alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                                        9
       
<S>                                          <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                            JUL-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                 OCT-31-1996
<CASH>                                         3,515,838
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                                 0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                       0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                       0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                   97,757,990
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                       168,221,222  
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                         190,837,562
<LOANS>                                      182,371,833
<ALLOWANCE>                                    3,149,174
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               472,697,859
<DEPOSITS>                                   360,988,800
<SHORT-TERM>                                  58,187,054
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                            5,106,958
<LONG-TERM>                                            0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                  0
<PREFERRED>                                            0
<COMMON>                                       6,441,504
<OTHER-SE>                                    41,973,543
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>               472,697,859
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                3,763,828
<INTEREST-INVEST>                              4,294,242
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                       0
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                               8,058,070
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                             3,426,070
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             4,208,531
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                          3,849,539
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                    105,000
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                               764,050
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                4,801,346
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  557,150
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       346,150
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                        0
<CHANGES>                                              0
<NET-INCOME>                                     346,150
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                       0.13 
<EPS-DILUTED>                                          0
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                      3.47
<LOANS-NON>                                    3,955,087
<LOANS-PAST>                                   3,955,087
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                       0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                        0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                               3,073,158
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                     39,965
<RECOVERIES>                                      10,981
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                              3,149,174
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                           3,149,174
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                    0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                                0
        


</TABLE>
#### Kennedy, Appellee, *v.*Industrial Commission of Ohio, Appellant.

(No. 3784

Decided June 9, 1941.)

*Mr. Barry P. Bood*and *Mr. Verner E. Wardlaw,*for appellee.

*Mr. Percy R. Taylor,*for appellant.

Carpenter, J.

This is an appeal on questions of law from a judgment for the plaintiff on an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas from an order of the Industrial Commission disallowing her claim for compensation. Two assignments of error are urged. The first is that the verdict and judgment are against the weight of the evidence. On an examination of the whole record this assignment is not sustained.

The second assignment is that there was error in the charge of the court on the subject of the preponderance of the evidence.

In an instruction before argument and twice in the *14general charge, the court told the jury in general terms that the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence was upon the plaintiff. Following the first one of these statements in the general charge, the court said:.

> “On the other hand, if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff was not injured on or about the 9th day of December, 1938, or that her injuries did not arise out of and during the course of her employment, or that she was disabled because of injuries which she did not receive in the course of her employment, or that the disability of which she complains is not the direct and proximate result of injuries she suffered which arose out of and during the course of her employment, then it will be your duty to find in favor of the defendant.”

This was wrong and placed an undue burden upon the defendant. Nowhere did the court in any way qualify or withdraw this statement of law. That this was prejudicial error has been said repeatedly by the Supreme Court as shown in *Industrial Commission*v. *Ripke,*129 Ohio St., 649, 196 N. E., 640, and the decisions therein cited.

For this error, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.

*Judgment reversed and cause remanded.*

Overmyer and Lloyd, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 11 - Computation of Earnings per Share



<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                Three months ended         Six Months ended
                                      June 30,                   June 30,
                               --------------------      -------------------
                                2001         2000          2001        2000
                               --------------------      -------------------
<S>                         <C>        <C>           <C>          <C>
Weighted average number of
  common shares outstanding
  used in basic earnings per
  common share calculation    3,745,151  3,881,190    3,733,951    3,939,614
Net dilutive effect of:
 Options                        219,121    114,259      217,913      114,612
 Restricted stock awards            585      1,881          660        2,584
                             ---------- ---------- ------------ ------------
Weighted average number of
 shares outstanding
 adjusted for effect of
 dilutive securities          3,964,857  3,997,330    3,952,524    4,056,810
                             ========== ========== ============ ============

Income available to common
  shareholders              $ 1,272,119  1,880,139    2,863,027    3,409,853
Basic earnings per
  common share              $      0.34       0.48         0.77         0.87
Diluted earnings per common
  share                     $      0.32       0.47         0.72         0.84

</TABLE>
861 A.2d 808

#### IN THE MATTER OF JON J. STEIGER, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 014851975).

December 6, 2004.

ORDER

JON J. STEIGER of MANASQUAN, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1975, having tendered his consent to disbarment as an attorney at law of the State of New Jersey, and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that JON J. STEIGER is disbarred by consent, effective immediately; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent’s name be stricken from the roll of attorneys and that he be permanently restrained and enjoined from practicing law; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent comply with *Rule*1:20-20 dealing with disbarred attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that all funds, if any, currently existing in any New Jersey financial institution maintained by JON J. STEIGER, pursuant to *Rule*1:21-6, be restrained from disbursement except on application to this Court, for good cause shown, and shall be transferred by the financial institution to the Clerk of the Superior Court, who is directed to deposit the funds in the Superior Court Trust Fund pending further Order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for appropriate administrative costs incurred in the prosecution of this matter.
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT

R UIZ FOOD PR ODUC TS, INC ., a C a l ifornia C orpora tion, Pla intiff - Appe lla nt,
v. C ATLIN SYNDIC ATE LIM ITED, sue d a s C e rta i n Unde rwrite rs a t Lloy d’ s of London Subsc ribing to Polic y No. PC I937441010, De fe nda

nt - Appe lle e . No. 12-17283 D.C . No. 1:11-c v-00889-B AM
M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Sta t e s Distric t C ourt for the Ea ste rn Distric t of C a lifornia B a rba ra M c Auliffe , M a gistra te Judge , Pre siding A rgue d a nd Subm itte d De c e m

be r 12, 2014 Sa n Fra n c isc o , C a lifornia B e fore : O’ SC A

NNLAIN, N.R . SM ITH, a nd HUR W ITZ, C irc uit Judge s . 

# FIL ED
D EC 22 2014 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U

. S

. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public a t ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3.Ru i z Food Produc ts, Inc
. a ppe a ls from a sum

m a ry judgm e nt e nte re d in fav o r of its i nsura

nc e c a rrie r, C a tlin Sy ndic a te Lim it ed

. We ha ve jurisdic tion pursua nt to 28 U.S.C . § 1291, 1 a nd a ffirm

. 1. W e re v ie w d e novo a distric t c ourt’ s rulings on c ross-m otions for sum m a ry judgm e nt. Roc k

y Mountain Farme rs Union v . C ore y , 730 F.3d 1070, 1086 (9th C ir. 2013). In C a lifornia , the inte rpre ta tion of a n insura nc e c ontra c t is a que stion of la w. Se e Oliv e r Mac h. C

o. v . U.S. Fid. & Guar. C o. , 232 C a l. R

ptr. 6 91 , 695 (C t. App. 1986). 2. The distric t c ourt prope rly c onc l ude d t he re wa s no c ove ra ge unde r the C a tlin polic y , whic h insure d a ga inst “ a c c ide nta l or uninte ntiona l c onta m ina tion, im

pa irm e nt
or m isla be l ling of a n Insure d p roduc t(s), whic h o ccu rs during o r a s a re sult of its produc tion, pre pa

ra tion, m a nufa c ture , pa c ka ging or distribution . . . .”
a. In light o f t

he ne ga tive te sts for the pre se n c e of s alm one l la i n R uiz ’ s produc ts a

nd ingre die nts, the re wa s no e vide nc e of a c t ua l c o nta m ina tion. b. The m e re risk of c o nta m ina tion did not t

rigge r c ove ra ge . The polic y c ove rs only c onta m ina tion tha

t a c tua lly “ o c c urs.”

1 W ith the pa

rtie s’ c onse nt, a m a gistra

te judge c onduc te d the proc e e dings be low. Se e 28 U.S.C
. § 636(c )(1); se e a lso id. § 636(c )(3) (providing for a ppe lla te jurisdic tion). 2c . Ne ithe r a re c a ll of R uiz ’ s produc t nor the e c o nom ic e ffe c t o f the re c a ll wa s
a n “ i m pa irm e nt” of a

n insure d produc t unde r the polic y . 3. B e c a use t he re wa s no c ove ra g e un de r the polic y , C a tlin did n ot bre a c h the duty of good fa i th a nd fa ir de a ling. Se e W alle r v . Truc k Ins. E

x c h ., Inc

. , 900 P.2d 619, 639 (C a l. 1995). AFFIRM E D.

3
585 A.2d 368

#### COGEN TECHNOLOGIES NJ VENTURE v. BOYCE ENGINEERING INTERNATIONAL, INC.

September 4, 1990.

Petition for certification denied. (See 241 *N.J.Super.*268, 574 A.2d 1018)
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19

- 10031 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.

DEMOND LYNN, also known as Slime

,

Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal s from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:17

- CR

- 567

- 3

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The attorney appointed to represent Demond Lynn has moved for leave

to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California

, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores , 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011).
Lynn h a s not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the
relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s
assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review.

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED November 22, 2019
Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 19-10031 Document: 00515211245 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/22/2019No. 19

- 10031

2 Accordingly, counsel’s motion fo r leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is
excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED.

See 5 TH C IR

. R. 42.2. Case: 19-10031 Document: 00515211245 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/22/2019
585 A.2d 375

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. LAWRENCE BARLOW.

September 18, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-31269 (Summary Calendar)

NOLAN HUDSON, Jr.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CHARLES C. FOTI, Sheriff, Orleans Parish Prison,

Defendant-Appellee.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana

(99-CV-2445-G)

-------------------- September 1, 2000

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Plaintiff-Appellant Nolan Hudson, Jr., Louisiana state

prisoner # 901750, argues that the district court erred in granting

the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing his 42

U.S.C. § 1983 complaint.

The district court dismissed the complaint based on Hudson’s

failure to oppose the defendant’s assertion that Hudson had failed

to exhaust his prison administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e. Hudson has not challenged the district court’s dismissal2

of his complaint based on his failure to exhaust his administrative

remedies. Thus, he has abandoned that dispositive issue on appeal.

See Brinkmann v. Abner , 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).

Further, in connection with his accident, Hudson has not

alleged any p ersonal wrongdoing on the part of Sheriff Foti.

Therefore, his complaint is also subject to dismissal based on a

failure to state an arguable claim a gainst the only named

defendant. See Thompson v. Steele

, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir.

1983); Bickford v. International Speedway Corp.
, 654 F.2d 1028, 131

(5th Cir. 1981). The district court’s dismissal of the complaint

is AFFIRMED.

Hudson has failed to show exceptional circumstances t h at

warrant the appointment of counse l. Hudson’s motion for the

appointment of counsel is DENIED. S ee Ulmer v. Chancellor

, 691

F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 1982).

AFFIRMED.

S:\OPINIONS\UNPUB\99\99-31269.0
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-7185
ROGER DEAN RENSHAW, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus JAMES FEELY, M.D.; RON ANGELONE, Director, Department of Corrections; STERLING PROFFITT, Superintendent, Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Samuel G. Wilson, District Judge. (CA-96-615) Submitted: January 23, 1997 Decided: February 4, 1997 Before RUSSELL, WILKINS, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Roger Dean Renshaw, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals the district court's order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint. We have reviewed the recordand the district court's opinion. We affirm, in part, on the reasoning of the district court, Renshaw v. Feely , No. CA-96-615 (W.D.Va. July 25, 1996), and because Renshaw failed to show that Appellees acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

ERIK SCHARRITTER,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 24 WAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 13th day of June, 2022

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
585 A.2d 324

#### IN THE MATTER OF BARRY N. BRUMER, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW.

February 11, 1991.

BARRY N. BRUMER, of PORT ORANGE, FLORIDA, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1973, having pleaded guilty to two counts of knowingly and willfully encouraging and inducing aliens to reside in the United States, in violation of 8 *U.S.C.A.*§ 1324(a)(1)(D) and 18 *U.S.C.A.*§ 2;

And respondent having been suspended by order of this Court on March 20, 1990, pursuant to *Rule*l:20-6(b)(l);

And the Disciplinary Review Board having filed a report with the Supreme Court recommending that by way of reciprocal discipline respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years for his having pleaded guilty to knowingly and willfully encouraging and inducing aliens to reside in the United States, respondent having been suspended from the practice of law in the State of Florida for a period of three years on June 8, 1989;

And respondent having been ordered to show cause why he should not be disbarred or otherwise disciplined pursuant to Rule 1:20-7, and respondent having failed to appear on the return date of said Order to Show Cause; and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that the report of the Disciplinary Review Board is hereby adopted and BARRY N. BRUMER is suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years and until further order of the Court, effective June 8, 1989; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent shall not be eligible to apply for restoration to the practice of law in this State until he has been readmitted to the bar of the State of Florida; and it is further

ORDERED that the Decision and Recommendation of the Disciplinary Review Board, together with this order and the full *295record of the matter, be added as a permanent part of the file of respondent as an attorney at law of the State of New Jersey; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent continue to be restrained and enjoined from practicing law during the period of his suspension; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent continue to comply with Administrative Guideline No. 23 of the Office of Attorney Ethics dealing with suspended attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Ethics Financial Committee for appropriate administrative costs.
584 A.2d 243

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. IRVIN HERSHENBAUM.

June 11, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

DEMETRI GIBBS
, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA
, Appellee

.

No. 4D 14

- 1926

[ November 2, 2017 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County ; Martin J. Bidwill , Judge; L.T. Case No. 11

- 7012CF10A

.

Fairuze Sofia of The Sofia Law Firm, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Mark J. Hamel, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed.

T

AYLOR

, M AY and C ONNER

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
544 A.2d 1118

#### Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, Appellant *v.*Richard's Grill, Inc., Appellee.

Submitted on briefs April 19, 1988,

to Judges Craig and Palladino, and Senior Judge Barbieri, sitting as a panel of three.

*Eileen S. Maunus,*Assistant Counsel, with her, *Kenneth B.*Skelly, Chief Counsel, for appellant.

*Edward A. McQuoid, King, Ruprecht*& *McQuoid,*for appellee.

July 28, 1988:

Opinion by

Judge Craig,

The Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (LCB) has appealed from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County which reversed an LCB order im*222posing a $400 fine on Richard’s Grill, Inc., a licensee, for maintenance of gambling and gambling devices. From the uncontested testimony of the LCB agent, the trial court made the following findings:

> At the non-jury de novo trial held on 6 January 1987, the Commonwealth elicited testimony through Mortty Ivy who, on 31 July 1984, observed two (2) individuals playing video poker in Licensee’s establishment. Agent Ivy subsequently saw the bartender hand one of the players $20.00 cash from the Licensee’s cash register.

> Subsequently, on 5 September 1984, Agent Ivy visited Licensee’s establishment and played a ‘stamp machine’. After playing the machine, Agent Ivy asked Licensee’s bartender what he had won. No money changed hands relating to the play on the stamp machine.

The trial judge concluded that no illegal gambling was involved and that both events involved only legal contest under the then-effective section 476 of the Liquor Code, Act of April 12, 1951, P.L. 90, added by section 5 of the Act of May 9, 1984, P L. 246, and repealed by section 2 of the Act of February 28, 1985, P.L. 1 *formerly*47 P.S. §4-476.

However, that section authorized a licensee only to hold “a dart, billiard, bowling, shuffleboard, rings or card tournament or contest. ...” A “stamp machine” does not constitute any of the contests which were listed in that temporary statute; instead it constitutes a gambling device per se. *See Fulton Post, Inc. Liquor License Case,*63 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 313, 317, 438 A.2d 662, 664 (1981). This court has also recently held that an electronic video poker machine did not constitute one of the tournaments or contests authorized by the 1984 provision. *Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board v. Henstock,*118 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 223, 544 A.2d 1119 (1988).

*223Therefore, the conclusion must be that the trial court erred as a matter of law in regarding the activities and devices in this case as involving lawful contests.

Accordingly, the trial court’s order is reversed.

Order

Now, July 28, 1988, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, dated January 29, 1987, at S.A. 2063 of 1985, is reversed.