COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Willis and Bumgardner 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

GEORGE C. HOWELL, III 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2800-98-2 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III 

 JANUARY 27, 2000 

MARGARET H. HOWELL 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Theodore J. Markow, Judge 

 Ronald S. Evans (Lawrence D. Diehl; Brenner, 

Dohnal, Evans & Yoffy, P.C., on briefs), for 

appellant. 

 James C. Roberts (Dawn B. DeBoer; Mays & 

Valentine, L.L.P., on brief), for appellee. 

 George C. Howell, III appeals from the final decree 

divorcing Margaret H. Howell and him and distributing their 

marital estate. He complains primarily that the trial court 

erred in valuing his interest in his law firm, but he also 

asserts it erred in classifying a money market account, in 

allocating marital debt, and in setting spousal support. The 

trial court referred all issues to a commissioner in chancery 

and adopted nearly all of the commissioner's findings in its 

final decree. Concluding that the trial court did not err, we 

affirm. 

 The parties married in 1982 after the husband graduated 

from law school but before he began practicing law with Hunton & 
Williams, a large firm based in Richmond. The husband 

specialized in tax law, established a successful practice with 

the firm, became a partner in 1989, and earned an income of more 

than $400,000 by 1998. After the first of their two children 

was born in 1984, the wife no longer worked outside the home. 

She took care of their two children and maintained the 

household. When the parties separated November 17, 1995, she 

maintained custody of the children, and when they divorced 

November 4, 1998, she received sole physical custody of the 

children with the husband's consent. 

The husband conceded that his partnership interest was 

marital property because he acquired it during the marriage. 

The partnership agreement at Hunton & Williams defined the value 

of the partnership interest upon termination or death. It 

entitled the partner to receive only the balance of his capital 

account and his share of the net income. As applied to this 

case, those two items amounted to $85,614. The husband 

maintains that the agreement fixed the value of his partnership 

interest for equitable distribution purposes and that it 

precluded consideration of whether his interest had goodwill. 

He argues that Kaufman v. Kaufman, 7 Va. App. 488, 375 S.E.2d 

374 (1988), ruled that restrictive agreements control the 

valuation of business interests and limit the value to that 

established by the agreement. The husband argues that the trial 

court erred in finding that his partnership interest had 

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goodwill because the Hunton & Williams agreement made no 

provision for goodwill. 

Code § 20-107.3(A) directs that the trial court value all 

property of the parties, but it does not define the term, 

"value," for equitable distribution purposes. The statute does 

not set the standard of value, that is, the measure of 

property's worth for equitable distribution. "Value" is a 

mercurial term; the term has numerous, distinct meanings. The 

various meanings are not interchangeable. The meaning of the 

term, "value," depends on what is being valued, who is 

interested, and why it is being valued. A piece of property may 

have different values for different purposes. The purpose for 

which it is being valued determines which definition, which 

standard of value, is proper. Purpose determines the standard 

of value; that, in turn, determines the appropriate methods of 

valuation. 

Bosserman v. Bosserman, 9 Va. App. 1, 384 S.E.2d 104 

(1989), defined "value" for equitable distribution purposes; it 

set intrinsic value as the standard of value. "Trial courts 

valuing marital property for the purpose of making a monetary 

award must determine from the evidence that value which 

represents the property's intrinsic worth to the parties 

. . . ." Id. at 6, 384 S.E.2d at 107. The value of an item of 

marital property is its intrinsic worth to the parties: the 

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worth to the husband and wife, the parties; the value to the 

marital partnership that the court is dissolving. 

Intrinsic value is a very subjective concept that looks to 

the worth of the property to the parties. The methods of 

valuation must take into consideration the parties themselves 

and the different situations in which they exist. The item may 

have no established market value, and neither party may 

contemplate selling the item; indeed, sale may be restricted or 

forbidden. Commonly, one party will continue to enjoy the 

benefits of the property while the other must relinquish all 

future benefits. Still, its intrinsic value must be translated 

into a monetary amount. The parties must rely on accepted 

methods of valuation, but the particular method of valuing and 

the precise application of that method to the singular facts of 

the case must vary with the myriad situations that exist among 

married couples. 

Because intrinsic value must depend on the facts of the 

case, we give great weight to the findings of the trial court. 

We affirm if the evidence supports the findings and if the trial 

court finds a reasonable evaluation based on proven methodology 

and on the application of it to the particular facts of the 

case. See Russell v. Russell, 11 Va. App. 411, 415-16, 399 

S.E.2d 166, 168 (1990). "[T]he trial court's valuation of 

goodwill will not be disturbed if it appears that the court made 

a reasonable approximation of the goodwill value, if any, of the 

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professional practice based on competent evidence and the use of 

a sound method supported by that evidence." Id. at 417, 399 

S.E.2d at 169 (citation omitted). 

In Kaufman, the husband purchased a one-third interest in a 

medical practice six months after the parties separated. The 

purchase contract required stockholders to resell their interest 

to the corporation at a value excluding any provision for 

accounts receivable or work in progress. The trial court held 

that the value set by the contract controlled because the terms 

were made at arm's length and were devoid of fraud. This Court 

affirmed that valuation and ruled it was bound by the finding 

because there was evidence to support it. See 7 Va. App. at 

502, 375 S.E.2d at 381 (citing Code § 8.01-680). 

In Bosserman, the wife asked the court to value the 

husband's interest in a family-owned, closely-held corporation. 

A restrictive agreement required a shareholder to offer the 

stock first to the corporation at "true book value." The 

husband argued that the restriction defined the value. See 9 

Va. App. at 3, 384 S.E.2d at 106. This Court recognized that 

the value set by such agreements "is often artificial and does 

not always reflect true value," even though the agreements may 

be binding on business partners. Id. at 6, 384 S.E.2d at 108. 

"[T]he sale price set by restrictive provisions on transfer is 

not conclusive as to the value of the stock." Id. at 7, 384 

S.E.2d at 108. A restriction on transfer does not control its 

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value, "but the restriction on transfer is a factor which 

affects the value of the stock for purposes of equitable 

distribution." Id. (citations omitted). Interestingly, 

Bosserman relied upon an article discussing goodwill valuation 

in law firms to conclude restrictive provisions are not 

conclusive of value. 

Russell established that a psychiatric practice could have 

goodwill that had value. "[I]f the trial court determines from 

the greater weight of the evidence that a professional practice 

has goodwill value, that amount must be subject to valuation as 

part of the marital property. To hold otherwise would result in 

a windfall to the professional spouse." 11 Va. App. at 416, 399 

S.E.2d 168. Goodwill may be an asset of a professional 

practice, and if it is, it is subject to valuation for equitable 

distribution purposes. 

All three decisions turned upon the particular findings 

made from the precise evidence presented to the trial court. 

The holdings establish that the value of property is an issue of 

fact, not of law. Goodwill may exist, or may not; an agreement 

may restrict its value, or may not. The existence of goodwill 

must be proven, and if it exists, its value must be proven. The 

evidence presented at trial determines the result, and the 

result may vary from case to case as the evidence differs. If 

conflicting, competent evidence is presented, that found more 

credible will determine whether goodwill exists and its value if 

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it does exist. The existence is not fixed as a matter of law, 

nor is the method of valuation; both are functions of the fact 

finding process. 

In this case, the commissioner found that the husband's 

partnership interest had intangible value, goodwill, and that 

the partnership agreement did not reflect its true worth to the 

parties, its intrinsic value. After hearing extensive expert 

testimony, the commissioner accepted the opinion of the wife's 

expert and valued the partnership interest at $319,569. The 

trial court accepted the commissioner's findings. 

The wife's certified public accountant testified that the 

husband's interest in his law firm had value in the nature of 

goodwill. The husband's expert witness, also a certified public 

accountant, disagreed and testified that the partnership 

agreement controlled. Both opinions were made by qualified and 

experienced experts, were reasoned and based on accepted 

principles, and either might have been found credible by the 

trial court. In resolving the conflicting opinions, the 

commissioner gave greater weight to the wife's expert, and the 

trial court accepted that finding. 

The trial court has discretion to resolve conflicting 

expert testimony to determine an asset's value. See Rowe v. 

Rowe, 24 Va. App. 123, 140, 480 S.E.2d 760, 768 (1997); McDavid 

v. McDavid, 19 Va. App. 406, 413, 451 S.E.2d 713, 718 (1994). 

Where the court accepts the commissioner's findings of fact, 

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"the findings are presumed to be correct when reviewed on appeal 

and are to be given 'great weight' by this Court." Rowe, 24 Va. 

App. at 140, 480 S.E.2d at 768 (citation omitted). The court's 

decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or 

without evidence to support it. See Blank v. Blank, 10 Va. App. 

1, 9, 389 S.E.2d 723, 727 (1990). 

The standard of value has a critical impact on the effect 

of a restrictive agreement. The standard in equitable 

distribution, intrinsic value, looks to the value to the parties 

to the divorce action. When the parties do not contemplate sale 

and one of the two is going to enjoy the benefits of the 

property with no likelihood of leaving the business, a 

restrictive agreement may have less bearing on the value to the 

parties. The agreement should be considered but it is not 

conclusive. "The reason for rejecting the value set by buyout 

provisions is that they do not necessarily represent the 

intrinsic worth of the stock to the parties." Bosserman, 9 Va. 

App. at 6, 384 S.E.2d at 107. 

The commissioner considered the restrictive agreement as 

one factor in determining whether goodwill existed, but he did 

not find it to be the sole, controlling factor. Credible 

evidence supported the finding that the partnership agreement 

was but one factor to consider in determining the intrinsic 

value of the husband's partnership interest. The trial court 

did not err in finding that the Hunton & Williams partnership 

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agreement did not control the existence of goodwill in the 

husband's interest in the firm. 

The husband contends that even if the trial court did not 

err in rejecting the partnership agreement valuation, it did err 

in the method and application used to value the interest. Both 

sides presented expert testimony valuing the goodwill of the 

partnership interest. The commissioner found that the wife's 

expert was persuasive and accepted his evaluation. The trial 

court affirmed those findings fixing the value at $319,569. 

The wife's expert used the excess earnings method to value 

the practice goodwill, a method acknowledged by the husband's 

expert as the most popular method for evaluating professional 

goodwill. The wife's expert began by comparing the husband's 

average income for three years to that of a peer group. The 

difference between the two was the excess earnings due to the 

husband's association with the firm, but not the earnings due to 

his personal efforts. It was the additional income he received 

from being associated with his law firm. The wife's expert 

projected those excess earnings over the husband's expected 

career with Hunton & Williams. Using the discounted future 

earnings method, he then calculated the present value of the 

husband's total future excess earnings. 

The wife's expert began by comparing the husband's earnings 

to those of a peer group. The husband argues that this method, 

described as working from the "bottom up," is incorrect. He 

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contends that the peer group selected by the wife's expert 

compared him to merely average attorneys, did not reflect his 

special reputation and expertise, and failed to distinguish his 

personal credentials from those of Hunton & Williams. He also 

contends that the discounted future earnings method is an 

improper method of valuation because it is based on future 

earnings projections. Finally, he argues he can have no excess 

earnings due to his association with Hunton & Williams because 

he had received offers from other firms for 150-175% more 

income. 

The wife's expert carefully explained why he selected the 

methodology that he used. A major reason was the unavailability 

of partnership financial data. Before getting the appraisal, 

the wife attempted to discover the partnership's financial 

records. Hunton & Williams successfully had the request quashed 

and did not make any partnership financial data available. The 

wife's expert felt the "bottom up" method was more accurate 

under those circumstances. The trial court accepted that 

opinion and analysis. We cannot say that the opinion was 

unworthy of belief as a matter of law. 

The wife's expert selected the husband's peer group based 

on factors that included comparable geographic location, 

population, firm size, specialization, and years of practice. 

The husband argued that the group did not reflect his special 

talents and that the appropriate peer group was the one selected 

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by his expert. The trial court carefully examined these 

conflicting opinions and rejected the one offered by the 

husband. The trial court found the peer group suggested by the 

husband's expert was flawed because the group only included 

firms located in very large cities, such as New York or San 

Francisco, and it was a selection provided by the husband. 

 The wife's expert valued the husband's excess earnings due 

solely to his association with his firm at $38,269. He then 

projected this figure to the husband's expected retirement year, 

2021. After adding the terminal value of the husband's capital 

account, he applied a discount rate of 6.9%. The result was the 

present value of the husband's partnership interest, $319,569. 

The court accepted the wife's expert's use of a discount rate of 

only 6.9%. The expert justified that rate, one applicable to 

nearly risk-free investments, and the record does not suggest 

that it was incredible. As presented, the proper discount rate 

was an expert opinion that could be accepted if the trier of 

fact found it persuasive and believable. 

Discounting future earnings is not an inherently flawed 

method of valuation because it is based on projected future 

earnings. The value of goodwill can have two components. 

Professional goodwill (also designated as individual, personal, 

or separate goodwill) is attributable to the individual and is 

categorized as separate property in a divorce action. Practice 

goodwill (also designated as business or commercial goodwill) is 

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attributable to the business entity, the professional firm, and 

may be marital property. The commissioner and the trial court 

carefully distinguished between these two components and 

selected a value that was solely attributable to the husband 

being a partner in Hunton & Williams. It represented the 

premium due to the husband's association with Hunton & Williams, 

the economic advantage he enjoyed because he was a partner in 

that firm. It included no value attributable to him personally, 

and it did not rely upon any earnings due to the husband's own 

expertise, reputation, experience, skill, knowledge, or 

personality. As applied, the discounted future earnings method 

was not a flawed method of valuation. 

In valuing the goodwill of the partnership interest, courts 

must take special care not to confuse the owner spouse's 

personal future earning capacity with practice goodwill 

attributable to the law firm in order to avoid double counting. 

"Further, particular care must be given that future earnings 

capacity and reputation not be confused with professional 

goodwill." Russell, 11 Va. App. at 417, 399 S.E.2d at 168. 

Though the husband's expert first stated that in his 

opinion the partnership interest could have no goodwill value, 

he offered an alternative opinion that recognized the husband's 

interest did have goodwill value. The trial court found that 

the alternative opinions offered by the husband, that his 

interest did and did not have goodwill value, were contradictory 

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and confusing. The husband's expert used the capitalized 

historic earning method. His method required comparison of 

earnings to those of a peer group. The trial court found the 

husband's peer group inherently flawed, and it noted the group 

data was for the wrong year and compared group data to a single 

year of the husband's income. 

The husband's expert calculated the value of a theoretical, 

marketable, controlling partnership interest in Hunton & 

Williams. To that figure, the expert applied a discount of 40% 

for lack of marketability and 30% for minority status. That 

reduced the market value of the husband's interest to $105,177. 

The trial court rejected the husband's reasoning for discounting 

for minority status and marketability. It found the discounts 

inappropriate because no transfer of the partnership interest 

was foreseeable and no one in the firm, nor any group within it, 

exercised majority control. See Bosserman, 9 Va. App. at 7-9, 

384 S.E.2d at 108-09 (discussing restriction on marketability 

and minority shareholder status as affecting value to owning 

spouse). The trial court also rejected the argument that offers 

of employment at substantially higher compensation meant all 

goodwill was personal. The trial court would not accept the 

conclusion, suggested by that argument, that Hunton & Williams 

had no practice goodwill. 

The experts disagreed on which of two accepted methods of 

valuation to use and on the application of those methods. They 

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differed on the following: whether to value the individual 

interest first; whether to capitalize historic earnings or to 

discount future earnings; the proper peer group; the proper 

income data; and the application of discounts. The opinions of 

the experts conflicted, but neither was erroneous as a matter of 

law. "Depending on the circumstance of each case, different 

methods of valuation may reflect more accurately the actual 

value of the stock to the shareholder." Id. at 7, 384 S.E.2d at 

108. No single method for determining the value of professional 

goodwill is preferred. See Russell, 11 Va. App. at 417, 399 

S.E.2d at 169. We conclude that the trial court did not err in 

selecting the method of valuation or in the application of it to 

the facts presented in this case. The wife's valuation of the 

husband's interest in his law firm was supported by substantial 

and competent evidence. 

 The husband argues that the trial court erred in 

classifying a portion of a $203,288.46 money market account as 

marital property. The trial court designated $38,355 of the 

fund as marital property and $164,933 as the husband's separate 

property. The husband established the account in his name alone 

after the parties separated. He made the first deposit in March 

1996 when he received his annual partnership earnings 

distribution. 

 Hunton & Williams operated on a fiscal year that ended in 

March, and it paid the partners the balance of their earnings in 

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March of each year. The husband had to report his entire 

partnership income on his individual tax return for the calendar 

year in which the fiscal year ended. For example, he had to 

report all income earned from April 1, 1995 to March 31, 1996 on 

his individual income tax return for the calendar year 1996. 

That would throw nine months' worth of earnings, the portion 

earned in 1995, into the next individual income tax year, 1996. 

The receipt of annual earnings in a lump at the end of the 

partnership's fiscal year created an irregular cash flow. The 

couple's income trailed their expenditure of it. To balance 

expenditures with receipts of income, the parties borrowed 

temporarily. They established an equity line of credit when 

they first purchased the marital home. Throughout the marriage, 

they had used that as a source of funds to pay expenses that 

came due before the partnership distributed its earnings. When 

they received the distribution at the end of the fiscal year, 

they would pay the credit line down. They used the distribution 

to repay the temporary financing incurred over the preceding 

twelve months. 

 At the time the parties separated, the balance due on the 

equity line was $126,801. The husband borrowed an additional 

$70,000 after the separation, but the wife froze the account 

when she learned of these draws. He then borrowed on two 

additional accounts and used the proceeds to pay taxes and 

tuition. The husband claimed that the funds borrowed after 

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separation were used for marital purposes. From July 1995 the 

husband only paid interest on the equity line account, and after 

separation, he did not curtail the account except to apply 

$71,652.71 from the portion of the March 1996 distribution that 

he considered to be marital property. 

The fiscal year-end distribution that husband received in 

March 1996 was for work done both before and after the date of 

separation, November 1995. The husband calculated that $72,795 

was marital property. He applied $71,652.71 of that to the 

balance due on the equity line of credit. The remaining portion 

of the March 1996 distribution became the initial deposit to his 

new separate money market account. In June 1996, he received a 

$50,000 bonus that also represented work done before and after 

the separation. The husband calculated that $31,350 of that 

bonus was earned before separation and thus was marital 

property. He applied $27,000 of the marital portion toward 

payment of his 1996 estimated income tax and the balance to what 

he claimed were joint expenses. He deposited the portion that 

he considered separate property, $18,470, to his separate money 

market account. 

The trial court classified $38,355 of the money market fund 

as marital property because it disallowed as marital expenses 

the estimated tax payment of $27,000 and $11,355 claimed as 

expenses for maintaining the marital residence. The husband 

argues that the use of his separate money market fund to make 

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the wife whole is inappropriate. The husband contends these 

funds paid taxes, tuition, and household expenses of the marital 

residence. He argues that the marital share of the June 1996 

bonus paid the joint 1996 tax liability and not simply the taxes 

due on the bonus. 

The trial court disallowed $38,355 of his claimed marital 

expenditures finding that the payment of $27,000 toward 

estimated 1996 taxes was not reasonable and that $11,355 of 

household expenses were not adequately proven. The court held 

that the use of a substantial portion of the marital share of 

the June 1996 bonus to pay taxes under the guise of a joint 

obligation was not a valid marital purpose. The court also held 

the husband's evidence was insufficient to satisfy his burden to 

prove that the expenditures of $11,355 were for valid marital 

purposes. The husband did not provide a detailed explanation of 

these expenses, but the trial court still found that $54,955 was 

expended for marital purposes. 

The husband had the burden to establish by a preponderance 

of the evidence that post-separation withdrawals of marital 

funds were used for a legitimate marital purpose. See Alphin v. 

Alphin, 15 Va. App. 395, 402, 424 S.E.2d 572, 576 (1992) (court 

satisfied that husband's expenses, for which detailed accounting 

was provided, were for valid marital purpose); Amburn v. Amburn, 

13 Va. App. 661, 666-67, 414 S.E.2d 847, 850-51 (1992) (wife did 

not squander away marital funds by paying for living expenses 

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husband failed to pay). We conclude that the decision to 

classify a portion of the money market account to make up for 

the husband's non-legitimate marital expenditures was supported 

by the evidence and not plainly wrong when considering the way 

the parties normally managed their finances and used the credit 

line in tandem with their income. 

The trial court ordered the husband to pay the balance due 

on the equity line loan, on two additional bank loans, and on a 

credit card account used by the wife. The equity line balance 

was $122,129.50. The husband incurred the two loans of 

$54,344.75 and $22,461 after the separation to pay tuition and 

estimated taxes. The wife possessed only one major credit card 

after the separation, but the husband stopped paying the 

balance, began paying only the required minimum, and reduced the 

limit to $2,500. The balance on the account was $2,191. The 

husband contends that the trial court erred in allocating the 

entire marital debt to him. 

Throughout the marriage the parties used the equity credit 

line as a source of available funds until they received the 

partnership income distribution. After the separation, the 

husband stopped using his income to pay recurring family 

expenses. He prorated receipts, and he segregated the portion 

he designated as separate property into the money market account 

where it accumulated as a separate asset. He paid marital 

expenses or debts incurred to pay such expenses with the portion 

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he designated as marital property. The husband used the date of 

separation to divert arbitrarily his income from its established 

allocation to reducing debt incurred over the previous year for 

ordinary living expenses. The husband's action of not reducing 

the equity line permitted the joint debt to rise while he 

diverted the offsetting income to accumulate as his separate 

asset. This turned marital expenses into marital liabilities of 

the couple and reduced the marital wealth available for 

distribution. At the same time, any income earned after 

separation was diverted and not available for continuing family 

obligations. The combined effect permitted the husband to 

decrease the marital estate while increasing his personal 

estate, to distort their financial condition to his advantage. 

The trial court recognized the distorting effect upon 

obtaining a correct understanding of the marital debts of the 

parties. The trial court found that the equity line and credit 

card account were marital debts and found the other two debts, 

while incurred for marital expenses, would not have been 

incurred under normal circumstances. It allocated payment of 

all the debts, with the exception of the first deed of trust, to 

the husband. The court carefully noted that wife could not 

receive a double benefit from the equity in the home increasing 

if the husband paid that debt because it excluded the equity 

line debt from the calculation of the value of the marital 

residence. The trial court allocated the marital debt to the 

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husband because the debt would never have been incurred if the 

cycle of incurring and discharging debt, established during the 

marriage, had been allowed to complete its final circuit. 

Code § 20-107.3(E) empowers trial courts to distribute 

marital debt. Because making an equitable distribution award is 

often a difficult task, "'we rely heavily on the discretion of 

the trial judge in weighing the many considerations and 

circumstances that are presented in each case.'" Moran v. 

Moran, 29 Va. App. 408, 417, 512 S.E.2d 834, 838 (1999) 

(distribution of marital debt) (quoting Klein v. Klein, 11 Va. 

App. 155, 161, 396 S.E.2d 866, 870 (1990)). Absent an abuse of 

discretion, "the trial judge's determination will not be 

reversed on appeal." Id.

The allocation of the debt to the husband is proper given 

the manner in which this couple managed their finances. To 

prevent an inequity, the trial court properly ordered the 

husband to pay the debt, and it considered all the statutory 

factors of Code § 20-107.3. We find no abuse of discretion. 

Finally, we consider the court's award of spousal support 

to the wife. The court ordered the husband to pay $7,500 per 

month in spousal support and awarded child support of $2,181 

based on the statutory guidelines. On appeal, he claims the 

wife's expenses include some non-recurring expenses; the wife's 

award should be reduced by the payment on the first deed of 

trust; and that some expenses, such as mortgage payment, 

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automobile, utilities, and household expenses, should be reduced 

by two-thirds because they include expenses factored into the 

child support guidelines. 

The wife had no independent source of income. She 

submitted two exhibits to substantiate her claim for spousal 

support. One listed her average monthly expenses during the 

marriage ($8,746.92), and the other listed post-separation 

expenses ($8,013.76). She also presented two exhibits showing 

the corresponding child expenses of $3,017.23 and of $3,116.07. 

The wife's post-separation expenses included non-recurring 

expenses for legal bills and car rental which the court excluded 

from the support award. The court declined to reduce the 

support award by the amount of the mortgage payment because it 

found that the wife was entitled to a reasonable housing 

allowance and, when taxes on the support award were considered, 

she would not have sufficient funds to cover her monthly 

expenses. The court also found the husband's request to reduce 

the wife's living expenses by two-thirds unreasonable in view of 

her demonstrable needs. If so reduced, the wife would not be 

able to meet her demonstrated financial needs, and the support 

award would leave her below the standard of living to which she 

was accustomed during the marriage. 

The husband cites Rein v. Rein, Record No. 1120-93-1 

(unpublished, Va. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 1994), as authority for 

reducing these items. However, that case did not mandate such a 

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reduction. At most it directed that the trial court consider 

whether there might have been double consideration of items such 

as housing and utilities. 

The husband is obligated to maintain the wife, within the 

limits of his ability to pay, "according to the station in life 

in which [she] was accustomed during the marriage." Gamble v. 

Gamble, 14 Va. App. 558, 574, 421 S.E.2d 635, 644 (1992). A 

spousal support award is subject to the trial court's discretion 

and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or 

without evidence to support it. See Moreno v. Moreno, 24 Va. 

App. 190, 194-95, 480 S.E.2d 792, 794 (1997). Based on all the 

evidence and appropriate factors, we conclude that the record 

supports the spousal support award of $7,500 per month. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's 

ruling. 

Affirmed.

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