NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

__________________________ 

SANDRA G. HALE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES, 

Defendant- Appellee. 

__________________________ 

2012-5132 

__________________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in Case No. 10-CV-822, Judge Charles F. Lettow. 

___________________________ 

Decided: November 27, 2012 

___________________________ 

SANDRA G. HALE, of Spring, Texas, pro se. 

VINCENT D. PHILLIPS, Trial Attorney, Commercial 

Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for defendantappellee. With him on the brief were STUART F. DELERY, 

Acting Assistant Attorney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDION, 

Director, and KIRK T. MANHARDT, Assistant Director. Of 

counsel on the brief was RACHEL A. LANDEE, Litigation 
SANDRA HALE v. US 2

Attorney, United States Army Litigation Division, United 

States Department of the Army, of Fort Belvoir, Virginia. 

__________________________ 

Before BRYSON, REYNA, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

DECISION

Sandra G. Hale seeks review of a decision of the 

United States Court of Federal Claims dismissing her 

claim that she was improperly discharged from the military for misconduct and related claims. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Ms. Hale has a long but intermittent history of military service. She first enlisted in 1974 with the United 

States Air Force. She later served with the Naval Reserve, the Texas Army National Guard, and the Army 

Reserve. She joined the Texas Army National Guard in 

1987. Three years later, she was discharged with a 

characterization of general, under honorable conditions. 

She was then transferred to the United States Army 

Reserve, where she appears to have served until 1993. In 

November 2004, after an 11-year hiatus, she re-enlisted 

in the Army Reserve. 

This case concerns Ms. Hale’s most recent period of 

service. In August 2006, after completing training to 

become a Health Care Specialist, she was assigned to the 

160th Military Police Battalion in Florida. Shortly thereafter, in October 2006, the unit was ordered to active duty 

in Afghanistan. She arrived at Bagram Airfield on January 8, 2007. 
3 SANDRA HALE v. US

Ms. Hale experienced a number of medical issues during her service. In November 2006, before being deployed, 

she received emergency attention for an allergic reaction 

to pepper spray. At that time, she was diagnosed with 

reactive airway disease and bronchitis, and she was told 

to avoid physical activity for a week. Once in Afghanistan, she was treated within her first few months for pain 

in her feet, back, and wrist. In April 2007, she again 

complained of exposure to pepper spray. Physicians 

found that she suffered from mild wheezing at that time, 

which was treatable with medication, but they recommended that she be transferred to a unit where she would 

not be at risk of further exposure. 

Ms. Hale was therefore assigned to the intensive care 

unit at the Bagram Combat Support Hospital in May 

2007. Over the next two months, she complained of 

shortness of breath, chest pain, and an episode of loss of 

consciousness in which she fell and hit her head. She was 

sent to a medical center in Germany for testing; there, 

doctors diagnosed her with post-concussion syndrome and 

subclinical hypothyroidism. They also ordered her to 

avoid pepper spray. In June 2007, she returned to Afghanistan with the only restriction on her activity being 

that she stay away from pepper spray. 

In late June 2007, Ms. Hale returned to the medical 

clinic in Bagram. This time, she was issued a physical 

profile calling for additional limitations on her physical 

activities and recommending a disability evaluation. In 

light of the physical limitations, she was assigned to work 

in the mail room and, later, in the arms room. Ms. Hale 

also appeared for a medical evaluation in early August 

2007 but allegedly refused to cooperate. Then, at the end 

of the month, she failed to appear for an Army Physical 

Fitness Test. 
SANDRA HALE v. US 4

She returned to Germany for follow-up testing in September. Due to her complaint of continued headaches, 

one physician recommended that she be released back to 

the United States. After her unit represented that she 

could be adequately treated in Afghanistan, however, she 

was sent back to Bagram. 

Meanwhile, and in addition her medical troubles, Ms. 

Hale was involved in several episodes of alleged in-service 

misconduct. In November 2006, before her unit was 

deployed, she was recommended for promotion from 

Specialist (E-4) to Sergeant (E-5). On December 23, 2006, 

however, she was involved in an incident at the El Paso 

International Airport. The following month, she received 

a formal letter reprimanding her, and a “flag” was placed 

on her file that automatically precluded her from promotion. The flag was not formally removed from her file 

until August 2007. 

The airport event was not Ms. Hale’s only alleged 

transgression. On October 2, 2007, her commander 

initiated a separation action against her pursuant to 

Army Regulation 635-200, ¶ 14-12b, entitled “A pattern of 

misconduct.” That step triggered physical and mental 

status evaluations, and Ms. Hale requested that her case 

be considered by a separation board. She also filed a 

complaint against those in her chain of command. 

An administrative separation board convened to hear 

her case on November 15, 2007. The board found no 

fewer than 12 examples of “discreditable conduct and 

conduct prejudicial to the good order and discipline” of the 

military over the course of the prior year and recommended discharge under other than honorable conditions. 

The separation authority approved the board’s recommendation four days later. Ms. Hale was ordered to be 
5 SANDRA HALE v. US

discharged under other than honorable conditions, and 

her rank was reduced to Private (E-1). She was transferred back the United States and discharged in December 2007. 

Ms. Hale appealed her discharge to the Army Discharge Review Board (“ADRB”), which granted her partial 

relief. Her discharge was upgraded to general, under 

honorable conditions, and she was restored to her former 

rank of Specialist (E-4). The board also ordered further 

corrections to her record. In addition to her Army proceedings, Ms. Hale sought and obtained full disability 

benefits from the Social Security Administration; she also 

obtained partial disability benefits from the Department 

of Veterans Affairs (“DVA”). 

Ms. Hale then appealed the decisions of the ADRB 

and the DVA to the Court of Federal Claims. The parties 

requested a voluntary remand to the Army Board for 

Correction of Military Records (“ABCMR”) to consider Ms. 

Hale’s claims for (1) retroactive promotion with back pay, 

(2) a $15,000 re-enlistment bonus, and (3) an amendment 

to her record characterizing her discharge as honorable 

and based on medical reasons. In a detailed opinion, the 

ABCMR denied her claims for relief in their entirety. The 

board concluded that she was not entitled to a promotion, 

that the Army did not err in denying her a Medical 

Evaluation Board or a Physical Evaluation Board in 

conjunction with her separation, that she was fit to serve 

and thus did not warrant processing under the Physical 

Disability Evaluation System, and that she was properly 

discharged for misconduct. 

The Court of Federal Claims affirmed. First, the 

court held that Ms. Hale “failed to plead enough facts 

showing that she was promoted or that she satisfied all of 
SANDRA HALE v. US 6

the criteria for a promotion” and thus had not “met her 

burden of showing a ‘clear-cut, legal entitlement’ to the 

promotion.” Second, the court ruled that Ms. Hale was 

not entitled to a prior service enlistment bonus because 

she failed to meet the requirement of 37 U.S.C. 

§ 308i(a)(2)(A) that she have received an honorable discharge at the conclusion of all prior periods of service. 

Third, the trial court rejected Ms. Hale’s contention that 

her records should be corrected to reflect a medical disability discharge rather than a discharge for misconduct. 

Finally, the court refused Ms. Hale’s request to amend 

her DVA records, because it held that the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims had exclusive jurisdiction over 

veterans’ disability claims. 

DISCUSSION

On appeal to this court, Ms. Hale raises a number of 

alleged errors, none of which calls for reversal of the trial 

court’s decision. 

1. Ms. Hale first contends that she was wrongly denied promotion to Sergeant (E-5) and is owed back pay as 

a result. As the trial court explained, such a claim requires that she demonstrate a clear-cut legal entitlement 

to the promotion in question, i.e., that she “has satisfied 

all the legal requirements for promotion, but the military 

has refused to recognize [her] status.” Smith v. Sec’y of 

Army, 384 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We agree 

with the trial court that Ms. Hale has not made such a 

showing. 

Ms. Hale contends that the record “clearly shows [that 

she] met all the criteria for promotion.” She asserts that 

a promotion board approved her promotion in November 

2006, that her unit did as well, that she was on the active 
7 SANDRA HALE v. US

promotion list, and that she served in an E-5 role while 

working in the intensive care unit. She argues that the 

trial court was wrong to conclude that her promotion was 

barred by the flag arising out of the El Paso airport 

incident because that flag should have been removed in 

early 2007. In that regard, she asserts that she was 

formally reprimanded in January 2007 and that Army 

regulations require that disciplinary flags be reviewed 

monthly and be removed once the punishment (such as a 

reprimand) has been administered. 

Even taking all of Ms. Hale’s contentions as true, the 

trial court correctly held that she had no clear-cut entitlement to promotion. Her 2006 selection by the promotion board was merely a recommendation for possible 

action, see, e.g., Army Reg. 600-8-19, ¶ 5-6; Sexton v. 

United States, 228 Ct. Cl. 706, 708 (1981); it did not 

indicate that she was clearly entitled to later promotion. 

In particular, regardless of whether the December 2006 

flag should have been lifted before August 2007, Ms. Hale 

has not established that at any time (1) there was a 

vacancy for which she was eligible and would have been 

chosen and (2) no flag existed or should have existed in 

her file to block the promotion. The ABCMR found “no 

evidence” of a vacancy during her deployment, and Ms. 

Hale’s only allegation to the contrary rests on a few 

emails from July 2007 in which her unit responded affirmatively to an inquiry as to whether she should be 

promoted when her flag was lifted. Moreover, even if 

those emails are interpreted to indicate the likelihood of 

an upcoming vacancy, the board’s further findings establish that Ms. Hale was not entitled to fill it. Specifically, 

the board found that by the time her December 2006 flag 

was removed additional flags should have been placed on 

her file because she had failed a physical examination and 

because discharge proceedings had been instituted 
SANDRA HALE v. US 8

against her. The fact that other flags should have been 

placed on her file precluded her eligibility for promotion. 

See Army Reg. 600-8-19, ¶ 1-10a(10) (failure to file a flag 

“does not affect the Soldier’s nonpromotable status if a 

circumstance exists that requires imposition of a flag”). 

Ms. Hale has not refuted those findings and therefore has 

not carried her high burden to establish that she was 

entitled to promotion.1 

2. Ms. Hale also seeks an order directing the government to pay her a pre-enlistment bonus of $15,000. The 

trial court correctly held, however, that she did not meet 

all of the statutory prerequisites for a bonus because she 

did not “receive[] an honorable discharge at the conclusion 

of all prior periods of service.” 37 U.S.C. § 308i(a)(2)(A). 

Rather, she was discharged from the Texas Army National Guard with a characterization of general, under 

honorable conditions, which is distinct from the statutorily mandated “honorable discharge.” See, e.g., Army Reg. 

600-8-24, ¶ 1-22 (listing discharge classifications). 

Ms. Hale’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. She asserts that the trial court applied the wrong 

law because it “applied law for enlistment in the National 

Guard, not the Army Reserve” and because it “failed to 

take into account the fact that the enlistment bonus issue 

was instituted while on active duty and approved by 

proper military authorities.” Section 308i, however, 

 1 There appears to be a short gap between the removal of the December 2006 flag (on August 8, 2007) and 

Ms. Hale’s failure to pass the Army Physical Fitness Test 

(on August 31, 2007). The fact that no steps were taken 

to promote her during that time, when she had no flag on 

her file and had her unit’s apparent approval, suggests 

that, as the ABCMR found, there was no promotion 

vacancy that she was entitled to fill. 
9 SANDRA HALE v. US

applies to those who enlist in the “Selected Reserve of the 

Ready Reserve of an armed force,” 37 U.S.C. § 308i(a), 

and nothing about the consideration of the bonus issue 

while she was on active duty alters the fact that she did 

not satisfy the statutory requirements for payment of the 

bonus. Ms. Hale’s further contention that the Texas 

discharge was itself improper is unavailing. She does not 

claim that she ever sought to upgrade her 1993 discharge 

to honorable, and this case is not the proper forum for a 

collateral attack on her decades-old discharge from the 

Texas Army National Guard. 

3. Ms. Hale next contends that she should have been 

discharged honorably based on her medical conditions, 

rather than based on misconduct, and that she should 

have been processed through the disability system. She 

argues, for example, that the separation board and separation authority were not aware of all of her medical 

conditions and records and that subsequent boards of 

review did not adequately account for those errors. 

Similarly, she notes that one of her physicians recommended that a Medical Evaluation Board (“MEB”) be 

convened. Based on that recommendation, she argues 

that she was entitled to an MEB and that any separation 

proceedings based on misconduct should have awaited the 

results of the MEB. 

Judicial review of military personnel decisions is 

highly deferential, and we do not find the ABCMR’s 

decision to be “arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law, or 

unsupported by substantial evidence.” Chambers v. 

United States, 417 F.3d 1218, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The 

ABCMR found, and the trial court affirmed, that Ms. Hale 

did not warrant disability processing because she was fit 

to serve. Her only recurring condition that resulted in 

permanent physical limitations was an allergy to pepper 
SANDRA HALE v. US 10

spray, and that condition was accommodated through a 

change of assignment. We find that there was substantial 

evidence to support that determination. 

We are not persuaded by Ms. Hale’s contention that 

she should have received an MEB. She relies on one 

physician’s recommendation for an MEB. The ABCMR 

declined to give dispositive weight to that recommendation, however. The board found that the physician who 

made that recommendation did so “to give [Ms. Hale] 

what she wanted and to avoid harassment brought on by 

[her] belligerent and demanding demeanor,” and that the 

one physician’s recommendation for an MEB was contrary 

to the recommendations of Ms. Hale’s other treating 

physicians. Moreover, the regulations that Ms. Hale cites 

provide that, even after an MEB convenes, the military 

has the responsibility to decide whether to proceed 

through administrative or medical channels, particularly 

when, as here, a soldier’s misconduct allegations are 

unrelated to her claimed disability. See Army Reg. 635-

200, ¶ 1-33; Army Reg. 635-40, ¶ 4-3. As the ABCMR 

explained, all the other medical assessments found that 

Ms. Hale was fit to serve, and there is no reason to think 

that an MEB would have concluded any differently or 

that the MEB’s findings would have led her down a 

different administrative path. 

Ms. Hale’s other complaints about the processing and 

characterization of her discharge all suffer from the same 

flaw. Her arguments are effectively requests to re-do her 

separation proceedings; she overlooks the fact that the 

ADRB and the ABCMR conducted detailed reviews of her 

claims and (in the case of the ADRB) granted her partial 

relief. Moreover, the ABCMR considered records that she 

claims the separation authorities did not have, including 

various medical documents she submitted and the medi-
11 SANDRA HALE v. US

cal records accompanying the remand from the Court of 

Federal Claims. In the end, however, the ABCMR concluded that Ms. Hale failed to prove that she was medically unfit at the time of separation and should have been 

processed for separation due to physical disability; the 

board also concluded that Ms. Hale offered insufficient 

evidence to warrant a further upgrade to an honorable 

discharge. We agree with the trial court that the record 

provides no basis for overturning those conclusions. 

4. Ms. Hale also seeks to “complete” or “restore” the 

administrative record to its original state by adding 

documents that she claims are currently missing. Judicial review of a discharge claim, however, is confined to 

the administrative record before the ABCMR except in 

“extremely limited situations.” Metz v. United States, 466 

F.3d 991, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2006). It is not clear that Ms. 

Hale provided the board with the documents that she 

seeks to add here. Nor has she explained how the addition of the purportedly missing documents would bear on 

the ultimate disposition of her claims. Like the trial 

court, we do not find this to be one of the “extremely 

limited situations” in which augmentation of the record 

before the board is justified.

5. Finally, Ms. Hale does not appear to be pressing 

her claim that the trial court should have entertained her 

appeal relating to the DVA’s disability benefits determination. In any event, the trial court was clearly correct to 

hold that it lacked jurisdiction over that claim. See

Addington v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 779, 782 (2010); 

Davis v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 556, 559 (1996); Sanders v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 75, 79 (1995). 

No costs. 
SANDRA HALE v. US 12

AFFIRMED