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1

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication. 

Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may

have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value. 

See 9th Cir. BAP R. 8013.1.

2

 Hon. Mark S. Wallace, Bankruptcy Judge for the Central

District of California, sitting by designation.

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: ) BAP No. WW-10-1382-WaPaJu

)

WALTER WILLIAM COPLAND, ) Bk. No. 09-47782 

 )

Debtor. ) Adv. No. 09-04192

___________________________________)

 )

WALTER WILLIAM COPLAND, )

) 

Appellant, )

 )

v. ) M E M O R A N D U M 1

 )

BONNIE ANTHIS, Individually and as )

Personal Representative for the )

Estate of Harvey Allen Anthis, )

)

Appellee. )

___________________________________)

Argued and Submitted on October 21, 2011

at Seattle, Washington

Filed - January 10, 2012

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Western District of Washington

Honorable Brian D. Lynch, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding ____________________________________________

Appearances: David Clement Smith, Esq. argued for Appellant Walter

W. Copland; John G. Schultz, Esq. of Leavy Schultz

Davis & Fearing PS argued for Appellee Bonnie Anthis ____________________________________________

Before: WALLACE,2 PAPPAS, AND JURY, Bankruptcy Judges.

FILED

JAN 10 2012

SUSAN M SPRAUL, CLERK

U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
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3

 Individually, and in her capacity as personal

representative of the estate of Harvey Anthis.

4

 Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter, section and rule

references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, and

to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rules 1001-9037. 

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are referred to as “Civil

Rules.”

5

 We take these facts primarily from the Memorandum Opinion

of the bankruptcy judge entered on September 23, 2010.

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Debtor Walter W. Copland (“Copland”) appeals the Order and

Judgment of the bankruptcy court decreeing that the debt owed by

him to Bonnie Anthis3

 (“Creditor”) is the result of willful and

malicious injury and therefore not dischargeable pursuant to

section 523(a)(6).4 For the reasons stated below, we AFFIRM.

FACTS5

Copland is a retired police officer from the City of Tacoma

Police Department. He often spent time in Kennewick, Washington,

where his son lived. As a result, he became acquainted with John

Stevens, who lived across the street from Copland’s son, and with

Mr. Stevens’s friend Al Anthis. On September 15, 2005, Mr.

Stevens and Copland spent time together during the day, including

a visit to the Burbank Tavern in nearby Walla Walla County. 

After stopping to purchase whiskey and vodka, Mr. Stevens and

Copland returned to Stevens’s house later in the afternoon, where

they met up with Mr. Anthis. The three men hung out on

Mr. Stevens’s deck, talking about fishing trips, eating hot wings

and drinking around a four to five foot hexagonal table.

Mr. Stevens, as host, was in and out of the house cooking

the hot wings and described the ensuing events as he observed
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them. He recalled Copland saying to Mr. Anthis “I could shoot

and kill you,” and Mr. Anthis responding “Bring it on.” Copland

then stood up from his stool, walked behind Mr. Stevens and

around the table to Mr. Anthis. He pulled out a .22 derringer,

placed it up to Mr. Anthis’s right temple and fired. Mr. Stevens

saw the flash of the shot, heard the shot, and at that point saw

that Copland was holding the gun. He did not see him pull the

trigger. Mr. Anthis instantly fell off his bar stool to the

floor. Copland then returned to his seat, put the gun in his

back pocket, and placed his head in his hands, saying “Oh, my

God, I’ve killed Al.”

The Kennewick police arrived quickly in response to a call

and found Mr. Stevens and Copland still sitting on the deck. 

After being handcuffed and having the handgun removed from his

pocket, Copland told the officers “I’m sorry. I killed him. 

He’s dead.” He repeated a similar statement when an officer

checked Mr. Anthis’s pulse and thought he found one.

The next day at the jail Copland was trying to reach his son

by phone. When he was unsuccessful, the duty officer suggested

he call his son’s neighbor, Mr. Stevens, for assistance. Copland

responded, “That’s cold. I can’t call him. I just shot and

killed our best friend.” A detective who talked to Copland that

day testified that Copland was able to tell him what he had done

the whole day up to the events at the Stevens’s house.

Copland was eventually convicted of first degree

manslaughter in criminal proceedings. Creditor filed a wrongful

death lawsuit against Copland, which resulted in a judgment. 

After Copland filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in 2009,
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Creditor filed a timely adversary proceeding, asserting that the

debt owed by Copland was non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(6) as

based on willful and malicious injury. The bankruptcy court held

a trial and determined the debt was non-dischargeable. This

appeal followed.

JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 157(b)(2)(I) and 1334. We have jurisdiction of this appeal

under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) and (c).

ISSUES

Copland makes three arguments on appeal: (1) no evidence

exists that Copland intended to kill Anthis; (2) the bankruptcy

court improperly placed a burden of proof on Copland; and (3) the

evidence does not support the bankruptcy court’s finding that

Copland intended to kill Anthis. Copland emphasizes in his

appellant’s brief that the evidence is also consistent with an

accidental shooting, in part because Stevens never actually saw

Copland shoot Anthis and in part because there was no plausible

motive for an intentional shooting.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Panel reviews the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact

for clear error and conclusions of law de novo and applies

de novo review to mixed questions of law and fact that require

consideration of legal concepts and the exercise of judgment

about the values that animate the legal principles. Wolkowitz v.

Beverly (In re Beverly), 374 B.R. 221, 230 (9th Cir. BAP 2007),

aff’d in part and dismissed in part, 551 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir.

2008). The issue of dischargeability of a debt is a mixed
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question of fact and law that is reviewed de novo. Miller v.

United States, 363 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2004). We review the

bankruptcy court’s factual findings, which underlie the mixed

question, for clear error. Rule 8013.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

Section 523(a)(6) provides in relevant part that “[a]

discharge under section 727 . . . does not discharge an

individual debtor from any debt . . . for willful and malicious

injury by the debtor to another entity . . . .” A determination

of non-dischargeability under section 523(a)(6) requires a

finding that the injury was willful and a finding that the injury

was malicious. These are separate, independent elements. Ormsby

v. First Am. Title co. (In re Ormsby), 591 F.3d 1199, 1206

(9th Cir. 2010); Barboza v. New Form, Inc. (In re Barboza),

545 F.3d 702, 711 (9th Cir. 2008).

The word “willful” in (a)(6) denotes a deliberate and

intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act

that leads to injury. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61

(1998). The actor must intend the consequences of the act, not

merely the act itself. A driver who changes lanes without

looking and collides with another vehicle intentionally turned

the wheel to the left or right but would not be considered to

have “willfully” injured the other driver or his vehicle absent

evidence that he intended the collision. The willfulness

requirement is met if it is shown that the debtor had a

subjective intent to cause harm or a subjective belief or

knowledge that harm was substantially certain to occur. In re

Su, 290 F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir. 2002); Petralia v. Jercich
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(In re Jercich), 238 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001).

An injury is “malicious” under (a)(6) when it involves a

wrongful act, done intentionally, that necessarily causes injury

and is committed without just cause or excuse. In re Jercich,

238 F.3d at 1209; Thiara v. Spycher Bros. (In re Thiara),

285 B.R. 420, 427 (9th Cir. BAP 2002). Maliciousness may be

inferred based on the nature of the wrongful act, In re Ormsby,

591 F.3d at 1207, and it may be implied by the circumstances

surrounding a debtor’s acts and conduct, even in the absence of

personal hatred, spite, or ill-will. Navistar Fin. Corp. V.

Stelluti (In re Stelluti), 94 F.3d 84, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1996);

Sanger v. Busch (In re Busch), 311 B.R. 657, 666 (N.D.N.Y. 2004);

Itule v. Metlease, Inc. (In re Itule), 114 B.R. 206, 209-10 (9th

Cir. BAP 1990).

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence That Copland Intended to

Kill Anthis

Copland argues that there is no evidence of a motive of any

kind why he would kill Anthis and that he never formed the intent

to kill Anthis. Specifically, he points to the absence of a

heated or angry verbal exchange immediately preceding the

shooting.

Motive is not an element of willfulness or maliciousness

under section 523(a)(6). If a person walks up to a complete

stranger on the street and, for no reason at all, shoots him in

the head, intending to hurt or kill him, the resulting injury is

willful and malicious notwithstanding the absence of motive.

The bankruptcy court determined that the direct and

circumstantial evidence of Copland’s intent to injure Anthis by
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6

 As the bankruptcy court pointed out in its Memorandum

Opinion, there was no evidence of a slip or a scuffle that might

create an inference that the shooting was accidental or in

self-defense. Anthis v. Copland (In re Copland), Nos. 09-47782,

09-4192, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 4161 at *5-*6 (Bankr. W.D. Wash.

Sept. 23, 2010).

-7-

shooting him was compelling. This finding is not clearly

erroneous. Although the shooting of Anthis appears to have been

a spur of the moment event, that does not mean Copland did not

intend the fatal injury. When Copland said, “You know, I could

shoot you,” or “I could kill you,” he was making a kind of boast. 

When Anthis replied, “Bring it on,” he in a sense threw down the

gauntlet, daring Copland to make good his boast. The logical

implication from the fatal gunshot that occurred a few seconds

later is that Copland made good his boast. Copland’s intention

to kill Anthis may be inferred from a motive of carrying through

on a boast and responding to a dare.

Copland argues that the evidence is equally consistent with

the occurrence of an accident. After all, the argument runs,

Stevens did not actually see Copland put the derringer to

Anthis’s temple and pull the trigger. Perhaps the gun slipped.

The bankruptcy court rejected an accidental shooting

hypothesis. In the abstract, Copland’s state of intoxication may

be seen as providing some support for an accidental shooting. It

is not unrealistic to suppose that a drunk doesn’t handle a

firearm as carefully as a sober person. However, it is

speculation that an accident occurred,6

 and the boast/dare verbal

colloquy that immediately preceded the shooting creates a strong

inference that the shooting was intended and not accidental. The
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 Id. at *5.

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inference is powerful enough to overcome the speculative and

otherwise unsupported argument that an intoxicated Copland shot

Anthis accidentally. Even if we as the fact-finder might have

weighed the evidence differently, “when there are two permissible

views of the evidence, the trial judge’s choice between them

cannot be clearly erroneous.” In re Baldwin Builders, 232 B.R.

406, 410 (9th Cir. BAP 1999). Since even in a de novo review of

a mixed question, we must give deference to the bankruptcy

judge’s factual findings, we find no error here.

B. Placement of the Burden of Proof By the Bankruptcy

Court

The bankruptcy court’s Memorandum Opinion states that

“Mr. Copland contended that the evidence showed the shooting was

an accident or that he was not conscious that he had pulled the

trigger due to his state of inebriation.”7 Based upon this

statement, Copland contends that the bankruptcy court put the

burden of proof on him rather than on Creditor.

It is plain from both the statement and its context in the

opinion that the bankruptcy court was merely relating what

Copland’s contentions were, not placing the burden of proof on

Copland. At no point in the Memorandum Opinion does the

bankruptcy court state or imply that the burden of proof is on

anyone other than Creditor.

C. The Bankruptcy Court’s Findings on Copland’s Intent

In his final argument, Copland essentially re-argues the

first argument discussed above, namely, that the shooting could
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8

 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 18.

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 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 19.

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have been an accident, and that it was error based upon the

evidence presented for the bankruptcy court to conclude that

Copland intended to kill Anthis. Focusing again on motive,

Copland states, “Here, of course, however tragic the killing, no

one has suggested any motive for Mr. Copland to kill his

friend.”8 According to Copland, “every known fact in this case

is as consistent with an accidental shooting as an intentional

homicide.”9

Regarding motive, as discussed above, motive is not

necessary to show intent to injure. However, to the extent it

impacts our analysis, the evidence shows that Copland’s motive

was to make good on his boast and to respond to Anthis’s dare,

“Bring it on.” With respect to the known facts in this case, it

is simply not true that “every known fact” is as consistent with

an accidental shooting as an intentional homicide. When a person

says “I could kill you” and then does exactly that a few seconds

later, that is a fact consistent with homicide and completely

inconsistent with an accidental slaying.

Equally true, shooting Anthis was a wrongful act, done

intentionally, that necessarily caused injury and was without

just cause or excuse.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we AFFIRM the bankruptcy court’s

judgment decreeing Copland’s debt to Creditor to be

non-dischargeable in its entirety.