PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

KEVIN DEAN YOUNG,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

WILLIAM D. CATOE, Director, South

No. 99-6

Carolina Department of Corrections;

CHARLES M. CONDON, Attorney

General, State of South Carolina,

Respondents-Appellees.

KEVIN DEAN YOUNG,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v.

WILLIAM D. CATOE, Director, South

No. 99-8

Carolina Department of Corrections;

CHARLES M. CONDON, Attorney

General, State of South Carolina,

Respondents-Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston.

Matthew J. Perry Jr., Senior District Judge.

(CA-98-1742-2-10)

Argued: December 1, 1999

Decided: February 29, 2000

Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge King wrote the opinion, in

which Judge Williams and Judge Michael joined.

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COUNSEL

ARGUED: Daniel J. Westbrook, NELSON, MULLINS, RILEY &

SCARBOROUGH, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. William

Edgar Salter, III, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, South

Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: John D. Delgado, Columbia,

South Carolina, for Appellant. Charles M. Condon, Attorney General,

John W. McIntosh, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Donald J.

Zelenka, Assistant Deputy Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

KING, Circuit Judge:

Kevin Dean Young, imprisoned in South Carolina under a sentence

of death, appeals the district court's denial of his application for a writ

of habeas corpus. The lower court rejected Young's claims that (1) his

lawyer rendered ineffective assistance during the guilt phase of

Young's murder trial; and (2) his death sentence was arbitrarily and

capriciously imposed because the sentencing court declined to instruct

the jury that the alternative of life imprisonment would ensure that

Young served a minimum of thirty years. We agree with the district

court that Young is not in custody in violation of the Constitution or

laws of the United States, and we therefore affirm the judgment

below.

I.

A.

Not long after nightfall on August 31, 1988, Young and two

cohorts -- William Bell and John Glenn -- accosted Dennis Hepler

on the grounds of the West Franklin Street Elementary School in

 2
Anderson, South Carolina. Hepler, the school's principal, was working late that evening. During this encounter, Hepler was fatally shot

in the back with a .25 caliber pistol. Young and the others fled the

scene with Hepler's wallet, which contained less than seventy dollars.

Young was soon apprehended and charged with murder, of which

he was convicted by a jury on May 18, 1989. That same jury subsequently found Young to have murdered Hepler in the commission of

an armed robbery, and it recommended that Young be sentenced to

death. See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1)(d) (formerly (1)(e))

(West Supp. 1999) (specifying "robbery while armed with a deadly

weapon" as a statutory aggravating circumstance justifying imposition

of the death penalty upon conviction of murder). The trial court sentenced Young in accordance with the jury's recommendation, but that

sentence was vacated on appeal because of numerous evidentiary

errors infecting the sentencing phase. See State v. Young, 409 S.E.2d

352 (S.C. 1991) (affirming murder conviction but remanding for

resentencing).

In June 1993, the question of Young's sentence was presented to

a second jury. At the conclusion of those proceedings, Young was

again sentenced to death based on the jury's finding that Young had

murdered Hepler in the course of an armed robbery. The Supreme

Court of South Carolina affirmed Young's sentence, State v. Young,

459 S.E.2d 84 (S.C. 1995) ("Young II"), and the Supreme Court of the

United States denied review, Young v. South Carolina, 516 U.S. 1051

(1996).

B.

On May 22, 1996, Young filed an Application for Post-Conviction

Relief in the Court of Common Pleas of Anderson County, South Carolina (the "PCR Court"). Young later amended the Application, with

regard to which the PCR Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on

January 16 and April 9, 1997. On July 31, 1997, the PCR Court

entered a lengthy "Order of Dismissal" denying the Application with

prejudice. Young petitioned for review of the PCR Court's order, but

the Supreme Court of South Carolina denied certiorari on May 15,

1998.

 3
With the possibility of state relief thus foreclosed, Young filed this

application for a federal writ of habeas corpus in the district court on

July 29, 1998. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (conferring jurisdiction on the

federal courts to consider the claims of those in state custody that

their confinement is "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States"). In reply, the Director of the South Carolina

Department of Corrections1 and the state's Attorney General ("the

respondents") moved for summary judgment, submitting a number of

exhibits in support thereof.

The respondents' motion was referred to a magistrate judge for initial consideration, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). In his Report

and Recommendation filed October 28, 1998, the magistrate judge

concluded that Young's application should be denied. Young timely

filed written objections to the Report and Recommendation, requiring

that the district court review de novo the disputed findings and conclusions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

By order dated March 2, 1999, and judgment entered thereon, the

district court denied Young's application for habeas relief. The court

issued an expanded order ten days later, more fully explaining the reasons for its decision. On April 30, 1999, in response to Young's

motions for reconsideration and to alter or amend the judgment, the

district court amended its earlier explanatory order to correct certain

misstatements of fact contained within. The court's judgment in favor

of the respondents, however, remained unchanged. From the adverse

judgment of the district court and its final amended order of April 30,

1999, Young appeals.

II.

During the multitude of state and federal judicial proceedings that

have culminated in our review, Young's claims of constitutional error

have been whittled to two: (1) his lawyer's trial performance in several particulars fell short of the competence demanded by the Sixth

Amendment; and (2) the court's refusal at resentencing to instruct the

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1 On November 3, 1999, William D. Catoe, the current Director of the

South Carolina Department of Corrections, was substituted for the former Director as a party to this appeal.

 4
jury so as to correct its misapprehension of the term "life imprisonment" violated Young's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process,

with the result that the jury's decision to recommend a death sentence

was not sufficiently reliable to assure his Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Both claims were considered and rejected at the state level, the first by the PCR Court and the

second by the Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Regarding the ineffective assistance claim, the PCR Court concluded that Young's lawyer had competently pursued a trial strategy

designed to maximize the possibility that his client would eventually

escape a death sentence. The court opined that, even had counsel's

performance been deficient, Young had suffered no attendant prejudice because his own trial testimony virtually assured that the jury

would convict him.

With respect to the refused-instruction claim, the Supreme Court of

South Carolina declared that Young's eligibility for parole in the

event of a life sentence was irrelevant to the sentencing determination. See Young II, 459 S.E.2d at 87 (citing, inter alia, State v. Davis,

411 S.E.2d 220 (1991), for the proposition that"parole ineligibility is

not relevant to a jury's sentencing considerations," absent the defendant's future dangerousness being placed at issue). To the extent that

Young's parole status might have been relevant under the circumstances, the court characterized as "untenable" Young's contention

that the jury's knowledge thereof may have resulted in a more lenient

sentence. Young II, 459 S.E.2d at 87.

In the wake of the amendments to federal habeas law occasioned

by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA), our review of South Carolina's disposition of Young's

constitutional claims is considerably limited:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court

shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim--

 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

 5
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or

 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).2

If, as is generally true, no Supreme Court case is controlling as to

law and fact, habeas relief is warranted "only if the state court's resolution of a question of pure law rests upon an objectively unreason-

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2 Young maintains that the standard of review mandated by the

AEDPA amendments should not govern his ineffective assistance claim,

inasmuch as the PCR Court's Order of Dismissal adopted almost verbatim the state's legal memorandum in opposition to his Application for

Post-Conviction Relief. According to Young, the PCR Court's adoption

in toto of the state's position evidences the lack of a considered "decision" within the meaning of Paragraphs (1) and (2) of § 2254(d), the

existence of such decision being a prerequisite to the operation of the

statute. See Black's Law Dictionary 407 (6th ed. 1990) ("decision"

defined as "[a] determination arrived at after consideration of facts, and,

in legal context, law").

It is true that, with regard to opinions and orders rendered by the district courts within this circuit, "[t]he adoption of one party's proposed

findings and conclusions is a practice with which we have expressed disapproval on a number of occasions." Shaw v. Martin, 733 F.2d 304, 309

n.7 (4th Cir. 1984) (citing examples). Nonetheless, the disposition of a

petitioner's constitutional claims in such a manner is unquestionably an

"adjudication" by the state court. If that court addresses the merits of the

petitioner's claim, then § 2254(d) must be applied. Thomas v. Davis, 192

F.3d 445, 455 (4th Cir. 1999) (standard of review set forth in § 2254(d)

applies to all claims "adjudicated on the merits," i.e., "those claims substantively reviewed and finally determined as evidenced by the state

court's issuance of a formal judgment or decree") (citing Cardwell v.

Greene, 152 F.3d 331, 339 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 587

(1998)); see also Correll v. Thompson, 63 F.3d 1279, 1293 n.11 (4th Cir.

1995) (rejecting petitioner's argument that habeas court's factual findings were not entitled to presumption of correctness where court adopted

state's version verbatim).

 6
able derivation of legal principles from the relevant Supreme Court

precedents, or if its decision rests upon an objectively unreasonable

application of established principles to new facts." Green v. French,

143 F.3d 865, 870 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 844 (1999).

There is little dispute concerning the facts, detailed below, underlying South Carolina's determination that Young's claims lacked merit;

our focus instead is on the state's application of the relevant Supreme

Court authorities to those facts. We are charged with deciding

whether the South Carolina courts resolved in a reasonable fashion

the questions of "pure law" presented here.

III.

A.

Young was represented at trial by James Robert Mann, a former

prosecutor of considerable experience who had been retained by

Young's family. Mann soon discovered that the prospects for his client's acquittal seemed bleak. Following his arrest for Hepler's murder, Young had given an oral statement to the police admitting: "I

shot him. I'm the one who shot him. I pulled the trigger. William Bell

shot him, too."

Mann examined the autopsy report, which revealed that Hepler had

been shot twice, once in the back and once behind the right ear. The

latter bullet exited to the right of Hepler's nose, resulting in nothing

more than soft-tissue damage. The wound to the back, however,

proved lethal; that bullet pierced Hepler's aorta, causing him to bleed

to death.

Mann interviewed Young a number of times concerning the circumstances surrounding Hepler's death. On each occasion, Young

related that he had fired the first, fatal shot into Hepler's back.3 There-

_________________________________________________________________

3 See J.A. 1216 (state post-conviction testimony of James R. Mann). At

the PCR hearing, Young's recollection of these interviews stood in stark

contrast to Mann's. Young testified that he was unaware whether he had

inflicted the mortal wound (or even whether the bullet from his weapon

 7
after, according to Young, Bell seized the pistol and shot Hepler in

the head.

In South Carolina, murder is defined as "the killing of any person

with malice aforethought, either express or implied." S.C. Code Ann.

§ 16-3-10 (Law. Co-op. 1985). "Malice," in turn, is "the wrongful

intent to injure another and indicates a wicked or depraved spirit

intent on doing wrong." State v. Johnson, 352 S.E.2d 480, 481 (S.C.

1987) (citations omitted).

In light of the apparent facts and the applicable law, Mann decided

that the best course of action was to concentrate his efforts -- not on

Young's acquittal -- but on avoiding the imposition of the death penalty. At the PCR hearing, Mann described his thinking:

Q: What was your assessment of the strength of the state's

case against your client?

A: Well, I thought it was overwhelming. As I indicated

earlier, my -- I construed my job would be to save his

life.

J.A. 1219.

Toward his goal of saving Young's life, Mann decided to pursue

a strategy of being straightforward with the jury during the guilt

phase, attempting to thereby enhance his credibility and that of his client. Mann hoped that this approach would pay dividends at the sentencing phase, persuading the jury to accept his primary argument --

that Young's conduct, though reprehensible, was not so egregious as

_________________________________________________________________

had struck Hepler), and he steadfastly denied having told Mann anything

to the contrary. The PCR Court, however, concluded that Mann was a

truthful witness, while finding that Young's testimony lacked credence;

the court therefore adopted Mann's version of the events germaine to the

formulation of his trial strategy. Because the PCR Court's factual determination in this regard was not unreasonable, see 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(2), and has not been rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, see § 2254(e)(1), we must accept Mann's testimony as true.

 8
to merit a sentence of death. A key component of Mann's strategy

was to demonstrate to the jury that Young was not evil, and that he

was remorseful for the consequences of his actions. Mann therefore

thought it necessary that Young testify in his own defense, a decision

in which Young fully concurred.

Armed with his strategy of conciliation, Mann addressed the jury

at the commencement of trial:

Mr. Foreman, ladies and gentlemen, this case is going to be

different. You're going to find that the defense is just as

interested in getting at the truth as the State is .. . . You're

going to find in this case that this is a . . . situational development that resulted in the unfortunate death of Dennis

Hepler. No planning. No malice aforethought . . . . The

codefendant [sic] fired what is somewhat admittedly an

intentional shot, intended to kill. But it will be our contention that the shot fired by this defendant, admittedly the fatal

shot, was very questionable in its intent for various reasons

which you'll hear.

J.A. 666-67 (emphasis added). Later on, Mann returned to the question of Young's intent:

Now, when I use the language to you of a situational killing,

we're talking about a situation where there was no malice

aforethought . . . . The law requires him to plead not guilty.

He's guilty. He acknowledges his guilt. Technically he's

guilty. Morally he's guilty. Because in a situation like that,

you're presumed to intend the consequences of your act.

The hand of one tends to be hand of all . . . . The use of a

deadly weapon causes an implication of malice just by the

fact that it's a weapon. You don't have to say I'm mean and

I've got malice in my heart . . . . [I]t's implied that you have

malice if a gun was used. So, that element is supplied.

J.A. 670 (emphasis added). Mann then continued:

But when we look at murder . . . we think of planning, malicious intent. The fellow that goes in and robs a 24-hour

 9
store, he attempts to do what he's doing. It's not forced on

him by circumstances. It's not contributed to by other people. It's not contributed to by three boys drinking and wandering around engaged in minor degrees of devilness.

* * *

We don't dispute the basic circumstances which the State

found. We congratulate the law enforcement officers for

doing a good job in that connection. It's just our position

that this is not the type of case where we need to take

another life in order for justice to be done.

J.A. 670-71.

Unfortunately, Mann's opening presentation contained two stark

misstatements of South Carolina law. To begin with, any defendant

accused of a crime may enter a valid plea of guilty and forgo trial;

the state statute permitting conviction by guilty plea admits of no

exception for capital murder. See S.C. Code Ann. § 17-23-80 (Law.

Co-op. 1985); see also S.C. Code § 16-3-20(A) ("A person who is

convicted of or pleads guilty to murder must be punished by death,

by imprisonment for life, or by a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for thirty years.") (West Supp. 1999) (emphasis added).

Secondly, Mann's suggestion that the element of malice could be

presumed from Young's use of a deadly weapon was directly contrary

to the rule announced nearly six years earlier in State v. Elmore, 308

S.E.2d 781 (S.C. 1983), overruled on other grounds by State v.

Torrence, 406 S.E.2d 315, 328 n.5 (S.C. 1991) (concurring opinion

of Justice Toal, joined by a majority of the court). In Elmore, the

Supreme Court of South Carolina abolished the state's long-standing

practice of instructing juries in murder cases that the use of a deadly

weapon mandated a presumption of malice. Id. at 784.4 After Elmore,

_________________________________________________________________

4 In Gilbert v. Moore, 134 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 119

S. Ct. 103 (1998), we observed that the "presumed malice" instruction

unconstitutionally shifted the burden to the defendant with regard to an

essential element of the crime of murder.

 10
a jury could be instructed only that malice "may" be implied from the

use of such a weapon. See id.

The state's case-in-chief proceeded rapidly through eleven witnesses, just six of whom Mann chose to cross-examine at all, and

those but briefly. After the state rested, Mann called Young to the witness stand. Young described the encounter with Hepler as a chance

meeting, which degenerated into a confrontation when Bell grabbed

the necklace that Hepler wore and snatched it from his neck. As

Hepler started toward Bell, Young raised the pistol that he was carrying and pointed it toward the principal. Bell then demanded Hepler's

money; Hepler produced his wallet, and tossed it near Bell's feet.

According to Young, the critical moment arrived as Bell attempted to

retrieve the wallet:

A: Okay. So, he tossed the wallet towards Bell. Bell

turned, he had to walk to get the wallet. So, as Bell, he

turned to get the wallet, so I turned all my attention

towards Bell, which I still had the gun aimed, you

know. I was paying attention to Bell. Before I knew it,

the guy had swung. So, I kind of stumbled back on the

steps and I fell backwards, and the gun just went off

. . . . So, my friend Bell came and got the gun out of

my hand.

* * *

 I said, "John, let's get out of here, man." So, we started

to run. John [Glenn] then asked me, he said,"Kevin,

where's Bell at?" So we both stopped and turned

around. We saw Bell aim the gun and fire the gun also.

Q: Where was the man at that point?

A: He was laying down.

Q: All right. Could you see what part of him Bell fired at?

A: He shot towards his head.

 11
J.A. 798-99. After the prosecutor cross-examined Young, Mann summoned John Glenn to the witness stand. Glenn, however, invoked his

Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and offered little useful testimony. The defense then rested.

In his closing argument, Mann returned to the theme that had dominated his opening statement. In essence, Mann admitted that Young

was technically guilty of murder, but that he never planned to kill

Hepler. Mann implored the jury to consider that the crime that Young

had committed was "not the type of murder that society is going to

determine should forfeit one's life."

B.

1.

A petitioner seeking to obtain relief from his conviction or sentence

on the ground that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance must

make two showings. First, he must demonstrate that counsel's performance was indeed deficient, i.e., that his lawyer failed in some

respect to fulfill the role of adversary envisioned by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). Second, it must be shown that the petitioner suffered prejudice

attributable to counsel's deficiencies, i.e., that "counsel's errors were

so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose

result is reliable." Id.

Counsel's performance is evaluated with regard to whether it "fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness" under the circumstances. Id. at 688-90. The test is rigorous: "[A] court must indulge

a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide

range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant

must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the

challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." Id. at 689

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

With respect to the prejudice requirement, the petitioner "must

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

 12
different." Id. at 694. The level of certainty is something less than a

preponderance; it need not be proved that counsel's performance

more likely than not affected the outcome. Id. at 693. Instead, the

petitioner need only demonstrate "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694.

2.

The crux of Young's ineffective assistance claim is that Mann, during his opening statement, abdicated his role as advocate for the

defense by conceding: (1) that Young was guilty of the charge of

murder, including the essential element of malice; and (2) that Young

fired the shot that killed Hepler. Young contends that, had Mann contested the state's evidence tooth and nail, there was a reasonable probability that the jury would have convicted him of manslaughter

instead of murder.5

a.

i.

Our precedents plainly illustrate that counsel's concession of a client's guilt does not automatically constitute deficient performance.

Rather, we must heed Strickland's admonition to consider the totality

of the circumstances confronting the lawyer in order to accurately

evaluate the reasonableness of the conduct at issue.

In Clozza v. Murray, 913 F.2d 1092 (4th Cir. 1990), a capital

habeas proceeding, we addressed the petitioner's claim that defense

counsel had rendered ineffective assistance at trial by making a number of remarks intended to put distance between counsel and the petitioner, with the result that the jury may have perceived counsel to

have effectively conceded the petitioner's guilt. We acknowledged

that, under Strickland, a trial strategy designed to maintain counsel's

credibility with the jury could be reasonable, notwithstanding the possibility of short-term harm to the defendant. The lawyer in Clozza,

_________________________________________________________________

5 South Carolina defines manslaughter as "the unlawful killing of

another without malice." S.C. Code § 16-3-50 (West Supp. 1999).

 13
faced with "overpowering" proof against his client, id. at 1101, was

left with the sole hope of convincing the jury to accept his characterization of the evidence and ignore those portions of the defendant's

trial testimony inconsistent with an intoxication defense. We observed

that the remarks at issue

indicated to the jury that defense counsel understood the

gravity of the crimes as well as their horrible nature. Had

counsel attempted to pass the crimes off as anything other

than the atrocities that they were, his credibility with the

jury would most certainly become suspect. Thus, we conclude that counsel's remarks were consistent with his trial

strategy.

Id. at 1099.

Our subsequent decision in Bell v. Evatt, 72 F.3d 421 (4th Cir.

1995), makes the point more precisely. In that case, the petitioner's

lawyer, attempting to secure a guilty-but-mentally-ill verdict for his

client on charges of murder and kidnaping, explicitly told the jury

during his closing argument that his client was guilty of the latter. We

rejected the petitioner's claim that counsel had represented him ineffectively, noting that the evidence supporting the kidnaping charge

was "overwhelming," id. at 429, and that

[i]t was important for the defense to retain some credibility

so that the jury would be sympathetic to the defense witnesses testifying that Bell deserved mercy . . . .[T]he decision to pursue a GBMI verdict was a strategic one that Bell

and his trial counsel agreed to . . . . All indications lead us

to conclude that the decision to concede his guilt was a

rational one . . . . Id. at 428 (internal quotation marks omitted).6

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6 See also United States v. Leifried, 732 F.2d 388, 390 (4th Cir. 1984)

(counsel not ineffective for admitting defendant's guilt of individual drug

offenses where evidence was overwhelming and concession's purpose

was to persuade the jury that defendant was innocent of operating a continuing criminal enterprise).

 14
Clozza and Bell stand for the proposition that, on occasion, it is

best to risk losing the battle in the hope of winning the war. "There

is a distinction which can and must be drawn between a statement or

remark which amounts to a tactical retreat and one which has been

called a complete surrender." Clozza, 913 F.2d at 1099. As we thereafter recognized, "[s]ome remarks of complete concession may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, but tactical retreats may be

reasonable and necessary within the context of the entire trial, particularly when there is overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt."

Bell, 72 F.3d at 429.

In Clozza, it was necessary for counsel to retreat from being identified too closely with the cause of his client, if the latter were to stand

any chance of benefiting from the former's credibility. In Bell, it was

necessary for counsel to retreat from pursuing acquittal on the charge

of kidnaping, in order to increase the likelihood that the jury would

return a verdict of something less than unequivocal guilt of murder.

And, in the case now before us, it was necessary for counsel to retreat

from an unlikely acquittal of a patently guilty client, so that he might

attain the more realistic goal of saving the client's life.

That was, at least, the reasoning of the PCR Court, which found

that, in the face of "an overwhelmingly strong case" against Young,7

counsel felt that the best way to save [Young's] life was if

he gave the jury the appearance that he was willing for the

truth to come out concerning the murder and was remorseful

for his role in it . . . . Obviously, counsel's concession is

consistent with the overall strategy of conceding that

[Young] was technically guilty of murder but did not

deserve the death penalty.

_________________________________________________________________

7 In addition to Young's confession, detailed supra at 7, witnesses

placed Young in the vicinity of the school near the time of the shooting,

the murder weapon had been hidden just outside the front door of

Young's residence, and Young had told his mother that investigators

were accusing him of a "shooting at the school," when the officers had

not yet revealed the purpose of their visit to the family's home.

 15
J.A. 1738-39. The court concluded that "counsel's strategic decision

-- made only after investigation and with [Young's] express approval8

-- was reasonable." J.A. 1726.

With regard to the Sixth Amendment's requirement that trial counsel render competent assistance, the PCR Court's interpretation of the

applicable Supreme Court precedents is largely in accord with our

own, as evidenced by the similarities in circumstances, analysis, and

result between this case on one hand, and Clozza and Bell on the

other. Insofar as one could argue, however, that the PCR Court's decision is an extension of Strickland and its progeny beyond the limits

of what we have previously sanctioned, it nevertheless does not represent an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

Consequently, paying strict heed to the standard of review set forth

in § 2254(d)(1), we must uphold the PCR Court's conclusion that

Mann's concession of Young's guilt did not constitute deficient

performance.9

_________________________________________________________________

8 At the PCR hearing, Young denied having discussed with Mann any

trial strategy. As we observed supra in note 3, however, we are bound

to accept the PCR Court's contrary finding. Nonetheless, Young points

out that Mann's own testimony acknowledged that they discussed the

decision to "concede guilt" only to the extent that Mann promised Young

that his arguments to the jury would be crafted to Young's anticipated

testimony. Young's testimony, of course, established that he was guilty

of murder. See supra at 12. Hence, the PCR Court's finding of consent

has not been rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, and is not unreasonable.

9 It is of little moment that Mann also conceded the presence of malice.

As we noted supra at 9, malice is an essential element of the crime of

murder in South Carolina. By conceding Young's guilt of murder, Mann

necessarily conceded that Young acted with malice aforethought. In the

event that the jury might have ascribed unintended meaning to counsel's

concession, i.e., viewed Young as a malicious person within the lay definition of the term, Mann effectively negated that possibility by portraying his client in a positive light during the balance of his opening.

Further, to the extent that the prosecution's burden of proof was in danger of being ameliorated as the result of Mann's misstatements concerning implied malice, that danger was avoided as the result of the trial

judge giving a proper malice instruction prior to the jury commencing its

deliberations.

 16
ii.

We likewise sustain the PCR Court's ruling that Mann acted reasonably in admitting that Young had fired the fatal shot, even though

the state's evidence ultimately proved inconclusive on this point.

Given the defense theory that Young had more or less accidentally

discharged the pistol, Mann needed to associate Young's actions with

the shot to Hepler's back, rather than the execution-style coup de grce

administered afterward. The basis for Mann's argument was, of

course, what Young had repeatedly told him during their interviews,

which was later confirmed by Young's trial testimony that Bell had

fired toward Hepler's head.

Moreover, putting the state to its proof regarding who fired which

shot would have served little purpose, inasmuch as Young's conviction did not rest on his having actually inflicted the fatal wound. The

trial court instructed the jury consistently with South Carolina's "hand

of one, hand of all" doctrine: "[W]hen two or more persons aid,

encourage, and abet each other in the commission of a crime, all

being present, all are principals and equally guilty." State v. Hicks,

185 S.E.2d 746, 748 (S.C. 1971) (citation omitted). 10 The jury was not

_________________________________________________________________

We close our discussion of this section by noting finally Young's

remaining colorable claims of deficient performance, specifically that:

(1) during the hearing on the admissibility of Young's confession, Mann

failed to call a witness that would have corroborated Young's testimony

that he was intoxicated; (2) Mann engaged in little meaningful crossexamination of the state's witnesses; and (3) Mann's closing argument

compounded the errors that he purportedly made during his opening

statement, and was otherwise ineffective. We have fully considered the

PCR Court's disposition of all of these claims, and we conclude that no

relief is warranted under § 2254(d)(1).

10 In State v. Chavis, 290 S.E.2d 412 (S.C. 1982), the Supreme Court

of South Carolina stated:

When several people pursue a common design to commit an

unlawful act and each takes the part agreed upon or assigned to

him in an effort to insure the success of the common undertaking, the act of one is the act of all and all are presumed to be

present and guilty.

 17
instructed that, to convict Young, it had to first rule out Bell as the

deliverer of the mortal wound.11 In essence, then, Young had much to

gain and little to lose from Mann's "concession."

b.

Even were we persuaded that the PCR Court unreasonably applied

clearly established federal law in concluding that Mann's trial performance was adequate, we would still be constrained to deny relief in

this case because we can find no fault with the PCR Court's alternative holding that Young suffered no prejudice as the result of Mann's

allegedly defective representation. Put simply, Young's own statements admitted all of the facts required for a conviction, and those

statements were unaffected by the performance of his lawyer.

Young's statements were introduced through two sources: (1) the

arresting officer; and (2) Young himself. At trial, the officer testified

that the following exchange took place between himself and Young

after the arrest:

[Officer]: [H]e said that he and John Glenn and William

Bell, Jr. were together on the night of Wednesday, August

31st; he says that they all walked around to the West Frank-

_________________________________________________________________

Id. at 412-13 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Young contends that the language in Chavis referring to a common design or undertaking engrafted a premeditation requirement onto the "hand of one"

doctrine, an ingredient that he asserts is missing from the relatively spontaneous acts at issue here. We disagree with Young's premise. We read

Chavis to simply stand for the notion that, where a criminal act is in fact

perpetrated as the result of a deliberate plan or scheme, the "presence"

requirement of Hicks may be foregone and liability as a principal

imposed on those conspirators absent during the actual execution of the

crime.

11 Indeed, prior to Young's trial, Bell was convicted of capital murder

arising out of the same incident, notwithstanding that the evidence in that

proceeding indicated that Young had fired the shot that killed Hepler.

The trial judge in that case also gave the "hand of one" instruction. See

State v. Bell, 406 S.E.2d 165, 169-70 (S.C. 1991).

 18
lin Street School and they saw a car parked outside and they

went through the car. At that time Kevin Young said,"I shot

him. I'm the one who shot him. I pulled the trigger. William

Bell shot him too."

At that time I asked, "Why did you shoot him?"

And Kevin Young replied, "I don't know, man. I just shot

him. Bell shot him, too."

J.A. 774.

Between the statement to the officer and Young's in-court testimony (summarized supra at 11-12), Young admitted that: (1) he had

fired a shot against Hepler and hit him in the back; and (2) he shot

Hepler during the course of an armed robbery in which he was an

active and willing participant. Young's own testimony therefore

established that he shot Hepler while intentionally and wrongfully

holding the principal at bay so that Bell could rob him.12

Thus, from Young's undisputed statements alone, there was direct

_________________________________________________________________

12 The respondents, via the unnecessary vehicle of cross-appeal, assert

that the district court's judgment with respect to Young's ineffective

assistance claim should be affirmed on the alternative ground of procedural default. The respondents argued below that Whetsell v. State, 277

S.E.2d 891 (S.C. 1981), and related authorities barred federal collateral

review of state convictions where the petitioner had admitted guilt at

trial. The Supreme Court of South Carolina has since rejected that view

of Whetsell. See Johnson v. Catoe, 520 S.E.2d 617 (S.C. 1999).

Undaunted, the respondents now maintain that federal merits review

is foreclosed because Young's state petition for certiorari from the PCR

Court's denial of relief did not, within its broad allegations setting forth

the gist of the ineffective assistance claims, specifically argue that the

lower court's invocation of Whetsell was in error. However, when the

state filed its return to the petition listing the procedural bar ruling as an

additional sustaining ground, Young submitted a reply in opposition. The

district court ruled that, under the circumstances, Young's claim of ineffective assistance was properly exhausted before the state courts. We

agree.

 19
evidence that Young killed the victim in the course of an armed robbery -- an "aggravating circumstance" justifying the death penalty

under South Carolina law. We are convinced that there was no reasonable probability that the jury in this case would have returned a

verdict of manslaughter absent the purported errors of counsel.

We decline Young's invitation to presume prejudice from his counsel's trial performance. In an extraordinary situation, a petitioner may

be relieved of making a specific showing of prejudice in support of

his ineffective assistance claim. That approach, however, is appropriately limited to those rare cases where the petitioner has been denied

counsel at a critical stage of the court proceedings, or where counsel

"entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing[.]" United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-60 & n.25

(1984). Young was in no way denied counsel, and the latter situation

is not present here.

IV.

Young also contends that the resentencing court erred in refusing

to instruct the jury that, if the jury sentenced him to life imprisonment

in lieu of imposing a sentence of death, Young would not be parole

eligible for thirty years. In this regard, Young argues: (1) that his proposed instruction was mandated by Simmons v. South Carolina, 512

U.S. 154 (1994); and (2) that the absence of such an instruction violated due process, inasmuch as several of the jurors expressed confusion during voir dire about the meaning of "life imprisonment."

Young's first argument -- that his proposed instruction was mandated by Simmons -- is grounded in the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments. The Eighth Amendment, by incorporation through the

Fourteenth, prohibits the states from limiting the sentencer's consideration of any relevant fact that might cause it to decline to impose the

death penalty. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 824 (1991) (citation

omitted). More particularly, in Simmons, the Supreme Court held that

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a sentencer to be informed as to the probable duration of a "life" sentence

before it may decide on the alternative of death based on the defendant's future dangerousness.

 20
Simmons stands for the proposition that"where the State seeks to

show that the defendant will be a future danger to society, the presentation of the fact that the defendant will never be paroled and released

into the general public will often be the only way in which a violent

criminal can successfully meet the State's case." Roach v. Angelone,

176 F.3d 210, 220 (4th Cir. 1999). Because due process requires that

a criminal defendant "be allowed to meet the State's case against him,

. . . where the defendant is truly ineligible for parole, the Due Process

Clause entitles the defendant to inform the jury of that fact." Id. at

219-20.

We recently rejected the application of Simmons where the defendant would be parole eligible, however, noting that,"In a State in

which parole is available, the Constitution does not require (or preclude) jury consideration of that fact." Roach, 176 F.3d at 220 (quoting Simmons, 512 U.S. at 176). In evaluating Young's claim of error,

the Supreme Court of South Carolina similarly noted that it is up to

the states to determine which sentencing considerations are "relevant"

for Eighth Amendment purposes. Young II at 87 (citing California v.

Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1001 (1983)). The court then reaffirmed its rulings in previous cases that a defendant's eligibility for parole was not

a relevant factor that a jury ought to consider, holding that "Simmons

is inapposite as it involves a defendant's ineligibility for parole and

not, as here, information that the defendant would one day be released

from prison." Young II at 87 n.6.

We agree with Young that the State did, in fact, refer to Young's

future dangerousness at the resentencing phase (although the State did

so without specifically relying upon his future dangerousness as a

basis for seeking the death penalty),13 and that these references were

sufficient to place Young's future dangerousness at issue. Nonetheless, because there is no dispute that Young would have been parole

eligible in thirty years, we do not believe that the Supreme Court of

South Carolina's conclusion was unreasonable or that Young's claim

entitles him to habeas relief.

_________________________________________________________________

13 The Supreme Court of South Carolina noted that "[e]vidence was

presented concerning Young's character and his prior criminal record."

Young II, 459 S.E.2d at 87 n.4.

 21
Young's second argument -- that juror confusion necessitated his

proposed instruction -- also fails under the facts present here. When

asked on voir dire about the likely duration of a life sentence, one

juror responded that the defendant would serve "about twenty years."

A second juror answered that a person so sentenced would not necessarily spend the rest of his life in prison. All but two of the remaining

jurors also expressed an opinion on the matter; each believed that a

life sentence foreclosed the possibility of parole.

Although the district court subsequently refused Young's request

to inform the jury of the thirty-year minimum, the court did instruct

the jury that "the terms `life imprisonment' and `death sentence'

should be understood in their ordinary and plain meaning." J.A. 1929.

In other words, the district court -- by instructing the jury that life

imprisonment means "life imprisonment" -- effectively gave Young

more than he asked for, and any uncertainty on the part of the jury

in this regard should have been obviated by the court's instruction.

Juries are presumed to follow the court's instructions, see United

States v. Francisco, 35 F.3d 116, 120 (4th Cir. 1994), and we do not

believe that the Supreme Court of South Carolina's rejection of this

claim was unreasonable. Consequently, Young's petition for habeas

relief on this basis fails.

V.

Upon reviewing the parties' briefs and the arguments of counsel,

we cannot say that the Supreme Court of South Carolina unreasonably

applied clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States. Hence, § 2254(d)(1) admits of no ground

upon which relief may be granted Young.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Young is not entitled to

a writ of habeas corpus. The judgment of the district court is therefore

affirmed.

AFFIRMED

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