RENDERED: JUNE 28, 2024; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2023-CA-1400-WC

MICHAEL WYANT APPELLANT 

v. 

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION

OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD

ACTION NO. WC-17-95237

U.S. ERECTORS, INC.; HONORABLE 

CHRIS GREG DAVIS,

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; 

AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 

BOARD APPELLEES 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, ECKERLE, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: Appellant, Michael Wyant (Wyant), is an iron worker 

formerly employed by Appellee, U.S. Erectors, Inc. (Employer). While at work on 

February 6, 2016, Wyant injured his groin by lifting an approximately onehundred-pound keg of iron bolts. He filed a claim for workers’ compensation 

benefits due to the groin injury, as well as injuries to his right hip and back. 
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The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued an Opinion and Order 

awarding temporary total benefits (TTD), permanent partial disability benefits 

(PPD), and medical expenses. He assessed the date of Wyant’s maximum medical 

improvement (MMI) to be January 21, 2017. A three-percent impairment rating 

was assessed for the groin injury. Wyant petitioned the ALJ for reconsideration, 

which was denied. He appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Board (Board), 

which unanimously affirmed the ALJ’s decision. Wyant now appeals to this Court 

as a matter of right. Having reviewed the record and the law, we affirm. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The ALJ has “the sole discretion to determine the quality, character

weight, credibility, and substance of the evidence, and to draw reasonable 

inferences from the evidence.” Bowerman v. Black Equipment Co., 297 S.W.3d

858, 866 (Ky. App. 2009). Therefore, “appellate courts may not second-guess or 

disturb discretionary decisions of an ALJ unless those decisions amount to an

abuse of discretion.” Id. (citing Medley v. Bd. of Educ., Shelby County, 168

S.W.3d 398, 406 (Ky. App. 2004)). “If the reviewing court concludes the rule of 

law was correctly applied to facts supported by substantial evidence, the final order 

of the agency must be affirmed.” Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm’n v. Cecil,

381 S.W.3d 238, 246 (Ky. 2012) (citing Brown Hotel Co. v. Edwards, 365 S.W.2d

299 (Ky. 1962)). “Substantial evidence means evidence of substance and relevant 
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consequence having the fitness to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable 

men.” Smyzer v. B.F. Goodrich Chem. Co., 474 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Ky. 1971)

(citation omitted). Therefore, we review Board decisions to determine if it “has 

overlooked or misconstrued controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an 

error in assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice.” Western 

Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Ky. 1992). 

With these standards in mind, we now turn to the merits of the present case. 

ANALYSIS

Wyatt primarily argues that the ALJ: 1) mischaracterized medical 

testimony and ignored substantial evidence in determining that his lumbar and hip 

injuries were not work-related; 2) erroneously determined MMI; and 3) failed to 

enhance the PPD award by a factor of three (the 3X multiplier). The ALJ 

extensively addressed the evidence presented by the relevant experts in its opinion 

and order. And it did so most succinctly in its order denying Wyant’s Petition for 

Reconsideration as follows:

I do not believe the MMI date assigned by Dr. Hall is 

speculative and substantial evidence supports that date. I 

hope that the Opinion amply sets forth the basis of my 

rejection of the low back and right hip claims. I hope it 

also recites the evidence that would have supported a 

contrary finding. I summarized the evidence from Dr.

Wunder, Dr. Grefer and the Plaintiff and noted them in 

my analysis. They support, but do not compel, a contrary 

finding. While generally loathe, personally and 

professionally, to so note it is important to fully apprise 
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the parties of the basis for my opinion so there is this, I 

do not [find] Mr. Wyant credible when he states his low 

back or right hip were in pain far sooner than he told the 

doctors and I reject any notion that he would not have 

sought medical treatment if they were hurting as much as 

he says. Therefore, the Petition is OVERRULED

In its opinion affirming, the Board provided the following relevant summary:

[T]he opinions of Drs. Jacquemin, Nazar, and Griesser 

support the ALJ’s determination that neither the low back 

nor right hip conditions are causally related to the 

February 6, 2016, work incident. Due to the gap of time 

between the date of injury and the onset of Wyant’s low 

back and right hip pain, the ALJ was convinced the 

causal chain was broken. In fact, as the ALJ accurately 

noted in the June 15, 2023, Opinion, Award, and Order, 

Wyant’s March 18, 2022, hip surgery did not take place 

until six years following the work incident. Lumbar 

surgery was performed on February 22, 2021, five years 

following the work incident. The ALJ’s determination 

regarding the lack of causal connection between the work

incident and Wyant’s low back and right hip conditions is 

fully substantiated by the opinions of Drs. Jacquemin, 

Nazar, and Griesser. As such, we must affirm.

(Emphasis in original.) To be clear, the medical issue in this case focused on the

records and opinions of several physicians who treated or examined Wyant. And 

the primary issue is whether the ALJ erred in finding the low back and right hip

injuries were not work-related. The burden is on an injured worker to prove every 

element of his claim, including work-related causation. Gibbs v. Premier Scale 

Company/Indiana Scale Co., 50 S.W.3d 754, 763 (Ky. 2001), as modified on 

denial of reh’g (Aug. 23, 2001). 
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As to the back injury, the ALJ determined that “while I do certainly 

respect Dr. Wunder and Dr. Grefer, I also have two other doctors I respect, Dr. 

Sexton and Dr. Nazar, who do not feel as if the low back complaint was workrelated.” And as to the hip injury, the ALJ found that it appears the medical 

opinion of Dr. Matthew Grunkmeyer was “based solely on Wyant’s reassurance 

that he complained about his hip for a long period of time before treatment began 

for it.” The ALJ cited additional medical evidence documenting the hip injury. 

Ultimately, the ALJ relied on medical expert opinions to conclude that the hip and 

back injuries were not work-related and should be dismissed. This is proper

because the ALJ:

has the authority to determine the quality, character[,] . . . 

substance[,] and weight of the evidence presented, as 

well as the inferences to be drawn from the evidence.

Thus, the ALJ may reject any testimony and believe or 

disbelieve various parts of the evidence, regardless of 

whether it comes from the same witness or the same 

adversary party’s total proof.

Jones v. Brasch-Barry Gen. Contractors, 189 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Ky. App. 2006) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In other words, the ALJ’s opinion 

here was based on substantial evidence, i.e., “evidence of substance and relevant 

consequence having the fitness to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable 

men.” Smyzer, 474 S.W.2d at 369. (Citation omitted.) Therefore, having 
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reviewed the record and the law, we cannot say that the ALJ abused its discretion 

here.

Now having determined that the present case is limited to the groin 

injury, we also conclude that MMI was also proper for the following reason found 

by the ALJ: “[t]he only doctor who assigned a date of MMI for the groin, and only 

the groin injury, and after the end of medical treatment, other than a final exam, for 

the groin, is Dr. [Orin] Hall. That date is January 21, 2017.” Based on this 

evidence, we cannot conclude that the ALJ abused its discretion here. It further 

logically follows that the ALJ did not abuse its discretion in failing to assign the 

3X multiplier to Wyant’s PPD award. 

Pursuant to KRS1 342.730(1)(c)1., “If, due to an injury, an employee 

does not retain the physical capacity to return to the type of work that the employee 

performed at the time of injury, the benefit for permanent partial disability shall be 

multiplied by three (3) times the amount otherwise determined . . . .” On this issue, 

the Board reasoned in part as follows: “Dr. Griesser, the physician upon whom 

[the ALJ] relied in resolving this issue, did not assign any permanent restrictions as 

a result of the February 6, 2016 injury[,]” and that any restrictions imposed “are 

based upon Wyant’s non-work-related low back condition.” (Emphasis in 

1 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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original.) Therefore, the ALJ did not abuse its discretion is assessing the proper 

and complete compensation resulting from the underlying groin injury. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hereby affirm the Board, affirming the 

decision issued by the ALJ. 

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:

Joseph M. Schulte 

Covington, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

R. Christion Hutson 

Paducah, Kentucky