J-S01018-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.B., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: M.F., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 815 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered June 13, 2022,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,

Orphans' Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000232-2021.

IN THE INTEREST OF: E.B., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: M.F., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 816 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered June 13, 2022,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,

Family Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000233-2021.

IN THE INTEREST OF: N.B., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: M.F., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 817 WDA 2022
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Appeal from the Order Entered June 13, 2022,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,

Orphans' Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000231-2021.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: March 17, 2023

In this matter, M.F. (Mother) appeals the order terminating her parental 

rights to her three children, N.B., born May 2013, J.B., born July 2014, and 

E.B., born February 2016, pursuant to the Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and (b). 

The record1 discloses the following factual and procedural history: 

Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families (“the Agency”) has 

been aware of the family since May 2013, when N.B was born, and both N.B. 

and Mother tested positive for marijuana. N.B. was discharged to the care of 

her parents and the family’s case was closed on or about June 13, 2013. As 

noted above, J.B. was born in July 2014.

The family next came to the attention of the Agency in February 2016, 

shortly after E.B. was born. There were concerns regarding Mother’s drug use 

during her pregnancy, as well as Father’s drug use. Moreover, the family’s 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 We glean these facts and proceedings from the termination petitions as well 

as the joint stipulations entered at the termination hearing. See infra.
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home was unsafe and in deplorable condition. After the provision of services, 

the case was closed on or about August 7, 2017.

The Agency most recently became involved with the family on or about 

August 7, 2019. At that time, the Agency received a report indicating 

inappropriate discipline and neglect of the children, as well as concerns of 

Father’s drug use. For two weeks, the Agency was unsuccessful at assessing 

the home and family. On or about August 20, 2019, Kellie Pavilonis, an 

Agency caseworker, was able to make contact with both parents, but when 

the parents became verbally threatening, she needed to obtain police 

involvement to gain access to the home. After the police became involved, 

Ms. Pavilonis was able to see the children, but she was not able to interview 

them or assess the home. 

On or about November 19, 2019, the parents finally permitted the 

Agency to access a part of the home but did not permit a complete home 

inspection and did not make the children available to be interviewed. On 

November 20, 2019, the Juvenile Court ordered the parents to complete a 

drug screen, sign all releases of information, enroll the one child in school, 

provide access to the home and the children, and to assess the home where 

the children were staying. After the hearing, Father tested positive for THC 

and Mother tested positive for suboxone, cocaine, and THC. The parents also 

refused to sign all needed releases of information. 

Due to the family’s ongoing instability and parents’ failure to cooperate 

to ensure the children’s safety, the Agency obtained an order for emergency 
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protective custody on November 20, 2019 and took legal custody of the 

children. The children have not return to the care of either parent since that 

time. At a shelter hearing on November 22, 2019, the children were ordered 

to remain in foster care.

All three children were adjudicated dependent on December 18, 2019. 

Both parents stipulated to dependency based upon substance abuse issues, 

inadequate housing, and the fact that the children were not up to date 

medically. At the dependency hearing, both parents were ordered to: 1) have 

drug and alcohol and mental evaluations and participate in random screens; 

2) obtain appropriate housing; and 3) have liberal supervised visits at the 

Agency.

Upon removal, the parents were permitted to visit the children in person 

three days a week prior to the pandemic shutdown and then visits went to 

virtual three times a week. On May 14, 2020, the children’s foster parents 

were appointed secondary medical and educational decision makers.

On November 4, 2021, Agency petitioned to terminate both Mother’s

and Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8) 

and (b). The orphans’ court conducted an evidentiary hearing on June 10, 

2022. Counsel for the parents appeared, although neither Mother nor Father 

was present. Counsel was present for N.B. and E.B, while separate counsel 

appeared for J.B. None of the children were present.

The parties first entered eleven joint stipulations on the record. The 

Agency then presented the testimony from Mina Needham, the children’s 
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foster care supervisor, and Ms. Pavilonis, the Agency’s caseworker. By 

order entered December 29, 2021, the court granted the Agency’s petitions. 

Mother appealed.2 Both Mother and the orphans’ court complied with 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.

Mother presents the following issue:

Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err 

as a matter of law in concluding that [the Agency] met its 

burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that 

termination of Mother’s parental rights would best serve the 

needs and welfare of the children pursuant to 23 [Pa.C.S.A.] 

§ 2511(b)?

Mother’s Brief at 10.

We review this issue mindful of our well-settled standard of review.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights 

cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact 

and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are 

supported by the record. If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial 

court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A 

decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only 

upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court's 

decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that 

often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning 

multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted).

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2 Father did not appeal.
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Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in section 2511(a). Only 

if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court 

engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to section 

2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the 

child[.]

In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 261-262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

Here, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant 

to Section 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). Mother concedes that the Agency 

established by clear and convincing evidence that termination was warranted 

under Section 2511(a). Thus, we next consider her claim that the Agency 

failed to present clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Section 2511(b).

Section 2511(b) provides:

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection 

(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by 

the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which 

are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).
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This Court has explained that:

[S]ection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of 

parental rights would best serve the developmental, 

physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child. 

In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), 

this Court stated, “Intangibles such as love, comfort, 

security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the 

needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we instructed 

that the trial court must also discern the nature and status 

of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect 

on the child of permanently severing that bond. Id. 

However, in cases where there is no evidence of a bond 

between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no 

bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 

2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis 

necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular 

case. Id. at 763.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).

Concerning the bond, the question is not merely whether a bond exists, 

but whether termination would destroy this existing, necessary and beneficial 

relationship. See C.M.K., 203 A.2d at 264 (citation omitted); see 

also K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 764 (holding there was no bond worth preserving 

where the child had been in foster care for most of the child's life, which 

caused the resulting bond to be too attenuated). We add, the court is not 

required to use expert testimony to resolve the bond analysis but may rely on 

the testimony of social workers and caseworkers. Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. 

Finally, we emphasize that “[w]hile a parent's emotional bond with her and/or 

her child is a major aspect of the § 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is 

nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the court when 
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determining what is in the best interest of the child.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 

95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted).

Here, the orphans’ court determined that it based its Section 2511(b) 

determination on the “credible testimony” of Ms. Needham and Ms. Pavilonis. 

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/30/22, at 3. The court then noted Ms. Needham’s

opinion that “she did not think any of the three children would be detrimentally 

affected” if Mother’s parental rights were terminated, as well as her belief that 

the children were more bonded to the foster parents “than they are with 

[Mother.]” Id. at 7. 

The orphan’s court also credited Ms. Pavilonis’ testimony concerning the 

existence of a bond between the children and Mother. Ms. Pavilonis testified 

that the children have a strong bond with their foster parents and the 

cessation of that bond would be detrimental to the children. See N.T., 

6/10/22, at 18.

After review, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion when it 

found that termination would best serve the children’s needs and welfare 

under Section 2511(b). In arguing that the Agency did not meet its burden, 

Mother asserts that, Ms. Needham and Ms. Pavilonis had only “observed 

Mother with the Children a total of three times.” Mother’s Brief at 20. 

According to Mother, these witnesses presented by the Agency “simply opined 

that termination of [her] parental rights would not have a detrimental impact 

on the Children because [she] did not visit consistently, and because the 
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Children did not appear as bonded with [her] as they appeared to be with 

foster parents.” Id. We disagree.

Testimony from Ms. Needham and Ms. Pavilonis regarding the presence 

of a parental bond was proper under the pertinent case law. Z.P., supra. 

Moreover, as Mother did not appear at the termination hearing, no evidence 

was presented to contradict their testimony. Counsel for J.B. informed the 

court that J.B. wished to be adopted by his foster parents. Although counsel 

for N.B. and E.B. did not mention their desire to be adopted, he informed the 

court that, unequivocally, the children wished to remain in foster care with 

their brother. See N.T., 6/10/22, at 61-63. 

As noted above, we may not disturb the orphans’ courts credibility 

determinations when they are supported by the record. T.S.M., supra. As 

our review of the record supports the court’s determination that the Agency 

presented clear and convincing evidence, pursuant to Section 2511(b), that 

termination would best serve the needs and welfare of the children. We 

therefore affirm the orphans’ court order terminating Mother’s parental rights.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary
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Date: 3/17/2023