NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANTONIO SANTOS MOO MIS, AKA 

Santos Antonio Moo Mis, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

ROBERT M. WILKINSON, Acting 

Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. 19-70069 

Agency No. A098-269-704 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 1, 2021**

San Francisco, California

Before: SILER,*** RAWLINSON, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

Antonio Moo Mis, a 37-year-old Mexican native, was ordered removed by an 

immigration judge (“IJ”) under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Moo Mis conceded 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

FILED

FEB 3 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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removability but sought relief in the form of asylum, withholding of removal, and 

protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The IJ denied each 

claim, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed. Moo Mis timely

petitioned our court for review. He challenges the BIA’s decision only as to his 

withholding and CAT claims, not his asylum claim. For the reasons explained 

below, we deny his petition. 

1. Moo Mis claims eligibility for withholding of removal based on three 

sources of alleged persecution: his family, gang members, and a third group of

unknown assailants who are prejudiced against Americanized Mexicans. Substantial 

evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion as to each ground.

First, even if the domestic abuse that Moo Mis experienced as a child 

constituted past persecution, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination 

that a “fundamental change in circumstances” rebuts the presumption that he will 

face similar abuse if he returns to Mexico. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(A). As 

the BIA noted, Moo Mis—who was 37-years old at the time of his hearing—had not 

been beaten by his mother or stepdad since he was 13. Moo Mis offers no 

explanation or evidence to explain why his childhood domestic abuse would reoccur 

if he returns to Mexico as a man in his late 30s. Instead, he merely argues 

withholding claims should be analyzed from the perspective of the child and take 

into account the victim’s age at the time of the persecution. But that is only true 
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with respect to past persecution. See, e.g., Hernandez-Ortiz v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 

1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[I]njuries to a family must be considered in an asylum 

case where the events that form the basis of the past persecution claim were 

perceived when the petitioner was a child.”) (emphasis added). To evaluate changed 

circumstances, the agencies need not blind themselves to the inherent differences

between a 13-year-old boy and a 37-year-old man.1 

Second, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Moo Mis has 

not shown persecution on account of a political opinion based on his resistance to 

gang recruitment efforts. Moo Mis claims persecution based on his opinion that 

cartels are morally wrong and destructive, but he cites no record evidence to show 

that he holds this opinion—let alone that he ever publicly expressed it such that 

others would assign this belief to him. See Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 

747 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding BIA where petitioner “did not present evidence that 

he was politically or ideologically opposed to the ideals espoused by the Mara or to 

gangs in general, or that the Mara imputed to [the petitioner] any particular political 

belief”), abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 

(9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). Indeed, Moo Mis admitted that he has not done anything 

1 Moo Mis also argues that the agencies erred by failing to analyze his alleged

particular social group relating to his child abuse, but since the BIA found that 

changed circumstances rebutted any claim of persecution, it did not need to reach 

the nexus element. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004)

(BIA need not reach issues that would not change the result reached).
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to oppose gangs or publicly spoken out against them. The sole basis for his claim is 

that he resisted a gang’s recruitment efforts when he was 19. But resistance to a 

gang’s recruitment efforts, by itself, does not constitute a “political opinion.” See 

Santos-Lemus, 542 F.3d at 747.

Finally, substantial evidence supports the conclusion regarding Moo Mis’s 

fear of persecution as a “pocho,” which is slang for an Americanized Mexican. Our 

prior cases have recognized that “returning Mexicans from the United States,” or 

similar formulations of that group, is “too broad to qualify as a cognizable social 

group.” Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 2010); see also 

Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 2016) (rejecting proposed 

group of returning Mexicans who are viewed as wealthy Americans). We believe 

Moo Mis’s particular social group of being “pocho” is sufficiently foreclosed by 

Delgado-Ortiz and Ramirez-Munoz. Moo Mis fails to offer a compelling reason for 

us to depart from these cases now. 

2. To qualify for CAT protection, an applicant must show it is “more 

likely than not” he “would be tortured if removed to the proposed country....” 8 

C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that 

Moo Mis has not made this showing. When asked what he thought might happen to 

him if returned to Mexico, Moo Mis simply said, “I don’t know, perhaps other things 

could happen that one does not know about.” Moo Mis relies exclusively on 
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country-conditions evidence showing that Mexico is plagued by gang violence. This 

is insufficient to compel the conclusion that he will face a particularized risk of 

torture. See Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 915, 922–23 (9th Cir. 2006) (general 

reports regarding torture in a petitioner’s home country do not compel conclusion

that the petitioner faces likely torture). That is particularly true here, since the record 

evidence shows that Moo Mis is from Yucatan, one of the least-dangerous states in

Mexico. Nor do we find any merit to Moo Mis’s argument that the BIA 

insufficiently considered his CAT claim, which is ultimately just a disagreement 

with the BIA’s decision. 

PETITION DENIED.