Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1411-CR-806 | July 21, 2015 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Suzy St. John 

Marion County Public Defender 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller 

Attorney General of Indiana 

Tyler G. Banks 

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Meridian Horton, 

Appellant-Defendant, 

v. 

State of Indiana, 

Appellee-Plaintiff 

July 21, 2015 

Court of Appeals Case No. 

49A02-1411-CR-806 

Appeal from the Marion County

 Superior Court Criminal Division 8 

Cause No. 49F08-1405-CM-23045 

The Honorable Amy Jones, Judge 

Friedlander, Judge. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1411-CR-806 | July 21, 2015 Page 2 of 6

[1] Meridian Horton was convicted of Criminal Trespass, a class A misdemeanor.1

Horton appeals her conviction and presents the following restated issue for our 

review: Did the State present sufficient evidence to support a conviction for 

criminal trespass? 

[2] We affirm. 

[3] The facts most favorable to the conviction are as follows. Horton was homeless 

at the beginning of May 2014 and was staying in a women’s shelter. All women 

wishing to stay overnight at the shelter are required to check-in before 4:00 p.m. 

Horton left the shelter to go to the food stamp office and pick up her 

medication. Horton missed her check-in time at the shelter because her trip 

lasted longer than she anticipated. Without a place to spend the night, Horton 

went to a nearby motel, King’s Inn. 

[4] King’s Inn’s overnight rate is forty dollars a night plus an additional ten-dollar 

security deposit. Horton had only fifty dollars to her name, which she gave to 

the King’s Inn employee upon check-in. Once assigned a room, Horton placed 

her belongings on the ground and got into bed. 

[5] The next morning, Horton went to check out of the motel room at 11:00 a.m. 

and to retrieve her security deposit. Maintenance noted that Horton had 

broken a lamp and flooded the floor in her assigned room. The motel employee 

 

1

Ind. Code Ann. § 35-43-2-2(b)(2) (West, Westlaw current with all 2015 First Regular Session of the 119th

General Assembly legislation effective through June 28, 2015). 
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told Horton she had “destroyed the room” and she could not have her security 

deposit back. Transcript at 16. Horton then requested to speak to the manager 

but was told the manager had yet to arrive. Horton called the police and waited 

for them to arrive. 

[6] The manager of the motel arrived before law enforcement and tried to resolve 

the dispute with Horton but was unsuccessful. The manager asked Horton to 

leave the premises but she refused to leave until her deposit was returned. 

When the police officer arrived, Horton told the officer that she would not leave 

without her deposit. Horton was arrested for criminal trespass. On September 

30, 2014, the trial court found Horton guilty of criminal trespass. The trial 

court explained that Horton’s contractual interest in the room expired upon 

check-out. 

[7] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed to support a criminal 

conviction, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. Henley v. 

State, 881 N.E.2d 639 (Ind. 2008). “We consider only the evidence supporting 

the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such 

evidence.” Id. at 651. “[This court] will affirm unless no reasonable fact-finder 

could have found the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Dumes v. 

State, 23 N.E.3d 798, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). 

[8] To convict Horton of criminal trespass the State was required to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Horton (1) did not have a contractual interest in the 

property, and (2) knowingly or intentionally refused to leave the real property of 
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another person after having been asked to leave by the other person or that 

person’s agent. See I.C. § 35-43-2-2(b)(2). 

[9] Pertaining to the first element, Horton contends the State did not prove beyond 

a reasonable doubt that she lacked a contractual interest in the property. 

‘“Contractual interest’, as that phrase is used in the criminal trespass statute, 

refers to the right to be present on another’s property, arising out of an 

agreement between at least two parties that creates an obligation to do or not to 

do a particular thing.” Semenick v. State, 977 N.E.2d 7, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). 

In Woods v. State, the court held, “[A] person with a contractual interest cannot 

become a trespasser by virtue of being asked to leave the premises.” 703 

N.E.2d 1115, 1117 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). 

[10] Horton argues she had a contractual interest as a guest of the motel and 

entertained a good faith belief that she had an implied right to remain on the 

property to settle the dispute over her security deposit. Horton acknowledges 

that her right to be in the motel room terminated upon checkout; however, she 

claims that her right to be on the motel’s premises did not expire until the 

checkout process was complete by the return of her security deposit. 

[11] “[T]he State satisfies its burden when it disproves those contractual interests 

that are reasonably apparent from the context and circumstances under which 

the trespass is alleged to have occurred.” Semenick v. State, 977 N.E.2d at 10. In 

Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ind. 2012), the Court held that the State met 

its burden of proof by presenting evidence showing the defendant was “irate 
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and disrespectful.” “The defendant was neither an owner nor an employee of 

the bank, [and] the bank manager had authority to ask customers to leave the 

bank premises.” Id. 

Here, Horton “made quite the scene” when she tried to get around the front 

desk to confront the motel employee. Transcript at 5. The manager of the motel 

asked Horton to leave “several times” before she evicted Horton from the 

King’s Inn. Id. at 7. 

[12] As for the intent element, Horton contends that she did not have the requisite 

mens rea to be convicted of criminal trespass. Under I.C. § 35-43-2-2(b)(2), to 

satisfy the mens rea element the State must prove Horton knowingly or 

intentionally refused to leave the real property of another person after having 

been asked to leave by the other person or that person’s agent. 

[13] Horton argues that she believed she had a right to remain on the property until 

her security deposit dispute was resolved. “The belief that one has a right to be 

on the property of another will defeat the mens rea requirement of the criminal 

trespass statute if it has a fair and reasonable foundation.” Taylor v. State, 836 

N.E.2d 1024, 1028 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Assuming Horton believed that she 

had a right to remain on the property, such was unreasonable because she was 

asked to leave several times before law enforcement arrived. “When the 

evidence shows an invitee of a business has no contractual right to be on the 

business’s premises and remains there after being asked to leave, the State has 
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met its burden to prove intent.” Olsen v. State, 663 N.E.2d 1194, 1196 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1996). 

[14] Horton checked out of her motel room, set her belongings outside of the 

building, and returned to ask for her security deposit. Horton was informed 

that due to the room damage, the motel would not return her security deposit 

and she was asked to leave the property. Horton refused and told the property 

manager that she “would have to call the police” because she “wasn’t going 

anywhere.” Transcript at 8. When the police officer arrived, Horton stated, 

“You’re going to have to cuff me because I’m not leaving.” Id. The evidence 

was sufficient to prove that Horton committed criminal trespass. 

[15] Judgment affirmed. 

Baker, J., and Najam, J., concur.