2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit
2-25-2004 

# M oney v . C omm S o c i al S ec ur it y P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al D ocke t N o . 03-2553

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Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o you for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. It h as be e n a c c e pt e d for inclusion in 2004 D e c i sion s b y a n author i z e d a dmini s tr at or of V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. F or mor e infor m at ion, p le as e c on t a ct Be n j a min . C a rl s on@l a

w . v i l l a no va . e du
. Re c omme nde d C it at ion

" M oney v . C omm S oc i al S e c ur it y " (2004). 2004 D e cisio n s . P ape r 980. h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a

w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/9801 NOT PRE CEDENT IAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

No: 03-2553 KATHERINE N. (T AYLOR) MONEY,

Appellant

v. JOANNE B. BARNHART, COMM ISSI ONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY App eal from th e Un ited States District Co urt for the We stern D istrict of P enns ylvania

(Civ. No. 01- 1806) Distri ct Court: Hon. Gustave Diamond Submitte d Pursuant to Third Circ uit LAR 34.1(a)

February 12, 2004 Be for e: S CIR ICA , RO TH and M cK EE , Circuit Judges

. (Fil ed February

25, 2004) OPI NION M cK EE , Circuit

Judge

. This case a rises fro m the denia l of K atherin e N . Mo ney’s ap plication for d isability insurance benefit s and supple mental se curit y i ncome under Titl es II and XVI of the Social Securit y Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 and 1381-1381(c) ("Act") . Money appeal s the1 W e ha ve ju risdi ction ove r this mo tion to d ism iss u nde r 28 U.S .C. § 129 1. Far gno li v.

Halter , 247 F .3d 34 , 36 (3 d C ir. 2001 ). We exerc ise plen ary review over decisio ns to gra nt an d de ny m otio ns for su mm ary jud gm ent. Sutton v. Rasheed , 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003) . This means that we exer cise de novo r eview of alllegalquesti ons present ed by t he Commissioner’ s finaljudgment, but revi ew the factualfindings only to see i f they are supported by

substantial e vidence i n the rec ord. Subst antia l evide nce has been defined a s such releva nt evidenc e as a reason able mind might acc ept as adeq uate. Wh ere the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by s ubstantial evi dence, we are bound b y those find ing s, ev en if

we wo uld hav e de cide d th e fa ctua l inq uiry differe ntly. Far gno li , 247 F.3 d at 3 8. 2 district court’ s order gr anting s ummary judgment in favor of t

he Commissioner of t

he Soc ia l S ecuri ty

Admi ni stra ti on. For

th e r eas ons th atfol lo w, we wil l a ffirm. I. Inasmuch as we writ e only for the parti es it

is not necessar y t o recit e the fact s of this case in detail. M oney presents three c laims to this court: she arg ues that the A LJ’s decisio n ado pted b y the Ap peal’s Co uncil w as no t supp orted b y substan tial evide nce, d id not comply

with the Counci l’s August 1998 order, and fail ed to account for the a dditi onal med ical ev idenc e that th e Co uncil a dded into the record on th e initial ap peal. E ach c laim is c on sid er ed se pa ra tel y. 1 A. Substantial

evidence forthe decis ion Money argues t

hat the Commissioner’ s finaldecisi on was not support ed by substantialevidence on the record as a whole for five reasons. We disagree, and address

eac h of her re as ons se ri at im.2 When evaluati ng whether a cl aimant i s disabl ed, the ALJ must answer the fol lowing

five i nquiri es in t

his orde r: whether

(1) the clai mant is cur

rently engage d in subst antia l gainful acti vity ; (2) he or she has a severe impairment; (3) this i mpairment meet s or equa ls the crite ria listed in 20 C .F.R. P art 404 , Sub part P , Ap pend ix 1; (4) this impairment

prevents him or her from performing hi s or her pa st re levant work; and (5) he or she can per form any ot her work which exis ts i n the nat ional e conomy, in li ght of his or her age, educati on, work experi ence, and r esidualfuncti oning capaci ty . 20 C.F. R. §§ 404.1520, 416. 920. 3 1. Step three of the sequential process 2 M oney state s that the AL J erred wh en ev aluatin g her und er the listin g fo r orga nic brain d isorde rs, Listing 12.02 , in step th ree of the seq uentia l evalu ation o f disab ility clai ms. She argues that t he ALJ ignored neurops ychol ogicaltest resul ts i n the rec ord; fail ed to obta in curr ent neurops ychol ogicaltest s; and di scounted or misunderstood evidence pr oving she had br ain damage. A claimant must

show that hi s or her impairment mat ches a li sti ng to succee d at step t hree in t he process . An impair

ment matches a l ist ing only when it meets all of

the listing ’s sp ecif

ied m edic al cri teria

. Sullivan v. Zebley , 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990). Money th er ef or e h adto pr ove th at

sh e me t a llof

Li st in g 12 .0 2' s c ri te ri a. Li st in g 12 .0 2 ha s t wo gro ups of c riteria , “A ” an d “B ,” ea ch o f w hich had to b e m et. See 20 C.F.R. Pt . 404, Subpt. P. App. 1, § 12.02. The AL J found that she met the Group A criteri a but not those in Group B. Group B requir es her i mpairment t o resul t “in at lea st two of the foll owing: (1) M arked restriction of ac tivities of daily living; o r (2) M arked diffic ulties in maintai ning soci al funct ioning; or (3) Marked di fficul ties in maint aining c oncentration,4

persi stence, or pace; or (4) Repeat ed episodes of decompensati on, each of ext ended durati on. . . .” The only concret e evidence off

ered by Money to prove t

hat she met

the group B crit eria i s one of her t reating physi cians’ diagnoses of “multi -infarct dementi a” on a stat e employ ability assess ment form. I t is unclear whether it

necessarily

follows t

hat she meets t

he Group B crite ria s imply because she ha s thi s diagnosi s. The ALJ adduced evidence fr om M oney’ s own testimony and that of her phy sici ans that she did not

meet the Group B crit eria. The ALJ’s opinion was bas ed on substantialevidence and a pplied the c orre ct law

. 2. The treating p hysician s’ opinion s on resid ual func tional cap acity Money argues t

hat the ALJ failed t o defer t o the opini ons of her t reating physi cians which were based on obj ecti ve cli nicalevidence r egarding he r remaining functi onal capacit y ( “RFC”). She states t hat thi s failure cal ls i nto quest ion the ALJ’s finding t hat she could per form light work, and she argues that the dis tri ct court

should have r emanded her claim to co rrect this error. Controll ing weight i s given t o the opini on of a clai mant’s t reating physi cian regarding the nature and severit y of the clai mant’s impairment when, amon g other things, it i s not i nconsist ent with ot her subst antia l evide nce. 20 C.F. R. §§ 404.1527(d) (2), 416. 927(d)(2). H ere, the AL J found that the opinion s of M oney’s treating physicians w ere both interna lly inconsiste nt and incon sistent w ith othe r med ical ev idenc e. As a resu lt, their op inions we re no t entitled to contro lling w eight. B ecau se they w ere no t entitled to5

such we ight, the AL J cou ld eva luate a nd w eigh th em a gains t other m edica l evide nce in the r eco rd. 2 0 C .F.R . §§ 4 04.1 527 (d), 4 16.9 27) (d). 3. Hypotheticalposed to vocati onal expert M oney arg ues th at the tes timon y offere d by the v ocatio nal ex pert (“V E”) in response to hypot

hetic al questions that the ALJ posed to him were not s ubstant ial evid enc e. Sh e cla ims that t he h ypoth etica l did not inclu de h er sp ecif ic im pair me nts. An A LJ’s hypothetical qu estion to a V E mu st accurately portray the claimant’s ind ivid ual im pair me nts th at are sup por ted b y the re cor d. See Chrupcala v. Heckler , 829 F.2d 126 9, 127 6 (3d Cir. 19 87); Pod edw orny v. Ha rris , 745 F.2 d 21 0, 21 8 (3 d C ir. 19 84)

. As s tated a bov e, her tre ating p hysicians ’ opin ions w ere no t und isputed and w ere no t fully

acce pted b y the AL J. The AL J deter mine d that M oney co uld p erfor m ligh t wo rk that d id not require pushi ng, pull ing or fi ne manual dexte rit y wit h her ri ght hand, or complex and varied j ob tasks. The ALJ then incorpor ated these impai rments i n a hypot hetic al question he posed to t

he VE. His hypot

hetic al met t

he requir ements in Ch rupc ala , and he ther efo re p rop erly us ed th e V E’s testim ony in resp ons e to th is hyp oth etica l qu estio n. 4. Vocational

expert test imony’s confli ct with the Dicti onary of Occupational Tit les M oney arg ues th at the V E’s tes timon y conflic ts with the de scription s of th e jobs in the Dict ionary

of OccupationalTitl es (DOT), ther eby cr eati ng error s in st eps four and five of t he sequenti al anal ysi s. She cl aim that the dis tri ct court

should have r emanded her clai m to correc t thes e error s. She bel ieves t hat the error

in st ep four occurred when the6

ALJ did not reconc ile t

he VE’s description of Money ’s past relevant work as unski lled, entry -levelwork requir ing “medium” exer tion wit h the DOT’s class ific ation of it as “light” skil led work requi ring t hree to s ix months’ training and rea soning l evel 2. The second all eged error

was that, given the ALJ’s assess ment of her RFC, the DOT indicates that none o f the jobs that the V E listed wo uld be ap propriate for h er. It appears that Money argue d to the di stri ct court that r econcil iati on was requir ed by Soci al Security

Ruling 00-4p, which stat es that ALJs must resol ve confli cts bet ween the DOT and VE s’ te sti mony. The di stri ct court correctly

noted that the ALJ was not bound by t

his rul ing when he render ed this decisi on in 1999 because SSR 00-4p was not effecti ve untilDecember 2000. Perhaps as a res ult, Money mentions SSR 00-4p on appeal but

concedes that we do not need t o apply it her e. She argue s persuas ively that th is co urt h as en dor se d r ec onc il in g c onf li ct s b etwee n VEs ’ t es timon yan d the DOT definitio ns e ven in cla ims not gov ern ed b y SSR 00- 4p. See Burns v. Barnhart , 312 F.3d 113, 126-27 ( 3d Cir. 2002) . We do not need t o decide t his question, t

hough, because the distr ict co urt’s dec ision to affirm stan ds e ven if su ch r eco ncili ation wa s ne ede d. Money apparent ly

did not r aise t

he firs t is sue regar ding the e rror in step four to the distr ict co urt, a nd i t is the refo re w aive d. See Gass v. V. I. Telephone Corp. , 311 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 2002) (hol ding that issues not rai sed before a di stri ct court are waived on appeal). Looking at this i ssue on the merits, t his argument is sti ll unavailing because Money cannot pr ove that this error

caused any

harm. Even if he did not r econcil e the3 Money also s tate s that it i s unclear

which DOT job the VE meant when he stated “cleaner” b ecause the re are abou t 32 jobs labeled “cleaner” in the DO T. Ho wev er, there is onl y one l ist ing whose ti tle of fici ally stat es only

“cleaner” in the DOT , li sti ng 323.687- 7 VE ’s desc ription o f her p ast relev ant w ork w ith the D OT ’s desc ription o f it, the A LJ still came to a conclusion favor able t o her, t hat she coul d not perfor m the job t

hat was her only past r elevant

work experienc e. Bec ause M oney rais es the s econ d issue regard ing step five p rope rly, we an alyze it on its merits and again as sume that t he ALJ should have rec oncile d the VE’s tes timony with D OT testimony. In response to the hypothetical including the criteria in the AL J’s RFC for M oney, the VE listed materi al handl er, order fil ler, shoe dy er/cl eaner, kitche n work er, cleaner, and inserting mach ine operator. M oney argues tha t under the D OT ’s defini tions of these j obs, none of t hem meet her RFC for “simpl e, routine and re petitive” work as deter

mined by t

he ALJ. She stat es that , in t he DOT, all si x jobs except for clean er requ ire reaso ning levels 2 or 3, so they do n ot com ply with th e A LJ’s m anda te that he r work be “si mple.” She al so stat es that the fi rst t

hree of those six j obs were li sted in the DOT as skil led or s emi-ski lled, rather than unski lled, although t here was no evidence on t

he record r egarding any t ransfer rable s kill s she might

have. Fi nally , she stat es that

the DOT states t

hat thr ee of the j obs entai l more than the “l ight work” t hat her RFC calls for: the material handler j ob entai ls “heavy work,” and the kitche n worker and shoe cleaner jobs entail“medium w ork.” Money argues that this l eaves only the j ob as a cleaner. 3014; the ot her li sti ngs are for

“washer (al ternative title: cleaner)” whose cleaning involves industrialequipment, or jobs s uch as “seed c leaner ” in the agriculturalworker li sti ng and “ac id-ta nk c lean er” in a refiner y. See D ICTIONARY OFO CCUPATIO NAL T ITLES , U.S. D EP’T OF L ABOR, O FFICE OF A DMINI STRATIVE L AW J UDGES (4th ed. 1 991 ), at http ://w ww .oalj.d ol.g ov/ libd ot.h tm.

4 See “Appendix C: General Education Development, ” in D ICTIONARY OF O CCUPATIO

NAL T ITLES , U.S . D EP’T OF L ABOR, O FFICE OF A DMINI STRATIVE L AW J UDGES (4th ed. 1 991 ), athttp :/ /www. oal

j. dol .g ov/

pub li c/ dot

/r efr nc/ dot app c. htm.
5 See “Clerical and Sales Occupations” in D ICTIONARY OFO CCUPATIO NAL T ITLES , U.S . D EP’T OF L ABOR, O FFICE OF A DMINI STRATIVE L AW J UDGES (4th ed. 1 991 ), at http: //www.oalj .dol. gov/publi c/dot/ refrnc/dot02a. htm; “Servi ce Occupations ” in D ICTIONARY OFO CCUPATIO NAL T ITLES , U.S . D EP’T OF L ABOR, O FFICE OF A DMINI STRATIVE L AW J UDGES (4th ed. 1 991 ), at http :/ /www. oal

j. dol .g ov/

pub li c/ dot

/r efr nc/ dot 03a .h tm. 8 Money makes the as sumption t hat even a r easoning l evel of 2, where 1 is t he lowest possible l evel of rea soni ng, i s in compat ibl e with the ALJ’s de cis ion i n her RFC that he r jobs m ust be simp le. Ho we ver ev en lev el two only requ ires a p erson to “[a ]pply commonsense underst anding to c arry out deta iled but

uninvolved wri tten or

oral instructi ons[; d] eal with problems i nvolving a f ew concrete variable s in or f rom stan dar dize d situ ation s.” 4 Wo rking at reaso ning level 2 wo uld n ot con tradict th e ma ndate that h er w ork be s imp le, ro utin e an d re petit ive. Allowing for j obs requi ring r easoning l evels 1 and 2, for unski lled worker s who can do only

light work, thr ee of the s ix jobs that t he VE liste d sti ll meet

the ALJ’s st ated RFC f orMone yund er

th e DOT d ef

in itio ns . T he yar e i ns erting m ac hi ne ope rato r, DOT No. 208.685-018; cleaner , DOT N o. 323.687- 014; and si lver wrapper , one of the kitc hen worker jobs, DOT No. 318.687-018. 5 Therefore, the dis tri ct court correctly

found that9

many of t he j obs id entif

ie d by th e VE me t t

he l imi tati ons se t i n Mone y ’s RFC. 5. Developi ng the record on Money’s organic mental di sorders Money argues t

hat the ALJ should have furt her devel oped the re cord to ens ure a comp lete record on which to determine if she w as disabled, and that the district court erred when it

fail ed to remand her

clai m for furthe r recor d development. Specifi call y, she clai ms that t

he ALJ should have al lowed her to have a medicalexpert t esti fy and gr anted her reques t for cur

rent neuropsyc hologica l tes ting for cognitive defici ts becaus e he was

eva luati ng h er u nde r Lis ting 12.0 2. The burden li es with t

he clai mant to devel op the rec ord regar ding his or her disabi lit y because the cl aimant i s in a bet ter pos iti on to provi de informat ion about hi s or her ow n m edic al co ndi tion

. Bowen v. Yuckert , 482 U .S. 137 , 146 n .5 (19 87); see als o 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.151 2(a) and 4 16.912(a ). The A LJ’s only duty in this respect is to ensure that t he clai mant’s compl ete medica l his tory is devel oped on the re cord before f inding that the claim ant is no t disable d. 20 C .F.R. § § 40 4.151 2(d), 4 16.91 2(d). S uch a history is defined as records of the cl aimant’ s medicalsources f or at l east 12 months precedi ng when the clai mant fil ed the appl icat ion for di sabil ity benefit unless t he clai mant states that h is or h er d isab ility beg an le ss th an 1 2 m ont hs b efo re th e ap plica tion wa s file d. Id. On ly if the evid ence befo re the C om missio ner is in suff icient d oes th e A LJ h ave th e duty to att empt to obt ain addi tionalevidence t o determi ne whether a cl aimant i s disabl ed. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.152 7(c)(3), 416.92 7(c)(3).10

Money all eges that

her dis ability

began in July 1994, shortly aft er a car accident she had on June 26, 1994. The ALJ evaluat ed medical r ecords dat ed from July 1994 through Febr

uary 1996, about

2.5 y ears, in addition to ot her records from 1999 including

a con sultative exam ination orde red b y the AL J. This mee ts the stan dard for a “ com plete medical hi story” in 20 C.F. R. §§ 404.1512(d) and 416.912(d) . Nothing e lse i ndicat es that the rec ord lacke d enough data for the ALJ to make a well -infor med decisi on about whether Money was dis abled. Although Money might want the addi tionalevidence s he mentioned and i t might help the ALJ make an even more informed deci sion, such evidence was not

necessar y. The district c ourt cor rectly deni ed Money’s r equest for remand on this basis.

B. Following the Council’ s August 1998 order Money argues t

hat the second ALJ fail ed to heed t he Council’ s holdi ng that he r right hand impair

ment precluded her from per forming jobs requiring bil atera l manual dexerit y, and that

the dis tri ct court

erred when it

fail ed to remand her

clai m to the Co mm issio ner so it c oul d co mp ly with the h old ing or e xpl ain w hy it fa iled t o co mp ly. We dis agr ee. The di stri ctcour t properly

foun d th at“the r ecord is cl ear that t he ALJ complied wit

h all of the ins tructions set

forth i n the Appeals Counci l’s r emand order and too k no actio n in con siste nt w ith th at or der . (R. 3 06- 309 .)” O rde r at 1 2. The Council’s holding s tate d: The Co uncil b elieve s that the claim ant’s rig ht han d difficulties d o rep resen t a significant non exertional limitation. . . . The Co uncil believes that this sev ere11

dominant hand i mpairment which pr ecludes t he clai mant’s abi lit

y t o perform jobs requiring bil atera l manual dext erit y cannot be consider ed insi gnific ant and that vocationa l evidence is ne eded to d etermine the e xtent to wh ich the claiman t’s nonexerti onal limitat ions er ode the occupational ba se for work. Decision at

2. The A LJ gave significance to the hand impairment in his step t hree analysi s, finding t hat Money had t

he RFC to perform “a wide range of simple , routine and repetitiv e light w ork a ctivity, not inv olving push ing, pu lling or fine m anua l dexte rity with the right dom inant uppe r extremity.” He took vocationa l evidence reg arding M oney’s hand impa irmen t: he inc luded this limitatio n on man ual de xterity in the h ypothetic al to the V E a s dis cus sed abo ve. C. Accounting for the addi tionalmedical evi dence the Council added to t he record Money argues t

hat the Council shoul d have explai ned why it adopted the second ALJ’s opinion e ven after it adde d exhibit s to the record, and that the dis tri ct court

erred when it fai led to r emand her claim to the Councilfor such an expl anati on. We disagr ee. First , because she fail ed to rai se thi s argument bef ore the di stri ct court , Money

wa ived her righ t to ra ise it b efo re n ow . See Gass , 311 F.3d at 246. Second, Money appears t o think s he is entitl ed to revi ew by the Appeal s Council. The regulations do requir e the Councilto eval uate the enti re record including the new and materi al evi dence subm itted, bu t do n ot requ ire it to gra nt revie w u nless it fin ds tha t the A LJ’s d ecision “is contrar y t o the weight

of the evi dence curr ently of record. ” 20 C.F.R. § 404. 970(b). The Council can admi t the e vidence i nto the r ecord but doe s not have t o provide wri tten12

rev iew of th is ev iden ce u nles s it gr ants for ma l rev iew of th e A LJ’ s de cisio n. See Matthews v. Apf

el , 239 F.3 d 58 9, 59 2 (3 d C ir. 20 01)

. We have already

decided t

hat the only

way that the new evidence could be reviewed i n this sit

uation would be on remand to t he Commissioner. Such a remand

cou ld o nly tak e pla ce if it me t the c riteria listed in S ectio n 40 5(g ) of the A ct. Id. at 592- 93. The dis tri ct court

here properly

used thes e 405(g) factors to analyze whether t he new evidence at

issue r equired r emand. It found that

the pet iti oner did not

offer any

reasons why the evi dence was materi al or why the evi dence had not bee n generat ed in time to put into the record befo re the A LJ. T his co nclus ion is su ppo rted by the record , wh ich is bereft of any s uch explanations. The district c ourt cor rectly concluded that

it coul d not remand thi s clai m to the Commissi oner for cons ideration of thi s evidence because the evidence did not m eet the criteria for rema nd und er 405(g). II. For a ll of the abov e reaso ns, w e w ill affirm the distric t court’s judg men t.