COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-18-00123-CV

DALE WAYNE MOSELEY APPELLANT

V.

DIANNA RUTH GANDEE APPELLEE

----------

FROM THE 367TH DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 2012-50467-367

----------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

----------

Appellant Dale Wayne Moseley appeals the trial court’s orders granting 

Appellee Dianna Ruth Gandee’s motion to enforce the parties’ divorce decree, 

appointing a receiver, and denying Moseley’s motion to enforce. We affirm.

 1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

Background

Moseley and Gandee married in 2003. The trial court rendered a final 

divorce decree in May 2015. Under the headings “Reimbursement Claims” and 

“Equalization Judgment,” the decree included the following:

Reimbursement Claims

The Court finds that the husband DALE WAYNE MOSELEY is 

entitled to reimbursement from DIANNA RUTH GANDEE’s separate 

property estate in the sum of $38,000.00 for pre-marriage payments 

to reduce the debt on wife’s separate McReynolds[] house.

The Court finds that the community estate is entitled to 

reimbursement from DIANNA RUTH GANDEE’s separate property 

estate in the amount of $22,000.00 for community payments to 

reduce the debt on wife’s separate property McReynolds[] house.

The Court finds that wife DIANNA RUTH GANDEE is entitled 

to a reimbursement from the community estate in the amount of 

$217,000.00 for her separate property contribution to the purchase 

of the Crow Wright house.

Equalization Judgment

IT IS DECREED AND ORDERED that . . . the wife DIANNA 

RUTH GANDEE is awarded a judgment of $45,441 against DALE 

WAYNE MOSELEY as part of the fair and equitable division of the 

community estate.

Moseley requested findings of fact and conclusions of law. In July 2015, 

the trial court made the following conclusion of law, among others:

Conclusions of Law – 50/50 Division of Community

. . . After taking into account the value of all personal and real 

property awarded to each party and then applying the requisite 

reimbursement claims, a judgment in the amount of $45,441.00 

against Dale Wayne [Moseley] in favor of Dianna Ruth Gandee was 

required to equalize the distribution of the community estate.
3

In August 2015, the trial court rendered its “First Amended Final Decree of 

Divorce.” The only difference between the original decree and the first amended 

decree is the substitution of the words “[t]he Court ORDERS AND DECREES” for 

the words “[t]he Court finds” in the “Reimbursement Claims” paragraphs quoted 

above.

Gandee filed a motion to enforce the amended decree’s equalization 

judgment and to appoint a receiver in February 2016. Moseley filed a response, 

alleging that the amended decree’s reimbursement paragraphs and equalization 

judgment were ambiguous and requesting a clarifying order. Moseley also filed 

his own motion for enforcement, alleging that Gandee failed to reimburse his 

separate property estate and the community property estate as ordered by the 

amended decree.

In April 2016, the trial court issued an order appointing a receiver, 

essentially granting Gandee’s motion to enforce the decree. In May 2016, the 

trial court denied Moseley’s motion for enforcement. Moseley filed a timely 

notice of appeal.
4

Discussion

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion or impermissibly alter the 

amended decree by granting Gandee’s motion to enforce and 

denying Moseley’s.

In his first two issues, Moseley argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion and impermissibly altered the amended decree by denying his motion 

to enforce while granting Gandee’s.

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for enforcement under an 

abuse-of-discretion standard. In re M.K.R., 216 S.W.3d 58, 61 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth 2007, no pet.); Beck v. Walker, 154 S.W.3d 895, 901 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

2005, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion if the court acts without 

reference to any guiding rules or principles, that is, if the act is arbitrary or 

unreasonable. Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007); Cire v. 

Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838–39 (Tex. 2004).

If a divorce decree does not arise from an agreement of the parties, it is 

construed according to the same rules as other judgments, as opposed to the 

law of contracts, which is applied to consent or agreed judgments. Soto v. Soto, 

936 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1996, no writ) (op. on reh’g). If a nonconsent decree is unambiguous under the law in effect at the time the judgment 

was rendered, it is construed in accordance with its literal language. Wilde v. 

Murchie, 949 S.W.2d 331, 332 (Tex. 1997); Soto, 936 S.W.2d at 340–41;

Barnard v. Barnard, 863 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1993, no writ). 

But if a non-consent divorce judgment is ambiguous, the reviewing court must 
5

look both to the decree as a whole and to the record to determine the meaning of 

the judgment. Wilde, 949 S.W.2d at 332–33; Soto, 936 S.W.2d at 341.

Judgments, like other written instruments, are to be construed as a whole 

toward the end of harmonizing and giving effect to all the court has written. 

Constance v. Constance, 544 S.W.2d 659, 660 (Tex. 1976). “Conclusive effect 

is not to be given the use or not at a particular point in the judgment of the 

commonly employed decretal words, and what the court had adjudicated is to be 

determined from a fair reading of all the provisions of the judgment.” Id.

“Decretal” means the granting or denying of the remedy sought. Envtl. 

Procedures, Inc. v. Guidry, 282 S.W.3d 602, 620 n.21 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g). The factual recitations or reasons 

preceding the decretal portion of a judgment form no part of the judgment itself. 

Alcantar v. Okla. Nat’l Bank, 47 S.W.3d 815, 823 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, 

no pet.); see also Redwine v. Peckinpaugh, 535 S.W.3d 44, 49 (Tex. App.—Tyler 

2017, no pet.); Hines v. Villalba, 231 S.W.3d 550, 553 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, 

no pet.); Crider v. Cox, 960 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1997, writ 

denied). Moreover, where there appears to be a discrepancy between the 

judgment’s recital and decretal paragraphs, recitals preceding the decretal

portions of the judgment do not determine the rights and interests of the parties.

Alcantar, 47 S.W.3d at 823. Rather, the decretal provisions in the judgment 

control. Id.
6

The provisions of the amended decree at issue here are the 

“Reimbursement Claims” and the “Equalization Judgment.” The three 

reimbursement-claim paragraphs employ the same verbal formula: “The Court 

ORDERS AND DECREES that” one party or estate “is entitled to reimbursement” 

from another party or estate. [Emphasis added.] The equalization-judgment 

paragraph uses slightly different language: “IT IS DECREED AND ORDERED 

that [Gandee] is awarded a judgment of $45,441 against [Moseley] as part of the 

fair and equitable division of the community estate.” [Emphasis added.]

As noted above, the decree’s inclusion of the commonly used decretal 

verbs “order” and “decree” are not conclusive in our interpretation of the relevant 

provisions’ meaning. See Constance, 544 S.W.2d at 660. The more significant 

verbs in these provisions are “entitled” in the reimbursement paragraphs and 

“awarded” in the equalization paragraph.

The meaning of “awarded” in the equalization paragraph is unambiguous. 

The meaning of “entitled” in the reimbursement claims is less so. “Award” means 

to “grant by formal process or by judicial decree.” Award, Black’s Law Dictionary 

164 (10th ed. 2014). “Entitle,” however, can mean either to “grant a legal right to” 

or “[to] qualify for.” Entitle, Black’s Law Dictionary 649. One possible 

interpretation is that the decree uses the verbs “awarded” and “entitled” 

interchangeably. But an equally possible interpretation is that “entitled” as used 

in the reimbursement paragraphs comports with the second possible definition of 

the term, “to qualify for.” If so, then the court used the term “entitled” to 
7

recognize the various estates’ rights to reimbursement while it employed the term

“awarded” in the equalization paragraph to actually effectuate the division of the 

property. Under this interpretation, the reimbursement paragraphs are recitals, 

and the equalization paragraph is the decretal provision. Because the 

reimbursement paragraphs are susceptible to multiple interpretations when 

juxtaposed against the equalization paragraph, we conclude that the 

reimbursement paragraphs are ambiguous.

Having determined that the reimbursement paragraphs are ambiguous, we 

turn to the rest of the decree and the record to determine their meaning. See

Wilde, 949 S.W.2d at 332–33; Soto, 936 S.W.2d at 341. First, we note that the 

verb “entitled” appears only in the decree’s reimbursement paragraphs; the 

decree uses the verb “awarded” everywhere else.

Second, the amended decree’s headings identify the reimbursement 

paragraphs as “claims” but the equalization paragraph as a “judgment.”

Third, in its findings of fact and conclusions of law made after the trial court 

signed the original decree, the trial court concluded that it awarded the 

equalization judgment after “taking into account the value of all personal and real 

property awarded to each party and then applying the requisite reimbursement 

claims,” suggesting that the trial court did not intend the reimbursement 

paragraphs to function as separate awards. [Emphasis added.] The trial court 

incorporated this conclusion by reference into its response to the request for 
8

findings of fact and conclusions of law Moseley made after the court rendered the 

amended decree.

Fourth, at a July 2016 hearing on Moseley’s motion to reconsider the 

appointment of a receiver, the parties argued about whether the reimbursement 

paragraphs represented separate awards or were included in the equalization 

paragraph’s award. The trial judge said she had considered all offsets when 

awarding the equalization judgment.

Considering the reimbursement paragraphs in light of the rest of the 

amended decree and the record as a whole, we conclude that the reimbursement 

paragraphs are not separate awards. Rather, they are recitals that are 

subsumed within the equalization judgment’s decretal language awarding 

$45,441 to Gandee. We therefore hold that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion or impermissibly alter the amended decree by granting Gandee’s 

motion to enforce and denying Moseley’s. We overrule Moseley’s first and 

second issues.

2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by appointing a receiver.

In his third issue, Moseley argues the trial court abused its discretion by 

appointing a receiver to enforce the equalization judgment.

A trial court has broad powers to enlist the aid of a receiver to effectuate its 

orders and judgment. Young v. Young, 765 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. App.—Dallas

1988, writ denied) (citing Elliott v. Elliott, 422 S.W.2d 757, 758 (Tex. Civ. App.—
9

Fort Worth 1967, writ dism’d w.o.j.)). The appointment of a receiver is left to the 

discretion of the trial court. Id.

Moseley argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it appointed 

a receiver because he acted in good faith when he “sought and followed the 

advice of two attorneys in interpreting the terms of the Decree” when he failed to 

pay the $45,441 equalization judgment.2 Moseley cites no authority for the 

proposition that a party’s good-faith failure to comply with a divorce decree takes 

the appointment of a receiver outside the trial court’s discretion. Moseley cites 

one case—Cook v. Cameron, 733 S.W.2d 137, 141 (Tex. 1987) (op. on reh’g)—

for the idea that a party should not be punished for a good-faith interpretation of a 

decree. But we do not find that case instructive under the circumstances present 

here, as it did not involve the appointment of a receiver (it involved the legal 

interpretation of a decree’s contingent-escalation clause), and it was not decided 

under the abuse-of-discretion standard. See id. at 140–41.

Under the circumstances presented by the record before us, we hold that 

the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion by appointing a receiver to 

effectuate the decree’s equalization judgment. See Young, 765 S.W.2d at 444. 

We overrule Moseley’s third issue.

 2We note that the record before us contains no evidence that Moseley 

consulted with two attorneys or what those attorneys advised him to do. Moseley 

relies on his own unsworn supplemental motion for reconsideration of 

appointment of a receiver to support his argument.
10

Conclusion

Having overruled all of Moseley’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s orders. 

See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a).

/s/ Bonnie Sudderth

BONNIE SUDDERTH

CHIEF JUSTICE

PANEL: SUDDERTH, C.J.; GABRIEL and KERR, JJ.

DELIVERED: June 21, 2018