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Filed 2/27/23 Zhang v. Yu CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

LIAN ZHANG,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

TAO YU,

Defendant and Respondent.

 A163811

 (Alameda County 

 Super. Ct. No. RG20082952)

Plaintiff and appellant Lian Zhang (Lian)1 appeals following the trial 

court’s order granting defendant and respondent Tao Yu’s motion to quash 

service for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court held that Lian failed 

to meet her burden of establishing that Yu, a nonresident, was subject to 

either general or specific jurisdiction in California. We agree and affirm.

BACKGROUND

I.

Allegations in Complaint

The subject dispute involves a condominium unit located in Beijing, 

China (“Property”). Prior to 1989, Lian’s mother, Nai Sun, resided at but did 

not own the Property. In 1989, Sun immigrated to the United States and 

1 Since this opinion discusses Lian’s sister, Lesheng Zhang, we refer to

the sisters by their first names to avoid confusion and mean no disrespect by 

it. 
2

moved to Berkeley, California, where Lian worked. The complaint alleged 

that in 1993, Lian purchased the Property, with Sun agreeing to hold title to 

it in trust for Lian.2 Following the purchase and with Lian’s consent, Sun 

rented out the Property and used the proceeds towards her living expenses.

In early 2007, Lian’s sister, Leshang Zhang (Lesheng) immigrated from

Beijing to the United States and also settled in Berkeley. Lesheng offered to 

manage the Property since Sun was getting old and Lesheng already owned 

and managed other units in Beijing. Lian and Sun agreed to this.

In October 2007, Lesheng and Sun traveled back to China to visit 

family. The complaint alleged that while in China, Lesheng called Lian and 

informed her of a new rule in Beijing that prohibited non-resident owners 

from renting out their property. Lesheng’s daughter, Yu, was also on this 

call. Lesheng told Lian that if Sun wished to continue receiving rental

income, she would have to transfer the Property’s title to Yu since Yu was a 

resident of Beijing. Lesheng assured Lian she had nothing to worry about

and that Yu would hold title to the Property for Lian and would return the 

Property whenever Lian wanted it back. Yu allegedly confirmed Lesheng’s 

statements during this call, including that she would hold the Property in 

trust for Lian so that Sun could continue receiving rental income. Lian 

agreed and title to the Property was transferred from Sun to Yu. In 2015, Yu 

moved to North Carolina. 

2 Lian later explained in a declaration that in 1993, Sun became 

eligible to purchase the Property as a private citizen following a property 

ownership reform in China. Sun gave Lian the right to purchase the 

Property but agreed to hold title to it since Lian was not eligible to hold title 

as she was not an employee of the Chinese government nor the spouse of such 

an employee.
3

In May 2020, Sun passed away. The complaint alleged that shortly 

after this, Lian demanded the return of the Property from Lesheng and Yu

but was ignored. In October 2020, Lesheng and Yu sold the Property and 

kept the proceeds for themselves. Lian filed suit against Lesheng and Yu for 

elder abuse, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, promissory estoppel and 

conversion.

II.

Motion to Quash

Yu moved to quash service of the summons based on lack of personal 

jurisdiction. Yu argued that California lacked both general and specific 

jurisdiction over her as a nonresident. With respect to the lack of specific 

jurisdiction, Yu argued that the dispute involved property in China as well as 

alleged trusts established in China. Yu further contended that the exercise of 

jurisdiction would be unfair since she was a resident of North Carolina and 

should not be required to defend this case in California. In the alternative, 

Yu moved to be dismissed from the lawsuit based on inconvenient forum.

In her supporting declaration, Yu stated that she lived in China until 

December 2014 and then temporarily lived in California until April 2015 as 

an international student before moving to North Carolina permanently. She 

further averred that she has never spoken to Lian on the phone and has 

never discussed the Property with Lian. According to Yu, her grandmother 

(Sun) purchased the Property in 1993 and sold the Property to her mother 

(Lesheng) in 2007. A few years later, Lesheng sold the Property to Yu. The 

declaration did not include any supporting purchase documents but asserted 

that copies of the relevant records “exist at the relevant Chinese government 

authorities in China, which records will not be in English.” 
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In opposition to the motion, Lian submitted a supporting declaration 

that largely tracked the allegations made in the complaint. The declaration 

included the 2007 call in which Lesheng informed Lian of the new rule in 

Beijing that prohibited property rentals by non-resident owners, with Yu 

confirming this rule and offering to hold the Property in trust for Lian so that 

Sun could continue receiving her rental income. The opposition did not 

include any other evidence to support the exercise of jurisdiction over Yu.

Following full briefing by the parties, the trial court continued the 

motion and ordered supplemental briefing. The court commented that it was 

“unclear whether this case is about the obligations of trustees under a trust 

that might have been formed in California under California law or whether 

this case is about ownership of real estate in China.” Accordingly, the court 

requested, to the extent any documents existed, that Lian produce a copy of 

the 1993 trust document between herself and Sun as well as the 2007 

transfer of trustee document with Yu. In response, the only trust document 

Lian produced was a 1997 First Amendment to the 1995 De Lian Trust. In 

her supplemental brief, Lian asserted that this trust was formed in 

California in 1995 “during a personal crisis” and amended in 1997, with the 

Property added to the trust in 1998. Lian explained that she added the 

Property at this time in anticipation of receiving legal title to it soon.

Following oral argument, the trial court granted Yu’s motion. With 

respect to the trust, the court held, “The relevant trust [document] in this 

case is the alleged trust created by [Sun] in China and not the de Lian Trust 

that was created by Lian in California.” The court also made the following 

factual findings: “First, in 1996 [Sun] bought the property and thereafter 

owned the property, although it is disputed whether [Sun] owned the 

property for herself or in trust for Daughter Lian. Second, in 2007 [Sun] sold 
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the property to daughter Lesheng who then sold the property to 

Granddaughter [Yu].” This all took place in China. In 2020, Yu sold the 

Property while she resided in North Carolina. Based on this, the court 

concluded that Yu lacked minimum contacts with California to support the 

imposition of personal jurisdiction. 

Finally, the trial court noted that at the motion hearing, Lian “argued 

that in 2007 [Yu] had a telephone call with a person in California concerning 

the property and that contact could support specific jurisdiction.” The court 

acknowledged that the evidence was in conflict as to whether this call 

occurred. The court then stated it “assumes that there was this one 

telephone call” and found that “the single phone call is not sufficient to create 

specific jurisdiction.” Lian now appeals. 

DISCUSSION

I.

Standard of Review

In reviewing an order granting a motion to quash on jurisdictional 

grounds, “[w]hen there is conflicting evidence, the trial court’s factual 

determinations are not disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial 

evidence. [Citation.] When no conflict in the evidence exists, however, the

question of jurisdiction is purely one of law and the reviewing court engages 

in an independent review of the record.” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest 

Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 449 (Vons).)

“If there is conflicting evidence about whether a nonresident defendant 

committed acts or omissions outside the state, intending to cause a tortious 

effect in California, then we apply the substantial evidence rule to determine 

the validity of the trial court’s finding of fact. On conflicting evidence, we 

must support the trial court’s resolution of the conflict, including any implied 
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finding that acts and omissions were not committed outside the state with an 

intent to cause tortious effects in California.” (In re Automobile Antitrust 

Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 123.) All reasonable references are 

drawn in support of the trial court’s order. (Burdick v. Superior Court (2015) 

233 Cal.App.4th 8, 17.)

II.

Governing Principles 

California courts may exercise jurisdiction on any basis that is 

consistent with the Constitutions of California and the United States. (Code 

Civ. Proc., § 410.10.) Jurisdiction is proper if a defendant has minimum 

contacts with the state “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 

‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” (International Shoe 

Co. v. State of Washington, etc. (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316.) Personal 

jurisdiction can be general or specific. (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 445.) “A 

nonresident defendant may be subject to the general jurisdiction of the forum 

if his or her contacts in the forum state are ‘substantial . . . continuous and 

systematic.’ ” (Ibid.) 

If such substantial contacts are lacking, a nonresident defendant may 

still be subject to specific jurisdiction “if the defendant has purposefully 

availed himself or herself of forum benefits [citation], and the ‘controversy is 

related to or “arises out of” a defendant’s contacts with the forum.’ ” (Vons, 

supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 446.) The first requirement is met if a defendant

“ ‘purposefully directs’ his [or her] activities toward forum residents” (Burger 

King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 473 (Burger King)) such that he 

or she should “ ‘reasonably anticipate’ ” being haled into the forum for 

litigation. (Id. at p. 474.) To that end, it is the defendant’s actions that are 

material in determining whether there has been sufficient contact with the 
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forum for purposes of jurisdiction and not the unilateral activity of the 

plaintiff or another party. (Id. at p. 475.)

When a defendant moves to quash service based on lack of personal 

jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears “the initial burden of demonstrating facts by a 

preponderance of evidence justifying the exercise of jurisdiction in 

California.” (In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 110.) In meeting this burden, “[t]he plaintiff must do more than merely 

allege jurisdictional facts. . . . The plaintiff must provide affidavits and other 

authenticated documents in order to demonstrate competent evidence of 

jurisdictional facts.” (Ibid.) If this initial burden is satisfied, “the burden 

shifts to the defendant to present a compelling case demonstrating that the 

exercise of jurisdiction by our courts would be unreasonable.” (Id. at pp. 110-

111.)

III.

Lian Has Not Met Her Initial Burden to Justify the Exercise of 

Jurisdiction Over Yu.

Only specific jurisdiction is at issue here. Lian contends that Yu 

purposefully availed herself of forum benefits to justify the exercise of specific 

jurisdiction. Specifically, Lian argues that (1) Yu made a call in 2007 that 

purposefully directed her activities at Lian, a California resident; (2) Yu 

agreed to a continuing obligation to support Sun, a California resident, with 

rental income from the Property; and (3) Yu’s misconduct against Lian 

caused harm in California. We are not persuaded this was sufficient to 

establish minimum contacts for purposes of creating personal jurisdiction. 

As an initial matter, the trial court was presented with conflicting 

evidence as to whether a telephone call occurred in 2007 between Yu and 

Lian regarding the Property. Lian detailed the 2007 call in a supporting

declaration, while Yu in her declaration denied ever speaking to Lian on the 
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phone or discussing the Property with Lian. The trial court acknowledged 

this conflict and concluded that even assuming the call occurred, it was “not 

sufficient to create specific jurisdiction.” Though it is arguable whether the 

trial court made an explicit factual finding that a call occurred in 2007, we 

agree that even assuming the call did occur, it is insufficient to show that Yu 

purposefully directed her activities at a California resident such that she

should reasonably anticipate being haled into court here for litigation.

Lian cites Moncrief v. Clark (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1000 for the 

proposition that a single communication may be sufficient to establish 

personal jurisdiction over a nonresident. There, the court held that Clark, an

Arizona attorney, purposefully availed himself of the benefits of California 

when he made misrepresentations via telephone and email to Moncrief, a 

California attorney, to facilitate the sale of farm equipment on behalf of 

Clark’s Arizona client. (Id. at pp. 1003, 1006.) The court concluded that 

“while Moncrief and Clark engaged in a single transaction, Clark targeted 

Moncrief with the specific purpose of inducing Moncrief’s client to finalize the 

purchase of farm equipment in [Arizona.]” (Id. at p. 1007.) The court further 

concluded that “Clark’s communications with Moncrief were purposely and 

voluntarily directed toward California” such that Clark should expect to be 

subject to jurisdiction in California. (Ibid.) As Moncrief’s client was a 

California general partnership, there was no question that Clark knew he 

was targeting a buyer based in California. (Id. at p. 1003.)

Here, Lian’s declaration stated only that she received a call from 

Lesheng while Lesheng was in China, and that Yu was also on the call. It is 

unclear whether Yu played any role in initiating that call or perpetrating the 

fraud that was the alleged purpose of the call. Yu had lived in China from 

birth until approximately December 2014, and later lived in California for 
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five months in 2014 and 2015 as an international student, and then moved 

and took up permanent residence in North Carolina. Aside from the 2007 

call that Yu disputes occurred, Yu has spoken to Lian only twice; once at a 

Christmas party in 2014 and once at a family party in 2015. According to 

Lian, it was Lesheng who initiated the call to Lian while on a visit to Beijing 

in 2007 and, with Yu present, represented that there was a new local rule in 

Beijing that prohibited property rentals by non-resident owners and assured 

Lian that Yu could hold the Property for her. Yu confirmed Lesheng’s 

statements and assurances. On this thin record, we cannot say that Yu 

“purposefully directed” her activities towards a California resident such that 

she should “reasonably anticipate” being haled into a California court.

(Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at pp. 473-474.)

Indeed, as the high court held, in establishing specific jurisdiction over 

a nonresident defendant, “the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the 

defendant and the forum. Rather, it is the defendant’s conduct that must 

form the necessary connection with the forum State that is the basis for its 

jurisdiction over him.” (Walden v. Fiore (2014) 571 U.S. 277, 285 (Walden), 

italics added.) Here, the 2007 call with Lian cannot form the basis of specific 

jurisdiction where Yu did not otherwise engage in any conduct to establish a

necessary connection between herself and the forum. Her brief residence in 

California seven years later and once yearly visits to her family in California, 

which have no apparent connection with the alleged fraud, does not provide 

that connection for purposes of specific jurisdiction, and Zhang does not argue 

otherwise. 

Nor are we persuaded by Lian’s second argument that Yu’s minimum 

contacts with the forum were established by her ongoing obligation to support 

Sun, a California resident, with rental income from the Property. First, the 
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trial court found that in 2007, Sun sold the Property to Lesheng who then 

sold the Property to Yu. The court made no mention or findings as to 

whether there were any support obligations between Yu and Sun with 

respect to income from the Property. Second, the complaint itself alleges that 

it was Lesheng who took over management of the Property and gave Sun 

money from the Property’s rental income. Moreover, there is no evidence 

that Yu sent any funds on a regular basis (or any basis) to Sun or anyone else 

in California. Lian has not met her burden in demonstrating facts sufficient 

to establish the necessary connection between Yu and California.

Lian attempts to analogize the facts here to those in Gilmore Bank v. 

AsiaTrust New Zealand Ltd. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1558. There, the court 

held that the “purposeful availment” requirement for specific jurisdiction was

met where there was a “ ‘ “latticework” ’ ” of contacts that linked the 

nonresident defendant to California, including many calls to California, the 

execution of legal documents in California, continuous payments from the 

defendant to California, as well as a “continuing receipt by [defendant] of 

compensation from the California trustee of a California trust.” (Id. at 

p. 1573.)

Lian contends that Yu likewise had continuing contacts with California 

because Lian paid for the Property, Sun held title to it and received rental 

income from it for many years. However, Lian overlooks the critical rule that

“unilateral activity of another party or a third person is not an appropriate 

consideration when determining whether a defendant has sufficient contacts 

with a forum State to justify an assertion of jurisdiction.” (Helicopteros 

Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall (1984) 466 U.S. 408, 417.) In Gilmore 

Bank, it was the defendant’s many activities with California that established 

the necessary connection with the forum. Here however, Lian cites mainly to 
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the unilateral activity of two California residents (herself and Sun) with 

respect to the Property, but this fails to show that Yu herself directed any 

activity toward California. 

Lastly, Lian contends that Yu’s misconduct against Lian caused harm 

in California. The only harm Yu allegedly caused however, was harm to 

Lian. As discussed above, Lian as the plaintiff “cannot be the only link 

between the defendant and the forum.” (Walden, supra, 571 U.S. at p. 285.) 

Though Lian cites to Calder v. Jones (1984) 465 U.S. 783 to support that 

activity that causes harm to be suffered in California is sufficient, the high 

court in Walden clarified its earlier holding that “Calder made clear that 

mere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient connection to the forum. 

Regardless of where a plaintiff lives or works, an injury is jurisdictionally 

relevant only insofar as it shows that the defendant has formed a contact 

with the forum State.” (Walden, supra, 571 U.S. at p. 290.) Thus, “[t]he 

proper question is not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or 

effect but whether the defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a 

meaningful way.” (Ibid.) That Lian was a California resident harmed by

Yu’s conduct is insufficient to establish a connection between Yu as a 

nonresident and California where the dispute involves property in China and 

related property transfers that all took place in China. 

Since Lian has not met her burden in showing that Yu purposefully 

availed herself of forum benefits, we need not reach the second question of 

whether the controversy relates to or arises out of defendant’s contacts with 

the forum for purposes of establishing specific jurisdiction.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Yu shall recover her costs on appeal. 
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STEWART, P.J.

We concur.

RICHMAN, J.

MILLER, J.

Zhang v. Yu (A163811)