SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4844-17T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. 

GENESIS TORRES,

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________

Submitted May 21, 2019 – Decided June 4, 2019

Before Judges Gilson and Natali. 

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 17-12-0608.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Laura B. Lasota, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Angelo J. Onofri, Mercer County Prosecutor, attorney 

for respondent (Alycia Irene Pollice, Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Defendant Genesis Torres appeals from a May 18, 2018 judgment of 

conviction, following his guilty plea to third-degree possession of a controlled 

dangerous substance, heroin, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1). He was 

sentenced to a 364–day county jail term, to be followed by three years of 

probation, along with applicable fines and penalties. Defendant entered his plea 

following the denial of his motion to suppress. On appeal, he argues:

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 

EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE POLICE DID NOT 

HAVE THE REQUISITE REASONABLE 

SUSPICION TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATORY 

STOP OF DEFENDANT.

POINT II

WITH NO BASIS TO BELIEVE THAT DEFENDANT 

WAS ARMED AND DANGEROUS, POLICE HAD 

NO LAWFUL REASON TO FRISK OR SEARCH 

HIM. THEREFORE, ANY EVIDENCE FOUND ON 

DEFENDANT'S PERSON MUST BE SUPPRESSED.

Having considered defendant's arguments in light of the record and 

applicable legal principles, we conclude, based on the totality of the 

circumstances, that the police had a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop and 

frisk defendant, and seize the heroin in his pocket. Accordingly, we affirm.
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I.

At the suppression hearing, one witness testified; Detective Frederick 

Bender, a seventeen-year veteran of the Trenton Police Department. Bender's 

experience included a three-year assignment to the Patrol Unit in the eastern

portion of the city, twelve years in the Trenton Anti-Crime (TAC) Unit, a special 

unit designed to combat street-level narcotic sales and violent offenders, and 

approximately two years in the Violent Crimes Unit (VCU), where his job 

responsibilities mirrored those in the TAC unit. 

As a patrol officer, and member of the TAC and VCU units, Detective 

Bender testified that he participated in "thousands" of narcotic investigations, 

and "hundreds" of arrests, in the eastern section of Trenton where defendant was 

arrested, which Bender described as a "high crime area." In addition to offenses 

related to the sale and distribution of controlled dangerous substances, he also 

encountered "significant weapons," including "firearms[] [and] knives,"

"numerous times" in that area. 

On October 27, 2017, while he and two other officers were patrolling east

Trenton in an unmarked police vehicle, Detective Bender testified that he 

observed two individuals, one of whom was on a bicycle, "huddled close 

together, face-to-face" having a brief conversation on the sidewalk. Bender saw 
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one of the individuals, later identified as defendant, "manipulat[e] a rectangular 

object in his hand" that he had just removed from his pocket, as if "dealing a 

deck of cards," and hand it to the man on the bicycle. He also stated that 

defendant's actions were consistent with the way individuals distribute smaller 

amounts of heroin, although he acknowledged that he did not witness the man 

on the bicycle hand anything to defendant. He further testified that the 

transaction lasted about twenty to thirty seconds. After the man on the bicycle 

pedaled away, two officers from a different unit unsuccessfully attempted to 

apprehend him. 

Detective Bender and his partners exited their vehicle "to further 

investigate" and "advised [defendant]. . . to stop . . . ." He testified that he placed 

defendant "in a pat frisk" position because he "believed [he] witnessed a 

narcotics transaction" and explained that in his experience "what comes along 

with narcotics . . . is weapons," "whether there be a gun, a knife, [or] some kind 

of weapon." Detective Bender acknowledged that there was nothing that 

defendant specifically did at that time that indicated he had a weapon, but 

explained, in his experience, "usually they're concealed . . . when [people who 

deal in narcotics] see[] the police."
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Detective Bender stated he patted "the right side of [defendant's] pants,"

and "immediately felt what [he] immediately recognized through [his] training 

and experience as a bundle of distributable amount of heroin." He explained 

that a "bundle" is a "couple of bags of heroin . . . held together with a rubber 

band." Bender reached into defendant's front right pocket and removed ten bags 

of heroin, and immediately placed him under arrest. At police headquarters, 

defendant was processed, and a subsequent search uncovered additional bags of 

heroin, and approximately $170. 

After the suppression hearing, Judge Peter E. Warshaw made detailed 

findings of fact on the record, including that Detective Bender was a credible 

witness. Relying on State v. Bard, 445 N.J. Super. 145 (App. Div. 2016), Judge 

Warshaw explained that he considered the totality of the circumstances and gave 

weight to Detective Bender's knowledge and experience, as well as all 

reasonable inferences gleaned from the facts. Specifically, the court found that

east Trenton "is an area with which Detective Bender is extremely familiar," and

that he knew it was "a high drug trafficking area" and a "high crime area," which

"includes substantial weapons." Judge Warshaw also determined that Detective 

Bender believed he witnessed a narcotics transaction.
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After noting that Detective Bender "didn't have anything that [made it]

absolutely certain" that defendant was in possession of a weapon, Judge 

Warshaw concluded that "in my judgment, he d[id] not have to." Instead, the 

court noted that Detective Bender "has spent, really, his entire professional 

career in that area," which included drugs and "weapons investigations there," 

and found that he knew that "those who sell drugs are frequently armed." 

Having found that Detective Bender believed he had just witnessed a drug

transaction involving heroin, the court determined that he conducted a pat-down 

"as a large function of being informed by his training and experience" and 

"superior level of knowledge concerning the area."

Accordingly, based on the detective's testimony, the court determined that 

"a reasonable police officer would perceive a threat to the safety of other police 

officers in this situation," and concluded that Detective Bender was entitled to 

stop and frisk defendant. Further, Judge Warshaw was "absolutely satisfied that 

the State met its burden" of proving the "drugs . . . were [properly] seized in the 

field," and concluded that the drugs found at police headquarters were lawfully 

seized incident to an arrest.
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II.

In reviewing a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court's factual and 

credibility findings, "so long as those findings are supported by sufficient 

credible evidence in the record." State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 44 (2011) (quoting 

State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)). This deference is particularly 

appropriate when the court's factual findings are "substantially influenced by his 

[or her] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the 

case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." State v. Reece, 222 N.J. 154, 166 

(2015) (quoting State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999)). "An appellate court 

should disregard those findings only when a trial court's findings of fact are 

clearly mistaken." State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015). We afford no 

special deference to the court's legal conclusions, however, which we review de 

novo. State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010).

On appeal, defendant first argues that Detective Bender lacked the 

reasonable, particularized suspicion of criminal activity necessary for an 

investigatory detention. We disagree.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article I, 

Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, guarantee "[t]he right of the people 

to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
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searches and seizures" by requiring warrants issued on probable cause. "Under 

our constitutional jurisprudence, when it is practicable to do so, the police are 

generally required to secure a warrant before conducting a search . . . ." State 

v. Hathaway, 222 N.J. 453, 468 (2015) (citations omitted). One exception, 

however, is an investigatory stop. See Elders, 192 N.J. at 246.

It is well settled that police officers may lawfully detain someone to 

conduct an investigatory stop without a warrant, and on less than probable cause. 

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968); State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 356 (2002). 

An investigatory stop allows an officer to detain an individual temporarily for 

questioning if the officer can articulate "some minimum level of objective 

justification" based on "something more" than an "inchoate and unparticularized 

suspicion or hunch" of wrongdoing. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 

(1989) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord State v. Nishina, 

175 N.J. 502, 511 (2003).

A warrantless investigative stop is valid when an "officer observes

unusual conduct which leads [the officer] reasonably to conclude in light of his

[or her] experience that criminal activity may be afoot . . . ." Terry, 392 U.S. at 

30. The stop must be "based on specific and articulable facts which, taken 

together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable 
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suspicion of criminal activity." State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 20 (2004) (quoting 

Nishina, 175 N.J. at 510-11). Reasonable suspicion "involves a significantly 

lower degree of objective evidentiary justification than does the probable cause 

test," State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 501 (1986), and is found when an officer has 

"a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of 

criminal activity." Stovall, 170 N.J. at 356 (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 

517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)).

A reviewing court "must look at the 'totality of the circumstances' of each 

case to see whether the detaining officer has a 'particularized and objective basis' 

for suspecting legal wrongdoing" by the detained individual. United States v. 

Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). In evaluating the totality of the circumstances

"giving rise to the officer's suspicion of criminal activity, courts are to give 

weight to 'the officer's knowledge and experience' as well as 'rational inferences 

that could be drawn from the facts objectively and reasonably viewed in light of 

the officer's expertise.'" State v. Richards, 351 N.J. Super. 289, 299-300 (App. 

Div. 2002) (quoting State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 10–11 (1997)). Thus, a police 

officer may conduct an investigatory stop if, based on the totality of the 

circumstances, there is reasonable suspicion to believe an individual has just 
10 A-4844-17T4

engaged in, or about to engage in, criminal activity. State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 

471, 487 (2001).

A "stop" and "frisk" under Terry are judged under two separate inquiries:

[T]he facts that allow the detaining officer to make a 

stop do not automatically permit that officer to search 

for weapons. While the right to search may flow from 

the same set of facts that permitted the stop, "in 

situations where . . . the officers have no prior 

indication that the suspect is armed, more is required to 

justify a protective search."

[State v. Garland, 270 N.J. Super. 31, 41-42 (App. Div. 

1994) (quoting Thomas, 110 N.J. at 680).]

Addressing the Terry investigatory stop first, we are satisfied that the trial 

court's findings of fact are supported by sufficient credible evidence. Detective 

Bender testified that while patrolling an area known for high narcotics and 

illegal weapons activities, he witnessed two individuals huddle together and 

engage in what the detective believed was a narcotics transaction. Specifically, 

Detective Bender testified that he observed defendant pull "an unknown white 

object, light in color, [and] rectangular," which defendant manipulated before 

handing to another individual. Based on Detective Bender's "training and 

experience in these investigations" and the manner in which defendant 

manipulated the object, the detective specifically believed the object was heroin. 

These are articulable facts to support an objectively reasonable determination 
11 A-4844-17T4

that defendant engaged in criminal activity sufficient to justify the Terry stop. 

See Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 26 ("the reputation or history of an area" as being a highcrime area "and an officer's experience with and knowledge of the suspected transfer 

of narcotics" are "relevant factors to determine the validity of a Terry stop").

III.

Defendant next contends that the police lacked any reasonable suspicion 

to warrant a pat-down search. Specifically, he claims that because Detective 

Bender "conducted the search simply because of his generalized belief that drugs 

and weapons went hand-in-hand with one another," the frisk of defendant's 

person for weapons was not objectively reasonable. As a result, defendant

contends the heroin should have been suppressed. Again, we disagree.

Under Terry, once stopped, the "officer may conduct a reasonable search

for weapons if he [or she] is 'justified in believing that the individual whose 

suspicious behavior he [or she] is investigating at close range is armed and 

presently dangerous to the officer or to others.'" Richards, 351 N.J. Super. at 

299 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24). "The officer need not be absolutely certain 

that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent [person] 

in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his [or her] safety[,] 

or that of others[,] was in danger." Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. "The protective search 
12 A-4844-17T4

'must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to 

discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the 

police officer.'" State v. Jackson, 276 N.J. Super. 623, 629 (App. Div. 1994) 

(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 29). "[T]he same conduct that justifies an 

investigatory stop may also present the officer with a specific and particularized 

reason to believe that the suspect is armed." State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 30 

(2010). The existence of reasonable suspicion to frisk "is based on the totality 

of the circumstances." Roach, 172 N.J. at 27.

Accordingly, if a police officer conducts a pat-down search of an 

individual and detects an object in the clothing of the individual that the officer 

does not recognize as a weapon, nor identify as contraband, any nonthreatening 

contraband seized may not be used against the individual in a criminal 

prosecution. Jackson, 276 N.J. Super. at 630. However:

[i]f a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer 

clothing[,] and feels an object whose contour or mass 

makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been 

no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that already 

authorized by the officer's search for weapons; if the 

object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be 

justified by the same practical consideration that adhere 

in the plain view context.

[Id. at 630-31 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Minnesota 

v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375-76 (1993)).]
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Here, we conclude that Detective Bender's pat-down search of defendant

was justified. Detective Bender testified that the part of Trenton in which this 

incident occurred was a high-crime area and that he had encountered weapons 

"numerous times in that area." "Although a stop in a high-crime area does not 

by itself justify a Terry frisk . . . , the location of the investigatory stop can 

reasonably elevate a police officer's suspicion that a suspect is armed." State v. 

Valentine, 134 N.J. 536, 547 (1994) (citing Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 

334–35 n.2 (1990)). Further, Detective Bender stated that he believed he 

"witnessed a narcotics transaction" between defendant and the other individual. 

"[E]ven apart from [an officer's] personal experiences," courts "have recognized 

that to 'substantial dealers in narcotics' firearms are as much 'tools of the trade' 

as are most commonly recognized articles of narcotics paraphernalia." United 

States v. Oakes, 560 F.2d 45, 62 (2d Cir. 1977) (quoting United States v. Wiener, 

534 F.2d 15, 18 (2d Cir. 1976)). In this case, the detective used his "training 

and experience in these investigations" and his observation of how defendant 

manipulated the drug to conclude specifically that he had witnessed a transaction 

in heroin. 

Thus, the particularized suspicion that defendant had a weapon was that 

Detective Bender believed, based on his experience and training, he just 
14 A-4844-17T4

witnessed defendant provide heroin to another individual before the suspects

swiftly departed. See State v. Ramos, 282 N.J. Super. 19, 21 (App. Div. 1995) 

(finding an officer's observations in "an area of high drug activity," "considered 

in light of [the officer's] training and experience, supported a reasonable 

suspicion that defendant was engaging in a drug transaction"). Those factors, 

coupled with Detective Bender's testimony that, based on his familiarity with 

this particular area and his experience investigating crimes in it, people who 

engage in narcotics transactions there tend to have weapons on them, render his 

decision to pat defendant down for a weapon objectively reasonable. See

Valentine, 134 N.J. at 547 ("Terry itself acknowledges that police officers must 

be permitted to use their knowledge and experience in deciding whether to frisk 

a suspect"); id. at 543 (explaining that although "the Terry standard is an 

objective one, . . . '[t]he process does not deal with hard certainties, but with 

probabilities'") (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 

449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). 

Therefore, the frisk was justified under the circumstances. As a result, 

and because the detective immediately identified the object in defendant's 

pocket as contraband without first manipulating it, the seizure of the heroin was 

lawful. See State v. Toth, 321 N.J. Super. 609, 616-17 (App. Div. 1999) 
15 A-4844-17T4

(holding that a pat-down in which an officer immediately identifies an object as 

contraband without "in any way[] manipulat[ing] or explor[ing]" it "with his 

fingers" was a valid Terry frisk under the plain-feel doctrine).1 

Affirmed. 

 

1

 In light of our decision, we need not address the State's alternative argument 

that Detective Bender had probable cause to arrest defendant and that the seizure 

of heroin from his person resulted from a search incident to a lawful arrest.