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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

TAMARA CATHERINE SANTARELLI,

Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 571 MDA 2018

Appeal from the PCRA Order March 23, 2018

in the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-58-CR-0000583-2009, 

CP-58-CR-0000584-2009

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

TAMARA CATHERINE SANTARELLI,

Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1564 MDA 2018

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 21, 2018

in the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-58-CR-0000583-2009
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COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

TAMARA CATHERINE SANTARELLI,

Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1565 MDA 2018

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 21, 2018

in the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-58-CR-0000584-2009

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., NICHOLS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 15, 2019

In these consolidated cases, Tamara Catherine Santarelli (“Santarelli”), 

pro se, appeals from the Order dismissing her second Petition for relief filed 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1, 2 We affirm.

The PCRA court summarized the procedural history underlying this 

appeal as follows:

On January 7, 2011, [] [Santarelli] [] entered into nolo 

contendere pleas to one count of arson (docket number 2009-583 

CR [(hereinafter, “no. 583”)],) and one count of recklessly 

endangering another person (docket number 2009-584 CR 

[(hereinafter, “no. 584”)]). [I]n February 2011, [Santarelli] was 

sentenced to 7 years’ probation for [no. 583,] and two years’ 

probation for [no. 584], to run concurrently. On March 4, 2011, 

[Santarelli] filed a post-sentence [M]otion[,] which was denied. 

[Santarelli] did not file a direct appeal.

____________________________________________

1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 

2 Santarelli also appeals from a separate PCRA court Order, entered on March 

23, 2018, which we discuss below.
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[Santarelli] violated her probation[,] and on July 18, 2012, 

a bench warrant was issued. Following an October 30, 2013 

Gagnon II[3] probation violation hearing, probation was revoked 

and [Santarelli] was resentenced to a term of nine months to 

seven years’ incarceration[,] to run consecutive to a federal 

sentence for [no. 583,] and resentenced for [no. 584] to a term 

of three months to two years’ incarceration, to run consecutive to 

her federal sentence[,] but concurrent with the sentence imposed 

at [no.] 583.

On November 4, 2014, [Santarelli] filed a pro se [P]etition 

for relief pursuant to the [PCRA]. On February 27, 2015, the 

[PCRA] court dismissed [Santarelli’s] PCRA [P]etition after 

concluding that [it] was untimely. [Santarelli] appealed[,] and in 

an unreported [Memorandum], the Superior Court affirmed the 

[O]rder dismissing the [P]etition. See Comm. v. Santarelli, 

[145 A.2d 782 (Pa. Super. 2016) (unpublished memorandum)]. 

...

On February 1, 2018, [Santarelli] filed the current [P]etition 

pursuant to the PCRA[,] asserting that: (1) attorney Kevin 

Fitzgerald [(“Attorney Fitzgerald”)] was appointed to represent 

[Santarelli] in the probation violation hearing on October 30, 

2013[,] despite [Santarelli’s] having terminated that attorney’s 

prior representation of her; (2) [Attorney] Fitzgerald had been 

disbarred on October 10, 2013, and was disbarred at the time of 

the probation violation hearing; (3) subsequent appointed 

counsel, Attorney Larry Kelly, filed a [Motion for leave to] 

withdra[w] ... following [Santarelli’s] filing of her [first PCRA] 

Petition ...[,] and failed to inform [Santarelli] of [Attorney 

Fitzgerald’s] disbarment; and (4) the [D]istrict [A]ttorney[,] as 

well as the presiding judge[,] failed to inform [Santarelli] of 

[Attorney Fitzgerald’s] disbarment at the time of the probation 

violation hearing. On May 25, 2018, the Commonwealth of 

Pennsylvania filed its Answer to [Santarelli’s] pro se second 

[PCRA] Petition, denying [Santarelli’s] assertions and contending 

that the issues raised by [Santarelli] are barred[,] as they should 

have been raised in the prior PCRA [Petition].

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3 See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
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[Santarelli] also filed a Petition for Recusal, Petition for Transfer 

of Action[,] and a Motion under United States v. Pepper[, 562 

U.S. 476 (2011),] in conjunction with her PCRA Petition. [While a 

decision on Santarelli’s instant PCRA Petition was pending,] [i]n 

an Order dated March 23, 2018, [Santarelli’s] Petition for [] 

[R]ecusal[] and Petition for Transfer of Action were denied. ... [] 

[Santarelli’s] Motion under ... Pepper was held in abeyance 

pending the outcome of her [PCRA] Petition ....

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/1/18, at 1-3 (footnote added, footnote in original

moved to body).

Santarelli timely filed a single, pro se Notice of Appeal from the March 

23, 2018 Order, after which this Court docketed the appeal at 571 MDA 2018. 

The Notice of Appeal listed both PCRA court docket numbers, i.e., no. 583 and

no. 584, in its caption.4

By an Order entered on June 21, 2018, the PCRA court dismissed 

Santarelli’s PCRA Petition.5 In this Order, the PCRA court also denied 

Santarelli’s Motion under Pepper, supra, based on the fact that Santarelli’s 

sentence was never set aside on appeal. Cf. Pepper, 582 U.S. at 481 

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4 Santarelli filed the Notice of Appeal before the date of our Supreme Court’s 

decision in Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 971, 977 (Pa. June 1, 

2018) (holding that, prospectively from the date of the Walker decision, 

“where a single order resolves issues arising on more than one docket, 

separate notices of appeal must be filed for each case[,]” and that a failure to 

do so will result in quashal); see also Pa.R.A.P. 341, note. 

5 Concomitantly with this Order, the PCRA court issued two Opinions, one 

concerning dismissal of the PCRA Petition (hereinafter, “PCRA Opinion”), and 

the other in support of the court’s March 23, 2018 denial of the Petition for 

Recusal (hereinafter, “Petition for Recusal Opinion”).
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(discussing factors for a resentencing court to consider after a defendant’s 

sentence had been set aside on appeal). 

On August 17, 2018, Santarelli filed two duplicate, pro se Notices of 

Appeal from the Order dismissing her PCRA Petition.6 The respective captions

of the Notices of Appeal listed both no. 583 and no. 584. However, Santarelli 

filed a separate Notice of Appeal at each docket number. Additionally, each 

respective Notice of Appeal had one of the underlying docket numbers 

underlined in ink.

7

Santarelli now presents the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the [PCRA] court erred in denying [Santarelli’s] 

Petition for [] []Recusal[] of the judge pursuant to Canon 3C of 

the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial conduct[,] as the [] judge, 

the Honorable Jason Legg, previously acted as prosecutor for 

the Susquehanna County District Attorney’s [O]ffice in the 

instant cases?

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6 Though Santarelli filed her Notices of Appeal (which this Court docketed at 

1564 and 1565 MDA 2018) approximately two months after the entry of the 

Order dismissing her PCRA Petition, the appeals are nevertheless timely. The 

PCRA court, in an Order entered on October 17, 2018, granted Santarelli leave 

to appeal nunc pro tunc, based upon a breakdown in the court’s operation. 

7 Although Santarelli filed these Notices of Appeal after the date of the Walker

decision, quashal is not required, where she filed two separate Notices of 

Appeal. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lee, 194 A.3d 682 n.3 (Pa. Super. 

2018) (stating that “[t]he notices of appeal filed in these cases were 

technically not in compliance with [Walker and Pa.R.A.P. 341,] since one was 

merely a copy and each notice contained both docket numbers instead of just 

the respective, applicable number. Nonetheless, we will accept them as

sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 341[,]” where one

underlying docket number was highlighted in the captions of the respective

notices of appeal).
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2. Whether the [PCRA] court erred in denying [Santarelli’s]

Petition for [] []Recusal[] of the judge pursuant to Canon 3C of 

the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct[,] as the Honorable 

Kenneth Seamans acted with bias, prejudice, and/or 

discrimination?

3. Whether the [PCRA] court erred in denying [Santarelli’s] 

Transfer of Action Under Pa.R.C.P. 1006(d)(2) (Change of 

Venue)[,] as the county only has one judge, and now, one 

senior judge, both of whom are subject to the questions 

presented above, as well as other acts of bias, prejudice, 

and/or discrimination within other offices/agencies of 

Susquehanna County, limiting and/or denying [Santarelli] 

access to the documents, filings, responses, discovery, or 

otherwise for the instant case and/or perfecting this appeal?

4. Whether the [PCRA] court erred in denying [Santarelli’s] 

[PCRA] Petition without [an] evidentiary hearing or other 

discovery, especially as [Santarelli] made [a] claim[] ... that 

she had []been denied access to effective assistance of 

counsel, not only during the February 24, 2011 hearing[,] but 

also the October 30, 2013 hearing; information to which she 

was not privy to accessing due to her incarceration from 

January 9, 2013[,] through August 2017?

5. Whether the trial court[] not only abused its discretion, but also 

created a manifest constitutional error in sentencing 

[Santarelli] in excess of the Commonwealth’s statutory 

maximum incarceration for technical violations of probation[,]

without the mandatory statutory credit for time spent in 

custody before being sentenced?

6. Whether the trial court abused its discretion, and created a 

manifest constitutional error, in sentencing [Santarelli] to a 

second sentence in [no. 584], to the Commonwealth’s 

statutory maximum incarceration sentence, without statutory 

credit for jail time served for presentence jail time, after her 

probation sentence was completed, without any notice of 

violation of probation, warrant, or petition?

Brief for Appellant at 4-5 (some capitalization omitted).
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“Our standard of review for issues arising from the denial of PCRA relief

is well-settled. We must determine whether the PCRA court’s ruling is 

supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 

171 A.3d 675, 678 (Pa. 2017).

All PCRA petitions, including a second or subsequent petition, must be 

filed within one year of the date that the petitioner’s judgment of sentence 

becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); see also Commonwealth v. 

Chester, 895 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. 2006) (citation omitted) (stating that “[i]f a 

PCRA petition is untimely, neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has 

jurisdiction over the petition.”). 

Where, as here, a new sentence is imposed at a probation revocation 

hearing, the time for seeking PCRA relief runs for one year from the conclusion

of direct review of that new sentencing order, but only as to the issues of the

validity of the revocation proceedings and the legality of the new

sentence. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 788 A.2d 1019, 1022 (Pa. Super. 

2001). Any PCRA petition that is not filed within one year of the abovementioned date is time-barred, unless the petitioner has pled and proven one 

of the three exceptions (collectively, “timeliness exceptions”) to the PCRA’s 

time limitation set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii) (providing that an 

untimely PCRA petition may be considered timely if a petitioner alleges and 

proves (1) governmental interference with the presentation of his claims; (2) 

discovery of previously unknown facts which could not have been discovered 
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with due diligence; or (3) a newly-recognized constitutional right given 

retroactive application). A petition asserting one of the timeliness exceptions 

must also establish that the exception was raised within one year of the date 

the claim could have been first presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2)

(amended effective Dec. 24, 2018, which extended the time for filing from 60 

days of the date the claim could have been first presented, to one year).

Here, Santarelli concedes that her instant PCRA Petition is facially 

untimely, see Reply Brief for Appellant at 5, as she did not file it until February 

1, 2018, over four years after she was resentenced in October 2013. 

A review of Santarelli’s voluminous Argument section of her Brief (53 

single-spaced pages) discloses that she failed to discuss the untimeliness of 

her Petition aside from one cursory citation,

8 nor does she invoke any 

exception in her Statement of Questions Presented section. See 

Commonwealth v. Crews, 863 A.2d 498, 501 (Pa. 2004) (emphasizing that 

it is a PCRA petitioner’s burden to plead and prove that one of the timeliness 

exceptions applies); see also Commonwealth v. Lewis, 63 A.3d 1274, 

1278 (Pa. Super. 2013) (stating that “[a]lthough this Court is willing to 

construe liberally materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally 

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8 Specifically, Santarelli cited to the newly-discovered facts timeliness 

exception in a single sentence, see Brief for Appellant at 51, with no 

accompanying discussion. 
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confers no special benefit upon an appellant.”).

9

 Moreover, Santarelli’s claims 

in her briefs and PCRA Petition either (1) should have been raised on direct 

appeal or in Santarelli’s first PCRA Petition; and/or (2) are not cognizable

under the PCRA or have been previously litigated. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9543(a)(2) and (3) (respectively, listing the types of claims that are 

cognizable under the PCRA, and stating that previously litigated claims are not 

cognizable); see also Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 

785 (Pa. 2000) (stating that “a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel does 

not save an otherwise untimely petition for review on the merits.”).

10

 

Accordingly, we conclude that the record supports the PCRA court’s 

dismissal of Santarelli’s second PCRA Petition, and its denial of her Petition for 

Recusal.

Orders affirmed.

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9 To the extent that Santarelli, in her Reply Brief (see Reply Brief at 6-8), 

briefly discusses the “governmental interference” and “newly-discovered 

facts” exceptions, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i) and (ii), we 

determine that her claims fail to meet either of these exceptions. 

10 Even if Santarelli’s claims regarding recusal of the PCRA court judge, and

the ineffectiveness of Attorney Fitzgerald and subsequent counsel, were 

properly raised in this proceeding, we would determine that they do not entitle 

Santarelli to relief, based upon the reasoning advanced by the PCRA court in 

its Opinions. See Petition for Recusal Opinion, 6/21/18, at 1-2 (unnumbered); 

PCRA Opinion, 6/21/18, at 4-5. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/15/2019