Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 1 of 39

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS

Russell B. Cate

Carmel, Indiana

Christopher J. Evans

Dollard Evans Whalin, LLP

Noblesville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Ian A. McLean

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Daniel Wahl and Saundra Wahl,

Appellants-Defendants, 

v. 

State of Indiana, 

Appellee-Plaintiff. 

May 12, 2020 

Court of Appeals Case No. 

19A-CR-2258 

Appeal from the Hamilton 

Superior Court 

The Honorable David K. Najjar, 

Judge 

Trial Court Cause Nos. 

29D05-1309-FD-7823 & 

29D05-1309-FD-7824 

Riley, Judge. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 2 of 39

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellants-Defendants, Daniel Wahl (Daniel) and Saundra Wahl (Saundra), 

(collectively, the Wahls), appeal their conviction for involuntary manslaughter, 

Class D felonies, Ind. Code § 35-42-1-4 (2013). 

[2] We affirm. 

ISSUES

[3] The Wahls present this court with four issues on appeal, which we consolidate 

and restate as the following three issues: 

(1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain 

evidence;

(2) Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain the Wahls’ 

involuntary manslaughter conviction; and 

(3) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the Wahls to 

pay restitution.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] In 2003, the Wahls built their home in Fishers, Indiana, with the primary 

intention of operating a daycare facility from their basement. In 2006, the 

Wahls were licensed and they operated a daycare business under the name, 

Home Away from Home Child Care, LLC. Saundra was responsible for 

toddlers ranging from five months to two years old, while Daniel was 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 3 of 39

responsible for the older children. In the spring of 2011, after touring the 

Wahls’ daycare, Danny (Danny) and Jocelyne DiRienzo (collectively, the 

DiRienzos), enrolled their minor children, D.D., and A.D. at the Wahls’ 

daycare. 

[5] The Wahls had placed several security gates in their home. In the basement 

hallway, there was a white metal security gate—the gate at issue in this cause—

closing off the stairway leading to the first floor. If the gate was open, one had 

to pick up the gate and bring it over and place it down into a U-shaped cradle 

where it would snap into place. In 2006, Daniel made repairs to the gate’s

hinges “because it [had] started to give way.” (Transcript Vol. II, p. 172). 

More specifically, the screws used to secure the gate’s hinges had started pulling 

out from the “wood studs in the wall.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 172). Instead of using 

regular screws, Daniel used “some bolts and washers and nuts to hold it in 

place.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 173). To do all of that, he “went behind the wall and 

added two additional wood studs, got long bolts, drilled through, put those on 

with washers behind it and lock nuts so that they wouldn’t come loose.” (Tr. 

Vol. II, p. 173). Then sometime in 2006, Daniel made further improvements to 

the gate since a spindle had come loose, and he reattached it with some epoxy 

glue. According to Daniel, the Indiana Family and Social Services 

Administration (FSSA) had never given any directives or corrective actions to

the Wahls regarding the gate. 

[6] In June of 2013, A.D. was a healthy, twenty-month-old toddler. On June 20, 

2013, between 8:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., Daniel was in the backyard greeting 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 4 of 39

parents as they came in with their children. Daniel kept the older children with 

him, and he took the younger children to the basement to be cared for by 

Saundra. After the older children had lunch outside, Daniel lined them up at 

the stairway leading to the basement to go inside for their scheduled naps. At 

that moment, Daniel heard Saundra scream for help. After ensuring that all the 

children were inside the house, he proceeded to go to the basement. There, he 

found Saundra standing over A.D. who was lying motionless on the basement 

floor. Immediately, Daniel began performing CPR on A.D. while Saundra 

called 9-1-1. 

[7] At approximately 12:23 p.m., Officer Ryan Ermel (Officer Ermel) of the Fishers 

Police Department was first to arrive at the Wahls’ residence. Officer Ermel 

found Daniel administering CPR to A.D. and he assisted with the process. 

Shortly thereafter, the EMTs and two other officers arrived. The EMTs took 

over the CPR process and A.D. was transported to the Community North 

Hospital emergency room. At approximately 12:52 p.m., Detective David Finn 

(Detective Finn), arrived at the Wahls’ residence and he began questioning 

Daniel as to the daily daycare procedures. 

[8] At 12:59 p.m., A.D. was pronounced dead. During Daniel’s narration of the 

daily daycare procedures to Detective Finn and another officer, Saundra 

emerged from the basement and ran up the stairs to inform Daniel that A.D. 

was deceased. Detective Finn stopped questioning Daniel so that Daniel could 

give Saundra some comfort. After a few minutes, Detective Finn sat down with 

Saundra and Daniel. Saundra was still hysterical, and she was crying about 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 5 of 39

“how this wasn’t supposed to happen[,] and this shouldn’t have happened.” 

(Appellant’s App. Vol. IV, p. 220). During this time, a chaplain arrived and 

met with both Daniel and Saundra and he prayed with them. Detective James 

Hawkins (Detective Hawkins) and Detective Doug Baker (Detective Baker) 

arrived at the Wahls’ residence. At that point, Detective Finn asked Daniel to 

recite the events that took place during the time of the incident. Detective 

Hawkins then started processing the scene, while Detective Baker spoke with 

Saundra. 

[9] During the afternoon, other officers continued to arrive. One officer asked 

Daniel for a contact list of the children’s parents. After about 15 to 20 minutes, 

Daniel had not found the parents contact list but eventually either Daniel or 

Saundra provided the list. The police began contacting the parents of the 

children. The Wahls’ residence was taped off, and a canopy was set up close to 

their residence so that parents of the other children could retrieve their children 

without going inside the house.

[10] As Detective Hawkins took photographs of the interior of the house, he noticed 

that the basement hallway gate where A.D. had become lodged opened easily 

with “[m]aybe a couple pounds” of pressure: “I mean it was, there wasn’t 

much to it. It was just the very tip of that metal and you can kind of see all the 

wear marks[,] so it was, there wasn’t a whole lot to it. You just sort of pop it 

open.” (Tr. Vol. III, p. 76). Daniel, who was also in the basement at this time, 

informed Detective Hawkins that he and Saundra mitigated the issue “by 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 6 of 39

placing some furniture on either side of the gate to try to keep the kids from 

pushing through it.” (Tr. Vol. III, p. 76).

[11] At around 5:00 p.m., there were no children inside the residence, but there were 

multiple officers in the home. Detective Finn asked Saundra to participate in a 

video reenacting the events leading to the moment she discovered A.D. stuck in 

the gate. Saundra stated that she had left A.D. with another child, who was less 

than two years of age, at the far end of the toddler and infant room. Saundra 

stated that she walked into the kitchen to feed another young girl who was

seated in a highchair, and after she fed the child in the highchair, she 

momentarily faced away from the toddler and infant room and began warming

milk bottles in the sink. Once the bottles were warm, she picked up the child 

from the highchair and carried her on her hip along with a bottle back into the 

toddler and infant room. Once in the toddler and infant room, she saw A.D.

face down, wedged at the neck between the basement metal security gate and 

the wall. Saundra sat the child she was carrying down, and attended to A.D. 

After Saundra freed A.D. from the white metal security gate, she noticed that 

A.D. was unresponsive and not breathing. Saundra promptly began performing 

CPR on A.D. As she was doing that, she saw two older children who had been 

out in the backyard, and she requested that they call Daniel. The children did 

not comprehend, so Saundra momentarily left A.D. on the floor, rushed to the 

base of the stairway, and yelled to Daniel for assistance.

[12] When asked to reposition the furniture that was close to the metal security gate, 

she placed a rocking chair facing the infant room with its back against the gate, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 7 of 39

and she placed a swing on the other side of the gate leading to the stairway. 

Saundra explained that she needed to do that because if the children shook it 

“real hard, they would loosen” the gate. (State’s Exh. 45 at 4:28). Saundra was 

then asked to place a doll in the position where she found A.D. stuck in the 

gate. Detective Finn observed that the white metal security gate that had 

choked A.D. did not latch correctly. Detective Finn also observed that if the 

gate was open, there was no line of sight from the kitchen. At the end of the 

interview, the officers removed the gate from the residence and took it with 

them.

[13] On September 19, 2013, the State filed an Information, charging the Wahls 

with involuntary manslaughter, a Class D felony. They were tried jointly and 

found guilty by a jury. They appealed separately, arguing that there was 

insufficient evidence to sustain their convictions, the trial court erred when it 

declined to grant a mistrial due to juror misconduct, their sentences were 

inappropriate, and that the trial court erred in ordering restitution. We affirmed 

their convictions in separate opinions: Wahl v. State, 36 N.E.3d 1163 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2015) (Daniel’s); and Wahl v. State, 36 N.E.3d 1147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)

(Saundra’s). Our supreme court granted transfer and consolidated their cases. 

The supreme court consequently found that the Wahls’ motion for mistrial due 

to juror misconduct should have been granted, it reversed their convictions, and 

it remanded their cases for a new trial. See Wahl v. State, 51 N.E.3d 113 (Ind. 

2016). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 8 of 39

[14] The Wahls were tried jointly at another jury trial on August 7 through August 

9, 2019. Before their second trial, the Wahls filed their expert witness list,

disclosing Dr. Edward Dragan (Dr. Dragan) as a potential expert witness. In a 

deposition before their second trial, Dr. Dragan had testified that his area of 

expertise was reading and interpreting regulations that were applicable to 

daycares. However, Dr. Dragan stated that his area of expertise did not involve

interpreting regulations affecting daycares for children under the age of three. 

Based on Dr. Dragan’s deposition testimony, the State filed a motion in limine, 

seeking to exclude Dr. Dragan’s testimony, arguing that Dr. Dragan did not 

qualify as an expert under Indiana Rules of Evidence 702 because his expertise 

did not involve the care of infants and toddlers under three years of age. 

Following a hearing, the trial court issued an order in favor of the State, after 

concluding that Dr. Dragan could not be qualified to testify as an expert since 

“[a] very small amount of Dr. Dragan’s education and professional experience 

involves preschool programs, and none of it involves in-home daycare for 

children under three years of age.” (Appellant’s App. Conf. Vol. IV, p. 85). 

[15] During the second trial, the Wahls moved to suppress the photographs taken 

from inside the residence, an audio recording of the Wahls which was 

conducted in the living room, a video recording of Saundra reenacting the 

events that occurred before she discovered A.D. stuck in the gate, and the metal 

security gate that trapped A.D. A suppression hearing was held outside the 

jury’s presence, and the trial court heard testimony from several officers. At the 

conclusion of that hearing, the trial court excluded the physical gate from 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 9 of 39

evidence, but it determined that the other evidence, including the video 

reenactment where Saundra explained the events leading to A.D. being stuck in 

the gate, was admissible. After the presentation of all the evidence, the jury 

found the Wahls guilty of involuntary manslaughter. 

[16] The record shows that at the first sentencing hearing, Danny, A.D.’s father, 

testified as to the expenses he incurred, such as A.D.’s hospital and funeral

expenses, therapy for his wife, and his loss of wages, to support a restitution 

order against the Wahls. On August 26, 2019, the day before the Wahls’

second sentencing hearing, the State filed a motion, seeking judicial notice of 

Danny’s prior testimony to support a restitution claim against the Wahls. The 

trial court granted the State’s motion. At the start of the second sentencing 

hearing, the trial court additionally stated that for purposes of having a 

complete record, it would take judicial notice of the Presentence Investigation 

report (PSI) submitted at the first sentencing hearing, the addendum, and the 

sentencing order which included a restitution order against the Wahls in the 

amount of $22,353.72. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Wahls to 550 

days in the Department of Correction, with credit for 550 days served. Also, 

the trial court ordered the Wahls to pay restitution to the DiRienzos in the 

amount of $22,353.72. 

[17] The Wahls now appeal. Additional information will be provided as necessary. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 10 of 39

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Admission of the Evidence 

[18] When ruling on the admissibility of evidence, the trial court is afforded broad 

discretion, and we will only reverse the ruling upon a showing of abuse of 

discretion. Gibson v. State, 733 N.E.2d 945, 951 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). An abuse 

of discretion involves a decision that is clearly against the logic and effect of the 

facts and circumstances before the court. Id. We consider the evidence most 

favorable to the trial court’s ruling and any uncontradicted evidence to the 

contrary to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the ruling. 

Id.

[19] While presenting similar but slightly different arguments, the Wahls assert that 

the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded Dr. Dragan from testifying 

as an expert witness. In addition, the Wahls contend that the trial court abused 

its discretion by admitting into evidence the video reenactment of Saundra 

explaining the events leading to A.D. being stuck in the security gate. 

A. Expert Witness 

[20] Indiana Evidence Rule 702, the evidentiary rule concerning expert testimony, 

provides:

(a) If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will 

assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine 

a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, 

skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the 

form of an opinion or otherwise.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 11 of 39

(b) Expert scientific testimony is admissible only if the court is 

satisfied that the scientific principles upon which the expert 

testimony rests are reliable.

A trial court judge has broad discretion to admit or exclude the testimony of an 

expert witness under Rule 702. Carter v. State, 766 N.E.2d 377, 380 (Ind. 2002). 

The trial court’s decision will only be reversed for an abuse of that discretion. 

Id.

[21] The trial court’s order excluding Dr. Dragan’s testimony, stated in part that 

Dr. Dragan has expertise in the area of education, school 

supervision and school safety, and expertise in regulations 

governing schools. The issues involved in this case, however, do

not involve these topics. Here, the subject matter is the [Wahls’] 

supervision of a twenty-month old child in an in-home daycare. 

A very small amount of Dr. Dragan’s education and professional 

experience involves preschool programs, and none of it involves 

in-home daycare for children under three years of age. As he 

testified in his deposition, Dr. Dragan has no professional 

experience at all with children younger than three years. . .

[The Wahls] argue that the State ignores Dr. Dragan’s six years 

of experience running a Head Start program from 1969 to 1975 

for children from ages 3 to 5. But the relevant age group here is 

children under the age of 3. Dr. Dragan himself acknowledges 

that the level of supervision a child requires depends on the age 

and abilities of that child. He cannot be qualified to testify as an 

expert on the supervision required of children of an age and in a 

setting entirely outside his experience.

While Dr. Dragan certainly has expertise, the [c]ourt cannot find 

that any of that expertise is within the subject matter on which he 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 12 of 39

would be called to testify in this proceeding - the standard of care 

for supervision of a twenty-month old child in an in­ home 

daycare. . . . because his expertise does not lie within the area of 

his testimony, [his] testimony should be excluded.

(Appellant’s App. Conf. Vol. IV, p. 85). 

[22] A.D. was twenty-months old at the time of his death. As the trial court 

correctly noted, the Wahls’ supervision of a twenty-month-old child in an inhome daycare was at issue, and Dr. Dragan had limited education and 

professional experience as to in-home daycare for children under three years of 

age. Thus, Dr. Dragan’s testimony would not have assisted the jury in 

understanding the evidence or determine a fact in issue, i.e., whether the Wahls’ 

provided adequate supervision to A.D. prior to his death. Accordingly, Dr. 

Dragan’s testimony was irrelevant, and the trial court acted within its discretion 

to exclude his testimony. See Carter, 766 N.E.2d at 380.

[23] Further, we note that at the close of the evidence, the Wahls made an offer of 

proof regarding Dr. Dragan’s proposed testimony. See Woods v. State, 892 

N.E.2d 637, 641-42 (Ind. 2008) (holding that “[t]he purpose of an offer of proof 

is to convey the point of the witness’s testimony and provide the trial [court] the 

opportunity to reconsider the evidentiary ruling.”) In pertinent part, the Wahls 

claimed that Dr. Dragan would have testified that FSSA was responsible in 

overseeing licensing and monitoring home daycare, and because FSSA had 

never cited the Wahls for a defective gate, such testimony would have been 

helpful in determining if the Wahls were criminally liable. When an expert’s 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 13 of 39

testimony is, essentially, an assertion that a party has done no wrong as a 

matter of law, that testimony is inadmissible. See Ind. R. Evid. 704(b)

(providing that “witnesses may not testify to opinions concerning intent, guilt, 

or innocence in a criminal case; the truth or falsity of allegations; whether a 

witness has testified truthfully; or legal conclusions”); Schumm v. State, 868 

N.E.2d 1202,1204 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (defendant was not allowed to call 

police officer to testify that defendant’s vehicle was in compliance with 

applicable regulations since such testimony would have resulted in the officer 

making a legal conclusion). Notwithstanding the Wahls’ claim on appeal, the 

trial court could not have properly reconsidered its prior evidentiary ruling of 

excluding Dr. Dragan’s testimony. See Woods, 892 N.E.2d at 641-42. 

Accordingly, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in excluding his 

testimony as an expert witness. 

B. Video Reenactment 

[24] The Wahls argue that the trial court abused its discretion by denying their 

motion to suppress the video reenactment. Because the Wahls appeal after a 

completed trial, we review the trial court’s ruling for abuse of discretion. 

Reinhart v. State, 930 N.E.2d 42, 45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). In our review, we do 

not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorable 

to the trial court’s ruling. Id. We also defer to the trial court’s factual 

determinations unless clearly erroneous. Id. However, we consider afresh any 

legal question of the constitutionality of a search or seizure. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 14 of 39

[25] The Wahls collectively claim that when the video was taken, it violated their

Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution, and Article 1, 

Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Saundra additionally claims that her 

Fifth Amendment rights were violated when she was asked to participate in the 

reenactment video absent any Miranda warnings. 

1. Fourth Amendment Violation 

[26] The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 

persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures” 

and generally prohibits searches and seizures without a warrant supported by 

probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 

(Ind. 2013). As a result, evidence obtained without a warrant is generally 

inadmissible unless it falls within one of few well-delineated exceptions. Id.

The State has the burden to show that one of these well-delineated exceptions 

was met. Id.

[27] The Wahls concede that exigent circumstances existed after the police 

responded to the 9-1-1 call, however, they argue that their continued presence 

until 5:00 p.m. which led to the video reenactment, constituted an 

impermissible search not falling within any exception. The State argues the 

continued police presence in the Wahls’ home and the recording fell under the 

exigency exception. 

[28] “The warrant requirement becomes inapplicable where the ‘exigencies of the 

situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 15 of 39

warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’” 

Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 935 (Ind. 2006) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 

U.S. 393-94, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978)). Among the well-known 

exigent circumstances that have justified a warrantless search or seizure are 

entries (1) to prevent bodily harm or death; (2) to aid a person in need of 

assistance; (3) to protect private property; and (4) to prevent actual or imminent 

destruction or removal of incriminating evidence before a search warrant may 

be obtained. Weis v. State, 800 N.E.2d 209, 213 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In 

addition, we have found exigent circumstances where police entered to aid or 

prevent further injury to victims of violent crime. State v. Straub, 749 N.E.2d 

593, 597 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).

[29] The Wahls’ 9-1-1 call invited police to enter the house and deal with an 

emergency. See United States v. Risner, 593 F.3d 692, 694 (7th Cir. 2010) (911 

call seeking assistance is an invitation to enter and provide assistance). 

Notwithstanding the fact that A.D. had been removed from the home, once 

there, the officers found another emergency, namely, several other children in 

the daycare who had been present during the incident, it was of extreme

concern for the officers to remove those children from the scene of the incident. 

Throughout the afternoon, and in conjunction with the Wahls, the police cared 

for the children and reunited them with their parents. While the video was 

taken after all the children had presumably been picked up by their parents and 

no exigency existed at the time, the State argues that the video was taken with 

Saundra’s consent. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 16 of 39

[30] Another well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement is a voluntary 

and knowing consent to search. Primus v. State, 813 N.E.2d 370, 374 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2004). The theory underlying the consent exception is that, when an 

individual gives the State permission to search either his person or property, the 

governmental intrusion is presumably reasonable. Id. A defendant’s consent to 

search is valid except where procured by fraud, duress, fear, or intimidation or 

where it is merely a submission to the supremacy of the law. Buckley v. State, 

797 N.E.2d 845, 849 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Because it falls within an 

established exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, the 

scope of the authority to search is strictly limited to the consent given, and a 

consensual search is reasonable only if it is kept within the bounds of that 

consent. Id. The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under 

the Fourth Amendment is that of objective reasonableness. Id. In addition to 

objective reasonableness, the scope of a consensual search is generally 

measured by the expressed object to be searched and the subject’s-imposed

limitation. Id. Therefore, the scope of a consent search is factually sensitive 

and does not depend solely on the express object to be searched. Id. 

[31] Again, throughout the afternoon, the Wahls cooperated with the police in 

caring for the children inside their in-home daycare, they voluntarily discussed

what had happened in the living room, and later Saundra agreed to participate 

in a video reenactment of the events in the basement. While a few items were 

moved during the reenactment, namely, the rocking chair and swing, Saundra 

helped the officers place those items in their original position as she narrated 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 17 of 39

the events. Furthermore, the record is devoid of any evidence establishing that 

Detective Finn’s actions and statements were impermissibly coercive, thereby 

overcoming Saundra’s will. See Buckley, 797 N.E.2d at 849. The record 

supports that Detective Finn was very polite with his questioning during the 

video reenactment. As a result, we conclude that Saundra voluntarily and 

knowingly consented to the search of her home which led to the video 

reenactment. Accordingly, we find that the Wahls’ rights pursuant to the 

Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution were not violated.

2. Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution

[32] Next, we address the Wahls’ claim that law enforcement’s conduct in 

performing the reenactment video without a warrant was unreasonable and 

therefore violated their rights pursuant to the Article 1, Section 11 of the 

Indiana Constitution, which provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 

papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall 

not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable 

cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 

describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 

seized.

This language tracks the Fourth Amendment verbatim, however, the State of 

Indiana has adopted a different form of analysis for claims brought under 

Article I, Section 11. See Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 2005). 

Under our state’s constitution, the validity of a search by the government turns 

on an evaluation of the reasonableness of the officers’ conduct under the totality 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 18 of 39

of the circumstances. Id. Thus, the unique protections provided in the Indiana 

Constitution require us to review all the facts and circumstances that are 

particular to this case. Bell v. State, 818 N.E.2d 481, 484 (Ind.Ct.App.2004).

[33] In evaluating the totality of the circumstances, and thus the reasonableness of 

the search, we consider both the degree of intrusion into the subject’s ordinary 

activities and the basis upon which the officer selected the subject of the search 

or seizure. Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 360. Thus, to determine the reasonableness 

of police conduct under the totality of the circumstances, we consider “(1) the 

degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that the person has violated the law; 

(2) the degree of intrusiveness that the search or arrest method imposes on the 

person; and (3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” State v. Harmon, 846 

N.E.2d 1056, 1058 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

[34] Regarding the first factor, the officers’ degree of concern, suspicion, or 

knowledge that a violation had occurred, in the instant case, this factor was 

essentially non-existent. As we noted above, the officers arrived at the Wahls’

residence to assist with a report of an unconscious child. However, after A.D. 

was pronounced dead, the officers were justified in having a reasonably high 

degree of concern or suspicion that some sort of criminal activity might have 

occurred based on their observation of that the gate that had choked A.D. was 

faulty. As for the second factor, the degree of police intrusion on the Wahls’

ordinary activities were not substantial. The Wahls had invited the police 

inside their home to help with the unconscious child, and they continued to 

cooperate with law enforcement for the remainder of the afternoon to reunite 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 19 of 39

the other children with their parents. After all the children had left, Saundra 

agreed to take part in the video reenactment. Further, we note that the video

reenactment was limited to the basement, the area where the incident occurred. 

And finally, as to the third factor, we find that law enforcement needs were 

high. Detective Finn had good reason for investigating the events leading to 

A.D.’s death. Moreover, after Saundra consented to participating in the video

enactment, there was no need to obtain a warrant. 

[35] Saundra on behalf of Daniel, waived any and all of the Wahls’ search rights 

since she agreed to submit to the video reenactment. Thus, given the 

reasonably high degree of suspicion of criminal activity, the minimally intrusive 

nature of police conduct prior to obtaining Saundra’s consent, and the extent of 

law enforcement needs, the Wahls have failed to establish that the video 

reenactment, was unreasonable under Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana 

Constitution.

C. Custodial Interrogation

[36] Saundra claims that when the video reenactment was taken, the taped 

interrogation was custodial in nature and she should have been advised of her 

rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 

In Miranda [] the United States Supreme Court held that the 

prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or 

inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the 

defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards 

effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. These 

procedural safeguards include an advisement to the accused that 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 20 of 39

he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be 

used against him, that he has the right to an attorney, and that if 

he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him. 

However, these warnings are only required where a suspect is 

both in custody and subjected to interrogation. 

State v. Necessary, 800 N.E.2d 667, 669-70 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (internal citation 

marks omitted). A law enforcement officer’s duty to give Miranda warnings 

does not attach unless there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as 

to render him in custody. Loving v. State, 647 N.E.2d 1123, 1125 (Ind. 1995). 

[37] Saundra primarily relies on the presence of several officers in the house during 

the afternoon to support her claim that she was subject to a custodial 

interrogation. In particular, she contends that at the time the video was taped, 

there were no children inside her home, the police had taped off her home to 

keep everybody other than law enforcement from entering, and she had been 

surrounded by several officers who were “directing her course of action in 

recreating the scene of the accident.” (Saundra’s Br. p. 20). She adds that the 

police were also “not transparent” about their intentions and that the officers 

deceptively led her to believe that the video would only be used to assist the 

coroner in determining A.D.’s cause of death, and not for a criminal 

investigation. (Saundra’s Br. p. 20). Thus, Saundra maintains that she was in 

custody at the time the video was taped, and she should have been advised of 

her Miranda rights.

[38] The question of whether a person is in custody for purposes of Miranda is a 

mixed question of fact and law. State v. Ruiz, 123 N.E.3d 675, 679 (Ind. 2019). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 21 of 39

The test for whether a defendant is in custody is not whether a defendant feels 

free to go, but rather whether there was a “‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom 

of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” State v. Brown, 70 

N.E.3d 331, 336 (Ind. 2017) (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 114 

S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994)). Questioning an individual the police 

suspect of a crime does not inherently render the questioning custodial 

interrogation. Reid v. State, 113 N.E.3d 290, 300 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. 

denied. Courts look to the “totality of the circumstances” to determine whether 

a person was in custody. Brown, 70 N.E.3d at 336; see also Hicks v. State, 5 

N.E.3d 424, 429 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“We examine all the circumstances 

surrounding an interrogation and are concerned with objective circumstances, 

not with the subjective views of the interrogating officers or the suspect.”), trans. 

denied.

[39] There is no question in this case that Detective Finn’s questions during the 

video reenactment with Saundra constituted an interrogation. The dispositive 

issue here is whether Saundra was in custody at that time the video was taped. 

The record shows that law enforcement entered the Wahls’ residence to 

respond to a 9-1-1 call of an unconscious child. At approximately 12:52 p.m., 

Detective Finn, arrived at the Wahls’ residence and began questioning Daniel 

as to the daily procedures at the daycare. At 12:59 p.m., A.D. was pronounced 

dead. During Daniel’s narration of the events that had occurred that day, 

Saundra emerged from the basement in hysterics and announced to Daniel that 

A.D. was dead. Detective Finn stopped questioning Daniel so that Daniel 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 22 of 39

could give Saundra some comfort. The record reveals that Saundra was 

emotional and distraught by A.D.’s death. Other officers continued to arrive at 

the Wahls’ residence, some in uniform and others in street clothes. Following 

the pronouncement of A.D.’s death, the officers, in conjunction with the 

Wahls, spent the rest of their afternoon caring for the children and reuniting 

them with their parents at the canopy set up outside the Wahls’ residence. The

Wahls were not placed in handcuffs or attended by an officer who monitored 

their movements inside their home. It appears that at around 5:00 p.m., after 

all the children had presumably left the Wahls’ residence, Detective Finn finally 

made a proper inquiry as to the events preceding A.D. being stuck in the gate. 

It was at this moment that Saundra was asked to participate in a video 

recording demonstrating the events. 

[40] Despite spending his afternoon at the Wahls’ residence, Detective Finn was 

unaware of the events leading to A.D.’s death. Without more definite 

information about the events, Detective Finn conducted “[g]eneral on-the-scene 

questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of 

citizens in the fact-finding process,” which does not fall within the purview of 

Miranda requirements. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477-78, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Further, 

while there were other officers present during the video reenactment, it appears 

that only one officer was conducting the questioning. See Gauvin v. State, 878 

N.E.2d 515, 520-21 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (relying, in part, on fact that three 

officers conducted the interview to determine the suspect was in custody)

(citations omitted). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 23 of 39

[41] Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Saundra was not in 

custody and was not required to have been advised of her Miranda rights at the 

time she was asked to narrate the events which were captured in a video. 

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting the video recording into evidence. 

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

[42] The Wahls argue that the evidence is insufficient to sustain their conviction.

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed to support a criminal 

conviction, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. Bailey v. 

State, 907 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. 2009). “We consider only the evidence 

supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 

such evidence.” Id. We will affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative 

value such that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded the defendant 

was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[43] The version of Indiana Code section 35-42-1-4(e) in effect at the time the Wahls 

committed their crimes provided that if: (1) a child care provider recklessly 

supervises a child; and (2) the child dies as a result of the child care provider’s 

reckless supervision; the child care provider commits Class D felony 

involuntary manslaughter. Conduct is reckless if the person engaged in that 

conduct “in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might 

result and the disregard involves a substantial deviation from acceptable 

standards of conduct.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(c). As charged, to convict the Wahls of 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 24 of 39

involuntary manslaughter, the State was required to prove that the Wahls 

recklessly supervised A.D. and that A.D. died as a result thereof. 

[44] During her initial questioning, Saundra informed Detective Finn that she 

walked into the kitchen to feed another child who was seated in a highchair. 

After she fed the child in the highchair, she faced away from the toddler and 

infant room where A.D. was and began warming milk bottles. Once the bottles 

were warm, she picked up the child from the highchair and carried her on her 

hip along with a bottle and walked back into the toddler and infant room. Once 

she entered that room, Saundra saw A.D. face down, wedged at the neck 

between the basement baby gate and the wall. 

[45] At trial, Detective Finn testified that when the white metal security gate was 

open, there was no line of sight from the kitchen. Detective Finn added that the 

white metal security gate did not latch correctly. In addition, Detective 

Hawkins, who arrived shortly after Detective Finn, observed that when the 

white metal security was “in the closed position[,] there was really . . . no lock 

locking it in” and when he “put a couple fingers on it,” he “was able to push the 

gate open without any problem at all.” (Tr. Vol. III, pp. 75-76). While 

Detective Hawkins was manipulating the gate, Daniel informed him that to 

mitigate that problem, the Wahls placed “some furniture on either side of the 

gate to try to keep the kids from pushing through it.” (Tr. Vol. III, p. 76). 

[46] In arguing that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his involuntary 

manslaughter conviction, Daniel attempts to detach himself from the events of 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 25 of 39

June 20, 2013, by solely passing the blame onto Saundra. Daniel distances 

himself from A.D.’s death by arguing that he “was not present at the time A.D. 

was fatally injured. He did not know how long A.D. had been left without 

supervision, [or] what activities A.D. or [Saundra] were engaged in.” (Daniel’s 

Br. p. 40). Thus, Daniel argues that the evidence presented allowed the jury 

only to infer that Saundra may have recklessly supervised A.D. and, “therefore, 

[he] cannot be held vicariously criminally liable for [Saundra’s] actions.” 

(Daniel’s Br. p. 40). Daniel’s attempt to distance himself from A.D.’s death 

must fail since he installed and maintained the security gate that trapped and 

killed A.D. In proving its case against Daniel, the State offered evidence that 

Daniel was aware that the gate did not latch properly. In fact, several months 

after the incident, Daniel informed Detective Finn that A.D. could “bulldoze 

through” that gate. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 125). 

[47] As for Saundra, she contends that A.D.’s interaction with the gate was the 

proximate cause of his death. She equally distances herself from the events 

leading to A.D.’s death, and she claims that Daniel is to blame since Daniel 

was responsible for ensuring that the gate was installed properly and functioned 

well. Notwithstanding her contentions, at the second trial, Danny described his 

son as a healthy and happy baby. He testified that approximately a month or 

two prior to A.D.’s death, he was in the Wahls’ kitchen either during drop off 

or pick up and he and Saundra were discussing A.D.’s progress. During the 

conversation, Saundra stated that A.D. was “able to push his way through the 

baby gate downstairs.” (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 165-66).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 26 of 39

[48] An act is reckless if it is undertaken in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable 

disregard of harm that might result and the disregard involves a substantial 

deviation from acceptable standards of conduct. See I.C. § 35-41-2-2 (2013). It

is undisputed that the Wahls jointly owned and operated the daycare, they

recklessly failed to ensure that the gate functioned properly, and they were aware 

that A.D. could push through the gate. While there were several metal security 

gates installed in the Wahls’ residence, two months prior to A.D.’s death, 

Saundra informed A.D.’s father that A.D. could push open a baby gate that was 

in the basement. Daniel also informed Detective Hawkins that the gate did not 

latch properly and that to mitigate the problem, they used a rocking chair and 

swing on both sides of the gate to prevent the children from opening the gate. 

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence 

beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain the Class D felony involuntary 

manslaughter convictions against the Wahls. 

III. Restitution. 

[49] The Wahls argue that the evidence submitted at their sentencing hearing 

concerning the DiRienzos’ loss was insufficient to support the trial court’s 

restitution order of $22,353.72. 

[50] The purpose of a restitution order is to impress upon the criminal defendant the 

magnitude of the loss he has caused and to defray costs to the victims caused by 

the offense. Henderson v. State, 848 N.E.2d 341, 346 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). It is 

within the trial court’s discretion to order restitution, and we will reverse only 

for an abuse of that discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 27 of 39

court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances before it, or if the trial court misinterprets or misapplies the law. 

Id. 

[51] Indiana Code section 35-50-5-3(a) provides that, in addition to any sentence 

imposed for a felony or misdemeanor, a court may order the payment of 

restitution to the victim of the crime. When such an order is entered, it must be 

based upon a consideration of:

(1) property damages of the victim incurred as a result of the 

crime, based on the actual cost of repair (or replacement if repair 

is inappropriate);

(2) medical and hospital costs incurred by the victim (before the 

date of sentencing) as a result of the crime;

(3) the cost of medical laboratory tests to determine if the crime 

has caused the victim to contract a disease or other medical 

condition;

(4) earnings lost by the victim (before the date of sentencing) as a 

result of the crime including earnings lost while the victim was 

hospitalized or participating in the investigation or trial of the 

crime; and

(5) funeral, burial, or cremation costs incurred by the family or 

estate of a homicide victim as a result of the crime.

Id. A restitution order must reflect a loss sustained by the victim as a direct and 

immediate result of the defendant’s criminal acts, and the trial court may 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 28 of 39

consider only expenses incurred by the victim prior to the date of sentencing. 

Rich v. State, 890 N.E.2d 44, 51 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. “Evidence 

supporting a restitution order is sufficient ‘if it affords a reasonable basis for 

estimating loss and does not subject the trier of fact to mere speculation or 

conjecture.’” J.H. v. State, 950 N.E.2d 731, 734 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting 

M.L. v. State, 838 N.E.2d 525, 528 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied).

[52] Ahead of the sentencing hearing, the State successfully filed a motion seeking 

judicial notice of A.D.’s father testimony, which was offered at the Wahls’ first 

sentencing hearing. That transcript was admitted into evidence. Indiana Rule 

of Evidence 201 permits courts to take judicial notice of certain material, 

including facts “not subject to reasonable dispute” and facts “readily 

determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” 

For years, Rule 201 did not permit a trial court to take judicial notice of court 

records, even if they were “its own records in another case previously before the 

court on a related subject with related parties.” Gray v. State, 871 N.E.2d 408, 

413 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) trans. denied. Effective January 1, 2010, amended Rule 

201(b)(5) now permits courts to take judicial notice of “records of a court of this 

state,” precisely as the trial court did here.

[53] The Wahls complain that the trial court simply rubber-stamped the previous 

restitution amount without considering any evidence at all. Contrary to the 

Wahls’ assertion, the trial court took judicial notice of Danny’s sworn

testimony, which he offered at the sentencing hearing. That portion of 

transcript was admitted into evidence. The transcript shows that in support of 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 29 of 39

the DiRienzos’ restitution claim against the Wahls, A.D.’s father testified he 

was entitled to the reimbursement of daycare fees pertaining to A.D., his wife’s

therapy expenses, A.D.’s funeral expenses, and his lost wages, all amounting to 

$22,353.72. 

[54] Although Danny did not again testify as to those amounts at the Wahls’ second

sentencing hearing, the trial court took judicial notice of Danny’s prior sworn

testimony as given at the Wahls’ first sentencing hearing while reaching the 

restitution amount at the Wahls’ second sentencing hearing. See Rich, 890 

N.E.2d at 51 (holding that the trial court may consider only expenses incurred 

by the victim prior to the date of sentencing). As such, we hold that the 

restitution amount of $22,353.72 is supported by the evidence, and the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in awarding that amount. 

CONCLUSION 

[55] In light of the foregoing, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in excluding expert testimony, admitting the video reenactment, or issuing a 

restitution order. In addition, we hold that the State presented sufficient 

evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain the Wahls’ involuntary 

manslaughter conviction. 

[56] Affirmed. 

[57] Tavitas, J. concurs with separate opinion

[58] Mathias, J. dissents with separate opinion
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 30 of 39
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 31 of 39

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Daniel Wahl and Saundra Wahl,

Appellants-Defendants,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-2258

Tavitas, Judge concurring

[59] I respectfully concur, but I write separately to emphasize relevant statutory 

provisions, which I believe further support the conclusion that Miranda 

warnings were not required prior to Saundra’s participation in the video 

reenactment. Indiana Code Section 36-2-14-61 provides: 

Whenever the coroner is notified that a person in the county:

1 The cited version of Indiana Code Section 36-2-14-6 was in effect in 2013 when the investigation occurred. 

The language of the current version differs slightly. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 32 of 39

(1) has died from violence;

(2) has died by casualty;

(3) has died when apparently in good health;

(4) has died in an apparently suspicious, unusual, or 

unnatural manner; or

(5) has been found dead;

the coroner shall, before the scene of the death is disturbed, 

notify a law enforcement agency having jurisdiction in that area. 

The agency shall assist the coroner in conducting an investigation of how 

the person died and a medical investigation of the cause of death. The 

coroner may hold the remains of the decedent until the 

investigation of how the person died and the medical 

investigation of the cause of death are concluded. 

(emphasis added). The specific facts of this case demonstrate that the detectives 

were fulfilling their duty to assist the coroner in his investigation, and Saundra 

was not subjected to a custodial interrogation.2

 

[60] Law enforcement was dispatched to the Wahls’ daycare business on June 20, 

2013. When the first officer arrived at 12:23 p.m. after the Wahls called 911, 

the officer’s primary focus was saving A.D.’s life. The officers subsequently 

turned their attention to gathering the other children’s belongings and 

2 As the majority notes, we need only consider if Saundra is in custody. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 33 of 39

contacting parents to ensure the other children’s safety. This process took the 

“bulk of the afternoon[.]” Tr. Vol. III p. 16. 

[61] After the children were removed from the Wahls’ daycare, detectives were able 

to investigate the cause of A.D.’s death. Detectives advised Saundra that the 

purpose of the video reenactment was to assist the coroner in determining the 

cause and manner of death. The coroner and the coroner’s aide were also 

present. Detective Hawkins operated the video camera while Detective Finn 

narrated and asked questions regarding the reenactment. 

[62] As Detective Hawkins explained, the doll reenactment is “standard procedure” 

following infant and child deaths. Id. at 34. The coroner’s office “expect[s]” 

law enforcement to “have that documentation to help them out.” Id. Similarly, 

Detective Finn testified that a doll reenactment was “best practice” in any child 

or infant death case to assist the coroner’s office. Id. at 112. At the end of the 

video reenactment, Detective Finn told Saundra that Saundra needed to place 

the doll where A.D. was found in order for detectives to take a photograph for 

the coroner’s office. See State’s Ex. 45. The coroner used the doll reenactment 

in making findings with regard to A.D.’s death. 

[63] While the detectives did not tell Saundra that she was free to leave or free to ask 

the detectives to leave, Detective Finn communicated the Wahls were “not 

under arrest or otherwise detained.” Tr. Vol. III p. 23. At no point did the 

Wahls object to law enforcement’s presence in the house. The Wahls were 

cooperative and free to move about the home throughout the day. Moreover, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 34 of 39

as can be seen in the video, when Saundra became upset recalling the day’s 

events, she was permitted to walk away to calm down. See State’s Ex. 45. 

When detectives left the Wahls’ home on June 20, 2013, detectives did not 

consider the Wahls to be “suspects of criminal activity.”3

 Tr. Vol. III p. 131. 

[64] As evidenced by the above facts, law enforcement was conducting a general onscene investigation pursuant to Indiana Code Section’s 36-2-14-6’s mandate 

that law enforcement “shall assist the coroner”, and Saundra was not in 

custody. Thus, the warnings described in Miranda were unnecessary prior to 

the reenactment video, as Miranda does not affect “[g]eneral on-the-scene 

questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of 

citizens in the fact-finding process[.]” See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477, 86 S. Ct. at 

1629. 

[65] Indiana law follows Miranda’s directive that these warnings are not required 

prior to general on-the-scene questioning or general fact investigations. See 

Bishop v. State, 700 N.E.2d 473, 476 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (declining to find 

Bishop was in custody during general on-the-scene questioning “in a 

noncoercive atmosphere”); Lucas v. State, 413 N.E.2d 578 (Ind. 1980) (declining 

to find custodial interrogation occurred during questioning regarding an 

3 Suspecting an individual of committing a crime is not determinative in deciding whether that individual is 

in custody. See Reid v. State, 113 N.E.3d 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (“Questioning an individual the police 

suspect of a crime does not inherently render the questioning custodial interrogation.”). Nonetheless, this 

fact is further evidence that law enforcement was functioning as an investigator for the coroner during the 

reenactment video. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 35 of 39

automobile accident prior to law enforcement’s discovery that a crime had been 

committed); Dillon v. State, 275 N.E.2d 312 (Ind. 1971) (declining to find 

custodial interrogation occurred when police were “merely investigating a 

possible crime” (internal quotations omitted)); Wissman v. State, 540 N.E.2d 

1209, 1212 (Ind. 1989) (declining to find custodial interrogation occurred when 

officers asked Wissman what happened while he was lying on the floor, injured, 

and unable to move, because it was “for information, not a question used to 

elicit a confession”). 

[66] The events on June 20, 2013, were tragic, and there is no positive outcome 

here. Nonetheless, I am compelled to conclude law enforcement was 

conducting a general on-the-scene investigation to assist the coroner, and 

Saundra was not subjected to a custodial interrogation during the reenactment 

video. As such, I concur. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 36 of 39

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Daniel Wahl and Saundra Wahl,

Appellants-Defendants,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-2258

Mathias, J., dissenting

[67] Because I believe that the admission of the video reenactment violated 

Saundra’s Miranda rights, I respectfully dissent. 

[68] As correctly noted by the majority, an officer is required to give Miranda

warnings only when a defendant is both (1) in custody and (2) subject to 

interrogation. Furnish v. State, 779 N.E.2d 576, 578–79 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), 

trans. denied. I agree with the majority that Detective Finn’s questions during the 

video reenactment constituted interrogation. See Slip op. at 21 (“There is no 

question in this case that Detective Finn’s questions during the video 

reenactment with Saundra constituted an interrogation.”). Accordingly, the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 37 of 39

only issue on which I differ from the majority is whether Saundra was in 

custody for purposes of Miranda. The majority concludes that she was not; I 

believe that she was. 

[69] As our supreme court stated in State v. Ruiz, 123 N.E.3d 675, 680 (Ind. 2019): 

Under Miranda, freedom of movement is curtailed when a 

reasonable person would feel not free to terminate the 

interrogation and leave. This freedom-of-movement inquiry 

requires a court to examine the totality of objective circumstances 

surrounding the interrogation—such as the location, duration, 

and character of the questioning; statements made during the 

questioning; the number of law-enforcement officers present; the 

extent of police control over the environment; the degree of 

physical restraint; and how the interview begins and ends. 

State v. Ruiz, 123 N.E.3d 675, 680 (Ind. 2019) (citing Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 

499, 509 (2012)).4 We have also identified a similar list of factors as significant 

in determining whether a person is in custody, including: whether and to what 

extent the person has been made aware that he is free to refrain from answering 

questions; whether there has been prolonged coercive, and accusatory 

questioning, or whether police have employed subterfuge in order to induce 

self-incrimination; the degree of police control over the environment in which 

4 The majority cites State v. Brown, 70 N.E.3d 331, 336 (Ind. 2017), which stated that “[t]he test of whether a 

defendant is in custody is not whether a defendant feels free to go, but rather whether there was a formal 

arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” (emphasis added, 

internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994)). However, in Ruiz, 

our supreme court held that “freedom of movement is curtailed when a reasonable person would feel not 

free to terminate the interrogation and leave.”) (emphasis added) (citing Howes, 565 U.S. at 509). To the 

extent there is any conflict between these two statements, I follow the more recent case. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 38 of 39

the interrogation takes place, and in particular whether the suspect’s freedom of 

movement is physically restrained or otherwise significantly curtailed; and 

whether the suspect could reasonably believe that he has the right to interrupt 

prolonged questioning by leaving the scene. Gauvin v. State, 878 N.E.2d 515, 

521 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Sprosty v. Buchler, 79 F.3d 635, 641 (7th Cir. 

1996)). 

[70] I believe that the totality of the circumstances in the present case demonstrates 

that Saundra was in custody, i.e., her freedom of action was deprived in a 

significant way such that a reasonable person in her position would not have 

felt free to end the interrogation and leave. There was no indication that the 

police ever informed Saundra that she was free to not answer questions. And 

although Saundra called 911, thereby seeking the aid of the police, the police 

remained in the house for several hours after A.D. was taken to the hospital and 

after all of the other children were removed from the house. The police even 

told Saundra that they wanted her to recreate the scene of A.D.’s tragic death in 

order to help the police assist the coroner. But this was objectively not the only, 

or even the primary, purpose of the reenactment. Instead, the police were 

encouraging Saundra to incriminate herself. And even though the questioning 

took place in the Wahls’s home, the police had a large degree of control over 

the environment: the police had taped off the house to keep others out, and 

there were multiple police officers in the home. Indeed, the police collected 

evidence from the scene. The police also directed Saundra as she reenacted the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2258 | May 12, 2020 Page 39 of 39

events that led to A.D.’s death. In other words, the police were in control of the 

scene, not Saundra. 

[71] Under the totality of these facts and circumstances, I believe that Saundra’s 

freedom of action and movement were deprived in a significant way, i.e., she 

was in custody for purposes of Miranda. Because Saundra was subject to 

custodial interrogation, the police were required to advise her of her Miranda

rights. The failure to so advise Saundra of her Miranda rights means that the 

trial court should have excluded the video reenactment from evidence, and I 

respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion otherwise.