RENDERED: NOVEMBER 5, 2021; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2020-CA-1381-MR

COURTNEY LIGHTNER APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE KAREN A. CONRAD, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 19-CR-00189

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: CETRULO, LAMBERT, TAYLOR, JUDGES.

LAMBERT, JUDGE: Courtney Lightner appeals from the Oldham Circuit Court’s 

order setting restitution of $371.70, arguing that the circuit court lacked 

jurisdiction. After careful review of the record, applicable statutes, and case law, 

we affirm.
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Lightner was arrested on May 1, 2019, for theft of mail matter 

(Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 514.140)

1

from the Buckner, Kentucky, post 

office. Three months later, as part of an Oldham Circuit Court “rocket docket” 

offer to her, Lightner entered guilty pleas to five counts of the offense and received 

two years’ imprisonment for each conviction (to run concurrently for a total of two 

years), and the sentences were diverted for three years. At her circuit court 

appearance on that date, Lightner testified that she had opened mail and taken gift 

cards and cash while employed by the United States Postal Service at the Buckner 

Post Office. 

1 KRS 514.140 (“Theft of mail matter”) reads: 

(1) A person is guilty of theft of mail matter when with intent to deprive the 

owner thereof [s]he: 

(a) Steals;

(b) By fraud or deception obtains;

(c) Embezzles;

(d) Conceals;

(e) Damages; or

(f) Destroys;

any mail matter of another (including but not limited to any letter, postal card, 

package, bag, or other item) from any letterbox, mail receptacle, or other 

authorized depository for mail matter, or from a letter carrier, postal vehicle, or 

private mail box or which has been left for collection or delivery adjacent thereto 

by the United States Postal Service.

(2) Theft of mail matter is a Class D felony.
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As part of the diversion program established on the date of her guilty 

pleas, Lightner was ordered to pay restitution to the victims as well as court costs. 

By agreement of all parties, the matter was continued until September 5, 2019, to

review the issue of restitution, which was tentatively earmarked as being $50.00. 

On that date, $50.00 was withheld from Lightner’s bond to be applied to her 

restitution. At the September 5 hearing, the Commonwealth informed the circuit 

court that the restitution amount was $650.00.2 This was acknowledged on the 

record by Lightner’s counsel. Since Lightner’s appearance had been waived for 

that hearing, the matter was passed to October 3, 2019. 

When she appeared at the October hearing, Lightner insisted that she 

had been told that she would owe no more than $50.00. The matter was again 

continued for the Commonwealth to produce witness testimony and supporting 

evidence upon which the circuit court could base its findings. The record reflects 

that additional hearings concerning the restitution amount were held on December 

19, 2019; February 6, 2020; March 5, 2020; April 23, 2020; June 25, 2020; and 

July 16, 2020. It was at the October 3, 2019, hearing that Lightner first asserted 

that the circuit court had lost jurisdiction to impose restitution at an amount other 

than $50.00. On March 5, 2020, Defense counsel objected that the court had lost 

“particular case” jurisdiction since too much time had passed since the October 3, 

2 The actual amount requested by the victim’s advocate was $604.00.
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2019, hearing. The circuit court ordered the parties to brief the issue and set the 

next hearing on April 23, 2020. 

The circuit court overruled Lightner’s objection and ultimately held, 

in its order entered October 5, 2020, that Lightner was responsible for a total of 

$371.70, payable at the rate of $105.00 per month until satisfied. Lightner filed a 

timely notice of appeal.

We begin our analysis by citing the relevant statutes which address 

restitution. KRS 431.200 (“Reparation for property stolen or damaged, from 

person convicted”) provides: 

Any person convicted of a misdemeanor or felony for 

taking, injuring or destroying property shall restore the 

property or make reparation in damages if not ordered as 

a condition of probation. The court in which the 

conviction is had, if applied to by verified petition made 

within ninety (90) days of the date the sentence was 

pronounced, may order restitution or give judgment 

against the defendant for reparation in damages, and 

enforce collection by execution or other process. In a 

petition for restitution or reparation, the court shall cause 

the defendant, if in custody, to be brought into court, and 

demand of him if he has any defense to make to the 

petition. If he consents to the restitution or to reparation 

in damages in an agreed sum, the court shall give 

judgment accordingly. Otherwise a jury shall be 

impaneled to try the facts and ascertain the amount and 

the value of the property, or assess the damage, as the 

case may be. A failure to pursue this remedy shall not 

deprive the person aggrieved of his civil action for the 

injury sustained.
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(Emphasis added.) Restitution is defined as “any form of compensation paid by a 

convicted person to a victim for counseling, medical expenses, lost wages due to 

injury, or property damage and other expenses suffered by a victim because of a 

criminal act.” KRS 532.350(1)(a). Furthermore, KRS 532.032(2) states: “If 

pretrial diversion is granted, restitution shall be a part of the diversion agreement.” 

And, Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.10 addresses clerical errors in 

judgments, stating: 

Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of 

the record and errors therein arising from oversight or 

omission may be corrected by the court at any time on its 

own initiative or on the motion of any party and after 

such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the 

pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so 

corrected before the appeal is perfected in the appellate 

court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be 

so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 

We next cite relevant case law. “Pursuant to KRS 532.033, any order 

of restitution shall specify who it is to be paid to, set the amount of restitution to be 

paid and the amount and frequency of each payment.” Commonwealth v. Adams, 

566 S.W.3d 225, 231 (Ky. App. 2018); see also Compise v. Commonwealth, 597 

S.W.3d 175, 182 (Ky. App. 2020).

Our conclusion today is limited to facts like those 

presented in this case: where a defendant effectively 

consents to the trial court’s holding the restitution 

hearing after entry of the final judgment or otherwise 

fails to object and raise the “jurisdictional” question 
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to the trial court. If the defendant objected at trial, the 

question would be live on appellate review.

But Steadman never objected and therefore waived 

this claim. He never gave the trial court an opportunity 

to resolve these issues. For that reason, the issue was 

dead and decided when the appeal began. Because 

Steadman failed to raise this issue before the trial court, 

he is barred from pursuing it. Moreover, he has not 

framed a question of the trial court’s general subjectmatter jurisdiction.

Commonwealth v. Steadman, 411 S.W.3d 717, 725-26 (Ky. 2013) (emphasis

added). 

A review of the proceeds in the trial court reveals Adams 

clearly acquiesced to the trial court’s exercise of 

particular-case jurisdiction and waived any alleged error.

. . . 

Here, Adams unquestionably acquiesced in the trial 

court’s exercise of particular-case jurisdiction to enter the 

belated restitution order. The record reveals Adams at no 

time objected to the trial court’s jurisdiction during any 

of the proceedings herein, probably due, in large part, to 

the fact he was receiving diversion rather than a prison 

sentence. Consequently, Adams waived the alleged 

error, and thus there was no palpable error.

Adams v. Commonwealth, 560 S.W.3d 879, 883 (Ky. App. 2018). And lastly: 

[T]he trial court’s jurisdiction over the diverted case is 

extinguished in two circumstances: (1) upon the 

imposition of sentence in an unsuccessful diversion; or 

(2) upon entry of an order listing the charges as 

“dismissed-diverted” as required by KRS 533.258(1) 

after successful completion of the diversion agreement. 

Neither has occurred in this case.
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Ballard v. Commonwealth, 320 S.W.3d 69, 73 (Ky. 2010).

With these standards in mind, we address Lightner’s allegations of 

error. The question here, where Lightner initially acquiesced to a continuance but 

later objected, is somewhat different from case law precedent. However, the 

record clearly reflects, in both the hearings and court filings, that the amount of 

restitution remained unsettled and that Lightner’s counsel was made aware, prior to 

the September 2019 hearing, that the Commonwealth would be seeking upwards of 

$600.00 toward satisfying the victims’ losses. Also, the docket notations made in 

the initial hearings did not comply with the statutory requirements of KRS 

532.033. Adams, 566 S.W.3d at 231; Compise, 597 S.W.3d at 181.

In its order overruling Lightner’s objection to setting a further 

restitution hearing, the circuit court, citing Steadman, supra, held: 

At the outset, it should be noted that both 

[Lightner] and counsel for [Lightner] agreed that 

restitution could be determined at a later date. In 

addition, counsel for [Lightner] agreed that if restitution 

was set at a higher amount than that of $50.00, that a 

hearing would be scheduled to determine the amount of 

restitution owed. Last it should also be noted that the 

only person indicating that $50.00 was the total amount 

of restitution owed was [Lightner].

. . . 

In the present case, [Lightner] agreed to continue 

the case to determine restitution. The restitution amount 

was relayed to counsel for [Lightner] in September 

[2019]. The amount of restitution had never been 
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determined when, in October, [Lightner] erroneously 

informed the Court otherwise. Counsel for [Lightner] 

also mistakenly thought that the amount of restitution had 

been set by the Court and objected to the

Commonwealth’s attempt to raise it after the restitution 

had been determined. Based upon the foregoing, the 

Court believes that [Lightner] waived her particular case 

jurisdiction. In addition, it was only through information 

erroneously tendered to the Court regarding the amount 

owed that resulted in the Court entering an order stating 

the matter of restitution had been resolved.

We find no error in the circuit court’s holding. Although Lightner 

later objected to particular case jurisdiction, her initial waiver as well as timely 

notice of an ongoing dispute was sufficient evidence in the record to support the 

factual basis upon which the circuit court made a finding of waiver. Moreover, 

there is no question that the circuit court retained its jurisdiction over Lightner’s 

case until the “successful completion of the diversion agreement.” Ballard, 320 

S.W.3d at 73. 

The judgment of the Oldham Circuit Court is affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

Steven Nathan Goens

Frankfort, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel J. Cameron

Attorney General of Kentucky

Joseph A. Beckett

Assistant Attorney General

Frankfort, Kentucky