### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs O ct obe r 7, 200 8

HEN RYFO RD WILLIAM S, JR. v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE

Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Robertson County No. 00-0150 De e David Gay, Judge

No. M2007- 02070-CCA -R3-P C - F iled Dece m ber 19, 2008

Th e pe tit ion e r, He nr

y F or d Willi a ms, Jr., a

pp e a ls fr om the de nia l of his 20 06 pe titio n fo r po stconviction re lief, which c halleng ed his 2002 convictions of possession wit h t h e i n t ent to sell .5 g rams or more of coc aine within 1,000 fe et of a school zone and of simple possession of coc aine. He a sserts that he wa s denied the e ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel at trial and that he wa s denied due proce ss beca

use the jury

pool was racially imbalance d. Finding that the petitioner ha s failed to show by c le ar a nd c on vin c ing e vid e nc e that c ouns e l wa s in e ff e c tiv e and that th e pe tit ion e r h a s w a ive d h is du e pr oc e ss c la im, we a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he po st- c on vic tio n c ourt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D. K EL L Y T HOMAS , J R ., and C AM I L L E R. M C M UL L EN , J J ., joined.

J oe R. J ohnson, Springf

ield, Tenne ssee, f

or the a ppellant, Henr

y For d Wil liams, J r.

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r; Cla re nc e E. Lutz, As sis tant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; J ohn Wesley

Carney , J r., District Attorney Gene ral; and Dent Morriss, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.
OP IN ION

On Octobe r 19, 2002, a Robertson County Circuit Court jury

convicted the petitioner of possession w ith the intent to sell .5 grams or more of c ocaine , a Schedule I Idrug , within 1,000 fee t of a school zone and of simple possession of co ca i n e. T h e petitioner a lso pled g uilty to the unlawful possession of a fire arm in conne ction with the illega l drug char g es. The tr ial court mer g ed the illeg al drugconvictions and im posed an eff ective sentence of 32.5 y ear s as a Rang e I Ioffe nder to be serve d concur

rently with a t hree -y ear

sentenc e for

the unlawf

ul firea rm conviction. Se e Sta te

v . H e nr yFo rd W ill iam s, J r. , No. M2003-00515-CCA-R3-CD, slip op. at 1 (Te nn. Crim. Ap p ., Nashville, May

8, 2005), perm. app. de nied (T e nn . 2 00 5) . T he pe tit ion e r f ile d a tim e ly a pp e a l to thi s court, and we affirme d the convictions and sentence s. Id. Following the denial of his applicationT h e a m e n d e d p e tit io n a lso a lleg e d th a t “th e c o n v ic tio n is u n la w ful in tha t th e ju ry fa iled to se p a ra te the w e igh ts 1
of t he ‘ cas ual ex cha ng e’ cocai ne and t he ‘ po s s es s i on f or r es al e’ cocai ne.

. . . T he t r i al cour t i mp r op er l y merg ed t he t wo
c o u n ts to g e the r, thu s e q u a ting a n a m o u n t o f co c a ine o v e r 0 .5 gr a m s.” T h e trial c o u rt n o te d tha t t h is issu e w a s p re v io u sly d e te rm ine d b y the C o u rt o f C rim ina l A p p e a ls a n d d e n ie d re lief. See T

. C

. A

. § 40- 30

- 10 8(c) ( 6) ( 20 06 )

. T he pet i t i oner d o e s n o t ap p e a l t h is issu e

. -2- fo r p e rm iss ion

to a pp e a l to our s up re me c ourt on Au g us t 22 , 2 00 5, the pe tit ion e r f ile d a tim e ly petition for post-conviction re lief, mounting a two-issue cha lleng e to hi s convictions. The trial c ourt fo un d th e pe tit ion e r’ s c la ims c olo ra ble and a pp oin te d c ouns e l, who su

bs e qu e ntl y

a me nd e d th e po stconviction petition to state additional claims.

The evidenc e, as summarized by this c ourt on direc t a ppeal, established that Of fice r Kyle Reeve s of the Spring field P o l i ce Depa rtment executed a

sear ch wa

rra nt on the petitioner’s residenc e, located within 1,000 fee t of a school zone, on F ebrua ry 9, 2000. Id. “Of

fi cer Reeve s found a h an d -r o l l ed ciga rette w hich appe are d to be marijuana . Crack c ocaine was found in the firepla ce, on the hear

th, and u n d er n ea t h cu shions in the sofa.” Id. The police office rs found “ a
secur ity wand, a sawe d-off

shotgun, a

nd $97 in cash.” Id. O n e w e e k late r , in an“unre lated incident,” the pe titioner told Office r Reeve s, “‘Eve ry body knows Isell dope, but Idon’t eve r kee p any more on me than I

can g et rid of be fore y ’all come in.’” Id. , slip op. at 2. Other police off icer s also testified that they

“over hear d the def

endant a cknowledg e that he sold illeg al drug s.” Id.

The Te nnessee Bur eau of I nvesti gat ion crime labor atory “conf irmed that the substance disc overe d at the def endant’ s residenc e wa s coca ine,” a nd the weig ht of t

h e c o c a ine , which “included ‘ crumbs’ a

nd possibly

coca ine re sidue,” totaled .57 g rams. Id.

Th e pe tit ion e r t e sti fi e d on his ow n be ha lf and “ c la ime d th a t th e c oc a ine fo un d at hi s residenc e wa s for his per sonal use, not for r esale .” Id.

The pe titioner filed a timely petition f or post-conviction relief

on J anuar

y 25, 2006, alleg ing ine ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, claiming specific ally that “t ri al counsel wa s ineffe ctive for f ailing to objec t and pre serve a [ Batson v. Kentuck y , 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. C t. 171 2 (1986)] vio l ati on” and that “trial counse l failed to see k the identity of the c onfidential informa nt that was lis te d in the se arc h w arr ant. ” Ap po int e d p os t- c on vic tio n c ouns e l fi le d an a me nd e d pe tit ion fo r p os tconviction re lief on Jul y

20, 2007, reiter ating the petitioner’s or igin a l c la im s a n d adding as additional g rounds for r elief that “trial counse l was ineff ective in that no Moti on to Suppress was eve r filed on be ha lf of the [pe tit ion e r]” a

nd that the pe tit ion e r “ wa s de nie d a jur y of his pe e rs , a s his jur

y wa s a llwhite, and [petitioner] is African- Americ an.” 1

I n the J uly 24, 2007 evidentiar y hear ing, the petitioner testified, “I fee l that jurors that

wer e Af rica n Americ an we re sy stemically excluded by the Dis trict Attorney ’s Off ice, a nd Ifelt that [t rial counse l] did not object to none of this for the re cord . . . .” He testified that he re membere d only one Af rica n-Amer ican juror

in the jury pool of approximately 50 potential jurors, a pr oportion that h e b e li e v e d w a s u n r e p r e s e n tati v e o f th e p o p u lati o n ma k e u p o f Ro b e rts o n Co u n ty . I n the hear ing, the post-conviction court did not evaluate this cla im as an ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel-3-

claim for fa i l i n g t o m ak e a Batson objection, but rathe r it evaluated it as a c laim that the rac ial makeup of

the jury violated his rig ht to due proce ss. The petitioner a g ree d that, in his petiti on, he ob je c te d to “ a

wa y tha t th e sy ste m . . . in Rob e rt so n County sy ste matic a lly

e xclu de d c e rt a in p e op le of ce rtain ra ces.”

Wanda Vade n, who had se rved a s deputy cler k o f t h e cour

t for 44 y ear s, testified about the manne r in which jurors ha d been se lected in Rober tson County . She testified that potential jurors we re dr awn f

rom a list of people, provided by the Tenne ssee De partment of Saf ety , who had drivers’ licence s and state identific ation car ds, and she a g re ed that thi s method “appe ar[ed] to be used pre tty

widely acr oss the s t at e. ” S h e testified that the sy stem had no wa y of discriminating ag ainst any

“par ticular re cog nizable gr oup” and that the s y stem had been cha lleng ed bef ore a nd had

never been de emed unc onstitut ional. She testified t hat t he number of m inorities repr esente d in a jury pool oscillated from month to month depending on “a r andom dra wing .”
The pe titioner also complained that tria l counsel wa s ine ff ec t i v e. First, he posited that trial counsel f

ailed to se ek the identity of the confide ntial inf ormants relied upon in the Fe bruar y 9, 2000 sear ch wa

rra nt that ultim ately

lead to the searc h of petitioner’ s home and his ar rest. He testified, “[M] y

understandingof t h e [C] onstitut ion of the United States of A merica is that Ihave g ot the rig ht to meet my

acc user.” He also claimed that his trial counsel was ineffe ctive bec ause tria l counsel only

met with the petitioner one time prior to his trial. L astly , the petitioner stated that tria l counsel wa s i n ef

fe cti ve in fa iling to see k suppression of his statements made to law enf orce ment office rs re g ardinghis dealing illega l drug s. He testified that trial cou n s el i n fo rm ed him that the office rs’ stateme nts would be mentioned in trial, but the i ssue of suppression was “neve r discussed.”

Th e pe tit ion e r’ s tria l couns e l tes tif ie d that he ha d p ra c tic e d la w f or a lmo st 1 8 y e ars , that he wa s lic en ced to pr actice law in both Tenne ssee a nd Kentucky , and that appr ox imately 80 perc ent of his pra ctice w as devote d to criminal law. He stated that he se rved a s a prose cutor for three y ear s and that he h ad p ar t i ci pated in appr ox imately 110 trials. Acc ording to his request for compensation, he spent 8.4 hours in court a nd 28.8 hours in pr epar ation for the petitioner’s trial. He te sti fi e d th a t hi s r e c or ds re fl e c te d th a t he me t with the pe tit ion e r thr e e tim e s in pr e pa ra tio n f or tr ia l.

Coun sel st ate d t hat he d idno t s eek t he i den ti ty of an y con fi den ti al i nfo rm ant s bec a us e he did not believe the y

would be “material witnesse s to the crime char g ed when the sea rch w arr ant itself was e x ecute d on [t he petitioner’ s house].” Furthe r, he te stified that he did not b eli eve the inf or mants wo uld

a id t he pe tit ion e r i n h is d e fe ns e be c a us e the wa

rr ant i nd ic a te d th a t th e inf or mants ha d w itn e sse d th e pe tit ion e r s e lli ngdr ug s. He te sti fi e d th a t su c h in for mat io n “ wo uld te nd to

corr oborate the State’s theor y that the drug s there w ere there to be sold and not for personal use” and could be potentially

harmful to the pe titioner’s defe nse.
Counsel stated that he did not move to suppress the state ments that the peti t i o n er made to police be cause they wer e “not suppre ssible.” He te stified that to his understanding the defe ndant m ade these st atements to t he police of fice rs duringa conve rsation while he w as neither in c us tod y no r u nd e r i nte rr og a tio n. Al tho ug h th e of fi c e rs ’ te sti mony a

bo ut t he se state me nts c ou ld-4-

have been hear say , c ouns e l te sti fi e d th a t th e state me nts wo uld be pe rm itt e d und e r “ the pa rt y opponent exception.”

As to the petitioner’s c omplaint about the rac ial makeup of the jury , counsel testified t h a th e d i d

n o tr e c a l l an y Batson violations a nd ag ree d that “[h] ad it be en a matter t h at conce rned him” he would have raised suc h conce rn with the trial cour t. His testimony

indi ca t ed t hat jury

se le c tio n w a s n ot a

“ ho tly c on te nd e d is su e ” in t

he tr ia l.
The post-c onviction court filed a written orde r deny i n g p o s t-conviction re lief on Au g us t 7, 20 07 . A s to the pe tit ion e r’ s c la im that c ouns e l’ s pe rf or manc e wa s de fi c ie nt in f

a ili ngto

o b t ai n t h e identity

of the c onfidential informa nts list ed in the wa

rra nt, the post-conviction cour t noted that “these informants we re pr esent when drugactivity took place at [ p]eiti oner’ s residenc e and [p] etitioner wa s identified in the af fidavit as par

ticipating in the sale of c ocaine from that residenc e.” T he cour

t also noted that “the law is clea r t hat i dentity

of conf idential informants nee d not be re veale d unless they had been witnesses at the execution of the se arc h war rant at [ p]etit ioner’s resi d e n c e o r

th e y h a d b e e nma te r ia l t o th e [p ]e ti ti o n e r ’ s d e f e n s e

. ” T h e c o u rt a c c r e d it e d c o u n sel’s testimony that the identity

of the informants would have been pr ejudicial to petitioner’s de fense and the disclosure of

the informants wa s not require d under la w.
The post-conviction court also acc redited counsel’s testimony that he had no g rounds

on w h i c h t o o b

j e c t t o p o l i c e o f

f i c e r s ’ t e s t i m o n y r e p e a t i n g t h e p e t i t i o n e r ’ s s t a t e m e n t s t h a t he so ld ill e g a l dr ug s. Th e c ourt

no te d, “ Th e re wa s c le arl y no re a so n to fi le a mot ion to s up pr e ss t

his statement.” The court concluded that the petitioner had not prove d by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that c ouns e l w a s in e ff

e c tiv e a s to thi s is su e

. Th e po st- c on vic tio n c ourt a lso no te d that “ Mo tio ns to Suppress had be en filed a nd denied whe n [p] etitioner wa s repr esente d by the Public Defe nder’ s office .”
The post-c onviction court fur ther a ccr edited Ms. Vaden’s testi mony that Robertson County ’s method of sele cting jury pools did not violate the petitioner’s due proce ss r ights. The c ourt ruled that “ [t ]hi s g round wa s not proved by clea r or c onvincing evidenc e.”

Th e pe tit ion e r fi le d a time ly a pp e a l to thi s cou

rt fo llo wi ngthe de nia l of

re lie f. I n th is

a pp e a l, h e na

rr ow s h is c la ims to t

he ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l and the de nia l of d ue pr oc e ss due to the ra cial make up of the jury

.

The post-conviction petitioner bear s the burden of provinghis or her a lleg ations by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. T.C.A. § 40-30- 110(f) (20 0 6 ). On appeal, the appe llate cour t

ac co rd s t o t h e p o s t -c o n v i ct i o n co u rt ’s fi n d i n gs o f fa ct t h e we i gh t o f a j u ry v er d i ct , an d

t h es e f i n d i n gs
are conclusive on a

ppeal unless the e vidence p re p o n d er at es ag ainst them. He nle yv . S tate , 960 S.W. 2d 57 2, 57 8- 79 (T e nn . 1 99 7) ; Ba te s v . S tate , 973 S.W .2d 615, 631 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)

. By contra st, the post-conviction court’ s conclusions of law rec eive no de fer ence or pre sumption of

corr ectne ss on appea l. Fi e lds v . S tate , 40 S.W .3d 450, 453 (Tenn. 2001)

.-5- I. Ine ffective A ssistance of Counsel

Th e pe tit ion e r c on te nd s th a t hi s tr ia l couns e l w a s in e ff e c tiv e by fa ili ngto a de qu a te ly meet with the petitioner to de velop a de fense , by failing to move to suppress the stateme nts made by the petitioner to law enforc ement officer s, and by failing to seek the ide ntity of the c onfidential informants mentioned in the sea rch w arr ant.
When a petitioner see ks post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffec tive assistance of counse l, he must first establish that the service s rende red or the advice g iven w er e b el ow “the rang e of co mpetence demande d of attorne y s in criminal case s.” Ba x te r v . R os e , 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). Second, he must show that the def iciencie s “ac tually

had an a dverse eff

ect on the defe nse.” Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 693, 104 S. C t. 2052, 2067 (1984). The err or
m u s t b e so serious as to re nder a n unreliable result. Id. a t 6 8 7 , 1 0 4 S. Ct

. a t 2 0 6 4

. I t is not

nece ssary , howeve r, that abse nt the defic iency , the trial would have resulted in an acquittal. Id. at 69 5, 10 4 S. Ct. a t 20 68 . Sh ou ld t he pe tit ion e r f

a il t o e sta bli she ith e r f

a c tor , h e is n ot ent it le d to

re lie f. Our s up re me c ourt de sc ri be d th e sta

nd ard of re vie w a s f

oll ow s:

Be cause a petitioner must establish both prong s of the t e s t , a f a i l u r e t o p r o v e e i t h e r

d e f i c i e n c y o r p r e j u d i c e p r ov ide s a
su ff ic ie nt ba sis to de ny re lie f on the ine ff e c tiv e a ssi stan ce cl a im. I ndeed, a court ne ed not addr es s t h e compone nts in any particula r order or eve n addre ss both if the defe ndant makes a n insufficient sh ow ingof

on e c omp on e nt.

Go ad v . S tate , 938 S.W .2d 363, 370 (Tenn. 1996)

.
On claims of inef

fec tive assi s t an ce of

counsel, the pe titioner is not entitl ed to the benef it of hindsight, may not se cond-guess a rea sonably based trial strateg y , and ca nnot criticize a sound, but unsuccessf

ul, tactical de cision made duringthe cour se of the pr ocee dings. A d ki n s v. Sta te , 911 S. W

. 2 d 334, 347 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) . Such defe renc e to the tac tical dec isions of

co un s e l, h o w e v e r , a

p p li e s o n ly if th e c h o ic e s ar e ma d e a f te r a d e qu a te p r e p ar a ti o n f o r the c ase. Coo pe r v . S tate , 847 S.W .2d 521, 528 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992)

.
Claims of ineffe ctive assist ance of counse l are reg arde d as mix ed questions of law and fa ct. Sta te v . H

on e y c utt , 5 4 S. W.3 d 7 62 , 7 66 -6 7 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) ; State v. Burns , 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1 9 9 9 ). When review ing the application of la w to the post-conviction cour t’s fac tual finding s, our re view is de novo, a nd the post-conviction cour t’s conclus ions of law ar e g iven no presumption of corr ectne ss. Fields , 4 0 S. W.3 d at 45 7- 58 ; see also State v. England , 19 S.W .3d 762, 766 (Tenn. 2000)

.

The pe titioner first argues tha t, “[r] eg ardle ss of whethe r [counsel met with petitioner]

one or thr e e ti me s , th is matt e r r e s u lt e d in [th e p e ti ti o n e r ] b e in g s e n te n c e d to 3 2

. 5 y e ar s in

prison [sic ].” Hi s so le argume nt o n a pp e a l is that, “ I t is dif

fi c ult to i ma g ine ho w a

n atto rn e y c an b e fu lly-6-

pr e pa re d in a se ri ou s d

ru g c a se su c h a s th is w it h on ly a han df ul o f v isi ts t o th e c lie nt. ” Th is argument fails to addre ss whether counsel pe rfor

med below the rang e of competenc e dema nded of attorney s in criminal case s. See B axter , 5 23 S .W .2 d at 936. F ur the r, the pe tit ion e r h a s f

a ile d to show how he suffe red prejudice as a result of counsel only meeting him “a handf

ul” of times. He

c ite s to no ins tanc e s dur ing the tr ia l pr oc e e din g s th a t su g g e st t hat c ouns e l’ s f

a ilure to m e e t w ithhim

on more oc casions af

fec ted his repr esentation. Nothing in the rec ord shows that defe nse counsel wa s ill-prepar ed or that further m eeting s with the petitioner would have improved his perf ormanc e. B e c a us e the pe tit ion e r h a s f

a ile d to sh ow any fa c tor re qu ir e d in se e kin g po st- c on vic tio n r e lie f o n th is issue, the claim of ina dequate prepa ration is unfounded.

Ne xt, th e pe tition e r a

rgue s c ouns e l “ wa s in e ff e c tiv e in n ot atte mpt ingto s up pr e ss state me nts ma de by [the pe tit ion e r] to po lic e of fi c e r Ky le Re e ve s” and ma int a ins th at “ [ t] his te sti mony di rect ly c on tr a dic te d [th e pe tit ion e r’ s] e nti re c a se the or y , y e t [c ouns e l] di d n ot m ov e to suppress the state ment.” Howe ver, tria l counsel testified, a nd the post-conviction cour t ag ree d, that said statements we re not subjec t to suppression. We ag ree

.

Counsel testified that the onl y conce ivable mot ion to suppress would be base d on the fa c t that the pe tit ion e r wa s no t a pp ri se d o f h is Miranda war nings be fore making to Office r Reeve s the statement, “ ‘Ever

y body knows I sell dope, but I don’t ever keep any more on me t han I can g et rid of befor e y ’all come in.’” See Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). Counsel testified that these statements wer e not ma de while the petitioner was under c ustodial investigation; there fore , the evidenc e wa s not inadmissible. The court ag ree d, and we will not dis turb the finding of the post-c onviction court.

The e vidence showed that the disputed state ment was made to Offic er Ree ves during

an enc ounter that took place more than a wee k afte r the e x ecution of the Fe bruar y 9, 2000 sear ch

war rant a nd that the s tatement was unsolicited by Offic er Ree ves. In deter mining whe ther Miranda

war nings a re require d, the court must look to whether the def endant wa s “in custody ” at the time he made the inc riminating state ment. State v. Ande rson , 937 S.W .2d 851, 853 (Tenn. 1996) . Custodial int e rr og a tio n is “ qu e sti on ingini tiate d b y law e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs a ft e r a

pe rs on ha s b e e n ta

ke n in to custody or otherw ise deprive d of his f ree dom of action in a

ny signific ant way .” Miranda , 3 84 U. S. at 4 4 4 , 8 6 S . Ct. at 1612. The post-conviction cour t, in its written orde r deny ing post-c onviction relief aptly noted:

Th e tr ia l tr ans c ri pt .

. . c le arl y re ve a ls that th e se statements made by

the Petitioner eig ht day s afte r the e x ecution of the

sear ch wa rra nt at his residenc e we re voluntee red a nd [p] etitioner wa s
no t in c us tod

y and the re wa s no int e rr og a tio n. [De fe ns e cou ns e l] testified that he made no objection t o this evidenc e as [ p]etit ioner wa s
no t in c us tod y and be ing int e rr og a te d. Th e re wa s c le arl y no re a so n to file a motion to suppress this statement.-7-

Up on re vie w, the tr ia l court pr op e rl y ru le d that the de fe nd ant fa ile d to mee t the burd e n r e qu ir e d to sh owthat c ouns e l’ s f

a ilure to f ile a mot ion to s up pr e ss w a s d e fi c ie nt o r p re jud ic ia l.

L astly , the petitioner c ontends that counsel wa s ineffe ctive in dec iding “ not to file a motion seeking the identity of the c onfidential informa nt m en t i o n ed in the sear ch wa rra nt.” He loosely cites as a

uthority that “[t] he United States Constituti on g uara ntees a ny Def endant in a

c ri min a l ca se the ri g ht to co nf ro nt the ir a c c us e rs ,” and

he ma int a ins that a

c on fi de nti a l in fo rm ant i s an “a ccuse r.”
The po s t-conviction cour t noted that “the law

is clear that identity

of conf idential informants nee d not be re veale d unless they had bee n witn es s es at the e x ecution of the sear ch

war rant at [p] etitioner’s re sidence or they had bee n materia l to the [ p]etit ioner’s de fense .” Indeed, our supre me court has determined t hat t he identit y of a c onfidential informa nt is ge nera lly

privileg ed from discove ry

. Ho us e v . S tate , 4 4 S. W.3 d 5 08 , 5 12 (T e nn . 2 00 1)

. Th e pe tit ion e r’ s br ie f s ug g e sts that he desires discovery of t he confidential informant because “[w]i thout the searc h war rant ther e would be no ca se ag ainst [t he p eti tioner].” Howeve r, such disclosure shall be denie d when a defe ndant’s sole purpose of discover ing a confide n t ial informant’s identity is to challeng e the validity of a sear ch warra nt. Se e Sta te v . V

an de rfo rd , 980 S.W .2d 390, 395-96 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1997).
The pe titioner cannot show that c ounsel’s fa ilure to pro cu re t h e identity of any

c on fi de nti a l in fo rm ants lis te d in the se arc h w arr ant w a s d e fi c ie nt p e rf or manc e or pr e jud ic ia l be c a

us e the petitioner wa s not entitled to such information. Further, we will not dis turb counsel’ s tactica l decisi o n n o t to pursue such infor mation beca

use any informants’ testimony

would likely

have damag ed the pe titioner’s ca se.

II. J ury’s Rac ial Makeup as a DueProcess Violation
The pe titioner argues that the ra cial make up of t he jury that convicted him violated h i s d u e p ro ce s s ri gh t s , ci t i n g W hitus v . G e or

gia , 385 U.S. 54 5 , 87 S. Ct . 643 (1967) a nd State v. Mann , 959 S.W .2d 503 (Tenn. 1997)

. Hi s b ri e f s tate s,

I n deter mining whe ther, pursua

nt to t h e Six th and F ourt e e nth Am e ndme nts , a jur y wa s pr op e rl y se le c te d fr om a fair

c ro ss- se c tio n o f t

he c omm un ity , c ourt s u til ize the fo llo wi ngte st: (1) that the g roup alleg ed t o be excluded is a “ distinctive” g r o u p i nt h e c o m m u n i t y; (2) that the repr esentation of this g roup in venires f rom which juries ar e selec ted is not fa ir and re asonable in relation to the number of suc h persons in the c ommunity ; and (3) that t his process of

under r epre sentation is due to the sy stmatic [s ic] ex clusion of this gr oup in the jury -selec tion proce ss.-8-

The pe titioner sugg ests that, beca use he is African America n and only one potential juror in t he jury pool was Afr ican Ame rica n, Robertson County ’s method of sele cting potential jurors wa s
u n co n s t i t u t i onal. The State a rg ues that bec ause the petitioner fa iled to raise this issue at trial or direc t a ppeal, the issue is waived f or purpose s of post-conviction re lief. See T.C.A. § 40-30-106( g ). We ag ree with the State that the issue is waived.

Cod e se c tio n 40 -3 0- 10 6( g ) state s in pe rt ine nt pa rt , “ A g ro un d fo r re lie f is wa ive d if the petitioner pe rsonally or throug h an attorne y

faile d to present it for de termination in any proce eding befor e a c ourt of compe tent jurisdiction in which the g round could have bee n prese nted.” T.C.A. § 40-30-106( g ). The pe titioner had an oppor tunity to object to the ra cial make up of the jury at trial and on dire ct appe al; howeve r, he f ailed to make such objections. We hold that the petitioner has wa ived this issue and aff irm the post-conviction cour t’s order denying r elief on this g round.

III . Conclusion

Be cause the petitioner ha s failed to e stablish by clea r and convinc ing e vidence that his counsel per formed de ficiently , he is not ent i t l ed to pos t-conviction re lief on his claim of inef fe c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l. B e c a

us e the pe tit ion e r’ s c la im o f a vio latio n o f h is d

ue pr oc e ss ri g hts du e to t

he ra c ia l mak e up of the jur y wa s not pr e se nte d at tri a l or on dir e c t app e a l, t his c la im has bee n waived. A ccor dingly , the judg ment of the post-c onviction court is aff irmed.

___________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE