United States of America

Merit Systems Protection Board

Rhonda K. Conyers, Docket Number

Appellant, CH-0752-09-0925-I-1 p ^

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Agency Response to Office of Personnel Management's

Advisory Opinion and Briefs Amicus

Introduction

The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS or Agency) is an agency of the

United States Department of Defense (DoD). 32 C.F.R. § 352a.l. It employs over 10,000

people across the United States and at other locations throughout the world. The Agency

performs accounting work and payment functions for the Department of Defense (DoD), its

soldiers and civilian employees and payment functions for the employees of several other

Executive Branch agencies. Within DoD, DFAS employees provide finance and accounting

services to the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Military Departments; the Chairman, Joint

Chiefs of Staff and Joint Staff; the Unified and Specified Commands; the Inspector General of

the Department of Defense; other Defense Agencies; and DoD Field Activities. 32 C.F.R.

§ 352a.4(c)(2).

In accordance with the DoD Personnel Security Program, DoD Regulation 5200.2-R, all

civilian positions are categorized (with respect to security sensitivity) as either critical-sensitive,
noncritical-sensitive (NCS), or nonsensitive. 32 C.F.R. § 154.13(b). The position at issue in

this appeal is designated NCS.1

Statement of Facts

Appellant was an accounting technician, GS-525-05, assigned to an NCS position at

DFAS Columbus. On June 27,2007, Appellant received a Statement of Reasons to Deny

Eligibility for Access to Classified Information and/or Occupancy of a Sensitive Position (SOR),

which was issued by the Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) Consolidated Adjudications

Facility (CAP). The SOR explained that a tentative determination had been made to deny

Appellant eligibility for access to classified information and/or occupancy of a sensitive position

("eligibility"). Information from an investigation of Appellant's personal history, her security

background questionnaire, and an Equifax credit bureau report had led to security concerns and

had raised questions about her trustworthiness, reliability, and judgment. Appellant was advised

that she would not be eligible for occupancy of a sensitive position if the tentative determination

later became final and that she could challenge the tentative determination.

Appellant acknowledged that she received the SOR and challenged the tentative

*

determination by submitting a response through her Agency Security Director.

On February 18, 2009, the CAP denied Appellant's eligibility. On February 26, 2009,

Appellant acknowledged that she had received a Letter of Denial (LOD) of her eligibility. She

appealed the CAP determination to the WHS Clearance Appeals Board (CAB) and requested an

appearance before an Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals administrative judge.

1

 The Director of DFAS was delegated authority to designate any DFAS position as a "sensitive"

position. See 32 C.F.R. Part 352a Appendix.

2

 Her response included an explanation as to why she had omitted some debts from Item 22b in

the Questionnaire for Public Trust.
Based upon the CAP determination, the Agency issued a "Notice of Proposed

Indefinite Suspension" (Proposal) on April 13,2009, advising the Appellant of the

Agency's intent to suspend her without pay from her position as an accounting

technician, GS-0525-05, not earlier than 30 calendar days from the date that Appellant

received the Proposal. The reason stated for the proposed suspension was that Appellant

was occupying an NCS position, and the CAF had denied her eligibility:

Because your official position as a GS-525-5 Accounting Technician requires that

you have access to sensitive or classified information and the CAF denied your

access to such information, you no longer meet a qualification requirement for

your position and we may not permit you to perform your regularly assigned

duties.

Because the Appellant was not authorized to access sensitive information, she was unable

to perform the duties of her accounting technician position. There was no vacant nonsensitive

position to which the Agency could temporarily detail or assign Appellant pending her appeal.

The Agency proposed to place Appellant on an indefinite suspension without pay until such time

the Appellant exhausted her administrative due process concerning the determination of

eligibility and the Agency could take any necessary follow-on administrative actions related to

the determination of eligibility. The Agency advised Appellant that she had the right to submit a

written and/or verbal reply to the Proposal within 15 days, that she had the right to submit

documentary evidence, and that she had the right to be represented by an attorney or other

personal representative. In as much as the Appellant was no longer qualified to occupy her NCS

position, and because there were no vacant nonsensitive positions available, the Agency

temporarily assigned Appellant to a nonsensitive set of duties until a decision could be made

concerning the proposed suspension action. Although Appellant had the right to reply to the

Proposal in writing, she did not do so; she did meet briefly with the deciding official.
On September 3,2009, the deciding official issued the Notice of Decision (Decision),

which advised Appellant that she would be suspended from duty without pay from her position

as an accounting technician for an indefinite period of time. Her suspension was effective

September 11,2009, This appeal followed.3

Issue Presented

The Board has asked whether the rule in Department of the Naw v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518

(1988), which limits the scope of MSPB review of an adverse action based upon the revocation

of a security clearance, also limits Board review of an adverse action based upon denial of

continued eligibility to occupy a national security sensitive position.

Argument

For the reasons described below, we respectfully suggest that the Board hold that Egan

precludes review of an agency's decision to revoke or deny eligibility to occupy a national

security sensitive position, that the Appellant was determined not to be eligible to occupy a

national security sensitive position, and that review of the case be limited to determination of the

issue of whether the Appellant received appropriate procedural due process.

I. The Board Should Hold Th&tEean Precludes Review Of An Agency's Decision To

Deny Or Revoke Eligibility To Occupy A National Security Sensitive Position

The Board should hold that, in cases involving an adverse action based upon the

revocation or denial of eligibility to occupy a sensitive position, the Board does not possess

authority to review the merits of the underlying national security determination.4 In Egan, the

3

 In this appeal, Appellant appealed her indefinite suspension. Subsequently, Appellant was

removed from Federal service.

4

 Sensitive positions are divided into three categories depending upon the potential of the

occupant to damage the national security - noncritical sensitive, special sensitive, and critical

sensitive. 5 C.F.R. § 372.201(a). Although the Board specifically has asked whether the rule in

Egan applies to "non-critical sensitive" positions, the particular level of sensitivity is not
Supreme Court explained that, "[f]or 'reasons ... too obvious to call for enlarged discussion,"'

the question whether to grant a security clearance to a particular employee is "a sensitive and

inherently discretionary judgment call... committed by law to the appropriate agency of the

Executive Branch." 484 U.S. at 526-27. As the Supreme Court further explained, the

President's authority to classify and control access to national security information "flows

primarily from [the] constitutional investment of power in the President and exists quite apart

from any explicit congressional grant." Id. at 527. Although Mr. Egan's position required a

security clearance - a fact that is not present in Convcrs - this factual distinction is not

determinative of the outcome hi these matters. Rather, the important Constitutional principles at

issue in Egan govern. Because those principles apply equally to sensitive positions, Egan limits

review of an agency's determination whether an individual employee is eligible to occupy a

national security sensitive position.5

Like the authority to classify a position as one requiring a security clearance, which the

President has delegated to agency heads in a series of Executive Orders, Egan. 484 U.S. at 528,

the authority to designate a position as sensitive comes directly from the President's

Constitutional authority in the national security arena. Executive Order 10,450 requires agencies

determinative here. Rather, a position's sensitivity level determines the scope of the required

background check and the authority responsible for determining an employee's eligibility to

occupy a sensitive position. See E.G. 10,450 § 3; 5 C.F.R. § 732.201(b). Of course, if a

sensitive position also requires a security clearance, then it is undisputed that Egan applies.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") appears to confuse security

clearance requirements with eligibility to occupy a sensitive position when it suggests that "the

denial of a security clearance should have no bearing on an employee's ability to hold a position

that does not require access to classified information." See EEOC Br. at 8. Although the need

for "regular use of, or access to, classified information" is one factor that could lead an agency to

designate a position as sensitive, 5 C.F.R. § 732.102(a)(2), the determinations whether to grant

an individual a security clearance and whether an individual is eligible to occupy a national

security sensitive position are separate inquiries.
to designate as sensitive any position the occupant of which "could bring about, by virtue of the

nature of the position, a material adverse effect on the national security " E.G. 10,450 § 3(b),

Security Requirements for Government Employees, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953). Recognizing

these Constitutional underpinnings, amici acknowledge that position designations are not subject

to review by the Board or courts.6 National Employment Lawyers Association ("NELA") Br.

at 3; see also National Treasury Employees Union ("NTEU") Br. at 10; Government

Accountability Project ("GAP") Br. at 4.

Section 2 of Executive Order 10,450, which applies to both classified and sensitive

positions, further directs agency heads to insure that the employment and retention of any

employee "is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security." Id. § 2; Egan. 484

U.S. at 528. That determination, the Supreme Court explained in Egan. requires "an affirmative

act of discretion on the part of the granting official." Egan. 484 U.S. at 528. As the Board

observed in its February 4,2010 letter to OPM in these matters, national security sensitive

positions include those "that are concerned with the protection of the nation from foreign

aggression or espionage, including the development of defense plans or policies, intelligence or

counterintelligence activities, and related activities concerned with the preservation of the

military strength of the United States." 5 C.F.R. § 732.102(a)(l); see also 32 C.F.R. § 154.13

(Department of Defense regulation). The determination who may occupy such positions is not

6

 Accordingly, the Board should decline the Government Accountability Project's invitation to

consider any differences between agencies in the types of positions they designate as national

security sensitive. See GAP Br. at 6. Indeed, variation between agencies is to be expected. For

example, employees holding seemingly similar positions at the Department of Defense and the

Department of Education might have different position designations. This is a reflection of the

fact that only agency heads - to whom the President has delegated his Constitutional authority to

designate positions - possess the unique knowledge and expertise necessary to assess which of

their positions pose a national security risk.
akin to the type of general "fitness" determinations reviewed by the Board. Sec NTEU Br. at 5,

7. Rather, eligibility to occupy a national security sensitive position can be determined only by

personnel who are familiar with the nature and duties of a particular position, its degree of

sensitivity, the reasons why and ways In which its occupant could damage to the national

security, the range of factors that may lead a particular individual to act in a way that would

damage the national security, and the acceptable margin for error in a given case.

The President has vested agency heads with the authority to make these judgment calls,

and it is those agency heads who bear the responsibility should the occupant of a sensitive

position damage the national security. Cf. Egan. 484 U.S. at 529 C"[A]n agency head who must

bear the responsibility for the protection of classified information committed to his custody

should have the final say in deciding whether to repose his trust in an employee who has access

to such information.'" (quoting Cole v. Young. 351 U.S. 536, 546 (1956)). Allowing nonexpert

civilians to second-guess these determinations creates an irreconcilable conflict with Egan.

Further, like the determination to revoke or deny a security clearance, which is not a

covered "action" as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 7512, Egan. 484 U.S. at 530, the determination to

revoke or deny eligibility to occupy a national security sensitive position is not itself a covered

"action" subject to Board review. Rather, like a clearance determination, which is subject to its

own review process, Executive Order 12,968 § 5.2 (1995), a determination regarding eligibility

to occupy a national security sensitive position is subject to its own review process. Pursuant to

5 C.F.R. § 732.301, titled "Due Process," agencies must provide the subject of any unfavorable

sensitivity determination with notice of the specific reasons for the decision, an opportunity to

respond, and notice of appeal rights. And the Department of Defense makes its internal appeal

process, which affords employees six levels of review, equally available to employees in
classified and national security sensitive positions. To prevent national security decisions (which

can include matters such as an employee's financial responsibility and personal relationships)

from invading upon the employee-supervisor relationship, Federal supervisors often do not know

why an employee's security clearance or eligibility to occupy a sensitive position has been

revoked or denied. All the supervisor knows is that the employee, who occupies a national

security position, no longer meets the requirements of that position.

Against this procedural scheme, the Supreme Court determined that, when reviewing an

adverse employment action pursuant to section 7513, the MSPB and courts must stop short of

examining the merits of a security clearance determination; that is, they may review only the fact

of denial, the position's requirement of a security clearance, and the satisfactory provision of the

requisite procedural protections. Egan, 484 U.S. at 526-30. These same limitations upon review

must apply in national security sensitive cases. Any holding to the contrary would intrude upon

the ability of the Executive to make sensitive and inherently discretionary judgment calls about

which employees are trustworthy enough to occupy national security positions. The inevitable

result is that the Board would second-guess security professionals' determinations, contravening

the important limitations the Supreme Court recognized in Egan.

A decision by the Board to reverse an agency's removal action in these cases would place

the agency in an impossible position. The Board possesses authority to reinstate an employee,

but does not possess authority to order an agency to restore an employee's eligibility to occupy a

national security sensitive position. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 1204(a) (authority to issue orders in

matters within the Board's jurisdiction), with 5 U.S.C. § 7512 (defining covered "actions" within

the Board's jurisdiction). Thus, any decision by the Board ordering reinstatement of an

employee the agency has found is ineligible to occupy a sensitive position leaves the agency with
two options - violate the decision of the agency head and allow an employee who presents a

national security risk to occupy a sensitive position, or violate a Board order. This is not merely

an inconvenience; it demonstrates why the separation of powers concerns present in Egan must

apply equally in these cases.

These concerns are not present in the cases to which amici attempt to compare the

pending matters. As an initial matter, the majority of the cases cited are obviously

distinguishable as they do not involve national security matters.7 However, even the cases that

arguably have some connection to national security, including Adams v. Department of the

Army and Jacobs v. Department of the Army, are distinguishable.8 Even assuming, without

conceding, that both Adams and Jacobs were correctly decided, neither case presented the

question at issue here. Mr. Jacobs held a security clearance, and neither the initial nor the final

decision in Adams reveals whether Mr. Adams held a national security sensitive position.

Jacobs. 62 M.S.P.R. 688, 695 (1994); see Adams, 105 M.S.P.R. 50 (2007); Adams. 2006 WL

1816464 (May 25,2006). Moreover, in neither case did the Board directly review a

determination entrusted by the Constitution to the Executive, as the appellants and amici would

have the Board do here. Adams involved eligibility to access a computer system pursuant to the

agency's "information assurance" policy, and Jacobs involved eligibility under the agency's

7

 See, e.g.. NELA Br. at 5 (citing Lavcock v. Dep't of the Armv. 97 M.S.P.R. 597 (2004)

(attorney qualifications); Boulineau v. Dep't of the Armv. 57 M.S.P.R. 244 (1993) (medical

qualification of helicopter flight instructor); Graham v. Dep't of the Air Force, 46 M.S.P.R. 227

(1990) (agency medical credentials); Siesert v. Dep't of the Armv. 38 M.S.P.P.. 684,687-91

(1988) (medical clinical privileges); Cosby v. Federal Aviation Admin., 30 M.S.P.R. 16,18-19

(1986) (medical qualifications of air traffic control specialist)).

8

 Amici NTEU and NELA also cite Dodson v. Dep't of the Armv. 35 M.S.P.R. 562 (1987),

which involved eligibility under the agency's Personnel Reliability Program. NTEU Br. at 6;

NELA Br. at 5. However, Dodson provides no guidance here because it predates Egan.
Chemical Personnel Reliability Program. Adams. 105 M.S.P.R. 50 at 57; Jacobs. 62 M.S.P.R. at

689. Neither Adamg nor Jacobs suggests that the Board can review an agency's determination

regarding an employee's eligibility to occupy a sensitive position, when the President has

directed agency heads to make such determinations.

Finally, the application ofEgan in these cases will not result in the alarmist scenario

suggested by amici. As an initial matter, agencies have treated national security sensitive cases

as Egan matters for years and the Board's administrative judges have affirmed that approach.

See, e.g.. Tammv E. Hanson v. Dep't of Defense. No. CH-0752-08-0540-I-1,2008 WL 4923475

(Sept. 16,2008); Debbie L. Walker v. Dep't of Defense. No. AT-0752-04-0093-I-1,2004 WL

331304 (Feb. 10,2004). While this issue may have reached the Board only recently, there

certainly has been no momentous change in the law or sudden contraction of employee rights.

More importantly, employees in national security sensitive positions retain numerous

protections under Egan. Contrary to the suggestion by GAP, it is not the case that national

security sensitive employees lack due process protections. See GAP Br. at 5-7. As described

above, 5 C.F.R. § 732.301 requires agencies to provide the subject of any unfavorable sensitivity

determination with notice of the specific reasons for the decision, an opportunity to respond, and

notice of appeal rights. And, except for eligibility determinations, national security sensitive

employees otherwise retain their full MSPB appeal rights. Employees holding sensitive

positions can, and routinely do, appeal to the Board in adverse actions under Chapters 75,

performance-based actions under Chapter 43, and other matters falling within the Board's

jurisdiction. And, even under Egan. employees may obtain review of the questions whether

constitutional violations occurred in the process of revoking eligibility to occupy a national

security sensitive position, see El-Ganavni v. Dep't of Energy, 591 F.3d 176 (3rd Cir. 2009);

10
whether an agency has complied with its own procedures for revoking eligibility, see Makkvv.

Chertoff. 541 F.3d 205 (3rd Cir. 2008) and Romero v. Dep't of Defense. 527 F.3d 1324 (Fed.

Cir. 2008); and whether an agency has provided sufficient notice of the reasons for an eligibility

determination when that determination results in an adverse employment action, Chenev v. Dep't

of Justice. 479 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

The Board cannot assume that agencies will act in bad faith and somehow attempt to

portray every otherwise reviewable employment decision as a determination that an employee is

ineligible to occupy a national security sensitive position. To the extent there may be a concern

in a given case that an employee's eligibility to occupy a national security position has been

revoked for a discriminatory reason or in retaliation for making a protected disclosure, as amici

fear, that concern provides no basis to distinguish such positions from those requiring a security

clearance. An allegation of discrimination or retaliation does nothing to change the underlying

Constitutional basis for national security sensitive determinations. Cf. Hesse v. Dep't of State,

217 F.3d 1372,1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (explaining the presence of a claim under the

Whistleblower Protection Act "does not call for a different result" than in Egan because "the

dispositive question ... is the same: whether the [MSPB] is authorized to review security

clearance determinations and require that employees' security clearances be granted or

reinstated"). Rather, review of the employee's allegations would proceed under the rules

established in other Egan cases. See, e.g.. see El-Ganavni v. Dep't of Energy. 591 F.3d 176 (3rd

Cir. 2009)

Nor does application of Egan in national security sensitive cases threaten further

expansion to suitability determinations. See GAP Br. at 11-12. Suitability for Federal

employment and eligibility to occupy a sensitive position involve different inquiries and fall

11
under the authority of different agencies. Suitability, which falls within OPM's authority, refers

to "determinations based on a person's character or conduct that may have an impact on the

integrity or efficiency of the service." 5 C.F.R. §§ 732.101(a), 731.103. Eligibility to occupy a

sensitive position, which falls within the President's authority, refers to determinations that

employment of an individual is "clearly consistent with the interests of national security." E.G.

10,450 § 2. To occupy a national security sensitive position, an employee must be found both

suitable for Federal employment and eligible to occupy a national security position. Applying

Egan to eligibility determinations has no bearing on suitability determinations, which remain

subject to Board review. See 5 C.F.R. § 731.501.

As the NTEU explains in its brief, "[t]he Board's authority to review the merits of a

removal case presumptively includes a review of the merits of any determination underlying that

removal." NTEU Br. at 3 (citing Egan v. Dep't of the Navy. 28 M.S.P.R. 509, 517 n.5 (1986).

However, as the Supreme Court made clear, "th[is] proposition is not without limit, and it runs

aground when it encounters concerns of national security, as in this case, where the grant of a

security clearance to a particular employee, a sensitive and inherently discretionary judgment

call, is committed by law to the appropriate agency of the Executive Branch." Egan. 484 U.S. at

527. Because they implicate the same concerns of national security, involve the same inherently

discretionary judgment calls, and flow from the same Constitutional commitment of Presidential

authority, the Board should apply Egan to limit review of an agency's determination regarding

an individual's eligibility to occupy a national security sensitive position.

II. The Board Should Hold That Agency Acted Properly To Suspend Appellant After

The CAF Determined Appellant Was Not Eligible To Occupy A Sensitive Position.

The Agency determined that the accounting technician position, GS-525-05, which

Appellant occupied, was a NCS position. The CAF denied her eligibility for occupancy of a

12
sensitive position. The Agency properly acted to remove Appellant from the NCS position and

had no nonsensitive position available. The Agency properly suspended Appellant from her

position. Tamburello v. Department of Defense. 2006 MSPB Lexis 5279 (Sept. 5,2006).

III. The Appellant Received Appropriate Procedural Due Process With Respect To The

Eligibility To Occupy A NCS Position And With Respect To The Administrative

Suspension Action.

The Board can determine: (1) whether the position required NCS eligibility; (2) whether

the employee lost or was denied the eligibility; and (3) whether the employee was given minimal

due process rights. C.f. Egan. In determining minimal due process, the MSPB should conduct a

review of whether the due process procedures of 5 U.S.C § 7513 were met. That statute entitles

a Federal employee to (1) 15 days written notice with the reasons for the proposed action; (2) a

reasonable time period to respond; (3) representation; and (4) a written decisioa Hesse v.

Department of State. 217 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Norruu v. Department of the Naw. 87

M.S.P.R. 444, 446 (2001).

Appellant was given the appropriate due process with respect to the determination of her

eligibility to occupy a NCS position: written notice in the SOR of DoD's intent to deny her

eligibility, the opportunity to respond (and thirty days to do so), notice of her appeal rights, and

the opportunity to appeal to the CAB.

She was also given appropriate due process during the administrative action to suspend

her: clear notice of the reason for the proposed indefinite suspension, appropriate time to

respond, the opportunity to seek representation, and the opportunity to respond. Since her

eligibility had not been reinstated, her indefinite suspension was warranted. Appellant was given

a written decision that indefinitely suspended her from her position.

13
IV. Appellant's Indefinite Suspension Promoted The Efficiency Of The Service.

Absent a statute or regulation requiring reassignment to a nonsensitive position, it is

within the Agency's discretion whether or not to reassign an employee. The Agency is not

required to find other suitable employment for an employee in Appellant's situation. Instead, the

Agency may do whatever is in the best interests of the Government. Kriner v. Department of the

Navy, 61 M.S.P.R 526 (1994). Federal courts have concluded that, absent a regulatory or

statutory requirement, Egan did not impose on an agency the obligation to transfer employees.

Griffin v. Defense Mapping Agency. 864 F.2d 1579, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Jamil v. Secretary.

Department of Defense. 910 F.2d 1203,1209 (4th Cir. 1990).

In Appellant's case, no statute or regulation required the Agency to transfer Appellant to

another position. Furthermore, reassignment was not an option; the Agency did not have any

vacant non-NCS positions available for the Appellant. Appellant's suspension promoted the

efficiency of the Federal service because it allowed the Agency to replace her with someone who

met all the qualifications of the GS-525-05 position, including the requirement that the occupant

be eligible to occupy a sensitive position. Tamburello. supra.

Conclusion

The requirements of Egan should apply equally to appeals involving NCS positions and

those involving security clearances. The same essential authorities, rights, principles, and

expertise apply. Access eligibility requires determinations of individuals' potential risk to the

security of the DoD or the public based upon an assessment of their loyalty, trustworthiness,

reliability, and judgment. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Egan. absent specific authority to

the contrary, the judgment involving the nature of the information to be protected and the

eligibility of people to access that information must be committed to the broad discretion mission

14
of the agency responsible to protect it and those with the necessary expertise in protecting it. No

such authority or responsibility has been vested in the Board.

Board review of the suspension of an employee because she can no longer have access to

sensitive information should be limited to the determination of: (1) whether the position required

access to sensitive information; (2) whether the employee lost or was denied eligibility to access

sensitive information; and (3) whether the employee was given minimal due process rights with

respect to the suspension.

For the above reasons, the Agency requests that the Board dismiss this appeal.

Respectfully submitted,

ienior Associate Counsel and Agency

Representative

DF AS Office of General Counsel

P.O. Box 182317

Columbus, OH 43218-2317

614-693-8134

Fax 693-8031

Cynthia.Cummings@dfas.mil

15
^ CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that the attached Agency Response to Office of Personnel Management's

Advisory Opinion and Briefs Amicus was sent on this 13* day of May, 2010 by United States

Postal Service as indicated below to each of the following:

Merit Systems Protection Board

Merit Systems Protection Board USPS

Attn: Office of the Clerk

1615 M Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20419

Appellants

Devon Haughton Northover USPS

1824 Gillespie Drive

Montgomery, AL 36106

Rhonda K. Conyers USPS

2855 Fairwood Avenue

Columbus, OH 43207

Appellants' Representatives

Andres M. Grajales USPS

AFGE, Office of the General Counsel

80 F Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20001

Rosa V. Timmons USPS

3302 Ridgefield Drive

Montgomery, AL 36106

Stuart A. Kirsch USPS

AFGE

6724 Church Street, Suite 2

Riverdale, GA 30274

William T.Bolon

Associate Counsel

Defense Finance and Accounting Service

Office of General Counsel

3990 East Broad Street, Bldg 21

Columbus, OH 43213-1152

Tel. (614)693-6841
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