Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1411-CR-806 | July 21, 2015 Page 1 of 6 

### MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
A TTORNEY FOR A PPELLANT Suzy St. John Marion County Public Defender Indianapolis, Indiana A TTORNEYS FOR A PPELLEE Gregory F. Zoeller Attorney General of Indiana Tyler G. Banks Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana



### IN THE 

# COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Meridian Horton, A

ppellan t -Defendant,

v. 

### State of Indiana, A

ppelle e -Plaintiff July 21, 2015 Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1411-CR-806 Appeal from the Marion County Superior Court Criminal Division 8 Cause No. 49F08-1405-CM-23045 The Honorable Amy Jones, Judge


### Friedlander, Judge.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1411-CR-806 | July 21, 2015 Page 2 of 6 [1] Meridian Horton was convicted of Crim inal Trespass, a class A misdemeanor. 1 Horton appeals her conviction and presen ts the following restated issue for our review: Did the State present sufficient evidence to support a conviction for criminal trespass?

[2] We affirm.

[3] The facts most favorable to the conviction are as fo llows. Horton was homeless at the beginning of May 20 14 and was staying in a wo men’s shelter. All women wishing to stay overnight at the shelter are required to ch eck-in before 4:00 p.m. Horton left the shelter to go to th e food stamp office and pick up her medication. Horton missed her check-in time at the shelter because her trip lasted longer than she anticipated. Wi thout a place to spend the night, Horton went to a nearby motel, King’s Inn.

[4] King’s Inn’s overnight rate is forty dolla rs a night plus an additional ten-dollar security deposit. Horton had only fifty dollars to her name, which she gave to the King’s Inn employee upon check-in. Once assigned a room, Horton placed her belongings on the gr ound and got into bed.

[5] The next morning, Horton went to check out of the motel room at 11:00 a.m. and to retrieve her security deposit. Maintenance noted that Horton had broken a lamp and flooded the floor in her assigned room. The motel employee

1 Ind. Code Ann. § 35- 43-2-2(b)(2) (West, Westlaw current with all 2015 First Regular Session of the 119 th General Assembly legislation effective through June 28, 2015).Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1411-CR-806 | July 21, 2015 Page 3 of 6 told Horton she had “destr oyed the room” and she could not have her security deposit back. Transcript at 16. Horton then reques ted to speak to the manager but was told the manager had yet to arrive . Horton called the police and waited for them to arrive.

[6] The manager of the motel arrived before law enforcement and tried to resolve the dispute with Horton but was unsuccess ful. The manager asked Horton to leave the premises but she refused to leave until he r deposit was returned. When the police officer arrived, Horton told the officer that she would not leave without her deposit. Horton was arrested for criminal trespass. On September 30, 2014, the trial court found Horton gu ilty of criminal trespass. The trial court explained that Horton’s contractua l interest in the room expired upon check-out.

[7] When reviewing the sufficiency of the ev idence needed to support a criminal conviction, we neither reweigh eviden ce nor judge witness credibility. Henley v. State , 881 N.E.2d 639 (Ind. 2 008). “We consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable infere nces that can be drawn from such evidence.” Id . at 651. “[This court] will affi rm unless no reasonable fact-finder could have found the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Dumes v. State , 23 N.E.3d 798, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

[8] To convict Horton of criminal trespass th e State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Horton (1) did no t have a contractual interest in the property, and (2) knowingly or intentionall y refused to leave the real property ofCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1411-CR-806 | July 21, 2015 Page 4 of 6 another person after having been asked to leave by the other person or that person’s agent. See I.C. § 35-43-2-2(b)(2).

[9] Pertaining to the first elem ent, Horton contends the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she lacked a co ntractual interest in the property. ‘“Contractual interest’, as that phrase is used in the criminal trespass statute, refers to the right to be present on another’s property, arising out of an agreement between at least two parties that creates an obligation to do or not to do a particular thing.” Semenick v. State, 977 N.E.2d 7, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). In Woods v. State , the court held, “[A] person wi th a contractual interest cannot become a trespasser by virtue of bein g asked to leave th e premises.” 703 N.E.2d 1115, 1117 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).

[10] Horton argues she had a contractual in terest as a guest of the motel and entertained a good faith belief that she had an implied right to remain on the property to settle the dispute over her se curity deposit. Horton acknowledges that her right to be in the motel room terminated upon checkout; however, she claims that her right to be on the mo tel’s premises did not expire until the checkout process was complete by the return of her security deposit.

[11] “[T]he State satisfies its burden when it disproves those contractual interests that are reasonably apparent from th e context and circumstances under which the trespass is alleged to have occurred.” Semenick v. State , 977 N.E.2d at 10. In Lyles v. State , 970 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ind. 2012), th e Court held that the State met its burden of proof by presenting evid ence showing the defendant was “irateCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1411-CR-806 | July 21, 2015 Page 5 of 6 and disrespectful.” “The defendant wa s neither an owner nor an employee of the bank, [and] the bank manager had au thority to ask customers to leave the bank premises.” Id

. Here, Horton “made quite the scene” wh en she tried to get around the front desk to confront the motel employee. Transcript at 5. The manager of the motel asked Horton to leave “several times” before she evicted Horton from the King’s Inn. Id . at 7.

[12] As for the intent element, Horton conten ds that she did not have the requisite mens rea to be convicted of criminal trespass. Under I.C. § 35-43-2-2(b)(2), to satisfy the mens rea element the Stat e must prove Horton knowingly or intentionally refused to leave the real pr operty of another person after having been asked to leave by the other pe rson or that person’s agent.

[13] Horton argues that she beli eved she had a right to rema in on the property until her security deposit dispute was resolved. “The belief that one has a right to be on the property of another will defeat the mens rea requirem ent of the criminal trespass statute if it has a fair and reasonable foundation.” Taylor v. State , 836 N.E.2d 1024, 1028 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Assuming Horton believed that she had a right to remain on the property, such was unreasonab le because she was asked to leave several times before law enforcement arrived. “When the evidence shows an invitee of a business has no contractual right to be on the business’s premises and rema ins there after being asked to leave, the State hasCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1411-CR-806 | July 21, 2015 Page 6 of 6 met its burden to prove intent.” Olsen v. State , 663 N.E.2d 1194, 1196 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).

[14] Horton checked out of her motel room , set her belongings outside of the building, and returned to ask for her se curity deposit. Horton was informed that due to the room damage, the motel would not return her security deposit and she was asked to leave the property. Horton refu sed and told the property manager that she “would have to call the police” because she “wasn’t going anywhere.” Transcript at 8. When the police o fficer arrived, Horton stated, “You’re going to have to cuff me because I’m not leaving.” Id . The evidence was sufficient to prove that Hort on committed criminal trespass.

[15] Judgment affirmed. Baker, J., and Najam, J., concur.