(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2022 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

LORA v. UNITED STATES 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

No. 22–49. Argued March 28, 2023—Decided June 16, 2023 

A federal court imposing multiple prison sentences typically has discretion to run the sentences concurrently or consecutively. See 18 U. S. C. 

§3584. An exception exists in §924(c), which provides that “no term of 

imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run 

concurrently with any other term of imprisonment.” §924(c)(1)(D)(ii). 

Here, the Court considers whether §924(c)’s bar on concurrent sentences extends to a sentence imposed under a different subsection, 

§924(j). 

Petitioner Efrain Lora was convicted of the federal crime of aiding 

and abetting a violation of §924(j)(1), which penalizes “a person who, 

in the course of a violation of subsection (c), causes the death of a person through the use of a firearm,” where “the killing is a murder.” A 

violation of subsection (c) occurs when a person “uses or carries a firearm” “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime,” or “possesses a firearm” “in furtherance of any such crime.”

§924(c)(1)(A). Lora was also convicted of a second federal crime, conspiring to distribute drugs.

At sentencing, the District Court concluded that it lacked discretion 

to run the sentences for Lora’s two convictions concurrently, because 

§924(c)(1)(D)(ii)’s bar on concurrent sentences governs §924(j) sentences. The District Court sentenced Lora to consecutive terms of imprisonment for the drug-distribution-conspiracy count and the §924(j) 

count. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 

Held: Section 924(c)(1)(D)(ii)’s bar on concurrent sentences does not govern a sentence for a §924(j) conviction. A §924(j) sentence therefore 

can run either concurrently with or consecutively to another sentence. 

Pp. 3–10. 
 

 

 

2 LORA v. UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

(a) Sections 924(c) and 924(j) criminalize the use, carrying, and possession of firearms in connection with certain crimes. Subsection (c) 

lays out a set of offenses and their corresponding penalties. It also 

mandates that a “term of imprisonment imposed on a person under 

this subsection” must run consecutively with other sentences. 

§924(c)(1)(D)(ii). Subsection (j) likewise lays out offense elements and 

corresponding penalties. Unlike subsection (c), subsection (j) contains 

no consecutive-sentence mandate. Pp. 3–4.

(b) Subsection (c)’s consecutive-sentence mandate applies only to the

terms of imprisonment prescribed within subsection (c). A sentence 

imposed under subsection (j) does not qualify. Subsection (j) is located

outside subsection (c) and does not call for imposing any sentence from

subsection (c). And while subsection (j) references subsection (c), that 

reference is limited to offense elements, not penalties. Pp. 4–5.

(c) Congress did not, as the Government maintains, incorporate 

§924(c) as a whole into §924(j) such that a §924(j) defendant faces subsection (j)’s penalties plus subsection (c)’s penalties. Subsection (j) nowhere mentions—let alone incorporates—subsection (c)’s penalties.

Moreover, as subsections (c) and (j) are written, a sentencing court cannot always obey both sets of penalties. To avert potential conflict between subsections (c) and (j), the Government points to another provision, §924(c)(5), as a model. But assuming without deciding whether

§924(c)(5) operates as the Government says, Congress did not implement that design in subsection (j). Equally unavailing is the Government’s argument that, under double jeopardy principles, a defendant 

cannot receive both subsection (c) and subsection (j) sentences for the 

same conduct. That view of double jeopardy can easily be squared with 

the conclusion that subsection (j) neither incorporates subsection (c)’s 

penalties nor triggers the consecutive-sentence mandate. Pp. 5–8.

(d) It is not “implausible,” as the Government asserts, for Congress 

to have imposed the harsh consecutive-sentence mandate under subsection (c) but not subsection (j), which covers more serious offense 

conduct. That result is consistent with the statute’s design. Unlike 

subsection (c), subsection (j) generally eschews mandatory penalties in 

favor of sentencing flexibility. Of a piece, subsection (j) permits flexibility to choose between concurrent and consecutive sentences. Congress chose a different approach to punishment in subsection (j) than 

in subsection (c), and the Court must implement the design Congress 

chose. Pp. 8–10. 

Vacated and remanded. 

JACKSON, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of 

Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, 

pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 22–49 

EFRAIN LORA, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

[June 16, 2023] 

JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court. 

When a federal court imposes multiple prison sentences, 

it can typically choose whether to run the sentences concurrently or consecutively. See 18 U. S. C. §3584. An exception exists in subsection (c) of §924, which provides that “no

term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment.” §924(c)(1)(D)(ii).

In this case, we consider whether §924(c)’s bar on concurrent sentences extends to a sentence imposed under a different subsection: §924(j). We hold that it does not. A sentence for a §924(j) conviction therefore can run either 

concurrently with or consecutively to another sentence. 

I 

In 2002, members of a drug-dealing group from the Bronx 

assassinated a rival drug dealer. The Government accused 

petitioner Efrain Lora of being one of the group’s leaders 

and acting as a scout during the fatal shooting. After a jury

trial, Lora was convicted of aiding and abetting a violation 

of §924(j)(1), which penalizes “[a] person who, in the course

of a violation of subsection (c), causes the death of a person 
 

 

 

2 LORA v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

through the use of a firearm,” where “the killing is a murder.” See also §2(a) (an aider and abettor is punishable “as

a principal”). Lora was also convicted of conspiring to distribute drugs, in violation of 21 U. S. C. §§841 and 846. 

At sentencing, the District Court rejected two of Lora’s

arguments about his §924(j) conviction. Most pertinent

here, Lora argued that the District Court had discretion to

run the §924(j) sentence concurrently with the drugdistribution-conspiracy sentence. The District Court held 

it lacked such discretion. Applying Circuit precedent, it

held that §924(c)(1)(D)(ii)’s bar on concurrent sentences 

governs §924(j) sentences, such that Lora’s two sentences 

had to run consecutively. See United States v. Barrett, 937 

F. 3d 126, 129, n. 2 (CA2 2019). Lora also argued that a 

§924(j) conviction is not subject to the mandatory minimum 

sentences specified in §924(c). Disagreeing once again, the 

District Court applied the five-year mandatory minimum

under §924(c)(1)(A) to Lora’s sentencing calculation. 

The District Court ultimately sentenced Lora to 30 years 

of imprisonment: 25 years on the drug-distributionconspiracy count and—consecutively—five years on the

§924(j) count. Lora also received five years of supervised 

release. 

The Court of Appeals affirmed, adhering to its precedent 

barring §924(j) sentences from running concurrently with

other sentences. That decision reinforced a conflict among

the Courts of Appeals over whether §924(c)(1)(D)(ii)’s 

concurrent-sentence bar governs §924(j) sentences.1 We 

granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 598 U. S. ___ 

(2022). 

—————— 1Compare, e.g., Barrett, 937 F. 3d, at 129, n. 2 (§924(c)(1)(D)(ii)’s 

concurrent-sentence bar governs §924(j) sentences); United States v. Berrios, 676 F. 3d 118, 140–144 (CA3 2012); United States v. Bran, 776 F. 3d 

276, 280–282 (CA4 2015); and United States v. Dinwiddie, 618 F. 3d 821, 

837 (CA8 2010), with United States v. Julian, 633 F. 3d 1250, 1252–1257 

(CA11 2011) (it does not). 
 

 

Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

II 

A 

This case concerns federal laws that criminalize the use, 

carrying, and possession of firearms in connection with certain crimes. The relevant parts of that scheme are spread

across two subsections of 18 U. S. C. §924. 

Subsection (c) lays out a set of offenses and their corresponding penalties. It begins by making it a crime either to 

“us[e] or carr[y] a firearm” “during and in relation to any

crime of violence or drug trafficking crime,” or to “posses[s]

a firearm” “in furtherance of any such crime.” §924(c)(1)(A).

The provision then prescribes “a term of imprisonment” for

that offense: a minimum of five years. §924(c)(1)(A)(i).

Other (more serious) offense elements and “term[s] of imprisonment” follow within subsection (c). If the firearm is 

“brandished,” the “term of imprisonment” jumps to a minimum of seven years. §924(c)(1)(A)(ii). If the firearm is “discharged,” the minimum becomes 10 years; if the firearm is

a “machinegun,” 30 years; and so on. §§924(c)(1)(A)–(C), 

(c)(5).

Subsection (c) also provides that “no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run

concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed 

on the person.” §924(c)(1)(D)(ii). In other words, the sentence must run consecutively, not concurrently, in relation

to other sentences. This concurrent-sentence bar (or

consecutive-sentence mandate) is at issue in this case.

Subsection (j) was added decades after subsection (c) and

its consecutive-sentence mandate.2 Subsection (j) likewise 

lays out offense elements and corresponding penalties. It 

provides: 

—————— 2See 82 Stat. 1224 (enacting subsection (c) in 1968); 84 Stat. 1889–

1890 (adding subsection (c)’s consecutive-sentence mandate in 1971); 108

Stat. 1973 (enacting subsection (j), originally designated as subsection

(i), in 1994); 110 Stat. 3505 (redesignating as subsection (j) in 1996). 
 

 

 

4 LORA v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

“A person who, in the course of a violation of subsection (c), causes the death of a person through the use of

a firearm, shall— 

“(1) if the killing is a murder (as defined in section 

1111), be punished by death or by imprisonment for 

any term of years or for life; and

“(2) if the killing is manslaughter (as defined in section 1112), be punished as provided in that section.” 

§924(j). 

Subsection (j) contains no consecutive-sentence mandate. 

B 

Here, Lora was convicted of a subsection (j) offense. The 

parties dispute whether the sentence for that offense can

run concurrently with another sentence, or whether it is

subject to subsection (c)’s consecutive-sentence mandate. 

We hold the former. 

Subsection (c)’s consecutive-sentence requirement applies to a “term of imprisonment imposed on a person under 

this subsection”—i.e., subsection (c). §924(c)(1)(D)(ii) (emphasis added). By those plain terms, Congress applied the 

consecutive-sentence mandate only to terms of imprisonment imposed under that subsection. And Congress put 

subsection (j) in a different subsection of the statute. 

Drilling into the details confirms that straightforward 

reasoning. To begin, subsection (c) sets forth a host of offenses and the corresponding “term[s] of imprisonment” to

be imposed. §§924(c)(1), (5); supra, at 3. Those are the 

“term[s] of imprisonment imposed . . . under this subsection” that the consecutive-sentence mandate references. 

§924(c)(1)(D)(ii). That is, by echoing the phrase “term of

imprisonment” and referring inwards to “this subsection,”

§924(c)(1)(D)(ii) points to the terms of imprisonment prescribed within subsection (c). 

A sentence imposed under subsection (j) does not qualify.

To state the obvious again, subsection (j) is not located 
 

Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

within subsection (c). Nor does subsection (j) call for imposing any sentence from subsection (c). Instead, subsection 

(j) provides its own set of penalties. See §§924(j)(1)–(2). 

To be sure, subsection (j) references subsection (c). But it 

does so only with respect to offense elements, not penalties. 

Subsection (j)’s offense elements include causing death “in 

the course of a violation of subsection (c).” §924(j). And to 

define that phrase, one must consult subsection (c)’s offense 

elements (i.e., what it takes to violate that subsection). But 

that is where subsection (c)’s role in subsection (j) stops. 

One need not consult subsection (c)’s sentences in order to 

sentence a subsection (j) defendant. 

Thus, a defendant who is sentenced under subsection (j) 

does not receive a “term of imprisonment imposed . . . under 

[subsection (c)].” Consequently, §924(c)(1)(D)(ii)’s consecutive-sentence mandate does not apply. 

III 

A 

The Government tries to deflect this conclusion by blending subsections (c) and (j) together. It claims that “Congress 

incorporated Section 924(c) as a whole into Section 924(j).” 

Brief for United States 15. Under that view, a subsection 

(j) defendant faces subsection (j)’s penalties plus subsection 

(c)’s penalties—including subsection (c)’s mandatory minimum sentences and its consecutive-sentence mandate. 

The actual statute bears no resemblance to the Government’s vision. Subsection (j) nowhere mentions—let alone 

incorporates—subsection (c)’s penalties. Instead, as just 

explained, subsection (j)’s only reference to subsection (c) is

limited to offense elements. Supra this page. 

Moreover, a sentencing court cannot follow both subsection (c) and subsection (j) as written. Combining the two

subsections would set them on a collision course; indeed, in 

some cases, the maximum sentence would be lower than the 

minimum sentence. Take voluntary manslaughter using a 
 

 

6 LORA v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

machinegun in the course of a subsection (c)(1) violation, for 

example. Subsection (c), because of the machinegun, would 

command that “the person shall be sentenced to a term of

imprisonment of not less than 30 years.” §924(c)(1)(B)(ii).

Subsection (j), because of the voluntary manslaughter,

would command that, per §1112, the person “shall be . . . 

imprisoned not more than 15 years.” §§924(j)(2), 1112(b).

To fashion a sentence “not less than 30 years” and “not more

than 15 years”—that is, to obey both subsections (c) and 

(j)—is impossible. And Congress has not required that 

unachievable result. Instead, subsection (j) supplies its 

own comprehensive set of penalties that apply instead of 

subsection (c)’s.

To avert potential conflict between subsections (c) and (j), 

the Government tries to knit the two provisions together in

a very particular way. In the Government’s view, a court 

sentencing a subsection (j) defendant should jump to subsection (c), apply the penalties listed there, then jump back 

to subsection (j) and add the penalties listed there, then

jump back to subsection (c) and impose the consecutivesentence mandate listed in that subsection. But nothing in

subsection (j) calls for such calisthenics.

 To assuage that concern, the Government maintains that 

Congress has done this elsewhere; it says that another provision, §924(c)(5), operates this way. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27, 31.

Even if §924(c)(5) does work in that fashion—which we do 

not decide—the Government’s argument only underscores

that subsection (j) does not. 

Under §924(c)(5), a person who, inter alia, uses armor 

piercing ammunition during and in relation to a crime of 

violence or drug trafficking crime: 

“shall . . . 

“(A) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not

less than 15 years; and 
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

“(B) if death results from the use of such ammunition— 

“(i) if the killing is murder (as defined in section 

1111), be punished by death or sentenced to a term of 

imprisonment for any term of years or for life; and 

“(ii) if the killing is manslaughter (as defined in section 1112), be punished as provided in section 1112.”

(Emphasis added.) 

According to the Government, §924(c)(5) adds two penalties 

together when death results: Someone convicted of murder

resulting from the use of such ammunition faces a 15-year 

mandatory minimum sentence under §924(c)(5)(A) plus an 

additional sentence for murder under §924(c)(5)(B)(i). Tr. 

of Oral Arg. 27, 31. 

But subsection (j) is cast from a different mold. Section 

924(c)(5) groups the two penalties together and joins them

with the word “and.” In contrast, several unrelated subsections separate subsections (c) and (j) structurally, and nothing joins their penalties textually. So even if those features 

of §924(c)(5) make it operate as the Government contends, 

those aspects of §924(c)(5) are missing from subsection (j). 

In the Government’s own telling, then, §924(c)(5) shows

how Congress could have constructed penalties that might 

ultimately add together. Yet Congress did not implement 

that design in subsection (j).

Equally unavailing is the Government’s invocation of

double jeopardy principles. According to the Government’s

brief, “Section 924(j) amounts to the ‘same offense’ as Section 924(c) for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause,” so 

“a defendant may be punished for either a Section 924(c) 

offense or a Section 924(j) offense, but not both.” Brief for 

United States 22–26 (emphasis added; alterations and 

some internal quotation marks omitted). The Government 

argues that this conception of double jeopardy confirms subsection (j) incorporates all of subsection (c). Ibid. 
 

 

 

8 LORA v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

We express no position on the Government’s view of double jeopardy, because even assuming it, arguendo, the Government’s view does not refute our holding on the question 

presented. The Government says someone cannot receive

both subsection (c) and subsection (j) sentences for the same

conduct. But that aligns with our conclusion here: If a defendant receives a sentence under subsection (j), he does not 

receive a sentence “imposed . . . under [subsection (c)]” that

would trigger the consecutive-sentence mandate. 

§924(c)(1)(D)(ii). Accordingly, the Government’s view of

double jeopardy can easily be squared with our view that 

subsection (j) neither incorporates subsection (c)’s penalties 

nor triggers the consecutive-sentence mandate. 

B 

The Government protests that it is “implausible” that

Congress imposed the harsh consecutive-sentence mandate

under subsection (c) but not subsection (j), which covers

more serious offense conduct. Brief for United States 9, 28– 

35. Yet that result is consistent with other design features

of the statute. 

Congress plainly chose a different approach to punishment in subsection (j) than in subsection (c). Subsection (c),

first enacted in 1968, is full of mandatory penalties. It contains mandatory minimum years of imprisonment and 

mandatory consecutive sentences. In fact, when subsection 

(j) was enacted in 1994, subsection (c) specified not just 

mandatory minimums, but exact mandatory terms of imprisonment. 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1) (1994 ed.) (e.g., exactly

five years of imprisonment for the base subsection (c) offense).

Subsection (j), by contrast, generally eschews mandatory

penalties in favor of sentencing flexibility. Unlike subsection (c), subsection (j) contains no mandatory minimums. 

Even for murder, subsection (j) expressly permits a sentence of “any term of years.” §924(j)(1) (emphasis added). 
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

This follows the same pattern as several other provisions 

enacted alongside subsection (j) in the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 1959. In those provisions, as in 

§924(j)(1), Congress authorized the death penalty, but also

a flexible range of lesser sentences for “any term of years,”

with no mandatory minimum or consecutive-sentence mandate.3 In the same law, Congress also enacted a provision 

allowing judges to go below the otherwise-mandatory minimum sentence in certain cases.4 Given those choices to favor sentencing flexibility over mandatory penalties, it is not 

“implausible,” as the Government asserts, that subsection

(j) permits flexibility to choose between concurrent and consecutive sentences. 

Nor is that flexibility incompatible with the seriousness 

of subsection (j) offenses. Subsection (j) merely reflects the 

seriousness of the offense using a different approach than 

subsection (c)’s mandatory penalties. For murder, subsection (j) authorizes the harshest maximum penalty possible:

death. §924(j)(1). And for manslaughter, subsection (j) imposes the same harsh punishment that the Federal Criminal Code prescribes for other manslaughters. See §924(j)(2)

(aligning penalties with §1112).5 

Congress could certainly have designed the penalty 

—————— 3 108 Stat. 1971–1973, 1976, 1978–1982 (Pub. L. 103–322, §§60008,

60010, 60011, 60019–60024). 4 Id., at 1985–1986 (Pub. L. 103–322, §80001) (enacting 18 U. S. C. 

§3553(f )). 5When Congress enacted subsection (j), it actually imposed higher 

maximum penalties for manslaughter under subsection (j) than what 

subsection (c) had authorized for the base offense. A base subsection (c)

violation triggered a fixed five-year sentence, while subsection (j)(2) authorized more: up to 10 years for voluntary manslaughter and six years 

for involuntary manslaughter. 18 U. S. C. §§924(c)(1), (i)(2), 1112 (1994

ed.); see 110 Stat. 3505 (redesignating subsection (i) as subsection (j)). 

This reinforces that Congress designed subsection (j)’s penalties to account for the seriousness of the offense by themselves, without incorporating penalties from subsection (c). 
 

10 LORA v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

scheme at issue here differently. It could have mandated 

harsher punishment under subsection (j) than under subsection (c). It could have added a consecutive-sentence 

mandate to subsection (j). It could have written subsection 

(c)’s consecutive-sentence mandate more broadly. It could 

have placed subsection (j) within subsection (c).6 

But Congress did not do any of these things. And we 

must implement the design Congress chose. 

* * * 

Because the consecutive-sentence mandate in 

§924(c)(1)(D)(ii) does not govern §924(j) sentences, the District Court had discretion to impose Lora’s §924(j) sentence

concurrently with another sentence. We vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 

—————— 6Congress specifically considered and rejected that last possibility. 

The 1994 Congress had before it a proposal to add, within subsection (c),

a provision authorizing the death penalty when a subsection (c) violation

results in homicide. See 140 Cong. Rec. 11165, 24066. Congress rejected

that option and enacted a different version of that crime bill—which created subsection (j).