SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-1141-23 

L.N. and C.N., 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v.

B.R., 

 Defendant-Respondent. 

________________________

Argued June 4, 2024 – Decided July 8, 2024 

Before Judges Gooden Brown and Haas. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Sussex County, 

Docket No. FD-19-0083-24.

Melissa M. Ruvolo argued the cause for appellants 

(Family Focused Legal Solutions, Ruvolo Law Group, 

LLC, attorneys; Melissa M. Ruvolo, of counsel and on 

the briefs; Sofia M. Marsella, on the briefs).

Paris P. Eliades argued the cause for respondent (Paris 

P. Eliades Law Firm, LLC, attorneys; Paris P. Eliades, 

of counsel and on the brief; Amy F. Gjelsvik, on the 

brief). 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-1141-23

PER CURIAM 

Plaintiffs L.N.1 and C.N. appeal from the November 1, 2023, Family Part 

order dismissing their complaint2 against defendant B.R. for joint legal custody 

of their grandson and defendant's son, R.R., because they failed to demonstrate 

they were R.R.'s psychological parents. We reverse and remand for a plenary 

hearing. 

Defendant was in a dating relationship with plaintiffs' daughter who 

became pregnant with R.R. During their relationship, the couple lived with 

plaintiffs. Tragically, on November 3, 2021, plaintiffs' daughter died 

unexpectedly during childbirth. Defendant brought R.R. home from the hospital 

and continued to live in plaintiffs' home for approximately two years. During 

the two years, defendant worked as a truck driver for plaintiffs' trucking 

company and plaintiffs provided care for R.R., including childcare while 

defendant worked. 

The arrangement between the parties was mutually satisfactory for a 

significant period of time. However, eventually, the relationship soured, and, 

1

 We use initials to protect the confidentiality of the child. R. 1:38-3(d)(13). 

2

 Although the November 1, 2023, order lists L.N. as the only plaintiff, in the 

complaint, both L.N. and C.N. are identified as plaintiffs. 
3 A-1141-23

ultimately, on October 6, 2023, after plaintiffs returned with R.R. from a twomonth trip to Florida, defendant packed his belongings and moved out of 

plaintiffs' home with R.R. Ten days later, on October 16, 2023, plaintiffs filed 

an order to show cause (OTSC) and a verified complaint under the NonDissolution (FD) docket, seeking temporary restraints and "joint legal custody 

and primary residential custody" of R.R. The complaint did not request 

grandparent visitation. Defendant opposed the application and cross-moved for 

other relief not pertinent to this appeal. To support their respective positions, 

the parties submitted dueling certifications disputing the extent of plaintiffs' care 

of R.R. and their role in R.R.'s life. 

Specifically, L.N. certified that she and C.N. had been R.R.'s "de facto 

parents" and that she had "performed virtually all day-to-day care for . . . the 

past two . . . years." She averred that defendant "repeatedly state[d] that he 

wanted [her] and [her] husband to raise [R.R.]." L.N. characterized defendant's 

presence in R.R.'s life as sporadic, stating that defendant would "stay at [his 

girlfriend's] house most nights of the week," and when he was at their home, he 

would "sleep in [their daughter's] bedroom" while R.R. would "sleep in 

[plaintiffs'] bedroom" with them. According to L.N., defendant "would 

occasionally stop over [their] house" and "play with [R.R.] for a short time" 
4 A-1141-23

before "leav[ing] again." L.N. stated that on occasion, when defendant became 

angry, he would "threaten to take [R.R.] away from [them]." L.N. also declared 

that defendant would sometimes "bring [R.R.] to [defendant's] mother's house 

in Pennsylvania and not advise [plaintiffs] when he was going to return [R.R.]." 

L.N. attested that defendant eventually "followed through on his threat" 

on October 6, 2023, when he "abruptly whisked [R.R.] out of the house," 

claiming "that he was taking [R.R.] to his mother's home in Pennsylvania to 

visit." According to L.N., defendant "has since refused to respond to any text 

messages or phone calls" about R.R.'s return. L.N. added that although 

defendant may attribute his actions to anger over plaintiffs keeping R.R. in 

Florida for two months purportedly without defendant's consent, on the contrary, 

"[d]efendant was fully aware of [their] plans, consented to [R.R.] accompanying 

[them] to Florida, and at no point during [their] trip did he request that [they] 

bring [R.R.] back to New Jersey," inquire about R.R.'s wellbeing, "or even 

request to speak with him on the phone or via Facetime" (italicization omitted). 

 In his certification, defendant disputed L.N.'s assertions, describing them 

as "self-serving statements and lies." Defendant denied stating that he wanted 

plaintiffs to raise R.R., and averred that he "never consented to or fostered a 

parental relationship between" R.R. and plaintiffs. Defendant certified that he 
5 A-1141-23

was "always home," that he and R.R. stayed in plaintiffs' daughter's room 

together, and that even though plaintiffs helped care for his son, he "did not shy 

away from taking care of" R.R.'s daily needs. He stated that L.N. would prevent 

him from parenting his son by "physically grab[bing] [R.R.] away" when he 

tried to feed him, and "refus[ing] to allow [defendant] to bathe" R.R or change 

his diaper. Defendant claimed further that plaintiffs engaged in "deceit and 

trickery" to try to "exclude [him] from [his] son's life," and stated that he found 

a "tracking device hidden in [his] personal diaper bag" that was registered to 

another one of plaintiffs' daughters (emphasis omitted). 

Finally, defendant denied consenting to plaintiffs' two-month trip to 

Florida with R.R. Instead, defendant averred that he "freely gave [his] 

permission for two weeks," but "did not give them consent" to take away his son 

for "nearly two . . . months" and was "worried that they would try and keep him 

in Florida" (emphasis omitted). Defendant claimed that while they were in 

Florida, he "always asked about [R.R.]," and talked to R.R. on FaceTime. 

According to defendant, after plaintiffs continuously extended the trip, he finally 

demanded that they bring R.R. home. When plaintiffs returned from Florida on 

October 5, 2023, defendant confirmed that he packed up and moved out of 

plaintiffs' home with R.R. the next day. 
6 A-1141-23

In a reply certification, L.N. described defendant's accusations as

"unbelievable lies." In support, L.N. submitted screen shots of text messages 

with defendant's mother describing L.N.'s care of R.R. as "fantastic" and 

"[a]wesome," photographs of R.R.'s haircuts, and receipts for expenses plaintiffs 

incurred for R.R. without reimbursement. L.N. also submitted a Mother's Day 

card in which defendant purportedly referred to L.N. as a "bonus mom" 

(emphasis omitted). 

On October 17, 2023, the motion judge issued an order and accompanying 

written statement of reasons denying plaintiffs' request for emergent relief and 

converting the application to a regular motion. On November 1, 2023, the judge 

conducted oral argument on the motion, during which plaintiffs' counsel 

reaffirmed that plaintiffs were seeking custody based on their role as 

psychological parents. Counsel specified that "this [was] more than just . . . a 

grandparent visitation case[] because of more than just a typical grandchild 

relationship." 

Relying on the parties' certifications, the judge issued an order and oral 

opinion on the same day denying plaintiffs' application for custody of R.R. and 

dismissing plaintiffs' complaint. The judge determined that plaintiffs could not 

make a prima facie showing of psychological parenthood because although 
7 A-1141-23

plaintiffs "did live with the child," defendant also lived in the home with R.R., 

never consented to plaintiffs "rais[ing R.R.]," and "did not allow them to be 

[R.R.'s] primary caregivers." According to the judge, although plaintiffs 

"assisted with [R.R.'s] needs," their actions were typical of grandparents and did 

not "rise[] to the level of being a primary caregiver" because they did not 

perform "the parental functions to [a] significant degree." As such, the judge 

explained that as R.R.'s parent, defendant had the right to take his son and "go 

live somewhere else." As to any bond, although the judge assumed that 

plaintiffs had a relationship with R.R., the judge found there was no "expert 

evaluation[] indicating there[ was] a bond." 

The judge also determined that plaintiffs did not make "a prima facie 

showing that they should have grandparent[] visitation," stating: 

Where there's an application for grandparent[]

visitation, the applicant needs to show that there'd be 

harm to the child, if visitation wasn't imposed. 

I also don't find that the plaintiff has shown that

there would be harm to the child, if there was no [c]ourt 

ordered visitation. 

. . . . 

. . . [L]egally, I don't find that I can impose an 

order, ordering visitation. 

 

The judge entered a memorializing order and this appeal followed. 
8 A-1141-23

On appeal, plaintiffs argue the judge "incorrectly interpreted and 

misapplied the law on psychological parentage." Plaintiffs assert the judge 

"failed to fully analyze and assess [p]laintiff[s'] application" under V.C. v. 

M.J.B., 163 N.J. 200 (2000), placed outsized emphasis on the fact that 

"[d]efendant was also living in the home with [plaintiffs]," and made findings 

"based on dueling and conflicting papers and without the benefit of testimony 

from the parties." We agree. 

A reviewing court should not disturb the "factual findings and legal 

conclusions of the trial judge unless [it is] convinced that they are so manifestly 

unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably 

credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 

N.J. 394, 412 (1998) (alteration in original) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. 

Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). We accord special deference to 

the findings of fact made by the Family Part because of that court's expertise in 

family matters. Id. at 413. Deference is appropriate where the evidence is 

"largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility" because the trial court 

is in the best position to evaluate the veracity of the witnesses. P.B. v. T.H., 370 

N.J. Super. 586, 601 (App. Div. 2004). Even when a court denies a request for 

child custody without a plenary hearing, the denial is reviewed for an abuse of 
9 A-1141-23

discretion, with deference to the expertise of the Family Part judge. Costa v. 

Costa, 440 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 2015). However, we review issues of law 

de novo, including issues arising in a custody dispute. R.K. v. F.K., 437 N.J. 

Super. 58, 61 (App. Div. 2014). 

In W.M. v. D.G., 467 N.J. Super. 216 (App. Div. 2021), we outlined the 

rights of parents vis-a-vis third parties in a custody dispute. 

"[T]he right of parents to the care and custody of their 

children is not absolute." [V.C., 163 N.J. at 218]. 

While there is a presumption supporting a natural 

parent's "right to the care, custody, and control of his or 

her child," this "presumption in favor of the parent will 

be overcome by 'a showing of gross misconduct, 

unfitness, neglect, or "exceptional circumstances" 

affecting the welfare of the child[.]'" K.A.F. v. D.L.M., 

437 N.J. Super. 123, 131-32 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting 

[Watkins v. Nelson, 163 N.J. 235, 246 (2000)]). An

exceptional circumstance that overrides the 

presumption favoring the natural parent occurs when a 

third party has become a child's "psychological parent," 

i.e., where "a third party has stepped in to assume the 

role of the legal parent who has been unable or 

unwilling to undertake the obligations of parenthood." 

V.C., 163 N.J. at 219 (citing Sorentino v. Fam. & 

Child.'s Soc. of Elizabeth, 72 N.J. 127, 132 (1976)). 

The exceptional circumstances element is grounded in 

the court's power of parens patriae to protect minor 

children from serious physical or psychological harm. 

Watkins, 163 N.J. at 246-47.

[W.M., 467 N.J. Super. at 230 (third alteration in 

original).]
10 A-1141-23

Critically, only a third party who has stepped in to assume the obligations 

of parenthood has standing to raise a psychological parenthood claim. In V.C., 

our Supreme Court set forth a four-part test for a third party to prove 

psychological parenthood. 163 N.J. at 223. First, the petitioner must show that 

the biological parent "'consented to, and fostered, the petitioner's formation and 

establishment of a parent-like relationship with the child.'" Ibid. (quoting In re 

Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995)). The term "fostered" 

means "that the legal parent ceded over to the third party a measure of parental 

authority and autonomy and granted to that third party rights and duties vis-avis the child that the third party's status would not otherwise warrant." Id. at 

224. Also, "consent" will have different meanings under different scenarios. Id. 

at 223 n.6. 

Second, the petitioner must show that "'the petitioner and the child lived 

together in the same household.'" Id. at 223 (quoting H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 

421). Third, the petitioner must have "'assumed the obligations of parenthood 

by taking significant responsibility for the child's care, education and 

development . . . without expectation of financial compensation." Ibid. (quoting 

H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 421). The court should evaluate "the nature, quality, 

and extent of the functions undertaken by the third party and the response of the 
11 A-1141-23

child to that nurturance." Id. at 226. Fourth, the petitioner must have been in a 

parental role for a length of time that was sufficient to have created a bond with 

the child that was parental and dependent in nature. Ibid. 

The Court explained that what "is crucial . . . is not the amount of time but 

the nature of the relationship." Ibid. The bond between a psychological parent 

and the child need not be the same as or stronger than that of the bond between 

the biological parents and the child. See id. at 226-27. Notably, proof of the 

parent-child bond is critically important and requires expert testimony. Ibid. In 

fact, the only prong of the psychological parent test requiring expert testimony 

is the fourth prong. Id. at 223, 227. 

Overall, the four-prong analysis is fact-sensitive. Id. at 223. "A third 

party establishing exceptional circumstances by proving psychological 

parentage 'may rebut the presumption in favor of a parent seeking custody even 

if he or she is deemed to be a fit parent.'" W.M., 467 N.J. Super. at 231 (quoting 

Watkins, 163 N.J. at 247-48). If successfully proven, a third party who is 

considered to be a psychological parent will be placed "in parity" with a legal 

parent for the purposes of a custody determination. V.C., 163 N.J. at 227-28, 

230. Importantly, once a third party is "in parity" with the legal parent, the third 

party "stands in the shoes of [the biological] parent" and the court must then 
12 A-1141-23

conduct a best interests analysis under N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c). Watkins, 163 N.J. at 

254. Stated differently, after deciding the psychological parenthood issue, the 

court must then decide whether the award of custody or visitation to the third 

party would "promote the best interests of the child." Ibid. In that regard, the 

court should focus on the "safety, happiness, physical, mental and moral welfare 

of the child." Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 497 (1981) (quoting Fantony v. 

Fantony, 21 N.J. 525, 536 (1956)). 

When an analysis of the child's best interests demonstrates that both the 

biological parent and the psychological parent are equally capable of caring for 

the child, custody will be awarded to the biological parent and visitation to the 

psychological parent. V.C., 163 N.J. at 228. Thus, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:2-4, 

the court may enter an order that: provides joint custody of the child to both 

parents with provisions for residential arrangements that allow the child to 

reside with one parent or with both and, also, provisions for decision-making 

with regard to the child; awards sole custody to one parent with parenting time 

for the non-custodial parent; or sets forth any other custody arrangement as the 

court determines is in the best interests of the child. 

Here, the judge did not conduct a robust analysis of the required fourprong psychological parenthood test to determine whether plaintiffs' challenge 
13 A-1141-23

to defendant's custody satisfied the legal requirements. Rather, the judge made 

conclusionary statements based on conflicting certifications without eliciting 

any testimony, hearing from experts, or considering further evidence. We 

acknowledge that plaintiffs filed their OTSC and verified complaint under the 

FD docket. The FD docket allows actions by non-parent relatives seeking 

custody. B.C. v. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency, 450 N.J. Super. 197, 

201 (App. Div. 2017). Typically, the court handles an FD matter in a summary 

fashion to promote the "'purpose of swiftly and effectively disposing of matters 

which lend themselves to summary treatment.'" W.M., 467 N.J. Super. at 233 

(quoting R.K. v. D.L., Jr., 434 N.J. Super. 113, 133 (App. Div. 2014)). 

Nevertheless, as we explained in W.M., where the plaintiff has "raised a 

credible claim of psychological parenthood," the matter should not be treated 

summarily. Id. at 234; see also N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. C.S., 

432 N.J. Super. 224, 226-29 (App. Div. 2013) (explaining the parties were 

required to obtain bonding evaluations considering the best interests of the child 

where the grandparents sought custody of their grandchild under an FD docket). 

Based upon the record before us, we conclude plaintiffs raised a credible 

claim of psychological parenthood under the four-part test established in V.C. 

Although "[e]stablishing psychological parenthood is not an easy task" and the 
14 A-1141-23

V.C. standards "should be scrupulously applied in order to protect the legal 

parent-child relationship," 163 N.J. at 230, the matter should not have been 

treated summarily. Instead, in light of the conflicting certifications, the judge 

should have afforded the parties the opportunity to conduct discovery, including 

obtaining expert evaluations. The judge should then "conduct a plenary hearing 

to assess the credibility of witnesses' testimony, after they have been subjected 

to rigorous cross examination." R.K., 434 N.J. Super. at 121. Accordingly, we 

reverse the judge's ruling on plaintiffs' application for joint custody based on a 

psychological parenthood claim, reinstate the complaint, and remand for a 

plenary hearing. 

Turning to the judge's ruling regarding grandparent visitation, the 

Grandparent and Sibling Visitation Statute (GVS), N.J.S.A 9:2-7.1, "confers on 

a child's grandparent . . . standing to file an action for an order compelling 

visitation," Major v. Maguire, 224 N.J. 1, 13 (2016), and "provides the 

framework for grandparent . . . visitation when visitation is proven to be 'in the 

best interests of the child,'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. S.S., 187 N.J. 

556, 562 (2006) (quoting N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1(a)). Still, "the parent's determination 

whether to permit visitation is entitled to 'special weight,'" Major, 224 N.J. at 15 

(quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67-69 (2000)), and a "grandparent 
15 A-1141-23

seeking . . . visitation [under the GVS] must prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence that denial of [the visitation] would result in harm to the child." Id. at 

7 (citing Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84, 117-18 (2003)). To that end, the 

grandparent must make "a clear and specific allegation of concrete harm to the 

children." Daniels v. Daniels, 381 N.J. Super. 286, 294 (App. Div. 2005). 

In Slawinski v. Nicholas, 448 N.J. Super. 25 (App. Div. 2016), we 

described the level of harm a grandparent must demonstrate before a court is 

required to determine whether visitation is in a child's best interests. We stated: 

[P]roof of harm involves a greater showing than simply 

the best interests of the child. [Moriarty, 177 N.J. at 

116] (stating that a dispute between a "fit custodial 

parent and the child's grandparent is not a contest

between equals[,]" consequently "the best interest 

standard, which is the tiebreaker between fit parents, is 

inapplicable"). . . . The harm to the grandchild must be 

"a particular identifiable harm, specific to the child." 

Mizrahi v. Cannon, 375 N.J. Super. 221, 234 (App. Div. 

2005). It "generally rests on the existence of an 

unusually close relationship between the grandparent 

and the child, or on traumatic circumstances such as a 

parent's death." [Daniels, 381 N.J. Super. at 294]. By 

contrast, missed opportunities for creating "happy 

memories" do not suffice. Mizrahi, 375 N.J. Super. at 

234. Only after the grandparent vaults the proof-ofharm threshold will the court apply a best-interests 

analysis to resolve disputes over visitation details. 

Moriarty, 177 N.J. at 117. 

[Slawinski, 448 N.J. Super. at 34 (third alteration in 

original) (citations omitted).]
16 A-1141-23

Accordingly, if a grandparent meets the threshold showing of harm, the best 

interests standard applies and a trial court should consider the statutory factors 

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1(b) to determine whether permitting visitation would 

be in the child's best interests. Moriarty, 177 N.J. at 117. 

Here, the judge denied grandparent visitation under the GVS without 

plaintiffs having either requested it in their complaint or advocated for it during 

oral argument. Indeed, a claim of grandparent visitation requires proof of 

different facts and application of different law from a psychological parenthood 

claim. We therefore reverse the judge's ruling on grandparent visitation without 

prejudice to plaintiffs making the application anew. 

Plaintiffs seek a remand to a different judge in the Family Part because 

the judge made credibility findings based on "[d]efendant's [c]ertification." In 

an abundance of caution, we direct that this matter be assigned to a different 

judge on remand to avoid the appearance of bias or prejudice. See Entress v. 

Entress, 376 N.J. Super. 125, 133 (App. Div. 2005) (directing remand "to a 

different judge for the plenary hearing to avoid the appearance of bias or 

prejudice based upon the judge's prior involvement with the matter and his 

expressions of frustration with plaintiff"); N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. 

A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 617 (1986) ("Because the trial judge has heard this evidence 
17 A-1141-23

and may have a commitment to its findings, we believe it is best that the case be 

reconsidered by a new fact-finder."). 

In sum, we reverse and remand with directions that the matter be assigned 

to a different judge for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We 

express no opinion as to the ultimate outcome. Given our decision, we need not 

address the remaining arguments. 

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.