alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
_______________________________________ __ 

### Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan



## November 25, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice



## 137099 Michael F. Cavanag h Elizabeth A. Weave r Marilyn Kell y Maura D. Corriga n 

## PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, J ustices



## v SC: 137099 COA: 285198 Wayne CC: 80-000185-01-FH RONNIE EARL MCDONALD, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the Ju ly 3, 2008 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

s1117 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

November 25, 2008

Clerk
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 06-7806

ANTHONY VON LONGMORE, Petitioner - Appellant, versus STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA; HENRY DARGAN MCMASTER, Attorney General of South Carolina, Respondents - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Beaufort. Margaret B. Seymour, District Judge. (9:05-cv-02112) Submitted: February 15, 2007 De cided: February 23, 2007 Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Anthony Von Longmore, Appellant Pro Se. Melody Jane Brown, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.- 2 - PER CURIAM: Anthony Von Longmore seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Longmore has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
                          THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMA-
                          TION EXTRACTED FROM THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
                          CONTAINED IN THE FOTOBALL USA, INC. FORM 10-QSB 
                          FOR THE PERIOD ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1997, AND IS 
                          QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH 
                          FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.

       
<S>                                                   <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                         9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                     DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                        JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                          SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                                1,453,422
<SECURITIES>                                                  0
<RECEIVABLES>                                         1,413,071
<ALLOWANCES>                                                  0
<INVENTORY>                                           3,488,597
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                      6,560,649
<PP&E>                                                2,218,549
<DEPRECIATION>                                          874,185  
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                        8,489,670
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                 1,038,476
<BONDS>                                                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                         0
<PREFERRED>                                                   0
<COMMON>                                                 26,767
<OTHER-SE>                                            7,201,624
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                          8,489,670
<SALES>                                               9,430,585
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                      9,430,585
<CGS>                                                 6,075,789
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                         4,262,534
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                              0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                              0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                       29,347
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                        (856,914)
<INCOME-TAX>                                                  0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                    (856,914)
<DISCONTINUED>                                                0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                               0
<CHANGES>                                                     0
<NET-INCOME>                                           (856,914)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                              (.32)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                              (.32)
                                               

</TABLE>
<PAGE>


EXHIBIT 99.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Fotoball USA, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Thomas R. Hillebrandt,
Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.



/s/ Thomas R. Hillebrandt
Thomas R. Hillebrandt
Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
August 14, 2002
Exhibit 32.1





CERTIFICATION OF CEO AND CFO PURSUANT
TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report on
Form 10-K of First Capital Investment Corporation (the “Company”) for the year ended December 31, 2016, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Form 10-K”), Pat Clemens, as Chief Executive Officer
of the Company, and Robert F. Amweg, as Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:



| | · | the Form 10-K of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and
| | - | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | · | the information contained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | - | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------







| | Dated: April 14, 2017
| | ---------------------
| |                      
| |                      
| |                      
| |                      
| |                      
| |                      
| |                      
| |                      
| |                      
| |
H. Res. 1077 

In the House of Representatives, U. S., 

September 26, 2018. 

Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it shall 

be in order to consider the conference report to accompany 

the bill (H.R. 6157) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 

2019, and for other purposes. All points of order against the 

conference report and against its consideration are waived. 

The conference report shall be considered as read. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the conference report to its adoption without intervening motion except: (1) one hour of debate; and (2) one motion to recommit 

if applicable. 

SEC. 2. Upon adoption of this resolution it shall be in 

order without intervention of any point of order to consider 

in the House the resolution (H. Res. 1071) recognizing that 

allowing illegal immigrants the right to vote devalues the 

franchise and diminishes the voting power of United States 

citizens. The resolution shall be considered as read. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the resolu-
2 

•HRES 1077 EH 

tion and preamble to adoption without intervening motion or 

demand for division of the question except one hour of debate 

equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary. 

SEC. 3. It shall be in order at any time on the legislative 

day of September 27, 2018, or September 28, 2018, for the 

Speaker to entertain motions that the House suspend the 

rules as though under clause 1 of rule XV. The Speaker or 

his designee shall consult with the Minority Leader or her 

designee on the designation of any matter for consideration 

pursuant to this section. 

Attest: 

Clerk.
### MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04

- 11

- 00613

- CR The STATE of Texas , Appellant

v. Refugio Angel LOZANO , Appellee From the 229th Judicial District Court , Starr County, Texas Trial Court No. 04

- CRS

- 78 Honorable Ana Lisa Garza , Judge Presiding
PER CURIAM Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice Karen Angelini, Justice Marialyn Barnard, Justice Delivered and Filed: September 21, 2011
DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION This is an attempted appeal by the State of Texas from a trial court order granting appellee Refugio Angel Lozano’s writ of habeas corpus. The order from which the State attempts to appeal was signed July 8, 2011. Accordingly, the State’s notice of appea l was due on or before July 28, 2011, twenty days from the date the order was signed. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 26.2(b); T EX
. C ODE C RIM
. P ROC
. art. 44.01(d) (West Supp. 2010). However, the State did not file its notice of appeal until July 29, 2011. Moreover, the State did not timely file a motion to04

- 11

- 00613

- CR

- 2

- extend time to file the notice of appeal, which would have been due on August 12, 2011. See
T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 26.3. Because the notice of appeal appeared to be untimely, on August 29, 2011, we issued a show cause order requiring the State to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The State filed a response on September 8, 2011. In its response, the State admits it filed the notice of appeal on July 29, 2011, but claims it was timely pursuant to the rules governing the computation of time for deadlines. We disagree. Although we agree with the State that when computing time for purposes of filing deadlines, the day the order is signed is not included, but the last day of the relevant time period is included. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 4.1(a). Accordingly, in this case, in computing the twenty day deadline for the S tate’s notice of appeal, we would not include July 8 th , the date the trial court’s signed the order, but we would include the 20 th day. Excluding July 8 th , but including the 20 th day thereafter results in the notice of appeal being due July 28, 2011, not July 29, 2011, as asserted by the State. Given the State’s admission that its notice of appeal was filed July 29 th , and considering the twenty

- day deadline and the rules for computing time, we hold the State’s notice of appeal was one day late. This cou rt does not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal that was not timely filed. See Olivo v. State , 918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Therefore, because the State’s notice of appeal was untimely, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

PER CURIAM Do Not Publish
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED SEPTEMBER 19, 2024

NO. 03-24-00492-CR

Nora Lee Lopez, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 331ST DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE BYRNE, JUSTICES TRIANA AND KELLY

DISMISSED ON APPELLANT’S MOTION -- OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE BYRNE

This is an appeal from the judgment of conviction entered by the trial court. Nora Lee Lopez has 

filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. Therefore, the Court grants the motion, allows Nora Lee 

Lopez to withdraw her notice of appeal, and dismisses the appeal. Because appellant is indigent 

and unable to pay costs, no adjudication of costs is made.
Exhibit 32.2

RF MONOLITHICS, INC.

CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF SARBANES  OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, Harley E Barnes III, Chief Financial Officer of RF Monolithics, Inc. (the Company), DOES HEREBY CERTIFY
that, to his knowledge:



| | 1. | The Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended May 31, 2010 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | Information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.
| | -- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350 and is not being filed
as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure document.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has caused this instrument to
be executed this 14th day of July, 2010.



/s/ Harley E Barnes IIIName: Harley E Barnes IIITitle: Chief Financial Officer


*A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### STAMATIS GOLFINOPOULOS v. MICHAEL PADULA.

October 13, 1987.

Petition for certification denied. (See 218 *N.J.Super.*38).
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: Ernest C. Adimore-Nweke v. The State of Texas

Appellate case number: 01-20-00012-CR

Trial court case number: 2233595

Trial court: County Criminal Court at Law No. 15 of Harris County

and

Appellate case name: Ernest C. Adimore-Nweke v. The State of Texas

Appellate case number: 1-20-00014-CR

Trial court case number: 2233594

Trial court: County Criminal Court at Law No. 15 of Harris County

Appellant, Ernest C. Adimore-Nweke, filed a motion asking this Court to declare him 

indigent in these two appeals. The Court abates these appeals in order for the trial court to hold a 

hearing to hear evidence and issue findings of fact to determine whether appellant is indigent.

See TEX. R. APP. P. 20.1(b)(3). The court coordinator of the trial court shall set a date for said 

hearing within 30 days of the date of this Order and notify the parties, including appellant. If 

appellant is now incarcerated, he may appear by closed video teleconference.1 The trial court 

shall have a court reporter, or court recorder, record the hearing and file the reporter’s record 

with this Court no later than 30 days from the date of the indigency hearing. The trial court clerk 

shall file a clerk’s record containing the trial court’s findings no later than 30 days from the date 

of the indigency hearing.

 

1 Any such teleconference must use a closed-circuit video teleconferencing system that provides for a 

simultaneous compressed full motion video and interactive communication of image and sound between 

the trial court, appellant, and any attorneys representing the State or appellant. On request, appellant and 

his counsel shall be able to communicate privately without being recorded or heard by the trial court or the 

attorney representing the State.
The appeals are abated, treated as closed cases, and removed from this Court’s active 

docket. The appeals will be reinstated on this Court’s active docket when the clerk’s record and 

reporter’s record of the hearing are filed with this Court.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: ___________/s/ Julie Countiss__________

Acting individually 

Date: January 16, 2020
Exhibit 99.0


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In  connection  with the  Quarterly  Report of  Bedford  Bancshares,  Inc.  (the
"Company")  on Form 10-QSB for the period ending June 30, 2002 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), we, Harold
K. Neal,  President and Chief Executive Officer,  and James W. Smith,  Principal
Accounting and Financial  Officer,  certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as
adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.




/s/Harold K. Neal                             /s/James W. Smith
--------------------------------              -------------------------------
Harold K. Neal                                James W. Smith
President and Chief Executive Officer         Principal Accounting and Financial
                                              Officer




August 6, 2002
#### Commonwealth v. Summa

*George P. Skumanick Jr., district attorney,*for the Commonwealth.

*Gerald C. Grimaud,*for defendant.

October 29, 1992

VANSTON, *P.J.,*

This opinion is written subsequent to the court’s receipt of the defendant’s notice of appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Following a jury trial in 1991, the defendant was found guilty by that jury of resisting arrest (18 Pa.C.S. §5104) and disorderly conduct (18 Pa.C.S. §5503(a)(l)), both graded as misdemeanors. The jury acquitted the defendant on the charge of driving under the influence (75 Pa.C.S. §3731(a)(l)). At the same time, this court ruled upon the summary charges listed in the criminal information and found the defendant guilty of driving without lights to avoid identification or arrest (75 Pa.C.S. §3734). He was found not guilty by the court on two other summary motor vehicle violations.

On the misdemeanor charges, the defendant was sentenced to undergo imprisonment in the Wyoming County Prison for not less than six nor more than 23 1/2 months. He has since been paroled on that sentence. On the *225summary vehicle violation, he was sentenced to pay a fine of $200.

Following his sentencing, the defendant obtained new counsel who has filed a Post Conviction Relief Act petition, the principal thrust of which is to attack the summary vehicle conviction and not the two misdemeanor convictions. The apparent reason for this is that the defendant has been notified that the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, intends to suspend his driver’s license. An appeal from such suspension is also pending before this court.

Following hearing on the Post Conviction Relief Act petition and the receipt of briefs from counsel, this court dismissed the said petition for lack of jurisdiction. The Post Conviction Relief Act (42 Pa.C.S. §9541, et seq.) provides, in relevant portion:

> “Section 9543. *Eligibility for*Relief—

> “(a) General rule — To be eligible for relief under this subchapter, a person must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence all of the following:

> “(1) That the person has been convicted of a crime under the laws of this Commonwealth and is:

> “(i) currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole for the crime;

> “(ii) awaiting execution of a sentence of death for the crime; or

> “(iii) serving a sentence which must expire before the person may commence serving the disputed sentence.”

*226Further, the Post Conviction Relief Act is the “sole means of obtaining collateral relief” in criminal matters. See section 9542.

As to the summary conviction for driving without lights to avoid identification or arrest, for which the only penalty was a fine, it is clear that the Post Conviction Relief Act does not apply and that this court is without jurisdiction to grant the relief requested. See *Commonwealth*v. *Pierce,*397 Pa. Super. 126, 579 A.2d 963 (1990).
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 14**  **- 2312** 

EARL STEWART GORDON , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v. GREATER WASHINGTON ORTHOPAEDIC GROUP, P.A.; DISTRICT COURT OF MARYLAND FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY; THE HEALTH CLAIM ARBITRATION OFFICE , Defendants

- Appellees

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland , at Greenbelt

. Deborah K. Chasanow , Senior District Judge. ( 8:14

- cv - 02429

- DKC )

Submitted : April 23, 2015 Decided: April 27 , 2015

Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and THACKER , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by un published per curiam opinion

.

Earl Stewart Gordon , Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CU RIAM: Earl Stewart Gordon seeks to appeal the district court’s orders dismissing without prejudice his civil action and denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration. We dismiss in part and affirm in part. Parties are accorded thirty day s after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “T he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” Bowles v. Russell , 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). Because Gordon filed his appeal more than thirty days after the entry of the district court’s order dismissing his actio n without prejudice, and failed to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal of this order as untimely. Gordon’s notice of appeal was timely as to the order denying his Rule 60(b) motion. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of the Rule 60(b) motion for the reasons stated by the district court. Gordon v. Greater Washington Orthopaedic
Grou p, P.A. , No. 8:14

- cv - 02429

- DKC ( D. Md. Oct. 27, 2014)

. We3 d ispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART