J-S33043-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ISAAC BILAL PEARSON 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 862 EDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 31, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-39-CR-0004988-2015

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED DECEMBER 30, 2021

Isaac Bilal Pearson appeals pro se from the order dismissing his petition 

filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-

9546. Pearson maintains that the PCRA court erred in dismissing his petition 

as untimely. We affirm. 

The facts of this case are well known to the parties and have been set 

forth in a prior decision of this Court. See Commonwealth v. Pearson, 2116 

EDA 2018, unpublished memorandum (Pa.Super. filed Mar. 28, 2019). Briefly, 

a jury convicted Pearson in 2016 of two counts of Trafficking in Individuals, 

and one count each of Promoting Prostitution and Criminal Use of a 

Communication Facility.

1 The court imposed an aggregate sentence of 17 to 

34 years of imprisonment. 

____________________________________________

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3011(a), 5902(b)(3), and 7512(a), respectively.
J-S33043-21

- 2 -

On April 18, 2017, this Court affirmed Pearson’s judgment of sentence. 

Our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal on August 22, 

2017. In January 2018, Pearson filed a timely first PCRA petition. The court 

appointed counsel, who filed a no-merit letter. After a hearing, the court 

granted counsel’s petition to withdraw and permitted Pearson to proceed pro 

se at the evidentiary hearing. Following the hearing, the PCRA court denied 

Pearson relief. Pearson filed a timely pro se appeal. In March 2019, this Court 

affirmed the PCRA court’s denial of relief. See id.

On November 17, 2020, Pearson filed the instant, pro se, petition for 

post-conviction relief. The PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the 

petition as untimely. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). Pearson responded to the 

notice of intent to dismiss, and on March 31, 2021, the court dismissed 

Pearson’s petition. This timely appeal followed.

Pearson raises three issues on appeal.

1. Was Isaac Pearson’s PCRA petition dismissed prematurely after a 

showing of newly discovered psychiatric records? Did Isaac 

Pear[s]on’s untreated mental illness cause a structural defect in 

trial commensurate with miscarriage of justice?

2. Was the court’s sentence illegal by improperly imposing a 

consecutive sentence where a merger should have ensued? The 

court incorrectly considered the maximum penalty for violent prior 

where none exist.

3. Did trial judge Maria L. Dantos ‘erroneously’ terminate Isaac 

Pearson’s self-representation during his cross-examination of 

Commonwealth witness Kelli Favazza?

Pearson’s Br. at 5.
J-S33043-21

- 3 -

Prior to reaching the merits of Pearson’s claims on appeal, we must first

consider the timeliness of his PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Miller,

102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa.Super. 2014).

Crucial to the determination of any PCRA appeal is the timeliness

of the underlying petition. Thus, we must first determine whether

the instant PCRA petition was timely filed. The timeliness

requirement for PCRA petitions is mandatory and jurisdictional in

nature, and the court may not ignore it in order to reach the merits

of the petition. The question of whether a petition is timely raises

a question of law. Where the petitioner raises questions of law,

our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review plenary.

A PCRA petition is timely if it is “filed within one year of the date

the judgment [of sentence] becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9545(b)(1). “[A] judgment [of sentence] becomes final at the

conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the

Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.”

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). . . .

Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 491, 499 (Pa.Super. 2016) (case

citations and some quotation marks omitted).

Pearson’s judgment of sentence became final on November 20, 2017, 

90 days after our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal and Pearson did 

not petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. See 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (judgment of sentence becomes final “at the

conclusion of direct review . . . or at the expiration of time for seeking the

review”); U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13. Accordingly, Pearson had until November 20, 

2018, to file a timely PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). He filed 

the instant petition on November 17, 2020. Therefore, it was patently 

untimely and the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to review it unless Pearson
J-S33043-21

- 4 -

successfully pleaded and proved one of the statutory exceptions to the PCRA 

time-bar.

The PCRA provides three exceptions to its time-bar:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of

interference by government officials with the presentation of the

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth

or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise

of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized

by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court

of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and

has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). “[Our Supreme] Court has repeatedly 

stated it is the appellant’s burden to allege and prove that one of the 

timeliness exceptions applies.” Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 953 A.2d 1248, 

1253 (Pa. 2008).

In his petition, Pearson attempts to invoke both the government 

interference and the new fact exceptions to the PCRA time-bar. 

The government interference exception requires a petitioner to establish 

that the government interfered with a petitioner’s ability to present a claim. 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i). The new fact exception requires a petitioner

to establish that 1) “the facts upon which the claim [was] predicated were

unknown” and 2) “could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due

diligence.” Id. at § 9545(b)(1)(ii). Further, a “petitioner must explain why he 
J-S33043-21

- 5 -

could not have obtained the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due 

diligence.” Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1080 (Pa.Super. 

2010). “[T]he general rule remains that mental illness or psychological 

condition, absent more, will not serve as an exception to the PCRA’s 

jurisdictional time requirements.” Id. at 1081 (citation omitted).

Here, Pearson claims to be eligible for the new fact exception on account 

of his mother newly discovering medical documentation showing that he was 

diagnosed with ADHD. See Pearson’s Br. at 7. He asserts that he is eligible 

for the governmental interference exception because of the difficulty he 

experienced in obtaining mental health records. See id. at 9.

We conclude that Pearson has not proven applicability of either the 

government interference or the new fact exception. Pearson’s difficulty in 

obtaining records of his mental health diagnosis does not constitute 

governmental interference with his ability to present his claim. Additionally, 

the newly discovered “fact” on which Pearson relies is a document describing

his childhood diagnosis of ADHD. That document is at best new evidence of a 

fact, and is not itself a new fact. Moreover, Pearson has not established that 

that he was unable to discover the fact of his diagnosis prior to trial despite 

having exercised due diligence. 
J-S33043-21

- 6 -

Accordingly, Pearson’s second PCRA petition was facially untimely and 

qualified for no exception to the PCRA time-bar. Therefore, the PCRA court 

properly dismissed it.2

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/30/2021

____________________________________________

2 As the PCRA court correctly noted, Pearson’s second claim arguing that his 

conviction should have merged for sentencing was already raised on direct 

appeal. See Commonwealth v. Pearson, 1158 EDA 2016, unpublished 

memorandum (Pa.Super. filed April 18, 2017). Therefore, it was not a basis 

for relief under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3).