[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as Binder v. Cuyahoga Cty. , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5126.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2020-O HIO -5126
B INDER ET AL ., A PPELLEES , v . C UYAHOGA C OUNTY , A PPELLANT
. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as Binder v. Cuyahoga Cty. , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5126.] Jurisdiction of courts of common pleas

— Authority of R.C. 124.34

— R.C. 124.34 authorizes classified employees to appeal violations to the State Personnel Board of Review but not to the court of common pleas

— Judgment reversed
and cause remanded. (No. 2019-1232—Submitted August 4, 2020—Decided November 4, 202 0.)
A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, Nos. 106665 and 106666, 2019-Ohio-1236.

_________________ F RENCH , J. {¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal, we consider whether R.C. 124.34 a llows civil-service employees to file a civil action in common pleas court to redress an alleged reduction in pay in viol ation of the statute. Appellee s, Richard Binder, Gerald Butterfield, and other na med class representatives, file d two consolidatedS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 class-action lawsuits against t he appellant, Cuyahoga County. Appellees seek a declaratory judgment that the county reduced their compensation in violation of R.C. 124.34. They also seek back pay and lost benefits. {¶ 2} As R.C. 124.34 allows aggrieved employees to file an appeal wit h the
State Personnel Board of Review (“SPBR”) or their local civil-s ervice commission
and authorizes no alternative , we conclude that R.C. 124.34 doe s not allow a civilservice employee to file an action in common pleas court to vin dicate alleged violations of the statute by an appointing authority. We there fore reverse the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s classcertification order and remand the matter to the trial court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Cuyahoga County’s transiti on to charter government {¶ 3} In November 2009, the citizens of Cuyahoga County voted to adop t a charter form of government as au thorized under Article X, Secti on 3 of the Ohio Constitution. The county charter went into effect on January 1 , 2010. The charter created the office of the county executive and conferred legisl ative and taxing authority on the county council. T he charter also abolished ce rtain elected positions, such as county auditor, treasurer, recorder, and eng ineer, and replaced them with officials appointe d by the county executive. {¶ 4} The transition to charter govern ment also required reclassifica tion of the county’s employees. The cha rter mandated the implementatio n of a uniform classification and salary system covering employees of every co unty office, department, or agency. The Pe rsonnel Review Commission, former ly known as the Human Resource Commission, assumed responsibility for imple menting and administering the county’s civil-service system and hears all e mployee appeals previously under the jurisdiction of the SPBR. The charter pro vides that the county’s human-resources policies shall be established by ordin ance.January Term, 2020

3 {¶ 5} Before the charter and ordinan ce took effect, some county emplo yees worked 35 hours per week with unpaid lunch breaks, while other employees worked 40 hours per week, which include d a one-hour paid lunch break. In January 2012, the county council enacted an or dinance requiring all full-time employees to work 40 hours per week, including a one-hour paid lunch period. The transition did not change the employees’ annual salary. But employees who formerl y worked 35 hours per week saw their hourly pay rate reduced. The employee lawsuits {¶ 6} Beginning in 2013, numerous county employees filed four lawsuit s in Cuyahoga County common pleas court—we will refer to them as Dolezal , Corrigan , Binder , and Butterfield —challenging the trans ition to a 40-hour work week and other aspects of the county’s personnel restructuring. The four lawsuits
were consolidated before the judge assigned to Dolezal

. {¶ 7} Dolezal. In the first of these lawsuits, Dolezal v. Cuyahoga Cty. , Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV 13 801116, the plaintiffs asserted four cl aims. Relevant here, Count Two sought declarator y relief and damages for the a lleged reduction in compensation and benefits in violation of R.C. 124.34. The pla intiffs also sought class-action certification, which the trial court denied. The plaintiffs did not appeal
the denial of cla ss certification. {¶ 8} The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on C ount Two, concluding that the change to a 40-hour week resulted in a reduction in pay. The court of appeals dismissed the county’s appeal for lack of a final, appealable
order. {¶ 9} Corrigan

. The plaintiffs in Corrigan filed a lawsuit alleging that the county unlawfully reduced their c ompensation and benefits in vi olation of R.C.
124.34. Corrigan v. Cuyahoga Cty ., Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV 16 863441. The plaintiffs sought declaratory re lief and damages but did not se ek class certification. The trial court denied the county’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matterS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 jurisdiction and the county’s motion for judgment on the pleadi ngs. The trial court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to consolidate with Dolezal. {¶ 10} Binder. Richard Binder and other plaintiffs filed a class-action lawsuit alleging that the county violated R.C. 124.34 by increa sing their work week to 40 hours from 35 without increasing their compensation. Binder v. Cuyahoga Cty ., Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV 15 851760. In addition to class certif ication, the plaintiffs sought declaratory re lief and compensatory damages, including back pay and compensation for loss of ben efits. The trial court granted the county’s motion to dismiss and found that the change in lunch-break policy did not result in an increase in work-week hours or a reduction in pay. The Eighth District reversed. On remand, the trial court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to co nsolidate their lawsuit
with Dolezal. {¶ 11} Butterfield

. Gerald Butterfield and othe r plaintiffs filed a classaction lawsuit requesting a decl aratory judgment in conformity with the Dolezal decision that the change to a 40-hour work week resulted in a r eduction in pay and
lost benefits. Butterfield v. Cuyahoga Cty ., Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV 16 864446.
The trial court denied the count y’s motion to dismiss and grant ed the plaintiffs’
motion to consolidate their lawsuit with Dolezal

. Class certification in Binder and Butterfield {¶ 12} After consolidation of all four cases, the Binder and Butterfield plaintiffs filed a joint motion for class certification. The c ounty opposed class certification, arguing, among other things, that the employees did not have a private cause of action to redress allege d violations of civil-service protections. The trial court granted the motion f or class certification. {¶ 13} The county appealed the class-certification order to the Eighth District Court of Appeals. The j udges of the Eighth District r ecused themselves, and a panel from the Seventh Di strict Court of Appeals heard th e county’s appeal. The county again argued that class certification is improper be cause publicJanuary Term, 2020

5 employees do not have a private cause of action, apart from rem edies provided by
statute and the administrative process, to redr ess alleged viol ations of civil-service protections. The county also argued that the trial court lacke d subject-matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs’ declaratory-judgment actio ns improperly bypassed the special statutory procedure created in R.C. 124.34 for civil-service employees to appeal a reduction of pay or position. And the co unty argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing and fa iled to meet the requirements in Civ.R. 23 for class certification. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment and certified the following class definition:

The Court certifies the Binder and Butterfield cases as a class
action on the sole issue raised i n those cases, the request for a declaration on the alteration of the plaintiffs’ work week and whether it had any impact on their rate of pay. The class incl udes all non-salaried full-time employees of the County who were and are subject to alteration of the ir work week with the addition of the paid lunch hour each day and the change from a 35-hour work wee k
to a 40-hour work week.

2019-Ohio-1236, 134 N.E.3d 807, ¶ 155. QUESTIONS PRESENTED {¶ 14} We accepted the county’s discretionary appeal, 157 Ohio St.3d 1495, 2019-Ohio-4840, 134 N.E.3d 1209, which presents four prop ositions of law:

1. R.C. 124.34 does not provide classified civil servants with an independent cause of action in the court of common pleas. A s such, Ohio courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to certify a class
action under Civ.R. 23 when the cause of action is based upon R .C.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 124.34. Anderson v. Minter , 32 Ohio St.2d 207, 291 N.E.2d 457 (1972), applied. 2. R.C. 124.34 establishes a specialized statutory proceeding through the State Personnel Board of Review or civil service commission for classified civil service employees to challenge a claimed “reduction in pay.” Oh io courts lack jurisdiction over declaratory-judgment proceedings that attempt to bypass the specialized statutory proceeding established under R.C. 124.34. State ex rel. Albright v. Court of Common Pleas , 60 Ohio St.3d 40, 572 N.E.2d 1387 (1991), applied. 3. Class action plaintiffs who fail to exhaust available administrative appeals designated to hear their claims necessar ily lack standing to pursue those claims in judicial forums. 4. In conducting the required “rigorous analysis” under Civ.R. 23, a court may not disreg ard the proposed class definit ion and, sua sponte, certify the ultima te issue for class treatment

.

ANALYSIS No right of action under R.C. 124.34 {¶ 15} At the time of their request for class certification, the Binder and Butterfield plaintiffs asserted two claims in the common pleas court: a cla im for declaratory judgment that the county had violated R.C. 124.34 b y reducing their compensation and a claim for damages under R.C. 124.34. We con clude, however, that the plain language of R .C. 124.34 does not authorize eithe r claim for relief. {¶ 16} Plaintiffs who seek recovery in actions based on purely statuto ry violations must establish that t he statute in que stion provides for a right of action. Estate of Graves v. Circleville , 124 Ohio St.3d 339, 2010-Ohio-168, 922 N.E.2d 201, ¶ 24; see also State ex rel. Bailey v. Ohio Parole Bd. , 152 Ohio St.3d 426,January Term, 2020

7 2017-Ohio-9202, 97 N.E.3d 433, ¶ 13-14 (dismissing claim for de claratory relief and sanctions against public offi cials because criminal perjury and falsification statutes do not provide a private right of enforcement). As wi th any matter of statutory construction, we look to the express language of the statute to determine whether the General Assembly intended to authorize a civil acti on in common pleas court for alleged violations of R.C. 124.34. See generally Ayers v. Cleveland , __ Ohio St.3d __, 2020-Ohio-1047, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 17. {¶ 17} R.C. 124.34(A) says that no employee or officer employed in the
civil service “shall be redu ced in pay or position, fined, susp ended, or removed, or have the officer’s or employee’s longevity reduced or eliminate d,” except for the
reasons enumerated in the statut e, and those reasons include in competency, inefficiency, unsatisfactory pe rformance, dishonesty, neglect o f duty, violation of any policy or work rule, acts of misfeasance, malfeasance, or n onfeasance in office, or conviction of a felony while e mployed in the civil service. {¶ 18} In case of a reduction in pay or position, “the appointing auth ority shall serve the employee with a copy of the order of reduction, ” and the order “shall state the reasons for the action.” R.C. 124.34(B). Within ten days of the date on
which the order is ser ved, the employee

may file an appeal of the order in writing with the state perso nnel board of review or the [local civil service] commission. * * * If an appeal is filed, the board or commission shall forthwith notify the appointing authority and shall hear, or appoint a trial board t o hear, the appeal within thirty days from and after its filing with th e board or commission. The board, commission, or trial board may affir m, disaffirm, or modify the judgment of the appointing authority.
* * *S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 In cases of removal or reduction in pay for disciplinary reasons, either the appointing authority or the officer or empl oyee may appeal from the decision of the state personnel board of re view or the commission, and any such appeal shall be to the court of common pleas of the county in which the appointing authority is located, or to the court of common pleas of Franklin county, as provided by section 119.12 of the Revised Code.

Id

. {¶ 19} While the statute establishes an administrative scheme in which an aggrieved employee can appeal a reduction in pay to the SPBR or the applicable civil-service commission, we see no language in R.C. 124.34, or elsewhere in R.C. Chapter 124, demonstrating the Ge neral Assembly’s intent to aut horize a civil action in common pleas court for violations of the statute. Ha d the General Assembly intended to allow civil actions as an avenue of redres s, it could have said so expressly, as it has in other instances. {¶ 20} The General Assembly has, for example, created an administrativ e scheme in R.C. Chapter 4112 by which aggrieved employees can pr esent their claims for employment discrimination to the Ohio Civil Rights C ommission. See R.C. 4112.05. The legislature also added a provision expressly authorizing a civil suit in common pleas court for violations of R.C. Chapter 4112: “Whoever violates this chapter is subject to a civil action for damages, injuncti ve relief, or any other appropriate relief.” R.C. 4112.99; see also R.C. 4112.051. An employee claiming discrimination in violation of R.C. Chapter 4112 therefore has two avenues of recovery: administrative relief or a civil suit filed in common pleas court. Dworning v. Euclid , 119 Ohio St.3d 83, 2008-Ohio-3318, 892 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 30. By contrast, appellees here cannot point to any provision in R. C. Chapter 124 authorizing an independent cause of action for violations of R. C. 124.34.January Term, 2020

9 {¶ 21} Our conclusion here is also consistent with Anderson v. Minter , 32 Ohio St.2d 207, 212, 291 N.E.2d 457 (1972), in which this court held that former R.C. 143.27, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 271, 132 Ohio Laws, Part I, 163-16 4, the predecessor to R.C. 124.34, did not authorize an independent ac tion in common pleas court testing the legality of the suspension of a civil-s ervice employee. The statute provided for an appeal to SPBR of a suspension of more than five working days, but said nothing about suspensions of five days or fewer. Id . at 210. In the absence of express statutory la nguage authorizing an independen t cause of action in common pleas court, this court concluded that plaintiff’s co mplaint for declaratory relief and compensatory damages failed to state a c ause of action. Id at
212. {¶ 22} Likewise, we conclude here that R.C. 124.34 does not authorize civil-service employees to file a civil action in common pleas court for an alleged reduction in pay in violation of R.C. 124.34

. Because appellees’ complaints for declaratory relief and damages do not state a cause of action f or which relief may be granted, the trial court erre d in certifying a class based o n those claims. The common pleas court’s subject-matter jurisdiction {¶ 23} While our holding disposes of the county’s remaining arguments, we address a point of contention ra ised in the county’s first and second propositions of law: whether the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdictio n over the appellees’
lawsuits. When we have found tha t a court of common pleas lack s jurisdiction, “it is almost always because a statute explicitly removed that juri sdiction.” Ohio High
School Athletic Assn. v. Ruehlman , 157 Ohio St.3d 296, 2019-Ohio-2845, 136 N.E.3d 436, ¶ 9. Here, we do not find a ny language in R.C. Cha pter 124 divesting common pleas courts of their general jurisdiction. While the c ommon pleas court lacks the legal authority to grant the relief sought by the Binder and Butterfield plaintiffs, it nevertheless has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the cases.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 {¶ 24} The Ohio Constitution confers on the courts of common pleas “original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters and such po wers of review of proceedings of administrative officers and agencies as may be p rovided by law.” Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 4(B). With limited exce ptions, R.C. 2305.01 grants the courts of common pleas subject-matter jurisdiction o ver “all civil cases in which the sum or matter in dispute exceeds the exclusive ori ginal jurisdiction of county courts.” Because of this g eneral grant of jurisdiction, “a court of common pleas has jurisdiction over any cas e in which the matter in con troversy exceeds the jurisdictional limit unless some statute takes that jurisdictio n away.” Ruehlman at ¶ 9. {¶ 25} In Pivonka v. Corcoran , ___ Ohio St.3d __, 2020-Ohio-3476, __ N.E.3d __, we concluded that the common pleas court lacked subj ect-matter jurisdiction over a class action seeking declaratory relief and the recovery of overpayments to the Department of Medicaid because the statute that created an administrative-review process for Medicaid participants express ly provides that the administrative procedure is “the sole remedy” for challenging a n overpayment. Id. at ¶ 23, quoting R.C. 5160.37(P). See also State ex rel. Ohio Democratic Party v.
Blackwell , 111 Ohio St.3d 246, 2006-Ohio-5202, 855 N.E.2d 1188 (dismissi ng mandamus complaint for lack of jurisdiction because R.C. 3517.1 51(A) expressly provides that complaints regardin g alleged campaign finance vio lations “ shall be
filed with the Ohio elections c ommission.” (Empha sis added.) Id . at ¶ 10. {¶ 26} By contrast, R.C. 124.34 does not contain any express statutory language removing common pleas courts’ general jurisdiction. I f there is a reduction in pay, R.C. 124.34(B) pr ovides that an aggrieved civ il-service employee

“ may file an appeal of the order in writing with the state personne l board of review or the commission.” (Emphasis a dded.) Unlike the elections-co mmission statute
we reviewed in Blackwell , R.C. 124.34 does not mandate t he filing of claims with the administrative body. And in contrast to the Medicaid-overp ayment statute inJanuary Term, 2020

11 Pivonka , there is no express language stating that the administrative process in R.C.
124.34 is the sole or exclusive rem edy available to aggrieved e mployees. {¶ 27} While R.C. 124.34 does not divest common pleas courts of their general subject-matter jurisdic tion, appellees’ claims here for declaratory relief and damages ultimately fail because R.C. 124.34 does not authorize that relief. Stated another way, appellees’ complain ts do not present a jurisdictio nal defect, but rather a failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
CONCLUSION {¶ 28} We conclude that R.C. 124.34 does not authorize civil-service employees to file a civil action in common pleas court for an a lleged reduction in pay in violation of R.C. 124.34

. Because appellees’ complaints for declaratory relief and damages do not state a cause of action for which rel ief may be granted, the trial court erred in certifying a class based on those clai ms. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Eighth District, vacate the trial court’s c lass-certification order, and remand the matter to the trial court for proceedings consis tent with our
decision. Judgment reversed
and cause remanded.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and K ENNEDY , D E W INE , and C ROUSE , JJ., concur.
F ISCHER and D ONNELLY , JJ., concur in judgment only.
C ANDACE C. C ROUSE , J., of the First District Court of Appeals, sitting for
S TEWART , J.

_________________ The Roberts Law Firm and Kevin T. Roberts; and Cohen, Rosenthal & Kramer, L.L.P., Joshua R. Cohe n, and Ellen M. Krame r, for appel lees. Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and David
G. Lambert and Brian R. Gutkoski , Assistant Prosecuting Attorne ys, for appellant.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

12 Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., and Brad E. Bennett, urging reversal for amici curiae County Commissioners Asso ciation of Ohio, Ohio Municipal League, Ohio Public Employer Labor Relations Association, and Ohio Job and F amily Services
Directors’ Association.

_________________