15-2771 

Weng v. Lynch 

BIA 

Poczter, IJ 

A205 628 473 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

25th 4 day of January, two thousand seventeen. 

5 

6 PRESENT: 

7 REENA RAGGI,

8 GERARD E. LYNCH, 

9 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 

10 Circuit Judges. 

11 _____________________________________ 

12 

13 JIANQUAN WENG, 

14 Petitioner, 

15 

16 v. 15-2771 

17 NAC 

18 LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES 

19 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

20 Respondent. 

21 _____________________________________ 

22 

23 FOR PETITIONER: G. Victoria Calle, New York, N.Y. 

24 

25 FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy 

26 Assistant Attorney General; Anthony 

27 P. Nicastro, Assistant Director; 

28 Drew Brinkman, Trial Attorney, 

29 Office of Immigration Litigation, 

30 United States Department of Justice, 

31 Washington, D.C. 
2 

1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

4 DENIED. 

5 Petitioner Jianquan Weng, a native and citizen of the 

6 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an August 11, 2015, 

7 decision of the BIA, affirming a March 6, 2014, decision of an 

8 Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Weng’s application for asylum, 

9 withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against 

10 Torture (“CAT”). In re Jianquan Weng, No. A205 628 473 (B.I.A. 

11 Aug. 11, 2015), aff’g No. A205 628 473 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City 

12 Mar. 6, 2014). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

13 underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 

14 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both 

15 the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions. Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 

16 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of 

17 review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); 

18 Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008). 

19 For asylum applications like Weng’s, governed by the REAL 

20 ID Act, the agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the 

21 circumstances,” base a credibility finding on the plausibility 

22 of an applicant’s account and inconsistencies and omissions in 
3 

1 the applicant’s statements and his witness’s statements and 

2 evidence, “without regard to whether” those inconsistencies go 

3 “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. 

4 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64. “We 

5 defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from 

6 the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no 

7 reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility 

8 ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. The adverse 

9 credibility determination rests on substantial evidence. 

10 The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies among 

11 Weng’s testimony, statements, and evidence concerning his 

12 practice of Christianity in China. 8 U.S.C. 

13 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. On direct 

14 examination, Weng testified that he began attending an 

15 underground church as an adult in June 2009; on cross 

16 examination, however, Weng said that he had attended church when 

17 he was five or six years old and did so for two years. Weng 

18 sought to explain the inconsistency by asserting that he “was 

19 just a child” who went there to play, that he understood the 

20 question to mean when he began attending regularly, and that 

21 the attorney for the Department of Homeland Security asked when 

22 he was introduced to Christianity, not when he began attending 
4 

1 an underground church. The agency reasonably rejected Weng’s 

2 explanations. “A petitioner must do more than offer a 

3 plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure 

4 relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would 

5 be compelled to credit his testimony.” Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 

6 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Zhou Yun Zhang v. INS, 386 

7 F.3d 77, 76 (2d Cir. 2004)). Moreover, Weng could not state 

8 unequivocally whether his siblings attended church. The IJ 

9 reasonably concluded that this called into question whether 

10 Weng actually came from a devout family, as he claimed, and 

11 suggested that Weng embellished his testimony. See Majidi, 430 

12 F.3d at 80. 

13 In addition, the agency reasonably rested the adverse 

14 credibility determination on inconsistencies in Weng’s 

15 description of his purported arrest in China, the only alleged 

16 incident of persecution. See Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland 

17 Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 2006). Although Weng testified 

18 that, on the day of his arrest, his parents had “some other 

19 business” and did not attend church with him, his mother’s 

20 letter states that she was out of town on that day. 

21 Finally, additional inconsistencies concerning Weng’s 

22 past practice and his family’s practice of Christianity support 
5 

1 the adverse credibility determination. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 

2 F.3d at 167. First, the letter submitted by Weng’s mother did 

3 not corroborate Weng’s testimony that his parents attended an 

4 underground church until his 2012 arrest, when they began 

5 attending a government church. Moreover, a 2011 official 

6 household register listed Weng’s parents’ religion as 

7 Christianity, which conflicts with his claim that they 

8 practiced Christianity in secret. Second, Weng’s testimony 

9 and evidence regarding his brother was inconsistent. The 

10 household register listed Christianity as Weng’s brother’s 

11 religion, but Weng testified that only he and his parents 

12 practiced Christianity. Third, the agency also reasonably 

13 found Weng not credible regarding his practice of Christianity 

14 in the United States. Weng and his witness provided 

15 inconsistent testimony on this point. 8 U.S.C. 

16 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Weng testified that he and his 

17 childhood friend attend church together in the United States, 

18 although they had not recently because his friend was working 

19 in Los Angeles. But the witness testified that he never 

20 attended church services with Weng and was working in San Jose. 

21 Weng’s explanations for these inconsistencies are not 

22 compelling. See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80.
6 

1 Having questioned Weng’s credibility, the agency did not 

2 err in concluding that Weng’s lack of corroborating evidence 

3 further undermined his credibility. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 

4 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). Weng has not challenged that 

5 finding. 

6 Given the multiple inconsistencies identified going both 

7 to past events and to Weng’s continuing practice of 

8 Christianity, as well as the lack of corroboration, we conclude 

9 that a “reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse 

10 credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. The 

11 adverse credibility ruling is dispositive of asylum, 

12 withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three forms 

13 of relief are based on the same factual predicate. Paul v. 

14 Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006). 

15 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

16 DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion 

17 for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. 

18 FOR THE COURT: 

19 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk