NOT RECOMMENDED F OR F ULL-TEXT PUBLICATION File Na me: 13a0616n.06 No. 10-4152 UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS F OR THE S IXTH CIRCUIT ROBERT J. AL L EN, et a l., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) DONAL D MARTI

N, ) ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) ) TERRY J . COL L I

NS, et al., ) ) Def endant- Appellee

. ) ON APPEALFROM THE UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE N ORTHERN DI STRI CT OF OH I O

/ Be fore : KEI TH, MARTI N, and ROGERS, Circuit J udg es. BO YCE F. MARTI

N, J R., Circuit J udg e. Twenty -three parole -elig ible prisoners in the Ohio Depa rtment of Rehabilitation’s cust o d y i nitiated pro se this putative class action in district court pursuant to 42 Unit ed S tates C ode section 1983, alleg ing that the Ohio Parole B oard’ s retroa ctive application of its parole g uidelines, policies, and proce dures violated their rig hts under the Ex Post Fa cto and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constit ution. I n their amende d complaint, the prisoners sought declara tory and inj unctive relief from: t h e P ar o le Board’ s implementation of t he 2007 Guidelines Manual; the Parole Bo ard’ s implementation of portions of the Victims’ Rights Statute; other Parole Boa

rd policies and proce dures; and the cumulative chang es in parole standards and proc edure s.No. 104152

Robert Allen, et al. v. Terry Colli ns, et al. Pag e 2 I n the midst of the litigation, the Parole Boa rd re scinded the 2007 G uidelines Manual, and the district court subseque ntly held that the re scission mooted the prisoners’ c laim challeng ing it. The district c ourt then g rante d the Parole Boa rd’s motion for summary judgme nt on the prisoners’ claims challeng ing the Parole Boa rd’s i m p l ementation of the Victims’ Rights Statute and other Parole Boa

rd policies and proce dures. The district court held that the prisoners’ claim reg arding the cumulative chang es in parole standards and proce dures failed as a matter of law g iven the rea soning of Foster v. Booke r , 595 F.3d 353 (6th Cir. 2010). The district c ourt then dismiss ed as “moot” the prisoners’ pending motions—i ncluding those for an Orde r Reopening Discover y pursuant to Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 56(f) (now Rule 56(d)) and for class cer tification. Of the plaintiffs named in the amende d complaint, only prisoner Donald Martin appea led the district court’s judgme nt. We AF F IRM the district court’s judg ment. Martin and the orig inal plaintiffs in t h is case are “old-law ” prisoners, having rec eived indeterminate sentenc es befor e 1996. On J uly 1 , 1 996, the Ohio L eg islature enac ted a new sentenc ing scheme , SB2, which prospec tively eliminated indeterminate sentenc ing and parole

. The Ohio L eg islature did not apply SB2 retroac tively to those prisoners who had been sentenc ed prior to its enac tment. So, those prisoners, such as Martin, who wer e iss u ed indeterminate sentenc es befor e J uly 1, 1996, rema in subject to the Parole Boa rd, which has denied parole to Martin and the proposed class members. On appea l, Martin arg ues: 1) the resc ission of the 2007 Guidelines did not moot his challeng e to them; 2) the Victim’s Rights Statute violated his rig hts under the Ex Post Fa cto Clause; 3) the cumulative chang es to policie s and proce dures violated his rights under the Ex Post Fa cto Clause; and 4) the district c ourt abused its discretion in dismiss ing the prisoner’ s motion forNo. 104152

Robert Allen, et al. v. Terry Colli ns, et al. Pag e 3 an orde r re opening discovery pursuant to Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 56(f) . We addre ss eac h arg ument in turn. First, we addre ss Martin’s ar g ument that the district court should not have deter mined that his challeng e ag ainst the 2007 Guidelines beca me moot when the Parole Boa rd resc inded them. We revie w de novo a district court’s application of the mootness doctrine to a claim or case . Cleveland Branch, NAACP v. City of Parma, 263 F.3d 513, 530 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Craft v. United States , 233 F.3d 358, 373 ( 6th Cir. 2000)). The district court did not err in apply ing the m o o t n es s d octrine to Martin’s claim for decla ratory and injunctive relief from the 2007 Guidelines. When considering whether a claim for decla ratory relief is moot, “‘the question is whether the fac ts alleg ed, under all the circumstances, show that there is a subst antial controversy

. . . of sufficient imme d i ac y an d re al ity to war rant the issuance of a decla

ratory judgme nt.’” Campbell v. PMI Food Equipment Group, Inc. , 509 F.3d 776, 781 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Coal. for Gov’ t Procurem ent v. Fed. Prison Indus. , 365 F.3d 435, 459 (6th Cir. 2004)). I n Campbell , worke rs filed suit in district court seeking a decla ratory judgme nt that

a tax-abatement ag ree ment that their employ er had enter ed into violated their constitutional rig hts. Id

. The d i s t ri ct co u rt dismiss ed the worke rs’ claim for decla ratory relief as moot, beca use the ag ree ment had expired befor e the court issued its fin al order

. Id

. We aff irmed, rea soning that b ec ause the ag ree ment was no longe r in eff ect, no party had a continuing obliga tion under i t ; “[g]ranting decla

ratory relief would there fore h av e no eff ect on the [w] orker s’ curr ent leg al interests.” Id

.No. 104152

Robert Allen, et al. v. Terry Colli ns, et al. Pag e 4 Martin i s in a posi tion simil ar to that of the wor kers in Campbell : he has asked t he dis trict court to decla

re as unconstituti o nal a document—the 2007 Guidelines—that no longe r exis ts. A

co n t roversy

—let alone a substantial one—ca nnot exis t beca

use the Boa

rd resc inded the 2 0 0 7 Guidelines, eff

ective April 1, 2010, stating that “the Boa rd will no longe r use the Guidelines Manual for any purpose, including the rele ase decision proce ss.” As a result, the 2007 Guidelines, like the ag ree ment in Campbell , cannot aff ect Martin’s leg al interests. The district court corr ectly found that Martin’s cla im for dec lara tory relief as to the 2007 Guidelines wa s moot. Simi larly , the district court rea ched the corr ect conclusion in holding that Martin’s claim for injunctive relief from the Parole Boa rd’s use of the 2007 Guidelines had become moot. I n apply ing the mootness doc trine to a c laim seeking injunctive relief , we c onsider the c laim to be moot when either “‘the issues prese nted are no longe r ‘live’” or the “ ‘par ties lack a leg ally cog nizable inter est [‘personal stake’] in the outcome.’” Banas v. Dempse y , 742 F.2d 277, 281 (6th Cir. 1984). (quoting United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty , 4 4 5 U.S

. 388, 396 (1980) (par allel citations omitted)). I n Banas , welfa re recipients sought an injunction to p re vent t he st ate from enfor cing a policy which they

alleg ed viol ated their constitutional rights. Id . at 281. During the cour se of the litigation, Congr ess amende d a statute which preve n t ed t h e state from enfor cing the policy

. Id

. Be cause the state no longe r implemented the policy , there was no longe r any state action for the court to enjoin. Id. Her e, too, the district court could not enjoin the Parole Boa rd from using the 2007 Guidelines beca use they no longe r exist. M artin simply cannot have a pe rsonal stake in rescinde d policies.No. 104152

Robert Allen, et al. v. Terry Colli ns, et al. Pag e 5 Martin asser

ts that two exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply : the exception for an action capa ble of repe tition, y et evading review ; and the voluntary cessa tion doctrine. The d i s t rict court

corr ectly foun d t h at t h e fi rst exception did not apply

. We have explained that the “‘c apable of repe tition, y et evading revie w’ exception to the mootness doctrine applies in those exceptional case s wher e a plaintiff makes a rea sonable showing that he or she will ag ain be subjected to the sanction.” Thomas Sysco Fo o d S

er vs . v. Martin , 983 F.2d 60, 62 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting ConnAire, Inc. v. Sec’ y, U.S. Dep’ t of Transp. , 887 F.2d 723, 725–26 (6th Cir. 1989)). This exception is limit ed to

a situation that meets two conditions: “(1) the challeng ed action is too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessa tion or expiration; and (2) there is a rea sonable expectation t h at the same complaining party would be subject to the same action ag ain.” Id . (citing W einstein v. Bradford , 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (par allel citations omitted); Ahmed v. Univ. of Toledo , 822 F.2d 26, 28 (6th Cir. 1987)). And the plaintiff bears the burden of proff ering fac ts to meet both conditions. Lawrence v. Blackwell , 430 F.3d 368, 3 7 1 (6 t h C i r. 2005) (citing Deja Vu of Nashville v. Metro. Gov’ t. of Nashville & Davidson Cnty. , 274 F.3d 377, 390–91 (6th Cir. 2001) (re st of string citation omitted)). This exception cannot apply in Martin’ s ca s e b ecause Martin has not satisfied the second condition: he has not produce d evidenc e showing a rea sonable expectation that he will be subjected to the 2007 Guidelines—or any Parole Boa rd g uidelines—in the futu re. The rec ord shows that Martin cannot have a rea sonable expectation that the Boa rd would s u b

j ec t him to the 2007 Guidelines or policies they contain. The Boa rd informed Martin and the district court that it will no longe r use such g uidelines; rathe r, it “will continue to g ive ever y inmate meaning ful considerationNo. 104152

Robert Allen, et al. v. Terry Colli ns, et al. Pag e 6 for parole , and exercise its discretionar y rele asing authority by utiliz ing the Ohi o s t at u t o ry and Administrative Code provisions, which have essentially rema ined uncha

ng ed since 1975.” For the first t i m e o n appea l, Martin arg ues t hat t he volunt ary -ce ssation doctrine applies to preve nt his claim from being moot. We will not consider Martin’s arg ument that the voluntary

cessa tion doctrine applies beca use he did not arg ue this point of law in the district court, and our fu n ct i o n as an appellate court is “‘to revie w the case prese nted to the district court, rathe r than a better case fashioned afte r a[n]

. . . unfavor able order .’” Armstrong v. City of Melv indale , 432 F.3d 695, 700 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Barner v. P i l kington N. Am., Inc., 399 F.3d 745, 749 (6th Cir. 2005)). Yet the prisoners did arg ue in the di strict court, a nd Martin now ar g ues on appe al, that the Parole Boa

rd’s re s ci s s ion of the 2007 Guidelines did not moot their claims beca use the 2007 Guidelines wil l have a continui ng probable eff ect: namely , that eac h succe ssi v e m aj o r revision t o the parole g uidelines makes it m o re difficult to g et parole , which incre ases the measure of punishment for their offe nses. The prisoners analog ize their case to Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board 528 U.S. 320 (2000). I n Reno , a school board arg ued that challeng es to its redistricting plan

wer e moot beca

use the school board itself had resc inded the plan and promised never to use it ag ain for any purpose. Id. at 327–28. The Court disag ree d that the challeng es we re m o o t beca use it deter mined that the plan would have a “proba ble continuing eff

ect” g iven that it would “ser ve as the baseline” ag ainst which the B oard’ s next voting plan w ould be eva luated. Id. Her e, the prisoners have offe red no evidenc e to show that the 2007 Guidelines would serve as t he baseline for future parole g uidelines. The Parole Boa rd has explained that it will no longe rNo. 104152

Robert Allen, et al. v. Terry Colli ns, et al. Pag e 7 consult the 2007 Gui d el i n es in any way and instead will rely upon the rele vant statutes and reg ulations to make parole deter minations. We ag ree with the district court that the prisoners have offe red no evi d en ce t h at the 2007 Guidelines will have a probable continuing eff ect upon the prisoners a

nd that their attempt to ana logize their situation to Reno fails. We now addre ss Martin’s arg ument that the district court err ed in g ran t i n g summary judgme nt on his claim that the Parole Boa rd’s implementation of the Victim’s R ights Statute violates the U.S

. Constit utio n’s Ex Post Fa cto C lause. We revie w de novo a dis trict court’s gr ant of summary judgme nt. EEOC v. Prevo’ s Family Mkt., Inc. , 135 F.3d 1089, 1093 ( 6th Cir. 1998). Summary judgme nt is proper if there is no g enuine issue as to any materia l fac t and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of la

w. Id

. (citing Fe d. R. Civ. P. 56( c))

. The party moving f or summary judgme nt must show an abse nce of evidenc e to support the nonmoving party ’s ca se. Id

. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986) (par allel citations omitted)). We must deter mine either whether the evidenc e—whe n viewed in the light most favor able to the nonmoving party —prese nts a sufficie nt disag ree ment to require submissi on t o the fac t-finder , or whether the evidenc e is so one-sided that the moving party must preva il as a matter of law. Id

. (citing Anderson

v. L i b er t y Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986))

. I f the plaintiffs intended for an action t o proce ed on a class basis, and if their class-cer tification motion was s t i l l p ending when the di strict court g rante d the state’s motion for summary judgme nt, then the named plaintiffs “must show that

a g enuine issue of materia l f act exis ts as to e ach named plaintif f .” Michae l v

. Ghee , 498 F.3d 372, 374 n.1 (6th Cir. 2007) (e mphasis added)

.No. 104152

Robert Allen, et al. v. Terry Colli ns, et al. Pag e 8 Her e, althoug h the plaintiffs intended their action to proce ed on a class b as is, the district court, as in Michae l , g rante d the Parole Boa rd’s motion for summary judgme nt befor e cer tify ing the class. Only

one name d plaintiff re mains: Martin. Thus, Martin must show that a g enuine issue of materia l fac t exis ts with reg ard to the claim that the Victim’s Rights Statute has violated his rig hts. But thi s Martin cannot do beca use the statute applies only to those convicted of murder or ag g rava ted murder, and he was convicted of voluntary manslaug hter and theft. The Victim’s Rights Sta t u t e, Ohio Revised Code section 2967.12(B ), require s the Parole Boa rd to notify a victim’s repr esenta tive of a prisoner’ s pending rele ase if the victim’s repr esenta tive has reque sted such notice pursuant to Ohio Revised Code section 2930.16. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2967.12(B ) (West 2012). Section 2967.12(B ) further provides that “if the prisoner being considere d for parole was convicted of or pleade d g uilty to v i o l at i n g section 2903.1 [agg rava ted murder] or 2903.02 [m urder ] of the Revised C ode,” then t h e v i ct i m ’s represe ntative or immediate family members may reque st a full board hear ing rela tin g t o t h e potential parole of the prisoner and will “have the rig ht to g ive testimony at a full board hear ing of the parole board

. . .” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2967.12(B ) (West 2012 ). I f t he victim ’s represe ntative or immediate family reque sts such a full board hearing , then the reque st must be g rante d. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5149.101(A)( 2) (West 2012). The Parole Boa rd must consider the testimony

. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2967.03. The prisoner being considere d for parole has no rig ht to be prese nt at the hear ing—but may be repr esente d by counsel or some other person the prisoner desig nates. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5149.101(C) (West 2012). As noted above, Martin was convicted of v oluntary manslaug hter and theft—not ag g rava ted murder or murder.No. 104152

Robert Allen, et al. v. Terry Colli ns, et al. Pag e 9 There fore , none of these provisions of the Victims’ Rights Statute could have violated his rig hts, and the district court c orre ctly g rante d summary

judgme nt to the Parole B oard on this claim. We now addre ss Martin’s claim that the cumulative eff ects of chang es in the Parole Boa rd’s policies and proce dures over time violated his rig hts under the Ex Post Fa cto Clause. The prisoners

asser ted, i n their amended complaint, that the cumulative eff ects of parole ch an ges o ver tim e had “incr ease d the leng th of incar cer ation befor e parole for m em b er s o f the class.” The district court held that this claim “fail[ed] as a ma tter of law [,] ” and it g rante d summary judgme nt to the Parole Boa rd as to this claim, based on our rea soning in Foster v. Book er , 595 F.3d 353 ( 6th Cir. 2010). We may aff

irm the district court’s judgme nt “if corr ect for any rea son, including a rea son not considere d” by the district court. Russ’ Kwik Car W ash, Inc. v. Marathon Petroleum Co. , 772 F.2d 214, 216 (6th Cir. 1985) (per curia m) (citing J.E. Riley Inv. Co. v. Comm’r , 311 U.S. 55, 59 (1940) (pa ra l lel citations omitted)). Stated differ ently , “[w]here the decision below is corr ect it must be aff irmed by the appellate court thoug h the lower tribunal g ave a wrong rea son for its a ction.” J.E. Riley Inv. Co. , 311 U.S. at 59 (citing Helve ring v. Gowran , 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937) (par allel citations omitt ed). The district court did not err in g ranting summary judgme nt to th e Pa role Boa rd on this claim. The Ex Post Fa cto Clause of the United States Constit ution prohibits laws that “‘r etroa ctively alter the definition of crimes or incre ase the punishment for criminal acts.’” Foster v. Booke r , 595 F.3d 353, 361–62 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Cal. Dep’ t of Corr. v. Morales , 514 U.S. 499, 504 (1995) (par allel citations omitted)). The rele vant i n q u i ry , for purposes of deter mining whether a retroa ctively applied law violates the Ex Post Fa cto Clause, is whether the new parole g uideline orNo. 104152

Robert Allen, et al. v. Terry Colli ns, et al. Pag e 10 policy “pre sent[s] a signific ant ri s k o f incre asing the plaintiff’s amount of time actua lly serve d.” Michae l v. Ghee , 498 F.3d 372, 3 8 3 (6 t h C i r. 2007) (citing Garner v. Jones , 529 U.S. 244, 255 (2000))

. A prisoner seeking to prove that a law’s or a policy ’s re t ro ac t i ve application cre ates a sufficie nt risk of incre asing the measure of punishment applied to him or her may satisfy his or her burden in one of two wa

y s. First, “plaintiffs can establish an ex post fac to violation if they can show that the g uidelines [or laws], on their fac e, show a signific ant risk of incre ased incar cer ation.” Michae l , 498 F.3d at 384 (citing Garner , 529 U.S. at 255). But Martin has not identified any chang es in specific parole policies over ti m e that have aff ecte d him. Second, wher e t h e policy does not, by its own terms, show a signific ant risk of incre ased incar cer ation, a plaintif

f m u s t d emonstrate, by evidenc e draw n from the policy ’s prac tical implementation by the ag ency char g ed with exercising discretion, that its a pplication will r esult in

a longe r period o f incar cer ation than under an ear lier policy

. Michae l , 498 F.3d at 384 (citing Garner , 529 U.S. at 255; Dye r v. Bowlen , 465 F.3d 288, 291 (6th Cir. 2006) (explanatory pare nthetical omi tted)). Pl aintiffs in our cir cuit “nee d not show an actual incre ase in punishment, but rather a ‘suf ficient risk’ of

incre ased punishment.” Id . (citing Dye r , 465 F.3d a t 280). Her e, aga in, Martin cannot make out an Ex Post Fa cto claim because he has not identified the purporte d chang es in parole policies that have cre ated these supposed cumulative e ffe cts. L astly , we revie w Martin’s arg ument that the district court improperly denied the prisoners’ motion for d i s co very under Rule 56(f) (now Rule 56(d)) , which provides that, afte r a motion forNo. 104152

Robert Allen, et al. v. Terry Colli ns, et al. Pag e 11 summary judgme nt has been made, the nonmovant may reque st ad d i t ional discovery befor e the district court g rants the summary judgme nt motion if the nonmovant shows by aff idavit t h at , for specifie d rea sons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition. Fe d. R. Civ. P. 56(d). The district court may then: (1) deny t h e s u m m ar y judgme nt motion; (2) order a continuance to enable aff idavits to be obtained, depositions to be taken, or other discovery to be underta ken; or (3) issue any other just order

. Id. Her e, the prisoners’ Rule 56(f) motion soug ht: (1) documents showing how the Parole Boa rd exercises its discretion in making parole decisions, including deposition transcr ipts, memoranda , emails and corr espondenc e betwee n Parol e Boa rd members; (2) all documents contained in the parole files of the seven repr esentative plaintiffs in the amende d complaint; (3) statistical data on inmates g rante d parole betwee n 1987 and 2009, including the date of offe nse of conviction, the sentenc e imposed by the co u rt, and the date of parole ; and (4) depositions of “key ” Parole Boa rd members and staff. The prisoners’ counsel aver red in her aff

idavit i n s u pport of the Rule 56(f) motion that the Parole Boa rd allowed the prisoners’ counsel to have an informal interview with the Parole Boa

rd Chairper son, Cy

nthia Mausser. The P ar o l e Board would not allow the prisoners’ counsel to examine most of the documents conta ined in the prisoner s’ par ole files. We revie w the district court’s denial of a 56(f) motion for an abuse of discretion. CenTra, Inc. v. Estrin , 538 F.3d 402, 420 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Vance ex rel. Hammons v. United States , 90 F.3d 1145, 1 1 4 9 (6 th Cir. 1996) (explanatory pare nthetical omitted)). I n considering whether a district court has abused its discretion in deny ing a 56(f) motion we apply five fac tors: (1) when the proponents of the 56(f) motion lear ned of the issue that is the subject of the discovery they seek; (2)No. 104152

Robert Allen, et al. v. Terry Colli ns, et al. Pag e 12 whether the desired discovery would have chang ed the dist ri ct co u rt’s ruling ; (3) how long the discovery period lasted; (4) whether the proponents of the 56(f) motion wer e dilatory in their discovery eff

orts; and (5) whether the other party was responsive to disc overy reque sts. Id. (citing Plott v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 71 F.3d 1190, 1196–97 (6th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted), cert. denied , 517 U.S. 1157 (1996) (par allel citations omitted)). Ty pically , wher e a party has had no opportunity for discovery , a district court’s denial of the opposing party ’s Rule 56(f) motion and ru l i n g on a summary judgme nt motion is likely to be an abuse of discretion. CenTra , 538 F.3d at 420 (citing Ball v. Union Carbide Corp. , 385 F.3d 713, 719 (6th Cir. 2004) (expla n a to r y p a r enthetica l omitted)). Her e, the prisoners had insufficient time for discovery befor e the summary judgme nt motion

was g rante d. The rec ord shows that the Parole Boa rd was unresponsive to the prisoners’ discovery

re q u es t s . On October 14, 2009, the parties participa ted in a Fe d. R. Civ. P. 26(f) confe ren ce , at which they stipulated to d i scover y . The Parole Boa

rd proposed paper discovery , elec tronic discovery , and depositions. The P arole Boa rd also stated i n the j oint stipulation that the ex tent of the discovery for the named pla intiffs might be substantial due to the require ments to prove an E x Post Fa cto violation. The parties ag ree d that the discovery cut-off date would be Fe bruar y 1, 2010. I n their repor

t to the district court, the parties ag ree d to serve their I nitial Disclosures by November 6, 2009, a deadline that the prisoners met. The Parole Boa rd did not meet this deadline, moving the district court on November 6, 2009 for an extension of t ime until November 13, 2009 to file t heir I nitial Disclosures. The Parole Boa rd failed to meet this deadline, and the prisoners, on J anuar y 22, 2010, asked the district court to s et a st atus confe renc e pursuant to L ocal Rul e 37.1 to resolve the ong oing discovery dispute. The Parole Boa rd moved for summary judgme nt on Fe bruar y 1, 2010,No. 104152

Robert Allen, et al. v. Terry Colli ns, et al. Pag e 13 without responding to the prisoners’ di s co v er y re quests. On Fe bruar y 3, 2010, the Parole Boa rd

serve d Chairper son Mausser’ s response s to the Requests for Production and the I nterrogat ories. Then, on March 4 , 2 0 10, the prisoners filed their Rule 56(f) motion. Neve rtheless, on Aug ust 4, 2010, the district court g rante d the Parole B oard’ s motion for summary judgme nt. The Parole Boa

rd’s indolent and cava lier approa ch to dealing with its prisoners in a court of law is deeply unsettling. Were this Court direc tly hear ing this case , we would be hard p ressed to g rant summary judgme nt to the Parole Boa rd without g iving the prisoners the benef it of discovery the way the district court did her e. But that is not the task we are g iven on appellate revie w. We “have aff irmed denial of Rule 56(f) motions when the parties wer e g iven insufficient time for discovery if ‘fur ther discovery would not have chang ed the leg al and fac tual defic iencies.’ ” CenTra, Inc. , 538 F.3d at 420 (quoting Maki v. Laakko , 88 F.3d 361, 367 ( 6th Cir. 1996), cert. de nied , 519 U.S. 1114 (1997) (pa rallel c itations omitted)). We must do so here , beca use discovery would not have changed t h e leg al and fac tual defic iencies we have alre ady descr ibed in Martin’s claims. Thus, we are bound to conclude that the dist r ic t c o u r t d id not abuse its discretion in g ranting summary judgme nt without permitting discovery

or ruling on the prisoners’ Rule 56(f) motion. For this, and the other rea sons we have discussed, we AF F IRM the district court’s judg ment.