15-2771 Weng v. Lynch BIA Poczter, IJ A205 628 473 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS **FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT** 

## SUMMARY ORDER

**RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED**  **ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT**  = **S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED**  **WITH THIS**  **COURT, A**  **PARTY MUST**  **CITE EITHER**  **THE FEDERAL**  **APPENDIX OR**  **AN ELECTRONIC**  **DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY**  **OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for**  1 **the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States** 2 **Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the** 3 **25 th**  **day of January, two thousand seventeen.** 4 5 **PRESENT:** 6 **REENA RAGGI,** 7 **GERARD E. LYNCH,** 8 **RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,** 9 Circuit Judges. 10

**_____________________________________** 11 12 **JIANQUAN WENG,** 13 Petitioner **,** 14 15 **v. 15-2771** 16 **NAC** 17 **LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES** 18 **ATTORNEY GENERAL,** 19 Respondent **.** 20

**_____________________________________** 21 22 **FOR PETITIONER:** G. Victoria Calle, New York, N.Y. 23 24 **FOR RESPONDENT:** Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy 25 Assistant Attorney General; Anthony 26 P. Nicastro, Assistant Director; 27 Drew Brinkman, Trial Attorney, 28 Office of Immigration Litigation, 29 United States Department of Justice, 30 Washington, D.C. 312 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 1 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 2 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 3

DENIED. 4 Petitioner Jianquan Weng, a native and citizen of the 5 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an August 11, 2015, 6 decision of the BIA, affirming a March 6, 2014, decision of an 7 Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Weng’s application for asylum, 8 withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against 9 Torture (“CAT”). In re Jianquan Weng, No. A205 628 473 (B.I.A. 10 Aug. 11, 2015), aff’g No. A205 628 473 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City 11 Mar. 6, 2014). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 12 underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 13 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both 14 the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions. Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales , 432 15 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of 16 review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); 17 Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey , 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008). 18 For asylum applications like Weng’s, governed by the REAL 19 ID Act, the agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the 20 circumstances,” base a credibility finding on the plausibility 21 of an applicant’s account and inconsistencies and omissions in 223 the applicant’s statements and his witness’s statements and 1 evidence, “without regard to whether” those inconsistencies go 2 “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. 3 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin , 534 F.3d at 163-64. “We 4 defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from 5 the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no 6 reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility 7 ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin , 534 F.3d at 167. The adverse 8 credibility determination rests on substantial evidence. 9 The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies among 10 Weng’s testimony, statements, and evidence concerning his 11 practice of Christianity in China. 8 U.S.C. 12 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin , 534 F.3d at 167. On direct 13 examination, Weng testified that he began attending an 14 underground church as an adult in June 2009; on cross 15 examination, however, Weng said that he had attended church when 16 he was five or six years old and did so for two years. Weng 17 sought to explain the inconsistency by asserting that he “was 18 just a child” who went there to play, that he understood the 19 question to mean when he began attending regularly, and that 20 the attorney for the Department of Homeland Security asked when 21 he was introduced to Christianity, not when he began attending 224 an underground church. The agency reasonably rejected Weng’s 1 explanations. “A petitioner must do more than offer a 2 plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure 3 relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would 4 be compelled to credit his testimony.” Majidi v. Gonzales , 430 5 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Zhou Yun Zhang v. INS , 386 6 F.3d 77, 76 (2d Cir. 2004)). Moreover, Weng could not state 7 unequivocally whether his siblings attended church. The IJ 8 reasonably concluded that this called into question whether 9 Weng actually came from a devout family, as he claimed, and 10 suggested that Weng embellished his testimony. See Majidi , 430 11 F.3d at 80. 12 In addition, the agency reasonably rested the adverse 13 credibility determination on inconsistencies in Weng’s 14 description of his purported arrest in China, the only alleged 15 incident of persecution. See Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland 16

Sec. , 446 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 2006). Although Weng testified 17 that, on the day of his arrest, his parents had “some other 18 business” and did not attend church with him, his mother’s 19 letter states that she was out of town on that day. 20 Finally, additional inconsistencies concerning Weng’s 21 past practice and his family’s practice of Christianity support 225 the adverse credibility determination. See Xiu Xia Lin , 534 1 F.3d at 167. First, the letter submitted by Weng’s mother did 2 not corroborate Weng’s testimony that his parents attended an 3 underground church until his 2012 arrest, when they began 4 attending a government church. Moreover, a 2011 official 5 household register listed Weng’s parents’ religion as 6 Christianity, which conflicts with his claim that they 7 practiced Christianity in secret. Second, Weng’s testimony 8 and evidence regarding his brother was inconsistent. The 9 household register listed Christianity as Weng’s brother’s 10 religion, but Weng testified that only he and his parents 11 practiced Christianity. Third, the agency also reasonably 12 found Weng not credible regarding his practice of Christianity 13 in the United States. W eng and his witness provided 14 inconsistent testimony on this point. 8 U.S.C. 15 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Weng testified that he and his 16 childhood friend attend church together in the United States, 17 although they had not recently because his friend was working 18 in Los Angeles. But the witness testified that he never 19 attended church services with Weng and was working in San Jose. 20 Weng’s explanations for these inconsistencies are not 21 compelling. See Majidi , 430 F.3d at 80. 226 Having questioned Weng’s credibility, the agency did not 1 err in concluding that Weng’s lack of corroborating evidence 2 further undermined his credibility. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales , 3 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). Weng has not challenged that 4 finding. 5 Given the multiple in consistencies identified going both 6 to past events and to Weng’s continuing practice of 7 Christianity, as well as the lack of corroboration, we conclude 8 that a “reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse 9 credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin , 534 F.3d at 167. The 10 adverse credibility ruling is dispositive of asylum, 11 withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three forms 12 of relief are based on the same factual predicate. Paul v. 13 Gonzales , 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006). 14 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 15 DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion 16 for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. 17

FOR THE COURT: 18 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 19