NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

FREDI VARGAS-ESTUDILLO, AKA 

Alfredo Vargas-Estudillo, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-50235

D.C. No. 

3:15-cr-01198-LAB-1

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 13, 2017 

Pasadena, California

Before: NGUYEN and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and EATON,** Judge.

Fredi Vargas–Estudillo appeals his conviction for attempted re-entry of a 

removed alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b). We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291. We hold that the district court erred in denying Vargas–Estudillo’s 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** Richard K. Eaton, Judge of the United States Court of International 

Trade, sitting by designation.

FILED

DEC 15 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

discovery request, and otherwise deny the challenge to his conviction.

1. The district court denied Vargas’ motion to dismiss the indictment because 

it found that the government’s failure to preserve a video recording of the pedestrian 

lane at the Port of Entry was the result of mistake, not bad faith. This finding was 

not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Zaragoza–Moreira, 780 F.3d 971, 977 

(9th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Vargas–

Estudillo’s motion to dismiss the indictment.

2. We conclude, however, that the district court erred in denying Vargas–

Estudillo’s motion for a list of people who applied for admission at the San Ysidro 

Port of Entry on March 6, 2015, at approximately 5:23 p.m. through the SENTRI

lane and booth opposite of the SENTRI lane. These people may have been in a 

position to observe Vargas and his interaction with the Border Patrol, and the defense 

should have been allowed to endeavor to interview them. See United States v. Cadet, 

727 F.2d 1453, 1469 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Witnesses, particularly eye witnesses, to a 

crime are the property of neither the prosecution nor the defense. Both sides have an 

equal right, and should have an equal opportunity, to interview them.” (citation 

omitted)); see also United States v. Stever, 603 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2010)

(holding that the materiality requirement of Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i) is 

satisfied if a defendant presents “facts which would tend to show that the 

Government is in possession of information helpful to the defense” (citation 
3 

omitted)). 

3. Because the list of witnesses was not turned over, Vargas cannot know, nor 

can he show, that “there is a likelihood that the outcome of the trial would have been 

different if discovery had been granted.” United States v. Budziak, 697 F.3d 1105, 

1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Stever, 603 F.3d at 754). Nor is it possible, based on the 

appellate record, “for us to determine whether the result of [Vargas–Estudillo’s] trial 

would have been different if [the list of witnesses] had been disclosed to him.” Id. 

Accordingly, we remand and instruct the district court to order the production of the 

witness list and determine whether the list “would have led to . . . information that 

might have altered the verdict.” Id. (citations omitted). The district court “shall order 

a new trial” if it concludes that testimony from any disclosed witness “could have 

affected the outcome of the trial.” Id. 

VACATED and REMANDED with instructions.