### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ja nuary 10, 200 6

MA RLO N H AY ES v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE
Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Tip ton County No. 4532 Joseph H. Walk er, Judge

No. W2005-01026-C CA-R 3-P C - F iled April 19, 2006

The Appe llant, Marlon Hay es, appe als the Tipton CountyCircuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction re lief. On a ppeal, Hay es collate rally

challeng es h is guilty

pleas for first deg ree felony murder and ag g ravated robbe ry upon g rounds of inef

fec tive assista n ce o f counse l. After revie w of the r ecor d, we a ffirm the de nial of post-convic tion relief.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS and A L AN E. G L EN N , J J ., joined.

F rank De slaurie rs , Co vin g ton , T e nn e sse e , f or the Ap pe lla nt, Ma

rl on Hay e s.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Jan e L . B e e be , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Eliz abeth T. Rice , District Attorney Gene ral; and Colin A. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

P roce dural Hi story

I n November

of 2002, the Appe llant was indicted for first deg ree felony

murder, f irst deg ree preme ditated m urder , and especially ag g ravated robbery

. On Dec ember 3, 2003, the Appellant pled g uiltyto f irst de g ree felony murder and espe cially ag g ravated robbe ry , and he r ece ived an e ffe ctive
s e n te n c e o f li f

e p lu s tw e n ty

- f

iv e y e ar s

. H e f

il e d a pr o s e petition for post-conviction re lief on September 3, 2004, a lleg ing that he had been denied the effec tive assistance of counse l. Following the appointment of c ounsel, an e videntiary hearing w as held on April 1, 2005. The post-c onviction court de nied re lief by

written orde r of April 4, 2005. This appeal followe d.-2- Ana lys is

I n o rd ert o s u cc ee d o n a po s t -c o n v i ct i o n cl ai m , t h e A p p el l an tb ea rs t h e b u rd en o f s h o wi n g, by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e, the a lleg ations set forth in th e p et i t i on. T.C.A. § 40-30-110( f) (2003). To support a Six th Amendment claim of ine ffe ctiv e as s i s t ance of c ounsel, the Appe llant must establish that cou n s e l’s perf ormanc e fe ll below the ra ng e of c ompetence of attorne y s demande d in criminal ca ses. Ba

xter v . R os e , 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975) . Under Strickland v. W ashington , the Appellant must e stablish ( 1) defic ient repr esenta tion a nd (2) prejudi ce re s u lting from the de ficienc y . 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. C t. 2052, 2064 (1984). I t is unnece ssary for a court to addre ss deficie ncy

and pre judice in any

particula r orde r, or e ven to addr ess both if the petitioner makes a n insufficient showing on either. Id . at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069. Wit h a g uiltyplea, to satisfy the “pr ejudice” prong , the Appellant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s e rror s, he would not have pleade d g uilty and would have insisted on g oing to tria l.” Hi ll
v . Lo c k ha rt , 47 4 U. S. 52 , 56 , 10 6 S. Ct. 36 6, 36 9 (1 98 5) . “ A t ri a l c ou rt ’s fin din gs of f

ac t underly ing a cla im of ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel are revie wed on a ppeal unde r a de novo standard,
acc om p an i ed wi th a pre sumption t hat those finding s are corr ect unless the pr eponder ance of evidenc e is otherwise .” Fi e lds v . S tat e , 40 S.W. 3d 45 0, 45 8 (T e nn

. 20 01 ) (c iti ng Te nn

. R. A pp . P. 13 (d ); He nle

y v . S tat e , 960 S.W .2d 572, 578 (Tenn. 1997) ).

Th e Ap pe lla nt fr a me s his iss ue on app e a l a s fo llo ws : “ [t]he tr ia l c ou rt e rr [ed ] b y faili ng to fi ndthat tria l c ou ns e l’ s a dv ic e to [h im] to pl eadg uil ty to f ir st d e g re e mur de r ande sp e c ia lly ag g ravated robbery was ineffec tive assistance of counsel.” The A ppellant ar g ues that “[t] he fa ct the [Appellant] obtained no ef fec tive benef

it from the plea is c lear ly

evidenc e that the [ Appellant] was prejudice d by the result of the trial repr esenta tion.” I n support of this a rg ument, the Appellant
asserts, “[i] n eff

ect, [Appellant] has a 77 y ear sentenc e. At the time of the he aring [Appellant] was thirty one y ear s old. I t is clea

r that the sente nces in Te nnessee for life with parole a nd life without parole are substantially

the same w hen the [Appellant] is over 30 y ear s old.”
The Appe llant testified at the post-convic tion he ar i n g that had he g one to trial, he “ might ha ve ha d a

c ha nc e to g e t so me le sse r c ha rg e be sid e s f

ir st- de g re e mur de r” a nd“ wo uldha ve g ot a chanc e to tell his side” of the st o ry

. T ri al counse l testified that the evidenc e wa s overwhe lming ag ains t t h e Appellant and that the State initially soug ht the death pe nalty . After the Appellant underw ent a menta l evaluation, it was de termined he had an I Q of 69 and wa s mildl y reta rded. Trial counsel testified th at h e wa s able to negotiate a plea ag ree ment with the State which included
rec ommendation o f l i fe wi th parole f or the fir st deg ree murder c harg e. Tria l counsel testified he believed it wa s in the Appellant’s best interest to ac cept the a g ree ment. The proof also established that at the time of these offe nses, the Appe llant was on par ole from Ar kansas f or fe lonies committed in 1993, 1995, and 1997.
Preliminarily , we are constraine d to note that our revie w in this case is handicappe d by the Ap pe lla nt’ s f

a ilu re to i nc lud e in the re cord th e tr anscript of the he ari ng of

his g uil ty

ple a s to fi rs t deg ree murder and espec ially ag g ravated robbery

. Additionally , the Appellant has failed to include the ple a a g re e me nt f

orm, the ind ic tme nts fo r bo th o ff e ns e s, the jud g me nt o f c on vic tio n f or e sp e c ia lly-3-

a g g ra vate d r ob be ry , an d the tr a ns c ri pt of the se nte nc ing he ari ng wh ic h w a s c on du c te d f or e sp e c ia lly ag g ravated robbe ry

. When a party seeks a ppellate r eview, the re is a duty to prepa re a rec ord which convey s a fair, acc urate , and complete acc ount of what tra nspired with re spect to the issues for ming the basis of the a

ppeal. State v. Bunc h , 646 S.W .2d 158, 160 (Tenn. 1983)

. Notwithstanding the se critical omissions and the lac k of deve lopment of nee ded fa cts at the he ari ng , th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt ’s tho ro ug hly pr e pa re d f ind ings of

fa c t pr ov ide re le va nt d e ta il reg arding the Appellant’s convictions and the proce dural history of the case

. These f i n d i n gs are re c ite d in pa

rt a s f oll ow s:
Th e fa c ts o f the c a se e sta

bli sh e d that the [Ap pe lla nt] mur de re d a 69 y e ar o ld businessman at his place of business and se t the body on fire. The fir e depa

rtment put the fire out. T he body had trauma to the hea d and nec k and throat. Blood wa s over the middle part of the of fice . The [Appellant] took a car from the business a nd
wa s dis c ov e re d wi th the ve hic le

. He wa s in po sse ssi onof mon e y wi th b loo d o n it , which DNAanaly sis determined was the bl ood of t he victim

. The [Appellant’s] wife g a ve c on se nt t o s earch th e ho us e a ndpr op e rt y of the vic tim

wa s d isc ov e re d in [Appellant’s] house. The [Appellant] attempted to burn car key s from the victim’s bu sin e ss.

B loo d o f the vic tim

wa s d e te rm ine d by

DN A a na ly sis to b e on [Ap pe lla nt’ s] clothes that he w as we aring on the date of the murder

. [Appellant] g ave statements to office rs. He w as p ro p er l y advised of the Mir a nd a ri g hts

. Th e [Ap pe lla nt] w a s in dic te d f or Mu rd e r in the F ir st D e g re e a ndEs pe c ia lly A g g r a v a t e d R o b b e r y. T h e s t a t e f i l e d a n o t i c e o f i n t e n tt o s e e k

t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y.
Cou rt app oin te d co un se l neg oti a te d a ple a a g re e me nt to lif e fo r m ur de r, wi th
a s e n t e n c i n g h e ar i n g f

o r e s p e c i a l l y a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y.
Th e fi nd ing s f

urthe r n ote that:

On Dec ember

3, 2002, the [Appellant] enter ed g uilty pleas to mur der in the first deg ree and espe cially ag g ravated robbe ry . [Appellant] was sente nced to life for murder in the f

irst deg ree by

neg otiated plea a g ree ment. The [Appell an t ] was informed at the plea he aring the r an ge o f punishment for e specia lly ag g ravated
ro bb e ry , that the re wo uld be a se pa rate he ari ng on that se nte nc e , a nd that a determination would b e m ade whether the sentenc e would be c oncurr ent or
c on se c uti ve . H e state d h e un de rs too d th a t.-4- There was a

separ ate se ntencing hearing, w here the [Ap p el l ant] rec eived a sentenc e of 25 y ear s consec utive to the life sentenc e. The Appe llant’s ar g ument that his convictions should be vacated bec ause he rec eived no “ben ef i t ” fr o m the plea a g ree ment clea rly is misguided. The validity of a de fenda nt’s g uiltyplea pursuant to a plea ag ree ment is not measure d by whether the defe ndant g ot a g ood deal or a bad de al or by whether the defe ndant subjectively believes he obtained an advanta g e over the State in the plea neg otiations. “The standa rd wa s and re mains whether the plea r epre sents a voluntary and intellige nt choice am o n g t h e alternative cour ses of a ction open to the def endant.” Nor th C

aroli na v . A lfo rd , 400 U.S. 25 , 3 1, 91 S. Ct . 1 60 , 1 64 (1 97 0) . In ma kin g thi s d e te rm inatio n, the re vie wi ng c ou rt mus t look to the totalityof the c ircumstance s. State v. Turner , 919 S.W .2d 346, 353 (Tenn. Crim. App. 19 95 ); se e als o Ch am be rla in v . S tat e , 815 S.W .2d 534, 542 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) . I ndeed, a

c ou rt c ha rg e d w ith de te rm ini ng wh e the r .

. . ple a s w e re ‘v olu nta ry ’ and‘i nte lli g e nt’ must look t o various cir cumstantial fac tors, such as the r elative intellig ence of the defe ndant; the deg ree of his familiarity with criminal proce eding s; w hether he wa s repr esen t ed bycompetent c ounsel and ha d the opportunity to confe r with counsel about the options available to him; the ex tent of advice from counsel a nd the court
c o n c e r n i n g t h e c h ar g e s a g a i n s t h i m ; a n d t h e r e a s o n s f o r h i s d e c i s i o n t o p l e a d g u i l t y, inc lud ing a

de sir e to a vo id a

g re a te r p e na lty

that mi g ht r e su lt f

ro m a jury tr ia l.

Bl an k e ns hip v . S tat e , 858 S.W .2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993)

. M o re o v er , once a g uiltyplea ha s been enter ed, ef

fec tiveness of counsel is re levant only to the extent that it aff

ects the voluntariness of the ple a

. Sta te d a no the r way , de fi c ie nt pe rf orma nc e , sta nd ing a lon e , ir re sp e c tiv e of

its e g re g iou sn e ss, is irrele vant to th e c h a ll e n g e o f a g u il ty p le a , u n le s s it

c a n b e e s ta

b li s h e d th a t th e d e f

ic ie nt perf ormanc e is causa lly connec ted to the voluntariness of the ple a. I n this respec t, such claims of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e ne c e ssa

ri ly imp lic a te that g uil ty

ple a s m us t be volun tari ly a ndint e lli g e ntl y made. Hi ll v . Lo c k

ha rt , 4 7 4 U. S

. at 5 6 , 1 0 6 S

. C t

. at3 6 9 (c i t i n g Nor th C aroli na v . A lfo rd , 4 00 U. S. at 31, 91 S. Ct. at 164).

F oll ow ing a

de fe nd a nt’ s p le a of guilt, th e de fe nd a nt i s n ot e nti tle d to dis ow n h is s ole mn admissions in open court and under oath that he committed the crimes with which he wa s char g ed be c a us e it l a te r d e ve lop s th a t the Sta te ha d a we ake r c a se than th ou g ht, or be c a us e the de fe nd a nt d id not corre ctly

assess eve ry

rele vant fa ctor en t er i n g i nto his decision to plead g uilty , or, as he re, beca use the Appellant wants to te ll his side of the story and believes he could have g otten a better deal with a jury trial. See ge nerally Brady v . U.S. , 397 U.S. 742, 757, 90 S. Ct . 1463, 1473 (1970). I ndeed, the defe ndant’s sworn stat em en t s and admissions of g uilt st and as a witness ag ainst the defe ndant at the post-c onviction hearing w hen the de fenda nt disavows those statements.

I n deny ing r elief, the post-conviction court found:

Th e Cou rt fi nd s th a t [tr ia l c ou ns e l] pr ov ide d a de qu a te a ssi sta nc e ; he me t w ith petitioner and discusse d the ca se, including possible se ntence s. The def ense c ounsel-5-

su c c e ssf ull y fo ug ht the de a th p e na lty

no tic e . T he pe tit ion e r s til l f a c e d th e po ssi bil ity of life without par ole.
Petitioner failed to show any defic ient perf ormanc e by [defense c ounsel] or t h at h e w as p re

j u d i ce d

. He wa s ad eq u at el y wa rn ed o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f s en t en ci n g. The e ntry of a ple a of g uilty to avoid the risk of a g reater sente nce doe s not make a plea involuntary . Hicks v. State, 983 S.W.2d 240.

. . . . The Court finds that petit ioner has failed to establish the factual alleg ations contained in his petition by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-210. The petitioner has not shown that (a ) the services re ndere d by trial counsel
wer e def icient and (b) t he deficient performanc e was prejudicia l. The petitioner ha s not show n t h at t h e service s rende red or the advice g iven was be low the ra ng e of competenc e dema nded of attorney s in c riminal case s. The petitioner ha s not shown that there is a rea sonable probability that, but f or counsel’s defic ient perf ormanc e, the
re su lt o f the pr oc e e din g wo uldha ve be e n d if fe re nt.
The Court finds that the [A p p e ll an t] kn o w ingly and voluntarily

enter ed a ple a, that [Appellant] act u al ly

understood the sig nificanc e and c onsequenc es of the ple a an d s en t en ce

. T h e C o u rt fi n d s t h at t h e [ Ap p el l an t ] wa s n o t co er ce d i n t o en t er i n g a plea.

Af te r r e vie w, we c on c lud e the re c or d d oe s n ot p re po nd e rate a g a ins t th e se fi nd ing s.
CO NC LU SION

Ba sed upon the for eg oin g, we c onclude that the post-c onviction court prope rly denied the Ap pe lla nt’ s p e tit ion fo r p os t- c on vic tio n r e lie f. Ac c or din g ly , th e jud g me nt o f the Ti pto n Co un ty Circuit Court is affirmed.

___________________________________ DAVID G. HAY ES, J UDGE