AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed April 13, 2022 

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In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-21-00823-CV THE CITY OF CELINA , TEXAS, Appellant V. SHEA SCOTT, Appellee On Appeal from the 44th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-18195 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Carlyle , Smith, and Garcia Opinion by Justice Smith Appellee Shea Scott sued the City of Celina under the Texas Whistleblower Act (the Act) after the City terminated him. The City filed a pl ea to the jurisdiction, which the trial court denied. In three issu es, the City argues Scott failed to invoke the protections of the Act because he did not make a report to an appropriate law enforcement authority. We disagree with the City’s interpretation of the Act and cited case law. We affirm the trial c ourt’s order denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction. We deny Scott’s request to sanction the City for filing a frivolous appeal. Background–2– The following facts are from Scott’s or iginal and amended petitions. Scott was the City’s assistant chief of police. On June 8, 2020, Scott received emails from Sam Jeter, the husband of Jennifer Jeter, who was the City’s human resources director. The emails indicated that Jenni fer committed criminal family violence by pointing a loaded gun at Sam and possessed illegal drugs and dr ug paraphernalia. Because Scott received information about criminal conduct, he in good faith believed the law required him to report the allegations to a law enforcement agency. After Scott drafted a criminal complaint, he gave it to Detective Jeremiah Phillips in the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) an d instructed Phillips to file it with the proper law enforcement agency. At that time, Scott was unsure where the Jeters lived. Phillips determined they lived in Denton County and subs equently filed the criminal complaint with the Denton County Sheriff’s Office. Scott also filed an internal complaint with the police chief regarding Jennifer’s conduct. The City hired outside counsel to invest igate the allegations against Jennifer. After the City discovered fals e information on her resume, Jennifer resigned on July 2, 2020. Outside counsel then continued to investigate the police department, the police chief, and Scott. According to Scott, the city manage r told him not to investigate “my directors” and that Scott should have violat ed the law and kept th e allegations against Jennifer a secret instead of reporting them . The city manager expressly prohibited–3– Scott or other members of the police department from reporting misconduct by any City employee at the director level or above without the city manager’s approval. On August 3, 2020, the City hired an interim police chief. On August 12, 2020, the City placed Scott on administra tive leave and demanded resignation or face termination. The City did not identif y any violation or justification for the decision. Scott refused a se verance offer and requested re instatement. Instead of reinstatement, the interim police chief draf ted a list of grievances against Scott allegedly based on audits performed by an independent auditor and the human resources department. Sco tt was never provided copies of these audits. Scott responded to the grievances and stated the real reason for the grievances was retaliation for reporting Jennifer’s alleged criminal conduct. On October 5, 2020, Scott received written notice of his termination. He timely appealed his termination, participat ed in a hearing, but did not receive a decision. Scott subsequently filed suit under the Act. He believed he was wrongfully terminated because he in good faith reported a violati on of law by another public employee to an appropriate la w enforcement authority. Sc ott attached to his petition the emails from Sam, and a copy of hi s “FORMAL COMPLAINT,” dated June 9, 2020, to the city manager, the police chief, a nd the city attorney. Scott stated he was making the complaint “as I have exhausted all options to remedy the situation within–4– my chain of command.” His complaint desc ribed the drugs and drug paraphernalia at Jeters’ home, along with de tails about Jennifer pointing a loaded gun at Sam. The City filed its answer and plea to the jurisdiction on Janua ry 13, 2021. The City alleged Scott failed to sufficiently pl ead facts to waive the City’s immunity. The City argued Scott’s petiti on “affirmatively demonstrates [he] did not make a good faith report to an approp riate law enforcement agency .” The City asserted Scott’s actions were insufficient to invoke the Act because Sco tt made an internal complaint with the City and instructed a subordinate officer to file a criminal complaint with an unspecified law enfo rcement agency. Scott subsequently amended his petition, elaborat ed on his two written reports , and added a third oral report. In the amended petition, Scott explaine d Phillips was his subordinate. It was within Scott’s authority to delegate tasks, such as determining the proper jurisdiction for filing criminal complaints. If afte r receiving a criminal complaint Phillips determined the proper authority was a nother police department, it was within Phillips’ normal scope and authority to forward the complaint to the proper law enforcement authority. Within forty-eight hours, Phillips determin ed the Jeters lived in Denton County, and he forwarded Sco tt’s written report to the Denton County Sheriff’s Office. After the Denton County Sheriff’s Office received the report, a detective in the office contacted Scott. Scott then provid ed an oral report of the alleged criminal–5– conduct, including the source of the allegati ons and other related information. The City did not amend its plea to the jurisdiction to address this third oral report. Scott filed a response to the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and sought sanctions under rule 13. After a hearing, the trial court denied the City’s plea to the jurisdiction. The trial court stated in the order that Scott’s oral discussion with the Denton County Sheriff’s Office detective a nd his written reports to Phillips and the City’s police chief satisfied “the Texas Wh istleblower Act’s requirement for a report to an appropriate law enforcement agency.” The court denied Scott’s rule 13 motion for sanctions. This appeal followed.
Standard of Review A plea to the jurisdiction challenges th e court’s authority to decide a case. Heckman v. Williamson Cty ., 369 S.W.3d 137, 149 (Tex. 2012). We review a plea questioning the trial court’s subj ect matter jurisdiction de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). We focus on the plaintiff’s petition to determine whether the pleaded facts affirmatively demonstrate that subject matter jurisdiction exists. Id . We construe the plea dings liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Id

. If a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, the trial court may consider evidence and must do so when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised. Id . at 227; Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue , 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000). When evidence is subm itted that implicates the merits of the–6– case, our standard of review generally mi rrors the summary judgment standard under Texas Rule of Civ il Procedure 166a(c). Miranda , 133 S.W.3d at 228; see T EX

. R. C IV

. P. 166a(c). The burden is on the govern mental unit to present evidence to support its plea. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d at 228. If the governmental unit meets this burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a disputed material fact exists regarding the jurisdictional issue. Id . We take as true all evidence favorable to the plaintiff and indulge every reasonable in ference and resolve any doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Id . If the evidence creates a fact question regarding the jurisdictional issue, then the trial court ca nnot grant the plea to the jurisdiction, and the fact question will be resolved by the fact-finder. Id . at 227–28. If the relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a f act question on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court rules on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law. Id . at 228. Generally, governmental entities are imm une from suit and liability under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. State v. Lueck , 290 S.W.3d 876, 880 (Tex. 2009). Sovereign immunity from suit deprives a cour t of subject matter jurisdiction and is properly asserted in a pl ea to the jurisdiction. Harris Cty. v. Sykes , 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004); Miranda , 133 S.W.3d at 225–26. The Act, however, waives immunity from suit to the extent a government al entity is liable under its provisions.
See T EX

. G OV ’ T C ODE ANN . § 554.0035.–7– Discussion In three issues, the City argues Scott’ s two internal reports within the Celina police department and his phone call with the Denton County Sheriff’s Office do not qualify as reports to an “a ppropriate law enforcement agency” to satisfy section 554.002(b) of the government code. See T EX

. G OV ’ T C ODE ANN . § 554.002(b). Scott responds that the City relies on in applicable case law and ignores a plain reading of the statute that supports the tria l court’s denial of the City’s plea to the jurisdiction. The standard for a violation of the Act appears in section 554.002(a). Id

. § 554.002(a); Lueck, 290 S.W.3d at 881. The elemen ts of a Whistleblower claim are jurisdictional and may not be waived. Univ. of Houston. v. Barth , 403 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam). Under the Act, a plaintiff is required to prove: (1) that he was a public employee, (2) that he reported a violation of law in good faith, (3) that the viol ation of law reported was committed by his employing governmental entity or another public employee, (4) that the report was made to an appr opriate law enforcement authority, and (5) that his employing governmental entity took an adverse personnel action against him because of the report. Tex. Dep’t of Crimin al Justice v. McElyea , 239 S.W.3d 842, 849 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied); see T EX

. G OV ’ T C ODE ANN . § 554.002(a). The City only challenges whether Scott’s reports were made to an appropriate law enforcement authority. Section 554.002(b) defines “appropriate law enforcement authority” as follows:–8– [A] report is made to an appropriat e law enforcement authority if the authority is part of a state or local governmental entity or of the federal government that the employee in good faith believes is authorized to (1) regulate under or enforce the law alleged to be violated in the report; or (2) investigate or prosecute a violation of criminal law. T EX

. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN . § 554.002(b). An employee’s be lief is in good faith if: (1) the employee believed the gove rnmental entity was qualifie d, and (2) the employee’s belief was reasonable in light of the employee’s training and experience. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Okoli , 440 S.W.3d 611, 614 (Tex. 2014). To support its position, the City relie s on a line of Texas Supreme Court cases holding that internal reports to anothe r governmental employee, even if that employee is a supervisor tasked with ensu ring internal compliance, are not reports to an appropriate law enforcement authority. 1 The City argues Scott’s reports within the City’s police department were insuffici ent to trigger the Act’s protections. None of the supreme court cases the City cites involved a police officer reporting a criminal act. Rathe r, the cases involved internal reports to individuals within the governmental entity whom the c ourt determined did not possess outward1 See, e.g. , Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Franco , 417 S.W.3d 443, 445–46 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam) (in the school context, reporting to school officials not charged with enforcing laws outside the district falls short of what the Act requires); Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Farran , 409 S.W.3d 653, 655 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam) (same); Univ. of Houston v. Barth , 403 S.W.3d 851, 855–58 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam) (holding that none of the four people Barth repor ted alleged violations of the pe nal code—the university’s general counsel, CFO, internal auditor, and associate provost—c ould have investigated or prosecuted criminal law violations against third parties outside the university); Tex. A & M Univ.–Kingsville v. Moreno , 399 S.W.3d 128, 130 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam) (holding evidence by an employee at state university showing she reported an alleged violation of law to an authorit y that only oversaw internal university compliance was jurisdictionally insufficient under the Act); Gentilello , 398 S.W.3d at 689 (medical school faculty member overseeing federal compliance regulations did not have “l aw enforcement status” for reports of federal law violations); Lueck , 290 S.W.3d at 885–86.–9– looking enforcement or regulatory powers. See, e.g. , Gentilello , 398 S.W.3d at 686, 689 (“[F]or an entity to constitute an appr opriate law-enforcement authority under the Act, it must have authority to enforce, investigate, or prosecute violations of law against third parties outside of the entity itself, or it must have authority to promulgate regulations governing the c onduct of such third parties.”). To the extent the City argues internal complaints are insufficient, the supreme court has twice rejected the conclusion that a report under the Act “can never be made internally.” Id . at 686 (emphasis in original); Okoli , 440 S.W.3d at 616–17. In fact, the supreme court has provided th e following hypothetical involving a police officer: A police department employee could retain the protections of the Whistleblower Act if she reported thather partner is dealing narcotics to her supervisor in the narcotics or internal affairs division. In such a situation, the employee works for an entity with authority to investigate violations of drug laws commi tted by the citizenry at large. See Okoli , 440 S.W.3d at 611; Gentilello , 398 S.W.3d at 686. The Okoli court further recognized that the whistleblow er in the hypothetical was reporting a violation of law to a police officer, and “a police officer is authorized to investigate violations of law and to cite or arre st persons suspected of committing such violations .” Okoli , 440 S.W.3d at 611. Scott’s reports to Phillips and the po lice chief regardi ng Jeter’s alleged criminal violations are the types of inte rnal reports that fall within the supreme court’s hypothetical. Scott made report s to individuals who were “part of a–10– governmental arm or entity authorized to conduct criminal law investigations.” See Okoli , 440 S.W.3d at 617. The Celina police department, as a gove rnmental arm or entity, had “outward-looking powers” and authority to enforce and investigate violations of the Texas Penal Code. See, e.g. , Raymondville Indep. Sch. Dist

. v. Ruiz , No. 13-19-00597-CV, 2021 WL 822699, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus ChristiEdinburg Mar. 4, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (affirming de nial of school district’s plea to the jurisdiction when school dist rict truancy officer reported criminal violation to police chief, as his immediat e supervisor, and RISD police department had authority to investigate such violatio ns). Thus, Scott pleaded sufficient facts establishing that he in good faith filed tw o internal reports with appropriate law enforcement authorities. In reaching this conclusion, we rej ect the City’s argument that section 554.002(b)(2) has a geographical requirement limiting an officer’s ability to investigate or prosecute criminal law viola tions. The City asserts that even if the statute allowed Scott to make an internal re port, his reports were still not made to an “appropriate law enforcement authority” because the Celina police department did not have jurisdiction to investigate allege d criminal violations by a city employee that occurred outside its jurisdiction. Th e City, however, admits there are no cases holding that geography is relevant under the Act, but instead cites two cases “which clearly assume that is the case.” We are unpersuaded by the City’s assumptions.–11– In Tharling v. City of Port Lavaca , 329 F.3d 422 (5th Cir. 2003), a federal case not binding on this Court, the Fifth Ci rcuit concluded an o fficer was entitled to protection under the Act because he reported an alleged criminal violation to the Texas City police department, the police department “charged with enforcing the law in Texas City, where the violation occurred.” Id . at 430. The City emphasizes the “where the violation occurred” langua ge; however, the court’s holding was not dependent on this fact and is dicta. Si milarly, we reject the City’s reliance on Connally v. Dallas Independent School District , 506 S.W.3d 767, 783 (Tex. App.— El Paso 2016, no pet.) (acknowledging there was no dispute betwee n the parties that the DISD police department had authority to investigate pena l code violations occurring within its jurisdiction involving DISD employees or third parties). A plain reading of the statute requires a person to make a report to an entity “authorized to investigate or prosecute a violation of criminal law.” T EX

. G OV ’ T C ODE ANN . § 554.002(b)(2) (emphasis added). It does not require that the entity or agency has authority to investigate or prosecute the violation at issue. The legislature did, however, include such a limitation in subsection (b)(1), which requires a person to make a report to an entity “authorized to regulate under or enforce the law alleged to be violated in the report.” Id . § 554.002(b)(1) (emphasis added). We endeavor to read statutes contextually to give effect to every word, clause, and sentence. See In re Office of Attorney Gen ., 422 S.W.3d 623, 629 (Tex. 2013).–12– We presume the legislature included each word in the statute for a purpose, and words not included were purposefully omitted. ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Coleman , 512 S.W.3d 895, 899 (Tex. 2017). The statutory text is clear. Had the legislature intended to require a person to make a report to an entity authorized to investigate or prosecute the violation of criminal law alleged to be violated in the report , it could have added such language to (b )(2). Because it did not, we decline the City’s invitation to read language into the statute. We conclude Scott satisfied section 554.002(b)(2) as to his reports to Detective Phillips a nd the police chief. Accordingly, where Jeter lived and wher e the crimes allegedly occurred is not relevant to triggering the Act’s protecti on under section 554.002(b )(2). We overrule the City’s first and second issues. In its third issue, the City argues Sc ott’s conversation with the Denton County Sheriff’s Department is not entitled to pr otection because the Sheriff’s Department initiated the phone call to discuss Scott’s written report, which had been forwarded to the office. The City provides no authority for its propositions that section 554.002(b) does not apply if an entity reaches out to a party to discuss a report or that section 554.002(b) does not apply to any further statements a plaintiff makes once an investigation under the Act begins. If a report satisfies section 554.002(b)(1) or (2), then the Act applies to the report. The plain language of the statute does not limit “report” to only the first report starting the investigation or prohib it protection under the Act to subsequent–13– oral statements an employee makes to an entity. To the contra ry, there is case law in which the court analyzed multiple reports when determining if any were provided to “appropriate law enfo rcement authorities.” See, e.g. , Connally , 506 S.W.3d at 783 (analyzing numerous report s filed to various DISD departments to determine whether they were appropriate law en forcement authorities under the Act); see also Barth , 403 S.W.3d at 857–58 (concl uding reports to general counsel, CFO, internal auditor, and associate provos t were not reports to an appropriate law enforcement authority). Further, oral statements qualify as reports under the Act. See Connally , 506 S.W.3d at 784 (noting Act does not require a “formal” report and considering whether statements made in conversations provided sufficient information to support conclusion that DISD personal engaged in criminal activity); see also City of Donna
v. Ramirez , 548 S.W.3d 26, 33, 39 (T ex. App.—Corpus Chris ti-Edinburgh 2017, pet. denied) (considering whether Act applied to alleged violations of law reported orally to police chief and municipal judge). Here, a detective with the Denton C ounty Sheriff’s Office contacted Scott based on Scott’s original report that Phi llips forwarded to the office. Scott then provided an oral report via telephone of Je ter’s alleged criminal conduct, including the source of the allegations and other related information. The Denton County Sheriff’s Office was an “appropriate law enforcement authority” because the office was part of a local government entity investigating a violation of criminal law. See–14– T EX

. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN . § 544.002(b)(2). The trial c ourt did not err by denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction on this basi s. We overrule the City’s third issue.
Rule 45 Motion for Sanctions Scott has requested we sanction the C ity pursuant to rule of appellate procedure 45 for bringing a frivolous appeal because the City ignores clear statutory language, ignores language of the cas es it relies upon, relies upon a ground not properly preserved, and uses its appeal for needless delay. Rule 45 permits an award of just damages to the prevailing party of an appeal when the court determines the appeal is frivolous. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 45. “An appeal is frivolous when the reco rd, viewed from the perspective of the advocate, does not provide reasonable ground s for the advocate to believe that the case could be reversed.” See Owen v. Jim Allee Imports, Inc ., 380 S.W.3d 276, 290 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pe t.). Our decision to gran t appellate sanctions is a matter of discretion that we exercise with caution, careful deliberation, and only in truly egregious circumstances. Id . Moreover, rule 45 does not require that we award damages in every frivolous appeal . See Performance Pulsation Control, Inc. v. Sigma Drilling Techs

. , LLC , No. 05-17-01423-CV, 2018 WL 6599180, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 17, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). After reviewing the record and briefing fi led in this Court, we conclude this appeal does not present the type of egregious circumstances warranting the–15– imposition of sanctions. Accordingly, we deny Scott’s request for damages under rule 45.
Conclusion The trial court’s order denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction is affirmed.

210823F.P05 /Crai g Smith / CRAIG SMITH JUSTICE–16– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
THE CITY OF CELINA, TEXAS, Appellant

No. 05-21-00823-CV V. SHEA SCOTT, Appellee On Appeal from the 44th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-18195. Opinion delivered by Justice Smith. Justices Carlyle and Garcia participating. In accordance with this Court’s opi nion of this date, the order denying appellant The City of Celina’ s plea to the jurisdiction is AFFIRMED

. It is ORDERED that appellee SHEA SCOTT recover his costs of this appeal from appellant THE CITY OF CELINA, TEXAS.
Judgment entered April 13, 2022.