United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 4, 2014*

Decided November 4, 2014

Before

RICHARD D. CUDAHY, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 13-3859

CHARLES E. BRAMLETT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MARK S. CARICH, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 11-97-GPM

G. Patrick Murphy,

Judge.

O R D E R

Charles Bramlett, who is civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person at Big

Muddy River Correctional Center, see 725 ILCS 205, appeals from the dismissal of his

civil-rights suit against several Big Muddy employees, including the former

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

*

After examining the parties’ briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral

argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.

See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
No. 13-3859 Page 2

administrator of the facility’s sex-offender treatment program, Mark Carich. Bramlett

claimed that the defendants had violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due

process. We conclude that Bramlett’s claim against Carich (who retired during the suit’s

pendency) is moot, and that Bramlett fails to state a claim for relief against the other

defendants. Thus, we affirm the judgment.

In his complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Bramlett alleged that Carich

had purposely housed him with two dangerous cellmates—first Roy Shivers and then

Randy Blake—and that the other defendants were complicit because they ignored his

complaints and denied his grievances about the housing assignments. Carich was trying

to endanger him, Bramlett asserted, because therapy participants must incriminate

themselves during sessions, and he refused to do so. At first, Bramlett recounted, he

was assigned to cell with Shivers, and was disciplined with segregation when, after four

days with Shivers, he refused to continue sharing a cell. Then, when he reentered the

general prison population, Carich assigned him to cell with Blake. He was sent to

segregation, again, after Correctional Officer John Gwaltney reported that Bramlett had

threatened Blake, although Bramlett asserts that Gwaltney fabricated the threat.

Bramlett submitted grievances protesting the cell assignments administratively and

appealed the disciplinary sanctions on the ground that Carich’s choices of cellmate

placed him in danger. His grievances were denied, and he lost his appeals. Other than

Carich and Gwaltney, all of the named defendants were sued solely because of their

participation in handling Bramlett’s grievance and administrative appeals. 

The district court screened the complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, after which the

only surviving claim relevant to this appeal was Bramlett’s claim asserting that Carich

had failed to protect him from Shivers and Blake. But Bramlett did not allege an injury

from his cell placement, and thus the court limited his claim to one for injunctive relief.

See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845 (1994); Doe v. Welborn, 110 F.3d 520, 524 n.3 (7th

Cir. 1997); Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 272–73 (7th Cir. 1996).

Carich moved for summary judgment, arguing that Bramlett lacked evidence of

a continuing constitutional deprivation, and thus injunctive relief to prevent future

harm was unwarranted. In particular, Carich contended that Bramlett’s deposition

testimony contradicted his assertion that he faced a recurring danger of being placed

with unsafe cellmates. During the deposition Bramlett conceded that he had been celled

at Big Muddy with only two detainees who caused him to fear for his life: Shivers and

Blake. Moreover, by the time he was deposed, Bramlett had been confined at Big

Muddy for 13 years and had shared a cell with about 40 different men. He
No. 13-3859 Page 3

acknowledged that he and Shivers never physically fought but said that Shivers was

“always in my face ready to go.” Later when Bramlett was released from segregation

after refusing to live with Shivers, he shared a cell with another man before being

placed with Blake, who, Bramlett asserted, was known by Carich to make sexual

advances toward other detainees. As with Shivers, however, Bramlett did not have any

violent encounters with Blake even though they remained together for three months

until Bramlett again was sent to segregation. Bramlett further conceded that, when he

was deposed, he had a “workable” relationship with his current cellmate and did not

think that his life was threatened at Big Muddy. When asked about Jessica Stover, who

replaced Carich when he retired, Bramlett asserted that, like Carich, she places him with

whomever she wants, but he did not accuse her of selecting any cellmate who presented

a threat. 

The district court granted summary judgment for Carich. The court reasoned that

Bramlett had been removed from the cell placements which allegedly endangered him,

and that he lacked evidence suggesting that Stover would place him in danger in the

future. And without evidence of a continuing violation of federal law, the court

concluded, Bramlett could not obtain injunctive relief.

On appeal Bramlett contests the district court’s grant of summary judgment for

Carich and the dismissal of the defendants at screening. He maintains that Carich

knowingly put him in harm’s way by celling him with Shivers and Blake, that Shivers

threatened him with violence, that Blake threatened his bodily integrity, and that no one

at Big Muddy did anything to stop or remedy the danger. And he presses his claim that

Officer Gwaltney should be held accountable for ignoring his requests for protection

and “siding with” Blake over him. 

Bramlett’s appellate claims are without merit. First, Carich retired and no longer

works at Big Muddy. Thus, he no longer presents a current or future risk of harm to

Bramlett, making Bramlett’s claim against Carich moot. See Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709,

716 (7th Cir. 2011); Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 848 n.3 (7th Cir. 1999). As for

Officer Gwaltney, “even assuming fraudulent conduct on the part of prison officials, the

protection from such arbitrary action is found in the procedures mandated by due

process.” See McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 787 (7th Cir. 1999). Thus, so long as the

procedural requirements set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563–66, 571,

(1974)—advance written notice of the alleged disciplinary infraction, an opportunity to

present evidence to an impartial decision maker, and a written statement explaining the

evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action—Bramlett cannot state a
No. 13-3859 Page 4

claim for relief, see Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 625 (7th Cir. 2006). And Bramlett

did not allege any deviation from Wolff’s mandates. Lastly, Bramlett does not have an

actionable Fourteenth Amendment claim against those who processed his grievances

and discipline simply because they did not grant him relief. See Burks v. Raemisch, 555

F.3d 592, 595–96 (7th Cir. 2009); Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 657 (7th Cir. 2005).

We have reviewed Bramlett’s remaining contentions, and none has merit. 

AFFIRMED.