J-S07004-19

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

KEEON D. JONES 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1351 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 28, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-38-CR-0001080-2017

BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED APRIL 15, 2019

Appellant, Keeon D. Jones, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered on March 28, 2018, following his jury trial convictions for possession 

of a controlled substance, two counts of possession with intent to deliver a 

controlled substance (PWID), possession of drug paraphernalia, and false 

identification to law enforcement authorities.1 We affirm.

We briefly summarize the facts and procedural history of this case as 

follows. On May 22, 2017, police responded to a call that there was a disabled 

vehicle on Interstate 81 in East Hanover Township in Lebanon County. When 

police arrived on the scene, three women and two men were present. A man 

and a woman were standing outside of the vehicle and the other three people 

were in the backseat of the car. The male who was standing outside, later 

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1

 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), 35 P.S. 

§ 780-113(a)(32), and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4914, respectively.
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identified as Antonio Acklin, got back into the car in the driver’s seat when 

police arrived. Upon request, Acklin produced his Ohio driver’s license to 

police. At that time, police detected the odor of marijuana. Police determined 

that one of the women owned the car and she consented to a search of the 

vehicle. All five people were ordered out of the car. During an initial search, 

Police uncovered a plastic grocery bag that contained hundreds of little glass 

vials with caps, colored plastic bags, razors, and a digital scale. 

As a result, police detained Acklin and the other male, who was later 

identified as Appellant, by placing them in the back of a police cruiser. Police 

also detained two of the females, but not the third woman who was pregnant. 

Before placing Appellant in the police car, however, police searched Appellant 

and recovered $1,246.00 in cash from his person. While inside the police 

vehicle, the police recorded the conversations between Acklin and Appellant, 

using the cruiser dashboard camera and a microphone. 

Officer James Paparella and Officer Travis Kauffman were two of the 

investigating police officers who testified at trial. When Officer Paparella asked 

Appellant for identification while he was in the back of the police car, Appellant 

gave Officer Paparella two false names, but police were eventually able to 

identify him. At trial, the Commonwealth presented the videotaped 

conversations between Acklin and Appellant in the police car. The video 

depicts the scene as seen from inside the police car facing out the front window 

and shows police searching the vehicle in question, but the sound captured 

the two men inside the vehicle. Appellant told Acklin not to worry because 
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police only recovered “empty bottles and a scale.” Appellant further told 

Acklin that such a police discovery would only support the issuance of a 

citation, he asked Acklin to take responsibility for the items, and chastised 

Acklin for not doing more to insure that police would not impound the vehicle. 

Appellant also discussed his outstanding warrants and concern that he would

not be able to make bail because police confiscated the money he was 

carrying. 

Police summoned a canine (K-9) unit to the scene. The K-9 unit alerted 

police to additional contraband in the trunk. The video shows police removing 

and unwrapping a plastic bag containing a white powder. Inside that bag, 

police also discovered later approximately 50 various prescription pills.

2

 Police 

took Appellant into custody and permitted the four other people present to 

leave in the vehicle they just searched. Police transported Appellant to the 

police station and gave him warnings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 

U.S. 436 (1966). Appellant told police that there was a warrant for his arrest 

in New Jersey because during a vehicular stop there a local police officer said 

he smelled marijuana and Appellant fled. Appellant was on parole at that 

time. When asked whether the package containing white powder was crack 

cocaine, Appellant replied that it was cocaine. He claimed that he could not 

return to work after he fled from police in New Jersey and that he had to make 

ends meet. 

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2

 Subsequent chemical testing revealed that the white powder was cocaine 

and the pills were Oxycodone, Codeine, and Diazepam. 
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At trial, Appellant testified. Appellant claimed that the recovered

narcotics and paraphernalia belonged to Acklin. He maintained that the

recorded conversation showed that Appellant was asking Acklin to take 

responsibility for Acklin’s own crimes. Appellant claimed that he had money 

on his person because he cashed his last paycheck before leaving New Jersey. 

Appellant testified that during the investigation, he was most concerned about 

warrants for his arrest. Appellant denied subsequently telling police that he 

had fallen on hard times or that the alleged narcotics were cocaine. 

At the conclusion of trial on February 27, 2018, a jury convicted 

Appellant of the aforementioned charges. The trial court sentenced Appellant 

on March 28, 2018 to an aggregate term of three-and-one-half to nine years 

of imprisonment. This timely appeal resulted.3 

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3

 Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion on April 9, 2018. See 

PA.R.Crim.P. 720 (post-sentence motions shall be filed not later than 10 days 

after the imposition of sentence); see also 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (whenever the 

last day for filing falls on a weekend, those days are omitted from 

computation). A trial court has 120 days to decide a post-sentence motion or 

it is deemed denied by operation of law. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(a). If 

a post-sentence motion is deemed denied by operation of law, the clerk of 

courts shall enter an order deeming the motion denied and serve copies to the 

parties. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(c). Here, the 120th day fell on August 

7, 2018. However, the clerk of courts failed to enter a deemed denial order. 

The trial court then filed an opinion and order on August 10, 2018, denying 

Appellant relief. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on August 13, 2018. The 

notice of appeal was timely either from the deemed denial following the 

120-day period under Rule 720, despite the clerk of courts failure to enter an 

order, or from the trial court’s August 13, 2018 decision. See Pa.R.A.P. 903 

(notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order from 

which the appeal is taken). On August 27, 2018, the trial court ordered 

Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 
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On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

1. Whether [Appellant’s] motion for acquittal should [have] 

be[en] granted due to the Commonwealth’s failure to present 

sufficient evidence at trial?

2. Whether the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence?

3. Whether [the trial c]ourt erred when it refused to grant a 

mistrial after Trooper Paparella of the Pennsylvania State Police 

testified to previously undisclosed information concerning 

marijuana use by the occupants of the vehicle?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (issue numbers supplied).

In his first issue presented, Appellant claims that, “[t]he Commonwealth 

failed to present sufficient evidence at trial that [he] possessed the controlled 

substances and paraphernalia found in the trunk of the vehicle.” Appellant’s 

Brief at 13. More specifically, he argues:

[Appellant] testified that he was not the owner of the items. His 

testimony is supported by the lack of controlled substances or 

paraphernalia on his person. The vehicle, where the items were 

found, does not belong to him. The female owner of the vehicle 

admitted to regular mari[j]uana use in her vehicle. The 

Commonwealth attempted to bolster [Appellant’s] connection to 

the controlled substances through his possession of a large sum 

of money. [Appellant] explained it was from his employment and 

provided proof that he had a legitimate source of income. 

Additionally, he attempted to get the actual owner, [Antonio] 

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pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant complied timely. On October 12, 

2018, the trial court entered an order stating that the issues Appellant 

advanced in his Rule 1925(b) statement were addressed in the trial court’s 

August 10, 2018 decision. Accordingly, the trial court forwarded the certified 

record to this Court for review. 
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Acklin, to take responsibility for the items. When the factors are 

viewed together, the Commonwealth proved at best that 

[Appellant] had money in his pocket, was a passenger in a vehicle 

he did not own, where controlled substances were found in the 

trunk and [Appellant] had no drug paraphernalia on his person.

Id. at 15-16.4 

Our standard of review is well-settled:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 

is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence 

to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh 

the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In 

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by 

the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of 

innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be 

resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and 

inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be 

drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth 

may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record 

must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be 

considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, 

is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. This standard 

is equally applicable to cases where the evidence is circumstantial 

rather than direct so long as the combination of the evidence links 

the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Although a 

conviction must be based on more than mere suspicion or 

conjecture, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a 

mathematical certainty.

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 194 A.3d 159, 166 (Pa. Super. 2018) (internal 

citations and quotations omitted).

The Controlled Substances Act states, in pertinent part:

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4

 Appellant does not challenge his conviction for false identification to 

authorities. As such, we need not examine that crime. 
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(a) The following acts and the causing thereof within the 

Commonwealth are hereby prohibited:

* * *

(16) Knowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled or 

counterfeit substance by a person not registered under this act, 

or a practitioner not registered or licensed by the appropriate 

State board, unless the substance was obtained directly from, or 

pursuant to, a valid prescription order or order of a practitioner, 

or except as otherwise authorized by this act.

* * *

(30) Except as authorized by this act, the manufacture, delivery, 

or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled 

substance by a person not registered under this act, or a 

practitioner not registered or licensed by the appropriate State 

board, or knowingly creating, delivering or possessing with intent 

to deliver, a counterfeit controlled substance.

* * *

(32) The use of, or possession with intent to use, drug 

paraphernalia for the purpose of planting, propagating, 

cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, 

converting, producing, processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, 

packing, repacking, storing, containing, concealing, injecting, 

ingesting, inhaling or otherwise introducing into the human body 

a controlled substance in violation of this act.

35 P.S. §780-113(a)(16), (30), and (32).

Because Appellant was not in physical possession of the contraband, the 

Commonwealth relied upon the principle of constructive possession of the 

seized items to support Appellant’s convictions:

Constructive possession is a legal fiction, a pragmatic construct to 

deal with the realities of criminal law enforcement. Constructive 

possession is an inference arising from a set of facts that 

possession of the contraband was more likely than not. We have 
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defined constructive possession as conscious dominion. We 

subsequently defined conscious dominion as the power to control 

the contraband and the intent to exercise that control. To aid 

application, we have held that constructive possession may be 

established by the totality of the circumstances. Additionally, it is 

possible for two people to have joint constructive possession of an 

item of contraband.

Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 67 A.3d 817, 820–821 (Pa. Super. 2013).

Upon our review, including viewing the video and audio recording from 

the police cruiser, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to support 

Appellant’s convictions. Initially, we note that Appellant presents his 

sufficiency of the evidence claim with facts and argument in the light most 

favorable to himself, which is contrary to our standard of review. When 

examining the totality of the facts and circumstances, in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, as our standard requires, we find sufficient 

evidence to support Appellant’s narcotics-related convictions. Here, there was 

ample evidence that Appellant intended to exercise control over the recovered

contraband. The video and audio recordings show that Appellant knew what 

was inside the various bags recovered from the vehicle while the officers were 

conducting the search. Later, Appellant told police that the white powder was 

cocaine, before police could determine the substance. Testing confirmed that 

the powder was cocaine. From this, a jury was free to determine that because 

Appellant knew specific information about the narcotics, he exercised 

conscious dominion. Moreover, while Appellant can be heard asking Acklin to 

accept responsibility on the recording and Appellant testified that the narcotics 

and paraphernalia were Acklin’s at trial, the jury was free to believe all, part, 
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or none of the testimony. Finally, Appellant gave the police two false names. 

Evidence of self-concealment, including providing false names during contact 

with police, may be admitted to show consciousness of guilt. See 

Commonwealth v. Toro, 638 A.2d 991, 998 (Pa. Super. 1994). Based on a 

totality of the circumstances, we find sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s 

convictions. 

In his second issue, Appellant claims that his convictions were against 

the weight of the evidence presented. Appellant’s Brief at 14-16. Here, 

Appellant advances the same argument he made concerning the sufficiency of 

the evidence. Id. He claims that the jury’s verdict shocks one’s sense of 

justice and requires a new trial. Id. at 14. 

Our standard of review is as follows:

A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against 

the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the 

trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere 

conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts 

would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of 

the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, 

certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them 

or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice. 

It has often been stated that a new trial should be awarded when 

the jury's verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's 

sense of justice and the award of a new trial is imperative so that 

right may be given another opportunity to prevail.

An appellate court's standard of review when presented with a 

weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review 

applied by the trial court:

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the 

exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question 

of whether the verdict is against the weight of the 
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evidence. Because the trial judge has had the 

opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, 

an appellate court will give the gravest consideration 

to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial 

judge when reviewing a trial court's determination 

that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. 

One of the least assailable reasons for granting or 

denying a new trial is the lower court's conviction that 

the verdict was or was not against the weight of the 

evidence.

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 758 (Pa. Super. 2014) (internal 

citations, quotations, and brackets omitted).

Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Appellant’s weight 

of the evidence claim is without merit. Having already determined that there 

was sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s narcotics-related convictions, 

we conclude that those convictions are not against the weight of the evidence 

for the same reasons. Regarding his conviction for false identification to law 

enforcement authorities,5the record is clear that Appellant twice gave officers 

a name that was not his. Officer Paparella testified as such and Appellant is 

heard on the police recording giving two different names. See N.T., 

2/27/2018, at 28-30, citing Exhibit 16 (police cruiser recording). For all of 

the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s convictions do not shock the conscience of 

the court. Moreover, Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim is based upon 

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5

 Appellant does not argue that his false identification to law enforcement 

authorities conviction is against the weight of the evidence. As such, he has 

waived this aspect of this claim, but as discussed, we find it is otherwise 

without merit. 
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alleged conflicts in testimony and, as set forth above, a new trial is not 

warranted in such instances. As such, his second issue fails.

Finally, in his last issue presented, Appellant contends that the trial court 

erred by denying a request for a mistrial after Officer James Paparella testified 

that police had received a telephone call from an unknown third-party that 

someone was smoking marijuana near a disabled vehicle. Appellant’s Brief at 

16-17. Appellant objected to the testimony as hearsay, arguing the 

Commonwealth violated discovery rules by not providing the information prior 

to trial and the police “reports indicated that the only information received 

from the phone call was a vehicle was disabled.” Id. at 16. However, 

Appellant has failed to cite any legal authority on this issue and, as such, we 

find it waived. See In re Estate of Whitley, 50 A.3d 203, 209–210 (Pa.

Super. 2012) (“This Court will not consider the merits of an argument which 

fails to cite relevant case or statutory authority. Failure to cite relevant legal 

authority constitutes waiver of the claim on appeal.”); see also Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(a) (“The argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are 

questions to be argued[,] followed by such discussion and citation of 

authorities as are deemed pertinent.”); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2101 (“Briefs [...]

shall conform in all material respects with the requirements of [the] rules [of 

appellate procedure] as nearly as the circumstances of the particular case will 

admit, otherwise they may be suppressed, and, if the defects are in the brief 

[...] and are substantial, the appeal or other matter may be quashed or 
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dismissed.”). Appellant failed to support his third argument with any legal 

authority and we find it waived.6 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 04/15/2019

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6

In the alternative, we would find that Appellant was not entitled to relief on 

this issue. Here, the trial court properly determined that the Commonwealth 

did not elicit Officer Paparella’s inadvertent testimony that an anonymous 

caller reported that people were smoking marijuana near a disabled vehicle. 

The trial court issued a cautionary instruction to the jury to disregard the 

hearsay testimony. We presume the jury followed the trial court’s 

instructions. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 192 A.3d 1149, 1154 (Pa.

Super. 2018).