IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, 

Appellee,

v.

VICTOR TED HERNANDEZ, 

Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 19-0462

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2014-156118-001

The Honorable M. Scott McCoy, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Nicholas Chapman-Hushek

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Cory Engle

Counsel for Appellant

OPINION

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the opinion of the Court, in 

which Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.

FILED 10-13-2020
STATE v. HERNANDEZ

Opinion of the Court

2

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 Victor Ted Hernandez appeals his sentences for two 

convictions of attempted participation in a criminal street gang, Class 3 

felonies. Hernandez argues the aggravating circumstance of receipt, or 

expectation of receipt, of pecuniary value is unconstitutionally vague. 

Rejecting Hernandez’ claims, his sentences are affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In 2014, the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office intercepted two 

letters Hernandez attempted to mail while in custody. The letters revealed 

that Hernandez managed, directed and supervised criminal street-gang 

activity for financial gain. Hernandez was charged with, and convicted of, 

three counts of participating in a criminal street gang, Class 2 felonies. See 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. (A.R.S.) § 13-2321(A)(1)-(3) (2020).1 The jury also found 

Hernandez committed each offense as consideration for the receipt, or in 

the expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value. A.R.S. § 13-

701(D)(6).

¶3 The State timely alleged and proved other aggravating 

circumstances, including that the sentences were subject to a five-year gang 

enhancement. See A.R.S. § 13-714. The court sentenced Hernandez, as a nondangerous category-two repetitive offender, to concurrent greater than 

presumptive prison terms of 12 years for each conviction, with the five-year

gang enhancement for each conviction to be served consecutively.

¶4 In a prior appeal, one conviction and sentence were affirmed, 

while the other two convictions were modified to attempted participation 

in a criminal street gang, Class 3 felonies, and remanded for resentencing.

State v. Hernandez, 246 Ariz. 407, 411-12 ¶¶ 13-14 (App. 2019). On remand, 

the court sentenced Hernandez as a non-dangerous category-two repetitive 

offender to concurrent greater than presumptive prison terms of nine-andthree-quarter years for the two convictions, as modified, with five-year

gang enhancements for both to be served consecutively. 

¶5 This Court has jurisdiction over Hernandez’ timely appeal 

challenging the resentencing pursuant to Article VI, Section 9 of the Arizona 

Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12–120.21(A)(1), 13–4031 and –4033(A).

1 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes cited refer to

the current version unless otherwise indicated.
STATE v. HERNANDEZ

Opinion of the Court

3

DISCUSSION

¶6 Hernandez challenges the constitutionality of the aggravating 

circumstance that he committed the offenses as consideration for the 

receipt, or in the expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value. 

A.R.S. § 13-701(D)(6). He claims this aggravator is unconstitutionally vague,

meaning his enhanced sentences on remand were illegal.

¶7 The State argues Hernandez waived this argument by not

raising it in the prior appeal. The State relies on several cases that condemn

piecemeal appeals but do not preclude consideration of the merits of a

constitutional challenge. See State v. Rhodes, 112 Ariz. 500, 507 (1975); State

v. Guthrie, 110 Ariz. 257, 258 (1974); State v. Hughes, 8 Ariz. App. 366, 368

(1968); see also State v. Schackart, 190 Ariz. 238, 255 (1997); State v. Youngblood,

173 Ariz. 502, 504-05 (1993) (3-2 decision). In none of these cases did the

court find the defendant waived an argument in an appeal from a

resentencing by failing to raise the argument in the original appeal. To the

contrary, several of these cases cited by the State address the merits of the

purportedly waived issue. See Youngblood, 173 Ariz. at 504-508 (noting

“[t]he court of appeals should have rejected his claim as untimely” but then

addressing the merits of the claim); Rhodes, 112 Ariz. at 507 (stating

voluntariness should have been raised in prior appeal but then addressing

admissibility of the statements); Hughes, 8 Ariz. App. at 368 (first finding no

error in denying a motion to suppress and then stating defendant should

have raised the issue in his prior appeal).

¶8 In Guthrie, the first appeal affirmed the conviction and

sentence and the court rejected a request to revisit those decisions in the

second appeal. 110 Ariz. at 257-58. Nothing like that procedural oddity is

presented here. And Schackart addressed the defendant’s absences during

proceedings on remand, even though the court refused to address his

absences before the first appeal that did not impact resentencing. 190 Ariz.

at 255-56.

¶9 Although properly disapproving piecemeal appeals, these

cases do not preclude Hernandez from challenging the validity of an

aggravating circumstance applicable at resentencing on remand from his

prior appeal. See State v. Rossi, 171 Ariz. 276, 281 (1992) (considering a new 

claim on defendant’s third appeal, after his sentence had been vacated and 

remanded for resentencing); State v. Enriquez, 106 Ariz. 304, 307 (1970)

(suggesting prohibition of piecemeal appeals may be prudential, not 

jurisdictional, and addressing merits of constitutional issue raised in second 

appeal based on different record).
STATE v. HERNANDEZ

Opinion of the Court

4

¶10 Turning to the merits, the superior court may sentence a

defendant to an aggravated term if the jury determines that the “defendant 

committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in the expectation 

of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value.” A.R.S. § 13-701(D)(6). 

Hernandez contends Section 13-701(D)(6) “failed to provide sufficient 

notice of what behavior it prohibited and failed to provide sufficient 

standards for its application to avoid arbitrary enforcement by the jury, 

such that the pecuniary gain aggravator was unconstitutionally vague.”

Because Hernandez did not raise this argument with the superior court, the 

review on appeal is for fundamental error. See State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 

135, 140 ¶ 12 (2018). Accordingly, Hernandez “bears the burden to establish 

that (1) error exists, (2) the error is fundamental, and (3) the error caused 

him prejudice.” State v. James, 231 Ariz. 490, 493 ¶ 11 (App. 2013) (quotations 

and citations omitted).

¶11 Hernandez contends the statute’s “meaning [is] left to 

guesswork” because it fails to “define whether it applies to only a benefit 

that the person committing the crime might gain, or if it includes . . . third 

party benefits.” But a “statute is not vague simply because it is broad or . . .

there may be difficulty in deciding whether certain marginal conduct falls 

within the scope of the statute.” State v. Coulter, 236 Ariz. 270, 274–75 ¶ 9 

(App. 2014) (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 757 (1974)). Instead, “[a]

statute is unconstitutionally vague if it does not give persons of ordinary 

intelligence a reasonable opportunity to learn what it prohibits and does 

not provide explicit instructions for those who will apply it.” State v. 

McMahon, 201 Ariz. 548, 551 ¶ 7 (App. 2002) (citations omitted). When, as 

here, there is no First Amendment challenge, a vagueness claim “must be 

examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand.” United States v. Powell, 

423 U.S. 87, 92 (1975) (citation omitted).

¶12 Section 13-701(D)(6) provides for an enhanced penalty if an 

offense is committed for pecuniary gain, which describes Hernandez’

convictions here. Due process “requires only that the language of a statute 

convey a definite warning of the proscribed conduct.” Fuenning v. Superior 

Court, 139 Ariz. 590, 598 (1983) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the failure 

of Section 13-701(D)(6) to specify who must receive or expect to receive the 

pecuniary gain does not make the reach of the statute unclear to a 

reasonable person. See Bird v. State, 184 Ariz. 198, 203 (App. 1995) (noting 

due process “requires neither perfect notice, absolute precision nor 

impossible standards. It requires only that the language of a statute convey 

a definite warning of the proscribed conduct.”); see also United States v. 

Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 94 (1975) (observing that the fact that a more precise 

statute could be crafted does not mean the statute that was enacted is 
STATE v. HERNANDEZ

Opinion of the Court

5

unconstitutionally vague). Hernandez has not shown Section 13-701(D)(6) 

fails in that regard. 

¶13 The jury heard evidence that Hernandez was involved with a 

specific street gang, the methods that gang used to obtain money, and that 

Hernandez gave written, detailed instructions to extort money, commit 

robberies, and set up money transfers. Even if the evidence did not show 

that Hernandez would directly “recei[ve] . . . anything of pecuniary value” 

personally, A.R.S. § 13-701(D)(6), it still showed that Hernandez’ crimes 

brought pecuniary gain to his street gang. On this record, Section 13-

701(D)(6) is not unconstitutionally vague. See State v. Forde, 233 Ariz. 543, 

576 ¶ 151 (2014) (“The jury did not abuse its discretion by finding the 

[pecuniary value] aggravator” where the defendant, convicted of firstdegree murder, “planned and participated in the robbery to fund her 

minuteman operation. She involved people she knew wanted to kill [the 

victim] to facilitate the robbery and burglary.”). 

¶14 Hernandez also argues Section 13-701(D)(6) allows for 

arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement by courts and juries. Not so. 

Section 13-701(D)(6) does not grant unfettered “post hoc discretion” to the 

court or the jury to determine whether the statute has been violated, nor is

it a broad catch-all provision. See State v. Schmidt, 220 Ariz. 563, 566 ¶ 8-10 

(2009) (finding a catch-all aggravator, “[a]ny other factors which the court 

may deem appropriate to the ends of justice,” “patently vague”). To the 

contrary, Section 13-701(D)(6) provides sufficient guidance to describe

offenses committed for pecuniary gain and therefore does not 

impermissibly allow arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.

CONCLUSION

¶15 Because Hernandez has failed to show Section 13-710(D)(6) is 

unconstitutionally vague, his sentences for two counts of attempted 

participation in a criminal street gang, Class 3 felonies, are affirmed.