J-S22009-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

CHARLES WHEELER,

Appellant No. 748 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 30, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0012412-2007

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 25, 2018

Appellant, Charles Wheeler, appeals from the judgment of sentence of 

an aggregate term of five to ten years’ incarceration, followed by five years’ 

probation, imposed after his prior term of probation was revoked based on his 

commission of other, unrelated crimes. On appeal, Appellant solely challenges 

the discretionary aspects of his sentence. After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court briefly summarized the procedural history of Appellant’s 

case, as follows:

On July 27, 2007, [Appellant] entered into a negotiated 

guilty plea on charges of aggravated assault, criminal conspiracy, 

and possession of an instrument of crime. [Appellant] was 

sentenced to two to five years’ incarceration, followed by five 

years[’] probation. [He] was subsequently arrested and charged 

with [possession] with intent to deliver a controlled substance on 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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June 13, 2015. He thereafter entered a negotiated guilty plea to 

that charge and received a sentenced of 11[1⁄2] to 23 months[’] 

incarceration on July 10, 2017.

On July 17, 2015, [Appellant] was arrested and charged 

with, inter alia, criminal homicide. On January 9, 2017, 

[Appellant] was found guilty of first[-]degree murder and 

sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 

A Gagnon II[1] hearing was held on January 30, 2017, and 

[Appellant] was found [to be] in violation of probation. 

Consequently, this court revoked [his] probation and resentenced him to an aggregate term of five to ten years[’] 

imprisonment, to run consecutive to the sentence imposed for 

first-degree murder. 

Trial Court Opinion, 7/18/17, at 1 (footnote omitted). 

Appellant filed a timely motion for reconsideration of his sentence, but 

the docket does not indicate that the trial court ruled on that motion. 

Notwithstanding, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial court did 

not direct him to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal, however the court did issue an opinion addressing 

the claims presented in Appellant’s post-sentence motion for reconsideration. 

On appeal, Appellant presents one issue for our review: “Did not the 

probation revocation court err and abuse its discretion by not giving adequate 

reasons for imposing the maximum possible sentence to run consecutively to 

[A]ppellant’s life sentence, where the lower court merely commented on its 

perception of the senselessness of [A]ppellant’s original crime, which had 

occurred ten years before?” Appellant’s Brief at 3.

Appellant’s issue challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. 

____________________________________________

1 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
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Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not 

entitle an appellant to review as of right. Commonwealth v. 

Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 912 (Pa. Super. 2000). An appellant 

challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke 

this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

[the] appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see

Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly 

preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and 

modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether [the] 

appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and 

(4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence

appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing

Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2006), 

appeal denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303 (2006). Objections to 

the discretionary aspects of a sentence are generally waived if 

they are not raised at the sentencing hearing or in a motion to 

modify the sentence imposed. Commonwealth v. Mann, 820 

A.2d 788, 794 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, 574 Pa. 759, 831 

A.2d 599 (2003).

The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must 

be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul,

925 A.2d 825, 828 (Pa. Super. 2007). A substantial question 

exists “only when the appellant advances a colorable argument 

that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent 

with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary 

to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” 

Sierra, supra at 912–13.

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010)).

Appellant has satisfied the first three, above-stated requirements for 

obtaining review of his sentencing claim. In his Rule 2119(f) statement, 

Appellant argues that there is a substantial question warranting our review, 

because the trial court failed to consider the factors required by 42 Pa.C.S. § 
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9721(b), and because the “court failed to state adequate reasons on the 

record to explain its imposition of a maximum and consecutive sentence.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 10. We conclude that these two claims constitute 

substantial questions and, therefore, we will review the merits of Appellant’s 

arguments. See Commonwealth v. Derry, 150 A.3d 987, 995 (Pa. Super. 

2016) (holding that a claim that the sentencing court failed to consider the 

section 9721(b) factors constitutes a substantial question for our review); 

Commonwealth v. Flowers, 149 A.3d 867, 871 (Pa. Super. 2016) (finding 

a substantial question was presented where the appellant claimed the court 

failed to state adequate reasons on the record for the sentence imposed).

In assessing Appellant’s sentencing claims, we are mindful of the

following standard of review:

[T]he proper standard of review when considering whether to 

affirm the sentencing court’s determination is an abuse of 

discretion. ... [A]n abuse of discretion is more than a mere error 

of judgment; thus, a sentencing court will not have abused its 

discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment exercised 

was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, 

bias or ill-will. In more expansive terms, our Court recently 

offered: An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because 

an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but 

requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly 

erroneous.

The rationale behind such broad discretion and the concomitantly 

deferential standard of appellate review is that the sentencing

court is in the best position to determine the proper penalty for a 

particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual 

circumstances before it.
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Moury, 992 A.2d at 169–70 (quoting Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 

957, 961 (Pa. 2007)).

In this case, Appellant complains that the trial court did not state 

adequate reasons on the record for his sentence, or consider the factors set 

forth in section 9721(b) - namely, the protection of the public, the gravity of 

the offense, and his rehabilitative needs. Appellant asserts that “[t]he court’s 

view of [A]ppellant’s underlying crime appeared to be the sole sentencing 

factor.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. In support, Appellant quotes the following 

statement by the court just prior to imposing his sentence:

THE COURT: The jury ... found that they could not reach a verdict 

[i]n [Appellant’s underlying case]. And, subsequently, his 

attorney and the [Commonwealth] ... agreed on a negotiated 

guilty plea, which I’ve already articulated for the record. I’ve 

made that observation just to point out how senseless the 

underlying case was. This was a case [where Appellant’s codefendant, Abraham Saez,] was involved in an argument with Mr. 

Hoffman, a matter to which [Appellant] had absolutely no 

involvement. These two men argued; a fistfight ensued. Mr. 

Hoffman got the better of [Mr. Saez in] the fistfight, so Mr. Saez 

got on his phone and called [Appellant]. [Appellant] came out on 

the scene and Mr. Saez directed him to take care of Mr. Hoffman 

and [Appellant] did as he was bid to do and opened fire.

N.T. Revocation/Resentencing Hearing, 1/30/17, at 20. 

We discern nothing improper about the court’s reiterating the facts of 

Appellant’s underlying case and stressing the ‘senselessness’ of his criminal 

conduct; indeed, this demonstrates that the trial court considered the gravity 

of Appellant’s offense as section 9721(b) requires it to do. Furthermore, 
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Appellant acknowledges that the court went on to state that it “considered the 

factors I’m obliged to,” id. at 22, and then further explained:

THE COURT: [Appellant], after due consideration and taking into 

account your personal history, need for rehabilitation, society’s 

need for protection, and appreciating that the [c]ourt has the 

same powers at sentencing on this Gagnon II violation as it had 

initially, the [c]ourt believes that in light of the history, that is, 

your criminal history, this crime, and the crime which places you 

in violation, only the maximum sentence permissible is sufficient 

to address the underlying crime or crimes in this case.

Id. at 22-23.

Contrary to Appellant’s position on appeal, we conclude that these 

statements by the court adequately conveyed the court’s rationale for the 

sentence it imposed, and demonstrated that the court considered the section 

9721(b) factors. As the Commonwealth points out, “[t]he court was not 

required to engage in lengthy discourse of its reasoning, especially since this 

sentence followed the revocation of probation.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 7 

(citing Commonwealth v. Pasture, 107 A.3d 21, 28 (Pa. 2014) (“[F]ollowing 

revocation, a sentencing court need not undertake a lengthy discourse for its 

reasons for imposing a sentence or specifically reference the statutes in 

question. Simply put, since the defendant has previously appeared before the 

sentencing court, the stated reasons for a revocation sentence need not be as 
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elaborate as that which is required at initial sentencing.”). Therefore, we 

conclude that Appellant’s sentencing arguments are meritless.2

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/25/18

____________________________________________

2 We note that Appellant presents, for the first time on appeal, cursory 

assertions that the trial court relied on impermissible factors in fashioning his 

sentence (specifically, “the original conduct, ... and the maximum sentence 

[the court] could impose”), and that the court’s “imposing the sentence to run 

consecutively to [A]ppellant’s life sentence served no purpose other than 

vindictiveness.” Appellant’s Brief at 15. Because neither of these claims were 

presented in Appellant’s post-sentence motion, they are waived on appeal. 

See Commonwealth v. Bromley, 862 A.2d 598, 603 (Pa. Super. 2004) (“It 

is well settled that an [a]ppellant’s challenge to the discretionary aspects of 

his sentence is waived if the [a]ppellant has not filed a post-sentence motion 

challenging the discretionary aspects with the sentencing court.”) (citations 

omitted). In any event, we would deem these claims meritless. Clearly, the 

court was permitted to consider, along with the other factors mentioned supra, 

Appellant’s underlying crimes and the statutory maximum term it could 

impose in this case. Additionally, “Pennsylvania law affords the sentencing 

court discretion to impose its sentence concurrently or consecutively to other 

sentences being imposed at the same time or to sentences already imposed. 

Any challenge to the exercise of this discretion ordinarily does not raise a 

substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808 (Pa. 

Super. 2013) (citations omitted). Given that Appellant cites nothing in the 

record (aside from the imposition of a consecutive sentence) to support his 

allegation of vindictiveness by the trial court, we would reject his contention 

that the court abused its discretion in this regard.
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