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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 46394

In the Interest of: John Doe, Jane Doe I, 

and Jane Doe II, Children Under Eighteen 

(18) Years of Age.

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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 

AND WELFARE,

Petitioner-Respondent,

v.

JANE DOE,

Respondent-Appellant.

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Filed: December 12, 2018

Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 

District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. James S. Cawthon, Magistrate. 

Judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed.

Ada County Public Defender, Anthony R. Geddes; Joshua M. Wickard, Deputy 

Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Madison Miles, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

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HUSKEY, Judge

Jane Doe appeals from the magistrate’s judgment terminating her parental rights. Doe 

argues the magistrate erred: (1) in concluding the State proved the first two counts of the 

petition to terminate parental rights by clear and convincing evidence; and (2) by failing to 

analyze the best interest standard individually for each child. The magistrate’s judgment 

terminating parental rights is affirmed. 

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Jane Doe is the mother of three children. The children were placed in the custody of the 

Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (Department) after a detective declared the children 
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were in imminent danger. The detective’s investigation began after Doe reported one of her 

children was a victim of sexual abuse. During the investigation, Doe argued with the detective, 

impeded interviews, behaved erratically, and told the detective black mold in her home was 

causing her and her children health problems.

A social worker visited the home. Doe had gathered her and her children’s belongings in 

the living room and partitioned off the house by hanging sheets to isolate the black mold from 

the living spaces. However, the social worker observed no mold in the home. Doe also told the 

social worker that spirits in the home bit the children and, because of a heating problem, she had 

taken the children to the emergency room to be checked for carbon monoxide poisoning. At the 

time, Doe was not employed, did not have a source of income, and was shortly thereafter evicted 

from her home. Afterwards, Doe was unable to maintain a source of income, employment, or 

housing. 

Doe completed a psychological evaluation, but rejected the recommendations of the 

doctor who found Doe suffered from delusional disorder and mental health issues associated 

with childhood trauma. After a period of no communication with her case manager, Doe 

completed six counseling sessions but then stopped attending. Doe did participate in an intake 

appointment with a new counselor but never attended an appointment thereafter.

Doe’s visitation with her children was problematic. She mistreated the children’s foster 

parents, objecting to the foster mother’s parenting by threatening to make sure the children were 

removed from the home, and making an unfounded allegation that the foster father had sexually 

abused one of her children. Based on this behavior, Doe was notified her visitation would end 

unless she re-engaged in mental health counseling. Doe did not re-engage in mental health 

counseling. Instead, she made prohibited contact with her children, showing up at their 

counseling sessions. 

During the time the children were in foster care they became more active, talkative, 

curious, and outgoing. They made friends and pursued new interests and hobbies. They also 

enrolled in and attended school regularly and achieved good grades. 

The Department filed a petition to terminate Doe’s parental rights, alleging Doe: (1) was 

“unable to discharge parental responsibilities and such inability will continue for a prolonged 

indeterminate period and will be injurious” to the children and that her “current psychological 

and/or mental health issues render her unable to accurately understand or meet her children’s 
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needs”; (2) had neglected the children because her “psychological and/or mental health issues 

impair her ability to provide proper parental care and control”; and (3) had neglected her children 

because she “failed to demonstrate stability in housing, income, and/or mental health in order to 

provide for the children’s daily needs.” Doe did not appear at the termination hearing. The 

magistrate held that the State had proven all three counts by clear and convincing evidence and 

that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate Doe’s parental rights. Doe appeals to this 

Court. 

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her 

child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 

341, 343 (2002). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). Implicit in the 

Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act is the philosophy that, wherever possible, 

family life should be strengthened and preserved. I.C. § 16-2001(2). Therefore, the requisites of 

due process must be met when terminating the parent-child relationship. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 

383, 386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 (2006). Due process requires that the grounds for terminating a 

parent-child relationship be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Because a 

fundamental liberty interest is at stake, the United States Supreme Court has determined that a 

court may terminate a parent-child relationship only if that decision is supported by clear and 

convincing evidence. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982); see also I.C. § 16-2009; In 

re Doe, 146 Idaho 759, 761-62, 203 P.3d 689, 691-92 (2009); Doe, 143 Idaho at 386, 146 P.3d at 

652. 

On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the 

decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243, 

245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable 

inferences in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights 

be terminated. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has also said that the substantial evidence test 

requires a greater quantum of evidence in cases where the trial court’s finding must be supported 

by clear and convincing evidence than in cases where a mere preponderance is required. Doe v. 
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Doe, 143 Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and convincing evidence is generally 

understood to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably 

certain. In re Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006). Further, the magistrate’s 

decision must be supported by objectively supportable grounds. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d 

at 600.

Idaho Code Section 16-2005 permits a party to petition the court for termination of the 

parent-child relationship when it is in the child’s best interest and any one of the following five 

factors exist: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between 

the child and a presumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities 

for a prolonged period that will be injurious to the health, morals, or well-being of the child; or 

(e) the parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time. Each 

statutory ground is an independent basis for termination. Doe, 144 Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at 

1117. 

Idaho Code Section 16-2002(3)(a) defines “neglect” as any conduct included in I.C. § 16-

1602(31). Section 16-1602(31)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that a child is neglected when the 

child is without proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control 

necessary for his or her well-being because of the conduct or omission of his or her parents, 

guardian, or other custodian or their neglect or refusal to provide them. Neglect also exists 

where the parent has failed to comply with the court’s orders or the case plan in a child 

protective act case and the Department has had temporary or legal custody of the child for fifteen 

of the most recent twenty-two months and reunification has not been accomplished by the last 

day of the fifteenth month in which the child has been in the temporary or legal custody of the 

Department. I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b). 

Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the trial court must next 

determine whether it is in the best interest of the child to terminate the parent-child relationship. 

In re Aragon, 120 Idaho 606, 611, 818 P.2d 310, 315 (1991). When determining whether 

termination is in the child’s best interest, the trial court may consider the parent’s history with 

substance abuse, the stability and permanency of the home, the unemployment of the parent, the 

financial contribution of the parent to the child’s care after the child is placed in protective 

custody, the improvement of the child while in foster care, the parent’s efforts to improve his or 

her situation, and the parent’s continuing problems with the law. In re Doe, 159 Idaho 192, 198, 
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358 P.3d 77, 83 (2015); In re Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 111, 320 P.3d 1262, 1270 (2014). A finding 

that it is in the best interest of the child to terminate parental rights must still be made upon 

objective grounds. In re Doe, 152 Idaho 953, 956-57, 277 P.3d 400, 403-04 (Ct. App. 2012). 

III.

ANALYSIS

Doe first argues the magistrate erred in concluding the State proved the first two counts 

of the petition to terminate parental rights by clear and convincing evidence. Doe contends the 

magistrate disregarded evidence that she participated in mental health counseling. The State 

argues that even if the magistrate erred on the first two counts, its holding on count three is an 

uncontested alternative ground upon which this Court must affirm the termination of Doe’s 

parental rights.

Where a judgment of the trial court is based upon alternate grounds, if the 

judgment can be affirmed on one of the grounds the fact that the alternative 

ground may have been in error is of no consequence and may be disregarded. To 

state this principle in another manner, this court must uphold the finding and 

judgment of the trial court if it is capable of being upheld on any theory.

Fischer v. Fischer, 92 Idaho 379, 382, 443 P.2d 463, 466 (1968). Here, Count 3 of the State’s 

petition to terminate Doe’s parental rights, which alleges Doe neglected her children by failing

“to demonstrate stability in housing, income, and/or mental health in order to provide for the 

children’s daily needs,” is uncontested. On this ground alone, this Court can affirm the 

magistrate’s judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights.

Even if there were not an alternative ground upon which to affirm the magistrate’s 

judgment, this Court would still affirm the magistrate’s judgment because the magistrate did not 

err by holding the State had proven Counts 1 and 2 by clear and convincing evidence. The State 

provided evidence that Doe could not discharge her parental responsibilities and had neglected 

her children because her psychological and mental health issues impaired her ability to do so. 

Concerning Doe’s mental health counseling, the magistrate found that even though Doe had 

completed six counseling sessions, she had stopped attending even after her visitation with the 

children became conditional upon her attendance. Thus, the magistrate explicitly considered 

Doe’s participation in mental health counseling. Despite this, the magistrate found Doe’s mental 

health problems manifested in many ways “resulting in conduct in which she places her needs 

above those of [her children] and their well-being.” 
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Doe also argues the magistrate erred by failing to analyze the best interest standard 

individually for each child. Doe provides no authority for this proposition, nor does she show 

the magistrate did not consider each child’s needs. To the contrary, the magistrate’s analysis of 

the children’s best interests names each child individually several times and references their 

individual successes in foster care. Doe fails to show the magistrate erred in its best interest 

analysis.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The magistrate’s decision is upheld by an uncontested alternative ground--that Doe

neglected her children by failing to demonstrate stability in housing, income, and/or mental 

health in order to provide for her children’s daily needs. Even without the alternative ground, the 

magistrate did not err in holding the State had shown the first two counts of the petition had been 

proven by clear and convincing evidence--that Doe was unable to discharge parental 

responsibilities because of her psychological and/or mental health issues and that Doe had 

neglected the children because of her psychological and/or mental health issues. The magistrate 

also did not err in its best interest analysis. Therefore, the magistrate’s judgment terminating 

Doe’s parental rights is affirmed.

Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge LORELLO CONCUR.