alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Summary Calendar

No. 02-60624

STEPHEN MICHAEL COMBS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JAMES HOLMAN, Etc.; ET AL.,

Defendants,

NORRIS W. KENNEDY, Officially and Individually,

Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

(00-CV-36)

-------------------- March 14, 2003

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Plaintiff-Appellee Stephen Michael Combs’ motion to dismiss

Norris W. Kennedy’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction is GRANTED. we

have jurisdiction of “appeals from all final decisions of the

district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “[A] district court’s denial

of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an

issue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the meaningof 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final

judgment.” M itchell v. Forsyth

, 472 U.S. 511, 530 ( 1985). The

rationale of the Su preme Court in extending the collateral order

doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.

, 337 U.S. 541

(1949) to appeals from denials of qualified immunity was that the

“entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to

liability” and would be “ef fectively lost if a case [was]

erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell , 472 U.S. at 526

(italics in original). M itchell was an appe al from a denial of

qualified immunity raised in a motion for summary judgment. A

district court’s denial of summary judgment on the issue of

qualified immunity “conclusively determines the defendant’s claim

of right not to stand trial ” and that is the basis for the court’s

decision to allow an immediate appeal. I d

. a t 527 (italics in

original).

That rationale does not apply in this case. Kennedy could

have appealed the district court’s denial o f summary judgment in

its order of July 18, 2001, but he did not do so. He seeks to

appeal now, after a trial on liability, but before the second stage

of these bifurcated proceedings, in which the district court will

determine, not liability for damages, which has already been

decided against Kennedy, but the amount of damages. “An order that

determines the issue of liability but leaves unresolved the

assessment of damages is not final within the meaning of section1291.” S outhern Travel Club v. Carnival Air Lines, Inc.

, 986 F.2d

125, 129-30 (5th Cir. 1993).

The policy of the final j udgment rule against piecemeal and

duplicative litigation, as embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1291, is

offended by Kennedy’s attempted appeal in this case. M atter of

U.S. Abatement Corp.

, 39 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 1994). Kennedy’s

arguments can be considered and reviewed in an appeal from any

final judgment th at follows the district court’s assessment of

damages.

MOTION GRANTED; APPEAL DISMISSED.
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
 

                                            EXHIBIT 11

                      Statement Regarding Computation of Per Share Earnings

                          Three Months Ended September 30, 1998 and 1997

                         (Dollars in thousands, except per share amounts)



                                                                Three months ended September 30,

                                                                     1998               1997
                                                                 -----------        -----------
<S>                                                              <C>                <C>        
Net income ..............................................        $     2,851        $     2,686
                                                                 ===========        ===========

Number of shares outstanding:
  Weighted average shares issued ........................         11,900,000         11,900,000
  Less:  Weighted average shares held in treasury .......          2,608,412          2,255,430
  Less:  Average shares held by the ESOP ................            952,000            952,000
  Plus:  ESOP shares released or committed to be released
           during the fiscal year .......................            323,862            238,640
                                                                 -----------        -----------
         Average basic shares ...........................          8,663,450          8,931,210
  Plus:  Average common stock equivalents ...............            663,993            738,492
                                                                 -----------        -----------
         Average diluted shares .........................          9,327,443          9,669,702
                                                                 ===========        ===========

Earnings per common share:
         Basic ..........................................        $      0.33        $      0.30
                                                                 ===========        ===========
         Diluted ........................................        $      0.31        $      0.28
                                                                 ===========        ===========

</TABLE>
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 18

- 844

_____________________________
A MERICAN H ERITAGE L IFE I NSURANCE C OMPANY ,

Petitioner

,

v.

N ORMA J O S MITH a nd DGT, I NC

. ,
Respondents

.

_____________________________

Petition for Writ of Certiorari

— Original Jurisdiction.

November 13, 2018

P ER C URIAM

.
In this certiorari proceeding, Petitioner seeks review of the order allowing Respondent s to amend the ir counterclaim against Petitioner to asser t a claim for punitive damages. T he scope of our review is limited to determining whether the trial court complied with the procedural requirements in section 76 8.72, Florida Statutes ; we do not have jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the evidence proffered to support the punitive damages claim. See Simeon, Inc. v. Cox , 671 So. 2d 158, 160 (Fla. 1996); Globe Newspaper Co. v. King , 658 So. 2d 518, 520 (Fla. 1995) ; Monroe Health Systems, Inc. v. Estate of Gonzales , 795 So. 2d 1133, 1134 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001 ).2 Here, t he trial court complied with the applicable procedural requirements. R espondents proffered evidence to su pport the ir punitive damage claim, and after a hearing, the trial court entered a thorough order finding the proffer to be sufficient to support the claim

. Accordingly, the petition for writ of certiorar i is D ENIED

.
B.L. T HOMAS , C.J., and W ETHERELL and W INSOR , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________

Christopher M. Cobb and Kayla A. Haines of Jimerson & Cobb, P.A., Jacksonville

, for Petitioner

.

Alexander D. Brown and Adam S. Goldman of The Concept Law Group, P.A., Fort Lauderdale

, for Respondents

.
I 

115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 83 

To prohibit the receipt of Federal financial assistance by sanctuary cities, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 3, 2017 

Mr. BARLETTA introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on Oversight 

and Government Reform, for a period to be subsequently determined by 

the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To prohibit the receipt of Federal financial assistance by 

sanctuary cities, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Mobilizing Against 

5 Sanctuary Cities Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. SANCTUARY CITIES INELIGIBLE FOR FEDERAL FI7 NANCIAL ASSISTANCE. 

8 Any State or local government that violates section 

9 642 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant ReVerDate Sep 11 2014 07:13 Jan 06, 2017 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H83.IH H83

SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 83 IH

1 sponsibility Act of 1996 (8 U.S.C. 1373) may not receive 

2 any Federal financial assistance (as such term is defined 

3 in section 7501(a)(5) of title 31, United States Code). The 

4 Attorney General shall determine annually which State or 

5 local jurisdictions are not in compliance with section 642 

6 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Respon7 sibility Act and shall report such determinations to Con8 gress on March 1 of each year. The Attorney General shall 

9 also issue a report concerning the compliance of any par10 ticular State or local jurisdiction at the request of any 

11 Member of Congress. Any jurisdiction that is found to be 

12 out of compliance shall be ineligible to receive Federal fi13 nancial assistance for a minimum period of one year, and 

14 shall only become eligible again after the Attorney General 

15 certifies that the jurisdiction is in compliance. 

Æ 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
Exhibit 31.1
**BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc.**
I, James A. White, certify that:
1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form10-Q/A of BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc.;
2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report doesnot contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit tostate a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements weremade, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisquarterly report;
3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements,and other financial information included in this quarterlyreport, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of theregistrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisquarterly report;
4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I areresponsible for establishing and maintaining disclosurecontrols and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 a. designed such disclosure controls andprocedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, toensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, ismade known to us by others within those entities,particularly during the period in which this quarterlyreport is being prepared;
 b. evaluated the effectiveness of theregistrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this quarterly report our conclusions aboutthe effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisquarterly report based on such evaluation; and
 c. disclosed in this report any change inthe registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s mostrecent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or isreasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting; and
5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and Ihave disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internalcontrol over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditorsand the audit committee of registrant’s board of directors (orpersons performing the equivalent functions):
 a. all significant deficiencies andmaterial weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which arereasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and reportfinancial information; and
 b. any fraud, whether or not material,that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting.
Date: June 24, 2004
By: /s/ James A. White
584 A.2d 254

#### NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES v. M.R. IN THE MATTER OF N.D.R. AND G.C.R. (MINORS).

June 28, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
No. D-670.

#### In re Disbarment of Lewis.

Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 484 U. S. 1040.]
IIB 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 835 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 20, 2018 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural 

Resources 

AN ACT 

To update the map of, and modify the maximum acreage 

available for inclusion in, the Florissant Fossil Beds 

National Monument. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


daltland on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

HR 835 RFS 

1 SECTION 1. MAP UPDATE; MAXIMUM ACREAGE AVAILABLE 

2 FOR INCLUSION IN THE FLORISSANT FOSSIL 

3 BEDS NATIONAL MONUMENT. 

4 The first section of Public Law 91–60 (83 Stat. 101) 

5 is amended— 

6 (1) by striking ‘‘entitled ‘Proposed Florissant 

7 Fossil Beds National Monument’, numbered NM– 

8 FFB–7100, and dated March 1967, and more par9 ticularly described by metes and bounds in an at10 tachment to that map,’’ and inserting ‘‘entitled 

11 ‘Florissant Fossil Beds National Monument Pro12 posed Boundary Adjustment’, numbered 171/ 

13 132,544, and dated May 3, 2016,’’; and 

14 (2) by striking ‘‘six thousand acres’’ and insert15 ing ‘‘6,300 acres’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives March 19, 

2018. 

Attest: KAREN L. HAAS, 

Clerk. 


daltland on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with BILLS
Exhibit 32.1



Certification of Chief Executive Officer



Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer
of CV Therapeutics, Inc. (the Company) hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge, that:



(i) the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended September 30, 2005, (the
Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and



(ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                        |  |                                
|----------------------- |  | -------------------------------
|Dated: November 2, 2005 |  | /s/ LOUIS G. LANGE, M.D., PH.D.
|                        |  | Louis G. Lange, M.D., Ph.D.    
|                        |  | Chief Executive Officer
#### Mohammed SHOUMAN, Appellant, v. James M. ECKER, et al., Appellees.

No. 3D09-3369.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Jan. 12, 2011.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Bane Denied March 8, 2011.

*1092Mohammed Shouman, in proper person.

Stephens, Lynn, Klein, P.L., and Robert M. Klein, Miami, for appellee, Ecker; and Hirschhorn & Bieber and Joel Hirschhorn and Brian H. Bieber, Coral Gables, for appellee, Bieber.

Before RAMIREZ, C.J., and GERSTEN and LAGOA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. *See*§ 95.11(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004); *Steele v. Kehoe,*747 So.2d 931, 933 (Fla.1999).
#### The ESTATE OF Power Ed MEUS, by and through Power MEUS, as Personal Representative, Appellant, v. The GEO GROUP, INC., f/k/a Wackenhut Corrections Corp., d/b/a Moore Haven Correctional Facility, The State of Florida, The Department of Management and The Department of Corrections, Appellees.

No. 4D10-2137.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Feb. 9, 2011.

David A. Howard of David A. Howard, P.A., Miami, for appellant.

Brett M. Waronicki of Wiederhold & Moses, P.A., West Palm Beach, for Appel-lee-The GEO Group, Inc.

PER CURIAM.

Appellee, The Geo Group, Inc., concedes that the trial court erred in failing to make the necessary findings of fact required by *Kozel v. Ostendorf,*629 So.2d 817 (Fla.1993), and *Cook v. Custom Marine Distributing, Inc.,*29 So.3d 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), when dismissing appellant’s lawsuit as a sanction for failure to comply with the trial court’s discovery orders and when denying appellant’s motion for relief from judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the orders and remand this case for the trial court to enter an order based on the findings required by *Kozel*and *Cook,*consider imposing a lesser sanction, or take any other action it deems appropriate consistent with this opinion.

*Reversed and Remanded.*

WARNER, TAYLOR and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.
584 A.2d 219

#### THEODORE J. GEHERTY v. RICHARD J. MOORE AND JOHN DOE, ETC.

May 15, 1990.

Petition for certification granted. (See 238 *N.J.Super.*463, 570 A.2d 29)
#### G. Joseph BELLEFEUILLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kenneth S. APFEL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 00-1653.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 21, 2000.

Decided Jan. 9, 2001.

J. Layne Birdsong, Richardson & Birdsong, Columbia, SC, for appellant. Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, J. Rene Josey, United States Attorney, John Berkley Grimball, Assistant United States Attorney, Deana R. Ertl-Lombardi, Regional Chief Counsel, Michele M. Kelley, Assistant Regional Counsel, Social Security Administration, Denver, CO, for appel-lee.

Before WILKINS, DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Joseph Bellefeuille appeals the district court’s order affirming the Commissioner’s decision denying Bellefeuille’s application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion adopting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. *Bellefe-uille v. Apfel,*No. CA-98-3743-9-17BD (D.S.C. Mar. 16, 2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
#### STATE ex rel. Mark BALL v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KP-2105.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 1, 2011.

In re Ball, Mark; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 03-5008; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 09-WR-829.

Denied.
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis 

LINDA JULIA MILLER 

v. Record No. 0855-95-4 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 PER CURIAM 

LAUBSCHER, PRESTA & LAUBSCHER SEPTEMBER 19, 1995 

AND 

STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY 

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (Robert B. Adams; Ashcraft & Gerel, on brief), for 

appellant. 

 (Ruth N. Carter; Midkiff & Hiner, on brief), for 

appellees. 

 Linda Julia Miller contends that the Workers' Compensation 

Commission erred in suspending her compensation benefits. Upon 

reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude 

that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily 

affirm the commission's decision. Rule 5A:27. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 

 On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the employer, the prevailing party below. R.G. Moore Bldg. 

Corp. v. Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 

(1990). Factual findings made by the commission must be upheld 

by this Court if supported by credible evidence. James v. 

Capitol Steel Constr. Co., 8 Va. App. 512, 515, 382 S.E.2d 833, 

835 (1989). 

 Miller argues that the record contains no credible evidence 
 2 

that she failed to cooperate with employer's vocational 

rehabilitation efforts. In granting employer's application 

seeking to suspend Miller's compensation benefits, the commission 

found as follows: 

 We do not find that [Miller] cooperated 

with rehabilitation efforts. According to 

the treating physician, Dr. [Khosrow] Matini, 

[Miller] had the ability to perform sedentary 

work, including writing with a pencil, 

pushing buttons, and driving a standard shift 

automobile. Yet [Miller] has portrayed 

herself to potential employers as essentially 

unemployable, thus sabotaging efforts to find 

employment. It appears from the record that 

[Miller] was unwilling to attempt even a 

part-time job allowing her to work on the 

telephone at home scheduling truck pick-ups. 

 

 The commission's findings are supported by Dr. Matini's 

medical reports and the testimony of the rehabilitation 

consultant, Patricia Wendy Held. Therefore, those findings are 

binding and conclusive upon us on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm 

the commission's decision to suspend benefits until Miller 

demonstrates a good faith effort to cooperate with rehabilitation 

efforts. 

 Affirmed.
I 

115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 76 

To amend title 5, United States Code, to clarify the nature of judicial 

review of agency interpretations of statutory and regulatory provisions. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 3, 2017 

Mr. RATCLIFFE (for himself, Mr. GOODLATTE, Mr. SESSIONS, Mr. COLLINS

of Georgia, Mr. HENSARLING, Mr. KING of Iowa, Mr. ROE of Tennessee, 

Mr. GOSAR, Mr. MARINO, Mr. CULBERSON, Mrs. BLACK, Mr. EMMER, 

Mr. GROTHMAN, Mr. LAMBORN, Mrs. WAGNER, Mr. LABRADOR, Mr. 

ISSA, Mr. TROTT, Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS, Mr. GRIFFITH, Mr. 

LOUDERMILK, Mr. BYRNE, Mr. RENACCI, Mr. BURGESS, Mr. YOHO, Mr. 

WALKER, Mr. ROKITA, Mr. CARTER of Georgia, Mr. CHABOT, Mr. PALMER, Mr. TIPTON, Mr. BARR, Mr. DUNCAN of South Carolina, Mr. 

BRIDENSTINE, Mr. HILL, Mr. HUDSON, Mr. HOLDING, Mr. OLSON, Mr. 

ROTHFUS, Mr. FRANKS of Arizona, Mr. MULLIN, Mrs. LOVE, Mr. 

BISHOP of Utah, Mr. MEADOWS, Mr. DESANTIS, Mr. MESSER, Mr. 

LUETKEMEYER, Mr. CHAFFETZ, Mr. WESTERMAN, Mr. WOODALL, and 

Mr. BROOKS of Alabama) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend title 5, United States Code, to clarify the nature 

of judicial review of agency interpretations of statutory 

and regulatory provisions. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 76 IH

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Separation of Powers 

3 Restoration Act of 2017’’. 

4 SEC. 2. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATUTORY AND REGU5 LATORY INTERPRETATIONS. 

6 Section 706 of title 5, United States Code, is amend7 ed— 

8 (1) by striking ‘‘To the extent necessary’’ and 

9 inserting ‘‘(a) To the extent necessary’’; 

10 (2) by striking ‘‘decide all relevant questions of 

11 law, interpret constitutional and statutory provi12 sions, and’’; 

13 (3) by inserting after ‘‘of the terms of an agen14 cy action’’ the following ‘‘and decide de novo all rel15 evant questions of law, including the interpretation 

16 of constitutional and statutory provisions, and rules 

17 made by agencies. Notwithstanding any other provi18 sion of law, this subsection shall apply in any action 

19 for judicial review of agency action authorized under 

20 any provision of law. No law may exempt any such 

21 civil action from the application of this section ex22 cept by specific reference to this section’’; and 

23 (4) by striking ‘‘The reviewing court shall—’’ 

24 and inserting the following: 

25 ‘‘(b) The reviewing court shall—’’. 

Æ 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS