alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                      SECTION 1350, CHAPTER 63 OF TITLE 18
                           OF THE UNITED STATES CODE,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In  connection  with  the  Quarterly  Report  of CTD  Holdings,  Inc.  (the
"Company")  on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2010, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  I, C.E.
"Rick"  Strattan,  Chief Executive  Officer and Chief  Financial  Officer of the
Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to
section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1) The Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and result of  operations of the
Company.


________________________________
C.E. "Rick" StrattAn
Chief Executive Officer
Chief Financial Officer
May _____, 2010
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of the Interior

###### Bureau of Land Management

          - [LLMT922200-10-L13100000-FI0000-P;MTM 98742]

# AGENCY:

Bureau of Land Management, Interior.

# ACTION:

Notice.

# SUMMARY:

Under the provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, as amended, Coburn, LLC timely filed a petition for reinstatement of competitive oil and gas lease MTM 98742, for land in Fergus County, Montana. The lessee paid the required rental accruing from the date of termination.

The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) has not issued a valid lease to any other interest affecting the lands. The lessee agrees to new lease terms for rentals and royalties of $10 per acre and 16-2/3 percent. The lessee paid the $500 administration fee for the reinstatement of the lease and the $163 cost for publishing this notice.

The lessee has met the requirements for reinstatement of the lease under Section 31(d) and (e) of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 (30 U.S.C. 188). The BLM is proposing to reinstate the lease, effective the date of termination, subject to:
      - The original terms and conditions of the lease, except as otherwise provided;
      - The increased rental of $10 per acre;
      - The increased royalty of 16-2/3 percent;
      - The $163 cost of publishing this notice; and
      - The $500 administration fee.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Teri Bakken, Chief, Fluids Adjudication Section, Bureau of Land Management Montana State Office, 5001 Southgate Drive, Billings, Montana 59101-4669, 406-896-5091.

Teri Bakken,

Chief, Fluids Adjudication Section.

[FR Doc. 2010-26169 Filed 10-15-10; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4310-DN-P
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-7780

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

ANTHONY DUANE SCOTT,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern

District of West Virginia, at Wheeling. Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.,

District Judge. (5:02-cr-00047-FPS)

Submitted: March 22, 2007 Decided: March 29, 2007

Before WIDENER and WILKINSON, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Anthony Duane Scott, Appellant Pro Se. John Castle Parr, OFFICE OF

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Anthony Duane Scott appeals the district court’s order

accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying

with prejudice his motion for a reduction of sentence. We have

reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we

affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. See United

States v. Scott, No. 5:02-cr-00047-FPS (N.D.W. Va. Aug. 10, 2006).

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. JOHN SILEO.

November 2, 1987.

Petition for certification denied.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Morris K. Udall and Stewart L. Udall Foundation

# Time and Date:

9 a.m. to 12 p.m., Friday, October 29, 2010. 

# PLACE:

The offices of the Morris K. Udall and Stewart L. Udall Foundation, 130 South Scott Avenue, Tucson, AZ 85701.

# Status:

This meeting will be open to the public, unless it is necessary for the Board to consider items in executive session.

# Matters to be Considered:

                        (1) A report on the U.S. Institute for Environmental Conflict Resolution; (2) A report from                               ( print page 63514)                            the Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy; (3) A report on the Native Nations Institute; (4) Program Reports; and (5) A Report from the Management Committee.                    

# Portions Open to the Public:

All sessions with the exception of the session listed below.

# Portions Closed to the Public:

Executive session.

# Contact Person for More Information:

Ellen K. Wheeler, Executive Director, 130 South Scott Avenue, Tucson, AZ 85701, (520) 901-8500.

Dated: October 6, 2010.

Ellen K. Wheeler,

Executive Director, Morris K. Udall and Stewart L. Udall Foundation, and Federal Register Liaison Officer.

[FR Doc. 2010-25779 Filed 10-14-10; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6820-FN-M
#### MARGARET FRATELLO AND ROCCO FRATELLO, HER HUSBAND, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. THE CITY OF NEWARK, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Submitted May 2, 1944

Decided August 15, 1944.

Before Justices Pabkbk, Hbiibk and Copie.

For the appellant, *Philip J. Bcholland (Louis A. Fast,*of counsel).

For the respondents, *Pearce R. Franklin.*

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Colte, J.

On May 12th, 1942, the plaintiff Margaret Fratello alighted from a bus at the southeast corner of Belmont Avenue and Court Street in the City of Newark. She stepped up the curb and fell over an iron pipe imbedded in concrete and which was raised above the level of the concrete about an inch and a half or two inches. From the evidence, it was clearly deducible that there had been at that point an iron stanchion about eight feet high which fitted into a metal pipe or sleeve and was held in position by several holts which passed through the sleeve and anchored the stanchion in position. The stanchion bore on it a legend to the effect that the area was reserved to the patrons of a nearby bank for parking purposes and it is apparent from the evidence that the hank had not been in operation for a year or more. At or near the southeast corner of Belmont Avenue and Court Street *70there were other signs which were not permanently affixed in any one place, and the position of those movable signs had sometime prior to the accident been moved by the agents of the municipality. There was no direct evidence as to who removed the stanchion and sign and left protruding above the ground the sleeve over which plaintiff fell and sustained the injuries for which she and her husband brought suit. Assuming that there was evidence from which the trial judge might reasonably draw the inference that it was done by an agency of the municipality, nevertheless we are of the opinion that the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs was erroneous. It is settled that a municipality is not liable to respond in damages for injuries due to negligence on its part unless such negligence is the result of active wrongdoing or results from the performance of other than governmental functions. *Vickers*v. *Camden,*122 *N. J. L.*14. Leaving the sleeve protruding above the concrete in which it was imbedded was no more than non-feasance and lacks the element of active wrongdoing.

Eor the reasons stated, the judgment is reversed, with costs.

Mr. Justice Heher dissents from the judgment of reversal.
<TABLE> <S> <C>
  
<ARTICLE>                 5
<LEGEND>

     This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from
Financial Statements for the 3 months ended March 31, 1999, and is qualified
in its entirety by reference to such form 10QSB for three months ended March 
31, 1999.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                                         1
       
<S>                                                       <C>
<PERIOD-START>                                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                                    3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                                          44,932
<SECURITIES>                                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                                   62,880
<ALLOWANCES>                                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                                     37,574
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                               151,483
<PP&E>                                                          86,715
<DEPRECIATION>                                                  72,074
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                                 378,624
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                           37,572
<BONDS>                                                              0
<COMMON>                                                           160
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                                0
<PREFERRED>                                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                                     339,232
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                                   378,624
<SALES>                                                         92,130
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                                98,630
<CGS>                                                           12,273
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                                  126,446
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                                 3,076
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                                 266
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                                (31,160)
<INCOME-TAX>                                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                            (31,160)
<DISCONTINUED>                                                       0
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<CHANGES>                                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                                   (31,160)
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</TABLE>
Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-13-0000096 12-JAN-2016 09:33 AM
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                       1,430,487
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  678,523
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
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<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             8,218,576
<PP&E>                                       4,685,679
<DEPRECIATION>                               2,176,523
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              10,797,969
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        4,961,016
<BONDS>                                         56,725
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                  3,572,495
<COMMON>                                    45,507,801
<OTHER-SE>                                (43,875,087)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                10,797,969
<SALES>                                        421,517
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               421,517
<CGS>                                        1,149,207
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,149,207
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,049,155
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               7,310
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (2,954,604)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (2,954,604)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (2,954,604)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.24)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.24)
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     (Replace this text with the legend)
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0000921929
<NAME>                        Frontier Airlines, Inc.

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               MAR-31-2001
<PERIOD-START>                  APR-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                    SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                          118,891,103
<SECURITIES>                              0
<RECEIVABLES>                    29,095,393
<ALLOWANCES>                        639,321
<INVENTORY>                       2,916,390
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                191,355,185
<PP&E>                           34,577,438
<DEPRECIATION>                    8,095,257
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  254,177,086
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                     0
<PREFERRED>                               0
<BONDS>                                   0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           123,342,072
<COMMON>                             18,001
<OTHER-SE>                      120,050,149
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    254,177,086
<SALES>                         243,891,622
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                243,891,622
<CGS>                                     0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                   187,925,146
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                 (3,735,397)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                          0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                   34,950
<INCOME-PRETAX>                  59,666,923
<INCOME-TAX>                     23,025,105
<INCOME-CONTINUING>              36,641,818
<DISCONTINUED>                            0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                           0
<CHANGES>                                 0
<NET-INCOME>                     36,641,818
<EPS-BASIC>                            2.06
<EPS-DILUTED>                          1.90



</TABLE>
585 A.2d 357

#### JOSE VELASQUEZ v. VERA FRANZ, ETC., ET AL.

July 17, 1990.

Leave to appeal granted.
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18
- 1293

RENEE FEREBEE , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION; MR. LYLES , Defendants

- Appellees

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland , at Greenbelt

. Theodore D. Chuang , District Judge. ( 8:16

- cv
- 03803

- TDC )

Submitted : June 21, 2018 Decided: June 25, 2018

Before DIAZ and HARRIS , Circuit Judges , and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge

.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

.
Renee Ferebee, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:
Renee Ferebee seeks to appeal the district court’s order granting Def endant s ’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Ferebee’s civil action. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed. Parties are accorded 30 days after the entry of the district court’s final judgme nt or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” Bowles v. Russell , 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).
The district court’s order was entered on the docket on February 6, 2018 . The notice of appeal was filed 34 days later, on March 12, 2018 . Because Ferebee failed to
fil e a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. GERALD CARODENUTO.

November 17, 1987.

Petition for certification denied.
584 A.2d 207

#### NICHOLAS FRASCO v. E. CALVIN NEUBERT, ETC.

May 7, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORPORATION,

Respondent

v.

LISA G. COLTON A/K/A LISA COLTON,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 370 EAL 2018

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 29th day of January, 2019

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Noble E. BATES.

No. 2010-KP-2188.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 1, 2011.

In re Bates, Noble E.; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 2, No. 209,744; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-715-KH.

Denied.
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

IN RE

CHRIS SANCHEZ,

Relator.

§

§

§

§

No. 08-20-00058-CR

AN ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

IN MANDAMUS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Relator Chris Sanchez, pro se, has filed an application for a writ of mandamus against the 

41st District Court of El Paso County, asking this Court to grant him a new trial, or to reverse the 

judgment of conviction in his criminal case. The writ application should be denied.

Sanchez was convicted of murder. This Court heard Sanchez’s direct appeal in 2013 and 

affirmed his conviction in the 41st District Court in trial court cause number 20090D01202. See 

Sanchez v. State, No. 08-11-00074-CR, 2013 WL 841681 (Tex.App.--El Paso Mar. 6, 2013, no 

pet.) (not designated for publication). No petition for discretionary review was filed, meaning that 

Sanchez’s conviction is final. 

To be entitled to mandamus relief, a relator must meet two requirements. The relator must 

establish, (1) that he has no adequate remedy at law to redress his alleged harm, and (2) that what 

he seeks to compel is a ministerial act, not a discretionary or judicial decision. Bowen v. Carnes, 

343 S.W.3d 805, 810 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011) (orig. proceeding). 
2

Under Texas law, the sole method for a collateral attack on a felony conviction is through 

an application for a writ of habeas corpus. In re Harrison, 187 S.W.3d 199, 200 (Tex.App.--

Texarkana 2006, orig. proceeding). The procedure set forth in Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of 

Criminal Procedure is the exclusive post-conviction judicial remedy available when the conviction 

is final, and the applicant is confined by virtue of his or her felony conviction as in this case. Id. 

The petition for writ of mandamus is denied.

JEFF ALLEY, Chief Justice

March 20, 2020

Before Alley, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ.

(Do Not Publish)
Comments of Julie Glass Martin-Korb, Esq.

Re: Options for Proposed Amendments to MSPB Rules of Practice and Procedure

78 Fed. Reg. 67,076 (Nov. 8, 2013)

December 9, 2013

Via Email

William D. Spencer 

Clerk of the Board 

Merit Systems Protection Board 

1615 M Street NW 

Washington, DC 20419

mspb@mspb.gov

Dear Mr. Spencer:

I am an employment law attorney who has worked in federal sector employment law in a 

number of capacities over the last twenty years. I write now in my personal capacity as a former 

member of the National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA) and the Metropolitan 

Washington Employment Lawyers Association (MWELA), and a current member of the 

Maryland Employment Lawyers Association (MELA). I dissent from the views expressed by 

these organizations in their comments.

To put it bluntly, while NELA, MWELA, and MELA ostensibly advocate against 

summary judgment in Board proceedings, they are in fact voting for it. These organizations 

argue that the Board should maintain its current practice of requiring employees to make “nonfrivolous allegations” to establish jurisdiction in Board appeals. In practice, the implementation 

of the “non-frivolous allegation” requirement results in de facto summary judgment. Indeed, the

standard for determining whether non-frivolous allegations of jurisdiction exist is “analogous to 

that for summary judgment.” Kahn v. Dep’t of Justice, 528 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

Moreover, the Board’s whole notion of “non-frivolous allegation” ultimately derives from 

summary judgment jurisprudence. See Spiegel v. Dep’t of the Army, 2 M.S.P.R. 140, 141-42 

(1980) (citing federal summary judgment cases).

It is unfathomable to me why these organizations, which purport to represent federal 

employees’ interests, would advocate to perpetuate the current convoluted jurisdictional scheme 

which so disadvantages employees – particularly employees representing themselves pro se in 

Board proceedings. One can only hope that their comments are merely misguided, and not a 

cynical means to maintain a torturous system of establishing jurisdiction that can only be 

navigated by lawyers specializing in federal sector employment law.

Thank you for this opportunity to comment on the proposed regulations.

Respectfully submitted,

Julie Glass Martin-Korb