CLD

- 036 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 14

- 3173

___________ ANNUR HASHIM BEY,

Appellant

v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; THE JURY COMMISSION; DANIEL RENDIEN, JURY COMMISSION; JUANITA KIDD STOUT, TITLE UNKNOWN

____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 2

- 14

- cv - 03411) District Judge: Honorable William H. Yohn, Jr.

____________________________________ Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 November 14, 2014 Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : November 25, 2014 )

_________ OPINI ON *

_________

* This disposition is not an opi nion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2

PER CURIAM Annur Hashim Bey, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his claim with prejudice. For the reasons set forth below, we will summarily affirm.
I. In May 2014, the Philadelp hia Court of Common Pleas summoned Bey for jury duty. Bey replied with a letter requesting an exemption based on his religious beliefs and political views, relying on the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. The Jury
Selection Commission denied his re quest and noted that he could raise his objections when he appeared for jury duty. The Jury Selection Commission also warned Bey that “[f]ailure to obey this summons is punishable by fine and/or imprisonment.” On June 9, 2014, the day before his schedule d jury service, Bey filed this lawsuit, alleging that the defendants violated his free exercise rights. Bey sought compensation and permanent removal from the jury selection process. After granting Bey’s request to proceed in forma pauperis, the District Court screened his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The District Court then dismissed the case because Bey’s claim was invalid under current law and could not be cured by amendment. Bey timely appealed.
II. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U. S.C. § 1291, and our review of the District Court’s dismissal order is plenary. Allah v. Seiverling , 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).3

We will summarily affirm the District Court’s dismissal order because this appeal does not present a substantial questi on. See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. The District Court held that Bey’s free exercise claim failed under Employment
Division v. Smith , 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). We agree. Bey offers no basis to conclude that Pennsylvania’s jury service laws a re anything but “valid and neutral law[s] of general applicability” rationally related to a legitimate government objective. Id. ; see also Combs v. Homer

- Ctr. Sch. Dist. , 540 F.3d 231, 241

- 43 (3d Cir. 2008). Rather, Bey’s claim is precisely the kind of “ religious exemption[] from civic obligations” rejected in Employment Division v. Smith . 494 U.S. at 888

- 89. Because Bey’s claim is legally invalid under Supreme Court precedent, the District Court correctly concluded
that amendment would be futile. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dammann & Co. , 594 F.3d 238, 243 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Futility means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, the District Court di d not err in dismissing Bey’s complaint without leave to
amend. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp. , 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
III. There being no substantial question presented on appeal, we will summarily affirm

.