UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-7322

KEITH D. GOODMAN,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

GENE M. JOHNSON; HAROLD W. CLARKE; JOHN JABE; A. DAVID 

ROBINSON; FRED SHILLING; KIM RUNION; J. LAFOON; Q. 

BIRCHETTE; MS. G. F. SIVELS; CASSANDRA TAYLOR; C. MAYES; C. 

BAILEY; HARVARD STEPHENS, Doctor,

Defendants – Appellees,

and

G. ROBINSON; ELTON BROWN, Doctor; KRYM; SPRUILL, Doctor; 

PRISON HEALTH SERVICES,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District 

Judge. (1:11-cv-00079-GBL-IDD)

Submitted: March 27, 2012 Decided: April 4, 2012

Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Keith D. Goodman, Appellant Pro Se. Christopher Davies Supino, 

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia; 
2

Carlene Booth Johnson, PERRY LAW FIRM, PC, Dillwyn, Virginia, 

for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

Keith D. Goodman seeks to appeal the district court’s 

orders partially dismissing his complaint and denying his motion 

seeking reconsideration of that dismissal. We lack jurisdiction 

to consider Goodman’s appeal of either order.

This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final 

orders, and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292 (2006); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. 

Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1949). 

Further, a timely notice of appeal is a mandatory jurisdictional 

requirement in civil cases. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 

205, 214 (2007).

Here, Goodman failed to timely notice an appeal of the 

district court’s order partially dismissing his complaint. 

Under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a), Goodman, barring a motion for an 

extension of time or other tolling event, had thirty days to 

notice an appeal from the order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)-

(5). Goodman, however, did not seek an extension, and his 

motion seeking reconsideration, filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

54(b), did not qualify to toll the thirty-day time limit.1

 See

 1 Although the district court construed Goodman’s first 

motion to reconsider as filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), 

this erroneous characterization does not control or alter our 

analysis on appeal.
4

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A). Therefore, Goodman’s notice of 

appeal, filed over three months after the district court’s order 

of partial dismissal, was clearly untimely as to that order, and 

we lack jurisdiction to consider its propriety.2 

Further, although timely appealed from, the district 

court’s order denying Goodman’s motion seeking reconsideration 

is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or 

collateral order. Because the district court did not otherwise 

certify the order for appeal in compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 

54(b), we lack jurisdiction to consider it. See Braswell 

Shipyards, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 2 F.3d 1331, 1336 (4th 

Cir. 1993). 

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction and deny Goodman’s pending motion to appoint 

counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

DISMISSED

 2 Even if Goodman’s notice of appeal had been timely, we 

nevertheless would have lacked jurisdiction to review the order 

granting partial dismissal as that order was neither final nor 

an appealable interlocutory order.