Filed 4/7/21 Ghannoum v. Sevier CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

SAMIR GHANNOUM et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

JULIA K. SEVIER,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B304026

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. EC064044)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, William D. Stewart, Judge. Affirmed. 

Law Office of Zulu Ali & Associates and Donovan Fleming 

for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 

Anthony A. Sears for Defendant and Respondent. 
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Plaintiffs and appellants Samir Ghannoum (Samir) and 

Mohamed Ghannoum (Mohamed)1 (collectively, plaintiffs) appeal 

from a post-judgment order awarding defendant and respondent 

Julia K. Sevier (defendant) $93,913.85 in attorney fees following 

a jury trial and entry of judgment in defendant’s favor on all of 

plaintiffs’ causes of action. We affirm the attorney fees order.

BACKGROUND

On March 9, 2012, defendant and Mohamed signed a

residential lease agreement (the lease) for a room in a house 

owned by plaintiffs. Paragraph 37 of the lease contained a 

mediation provision, under which the parties agreed to “mediate 

any dispute or claim arising between them out of this Agreement, 

or any resulting transaction, before resorting to court 

action. . . . If, for any dispute or claim to which this paragraph 

applies, any party commences an action without first attempting 

to resolve the matter through mediation, or refuses to mediate 

after a request has been made, then that party shall not be 

entitled to recover attorney fees, even if they would otherwise be 

available to that party in any such action.” Paragraph 38 of the 

lease provided that, subject to paragraph 37, the prevailing party 

in any action “shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees and 

costs.” 

Pursuant to the lease mediation provisions, plaintiffs sent a

written demand for mediation to defendant on April 2, 2015. 

Plaintiffs’ demand was sent by mail to an address in Virginia and 

stated that plaintiffs would file an action for conversion and 

trespass to chattels if defendant refused to mediate or failed to 

1 Because appellants share the same surname, we refer to 

them individually by their first names to avoid confusion.
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respond within seven days. Defendant, through her attorney, 

responded in a letter dated April 14, 2015 stating that she was 

agreeable to mediation.

However, plaintiffs did not proceed with mediation but filed 

this action against defendant for conversion and trespass to 

chattels on May 7, 2015. Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint 

that they rented a room to defendant on March 9, 2012, and 

evicted her in May 2013. Plaintiffs further alleged that when 

defendant moved out of the premises, she removed and damaged 

$39,300 worth of plaintiffs’ property. 

After a two-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in 

defendant’s favor on all causes of action. Defendant filed a 

motion for attorney fees as the prevailing party, seeking fees in 

the amount of $116,527.10. 

In opposition to the motion, plaintiffs argued that 

defendant had not complied with their mediation demand and 

that she was therefore not entitled to recover attorney fees. 

Plaintiffs further argued that the amount of fees claimed was 

unreasonable. 

Defendant’s motion for attorney fees was heard on 

November 15, 2019. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial 

court issued a written ruling awarding defendant $93,913.85 in 

attorney fees. The record on appeal contains no reporter’s 

transcript of that hearing.

Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on 

November 25, 2019, arguing, for the first time, that because 

Samir was not a signatory to the lease, she should not be liable 

for any portion of the attorney fees. Defendant’s opposition to the 

motion included a copy of the deed to the rental premises, 
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showing that at the time of the lease, plaintiffs owned the 

property as “husband and wife as joint tenants.”

Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration was heard and denied 

on January 3, 2020. The record contains no reporter’s transcript 

of the hearing. The trial court’s written ruling states that 

because plaintiffs failed to comply with the affidavit 

requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, and failed

to explain why the issue for reconsideration was not raised 

during the previous motion for attorney fees, the court lacked 

jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs’ motion.

This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs contend the attorney fees order should be 

reversed as to Samir because she was not a signatory to the lease. 

Plaintiffs further contend the attorney fees award was improper 

because the causes of action on which defendant prevailed --

conversion and trespass to chattel—did not arise under the lease.

I. Fees against nonsignatory

Plaintiffs failed to argue in their opposition to defendant’s 

motion for attorney fees that a fee award was improper against 

Samir, a nonsignatory to the lease. Their failure to do so 

forfeited the claim on appeal. “Failure to raise specific challenges 

in the trial court forfeits the claim on appeal. ‘“‘[I]t is 

fundamental that a reviewing court will ordinarily not consider 

claims made for the first time on appeal which could have been 

but were not presented to the trial court.’ Thus, ‘we ignore 

arguments, authority, and facts not presented and litigated in the 

trial court. Generally, issues raised for the first time on appeal 
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which were not litigated in the trial court are waived. 

[Citations.]’” [Citation.]’” (Premier Medical Management 

Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 

Cal.App.4th 550, 564 (Premier Medical).)

Plaintiffs’ unsuccessful attempt to raise the nonsignatory 

argument in their motion for reconsideration did not avert the 

forfeiture. The trial court found that because plaintiffs failed to 

comply with the affidavit requirements of Code of Civil Procedure 

section 1008, subdivision (a), and failed to indicate to the trial 

court the reasons the nonsignatory argument was not raised 

during the previous, fully briefed, attorney fees motion, the trial 

court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion for 

reconsideration. The nonsignatory issue was not litigated in the 

trial court. It was accordingly forfeited on appeal. (Premier 

Medical, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 564.)

II. Causes of action arising under the lease

Plaintiffs argue for the first time in this appeal that the 

conversion and trespass to chattel causes of action on which 

defendant prevailed were not claims “arising out of” the lease 

within the meaning of the lease’s attorney fees provision. Their 

failure to raise this argument in the trial court below forfeits the 

issue on appeal. (Premier Medical, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 564.)

Even absent such forfeiture, the argument is not well 

taken. Contractual attorney fees may be recovered on a claim for 

conversion based on a contract. (Mustachio v. Great Western 

Bank (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1151.) The allegations in 

plaintiffs’ complaint indicate that their claims for conversion and 

trespass to chattel are based on the lease. Plaintiffs alleged the 
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existence of a lease between them and defendant, that they 

evicted defendant from the premises, and that defendant

removed and damaged plaintiffs’ property when vacating the 

premises. The lease states that defendant was obligated upon 

vacating the premises to return the premises, including any 

furniture, furnishings, appliances, landscaping, and fixtures 

therein, in the same condition as at commencement of the lease 

term. The lease further states that breach of these obligations 

shall constitute breach of the lease. Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief in 

their complaint included a request for attorney fees. The causes 

of action on which defendant prevailed were claims arising under 

the lease. Defendant accordingly was entitled to recover her 

attorney fees as the prevailing party on those claims.

III. Other arguments

We do not address arguments plaintiffs raise for the first 

time in their reply brief – (1) defendant’s failure to timely 

respond to plaintiffs’ demand for mediation waived her claim for 

attorney fees under the lease, (2) the fees awarded were excessive 

and unconscionable, and (3) the trial court abused its discretion 

by not adjudicating the nonsignatory issue in plaintiffs’ motion 

for reconsideration. Plaintiffs waived these arguments by failing 

to raise them in their opening brief on appeal. (Shade Foods, Inc. 

v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 

Cal.App.4th 847, 894, fn. 10.)
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DISPOSITION

The order awarding defendant her attorney fees is 

affirmed. Defendant shall recover her costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

 ________________________, J.

 CHAVEZ

We concur:

_______________________, P. J. 

LUI

________________________, J.

ASHMANN-GERST