alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 202 (Wednesday, October 20, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 64753]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-26344]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION


Proposed Collection; Comment Request

Upon Written Request, Copies Available From: Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Office of Investor Education and Advocacy, Washington, DC 
20549-0213.

Extension:
    Rule 425, OMB Control No. 3235-0521, SEC File No. 270-462.

    Notice is hereby given, that pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction 
Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (``Commission'') is soliciting comments on the collection of 
information summarized below. The Commission plans to submit this 
existing collection of information to the Office of Management and 
Budget for approval.
    Rule 425 (17 CFR 230.425) under the Securities Act of 1933 (15 
U.S.C. 77a et seq.) requires the filing of certain prospectuses and 
communications under Rule 135 (17 CFR 230.135) and Rule 165 (17 CFR 
230.165) in connection with business combination transactions. The 
purpose of the rule is to permit more oral and written communications 
with shareholders about tender offers, mergers and other business 
combination transactions on a more timely basis, so long as the written 
communications are filed on the date of first use. Approximately 1,680 
issuers file communications under Rule 425 at an estimated 0.25 hours 
per response for a total of 420 annual burden hours.
    Written comments are invited on: (a) Whether the collection of 
information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of 
the agency, including whether the information will have practical 
utility; (b) the accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden 
imposed by the collection of information; (c) ways to enhance the 
quality, utility, and clarity of the information collected; and (d) 
ways to minimize the burden of the collection of information on 
respondents, including through the use of automated collection 
techniques or other forms of information technology. Consideration will 
be given to comments and suggestions submitted in writing within 60 
days of this publication.
    Please direct your written comments to Jeffrey Heslop, Acting 
Director/CIO, Securities and Exchange Commission, C/O Remi Pavlik-
Simon, 6432 General Green Way, Alexandria, VA 22312; or send an e-mail 
to: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#7e2e2c3f21331f17121c11063e0d1b1d50191108"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="ca9a988b9587aba3a6a8a5b28ab9afa9e4ada5bc">[email protected]</span></a>.

    Dated: October 6, 2010.
Florence E. Harmon,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2010-26344 Filed 10-19-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JULIO CESAR HUERTA

- CARILLO,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent. No. 16

- 73724

Agency No. A092

- 474

- 925

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 14, 2022 * *
Pasadena, California

Before: BRESS and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and GLEASON, ** * District Judge.

Julio Huerta

- Carillo petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals

(“BIA”) decision denying his motion for sua sponte reopen ing based on a

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Sharon L. Gleason, Chief United States District Judge

for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

FEB 18 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

fundamental change in the law

. We generally lack jurisdiction to review the denial

of a sua sponte motion for reopening. See Ekimian v. INS , 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th

Cir. 2002). However, we retain jurisdiction “for the limited purpose of reviewing

the reasoning behind the decision[] for legal or constitutional error.” Bonilla v.

Lynch , 840 F.3d 575, 588 (9th Cir. 2016). We deny Huerta

- Carillo’s petition.

1. The BIA’s denial of Huerta

- Carillo’s motion for sua sponte reopening

did not rest on a legal or constitutional error. The BIA found that , even assuming

there was a fundamental change in the law, the time between the change and the

filing of Huerta

- Carillo’s motion was too long to justify reopening

. In its analysis

,

the BIA examined the time that had elapsed in prior cases of sua s ponte reopening

,

and determined that Huerta

- Carillo’s fourteen

- month delay did not warrant

reopening

.

In reaching this decision , the BIA did not “misconstrue[] the parameters of its

sua sponte authority [

. ] ” See Lona v. Barr , 958 F.3d 1225, 1237 (9th Cir. 2020)

.

Instead, the BIA exercised its discretion by reaching a decision based on the length

of time that Huerta

- Carillo waite d to bring his claim. When the BIA does so

, “there

is nothing left for us to review.” Id. at 1235 (simplified) . Because the BIA did not

commit any legal or constitutional error in determining that Huerta

- Carillo waited

too long to bring his claim, we la ck jurisdiction to consider the denial of his motion

for sua sponte r eopening. Cf. Bonilla , 840 F.3d at 581

– 82

.3

DENIED

.
# Memo from the Director of Contracting re: COVID-19

## For USACE Contractors, As the Director of Contracting for the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, I wanted to personally reach out to all of you and let you know that we are actively monitoring the situation in regards to the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19). Attached is the guidance we received on planning for potential Novel Coronavirus Contract Impacts. Please read the attachment, and if you have any questions or concerns how this situation affects your project(s), please reach out to your respective Contracting Officer for assistance. My Point of contact for this memorandum is John A. Jacobson at (202) 761- 8817 or John.A.Jacobson@usace.army.mil Released by:JILL E. STIGLICHDirector of Contracting

COVID-19
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. RAYMOND P. TANGO, JR.

May 28, 1987.

Petition for certification denied.
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. RANDOLPH GRAHAM.

March 24, 1987.

Petition for certification denied. See *State v. O’Connor,*105 *N.J.*399 (1987), and *State v. Hartye,*105 *N.J.*411 (1987).
IN GENERAL TERM, 1872.

#### The Indianapolis and Lanesville Gravel Road Co. *v.*Gideon Newkirk, Appellant.

Appeal from Band, J.

*Appeal*— in *Superior Couri.*

An appeal can not be taken from a Special to a General Term of this Court, except in like eases where an appeal will lie from the Circuit to the Supreme Court.

*Woollen Sf Ruddell,*for appellant.

*Wm. Wallace,*for appellee.

Blair, J.

This was a suit to recover the penalty allowed by statute for turning off the road of plaintiff, and driving around the toll gate to defraud the plaintiff of her tolls. The cause was originally commenced before a Justice of the Peace, and brought to this Court by appeal. At Special Term a trial by jury was had, resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff, in the sum of three dollars.

A motion for new trial was overruled, and the defendant appealed to General Term. The only error assigned is the overruling of the motion for a -new trial. The new trial was asked on two grounds :

*jFirst,*That the verdict of the jury was contrary to the law.

*Second,,*That it was contrary to the evidence.

We think there was evidence tending to show that the defendant turned off the road of the plaintiff before coming *164to the toll gate, and drove around the gate for the purpose of defrauding the plaintiff of her toll. If such was the case, the verdict is supported by the law, and the jury having so found, we can not disturb the verdict.

In addition to this, an appeal can not be taken from a Special to a General Term of this Court, except in cases where an appeal will lie from the Circuit Court to the Supreme Court. Acts 1871, p. 53, Sec. 25. The provisions of Sec. 550, p. 269, 2 G. & H., will not permit an appeal from the Circuit Court to the Supreme Court in this case, the judgment, exclusive of costs, being less than ten dollars. Hence the appeal will not lie.

The appeal is therefore dismissed at appellant’s cost.
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

**491 KA 12-01619**  PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, FAHEY, SCONIERS, AND VALENTINO, JJ.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CHRISTOPHER BOSWELL, SR., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. (APPEAL NO. 1.)

JAMES S. KERNAN, PUBLIC DEFENDER, LYONS (RICHARD W. YOUNGMAN OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

RICHARD M. HEALY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, LYONS (BRUCE A. ROSEKRANS OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.

Appeal from a judgment of the Wayne County Court (Dennis M. Kehoe, J.), rendered July 5, 2011. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of assault in the second degree.

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: In appeal No. 1, defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of assault in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.05 [3]). In appeal No. 2, defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of promoting prison contraband in the first degree (§ 205.25 [1]). In appeal No. 3, defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of aggravated criminal contempt (§ 215.52 [1]). Defendant contends with respect to each appeal that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. That contention does not survive his guilty plea in any appeal inasmuch as “defendant failed to demonstrate that the plea bargaining process was infected by [the] allegedly ineffective assistance or that defendant entered the plea because of [defense counsel’s] allegedly poor performance” ( People v Durodoye
, 113 AD3d 1130, 1131 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Wright , 66 AD3d 1334, 1334, lv denied 13 NY3d 912). To the extent that defendant’s contention involves matters outside the record on appeal, we note that it must be raised by way of a motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 ( see People v Russell , 83 AD3d 1463, 1465, lv denied 17 NY3d 800).

We reject defendant’s further contention in each appeal that the court’s failure to address his request for substitution of counsel requires reversal. In support of his request, defendant made only conclusory assertions that “did not ‘suggest a serious possibility of**-2- 491 KA 12-01619** 
good cause for substitution’ ” ( People v Thagard , 28 AD3d 1097, 1098, lv denied 7 NY3d 795; see People v Hyson , 111 AD3d 1387, 1388). In any event, defendant abandoned his request when he “ ‘decid[ed] . . . to plead guilty while still being represented by the same attorney’ ” ( People v Guantero , 100 AD3d 1386, 1387, lv denied 21 NY3d 1004; see People v Morris , 94 AD3d 1450, 1451, lv denied 19 NY3d 976; People v Munzert , 92 AD3d 1291, 1292-1293).

Entered: May 2, 2014 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
Document

Exhibit 10-e-5


SECOND amendment
to
NORDSON CORPORATION 
AMENDED AND RESTATED 2005
SUPPLEMENTAL EXECUTIVE RETIREMENT PLAN
[DEFINED BENEFIT]


WHEREAS, Nordson Corporation (the “Company”) presently maintains in effect the Nordson Corporation Amended and Restated 2005 Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan [Defined Benefit] (the “2005 Excess Defined Benefit Pension Plan”); and


WHEREAS, the Board of Directors of the Company has authorized the closure of the 2005 Excess Defined Benefit Pension Plan to all Employees who are hired, rehired, or transferred to salaried or non-union hourly employment on or after July 1, 2021 and thus, on and after July 1, 2021, the Employees who are eligible to participate in the 2005 Excess Defined Benefit Plan are those Employees who (i) are actively participating in the Nordson Corporation Salaried Employees Pension Plan on June 30, 2021 or (ii) are engaged in salaried or non-union employment with an Employer before July 1, 2021, and become eligible to participate in the Nordson Corporation Salaried Employees Pension Plan on or after that date, excluding any Employee described in (i) or (ii) who is rehired on or after July 1, 2021.


NOW THEREFORE, in furtherance of the authorization of the Board of Directors of the Company, the 2005 Excess Defined Benefit Pension Plan is hereby amended, effective as of the date set forth below, in the following respects:


1.Effective as of July 1, 2021, Section 1.1(e) of the 2005 Excess Defined Benefit Pension Plan is amended by the addition of a new sentence at the end thereof to provide as follows:


Notwithstanding any provision of the Plan to the contrary, the term “Employee” shall not include: (i) any person who first completes an Hour of Service on or after July 1, 2021; (ii) any retired or former employee who is rehired by an Employer on or after July 1, 2021; or (iii) any person who transfers or retransfers on or after July 1, 2021 to employment compensated, in whole or in part, on a salaried or non-union hourly basis.


EXECUTED at Westlake, Ohio, this  29th  day of  October , 2021.
NORDSON CORPORATION


By:  /s/ Shelly M. Peet
Name:  Shelly M. Peet
Title:   Executive Vice President, Human Resources
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. JOSE SERRANO.

February 27, 1987.

Petition for certification denied. (See 213 *N.J.Super.*419)
#### NICHOLAS TIERNEY, ETC., ET AL. v. ST. MICHAEL’S MEDICAL CENTER, ET AL.

March 2, 1987.

Cross-petition for certification denied. (See 214 *N.J.Super.*27)
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. THEODORE PYCH.

January 28, 1987.

Petition for certification denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
COMPANY'S SEPTEMBER 30, 1997 CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   14,135
<ALLOWANCES>                                     4,107
<INVENTORY>                                      6,102
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                21,283
<PP&E>                                         154,894
<DEPRECIATION>                                  68,498
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 150,505
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          100,117
<BONDS>                                        126,671
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                    (76,283)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   150,505
<SALES>                                         50,357
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               200,431
<CGS>                                           62,437
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   62,437
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               141,577
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              13,437
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (19,238)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (19,238)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (19,238)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>           5
<MULTIPLIER>        1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                           9,767
<SECURITIES>                                    42,572
<RECEIVABLES>                                   12,182
<ALLOWANCES>                                      (300)
<INVENTORY>                                     16,254
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                82,466
<PP&E>                                          66,432
<DEPRECIATION>                                  (9,729)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 139,593
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           16,142
<BONDS>                                          4,091
<COMMON>                                           162
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                     117,907
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   139,593
<SALES>                                         22,224
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                22,224
<CGS>                                           15,749
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   15,749
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 109
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  4,063
<INCOME-TAX>                                       802
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              3,261
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     3,261
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .20
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .20
        

</TABLE>
**Exhibit 23.1**

**Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-200366) pertaining to the Amended and Restated 2005 VirginAmerica Inc. Stock Incentive Plan, the Virgin America Inc. 2014 Equity Incentive Award Plan and the 2014 Employee Stock Purchase Plan of our report dated March 2, 2015, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Virgin AmericaInc. included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31, 2014. 

/s/ Ernst & Young 

San Francisco, California 

March 2, 2015
**Exhibit 31.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

I, Robert B. Goergen,Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Blyth, Inc., certify that:

 

1.                  I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Qof Blyth, Inc.;

 

2.                  Based on my knowledge, this report does notcontain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a materialfact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances underwhich such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;

 

3.                  Based on my knowledge, the financialstatements, and other financial information included in this report, fairlypresent in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

 

4.                 The registrant’s other certifying officer(s)and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls andprocedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e))for the registrant and have:

 

(a) Designed such disclosure controls andprocedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designedunder our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us byothers within those entities, particularly during the period in which thisreport is being prepared;

 

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of theregistrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this reportour conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and

 

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarterin the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonablylikely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting; and

 

5.                  The registrant’s other certifying officer(s)and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal controlover financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committeeof the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions):

 

(a) All significant deficiencies and materialweaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financialreporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

 

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, thatinvolves management or other employees who have a significant role in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting.

 

Date: September 9, 2005

 

 
| /s/ Robert B. Goergen |   |
|-----------------------|--------|

Robert B. Goergen

Chairman and Chief ExecutiveOfficer

 

----
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 21, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-11312

Conference Calendar

 

FREDERICK LYNN MITCHELL,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

K.J. WENDT, Warden, Federal Correctional

Institution - Seagoville,

Respondent-Appellee.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:03-CV-1306-A

--------------------

Before JOLLY, JONES, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

 Frederick Lynn Mitchell, federal prisoner #26943-177,

appeals the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of his 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241 petition, which the district court construed as a

successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion filed without proper

authorization. In his petition, he sought to challenge his

guilty-plea conviction for possession with the intent to

distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base. Mitchell argued
No. 03-11312

-2-

that (1) his conviction was void because the statutes under which

he was convicted were uncodified; (2) the indictment was

defective because it failed to allege the essential elements of

the offense; (3) the district court lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction because the indictment failed to allege the

essential elements of the offense; (4) he was actually innocent

of the offense of conviction; and (5) the “fair warning doctrine”

was violated because the indictment failed to allege the

essential elements of the offense. 

The district court correctly construed the petition as a

successive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 because Mitchell was

attacking the legality of his conviction rather than the manner

of execution of his sentence. Tolliver v. Dobre, 211 F.3d 876,

877 (5th Cir. 2000). Nor has Mitchell shown that his case fits

within the “savings clause” of 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255; Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 904 (5th

Cir. 2001). The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.