NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

ABDUL KHABIR WAHID, AKA AK, 

AKA Abdul Khabir Hyman, AKA Marion 

Marshall Hyman, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20-10109 

D.C. Nos. 

2:17-cr-00360-JJT-1 

2:17-cr-00360-JJT 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

John Joseph Tuchi, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 27, 2021**

San Francisco, California

Before: McKEOWN and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and LAMBERTH,*** District 

Judge.

Abdul Khabir Wahid appeals the district court’s order granting his motion to 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Royce C. Lamberth, United States District Judge for 

the District of Columbia, sitting by designation.

FILED

JUL 29 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

represent himself in his case. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and 

we affirm.

We review de novo whether a waiver of the right to counsel was made 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. United States v. Lopez-Osuna, 242 F.3d 

1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2000). “In order for a waiver of the right to counsel to be 

knowing and intelligent, the defendant must be made aware of the ‘three elements’ 

of self-representation: ‘(1) the nature of the charges against him; (2) the possible 

penalties; and (3) the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.’” Id. at 

1199 (quoting United States v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 614, 623–24 (9th Cir. 2000)).

The district court sufficiently advised Wahid of the elements of selfrepresentation. The court stated the charges against Wahid and explained the 

possible penalties. Contrary to Wahid’s assertion, the district court was not 

required to list the elements of the charges. See id. (“This court has refrained from 

requiring the district court to use a particular script when conducting an inquiry 

into whether a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived the right to 

counsel.”); see also United States v. Calhoun, 143 F. App’x 28, 29 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(finding that the argument “that a defendant can only be made aware of the nature 

of the charges by being informed of their elements . . . fails”).

The court likewise sufficiently conveyed the consequences of proceeding 

pro se by explaining that it would not give Wahid legal advice, that it would hold 
3 

him to the same evidentiary and procedural rules as a trained lawyer, that it would 

expect him to comply with all court orders, that he might be stretched too thin 

given his pending civil case, and that he would likely be unable to defend himself 

as effectively as a trained lawyer. These warnings were sufficient to ensure that 

Wahid made his decision to proceed pro se with “eyes open.” Faretta v. 

California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. 

McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)); see also United States v. Clapier, 40 F. App’x 

455, 456–57 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding waiver valid where the district court 

cautioned the defendant “against representing herself, explained that she would be 

held responsible for compliance with procedural and evidentiary rules, and 

repeatedly characterized the benefits of representation by qualified counsel”).

Wahid argues that the district court erred in allowing him to waive counsel 

without clearing up his misconception that his appointed attorneys were part of the 

Department of Justice. Even if Wahid had this misconception, that alone does not 

invalidate his waiver. There is no indication that Wahid thought his attorneys were 

controlled by the prosecution. Instead, Wahid’s statements to the court suggest 

that he was dissatisfied with his attorneys’ performance. 

AFFIRMED.