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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before

publication in the New York Reports.

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No. 12 

In the Matter of Veronica P.,

 Respondent,

 v.

Radcliff A.,

 Appellant.

George E. Reed, Jr., for appellant.

Eric Nelson, for respondent.

ABDUS-SALAAM, J.:

We are confronted with the question of whether an

appeal from a contested order of protection issued by Family

Court, based upon a finding that the subject individual has

committed a family offense, is mooted solely by the expiration of

the order. We hold that it is not.

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In 2009, respondent Radcliff A. regularly stayed in an

apartment with his aunt, petitioner Veronica P. On September 22,

2009, petitioner filed a petition charging respondent with

various family offenses under Family Court Act article 8,

alleging that, on certain occasions during the previous month,

respondent had assaulted and harassed her in the apartment. 

Petitioner sought an order adjudging respondent guilty of the

charged offenses, as well as an order of protection against him

pursuant to Family Court Act § 842. Family Court immediately

granted petitioner a temporary order of protection and thereafter

held a hearing on the petition. At the hearing, both sides

called witnesses to testify to the relevant events, and

respondent vigorously opposed the entry of an order of protection

or any other adverse adjudication. 

In an oral decision rendered on February 4, 2011, the

court found that respondent was guilty of a family offense,

concluding that he had committed acts constituting harassment in

the second degree (see Penal Law § 240.26; see also Family Court

Act § 812 [1]). That same day, the court entered a written twoyear order of protection against respondent. The written order

stated that a family offense petition had been filed in the case,

listed the date of the petition and noted that the order was

being issued after a hearing at which respondent had been

present. The order directed respondent to stay away from

petitioner's home and to refrain from committing assault,

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harassment, stalking and certain other offenses against her. 

Respondent appealed, but while the appeal was pending,

the order of protection expired. The Appellate Division

unanimously dismissed the appeal as moot, citing the expiration

of the order (Matter of Veronica P. v Radcliff A., 110 AD3d 486,

486 [1st Dept 2013]). We granted respondent leave to appeal, and

we now reverse.

As we have often emphasized, "[i]n general an appeal

will be considered moot unless the rights of the parties will be

directly affected by the determination of the appeal and the

interest of the parties is an immediate consequence of the

judgment" (Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne, 50 NY2d 707, 714

[1980]; see Matter of New York State Commn. on Jud. Conduct v

Rubenstein, 23 NY3d 570, 576 [2014]; Coleman v Daines, 19 NY3d

1087, 1090 [2012]). The ability of an appellate decision to

directly and immediately impact the parties' rights and interests

is among the most important aspects of the mootness analysis, for

otherwise the analysis might turn on inchoate or speculative

matters, making mootness an unwieldy doctrine of a thousand "what

ifs." On the other hand, even where the resolution of an appeal

may not immediately relieve a party from a currently ongoing

court-ordered penalty or obligation to pay a judgment, the appeal

is not moot if an appellate decision will eliminate readily

ascertainable and legally significant enduring consequences that

befall a party as a result of the order which the party seeks to

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appeal (see Matter of Bickwid v Deutsch, 87 NY2d 862, 863 [1995];

see also Rubenstein, 23 NY3d at 576). 

In this case, the expiration of the order of protection

does not moot the appeal because the order still imposes

significant enduring consequences upon respondent, who may

receive relief from those consequences upon a favorable appellate

decision. Because the order of protection on its face strongly

suggests that respondent committed a family offense, the court in

a future criminal case or Family Court proceeding would likely

rely on the order to enhance a sentence or adverse civil

adjudication against respondent. In that regard, although the

order does not declare respondent guilty of a family offense in

so many words, the order notes that it was issued after a hearing

in a family offense proceeding, and it expressly bars respondent

from victimizing petitioner by committing a variety of crimes

nearly identical to those charged in the family offense petition. 

Thus, a court examining the order may readily discern that Family

Court found respondent guilty of committing a family offense

against petitioner and issued an order of protection to prevent

him from continuing to offend against her. Armed with that

information, the court in a future case may increase the severity

of any applicable criminal sentence or civil judgment against

respondent.1

 In the face of the substantial probability that the

1

 Indeed, that is highly likely to occur, as the Department

of Probation or prosecutors in a future proceeding will likely

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order of protection will prompt severely deleterious future legal

rulings against respondent, an appellate decision in his favor

will directly vindicate his interest in avoiding that consequence

of the order. 

The order of protection has other potential legal

consequences that render it susceptible to appellate review. For

example, in a future legal matter, an opposing party might be

permitted to use the order of protection to impeach respondent's

credibility (see Bickwid, 87 NY2d at 863-864 [finding that the

impeachment potential of the adjudication being appealed

supported the conclusion that the appeal was not moot]). 

Furthermore, since the order of protection remains in a police

computer database, albeit not in an active file (see Executive

Law §§ 221-a [1]; 221-a [6]; see also 9 NYCRR 486.2 [g]),

respondent may face additional law enforcement scrutiny and an

increased likelihood of arrest in certain encounters with the

police (see 9 NYCRR 486.3 [n] [declaring information obtained

from the database to be relevant to the decision to arrest an

individual]).2

inform the court of the order and, quite possibly, the oral

decision finding respondent guilty of a family offense (see

Family Court Act §§ 252; 815; 835 [b]; CPL 390.30 [1]).

2

 Significantly, state regulations governing the computer

database do not on their face prevent the police from taking

action based on information contained in an inactive file, for

the regulations permit or forbid the use of information in the

database under certain circumstances without distinguishing

between information in an active or inactive file (see generally

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Beyond its legal consequences, the order of protection

places a severe stigma on respondent, and he can escape that

stigma by prevailing on appeal (see Rubenstein, 23 NY3d at 577-

578). As discussed above, the order essentially labels

respondent a family offender and at least implies that he has

committed an assault or harassment offense against his aunt. It

follows that, should the order come to the attention of

respondent's business contacts, social acquaintances or other

members of the public, those individuals would almost certainly

view him as a domestic violence offender -- a decidedly

pejorative label -- and cease their dealings with him. Perhaps

most importantly, potential employers might ask respondent

whether an order of protection has ever been entered against him,

and he may be ethically or legally bound to answer in the

affirmative, significantly curtailing his chances of getting a

job.

In sum, given the totality of the enduring legal and

reputational consequences of the contested order of protection,

respondent's appeal from that order is not moot.3 Furthermore,

9 NYCRR 486.2 [g] [defining "computer information" that may be

disseminated among the police via the database as, essentially,

any data in the database, without distinguishing between active

and inactive files]).

3

 Respondent urges us to hold that an appeal from any

expired order of protection, other than one entered upon

stipulation, is not moot. But we express no view on the

correctness of that proposed holding because it is unnecessary to

resolve the case at hand.

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because our consideration of the merits would be inappropriate

under the circumstances of this case, the matter should be

remitted to the Appellate Division for consideration of the

appeal (see Bickwid, 87 NY2d at 864).

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should

be reversed, without costs, and the matter remitted to that court

for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Order reversed, without costs, and matter remitted to the

Appellate Division, First Department, for further proceedings in

accordance with the opinion herein. Opinion by Judge AbdusSalaam. Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Read, Pigott and Rivera

concur. Judges Stein and Fahey took no part.

Decided February 12, 2015

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