No. 89-23 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1989 

HILLCREST HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, 

a Montana corporation, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

-vsA. G. WILEY and KANCHANA WILEY, 

Defendants and Respondents. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Flathead, 

The Honorable Michael Keedy, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Thomas R. Bostock; Warden, Christiansen, Johnson and 

Berg, Kalispell, Montana 

For Respondent: 

H. James Oleson; Oleson Law Firm, Kalispell, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: June 30, 1989 

Decided: August 31, 1989 
Justice L. C. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Plaintiff, the Hillcrest Homeowners Association, filed 

a complaint in the District Court for the Eleventh Judicial 

District, Flathead County, alleging that the defendants, A.G. 

Wiley and Kanchana Wiley, now deceased, violated a 

restrictive covenant by building a garage on their lot in 

Hillcrest Estates subdivision, Flathead County. The District 

Court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 

Plaintiffs appeal. We reverse and remand. 

Hillcrest Estates is a residential subdivision located 

in Flathead County. In 1969, the owners of Hillcrest Estates 

adopted restrictive convenants that were then duly recorded 

in the Clerk and Recorder's office in Flathead County. These 

covenants provide in pertinent part: 

- RESIDENTIAL AREA COVENANTS. 

1. LAND USE AND BUILDING TYPE. No lot 

shall be used except for single family 

residential purposes, only one residence 

per lot and no lot shall be subdivided. 

2. IMPROVEMENTS. (a) All homes must be 

of new construction and have a minimum of 

1600 square feet of living area on the 

ground level. 

(b) Exterior of improvements must 

be completed within one year after start 

of construction. 

(c) No temporary buildings of any 

nature will be allowed during or after 

construction, including trailer homes. 

In 1979, A. G. Wiley and Kanchana Wiley purchased lot 3 

in the Hillcrest Estates subdivision. In late 1980, or early 

1981, they completed construction of a steel sided garage on 

their property. The Wileys built this garage as part of 
their original plan to build a single family residence with a 

detached garage. Kanchana Wiley died in May, 1983, and the 

actual residence was never built. A. G. Wiley eventually 

moved to Utah. 

In April, 1987, the Hillcrest Homeowners Association 

filed a complaint in the District Court for the Eleventh 

Judicial District, Flathead County, alleging that the garage 

violated the restrictive covenants. The Hillcrest Homeowners 

Association appeal the District Court's finding, which stated 

that the garage built on lot 3 is permanent, complete, and 

does not violate the restrictive covenants. 

The only issue Hillcrest raises on appeal is whether 

the District Court erred in determining that the garage did 

not violate the restrictive covenants. 

Hillcrest argues that the garage violates the 

"residential purposes" language of the restrictive covenant. 

In particular, Hillcrest argues that while a garage, in 

conjunction with a residence, is consistent with "residential 

purposes," a garage by itself, absent the development of a 

residence, is not consistent with "residential purposes." 

Hillcrest therefore argues that the Wileys violated the 

restrictive covenant that is applicable to the Hillcrest 

Estates. We agree. 

Restrictive covenants are generally valid "if they tend 

to maintain or enhance the character of a particular 

residential subdivision.'' Town & Country Estates Ass'n 

(Mont. 1987), 740 P.2d 668, 671, 44 St.Rep. 1257, 1260. When 

interpreting a restrictive covenant, this Court applies the 

same rules as those applicable to contract interpretation. 

Gosnay v. Big Sky Owners Ass'n (1983), 205 Mont. 221, 227, 

666 P.2d 1247, 1250. Therefore, this Court must, if 

reasonably practical, read the restrictive covenant as a 

whole so as to give meaning to every part of the covenant. 
See 28-3-202, MCA. In addition, the language of the 

covenant is to be understood in its ordinary and popular 

sense, see S 28-3-501, MCA, and the language will govern the 

covenant's interpretation when the words are plain and 

unambiguous. Gosnay, 205 Mont. at 227, 666 P.2d at 1250. 

When interpreting the covenant in this case, this Court 

must ascertain the meaning of "residential purposes." 

Webster's Dictionary defines "residential" as "used as a 

residence or by residents." "Residence" is then defined as 

"the act or fact of dwelling in a place for some time." 

Webster' s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1003 (1986) . Consistent with these definitions, courts have held that a 

garage built on a lot without a dwelling house on the same 

lot violates a restrictive covenant when the covenant 

specifically limits a lot's use to "residential purposes." 

In particular, the Washington Court of Appeals in Sandy Point 

Improvement Co. v. Huber (Wash. 1980), 613 P.2d 160, recited: 

A private garage is a proper appurtenance 

necessary to the enjoyment of a dwelling 

house and does not violate a "for 

residence purposes only" covenant [cites 

omitted]. However, if the garage is 

placed on an adjoining lot, it is no 

longer deemed to be appurtenant and does 

violate such a restriction even though 

used in connection with a residence on an 

adjoining lot [cites omitted]. 

Sandy Point Improvement Co., 613 P.2d at 163. In light of 

the ordinary and popular use of the word "residential," we 

agree with the Washington Court of Appeals1 interpretation of 

"residential purposes." 

In the present case, Wiley's garage was built on lot 3 

in the Hillcrest Estates subdivision approximately seven 

years before the complaint was filed. The restrictive 

covenant clearly provides that the Hillcrest lots shall be 
used only for "single family residential purposes." Reading 

the covenant as a whole and in light of the popular and 

ordinary meaning of "residential," a garage, by itself, is 

not consistent with "single family residential purposes" when 

the garage is not used in conjunction with a residential 

dwelling. Therefore, we hold that Wiley violated the 

restrictive covenant when he built the garage on lot 3 in the 

Hillcrest Estates subdivision and did not, within a 

reasonable time, build a residential dwelling to accompany 

the garage. We therefore reverse the District Court and 

remand this case to allow the District Court to determine the 

proper relief warranted under the facts of this case. 

/' 

Reverse and remanded. 

We Concur: 

Justices 

I do not concur with the findings of the majority.