1 IN TH E SUPREME COURT O F THE ST ATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 Opinion N um ber: 3 F ili ng D at e: N ove m be r 20, 201 7 4 N O. S -1 -S C -3 5302 5 SARA CAHN, 6 Plaintiff- Petitioner, 7 v
. 8 JO HN D. BERRYMAN, M.D., 9 D ef

en dant- Re spon de nt. 10 ORI GI NAL PROCEEDI NG ON CERTI ORARI 11 N an G. N ash , D ist ri ctJu dg e 12 Law O ffice s of Felicia C. W eingartner 13 Felicia C . W eingartner 14 Alb uq ue rq ue , NM 15 Law Offic e o f Ci d D. Lop ez, LLC 16 Cid Dagw ard L opez 17 Alb uq ue rq ue , NM 18 Carm ela D . S tarac e 19 Alb uq ue rq ue , NM 20 for Pe tition er 21 Butt, T hornton & Bae hr, P .C. 22 E m ily A
. F ranke 23 Alb uq ue rq ue , NM1 Hin kl e Sh an orLLP

2 W illiam

P. Slattery 3 D an a Si m

m ons H ar dy 4 San ta Fe, NM 5 6 fo r Re spon de nt1 OPIN ION

2 NA KAM UR

A, Justice. 3 { 1} T he Me dic al Ma lpr ac tic e A ct ( MM A ), N MS A 197 8, §§ 4 1- 5- 1 to - 29 ( 1976 , 4 as am en de d thr ough 2015 ) fo re cl ose s any c au se of a ct ionthat do es not

a cc ru e w ith in 5 th ree years o f th e act o f mal p r a c t i ce. See § 41 -5 -1 3. I n th is c as e, w e cl ar if y the 6 co nto ur s of

the due pr oc es s ex ce pti on to thi s li m itatio n and h old that pl ai nti ff

s w ith 7 la te -a cc ru ing m ed ic al m al pr ac tic e cl ai m s, i. e. , c la im s a cc ruing in the la st tw el ve 8 m onths o f the thr ee -y ear re pose pe ri od, sha ll have twel ve m onths f ro m the ti m e of 9 ac cr ua l t o c om

m en ce sui t. 10 { 2} Petitioner Sar ah Cahn invok ed the due process ex ception bu t did no t file her 11 la te -accru ing m ed ic al m alpr ac tic e cl ai m a ga ins t R es po nd en t J oh n D. Ber rym an , M.D., 12 w ith in tw el ve m onths. T w en ty -o ne m onths e la pse d be tw ee n th e accr ua l da te of 13 Cahn’ s claim

against Dr. Berr

ym an and the date she filed suit against h im
. Thus, her 14 cl ai m is barr ed by S ec tio n 41 -5 -1 3. W e af fi rm the Co urt of

Appe al s and wri te to 15 cl ar if y the le ga l pr inc ipl es upo n w hic h our de ci sio n is ba se d. 16 I. BACKGRO UND 17 { 3} In 2006, Cahn soug ht treatm ent for pelv ic p ain at Lovelace Wom en’ s Hospital 18 in Alb uq ue rq ue . InMay 200 6, Cahn re cei ve d ape lvi c ultra soun d. T he ultra soun d2

1 report indicated that there w as a com plex m ass on Ca h n ’ s left ovary and noted th at 2 “ [a] m al ig na nc y

ne ed [ed ] to be ex cl ud ed .” 3 { 4} On Aug us t 8, 2 00 6, Ca hn co ns ul te d Dr. Be rrym an . Th i s wa s Dr . B errym an ’s 4 on ly app oi nt m en t wi th C a h n. A t tha t t im e, D r. Be rr ym anw orke d f

or S an dia 5 OB/G YNAssociates, P. C., in an office located in the Lovelace Wo m en ’ s Hospital 6 m ed ic al co m

pl ex . D r. Be rr

y m an re vie w ed the ultra soun d re port, but did not sc he dul e 7 a b io ps y . Rathe r, he e xa m ine d C ah n, di agnose d he r as ha vin g e ndom etri osi s, a nd 8 providedher w ith m edication for that conditio n intend ing th at s he return to his office 9 fo r a fo ll ow- up vi si t. Co ntr ar y to D r. Be rr

ym an ’ s int en tio n, Cahn n ev er r et ur ne d f or 10 follow-up car e. 11 { 5} On Se ptem

b er 2 2 , 2 008, while seeing an O B/GY N in Wy om ing for her 12 co nti nui ng p el vic pa in, Cahn l earn ed that D r. Be rr

ym anha d f

aile d to inf

orm he r of 1 3 t h e mas s o n h e r

l e f to v a ry. Furthe r te sts re ve al ed that Cahn ha d ov ar ian c an ce r, a nd 14 on O ct obe r 15, 200 8, she und er w en t a hy ste re ct om

y in N ewY ork. 15 { 6} Af

ter surgery , C ahn set out to sue Lovelace He alth Sy stem , Inc. , ( LH S) and her 16 do ct or s. She could not, however, rem em ber D r. Ber

rym an’ s nam e or prec isely when 17 he treate d her. Cahn took steps to discover Dr . B erry m an’ s nam e and the date of her 18 consult ation with h im
. She su bm itted record requests to various Lovelace health care 19 provider entities and o t h er m edical providers in Albuquerque, called one L ovelace3

1 en tity , a nd re que ste d expl an at ion of be ne fi ts fo rm s f ro m he r he al th i nsur er . B ut the 2 doc um en ts and i nf

orm at ionshe r ec ei ve d inr es pons e did not ide nti fy

D r. Be rr ym an . 3 Af ter Cahn retained counsel, addition al rec ord requ es ts wer e subm itted by counsel 4 on C ah n’ s be ha lf

to vari ous L ove la ce e nti tie s, but the r ec or ds r ec ei ve d inr es pons e 5 to those r eque sts sim ilarl y did not r ef le ct the c onsu ltatio n w ithD r. Be rr ym an . 6 { 7} O n Apr il 10, 2 0 0 9 , Cahn f ile d ac om pla int a lle gin g m ed ic al m al pr ac tic e ag ai nst 7 LHS and sev eral ot he r de fen da nt s. Dr. Berrym an was no t a n a med d e f en da nt . On 8 Jul y 1, 201 0, LH S pr oduc ed

r ec or ds i n r es pons e to C ah n’ s r eque sts f or pr oduc tio n 9 show ing that C ah n r ec ei ve d c ar e fr om D r. Be rr ym anon Augus t 8, 200 6. O n Ju ly 9, 10 2010 , e xactly

one wee k aft er re ceiv ing th ese re cords, Cahn filed an am ended 11 com plaint in which she nam ed Dr
. Berr ym an as a defendant and asserted a m edical 12 m al pr act ic e cl ai m ag ai ns t h im
. Be fo re pr oc ee din g f urthe r, w e pause to em

pha siz e the 13 dis posi tiv e fa ct s w hic h c anbe dis ce rn ed f ro m the f or eg oin g. 14 { 8} T he a ct

of m al pr ac tic e that C ah n a lle ge s D r. Be rr ym an co m

m itt ed oc curr ed

on 15 Aug us t 8 , 20 06
. Cahn’ s m al pr ac tic e cl ai m a cc ru ed on S ep te m

be r 22, 2008 , the da te 16 she dis co ve red that D r. Be rr ym andid not a le rt he r to the f

ind ing s in dic at ed

by the 17 May 200 6 ul tr as ound

r ep ort. Se e R obe rts v . Sw

. Cm ty
. H ea lth Se rv

s. , 1992-NMS C18 042, ¶ 27, 114 N
. M. 248 , 837 P
. 2d 4 42 ( “ [T ] he c au se of act io n acc ru es w he n th e 19 pla int if

f know s or

w ithr ea sona

ble dil ige nc e shou ld h av e known of the inj ur y a nd i ts4

1 cause. ”). Cahn’ s claim

accr ued ten and one-half m onth s before Augus t 8, 2009, w hen 2 the three-y ear repos e p eriod of Sec tion 4 1-5-13 was set to expire. Cahn sued Dr
. 3 Be rr ym anon July

9, 2010 , thr ee y ears an d el ev en m onths af te r D r. Be rr

ym an ’ s a ct

of 4 mal p r a c t i c e o c c u rr e d a n d o n e ye a r a n d n i n e a n d o n e - h a l f mo n th s ( mo r e t h a n t w e n t y5 one m onths) a ft er

Cahn’ s c la im

a cc ru ed
. Apic tor ial r ep re se ntatio n of the se e ve nts 6 is in cl ud edat t he en d o f th is op in io n a s Ap pe nd ix A. 7 { 9} I n t he S e c on d Ju di c i a l D i str i c tC ourt , D r . B e rrym a n m ov e d f or s um m ary 8 j u d g me n t a r g u i n g t h a t S e c t i o n 4 1
- 5
- 1 3 b arr e dC a h n ’s ma l p r a c t i c e c l a i m. The court 9 de nie d D r. Be rr

ym an ’ s m oti on c onc lud ing that a ppl ic at ionof

the statut or

y bar w oul d 10 violate Cahn’ s right t o d u e p ro cess as guaranteed by the United State s and New 11 Me xic o C onst itu tio ns. T he dis tr ict co ur t lat er de nie d D r. Be rr

ym an ’ s m oti on f

or 12 reconsideration on th e question of t he applicability of Section 41-5-13. Dr . B erry m an 13 then req u es ted that the court certify the statute-of-re pose issu e for inter locutory 14 ap pe al
. T he c ou rt ente re d an or de r ce rt if y ing the iss ue , but the Co urt of Appe al s 15 de nie d D r. Be rr

ym an ’ s a ppl ic at ion
. 16 { 10} The district c ourt then set the case for a j ury trial, but Cahn and Dr. Ber rym an 17 entered into a stipulated con ditio nal directed verdict and final j udgm ent, stating that 18 D r. Be rr

ym anw as li ab le to Cahn for m ed ic al ne gli ge nc e in the a m ount of $70 0, 000 1 9 b u tp re s er v i n g fo r ap p ea l t h e i s s u e o f w h et h erSe ct i o n 4 1 -5 -1 3 b arre dCa h n ’s5

1 m al pr act ic e cl ai m . The C ourt of Appeals, in a di v i ded opin ion, concluded that 2 Se c t i on 41
- 5- 13 di d bar C a hn ’ s c l a i m a nd r e ve r se d t he di str i c t c ourt , which had 3 “ ruled otherwise. ” C

a h n v . B er ry m an , 20 15 -NMCA- 07 8, ¶ 1 , 35 5 P .3d58 , ce rt. 4 gran ted , 201 5- N MC E RT -0 07. 5 { 11} Cahn p et iti one d f or aw ri t of

c er tio rari, whi chw e gr an te d, e xe rc isi ng o ur 6 j urisdictio n und er A rticle V I, Sec tion 3 of th e New Mexico Constitu tion and NMSA 7 1978 , S ec tio n 34 -5 -1 4( B) ( 1972 ). W e iss ue d th e w ri t t o c onsi de r whe ther the 8 ap pli catio n of

S ec tio n 41 -5 -1 3 to bar Cahn’ s m al pr ac tic e cl ai m vio la te d he r ri ght

to 9 due pr oc es s. 10 II. DISC US SION 11 A. Stand ard of R eview 12 { 12} “ T his Co ur

t’ s r ev ie wof

orde rs gr an tin g or

de ny ing sum

m ar y j udgm en t i s de 13 novo .” Za m ora v. St. V inc en t H osp. , 2 0 1 4
- N M S C
- 0 3 5 , ¶ 9 , 3 3 5 P
. 3 d1 2 43. 14 “ Sum m ary j udgm ent is appropriate i n the absence o f any genuin e is sues of m aterial 15 fact and where t h e m ovant is enti tled to judgm ent as a m atter of law. ” Id

. “ In 16 rev ie win g a n o rd er o n s umm ary jud gm en t, we ex am in e th e who le reco rdon rev ie w, 17 co nsi de ri ng the f

ac ts in a lig ht m ost

f av or ab le to the non m ovi ng p ar ty a nd draw ing 18 all rea sonable inferences in suppo rt of a tr ial on the m erits.” Id

.6

1 B. Se ct ion 41- 5- 13: t he M M A ’s S ta tu te of R ep ose 2 { 13} “ Lik e m an y

ot he r st at es , Ne w M ex ic o refo rm ed it s m ed ic al m al pr act ic e la ws 3 in 197 6 in respons e to a m uch discuss ed m edical m alpractice crisis.” Cumm ings v. 4 X-Ray Assocs. of N.M

., P. C. , 1996 -N MS C- 035, ¶ 40, 121 N
. M. 821, 918 P. 2d 1 321. 5 Survey ing th at crisis, the Court of Appeals observed that 6 [t ] he ins ur an ce cr isi s that pr om pte d the en ac tm en t of the MM A a ro se out 7 of a nationwide perc ep t i o n that m edical m alpractice insurance wa s 8 increasingly

becom ing un av ai l ab le. The specific event that triggered 9 co nc er

n inN ew Me xic o wa s the an noun ce d w ith dr aw al in 1975 of the 10 Tr avelers’ Insurance Com pany as the underwriter of the N ewMexico 1 1 Medical Society’s p ro fe s s i o n al l i ab i l i t y p ro g ra m . Tr av el er s ’ wi t h d rawal 12 j eo pa

rd iz edhe al th care pro vi de rs ’ pr ot ect io n aga ins t l ia bil ity c la im s a nd, 13 in turn, com

prom ised the legal rem edies available to health care 14 co nsum er s in

j ur ed by the ne gli ge nc e of

he al th c ar e pr ovi de rs . 15 B a k e r v . H e d s tro m , 201 2- N MC A -0 73, ¶ 22, 284 P
. 3d 4 00 ( ci tin g R uthL
. K ovnat, 16 Medical M

alpra ctice L eg i s latio n in New M exico , 7 N .M. L. Rev. 5, 7 (1976-77)), 17 aff’d on o the r gr ounds , 201 3- N MS C- 043, 309 P
. 3d 1 047. T he ins ur an ce c ri sis 18 prom pted c o n cerns abo ut the departure of m edical providers from Ne w Me xico as 19 w el l a s th e av ai la

bil ity of r ec ove ry f or N ewMe xic an s wh o suff er inj ur ie s r es ult ing 20 fro m m ed ic al m al pr act ic e. Se e id. 21 { 14} T he MM A sou ght to ad dr es s th is c ri sis by en sur ing that pr of es sio na l l ia

bil ity 22 ins ur an ce w as a va ila

ble to he al th c ar e pr ovi de rs in N ewMe xic o. S ec tio n 41 -5 -2
. 23 T he L eg isl at

ur e “ co nc lud ed that the pot en tia l f or am al pr ac tic e sui t be ing f ile d lo ng7

1 after th e ac t o f m alpractice wa s one of the reasons that insu rance carr iers w ere 2 w i thd raw ing from

m edical m alpractice liabilitycoverage. ” Cu mmings , 1996-NMS C3 035, ¶40
. T o a d d r e s s t h i s p r o b l e m , t h e L e g i s l a tu r e e n a c t e d S e c t i o n 4 1
- 5
- 1 3 a nd 4 precluded “ alm ost all m alpractice claim s from being brou ght m ore than three y ears 5 after the act of m alpractice .” Cu m m ing s , 199 6- N MS C- 035, ¶

¶ 39- 40. 6 { 15} Se ct ion41- 5- 13 p ro vid es a s f oll ow s: 7 No claim

for m alpractice arising out o f an ac t of m alpr ac t ice w hich 8 oc curr ed

sub se que nt to the ef

fe ct ive da te of the [M MA ] m ay be br ough t 9 agai ns t a he al th c ar e pr ovi de r unl es s f ile d w ith in thr ee y ears a ft er the 10 da te that the a ct of m al pr ac tic e oc curr ed

e xc ep t t ha t a

m ino r unde r the 11 full age of six y ears shall have until his nin th birthd ay in which to file. 12 This subsection
. . . applies to all persons regar dless of m inority or other 1 3 l e g a l d i s ab i l i t y. 14 Thi s p ro vi si on op erat es as a st atut e o f rep os e. To m lin son v. G eo rge , 15 2005 -N MS C- 020, ¶

8, 138 N
. M. 34, 116 P
. 3d 1 05. S ta tut es of rep os e ref le ct a 16 le gis la tiv e pol ic y

to ex tin gui sh, a ft er

the pa ssa ge of

ape ri od o f tim e, a ll lia

bil ity f or 1 7 c l a i ms n o tf

i l e db y t h e e n d o f t h e r e p o s e p e r i o di rr e s p e c t i v e o f w h e t h e r t h e c l a i ms 18 ha ve al read y accrue d or ha ve y etto accrue . Se e id. S ta tut es of r ep ose be ginto run 19 w he n a stat

uto ri ly de sig na te d eve nt occ ur s, “ w ith out r eg ar d to w he n th e unde rl y ing 20 cau se of a c t i o n a c cru es an d wi th ou t re ga rdto th e d is co ve ry of i nju ry or d am ag es .” 21 G arc ia e

x re l. G arc ia v
. L aF

arge , 1995 -N MS C- 019, ¶ 14, 119 N
. M. 532 , 893 P
. 2d 22 428; se e als o Re state m en t ( Se co nd) of Tort s § 899( g) ( A m . L awI nst . 197 9)8

1 (“ [S ] ta tut es [ of

r ep ose ] se t a

de sig na te d e ve nt fo r the statut or y pe ri od t o st ar

t r unni ng 2 an d th enpr ovi de that a t the e xpi ratio n of the pe ri od an y caus e of a ct ionis 3 barr ed
. . . . ”)
. “ Se ct ion 41- 5- 13’ s statut or ily de te rm ine d tr igg er ing ev en t i s . . . the 4 act of m edical m alpractice and does no t entail whether t h e inj ury has been 5 di sc overed.” T

om lin son , 200 5- N MS C- 020, ¶ 9 ( int er na l qu otatio n m ar

ks and c itatio n 6 om itt ed ). T his Co urt ha s c onc lud ed that “ the thr ee -y ear tim e lim it of Se ct ion41- 5- 13 7 es tabl is he s a r eas on ab l e ter m in at io n p oi nt form ed ic al m al pr act ic e cl ai m s.” 8 Cu m m ing

s , 199 6- N MS C- 035, ¶ 39. 9 C . Th e D ue P ro ce ss E xc ep ti on t o t he A pp lic at ion of S ec ti on 41- 5- 13 10 { 16} T he D ue Pr oc es s Cl au se s of the U nit ed St at es a nd N ewMe xic o C onst itu tio ns, 11 U. S. Const. am end. X IV , § 1; N .M. Const., art. II, § 18, p ro v ide the basis for an 12 ex cep ti on to th e ap pl ic at io n o f th e MM A’ s s ta tu te of r ep os e. G arc ia , 1995-NMS C1 3 0 1 9 , ¶ ¶ 3 5
- 3 6 ( c iti ng Terry v. N. M. State Highway Comm ’n , 198 2- N MS C- 047, 98 14 N
. M. 119 , 645 P
. 2d 1 375)
. O nc e a cau se of act iona cc ru es , it is subj ec t t o th e 15 pr ot ect io ns of d ue pro ces s. Se e G arc ia , 1 9 9 5
- N M S C
- 0 1 9 , ¶ ¶ 3 3
- 3 6 ( c i t i n g W

il son 16 v. Isem inger , 185 U
. S. 55, 6 2 ( 1902 )) ; se e als o T erry , 198 2- N MS C- 047, ¶ ¶ 9- 17. 17 Hen ce, Gar ci a he ld tha t du e pr oc es s r equir es that the pla int if f ha ve ar ea sona

ble 18 a m ount

o f t i m e i n w hi c h t o c om m e nc e s ui ta f

t e r a ny l a t e - a c c r

ui ng m edical 19 m al pr act ic e cl ai m

ha s ac cru ed
. See 1995 -N MS C- 019, ¶ ¶ 35- 36

. T his due pr oc es s9

1 ex ce pti on i s im

pli cate d, how ev er , onl y

if apla int if f’ s c la im a cc ru es la te w ith in the 2 th ree- y ear rep os e p eri od
. Se e To m lin son , 2005-NMS C-020, ¶ 23. D ue process does 3 not pr ev en t S ec tio n 41 -5 -1 3 f ro m c utt ing of

f cl ai m s th at are dis co ve re d a ft er the 4 th ree- y ear r ep os e p eri od ha s ru n. Id

. 5 { 17} Whe n am ed ic al m al pr ac tic e cl ai m a cc ru es la te w ith in the r ep ose pe ri od and the 6 plaintiff requires additional tim e bey ond th at period t o co m m ence suit, to w hat 7 am ount of ti m e is the pla int if

f en tit le d a s a co nse que nc e of due pr oc es s be fo re S ec tio n 8 41- 5- 13 e xti ngui she s th e cl ai m ? T hr ee c as es ha ve tou ch ed dir ec tly upo n th is 9 que sti on. 10 { 18} In G arc ia , the pla int if f’ s m al pr ac tic e cl ai m

a cc ru ed e igh ty -f ive day s be fo re the 1 1 e x p i r a t i o n o f

t h e M M A ’s t h r e e ye a r r e p o s e p e r i o d , a n d w e h e l d t h a te i g h t y- f i v e d a ys 12 is a c onst itu tio na lly

ins uf fi ci en t am ount of

ti m e fo r the pla int if

f to c om m en ce sui t. 13 See 199 5- N MS C- 019, ¶ ¶ 37- 38. I n Cu m m ing

s , by c ontra st, the pla int if

f’ s c la im 14 accrue d e ig ht een m on th s b efo re t he ex pi rat io n o f th e rep os e pe rio d, an d we 15 determ ined that eighteen m onth s was a constitu tionallyrea sonable am ount of tim e. 16 See 19 96 -NMSC -0 35 , ¶¶57 -5 9. A nd i n To m lin son , the plaintiff’ s claim accr ued 17 thirty -two m onth s before the expiration of the repose period, and w e determ ined that 18 th is was m os t ce rta in ly a c o n s t i tu ti on al ly reaso nabl e am ou nt of t im e. See 200 5-10

1 NMS C-020, ¶¶

3, 23. Expanding ou r inquiry bey ond th e MMAcontext, w e glean 2 ad dit ion al ins igh t i nto the a nsw er to the iss ue be fo re us. 3 { 19} N ewMe xic o a

ppe llate c ourts h av e uphe ld a s c onsi ste nt w ithdue pr oc es s th e 4 ap pl ic at io n o f st atut ory ba r s t h a t c r e at e li m it at io ns pe rio ds of o ne y ear. Se e Te rry , 5 1982 -NMSC-047, ¶

17 (“ W e have upheld lim itations periods as short as one y ear 6 w he n j ust if

ie d by spe ci fi c co ns id erati ons. ”) ; M art ine z v . P ub. E

m ps. R et
. A ss’ n of 7 N.M. , 2012-NMC A- 096, ¶¶ 15, 40-41, 286 P.3d 613 (ob servi n g that the one-y ear 8 deadline set forth in NMSA1978 , S ection 10-11 -14 .5 (A ) (199 7) “ functions like a 9 statute o f repose” and uphol ding the application of that statu tory provisio n as 10 co ns is te nt wit h d ue pro ces s) . Oth er jur is di ct io ns ha ve do n e t he same. Se e, e . g. , 11 Canadi an N. R

y. Co. v . E

ggen , 252 U. S. 553, 562-63 (1920) (concluding that a one12 y ear statut e of

li m itatio ns f

or a pe rs ona l inj ur

y tort ac tio n w as “ re ason abl y suf fic ie nt 13 to e nable a n or din ar ily dil ige nt m an to inst itu te pr oc ee din gs for
. . . [the ] pr ote ct ion 14 [o f his r igh ts] ” (e m

pha sis a dde d) ). T he S upr em e Co urt of O hio , w he n c onsi de ri ng 15 ana na log ous due pr oc es s e xc ep tio n to am ed ic al m al pr ac tic e statut e of re pose , sa id 16 that “ [a] rea s o n ab le tim e in which to bring a m edical m alpractice action was 17 de fi ne d .
. . a s one y ea r after the discovery of the m alpractice .” Gaines v. Pret er m18 Cleveland, I

nc. , 514 N. E. 2d 70 9, 716 (O hio 19 87) (em phasis add ed) (internal 19 quot at ion m ar

ks an d ci ta tio n om itt ed ). L im itatio ns pe ri ods of le ss than a y ear ha ve11

1 al so be e n u p h e l d as c on si st en t wi th du e p ro ces s. See F er guso n v . N. M

. Sta te 2 Highway Com m’ n , 198 2- N MC A -1 80, ¶ ¶ 12, 14- 15, 99 N
. M. 1 94 , 6 56 P
. 2d 2 44 3 (h old ing that the nin ety -d ay not ic e re qui re m en t of NM SA197 8, § 41 -4 -1 6( A ) (1 977, 4 as am en de d 2013) w ith in the T ort Cla im s Ac t does not de ny due pr oc es s be ca use it 5 is n ot unr ea sona

bly sho rt ); Litt lewolf v. Hodel , 681 F. Supp. 929, 939-40 (D. D. C. 6 1988 ) (co ll ect in g c as es up ho ld in g “ st atut es of l im it at io ns ba rri ng su it wit hi n s im ila rl y 7 sh or t p eri od s o f ti m e [i.e ., 18 0 days]”); Rob in Mi ll er, Validity of Medical Malpractice 8 Sta tut es of R ep ose , 5 A
. L
. R. 6th 133, § 18 (2 005 & Su pp. to the pr es en t) ( co lle ct ing 9 ca se s f ro m j ur isd ic tio ns that ha ve ad j udi cate d co nst itu tio na l ch al le nge s to ana log ous 10 m ed ic al m al pr ac tic e statut es of r ep ose ). F ro m

the se vari ous au tho ri tie s, w e dr awour 11 co nc lus ion
. 12 { 20} We h o l dt h a tt w e l v e mo n t h s i s ac o n s t i tu t i o n a l l y r e a s o n ab l e p e r i o do f t i me 13 w ith in whic h to f

ile a n a cc ru ed cl ai m re gard le ss of w he the r the c la im a cc ru es tw el ve 14 m onths or one day be fo re the ex pir at ion of the thr ee -y ear re pose pe ri od. O ur hol din g 15 shou ld not , how ever, be interpreted to m ean that twelve m onth s is the min imu m ti me 16 pe ri od tha t w ill sa tis fy due pr oc ess. O ur

de ci sio n to day

doe s no t pr ec lud e our 17 Le gislature from

shortening —or l e ng the ni ng
— the a dd i t i on a l t i m e p l a i nt i f f s w i th l ate1 8 a c c r u i n g c l a i ms r e c e i v e . T o e n s u r e t h a to u r h o l d i n g i s c l e a r , w e o f f e r s o me 19 ill ustratio ns o f the r

ule w e ha ve a rt ic ulate d.12

1 { 21} If a

m alpractice claim accr

ues (i.e ., the plaintiff discovers that she has suffered 2 m al pr ac tic e) tw el ve m onths p ri or to the e xpi ratio n of

the thr ee -y ear re pose pe ri od, the 3 plaintiff shall have the rem ainder o f th e repose period (twe lve m onth s) t o com m ence 4 sui t. I f, how ev er , the c la im a cc ru es six m onths p ri or to the ex pir at ion of the r ep ose 5 p e r i o d , t h e p l a i n t i f

f w i l l h a v e t w e l v e mo n t h s f r o m t h a t a c c r

u a l d a t e t o f

i l e h e r c l a i m, 6 i. e. , the r em ai nder

of the r ep ose pe ri od p lus a n a ddi tio na l si x m onths a ft er the 7 ex pir at ionof

the r ep ose pe ri od ( a tot al of tw el ve m onths)
. I f the c la im a cc ru es on the 8 last day of the repose period, the plaintiff shall have twelve m onth s from that last day 9 to file suit. T hese exam ples are off

ered to illustrate that a pl ai ntiff w ith a late10 ac cr uin g cl ai m sha ll ha ve tw el ve m onths f ro m w hic he ve r date the la te -a cc ru ing c la im 11 ac cr ue s to file sui t. Bu t the be ne fi t of a ddi tio na l t im e that this due pr oc es s e xc ep tio n 12 pr ovi de s inur es onl y

to pla int if

fs w ithla te -a cc ru ing c la im s, i. e. , c la im s a cc ru ing in the 13 la st tw el ve m onths o f the three -y ear re pose pe ri od. P la int if fs w ithc la im s a cc ru ing 14 in the f

ir st tw en ty -f

our m onths o f the r ep ose pe riod sha ll not be ne fi t f ro m thi s 1 5 ex c e p t i o n t o S e c t i o n 4 1
- 5
- 1 3 a s c l a i m s t h a t a c c r u e i n t h a t t i m e p e r i o d ar e not“ la te 16 ac cr uin g. ” A ddi tio na lly , S ec tio n 41-5 -1 3 exti ngui she s any cl ai m a cc ru ing a ft er

the 17 thr ee -y ear re pose pe ri od h as e xpi re d. 18 { 22} W e re cognize that our deci s ion to grant plaintiffs with late-a ccruing m edical 19 m al pr ac tic e cl ai m s atw el ve -m onth pe ri od in w hic h to fi le tho se cl ai m s is i nc onsi ste nt13

1 w ith G arc ia wher e w e determ ined that a plaintiff with a late- accru i n g m edical 2 m al pr ac tic e cl ai m w oul d re ce ive the be ne fi t of the statut e of

li m itatio ns whic h w oul d 3 ha ve be enappl ic ab le ha d Secti on 4 1- 5- 13 n ev er be ene na ct ed
. 199 5- N MS C- 019, 4 ¶ 37. W e now overr

ule this sp ecific portion of G arc ia
. H av in g esta bli she d th e 5 p ri n ci p l es t h at g u i d e o u r a n al ysi s , we n ee do n l y ap p l y t h em to t h e f ac t s i n Ca h n ’s 6 ca se . B ef

or e doi ng s o, w e re spon d to the dis se nt. 7 { 23} The d i s s en t cl aim s that our ruling today is a form

of “ legislating ” that 8 “ en tangl es a nd im

pe ri ls f undam en ta l se paratio n- of -p ow er s j ur isp ru de nc e” a nd i s 9 inconsi stent with “ long standin g” due-process j urisprud en ce because the twelve10 m onth rule w e em

b ra ce applies “ in every

case r egardless [of] the circum stances 11 [presented] .” D issentin g Op. ¶¶ 53-54, 63, 74. Cle arly , w e disagree. 12 { 24} O ur

L eg isl at ur e ha s no t m ad e ac co m

m oda tio ns f

or pla int if fs , li ke Cahn, w hose 13 m ed ic al m al pr ac tic e cl ai m s a cc ru e la te in Se ct ion41- 5- 13’ s th re e- y ear re pose pe ri od 14 and who require a dditi onal t i m e b eyo n d the three-y ear period to file claim s. O ther 15 state le gis la tur es ha ve pr ovi de d su cha cc om m oda tio ns i n st at

ute of r ep ose c ont ex ts 16 ot he r th an m ed ic al m al pr act ic e. Se e, e . g. , A ri z. Re v. S ta t. A nn. § 12 -5 52( B) ( 1992 ) 17 (a llo w ing aone -y ear pe ri od f or the c om m en ce m en t of

sui t on cl ai m s ac cr

uin g inthe 18 fi na l y ear of

a n e igh t- y ear statut e of

r ep ose ); Ca l. Ci v. P ro c. Co de § 33 7. 1( b) ( W es t 19 1967 ) (a llo w ing aone -y ear pe ri od fo r the c om m en ce m en t of

sui t onc la im s a cc ru ing14

1 in the f ina l y ear of

af our -y ear statu te of

r ep ose ); Co lo. Re v. S ta t. A nn. § 13 -8 0- 2 104( 2) ( W es t 20 01) ( al low ing atw o- y ear pe ri od f or the c om m en ce m en t of

sui t on 3 cl ai m s a cc ru ing in the f ina l tw o y ears of

asix -y ear statut e of

r ep ose ). O ur 4 L eg isl at

ur e’ s in ac tio n is si gnifi cant. O nc e w e em br ac e the c onc lus ionthat C ah n is 5 en tit le d, a s ac onse que nc e of due pr oc es s, to som e add iti ona l per iod of ti m e be y ond 6 that pr ovi de d inth e MAA to ini tiate he r ac tio n a ga ins t D r. Be rr ym an , w e cr oss a 7 Rubicon of sorts. Whatever answ er we supply to the questio n “ To how m uch 8 addi ti on al ti m e, e xa ct ly , is Cahn e nti tle d?” w e ne ce ssari ly inj ec t our j udgm en t i nto 9 a sphe re oth er

w ise c ontro lle d by statut e and m ust en ga ge in the ty

pe of li ne dr aw ing 10 th atis be st ha nd le d i n t he fir st in st an ce b y th e Leg is la tu re. See H artfo rd Ins. Co. v. 11 Cl ine , 2006- NM SC -0 3 3 , ¶ 8, 140 N. M. 16, 139 P.3d 176 (“ The pre dom inant vo ice 1 2 be hin dt h e d e c l a r a t i o n o f p ub l i c p o l i c y

o f t h e s t a t e m

u s tc o m e f

r o m the 13 le gis la tur e . . . . ”)
. T he dis se nt c ont en ds tha t w e m ay m ini m iz e our

intru sio n by 14 re sortin g to “ ap pli ca

ble ba ck gr ound

statut e of lim itatio ns. ” D iss en tin g O p. ¶ ¶ 43- 44. 1 5 Wh i l e t h i s c l a i m h a s s u r f a c e l e v e l ap p e a l , i td o e s n o twi t h s t a n ds c r u t i n y. 16 { 25} Ina n e ar lie r se ct ionof thi s op ini on, w e not ed that our L eg isl at ur e en ac te d th e 17 MM A a nd i ts st at ut e of r ep ose , in part , to supp lant t he ve ry ba ck gr ound

statut e of 18 lim itatio ns the dis se nt i nsi sts shou ld c ontro l. I f thi s is so, the n a ppl y ing the 19 ba ck gr ound

statut e of lim itatio ns i s, if a nythi ng, the r es ult

m ost inc onsi ste nt w iththe15

1 L eg isl at

ur e’ s in te nti ons an d th e res ul t m ost intru siv e an d su sc ep tib le to cr iti ci sm 2 based on separation of po we rs principles. T his point see m s to have been overlook ed 3 b y Te rrya nd G arc ia
. N ei th er cas e pr ovi de s am eanin gf ul e xpl an at ionw hy

the 4 ba ck gr ou nd st atut e o f li m it at io ns sh ou ldap pl y . Te rrym erely notes that the j udiciary 5 doe s not “ se t appr opr ia te lim itatio ns per iod s. ” 1982 -N MS C- 047, ¶ 17. O ur de ci sio n 6 to extend to Cahn—and any other plaintiff with a l at e-ac cruing MMA c laim —an 7 ad dit ion al y ear fr om

the da te of

a cc ru al is not

“ se tti ng a

li m itat io ns pe ri od. ” T he 8 lim itatio ns p er iod , or

m or e ac curate ly

the r ep ose pe ri od, in the MM A is thr ee y ears . 9 O ur opi nio n to day

doe s no thi ng t o c hange thi s f ac t. T he ad dit ion al ti m e w e pr ovi de 10 pla int if

fs w ithla te -a cc ru ing c la im s is ac onsti tut ion al ly m an da te d e xc ep tio n to the 11 ap pli catio n of

thi s th re e- y ear pe ri od. 12 { 26} T he a sse rt ionthat the r ule w e em

br ac e fa ils to ac co unt

f or the part ic ular fa ct s 13 of ea ch ca se re fl ec ts a m isunde rs tandi ng of the ru le
. It is ne ce ssari ly

te the re d to the 14 facts of each case an d extends th e re pose period on e y ear bey ond th e acc rual date of 15 the part ic ula r la te -a cc rui ng c lai m at iss ue . T he r ule m ir ro rs a nd, thu s, is fa ith fu l t o 16 the structure of the MMAitself. Like any other MMA claim ant, plaintiffs w ith late17 ac cr uin g c la im s m

ust f ile w ith in a

f ixe d a m ount

of ti m e. I f they fa il to d o so , the ir 18 claim is lost. If our Legislature deter m ines that our r

ule is not faithful to the MMA 19 or f ai ls t o r ef le ct pol ic y it deem s m ost

w ise , it is fr ee ( as w e ha ve a lr ea dy not ed ) to16

1 en ac t a

pr ovi sio n th at

r ef le ct s it s j udgm en t a

bou t th e m ost

pr ude nt w ay

to 2 ac co m m oda te pla int if

fs w ithla te -a cc ru ing c la im s. 3 D . C ah n F ile d He r Lat e- A cc ru in g Cl aim A gai ns t D r. Be rr ym an M or e Th an 4 Tw elve Mont hs Af ter It A ccru ed 5 { 27} Cahn’ s c la im

a ga ins t D r. Be rr

ym ana cc ru ed la te . A t the ti m e he r cl ai m 6 ac cr ue d, te n and one -h al f m onths r em ai ne d be fo re the e xpi ratio n of the r ep ose pe ri od. 7 Cahn f ile d su it ag ai nst D r. Be rr

ym an af te r the ex pir at ion of the re pose pe ri od. O ne 8 y e ar and n i ne and o ne - ha l f m onths—m ore than twe nty -one m onth s—elapsed between 9 the da te Cahn’ s c la im a ga ins t D r. Be rr

ym anaccr

ue d and the da te she f

ile d th e 10 am en de d c om

pla int in w hic h he w as na m ed

a s ade fe ndant. T hus, a t the ti m e Cahn 11 co m m en ce d su it ag ai nst

D r. Be rr ym an , m or e than tw el ve m on th s ha d e la pse d f ro m 12 the da te that C ah n’ s c la im a cc ru ed
. Cah n has not ar gue d that D r. Be rr ym an ’ s id en tity 13 w a s frau du le nt ly con ceal edfro m he r. Se e To m lin son , 20 05
- N M S C
- 02 0, ¶ 2 14 (rec ogni zing that the statutory period of repose m ay be tolled when “ the plaintiff does 15 no t di sc ove r the a lle ge d m al pr ac tic e w ith in the statut or y pe ri od a s ar es ult

of the 16 defendant’ s fraudulent concealm ent.”). Ac cordingly , C ahn’ s claim against Dr. 17 Be rr ym anis barr ed

by S ec tio n 41 -5 -1 3. 18 III. CON CLU SION 19 { 28} Du e p ro ce s s d o es n o tp re cl u d e ap p l i ca t i o n o f S ec t i o n 4 1 -5 -1 3 t o b arCa h n ’s 20 cl ai m a ga ins t D r. Be rr

ym an . W e af

fi rm the Co urt of

Appe al s an d rem and to the17

1 district court for the entry of fin al j udgm ent or any further proce edings th e court 2 d e e ms n e c e s s a ry. 3 { 29} IT IS SO ORD ERE D
.

4

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ 5 JUD ITH K. NA KAM UR A, Ch ief Justice

6 WE CO NCUR:

7

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 8 CHA RLE S W. DA NIEL S, Justice

9

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 10 BARBAR

A J. VIGIL, Justice 11 EDWA RD L. CH ÁV EZ , Just ice, specially concur ring 12 PE TRAJIMEN EZMA ES, Justice, dissentin g18

1 CHÁ VEZ , Just ice (c oncurr ing in resu lt). 2 { 30} I co nc ur

in the re sul t r ea ch ed

by the m aj or ity

of the Co urt. H ow ev er , I c an not 3 joi n i n t he ho ld in g t ha t “ pl ai nt iff s wi th lat e-ac cru in g m ed ic al m al pr act ic e cl ai m s . . . 4 sha ll ha ve tw el ve m onths fr om the tim e of ac cr ua l to com

m en ce sui t. ” Ma

j
. op. ¶ 1. 5 I am not persuaded byeither the m aj ority or the diss en t i n g o p inion that this Court 6 shou ld adopt a specific tim e period within which a plaintiff m ust file a law suit when 7 due pr oc es s c onsi de ratio ns are a t i ssu e. T he pol es tar qu es ti on in adue pr oc es s 8 an aly si s is whe the r re as ona ble ti m e re m ai ns a ft er

ac au se of

a ct iona cc ru es w ith in 9 which a plaintiff, exercising due dilig ence, can file his or her claim before it is tim e10 barred under a statute of repose. If the answer is y es, then the cla im m ust be filed 11 w ith in the statut e of re pose . If the a nsw er

is no, the n th e cl ai m

m ust be f ile d w ith in 12 a re as ona

ble ti m e af

te r the statut e of

r ep ose ha s ex pir ed
. Whe n r ea sona ble ne ss i s th e 13 es se nc e of

asub stan tive due pr oc es s c la im , due pr oc es s a bhor s th e ex pe die nc y

of 14 thou ghtless ness. By

necessity the due process analy sis has alway s been a fa ct-based 15 an al y sis w hic h take s in to a cc ount m or e than th e dat e tha t the pla int if f’ s c la im a cc ru es . 16 Tw elve m onth s fr o m when an action accrues under the Medical Ma lpractice A ct 17 (M MA ), N MS A 197 8, §§ 4 1- 5- 1 to - 29 ( 1976 , a s am en de d th ro ugh 2015 ) m ay pr ove 18 to be a reasonabl e am ount of t im e within which a plaintiff, exercising due dilig ence, 19 can f ile his or he r cl ai m . Bu t w he the r the am ount of tim e is r ea sona ble de pe nds on19

1 the co m

ple xity of the c as e ci rc um stanc es –not j ust w he n th e ca

use of a ct iona cc ru ed
. 2 Fo r ex am

ple , the c om

pli cate d m ed ic al pr ovi de r re la tio nshi ps tha t e xis t t oday , a nd the 3 d i fficultyin identify ing which doctor provi ded what tre atm ent, or interpr eted what 4 la b r es ult s, r ad iog ra

phs, or so on, m ay

m ak e tw el ve m onths c onst itu tio na lly 5 ina de qua te . N ev er

the le ss, be ca

use I c onc lud e that C ah n ha d ar eas on ab le ti m e to 6 br ing he r ca

use of a ct ionbe fo re the statut e of r ep ose e xpi red , I conc ur in the r es ult 7 r e a c h e db y th e maj o r i t y. 8 { 31} I al so do not ag re e w ith the dis se nti ng o pin ion ’ s su gge sti on tha t G arc ia e x re l. 9 Garcia v . L aF

arge , 1 9 9 5
- N M S C
- 0 1 9 , 1 1 9 N
. M
. 5 3 2 , 8 9 3 P
. 2 d4 2 8 , e s s e n t i al ly 10 re qui re s athr ee -y ear ac cr ua l statut e of lim itatio ns in MM A c as es w he n th e ca use of 11 act io n accru es wit hi n th e st atut e o f rep os e. See dis se nti ng op. ¶¶ 48, 53. I n G arc ia , 12 thi s C ourt f

ound that eig hty -f

ive day s be fo re the statut e of r ep ose w oul d r

un w as too 13 sho rt a pe ri od o f tim e fo r the G ar ci as , w ho w er e the pla int if fs , to br ing alaw sui t 14 ag ai nst the de fe ndant . Id

. ¶ 37. Be ca use the L eg isl at

ur e ha d no t sp ec if

ie d a 15 re as ona

ble pe ri od o f tim e w ith in w hic h to br ing c la im s th at a cc ru e shor

tly be fo re the 16 runni ng of the statut e of r ep ose , in G arc ia this Court im posed th e three- y ear accr

ual 17 statut e of

li m itatio n of

N MS A 197 8, S ec tio n 37 -1 -8 ( Re pl. P am p. 19 90)
. 199 5- 18 NMS C-019, ¶ 37. T he G arc ia Cour t he ld that a s it appl ie d to the G ar ci as , S ec tio n 19 41-5-13 vi olated due process—the Court did not ho ld that the statute of repose w as20

1 uncons titutio nal on its face
. 1995 -N MSC- 019, ¶¶ 36-37. Nor did the G arc ia Court 2 holdthat Section 37-1-8 would be the controlli ng statut e of lim i t at i o n for MMA 3 ca s es . 1995 -N MSC- 019, ¶ 37. H ad it done so, I w ouldvote to ov errule G a rc ia 4 sim ply on the ba sis of

se paratio n of

pow er s. 5 { 32} Ina ddi tio n, the pr oc ed ur al his tor

y in G arc ia is re m ar

kably dif fe re nt fr om

the 6 ins tant c as e. I n G arc ia , the la te st a ct of m al pr ac tic e oc curr ed on Fe br uary 8, 198 9. 7 1995 -N MS C- 019, ¶

1. T he pla int if

fs ha d unt il Fe br

uary 8, 199 2 to f

ile alaw sui t. T he 8 ca use of a ct iona ro se out

of ac ar dia c ar

re st that oc curr ed

on N ove m

be r 16, 199 1, 9 le av in g t he pl ai nt iff

s o nl y eig ht y -fi ve da y s t o fi le su it un de r th e st atut e o f rep os e. Id

. 10 ¶¶ 1, 6, 13. On February 24, 1 992, the Garcias filed an application with the Medical 11 Re v i e w C o mm is si on . Id

. ¶ 1 . Un d ert h e p ro v i s i o n s o f S ec t i o n 4 1 -5 -1 5 (A ), “ [n ]o 12 m alpractice action m ay be filed in any court against a qualify ing health care provider 1 3 be fo re ap p l i c a t i o n i s m a d e t o t h e m e d i c a l r e v i e w c o m m i s s i o n a n d i t s d e c i s i o n is 14 rendered. ” T he s t at u t e o f repose is tolled “ until thirty day s after

the panel’ s final 15 decision is entered in the perm anent files of the com m issio n and a copy

is served 16 uponthe c la im an t and h is atto rn ey by c er tif ie d m ai l. ” S ec tio n 41 -5 -2 2; se e als o 17 G rant lan d v

. L ea R eg ’l H osp. , 199 0- N MS C- 076, ¶ 9, 110 N
. M. 37 8, 796 P
. 2d 5 99 18 (holdin g that the statute of repose is toll ed regar dless of the ou t co m e o f the ca se). 19 T he G ar ci as f

ile d th ei r cl ai m

a ga ins t the c or

re ct doc tor 109 day s fr om

w he n it21

1 ac cr ue d, o r s t a t e dd i f

f e r e n t l y , j u s ts i x t e e n d a y s a f t e r t h e r u n n i n g o f t h e l i m i t a t ion 2 period in the statu te of re pose. 3 { 33} Fi lin g an a

ppl ic at ionw iththe Co m

m iss iona s to one pr ovi de r doe s no t t oll the 4 lim itations period as to an o t h er provider who wa s not nam ed in the original 5 application and for whom the statutory period in which to f ile a cause of action has 6 pa ss ed
. See M

eza v. Topalo vski , 2012 -N MC A -0 02, ¶ 8, 268 P
. 3d 1 284. I m ak e thi s 7 l a t t e r p o i n t b e c a u s e C a h n f

i l e dac l a i m w i t h t h e C o mmi s s i o n , b u ts h e d i dn o tn a me 8 B e rryma n , w h i c h d e p r i v e dh e r o f t h e t o l l i n g p r o v i s i o n a s t o h i m. 9 { 34} Re gard ing the que sti on o f w he the r re as ona ble ti m e re m ai ne d a ft er

ac au se of 10 actio n a c c r

ue d w i t hi n w hi c h C a hn , e xe r c i si ng du e di l i ge nc e , c ou l d have f i led her 1 1 c l a i m b e f

o r e t h e r u n n i n g o f t h e s t a tu t e o f

r e p o s e , t h e f

o l l o w i n g a n a l ys i s p e r s u a d e s me 12 that the answer is y es. Cahn rece ived a p elvic ultrasound at W est Mesa Medica l 1 3 Ce nte r

o n M a y 1 9 , 2 0 0 6
. O n A u g u s t8 , 2 0 0 6 , s h e m e tw i t h D r . B e rrym a n a nd 14 providedhim a cop y of the wr itten ultrasou nd report. B erry m an neither ref

erence d 15 the f ind ing s in dicated by

the ultra soun d r ep ort no r sc he dul ed abio psy . I nst ea d, 16 Berr ym an exam ined Ca h n , diagnosed her as having endo m etriosis, prescr ibed 17 m ed ic at ionf

or that cond iti on, a nd a dvi se d C ah n to r et ur n to his of fi ce f or af oll ow -u p 18 vis it. S he did

not r et ur n f or af oll ow -u p vi sit
.17 See M aestas v. Zager , 200 7- N MS C- 003, ¶ 19, 141 N.M. 154, 152 P
. 3d 1 41 1 18 (describing the discovery rule as when a plaintiff knows or with reasonable diligence 19 shou ld have known of the injury and its cause, a lthou gh the rule does no t require that 20 the plaintiff discov er that the defe ndant’s ac tions constitu te m edical m alpractice )

. 22 1 { 35} U lti m at el y , a s r ef le ct ed in both th e m aj or ity an d the diss en tin g op ini ons, Cahn 2 kne wof

he r inj ur y a nd i ts c au se on S ep tem ber 22, 200 8. H ow ev er , she c oul d no t 1 3 rem em ber t he nam e of t he do c t or w ho c aus e d or c on t r i bu t e d t o he r i nj ur y , or when 4 he e x a m i n e d h e r . W e kn o w t h a t C a h n h a d u n t i l A u g u s t 8 , 2 0 0 9 t o d i s c o ve r the 5 identityof the doctor and sue him
. By De cem ber 2008, Cahn had re t ai ned couns el 6 to p ur sue he r m al pr ac tic e cl ai m . B ef or e re ta ini ng c ouns el , a s e ar ly a s O ct obe r 27, 7 2008 , w hil e re co ve ri ng f ro m m aj or sur ge ry , Cahn h er se lf be gan in ve sti ga tin g to 8 de te rm ine the ide nti ty

of the doc tor

w hom she be li ev ed ha d com

m itt ed the a ct of 9 m alpractice
. Did Cahn have health insurance at the tim e? If so, who did her insu rer 1 0 p a y fo r

t h e e v a l u a t i o n ? Di ds h e h a v e ac o - p a ym e n t o r a d e du c t i b l e s h e h a dt o p a y? 11 If she did , howdid

she pay it , a nd i s th er e a re co rd

of w ho s he pa id? 12 { 36} T he se que sti ons m igh t se em ob vi ou s in r etro spe ct , but Cahn h er se lf

kne wto 13 as k th e que sti ons. I n late 2008 Cahn con ta ct ed he r he al th insure r, L ove la ce H ea lth 14 Pl an , a nd r eque ste d he r ex plana tio n of be ne fi ts (E O B) f

orm s f or May , Jun e, a nd July 15 2006
. The doctor’ s identitywa s obvi ouslynot in th e re cords that Cahn rece ived 16 be ca use she sawD r. Be rr

ym anin A ugus t, 200 6. I t i s no t c le ar w hy Cahn o nly23

1 re que ste d E O Bs f

or onl y thr ee m onths. Ha d she re que ste d all of the E O B f orm s f or 2 20 0 6 s h e wo u ld have received an E OB dated August 23 , 2006, w hich identi fied 3 Berr ym an as the doctor who treated her on Augus t 8, 2006 . L ovelace H ealth Plan had 4 m ai le d th is E O B t o C ah n sh ortly a ft er she r ec ei ve d B er

ry m an’s m ed ica l se rv ic es . 5 Cahn’ s c re dit

uni on b an k st at em en t i n Augus t 2006 l ist ed Cahn’ s $3 0 c o- paym en t t o 6 Sandi a O B/ G YN , w he re Be rr ym anw orke d inA ugus t 20 06. 7 { 37} T his pr oc ed

ur al his tor

y pe rs ua de s m e that B er

ry m an ’ s id en tity

w as r ea sona

bly 8 ascerta inable within the tim e re m aining o n the statute of repose. T here is no evidence 9 that B er

ry m anw as c onc ea lin g, m

uc h le ss f ra udul en tly c onc ea lin g, his ide ntity. I 10 w oul d no t f

ind adue pr oc es s vi olatio n in th is case be ca use the ti m e w as not 11 unreasonablyshort for Cahn and her attorney s to identi fy Berr ym an in tim e to file a 12 lawsuit within three y ears f rom the occurre nce of the m alpractice
. 13 { 38} The harshness of t he result will b e trou bling to som e, but no t to oth ers. L aw 14 is a dve rs ar ia l and m or al ly a m big uous be ca

use both s id es m

ust m ak e ir re co nc ila ble 15 m or al arg um en ts, a nd o nly one sid e w ins
. R eg ar din g st at ute s of li m itatio n or

of 16 re pose , I a m

r em ind ed

of w ha t this Co urt st at ed

in Cu m m ing

s v. X -R ay A sso ci ates of 17 New M

exico, P. C. , 199 6- N MS C- 035, ¶ 37, 121 N
. M. 821 , 918 P
. 2d 1 32 1 (quo tin g 18 Ch ase Se cu rit ies Co rp. v. D onal dson , 325 U
. S. 304 , 314 ( 1945 ) (a lte ratio ns i n 19 original) (footnote om itted):24

1 T he re is no s ta tut e of li m itatio ns tha t do es not

pr ev en t som e ide nti fi ab le 2 c l a s s f

r o m l i t i g a t i n g i t s c au s e o f a c t i o n . S u c h a c l a s s i s a l w a ys 3 ch ar ac te ri ze d b y th e fa ct that i ts m em

be rs f ai le d to ti m el y

pur sue the ir 4 cl ai m . Whe the r thi s f ai lur e is thr oughc ar el es s ne gli ge nc e or inn oc en t 5 la ck

of inf orm at ionis ge ne ra lly ir

re le vant t o th e co nst itu tio na lity of the 6 tim e lim it. 7 [S ta tut es of li m itatio n] a re by

de fi nit iona rb itr ar

y , an d th ei r 8 ope ratio n do es not dis cr im inate be tw ee n th e j ust a nd the 9 unjust claim , or the void able and unavoid able delay
. They 10 ha ve c om e int o th e lawnot thr oughthe j udi ci al pr oc es s bu t 11 thr oughle gis la tio n. T he y r ep re se nt a

pub lic pol ic y

about 12 the privilege to lit i g ate. T heir shelter has never bee n 13 re gard ed as w ha t no wis ca lle d a‘ fundam en ta l’ r igh t or 14 w ha t us ed to be c al le d a‘ na tur al ’ ri ght of the ind ivi dua l. 15 [T he ind ivi dua l] m ay , of c our se , ha ve the pr ote ct ionof the 16 pol ic y

w hil e it ex ist s, but the his tor y of ple as of

li m itatio n 17 show s them to be goo d on ly

by le gis la tiv e gr ac e an d to be 18 subj ec t t o ar el at ive ly larg e de gr ee of

le gis la tiv e co ntr ol. 19 { 39} For exam

ple, had Mr. Garcia in the G arc ia v
. L aF arge case suff

ered his heart 20 attack eighty -six day s later, on February 9, 1992, his cause of ac tion wouldhave been 21 ti m e-b arre d, ev en th ou gh hi s ca us e o f act io n h adno t ac cru e d b e f o r e th en . See 22 To m lin son v. G eo rge , 200 5- N MS C- 020, ¶ 8, 138 N
. M. 34, 116 P. 3d 105 (“ [A ] statut e 23 of repose term inates the right to anyaction after a specific tim e has elapsed , e ven 24 tho ugh no i nj ur

y ha s y et m an if es te d its el f. ” (a lte ratio n inor igi na l) ( int er na l qu otatio n 25 m arks and citation om itted)). This Cou rt h as u pheld the constitu tionalit y of the MMA 26 statute of repose when the c ause of action accr ues after the statute of repose has 27 ex pi redag ai ns t b ot h a n e qu al pro te ct io n a nd a du e p ro ces s c h a l l e n ge . Cu m m ing s ,25

1 1996 -N MS C- 035, ¶

¶ 22- 42. Uphol din g th e co nst itu tio na lity of the MM A statut e of 2 repose in instances when the cause of a ct i o n ac crued af ter the statute of re pose has 3 expired necessarily

requires uphold ing its constitu tionalit y in the present case, wher e 4 Cahn h ad

r ea sona ble ti m e to b ri ng h er

c au se of a ct ion be fo re the statut e of r ep ose 5 ex pir ed
. 6 { 40} I r e s p e c t f

u l l y c o n c u r

i n t h e r e s u l tr e a c h e db y th e maj o r i t y.

7

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ 8 EDWA RD L. CH ÁV EZ , Just ice26

1 MA ES, Justice ( dissenting). 2 { 41} Beca

use I believe the teac h i n g s o f our prior ca ses, the r elevant statutory 3 structure, the nature of the due p rocess guarantee, and other fundam ental 4 co nst itu tio na l c onsi de ratio ns co unse l ag ai nst ad opt ionof the tw el ve -m onth r

ule the 5 m aj or ity

c re at es tod ay , I r es pe ct fu lly dis se nt. 6 I. Th e Te rr y–G ar ci a A na lys is 7 { 42} The principles of our prior ca ses sugg est we need not cr eate a new rule here. 8 Fo r ca use s of a ct iona cc ru ing w ith in the statut or y pe ri od— as Cahn’ s di d he re —our 9 cas es ha ve m ad e cl ear th e st atut ory rep os e fu nc ti on is typic al ly irrel ev an t; in st ead , we 10 m ust a nsw er tw o pr eci se du e pr oc es s- or ie nte d qu es tio ns r eg ar din g th e re m ai nin g 11 effe ct i ve li m it at io ns pe rio d fo r th e cau se aft er ac cru al
. Se e Te rryv . N. M

. Sta te 12 Highway Com m’ n , 198 2- N MS C- 047, ¶ ¶ 10, 17, 98 N
. M. 119 , 645 P. 2d 1 375 13 (e xa m ini ng te n- y ear re pose pe ri od f or c onstru ct ionde fe ct

sui ts)
. F ir st, be ca

use “ [t ] he 1 4 c o n s t i tu t i o n a l i t y o f s t a tu t e s o f l i mi t a t i o n h a s h i n g e do n t h e r e a s o n ab l e n e s s o f t h e t i me 15 providedto pursue a rem edy ,” id. ¶ 14, w e ha ve inv es tig at ed w he the r an d w he n th e 16 pot en tia lly

r em ai nin g e ff

ec tiv e pe ri od f

or f ili ng a c om pla int m ay be so “ ab br ev ia te d” 17 as to be co ns ti tu ti on al ly u nr eas on ab le
. Id

. ¶ 16. A nd whe re the pot en tia l pe ri od f or 18 fi lin g is unr ea sona

bly abbrevi at ed , w e not ed

in Te rry , w e m

ust a ddr es s ase co nd 19 critical question of wh at the appr opr ia te li m itatio ns p er iod f or the cl ai m m ay

be in the27

1 absence of a specific legislative presc ription in the repose provisi on o r r el ated 2 pr ov is io ns . Id

. ¶ 17. 3 { 43} In ve sti ga tin g th e se co nd que sti on i n Te rry , w e em phas iz ed th at “ it is n ot a 4 j udicial function to set appropriate lim itations periods.” Id

. In ste ad of c re at ing our 5 own ap pl ic ab le pe rio d, we b rie fly su rv ey edot he r le gi sl at iv el y -d rawn pe rio ds
. Id

. A 6 pe ri od a s sh ort a s asin gle y ear fo r ce rt ai n c au se s of a ct ion , we obse rv ed , m igh t 7 survive cons titutio nal scrutiny , when “ j ustified by specific considerations.” Id

. B ut 8 w he re “ the L eg isl at

ur e has not spe ci fi ed

asho rt er r ea sona ble pe ri od o f lim itatio ns” 9 fo r the spe ci fi c kin d of a ct ionbe fo re us, w e ad de d, our ta sk i s “ to ap ply

the pe ri od 10 pr ovi de d by the ap pli ca ble ” ba ck gr ound statut es of lim itati on s. Id

. A nd thus the 11 T e rry re sul t w as str ai ght fo rw ar d: b ec au se the c onstru ct ion -d ef ec t r ep ose pr ovi sio n 12 at is su e in Te rrygave no specific lim itations guidance and because the T e r ry 13 pla int if

fs ’ c la im s w er e ac tio ns f or wron gf ul death and p er sona l i nj ur y , w e sim ply 14 applied the legis latively -p re s cr i b ed periods for wr ongful d eath and personal injury 15 cau s e s o f a c t i o n , m

uc h a s o th er co ur ts ha d d on e atth e ti m e. Id

. ; see G aines v. 16 Prete rm-C

leveland , Inc. , 514 N
. E
. 2d 7 09, 716 ( O hio 198 7) ( ap ply ing ba ck gr ound 17 m alpractice lim itation p eriod in place of constituti onally pro b l emat ic m edical 18 m al pr ac tic e pr ovi sio n) ; M cM ac ke n v . Sta te , 320 N
. W
. 2d 1 31, 139 ( S. D
. 198 2) 19 (a ppl y ing ba ck gr ound

pe rs ona l i nj ur

y li m itatio n pe ri od i n pl ac e of c on st it ut ion al ly28

1 pr ob le m at ic co ns tru ct io n d efec t p ro vi si on ), ov errul e d o n oth er gro unds byD auga ard 2 v. Baltic Co-op. Bldg. Supp ly A ss’n , 349 N
. W
. 2d 4 19 ( S. D
. 198 4) ; H unt er v . Sc hool 3 Dis t. o f G ale -E ttr ic k- Tr em

pe ale au , 2 9 3 N
. W
. 2 d5 1 5 , 5 2 2 ( W i s . 1 9 8 0 ) ( a f f i rm ing 4 court of appeals decision appl yin g backgroundlim itation p eriod in place of m ore 5 specific period w ith const itutio nally problem atic application). 6 { 44} In Te rry , be ca

use both st at

uto ry ba ck gr ound

pr ovi sio ns e sta

bli she d li m itatio ns 7 periods of three y ears from the tim e o f ac crual and the plaintiffs’ claim s had accrued 8 ap pr oxi m at el y th ree m onths b ef or e ex pir at ionof

the te n- y ear re pose pe ri od f or 9 co nstru ct ionde fe ct cl ai m s, ap pli catio n to the pla int if fs ’ c la im s a dde d tw o y ears a nd 10 nin e m onths t o th e ef fe ctive l im itatio ns p er iod r em ai nin g un de r the c onstru ct ion

1 1 d e f e c tp r o v i s i o n . 1 9 8 2
- N M S C
- 0 4 7 , ¶ ¶ 9 , 1 7
. Ap p l i c a t i o n o f

t h o s e b a ck gr ound 12 statutory

provisio ns had the effect of giving the Te rrypla int if fs a de qua te ti m e to f

ile 13 and th e addit ion al e ff ec t of tr eatin g si m ilarl y

a ll pr ospe ct ive pla int if

fs f or w hom 14 actions accrue bef

ore the end of the period of re p o s e. Whi l e n either ef fect m erited 15 m en tio n in Te rry , I su gg es t the r es ult sho uld gui de our

a na ly sis tod ay

a nd i n th e 16 future. 17 { 45} In ear l y

c a se s e xam i ni ng t he e f

f e c to f N M S A 1 97 8, S e c t i on4 1- 5- 13 ( 19 76 ), 18 we had no troub le w ith, and no objection to, application of the basic Terry pr inc ipl es . 19 Se e, e . g. , G arc ia e

x re l. G arc ia v
. L a F

arge , 199 5-NMS C-019, ¶¶ 3 4-37, 119 N. M.29

1 532, 893 P
. 2d 4 28; Crumpton v. Hum ana, Inc. , 1983 -N MS C- 034, ¶ 5, 99 N
. M. 562 , 2 661 P. 2d 5 4. I n Cr um

pto n , f or e xa m ple , w he re ac au se of

a ct ionha d a cc ru ed

on the 3 da te of a lle ge d m al pr ac tic e an d the pla int if f fi le d sui t m or e than th re e y ears a ft er the 4 da te , w e m ar sha le d both Se ct ion 41- 5- 13 and the ge ne ra l pe rs ona l i nj ur y li m itatio ns 5 pe rio d i n s up po rt o f a co nc lu si on th e p la in ti ff’s s ui t was ti m e-b arre d. Se e Cr um pto n , 6 1983 -N MS C- 034, ¶

5. T he statut es r ea d intande m , w e co nc lud ed , “ cl earl y ind ic at e 7 that the statute of lim itations ” for purposes of these ca u s es o f action “ com m ences 8 running from

the date of in

jury or the date of the alleged malpra ctice .” Id

. ( em pha sis 9 in origin al). The m ost probable reason for application o f the genera l personal injury 10 lim itatio ns p er iod

w as c le ar : w e w er e re luc tant t o im pose our ow n bac kgr ound r ule 11 in the e ve nt S ec tio n 41 -5 -1 3 c oul d no t pr ovi de the r ule fo r de ci sio n un de r the 12 ci rc um stanc es . 13 { 46} W e re vis ite d th e q u e s t ionof the appl ic ab le li m itatio ns p er iod und er S ec tio n 41
- 14 5- 13 a ga in i n G arc ia , w he re w e ex pli ci tly a dopt ed an d a

ppl ie d th e tw o- ste p Te rry 15 inquir y fo r cl ai m s ar isi ng unde r the Me dic al Ma lpr ac tic e A ct ( MM A ), N MS A 197 8, 16 § 4 1- 5- 1 t o -2 9 (1 97 6, as am en de d th ro ug h 20 15 ). Se e G arc ia , 1995-NMS C-019, ¶¶ 17 29- 37. W e obse rv ed

that S ec tio n 41 -5 -1 3 inco rp or at es f unc tio ns o f both r ep ose a nd 18 lim itatio n, m

uc h li ke the c onstru ct ion -d ef ect pr ov isi on a t i ssu e in Te rry . G arc ia , 19 1995 -N MS C- 019, ¶

14. W e re ite rate d th at , f or pur pose s of the lim itatio n f

unc tio n,30

1 t h e c o n s t i tu t i o n a l i t y o f t h e p r o v i s i o n w o u l dtu rn o n t h e r e a s o n ab l e n e s s o f t h e t i me 2 pr ov id edforpu rs ui t o f ex is ti ng cau se s o f act io n. Id

. ¶ 3 4
. An y c o n s t i tu t i o n a l l y3 ap pr opr ia te li m itatio ns p er iod , w e not ed , “ ‘ m ust pr oc ee d on th e id ea

that the party 4 h as full oppo rtunity

aff orded him

to try his right in the courts.’ ” Id

. ¶ 33 ( quot ing 5 W ilson v. Isem inger , 185 U. S. 55, 62 (1902)). 6 { 47} Fa ce d w ithapla int if f in G arc ia whose claim

accr ued eighty -five day s before 7 the thr ee -y ear pe ri od e xpi re d, w e obse rv ed , m uc h as w e ha d in Te rry , that a statutory 8 provisi on allowing “ an unreasonably short pe riod of tim e w ithin which to bring an 9 accr ued c aus e o f

a c t i onv i ol a t e s t he D ue P r oc e ss C l aus e o f t he N e wM e xico 10 Co n s t itutio n.” G arc ia , 1 9 9 5
- N M S C
- 0 1 9 , ¶ 3 6
. T h a tt h e r e m a i n i n g e f f e c t ive 11 lim itations period for various potenti al claim s arising u n d er Section 41-5-13 was 12 unr ea sona

bly sho rt w as unqu es tio ne d bec au se the pot en tia lly e ff ec tiv e pe ri od w oul d 13 ha ve be enunr ea sona bly abbr ev ia te d f

or a ny “ cl ai m a cc ru ing ne ar

the e nd o f the 14 lim itations period.” G arc ia , 199 5- N MS C- 019, ¶ 36. 15 { 48} Having concluded appli cation of the rem ainin g lim itations period und er 16 Se ct ion41- 5- 13 w as c onst itu ti on al ly pro ble m at ic , w e tur ne d to the se co nd Te rry 17 inquir y of w ha t l im itatio ns p er iod

sho uld appr opr ia te ly

gov er n th e pla int if

f’ s c la im s. 18 G arc ia , 199 5- N MS C- 019, ¶ 37. In answ er ing that qu es tio n, w e re lie d on Te rry 19 ex cl usi ve ly , not ing , a s w e ha d in Te rry , that w hil e a co urt “ m ay de term ine that the31

1 lim itatio ns p er iod

se le ct ed is unr ea sona

bly sho rt , ” “ it is g en er al ly

am atte r fo r the 2 legislature to estab l i s h lim itations periods.” G arc ia , 199 5- N MS C- 019, ¶ 37. A nd 3 be ca use the L eg isl at

ur e had not of

fe re d som e othe r spe ci fi c lim itatio n per iod in the 4 MM A , w e co nc lud ed , m uc h a s w e ha d in Te rry , that the ba ck gr ound thr ee -y ear ru le 5 fo r pe rs ona l i nj ur y actions , r unni ng f ro m the da te of

a cc ru al , w oul d go ve rnthe 6 pla int if f’ s c la im s and, a s in Te rry , w o u l dh a v e t h e e f f e c t s o f a d d i n g s i g n i f

i c a n tt i me 7 to th e li m it at io n p eri od rem ai ni ng un de r th e rep os e p r o v is io n (app ro xi m at el y two 8 y ears a nd n inth m onths) a nd tre at ing sim ila rl y a ll cl ai m an ts f

or w hom c au se s of 9 act io n a ccru e p rio r to th e en d o f th e rep os e pe rio d. G arc ia , 199 5- N MS C- 019, ¶ 37. 10 { 49} Our Cu m m ing

s case c am e j ust a y ear after G arc ia , a nd i n Cu m m ing s w e ag ai n 11 expla ine d S ec tio n 41 -5 -1 3 in co rp or at es f unc tio ns o f both r ep ose a nd l im itatio n. 12 Cumm ings v. X

-R ay Assocs. of N.M

., P. C. , 1 9 9 6
- N MS C- 035, ¶ ¶ 47- 48, 121 N
. M. 821 , 13 918 P. 2d 1 321. A nd i n li eu of ex pl ic itly inv oki ng the tw o- ste p Te rry –G arc ia 14 analy sis , w e explained that the Cu m m ing s pla int if f co uld not be ne fi t f

ro m our 15 standard

due pr oc es s- ba se d li m itatio ns ana ly sis be ca use she ha d fa ile d to “ ex er ci se 16 dilig ence w hen she first learned she had been m isinform ed about the m ass in her 17 lu ng ” b y

th e d efen da nt . Cu m m ing s , 199 6- N MS C- 035 , ¶ 57. O ur a na ly sis 18 em ph as iz eda la ckof d il ig en ce . B u t d i li ge nc e as id e, Cu m m ing s c anbe sim

ply 19 unde rs too d a s y et

a nothe r ap pli catio n of

the tw o- ste p Te rry

–G arc ia a na ly sis
. S ec tio n32

1 41-5-13, we concluded, left var ious p otential claim ants an unreasonablyabbreviated 2 pe ri od o f tim e w ith in whi ch to pursu e ca use s of a ct ion , a nd thus Terry an d G arc ia 3 req ui redth atwe lo ok to th e rel ev an t b ack gr ou nd rul e. Cf . id

. ¶ 55 ( quot ing G arc ia , 4 1995 -N MSC- 019, ¶ 26). The Cu m m ing s ac tio n wa s an ac tio n f

or pe rs ona l i nj ur

y , a nd 5 th us th e th ree- y ear pe rs on al in jury p eri od ap pl ie d. Se e G arc ia , 19 95 -NMSC -0 19 , ¶ 6 37. And that wa s dispo sitive: because the Cu m m ing s action had accr

ued on February 7 23, 1990, the t hree-y ear legislative backgrou nd rule supp lied by the Te rry

–G arc ia 8 an al y sis w oul d ha ve giv en the pla int if f unt il Fe br

uary 23, 199 3, to fi le
. B ut h av ing 9 wa ited to sue the defendant un t i l De cem ber 7, 1993 , the plaintiff w as too late, at 10 ne arl y ten m on th s b ey on d e xp ira ti on of t he b a c k g ro un d ru le
. Cu m m ing s , 199 6- 11 N MS C- 035, ¶

57. 12 { 50} De spite the straightforward tea chings o f Te rry , G arc ia , a nd Cu m m ing s , a nd 13 desp it e de cades of

le gis la tiv e ac qui es ce nc e to those de ci sio ns, w e got of f tr ac k in 14 To m lin son v. G eo rge , 2 00 5- NMSC -0 20 , 1 38 N.M. 34 , 11 6 P .3d10 5. Cf
. Basic Inc. 15 v. L ev ins on , 485 U
. S. 224 , 230 -3 1 (1 98 8) (o bse rv ing “ [j ] udi ci al int er pr et at iona nd 16 ap pli catio n, le gis la tiv e ac qui es cen ce, and the pa ssa ge of ti m e ha ve r em ove d any 17 doub t” regar ding future application of past interpretive decisions ). W e avo ided 18 le gis la tin g inthe se e ar lie r thr ee c as es , an d a le gis la tiv el y -p re sc ri be d ba ck gr ound r ule 19 su pp li edth e ap pr op ria te rul e fo r de ci si on in each cas e. Glo ss in g ov er tha t h is to ry , we33

1 pr onounc ed

in To m lin son that Cu m m ing s had concluded “ that one and one-half y ears 2 is a co n s ti tu ti on al ly reaso nabl e p eri od of t im e wit hi n wh ic h t o fi le a cl ai m .” 3 To m lin son , 200 5- N MS C- 020, ¶ 23. B ut o f co ur se , w e put it ve ry dif fe re ntl y in 4 Cu m m ing

s statin g th at : 5 A t tha t t im e the re w as sti ll ab out ay ear an d aha lf

be fo re the statut e of 6 rep os e o n h er m al pr act ic e cl ai m ex pi red . Never th el e ss , she sat on her 7 rig

hts a nd d id n ot f

ile a ny c la im f or m or e than t w o y ears , on July 27, 8 1992
. B y

that t im e, a lm ost

f our y ears ha d pa sse d si nc e the 198 8 a ct of 9 m al pr ac tic e. S he did not sue X -R ay A sso ci at es unt il D ec em be r 7, 199 3, 10 m or e than five y ears a ft er the a ct . Cum

m ing s los t he r m edic al 11 malpractice claim through her own lack of dilig ence . 12 Cu m m ing

s , 199 6- N MS C-03 5, ¶

57 ( em pha sis a dde d)
. Why

that on e an d on e- ha lf 13 y ear pe ri od r ec ei ve d th e tr an spos iti on i t di d in To m lin son w a s a n dr e m a ins 14 une xam ine d. R eg ar dle ss, it is suf fi ci en t f or our pur pose s to day

to not e w e re fu se d to 15 im pose our ow n li m itatio n per iod

in Te rry , a nd i n G arc ia , a nd i n Cu m m ing s , be ca use 16 the statut or

y ba ck gr ound

r ule ha d su

pp li ed the r

ule f or de ci sio n in ste ad
. B ut i n 17 To m lin son , w e undi d th e an al y se s of tho se ca se s an d cr af

te d our ow n r

ule , c onc lud ing 18 “ tw o y ears a nd e igh t m onths i s aco ns ti tution al ly r ea sona ble pe ri od o f tim e w ith in 19 w hic h to f

ile ” a cl ai m . 200 5- N MS C- 020, ¶ 24. 20 { 51} Faithful application of the Te rry
– G arc ia a na ly sis w oul d have r equir ed the 21 oppo site result. T he To m lin son p l a i n t i f f ’s c l a i m wa s a g a i n o n e f

o r p e r s o n a l i n

ju ry, 22 and the three-y ear personal inj ury lim itation period shoul d have governed, m uch as34

1 i th a din Te rry , 198 2- N MS C- 047, ¶ 17, in G arc ia , 199 5- N MS C- 019, ¶ 37, a nd i n 2 Cr um pto n , 1 9 8 3-NMS C-034, ¶ 5. A nd appli cation of the legislatively -prescr ibed 3 three-y ear period sug gests the To m lin son pla int if f w as ti m el y : the cl ai m

a cc ru ed on 4 De cem ber 24, 1996, and she filed an application with the statutorily -cre ated m edical 5 re vie wc om

m iss ion , w hic h to lls the r

unni ng o f the lim itatio n pe ri od, on D ec em be r 13, 6 1999
. 200 5- N MS C- 020, ¶ ¶ 4- 5; see NMS A 1978, § 37-1-8 (1976). 7 { 52} T w o ob vio us o bj ec tio ns t o th at out co m e in To m lin son w oul d have a ri se n; b oth , 8 however, had been asked and answer ed in our prior cases. Filing outs ide the three9 y ear window provided by Sec tion 4 1-5-13 seem s at odds wi t h the basic statutory 10 langua ge —bu t as w e not ed in Te rrya nd a ga in i n G arc ia , “ co nsi de ratio ns o f fa ir ne ss 11 im plicit i n t h e D ue Proce ss Clauses of the United States and NewMexico 12 Co nst itu tio ns d ic ta te that w he n th e le gis la tur e en ac ts a li m it at io ns p er iod

it m ust 13 al lowar ea sona

ble ti m e w ith in whic h e xi st ing or a cc ru ing c au se s of

a ct ionm ay

be 14 brough t.” G arc ia , 1 9 9 5
- N M S C
- 0 1 9 , ¶ 36; ac co rd T

erry , 198 2- N MS C- 047, ¶

¶ 14- 15. 15 A nd tw o y ears a nd e igh t m onths m ay ha ve se em ed a ge ne ro usl y lon g pe ri od f

or 16 pur sui t of the cl ai m , but the statut e its el f al low s thr ee y ears f or e ar ly a cc ru ing c la im s; 17 the background period for personal injury actions allows three y ears; w e had applied 18 the ba ck gr ound

pe ri od bef

or e w ith out obj ec tio n f

ro m the L eg isl at

ur e; a nd a s w e ha ve 19 re pe at ed ly

e xpl ai ne d, “ it is n ot a

j udi ci al f

unc tio n to se t a

ppr opr iate li m itatio ns35

1 periods.” Te rry , 198 2- N MS C- 047, ¶ 17; se e G arc ia , 1995 -N MS C- 019, ¶ 37; ac co rd 2 Feld ha ke v. Ci ty of

Sa nt a Fe , 19 56 -NMSC -0 79, ¶ 33, 61 N
. M. 348 , 300 P
. 2d 9 34, 3 (“ The c ourts cannot legi slate .
. . .” ). 4 { 53} W e could rej ect, narrow , or find another justification for To m lin son , b u tmy 5 co nc er n he re is that th e m ajor it y ’ s r ec ap of the c as e lawput s th is h ist or y a sid e to 6 Cahn’ s gr eat de tr im en t, a nd this ne wtw el ve -m onth ru le e ntangl es a nd i m pe ri ls 7 fu nd am en ta l s ep arat io n- of -pow er s j ur isp ru de nc e. Se e, e . g. , D e G raf te nre id v

. Str ong , 8 1922 -N M S C
- 03 1, ¶ 8, 28 N
. M
. 91 , 20 6 P
. 69 4 ( “ C ourt s c a nn ot r e a d i nt o a n act 9 som ething th at is not within th e m anifest intention of the L egislatu re, as gathered 10 from the statute itself. To do so would be to legislate
. . . .” )

. De spite the To m lin son 11 pr onounc em en t r eg ar din g Cu m m ing s , w e have never in this context held, or even 1 2 c o n c l u d e d , t h a t“ e i g h t e e n m o n t h s i s ac o n s t i tu t i o n a l l y r e a s o n ab l e p e r i o d ” f

or 13 re qui ri ng the f

il in g of a cl ai m . I nst ea d, w e ha ve a ske d w he the r Se ct ion41- 5- 13 1 4 p r o v i d e s a n u n r e a s o n ab l y ab b r e v i a t e dl i mi t a t i o n p e r i o d f o r v a r i o u s p o t e n t i a l c l a i ms 15 an d, a nsw er ing that que sti on in the af fi rm at ive , w e ha ve m ove d onto the que sti on o f 16 w ha t l im itatio n pe ri od s houl d go ve rn fo r cl ai m s a cc ru ing be fo re S ec tio n 41 -5 -1 3 17 re pose appl ie s. T he a nsw er w as c le ar

in G arc ia , a s it

w as in Cr um

pto n —the 18 legislatively -suppli ed personal injury lim itation period governs those claim s where 19 Section 41-5-13 cannot—an d it provid ed the rule of decision for Cu m m ing s . T he36

1 an sw er is j ust a s c le ar he re , a nd C ah n sh oul d be ne fi t f ro m it
. H er c la im a cc ru ed on 2 Sept em

be r 22, 200 8, w ith in the S ec tio n 41 -5 -1 3 pe ri od; giv enthe ba ck gr ound 3 pe rs ona l i nj ur

y pr ovi sio n of thr ee y ears , she ha d unt il Se pte m be r 22, 201 1, to fi le ; and 4 she f ile d a ga ins t B er

ry m anon July

9, 201 0, w el l w ith in the thr ee -y ear de ad lin e 5 im po se d b y th e b ack gr ou nd pro vi si on . 6 { 54} The tw elve-m onth rule the m aj ority adopts ra ises two concer

ns. Fir st, in order 7 to c re at e thi s ne wr

ule , the m aj or ity

ove rr ule s G a r ci a b u t d o es so sua spo nte. 8 Majo rit y

Op. ¶ 2 2. Be ca

use no p ar

ty r eque ste d th at G arc ia be ove rr ule d and w e did 9 not r eque st b ri ef

ing , w e ar e ove rt

ur nin g pr ec ed en t w ith out the be ne fi t of stare de ci sis
. 10 Tr uji llo v . Ci tyof A lbu que rque , 199 8- N MS C- 03 1, ¶¶ 33-36 (“ St ar e de ci sis is the 11 j udicial obl igatio n t o follow prece dent, and it lies at the very core of the j udicial 12 pr oc es s of

int er pr et ing a nd announc ing la w” an d “ [p ] ar tic ular que sti ons m

ust be 13 co nsi de re d be fo re o ve rt ur nin g pr ec ed en t. ”) ; see State v. Riley , 20 10 -NMSC -0 05 , ¶ 14 40 , 14 7 N.M. 5 57 , 22 6 P
. 3d 65 6, (C há ve z, J., s pe ci al ly con cu rri ng , Bos so n, J ., 15 co nc ur

ri ng i n part

a nd d i s s e n t i n g i np ar

t , D an ie ls, J. , spe ci al ly

c onc ur ri ng) ( ex pla ini ng 16 stare de ci sis pr ev en ts this Co urt f ro m ove rr uli ng p re ce de nt whe re the part ie s have not 17 br ie fe d and s pe ci fi ca lly ar gue the r el ev an t f ac tor s to be c onsi de re d be fo re ove rt ur nin g 18 ou r pr eced en t). Se co ndl y , c re at ionof ane wr ule c onst itu te s th e k in d of le gis la tio n 19 w e sa id w e co uld

not c ra ft in Terry an d Gar ci a. Thu s I wo ul d n ot a d o p t i t h e r e. I37

1 w oul d a lso de cl ine to ap ply the r ule r etro ac tiv el y , b ecause w e cannot kno whow 2 C a h n ’s p u r s u i to f

h e r c l a i m w o u l d h a v e t r an s p i r e d h a d s h e kn o w n s h e h a dmo r e t i me 3 av ai labl e as sh e en co un te redex pi rat io n o f th e in it ia l l im it at io ns pe rio d. In st ead , I 4 would apply

the Te rry –G arc ia a na ly sis a s w e ha ve appl ie d it in the pa st; a nd h av ing 5 done that, I w ould reverse the court of ap peals decision and reinstate the conditio nal 6 ve rd ic t of

the dis tr ic t c ourt. 7 II. The S tatut ory Arc hitec ture 8 { 55} Even w ere we hesitant to appl y the legislatively-s u p plied three-y ear 9 ba ck gr ound

r ule de spi te the appl ic at ion s in Terry an d G arc ia and the ensuin g decades 10 of legislative acquiescence, I b el i ev e the MMAis design ed to obv iate the problem 1 1 t h a tp l a g u e dC a h n h e r e . T h e s t a tu t o ry s t r u c tu r e , i n o t h e r w o r d s , s u g g e s t s c l a i ms 12 ar isi ng i n th e post

ur e Cahn’ s di d he re ne ed not be sub j ec t t o th e Se ct ion41- 5- 13 13 repose. 14 { 56} The M MA m ad e various changes to the way our courts process m edical 15 ne gli ge nc e cl ai m s; am ong tho se c hange s w as the a ddi tio n of the Se ct ion 41- 5- 13 16 re pose pr ovi sio n w e ha ve giv enm uc h a tte nti on t oday . T he MM A a lso e sta bli she d a 17 “ m edical re view com

m issio n,” the f

unction of w hich “ is to prov ide panels to review 18 al l m al pr ac tic e cl ai m s aga ins t hea lth care pr ovi de rs co ve re d by the [ MM A ]
. ” S ec tio n 19 41-5-14(A). Af

ter the re quisi te review , the panel is tasked w ith decidin g “ (1) w hether38

1 there is s ubstant ial evidence that the acts com plained of occurred and that they 2 constitu te m alpractice ; and (2) w hether there is a reasonable m edical probabilitythat 3 the patient was inj ured thereby .” Sec tion 4 1-5-20(A)( 1)-(2). 4 { 57} T his r ev ie wis re qui re d for an y cl ai m s m ad e ag ai nst qua lif y ing pr ovi de rs li ke 5 Berr ym an; the MMA directs that “ [n] o m alpractice action m ay be filed in any court 6 against a qualify ing health care provider bef ore application is m ade to the m ed ical 7 review com

m issio n and its decision is rendered. ” Section 41-5-15. And t he review 8 is s ubst an tiv e. A n a

ppl ic at ionby

ac la im an t m

ust c ont ai n ( 1) f

ac ts, na m es , da te s, a nd 9 ci rc um stanc es , “ so far as the y ar e known, ” an d (2 ) a state m en t auth or iz ing “ ac ce ss t o 10 all m edical and hospi tal records and inform ation pertaining to the m atter. ” Id
. H ea lth 11 care pr ovi de rs inv olv ed ha ve r ec ipro cal obl igatio ns—the y m ust “ an sw er the 12 ap pli catio n f

or r ev ie w , ” an d th ey

m us t “ s u b m i t a s t at e m e n t auth or iz ing ” the r ev ie w ing 13 pane l “ to o bta in a cc es s to al l m ed ic al an d ho spi ta l r ec or ds and i nf orm at ionpe rt ai nin g 14 to the m atte r. ” Se ct ion41- 5- 16( B)
. E ve ntu al ly , the pane l m ust hol d ahe ar ing on the 15 m atte r; a nd p ost -h eari ng, sho uld the pane l conc lud e it sti ll la ck s r el ev an t i nf orm at ion 16 fo r pur

pose s of m ak ing the de te rm inatio ns re qui re d by statut e, the pane l “ m ay r eque st 17 that a ddi tio na l f

ac ts, r ec or ds, w itn es se s or oth er inf orm at ionbe obt ai ne d. ” S ec tio n 18 41- 5- 19( D ). R ec ogni zi ng the bur de n th is r ev ie wim pose s onthe c la im an t and 19 re co gni zi ng the ti m e an y r ev ie wof sub stanc e m igh t r equir e, our L eg isl at ur e bui lt int o39

1 the MM A atol lin g pr ovi sio n whi ch di rec ts tha t “ [t ] he r unni ng o f the appl ic ab le 2 lim itation p eriod” for these prof essional negligence claim s is tolled while the panel 3 ga th ers in fo rm at io n, re vi ews , and de li be rat es . Sect io n 4 1- 5- 22
. 4 { 58} T he pr ovi sio ns g ove rn ing thi s r ev ie wpr oc es s are ins tr uc tiv e in sev er al w ay s. 5 T he f le xib ili ty of the phr as e “ ap pli ca

ble li m itatio n per iod ” of

S ec tio n 41 -5 -2 2 inthe 6 tol li n g p r o v i s i o n a n d t h e ab s e n c e o f s p e c i f i c r e f e r e n c e t o t h e l i m i t a t i o n p er iodof 7 Section 41-5-13 are telling. The Le gislature surely knew how to incorporate r elated 8 pr ov is io ns by refe ren ce, an d d idso els ewh ere i n t he MMA. Se e, e . g. , S ec tio n 41 -5
- 9 5( A )( 2) ( m ak ing re fe re nc e to s pe ci fi c pr ovi sio ns i n S ec tio n 41 -5 -2 5)
. T he om iss ion 10 of a ny m en tio n of

S ec tio n 41 -5 -1 3 inthe ge ne ral langua ge of S ec tio n 41 -5 -2 2 11 sugg es ts the L eg isl at

ur e m ay w el l have und er sto od m

ult ipl e lim itatio n s pe ri ods m igh t 12 gove rnc la im s br ough t unde r the MM A
. A nd the e xis te nc e of the tol lin g pr ovi sio n 13 its el f re fl ec ts a

le gis la tive jud gm en t tha t S ec tio n 41 -5 -1 3 is not astandard

r ep ose 14 provisi on—repose per iods ar e ty pically “ fixed” and not to “ be delay ed b y es t o ppel 15 orto ll in g.” 4 Cha rle s Alan Wrig ht , Arth ur A. Mi ll er & Ada m N. Stei nm an , F

ed eral 16 Practice and Procedure § 10 56 (4 th ed. 201 5) ; see also CTS Corp. v. W aldb urger , 17 134 S. Ct. 2175 , 2183 (2014). 18 { 59} Mor e im

portant s til l are th e M M A ’ s i n f o r m at i o n -s ee kin g pr ovi sio ns. T he ba sic 19 pur pose s un de rl y ing c re at ionof the co m m iss ion an d re vie w sugg es t the inf orm at ion

-40

1 se ek ing pr ovi sio ns w er e de sig ne d to pr ec lud e th e probl em that aro se he re . T he 2 le gis la tiv e obj ect ive in cr eatin g th es e sc re en ing pane ls w as , ost en sib ly , to ex pe dit e 3 re sol uti on o f cl ai m s, w itha sso ci at ed goa ls of re duc ing the ove ra ll co sts of pr oc es sin g 4 t h e se cla im s an d p ro m ot in g ju di ci al effi ci en cy . See Je an A. Macch ia ro li , M edic al 5 M alp rac tic e Sc re en ing

P ane ls: Propo se d M

ode l Le gis lat ion to Cu re J

udi ci al I lls , 58 6 Ge o. W ash. L . R ev. 181, 186, 240 (1990) (“ [A ] ll state legislatures that have created 7 sc re en ing pane ls h av e done so f or e sse nti al ly

ide nti ca l r ea sons . ”)
. T he se pane ls, in 8 oth er w or ds, w er e cr eate d to sc re en , str eam lin e, an d fi lte r cl ai m s f or the part ie s and 9 the c ourts. E ff

ic ienc y ac ro ss b othle ve ls o f re vie w—pane l and c ourt— w as a 10 pr om ine nt g oal. A nd the se obj ec tiv es sug ge st the ti m el ine r eg ar din g id en tif ic at ion 11 of Be rr ym anhe re w as ( 1) e xc ep tio na l, a nd ( 2) not li ke ly th e ki nd o f tim el ine our 12 Le gislature intend ed to proscribe in establish ing the Section 41-5-13 re pose. O nce 13 Cahn had tim ely

filed w ith respect to Lovelace and som e o f th e o ther p roviders here, 14 the sc re en ing m ec hanis m sho uld ty pic al ly ha ve ide nt ifie d any

ind ivi dua ls 15 inv olv ed

—the statut or

y pr ovi sio ns m an da te that both part ie s auth or iz e ac ce ss t o a ll 16 re le vant i nf

orm at ion , an d the pa ne l has an ongo ing obl igatio n to se ek a ny inf orm at ion 1 7 ne ce ss a ry

f o r m a k i n g i t s d e t e rm i n a t i o n s . I n m o s tc a s e s , t h e y e a r - l o n g s e a r c h f or 18 Berr ym an in discov ery

shoul d then hav e b e e n unne c essary ; had the panel encount ered 19 the sam e ide nti fi catio n dif fi cu lty , a ca se fo r es top pe l or fr au dul en t c onc ea lm en t m igh t41

1 ha ve loom ed la rg e. A nd r eg ar dle ss whe the r tho se c as es c oul d be m ad e, nothin g in 2 the statut or

y pr ovi sio ns sugge sts the cl ai m an t shoul d suff er w he n th e pr ovi de rs a nd 3 pane l f ai l to sati sf

y the ir ow n id en tif

ic at ionobl igatio ns—the S ec tio n 41 -5 -1 3 r ep ose 4 is t oll ed

f or a s lo ng a s th e sc re en ing pr oc es s take s. 5 { 60} One obj ection to reliance on the statutory schem e for guidance m ay be that 6 with the exception of Berr ym an, none of the other providers w ere covered providers 7 here. The record does not clearly revea l the status of the oth er providers for us; w ere 8 it the case they we re all uncovered providers, no screening would have been required 9 unt il Be rr

ym anw as id en tif

ie d, a nd C ahn w oul d no t have be ne fi tte d f ro m the 10 inf orm at ion -p ro duc ing apparatus of re vie w . Bu t it w oul d be a t od ds w iththe goa ls 11 of both th e MM A a nd r ev ie wto sugges t the sc he m e is i nte nde d to e nc our ag e 12 affilia t i o n s b etwe en entities avoid ing th e burdens of qualification un der the MMA 1 3 a n dc o n t r a c t i n g p r o v i d e r s w h o g a i n i t s p r o t e c t i o n s , w h i l e a tt h e s a me t i me 14 en co ur ag ing the ba sic r el at ion al dis or ganiz at ion , dy sf unc tio n, an d op ac ity

giv ing r ise 15 to the identi fication problem here. T he point , w e h av e s aid, is to “ encourage m ore 16 ph y si ci an s t o c a rry ” in su ran ce—no t t o e nc ou rag e st rat eg ic an d o pa qu el y dra wn 17 rel at io ns hi ps wit h t ho se no t ca rry in g i ns ur an ce. G arc ia , 199 5- N MS C- 019, ¶ 24. 18 { 61} In ste ad , the ba sic le gisla tive pr ef er en ce f or f ilt er ing , a nd f

or de ve lop ing the 19 inf orm at ionr el ev an t t o, a s m an y of the se c la im s a s po ssi ble in re vie wsug ge sts a42

1 legislative un derstanding that the identification p r ob l e m and p r ot r a c t e d di sc over

y that 2 oc curr ed

he re sho uld

r ar el y , if e ve r, a ri se f

or qua lif ie d pr ovi de rs li ke Be rr

ym an. 3 Whe n th ose pr obl em s do a ri se a nd the ide nti fi catio n pr obl em is re le vant to r es olu tio n 4 of th e cl ai m , r ep ose is ty pic al ly tol le d. N oth ing in the MM A sug ge sts the r es ult 5 s h ouldbe differ ent for qualified providers when they aff iliate with non-qualified 6 pr ov id ers . Cf. Grantland v. Lea Re g’l Hosp., Inc. , 199 0-NMS C-076, ¶ 8, 110 N. M. 7 378, 796 P
. 2d 5 99 ( “ If w e req ui re cl ai m an ts t o f ile in dis tr ic t c ourt a t the pe ri l of 8 losin g their case before the classification of the health care provider is kno wn, then 9 ev er y c la im w ill be f ile d indis tr ic t c ourt a s asa fe ty pr ec au tio n, an d th e pur

pose 10 be hi nd th e [MM A]
. . . wil l b e d efea te d.” ). 11 { 62} Ba se d onthat ar ch ite ct ur e an d ba se d onthe sti pul at ionhe re of abse nc e of

a ny 12 co st c onc er

ns ari sin g f

ro m pot en tia l fr ivolity , sta le ne ss, que sti ons of c au sa tio n, or 13 di ffi cu lt ie s i n e st ab li sh in g m is di ag no si s b as edon ne gl ig en c e , I do no t b el ie ve we 14 shou ld c onc lud e the S ec tio n 41 -5 -1 3 r ep ose w as designe d to appl y to the 15 ci rcu m st an ces as t he y aro se he re. Co mpa re Cu m m ing s , 199 6- N MS C- 035, ¶

38 16 (j ustify ing appl ication of repose on groun ds that “ [c] laim s co u l d arise long after 17 m em ories have faded, parties becom e unavailable, and evidence is los t”).43

1 III . D ue P ro ce ss a nd C ir cu m st an ce -S pe ci fi c R ea son ab le ne ss 2 { 63} A nd m ost

im portantl y , th is n ew tw el ve -m onth r ule that i s to be appl ie d in 3 every case r egardless the ci rcum stances (w ith po tential carve- outs for other 4 ex ce pti ona l sc en ar ios li ke f ra udul en t c onc ea lm en t, w hic h C ah n do es not pr es s on 5 appe al he re ), is inc onsi ste nt w iththe lon gst an din g c as e lawe sta bli shi ng tha t du e 6 process protection requires circum stance-specific i n v estigation before w e m ay 7 ex ti ng ui sh a ve s t e d r i g ht
. Se e, e . g. , T erryv . A nde rso n , 95 U
. S. 628 , 633 ( 1877 ) 8 (c onsi de ri ng “ al l the c ir cu m stanc es ”) ; W ilson v. Is em inger , 185 U
. S. a t 63 ( 1902 ) 9 (“ [W ] ha t i s r ea sona

ble in a part ic ular ca se de pe nds uponit s part ic ular fa ct s. ”) ; Te rry , 10 1982 -N MSC- 047, ¶ 16 (exam ining potential appl ication of lim i t at i on s pe r i ods “ under 11 these fa ct s”); c

f. B urne tt v. N. Y. Ce nt. R

. R

. Co

. , 380 U
. S. 424 , 428 ( 1965 ) (“ T his 12 policy of repose, designed to protect defendants, is f requently outweighed, however , 13 wher e the interests of j ustice require vindication o f the plaintiff’ s rights.”). 14 { 64} A ny

c au se of ac tio n that ha s ac cr ue d a s S ar ahCahn’ s ha s he re is a “ spe ci es of 15 property

protected by

the Fourteenth Am endm ent’ s Due P rocess Claus e. ” Logan v. 16 Zi m m erm an B rus h C

o. , 455 U. S. 422, 428 (1982). Due process protection , the United 17 St at es S upr em e Co urt ha s of te n expl ai ne d, ge ne ra lly

r equir es that any

de pr ivatio n of 18 lif e, li be rty , or

pr ope rty be pr ec ed ed

by not ic e an d an o pp or tu ni ty t o be he ar d ina 19 m anner appro p ri at e for “ the nature of the ca se.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.44

1 Lo ude rm ill , 470 U
. S. 532 , 542 ( 1985 ) (c itatio n om itt ed ). I n th e co nte xt o f lim itatio ns 2 pe ri ods, w e ha ve ex pla ine d “ that statut es of lim itatio n m ay be pa sse d w he re f orm er ly 3 the re w er e none , an d e xis tin g li m itatio n pe ri ods m ay be r ed uc ed w hil e the ti m e is s til l 4 runni ng, ” but

due pr oc es s re qui re s that a “ re as ona ble tim e” be “ le ft

f or the ins tit uti on 5 of an action before it is tim e-barr ed.” Te rry , 198 2- N MS C- 047, ¶ 14; accord Sohn v. 6 W ate rso n , 8 4 U
. S
. 5 9 6 , 5 9 9 ( 1 8 7 3 ) ( “[ I ]f a n a c t i o n a c c r

u e dmo r e t h a n t h e l i mi t e dt i me 7 be fo re the statut e w as pa sse d ali te ra l i nte rp re ta tio n of the stat ut e wou ld ha ve the 8 ef fe ct of absol ute ly

barr ing suc h a ct ion
. . . . I t wi ll be pr es um ed that su chw as not 9 th e in te nt of t he leg is l a t u r e . Su ch an in te nt wou ldbe un co ns ti tu ti on al .”). Andwe 10 have extended ap p l i cation of that rule, im posin g it as “ an appropriate general 11 re str ic tio n onthe L eg isl at ur e’s rig ht t o st at

uto ri ly li m it ac tio ns” —ar igh t our 12 Leg is la tu re h as at te m pt ed to ex erci se in Sect io n 4 1- 5- 13
. Te rry , 198 2- N MS C- 047, 13 ¶ 15. 14 { 65} “ Re as ona

ble ti m e” in thi s c ont ex t ha s a lw ay s ha d an in te nti ona lly f le xib le 15 m eanin g. T he re as ona ble ne ss d et er

m inatio n, the U nit ed

S ta te s S upr em e Co urt l ong 16 ag o o bs erv ed , m

us t acco un t fo r “ al l th e ci rcu m st an ces ” of a p art ic ul ar ca se . Terry v. 17 A nde rso n , 95 U
. S. a t 633. Re as ona ble ne ss in an y giv en ca se , in oth er w or ds, de pe nds 18 “ upon its particular fa cts.” Id

. ; se e als o T

erry , 1982-NMS C-047, ¶ 16 ( “ W e holdthat 19 suc h an a

bbr ev ia te d pe ri od i s un re as ona ble
. ”)
. It ha s no “ fi xe d co nte nt, ” an d w e m ust45

1 evaluate it “ as t he particular sit uation dem ands.” U

. S. W es t C om m c’ns v . N. M

. Sta te 2 Co rp . Comm’n (In re 19 97 Ear ni ng s of U S West

Co mmc’n s, In c.) , 199 9- N MS C- 016, 3 ¶ 25 , 127 N
. M. 254 , 980 P
. 2d 3 7 ( ci ta tio n om itt ed ); ac c ord A nd e rs on N at
. B ank v. 4 Lu ck et t , 321 U
. S. 233 , 246 ( 1944 ) (“ Wha t i s du e pr oc es s inapr oc ed ur e af fe ct ing 5 pr ope rty

int er es ts m

ust be de te rm ine d by

takin g in to a cc ount

the p urpo se s of

the 6 procedure and its effe ct upon th e rights asserted and all other circ um stances which 7 m ay render the proce eding approp riate to the nature of the c ase. ”). 8 { 66} Inthe c ont ex t of th e MM A , w e ha ve of te n ob se rv ed

that the due pr oc es s 9 guara nte e re qui re s us to ac co unt fo r al l c as e- spe ci fi c ci rc um stanc es ; and b as ed on 10 tho se c ir cu m stanc es , the g u ar an te e m ay c om pe l us to co nc lud e the MM A ’ s pr ovi sio ns 11 m us t yield
. Se e, e . g. , J

iro n v . M ahlab , 198 3- N MS C- 022, ¶ 12, 99 N
. M. 425 , 659 P
. 2d 12 311 (“ [W ] he re the r equir em en t of f ir st g oin g bef

or e the Me dic al Re vie wCo m m iss ion 13 caus es un du e de lay

pr ej udi ci ng a

pla int if f by the los s of

w itn es se s or

part ie s, the 14 pla int if

f is uncon st it ut io na lly

de pr ive d of

his r igh t of

a cc es s to the c ourts. ”)
. D ue 15 pr oc es s th er ef

or e, e nsur es that “ cl ai m an ts who m ak e a good -f ai th atte m pt t o c om ply 16 with the [MMA ] ” ar e “ not [to] be deprived of their day in court by

placing form 17 above sub stance.” G rant lan d , 199 0- N MS C- 076, ¶ 6; se e O te ro v. Z

ouha r , 198 5- 18 NMSC -0 21 , ¶ 22 , 10 2 N. M
. 4 8 2 , 69 7 P .2d48 2, ov errul ed byG rant lan d , 19 1990 -N MS C- 076 (c onc lud ing cl ai m an t had fa ile d to co m ply w ithstr ic t r equir em en ts46

1 of Ac t but had d one “ what m ight reasonablybe e x p ected of a person of ordinary 2 prud en ce, ac ti ng un de r si m il ar ci rcu m st an ces , who de si redto co m pl y wit h t he law” 3 (i nte rn al quo ta tio n m ar ks and c itatio ns o m itt ed ))
. A nd thus fo r pur pose s of 4 ev al ua tin g th e MM A ’ s li m itation fu nc tio n, w e ha ve e xpl ai ne d th at “ pr ote ct ing the 5 defendant is a lau d at o ry g o al,” but any period im

posed “ shou ld reflec t a policy 6 de ci sio n r egard in g wha t c onst itu te s an a de qua te pe ri od o f tim e fo r a pe rs on o f 7 ordinary

dilige n ce to pursu e his claim .” R obe rts v . Sw

. Cm ty
. H ea lth Se rv

s. , 8 1992 -N MS C- 042, ¶ 26 , 114 N
. M. 248 , 837 P
. 2d 4 42 ( int er na l qu otatio n m ar

ks 9 om itted). 10 { 67} O ur

due pr oc es s r easo na blene ss d et er m inatio n inthe li m itatio ns c ont ex t, in 1 1 o t h erwo rd s , h as al wa ys n ec es s ar i l y i n co rp o ra t ed an ex ami n a t i o n o f t h e c l ai m an t ’s 12 dil ige nc e in p ur sui ng a c la im

. Se e Cu m m ing

s , 199 6- N MS C- 035 , ¶57 ( “ Cu m m ing s 13 los t he r m ed ic al m al pr ac tic e cl ai m thr oughhe r ow n la ck of dil ige nc e. ”)
. T he c onc ep t 14 is n ei the r nove l no r an ti qu at ed —the dil ige nc e inquir

y ha s lo ng f

eatur ed in due 15 pr oc es s re as on ab le ne ss de te rm in at io ns an d s ti ll do es . Se e, e . g. , H erron v. A nigbo , 16 897 N
. E
. 2d 4 44, 449 ( In d. 200 8) ( “ [T ] he pla int if f m ust f ile be fo re the statut e of 17 lim itations has run if poss ible in the exercise of due dilig ence. ”); Te ne t Ho sps . L td. 18 v. R iv era , 445 S
. W
. 3d 6 98, 703 ( T ex . 201 4) ( “ [A ] n op enc our ts c ha lle nge is a due 19 pr oc es s c om

pla int an d re qui re s th e party to use due dil ige nc e. ”) ; accord Cana dian N.47

1 Ry . C o. v. Eggen , 2 5 2 U
. S
. 55 3, 5 62 (19 20 ) (ex pl ai ni ng “ po wer i s i n t he co ur ts . . . 2 to d et er

m ine the a de qua cy an d re as ona ble ne ss” of ac ce ss to c ourts, a nd c onc lud ing 3 constitu tional prob lem is avoided when claim ant “ is given free acce ss to th em for a 4 le ngth of

ti m e re as ona

bly suf fi ci en t t o ena

ble an or din ar ily dil ige nt m anto ins tit ute 5 pr oc ee din gs f

or the ir pr ote ct ion”). And evenin To m lin son , on whic h th e m aj or ity 6 rel ie s tod ay fo r supp ort fo r el im inatio n of the ca se -s pe ci fi c dil ige nc e inqui ry , we 7 recognized that we acce pt claim s conflicting with th e MMA’ s provisi ons “ in cases 8 inv olv ing pe cu liar fa ct s . . . a nd whe n ago od f ai th e ff ort ha s be enm ad e to c om ply 9 w iththe A ct . ” 2005 -N MS C- 020, ¶ 22 (in te rn al quot at ion m ar ks o m itt ed ). F or

thi s 10 reason, I disagree w ith the m aj ority that injec ting o ur j udgm ent to decide how m uch 1 1 a d d i t i o n a l t i me t o g r a n tc l a i ma n t s w i t h l a t e a c c r u i n g a c t i o n i s t o a d o p t s t a tu t e o f t i me 12 lim itatio ns f

ro m oth er j ur isd ic tio ns. Ma

j or ity O p ¶ ¶ 24- 24. A nd I w oul d answ er the 13 que sti on “ H owm

uc h a ddi tio na l t im e, exac tly , is Cahn e nti tle d?” b y loo kin g a t the 14 specific fa cts in Cahn’ s case. 15 { 68} Re sol uti on o f the tr ad iti ona l di lig en ce inquir y given Cahn’ s f

ac ts i s 16 straightforwar d. By

Septem ber 2008, two y ears after Cahn had been m isdiagn osed 17 by Be rr ym an , she ha d r el oc at ed

to Ja ck son, Wy om ing , a nd s he w as sti ll none the 18 wiser
. On Se ptem

ber 19, 2008, she underwe nt an annual pap sm ear and discuss ed her 19 ch ro nic pe lvi c pa in w ithane wWy om ing doc tor . Ac opy of her or ig in al r ad iol ogy48

1 report w as sent to the new phy sician’ s office, and she wa s prom ptly scheduled for a 2 CT scan on Septem

ber 22, 2008, three day s af t er h er initial vis it. H er newscan 3 re ve al ed

“ ex te nsi ve abnor

m al ity in the pe lvi s, ” w hic h w as c hara ct er iz ed a s “ hig hly 4 sus pic iou s f

or a n ov ar ian m al ig na nc y .” I n th e ne xt f eww ee ks, she tr av el ed

f ro m 5 Wy om ing to N ewY ork’ s M em or ia l S loan- K ette ri ng C an ce r Ce nte r fo r co nf irm at ion 6 of the diagnos is and und erw ent extensive surgery soon after. H er diagnosis was 7 “ m etastatic se ro u s borderline tum or of the ovary ,” and because the tum or had been 8 inc or re ct ly dia gnos ed at ini tia l dis co ve ry , the canc er ha d pr ogr es se d fr om sta ge I to 9 sta ge I II C, subs tanti al ly de cr ea sin g he r ch an ce s of re m edy . O n O ct obe r 15, 2008 , she 10 un de rwen t a t ot a l a bd om in al hyste rect omy , a bi la te ral sal pi ng o- oo ph or ect omy , a 11 pelvic and para-aortic node dis section om entectom y , and s h e wa s fitted with an 12 intra pe ri ton ea l c athe te r. S he r em ai ne d in N ew Y ork unde r the care of he r pare nts f

or 13 ap pr oxi m at el y

e igh t m onths. 14 { 69} Q uic kly

r ec ogni zi ng s he ha d be enm isd ia gnos ed , Cahn w en t to wor k—a s sh e 15 re cu pe rate d inN ewY ork—t o un co ve r the ide nti ty of Be rr ym an , w ho h ad

m ad e the 16 er ro r tw o y ears e ar lie r. W ith in tw el ve day s of that m as siv e co rrec ti ve sur ge ry on 17 O ct obe r 15, she w as se ndi ng r ec or ds r eq ue sts . B etw ee n O ct ober 27 , 2 008, a nd 18 Novem

ber 3, 2008 , she sen t at least eight requests for inform ation to Lovelace 19 W om en ’ s H ospi ta l, L ove la ce W es tsi de H ospi ta l, a nd A BQ H ea lthP ar tne rs , in pur sui t49

1 of Ber rym an’ s nam e. N one of t he records sh e received in response m ade note of her 2 A u g u s t2 0 0 6 v i s i to r

B e rrym a n ’s i d e n t i t y. 3 { 70} Inthe ne xt m onth, se nsi ng s he m ig ht ha ve avia ble m al pr ac tic e cl ai m , she 4 re ta ine d—a ga in f

ro m N ewY ork—A lbu que rque c ouns el to as sis t w ithde ve lop m en t 5 of what at that poin t could on ly have appeare d a com

plex case. She indicated to her 6 A lbu que rque at to rney s sh e tho ught she r em em

be re d th e da te of

the r el ev an t 20 06 7 ap p o i n t men twi t h B e rrym a n , b u t s h e c o u l d n o tr e memb e r h i s n a me. C a h n ’s a t t o rn e ys 8 inv es tig at ed

the re co rd s she ha d a lr ea dy r ec ei ve d inr es pons e to h er ini tia l r eque sts , 9 and the y s o u g h t t o suppl em ent the inform ation ov er the next tw o m onth s with new 10 re que sts to al l thr ee part ic ipatin g fa ci lit ie s f or Cahn’ s “ co m

ple te m ed ic al c hart ” an d 11 an y appl ic ab le it em iz ed

bil lin g st at em en ts c ove ri ng the pe ri od f ro m May 17, 200 6, 12 through the tim e o f th e requests . All to ld, Cahn and her attorney s sent the provid er 13 entities at least sixteen di s t i n ct rec ords requests. E ventually , a s a result of her 14 inv es tig at ion , Cahn d isc ove re d sh e ha d be ena ssi gne d th re e se parate m ed ic al r ec or ds 15 num be rs in the L ove la ce S an dia H ea lth Sy ste m , w hic h w as hig hly unu sua l f

or 16 L ove la ce pa tie nts ; no ne the le ss, Be rr ym anr em ai ne d un na m ed
. 17 { 71} D ue at le as t in part to that unor tho dox re co rdke ep ing , Be rr ym an ’ s id en tity 18 re m ai ne d am

y ste ry to Cahn and h er

co un sel de spi te se ve ra l m onths o f ac tiv e 19 inv es tig at ion
. R ec ogni zi ng the Se ct ion 41- 5- 13 lim itatio n pe ri od w as ne ar ing a n e nd,50

1 Cahn, on Apr il 10, 2009 , tim el y fi le d a dis tr ic t co urt ac tio n, na m ing th e var iou s 2 provider identit ies she had been able to uncov er and addin g a placeholder phy sician 3 JohnD oe de fe ndant unti l B er ry m anc oul d be ide nti fied
. Cahn’ s a tto rn ey s a ct ive ly 4 c o n t i n u e dt o s e e kB e rrym a n ’s i d e n t i t y i n t h e d i s t r i c tco urt p ro ceed in g— bu t d is co ve ry, 5 ex pe ri en ce sho w s, is rare ly qui ck or c le an . F ina lly , dis co ve ry r es pons es r ec ei ve d on 6 Jul y 1, 201 0 r ev ea le d B er

ry m an ’ s nam e. D ay s late r, on July 6, 20 10 , C ah n, no tin g 7 t h e l o n g an dp ro t ra ct ed “ co n ce rt ed ef fo rt s ” s h e h ad ma d e t o u n co v erBe rrym an ’s 8 ide nt i t y , s o u g h t t o a m e n d h e r c o m p l a i n t t o a d d B e rrym a n i n p l a c e o f t h e D oe 9 defendant. The district court, finding Cahn’s contentions “ we ll taken,” granted her 10 le av e, an d on Jul y

9, 201 0 C ah n f

ile d he r am en de d c om

pla int na m ing D r. Be rr

ym an . 11 Berr ym an then m oved f

or summ ary j udgm ent on the ground Cahn ’s am ended 1 2 co m pl a i n tw a s u n t i m e l y

u n d e r S e c t i o n 4 1
- 5
- 1 3
. B u tt h e d i s t r i c tc o u rt , h a v i ng 13 review ed this extensive histo ry of Cahn’ s case, explained our du e process case law 14 co m pe lle d ac onc lus ionthat the S ec tio n 41 -5 -1 3 pe ri od co uld not bar he r cl ai m s, a nd 15 de nie d th e m oti on. 16 { 72} T ha t r ec or d is suf fi ci en t to esta

bli sh Cahn’ s dili ge nc e, an d it is thu s su ff ic ie nt 17 to a llo wus t o c onc lud e, a s th e d is tri ct co urt di d, that anype ri od s horte r than th e 18 twenty -one m onth s that elapsed betwee n accr ual and filing with respect to Berr ym an 19 w oul d have be enunr ea sona bly abbr ev ia te d un de r the c ir cu m stanc es . Thi s w as not51

1 a cas e whe re Ca hn “ sa t o n h er ri gh ts ” an d fa il edto “ fil e an y cla im for m or e th an two 2 y ears. ” Cu m m ing

s , 199 6- N MS C- 035, ¶

57. A nd i t w as c le ar ly

not ac as e w he re she 3 “ kne wof

he r ca use of act iona nd h ad

ove r tw o y ears a nd e igh t m onths d ur ing the 4 statutory period in which to file her claim .” To m lin son , 200 5- N MS C- 020, ¶ 28. 5 Be ca use it is im por tant t o c om

pare th e m aj or ity

r ule to Cahn’ s t im el in e, I al so 6 include a pictorial representation at the end of m y dissent as append ix B. 7 { 73} E ve n B er

ry m anc onc ed es the ti m el ine he re m ay be a ttr ibu ta

ble larg el y

to 8 L ove la ce ; i n th at

c as e, he a sks onl y

that he not

be “ de pr ive d” of

a“ subs tanti ve r igh t” 9 based on Lovelace’ s wr ongd oing
. Whether that argum ent s h o uld prevail m ay be a 10 quest i onw or

t h r e vi si t i ng
—r e gar dl e ss , i ts ho ul d have n o be a r i ng o n t he d i ligence 11 de te rm in at io n. Se e, e . g. , Ca m pbe ll v. H

olt , 115 U .S
. 620, 629 (1885) (“ W e can see 1 2 n o r i g h tw h i c h t h e p r o mi s o r h a s i n t h e l a ww h i c h p e rmi t s h i m t o p l e a d l ap s e o f t i me 13 ins te ad

of paym en t . . . . ”)
. A nd I not e that the m aj or ity de cl ine s, a s do I , a s di d th e 14 dis tr ic t c ourt, to re ac h th e co nc lus ionCahn “ los t he r m ed ic al m al pr ac tic e cl ai m 15 through her ow n lack of diligence.” Cu m m ing s , 19 96 -NMSC -0 35 , ¶ 57
. 16 { 74} So why

legislate a newstatute of repose of one y ear? E specially as Justice 1 7 Ch á v e z s t a t e s i n h i s s p e c i a l c o n c u rr e n c e , “ d i f f i c u l t y i n i d e n t i f

y i n g w h i c h d o c t or 18 pr ovi de d tr eatm en t”
. . . he “ cannot a gr ee th at in a ll ca se s tw el ve m onths w ill be 19 constitu tionallyadequate.” I subm it that this is e xactly that case and would hold that52

1 the te n a nd on e-ha lf

m onths l ef

t be fo re the statut e of

r ep ose e xpi re d, w as not a 2 re as ona

ble ti m e fo r Cahn t o br ing he r ca use of act ion
. A cc or din gly , I w oul d no t 3 ap ply the m aj or ity ’ s r

ule he re , a nd I w oul d no t a ppl y it a s an unf lin ch ing ru le in any 4 cas e whe re, as he re, t he Uni te d S ta te s an d New M ex ic o Con st it ut io ns req ui re t ha t we 5 co nsi de r a ca se ’ s part ic ular fa ct s. 6 IV. Othe r C onstitut ional Concer ns 7 { 75} In addition to the due process concerns it raises, the tw elve-m onth rule gives 8 ris e to a ho st of ad di ti on al co ns ti tu ti on al qu es ti on s. Se e, e . g. , Re state m en t ( Se co nd) 9 of T o rt s § 8 9 9 c m

t . g ( A m . L a w I n s t . 1 9 7 9 ) ( “ T h e s t a tu t o ry p e r i o d i n [ s t a tu t es of 10 re pose ] is usua lly

lon ge r than that f

or the r eg ular statut e of

li m itatio ns, but , de pe ndi ng 11 upon the designated event starting the running of t he statute, it m ay have run before 12 a cause of action cam e fully into existence. This m ay we ll raise co n s t i t u t ional 13 pr ob le m s.”) . We h av e ad dr es se d so m e o f th e co ns ti tu ti on al qu es ti on s b efo re, an d we 14 ha ve ge ne ral ly con cl ud ed(1) th e rep os e pr ov is io n is su bjec t to rat io na l-b as is rev ie w, 15 and (2) the provision wa s a rea sonabl e resp onse to th e “ perceived

m edical 16 m al pr act ic e cri si s” o f t he 19 70 s. Cu m m ing s , 199 6- N MS C- 035, ¶

40 ( em pha sis in 17 original). 18 { 76} Justi ce Chávez ’ s special concurrence high light s thos e constituti onal 19 co nc lus ion s w e m ad e in Cu m m ing s a nd s ugge sts tho se c onc lus ion s m ust gov er n th e53

1 out co m e her e. But seve ra l cons ide ratio ns leave m e unc onvi nc ed
. F ir st, w e cam e to 2 those conclusions at a tim e w h en o u r G arc ia a na ly sis a llo w ed us t o a ddr es s 3 pot e n t i a l l y u n c o n s t i tu t i o n a l ap p l i c a t i o n s c a s e b y c a s e , a n d t h a t o p p o rtu n i t yf or 4 rem ediation has v anished with the advent of tod ay ’ s rule. 5 { 77} Se co nd, the due pr oc es s ch al le nge a t i ssu e in Cu m m ing s w as one of 6 “ fundam ental right of acce ss to th e courts.” Cu m m ing s , 199 6- N MS C- 035, ¶ 33. O ur 7 an al y sis of

that clai m was stra igh tf or w ar d: w e ex pla ine d th at

“ [a ] pla int if

f ha s no 8 ex p ec t an cy

of a c ause of action that has been legitim ately denied by

the legislature 9 before it ac crues. ” Id

. A nd analy zing a cause of action accr uing after the statutory 10 period has expired, w e add ed that “ wher e there is no cause of action, a plaintiff 11 cannot claim

they have been denied acce ss to th e courts.” Id

. In o th er wo rd s, we 12 co nc lud ed , “ no r igh t ha s a cc ru ed , ” an d thu s the re w as no ne ed to furthe r ex am ine the 13 ch al le ng e. Id

. B ut h er e, a s I ha ve e xpl ai ne d, the pos tu re is quit e 14 dif fe re nt— ev er

y body a gr ee s C ah n’ s c au se of ac tio n had ac cr ue d be fo re r ep ose se t i n, 15 an d nobo dy

dis put es that a

c au se of a ct ionthat has a cc ru ed

c onst itu te s aspe ci es of 16 pr ope rty

e nti tle d to due pr oc es s pr ote ct ionnot giv ensig nif

ic an t a tte nti on i n 17 Cu m m ing

s . Se e Lo gan v. Z

im m erm an B rus h C

o. , 4 5 5 U
. S
. a t4 2 8 ( 1982 ); ac co rd 18 Cu m m ing

s , 199 6- N MS C- 035, ¶

33 (“ Si nc e no rig ht has ac cr ue d, it is m oot

to que sti on 19 w he the r the re ha s be enade nia l of af undam en ta l r igh t t o vi nd ic ate that r igh t i n54

1 court.”)
. That basic due process difference sugg ests the constitu tional analy sis m ay 2 be quite different for plaintiffs whose claim s accr ue before the statutory

period has 3 run than for those whose claim s accr ue later—but that questio n is clearly not before 4 u s t o d a y. 5 { 78} Thi rdan d fi na ll y , Cu m m ing s f eatu re d on ly

li m ite d ana ly sis r eg ar din g th e 6 spe ci fi c vari an t of

e qua l pr ote ct ion ch al le nge that m igh t a llo wthe pla int if f w iththe 7 la te ntin

jury (andth us a l at e-ac cru in g c la im ) to pre va il , and itis no t cl ear wh y we 8 ad dr es se d th at equa l pr ote ct ion que sti on in the f ir st i nst an ce , giv enour

c onc lus ionthe 9 in jury ha d no t b een lat en t. Se e Cu m m ing s , 199 6-NMS C-035, ¶ 57 (explaining “ there 10 wa s stil l abo ut

ay e a r a nd ah a l f b e f or e t he s t a tut e o f

r e po se ” e xp i r e d a f

t e r plaintiff 11 ha d di sc ove re d in

j ur y ). H ad the f ac ts b ee n di ff

er en t and a ct

ua lly giv enr ise to the 1 2 eq u a l p r o t e c t i o n c l a i m , p e rh ap s o u r c o n c l u s i o n w o u l dh a v e b e e n d i f f e r e n t , a nd 13 perhaps that would have rendered m oot any concerns that our due process case law 14 requires a different analy sis for a plaintiff whose claim accr ues before the statutory 15 peri o d ex p i re s. A s at least one com m entator has observed, “ every court that has 16 spok enw itha ny

cla rit y on the iss ue ha s ul tim at el y c onc lud ed

that vi ct im s of 17 m isd ia gnos is o f dis ea se s w ithlon g late nc y pe ri ods” m ay

w el l be sub

ject to, a nd 18 be ne fit fro m , a di ffer en t an al y si s. See Pet er Zab lo ts ky, F rom a W him pe r to a B ang: 19 Th e Tr en d T

ow ar d F inding O cc urr en ce B ase d Statu tes of L im ita tio ns G ov ernin g55

1 Ne gli ge nt M isdiag nosi s of D ise ases W

ith L ong La te nc

y P er iod s U nc onst itu tio nal , 2 103 D ic k. L
. Re v. 455 , 495 ( 1999 ). T hose c ourts h ave fre que ntl y f ound 3 uncons titutio nal deprivation for the plaintiff in the long latency scenario, on equal 4 protection grou nds, on due process grou nds, and on related s t at e con stitut ional 5 gr ou nd s. Id . But as I ha ve no te d, t ho se qu es ti on s a r e n o t b efo re u s t od ay , and we 6 need not address them

here. 7 { 79} Instead, I note m ore generally that num erous courts have found con stitut ional 8 challenges com

pelling in the m edical m alpractice context, and it m ay be that future 9 ap pli catio n of

tod ay ’ s rul e re qui re s us to re vis it som e of the se arg um en ts and the ir 10 ap pl ic at io ns . See g en er a l ly Z ab lot sky , 103 D ic k. L
. Re v. 455 ; se e als o, e . g. , 11 M cCo ll um v. Sis te rs o

f C hari tyof Nazar et

h H ea lth Co rp. , 7 9 9 S
. W. 2 d1 5 , 1 9 ( K y. 12 1990 ) (“ Whil e the re m ay be c er ta in s al utary

e ff ec ts f ro m li m it in g to fi ve y ears the 13 p er i o d in which suits can be broug ht, these cannot outweigh a plaintiff’s 14 co nstitu tio na l r igh t t o have his or he r day in co urt. ”) ; Le e v. G auf

in , 8 6 7 P
. 2d 5 72, 15 587 (Utah 1 993) (“ [T ] he dom inant causes o f increa sed health-care costs wer e fa ctors 16 oth er than in cr eased m al pr ac tic e ins ur an ce pr em ium s. ”) ; De Yo ung v. Providence 17 M ed

. Ct r. , 960 P. 2d 919, 924 (W ash. 1998 ) (en banc) (“ Plaintiff next contends that 18 the classification of m edical m alpractice claim s which are subject to the eight-y ear 19 statute of re p o s e d o es not bear a r ational relationshi p to the pu rpose of the statute.56

1 W e ag re e. ”) ; cf. Pick

ett v. Brown , 462 U .S
. 1, 18 ( 1983 ) (conclud i n g t wo -year 2 lim itatio ns p er iod was “ not subs tanti al ly r el at ed to the le git im at e state int er es t i n 3 preventing th e litigation of stale or f raudulent claim s”). 4 { 80} Bu t our ca se lawsug ge sts the be tte r co ur se is to ste er c le ar of the se 5 co nst itu tio na l sh oa ls— “ w e m ust c onstru e a statut e . . . so a s to a voi d no t on ly the 6 conclusio n that it is unconstitu tional, but also grave doub ts upon that score. ” Sta te 7 v. Pangaea Cinema, LLC , 201 3- N MS C- 044, ¶ 23, 310 P
. 3d 6 04 ( int er

na l qu otatio n 8 m arks and citation om itted). B ecause Te rrya nd G arc ia ha ve giv enus a lon gst an din g 9 rule for dec ision here that obviates at least som e of the re levant constit u t i o nal 10 co nc er

ns, I cannot co nc lud e w e ha ve goo d r ea son to a dopt the m aj or ity

r ule tod ay a nd 11 em bark on a new and uncharted consti tutio nal collisio n course. 12 V . C on cl us ion 13 { 81} It

m ay be sim ple to im pose r igi d ti m e re str ic tio ns fo r cl ai m s th at a cc ru e w ith in 14 the thr ee -y ear statut e of r ep ose to el im inate the le ga l w rangl ing that i s pr es en t w ith 15 the c om

ple xity of the se ty pe s of cas es . Bu t it is i nc onsi ste nt w iththe spi ri t of due 16 pr oc es s to take thi s si m ple r out e. W e m

ust co nsi de r tim e, pla ce , ci rc um stanc es , a nd 17 m an y oth er fa ct or s in the pur sui t of fun da m en ta l fa ir ne ss, de spi te howne bul ous the 18 co nc ep t m ay

be
. A f ac t- ba se d a

ppr oa chw oul d pr ovi de the f ai rn es s th e D ue P ro ce ss 19 Clause seeks to protect, while also changin g the focus of the legal analy sis to whether57

1 a p l ai ntiff w as sufficiently diligent
. Ac cordingly , I would not appl y the m aj ority’ s 2 rule here, and I w ouldnot applyit as an unflinching rule in any case where, as here, 3 t h e Unit ed States and N ewMexico Constitu tions require that w e consider a cas e’s 4 pa rti cu la r fac ts . I res pe ct fu ll y di ss en t.

5

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