NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

ERIN B., Appellant,

v.

JON F., T.F., A.F., X.F., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 18-0414 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JS518544

The Honorable Cynthia L. Gialketsis, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Vierling Law Offices, Phoenix

By Thomas A. Vierling

Counsel for Appellant

Berkshire Law Offices PLLC, Tempe

By Keith Berkshire, Erica L. Gadberry

Counsel for Appellee Jon F.

FILED 3-19-2019
ERIN B. v. JON F., et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 Erin B. (“Mother”) appeals from the juvenile court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to her children, T.F., A.F., and X.F. For the 

following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother and Jon F. (“Father”) are the biological parents of T.F., 

A.F., and X.F. Mother and Father were married in August 1998, and their 

first child, T.F., was born in April 2002. According to Father, his relationship

with Mother became “chaotic” after she gave birth to their twins—A.F. and 

X.F—and T.F. was diagnosed with autism. Mother and Father separated in 

early 2009 and then divorced in November 2010.

¶3 In January 2014, Father petitioned the court to modify orders 

regarding legal decision-making authority, parenting time, child support, 

and spousal maintenance. In February 2015, Dr. Raymond Branton

performed a court-ordered psychological evaluation of Mother and 

submitted a report to the court. Dr. Branton concluded that Mother had 

several personality disorders, as well as anxiety and hoarding disorders. He

also noted that Mother’s “significant mental health issues, unhealthy 

patterns, and unstable lifestyle may limit [her] ability to properly care for 

the children.” The court entered final orders in May 2015, which became 

effective in June 2015. The court granted Father sole legal decision-making

authority, designated him as the primary residential parent, and allowed

Mother supervised visits. The court also set forth requirements for Mother 

to qualify for unsupervised visits. At a minimum, she had to demonstrate

that she was complying with Dr. Branton’s recommendations outlined in 

his report. Those recommendations included engaging in weekly

individual counseling “to address the mental health symptoms, [] cognitive 

distortions, and problematic behavioral patterns” identified in the report

and providing “[q]uarterly progress reports from the counselor . . . to the 

[c]ourt[.]” Mother never sought to modify the court’s final orders, including 

the child support award.
ERIN B. v. JON F., et al.

Decision of the Court

3

¶4 Despite the parenting time order, Mother did not exercise her

right to supervised parenting time and requested only one supervised visit

through email in the years that followed. According to Father, Mother also 

never sent any gifts, photos, or letters, and she failed to satisfy her child 

support obligations.

¶5 In July 2017, Father petitioned the juvenile court to terminate 

Mother’s parental rights, citing abandonment under A.R.S. § 8–533(B)(1) 

and mental illness under A.R.S. § 8–533(B)(3) as grounds for termination.

As the termination hearing approached, Mother’s tax refund was

intercepted to pay delinquent child support. She was also found in 

contempt of court for failure to pay child support arrears that accrued 

between June 2015 and November 2017. The court ordered that she not be 

released until she remitted a purge payment of $5,000. In March 2018, she 

paid $5,000 to purge the contempt order. According to Father, “that was the 

first time Mother voluntarily paid any support[.]” He reported that 

between May 2015 and March 2018, he had only received two child support 

payments from Mother, which were acquired through “garnishment” or 

other involuntary means. 

¶6 At the contested July 2018 termination hearing, Mother was 

asked why she had not provided the court with any of the counseling 

reports that she was ordered to submit to have unsupervised contact with 

the children. She explained that she had experienced “setbacks” because

she had been focusing on an ongoing dependency proceeding the 

Department of Child Safety had brought regarding a child that was not at 

issue in the present matter, X.B. Mother then testified that although she did 

not provide any counseling reports to the court, she had been participating

in counseling through TERROS—which she said helped her overcome an 

“alcohol disorder.” She later acknowledged, however, that she had not 

provided her counselor with Dr. Branton’s full psychological evaluation 

report.

¶7 Father testified about the children’s recent interactions with 

Mother. According to Father, Mother had only one phone conversation 

with A.F., who was upset by that conversation and refused thereafter to 

speak to Mother. Father also testified that X.F. was upset after Mother’s 

most recent phone call, during which he learned that Mother had 

permanently moved to California and had another child.

¶8 Father then testified about matters concerning the best 

interests of the children. According to Father, he petitioned to terminate 

Mother’s parental rights because he wanted his fiancée—D.W.—to adopt 
ERIN B. v. JON F., et al.

Decision of the Court

4

the children. He asserted that having Mother’s parental rights terminated

would benefit the children because it would allow D.W. to adopt them and 

restore stability in their lives. He testified that D.W. performed parental 

duties for the children and had “been the exact figure that a mother should 

be[.]” He explained that D.W. had been involved in the children’s 

“everyday life” and that she had actively engaged in helping T.F. with his 

needs. He specifically mentioned that “[s]he’s part of the [Individual 

Education Programs], the [Individual Support Plans], [and] she works with 

the therapist[.]”

¶9 D.W. confirmed that she wanted to adopt the children and

that she performed parental duties for the children. She also testified that 

she is committed to helping T.F. with his medical needs and in improving 

his condition. She testified further that she intends to marry Father “as soon 

as this [thing] wraps up[.]”

¶10 A caseworker opined in a social study report that termination 

was in the children’s best interests because the children were in a stable 

home with Father and D.W. who have been providing—and can continue 

providing—for the children’s financial, emotional, and educational needs.

According to the report, D.W. felt “pride” in caring for T.F., A.F., and X.F.,

looked forward to the day she is able to adopt them, and had been helping 

raise the children for the past two years.

¶11 Furthermore, the report noted that Mother had no contact 

with T.F. since May 2015 and that she had never inquired about any of the 

children’s well-being. It also noted that the only contact that Mother had 

with the children was one phone call with X.F. and A.F in November 2015

and one additional phone call with just X.F. in February 2017. Moreover, 

the report stated that a bond between the children and D.W. “was evident 

during the study” and that D.W. was actively involved in the care of T.F.

¶12 The juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights under 

the statutory ground of abandonment. The court found that Mother had no 

physical contact with the children since June 2015 and that her last phone 

contact with any of the children was in February 2017. The court noted that 

Mother had failed to provide reasonable child support on a regular basis, 

recently had a tax refund seized to pay for arrears in her child support, and 

had made little effort to satisfy the requirements to have unsupervised 

visits with the children. The court further noted that although Mother had 

gone to counseling, she “never provided a copy of Dr. Branton’s report 

(only providing page 16) to her counselor so that the issues raised by Dr. 

Branton could be addressed properly.”
ERIN B. v. JON F., et al.

Decision of the Court

5

¶13 The court then found that terminating Mother’s parental

rights would be in the children’s best interests. The court reasoned that 

termination would benefit the children because it would allow D.W. to 

adopt them. The court noted that D.W. had assumed a “maternal role” in

the children’s lives, had been fully engaged in addressing T.F.’s special 

needs, and had been actively involved in providing for the children’s 

educational needs. Also, the court found that continuing the parent-child 

relationship would be detrimental to the children because Mother was

unable to demonstrate an understanding for why her actions had upset the

children. The court also noted that Mother had neither inquired about T.F.’s 

needs nor participated in his care since 2015. Mother timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

¶14 Mother challenges only the juvenile court’s best interests 

finding; she does not dispute the finding of abandonment. A juvenile 

court’s termination order is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. E.R. v. Dep’t 

of Child Safety, 237 Ariz. 56, 58 ¶ 9 (App. 2015). “The juvenile court, as the 

trier of fact in a termination proceeding, is in the best position to weigh the 

evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and make 

appropriate findings.” Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280 

¶ 4 (App. 2002). We accept the juvenile court’s factual findings unless no 

reasonable evidence supports them and will affirm a termination order

unless it is clearly erroneous. Bobby G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 219 Ariz. 

506, 508 ¶ 1 (App. 2008). 

¶15 Terminating parental rights is in the children’s best interests

if the children will benefit from the termination or will be harmed if the 

relationship continues. Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 

179 ¶ 20 (App. 2014). In determining whether the children will benefit from 

termination, relevant factors include whether the placement is meeting the 

children’s needs, an adoption plan is in place, and if the children are 

adoptable. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 3–4 ¶ 12 (2016). “Of course, 

a court need not automatically conclude that severance is in a child’s best

interests just because the child is adoptable; there may be other 

circumstances indicating that severance is not the best option.” Id. at 4 ¶ 14.

The juvenile court must, therefore, consider the totality of the circumstances 

when making a best-interests finding. Dominique M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 

240 Ariz. 96, 99 ¶ 12 (App. 2016). 

¶16 Sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that 

the children would both benefit from the termination and would be harmed 

if the relationship continued. The caseworker that conducted the social 
ERIN B. v. JON F., et al.

Decision of the Court

6

study reported that Father and D.W. had been appropriately providing for 

the children’s needs and that the children had a positive relationship with 

D.W. Additionally, Father testified that terminating Mother’s parental 

rights would benefit the children because it would restore a stable home 

environment and allow D.W. to adopt the children. D.W. also expressed her 

desire to adopt and stated that she had been performing parental duties for 

the children for two years. In contrast, Mother had not seen the children in 

several years, had been unable to meet any of the requirements to obtain 

unsupervised contact with the children, and her only contact with the 

children had upset them. Thus, the record adequately supports the court’s 

finding that termination was in the children’s best interests. 

¶17 Mother asserts that termination would not benefit the 

children because Father and D.W.’s plan to marry was “speculative” and 

unsupported by “credible evidence.” We decline to consider Mother’s

assertion because we will not substitute our judgment for that of the 

juvenile court about the credibility and weight of witness testimony. See 

Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 282 ¶¶ 4, 12. Moreover, availability of a likely adoptive 

parent is only one potential benefit relevant to a best-interests assessment,

and the record here reflects that additional factors sufficiently support the 

juvenile court’s determination that terminating Mother’s parental rights 

would benefit the children.

¶18 Mother argues that “[D.W.] is not a person who can adopt the 

children and the Juvenile Court erred as a matter of law in considering her 

as such.” For support, Mother relies on Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.,

194 Ariz. 376 (App. 1998). That decision, however, is inapposite. In Audra 

T., this Court affirmed the juvenile court’s determination that the child’s 

best interests favored placing him with his foster family rather than his 

paternal grandparents because the grandparents had never established a 

relationship with the child; the grandmother visited the child only once 

after his removal, the grandfather had no contact with the child, and the 

grandparents had not been available to take the child when he was initially 

removed from his parents. Id. at 378 ¶ 7. None of these circumstances are 

present here. Thus, Mother’s argument fails.

¶19 Next, Mother argues that the juvenile court should have 

considered only her current—and not past—conduct in making its 

best-interests determination and that the court erred by failing to “articulate 

how maintaining her parental rights would be a detriment to the children 

currently or in the future.” The record does not support Mother’s argument, 

however. The record shows and the juvenile court found that Mother’s 

patterns of behavior and complete absence from the children’s lives had 
ERIN B. v. JON F., et al.

Decision of the Court

7

negatively affected the children and that those same patterns and 

circumstances persisted at the time of the termination hearing. As of the 

termination hearing, Mother had virtually no contact with the children for 

many years; her most recent interaction with X.F. had left him distraught; 

she had never sent any gifts, letters, or pictures; she had made little or no 

effort to visit the children; and she had not provided the children with any 

meaningful financial support. Furthermore, the juvenile court found that 

Mother had not inquired about T.F.’s needs, had not participated in his care 

since 2015, and she recently had a tax refund intercepted to pay for arrears 

in her child support. The court’s best-interests determination is therefore 

based on “current” evidence, and that evidence adequately supports the 

conclusion that maintaining Mother’s parent-child relationship risked 

harm to the children.

¶20 Mother nonetheless highlights her testimony that she 

participated in counseling services, has a bond with the children, 

“overcame alcohol,” and “is ready to begin therapeutic intervention for 

visitation and contact.” But in doing so Mother essentially asks this Court 

to reweigh the evidence presented at trial, which we will not do. See Jesus 

M., 203 Ariz. at 282 ¶ 12 (stating that this Court does not reweigh evidence 

on appeal). Thus, the juvenile court did not err in finding that terminating 

Mother’s rights would be in the children’s best interests. 

CONCLUSION

¶21 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.