MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 20 2 1 ME 30 Docket: Yor

- 20

- 311 Submitted

On	B riefs : May	19,	2021 Decided: June	10,	2021 Panel: MEAD, GORMAN,	JABAR , HUMPHREY,	HORTON , and CONNORS , JJ.

ERIC	B.	LOW

v. TOMMIE	E.	LOW

J ABAR ,	J. [¶1] Eric	B.	Low (Ben) 1 appeals	from	a	divorce	judgment	entered by the District	 Court	 ( Springvale , D.	 Driscoll,	 J .)	 following	 a	 one

- day	 hearing. Ben contends	 that	 the	 court	 erred	 and	 abused	 its	 discretion	 when	 it	 granted primary	 residence	 of	 the	 parties’	 son to Tommie	 E.	 Low ,	 who	 intends	 to
relocate	to	Texas. 2 We	affirm	the	judgment.
I.		BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ] Ben	and	Tommie	were	married	in	Texas	 on	 Jul y	 21,	 2005.	 	They are	the	parents	of	one	son,	who	was	born	in Texas	in February	2012. Ben	filed

1 Eric	 is	 referred	 to as	 “Ben”	 because	 that	 is	 his	 preferred	 name	 and	 the	 name	 used	 most consistently at	trial and in	the trial	court’s judgment.		Ben’s	 father,	who	testified	at	the	hearing,	is named	Eric	D.	Low	and	goes	by	“Eric.”

2 Ben	also	contends	that	the	court	erred	a nd	abused	its	discretion	when	it	ordered him to	pay retroactive	child	support.		We	do	not	find	his	argument	persuasive	and	do	not	discuss	it	further.2 a	divorce	c omplaint	in	October	2019,	and	a	one

- day	trial	was	ultimately	held in	 October	 2020.	 	 The	 trial	 predominantly	 focused	 on	 Tommie’s	 intend ed
relocation to	 Texas	 and	 her	 desire	 to	 bring	 their	 son	 with	 her. The	 court found	the	following	facts , all	of	which	are	supported	by	competent	evidence	in
the	record. See	Akers	v.	Akers ,	2012	ME	75,	¶	3,	44	A.3d	311. [¶ 3 ] Ben	is	 from	Maine , and	Tommie	is	 from	Texas.		They	met	during military	training	in	Texas	in	January	of	2005.		They	dated	for	six	months	and then were married	in	Texas.		The	couple	moved	frequently	before	returning	to
Texas , where their	son	was	born.		Six	months	after	 the	ch ild’s	birth	 they	left
Texas and moved to	Maine , where	they	have	lived	since. [¶ 4 ] Tommie’s	mother,	 Irene,	lives	with her and	 the	 child,	and before the	separation lived	with	the	family	in	Maine	for	a	while.		The	child	has	a	close relationship	with	Irene , who	helps	care	for	him	daily.		The	child	also	has	a	very close	 relationship	with	 his	 paternal	grandparents in	Maine .	 	 Tommie	 has	 no family	in	Maine , and	her	primary	reason	 for	moving	 to	Texas	is	 that	she	has family	support	there. [¶ 5 ] The	 court	 found	 t hat	 Tommie	 has	 always	 been	 the	 primary caregiver	 for	 the	 child. Even	 when	 she	 was	 attending	 college	 full	 time,	 she was	 the	 decision	 maker	 and	 daily	 caregiver	 for	 him.	 	 The	 court recognized3 Tommie’s consistent	and ongoing commitment	to	the	child 3 while no ting	that
Ben’s involvement	in	the	child’s	school	and	activities	had	increased	since	the parties	 separated. The	 court	 found	 that	 Ben	 has	 no concrete plan for addressing	the	child’s	day

- to
- day needs should	the	child	reside	primarily	with
him

. [¶ 6 ] The	 court	 spent	 considerable	 time	 detailing	 why	 it	 was not agreeing	 with the guardian	 ad	 litem’s	 (GAL) recommendation.	 	 The	 GAL’s October	 2020	 recommendation	 was	 to	 grant	 Tommie	 primary	 residence	 as long as	she	was	in	Maine	but to	shift	it	to	Ben if	Tommie	moved	to	Texas.		The court	found	that	the	GAL	“had	a	difficult	family	situation	to	assess.”		The	GAL ’ s memo	 to	 counsel	 on	 April	 1,	 2020,	 indicated	 that	 her	 investigation	 was complete	 and	 recommended	 prim ary	 residence	 with	 Tommie	 even	 if	 she moved	 to	Texas.		However,	 on	October	15,	2020,	a	 few	days	before	 the	 final hearing,	 the	 GAL	 filed	 her	 final	 report and	 changed	 her	 recommendation , which	would	have	required	the	child	to	remain	in	Maine

.

3 The	 court	 found	 that	 Tommie	 took	 care	 of	 choosing	 the	 child’s	 daycares,	 pediatricians,	 and other	 healt hcare	 providers;	 that	 she	 picked	 up	 and	 dropped	 him	 off	 at	 daycare,	 school,	 and appointments;	 that	Tommie	handled	all	emergencies	and	illnesses	and	would	rearrange	her	work schedule	or	miss	work	for	the	child;	that	Tommie spends	her	whole	weekends	with	the child;	and that	Tommie	was	the main parent	involved	in	the	child’s	school	and	activities.4 [¶ 7 ] After	r eviewing the	relevant	statutory	factors , 4 see ,	e.g., 19

- A	M.R.S. § 1653(3)(F) , (H)	 (2021) , the	 court found	 that	 it	 was	 in	 the	 child’s	 best interest	 to	 remain	 in	 the	 primary	 custodial	 care	 of	 his	 mother even	 if	 she
moves	 to	 Texas .	 	 Because	 t he	 court	 found	 that	 the	 transition away from
Tommie	 would	 be	 more	 detrimental	 to	 the	 child	 than	 the	 transition away from	Ben , Tommie	was granted	primary	residence , permit ting	 the relocation of	 the child to	 Texas. Ben	 timely	 appealed	 the	 judgment. See 19

- A	 M.R.S. § 104	(2021);	14	M.R.S.	§	1901	(2021); M.R.	App.	P.	2B(c)( 1)

. II. DISCUSSION [¶ 8 ] Ben	contends	that	the	court	erred	and	abused	its	discretion	when
it found	 that	 it	 was	 in	 the	 child’s	 best	 interest	 to	 reside	 primarily	 with
Tommie ,	who intends to relocate	to	Texas	with	the	child. [¶ 9 ] We	review	the	trial	court’s	factual	findings	for	cl ear	error	and	the ultimate	 conclusion	 regarding	 the	 child’s	 best	 interest	 for	 an	 abuse	 of
discretion. Young	 v.	 Young , 2015	 ME	 89,	 ¶	 5,	 120	 A.3d	 106.	 	 Substantial deference	is	given	 to	 the	 trial	court “ because	 the	court	is	able	 to	appraise	all the	testimon y	of	the	parties	and	their	experts. ” Grant	v.	Hamm ,	2012	ME	79 ,

4 The	court	focused	on	the	motivation s of	the	parties	and	their	capacities	to	give	the	child	love, affection , and	 guidance,	 and	 the	 capacity	 of	 each	 parent	 to	 all ow	 and	 encourage	 frequent	 and continuing	contact	between	the	child	and	the	other	parent.5 ¶ 6,	 48	 A.3d	 789 (quotation	 marks	 omitted) .	 	 In	 the	 context	 of	 a	 parental relocation	issue,	 the	 court	must	 balance	 the	 right	 of	 the	 custodial	 parent	 “to engage	 in	 interstate	 travel	 and	 to	 dec ide	 where	 the	 parent	 and	 child	 will reside,	and	a	non

- custodial	parent’s	right	 to	have	continuing	and	meaningful parent/child	contact	with	the	child.” Light v.	D’Amato ,	2014	ME	134,	¶	20,	105
A.3d	447 (quotation	marks	omitted) .		The	trial	court	must	balan ce	the	rights and	 interests	 of	 the	 parents	 while	 taking	 into	 full	 consideration	 the	 child’s best	interest. Id. ¶	22. [¶1 0 ] Here,	 the	 court carefully	 considered the	 right	 of	 each	 parent	 to
have	contact	with	the	child and	conducted an	extensive	best	interest	analysis.
The	court	also explained why	it	was	disagreeing	with	the	October	GAL	report on	 the	issue	 of	 relocation.	 	The	 court’s	 finding	 that	it	was	in	 the	 chi ld’s	 best interest	 to	 be	 with	 Tommie	 as	 the	 primary	 caregiver	 was	 supported	 by substantial	 record	 evidence.	 	 The	 court	 based	its	 decision	 on	 the	 full	 record and	with	 consideration	 of	 each	 of	 the	 statutory	 factors	 regarding	 the	 child’s
best	interest. See R o alsvik	 v.	 Comack , 201 9 ME 71 ,	 ¶ 7 , 208 A.3d 367 (“The weight	 and	 credibility	 of	 the	 testimony	 and	 other	 evidence,	 including	 GAL reports, is for	the	fact

- finder’s	determination.” (quotation	marks	omitted) ).6 [¶1 1 ] In Light ,	a	case that Ben relies	on	to	su pport	his	claim	of	error ,	the court	 declined	 to	 allow	 primary	 residence	 with	 the	 mother	 should	 she relocate	to	Italy. 2014	ME	134, ¶	10, 105	A.3d	447 .		However,	in	that	case	the court	 found that that	particular	child’s	need	 for	stability	and	 the “substantial support	network	of	 friends,	paternal	 family,	and	neighbors,”	all	explained	by the	child’s	 therapist,	supported	 the	 trial	court’s	decision

. Id. ¶ ¶ 3

- 10 .		Here, the	 court	 found	 that Tommie’s	 role	 as	 the	 child’s	 primary	 caretaker	 should
continue ,	and	“to	preclude	the	historical	primary	caretaker	the	opportunity	to put	herself	in	 the	most	advantageous	position	 to	continue	 that	 role	is	not	in the	best	interest	of	[the	child]. ” [¶1 2 ] Given	 its	 supported	 findings, the	 court	 did	 not	 abuse	 its
discr etion	in	awarding	primary residence to	Tommie

. See	Daggett	v.	Sternick , 2015	 ME	 8,	 ¶	 16,	 109	 A.3d	 1137	 (holding	 that	 “the	 court	 did	 not	 abuse	 its discretion	in	granting	primary	residence	 to	[the	mother]	and	allowing	her	 to
relocate	 to	 Florida	 where	 the	 ch ild	 will	 also	 have	 the	 substantial	 benefit	 of extended	family	support”). The	entry	is: Judgment	affirmed.7 Albert	Hansen,	Esq. , Hansen	Law	Offices,	PLLC,	Kennebunk,	for	appellant	Eric B.	Low Pamela	 Holmes,	 Esq.,	 and	 Mary

- Ann	 Letourneau,	 Esq., Holmes	 Legal	 Group, LLC,	Wells,	for	appellee	Tommie	E.	Low

Biddeford District	Court	docket	number	FM

- 2019

- 376 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY