1

Filed 4/28/22

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR 

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RONALD RAY ANDERSON,

Defendant and 

Appellant.

 A162633 

 (Alameda County

 Super. Ct. No. 69119)

In 1979, defendant Ronald Ray Anderson was tried for the 

murders and robberies of Phillip and Kathryn Ranzo, as well as 

for burglarizing their home. In the same trial, Anderson was also 

tried for the separate robbery of Leonard Luna. With respect to 

the Ranzos, the jury convicted Anderson of two counts of first 

degree murder, two counts of robbery, and one count of burglary, 

and his convictions were affirmed on appeal. In this appeal from 

the denial of Anderson’s Penal Code1 section 1170.95 petition, 

Anderson argues that the trial court prejudicially erred by 

admitting in his section 1170.95 evidentiary hearing testimony 

from Anderson’s parole suitability hearings, when that testimony 

should have been excluded under the reasoning of People v. 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code 

unless otherwise indicated. 
2

Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867 (Coleman). We affirm the trial 

court’s order denying Anderson’s section 1170.95 petition because 

we conclude that Anderson has not established that the trial 

court erred in considering testimony from his parole suitability 

hearings.

2

BACKGROUND

We set forth below the factual recitation from the 1982 

unpublished appellate opinion affirming Anderson’s convictions.

Leonard Luna was taking care of the home of 

Bernard Marks, his employer, who was out of town 

on Sunday, June 24, 1979. The home was located at 

3307 West Stuhr Road, Newman.

Between 11:30 p.m. and midnight on June 24, 

two young men came to the door and asked Luna if 

he could sell them some gasoline because their car 

was empty. The two left after Luna provided them 

with some gasoline, but returned about 15 minutes 

later and asked if they could use the telephone. As 

they appeared to be leaving, one of the men turned 

round with a pistol in his hand and told Luna to hit 

the floor and close his eyes. Luna complied and then 

heard a car drive up in front of the house and some 

more people enter it. He did not know exactly how 

many.

2 Anderson has also filed a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus, which we have considered together with this appeal. We 

dispose of the writ by separate order.
3

After being hit on his head, Luna was taken 

into the den where he was placed on a couch and 

“hog-tied.” His hands were tied behind his back and 

also tied to his feet. On two occasions a person he 

later identified as Marty Jackson, also known as 

Marty Spears, said he wanted to “blast” Luna 

because Luna had seen Jackson’s face. Luna was 

later able to identify Marty Jackson (Spears) and 

Daniel Geysler as the two who had first come to the 

door. A large safe on wheels, several guns, a 

switchblade knife and two watches were missing 

from the Marks home and it showed signs of having 

been ransacked.

On June 26, 1979, the bodies of Phillip and 

Kathryn Ranzo were found at their residence at 1404 

Fernview Drive in Modesto. They had failed to 

appear at their respective places of employment and 

James Blomquist, Phillip’s boss at the pharmacy 

where he worked, and Carolyn Shaffer, an employee 

of the beauty salon owned by Kathryn, went to the 

Ranzo residence. Carolyn Shaffer had called the 

police because of her concern before going to the 

Ranzo residence. Blomquist, having found the front 

door locked, looked in the garage and found Phillip’s 

body lying on the floor. The police arrived about five 

minutes later.
4

Officer Hamilton, who had responded to the 

prior call for a security check of the Ranzo residence, 

was shown the body of Phillip Ranzo [by] Bloomquist 

and they then sought to gain entrance to the house. 

The officer finally had to force a third level door. In 

the upstairs bathroom the nude body of Kathryn 

Ranzo was found lying on the floor.

The bodies of both victims had been tied with 

hands behind the back and also tied to the feet. The 

cause of death for each was bleeding from multiple 

stab wounds and the severing of arteries. Phillip had 

also been hit over the head with a blunt instrument 

at least six times, causing severe fragmentation of his 

skull. His wife had also been struck on the head 

several times with the back of an axe found in the 

hall next to the bathroom.

The rope used to tie the Ranzos appeared to be 

identical to that used on Luna in the Newman 

robbery. The knife wounds sustained by Kathryn 

Ranzo were of a different kind than those sustained 

by her husband. Dr. Ernoehazy, Stanislaus County 

pathologist, testified that her wounds could have 

been caused by the switchblade knife taken in the 

Newman robbery.

Officer Hamilton arrived at the Ranzo 

residence at about 2:15 p.m. of June 26, 1979. Dr. 

Ernoehazy was summoned and arrived there about 4 
5

p.m. It was his opinion that the time of the death of 

each of the victims was about 16 hours prior to his 

first examination of the bodies. He fixed the time of 

their deaths at between 11 p.m. June 25 and 1 a.m. 

June 26.

The office area and the master bedroom of the 

Ranzo residence had been ransacked, with drawers 

pulled out and money, checks, papers and jewelry on 

the floor. Some money, a Browning automatic 

shotgun and two pendants, one with diamonds, were 

found missing by Sam Ranzo, father of the victim 

Phillip.

On the evening of June 25, 1979, Kathryn and 

Phillip Ranzo had had dinner at their home with 

their 10-year-old son, Mark, Phillip’s parents, Sam 

and Marie Ranzo, Mark’s friend, Michele Hermann 

and two of Mark’s cousins, Mike and Michele 

Narzano. Later in the evening the four children and 

the grandparents went to the grandparents’ home, 

about one block away and around the corner from the 

victims’ home. Mark spent the night with his 

grandparents.

The children played outside the grandparents’ 

home after dinner. They recalled, in substance, that 

they had seen an old blue vehicle, with a pickup body, 

drive by very slowly several times. There were four 

young male passengers, three in front and one in the 
6

pickup portion in the back. The back also contained 

some boxes and a trash can. They first saw it around 

9:45 p.m. They told grandmother Marie about it and 

she observed it stopping and backing up at the end of 

their lot. It was last seen by them about 11:15 p.m. 

and was then going quite fast.

One neighbor had seen the older model blue El 

Camino Chevrolet cruising at low speed in front of 

his house at 1416 Fernview Drive on the afternoon of 

June 25 between 3 and 5 p.m. His attention was 

attracted to it because it sounded like “an inboard 

motorboat” and he thought it had a blown muffler. 

There were two young men in it, one of whom had 

hair of the same color as [Anderson]. The occupants 

were “kind of looking around at the houses.”

Another neighbor who lived at 1413 Fernview 

Drive, across the street from the Ranzo residence, 

was walking his dog along that street on the evening 

of June 25. He saw Phillip Ranzo working on one of 

his autos in the garage at about 10:30 to 11 p.m. He 

later went to bed and was awakened around 

midnight by the sound of screeching tires. He got up 

and looked out the window and saw what looked like 

a 1959 bluish green El Camino pickup driving at a 

faster speed than normal along the street in front of 

his house. It had a noisy muffler. There were two 

people in the vehicle. He identified a slide picture, 
7

16-G in evidence, as that of the vehicle which he had 

seen that night.

In addition to the facts set forth above from the appellate 

opinion, the record before us in this appeal contains evidence 

from trial establishing that Anderson lived with Jackson, and 

Jackson, Anderson, and two others, D.L. and J.M.—all 

teenagers—went to the Ranzos’ home to commit burglary and 

robbery. They targeted the Ranzos’ home because they believed 

large amounts of cash were kept therein, and Anderson admitted 

to Jackson’s brother after the robbery that they had committed 

the robbery. Anderson drove with Jackson around the Ranzos’ 

neighborhood in Jackson’s El Camino multiple times in the hours 

before the robbery. Anderson knew at least one of his 

confederates was armed with a pistol when he went into the 

Ranzos’ house because Anderson told detectives that he saw a 

pistol in J.M.’s waistband, and he also said that Jackson grabbed 

rope from the vehicle and carried it away from the car. 

According to trial transcripts, Anderson told police that, 

before leaving Jackson’s house to execute the robbery of the 

Ranzos, he “overheard” Jackson and the others discussing the 

possibility of killing the Ranzos, although Anderson claimed he 

was not involved in the discussion. A police detective testified at 

trial that Anderson said once they arrived at, and were about to 

enter the Ranzos’ house, Jackson for the second time talked to 

the others about killing the Ranzos. Anderson told police that he 

“didn’t enter into the conversation.” The jury heard evidence that 

Anderson’s then-girlfriend told investigators that Anderson said 
8

his role was to wait outside in the El Camino and, if necessary, 

signal his confederates by driving around and honking if anyone 

came. Anderson also told investigators he “considered himself as 

the watchman.”

When Anderson’s three confederates went into the Ranzos’

home, Anderson remained with the truck. According to 

Anderson, D.L. and J.M. returned to the truck about 20 minutes 

later with a manila envelope, leaving Jackson inside the house. 

D.L. and J.M. came running back and were excited. Anderson, 

who had the keys to the truck, took D.L. and J.M. to a nearby 

apartment building and then returned to the same parking spot. 

After Anderson picked Jackson up, they went in search for J.M.

and D.L. They found J.M.’s brother, D.M., at Lisa Swenson’s 

house in the early morning hours of June 26, 1979. Swenson 

testified that Jackson admitted killing two people because they 

had seen him. D.M. testified that Jackson said that he had just 

killed two people, and Anderson asked David where his brother 

(J.M.) was and threatened to kill D.M. if he did not tell Anderson.

Jackson’s father testified that, at about 3:30 a.m. on June 

26, 1979, Anderson and Jackson were back at their home and had 

an envelope full of cash out on the kitchen table that Jackson had 

brought in from outside the home. After counting the money, 

Jackson and Anderson each took their share. Jackson’s mother 

testified that, while generally discussing the Ranzos, Anderson 

told her that “it was a bad scene. . . . It would have made you 

sick.”
9

Anderson was charged by information with two counts of 

murder (§ 187), three counts of robbery (§ 211), and one count of 

first degree burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a)), with a gun 

enhancement for each count.3 The jury found Anderson guilty as 

charged, and he was sentenced to 25 years to life. 

In 2019, Anderson filed a pro se petition seeking relief 

under section 1170.95 after the Legislature enacted Senate Bill 

No. 1437. The court appointed counsel for Anderson, ordered 

preliminary briefing, and then issued an order to show cause. 

Prior to the hearing on the petition, Anderson sought to exclude 

from the court’s consideration his testimony from prior parole 

suitability hearings, arguing that such testimony should be 

excluded under Coleman and similar authorities. The court 

denied the motion, reviewed the materials submitted by the 

parties relating to the petition, and held a hearing. The court 

denied Anderson’s petition, finding the prosecution had 

established beyond a reasonable doubt that Anderson could be 

convicted of felony murder as a major participant in an 

enumerated felony who acted with reckless indifference to human 

life and that he could also be found guilty under a direct aiding 

and abetting theory.

Anderson timely appealed the trial court’s denial of his 

section 1170.95 petition.

3 Counts 1 through 5 (two counts of murder, two counts of 

robbery, and one count of burglary) pertain to the Ranzos and 

count 6 (robbery) pertains to Luna. 
10

DISCUSSION

Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 

Reg. Sess.) changed the law of homicide by amending the felony 

murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine 

as it relates to murder. (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 

842–843; Stats. 2018, ch. 1015 § 1.)4 Senate Bill No. 1437 also 

enacted section 1170.95 to provide a procedure for those convicted 

of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable 

consequences doctrine prior to Senate Bill No. 1437’s enactment 

to seek relief. (Gentile, at p. 843; Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3.) 

Under the version of section 1170.95 effective at Anderson’s 

hearing,5 a person seeking relief had to file a petition in superior 

4 Senate Bill No. 1437 added section 189, subdivision (e) to 

the felony murder rule and added subdivision (a)(3) to section 

188. (People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 842–843; Stats. 

2018, ch. 1015 §§ 2–3.) The former provision provided, “A 

participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of 

[qualifying felonies] in which a death occurs is liable for murder 

only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the 

actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, 

with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, 

induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the 

commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a 

major participant in the underlying felony and acted with 

reckless indifference to human life . . . .” (§ 189, subd. (e)(3).) 

The latter provision states, “Except [for felony murder liability] 

as stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order to be convicted 

of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice 

aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based 

solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) 

5 Effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature amended 

section 1170.95 in several ways, none of which is relevant to our 

analysis here. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.) We reference only the 

version of the statute applicable at Anderson’s hearing.
11

court declaring, among other things, that he or she “could not be 

convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes to 

Section 188 or 189” (former § 1170.95, subd. (a)(3)); the trial court 

then had to determine if the petitioner made a prima facie 

showing that he or she fell within the provisions of the statute, 

and, if so, it had to issue an order to show cause and hold a 

hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction 

and to resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts (id.,

subds. (c), (d)(1)). At the evidentiary hearing under section 

1170.95, subdivision (d)(1), the prosecution had to “prove, beyond 

a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for 

resentencing.” (Id., subd. (d)(3).)

In his appeal from the trial court’s order denying his 

section 1170.95 petition, Anderson contends the court 

prejudicially erred in admitting his testimony from prior parole 

suitability hearings because he should have been afforded use 

immunity for such testimony.6 Defendant relies on Coleman and 

similar decisions to argue that statements made in a parole 

suitability hearing should be deemed inadmissible in a section 

1170.95 evidentiary hearing. In response, the Attorney General 

points out that People v. Myles (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 688 (Myles) 

recently rejected a similar argument. As explained below, 

6 Anderson does not argue on appeal that the evidence 

admitted at his section 1170.95 evidentiary hearing was 

insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that he was a 

major participant in the designated felonies who acted with 

reckless disregard for human life.
12

Anderson does not establish that he is entitled to use immunity 

or that Myles was incorrectly decided.7

In Myles, as Anderson does here, the defendant relied on 

Coleman and related authorities to argue that, in her section 

1170.95 evidentiary hearing, she was entitled to use immunity 

for her statements and testimony in connection with her parole 

suitability proceedings. (Myles, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 704.) 

Our colleagues in Division One disagreed.

First, our colleagues reviewed Coleman. “In Coleman, the 

California Supreme Court held a defendant’s statement from a 

probation revocation proceeding could not be used against him by 

the prosecution to lighten its burden of proof at trial. [Citation.] 

The court reasoned that a defendant should not be compelled to 

choose between the privilege against self-incrimination at trial 

and the exercise of the right to be heard at a probation revocation 

hearing. [Citation.] To resolve the tension between competing 

rights, the court created a ‘ “judicially declared exclusionary 

rule” ’ that a probationer’s revocation hearing testimony is 

inadmissible during the prosecution’s case-in-chief. The intent of 

the rule ‘is to encourage the fullest possible truthful disclosure of 

relevant facts and circumstances at the revocation hearing by 

allowing a probationer who does testify at his revocation hearing 

nonetheless to enjoy unimpaired the full protection of the 

7 Anderson testified at a number of parole suitability 

hearings throughout the years. Given our denial of Anderson’s 

claim that this testimony was improperly admitted, we need not 

describe this testimony herein.
13

privilege against self-incrimination at his subsequent trial.’ ” 

(Myles, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 705.)

Myles next found the defendant’s reliance on Coleman and 

its progeny unavailing: “The Fifth Amendment privilege against 

self-incrimination protects persons from being compelled by 

‘ “governmental coercion” ’ to serve as witnesses against 

themselves in ‘ “any criminal case.” ’ (People v. Tom (2014) 

59 Cal.4th 1210, 1223, 1222 [ ].) A section 1170.95 hearing, 

however, ‘ “is not a trial de novo on all the original charges.” 

[Citation.] Rather, it is a postconviction proceeding “due to the 

Legislature’s inclusion of section 1170.95 in Senate Bill 

No. 1437 . . . , [as] an ‘act of lenity’ [citation], allowing for the 

retroactive application of the new law governing accomplice 

liability for felony murder [citation] for defendants already 

serving valid sentences for murder.” ’ ” ([People v.] Williams

[(2020)] 57 Cal.App.5th [652,] 661, quoting People v. Wilson

[(2020)] 53 Cal.App.5th [42,] 53; see, e.g., People v. Anthony

[(2019)] 32 Cal.App.5th [1102,] 1156 [§ 1170.95 petitioners do not 

have 6th Amend. trial rights].) Because a sentence modification 

under section 1170.95 is an act of lenity and not a criminal trial, 

the wrongful admission of evidence does not implicate 

defendant’s constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment.” 

(Myles, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at pp. 705–706.) 

Finally, Myles rejected the defendant’s argument that use 

immunity should have been recognized for the additional reason 

that the Fifth Amendment protects individuals from government 

coercion, but “defendant was not compelled to file a section 
14

1170.95 petition, nor to testify at her parole hearing, nor to 

participate in her risk assessment interview. Indeed, as the trial 

court noted and defendant acknowledges, parole cannot be 

conditioned on admission of guilt to a certain version of the 

crime. (§ 5011, subd. (b); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2236; In re 

Swanigan (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1, 14 [parole board cannot rely 

on fact that inmate insists on his innocence to deny parole]; In re 

McDonald (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1023 [“ ‘the express 

provisions of Penal Code section 5011 and section 2236 of title 15 

of the California Code of Regulations prohibit requiring an 

admission of guilt as a condition for release on 

parole’].) . . . Having chosen to be truthful in the assessment 

interview and testify truthfully at the parole hearing, it is not 

fundamentally unfair to admit that information during a 

resentencing proceeding voluntarily initiated by defendant 

bearing on some of the same issues.” (Myles, supra, 

69 Cal.App.5th at pp. 705–706.)

Anderson argues that Myles is incorrect because Coleman

was not decided on constitutional grounds, therefore “whether 

the Fifth Amendment is applicable to a section 1170.95 

proceeding is not determinative as to whether Coleman should 

apply.” In so arguing, Anderson ignores the fact that a central 

justification for the creation of Coleman’s exclusionary rule was 

the need to protect a defendant’s constitutional privilege against 

self-incrimination. 

In Coleman, the district attorney initiated probation 

revocation proceedings on grounds that were also the basis for 
15

independent criminal charges, and the court revoked the 

defendant’s probation after he declined to testify at the 

revocation hearing. (Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 871.) The 

defendant argued that holding the probation revocation hearing 

prior to his criminal trial denied him procedural due process 

because he was forced to forego the opportunity to testify at his 

revocation hearing to avoid incriminating himself at trial. (Ibid.) 

Observing that federal law did not clearly require a grant of 

immunity for the probation revocation testimony, our Supreme 

Court declined to decide the constitutional question. (Id. at 

pp. 878, 888–889.) Instead, it fashioned a “judicial rule of 

evidence” providing that, upon objection, the defendant’s 

probation revocation hearing testimony and evidence derived 

therefrom is inadmissible against the probationer during 

subsequent proceedings on the related criminal charges, save for 

impeachment or rebuttal. (Id. at p. 889.) The rationale for this 

rule was “that a defendant should not be compelled to choose 

between the privilege against self-incrimination at trial and the 

exercise of the right to be heard at a probation revocation 

hearing” (Myles, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 705), and the court 

made clear that its rule afforded protection “ ‘coextensive with 

the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination.’ ” (Coleman,

at p. 892, citing Kastigar v. United States (1972) 406 U.S. 441, 

453, 461.) Thus, the existence of the defendant’s constitutional 

privilege against self-incrimination in the subsequent criminal 

trial was integral to the justification for the exclusionary rule 

announced in Coleman.
16

Indeed, all the use immunities in the authorities upon 

which Anderson relies prevented evidence elicited in various 

proceedings from being introduced against a defendant as 

evidence of guilt in a subsequent criminal or juvenile delinquency 

proceeding. (See, e.g., Bryan v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 

575, 586–589 [statements made by a minor to probation officer 

and to court in a fitness hearing could not be introduced as 

substantive evidence against minor in criminal trial]; In re 

Wayne H. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 595, 602 [minor’s statements to 

probation officer inadmissible for any purpose to prove criminal 

guilt in juvenile or adult proceeding]; In re Jessica B. (1989) 

207 Cal.App.3d 504, 521 [statements made by parent in therapy 

ordered by dependency court inadmissible in parent’s criminal 

trial]; Sheila O. v. Superior Court (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 812, 

816–817 [testimony given by juvenile at fitness hearing 

inadmissible in later criminal proceedings]; People v. Dennis

(1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 863, 876 [defendant’s disclosures in 

support of a motion for a new trial based upon ineffective 

assistance of counsel inadmissible in subsequent criminal trial]; 

People v. Knight (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1, 5–8 [statements made 

in support of Marsden8 motion inadmissible in criminal trial].) 

Our Supreme Court has described Coleman and its progeny as a 

“number of decisions by this court granting use immunity in 

other contexts in which it would be unfair to require the 

defendant to choose between maintaining a privilege and 

asserting other important rights.” (People v. Ledesma (2006) 

8 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.
17

39 Cal.4th 641, 692, 694–695, italics added [holding disclosure of 

attorney-client privileged information in a habeas proceeding 

premised on ineffective assistance pursuant to Evidence Code 

section 958 did not waive the privilege for purposes of defendant’s 

criminal retrial].) 

Ten years after Coleman, in two separate decisions, our 

Supreme Court held that the California Constitution’s privilege 

against self-incrimination mandated the grant of Coleman’s use 

immunity and a similar use immunity for testimony that a minor 

gives at a fitness hearing and statements the minor makes to her 

probation officer in connection with that hearing. (Ramona R. v. 

Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 808, 810 (Ramona R.); 

People v. Weaver (1985) 39 Cal.3d 654, 659–660 [addressing 

Coleman’s use immunity].) In Ramona R., the first of the two 

decisions, the issue our Supreme Court addressed was whether 

use immunity for testimony that a minor gave at a fitness 

hearing or statements she made to her probation officer remained 

viable given the passage of Proposition 8, which added section 28, 

subdivision (d), to article I to the California Constitution.9 In 

9 Proposition 8 enacted what has been deemed the “Rightto-Truth-in-Evidence” provision in 1982, and it has since been 

redesignated as article I, section (f)(2) of the California 

Constitution. (People v. Guzman (2019) 8 Cal.5th 673, 677, fn. 3.) 

This provision states, “Except as provided by statute hereafter 

enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of 

the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any 

criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction 

motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a 

criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court. 

Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory rule of 
18

Ramona R., our Supreme Court examined the genesis of 

Coleman’s use immunity and explained that it was necessary to 

protect the privilege against self-incrimination. (Ramona R., at 

p. 809 [“Coleman examined in depth the need for use immunities 

in probation hearings to protect the privilege against selfincrimination.”].) The court acknowledged that it had declined to 

rest Coleman’s holding on constitutional grounds, “but only 

because we deemed such a determination to be unnecessary, as 

‘our judicially declared exclusionary rule provides protection 

“coextensive with the scope of the privilege against selfincrimination.” ’ ” (Ramona R., at p. 809, italics added.) The 

court then held that the use immunity at issue therein was 

essential to our state constitutional privilege against selfincrimination and was reflected in Evidence Code section 940.10 

(Ramona R., pp. 808–809; People v. Weaver, at pp. 659–660 

[Coleman’s use immunity survived enactment of Right-to-Truthin-Evidence provision for same reasons stated in Ramona R.]; see 

People v. Carter (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1248 [“Though 

Coleman expressed its holding in terms of a judicially devised 

exclusionary rule, later cases have treated Coleman as creating a 

limited species of use immunity grounded in California’s 

constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination”].) Where the 

evidence relating to privilege . . . .” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, 

subd. (f)(2).) 

10 This statute provides, “To the extent that such privilege 

exists under the Constitution of the United States or the State of 

California, a person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any 

matter that may tend to incriminate him.” (Evid. Code, § 940.)
19

privilege against self-incrimination is not implicated, the 

rationale for immunities at issue in Coleman and Ramona R. 

disappears.

Accordingly, the authorities upon which Anderson relies 

demonstrate that his argument requires him to establish that a 

constitutional privilege against self-incrimination applied in his 

section 1170.95 evidentiary hearing. Yet Anderson makes only 

the conclusory assertion that he “had a constitutional privilege 

against self-incrimination”, and he fails to provide any reasoned 

supporting argument. Addressing Myles, he does not argue that 

the decision was incorrect because a constitutional privilege 

against self-incrimination in fact applied in his section 1170.95

evidentiary hearing, nor does he argue that the California 

Constitution or United States Constitution required the exclusion 

of his parole suitability testimony. Indeed, the United States 

Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment applies 

through original sentencing, but has stated that incrimination is 

complete in cases in which the sentence has been fixed and the 

judgment of conviction has become final. (Mitchell v. United 

States (1999) 526 U.S. 314, 326 [“If no adverse consequences can 

be visited upon the convicted person by reason of further 

testimony, then there is no further incrimination to be feared.”]; 

see In re Tapia (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1111, fn. 3 [noting 

in dicta that parolee’s privilege against self-incrimination ended 

when his conviction became final].) 

For the reasons set forth above, we conclude, as did the 

court in Myles, that “defendant has not demonstrated that the 
20

same principles and rationale underlying the judicially created 

exclusionary rule formulated in Coleman and applicable in 

criminal trials apply in [his] section 1170.95 resentencing 

hearing.” (Myles, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 706.) The trial 

court thus did not err in considering Anderson’s testimony from 

his parole suitability hearings.

DISPOSITION

The order denying Anderson’s section 1170.95 petition is 

affirmed. 

BROWN, J.

WE CONCUR:

POLLAK, P. J.

STREETER, J.

People v. Anderson (A162633)
Trial Court: Alameda County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Morris D. Jacobson

Counsel: Matthew Alger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance Winters and Jeffrey 

M. Laurence, Assistant Attorneys General, René A. Chacón 

and Juliet B. Haley, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff 

and Respondent.