[Cite as State v. Saunders, 2022-Ohio-4739.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

GREENE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

RAYMOND L. SAUNDERS

Defendant-Appellant

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Appellate Case No. 2022-CA-21

Trial Court Case No. 2021-CR-344

(Criminal Appeal from

Common Pleas Court)

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O P I N I O N

Rendered on the 29th day of December, 2022.

. . . . . . . . . . . 

MEGAN A. HAMMOND, Atty. Reg. No. 0097714, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Greene 

County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, 61 Greene Street, Suite 200, Xenia, Ohio 

45385

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee

 

JOHNNA M. SHIA, Atty. Reg. No. 0067685, P.O. Box 145, Springboro, Ohio 45066

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

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TUCKER, P.J.
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{¶ 1} Raymond L. Saunders appeals from his conviction following a jury trial on 

felony charges of tampering with records and telecommunications fraud and on 

misdemeanor charges of obstructing official business and interference with custody.

{¶ 2} Saunders contends the trial court erred in overruling a motion to dismiss the 

charges against him based on a statutory speedy-trial violation. He also challenges the 

legal sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence to sustain his convictions for 

tampering with records, telecommunications fraud, and obstructing official business. 

Finally, he argues ineffective assistance of counsel based on his attorney’s failure to (1) 

retain an expert witness to examine data obtained from his Google account, (2) crossexamine a detective about the data, and (3) admit into evidence a full “Cellebrite” report

generated from downloaded content from Saunders’ Google account. 

{¶ 3} Upon review, we see no violation of Saunders’ statutory right to a speedy 

trial. We also conclude that the challenged convictions were supported by legally 

sufficient evidence and were not against the weight of the evidence. As for ineffective 

assistance of counsel, the record does not portray constitutionally deficient representation 

that prejudiced Saunders. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed. 

I. Background

{¶ 4} The present appeal stems from a parenting-time dispute between Saunders 

and Laqueta Maze, who are the parents of two young children. At the time in question, 

Maze had legal custody of the children, and Saunders had court-ordered parenting time 

every Tuesday through Friday from 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. with additional time as agreed.
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While exercising his parenting time on Friday, May 14, 2021, Saunders sought permission 

to keep the children overnight. Maze denied the request. Saunders then failed to return 

the children by 6:00 p.m. Maze became concerned and contacted the Fairborn police 

department. She testified that the police refused to take action, characterizing the dispute

as a “civil matter.” After Saunders did not return the children Friday night, Maze spent 

Saturday driving around looking for Saunders and contacting family members. She also 

spoke to police sergeant Nathan Penrod early that afternoon. Penrod took Maze’s 

complaint and began an investigation that same day. 

{¶ 5} Penrod testified that he spoke with Saunders by phone on Saturday, May 15, 

2021. Saunders told the sergeant that his parenting time recently had been modified and 

that he was allowed to have the children on Saturday. The juvenile court was closed on 

Saturday, so Saunders offered to email Penrod a copy of the modified order. Penrod 

received the email shortly before 5:00 p.m. It appeared to have been sent to Saunders 

from his attorney and then forwarded by Saunders to Penrod. The email included a pdf 

attachment entitled “Copy of maze ordere” (sic). The attached order appeared to be from 

the juvenile court, and it granted Saunders parenting time Tuesday through Saturday from 

10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Penrod proceeded to spend five to six hours over the weekend 

researching and pulling records to attempt to confirm the accuracy of the emailed order. 

{¶ 6} In the meantime, Saunders returned the children to Maze around 8:30 p.m. 

on Saturday, May 15, 2021 by dropping them off outside of her house. When sergeant 

Penrod returned to work the following week, he again spoke to Maze about the incident.

She denied the existence of a revised court order giving Saunders parenting time on 
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Saturdays. Maze reviewed the order Saunders had emailed and told Penrod it was 

forged. Penrod then referred the matter to detective Alan Kraker on May 20, 2021. 

{¶ 7} Detective Kraker contacted the juvenile court and established that the order 

Saunders had emailed indeed was fraudulent. Kraker interviewed Saunders on June 28, 

2021. During the interview, Saunders admitted keeping the children Friday night without 

authorization. He insisted, however, that he believed the disputed order granting him 

parenting time from 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. on Saturday was valid. He suggested that his 

attorney had sent it to him and that he simply had forwarded it to sergeant Penrod. In 

short, Saunders admitted emailing Penrod the fraudulent order but denied knowing that 

it had been forged.

{¶ 8} Detective Kraker subsequently obtained a search warrant for Saunders’ 

Google account. When reviewing the account information he received, Kraker confirmed 

that Saunders’ email address and telephone number were associated with the account. 

The “account recovery” phone number and the “two-step verification” phone number also 

matched Saunders’ number. The information Kraker received was a “digital download 

from Google” consisting of electronic data. Kraker turned the information over to detective 

Shane Hartwell for forensic analysis. 

{¶ 9} Detective Hartwell ran the Google account data he received through a 

“Cellebrite” software program to create a user-friendly report. Hartwell testified that 

Saunders would have needed to follow a “two-step verification” process to access his 

Google account. The process would have involved Saunders entering a user name and 

password, then receiving a “pin code” by text message and entering the code to access 
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the account. With regard to the content of the data he examined, Hartwell identified 

messages sent from Saunders to Penrod. The email with the attached forged order was 

sent by Saunders to Penrod at 4:51 p.m. on May 15, 2021. According to Hartwell, the 

attached order had been edited several times within Saunders’ account. 

{¶ 10} Edward Frizzell, who was Saunders’ attorney in the juvenile-court 

proceedings regarding custody and parenting time, also testified at the criminal trial. 

Frizzell denied forging the parenting-time order or sending a forged order to Saunders. 

{¶ 11} The final witness was Saunders, who testified in his own defense. He 

admitted keeping the children overnight Friday in violation of even the disputed parentingtime order. He explained, however, that the order he emailed to Penrod did give him 

parenting time on Saturdays from 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Saunders claimed he did not 

create the forged order and that he believed it was legitimate when he sent it to Penrod. 

Saunders acknowledged that his phone number was contained in the Google data linked 

to his account. He pointed out, however, that another phone number also was shown as 

being associated with the account. Saunders identified that phone number and testified 

that it belonged to Eric Hocker, who was Maze’s boyfriend and the father of another child

with her. Saunders testified that a review of the Google records showed Hocker’s email 

address and showed Hocker being logged into Saunders’ account. Saunders’ theory was 

that Hocker had accessed the account and altered the existing parenting-time order to 

frame him. 

{¶ 12} Saunders testified that he relied on that altered order and emailed it to 

Penrod without knowing that it had been changed. With regard to the alleged 
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modifications of the order shortly before he emailed it, Saunders claimed that he was 

simply moving the document around between devices and converting it from one file 

format into another. On cross-examination, Saunders insisted that the Google account 

data showed Hocker logging into the account under Saunders’ email address and not 

logging out. Saunders testified that he had no close relationship with Hocker, who had no 

reason to be logged into his account. In response to this explanation from Saunders, the 

prosecutor stated: “Well, perhaps it may have been a better question to ask Detective 

Hartwell when he testified, but I think we’re going to have to just agree to disagree about 

what that page shows.” 

{¶ 13} Based on the evidence presented, the jury found Saunders guilty of all 

charges against him. The trial court sentenced him to five years of community control

sanctions. This appeal followed. 

II. Analysis

{¶ 14} Saunders advances four assignments of error. He raises a speedy-trial 

issue, challenges the legal sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence to sustain his 

convictions, and alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 

A. Speedy Trial

{¶ 15} In his first assignment of error, Saunders contends the trial court erred in 

failing to dismiss the charges against him based on a violation of his statutory right to a 

speedy trial. The narrow issue Saunders raises is whether speedy-trial time should have 

been tolled (1) during the pendency of the State’s effort to have him undergo a 

competence evaluation and to have the trial court determine his competency and (2) due 
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to a continuance requested by the State based on the prosecutor’s scheduled surgery. 

{¶ 16} Saunders argues that neither his attorney nor the trial court had expressed 

any concern about his competence and that the State’s motion for a competence 

evaluation was unfounded and should not have tolled speedy-trial time. With regard to 

the prosecutor’s surgery, Saunders claims the trial court improperly ruled on the 

continuance request before he could respond. He further argues that the trial court failed 

to provide a rationale for granting the continuance. Finally, Saunders contends another 

prosecutor should have been able to handle the case, making a continuance 

unnecessary. 

{¶ 17} The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio 

Constitution. This constitutional mandate has been codified in R.C. 2945.71, which 

designates specific time limits for bringing a defendant to trial. As relevant here, a 

defendant charged with a felony must be brought to trial within 270 days of arrest. R.C. 

2945.71(C)(2). Each day that a defendant is held in jail in lieu of bail counts as three days 

when computing this time. R.C. 2945.71(E). This means a defendant held in jail must be 

brought to trial within 90 days of arrest. Speedy-trial time may be tolled by certain events 

delineated in R.C. 2945.72. Compliance with the speedy-trial statutes is mandatory, and 

they “must be strictly construed against the state.” State v. Cox, 12th Dist. Clermont No. 

CA2008-03-028, 2009-Ohio-928, ¶ 12. “The rationale supporting speedy-trial legislation 

is to prevent inexcusable delays caused by indolence within the judicial system.” State v. 

Sanchez, 110 Ohio St.3d 274, 2006-Ohio-4478, 853 N.E.2d 283, ¶ 8. “Review of a 
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speedy-trial claim involves a mixed question of law and fact. Therefore, we defer to the 

trial court’s factual findings if they are supported by competent, credible evidence, but we 

review the application of the law to those facts de novo.” State v. Long, 163 Ohio St.3d 

179, 2020-Ohio-5363, 168 N.E.3d 1163, ¶ 15. 

{¶ 18} In the present case, Saunders was held in jail in lieu of bail. Therefore, he 

was required to be brought to trial within 90 days of his arrest. Saunders was arrested 

and confined on the above-captioned charges on June 28, 2021. Ninety days from June 

28, 2021 was September 26, 2021. Saunders’ trial originally was scheduled for 

September 13, 2021. It did not commence until January 25, 2022, which was 121 days 

after the original September 26, 2021 speedy-trial deadline. 

{¶ 19} On August 30, 2021, however, Saunders moved to continue the scheduled 

September 13, 2021 trial date, citing a need for additional time for “plea negotiation/trial 

preparation” and a scheduling conflict for defense counsel. On September 1, 2021, the 

trial court sustained Saunders’ motion, tolled speedy trial time pursuant to R.C. 

2945.72(H), and reset trial for October 25, 2021. As a result, the 42 days between 

September 13 and October 25, 2021, were not chargeable to the State. Speedy-trial time 

also was tolled for two days between the filing of Saunders’ motion for a continuance and 

the trial court’s ruling on the motion. 

{¶ 20} During the interim between the originally scheduled trial date and the new 

trial date, Saunders filed a pro se motion to dismiss the charges against him. The trial 

court overruled the motion because Saunders was represented by counsel. On October 

5, 2021, Saunders’ counsel then moved to withdraw from further representation, citing a 
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breakdown in the attorney-client relationship and Saunders’ desire to represent himself. 

The trial court held an October 13, 2021 hearing on the motion to withdraw as counsel. 

During the hearing, Saunders made statements about being a “Moor,” about “filing a 

UCC-1,” and about “capitis diminution maxima.” See Motion to Withdraw Transcript at 5. 

Saunders told the trial court he had “fraternity brothers” and Masonic lodge friends who 

were attorneys and who already had “done this case” for him. Id. at 14-15. When the trial 

court asked why Saunders did not have one of those attorneys represent him, he 

responded: “Well, when the Court can show me jurisdiction over my straw man that I own 

the account, then I would. But I haven’t seen any jurisdiction or proof of jurisdiction over 

my straw man.” Id. at 16. Saunders proceeded to assert that the trial court was displaying 

a wartime flag. He explained that “when you cross into the courtroom, you are operating 

under maritime admiralty law, because I’m now on a ship, and that’s the reason why this 

Court is set up like that.” Id. at 18-19. After the hearing, the trial court permitted Saunders 

to waive counsel.

{¶ 21} The following day, October 14, 2021, the State filed a motion seeking to 

have Saunders undergo a competency evaluation. As reasonable grounds for its request, 

the State relied largely on Saunders’ comments during the hearing on counsel’s motion 

to withdraw. On October 18, 2021, the trial court sustained the State’s motion and ordered 

Saunders to undergo an evaluation. The trial court amended its entry the following day to 

clarify that the evaluation was for competency, not sanity. Also on October 19, 2021, the 

trial court sustained a motion by Saunders to have counsel reappointed to represent him 

and to withdraw his waiver of counsel. After reviewing a competency-evaluation report, 
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the trial court filed a November 30, 2021 entry finding Saunders competent to stand trial. 

{¶ 22} On appeal, Saunders contends speedy-trial time should not have been 

tolled between October 14, 2021, when the State filed its motion for a competency 

evaluation, and November 30, 2021, when the trial court found Saunders competent. We 

disagree. Pursuant to R.C. 2945.72(B), speedy-trial time is tolled for “[a]ny period during 

which the accused is mentally incompetent to stand trial or during which his mental 

competence to stand trial is being determined[.]” Although Saunders did not seek the 

competency evaluation, tolling nevertheless applied provided that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in sustaining the State’s motion and ordering an evaluation. State v. 

Ridley, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-10-1314, 2013-Ohio-1268, ¶ 19, citing State v. Patton, 10th 

Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-800, 2009-Ohio-1382, ¶ 10. Based on our review of the record, 

we do not find that the trial court acted unreasonably or otherwise abused its discretion 

in finding a competency evaluation warranted. Therefore, the 47 days between October 

14 and November 30, 2021 were not chargeable to the State for speedy-trial purposes. 

{¶ 23} Because of the competency evaluation and related proceedings, the trial 

court was required to reset the previously-scheduled October 25, 2021 trial date. During 

a November 30, 2021 oral hearing and in its judgment entry filed on that date finding 

Saunders competent, the trial court scheduled trial for January 31, 2022. On December 

1, 2021, however, the trial court sua sponte moved the scheduled trial date up to 

December 20, 2021. Thereafter, on December 8, 2021, the State moved for a 

continuance and sought to extend speedy-trial time under R.C. 2945.72(H), which tolls 

time for “the period of any reasonable continuance granted other than upon the accused’s 
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own motion.” The basis for the request was that the prosecutor was scheduled for 

“necessary and time-sensitive surgery” on December 21, 2021. The motion explained that 

surgery originally had been scheduled for earlier in the year but had been postponed until 

late December for reasons beyond the prosecutor’s control. Based on the complexity of 

the procedure and the lengthy recovery period, the State sought a continuance of trial 

until January 24, 2022. The State noted that it had considered having another prosecutor 

take the case, but it preferred not to do so given the nature and complexities of the case.

On December 13, 2021, the trial court sustained the State’s motion and continued the 

trial date until January 24, 2022. 

{¶ 24} On appeal, Saunders contends speedy-trial time should not have been 

tolled between December 20, 2021, and January 24, 2022. He notes that the trial court 

ruled on the State’s motion before he could respond, did not hold a hearing on the motion, 

and failed to cite specific reasons for granting the continuance. Saunders also asserts 

that the State’s justification for a continuance was unreasonable because another 

prosecutor could have handled the case.

{¶ 25} Upon review, we see no error in the trial court’s decision to grant a 

continuance based on the prosecutor’s scheduled surgery. “It is permissible for a trial 

court to grant the state a continuance of a trial date beyond the statutory speedy trial time 

limit if the continuance is reasonable and necessary under the circumstances.” State v. 

Ramey, 2012-Ohio-6187, 986 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.). Moreover, there is no per se 

requirement for a trial court to hold a hearing on a motion for a continuance. See, e.g., 

Greene County C.P. Loc.R. 3.05 (recognizing that a trial court has discretion to rule on a 
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motion in a criminal case without a hearing). As an officer of the court, the prosecutor 

provided a full explanation of the circumstances necessitating a continuance. In our view, 

the trial court acted within its discretion in accepting the prosecutor’s representations and 

finding a continuance justified without the need for a hearing.

{¶ 26} Although the trial court’s order granting a continuance did not spell out the 

rationale for its decision, it did specify that the continuance was ordered “for good cause 

shown.” It is beyond dispute that the “good cause shown” was the explanation provided 

in the memorandum accompanying the State’s motion. Therefore, the trial court 

effectively did set forth the basis for its decision by reference. Compare State v. Tope, 2d 

Dist. Greene No. 2019-CA-11, 2020-Ohio-953, ¶ 30, quoting State v. Myers, 97 Ohio 

St.3d 335, 2002-Ohio-6658, 780 N.E.2d 186, ¶ 62 (“[D]espite the trial court’s omission of 

an express finding that the unavailability of the coroner was the basis for its decision to 

grant the continuance, the court did expressly indicate that it granted the continuance for 

the reason set forth by the State in its motion. * * * The record thereby ‘affirmatively 

demonstrates the necessity for [the] continuance and the reasonableness thereof,’ and 

the court’s decision to grant the continuance should consequently be upheld.”). 

{¶ 27} We also see no error in the trial court’s accepting the State’s assertion that 

it was impracticable to have another prosecutor take over Saunders’ case. Based on the 

record before us, the trial court reasonably could have determined that the nature and 

complexity of the case justified continuing the trial date so the original prosecutor could 

participate. In reaching this conclusion, we note that the case involved forensic analysis 

of Saunders’ Google account data, an issue with which the original prosecutor 
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undoubtedly had acquired familiarity.

{¶ 28} Finally, we are unpersuaded that the trial court’s premature ruling on the 

State’s motion resulted in a speedy-trial violation. As set forth above, the trial court 

granted a continuance six days after the State filed its motion. Although the trial court 

ruled without giving Saunders 14 days to respond, he was served with the trial court’s 

order and failed to lodge any complaint until January 3, 2022, when he filed a motion to 

dismiss, arguing that a continuance was unjustified and that speedy-trial time had expired 

on December 28, 2021. 

{¶ 29} We have held that a trial court’s premature issuance of an order in a criminal 

case does not violate due process where the defendant knew about the order and failed 

to object or seek additional time despite being able to do so. State v. Webster, 2d Dist. 

Clark No. 2019-CA-47, 2020-Ohio-3576, ¶ 17-18 (involving a trial court’s scheduling of a 

retrial prior to expiration of a defendant’s time to file a motion for judgment of acquittal).

Ohio courts also have found no reversible error where a defendant fails to show how the 

result would have been different if he had been given an opportunity to respond prior to 

a trial court’s ruling on a motion by the State. State v. Lomack, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2012-

CA-32, 2013-Ohio-5, ¶ 24; State v. Starks, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-10-1191, 2011-Ohio1704, ¶ 39.

{¶ 30} In State v. Kelley, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 13-CA-78, 2014-Ohio-3673, the 

Fifth District found no reversible error where the trial court sustained a motion one day 

after it was filed without first granting the opposing party an opportunity to respond. Id. at 

¶ 15. The motion in Kelley was a motion to supplement a motion to suppress. Weeks after 
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the trial court sustained the motion, the State filed a memorandum challenging the motion 

to supplement. The trial court considered the State’s arguments and rejected them after 

the fact. Under these circumstances, the Fifth District found that the State had not been 

prejudiced by the trial court’s premature ruling. Id. at ¶ 15-19. In reaching its conclusion, 

the Fifth District distinguished cases involving a trial court’s issuance of a dispositive 

ruling without first giving the losing party an opportunity to respond. Id. at ¶ 18. 

{¶ 31} Here the trial court prematurely ruled on the State’s motion for a 

continuance. In that ruling, the trial court found a continuance to be reasonable and

necessary under the circumstances. Despite the trial court’s premature decision granting 

a continuance and tolling-speedy trial time, Saunders later did present his substantive 

arguments opposing the continuance. He did so in the context of his January 3, 2022 

motion to dismiss the charges against him. There he argued that a continuance was not 

reasonably necessary. The trial court addressed Saunders’ arguments on their merits and 

rejected them, reiterating its belief that a continuance was appropriate. As in Kelley, then, 

Saunders ultimately did have an after-the-fact opportunity to oppose both the State’s 

motion and the trial court’s ruling granting a continuance. Under these circumstances, we 

fail to see how Saunders was prejudiced, particularly given our determination above that 

the trial court’s order granting a continuance substantively was correct. Any error in the 

timing of the trial court’s continuance ruling was harmless. For the foregoing reasons, we 

conclude that the trial court correctly tolled speedy-trial time for 35 days between 

December 20, 2021, and January 24, 2022. Finally, on January 21, 2022, the trial court 

sua sponte continued the trial one additional day from January 24 until January 25, 2022, 
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due to a confirmed positive COVID-19 diagnosis by the prosecutor. We find that one-day 

continuance to be appropriate as well. 

{¶ 32} In light of the tolling events set forth above, we agree with the State that

Saunders was brought to trial within the statutory speedy-trial deadline. He was arrested 

and confined on June 28, 2021. Ninety days from June 28, 2021 was September 26, 

2021. His trial commenced on January 25, 2022, which was 121 days after the original 

September 26, 2021 speedy-trial deadline. In our analysis above, however, we have 

identified at least 127 days during which speedy-trial time was tolled. Consequently, the 

trial court did not err in overruling Saunders’ motion to dismiss based on a speedy-trial 

violation. The first assignment of error is overruled. 

B. Legal Sufficiency and Manifest Weight of the Evidence

{¶ 33} In his second and third assignments of error, Saunders challenges the legal 

sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence to sustain his convictions for tampering 

with records, telecommunications fraud, and obstructing official business. 

{¶ 34} “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to 

determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the 

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after 

viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 

could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶ 35} Our analysis is different when reviewing a manifest-weight argument. When 
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a conviction is challenged on appeal as being against the weight of the evidence, an 

appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences, consider witness credibility, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in 

the evidence, the trier of fact “clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage 

of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. 

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). A judgment should be 

reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence “only in the exceptional 

case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” State v. Martin, 20 

Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).

{¶ 36} With the foregoing standards in mind, we conclude that Saunders’ 

convictions were based on legally sufficient evidence and were not against the weight of 

the evidence. Saunders challenges his convictions for tampering with records, 

telecommunications fraud, and obstructing official business. His records-tampering 

conviction required proof that he falsified or altered a government writing or record with a 

purpose to defraud. R.C. 2913.42(A)(1) and (B)(4). His telecommunications-fraud 

conviction required proof that he knowingly disseminated or transmitted by means of a 

wire, radio, satellite, telecommunication, telecommunications device, telecommunications 

service, or voice over internet protocol service any writing or image with purpose to 

execute or otherwise further a scheme to defraud. R.C. 2913.05(A). Finally, his 

obstructing-official-business conviction required proof that he did an act that hampered or 

impeded a public official in the performance of the public official’s lawful duties and that 

he did so with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance of the public official’s 
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authorized actions. 

{¶ 37} With regard to records tampering and telecommunications fraud, Saunders 

admitted that he emailed a falsified court order to sergeant Penrod. He insisted, however, 

that he did not falsify the order and did not know it had been falsified. Therefore, he 

contends his convictions for records tampering and telecommunications fraud were based 

on legally insufficient evidence and were against the weight of the evidence. 

{¶ 38} We disagree. The State’s evidence demonstrated that the parenting-time

order was “modified” several times within Saunders’ Google account the same day he 

emailed it to Penrod. See Cellebrite Report, State’s Exhibit 23. The “path” showed 

Saunders’ email address being involved in the modifications, which also included 

converting the court order into various formats, including an editable Microsoft Word 

document. Id. The record reflects that the original court order was modified to give 

Saunders parenting time on Saturdays from 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. The modified version 

also included a changed filing time. Finally, a thumbnail image of the magistrate’s 

signature was found in Saunders’ account. This evidence, if believed, was legally 

sufficient to support his conviction for records tampering and telecommunications fraud. 

{¶ 39} Saunders’ theory that Eric Hocker hacked his Google account and modified 

the order without his knowledge went to the manifest weight of the evidence. In our view, 

however, the jury acted within its discretion in rejecting Saunders’ version of events. In 

addition to Saunders’ telephone number, the record did reflect a second telephone 

number associated with his Google account. See Google Subscriber Information, State’s 

Exhibit 17. Saunders identified this other telephone number as belonging to Eric Hocker. 
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The Google records also identify Hocker’s email address as being an account “Linked by 

SMS” to Saunders’ account. See Cellebrite Report, State’s Exhibit 23. 

{¶ 40} Although Hocker’s email address and telephone number did appear in 

Saunders’ Google account records, we see nothing to compel or even to support a finding 

that Hocker hacked into the Google account and modified the court order prior to 

Saunders’ sending it to Penrod. As set forth above, the State’s evidence demonstrated 

that the order was modified very shortly before Saunders emailed it and that the changes 

and transfers were made using Saunders’ email address. Ultimately, it was for the jury to 

assess Saunders’ credibility and to determine what weight to give to his testimony. We 

do not find that the jury lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice by finding 

Saunders guilty of records tampering and telecommunications fraud.

{¶ 41} Saunders’ conviction for obstructing official business also was supported by 

legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence. At Laqueta 

Maze’s request, sergeant Penrod was investigating the whereabouts of the two children 

on Saturday, May 15, 2021. In the course of his investigation, Penrod spoke to Saunders, 

who claimed that his parenting time recently had been modified and that he was allowed 

to have the children on Saturdays. Saunders emailed Penrod the falsified order to prove 

his entitlement to Saturday parenting time. Because the juvenile court was closed, Penrod 

spent five or six hours attempting to confirm the accuracy of the emailed order through 

other sources. 

{¶ 42} The jury reasonably found that Saunders had obstructed official business 

by emailing Penrod the falsified order when the court was closed so that he could keep 
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the children on Saturday. The State’s evidence supported a finding that Saunders had 

sent Penrod the order to hamper or impede the sergeant in the performance of his lawful 

duties and that Saunders did so with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay Penrod’s 

investigation of the legitimacy of the order and Saunders’ right to Saturday parenting time. 

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the jury could have 

found the elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This also is not an 

exceptional case in which the evidence weighed heavily against Saunders’ conviction. 

Accordingly, the second and third assignments of error are overruled.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

{¶ 43} In a final assignment of error, Saunders argues ineffective assistance of 

counsel based on his attorney’s failure to (1) retain an expert witness to examine the data 

obtained from his Google account, (2) cross-examine detective Hartwell about the data, 

and (3) admit into evidence the full Cellebrite report referenced by Hartwell.

{¶ 44} To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 

demonstrate both that trial counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness and that the errors were serious enough to create a reasonable 

probability that, but for the errors, the outcome of the case would have been different. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. 

Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 141-142, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). Hindsight is not permitted 

to distort the assessment of what was reasonable in light of counsel’s perspective at the 

time, and a debatable decision concerning trial strategy cannot form the basis for a finding 

of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Cook, 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 524-525, 605 
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N.E.2d 70 (1992); State v. Fields, 2017-Ohio-400, 84 N.E.3d 193, ¶ 38 (2d Dist.). 

{¶ 45} Here Saunders’ arguments fail to establish ineffective assistance of 

counsel. A fundamental problem with his assertions is that we have no way to test them 

to determine whether the alleged deficiencies he cites were prejudicial. For example, we 

have no way of knowing what a defense expert would have said if counsel had retained

one to examine the data obtained from Saunders’ Google account. For all we know, a 

defense expert may have agreed with detective Hartwell’s incriminating analysis and 

conclusions.

{¶ 46} We reach the same conclusion regarding Saunders’ complaint about 

defense counsel’s failure to cross examine Hartwell. It is impossible to know what Hartwell 

would have said about Saunders’ theory that Eric Hocker had hacked into his Google 

account and framed him. If questioned about the matter, Hartwell very well may have 

explained why Saunders’ theory was wrong. Indeed, defense counsel may have 

recognized flaws in Saunders’ theory and declined to raise the issue with Hartwell on 

cross-examination for that reason. 

{¶ 47} Saunders’ final argument about defense counsel’s failure to admit the full 

Cellebrite report into evidence also lacks merit. State’s Exhibit 23 was a power-point 

presentation based on the content of the Cellebrite report. It is unclear how much of the 

actual Cellebrite report was contained in the power-point presentation. But even if the full 

report was not incorporated into the presentation and admitted into evidence, we have no 

way of knowing whether any omitted portions would have made a difference or whether 

defense counsel’s failure to admit the full report was prejudicial. On the record before us, 
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then, Saunders cannot establish ineffective assistance of counsel. His fourth assignment 

of error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 48} Having overruled Saunders’ assignments of error, we affirm the judgment 

of the Greene County Common Pleas Court.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

WELBAUM, J. and EPLEY, J., concur. 

Copies sent to: 

Megan A. Hammond

Johnna M. Shia

Hon. Adolfo A. Tornichio