J-A11033-17

2017 PA Super 232

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JESSE RAY BUSH 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1765 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 29, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0007979-2015

BEFORE: SHOGAN, MOULTON, JJ., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 19, 2017

This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence entered in the Court 

of Common Pleas of York County following Appellant Jesse Ray Bush’s 

conviction in a non-jury trial on the charges of possession of drug 

paraphernalia, driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled 

substance (“DUI”), driving under suspension as a habitual offender, and 

driving under suspension-DUI related.1 Appellant’s sole claim is that the 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 35 P.S. 780-113(a)(32); 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(a)(1), 6503.1, and 

1543(b)(1.1)(i), respectively. Appellant was also charged with DUI under 75 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(d)(1)(iii) and (d)(3); however, the Commonwealth nol 

prossed the charges. Further, Appellant was charged with the summary 

offenses of driving on roadways laned for traffic, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3309(1), 

and use of multiple-beam road lighting equipment, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4306(a); 

however, the trial court indicated that, in light of its findings of guilt on 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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police officer did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop his 

vehicle, and therefore, the lower court erred in denying his pre-trial motion 

to suppress the physical evidence seized by the police. After a careful 

review, we affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: Appellant was 

arrested, and on April 11, 2016, he filed a counseled pre-trial motion 

seeking to suppress the physical evidence seized by the police following the 

stop of his vehicle. Specifically, Appellant averred the stop of his vehicle 

was illegal since the police officer had neither probable cause nor reasonable 

suspicion to initiate the stop. 

On June 28, 2016, the matter proceeded to a suppression hearing at 

which the sole witness was Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Raymond W. 

Rutter, who testified that he has been a trooper for approximately three 

years. N.T., 6/28/16, at 4. He indicated that, on November 1, 2015, at 

approximately 3:15 a.m., he was on duty and traveling in the left-hand lane 

on I-83 southbound near the Maryland state line when he observed the 

following:

[A] SUV, a dark colored SUV, which was traveling northbound, 

which had passed me, which had its high beams on. While that 

[SUV] had passed me there was another vehicle—that [SUV] 

was traveling in the right lane, there was a smaller sedan which 

was traveling in the left-hand lane, passing that [SUV] that was 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

various charges, it would “not make a finding of guilt” on the summary 

offenses. N.T., 9/29/16, at 3.
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in the right which had its high beams on, and then I spun around 

just north of the Maryland line, the divider, and approached that 

[SUV] which I saw [with] its high beams on from the rear. 

Id. at 6-7. 

When asked by the prosecutor how he could “tell that the high beams 

were on[,]” Trooper Rutter answered that the lights “were bright to me 

looking at them.” Id. at 7. Trooper Rutter indicated that his experience as 

a trooper assisted him in making his determination. Id. 

Moreover, when the prosecutor asked Trooper Rutter how close he was 

to the SUV when he first noticed the high beams were activated, Trooper 

Rutter testified that he was within 300 feet. Id. at 8. He further indicated 

that he “actually pas[sed] [the SUV] going south and they were still 

activated. So whatever the distance from two lanes over would be on the 

interstate, plus the center.” Id.

Trooper Rutter clarified that, when he turned his police vehicle around 

at the highway divider and proceeded northbound, he did so with the intent 

of stopping Appellant’s SUV “for the violation of the high beams.” Id. He 

indicated that, once he caught up to the SUV, he did not immediately stop it, 

but he continued to follow it as he knew that the welcome center, which 

would be a safe place to stop the SUV, was “just north of [his] location.” Id. 

As he followed the SUV to the welcome center, Trooper Rutter noticed 

the vehicle “cross over the fog lines two times[.]” Id. at 8-9. Trooper 

Rutter testified that, at this point, in addition to the high beams traffic 
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violation, Trooper Rutter suspected that Appellant might be DUI. Id. at 10-

11. He clarified, however, that even if Appellant’s SUV had not crossed the 

fog lines twice, he still intended to stop the vehicle “for the high beams 

violation." Id. at 11. Trooper Rutter indicated that he stopped Appellant’s 

SUV, and charged Appellant with numerous crimes, including DUI-related 

charges and the high beams violation. Id. at 12.

On cross-examination, Trooper Rutter clarified that, in the area where 

the incident occurred, between the northbound and southbound lanes on I83, there was a guardrail at the height of the concrete barriers. Id. at 13-

14, 16. He confirmed that Appellant was driving in the northbound righthand lane, and he was traveling in the southbound left-hand lane; the 

divider between the northbound and southbound lanes was approximately 

sixty feet in width. Id. at 16. Trooper Rutter testified that the highways 

were straight without curves in this area, so the northbound and southbound 

vehicles passed each other. Id. 

Trooper Rutter reiterated that when he first noticed Appellant’s SUV 

traveling northbound it “appeared to [him] that it had the high beams on.” 

Id. at 14. He noted that he has “made numerous stops on high beam 

violations, and [Appellant’s SUV] appeared to be [sic] high beams on to 

[him.]” Id. at 14-15. Further, Trooper Rutter noted that, based on his 

training and experience, Appellant’s SUV had its high beams on. Id. at 15. 

He testified that Appellant’s SUV’s lights “affected [his] eyes, they were 
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bright into [his] eyes, but it didn’t make [him] swerve or crash or anything 

like that.” Id. He noted that the sedan, which was passing Appellant’s SUV, 

did not have its high beams activated. Id. at 16. Trooper Rutter testified 

that he is “pretty good” about “picking out” which vehicles have their high 

beams activated. Id. at 20. He reiterated that from his “training and 

experience it appeared to be high beams and that’s why [he] initiated the 

stop [of Appellant’s SUV].” Id. at 21. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the suppression court denied 

Appellant’s motion to suppress, concluding that Trooper Rutter observed 

Appellant’s SUV with its high beams improperly activated, and thus, he had 

probable cause to stop Appellant’s SUV. Id. at 41-42. Subsequently, 

following a non-jury trial, the trial court convicted Appellant of the offenses 

indicated supra and sentenced him to an aggregate of nine and one-half 

years to twenty years in prison. This timely appeal followed, and all 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925 requirements have been met. 

On appeal, Appellant contends that the stop of his SUV was illegal 

since Trooper Rutter did not have the requisite probable cause or reasonable 

suspicion to initiate a stop. Accordingly, he argues the trial court erred in 

denying his pre-trial motion to suppress the physical evidence seized as a 

result of the stop of his SUV. 

The issue of what quantum of cause a police officer must possess in 

order to conduct a vehicle stop based on a possible violation of the Motor 
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Vehicle Code is a question of law, over which our scope of review is plenary 

and our standard of review is de novo. Commonwealth v. Chase, 599 Pa. 

80, 960 A.2d 108 (2008). “[A]ppellate courts are limited to reviewing only 

the evidence presented at the suppression hearing when examining a ruling 

on a pre-trial motion to suppress.” Commonwealth v. Stilo, 138 A.3d 33, 

35-36 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citation omitted). Our Supreme Court has 

declared:

[The] standard of review in addressing a challenge to a 

trial court’s denial of a suppression motion is whether the factual 

findings are supported by the record and whether the legal 

conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. When reviewing 

such a ruling by the suppression court, we must consider only 

the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence of 

the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context 

of the record....Where the record supports the findings of the 

suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse 

only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.

Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 591 Pa. 1, 915 A.2d 1122, 1134 (2007) 

(internal citations omitted). “It is within the suppression court’s sole 

province as factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight 

to be given their testimony.” Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 896 A.2d 583, 

585 (Pa.Super. 2006) (quotation marks and quotation omitted).

Our analysis of the quantum of cause required for a traffic stop begins 

with 75 Pa.C.S.A.§ 6308(b), which provides: 

(b) Authority of police officer.—Whenever a police officer is 

engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers 

or has reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is 

occurring or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request 

or signal, for the purpose of checking the vehicle’s registration, 
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proof of financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or 

engine number or the driver’s license, or to secure such other 

information as the officer may reasonably believe to be 

necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b) (bold in original). “Traffic stops based on a 

reasonable suspicion: either of criminal activity or a violation of the Motor 

Vehicle Code under the authority of Section 6308(b) must serve a stated 

investigatory purpose.” Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 

(Pa.Super. 2010) (en banc) (citation omitted). For a stop based on the 

observed violation of the vehicle code or otherwise non-investigable offense, 

an officer must have probable cause to make a constitutional vehicle stop. 

Feczko, 10 A.3d at 1291 (“Mere reasonable suspicion will not justify a 

vehicle stop when the driver’s detention cannot serve an investigatory 

purpose relevant to the suspected violation.”). 

Here, the trial court found that Trooper Rutter credibly testified that he 

stopped Appellant’s vehicle on the basis that Appellant had his high beams 

activated in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4306, use of multiple-beam road 

lighting equipment. Since an investigation following the traffic stop would 

have provided Trooper Rutter with no additional information as to whether 

Appellant violated Section 4306, probable cause was necessary to initiate 

the stop on this basis. See Commonwealth v. Slattery, 139 A.3d 221, 

222-23 (Pa.Super. 2016) (holding that where the “vehicular stop is to 

determine whether there has been compliance with the Commonwealth’s 

vehicle code, it is incumbent upon the officer to articulate....probable cause 
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to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of some provision of 

the code”) (citation omitted)); Feczko, supra. 

Our Supreme Court has defined probable cause as follows:

Probable cause is made out when the facts and circumstances 

which are within the knowledge of the officer at the time of the

[stop], and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, 

are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the 

belief that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime. 

The question we ask is not whether the officer’s belief was 

correct or more likely true than false. Rather, we require only a 

probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity. 

In determining whether probable cause exists, we apply a 

totality of the circumstances test.

Commonwealth v. Martin, 627 Pa. 623, 101 A.3d 706, 721 (2014)

(citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Pennsylvania law makes clear, 

however, that a police officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if 

the officer observes a traffic code violation, even if it is a minor offense. 

Chase, supra.

Here, Trooper Rutter stopped Appellant’s SUV for a violation of Section 

4306, which provides, in relevant part, the following:

§ 4306. Use of multiple-beam road lighting equipment

(a) Approaching an oncoming vehicle.-Whenever the driver 

of a vehicle approaches an oncoming vehicle within 500 feet, the 

driver shall use the low beam of light. 

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4306(a) (bold in original).2

____________________________________________

2 Section 4306 provides for exceptions related to emergency vehicles and 

drivers flashing their high beams for purposes of warning oncoming vehicles 

of danger; however, neither of these exceptions are implicated in the case 

sub judice. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4306(c). 
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In construing Section 4306(a) to determine its meaning, we are 

guided by the following legal precepts as set forth by our Supreme Court: 

The purpose of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the 

General Assembly’s intent and give it effect. 1 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 

1921(a). In discerning that intent, the court first resorts to the 

language of the statute itself. If the language of the statute 

clearly and unambiguously sets forth the legislative intent, it is 

the duty of the court to apply that intent to the case at hand and 

not look beyond the statutory language to ascertain its meaning. 

See 1 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 1921(b) (“When the words of a statute are 

clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be 

disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”). 

“Relatedly, it is well established that resort to the rules of 

statutory construction is to be made only when there is an 

ambiguity in the provision.” Oliver v. City of Pittsburgh, 608 

Pa. 386, 11 A.3d 960, 965 (2011) (citations omitted).

Mohamed v. Com., Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 615 Pa. 

6, 40 A.3d 1186, 1193 (2012). See Commonwealth v. Irwin, 769 A.2d 

517, 521 (Pa.Super. 2001) (holding when language of a statute is clear and 

unambiguous, it must be given effect in accordance with its plain and 

common meaning). 

Pursuant to the plain and clear language of Section 4306(a), a driver 

commits a traffic code violation whenever the driver approaches an 

oncoming vehicle within 500 feet and does not use the vehicle’s low beam 

lights. In Irwin, supra, we noted that the term “approaches,” as used in 

Section 4306(a), is defined as “to come nearer in space.” Irwin, 769 A.2d 

at 522. Moreover, the dictionary definition of “oncoming” is “coming nearer 

in time or space.” Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 811 (10th ed. 1997). 
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In the case sub judice, the trial court found that Trooper Rutter 

credibly testified that, as he was driving in the southbound left-hand lane of 

I-83, Appellant, who was driving his SUV in the northbound right-hand lane 

of I-83, drove by Trooper Rutter with his SUV’s high beams activated. N.T., 

4/12/16, at 41. The trooper testified that Appellant’s SUV was within 300 

feet of his cruiser. Id. at 8. He further testified that he had a clear view of 

Appellant’s SUV’s lights; Appellant’s SUV’s lights were noticeably brighter 

than the lights of the sedan, which passed Appellant’s SUV; and Appellant’s 

SUV’s lights affected the trooper’s eyes. Id. at 15-16. Trooper Rutter 

testified that he has made numerous stops based on high beam violations, 

and based on his training and experience, he concluded Appellant did not 

properly dim his lights when he passed by the trooper’s cruiser. Id. at 14, 

21. 

Based on the aforementioned, we conclude the trial court properly 

determined that Trooper Rutter had probable cause to stop Appellant’s SUV 

for a violation of Section 4306(a). Simply put, Appellant’s SUV approached 

(came closer to) Trooper Rutter’s police cruiser as the cruiser was oncoming 

(coming near to Appellant’s vehicle) within 500 feet, and Appellant did not 

use the low beam of light.3 

____________________________________________

3 Appellant specifically avers Trooper Rutter did not offer sufficient credible 

testimony to establish probable cause to believe that Appellant, in fact, had 

his SUV’s high beams activated when he drove by the trooper’s cruiser. See

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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We find unavailing Appellant’s specific argument that he was not 

required to dim his lights as his SUV did not approach an oncoming vehicle 

as required for a violation of Section 4306(a). In this regard, Appellant 

reasons that, since a guardrail and concrete barrier divided I-83’s 

southbound lane in which Trooper Rutter was driving from the northbound 

lane in which Appellant was driving, the SUV was not “approaching” and the 

trooper’s cruiser was not “oncoming” for purposes of the statute. 

As fully discussed supra, giving the statute’s express terms their plain 

meaning, we disagree with Appellant’s argument. While the guardrail and 

concrete barrier should be taken into consideration in determining whether 

Appellant’s SUV approached within 500 feet of Trooper Rutter’s oncoming 

police cruiser, the existence of such does not alter or negate the plain 

language of the statue. Moreover, while the Legislature listed exceptions to 

the use of high beams in Section 4306(c), it did not include a blanket 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Appellant’s Brief at 15-17. In this regard, he notes that vehicle lights have 

varying degrees of brightness, and Trooper Rutter allegedly offered 

contradictory reasons as to why he stopped Appellant’s vehicle. See id. As 

indicated supra, the suppression court found Trooper Rutter’s testimony 

regarding Appellant’s use of high beams to be credible. We are bound by 

the suppression court’s credibility determination and factual findings, which 

are supported by the record. See Eichinger, supra; Gallagher, supra.
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exception related to the use of high beams on a divided highway4as was 

present in this case.

Further, we find unavailing Appellant’s reliance upon Commonwealth 

v. Beachey, 556 Pa. 345, 728 A.2d 912 (199), in support of his argument 

that he did not violate Section 4306(a). In Beachey, the appellant, who 

was driving during the daylight hours of an overcast summer day, flashed 

his high beams ten or more times to warn oncoming motorists of the 

presence of a police radar unit. Id. at 347, 728 A.2d at 912. An officer 

stopped the appellant’s vehicle and cited him with violating Section 4306(a). 

This Court affirmed the appellant’s judgment of sentence. 

In reversing and finding no violation of the high beams statute 

occurred, our Supreme Court reasoned that “[a]lthough [Section 4306(a)] 

does not specify its scope of application, reason requires that it be read in 

connection with statutory language that sets forth the circumstances when 

motorist are required to use their headlights.” Id. at 347, 728 A.2d at 913 

(citing 1 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 1932 (statutes in pari materia are to be construed 

together)). Accordingly, our Supreme Court examined 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4302, 

which requires motorists to use lighted head lamps between sunset and 

____________________________________________

4 The Motor Vehicle Code defines “divided highway” as “[a] highway divided 

into two or more roadways and so constructed as to impede vehicular traffic 

between the roadways by providing an intervening space, physical barrier or 

clearly indicated dividing section.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 102. 
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sunrise, as well as when there is insufficient light due to “unfavorable 

atmospheric conditions[.]”5 Based thereon, our Supreme Court held:

[S]ection 4302 sets forth the times when headlights must 

be used, and [S]ection 4306(a) limits the use of high beams 

during those times. If the two provisions were not read 

together, application of [S]ection 4306(a) would not be limited 

to the times specified in [S]ection 4302 and an absurd result 

would follow. Specifically, [S]ection 4306(a)’s requirement that 

motorists use their low beams whenever approaching another 

vehicle within 500 feet would be applicable during the daytime. 

Hence, a motorist would be in violation if, during daylight hours, 

he failed to turn on his low beam headlights every time a vehicle 

approached within 500 feet. In interpreting statutes, it is 

axiomatic that the legislature did not intend an absurd or 

unreasonable result. See 1 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 1922(a) (presumptions 

in ascertaining legislative intent). 

Beachey, 556 Pa. at 348, 728 A.2d at 913.

In the case sub judice, Appellant does not dispute that his high beams 

violation occurred during the nighttime hours between sunset and sunrise. 

____________________________________________

5 Section 4302 relevantly provides:

§ 4302. Periods for requiring lighted lamps

(a) General rule.-The operator of a vehicle upon a highway 

shall display the lighted head lamps and other lamps and 

illuminating devices required under this chapter for different 

classes of vehicles, subject to exceptions with respect to parked 

vehicles, at the following times:

(1) Between sunset and sunrise.

(2) Any time when, due to insufficient light or unfavorable 

atmospheric conditions, including rain, snow, sleet, hail, fog, 

smoke or smog, persons and vehicles on the highway are not 

clearly discernible to the operator for a distance of 1,000 feet 

ahead.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4302(a) (bold in original). 
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Accordingly, Appellant was required to use his headlights pursuant to 4302, 

and we conclude Beachey is distinguishable. 

This does not end our inquiry, however, as Appellant suggests that 

Beachey’s holding that Section 4306(a) must be read together with other 

statutes so as to avoid an absurd result requires the courts to construe 

Section 4306(a) in conjunction with 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3345, pertaining to a 

driver’s duty in meeting or overtaking a school bus. 

In this regard, Appellant notes that Section 3345(a) requires “the 

driver of a vehicle meeting or overtaking any school bus stopped on a 

highway...[to] stop at least ten feet before reaching the school bus when the 

red signal lights...are flashing and the side stop signal arms are activated[.]” 

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3345(a). Further, he notes the school bus statute provides 

an exception from the stopping requirement, indicating “[t]he driver of a 

vehicle upon a highway...with separate roadways need not stop upon 

meeting or passing a school bus with actuated red signal lights which is on a 

different roadway.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3345(g). 

Appellant reasons that Section 4306(a) must be read in connection 

with Section 3345(g) so as to avoid an absurd result in the case sub judice. 

In essence, he argues that if drivers are not required to stop for a school bus 

on a highway with separate roadways then it would be absurd to require 

drivers to use their low beams when approaching an oncoming car on a 

divided highway. We disagree.
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Statues in para materia are those relating to the same matter. In re 

Trust Under Deed of Kulig, 131 A.3d 494, 497 (Pa.Super. 2015); Black’s 

Law Dictionary 807 (10th ed. 2004). While we agree with Appellant that, if 

possible, statutes in para materia should be construed together, we disagree 

with Appellant that Sections 4306(a) and 3345(g) are in para materia. The 

statutes do not relate to the same matter and do not have a common 

purpose. Whereas Section 4306 relates to drivers’ use of high beam 

headlights, Section 3345 relates to drivers approaching school buses that 

are transporting students. The statutes are fundamentally different and, 

thus, Beachey’s recognition of the in pari materia principle does not require 

that the highway with separate roadways exception contained in the school 

bus statute be applied to the high beam statute as well. 

Finally, we find unavailing Appellant’s argument that the legislative 

intent of Section 4306(a), as recognized in Beachey, does not support the 

finding of a violation of Section 4306(a) in the case sub judice. In Beachey

our Supreme Court opined that the language of Section 4306(a) 

unambiguously and clearly sets forth the legislative intent of the statute, and 

further, that such intent did not support a violation of the statute when 

drivers use their high beams during normal, daytime driving. Specifically, in 

Beachy, our Supreme Court held as follows: 

The plain legislative intent of [S]ection 4306(a) was to 

prevent motorists from facing excessive glare, so as to reduce 

the obvious safety hazard that exists when a driver suffers 

momentary blindness upon being subjected even very briefly to 
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the intense brightness of high beam lamps. However, it is 

inconceivable that the [L]egislature was concerned about the 

midday use of high beams during periods when normal 

atmospheric and lighting conditions make it impossible for 

drivers to be blinded by headlight glare. We conclude, therefore, 

that [S]ection 4306(a) was never intended to apply to the 

midday use of one’s headlights. [The] [a]ppellant’s conviction 

for the daytime use of his high beams cannot, therefore, be 

sustained.

Beachey, 556 Pa. at 348, 728 A.2d at 913. 

Here, unlike in Beachey, the safety hazard that Section 4306(a)’s 

plain language seeks to prevent was present. The trial court found that 

Trooper Rutter credibly testified that the guardrail and concrete barrier did 

not prevent Appellant’s SUV’s high beams from shining into his eyes. In 

fact, Trooper Rutter specifically testified that Appellant’s SUV’s lights 

“affected [his] eyes, they were bright into [his] eyes[.]” N.T., 6/28/ 16, at 

15. Thus, the excessive glare which Section 4306 seeks to prevent so as to 

reduce the hazard that exists when a driver is momentarily blinded by the 

brief, intense brightness of high beam lamps existed in this case, despite the 

existence of the guardrail and concrete barrier between the northbound and 

southbound lanes of I-83. Accordingly, we find no merit to Appellant’s final 

claim.
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For all of the aforementioned reasons, we conclude that the facts of 

this case6 presented probable cause of violation of Section 4306(a) for 

purposes of the traffic stop of Appellant’s SUV. Further, Trooper Rutter 

offered specific and articulable facts that provided probable cause that 

Appellant violated the section. Accordingly, as the traffic stop was not 

illegal, the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s pre-trial suppression 

motion. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

Affirmed. 

Judge Moulton joins the Opinion.

Judge Shogan files a Concurring Opinion to which P.J.E Stevens joins.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/19/2017

____________________________________________

6 We recognize that “divided highways” in Pennsylvania exist with numerous 

variations, including the dividing of roadways by intervening space with trees 

and large physical barriers. We save for another day the issue of whether 

Section 4306(a) may be violated in other factual scenarios not present in 

this case.