory. NASA
officials saw a potential for investigations to yield information in seven
areas: life sciences, solar physics, Earth observations, astrophysics,
materials science and manufacturing, engineering and technology' and student
experiments.16 Mueller soon decided
that one of the experiments should involve photographing solar activity.
Originally NASA had intended to use a satellite called the Advanced Orbiting
Solar Observatory for that purpose, but budgetary constraints had forced
the cancellation of that project. Mueller felt that the crew of a space
laboratory could complete those photographic tasks, and had directed AAP
efforts to develop a telescopic mount for such a purpose. After extensive
work at a number of NASA Centers, on September 19, 1966, NASA's Manned
Space Flight Experiments Board (MSFEB) accepted the plan to include such
a device, known as the Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM), in the space laboratory
program.17

While the idea of the ATM had moved steadily from proposal to approval,
the selection of other experiments took much longer. Although those in
the AAP knew of over 100 experiments being considered by individuals at
the various space centers, a lack of fluids and supporting manpower prevented
many of these potential contributors from moving quickly to solidify, plans
for such endeavors. But energetic work involving visits to the various
centers by Douglas Lord, head of the Advanced Manned Missions Office Experiments
Division, spurred interested individuals to complete their feasibility
studies. By the end of 1966 the MSFEB had received and approved fifty-two
such proposals.18

Individuals involved in preparations for a manned laboratory in Earth
orbit felt quietly optimistic as 1967 began. They had seen the AAP receive
formal approval from President Johnson, and knew that the program had become
a line item of NASA's budget. Although some experts in the field questioned
the timetable, the AAP team believed that



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218 THE HUMAN TOUCH: THE HISTORY OF THE SKYLAB PROGRAM

NASA could place a space laboratory into orbit by the middle of 1968.
Understandably, then, George Mueller considered the time right to reveal
his plans to the national media; at a press conference on January 26, 1967,
he spoke publicly, for the first time, about the ambitious space laboratory
program of the agency. But an event which occurred the very next day put
the hopes of those involved with the project on hold, and came close to
scuttling the idea entirely.

|Photo of Technicians at work on a piece of test hardware for the Apollo Telescope.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Technicians at work on a piece of test hardware for
the Apollo Telescope Mount for Skylab at the NASA Marshall Space
Flight Center. Called an ATM spar assembly this piece of hardware was made
for heat tests in a Marshall Center vacuum chamber: Replicas of the ATM
solar experiments and other equipment were mounted on the spar and a metal
outside covering added. The ATM canister was tested in MSFC's Sunspot II
vacuum chamber Working on the spar are, from the top left, Ronald Andrews
and R.M. Freeman; J. B. Pendegraft, kneeling.- and J. R. Clift holding
blueprint, all of the Manufacturing Engineering Laboratory. (NASA photo
no. 69-H-1621).



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FROM ENGINEERING SCIENCE TO BIG SCIENCE 219

Battling Back From Adversity

In the late afternoon of January 27, 1967, a disastrous fire swept through
an Apollo command module perched atop a Saturn launch vehicle at the Kennedy
Space Center. The conflagration caused the deaths of astronauts Virgil
"Gus" Grissom, Edward White, and Roger Chaffee, forcing NASA officials
to reconsider many aspects of the Apollo program. This process of review
meant that the agency would not move as quickly toward a lunar mission
as originally planned, which caused the new director of the AAP, Charles
W. Matthews, to recognize the impossibility of meeting the proposed orbital
laboratory launch date.19

Unfortunately, the impact of the fatal fire did not end with the postponement.
Congress, concerned about the efficacy of NASA programs and recognizing
the increasing financial burden of the Vietnam War, appropriated only $300
million of the $457 million asked by NASA for the AAP in fiscal year 1968.
This reduction forced officials in the AAP to further postpone the orbital
laboratory schedule, which would involve three separate missions, back
into the 1970 calendar year.

These setbacks put hurdles in the path of the space laboratory program,
but paled in comparison to the challenge soon offered within the agency
itself. Robert C. Seamans, Jr., visiting space centers in June 1967 to
monitor activities in the wake of the Apollo disaster, found that many
people in the agency wanted to express their strong reservations about
the AAP mission design. Individuals at the MSC in particular believed that
the idea of converting a spent booster stage into a laboratory in outer
space posed too many potential difficulties. They asserted that building
a workshop on Earth and then putting it into orbit offered a greater chance
for success. Encouraged by the response of Seamans, personnel at the MSC
decided to make a presentation on the subject at a conference to discuss
plans for Earth-orbiting missions, scheduled for November 18.20

At the conference, both sides presented their views on the wet workshop
proposal. George Mueller felt that the proponents sufficiently answered
the objections to the AAP plans for an orbital laboratory, and reported
favorably on the concept to Robert Seamans. But the top echelon of NASA
management still had reservations based on the concerns voiced during Seamans'
summer tour, and therefore NASA Administrator James Webb felt compelled
to call for a total AAP review, which he scheduled for December 6. At that
meeting Webb found adequate reasons for placing the wet workshop proposal
on hold until the agency could conduct a total review.

To examine all the possibilities for NASA in the post-Apollo era, including
the concept of a manned space laboratory, Webb convened a special committee
in early 1968. This group, chaired by Langley Research Center Director
Floyd L. Thompson, soon demonstrated agreement about the value of an orbital
workshop. The members, however, recognized the limitations of the concept
as then constituted. In March 1968, Thompson's group suggested that if
the agency could not overcome the technical problems which beset the program
it should consider "ground-assembling the workshop and launching it dry."21

This idea, which had circulated within the agency for some time, had
great scientific merit. It would require the use of a powerful Saturn V
launch vehicle, but would allow more flexibility in mission planning. Unfortunately,
by the time of the Thompson committee report it had become apparent that
Congress, beset by the increasing financial burdens of



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220 THE HUMAN TOUCH: THE HISTORY OF THE SKYLAB PROGRAM



the Vietnam War, Great Society efforts, and the space program, would
not appropriate funds for such a modification. Moreover, NASA Administrator
Webb, who at one time had strongly supported AAP, had by this time become
a lukewarm proponent at best. Discussing AAP at a meeting with directors
of the space Centers, Webb asserted that the program was merely "a surge
tank for Apollo." Convinced that no other space agency program should demand
funds which NASA Could spend on Apollo, Webb authorized only those expenditures
for the space laboratory regarded as absolutely necessary.22
Many wondered if NASA would launch the workshop in any configuration, much
less agree to a dry workshop program.

just as the prospects for AAP seemed to have reached the lowest point,
however, a series of events transpired which revived the flagging program.
First, NASA Administrator ,James Webb announced his retirement in the fall
of 1968. His successor, Deputy Director Thomas O. Paine, had demonstrated
a much firmer commitment to the concept of a manned space laboratory, and
would become a valuable asset to the project. Second, NASA successfully
flew a manned Apollo mission in October 1968, restoring public confidence
in the space program in general. Finally, the memorable December 1968 flight
of Apollo 8 seemed to have made Congress more amenable to NASA budgetary
requests; by April 1969 NASA officials knew that they would have at least
$252 million to spend on AAP. Thus reassured, they could plan for the space
laboratory with confidence.

Revising the Configuration

With their hopes bolstered by the recent turn of events, NASA officials
began to firm up plans for an orbital space laboratory. But as those involved
in the project resumed their work, they noted a subtle change in the attitude
of George Mueller. The man who had long championed the concept of a wet
workshop now seemed determined to utilize the proposal of Floyd Thompson's
committee as well. Indeed, at a conference on May 3 and 4, 1969, Mueller
announced to those involved in the program his hope of developing a series
of missions which would include both a wet and a dry workshop.

Mueller's plan struck many as impractical. Some pointed out the financial
burdens of redesigning AAP missions, while others noted how adding a second
type of workshop would delay the program. But it occurred to Leland E.
Belew, the director of the Marshall Space Flight Center's Saturn-AAP Office,
that NASA could save time and money by merely replacing the plan for a
wet workshop with one for a dry workshop. Mueller immediately saw the logic
of this suggestion, and called upon those involved in AAP to voice their
opinions. Gradually, a consensus emerged in favor of launching a prefabricated
laboratory on a Saturn V rocket as the sole AAP effort involving a manned
space workshop. Thomas Paine made the decision complete when he gave his
formal approval on July 18, 1969.

Public notice of this change had to wait, however, until NASA officials
could officially authorize the use of a Saturn V by AAP. James Webb had
insisted upon a commitment of those launch vehicles exclusively to Apollo;
until a successful landing on the Moon, therefore, NASA could not guarantee
the availability of a Saturn V for any other purpose.23
But since the lunar module from Apollo 11 would touch down on the lunar
surface only two days after Paine's action, Mueller felt confident that
such official notification would come



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FROM ENGINEERING SCIENCE TO BIG SCIENCE 221

shortly. In fact, on July 22, 1969, those involved in AAP received the
word to proceed with the dry workshop program .24
With the goal of the Apollo program successfully attained, NASA could devote
more of its attention to planning for the future. An indication of this
shift came in February 1970, when the agency chose a name for the dry workshop
proposal. After considering over 100 possible suggestions, the NASA Project
Designation Committee selected the title Skylab, submitted by U.S.
Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Donald Steelman. But it soon turned out that
not everyone shared the optimism of the agency regarding the future of
the American space program. Thomas Paine had hoped to use the success of
the Apollo program as a springboard for funding more ambitious projects;
much to his frustration, however, he found in September 1970 that the Nixon
Administration hoped to cut the NASA budget substantially. On the fifteenth
of that month, Paine resigned.

His acting replacement, George M. Low, tried to salvage as much funding
as possible from the Nixon Administration. He succeeded in minimizing the
cuts to the Skylab project, but Low knew that this would still necessitate
a readjustment of that program's schedule. The Office of Manned Space Flight
finally set the date for the first launch of Skylab for April 1973,
and work on the program began in earnest.

In its final configuration, Skylab would consist of five components:
a command module (which would join the other components in orbit), a service
module, a docking adapter, an airlock, and a workshop. The workshop would
itself have two separate sections. The upper compartment would house the
work station and equipment for experiments, the frozen food locker, water
containers, and film bins. The lower compartment would contain "the kitchen
and dining room, bedrooms, an experimental work area, and the toilet."
The workshop, forty-one feet long by twenty-two feet wide, would provide
10,426 cubic feet of work space for the astronaut crews. Satisfied with
the design, NASA officials finalized contracts with private contractors
for the various components.25

By this time, the Skylab program had lost one champion, but had
gained another. George Mueller, the person who had guided the idea of an
orbital laboratory through troubled times, had resigned from NASA in 1969.
While he would be missed, William C. Schneider, who had become the director
of the AAP in December 1968, had already demonstrated the same enthusiasm
for the orbital workshop concept that Mueller had exhibited. Building on
the foundation established by Mueller, Schneider worked steadily on ways
to expedite the progress being made on the project. The former Apollo mission
director found the NASA system of reviews, implemented during the Apollo
program, of great help in keeping the program on schedule. The procedure,
which involved formal assessments at seven different stages of development,
insured that program officials could quickly identify potential difficulties.26
By the end of 1970, Schneider had approved the last of the modifications
necessitated by the change to the dry workshop configuration, and had authorized
the testing of the components for the project.

While the various contractors began the preparation of the materials
to be used, NASA officials finalized their assessment of the habitability
of Skylab. In the fall of 1969, Schneider had already authorized
a number of modifications in this regard; the orbital laboratory would
now have a room for the astronauts to both sleep and dine in, and an observation
window for the viewing pleasure of the astronauts. By late 1970, the only
serious question remaining about living conditions involved food. The MSC
wanted a more



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222 THE HUMAN TOUCH: THE HISTORY OF THE SKYLAB PROGRAM

elaborate system for storing and preparing meals than the Marshall Space
Flight Center felt the laboratory could accommodate. In the end both sides
compromised, and Schneider faced no further controversy involving the habitability
of Skylab.

Confident that agency officials had designed a workable program, Schneider
then turned his attention to the private companies supplying two major
components for Skylab. He knew that in April 1969 workers at the
McDonnell Douglas Corporation's Huntington Beach, California, facility
had started the process of converting a Saturn IVB final stage into an
orbital workshop. Schneider soon found that the work of the company had
fallen behind schedule. The vast number of pieces, many supplied by other
contractors, involved in assembling the craft proved especially daunting.
But by utilizing more efficient management techniques, McDonnell Douglas
proved able to increase the pace and improve the quality of its efforts.
Indeed, in 510 hours of tests during the summer of 1972 company technicians
found only minor technical flaws. Confident about the finished product,
in a ceremony on September 7 of that year, McDonnell Douglas officially
presented NASA administrators with the completed laboratory. 27

One month later, NASA received the other major component of the Skylab
vessel. Technicians at the space agency had designed a docking facility
and airlock for inclusion in the project; these would allow a crew in an
Apollo command module to rendezvous with Skylab in outer space and
enter the orbital laboratory. In the summer of 1970, the Martin Marietta
Company had built a multiple docking adapter and had sent in to the St.
Louis facility of McDonnell Douglas where workers would connect it with
the airlock they had constructed. On October 5, 1972, a NASA Super Guppy
airplane flew this last component to the Kennedy Space Center (KSC).

As NASA technicians joined the various parts of Skylab together
at KSC, agency officials finalized the process of preparing the astronauts
who would eventually live and work in it. Initially, the selection of these
individuals had created a controversy within NASA. In 1965 and again in
1967, the space agency had recruited a number of scientists for the astronaut
program, and these individuals saw the Skylab program as a logical
venue in which NASA could utilize their talents. They hoped that NASA would
include two of their number on each mission. But Donald K. "Deke" Slayton,
NASA Director of Flight Crew Operations, had chosen to include only one
scientist in each of the three three-person crews. In spite of strong protests
from the scientific community, Slayton held his ground, arguing that the
missions might need two individuals trained primarily in piloting. Backed
by Rober Gilruth of the MSC, Slayton won his case, and NASA finalized the
composition of the three crews. An all-Navy team of Captain Charles "Pete"
Conrad, Jr., Commander Joseph P. Kerwin, and Commander Paul J. Weitz would
fly the first mission. In September 1972 all the crews started a program
of mission simulations, preparing for the schedule of launches.28

Personnel at KSC began working longer hours in 1973, getting all systems
ready for the long anticipated May launch date. Inclement weather threatened
to disrupt the schedule, but by May 14, 1973, conditions had improved sufficiently
to warrant initiation of the countdown sequence. At 1:30 p.m. the 334-foot
Saturn V carrying Skylab lifted off from its launch pad, ending
the years of planning and preparation. Now the question became whether
the program could deliver on the promises its proponents had made for it.



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FROM ENGINEERING SCIENCE TO BIG SCIENCE 223

Saving the Program

Telemetry received at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) indicated that
the powerful Saturn V had taken only ten minutes to place its cargo into
orbit at a height of 270 statute miles. At that point various electrical
systems aboard Skylab began to come to life .29
At first every indication suggested a normal process, but soon Flight Director
Donald Puddy noticed readings that gave him pause for concern. After a
few hours of investigation, NASA officials determined that two things had
indeed gone wrong with the mission. First, the two solar panels, which
would provide power for the laboratory, had failed to deploy properly.
And second, it appeared that a shield designed to both protect against
micrometeorites and provide shade for Skylab had been lost. Both
of these developments posed serious, perhaps even mission-threatening,
challenges for NASA officials to ponder.

Analysis by engineers at the Marshall Space Flight Center revealed that
the loss of the micrometeorite shield would cause the temperature inside
the orbital laboratory to rise to 190 degrees fahrenheit when bathed in
sunlight. This heat, they realized, could damage the photographic film
and food aboard Skylab, more ominous still, it might melt plastic
inside the laboratory, releasing toxic fumes. The mission control team
could change the attitude of the orbital laboratory to reduce the angle
at which the rays would hit it, thus reducing temperatures, but that adjustment
would also limit the amount of sunlight reaching the solar cells of the
ATM Skylab's major remaining source of power. The attitude finally
chosen by NASA lowered the temperature inside Skylab to 130 degrees
and allowed the generation of 2800 watts of power, but NASA officials believed
that they would have to arrange for some sort of sunscreen to protect Skylab
if they hoped to save the mission.30

After NASA postponed the launch of the first crew of astronauts for
ten days, individuals at the JSC and Marshall immediately began to explore
possible methods for providing a sunscreen. After discarding a number of
suggestions, NASA officials finally narrowed the range of options to three.
One came from Jack Kinzler of the JSC's Technical Services Division, who
suggested creating a collapsible parasol out of aluminum-coated mylar supplied
by the G.T. Schjeldahl Company. Kinzler felt that the astronaut crew could
deploy such a device through the scientific airlock of Skylab after
docking. A second suggestion involved having the astronauts affix a twenty-two-by-twenty-four-foot
sunscreen to the outside of the laboratory while standing in the hatch
of their Apollo command module. Finally, a third idea envisioned attaching
a "twin boom" frame to the ATM and then hoisting a sail between the two
rods. While finally favoring the Kinzler recommendation, NASA officials
decided to have Conrad, Kerwin, and Weitz take all three devices with them
aboard the Apollo command module.31

NASA officials also hoped that the astronauts could salvage some power
capacity from the solar panels. Data received from Skylab indicated
that one of the panels had remained attached to the laboratory, but had
not deployed. If debris from the micrometeorite shield had trapped it,
Conrad, Kerwin, and Weitz might have a chance to free the panel. To facilitate
these repair efforts, the agency requisitioned specific tools from the
A.B. Chance Company and included them in the cargo which the astronauts
would take into outer space.

The astronauts lifted off on May 25, 1973. After achieving rendezvous
with Skylab and



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224 THE HUMAN TOUCH THE HISTORY OF THE SKYLAB PROGRAM

eating a meal, the crew began the planned repairs. Conrad took the Apollo
command module away from the docking port and placed it next to the remaining
solar panel which, as it turned out, had not deployed because of a strap
from the micrometeorite shield which had become wrapped around it. Weitz
attempted mightily to free the solar array panel, but had no success. Finally
abandoning that endeavor, Conrad decided to dock the command module for
the crew's rest period. But this time when he attempted the procedure,
Conrad found that the latches of the respective entry ports would not engage.
He tried a number of other docking techniques, but these too failed. As
a last resort, the astronauts effected a manual modification of their craft's
docking port, which allowed Conrad to finally couple the vessels. After
a twenty-two-hour day, the crew went to sleep in the command module.32

When the crew awakened, Weitz entered Skylab to determine if
the high temperatures had generated toxic fumes. Finding no such danger,
the crew then entered the laboratory and prepared to deploy the parasol
they had brought along. Working carefully, they managed to unfurl the device,
and noticed an immediate cooling inside the laboratory. The temperature
inside Skylab would soon stabilize at ninety degrees. The parasol
did not cover as wide a surface area as originally hoped, but it would
allow the crew to begin the schedule of experiments in relative comfort.
Conrad, Kerwin, and Weitz would waste no time in initiating these efforts.

The "Can Do" Spirit

The crew soon established a regular schedule which involved carrying
out experiments, exercising, eating, maintaining the vessel, and sleeping.
They found no difficulty in adjusting to the sensation of living in outer
space, experiencing no motion sickness, but found the pace of the tasks
assigned to them very demanding. Within days Conrad suggested revising
the time allotments for experiments and other duties, and his crew soon
settled into a comfortable routine.33
But the crew soon recognized that insufficient power levels might not allow
the completion of a number of the proposed experiments. NASA officials
concluded that the astronauts would have to make another attempt to free
the remaining solar panel.

NASA officials had prepared Conrad, Kerwin, and Weitz for their extra-vehicular
repair effort by having them train in a zero-gravity neutral buoyancy simulator.
Kerwin, however, had not found the technique practiced on Earth any help
to him in his first repair attempt. Therefore, NASA officials assigned
a group headed by Russell "Rusty" Schweickart (the commander of the back-up
crew for the first mission) to devise another method for deploying the
solar panel. The team finally recommended using a twenty-five foot long
cable cutter to free the panel and a tether to maneuver it, once freed,
into proper alignment. Ground control relayed instructions on the procedure
to the crew, and on June 7 Kerwin and Conrad left the workshop to make
another attempt.

It became immediately apparent to the two astronauts that the actual
repair efforts in outer space would differ significantly from those practiced
on Earth. To begin with, Kerwin found that he could not establish a firm
foothold on the solar observatory antenna as Schweickart had done; cables
prevented him from getting close enough to secure his feet. Every time
Kerwin attempted to position the cutter he simply drifted off until the



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FROM ENGINEERING SCIENCE TO BIG SCIENCE 225



|Photo of an astronaut taking ultra-violet photos of the Milky Way from a camera on Skylab.                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Skylab Ultra-violet Stellar Astronomy-A special
airlock in the wall of the Workshop allowed the crew to Perform several
"outside" experiments. Here, a camera equipped with calcium fluoride transmission
optics to pass ultra-violet light is aimed at stars in the Milky Way field.
(NASA photo no. 72-H-891).



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226 THE HUMAN TOUCH: THE HISTORY OF THE SKYLAB PROGRAM

cord connecting him to the antenna restrained him. Moreover, when Conrad
attempted to place the hooks of the tether into holes on the solar array
panel he found them smaller than those on the panel on which Schweickart's
team had practiced. He managed to fit one hook onto the restrained device,
but wondered whether he could exert sufficient force to free it with only
one clasp. Kerwin then began to cut the strap, but after thirty minutes
of work the astronaut had not made any progress toward accomplishing his
goal.34

At that moment, however, Kerwin had an idea. He took the line connecting
him to the antenna and shortened the length until he had secured his position.
Having thus gained leverage, within ten minutes Kerwin proved able to cut
the strap. The solar array panel then swung open at an angle of about twenty
degrees. At that point, Kerwin and Conrad began to pull on the tether connected
to the device, but with no success. Finally Conrad stood up and slung the
tether over his shoulder, while Kerwin continued to pull. This technique
worked almost too well-the recalcitrant hinge broke loose suddenly, sending
the astronauts flying off into space. When the restraining cords stopped
their motion, Kerwin and Conrad saw the panel almost fully deployed. Within
days the astronauts could report that power levels had almost doubled.

Having lost a significant portion of the four week duration of the mission
to repair efforts, NASA officials hoped to salvage as much of the experimental
schedule as possible. Forced to prioritize the investigations, they decided
to give the highest ranking to medical experiments. During the time remaining
in orbit, Conrad, Kerwin, and Weitz managed to achieve nearly 100 percent
of the projected goals that medical officials had set forth for the mission.35
Of particular interest to the medical community was the fact that weightlessness
allowed the skeletal structure of the astronauts to fully extend, increasing
their height by an inch. It also balanced fluids within the body more evenly,
thus making the faces of Conrad, Kerwin, and Weitz appear fuller. With
a regular regimen of exercise the astronauts remained in outstanding physical
condition throughout the duration of the mission, proving the adaptability
of humans to living in outer space.

The crew also managed to accomplish a high percentage of the assigned
tasks involving the observation of solar activity, eventually taking over
25,000 pictures of the sun. This endeavor proved a highly challenging one
for the crew, given the complicated nature of the control equipment. Located
in the docking adapter, these instruments activated the ATM telescopes.
Kerwin later asserted that the pace of mission experiments kept him from
ever completely mastering the control system.36
He found the procedure for observing solar flares especially frustrating.
NASA technicians had developed a sensor which would alert the crew to solar
flare activity, but the radiation field over the eastern section of South
America would frequently trigger the alarm system. After many false warnings,
the crew despaired of ever observing a solar flare. But after deciding
to spend the entire work day of June 15 in hopes of witnessing such an
occurrence, their patience paid off. Weitz proved able to record a flare
of impressive magnitude for over two minutes. Although the crew may have
felt that their work involving the observation of solar activity had not
met up to expectations, astronomers proved genuinely pleased with the results,
which they considered to have met eighty percent of pre-mission expectations.

The scientific aspect which suffered the most from the compression of
the mission schedule involved earth resources experiments. NASA officials
had included cameras and other devices to provide a more detailed analysis
of geological, meteorological, and agricultural features than could otherwise
be gathered by conventional methods. The equipment



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FROM ENGINEERING SCIENCE TO BIG SCIENCE 227



|Photo of the sun's Corona. The black dot in the center hides the bright part of the sun allowing photos of the solar flares.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|The Sun's hot outer atmosphere, or corona, color-coded
to distinguish levels of brightness, reaches outward for millions of miles.
A coronagraph, one of Skylab's eight telescopes, masked the Sun's
disk, creating artificial eclipses. It permitted 8-1/2 months of corona
observation, compared to less than eighty hours from all natural eclipses
since use of photogrophy began in 1839. (NASA photo no. 74-H-97).

which these experiments utilized required a significant amount of power
and, because of this, NASA officials had to postpone a vast number of them
at the beginning of the mission. The first crew never fully caught up,
but still managed to complete an estimated 60 percent of the planned earth
resources experiments.37

Ironically, the crew might not have done as many earth resource experiments
as they did had the astronauts not completed an in-flight repair of the
power system. During the mission, the device which collected power from
the ATM panels failed to function properly, causing concern at JSC. NASA
technicians, remembering that they had overcome the same difficulty in
ground tests by delivering a sharp blow to the device, recommended a similar
procedure to the astronauts. Conrad, wielding a hammer, soon had the power
conditioner operating properly again, and mission experiments continued.38

As the end of their mission drew near, the astronauts began their preparations
to depart from Skylab. On June 22 the crew boarded their command
module to fly back to earth. After 404 orbits and twentyeight days in space,
the astronauts made a successful splashdown in the Pacific Ocean 800 miles
west of San Diego. Picked up by the aircraft carrier Ticonderoga,
the astronauts soon received a hero's welcome when they reached the



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228 THE HUMAN TOUCH: THE HISTORY OF THE SKYLAB PROGRAM



|Photo of the sun taken from Skylab. Light and dark spots make the surface appear like the skin of an orange.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|This photo of the Sun, taken from Skylab on
December 19, 1973, shows one of the most spectacular solar flares ever
recorded, spanning more than 588, 000 kilometers (367, 000 miles) across
the solar surface. The flare gave the distinctive impression of a twisted
sheet of gas in the process of unwinding itself. The solar poles are distinguished
by a relative absence of supergranulation network, and a much darker tone
than the central portions of the disk. Several active regions are seen
on the eastern side of the disk. This photo was taken in the light of ionized
helium by the extreme ultraviolet spectroheliograph instrument of the U.S.
Naval Research Laboratory. (NASA photo no. 74-N-434).

United States. Encouraged by the success of the first mission, but concerned
that further mechanical difficulties occurring with no crew aboard to rectify
them might jeopardize the status of Skylab, NASA officials decided
to advance the launch date of the second mission by three weeks. Attention
would therefore turn again to KSC.

A Commitment to Excellence

As the second mission began on July 28, 1973, the crew Navy
Captain Alan L. Bean, Marine Major Jack R. Lousma, and civilian Owen K.
Garriottsoon realized that their experience would differ in at
least one respect from that of the first crew: Lousma reported nausea only
one hour into the flight. The other two soon experienced the same malady.
The



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FROM ENGINEERING SCIENCE TO BIG SCIENCE 229

crew attempted to work through their infirmities, but motion sickness
slowed down the pace of activity during the first few days, prompting concern
among medical officials at NASA. These officials, after reviewing the timing
of the occurrences among the crew during the day, recommended that Bean,
Lousma, and Garriott eat six small meals rather than three larger ones
each day. Whether because of this procedure or simply through an adjustment
to space, within days the crew reported that they felt back to normal.39

This return to good health came just in time. In addition to assigned
tasks involved in making Skylab operational, the crew also had the
responsibility of deploying another sunscreen over the laboratory. NASA
officials had chosen the parasol concept for the first crew to use because
of the speed with which the astronauts could deploy it, but had recognized
that ultraviolet rays would soon cause the fabric of that device to deteriorate.
They therefore decided to have the second crew deploy another device considered
for use by NASA during the original mission: the twin boom frame sunscreen.
Bean, Lousma, and Garriott had practiced extensively on the necessary construction
techniques in the neutral buoyancy tank at Houston, and with their health
vastly improved they felt ready to begin the task on August 6.

As frequently happened, this activity did not go exactly as planned.
Garriott and Lousma soon recognized that the size of the components which
they were using differed slightly from those they had practiced with on
Earth, forcing them to make a series of adjustments while out of the vehicle.
But patiently keeping at their task, the astronauts eventually managed
to assemble the frame and raise the sunscreen shade. Lousma and Garriott
then replaced film in the ATM, gathered data from previous experiments,
and checked on a potentially threatening situation involving the rocket
thrusters of the Apollo module. After six hours and thirty-one minutes
the two returned to Skylab, having established a record for the
longest period of extra-vehicular activity in outer space.40

After completing the necessary repair, the crew resumed the regular
experimental schedule. As with the first mission, the observation of solar
phenomena had received a high priority. From August 10-20 in particular,
the astronauts devoted a significant portion of their work days to capturing
solar activity on film. On August 21 the crew witnessed a gigantic bubble
develop on one side of the Sun and watched it grow to a size nearly three-quarters
that of the Sun itself. In all, the second crew would spend over 300 hours
engaged in solar-related activity; their efforts received unqualified praise
from the scientific community, and many had an opportunity to speak to
the crew directly from Houston.

This approbation did not go unnoticed. Indeed, reporter's covering the
Skylab
program asked NASA officials at a press conference on August 10 why the
second crew seemed to find greater favor with the scientific community.
Dr, Ernest Hindler of the High Altitude Observatory of Boulder, Colorado,
asserted that the first crew had actually paved the way for the rapport
with the second crew. By pointing out the flaws in the program, Conrad,
Kerwin, and Weitz had helped the second team avoid problems on their mission.
But, he conceded, the second crew also seemed more amenable to an interactive
dialogue with scientists at ground control than the first had.41

While solar observations took much of the time of the astronauts during
the first part of the mission, Earth resources observations also merited
considerable attention. All three astronauts would participate simultaneously
in these efforts, with each operating a particular piece of equipment six
major instruments in all. NASA officials planned to utilize the first and
last segments of the mission for Earth resources observation, knowing that
atmospheric conditions would limit visibility during the middle period.
In spite of certain



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230 THE HUMAN TOUCH: THE HISTORY OF THE SKYLAB PROGRAM

difficulties, the crew managed to take almost 16,000 photographs of
Earth and load data onto 18 miles of magnetic tape .42

After the first period of earth resources activity ended, the crew then
took up what NASA officials called "corollary experiments." These involved
space technology, space physics, and observations of stars. Although the
exploits of two spiders (named Arabella and Anita) overshadowed these experiments
in the eyes of the American public, the crew in fact produced a wealth
of important data.43

The endeavors of Arabella and Anita certainly certainly caught the fancy
of the people on Earth, but the astronauts themselves proved able to capture
their attention as well. Lousma provided amusing commentary about the mission
on the twenty-four-hour-delay communication channel B, and Garriott conducted
a number of experiments which gave vivid televised visual illustrations
of scientific principles. But the crew's most famous exploit involved a
mysterious voice. One day the ground control team at JSC heard a female
voice speaking to them from Skylab over the public air-to-ground
channel. Houston hesitantly responded, and the conversation with the unidentified
person went on for a few minutes. Finally, Garriott aboard Skylab
burst out in laughter; he had brought along a tape recording of his wife's
voice for this bit of levity.

While these activities illustrate that the second crew certainly liked
to have fun, they should not overshadow the fact that Lousma, Garriott,
and Bean more than met the expectations set forth for them at the beginning
of the mission. While illness and repair efforts had put them well behind
schedule for the first ten days, the astronauts soon caught up and in fact
began to ask for additional tasks. Indeed, Bean asked Houston to lengthen
the mission by at least a week to give the crew more opportunities for
meaningful research. JSC declined this request, but the astronauts still
proved able to supercede expectations by fifty percent during their mission.44

On September 25, 1973, after fifty-nine days in space, the crew boarded
the command module and began their return to Earth. At 6:20 p.m. EDT, the
capsule splashed down in the Pacific Ocean 300 miles from San Diego. Picked
up by the U.S. S. New Orleans, less than forty-five minutes later,
the astronauts received accolades for their impressive accomplishments.
Encouraged by their efforts, NASA officials eagerly began final preparations
for the third, and last, Skylab mission.

A Series of Challenges

NASA officials had hoped to launch the third crew, consisting of Marine
Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Carr, Air Force Lieutenant Colonel William Pogue,
and civilian Edward Gibson, on November 11, 1973. Flaws in the launch vehicle
temporarily postponed the mission, but on November 16 the Saturn IV blasted
off, taking the crew to a rendezvous with Skylab. After initial
difficulties, Carr managed to dock the two crafts. Under orders from NASA,
the crew would wait until after a rest period to begin the activation of
the laboratory.

To minimize the chances of having the crew suffer from space sickness,
NASA medical personnel had ordered the astronauts to take anti-nausea pills.
Unfortunately, this precaution did not help Pogue, who soon became quite
ill. Gibson and Carr pondered what to do about this incident; if they reported
the full extent of Pogue's distress (which included vomiting), NASA officials
might alter the schedule of the mission. They chose, therefore, to reveal
to Houston only that Pogue had experienced some nausea, but would withhold
any mention of the vomiting.



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FROM ENGINEERING SCIENCE TO BIG SCIENCE 231

This information would not remain a secret for long, however. The crew
had forgotten that NASA officials would hear their deliberations; an onboard
taping device had recorded their discussion word for word, and when doing
a routine review of the conversations ground control soon discovered the
coverup. Upset by the lack of candor displayed by the crew, NASA chief
of astronauts Alan B. Shepard sternly warned them not to repeat their mistake.
The crew admitted their error, and promised better behavior.45

Individuals at ground control soon found another reason to criticize
the crew. After beginning the process of activating Skylab, during
which they made a number of mistakes, the astronauts complained about the
pace of the activities planned for them. It seemed to some at NASA, however,
that the astronauts simply did not want to work as hard as they should.
In defense of the crew, it should be noted that none of the astronauts
had any space flight experience, thus making their adjustment to the mission
more difficult. In addition, NASA officials had added a number of experiments
to the mission in the period after the return of the second Skylab
crew, which left little time for Pogue, Carr, and Gibson to learn the new
procedures. Finally, the astronauts often could not find gear aboard Skylab
where NASA officials had told them to expect to find it. In spite of these
reasons, NASA flight planners continued to regard the third crew as not
working up to maximum capacity.46

Matters came to a head on December 30. The crew initiated a frank discussion
with capsule communicator Richard Truly, hoping to make NASA officials
aware of their objections to the pace of activities set forth for them.
Carr proved especially critical of the fact that NASA mission plans had
allocated virtually no free time for the astronauts directly before and
after the sleep periods. Truly attempted to mollify the astronauts by praising
their efforts to date, but subtly suggested that NASA felt that the crew
could work at a faster pace during the last half of the mission. After
almost an hour of discussion (punctuated by a 20-minute break in the communications
link) Truly ended the conversation by telling the crew that he was "very
happy with the way you're doing business." Both sides seemed satisfied
that they had clarified their respective points of view, and in the days
to follow, ground control noted a new sense of responsiveness on the part
of the astronauts.

This incident illustrates an inherent tension that ran through much
of the history of the space program. Beginning with the confrontation between
the original seven astronauts and the designers of the Mercury capsule
over the inclusion of a window in the spacecraft, astronauts had repeatedly
disagreed with positions taken by the scientific and engineering community
regarding the subject of space flight. To the crew of the third mission,
it seemed as though flight planners felt that every mission could be treated
like a computer ready to be programmed. Pogue, Gibson, and Carr had asserted
the astronauts' view that flexibility had to be built into a flight plan
to provide for the diversity of each human put into outer space. In the
wake of their conversation with Truly, the astronauts felt that they had
regained their individuality.

Pleased with their new freedom, the astronauts threw themselves back
into their work. Gibson in particular demonstrated almost a compulsion
to record a solar flare in its entirety, spending extra time manning the
solar observation controls. His diligence was rewarded on January 21, 1974,
when he witnessed an impressive solar event.47
Coupled with the observations already done on the comet Kahoutek, the third
crew could therefore take great pride in their contributions to the field
of astronomy.

Not much time remained for the third crew in space. The astronauts did
a number of medical experiments in the days after January 20 and conducted
their final televised press conference, but they also devoted an increasing
amount of time to preparations for the



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232 THE HUMAN TOUCH: THE HISTORY OF THE SKYLAB PROGRAM

eventual moment of deactivation. They experienced some difficulty in
storing in the command module all the things they wanted to take back to
Earth, but using ingenuity and a certain amount of force they succeeded
in packing their craft. On February 8 the crew boarded the command module,
but before disengaging from Skylab they used the thrusters of the
Apollo spacecraft to lift the laboratory to a higher orbit. After accomplishing
that task, Pogue, Carr, and Gibson headed for earth.

One final bit of adventure awaited this crew. When Carr attempted to
maneuver the command module prior to reentry, he found that neither the
pitch nor the yaw controllers worked. Momentarily nonplussed, he nevertheless
quickly shifted to another system and resumed the landing sequence. Later,
the astronauts revealed they had accidentally activated a set of circuit
breakers, thus neutralizing the thrusters in question. Carr's rapid response
had saved the day. As on the second mission, the Navy used the U.S. S.
New
Orleans to conduct the recovery operation for the final crew, thus
bringing to an end the 171 days, 13 hours, and 12 minutes of space flight
connected with the Skylab program.

The Mission in Retrospect

The February 8 splashdown marked the official termination of the Skylab
program. Scientists would need a great deal of time to fully analyze all
of the data that the three crews had gathered, but enough work in this
regard had already been done to allow observers to appraise the value of
the project. Of the seven types of experiments the nine astronauts had
conducted, they surpassed expectations in all except the area of engineering
and technology investigations.48 Many
scientists, hitherto skeptical of the allocation of financial resources
to the Skylab program, spoke in glowing terms of its value. Leo
Goldberg, Director of the Kitt Peak National Observatory, voiced the views
of his profession when he asserted that the astronauts, "by their rigorous
preparation and training and enthusiastic devotion to the scientific goals
of the mission.... have proven the value of men in space as true scientific
partners in space science research."49

Goldberg's observation provides a fitting epitaph for Skylab
(which would disintegrate upon reentering the Earth's atmosphere in 1979).
While the program unquestionably yielded valuable scientific information,
its greatest value came from its demonstration of the importance of the
human element in the space program. As John Disher, NASA Director of Advanced
Programs in the Office of Space Transportation Systems, would later note,
Skylab
"turned around many people who thought men in space were a hindrance rather
than a help."50 Echoing this sentiment,
Program Director William Schneider stated that
Skylab had shown
that, regarding the space program, "the limit is only our resolve, not
the ability of men to work, and not our technical knowledge."

In his statement, Schneider succinctly captured the essence of a central
debate regarding the American space program. Many individuals had argued
that scientific inquiry in outer space did not depend on a human presence
in that realm; in the words of Homer E. Newell in 1958, "all we need is
a few thirty-pound satellites in Earth orbits [to] furnish enough observational
data to keep our space scientists busy for decades to come ."51
But the majority of the personnel at NASA had from the beginning believed
that "the ultimate objective [was] manned travel to and from the other
planets," and often



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FROM ENGINEERING SCIENCE TO BIG SCIENCE 233



|Photo of the bathroom and kitchen in a mockup of Skylab.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Ralph Geiger (left) and Ralph Murphy check out equipment
in the waste management and food management compartments, respectively,
in a full-scale mockup of Skylab at the NASA Marshall Spare Flight
Center. The Workshop was developed by Marshall Center for three Earth orbit
missions in 1972, the first lasting 28 days and the other two 56 days each.
This view of the living area shows the "telephone booth" type doors used
and the grid floor that separates the living area from the laboratory or
working area making up the 10, 000 cubic feet of space inside. joined to
the Workshop main body to form the "cluster' configuration was an airlock,
multiple docking adapter Apollo Telescope Mount and the Apollo command/service
module, All of the components were to be launched by a Saturn V with the
exception of the command/service module, into an Earth orbit of about 250
statute miles. Several days later NASA Planned for the astronauts in the
command/service module to be launched by a Saturn 1B rocket for rendezvous
and docking with the multiple docking adapter. The cluster of spacecraft
was used to conduct experiments, scientific and medical, and for Photographic
studies of the Sun. (NASA photo no. 69-H-1645).

focused planning efforts in this direction.52
The Skylab program, therefore, provided crucial and timely evidence
to support the predominant NASA position.

Fittingly, the Collier Trophy Committee decided to present the 1973
trophy of their organization to the director of the Skylab program.
Although the Committee noted the contributions of the over 26,000 individuals
who had worked on the program, the members felt that William Schneider
should receive the trophy on behalf of the three crews because of his leadership
in the extraordinarily difficult venture. When Vice President Gerald Ford
presented the award to Schneider on June 4, 1974, it provided an apt climax
to an American space project which had proved without question the value
of "the human touch" in space endeavors.



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