[Cite as State v. Loveless, 2019-Ohio-4830.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

CLERMONT COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 Appellee, 

 - vs - 

PAUL A. LOVELESS, 

 Appellant. 

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CASE NO. CA2019-03-028 

O P I N I O N 

11/25/2019 

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM CLERMONT COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

Case No. 2009CR00548 

Vincent D. Faris, Clermont County Prosecuting Attorney, Nicholas A. Horton, 76 South 

Riverside Drive, 2nd Floor, Batavia, Ohio 45103, for appellee 

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, Lauren Hammersmith, 250 East Broad Street, Suite 

1400, Columbus, Ohio 43215, for appellant 

 S. POWELL, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Paul A. Loveless, appeals the decision of the Clermont County 

Court of Common Pleas denying his motion to vacate his 2009 conviction for one count of 

tampering with evidence, one count of pandering obscenity, and five counts of unauthorized 

use of a computer. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm. 
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Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 2} The facts of this case are generally not in dispute. At 10:44 a.m. on May 1, 

2006, John Burns, the Manager of Technology Operations at the Great Oaks Institute of 

Technology and Career Development ("Great Oaks"), received an anonymous three-page 

e-mail from a Great Oaks student claiming he had discovered certain vulnerabilities in the 

Great Oaks' computer network that allowed him unauthorized access to confidential 

information stored on the network.1 The student also claimed that he was sharing this 

information with Burns in order to assist Great Oaks in fixing the security issues with its 

network. Upon receiving this e-mail, Burns contacted the Sharonville Police Department to 

report the security breach. There is no dispute that the student who authored this e-mail 

later identified himself as Loveless. There is also no dispute that Loveless, who was then 

17 years old, agreed to meet with Burns the next day to discuss how he was able to gain 

access to the Great Oaks' network.

{¶ 3} At 1:37 p.m. on May 2, 2006, Burns, Detective Aaron Blasky with the 

Sharonville Police Department, and Officer Steve Burgess with the Miami Township Police 

Department, as well as two Great Oaks officials, administrator Dan Cox and counselor 

Robin Scallon, met with Loveless in a Great Oaks' conference room.2 During this meeting, 

Detective Blasky informed Loveless that they were there "to find out what went on" and 

"need[ed] to talk" about his "great sleuthing" into the Great Oaks' computer network. 

Loveless responded "yep" and explained that "he would fully cooperate and be honest."3 

 

1. The e-mail included several screenshots showing the student had access to payroll records, employee 

account numbers, social security numbers, and routing information stored on the Great Oaks' network. The 

e-mail also included a screenshot showing the student had access and the ability to change student grades. 

2. Officer Burgess was at that time the Great Oaks' school resource officer. 

3. These statements are taken from a narrative supplement drafted by Officer Burgess on May 5, 2006. 
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{¶ 4} Loveless thereafter admitted to accessing the Great Oaks' network by using 

an administrator account login name and password that he had obtained by watching a 

Great Oaks technician log on to a classroom computer.4 Loveless also admitted that after 

he obtained the login name and password that he enabled a program that allowed him to 

log on to the Great Oaks' network from home. Following these admissions, Loveless 

demonstrated how he could gain access into the Great Oaks' network "within seconds" of 

logging on to the network. There is no dispute that Loveless made these admissions after 

signing a waiver of his Miranda rights.5 There is also no dispute that Loveless made these 

admissions after Detective Blasky told Loveless that although "this could lead to criminal 

charges" that he was not under arrest. 

{¶ 5} After meeting with Loveless in the Great Oaks' conference room for 

approximately two hours, officials from Great Oaks contacted Loveless' parents. Upon 

being contacted by Great Oaks officials, Loveless' father agreed to meet with Detective 

Blasky and Officer Burgess at the Loveless residence. Shortly thereafter, at 4:23 p.m., 

Detective Blasky transported Loveless home in his police cruiser. Once there, Loveless 

showed Officer Burgess the three computers that the Loveless family kept in their home; 

one in Loveless' parents' first-floor bedroom and two in Loveless' bedroom in the basement. 

During this time, Officer Burgess waited upstairs for Loveless' father to arrive home. 

{¶ 6} Upon his arrival home, Loveless' father spoke upstairs with Detective Blasky 

and Officer Burgess. During this conversation, there is no dispute that Loveless was left 

alone downstairs in his basement bedroom with two of the family's three computers. After 

speaking with Loveless' father, Detective Blasky went downstairs to the basement and 

 

4. The record indicates this technician logged on to the classroom computer by using an "on screen keyboard 

on the large screen in the front of the class." 

5. The record indicates that Detective Blasky read Loveless his Miranda rights at 2:05 p.m., 28 minutes after 

Loveless first entered the Great Oaks' conference room for questioning. 
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asked Loveless to join them upstairs. Detective Blasky indicated that Loveless was at that 

time acting "more nervous than before[.]" 

{¶ 7} Once Loveless was back upstairs, Loveless' father "agreed to fully cooperate" 

with the investigation. To that end, Loveless' father signed a consent form that gave 

Detective Blasky and Officer Burgess consent to search each of the Loveless family's three 

computers. Loveless' father signed this consent form at 4:45 p.m., approximately three 

hours after Detective Blasky and Officer Burgess had first met with Loveless in the Great 

Oaks' conference room. While signing this consent form, the record indicates that Loveless' 

father told Detective Blasky and Officer Burgess that he "completely understood the 

concern of Great Oaks."

{¶ 8} On May 4, 2006, Officer Burgess contacted Loveless' probation officer and 

advised him that there was an open investigation into Loveless gaining unauthorized access 

to the Great Oaks' computer network.6 Later that day, at 12:49 p.m., Officer Burgess 

received a telephone call from Loveless. During this call, Loveless informed Officer Burgess 

that his probation officer had called him and informed him that he was being placed on the 

"Detention Roster."7 Loveless then asked Officer Burgess if he "could be looking at felony 

charges." Officer Burgess responded that the investigation was still ongoing but that it was 

certainly a "possibility." 

{¶ 9} At 9:30 a.m. on May 11, 2006, Loveless came into Officer Burgess' office 

"upset and crying." Once there, Loveless told Officer Burgess that he was "just given 80 

days out of school and will probably now go to jail."8 Rather than discussing the ongoing 

 

6. This information is taken from two narrative supplements drafted by Officer Burgess on May 5 and 8, 2006. 

7. We note that while there are some references in the record to Loveless' earlier legal trouble, the record 

does not contain any specific information as to why Loveless was at that time on probation. 

 

8. These statements are taken from a narrative supplement drafted by Officer Burgess on May 12, 2006. 
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investigation and the details of the case, Officer Burgess responded and advised Loveless 

that he needed "to get his [life] on track" and do "the right things." A half-hour later, at 10:00 

a.m., Loveless' parents arrived and joined Loveless in Officer Burgess' office. 

{¶ 10} After Loveless' parents arrived, Officer Burgess "explained to them the case 

was still under investigation and may take a while" but that Loveless "could be looking at 

felony charges." After explaining to Loveless the serious nature of the charges levied 

against him, Officer Burgess asked Loveless if he would like to write a statement. Although 

initially somewhat reluctant, Loveless nevertheless agreed to write a statement for Officer 

Burgess. While writing this statement, the record indicates that Loveless became visibly 

upset and told Officer Burgess that he just wanted "to be honest." There is no dispute that 

Loveless wrote this statement after again signing a waiver of his Miranda rights. 

{¶ 11} At 9:02 a.m. on May 19, 2006, Burns, Detective Blasky, and Officer Burgess 

met to discuss the progress of the ongoing investigation into Loveless' unauthorized access 

onto the Great Oaks' computer network. During this meeting, Detective Blasky advised 

Burns and Officer Burgess that "there is much more than he anticipated that [Loveless] 

accessed and did."9 This includes Detective Blasky's discovery that Loveless had also 

gained unauthorized access to a company's computer network located in Michigan. Burns 

further advised Detective Blasky and Officer Burgess that Great Oaks was still in the 

process of bringing in computer consultants to check its computer network and "do the 

needed maintenance."

{¶ 12} Approximately one month later, on June 16, 2006, Detective Blasky began a 

forensic examination of the computer taken from Loveless' parents' first-floor bedroom. 

During this examination, Detective Blasky discovered accounts belonging to both Loveless 

 

9. This information is taken from a narrative supplement drafted by Officer Burgess on May 22, 2006. 
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and Loveless' parents. Detective Blasky also found a folder that contained "evidence of 

.mpg (movie) files of apparent minors engaged in sexual acts." After discovering these 

video files, Detective Blasky spoke with Officer Burgess. A search warrant was then 

obtained for all three computers taken from the Loveless family's residence. 

{¶ 13} Once the search warrant was obtained, Detective Blasky met with Loveless' 

parents at the Miami Township Police Department and "informed them of this development, 

providing them with copies of the warrants." After speaking with Loveless' parents, 

Detective Blasky continued his forensic examination of the computer taken from Loveless' 

parent's first-floor bedroom. This examination uncovered "remnants of approximately 15 

movies depicting minors engaged in sexual acts" that had been deleted "one year prior 

which coincides with the last login date of [Loveless'] account."

{¶ 14} On June 27, 2006, Detective Blasky conducted a forensic examination on one 

of the two computers taken from Loveless' basement bedroom. Detective Blasky identified 

this computer as "Homemade Computer SCSI Hard drive from [Loveless'] Room." This 

examination resulted in Detective Blasky discovering several now deleted files containing 

child pornography. Detective Blasky also discovered evidence that these files had been 

deleted while Loveless was left alone in the basement when he and Officer Burgess were 

upstairs speaking to Loveless' father on the afternoon of May 2, 2006. 

{¶ 15} Due to the complex nature of this case, the record indicates that Detective 

Blasky did not conduct a forensic examination of the other computer taken from Loveless' 

basement bedroom until nearly a year later on June 22, 2007. Detective Blasky identified 

this computer as "IBM Computer from [Loveless'] Room." Similar to the first computer taken 

from Loveless' basement bedroom, the record indicates this examination also resulted in 

Detective Blasky discovering a number of files that related to either child pornography or 

computer hacking. This includes one file named "R@ygold – 12yo girl lets 11yo boy cum."
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{¶ 16} On August 3, 2007, Office Burgess drafted a narrative supplement to his 

original May 2, 2006 police report. As part of this supplemental narrative, Officer Burgess 

stated that he had "kept in touch" with Detective Blasky regarding the "very complex" 

investigation into Loveless having gained unauthorized access to the Great Oaks' computer 

network and subsequent discovery of child pornography on the Loveless family's three 

computers. Officer Burgess also stated that both of these matters were still "currently under 

investigation." To that end, and as part of this ongoing investigation, Officer Burgess stated 

that he had met with Detective Blasky in late June of 2007. During this meeting, Detective 

Blasky stated that he briefed Officer Burgess on the status of the ongoing investigation and 

"the downloads that were leading to the investigation." 

{¶ 17} Continuing this narrative supplement, Officer Burgess described how the 

investigation was progressing as follows:

August 1, 2007 Det. Blasky met with Ofc. Burgess at the Miami 

Township Police Department with the complete investigation 

and reviewed same. Det. Blasky gave Ofc. Burgess (2) 

investigation notebooks, one for the PD and one for the 

Prosecutor's Office. 

August 2, 2007 Ofc. Burgess e-mailed Great Oaks Director of 

Technology, John Burns and requested a detailed report and 

restitution request for the Loveless case. 

August 3, 2007 Ofc. Burgess spoke with Clermont County 

Prosecutor, Jay Mathers and briefed him of the investigation 

findings. A meeting will be set in the future. 

Officer Burgess concluded his supplemental narrative by noting that the "[c]ase remains 

open." 

{¶ 18} Over 18 months later, in April of 2009, the case was assigned to Detective 

Robert Bradford with the Miami Township Police Department. After being assigned the 

case, Detective Bradford met with Kevin Miles, an Assistant Prosecutor with the Clermont 

County Prosecutor's Office. During this meeting, which occurred on April 30, 2009, 
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Assistant Prosecutor Miles advised Detective Bradford of the facts and circumstances 

surrounding the ongoing investigation into Loveless' unauthorized access into the Great 

Oaks' computer network and "pandering nudity oriented matter involving a juvenile." To 

further this ongoing investigation, Assistant Prosecutor Miles asked Detective Bradford to 

"gather the images in question for review" and meet with him again after reviewing the file. 

{¶ 19} The following month, in May of 2009, Detective Bradford asked Detective 

Blasky to provide him with the files that were recovered from the Loveless family's three 

computers. This includes the two computers taken from Loveless' basement bedroom. 

Detective Blasky responded that he would have the files available for Detective Bradford 

"as soon as he could create a disk." Later that month, Detective Blasky provided Detective 

Bradford with a disk that contained the various photographs and videos of minors engaged 

in sexual acts that were recovered from the Loveless family's three computers. Upon 

receiving this disk, Detective Bradford reviewed the files provided to him by Detective 

Blasky. This review resulted in Detective Bradford locating 26 files that contained child 

pornography and several other files that "depicted child pornography by the file names." 

{¶ 20} After reviewing the files provided to him by Detective Blasky, Detective 

Bradford met with Assistant Prosecutor Miles again and advised him of his findings. Upon 

being so advised, Assistant Prosecutor Miles asked Detective Bradford to contact Detective 

Blasky to determine exactly how many times Loveless had gained access into the Great 

Oaks' computer network. Assistant Prosecutor Miles also asked Detective Bradford to 

interview Loveless and Loveless' parents again. Assistant Prosecutor Miles further advised 

Detective Bradford that, in accordance with R.C. 2151.23(I), Loveless "would have a grand 

jury hearing for indictment after he turned 21 years old [two months later on July 31, 2009], 

because he was a juvenile when this offense took place." Pursuant to R.C. 2151.23(I), an 

offender who is 21 years old or older may be prosecuted as an adult and subject to adult 
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sentences regardless of when the act was committed so long as the act would be charged 

as a felony if committed by an adult and "the person [had not been] taken into custody or 

apprehended for that act until after the person attains twenty-one years of age[.]" 

{¶ 21} On June 4, 2009, Loveless went to the Miami Township Police Department to 

obtain a copy of an unrelated crash report. While there, Detective Bradford asked Loveless 

if they could talk. Loveless agreed. Detective Bradford and Loveless then went into an 

interview room located just off of the police department's front lobby. Once in the interview 

room, Detective Bradford advised Loveless that he did not need to speak with him and that 

he was free to leave at any time. Upon being so advised, Detective Bradford asked 

Loveless about the child pornography that Detective Blasky had discovered on the three 

computers taken from the Loveless family's residence. Loveless denied all knowledge 

about the child pornography found on those three computers. Loveless instead advised 

Detective Bradford that he used to buy and sell computers so the child pornography must 

have belonged to someone else. Loveless also denied any knowledge about the child 

pornography that was deleted from one of the two computers taken from his basement 

bedroom while Detective Blasky and Officer Burgess were upstairs talking to his father on 

the afternoon of May 2, 2006. 

{¶ 22} At 11:10 a.m. on July 15, 2009, Detective Bradford met with Loveless' father 

to discuss the allegations against Loveless and the child pornography located on the 

Loveless family's three computers. During this meeting, Loveless' father told Detective 

Bradford that Loveless had prior legal trouble relating to computer hacking and other 

sexually related offenses. This includes Loveless having a "problem" with child 

pornography. Loveless' father also advised Detective Bradford that Loveless "has had so 
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much counseling in the past that he did not know if this was still a problem for him."10 

Loveless' father further told Detective Bradford that Loveless "would fix and refurbish 

computers" and that Loveless may not have been "as careful as he should about that." 

Loveless' father additionally advised Detective Bradford that Loveless, who had been 

diagnosed with bipolar disorder and ADHD, had previously attempted to "set up a porn site 

and solicit girls" before this more recent incident involving child pornography. 

{¶ 23} The record indicates Loveless' father also showed concerns that the police 

might have thought the child pornography belonged to him. So, in order to distance himself 

from those allegations, Loveless' father advised Detective Bradford that Loveless had vast 

knowledge of computers and computer systems, thereby making it relatively easy for 

Loveless to crack computer passwords. Loveless' father also told Detective Bradford that 

he had already told Detective Blasky that it was "[Loveless] on his computers and that he 

was not doing this." Loveless' father further told Detective Bradford that he wanted to help 

Loveless but that he was "unaware of anything that had ever happened to [Loveless] that 

would cause this type of behavior." Loveless' father additionally advised Detective Bradford 

that he was unaware if Loveless had ever been abused and denied that any abuse had 

ever occurred in their home. 

{¶ 24} Later that day, Detective Bradford drafted a narrative supplement outlining his 

conversations with Loveless and Loveless' father. Detective Bradford also noted that he 

had prepared a discovery packet that included a disk containing the child pornography 

discovered on the Loveless family's three computers. Detective Bradford concluded this 

narrative statement by noting that he was recommending Loveless be indicted for 26 counts 

of second-degree felony pandering sexually oriented material involving a minor in violation 

 

10. As discussed more fully below, these statements are taken from a memorandum drafted by Detective 

Bradford on the same day that he spoke with Loveless' father, July 15, 2009. 
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of R.C. 2907.322(A)(1), 26 additional counts of third-degree felony pandering sexually 

oriented material involving a minor in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(5), one count of thirddegree felony tampering with evidence in violation or R.C. 2921.12, and five counts of fifthdegree felony unauthorized use of a computer in violation or R.C. 2913.04(B). After drafting 

this narrative supplement, Detective Bradford left a message for Assistant Prosecutor Miles 

advising him that the discovery packet was ready to be dropped off at the Clermont County 

Prosecutor's Office. 

{¶ 25} On August 5, 2009, approximately three weeks after Detective Bradford spoke 

to Loveless' father, and five days after Loveless turned 21 years old, the Clermont County 

Grand Jury returned a 26-count indictment against Loveless. Somewhat different than the 

charges recommended by Detective Bradford, the indictment charged Loveless with ten 

counts of second-degree felony pandering sexually oriented material involving a minor in 

violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(1), ten counts of fourth-degree felony pandering sexually 

oriented material involving a minor in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(5), one count of thirddegree felony tampering with evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), and five counts 

of fifth-degree felony unauthorized use of a computer in violation of R.C. 2913.04(B). The 

charges were based on the facts set forth above that were alleged to have occurred 

between January 18, 2006 and May 2, 2006 when Loveless was 17 years old. 

{¶ 26} On October 21, 2009, Loveless entered a plea agreement and pled guilty to 

one count of third-degree felony tampering with evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), 

one count of fifth-degree felony pandering obscenity in violation of R.C. 2907.32(A)(1), and 

five counts of fifth-degree felony unauthorized use of a computer in violation R.C. 

2913.04(B). Approximately three months later, on January 7, 2010, the trial court held a 

sentencing hearing and sentenced Loveless to three years of community control. The trial 

court also classified Loveless as a Tier I sex offender and ordered Loveless to pay Great 
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Oaks $11,945 in restitution. Loveless thereafter violated his community control three times, 

which ultimately resulted in him serving two years in prison. These violations included 

Loveless having possession of two computers and a cell phone that he then used to access 

the Internet and view pornography, Loveless submitting three positive drug screens, and 

Loveless admitted heroin use, among others. 

{¶ 27} On July 13, 2018, over nine years after he entered his guilty plea, Loveless 

filed a motion to vacate his conviction. Loveless supported his motion based on two central 

arguments; (1) preindictment delay and (2) the trial court's alleged improper exercise of 

subject matter jurisdiction to convict and sentence him for crimes that he committed prior to 

turning 18. Taking the matter under advisement, the trial court issued a decision denying 

Loveless' motion on February 26, 2019. In so holding, the trial court found that by pleading 

guilty Loveless had waived any argument that his conviction should be vacated due to 

preindictment delay. The trial court also found that it had properly exercised subject matter 

jurisdiction over Loveless' conviction even though the conviction was based on crimes that 

Loveless committed prior to turning 18 since he was neither "taken into custody" nor 

"apprehended" as those terms are used in R.C. 2151.23(I) prior to his 21st birthday. 

Appeal

{¶ 28} Loveless now appeals the trial court's decision denying his motion to vacate 

his conviction, raising the following single assignment of error for review. 

{¶ 29} THE CLERMONT COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ERRED [WHEN] 

IT FAILED TO VACATE PAUL LOVELESS' CONVICTIONS AS VOID BECAUSE THE 

COMMON PLEAS COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO CONVICT HIM OF THAT 

OFFENSE IN 2009 AND BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO TIMELY PROSECUTE 

PAUL. 

{¶ 30} In his single assignment of error, Loveless argues that the trial court erred by 
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denying his motion to vacate his conviction. We disagree. 

{¶ 31} Loveless initially argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion since 

the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to convict him for crimes that he committed 

prior to turning 18. Loveless instead argues that it was the juvenile court that had exclusive 

subject-matter jurisdiction to punish him for those offenses. We find no merit to Loveless' 

claim. 

{¶ 32} Pursuant to R.C. 2151.23(A)(1), "[j]uvenile courts have exclusive original 

jurisdiction over proceedings involving a child alleged to have committed a delinquent act." 

State v. Watkins, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2017-03-013, 2018-Ohio-46, ¶ 13. The term 

"child" generally means "a person who is under eighteen years of age[.]" R.C. 

2152.02(C)(1). "Therefore, absent a proper bindover procedure, 'the juvenile court has the 

exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over any case concerning a child who is alleged to be 

a delinquent' that 'cannot be waived.'" State v. Isse, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2017-06-

012, 2018-Ohio-799, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 40 (1995), paragraphs 

one and two of the syllabus ("[t]he exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of the juvenile court 

cannot be waived"). "A conviction is void where the court of common pleas lacks subject 

matter jurisdiction to convict the defendant due to the defendant's age at the time of the 

offense." Id., citing Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Horn, 142 Ohio St.3d 416, 2015-Ohio-1484, 

¶ 8, fn. 1, citing Wilson at 44. 

{¶ 33} There is an exception, however, that limits the juvenile court's exclusive 

subject-matter jurisdiction. Bear v. Buchanan, 156 Ohio St.3d 348, 2019-Ohio-931, ¶ 5. As 

noted above, this exception is found in R.C. 2151.23(I). Pursuant to that statute: 

If a person under eighteen years of age allegedly commits an 

act that would be a felony if committed by an adult and if the 

person is not taken into custody or apprehended for that act until 

after the person attains twenty-one years of age, the juvenile 

court does not have jurisdiction to hear or determine any portion 
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of the case charging the person with committing that act. In 

those circumstances, divisions (A) and (B) of section 2152.12 of 

the Revised Code do not apply regarding the act, and the case 

charging the person with committing the act shall be a criminal

prosecution commenced and heard in the appropriate court 

having jurisdiction of the offense as if the person had been 

eighteen years of age or older when the person committed the 

act. All proceedings pertaining to the act shall be within the

jurisdiction of the court having jurisdiction of the offense, and 

that court has all the authority and duties in the case that it has 

in other criminal cases in that court. 

{¶ 34} "By enacting R.C. 2151.23(I), the General Assembly intended for offenders 

21 years of age to be prosecuted as adults and subject to adult sentences, regardless of 

when their acts were committed." State v. Stidam, 4th Dist. Adams No. 15CA1014, 2016-

Ohio-7906, ¶ 58. This, as the Ohio Supreme Court explained, effectively removes "anyone 

over 21 years of age from juvenile-court jurisdiction, regardless of the date on which the 

person allegedly committed the offense." State v. Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437, 2002-Ohio5059, ¶ 14 This is because "R.C. 2151.23(I) is written in the negative, and clearly states 

that a juvenile court is divested of jurisdiction when certain requirements are met." In re 

H.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102601, 2015-Ohio-3676, ¶ 10. Those requirements are as 

follows: 

(1) The defendant must have been under eighteen years of age 

at the time of the offense; 

(2) The alleged offense would be a felony if committed by an 

adult; and 

(3) The defendant must not have been "taken into custody or 

apprehended" for the offense prior to turning twenty-one years 

of age. 

State v. Taylor, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105322, 2017-Ohio-8066, ¶ 4. 

{¶ 35} "The legislature chose to authorize prosecution of those [offenders over the 

age of 21] in the general division because persons who commit offenses as juveniles but 

who are not prosecuted until after they turn 21 are not likely to be amenable to the juvenile 
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justice system." State v. Fortson, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2011-P-0031, 2012-Ohio-3118, ¶ 

43, citing State v. Schaar, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2003CA00129, 2004-Ohio-1631, ¶ 29. To 

hold otherwise, thereby permitting a juvenile court to retain subject-matter jurisdiction over 

a person who is 21 years old or older, the juvenile court "would find its dispositional options 

profoundly limited." Walls, 2002-Ohio-5059 at ¶ 40. This makes "the age of the offender 

upon apprehension the touchstone of determining juvenile-court jurisdiction[.]" (Emphasis 

sic.) Id. at ¶ 14. 

{¶ 36} There is no dispute that Loveless was under the age of 18 at the time he 

committed the above named offenses and that the offenses, if committed by an adult, would 

all be charged as felonies. The only question is whether Loveless was "taken into custody 

or apprehended" as those terms are used in R.C. 2151.23(I) prior to turning 21. "The fact 

that the legislature chose to use the phrase, 'taken into custody or apprehended' in the 

disjunctive and as opposed to the phrase 'taken into custody' alone, indicates that the 

legislature recognized a difference between being in 'custody' and being 'apprehended.'" 

Lindstrom, 2011-Ohio-6755 at ¶ 22. 

{¶ 37} As it relates to whether an offender was "taken into custody" under R.C. 

2151.23(I), R.C. 2151.31(A) and Juv.R. 6(A) provide that a child may be "taken into custody" 

in accordance with a court order, the "laws of arrest," or by a law enforcement officer where 

"[t]here are reasonable grounds to believe that the child committed a delinquent act and 

that taking the child into custody is necessary to protect the public interest and safety."11 

This implies that an offender has been "taken into custody" under R.C. 2151.23(I) when the 

offender has been physically detained "by virtue of lawful authority" for "judicial or penal 

 

11. Both R.C. 2151.31(A) and Juv.R. 6(A) list several other ways in which a child may be "taken into custody" 

none of which are applicable here. 
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safe-keeping." Lidstrom at ¶ 20, citing Rarey v. Schmidt, 115 Ohio St. 518, 522 (1926). 

{¶ 38} On the other hand, unlike where a child has been "taken into custody," it has 

been determined that an offender has been "apprehended" under R.C. 2151.23(I) when a 

complaint has been filed in the juvenile court and a summons has been issued for the 

offender's arrest if the state had so requested. Lindstrom at ¶ 29. This is true despite the 

fact that the offender was not physically taken into custody. Id. Therefore, as properly 

explained by the trial court, the term "apprehended" would "cover complaints filed and 

served, but not necessarily accompanied by physical seizure," whereas the phrase "taken 

into custody" would "apply to physical seizure in accordance with official action." 

{¶ 39} Loveless claims that he was "taken into custody" as that term is used in R.C. 

2151.23(I) prior to turning 21 when "he was brought into his school's conference room for 

questioning" on the afternoon of May 2, 2006. However, as the record indicates, there was 

no court order mandating Loveless be taken into custody at the time he was brought into 

the Great Oaks' conference room for questioning. Loveless was also not taken into custody 

by being placed under arrest either before, during, or immediately after he was questioned 

by police in the Great Oaks' conference room. Loveless was instead taken into custody 

years later after he was indicted and a warrant was issued for his arrest on August 5, 2009, 

five days after Loveless turned 21 on July 31, 2009. 

{¶ 40} The record further indicates that there was no reason to believe that it was 

necessary to physically detain Loveless by taking him into custody or place him under arrest 

in order to protect the public interest or public safety on the afternoon of May 2, 2006. This 

holds true even after Detective Blasky drove Loveless home in his police cruiser and spoke 

with Loveless' father. This is because Loveless was at that time being investigated based 

solely on allegations that he had gained unauthorized access onto the Great Oaks' 

computer network and not for possessing child pornography. Therefore, contrary to 
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Loveless' claim otherwise, Loveless was not "taken into custody" as that term is used in 

R.C. 2151.23(I) when he was questioned by police in the Great Oaks' conference room on 

the afternoon of May 2, 2006. 

{¶ 41} Although this court's analysis is based on the meaning of the phrase "taken 

into custody" under R.C. 2151.23(I), we find the same to be true when considering whether 

Loveless was "in custody" and subject to a "custodial interrogation" under Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966). "[C]ourts have previously rejected the 

argument that a school is necessarily a coercive setting for a juvenile to be questioned by 

police." State v. Spahr, 2d Dist. Miami Nos. 2008 CA 21 and 2008 CA 22, 2009-Ohio-4609, 

¶ 15. Therefore, when faced with facts similar to the case at bar, it has been determined 

that "the act of law enforcement officers questioning minors while they are at school does 

not amount to custodial interrogation where there is no evidence that the student was under 

arrest or told he was not free to leave." In re Haubeil, 4th Dist. Ross No. 01CA2631, 2002-

Ohio-4095, ¶ 16, citing In re Bucy, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 96CA0019, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 

4842 (Nov. 6, 1996) (student was not in custody when he was interviewed by a police officer 

in his school's conference room where the student was told that he was not under arrest 

and was free to leave to which the student responded that he wanted to speak with the 

officer because he had "nothing to hide"). Accordingly, even when analyzing this case 

under Miranda, Loveless' claim that he was "taken into custody" when he was questioned 

by police in the Great Oaks' conference room on the afternoon of May 2, 2006, or at any 

time immediately thereafter, lacks merit. 

{¶ 42} Loveless also claims that he was "apprehended" as that term is used in R.C. 

2151.23(I) prior to turning 21 since the police "knew his identity, his whereabouts, and the 

nature of his offenses before he turned 21." However, contrary to Loveless' claim, the term 

"apprehended" means something more than "a mere thought or perception that a person 
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named as the perpetrator of an offense could be arrested or detained." (Emphasis sic.). 

Taylor, 2017-Ohio-8066 at ¶ 8 (appellant was not apprehended by police even though police 

had "become aware" of appellant, "perceived" appellant, and had "positively identified" 

appellant as the offender before he turned 21 years old). 

{¶ 43} Again, as properly explained by the trial court, the term "apprehended" would 

"cover complaints filed and served, but not necessarily accompanied by physical seizure." 

Therefore, as discussed more fully above, not only was Loveless not "taken into custody" 

prior to turning 21, Loveless was also not "apprehended" until after he was indicted and a 

warrant was issued for his arrest on August 5, 2009, five days after his 21st birthday on July 

31, 2009. See State v. Steele, 146 Ohio Misc. 2d 23, 2008-Ohio-2467, ¶ 6 (C.P.) (offender 

was not "apprehended" as that term is used in R.C. 2151.23(I) until after the offender was 

indicted). Accordingly, because Loveless was neither "taken into custody" nor 

"apprehended" as those terms are used under R.C. 2151.23(I) prior to turning 21, Loveless' 

claim that the trial court erred by denying his motion to vacate his conviction for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction is without merit. 

Preindictment Delay 

{¶ 44} Loveless additionally argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to 

vacate his conviction since he was subject to preindictment delay that violated his right to 

due process. While there may be some question as to why the investigation lasted for over 

three years, it is nevertheless well established that "a guilty plea waives any alleged due 

process violation arising from preindictment delay." State v. Thomas, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 105824, 2019-Ohio-1372, ¶ 6, citing State v. Brown, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104085, 

2017-Ohio-184, ¶ 9 ("[appellant's] guilty plea waives any alleged due process violation 

arising from preindictment delay"); State v. Shivers, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105621, 2018-

Ohio-99, ¶ 11 ("appellant's guilty plea resulted in a waiver of any alleged due process 
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violation arising from preindictment delay"); State v. Cordell, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2009 CA 

57, 2010-Ohio-5277, ¶ 8 (appellant's guilty plea "effectively waived" any due process 

violation arising from preindictment delay). Therefore, just as the trial court found, "by 

pleading guilty, Loveless waived his right to challenge his conviction based upon a 

preindictment delay argument." Accordingly, even though the record is not explicit in why 

the investigation lasted as long as it did, because Loveless waived any alleged due process 

violation arising from preindictment delay by entering a guilty plea, Loveless' claim that the 

trial court erred by denying his motion to vacate his conviction due to preindictment delay 

also lacks merit. 

Conclusion

{¶ 45} The trial court did not err by denying Loveless' motion to vacate his conviction 

resulting from his guilty plea to one count of tampering with evidence, one count of 

pandering obscenity, and five counts of unauthorized use of property. Therefore, finding 

no merit to any of the argument raised herein, Loveless' single assignment of error 

challenging the trial court's decision denying his motion to vacate his conviction is overruled. 

{¶ 46} Judgment affirmed. 

 HENDRICKSON, P.J., and M. POWELL, J., concur.