United States Court of Appeal

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-50452

____________

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee, 

versus

Ronnie Diaz, Jr., 

Defendant—Appellant. 

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 5:21-CR-2-1 

______________________________

Before Smith, Wiener, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.

Jacques L. Wiener, Jr., Circuit Judge: 

Defendant-Appellant Ronnie Diaz, Jr. was charged with, inter alia, 

possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He 

moved to dismiss that charge, contending that the statute violates the Second 

Amendment, both facially and as applied to him. The district court denied 

that motion, and Diaz was convicted and sentenced. He appeals, again raising 

his Second Amendment argument and adding a Commerce Clause challenge, 

which he acknowledges is foreclosed by this court’s precedent. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 18, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I.

On November 4, 2020, officers from the San Antonio Police Department conducted a traffic stop of a car driven by Diaz. The officers noted a 

“strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle and empty baggies commonly known to contain narcotics.” Diaz was asked to exit the vehicle and 

was placed in handcuffs. While his person was searched, he admitted that 

there was ammunition in his pocket and that he was a convicted felon. A 

search of the vehicle revealed a .45 caliber pistol, three baggies of methamphetamine, three baggies of counterfeit Xanax, and one small baggie of heroin. 

This was not Diaz’s first run-in with the law. After various misdemeanors, he was convicted in 2014 in Texas state court of theft of a vehicle 

and evading arrest or detention with a vehicle, and he was sentenced to three 

years’ imprisonment. Then, in 2018, he was apprehended attempting to 

break into a car and found to be in possession of a handgun and a baggie containing methamphetamine. Diaz was convicted of possessing a firearm as a 

felon, again in state court, and was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment.

After the November 2020 traffic stop, Diaz was charged in the Western District of Texas with the following: (1) count one, possession with intent 

to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1); (2) count two, possessing firearms during and in relation to a 

drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); and (3) count three, 

being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) 

and 924(a)(2). Diaz moved to dismiss count three of the indictment, arguing 

that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under New York Rifle and Pistol 

Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). 

The district court denied that motion, and, after a bench trial, found 

Diaz guilty on all three counts. Diaz was sentenced to 120 months’ 

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imprisonment on counts one and three, to run concurrently, and 60 months’ 

imprisonment on count two, to run consecutively. 

Diaz brings two claims on appeal. First, he asserts that his conviction 

under § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, both 

facially and as applied to him. Second, he contends that § 922(g)(1) exceeds 

Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. He acknowledges that this 

second argument is foreclosed under this court’s precedent, and that he 

raises it only to preserve it for possible future review by the Supreme Court. 

See United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 2013). We spend no 

more words on that subject.

We review constitutional challenges to a statute de novo. United States 

v. Perez-Macias, 335 F.3d 421, 425 (5th Cir. 2003).

II.

The Second Amendment mandates that “[a] well-regulated Militia, 

being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep 

and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II. We begin by 

tracing the courts’ application of this often-obfuscating language to statutes 

regulating firearm possession and use.

In 2001, this court evaluated the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(8), which prohibits firearm possession by those subject to domestic 

violence restraining orders. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 212 (5th 

Cir. 2001). We determined that the statute does not violate the Second 

Amendment, which has always been limited in its application. Id. at 261. For 

example, “it is clear that felons, infants[,] and those of unsound mind may be 

prohibited from possessing firearms.” Id. The necessary finding of a present 

and actual threat inherent in the issuance of a restraining order was a valid 

reason to restrict the Amendment’s guarantee. Id. at 262.

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Then, in 2003, we applied Emerson to § 922(g)(1) in United States v. 

Darrington, 351 F.3d 632, 634 (5th Cir. 2003). Section 922(g)(1) regulates 

possession of firearms by any person “who has been convicted in any court 

of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”

Darrington upheld the constitutionality of the statute by relying on Emerson’s 

language about “felons, infants[,] and those of unsound mind.” Id. (quoting 

Emerson, 270 F.3d at 261). No additional analysis ensued. 

The landscape of Second Amendment jurisprudence changed in 

2008. In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), the Supreme 

Court held that a Washington D.C. law that prohibited possession of handguns in the home was unconstitutional. The Court interpreted the language 

of the Second Amendment and determined that its drafters intended for it to

protect “the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense 

of hearth and home.” Id. at 635. Thus, D.C.’s categorical prohibition did not 

pass constitutional muster. Id. at 628–29. However, Justice Scalia wrote, the 

right to bear arms is not unlimited: it is not a right to “keep and carry any 

weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” 

Id. at 626. He cautioned that the opinion should not be read to “cast doubt 

on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the 

mentally ill,” among other limitations. Id. at 626–27. Those regulations, Heller said, are “presumptively lawful.” Id. at 627 n.26.

After Heller, this court and its peers “adopted a two-step inquiry for 

analyzing laws that might impact the Second Amendment.” Hollis v. Lynch, 

827 F.3d 436, 446 (5th Cir. 2016). We first considered “whether the challenged law impinges upon a right protected by the Second Amendment.” Id. 

(quoting Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, 

& Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012)). If it did, we would then proceed to the second “means-end scrutiny” step, during which we determined

“whether to apply intermediate or strict scrutiny,” and then applied the 

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appropriate scrutiny to the challenged law. Id.; see also Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 700 

F.3d at 195. However, even after Heller and its resultant two-step framework,

we continued to apply Darrington to bar challenges to § 922(g)(1) under the 

Second Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 & 

n.6 (5th Cir. 2009) (explaining that Heller “provides no basis for reconsidering Darrington” because it re-affirmed longstanding prohibitions on felons’

possessing firearms). 

In 2022, the Supreme Court revisited and refined Heller in Bruen. 

There, the Court extended Heller’s protection for carrying handguns in the 

home to carrying them publicly. 597 U.S. at 8–9. In so doing, the Court rejected the second step of the two-step framework that had developed after 

Heller. Id. at 19 (“Despite the popularity of this two-step approach, it is one 

step too many.”). “Step one,” the Court wrote, “is broadly consistent with 

Heller, which demands a test rooted in the Second Amendment’s text, as informed by history.” Id. However, instead of moving on to means-ends scrutiny, the Court held that, when step one’s requirements are met, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. Id. at 17. The burden then shifts 

to the government to “demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this 

Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. This involves addressing “how and why the regulations burden a law-abiding citizen’s right 

to armed self-defense.” Id. at 29. The Court held that the plain text of the 

Second Amendment protectsthe right to bear arms in public for self-defense,

and that the government had failed to “identify an American tradition” justifying the regulation of such behavior. Id. at 38–39. The challenged New 

York law thus violated the Second Amendment.

A panel of this court applied Bruen to find § 922(g)(8) unconstitutional in United States v. Rahimi, 61 F.4th 443, 450–51 (5th Cir. 2023), rev’d, 

144 S. Ct. 1889 (2024) (hereinafter “Rahimi I”). The panel considered various “historical analogues” and found that they were not “relevantly similar” 

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precursors to § 922(g)(8). Id. at 456. The Supreme Court reversed. 144 S.Ct. 

at 1903. An eight-Justice majority held that § 922(g)(8) “fits comfortably” in 

this Nation’s tradition of “preventing individuals who threaten physical 

harm to others from misusing firearms.” Id. at 1897. The Court first cited 

surety laws as a historical analogue. Those laws required individuals to post 

bonds wheneverthere was a “probable ground to suspect of future misbehaviour.” Id. at 1899–1900 (quoting 4 Blackstone 251). Surety laws were used to 

“prevent all forms of violence, including spousal abuse” and the misuse of 

firearms. Id. at 1900. The Court also relied on “going armed” laws, which 

prohibited “riding or going armed, with dangerous or unusual weapons, to 

terrify the good people of the land.” Id. at 1901 (brackets omitted) (quoting 

4 Blackstone 149). Because such conduct “disrupted the public order and led 

almost necessarily to actual violence . . . . the law punished these acts with 

forfeiture of the arms and imprisonment.” Id. (cleaned up). 

The Court examined “why and how” surety and going armed laws 

burdened the Second Amendment right to bear arms, as instructed by Bruen. 

Id. at 1898. It determined that, just like § 922(g)(8), both surety and going 

armed laws were used “to mitigate demonstrated threats of physical violence.” Id. at 1901. In considering the “how,” the Court found that 

§ 922(g)(8)’s burden is comparable to the burdens imposed by surety and 

going armed laws. Id. None of these laws “broadly restrict arms use by the 

public generally,” but instead apply only “once a court has found that the 

defendant ‘represents a credible threat to the physical safety’ of another.” 

Id. at 1901–02 (quoting § 922(g)(8)(C)(i)). Surety laws were temporary restrictions, like § 922(g)(8), which applies only while a restraining order is in 

place. Id. at 1902. Finally, violating surety and going armed laws could result 

in imprisonment. Id. “[I]f imprisonment was permissible to respond to the 

use of guns to threaten the physical safety of others, then the lesser restriction 

of temporary disarmament that Section 922(g)(8) imposes is also 

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permissible.” Id. In short, the Court held that § 922(g)(8) does not violate 

the Second Amendment, facially or as applied to Rahimi, because “[o]ur tradition of firearm regulation allows the Government to disarm individuals who 

present a credible threat to the physical safety of others.” Id.

Having outlined the jurisprudence as it currently stands, we turn to 

Diaz’s Second Amendment challenge.

III.

Diaz brings a facial and an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality 

of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) under Bruen. We address the government’s preliminary defenses before undertaking the historical analysis required by Bruen 

and its progeny to decide the merits of Diaz’s claims. 

A.

The government first contends that our pre-Bruen precedent such as

Darrington, which upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1), is still the law 

of the land. It notes that Bruen did not address § 922(g)(1), nor any other 

“status-based gun restrictions.” See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 72 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Our holding decides nothing about who may lawfully possess a firearm.”). We have repeatedly held that Emerson and Darrington foreclose Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1). See, e.g., United States v. Massey, 

849 F.3d 262, 265 (5th Cir. 2017); Anderson, 559 F.3d at 352; United States v. 

Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 516 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Everist, 368 F.3d 

517, 519 (5th Cir. 2004). But each of those cases predates Bruen, which established a new historical paradigm for analyzing Second Amendment claims. 

Under the rule of orderliness, a later panel may overturn another panel’s decision when it has “fallen unequivocally out of step with some intervening 

change in the law.” In re Bonvillian Marine Servs., Inc., 19 F.4th 787, 792 (5th 

Cir. 2021). Bruen constitutes such a change, “rendering our prior precedent 

obsolete.” Rahimi I, 61 F.4th at 451.

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The government maintains that these earlier cases survive Bruen because they were decided at Heller’s step one—historical tradition—and not 

at its second step which was repudiated by Bruen. See Darrington, 351 F.3d at 

633–34; Bruen, 597 U.S. at 19. But Darrington relied solely on Emerson for its 

Second Amendment analysis, and Emerson was decided based on the meansends scrutiny that Bruen renounced. See Emerson, 270 F.3d at 261; Bruen, 597 

U.S. at 22–24.1 The Supreme Court in Rahimi declined to even mention Emerson, which would have been directly on point to its consideration of 

§ 922(g)(8). The law of orderliness mandates that we abandon that prior 

precedent.

Even if our own case law is no longer binding, says the government,

the Supreme Court has already weighed in on the constitutionality of 

§ 922(g)(1) as well. To be sure, there is language in the cases described above

that contrasts the regulations at issue with the regulation of felons’ possessing firearms. In Heller, the Court wrote that “nothing in our opinion 

should be taken to cast doubt on the longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.” 554 U.S. at 626. Multiple concurrences in Bruen 

reiterated the Justices’ intent to leave undisturbed those government regulations that prohibit convicted felons from carrying firearms. See, e.g., 597 U.S. 

at 81 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Finally, Rahimi cited Heller’s language to 

again state that prohibitions on possession of firearms by “felons and the 

mentally ill” are “presumptively lawful.” 144 S. Ct. at 1902. The 

_____________________

1 Rahimi I specifically identified Emerson as “applying some form of means-ends 

scrutiny sub silentio.” 61 F.4th at 450. Courts have recently (post-Rahimi-reversal) relied 

on this reasoning, distinguishing cases such as Emerson that involve means-ends scrutiny. 

See United States v. Alvarez, Crim. No. H-20-297, 2024 WL 3166935, at *3 (S.D. Tex. June 

25, 2024); see also United States v. Petteway, No. 24 Cr. 80 (AT), 2024 WL 3105006, at *2 

(S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2024) (adopting the same logic, distinguishing cases not involving 

means-ends scrutiny, under Second Circuit precedent).

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government makes much of this language, suggesting that it can begin and 

end our analysis.

However, because none of those cases actually concerned § 922(g)(1), 

they are not binding precedent on the issue now before us. The Court did not 

complete any historical analysis of laws forbidding felons from possessing 

firearms, as required by Bruen. The mentions of felonsin those cases are mere 

dicta. See Int’l Truck & Engine Corp. v. Bray, 372 F.3d 717, 721 (5th Cir. 2004) 

(“A statement is dictum if it ‘could have been deleted without seriously impairing the analytical foundations of the holding’ and ‘being peripheral, may 

not have received the full and careful consideration of the court that uttered 

it.’” (quoting Gochicoa v. Johnson, 238 F.3d 278, 286 n.11 (5th Cir. 2000)). 

And although we recognized in McRorey v. Garland that we are generally 

bound by Supreme Court dicta, 99 F.4th 831, 837 (5th Cir. 2024), that dicta 

cannot supplant the most recent analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in 

Rahimi, which we apply today. Without precedent that conducts Bruen’s historical inquiry into our Nation’s tradition of regulating firearm possession by 

felons in particular, we must do so ourselves.2

The government also raises the familiar argument that Diaz is not 

among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment. We disagree. 

There are two approaches to take in considering the constitutionality of gun 

regulations. As now-Justice Barrett has written in an oft-cited passage, one 

_____________________

2 Not all courts agree with this proposition. The Eleventh Circuit has recently 

relied solely upon Rahimi’s mention of Heller’s “felons and the mentally ill” language in 

upholding the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). See United States v. Rambo, No. 23-13772, 

2024 WL 3534730, at *2 (11th Cir. July 25, 2024) (per curiam); United States v. Young, No. 

13-10464, 2024 WL 3466607, at *9 (11th Cir. July 19, 2024) (per curiam); United States v. 

Johnson, No. 23-11885, 2024 WL 3371414, at *3 (11th Cir. July 11, 2024) (per curiam). We 

respectfully disagree with this approach—especially after Rahimi—and believe that a full 

historical analysis is required.

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approach “uses history and tradition to identify the scope of the right, and 

the other uses that same body of evidence to identify the scope of the legislature’s power to take it away.” Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 452 (7th Cir. 

2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting). Bruen mandates the second approach. See 597 

U.S. at 70 (explaining that the right can be limited under certain circumstances, but that the government does not require citizens to “demonstrate a 

special need for self-protection” to be entitled to the right in the first place). 

“[A]ll people have the right to keep and bear arms,” but “history and tradition support Congress’s power to strip certain groups of that right.” Kanter, 

919 F.3d at 452 (Barrett, J., dissenting). The Court in Rahimi affirmed this 

approach, assuming that Rahimi was protected by the Second Amendment 

even though he had committed “family violence.” See 144 S.Ct. at 1898. As 

Justice Thomas remarked in his dissent, it was “undisputed that the Second 

Amendment applies to Rahimi . . . . [It] extends to ‘the people,’ and that ‘that 

term unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, not an 

unspecified subset.’” 144 S. Ct. at 1933 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis 

added) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 580); see also id. at 1907 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“In this case, no one questions that the law Mr. Rahimi challenges 

addresses individual conduct covered by the text of the Second Amendment.”).

Diaz’s status as a felon is relevant to our analysis, but it becomes so in 

Bruen’s second step of whether regulating firearm use in this way is “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition” rather than in considering the 

Second Amendment’s initial applicability. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24. As in 

Rahimi, the “two-step” view of Bruen is effectively collapsed into one question: whether the law is consistent with our Nation’s history of firearm regulation. See Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. at 1898.

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B.

Having disposed of the government’s initial contentions, we reach the 

marrow of the case. We begin with Diaz’s as-applied challenge, because it is 

“the narrower consideration.” See Buchanan v. Alexander, 919 F.3d 847, 852 

(5th Cir. 2019).

The plain text of the Second Amendment covers the conduct prohibited by § 922(g)(1), as it does with that of § 922(g)(8). See Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. 

at 1907 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). The burden thus shifts to the government 

to demonstrate that regulating Diaz’s possession of a firearm is “consistent 

with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Bruen, 597 U.S. 

at 24. To satisfy this burden, the government must “identify a well-established and representative historical analogue, not a historical twin.” Id. at 30. 

Evidence must be “relevantly similar” to the challenged law. Id. at 29. In 

assessing similarity, we consider “whether modern and historical regulations 

impose a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense and whether 

that burden is comparably justified.” Id. The government identifies as relevant laws (1) focusing on how our Nation punished felons; and (2) disarming 

certain classes of persons.

For the purposes of assessing Diaz’s predicate offenses under 

§ 922(g)(1), we may consider prior convictions that are “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” See § 922(g)(1). Diaz’s pertinent

criminal history consists of vehicle theft, evading arrest, and possessing a firearm as a felon. Both he and the government discuss various drug offenses in 

their briefing on his as-applied challenge, but those are not relevant for our 

purposes. In 2018 and 2020, Diaz was charged with possession of a controlled 

substance and possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, but 

those charges were dismissed. He was convicted in state court of possession 

of less than two ounces of marijuana, but that is not a felony punishable by 

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more than one year, as required by § 922(g)(1). And count one of the conviction that Diaz appeals here (possession with intent to distribute) cannot serve 

as a predicate for his § 922(g)(1) charge in the same indictment; that charge

must instead rely on previous history. Thus, the only relevant criminal convictions for our purposes are car theft, evading arrest, and possessing a firearm as a felon. To survive Diaz’s as-applied challenge, the government must 

demonstrate that the Nation has a longstanding tradition of disarming someone with a criminal history analogous to this.

1. Punishment

The government first cites historical laws authorizing capital punishment and estate forfeiture as consequences for felonies. At the time of the 

Founding, the death penalty was “the standard penalty for all serious 

crimes.” Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 94 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring in the 

judgment) (quoting Stuart Banner, The Death Penalty: An 

American History 23 (2002)); see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 

13 (1985) (explaining that, at common law, “virtually all felonies were punishable by death”). Colonies and states also routinely made use of estate forfeiture as punishment. See Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 

102 CAL. L. REV. 277, 332 nn. 275 & 276 (2014) (collecting statutes). The 

government asserts that, since these penalties imposed such severe burdens 

on the right to bear arms, the lesser burden of disarmament via § 922(g)(1) is

consistent with our Nation’s history and traditions.

At the outset, Diaz contends that laws about capital punishment and 

estate forfeiture are not relevant because Bruen directs courts to consider 

whether the regulation is “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition 

of firearm regulation.” See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17 (emphasis added). Diaz notes 

that every historical law that Bruen addressed was an “explicit firearm regulation.” That makes sense because Bruen was addressing the 

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constitutionality of a statute that entirely constrained carrying firearms outside of the home, applicable to everyone equally. Section 922(g)(1), in contrast, focuses on a specific group of people, so we may consider laws regulating that group, even if they are not explicitly related to firearms. In Rahimi, 

the Court did just that, considering several historical laws that were not explicitly related to guns, yet sometimes applied to limit their possession. See 

144 S. Ct. at 1899. For example, surety laws targeted various kinds of “misbehaviour,” just as did rules allowing capital punishment. See id. None of 

those laws were passed solely for the purpose of regulating firearm possession 

or use.

At the time of our Nation’s birth, “felony” was “a term of loose signification.” The Federalist No. 42, at 228 (James Madison); see also 

Will Tress, Unintended Collateral Consequences: Defining Felony in the Early 

American Republic, 57 Clev. St. L. Rev. 461, 465 (2009) (emphasizing the 

“ambiguity in the meaning of felony” at the Founding). The category was “a 

good deal narrower” then. Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295, 311 (2021).

“Many crimes classified as misdemeanors, or nonexistent, at common law 

are now felonies.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 14 (1985). For example, 

possessing a firearm as a felon—one of Diaz’s three predicate convictions 

justifying the application of § 922(g)(1)—was not considered a crime until 

1938 at the earliest. See Federal Firearms Act, ch. 850, §§ 1(6), 2(f), 52 Stat. 

1250, 1250–51 (1938); An Act to Strengthen the Federal Firearms Act, Pub.

L. No. 87–342, § 2, 75 Stat. 757, 757 (1961). The fact that Diaz is a felon today, 

then, does not necessarily mean that he would have been one in the 18th century.

However, the government’s evidence is more specifically targeted to 

Diaz’s circumstances. It cites laws targeting the crime of theft, which was 

considered a felony at the time of the Founding and was punished accordingly. See, e.g., 2 Records of the Court of Assistants of 

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the Colony of the Massachusetts Bay 1630–1692, at 32 (John 

Noble ed., 1904) (punishing theft by ordering, among other penalties, that 

“all his estate shalbe forfected”); Act of Feb. 21, 1788, ch. 37, 1788 N.Y. 

Laws 664–65 (authorizing the death penalty for theft of chattels worth over 

five pounds). Our own research reveals that those convicted of horse theft—

likely the closest colonial-era analogue to vehicle theft—were often subject 

to the death penalty. Kathryn Preyer, Crime and Reform in Post-Revolutionary 

Virginia, 1 Law & Hist. Rev. 53, 73 (1983). Those colonial-era laws correspond to the law against theft of a vehicle that serves as a predicate offense 

for Diaz’s § 922(g)(1) charge. They establish that our country has a historical 

tradition of severely punishing people like Diaz who have been convicted of 

theft.

Addressing Bruen’s two “central considerations,” the “why” of 

these examples aligns with the “why” of § 922(g)(1). As the government explains, these laws were “justified by the need to adequately punish felons, 

deter reoffending, and protect society from those proven untrustworthy to 

follow the law.” The purpose of capital punishment in colonial America was 

threefold: deterrence, retribution, and penitence. See Banner, supra, at 23.

Virginia, for example, punished the crime of horse theft with the death penalty for the purpose of deterring the crime. Robert M. Bohm, DeathQuest: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of 

Capital Punishment 6 (1999). The precursor to § 922(g)(1), in turn,

was enacted to “bar possession of a firearm from persons whose prior behaviors have established their violent tendencies.” 114 Cong. Rec. 14773

(daily ed. May 23, 1968) (statement of Sen. Russell Long of Louisiana). It was 

intended to keep firearms out of the hands of those who are “a hazard to lawabiding citizens” and who had demonstrated that “they may not be trusted 

to possess a firearm without becoming a threat to society.” Id. The 

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justification for § 922(g)(1) is relevantly similar to that of the offered examples: to deter violence and lawlessness.

As to the “how,” these laws achieved their goals by permanently punishing offenders, as does § 922(g)(1). Capital punishment is obviously permanent, and the majority of the estate forfeiture laws that the government 

cites did not provide an opportunity for offenders to regain their possessions.3 Permanent disarmament under § 922(g)(1) does not punish such

crimes “to an extent beyond what was done at the founding,” given the government’s evidence that crimes such as theft were punished so severely and 

permanently. See Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. at 1898. The Court in Rahimi was persuaded that, “if imprisonment was permissible to respond to the use of guns 

to threaten the physical safety of others, then the lesser restriction of temporary disarmament that § 922(g)(8) imposes is also permissible.” Id. at 1902. 

Here, if capital punishment was permissible to respond to theft, then the 

lesser restriction of permanent disarmament that § 922(g)(1) imposes is also 

permissible. These laws establish a historical tradition of permanently punishing certain offenders who the evidence shows would have been considered 

felons and exposed to these types of penalties at the time of the Founding.

We emphasize that our holding is not only premised on the fact that 

Diaz is a felon. Simply classifying a crime as a felony does not meet the level 

of historical rigor required by Bruen and its progeny. The legislature has determined that the term “felony” encompasses all crimes punishable by more 

than one year of imprisonment, rendering Diaz a felon today. But not all felons today would have been considered felons at the Founding. Further,

_____________________

3 There are some exceptions. See Colgan, supra, at 332 n.276 (citing a 1718 

Pennsylvania law allowing a forfeited estate to be returned to a “criminal’s wife and 

children”). But, combined with the capital punishment examples and the going armed laws 

described below, it is clear that America has a tradition of permanent punishment.

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Congress may decide to change that definition in the future. Such a shifting 

benchmark should not define the limits of the Second Amendment, without 

further consideration of how that right was understood when it was first recognized. At that time, at least one of the predicate crimes that Diaz’s 

§ 922(g)(1) conviction relies on—theft—was a felony and thus would have 

led to capital punishment or estate forfeiture. Disarming Diaz fits within this 

tradition of serious and permanent punishment.4

2. Firearms

We could stop here, as the punishment-focused laws discussed above

demonstrate a historical tradition of severely punishing people like Diaz who 

would have been felons at the Founding. At least one court, though, has expressed concern that just because “Founding-era governments punished 

some nonviolent crimes with death does not suggest that the particular (and 

distinct) punishment at issue—lifetime disarmament—is rooted in our Nation’s history and tradition.” Range v. Attorney General, 69 F.4th 96, 105 (3d 

Cir. 2023) (en banc), vacated in light of Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. 4706 (2024). In that 

court’s view, “[t]he greater does not necessarily include the lesser.” Id. We 

thus consider the government’s proffered firearm-focused evidence as well, 

to further illuminate the “how” of our country’s tradition of punishment. 

See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29.

The government first identifies as relevant two proposals from state 

constitutional conventions: a speech from a minority group in Pennsylvania 

and an amendment offered by Samuel Adams of Massachusetts. Heller discussed both of these sources. See 554 U.S. at 604 (calling the Pennsylvania 

proposal “highly influential”). The Pennsylvania address suggested that 

_____________________

4 Our opinion today does not foreclose future as-applied challenges by defendants 

with different predicate convictions.

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citizens have a personal right to bear arms “unless for crimes committed, or

real danger of public injury.” Bernard Schwartz, The Bill of 

Rights: A Documentary History 662, 665 (1971). Massachusetts’s

proposed amendment said that the Constitution authorized “the people of 

the United States, who are peaceable citizens, [to keep] their own arms.” Id.

at 681. The government maintains that these contemporaneous examples 

support a national tradition of disarming those who are violent or pose a 

threat to public safety. However, relying solely on these types of unadopted

proposals to establish a tradition is a “dubious” practice. Heller, 554 U.S. at 

603. Nevertheless, taken together with the other evidence discussed herein, 

they do help to illuminate the “public understanding” of the Second Amendment around the time of its ratification. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 20. They reveal that the right to bear arms at the time was not unlimited, and that the 

government could prevent people who had committed crimes or were “quarrelsome” from accessing weapons. See Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (5th Ed. 1773) (defining “unpeaceable”). 

The government also points to colonial-era statutes that prohibited 

going armed offensively and authorized forfeiture of weapons as punishment. 

See, e.g., Acts and Resolves, Public and Private, of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay 52–53 (1869); Acts and Laws of His Majesty’s Province of 

New Hampshire in New England; with Sundry Acts of Parliament 17 (1771); 

Collection of All Such Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia, of a Public 

and Permanent Nature, as Are Now in Force 33 (1794); A Compilation of the 

Statutes of Tennessee of a General and Permanent Nature, from the Commencement of the Government to the Present Time 99–100 (1836). These

laws punished “those who had menaced others with firearms.” Rahimi, 144 

S. Ct. at 1900. Doing so “disrupted the ‘public order’ and ‘le[d] almost necessarily to actual violence.’” Id. at 1901 (alteration in original) (quoting State 

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v. Huntly, 25 N.C. 418, 421–22 (1843) (per curiam)). Rahimi found these 

same going armed laws to be a relevant historical analogue to § 922(g)(8). Id.

The size of these laws’ burden on the right to bear arms is comparable 

to that of § 922(g)(1). They both provide for permanent arms forfeiture as a 

penalty. See, e.g., Acts and Resolves, Public and Private, of the Province of 

the Massachusetts Bay 53. Capital punishment and estate forfeiture were not 

the only severe penalties imposed on those who violated colonial-era laws. 

Cf. Range, 69 F.4th at 105. Imposing permanent disarmament as a punishment is also within our Nation’s history and tradition. Applying § 922(g)(1) 

to Diaz “fits neatly” within that tradition. See Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. at 1901.5

Diaz complains that Bruen allows this type of reasoning-by-analogy 

only when the regulation in question was “unimaginable at the founding.” 

Bruen, 597 U.S. at 28. He says that, because § 922(g)(1) does not address 

“unprecedented societal concerns or dramatic technological changes,” only 

directly similar historical analogues should be considered. Id. at 27. This “bifurcated” approach has been rejected by the Supreme Court.6 In Bruen, the 

Court noted that handgun possession for self-defense was a “straightforward 

historical inquiry,” such that the historical analogues were “relatively simple 

to draw.” 597 U.S. at 27. Even so, it compared the Second Amendment 

standard with the First and Sixth Amendments. Id. at 24–25. And, in Rahimi, 

the Court considered surety and going armed laws, despite the fact that 

_____________________

5 We acknowledge that the justification behind going armed laws—to “mitigate 

demonstrated threats of physical violence”—does not necessarily support a tradition of 

disarming Diaz, whose underlying convictions do not inherently involve a threat of 

violence. See 144 S. Ct. at 1901. We focus on these laws to address the “how” of colonialera firearm regulation, rather than the “why,” which is supported by other evidence. See 

Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29.

6 Justice Thomas, as the lone dissenting voice in Rahimi, advanced this 

interpretation. See 144 S. Ct. at 1933 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

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domestic violence is not a new phenomenon. 144 S. Ct. at 1901; see also id. at 

1904 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[T]he Government has not identified a 

founding-era or Reconstruction-era law that specifically disarmed domestic 

abusers, but it did not need to do so.” (citation omitted)). Going armed laws 

are relevant historical analogues to § 922(g)(1), just as Rahimi found them to 

be with respect to § 922(g)(8). 

“Taken together,” laws authorizing severe punishments for thievery

and permanent disarmament in other cases establish that our tradition of firearm regulation supports the application of § 922(g)(1) to Diaz.

7 See id. Diaz’s 

Second Amendment claim fails.

C.

Diaz also brings a facial challenge to § 922(g)(1). To sustain a facial 

challenge, “the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists 

under which the statute would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 

739, 745 (1987). This Diaz cannot do, because the statute is constitutional as 

applied to the facts of his own case. See Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. at 1898. 

IV.

The government has met its burden to show that applying 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1) to Diaz is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17. At the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification, those—like Diaz—guilty of certain crimes—like theft—

were punished permanently and severely. And permanent disarmament was

a part of our country’s arsenal of available punishments at that time. Because 

_____________________

7 Because the evidence discussed herein is sufficient to support a historical

tradition of permanently disarming people like Diaz, we do not address the government’s 

other historical examples.

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applying § 922(g)(1) to Diaz “fits neatly” in this tradition, it is constitutional 

as applied and facially as well. See Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. at 1901.

Diaz’s conviction is AFFIRMED.

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