In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 18-2045 

DETLEF SOMMERFIELD, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

LAWRENCE KNASIAK, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 08 C 3025 — Joan B. Gottschall, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED FEBRUARY 19, 2020 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2020 

____________________ 

Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and WOOD, Circuit Judges. 

WOOD, Circuit Judge. After experiencing virulent anti-Semitic abuse at the hands of Sergeant Lawrence Knasiak, Officer Detlef Sommerfield of the Chicago Police Department 

(CPD) filed a lawsuit against Knasiak and the City of Chicago 

in which he alleged discrimination, harassment, and retaliation based on his German national origin and his Jewish ethnicity. After the City was dismissed from the case, a jury returned a verdict for Sommerfield and awarded him $540,000 
2 No. 18-2045 

in punitive damages; he also received a modest award representing pre-judgment interest for backpay and pension benefits he already had received. Knasiak has appealed, contending that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or at 

least a new trial, and that the court should have reduced the 

punitive-damage award. We recognize that this was a closely 

contested case, but in the end we find no error in the district 

court’s decisions, and so we affirm. 

I

We recount the facts in the light most favorable to the 

jury’s verdict. Sommerfield was born and raised in Germany, 

where some of his family members had died in concentration 

camps during the Holocaust. At some point he emigrated to 

the United States, settled in Chicago, and joined the CPD. His 

supervisor there was Sgt. Knasiak. For years, Sommerfield endured vicious anti-Semitic abuse from Knasiak. We prefer not 

to debase this opinion by repeating what Knasiak said: suffice 

it to say that the vitriol invoked Hitler, the actions the Nazis 

took in the death camps, and regret that Jews today live in the 

United States. Although Sommerfield repeatedly pleaded 

with Knasiak to stop the harassment, Knasiak never let up. 

On March 13, 2004, Sommerfield’s girlfriend was taken to 

the emergency room after suffering a severe allergic reaction 

to a medication. Sommerfield received permission from the 

police captain to go visit her in the hospital during his shift. 

When he returned, Knasiak said, “if you want to take care of 

your f**king Mexican girlfriend, you take time off like everybody else.” This was the last straw for Sommerfield; he responded by filing a formal complaint, known as a CR, or 

“complaint register,” to the internal affairs division about 

Knasiak’s offensive comment about his girlfriend and the 
No. 18-2045 3

relentless harassment. Filing the CR against Knasiak was a 

drastic step: one CPD sergeant testified at trial that he had 

never heard of another officer filing a CR against a superior. 

On March 15, 2004, two days after filing his complaint, 

Sommerfield was riding in the passenger seat of a patrol car 

driven by another officer. Attempting to refuel the car at a gas 

station, the driver discovered that his gas card did not work. 

He suggested that, because Sommerfield lived in the area, 

they could go to Sommerfield’s house to retrieve his gas card. 

Sommerfield agreed, they drove to his house, and Sommerfield ran inside for a moment and retrieved the card. 

Sergeant Kelly, another police officer, was on Sommerfield’s street at the time Sommerfield went into his house. 

Kelly immediately called Knasiak, who ordered Sommerfield 

and the driver to meet him back at the station in the commander’s office. They complied. At the station, Knasiak had 

summoned four other superior officers to witness his discipline of Sommerfield. At trial, CPD officers testified that they 

had never heard of this happening before. Knasiak first interrogated the driver, and then dismissed him and turned to 

Sommerfield. Knasiak accused Sommerfield of violating rules 

by failing to contact the dispatcher while he was retrieving the 

gas card. Knasiak then filed a CR against Sommerfield alleging that he had been insubordinate by leaving the car without 

contacting the dispatcher and recommending that Sommerfield be suspended. This was the only time Knasiak had ever 

issued a CR, much less one with the serious charge of insubordination. 

An apparently independent group of Department officials 

briefly investigated Knasiak’s complaint and suspended Sommerfield for five days. This measure was unprecedented; in 
4 No. 18-2045 

fact, the record showed, it was common practice in the Department not to bother the dispatchers for such a short errand. 

Sommerfield was the only person Knasiak ever disciplined for 

the relatively minor infraction of “failure to report location to 

dispatch.” The driver who suggested the brief stop received 

only a reprimand. There were other apparent lapses in the investigation, too. The investigating sergeant failed to interview 

a secretary whom Knasiak told to leave the office the night he 

disciplined Sommerfield, nor did the investigator interview 

two patrol officers who were sitting outside Knasiak’s office 

at the time of the reprimand. Further, the report omitted evidence that Knasiak had shouted profanities at Sommerfield as 

he disciplined him, relying instead exclusively on the statements of the officers Knasiak had brought into the office, who 

insisted that it was Sommerfield, and not Knasiak, who had 

lost his temper. 

Later Sommerfield was passed over for a promotion to the 

position of canine handler, even though he was rated “wellqualified.” According to Department rules, in order to be eligible for that position, an officer could not have three or more 

complaints against him that resulted in suspension. The 

CPD’s canine coordinator testified that Sommerfield did not 

get the promotion because he had had exactly three suspensions in the preceding five years, including the one that resulted from Knasiak’s recommendation. 

In 2006, Sommerfield filed a lawsuit against the City of 

Chicago and Knasiak (Sommerfield I). Because the statute of 

limitations had run on the only claim he raised against 

Knasiak, the court dismissed Knasiak from that case, which 

proceeded against only the City. Sommerfield won a jury verdict of $30,000. Still wishing to sue Knasiak, however, 
No. 18-2045 5

Sommerfield brought the present action (Sommerfield II) 

against Knasiak and the City on May 23, 2008. In it, he complained that Knasiak had harassed him and discriminated 

against him on the basis of race, religion, and national origin, 

and had retaliated against him based on protected activities, 

and that the City was responsible for all this. The district court 

dismissed the claims against the City with prejudice on February 26, 2009, on the ground that they duplicated those in 

Sommerfield I, but it permitted the claims against Knasiak to 

proceed. A somewhat pared down version of that part of the 

case went to a jury trial. On July 24, 2014, the jury returned a 

verdict in Sommerfield’s favor for $540,000 in punitive damages and $0 in compensatory damages. 

At that point, before the district court entered final judgment on the verdict, three years of post-trial litigation ensued. 

It was concerned primarily with Sommerfield’s efforts to add 

a belated indemnity claim against the City and to obtain prejudgment interest, and the efforts of the court to calculate (by 

the parties’ agreement) Sommerfield’s economic damages 

The district court entered its final judgment in Sommerfield II 

on May 12, 2017. It awarded Sommerfield a total of 

$548,703.96, which represented $540,000 in damages awarded 

by the jury and $8,703.96 in pre-judgment interest. The district 

court also concluded that Sommerfield was entitled to another $54,315.24 in economic damages, but it offset that award 

by a voluntary payment in the same amount that the City had 

made to Sommerfield while the case was pending. On June 9, 

2017, Knasiak filed a timely motion for judgment as a matter 

of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), a 

Rule 59(a) motion for a new trial, and a Rule 59(e) motion to 

alter or amend the judgment. The district court denied all 

three motions, and Knasiak now appeals. 
6 No. 18-2045 

II 

Relying on Rule 50(b), Knasiak first urges that it was 

wrong even to ask the jury to decide whether he was responsible for either of the adverse actions at issue. Knasiak focuses 

in both instances on Sommerfield’s evidence of causation: if 

no reasonable juror could connect Knasiak to those adverse 

actions, then his motion for judgment as a matter of law 

should have been granted. The question is thus whether there 

was enough evidence in the record to permit the jury to conclude that, for the suspension, the nominal actors (the investigating officers) were simply following Knasiak’s recommendations, and thus that no intervening actor insulated Knasiak 

from responsibility. See Schandelmeier-Bartels v. Chicago Park 

Dist., 634 F.3d 372, 379 (7th Cir. 2011) (plaintiff must prove the 

“existence of a link between an employment decision made 

by an unbiased individual and the impermissible bias of a 

non-decisionmaking co-worker.”) The second adverse action 

flows directly from the first: had Sommerfield not received the 

CR for the gas-card stop, he would have been eligible for the 

canine position and would have received it. 

Knasiak urges that he was not the person who imposed 

Sommerfield’s suspension or denied him the promotion. This 

alone, he contends, was enough to preclude the jury from concluding that he was responsible for the adverse actions, because he did not “participate[] directly in the constitutional 

violation.” Hildebrandt v. Illinois Dep’t of Nat. Res., 347 F.3d 

1014, 1039 (7th Cir. 2003). But the question is not that simple. 

As the district court pointed out in its opinion denying 

Knasiak’s post-judgment motions, individual liability is possible if the subordinate employee, motivated by unlawful discriminatory intent, caused the nominal actors to take the 
No. 18-2045 7

adverse action. That can happen, for example, if the evidence 

shows that the nominal decisionmakers played no real role in 

the action, but instead simply rubber-stamped the action of 

the subordinate. 

There was ample evidence in the record from which the 

jury could have concluded (and did conclude) that Knasiak 

filed the CR after the gas-card incident out of discriminatory 

animus, and that it was this action that triggered the two adverse actions at issue. In filing that CR, he intended to bring 

about the predictable results—namely, Sommerfield’s suspension and ineligibility for the canine handler position. Staub 

v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 417 (2011) (“Intentional torts 

such as this, as distinguished from negligent or reckless torts, 

generally require that the actor intend the consequences of an 

act, not simply the act itself.”) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted). 

There was also evidence to support the jury’s conclusion 

that Knasiak, not the committee that investigated the CR, was 

the real decisionmaker. Knasiak himself testified that his recommendations for suspensions were almost always taken. 

And Sommerfield presented evidence that this practice was 

followed in his case, given that Knasiak spoke with the police 

sergeants investigating his CR. The jury was entitled to conclude that Knasiak intended to get Sommerfield suspended 

because of his Jewish heritage and that he knew his suspension recommendation would be accepted because of the consistent practice in the Department and his close relationships 

with the investigators. 

Sommerfield also presented enough evidence to permit 

the jury to conclude that Knasiak knew about his ambition to 

become a canine handler. Another superior officer testified 
8 No. 18-2045 

that he knew that Sommerfield was on the “well-qualified 

list” for a promotion to canine handler. The officer additionally testified that it was well-known around the precinct that 

Sommerfield had been angling for the position. Finally, the 

officer confirmed that it was well-known that multiple suspensions would disqualify an applicant from the canine handler job. Although there is no direct evidence that Knasiak 

knew that Sommerfield wanted the job, there was enough circumstantial evidence for a jury to find that Knasiak had the 

requisite knowledge and intent. 

We are not saying that this evidence was overwhelming, 

but that is not the standard. We do not lightly set aside jury 

verdicts, and we are satisfied that this is not one of the rare 

cases in which that must be done. We also find much of the 

discussion in the briefs in this court about the so-called cat’spaw idea to be beside the point. Courts need to resist the 

temptation to turn colorful metaphors into “doctrines” or 

“theories.” Just as we said in Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, 834 

F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016), “[the] legal standard ... is simply 

whether the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to 

conclude that the plaintiff’s race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or 

other proscribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse 

employment action.” Id. at 765. Though Ortiz arose under section 1981, we clarify here that the same standard applies to 

cases brought under section 1983. See Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 

888, 899 (7th Cir. 2012) (“In general, the same standards govern intentional discrimination claims under Title VII, § 1981, 

and § 1983.”), overruled on other grounds by Ortiz, supra. The 

evidence before this jury permitted it to conclude that Knasiak 

engineered Sommerfield’s wrongful suspension and his loss 

of the promotion. The district court thus correctly denied 

Knasiak’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. 
No. 18-2045 9

Knasiak argued in the alternative for a new trial, citing 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a). Relying largely on its 

discussion of the evidence in connection with the Rule 50(b) 

motion, the district found that no new trial was warranted. 

We review this type of ruling only for abuse of discretion. See 

Browning-Ferris Ind. of Vermont, Inc., v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 

U.S. 257, 279 (1989). We see no problem of that magnitude 

here. 

III 

Even if he is not entitled to set aside the verdict as a matter 

of law or to obtain a full new trial, Knasiak insists that the 

punitive-damages component of the jury’s verdict is excessive, disproportionate, and violates due process principles, 

and for those reasons must be set aside or reduced pursuant 

to Rule 59(e). This is essentially a request for a remittitur. We 

generally review a district court’s decision to grant or deny 

remittitur for abuse of discretion. Pickett v. Sheridan Health 

Care Ctr., 610 F.3d 434, 446 (7th Cir. 2010). A constitutional 

challenge to a denial of a motion for remittitur, however, is 

reviewed de novo. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., 

Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 435 (2001). 

We analyze the constitutionality of an award of punitive 

damages according to the three-part test set out by the Supreme Court in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 

559 (1996). There, the Supreme Court held that an award of 

punitive damages will violate the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment only if it is “grossly excessive” in relation to a state’s legitimate interest “in punishing unlawful 

conduct and deterring its repetition.” Id. at 568. In applying 

that standard, the district court should consider: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the 
10 No. 18-2045 

disparity between the harm (or potential harm) suffered by 

the plaintiff and the punitive-damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury 

and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable 

cases. Id. at 574−75. 

Following these instructions, the district court found first 

that Knasiak’s behavior was “extremely reprehensible,” because he had “abused a position of power, one of public 

trust,” and because his harassment “persisted for years and 

escalated in tone and frequency.” As for the second point, the 

court found that the ratio between the punitive-damages 

award and the compensatory-damages award stood at 5.8, 

which it determined was not irrational. Finally, the court 

found that the punitive-damages award was not excessive 

compared to other cases. 

Knasiak argues that the district court erred in all three of 

these determinations. First, he argues that the Supreme Court 

in Gore set out a “hierarchy of reprehensibility,” according to 

which acts and threats of violence stand at the top. See Gore, 

517 U.S. at 575−76 (“This principle reflects the accepted view 

that some wrongs are more blameworthy than others. Thus, 

we have said that nonviolent crimes are less serious than 

crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Mere verbal harassment, according to Knasiak, cannot support such a large punitivedamages award, as it falls lower in the hierarchy. Second, he 

argues that the punitive damages were not reasonably related 

to the compensatory damages. Finally, he cites a statute that 

he says shows that the punitive damages levied against him 

are disproportionately large. 
No. 18-2045 11

We do not find Knasiak’s arguments persuasive. We do 

not read Gore as establishing such a rigid hierarchy of reprehensibility. The Court observed only that the “degree of reprehensibility” is “the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award.” Id. at 575. It noted 

that certain types of conduct could support larger punitivedamages awards than others. Id. Indeed, the Court later clarified that Gore merely set out a series of “factors” to be considered when evaluating whether conduct was sufficiently reprehensible to warrant a punitive-damages award. State Farm 

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003). 

Although Knasiak’s harassment never turned physically 

violent, his conduct was nevertheless “extremely reprehensible.” See Farfaras v. Citizens Bank & Trust of Chi., 433 F.3d 558, 

561 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that continuous sexual harassment by three superiors constituted extremely reprehensible 

conduct); Neuros Co., Ltd. v. KTurbo, Inc., 698 F.3d 514, 516−17 

(7th Cir. 2012) (holding that a company’s dissemination of 

false information about a competitor’s products could support a five-to-one punitive-damages award). Knasiak verbally 

abused Sommerfield with vicious anti-Semitic slurs for a period lasting years. He degraded him for his Jewish heritage in 

front of his co-workers and insulted his girlfriend for her race. 

The absence of physical abuse does not render Knasiak’s behavior any less reprehensible. 

No legal principle requires the conclusion that this punitive-damages award was excessive relative to the harm that 

Knasiak inflicted. Under Gore, a court analyzes the ratio of punitive damages to “the actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff.” 

Gore, 517 U.S. at 580. The district court determined that the 

actual economic harm inflicted on Sommerfield as a result of 
12 No. 18-2045 

his suspension and his loss of the canine handler position was 

$54,315.24. The court additionally concluded that the $30,000 

that the jury awarded Sommerfield in Sommerfield I belonged 

in the calculation of actual harm. Thus, according to the district court, the final ratio between the punitive damages and 

actual harm stood at $540,000 to $93,019.20, roughly 5.8 to 1. 

The court concluded that this was well within constitutional 

bounds. 

Knasiak contends nonetheless that the punitive damages 

here bear no “reasonable relationship” to the compensatory 

damages. He argues that he could not be held liable for the 

$54,315.24 that the City of Chicago paid Sommerfield in backpay and other compensation. He draws from that fact the conclusion that he could not be held liable for Sommerfield’s suspension or his failure to get the canine handler position. Additionally, Knasiak argues, because the jury awarded Sommerfield only punitive damages and no compensatory damages, it must have been motived by animus toward Knasiak. 

Punitive-damages awards, however, are not conditioned 

upon the presence of compensatory damages. Timm v. Progressive Steel Treating, Inc., 137 F.3d 1008, 1010 (7th Cir. 1998). 

The jury’s award of punitive damages without compensatory 

damages is thus not suspect, at least not on that basis. We already have held that there was enough evidence to hold 

Knasiak liable for Sommerfield’s loss of pay resulting from his 

failure to obtain the canine handler position. Even without 

considering the $30,000 award that Knasiak received from the 

City of Chicago, the ratio would be $540,000 to $54,315.24, or 

9.94 to 1. Mathematical ratios are not “the be-all and end-all 

in punitive-damages analysis.” Shea v. Galaxie Lumber & Constr. Co., 152 F.3d 729, 736 (7th Cir. 1998). We have upheld 
No. 18-2045 13

substantially larger ratios between actual damages and punitive damages in similar cases. See, e.g., Mathias v. Accor Econ. 

Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding a ratio of 

37.2 to 1 where a hotel had been found grossly negligent in 

failing to rid itself of bedbugs); Fine v. Ryan Int’l Airlines, 305 

F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2002) (upholding a ratio of 50 to 1 in a case 

of sex discrimination). The single-digit ratio here, in light of 

the severity of the harassment, was consistent with awards in 

other cases and did not violate due process. 

With respect to the third Gore factor, Knasiak argues that 

the amount of punitive damages imposed upon him exceeds 

the amount authorized elsewhere for comparable misconduct. Knasiak points to Title VII’s statutory damages cap, 

which limits damages in employment discrimination cases to 

a maximum of $300,000. 42 U.S.C. §1981a(b)(3). He argues 

that, by analogy, punitive damages should be so limited here. 

We do not accept the first step of his argument: that Title 

VII’s damages cap is relevant in this situation. That cap represents a policy judgment on Congress’s part to limit the 

amount of damages that a defendant must pay in a Title VII 

case. Title VII applies to entities, rather than individuals, and 

the cap reflects the difference in the incentives an entity may 

have to take corrective action after an incident of employment 

discrimination. A jury may still award more than $300,000 under Title VII’s system, but the court must reduce the amount 

to $300,000. If Congress had wished to cap the damages available under section 1981, then it would have done so. But it did 

not, and we see no warrant for what would amount to a judicial amendment to the statute. 

Finally, Knasiak argues that we should consider his financial circumstances in assessing the legitimacy of the punitive 
14 No. 18-2045 

damages. Knasiak is now retired. He has indicated that he 

works only sporadically and that he has a mortgage on his 

house, medical bills unpaid by insurance, and a negative net 

worth. The jury apparently chose $540,000 because it amounts 

to ten years of his pension. Knasiak argues that a damages 

award of $540,000 would mean financial ruin for him, and 

that the district court should have taken that into consideration. But a comparison between the level of punitive damages 

and the defendant’s financial resources is not mentioned in 

Gore. See also id. at 591 (Breyer, J., concurring) (the financial 

position of the defendant “is not necessarily intended to act 

as a significant constraint on punitive awards. Rather, it provides an open-ended basis for inflating awards when the defendant is wealthy.”). We have held that “sanctions should be 

based on the wrong done rather than on the status of the defendant; a person is punished for what he does, not for who 

he is.” Mathias, 347 F.3d at 676. We note as well that if Knasiak 

is or becomes insolvent, his remedy is bankruptcy, which ensures that all creditors receive their contractual and statutory 

due, rather than leaving one unpaid. Thus, the district court 

was within its discretion in declining to grant remittitur. 

IV 

We AFFIRM the decision of the district court.