1

Filed 6/30/21 Goodwin v. Goodwin CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

ROCKY LEE GOODWIN, et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

MERLIN W. GOODWIN, JR., as 

Trustee, etc.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A157499

 (Humboldt County

 Super. Ct. No. DR130381)

A trustee appeals two trial court rulings: (1) that certain trust property 

belongs to one of the settlors’ children pursuant to an oral contract, and (2) 

denying the trustee’s request for reimbursement of attorney fees from the 

trust estate. We reverse the latter ruling in part and otherwise affirm.

BACKGROUND

This case involves a family dispute over certain real property known as 

“Moose Ranch,” which was originally owned by Merlin “Buddy” Goodwin, Sr.,

and Billie Lee Goodwin.1 Buddy and Billie had four children: Rocky, Merlin, 

Tamara, and Gary. Buddy died in 2007. In 2011, Billie created the Billie Lee 

1 Like the trial court and the parties, we refer to Merlin Goodwin, Sr., by his 

nickname, Buddy, and to the other members of the Goodwin family by their 

first names. No disrespect is intended.
2

Goodwin Revocable Trust (the Trust). The Trust property included Moose 

Ranch as well as other real and personal property. The Trust provided that, 

upon Billie’s death, Rocky was to receive a 90 percent interest in Moose 

Ranch and Tamara was to receive the remaining 10 percent interest. After 

the distribution of other specific bequests, the remainder of the Trust estate 

would be divided equally among the four children. 

In 2013, Rocky and his wife Sarah (collectively, Plaintiffs) sued Billie, 

individually and in her capacity as trustee of the Trust. The complaint 

alleged Billie and Buddy made an oral agreement with Plaintiffs decades 

earlier that, if Plaintiffs lived on Moose Ranch and maintained and improved 

the property, Billie and Buddy would transfer title to Plaintiffs when they 

died. The complaint further alleged Billie recently breached that agreement 

by listing the property for sale and directing Plaintiffs to leave. 

Billie filed a cross-complaint alleging claims for infliction of emotional 

distress, waste, and conversion, and seeking a declaratory judgment that 

Plaintiffs were tenants of Moose Ranch. Billie also executed an amendment 

to the Trust disinheriting Rocky and providing that Moose Ranch be sold 

upon Billie’s death with the proceeds divided between Merlin, Tamara, and 

Gary. 

Billie died shortly thereafter. Merlin became successor trustee to the 

Trust (Trustee) and continued to defend against the complaint and prosecute

the cross-complaint in that capacity. 

Plaintiffs filed a petition against Merlin, individually and as Trustee, 

as well as Tamara and Gary. The petition contested the Trust amendment, 

alleging it was the result of undue influence or fraud in the inducement by 

Merlin, Tamara, and Gary. The petition also alleged claims for elder abuse, 

interference with contractual relations, and conspiracy to induce breach of 
3

contract, seeking damages for these claims. The petition was consolidated 

with the complaint and cross-complaint. 

In 2018, a bench trial on all the pleadings was held. After Plaintiffs’ 

case-in-chief, the court granted Trustee’s motion for judgment on the 

pleadings on Plaintiffs’ petition. At the conclusion of the trial, the court 

issued a lengthy statement of decision finding for Plaintiffs on the complaint 

and cross-complaint. Among other findings, the trial court found: “Circa 

1985-86, Buddy and Billie made an offer to Rocky and Sarah to by deed or 

testamentary disposition give to them the Moose Ranch if Rocky and Sarah 

would move to and become resident caretakers of the property; [¶] 2. Rocky 

and Sarah accepted that offer and moved to and assisted in caring for the 

property, including participating in rehabilitation and maintenance of the 

two residences, management of cattle, fences, and roads, continuously since 

1986. [¶] 3. Rocky and Sarah fully performed their side of the bargain and 

thus, Billie, having survived Buddy, was obligated to transfer Moose Ranch 

to them; [¶] 4. Billie failed to transfer the Moose Ranch to Rocky and Sarah 

prior to her death or by her estate plan; [¶] 5. A contract existed which was 

breached by Billie, the surviving promisor, and Plaintiffs are entitled to 

specific performance.” The trial court rejected Trustee’s affirmative defenses. 

Subsequently, Trustee filed a motion requesting reimbursement of his 

attorney fees from the Trust. The court declined to so order. 

DISCUSSION

I. The Oral Agreement

Trustee argues the trial court erred in rejecting various defenses to 

Plaintiffs’ contract claim. We disagree.
4

A. Statute of Frauds

“The statute of frauds provides that certain contracts ‘are invalid, 

unless they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and 

subscribed by the party to be charged . . . .’ (Civ. Code, § 1624.)” (Sterling v. 

Taylor (2007) 40 Cal.4th 757, 761.) “Equitable estoppel may preclude the use 

of a statute of frauds defense.” (Byrne v. Laura (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1054, 

1068 (Byrne).) Specifically, “equitable estoppel may apply to avoid the 

statutes of fraud and to make an oral agreement enforceable if (a) the 

promisee detrimentally relied on the agreement and would suffer an 

unconscionable injury if the oral agreement were not enforced or (b) the 

promisor would receive unjust enrichment if allowed to retain the benefit of 

the promisee’s performance without abiding by the promisor’s obligations 

under the oral agreement.” (Estate of Housley (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 342, 359

(Housley).) “Whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied in a 

given case is generally a question of fact.” (Byrne, at p. 1068.)2

The trial court found, with respect to this defense: “Plaintiffs’ long 

residence at and caretaking of the Moose Ranch operates to relieve the 

requirement of a writing; Plaintiffs’ performance of that which was asked of 

them by decedents in reliance on the promises of decedents to their detriment 

constitutes consideration and serves to estop Defendant from reliance on the

Statute of Frauds,” and “Plaintiffs’ full performance for decades of that which 

promisor-decedents required of them satisfies the Statute of Frauds and no 

writing is required; absent enforcement of the contract Defendants would be 

2 Trustee relies on inapposite authority that application of the statute of 

frauds is a question of law. The issue before us is whether Trustee is 

equitably estopped from invoking the statute of frauds.
5

unjustly enriched and Plaintiffs would suffer substantial hardship and 

unconscionable injury.” 

Trustee first argues the trial court applied the wrong legal standard 

because the promisor’s fraud is an element of equitable estoppel. The cases

relied on by Trustee make clear that to the extent “fraud” is required, intent 

to deceive need not be shown; instead, the requirement is satisfied by 

demonstrating an unconscionable injury. (Parker v. Solomon (1959) 171 

Cal.App.2d 125, 132 [“ ‘The doctrine of estoppel to assert the statute of frauds 

has been consistently applied by the courts of this state to prevent fraud that 

would result from refusal to enforce oral contracts in certain circumstances. 

Such fraud may inhere in the unconscionable injury that would result from 

denying enforcement of the contract after one party has been induced by the 

other seriously to change his position in reliance on the contract [citations], or 

in the unjust enrichment that would result if a party who has received the 

benefits of the other’s performance were allowed to rely upon the statute.’ ”]; 

Notten v. Mensing (1935) 3 Cal.2d 469, 476 [“In order to raise the estoppel, 

fraud in some form is essential, but it is not required that an actual intent to 

defraud or mislead exist . . . . ‘All that is meant in the expression that an 

estoppel must possess an element of fraud is that the case must be one in 

which the circumstances and conduct would render it a fraud for the party to 

deny what he had previously induced or suffered another to believe and take 

action upon. . . . There need be no precedent corrupt motive or evil design.’ ”]; 

see also Stahmer v. Schley (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 200, 203–204 [“No intent to 

defraud on the part of the [parties asserting the statute of frauds] is 

necessary to create the estoppel. It suffices that a constructive fraud will 

result if these [parties] are permitted to invoke the statute of frauds.”].) 

Accordingly, the trial court applied the correct legal standard.
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Trustee also argues the evidence did not establish detrimental reliance 

or unconscionable injury.

3 In Housley, the plaintiff submitted evidence that 

his father promised to leave all his property to the plaintiff if the plaintiff 

“would care for him during [the father’s] lifetime” and, in reliance on this 

promise, the plaintiff “lived with [his father] for almost 30 years, provided 

[his father] with care and companionship, and . . . paid an increasing 

proportion of [his father’s] living expenses.” (Housley, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 360.) The Court of Appeal held this evidence, if believed by the trier of 

fact, was sufficient to establish detrimental reliance and unconscionable 

injury. (Ibid.) In Byrne, the plaintiff submitted evidence that she “relied on 

[the decedent’s] assurances that she would receive his property and that he 

would document this understanding,” and that she “had ‘seriously’ changed 

her position in reliance on [these] promises by moving in with him, 

performing the duties of a spouse, and retiring from her job at his insistence.” 

(Byrne, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 1069.) The Court of Appeal held the trier 

of fact could find, based on this evidence, that the plaintiff established 

detrimental reliance and unconscionable injury. (Ibid.)

The trial court found, based on the evidence at trial, that Plaintiffs 

moved to Moose Ranch in 1986 and lived there continuously since, Plaintiffs 

expended substantial labor and money on maintaining and improving the 

property, and Plaintiffs did so only because of Buddy and Billie’s promise 

that they would give Plaintiffs Moose Ranch either before or upon their 

death. As in Housley and Byrne, this evidence is sufficient to support the 

3 To the extent Trustee argues the trial court found only detrimental reliance 

and not unconscionable injury, the statement of decision establishes 

otherwise. 
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court’s findings that Plaintiffs established detrimental reliance and 

unconscionable injury.

Trustee argues Plaintiffs received a benefit by living at Moose Ranch

because they paid reduced rent. In Housley, the court found the fact that the 

plaintiff “may have received some financial benefit by living in [his father’s] 

house ‘rent-free’ ” would only preclude the application of equitable estoppel if 

“this benefit to [the plaintiff] outweighs the benefits received by [his father] 

over the years.” (Housley, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 360.) As an initial 

matter, although Trustee asserts the rent paid by Plaintiffs was reduced, he 

provides no record citations to any evidence of the market rental value. In 

addition, Plaintiffs testified their labor and expenditures on the property was 

worth approximately $900,000; although the trial court found this figure 

“exaggerated” it still found they performed substantial work and 

improvements on the property. Finally, the court found the benefits to Buddy 

and Billie included “p[ea]ce of mind” and “a great comfort” in knowing that 

Plaintiffs were maintaining the property. (Cf. Housley, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 360 [“cases hold that care and companionship provided by family 

members cannot adequately be quantified to make a monetary comparison”].) 

Trustee has not demonstrated the trial court’s application of equitable 

estoppel lacked substantial evidence.

Finally, Trustee notes that Tamara also lived at Moose Ranch, paid 

reduced rent, and performed improvements, arguing this shows there was no 

detriment to Plaintiffs. Tamara’s testimony was that she lived at Moose 

Ranch for less than eight years, and Trustee cites no evidence that she made 

any commitment to Buddy and Billie with respect to the property. The trial 

court could reasonably find detrimental reliance resulting from Plaintiffs’ 
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long tenure of more than 30 years and commitment to remain on the 

property, regardless of Tamara’s situation.

In sum, the trial court’s finding that Trustee was equitably estopped 

from invoking the statute of frauds is supported by substantial evidence.

B. Statute of Limitations

Trustee argues Plaintiffs’ contract claim was barred by the statute of 

limitations because their lawsuit was filed more than two years after Billie 

transferred Moose Ranch to the Trust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 339 [two year 

limitations period for oral contract claim].)

“[T]he ‘[g]eneral [r]ule’ [is] that a contract cause of action runs from the 

date of the breach. [Citation.] . . . [A] breach of contract ordinarily occurs 

upon the promisor’s failure to render the promised performance.” (McCaskey 

v. California State Automobile Assn. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 947, 958.) “[A] 

repudiation may constitute an anticipatory breach, giving the aggrieved 

promisee the option of suing immediately. [Citation.] But it does not 

accelerate the accrual of a cause of action for limitations purposes; the 

promisee remains entitled to wait until performance is due and the promisor 

has failed to perform, i.e., to do the thing promised.” (Ibid.)

The Trust, by its terms, could be revoked or amended by Billie. To the 

extent Billie’s transfer of Moose Ranch to the Trust constituted a repudiation

of the oral agreement to transfer the property to Plaintiffs on or before her 

death, the breach was anticipatory only and did not trigger the statute of 

limitations.

C. Unenforceable Gift

Trustee argues Buddy and Billie’s promise to Plaintiffs was not an oral 

contract, but instead was an unenforceable gift. 
9

“It is basic that what distinguishes a contract from a gift is that the 

latter only takes place in the absence of consideration.” (In re Marriage of 

Mehren & Dargan (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1172.) Confusingly, Trustee

argues the purported gift was unenforceable because there was consideration. 

The trial court found the elements of an oral contract established; Trustee’s

argument that the promise was not an enforceable gift does not demonstrate

error in this finding.

D. Laches

Trustee argues laches should have barred Plaintiffs’ claim because 

Plaintiffs unreasonably delayed in bringing suit after Billie transferred 

Moose Ranch to the Trust. The trial court found no credible evidence 

supporting the application of laches. 

“A party asserting laches must show both unreasonable delay and 

prejudice resulting from the delay. [Citation.] A trial court’s ruling 

regarding laches will be sustained if there is substantial evidence to support 

it.” (Martin v. Santa Clara Unified School Dist. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 241, 

257.) Trustee makes no argument whatsoever regarding prejudice. In 

addition, Rocky testified that after Billie transferred Moose Ranch to the 

Trust, she assured him, “ ‘Don’t worry. I’m going to change it before I die. 

You guys are getting the place . . . .’ ” Accordingly, substantial evidence 

supports the trial court’s implied finding that any delay was not 

unreasonable.

II. Attorney Fees

Trustee argues the trial court erred in denying his request to have his 

attorney fees reimbursed from the Trust. We agree in part.
10

A. Legal Background

“ ‘[T]he Probate Code is studded with provisions authorizing the trustee 

to hire and pay (or seek reimbursement for having paid) attorneys to assist in 

trust administration.’ [Citation.] . . . [¶] ‘ “The underlying principle which 

guides the court in allowing costs and attorneys’ fees incidental to litigation 

out of a trust estate is that such litigation is a benefit and a service to the 

trust,” ’ and not for the personal benefit of the trustee.” (People ex rel. Harris 

& Becerra v. Shine (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 524, 534 (Harris).)

For example, in Whittlesey v. Aiello (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1221

(Whittlesey), one beneficiary contested a trust amendment that removed her 

as primary beneficiary. (Id. at pp. 1224–1225.) The trustee unsuccessfully 

defended the contest and sought reimbursement of his attorney fees from the 

trust. (Id. at p. 1225.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial 

of reimbursement, reasoning, “where the trust is not benefited by litigation, 

or did not stand to be benefited if the trustee had succeeded, there is no basis 

for the recovery of expenses out of the trust assets.” (Id. at p. 1230.) “The 

essence of the underlying action was not a challenge to the existence of the 

trust; it was a dispute over who would control and benefit from it. Whether 

or not the contest prevailed, the trust would remain intact.” (Id. at p. 1228.) 

Moreover, because the trustee was unsuccessful in the litigation, “an award 

of fees to [the trustee’s attorney] from the trust would be, in effect, an award 

from [the successful beneficiary]. In other words, [the beneficiary] would be 

required to finance her own trust litigation and that of her opponent, despite 

the fact she prevailed. There can be no equity in that.” (Id. at p. 1230; see 

also Terry v. Conlan (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1464 (Terry) [“[The 

trustee] has not participated in this litigation as a neutral trustee to defend 

the trust and protect its assets; rather, she has consistently pursued her own 
11

interests [as beneficiary] . . . . As such, she must bear her own costs in this 

litigation, rather than be reimbursed from the trust.”].)

“A trustee’s entitlement to use of trust assets to retain and compensate 

attorneys may be expanded by the terms of the trust instrument.” (Harris, 

supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 535.) For example, in Doolittle v. Exchange Bank

(2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 529 (Doolittle), an independent trustee sought an 

order authorizing use of trust assets to defend against a contest to a trust 

amendment. (Id. at pp. 535–536.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial 

court’s order granting the request, finding Whittlesey and Terry

distinguishable because of trust provisions stating: “ ‘The Trustee is hereby 

directed to defend, at the expense of any trust estate governed by this 

Agreement, any contest or other attack of any nature on this Agreement, on 

any of its provisions and any amendments hereto . . . .’ ” (Id. at pp. 534, 538.) 

“ ‘Allowance of litigation expenses rests in the sound discretion of the 

trial court, whose ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse.’ 

[Citation.] However, a trial court abuses its discretion when it applies the 

wrong legal standards. [Citation.] We decide questions of law de novo.” 

(Harris, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 534.)

B. Analysis

Trustee relies on two provisions in the Trust. First, “The trustee may, 

in the trustee’s discretion, initiate or defend, at the expense of the trust, any 

litigation that the trustee consider[s] advisable relating to the trust or any 

property of the trust estate.” Second, “The trustee is authorized to defend, at 

the expense of the trust estate, any contest or other attack of any nature on 

this trust or any of its provisions or amendments.” 

Trustee argues he had a “duty” under these Trust provisions to defend 

against Plaintiffs’ complaint and petition, asserting the provisions are “nearly 
12

identical” to those in Doolittle. To the contrary, the provisions in that case 

were materially different, stating the trustee was “ ‘directed to defend’ ” 

certain types of actions. (Doolittle, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 534, italics 

added.) The Trust, in contrast, authorizes certain litigation conduct but does 

not direct it.

To the extent Trustee suggests the Trust provisions require 

reimbursement of attorney fees from the Trust regardless of whether the 

Trustee’s litigation position was reasonable, we disagree. We will not 

assume, absent clear indication to the contrary, that the Trust provisions 

alter settled law requiring a trustee’s litigation position to be reasonable to 

recover fees.4 (See Prob. Code, § 16011 [“The trustee has a duty to take 

reasonable steps to defend actions that may result in a loss to the trust.”]; 

Whittlesey, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1230 [discussing whether facts 

“establish the objective reasonableness of the trustee’s defense”]; Estate of 

Moore (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1106 [“As trustee, the burden was on 

appellant to show that he subjectively believed the fees and expenses were 

necessary or appropriate to carry out the trust’s purposes, and that his belief

was objectively reasonable.”].) The Trust’s provisions do not provide such a 

clear indication. To the contrary, the first provision expressly specifies the 

trustee must consider the litigation “advisable.” 

4 Trustee’s suggestion that the standard is lack of willful misconduct or gross 

negligence is unavailing. That standard applied in Harris because of 

language in the trust that is not present here. (See Harris, supra, 16 

Cal.App.5th at p. 536 [“The Trust instrument here, as amended, provides: 

‘Except for the Trustee’s willful misconduct or gross negligence . . . , the 

Trustee shall be indemnified and held harmless . . . by the trust estate 

. . . .’ ”].)
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As Plaintiffs argue, there is substantial evidence supporting an implied 

finding that Trustee’s defense of Plaintiffs’ complaint was not reasonable

because he was aware of the binding oral agreement. (See Carter v. Cohen

(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1053 [“we will affirm the [fee] award on any 

basis properly supported by the record”].) Trustee’s protestations that he did 

not know of the agreement are unavailing: the trial court found otherwise, 

and Trustee has not shown this finding lacked substantial evidence. 

Accordingly, the trial court’s refusal to reimburse fees incurred in the defense 

of Plaintiffs’ complaint was not in error.

It is unclear whether Trustee also seeks reimbursement for fees 

incurred in prosecuting the cross-complaint against Plaintiffs. To the extent 

he does seek such fees, we affirm the trial court’s denial of reimbursement. 

Some of the claims asserted in the cross-complaint had no relation to the 

Trust; for example, the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

As for the claims that related to Moose Ranch, we affirm the trial court for 

the same reasons set forth above.

Reimbursement for attorney fees incurred in Trustee’s defense of 

Plaintiffs’ petition, however, is subject to a different analysis. There is no 

evidence this defense was unreasonable; to the contrary, it was successful. 

Moreover, the Trust expressly authorizes the use of Trust assets to defend 

against such contests: “The trustee is authorized to defend, at the expense of 

the trust estate, any contest or other attack of any nature on this trust or any 

of its provisions or amendments.” (Italics added.) Some (though not all) of 

the Petition’s causes of action sought to invalidate the amendment to the 

Trust. Thus, the Trustee is entitled to reimbursement of reasonable attorney 

fees incurred in his successful defense of Plaintiffs’ attack on the Trust’s 
14

amendment. We will remand for the trial court to determine the amount of 

such fees.5

Plaintiffs argue it would be inequitable to encumber Moose Ranch to 

reimburse Trustee’s attorney fees, an argument that assumes Moose Ranch 

will remain part of the Trust estate, the entity liable for reimbursement. 

Trustee concedes that this court’s affirmance of the trial court’s judgment on 

Plaintiffs’ complaint will result in the transfer of Moose Ranch from the Trust 

to Plaintiffs.

6 Both parties appear to agree, however, that the trial court can 

order this transfer delayed until any fee order is satisfied. Trustee argues 

the trial court could also allow the transfer to proceed but subsequently order 

Plaintiffs to return Moose Ranch to the Trust. The parties disagree on the 

equities.

5 For the first time at oral argument, Plaintiffs argued Trustee was not 

entitled to such a remand because he failed to include the judgment on the 

Petition in the record on appeal. Oral argument is too late to raise a new 

contention. “ ‘It is a clearly understood principle of appellate review, so well 

established as to need no citation to authority, that contentions raised for the 

first time at oral argument are disfavored and may be rejected solely on the 

ground of their untimeliness.’ ” (Estate of McDaniel (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 

458, 463.) In any event, we reject the claim. The record on appeal contains a 

minute order granting Trustee’s motion for judgment on the Petition and the 

judgment on the complaint, which recites the procedural history of the 

litigation including entry of judgment on the Petition. The trial court did not 

issue a separate order on Trustee’s fee motion and Trustee’s notice of appeal

indicates Trustee’s appeal of both the judgment and “the trial court’s failure 

to use the Proposed Judgment submitted by [Trustee] which included an 

award of costs and attorneys’ fees in favor of [Trustee].” Trustee’s failure to 

include the judgment on the Petition in the record on appeal does not 

preclude this court from reversing the trial court’s postjudgment order

denying his fee motion with respect to fees incurred in defending against the 

Petition.

6 The parties filed supplemental briefs on this issue in response to our 

request.
15

We decline to decide these issues because their resolution may be 

unnecessary. First, it appears the Petition’s only claims contesting the Trust 

amendment—the only reimbursable claims—were dismissed by Plaintiffs 

during their case-in-chief at trial. Accordingly, the amount of fees 

attributable to Trustee’s defense of these claims is likely very small.7 Second, 

although Trustee asserts Moose Ranch is the only asset in the Trust estate, 

the record citation provided does not so establish. The Trust identified other 

real and personal property as part of the estate; although Billie apparently 

transferred the other real property to Martin, Gary, and Tamara before her 

death, the Trust property also included livestock and multiple vehicles. 

Thus, the Trust may contain sufficient assets, independent of Moose Ranch, 

to satisfy an attorney fee order issued on remand. If not, the trial court in 

the first instance may determine whether Moose Ranch can and should be 

used to satisfy the order (issues on which we express no opinion).

DISPOSITION

The aspect of the judgment denying Trustee’s request for 

reimbursement from the Trust of reasonable attorney fees incurred in his 

successful defense of Plaintiffs’ attack on the Trust’s amendment is reversed 

and remanded. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. Plaintiffs are

awarded their costs on appeal. 

7 Following trial, the trial court characterized the Petition as an action “to 

advance [Plaintiffs’] claims to Moose Ranch pursuant to contract,” suggesting 

the overwhelming majority of litigation on the Petition did not involve its 

attack on the Trust amendment. 
16

SIMONS, Acting P.J.

We concur.

NEEDHAM, J.

BURNS, J.

(A157499)