J-A20026-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RYAN STANFORD LEE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2471 EDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 29, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County 

Criminal Division at No: CP-46-CR-0006593-2016

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JANUARY 3, 2023

Appellant, Ryan Stanford Lee, appeals from the October 29, 2021 order 

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County dismissing his 

petition for collateral relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Upon review, we affirm. 

The factual background and procedural history are not at issue here. 

Briefly, following his guilty pleas to third-degree murder and criminal 

conspiracy, Appellant, on August 17, 2017, was sentenced to an aggregate 

term of 171⁄2 to 35 years of imprisonment. Appellant appealed to this Court, 

and on May 6, 2019, we affirmed the judgment of sentence. See 

Commonwealth v. Lee, No. 2819 EDA 2017, unpublished memorandum (Pa. 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Super. filed May 6, 2019). Appellant did not file a petition for allowance of 

appeal in our Supreme Court.

Appellant filed his first PCRA petition on December 21, 2020. The PCRA 

court proceeded to appoint counsel to assist Appellant in connection with his 

first PCRA petition. Subsequently, on May 4, 2021, appointed counsel filed an 

amended PCRA petition. In the amended petition, Appellant acknowledged 

that the petition was facially untimely, but argued that the delay in filing his 

first PCRA petition was attributable to the Department of Corrections (SCI 

Somerset).

1

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1 The PCRA court also noted the following:

Counsel attached several exhibits to the petition, including a copy 

of the telephone expert’s report marked as Exhibit A and SCI 

Somerset documents marked as Exhibit D. Specifically, Exhibit D 

consists of three (3) documents either drafted by or addressed to 

Appellant concerning Appellant’s request to access the law library 

at SCI Somerset. The first document, an Inmate’s Request to 

Staff Member form, submitted by Appellant on February 23, 2021, 

asks what is required to “attend” the law library. A stamped 

response from a staff member dated February 28, 2021, on the 

same form reads:

We are currently scheduling Library for time-dated 

deadlines ONLY.[FN] If you have a deadline of 30 

days or less and are pro se, have your unit staff 

contact the Library to be scheduled the next available 

session with your Zone.

[Appellant’s Amended PCRA petition, filed 5/4/21, Exhibit D)

(emphasis added).

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Upon review, on August 2, 2021, the PCRA court entered a notice of 

intention to dismiss the amended PCRA petition without a hearing because the 

PCRA petition was facially untimely and failed to meet the government 

interference exception. Appellant filed a response, disputing the PCRA court’s 

conclusions.

On October 29, 2021, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s first 

amended PCRA petition. This appeal followed. 

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[FN]: Although Counsel asserts that Appellant’s 

requests to use the law library to perfect a PCRA 

petition were denied because “no court-ordered 

deadline” existed, the denial submitted by Appellant 

does not state that a court order is required.

The second document, a Rejection Form from the facility 

grievance coordinator at SCI Somerset dated February 22, 2021, 

is a response to Appellant’s grievance. The response indicates 

Appellant’s grievance is untimely. Moreover, the response notes 

that Appellant’s suspension from attending the law library from 

January 2019 through January 2020 was a disciplinary action 

taken based upon Appellant’s own behavior. Additionally, the 

response notes that although Appellant could not physically enter 

the law library, he could still access materials from the library on 

request. 

The third document, an Inmate Grievance Appeal to Facility 

Manager Form, is a typewritten administrative appeal signed by 

Appellant and dated February 24, 2021. Therein, Appellant states 

that he has attempted to gain access to the law library for the past 

two (2) years and has been unsuccessful. Appellant did not attach 

any evidence of denied attempts to gain access inside the library 

or attempts to request material from the library prior to February 

2021.

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/13/22, at 5-6.
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“[A]n appellate court reviews the PCRA court’s findings of fact to 

determine whether they are supported by the record, and reviews its 

conclusions of law to determine whether they are free from legal error.” 

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). 

All PCRA petitions, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be 

filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(b)(1). The one-year time limitation, however, can be overcome if a 

petitioner (1) alleges and proves one of the three exceptions set forth in 

Section 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) of the PCRA, and (2) files a petition raising this 

exception within one year of the date the claim could have been presented. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). 

As noted above, Appellant filed the instant petition on December 21, 

2020, more than one year and six months after his judgment of sentence 

became final. As such, the instant petition is facially untimely.2 

On appeal, Appellant argues that his failure to file timely the instant 

petition was the result of government interference, Section 9545(b)(1)(i), and 

that the PCRA court erred in not recognizing that he met that exception. 

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2 The record reflects Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on June 

5, 2019, at the expiration of the 30-day term to petition our Supreme Court 

for allowance of appeal. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). 

Appellant had one year from June 5, 2019 (i.e., June 5, 2020), to file a timely 

PCRA petition. His present petition, which was filed on December 21, 2020, 

is therefore facially untimely.
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Appellant also argues the PCRA court erred in not holding a hearing on his 

petition.3 We disagree. 

In order to establish the governmental interference exception, a 

petitioner must plead and prove (1) the failure to raise the claim previously

was the result of interference by government officials and (2) the petitioner 

could not have obtained the information earlier with the exercise of due 

diligence. See Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (Pa. 

2008). In other words, a petitioner is required to show that but for the 

interference of a government actor “he could not have filed his claim earlier.” 

Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 A.2d at 310.

In response to Appellant’s argument, the PCRA court noted that 

Appellant admits that his law library access privileges were 

suspended from January 2, 2019, to January 2, 2020[,] as a 

consequence of him returning late to his housing unit from library. 

Additionally, Appellant also admits that he was then placed in 

disciplinary custody until February 19, 2020, as a result of his 

behavior. Then, beginning on March 13, 2020, the law library was 

closed for entry due to Covid-19 restrictions. Appellant presents 

an investigation report dated August 19, 2021[,] completed on 

behalf of his attorney, by an investigator. The report does not 

allege that Appellant could not access materials but, rather, 

reaffirms that typically inmates who have deadlines sooner were 

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3 Appellant articulated his claim before us as follows:

Did the lower court err in dismissing [Appellant]’s amended PCRA 

petition on timeliness grounds without holding an evidentiary 

hearing where [Appellant] alleged his pro se petition had been 

rendered untimely by the interference of Department of 

Corrections officials?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.
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accepted into the library first. In the report, the investigator 

describes that she was informed by an SCI Somerset staff member 

that an inmate on suspension from the library could obtain library 

materials by sending a request to the library to have the librarian 

make a copy. This only serves to confirm that Appellant’s physical 

access to the library was restricted, and not that SCI Somerset 

denied his access to needed materials from the library.

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/13/22, at 13 (quotation marks and internal citations 

omitted).

We agree. There is no indication that Appellant was prevented from 

using the law library. The restrictions in place resulting from his suspension 

from the law library or the restriction in place due to COVID-19 merely changed 

how to access the library. While Appellant could not physically access the 

library, he had nonetheless access to the materials in the library.4 Thus, 

Appellant was never prevented from accessing any materials he would need to 

file a timely PCRA petition.

Additionally, other than bald allegations, Appellant fails to provide any 

evidence that he was prevented from accessing the library materials. While 

Appellant furnished copies of requests and grievances relating to access to the 

library, said requests and grievances were submitted in 2021, when his PCRA 

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4 “Documentation provided by Appellant . . . demonstrates that while physical 

entry into the law library may have been precluded, due first to the 

consequences of Appellant’s own actions and then to Covid-19 precautions, 

Appellant was not precluded from requesting and receiving materials from the 

library.” PCRA Court Opinion, 4/13/22, at 14. 
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petition was already untimely.5 As the Commonwealth noted, “they show that 

he did not attempt to gain access to the library until more than eight months 

after the deadline to file a timely petition passed.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 

11; see also PCRA Court Opinion, 4/13/22, at 14.

To the extent that Appellant, in the argument section of his brief before 

us, focuses on the allegation that the untimeliness of the petition was due to 

the Department of Corrections’ refusal “to honor [Appellant’s] request for 

materials from the law library because he did not have a court-ordered 

deadline,” Appellant’s Brief at 9, we must agree with the PCRA court (and the 

Commonwealth) that the instant claim is based on a misunderstanding of the

very same evidence he provided to the PCRA court. To this end, the PCRA 

court noted: “Although Counsel asserts that Appellant’s requests to use the 

law library to perfect a PCRA petition were denied because ‘no court-ordered 

deadline’ existed, the denial submitted by Appellant does not state that a court 

order is required.” PCRA Court Opinion, 4/13/22, at 5, n.1; see also

Commonwealth’s Brief at 12; see infra n.1. Indeed, the Department of 

Corrections consistently indicated to Appellant that (1) those inmates with 

deadlines will be accommodated before those who did not have set deadlines,

which does not mean, as Appellant suggests, that absent a court-ordered 

deadline, inmates will not have access to the library; and (2) regardless of 

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5 See supra, footnote 1.
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lockdown or suspension, inmates still have access to the materials of the 

library by simply submitting a request. 

Finally, and equally importantly, it should be noted that Appellant did 

not argue that “any of the conditions of his incarceration were illegal, as 

required to meet the governmental interference exception to PCRA’s 

timeliness requirement. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i) (governmental 

interference must violate United States or Pennsylvania Constitution or laws).” 

Commonwealth v. Rizvi, 166 A.3d 344 (Pa. Super. 2017) (holding 

restrictions on access to prison resources does not qualify a petition for the 

governmental interference exception);6 see also Commonwealth v. 

Bankhead, 217 A.3d 1245 (Pa. Super. 2019).

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6

In Rizvi, we also noted:

In Commonwealth v. Barrett, 761 A.2d 145 (Pa. Super. 2000), 

a prison’s restrictive housing unit policy permitted petitioner to 

obtain library materials only by request slips and prohibited him 

from seeking legal assistance from other inmates. This Court 

affirmed the PCRA court’s rejection of petitioner’s governmental 

interference claim based on these restrictions. We stated 

“although [petitioner] may not have been permitted to prepare his 

PCRA petition in the manner he would have wished, prison officials 

did not prevent him from filing his petition in accordance with the 

timing requirements by reason of his confinement in the 

[Restricted Housing Unit].” 

Rizvi, 166 A.3d at 348 n.3.

Similarly, here, Appellant’s bald allegations do not permit the inference that 

the Department of Corrections prevented him from filing a timely PCRA 

petition.
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Considering the foregoing, we conclude that Appellant failed to establish 

the governmental interference exception. Accordingly, the underlying PCRA 

petition is untimely.

Next, Appellant argues the PCRA court erred in dismissing his petition 

without holding a hearing.7 We disagree. Pursuant to the Rules of Criminal 

Procedure, a PCRA court must hold a hearing when a PCRA petition raises any 

issues of material fact. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 908(A)(2)). As explained, however, 

we have concluded that Appellant’s petition was untimely, and the PCRA court 

properly determined that it had no jurisdiction to entertain it. Thus, we 

conclude that the PCRA court did not err in dismissing Appellant's petition 

without a hearing. See Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 723 

(Pa. 2008). 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/3/2023

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7 The hearing issue, while mentioned in the questions for our review, is not 

addressed in the argument section of Appellant’s brief. While we would 

generally find it waived, we have addressed it only for sake of completeness.