IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2015-KA-00901-SCT
EUGENE MARTIN a/k/a E. MARTIN

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/28/2015 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LEE SORRELS COLEMAN COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: LOW NDES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF THE STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: MOLLIE MARIE McMILLIN GEORGE T. HOLMES ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: KAYLYN HAVRILLA McCLINTON DISTRICT ATTORNEY: FORREST ALLGOOD NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED - 03/09/2017 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC.
MAX WELL, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT ¶1. Mississippi Code Section 99-19-81 1 authorizes the Sta t e t o seek increased p unishm ent f or

1 U n d er th is sen ten cin g en h an cem en t:
E v ery p erso n co n v icted in t h is state o f a f e lo n y w h o s h all h av e b een co n v icted tw ice p rev io u s l y o f an y f elo n y o r f

e d eral crim e u p o n ch a rg es sep arately b ro u g h t an d arisin g o u t o f sep arate in cid en ts at d if f eren t t im es an d w h o sh all h av e b een sen ten ced t o s ep arate term s o f o n e (1 ) y ear o r mo r e in an y state an d /o r f ed eral p en al in stitu tio n , w h eth er i n th is state o r elsew h e re, sh all b e sen ten c ed t o th e m a x im

u m term o f im

p riso n m en t p rescrib ed f

o r su ch f elo n y , an d su c h sen ten ce sh all n o t b e red u c ed o r s u sp en d ed n o r sh all su ch p erso n b ethose charged with a f elony of f ense af ter having twice been convicted of prior f elonies. But f

or this statutory enhancem ent to apply , the State m ust prove each of the d ef

endant’s prior f

elony
convictions resulted in a sentence of one or m ore y ears in a state o r f ederal prison. If the State
seeks enhanced sentencing, and the requirem ents are m e t , S ection 99-19-81 m andates the court
sentence the def

endant to the m axim

um term of im prisonm ent f

or the subject of

f ense—in this case ten y ears. ¶2. Eugene M artin, who r ecently was convicted of shooting into a dwell i n g a n d s e ntenced

as a habitual of

f ender under Section 99-19-81, claim s one o f h i s t w o p r ior q ualif y ing f elony
convictions resulted i n a sentence of l ess than one y ear. So he was wrongf ully subjected to the

s e n t e ncing enhancem ent. A f ter review, we agree. W e t hus af f irm Martin’s c onviction f o r shooting into a dwelling, but reverse and rem a n d f or resentencing.
B ackground Facts and Procedural History ¶3. A f ter a night out a t a club, Martin and Gene S herrod g ot into an argum en t o u t s i d e t h e apartm ents where they lived in C olum bus, Mississippi. 2 Around m idnight, a scuf f le broke out between the two, and Sherrod choked Martin in a h eadlock. Af ter he let go of Martin, the m en returned to their apartm e nts. A short tim e later, Martin returned to S herrod’s apartm ent arm ed
with a pistol. W hen h e was unable to f orce his w ay inside Sherrod’s locked apartm ent, Martin
f ired several shots through the door.

elig ib le f o r p aro le o r p ro b a tio n
. M iss. C o d e A n n . § 9 9 -1 9 -8 1 (R ev . 2 0 1 5 ).

2 M a rtin h a d b een at th e clu b o n th e ev en in g o f S ep tem b e r 2 5 , 2 0 1 3

. 2¶4. On April 22, 2014, a Lowndes County grand jury indicted Martin f or f iring a weapon into

a dwelling, in violation of M i ssissippi Code S e c t i o n 9 7

- 3 7

- 29. T he State m oved to am end
Martin’s indictm ent to charge him a s a habitual of f ender under Mississippi C o d e Section
99-19-81. The m otion c ited a 1 982 conviction f or burglary in Lowndes C o u n t y a nd a 1994
f ederal bank-f

raud conviction f

rom Calif ornia. 3 A h e a r ing w as h eld, and Martin’s attorney

m ade no objection to the State am ending his indictm e nt to s eek enhanced punishm ent. Af ter a
t w o - d a y trial in May 2015, a jury f ound Martin guilty

. Based on the habitual-of f ender
enhancem ent, the trial judge sentenced Martin to the m axim um term under the statute—ten y ears in prison. Martin f

iled a m otion f

o r a judgm ent notwithstanding t he verdict or, a lternatively , f or a new trial. The judge denied the m otion. ¶5. On appeal, M artin’s new c ounsel argues his sentence is illegal because the prior f ederal
bank-f raud conviction did not result in a sentence o f one y ear or m ore and does not m eet Mississippi Code Section 99-19-81’s requirem ents f or a habitual-of

f ender enhancem ent. 4
Discussion

3 T h e m o tio n arg u es t h e b u rg lary co n v ictio n carried a term o f o n e y ear o r m o re in th e M ississip p i D ep artm en t o f C o rrectio n s, w h i le th e b an k -f r au d co n v ictio n carr i e d a term o f th ree m o n th s in th e c u sto d y o f th e U n i te d S t a t e s B u r eau o f P riso n s an d th ree y ears o f su p erv i sed release.

4 Additionally , Martin has f iled num erous pro se m otions asserting on appeal that: (1) his sentence is illegal because of im proper e nhancem ent as a habitual of f ender, (2) there was insuf f icient evidence to enhance his sentence, (3) his counsel was inef f e ctive f or f ailing to object during sentencing or o therwise challenge his sentence enhancem ent, ( 4) there was no Rule 11.03 hearing u n der the Mi s s i s sippi Unif orm Rules of Circuit and County Court P r a c t i c e, (5) there was insuf f i cient notice on t he m otion to am end the indictm ent, (6) his indictm ent was def

ective, (7) his c o nviction was based on insuf f i cient evidence and is against the overwhelm ing weight of the evidence, and (8) his due process rights were violated.

3¶6. Martin d i d n o t object t o the judge im posing the m andatory m axim u m sentence under
Section 99-19-81. A nd f

ailure to object to a habitual-of f ender enhancem ent during sentencing procedurally bars a def

endant f rom raising that issue on appeal. Cum m ings v. State , 465 So. 2d 993, 995 (Miss. 1 9 85) (citing Tucker v. State , 403 S o. 2 d 1 271 (Miss. 1981), and T u bbs v. State , 402 So. 2 d 830 (Miss. 1981)). But plain-error review allows this Court to correct obvious errors,
not p roperly addressed below, which im pact f undam ental, substantive rights. See S m ith v. State , 986 S o. 2d 290, 294 (¶ 10) (Miss. 2008) (citations om i tted). An illegal sentence is an obvious

error subject to plain-error review. 5 See Conner v. State , 1 38 S o. 3d 143, 150-51 (¶ 19) (Miss. 2014) (citing Grayer v. State , 120 So. 3d 964, 969 (Miss. 2013)).
I. Habitual-Offender Enhancem ent ¶7. Bef

ore Martin’s indictm ent was am ended to seek a habitual-of f e n der s entence, he f

aced

a discretionary sentence of up to ten y ears im p risonm ent under Section 97-37-29. But the State sought enhanced p unishm ent, and the circuit judge granted the State’s request b ased on Martin’s prior f e lony convictions. The p articular habitual-of f ender statute that the j udge f ound applicable
here—Section 9 9-19-81—required, upon conviction, that he sentence M artin to a mandatory

5 T h is C o u rt p rev io u sly f

aced a sim ilar c laim th at a f elo n y co n v ictio n , w h ich resu l ted in a f o rty -f iv e d a y s en ten ce w ith f

iv e y ears o f p o s t-release su p erv isio n , d id n o t q u alif y a s a sen ten ce o f o n e y ear o r m o r e , to trig g e r a h ab itu al-o f f en d er sen ten ce u n d er S ectio n 9 9 -1 9

- 8 1

. V a n w ey v. S

ta te , 1 4 9 S o
. 3 d 1 0 2 3 ( M iss. 2 0 1 4 ). B u t i n Va n w ey , th is C o u r t h eld th e d ef en d a n t w aiv ed an y ch allen g e to th e sen ten ce b y f ailin g t o o b

j ect t o th e alleg ed l y im

p ro p er S ectio n 9 9 -1 9 -8 1 en h an c em en t. We f o u n d n o m iscar r i a g e o f j u stice in th at case, b ecau se th e d e f e n d an t f aced 2 4 5 y ears in p riso n b u t n e g o tiated a p lea ag reem en t to a f ar lesser sen ten ce o f f

o r ty -f iv e y e ars. Id

. at 1 0 2 4 (¶ 4 )

. T h e case b ef o r e u s, h o w ev e r , in v o lv es a m u ch d if f eren t situ atio n
. In t h is cas e , M a r t i n d i d n o t n eg o tiate a p lea ag reem en t, reco m m en d in g a lesser sen te n ce— h e w as co n v icted at trial. N o r d id h e receiv e a lesser sen ten ce, rath er h e w as sen ten ced as a h a b itu al o f f en d er to a m a n d

a to ry m ax i m

u m sen ten ce o f ten y ears. T h u s, h is su b stan t iv e rig h ts w ere im p acted , so w e can n o t f

in d w aiv er. 4term

of ten y ears. 6 ¶8. To qualif

y as a habitual of

f ender under Section 99-19-81, the def endant m ust have two prior f elony or f ederal convictions that resulted in separate prison sentences of one y ear or m ore. The problem w ith the statute’s application here is that the State proved just one o f Martin’s prior
convictions im

posed a prison sentence of one y ear or m ore—his 1982 burglary conviction. ¶9. Martin’s other cited conviction—a 1994 f ederal bank-f

raud convicti o n f

rom Calif o rnia—resulted in a sentence of only three m o nths’ im prisonm ent, with three y ears of supervised release. And when Martin violated the term s of that r elease, he was s entenced to only

an additional f

ive m onths’ i m

prisonm e nt. E ven with the tim e tallied together, he was sentenced

to less than one y ear on the f ederal conviction. So, w ith M artin lacking two qualif y i n g convictions f

or e nhance m e n t u

n d e r S e c t i o n 9 9 -19-81, the habitual-of f ender s tatute did not apply

. And the circuit judge was not r equired to sentence Martin to a m andat o r y t e n - y e ar sentence under Section 97-37-29. Theref o re, Martin m

ust be resentenced. 7
II. Defective Indictm ent ¶10. Martin also l odges a pro s e claim that his am ended indictm ent is def ective. The purported
def ect is that hi s i n d i ctm ent was im properly am ended a n d never served o n him

. These
argum ents lack m erit. T he or i g i n a l i ndictm ent charged the necessary elem e nts of Section

6 S ee M iss. C o d e A n n . § 9 9 -1 9 -8 1 (R ev
. 2 0 1 5 ).

7 O n rem an d f

o r resen ten cin g , M artin still f aces u p to ten y ears’ i m

p riso n m en t, b u t n o t a m an d ato ry

sen ten ce o f

ten y ears. 597-37-29. 8 And t he only revision was the State’s inclusion of his p rior f elony convictions to trigger the habitual-of

f ender enhancem ent. Unif orm R ule o f C ircuit and County Court Practice
7.09 perm its am ending indictm ents to charge t he def endants a s habitual of

f e n ders if the
def endant has an opportunity to def end and is not unf

airly surprised. ¶i) T h e S t a t e mo v e d

to am end Martin’s i ndictm ent on August 29, 2014. T he hearing on the m otion was Septem ber 2, 2014. Martin m ade n o ef f ort to c o n t e s t o r o b

j ect to the m otion. Martin’s trial did not

com m ence until May 27, 2015. S o the tim ing of the notice is not an issue. And f rom the record,
it is clear Martin was neither u naware nor surprised by the substantive charge of shooting into

a dwell ing. He h ad am

ple notice and tim e t o contest the habitual-of f ender am endm ent; he
sim ply opted against doing so. Because t here i s no r ecord evidence h is attorney did not provide
him the am e nded indictm ent, resulting in prejudice to his def ense, we reject this claim

. III. Weight and Sufficiency of the Evidence
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence ¶11. W h en reviewing the suf f i ciency of the evidence, we ask “whether, af ter viewing the

8 M i ssissip p i C o d e S ectio n 9 7 -3 7 -2 9 states, in f u ll:
If an y p erso n sh all w illf

u lly a n d u n law f

u l l y sh o o t o r d isch arg e an y p isto l, sh o tg u n , rif

le o r f irearm o f an y n atu re o r d e scrip tio n in t o a n y d w ellin g h o u se o r an y o th e r b u ild in g u su ally o ccu p ied b y p erso n s, w h eth er actu ally o ccu p ied o r n o t , h e s h all b e g u ilty o f a f elo n y w h eth er o r n o t an y b o d y b e in

j u red th ereb y an d , o n co n v ictio n th ereo f , sh a ll b e p u n ish ed b y im

p riso n m e n t in th e state p e n iten tiary f

o r a term n o t to ex ceed ten (1 0 ) y ears, o r b y im p r iso n m en t in th e co u n ty

j ail f o r n o t m o re th an o n e ( 1 ) y ear, o r b y f in e o f n o t m o re th an f iv e th o u san d d o llars ($ 5 ,0 0 0

. 0 0 ), o r b y b o th su ch im p r iso n m en t an d f

in e, w i th in th e d i scretio n o f

th e co u rt.
M iss. C o d e A n n . § 9 7 -3 7 -2 9 (R ev . 2 0 1 4 ). 6evidence in the light m ost f avorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of f a ct could have
f ound the essential elem ents of the crim e bey ond a reasonable doubt.” Bush v. State , 895 So.
2d 836, 843 (¶ 16) (Miss. 2005) (quoting Jackson v. V irginia , 443 U.S. 307, 315, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)). ¶12. Though Martin suggests his conviction is based on insuf f icient evidence, he f

ails to

m ention what elem ent the State f ailed to prove. There was testim ony f rom the victim , Gene Sherrod, and Colum

bus Police Investigator Taberth a Hardin. T hey detailed how Martin f ired
f our shots f

r om a nine-m illim e ter pistol into Sherrod’s apartm ent. The bullets t raveled through
the apa r t ment’s f

ront door, dam aging Sherrod’s television. And a t every stage, f rom the shooting, to a p h oto lineup, a nd ultim ately trial, Gene Sherrod i dentif ied Martin as the shooter.
The S tate suf

f i ciently proved Martin shot a f irearm , willf

ully and unlawf

ully , i n t o Gene Sherrod’s apartm e nt, m e eting every elem ent of Section 97-37-29.
B. W eight of the Evidence ¶13. W h en considering a challenge to the weight o f the evidence, we review the evidence “in
the l ight m ost f

avorable to t he verdict.” Bush , 895 So. 2d at 844 (¶ 18) (citing Herring v. State , 691 S o. 2d 948, 957 ( Miss. 1997)). A nd we “will only disturb a verdict when it is so contrary
to the overwhelm ing w eight of the evidence that to allow i t t o stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.” Id

. Again, the ey e witness v ictim testif ied. S o did a Colum

bus Police Departm ent investigator. A nd M artin’s cross-exam ination o f the S tate’s witnesses was lim ited.
Martin called no witnesses and rested without o f f e r i n g a n y testim ony in def ense. Martin’s attorney s im

ply argued that som eone else shot into Sherrod’s apartm e nt, but the jury disagreed.

7The weight of the evidence overwhelm ingly supports Martin’s conviction.
IV. Rem aining Claim ed Errors ¶14. Martin also pitches a litany of other supposed errors. But these claim s are unsupported by either r ecord evidence or authority

. 9 This Court has been clear: “an appellant m ust present
to us a record suf

f icient to show the o ccurrence of the error he asserts and also that the m atter

was p roperly p resented to t he trial court and tim ely preserved.” B yrom v. State , 863 So. 2 d 836,
853 (¶ 35) (Miss. 2003) (citing Acker v. State , 797 So. 2d 966, 967 ( Miss. 20 0 1 ) ( q u o t a tions

om itted)). And “[ f

]ailure to cite relevant authority obviates the appellate court’s obligation to review such issues.” Id

. (citing Sim m ons v. State , 805 S o. 2d 452, 487 (Miss. 2001) (citations

om itted)). Thus, we need not address the rem ainder of Martin’s claim s. Conclusion ¶15. Because Martin received a n illegal sentence e nh a n c e me n t under Section 99-19-81, we

reverse Martin’s m andatorily im posed m axim

um sentence a nd rem a n d f o r resentencing under
Section 97-37-29. W e af f i rm in all other respects. ¶16. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED. WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON, P.J., KITCHENS, KING, C O L E M A N , B E A M AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., CONCUR. RANDOLPH, P.J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

9 M a rtin claim s n u m ero u s “ d u e p ro cess v io latio n s.” H e s u g g ests w i tn esses lied in af f id av its, h e w a s g iv en n o o p p o r tu n ity f o r a f air trial, h e w a s p ro v id ed in su f f icien t n o tice, an d th a t p o lice su p p ressed ev i d en ce. H o w ev er, h e c ites n o reco rd ev id en c e o r su p p o rtin g au th o rity to su b stan tiate an y

o f th ese claim s. 8