AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed September 24, 2013.

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-13-00820-CR

EX PARTE ROBERT ALLAN MILLER

On Appeal from the 422nd Judicial District Court

Kaufman County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 88341-422

OPINION

Before Justices Moseley, Myers, and Evans

Opinion by Justice Moseley

Robert Allan Miller appeals the trial court’s order denying him the relief sought by his 

pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus seeking a reduction of his bonds. In a single issue, 

appellant complains the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to reduce the bail on his two 

charges to $10,000 each because the amounts set are excessive and in violation of the United 

States and Texas Constitutions.

BACKGROUND

On April 4, 2013, appellant was arrested for the offense of terroristic threat. The trial 

court set appellant’s bail at $1,000,000. On May 15, 2013, appellant filed an application for writ 

of habeas corpus seeking reasonable bail. On May 16, 2013, appellant was charged in a twocount indictment with terroristic threat and obstruction or retaliation. The indictment also 
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included one enhancement paragraph alleging a prior final felony conviction. On May 29, 2013, 

appellant filed a second amended petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking a reduction in bail on 

the terroristic threat charge to $10,000 and seeking to have bail set at $10,000 on the obstruction 

or retaliation charge.

Both alleged offenses arise from a posting on the internet site Facebook; the post is as 

follows (spelling, punctuation, and grammatical constructs are original):

There has been no mistake or coincidence concerning the murders 

of the two Kaufman County District Attorney's Office officials. I 

expect that Assistant District Attorney Daniel Floyd will soon 

perish, bringing closure to an era of unacceptable practices and 

allowing Kaufman County residents to move forward with liberty 

and justice. What's happening is not an attack on the Criminal 

Justice System as a whole. It's a person or group who have unjustly 

had their lives destroyed by that office. What we are seeing unfold 

are acts of revenge against the tyrannical, unjust, Pit Bull style 

treatment of every poor soul damned to do business in the 

Kaufman County Courthouse. What District Attorney Mike 

McLelland boasted of as "In your face prosecuting". They make it 

personal, very personal. They quickly railroad a Defense Attorney 

and Defendant into complete despair without regard for ones 

innocence or guilt. 

Visitors to the Courthouse are quickly slapped with the air of 

1950's deep south backwoods rule. Upon entering, citizens are 

immediately chastised for common manners of dress and hairstyle. 

They're forced to remove any piercings, other than women's ears. 

They're made to tuck in all shirts without regard to the type or 

style. They must leave the premisses and return changed if a tee 

shirt has anything printed on it or if a woman is wearing anything 

considered by a Sheriffs Deputy to be even slightly provocative. 

Proceedings in Dallas, Tarrant, Denton, Collin, and Hunt County 

Courts all seem to function in a professional, polite, business like 

fashion. Kaufman County's Courthouse is a step back in time. An 

oppressive, completely offensive affront to the citizens of its 

beautiful county.
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Kaufman County's Defense Attorney's are quick to admit doubt of 

the prospect of a fair trial. A defendant is not given their "day in 

court" in Kaufman. Defendants and Defense Attorneys alike are 

belittled, berated, and, treated with disrespect from initial contact 

to fruition. The defendant is guilty simply by the fact that they 

were arrested. According to McCellan's own unofficial office 

policy, no mitigating circumstances or reason will be heard or 

taken into consideration in any case. The District Attorney's Office 

shall do anything and everything necessary, by any means, to find 

the accused guilty and levy the maximum punishment allowable, in 

every case, without exception, no matter what.

Kaufman County prosecutors violently attack from start to finish. 

Actual guilt or innocence does not concern them. Winning the 

State's case is their only goal and justice takes the backseat. That 

alone is unfair, unjust, unAmerican, and ungodly. To knowingly 

ruin the life of an innocent person for an inner office "high five" is 

a moral crime far beyond that which any Defendant might be 

suspected. This is most certainly not Justice. "Liberty and Justice 

for all" is the law of the land that gives us all the hope of fair 

treatment under the law. It gives us all respect for public office. 

Operating any public office in a manner that commands only fear 

from its subjects and cares not for its citizen's respect will 

eventually receive the same violent malice, that it has dealt to its 

people. They are now simply reaping what they have sown.

Most Sincerely, Kaufman County Resident, Bob Miller

At the habeas corpus hearing, Kaufman County Deputy Sheriff Joey Cagle testified he 

investigated the above post. He testified it was sent to twenty different news media sites and that 

he interpreted it as a threat to Kaufman County Assistant District Attorney Daniel Floyd. The 

posting was made during the time Kaufman County law enforcement officers were investigating 

the murders of Michael McClelland, the Kaufman County District Attorney, McClelland’s wife

Cynthia, and Assistant District Attorney Mark Hasse. Cagle was present when two Texas 

Rangers interviewed Floyd. Cagle testified Floyd was “in fear of his life,” and officers provided 

Floyd protection at his office and his home.
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Cagle testified he traced the address of the computer used to post the alleged Facebook 

threat to appellant’s residence in Hunt County. Cagle and Texas Rangers went to appellant’s 

residence, arrested him, and executed a search warrant on his residence. Cagle transported 

appellant to the Kaufman County Law Enforcement Center, where Cagle conducted a videotaped

interview with appellant. During the interview, appellant was asked what he would say to Floyd 

if Floyd was in the room with them. Appellant stated he would tell Floyd “he should hide . . . he 

should dig a hole someplace and hide,” and that Floyd was “probably the next to perish.” 

Appellant insisted he wrote the Facebook post as a warning and not as a threat to Floyd. 

Portions of the interview were played to the trial court. Cagle testified that at the time of 

appellant’s arrest on the terroristic threat and obstruction or retaliation charges, appellant was out 

on bond on a felony DWI offense; Floyd was the prosecutor in that case. Cagle testified he 

believed appellant was attempting to affect the outcome of his DWI case by making Floyd either 

quit or “take it easier on people he was prosecuting.”

LaShonda Taylor, an attorney with the Kaufman County Public Defender’s Office, 

testified she was appointed to represent appellant on the felony DWI case on July 27, 2012. She 

filed a motion to withdraw on April 12, 2013, after appellant was arrested on the terroristic threat 

charge. The motion was granted by written order on April 24, 2013. Taylor testified she 

withdrew from representing appellant due to a conflict of interest that would arise by her being 

called as a witness in this case. Taylor testified appellant did appear in court on the felony DWI 

charge whenever he was required, and he had a prior probation that he successfully completed.

Appellant’s wife, Maurine Miller, testified she and appellant had been married for 

eighteen years and had lived in Terrell for seventeen years. They lived in a “metal building and 

on a bus parked on five acres” of land that was deeded to appellant by his mother. Maurine 
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testified that their monthly expenses included a $900 payment to appellant’s mother for living on 

the property and to pay the phone bill that was in the mother’s name; $200 to $300 for groceries; 

$200 for electricity; $40 for water; $50 for Internet usage; $30 for auto insurance; $150 for credit 

card; and $70 for medications not covered by Medicare. They also paid $140 per quarter for 

term life insurance. Maurine testified their monthly income included a $1,206 Social Security 

disability payment to appellant as a result of his heart condition and being diabetic, and $656 she 

received in Social Security disability payments for their sixteen-year-old son, whom she 

homeschooled. They also received $115 in food stamps each month. She also testified they 

owned personal household items, several junk cars that were parked on the property, a 1999 

Suburban, and a bank account with $130 deposited. Maurine testified she contacted twelve 

different bail bondsmen, but most were not approved to post a $1 million bond. One bondsman 

wanted $100,000 and another wanted $80,000 to post the bond.

On cross-examination, Maurine testified appellant is the owner of the five acres on which 

they live, and she was aware that in 2012, the assessed value for the land and improvements was 

$102,220. Maurine testified the 2012 valuation was not correct, and she would value the 

property at $60,000. Maurine further testified she did not know why the property is listed as 

having no mortgage; she has not tried to sell any of the acreage; she does not have any kind of 

disability or health condition; and she could get a job if she wanted.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court reduced the bail to $200,000 on the 

terroristic threat charge and set bail on the obstruction or retaliation charge at $50,000. 

APPLICABLE LAW

We review the trial court’s denial of a bond reduction request under an abuse of 

discretion standard. See Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848, 850 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 
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1981); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15 (West 2011). To determine whether a 

trial court abused its discretion, we must decide whether the trial court acted without reference to 

any guiding rules or principles, or whether the act was arbitrary or unreasonable. See 

Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Merely because a trial court 

decides a matter within its discretion in a different manner than an appellate court would in a 

similar circumstance does not demonstrate that an abuse of discretion has occurred. Id.

The primary purpose of an appearance bond is to secure the presence of a defendant at 

trial on the offense charged. Ex parte Vasquez, 558 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). 

In determining the amount of bail to set, the trial court is guided by the following rules: (1) the 

bail should be sufficiently high to give reasonable assurance that the undertaking will be 

complied with; (2) the power to require bail is not to be so used as to make it an instrument of 

oppression; (3) the nature of the offense and the circumstances under which it was committed are 

to be considered; (4) the ability to make bail is to be considered; and (5) the future safety of a 

victim of the alleged offense and the community may be considered. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

ANN. art. 17.15; see also Ex parte Welch, 729 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no 

pet.). Relevant facts to be considered in determining the amount of bond include the accused’s 

work record; family and community ties; length of residency; previous criminal record; 

conformity with the conditions of any previous bond; the existence of outstanding bonds; any 

aggravating circumstances alleged to have been involved in the charged offense; and the range of 

punishment for the charged offense. Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849–50.

The person seeking the reduction has the burden of demonstrating the bail is excessive. 

See Ex parte Rodriguez, 595 S.W.2d 549, 550 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). Although 

the ability or inability of the accused to make bail is a factor to be considered, that factor alone 
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does not control the amount of bail. See Ex parte Charlesworth, 600 S.W.2d 316, 317 (Tex. 

Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980).

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends the bond amounts are excessive. He asserts the Facebook post was 

not a threat toward Floyd; rather, it was an exercise of appellant’s right to free speech guaranteed 

by the United States Constitution. Appellant argues the bond amounts should be the same in 

both cases because they arise from the same set of facts. Appellant further asserts that even if 

both bonds are the same amount, $50,000 is still excessive and his bail should be reduced to 

$10,000 in each case. The State responds that the trial court acted within its discretion in setting

appellant’s bond amounts.

Appellant is charged with terroristic threat and obstruction or retaliation, each of which is 

a third-degree felony offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.07(a)(6), (e); 36.06(a)(1)(A), 

(c) (West 2011 & Supp. 2012). If the enhancement paragraph is found to be true, the punishment 

range will be increased to that of a second-degree felony, which is imprisonment for two to

twenty years and an optional fine not to exceed $10,000. Appellant was already on bond for a

pending third-degree felony offense at the time he was charged with these new offenses. Given 

the serious nature of these offenses and the potential punishment involved, the trial court could 

properly have concluded the amount of the bond was reasonable.

Moreover, at the bond hearing, appellant’s wife testified to their income, living expenses, 

and inability to make bond. However, appellant introduced no evidence to support his wife’s

claim that he was unable to make the bond or that he had made any efforts himself to secure any 

bond that was denied. While the ability or inability of the accused to make bail is a factor to be 

considered, that factor alone does not control the amount of bail. See Ex parte Charlesworth, 
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600 S.W.2d at 317. Finally, the trial court heard testimony regarding the charges in this case, 

appellant’s statements to the officers during his videotaped interview, and appellant’s pending 

felony charge and prior criminal record.

After reviewing the record, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion—that 

it acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles, or acted arbitrarily or 

unreasonably—in setting the respective bails at $200,000 and $50,000. See Montgomery, 810 

S.W.2d at 380; Ex parte Welch, 729 S.W.2d at 309; Ex parte Scott, 122 S.W.3d 866, 868 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). We resolve appellant’s sole issue against him.

We affirm the trial court’s order.

/s/Jim Moseley 

JIM MOSELEY

JUSTICE

PUBLISH

TEX. R. APP. P. 47

130820F.P05
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Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT

EX PARTE ROBERT ALLAN MILLER

No. 05-13-00820-CR 

Appeal from the 422nd Judicial District 

Court of Kaufman County, Texas 

(Tr.Ct.No. 88341-422).

Opinion delivered by Justice Moseley, 

Justices Myers and Evans participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s order is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered September 24, 2013.

/s/ Jim Moseley

JIM MOSELEY

JUSTICE