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IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHILLLE

September 12, 2017 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. SHARON DAUGHERTY

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Macon County

No. 15-CR-81 Brody Kane, Judge

 

No. M2016-02552-CCA-R3-CD

The Appellant, Sharon Daugherty, appeals the Macon County Criminal Court’s order 

denying her motion to recover firearms confiscated during a search of her home. On appeal, 

the Appellant contends that she is entitled to the return of the property because the State 

dismissed the criminal charges against her. Because the Appellant has no appeal as of right 

from the denial of a motion to recover confiscated property, we dismiss the appeal. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dismissed

ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN 

EVERETT WILLIAMS and ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JJ., joined.

Harry A. Christensen, Lebanon, Tennessee, for the appellant, Sharon Daugherty.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; M. Todd Ridley, Assistant Attorney 

General; Tom P. Thompson, Jr., District Attorney General; and Jason Lawson, Assistant 

District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

On August 24, 2016, the Appellant filed a motion to recover firearms confiscated 

from her home by the drug task force after the execution of a search warrant. The motion 

stated that the Appellant’s husband, Tommy Daugherty, was arrested on drug-related charges 

after the search. According to the motion, Mr. Daugherty ultimately pleaded guilty to a 

single drug-related offense in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges, including 

a weapons-related offense relative to the seized firearms. Although the motion does not 

identify the State’s charges against the Appellant, the motion states that all of her charges 

were dismissed after Mr. Daugherty pleaded guilty. 

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At the November 4, 2016 motion hearing, counsel stated that the Appellant was 

initially charged with drug possession with the intent to sell because the Appellant “had 

some personal pharmaceuticals that apparently weren’t satisfactorily up to count.” Counsel 

said that during plea negotiations with the prosecutor, the parties agreed the charges against 

the Appellant would be dismissed. Counsel conceded that he and the prosecutor did not 

discuss the confiscated firearms during plea negotiations but stated that no forfeiture warrant 

was filed and that the police investigation was closed. Counsel stated that the Appellant had 

no pending criminal charges against her, that she was not a convicted felon, that she needed 

money to pay her mortgage during Mr. Daugherty’s confinement, and that she intended to 

sell the firearms to meet her financial obligations.

The prosecutor opposed the motion on the basis that Mr. Daugherty pleaded guilty to 

selling narcotics, which were the same type of narcotics for which the Appellant “was short 

on her pill count.” The prosecutor said that the Appellant and Mr. Daugherty were charged 

after a controlled drug purchase. The prosecutor also opposed the motion on the basis that 

the Appellant had failed to provide proof of ownership of the confiscated firearms. The 

prosecutor believed the firearms belonged to Mr. Daugherty and stated the prosecutor could 

not provide the firearms to a third party. The prosecutor stated that Mr. Daugherty was 

prohibited from owning and possessing firearms because he was now a convicted felon and 

without proof that the firearms belonged to the Appellant, she was not entitled to recover

them. 

Upon questioning by the trial court, the Appellant testified that she could not provide 

the dates upon which the firearms were purchased. The following exchange occurred:

The Court: Tell me what guns you’re wanting back.

[The Appellant]: I’d like to have all of them.

The Court: I don’t want you looking at a sheet, ma’am. I want you 

to tell me what they are. 

[The Appellant]: I couldn’t tell you what they are. I mean, I’ll just be 

honest with you.

The Court: Motion denied.

In a written order, the trial court found that the Appellant could not provide a general 

description or identify the make and model of any firearm seized by the police during the 

drug-related investigation and that the Appellant did not provide information relative to the 

length of her marriage to Mr. Daugherty. The court determined that the firearms were 

possessed during the commission of a criminal offense and were subject to asset forfeiture. 

The court found that the Appellant was unable to establish any interest in the firearms, that 

no evidence showed she acquired any of the firearms or was the lawful owner, and that no 
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evidence showed the firearms were acquired by Mr. Daugherty during the Appellant’s 

marriage to him. This appeal followed. 

The Appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying her motion. She argues 

that the firearms are “family property” and that she is entitled to receive them. The State 

argues that the appeal should be dismissed because the Appellant does not have an appeal as 

of right from the trial court’s order. We agree with the State. 

As a preliminary matter, we note that the appellate record only contains the 

Appellant’s motion, the motion hearing transcript, and the trial court’s written order. 

Although the Appellant’s motion is restricted to the return of the firearms seized during the 

search of her and Mr. Daugherty’s home, nothing related to the relevant criminal 

investigation against her and her husband is included in the appellate record before this 

court. The Appellant has the burden of preparing a fair, accurate, and complete account of 

what transpired in the trial court relative to the issues raised on appeal. See, e.g., State v. 

Bunch, 646 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tenn. 1983). “When the record is incomplete, or does not 

contain the proceedings relevant to an issue, this [c]ourt is precluded from considering the 

issue.” State v. Miller, 737 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). Likewise, “this 

[c]ourt must conclusively presume that the ruling of the trial court was correct in all 

particulars.” Id. (citing State v. Jones, 623 S.W.2d 129, 131 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981); State 

v. Baron, 659 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983); State v. Taylor, 669 S.W.2d 694, 

699 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983)); see State v. Ivy, 868 S.W.2d 724, 728 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

1993). 

In any event, we conclude that this court does not have jurisdiction to consider the 

Appellant’s appeal. See T.R.A.P. 13(b) (stating that “[t]he appellate court shall also consider 

whether the trial and appellate court have jurisdiction over the subject matter, whether or not 

presented for review”). Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 3(b) states, in relevant 

part, that an appeal as of right in a criminal action “lies from any judgment of conviction 

entered by a trial court from which an appeal lies to the . . . Court of Criminal Appeals.” In 

the present case, no judgment of conviction exists because, as the parties agree, the charges 

against the Appellant were dismissed. 

Furthermore, the Appellant’s reliance on Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 41(g),

related to the return of property seized pursuant to an unlawful or invalid search by law 

enforcement to provide a basis for this appeal, is misplaced. The Appellant is not appealing 

the denial of a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 41, and even 

if she were, an appeal as of right from the denial of a Rule 41 motion to obtain seized 

property only lies when the property seized is the basis of a successful motion to suppress 

evidence. See State v. Rowland, 520 S.W.3d 542, 548 (Tenn. 2017). No evidence shows the 

firearms were the subject of a successful motion to suppress evidence before the charges 
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against her were dismissed. Therefore, this court does not have jurisdiction to determine 

whether the Appellant is entitled to receive the firearms. 

In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the appeal is dismissed. 

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ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JUDGE