[Cite as Henderson v. Stalder, 2024-Ohio-3037.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

MONROE COUNTY

STEVEN C. HENDERSON ET AL.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

STANLEY STALDER ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellees,

ALLAN HENDERSON ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellants.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Case No. 23 MO 0017

Civil Appeal from the

Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County, Ohio

Case No. 2022-175

BEFORE:

Mark A. Hanni, Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Judges.

JUDGMENT:

Reversed and Remanded.

Atty. Andrew P. Lycans, Critchfield, Critchfield & Johnson, Ltd., for Plaintiffs-Appellees 

and

Atty. Craig E. Sweeney and Atty. Zachary D. Eddy, Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, LLP, for 

Defendants-Appellees and
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Case No. 23 MO 0017

Atty. Brent A. Barnes and Atty. Jack F. Willems, Geiger, Teeple, Robinson & McElwee, 

PLCC, for Defendants-Appellants.

Dated: August 9, 2024

HANNI, J.

{¶1} Defendants-Appellants, Allan and Roseanne Henderson, appeal from a 

Monroe County Common Pleas Court judgment granting summary judgment in favor of 

Defendants/Cross-claimants/Counterclaimants-Appellees, Stanley and Marcia Stalder, 

on a complaint filed by Plaintiffs, Steven C. Henderson, John D. Henderson, and Patricia 

J. Henderson, for declaratory judgment and to quiet title as to a certain oil and gas 

interest. Because the Stalders did not fully comply with the Dormant Mineral Act (DMA) 

in having the oil and gas interest at issue declared abandoned and vested in them as the 

surface owners, the trial court’s judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded. 

{¶2} This case concerns the ownership of the oil and gas rights underlying 

approximately 15.669 acres of property in Monroe County (the Property). 

{¶3} In 1910, S.W. and Aura Egger reserved one-half of all coal, oil, and gas 

underlying the Property (Egger Reservation) in a warranty deed to Caroline Snider and 

the heirs of August Snider:

Excepting and reserving all timber on said lands together with the right of 

way for the purpose of removing the same for the period of 2 years from the 

date hereof. Also excepting the one-half of all coal, oil and gas in and 

underlying said premises.

(June 2, 2023 Joint Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. A). The Egger Reservation 

created the Egger Interest underlying the Property. Appellants, Allan and Roseanne 

Henderson (the Henderson Appellants), and Plaintiffs, Steven Henderson, John 

Henderson, and Patricia Henderson (the Henderson Plaintiffs), now claim title to the 

Egger Interest. 

{¶4} Appellees, the Stalders (the Stalders), are the current surface owners of the 

Property. Prior to the Stalders’ ownership, the Property was owned by Appellee Stanley 

Stalder and his brother Richard Stalder. 
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Case No. 23 MO 0017

{¶5} Stanley and Richard were approached by oil and gas companies regarding 

leasing the oil and gas rights underlying the Property. It was then that Stanley and 

Richard discovered the Egger Reservation. 

{¶6} Stanley and Richard hired an attorney to aid in their effort to have the Egger 

Interest deemed abandoned and vested in the surface under the DMA. The attorney 

hired Knight Research, Ltd. to perform title research. Jessica Wielitzka performed the 

title research. She prepared two title reports that outlined the chain of title to the Property 

and the Egger Reservation.

{¶7} After searching the Monroe County public records and finding no heirs, 

Wielitzka conducted additional internet research. Wielitzka’s research revealed that 

“Virginia” Egger Henderson may have been an heir to the Eggers. It was determined that 

“Virginia” was actually “Vivian” Egger Henderson. The Henderson Appellants and 

Henderson Plaintiffs are Vivian’s nieces/nephews through marriage. A potential address 

was identified for Vivian in Portage County. Stanley and Richard attempted service via 

certified mail at that address on June 15, 2014. However, the address was actually for 

property previously owned by the Henderson Appellants. The certified mail was returned. 

On June 27, 2014, Stanley and Richard served notice on the Eggers and their heirs and 

assigns by publication in The Monroe County Beacon. This notice gave any potential 

holders until July 26, 2014, to file a claim to preserve or an affidavit identifying a savings 

event. 

{¶8} By August 18, 2014, no mineral interest holder had filed a claim to preserve 

or an affidavit identifying a savings event. Stanley and Richard subsequently filed an 

Affidavit of Abandonment pursuant to the DMA. 

{¶9} By September 29, 2014, still no mineral interest holder had filed a claim to 

preserve or an affidavit identifying a savings event. Stanley and Richard then recorded 

a Notice of Failure to File on September 20, 2014, indicating the Egger Interest was 

deemed abandoned and vested in Stanley and Richard. The Stalders have since entered 

into oil and gas leases for the premises.

{¶10} On June 24, 2022, the Henderson Plaintiffs filed a complaint for declaratory 

judgment and to quiet title to the mineral interest. They claimed the abandonment process 

was ineffective and they are the rightful owners of the oil and gas interest. The Stalders 
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filed an answer, counterclaim (against the Henderson Plaintiffs), and cross-claim (against 

the Henderson Appellants) raising claims under the DMA and the Marketable Title Act 

(MTA) for declaratory judgment and to quiet title. The parties then filed competing 

motions for summary judgment. 

{¶11} On September 18, 2023, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor 

of the Stalders on all claims. It found that all material facts were matters of public record. 

The court determined that Richard and Stanley undertook reasonable diligence to locate

any mineral interest holders before resorting to notice by publication. Therefore, the court 

found the abandonment was proper and granted summary judgment in favor of the 

Stalders on all claims, counterclaims, and cross-claims. 

{¶12} The Henderson Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal on October 17, 

2023. They now raise three assignments of error for our review. 

{¶13} An appellate court reviews a summary judgment ruling de novo. Comer v. 

Risko, 2005-Ohio-4559, ¶ 8. Thus, we shall apply the same test as the trial court in 

determining whether summary judgment was proper.

{¶14} A court may grant summary judgment only when (1) no genuine issue of 

material fact exists; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and 

(3) the evidence can only produce a finding that is contrary to the non-moving party.

Mercer v. Halmbacher, 2015-Ohio-4167, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.); Civ.R. 56(C). The initial burden 

is on the party moving for summary judgment to demonstrate the absence of a genuine 

issue of material fact as to the essential elements of the case with evidence of the type 

listed in Civ.R. 56(C). Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292 (1996). A “material fact” 

depends on the substantive law of the claim being litigated. Hoyt, Inc. v. Gordon & Assoc., 

Inc., 104 Ohio App.3d 598, 603 (8th Dist.1995), citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

477 U.S. 242, 247-248 (1986).

{¶15} “[T]he moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial court 

of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate 

the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the nonmoving party's 

claim.” Dresher, 75 Ohio St.3d at 296. The trial court's decision must be based upon 

“the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, 
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Case No. 23 MO 0017

transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action.”

Civ.R. 56(C).

{¶16} If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving 

party to set forth specific facts to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Id.; 

Civ.R. 56(E). “Trial courts should award summary judgment with caution, being careful 

to resolve doubts and construe evidence in favor of the nonmoving party.” Welco 

Industries, Inc. v. Applied Cos., 67 Ohio St.3d 344, 346 (1993).

{¶17} The Henderson Appellants’ first assignment of error states:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RENDERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 

FAVOR OF STALDER SINCE STALDER FAILED TO MEET THEIR 

BURDEN OF PROVING PERFORMANCE OF A REASONABLY DILIGENT 

SEARCH TO LOCATE THE NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF THE 

MINERAL HOLDERS UNDER FONZI V. BROWN, 169 OHIO ST.3D 70,

2022-OHIO-901, 202 N.E.3D 604.

{¶18} The Henderson Appellants agree that a general search of the Monroe 

County public records in 2014 would not have revealed the name or address of Vivian 

Henderson. But they assert that at that time, the Stalders had actual knowledge through 

their agent, Wielitzka, who had found on ancestry.com that Vivian Henderson died in 2000 

as a resident of Mahoning County. Because the Stalders allegedly possessed this 

information, the Henderson Appellants argue the Stalders should have searched the 

public records of Mahoning County. Had they done so, the Stalders would have found 

Vivian’s estate, which contained the names and addresses of her heirs. Because the 

Stalders failed to search the Mahoning County public records, the Henderson Appellants 

argue the Stalders did not conduct a reasonably diligent search. 

{¶19} The DMA provides that “[a]ny mineral interest held by any person, other 

than the owner of the surface of the lands subject to the interest, shall be deemed 

abandoned and vested in the owner of the surface of the lands subject to the interest if 

the requirements established in division (E) of this section are satisfied” and no savings 

events occur. R.C. 5301.56(B). “If a holder or a holder's successors or assignees claim 

that the mineral interest that is the subject of a notice under division (E) of this section 
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Case No. 23 MO 0017

has not been abandoned, the holder or the holder's successors or assignees, not later 

than sixty days after the date on which the notice was served or published, as applicable, 

shall file” either a claim to preserve or an affidavit in compliance with the statute. R.C. 

5301.56(H)(1)(a)(b). A timely claim to preserve by any holder preserves the rights of all 

holders of a mineral interest in the same land. R.C. 5301.56(C)(2). 

{¶20} Pursuant to R.C. 5301.56(E)(1), before a mineral interest becomes vested 

in the surface owner, the surface owner shall:

Serve notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to each holder or 

each holder's successors or assignees, at the last known address of each, 

of the owner's intent to declare the mineral interest abandoned. If service of 

notice cannot be completed to any holder, the owner shall publish notice of 

the owner's intent to declare the mineral interest abandoned at least once 

in a newspaper of general circulation in each county in which the land that 

is subject to the interest is located. The notice shall contain all of the 

information specified in division (F) of this section.

{¶21} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that a surface owner need not 

specifically identify by name every holder before using notice by publication. Gerrity v. 

Chervenak, 2020-Ohio-6705, ¶ 19. The Court observed that, “[c]onstruing the Dormant 

Mineral Act as ineffective unless the surface owner identifies every mineral-interest 

holder, including every successor or assignee of a record holder, would negate the 

express legislative purpose of the act.” Id. at ¶ 21.

{¶22} As to what constitutes a reasonable search for holders under R.C. 

5301.56(E)(1), this Court has stated:

We have made it abundantly clear that what constitutes reasonable due 

diligence will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. We 

again decline to establish a bright-line rule requiring a specific search 

process, and reaffirm that what constitutes reasonable due diligence will 

depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. We emphasize that 

R.C. 5301.56(E)(1) makes it clear that since notice by publication is a last 
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Case No. 23 MO 0017

resort, a sincere, diligent effort by the researcher is required before service 

by publication is appropriate.

Fonzi v. Miller, 2020-Ohio-3739, ¶ 34 (7th Dist.), appeal allowed, 2020-Ohio-4574.

{¶23} Without establishing a strict rule, the Ohio Supreme Court outlined 

reasonable steps a surface owner should take before resorting to notice by publication:

[T]he surface owner must consult the public-property records in the county 

in which the surface property is located to determine whether a saving event 

has occurred. If no saving event is evident, the surface owner must also 

consult the chain of title to determine the record holder or record holders of 

the mineral interest—the starting point for determining who the surface 

owner must attempt to notify pursuant to R.C. 5301.56(E)(1). In addition to 

property records in the county in which the land that is subject to the mineral 

interest is located, a reasonable search for holders of a severed mineral 

interest will generally also include a search of court records, including 

probate records, in that county.

Gerrity at ¶ 35.

{¶24} In Gerrity, the surface owner searched the public records in the county 

where the property was located for any holders, located an address in another county for 

a possible holder, searched that county’s public records to no avail, and unsuccessfully 

attempted service at one potential address. No internet search was attempted. The 

surface owner then resorted to notice by publication. The Ohio Supreme Court found this 

search reasonable. 

{¶25} In Shilts v. Beardmore, 2018-Ohio-863 (7th Dist.), this Court found 

reasonable a search that included a search of the public records of the county where the 

property was located, the records of the Ohio Department of Natural Resources, and an 

internet search. There was no attempt to serve a holder by certified mail as no heirs were 

located. This Court found the search to be reasonable. 

{¶26} In Crum v. Yoder, 2020-Ohio-5046, ¶ 62 (7th Dist.), we found “the surface 

owners engaged in reasonable efforts by using the names of the record holders to search 

the public records of Monroe County and the probate records of Belmont County (as well 
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Case No. 23 MO 0017

as Monroe County). It is undisputed that no heirs were revealed by these searches. A 

general internet search is not a mandate in determining the identity of the heirs of a record 

holder[.]”

{¶27} In discussing a case where the surface owner should have searched 

beyond the public records of the county where the property was located, this Court stated:

In Fonzi [v. Brown], the 1952 deed transferring Monroe County 

property and reserving a mineral interest showed the grantor lived in 

Washington County, Pennsylvania. Fonzi, 169 Ohio St.3d 70, 2022-Ohio901, 202 N.E.3d 604 at ¶ 2. Before serving notice of abandonment by 

publication, the surface owners searched Monroe County public records 

and performed “limited Internet research” without attempting to search the 

public records in Washington County, Pennsylvania, even though that was 

the mineral holder's last known residence. Id. at ¶ 26. The trial court granted 

summary judgment for the surface owners. We reversed, finding this was 

not a reasonably diligent search. Fonzi v. Brown, 7th Dist. Monroe No. 19 

MO 0012, 2020-Ohio-3631, 2020 WL 3639886, ¶ 19 (where the surface 

owner argued the law did not require a search beyond the public records in 

the county where the property is located, we explained further search 

requirements depend on the circumstances), citing, e.g., Sharp v. Miller, 

2018-Ohio-4740, 114 N.E.3d 1285 (7th Dist.) (where the mineral holders 

argued an internet search was required for a reasonably diligent search, we 

rejected a bright-line approach and held the public records search was 

sufficient because the probate records for the holder's estate gave the 

surface owners no reason to believe an internet search would have located 

potential heirs).

The Supreme Court upheld our decision, finding a lack of reasonable 

diligence because the surface owners failed to attempt personal service at 

the last known address and “failed to search public records beyond the 

county where the mineral interests were located, despite having knowledge 

that the mineral-interest holder did not reside within that county when the 
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Case No. 23 MO 0017

reservation was made * * *.” Fonzi, 169 Ohio St.3d 70, 2022-Ohio-901, 202 

N.E.3d 604 at ¶ 28. In general, surface owners must not disregard 

information about the holder in the public records in order to proceed directly 

to publication. See id. (on the subject of last known address).

Jeffco Resources, Inc. v. Abrecht, 2023-Ohio-4712, ¶ 31-32 (7th Dist.).

{¶28} The Henderson Appellants contend in this case that Stanley and Richard 

Stalder acquired actual knowledge through Wielitzka’s search on ancestry.com that 

Vivian Egger Henderson died in 2000 as a resident of Mahoning County. Therefore, they 

claim reasonable diligence required Stanley and Richard to search the public records of 

Mahoning County before resorting to notice by publication. 

{¶29} The problem with the Henderson Appellants’ argument, however, is that 

there is no evidence that Stanley and Richard had actual knowledge that Vivian died in 

2000 as a resident of Mahoning County. The evidence shows that they had knowledge 

of her death, but not that she may have died a resident of Mahoning County. 

{¶30} In their search for a holder, Stanley and Richard hired an attorney who 

specializes in oil and gas law. (Warnock Dep. 15-16). The attorney then hired Knight 

Research Ltd.’s Wielitzka, a title examiner, to conduct a mineral title search and perform 

additional research. (Warnock Dep. 19, 27; Warnock Aff. ¶ 5). 

{¶31} Wielitzka provided two reports outlining the chain of title to the Property and 

the Egger Interest. (Wielitzka Dep. 18-25). Wielitzka’s report indicated that the Egger 

Interest was created in 1910 by S.W. and Aura Egger. (Wielitzka Dep. Ex. F). The report 

found S.W.’s estate, noting that S.W. died leaving everything to Aura. (Wielitzka Dep. 

Ex. F). The report stated that according to ancestry.com, Aura died in 1946. (Wielitzka 

Dep. Ex. F). Aura left three heirs: Bertha Egger (who died single and childless in 1958); 

Grace Egger Clifford (who died widowed in 1970 with no children found); and George 

Egger (who died in 1966 with two daughters living at the time - Ruth Egger and “Virginia” 

Egger Henderson). (Wielitzka Dep. Ex. F). The report indicated that “Virginia” died 

widowed in 2000 and no records could be found for Ruth. (Wielitzka Dep. Ex. F). The 

report indicated there were no probate records for Bertha Egger, Grace Egger, or George 

Egger, though they all died in Monroe County. (Wielitzka Dep. Ex. F). 
– 10 –

Case No. 23 MO 0017

{¶32} Based on Wielitzka’s research and additional searching, the attorney came 

to believe that “Virginia” Egger Henderson was actually “Vivian” Egger Henderson. 

(Warnock Aff. ¶ 10). He also identified a possible address in Portage County, Ohio where 

Vivian may have lived, which is where the Stalders attempted service by certified mail. 

(Warnock Aff. ¶ 10). 

{¶33} During Wielitzka’s deposition, the Henderson Appellants’ counsel 

introduced an exhibit that he stated he printed from ancestry.com on April 11, 2023. 

(Wielitzka Dep. 34; Ex. H to Ex. O). This is the only place in the record where it is 

suggested that Vivian died as a resident of Mahoning County. Neither the title reports 

nor deposition testimony make any mention that Vivian may have resided in Mahoning 

County. 

{¶34} In discussing online searches, this Court has observed: 

Regarding general online searches, the information available on the internet 

is not always reliable. Furthermore, it changes continually. Previously 

printed information is gradually put on the internet, but the date of internet 

publication does not necessarily match the date of print publication for 

purposes of ascertaining what information was available years ago when 

statutory abandonment proceedings were utilized as to a property.

Crum v. Yoder, 2020-Ohio-5046, ¶ 61 (7th Dist.). Hence, just because information may 

have been available on ancestry.com on April 11, 2023 (when the Henderson 

Appellants’ attorney searched), does not mean this same information was available in 

2014 (when the attorney and title examiner searched). 

{¶35} The Stalders were reasonably diligent in their search before resorting to 

notice by publication. They took all of the steps outlined by the Ohio Supreme Court in 

Gerrity, 2020-Ohio-6705: (1) they consulted the public-property records in Monroe 

County where the Property is located; (2) they researched the chain of title to determine 

the record holders of the Egger Interest; and (3) they searched Monroe County probate 

court records for holders of the Egger Interest. They went even further by conducting an 

internet search and attempting service by certified mail at a possible address for a 
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Case No. 23 MO 0017

deceased potential heir. These steps satisfy the reasonable diligence standard in this 

case. 

{¶36} Accordingly, the Henderson Appellants’ first assignment of error is without 

merit and is overruled. 

{¶37} The Henderson Appellants’ second assignment of error states:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RENDERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 

FAVOR OF STALDER SINCE THE STALDER’S ABANDONMENT 

NOTICE PUBLISHED IN THE MONROE COUNTY BEACON WAS 

DEFECTIVE ON ITS FACE AS IT FAILED TO NAME THE KNOWN 

HOLDERS OF THE EGGER MINERAL INTEREST.

{¶38} Here, the Henderson Appellants argue the Stalders attempted to serve 

Vivian via certified mail as the sole mineral interest holder. After that service by certified 

mail failed, the Stalders then attempted service by publication in The Monroe County 

Beacon. The problem, however, the Henderson Appellants contend, is that the notice by 

publication did not name Vivian. They claim this failure was fatal to the Stalders’ efforts 

to use the DMA.

{¶39} The Stalders, however, contend their notice by publication was sufficient 

and in compliance with the DMA. They state the only record holders in this case were 

S.W. Egger and Aura Egger. 

{¶40} Pursuant to R.C. 5301.56(F)(1), the notice required under R.C. 

5301.56(E)(1) shall contain, in addition to other requirements, “[t]he name of each holder 

and the holder's successors and assignees, as applicable[.]” (Emphasis added). A 

“holder” is “the record holder of a mineral interest, and any person who derives the 

person’s rights from, or has a common source with, the record holder and whose claim 

does not indicate, expressly or by clear implication, that it is adverse to the interest of the 

record holder.” R.C. 5301.56(A)(1).

{¶41} In their notice by publication, the Stalders only listed S.W. and Aura Egger 

as holders of the Egger Interest. They did not list Vivian Egger Henderson, despite having 

traced her interest in the Egger Interest. Had they listed Vivian, it is possible the 

Henderson Appellants may have responded to the notice as they are her heirs. 
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Case No. 23 MO 0017

{¶42} Clearly, in this case S.W. and Aura Egger were holders of the mineral 

interest. But Vivian Egger Henderson was identified by the Stalders as a successor and 

as someone who “derived her right” to the Egger Interest from S.W. and Aura Egger. R.C. 

5301.56(F) states that the R.C. 5301.56(E) notice “shall” contain the name of each holder 

and the holder's successors and assignees, as applicable. 

{¶43} The Ohio Supreme Court previously addressed the argument that because 

R.C. 5301.56(F)(1) states that the notice shall contain the name of each holder and the 

holder's successors and assignees, as applicable, the only way that an interest can be 

abandoned is if each holder is specifically named in the notice. Gerrity, 2020-Ohio-6705. 

The Court found:

We cannot, however, read R.C. 5301.56(F)(1) in isolation. Its 

mandate must be understood in light of the rest of the statutory scheme, 

including R.C. 5301.56(E)(1), which contains an express provision for 

notice by publication when service of notice by certified mail “cannot be 

completed to any holder.” Plainly, when a holder cannot be identified, 

service by mail cannot be completed on that holder. At that point, notice by 

publication is permitted under the express terms of R.C. 5301.56(E)(1). It 

would strain credulity to read R.C. 5301.56(E)(1) to allow notice by 

publication when a holder cannot be identified but at the same time to 

require identification of the holder in the notice itself.

On the other hand, reading the provision to not require identification 

of an unidentified holder is consistent with the qualifier in R.C. 5301.56(F)(1) 

that the notice shall identify “each holder and the holder's successors and 

assignees, as applicable.” (Emphasis added.) When notice is being 

provided through publication because a holder cannot be identified, the 

identity of the holder is “not applicable.”

Considering R.C. 5301.56(F)(1) in the context of R.C. 

5301.56(E)(1)'s explicit grant of authority for notice by publication, we think 

the best reading of the statute is that a surface owner need not specifically 

identify by name every holder, as broadly defined in R.C. 5301.56(A)(1). 
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Case No. 23 MO 0017

Id. at ¶ 17-19.

{¶44} Thus, Gerrity suggests that when the identity of a holder is applicable, in 

other words when their identity is known, the notice by publication shall include their 

name. Because the Stalders did not include Vivian Egger Henderson’s name in the notice 

by publication, they did not comply with the mandates of R.C. 5301.56. For this reason, 

the abandonment was not completed and summary judgment was not proper on the DMA 

claim. 

{¶45} Accordingly, the Henderson Appellants’ second assignment of error has 

merit and is sustained. 

{¶46} The Henderson Appellants’ third assignment of error states:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RENDERING A “BLANKET” SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF STAL[D]ER ON “ALL COUNTS” WHEN 

APPELLEES[’] CLAIMS UNDER THE MARKETABLE TITLE ACT ARE 

INVALID. 

{¶47} The trial court did not address the Stalders’ MTA claim. Instead, the court 

simply found that the abandonment was upheld and granted judgment to the Stalders on 

all counts in their counterclaims and cross-claims. 

{¶48} The Henderson Appellants now argue the trial court erred in ruling in favor 

of the Stalders on the MTA claims. They ask that we remand this matter to the trial court 

to rule on these issues. They assert that each of the Stalders’ chain of title deeds within 

the last 40 years refer to the Egger Interest. 

{¶49} Pursuant to the MTA, a person who has an unbroken chain of title of record 

to any interest in land for 40 years or more has a marketable record title to such interest. 

R.C. 5301.48. A “marketable record title” is defined as “a title of record, as indicated in 

section 5301.48 of the Revised Code, which operates to extinguish such interests and 

claims, existing prior to the effective date of the root of title, as are stated in section 

5301.50 of the Revised Code.” R.C. 5301.47(A). “Root of title” is defined as “that 

conveyance or other title transaction in the chain of title of a person, purporting to create 

the interest claimed by such person, upon which he relies as a basis for the marketability 

of his title, and which was the most recent to be recorded as of a date of forty years prior 
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to the time when marketability is being determined.” R.C. 5301.47(E). The effective date 

of the root of title is the date it was recorded. R.C. 5301.47(E).

{¶50} The Henderson Appellants correctly point out that the trial court did not 

address the MTA claim. In addressing this issue previously, this Court has stated:

“We generally refrain from ruling on arguments and claims not ruled 

upon by the trial court as the issues are not ripe for our review where the 

trial court proceeded as if they were moot due to another ruling.” Jefferis 

Real Estate Oil & Gas Holdings, LLC v. Schaffner Law Offices, LPA, 7th 

Dist. Belmont, 2018-Ohio-3733, 109 N.E.3d 1265, ¶ 41. See also Taylor v. 

Crosby, 150 Ohio St.3d 344, 2016-Ohio-5820, 81 N.E.3d 1223, ¶ 1 

(remanding to the trial court to address the arguments on the 2006 version 

of the Dormant Mineral Act which were not addressed by the appellate court 

as the trial court did not rule on them); Bowen v. Kil-Kare, Inc., 63 Ohio St.3d 

84, 88-89, 585 N.E.2d 384, fn. 5 (1992); Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio 

St.3d 356, 360, 604 N.E.2d 138 (1992) (de novo summary judgment review 

does not mean the appellate court must address issues in the motions 

which the trial court never reached).

It has been this court's regular position in numerous recent mineral 

rights cases to remand for the trial court to rule on unaddressed MTA issues 

where the trial court never reached the MTA's application (for instance, 

because it relied on only the DMA). 

West v. Bode, 2019-Ohio-4092, ¶ 61-62 (7th Dist.), aff'd, 2020-Ohio-5473, ¶ 62-63. 

{¶51} Based on this Court’s past practice, we must remand this matter for the trial 

court to address the MTA claim. 

{¶52} Accordingly, the Henderson Appellants’ third assignment of error has merit 

and is sustained.
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Case No. 23 MO 0017

{¶53} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is reversed and the 

matter is remanded for the trial court to address the MTA claim.

Waite, J., concurs.

Robb, P.J., concurs.
[Cite as Henderson v. Stalder, 2024-Ohio-3037.]

For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the Henderson Appellants’ 

first assignment of error is without merit and is overruled. The Henderson Appellants’ 

second and third assignments of error have merit and are sustained. It is the final 

judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of 

Monroe County, Ohio, is reversed. We hereby remand this matter to the trial court to 

address the Marketable Title Act claim. Costs to be taxed against the Appellees Stanley 

and Marcia Stalder.

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in 

this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a 

certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.