alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-50413

Summary Calendar

In The Matter Of: DELORIS SIMMONS,

Debtor.

--------------------

DELORIS SIMMONS,

Appellant,

VERSUS

PHYLLIS BRACHER,

Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

(EP-99-CV-12-F)

November 24, 1999

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

This is an appeal of the bankruptcy court’s refusal, affirmed

by the district court, to confirm a Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan.

The bankruptcy plan gave a debt co-signed by the debtor’s exhusband priority over all other unsecured claims, so that the cosigned debt would have to be paid in full before any other claims

could be paid. The relevant statutory provision allows a plan to

"designate a class or classes of unsecured claims, as provided in

§ 1122 of this Title, but may not discriminate unfairly against any
2

class so designated; however, such a plan may treat plans for a

consumer debt of the debtor if an individual is liable on such

consumer debt with the debtor differently than other unsecured

claims." 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1). The bankruptcy court concluded

that the phrase prohibiting the plan from "discriminating unfairly

against any class" applied to the class where "an individual is

liable on such consumer debt with the debtor." Since the debtor

had failed to articulate the reasons for the special classification

proposed and had failed to introduce information as to the prepetition status or terms of the debts co-signed by her ex-husband

and had failed to establish the financial conditions of the exhusband, the classification in question did unfairly discriminate

against the other classes. The debtor appealed to the district

court who affirmed the bankruptcy court’s conclusion. 

We have carefully reviewed the briefs, the record excerpts and

relevant portions of the record itself. For the reasons stated by

the district court in its Order affirming the bankruptcy court’s

decision filed under date of March 26, 1999, we AFFIRM the Final

Judgment of the district court entered under date of March 26,

1999, which affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision. See also In

the Matter of Oscar Chacon, Jr. and Patricia Chacon, Debtors, No.

99-50163 (5th Cir. Sept. 24, 1999 (unpublished)).

AFFIRMED.
MANDATE

Court of Appeals 

First District of Texas 

NO. 01-14-00094-CV

BYRON ROBINSON, Appellant

V.

ELIZABETH SHELTON, Appellee

Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 1 of Harris County. (Tr. Ct. No. 

1039938).

TO THE COUNTY CIVIL COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF HARRIS COUNTY, 

GREETINGS:

Before this Court, on the 30th day of April 2015, the case upon appeal to revise or 

to reverse your judgment was determined. This Court made its order in these words:

This case is an appeal from the final judgment signed 

by the trial court on January 17, 2014. After submitting the 

case on the appellate record and the arguments properly 

raised by the parties, the Court holds that the trial court’s 

judgment contains no reversible error. Accordingly, the 

Court affirms the trial court’s judgment.

The Court orders that the appellant, Byron Robinson, 

pay all appellate costs.

The Court orders that this decision be certified below 

for observance.
Judgment rendered April 30, 2015.

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Bland, and Massengale. 

Opinion delivered by Justice Bland.

WHEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of our said Court 

in this behalf and in all things to have it duly recognized, obeyed, and executed.

July 13, 2015

Date CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE

 CLERK OF THE COURT
##### 



Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
(SUBSECTIONS (a) AND (b) OF SECTION 1350, CHAPTER 63 OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES
CODE)

Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and
(b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code), the
undersigned officer of Spatializer Audio Laboratories, Inc. (the Company)
hereby certifies with respect to the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of the
Company for the quarter ended June 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the 10-Q Report) that to his knowledge:

|   |  |                                                                                                                                                      | 
|-- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | 
|1) |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and                           
|   |  |                                                                                                                                                     
|2) |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date: August 12, 2003

/s/ Henry R. Mandell

Henry R. Mandell
Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 197 (Wednesday, October 13, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 62819]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-25631]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION


Update to Notice of Financial Institutions for Which the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Has Been Appointed Either Receiver, 
Liquidator, or Manager

AGENCY: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

ACTION: Update Listing of Financial Institutions in Liquidation.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (Corporation) has been appointed the sole receiver for the 
following financial institutions effective as of the Date Closed as 
indicated in the listing. This list (as updated from time to time in 
the Federal Register) may be relied upon as ``of record'' notice that 
the Corporation has been appointed receiver for purposes of the 
statement of policy published in the July 2, 1992 issue of the Federal 
Register (57 FR 29491). For further information concerning the 
identification of any institutions which have been placed in 
liquidation, please visit the Corporation Web site at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html or contact the 
Manager of Receivership Oversight in the appropriate service center.

    Dated: October 1, 2010.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Pamela Johnson,
Regulatory Editing Specialist.

                                           Institutions in Liquidation
                                             [In alphabetical order]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          FDIC Ref. No.                 Bank name               City                State           Date closed
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
10295............................  Shoreline Bank.....  Shoreline..........  WA.................       10/1/2010
10296............................  Wakulla Bank.......  Crawfordville......  FL.................       10/1/2010
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[FR Doc. 2010-25631 Filed 10-12-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
EX-31Rule 13a-14(d)/15d-14(d) Certifications.

 

 

I,Helaine M. Kaplan, certify that:

 

1. Ihave reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required tobe filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of theCOMM 2014-CCRE19 Mortgage Trust (the "Exchange Act periodicreports");

 

2.Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, donot contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a materialfact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances underwhich such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;

 

3.Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other informationrequired to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this reportis included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

 

4.Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statements required in thisreport under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in theExchange Act periodic reports, the servicers have fulfilled their obligationsunder the servicing agreements in all material respects; and

 

5. Allof the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria forasset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment ofcompliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to beincluded in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB andExchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to thisreport, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances ofnoncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report onForm 10-K.

 

Ingiving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on informationprovided to me by the following unaffiliated parties:

 

MidlandLoan Services, a Division of PNC Bank, National Association, as MasterServicer, Midland Loan Services, a Division of PNC Bank, National Association,as Special Servicer, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as Trustee andCertificate Administrator, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, asCustodian, Park Bridge Lender Services LLC, as Operating Advisor, BerkeleyPoint Capital LLC d/b/a Newmark Knight Frank, as Primary Servicer,Computershare Trust Company, National Association, as Servicing FunctionParticipant for the Certificate Administrator, and Computershare Trust Company,National Association, as Servicing Function Participant for the Custodian.

 

 

 

Dated: March 14, 2024

 

 

/s/Helaine M. Kaplan

HelaineM. Kaplan

President

(seniorofficer in charge of securitization of the depositor)
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. SEBASTIAN MONTUORI.

November 2, 1987.

Petition for certification denied.
### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-13-00263- CR
Isayah Alk enyon Griffi n, App ellant

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F B ELL COUNTY , 426 TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. 258 ,681 , H ONO RAB LE F ANCY H. JEZEK, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant I say ah Alkeny on Griff in seeks to appea l the district court’s order deny ing relief on a writ of habea s corpus enter ed on Aug ust 23, 2012. See Tex. Const. art. V, § 8; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.05. The deadline for perf ecting the appeal was Septe mber 24, 2012. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a) (1) (providing that notice of appea l must be filed within thirty day s afte r day trial court e nters appe alable or der)
. Griff in’s notice of a

ppeal wa s filed on April 15, 2013. 1 On April 19, 2013, Griff

in filed a motion reque sting a n extension of time for filing notice of a

ppeal in this Court. The rules of appellate proce dure allow an a ppellate c ourt to ext end

Where a timely motion for new trial has been filed, a defe ndant’s notice of appea l must be 1 filed within ninety day s afte r the sentenc e is imposed or suspended in open court. See Tex. R. App. P. 2 6
. 2 ( a ) ( 2 )
. A c c o r d in g to G r if f in , h e f il e d a mo ti o n f

o r r e h e a r in g o n N o v e mb e r 1 4 , 2 0 1 2
. H o w e v e r , beca use Griffin is appea ling an order deny ing relief on a writ of habeas corpus, not a judg ment of conviction, the motion is ineffe ctive for purposes of extending appellate deadlines under rule 26.2. Fur thermore , even if the motion wer e eff ective to extend Griff

in’s appellate deadlines, his deadline to file his notice of a

ppeal would have bee n November 21, 2012.the time to file the notice of appea l if, within fifteen da y s after the dea dline for f

iling the notice of ap p eal, the appellant (1) files the notice of appea l in the trial court and (2) files a motion for extension of time in the appellate court. Tex. R. App. P. 26.3. Her e, both the notice of appea l a nd the m otion for ex tension of t ime wer e fi l ed more than fifteen day s afte r t he deadline for filing the notice of appea l and there fore wer e untimely
. Consequently , we are without authority to extend the time to file the notice of a ppeal. The motion for extension of tim e is denied. Griff in failed to timely file a notice of appea l in compliance with rule 26 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedur e. Under these circ umstances, we lack jurisdiction to dispose of this appea l in any manner other than by dismiss ing it for want of jurisdiction. See Castil lo v. State , 369 S.W .3d 196, 198 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

__________________________________________ Scott K. Field, Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Goodwin and F ield Dismissed for Want of J urisdiction Filed: June 6, 2013 Do Not Publish

2
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. PASQUALE D’ABUNDO.

October 20, 1987.

Petition for certification denied.
Order entered July 23, 2018

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05 - 18 - 00576 - CV SNP SCHNEIDER - NEUREI THER & PARTNER AG, Appellant V. SAMUEL WOOD AND JAME S D. SPIELMAN, App ellee s On Appeal from the 192nd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. Dc - 17 - 14118



### O RDER Before the Court is appellees’ July 19, 2018 unopposed motion for extension of time to file a brief. We GRANT the motion and extend the time to July 27, 2018

. /s/ ADA BROWN JUSTICE
585 A.2d 362

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. RICHARD POORMAN.

September 4, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
##### 



Exhibit 32.1 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Quarterly Report of Uroplasty, Inc. (the Company) on
Form 10-QSB for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Daniel
G. Holman, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company. /s/ DANIEL G. HOLMAN Daniel G. Holman
Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer Dated: November 12, 2004 Page 25




---



##### 



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Quarterly Report of Uroplasty, Inc. (the Company) on
Form 10-QSB for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Arie
J. Koole, Controller and Principal Accounting Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company. /s/ ARIE J. KOOLE Arie J. Koole
Controller (Principal Accounting Officer) Dated: November 12, 2004 Page 26
#### State of Indiana *v.*Palmwic Indiana Realty, Inc., Mobil Oil Corporation and Robert Stockdale.

[No. 2-672A22.

Filed June 26, 1973.]

*Theodore L. Sendak,*Attorney General, and *Wesley T. Wilson,*Deputy Attorney General, for appellant.

*William B. LeMond, Kammins, LeMond, Carson & Stewart,*of Indianapolis, *Stephen B. Caplin, Caplin & Levinson,*of Indianapolis for appellees.

Per Curiam

The facts and the trial court judgment and the issues on appeal in the case at bar are, in every significant respect, substantially identical to those recited in the consolidated opinion handed down May 9, 1973, by the Supreme Court of Indiana in *State*v. *Everett Holder, et al.,*and *State*v. *Rentchler, et al.,*260 Ind. 336, 295 N.E.2d 799, 36 Ind. Dec. 331. On authority of that opinion we order the trial court to vacate that part of its final judgment which required the State to pay appellees’ attorney fees, appraisers’ fees, and “other expenses.”

Concurring Opinion

Sullivan, J.

I deem the dissenting opinion in *State*v. *Holder*and *State*v. *Rentchler*(1973), 260 Ind. 336, 295 N.E.2d 799 to be extremely persuasive insofar as it construes Trial Rule 41 (A) (2) to constitute authorization for the trial court *in its discretion*to assess attorney fees and expenses of trial preparation against the State as a term or condition of dismissal of the State’s exceptions to the appraisers’ report in an eminent domain action. We are, however, bound by the holding of the majority in *Holder*and *Rentchler, supra.*It is for this reason that I concur.

Note. — Reported at 297 N.E.2d 479.
FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

JULY 1, 2005

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 04-14938

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 03-02269-CV-T-27TGW

JEFFERY CHARLES COOK, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

versus 

RANDY BRYANT, Warden, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

_________________________

 (July 1, 2005)

Before BARKETT, HULL and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Jeffery Charles Cook, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the

district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We granted a

certificate of appealability (“COA”) on the following issues:
 As in Varela, after we issued a COA, the Supreme Court further explained in Booker 1

that the holding in Blakely applies to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See Varela, 400 F.3d at

865 n.1. Thus, to the extent Cook’s appeal turns on the application of Blakely, it also turns on

the application of Booker. 

2

(1) Are either Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct.

2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), or United States v. Booker, 543

U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), retroactive to

cases on collateral review pursuant to Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.

288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989)?

(2) If so, is the appellant able to challenge his sentences on

collateral review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C)?

On appeal, Cook argues that justice requires retroactive application to all

who are similarly situated. He asserts that he did not stipulate to any of the

relevant facts used to enhance his sentence. Since granting the COA we have held

in United States v. Varela, 400 F.3d 864, 868 (11th Cir. 2005) and United States v.

Swindall, 107 F.3d 831, 834 n.4 (11th Cir. 1997) that Booker is not retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review. Thus, the district court did not err in

denying Cook’s § 2254 petition. See Varela, 400 F.3d at 868; Swindall, 107 F.3d

at 834 n.4. Because the first question is answered negatively, we need not address 1

the second question. 

AFFIRMED.
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. TERRELL FARMER.

October 13, 1987.

Petition for certification denied.
#### TITAN GROUP INCORPORATED v. CORINNO CIVETTA CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION OF NEW JERSEY.

November 2, 1987.

Petition for certification denied.
#### Francesco FOTI, a/k/a Frank Foti, Petitioner, v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.

No. 482, Docket 27345.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued May 14, 1964.

Decided May 26, 1964.

James J. Cally, of Cally & Cally, New York City, for petitioner.

Roy Babitt, Sp. Asst. U. S. Atty. (Robert M. Morgenthau, U. S. Atty., on the brief), for respondent.

Before KAUFMAN, HAYS and MARSHALL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The petitioner, who concedes that he is deportable, applied to the Attorney General for suspension of deportation on the ground of hardship. He seeks review here of the order of the Attorney General denying his application.

When this case was originally before this court, see Foti v. I. N. S., 308 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. granted, 371 U.S. 947, 83 S.Ct. 503, 9 L.Ed.2d 496 (1963); see also Foti v. I. N. S., 375 U.S. 217, 84 S.Ct. 306, 11 L.Ed.2d 281 (1963), the issue was whether or not the Attorney General had abused his discretion in refusing to grant the application for suspension of deportation. Since that time Congress has amended the applicable statute, 8 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1959-1962) § 1254, to provide that discretionary suspension of deportation is unavailable to aliens who, like the petitioner, entered the United States as crewmen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(f) (1).

There can be no doubt that the new provision of the statute is applicable to the petitioner and that he is now ineligible for suspension of deportation. See Fassilis v. Esperdy, 301 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1962).

Remand of this case to the Attorney General would be a pointless formality since the Attorney General is required by the statute to deny petitioner’s application. We therefore dismiss the petition.
No. D-668.

#### In re Disbarment of Rubino.

Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 484 U. S. 1039.]