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## COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI

– EDINBURG

GUADALUPE CORTEZ , Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee.

On appeal from the 148 th District Court of Nueces County, Texas

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## MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez , and Longoria

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria By two issues, Guadalupe Cortez appeals the trial court’s judgment revoking his deferred adjudication community supervision, adjudging him guilty, and imposing a two year prison sentence for the second degree felony offense of possession of four grams2

or m ore but less than two hundred grams of cocaine. See T EX

. H EALTH & S AFETY C ODE A NN

. § 481.102(3)(d) (West 2010 ) (“Penalty Group 1 [includes] . . . [c]ocaine . . . .”); id . § 481.115(d) (West 2010 ) (“Possession of [a] [s]ubstance in Penalty Group 1 . . . is a felony of the second degree if the amount of the controlled substance possessed is, by aggregate weight, including adulterants or dilutants, four grams or more but less than 200
grams .”); T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN . § 12.33(a) (West 2011 ) (“ An individual adjud ged guilty of a felony of the second degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for any term of not more than 20 years or less than 2
years. ”); T EX

. C ODE C RIM

. P ROC

. A NN

. art. 42.12, § 5(b) (West Supp. 2013 ) (“ The determination to proceed with an adjudication of guilt on the original charge is reviewable in the same manner as a revocation hearing conducted under Section 21 in a case in which an adjudication of guilt had not been deferred. ”). For the reasons set for th below, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. In his first issue, Cortez contends that the evidence presented by the State at the hearing on the State’s motion to revoke was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding
that he violated the terms and conditions of his probation by committing the new offenses of unlawful possession of a firearm and possession of a controlled substance (namely, cocaine) within 1,000 feet of a drug

- free zone with intent to deliver. See T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN . § 46.04 (West 2011 ) (“Unlawful Possession of Firearm”); T EX

. H EALTH & S AFETY C ODE A NN

. § 481.112 (West 2010 ) (“ Offense: Manufacture or Delivery of Substance in Penalty Group 1 ”); id

. § 481.134 (West Supp. 2013 ) (“Drug

- Free Zones”). The State alleged, and the trial cou rt found to be “true,” fourteen different violations. Cortez pled “true” to twelve of the fourteen violations, including failure to pay various fees, failure to3

report any change of residence, job, or job status, failure to attend “felony victim impact
pa nel,” failure to participate in the “specialized caseload for substance abuse program” by failing to report in March, April, May, June, and July 2011, failure to attend “Coastal Bend Outpatient Program,” and failure to complete 45.75 of 120 hours of commun ity service restitution. On appeal, Cortez has not challenged the trial court’s finding that he committed the twelve violations to which he pled “true.” S ee Moses v. State , 590 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (“Appellant’ s plea of true, standing a lone is sufficient to support the revocation of probation. ”)

. Since “p roof of a single violation will support
revocation ,” Cortez cannot establish reversible error by demonstrating that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s finding with respect to the two new offense violations involving unlawful possession of a firearm and possession of cocaine with int ent to distribute. Garcia v. State , 387 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Accordingly, Cortez’s first issue is overruled. In his second issue, Cortez contends for the first time on appeal that the trial court violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by imposing a sentence that was disproportionate to the seriousness of the alleged offense. See U.S. C ONST . amends. VIII, XIV. Cortez’s failure to specifically object to an alleged disproportionate or cruel and unusual sentence in the trial court or in a post

trial motion waive d any error for the purposes of appellate review. See Rhoades v. State , 934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (“ Since, appellant is raising this argument for the first ti me on appeal, any error is waived .”) ; Noland v. State , 264 S.W.3d 144, 151 (Tex. App.

— Hou ston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’ d) (“[I]n order to preserve for appellate review a complaint that a sentence is grossly disproportionate, constituting cruel and4

unusua l punishment, a defendant must present to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion stating the specific grounds for the ruling desired.”). Accordingly, Cortez’s second issue is overruled. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

NORA L. LONGORIA Justice Do not publish. T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.2(b)

. Delivered and filed the 27th day of March , 201 4

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