UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 

 

TAB 1a 

September 24, 2013 

THE DEPARTMENT OF NAVY MASTER NARRATIVE REGARDING 

THE MAY 2013 FURLOUGH OF CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES

This master narrative represents the position of the Department of the Navy regarding the 

overarching issues raised by appellants in challenges to the furlough directed by the Secretary of 

Defense on May 14, 2013. It is applicable to all furlough appeals filed by Department of the 

Navy civilian employees. This master narrative will not be filed separately for each consolidated 

appeal. Supplemental information, as reflected in supplemental statements of fact, supplemental 

narratives, and supplemental documents, will be filed for each consolidated Acknowledgment 

Order issued by the Merit Systems Protection Board in order to address matters raised in the 

individual employee appeals that were consolidated. The supplemental information will be filed 

with the MSPB in accordance with the Acknowledgment Order issued by the assigned 

Administrative Judge. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

In May 2013, the Department of Defense (DoD or the Department) faced a daunting 

challenge: accommodate a dramatic reduction in available resources with less than six months 

remaining in the fiscal year. In response, on May 14, 2013, the Secretary of Defense (the 

Secretary) directed DoD managers to prepare to furlough most of the Department’s civilian 

employees for up to 11 discontinuous workdays prior to the end of the fiscal year. The furlough 

encompassed virtually all DoD member agencies as well as all DoD military departments 

including the Department of the Navy (which includes the United States Marine Corps) (DON), 

the Department of the Army (DA), and the Department of the Air Force (DAF), and impacted 

more than 650,000 out of approximately 800,000 total civilian employees, including almost 

160,000 out of approximately 250,000 DON civilian employees. In response to the Secretary’s 

directive, the DON began to furlough civilian employees on July 8, 2013. Subsequently, after 

changes in the fiscal picture due to Congressional actions and internal budget management 

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that furloughs could be limited to a maximum of 11 days (88 hours). DoD estimated that 

furloughs of 11 days would save the Department about $2 billion, avoiding substantial further 

cuts in training and maintenance. See Tab 1, Hale Decl at ¶ 17. 

The Impact of DoD Reprogramming Efforts

15. Thereafter, the Department undertook extensive efforts to identify budget changes that 

would close the remaining gap and, if possible, reduce cutbacks in training and impose fewer 

furlough days. In mid-May, the Department prepared and submitted two Omnibus 

reprogramming requests that sought permission from the congressional defense committees to 

move funds totaling $9.6 billion from lower priority budget lines to higher priority budget lines. 

When the congressional committees did not approve all of the Omnibus reprogramming requests, 

the Department submitted two additional reprogramming actions on July 22, 2013, that included 

about $1 billion of replacement sources for those sources that one or more of the committees had 

denied or deferred. These reprogramming actions moved furlough savings and funds for lowerpriority activities to areas of highest budgetary need. The law limits the amount of funds that can 

be transferred annually under reprogramming, and these two reprogramming actions used almost 

all of DoD’s transfer authority for FY 2013. Second, pursuant to existing authorities, the 

Department transferred responsibilities for some specific programs and missions from one DoD 

component to another and used other available means to reallocate the financial burden for 

supporting the warfighter. For example, on July 15, 2013, pursuant to section 165(c) of title 10 

of the United States Code, the Deputy Secretary of Defense assigned to the Secretary of the 

Navy the responsibility for providing up to $450 million for support to U.S. Forces in 

Afghanistan that previously had been the responsibility of the Army under the Logistics Civil 

Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). DON ultimately provided $310 million for the support to 

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27 

cross-leveling of funds between departments that were more fiscally robust (such as the DON), 

in order to assist those services (particularly the Army), which was approximately 80% short of 

its O&M for the last seven months of FY13.7

 Absent such cross-funding, it was perceived that 

certain services would exceed the statutory maximum of 22 furlough days, which would have 

resulted in a permanent RIF for at least some civilians – an option that was more severe and less 

viable at the fiscal year’s midpoint. See Tab 1, Hale Decl at ¶¶ 13-14. 

b. Application of the Furlough to Civilian Employees of WCFs 

Similarly, challenges to the structural determination to include civilian employees at 

entities funded through Defense WCFs, which are indirectly linked to appropriations impacted 

by sequestration, also must fail. The Board has explicitly recognized that, “even if the 

sequestration does not affect the funds used to pay for work that is to be performed,” an agency 

can still institute a furlough action against such employees based on the agency’s budgetary 

deficit, and the only relevant inquiry is whether such inclusion was applied in an even-handed 

manner to similarly situated groups of employees. See FDA v. Davidson, 46 M.S.P.R. at 226 

(citing Waksman v. Dep’t of Commerce, 37 M.S.P.R. 640 (1988) (agency could terminate 

employees in a RIF due to a funding shortage even though that shortage resulted from a decrease 

in funds other than those used to pay for work being performed by those employees.)) Here, the 

Secretary's decision to include all WCF employees (who, with respect to the DON, comprise 

 

7

 This greater flexibility, in fact, came into play on July 15, 2013, when the Deputy Secretary of Defense assigned to 

the Secretary of the Navy the responsibility for providing up to $450 million for support to U.S. Forces in 

Afghanistan that previously had been the responsibility of the Army under LOGCAP. DON ultimately provided 

$310 million for the support to U.S. Forces in Afghanistan using the Army’s LOGCAP contract. See Hale Decl at ¶ 

20. 

 

Department of the Navy Master Narrative Response, September 24, 2013, Agency File Tab 1a