### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 08 -0 01 94 -C R

______________________________ GERAL D DEWAYNE B UTL ER, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appea l from the 188th J udicial District Court

Gre g g County , Texas Trial Court No. 36,300-A

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C

. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Opinion by

J ustice Moseley2 O P I N I O N Ger ald D e Way

n e B u tl e r , h a v in g b e e nc o n v ic te d b y a ju r y o f tw o c o u n ts o f

a g g r a v a te d robber y , was a ssessed a penalty by that same jury of life imprisonment a nd a fine of $10,000.00 on

eac h count. The tria l court sentenced Butler in a ccor d with the jury ' s rec ommendation (the sente nces to run conc urre ntly). We aff irm the trial cour

t's judg ment. I. Robbery at Car lito's and Investigation As Carlos R odrig uez, the owner of C arlito' s Restaura nt, was finishing up his closing duties

so me tim e a ft e r 1 1:0 0 p .m. on No ve mbe r 21 , 20 07 , tr ou ble aro se . Em

plo y e e Juan

Jime ne z ha d ju st exit ed the r estaura

nt's r ear door, only

to return a lmost i mmediately , calling to Ro d ri gu ez , "Ithink we' re g oing to g et in trouble." Two people in ski masks and g loves ente red the open bac k door immediately

afte r Ji menez. One c arr ied a pistol, which Rodrig uez de scribed a s having a long barr el and looking old. The arme d bandit fired twice; one shot struc k J imenez in the midsection, and the other wa s fired into the c eiling. Jimenez fell to the gr ound and fe igne d death. The robbe r with the g un then orde red Rodriguez to open the safe . Rodrigue z said he was not fa miliar with f

irea rms and could not say

what the c aliber of

the wea pon was. Rodrig uez c omplied a nd opened the safe . He wa s immediately

shoved aside a

nd the robber s took about $8,500.00 and a .357 ma g num pistol from the safe

. I n addition to the contents of the safe , the robber s also took Rodriguez's bri ef ca s e, wh ich contained his c heckbook a nd cre dit cards, includingRodrigue z's Exx on cre dit card, a nd left.We f ind the traff

ic stop w as proper , and, there fore , the trial court did not er r in suppressing 1 evidenc e ther eby

obtained; please see our

discussion of Butler ' s fourth and f ifth points of error

. 3 About three wee ks after

the robber

y , on Dec ember

12, 2007, Offic er Ma

rk Watson saw an autom o b il e w h ic h matc h e d th e d e s c r ip ti o n o f o n e s e e n e ar li e r th a t d ay a t a r o b b e r y a t a local

c on ve nie nc e sto re . Watso n f oll ow e d th e c ar and wh e n h e sa w the a uto mob ile tur

n w ith ou t f

ir st sig na lin g , h e ini tiate d a tra ff ic sto p. B utl e r wa s dri vin g the c ar an d he ha d a pa sse ng e r, Ta

rn e sh ia Wheat. Butler could produce neither a drive r' s license nor proof of insurance . Butler

was a rre sted fo r o pe ratin g a

ve hic le wi tho ut a

dr ive r' s li c e ns e . B e c a

us e the pa ss enger, W heat, lik e wi se c ou ld produce no driver' s license, Watson would not relea se the ve hicle to her , so the autom obile was impounded. As a pa

rt of the impoundment proc edure , the contents of t h e au t o m o bile wer e inventoried; during the inventory , Rodrigue z's pistol (which had be en take n from the sa fe dur ing the robber y at Carlito' s Restaurant) was discove red in the trunk of the automobile. 1 After Butler ' s arr est and on the same day as t he traffic arre st, althoug h the reason which led office rs to do so seem somewhat obscure d, police had the occasion to g o to 104-C Pinebrook Place in L on g vie w. AT F a g e nt K e n Ke e ne r s a id t he y we nt t o th a t a dd

re ss " to f oll owup on

so me interviews." Present at that addre ss wer e B utler' s brother, Me lvin, his cousin, Dex ter Sparkma n, and Wheat, who wa s t h e p asseng er in B utler' s car when it was stopped f

or the tra ffic violation. Sparkman c onsented to a sear ch of the dupl ex. L ater , when Butler took the stand, he testified that he lived at 102- C Pi nebrook, not at 104-C. Howeve r, there was testimony that 102-C and 104-C

we re the tw o s ide s o f a

du ple x. Al so , B utl e r a c kn ow le dg e d h e so me tim e s st ay e d th e nig ht at 10 4- C.We find Butler ' s second inter view wa s proper ly

admitted; see discussion below. 2 4 At 104-C, Dexter Sparkman ga ve the office rs consent to searc h the duplex. I n the duplex were f ound

a ho od e d s we a tsh ir

t matc hin g tha

t w or n b y on e of the Carl ito ' s r ob be rs , Ro dr ig ue z' s E xx on c re dit

car d, and a .22 pistol m atchingthe desc ription give n by Rodrigue z of the pistol carried by the robbe rs during the robbe ry

of Carlito' s. Wit hin a fe w hours af

ter B utler had be en take n to jail after the traff ic stop, Bu tler wa s interviewe d at the jail by

FB ISpecial Age nt Cliff Carruth and L ong view P olice Detective Darin L air. Although that i n t er v i ew wa s not presente d as evide nce to the jur y , it will become re levant in our discussion o f B u tl e r ' s s ixt h p o in t o f e r

r o r . T h e s e ar c h o f 1 0 4

- C Pi n e b r o o k h a d c o n s u me d quite a long time a

nd it wa s afte r midnight when office rs returne d to the jail. About 2 : 0 0 a. m . , Ag ent Carr uth and De te c tiv e Te rr

y Da vis c on du c te d a

no the r i nte rv iew of B utl e r. Th e re wa s so me indication that Butler

had bee n aslee p, but had nonethele ss ag ree d to talk with the officers. B utler

was a dvised of his rig hts and another interview was conducted, t his tim e beingprese rved by a dig ital

au d i o re co rd er

wh i ch Da v i s h adb ro u gh t
. I nt h i s au d i o re co rd i n g, Bu t l er ad m i t t edro b b i n g C ar l i t o 's 2

w it h h is b r o th e r , M e lv in

. A lt h o u g h B u tl e r

a d mi tt e d th a t h e h a d

h e ld th e p is to l w h ic h s h o t Ji me n e z, he maintained that the shooting wa s completely acc idental. II. Suf

fi ciency of Evid ence Butler ' s first and third poin t s o f error c halleng e the leg al and f actua l sufficienc y

of the

e vid e nc e to s up po rt

his c on vic tio ns , r e sp e c tiv e ly . H is s e c on d p oin t c la ims the e vid e nc e wa s le g a lly5

insu f f ic ie n t " u n d e r

f e d e r a l l aw " ; w e w il l r e v ie w th is c la im in o u r an a ly s is o f

th e le g a l s u f

f ic iency under " state law" as B utler uses those ter ms. I n revie wing the leg al suffic iency of the e vidence , we view all of t h e ev i d en ce in the light most favora

ble to the ver dict and dete rmine whe ther a ny rational trier of fac t c ould ha ve found the essential elements of the c rime beyond a re asonable doubt. J oh ns on v . S

tat e , 2 3 S. W. 3 d 1 , 7 ( T e x. Crim. App. 2000). I n a fa ctual suff

iciency revie w, we r eview a ll the evidenc e, but do so in a neutra l light and deter mine whether

the evidenc e supporting t he verdict is so weak or is so outweig hed by the g reat

we ig ht and pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e that the jur y ' s ve rd ic t is c le arl y wrong or m anif e stl y unjust. Lan c on v . S

tat e , 2 53 S.W. 3d 69 9, 70 5 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 08 ); Ro be rts v . S tat e , 220 S.W .3d 521, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). I n this analy sis, we use a hy pothetically -cor

rec t jury char g e to eva luate both t he leg al and fac tual sufficie ncy

of the e vidence

. Gr ott i v . S tat e , 273 S.W .3d 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Such

a c ha rg e a c c ur a te ly

se ts out the law, is au tho ri zed by the ind ic tme nt, do e s n ot u nn e c e ssa ri ly inc re a se the State ' s b ur de n of pr oo f o r u nn e c e ssa ri ly re str ic t th e State ' s th e or ie s o f l ia bil ity , a nd a de qu a te ly descr ibes the particular offense for which the defe ndant was trie d. Vi lla rre al v . S tat e , 286 S.W .3d 32 1 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 09 ); Ma lik v . S tat e , 953 S.W .2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The State' s indictment charged Bu tler with two counts of having c ommitt ed ag g ravated robber y . I n the first count, it was a lleg ed that he ha d cause d inj u ry t o J i m en ez while committingBu t l er m ak es n o co mp l ai n t ab o u tt h e j u ry ch ar ge i nt h i s ca s e. Af

t er re v i ew i n g t h e c h ar ge 3 gi v en t h e j u ry

an d t h e s t at u t o ry

el em en t s o f a ggra v at edro b b ery , we fi n d t h e g i v e nch ar ge substantially

complies with the hy

pthetically -cor

rec t char g e for

this crime. Se e Gr ott i , 273 S.W .3d 273. 6 theft, while using or exhibit ing a dea dly wea pon; the second c ount alleg ed that B utler had thre atene d Rod ri g ue z or pu t him in fe ar o f i mmi ne nt b od ily inj ur y , in the c ours e of

c omm itt ingthe ft , w hil e exhibi ting or using a dea dly wea pon. See T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 29.03 (Ve rnon 2003). We have summarized t h e ev i d ence above. B utler admitted robbingthe re staurant, wie lding the pistol, and shoo ti n g Jim e n e z. A d d it io n a ll y , Ro dr igu e z t e s ti f ie d h e w a s f e ar f u l f o r h is li f e a f te r h a v in g seen J i m en ez s h o t
. T h e ev i d en ce i s l ega l l y an d fa ct u al l y s u ff i ci en t t o s u

p p o rt t h e ju ry 's v er d i ct s . Bu t l er 's confe ssion an d R o d ri g uez's te stimony , toge ther with the phy sical evide nce ( the pistol stol en fr om the re staurant be ing f

ound in the automobile driven by Butler and Rodrig uez's c redit ca

rd take n from the re staurant, in addition to a sweatshirt a nd pistol ver

y much like those worn or use d at the robbe ry t ak en fr o m Butler ' s home) could a llow a rational jury to find the essential e lements of ag g ravated robber y bey ond a re asonable doubt. See Johnson , 23 S.W .3d at 7. Viewingthe evidenc e in a ne utral light, the e vidence supporting the jury ' s verdict is strong ; it is not so weak or outweig hed by the g reat

we ig ht a nd pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e to r e nd e r t

he jur y ' s v e rd ic t clear ly

wr on g or manif e stl y unjust. See Lancon , 253 S.W .3d at 705. We overr ule B utler' s first three points of error

. 3 III. Evid ence Obtained After Traffi c Stop Butler ' s fourth and fifth points of err or complain of the admission of phy sical evide nce f ound in his car afte r he w as stopped by

L ong view police f

or a tra ffic violation. The trial court ove rruledSe c tio n 5 45 .1 04 of the Te xas T ra

ns po rt a tio n Co de state s: 4 (a ) A n o pe rator

sh a ll u se the sig na l a

uth or ize d b y

Se c tio n 5 45 .1 06 to i nd ic a te an intention to turn, chang e lane s, or start fr om a par ked position. (b) An o p erator intending to turn a vehic le rig ht or left shall sig nal continuously

for not less than the last 100 feet of movement of the ve hicle bef ore the turn. T EX . T RA N SP . C ODE ANN . § 545.104. 7 Butler ' s motion t o suppress the e vidence that Rodrigue z's pistol was found in a c ar dr iven by Butler about three wee ks after

the Carlito' s robber

y . I n his fourth point of err or, B utler cla ims that W atson lacke d probable cause to stop the c ar Butler was drivingDec ember

12, 2007. As stated above , Watson testified that on Dece mber 12, he had re ceive d a re port of a w hite Chevrolet Capric e with g rey doors havingbeen use d in a robber y of a c onvenienc e store that morning

. Watson saw a car matching the desc ribed ve hicle and f ollowed it. He saw the driver of

the ca r make a turn without signa ling f or 100 fe et bef

ore the turn. See T EX . T RA N SP . C ODE ANN . § 545.104 (Ve rnon 1999). Watson then pulled the au t o mobile over a nd 4 discovere d that Butler

was driving

it. When Butler c ould produce neither a driver' s license nor

proof of i nsuranc e, he was ar

rested. See T EX . T RA N SP . C ODE ANN . § 543.001 (Ve rnon 1999) (" Any peac e of fi c e r m ay arr e st w ith ou t w arr ant a

pe rs on fo un d co mmi tti ng a vio la tio n of thi s su bti tle ." ); Ga rc ia

v . S tat e , 218 S.W .3d 756, 760 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2007, no pet. ) (d ep u t y authorized to a rr e st Ga rc ia wh e re de pu ty

ob se rv e d tw o tr a ff

ic vio la tio ns : f

a ilure to d isp lay

fr on t li c e ns e plate

and fa ilure to p ro du c e dr ive r' s li c e ns e ). Sin c e the re wa s no lic e ns e d dri ve r a c c omp anyingB utl e r t oB utl e r u rg e d h is m oti on

to sup pr e ss be fo re Of

fi c e r Wat so n te sti fi e d to the jur y . A t th a t ti me 5 in t ri a l, R od ri g ue z ha d a lr e a dy

te sti fi e d a

nd ide nti fi e d h is . 35 7 p ist ol, and the g un wa s a dmi tte d in to e vid e nc e a ft e r B utl e r' s c ouns el a ff ir ma tiv e ly sa id h e ha d n o o bje c tio n to the g un ' s a dmi ssi on int o evidenc e. However , we interpret B utler' s appellate complaint to also claim err or in Watson's be ing a llo we d to te sti fy

to t he fa c t th a t th e g un

wa s f ound in B utl e r' s p os se ssi on , e vid e nc e wh ic h c on ne c ts Butler to the robber

y . 8 whom possession of the automobile could be delivere d, i t wa s impounded. During an inventory

sear ch anc illary

to the impoundment, Rodriguez' s pistol was discovere d in the trunk. I n revie wing a trial c ourt' s ruling on a motion to s uppress, a

ppellate courts must g ive g reat de fe re nc e to t

he tr ia l court ' s fin din g s of his tor ic a l fa c ts so lon g a s th e re c or d s up po rt s th os e fi nd ing s. Gu zm an v . S tat e , 955 S.W .2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Be cause the trial cour t is the ex clusive finder of fac t, the appellate court re views evide nce a dduced at the suppression hea ring in the light most fa vorable to the trial court' s ruling. Car mo uc he v . S

tat e , 10 S.W .3d 323, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Fur

ther, we g ive defe renc e to the trial court' s ruling s on mix ed questions of lawand of f act when those r

ulings turn on a

n evaluation of cre dibilit y and deme anor. Guzman , 955 S.W .2d at 89. On the oth e r ha

nd , in c ir c ums tanc e s wh e re su c h r uli ng s d o n ot t

ur n o n a n e va luatio n o f c re dib ili ty and deme anor, w e re view de novo the trial court' s actions. Id

. B utl e r m ov e d to su

pp re ss t he e vid e nc e of

the pis tol and the fa c t that it ha d b e e n f ound in h is

c ar, arguin g the of

fi c e r l a c ke d p ro ba

ble c a us e to c on du c t th e tr a ff

ic sto p. At the he ari ngon his 5 motion for new tria l, Butler for the first time ma intained that the lane f rom which he made a

rig ht turn was a rig ht-turn-only lane; therefor e, he posited, no turn signa l was required. At the hear ing on his moti on for ne w trial, he a rg ued that the a

rea in question did not "qua lif[y ] as an intersection" as" (a ) I n th is s ub tit le , ' int e rs e c tio n' me ans the c omm on are a a t th e jun c tio n o f t

wo hig hw a y s, 6 ot her t han th e ju nct io n o f an a ll ey anda hi ghway ." T EX . T RA N SP . C ODE ANN . § 541.303 (Ve rnon 1999). 9 contemplated by

the Texas Transpor

tation Code

. I n his a

ppellate brief, B utler ar g ues that a dr iver 6 is not obli g ated to sig nal a turn w hile in a turn-onl y l an e. I n s u p p ort, he c ites broadly to Texas Transpor tation Code Sections 541.304 (addre ssing tra ff ic control), 545.101 ( turning at an int e rs e c tio n) , a

nd 54 5. 10 4 ( us e of

tur n s ig na ls w he n s ig na lin g a tur n)

. Up on re vie w o f t

he se statut e s,
we a re unc onvinced of

Butler ' s conclusion and we issue no dec ision on whether a signa l is required in a de dic a te d tur

n lane . I n su

pp or t of thi s a rgume nt, B utl e r c ite s Tra ha n v. Sta te , 16 S.W .3d 146, 14 7 (T e x. Ap p. —B e a

umo nt 200 0, no pe t.)

. Tr aha n, lik e B utl e r, wa s stop pe d for fa ili ng to s ig na l a lane chang e. Howeve r, Traha n was cited for f

ailing to sig nal when he was e x iting the f ree way . The appellate court pointed out that there was no evidenc e in the rec ord that Traha n turned or c hang ed lanes in orde r to exit the fre ewa y . Acc ording to the opinion, the arr esting office r only testified that he stopped Tr ahan f

or fa iling to signa l his ex it from the fre ewa y . The c ourt of appe als reje cted the State' s proposition that such a movement nece ssarily involved a turn. Refusing to a ssume fac ts not in evidence , the Trahan court found the traff ic stop unjustified. Id. He re , we fi rs tn o t e t h at we d ef er t o t h e t ri al co u rt 's ev al u at i o no f t h e c re d i b i l i t y o f B u t l er 's testimony that there was a sign indicating a turn-only lane. During the hearing on the motion for new tr ia l, B utl e r' s cou

ns e l ask e d him i f t

he re wa s " a

de sig nate d r ig ht- tur

n la ne ." B utl e r r e sp on de d th a t, "It w as like a turnoff." Butler ag ree d with his attorney ' s questions, that " there wer e b i g ar rows10

pointing this way

to the rig ht in that lane," and a sign reading "r ight lane rig ht turn only ." We have
a lso r e v i e w e d t h e dr aw i n g d o n e b y B u t l e r ' s c o u n s e l a t t h e h e ar i n g o n t h e m o t i o n f o r n e w t r i a l ; it

su g g e sts a

l an e t h atv e e r s t o t h e r i g h tf o r tu r n i n g t r a f f i c . A tt h e s u

p p r e s s i o nh e ar i n g , d

u r i n g t r i a l, Watson said he stopped Butler for f ailing to sig nal his intent to turn for 100 fe et bef ore the turn, and Watson was not rec alled for the hea ring on the motion for new tr ial. Butler testified, though, that he did no t si g na l to g e t in to t

he a lle g e d tur

n lane and

he c ou ld n ot r e c a ll i f h e sig na le d h is i nte nt t o turn once he had g otten into the supposed turn lane. We express no opinion on Butler ' s rea ding of Trahan beca use we do not find its reasoning

c on tr oll inghe re . The e vid e nc e that supp or ts B utl e r' s a sse rt ion

he wa s in a lane wh ic h e xcu se d h is obligation to si g nal his turn is sc ant. Of g reater rele vance and importanc e is Watson's testimony that he sawwhat he believed to be a violation: failure to sig nal a turn for the requisite 100 fe et bef ore the turn is neg otiated. I f a pe ace o ffice r has a rea sonable ba sis for suspectingthat a per son has committed a traf

fic off ense, he may

leg ally initiate a traffic stop. Gr e e n v . S tat e , 93 S.W .3d 541, 544 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2002, pet. re f' d); Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v . Fisher , 56 S.W .3d 159, 163 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 2 00 1, no pe t.) . T he Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Cou

rt ha s h e ld that a

tr a ff ic sto p w ill be dee med valid as long as a r easona ble offic er in the same circumstances could have stopped the

c ar f or the su sp e c te d o ff

e ns e , e ve n w he re the re mig ht have a lso be e n an u lte ri or mot ive in a c tua lly making the stop. W

hren v. U nited States , 5 17 U. S. 8 06 , 8 09 (1 99 6) . T he State is n ot re qu ir e d to pr ov e that the ind ivi du a l ac tua lly c omm itt e d a tra ff ic vio la tio n, bu t only

that th e of

fi c e r r e a so na

bly11

believed a

violation was i n p rog ress. Gree n , 9 3 S. W.3 d at 54 5; Fisher , 56 S.W .3d at 163. There fore , "[i]n assessing whe ther the intrusion wa s reasonable, a n objective standa

rd is utiliz ed: would the fa cts ava ilable to the offic er at the moment of the se i z u re or sea rch w arr ant a man of

reas on abl e caut io n i n t he b eli ef t hat th e act io n t aken was app rop ri ate ." Da v is v . S tat e , 947 S.W .2d 240, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 1 9 9 7 ). W e fi n d the trial cour t did not abuse its discretion in denying Butler ' s motion t o suppress; we ove rrule B utler' s fourth point of er ror. IV. F ourth Am endm ent Claim Not P rese rved Th e F ourt h A me ndme nt gua

ra nte e s " the ri g ht o f t

he pe op le to b e se c ur e in the ir pe rs on s, ho us e s, pa

pe rs , an d ef

fe c ts, a g a ins t unre a so na

ble se arc he s and

se izur e s. " U. S. C O N ST . amend. IV. I n B utl e r' s f

if th p oin t of

e rr or , h e c la ims the mot ion to s up pr e ss s ho uld have be e n g ra

nte d b e c a us e the se arc h of his ve hic le wa s a vio la tio n of his F ourt h Am e ndme nt ri g ht to be pro tec ted aga ins t

unrea sonable sea

rche s. Specifica lly , Butler claims that when the police conduc ted an inventor y of his automobile af

t er h e was a

rre sted, such an inve ntory ran a foul of his Four

th Amendment pr ote c tio ns . H ow e ve r, B utl e r n e ve r a rgue d to the tr ia l c ourt

that t he in ve nto ry

wa s im pr op e r a s a violation of his Fou rt h Amendment rig hts. I n order for a complaint to be pre sented on a ppeal, a timely reque st, objection, or motion must have been made t o the t rial court stating the g rounds for th e rul in g "wit h s uff

ici ent sp eci fi cit y

to mak e th e tr ial cou rt aware of th e com pl ain t. " T EX . R. A PP . P. 33.1(a)( 1)(A)

. Butler ' s written motion to suppress and his arguments at the suppre ssion hearing and the he aringon his moti on for ne w trial made no complaint about the inventory sear ch of his car

.373 U.S. 83 (1963). 7 12 There fore , Butler

has for feited this issue for a ppeal. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 3 3. 1; Go ud e au v . S tat e , 209 S.W .3d 713, 721–22 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2006, no p et
. ) (whe re a ppellant did not complain about inventory sear ch of vehicle in suppression motion or hearing , but raised a rg ument for the f irst time on appeal, issue not pre serve d). We overr ule B utler' s fifth point of err or. V. No Errorin Failing to Su ppress Bu tler 's Conf ession A. Al le ge d BradyViolation Butler 's s i x th point of error complains that the trial cour t should have suppre ssed the

co n fe s s i o nh e ga v e t o l aw en fo rc em en t
. Bu t l er fi rs t cl ai m s t h at t h e S t at e s o m eh o w v i o l at edBu t l er 's rig ht to ex culpatory

evidenc e as a

rticulated in Brady v. Maryland

. B utl e r d id n ot f ile a mot ion to 7 suppress, but rather a motion attacking the vol untariness of any admission or confession. The trial court c onducted a

pretria l hear ing on this m otion; at the end of the he aring , the trial cour t said that it w ou ld t a ke the ma tte r u nd er advise me nt, watc h th e vid e o in te rv ie w, and lis te n to the a

ud io

re c or din g , a

nd the n ma ke a rul ing . B utl e r a lso a rgue d a nd pr e se nte d e vid e nc e in s up po rt of thi s motion at the hear ing on his motion for ne w trial. Under Brady , to ensure the acc used a fair trial, a prosecutor has an affirmative duty under the Due Proc es s C l au s e of the Four teenth Amendme nt to disclose to the acc used all exculpatory or imp e a c hme nt e vid e nc e , r e g ard le ss o f t he g oo d f

a ithor ba d faith

of the pr os e c uti on , w hic h is favor abl e t o t h e d ef

en dant and is mater ial to either guilt or punishment. Id. a t 87 . Adu e pr oc e ss13

violation occurs if ( 1) the prose cutor fa ils to di sclose evide nce that is (2) favor able to the de fenda nt and (3) materia l. W

y att v . S tat e , 2 3 S

. W

. 3 d 1 8 , 2 7 ( T e x. C r i m . Ap p. 20 00 ); Fran k s v . S tat e , 90 S.W. 3d 77 1, 79 6 ( Te x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 2 00 2, no pe t.)

. Ev ide nc e is m a te ri a l if the re is a

rea sonable proba

bility that had the e vidence been disc losed, the outcome of the trial would have been differ ent. Ha mp ton v . S tat e , 86 S.W .3d 603, 612 (T ex . C rim. App. 2002). Unde r Brady , the defe ndant bea

rs the burde n of showingthat in light of a ll the evidence , it is reasona bly probable the outcome of the trial would have been differ ent had the prosec utor made a timely disclosure. Id . The

me r e p o s s ib il it

y th a t an it e m o f u n d is c lo s e d in f o r mati o n mi g h t h a v e h e lp e d th e d e f e n s e , o r might have a ffe cted the outc ome of the tria l, doe s not establish materiality in the constitutional sense. Id

. Butler ' s argument that his r ights unde r Bradywer e violated c enter s on exhi bits he introduced

a t th e he ari ngon

the mot ion

fo r n e w tri a l. T wo e xhibi ts w e re the tw o " Ad vice of Rig hts " fo rm s introduced by the State at trial, one from ea ch intervie w g iven by Butler . Howeve r, attac hed to ea ch for m t hat But ler

in tr od u c e d a t t h e h e a ri ng on hi s m ot io n fo r new tr ial is wha t am ou nt s t o an FBI

c ov e r s he e t; e a c h o ne su mma ri zes the int e rv ie w w hic h f oll ow e d t h e p a r t i c u l ar " Rig hts " fo rm

and lis ts information such a s the date of investigation; "Date dictated" ; and " Date of transcr iption" (it does not appea r that any transcr ipts were pr oduced at trial). Butler also ref ere nced te stimony

from Rodney Bur

ns, Gre g g County J ail Administrator, and

rec ords which doc ument the movement of inmate s within the jail. The hear t of Butler ' s complaint is that these exhibit s are inconsistent with the testimony of the lawenfor ceme nt office rs whoI t is not re quired that a suspect be informed that a n interview is beingrec orded. Moore v

. 8 Sta te , 8 82 S.W. 2d

84 4, 84 6 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ); Fl e mm ing v . S tat e , 9 4 9 S. W. 2 d

8 7 6 , 8 7 8 ( T e x. App.—Houston [14th Dis t.] 1997, no pet.). 14 conducte d the t wo i nterview s with Butler

. Butler claims that the for

ms which show an inmate be ing moved to differ ent locations do not ref lect that B utler wa s taken fr om a c el l t o b e i nterview ed by Carruth a nd Davis at 2:00 a .m. D ece mber 13. Howeve r, the re cords a lso do not indi cate Butler being taken out of a

cell for the interviewear ly

in the afte rnoon of De cembe r 12, the intervie w B utler

a dmi ts g ivi ng . F ur

the r, B ur ns te sti fi e d th a t the re c or d be ing re vie we d w ou ld n or ma lly no t in dic a te wh e n a pr iso ne r w a s q

ue sti on e d b y

law en fo rc e me nt. B ur

ns sa id an " inm a te tr ans fe r" fo rm wo uld be used to indicate a pr isoner beingtransporte d for pur poses of que stioning, but he did not find such a for m in Butler' s file. Ne xt , B u t l e r

c o mp l a i n s a

b o u ti n c o n s i s t e n c i e s i nw h a tw e h a v e c a l l e d t h e F B Ic o v e r

s h e e ts attache d to the two "A d v i ce o f R i ghts" for ms. The form pe rtaining to the interview g iven the afte rnoon of De cembe r 12, the video r ecord ed i n t er v i ew, sa y s "[t] he deta ils [ of the intervie w] are provided in the audio rec ording ." This is inconsistent w ith the fac t that the interview w as the subjec t of a vide o rec ording , argues B utler. Reg ardingthe interviewdone about 2 : 0 0 a. m. Dece mber 13, Davis ac knowledg ed he did not tell B utler he w as re cordingthe interview

. Ho we v er , t h e cove r 8 sheet for the " Advice of

Rights" form per

taining to the se cond intervie w states, " The details of the rob beri es w as co ns ens ual ly reco rded by

Det ect iv e Dav is ."15

We disag ree with Butler' s claim that the cove r s h ee t s we re e x culpatory and mater ial. At most, they

reve aled some inconsistent recor d keeping . Butler asser ts that the forms wer e mater ial to the voluntariness of his sec ond statement. B ut voluntar iness is a matter of law for the trial cour

t to decide. T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 38.22, § 6 (V er n o n 2 0 0 5 ). I n making that deter mination, the trial court could compar e the voice on the two re cording s; he could eva luate the

c re dib ili ty

of Carr uth wh e n he ide nti fi e d Butle r as the ind ivi du a l he inte rv ie we d in the tw o s e ssi on s. Da vis a lso ide nti fi e d B utl e r a s the pe rs on he int e rv ie we d in the la te -n ig ht s e ssi on ; D a vis a lso sa id that he kn e w B utl e r o ve r D a vis ' s se ve ra l y e ars in l aw e nf or c e men t in

L on g vie w. Th e se i d en t i fi ca t i o n s we re gi v en b ef o re t h e tr i al co u rt wi t h Bu t l er i nt h e c o u rt ro o m at t h e p re t ri al h ea ri n g. Ca rruthand

Da vis sim ila rl y ide nti fi e d B utl e r d

ur ingtr ia l. B utl e r d oe s n ot s ug g e st that th e ja il

rec ords and F BI

cover sheets were not available to him bef ore tria l or that the State in any way

w i t h h e l d t h e m . F u rt h e r , w e d o n o t s e e t h a t i f B u t l e r h a d t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n an d p r e s e n t e d i t t o t h e j u r y, it would have made an acquittal more likely

. Se e Ex pa rteMi tc he ll , 8 53 S.W. 2d 1, 4 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 1993) (e vidence is favora ble " if disclosed and use d eff ectively

. . . [i t ] may

make the dif

fer ence be tw e e n c on vic tio n a

nd a c qu itt a l" ). No r ha s B utl e r de mon str a te d that thi s e vid e nc e wa s mate ri a l. Assuming, a

rg uendo, that this evidenc e wa s withheld, Butler must show it t o have be en mater ial; that is, "the re is a rea sonable proba bility that, had the e vidence been disc losed to the defe nse, the

ou tco me o f t he proc eedi ng wou ld hav e been di fferen t. " Lag ro ne v . S tat e , 9 4 2 S. W. 2 d

6 0 2 , 6 1 5 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1997) (citation omitted). No Bradyviolation occurr ed her e.I n a r g u in g th is s u b p o in t o f e r

r o r , B u tl e r c o n ti n u e s to ma in ta in h is is n o t the voice on the 9 second inter

view. 16 B. No Co nst it ut ion al V iol at ion Shown As a se c on d r e a so n urg ingtha t hi s c on fe ssi on

sh ou ld h a ve be e n s up pr e sse d, B utl e r c la ims use of the r ecor ded stateme nt, wher e he w as not advised he was be i n g recorded, a nd office rs 9 interviewe d him at 2:00 a.m., violated his constituti onal rig hts. W e disag ree . As detailed a

bove, Butler wa s arr ested a round midday

Dec ember

12, 2007. Early

that afte rnoon, he w as interview ed for at least two hours by Carruth and L air. I n that interview, B utler first asser ted that his only

crime w as driving without a driver' s license; he then tells the office rs he had le t t h e r o b b e r s b o r

r o w h is c ar . I n c id e n ta ll y , thr o u g h o u t t h e a f te r n o o nin te r

v ie w , h e speaks

re pe a te dly

of the a uto mob ile in t e rm s o f i t be lon g ingto h im; on ly wh e n h e too k th e sta

nd a t tr ia l di d Butler claim that he ha d borro we d the ca r and that he had no a cce ss to the trunk. L ater in the

a ft e rn oo n o f D e c e mbe r 1 2, law of fi c e rs we nt t o a

re sid e nc e (t

he du ple x ne xt to a

nd in t he same building whe re B utler said he l i v ed ). Althoug h the offic ers f ound signific ant evidenc e tying the inhabitants of the duplex to sever al ag g ravated robber ies (including the one f or which B utler wa s on trial here ), no evidenc e of e x trane ous offe nses was a dmitted in thi s trial. Carruth testified that after

se arc hin g the du

ple x an d in te rv ie wi ngoth e r s us pe c ts, he and Dav is w e nt t o th e ja il t o s pe a k w ith Butler ag ain. During that interview, the office rs can be heard asking Butler if he had slept, and the of fi c e rs of fe re d h im a

pie c e of pie and a so da

. Th e re is no i nd ic a tio n th e of fi c e rs ro us e d B utl e r i n the middle of the nig ht in an eff ort to disorient him. This C ourt has bee n supplied the full unreda ctedAg a in, no e xtra ne ou s off e ns e s we re int

ro du c e d be fo re the jur

y ; we me nti on the se on ly

to 10 demon s t rate what evide nce the trial court ha d befor e it in evaluatingwhether it was in fac t Butler g i v i n g t h e s t a t e m e n t , an d

w h e t h e r i tw a s v o l u n t ar

y. 17 inte r v ie w an d w e h e ar n o th in g in d ic a ti n g c o e r c iv e in te r v ie w ta c ti c s o r an y

th in g s u g g e s ti n g that Butler g ave his c onfession under compulsion. Rather, B utler ca n be hea rd sobbing during parts of his confession, but that is only afte r he initially

continued to d en y

involvement. L ater

in the int e rv ie w, B utl e r r e g a ins his c omp os ur e a s h e de ta ils his pa rt ic ipatio n in

mul tip le ro bb e ri e s. 10 B u tl e r a c kn o w le d g e s th a t th e c u r r e n t s tatute c o n tr o ll in g d e f e n d an ts ' s tate me n ts no longe r require s a suspect be advised that a statement is be ing r ecor ded. Cf. T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . ar t
. 3 8

. 2 2 (V ern o n2 0 0 5 ). As fa r a s B u t l er 's ar gu m en tt h at n o t wi t h s t an d i n g t h e s t at em en t 's compliance with Texas law, the circ umstances of the stat ement still render it unconstitut ional, a sister court ha s provided a thoug htful and deta iled examination of how the curr ent Article 38.22 satisfies constitutional muster. See F lemming , 9 49 S.W. 2d

a t 87 9: Both the f

eder al and T ex as co nstitut ions provide that a pe rson may not be "c ompelled" to give testimony ag ainst himself. .

. . Criminal defenda nts, theref

ore, are c on sti tut ion a lly

pr ote c te d o nly

fr om c om

pu lso ry self-inc rimination. Police, the re fo re , ma

y no t e xer t phy sic a l or

me nta l c omp uls ion

to ob ta in a

state me nt. Phy sical compulsion includes phy sical torture or extended deprivation of food and water . Mental compulsion includes the more s u b t le forc e assoc iated with offe ring a def endan t t wo ch o i ces, i.e ., to give a stateme nt or fac e an imprope r and u n w ar r an t e d p e n a l t y , p u n i s h m e n t , o r

d e tr i m e n t
. W h i l e a

s u s p e c tm ay

kn o w i n g l y, voluntarily , and intellige ntly waive a constitut i o n al rig ht, phy sical or menta l c omp uls ion

may re mov e the e le me nt of vo lun tari ne ss f ro m a de fe nd ant' s d e c isi on

to inc ri min a te him se lf

. T he wa ive r, the re fo re , must be vo lun tary in t he se ns e that it

is the produc t of a fr ee an d deliberate choice rathe r than intimidation, coerc ion or dece ption.Cf. He nd e rso n v . S tat e , 1 3 S.W. 3d 10 7, 11 0 ( Te x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 20 00 , n o p e t.) (S ta te 11 c a lle d de fe nd ant, wh o w a ive d c ouns e l, t o s tand in S ta te ' s c a se -i n- c hie f; tr ia l c ourt ' s a dmo nis hme nts incorre ct and a

mounted to compulsion to t estify ). 18 Flemming , 949 S.W .2d at 879 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). I n Flemming , the def endant

a dmi tte d, in a re c or de d state me nt, that he ha d e nte re d th e c omp la ina nt' s h ome bu t de nie d s e xua lly

a ssa ult inghe r. The int e rv ie wi ngde te c tiv e tur ne d o ff the ta pe re c or de r, bu t c on tin

ue d ta lki ngto Flemming

. Flemming then admitted to the sexual a ssault, but said he did not wa nt to have anyone make a rec ording of his admission. The detec tive activate d a hidden r ecor ding de vice a nd Flemming ag ai n s t at ed h e h ad sex with the victim. Id. at 878. The c ourt of appe als found that while the detec tive dece ived Flemming , Flemming ' s ignor ance of the re cording"c ould hardly have compe lled him to confess. The de ception em p l o y ed by Detec tive Big ley

was not coe rcive , nor could it have

ov erbo rne app ell ant 's w i l l. " Id. at 879. We find nothing in the r ecor d to sugg est that Butler was
c omp e lle d to make the state me nts a g a ins t hi s in te re st. 11 As a fina l point, we note that a tria l court' s admission or exclusi on of evidence is re viewed for a n abuse of

discretion. O

p r e a n v . S

tat e , 2 0 1 S .W.3d 724, 726 (Tex. C rim. App. 2006); Mo ntgom e ry

v . S tat e , 810 S.W .2d 372, 379–80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). We will not reve rse a trial

c o u r t who se r

ul in g was wi th in th e "z on e of r easo nab le d is agreemen t. " Mo ntgom e ry , 8 1 0 S.W .2d at 391 (o p . o n re h 'g). The trial court wa s able to re view the two inter views alleg ed to have been g ive n b y B utl e r a nd c omp are the sig natur e s o n the tw o "A dv ic e of Rig hts " fo rm s. We fi nd no a bu se of discre tion in the admission of the second intervie w.19

VI. Motion for Couns el to Withdraw Butler complains nex t that the trial cour t erre d by not gr anting a motion filed by his trial attorney seekingto al l o w t h e attorney to withdraw fr om repre senting Butler . A hea ring on the motion to wit hdrawwas he ld J une 30, 2008. Trial commence d Aug ust 25, 2008. At the hea ring on the motion to withdraw, Butler' s attorney said he had be en appointed a bout Dece mber of 2007, ha d obtained and r eviewe d numerous exhibi ts suc h as at least one of the rec orded interviews with Butler and other rec orded state ments g iven by Butler ' s co-d ef

en d ants , and had just viewe d a copy of the surveillance video showing the Carlito' s robber y . Contrary to Butler' s assertion that the attorney had not provided B utler with discover y materia ls, counsel told the trial court that he had fur nished Butler with all discovery

obtained to that point. Butler told the tria l court that he did not fee l c ounsel was

a c tin g in B utl e r' s " be st int e re st" and ha d no t me t w ithB utl e r t o d isc us s w itn e sse s, a lib is, wh e the r t o g o to tr ial befor e a jur

y or whe ther to submit to a trial befor e the be nch. Counsel also told the trial court that Butler wanted t he attorne y to file a motion to dismi ss the indictment even thoug h there was
no bas is for

su ch a f il in g becaus e "th e in di ctm ent [ ] tr ack[ s] th e st atu te. " The trial c ourt' s decision to deny the motion to withdraw is review ed for abuse of discre tion. Kin g v . S tat e , 29 S.W .3d 556, 566 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). An i ndige nt defe ndant' s rig ht to counsel does not requir e the tria l court to appoint a c ounsel agree able to the a ccuse d. Id . In g e ne ra l, persona lity

conflicts an d d isag ree ments conce rning trial strateg y do not form valid g rounds for withdrawa l. Id . Unless a de fenda nt s hows ade quate g rounds for the appointment of newcounselTrial counse l made br ief mention, at the he aringon the motion to withdraw, that Butler 12 "c ontacted the Ba

r Association." B utler did not mention or expand on this when he addr essed the tr ia l c ourt , s o th e re is n oth ingin t he re c or d to su g g e st a le g iti ma te c on fl ic t of int e re st, wh ic h c a n in some circ umstances entitle an accuse d to a new c ounsel . See, e .g. , Sm ith v . Lo c k ha rt , 923 F.2d 1314, 13 21 (8 th C ir . 1 99 1) (c on fl ic t of int e re st a

ri sin g fr om d e fe nd ant's cl a ss a c tio n s uit a g a ins t c la ss inc lud inga tto rn e y , c ou

ple d w ithina

bil ity to c omm un ic a te wi th e a c h o the r) ; Un ite d S tat es v. H ur t , 543 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (appe llate counsel' s conflict of interest arising out of libel suit brought ag ainst him by

appellant' s trial counsel for asser ting, on a ppeal, inef

fec tiveness of trial c ounsel). 20 or choose s to waive his rig ht to counsel and to proce ed pro se , he must acc ept the counse l appointed by the trial cour

t. Ga rn e r v . S

tat e , 8 64 S.W. 2d

92 , 9 8 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 19 93 , p e t. ref ' d). I n his appellate point, B utler complains " the t rial judg e g ave f ew, if a ny , rea sons for deny

ing the motion to withdraw." Howeve r, a defe ndant must bring the matter to the trial court' s attention

and mus t c arr

y the burd e n of

pr ov inghe is e nti tle d to ne w c ouns e l. Ste ph e ns on v . S

tat e , 255 S.W .3d 6 5 2 , 6 5 5 n . 4 (T ex . Ap p . — Fo rt W o rt h 2 0 0 8 , p et
. re f'd ) ( ci t i n g Ma lc om v . S tat e , 628 S.W .2d 790, 791 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. [Pan e l O p. ] 198 2) ; W e bb v . S tat e , 5 3 3 S. W. 2 d

7 8 0 , 7 8 4 n . 3 ( T e x. Cr im

. A pp. 1976)). B ased on the minimal complaints Butler pre sented to the trial court, we find the trial cour t did not abuse its discretion in denying B utler' s motion. The seventh point of er ror is over

ruled. 12 VII. No Errorin Alleged Hearsay I n his eig hth point of error , Bu t l er complains that the trial cour t erre d in allowing he arsa y testimony by the State' s witnesses. B utler complains of three statements made by law enf orce ment witnesses, which the trial court a llowed over Butler ' s objections.21

The fir st statement of which B utler complains came from L air; the State a sked L air if it was L air' s "unde rstanding that Ger ald Dew ay ne Bu t l er at least stay ed" at 104-C Pinebrook Place , the duplex wher e incriminating evidenc e was found. Howeve r, when B utler took the stand, he te stified that he lived at 102- C Pi nebrook, but o cc as i o n al ly stay ed the nig ht at 104-C. Wit hout deciding whether it was error to a llow L air' s testimony about his "unde rstanding " of wher e B utler re sided or sta y e d, we po int

ou t th a t a pa rt y wa ive s e rr or

re g ard ingimp ro pe rl y adm itt e d e vid e nc e if the same evidenc e is later a dmitted without obj ection. Se e Ro ge rs v . S tat e , 8 53 S.W. 2d 29 , 35 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 93 ); Ho us e v . S

tat e , 909 S.W .2d 214, 216 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1995) (stating any err or in allowing inadmissible evidence is cured w hen s a me e vidence comes in without objection elsewhe re in trial) , a

ff 'd , 947 S.W .2d 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Butler also complains that the State wa s al l o we d to cross-e x amine him with the qu e sti on ," Wel l, i f M s. [Tarnes hi a] Whe a t to ld S pe c ia l A g e nt K e e ne r t hat y ou liv e d th e re [104 -C ]

. . . t h a ty o us o m e t i m e s s t ay e d i n t h a t b e dr o o m w h e r e t h e . 2 2 g u nw a s f o u n d , w o u l d

s h e b e a l i a r ?" Ar g ua bly , th is ass ert io n b y

the State a ssume s f

a c ts n ot i n e vid e nc e : Whe a t di d n ot t e sti fy a t tr ia l. Fur ther, the sug g estion of what W heat said g oes t o why the i nvestig ating office r went to searc h for

e vid e nc e a t 10 4- C. A lso , th e pr os e c uto r' s q ue sti on wa s not ev ide nc e . E ve n if thi s w e re ina dmi ssi ble hear say , Butler ' s conce ssion that he lived next door and occa sionally stay ed in the 10 4 -C location waived a ny complaint.22

We r e a c h a

sim ila r c on c lus ion

re g ard ingB utl e r' s c omp la int tha t th e State wa s a llo we d to a sk Bu t l er , "w h y

wo u l d [ Bu t l er 's b ro t h er ] t el l t h e p o l i ce t h at h e p ar t i ci p at edi nt h e C ar l o s -- C ar l i t o 's

re sta ur ant a g g ra

vate d r ob be ry

and that y ou we re in i t, a lso ? " Th e State ' s q ue sti on wa s im pr op e r: it assumed fa cts not in evidence . But the State w as not offe ring testimony , and, there fore , the question did not amount to hearsay . We overrule Butler ' s eig hth point of error

. We affir m the trial court' s judgme nt.

Ba iley C. Moseley J ustice Date Submitted: September 30, 2009 Date D ecide d: November 12, 2009 Pub lis h