1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

RODNEY RYAN GRAVES, et al. , Plaintiffs, v. Civil Action No. 17-593 (JEB) CYNTHIA CALLAHAN,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pro se Plaintiffs Rodney and DeAlva Graves brought this action for mon ey damages against Cynthia Callahan, a judge on the Montgomery County (Maryland) C ircuit Court. The Graveses are unhappy with certain rulings Judge Callahan made in their forec losure proceedings. Defendant now moves to dismiss on myriad grounds. As judicial immunity (amon g other doctrines) bars this suit, the Court will grant the Motion. I. Background Although their Complaint can be hard to follow at times (and a pparently omits several pages), Plaintiffs allege that, during litigation concerning a foreclosure of their property, Judge

Callahan “‘ acted non judicially’ by inter alia , failing to acknowledge Rodney’s ‘ legal interest ’ and standing, already established by Judge Greenberg nearly 2 years prior.” Compl. at 5. She also purportedly erred “by not following [Maryland Rule 14-211] and unlawfully enjoining Rodney from further filing pleadings in foreclosure process, which deprived him of due process of law for appeal.” Id. (brackets original). The Graveses also allege that “Judge Callahan is not an appellant judge, thus

her actions were in ‘ clear absence of all jurisdiction ’ when she unlawfully overruled Judge Greenberg.” Id. She further “acted outside her delegated juri sdiction while not performing functions2 normally performed by judges of the Circuit Court for Judicial Circuit 6.” Id. Some of her conduct “intentionally violated [Plaintiffs’] protected constitutional and civil rights because of their ‘ race and

color .’” Id. As a result of Defendant’s alleged transgressions, Plaintiffs seek $850,000 in compensatory damages, treble damages, and $10 million in punitive damages. Id. at 6-7. II. Legal Standard Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a Court to dis miss any count of a complaint that fails “to sta te a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court “must treat the complaint’s factual alleg ations as true and must grant plaintiff ‘the benefit of all inf erences that can be derived fr om the facts alleged.’” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 11 13 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Sch uler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)) (cit ation omitted). The Co urt need not accept as true, however, “a legal conclusion couc hed as a factual allegation” o r an inference unsupported by the facts set forth in the Compl aint. Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178 , 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Rule 12(b)(6)’s pleading standard is “not meant to impose a gre at burden upon a plaintiff,” Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (200 5), as a count will survive so long as there is a “‘reasonably f ounded hope that the [discovery] pr ocess will reveal relevant evidence’ to support the claim.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 5 50 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007) (quoting Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 347). While “detailed factua l allegations” are not necessary to withstand a dismissal motion, id. at 555, a complaint still “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is p lausible on its face. ’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 5 70). In other words, a plaintiff must put forth “factual content that allows the court to draw t he reasonable inference that the3 defendant is liable for the mi sconduct alleged.” Id. A compla int may survive even if “‘recovery is very remote and unlikely’” or t he veracity of the claims are “doubtful in fact” if the factual matter alleged in the complaint is “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S . 232, 236 (1974)). In evaluating the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Complaint under R ule 12(b)(6), the Court may consider “the facts alleged in t he complaint, any documents eit her attached to or incorporated in the complaint[,] and matters of w hich [the court] may take judi cial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 1 17 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In addition, the Court must consider

a pro se litigant’s Complaint “in light of” all filings, including thos e responsive to a motion to dismiss. Brown v. Whole Foods Market, 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted). In so doing, the Court is also mindful that complain ts filed by pro se litigants are “h[e]ld to less stringent standard s than formal pleadings draft ed by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). III. Analysis While Defendant appropriately raises a host of infirmities wit h Plaintiffs’ pleadings, some would just delay the litigation either here or elsewhere. For example, although Judge Callahan questions personal jurisdiction in this case, it is unclear wit hout discovery or further briefing whether she may be sued here. Given that the doctrine of judicial immu nity plainly shields her, however, this seems the wisest basis on which to dispose of the matter. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007) (“[A] federal court ha s leeway to choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits.”) (quotat ion omitted). “Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judi cial jurisdiction.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967). One purpose of the doctrine is to “pr otect[] judicial independence by4 insulating judges from vexatious actions prosecuted by disgrunt led litigants,” Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988) – precisely the case here. As a result, “ judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done malicious ly or corruptly.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978) (quotation omitted). Such immunity even covers suits claiming a deprivation of constitutional rights. See Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83, 90 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“The common law immunity of judges is fully applicable in suits unde r 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging deprivations of constitutional rights.”). As the Graveses here complain solely of acts taken by Judge Ca llahan in her judicial role, and as they seek money damages (as opposed to some type of inju nctive or declaratory relief), their suit cannot survive. Moore v. Motz, 437 F. Supp. 2d 88, 93 (D. D.C. 2006) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991)).

IV. Conclusion The Court, accordingly, will dismiss the case without prejudic e. A separate Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion shall issue this date.

/s/ James E. Boasberg JAMES E. BOASBERG United States District Judge Date: May 30, 2017