alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 99-1474

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Southern v. * District of Iowa. * Dennis D. Miller, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: August 6, 1999

Filed: August 16, 1999

___________ Before BEAM, FAGG, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Dennis D. Miller challenges the sentence imposed by the district court after Miller pleaded guilty to production of child pornography and to possession of child pornography. After Miller's counsel filed a brief under Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and moved to withdraw, we granted Miller permission to file a pro se supplemental brief but he has not done so.
Inthe Anders brief, counsel challenges the 188-month sentence imposed by the district court because 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) requires the court to impose "a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in" 18-2-

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). Counsel argues that Miller's sentence is greater than necessary to satisfy those purposes. We disagree.
The district court referred to testimony about the harmful impact of Miller's conduct on his victims, stressed the flagrancy of his actions, and chose the maximum sentence available within the applicable range to punish and deter Miller, to protect society from him, and to deter others like him. We conclude the district court satisfactorily explained why the sentence was sufficient but not greater than necessary to reflect the seriousness of the offenses, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, protect the public, and provide Miller with neededtreatment. See 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2). We thus defer to the district court's exercise of its sentencing discretion. See Williams v. United States , 503 U.S. 193, 205 (1992).
Based on our independent review of the record, we find no nonfrivolous issues. See Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75 (1988). We thus affirm Miller's sentence and grant counsel's motion to withdraw. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
Exhibit 4.431

 

GENERAL BANKING LICENSE

 

No. 2268

 

Pursuant to the Federal Law “On Banks and Banking Activities”, the General License is issued to

 

MTS Bank Public Joint-Stock Company

 

MTS Bank PJSC, Moscow,

 

hereinafter referred to as the “Bank” to perform banking activities.

 

The Bank is entitled to perform the following banking operations with funds denominated in roubles and foreign currency:

 

1.              Raising funds of individuals and legal entities for demand and time deposits.

2.              Depositing the funds raised from individuals and legal entities on its behalf and at own expense (demand and time deposits).

3.              Opening and keeping bank accounts of individuals and legal entities.

4.              Remittances on behalf of individuals and legal entities, including authorized correspondent and foreign banks through their bank accounts.

5.              Collecting cash, promissory notes, payment and settlement documents, as well as cash services for individuals and legal entities.

6.              Buying and selling foreign currency on a cash and non-cash basis.

7.              Issuing bank guarantees.

8.              Remittances without opening bank accounts, including electronic funds transfers (save for postal remittances).

 

 

	
First Deputy Chairman
    	
/signature/   A.Y. Simanovsky
    
	
of the Central Bank of Russia
    	
 
    


 

[Round seal of the Central Bank of Russia]

 

17 December 2014
IV 

115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 120 

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives with regard to the 

courts’ actions against President Trump’s Executive order. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 13, 2017 

Mr. KING of Iowa submitted the following resolution; which was referred to 

the Committee on the Judiciary 

RESOLUTION 

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives with 

regard to the courts’ actions against President Trump’s 

Executive order. 

1 Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Rep2 resentatives that— 

3 (1) Judge James L. Robart of the Western Dis4 trict of Washington ignored the Constitution, Fed5 eral law and court precedent in issuing a temporary 

6 restraining order against President Trump’s Execu7 tive order entitled ‘‘Protecting the Nation from For8 eign Terrorist Entry into the United States’’; and 


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2 

•HRES 120 IH 

1 (2) the United States Court of Appeals for the 

2 Ninth Circuit erred in failing to reverse Judge 

3 Robart’s erroneous temporary restraining order. 

Æ 


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<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
DEOTEXIS, INC. AND SUBSIDIARY CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR
THE SIX MONTHS ENDED JUNE 30, 2000 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE
TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                         887,330
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,125,860
<PP&E>                                               0
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<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,916,338
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           82,997
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<COMMON>                                         4,547
<OTHER-SE>                                     931,757
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,916,338
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               106,368
<CGS>                                                0
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               483,250
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              28,600
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (405,482)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (405,482)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.09)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.09)


</TABLE>
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-50834

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

RESHAWN MOSSES LEAL, also known as Reshawn Leal,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 7:13-CR-131-5

Before KING, JOLLY, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The attorney appointed to represent Reshawn Mosses Leal has moved 

for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th 

Cir. 2011). Leal has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and 

the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s 

assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 19, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

 Case: 13-50834 Document: 00512775100 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/19/2014
No. 13-50834

Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is 

excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. 

See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

2

 Case: 13-50834 Document: 00512775100 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/19/2014
IV 

115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 122 

Providing amounts for the expenses of the Committee on Science, Space, 

and Technology in the One Hundred Fifteenth Congress. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 13, 2017 

Mr. SMITH of Texas submitted the following resolution; which was referred 

to the Committee on House Administration 

RESOLUTION 

Providing amounts for the expenses of the Committee on 

Science, Space, and Technology in the One Hundred 

Fifteenth Congress. 

1 Resolved, 

2 SECTION 1. AMOUNTS FOR COMMITTEE EXPENSES. 

3 For the expenses of the Committee on Science, Space, 

4 and Technology (hereafter in this resolution referred to 

5 as the ‘‘Committee’’), including the expenses of all staff 

6 salaries, there shall be paid, out of the applicable accounts 

7 of the House of Representatives for committee salaries 

8 and expenses, not more than $10,969,956 for the One 

9 Hundred Fifteenth Congress. 


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2 

•HRES 122 IH 

1 SEC. 2. SESSION LIMITATIONS. 

2 Of the amount specified in section 1— 

3 (1) not more than $5,484,978 shall be available 

4 for expenses incurred during the period beginning at 

5 noon on January 3, 2017, and ending immediately 

6 before noon on January 3, 2018; and 

7 (2) not more than $5,484,978 shall be available 

8 for expenses incurred during the period beginning at 

9 noon on January 3, 2018, and ending immediately 

10 before noon on January 3, 2019. 

11 SEC. 3. VOUCHERS. 

12 Payments under this resolution shall be made on 

13 vouchers authorized by the Committee, signed by the 

14 Chairman of the Committee, and approved in the manner 

15 directed by the Committee on House Administration. 

16 SEC. 4. REGULATIONS. 

17 Amounts made available under this resolution shall 

18 be expended in accordance with regulations prescribed by 

19 the Committee on House Administration. 

Æ 


emcdonald on DSK9F6TC42PROD with BILLS
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. LOWELL ALLEN.

May 19, 1987.

Petition for certification denied.
U.S. Merit System s Protection Board

Policy Govern in g the Design ation 

o f Ag e n cy In it ia l Co n t a ct s

On October 16, 2023, MSPB will launch its new e-Appeal system, which provides the same 

extensive capabilities of the former e-Appeal Online and offers additional functionality for 

monitoring agency cases. The Board’s regulations provide that “[a]gencies are required to 

designate a specific individual as an initial agency representative to whom the Board will serve 

a copy of an appeal when it is docketed” and that “[a]gency initial contacts are responsible for 

monitoring case activity regularly at e-Appeal.” See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.14(g)(1). All agency 

representatives are required to register as e-filers and use e-Appeal as the exclusive system for 

electronic filing with the MSPB. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.14(b), (e)(5). The instant policy sets forth the 

requirements for the designation of agency initial contacts pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 1201.14(g)(2).

Each agency work unit must designate with the Board a specific individual, with a unique email 

address, as the agency initial contact. E-Appeal provides flexibility in reasonably allowing the 

agency to define its work unit in a manner supporting its organizational structure for handling 

MSPB appeals. An agency work unit may encompass the entire agency/subagency, or it may be 

structured by location and geographic area. The agency initial contact must provide the Board 

with the definition or coverage of the work unit to facilitate notification of new Board appeals.

The agency initial contact is responsible for updating the work unit’s information with the Board 

as necessary, including any update to the designated initial contact, their email address and

contact information, and work unit coverage. Failure to maintain accurate initial contact 

information for a work unit could lead to sanctions or a finding against the agency in any case 

in which the agency fails to appear or respond to orders.

E-Appeal provides the agency initial contact and work unit with expanded functionality

to assist in fulfilling the initial contact’s monitoring obligations. The initial contact can 

designate five users in the work unit as "superusers," who, in addition to the initial contact,

can monitor all appeals in the work unit; preregister, deactivate, and edit agency users in the 

work unit; and invite agency representatives in the work unit to designate themselves on a 

case. For more information regarding e-Appeal’s functionality for initial contacts and 

superusers, please refer to the “Information for Agency Users” and “e-Appeal Guide for Agency 

Users,” available at the MSPB e-Appeal Information Hub. 

Date: October 13, 2023
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. TINA CARTER.

February 27, 1987.

Petition for certification denied.
Exhibit
31
 
 RULE
13a-14(a)/15d-14(a) CERTIFICATION
 
 I,
Jay Gottlieb certify that:
 
 1.
              I
      have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Spatializer Audio
      Laboratories, Inc.;
 
 2.
              Based
      on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
      material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
      statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
      were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
      report;
 
 3.
              Based
      on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
      included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
      financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
      registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
      report;
 
 4.
              The
      registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for
      establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as
      defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant
      and have:
 
 a)
Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;
 
 b)
Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and
 
 c)
Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal
quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and
 
 5.
              The
      registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on
      our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting,
      to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s
      board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
      functions):
 
 a) All
significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and
report financial information; and
 
 b) Any
fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who
have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial
reporting.
 
 Date:
November 12, 2008
 
 /s/
      Jay GottliebJay GottliebChairman
      of the Board and President(performing
      the functions of principal executiveofficer
      and principal financial officer)
Order entered Ju ly 1 , 2014

In The 

## Court of Appeals **Fifth District of Texas at Dallas** No. 05 - 13 - 01269 - CV TIFFANY LYNN FRASER, Appellant V. TIMOTHY PURNELL, AS INDEPENDENT EXECUTOR , ESTATE OF TOMMY ARTHUR PU R NELL, DECEASED, Appellee s On Appeal from the Probate Court No. 1 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. PR - 11 - 927 - 1 

### O RDER We GRANT appellant’s June 26, 2014 unopposed motion to extend time to file reply brief and ORDER the brief be filed no later than July 16, 2014

. No further extensions w ill be granted absent exigent circumstances.

/s/ ELIZABETH LANG

- MIERS JUSTICE
# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

January 9, 2019

No. 04

- 18

- 00929

- CV

IN R E Tracey MURPHY

, Appellant

From the 81st Judicial District Court, Karnes County, Texas

Trial Court No. 15

- 04

- 00091

- CVK

Honorable Donna S. Rayes, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

The Relator ’ s Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Rehearing is GRANTED.

Time is extended until January 14, 2019.

___ ______________________________ Irene Rios , Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 9th day of January, 2019

.

______ _____________________________ K eith E. H ottle

Clerk of Court
#### NORTH LAWRENCE CITIZENS ASSOCIATION v. THE TOWNSHIP COUNCIL OF THE TOWNSHIP OF LAWRENCE AND PRINCETON PIKE PARTNERSHIP.

May 19, 1987.

Petition for certification denied.
# Sitemap

## March 23, 2003

- Home
- Sitemap
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- March 23, 2003

            - Pioneer 10 Sends Last Signal
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. STEPHEN PITTS.

December 22, 1986.

This matter having been presented on petition for certification and it appearing that the record does not set forth the trial court’s reasons for the consecutive features of the sentences or whether the trial court had considered elements of defendant’s crimes as aggravating factors in the imposition of defendant’s sentence, see *State v. Link,*197 *N.J.Super.*615, 620 (App.Div. 1984), and since the original sentencer may have a commitment to the sentence already imposed, it is ORDERED that the petition for certification is granted, limited solely as to the issue of excessiveness of sentence; and it is further

ORDERED that the matter is summarily remanded to the Superior Court, Law Division, for resentencing in light of *State v. Yarbough,*100 *N.J.*627 (1985), by a court other than the court that originally imposed the sentence.

Jurisdiction is not retained.
#### The State of Ohio, Appellee, *v.*Williams, Appellant.

(No. 6336

Decided November 22, 1943.)

*Mr. Carson Hoy*and *Mr. Louis F. Britten,*for appellee.

*Mr. Edwin T. Heillcer,*for appellant.

Ross, P. J.

The defendant was employed by the Saunders System to service motor vehicles used by it *371in its business. He was permitted to use an automobile of the company to go to and from various places where his services were required by the company and to his home for a meal about midnight, his employment requiring him to work during the night.

After going to his home for a meal, defendant drove the car on an excursion of his own, being apprehended on the following day, in possession of the vehicle.

He was indicted on three counts, the first charging larceny of the car, the second, driving it without the consent of the owner, and the third, possessing it, knowing it to have been stolen.

The first and third counts were dismissed by the court. The trial on the second count resulted in defendant’s conviction. An appeal on questions of law is taken from the judgment of the Common Pleas Court of Hamilton county, predicated upon the verdict.

The contention of the defendant is that the 'evidence showing he was given permission to use the car for definite purposes, his later unauthorized use of the car for his own purposes does not justify a conviction under the provisions of Section 12619, General Code. This statute provides in part, that “whoever purposely takes, drives or operates any motor vehicle without the consent of the owner thereof’’ shall be punished as therein provided.

When the defendant departed from the use of the car for which the consent and permission of his employer had been given, and thereafter proceeded to use the car for his own purposes entirely dissociated with any business of his employer, he most certainly drove and operated it without the consent of the owner.

No one would claim that the owner could be held accountable for any harm resulting from the operation of the vehicle after the defendant proceeded upon his own affairs, which incidentally the evidence shows was to use it to convey himself and several acquaintances *372upon an extended carousal — ending on the following day. No consent or permission to so use the vehicle may be inferred or implied from the original consent to use it for lawful purposes connected with the master’s business.

The original talcing of the car may in one sense be considered lawful — even so, the driving and operating were unlawful and in violation of the statute, as such procedure was wholly without the consent of the owner. The provisions of the statute are in the disjunctive and severable. In another sense, however, when the defendant proceeded upon his misuse of the car, employing it for his own purposes, and for reasons entirely separate from the use originally permitted, this in itself constituted a taking as well as a driving and operation without the consent of the owner.

The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Hildebrant and Matthews, JJ., concur.
# Celebrate the 4th of July by practicing water safety

Operation Dry Water is July 3 - 5, 2020

**ST. PAUL, Minn. –**As we begin our 4th of July celebrations across the Upper Midwest, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, St. Paul District, wants to remind everyone to celebrate it safely, especially near the water.

As COVID-19 continues to change plans and traditions, boating and swimming are becoming better opportunities to enjoy the summer while practicing social distancing. There are several great areas to get out on the water whether you are looking for a leisurely float on a lake or a chance to catch a walleye on a river. Regardless of your plans, Corps staff want to remind everyone to do it safely and to always wear your life jacket.

In addition to the 4th of July, Corps staff want to remind everyone that this weekend is Operation Dry Water, a water safety and boating safety campaign created by the National Association of State Boating Law Administrators. This means more law enforcement will be on the water patrolling to ensure you are safe and sober while operating your boat. Remember, drunk boating is drunk driving.

Finally, here are a few additional tips to ensure you are safe while on the water:
          - Carry a marine radio – tuned to channel 16, designated as the international distress frequency;
          - Carry an appropriate-sized anchor – the anchor should be able to still your vessel, with enough line to remain secure at alternate depths;
          - Observe restricted areas – set at 600-feet upstream of a dam and 150-feet below; and
          - Be courteous of other vessels – especially commercial tows, which will be more prevalent on the water and take up to a quarter-mile to stop.

 

– 30 – 

**Contact**

Release no. 20-058

boating

water safety

life jacket

4th of July

operation dry water

St. Paul District

Mississippi Valley  Division

USACE
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. JOSE SANTIAGO GONZALEZ.

April 28, 1987.

Petition for certification denied.