COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bumgardner, Humphreys and Agee 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

WILLIAM EDWARD MIZE 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1185-00-3 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III 

 MARCH 13, 2001 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRY COUNTY 

David V. Williams, Judge 

 S. Jane Chittom, Appellate Defender (Public 

Defender Commission, on brief), for 

appellant. 

 Steven A. Witmer, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

William Edward Mize was convicted of aggravated malicious 

wounding and malicious wounding. He contends the evidence is 

insufficient to establish malice or the intent to maim, 

disfigure, disable, or kill. He also contends the evidence was 

not sufficient to prove use of a firearm during the commission 

of the malicious woundings because the evidence was not 

sufficient to prove the underlying offenses. Finding no error, 

we affirm. 

The defendant shot his sister-in-law and her daughter with 

a 16-gauge shotgun. He hit the fourteen-year-old daughter, 
Amanda, in her face leaving her totally blind. He hit the 

sister-in-law, Wanda, in the back of her neck with one pellet. 

At trial, the defendant maintained the shotgun discharged 

accidentally while he was cleaning it. "On appeal, 'we review 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible 

therefrom.'" Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 

S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) (citation omitted). So viewed the 

evidence supports the finding that the defendant fired the 

weapon at the two victims maliciously and intentionally. 

Malice may be inferred "from the deliberate use of a deadly 

weapon." Perricllia v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 85, 91, 326 S.E.2d 

679, 683 (1985). Similarly, use of a deadly weapon, coupled 

with defendant's conduct and statements, may be sufficient to 

prove specific intent to kill. Hargrave v. Commonwealth, 214 

Va. 436, 437, 201 S.E.2d 597, 598 (1974). Voluntarily 

brandishing a firearm and firing a weapon near victims supported 

the inference of intent to kill. Bell v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. 

App. 530, 533-34, 399 S.E.2d 450, 452 (1991). A defendant's 

intent may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of a 

particular case. Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 626, 

631, 426 S.E.2d 137, 140 (1993). 

The defendant lived next door to his brother Johnny. The 

two began drinking beer around noon. At some point, they argued 

after the defendant complained that Johnny's stepdaughter was 

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dressing too suggestively for a fourteen-year-old girl. The 

drinking continued into the afternoon. After a friend, Timothy 

Dunford, arrived, the defendant told him, "I hate that little 

bitch." 

Johnny and Dunford left to get some more beer, and the 

defendant retrieved his shotgun from his bedroom where he kept 

it. He usually kept the gun unloaded and stored the ammunition 

separately. The defendant returned outside with his shotgun, 

and the gun discharged. Wanda looked up to see the defendant 

standing right outside his front door holding the gun against 

his shoulder in a firing position, pointing it at her and her 

daughter. She then realized the shot had hit Amanda in the 

face. Her son, David, also saw the defendant holding the gun in 

a firing position pointed at his mother and sister. The 

defendant dropped the shotgun and fled into the woods. He did 

not turn himself in to the police until the next day. 

The defendant gave different accounts of what happened. At 

first, he claimed he took the gun to the front porch to clean 

it. While leaning against the picnic table with the gun on his 

lap, it fired accidentally. When the police challenged that 

story because of the witness reports and the physical 

impossibility of hitting the victims from that firing position, 

the defendant suggested he might have had the gun raised higher 

as he was blowing it clean. 

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He next stated he realized Amanda and another girl were on 

the porch, he aimed at the porch, and he fired. He explicitly 

stated his first story was not true, the shooting was not an 

accident, and he did raise the gun and shoot in the direction of 

Amanda. At trial, the defendant again claimed the shooting was 

an accident, he explained his conflicting accounts, and 

extenuated the incriminating statements. 

 Whether a shooting is intentional or accidental is "a 

matter peculiarly within the province of [the fact finder] to 

determine." Compton v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 716, 731, 250 

S.E.2d 749, 758 (1979). The fact finder "was entitled to weigh 

the defendant's contradictory statements." Toler v. 

Commonwealth, 188 Va. 774, 781, 51 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1949). It 

is also entitled to infer the defendant was concealing his guilt 

by giving differing accounts. Black v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 

838, 842, 284 S.E.2d 608, 610 (1981); Marable v. Commonwealth, 

27 Va. App. 505, 509-10, 500 S.E.2d 233, 235 (1998). 

 Based on these facts, coupled with the defendant's flight, 

Clagett v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 93, 472 S.E.2d 263, 271 

(1996), cert. denied, 579 U.S. 1122 (1997), the fact finder 

could reasonably find the defendant maliciously shot the victims 

with the intent to main, disfigure, disable, or kill. Because 

the evidence supports the finding of guilt of the primary 

offenses, aggravated malicious wounding and malicious wounding, 

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it permits a finding of guilt of the related firearm possession 

offenses. Accordingly, we affirm his convictions. 

Affirmed.

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