[Cite as Haviza v. Haviza, 2017-Ohio-5615.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 DARKE COUNTY 

ABIGAIL S. HAVIZA 

Plaintiff-Appellee/CrossAppellant

v. 

CHRISTOPHER M. HAVIZA 

Defendant-Appellant/CrossAppellee 

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Appellate Case No. 2017-CA-1 

Trial Court Case No. 2013-DIV-531 

(Appeal from Domestic Relations 

Court) 

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O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 30th day of June, 2017. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

SCOTT D. RUDNICK, Atty. Reg. No. 0000853, 121 West Third Street, Greenville, Ohio 

45331 

 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant 

 

JENNIFER J. WALTERS, Atty. Reg. No. 0066610, 80 South Plum Street, Troy, Ohio 

45373 

 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 

TUCKER, J. 
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{¶ 1} This appeal arises from a decision of the Darke County Court of Common 

Pleas regarding numerous post-divorce motions filed by Christopher Haviza and his exwife, Abigail Haviza. 1 Christopher filed an appeal from the decision raising nine 

assignments of error. Abigail filed a cross-appeal asserting four assignments of error. 

For the reasons set forth below, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and 

reversed in part and the matter is remanded to the trial court. Upon remand, the trial 

court shall order Christopher M. Haviza to return the master bathroom cabinet to Abigail 

S. Haviza. 

 I. Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 2} The Havizas were married in 1995. They have two children, one of whom is 

still a minor, born as a result of the marriage. The parties were divorced in June 2015. 

{¶ 3} Of relevance to this appeal, Abigail was designated as the residential parent 

and legal custodian of the parties’ minor child. Christopher was awarded parenting time 

on alternate weeks. The parties were ordered to follow the Darke County Standard 

Visitation Guidelines regarding holidays and summer vacation. Christopher was ordered 

to pay child support in the amount of $153.58 per month. He was also ordered to provide 

health insurance coverage for the child. 

{¶ 4} The divorce decree further provided that the parties were to determine who 

would retain the marital residence which had an appraised value of $266,000.00. Abigail 

was ordered to sell a 2008 Ford Expedition within 60 days with the proceeds to be divided 

 

1 For purposes of convenience, we will refer to the parties by their first names. 
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equally after an existing lien on the vehicle was paid.2 Personal property was ordered to 

be divided by the parties. 

{¶ 5} In August 2015, Christopher filed a motion to reduce his child support 

obligation. He also filed a motion for contempt based upon the claim that Abigail failed 

to make loan payments on the Ford Expedition. Thereafter, on October 1, 2015, 

Christopher filed a motion seeking to have the trial court set a deadline for Abigail to 

refinance the mortgage on the marital residence. On that same date he filed a motion to 

hold Abigail in contempt for her failure to sell the Ford Expedition. 

{¶ 6} On October 7, 2015, Abigail filed a multi-part motion in which she sought to 

hold Christopher in contempt for violating the parenting time order. The motion also 

sought additional parenting time as a remedy for the violation of the order. The motion 

requested an order requiring Christopher to return or replace fixtures that were removed 

from the marital home. The motion sought an order requiring Christopher to return 

personal property that was awarded to her but removed from the marital home when 

Christopher moved out. Abigail’s motion asked for a judgment against Christopher for 

the amount of unpaid mortgage indebtedness and real estate taxes which he incurred 

while occupying the marital residence. Finally, the motion asked for an order permitting 

her to purchase the Ford Expedition for the sum of $11,000. 

{¶ 7} A hearing was conducted on October 21, 2015 and November 25, 2015. 

The magistrate’s decision was filed in January 2016. With regard to the Ford Expedition, 

the magistrate found that while Abigail was late on two payments, she ultimately made 

those payments and, at the time of the hearing, had paid off the entire lien amount of 

 

2 No value was established for the vehicle because neither party wanted to retain it. 
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$7,474 owed on the vehicle. The magistrate further found that she had attempted to sell 

the vehicle, but was unsuccessful. Thus, the magistrate overruled Christopher’s motion 

for contempt on those issues. The magistrate also permitted Abigail to purchase the 

vehicle for the sum of $11,000, and ordered her to pay Christopher the sum of $1,763 

which represents his half of the equity in the vehicle. 

{¶ 8} The magistrate’s decision set a deadline for Abigail to refinance the mortgage 

on the marital residence. The magistrate further found that because Christopher 

occupied the marital residence for two months following the divorce decree, he should be 

responsible for the payment of the mortgage for those months. The magistrate also 

found that the parties should equally divide the cost of any unpaid real estate taxes. 

{¶ 9} With regard to child support, the magistrate noted that at the time of the 

decree, neither party was fully employed, but had since started full-time jobs. Thus, the 

magistrate recalculated child support based upon the parties’ current salaries. The 

magistrate also granted a 50% downward deviation to account for the parties’ equal 

parenting time. Christopher’s new child support obligation was increased to $166.24 per 

month. 

{¶ 10} The magistrate found Christopher in contempt with regard to parenting time 

based upon the finding that Christopher kept the child for two successive weeks despite 

Abigail’s attempt to take the child for her week of parenting time. However, the decision 

permitted Christopher to purge the contempt by complying with the parenting time 

schedule in the future. 

{¶ 11} Finally, the magistrate ordered Christopher to return all of the items of 

personal property awarded to Abigail which were not in the marital residence when she 
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took possession. The magistrate also ordered Christopher to replace a cooktop deemed 

a marital residence fixture, and to pay for the replacement and installation of a thermostat 

he removed from the home. With regard to the remainder of the items which Abigail 

claimed had been removed from the home, the magistrate found they did not constitute 

fixtures and were thus subject to division. 

{¶ 12} Both parties filed objections. The trial court modified the decision of the 

magistrate with regard to the personal property of the children. Specifically, the trial court 

awarded the parties’ son a waterski shelf, and the daughter was awarded her armoire, 

daybed, toys and dolls. The children were permitted to determine where they wanted to 

locate their belongings. The trial court also stated that Christopher did not need to 

replace any of the items Abigail claimed as fixtures other than the cooktop and the 

thermostat. Otherwise, the trial court adopted the decision of the magistrate. 

{¶ 13} Christopher filed a notice of appeal and Abigail filed a notice of crossappeal. 

 II. Ford Expedition 

{¶ 14} Christopher’s first and second assignments of error state: 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND APPELLEE IN 

CONTEMPT FOR HER FAILURE TO SELL THE FORD EXPEDITION. 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING APPELLEE TO PURCHASE 

THE FORD EXPEDITION FOR $11,000. 

{¶ 15} Christopher contends that the trial court should have found Abigail in 

contempt because the evidence demonstrates that she did not comply with the 
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requirement that she sell the 2008 Ford Expedition within 60 days of the entry of the 

decree. In support, he argues that her efforts to sell the vehicle were minimal, and thus 

cannot be viewed as compliance with the court’s order. Christopher also objects to the 

purchase price of $11,000 set by the court. 

{¶ 16} We begin with the issue of contempt. “A prima facie case of civil contempt 

is made when the moving party proves both the existence of a court order and the 

nonmoving party's noncompliance with the terms of that order.” Jenkins v. Jenkins, 

2012–Ohio–4182, 975 N.E.2d 1060, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.), citing Wolf v. Wolf, 1st Dist. Hamilton 

No. C–090587, 2010–Ohio–2762, ¶ 4. Clear and convincing evidence is the standard of 

proof in civil contempt proceedings. Id., quoting Flowers v. Flowers, 10th Dist. Franklin 

No. 10AP1176, 2011-Ohio-5972, ¶ 13. “Clear and convincing evidence is that measure 

or degree of proof which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to 

the extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, 

and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the 

facts sought to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 

(1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. 

{¶ 17} We review the trial court's decision whether to find a party in contempt under 

an abuse of discretion standard. Wolf at ¶ 4. The term “abuse of discretion” indicates 

that the attitude of the trial court is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. 

Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). This standard 

is satisfied when there is no sound reasoning process that would support the trial court's 

decision. AAAA Enterprises, Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment 

Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990). 
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{¶ 18} At the hearing, Christopher admitted that Abigail did put a “for sale” sign in 

the vehicle, although he testified that she only did so for about a week and the sign was 

difficult to see due to the vehicle’s window tinting. Abigail admitted that she waited 

almost two weeks, until July 11, 2015, before trying to sell the Ford. She testified that 

she placed a for sale sign in the truck, and that she cleaned the vehicle and took pictures 

of it. She testified that she made two calls to a local radio show, known as Market Time 

Radio, to advertise the sale. Abigail testified that she subsequently began to utilize the 

internet. She advertised the vehicle on FaceBook and Craig’s List, as well as two local 

websites known as “Darke County Rummage Sale” and “For Sale in Darke County.” Tr. 

p. 69. Abigail testified that she called a car dealership that specializes in trucks, but the 

dealership was not interested. She testified that she originally priced the vehicle at 

$16,000 but eventually dropped the price to $14,000. She testified that she visited a car 

dealership to assess trade-in value, but that the values were too low. Abigail also 

testified that she then took the car to a CarMax dealership where she was offered 

$11,000. Abigail testified that she had researched the vehicle’s value which, according 

to Kelly Blue Book, was between $10,000 and $13,000. Finally, she testified that she 

told her co-workers, family and friends about the sale. 

{¶ 19} The magistrate denied the motion for contempt. In reviewing the 

magistrate’s decision, the trial court stated that the transcript “shows minimal efforts which 

were barely done in a timely manner.” Dkt. No. 128. However, the trial court adopted 

the magistrate’s determination. 

{¶ 20} Based upon the testimony presented at the hearing, we conclude that there 

was competent evidence upon which the magistrate could reasonably rely in finding that 
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Abigail made sufficient efforts to sell the vehicle, and that, therefore, a finding of contempt 

was not merited. Indeed, from our review of the record we conclude that Abigail made 

more than “minimal” efforts. We find no abuse of discretion in the decision to deny the 

motion for contempt. 

{¶ 21} We next address the value of the vehicle. “The trial court enjoys broad 

discretion in determining the value of a marital asset; however, this discretion is not 

limitless.” James v. James, 101 Ohio App.3d 668, 681, 656 N.E.2d 399 (2d Dist.1995). 

“Our task on appeal is not to require the adoption of any particular method of valuation, 

but to determine whether, based on all the relevant facts and circumstances, the court 

abused its discretion in arriving at a value.” Id. 

{¶ 22} Christopher testified that he had no opinion as to the value of the Ford, and 

admitted that he did not research valuation. However, he testified that the purchase 

price should be set at $14,500. When questioned about this price, Christopher stated, “I 

believe that’s the difference between her initial number of [$]9,000 and my initial number 

of [$]20,000 for the value of the vehicle [during the divorce hearing]. So that’s just a 

standard meeting in the halfway.” Tr. p. 43. As noted above, Abigail testified that her 

valuation of the vehicle was based upon her research and upon the fact that she ultimately 

received an offer of $11,000 from a car dealership. We conclude that Christopher has 

failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion. 

{¶ 23} Christopher’s first and second assignments of error are overruled. 

 III. Child Support 

{¶ 24} The third and fourth assignments of error asserted by Christopher state: 
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THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INCREASING APPELLANT’S CHILD 

SUPPORT OBLIGATION WHEN A MOTION TO REDUCE CHILD 

SUPPORT HAD BEEN FILED. 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REDUCE APPELLANT’S 

CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION. 

{¶ 25} Christopher contends that the trial court was limited to either reducing or 

maintaining his prior child support obligation because Abigail did not file a concurrent 

motion for an increase. He further contends that the trial court should have reduced his 

child support obligation to zero. In support, he argues that the child support obligation is 

inequitable because (1) the difference between the parties’ income is less than $2,000 

per year; (2) he is providing health insurance coverage for the minor child; and (3) the 

parties exercise equal parenting time. 

{¶ 26} “Pursuant to R.C. 3119.79, when either party requests a modification of a 

child support order based upon a change in income, the court must recalculate the 

amount of support using the statutory guidelines, schedules, and worksheets.” L.B. v. 

T.B., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24441, 2011-Ohio-3418, ¶ 11. Thus, “courts must 

independently analyze the appropriateness of the imposition of guideline child support, 

whether it is at the stage of the initial order respecting the issue of child support, or at a 

later stage, after one or both of the parties has asked the court to revisit the issue.” 

Cameron v. Cameron, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-687, 2005-Ohio-2435, ¶ 22, citing 

DePalmo v. DePalmo, 78 Ohio St.3d 535, 679 N.E.2d 266 (1997). “If there has been a 

change in circumstances, the court may modify the support order in accordance with the 

statutory factors and guidelines.” L.B. at ¶ 11. 
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{¶ 27} Consistent with the statute, the magistrate performed the child support 

calculation using the applicable schedule and worksheet. The child support worksheet 

showed that Christopher’s new obligation was more than ten-percent greater than his 

previous obligation.3 Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a 

modification was appropriate. 

{¶ 28} Christopher’s motion “invoked anew the trial court's obligation to begin with 

the rebuttable presumption that guideline child support was in the child's best interests.” 

Quint v. Lomakoski, 173 Ohio App.3d 146, 2007-Ohio-4722, 877 N.E.2d 738, ¶ 42 (2d 

Dist.). However, the magistrate, as permitted by R.C. 3119.23(D) and 3119.22, granted 

a downward deviation of 50% in recognition of the fact that the parties have equal 

parenting time with the child. Further, the child support worksheet accounts for the 

amount of the health insurance premiums paid by Christopher. Thus, we conclude that 

Christopher’s claim that the amount of child support is inequitable lacks merit. 

{¶ 29} Absent an abuse of discretion, a trial court's determination regarding a child 

support obligation will not be disturbed on appeal. Pauly v. Pauly, 80 Ohio St.3d 386, 

390, 686 N.E.2d 1108 (1997). By filing his motion for a decrease in child support, 

Christopher brought the matter of child support squarely before the trial court. Upon 

complying with its statutory duty to recalculate the amount of support, the trial court 

determined that a modification was warranted. We find no abuse of discretion. 

 

3 R.C. 3119.79(A) provides that if the amount of support owed “as recalculated is more 

than ten per cent greater than or more than ten per cent less than the amount of child 

support required to be paid pursuant to the existing child support order, the deviation from 

the recalculated amount that would be required to be paid under the schedule and the 

applicable worksheet shall be considered by the court as a change of circumstance 

substantial enough to require a modification of the child support amount.” 
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{¶ 30} Christopher’s third and fourth assignments of error are overruled. 

 IV. Parenting Time 

{¶ 31} Christopher’s fifth assignment of error states: 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING DEFENDANT IN CONTEMPT 

FOR FAILURE TO ALLOW PARENTING TIME AS ORDERED. 

{¶ 32} Christopher contends that Abigail failed to prove, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that he violated the parenting time orders 

{¶ 33} There is competent, credible evidence in this record upon which the court 

could rely in determining that Christopher had the child in his custody from July 5 through 

July 12, 2015, and that he refused to allow Abigail to take the child on July 12. There is 

evidence that Abigail did not get physical custody of the child until July 19. Thus, 

Christopher had the child for two successive weeks despite the decree’s order that the 

parties exercise week to week parenting time. 

{¶ 34} While the evidence in this case consisted of the somewhat contradictory 

testimony by the parties, the magistrate was free to credit Abigail over Christopher. 

Indeed, the magistrate noted that Christopher exhibited “a general attitude, as is also 

reflected in the division of property problems discussed below, that he can decide how 

things will be handled.” Dkt. No. 109. Thus, it is clear that the magistrate found 

Christopher’s testimony lacked credibility. 

{¶ 35} We conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that there was clear 

and convincing evidence that Christopher did not comply with the terms of the parenting 

orders. 
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{¶ 36} Christopher’s fifth assignment of error is overruled. 

 V. Mortgage 

{¶ 37} Christopher’s sixth assignment of error provides: 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT SHOULD BE 

RESPONSIBLE FOR PAYMENT OF THE AUGUST MORTGAGE 

PAYMENT AND LATE FEES. 

{¶ 38} Christopher contends he should not be required to pay for the August 

mortgage payment, along with any attendant late fees, on the marital residence. 

{¶ 39} The record shows that Christopher maintained sole possession of the 

marital residence during the pendency of the divorce. And, as conceded by Christopher, 

he remained in the residence for sixty days after the entry of the divorce decree. We 

cannot say, on this record, that requiring Christopher to pay the mortgage for the month 

of August 2015 when he was in sole possession of, and living in, the home is inequitable. 

Thus, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion. 

{¶ 40} The sixth assignment of error is overruled. 

 VI. Personal Property 

{¶ 41} The seventh and eighth assignments of error asserted by Christopher state: 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT SHOULD 

RETURN TO APPELLEE CERTAIN TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY 

ITEMS. 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING APPELLANT TO PAY THE 
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COST OF THE NEW THERMOSTAT AND THE SERVICE INCURRED TO 

INSTALL IT. 

{¶ 42} Christopher contends that the court abused its discretion by ordering the 

return of numerous items of personal property to Abigail, and by ordering him to reimburse 

her for the cost of installing a new thermostat in the marital residence. 

{¶ 43} The following method for dividing personal property was set forth in the 

magistrate’s trial decision and incorporated into the divorce decree: 

The magistrate finds that all of the items on [Abigail’s] Exhibit 4(a) [sic] 

should be considered marital property unless designated on the Exhibit as 

a gift to one of the parties and the Defendant did not disagree on Exhibit Z 

(aka Exhibit ZZ). For example, if an item was listed on 4(b) as a gift 

specifically to Chris, then it should be his separate property. If it is listed 

as a gift to Abby and Chris did not disagree on Exhibit Z (aka Exhibit ZZ), 

then it should be her separate property. Anything not agreed upon should 

be considered subject to division as the things were acquired during the 

marriage and neither party presented any evidence to corroborate his or her 

testimony. Both parties seem to agree that the padded chair in [the son’s] 

room and the pink chair in [the daughter’s] room were gifts directly to them. 

Fixtures should remain with the house. The children’s toys are just that: 

the children’s toys and should not be awarded to either party. All marital 

property shall be divided before [Christopher] vacates the former marital 

residence. 

{¶ 44} At the hearing, Abigail introduced Exhibit 3 which sets forth a list of over 20 
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items of personal property that she testified were removed from the residence despite the 

fact that they belonged to her by virtue of this division provision. She also testified that 

Christopher removed a thermostat from the home. 

{¶ 45} Christopher testified that three of the items on Exhibit 3 – two gladiator 

cabinets, a wheelbarrow and a tile saw - were gifts to him from his parents. He further 

testified that they were marked on Exhibit Z as gifts. Thus, he argues that they were 

awarded to him pursuant to the decree division method. He testified that the remaining 

items were in Abigail’s possession. He also testified that the thermostat was a gift to him 

from his parents. He noted that he re-installed the home’s original thermostat.4 

{¶ 46} The magistrate’s decision required Christopher to return all of the items 

listed on Exhibit 3, and to pay for all replacement and installation costs of a new 

thermostat. Following the parties’ objections, the trial court modified the magistrate’s 

decision to find that some of the items listed on Exhibit 3 belonged to the parties’ children 

and that the children could determine where those items should be located. The trial 

court adopted the magistrate’s decision on this issue in all other respects. 

{¶ 47} From our review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion. We disagree 

with Christopher’s conclusion that the cabinets, wheelbarrow and saw were 

acknowledged as gifts to him. While Christopher’s Exhibit Z did designate them as gifts, 

they were not listed on Exhibit 4(b) as a gift. Thus, at best, they were items that were 

not agreed upon, and were subject to division. 

{¶ 48} We also find that the magistrate was entitled to accept Abigail’s testimony 

 

4 Abigail testified that the replacement thermostat, which she found dangling by its wires 

from a hole in the wall, did not work. Thus, she testified that she incurred costs because 

she was required to have it serviced. 
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that the items at issue were not in the marital residence when she took possession of the 

home. Further, we find no abuse of discretion with the requirement that Christopher, 

who did not request the thermostat at the final hearing, pay the costs related to the 

reinstallation of the thermostat. 

{¶ 49} Accordingly, the seventh and eighth assignments of error are overruled. 

 VII. Court Costs 

{¶ 50} Christopher’s ninth, and final, assignment of error states: 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING APPELLANT TO PAY ALL 

COURT COSTS. 

{¶ 51} Christopher objects to the decision of the trial court requiring him to pay the 

costs of the proceeding. In support, he notes that Abigail’s motion had more than eight 

branches while he only filed four motions. 

{¶ 52} Civil Rule 54(D) provides, “[e]xcept when express provision therefor is made 

either in a statute or in these rules, costs shall be allowed to the prevailing party unless 

the court otherwise directs.” The decision to award or to decline to award costs is a 

matter within the discretion of the trial court and absent an abuse of discretion will not be 

reversed on appeal. Raab v. Wenrich, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19066, 2001 WL 

1782784, * 1 (Feb. 22, 2001). 

{¶ 53} While Christopher contends that Abigail was not the prevailing party, we 

cannot agree as Abigail prevailed on most issues. Further, we cannot say that the award 

of costs constituted an abuse of discretion. 

{¶ 54} The ninth assignment of error is overruled. 
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 VIII. Visitation 

{¶ 55} Abigail’s first cross-assignment of error states: 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS AS A 

RESULT OF THE CROSS-APPELLEE’S CONTEMPT AND TO AWARD CROSSAPPELLANT ADDITIONAL VISITATION TIME. 

{¶ 56} Abigail contends that the trial court should have imposed sanctions against 

Christopher with regard to the violation of parenting time. She further contends that she 

should have been granted additional parenting time in order to make up for the time she 

missed as a result of Christopher’s actions. 

{¶ 57} The purpose of a civil contempt sanction is to benefit the complainant by 

compelling compliance with court orders. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 2012-Ohio-4182, 975 

N.E.2d 1060, ¶ 11 and 16 (2d Dist.). However, we have not found, and Abigail has not 

cited any authority, mandating the imposition of a sanction. 

{¶ 58} As previously noted, there is evidence in the record that Christopher had 

the child for two successive weeks in contravention of the decree. The magistrate and 

trial court found Christopher in contempt, but did not impose any sanction. 

{¶ 59} We cannot say that the court abused its discretion by failing to impose a 

sanction or by denying the request for extra parenting time. We note that the violation 

of the order occurred immediately following the filing of the final decree and appears to 

have been an isolated incident. 

{¶ 60} The first cross-assignment of error is overruled. 
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 IX. Real Estate Taxes 

{¶ 61} Abigail’s second cross-assignment of error is as follows: 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ORDER CROSS-APPELLEE 

TO REIMBURSE CROSS-APPELLANT FOR REAL ESTATE TAXES 

WHICH HE HAD PAID FROM THE PARTIES’ HELOC. 

{¶ 62} Abigail contends that the court erred because it failed to order Christopher 

to reimburse her for real estate taxes he paid with proceeds from the parties’ home equity 

line of credit. It appears from the record that this issue was raised prior to the entry of 

the final decree. However, the issue was not addressed in the final decree. Thus, 

Abigail included this issue in her post-decree motions. Abigail also contends that 

Christopher should have been required to pay half of the real estate taxes due for the 

time he occupied the marital home after the entry of the divorce decree. 

{¶ 63} To the extent that this assignment of error involves an issue of taxes raised 

in the original divorce action, it is not properly before this court. Any problem with the 

decree should have been raised by direct appeal of the decree. 

{¶ 64} With regard to the post-decree real estate taxes, the record indicates that 

these taxes were included in the mortgage payments made by the parties, and that those 

amounts were placed into an escrow account to be paid by the mortgagee when the tax 

bill came due. Christopher paid the July 2015 mortgage payment, and he was ordered 

to pay the August 2015 payment. Thus, any real estate taxes for which he would be 

liable were included in the mortgage payment he made in July 2015, and will be included 

in the payment for August 2015. 

{¶ 65} The second cross-assignment of error is overruled. 
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 X. Master Bathroom Cabinet 

{¶ 66} The third cross-assignment of error asserted by Abigail states: 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO ORDER THE CROSSAPPELLEE TO RETURN TO THE CROSS-APPELLANT THE MASTER 

BATHROOM CABINETRY. 

{¶ 67} Abigail contends that the magistrate and trial court erred by failing to order 

Christopher to return a cabinet she claims was a fixture in the master bathroom of the 

marital residence. She claims that, although she raised the issue, neither the magistrate 

nor the trial court addressed the issue. 

{¶ 68} At the hearing, Abigail introduced Exhibit 5 which set forth a list of items she 

claims are fixtures that Christopher improperly removed from the marital residence. The 

list included a master bathroom cabinet, a thermador gas cooktop, custom closet 

shelving, garage wall shelving, a shoe rack in the garage, four ceiling pulley bike storage 

systems, a laundry room cabinet, and two walls of kitchen pantry shelving. 

{¶ 69} The magistrate determined that the cooktop, which Christopher removed by 

sawing through a gas pipe, was the only item on the list constituting a fixture. The 

magistrate found that the remaining items were not fixtures and were subject to division. 

The trial court’s decision adopted the finding that these items are not fixtures. The trial 

court further concluded that the items need not be returned to Abigail. 

{¶ 70} The evidence in this record supports a finding that the Exhibit 5 items listed 

above were attached to the home by screws or nails.5 During the pendency of the 

 

5 The exception is the master bathroom cabinet. While it was custom built to match the 
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divorce, neither party requested that these items be divided. None of the items were 

included on the lists of property to be divided at that time, and none of the items were 

brought to the attention of the court during the divorce hearing. Thus, it can be inferred 

that these items were intended by the parties to remain with the home and with the party 

that ultimately retained the home. 

{¶ 71} The final decree of divorce did not make any reference to these items. And 

since there were no exhibits listing these items, it cannot be claimed that the decree’s 

division method is applicable to these items. Since the decree was a final order from 

which no appeal was taken, the trial court did not, at the time of the post-decree hearing, 

have the ability to order or permit removal of this property from the home or to conclude 

that these items are now subject to division. 

{¶ 72} However, Abigail only objects to the failure to return the master bathroom 

cabinet. Thus, we conclude that it is the only item on the Exhibit 5 list that must be 

returned. 

{¶ 73} Accordingly, the third cross-assignment of error is sustained. 

 XI. Lawn and Lawnmower 

{¶ 74} Abigail’s fourth cross-assignment of error states: 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO AWARD CROSSAPPELLANT COMPENSATION FOR THE DAMAGES TO THE LAWN AND 

LAWNMOWER CAUSED BY CROSS-APPELLEE DURING HIS EXCLUSIVE 

 

other cabinetry in the bath, a picture of the bathroom supports a finding that the cabinet 

was free-standing. 
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USE AND OCCUPANCY OF THE REAL PROPERTY. 

{¶ 75} Abigail contends that when she took possession of the marital residence in 

2015 she found damage to the lawn. She also claims that the riding lawnmower awarded 

to her was not working, and that she was required to have it repaired. She contends that 

the trial court should have awarded her damages for these issues. 

{¶ 76} A review of the record shows that evidence was presented of several spots 

of discolored grass at the marital home. Christopher testified that he fertilized the lawn 

while he was living there. He testified that the fertilizer could have burned the grass in 

several areas because it did not rain after the application. 

{¶ 77} The trial court found that there was no evidence that Christopher intended 

to damage the lawn. We cannot say that this finding is erroneous. Further, we note that 

there is no evidence that the damaged areas would not recover. In other words, there 

was no evidence that it was necessary to expend monies to resod or reseed in order for 

the area to regrow. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Abigail’s motion for damages. 

{¶ 78} We further cannot conclude there is evidence in the record to indicate that 

Christopher did anything to cause the riding mower to stop working. Indeed, it is not 

entirely clear that it was not working. While Abigail did have the mower serviced, there 

is no evidence that the work performed constituted anything other than routine 

maintenance. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying this request 

for damages. 

{¶ 79} Abigail’s fourth cross-assignment of error is overruled. 
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 XII. Conclusion 

{¶ 80} All of Christopher’s assignments of error are overruled. Abigail’s third 

assignment of error is sustained. Her remaining assignments of error are overruled. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. This 

matter is remanded to the trial court. Upon remand, the trial court shall order Christopher 

to return the master bathroom cabinet to Abigail. 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

HALL, P.J. and DONOVAN, J., concur. 

Copies mailed to: 

Scott D. Rudnick 

Jennifer J. Walters 

Hon. Jonathan P. Hein