### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A ugus t 8, 200 7 S es sio n CRACKER BARREL OL D COUNTY STORE , INC., ET AL 

### . v.

RICHARD EPPERSO N, ET AL 

### . Appeal from the Chancery Court for D avidson County No. 05-2220-II Car ol McCoy, C hancellor

No. M2006- 02424-COA-R 3-CV - Filed Marc h 4, 2008

In denying a r equest for

attorneys’ fee s in an ac tion involvi ng the enf orce ment of a de clar ation of ease ments and re strictions, the trial court found the phrase “costs and e xpenses” in that declar ation does not include re covery of attorne ys’ fe es. The trial court is af firmed. Tenn. R. App . P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancer y Court Affir med
P AT R I C I A J. C OTTRE LL , J., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which E. R I LE Y A NDE R S ON , S P
. J., joined. F R ANK G. C LE MENT , J R ., J. filed a dissenting opinion.
C. D e we e s Be rry, Nanc y S. Jo ne s, Na sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or theapp e llants , Cr a c ke r B arr e l O ld Cou ntry St or e , I nc . a ndCr a c ke r B arr e l A sso c iate s L LC. William T. Ramsey, Jonathan H. W ardle , Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellees Richa

rd Epperson and Timothy Causey.
OP IN ION
The sole issue on a

ppeal is whe ther the pa

rties intended to includ e at torneys’ f ees in a n a gr e e me nt that a llo we d r e c ov e ry of lit igatio n c os t a nd

e xp e ns e s. Cr a c ke r B arr e l O ld C ou nty Sto re , I nc ., a ndCr a c ke r B arr e l A sso c iate s LLC ( c oll e c tiv e ly

“ Cr a c ke r B arr e l” ) fi led suit a ga ins t Mr . Ri c ha rdEp pe rs on a ndTi mothy Caus e y ( c oll e c tiv e ly “def endants” ) alleging that de fendants’ plan to expand the ir building viol ated t h e De clar ation of Re c ipr oc a l Rig hts a ndEa se me nt andRe stric tiv e Cov e nants (“ De c laratio n” ) w hic h g ov e rn e d theus e of both the prope rties of Cra cker Barre l and def

endants. As pa

rt of that ac tion , C ra ck er Barre l re qu e ste d that it

be a wa rd e d atto rn e ys ’ f

e e s. Th e de fe nd a nts lik e wi se so ug ht t o r e c ov e r atto rn e ys ’ fe e s inthe ir

c ou nterc la im.-2-

Ac c or din g to Cr a c ke r Barr e l, para gr aph 9 of the De c laratio n au tho ri z e s a wa rdof a tto rn e ys ’ fe e s a s f oll ow s: Th e e a se me nts , r e stric tio ns , b e ne fi ts, a nd ob lig a tio ns he re in s e t f orth s ha ll c re a te mutual benef

its and servitude on the P roperty running with the l and and shall inure to the benef

it of and be bindi ng upon the respective Lot Owner s, their succ essors and assigns. In the event of any violation or threatened violation of a ny of the provisions of thi s D e c laratio n, a ny pe rs on ha vin g an int e re st of re c or d in any pa rt of thePr op e rty shall be entitled forthwith to full and adequate r el i ef b y i njunction and/or all such other a vailable lega l and equitable r emedies f rom the consequence s of any suc h vio latio n. Al l c os ts ande xp e ns e s o f any su it or pr oc e e din g sha ll be a sse sse d a gains t the def aulting party.
It is not disputed that Cracke r Barr el ultimately prevailed when an Agre ed Judgment and Permane nt Injunction was ente red in Janua ry of 2006. With rega

rd to attorneys’ fee s, the Agre ed Ju dg me nt p ro vid e d a s f

oll ow s: IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that should the Parties be una ble to resolve through informal, non-binding mediation that portion of the dispute dea ling with the interpre tation of Paragr aph Nine ( 9) of the D ecla ration, as it relates to the payment of Pla int if

fs ’ a tto rn e ys ’ fe e s, c os ts a nd e xp e ns e s inc ur re d in c on ne c tion with obtaining this Permane nt Injunction, Plaintiffs may rene w their motion for a n awa rd of su c h f e e s, c os ts ande xp e ns e s. After a hea ring, the trial court awar ded Crac ker Bar rel its costs but found that the langua ge in the Declaration authorizing “costs and expenses” did not include attorneys’ fe es. Crac ker Bar rel app e a ls the tria l c ou rt ’s de nia l of its re qu e st f

or a tto rn e ys ’ f

e e s.
It is we ll se ttl e d that Ten ne sse e fo llo ws theAm e ri c a n Ru le wh ic h p ro vid e s th a t li tig a nts mus t p a y th e ir o w n a tt o r n e y s ’ f e e s u n le s s th e r e is a s ta

tu te o r c o n tr a c t p r o v id ing otherwise. Taylor v. Fe ze ll , 158 S.W .3 d 352 , 3 59 (T e nn . 2 00 5) ; State v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. , 18 S.W.3d 18 6, 19 4 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) ; S t a t e ex re l. Orr v. Thomas , 585 S.W.2d 606, 607 (Tenn. 1979) . In the absenc e of suc h a fe e-shifti n g s t at u te, contra ct provision, or other r ecogniz ed equitable ground, courts may not co mpel a losing party to pay the w inning party’s attorne ys’ fe es. Brown & Wi lli am so n Tob ac c o Co rp ., 18 S.W .3 d at 19 4; Kul tur a, In c . v . S ou the rn Le as ing Cor p ., 923 S.W.2d 536, 540 (Tenn. 1996)

. W ith ou t a statut ory or co ntr a c tua l bas is, or c e rt a in eq uit able ba se s, a llo wanc e of a tto rn e ys ’ fee s is contra

ry t o the publ ic pol icy of Tenne ssee. John Kohl & C o. v. De arborn and Ewing , 977 S.W .2 d 5 28 , 5 34 (T e nn . 1 99 8) ; P u ll m a n S ta n d a r d v
. A b e x Co r p. , 6 9 3 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tenn. 19 85 ); Thayer v. W

right Company , 3 62 S.W .2 d 8 05 , 8 12 (T e nn . 1 96 1) ; Fossett v. Gray , 173 S.W.3d 74 2, 75 2 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 4) ; Mo rro w v . B ob bit t , 943 S.W.2d 384, 392 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); John J. Heirigs Constr. C o. v. Ex ide , 70 9 S.W .2 d 6 04 , 6 09 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 98 6) ; ABC Painting C o. v. White O aks Apartments of Herm itage , 2006-00280-COA- R3-CV, 2007 WL 14250, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2007) (no Te nn. R. App. P. 11 application filed).The que s t i on, how eve r , i s w het her t he ow ner of t he pr oper t y w ho cr ea t ed t he obl i gat i ons i n t he D ec l ar at i on 1 i nt ende d “ cos t s a nd e xpens es ” t o i ncl ude at t or neys ’ f ee s
. Thi s i s s ue i s pr es ent ed i n a s l i ght l y uni que cont r ac t ual s et t i ng sin c e C ra c k e r B a rr e l an d th e d e fe n d a n ts d id n o t fo rm th e c o n tra c t at issu e , b u t t h e ir p ro p e rtie s a re s u b je c t t o it

. Cons eque nt l y, w hen w e s pea k of t he i nt ent of

t he cont r ac t i ng pa r t i es , i t i s not Cr ac ker Bar rel a n d the de f enda nt s but
r at her t he or i gi nal ow ner of t he pr oper t i es w ho c r ea t ed t he D ec l ar at i on.

-3- For p u rp o s e s o f

d e te r mi n in g w h e th e r

a n e x c e p ti o n to th e A me r ic a n Ru lee x is ts , the Dec laration is considered a contra ct. Thus, the question her e is whethe r the De clar ation in para graph 9 authorize s rec overy of

attorneys’ fee s. Our courts have provide d a standa rd to assist in deciding whether the parties to a contr act intende d the pre vailing party to rec over attorneys’ fe es in ac tions to enfor ce the contra ct. In Pu llm an Sta nd ar d , the Tenne ssee Supre me Court stated the re quirement 1 thusly:
We con ti n u e to a d h e r e to th e ru leinT e n n e s s e e th a t att o r n e y s ’ f e e s ar e n ot re c ov e ra blein the abs e nce o f a statuteor c on tr a c t spe c if

ic all y providing for such rec overy . . . 693 S.W.2d at 338 (e mphasis added)

. This require ment that a contr act “ specific ally” provide for r ec o v er y of attorne ys’ fe es has b ee n a consistently applied by Te nnessee courts. Kul tur a , 9 2 3 S. W

. 2 d a t 5 4 0 ( h o ld ing U CC’s a llo wanc e fo r r e cov ery of “a ny los s” do e s n ot i nc lud e a tto rn e ys ’ f e e s) ; Chambers v. City of Chattanooga , 7 1 S. W .3 d 2 81 , 2 84 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 1) ; Pinney v . Tarpley , 686 S.W.2d 574, 581 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 98 4) ; Hosier v. Crye -Leike Commercial, Inc

. , M2000-01182-COA- R3-CV, 2001 WL 799740, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 17, 2001) (no Te nn. R. App. P. 11 applications filed) (“ [o]ne of the most common excep t i o n s to the American Rule involves contrac ts containing provisions e xp re ssl y a llo wi ng thepr e va ili ng pa rty to re c ov e r i ts re a so na

ble a tto rn e ys ’ fe e s .
. . ” ); Hewgley v. Vivo , No. 01-A- 0 1 -9506-CH-00266, 1997 WL 92077, at *4 (T enn. Ct. App. Marc h 5, 1997) (no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 appli ca t i o n fi l ed) ( “[A ] contra ct must contain an e xpress provision for the payme nt o f atto rn e ys ’ f

e e s inor de r t o e na

blea pr e vaili ng part y to reco ver thele ga l e xp e ns e s it incurre d to enforc e the c ontrac t.”)
We ha ve found no Te nnessee decision addressing whether “costs and e xpenses” in a contra ct include attorne ys’ fe es, and the parties ha ve likewise pr ovided no such authority. Given our long recognized a dhere nce to the A merican Rule, the attendant public policy considerations, and the decisions re quiring authorization of attorneys’ fee s to be “spec ific” or “expr ess,” we c onclude that

“ c os ts ande xp e ns e s, ” a s u se d intheDe c laratio n, do no t in c lud e a tto rn e ys ’ f e e s. The De clar ation s i m p l y d o es notinclude any e xpress intention that a losing party in an enfor ceme nt action re garding th e De claration would be re quired to pay the prevailing party’s attorn e y s ’ f

e e s
. T h eD e c la

ration is a sophisticated doc ument governing de velopment of prope rty that is intended to run with the l and, presumably draf ted by an attorney. If

the dra fter of

the Dec laration had intended to a

brogate the Americ an Rule, the document c ould have “ specific ally” or “ expre ssly”-4-

do ne so
. Ab se nt a n e xp re ssi on of a c le ar a nd un a mbi gu ou s int e nt, we de c lin e to i nte rp re t th e ph ra se

“ c os ts ande xp e ns e s” to i nc lud e a tto rn e ys ’ f e e s. Th e re fo re , w e a ff

irm th e tria l c ou rt

. Cracke r Barre l ma

kes sever al argume nts that, w hile well ar gued, we do not find persua sive. In its primary argume nt, Cra cker Barre l r elies on decisions interpre ting statutory authorization for fee s and expenses. Howeve r, we believe it is appropriate to rely primarily upon Tennessee decisions e xa min ing wh e the r c on tr a c tua l pr ov isi on s inc lud e a tto rn e ys ’ fe e s rathe r than s tatut ory e na c tme nts

. The inquiry re garding interpr etation of co n t ra cts involves the parties’ intent, while interpre ting statutes involves determining legislative intent. While there m ay be some analogy to be dr awn, one must tread ca

ref ully since indicia of the intent of private pa

rties in a com m er ci al context is far differ ent from indicia of wh at t he legislature intended whe n it enacte d a particular piec e of legislation.
Cracke r Barr el also ar gues that by re questing attorneys’ f ees in their counter- complaint def e n d a n ts ar e e s to p p e d f

r o m a r g u in g th a t p ar a g r ap h 9 o f th e D e c la

r a ti o n d o e s n o t a uthorize attorneys’ fee s. We do not a gree . First, while the defe ndants’ counte rcla im r eq u es t s rec overy of fee s, it does not cite a basis for the re quest. Ther efor e, the req u es t wa s n ot nece ssarily a manifestation of de fendants’ interpre tation of the De clar ation. They simply asked to re cover attorneys’ fee s. Second, while in the normal context when the parties to a contract a re a rguing over its meaning, one party’s pleading on the issue may be an admission about that party’s intent, such is not the case he re. Since defe ndants were n ot parties to the De clar ation at its formation, any ple a din g b y d e fe nd a nts on thematte r i s n ot i nd ic a tiv e of wh a t th e dr a ft e rs int e nd e d p ara gr aph9 to mean. The t ri al co u rt is affirme d. Costs of this appea l are taxed to Crac ker Bar rel Old Country Store, Inc. and Cracke r Barr el Associate LLC for whic h exec ution may issue if nece ssary.

____________________________________ PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JUDGE