UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ROBERT ONEAL BEAN, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 17-0140 (RC) : v. : Re Document No.: 16 : SONNY PERDUE, Secretary, : United States Department of Agriculture, 1 : : Defendant. : MEMORANDUM OPINION G RANTING IN P ART AND D ENYING IN P ART D EFENDANT ’ S M OTION TO D ISMISS I. INTRODUCTION This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s motion to dismis s for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be gr anted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6 ) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Robert Oneal Bean br ought this action against the S ecretary of the United States Department of Agriculture (“US DA”) because the USDA denied him loan servicing and decided to foreclose on land t hat Mr. Bean had purchas ed. Mr. Bean cla ims that these acts violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), Pub. L. 79-404, § 706, 60 Stat. 237 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq. ), the Agricultural, Rural D evelopment, Food and Drug Administr ation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. 105–277, § 741, 112 Stat. 2681 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2279)) (“1999 Agricultural Approp riations Act”), “and/or the Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008,” Pub. L. 110–234, § 14011, 122 Stat. 923 (“2008 Fa rm Bill”). See Am. Compl. at

1 Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 25(d), Sonny Perdue, the current Secretary of the United States De partment of Agric ulture, is au tomatically substituted as the defendant in this matter.2 5–6, ECF No. 3. For the reasons sta ted below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 2 Robert Oneal Bean, an African Ame rican farmer from Mississippi, borrowed approximately $50,000 from the Farm Service Agency (“FSA”) to p urchase a 120-acre tract of farm land in 2001. Am. Compl. at 3, ECF No. 3. Mr. Bean made timely payments to FSA until 2011, when he was diagnosed with pro state cancer. Am. Compl. a t 4. Thereafter, Mr. Bean fell behind in his payments. See id. Later that year, an FSA Loan Of ficer accelerated Mr. Bean’s lo an and demanded that Mr. Bean pay t he full balance to avoid forecl osure. See Am. Compl. at 4. In response, Mr. Bean submitted medical records demonstrating that he had cancer, hoping that the FSA would allow him the opportunity to recover. See id

. Mr. Bean alleges that in the Fa ll of 2016, the FSA Loan Officer advised Mr. Bean that the FSA could divide his land and sel l a sufficient amount to satis fy the $40,000 that Mr. Bean still owed to the FSA. See Am. Compl. at 4. On December 15, 2016, during a visit to an F SA Office, Mr. Bean asked the FSA L oan Officer whether he could ap ply to reschedule his outstanding debt. See Am. Compl. at 4–5. The FSA Loa n Officer replied that Mr. Beanhad forfeited that opportunity for l oan servicing because Mr. Bean had not completed the necessary application in a timely manner (s ixty days from the receipt of the application materials). See Am. Compl. at 5. Mr. Bean alleges that he was not aware of anyapplication and, in any event, he could not have submitted any such application due to his pro state cancer. See id. Mr. Bean does not affirmatively allege tha t he did not receive a loan se rvicing application. Rather, he

2 At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court accepts Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true. See e.g. , Harris v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth. , 791 F.3d 65, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2015).3 alleges that he “does not reca ll” receiving an application, eit her in person or through the mail. Id

. On January 23, 2017, Mr. Bean filed this action claiming that the USDA acted in an arbitrary and capricious manne r in violation of the APA, and di scriminated against him on the basis of his disability in vi olation of the 1999 Agricultural A ppropriations Act, and the 2008 Farm Bill.

III. LEGAL STANDARD Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civ il Procedure re quires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim ” in order to give the defendan t fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests . Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); accord Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam). A motion t o dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) d oes not test a plaintiff’s ultimate likelihood of success on the merits; rather, it tests whether a plaintiff has properl y stated a claim. See Scheuer v. Rhodes , 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). A court considering such a motion presumes that the complaint’s factual al legations are true and construes them liberally in the plaintiff’s favor. See, e.g. , United States v. Philip Morris, Inc. , 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 2000). Nevertheless, “[t]o survive a m otion to dismiss, a complaint mu st contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief t hat is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This means that a plaint iff’s factual allegations “mu st be enough to raise aright to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the all egations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007) (citations omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of a ction, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are therefore insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Iqbal , 5564 U.S. at 678. A court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal concl usions as true, see id. , nor must a court presume the veracity of the legal conclusions that are co uched as factual allegations. See Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555.

IV. ANALYSIS A. Pigford v. Glickman Consent Decree and the 2008 Farm Bill Much of Mr. Bean’s Amended Compl aint and briefing is devoted to his assertion that he is a claimant under Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999) (“ Pigford ”) and that he is entitled to relief pur suant to the consentdecree entered in th at case. See Am. Compl. at 1–3; Pl.’s Opp’n Mot. Dismiss (“Opp’n”) at 2–4, 5–6, ECF No. 18

. Defendant argues that Mr. Bean’s

status as a Pigford claimant is irrelevant. See Def.’s Mot. Dismiss (“MTD”) at 6–7, ECF No. 16. The Court agrees and finds that Pigford is inapposite to the validity of Mr. Bean’s claims. Pigford was a class action lawsuit f iled on behalf of African-American farmers in 1997. See Pigford , 185 F.R.D. at 89. Plaintiffs in tha t case alleged that the US DA violated the Equal Credit and Opportunities Act (“E COA”) when it discriminated aga inst African-American farmers with respect to its administration of its federal farm credit and benefit programs. See id. at 87. The Pigford plaintiffs further alleged that the USDA violated the APA when it failed to properly investigate and re spond to complaints from 1981 throug h 1996. See id . at 98, 105

. In that case, the court certified a class, which it defined as: All African American farmers w ho (1) farmed, or attempted to fa rm, between January 1, 1981 and December 31, 1996; (2) applied to the Unite d States Department of Agriculture (US DA) during that time period for pa rticipation in a federal farm credit or benef it program and who believed that th ey were discriminated against on the basi s of race in USDA’s response t o that application; and (3) filed a discrimination c omplaint on or before July 1, 1 997, regarding USDA’s treatment of such farm cr edit or benefit application. 185 F.R.D. at 92.5 On April 14, 1999, the court in Pigford entered a consent decree th at settled plaintiffs’ claims. See 185 F.R.D. at 112. The consent decree instructed class member s to file their claims under a two-track system. See 185 F.R.D. at 95. Under Track A, “cl ass members with little o r no documentary evidence” were en titled to “a virtually automati c cash payment of $50,000, and forgiveness of debt owed to the USDA.” Id. Under Track B, class members were given the chance to “prove their cases wit h documentary or other evidence by a preponderance of the evidence [with] . . . no cap on the a mount they may recover.” Id . Class members seeking relief under the consent decree were re quired to submit their claims p ackages on or before October 12, 1999. Consent Decree ¶ 5(c), Pigford , 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999) (No. 97-cv-1978) (“Consent Decree”). A late claim could only proceed after an a rbitrator determined that the claimant’s “failure to submit a timely claim was due to extraor dinary circumstances beyond his control.” Consent Decree ¶ 5(g). By December 31, 2010, over on e billion dollars had been awarded to approximately 16,000 succe ssful claimants in the for m of direct payments, loan forgiveness, and tax relief. See In re Black Farmers Discrimination Litig. , 856 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2011). More than 58,000 indi viduals, though, were denie d leave to submit late claim packages. See id. In 2008, after extensive hearings, C ongress resurrected the la te Pigford claims in the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (“2008 Farm Bill”). Id. Under this Act, “[a]ny Pigford claimant who ha[d] not previous ly obtained a determination on the merits of a Pigford claim [could], in a civil action b rought in the United States D istrict Court for the District of Columbia, obtain that determination.” Pub. L. 110-234, §14012( b), 122 Stat. 923, 1448 (2008). Civil suits brought pursuant to thi s legislation w ere later con solidated inIn re Black Farmers Discrimination Litigation (“ Pigford II ”), 856 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2011). See 856 F. Supp. 2d6 at 16. On October 27, 2011, the litigants in that suit also re ached a settlement. See id. at 42. Under the terms of that agreem ent, members of the class had unt il May 11, 2012 to submit their claims. See 856 F. Supp. 2d at 23. In his Amended Complaint, Mr. B ean claims that he is entitled t o relief under the 2008 Farm Bill and alleges that the “issue raised in this action has its origin in [ Pigford ].” Am. Compl. at 2. But even a cursory review of Mr. Bean’s Amended Complain t demonstrates that there is no such nexus between the facts that Mr. Bean alleges today and th e claims that were remedied in Pigford

. To start, a Pigford claim depends entirely on a rela tionship with the USDA occurri ng between 1981 and 1996. 3 However, Mr. Bean alleges thathe did not borrow money from t he USDA to purchase the land at issue until 2001. See Am. Compl. at 3–5. Furthermore, unlike Pigford , Mr. Bean attempts to allege that the USDA discriminated againsthim, not because of his race, but because of his disability. See Am. Compl. at 5, 6. Thus, Mr. Bean has not alleged any facts from which this Court could reasonably conclude that he is entitled to relief under the Pigford consent decree, which concerned r acial discrimination against A frican-American farmers in the 1980’s and 90’s. As a res ult, Mr. Bean has failed to al lege any facts demonstrating that he may be entitled to relief as a Pigford claimant. B. The 1999 Agricultural Appropriations Act Although Mr. Bean also claims tha t he is entitled to relief und er § 741 of the 1999 Agricultural Appropriations Act, see Am. Compl. at 6, he misunders tands that provision.

3 Mr. Bean could be a Pigford claimant, if he (1) farme d on a tract of land during the period between 1981 and 1996, (2) applie d to the USDA to partic ipate in a federal farm credit or benefit program during that time and was discriminated against on the basis of race, and (3) filed a discrimination complaint to t he USDA “on or before July 1, 19 97.” Pigford , 185 F.R.D. at 92. If that is the case, he could be entitled to relief for those c laims as a late claimant if he had submitted his claim by May 11, 2012. Pigford II at 23. Mr. Bean, however, makes none of these allegations in his Complaint. See generally Am. Compl.7 Section 741 does not create a pr ivate right of action and it al one cannot form the basis for Mr. Bean’s claims. See Pub. L. 105–277, § 741, 112 Stat. 2681. Despite this error, f ederal pleading rules “do not countenance dismissa l of a complaint for imperfec t statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.” Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss. , 135 S. Ct. 346, 346 (2014) (per curiam) (holding that former police officers suing the city for violation of due process right in their terminations need not expressly invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a provision creating such a right of action in their complaint); see also Greer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of D.C. , 113 F. Supp. 3d 297, 305 (D.D.C. 2015) (assessing the pla intiff’s claims under the A DEA in a motion to dismiss “despite Plaintiff’s failure t o, twice, include a citation to t hat statute in his c omplaint”). Thus, the Court will endeavor to discer n the legal theory that Mr. Be an is attempting to assert based on his Complaint and other filings. Based on his filings, the Court concludes that there are three possible legal theories that Mr. Bean may be attempting to aver here: the Americans with Dis abilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. , the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”), 29 U.S .C. § 701 et
seq. , and the Equal Credit Opportun ity Act (“ECOA”), 15 U.S.C. § 16 91 et seq. Mr. Bean alleges in his Amended Complai nt that § 741 “incorporates provi sions of the [ADA].” Am. Compl. at 6. In actuality, § 741 doe s not incorporate the ADA, but instead waives the statute of limitations for certain claims brought under the ECOA. See Pub. L. 105-277, § 741. In his opposition to Defendant’s motion, Mr. Bean makes arguments conc erning both the ADA and the ECOA. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 2–5. Because it is unclear which legal theory M r. Bean is advancing in his Amended Complaint, the C ourt will consid er both the ADA and the ECOA. In addition, the Court will consider the Reh abilitation Act, which is suffic iently similar to the ADA to8 warrant consideration. However , for the reasons stated below, the Court finds that Mr. Bean has not stated a claim under any of these statutes. 1. ADA To the extent that Plaintiff s eeks relief under the ADA, that c laim must fail. See Am. Compl. at 6. Defendant argues th at the USDA is an agency withi n the executive branch and thus not covered by the ADA. See MTD at 6, ECF No. 16; Defendant ’s Reply to Opp’n Mot. Dismiss (“Reply”) at 3, ECF No. 20. Mr. Bean responds that the ADA is only unavailable to federal employees. See Opp’n at 4–5, ECF No. 18. Therefore , he argues that, because he is not a federal employee, his action is not barred. See id . Mr. Bean’s argument is without merit. The ADA is a civil rights law that prohibits discrimination aga inst individuals with disabilities in several areas of life including, employment, st ate and local government services, public accommodations, a nd telecommunications. See generally 42 U.S.C. ch. 126. However, the ADA does not cover the federa l government in any of these a reas. The “employer” under Title I of the ADA “does not incl ude [] the United States,” thu s barring claims by federal employees. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B) . Title II of the ADA prohib its discrimination of qualified individuals due to their disabil ities in “the services, program s, or activities of a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Yet, “public entity” is defined to cover only: “(A) any State or local government; (B) any department, agency, special purpose distric t, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local governme nt; and (C) the National Railr oad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131. Thus, the federal government and its agencies are not covered. A claim for relie f under Title III of the ADA is also not viable as it prohibits discrimination by “public accommodations,” but only applies to enumerated types of private entities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181–82. Thus, to the ext ent that Mr. Bean is at tempting to bring suit9 under the ADA, his claim must fail because the federal governme nt is not amenable to suit under that statute. 2. Rehabilitation Act Mr. Bean’s claims fare no better un der the Rehabilitation Act. While the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination on t he basis of disabilities under any “program or activity” conducted by any federal age ncies, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), 4 Mr. Bean has failed to state a claim. The Rehabilitation Act provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability . . . be excluded from partic ipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected t o discrimination under any progra m or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S .C. § 794(a) (emphasis added). C ritically, a plaintiff seeking relief under section 504 of the Rehabilita tion Act “must show that he or she was discriminated against solely by reason of his [or her] handicap .” R.S. v. District of Columbia , 292 F. Supp. 2d 23, 27 (D.D.C. 2003) (emphasis added) (quoting Walker v. District of Columbia , 969 F.Supp. 794, 797 (D.D.C.1997)). Here, although Mr. B ean recites the word “discr imination” in his Amended Complaint, he has not allege d any acts of discrimination nor st ated any facts suggesting that the USDA’s denial of his request for loan servicing was due “solely ”—or even partly—to his disability. Indeed, Plaintiff hims elf alleges that the FSA den ied his request for loan servicing because the 60-day application period had expired. See Am. Compl. at 5. Accordingly, Mr. Bean has not alleged facts showing tha t he is entitled to relief und er the Rehabilitation Act.

4 Defendant had adequate notice of a legal theory based on the R ehabilitation Act as they have addressed it in their motion to dismiss. See MTD at 6.10 3. ECOA Finally, considering Mr. Bean’s A mended Complaint as a claim un der the ECOA, the Court finds that Mr. Bean has faile d to state a p lausible claim for relief. The ECOA prohibits creditors from discriminating a gainst any applicant “on the bas is of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status , or age.” 15 U.S.C. §1691(a)(1). Mr. Bean, however , states no facts in his Amended Complaint from wh ich to infer that the USDA disc riminated against him based on any of those protected classes. Hildebrandt v. Vilsack , 102 F. Supp. 3d 318, 325–26 (D.D.C. 2015) (“To succeed on their ECOA clai ms, the [plaintiffs] must demonstrate not only that the FSA denied at least one request for a loan application or loan servicing, but also that any such denials were made on the basis of the [plaintiffs’] race.”). T hus, the Court finds that Mr. Bean has failed to state a claim under the ECOA. * * * Consequently, the Court finds t hat Mr. Bean has failed to state a claim under any of the statutes that could reasonabl y have been implicated by his supp osed claim under § 741 of the 1999 Appropriations Act. C. APA While Mr. Bean’s other claims necessarily fail, the Court is sa tisfied that he has adequately plead fact ual matters sufficien t to support a claim under the APA. Under the APA, an agency decision should be upheld unl ess it is “arb itrary, capri cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). “To make this finding the court must consider whether the decisi on was based on a considerationof the relevant factors and whether there has been a c lear error of judgment.” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe , 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). “[T]he ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court11 is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the age ncy.” Id . As the Supreme Court has instructed, “the agency mus t examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action incl uding a rational connection betw een the facts found and the choice made.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (internal quotations omitted); accord Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft (“ Holy Land I ”), 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 67 (D.D.C. 2002), aff’d , 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“the Court must review the administrative record assembled by the agency to determine whether its decision was supported by arational basis”). The arbitrary-and-capricious s tandard of review is “very defere ntial.” Rural Cellular Ass’n v. FCC , 588 F.3d 1095, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The refore, the court wi ll generally defer to the wisdom of the agency as long as the acti on is supported by “reasoned decisionmaking.” Fox v. Clinton , 684 F.3d 67, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2012); see also Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp. , 461 U.S. 402, 422 (1983) (explaining t hat the agency’s decisi on need not be “the only reasonable one, or even ... the r esult [the Court] would h ave reached”) (quoting Unemployment Comp. Comm’n v. Aragon , 329 U.S. 143, 153 (1946)). “Moreover, the party challenging an agency’s action as arbitrary and capricious bear s the burden of proof.” San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. U.S. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n , 789 F.2d 26, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (en banc). In this case, Defendant argue s that, in denying Mr. Bean’s requ est for loan servicing, it was merely following the regula tions that it had promulgated onthis subject. See MTD at 6–7. Loan servicing for loan programs administered by the FSA is gov erned by 7 C.F.R. § 766. When a borrower’s delinquency or f inancial distress is the resu lt of reduced ability to pay due to circumstances beyond the borrower’ s control, including illness or injury of a borrower who12 operates the farm, a borrower may b e considered for loan servic ing under certain conditions. 5 See 7 C.F.R. § 766.104(a). The agency will send loan servicing in formation via certified mail to any borrower that is “90 days or more past due on loan payments ” or to any borrower who “request[s] this information.” 6 7 C.F.R. § 766.101. However, if a borrower who has received a loan servicing application for m “fails to timely respond or doe s not submit a complete application within [a] 60–day tim eframe,” the Agency will notif y the borrower of the agency’s intent to accelerate the loan a nd the borrower’s right to reque st reconsideration. 7 C.F.R. § 766.103(b). If the borrower does not apply for loan servicing, the agency will then accelerate the borrowers’ account. 7 C .F.R. § 766.351(b)(1). If the USDA can demonstrate thatit was adhering to the relevan t statutes and regulations concerning loan servicing when it denied Mr. Bean, then its dec ision was neither arbitrary nor capricious. For example, the Nin th Circuit considered a case ve ry similar to the one at bar in Grinstead v. United States , 122 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1997) (unpublis hed). In that case, t he plaintiff argued that he should ha ve been exempt from foreclosure for so long as he remained disabled and that the Farmers Ho me Administration (“FmHA”) “act ed arbitrarily and capriciously” when it “decid[ed] to foreclose on his property w ithout offering any further extensions of time or restructuring options with regard to his farm loans.” Id. at *1. The Ninth Circuit disagreed. It observed tha t, under the relevant statute , “[i]f the borrower can service a restructured loan with a present value that is gr eater than or equal to the liquidation recovery

5 Some of the conditions are (i) the borrower does not have non -essential assets the net value of which is sufficient to pay the delinquent portion of t he loan and (ii) the borrower has acted in good faith. See 7 C.F.R. § 766.104.

6 If certified mail is not accepted, the notice will be sent by first class mail to the borrower’s last known address. See 7 C.F.R. § 766.101.13 value of FmHA’s collateral, FmHA must restructure the loan, the reby allowing the borrower to continue his farming operation.” Id. at *2 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2001(c )(5)). Although the plaintiff had applied for loan servicing, the FmHA had determined “that e ven with loan servicing; after paying all operating expenses, t axes, scheduled payments on all debts and family living expenses, [plaintiff] would have ha d an available balance of ne gative $6,048.” Id. Therefore, regardless of the plaintiff’s di sability, the Ninth Circuit hel d that the “FmHA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously whe n it decided not to offer [plain tiff] any further extensions of time or restructuring options with r egard to his outstanding FmHA lo ans.” Id . Moreover, other courts in different contexts have likew ise found that administrative d ecisions made in accordance with statutes and regulations are not arbitrary and capricious. See e.g. , Makey Deli Grocery Inc. v. United States , 873 F. Supp. 2d 516, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that agency action “was neither arbitrary nor capricious ” when agency “adhered to its o wn regulations”); Young Jin Choi v. United States , 944 F. Supp. 323, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“A sanction is not arb itrary and capricious when a federal agenc y properly adheres to its own re gulations and guidelines when imposing it.”) (citing Lawrence v. United States, 693 F.2d 274, 276 (2d Cir. 1982)). Here, Mr. Bean alleges that whe n he requested loan servicing, h e was denied “because [he] did not complete the loan s ervicing application in a timel y [manner] ([s]ixty [d]ays).” Am. Compl. at 5. This, of course, is consistent with the USDA’s re gulations that require borrowers to submit timely applications in orde r to be considered for loan s ervicing. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 766.101(d), 766.103(b). However, this 60-day time frame begi ns to run from the date the borrower receives the application materials. See id at § 766.101(d). Mr. Bean alleges that he “was not aware of ... the Loan Servicing materials” and “does not recall any such receipt [of these materials] either in pers on or via mail.” Am. Compl. at 5 . Although Mr. Bean does not14 affirmatively allege that he did not receive application materi als, see generally Am. Compl., the Court is obliged to construe his Complaint liberally and grant him “the benefit of all inferences that can be derived fro m the facts alleged,” Kowal v. MCI Comms. Corp. , 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Doing so, the Court believes that Mr. Bean’s allegations are sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference that he did not receive the rele vant loan servicing application materials. If true, then denyi ng him loan servicing for failure to submit a timely application would not be in accordance with the USDA’s regulations and may very well have been arbitrary and capricious. See e.g. , Ingram Barge Co. v. United States , 884 F.2d 1400, 1405 (D.C. Cir.1989) ( “Thus, even if the [ agency] had made and then breac hed a promise to depart from its own regulation, its departure—not its return to the established course—would be arbitrary and capricious.”); Fuller v. Winter , 538 F. Supp. 2d 179, 186 (D.D.C. 2008) (“It is a fundamental principle of administrative law that an agency is bound to adhe re to its own re gulations” and “failure to do so can lead to a rbitrary and capricious decision -making in violation of the APA.”) Thus, the Court finds that the fa ctual material in Mr. Bean’s C omplaint sufficiently supports his claim under the APA and accordingly denies Defendant’s Motion t o Dismiss with regard to that claim. Of course, the governmentis free to demonstrate its co mpliance with its regulations upon summary judgment after submissi on of the applicable administrat ive record.

V. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss the ca se under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proc edure is granted in part and den ied in part. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is se parately and contemporaneousl y issued. Dated: September 11, 2017 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge