UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4388

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

ANTONIO TASTE, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, Jr., 

District Judge. (1:07-cr-00280-WO-1) 

Submitted: November 18, 2008 Decided: December 16, 2008 

Before TRAXLER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, Gregory Davis, 

OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Winston-Salem, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Angela Hewlett Miller, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
Antonio Taste appeals the 180-month sentence the 

district court imposed after he pled guilty to possession of a 

firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1) (2006). Counsel submitted a brief pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), averring there are no 

meritorious issues for appeal, but suggesting this court should 

consider whether the district court erred by enhancing Taste’s 

sentence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006), because he 

had at least three previous convictions for violent felonies. 

Specifically, Taste was convicted of four counts of breaking or 

entering in North Carolina state court in 2007 and was convicted 

of strong arm robbery in South Carolina state court in 1998. 

Under § 924(e), a “violent felony” is defined as a 

crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year 

that is one of several specified offenses, or a crime that 

“otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential 

risk of physical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006). In considering whether the district 

court properly designated Taste an armed career criminal, we 

review the district court’s legal determinations de novo and its 

factual findings for clear error. United States v. Wardrick, 

350 F.3d 446, 451 (4th Cir. 2003). In determining whether a 

crime is a violent felony within the meaning of § 924(e), the 

offense is considered generically in terms of how the law 

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defines the offense and not in terms of how an individual 

offender might have committed it on a particular occasion. 

Begay v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1581, 1584 (2008). In 

particular, “the phrase ‘maximum term of imprisonment . . . 

prescribed by law’ for the ‘offense’ was not meant to apply to 

the top sentence in a guidelines range.” United States v. 

Rodriguez, 128 S. Ct. 1783, 1792 (2008). 

In United States v. Harp, 406 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 

2005), the defendant argued that one of his Armed Career 

Criminal Act predicate convictions, a North Carolina Class I 

felony, did not qualify as “an offense punishable by a term of 

imprisonment of more than one year” because “the maximum nonaggravated punishment” was twelve months. Harp, 406 F.3d at 

245-46. Declining, as in United States v. Jones, 195 F.3d 205 

(4th Cir. 1999), to apply an “individualized analysis,” we held 

in Harp that, “to determine whether a conviction is a crime 

punishable by a prison term exceeding one year, Jones dictates 

that we consider the maximum aggravated sentence that could be 

imposed for that crime upon a defendant with the worst possible 

criminal history.” Harp, 406 F.3d at 246. 

Taste acknowledges that the maximum sentences that 

could be imposed upon any defendant for his prior convictions 

exceed one year. Accordingly, the district court did not err in 

applying the § 924(e)(1) enhancement. 

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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform Taste, in writing, of the right to 

petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If Taste requests that a petition be filed, but counsel 

believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel 

may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Taste. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED