alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 198 (Thursday, October 14, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 63179]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-25885]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION


Agency Information Collection Activities: Existing Collection; 
Emergency Extension

AGENCY: Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

ACTION: Notice of Information Collection--Emergency Extension Without 
Change: Local Union Report (EEO-3).

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) announces that 
it submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) a request for 
a 90-day emergency extension of the Local Union Report (EEO-3), to be 
effective after the current October 31, 2010 expiration date.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ronald Edwards, Director, Program 
Research and Surveys Division, 131 M Street, NE., Room 4SW30F, 
Washington, DC 20507; (202) 663-4958 (voice) or (202) 663-7063 (TTY).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The EEOC has collected information from 
local unions on the EEO-3 form since 1966 (biennially since 1985).

Overview of Information Collection

    Collection Title: Local Union Report (EEO-3).
    OMB Number: 3046-0006.
    Frequency of Report: Biennial.
    Type of Respondent: Referral local unions with 100 or more members.
    Description of Affected Public: Referral local unions and 
independent or unaffiliated referral unions and similar labor 
organizations.
    Responses: 1,399.
    Reporting Hours: 4,500 (including recordkeeping).
    Cost to Respondents: $85,000.
    Federal Cost: $60,000.
    Number of Forms: 1.
    Form Number: EEOC Form 274.
    Abstract: Section 709(c) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-8(c), requires labor organizations to 
make and keep records relevant to a determination of whether unlawful 
employment practices have been or are being committed and to produce 
reports from the data. The EEOC issued regulations requiring referral 
local unions with 100 or more members to submit EEO-3 reports. The 
individual reports are confidential. The EEOC uses EEO-3 data to 
investigate charges of discrimination and for research.
    Burden Statement: The estimated number of respondents included in 
the biennial EEO-3 survey is 1,399 referral unions. The form is 
estimated to impose 4,500 burden hours biennially. In order to help 
reduce survey burden, respondents are encouraged to report data 
electronically whenever possible.

    Dated: September 23, 2010.

    For the Commission.
Jacqueline A. Berrien,
Chair.
[FR Doc. 2010-25885 Filed 10-13-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6570-01-P
1 The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 06-1407

___________ United States of America, *
* Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of Minnesota. William Edward Miller, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: March 12, 2007 Filed: May 7, 2007

___________ Before COLLOTON, BEAM, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM.

William Miller appeals his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon. He argues that the district court 1 erred in concluding that he was an armed career criminal, s ubject to a statutory minimum sentence of fifteen years’ imprisonment, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), and by enhancing his advisory guideline range based on his possession of a firearm in connection with another felony, USSG § 2K2.1(b)(5 ) (Nov. 2005). We affirm.-2- Miller pled guilty to unlawful posse ssion of the handgun as a previouslyconvicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He was charged after police found a semi-automatic handgun in a stolen va n that Miller was driving at the time of a traffic accident.

Prior to the instant offense, Miller ha d sustained three prior felony convictions for theft of a motor vehicle, two for attempted theft of a vehicle, and two for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), a statutory minimum se ntence of fifteen years’ imprisonment applies if at least three of Miller’s prio r convictions are “violent felonies” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). See United States v. Wilson, 406 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir.), cert. denied , 126 S. Ct. 292 (2005). Under our pr ecedent, Miller’s three convictions for auto theft qualify as violent felonies. Id. ; United States v. Barbour , 395 F.3d 826, 827 (8th Cir.), cert. denied , 126 S. Ct. 133 (2005); United States v. Sun Bear , 307 F.3d 747, 753 (8th Cir. 2002). These decisions are not undermined by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Leocal v. Ashcroft , 543 U.S. 1 (2004), which involved a materially different statutory provision, see United States v. McCall , 439 F.3d 967, 971 (8th Cir. 2006) (en banc); Barbour, 295 F.3d at 828, and our precedent, of course, is binding on this panel. The district court thus properly cl assified Miller as an armed career criminal and correctly applied the mandatory minimum term of 180 months’ imprisonment.

Because Miller was sentenced to the statutory minimum term of imprisonment, a favorable ruling on the question whether he possessed a firear m in connection with another felony could not reduce his sentence, so we need not consider the issue. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. MANUEL MCCASKILL.

December 8, 1987.

Petition for certification denied.
Motion Denied; Order filed May 19, 2016.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-15-00658-CR

____________

LAURA LEA KOLB, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 405th District Court

Galveston County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 14CR3253

ORDER

Appellant is represented by appointed counsel, Mark W. Stevens. Appellant’s 

brief was originally due February 15, 2016. We have granted a total of 90 days’ 

extension to file appellant’s brief until May 11, 2016. When we granted the last 

extension, we noted that no further extensions would be granted absent exceptional 

circumstances. No brief was filed. On May 12, 2016, counsel filed a further request 
for extension of time to file appellant’s brief. Counsel did not allege any exceptional 

circumstances in the request. 

We deny the request for extension and issue the following order.

We order Mark W. Stevens to file a brief with the clerk of this court on or 

before June 10, 2016. If counsel does not timely file appellant’s brief as ordered, the 

court will issue an order abating the appeal and directing the trial court to conduct a 

hearing to determine the reason for the failure to file the brief and the consideration 

of sanctions, appointment of new counsel, or other appropriate relief.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices McCally and Brown.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

UNITED STATES MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

THOMAS DAY, )

)

)Docket No.

)

Appellant )SF-1221-12-0528-W-1

)

v. )

) 

)

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, )

)

)

)

Agency )

)

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF

Per relevant Board regulation at 5 CFR section 1201.34(e) and Federal Register notice of

February 8, 2013, Vol. 8, no. 27, page 9431, I respectfully submit an amicus curiae brief in

support of retroactive application of Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA).

Argument:

For 35 years now, the Board has failed to conduct special studies of the mandated study areas -

specifically as to: 1) whether federal employees can effectively bring forward concerns,

particularly classified ones to the U.S. Office of Special Counsel, and 2) whether federal

employees are adequately protected from reprisal other types of prohibited personnel practices

(PPPs), particularly by the Office of Special Counsel interpreting and applying its

nondiscretionary statutory duties to “protect” employees from PPP and agency heads in

“preventing PPPs.” As a result, the President is unable to comply with his duty to ‘take any

action....necessary” to ensure the federal civil service “embodies” the merit system principles.1

America is much diminished and more threatened as a result of the Board’s failure to comply

1See www.broken-covenant.orgfor extensive detail and legal cites.

1
with this essential statutory duty for 35 years. Thousands of loyal, patriotic federal employees as

Mr. Day have suffered much for doing their duty to protect the health, safety, welfare and

security of Americans. All these direct victims of the “broken covenant” of the Civil Service

Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA) merit full-retroactive relief, because absent the Board’s failure to

comply with its lawful duty to determine whether OSC was effectively complying with its

respective nondiscretionary statutory duties, they would not have suffered.

I hope our Country finds the moral courage to establish a “truth and reconciliation commission”

after the “broken covenant” of the CSRA is exposed and ended, but given the Board’s

responsibility for the suffering of Mr. Day, I hope it extends retroactivity to the WPEA to his

case and similar cases.

I have attached a legal analysis of an independent attorney about the validity of “broken

covenant” contentions and wish it be included with this amicus brief.

Respectfully,

_____________/S/______________

Joseph Carson, PE

2

B6
B6
585 A.2d 385

#### JOHN J. TURI v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND CHARLES SERRAINO.

October 2, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
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I 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 7393 

To require the Secretary of Health and Human Services to promulgate 

regulations with respect to quality control and oversight of out-of-State 

care under the Medicaid program. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 21, 2018 

Mr. FASO introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To require the Secretary of Health and Human Services 

to promulgate regulations with respect to quality control 

and oversight of out-of-State care under the Medicaid 

program. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Medicaid Quality Care 

5 Act’’. 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 7393 IH

1 SEC. 2. REGULATIONS WITH RESPECT TO QUALITY CON2 TROL AND OVERSIGHT OF OUT-OF-STATE 

3 CARE UNDER MEDICAID PROGRAM. 

4 Not later than one year after the date of enactment 

5 of this Act, the Secretary of Health and Human Services 

6 shall promulgate regulations requiring each State with a 

7 State plan approved under title XIX of the Social Security 

8 Act (42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq.) to develop and implement 

9 a written plan providing for quality control and oversight 

10 by the State of medical assistance provided by out-of-State 

11 providers to individuals enrolled under the State plan (or 

12 a waiver of such plan). 

Æ 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-7770

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

RANDALL WAYNE GILBERT,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Winston-Salem. Frank W. Bullock, Jr.,

Chief District Judge. (CR-91-53-WS, CA-96-385-6)

Submitted: February 17, 1998 Decided: March 12, 1998

Before WIDENER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Randall Wayne Gilbert, Appellant Pro Se. Benjamin H. White, Jr.,

Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying

his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997).

We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion

accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find no

reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court.

United States v. Gilbert, Nos. CR-91-53-WS; CA-96-385-6 (M.D.N.C.

Sept. 16, 1996). We deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
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#### IN THE MATTER OF THE TENURE HEARING OF ROBERT E. DOYLE, SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PEMBERTON, BURLINGTON COUNTY.

October 20, 1987.

Petition for certification denied.
NO. 07-09-0319-CR 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

AT AMARILLO 

PANEL C 

NOVEMBER 9, 2010 

______________________________ 

DAVID TULIO RODRIGUEZ, APPELLANT 

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

_____________________________ 

FROM THE 84TH DISTRICT COURT OF HUTCHINSON COUNTY; 

NO. 10,257; HONORABLE WILLIAM D. SMITH, JUDGE 

___________________________ 

Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ. 

CONCURRING OPINION 

I agree with the result reached by the majority, and I applaud the decision to 

address Appellant's third issue as presented; however, I write separately to express my 

opinion that Appellant's general premise about that issue is misstated. 

 
2 

By his third issue Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it 

failed to "follow the strictures of Article 36.01 (a)(1), Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, 

by not reading the State's enhancement paragraphs to the jury and subsequently 

entering the Appellant's plea to the same." While I agree that the trial court committed 

error during the punishment phase of Appellant's trial, it wasn't because the 

enhancement paragraphs weren't read and a plea wasn't entered. 

On January 29, 2009, a Hutchinson County Grand Jury returned an indictment 

charging Appellant with the first degree felony offense of aggravated assault on a public 

servant1

 (Count One) and the state jail felony offense of burglary of a building2 (Count 

Two). While the indictment itself did not contain any enhancement allegations, on 

August 17, 2009, the State filed notice of its intent to seek enhancement of the 

punishment range for each count.3 Notwithstanding the express intent to request the 

court to instruct the jury on the enhanced range of punishment, the State never insisted 

that the enhancements be read or that Appellant enter a plea thereto. By failing to do 

so, the State waived those enhancements. Because those enhancements were waived, 

the trial court did not commit error by failing to read the enhancements or have the 

Appellant enter a plea. While the trial court may have erred in instructing the jury as to 

the range of punishment, an issue not presented to this Court, it did not err in the 

 

1

See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(a)(2), § 22.02(a)(2), § 22.02(b)(2)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2010). 

2

See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a)(1), § 30.02(c)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2010). 

3

See Brooks v. State, 957 S.W.2d 30 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) (holding that enhancement allegations do not 

need to be contained within the body of the primary charging document). 
3 

manner presented by Appellant's third issue. Accordingly, I concur with the majority in 

finding no reversible error raised. 

Patrick A. Pirtle 

 Justice 

Do not publish.
#### JOSEPH IELLIMO v. TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPELINE CORPORATION.

December 8, 1987.

Petition for certification denied.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Robert L. WILLIAMS.

No. 2010-KO-2837.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 3, 2011.

In re Williams, Robert L.; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 476-208; to the *1006Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-KA-0964.

Denied.
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