alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Orval D. Hunter, Administrator of the Estate of Ray E. Hunter Deceased; Hilda Hunter *v.*Iva Hunter; Frankie Ferguson.

[No. 568A97.

Filed May 14, 1973.]

*James B. Sparks,*of Bloomfield, for appellants.

*Ferguson, Berry, Ferguson & Bridges,*of Bloomington, for appellees.

Buchanan, P.J.

Defendant-appellants Orval D. Hunter, Administrator of the Estate of Ray E. Hunter, Deceased (Ray), and Hilda Hunter (jointly referred to as Orval), seek clarification and enforcement of the mandate contained in our opinion rendered in this case on June 14, 1972, at 283 N.E.2d 775.

The original action commenced in 1967 by plaintiffs-appellees Iva Hunter and Frankie Ferguson (Iva and Frankie) sought to establish a constructive trust on land which they had conveyed to their brother, Ray, prior to his death. The *188trial court found a constructive trust, entered judgment for Iva and Frankie, and appointed a Commissioner who conveyed the land in question to Iva and Frankie on March 28, 1968 (Deed recorded in Deed Record 192, Page 281 in the Recorder’s Office of Greene County, Indiana).

No application to stay proceedings pending appeal was filed in this or the trial court pursuant to former Supreme Court Rule 2-3. Possession and title to the land remain in Iva and Frankie.

Our opinion of June 14,1972 held the evidence insufficient to establish a constructive trust and concluded, “Therefore the judgment is reversed.”

On March 26, 1973, the Indiana Supreme Court denied Iva and Frankie’s Petition To Transfer.

Lamenting continued possession and title to the land in Iva and Frankie, Orval’s Petition now seeks to clarify the relief granted by our opinion of June 14, 1972, and further requests that we mandate the Daviess Circuit Court to effectuate transfer of title to the name of Ray E. Hunter.

It is well settled that a court on appeal retains jurisdiction of the original cause for the purpose of effectuating its mandate. *International Shoe Co.*v. *Lacy*(1945), 116 Ind. App. 78, 61 N.E.2d 85; *Union Trust Co.*v. *Curtis*(1917), 186 Ind. 516, 116 N.E. 916. Also see Rule AP. 15 (M).

The effect of our mandate stating that the trial court’s “judgment is reversed” was to vacate and nullify the trial court’s judgment and any orders based thereon and return the parties to the positions they occupied prior to the trial court’s judgment.

To avoid any lingering doubt as to the effect of our previous judgment we hereby specifically order the trial court to:

> 1) enter an order reversing its judgment in favor of Iva and Frankie,

> 2) enter judgment for Orval,

> *1893) cause conveyance of title to the land described above to be effected to Orval as administrator of the Estate of Ray E. Hunter, deceased, or to such other person or persons legally entitled thereto, free of trust.

> 4) appoint a commissioner if necessary for such reconveyance,

> 5) to do such further acts and to require such further proceedings as are consistent with this and our prior opinion in this case.

Note. — Reported at 295 N.E.2d 834.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 January 29, 2014

p0122

Order 

Clerk

January 29, 2014

147091

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 147091

COA: 314337

St. Joseph CC: 12-017690-FH

MICHAEL ANDREW RADANDT,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 14, 2013 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(H)(1), in lieu of 

granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for 

consideration, as on leave granted, of the issue whether the police officers unlawfully 

expanded a “knock and talk” procedure by entering the defendant’s backyard and 

walking onto a wooden deck, which was attached to the home, and, if a constitutional 

violation occurred, whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies 

under these facts. In all other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
#### Holmes, Administratrix, etc. *v.*Fletcher et al.

[No. 19,807.

Filed June 27, 1963.

Rehearing- denied August 6, 1963.]

*Larry J. Burke*and *Kennerk, Dumas & Burke,*of Fort Wayne, for appellant.

*84*Thomas Logan*and *Rothberg, Gallmeyer, Strutz, Frueehtenieht & Logan,*of Fort Wayne, for appellee, Joe Willie Day.

*Edward J. Moppert, Jr.,*and *Hoffman, Moppert & Solomon,*of Fort Wayne, for appellee, Sam Fletcher.

*Hunt, Suedhoff & Wilks*and *Leigh L. Hunt,*of Fort Wayne, for appellee, Sears, Roebuck *&*Company.

Mote, C. J.

— A second amended complaint was filed in the trial court by the appellant which alleged negligence on the part of the appellees, or their agents or employees, on February 27, 1953, proximately causing personal injuries to Homer Holmes, appellant’s decedent. The complaint further alleged that the injuries resulted in medical, hospital and nursing expenses, as well as loss of income, to said decedent from the date of injury to the date of his death on February 28, 1959, from causes other than said personal injuries.

Appellees each addressed a demurrer to the second amended complaint on the ground that the pleading did not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and by raising a specific issue of law as to whether a cause of action survived the death of Homer Holmes.

The trial court sustained the demurrer of each appellee to said second amended complaint. Appellant refused to plead over and judgment was rendered as follows:

> “It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed by the Court that the said defendant, Sears, Roebuck and Company have and recover of and from the plaintiff the costs of this action, and plaintiff take nothing by her complaint as to defendant, Sears, Roebuck and Company.”

> “It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed by the Court that the defendants Sam Fletcher and Joe Willie Day have and recover from the *85plaintiff the costs of this action as herein laid out and expended.”

The sole and only question in this appeal is whether a cause of action survived the death of the said Holmes. Appellant concedes that there are no significant differences in the pattern of facts as set forth in the case of *Leslie A. Malone, Administrator of the Estate of Sylvester Malone, Decedent*v. *Ronald J. Conner,*in Cause No. 19650,1 Ind. Dec. 288, 135 Ind. App. 167, 189 N. E. 2d 590, decided by this court, Division Number One, on April 18, 1963. In other words, the same question is presented by this appeal as was presented in the *Malone*case.

On the basis of the conclusion reached in said *Malone*case we hereby affirm the judgment herein.

Hunter, Kelley, Pfaff, JJ., concur.

Note. — Reported in 191 N. E. 2d 335.
**Exhibit 31.1**

 

**CERTIFICATIONS**

 

I, Brian E. Schaaf, certify that:

 

1.                                     I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of Ford Credit Auto Lease Trust 2014-B (the “Exchange Act periodic reports”);

 

2.                                     Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3.                                     Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

 

4.                                     I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the servicer and based on my knowledge and the compliance review conducted in preparing the servicer compliance statement required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the servicing agreement in all material respects; and

 

5.                                     All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report.  Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.

 

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: The Bank of New York Mellon, as indenture trustee of the issuing entity, and U.S. Bank Trust National Association, as owner trustee of the issuing entity.

 

Dated March 23, 2016

 

 
|   | /s/ Brian E. Schaaf                                |
|--------|----------------------------------------------------|
|   | Brian E. Schaaf                                    |
|   | Vice President and   Assistant Treasurer           |
|   | Ford Motor Credit   Company LLC, as Servicer       |
|   | (senior officer in   charge of servicing function) |

 

----
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. FRED PAINTER.

November 17, 1987.

Petition for certification denied.
#### CARRIER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent. Local Union No. 5895, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, et al., Interveners.

Docket No. 27079.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

May 25, 1964.

*564Hancock Dorr Ryan & Shove, SyraCUSS’ ,i> V ’ a-u i w f106’ ri S r1 man & Kammholz, Washington, D. C., for Carrier Corp.

Associate Gen. Counsel, N. L. R. B., Washington, D. C., Merle D. Vincent, Jr., Director, Region 3, N. L. R. B., Buffalo, N. Y., for National Labor Relations Bd.

McMahon & Crotty, Buffalo, N. Y., Feller, Bredoff & Anker, Washington, D. C., for United Steel Workers of America

Isadore Greenberg, Syracuse, N. Y„ or Local 5895.

Gerald E. Dwyer, New York City, for Association of American Railroads ami'cus curiae.

Before LUMBARD, Chief Judge, and :SWAN and, WATERMAN, Circuit Judges. *

PER CURIAM.

This action was remanded to us by the Supreme Court of the United States pursuant to the opinion and judgment of the 'Court in United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. National Labor Relations Board, 376 U.S. 492, 84 S.Ct. 899, 11 L.Ed.2d 863, for further proceedings in conformity with the opinion of the Court.

In accord with the remand our judgment of October 18, 1962 issued upon our •opinion, 311 F.2d 135 (2 Cir. 1962) is vacated. For the reasons stated in the .Supreme Court opinion, supra, the decision of the Board that the union activity in this case did not violate Sections 8(b) (4) (i) (B) or 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of the National Labor Relations Act is affirmed, and the petition of the employer herein to review and modify the decision and order of National Labor Relations Board, 132 N.L.R.B. 127, 130 <1961) is denied.
IV 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. RES. 1013 

Celebrating civic advocacy in the United States and supporting the designation 

of July 24th as National Advocacy Day. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 23, 2018 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI (for himself, Mr. YODER, Ms. NORTON, and Mr. 

QUIGLEY) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

RESOLUTION 

Celebrating civic advocacy in the United States and supporting the designation of July 24th as National Advocacy Day. 

Whereas the Pew Research Center found that approximately 

50 percent of adults in the United States reported directly taking part in a civic group or activity every year; 

Whereas the Pew Research Center found that approximately 

40 percent of adults in the United States reported contacting a government official or speaking out in public forums via offline methods about an issue facing their community; 

Whereas the Pew Research Center found that 53 percent of 

adults in the United States reported engaging in political 

or civic activity on a social networking site; 


dlhill on DSK3GLQ082PROD with BILLS
2 

•HRES 1013 IH 

Whereas strong civic advocacy and the ability of United 

States citizens to petition government improves public life 

and preserves the health of democracy in the United 

States; 

Whereas participation in civic advocacy equips people in the 

United States with the tools and inspiration to give back 

to their communities through local and national service; 

Whereas participation in advocacy activities provides youth in 

the United States with leadership qualities and a sense 

of empowerment; 

Whereas participation in advocacy activities improves civic 

education in the United States and increases awareness 

about pressing issues and current events, leading to higher levels of social and political participation; and 

Whereas the right to petition government is a freedom guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States 

Constitution, and should be celebrated for its contribution to civic life in the United States: Now, therefore, be 

it 

1 Resolved, That the House of Representatives supports 

2 celebration of civic advocacy efforts on National Advocacy 

3 Day. 

Æ 


dlhill on DSK3GLQ082PROD with BILLS
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-8533

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

CURTIS D. DAVIS, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Newport News. Jerome B. Friedman, 

District Judge. (4:99-cr-00055-JBF-1) 

Submitted: February 19, 2009 Decided: February 27, 2009 

Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. 

Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion. 

Curtis D. Davis, Appellant Pro Se. Timothy Richard Murphy, 

Special Assistant United States Attorney, Newport News, 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

Curtis D. Davis seeks to appeal the district court’s 

order denying his motion for reduction of sentence under 18 

U.S.C. § 3582 (2006), and its subsequent order denying his 

motion for reconsideration. In criminal cases, the defendant 

must file the notice of appeal within ten days after the entry 

of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A); see United States v. 

Alvarez, 210 F.3d 309, 310 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that § 3582 

proceeding is criminal in nature and ten-day appeal period 

applies). With or without a motion, upon a showing of excusable 

neglect or good cause, the district court may grant an extension 

of up to thirty days to file a notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. 

P. 4(b)(4); United States v. Reyes, 759 F.2d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 

1985). 

The district court entered its order denying the 

motion for reduction of sentence on October 8, 2008. The notice 

of appeal was filed on November 24, 2008.1 Because Davis failed 

to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension of 

 1

 For the purpose of this appeal, we assume that the date 

appearing on the notice of appeal is the earliest date it could 

have been properly delivered to prison officials for mailing to 

the court. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c); Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 

(1988). 

2 
3 

the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal of the district court’s 

order denying Davis’ § 3582 motion.2

Turning to the order denying Davis’ motion for 

reconsideration, we have reviewed the record and conclude that 

the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 

motion. According, we affirm for the reasons stated by the 

district court. United States v. Davis, No. 4:99-cr-00055-JBF-1 

(E.D. Va. Nov. 18, 2008). We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

DISMISSED IN PART AND

AFFIRMED IN PART 

 2

 Davis’ motion for reconsideration was filed on November 

10, 2008, more than ten days after the district court entered 

its order denying his § 3582 motion, and therefore did not toll 

the running of the time to file a notice of appeal. United 

States v. Christy, 3 F.3d 765, 767 n.1 (4th Cir. 1993).
#### DONNA FRAME v. DR. N. KOTHARI, M.D. AND HEALTH CARE PLAN OF NEW JERSEY.

October 13, 1987.

Petition for certification granted. (See 218 *N.J.Super.*537).
| (logo) WELLS            FARGO | Corporate Trust Services

 

MAC R1204-010 9062 Old Annapolis Road

Columbia, MD 21045

 

Tel:  410 884 2000

Fax: 410 715 2380 |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.

383 Madison Avenue

31st Floor

New York, New York 10179

 

 

 

 

RE: Annual Statement of Compliance for JPMBB Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2014-C22 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2014-C22

 

 

Per the Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of August 1, 2014 ( the "Agreement"), the undersigned, a duly authorized officer of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Certificate Administrator (''Wells Fargo"), hereby certifies as follows as of and for the year ending December 31, 2014 (the "Reporting Period" ) :

 

(a) A review of Wells Fargo's activities during the Reporting Period and of its performance under the Agreement has been made under such officer's supervision; and

 

(b) To the best of such officer's knowledge, based on such review, Wells Fargo has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the Reporting Period.

 

 

 

February 25, 2015

 

 

 

/s/  Brian Smith 

BRIAN SMITH 

Vice President

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
1

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

_________________

NO. 09-12-00391-CV

_________________

IN RE COMMITMENT OF ERICK LAWSON

________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 435th District Court

Montgomery County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 07-08-08159 CV

________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In an appeal from an order entered in a sexually-violent-predator proceeding

modifying the terms of a commitment order, changing the entity that approves 

where Erick Lawson must reside, we questioned our appellate jurisdiction over 

such order. Upon consideration of the statute and the responses of the parties, we 

conclude that the trial court’s order is not appealable, and we also conclude that 

mandamus relief on the issues Lawson raises is not warranted. Accordingly, we 

dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
2

Recently, in In re Commitment of Holt and In re Commitment of Cortez, we 

addressed the same issues Lawson raises in his brief, and we concluded that we did 

not have appellate jurisdiction over these same issues. In re Commitment of Holt, 

No. 09-12-00406-CV, 2013 WL _______, at *___ (Tex. App.—Beaumont July 11, 

2013, no pet. h.); In re Commitment of Cortez, No. 09-12-00385-CV, 2013 WL 

3270613, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 27, 2013, no pet. h.). We also 

considered whether Holt and Cortez raised issues entitling them to mandamus 

relief. See Holt, 2013 WL _______, at *___; Cortez, 2013 WL 3270613, at **2-6.

For the same reasons stated in Holt and Cortez, we conclude that we lack 

appellate jurisdiction to review the trial court’s order dated July 26, 2012, and that 

Lawson has not demonstrated that he is entitled to mandamus relief. Accordingly, 

we dismiss Lawson’s appeal.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

 ___________________________

CHARLES KREGER

 Justice

Submitted on July 10, 2013

Opinion Delivered August 15, 2013

Before Gaultney, Kreger, and Horton, JJ.
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A25E0027. TASHEIKA ANTWAUN WASHINGTON v. JEWEL C. SCOTT,

JUDGE et al.

Appellant’s petition for writ of mandamus and writ of prohibition is hereby

denied. The petition fails to establish that invocation of this Court’s mandamnus

jurisdiction is warranted under the facts ofthis case. See Court ofAppeals Rule 40 (c).

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office,Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

October 08, 2024

10/08/2024
Exhibit 10.76



AMENDED AND RESTATED REVOLVING NOTE



|$13,500,000 |  |  |  | February 3, 2003
|----------- |  |  |  | ----------------



For
value received, the undersigned, RF MONOLITHICS, INC., a Delaware corporation (the Borrower), hereby promises to pay on the Termination Date under the Credit Agreement (defined below), to the order of WELLS FARGO BUSINESS CREDIT, INC., a
Minnesota corporation (the Lender), at its main office in Minneapolis, Minnesota, or at any other place designated at any time by the holder hereof, in lawful money of the United States of America and in immediately available funds, the
principal sum of Thirteen Million Five Hundred Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($13,500,000.00) or, if less, the aggregate unpaid principal amount of all Revolving Advances made by the Lender to the Borrower under the Credit Agreement (defined below)
together with interest on the principal amount hereunder remaining unpaid from time to time, computed on the basis of the actual number of days elapsed and a 360-day year, from the date hereof until this Note is fully paid at the rate from time to
time in effect under the Amended and Restated Credit and Security Agreement of even date herewith (as the same may hereafter be amended, supplemented or restated from time to time, the Credit Agreement) by and between the Lender and the
Borrower. The principal hereof and interest accruing thereon shall be due and payable as provided in the Credit Agreement. This Note may be prepaid only in accordance with the Credit Agreement.



This Note is issued pursuant, and is subject, to the Credit
Agreement, which provides, among other things, for acceleration hereof. This Note is the Revolving Note referred to in the Credit Agreement. This Note is secured, among other things, pursuant to the Credit Agreement and the Security Documents as
therein defined, and may now or hereafter be secured by one or more other security agreements, mortgages, deeds of trust, assignments or other instruments or agreements.



The Borrower hereby agrees to pay all costs of collection, including attorneys fees and legal expenses
in the event this Note is not paid when due, whether or not legal proceedings are commenced.



Presentment or other demand for payment, notice of acceleration, notice of intent to accelerate, notice of dishonor and protest and all other notices of any kind are expressly waived.



This Note is given in amendment, restatement and modification,
but not in extinguishment or novation, of the indebtedness evidenced by that certain Revolving Note in the principal amount of $13,500,000.00, dated December 8, 2000, executed by the Borrower and payable to the order of the Lender.



RF MONOLITHICS, INC.By:

/s/ David M. KirkDavid M. Kirk President