IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA No. 315 P A1 5 Filed 19 August 2016 QUALITY BUILT HOMES INCORPORATED and STAFFORD LAND COMPANY, INC.

v. TOWN OF CARTHAGE

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A

- 31 of a unanimous , unpublished d ecision of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 7 76 S.E.2d 8 9 7 (20 1 5 ), affirming an order allowing summary judgment entered on 1 7 October 201 4 by Judge James M. Webb in Superior Court, Moore County

. On 5 November 2015, the Supreme Court allowed defendant’s conditional petition for discretionary review as to additional issues. Heard in the Supreme Court on 17 May 2016 in session in the Old Burke County Courthouse in the City of Morganto n pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A

- 10(a).
Ferguson, Hayes, Hawkins & DeMay, PLLC, by James R. DeMay; and Scarbrough & Scarbrough, PLLC, by James E. Scarbrough , for plaintiff

appellants/appellees

. Cranfill Sumner & Hartzog LLP, by Susan K. Burkhart, for defendant

appellant/ appellee. Law Office of John T. Benjamin, Jr., P.A., by John T. Benja min, Jr. and William E. Hubbard, for Leading Builders of America, amicus curiae

. Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A., by Edward F. Hennessey; and J. Michael Carpenter, General Counsel, for North Carolina Home Builders Association, Inc., amicus curiae.Q UALITY B UILT H OMES V
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- Ellis & Winters LLP, by Matthew W. Sawchak and Paul M. Cox; and F. Paul Calamita for North Carolina Water Quality Association, amicus curiae.
NEWBY, Justice.

In this case we consider whether the Town of Carthage exceeded its municipal authority under the Public E nterprise Statutes, N.C.G.S. §§ 160A

- 311 to

- 338 (2015) , by adopting certain water and sewer “impact fee” ordinances. Upon approval of a subdivision of real property , the ordinances trigger immediate charges for future water and sewer system expansion, regardless of whether the landowner ever connects to the system or whether Carthage ever expands the system. As creat ion s of the legislature, municipalities have only those power s delegated to them by the General Assembly. When Carthage adopted the ordinances at issue here, it exercised
power that it had not been granted . The impact fee ordinances are therefore invalid

an d, accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. In 2003, following a period of rapid population growth, Carthage adopted tw o similar impact fee ordinances: one pertaining to its water system , and the other pertaining to its sewer system

. In their current form, t he ordinances state that the impact fees “shall be used to cover the costs of expandi ng the [water and sewer] system [s] .” Carthage, N.C., Code §§ 51.076(F) (water) , 51.096(H) (sewer) (2015)

. These costs include “water treatment plant expansion, elevated storage expansion,Q UALITY B UILT H OMES V
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- and transmission mains” for the water system, id. § 51.076(F), and “gravity mains, force mains, and lift stations” for the sewer system, id. § 51.096(H). Under both ordinances, a land owner who seeks to subdiv ide property and receives “final plat approval , ” id. §§ 51.076(C)(1), 51.096(B), must pay water and

sewer impact fee s “based on water meter size according to the town’s fee schedule,” id. §§ 51.076(B), 51.096(A) , in amounts ranging from $1 , 000 to $30,000 p er connection

. Carthage, N.C., Fee and Rate Schedule 4 (July 1, 2016). “ If a [ property ] has received its final plat, then the entire [ water and sewer ] impact fee [s] shall be paid at the earliest or n ext occurrence of .

. . [the] (a) Tap fee; or (b ) Development permit.” Id. §§ 51.076( C ) (2), 51.096(C ) ; see also Fee and Rate Schedule 4 (“Water/Sewer Impact Fees are due upon final plat approval for new subdivisions (major or minor) or upon application for building permit, whichever occurs first.”)

. T ap fee s cover Carthage’s costs “to ‘tap’ or access” the “water and/or sewer line that exists in front of the property, ” wh ereas “impact fees offset .

. . costs to expand the syste m to accommodate development.”
I mpact fees are assessed “ in addition to the r egular water and sewer tap fees, ” and the monthly service charges to water and sewer customers

. If a property owner does not pay the impact fees, Carthage “will refuse ” to issue building permits

. Certain exceptions exist “for temporary or emergency service,” id. § 51.076 (A) (2)(b), and any service solely for “fire protection,” id. §§ 51.076(E ), 51.096(G), but in all instances, impact fees are assessed reg ardless of the property owner ’ s actual use of the systemsQ UALITY B UILT H OMES V
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- or whether Carthage actually expands the systems. In 2014 Carthage ’s Town Manager reported that the Town had “neglected to make needed improvements to its water and sewer systems for many years.” Plaintiffs are North Carolina corporations engage d in residential ho mebuilding. At the time of filing their action, plaintiffs had paid Carthage a total of $123,000 in water and sewer impact fees. On 28 October 2013, plaintiffs filed their complaint seeking, inter alia , a declaratory judgment and monetary damages

. 1 Plaintiffs allege that “Carthage has acted outside th e scope of its legal authority” by “charging” the impact fees “without a specific delegation of auth ority from the General Assembly ” and that, accordingly, plaintiffs are entitled to a return of all impa ct fees paid , plus interest and attorney s’ fees

. Carthage timely answered the complaint , contending that “the water and sewer fees imposed by Defendant were authorized by North Carol ina’s Public Enterprise Statute ” and asserting various affirmative defen ses, including, inter alia , the statute of limitations and estoppel

. All parties moved for summary judgment. On 17 October 2014 , the trial court entered an order granting summary judgment for Carthage

. Plaintiffs appe aled the summary judgment order to the Court of Appeals.

1 Not at issue here, o n 23 June 2014, pla intiffs amended their complaint to, inter alia , add equal pr otection and due process claims

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- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Carthage. Quality Built Homes Inc. v. Town of Carthage , ___ N.C. App. ___ , 776 S.E.2d 897 , 2015 WL 4620404 (2015) (unpublished). Applying “br oad construction” interpretat ion principles under N.C.G.S. § 160A

- 4, t he Court of Appeals concluded that Carthage acted within its delegated municipal authority to impose and collect the impact fees under the Public Enterprise Statute s , Quality Built Homes , 2015 WL 4620404 , at * 4

- 5 (citing, inter alia , N.C.G.S. § 160A

- 4 (2013 ); Homebuilders Ass’n of Charlotte v. City of Charlotte , 336 N.C. 37, 43

- 44, 442 S.E.2d 45, 50 (1994); and Town of Spring Hope v. Bissette , 305 N.C. 248, 252, 287 S.E. 2d 851,
854 (1982) ), which e nable municipalities to “ establish and rev ise .

. . schedules of rents, rates, fees, charges, and penalties for the use of or the services furnished by any public enterprise ,” N.C.G.S. § 160A

- 314(a). 2
We allowed both plaintiffs ’ petition and defendant’s conditional petition for discretionary review. We review matters of statutory interpretation de novo, In re Ernst & Young, LLP , 363 N.C. 612, 616, 684 S.E.2d 151, 154 (2009) (citation s omitted), as well as orders grant ing summary judgment , viewing the allegations as true and “the presented evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” Dalton v. Camp , 353 N.C. 647, 651, 548 S.E.2d 704, 707 (2001) (c itation omitted).

2 Because of its resolution of the matter , t he Court of Appeals did not reach the statute of limitations or estoppel issues

. Quality Built Homes , 2015 WL 4620404 at *5. Moreover, the court overruled plaintiffs’ argument that they are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. at *6.Q UALITY B UILT H OMES V
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- From the very formation of our State government, municipali ties, in their various forms, have been considered “ creatures of the legislative will, and are subject to its control.” Lutterloh v. City of Fayetteville , 149 N.C. 65, 69 , 62 S.E. 758, 760 (1908); see King v. Chapel Hill , 367 N.C. 400, 405, 758 S.E.2d 364 , 369 (2014 ) ; Bd. of Trs. of Youngsville Twp. v. Webb , 155 N.C. 379, 384

- 85 , 71 S.E. 520, 522 (1911)

. Fundamental to our system is the legislature’s ability to confer upon municipalities certain authority needed to effectuate the purposes of government. N.C. Const. a rt. VII, § 1 (“The General Assembly shall provide for the organization and government

. . . of counties, cities and towns, and

. . . may give such powers and duties to

. . . [them] as it may deem advisable.”); White v. Comm’rs of Chowan Cty. , 90 N.C. 4 37, 438 (1884) (“[Municipalities] contribute largely to the life

- principle of American liberty, and are .

. . invested with appropriate corporate functions .

. . [which] may be enlarged, abridged or modified at the will of the legislature .

. . . ” ); see also 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *470 (“[Municipalities] are erected for the good government of a town or particular district . . . .”) The General Assembly delegates express power to municipalities by adopting an enabling statute, which incl udes “ implied power s . . . essential to the exercise of those which are expressly conferred.” O’Neal v. Wake County , 196 N.C. 184 , 187 , 145 S.E. 28, 29 (1928); s ee Lanvale Props., LLC v. County of Cabarrus , 366 N.C. 142, 150, 731 S.E.2d 800, 807 (2012 ) ; T own of Saluda v. County of Polk , 207 N.C. 180, 186 , 176 S.E. 298, 301

- 02 (1934)

. “All acts beyond the scope of the powers granted to aQ UALITY B UILT H OMES V
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- municipality are [invalid] .” City of Asheville v. Herbert , 190 N.C. 732, 735, 130 S.E. 861, 863 (1925) (citations omitted). When determining the extent of legislative power conferred upon a municipa lity, the plain language of the enabling statute governs. Smith Chapel Baptist Church v. City of Durham , 350 N.C. 805, 811, 517 S.E.2d 874, 878 (1999) (citation omitted). I f the “language of [the enabling] statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction, and the courts must give it its plain and definite meaning.” Id. at 811, 517 S.E.2d at 878 (quoting Lemons v. Old Hickory Council, BSA , 322 N .C. 271, 276, 367 S.E.2d 655, 658 (1988)). “[A] statute clear on its face must be enforced as written.” Bowers v. City of High Point , 339 N.C. 413, 419

- 20, 451 S.E.2d 284, 289 (1994) (citation omitted).
I f the enabling statute is ambiguous, the “ legisl ation ‘shall be broadly construed

. . . to include any additional and supplementary powers that are reasonably necessary or expedient to carry them into execution and effect.’ ” King , 36 7 N.C. at 405, 758 S.E.2d at 369 (citation omitted) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 160A

- 4 )

. The “broad construction” mandate of section 160A

- 4 is “ a rule of statutory construction rather than a general directive,” Lanvale Props. , 366 N.C. at 154, 731 S.E.2d at 809, and , as such, is inoperative when the enabling statute is clear and

u nambiguous on its face, s ee id. at 154

- 55, 731 S.E.2d at 809

- 10 (citations omitted).Q UALITY B UILT H OMES V
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- Carthage asserts that under the Public Enterprise Statutes it has broad authority to “ collect monies” for the “operation, maintenance and expansion” of its water and sewer system s , and that such authority extends to the collection of impact fees. Carthage claims that “impact fees” fall squarely within its “authority to charge ‘fees’ or ‘charges’ ” under N.C.G.S. § 160A

- 314. We disagree. While the enabling
statu t es allow Carthage to charge for the contemporaneous use of its water and sewer systems, the plain language of the Public Enterprise Statutes clearly fails to empower the Town to impose impact fees for future services

. The enabling statutes at issue here provide , in pertinent part, that “[ a ] city may establish and revise

. . . rents, rates, fees, charges, and penalties for the use of or the services furn i shed by any public enterprise,” N.C.G.S. § 160A

- 314 (a) , that “ [a] city shall have authority to acquire, construct, establish, enlarge, improve, maintain, own, operate, and contract for the operation of any or all of the public enterprises

. . . to furnish services ,” i d. § 160A

- 312(a), and that “a city shall have full authority to finance the cost of any public enterpr ise by levying taxes, borrowing money, and appropriating any other revenues therefor ,” id. § 160A

- 313.
T he se enabling statutes clearly and unambiguously empower Carthage to charge for the contemporaneous use of water and sewer services

— not to collect fees for future discretionary spending

. See Smith Chapel , 350 N.C. at 811, 517 S.E.2d at
878 (finding that the “plain language” of N.C.G.S. § 160A

- 314 is “clear and unambiguous”). A municipality’s ability to “establish and revise” its various “fees” isQ UALITY B UILT H OMES V
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- limited to “the use of” or “the services furnished by” the enterprise , which provisions

are operative in the present tense. S ee Dunn v. Pac. Emp’r s Ins. Co. , 332 N.C. 129, 134, 418 S.E.2d 645, 648 (1992) (“ Ordinary rules of grammar apply when ascertaining the meaning of a statute

. . . .” (citations omitted) ). Though the enabling statutes allow municipalities to charge for “services furnished,” u nlike similar county water and sewer district enabling statutes, the language at issue here fail s to authorize Carthage to charge for services “ to be furnished. ” S ee McNeill v. Harnett County , 327 N.C. 552, 570, 398 S.E.2d 475, 485 (1990) ( holding that the latter part of the enabling phrase “services furnished or to be furnished ,” N.C.G.S. § 162A

- 88 (1987 ) (emphasis added) (governing county water and sewer districts) , plainly allowed the charge for prospective services, which are “ not limited to the financing of maintenance and improvements of existing cus tomers”). 3 Since 1982 this Court has cautioned that municipalities may lack the power to charge for prospective services absent the essential “to be” language. Bissette , 305 N.C. at 251, 287 S.E.2d at 853 (dictum) (“[W ]e agree that under [N.C.G.S. § 160A

- 314(a)] a municipality may not charge for services ‘ to be furnished.’ ”). We simply cannot read

3 E nabling statutes pertaining to other entities employ the same “to be furnished” prospective l anguage , which section 160A

- 314(a) does not

. E.g. , N.C.G.S. § 162A

- 9 (2015) (enabling water and sewer authorities to “establish and revise a schedule of rates .

. . for the services furnished or to be furnished”); id. § 162A

- 14(3) (enabling certain “ governing bod[ies]” to “fix

. . . charges .

. . for the services furnished or to be furnished by any water system or sewer system of the authority”); id. § 162A

- 49 (2015) ( same for district boards of metropolitan water districts ). Accord id. §§ 162A

- 53(3),

- 72,

- 73(3),

- 85.13 (a) , - 8 5.19(a)(3) (2015).Q UALITY B UILT H OMES V
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- language into a statute where it does not exist. N.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. N.C. Med. Bd. , 363 N.C. 189, 201, 675 S.E .2d 64 1, 649 (2009) ( We “ presum [e] that the legislature carefully chose each word used.” (citatio n omitted) ); Carlyle v. State Highway Comm’n , 193 N.C. 36, 47 , 136 S.E. 612, 619 (1927) (“If the courts attempt to read in to the law words of their own .

. . , then this would amount to erecting a legi slative despotism of five men .

. . .”).
The language of the impact fee ordinances plainly point s to future services, thus requiring Carthage to invoke prospective charging power. Both ordinances contemplate “ expanding ” the systems, including “plant” and “storage expansion,” and the water impact fee is assessed on property that is “ to be served” by the water system.
T he fees are not assessed at the time of actual use , but are payable in full at t he time of “final [subdivision] plat approval”

— a time when water, sewer, or other infrastructure might no t have been built and only a recorded plat exists. Moreover, Carthage charges the impact fees in addition to tap fees, which are assessed when a property owner actually connects to the system. Indeed, plaintiffs were required to
pay some impact fees before improving or establishing a need for services on their property

. C

f. Bissette , 305 N.C. at 251

- 52, 287 S.E.2d at 853 (concluding that an increased rate on all customers to fund a new treatment plant “did not reflect any services yet to be furnished , but merely the same service which had previously been furnished” ).Q UALITY B UILT H OMES V
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- M unicipalities routinely seek and obtain enabling legislation from the General Assembly to assess impact fees

. E.g. , Act of June 28, 1988, ch. 996, sec. 1, 1987 N.C. Sess. Law (Reg. Se ss. 1988) 178, 178 (enabling Rolesville to “provide by ordinance for a system of impact fees”); Act of June 23, 1987, ch. 460, sec. 13, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 609, 613 (same for Pittsboro); Act of July 8, 1986, ch. 936, sec. 1, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws (Reg. Ses s. 1986) 221, 221 ( same for Chapel Hill); s ee also Mills v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Iredell Cty. , 175 N.C. 215, 218, 95 S.E. 481, 482 (1918) (noting that county demands for additional authority, suc h as “raising of proper funds .

. . for improvements in some fix ed pla ce or in restricted territory .

. . can only be confe rred by legislative
enactment ” (citations omitted) )

. Yet it appears that Carthage has elected not to pursue such legislation. Furthermore, Carthage has the authority to charge tap fees and to establish water and sewer rates to fund necessary improvements and maintain services to its inhabitants, which is sufficient to address its expansion needs. S ee Bissette , 305 N.C.
at 251

- 52, 287 S.E.2d at 853 (concluding that the town validly increase d ra tes on all customers to pay for “a necessary improvement to the already existing sewer system without which the Town could not contin ue to provide sewer service”).
W hile the Public Enterprise Statutes at issue here enable Carthage to charge for the contemporaneous use of its water and sewer systems, the statutes clear ly and unambiguous ly fail to give Carthage the essential prospective charging power

ne cessary to assess impact fees. Because the legislature alone con trols the extensionQ UALITY B UILT H OMES V
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- of municipal authority , the impact fee ordinances on their face exceed the powers delegated to the Town by the General Assembly, thus overstepping Carthage’s rightful authority

. S ee Smith Chapel , 350 N. C. at 812, 517 S.E.2d at 879 (hol ding that “the [town’s] ordinance on its face exceeds the express limitation of the plain and unambiguous reading of ” the applicable Public Enterprise Statutes).
T he ordinances are therefore invalid and, a ccordingly, we reverse the d ecision of the Court of Appeals , which affirm ed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the Town of Carthage . We conclude that discretionary review was improvidently allowed as to the remaining issues on appeal and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for considerat ion of the unresolved issues. REVERSED AND REMANDED; DISCRETIONARY REVIEW IMPROVIDENTLY ALLOWED IN PART.