Filed 8/24/21 C.H. Reynolds Electric v. Powers CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

C.H. REYNOLDS ELECTRIC, INC.,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

GAVIN JOHN POWERS,

Defendant and Respondent.

 H046554

 (Santa Clara County

 Super. Ct. No. 17CH007422)

Appellant C.H. Reynolds Electric, Inc. (CHRE) initiated contempt proceedings 

against its former employee, respondent Gavin John Powers,

1

after he violated a 

workplace violence restraining order. On appeal, CHRE challenges the trial court’s order

denying CHRE recovery of security costs from Powers and asserts they are recoverable 

under the governing statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 1218, subdivision (a).

2 For 

the reasons we explain below, we affirm the order.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2017, CHRE obtained a workplace violence restraining order against Powers,

who had worked as a foreman for CHRE on a construction project. After Powers later 

violated the 2017 restraining order, CHRE initiated contempt proceedings. In September 

1 Powers has not participated in this appeal. 

2 Unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 
2

2017, the trial court found Powers in contempt based on numerous violations of the 

restraining order and stayed imposition of the sentence which, by agreement of the 

parties, was six days in the county jail and a $1,000 fine. 

In July 2018, the trial court again held Powers in contempt, finding he had 

willfully sent texts and e-mails to parties protected by the restraining order. The trial 

court lifted the stay on the 2017 sentence and imposed a modified jail term of five days 

(instead of six) and a $1,000 fine. The trial court also imposed a 15-day jail term and a 

fine of $4,000 for the new contempt violations. The trial court allowed CHRE to seek 

attorney fees and costs under section 1218, subdivision (a) (hereafter section 1218(a)) for 

both contempt proceedings.

CHRE filed a motion and supporting papers under section 1218(a) seeking, among 

other fees and costs, approximately $30,000 for private security guard expenses

(hereafter security costs). CHRE argued that it had to retain armed security to protect its 

employees because local law enforcement and the trial court failed to act quickly and 

Powers’s conduct was increasingly unstable. In a declaration, CHRE’s attorney stated 

that “CHRE was forced to incur private security guard and emergency intercom expenses 

in the amount of $29,935.00 because local law enforcement and the Court did not redress 

the contemptuous activity in a speedy manner and it had a duty to provide its employees 

with a safe and secure workplace.” That declaration also attached, among other 

documents, supporting invoices and a 2002 federal OSHA fact sheet regarding workplace 

violence that detailed additional protections an employer could take to secure the 

workplace, including hiring security guards. The motion contended, based on certain 

legislative history of section 1218, the Legislature intended for “an employer prosecuting 

a contempt action to be ‘made whole.’ ”

On November 16, 2018, following a hearing, the trial court issued the written 

order that is the subject of this appeal. The trial court ordered Powers to pay CHRE 

approximately $4,000 in various court costs and approximately $83,000 in attorney fees. 
3

However, the trial court rejected CHRE’s request for reimbursement of security costs. 

The trial court stated that, although the claimed costs were “reasonable” in light of 

Powers’s conduct, the costs were “not ‘connected’ sufficiently with the contempt 

proceeding to fall within section 1218(a).” Furthermore, the trial court found that the 

“snippet of somewhat-ambiguous legislative history” suggesting that employers should 

be made whole could not overcome the plain language of section 1218(a) requiring a 

connection to the contempt proceeding. The court therefore declined to order Powers to 

reimburse CHRE for the security costs. 

CHRE filed a notice of appeal of the November 16, 2018 order, asserting it was 

appealing from “[a]n order after judgment under Code of Civil Procedure, § 904.1(a)(2).” 

II. DISCUSSION

CHRE challenges the trial court’s denial of its request for security costs, which it

asserts are recoverable under section 1218(a). CHRE argues we should apply de novo 

review to the question whether, on these facts, its security costs were sufficiently 

connected to the contempt proceedings to be recoverable. CHRE maintains the security

costs were logically related to the contempt proceedings as the company had to incur 

them due to delays by law enforcement and courts in responding to Powers’s violations 

of the restraining order.

A. Appealability

In its statement of appealability (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(B)), 

CHRE contends section 904.1, subdivision (a)(1), authorizes its appeal from the partial 

denial of its motion for attorney fees and costs. CHRE acknowledges that a “ ‘judgment 

of contempt’ is nonappealable” (see § 1222). However, it asserts that the November 16, 

2018 order issued in the contempt proceedings is appealable as a final judgment, relying 

primarily on Los Angeles Times v. Alameda Corridor Transportation Authority (2001) 88 

Cal.App.4th 1381, 1388 (LA Times). Alternatively, CHRE requests that we treat its 

appeal as a writ proceeding. 
4

A reviewing court has jurisdiction over a direct appeal only when there is (1) an 

appealable order or (2) an appealable judgment. (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com.

(2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 696 (Griset).) Because the existence of an appealable judgment 

or order “is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal” (Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 

Cal.4th 121, 126), a reviewing court must resolve any doubts regarding finality of a 

judgment or appealability of an order before turning to the merits of the appeal. (Ibid.) 

Whether a trial court’s order is appealable is determined by statute. (Griset, supra, 

25 Cal.4th at p. 696.) Section 904.1 provides the main statutory authorization for civil 

appeals. (Enrique M. v. Angelina V. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1377.) It states in 

relevant part that an appeal may be taken from a final judgment (§ 904.1 subd. (a)(1)).3

Based on the circumstances here, we conclude that the order at issue in this case 

fits under the rubric of an appealable final judgment. In LA Times, the appellate court 

concluded it had jurisdiction under section 904.1, subdivision (a)(1), over an order 

denying attorney fees incurred in a California Public Records Act lawsuit, even though 

the underlying judgment was not itself appealable. (LA Times, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 1384, 1388–1389.) The Court of Appeal in LA Times reasoned that the attorney fees 

order was appealable because, “[n]othing remains for future consideration, and no other 

opportunity exists for appellate review” and it “is therefore ‘properly viewed as a final 

judgment and hence appealable as such’ under section 904.1, subdivision (a)(1).” (Id. at 

p. 1389; see also Estate of Miramontes-Najera (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 750, 755.) We 

reach the same conclusion here. 

With respect to the trial court’s order denying CHRE the security costs, nothing 

remains to be adjudicated, and there exists no other avenue for appellate review. While a 

3 As CHRE points out in its briefing, CHRE’s notice of appeal relied on another 

listed ground in section 904.1—section 904.1, subd. (a)(2)—that applies to an order made 

after an appealable judgment. CHRE asserts that its reliance on that ground was in error 

because contempt judgments are nonappealable. We agree and therefore do not address 

this ground further. 
5

judgment or order of contempt is not directly appealable (see § 1222; Bermudez v. 

Municipal Court (1992) 1 Cal.4th 855, 861, fn. 5), we are not faced with an order of 

contempt, but rather an order setting costs and attorney fees. We further note that the 

reasons for prompt writ review (rather than a direct appeal) of a judgment or order of 

contempt are not at issue here. (Cf. In re M.R. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 49, 65 [“A 

challenge to a judgment of contempt requires writ review because it is vital that an order 

of incarceration be reviewed promptly.”].) We are therefore satisfied that the order under 

these circumstances is an appealable final judgment, and we have jurisdiction to review 

it. 

B. Analysis

Turning to the merits of the appeal, we do not agree with CHRE that the trial court 

committed reversible error in declining to award the claimed security costs under section

1218(a). That statute provides: “[A] person who is subject to a court order as a party to 

the action . . . who is adjudged guilty of contempt for violating that court order may be 

ordered to pay to the party initiating the contempt proceeding the reasonable attorney’s 

fees and costs incurred by this party in connection with the contempt proceeding.” 

CHRE asserts we should review the trial court’s conclusion de novo. Although we 

have not located a published decision articulating the standard of review for a trial court’s 

order under section 1218(a), we reject CHRE’s argument that its challenge presents a 

pure question of law. Instead, we conclude we should review the order for abuse of 

discretion. Notably, the statute uses the word “may” to describe the trial court’s authority 

to order costs and therefore invests discretion in the court. (See Chaaban v. Wet Seal, 

Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 49, 52 [holding, in context of order denying motion to tax 

costs and allowing costs under section 1033.5, “[t]o the extent the statute grants the court 

discretion in allowing or denying costs or in determining amounts, we reverse only if 

there has been a ‘ “clear abuse of discretion” and a “miscarriage of justice” ’ ”].) 
6

We analogize our review of a costs order under section 1218(a) to an award for 

attorney fees under that statute. “ ‘ “ ‘ “An order granting or denying an award of 

attorney fees is generally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of review; 

however, the ‘determination of whether the criteria for an award of attorney fees and 

costs have been met is a question of law.’ . . . ” ’ ” . . . An issue of law concerning 

entitlement to attorney fees is reviewed de novo.’ ” (Rickley v. Goodfriend (2012) 207 

Cal.App.4th 1528, 1533.) With respect to what constitutes an abuse of discretion, 

“ ‘[d]iscretion is abused whenever, in its exercise, the court exceeds the bounds of reason, 

all of the circumstances before it being considered. The burden is on the party 

complaining to establish an abuse of discretion, and unless a clear case of abuse is shown 

and unless there has been a miscarriage of justice a reviewing court will not substitute its 

opinion and thereby divest the trial court of its discretionary power.’ ” (Denham v. 

Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566.) 

With these principles in mind and having carefully reviewed the record, we 

conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion. There is no indication that the trial 

court misunderstood the relevant law or believed it generally lacked authority to grant

security costs. We disagree with CHRE’s contention that the trial court “improperly 

interpreted the statutory phrase ‘in connection with contempt proceedings.’ ” Under the 

permissive terms of section 1218(a), the trial court was not required to order Powers to 

pay any costs incurred by CHRE, regardless whether security costs are theoretically

recoverable under the statute. Rather, “the Legislature intended to authorize a trial court 

to, in its discretion, require a contemner to pay the complainant’s reasonable attorney fees 

and costs incurred in connection with the contempt proceeding.” (Goold v. Superior 

Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1, 10.) 

CHRE argues it had to incur these security costs because local law enforcement 

failed to “properly” enforce the restraining order and Powers posed a “credible threat.” 

But whether Powers should be ordered to pay them is a question the statute commits to 
7

the discretion of the trial court. Although another trial court may well have reached a 

different decision, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that the 

security costs were too attenuated from the contempt proceedings in this case to justify 

ordering Powers to pay for them. While we are sympathetic to the security concerns 

faced by CHRE, we cannot conclude the trial court erred. We therefore affirm its order. 

III. DISPOSITION

The appeal from the November 16, 2018 order is affirmed. 
______________________________________

Danner, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________

Greenwood, P.J.

____________________________________

Grover, J.

H046554

C.H. Reynolds Electric, Inc. v. Powers