IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE )

)

v. ) I.D. No. 1801007017

) 

MAURICE COOPER, )

)

Defendant. )

Submitted: August 3, 2022

Decided: August 3, 2022

Upon Defendant Maurice Cooper’s Motion to Disqualify Counsel,

GRANTED.

ORDER 

Mark A. Denny, Jr., Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, DEPARTMENT OF 

JUSTICE, 820 North French Street, Wilmington, DE, Attorney for the State of 

Delaware.

Peter A. Levin, Esquire, 1927 Hamilton Street, Philadelphia PA, 19130, Attorney 

for Defendant Maurice Cooper.

Jan A. T. van Amerongen, Jr., Esquire, OFFICE OF DEFENSE SERVICES 

OFFICE OF CONFLICTS COUNSEL, 900 King Street, Suite 320, Wilmington, DE 

19801.

Maurice Cooper, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, 1181 Paddock Road, 

Smyrna, DE 19977, Defendant 

WHARTON, J.
2

This 3rd day of August, 2022, upon consideration of Defendant Maurice 

Cooper’s (“Cooper”) Motion to Disqualify Counsel, the responses to that motion of 

Peter A. Levin, Esquire, the State of Delaware, and the Office of Defense Services 

Office of Conflicts Counsel, Cooper’s letter withdrawing of his Motion to Disqualify 

Counsel, the responses of counsel to that letter, and the record in this matter, it 

appears to the Court that:

1. Defendant Maurice Cooper was convicted by a jury of Drug Dealing 

(Heroin), Aggravated Possession of Heroin, four counts of Possession of a Firearm 

by a Person Prohibited, and two counts of Possession of Ammunition by a Person 

Prohibited on February 28, 2019.1 He was sentenced to an aggregate of 75 years of 

unsuspended incarceration at Level 5, much of it minimum/mandatory incarceration.

2

 

He also received additional periods of suspended incarceration with decreasing levels 

of supervision.3 An unsuccessful appeal followed.4 On April 7, 2021, Cooper filed a 

pro se motion for postconviction relief and an accompanying motion for appointment

of counsel.

5

 On April 19th, the Court granted the motion for appointment of counsel.6

On January 18, 2022, the Office of Conflicts Counsel moved for the admission pro 

hac vice of Peter A. Levin, Esquire to represent Cooper.7 That motion was granted 

1 D.I. 69.

2 D.I. 86.

3

Id.

4 Cooper v. State, 228 A.3d 399 (Del. Apr. 15, 2020).

5 D.I. 120, 121. 

6 D.I. 125.

7 D.I. 126.
3

the same day.8 On June 13, 2022, Mr. Levin filed an Amended Motion for 

Postconviction Relief of Cooper’s behalf.9 

2. On June 8, 2022, Cooper filed this pro se Motion to Disqualify Counsel

(“Motion”).

10 Cooper alleges that Mr. Levin has a conflict of interest in representing 

him because he represented a “codefendant/witness” at a federal violation of 

probation hearing.

11

 Cooper states that the codefendant/witness agreed to cooperate 

against him in the federal and state proceedings against him stemming from the 

racketeering investigation that resulted in Cooper’s conviction in this case.12

3. The Court solicited the positions of Mr. Levin, the State, and the Office 

of Conflicts Counsel. Mr. Levin responds that he was asked by Conflicts Counsel to 

represent another defendant in this case but declined because he was representing the 

“codefendant/witness” in the federal violation of probation matter and that 

“codefendant/witness” was also a defendant in this case.13 Therefore, he declined to 

represent any defendant in this case.14 Initially, Mr. Levin was under the belief that 

representing Cooper on his postconviction effort would not pose a conflict, but upon 

delving deeper into the points Cooper raised in his motion to disqualify, he concludes

8 D.I. 127.

9 D.I. 135.

10 D.I. 132.

11 Id.

12 Id.

13 D.I. 136.

14 Id.
4

that the Motion has merit.15 The State does not perceive a conflict.16 The Office of 

Conflicts Counsel defers to Mr. Levin and agrees that a conflict exists.17 

4. Subsequently, Cooper wrote to the Court withdrawing the Motion.18 The 

letter did not provide an explanation for his change of heart.19 The Court again 

solicited the comments of counsel to Cooper’s attempt to withdraw the Motion. Mr. 

Levin responded on July 28th reiterating his belief that there is an incurable conflict 

of interest between the interests of his former client and his continued representation 

of Cooper.20 He bases that belief on a review of his former client’s file and a 

conversation with that client’s counsel on his Delaware state charges.21 It appears 

that Mr. Levin’s former client provided authorities with information about Cooper’s 

alleged involvement in a homicide, two attempted murders, a robbery, and other 

offenses.22 Mr. Levin also reviewed interview notes wherein his former client 

expressed fear of Cooper and others.23 Finally, his former client has never waived 

any conflict of interest.24 The Office of Conflicts Counsel responded on July 29th.25 

Conflict Counsel received a call from Cooper in which he expressed his concern about 

15 Id.

16 D.I. 

17 D.I. 

18 D.I. 137.

19 Id.

20 D.I. 138. 

21 Id. 

22 Id.

23 Id.

24 Id. 

25 D.I. 140.
5

the delay that reassignment of his case to another attorney would cause.26 

Nonetheless, the Office of Conflicts Counsel supports Mr. Levin’s determination that 

the appointment of new counsel is necessary.27 The State does not oppose Cooper’s 

request to withdraw his Motion to Disqualify Counsel.28 It believes that the basis 

proffered for disqualification does not appear to conflict with any issues in Cooper’s 

case.29 The State, in apparent agreement with Cooper, believes it is in the parties’ 

interest to proceed in a timely manner.30

5. The Court has considered the positions of all counsel and Cooper and 

concludes that it would be appropriate for new counsel to be appointed to represent 

Cooper. Interestingly, in all of their submissions, no one references the conflict of 

interest rules of the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“DLRPC”) 

and only Cooper cites any case law. DLRPC Rule 1.9 provides that a lawyer “who 

has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another 

person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests 

are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client 

gives informed consent confirmed in writing.” The Court finds that the matter in 

which Mr. Levin represented the former client is substantially related to Cooper’s 

26 Id.

27 Id.

28 D.I. 139.

29 Id.

30 Id.
6

case.31 The Court further finds that the interests of Cooper and the former client are 

materially adverse,

32 and that the former client has not given informed consent to Mr. 

Levin’s representation of Cooper, confirmed in writing. Accordingly, a conflict of 

interest exists between Mr. Levin’s representation of his former client and his 

representation of Cooper. 

THEREFORE, Defendant Maurice Cooper’s Motion to Disqualify Counsel is 

GRANTED, notwithstanding his attempt to withdraw it. The Office of Conflicts 

Counsel is directed to appoint new counsel for Cooper as expeditiously as possible. 

Upon the appointment of new counsel, the Court will issue a new scheduling order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Ferris W. Wharton

Ferris W. Wharton, J.

 

31 Cooper has provided detailed evidence supporting this conclusion in his Motion. 

See, D.I. 132. 

32 Mr. Levin’s former client has expressed his fear of Cooper. That fear no doubt 

would be exacerbated were Mr. Levin to be successful on Cooper’s behalf.