1

Filed 4/17/17

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Yolo)

----

In re the Marriage of FRANK and DEANNA 

HUNTLEY.

FRANK HUNTLEY,

Respondent,

v.

DEANNA HUNTLEY,

Appellant.

C080534

(Super. Ct. No. FL11001946)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Yolo County, Kathleen M. 

White, Judge. Reversed.

Matthew B. Smith for Appellant.

BAIR & BAIR and Pamela A. Bair for Respondent.

Deanna Huntley challenges the trial court‟s denial of her motion to divide 

unadjudicated community property under Family Code section 2556.1 Deanna filed her 

 

1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Family Code.
2

motion more than two years after entry of a default judgment that dissolved her marriage 

to Frank Huntley.2 The trial court denied the motion on grounds Deanna had not first 

moved to set aside the default judgment. 

On appeal, Deanna contends (1) section 2556 confers the trial court with 

continuing jurisdiction to adjudicate omitted community property without having 

to first move to set aside the judgment, (2) the dissolution judgment‟s silence as to the 

division of any property means all of the community property remains to be divided,

and (3) the trial court‟s error requires reversal for proper division of the parties‟ 

community property. 

We conclude section 2556 provided the trial court with continuing jurisdiction to 

divide omitted or unadjudicated community property. The default judgment‟s silence as 

to any division of property requires reversal and remand for further proceedings under 

sections 2550 and 2556.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Parties’ Community Property

The facts of this case are undisputed. Frank and Deanna married in 2000 and 

separated in June 2011. As the trial court found, “Both parties were employed during 

their marriage and [Deanna] was in charge of the parties‟ finances. She paid the bills. 

She was employed with the City of Woodland and was aware of her own employment 

benefits. [Deanna] was also aware of all of the parties‟ assets, their debts, their furniture, 

vehicles, and other assets. [Frank] retired approximately 15 months before the parties 

separated and began receiving retirement benefits. [Deanna] was well aware of these 

benefits and was also aware of [Frank‟s] Deferred Benefit Account, because the parties 

withdrew substantial funds from that account during their marriage.”

 

2 For the sake of clarity, we refer to the parties by their first names.
3

The trial court further found that “there were other assets, namely household 

furnishings, vehicles, [Deanna‟s] PERS retirement, and [Frank‟s] Union Pension Plan 

and Deferred Compensation Plan. [Frank‟s] Pension Plan and Deferred Compensation 

Plan were both in pay status with monthly payments being received by the parties each 

month. At one of the hearings in this case, [Deanna] admitted she was aware of all of 

these assets.” 

Petition for Dissolution of Marriage and Default Judgment 

In December 2011, Frank served Deanna with a petition for dissolution of 

marriage, an income and expense declaration, and a community and quasi-community 

property declaration. Frank‟s petition stated all community and quasi-community 

property was listed in his accompanying declaration. However, the declaration did not 

list any property other than a house with a negative value of $89,000.

Deanna was served with the petition and attached declarations, but did not 

respond. In July 2012, Frank filed a request for default and served Deanna with 

a copy of the request. In October 2012, the trial court entered a default judgment. 

The default judgment dissolved the marriage but did not mention any community 

property. 

At some point after Deanna received the request to enter a default judgment, she 

signed a grant deed conveying all title and interest in the house to Frank. 

Deanna’s Motion to Adjudicate Omitted Assets 

In November 2014, Deanna filed a motion to adjudicate omitted community 

property. After conducting several hearings, the trial court denied the motion. In 

denying the motion, the trial court reasoned that “[w]hen [Deanna] received Notice of the 

Judgment, it was obvious that no property orders were made. She had the opportunity to 

file a Motion to set aside the Judgment and take further action. She took no action.” The 

trial court acknowledged, “the Judgment does not award assets to either party,” but found 
4

“those assets are now owned by the parties based on their actual title. Retirement 

benefits and retirement accounts are titled in the sole name of the individual who earned 

them. [Deanna] has signed a Grant Deed releasing her interest in the residence to 

[Frank]. Vehicles have titles, which reflect their ownership and the parties apparently 

divided their furniture and furnishings to their satisfaction.” The trial court further found 

Deanna‟s signing of the grant deed to the house “seems to support [Frank‟s] contention 

that the parties had an oral agreement as to how to divide their assets and debts.” There 

is no indication the oral agreement was stated on the record in open court. Ultimately,

the trial court determined “this case is concluded.” 

Deanna timely filed a notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION

Motion to Divide Omitted or Unadjudicated Community Property after Entry of a 

Default Judgment

Deanna contends a motion to vacate the default judgment was not necessary 

because section 2556 provided the trial court with continuing jurisdiction to hear her

“motion for adjudication of omitted assets.” The contention has merit.

A.

Standard of Review

We review questions of statutory interpretation under the independent standard of 

review. (Connerly v. State Personnel Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1169, 1175.) “ „In doing so, 

“ „our fundamental task is to “ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the 

purpose of the statute.” ‟ ” ‟ [Citation.] As always, we start with the language of the 

statute, “giv[ing] the words their usual and ordinary meaning [citation], while construing 

them in light of the statute as a whole and the statute‟s purpose [citation].” [Citation.]‟ ” 

(Coker v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 667, 674, quoting Apple Inc. v. 

Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 128, 135.)
5

B.

The Trial Court’s Continuing Jurisdiction under Section 2556

“Generally, once a marital dissolution judgment has become final, the court loses 

jurisdiction to modify or alter it.” (In re Marriage of Thorne and Raccina (2012) 203 

Cal.App.4th 492, 499 (Thorne).) However, as the California Supreme Court has 

explained, a dissolution judgment does not affect the disposition of community property 

as to which the judgment is silent. “Under California law, a spouse‟s entitlement to a 

share of the community property arises at the time that the property is acquired. 

[Citations.] That interest is not altered except by judicial decree or an agreement between 

the parties. Hence „under settled principles of California community property law, 

“property which is not mentioned in the pleadings as community property is left 

unadjudicated by decree of divorce, and is subject to future litigation, the parties being 

tenants in common meanwhile.” ‟ (In re Marriage of Brown [1976)] 15 Cal.3d [838,] 

850-851 . . . .) [Citations.] This rule applies to partial divisions of community property 

as well as divorces unaccompanied by any property adjudication whatsoever.” (Henn v. 

Henn (1980) 26 Cal.3d 323, 330 (Henn).) 

At the time the California Supreme Court decided Henn, a former spouse 

was required to file a new case in order to seek division of community property 

assets that were omitted from a dissolution judgment. (Henn, supra, 26 Cal.3d at 

p. 330.) To alleviate the burden of filing an entirely new action to divide community 

property previously omitted in a dissolution judgment, the Legislature enacted Civil 

Code section 4353 that was later recodified without substantive change at Family 

Code section 2556. (Lakkees v. Superior Court (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 531, 540, 

fn. 5 (Lakkees); see also West‟s Fam. Code, § 2556, Law Revision Commission 

Comment [“Section 2556 continues former Civil Code Section 4353 without substantive 

change”].) 
6

Section 2556 provides: “In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, for nullity 

of marriage, or for legal separation of the parties, the court has continuing jurisdiction 

to award community estate assets or community estate liabilities to the parties that 

have not been previously adjudicated by a judgment in the proceeding. A party may 

file a postjudgment motion or order to show cause in the proceeding in order to obtain 

adjudication of any community estate asset or liability omitted or not adjudicated by 

the judgment. In these cases, the court shall equally divide the omitted or unadjudicated 

community estate asset or liability, unless the court finds upon good cause shown that 

the interests of justice require an unequal division of the asset or liability.” (Italics 

added.) 

In providing courts with continuing jurisdiction, section 2556 imposes no time 

limit on former spouses to seek to adjudicate omitted or unadjudicated community 

property after a dissolution judgment was entered. In Lakkees, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d 

531, the Court of Appeal noted arguments “that a dilatory party who suffers an 

involuntary dismissal should be barred from the postjudgment relief available under Civil 

Code section 4353 are not supported by any statutory language.” (Id. at p. 540, fn. 5.) 

The same observation holds true for Civil Code section 4353‟s successor: there is no 

statute of limitations imposed by section 2556 on a former spouse who seeks adjudication 

of omitted or unadjudicated community property. Section 2556 also imposes no 

limitation for default judgments such as that entered in this case. Accordingly, section 

2556 applies to require adjudication of the omitted assets.

Section 2556 applies even when former spouses were aware of the community 

property at the time the dissolution judgment was entered. In Huddleson v. Huddleson

(1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1564 (Huddleson), the appellate court rejected a contention that a 

community property pension was immune from post-judgment division because the 

moving party had known of the asset at the time of judgment. The Huddleson court 
7

explained, “Regardless of whether the parties know of, or discuss, the vested pension, if 

the „court was not called upon to award it, and did not award it, as community property, 

separate property, or any property at all‟ [citation], then the pension is a missed asset 

subject to a post-dissolution claim.” (Huddleson, at p. 1569, citing Henn, supra, 26 

Cal.3d at p. 330.) 

Although Code of Civil Procedure section 473 generally governs the finality of 

most default judgments, it does not control in this case. Section 2556 is the more specific 

statute in specifically addressing assets omitted from a dissolution of marriage. As the 

California Supreme Court has held, “ „It is the general rule that where the general statute 

standing alone would include the same matter as the special act, and thus conflict with it, 

the special act will be considered as an exception to the general statute whether it was 

passed before or after such general enactment.‟ ” (People v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475, 

479, quoting In re Williamson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 651, 654; accord Stone Street Capital, 

LLC v. California State Lottery Com.’ (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 109, 118. The 

Legislature‟s specific provision in section 2556 for adjudication of assets omitted from 

a marital dissolution judgment is the more specific statute and supplies the governing 

rule here.

In sum, section 2556 applies to community property not actually adjudicated in the 

previously entered dissolution judgment. “The mere mention of an asset in the judgment 

is not controlling. [Citation.] „[T]he crucial question is whether the [community 

property] benefits were actually litigated and divided in the previous proceeding.‟ ” (In 

re Marriage of Georgiou and Leslie (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 561, 575, quoting Thorne, 

supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 501.)
8

C.

Motion to Divide Omitted or Unadjudicated Community Property

The trial court erred in ruling Deanna was required to move to set aside the default 

judgment before availing herself of the continuing jurisdiction provided by section 2556 

for division of unadjudicated community property. The dissolution judgment did not 

divide – or even mention – any community property. Consequently, the parties‟ 

community property remained “subject to future litigation.” (Henn, supra, 26 Cal.3d 

323, 330, § 2556.) Even though Deanna waited more than two years after entry of the 

default judgment before bringing her motion for adjudication of omitted assets, the trial 

court had jurisdiction under section 2556 to hear the motion. (See Lakkees, supra, 222 

Cal.App.3d at p. 540, fn. 5.) Although it is undisputed Deanna handled the finances 

during the marriage and was aware of the very community property she sought to have

divided under section 2556, her knowledge did not provide a basis for denying her 

motion. (Huddleson, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at p. 1569.) Consequently, the trial court 

should have adjudicated the omitted community property as requested in Deanna‟s 

motion.

Frank argues the trial court correctly determined that, even if cognizable, 

Deanna‟s motion was properly denied because all of the community property had actually 

been divided by the parties according to their informal agreement. As the trial court 

noted, Deanna‟s signing of a grant deed to the marital residence in favor of Frank after 

entry of the default judgment indicated the parties had actually reached an informal 

agreement as to the disposition of their property. 

Former spouses may divide their community property by agreement, even if the 

division is not equal. “As long as such agreement is based upon a complete and accurate 

understanding of the existence and value of community and separate assets that are 

material to the agreement, the parties are free to decide on an unequal distribution.” (In 
9

re Marriage of Brewer v. Federici (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1349.) However, to be 

valid, even an agreement to divide community property equally must comply with 

section 2550. Section 2550 provides: “Except upon the written agreement of the parties, 

or on oral stipulation of the parties in open court, or as otherwise provided in this 

division, in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or for legal separation of the parties, 

the court shall, either in its judgment of dissolution of the marriage, in its judgment of 

legal separation of the parties, or at a later time if it expressly reserves jurisdiction 

to make such a property division, divide the community estate of the parties equally.” 

(Italics added.)

The requirement of section 2550 that an agreement either be written or orally 

stated in open court is strictly construed. In re Marriage of Dellaria & BlickmanDellaria (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 196 explains that “strictly enforcing . . . section 2550‟s 

requirements will actually promote the policy of encouraging the parties to arrive at an 

out-of-court resolution containing sufficiently definite terms to be enforced by the court 

without further litigation. Requiring the parties‟ settlement agreement to be committed to 

writing or recited in court, as mandated by . . . section 2550, prevents the risk of the court 

enforcing an agreement that never was made.” (Id. at pp. 203-204.)

In this case, the parties neither reduced their agreement to writing nor did they 

state terms of the agreement on the record in open court. Consequently, at the time of 

its judgment of dissolution of marriage, the trial court had the statutory duty to equally 

divide Frank and Deanna‟s community property or make a property division based on 

the written agreement of the parties or on oral stipulation of the parties in open court. 

(§ 2550.) It is undisputed the judgment of dissolution of marriage did not include any 

property orders. And there is no evidence of any written agreement or an oral stipulation 

of the parties in open court. In its statement of decision on Deanna‟s motion, the trial 

court found the parties had divided all of their community property and these assets 
10

were “now owned by the parties based on their actual title.” But this later finding does 

not address or remedy the absence of any division of community property in the 

judgment. For this reason, the trial court did not fulfill its duty to divide the parties‟ 

community property as required by section 2550 and under the continuing jurisdiction 

provided by section 2556.3

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings 

under Family Code sections 2550 and 2556. The parties shall bear their own costs on 

appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (5).)

 /s/

HOCH, J.

We concur:

 /s/

BUTZ, Acting P. J.

 /s/

RENNER, J.

 

3 We express no opinion as to the factual question of whether the informal division 

of community property by Frank and Deanna was equal or unequal within the meaning of 

sections 2550 and 2556.