De fe nd ants do no t a sse rt that di ve rs ity

jur isd ic tio n p ur su ant t o 2 8 U .S. C. § 13 32 e xists
. 1 CHERYLSTEEL E, Plaintiff,
v. S. MI CHAH SAL B, Esquire , and L I PPMA N, SEM ESKER & SAL B , L L C, De fe nd ants . UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

Civil Action No. 09-2400 ( CKK)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION (January 29, 2010) The a bove-c aptioned civil ac tion was remove d to this C ourt from the Super ior Court for the District of Columbia by Def endants on De cembe r 18, 2009. As set for th in the Notice of Removal, Def

endants a ssert that this Court has fede ral que stion jurisdi ction over Plaintiff’s Com pla int purs ua nt t o 2 8 U .S. C. § 13 31 (“ Th e dis tr ic t c ourt s sh a ll h ave or ig ina l juri sd ic tio n o f a ll
c ivi l a c tio ns ari sin g un de r t he Con sti tut ion , la

ws , o r t re a tie s o f t

he Un ite d St a te s. ” ). Ac c or din g to 1 Def endants, a lthough Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts only state law c laims — namely , leg al neg lige nce a

nd brea ch of c ontrac t — this C ourt nonethele ss has fede ral que stion jurisdi ction over Plaintiff’s Complaint because the claims and a lleg ations asserte d there in stem from the Def endants’ r epre sentation of Plaintiff in a fe dera l action for T itle VI Iemploy ment discrimination. Specifica lly , Def endants c ontend that re solution of Pl aintiff’s c laims for leg al neg lige nce a

nd brea ch of c ontrac t are “pre mised on the interpre tation and application of fede ral2

law, Title VI I ,” and a s such, “a substantial question of Fe dera l law is a nec essar y element of Pla int if f’ s c la im. ” De fe nd ants a lso a sse rt that de fe ns e of

the a lle g a tio ns of

Pla int if f’ s c la im w ill
re qu ir e re so lut ion

of a fe de ra l qu e sti on . D e fe nd ants the re fo re c on te nd that r e mov a l of

thi s c a se pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) is prope r. This Court issued an [4] Orde r to Show Cause on January 4, 2010, finding that it was “fa r from cle ar on the curr ent re cord” that the Court had subjec t matter jurisdiction over the instant action. De fenda

nts were there fore order ed to show ca use why this case should not be re manded back to the Super ior Court for the D istrict of Columbia for lack of subject matter jur isdiction. As require d, Def

endants timely

filed a [7] R esponse to the Or der to Show Cause. U pon consideration of that Response a

nd the positions set forth therein, the a pplicable c ase la

w and statutory authority , as we ll as the rec ord of this ca se as a whole, the Court conc ludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the instant action. Consequently , the above -ca ptioned action shall be
rema nded bac k to the Superior Court for the District of Columbia.

LEGAL STA ND AR

D A ND DI SCU SSIO N Th e D. C. C ir c uit

ha s e xpla ine d th a t “ [w]he n it a pp e ars that a

dis tr ic t c ourt

la c ks su bje c t
matte r j ur isd ic tio n o ve r a c a se tha t ha s b e e n r e mov e d f

ro m a state c ourt , th e dis tr ic t c ourt mu st rema nd the ca se.” Republic of Vene zuela v. Philip Morris Inc. , 287 F.3d 192, 196 ( D.C. Cir. 2002) (c iting 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (empha sis added)) . Be cause remova l impli cate s signific ant fede ralism conce rns, a c ourt must “strictly construe[] the scope of its remova l jurisdiction.” Do wne y v . A mb as sa do r D e v e l., LLC , 5 6 8 F. S u p p . 2 d 2 8 , 3 0 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g Sh am ro c k Oi l &Ga s Co rp . v . S

he e ts , 313 U.S. 100, 107-09 (1941)) . “‘[I ]f feder al jurisdiction is doubtful, a
rema nd to state court is nec essar y .’” Id. (qu o t i n g Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, I nc. , 369 F.3d 811, 815-3

16 (4 th C ir . 2 00 4) (e n b anc )) ; se e als o J oh ns on -B ro wn v . 2 20 0 M . S t. L LC , 257 F. Supp. 2d 175, 177 (D.D.C. 2003) ( “Where the nee d to remand is not self- evident, the c ourt must resolve any ambig uities conce rningthe proprie ty of re moval in favor of

rema nd.”). “ The pa

rty seeking
remova l of an a ction bear s the burden of provingthat jurisdiction ex ists in federa l court.” Downey , 5 68 F . Su

pp . 2 d at 30 ; se e als o B hagwa na ni v . H owa rd Un iv ., 355 F. Supp. 2d 294, 297 (D.D.C. 2005). I f the pa

rty “ca nnot meet this burden, the c ourt must remand the c ase.” JohnsonBrown, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 177. As indicated a

bove, De fenda

nts claim that this C ourt has subjec t matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C . § 1331 (fe dera l question jurisdiction), such that
remova l is proper unde r 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). T he Court does not agree . “Unde r the long standing well-plea ded complaint rule , . . . a suit ‘ar ises under’ fede ral law‘only when the pla intiff’s statement of his own c ause of action shows that it is based upon [feder al law].’” Vaden v
. Discove r Bank, _

_ U. S
. _ _ , 1 2 9 S
. C t . 1 2 6 2 , 1 2 7 2 (2 0 0 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Louisvill e &Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley , 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908)). “ Fe dera l jurisdiction cannot be pre dicated on a n actua l or anticipated de fense .” Id. Acc ording ly , fede ral que stion jurisdi ction is ge nera lly “invoked by

and larg e by plaintiffs pleadinga ca

use of a ction cre ated by

fede ral law .” Grable &Sons Metal Products, Inc. v . Darue Eng’ g &Mfg. , 5 45 U. S. 3 08 , 3 12 (2 00 5) . In a lim ite d numb e r o f c a se s, ho we ve r, fe de ra l qu e sti on jur isd ic tio n ma

y be fo un d “ ov e r s tate -l aw c la ims that im pli c a te signific ant fe dera l issues.” Id. Nonethele ss, the Supreme Court has made clea r that “e ven whe n the state a ction discloses a c ontested and substantial fe dera l question, the exercise of f eder al jurisdiction is subj ect to a possible ve to. For the fede ral issue will ultimately qualify for a fede ral forum only

if fede ral jurisdiction is consistent with cong ressional judg ment about the sound4

division of labor betwe en state a nd fede ral c ourts g overningthe application of § 1331.” Id. at 313-14. Ba sed on this leg al fra

mework, “ [m ]any

fede ral c ourts have he ld that . . . brea ch of contra ct or attorney

malprac tice cla ims properly belongin state court, e ven whe re the underlying
case involved claims arisingunder f eder al law.” W

alk e r v . D wos k

in , Ci v . N o . 3 :0 9 c v 4 , 2 0 0 9 WL 36 63 87 , * 2 ( W.D . V a . F e b. 12 , 2 00 9) (r e mand ingma lpr a c tic e a c tio n b a se d o n u nd e rl yingTi tle VI Ic la im f

or la c k o f s ub

je c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n) ; see also W arrior Sports , Inc. v . Dickinson W right, PLL C, __ F. Supp. 2d __, Civ. Act. No. 09cv12102, 2009 WL3492018, * 4 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 30, 2009) ( finding that “Plaintiff’s leg al malpra ctice c laim stemming fr om repre sentation in a pr ior fe de ra l su it d oe s n ot r a ise su bs tanti a l qu e sti on s o f f

e de ra l la w” ); Hi gb e e v . M alle ris , 4 70 F. Supp. 2d 845, 851 (N.D. I ll. 2007) (“The re is, simply put, a plethora

of putative attorney

and/or profe ssional malprac tice ca ses conc erningunderly ing f eder al litigation, in which c ases have bee n rema nded to state c ourt for a djudication or dismissed for lac k of fe dera l subject matter jur isd ic tio n. ” ) ( c omp ili ngc a se s) (r e mand ingma lpr a c tic e a c tio n b a se d o n r e pr e se ntatio n in underlying T itle VI Iaction for lack of subject matter jur isdiction). The Court is persuade d by the log ic of the se de c isi on s th a t f

e de ra l su bje c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n d oe s n ot l ie ov e r P la int if f’ s st a te law cla ims for brea ch of c ontrac t and leg al neg lige nce. T he fa ct that Plaintiff’s lawsuit is based
on a lle g e d e rr or s ma de by

De fe nd ants wh ile re pr e se nti ngPla int if f i n a fe de ra l T itl e VI Ia c tio n is not sufficient to cr eate fede ral que stion jurisdi ction in this case. Def endants’ a ssertions to the contra ry are without merit. Relying on a single case from the F e de ra l Cir c uit , w hic h o f c ours e is n ot b ind ingon thi s Co ur t, D e fe nd ants argue that r e mov a l is appropr iate in this instance. SeeDef s.’ [7] Response at 4. Spec ifically , Def endants c ite to Ai r5

Me as ur e me nt T

e c h. , I nc . v . A k in G um p S tra us s H au e r &Fe ld, LLP , 504 F.3d 1262 ( Fe d. Cir. 2007), in which the United States Court of Appea ls for the F eder al Circuit upheld re moval of a leg al malpra ctice c laim based on a lleg ed er rors by counsel duringa pate nt prosecution ac tion. The Court finds that De fenda nts’ relianc e is misplaced. Give n the uniquely fede ral nature of fede ral patent law ca ses — over which fe dera l district courts have e x clusive jurisdiction, see28 U. S.C. § 1 33 8( a ) —

fe de ra l c ourt s h ave be e n mo re inc lin e d to fi nd that le g a l ma lpr a c tic e c la ims based on unde rlying patent actions ra ise a substantial question of fe dera l question. See W alker , 2009 WL366387, * 2 (“B eca use of the strongpolicy

considerations weig hing in f avor of uniform int e rp re tatio n o f t

he fe de ra l pate nt l aws , c ourt s a re mor e wi lli ngto h old

that st a te law c la ims involving the r esolution of fede ral patent law issues g ive rise to fe dera l question jurisdiction.”). This willingness to find fe dera l question jurisdiction over a leg al malpra ctice a ction involving fede ral patent law does not, ther efor e, support findingthat fede ral que stion jurisdi ction lies over leg al malpra ctice a ctions, like this one, that are based on g arde n varie ty fede ral law
. W

arrior Sp or ts , 2009 WL3492018, * 2 (obser ving that “seve ral c ourts have de clined to re ach unde rlying fede ral lawissues for purpose s of exercisingfede ral que stion jurisdi ction in leg al malpra ctice
a c tio ns outsi de the pate nt l aw c on te xt”) ; cf. Hughley v. W einstock, Frie dman &Friedman, PA , Civ. Act. No. 06-88, 2006 WL2244575, * 4 (D.D.C. Aug . 4, 2006) (r emandingleg al malpra ctice claim base d on Title VI Iaction for lack of subject matter jur isdiction and observingthat “the District of Columbia courts re g ularly adjudicate Title VI Iclaims”) ( compiling c ases)
. Acc ording ly , beca

use De fenda

nts have not met their bur den of pr oving that this C ourt has fe dera l question jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s leg al neg lige nce a nd brea ch of c ontrac t claims, the Court shall remand this ca se to the Superior Court for the District of Columbia. See Nat’l Org. for6

W omen v . Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 612 F. Supp. 100, 109 (D.D .C. 1985) (“The court c oncludes that the def

endant ha s not met its burden upon removal of demonstratingthat this court can exercise jurisdiction over this action; theref

ore this ca se must be re manded. . . .” ). CO NC LU SION For the re asons set for

th above, the Court sha ll REMAND this case to the Superior Court for the D istrict of Columbia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). An a ppropriate Orde r ac companies this Memorandum Opinion. Date: January

29, 2010 /s/ C O LLE E N K O LLA R
- K O T E LLY Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge