alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<MULTIPLIER>                  1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                             MAY-24-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                  AUG-31-1996
<CASH>                                              4,471
<SECURITIES>                                       11,203
<RECEIVABLES>                                      24,332
<ALLOWANCES>                                           78
<INVENTORY>                                         6,455
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   47,582
<PP&E>                                            107,384
<DEPRECIATION>                                     48,104
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                    110,861
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                              17,010
<BONDS>                                                 0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                   0
<PREFERRED>                                             0
<COMMON>                                           43,937
<OTHER-SE>                                         24,933
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                      110,861
<SALES>                                            41,116
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   41,116
<CGS>                                              33,764
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                      33,764
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    1,650
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                        0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                    383
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                     2,026
<INCOME-TAX>                                          770
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                 1,256
<DISCONTINUED>                                          0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                         0
<CHANGES>                                               0
<NET-INCOME>                                        1,256
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                         .20
<EPS-DILUTED>                                         .20
        

</TABLE>
585 A.2d 336

#### BOARD OF HIGHER EDUCATION AND T. EDWARD HOLLANDER, ETC. v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF HUDSON COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE AND WALTER N. SHEIL, ETC.

July 10, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
**Exhibit32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report of Blyth, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the periodending July 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commissionon the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Robert H. Barghaus, VicePresident and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, that:

 

(1)                                  TheReport fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)                                  Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

 

 
|   | /s/ Robert H. Barghaus                      |   |
|--------|---------------------------------------------|--------|
|   | Robert H. Barghaus                          |
|   | Vice President and  Chief Financial Officer |
|   | September 15, 2003                     |

 

 

This certification ismade solely for the purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 1350, subject to the knowledgestandard contained therein, and not for any other purpose.

 

----
#### STATE ex rel. John F. BONVILLAIN, Sr. v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-0177.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 14, 2011.

In r Bonvillain Sr., John F.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 393,225; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KW 2025.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; *State ex rel Glover v. State,*93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; *State v. Parker,*98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.
585 A.2d 381

#### RAMIRO SANTA CRUZ v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRY, STATE OF NEW JERSEY.

September 18, 1990.

Petition for certification granted.
EXHIBIT
32.1    CERTIFICATION
OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT
TO 18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  Pursuant
to the requirement set forth in Rule 13a-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, (the “Exchange
Act”) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States of America Code (18 U.S.C. §1350),
Wong Oon Leong, President, Chief Executive Officer and Director of Vershire Corporation (the “Company”), hereby certifies
that, to the best of her knowledge:  1.
    The
    Company's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the period ended June 30, 2015, to which this Certification is attached as Exhibit 32.1
    (the “Periodic Report”), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of
    the Exchange Act; and  2.
    The information contained in the Periodic
    Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.  IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has set her hand hereto as of November 10, 2015.   /s/
    Wong Oon LeongWong Oon LeongPresident,
                               Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer)
        &
        Director
# C o u rt o f

A p p ea ls

o f t h e S t a te o f

G eo rg ia

ATLANTA,_

_ _ __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ Th e Co u rt

o f Ap p ea l s h er eb y p a s s es t h e f

o ll owi n g o r der :

A2 0 A1 68 5 . SAM LEVI NE v . GEORGI A ALLOY, LLC et a l

.
Fo l l owi n g a n un fav o rab l e d i s p o ss es s ory ru l i n g , Sam Lev i n e ap p eal ed t o t h i s Co u rt , an d we affi rm ed t h e t ri al co u rt ’ s ru l in g

. See Levi n e v. Geo r g i a Al lo y, LLC , Cas e No

. A1 9 A0 1 87 , d eci d ed M ay 2 1 , 20 1 9

. On March 1 1 , 2 0 2 0 , t h e tri al co u rt

en t ered i t s Rem i t t i t u r Ord er. Lev i n e t h en fi led t h i s ap p eal fro m t h at o rd er. OCGA § 5-6 -1 0 req u i res t he t ri al co u rt t o carry o u t t h is Co u rt ’ s d eci s i o n

. In

e n t eri n g t h e ord er u p o n rem i t t i t u r, t h e t ri al co u rt fu l fi ll ed t h is req u i rem en t

. Acco rd in g ly , “ t h e co n tro v ers y i s at an en d; [an d ] t he ri gh t s o f t h e part i es , s o far as t h ey are i n vo l v ed i n th e l i t i g at io n , are co n cl u si v el y ad ju d i cat ed

. ” Pea r l e Op t i ca l of Mo n r o evi l le v. Geo r

g i a S t a t e Bd

. o f Exa mi n er s i n O p t o met r y , 2 1 9 G a. 85 6 , 8 5 8 (1 3 6 SE2 d 3 71 ) (1 9 6 4 ). It fo l l o w s t h at n o ap p eal is perm it t ed fro m t h e rem i t ti t ur o rd er, an d
t h i s ap p eal i s h ereb y

DISM ISSED.

C o u r t o f A p p e a l s o f t h e S t a t e o

f G e o r g ia C le r k ’ s O f f i c e , A t la n t a ,

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I c e r ti fy t h a t t h e a b o v e i s a t r u e e x t r a c t f r o m
t h e m i n u t e s o

f t h e C o u r t o

f A p p e a l s o f G e o r g i a

. W i tn e s s m y s i g n a t u r e a n d th e s e a l o

f s a i d c o u r t h e r e t o a f f i x e d t h e d a y a n d y e a r l a s t a b o v e w r i t t e n

.

, C l e r k

. June 30, 2020

06/30/2020
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 01-7757 JERRY RAYSOR, a/k/a Jerry Razor, Petitioner - Appellant, versus WILLIE EAGLETON, Warden; EVANS CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, Respondents - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Spartanburg. David C. Norton, District Judge. (CA-01-2656-7-18BG) Submitted: February 14, 2002 Decided: February 26, 2002 Before WIDENER, LUTTIG, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Jerry Raysor, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM:Jerry Raysor seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his petition, construed as filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 2001). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See Raysor v. Eagleton , No. CA01-2656-7-18BG (D.S.C. Sept. 19, 2001). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET OF VIEWCAST.COM, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES AS OF JUNE 30,
1999 (UNAUDITED) AND THE RELATED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE
SIX MONTHS ENDED JUNE 30, 1999 (UNAUDITED) AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                       6,768,343
<SECURITIES>                                 1,762,715
<RECEIVABLES>                                2,916,240
<ALLOWANCES>                                   780,400
<INVENTORY>                                  2,704,089
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            13,657,164
<PP&E>                                       2,467,324
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,175,507
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              16,751,140
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        4,830,147
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                        100
<COMMON>                                         1,392
<OTHER-SE>                                  11,919,501
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                16,751,140
<SALES>                                      4,123,990
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             4,233,990
<CGS>                                        2,206,249
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,206,249
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,963,253
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                85,249
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             579,697
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (3,826,693)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (3,826,693)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (3,826,693)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.34)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.34)


</TABLE>
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DAVID MUNGAI NJENGA,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 08-74044

Agency No. A091-738-632

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 10, 2013** 

Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

David Mungai Njenga, a native and citizen of Kenya, petitions for review of

the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an

immigration judge’s decision denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings

conducted in absentia. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review

FILED

JUN 18 2013

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 08-74044

for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. Najmabadi v. Holder, 597

F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010). We deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Njenga’s untimely motion to

reopen because he failed to establish material evidence of changed circumstances

in Kenya. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(i); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 990 (a

petitioner’s evidence lacks the required materiality where it simply recounts

generalized conditions that fail to demonstrate “that her predicament is appreciably

different from the dangers faced by her fellow citizens”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
#### David P. SIBO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 426, Docket 28750.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued April 20, 1964.

Decided May 13, 1964.

Valentine J. Sacco (Butler, Volpe, Garrity & Sacco, Hartford, Conn.), for plaintiff-appellant.

John D. Adams, Asst. U. S. Atty. (Robert C. Zampano, U. S. Atty.), for the-United States.

Before MOORE, KAUFMAN and MARSHALL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from the denial of appellant’s motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence. Appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of an indictment and on June 3, 1963, was sentenced to “imprisonment for a period of three (3) years on each count, concurrent, execution suspended after eighteen (18) months, whereupon defendant shall be placed on probation for a period of two years.” On June 5, 1963, on its own motion, the District Court corrected the sentence to read: “imprisonment for a period of three (3) years on each [of] the first and third counts to run concurrently.”

 As the District Court correctly observed, 18 U.S.C. § 3651 does not permit suspension of sentence after a period of incarceration of more than six months-This is what the sentence imposed on June 3, 1963, sought to do. That sentence was therefore illegal and properly corrected under Rule 35, Fed.R.Crim-Proc.

Appellant correctly notes that the District Court might have sentenced him to' consecutive sentences of eighteen months, on one count and two years probation on the other, in which case he would have been eligible for release after six months. Yet it is equally clear that this was not what was in fact done, nor was it what the District Court intended to do. Had the District Judge actually intended Sibo to serve only six months, this easily might have been accomplished on resentencing; the fact that Sibo was instead *177sentenced to “a period of three (3) years on each the first and third counts to run concurrently” would strongly indicate that the Court had no such intention. Finally, while a general sentence may have been possible, the initial sentence was explicitly imposed on “each count” of the indictment. In short, whatever the Court *might*have done, it seems clear that the sentence which *was*imposed was illegal; the Court was thus empowered by Rule 35 to correct it.

Affirmed.
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

**CERTIFICATE PURSUANT      TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION      1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT      TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE      SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

| 1.   | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section                  13(a) or                  15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;                  and |
|----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 2.   | The information contained in the Report Fairly presents, in                  all                  material respects, the financial condition and results of operations                  of                  the Company. |
|----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
584 A.2d 227

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. ROBERT L. KLINE.

May 30, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
### **EXHIBIT 99.2**

 

 

PDS GAMING CORPORATIONANNOUNCES UPDATE ON SHAREHOLDER COMPLAINTS

 

LASVEGAS, NV – July 8, 2003 – PDS Gaming Corporation (NasdaqSC: PDSG) todayannounced that it has been named as a defendant in a purported class actionlawsuit filed by a shareholder in District Court, Clark County, Nevada.  The complaint alleges that the members ofthe Company’s Board of Directors violated their fiduciary duties in approving aletter of intent with respect to a proposal submitted by a management group toacquire shares of common stock of the Company as announced in the Company’spress releases dated February 24, 2003 and February 26, 2003.

 

TheCompany believes the allegations are without merit and intends to vigorouslydefend the lawsuit.

 

Thisis the third such complaint against the Company relating to the proposedmanagement acquisition.  Each of the twoprior lawsuits was voluntarily dismissed by the respective plaintiffs inresponse to the Company’s motion to dismiss.

 

Aspecial committee of the Company’s Board of Directors, consisting of itsindependent directors, and the management group continue to negotiate toward adefinitive agreement.  The proposal issubject to, among other things, the execution of a definitive agreement, approvalby a committee of the Company’s independent directors and by a majority of theCompany’s shares not owned by the management group, the procuring of allnecessary consents of the Company’s commercial lenders and the trustees underthe indentures covering the Company’s outstanding debt securities, the securingof required approvals from all gaming regulatory agencies, the obtaining of thenecessary financing, and the receipt by the Company of a favorable fairnessopinion from an investment bank.

 

 

Foradditional information, please contact:

 

PeterCleary

InterimChief Financial Officer

PDSGaming Corporation

6171McLeod Drive

LasVegas, NV  89120

(702)736-0700

 

----

 

APROXY SOLICITATION WITH RESPECT TO, OR TENDER OFFER FOR, THE OUTSTANDING SHARESOF PDS GAMING CORPORATION COMMON STOCK HAS NOT YET COMMENCED.  IF A PROXY SOLICITATION OR TENDER OFFERCOMMENCES, EACH HOLDER OF COMMON STOCK OF PDS GAMING CORPORATION SHOULD READTHE PROXY STATEMENT OR TENDER OFFER STATEMENT WHEN IT BECOMES AVAILABLE BECAUSEIT WILL CONTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE MERGER OR TENDER OFFER.  ONCE A FILING IS MADE, HOLDERS OF COMMONSTOCK OF PDS GAMING CORPORATION CAN OBTAIN THE PROXY STATEMENT OR TENDER OFFERSTATEMENT AND OTHER DOCUMENTS THAT ARE FILED WITH THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGECOMMISSION AT ITS WEB SITE AT HTTP://WWW.SEC.GOV.  HOLDERS OF COMMON STOCK OF PDS GAMING CORPORATION MAY ALSO OBTAINCOPIES OF THE PROXY STATEMENT OR TENDER OFFER STATEMENT AND OTHER DOCUMENTSFILED WITH THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION FOR FREE BY CONTACTING JOHANP. FINLEY AT THE COMPANY WHEN THE DOCUMENTS BECOME AVAILABLE.

 

###

 

----
585 A.2d 405

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. THOMAS HARDY.

October 30, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of the Interior

###### National Park Service

Pursuant to section 60.15 of 36 CFR Part 60, comments are being accepted on the following properties being considered for removal from the National Register of Historic Places. Comments may be forwarded by United States Postal Service, to the National Register of Historic Places, National Park Service, 1849 C St., NW., MS 2280, Washington, DC 20240; by all other carriers, National Register of Historic Places, National Park Service, 1201 Eye St., NW., 8th floor, Washington, DC 20005; or by fax, 202-371-6447. Written or faxed comments should be submitted by October 28, 2010.

Before including your address, phone number, e-mail address, or other personal identifying information in your comment, you should be aware that your entire comment—including your personal identifying information—may be made publicly available at any time. While you can ask us in your comment to withhold your personal identifying information from public review, we cannot guarantee that we will be able to do so.

J. Paul Loether,

Chief, National Register of Historic Places/National Historic Landmarks Program.

Request for REMOVAL has been made for the following resource:

## PENNSYLVANIA

## Schuykill County

Mount Pleasant Historic District, TR 881, Mt. Pleasant, 87002211.

[FR Doc. 2010-25753 Filed 10-12-10; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4312-51-P
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-13-00429-CV

Ex parte Carolyn Barnes

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FROM WILLIAMSON COUNTY

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Carolyn Barnes has filed an original application for writ of habeas corpus in this

Court. In her application, Barnes contends that she “is suffering an unlawful extraterritorial restraint

on her liberty,” having been charged by indictment with a first degree felony, and that “on appeal this

‘conviction’ will be overturned.” Barnes prays that the she be immediately released or, in the

alternative, that this Court reduce the amount of her appellate bond.1

This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus is limited to those

cases in which a person’s liberty is restrained because the person has violated an order, judgment, or

decree entered in a civil case. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.221(d); Dodson v. State, 988 S.W.2d 833,

835 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.). Moreover, article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal

Procedure vests complete jurisdiction over post-conviction relieffrom final felonyconvictions in the

Article 44.04 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows a convicted defendant to seek, in 1

the trial court, reasonable bail pending appeal under certain circumstances. Tex. Code Crim. Proc.

art. 44.04(b). The statute also provides for a separate, preferential appeal for complaints about the

trial court’s action in setting bond pending appeal. Id. art. 44.04(g). Here, Barnes has not filed

notice of appeal with respect to any trial court order denying her request, if made, to reduce the

amount of her bond pending appeal. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to consider any complaint

related to Barnes’s appellate bond in this proceeding.
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See Padieu v. Court of Appeals of Tex., Fifth Dist., 392 S.W.3d

115, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07, § 5. Barnes is in

custody pursuant to a felony conviction for aggravated assault. See Tex. Penal Code § 22.02(a)(2).

Accordingly, we dismiss her application for writ of habeas corpus for want of jurisdiction.

__________________________________________

Scott K. Field, Justice

Before Chief Justice Jones, Justices Pemberton and Field

Filed: July 12, 2013

2