alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
LEETO L. ALLEN , Appellant,

v.
STATE OF FLORIDA , Appellee

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
CASE NO. 1D 15

- 5476

_____________________________/ Opinion filed March 15, 2017. An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County

. Waddell A. Wallace, III , Judge

. Leeto L. Allen, pro se , Appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee , for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.
Leeto L. Allen appeals from the final order of the lower court denying his motions for postconviction relief

. Those motions and Allen’s petition for writ of habeas corpus

— which the lower court converted to a mo tion for postconviction
relief

— all raised the sa me argument s : Allen’s convictions and sentences should be2 vacated because the presiding trial court judge did not conduct a n evidentiary hearing on his competency following the issuance of an October 5, 2010, competency evaluation finding him competent to pr oceed to trial , and did not enter an order expressly finding him competent to proceed. Important to our assessment
of Allen’s contention s , Allen did not file a direct appeal.
The lower court was correct in denying Allen relief. “The competency issue is procedurally barred because it should have been raised on direct appeal.” Patton v.
State , 784 So. 2d 380, 393 (Fla. 2000) (citing Johnston v. Dugger , 583 So. 2d 657, 659 (Fla. 1991)) ; accord Thompson v. State , 88 So. 3d 312 , 317 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (a defendant’s claim that the trial court “erred in fail ing to follow procedures to

ensure competency can and must be raised on direct appeal only ” ) (emphasis in original) (citing Nelson v. State , 43 So. 3d 20, 33 (Fla. 2002)), rev. denied , 107 So. 3d 407 (Fla. 2012). Likewise , a defendant’s substantive claim that he or she has a due process right not to be proce eded against while incompetent can be raised on direct appeal and is procedurally barred from being raise d in a postconvict ion
motion. Carroll v. State , 815 So. 2d 601, 609

- 10 (Fla. 2002); Patton , 784 So. 2d at
393. Allen did not raise his claim on direct appeal. Therefore, Allen is procedurally barred from raising it in a postconviction motion.
AFFIRMED.3 ROBERTS, C.J., JAY, and WINSOR, JJ., CONCUR.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FRANCISCO ABRAHAM ALVARADOFAVELA,

Petitioner,

 v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent.

No. 16-72374

Agency No. A095-662-816

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted August 7, 2019** 

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, McKEOWN and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

Francisco Abraham Alvarado-Favela, a native and citizen of Mexico,

petitions for review of the Board of Immigrations Appeals’ (BIA) order dismissing

his appeal from an immigration judge’s (IJ) decision denying his applications for

FILED

AUG 28 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

(CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

Whether a group constitutes a “particular social group” is a question of law

that we review de novo. Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 665 (9th Cir. 2010). 

We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Zehatye v.

Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2006).

The BIA did not err in its conclusion that Alvarado-Favela failed to establish

membership in a cognizable social group. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125,

1131 (9th Cir. 2016) (in order to demonstrate membership in a particular group,

“[t]he applicant must ‘establish that the group is (1) composed of members who

share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3)

socially distinct within the society in question’” (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26

I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014))); Barbosa v. Barr, 926 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th

Cir. 2019) (finding that individuals returning to Mexico from the United States

2
who are believed to be wealthy does not constitute a particular social group). 

Thus, Alvarado-Favela’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail.1 

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Alvarado-Favela

did not establish that he is more likely than not to be tortured by or with the

consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to Mexico. See Aden v.

Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009); Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d

1026, 1033 (9th Cir. 2014) (concluding that petitioner did not establish the

necessary “state action” for CAT relief). Thus, Alvarado-Favela’s CAT claim fails. 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. 

1

 Our conclusion is not affected by the differing nexus standards applicable

to asylum and withholding of removal claims. Cf. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846

F.3d 351, 360 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing Zetino v. Holder having drawn no

distinction between the standards where there was no nexus at all to a protected

ground).

3
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 199 (Friday, October 15, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 63475-63476]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-25928]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION


Radio Broadcasting Services; AM or FM Proposals To Change The 
Community of License

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The following applicants filed AM or FM proposals to change 
the community of license: 1TV.COM, INC., Station KIKO, Facility ID 
72477, BP-20100824ABA, From MIAMI, AZ, To SUPERIOR, AZ; AIRWAVES FOR 
JESUS, INC., Station NONE, Facility ID 176879, BMPED-20100831AAQ, From 
CRAIGSVILLE, WV, To WEBSTER SPRINGS, WV; ENTRAVISION HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Station KVVA-FM, Facility ID 1331, BPH-20100817ABA, From APACHE 
JUNCTION, AZ, To SUN LAKES, AZ; MEDIA MINISTRIES, INC., Station KLIC, 
Facility ID 22171, BP-20100903ABU, From MONROE, LA, To RICHWOOD, LA; 
PMB BROADCASTING, LLC, Station WKCN, Facility ID 54670, BPH-
20100908ACE, From LUMPKIN, GA, To FORT BENNING SOUTH, GA; SOUTHWEST FM 
BROADCASTING CO., INC., Station KAHM, Facility ID 61510, BPH-
20100813BHN, From PRESCOTT, AZ, To SPRING VALLEY, AZ.

DATES: Comments may be filed through December 14, 2010.

ADDRESSES: Federal Communications Commission, 445 Twelfth Street, SW., 
Washington, DC 20554.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tung Bui, 202-418-2700.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The full text of these applications is 
available for inspection and copying during normal business hours in 
the Commission's Reference Center, 445 12th Street, SW., Washington, DC 
20554 or electronically via the Media Bureau's Consolidated Data Base 
System, http://svartifoss2.fcc.gov/prod/cdbs/pubacc/prod/cdbs_pa.htm. 
A copy of this application may also be purchased from the Commission's 
duplicating contractor, Best Copy and Printing, Inc., 445 12th Street, 
SW., Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 20554, telephone 1-800-378-3160 or 
http://www.BCPIWEB.com.


[[Page 63476]]


Federal Communications Commission
James D. Bradshaw,
Deputy Chief, Audio Division, Media Bureau.
[FR Doc. 2010-25928 Filed 10-14-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

JIMMY JEUDY, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2D19-403

)

STATE OF FLORIDA, )

)

Appellee. )

________________________________ )

Opinion filed September 18, 2020.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for 

Sarasota County; Debra Johnes Riva, 

Judge.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, 

and Cynthia J. Dodge, Assistant Public 

Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. 

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, for Appellee. 

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. 

NORTHCUTT, ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, and SMITH, JJ., Concur.
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER



I, Edward C. Milligan, Chief Executive
Officer of Main Street Banks, Inc. (the Registrant), do hereby certify in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, based on my knowledge:



| | (1) | the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Registrant, to which this certification is attached as an exhibit (the Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section
13 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m); and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                   |  |     |  |                                                          |  | 
|------------------ |  | --- |  | -------------------------------------------------------- |  | 
|Date: May 10, 2004 |  | By: |  | /s/ EDWARD C. MILLIGAN                                  
|                   |  |     |  | Edward C. Milligan, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer



24
#### Horanic v. Westmoreland County Tax Claim Bureau

*Jerome L. Tierney,*for plaintiff.

*Barry B. Gindlesperger,*for defendant Louis J. Paulisicks.

*William J. McCabe,*for defendants Raymond and Tina Hadad.

March 5, 1992

McCORMICK, *J.,*

This matter is raised by the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, seeking a dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint for failure to allége an agreement in compliance with the requisite aspects of the Statute of Frauds, 33 P.S. §1 et seq.

The plaintiff’s first amended complaint contends that the plaintiff and defendant Raymond Hadad had a mutual belief or understanding at the time they acquired the properties in question as tenants in common, that each had to consent to the other’s conveyance of the properties to third parties. At the time Ms. Horanic and Mr. Hadad acquired the properties, they were engaged to be married, but that engagement was subsequently terminated, and Mr. Hadad has married another, Tina Hadad, a defendant to this case. A review *617of the deeds whereby Ms. Horanic and Mr. Hadad achieved title discloses no indication of any restrictions on either party regarding subsequent conveyances. Neither has Ms. Horanic made this court aware of any other writing that purports to set forth any such restriction.

What the plaintiff contends is applicable herein is a forbearance to convey. Normally, a tenant in common is free to convey his interest in the co-tenancy without reference to or consent from his co-tenant. *Werner*v. *Quality Service Oil Co. Inc.,*337 Pa. Super. 264, 486 A.2d 1009 (1984). Any restriction upon that right to convey would constitute the grant or surrender of an interest in land, which would require compliance with the Statute of Frauds in order to be considered a legitimate right enforceable as against that co-tenant. Although there appears to be some agreement by Mr. Hadad that he may have orally promised to forbear from conveying his share of the co-tenancy, such an oral promise does not meet the requirements of the statute.

This case can be analogized to *Atlantic Financial Federal v. Orianna Historic Associates,*406 Pa. Super. 316, 594 A.2d 356 (1991), wherein it was alleged that the plaintiffs in a mortgage foreclosure action had orally agreed to forbear from foreclosing upon the mortgages in question. The Superior Court found that such an oral forbearance agreement would have been the surrender of an interest in land and as such was subject to the Statute of Frauds. The same is clear in the instant case.

The plaintiff is therefore unable to make out an agreement to support her contention. Considering the plead*618ings, depositions, interrogatories and admissions constituting the record in this case, along with the affidavits submitted, this court must conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact remaining for resolution by the fact finder and must grant summary judgment. *Rosen v. Tessoro Petroleum Corp.,*399 Pa. Super. 226, 582 A.2d 27 (1990).

ORDER OF COURT

And now, March 5, 1992, there appearing to be no genuine issues of material fact remaining for resolution by the finder of fact, the defendants’ motions for summary judgment are granted.
Exhibit 31.1

CERTIFICATION

I, Somsak Chivavibul,
certify that:

1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period
covered by this report on Form 10-K of Navient Student Loan Trust 2014-3 (the Exchange Act periodic reports);

2. Based on my
knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing
and other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

4. Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statements required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as
disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicer and administrator have fulfilled their obligations under the servicing agreement and administration agreement, as applicable, in all material respects; and

5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on
assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this
report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K. In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information
provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: Xerox Education Services, LLC, as subservicer, and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as indenture trustee.

[Signature Page Follows]



---

|                                                                     
|---------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: March 30, 2016                                                 
|                                                                     
|/s/ SOMSAK CHIVAVIBUL                                                
|Somsak Chivavibul                                                    
|President and Chief Financial Officer (Senior
Securitization Officer)
|Navient Funding, LLC
ACCEPTED 03-14-00516-CR 3703065 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS 1/8/2015 4:05:56 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 9
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS FOR PERIOD ENDING JUNE 30, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                       9,966,295
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                         114,762
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                            18,990,000
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                 21,772,858
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                       1,999,664
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                         1,997,049
<LOANS>                                    116,650,311
<ALLOWANCE>                                  1,483,062
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             176,196,086
<DEPOSITS>                                 157,612,991
<SHORT-TERM>                                   536,722
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                          1,050,796
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                    12,377,262
<OTHER-SE>                                   5,553,795
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>             176,196,086
<INTEREST-LOAN>                              5,906,562
<INTEREST-INVEST>                              763,930
<INTEREST-OTHER>                               433,904
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                             7,104,396
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                           3,058,193
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           3,066,750
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                        4,037,646
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                  110,000
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                              2,694,999
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,660,234
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                   1,660,234
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,106,939
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .44
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .40
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                       0
<LOANS-NON>                                          0
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                     0
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                        0
<RECOVERIES>                                         0
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                    0
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                                 0
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.2



RF MONOLITHICS, INC.



CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF SARBANES  OXLEY ACT OF 2002



The
undersigned, Harley E Barnes III, Chief Financial Officer of RF Monolithics, Inc. (the Company), DOES HEREBY CERTIFY that:



| | 1. | The Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended May 31, 2004 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | Information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.
| | -- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§1350 and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure document.



IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has caused this instrument to be executed this 14th day of July, 2004.



/s/ Harley E Barnes IIIName:

Harley E Barnes IIITitle:

Chief Financial Officer




*A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
This is a comment in response to the proposed changes to 5 C.F.R. 1209.2, Jurisdiction. 

MSPB proposes to change this rule such that employees who choose to pursue a 

whistleblowing reprisal action with the Office of Special Counsel will sacrifice the ability 

to challenge the personnel action on the merits when filing an Individual Right of Action 

with MSPB. This is a significant limitation of whistleblowers' legal rights, but since it is 

one that Congress enacted in 1994, the MSPB has no choice but to reconcile its 

regulations with 5 U.S.C. 7121(g). 

I am concerned, however, that tribunals adjudicating future IRA cases might apply this 

rule to conduct taking place before the rule's enactment. This is contrary to Supreme 

Court and Federal Circuit precedent. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 

269-70 (1994) ("A statute does not operate 'retrospectively' merely because it is applied 

in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute's enactment, . . . or upsets 

expectations based in prior law. Rather, the court must ask whether the new provision 

attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment. The 

conclusion that a particular rule operates 'retroactively' comes at the end of a process of 

judgment concerning the nature and extent of the change in the law and the degree of 

connection between the operation of the new rule and a relevant past event.") (internal 

citations omitted); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) 

("Retroactivity is not favored in the law. Thus, congressional enactments and 

administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language 

requires this result.") (citations omitted); Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States, 397 F.3d 

1358, 1362-62 (Fed. Cir.2005) (restating and applying the Bowen and Landgraf 

holdings).

In cases where a federal employee who makes a protected disclosure suffers a causal 

personnel action before the proposed rule is enacted, but files a complaint with the Office 

of Special Counsel after (or files with OSC before but does not file the IRA until after the 

rule takes effect), the above analysis applies and the current version of 5 C.F.R. 1209.2 

should govern. In order to minimize confusion and reduce litigation, the Board should 

state in the final rule preamble that the revised Section 1209.2 applies only to conduct 

that takes place after the rule takes effect.

Sincerely,

David Pardo

MSPB Watch