### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 09 -0 00 23 -C R

______________________________ CHARL ES GL ENDAL LMEWBOURN, Appe llant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appea l from the 3rd Judicial District Court

Ander son County , Texas Trial Court No. 29370

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C
. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Memorandum Opinion by J ustice MoseleyOrig inally appea led t o the Twelfth Court of Appeals, this case was transfer red to thi s Court 1 by the Tex as S upreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization eff orts. See T EX . G OV ' T C ODE ANN . § 73.001 (Ve rnon 2005). We a re unawa re of any conflict be tween pr ece dent of the Tw elfth Court of Appe als and that of this Court on any rele vant issue. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 41.3. 2 MEMORANDUM OPI

NI ON Cha rl e s G le nd a ll M e wb ourn

wa s c on vic te d b y

a jur y of a g g ra vate d s e xua l a ssa

ult on a c hil d and the jury

assessed his punishment at li fe imprisonm ent. Mewbourn c omplains on appea l that the 1 tr ia l c ourt e rr e d b y a llo wi ngthe c hil d v ic timto t e sti fy by c los e d- c ir c uit tel e vis ion

rathe r t ha n in person in the c ourtroom, basing his arg ument on the rig ht to confront adve rse witnesse s as g ua ra nte e d b y the Sixth A me ndme nt t o th e Un ite d St a te s Co ns tit uti on . U .S. C O N ST . a m e n d

. V I. Th e c h ar g e w h i c h M e w b o u r n f a c e d w a s b a s e d u

p o n h i s a s s a

u l t o f a f i v e - y e ar - o l d

vic tim , wh om it wa s a lle g e d c on tr a c te d g e nit a l he rp e s fr om Me wb ourn , the dia g no sis of t he d ise a se prec ipitating the investigation l eadingto the char g es. I t was this victim who was allowed to testify by closed-c ircuit television. Mewbourn a

rg ues t hat t he S tate failed to prove with any signific ant deg ree of ce rtainty that the child victim w ould suf fer emotional distress from testify ing. Mewbourn elec ts to point out that the State' s witness re gardingthis potential emotional dist ress said that the c hild's fa ce- to-fac e confr ontation with Mewbourn could be helpful to the child. Thus, he a rgue s , t h e s tatutory

and

c on sti tut ion a l r e qu ir e me nts we re no t me t, a nd the tr ia l c ourt

c ou ld n ot p ro pe rl y

a llo w the vic timto testify by closed-c ircuit television.3

A trial court may order

the testimony

of a c hild y oung er tha

n thirteen y ear s of ag e to be take n outside the cour

troom and televised by

closed-c ircuit equipment whe re it ca n be viewe d by

the cour t and the f inder of f act if the trial court de termines that the child would be unava ilable to testify in the prese nce of

the def endant a bout an offe nse, including murder. T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . a rt
. 38 .0 71 , § § 1 (1 ), 3(a) (V e rn on Sup p. 20 07 ); Ga ita n v . S tat e , 257 S.W .3d 1, 3 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2008), cert. de nied , 129 S.Ct . 1050 (2009). Whe n d e te rm ini ngun a va ila bil ity of su c h a wi tne ss t o b e pe rs on a lly

pr e se nt i n th e c ourt

ro om, the trial cour

t is to consider rele vant fa ctors. Some of the f actor s t o b e co n s i dere d are the relationship of the defe ndant to the child, the char acte r and duration of the a lleg ed off ense, the ag e, maturity , and emotional stability of the c hild, the t ime which has elapse d since the alleg ed off ense, and whe ther the c hild is m ore likely than not to be unavailable to testify beca use of e motional or phy sical ca

uses (including confr ontation with the defe ndant), or the child would suffe r undue psy cholog ical or phy sical har m throug h her involveme nt at the hear ing or proce eding

. T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 38.071, § 8(a )(1) –(2) ( Ver non Supp. 2008). Recog nizi ng that this statute deprives a de fenda nt of fac e - to
- f

a c e c o n f r o nta ti o n , the trial cour

t is require d to hear

evidenc e and ma

ke a c ase- specific deter

mination: (1) that the use of the statutory pr oc e dure uti lize d is ne c e ssary to p ro te c t th e we lf

are of the pa rt ic ula r c hil d w itn e ss w ho se e ks to te sti fy ; ( 2) that th e chi ld wi tne ss w ou ld b e tr a uma tize d ( no t by

the c ourt

ro om o r t ri a l pr oc e ss g ener ally but, rather , by

the pre sence of the defe ndant); and (3) that the emotional distress suffe red4

by the child wit ness i n the pre sence of the de fenda nt is "more tha

n de minimis, i .e., more than mere

nerv ou sn ess or ex ci t e m e n t o r so me r elu cta nce t o t est if y ." Hi gh tow e r v . S

tat e , 822 S.W .2d 48, 51 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ); Go nz ale s v . S tat e , 818 S.W. 2d

75 6, 76 2 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ). Th e se requisite finding s are not require d by the s tatute, but are constitutionally require d. See M

aryland v. Cra ig , 497 U.S. 836, 855–56 (1990); Hightower , 82 2 S
. W
. 2d at 51. Should the trial court make these findings, t hen the Six th Amendment does not prohibit the use of a proce dure that, despite the

a bs e nc e of fa c e -t o- fa c e c on fr on ta tio n, e ns ur e s th e re lia bil ity of the e vid e nce by

su bje c tin g it t o rig orous cr oss-examination. Gonzales , 818 S.W .2d at 762. Fur ther, a lthough the finding s need not be individually and explicitly

made, they

must—at the m inimum—be implicit from the ruling of the c ourt. Liv e ly v . S tat e , 9 6 8 S. W. 2 d 3 6 3 , 3 6 6 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ); se e Ed

w a r d s v . S tat e , 1 07 S.W. 3d

10 7, 10 9– 11 (T e x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 20 03 , p e t. ref ' d). I n o ur

re vie w, we loo k to se e wh e the r t he tr ia l c ourt

a bu se d it s d isc re tio n b y

re a c hing i ts decision to allow examination by closed-c ircuit television in this t y pe of situation. See H

ightower , 8 2 2 S
. W
. 2 d

a t53 ; see al

so Act of July

18, 1987, 70th L eg ., 2d C.S., ch. 55, § 2, 1987 Tex. Gen. L aws 180, 185 (stating pr efe renc e for aff ording "suf

ficient d i s cr et ion" to trial c ourts applying statut e ); Ma rx v . S

tat e , 953 S.W .2d 321, 327 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997), a ff 'd , 9 8 7 S. W. 2 d

5 7 7 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1999).5

I n this case, the sole argu m en t raised by Mewbourn f

ocuses on the a lleg ed lac k of any signific ant amount of e vidence (and thus d i d not make the r equire d "a dequate showing ") that the child would suffe r any

emotional distress from testifying. There was testimony

elicited fr o m Dr. Juli e Davis, a profe ssional counselor who w as counseling the victi m , that the victim had classic sy mptoms of post-traumatic stress disorde r,
s u f f e r e d n ig h tm ar e s , an d th a t th e th o u g h t o f s e e in g M e w b o u r n ma d e th e v ic ti m " v e r

y , very fr ig hte ne d a

nd that' s w he n s he ha s a

lot of the se sh a ke s and ph y sic a l." Da vis te sti fi e d tha t it

wo uld be very traumatic for the victim to testify in Me wbourn' s prese nce and that it could cause her to onc e
a g a in e xpe ri e nc e the tr a

umatic fe e lin g s, fe ar, pa

nic a tta c ks , and a

nxie ty
. Th e se a dv e rs e re a c tio ns , she said, would not be cause d by the courtroom experience g ener ally but, rather , by

the pre sence of Mewbourn. D avis went on to testify that in te rms of a potential for a par ticular de leterious ef

fec t on the c hil d, e mpl oying a sc a le of 1 to 10 , the vic tim ' s anxie ty wa s a bo ut a 7. 5 to 8 , a

nd that on the same scale , there was a

bout a 70 to 80 perc ent chance that the victim would suffer ba d eff ects fr om fac eto -face t est im on y

for "qui te s om eti me [ si c] ." The c ourt also questioned the w itness. During this, Da vis testified that should the child be fo rc e d to te sti fy

in M e wb ourn ' s p re se nc e , th e re wa s a 60 pe rc e nt ch anc e that th e imp a c t on the c hil d would be ser iously neg ative and about a 40 perc ent chance that the act of testify ing c ould be positive. The re fer ence d evi d en ce was not entire ly consistent. Howeve r, eve n the wea kest sections of the te sti mony ma de it c le ar t

hat th e re wa s a

proba bil ity of su bs tanti a l e mot ion a l di str e ss t o th e vic tim6

from fa ce- to-fac e conf

rontation with Mewbourn at trial and that the injury would not be from the tr ia l it se lf , b ut f ro m e xpos ur e to t

he ind ivi du a l, h e r a ssa ila

nt. Thus , th e tr ia l c ourt

c on c lud e d th a t it was in the be st interest of the c hild, as shown by the evidenc e, to allow examination of the child by closed-c ircuit television, rathe r than having the child t es t i fy i n the cour troom, fac ing Me wbourn. Although the re w ere no expli cit finding s announce d or enter ed which suppor t the actions of the tr ial

c ourt in p e rm itt ingthe c los e d- c ir c uit te le vis ion

te sti mony

of the c hil d, th ere is ampl e e vid e nc e to support implicit findi ng s. The cour t's ruling is within the ex erc ise of i ts discretion, as it is supported by the evidenc e. We affir m.

Ba iley C. Moseley J ustice Date Submitted: September 8, 2009 Date D ecide d: September 18, 2009 Do No t Pu

bli sh