No. 89-23
IN THE SUPREME COURTOF THE STATE OFMONTANA 1989

HILLCRESTHOMEOWNERSASSOCIATION, a Montana corporation, PlaintiffandAppellant,-vsA. G. WILEY and KANCHANAWILEY, Defendantsand Respondents.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and for the County of Flathead, TheHonorableMichael Keedy, Judgepresiding.
COUNSELOF RECORD:
ForAppellant: Thomas 

### R. Bostock; Warden, Christiansen, Johnson and Berg, Kalispell,Montana
For Respondent:
H. JamesOleson; Oleson Law Firm,Kalispell,Montana

Submitted on Briefs: June 30, 1989 Decided: August 31, 1989JusticeL. C. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Plaintiff, the Hillcrest HomeownersAssociation, filed a complaint in the District Court for the Eleventh Judicial District,Flathead County, alleging that the defendants,A.G. Wiley and Kanchana Wiley, now deceased, violated a restrictive covenant by building a garage on their lot in HillcrestEstates subdivision,Flathead County. The District Court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Plaintiffsappeal. We reverse and remand. Hillcrest Estates is a residential subdivision located in Flathead County. In 1969, the owners of Hillcrest Estates adopted restrictive convenants that were then duly recorded in theClerk and Recorder's office in Flathead County. These covenantsprovide in pertinent part: RESIDENTIAL AREA COVENANTS. 

### - 1. LAND USE AND BUILDING TYPE. No lot shall be used except for single family residential purposes, only one residence per lot and no lot shall be subdivided. 2. IMPROVEMENTS. (a)All homes must be ofnew construction and have aminimum 

### of 1600 square feet of living area on the ground level. (b) Exterior of improvements must be completed within one year after start of construction. (c) No temporary buildings of any nature will be allowed during or after construction, including trailer homes.
In 1979,A. G. Wiley and Kanchana Wiley purchased lot 3 in the Hillcrest Estates subdivision. In late 1980, or early 1981, they completed construction of a steel sided garage on their property. The Wileys built this garage as part oftheir original plan tobuild a single family residencewith a detached garage. Kanchana Wiley died in May, 1983, and the actual residence was never built. A. G. Wiley eventually moved toUtah. In April, 1987, the Hillcrest Homeowners Association filed a complaint in the District Court for the Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County, alleging that the garage violated the restrictivecovenants. The Hillcrest Homeowners Association appeal the District Court's finding, which stated that the garage built on lot 3 is permanent, complete, and does not violate the restrictivecovenants. The only issue Hillcrest raises on appeal is whether the District Court erred in determining that the garage did not violate the restrictivecovenants. Hillcrest argues that the garage violates the "residentialpurposes" language of the restrictive covenant. In particular, Hillcrest argues that while a garage, in conjunction with a residence, is consistent with "residential purposes," a garage by itself, absent the development of a residence, is not consistent with "residential purposes." Hillcrest therefore argues that the Wileys violated the restrictive covenant that is applicable to the Hillcrest Estates. We agree. Restrictive covenants are generally valid "if they tend to maintain or enhance the character of a particular residential subdivision.'' Town & Country Estates Ass'n

(Mont. 1987), 740 P.2d 668, 671, 44 St.Rep. 1257, 1260. When interpreting a restrictive covenant, this Court applies the same rules as those applicable to contract interpretation. Gosnay v. Big Sky Owners Ass'n (1983), 205 Mont. 221, 227, 666 P.2d 1247, 1250. Therefore, this Court must, if reasonably practical, read the restrictive covenant as a whole so as to give meaning to every part of the covenant.

### See 28-3-202, MCA. In addition, the language of the covenant is to be understood in its ordinary and popular sense, see S 

### 28-3-501,MCA, and the languagewill govern the covenant's interpretation when the words are plain and unambiguous. Gosnay, 205 Mont. at 227, 666 P.2d at 1250. When interpreting the covenant in this case, this Court must ascertain the meaning of "residential purposes." Webster's Dictionary defines "residential" as "used as a residence or by residents." "Residence" is then defined as "the act or fact of dwelling in a place for some time." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1003 (1986)

# . Consistent with these definitions, courts have held that a garage built on a lot without a dwelling house on the same lot violates a restrictive covenant when the covenant specifically limits a lot's use to "residential purposes." Inparticular, the Washington Court ofAppeals in Sandy Point ImprovementCo. v. Huber (Wash. 1980), 613P.2d 160,recited: A private garage is aproper appurtenance necessary to the enjoyment of a dwelling house and does not violate a "for residence purposes only" covenant [cites omitted]. However, if the garage is placed on an adjoining lot, it is no longer deemed to be appurtenant and does violate such a restriction even though used in connection with a residenceon an adjoining lot [citesomitted]. Sandy Point Improvement Co., 613 P.2d at 163. In light of the ordinary and popular use of the word "residential,"we agree with theWashington Court of Appeals1interpretation of "residentialpurposes." In the present case,Wiley's garage was built on lot 3 in the Hillcrest Estates subdivision approximately seven years before the complaint was filed. The restrictive covenant clearly provides that the Hillcrest lots shall beused only for "single family residentialpurposes." Reading the covenant as a whole and in light of the popular and ordinary meaning of "residential," a garage, by itself, is not consistent with "single familyresidentialpurposes" when the garage is not used in conjunction with a residential dwelling. Therefore, we hold that Wiley violated the restrictive covenantwhenhebuilt the garage on lot 3 in the Hillcrest Estates subdivision and did not, within a reasonable time, build a residential dwelling to accompany the garage. We therefore reverse the District Court and remand this case to allow the District Court to determine the proper relief warranted under the facts of this case. /' Reverse and remanded.

We Concur:

Justices


### Idonot concur with the findings of themajority.