J-S25019-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v.

RUSSELL EARL LATTIMER 

 Appellant No. 1473 MDA 2013 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered April 2, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County 

Criminal Division at No: CP-08-CR-0000546-2012 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v.

RUSSELL EARL LATTIMER 

 Appellant No. 1474 MDA 2013 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered April 2, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County 

Criminal Division at No: CP-08-CR-0000549-2012 

BEFORE: OTT, STABILE, and MUSMANNO, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED AUGUST 01, 2014 

Appellant, Russell Earl Lattimer, appeals from the April 2, 2013 

judgment of sentence. We affirm. 

At docket number CP-08-CR-0000546-2012, a jury found Appellant 

guilty of rape, aggravated indecent assault, intimidation of witnesses, 
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statutory sexual assault, and indecent assault.1 At docket number CP-08-

CR-0000549-2012, a jury convicted Appellant of rape, aggravated indecent 

assault, three counts of indecent assault, and sexual assault.2

 

The Commonwealth charged Appellant with committing the 

aforementioned sexual offenses against five female victims, including his 

biological daughter and four daughters of his paramour. The rape and 

aggravated indecent assault convictions resulted from Appellant’s 

victimization of S.T. and T.O., two daughters of Appellant’s paramour. 

S.T., 26 years old at the time of trial, testified that she was twelve 

years old the first time Appellant had sex with her. N.T. Trial, 11/15/12 at 

25, 37-40. She began living in Appellant’s home at age 11 and moved out 

when she was 20 or 21. Id. at 27, 30. In describing her first sexual 

encounter with Appellant, S.T. said she went into Appellant’s bedroom to ask 

him a question. Id. at 34. S.T. was home sick from school at the time, and

her mother was at work. Id. at 36. As she was leaving the bedroom, 

Appellant asked S.T. to sit on the bed and talk to him, so she did. Id. at 34-

35. Appellant started touching her vagina and chest. Id. at 35. When S.T. 

asked Appellant why he was touching her, he told her she would like it. Id.

at 35. Appellant proceeded to take S.T.’s clothes off and “have sex” with 

____________________________________________ 

1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(2), 3125, 4952, 3122.1, and 3126, respectively. 

2

 Sexual assault is codified at 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3124.1. 
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her. Id. at 36. He stopped “when he was done.” Id. S.T. told Appellant to 

stop and that he was hurting her. Id. at 37. 

Appellant continued having sex with S.T. two or three times per week 

until after her high school graduation. Id. at 45. S.T. testified that 

Appellant used condoms at first, but stopped using because S.T. had an 

allergic reaction to them. Id. at 42. Appellant would occasionally ejaculate 

outside of her after that. Id. If S.T. refused to submit to the sexual 

encounter, Appellant would treat her “like crap,” refusing to communicate 

with her or do anything for her. Id. at 40. When she submitted, Appellant 

would buy her things such as clothes, a cell phone, and a computer for her 

room. Id. at 40-41. Appellant would allow S.T. to visit her boyfriend only if 

she submitted to sex with Appellant. Id. at 44. After S.T.’s high school 

graduation, Appellant made payments on S.T.’s car for her as long as she 

kept having sex with him. Id. at 45-46. She was 19 years of age at that 

time. Id. at 57. 

T.O. was 24 years old at the time of trial. Id. at 101. She lived in 

Appellant’s home from age 11 to 19. Id. at 102, 105. Appellant acted as a 

father and was in charge of the household. Id. at 106. When she was 12 

years old, Appellant began touching her breasts and vagina. Id. at 107-08. 

T.O. did not report Appellant’s behavior “[b]ecause he told me that if I told 

anyone, that our whole family would be broken apart, we would be put in 

foster care, and that my mom could go to jail. He also told me that my 
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mom wouldn’t believe me.” Id. at 109. She testified that Appellant had 

sexual intercourse with her for the first time on her 13

th birthday. Id. at 

110. After that, Appellant continued to have sexual intercourse with T.O. 

several times per week until T.O. was 19. Id. at 111-12, 117. On each 

occasion, he withdrew and ejaculated outside of her in order to avoid 

pregnancy. Id. at 113. T.O. allowed the conduct to continue because she 

was afraid her family would break up if she told anyone. Id. at 119. 

A jury found Appellant guilty of the aforementioned offenses at the 

conclusion of the November 15, 2012 trial. Prior to sentencing, the Sexual 

Offenders Assessment Board concluded Appellant was a sexually violent 

predator. The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 35 years and 7 

months to 81 years of incarceration on April 2, 2013. Appellant filed a 

timely post-sentence motion on April 10, 2013, in which he challenged the 

weight of the evidence and the discretionary aspects of his sentence. The 

trial court denied that motion on July 29, 2013 and this timely appeal 

followed. 

Appellant raises four assertions of error: 

I. Whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence 

of penetration to sustain verdicts of guilty on rape and 

aggravated indecent assault? 

II. Whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence 

of threat of forcible compulsion to sustain verdicts of guilty 

of rape? 

III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the 

motion in arrest of judgment? 
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IV. Whether the sentence is unduly harsh and excessive? 

Appellant’s Brief at 11. 

Appellant’s first two arguments challenge the sufficiency of the 

evidence. We will address the first these arguments together, pursuant to 

the well-settled standard of review: 

The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of 

the evidence is to determine whether, when viewed in a light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, the evidence at trial and all 

reasonable inferences therefrom is sufficient for the trier of fact 

to find that each element of the crimes charged is established 

beyond a reasonable doubt. The Commonwealth may sustain its 

burden of proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt by 

means of wholly circumstantial evidence. 

The facts and circumstances established by the 

Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. 

Any doubt raised as to the accused’s guilt is to be resolved by 

the fact-finder. As an appellate court, we do not assess 

credibility nor do we assign weight to any of the testimony of 

record. Therefore, we will not disturb the verdict unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. 

Commonwealth v. Vogelsong, 90 A.3d 717, 719 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted). As sufficiency of the evidence 

poses a question of law, or standard of review is de novo and our scope of 

review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Staton, 38 A.3d 785, 789 (Pa. 

2012). 

Appellant’s arguments arise under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(a)(2), which 

defines rape as follows: 

§ 3121. Rape. 
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(a) Offense defined. --A person commits a felony of the 

first degree when the person engages in sexual intercourse with 

a complainant: 

[...]

(2) By threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent 

resistance by a person of reasonable resolution.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(a)(2). Sexual intercourse includes, “[i]n addition to its 

ordinary meaning, [. . .] intercourse per os or per anus, with some 

penetration however slight; emission is not required. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101. 

Forcible compulsion includes: “Compulsion by use of physical, intellectual, 

moral, emotional or psychological force, either express or implied.” Id.3

 

____________________________________________ 

3

 The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines aggravated indecent assault as 

follows: 

(a) Offenses defined. --Except as provided in sections 

3121 (relating to rape), 3122.1 (relating to statutory sexual 

assault), 3123 (relating to involuntary deviate sexual 

intercourse) and 3124.1 (relating to sexual assault), a person 

who engages in penetration, however slight, of the genitals or 

anus of a complainant with a part of the person’s body for any 

purpose other than good faith medical, hygienic or law

enforcement procedures commits aggravated indecent assault if: 

(1) the person does so without the complainant’s consent;

(2) the person does so by forcible compulsion; 

(3) the person does so by threat of forcible compulsion 

that would prevent resistance by a person of reasonable

resolution; 

[...]

(7) the complainant is less than 13 years of age; 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
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Appellant first argues the Commonwealth failed to produce sufficient 

evidence of penetration to support the rape and aggravated assault 

convictions. As noted above, S.T. and T.O. both testified that Appellant 

repeatedly had sexual intercourse with them several times per week 

throughout their teenage years. Appellant argues that testimony indicating 

he and the victims “had sex” is ambiguous. Appellant’s Brief at 18. This 

argument strains credulity, in that S.T. and T.O. were in their mid-twenties 

at the time of trial and clearly understood their testimony. In addition, both 

victims testified that Appellant would withdraw and ejaculate outside of them 

to avoid pregnancy. The record contains overwhelming evidence that 

Appellant engaged in sexual intercourse, as that term is defined in § 3101, 

with both S.T. and T.O. 

Appellant also asserts his conviction for aggravated assault of a victim 

less than thirteen years of age with respect to T.O. cannot stand because 

T.O. testified that she first had intercourse with Appellant on her thirteenth 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ 

[...]

(b) Aggravated indecent assault of a child. --A person 

commits aggravated indecent assault of a child when the person 

violates subsection (a)(1), (2), (3), (4), (5) or (6) and the 

complainant is less than 13 years of age. 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125. 
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birthday.4 Appellant concedes that he failed to include this issue in his 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, which results in waiver. Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b)(4)(vii).5

 

Next, Appellant argues the record does not contain sufficient evidence 

that his intercourse with S.T. and T.O. took place under threat of forcible 

compulsion. In Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217 (Pa. 1986), the 

____________________________________________ 

4

 S.T. testified that she and Appellant began having sex prior to her 

thirteenth birthday. 

5

 Regardless of Appellant’s waiver of this issue, we explained above that 

prior to T.O.’s thirteenth birthday, Appellant used his fingers to touch her 

vagina. This Court has held similar conduct sufficient to establish 

penetration: 

[T]he definition of ‘sexual intercourse’ found at [18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3101] does not specify ‘penetration of the vagina,’ 

but instead specifies ‘some penetration however slight’ [...] 

entrance in the labia is sufficient[.] We therefore will not hold 

that a finding of penetration of the vagina is necessary for the 

jury to find ‘penetration however slight’ under Section 3101, [...] 

since penetration of the vagina, in essence the farther reaches of 

the female genitalia, is not necessary to find penetration under 

Section 3101[.]”

Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 457 A.2d 559, 560-61 (Pa. Super. 1983); see 

also, Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 550 A.2d 567, 569-70 (Pa. Super. 1988) 

(victim’s testimony that the defendant licked her vagina sufficient to 

establish penetration), overruled in part on other grounds, Commonwealth 

v. Goggins, 748 A.2d 721 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc), appeal denied, 759 

A.2d 120 (Pa. 2000). Appellant’s first argument lacks merit.

We further observe that aggravated indecent assault occurs when the 

perpetrator penetrates genitals or anus of the victim with a part of his or her 

body. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(a). Digital penetration is therefore sufficient. 

Commonwealth v. Bishop, 742 A.2d 178, 189-90 (Pa. Super. 1999), 

appeal denied, 758 A.2d 1194 (Pa. 2000). 
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20-year-old perpetrator raped his 8-year-old neighbor. Id. at 1218. They 

had been neighbors for three years. Id. The perpetrator sexually assaulted 

the victim after he led her to an upstairs room in an abandoned building and 

instructed her to lie down on the floor and pull her legs up. Id. The 

Supreme Court set forth the following guidelines for ascertaining the 

existence of forcible compulsion or threat thereof: 

The determination of whether there is sufficient evidence 

to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that an accused 

engaged in sexual intercourse by forcible compulsion (which we 

have defined to include not only physical force or violence, but 

also moral, psychological or intellectual force used to compel a 

person to engage in sexual intercourse against that person’s 

will,[]), or by the threat of such forcible compulsion that would 

prevent resistance by a person of reasonable resolution is, of 

course, a determination that will be made in each case based 

upon the totality of the circumstances that have been presented 

to the fact finder. Significant factors to be weighed in that 

determination would include the respective ages of the victim 

and the accused, the respective mental and physical conditions 

of the victim and the accused, the atmosphere and physical 

setting in which the incident was alleged to have taken place, 

the extent to which the accused may have been in a position of 

authority, domination or custodial control over the victim, and 

whether the victim was under duress. This list of possible 

factors is by no means exclusive. 

Id. at 1226. 

In ruling that the record contained sufficient evidence in support of a 

conviction for rape by threat of forcible compulsion, the Court wrote: 

There is an element of forcible compulsion, or the threat of 

forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person of 

reasonable resolution, inherent in the situation in which an adult 

who is with a child who is younger, smaller, less psychologically 

and emotionally mature, and less sophisticated than the adult, 

instructs the child to submit to the performance of sexual acts. 
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This is especially so where the child knows and trusts the adult. 

In such cases, forcible compulsion or the threat of forcible 

compulsion derives from the respective capacities of the child 

and the adult sufficient to induce the child to submit to the 

wishes of the adult (‘prevent resistance’), without the use of 

physical force or violence or the explicit threat of physical force 

or violence. 

Id. at 1227. Thus, the 20-year-old perpetrator who knew the 8-year-old 

victim for three years and lured her into an abandoned building committed 

rape by threat of forcible compulsion. Id. The Supreme Court therefore 

reversed this Court’s conclusion to the contrary: “the illicit commands of 

this twenty year old [man] in an isolated and abandoned room were . . . an 

imperative which gave the [eight year old] child victim no alternative but 

submission to appellant’s corrupt scheme. This eight year old child was 

physically and emotionally helpless to resist the commands of her twenty 

year old neighbor[.]” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 481 A.2d 

610, 614 (Pa. Super. 1984) (Cavanaugh, J. dissenting), rev’d, 510 A.2d 

1217 (Pa. 1986)). 

Appellant relies primarily on Commonwealth v. Titus, 556 A.2d 425 

(Pa. Super. 1989), in which this Court found insufficient evidence of threat of 

forcible compulsion where the defendant was convicted of raping his 13-

year-old daughter. Id. at 426. The defendant came home from a night of 

drinking, got in bed with his daughter, and had sex with her after she 

awoke. Id. The victim pushed the defendant away after the intercourse 

was over. Id. In reversing the rape conviction, this Court reasoned that a 
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parent-child relationship, in and of itself, is not sufficient to support a finding 

of forcible compulsion. Id. at 429. Since no fact of record, other than the 

father/daughter relationship, supported a finding of forcible compulsion, this 

Court vacated the judgment of sentence. Id. at 430. In distinguishing 

Rhodes, the trial court noted additional factors contributing to the finding of 

forcible compulsion in that case, such as directing the victim to a remote 

location where she could not get help. Id. at 429. 

Indeed, in many cases where a familial relationship exists between the 

perpetrator, the courts rely on additional factors to support a finding of 

forcible compulsion. See Commonwealth v. Ables, 590 A.2d 334, 338 

(Pa. Super. 1991) (finding sufficient evidence of forcible compulsion where 

the defendant repeatedly victimized his thirteen-year-old niece and told her 

if she told anyone she would get into trouble), appeal denied, 597 A.2d 1150 

(Pa. 1991); Commonwealth v. Ruppert, 579 A.2d 966, 969 (Pa. Super. 

1990) (finding sufficient evidence of forcible compulsion where the father, 

who repeatedly sexually victimized his nine-year-old daughter over the 

course of three months, showed her sexually explicit magazines to 

encourage her to imitate what she saw), appeal denied, 588 A.2d 914 (Pa. 

1991). 

Instantly, the parties do not dispute that Appellant served as a father 

figure to both S.T. and T.O. In addition to this relationship, the record 

contains evidence that Appellant would withhold favorable treatment from 
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S.T. if she did not submit to sexual intercourse. Likewise, Appellant told 

T.O. that her family would break up if she divulged Appellant’s behavior to 

anyone. Appellant continued this course of conduct from the victims’ preteen years until they reached the age of majority. In other words, Appellant 

used psychological and emotional force to gain submission from S.T. and 

T.O., who clearly were unwilling victims. As such, the record contains 

evidence, in addition to the familial relationship, indicating that Appellant 

engaged in behavior calculated to overcome the victims’ resistance. See 

Commonwealth v. Poindexter, 539 A.2d 1341, 1344-45 (Pa. Super. 

1988) (finding sufficient evidence of forcible compulsion where the sexual 

assaults commenced when the victims were young and the perpetrator used 

“subtle and psychological” force to gain submission, including threats that 

their family would break up if they told anyone), appeal denied, 549 A.2d 

134 (Pa. 1988). This case is easily distinguishable from Titus, which 

involved a single incident of sexual intercourse not precipitated by any 

physical or psychological force. Appellant’s second argument lacks merit. 

Appellant’s third argument challenges the weight of the evidence in 

support of his rape convictions. 

A verdict is not contrary to the weight of the evidence

because of a conflict in testimony or because the reviewing court 

on the same facts might have arrived at a different conclusion 

than the factfinder. Rather, a new trial is warranted only when 

the jury’s verdict is ‘so contrary to the evidence that it shocks 

one’s sense of justice and the award of a new trial is imperative 

so that right may be given another opportunity to prevail.’ 

Where, as here, the judge who presided at trial ruled on the 
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weight claim below, an appellate court’s role is not to consider 

the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the 

weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate review is limited to 

whether the trial court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on 

the weight claim. 

Commonwealth v. Tharp, 830 A.2d 519, 528 (Pa. 2003) (citations 

omitted), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1045 (2004). Appellant preserved this 

issue in a timely post-sentence motion in accordance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 

607(A)(3). We therefore proceed to assess the trial court’s discretion in 

denying Appellant’s motion for a new trial. 

Appellant argues the victims were not able to give dates, days of the 

week, or times of day that many of the sexual assaults occurred. Appellant’s 

Brief at 28. Appellant also argues his biological daughter T.L.’s trial 

testimony was inconsistent with a prior statement she made to a social 

worker. Id. Appellant also argues the jury failed to give sufficient weight to 

the victims’ failure to report the assaults in timely fashion and that some of 

them allowed the sexual relationship with Appellant to continue into 

adulthood. Id. 

None of these assertions warrants a new trial. Given that Appellant 

committed numerous sexual assaults over many years, it is not surprising 

the victims could not recite dates and times. Further, the jury was free to 

assess the victims’ credibility in light of the level of detail in their testimony. 

Similarly, the jury could assess the credibility of T.L.’s trial testimony in light 

of her prior inconsistent statement. Finally, the ongoing sexual conduct 
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between the victims and Appellant and the delay in the victims’ decision to 

report Appellant’s conduct was relevant to the victim’s credibility. A 

reviewing court will not disturb the jury’s credibility findings. 

Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 946 A.2d 645, 653 (Pa. 2006) (“Assessing 

the credibility of witnesses at trial is within the sole discretion of the factfinder.”), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1177 (2009). The trial court acted well 

within its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for a new trial. 

Appellant’s final assertion of error is that the trial court abused its 

discretion in imposing a sentence of 35 years and 7 months to 81 years of 

incarceration. Appellant was 58 years old at the time of sentencing, and he 

argues the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a virtual life 

sentence. 

Appellant preserved this issue in a timely post-sentence motion, and 

his brief includes a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement asserting that a substantial 

question exists. The 2119(f) statement notes that the trial court arrived at 

its sentence by imposing sentence at the top of the aggravated range for 

each offense and running the sentences consecutively. Appellant argues the 

aggravated range sentences were inappropriate because Appellant’s offenses 

were not atypical of the crimes for which Appellant was convicted. This 

argument raises a substantial question. Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 

A.2d 843, 848 (Pa. Super. 2006). We will therefore review the merits of 

Appellant’s sentencing challenges. 
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We review the trial court’s sentence for abuse of discretion. 

Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957 (Pa. 2007). The sentencing court 

must “impose a sentence that is ‘consistent with the protection of the public, 

the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim 

and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.’” Id.

at 962 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b)). Where, as here, the trial court’s 

sentence falls within the sentencing guidelines, the reviewing court may 

reverse only if the sentencing court applied the guidelines improperly or if 

the sentence is “clearly unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(1), (2). 

In conducting our review of the record, we must consider: 

(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the 

history and characteristics of the defendant. 

(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the 

defendant, including any presentence investigation. 

(3) The findings upon which the sentence was based. 

(4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(d). 

Appellant repeatedly sexually abused five young women, to whom he 

was a father and father figure over a period of years. The trial court noted 

the victims were young women Appellant should have been protecting rather 

than exploiting. Trial Court Opinion, 11/6/13, at 4-5. He was in the home 

when his paramour was working and took advantage of the victims when no 

one was there to protect them. Id. As such, the trial court concluded 

aggravated range sentences were appropriate. Id. at 5. Based on all of the 
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evidence of record, as summarized above, we conclude the trial court acted 

within its permissible discretion in imposing sentences at the top of the 

aggravated range. 

Appellant also argues the trial court abused its discretion in imposing 

the sentences consecutively. He cites Commonwealth v. Dodge, 957 A.2d 

1198 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“Dodge II”), appeal denied, 980 A.2d 605 (Pa. 

2009) for the proposition that a trial court can abuse its discretion in 

creating a de facto life sentence by imposing numerous consecutive 

sentences. In Dodge II, the trial court imposed 521⁄2 to 111 years of 

incarceration for numerous thefts of personal property of little monetary 

value. Id. at 1199, 1201. Given the absence of injured victims or violent 

crime, we concluded the trial court abused its discretion imposing a de facto 

life sentence. Id. at 1202. The rationale of Dodge II plainly has no 

application here, where Appellant repeatedly engaged in the sexual abuse of 

five young women who lived in his home with him. Appellant has failed to 

offer a meritorious argument that the trial court abused its discretion in 

imposing consecutive sentences. 

Finally, Appellant asserts the trial court improperly disregarded his 

rehabilitative needs. A defendant’s rehabilitative needs are relevant under 

the Sentencing Code, but they must be weighed alongside protection of the 

public, the gravity of the offense, and the impact on the victims. 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). Here, the trial court was well aware of the gravity of 
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Appellant’s offenses and their impact on the victims. Moreover, the trial 

court was aware the conduct continued for years until Appellant was 

arrested. After Appellant was arrested and jailed, he wrote a letter to S.T. 

asking her not to say anything if she could avoid it. N.T. Trial, 11/15/12, at 

47, 49-51.: 

Q. I’m gonna refer you to paragraph four of the letter –

or excuse me, page four. And there’s a paragraph that begins: 

If they ever ask. Do you see that paragraph? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Can you read that to us? 

A. If they ever ask if I did anything to you, too, and you 

really have to, tell them yes it was when you lived where [name 

deleted] lives and you wanted me. But don’t say anything 

if you don’t have to. And don’t say anything about this on the 

phone calls [sic] are monitored. 

Id. at 51 (emphasis added). Thus, when Appellant was facing criminal 

charges he asked S.T. to say nothing or maintain that she was a willing 

victim. 

In light of the foregoing, the trial court acted within its permissible 

discretion in weighing the § 9721(b) factors and discounting the prospect of 

Appellant’s prospects of rehabilitation. Appellant’s challenge to the trial 

court’s exercise of its sentencing discretion does not merit relief. 

Since we have reviewed each of Appellant’s arguments and found none 

of them meritorious, we affirm the judgment of sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/1/2014