1

22-1224-cr

United States v. Williams

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. 

CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS 

PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A 

SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY 

MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY 

COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 

held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the 

City of New York, on the 4th day of March, two thousand twenty-four.

PRESENT: BARRINGTON D. PARKER,

RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,

MICHAEL H. PARK,

Circuit Judges.

------------------------------------------------------------------

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v. No. 22-1224-cr

RONALD WILLIAMS, AKA 

BLACKMAN, AKA JURMAINE, 

AKA LEON GORDON, AKA 

MARCUS REESE,

Defendant-Appellant, 
2

LEON CAMPBELL, AKA COUNTRY,

Defendant.

------------------------------------------------------------------

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: SUSAN G. KELLMAN (Ezra 

Spilke, on the brief), Law 

Offices of Susan G. Kellman, 

Brooklyn, NY

FOR APPELLEE: HIRAL D. MEHTA (Susan 

Corkery, on the brief), Assistant 

United States Attorney, for

Breon Peace, United States 

Attorney for the Eastern 

District of New York, 

Brooklyn, NY

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of New York (LaShann DeArcy Hall, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 

AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.

Defendant-Appellant Ronald Williams appeals from a judgment of the 

United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (DeArcy Hall,

J.) convicting him, after a jury trial, of (1) conspiracy to distribute marijuana, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a), and 841(b)(1)(C); (2) conspiracy to commit

obstruction of justice murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(k), 1512(a)(1)(C),
3

and 1512(a)(3)(B)(i); (3) conspiracy to commit murder for hire, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1958(a); (4) being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2); and (5) use of a firearm during 

and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Williams argues that there was insufficient evidence to support 

his conviction on the conspiracy to commit murder charges; the District Court

erroneously excluded his post-arrest statement to law enforcement; and the 

District Court erred in calculating his criminal history at sentencing. We assume 

the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the record of prior 

proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to 

affirm.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

First, Williams argues that there was insufficient evidence at trial to 

support two counts of conviction: conspiracy to commit murder for hire and 

obstruction of justice murder, each stemming from a plot between Williams and 

co-conspirator Leon Campbell to kill Everton Leslie, a suspected government 

informant. 

We review a challenge to a conviction based on the sufficiency of the 
4

evidence de novo and “uphold the jury verdict if drawing all inferences in favor 

of the prosecution and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Cuti, 720 F.3d 453, 461 (2d 

Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). A defendant challenging a conviction on 

sufficiency grounds thus bears a “heavy burden.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

Williams has not met that burden. As the District Court noted, the jury 

heard evidence that: “(1) Williams was aware that Campbell had been pursued 

by federal law enforcement, (2) Williams was aware that Campbell suspected an 

informant, (3) Campbell had accused Leslie of being an informant, and (4) 

Williams was aware that Campbell no longer believed that the informant was a 

former prison inmate.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 374, at 7. The jury also heard multiple 

phone calls between Campbell and Williams, including a call during which

Campbell described Leslie to Williams, told Williams Leslie’s approximate 

address and current location, and offered Williams $5,000 to kill Leslie. Based on

this and other evidence adduced at trial, we conclude that there was sufficient 

evidence presented to prove both conspiracy charges.
5

II. Williams’ Post-Arrest Statement

Williams next asserts that the District Court erred in excluding a portion of 

his post-arrest statements to law enforcement officers, while admitting his 

inculpatory statements. In particular, Williams contends that his post-arrest 

exculpatory statements – that he never intended to carry out the murder for hire 

and instead intended to rob Campbell – were necessary to put the admitted 

statements in context. He thus argues that the exculpatory statements should 

have been admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 106, the rule of 

completeness.

The rule of completeness “provides that an omitted portion of a statement 

must be placed in evidence if necessary to explain the admitted portion, to place 

the admitted portion in context, to avoid misleading the jury, or to ensure fair 

and impartial understanding of the admitted portion.” United States v. Thiam, 

934 F.3d 89, 96 (2d Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted); see Fed. R. Evid. 106. 

The rule, however, “does not require introduction of portions of a statement that 

are neither explanatory of nor relevant to the admitted passages.” Thiam, 934 

F.3d at 96 (quotation marks omitted). We review a district court’s application of 

the rule of completeness for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Williams, 930 
6

F.3d 44, 58 (2d Cir. 2019). 

With these principles in mind, we reject Williams’ argument. As the 

District Court noted, the admitted passage refers only to the intent and conduct 

of Campbell, not of Williams. Accordingly, Williams’ statements were “neither 

explanatory of nor relevant to the admitted passage[],” United States v. Johnson, 

507 F.3d 793, 797 (2d Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted), and the District Court 

did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit them.

III. Sentencing

Williams finally challenges his sentence, arguing that his 2007 attempted 

assault and 2009 weapons charges were part of the same course of conduct as his 

2013 conspiracy to distribute marijuana charge and thus should have been 

considered relevant conduct for purposes of his sentencing.1 We review a 

district court’s determination of whether acts constitute relevant conduct for 

clear error. United States v. McCray, 7 F.4th 40, 47 (2d Cir. 2021). On clear-error 

review, we conclude that Williams has not demonstrated that his 2007 and 2009

1 “Under the Guidelines a defendant’s base offense level is determined based on 

‘relevant conduct,’” United States v. Burnett, 968 F.2d 278, 280 (2d Cir. 1992), 

which does not count as part of a defendant’s criminal history, see U.S.S.G. 

§ 4A1.2 cmt. n.1. Relevant conduct includes acts that “were part of the same 

course of conduct . . . as the offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2) 

(emphasis added).
7

charges and the marijuana distribution conviction in this case are “sufficiently 

connected or related to each other as to warrant the conclusion that they are part 

of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. 

n.5(B)(ii). We therefore see no error in the District Court’s finding that Williams’ 

2007 and 2009 charges were not relevant conduct, and we accordingly affirm the 

sentence.

CONCLUSION

We have considered Williams’ remaining arguments and conclude that 

they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 

Court is AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court