### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs D ec em be r 13, 200 5
IN R E A DOP TION OF J.A .K. & K .R .K. Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for Lincoln County No. A-186 Jam es B. Cox, Chancellor

No. M2005- 02206-COA-R 3-P T - F iled Janu ary 26, 2006

This is the se cond appe al in this procee ding to terminate a biolog ical mother’ s pare ntal rig hts. On the first appe al, this court af firmed the trial court’s c onclusion that the m o t her ha d abandone d the ch il d r e n b u t r e man d e d th e c a s e to th e tria l c o u r t to ma k e s p e c if ic f in d in g s r e g ar d in g w h e th e r the termination of the mother ’s par ental rig hts was in the childre n’s best intere sts. T h e t ri al court dete rm i n ed t h at t erminating the mother’s rights would be in her c hildren’s be st interests, and the mother appealed. We ha ve dete rmined that the re cord c ontains clea r and c onvincing evidenc e supporting the trial court’ s conclusion.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Aff irm ed
P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., M.S., joi ned. W I L L I AM B. C A IN , J ., filed a c oncurring opinion. Susan E. McCown, Fay etteville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, J .E.K. N. Andy Myrick, Jr., Fay etteville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellees, C.J.K and J .E.K.
OP IN ION
Thi s is th e s e c o n d ap p e a l in th is te r mi n a ti o n o f p ar e n ta l r ig h ts c a s e
. T h is c o u r t’ s ear lier opinion sets out in t horoug h detail the fa cts and history of the children and their par ents. Se e In re Adoption of Kl eshinski , No. M2004-00986-COA- R3-CV, 2005 WL 1046796 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 4, 2005). Essentially , J .E.K. (“F ather ”) and J .E.K. (“Mother ”) had two sons during their marriag e. They wer e divorc ed in 1996, and c u s t o d y o f the older son, then f ive and a half y ear s old, was awa rded to F ather , while custody of t he y oung er son, then onl y one and a half y ear s old, was awa rded to Mother. L ess t h an a y ear later, Mother

signe d a conse nt order g iving F ather custody of the y oung er son and g iving Mother rea sonable visitation with both c hildren “to be established by Father in h is d isc re tio n. ” Mo the r w a s n ot o rd e re d to pay c hil d s up po rt

.-2-

A mon t h b ef

o re Mother sig ned the c onsent order , Father re marrie d. He a nd his new wife (“ Ste pmo the r” ) c on tin ue d to re sid e in Linc oln Cou nty , T e nn e sse e , a ndthe tw o boy s live d w ith the m. Mo the r m ov e d to Al aba ma a t so me po int , b ut con ti nu ed reg ula r v isi ta tio n w ith the bo y s u nti l a dispute arose over visitation on New Year ’s Eve in 1998. She has not had visitation with them since that time. Mother re marrie d, and she and her ne w husband c ontinued to live in Alabama.
Father a nd Stepmother filed a pe tition t o term i n ate Mother’s par ental rig hts and to allow Stepmother to adopt the two chil dren in F ebrua ry of 2003. Afte r the trial c ourt terminated he r pare ntal rig hts, Mother appe aled. In its opini on dated Ma y 4, 2005, this court affi rm ed the tria l court’s f inding that g rounds exist ed for termination. Specifica lly , afte r exhaustively revie wing the te sti mon y a ndthe tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s, thi s c ou rt he ld that th e c omb ine d w e ig ht o f the fa c ts constituted clea

r and c onvincing evidenc e that Mother ha d willfullyfail ed to vi sit the children. Consequentl y , the g round of a bandonment as de fined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102( 1)(A) was found to have been pr oved by the re quisite heig htened standa rd of pr oof.
As to the second r equire ment for termination of pare ntal rig hts, howeve r, t his court he ld that the trial court had failed to make an expli cit finding that termination of Mot her’ s pare ntal rig hts was i n t h e ch i l d ren’ s best interests. See Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 1- 11 3( c ). F urthe r, the tr ia l c ou rt a lso failed to make specific finding s of fa ct as to best in t er est s. Acc ording ly , this court vacated the judgme nt terminating Mother’s parenta l rig hts and remanded the case for written findings of fac t and conclusions of law on the best interest issue a s require d by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(k) . The trial
c o u r tw a s g i v e n d i s c r e t i o n t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r f u r t h e r p r o o f o n t h e r e m a n d e d i s s u e w a s n e c e s s ar y.
I. P ROCE E DI NGS ON R E M AND
On re mand, the trial c o u rt d i d n ot take additional proof , but instead ana ly zed the proof alre ady prese nted. The tria l court ente re d a memorandum opinion finding that termination of Mo the r’ s p are nta l r ig hts wa s in the c hil dr e n’ s b e st i nte re sts . In pe rt ine nt p art , th a t op ini on pr ov ide s:

Fr om the fore g oing f

acts the Court c oncludes that, by clear and c onvincing pro o f, it is i n the childre n’s best intere sts that the pare ntal rig hts of the mother be te rm inate d. Th e Cou rt

ha s c on sid e re d all the s ta tut ory fa c tor s in re a c hin g its conclusion. Specifica lly , the Court is clear ly convince d by

the proof that the mother, having not seen t h e childre n in over four (4) y ear s, has made no me aning ful
a dju stm e nt o f c ir c ums ta nc e that wo uldre nd e r i t in the c hil dr e n’ s b e st i nte re st t o resume a relationship wit h her or

to be in her home

. Cle arl y , th e mothe r ha s fa ile d in a ll r e sp e c ts t o e ff e c t a la sti ng a dju stm e nt t o her situatio n an d t h e rec ord is void of any attempts on her pa

rt to involve social
se rv ic e s in the e qu a tio n. A l a sti ng a djust men t in to he r h ome do e s n ot r e a so na bly ap p ea r p o s s ible afte r such a lapse of time a nd afte r uncontrove rted proof that the y oung est child does not eve n know the mother. There has bee n no contac t betwee n-3-

the mother a nd these children i n over four (4) y ear s and no mea ningf ul relationships exis t, nor should exi st, after the passag e of so much time.
The mother ha s clea

rly not paid support and wa s under no oblig ation to do so, but she also has made no monetary contribution to the l ives and the be st interests of these c hildren.
A final orde r wa s subsequently enter ed, incor

porating the memora ndum opinio n , termi n ating Mother’s pa

renta l rig hts. The final orde r spec ifically states that the court considere d eac h statutory fac tor in conducting the best intere st analy sis. Mother appea led.
II. A PP LI C A BLE S T ANDARD S The only issu e b ef ore this court is whether ther e wa s clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that termination of Mother’ s rig hts was in the best intere sts of the children. T he existence of a statutory gro u n d , ab an d o n m en t , wa s p re v i o u s l y fo u n d b y t h e t ri al co u rt , an d t h i s co u rt af fi rm ed t h at fi n d i n g. H o w e v e r , th e p ar ty s e e k in g te r mi n a ti o n o f a p ar e n t’ s r ig h ts mu s t p r o v e b y c le ar and convinc ing evidenc e both a statutory g round and that termination is in the child’s best interest. Te nn. Code Ann. § 3 6- 1- 11 3( c )( 1) ; In re Vale ntine , 79 S.W .3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002)

. The requireme nt of grounds primarily involves the rights of t he parent and the question of wh e the r that pa

re nt h a s ac te d in suc h a wa y a s to for fe it tho se ri g hts . In c on tr a st, the qu e sti on of be st interest primarily

involves the rig hts of the child. T h e question of the pa rent’s rights is re levant du ri ng thi s p ha se of

the c ou rt ’s in qu ir y on ly

to the e xten t th a t it

imp a c ts the c hil d’ s b e st i nte re st. Whe n th e int e re sts of

the c hil d a ndthe pa

re nts div e rg e , th e be st i nte re sts of the c hil d mu st p re va il. In re H. A. L. , No. M20 0 5 -0 0 0 4 5 -C OA-R3-PT, 2005 W L 954866, at *9 (Te nn. Ct. App. April 25, 2005)(No T enn. R. App. P. 11 applicatio nf ile d); I n r e M

. E

. W. a n d J

. W. W. , No. M2003-01739-COAR3-PT, 2004 W L

865840, at *9 (Te nn. Ct. App. April 21, 2004).
The be st interests of the c hild do not become the paramount consideration until the trial court ha s determined that the pare nt is unfit based on clea r and c onvincing evidenc e of one or more of the g rounds for te rmination listed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( g ). Once a parent has been found to be unfit, t he intere sts of the pare nt and child diverg e. While the pare nt’s interests do n o t ev aporate upon a f inding of unfitness, the foc us of the proc eeding s shifts to the best interests of the c hild.
In Re Au drey S. & Vi c tor ia L

. , No. M2004-02758-COA- R3-PT, 2005 W L 2051286 at *26 (Te nn. Ct. App. Aug . 25, 2005). The le g islature has c lear ly stated the rule in this reg ard:
I n a ll ca se s, wh e n the be st inte re sts of the c hil d an d thos e of the a du lts are in c on fl ic t, such conf lict shall alway s be re solved to favor the rig hts and the best intere sts of the child, which intere sts are he reby rec og nized as constit utionally protec ted and, to that end, this part shall be liber ally construed.-4-

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-101(d)

. The leg islature has give n the courts guida nce a s to the fac tors they should consider whe n de te rm ini ng a

c hil d’ s b e st i nte re st. Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d § 36 -1 -1 13 (i ) r e a ds :
I n determining whe ther termination of pare ntal or g uardia nship right s is in the be st i nte re st o f the c hil d p ur su a nt t o thi s pa rt , the c ou rt

sh a ll c on sid e r, bu t is
n o tl i m i t ed t o , th e f

o l l o wi n g: (1) Whether

the pa re nt or g uardia n has made such an a djustment of
c ir c ums ta nc e , c on du c t, o r c on dit ion s a s to make it sa fe a nd in the c hil d' s b e st interest to be in the home of the par ent or g uardia n; (2) Whether

the par ent or g uardia n has fa iled to effe ct a lasting adjustment after

rea sonable e fforts by

available social service s ag encie s for such duration of time that lasting adjustment does not rea sonably appea r possible; (3) Whether

the par ent or g uardia n has maintained r eg ular visitation or other c ontact with the child; (4) Whether

a mea ningf

ul relation s h ip has otherwise been e stablished betwee n the par ent or g uardia n and the c hild; (5 ) T he e ff

e c t a c ha ng e of

c are tak ers a ndph y sic a l e nv ir on me nt i s likely to have on the child' s emotional, psy cholog ical and me dical condition; (6) Whether

the par ent or g uardia n, or other pe rson re siding with the p ar en t or g uardia n, has shown bruta lity , phy sical, sexual, emotional or ps y c ho log ic a l abu se , or ne g le c t tow ardthe c hil d, or a no the r c hil d o r a du lt i n the fa milyor household; (7 ) W h et h er t h e ph y s i ca l en v i ro n m en t o f t h e pa re n t 's o rg u a r d i an 's home is healthy

an d s afe, whethe r there is criminal activity in the home, or whether there is suc h use of a lcohol or controlled substanc es as may rende r the par ent or g uardia n consistently unable to ca

re f or the c hild in a safe and stable manne r; (8) Whether

the par ent' s or g uardia n' s mental and/or e motional status would b e detrimental to the child or pre vent the par ent or g uardia n from eff ectively providing safe and stable c are and super vision for the child; or-5- (9) Whether the parent or g uardia n has paid c hild support consistent wi th the c hil d su pp ort g uid e lin e s pr omu lg a te d by the de pa rt me nt p ur su a nt t o § 36-5-101.
Th e tr ia l c ou rt

he re in t wi c e state d it

ha d c on sid e re d th e se statut ory fa c tor s. Many of these f

actor s ar e cl ea rl y

meant to be a

pplied in situations where a child has bee n remove d from a pa

rent’s home (usually

initiated by

the Depa rtment of Childr en ’s S er v ices) and reunific ation of the familyhas not bee n possible. Be cause long term foster care is disfavored unde r the public policy

established by

the leg islature and is seldom in a child’s best interest, many of the statutory best interest fa ctors re late to the likelihood that the child will be able to leave foster c are and re turn to the pare nt’s home in the near future. I f that likelihood is remote, the be st interest of the child of

t en lies in termination of pa renta l rig hts so that the child can attain the security and stabilityof a pe rmane nt home throug h adoption. Adoption cannot occ ur until the pare nt’s rig hts are terminated.
The c ase be fore us does not fit that fac tual scena rio. The c hildren ar e not in foster c are . They have be en living f

or the pa st nine y ear s with F ather and Stepmother a nd appea r to have been pa

rt of
a sta ble famil y un it. Th e qu e sti on of wh e the r the c hil dr e n co uld sa fe ly re sid e wi th Mothe r is o f l itt le rele vance since F ather

has had c ustody

under c o u rt order s since shortly afte r the divorc e and any c ha ng e of c us tod y c ou ld on ly oc c ur if tho se or de rs we re mod if

ie d u nd e r a

pp lic able le g a l st a nd ard s.
Ha vin g ma de thi s d ist inc tio n, we wi ll ap ply the mos t re le va nt fa c tor s and /or a tte mpt

to a pp ly fa c tor s in a

way that is re a so na

ble in the fa c tual situatio n b e fo re us . In r e vie wi ng the jud g me nt, h e r e i n , t h i s c o u r tm u s tap p l y t h e ap p r o p r i a t e s t a n d ar d s , w h i c h h a v e b e e n e x p l a i n e d t h u s l y:
Evidence satisfy ing the clea r and convincing evidenc e standard e stablishes that the truth of the fa cts asserted i s highly probable , and elimi nates a ny serious or substantial doubt about the cor

rec tness of t he conclusions draw n from the evidenc e. It produce s in a fa c t- fi nd e r’ s mi nda

fi rm be lie f o r c on vic tio n r e g ard ing the truthof the fa c ts soug ht to be established.
* * *
The heig htened burden of proof require d by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( c)( 1) require s us to adapt Tenn. R. App. P

. 13(d)’ s customary standard of revie w for c ases of thi s so rt

. F ir st, we mus t re vie w the tr ia l c ou rt ’s sp e c if ic fi nd ing s o f f

a c t de novo in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h T e n n
. R

. A p p
. P

. 1 3 ( d )

. T h u s , e a c h o f t h e tr i a l c o u r t ’ s s p e c if

ic fac t ual finding s will be presumed to be corr ect unless the e vidence preponde rate s otherwise. Sec ond, we must determine whether the fa cts, either a s found by the trial
c ou rt or a s su pp orte d b y

the pr e po nd e ranc e of

the e vid e nc e , c le arl y

a ndc on vin c ing ly
e sta bli sh the e le me nts re qu ir e d to te rm inate a bio log ic a l pa

re nt’ s p are nta l r ig hts

.-6-

In re M .O. , 1 73 S.W. 3d13 , 1 8- 19 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 5) ; see also In re Valentine , 79 S.W .3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002)

. III
. A N A L Y SIS
I n a dd iti on to the mor e general fi nd ing s o r c on c lus ion s se t ou t e arl ie r, the tr ia l c ou rt a lso
ma de the fo llo wi ng fi nd ing s o f f a c t: (1) Def

endant did not see the children for four and one ha lf (41/2) y ear s prec eding the filing of the pe tition; (2) There has bee n absolutely no contac t for two (2) y ear s, even by telephone; (3) Def

endant kne w or should have known t he custody order she sig ned wa s not t e m p o r ar y; (4) Def

endant kne w of the r esidenc e of the Petitioner’s for the entire time she ha s no t vi sit e d a ndha s h a d a

bs olu te ly no c on ta c t; (5) Def

endant admits no payment of support or m edica l bills of any kind during this period; (6) The C o u rt fi n ds that no overt thre ats wer e made to the Def endant a nd her
ex cu s es as t o why

she did nothing to g ain time with her c hildren ar e not cre dible; (7) Residential sharing occur red w ithout threat or viol ence ag ainst the Def endant until the “New Y ear ’s eve blow up” ende d al l residential sha ring by the De fe nd a nt; (8) The De fendant knew whe re the Plaintiff’s lived and made no overt attempt to enforc e visitation in person; (9) Acc ording to the fathe r, the y oung est chil d d o es not even know the De fe nd a nt.
On app e a l, M oth e r a

rg ue s th a t he r f

a ilu re to vis it or c on ta c t the c hil dr e n wa s n ot w ill fu l bu t, ins te a d, c aus e d b y

he r f e ar o f p hy sic a l ha

rm . T he tr ia l c ou rt

ma de a c on trary fi nd ing in i ts b e st interest ana ly sis. Further, the question of whether her failure to visit was will ful was decided in the
earlier stag e of this proc eeding in the context of gr ounds when the tria l court held, a nd this co u rt aff irmed the holding , that Mother’s f ailure to visit for y ear s had been willful. We cannot re visit t hat determination.In its o p i ni o n, t he m ajo ri t y of t he p anel heari ng t he earl i er app eal s t at ed t here was “ l i t t l e evi d ence” in t he 1

r ecor d t hat t er mi nat i on was i n t he bes t i nt er es t of t he t wo bo y s
. 20 05 W L 10 46 79 6, at * 28

. T he concu r r enc e di s agr eed wi t h any co m m ent on t he evi d ence o r l ack t hereo f i n vi ew o f

t he rema nd fo r f

i nd i ngs. I n any event , we m ust revi ew t he t ri al co urt ’ s f

i nd i ngs no w t hat t he y h a v e b e e n m a d e and do not co nsi d er t he d i ct a i n t he earl i er op i ni o n t o have any bear i ng on t hat r evi ew.

T hey are now f

i f t een and el even. 2
-7- Mo the r w ou ld l ike the op po rtun ity to r e -e sta

bli sh a rel ations hip wi th h e r c hil dr e n a ndto resume visitation, pref

era bly under specific court order s. Whil e we do not doubt the since rity and depth of Mother ’s wishes, that cannot be a de termining fac tor in the best interest a naly sis. I nstead, we must look at the childre n’s intere sts in view of their cur rent situation.
Mo the r’ s p ri mary argum ent is that th e e vid e nc e that te rm inatio n is in the c hil dr e n’ s b e st interests does not rise to the c lear and convinc ing le vel. Sin ce n o n ew e vidence was take n afte r re ma nd , M oth e r r e lie s o n s ta te me nts ma de by the tr ia l c ou rt a ndthi s c ou rt

in the e arl ie r p ro c e e din g s. 1 The state m en t s of the trial c ourt that are quoted in Mother’s brief we re ma de at the c lose of the hearing a s part of the court’s or al ruling . Both the lang uag e of the s tatements and their conte x t show they ref er to the s epar ate question of whether to g rant Stepmother’ s petition to adopt the boy s. The court de cided it would not immediately rule on that petition and would not waive usua l prere quisites such as a home s tudy . The c ourt was c oncerned about F ather ’s admitted prior a cts of phy sical violence a g ainst Mother during their mar ri age and S tepmother’s making e x tremely derog atory rema rks about Mother.
Ba sed on our r eview of the rec ord, we find that eac h of the spec ific fa ctual finding s made by the tr ia l c ou rt

is f ull y su pp orte d b y the e vid e nc e
. Th e se c hil dr e n h a d n ot s e e n th e ir mothe r s inc e la te 1 9 9 8 , a p e r i o d o f m o r e t h a n f

o u r ye ar s a tt h e t i m e o f

t h e h e a r i n g a n d s e v e n ye ar s n o w
. T h e b o ys we re a g e s tw e lve a nde ig ht at the tim e of the he ari ng
. At

that ti me , th e re ha d b e e n n o c on ta c t a t a ll, 2
e ve n b y te le ph on e , f

or tw o y e ars
. The trial c ourt found that no meaning ful relationship ex isted betwee n the boy s and Mother. We ag ree it would be unlikely one could exis t in these circumstance s. As the trial court noted, there wa s te sti mon y

the y ou ng e r c hil d d id n ot e ve n kno w M oth e r. Ag a in, thi s is a no t un e xpe c te d r e su lt of los s o f c on ta c t.
Th e qu e sti on be fo re us is n ot w he the r M oth e r s ho uldbe g ive n a no the r c ha nc e to e st ablish and maintain a r elationship with her sons. I nstead, it is what eff ect termination of Mother’ s pare ntal rig hts w ould ha ve on the boy s. Be cause of the nature of the question, there is simply littl e evide nce a s to ho w the bo y s w ou ld b e ne fi t f ro m ha vi ng Mo ther

re su me c on ta c t w ith the m. It is g e ne ra lly
a ssu me d, a ndis in fa c t the pu bli c po lic y of the state in the c on te xt of c us tod y arr a ng e me nts , th a t a meaning ful relationship wit h both pare nts is im portant and be nefic ial to a child. Such an a ssumption must disappear, how ever , when a pare n t h as ab an d o n ed her children. In any event, it was not Mo the r’ s b ur de n to pr ov e that a llo wi ng he r t o v isi t or c on ta c t th e c hil dr e n w a s inthe ir be st i nte re sts

.I n i t s ea r l i er opi ni on, t hi s cour t hel d t hat Fat her di d n ot hav e s t andi ng t o s eek t er mi nat i on of M ot her ’ s par ent al 3 ri ght s si nce t he st at ut e set t i ng fort h e l i gi b l e p art i es di d not i ncl ud e p arent s, rel y i ng on O sb o rn v. M a rr , 127 S. W

. 3d 737, 7 4 0 (T e n n . 2 0 0 4 ). A c c o rd ing ly, the c o u rt d ism isse d the p e tit io n a s to F a the r. T h e a p p e a l p ro c e e d e d o n S te p m o the r’s p et i t i o n. Stepm o t her explai ned , “[ i ]t wo ul d b e l i ke t aki ng t hem t o W al m art and p i cki ng out a rando m wo m an and s ayi ng

4 this is yo u r m o the r.”

Stepm o t her t est i f

i ed ab o ut t i m es i n t he p ast when M o t her d i d no t vi si t af t er arr angem ent s had be en m ad e and 5 h o w sh e w o u ld ha v e to c o m fo rt the b o ys o n tho se o c c a sio n s b e c a u se the y w e re up se t. -8- To the contra

ry , the burde n was on S tepmother to prove, by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e, 3 that terminati o n o f Mother’ s pare ntal rig hts was in the best intere sts of the children. B esides the
e vid e nc e re g ard ing the la c k of c on ta c t a nd la c k of a me a nin g fu l r e la tio ns hip wi th M oth e r, the on ly
e vid e nc e re g ard ing the e ff e c t of re -i ntr od uc ing Mo the r i nto the bo y s’ liv e s w a s te sti mon y fr om b oth F a the r andSte pmo the r that it wo uld be de tr ime nta l to the bo y s to allo w Mothe r to co me ba c k in to their lives af

ter such a long a bsence

. T here was no e x pert testimony about the psy cholog ical or 4 emotional impact such a chang e would have. Whil e such evidenc e would have been he lpful, we do not implythat parties se eking termination of a pa rent’s rights must alway s prese nt such evidenc e. Th e re is n oth ing in this re c or d to in di c a te the se c hil dr e n h a ve ne e de d a ny kin d o f m e nta l he a lth
a ssi stanc e that w ou ld h a ve pr od uc e d a n e xpe rt wi th a c tua l kn ow le dg e of the bo y s. I t is no t di ff ic ult to p e rc e ive that r e -i ntr od uc tio n o f Mothe r int o the bo y s’ oth e rw ise se ttl e d li ve s w ou ld c a us e so me disruption. W hether

or not she could e stablish a relationship with them that would add to their lives is questionable in view of the ir ag es and the time that ha s passed. I f she we re not succ essful or, more
s i gn i fica ntly , wer e she to fail to follow through with visits after initially visiti ng reg ularly , the
co n s eq u en ce s t o t h e b o y s wo u l d b e h ar m fu l , p er h ap s d ev as t at i n g. 5

Ba sed on all the above and our t horoug h revie w of the record, we find there was c lear and convincing evidenc e that termination of Mother’ s pare ntal rig hts is in t he best intere sts of these two
c hil dr e n. We do not do so lig htl y , but with a cle ar und e rs ta nd ing of the g ra vit y of the c on se qu e nc e s.
Th e jud g me nt of the tr ia l c ou rt te rm inatin g Mo the r’ s p are nta l r ig hts is a ff ir me d. Th e c os ts on appea l are taxed to the appellant, Mother, J.E.K.

____________________________________ PATRI CI A J . COTTRELL , J UDGE