IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
N O. 2018-CP-00796-COA THOMAS TAYLOR A/K/A THOMAS EDWARD TAYLOR A/K/A TINKER APPELLANT

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/21/2018 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LEE J. HOW ARD COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: LOW NDES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: THOMAS TAYLOR (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BILLY L. GORE NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 05/14/2019 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE J. WILSON, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND McDONALD, JJ. McDONALD, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. T h o ma s T ay lor appeals the Lowndes County Circuit Court’s dism i ssal o f anot h e r petition h e h a s f

i l ed f or post-conviction relief (PCR). W e agree with the c ircuit court’s determ ination that it lacked juri s d i ction to hear the petition because Tay lor h ad f ailed to obtain the suprem e court’s approval prior to f iling.
FACTS ¶2. On May

9, 1997, Tay lor was indicted f or carnally

knowing a c h ild under the age off

ourteen in violation of

Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-65(1) ( Rev. 1 994). 1 The original ind i c t m e n t h e was served listed the child as being under the age of f ourteen. But when attem

pting to put the num

ber in parentheses, a “0" instead o f a “ ) ” w as ty ped at the end, thus reading “(140.” T he ty pist a ttem pted to correct the error by superim p osing the “)” m ark

over the “0,” m aking it still seem that the num eric age o f the ch i l d w a s l e s s than 140. Another corrected indictm ent that c l e a r l y s tated that the victim was “a child u nder the age f ourteen (14) y ears” was then prepared, signed, and recorded on the sam e date. ¶3. Tay lor was tried, and on February 11, 1998, he was f o und guilty

of raping an eighty e a r - o l d girl. He appealed h is conviction of capital rape, and on March 2 3, 1999, t h e Mississippi Court of A ppeals af f irm ed th a t c onviction. Taylor v. State , 744 So. 2d 306 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). In that opinion, this Court d ealt with thirty -three (33) purported errors that T ay lor had raised. One of the issues resolved in that opinion was the v alidity of Tay lor’s indictm ent. Tay lor had c laim ed that he was tried under an inva l i d i n d i c t m e nt because it showed a dif

f erent age of the victim

. The Court said that it f ound nothing in the record to support his contention and noted that the issue was not raised at trial. Accordingly , the Court determ ined there was no error. ¶4. Over the last several y ears, Tay lor has f iled several petitions f

or post-conviction relief in the circuit court in 1999, 2005, 2011, and alm ost annually since 2012. He h as also f iled petitions with the Mississippi Suprem e Court seeking relief

. ¶5. On March 7, 2 0 1 8 , T a y l o r f iled a docum ent in the circuit court entitled “ Order to

1 T h e statu te n o w d escrib es th e crim e as “statu to ry rap e.” M iss. C o d e A n n . § 9 7 -3 -6 5 (R ev . 2 0 1 4 ). 2Show Cause or B ring to Trial” in w hich he raises the sam e i s s u e a b o u t the corrected

indictm ent that h e claim s i s f orged. He say s that the “original” i ndictm ent, the one with the

error, was the true indictm ent that he was served with. H e claim s he was n ever served with the corrected indictm e nt. He dem ands a trial under the “ o r i g i n al” indictm ent, which apparently

is not even in the court’s f ile. Tay lor raises no other grounds f o r relief

. ¶6. On March 21, 2018, Tay l or also f iled a “W rit o f Mandam

u s (or) Motion to Com

pel ( or) Strike Error” i n the circuit court, despite being sty led “In the Mississipp i S u p r e me Court.” In this docum ent, Tay l or states that bef ore the ci r c u i t c o u r t can rule o n any postconviction m otion, the Mississippi Suprem e Court m ust f irst grant leave. Tay lor then goes

on to f ault the circuit court f

or n ot getting leave f

rom t h e s u p r e me court concerning postc o n v iction petitions be declared null and void. He does not ask f or leave to f

ile any thing

. No action appears to have been taken by any c ourt on this m otion which i s i r r e l e v a n t and contains a m isstatem ent of the law. ¶7. On May 21, 201 8 , t h e circuit c ourt entered its order dism issing T a y lor’s March 7,
2018 f iling, say ing the court h ad no authority to hear any post-conviction m otion until Tay lor obtains perm ission f

rom the appellate court to f

ile such a m otion. Because h e had not, the petition was dism issed. From this order, Tay lor appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶8. W h en reviewing a r uling c ourt’s denial o r dism i ssal of a PCR m otion, we will only disturb that court’s decision if it is clearly

erroneous . . . . ” Patrickson v. State , 242 So. 3d 939, 940-41 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018). But we r eview questions of law de novo. Gray v.

3State , No. 2017-CP-00842-COA, 2019 W L 1349705, at *2 (Miss. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2019);

W illiams v. State , 248 So. 3d 910, 913 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).
DISCUSSION ¶9. The Mississippi Unif orm Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act provides:
W h ere the conviction and sentence have been a f f i rm ed on appeal or the appeal has been dism issed, the m o tion u nder this article shall not be f iled in the trial court until the m otion shall have f i r s t been presented to a quorum of the Justices of the Suprem e Court of Mississippi, convened f or said purpose either in t erm tim e or i n vacation, and an o rder granted a llowin g t h e f i l i ng of such m otion in the trial court. T he procedure governing applications to the S uprem e Court f or leave to f

i l e a m otion under this article shall be as p rovided in Section 99-39-27. Miss. C ode Ann. § 99-39-7 (Rev. 2015). Pursuant to this statute, because his c o nviction and

sentence have b een af

f irm ed on a

ppeal, Tay lor m

ust f irst f ile a m otion with the S u p r e me Court and be granted l eave to f i l e a m o tion f

or post-conviction relief bef ore he f iles any petition f or post-conviction relief

in the circuit court. ¶10. W e have reiterated this requirem ent on num erous occasions, even d irectly to Tay lor in h is 2012 request f

or habeas corpus, which the c ircuit c ourt dism issed because Tay lor had sought but f

ailed to obtain perm ission f rom the suprem e court to proceed. W e af f irm ed the circuit court’s d ism issal s a y ing that because T ay lor f ailed t o o btain perm ission to f ile the

m otion, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear the m atter. Taylor v. State , 121 So. 3d 329, 3 31 ( ¶10) ( Miss. Ct. App. 2013). W e also pointed o ut that in his PCR m otion Tay lor im p roperly re-argued i ssues previously determ ined on the direct appeal of h i s conviction.
In Lockett v. State , 614 So. 2d 888, 893 (Miss. 1 992), the Miss issippi S uprem e Court held that “[ r ]ephrasing direct appeal issu e s f or post-conviction purposes will not def eat the

4procedural bar of res judicata.” Taylor , 121 So. 3d at 331 (¶11). ¶11. T h e l a w h a s n o t c hanged on this basic requirem e n t, which we h ave m ost recentl y reiterated in Saunders v. State , No. 2018-CP-00141-COA, 2 019 W L 1348363, a t *1 (Miss.
Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2 019) and Gray v. State , No. 2017-CP-00842-COA, 2019 W L 1349705, at *1 (Miss. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2019). W hile in those cases the petitioners raised collateral issues on which the Court com m ented, their requests f or post

- c onviction relief were not granted b ecause they did not secure leave f rom the Mississippi Suprem e Court bef o re f iling. ¶12. Directly on point is Jones v
. State , No. 2017-CP-01510-COA, 2 018 W L 6498665, at *1 (Miss. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2018). There Jones, like petitioner Tay lor her e , h a d f iled six applications with the suprem e court requesting leave to f ile a post-conviction relief m otion with the circuit c ourt. T he suprem e c ourt denied the f irst application and d ism issed the f ive subsequent applications a s untim ely or successive. The last p etition J ones f iled directly with the c i r c u i t c ourt, requesting the production of biological evidence that was used in connection with his co n v i c t i o n . W e p ointed out that the s uprem e court has held that “ pleadings cognizable u nder the Unif orm P ost Conviction Collateral R e lief A ct (UPCCR A ) w i l l b e treated as . . . m otions f

or [ PCR] that are subject to the procedural rules prom ulgated therein, regardless of how the plaintif f has denom inated or characterized the p leadings,” citing May

v. State , 116 So. 3d 1107, 1109 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013). Jones , 2 018 W L 6498665, at *1 (¶5). Ultim ately , we h eld that Jones did not have perm ission f rom the s uprem e court to f ile his current petition and theref ore, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear it. ¶13. Despite its title (“Order t o S how Cause or Bring to Trial”), Tay lor’s March 17, 2018

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iling with the circuit court clearly sought post-conviction relief

. He raises the issue of the alleged f o rged indictm ent and c hallenges the c i r c u i t court’s sentence, b oth of which were raised in his direct appeal y ears ago. Tay lor n ever obtained perm ission f rom the Mississippi Suprem e Court bef

ore f iling this latest petition. ¶14. W e r e c o g n i z e t h a t e r r o r s a f f e c t i n g f u n d am e ntal rights are excepted f rom the
UPCCRA’s p r ocedural bars. Rowland v. State , 42 S o. 3d 5 03, 507 (¶9) (Miss. 2010); 2
Brandon v. State , 1 0 8 So. 3d 999, 1004 n.3, 1006 (¶¶12, 2 3) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013). But even these e xceptions m ay only be raised af ter f irst obtaining perm ission f rom the suprem e court
to f i le the appropria t e m otion. Allen v. S tate , 2 46 So. 3d 953, 955 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018). Here the record ref lects that Tay lor has raised none o f these exceptions i n his f iling with the court 3 a nd, m ore im portantly , he f

a i led t o o b t ain perm ission to f ile it in the f

irst place.
CONCLUSION ¶15. Tay lor m

ust f ollow the procedures outlined in the UPCC R A a n d n e e d e d t o h a ve

2 O n ly f o u r ty p es o f “f u n d am en tal r ig h ts” h av e b een ex p ressly f o u n d to su rv iv e P C R p ro ced u ral b ars: (1 ) th e rig h t ag ain st d o u b le j eo p ard y ; (2 ) th e rig h t to b e f ree f ro m an illeg al sen ten ce; (3 ) th e rig h t to d u e p ro cess at sen ten c in g ; an d (4 ) th e rig h t n o t to b e su b j ect to ex p o st f a cto law s. S

a l ter v. S ta t e , 1 8 4 S o . 3 d 9 4 4 , 9 5 0 (¶2 2 ) (M iss. C t. A p p . 2 0 1 5 ). T ay lo r, as th e m o v an t, w o u ld b e a r th e b u rd en o f p ro v in g a n ex cep tio n ap p lies to th e U P C C R A ’s p ro ced u ral b ars if

th e f ilin g h ad b een ap p ro v ed b y th e su p rem e co u rt.

3 In h is b rief to th is C o u rt, T ay lo r raises n u m ero u s issu es (j u risd ictio n , sen ten c i n g , in ef f ectiv e co u n sel, etc.), m an y o f w h ich h e h ad raised in h is d irect ap p eal y e ars ag o . B u t th ese w ere n o t co n tain ed in th e P C R f ilin g n o r co n sid e r e d b y th e circu it co u rt. T h u s th ey w i ll n o t b e ad d ressed b y th is C o u rt. C ren sh a w v. S ta te , 5 2 0 S o . 2 d 1 3 1 , 1 3 4 (M iss. 1 9 8 8 ). N o r d o th ey n eed to b e ad d ressed sin ce th e circu it co u rt lack ed j u risd ictio n to co n sid er th e f ilin g . 6obtained leave f rom the suprem e court b ef ore f i ling his latest petition. He did n ot do so. W e theref ore af f irm the circuit court’s dism issal f or lack of jurisdiction. ¶16. AFFIRMED. BARNES, C.J., C ARLTON AND J. WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE, W E S TBROOKS, TINDELL, LAWRENCE, McCARTY AND C . WILSON, J J., CONCUR.

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