# Supreme Court of Florida

____________ No. SC12-702

____________ GREGORY DAVID LARKIN, Appellant,

vs. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. [May 22, 2014]
PER CURIAM. Gregory David Larkin was convict ed of the April 2009 first-deg ree murders of his parents, Richard and Myra Larkin, and he was sentenced t o death for both murders. This is Larkin’s directappeal. We have jurisdiction . See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Having re viewed the record and consideredthe issues presented, we affirm Larkin’ s convictions and sentences.
I. BACKGROUND In July 2009, a Nassau County grand jury indicted Larkin, who was 35 years old, on two counts of first-degr ee murder in the deaths of his parents in April of- 2 - that same year. The case proceede d to a jury trial, at which L arkin elected to represent himself. A. Self-Representation Although the trial court initia lly appointed a public defender , Brian Morrissey, to represent Larkin, L arkin subsequently sought to d ischarge counsel at a November 2009 hearing. Larkin contended that Morrissey waive d his right to a speedy trial, played a role in covering up a “second indictment ” signed by another judge, and tried to elicit informa tion from Larkin in secretly recorded conversations to aid the pros ecution. Under oath, Morrissey ex plained Larkin’s apparent confusion regarding th e different judges at different proceedings, stated that he was unaware of any illega l recording of confidential in terviews with his client, and referenced the judge’ s earlier explanation that a s peedy trial was waived in light of the substantial issu es in the case. Defense counse l assured the trial court that he was working on behalf of his client to address the char ges. The trial court concluded that there was no basi s for Larkin’s claim that defen se counsel was rendering ineffective assistan ce. Accordingly, the trial judge asked if Larkin wanted to discharge counsel and represent himself, and Larkin d eclined. In July 2010, Larkin obtained private counsel in lieu of Morri ssey. However, in September 2011, priva te counsel requested and was g ranted permission to withdraw from repr esentation. At that time, Lark in sought to- 3 - represent himself. The trial c ourt held a Faretta hearing, see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), informing Lark in of the advantages of havi ng a lawyer, questioning Larkin about his unde rstanding of the limitations a nd disadvantages of self-representation, and determin ing his competency to knowingl y and intelligently waive counsel. Larkin stated tha t he was 38 years old, knew an d understood English, had attended two years of community college, was not i mpaired, had never previously represented h imself, and while awaiting trial, had read some of the books in the law library. The judge determined that Larkin was competent to waive counsel but withheld his r uling. Then, at a hearing on O ctober 13, 2011, Larkin reaffirmed his desire to r epresent himself, and the tria l judge ruled that Larkin could represent himself but reappointed Morrissey as sta ndby counsel. At subsequent hearings on November 3 and December 20, 2011, the tr ial court again discussed the advantages and di sadvantages of self-representati on, and Larkin reaffirmed his election to repre sent himself and to have only s tandby counsel. On January 5, 2012, before the h earing on Larkin’s motion to s uppress, the trial judge again held a Faretta colloquy and encouraged Larkin to obtain or accept counsel in light of the serious ness of the proceeding. Larkin, however, chose continued self-representation, s tating that he understood the p ros and cons of his decision. Larkin then argued th e motion to suppress authored b y prior counsel, contending that the police did not have probable cause to arres t him in April 2009- 4 - and that the evidence obtained from his hotel room at that time should be suppressed. After hearing argumen ts, the trial court denied th e motion. During jury selection the next d ay, Larkin again declined the offer of appointment of counsel and stat ed that he would allow the prose cutor to select the jury. After the judge and prosecu tor questioned the potential jurors, Larkin declined to strike any potential juror. For reasons that inclu ded opposition to the death penalty, a stated inability to be impartial, and work-rel ated hardship, among others, the trial court struck ten potential jurors, and the pr osecutor struck four. In addition, two alternate jurors were chosen.
B. The Guilt Phase The trial commenced on Janua ry 9, 2012. Larkin invoked the ru le to exclude witnesses from the courtr oom, and the jury was sworn in . See § 90.616, Fla. Stat. (2011). After the pr osecutor’s opening statement, L arkin argued to the jury that he was innocent. He sta ted that the evidence would s how that his parents were killed three to five days b efore their bodies were discove red on April 18, 2009, and that he was out of the country from April 12 to April 18. Claiming that no evidence tied him to the murde rs, he stated that there were no fingerprints or DNA evidence on the murder weapon and two witnesses would testi fy that they saw or spoke to Larkin’s parents on April 14, 2009, when Larkin was out of the- 5 - country. Finally, he argued thatthe prosecution could not pro duce an eyewitness or establish a motive for the murders. The evidence at trial showed tha t in January 2009, Larkin unex pectedly arrived at his parents’ Fernandi na Beach home for a visit and s tayed for several months. Larkin managed the family owned business in Costa Rica , a dive shop named Aquamor. The business wa s failing at that time, and ther e was ongoing dissension in the family over wh ether to sell it. Richard Lark in, III (Rick), Gregory Larkin’s older brother, t estified that their father was actively trying to sell the business at the time of his d eath and Gregory Larkin oppose d the sale. Other members of the family also disa greed on whether they should sel l the business. The evidence showed that late on the morning of April 12, 2009, Larkin parked his parents’ car at the J acksonville International Airpo rt, bought a one-way ticket to Mexico at about 11:30 a .m., and flew to Mexico in the mid-afternoon. One week later, on the morning of April 18, a Nassau County She riff’s deputy was dispatched to the Larkins’ home to perform a wellness check tha t was prompted by a family friend’s concern about not having heard from Richard a nd Myra Larkin for several days. The deputy f ound a FedEx package on the Lark ins’ doorstep that had been delivered on April 14. No one responded when the depu ty knocked on the door and rang the doorbell. H e then walked around to the b ack of the house, where he entered the unlocked sc reen enclosure around the pool. Peering through- 6 - the glass doors into the family r oom, he saw Myra Larkin lying dead on the floor with a pool of dried blood by her head. When backup officers arrived, the y forced entry into the secure ly locked home. In the living room where M yra Larkin’s body lay, blood a nd blood spatter was observed on various surfaces , including a chair and hassock , the entertainment center and television, the wall, and covers of magazines. As t he officers searched the house, they soon found Rich ard Larkin dead, lying on the fl oor of his garage office. His face was unrecognizab le, and a large stone statue from the pool area lay on his chest. There was bl ood on the office cabinets, wall s, desk chair, office machinery, and paperwork, and a baseball bat discolored by bloo d was found just outside the office door. Except for the two murder sites , the house was otherwise tidy, although there was some clutter on the k itchen counter—food items, wine, and used wine glasses—apparently related to me al preparation. Valuables incl uding televisions, jewelry, computers, and Myra Lar kin’s purse, however, were in p lain view. In light of this fact and evidence th at the home was securely lock ed, it was clear that no burglary had occurred. Docume nts on the dining room table w ere admitted into evidence over Larkin’s hearsay objection. They included plane tickets with Larkin’s name on them, copies o f e-mails to Richard Larkin offe ring to discuss the purchase of Aquamor, and Gregory Larkin’s scuba certification c ard.- 7 - Because Richard and Myra Larki n’s vehicle was missing, a BOLO was quickly issued, and the vehicle was located in the parking lot of the Jacksonville International Airport later on the same day that the murders we re discovered. Also, Gregory Larkin flew into J acksonville that evening, arriv ing at approximately 10 p.m. and then c hecking into a nearby hotel. T hat is where authorities found him in the ear ly morning hours of April 19. After an initial interview, he was taken to the Police Memorial Building in Jack sonville for further questioning, which was videotaped . Over Larkin’s objection, th e trial court admitted the initial portion of t he videotape into evidence but granted his objection to exclude the portion of the v ideo that followed Larkin’s invo cation of his right to counsel. During the interview, Larkin wa s not told that his parents were found dead, and he did not ask about his par ents. Larkin told law enforcem ent officers that he left his parents’ home on April 12 and flew to Mexico to look f or a job. He explained that he took his pare nts’ car because they were suppo sed to leave on a trip for which they had planned to rent a car. Asked if he had called his parents upon his return to Jacksonville, L arkin told police that no one answered the phone when he called, but it was possibl e that he had misdialed, as h e sometimes did. The police arrested Larkin for gr and theft of the automobile an d, pursuant to a warrant, searched his hotel room . In his backpack, they found, among other items,- 8 - airline ticket receipts and his mother’s gold bracelet, which h is brother Rick Larkin later testified was valued at $8,000. The grand theft auto cha rge was ultimately nolle prosequied. With regard to time of death, evi dence of when people last saw the victims was presented. Moyra Bird-Owens , a longtime friend of Myra Lar kin, testified that she last spoke to Mrs. Larkin on April 10, 2009. She then went to the Larkins’ home on April 12 but left when she saw that the garage door was closed and the car was gone. Her subsequent t elephone calls went unanswered. Rick Larkin, the Larkins’ oldest son, testified that he last spoke to his mother on April 11, and that his parents’ bank account showe d no activity since that date. April 11 was also the last time Rick spoke to his brothe r Gregory before the murders. They made plans for Gregory to visit Rick the f ollowing weekend on April 17, bu t Gregory did not contact Rick further. In additio n, the manager of a movie rent al business testified that Myra Larkin was a regular cus tomer who always returned ren tals promptly, but she did not return the movi e that she rented on April 11. Home Depot and Harris Teeter sales receipts a nd security videos of April 11 sh owed that Myra Larkin made purchases at the st ores at 3:35 and 4:23 p.m. Not only did the items on the grocery store’s conveyor b elt match the groceries found on the Larkins’ kitchen counter on April 18, butwhen Myra Larkin’s body was di scovered, she was dressed in the same clothes that she wore in the April 11 s tore videos. The- 9 - evidence indicated tha t when she was killed, she was sitting in the living room watching the movie that she had rented on April 11. When Richa rd Larkin was killed, he was using the comput er in his home office, which was built into the garage. He typically spent muc h of his time there. The comput er was last used on April 11, 2009, at 8 p.m. The medical examiner, Dr. Jesse Giles, conducted both autopsies . At the outset of his testimony, the tri al judge overruled Larkin’s obj ection that photographs of the decedents at t he crime scene were unduly pre judicial. Dr. Giles testified that both victims we re killed at about the same time and estimated that when found on April 18, the coupl e had been dead for at least t hree to five days, but it could have been as many as seven days. He explained tha t such estimates are inexact and might be affected by external factors, such as when the victims were last contacted or seen alive, or when a computer was last used or a movie was rented. He concluded that both Ri chard and Myra Larkin died fr om skull fractures and hemorrhaging resulting from blunt force trauma. The manner of death was homicide. According to Dr. Giles, Myra La rkin was attacked from behind. A significant blunt force blow to the left side of her head cause d massive skull fractures and tearing of her scal p, resulting in part of her br ain emerging from her skull. In addition, she had def ensive injuries to her arm and hand resulting from a- 10 - blunt force blow that lacerate d her hand, exposing the tendons and fracturing a finger. Dr. Giles opined that the weapon had no discernible pa ttern and was likely smooth, which was consiste nt with a baseball bat. Richard Larkin was also likely to have been attacked from behin d. He sustained at least five or six blunt force blows to his head, r esulting in a broken skull cap and extensive brain in juries. The lacerations and br uising on his arm were defensive wounds. In addition , post-mortem, the victim’s face was mashed flat, his nose broken, and his ri bs fractured on both sides of his chest. Dr. Giles stated that Richard Larkin’s wo unds indicated an assailant with a significant degree of anger. Arnika Edmondson, an analyst with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), developed comp lete DNA profiles of Larkin a nd the two victims in order to analyze va rious evidentiary items. She the n tested a T-shirt, a pair of shorts, and two pairs of socks found behind the bathroo m door nearest to the bedroom where Gregory Lark in’s belongings were located. Th e blood on the exterior of the T-shirt matched the DNA of Richard Larkin. The blood on the front of the shorts matched Myra La rkin’s DNA. Edmondson testified t hat when people exercise heavily, DNA can be transferred to their clothes. The DNA from the interior waistband and zipper ar ea of the shorts—“wearer DNA”—m atched Gregory Larkin’s profile. The l ikelihood that the wearer DNA w ould match an- 11 - unrelated person other than Gre gory Larkin was one in 6.9 quadr illion Caucasians, one in 2.1 quintillion African Am ericans, and one in 18 quadril lion Southeastern Hispanics. A partial profile of wearer DNA on one sock of a pa ir also matched Gregory Larkin. On the other pai r of socks, Richard Larkin’s b lood was found on the bottom of both socks and his wife’s on the top of one sock. DNA testing of two used wine gla sses in the kitchen sink result ed in matches with Myra Larkin’s DNA on one and Gregory Larkin’s on the other . The frequency of recurrence of Gregory Larkin’s DNA profile was one in 370 trillion Caucasians, one in 49 quadrillion African Americans, and one in 520 trillion Southeastern Hispanics. A swab from one area of the baseball b at showed Myra Larkin to be the major contributo r to a mixture of DNA, and a s wab from another area of the bat containe d Richard Larkin’s DNA. An FDLE fingerprint expert, Willia m Tucker, testified that no u sable or identifiable fingerprints were f ound on various objects, includ ing the baseball bat, but Larkin’s fingerprints were found on an energy drink can. I n addition, Matthew Ruddell, an FDLE digital evidence analyst, examined the compute rs in the home and testified that the last time the computer in Richard Larkin ’s office was used was April 11, 2009, at 8 p.m. Testimony on forensic crime scene reconstruction was provided b y Michael Knox, a forensic consultant. He opined that the motive for the murders was not- 12 - robbery, but the trial judge sustained Larkin’s objection that this statement was speculative. Knox then testified that in light of the similari ty of injuries suffered by the victims, the evidence show ed that one assailant used a s ingle weapon in the attack. Moreover, blood splatter analysis indicated that both victims were attacked from behind. Regarding Myra Larki n’s murder, Knox testified th at an initial glancing blow to Mrs. Larkin’s h ead also struck an adjacent lam p. Although she moved to escape, she was soon so disabled by the subsequent blo ws that she collapsed onto the floor, wher e she was struck again. According to Knox, the murder of R ichard Larkin was dramaticall y different and lasted for a longer period of time. He was sitting in a ch air at his desk in his garage office with his back to the doorway when his assailant h it him on the head. Richard Larkin was struck by mu ltiple blows, and his blood spla ttered all over the room. Like his wife, he tried t o ward off the attack to no ava il and stood up. Ultimately, he fell to the floor and crawled on his hands and knees on the bloody floor, where he died lying on his back. Post-mortem, a large s tatue was brought from the pool area and dropped upright on his face. The statue was found lying partly on Richard Larkin’s bo dy. White powder found on the T-s hirt and shorts found in the bathroom was consis tent with the surface of the wh ite garden statue and with the residue from the p ool area where the statue had st ood. The trial court sustained Larkin’s objections t hat any testim ony by Knox on the meaning of- 13 - dropping the statue on Richard L arkin’s body and the reason thi s attack was more prolonged was speculative. Finally, Knox explained that Myra Larkin was killed first, noti ng that Richard Larkin’s murder was bl oodier, but none of his blood was present in the living room where Myra Larkin wa s killed. In addition, the noi se from the violent murder of her husband in his o ffice would have alerted her, but she was assaulted while she remained seated on a liv ing room chair watching a mov ie. The trial court sustained the State’s objection to Larkin’s question of w hether the listing of his father’s murder in the first count of the indictment raised reasonable doubt regarding the deaths. Two other family members testif ied. Ron Larkin, Gregory Larkin ’s uncle, testified that he visited Lark in on numerous occasions after hi s arrest. Gregory Larkin told him that on April 11 , Gregory worked outside the ho use building some flower boxes and went on a le ngthy walk in the neighborhood. G regory then returned to the house and had di nner with his parents. Afterwa rds, Gregory drove to Jacksonville, stayed in a hotel overnight, and flew to Mexic o the next day. Ron Larkin testified that he tried but failed to locate the hotel a t which Gregory stayed, and Gregory could not recall the hotel’s name. Katrina Larkin, Gregory Larkin’s sister, testified that when she lived with her parents for a fe w months in 2005, she observed their routine. Typical ly, her father was using the co mputer in his garage- 14 - office, watching television, or cooking. Her mother usually dr ank wine in the evening, and Gregory also drank wi ne several times a week. Wit h regard to Gregory’s visit to her parents ’ home in 2009, she testified tha t his visit occurred during the rainy season in Costa Rica, when th ere was little to no business for the family dive shop. Larkin called four defense witn esses in his case and conducted the direct examinations. Michael O’Hagen, a n acquaintance of Richard Lark in, testified that a few days after Easter (Apr il 12, 2009), possibly on April 14, he saw Richard Larkin at a convenience store. They discussed coaching childre n’s soccer. On cross-examination, the witness st ated that he did not recall th e exact date and that Richard Larkin probably was driv ing his white SUV that day, as he usually did. Moyra Bird-Owens returned to the stand and testified that as a longtime friend, she spent a lot of time with the Larkins over many year s. She stated that Gregory Larkin had a very good re lationship with his parents. During his latest visit, she had travelled with the three of them to Jekyll Islan d. Gregory had been very helpful, and she did not o bserve any drug use by him. In addition, she was aware that the Larkins planned to take a trip to Savannah, Geor gia, on April 14, 2009, and had reserved a rental car to travel in a more reliabl e vehicle than their own. Asked if Richard Larkin ha d any enemies, she responded th at she knew Allstate Insurance Company was his enemy, and she did not know if that situation- 15 - was ever resolved. Finally, she testified that Gregory sent he r a letter from jail in which he maintained his innocence. Two neighbors of the Larkins als o testified for the defense. J udith Ankerson testified that her home faced the victims’ home. She often saw Richard Larkin through his office window when she took her morning walks. She was uncertain of the date, but she believed th at she last saw Richard and Myr a Larkin on April 14, 2009, and that she noticed Richard’s office window blinds w ere closed sometime around April 15, which was unusual. Nancy Lane also h ad known the family for a long time. The family’s relationships were health y and loving, and they had fun together. She testi fied that she did not recall h earing any arguments between Gregory Lark in and his parents while he was at home. S he recalled that on one visit to her neighbors’ hom e, Gregory was working on the computer looking for employment with div e shops, including businesses in Mexico. Finally, she testified that Allstate Insur ance Company was Richard Larki n’s enemy. In rebuttal testimony, Sergeant Mi chelle Christensen of the Nas sau County Sheriff’s Office testified that t he Larkins’ vehicle was in a p arking lot of the Jacksonville International Airport on April 12 and was also the re on April 14. Security video from the convenien ce store for that date showed neither O’Hagen nor Richard Larkin. Further, a fter learning of the murders, Ju dith Ankerson, who was out of town at the time, c ontacted authorities about when s he last saw the- 16 - victims. Sergeant Christensen testified that during the phone conversation with Ankerson, she claimed to have las t seen Myra Larkin planting fl owers at the mailbox on April 14, but Ankerson was uncertain of the date. S ergeant Christensen testified, however, that there were no flowers plan ted around the mailbox. At the close of the evidence, Larkin affirmed to the trial cour t that he would not testify and had no more witne sses to call. The trial judge then denied Larkin’s motion for judgment of acquittal . In his closing argument, Lar kin argued that the small amount of blood found on t he clothing from the bathroom—t he T-shirt, shorts, and socks—was inconsiste nt with the bloody crime scene and there was no proof regarding when those clothe s were worn. Moreover, there were no fingerprints on the murder weapon . In fact, there was no witne ss, no motive, and no clean-up of the scene. Thus, t here was no hard evidence suf ficient to support a conviction. Larkin further claim ed that he chose to represent himself because his right to a speedy trial was viol ated when the public defender w aived it and because he had been wrongly accused of the grand theft of his parents’ car. After deliberation, the jury re turned verdicts of guilty on both counts of firstdegree murder. The judge renewed t he offer of counsel to Larki n, who responded that he would think about it. T he trial judge indicated that h e would soon hold another Faretta hearing.- 17 - C. Mental Competence At the January 12, 2012, hearing , the trial court renewed the o ffer of counsel to Larkin but he declined. After the Faretta hearing, the tria l court again found Larkin competent to waive counse l and that the waiver was knowi ngly and intelligently made. Morrissey then addressed the trial court, stating that he had just concluded that Larkin suffered from a delusional disorder. He requested that the trial court order a mental health evaluation, noting that the m otion was based on Larkin’s behavior during the tr ial but providing no specifics. The trial judge ordered a mental health evalua tion based solely on Morrissey’s conclusory motion. Dr. William Meadows, a forensic psychologist, evaluated Larkin by administering two tests—the “Str uctured Inventory of Malingered Symptomology (SIMS)” and the “Minnesota Multip hasic Personality Inventory, S econd Edition (MMPI-2)”—and conducting interviews with Larkin and several of his family members. The testing indicated that Larkin was not malingering , and although Larkin was impulsive and narcissi stic, he did not suffer from p sychotic disturbances. The expert concl uded, however, that Larkin’s und erstanding of the adversarial nature of legal pr oceedings, his capacity to disclo se pertinent facts to counsel, and his capacity to testif y relevantly and coherently were unacceptable. Further, Dr. Meadows found that Larkin gave an illogical accoun t of the evidence, believed the two witnesses who te stified in his defense that th ey had seen his- 18 - parents alive when Larkin was in Mexico, described a bizarre co nspiracy involving an insurance company, and believe d that his prior counsel were involved in a conspiracy to withhold exculpat ory evidence. Accordingly, Dr. Meadows concluded that Larkin met the “provisional DSM-IV-TR [Diagnosti c and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders] dia gnostic criteria for a Delusiona l Disorder” and was thus incompetent to proceed. Subsequently, a hearing was held on January 19, 2012, regarding the report. Larkin again elected to represen t himself, and the trial judge found him competent to waive counsel. The prosecutor argued that Dr. Meadows’ repo rt did not call Larkin’s competence into quest ion and that a second evaluation was not necessary. The trial judge noted that the ev idence cited in the report to support the conclusion that Larkin was delusional woul d require Larkin to disbelieve e vidence that he had presented at trial and that Larkin’s self-representation at tri al contradicted any conclusion that he did not und erstand the legal proceedings. I n addition, the trial judge questioned Larkin regarding some of the statements ascrib ed to him in the report. Then, turning to Morriss ey, the judge asked him to pro vide evidence of Larkin’s incompetence. When M orrissey responded that his motio n for a mental health evaluation was based on th e same behaviors that the judg e had observed at the trial and again cited no sp ecific examples, the judge state d that unlike Morrissey, he had not observed a ny delusional behavior by Larki n during the trial.- 19 - After stating that he would rej ect the competenc y determinationif this were not a death case, the trial judge called Dr. Meadows to testify at a hearing. Consistent with his report, he opined that Larkin was not compe tent to proceed. Dr. Meadows acknowledged that he was unaware of the degree to w hich Larkin represented himself at trial, s uch as making opening and closin g arguments and entering valid objections. Furth er, Dr. Meadows stated that so me of the collateral information, such as the report that Larkin believed in the exi stence of demons and angels on earth, came from Lark ins’ family members, and Dr. Mea dows did not discuss these reports with Larki n. Dr. Meadows also opined tha t Larkin was delusional with regard to his fat her being threatened by an ins urance company. However, when questi oned by Larkin at the hearing, Dr. Meadows acknowledged that Larkin had told Dr. Meadows about a letter Larkin had rece ived from his father, Richard Larkin. The let ter indicated that if anything happened to his father, Larkin should look for a video t hat his father had made regardi ng his difficulties with the insurance company. It wa s this video that Larkin beli eved was being withheld from him by prior def ense counsel. Morrissey declinedthe opportunity to question Dr. Meadows. The trial court subsequently a ppointed a second expert, Dr. Ala n Waldman, a psychiatrist, to examine Lark in, and a brief hearing was heldto accept that report. Dr. Waldman’s mental health evalu ation concluded that Larkin wa s competent to- 20 - proceed. He found that Larkin fu lly appreciated the charges an d the range of penalties, understood the adversar ial nature of the legal proce ss, and had the capacity to disclose pertinent f acts to counsel, as he had to t he doctor in the examination. Larkin also under stood what was needed to exculpa te him. Further, Larkin could realistically challe nge prosecution witnesses, man ifest appropriate courtroom behavior, and testify relevantly. Dr. Waldman opinedthat Larkin was not overtly psychotic or delusi onal and diagnosed him with a “P ersonality Disorder Not Otherwise Specified.” Althoug h Larkin believed that there was a conspiracy against him for a quick conviction, Dr. Waldman stated that suc h conspiracy beliefs are not uncom mon and in this case did not evidence ment al illness. Because the first two mental hea lth evaluations conflicted, a t hird expert, Dr. Umesh Mahtre, a psychiatrist, eva luated Larkin. Dr. Mahtre fou nd that the testing previously conducted showed no ev idence of psychosis and conclu ded that Larkin was competent to pro ceed. In addition, he noted that Larkin ha d no history of paranoia or psychiatric problems and that Larkin was not schizo phrenic and did not suffer from any para noid personality disorder. A hearing was h eld on February 2, 2012, to accept the third report . Again the trial judge began with a Faretta inquiry, Larkin chose self-representation , and the trial judge found him competent. D. Penalty Phase- 21 - As in the prior proceedings, Lar kin waived counsel in the penal ty phase. The State declined to present a ny witnesses, the trial court de clined a request by two family members that the tria l court call them as court witn esses, and Larkin declined to present mitigation witnesses and to testify. After the prosecutor made an opening argument and Larkin d eclined the opportunity to make a statement, the trial court called Dr. Meadows as the court’s witness. Larkin did not conduct the examination of Dr. Meadows; instead, the trial judge appointed standby counsel Morrissey, pursuant to Muhammad v. State, 782 So. 2d 343, 364 ( Fla. 2001), to question the witness. Dr. Meadows testified—consistent with his evaluation—that Larki n was intelligent and was not fabrica ting mental illness, but he was defensive during the mental health evaluation. Dr. Me adows stated that the testing and interview demonstrated that Larkin was unw illing to admit to basic human flaws or psychological weaknesses. Such d efensiveness, Dr. Meadows opin ed, may indicate that Larkin has psychi atric issues but does not want t o be seen as psychiatrically impaired. Moreove r, Larkin made statements of a persecutory delusional nature. Larkin’s family members reported that Larki n seemed increasingly paranoid over time, s tating that Larkin made bizar re statements about demons and angels. In addition , Larkin told Dr. Meadows that h e believed his attorneys conspired against him . On the other hand, Larkin hadno history of- 22 - alcohol or drug abuse and no hist ory of paranoia or other psych otic disturbances. Larkin was coherent, intelligent , and ran a business, but he wa s also immature, self-centered, and impulsive. C onsidering the testing and the other information, Dr. Meadows concluded that there w as sufficient test data to su pport a provisional diagnosis of a delusional disord er but Larkin was not overtly p sychotic. After deliberation, the jury una nimously voted for the death pe nalty as to both murders. The jury was disc harged, and the trial court onc e again renewed the offer of counsel, which was declined. E. Spencer Hearing At the beginning of the Spence r hearing, the trial judge’s offe r to appoint counsel was again declined. S ee Spencer v. Sta te, 615 So. 2d 6 88, 690-91 (Fla. 1993). A packet of letters from fa mily and friends in support of Larkin was presented to the trial court, and three witnesses testified. H elena Larkin, Gregory Larkin’s sister-in-law, showed phot os of Richard and Myra Larki n and described how they were admired and love d by family and friends. She als o related the nightmare experienced by the fam ily in the aftermath of the mur ders. Heather McLaughlin, the victims’ niece, t estified that she sought thera py after the murders. She described the murders as an act of evil and said the questi on of Larkin’s guilt had broken the family apart. Fin ally, Rick Larkin described ho w the murders had broken the family irre parably apart. Referring to the letters from family members- 23 - and others offered to the trial court in mitigation, he called them a gift to Larkin. No other statements were present ed, and Larkin presented no mit igation evidence. F. Sentencing On March 15, 2012, the trial cou rt sentenced Gregory Larkin to death on both counts of first-degree murd er. In the murder of Richard L arkin, the trial court found two aggravating factors and accorded them each great weig ht: (1) Larkin had a prior capital or violent f elony conviction; and (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC ). The first factor was based on the contemporaneous murde r of Myra Larkin. In finding the HAC aggr avator, the court noted that the victim was repeatedly beaten in the head w ith a baseball bat and died from the resulting skul l fractures and hemorrhaging. Moreover, the evidence showed that Richard Larkin stood up and turned to face his attacker and was injured in his efforts to defend himself from the blows. A ccordingly, death was not instantaneous, and Richar d Larkin was conscious and awa re both of the attack and the identity of his attacker. The trial court explained that i n light of Larkin’s decision no t to present mitigation evidence during the pe nalty phase, the record was re viewed for evidence to support any of the statutory mitigators. See § 921 .141, Fla. Stat. (2009). Accordingly, the trial j udge found that two statutory mitigating factors were established and ascribed e ach the weight indicated: (1) La rkin had no- 24 - significant history of prior criminal activity (some weight); a nd (2) Larkin was a good son, a hard worker, and rescue d some people from drowning (little weight). The trial court determined that another statutory mitigator— substantially impaired capacity to appreciate the crim inality of the conduct or conform to the requirements of law—was not established. In sentencing Larkin to death fo r the first-degree murder of My ra Larkin, the trial court again found the HAC aggravator and accorded it grea t weight, citing the multiple blows from the baseball bat that resulted in broken bo nes, brain lacerations, and a broken skull. M oreover, Myra Larkin’s defen sive wounds evidenced her consciousness duri ng the brutal beating. The tri al court also found the prior violent felony aggrav ator, based on the contemporaneo us murder of her husband, Richard Larkin, but g ave that factor little weight bec ause she was the first victim. Finally, with regard to mitigation, the trial judge ma de the same findings and ascribed the same weights to each factor as he did regardin g the murder of her husband. The trial judge concluded that a s to each first-degree murder, the aggravating factors far outweighe d the mitigating factors that were found to exist. Accordingly, he sent enced Larkin to death on both counts of fir st-degree murder.
II. ANALYSIS- 25 - On appeal from his dual convic tions and sentences of death, La rkin raises the following claims: (A) the tr ial court committed reversible error by permitting Larkin to represent himself duri ng competency proceedings; and (B) Florida’s capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional under Ring v. Ar izona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). In addition to addressing these claims, we also: (C) r eview the record to determine whether competent, subs tantial evidence supports the verdict; and (D) determine whether the death sentences are proportionate. A. Competency and Self-Representation Larkin argues that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was vi olated when the trial court failed to appoint counsel to represent him duri ng a hearing regarding his competence to proceed. We di sagree and conclude that neith er Dr. Meadows’ report nor Morrissey raised a r easonable doubt about Larkin’s m ental competence. A trial court’s decision regardi ng a determinati on of competenc y is subject to review for abuse of discretion , and the trial court’s resolutio n of factual disputes will be upheld if supported by co mpetent, substantial evidence. McCray v. State, 71 So. 3d 848, 862 (Fla. 2011), cer t. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1743 ( 2012). Accordingly, for the reasons explained below, we hold that the trial court d id not abuse its discretion by determining that L arkin was competent to continue to exercise his right to waive counsel and repres ent himself during the compete ncy proceedings.- 26 - As we have previously stated, “ [i]t is well-settled that a cri minal prosecution may not move forward at any mate rial stage of a criminal procee ding against a defendant who is incom petent to proceed.” Caraballo v. State, 39 So. 3d 1234, 1252 (Fla. 2010). In Drope v. Mi ssouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (197 5), the Supreme Court stated that “a person w hose mental condition is such thathe lacks the capacity to understand the natur e and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assis t in preparing his defense ma y not be subjected to a trial.” See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.210(a) (“A person accused of an offense or a violation of probation or comm unity control who is mentally inc ompetent to proceed at any material stage o f a criminal proceeding shall no t be proceeded against while incompetent.”). Ac cordingly, the test for determ ining a defendant’s mental competence is whether th e defendant “has sufficient pres ent ability to consult with his lawyer with areasonable degree of rational un derstanding—and whether he has a rational as w ell as factual understanding of t he proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) ; see § 916.115, Fla. Stat. (2009) (providing for appointment of experts “to det ermine the mental condition of a defendant in a cr iminal case”). This standard i s echoed in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.2 11(a)(1). In making the competen cy determination, the examining expert must consid er the defendant’s capacity to appreciate the charges and range of potential penalties, understand the advers arial nature of the- 27 - proceedings, disclose pertinent facts to counsel, behave approp riately in court, and “testify relevantly.” Fla. R . Crim. P. 3.211(a)(2)(A)(vi). In this case, Morrissey raised th e issue of Larkin’s competence at the conclusion of the guilt phase, t hroughout which Larkin represen ted himself. The right to self-representation may be exercised onl y by a defenda nt who is competent and makes a knowing and volunta ry waiver of counsel. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.111(d); Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835- 36. Moreover, where the tri al court finds a defendant has made a knowing wa iver of counsel, the court canno t deny an unequivocal request for self-repres entation absent a determinat ion that the defendant “suffer[s] from severe mental illness to the point wh ere the defendant is not competent to conduct trial pr oceedings by himself or hersel f.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.111(d)(3). In Indiana v. E dwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177-78 (2008 ), the Supreme Court explained that [t]he Constitution permits judges to take realistic account of the particular defendant’s mental capacities by asking whether a defendant who seeks to conduct his own defense at trial is ment ally competent to do so. That is to say, the Constitution permits S tates to insist upon representation by co unsel for those competent enoug h to stand trial under Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to c onduct trial proc eedings by themselves. In this case, at the time Morrisse y moved for a mental competen cy determination, Larkin had conti nuously met the standard of comp etence required for self-representation, includi ng on the day of t he competencyhearing. For- 28 - example, Larkin argued motions on valid legal grounds, raised v alid objections that were upheld, conducted both directand cross-examination of wit nesses, and made opening and closing arguments to the jury. Larkin was well-man nered throughout the proceedings and was not comba tive with the trial court or t he witnesses. Florida Rule of Criminal Proce dure 3.210(b) provides that if at “any material stage” of a criminal case, the trial court, defense counsel, or the State “has reasonable ground to believe tha t the defendant is not mentally competent to proceed, the court shall immediat ely” set a competency hearing and may order up to three expert examinations of the defendant. Moreover, a wri tten motion for a mental competency evaluation “s hall contain a certificate of co unsel that the motion is made in good faith and on reasonable grounds to belie ve that the defendant is incompetent to proce ed” and “a recital of the spec ific [non-privileged] observations of and c onversations with the d efendant that have formed the basis for the motion.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.210(b)(1) (emphasis added) . In this case, when Morrissey raised the question of Larkin’s competence, he offere d not a single specific example to support the c laim. The motion was based on unspecified observations and allegedly—but unidentified—illogical decisions that Larkin made during the court proceedings. T hus, the trial court ordered th e examination solely because Morrissey requested it and not because a “reasonable gr ound” to doubt Larkin’s competence had been demonstrated.- 29 - Larkin contends that error occu rred when he was allowed to con tinue to represent himself at the hearing held on the incompetency deter mination by Dr. Meadows. At the hearing, before Dr. Meadows arrived, the trial judge again asked Morrissey for a factual basis supporting his original allegatio n of incompetence. Morrissey could provide none, ins tead suggesting that the trial judge witnessed the unspecified behavior as well. T he trial judge responded that h e had not witnessed any delusional behavi or by Larkin at the trial. In fact, the j udge stated that the competency report’s findings were completely contradicted by th e events at trial. For example, Dr. Meadows’ findi ngs that Larkin lacked an unders tanding of the adversarial nature of the trial and the capacity to testify coh erently were clearly rebutted by his able self-repres entation at trial. Moreover, D r. Meadows’ determination of incompetency wa s based in part on Larkin’s bel ief that an insurance company had targeted h is father and that Larkin insis ted people had seen his parents alive while he was in Mexico. However these facts were supported by witness testimony at trial. In addition, Larkin created no dis ruptions at trial, and the trial judge witnessed nothing to indicate that Larkin was d elusional. Accordingly, the trial court fou nd the report “flimsy at best” and stated that had it not been a death penalty case, he would have rejected the deter mination. Dr. Meadows’ testimony at the heari ng did nothing to alter the tria l court’s conclusion.- 30 - Moreover, the other mental health experts who subs equently exam ined Larkin found him competent to proceed. In this case, the initial incomp etency determination did not ra ise a reasonable doubt regarding Larkin’s competency. The findings w ere clearly contradicted by the actual event s at trial. Accordingly, we co nclude that the trial court did not abuse its discre tion by allowing Larkin to contin ue to represent himself during the comp etency proceedings. B. The Ring Issue Larkin argues that Florida’s d eath penalty statute is unconstit utional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002 ). We have consistently rej ected Ring claims in cases such as this one, where the jury recommended a sentenc e of death by a unanimous vote. See Bevel v. S tate, 983 So. 2d 505, 526 (Fla. 2008). Moreover, we also have previously rejected Ring claims in cases in which one of the aggravating factors found is a p rior violent felony conviction. See Frances v. State, 970 So. 2d 806, 822 (Fla. 2007). In this double murder case, the prior violent felony aggravator for the contemporaneous murder suppor ts each death sentence. Id. (“Ring did not alte r the express exemption in A pprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), that prior convictions are exempt from the Sixth Amendment requirements announcedin the cases. This Court has repeatedly- 31 - relied on the presence of the pr ior violent felony aggravating circumstance in denying Ring claims.”). Accordi ngly, Larkin’s claim has no mer it. C. Competent, Substantial Evidence Regardless of whether Larkin raise s the issue, this Court indep endently reviews the record in death pena lty cases to determine whether competent, substantial evidence supports t he conviction. Pham v. State, 7 0 So. 3d 485, 501 (Fla. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1752 (2012). “In determi ning the sufficiency of the evidence, the question is whether, after viewing the evi dence in the light most favorable to the State, a r ational trier of fact could hav e found the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Bradl ey v. State, 787 So. 2d 732, 738 (Fla. 2001). In this case, the evidence showedthat Gregory Larkin, the mana ger of the family’s dive shop, lived with h is parents during a period of f amily turmoil regarding the financial difficult ies and fate of this Costa Ric an-based business. In the spring of 2009, Richard Lar kin was actively seeking a buyer for the failing business, a decision that Gregory Larkin

— who would lose his job

— vigorously opposed. On April 11, 2009, Myr a Larkin went shopping and retu rned home in the late afternoon. Richard and Myra L arkin apparently ate dinner, and then Mrs. Larkin sat down to watch a movie that she had rented that day, while Richard Larkin used the computer in his office in the garage. She was still wearing the- 32 - same clothes in which she appear ed in store security videos ear lier that day. In addition, some of the groceries th at she had purchased that aft ernoon were on the kitchen counter, including open wine bottles. Used wine glasse s, with Gregory Larkin’s DNA on one and Myra Larki n’s on the other, were nearby . Around 8 p.m., the last time the home o ffice computer was used, the murd erer entered the living room, approached Myra Lark in from behind as she sat watc hing a movie, and then beat her with a baseba ll bat until she lay on the floo r and died in a pool of blood from the resulting injuries . The assailant then walked u p behind Richard Larkin, who sat using his comput er in the garage office, and at tacked him in the same manner, landing multiple blo ws with a baseball bat, as Ric hard Larkin attempted to rise and defend hims elf. As Richard Larkin lay de ad on the floor, the assailant carried a large statu e in from the pool area and drop ped it on the victim’s face. On the next mo rning, April 12, Larkin parked his parents ’ car in the parking lot of the Jacksonville Interna tional Airport, bought a one-way ticket, and flew to Mexico. The bodies of Richard a nd Myra Larkin were found a wee k later, on April 18. There were no signs o f burglary, and the house was s ecurely locked. DNA from blood on clothing—shorts, a T-shirt, and socks—found i n the bathroom nearest to Gregory Larkin’s bed room matched the DNA profiles of Richard and Myra Larkin, and DNA from the wa istband of the shorts indicated that Gregory Larkin wore them. In addition, awhite powdery substance, cons istent with the- 33 - pool statue, was found on the T-sh irt. The record shows that L arkin did not contact or go to visit his brother on April 17, as initially planned. Instead, having never contacted anyone about his trip, he returned from Mexico to Jac ksonville on April 18. Then, instead of going to hi s parents’ home, Larkin checke d into an airport hotel, where authorities found him. He told the officers that his car keys had been stolen during a robbery in Mexi co. In light of the foregoing, we find that sufficient evidence was presented for the ju ry to find Larkin guilty of tw o counts of firstdegree murder in the deaths o f Richard and Myra Larkin. D. Proportionality The death penalty is reserved for the most aggravated and least mitigated first-degree murders. Lebron v . State, 982 So. 2d 649, 668 (Fl a. 2008). In conducting a proportionality review, t his Court considers the t otality of the circumstances in the case and co mpares it with other capital ca ses to determine whether the capital case falls w ithin this category and the dea th sentence is thus warranted. Moreover, we accept th e trial court’s weighing of the mitigating and aggravating factors. Smith v. S tate, 7 So. 3d 473, 510 (Fla. 2 009). Proportionality review “is not a comparison betw een the number of aggravating a nd mitigating circumstances.” Sexton v. Sta te, 775 So. 2d 923, 935 (Fla. 200 0) (quoting Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fl a. 1990)). Thus, it is a qu alitative rather than a- 34 - quantitative review. Here, the s trength of the aggravating fac tors and little mitigation found in the record s upport the sentences of death. In this case, the trial court se ntenced Larkin to death for the murder of his parents. The judge found the same two aggravators applicable t o both murders—a prior violent felony conviction fo r the murder of the other par ent and HAC. With regard to the first aggravati ng factor, the trial judge ascribe d great weight in the death of Larkin’s father but little weight to the same factor i n the murder of his mother, the first victim. The HAC aggravator was given great w eight as to both murders. Regardless of the wei ght ascribed by the trial court, however, HAC and prior violent felony conviction ar e deemed two of the most seri ous aggravating circumstances. See Jackson v . State, 18 So. 3d 1016, 1035 (Fla . 2009) (noting that HAC falls in most serious aggravat or category); Chamberlain v. State, 881 So. 2d 1087, 1108-09 (Fla. 2004) (finding that prior violent felony co nviction is one of the most serious aggravators). Moreover, the trial court found lit tle mitigation, ascribing some weight to the sta tutory mitigator of no signific ant criminal history and little weight to the catchall provision of other mitigating factors in the Larkin’s background, noting that Larkinwas a good son and a hard worker , and had rescued two people from drowning. Accordi ngly, the aggravation more th an outweighed the mitigation here. In addition, the jury unanimously recomme nded the death penalty for both murders.- 35 - This Court has affirmed the imp osition of the death penalty in comparable cases. In Green v. State, 583 So. 2d 647, 648-49 (Fla. 1991), the defendant killed a couple from whom he rented his a partment when they refused to r eturn his late rent check, with which he wanted to buy cocaine. Arme d with a butch er knife, Green repeatedly stabbed the female vic tim and went to the back bedro om, where he stabbed her husband twenty-eight times. Id. at 649. After a n ew penalty phase, the jury recommend death sentences by a ten-to-two vote, and the tr ial court imposed such sentences, finding the follow ing three aggravating factors as to each murder and according each great weight: the defendant had a prior capi tal felony conviction; the capital felony wa s committed for pecuniary gain ; and the murder was especially HAC. Green v. State, 907 So. 2d 489, 495 (Fla. 2005). As to each murder, the trial judge found two statutory mitigators of moder ate weight: defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotiona l disturbance; and defendant had an impaired capacity to appreciate the criminalit y of his conduct. The trial judge also found a num ber of factors under the catcha ll mitigation provision, § 921.141(6), Fla. Stat. (2009), including that Gree n was “capable of a warm and loving relationship; had[a] substantial history of st able and successful employment; had experienced a sev ere personal, social, economic , and health decline as a result of a crack cocaine addiction; . . . and had voluntarily turned himself in to authorities.” Green, 907 So. 2d at 495. In addi tion, the trial judge- 36 - gave slight weight to the testim ony of two witnesses and modera te weight to Green’s letter offered durin g a Spencer hearing. Id. Similarly, in Rigterink v. Sta te, 66 So. 3d 866, 870-71 (Fla. 2 011), the trial court sentenced the defendant to death for the stabbing deaths of two people in a warehouse. The trial court fou nd the same two aggravators thatwere applied in the instant case—HAC and prior violen t felony conviction. In addit ion, the court in Rigterink found that the avoid a rrest aggravator was applicable to one of the murders. Id. at 871 (quoting Ri gterink v. State, 2 So. 3d 221, 234 (Fla. 2009)). The trial court found that each aggravator carried great weight . As in the instant case, the court found the statu tory mitigator of no significantprior criminal history and assigned it some weight. Id . at 871. The trial court also found twelve factors of nonstatutory mitigation. Id. Finally, in Bright v. State, 90 So. 3d 249, 253-54 (Fla.), cert . denied, 133 S. Ct. 300 (2012), the defendant kille d two men in his home, beati ng them to death with a hammer. The jury recomme nded death sentences by an eigh t-to-four vote as to both murders. Id. at 256 . The trial court also found an d weighed the same aggravators and mitigators in b oth murders. The court found th ree aggravators of great weight: the defendant had aprior violent felony convicti on based on a robbery; the defendant had a pri or violent felony conviction th at was based on the contemporaneous murder; and the murder was HAC. Id. at 256-57. Further, the- 37 - judge found one statutory mitigat or—the murders were committed while defendant was under the influence of an extr eme mental or emotional disturbance—and nineteen nonstatutory mitigators— including that defendant had ahistory of drug abuse, had a decade of military s ervice with an honorable disch arge, and was a good brother and father—to which the trial court ascribed weigh ts varying from slight to considerable. Id. at 257. This Court found that the evidence presented at trial was “consistent with a scen ario in which Bright waited un til the victims were asleep, and then attacked them.” Id. at 258. After reviewing the facts and re levant cases, we hold that the death sentences imposed in this case are proportionate.
III. CONCLUSION Having reviewed the issues pre sented by Larkin, as well as the sufficiency of the evidence to support the convi ctions and the proportionalityof the sentences of death, we affirm the judgment a nd sentences of death in this ca se. It is so ordered. POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, L EWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF FILED, DETERMINED An Appeal from the Circuit Co urt in and for Nassau County, Robert Mallory Foster, Judge - Case No. 45-2009-CF-000448-AX- 38 - Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender , and Nada M. Carey, AssistantPublic Defender, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellant Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney Genera l, and Renee M. Rancour, Assist ant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellee