J-S19030-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: C.B., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: B.B., MOTHER No. 1794 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Decree entered May 14, 2015, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Family Court,

at No: 51-FN-388415-2009

CP-51-AP-0000054-2015

IN THE INTEREST OF: X.S.B.-D., A 

MINOR

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: B.B., MOTHER No. 1795 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Decree entered May 14, 2015, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Family Court,

at No: 51-FN-388415-2009

CP-51-AP-0000055-2015

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.S.B., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: B.B., MOTHER No. 1796 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Decree entered May 14, 2015, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Family Court,

at No: 51-FN-388415-2009

CP-51-AP-0000056-2015
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BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E, STABILE, and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED APRIL 13, 2016

B.B. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees entered May 14, 2015, in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which involuntarily 

terminated her parental rights to her minor daughters, X.S.B.-D., born in 

June of 2005; S.S.B., born in July of 2011; and C.B., born in February of 

2014 (collectively, “the Children”).1, 2 We affirm.

The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this 

matter as follows.

On April 26, 2013 [the Philadelphia Department of Human 

Services (“DHS”)] received a General Protective Services (“GPS”) 

Report alleging that Mother was under the influence of drugs 

while she was caring for her [c]hild, S.S.B. Mother, when 

questioned by the police, acted belligerently and gave multiple 

addresses as her place of residence. The [c]hild, S.S.B., was 

crying and hungry and lacked her immunizations. Mother, who 

lacked appropriate housing, agreed to allow the [c]hild to be 

placed into the care of a [m]aternal [g]reat [a]unt, C.H. Mother 

agreed to enter a drug treatment program. On May 9, 2013, the 

[c]hild, S.S.B., was adjudicated [d]ependent on which date 

Mother’s whereabouts were unknown. On June 25, 2013, 

Mother received a court-ordered drug screen at the Clinical 

Evaluation Unit, (“CEU”) which revealed that she tested positive 

for high levels of marijuana. On July 29, 2013, . . . Mother 

began inpatient treatment at Gaudenzia Diagnostic Rehabilitation 

Center. On October 16, 2013, Mother was successfully 

 

1 On March 12, 2015, the trial court entered decrees terminating the 

parental rights of the Children’s unknown father or fathers. No alleged 

father is a party to the instant appeal. 

2 We note that the certified record in this case was originally due on July 13, 

2015. However, this Court did not receive the record from the trial court 

until well past the due date, on October 29, 2015. As a result, the briefing 

schedule in this matter was delayed by over three months.
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discharged from treatment and stepped down to an intensive 

outpatient treatment program with the plan for her to attend 

Southwest Nu-Stop. On November 14, 2013, a Permanency 

Review Hearing was held at which time Mother was residing with 

an [u]ncle and the [c]hild[,] S.S.B[.,] was ordered to remain 

committed to DHS under the care of her [m]aternal [g]reat 

[a]unt, C.H. 

On December 31, 2013, DHS received a Child Protective 

Services (“CPS”) Report alleging Mother’s [c]hild, X.S.B.-D., had 

been sexually abused by a maternal teenage cousin with whom 

she shared a bedroom. The [c]hild, X.S.B.-D., had exhibited 

changes in her behavior in school and at home where she had 

set fire to the bedroom where she had been sexually abused. 

This [c]hild was referred to Horsham Clinic due to her behavioral 

changes. The [c]hild had been in the care of the mother of her 

abuser following the death of her maternal grandmother, who 

was her legal custodian. Consequently, an OPC was obtained on 

December 31, 2013, and [c]hild, X.S.B.-D., was placed with 

[m]aternal [g]reat [a]unt, C.H. On January 10, 2014, the [c]hild 

was adjudicated [d]ependent. 

[In February of] 2014, DHS received a GPS Report alleging 

that Mother had given birth to [the c]hild, C.B., . . . at Temple 

University Hospital. Mother had reportedly forgotten to provide 

a sample of her urine and appeared to have cognitive or 

developmental delays. On February 19, 2014, DHS visited 

Mother’s home and determined that it was appropriate for her to 

care for her [c]hild, C.B. On February 20, 2014, DHS visited 

Mother’s home and the [c]hild appeared to be safe. At that 

time, Mother agreed to have In-Home Protective Services 

(“IHPS”) implemented in her home. 

***

On April 2, 2014, DHS encountered Mother with her 

[c]hild, C.B.[,] in the home of the mother of the teenage child 

who had abused her [c]hild, X.S.B.-D. At that time DHS 

attempted to schedule an appointment to visit Mother’s home, 

but she was uncooperative. DHS attempted to visit Mother’s 

home on a number of occasions without success, as no one 

answered the door. DHS left a number of letters at Mother’s 

residence requesting her to cooperate.
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On April 16, 2014, following a supervised visit with the 

[c]hildren, X.S.B[.]-D[.] and S.S.B[.], at New Foundations, 

Mother refused to relinquish the [c]hildren to the foster parent. 

While the foster parent and New Foundation staff were trying to 

put the [c]hildren into [the] foster parent’s car, Mother appeared 

very agitated and struck the foster parent in the face. Mother 

then grabbed one of the [c]hildren and boarded a departing 

SEPTA bus. New Foundations staff followed the bus and, with 

the assistance of the Philadelphia Police, was able to retrieve the 

[c]hild, who was returned to placement.

***

On May 14, 2014, DHS received a GPS [r]eport alleging 

that the [c]hild, C.B., had been home alone for an unknown 

length of time. Police [o]fficers responded to a call at the family 

home at approximately 7:15 A.M. but were unable to gain access 

to the home. At approximately 8:10 A.M. [p]olice [o]fficers 

responded to a second call at which time they encountered 

Mother sitting on the front steps of the home who told them that 

she was locked outside and that her [c]hild, C.B., was inside the 

home. Mother, who appeared to be under the influence of an 

unknown substance, was arrested for endangering the welfare of 

a child. Upon gaining entry to the home, the [c]hild, C.B., was 

found lying face down on a mattress on the floor. The child’s 

diaper had not been changed for an extended period of time. 

Police [o]fficers transported the [c]hild, C.B.[,] to DHS. 

Subsequently, DHS obtained an OPC for [the c]hild[,] C.B.[,] and 

placed her in a foster home through New Foundations. On May 

16, 2014, DHS referred Mother to [the Achieving Reunification 

Center].

On May 29, 2014, the [c]hild[,] C.B.[,] was adjudicated 

[d]ependent and committed to DHS. On that date, the 

[c]hildren[,] X.S.B[.]-D. and S.S.B.[,] were [o]rdered to remain 

committed to DHS. The [trial c]ourt referred Mother to CEU for 

a forthwith drug screen, dual diagnosis assessment and 

monitoring to include three (3) random drug screens prior to the 

next [c]ourt [h]earing. [The trial c]ourt ordered DHS to refer 

Mother for a parenting capacity evaluation. [The trial c]ourt 

further ordered that DHS explore a foster home where all of the 

[c]hildren could reside together. Finally, Mother’s visits were 

suspended until she achieved compliance with drug and alcohol 
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treatment and mental health treatment. The identity of the 

fathers of the [c]hildren remained unknown to DHS.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/28/15, at 2-6.

On January 29, 2015, DHS filed petitions to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights to the Children involuntarily. A termination hearing was held

on March 12, 2015, during which the trial court heard the testimony of 

Community Umbrella Agency case manager, Latonya Saxon. In addition, 

Mother’s counsel agreed to stipulate to the statements of facts attached to 

the termination petitions. N.T., 3/12/15, at 6. At the conclusion of the 

hearing, the court agreed to hold its decision in abeyance in order to provide 

Mother with the opportunity to relinquish her parental rights voluntarily. Id.

at 18. Court reconvened on May 14, 2015, at which time it was determined 

that Mother had not relinquished her parental rights. Thus, the court 

entered its decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children 

involuntarily. Mother timely filed notices of appeal on June 11, 2015, along 

with concise statements of errors complained of on appeal.

Mother now raises the following issues for our review. 

1. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in terminating [Mother’s] parental 

rights under Pa.C.S. Section 2511?

2. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in finding that termination of 

parental rights best served the [C]hildren’s developmental, 

physical and emotional needs under sub-section 2511(b)?

3. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in changing the [C]hildren’s goal to 

adoption?
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Mother’s brief at vi.3

We consider Mother’s claims mindful of our well-settled standard of 

review.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely

because the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often

have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple 

hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

 

3 While Mother purports to challenge the trial court’s decision to change the 

Children’s permanency goals to adoption, it does not appear that Mother 

filed an appeal from the court’s goal change orders. The “Statement of 

Orders in Question” in Mother’s brief references only the termination 

decrees, and Mother attaches only the termination decrees to her brief. See 

Mother’s brief at v. Mother’s notices of appeal indicate that she is appealing 

from the termination decrees only, and do not mention goal change orders. 

The certified record on appeal includes only the Children’s adoption 

proceedings, and does not include the Children’s dependency proceedings. 

As a result, the record does not contain any goal change orders. Thus, we 

address only the decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights. 
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evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if 

the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

In this case, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).4 We need only 

agree with the court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as 

Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Here, 

we analyze the court’s decision to terminate under Sections 2511(a)(2) and 

(b), which provide as follows.

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

 

4 We note that the trial court concluded incorrectly that Mother’s parental 

rights could be terminated as to X.S.B.-D. under Sections 2511(a)(5) and 

(a)(8). Both of these sections require that the subject child have “been 

removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary 

agreement with an agency” in order to be applicable. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(5), (8). X.S.B.-D. was not in the care of Mother at the time DHS 

obtained its OPC, and thus she was not “removed from the care of the 

parent” as the statute requires. See In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1200 (Pa. 

Super. 2000) (en banc) (concluding that termination was inappropriate 

under Sections 2511(a)(5) and (8) “because the record reflects that C.S. 

was never in Appellant’s care and, therefore, could not have been removed 

from his care.”).
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***

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being and the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied by the parent.

***

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1) 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) 

such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted)). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that 
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cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the 

contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to 

perform parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 

2002) (citations omitted). “[A] parent’s incarceration is relevant to the 

section (a)(2) analysis and, depending on the circumstances of the case, it 

may be dispositive of a parent’s ability to provide the ‘essential parental 

care, control or subsistence’ that the section contemplates.” In re A.D., 93 

A.3d 888, 897 (Pa. Super. 2014) (discussing In re Adoption of S.P., 47 

A.3d 817 (Pa. 2012)).

Instantly, the trial court found that Mother has demonstrated both an 

incapacity and refusal to parent the Children. Trial Court Opinion, 10/28/15, 

at 12. The court reasoned that Mother has failed to establish and maintain a 

relationship with the Children, and that her incarceration has left the 

Children without necessary parental care. Id. The court also concluded that 

Mother will not be able to resolve her “dependency issues” in the near 

future. Id. at 13. 

Mother argues that DHS failed to prove that she has not remedied the 

conditions causing the Children’s placement in foster care. Mother’s brief at 

3. Mother points out that she participated in visits with the Children prior to 

being incarcerated, and that she completed an inpatient drug and alcohol 

program. Id. at 2-3.
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After a thorough review of the record in this matter, we conclude that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion. During the termination hearing, 

Community Umbrella Agency case manager, Latonya Saxon, testified that 

Mother was provided with several Family Service Plan objectives, including 

“[drug and alcohol], mental health, housing, and visitation.”5 N.T., 3/12/15, 

at 8. Concerning Mother’s drug and alcohol objective, Ms. Saxon agreed 

that Mother completed an inpatient treatment program. Id. at 10. 

However, Mother “never followed up with recommendations” and relapsed. 

Id. at 10. Mother never completed a mental health program, and Mother 

currently lacks housing, because she is incarcerated. Id. Ms. Saxon noted 

that Mother lacked housing even prior to her incarceration.6 Id.

Concerning Mother’s visitation objective, Ms. Saxon testified that 

Mother’s last visit with the Children took place on April 16, 2014.7 Id. at 8. 

 

5 The transcript of the termination hearing indicates that Mother had a 

“DNA” objective, and that she participated in “DNA” treatment. It is clear 

that Ms. Saxon was referring to “D and A” treatment, meaning “drug and 

alcohol.” 

6 Ms. Saxon explained that Mother was incarcerated on January 21, 2015, as 

a result of “[c]hild endangerment for the incident that happened with the 

youngest child, [C.B.].” N.T., 3/12/15, at 9, 11. As described, supra, 

Mother apparently locked herself out of her home while C.B. was left inside. 

See Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights (Statement of 

Facts Re: C.B.), 1/29/15, at ¶ y. Mother appeared to be under the influence 

of an unknown substance during this incident. Id.

7 While Ms. Saxon testified that Mother’s last visit with the Children took 

place on April 16, 2014, we note that C.B. was not removed from Mother’s 

care until almost a month later, on May 14, 2014. See Petition for 

Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights (Statement of Facts Re: C.B.), 
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Mother’s visits were already suspended at the time Ms. Saxon was assigned 

to this case in May of 2014, and Ms. Saxon agreed that “there has been 

absolutely no visits or contact from [M]other” since that time. Id. at 8, 14. 

Ms. Saxon later added that Mother left her a voicemail in June of 2014, but 

Mother did not include any contact information that would have allowed Ms. 

Saxon to call her back. Id. at 15. Mother never attended any court 

hearings. Id. at 15-16.

Accordingly, the record supports the conclusion of the trial court that 

Mother has demonstrated an incapacity and refusal to parent the Children. 

Moreover, Mother cannot, or will not, remedy her incapacity and refusal. 

Mother has failed to complete her Family Service Plan objectives, and she 

currently is incarcerated for an unknown length of time. In addition, as 

observed by the trial court, it does not appear that Mother has made any 

effort to maintain a relationship with the Children. While Mother was unable 

to see the Children in person after her visits were suspended, there was no 

testimony during the termination hearing that Mother attempted to maintain 

contact with the Children by sending cards or letters, or that Mother did 

anything in an effort to get her visits back. As this Court has emphasized, 

“[a] child's life simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will 

summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” M.E.P., 825 

A.2d at 1276 (citations omitted).

 

1/29/15, at ¶ aa. Mother’s visits were suspended on May 29, 2014. Id. at ¶ 

cc. 
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We next consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). We have 

discussed our analysis under Section 2511(b) as follows.

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 

A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, 

“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are 

involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” 

In addition, we instructed that the trial court must also discern 

the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost 

attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that 

bond. However, in cases where there is no evidence of a bond 

between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond 

exists. Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis 

necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case. 

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations 

omitted). 

Here, the trial court concluded that terminating Mother’s parental 

rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the Children. Trial Court 

Opinion, 10/28/15, at 15. The court noted that the Children are bonded 

with their foster mother, and refer to her as “mom.” Id. In contrast, the 

court found that S.S.B. and C.B. have no bond with Mother. Id. With 

respect to X.S.B.-D., the court found that she has not lived with Mother for 

the majority of her life, and that she does not feel safe with Mother. Id. 

The court reasoned that the Children would not suffer irreparable harm if 

Mother’s parental rights are terminated. Id. In response, Mother argues, 
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“the DHS worker [sic] testified that the [C]hildren do have a bond with their 

mother[,] but it is not a parental bond.” Mother’s brief at 5. 

We again discern no abuse of discretion. Ms. Saxon acknowledged 

during the termination hearing that she has never seen the Children interact 

with Mother. N.T., 3/12/15, at 13. However, Ms. Saxon opined that there is 

no bond between Mother and the Children, and that the Children will not 

suffer irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights are terminated. Id. at 11, 

13-14. With respect to S.S.B. and C.B., Ms. Saxon explained that they are 

“too young to understand what is actually going on.” Id. at 13. With 

respect to X.S.B.-D., Ms. Saxon stated, “she is aware of what’s going on, 

however, she has expressed that she -- in the past, she did not feel safe 

with Mom and that she is -- she feels very safe now, where she is, and that 

she would like to stay.” Id. at 13-14. Ms. Saxon agreed that Mother has 

“never really cared for” X.S.B.-D., and that X.S.B.-D. spent the majority of 

her life living with a family member in Maryland. Id. at 14-15. Ms. Saxon 

noted that that the Children do not ask about Mother. Id. at 13. The 

Children are bonded with their pre-adoptive foster mother and refer to her 

as “mom.” Id. at 7, 12. 

Thus, the record confirms that it would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the Children to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Contrary to 

Mother’s argument on appeal, Ms. Saxon did not testify that the Children 

have any sort of a bond with her. Instead, Ms. Saxon opined that no bond 
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exists, due the young age of S.S.B. and C.B., and because X.S.B.-D. feels 

unsafe while in Mother’s care. Ms. Saxon’s conclusion is supported by the 

fact that Mother has had no contact with the Children since May of 2014, 

and the fact that the Children spent relatively little time in Mother’s care 

even prior to the suspension of her visits. The trial court was well within its 

discretion when it accepted the testimony of Ms. Saxon, and concluded that 

the Children will not suffer irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights are 

terminated. 

Accordingly, because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to the 

Children, we affirm the decrees of the trial court pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(2) and (b).

Decrees affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/13/2016