alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                                                9
       
<S>                                            <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                  9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JUL-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   APR-30-1997
<CASH>                                           6,663,844
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                                   0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                         0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                         0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     82,559,057
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                         159,081,727
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                           168,237,962
<LOANS>                                        210,473,328
<ALLOWANCE>                                      3,162,057
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 481,646,013
<DEPOSITS>                                     373,514,304
<SHORT-TERM>                                    58,779,500
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              3,514,967
<LONG-TERM>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                         6,441,504
<OTHER-SE>                                      39,395,738
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 481,646,013
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                  4,495,467
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                3,876,620
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                         0
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                 8,372,087
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               3,450,719
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               4,311,532
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            4,060,555
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                      300,000
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                 (21,923)
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  2,846,940
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,885,566
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       1,339,172
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,339,172
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                          .54
<EPS-DILUTED>                                          .54
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                        7.42
<LOANS-NON>                                      3,027,790
<LOANS-PAST>                                     3,027,790
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                         0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                          0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 3,109,841
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                      259,731
<RECOVERIES>                                        11,948
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                3,162,057
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                             3,162,058
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                                  0
        


</TABLE>
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RAYMOND FELDMAN; et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

 v.

THE HONORABLE PATTI JO McKAY; 

et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-56958

D.C. No. 2:15-cv-04892-MMMJEM

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 18, 2017**

Before: TROTT, TASHIMA, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges. 

Plaintiffs appeal pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing their 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims in connection with 

plaintiffs’ state court unlawful detainer proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JAN 26 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
 2 15-56958

28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine, Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ action for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because their claims 

constituted a forbidden “de facto appeal” of a prior, final state court judgment. See 

id. at 1163 (“It is a forbidden de facto appeal under Rooker-Feldman when the 

plaintiff in federal district court complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed 

by the state court, and seeks relief from the judgment of that court.”); see also 

Mothershed v. Justices of Supreme Court, 410 F.3d 602, 604 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(state court proceedings “ended for Rooker-Feldman purposes” upon state supreme 

court’s denial of a request for writ of mandamus). We reject as unsupported by the 

record plaintiffs’ contention that defendants issued a void order in state court 

proceedings that precluded the application of Rooker-Feldman.

Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, the district court’s order granting the 

motion to dismiss did not violate the law of the case doctrine because the issues 

presented in that motion had not already been decided by the district court or a 

higher court. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Salazar, 706 F.3d 1085, 1090 

(9th Cir. 2013) (law of the case doctrine pertains to reconsideration of “an issue 
 3 15-56958

that has already been decided by the same court or a higher court in the same 

case.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

AFFIRMED.
#### KEVIN CANNON v. NEW JERSEY BELL TELEPHONE.

October 20, 1987.

Petition for certification denied. (See 219 *N.J.Super.*304).
584 A.2d 215

#### JAYBER, INC., v. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF THE TOWNSHIP OF WEST ORANGE AND MR. AND MRS. JOHN BELEJACK.

May 15, 1990.

Petition for certification denied. (See 238 *N.J.Super.*165, 569 A.2d 304)
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                         252,853
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  304,687
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               557,540
<PP&E>                                      17,356,408
<DEPRECIATION>                                (101,108)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              17,812,760
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          536,121
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                  17,276,639
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                17,812,760
<SALES>                                        993,540
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,046,841
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  164,312
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                882,529
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            882,529
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   882,529
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
584 A.2d 242

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. FELIX W. OSORIO.

June 11, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
584 A.2d 252

#### CONSTANCE HOLLOWAY v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. MUSKIN CORPORATION, ET AL.

June 11, 1990.

Leave to appeal granted. (See 239 *N.J.Super.*554, 571 A.2d 1324)
(logo) LNR          Partners, LLC  **ANNUAL STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE**** ****OF**** ****LNR PARTNERS, LLC**  The undersigned, Job Warshaw, being the President of LNR Partners, LLC (the "Special Servicer"), as special servicer under the applicable Pooling and Servicing Agreement for the transactions listed on Schedule I hereto, hereby certifies, subject to any limitations listed on Schedule I hereto, as of the date hereof, on behalf of the Special Servicer, solely in his capacity as an authorized officer of the Special Servicer and not in his individual capacity, as follows: 1. A review of the activities performed by the Special Servicer during the period commencing on January 1, 2015 and ending on December 31, 2015 (or any other shorter period set forth on Schedule I hereto) (the “Reporting Period"), and of the Special Servicer's performance under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement has been made under my supervision; and 2. To the best of my knowledge, based on such review and using the applicable servicing criteria under Item 1122 of Regulation AB, the Special Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the applicable Pooling and Servicing Agreement in all material respects throughout the Reporting Period.  LNR PARTNERS, LLC,a Florida limited liability companyBy: /s/ Job WarshawJob WarshawPresident  Dated: February 23, 2016  1601 Washington Avenue · Suite 700 · Miami Beach, Florida 33139-3164Telephone: (305) 695-5600 · Fax: (305) 695-5601  **Schedule I**  JPMBB 2014-C18JPMBB Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2014-C18, Commercial Mortgage Pass Through Certificates, Series 2014-C18  Fitch Ratings Inc. 33 Whitehall StreetAttention: Commercial Mortgaged SurveillanceNew York NY 10004General Contact J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.383 Madison Avenue, 32nd FloorNew York NY 10179 Bianca A Russo  J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., 383 Madison Avenue, 31st FloorNew York NY 10179 Kunal K. Singh Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Inc., 845 Third Avnue, 4th Floor Attention: CMBS Surveillance New York NY 10022General Contact Moody's Investors Service, Inc. 7 World Trade Center250 Greenwich StreetAttn: Commercial Mortgage Surveillace Group New York NY 10007General Contact Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 9062 Old Annapolis Road Columbia MD 21045 Group Notices Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 9062 Old Annapolis Road MAC N2702-011Columbia MD 21045-1951 Josh S. Grimard
# United States Court of Appeals **For the Eighth Circuit**

___________________________ No. 16-2665

___________________________ Xavier Cravenwolfe lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant
v. Robert Carter, ACI Director; Tim Lowery , ACI Furniture Factory Plant Manager; Randal Raper, ACI Furniture Factory Floor Manager lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock

____________ Submitted: November 15, 2016 Filed: November 29, 2016 [Unpublished]

____________ Before MURPHY, COLLOTON, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

____________ PER CURIAM.Arkansas inmate Xavier Cravenwolf e appeals after the district court 1 dismissed his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action without prejudi ce, following its determination that Cravenwolfe failed to exhaus t administrative remedies. We conclude that the distri ct court did not err in its determination, as the record showed beyond genuine dispute that Craven wolfe omitted material information that was required on a grievance appeal form. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under § 1983 by prisoner until such administrative remedies as ar e available are exhausted); King v. Iowa Dep’t. of Corr. , 598 F.3d 1051, 1052 (8th Cir. 2010) (de novo review of district court’s interpretation of § 1997e(a)); see also Jones v. Bock , 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007) (prison’s administrative exhaustion requirements gov ern whether exhaustion has occurred); Woodford v. Ngo , 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006) (proper exhaustion demands compliance with prison’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules); Chelette v. Harris , 229 F.3d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 2000) (inmate’s s ubjective beliefs about grievance process cannot excuse exhaustion requirement). Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. We also deny as moot Cravenwolfe’s pending motion for appointment of counsel.

______________________________

1 The Honorable James M. Moody Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas. -2-
Exhibit 32.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of Great Western Bancorp, Inc. (the “ Company ”) on Form 10-K for the period ended September 30, 2014 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “ Report ”), I, Peter Chapman, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:





|    |                                                                                                                      
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




|    |                                                                                                                                                     
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Date: December 12, 2014





By: /s/ Peter Chapman


Name:    Peter Chapman


Title:    Executive Vice President and


Chief Financial Officer
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 17, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-41568

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

VICTOR ESPINOSA-CONTRERAS,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:05-CR-1004-ALL

--------------------

Before DeMOSS, STEWART, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Victor Espinosa-Contreras (Espinosa) appeals the 46-month

sentence of imprisonment imposed following his guilty plea

conviction for illegal reentry following deportation. Espinosa

argues that the district court did not address all of the

sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in imposing

sentence and did not address the reasons that Espinosa advanced

for a downward departure or variance from the Guidelines. 
No. 05-41568

-2-

The Government argues that the court lacks jurisdiction to

review the district court’s discretionary denial of Espinosa’s

motion for a downward departure or variance.

The court lacks jurisdiction to review a discretionary

decision not to depart downward from the guideline range. 

However, the court must still determine whether the imposition of

a guideline sentence instead of a non-guideline sentence was

reasonable. United States v. Nikonova, 480 F.3d 371, 375 (5th

Cir. 2007).

Espinosa has demonstrated no error in the guidelines

computation, and the district court gave appropriate reasons for

the sentence. We therefore give great deference to the sentence

imposed. United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 520 (5th Cir.),

cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 43 (2005). Given Espinosa’s serious

prior drug conviction and his illegal return to the United States

after serving a 40-month sentence and being deported to Mexico,

and the deference due to the sentencing judge’s discretion, the

sentence imposed is not unreasonable. 

Espinosa’s constitutional challenge to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) is

foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224,

235 (1998). Although Espinosa contends that Almendarez-Torres

was incorrectly decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court

would overrule Almendarez-Torres in light of Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), we have repeatedly rejected such

arguments on the basis that Almendarez-Torres remains binding. 
No. 05-41568

-3-

See United States v. Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir.),

cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 298 (2005). Espinosa properly concedes

that his argument is foreclosed in light of Almendarez-Torres and

circuit precedent, but he raises it here to preserve it for

further review. 

AFFIRMED.
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Senior Judges Cole and Duff

NIELSEN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. AND VIRGINIA CONTRACTORS GROUP SELF-INSURANCE ASSOCIATION MEMORANDUM OPINION * PER CURIAM v. Record No. 0290-96-3 JUNE 18, 1996

ARNOLD LESTER COOK

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION (Cathleen P. Welsh; Wharton, Aldhizer & Weaver, on brief), for appellants. (A. Thomas Lane, Jr., on brief), for appellee.

Nielsen Construction Company, Inc. and its insurer contend that the Workers' Compensation Commission erred in finding that Arnold Lester Cook's bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome qualifies as an occupational "disease" under the Workers' Compensation Act.

* Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication. This appeal is controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in Stenrich Group v. Jemmott , ___ Va. ___, ___, 467 S.E.2d 795, 802 (1996) (holding that "job-related impairments resulting from cumulative trauma caused by repetitive motion, however labeled or however defined, are, as a matter of law, not compensable under the present provisions of the Act"). Accordingly, we reverse the commission's decision.

Reversed

.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>               5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                         130,687
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  723,509
<ALLOWANCES>                                    54,176
<INVENTORY>                                  1,734,772
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,841,258
<PP&E>                                       2,591,933
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,173,900
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,981,471
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,212,898
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                    13,452,497
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,981,471
<SALES>                                      1,914,231
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,410,130
<CGS>                                          493,559
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,559,742
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               263,597
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              40,095
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (906,768)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (906,768)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (906,768)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.56)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.56)
        

</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Manuel MARTINEZ-RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 99-10584.

D.C. No. CR-99-00786-RCB.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Oct. 6, 2000.

Decided Jan. 9, 2001.

*677Before SCHROEDER, BEEZER, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM1

Manuel Martinez-Rodriguez appeals from his sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and 1326(b)(2). His sentence included a sentence of imprisonment of 63 months which he claims was imposed in violation of the terms of the plea agreement.

The government agrees that the sentence was not in accordance with the terms of the agreement. It takes the position that if the district court accepted the plea agreement, it should not have imposed this sentence. The government contends, however, that the district court may have rejected the agreement and imposed this sentence instead. We agree with the government that on the basis of this record, it is not clear whether the district court accepted the agreement. We therefore remand for the district court to determine whether it accepted or rejected the agreement, and if the latter, to reinstate the indictment and permit defendant to withdraw his plea. If the district court accepted the plea agreement, then the parties agree the sentence was not in accordance with the agreement, and the court should resentence in accordance with the agreement.

In this case, the district court entered a judgment of conviction for both 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and 1326(b)(2). After the district court’s judgment, we held that it was improper for a district court to enter a judgment of conviction for both §§ 1326(a) and 1326(b)(2), because the Supreme Court in *Almendarez-Torres v. United States,*523 U.S. 224, 226, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), ruled that § 1326(b)(2) is a penalty provision and does not define a separate punishable offense. *United States v. Rivera^Sanchez,*222 F.3d 1057, 1061-62 (9th Cir.2000). We follow the procedure prescribed by *Rivera-Sanchez*in directing the district court, on remand, to enter a corrected judgment striking the reference to § 1326(b)(2) so that the judgment will unambiguously reflect that the defendant was convicted of only one punishable offense pursuant to § 1326(a).

SENTENCE VACATED AND REMANDED.

1

. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
584 A.2d 243

#### EDWARD MAHER v. NEW JERSEY TRANSIT RAIL OPERATIONS, INC., ET AL.

June 11, 1990.

Petition for certification granted. (See 239 *N.J.Super.*213, 570 A.2d 1289)