FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D2023-1788 

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TERRANCE ANTON HARRIS,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County.

Coleman L. Robinson, Judge.

August 21, 2024

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

B.L. THOMAS and NORDBY, JJ., concur; TANENBAUM, J., concurs 

with opinion.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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2

TANENBAUM, J., concurring.

Though not raised by Harris in this appeal, the record reveals 

a potentially illegal sentence, one imposed by the trial court after 

improperly revoking his probation. Section 948.06(2)(f)1., Florida 

Statutes, requires (except in limited circumstances not applicable 

here) the trial court to “modify or continue a probationary term” if 

all the following apply:

a. The term of supervision is probation.

b. The probationer does not qualify as a violent felony 

offender of special concern, as defined in paragraph (8)(b).

c. The violation is a low-risk technical violation, as 

defined in paragraph (9)(b).

d. The court has not previously found the probationer in 

violation of his or her probation pursuant to a filed 

violation of probation affidavit during the current term of 

supervision. A probationer who has successfully 

completed sanctions through the alternative sanctioning 

program is eligible for mandatory modification or 

continuation of his or her probation.

“Failure to report a change in address or other required 

information” is a “low-risk technical violation[].” § 948.06(9)(b)3., 

Fla. Stat.

The probation officer averred in part in the violation affidavit 

that Harris had “absconded,” specifying though that it was 

condition three of the probation order Harris violated. Condition 

three required Harris to “remain in a specified place” and 

precluded him from changing his “residence or employment” or 

leaving the county where he resides “without first procuring the 

consent of [his probation] officer.” After a contested evidentiary 

hearing, the trial court violated Harris for failure to comply with 

condition three. It seems to me the violation was a low-risk one 

under the statutory definition, yet the trial court revoked Harris’s 

probation, imposing a five-year prison sentence rather than 

“modify[ing] or continu[ing]” the probation as required by section 

948.06(2)(f)1.
3 

Despite the apparent impropriety of the trial court’s 

revocation order and the ostensibly unauthorized prison sentence 

imposed as a result, there is nothing we can do in this direct appeal 

because Harris did not properly raise the issue. See Hall v. State, 

823 So. 2d 757, 763 (Fla. 2002) (finding where the appellant “made 

no argument” as to a certain issue in his initial brief, that issue 

was deemed abandoned); D.H. v. Adept Cmty. Servs., Inc., 271 So. 

3d 870, 880 (Fla. 2018) (“Claims of error not raised by an appellant 

in its initial brief are deemed abandoned.”); cf. State v. Dortch, 317 

So. 3d 1074, 1081 (Fla. 2021) (describing that even if an error is 

fundamental, “a defendant has no constitutional due process right 

to the correction of unpreserved error”); id. at 1081–82 (explaining 

that “for sentencing errors, to raise even fundamental errors on 

appeal, defendants must first file a motion under rule 3.800(b)”). 

Whether Harris has another avenue by which to challenge his 

sentence possibly is a question for another day. Here, we must 

affirm on the arguments Harris did make. 

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Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Ross S. Haine II, Assistant 

Public Defender, for Appellant. 

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Amanda A. Uwaibi, 

Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee.