WA YN E B
. U PS H A W,

Plaintiff,
v. UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, De fe nd ant. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

Civil No. 09-664 (CKK)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION (Nove mber 16, 2009) Plaintiff, Way

ne B . Upshaw, a

former employ ee of

the L ibrary

of Cong ress (“ L ibrary”), ha s filed suit alleg ing that three f ormer c o-worke rs made de famatory statements about him duringthe
course of an Equa l Employ ment Opportunity

(“EE O”) investigation into charg es of discr imination. Plaintiff, repre senting himself pr o s e , orig inally filed this suit as a state-law tort action ag ainst the three employ ees in their individual ca pacities in the Superior

Court for the District of

Columbi a. The Chief of

the Civil Divi sion in the Office of the United States Attorne y for the D istrict of Columbi a subseque ntly

cer tified pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) that the individuals wer e ac ting within the scope of the ir employ ment as employ ees of

the United States at the time of the alleg ed incident. As a c onsequenc e, the United States w as substituted as the sole def endant, the a ction was
conver ted into one broug ht under the F eder al Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 et seq. (her einaf ter, the “ FTCA” ), and the case was re moved to this Court. Shortly there afte r, the United States f iled its now-pending[13] Motion to Dism iss, or in the Alternative, for Summary J udg ment. In response , Plaintiff filed a [17] Motion for L eave to Amend the Amende d Complaint and for Tra nsfer to the Superior Court of the D istrict of Columbia, whichBe cause the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims must be dismiss ed for lack of subject 1 matte r j ur isd ic tio n p ur su ant t o Ru le 12 (b )( 1) , it do e s n ot r e a c h th e Un ite d St ate s’ argume nts in the a lte rn ativ e that Pla int if f’ s c la ims mus t a lso be dis mis se d und e r R ule 12 (b )( 6) fo r f

a ilure to state a c laim or that the United States is entitled to summary judgme nt under Rule 56. I t is we ll e sta

bli sh e d th at a

mot ion to d ism iss purs ua

nt t o Ru le 12 (b )( 1) c an r e fe r t o 2 materia l outside of the pleading s without being c onverte d into a motion for summary judgme nt. See, e .g., Herbe rt v. Nat’l Acad. of Scienc es , 974 F.2d 192, 197 ( D.C. Cir. 1992) (“where ne c e ssa ry , th e c ourt

may c on sid e r t

he c omp la int

su pp le me nte d b y

un dis pute d f

a c ts e vid e nc e d in 2 is also curre ntly

pendingbefor e the Court. Upon c onsideration of the parties’ submissi ons, the applicable case law and statutory authority , and the r ecor d of this case as a whole, the Court
c on c lud e s th at th e Un ite d St ate s is the pr op e r d e fe nd ant i n th is c a se and that Pla int if

f’ s a c tio n mu st b e b ro u gh tun d er

th e F T C A. M o re o v er , b ec au s e t h e U n i t edS t at es h as n o twa i v edi t s s o v er ei gn immun ity fo r c la ims ari sin gout of

de fa matio n a nd be c a us e Pla int if

f h a s f a ile d to e xha

us t hi s administrative re medies as r equire d, Plaintiff’s suit must be dismissed pursuant to Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e (“ Rule”) 12( b)(1) for lac k of subject matter jurisdiction. Accor dingly , the United States’ [13] Motion to Dism iss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’ s [17] Motion for L eave to Amend the Amende d Complaint and for Tra nsfer to the Superior Court of the D istrict of Columbia is DENI ED, for the re asons that follow. 1

I. BACKG ROUND Pla int if f i s a fo rm e r e mpl oye e of

the Con g re ssi on a l Re se arc h Se rv ic e (“ CRS” ), a un it w ith in the L ibrary

of Cong ress. Ame nded Complaint, Docket No. [10], ¶ 1 (here inafter “Am. Compl.”). He se rved a s the Deputy

Assistant Director

for the G overnme nt and Fina nce D ivision (“Division”) wi thi n CR S f

ro m N ov e mbe r 1 3, 20 06 thr ou g h O c tob e r 1 2, 20 07 , at w hic h ti me he wa s invo luntari ly separ ated f

rom the L ibrary
. Id. ¶¶

1- 2; see also Docke t No. [6-2] (Plaintiff’s 11/7/07 EEO Complaint) (here inafter

“EEO Complaint”). Shortly there afte r, in Novembe r of 2007, Plaintiff 2the re cord, or the complaint supplemented by undisputed fac ts plus the court’s re solution of dis pute d f a c ts” ); Bonterra Am., Inc . v. Be stmann , 907 F. Supp. 4, 5 n. 1 (D.D .C. 1995) (noting that, “[i] n decidinga motion to dism iss a case for lac k of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court may consider e videntiary

matters outside the plea dings” ).

3 filed an EE O complaint alleg ing that the L ibrary had discriminated a g ainst him by failingto conver

t him to a permane nt employ ee be cause of his rac e and r etaliation. See EE O C omp la int . Purs ua nt t o the applica

ble L ibrary

of Cong ress Reg

ulations, the L ibrary

initiated an investig ation of the alleg ations asserte d in Plainti ff’ s EEO Complaint. See Am. Compl. ¶ 3; Docke t No. [6-3] , (copy of L ibrary of Cong ress Regulation 2010-3.1, Resolution of Problems, Com plaints, and Charg es of Discrimination in L ibrary Employ ment and Staff Re lations Under the E qual Employ ment Op po rt un ity pr og ra m) (h e re ina ft e r “ L CR 2 01 0- 3. 1” ), § 8 ) ( re qu ir inginq uir y and inv e sti g atio n into EEO complaints re ceive d by the L ibrary

). Duringthe EEO investig ation that followed, a n EEO investig ator intervie wed a nd took statements from: (1) Robert J . Dilge r, De puty Assistant Director

of the Division and Plaintiff’s direc t supervisor; (2) Jane G. G rave lle, a Senior Spec ialist in t he Division and Plaintiff’s
s u b o r d i n at e ; ( 3 ) M ar c L a

b o n t e , a S p e c i a l i s ti nth e D i v i s i o nan d P l a i n t i f f ’ s s u b o r d i n at e ( c o l l e c t i v e l y, “individual Fe dera l Defe ndants”). A m. Compl . ¶ 3. The r eleva nt L ibrary regulations obligate d the individual Fede ral De fenda nts, as employ ees of

the L ibrary , to cooper ate with the investig ation. See L CR 2010-3.1, § 8.F (“ In car rying out their

responsibilities under [] Section [8: Investig ations of Com pla int s], the As sis tant C hie f, Of fi c e rs , Inv e sti g ator s, and

L ibr ary of fi c ia ls s ha ll h ave the fu ll cooper ation of all staff

. . . .”). On Fe bruar

y 13, 2009, Plaintiff, repre senting himself pr o s e , filed suit ag ainst the individual Fe dera l Defe ndants alleg ing that they had made defa

matory statements duringthe cour se of the E EO4

investigation. SeeDo c ke t N o. [1- 1], at 10 -1 5 ( Com pla int ) ( he re ina ft e r “ Com pl. ” ). Ac c or din gto Plaintiff, the individual Fede ral De fenda nts falsely

sug g ested to the EEO investigator that Plaintiff ha d “ a bu se d h is d isc re tio na

ry a uth or ity” a s a

De puty As sis tant D ir e c tor

wi thi n CR S in

or de r t o “promote a

persona l ag enda” — i.e. , to influence or pre ssure e mploy ees to re ach r esea rch outc omes consistent with his own personal pre fer ence s. See Am . Co mpl . ¶ 7. Pla int if

f a sse rt s th at th e se alleg edly defa matory statements play ed a sig nificant role in preve nting him from be ing r e-instated as a pe rmane nt L ibrary

employ ee. Id. ¶¶ 3, 4. As explained above, Plaintiff’s suit was or igina lly filed ag ainst the individual Fede ral Def endants in their individual ca pacities in the Superior

Court for the District of

Columbi a. See generally Compl. On April 3, 2009, the Chief of the Civil Divisi on in the Offic e of the United States Attorney

for the D istrict of Columbia certified that the individual Fede ral De fenda nts were actingwithin the scope of the ir employ ment as employ ees of

the United States at the time of the alleg ed incidents, pursua

nt to 28 U.S.C . § 2679(d). See Docke t No. [1-1] at 4 (28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) Certification by

Rudolph Cont rer as, Chief of the Civil Division, Office of the United States Attor ne y fo r t he Di str ic t of

Col umb ia ) ( he re ina ft e r “ Wes tf a ll Ce rt if ic atio n” ). B a se d o n th is Certification, the individual Feder al Def endants re moved the ca se to this Court on April 9, 2009,
and fi le d a c on so lid ate d M oti on

to D ism iss and

Mo tio n to Sub sti tut e the Un ite d St ate s a s th e Sol e Def endant. SeeNot. of Removal, Doc ket No. [1] ; Defs.’ Mot. to Dismi ss and Mot. to Subst itute the Un ite d St ate s a s th e Sol e De f. , D oc ke t N o. [6]. T he ind ivi du a l F e de ra l D e fe nd ants argue d in the ir mot ion that th e Un ite d St ate s sh ou ld b e su bs tit ute d a s th e so le de fe nd ant b y vir tue of the Wes tf

a ll Ce rt if ic atio n a nd that on c e su c h s ub sti tut ion wa s ma de , th e a c tio n mu st b e dis mis se d — bo th beca use the United States ha s not waived its sovere ign immunity under the FTCA f

or def amation5

claims and be cause Plaintiff has not alleg ed timely exhaustion of his admini strative re medies as require d under the FTCA. See ge nerally Def s.’ Mot. to Dismis s and Mot. to Subst itute the United States as the Sole Def

. Be fore the Court had an oppor tunity to consider the individual F eder al Def endants’ motion, the Plaintiff filed an A mended Complaint. SeeAm. Compl. The Amended Complaint makes two primary chang es. F irst, Plainti ff substituted the United States as the sole defe ndant in this li tigation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d). See id. Second, in addition to his claim for def amation, Plaintiff added a second c laim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, alleg ing that he “suff ere d emotional distress” as a

result of the individual F eder al Def endants’ de famatory

statements. See id. ¶¶ 12- 17. In consideration of the filing by Plaintiff of his Amended Complaint, the Court issued an Or de r o n M ay

27 , 2 00 9, wh ic h: ( 1) de nie d a s mo ot t he ind ivi du a l F e de ra l D e fe nd ants ’ M oti on to Substi tute the United States as Sole De fenda nt in light of Plaintiff’s Amende d Complaint, which named the United States as the sole de fenda nt in this action; and ( 2) denie d without prejudice the ind ivi du a l F e de ra l D e fe nd ants ’ M oti on to D ism iss , a s it

wa s d ir e c te d at Pla int if

f’ s in iti a l c omp la int , which wa s no longe r the ope rative ple ading
. See5/27/09 Order, D ocket No. [11]. I n addition, the Or de r p ro vid e d th e Un ite d St ate s w ithan o pp or tun ity to f ile a re ne we d M oti on

to D ism iss a s a g a ins t Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, if it deemed it appr opriate. See id. Pur su ant t o th e Court ’s Ma y 27 , 2 00 9 O rd e r, the Un ite d St ate s f ile d a re ne we d M oti on

to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary

J udg ment. SeeDef

.’s MTD/MSJ , Docke t No. [13] . As
se t f or th t he re in, the Un ite d St ate s argue s th at Pla int if f’ s su it mus t be dis mis se d p ur su ant t o Ru le 12(b)( 1) for

lack of subject matter jur isdiction and/or Rule 12(b)(6) for f ailure to state a

claim.Pursuant to the D.C. Circuit’s decisions in Fox v . Strickland , 837 F.2d 507 ( D.C. Cir. 3 1988) and Ne al v . Ke lly , 963 F.2d 453 ( D.C. Cir. 1992), the Court had pre viously issued an Or der advising Plaintiff that the United States had filed a Motion to Dism iss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary

J udg ment and that, if Plaintiff fa iled to timely respond to the motion, the Court would consider the United States’ Renew ed Motion to Dismis s, or in the Alternative, for Summary J udg ment conce ded. 6/11/09 Orde r, Doc ket No. [14]
. 6 Alternatively , the United States asse rts that the Court should enter summary judgme nt in its favor pursuant to Rule 56. In support of its motion, t he United States make s two principal ar g uments. F ir st, the Un ite d St ate s argue s th at it ha s n ot w a ive d it s so ve re ig n immun ity fo r P la int if

f’ s c la ims , which ar e base d on and ar ise out of alleg edly defa matory statements. Second, the United States contends that Plaintiff has not alleg ed the timely exhaustion of administ rative r emedies a s require d under the FTCA. Plaintiff responded by

filing both a

n Opposition to t he United States’ motion, seePl.’s Opp’n, Doc ket No. [18] , and a Motion for L eave to Amend the Amende d Complaint and for Transf er to the Super ior Court of the District of Columbia, seePl.’s Mot. for L eave to Amend and fo r T ra ns fe r t o Su

p. Ct. of D. C., Do c ke t N o. [17] ( he re ina ft e r, “ Pl. ’s Mo t. t o A me nd ” ). As se t f or th 3 there in, Plainti ff a sserts that he “ orig inally soug ht and still seeks only to sue the individual de fe nd ant’ s [ sic ] i ndividually for de famatory

/libelous statements made outside their e mploy ment obligations.” Pl.’s Mot. t o Amend ¶ 2. A lthough his Amende d Complaint subs tituted the United States as the sole de fenda nt in this action, Plaintiff asser ts that he did so based on the mistaken
un de rs tand ingthat th e Court ha d a lr e a dy

or de re d th e Un ite d St ate s to be su bs tit ute d a s d e fe nd ant i n this li tigation. See id. ¶¶

3- 4; se e als o ge ne ra lly

Pl.’s Opp’n. Acc ordingto Plainti ff, he did not intend to conce de that substitution of the United States as defe ndant is appropr iate. See id. ¶¶ 3- 4;
se e als o ge ne ra lly

Pl.’s Opp’n.7

Mo re ov e r, Pla int if

f n owargue s th at th e Wes tf a ll Ce rt if ic atio n is , in

fa c t, i mpr op e r b e c a

us e “[i] t is not part of an e mploy ee’ s duties to make fa lse, defa matory statements,” suc h that the individual Fede ral De fenda nts were “ac t[ ing] outside the scope of their e mploy ment duties” whe n they made the a lleg edly

defa matory statements ag ainst Plainti ff. See Pl. ’s Me m. i n Su pp or t of his Opp’n ¶ 17. Plaintiff c oncludes that the United States was ther efor e improper ly substitut ed as defe ndant, and he reque sts leave to ame nd his complaint in order to “r estore[] the origina l individual defe ndants” a

nd to permit “transf

er [of this action] to [ the] S uperior Court a s a simple defa mation
c a se , a s inte nd e d. ” Pl. ’s Mo t. t o A me nd , ¶ 5. Th e Court

no te s th at Pla int if

f h a s n ot o the rw ise responde d to the United States’ ar g uments that this case should be dismissed for la ck of subjec t
matte r j ur isd ic tio n a

nd /or fo r f a ilure to s tate a

c la im, a ssumin gthe Un ite d St ate s h a s b e e n p ro pe rl y
su bs tit ute d a s th e so le de fe nd ant. Ins te a d, Pla int if f f oc us e s so le ly

on the pr op ri e ty

of the Wes tf

a ll Certification. See generally Pl.’s Opp’n; Pl.’s Mot. t o Amend. The United States f

iled a Reply

in Support of its R enew ed Motion to Dismis s, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary J udg ment, and Opposition to Pl aintiff’s Motion to Amend. See Def .’s Reply /Opp’n, Doc ket Nos. [20] & [21]. I n so doing, the United States argues that Plaintiff has fa iled to alleg e suff

icient fa cts that, if true, w ould rebut the Westfall Certification in thi s case . Acc ording ly , the United States asse rts that the substituti on of the United States a nd the conve rsion of this action into a FT CA suit was appropr iate. See ge nerally id. Pla int if f d e c lin e d to fi le any

re ply in support of his Motion t o Amend. As brie fingis now complete, the pa rties’ motions are ripe for the Court’s re solution and review. II. LEGAL STANDARDS The United States ha s moved for dismissal of this case pursuant to Rule 12(b)( 1) and/or8

Rule 12(b)(6) and, in the alter native, for

summary judgme nt pursuant to Rule 56. For the rea sons set forth be low, the Court finds that the par ties’ ar g uments are more a ppropriate ly

evaluated under Rul e 12 (b )( 1) . A c c or din g ly , th e Court tr e ats the Un ite d St ate s’ mot ion a s a mot ion to d ism iss pursuant to Rule 12(b)( 1) for lack of subject matter jur isdiction, and does not rea ch the United States’ ar g uments in the alternative that Plaintiff’s claims must be dismiss ed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a c laim or that the United States is entitled to summary judgme nt under Rule 56. A. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(

b) ( 1) A c ourt mus t di smi ss a

c a se wh e n it

la c ks su bje c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n p ur su ant t o Ru le 12 (b )( 1) . In s o d oin g , th e Court may “ c on sid e r t

he c omp la int

su pp le me nte d b y

un dis pute d f

a c ts evidenc ed in the re cord, or the complaint supplemented by undisputed fac ts plus the court’s resolution of disputed fa cts.” Coa lit ion for Un de rg ro un d E x pa ns ion v . M

ine ta , 333 F.3d 193, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (c itations omi tted). Se e als o Jerom e Stev ens Pharm., Inc . v. Food &Drug Admin. , 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 ( D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he district court may consider materia ls outside the pleading s in decidingwhether to gr ant a motion to dismi ss for lac k of jurisdiction.”); Vanove r v. Hantman , 77 F. Supp. 2d 91, 98 (D.D .C. 1999), aff’d , 38 F. App’ x 4 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“ [W ]here a document is ref

err ed to in the complaint and is ce ntral to plaintiff’s c laim, such a doc ument attache d to the motion papers may be conside red w ithout convertingthe motion to one for summary j u d gm en t . ”) (c i t i n g Gree nberg v. The Life Ins. Co. of Va. , 177 F.3d 507, 514 ( 6th Cir. 1999)). “At the mot ion

to d ism iss sta g e , c ouns e le d c omp la int s, a s w e ll a s pro s e complaints, are to be construe d with sufficient libera lity

to affor d all possible infere nces f avora ble to the pleade r on alleg ations of fac t.” Settles v. U.S. ParoleComm’n , 429 F.3d 1098, 1106 ( D.C. Cir. 2005). In spite of the favor able infe renc es that a pla intiff rec eives on a motion to di smiss, i t remains the plaintiff’ s burden9

to prove subjec t matter jurisdiction by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. Am . F

ar m B ur e au v . E

nv tl. Prot. Agency , 121 F. Supp. 2d 84, 90 (D.D .C. 2000). B. Motion for Leave to Ame nd Complaint Pursuant to Fede ral Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) , a par ty may amend its pleading s after a responsive ple adinghas bee n serve d only with the opposing pa

rty ’s written c onsent or the c ourt’s leave . F ED . R. C IV . P. 1 5( a )( 2) . T he de c isi on wh e the r t o g ra

nt l e ave to a

me nd a c omp la int

is w ith in the discre tion of the district court, but leave “should be fr eely g iven unless there is a g ood rea son, such as f utilit y , to the contra

ry .” W illoughby v. Potomac Ele c. Power Co., 100 F.3d 999, 1003 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 6) (i nte rn a l c itatio ns omi tte d) ; se e als o F om an v . D av is , 3 7 1 U
. S
. 1 7 8 , 1 8 2 ( 1 9 6 2 ) ( “ If the under lying f

acts or c ircumstance s relied upon by a plaintiff may

be a pr oper subjec t of relief , he oug ht to be aff

orded a n opportunity

to test his claim on the merits. I n the abse nce of any appar ent or de c lare d r e a so n— su c h a s und ue de lay , b a d f

a ithor dil ator y mot ive on

the pa rt of the mov ant, repe ated f ailure to c ure de ficienc ies by amendments pre viously

allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing pa

rty by virtue of a llowance of the amendment, futility of ame ndment, etc.—the le ave soug ht should, as the rules re quire, be ‘fr eely g iven.’” ). III . D ISC USS ION As prese nted by

the par ties, the key

question now befor e the Court is whethe r the United States is the proper de fenda nt in this litigation. I f so, the United States a rgues, and Plaintiff a

ppear s to c on c e de , th at Pla int if

f’ s c la ims fo r d e fa

matio n a nd int e nti on a l in fl ic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss must be dismis sed for

lack of subject matter jur isdiction — both because the United States has not
wa ive d it s so ve re ig n immun ity fo r P la int if

f’ s c la ims and

be c a us e Pla int if

f h a s n ot a lle g e d ti me ly
e xha us tio n o f h is a dmi nis tr ativ e re me die s a s r e qu ir e d und e r t he F TCA . A c c or din g ly , th e Court sh a ll10

turn first to consider whether the United States is the prope r def endant be fore then turningto the pa rt ie s’ re ma ini ngargume nts . A. The United States is the Proper De fendant Th e Court

tur ns fi rs t to c on sid e r whe the r t he Un ite d St ate s is pr op e rl y su bs tit ute d a s th e so le defe ndant in this case. As a n initial matter, the United States asser ts that this “Court has alrea dy
ru le d th at th e Un ite d St ate s w a s su bs tit ute d a s th e pr op e r D e fe nd ant i n th is m atte r, ” su c h th at th is iss ue ha s b e e n d e fi nit ive ly re so lve d in

the Un ite d St ate s’ fa

vo r. De f. ’s Re ply

at 3- 4 ( e mph a sis in
or ig ina l) . T he Court

dis a g re e s. As e xpla ine d a bo ve , th e ind ivi du a l F e de ra l D e fe nd ants ini tia lly fi le d a mot ion se e kin gto s ub sti tut e the Un ite d St ate s a s th e so le de fe nd ant i n th is a c tio n. B e c a us e Plaintiff subsequently

filed an A mended Complaint, which itself appe are d to substit ute the United State s a s th e so le de fe nd ant, the Court de nie d th e ind ivi du a l F e de ra l D e fe nd ants ’ m oti on a s mo ot i n light of the Amended Complaint. See 5/27/09 Order. Contra ry to the United States’ asse rtion, the Court did not reac h the merits of the individual F eder al Def endants’ motion see king substitution of the United States as the sole defe ndant in this action. Plaintiff has now explained that he did not intend to conce de this issue by substitut ing the United States as def

endant in his Amende d Complaint, butrathe r did so based upon his mistaken be lie f t hat th e Court

ha d a lr e a dy

ru le d o n th is i ssu e . Pl .’ s Mo t. t o A me nd ¶¶ 3- 4; se e als o ge ne ra lly Pl.’s Opp’n. Althoug h, as the United States c orre ctly notes, Plaintiff failed to dire ctly challeng e the Court’s May

27, 2009 Orde r deny

ing the individual Fede ral De fenda nts’ motion for substitut ion as moot — based on the Court’s a ssumption t hat Plaintiff had conc eded to substitution of the United States as def

endant — the Court sha ll nonetheless proc eed to the me rits of Plaintiff’s argument at this ti me, in consideration of Plainti ff’ s status as a pro se litigant.The Attorne y Gene ral ha s deleg ated the a uthority to issue Westfall Certifications to the 4 Un ite d St ate s A tto rn e y

fo r t he dis tr ic t w he re the c ivi l a c tio n is br ou g ht. 28 C.F .R. § 1 5. 4. With re sp e c t to the Di str ic t of

Col umb ia , th e Un ite d St ate s A tto rn e y ha s r e de le g ate d h is a

uth or ity under the Westfall Act to Rudolph Cont rer as, Chief of the Civil Division of the United States Attorney ’s Off

ice f or the District of Columbia. SeeWestfall Certification. 11 1. Absolute Immunity Under the Westfall Act Turningthen to the merits of the issue at hand, Cong ress e nacte d the Westfall Act to provide that fede ral off

icials are absolutely

immune from state tort lawsuits for mone y damag es whe n the officia l was ac ting within the scope of employ ment duringthe alleg ed incident. Haddon v. United States , 68 F.3d 1420, 1422- 23 (D.C. Cir. 1995), overruled on othe r grounds , Osburn v. Haley , 549 U. S. 2 25 (2 00 7) . “ Un de r t he Wes tf a ll A c t, a n A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l or

de signe e wh o b e lie ve s th at a fede ral e mploy ee w as ac ting within the scope of employ ment at the time of the a lleg ed incident may issue a ce rtification to that ef fec t.” Id. at 1423 (c iting 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2) and 28 C.F.R. § 15.3 4 (1995)) . This cer

tification has thre e conse quence s where , as her e, the suit was or igina lly filed by the pla int if f i n s tate c ourt

un de r s tate tor

t la w: (1 ) t he Attor ne y Ge ne ra l or

de signe e is r e qu ir e d to
remove the lawsuit to the local fe dera l court; (2) the United States is substit uted for the fede ral
e mpl oye e a s th e so le de fe nd ant i n th e laws uit ; and (3 ) t he laws uit

is c onve rt e d into a

n a c tio n a g a ins t the Un ite d St ate s und e r t

he F TCA . 2 8 U .S. C. § 26 79 (d )( 2) ; see also Haddon , 638 F.3d at 1423. Al tho ug h c e rt if

ic atio n und e r t

he Wes tf a ll A c t is c on c lus ive fo r p ur po se s o f r e mov a l, “ it i s not conclusive r eg ardingsubstitut ion of the fe dera l gove rnment;” rather, the substitution of the United States and the suit’s conve rsion into a FCTA a ction are subject to judicial revie w. Haddon , 638 F. 3 d at1 4 2 3 (e mp h as i s i no ri gi n al ) ( ci t i n g Gutierrez de M artinez v. Lamagno , 515 U.S. 417, 434 (1995)) . That is, when c halleng ed, the district cour t must i ndepende ntly

deter mine whether

the employ ee w as ac ting within the scope of employ ment when the a lleg ed incident oc curr ed, such that12

substitut ion of the United States as the sole defe ndant is proper
. To deter mine whether

an employ ee w as ac ting within the scope of employ ment for pur

poses of the Westfall Ac t, a cour t applies the re spondeat super ior law of the state in which the a lleg ed tort
occur red. W ilson v. Libby , 535 F.3d 697, 711 ( D.C. Cir. 2008). Acc ording ly , this Court m ust look to a nd a pp ly Di str ic t of

Col umb ia

law, wh ic h d e fi ne s th e sc op e of e mpl oy me nt i n a c c or da

nc e wi th the Restatement ( Second) of Ag ency (1958) ( here inafter

“Restateme nt”). Id. The Restate ment pr ov ide s in

re le va nt p art that: Conduct of a se rvant is within the scope of employ ment if, but only

if: (a ) i t is of the kin d h e is e mpl oye d to pe rf or m; (b ) i t oc c ur s su

bs tanti a lly

wi thi n th e a

uth or ize d ti me and

sp a c e lim its ; (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master, a nd (d) if f orce is intentionally

used by the s erva

nt ag ainst another, the use of forc e is not unexpectable by the master. Re state me nt § 22 8( 1) ; see also W ilson , 535 F.3d at 711. “‘[T]he test for scope of employ ment is an objective one , based on a ll the fac ts and circ umstances.’ ” Counsel on Am. Islamic Re lations v. Ballenger , 4 4 4 F. 3 d

6 5 9 , 6 6 3 (D
. C
. C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( p er cu ri am ) ( qu o t i n g W

einberg v . Johnson , 518 A.2d 98 5, 99 1 ( D. C. 1 98 6) ). “ Al tho ug h s c op e of e mpl oy me nt i s g e ne ra lly

a qu e sti on fo r t he jur y , it ‘bec omes a que stion of law for the court, howe ver, if the re is not suffic ient evidenc e fr om which a
rea sonable juror

could conc lude that the ac tion was within the scope of the employ

ment.’” Id. (qu o t i n g Bo

y k in v . D ist ric t of Colum bia , 484 A.2d 560, 562 (D.C. 1984))
. I mp o rta n tl y , th e We s tf

a ll Ce rti f ic ati o nit s e lf

“ c o n s ti tute [s ] pr im a fa c ieevidenc e that the employ ee w as ac ting with the sc ope of his employ ment.” Id. at6 6 2 (c i t i n g Kimbro v. Velten , 3013

F.3d 1501, 1509 ( D.C. Cir. 1994)). See also W ilson , 5 35 F .3 d at 71 1 ( “ Th e c e rt if ic atio n c arr ie s a rebuttable presumption that the employ ee ha s absolute immunity from the law suit and that the Un i t edS t at es i s t o b e s u

b s t i tu t edas th e d ef

en d an t . ”)
. Ac co rd i n gl y , a p l ai n t i ff s ee k i n g t o ch al l en ge the Un ite d St ate s’ Wes tf

a ll Ce rt if ic atio n “ ‘b e ars the burd e n o f c omi ngfo rw ard wi th s pe c if

ic fa c ts rebuttingthe ce rtification.’” Id. (qu o t i n g Sto k es v . Cros s , 327 F.3d 1210, 1214 ( D.C. Cir. 2003)). At the mot ion

to d ism iss sta g e , a

pla int if f m us t th e re fo re a lle g e fa c ts that, i f t ru e , w ou ld e sta

bli sh that the def

endants we re a ctingoutside the scope of their employ

ment. Stokes , 3 2 7 F
. 3 d

at1 2 1 5
. “ If a plaintiff mee ts this pl eadingburden, he may , if nec essar y , attain ‘limited discovery ’ to resolve any fac tual disputes over jurisdiction.” W uterich v. M

urtha , 562 F.3d 375, 381 ( D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Stokes , 327 F.3d at 1214, 1216). The D.C. Circuit has r epeatedly made c lear , howeve r, “that ‘[n] ot
ever y complaint will warra

nt further inquiry into the scope-of

-employ ment issue.’” Id. (quoting Stokes , 327 F.3d at 1216)). “Conseque ntly , wher e a pla intiff fails to alleg e suff icient fa cts to rebut the ce rtification, the United States must be substituted as the de fenda nt beca use the fe dera l employ ee is absolutely

immune from suit.” Id. For the re asons set for

th below, the Court finds that Plaintiff ha s f a ile d to me e t hi s b ur de n to a lle g e fa c ts that, i f t ru e , w ou ld r e but th e Un ite d St ate s’ Wes tf a ll Ce rt if ic atio n, and

the Un ite d St ate s is the re fo re pr op e rl y su bs tit ute d a s th e so le de fe nd ant i n th is action. 2. The Individual Fede ral De fenda nts W ere ActingWit hin the Scope of Employ ment As there is no alleg ation of for ce in this ca se, only the first three fac tors of Restateme nt § 228
are at issue in this suit . The Court shall consider eac h in turn. In so doing, the “cour t must acce pt [P laintiff’s] factua l alleg ations as true a nd construe the complaint liberally in his favor.” Id. at 383.14 a . Whe the r t

he a lle g e d c on du c t is of

the kin d th e of

fi c ia l is e mpl oye d to pe rf or m.

“ To qu a lif

y a s c on du c t of

the kin d [th e ind ivi du a l F e de ra l D e fe nd ants we re ] em plo y e d to perf orm, the[ir] actions must have e ither bee n ‘of the sa me g ener al nature as that authorized’ or

‘ incidental

to the conduct a

uthorized.’” Haddon , 68 F.3d at 1424 (quoting Restatement (Sec ond) § 229) (e mphasis added by

D.C. Circuit). “Conduct is ‘incidenta l’ to an employ ee’ s leg itimate duties if it is ‘forese eable .’” Id. For conduct to qualify

as for esee able whe re, a s here , the plaintiff has alleg ed an intentional tort, the c laimed tortious conduct “must be ‘ a dire ct outg rowth of the employ ee’ s instructions or job assignme nt.’” Id. (qu o t i n g Bo y k in , 484 A.2d at 562). Revie w of the rele vant pre cede nt confirms that the ter m “incidental” must be construed br oadly in this contex t. See, e .g. , Johnson , 434 A.2d at 409 (holdingthat a re asonable juror could f ind that a laundromat
e mpl oye e ’s a ssa

ult on a c us tom e r d

ur inga dis pute c on c e rn ingmis sin gsh ir ts w a s f or e se e a ble ); Lyon v. Carey , 5 33 F .2 d 6 49 , 6 52 (D .C. Cir . 1 97 6) (h old ingthat a jur y re a so na bly c ou ld f ind that a
mattr e ss d e liv e ry

man’ s a ssa

ult on a c us tom e r f

oll ow inga

de liv e ry -r e late d d isp ute wa s a “ fo re se e a ble
a lte rc atio n” ); c

f. Stokes , 3 27 F .3 d at 12 16 (o bs e rv ingthat D ist ri c t of Col umb ia

law “ lib e ra lly construes” this first prong ). In th is c a se , th e ind ivi du a l F e de ra l D e fe nd ants we re no t on ly a uth or ize d b ut w e re re qu ir e d to cooper ate a

nd assist with EEO investigations. See L CR 2 01 0- 3. 1, § 8 .F (“ In c arr yingout th e ir
re sp on sib ili tie s und e r [] Se c tio n [8: Inv e sti g atio ns of Com pla int s], t he As sis tant C hie f, Of

fi c e rs , Investig ators, and L ibrary officia ls shall have the f

ull cooperation of all staff, a nd all shall be fr ee fr om r e str a int , inte rf

e re nc e , c oe rc ion , a

nd /or re pr isa l in

c onne c tio n w iththe pe rf or manc e of the se duties.”). More over, the ir alleg edly defa matory statements solely

relate to Plaintiff’s conduct at15

wo rk . T hat is , th e state me nts of wh ic h Pl a int if

f c omp la ins , a s se t f

or th i n h is p le a din g s, c on sis t entirely of the individual Fe dera l Defe ndants’ views — a lbeit unfavora ble — of Plaintiff’s wor

k perf ormanc e. Se e su

pra at p. 4. The Court ther efor e conc ludes that the individual Fe dera l De fe nd ants ’ p art ic ipatio n in the EE O i nv e sti g atio n w a s a uth or ize d c on du c t and

that any a lle g e dly defa matory statements to the EEO investig ator we re inc ide nta l to that authorized conduct, such that this first prong is satisfied. Indeed, c ourts have r outinely found that a f

eder al employ ee’ s statements made dur ing analog ous g overnme nt investigations fall within the scope of a n employ ee’ s duties — even whe n the statements ar e alleg edly

false or defa matory . Se e, e .g., Klu

ge l v . S ma ll , 519 F. Supp. 2d 66, 74 (D.D.C. 2007) ( finding that fede ral e mploy ees w ere actingin the scope of employ ment when they
ma de a lle g e dly

de fa mator y state me nts to t

he a g e nc y ’s ins pe c tor

g e ne ra l du

ri ngan inve sti g atio n into plaintiff’s improper

use of of ficial tra vel); Ho se

yv . J ac ob ik, 966 F. Supp. 12, 14-15 (D .D.C. 1997) (f i n d i n g th atfe d er al em p l o y ee ’s al l ege d l y d ef am at o ry s t at em en t s t o i n v es t i gat o r duri n g a g ov e rnme nt s e c ur ity

c le ara nc e inv e sti g atio n w e re ma de wi thi n th e sc op e of e mpl oy me nt) ; Brum

fie ld
v . S an de rs , 232 F.3d 376, 380- 81 (3rd Cir. 2000) ( finding under the Restatement (Sec ond) of Ag ency that employ ees w ere actingwithin the scope of e mploy ment when they

made a lleg edly

false, defa matory statements about plaintiff to g overnme nt investigator duringinvestigation reg arding plaintiff’s unprof

essional conduc t). Plaintiff’s only

argument to the contra

ry is his claim that “[i ]tis not part of an e mploy ee’ s duties to make fa lse, defa matory statements,” suc h that the individual Fede ral De fenda nts theref ore “ac ted outside the scope of their e mploy ment duties in making” the alleg edly defa matory statements. Pl. ’s Me m. i n Su

pp or t of his Op p’ n ¶

17 . T his a

rgume nt h a s b e e n e xplic itl y re je c te d b y the D. C.16

Circuit. See Counc il on Am. Islamic Relations , 444. F.3d at 664 (reje ctingargument that the Wes tf a ll Ce rt if ic atio n w a s im

pr op e r i n d e fa

matio n a c tio n b e c a

us e the de fa

mator y state me nt i tse lf

is not conduct of the kind an employ ee is hire d to perfor m). In so doing, the D.C. Circuit made cle ar th atth e i n qu i r

y un d e r th i s f i r s tp r o n gp r o p e r l y “ ‘ f

o c u s e s o nth e un d e r l yi n gd i s p u t e o r c o n tr o v e r s y, not on the nature of the tort, and is broa d enoug h to embrac e any intentional tort arising out of [conduct] t hat was or igina lly undertaken on the e mploy er’ s behalf.’ ” Id. (qu o t i n g Johnson , 518 A.2d at 992)) . Acc ording ly , the question now bef ore the Court is whether the individual F eder al Def endants’ statements to the EEO investig ator — not the a lleg edly defa matory statements made there in — were the kind of conduc t they wer e employ ed and a

uthorized to perform. See id. at 664. Plaintiff’s argument to the contra ry “re sts on a misunderstandingof D.C. scope -of- employ ment law (not to mention the plain tex t of the Westfall Act), which direc ts courts to look bey ond the alleg ed intentional torts themselves.” Id. As e xpla ine d a bo ve , th e ind ivi du a l F e de ra l D e fe nd ants ’ participation in the EEO investigation was the kind of conduc t they wer e author ized to perform, a nd their statements to the EEO investigator — eve n if false — wer e incidenta l to that authorized conduct. The Court theref ore f inds that this first prong ha s been sa tisfied. b. Whether the a lleg ed conduc t occur red substantially

within the a uth or ize d ti me and

sp a c e lim its
. Plaintiff’s pleading s in this case ar e entire ly devoid of a

ny alleg ations that the defa

matory statements at issue we re ma de to the EEO inve stigator outside of the L ibrary or outside of norma l workinghours. See ge nerally Am. Compl. According ly , the sec ond Restatement fa ctor is satisfied. See M yve tt v. W

illiams , 6 3 8 F. S u

p p . 2 d 5 9 , 6 7 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 9 ) ( “B ec au s e t h e p l ai n t i ff fa i l s t o al l ege that the def

endants’ c onduct occ urre d outside of [the gove rnment ag ency] or outsi de of nor mal17

workinghours, the cr iterion that conduc t ‘occ ur[] substantially within the authorized time and space limit s’ is met.”).
c . W h e th e r th e a l l e g e d

c o n d u c tw a s a c tu at e d , atl e a s ti np art , b y a purpose to ser

ve the maste r. The Court turns finally

to consider whe ther the individual F eder al Def endants’ c onduct was actuated, at lea st in part, by a purpose to serve the L ibrary . As the D.C. Circuit has made clea r, “eve n a partial

desire to se rve the master is suffic ient” to satisfy this final prong
. Council on Am. Islamic Re lations , 444. F.3d at 664 (emphasis in orig inal). In this case, the individual F eder al De fe nd ants sp ok e wi th t

he EE O i nv e sti g ator

purs ua nt t o th e ir e mpl oye r’ s in str

uc tio ns to f

ull y cooper ate with any

EEO investig ation, and their a lleg edly defa matory statements foc used solely on purported pr oblems with Pl aintiff’s wor k perf ormanc e. More ver, the ir statements supported the L ibrary ’s position that the Pl aintiff had be en involuntarily separ ated f

or a le g itimate, nondiscriminatory

rea son ( i.e. , work pe rfor

mance problems). Thus, their statements appe ar to have bee n motivated, at least in par

t, by the employ ees’ desire to se rve the L ibrary . Plaintiff, for his part, ha s fa ile d to ple a d a

ny a lle g atio ns that th e ind ivi du a l F e de ra l D e fe nd ants ’ c on du c t w a s n ot m oti vate d in any way by a desire to serve the L ibrary
. See ge nerally Am. Compl. According ly , the Court finds that th is thir d p ro ngis s atis fi e d a s w e ll. In summary , the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to pr offe r fa cts that, if true, a re suf ficient to rebut the United States’ Westfall Certification. Ac cording ly , the Court conclude s that the ind ivi du a l F e de ra l D e fe nd ants a c te d w ith in t he sc op e of

e mpl oy me nt whe n th e y

ma de the a lle g e dly defa matory statements to the EEO investig ator; the United States wa s proper ly substitut ed as the sole defe ndant in this action; and Plaintiff’s claims ar e appr opriately evaluated under

the FCTA.The Court notes that eve n it if were to find that the Westfall Certification wa s not 5 appropr iate, the Supre me Court has made clea r that the Court is without authority to remand a remove d action on the ground that the Westfall Certification was err oneous. Osborn v. Haley , 549 U.S. 225, 243 (2007) (“ Congr ess has ba rre d a district cour

t from passingthe ca se bac k to the state cour t where it originated base d on the cour t’s disag ree ment with the Attorney Gene ral’s scope- of-e mploy

ment deter

mination.”). 18 Gi ve n th is c on c lus ion , th e Court fi nd s th at Pla int if

f’ s r e qu e st f

or le ave to a

me nd his c omp la int

to “re store[] the orig inal individual defenda nts” and to per

mit “transfe r [of this action] to [ the] S uperior Court as a simple def

amation ca se,” seePl.’s Mot. t o Amend, ¶ 5, is futile. Plaintiff’s [17] Motion for L eave to Amend the Amende d Complaint and for Tra nsfer to the Superior Court of the D istrict of Columbia is therefor e DEN I ED. 5 B. The Court L acks Subje ct Matter Jurisdiction Ove r Plaintif f’s FTCA Cl aims Havingdeter

mined that this action is properly broug ht under the F TCA, the Court now turns to the merits of the United States’ argument that the ca se must be dismissed for lac k of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)( 1). Specific ally , the United States moves for dismiss al on two g rounds. Fir st, the United States argues that Plaintiff’s def amation and intentional infliction of
em o t i o n al d i s tre s s cl ai m s mu s tb e d i s m i s s edb ec au s e t h e U n i t edS t at es h as n o twa i v edi t s s o v er ei gn immunit y for suc h claims. Second, the United States argues that Plaintiff’s cla ims must be dismiss ed as he has not alleg ed the timely exhaustion of administ rative r emedies a s require d under the FT CA. Significa ntly , Plaintiff has not responde d to the United States’ substantive ar g uments in favor of dismissal, inst ead f

ocusingonly

on the appr opriatene ss of the Westfall Certification. As the Court pr e vio us ly

a dv ise d Pl a int if

f, fa ilure to r e sp on d to the Un ite d St ate s’ argume nts may re su lt i n the Court deemingits mot ion as conc eded. See 6/11/09 Order, D ocket No. [14]. See also Hopk ins19

v. W omen’ s Div., Ge neral Bd. of Global Ministri es , 284 F. Supp. 2d 15, 25 (D.D .C. 2003), aff’d 98 Fe d. Appx. 8 (D.C. C ir. 2004) (“ I t is well understood in this C ircuit that when a plaintiff files an opposition t o a dispositive motion and addresse s only cer tain arguments raised by

the def endant, a
c ourt may tr e at th os e argume nts that th e pla int if f f a ile d to a dd

re ss a s c on c e de d. ” ). No ne the le ss,
c og niza nt o f P la int if

f’ s pro se status , th e Court sh a ll e xer c ise its dis c re tio n a nd c on sid e r t

he me ri ts of the Un ite d St ate s’ mot ion to d ism iss . F or

the re a so ns se t f

or th b e low , th e Court

ult imate ly conclude s that this case must be dismissed for lac k of subject matter jurisdiction because the United States has not waived its sover eig n immunit y and, alter natively , beca

use Plaintiff has not alleg ed exhaustion of his admini strative re medies.

1. The United States Ha s Not Waived Sovereig n I mmunity Over Plaintiff’s Cla ims Th e F TCA“ g ra

nts fe de ra l di str ic t c ourt s juri sd ic tio n o ve r c la ims ari sin gfr om c e rt a in t or ts committed by

fede ral e mploy ees in the sc ope of the ir employ ment, and wa ives the g overnme nt’s
sovere ign immunity

from such c laims.” Sloan v. Dep’ t of Housing & Urban Dev

. , 236 F.3d 756, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (c iting 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674). H oweve r, “[t] he g rant of jur isdiction and waiver of immunity

are subject to a number

of express exceptions.” Id. (citing28 U.S.C. § 2680). Claims that fall under one of the enumer ated e x ceptions to the F TCA must be dismis sed for lack of subject matter jur isdiction. Id. Un de r o ne su c h e xce pti on , s ov e re ig n immun ity is n ot w a ive d w ith respe ct to “[a]ny

claim ar ising out of . . . libel, slande r, misrepre sentation, [or] dece it.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Ac cording ly , Plaintiff’s claim for de famation mustbe dismissed for lac k of subject matter jurisdiction. See Council on Am. Islamic Re lations , 444. F.3d at 666 (dismissi ngdefa mation action
un de r t he F TCAfo r l a c k o f s ub

je c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n) ; see also W uterich , 562 F.3d at 234 (same)
.20

Simi larly , Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of e motional dist ress must also be dismiss ed for

lack of subject matter jur isdiction because it “arise[s] outof . . . libel, slander , misrepre sentation, [or] dece it.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). As set for th in Pl aintiff’s Ame nded Complaint, t his claim is based on alleg ations that he “suf fer ed emotional distress” a s a re sult of the individual Fede ral De fenda nts’ defa matory statements. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12-17. “Claims, no matter how the y

are descr ibed by

a plaintiff, ba sed on dissemination of def amatory information perta ining to a f

eder al investig ation are barr ed by the libel/slander e x emption.” Edmonds v. United States , 4 3 6 F. S u

p p . 2 d 2 8 , 3 5 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g Kugel v. United States , 947 F.2d 1504, 1506- 07 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 1) ). Ac c or din g ly , “ [i]n a sse ssi ngthe natur e of [Pla int if f’ s] c la im, ” the Court

“ mus t scrutinize the alleg ed ca

use of his injury .” Kugel , 947 F.2d at 1507. Where, as he re, the alleg ed injury was purpor

tedly cause d by

defa matory statements, the cla im is ex empted under the FT CA. See id. (c on c lud ingthat pl a int if f’ s su it, a lth ou g h f

ra me d a s a ne g lig e nc e a c tio n, so un de d in defa mation and was the ref

ore e x empt under the FTCA) . Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of
e mot ion dis tr e ss m

us t th e re fo re be dis mis se d f or la c k o f s ub

je c t matte r a s w e ll. 2. The Plaintiff Ha s Not Alleg ed Exhaustion of His Adminis trative Remedie s Al te rn ativ e ly , th e Court

fi nd s th at Pla int if

f’ s c la ims mus t be dis mis se d f or fa ilure to e xha

us t his a dmi nis tr ativ e re me die s. In o rd e r t o b ri ngsu it und e r t he F TCA , a

c la ima nt m us t f ir st e xha us t hi s
or he r a dmi nis tr ativ e re me die s. Spe c if ic a lly , s e c tio n 2 67 5( a ) p ro vid e s th at: An ac tion shall not be insti tuted upon a cla im ag ainst the United States for money damag es for injury or . . . or persona l injury or death c aused by the neg lige nt or wrong ful a c t or omi ssi on of any e mpl oye e of the Go ve rnme nt wh ile a c tin g wi thi n the sc op e of his office or employ

m ent, unl ess the cla imant shall have fir st presente d the claim to the appropr iate F eder al age ncy and his claim s hall have been finally denied by the ag ency in writing a

nd sent by cer tified or re g istered mail. The failure of an ag ency to make fina l dispositi on of a c laim within si x months af t er i t i s filed shall, at the option of the21

c la ima nt a ny tim e the re a ft e r, be de e me d a fi na l de nia l of the c la im fo r purp os e s of thi s section. 28 U. S.C. § 2 67 5( a ). Th e pla in l angua g e of the F TCAthe re fo re ba

rs a pla int if f f ro m f ili ngsu it befor e he or

she has e x hausted these administrative re medies. McNeil v. U nited States , 5 08 U. S. 106, 112 (1993) ( “The most natural re adingof the statute indicates that Congr ess intended to re quire
c omp le te e xha

us tio n o f E xec uti ve re me die s before inv oc atio n o f t he jud ic ia l pr oc e ss. ” ) ( e mph a sis added) . Her e, Plaintiff has not pled that he exhausted his administ rative r emedies nor has he
c on te ste d th e Un ite d St ate s’ a sse rt ion that he fa ile d to do so a s r e qu ir e d und e r t he F TCA . T his Court theref

ore la cks subject matter

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s F TCA claims. Acc ording ly , the Un ite d St ate s’ Mo tio n to Di smi ss t he ins tant a c tio n f

or la c k o f s ub

je c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n p ur su ant t o Rule 12(b)(1) is GRANTED, and this ca se is dismiss ed in its entirety
. IV . C ON CL USI ON For the re asons set out above , the United States’ [13] M otion to Dism iss for lack of subject matter pursua

nt to Fede ral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)( 1) is GRANTED, a nd Plaintiff’s [17] Motion for L eave to Amend the Amende d Complaint and for Tra nsfer to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia is DENI ED. This ca se is dismiss ed in its entirety . An appr opriate O rder
acc ompanies this Memorandum Opinion. Date: November

16, 2009 /s/ C O LLE E N K O LLA R
- K O T E LLY Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge