COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Petty, Beales and Chafin 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

FRANKIE JUNIOR WRIGHT 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION

 BY 

v. Record No. 0003-13-2 JUDGE WILLIAM G. PETTY 

 FEBRUARY 18, 2014 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DINWIDDIE COUNTY 

Paul W. Cella, Judge 

 Marlene A. Harris for appellant. 

 Susan M. Harris, Assistant Attorney General (Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, 

II, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Frankie Junior Wright appeals his conviction of felonious violation of a protective order, 

third or subsequent violation, under Code § 16.1-253.2. On appeal, Wright argues that the trial 

court erred in denying his motion to strike because the evidence was insufficient to convict him 

of a felony violation of a protective order. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the 

judgment of the trial court. 

I. 

Because the parties are fully conversant with the record in this case and this 

memorandum opinion carries no precedential value, we recite below only those facts and 

incidents of the proceedings as are necessary to the parties’ understanding of the disposition of 

this appeal. “On appeal, ‘we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.’” Archer v. 

 

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 

UNPUBLISHED 
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Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) (quoting Martin v. 

Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987)). 

II. 

Sufficiency of the Evidence 

 Wright first argues that the evidence is insufficient to convict him of violating the 

protective order because there was no evidence that he was on Felicia Hardy’s property. We 

disagree. 

“‘When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, [this] Court 

will affirm the judgment unless the judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support 

it.’” Mayfield v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 839, 850, 722 S.E.2d 689, 695 (2012) (alteration 

in original) (quoting Bolden v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 144, 148, 654 S.E.2d 584, 586 (2008)). 

Thus, an “‘appellate court does not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial 

established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Britt v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 

569, 573-74, 667 S.E.2d 763, 765 (2008)). Instead, “‘the relevant question is whether any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt.’” Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). “‘This familiar standard 

gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact . . . to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to 

weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” Id. 

(alteration in original) (quoting Brown v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 178, 185, 692 S.E.2d 

271, 274 (2010)). 

 Under Code § 16.1-279.1, a protective order may be issued “[i]n cases of family abuse 

. . . to protect the health and safety of the petitioner and family or household members of the 

petitioner.” Here, a protective order was issued that directed Wright to refrain from having 
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contact with Hardy and “immediately leave and stay away from the residence” on McIlwaine 

Drive. Wright argues that there was no evidence of direct contact between himself and Hardy 

and that it was not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that he was on Hardy’s property. However, 

ample circumstantial evidence proves that Wright violated the protective order by going on 

Hardy’s property. 

“Circumstantial evidence . . . is evidence of facts or circumstances not in issue from 

which facts or circumstances in issue may be inferred.” Byers v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 

146, 151, 474 S.E.2d 852, 854 (1996) (citation omitted). “‘Circumstantial evidence [presented 

during the course of the trial] is as competent and is entitled to as much weight as direct 

evidence, provided it is sufficiently convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except 

that of guilt.’” Salcedo v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 525, 535, 712 S.E.2d 8, 12 (2011) 

(quoting Holloway v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 658, 665, 705 S.E.2d 510, 513 (2011) (en 

banc)). Moreoever, “[c]ircumstantial evidence is as acceptable to prove guilt as direct evidence.” 

Parks v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 492, 498, 270 S.E.2d 755, 759 (1980). 

 On May 30, 2012, at about 12:30 a.m., Hardy received a phone call from the VINE 

Service,1

 which informed her that Wright was released from jail. At about 2:30 a.m. that same 

morning, Hardy heard knocking on the window outside her bedroom and at the back of the 

house. The knocking continued for several minutes. Moments later, Hardy looked out her 

bedroom window. She did not see anyone. After looking out her bedroom window, Hardy heard 

knocking on the front door of her house. Hardy walked to the front of her house, looked out the 

window, and saw Wright walking away from her house in the ditch line on the edge of her yard. 

 1

 VINE is an acronym standing for Victim Information and Notification Everyday. It is 

an automated service offered by local sheriffs and the Department of Corrections to provide 

victims with the custody status of offenders. 
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 Kianna Bell, Hardy’s girlfriend, lived a couple of houses down from Hardy on McIlwaine 

Drive. Bell testified that Wright knocked on her front door around 2:30 a.m. that night. Wright 

knocked on her door for around five minutes and then left. Bell did not answer the door. 

 Deputy Tomlin was dispatched to McIlwaine Drive at around 2:30 a.m. that morning in 

reference to a possible protective order violation. Deputy Tomlin encountered Wright about one 

block away from Hardy’s house. Deputy Tomlin informed Wright that he was not supposed to 

be on Hardy’s property. Wright said that he was going to Hardy’s property to retrieve his 

personal belongings. 

 The trial court held that this evidence was sufficient to prove that Wright was on Hardy’s 

property: “I think that while nobody actually saw him on the property, I think that the fact 

nobody was around except him compared with his conversation with Deputy Tomlin is 

sufficient.” The trial court’s holding is not plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. To 

the contrary, the evidence demonstrates that Wright was on Hardy’s property in violation of the 

protective order. There is no need for testimony from a witness that she actually saw Wright on 

the property. The circumstantial evidence, and reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, 

is sufficient to demonstrate that Wright was on Hardy’s property in violation of the protective 

order. Therefore, we affirm the holding of the trial court. 

Rule 5A:20 

 Wright next argues that there was no admissible evidence to prove that one or more of his 

prior violations of the protective order had an act of violence as its basis. His entire argument 

consists of the following: 

Additionally, in order to support a finding of guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt for a third violation of a protective order, there 

must be evidence that at least one of the prior convictions was 

based on an act of violence (See 16.1-253.2). Here, the order only 
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shows that appellant was convicted of a violation of a protective 

order in Petersburg. The court speaks through its orders and here, 

there is no indication that there was an act of violence that led to 

the court’s finding. The fact that a finding of a violation of a 

protective order could arise from mere proximity to the individual 

to be protected, there can be no presumption that the finding was 

made based on an act of violence, even if there is some testimony 

regarding an act of violence. The statute specifically requires that 

the finding be based on an act of violence. Here there is no 

indication of what the finding was based upon. Thus there is no 

evidence that the conviction was based upon an act of violence and 

that element of the enhanced offense has not been shown beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 

 “Rule 5A:20(e) requires that an appellant’s opening brief contain ‘[t]he principles of law, 

the argument, and the authorities relating to each question presented.’ Unsupported assertions of 

error ‘do not merit appellate consideration.’” Fadness v. Fadness, 52 Va. App. 833, 850, 667 

S.E.2d 857, 865 (2008) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 730, 734, 660 S.E.2d 

343, 345 (2008)). Indeed, 

“A court of review is entitled to have the issues clearly defined and 

to be cited pertinent authority. The appellate court is not a 

depository in which the appellant may dump the burden of 

argument and research. To ignore such a rule by addressing the 

case on the merits would require this court to be an advocate for, as 

well as the judge of the correctness of, [appellant’s] position on the 

issues he raises. On the other hand, strict compliance with the 

rules permits a reviewing court to ascertain the integrity of the 

parties’ assertions which is essential to an accurate determination 

of the issues raised on appeal.” 

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Jones, 51 Va. App. at 734-35, 660 S.E.2d at 345). 

Accordingly, if a party fails to strictly adhere to the requirements of Rule 5A:20(e), and that 

failure is significant, then we may treat the assignment of error as waived. Id. 
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 Wright failed to provide any guiding legal authority. Wright’s counsel stated at oral 

argument that this was an issue of first “blush.”2 This statement is not entirely correct. Although 

there are no cases with the exact same facts as this case, there are plenty of cases which analyze 

the issue of proving a prior conviction. See McMillan v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 11, 671 

S.E.2d 396 (2009); Overbey v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 231, 623 S.E.2d 904 (2006); Palmer v. 

Commonwealth, 269 Va. 203, 609 S.E.2d 308 (2005). Moreover, the Commonwealth points out 

cases which state that a prior conviction can be proven by any competent evidence. See 

McMillan, 277 Va. at 28, 671 S.E.2d at 405; Perez v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 724, 729, 652 

S.E.2d 95, 98 (2007). Wright fails to mention these cases in his opening brief or to argue why 

they are not dispositive of the issue in a reply brief. Additionally, if Wright believes that Code 

§ 16.1-253.2 requires that the facts of the prior conviction can only be established by the 

language included in that order of conviction, he could have presented an argument based on 

rules of statutory construction and legislative intent. 

It is apparent that Wright abdicated his burden of research to this Court. We refuse to be 

an advocate for Wright. “Appellate courts are not unlit rooms where attorneys may wander 

blindly about, hoping to stumble upon a reversible error. If [Wright] believed that the circuit 

court erred, it was [his] duty to present that error to us with legal authority to support [his] 

contention.” Fadness, 52 Va. App. at 851, 667 S.E.2d at 865. Because Wright’s failure to 

provide legal argument or authority is significant, he has waived his right to have this assignment 

of error reviewed by this Court. 

 2

 We assume Wright’s counsel meant that this was an issue of first impression. 
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III. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Wright’s conviction. 

Affirmed.