This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. NO. 34,296 4 AMANDA FLORES, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY 7 William C. Birdsall, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Joel Jacobsen, Assistant Attorney General 10 Santa Fe, NM 11 for Appellee 12 Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender 13 Sergio Viscoli, Assist ant Appellate Defender 14 Santa Fe, NM 15 for Appellant 16 MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 GARCIA, Judge. 18

{1} Defendant appealed from the district c ourt’s denial of her motion to suppress 19following her reservation of the right to appeal this issue pursuant to her conditional 1 plea. On appeal, Defendant contends that th e district court erred in its conclusion that 2 officers’ entry into her home was jus tified under an exception to the warrant 3 requirement. This Court issued a calendar notice proposing to reverse and the State 4 has responded by filing a memorandum in oppos ition. Having given due consideration 5 to the arguments made by the State, we reverse and remand to the district court. 6

{2} In this Court’s calendar notice, we poi nted out that “[t]he emergency aid 7 doctrine applies to . . . warrantless intrusi ons into personal residences[,]” and that 8 “only a genuine emergency will justify entering and searching a home without a 9 warrant and without c onsent or knowledge.” State v. Ryon , 2005-NMSC-005, ¶¶ 25- 10 26, 137 N.M. 174, 108 P.3d 132. Thus, as wepointed out in our calendar notice, 11 “officers must have credible and specific information that a victim is very likely to be 12 located at a particular place and in need of immediate aid to avoid great bodily harm 13 or death.” Id. ¶ 42. We proposed to conclude that, based on the facts of this case, the 14 officers only possessed a generalized, nonsp ecific suspicion that Defendant or her 15 child were injured and that this was insu fficient to justify a warrantless entry into 16 Defendant’s home. See id. ¶¶ 29, 43. 17

{3} In response, the State asserts that both Defendant’s sister and her partner were 18 concerned by Defendant’s behavior, and thatdamage to Defendant’s vehicle indicated 19that she or her child may have been injure d in the accident. [MIO 9-10] However, the 1 evidence the State relies on, again, amounts to no more than speculation and 2 generalized concern. Although Defendant’s car exhibited signs of a recent accident, 3 the neighbor that reported Defendant provide d no indication that either Defendant or 4 her child were injured in any way. Whileit may be reasonable for the police to be 5 concerned for Defendant’s and her child’s welfare, as we stated in our notice, 6 generalized concern is insufficient to support warrantless entry into a residence. 7 Viewing the evidence in the light most favor able to the district court’s ruling, the 8 evidence in this case does not support a conc lusion that Defendant or her child was 9 “very likely” in need of “immediate aid to avoid great bodily harm or death.” Ryon , 10 2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 42. In additi on, we note that some of the officers’ concern should 11 have dissipated when officer s saw Defendant pushing agains t the door to try and bar 12 their entry. Cf. State v. Figueroa , 2010-NMCA-048, ¶ 23, 148 N.M. 811, 242 P.3d 13 378 (stating that “[r]easonable suspicion is measured by the totality of the 14 circumstances” and that when an initial susp icion is dispelled a continued detention 15 or frisk is impermissible (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 16

{4} Moreover, to the extent the State asserts that entry was consensual because 17 Defendant’s partner provided officers withthe key and permission to enter, this 18 argument is unpersuasive. When officers opened the door the second time and saw 19Defendant pushing against the door to attempt to bar their entry, any consent provided 1 by Defendant’s partner wa s overridden by Defendant. See generally State v. Janzen , 2 2007-NMCA-134, ¶ 8, 142 N.M. 638, 168 P.3d 768 (discussing Georgia v. Randolph , 3 547 U.S. 103 (2006), and its holding “that a warrantless search of a shared dwelling 4 . . . over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be 5 justified as reasonable as to him on the basi s of consent given to the police by another 6 resident”). We therefore conclude that th e officers’ warrantless entry into Defendant’s 7 home was neither consensual nor justif ied under the emergency aid doctrine. 8

{5} The State contends that this Court can s till affirm the district court’s denial of 9 Defendant’s motion to suppress based on exigent circumstances under a right-for-any10 reason analysis—specifically, that exig ent circumstances existed based on the 11 dissipation of alcohol. [MIO 14 (citing State v. Nance, 2011-NMCA-048, 149 N.M. 12 644, 253 P.3d 934)] An appellate court may affirm a trial court’s ruling on a ground 13 that was not relied on below if reliance on the new ground would not be unfair to the 14 appellant. Meiboom v. Watson , 2000-NMSC-004, ¶ 20, 128 N.M. 536, 994 P.2d 1154 15 (“This Court may affirm a district court ruling on a ground not relied upon by the 16 district court, but will not do so if reliance on the new ground would be unfair to 17 appellant.” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and c itation omitted)). “Under the 18 right for any reason doctrine, we may affirm the district court’s order on grounds not 19relied upon by the district court if those grounds do not require us to look beyond the 1 factual allegations that were raised and considered below.” State v. Vargas , 2 2008-NMSC-019, ¶ 8, 143 N.M. 692, 181 P. 3d 684 (internal quotation marks and 3 citation omitted). 4

{6} We note that, in the present case, no written findings of fact were entered to 5 support the district court’s conclusion under the emergency aid doctrine. Generally, 6 where we have no written findings on which torely, we will draw all inferences and 7 indulge all presumptions in favor of the district court’s ruling. See State v. Nysus , 8 2001-NMCA-102, ¶ 18, 131 N.M. 338, 35 P.3d 993 (“On appeal, we look to whether 9 the law was correctly applied to the facts and review the evidence in the light most 10 favorable to support the decision reached be low, resolving all conflicts and indulging 11 all inferences in support of that decision.”) . However, here, the district court’s ruling 12 was that officers were justified in entering the home under the emergency aid doctrine. 13 Given that there are no factual findings in this case, we conclude that it would be 14 unfair to indulge in inferences and pres umptions to support a conclusion that the 15 district court never actually reached. We, therefore, decline the St ate’s request that we 16 analyze this issue to see if entry was permitted based on exigent circumstances. 17 Instead, we remand this matter to the district court for such a determination. 18 19{7} For the reasons stated above and in this Court’s notice of proposed disposition, 1 we reverse the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress on the 2 grounds that the emergency aid doctrine app lies, and remand for consideration of the 3 State’s alternate argument. 4

{8} IT IS SO ORDERED. 5

__________________ ______________ 6 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 7 WE CONCUR: 8

_______________________________ 9 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 10

_______________________________ 11 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 12