alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Harvinder Singh BAINS, Petitioner, v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.

No. 99-70790.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Jan. 8, 2001.

Decided Jan. 16, 2001.

*722Before GOODWIN, GRABER, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

After a hearing, an Immigration Judge (IJ) concluded that Petitioner Harvinder Singh Bains was deportable as an aggravated felon and ordered him deported to India. Petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The BIA dismissed the appeal on the ground that Petitioner had waived the right to appeal during his hearing before the IJ. Petitioner appeals. We review de novo the validity of a waiver of the right to appeal an order of removal. *United States v. Garza-Sanchez,*217 F.3d 806, 808 (9th Cir .2000).

A deportee may waive the right to judicial review of a deportation order, but that waiver must be “knowing and voluntary.” *United States v. Jimenez-Marmolejo,*104 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1996). Petitioner’s waiver satisfied that standard. The IJ explained the right to appeal at the beginning of the hearing. Later, after concluding that Petitioner was deportable, the IJ asked Petitioner if he wanted to appeal the decision. Petitioner unequivocally stated that he did not wish to appeal. No more is required. *See United States v. Estrada-Torres,*179 F.3d 776, 781 (9th Cir.1999) (holding that, “[b]e-cause the immigration judge explained the right to appeal to Estrada-Torres (with the other deportees) and individually asked him specifically if he wanted to appeal his deportation order, his waiver of his right to appeal was ‘considered and intelligent’ ”).

AFFIRMED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Shaeem Grady, Appellant.

[775 NYS2d 662]

*1150Appeal from a judgment of the Onondaga County Court (Anthony F. Aloi, J.), rendered December 20, 2002. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [2]). We reject the contention of defendant that, because of his intellectual limitations, County Court should have granted his motion to suppress his statement to the police. The court determined that defendant was able to understand the *Miranda*rights and that the ability of defendant to waive those rights was not negated by the fact that he took special education classes in high school. “An effective waiver of *Miranda*rights may be made by an accused of subnormal intelligence so long as it is established that he or she understood the immediate meaning of the warnings” *(People v Williams,*62 NY2d 285, 287 [1984]). Furthermore, “ ‘the question of the effect of an accused’s subnormality of intelligence upon the voluntariness and admissibility of his [or her] confession is that deficient intelligence is but one factor in the whole “totality of circumstances” to be considered in determining voluntariness and admissibility’ ” *(id.*at 288-289; *see People v Marx,*305 AD2d 726, 728 [2003], *lv denied*100 NY2d 596 [2003]; *People v King,*234 AD2d 923, 923-924 [1996], *lv denied*89 NY2d 1012 [1997]). The People met “their initial burden of establishing the legality of the police conduct and defendant’s waiver of rights,” and defendant failed to establish that he did not waive those rights, or that the waiver was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent *(King,*234 AD2d at 924). Thus, the court properly refused to suppress defendant’s statement *(see People v Bray,*295 AD2d 996, 997 [2002], *lv denied*98 NY2d 694 [2002]; *see also People v Engert,*263 AD2d 959 [1999], *lv denied*93 NY2d 1017 [1999]). Present—Pigott, Jr., PJ., Green, Wisner, Scudder and Gofski, JJ.
First Amendment to the Actuant Corporation 2001 Stock Plan



 Exhibit 10.9 
 FIRST AMENDMENT 
 TO THE 
 ACTUANT CORPORATION 2001 STOCK PLAN 
 THIS AMENDMENT to the Actuant
Corporation 2001 Stock Plan (the “Plan”) is made on this 25th day of December, 2008, by Actuant Corporation (the “Company”). 
 WHEREAS, the Company has established the Plan as a means to provide key employees of the Company and its subsidiaries with an incentive to improve corporate performance on a long-term basis, as well as to attract and retain key
employees; 
 WHEREAS, the Company’s Board of Directors has the authority to amend the Plan under Section 9.04 thereof; and

 WHEREAS, the Company desires to amend the Plan to comply with Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code. 
 NOW, THEREFORE, the Plan is hereby amended as follows, effective as of January 1, 2008: 
 1. Section 3.02 of the Plan shall be amended by adding the following sentence at the end of such Section: 
 “Any such adjustments shall be done in a manner that complies with the requirements of Section 409A of the Code, to the extent applicable.”

 2. Section 6.02 of the Plan shall be amended by deleting the third sentence of such Section in its entirety. 
 3. Section 6.03 of the Plan shall be amended by adding the following words after “authorized”: 
 “, and created the legally binding right to,” 
 4.
Section 6.07(b) of the Plan shall be amended by deleting the second sentence of such Section and replacing it with the following: 
 “The Committee shall value options as it deems reasonable in the event of a cash settlement, based on the Fair Market Value of the Common Stock at the time of such settlement, and may base the settlement solely upon the excess if any
of the per share amount payable upon or in respect of such event over the exercise price of the option.” 
 5. Section 6.09 of the Plan shall be
deleted in its entirety. 
 6. Section 9.04 of the Plan shall be amended by deleting the words “reduce the exercise price of outstanding
options,” from the second sentence of such Section. 







 7. Section 9.04 of the Plan shall be further amended by adding the following sentence at the end of such Section:

 “Any action taken by the Committee under this Section 9.04 shall be done in a manner that complies with the requirements of
Section 409A of the Code, to the extent applicable.” 
 8. All other terms of the Plan shall remain in full force and effect. 
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has caused this Amendment to be executed as of the day and year first written above. 
  

					
	ACTUANT CORPORATION
		
	By:	 	/s/ Susan Korthase
		 	Its:	 	Vice President, Human Resource
		
	By:	 	/s/ Andrew G. Lampereur
		 	Its:	 	Executive Vice President and CFO
EXHIBIT 32.1

          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 , AS ADOPTED
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of Safari
Associates, Inc. ( the "Company") for the quarter ended September 30, 2004, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"report"), I, Morton Berger, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that

      (1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   The information contained in the Report fairly represents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.


                                                        /s/ Morton Berger
                                                        Morton Berger
                                                        Chief Financial Officer
585 A.2d 367

#### CARMINE P. PRINZO, ET AL. v. FRANCESCA A. CASTRONOVO, ET AL.

September 4, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
584 A.2d 253

#### CONSTANCE HOLLOWAY v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. MUSKIN CORPORATION, ET AL. AND KDI SYLVAN POOLS, INC.

June 11, 1990.

Leave to appeal granted. (See 239 *N.J.Super.*554, 571 A.2d 1324)
585 A.2d 379

#### BERTA STAROBINSKY v. DR. WILLIAM A. ALLGAIR AND JOHN DOE DOCTORS.

September 18, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
584 A.2d 248

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. AKBAR NAIM.

June 11, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
**Exhibit32.2**

 

HERITAGE OAKS BANCORP

 

Quarterly Report on Form 10QSB

for the Quarter ended June 30, 2003

 

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

Pursuant to Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

 

 

The undersigned,who is the Chief Financial Officer of Heritage Oaks Bancorp (the “Company”),hereby certify that (i) the Quarterly Report on Form 10QSB for the quarterended June 30, 2003, as filed by the Company with the Securities and ExchangeCommission (the “Quarterly Report”), to which this Certification is an Exhibit,fully complies with the applicable requirements of Section 13(a) and 15(d) ofthe Exchange Act; and (ii) the information contained in this Quarterly Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company.

 

 
| Dated:  July  25, 2003 | /s/ Margaret A. Torres                                |   |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                        | Margaret A. Torres                                    |
|                        | Executive Vice President and Chief Financial  Officer |

 

1

----
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 12**  **- 2114** 

PHENROY DAY , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,
v. MR. & MRS. LISA YEATTS; MR. & MRS. CANNY; MR. & MRS. ANGELA TAYLOR , Defendants

- Appellees
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Newport News
. Rebecca Beach Smith , District Judge. ( 4:12

- cv - 00127

- RBS

- FBS )

Submitted : November 13 , 2012 Decided: November 15, 2012

Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and DIAZ , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion
.
Phenroy Day, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Phenroy Day appeals the district court ’ s order dismissing his civil act ion as frivolous . We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. Day v. Yeatts , No. 4:12

- cv - 00127

- RBS

- FBS (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2012). We dispense with oral argument because t he facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
|   | 1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Operating Partnership. |
|--------|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|  /s/ Terry L. Stevens                                                               |   |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Terry L. StevensSenior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the General Partner |   |
| October 29, 2009                                                               |   |
**Exhibit31.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

I, Robert H.Barghaus, Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Blyth, Inc., certifythat:

 

1.                 I have reviewedthis quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Blyth, Inc.;

 

2.                 Based on myknowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3.                 Based on myknowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this report;

 

4.                The registrant’sother certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange ActRules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

 

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, toensure that material information relating to the registrant, including itsconsolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

 

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectivenessof the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period coveredby this report based on such evaluation; and

 

(c) Disclosed in this report any change inthe registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred duringthe registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscalquarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or isreasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting; and

 

5.                 The registrant’sother certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’sauditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (orpersons performing the equivalent functions):

 

(a) All significant deficiencies and materialweaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financialreporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

 

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, thatinvolves management or other employees who have a significant role in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting.

 

 

Date: December 16, 2004

 

 
| /s/ Robert H. Barghaus                      |   |
|---------------------------------------------|--------|
| Robert H.  Barghaus                         |
| Vice  President and Chief Financial Officer |

 

----
I 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 7300 

To provide for a one-time safe harbor for certain failures by individuals 

to pay estimated income tax. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 13, 2018 

Ms. JUDY CHU of California (for herself, Mr. DOGGETT, Mr. LARSON of Connecticut, Mr. DANNY K. DAVIS of Illinois, Mr. HIGGINS of New York, and 

Ms. SA ́NCHEZ) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To provide for a one-time safe harbor for certain failures 

by individuals to pay estimated income tax. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Taxpayer Penalty Pro5 tection Act of 2018’’. 

6 SEC. 2. SAFE HARBOR FOR FAILURE BY INDIVIDUALS TO 

7 PAY ESTIMATED INCOME TAX. 

8 In the case of a taxable year beginning in 2018— 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 7300 IH

1 (1) section 6654(d)(1)(B)(ii) of the Internal 

2 Revenue Code of 1986 shall be applied by sub3 stituting ‘‘80 percent’’ for ‘‘100 percent’’; and 

4 (2) the table in section 6654(d)(1)(C) of such 

5 Code shall be applied by substituting ‘‘100’’ for 

6 ‘‘110’’. 

Æ 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
Exhibit 13.1

Certification of CEO and CFO Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 20-F/A (the Report) of Kenon Holdings Ltd. (the Company) for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2014 as filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) on the date hereof, Yoav Doppelt, as Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and Tzahi Goshen, as Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each
hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of his knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                 |  |                        
|---------------- |  | -----------------------
|/s/ Yoav Doppelt
|Name:            |  | Yoav Doppelt           
|Title:           |  | Chief Executive Officer
|Date:            |  | March 4, 2016          
|                
|/s/ Tzahi Goshen
|Name:            |  | Tzahi Goshen           
|Title:           |  | Chief Financial Officer
|Date:            |  | March 4, 2016          

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to the
Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the SEC or its staff upon request.

This certification accompanies the Report pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
585 A.2d 376

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. FREDERICK STUBBS.

September 18, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1



      CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                                   PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Robert J. Skandalaris, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the
best of my knowledge the Annual Report of Noble International, Ltd. on Form 10-K
for the annual period ended December 31, 2002 fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and that information contained in such Form 10-K fairly presents in all material
respects the financial condition and results of operations of Noble
International, Ltd.


                        By: /s/ Robert J. Skandalaris
                           ---------------------------------------------------
                           Name: Robert J. Skandalaris
                           Title: Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive
                           Officer) of Noble International, Ltd.
585 A.2d 363

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. MARIANO ESPINAL.

September 4, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

JUDGMENT

No. 04-21-00134-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF A.L.B.

From the 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2020PA00106

Honorable Charles E. Montemayor, Associate Judge Presiding

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE MARTINEZ, JUSTICE CHAPA, AND JUSTICE RODRIGUEZ

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s order terminating 

appellant’s parental rights is AFFIRMED. No costs of appeal are taxed against appellant. 

SIGNED August 11, 2021.

_____________________________

Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
#### A-1 PRESTO ROOFING, CORP., Appellant, v. Maria ESPINOSA, Appellee.

No. 3D10-1270.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Dec. 22, 2010.

*567Aran Correa Guarch & Shapiro, and Craig B. Shapiro, Coral Gables, for appellant.

Harvey D. Rogers, Miami, for appellee.

Before RAMIREZ, C.J., and GERSTEN, J., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.

RAMIREZ, C.J.

This is an appeal from an order granting dismissal for lack of prosecution under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(e). Because the order was entered by following the requirements of the rule, we affirm.

Rule 1.420(e) provides as follows:

> (e) Failure to Prosecute. In all actions in which it appears on the face of the record that no activity by filing of pleadings, order of court, or otherwise has occurred for a period of 10 months, and no order staying the action has been issued nor stipulation for stay approved by the court, any interested person, whether a party to the action or not, the court, or the clerk of the court may serve notice to all parties that no such activity has occurred. If no such record activity has occurred within the 10 months immediately preceding the service of such notice, and no record activity occurs within the 60 days immediately following the service of such notice, and if no stay was issued or approved prior to the expiration of such 60-day period, the action shall be dismissed by the court on its own motion or on the motion of any interested person, whether a party to the action or not, after reasonable notice to the parties, unless a party shows good cause in writing at least 5 days before the hearing on the motion why the action should remain pending. Mere inaction for a period of less than 1 year shall not be sufficient cause for dismissal for failure to prosecute.

Thus, under the rule, if there is *any*record activity within the ten (10) months immediately preceding the service of such notice, the case should not be dismissed. *See Wilson v. Salamon,*928 So.2d 363 (Fla.2005). It is undisputed that no such record activity took place. The second option to avoid dismissal is to create record activity within the next sixty (60) days immediately following the service of such notice. It is undisputed that no such record activity took place within sixty (60) days of the court serving its Notice of Lack of Prosecution. The third option under the rule to avoid dismissal is to show good cause in writing within five (5) days before the hearing on the motion as to why the action should remain pending. It is undisputed that no such writing was filed nor good cause was shown.

*568Appellant would have us create a fourth way to keep a case from being dismissed, and that is by filing a paper after the sixty (60) days have elapsed. Here, appellant filed a Notice of Readiness for Non-Jury Trial on November 6, 2009, three days before the hearing on the court’s notice, but well after the sixty (60) days contemplated by the rule. We decline to rewrite the rule as suggested by appellant. The trial court properly dismissed the action. The dismissal is of course without prejudice.

Affirmed.
#### Charles D. BYRD, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 3D11-759.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

May 4, 2011.

Charles D. Byrd, in proper person.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for Respondent.

Before RAMIREZ, C.J., and GERSTEN and EMAS, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Petition denied. *Cubelo v. State,*41 So.3d 263 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (holding erroneous jury instruction on manslaughter by intentional act not fundamental error where trial court also instructed jury on manslaughter by culpable negligence); *Salonko v. State,*42 So.3d 801 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (same); *Barros-Dias v. State,*41 So.3d 370 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (same); *1190
      *Singh v. State,*36 So.3d 848 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (same).