### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03

- 18

- 00644

- CR

Leon Young, Appellant

v. The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE 450TH DISTR ICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D

- 1

- DC

- 15

- 100069 , THE HONORABLE BRAD URRUTIA, JUDGE PRES IDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

A jury convicted appellant Leon Young of the offense of aggravated sexual
assault of a child and assessed punishment at 30 years ’ imprisonment

. See Tex. Penal Code § 22.021(a) (1)(B), (2)(B). The district court rendered ju dg ment on the verdict. In five points of error on appeal, Young asserts that the district court abused its discretion by : (1) allowing a forensic interviewer to testify as an outcry witness; (2) allowi ng the child ’ s mother to testify as

a n outcry witness; ( 3) allow ing a person in the courtroom to stand during the child ’ s testimon y ; and (4) not granting a mistrial following the admission of irrelevant testimony . Young also
claims that (5) there is a clerical error in the written judgment of convict ion. We w ill affi rm the
district court ’ s judgment.2 BACKGROUND Young , a former school bus drive r with the Austin Independent S chool District,

was charged with aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child by sexual

contac t . The following fac tu al summa ry is based on evidence that was admitted at Yo ung ’ s trial
for those offenses

. During the 2014

– 2015 school year, two children told their second

- grade teachers at Walnut Creek Elementary School that they had observed a b us driver engaging in
ina pp ropriate physical contact with a nother child who rode the ir bus. The teachers reported to
school authorities what th e children had told them , and an investigation began. The bus driver was identified as Young, and the child was identified as J.P., who wa s in kin dergarten or first grade at the time

. J.P. ’ s mother was informed of the allegations by the school principal and a detective, both of whom called the mother to repo rt what they had learned

. J.P. ’ s mother
testified that on the same afternoon she r eceived the phone calls , she asked J.P. wh at had happened , and J.P. told her that Young hug ged her and “ touche [d] her on her kitty cat in the front
and the back and that he rub [bed] her stomach and rub [bed] her back

. ” 1 J.P. also told her mother
that You ng touche d her on the inside of her panties and that he “ touche [d] the front and then
touche [ d ] her back and rub [bed] her butthole

. ” J.P. ’ s mother asked J.P. how long this had been happening . Although J.P. “ couldn ’ t be specific on [the] time frame , ” she to ld her m other that “ it happened so m uch for a long, long time

. ”

1 The mother testified that “ k itty cat ” was a term that the family used t o refer to a girl ’ s

“ private area. ”3 J.P. was interviewed by Grace Yeager, who was a t the time a senior foren sic interviewer with the Hill Country Children ’ s Ad vocacy Center

. Yeager testified that J.P. told her
that “ her b u s driver put hi [s] hand in her kitty cat, which she later described as a place on her body that pee comes out of

. ” Yeager also recounted , “ She gave me kind of a narrative about the
bus driver giving her candy, a circle. She ate it very quickly. She wen t back up to get some more, that is when he put his hand inside of her pants, inside of her underwear, inside of her vagina. ” Yeager added that J.P. did not use the word vagina but referred instead to her “ kitty

cat ” and “ middle part. ” Yeager also testif i e d that J .P. indicated to her that this had happened
more than on e time

. J.P. , who was in fourth grade at the time of trial and had moved to Corpus Christi , testified that when she had attended Walnut Creek Elementary School , her bus driver would tell
h e r to hug him and that when she hugged him , he would give her candy and touch the inside of
her “ middle part ” underneath her clothes , using his hand

. J.P. also testified that the driver would put his hand inside her “ butt. ” Detective Alex Phillips of th e Austin I SD Police Department interviewed Young during the investigation

. Phillips testified that Young acknowledged that “ he would hug a child on a regular basis, even though he understood that he shouldn ’ t be doing that , ” and that he

“ handed out candy t o the stu dents on the bus, ” including J.P. The interview was r ecorded, and a copy of the recording was admitted into evidence and played for the jury. Other witnesses at
trial included the children who had reported the bus driver to their teachers ; J.P. ’ s brother , who
rode the bus with J.P. and had witnessed some of the bus driver’s behavior ; and school

- district employees who had been made aware of the a buse.4 The jury conv icted Young of both aggravated sexual assault of a child and
inde cency with a chi l d by sexu al contact , assessing punishment at 30 years ’ imprisonme nt for the assault offense and 15 years ’ imprisonment for the indecency offense

. P rior to sentencing , Young made a n oral motion to vacate the inde cency conviction on double jeopardy grounds , which th e State did not oppos e . The district court granted the motion

. Young later filed a
motion for new trial, which was overruled by operation of law. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS Outcry

- witn ess testimony
In his first and second point s of e rror , Yo ung asserts that the district court abused its discretion in allowing Grace Yeager and J.P. ’ s moth er to testif y as out cry witness es
. Speci fically, he claims that the statements J.P. made to each witness are unreliable and that

Y eager did not testi fy t o “ a separate, discrete instance of sexual abuse. ”
Governing law

“ Hearsay statements, while general ly inadmissi ble, may be admitted under specific conditions when public policy supports their use, and the circumstances surrounding the making of th ose s ta t ements pedigree their reliability. ” Martinez v. State , 178 S.W.3d 806 , 810 ( Tex

. Crim. App. 2005). Article 38. 072 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, also known as the outcry statute, creates a hearsay exception in the prosecution of certain sexu al offenses
committed against children for the admission of a child ’ s first outcry of sexual abuse to an adult.
Se e Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.072; Bays v. State , 396 S.W.3d 580, 581 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)

. “ Because it is ofte n traumatic for child re n to testify in a courtroom setting, especially about sexual offenses committed against them, the Legislature ena cted Article 38.072 to admit5 the testimony of the first adult a child confides in reg arding the abuse. ” Martin ez , 178 S.W.3d at
810

– 11. “ Th is witness may recite the child ’ s out

- of

- court statements concerning the offense, and that testimony is substantive evidence of the crime. ” Id . at 811.
To be admissible under Article 38.072 , among other requirements, “ [ t ] he
statement must be ‘ mor e tha n w ords which give a general allusion that something in the a rea of child abuse is going on ’ ; it must be made in so me discern i ble manner and is event

- specific rather than person

- specific. ” Lopez v. State , 343 S.W.3d 137 , 140 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (q uotin g
G arcia v. State , 792 S.W.2d 88, 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990 ) ). Thus , “ [ t ] here may be only one outcry witness per ev ent. ” Id

. “ Hearsay testimony from more than one outcry witness may be admissible under article 38.072 only if the witnesses testify ab out d iff erent events. ” Id .; see
H

ernandez v. State , 973 S.W.2d 787 , 789 (T ex. App.

— Austin 1998, pet. ref ’ d). Additiona lly , the trial court must find , “ in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that the
statement is reliable based on the ti me, c ont ent, and circumstances of the statement

. ” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.072, § 2(b)(2).
We review a trial cou rt ’ s admission of testimony from an outcry witness under an
abuse

- of

- discretion standard. See Garcia , 792 S.W.2d at 92; Buent ello v. St ate , 512 S.W.3d 508 , 516

– 17 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist. ] 2016 , pet. ref ’ d)

. A tria l court has “ broad discretion ” in
d etermining who qualifies as a proper outcry witness, and we will uphold the trial court ’ s ruling if it is reasonably supported by the re cord and within the zone of reasonable disagreement. See
Garcia , 792 S.W.2d at 92 ; Buentell o , 512 S.W.3d at 516

– 17.

Se parate and discrete instances of abuse We first address Young ’ s contention th at Yeager did not testify to a separate and
discrete i nstance of abu se so as to qualify as a se c ond outcry witness

. Young was charged with6 two offenses, aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecen cy with a child by contact. At the hearing on the admissibility of the outcry statements, t he district cour t fo und th at J.P. ’ s
statements to her mother described the offense of indece ncy with a child by contact , while J.P. ’ s

statements to Y eager described the separate offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child. The record supports the district court ’ s finding s
. At the Article 38.072 hearing , J.P. ’ s mother testified that J.P. told her that Young “ rubs the front of her, rubs her back, and then

touc hes her down there and her butthole

. ” Additionally, w hen J.P. ’ s mother asked her if Young
touched her ins id e her p a nti es, J.P. told her that Young “ puts his hand on [her] kitty cat and he
touches [her] down there on the front and touches [her] butthole

. ” When J.P. ’ s mother asked her

“ what else happen [ed] on the bus, ” J.P. told her “ that was it. That ’ s all she t old m e
. ” Thus,
J.P. ’ s statements to her mother were limited to a description of sexual touching or contact

. See Tex. Penal Code § 21.11(a)(1) (def ining offense of indecency with child by sexual contact), (c)( 1 ) (defining “ sexual contact ” as “ any touchi ng by a per son, including t ouching through clothing, of the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals of a child ” ). In contrast, Yeager testifi ed at the hearing that J.P. told her of a n incident in which Young ’ s fingers were “ rubbing inside ”
and “ moving i ns ide o f he r kitty cat

. ” Th ese statements describe the penetration of J.P. ’ s sexual

organ with Young ’ s fingers , i.e., a sexual assault

. See id . § 22.021(a) ( defining offense of aggravated sexual assault of child). Thus, it was within the zone of rea sona ble dis agre ement for
the district court to have found that J.P. ’ s statements to her mother and Yeager were describing

s eparate and discrete acts of abuse and to allow both witnesses to testify

. Reliability We next address Young ’ s contention tha t J.P

. ’ s statem ents to her mother an d Yeager were not reliable. As an initial matter , Young did not object in the court bel ow to the7 reliability of J.P

. ’ s statement s to her mother

. Accordingly, Young has failed to preserve for
review th e reliability of t hose statements

. S ee Tex. R. App. P. 33.1( a); Clark v. State , 365 S.W.3d 333 , 339

– 40 ( Tex. C rim. App. 2012); T aylor v. State , 509 S.W.3d 468 , 47 3

– 74 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2015, pet. ref ’ d).
As for the statements that J.P. made to Yeager during the for ensi c interview , we

can not conclude that the district court abused its discretion in finding th ose statements t o be
reliable. Yeager testified that she conducted a “ multisession forensic interview ” with J.P. and
met with her on three oc casions within a sp an o f one week . Du ring the first and second session s , J.P. did not provide a statement to Yeager

. However, d uring the third session, J.P. told Yeager

“ that something happened with her body, with the middle part of her body. And she said it ’ s a
little na sty

. And she went on t o say that when [she] get [s] on the bus, he is always putting his
hands in he r kitty cat and then [he] got kicked off. ” When asked to describe what else J.P. had
told her , Yeager testified as follows:

She told me that the kitty cat is u sed

— pee comes o u t o f the kitty cat. She said that she was next to the bus driver when this happ ened. She was getting candy. She talked about a specific time when she had gotten candy. She finished the candy, she got up to get more candy from him, an d th en he put his h ands underneath her clothes in the front and in the back. She said that his fing ers were rubbing inside. And then she poin ted to her finger and she said hi [s] hand moving inside of her kitty cat, it felt not good. She said everyone el se w as sitting down

. Sh e said she could hear him breathing. I asked her about the back and she said h e put his hand in the back of her clothes. Then she said something to the effect of him always do [ing] this.

Thus, J.P. ’ s statement s to Y eager included te rmin ology that a ch ild would use and contained specific de tails regarding the abuse

. These circumstances are indicative of reliability

. See8 Gonzales v. State , 477 S.W.3d 475 , 4 79 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2015, pet. ref ’ d) ; Norris v.
State , 788 S .W.2d 65, 71 (Te x. App.

— Dallas 1990 , pet. ref ’ d). Young argued at th e Art icle 38.072 hearing that there was a “ poten tial ” that J.P. ’ s
mother had “ coac hed ” J.P. on what to say during the forensic interview. S ome evidence was
admitted at the hearing to that eff ect, but i t was minimal

. Yea ger testified that although J.P. ’ s
mother had “ spoken to her a b o u t w h a t t o s a y , ” J.P. “ wasn ’ t clear onto what that was. ” N o other testimony indicat ed what, if anything, J.P. ’ s mother might ha ve told J.P. before th e interview

. The distr ict court, in r uling that the out cry was “ sufficiently reliable , ” explained , “ I don ’ t know that I saw enough to believe the in terview was tainted

. With regard to anything such as what the
mother may have told her, that ’ s proper evid ence to be put before t he jury to dete rmine the credibility of those statements that she made to Ms. Yeager at a later time. ” In other words, to
the extent that J.P. ’ s mother might have spoken with J.P. before the interview, the district court
determine d that this went to the w eight of the ev idenc e rather than its admissibility. On this record, given the “ broad discretion ” that a trial court has in admitting outcry testimony, we
cannot conclude that the district court ’ s ruling on the admissibility of th e evidence was outside
th e zone of reaso nable disagreement. 2 See Sanchez v. State , 35 4 S.W.3d 476 , 486

– 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011 ). We overrule Young ’ s first and second points of error.

2 The district court made its ruling on the a dmissib ility o f the outcry s tatements at a hearing prior to trial. In arguing that the statements were inadmissible , Young relies in part on evidence t hat was admitted during trial, after the dist rict court had made its rul ing. Howev er, our review is limited to the ev idence that wa s before the district court when it made its ruling

. See Weatherred v. State , 1 5 S.W.3d 540 , 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)

.9 Person standing in courtr oom during victim ’ s testimony
In his th ir d point of error, Young asserts that the dis trict court abused its discretion “by allowing a support person to influence the testimony of a child witness by repeatedly standing up in court during the child’s testimony.” During J.P. ’ s testim ony, defense counsel noticed a person sta nding in the c ourt room . The record reflects that during a bench conference, defense counsel brought this to the district court ’ s attention as follows :

[Defense counsel] : Judge, why is this lady standing up? That lady right th ere. Why is she stand ing up? That ’ s t he secon d time I ’ ve caught her standing up. I want her out o f the room. [The court] : Just a second and we can deal with that. (Open court) [The court] : Ladies and gentlemen of the ju ry, I ’ m going to ne ed t o excuse you for a few minutes. ( No jury)

. . . . [Defense counsel] : I want this person remove d from the courtroom. She ’ s continually standing up while the witness is testify [ing] and that ’ s improper. [The court] : I think that

— are you ref erring to Ms. Kim? [ Defense counsel] : I ’ m not sure what her nam e is. I just know she is the stan di ng up lady. [The court] : Ms. Kim, I think, was standing up so she can better hear or give comfort to the child as we were a t the bench during a bench conference. I don ’ t find her behavior to be disruptive to the procee d ings or that the jury is even paying attention to her. So, one, I ’ m not going to remove Ms. Kim from the courtroom. But I will, Ms. Kim, ask y ou if you10 could jus t keep the standing t o a minimum, plea se. Thank you. [ 3 ] [Defense counsel] : Your Honor, i f I may for th e rec ord, that ’ s the second time she ’ s stood up that I ’ ve seen and I ’ m facing forward. [The court] : I think I made my r uling, [defense cou nsel ]

. I appreciate you making that c lear for the record. Thank you.

A rticle 38.074 of the Code of C riminal Procedure provides that “ [ o ] n the motion of any party

. . . the court s hall

. . . allow a support person to be present in close proximity t o th e child during the ch il d’s testimony i f the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the child cannot reliably test ify with out the

. . . presence of the support person, as applicable;
and (2) granting the motion is not likely to prejudi ce t he trier of fact in e va luating the chi ld’s testimony

. ” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.074 , § 3 (b)

. A “ su pport person ” means “ any p erson
wh ose presence would contribute to the welfare and well

- being of a child

. ” Id . § 1(2). “ A

sup port person who is p rese nt during a child’s t es timony may not: (1) obscure the child from the
view of the defendant or the trier of fact; (2) provide the c hild wit h an answer to any question asked of the child; or (3) assist or influence the testimony of the child

. ” Id . § 3( c). Young ’ s specific argu ment on appea l is that the State failed to file a motion requesting the presence of a support person and that the distric t court failed to hold a hearing on
the matter or make the required findings under Article 38.0 74

. See id . § 3(b). Ho wever, Young
did not ra ise th ese complaints in the c ourt below . Instead , he objected solely on t he basis that it

was improper for the su pport pe rson to stand while J.P. was testifying. Because Young ’ s trial objection does not comp ort with hi s compla int on appeal , he faile d to preser ve error, if any, in

3 Other than the d istrict court’s above remarks regarding Ki m , the record conta ins no further information as to her iden tity or the na ture of her relationship with the witness.11 the district court ’ s failure to comply with the requirements of Article 38.074

. See Tex. R. App.
P. 33.1(a)(1) ; Hallmark v. State , 541 S.W.3d 167 , 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) ( complaint on

appe al must comport with tria l obje ction to pr eserve error); Yazdchi v. State , 428 S.W.3d 831 , 844

– 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (same) ; see also Lambeth v. State , 523 S.W.3d 244 , 247 (Tex. App.

— Beaumont 2017, no pet.); Smith v. State , 491 S.W.3d 864 , 875 (Tex. Ap p.

— Houst on [14th Dist.] 2 016, p et. ref ’ d); Co ronado v. State , 431 S.W.3d 744 , 747

– 78 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo 2014, pet. ref ’ d ). Additionally, even if Young ha d pres erved error , we cou ld not conclude on this
record that t he error, if any, harmed Young . The f ailure t o comply with the proce dural requi rements of Article 3 8.074 is non constitutional error. See Lambeth , 523 S.W.3d at 248;
Smith , 491 S.W.3d at 876

– 77

. Non constitution al error “ that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded. ” Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b) ; Thomas v. Sta te , 505 S.W.3 d 916 , 925 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). “ ‘ A substantial right is affecte d when the error had a subs ta ntial and injurious effect or influence in de termining the jury ’ s verdict. ’ ” Thomas , 505 S.W.3d at 926 (quoting Ki ng v. St ate , 953 S.W.2d 266 , 27 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ). “ The proper inquiry is

‘ whether the e rror itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the
conviction cannot stand. ’ ” Id . (quoting Kotteakos v. United States , 328 U. S. 750, 764 (1946) ).

“ On t he o ther hand, if ‘ the e rror did not influence the jury, or had but v ery slight effect , the
verdic t and the judgment should stand. ’ ” Id

. Here, the record reflects that defense counsel saw K im standing on two occasions
du ring J.P. ’ s testimony , once dur i ng a bench confe rence a nd once at some unspecified point
before th at

. As the State ob serves in its brief , the record does not re flect how long Kim was

stan ding on either occasion, where she was standing in relation to the witness, whe ther she was12 st andin g while the witne s s was answering questions or only during bench conferences , and the

e xtent to which the jury was aware of her standing

. The record also does not reflect how often , if at all, Kim stood after the d istrict court a sked her to “ keep the stan ding to a mini mum
. ” Additionally, the re is no thing in the record to suggest that Kim , i n violation of Article 38.074,
obscure d the child from the view of the defendant or the jury , provide d the child with an an swer to any question asked of th e child , or a ssist ed or influe nce d the testimony of the child

. See Tex.
Code Cri m. Proc. art. 38.074 § 3(c). In short , on this record, we c ould not conclude that the
district court ’ s error, if any, in allowing Kim to s tand had a “ substantial or injur ious ” effect or
i nfluen ce in deter mining the jury ’ s verdict.
We overrule Young ’ s third point of error.

Motion for mistrial
One of the State ’ s witnesses a t trial was Ylise Janssen, an attorne y for the Austin
Ind epe ndent School District . The reco rd reflects that during her testimony, the following
occurred :

Q. Were there cameras on the school buses in the 2014, 2015 school year?
A. On some of the buses there were. Probably the majority of them, bu t not quite all of them

. Some of our older buses and perhaps smal ler buses, there may have been some instances where there would not necessarily have been
some cameras.

. . . . Q. Okay. After the 2014, 2015 school year, did Austin ISD make any significant changes to th e buses?
A. Yes, ma ’ a m, we did.13 Q. What was that?
A. After the incident in question

— [Defense counsel] : Judge, I ’ m goin g to object t o that. [The cou rt] : Come on up. (At the Bench, on the record) [The cou rt] : What is your objection? [De fense counsel] : My obje ction is th at this is highly prejudicial. This is an attorney who knows much better than to say that. [P ros ecutor] : I ’ ll withdraw the question.

Young then moved for a mistrial, which the di strict court denied. However, the district court
sustained Young ’ s ob ject ion to the testimony and instructed the jury to disregard it as follows:

Any testimony that you heard with regard to whether after the incident, as stated by the witness, cameras wer e installed or anything like that, you should dis regard it. It is not relevant to the proceedings in this case, nor should you consider it in any way to establish guilt or innocen ce, or allude to it any further in consideration of your verdict. Do you un derstand? Thank you.
Young again m oved for a mis trial , whi ch the dist rict court denied. Janssen provided no further
testi mony
. In his fourth point of error, Young asserts that the dist rict court abused its discretion by denying his motion for mistrial.

“ We review a trial court ’ s denial of a mistri al fo r an ab use of di scretion. ”
Balderas v. State , 517 S.W.3d 756 , 783 (Tex . Crim. App. 2016)

. “ We review the evidence in the light most f avorabl e t o the trial cour t ’ s ruling and consi der only those argume nts before the court
at the t ime of the ruling. ” Turn er v. S tate , 570 S.W.3d 250, 268 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)

. “ The
trial c ourt ’ s ruling must be upheld if it was within the zone of reasona ble disagreement

. ” Id

.14 “A mistrial is an appropriate reme dy in extreme circumstances for a narrow class of high ly prejudici al an d in curable errors.” Id

. “ A mistrial halts trial pr oceedings when error is so prejudicial that expenditure of further time and expense would be wasteful and futile

. ” Ocon
v. State , 284 S. W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. Crim. App . 2009). “ Whether a n error requires a mi strial

mus t b e determined by the particular facts of the case. ” Id

. An improper question a nd answer “ will seldom call for a mistrial, because, in most cases, any harm can be cured by an instruction to disregard. ” Russeau v. State , 171 S.W.3d
871 , 885 ( Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Ladd v. State , 3 S.W.3d 547 , 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1 999). It
is well e stablished that “ [ i ] n the va st majority of cases in which argument is made or testimony

co mes in, deliberately or inadvert ently, which has no relevance to any mate rial issue in the case and carries with it some definite potential for prejudice to the accus ed, ” courts presume “ that an
in struction to disregard the evidence will be obeyed by the jury

. ” Ladd , 3 S.W.3d at 567;
Ga rdner v. State , 730 S.W.2d 675 , 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) ; see Archie v. State , 340 S.W.3d
734 , 741 (Tex. C rim. App. 2011); Ovalle v. State , 13 S.W.3d 774, 783 ( Tex. Crim. App. 2000)

.

“ ‘ This is true except i n extreme cases wh ere it appears that the evide nce is clearly calcu lated to
inflame the minds of the jury and is of such a character as to suggest the impossibility of withdrawing t he impression produced on the ir minds. ’ ” Ladd , 3 S.W.3d at 56 7 (quoting
Gardner , 730 S.W.2d at 696) ; see Owens v . State , 381 S.W.3d 696 , 707 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2012, no pet.)

. Here , t he testimony to which Young objected was the witness referring to “ the incident in question

. ” Th is testimony was in response to the State asking the witness if the
school district had made “ any significant cha nges to the buses ” fo llowing the 2014

– 15 school

year
. It would not have been outside the zone of reasonable disagreement for the district cour t to15 have found that th is evidence was not “ clearly calculated t o inflame the minds of the ju ry and is
of such a character as to sugge st the impossibility of withdrawing the impression produced on
their minds

. ” The witness did not use inflammatory languag e to refer to the matter

. Moreover,
becau se of Young ’ s objection, the witness did not finish her answer to the q uestion , and the jury
was not told what the school district did “ after the incident in question. ” Although the jury might
have inferred , based on the pr evious q uestions, that the school district ’ s action related to the
installation of cameras on school bu ses , the district cou rt instructed the jury to disregard that
informat ion, and we cannot conclude that th is is the type of “ inflammatory infor m ation ” that the ju ry would have be e n unable to disregard

. On this record, we cannot conclude that the d istrict

c ourt abused its discr etion in denying Young ’ s motion for mistrial. We overrule Young ’ s fourth point of error.

Alleged c lerical error in w rit ten jud gment of conviction In his fifth point of error, Young asse rts that the w ritten judg ment of c onviction
contains a cleri cal error
. Specifically, he claims that the judgment indicates erroneously that Young is to be confined in the “ State Jail D i vi sion ” o f TDCJ. However, Young is mistaken.

T he judgment reflects correctly that Young is to be confi n ed in the “ Institutional Divi sion ” of
TDCJ , w hich is consistent with the d istrict court ’ s pronouncement of Young ’ s sentence in open

court

. We overrule Young ’ s fifth poi nt of error. 4

4 The St ate represents in its brief t hat it has conferred with Young’s counsel on this issue
a nd that Young ’ s counsel now agrees that there is no clerical error i n the judg ment.16 CONCLUSION
We a ffirm the district court ’ s judgment of conviction.

______________________________ ____________ Gisela D . Triana , Justice
Before Chief Just ice Rose, Justices Triana and Smith
Affirmed
Filed: No vember 19, 2019
Do Not Publish