United States Court of Appeals

 For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 14-3756

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Quincy Jackson

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri

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 Submitted: December 18, 2015

 Filed: January 28, 2016

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Before MURPHY, BENTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

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BENTON, Circuit Judge.

QuincyL. Jackson pled guilty to possessing marijuana with intent to distribute,

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(D). In the plea agreement, Jackson
reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. 1

Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms. 

I.

On the evening of November 27, 2012, Jackson’s small aircraft diverted from

its original flight plan—Wichita, Kansas to Jacksonville, Illinois—and landed at the

downtown airport in Kansas City. Homeland Security agents, finding thissuspicious,

alerted the Airport Police. They called for a dog trained to detect illegal drugs. This

was her first field operation. She had a 97 percent success rate during training. She

alerted positively to narcotics near both wings of Jackson’s aircraft. 

Drug Enforcement Agency agents learned Jackson was staying at a nearby

hotel. Arriving there, about midnight, they knocked on the door seeking his consent

to search. No one answered. An agent called Jackson’s room. He answered, saying

he would come to the door, but he didn’t. After more calls to Jackson’s cell phone

and the room, agents smelled a strong odor emanating from the room, like Swisher

Sweet cigars—commonly used to smoke marijuana. A different dog came to the hotel

but did not alert. 

At 2:00 a.m., an agent returned to the aircraft to draft an affidavit for a warrant. 

The agent learned Jackson had his pilot’s license lessthan a month and had registered

the plane five months earlier. The agent submitted the draft at about 8:00 a.m., but

the prosecutor requested adding the drug dog’s certification. 

The Honorable Howard F. Sachs, United States DistrictJudge for the Western 1

District of Missouri, adopting the report and recommendation of the Honorable

Robert E. Larsen, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of

Missouri. 

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Also around 8:00 a.m., Jackson left his room. Two agents approached. He ran

back into his room. The agentsfollowed through the open door, handcuffed him, and

read him his Miranda rights. They stayed with Jackson until check-out time, when

they drove him to the Airport. An agent remained with him there. A search warrant

issued at about 5:40 p.m. that evening. Agents searched the aircraft, finding two large

boxes with 39 bags of marijuana, weighing 15.7 kilograms. 

Jackson moved to suppress the marijuana. A magistrate judge recommended

denying the motion, finding (1) his detention was immaterial because no evidence

came from it, (2) the dog’s positive alert provided probable cause to search the

aircraft, (3) the warrant was not based on misleading information, and (4) Jackson

was not the victim of wrongful profiling. The district court agreed (although noting

concern about the length of detention). Jackson appeals, arguing there was no

probable cause to search the aircraft, and the marijuana wasthe poisonous fruit of his

detention. 

II. 

“In an appeal from a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence,

the court reviews factual findings for clear error, and questions of constitutional law

de novo.” United States v. Gordon, 741 F.3d 872, 875 (8th Cir. 2013). “We may

affirm the denial of a motion to suppress on any grounds supported by the record.”

United States v. Allen, 705 F.3d 367, 369 (8th Cir. 2013). 

Jackson attacks the probable cause to search his aircraft, claiming the drug dog

was unreliable, and the affidavit had insufficient information about the dog’s

reliability. The test is “whether all the facts surrounding a dog’s alert, viewed

through the lens of common sense, would make a reasonably prudent person think

that a search would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime.” Florida v. Harris,

133 S.Ct. 1050, 1058 (2013). “[E]vidence of a dog’s satisfactory performance in a

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certification or training programcan itself provide sufficient reason to trust his alert.” 

Id. at 1057. An affidavit “need only state the dog has been trained and certified to

detect drugs” and “need not give a detailed account of the dog’s track record or

education.” United States v. Lakoskey, 462 F.3d 965, 978 (8th Cir. 2006), quoting

United States v. Sundby, 186 F.3d 873, 876 (8th Cir. 1999). 

The affidavit here gave sufficient facts about the dog’s reliability. It stated that

the dog wastrained alongside her handler by an established company. Training lasted

four weeks, including operations in buildings, lockers, luggage, automobiles, and

open areas. The affidavit noted that the dog was certified, with a 97 percent accuracy

rate in detecting illegal drugs. 

The facts here meet the Harris standard. The positive alert by a reliable dog

alone established probable cause. See Harris, 133 S.Ct. at 1057 (“If a bona fide

organization has certified a dog after testing his reliability in a controlled setting, a

court can presume (subject to any conflicting evidence offered) that the dog’s alert

provides probable cause to search.”). All the other facts support probable cause. 

Jackson was a licensed pilot for less than a month, purchasing the plane months

before. Flying a non-commercial aircraft a long distance at night, he deviated from

his flight plan—suspicious for a new pilot. His evasive behavior at the hotel

buttresses the probable cause finding. Cf. United States v. Massi, 761 F.3d 512, 522-

24 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding—where the dog did not alert—suspicious flight pattern,

denial of consent to search airplane, and evasive and inconsistent answers about box

on airplane did not show probable cause). 

Jackson contendsthat his arrest in the hotel room and his subsequent detention

awaiting the search warrant were illegal, making the marijuana in the aircraft the

“poisonous fruit” of his detention. To the contrary, the marijuana in the aircraft was

seized due to the warrant, not the arrest or detention. See Wong Sun v. United States,

371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963) (holding exclusionary rule inapplicable when evidence is

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acquired through source independent of illegal seizure). Jackson made no

incriminating statements; no evidence was seized from him. The warrant was based

on information obtained before Jackson’s arrest and detention. See United States v.

Swope, 542 F.3d 609, 613-14 (8th Cir. 2008) (warrant is independent source when

based on evidence not obtained by unlawful act). 

Jackson assertsthat if he had not been arrested and detained, he would have left

on the aircraft with the marijuana. In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153

(1925), the Court held that “an automobile or other vehicle may be searched” “where

it is not practicable to secure a warrant.” (emphasis added). See United States v.

Nigro, 727 F.2d 100, 106-07 (6th Cir. 1984) (“[S]everal courts of appeals have held

that the automobile exception applies to aircraft.”). Because therewas probable cause

that the aircraft contained evidence of a crime, the plane could be held until the

warrant issued. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1970) (“[W]e see no

difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the

probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate

search.”). Jackson could not have simply left on the aircraft. 

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The judgment is affirmed. 

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