IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0981

Filed June 5, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

LONNIE JAMES PRYOR,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County, Kevin Parker, 

Judge.

A criminal defendant challenges a suppression ruling, his conviction, and 

the resulting sentence. AFFIRMED.

John C. Heinicke of Kragnes & Associates, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Badding and Buller, JJ.
2

BULLER, Judge.

Lonnie James Pryor appeals his conviction and sentence for driving while 

barred. After considering his suppression, sufficiency, and sentencing challenges, 

we affirm.

A bit before midnight, a Warren County deputy sheriff was responding to an 

unrelated call for service when he spotted a car without license plates or running 

lights being towed by a truck with a strap. About twenty seconds later, the deputy

turned around and pulled up behind the truck, which was now parked and partially 

blocking a roadway. 

When the deputy approached, he confirmed the car did not have running 

lights, rear lamps, or license plates. Pryor was standing next to the towed car and 

a woman was seated inside. Pryor told the officer he was trying to help the woman 

get the car to a residence. 

As the deputy spoke with Pryor and the woman, they informed him none of 

the lights were working on the towed car because the battery died. The deputy 

ran Pryor and the woman’s licenses, and the results indicated he was barred and 

she was suspended. A certified abstract of driving record confirmed Pryor had 

been barred from driving since 2018 and showed six prior convictions for driving 

while barred, plus five for driving while suspended or without a license, starting 

in 2003. 

Pryor told the deputy he knew he was barred and knew he shouldn’t be

driving. He also responded in the affirmative when the deputy asked him, “So you

were towing [the woman’s] car from Indianola?” The woman in the car also said 

she understood Pryor shouldn’t be driving but was anyway. Pryor never denied 
3

that he had been driving the truck. And he gave the deputy directions for where to 

find documents inside the truck and permission to retrieve them. Before 

transporting Pryor to the county jail, the responding deputy allowed Pryor to call 

and arrange bond and then he and another deputy helped push the woman’s car 

to a safer location. 

At a combined bench trial and suppression hearing, Pryor testified in his 

own defense. He admitted he was barred from driving but denied doing so that 

night, claiming he was in the car and the woman was driving the truck. Pryor 

conceded he intended to drive the truck that night but claimed he “never got behind 

the wheel.” And he admitted on cross-examination that, despite telling the deputy 

it had been “a long time since [he had] been in trouble,” he was actually arrested 

for driving while barred less than two weeks before this traffic stop. 

The district court denied the motion to suppress, finding the lack of 

illuminated rear lamps on the towed car supported reasonable suspicion for a 

traffic stop under Iowa Code section 321.387 (2022). And the court found Pryor

guilty of driving while barred, an aggravated misdemeanor in violation of 

section 321.561. 

At sentencing, the State recommended prison and Pryor requested thirty

days in jail. The district court sentenced Pryor to prison, citing the need to 

rehabilitate Pryor and protect the public. Pryor appeals, challenging denial of the 

motion to suppress, sufficiency of the evidence, and the court’s exercise of 

discretion at sentencing.

Motion to Suppress. Pryor argues that, at some point after the deputy 

approached the vehicle and before he was arrested, he was “seized” in violation 
4

of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or article I, section 8 of 

the Iowa Constitution. We review this challenge de novo. State v. Fogg, 936 

N.W.2d 664, 667 (Iowa 2019). And we agree with the district court that the deputy 

had reasonable suspicion (and probable cause) to detain Pryor for investigation

when the deputy observed the rear lamps of the towed car were not lit. See Iowa 

Code § 321.387 (“Every motor vehicle and every vehicle which is being drawn at 

the end of a train of vehicles shall be equipped with a lighted rear lamp or 

lamps . . .”); State v. Mitchell, 498 N.W.2d 691, 693 (Iowa 1993) (“When a peace 

officer observes a traffic offense, however minor, the officer has probable cause to 

stop the driver of the vehicle.”). We affirm denial of the motion to suppress.

Sufficiency. Pryor next claims the bench verdict was not supported by 

sufficient evidence. We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims for correction of 

errors at law. State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 2021). “In determining 

whether the [fact finder’s] verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including all ‘legitimate inferences 

and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the record 

evidence.’” Id. (quoting State v. Tipton, 897 N.W.2d 653, 692 (Iowa 2017)). The 

deputy’s testimony, the body-camera footage, Pryor’s statements at the scene,

and the certified abstract of driving record provide sufficient evidence to prove 

Pryor’s driving privileges were barred and he drove—satisfying the elements of the 

offense. See Iowa Code § 321.560. And to the extent Pryor urges he could not 

be convicted of driving while barred unless caught in the act, our case law on 

circumstantial evidence forecloses his argument. See State v. Boleyn, 547 
5

N.W2d 202, 205–06 (Iowa 1996) (rejecting a similar challenge in the context of an 

operating-while-intoxicated prosecution).

Sentencing. Pryor challenges his sentence, urging the district court 

abused its discretion. “[T]he decision of the district court to impose a particular 

sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor, 

and will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of 

inappropriate matters.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). 

“[O]ur task on appeal is not to second guess the decision made by the district court, 

but to determine if it was unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.” Id. at 725. 

Pryor asserts general disagreement with the sentence imposed but does not point 

to any illegality or improper considerations. We conclude the district court did not 

abuse its discretion when sentencing this repeat offender to prison.

AFFIRMED.