United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 21-40211

Summary Calendar

Michael Shemond White, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Coffield Medical Staff; John Ellis; Office of Attorney 

General; RN Linda Garner, 

Defendants—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 6:19-CV-345

Before King, Costa, and Ho, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Michael Shemond White appeals from the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment for defendants on White’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 8, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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related to an alleged use of excessive force. For the following reasons, we 

AFFIRM. 

I.

At all times relevant to this case, Michael Shemond White was a 

prisoner housed at the Coffield Unit of the Texas Department of Justice. His 

§ 1983 suit stems from events occurring on or about April 10, 2018. Following 

an incident where White threw unknown liquids at prison officers, Sergeant

John Ellis and Officer William Barnett conducted a search of White’s cell for 

contraband. White was handcuffed and under the control of Officer Barnett 

during the search. While being returned to his cell, White attempted to pull 

away from Officer Barnett. After Officer Barnett began to slip due to White’s 

efforts, Sgt. Ellis intervened and both he and Officer Barnett took White to 

the ground to regain control of the situation. White continued to resist and 

grabbed a pen from Sgt. Ellis’s vest and attempted to stab the two officers. 

In response, Sgt. Ellis used joint manipulation on White’s thumb to regain 

control of the pen and prevent its use as a weapon. Multiple officers and staff 

then arrived to assist in the situation and White was brought to the infirmary. 

He was examined by Linda Garner, RN, who found that White had suffered 

injuries from the joint manipulation which had caused slight swelling, but 

that the injuries did not require treatment beyond first aid. White then 

refused any treatment for his hand, was cleared by RN Garner, and was 

returned to his cell. 

White filed a § 1983 claim, asserting that Sgt. Ellis used his body 

weight to break both of White’s thumbs while White was handcuffed and face 

down on the floor.1 Sgt. Ellis filed a motion for summary judgment, to which 

1 These allegations were made in White’s amended complaint. White initially filed 

his complaint in the form of a letter (which the magistrate judge construed as a complaint 

against “Coffield Medical Staff”) asserting a lack of treatment for his thumb injuries, which 

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White did not respond. The magistrate judge issued a report and 

recommendations concluding that Sgt. Ellis’s motion for summary judgment 

should be granted. White then filed a second amended complaint, and the 

magistrate judge denied his implied motion for leave to amend his complaint. 

White then filed two letters, which the district court construed as objections 

to the magistrate judge’s recommendation. The district court denied those 

objections, adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendations, and 

granted summary judgment in favor of Sgt. Ellis. 

II.

“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, 

applying the same standards as the district court.” Lindsley v. TRT Holdings, 

Inc., 984 F.3d 460, 466 (5th Cir. 2021). Summary judgment is appropriate 

when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A fact is 

material if it might affect the outcome of the suit, and a factual dispute is 

genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict 

for” the plaintiff. Lindsley, 984 F.3d at 466. Once a motion for summary 

judgment is filed, “the adverse party ‘must set forth specific facts showing 

that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (quoting Fed R. Civ. P. 56(e)). Where, as here, a 

the magistrate judge found did not satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8(a) and required amendment. In his amended complaint, White only listed 

Sgt. Ellis as a defendant and based his claims on the alleged use of excessive force. 

Therefore, as the magistrate judge correctly noted, “[‘Coffield Medical Staff’] has 

effectively been dismissed through the filing of the amended complaint” and we therefore 

have no need to address any claims against them. Similarly, Linda Garner, RN, was only 

added as a purported defendant through a belated, implied motion from White for leave to 

amend his complaint, which the magistrate judge denied. Therefore, the only remaining 

defendant is Sgt. Ellis and we review only the decision related to White’s excessive-force 

claim against him. 

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plaintiff does not file an opposition to a defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment, a district court may properly take the facts put forward by 

defendant in support of his motion for summary judgment to be undisputed. 

Eversley v. Mbank Dall., 843 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1988). We therefore 

consider whether an Eighth Amendment violation2 occurred based on 

Sgt. Ellis’s accounting of the facts of the incident.

When considering whether a use of force was excessive, and thus 

violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual 

punishment, “the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a 

good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and 

sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. When determining 

“whether unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain was used,” we normally 

look to five relevant factors: “(1) the extent of the injury suffered; (2) the 

need for the application of force; (3) the relationship between the need and 

the amount of force used; (4) the threat reasonably perceived by the 

responsible officials; and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of a 

forceful response.” Baldwin v. Stalder, 137 F.3d 836, 839 (5th Cir. 1998). 

Considering these factors, and looking to the undisputed facts, we hold that 

Sgt. Ellis did not act maliciously or sadistically, but instead engaged in a goodfaith effort to restore discipline by bringing White, a resisting prisoner, under 

control. Therefore, Sgt. Ellis did not use excessive force in violation of 

White’s rights under the Eighth Amendment. 

The magistrate judge found that the first factor “weighs in White’s 

favor” because Sgt. Ellis assumed arguendo that his manipulation of White’s 

thumb caused injury to avoid a fact dispute. We note that White has pointed 

2 Because White is a prisoner, his excessive-force claim is considered under the 

Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Hudson v. 

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1992). 

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to no facts in the record supporting his claims that he suffered one or more 

broken thumbs, rather than minor injuries leading to slight swelling. If the 

latter, this factor would definitively tip in Sgt. Ellis’s favor since “[t]he 

Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments 

necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of 

physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the 

conscience of mankind.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37–38 (2010) 

(quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9–10). But in any event, we need not directly 

consider this question as the other factors cut towards Sgt. Ellis.

The second factor, the need for the force at hand, strongly supports 

Sgt. Ellis. The undisputed facts demonstrate that Sgt. Ellis brought White to 

the ground in response to several attempts by White to pull away from Officer 

Barnett (efforts severe enough to cause Officer Barnett to lose his footing) 

and then used joint manipulation to prevent White from stabbing the officers 

with a pen. Such behavior quite obviously threatens the discipline of a prison, 

and the actions taken as outlined by Sgt. Ellis can be considered a “good-faith 

effort to . . . restore [that] discipline.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7; see also Freeman 

v. Sims, 558 F. App’x 412, 413 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Based on [plaintiff’s] refusal 

to comply with orders and aggressive behavior, there was need for application 

of force[.]”). 

The magistrate judge found the third factor “inconclusive,” finding 

that there was not enough evidence to determine whether the amount of force 

used by Sgt. Ellis (especially if it did indeed break White’s thumb) was 

necessary given the danger. Again, if we credit Sgt. Ellis’s unopposed 

description of the results of the force, his use of joint manipulation was 

proportional to the danger posed by White’s use of the pen as a weapon. And 

even if we adopt White’s portrayal of the injuries, we do not find that this 

factor, given the totality of the case, would pull hard enough to drag the 

analysis to White’s side of the line. 

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As to the fourth factor, the threat reasonably perceived by prison 

officials, our analysis largely tracks with our consideration of the second 

factor (the need for the force). It is clear beyond cavil that the officers could 

have reasonably perceived a threat in White’s actions, especially his efforts 

to stab them with a pen. One need not consider if the pen is mightier than the 

sword when someone is attempting to use the pen as a sword. And as the 

magistrate judge correctly noted, “[s]uch behavior plainly poses a threat and 

cannot be tolerated in a facility of incarceration.” See Baldwin, 137 F.3d at 

840; Freeman, 558 F. App’x at 413. 

Finally, we consider the fifth factor and determine whether sufficient 

efforts were made to temper the severity of a forceful response. The Supreme 

Court has previously found that in “dangerous and volatile” situations, 

“[t]he failure to provide for verbal warnings is . . . not so insupportable as to 

be wanton.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 323–24 (1986). While there is no 

evidence that Sgt. Ellis gave a verbal warning to White, that fact does not 

control given the sudden nature of White’s actions (grabbing the pen) and 

the need to quickly react to prevent further danger. Further, the force 

Sgt. Ellis used (joint manipulation) could in many ways be viewed as an effort 

to temper the situation by preventing the need for a more severe and forceful 

response to White’s aggressive actions. This factor does not counsel against 

a grant of summary judgment for Sgt. Ellis.

In sum, our core inquiry is into whether Sgt. Ellis acted in good faith 

to restore discipline or sadistically with the intent to cause harm, and we find 

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the undisputed facts show the former. White’s Eighth Amendment 

excessive-force claim fails.3

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED.

3 Because we find that there is insufficient evidence to support White’s claim that 

his rights under the Eighth Amendment were violated, we need not consider Sgt. Ellis’s 

additional argument that his actions are protected by qualified immunity. 

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