SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0676-18T4

NICHOLAS VALLO JR.,

Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF REVIEW 

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

and BUILDERS GENERAL 

SUPPLY CO.,

Respondent.

__________________________

Submitted January 29, 2020 – Decided

Before Judges Whipple and Gooden Brown.

On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of 

Labor, Docket No. 153,691.

Nicholas Vallo Jr., appellant pro se.

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent Board of Review (Donna Arons, Assistant 

Attorney General, of counsel; Andy Jong, Deputy 

Attorney General, on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

February 25, 2020
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Respondent Builders General Supply Co. has not filed 

a brief. 

PER CURIAM

Nicholas Vallo Jr. appeals from the September 27, 2018 final agency 

decision of the Board of Review (Board), Department of Labor, dismissing his 

appeal from the adverse ruling of the Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal) because the 

appeal was not filed within the strict time frame prescribed by N.J.S.A. 43:21-

6(c). We affirm.

After approximately sixteen months of employment, on May 15, 2018, 

Vallo resigned from his position as a driver with Builders General Supply 

Company because of the level of physical labor required by the job. On May 

27, 2018, Vallo filed a claim for unemployment benefits, which was denied by 

the Deputy of the Division of Unemployment Insurance (Deputy) under N.J.S.A. 

43:21-5, on the ground that the claimant left work voluntarily without good 

cause attributable to the work. 

On June 18, 2018, Vallo appealed to the Tribunal and participated in a 

July 13, 2018 telephonic hearing along with his employer. The proofs adduced

at the hearing1revealed that Vallo had been granted a medical leave of absence,

1

 We glean these facts from the Tribunal's decision as the transcript of the 

hearing is not a part of the record. 
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after which he was allowed to return to work by his doctor with no restrictions, 

but resigned instead after his employer indicated it could not accommodate him 

by placing him in a less physically demanding job. Vallo neither provided 

medical documentation to his employer to show that the job caused or 

aggravated his condition, nor requested another leave of absence.

Following the hearing, the Tribunal affirmed the Deputy's 

disqualification. Applying N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.32and Self v. Board of Review, 91 

N.J. 453 (1982),3the Tribunal determined that while Vallo's "reason for 

voluntarily leaving" the job was "compelling in nature," it was "not considered 

to be good cause to leave work voluntarily" because Vallo failed "to provide 

medical documentation to the employer to show that the job caused or 

exasperated his condition and/or that he was incapable of continuing to work in 

2

 N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3 establishes three categories applicable when an employee 

leaves work for reasons related to a medical condition, which are not subject to 

disqualification from benefits, provided certain conditions are met, including 

making "a reasonable effort to preserve his or her employment," N.J.A.C. 12:17-

9.3(c), and providing a "medical certification . . . to support a finding of good 

cause attributable to work," N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(d).

3

 In Self, the Court clarified that "a departure not attributable to work is a 

'voluntary departure without good cause related to work' that will disqualify the 

employee from receiving unemployment benefits,'" and "[t]he only recognized 

exception to that rule is where an employee is unable to work because of illness 

and attempts to protect [his or] her employment." Id. at 457 (quoting DeLorenzo 

v. Bd. of Review, 54 N.J. 361, 363-64 (1969)). 
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the role he was hired for," and failed to request "another leave of absence or an 

extension of his most recent one." Thus, the Tribunal concluded Vallo failed to 

satisfy his "obligation to do those things reasonably calculated to relieve himself 

of the condition or complained of circumstances before [] voluntarily leaving 

the job could be justified."

The Tribunal's decision, which was mailed to Vallo on July 17, 2018, 

contained explicit language warning

This decision will become final, unless, within twenty

. . . days of the date of mailing . . . , a written appeal is 

filed with the Board . . . . The appeal period will be 

extended if good cause for late filing is shown. Good 

cause exists in situations where it can be shown that the 

delay was due to circumstances beyond the control of 

the appellant, which could not have been reasonably 

foreseen or prevented.

Accordingly, the deadline for Vallo's administrative appeal was August 5, 2018.

Although dated August 10, 2018, Vallo filed an appeal to the Board on 

August 14, 2018, simply stating "I would like to appeal the decision of the 

unemployment officer on the grounds he did not [hear] all the facts." In a 

September 27, 2018 decision, the Board dismissed Vallo's appeal, stating "the 

appeal was filed late, in that it was filed subsequent to the expiration of the 

statutory period of twenty . . . days from the date of mailing of the . . . Tribunal 
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decision (N.J.S.A. 43:21-6(c)); and [g]ood cause not having been shown for such 

late filing." This appeal followed. 

We need not address the merits of Vallo's application for benefits because 

it is clear, as a procedural matter, that his administrative appeal was out of time. 

N.J.S.A. 43:21-6(c) specifies that the Tribunal's decision "shall be deemed to be 

the final decision of the [Board], unless further appeal is initiated pursuant to 

[N.J.S.A. 43:21-6(e)] . . . within [twenty] days after the date of . . . mailing of 

such decision." "If a review . . . is not initiated . . . within the [prescribed time 

limits], the decision becomes 'final' and is not subject to review except upon a 

showing of fraud or other fundamental defect in the proceedings." Van Ouhl v. 

Bd. of Review, 254 N.J. Super. 147, 151 (App. Div. 1992) (citing Kaske v. State 

of N.J., Bd. of Review, 34 N.J. Super. 222, 225-26 (App. Div. 1955)). See

Lowden v. Bd. of Review, 78 N.J. Super. 467, 468-70 (App. Div. 1963) (strictly 

enforcing the applicable filing deadline for administrative appeals). 

Relief from these time constraints is afforded by N.J.A.C. 12:20-4.1(h),

which provides:

A late appeal shall be considered on its merits if it is 

determined that the appeal was delayed for good cause. 

Good cause exists in circumstances where it is shown 

that:
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1. The delay in filing the appeal was due to 

circumstances beyond the control of the appellant; or

2. The appellant delayed filing the appeal for 

circumstances which could not have been reasonably 

foreseen or prevented.

Although N.J.A.C. 12:20-4.1(h) allows the deadline to be extended in 

limited situations upon a demonstration of good cause, Vallo offered the Board 

no explanation for his delay in filing an administrative appeal. Likewise, on 

appeal, Vallo renews the contentions rejected by the Tribunal, and still offers no 

explanation for his untimely appeal to the Board. Accordingly, we must affirm 

the Board's decision, affording it the deference it is owed as an administrative 

agency on matters within its area of responsibility. See, e.g., Brady v. Bd. of 

Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997); Self, 91 N.J. at 459; Futterman v. Bd. of 

Review, 421 N.J. Super. 281, 287 (App. Div. 2011).

Affirmed.