United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Argued April 24, 2019 

Decided May 16, 2019 

Before 

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge 

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge 

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 18-1629 

BONNIE DUDLEY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. 

No. 16-CV-1721-WCG 

William C. Griesbach, 

Chief Judge. 

O R D E R 

Bonnie Dudley, a 53-year-old former housekeeper and cook who suffers from a 

host of physical and mental health conditions, challenged the denial of her application 

for Social Security disability benefits. An Administrative Law Judge denied her 

application for disability insurance benefits after finding that although she suffers from 

several mental impairments (depression, anxiety disorder, and attention deficit 

disorder) and physical infirmities (pain in her back, hips, and legs), she could perform a 

limited range of light work. Because the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial 

evidence, we affirm. 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 18-1629 Page 2 

I 

 Bonnie Dudley, then 48-years-old, applied for supplemental security income and 

disability insurance benefits in 2013. Before her symptoms became overwhelming, 

Dudley worked as a housekeeper and cook at a nursing home. In 2012, she quit because 

of the pain from her physical infirmities and because of her “really bad” anxiety. 

 Four months after Dudley applied for disability benefits, her primary-care 

physician referred her to the behavioral-care department at a local health facility to 

receive treatment for depression, anxiety, attention deficit disorder, and agoraphobia 

with panic disorder. The primary-care physician recorded Dudley’s comment that she 

had dealt with anxiety and depression for more than 25 years. 

Dudley was then referred by the Disability Determination Bureau to a 

consultative psychologist, Dr. Sandra King. After an examination, Dr. King diagnosed 

Dudley with major depression, generalized anxiety, post-traumatic stress, and 

attention-deficit/hyperactivity. She characterized Dudley’s prognosis as “guarded, 

given the chronicity of her psychiatric disorders.” In a “statement of work capacity,” Dr. 

King opined that she did not expect Dudley to have difficulties understanding 

directions, but her “lack of concentration/distractibility” could affect her ability to 

remember and carry out directions. Dr. King added that Dudley’s ability to concentrate 

was “mildly impaired,” and that Dudley likely would have “moderate to severe 

difficulties withstanding routine work stress and adapting to change.” 

Also in connection with Dudley’s application, state-agency psychiatrist ChangWuk Kang reviewed Dudley’s medical records and opined that she had moderate 

limitations in a number of areas related to concentration, persistence, and pace. The 

doctor explained that Dudley might have some difficulty focusing on detailed tasks, but 

that she could perform simple repetitive tasks. As for her “adaptation limitations,” Dr. 

Kang opined that Dudley might have some difficulty dealing with workplace stresses, 

but that she could adjust to work settings requiring simple, repetitive tasks. 

When the Social Security Administration reconsidered Dudley’s application for 

benefits in 2014, another state-agency psychologist, Dr. David Biscardi, reviewed her 

medical records and identified her most serious limitations as attention-deficit 

hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), depression, and anxiety. Dr. Biscardi concluded that 

Dudley was “moderately limited” in many tasks related to her ability to work: her 

ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; to complete a 

normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based 
No. 18-1629 Page 3 

symptoms, to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length 

of rest periods, to accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from 

supervisors; to get along with coworkers or peers without distracting them or 

exhibiting behavioral extremes. He concluded that she could understand, remember, 

and sustain performance of one- to three-step tasks, so long as the tasks were not 

complicated and her interactions with coworkers and supervisors were brief. 

 At her hearing before the ALJ in 2015, Dudley testified that her pain and “really 

bad” anxiety prevented her from working. She felt pain “all over”—“constant pain” in 

her legs and hips, pain in her back at all times, even when taking her medications. She 

also testified that she had problems concentrating; she had to re-read words several 

times to follow along. “Everything” caused her anxiety—“just leaving the house, just 

driving, people.” She required her husband’s assistance to go grocery shopping and 

attend her medical appointments, and she had stopped driving three years prior. She 

had not left the house alone in over a year. Her anxiety triggered panic attacks at least 

twice a week; during these attacks, she was unable to think about or do anything else. 

The ALJ asked a vocational expert to consider the work that would be available 

to a person of Dudley’s age, education, and work experience with her physical and 

mental limitations. This hypothetical person could do some light work but would also 

be “limited to simple routine tasks, jobs that have no more than simple decisionmaking.” She should not be exposed to “more than occasional and minor changes in the 

work setting in terms of workplace and work processes.” The ALJ noted that this 

person could work at an “average production rate,” but not at a “significantly above 

average or highly variable production rate work.” That work, he added, should not be 

presented to her “at an excessively fast or highly variable pace.” The ALJ further 

specified that this person could briefly and superficially interact with other people, 

without doing “direct public service work,” teamwork, or work “in crowded or hectic 

environments.” 

The VE opined that such a person could work in light, unskilled positions such 

as “office helper” or “mailing clerk.” The ALJ later added a restriction to sedentary 

work, to which the VE replied that appropriate positions would include address clerks, 

account clerks, and sorting positions. 

The ALJ denied Dudley’s application for disability benefits. Applying the fivestep analysis found in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4), the ALJ determined the following: at 

Step 1, Dudley had met the insured status requirements and had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date; at Step 2, Dudley had the severe 
No. 18-1629 Page 4 

impairments of anxiety disorder, depression, ADHD, degenerative disc disease, and 

degenerative joint disease; at Step 3, neither Dudley’s physical nor mental impairments 

equaled a listed impairment; at Step 4, Dudley had the residual functional capacity 

(RFC) to perform a range of light work with some limitations (simple, routine, and 

repetitive tasks; work involving no more than simple decision-making or the exercise of 

simple judgment; a work setting with no more than occasional and minor changes; and 

no jobs that required work at a variable pace or above an average pace, in direct public 

service, in crowded or hectic environments, or involving tandem tasks); at Step 5, 

Dudley could not perform her past relevant work but could still perform jobs that 

existed in significant numbers. 

The Appeals Council denied review, and so the ALJ’s decision was the 

Commissioner’s final decision. See Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2015). 

Dudley sought judicial review, and the district court upheld the Commissioner’s 

decision. The court rejected both of Dudley’s arguments—first, that the ALJ failed to 

properly account for limitations on Dudley’s ability to maintain concentration, 

persistence, and pace when formulating Dudley’s RFC; and second, that the ALJ failed 

to assign weight expressly to the opinion of Dudley’s consultative psychologist, 

Dr. Sandra King. The district court explained that the ALJ’s listed mental limitations 

exceeded the limitations opined by the state-agency doctors, who were the only sources 

to opine on Dudley’s functional work-related limitations. In addition, the RFC was, in 

its “entirety,” “clearly directed at minimizing [Dudley’s] stress,” so the ALJ did not 

disregard Dr. King’s opinion. 

II 

A. Whether the ALJ failed to properly encapsulate his finding of Dudley’s 

moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace into the 

hypothetical posed to the VE 

Dudley argues that the ALJ failed to account for her moderate limitations in 

concentration, persistence, and pace in both the residual functional capacity assessment 

and resulting hypothetical posed to the VE. In his RFC assessment and hypothetical to 

the VE, the ALJ identified these mental limitations: 

 Limitation to simple, routine and repetitive tasks; 

 Work involving no more than simple decision-making; 

 No more than occasional and minor changes in the work setting; 
No. 18-1629 Page 5 

 Work requiring the exercise of only simple judgment; 

 Tolerance of an average production pace, but not above average or variable pace; 

 Preclusion from work involving direct public service, in person or over the 

phone; 

 Tolerance for brief and superficial interaction with the public, which is incidental 

to job duties; 

 Preclusion from work in crowded, hectic environments; 

 Tolerance for brief and superficial interaction with supervisors and coworkers; 

and 

 No tandem task work. 

Without a “logical bridge” to link these moderate limitations to the limitations 

presented by the hypothetical, see Lanigan v. Berryhill, 865 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2017), 

Dudley argues that the hypothetical did not orient the VE to her limitations. And 

because the hypothetical was flawed, Dudley adds, the vocational testimony was not 

supported by substantial evidence. This court has specified that “the most effective 

way” to inform the VE fully of a claimant’s limitations is to include all of them directly 

in the hypothetical. O’Connor-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, 619 (7th Cir. 2010). 

Although the ALJ did not explicitly include Dudley’s moderate limitations in 

concentration, persistence, and pace in the hypothetical, he did adequately account for 

these limitations. Dudley’s greatest limitations are stress- and panic-related, and the 

ALJ adequately addressed them by limiting her to “simple, routine and repetitive tasks, 

work involving no more than simple decision-making, no more than occasional and 

minor changes in the work setting, and work requiring the exercise of only simple 

judgment”; by excluding work above an average pace, at a variable pace, or in crowded, 

hectic environments; and by limiting her interactions with the public, supervisors, and 

coworkers. Although this court recently observed that limitations on social interaction 

might not encapsulate concentration difficulties because a claimant may have stressrelated symptoms even when others are absent, Winsted v. Berryhill, --- F.3d ----, 2019 

WL 1941179, at *4 (7th Cir. Feb. 8, 2019), the ALJ here specifically limited Dudley to 

“work requiring the exercise of only simple judgment,”—a limitation that specifically 

accounts for Dudley’s concentration difficulties. 

Critically, Dudley did not identify any limitations that the ALJ omitted and 

should have included in the hypothetical question. Indeed, the hypothetical that the 

ALJ posed to the vocational expert contained limitations that were more restrictive than 

the functional work-related limitations identified by the state-agency doctors. The ALJ’s 
No. 18-1629 Page 6 

stated limitations, for example, went so far as to preclude Dudley from tandem tasks 

with supervisors and coworkers, as well as work above an average or variable pace. 

This limitation was more restrictive than that suggested by the report of Dr. Kang, who 

opined that Dudley would have some difficulty focusing on detailed tasks, but that she 

could “maintain concentration and persistence to complete workdays and workweeks 

in performance of simple repetitive task[s]”; that Dudley “may have difficulty in 

dealing with general public but she can interact otherwise”; and that Dudley “might 

have some difficulty dealing with work place stresses but she can adjust to the settings 

requiring simple repetitive task[s].” The ALJ’s stated limitation was also more 

restrictive than that suggested by the report of Dr. Biscardi, who opined that Dudley 

would become overwhelmed with complicated procedures, but retained the capacity to 

complete a normal workday, interact briefly with coworkers and supervisors, and adapt 

to “changes/stressors” associated with “simple routine competitive work activities.” 

Dudley also contends that the state-agency psychologists’ opinions were flawed 

because of internal inconsistencies within them. Specifically, she says that Dr. Kang 

provided a written narrative, which failed to account for various limitations that he had 

noted on a checklist elsewhere in his assessment (e.g., limitations in attention and 

concentration). Dr. Biscardi’s narrative similarly failed to account for a limitation in 

work pace. But Dudley mistakenly presumes that the psychologists’ answers to the 

checklist section outweigh the narrative opinion section. In Varga, this court noted that 

while checklist observations cannot be ignored, they are “perhaps less useful to an ALJ 

than a doctor’s narrative.” 794 F.3d at 816. Further, an ALJ may rely on a doctor’s 

narrative where it adequately translates those worksheet observations. See, e.g., 

Johansen v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 283, 287–89 (7th Cir. 2002).

B. Whether the ALJ failed to include a key finding from the opinion of Dudley’s 

consultative examiner in the RFC determination 

Dudley next contends that the ALJ’s RFC assessment failed to account for 

Dr. King’s opinion that Dudley would have moderate-to-severe limitations handling 

work stress or adapting to change. If the limitations contained in the RFC assessment 

were “supposed to address work stress or adapting to changes,” Dudley argues, the 

ALJ did not say enough to justify his reasoning. 

But the ALJ, short of rejecting Dr. King’s opinion, in fact accepted it. True, the 

ALJ did not assign a specific weight to Dr. King’s opinion. But this error was harmless 

because the ALJ took heed of Dr. King’s opinion by adding limitations accounting for 

work stress. The ALJ limited Dudley to only occasional and minor changes in the 
No. 18-1629 Page 7 

workplace; he addressed the issue of routine work stress by specifying that she could 

only do tasks requiring simple judgment and at most an average pace—limitations 

accommodating Dr. King’s conclusion that Dudley would have difficulty adapting to 

change-related work stress. When no doctor’s opinion indicates greater limitations than 

those found by the ALJ, there is no error. Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 370 (7th Cir. 

2004).

III 

Finally, three weeks before oral argument, the Commissioner moved for leave to 

submit a supplemental brief to “address concerns” raised by this court in recent 

decisions reversing the judgment on grounds that the ALJ inadequately accounted for a 

claimant’s moderate difficulties in the area of concentration, persistence, and pace.1 In 

each of these decisions, this court urged the ALJ to apprise the VE fully of a claimant’s 

difficulties with “concentration, persistence, and pace.” The Commissioner sought to 

supplement its brief to address “constraints” that ALJs face from agency regulations in 

following the court’s advice. The Commissioner also wished to draw our attention to a 

recent Supreme Court decision, Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148 (2019), which 

“provides pertinent guidance” in that it “rejected a categorical rule relating to 

vocational expert testimony” in favor of a substantiality-of-evidence inquiry to be 

conducted on a “case-by-case” basis. The court granted the Commission’s motion for 

leave to file the brief before receiving Dudley’s opposition to it, so the court deemed 

Dudley’s opposition as a motion to reconsider. Because we need not—and do not—rely 

on the Commissioner’s supplemental briefing for the disposition of this case, we DENY 

the motion to reconsider as moot. The supplemental brief does not prejudice Dudley 

because it does not affect this appeal’s outcome. 

 AFFIRMED 

 

 

1 DeCamp v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 2019); Radosevich v. Berryhill, 759 Fed.Appx. 492, 495 (7th 

Cir. 2019) (nonprecedential disposition); Paul v. Berryhill, 760 Fed.Appx. 460, 465 (7th Cir. 2019) 

(nonprecedential disposition); Mischler v. Berryhill, No. 18-1523, 2019 WL 1299948, at *3 (7th Cir. Mar. 20, 

2019) (nonprecedential disposition).