* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-10705

Summary Calendar

 

ALVIN RAY COOPER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

RICK HUDSON, Warden;

GREGORY T. FRANKLIN, Captain,

Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 2:96-CV-103

- - - - - - - - - -

February 19, 1998

Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Alvin Ray Cooper, Texas prisoner # 534218, appeals the

district court’s dismissal of his civil rights claims as

frivolous and for failure to state a claim. Cooper argues that 

1) the district court erred in dismissing his claims prior to the

expiration of the period for filing objections to the magistrate

judge’s report; 2) the district court erred in dismissing his

claims of due process violations and of retaliation; and 3) the
** Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985).

2

magistrate judge erred in consolidating, for purposes of

conducting a Spears** hearing, the instant case with another

civil rights action in which Cooper is the plaintiff.

As Cooper suggests, the district court dismissed his civil

rights claims only six days after Cooper received the magistrate

judge’s report and recommendation. As a general rule a district

court errs if it does not consider timely-filed objections to a

magistrate judge's report and recommendation. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(C); Smith v. Collins, 964 F.2d 483, 485 (5th Cir.

1992). However, Cooper has not demonstrated that he ever filed

his objections in the district court. Even assuming Cooper 

submitted his objections to the district court, any error by the

district court in not considering those objections is harmless.

See Smith, 964 F.2d at 485.

Normally a party’s failure to file timely objections limits

appellate review to plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs.

Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996); Robertson v.

Plano City of Texas, 70 F.3d 21, 23 (5th Cir. 1995). The

Douglass rule, however, generally is not applied if the district

court engages in de novo review of the points considered by the

magistrate judge. Douglass, 79 F.3d at 1429. In light of the

district court’s entry of judgment only six days after Cooper

received the report and recommendation and the district court’s
3

independent review of the magistrate judge’s report, review by

this court is not limited to plain error.

Because Cooper’s due process claims call into question the

lawfulness of his punishment following the disciplinary hearings

and he has not demonstrated that he has obtained relief as

required by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), the

claims are not cognizable in a § 1983 proceeding. See Clarke v.

Stalder, 121 F.3d 222, 226 (5th Cir. 1997). 

Neither the magistrate judge nor the district court

expressly addressed Cooper’s claim that the disciplinary charges

were brought against him in retaliation for his exercise of his

right of access to courts. “To state a claim of retaliation an inmate must allege

the violation of a specific constitutional right and be prepared to establish that but for the

retaliatory motive the complained of incident . . . would not have occurred.” Woods v. Smith, 60

F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1995). 

Cooper argues that he was charged with the disciplinary

infractions in retaliation for seeking redress for wrongdoings

and for being a “writ writer.” He contends that officials

informed him that the disciplinary charges were retaliatory and

that officials informed him that he was being retaliated against

because he was a writ writer. Cooper’s activities as a writ

writer are not constitutionally protected and do not support a

retaliation claim. See Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 310-
4

11 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 559 (1997); Tighe v.

Wall, 100 F.3d 41, 43 (5th Cir. 1996). 

Because Cooper has not adequately briefed the issues of the

district court’s dismissal of his claims that he was subjected to

cruel and unusual punishment and that inadequate evidence

supported the disciplinary actions, these claims have been

abandoned. See Evans v. City of Marlin, Tex., 986 F.2d 104, 106

n.1 (5th Cir. 1993). Cooper’s conclusional allegations do not

demonstrate that he was harmed by the magistrate judge’s

“consolidation” of this case with another civil rights action for

purposes of a Spears hearing.

AFFIRMED.