### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE Septem ber 24, 200 2 Session CRYSTAL REN

A STURGILL v. STA TE OF TENNESSEE Appeal from the Criminal Court for Greene C ounty No. 01CR064 James E. Beckner, Judge

No. E2002-00385-CCA-R3-PC February 4, 2003 The petitioner, Crystal Rena Sturgill, appeals from the Greene County Criminal Court’s denying her post-conviction relief from her convictions for three counts of f irst de gree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, two counts of e specially ag gravated kidnapp ing, tw o counts of aggravated

kidn appin g, and one count of Class D felony thef

t. Essentially, she contends (1) tha t her guilty pleas were not knowingly , intel ligently, an d voluntarily entere d, (2) that due process was violated by t

he mass s entenci n g procedure, and (3) that she r eceived the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affir

m the judg

ment of the

trial cou rt. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed J OSEPH M. T IPTON , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D AVID H. W ELLES and A LAN E. G LENN , JJ., joined. John S. Ander son, Roge

rsville, Tennesse e, for th

e appell ant, Cry stal Rena

Sturgill. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral andReporter; Mark A. Fulks, Assistant Attorney Genera l; C. Berkeley Bell, Jr., District Attorney Gene ral; andEric D. Christiansen, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Te nnessee. OPINION The petitioner was prosecuted with five codefe ndants for crimes committed against Vidar, Delfina, and Tabitha Lillelid, who wer e murdered, and Peter L

illelid, who survived. We neednot recount the tragic details here. See State v. H owell , 34 S.W.3d 484 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). They all pled guilty to the cr

imes and after a sentenc ing hea ring received consecutive sentences of life withoutparole for the murders and twenty -five ye ars for the attempted murder. On app eal , the petitioner’s sentences were ordered to be se rved concurrently

for an effective sentence of life without parole. Id. at 515. Relative to her guilty pleas, the pe

titioner has complained that she was under the influence of medic ation and that she w as coer

ced into p leading

guilty because the state require d all the defendants to plead guilty before agreeing

to remove th e de ath pen alt y fro m co nsi der ati on. In-2-

this respect, she has indicated that her guilty plea was based upon

her concern that

a codef endant, Dean Mullins, would

have be en exposed

to the dea

th penalt y if they went to tr

ial. At the po st-co nvict ion ev ident iary heari ng, the petitioner and her two trial attorney s testified. The attorneys we

re the District Public Defender and one of his assistants. They de tailed the amount of work they

putinto the case for ten to eleven months. They had sought to sever the petitioner’s case from that of the codefendants at every stage. Upon the trial court’s denial of a seve rance, they had pursued an interlocutory appeal a ll the way to the Unit

ed StatesSupreme

Court. The appeal was unavailing. Theyhad hired a psy chiatrist, a psycholog ist, an investigator, and a jury selection cons ult ant. They

had met wi

th the pet itioner r egular ly a nd discuss ed with he

r all fac ets of the

ir investigation and case

developm

ent. The record reflec ts that the

y f iled over one thousa

nd motions. They obtained information regarding the c odefendants’ trial st rateg ies and de

veloped a defense st ra te gy, which they ca

lled the “accidental tourist,” to separ ate the p etitioner

from her codefe ndants. Alth ough they

were a ware tha t t he petitioner had been diagnosed with a borde rline persona lity disorder and

de pression and that she was taking medication, they saw the petitioner al wa ys being communicative, articulate, and rational. They sa

w no signs of mental or

psychologic al impairment, and the petitioner never complained about being unde r the influence of medication. The assistant public defender testified that the petitioner’s guilty plea was en tered knowing ly , un de rs ta nd in gl y, an d v ol un ta ri ly. He acknowledged that a conc ern for Dean Mullins was part of the reason for the p etitioner ’s decid ing to ple ad guilt

y, b ut he asse rted th at her decision was her own. He noted that she had implored her attorney s to save her life. The assistant testified that they discussed all options and their ra mification s wit h the petitioner. He said th at, in fact, possible pleas and their consequences were f ully discussed with the petitioner from early

in their representation of

her. He said that after she decided to plea d guilty, she never wavered in that decision. The petitioner testified that her best friend is Dean Mullins and that he was a major concern in her considering whether to take the state ’s offer. She said she did not “really bel i eve” that she would get the death penalty but that she w as concerned that Dean Mullins would. She said she f elt a great deal of pressure in making the decision. She asserted that if she had received a separ ate tria l, sh e w ou ld no t h av e p le d g ui lt y. The petitione

r testified that she had been taking 100 milligrams of Doxepin daily . She acknowledged, though, that the trial court discussed this with her at the time of the plea and that she had told the court under

oath that she was in full command of her faculties. She admitted that she was made aw are of h

er waiving var

ious rights , but she did not specifically re member being made aware that she w as waiving claim s rega rding tr ial cour t errorsin pretri al matter s.-3-

The petitioner acknowledged that she told her attorneys to save her life and that a “genuine po ss ib il it y” of

the death penalty

existed. She admitted that she was concerned for herself a s well as for Dean Mullins. The petitioner acknowledged that it was her voluntary and intelligent decision not to testify at t he sentencing hearing. She a dmitted that her story was told in a fa vorable light in the expert re port given to the trial court. She also said that her attorney s were “very thorough,” visited her “very regularly ,” and immediately addre ssed any conc erns she had expressed. Finally , she admitted that they “left no stone unturned.” Relevant to this appeal, the trial court found the following reg ar ding coun sel and the petitioner’s plea: [The attorne ys] in tri al preparation, according to the testimony

of the petitioner

at thi s evid entia ry hearing, “left no stone unturned.” They filed over one thousand (1,00 0) mo tions after researching the law and in

vestiga ting the facts. They worked on the case for ten (10) or eleven (11) months, interviewing all possible witnesses, traveling to Arizona and Kentucky and eve ry jurisdict ion touched by

th e tra vels of the defenda nts. They obtained information as to th e strategies of codefenda nts and worked to make petitioner’s com pati ble. They thus developed a strategy

of the “accidental tourist.” The y were c ompletely

prepar ed for tr ial and c omplete l y prepared for mitigati on if it bec ame nec essary at a bifur cated h earing. The at to rn eys were aware of the psy chological findings of

the experts and the medications prescribed to petitioner. They worked with her in the cont

ext of those

facts. They found pet itione r even with her diagnoses and prescri ptions to be sober, intelligent, articulate and very understanding of all the matters explained to her. The attorneys we

re very thorough in explaining each and every issue. Petitioner c learly under stood. The transcri pt of the allocution of the guilty ple a unequivo cally

shows tha

t p etitioner understood her rights and was-4- clear minded and not under the influen ce of me dications or psy cholog ical stre sses. On page eight (8) of the tra nscript the following colloquy occurs: The Court : Have you had any alcohol o

r drugs in the last

2 4 hours? Miss Sturg ill: Yes The Court : What? Miss Sturg ill: I have pres cription medication, 100 milligra ms o f [Doxep in]. The Court: Is there any thing about that that

affects y our

ability to be clear of mind and understand what we’re doing he re to da y? Miss Sturg ill: No A possible plea and consequences thereof wer e discussed from early in the r

epresentation of petitioner. These discussions continued throughout

th e r ep re se nt at io n. Th es e a tt or ne ys were aware of the fact that the fate of co-def endant Mu

llins was im

portant to petitioner and could

influence her decision. However, in the bala nce it did notma ke a decisive difference. Petitioner had begged the at to rn eys all along to not let her die. She was very relieved not to be exposed to the death penalty. She ne ver told them anything

butthat she wanted to take the plea offer and neve r later told them she wanted to rejec t it. The attorneys fully

and co mpletel y explained the plea, the consequ ences, the right to a jury trial, etc. and

petitione r comple tely understo od all thos e things

. The attorneys we

re and still are convinced petitioner was not coerced or influ enced by psychologic al problems or drugs and that her plea was voluntarily

and intelligently made

. The attorne

ys o bjected to the “in mass” se ntencing , but their objectio ns were

overrul ed by

the trial court.-5- The record will show that the sentencing was conducted in a fair and constitutionally appr opriate manner.

. . . . There was no constitutional infirmity in the “all or n othin g” offer by the state and nothing has been offered at this evidentiary hearing to show that its effect was violative of due process. If counsel had raised the issue on appe al it would not have been success ful. The issue of sentencing was raised on appeal and has been previously determined a

dversely to petitioner. The mitigation preparation was thorough and complete. The petitioner chose no t to testify

even as to remorse. Dr. McCoy ’s report was exhaustive

withover fifty ( 50) attachments. The attorneys we re a llowed to file the report without objection or exception and not subject to cross examination. From all of the

foreg oin g this C ourt concludes that the petitioner in all aspects of the case received effective if not superior assistance of counsel. See Baxter v Rose 52 3 SW2d 920 (Tenn. 1975). This Court further finds tha t the p etitioner ’s plea w as in all respec ts voluntar

ily, understa

ndingly , knowing ly a

nd intellig ently entered into and consummated. The petitioner had the burden in the trial court to prove the factual bases for her claims for relief by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-210(f). On appeal, we a re bound by the trial court’s findings of fact unless we conclude that the evidence in the record preponder ates against those findings. Fields v. State , 40 S.W.3d 450, 456 (Tenn. 2001). Relative to the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, it being a m ixed que stion of law and fact, we review the trial court’s conclusions regarding counsel’s performance and prejudice under a de novo standar

d with no presumption of correctness. Id. at 457. As for the p etitioner ’s claimsregar ding he r guilty pleas, w e conclu de that the evidence fully justifies the trial court’s findings and conclusions. Plea offers by the state may legitimately re

quire that all codefendants agree be fore the offer is extended to any defendant, an d such a contingency does not equat

e with acoerced guilty

plea. See, e .g. , Parham v. State , 885 S.W.2d 3 75 (Tenn . Crim. App. 1994). I

n this resp ect, the fact that the petitioner’s concern for Dean Mullins play

ed a par t in her decision to plead g uilty does not negate th

e validity of her plea. Many

factors other than thefacts-6-

may legitima tely influenc e a deci sion to ple ad guilt y, s uch as, r

eduction of stresson a

defendant and his or her family, the

removal of uncertain consequences, a nd reduct ion of actual exposure. See McMann v. Richardson , 397 U.S. 759, 768-69, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1447 (1970). We also note that the record reflec ts that the

petitione r was moti vated to p lead gu ilty in order to remove h

er exposur

e to the death penalty

. Relative to the petitioner’s mental state, the evidence reflects that her mind was not clouded by her medication or mental condition. Indeed, she made no such claim in her t estimony. The record reflects that the petitioner’s decision to plead guilty was not coerced and that

her guilty pleas were voluntarily , knowingly, a nd intelligently enter

ed. The petitioner claims that having one sentencing he aring f or her a nd the cod

efenda nts violated due process, although s he fails to explain how. We note, though, that the issue of the severance of her sentencing hearing was raised in her sentencing appeal, but

rejected. Howell , 34 S.W.3d at 513. Th

us, not only

has no mer

it been sh own for th

is claim, it h as been pre viously determined. Fi na ll y, as to the petitioner’s claim of the ineffective assistance of counsel, we note that no specific action or nonaction is identified as inappropriate. In a

ny event, the record fully

supports the trial court’s finding s and conclusions r egard ing the q uali ty of repr

esentation received by

the petitioner, which she

essentia lly a dmitted in her testimony. We conclude tha t the petitioner received the eff ective a ssistance

of counse

l. In consideration of the for egoing and the recor

d as a whole, we affirm the judgment of the trial cou rt.

___________________________________ JOSEPH M. TIPTON, JUDGE