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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 46211

JUAN ROBERTO JIMENEZ,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

STATE OF IDAHO,

Respondent.

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Filed: March 20, 2020

Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin 

Falls County. Hon. Benjamin J. Cluff, District Judge. 

Order denying petition for post-conviction relief, affirmed.

Fyffe Law, LLC; Robyn Fyffe, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

GRATTON, Judge 

Juan Roberto Jimenez appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In the underlying case, a jury convicted Jimenez of aggravated battery (Idaho Code

§§ 18-903, 18-907, and 19-2520) and being a felon in possession of a firearm (I.C. § 18-3316).

Jimenez subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief asserting ineffective assistance of 

counsel and newly discovered evidence. In his petition, Jimenez argued his counsel had failed in 

the following ways: to seek a continuance or mistrial during Jimenez’s withdrawal from pain 

medication, which violated his fundamental right to testify on his own behalf; to file a motion to 

suppress statements he made to a responding officer while being held at gunpoint; and to 

properly cross-examine or impeach the victim-witness. Additionally, he argued a new mental 
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health evaluation demonstrated the district court had incomplete information at the time of 

sentencing. The district court denied Jimenez’s petition after an evidentiary hearing. He timely 

appeals.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that is civil in nature. Idaho 

Code § 19-4907; Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 249, 220 P.3d 1066, 1068 (2009); State v. 

Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921, 

828 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct. App. 1992). In order to prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the 

petitioner must prove the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. I.C. § 19-4907; Stuart 

v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990); Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 861, 

243 P.3d 675, 677 (Ct. App. 2010). When reviewing a decision denying post-conviction relief 

after an evidentiary hearing, an appellate court will not disturb the lower court’s factual findings 

unless they are clearly erroneous. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a); Dunlap v. State, 141 

Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67, 794 P.2d 654, 656 

(Ct. App. 1990). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and 

the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the province of the 

district court. Dunlap, 141 Idaho at 56, 106 P.3d at 382; Larkin v. State, 115 Idaho 72, 73, 764 

P.2d 439, 440 (Ct. App. 1988). We exercise free review of the district court’s application of the 

relevant law to the facts. Baxter, 149 Idaho at 862, 243 P.3d at 678.

III.

ANALYSIS

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the Uniform 

Post-Conviction Procedure Act. Barcella v. State, 148 Idaho 469, 477, 224 P.3d 536, 544 (Ct. 

App. 2009). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must show 

that the attorney’s performance was deficient and that the petitioner was prejudiced by the 

deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Self v. State, 145 Idaho 578, 

580, 181 P.3d 504, 506 (Ct. App. 2007). To establish a deficiency, the petitioner has the burden 

of showing that the attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 

Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 
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433, 442, 163 P.3d 222, 231 (Ct. App. 2007). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show a 

reasonable probability that, but for the attorney’s deficient performance, the outcome of the trial 

would have been different. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177; Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 

442, 163 P.3d at 231. This Court has long adhered to the proposition that tactical or strategic 

decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based

on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective 

evaluation. Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho 168, 172, 254 P.3d 69, 73 (Ct. App. 2011).

1. The district court did not err in determining trial counsel’s 

performance (related to Jimenez’s medical issues at trial) was not 

deficient 

Jimenez argues that his trial counsel was deficient for failing to seek a continuance or a 

mistrial because withdrawal from Jimenez’s medication left him without the capacity to testify. 

Specifically, Jimenez argues this diminished ability violated his constitutional right to testify on 

his own behalf.1 Jimenez further asserts that “regardless of whether [he] was seemingly 

coherent . . . his condition certainly [a]ffected his testimony in ways that cannot be quantified.” 

Jimenez makes no further assertion as to how the lack of medication affected his testimony or 

how the outcome of the trial would have been different if allowed to testify with the proper 

medication.

After hearing Jimenez was being held in jail prior to trial and, as a result, was having 

difficulty getting his prescribed medication, the district court found “[a]t no time during the 

entire trial, did [Jimenez] ever convey to counsel that [Jimenez] was unable to assist in his own 

defense” and that “[Jimenez] did not appear to struggle in any regard with his testimony.” 

Jimenez’s alleged pain, without more information, is not enough to demonstrate his attorney was 

deficient in his performance. Though Jimenez may have been experiencing discomfort without 

his prescribed medications, it was his obligation to demonstrate how it prejudiced him and how 

his testimony would have been different.

In essence, the key inquiry for the district court was whether counsel was deficient and 

how that deficiency prejudiced Jimenez. This Court’s inquiry is whether the district court’s 

determination was in error, specifically whether its findings of fact are supported by substantial 

 1 The State argues that Jimenez asserts the constitutional violation for the first time on 

appeal. We agree and consider it only in reference to the ineffective counsel claim. “This Court 

will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.” State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 

Idaho 271, 275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017).
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and competent evidence. Jimenez misunderstands these requirements, failing to point to any 

such deficiency or prejudice, arguing it simply cannot be quantified. This is an assertion. It does 

not demonstrate the district court’s findings were clearly erroneous or how the district court erred 

in its application of the law. Therefore, because we cannot disturb factual findings unless they 

are clearly erroneous and Jimenez has failed to make such a claim, we can find no error.

2. The district court did not err in determining trial counsel’s 

performance (related to the motion to suppress) was not deficient

Jimenez argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress

because the statements in question were made prior to his receiving Miranda2 warnings. The 

State argues that, on appeal, Jimenez fails to address or assign error to the district court’s 

findings, making it impossible for this Court to determine if there was clear error. We agree.

The district court found Jimenez failed to show his counsel’s performance was deficient 

or that there was any resulting prejudice from the alleged deficiency. It concluded Jimenez had 

not met his burden as to either prong of the Strickland test. First, he had not shown, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that he would have been successful regarding a motion to 

suppress.3 Second, even if the motion to suppress would have been granted, it still was not error 

to decline to file it because a nearly identical statement was properly admitted. 

On appeal, Jimenez makes no attempt to satisfy the standard, asserting that “[his] 

freedom of movement was curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest and a motion to 

suppress should have been granted. Regardless of whether [he] made a similar statement to a 

911 operator, his statement to law enforcement undoubtedly impacted the jury . . .” (emphasis 

added). This assertion does not demonstrate prejudice. It does not demonstrate a reasonable 

probability that, but for the attorney’s performance, the outcome of the trial would have been 

different. Further, Jimenez makes no argument as to how the statements were prejudicial when 

similar statements were admitted through alternative evidence. Moreover, Jimenez fails to 

 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 

3 In a post-conviction proceeding challenging an attorney’s failure to pursue a motion in 

the underlying criminal action, the district court may consider the probability of success of the 

motion in question in determining whether the attorney’s inactivity constituted ineffective 

assistance. Lint v. State, 145 Idaho 472, 477, 180 P.3d 511, 516 (Ct. App. 2008). Where the 

alleged deficiency is counsel’s failure to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion, if pursued, 

would not have been granted by the trial court, is generally determinative of both prongs of the 

Strickland test. Lint, 145 Idaho at 477-78, 180 P.3d at 516-17.
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address the facts found by the district court or assign error to those findings. With no assignment

of error to the findings, we are left without any ability to apply our standard of review. Bach v. 

Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 796, 229 P.3d 1146, 1158 (2010). Accordingly, the district court is 

affirmed.

3. The district court did not err in determining trial counsel’s 

performance (related to the cross-examination of the victim-witness)

was not deficient

Jimenez argues his trial counsel failed to adequately cross-examine the victim-witness 

and that this failure was not strategic. The district court found counsel’s actions were strategic. 

It found the primary reason for not cross-examining the witness on inconsistent statements 

regarding who shot him included defense counsel’s plan to argue Jimenez shot the victim in selfdefense. 

Jimenez asserts on appeal that trial counsel’s rationale was not strategic and “[n]o 

reasonable trial strategy could explain trial counsel’s failure to cross-examine [the witness] on 

critical issues at trial . . . .” Jimenez also cites the cumulative error doctrine with no clear 

argument as to how it is applicable: “Trial counsel was deficient by failing to raise the key 

issues to support [Jimenez’s] defense and such deficiency individually and cumulatively 

prejudiced [Jimenez].” Again, these are assertions. The district court found counsel’s actions 

were strategic. Jimenez is required to show that counsel’s actions were not strategic because 

they were based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings 

capable of objective evaluation. Instead, Jimenez states the determination was in error without 

pointing to actual evidence undermining the district court’s findings of fact. With no assignment

of error to the findings, we are left without the ability to apply the appropriate standard of 

review. Bach, 148 Idaho at 796, 229 P.3d at 1158. Accordingly, the district court is affirmed.

B. Newly Discovered Evidence

Jimenez argues that a neuropsychological evaluation revealed he had post-traumatic 

stress disorder and attention deficit disorder, making the sentencing court’s information 

incomplete.

A request for a new trial in a post-conviction proceeding based on newly discovered 

evidence is the same as a motion for new trial subsequent to a jury verdict. Johnson v. State, 156 

Idaho 7, 12, 319 P.3d 491, 496 (2014). When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed 

on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the lower 
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court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of 

such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices 

before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 

270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018). Whether a trial court properly applied a statutory provision to 

the facts of a particular case is a question of law over which we exercise free review. State v. 

Heiner, 163 Idaho 99, 101, 408 P.3d 97, 99 (Ct. App. 2017). 

A motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence must disclose that: (1) the 

evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to the defendant at the time of the trial; (2) the 

evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) it will probably produce an 

acquittal; and (4) failure to learn of the evidence was due to no lack of diligence on the part of 

the defendant. State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 691, 551 P.2d 972, 978 (1976).

The district court determined Jimenez failed to prove three elements of the claim: 

materiality, likelihood of producing an acquittal, and that the evidence could not have been 

discovered prior to sentencing. The State additionally argues Jimenez failed to prove all four 

elements of the claim because evidence of mental health available to the petitioner at the time of 

sentencing, simply a new diagnosis, cannot be characterized as newly discovered evidence. We 

agree with this argument and note that again Jimenez has failed, beyond bare assertion, to 

support his claim. He does not argue the elements of Drapeau, that the district court employed 

the wrong test, or provide evidence that sentencing would probably have been different but for 

the lack of neuropsychological evidence. For these reasons, Jimenez has failed to demonstrate 

the district court abused its discretion in denying his petition for post-conviction relief based on 

newly discovered evidence. 

IV.

CONCLUSION

Jimenez failed to assign error to the district court’s determinations and therefore to 

demonstrate the district court erred. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of his petition for postconviction relief. 

Chief Judge HUSKEY and Judge BRAILSFORD CONCUR.