United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

05-1204 

CATHERINE LACAVERA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

JON W. DUDAS, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of 

the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 

Defendant-Appellee.

Catherine C. Lacavera, of San Francisco, California, pro se. 

John M. Whealan, Solicitor, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and 

Trademark Office, of Arlington, Virginia, argued for defendant-appellee. With him on the 

brief were Sydney O. Johnson, Jr. and James R. Hughes, Associate Solicitors. 

Appealed from: United States District Court for the District of Columbia 

Judge John D. Bates 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

 

05-1204 

CATHERINE LACAVERA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

JON W. DUDAS, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and 

Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

 __________________________ 

 DECIDED: February 6, 2006 

 __________________________ 

Before NEWMAN, MAYER, and GAJARSA, Circuit Judges. 

MAYER, Circuit Judge. 

 Catherine Lacavera appeals the judgment of the United States District Court for 

the District of Columbia denying her motion for summary judgment and granting 

summary judgment in favor of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”). 

Lacavera v. Toupin, Civ. Action No. 03-1469 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2004).∗ Because the 

PTO’s decision to grant Lacavera limited recognition was consistent with its regulations 

and supported by the record, its regulations do not exceed the statutory authority, and it 

did not deny Lacavera equal protection, we affirm. 

 ∗

 During the pendency of this appeal, at the PTO’s request and with 

Lacavera’s consent, Jon W. Dudas, Director of the PTO, was substituted for James 

Toupin, PTO General Counsel, as the defendant-appellee. 
Background

The PTO has statutory authority to regulate attorney practice before it pursuant 

to 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(D) (2000), which provides: 

the [PTO] may establish regulations, not inconsistent with law, which . . . 

may govern the recognition and conduct of . . . attorneys . . . representing 

applicants or other parties before the Office, and may require them . . . to 

show that they are of good moral character and reputation and are 

possessed of the necessary qualifications to render to applicants or other 

persons valuable service, advice, and assistance in the presentation or 

prosecution of their applications or other business before the Office . . . . 

From this authority, the PTO has issued regulations to govern the recognition of

attorneys. Under 37 C.F.R. § 10.7(a)(2) (2003),∗∗ in order to be registered, an individual

must establish that she is “[o]f good moral character and repute; . . . [p]ossessed of the 

legal, scientific, and technical qualifications . . . and . . . otherwise competent to advise 

and assist applicants for patents.” An alien “may be registered . . . provided . . .

[r]egistration is not inconsistent with the terms upon which the alien was admitted to,

and resides in, the United States.” 37 C.F.R. § 10.6(a). Aliens for whom registration 

would be inconsistent with legal restrictions imposed on them may, nevertheless, be 

granted “limited recognition,” see id. § 10.9(b), a status which allows them to practice

before the PTO, but confines their activities to those authorized by the Immigration and 

Naturalization Service (“INS”), now the United States Bureau of Citizenship and 

Immigration Services. With respect to nonimmigrant aliens, the PTO has interpreted 

 ∗∗ Effective July 26, 2004, the PTO changed its regulations pertaining to the 

representation of others. See 69 Fed. Reg. 35428 (June 24, 2004). As a result of these 

changes, sections 10.6, 10.7, and 10.9 were removed and reserved, and the applicable 

regulations governing the representation of others are now found at sections 11.6, 11.7, 

and 11.9. See 37 C.F.R. § 11 (2005). Sections 10.6, 10.7, and 10.9 were, however, 

the governing regulations for Lacavera’s administrative action and her request for 

judicial review before the trial court. Hence, in reviewing the trial court’s decision, we 

use sections 10.6, 10.7, and 10.9. 

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section 10.9(b) to dictate that they are not registered upon passing the patent 

examination, but rather are “given limited recognition under 37 CFR § 10.9(b) if 

recognition is consistent with the capacity of employment authorized by the INS.” See

PTO, General Requirements Bulletin (Nov. 3, 1999) (“GRB”). 

Lacavera, a Canadian citizen and nonimmigrant alien, began working in the 

United States as an attorney in September 2001 pursuant to a one year TN visa, which 

permitted her only to prepare and prosecute patent applications at the New York office 

of the White & Case law firm. In January 2002, Lacavera began the application process

for recognition before the PTO, and she successfully passed the April 17, 2002, patent

examination. Because of legal restrictions imposed by her visa, she was granted limited 

recognition. Although Lacavera’s visa had a one year duration, she received timely 

extensions from the INS, and the PTO extended her limited recognition period

accordingly. At the time this appeal was filed, Lacavera held an H-1B visa and, with the 

appropriate INS authorization, had changed employers. Her present visa has a three 

year duration and lists preparation and prosecution of patent applications for Google,

Inc. as her sole employable activity. Her current limited recognition status is consistent

with her work and time restrictions. 

After Lacavera was initially granted limited recognition on July 8, 2002, she 

challenged the PTO’s decision to deny her full registration. The PTO General Counsel 

denied her challenge, and Lacavera filed suit in the United States District Court for the 

District of Columbia under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-706 

(2000), claiming that (1) the PTO’s decision was inconsistent with its regulations, (2) the 

regulations exceeded the authority of their enabling statute, and (3) the PTO’s decision 

denied her equal protection. The trial court denied Lacavera’s motion for summary 

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judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the PTO. Lacavera appeals, and 

we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). 

Discussion

We review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment without deference, 

reapplying the same standard as the trial court. See Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 

393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 

the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

Applying this standard, we reject each of Lacavera’s arguments. 

Lacavera contends that the PTO’s decision was an abuse of discretion because 

it improperly found full registration inconsistent with the legal restrictions imposed by her 

visa. “An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is based on an erroneous

interpretation of the law, on factual findings that are not supported by substantial 

evidence, or represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors.” Star

Fruits, 393 F.3d at 1281. The “scope of review under [this] standard is narrow and a 

court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n 

of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Moreover, “[a]n 

agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to substantial deference and will 

be accepted unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Star 

Fruits, 393 F.3d at 1282. 

The PTO based its decision to grant limited recognition on the interpretation of

section 10.9(b) found in the GRB, an interpretation that we believe reasonably interprets 

that regulation, and on its conclusion that Lacavera’s visa restrictions were inconsistent

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with full recognition. Because granting Lacavera full registration would have given her 

PTO approval to do work in which she could not lawfully engage, we find no abuse of

discretion in the PTO’s determination that granting her full registration was inconsistent

with the terms of her visa. Moreover, the decision to grant limited recognition with 

restrictions consistent with those in her visa correctly applied sections 10.6(a) and 

10.9(b) and the GRB, and was, therefore, not an abuse of discretion or arbitrary and 

capricious.

Lacavera next argues that the PTO exceeded the authority granted to it by 

35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) in promulgating regulations that take into account visa restrictions 

when determining whether or not to grant full recognition. Under 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2),

the PTO has broad authority to govern the conduct of proceedings before it and to 

govern the recognition and conduct of attorneys. See Stevens v. Tamai, 366 F.3d 

1325, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Because the PTO is specifically charged with 

administering this statute, we analyze a challenge to the statutory authority of its 

regulations under the Chevron framework. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.

218 (2001); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

First, we determine whether the statute speaks to the issue of the challenge, and if it is

silent or ambiguous, we defer to the agency’s reasonable interpretation. See Chevron, 

467 U.S. at 842-43. 

In this case, the statute is silent as to whether the PTO may consider visa 

restrictions in determining whether or not to grant recognition. However, the statute 

states that the PTO “may require [applicants] . . . to show that they are . . . possessed of 

the necessary qualifications to render to applicants . . . valuable service.” 35 U.S.C.

§ 2(b)(2)(D) (emphasis added). It was reasonable for the PTO to interpret legal 

05-1204 5
authority to render service as being a necessary qualification. Accordingly, it was

reasonable for the PTO to enact regulations that limit an alien’s ability to practice before

it to those activities in which the alien may lawfully engage. Therefore, the PTO did not 

exceed its statutory authority in promulgating the regulations in question. 

Finally, Lacavera contends that she was denied equal protection. We review her 

claim under the rational review standard. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78 (1976). 

Lacavera offered no evidence that she was treated unequally as compared to other 

aliens with visa restrictions, and therefore she suffered no individual equal protection 

violation. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).

Moreover, because the regulations in question are rationally related to a legitimate

government interest, e.g., minimizing the unauthorized practice of law before the PTO

and its attendant public harm, they do not violate the equal protection clause and are, 

therefore, valid. Id. at 440. 

Conclusion

Accordingly, the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of 

Columbia is affirmed. 

COSTS 

 No costs. 

AFFIRMED

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