IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-10559

Summary Calendar

DAMON LEE WOOD,

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

PARKER COUNTY, Governmental Unit; JUDGE GRAHAM 

QUESINBERRY; JUDGE JERRY BUCKNER; DEBRA YANIKO DUPONT;

JUDGE MARK RILEY,

Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:10-CV-826

Before BARKSDALE, STEWART, and PRADO, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Damon Lee Wood, Texas prisoner # 00590030, proceeding pro se, appeals

the 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B) dismissal as frivolous and for failure

to state a claim of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Parker County, Texas, and

four current and former judges of Parker County courts. Wood’s action claimed

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

March 2, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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No. 11-10559

a constitutional violation in the execution of his mother’s will. Review is de

novo. E.g., Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005).

Wood challenges the district court’s dismissal of his claims against the

individual state-court judges, contending the judges were not entitled to judicial

immunity. He does not brief claims seeking to have reopened other trust cases

adjudicated by the judges or his claims against Parker County; those claims are,

therefore, deemed abandoned. Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir.

1993).

Judicial officers are entitled to absolute immunity from suit in § 1983

actions arising from the exercise of their judicial functions. Boyd v. Biggers,

31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994). Immunity may be overcome by showing: the

disputed acts were not judicial in nature; or, if judicial in nature, were performed

in the complete absence of jurisdiction. Id.

Wood’s assertion that the judges’ actions were nonjudicial in nature is

without merit. His complaint makes plain that he seeks recovery for decisions

regarding the transfer and retention of his case during probate proceedings, acts

which are usually performed by judges, and he fails to allege the judges acted in

any role other than their judicial one. 

Also unavailing is Wood’s assertion that the judges acted in the clear

absence of all jurisdiction. Where judicial immunity is concerned, “the scope of

the judge’s jurisdiction must be construed broadly. . . . A judge will not be

deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done

maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to

liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction”. Stump

v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Upon Wood’s motion to transfer, the constitutional county court judge was

required by state law to transfer his case; the judge thus acted within the scope

of the court’s jurisdiction and is entitled to judicial immunity. Similarly, the

judges of the county court at law are entitled to immunity because they did not

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No. 11-10559

act in clear absence of all jurisdiction, despite the state appellate court later

determining the county court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the

testamentary trust issues presented. See Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 373 (5th

Cir. 1995) (inquiry “is not whether the judge actually had jurisdiction, or even

whether the court exceeded its jurisdictional authority, but whether the

challenged actions were obviously taken outside the scope of the judge’s power”). 

The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. Its dismissal of Wood’s

§ 1983 complaint as frivolous counts as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(g). E.g., Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 1996). Wood

is CAUTIONED that, if he accumulates three strikes under § 1915(g), he will not

be allowed to proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal while incarcerated or

detained in any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical

injury. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

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