alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-7579

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

SIMON CHOW,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior District Judge. (CR-94-219, CA-96-1641-AM)

Submitted: April 10, 2000 Decided: May 1, 2000

Before WILLIAMS and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Simon Chow, Appellant Pro Se. Lawrence Joseph Leiser, Assistant

United States Attorney, William Neil Hammerstrom, Jr., OFFICE OF

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Simon Chow seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying

his motion for relief from the court’s order denying his motion

filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 1999). We have reviewed

the record and the district court’s opinion and find no abuse of

discretion in the denial of the motion. See National Org. for

Women v. Operation Rescue, 47 F.3d 667, 669 (4th Cir. 1995). Chow

did not establish any extraordinary circumstances warranting relief

under Rule 60(b), Fed. R. Civ. P. See Ackermann v. United States,

340 U.S. 193, 202 (1950). Accordingly, we deny a certificate of

appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid

the decisional process.

DISMISSED
649 A.2d 1280

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. LEONARD R. JAFFEE.

July 15, 1994.

ORDER

This matter having come before the Court on an appeal as of right pursuant to *Rule*2:2-l(a)(l), and the Court having deter*259mined that the matter does not present a substantial constitutional question within the meaning of the *Rule*or applicable caselaw;

It is ORDERED that the within appeal is dismissed.
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<SECURITIES>                                   6,619,000
<RECEIVABLES>                                  2,563,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                     163,000
<INVENTORY>                                      311,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                              12,107,000
<PP&E>                                         1,435,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                   836,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                17,111,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          1,532,000
<BONDS>                                                0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                  0
<PREFERRED>                                            0
<COMMON>                                          47,000
<OTHER-SE>                                    15,454,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  17,111,000
<SALES>                                        2,074,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               4,935,000
<CGS>                                          1,630,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  3,435,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                       0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                     0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                1,500,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                     555,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              945,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                         0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                        0
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<NET-INCOME>                                     945,000
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        .20
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**EXHIBIT 32.1**

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

The undersigned officer of Lockbox Link, Inc. (the "Company"), hereby certifies, to such officer's knowledge, that the Company's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2017 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 

*/s/ Natalie Moores*

Natalie Moores

Chief Executive Officer

Chief Financial Officer

 

 

February 23, 2018
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. ALLEN ROGERS.

October 20, 1987.

Petition for certification denied.
584 A.2d 238

#### IN THE MATTER OF THE DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS FILED BY AMERICAN REF-FUEL COMPANY OF BERGEN COUNTY AND AMERICAN REF-FUEL COMPANY OF ESSEX COUNTY.

May 30, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
#### Allen Lee LAMPKIN, Appellant, v. STROMAN’S, INC., Appellee.

No. 00-2577.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 12, 2001.

Decided Jan. 18, 2001.

Before BOWMAN, BEAM, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Allen Lampkin appeals from the district court’s1 adverse grant of summary judgment in his employment discrimination lawsuit against his former employer. Upon de novo review, we agree with the district court, for the reasons expressed in its order, that Lampkin failed to demonstrate Stroman’s stated reasons for his termination were a pretext for discrimination, or Stroman’s engaged in retaliatory behavior. *See Whitley v. Peer Review Systems, Inc.,*221 F.3d 1053, 1055 (8th Cir.2000).

Accordingly, we affirm. *See*8th Cir. R. 47B. We deny Stroman’s pending motions on appeal.

1

. The Honorable G. Thomas Eisele, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas.
584 A.2d 235

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. DR. STANLEY FIEBER.

May 30, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
Exhibit (10)(a)

    

    

    

    

    

    

    Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

    

    

    

    

    We consent to the reference to our firm under the caption “Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm” in
      Post-Effective Amendment No. 37 to the 1933 Act Registration Statement (Form N-4 No. 333-172328) and Amendment No. 868 to the 1940 Act Registration
      Statement (Form N-4 No. 811-08517), and to the use therein of our reports dated (a) March 9, 2021, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of The Lincoln National Life Insurance Company and (b) April 15, 2021, with respect to the financial statements of Lincoln Life Variable Annuity Account
      N for the registration of interests in a separate account under individual flexible payment deferred variable annuity contracts.

    

    

    

    

    

    

    

    

    /s/ Ernst & Young LLP

    Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

    December 10, 2021
### THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13

- 18

- 00412

- CV
Edinburg Consolidated Independent School District and Mike Morath, Commissioner of Education for the State of Texas

v. Cristina L. Esparza

On A ppeal from the 275th District Court of Hidalgo County , Texa s Trial Cour t Cause No. C

- 1553

- 17

- E

JUDGMENT THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on appeal, concludes the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and rendered

. The Court orders the judgment of the trial court REVERSED an d REND ER ED in accordance with its opinion

. Costs of the appeal are adjudged against appell ee

. We further order this decision certified below for observance. March 19 , 2020
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Stephen J. Markman

, Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Kurtis T. Wilder

Elizabeth T. Clement

, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

November 21, 2018

a1114 

# Order

Clerk November 21, 2018

157481

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 157481

COA: 336745

Wayne CC: 16

- 002137

- FC

DAYQUAN MARTELL JACKSON,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 15, 2018

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENI ED, because we are not

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

**CERTIFICATIONS**

 

The undersigned, as the Chief Financial Officer of Valley Financial Corporation, certifies that the Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2009, which accompanies this certification, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the periodic report fairly presents, in all            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Valley Financial Corporation at the dates and for the periods indicated. The foregoing certification is made solely for purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United States Code and is subject to the knowledge and willfulness qualifications contained in Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350(c).

 

Dated: August 12, 2009

 

|   | /s/ Kimberly B. Snyder_______ |
|--------|-------------------------------|

|   | Chief Financial Officer |
|--------|-------------------------|
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report of Blyth, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for theperiod ending October 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Robert B. Goergen, Chairmanand Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Actof 2002, that:

 

(1)            The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)            The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

 

 
|   | /s/ Robert B. Goergen                |   |
|--------|--------------------------------------|--------|
|   | Robert B. Goergen                    |
|   | Chairman and Chief Executive Officer |
|   | December 7, 2007                     |

 

This certification is made solely for thepurpose of 18 U.S.C. § 1350, subject to the knowledge standard containedtherein, and not for any other purpose.

 

----
##### 



EXHIBIT 31.2
 CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICERS
CERTIFICATION UNDER
SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Trico Marine Services, Inc.;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of
the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the
period covered by this report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods
presented in this report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)
and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have:
     5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most
recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants
auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons
performing the equivalent functions):
   Date: November 9, 2006
    
    By:  /s/ Geoff JonesGeoff JonesChief Financial Officer
#### Jeffrey J. RITTENHOUSE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Rick HUDSON, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 00-6142.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Jan. 9, 2001.

Before BALDOCK, PORFILIO, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

BRORBY, Circuit Judge.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unani*863mously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. *See*Fed.R.App.P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir.R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Jeffrey J. Rittenhouse appeals from the district court’s order dismissing his federal habeas complaint, filed pro se and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Our jurisdiction over this appeal arises from 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Petitioner alleged claims pursuant to due process, the Eighth and Thirteenth amendments, and equal protection — all resulting from his transfer out of a Wisconsin state prison to a private prison facility in Oklahoma. The magistrate judge recommended that all of petitioner’s claims be dismissed, *see*R. Vol. I, doc. 12, and, after considering the petitioner’s objections, the district court agreed, *see id.,*doc. 15.

On appeal, petitioner reiterates those issues and arguments presented in his objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. He also presents a jurisdictional issue and various other arguments and theories which were not presented to the district court. In accord with the general rule, we do not consider issues, theories, and arguments not presented below absent special circumstances not present here. *See Okland Oil Co. v. Conoco, Inc. .,*144 F.3d 1308, 1314 n. 4 (10th Cir.1998); *Smith v. Rogers Galvanizing Co.,*128 F.3d 1380, 1385-86 (10th Cir.1997).

Because the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act applies to this appeal, petitioner must obtain a certificate of ap-pealability (COA) before proceeding on appeal. *See Montez v. McKinna,*208 F.3d 862, 867 (10th Cir.2000). The district court denied petitioner COA, *see*R. Vol. I, doc. 15, at 3; this court construes petitioner’s notice of appeal as a renewed application for COA, see Fed.R.App.P. 22(b)(2). In determining whether COA should issue, we must decide whether petitioner has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U .S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

Petitioner also seeks leave to proceed without prepayment of costs and fees; that request is granted. However, after careful review of the entire record on appeal in light of the applicable law and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that petitioner has not met the standards for issuance of COA, for the reasons set forth in the district court’s order dated April 5, 2000. This appeal is dismissed; the mandate shall issue forthwith.

*

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the *863case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir.R. 36.3.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS OF CAPSTONE CAPITAL CORPORATION FOR THE QUARTER ENDED JUNE 30, 1997,
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                         734,736
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                4,928,445
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            16,396,836
<PP&E>                                     387,142,858
<DEPRECIATION>                              14,960,612
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             518,364,728
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        9,889,505
<BONDS>                                     82,130,295
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        16,206
<OTHER-SE>                                 280,696,361
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               518,364,728
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            12,970,634
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                6,528,809
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           3,412,590
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              6,441,825
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          6,441,825
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 6,441,825
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     .043
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     .043
        

</TABLE>
583 A.2d 738

#### IN THE MATTER OF EDWARD J. ROSNER, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW.

January 4, 1991.

*4ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed a report with the Supreme Court, recommending that EDWARD J. ROSNER, formerly of ROSEMONT, PENNSYLVANIA, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1975 be suspended and sanctioned for his failure to pay administrative costs arising out of prior disciplinary matter;

And the Court having ordered that respondent show cause before it on January 2, 1991 why he should not be suspended from the practice of law and sanctioned for his failure to pay administrative costs, and respondent having failed to appear on the return date of the Order to Show Cause; and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that EDWARD J. ROSNER be suspended from the practice of law until he remits $2,595.00 in past-due administrative costs assessed pursuant to this Court’s order of November 7, 1988, together with interest on said amount from November 7, 1988 until the date of payment and until further Order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that a sanction of $250.00, payable to the Ethics Financial Committee, be imposed against respondent for respondent’s failure to comply with the order of November 7, 1988; and it is further

ORDERED that the Office of Attorney Ethics shall take such protective action pursuant to *Rule*l:20-ll(c) as may be appropriate to gain possession and control of the legal files, records, practice and trust assets of EDWARD J. ROSNER wherever situate; and it is further

*5ORDERED that all funds, if any, presently existing in any New Jersey financial institution pursuant to *Rule*1:21-6 shall be restrained from disbursement and shall be transmitted by the banks that are the present custodians thereof to the Clerk to the Superior Court for deposit in the Superior Court Trust Fund pending the further Order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that EDWARD J. ROSNER is hereby restrained and enjoined from practicing law during the period of suspension; and it is further

ORDERED that EDWARD J. ROSNER shall comply with Administrative Guideline No. 23 of the Office of Attorney Ethics governing suspended, disbarred or resigned attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that service be made on respondent by publication of this Order for two consecutive weeks in the New Jersey Law Journal.
#### Ira E. JENKINS, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 2D09-2208.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Oct. 1, 2010.

*244Ira E. Jenkins, Jr., pro se.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Anne Sheer Weiner, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

SILBERMAN, Judge.

Ira E. Jenkins, Jr., seeks review of the order denying his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Jenkins argues that the postconviction court erred in summarily denying relief on claims two and three and denying claim one after an evi-dentiary hearing. Jenkins also argues that the court erred in denying his motion for postconviction counsel. We affirm the denial of relief on Jenkins’ motion for counsel and claim one of his rule 3.850 motion without further comment. However, we reverse the summary denial of claims two and three because the court erroneously determined that the plea colloquy conclusively refuted those claims.

In February 2006 Jenkins entered guilty pleas to numerous charges in various different cases. The trial court subsequently sentenced Jenkins to twenty-five years in prison on the primary offense of robbery with a gun or deadly weapon. Jenkins filed his rule 3.850 motion in November 2007 raising claim one. In January 2008 Jenkins filed an amended rule 3.850 motion in which he added two claims.

In claim two, Jenkins argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the robbery crime scene to locate eyewitnesses. Jenkins claimed that the robbery occurred at a liquor store where a crowd of regulars hung out but counsel never attempted to ascertain if any of these regulars witnessed the robbery. In claim three, Jenkins argued that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and interview Sabrina Hall, a cashier who was working at the liquor store on the day of the robbery and who would have established Jenkins’ defense of misidentification.

The postconviction court summarily denied relief on claims two and three based on its determination that they were conclusively refuted by the transcript of the plea colloquy wherein Jenkins acknowledged he was satisfied with counsel’s representation. On appeal, Jenkins correctly asserts that the plea colloquy does not conclusively establish that he is not entitled to relief on claims two and three. Jenkins’ motion does not state when he learned that counsel failed to investigate the robbery crime scene or witness Hall. Thus, at the time Jenkins entered his plea, he could have been satisfied with counsel’s performance. *See Mondy v. State,*6 So.3d 1251, 1252 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (holding that court erred in determining that a postconviction claim was refuted by the defendant’s statement in the plea colloquy that he was satisfied with counsel’s representation because it was not clear the defendant knew *245of counsel’s ineffectiveness at the time he entered his plea). Therefore, we reverse and remand for the postconviction court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve these claims.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

WHATLEY and BLACK, JJ, Concur.
#### STATE ex rel. Ronald WALTON v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2009-OK-2495.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 29, 2010.

In re Walton, Ronald; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lasalle, 28th Judicial District Court Div 0, No. 70,802; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. 09 00682-KH, KH 09-00709.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; *State ex rel. Glover v. State,*93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; *State v. Parker,*98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; *State ex rel Melinie v. State,*93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.