IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-31056

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

PAL SAT,

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 1:12-CR-342-1

Before BARKSDALE, HAYNES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Pal Sat was convicted by a jury on two counts of failure to depart 

pursuant to a lawful order of removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1)(C). 

He challenges his conviction on two grounds: sufficiency of his affirmative 

defense (duress); and claimed improper comments by the Government during 

closing argument.

* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. 

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 16, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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No. 13-31056

Regarding his duress defense, Sat contends the district court erred by 

denying his motions for judgment of acquittal. We review de novo, determining 

whether “a rational trier of fact could have found that the evidence established 

the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt”. United States 

v. Ferguson, 211 F.3d 878, 882 (5th Cir. 2000).

At trial, Sat relied on the affirmative defense of duress, which requires

a defendant to show: he was under an unlawful, imminent, and impending 

threat that would induce a well-grounded fear of death or serious bodily injury;

he had not recklessly or negligently placed himself in that situation; he had no 

legal and reasonable alternative to violating the law; and it was reasonable to 

anticipate the criminal actions would avoid the possible harm. United States 

v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 873 (5th Cir. 1998). Defendant bears the burden 

of proving each of these elements by a preponderance of the evidence. Dixon 

v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 17 (2006). 

Sat prevented his removal by refusing, in Alexandria, Louisiana, to 

board a flight to India on 12 September and 16 October 2012. Sat’s duress 

defense was based on his testimony that, if he returned to India, he would be 

attacked and probably killed. However, a defendant claiming duress must 

prove the existence of “a real emergency leaving no time to pursue any legal 

alternative” or an “absolute and uncontrollable necessity” at the time he 

committed the offense. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d at 874 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Harper, 802 F.2d 115, 118 

(5th Cir. 1986). Because Sat’s criminal actions occurred at the airport in 

Alexandria, Louisiana, a rational jury could have found any future harm in 

India would not constitute the requisite imminent and impending threat at the 

time of his criminal conduct. See, e.g., Harper, 802 F.2d at 118 (finding “no 

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evidence [Appellant] was in danger of imminent bodily harm at the moment he 

[committed the offense]”). 

Regarding the Government’s closing argument, Sat contends it 

suggested improperly to the jury that it should defer to the prior conclusion of 

an immigration judge who had considered and rejected Sat’s evidence 

regarding his fear of returning to India. In reviewing properly preserved 

claims of misconduct during closing arguments, we engage in a two-step 

analysis. United States v. McCann, 613 F.3d 486, 494 (5th Cir. 2010). We first

determine whether the remark was improper; if it was, we then review 

whether the remark affected defendant’s substantial rights. Id. In evaluating 

the effect on substantial rights, we consider “(1) the magnitude of the 

statement’s prejudice, (2) the effect of any cautionary instructions given, and 

(3) the strength of the evidence of the defendant’s guilt”. Id. at 496 (internal 

quotations marks and citation omitted). 

As Sat concedes, because he did not object on this basis in district court, 

our review is only for plain error. Under the plain-error standard, Sat must 

show a forfeited clear or obvious error that affected his substantial rights. 

Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). If he shows such reversible 

plain error, we have the discretion to correct the error, but should do so only if 

it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the 

proceedings. Id. 

In closing, the Government compared the objective standard for fear in 

the context of receiving asylum with the standard for duress, and stated: 

The government would remind you that an asylum 

officer already reviewed the defendant’s request for 

asylum. Even though the defendant claims that he had 

nothing to do with that paperwork, that request has 

already been reviewed. That request was denied. A 

hearing was held, and the defendant didn't show up.

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The Government’s statement is supported by the record and factually correct: 

Sat filed an asylum request; it was denied by an “asylum officer”; and Sat failed 

to appear for a subsequent hearing. 

Even assuming arguendo the closing-argument statement was improper, 

it did not affect Sat’s substantial rights. The factually-correct statement 

comprised only a brief part of the Government’s argument. See, e.g., United 

States v. Delgado, 672 F.3d 320, 337–38 (5th Cir 2012) (en banc) (“[A] single 

statement at closing will rarely justify reversal”.). And, the court instructed 

the jury that the statements of the attorneys were not evidence. See McCann,

613 F.3d at 497 (noting even generic cautionary instructions have a “minor 

mitigating effect” on improper, prejudicial statements by a prosecutor). 

Finally, even if the jurors thought Sat should have been granted asylum, 

this was not the issue before them; as discussed above, a rational jury could 

have found that, even if he legitimately feared harm in India, Sat had failed to 

establish an imminent threat of harm at the time of his criminal activity. In 

short, Sat cannot establish reversible plain error. 

AFFIRMED.

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