### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TE NNESSEE AT NASHVILLE O ct obe r 9, 200 2 S es sio n
JE NNIFER L. BI SCAN, ET AL 

### . v. FRANKLI N H. BROW N, ET AL 

### .

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Davidson County No. 98C-2721 C arol Solom an, Jud ge

No. M2001- 02766-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Dece m ber 15, 2003

Af te r atte nd ing a

pa rty wh e re a lc oh ol w a s p re se nt, a min or int ox ica te d d ri ve r andmin or g ue st p a s s e n g e r w e r e i n v o l v e d i n a n au t o m o b i l e a c c i d e n t i n w h i c h t h e p a s s e n g e r s u f f e r e d s e r i o u s i n

j u r y. Th e pa sse ng er s ue d th e drive r andthea du lt h os t of the pa rty . T he jury

a wa rd e d th e min or

g ue st pa sse ng e r d a ma g e s a nd a llo c a te d fa ult 70 % t o th e min or

int oxic a te d d ri ve r, 15 % t o th e a du lt p arty host, and 15% to the minor g uest passeng er. Thedriver and the host appea l various ruling s of the tr ia l c ou rt . We a ff

ir m. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed and Rem anded

P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which B EN H. C A N T RE LL , P.J ., M.S.,
a n d W. M I CH A EL M AL OAN , S P

. J ., joined.
Al a n M . So we ll, J ohn J. H oll ins , Jr. , Jose ph T. Ho we ll, Na sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nts , F r a n k l i n H u g h e s B r o w n , P au l N

. W o r l e y.
Phili p N. Elbert, Ma

rk P. Chalos, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellees, Je n n i fe r L

. Bi scan and Robert S. Biscan.
OP IN ION

I n this appeal , t h e d efendants appe al a judg ment enter ed af ter a jury verdic t awar ding damag es to J ennife r B iscan and her father , Robert B iscan, for serious bra in injuries J ennife r incurr ed in an automo b i l e acc ident, which injuries lef t her pe rmane ntly

impaired. Jennifer, 16 at the time, was riding as a pa sseng er in the c ar driven by Hug hes Brown, then 17, who was intox icated. The
a c c id ent oc c ur

re d a ft e r Je nn if

e r andHu g he s le ft

a pa rty a t th e ho me of

Paul Wo rl e y , w he reso me g uests had consume d beer

. I t i s u n co n t ested that Hug hes B rown’s ne g lige nt operation of the ca r wh ile int oxic a te d w a s th e c aus e of thea c c ide nt.T h e j u r y a l s o fou n d t h at n ei t h er M r
. B r o wn no r M r. W o rl ey w as g u i l t y of s u ch ma l i ci ou s , i n t en t i on al , or 1

rec kless co nd uc t so as to e nti t l e the p l ainti f f s t o p un i t i ve d am ag es.

T enn
. Co de Ann. § 55

- 10

- 40 8(b) es t abl i s hes a pr es umpt i on t hat a per s on’ s dri vi ng was i mp ai r ed i f hi s or her 2 bl oo d al cohol l eve l i s
. 10 % or mo r e. 2 After a jury trial, damag es of $3,954,810 we re a war ded to J ennife r and Mr. Biscan. The jury fo un d H ug he s B ro wn, J enn if er Bis c a n, a ndMr . Wo rl e y to b e ne g lig e nt anda lso fo un d th a t th e ir neg lige nce w as the leg al cause of the acc ident and resulting injuries. The jury assessed f

ault 70% to Hug hes B rown, 15% to Mr. Worley , and 15% to Jennifer B iscan. Bo t h M r. Brown a nd Mr. 1 Worley appea led.
The a ppellants do not directly raise a questi on of whe ther the jury ’s ver dict is supported by
ma te ri a l e vid e nc e . I ns tea d, they ha ve ide nti fi e d a

tot a l of fi ft e e n is su e s o n a

pp e a l th a t prima

ri ly involve (1 ) l eg al questions reg arding proper parties a s plaintiff, defe ndant, and f or purpose s of
a llo c a tin g fa

ult , ( 2) e vid e nti ary

ru lin g s, a nd(3 ) j ury

ins truc tio ns
. As g ener al bac kg round, on Oc tober 18, 1997, Paul Worley hosted a pa

rty fo r his daug hter Ashley ’s eig hteenth birthday at his home. A majority

of the c hildren who attended the pa rty wer e students at Ash l ey W o rl ey ’s school, whe re she was a senior. People we re invited to the pa rty by
w o r d o f m o u t h , s o m e b e i n g p e r s o n a l l y i n v i t e d b y A s h l e y W o r l e y. O t h e r s o n l y h e ar d ab o u tt h e p ar t y. The Worley s did not serve a lco hol or make it available at the pa rty . Although ma ny attendee s did not drink, a number b ro u gh t alcohol, primarily beer , to the party

and drank it there. M r
. W o r l e y f

u l l y e x p e c t e d t h a tt h e m i n o r g u e s t s w o u l d b o t h b r i n g a n d c o n s u m e b e e r o n h i s p r o p e r t y. He intended that a rule he had implemente d in previous parties g iven by his son would apply : that is, that any

g uest who chose to drink a lcohol would be re quired to turn over car key s and spend the night r ather

than drive home

. Sometime after 11:00 p.m., J ennife r Biscan decide d she wa nted to leave the party . She ran into her long time friend Hug hes Br own, who had been drinking , and asked him f or a ride. The two left t he W orley residenc e together in Hug hes B rown’s c ar, and approximately one mile away , at the intersec tion of Sawy er B rown a nd Sneed Road, Hug hes B rown ran into a g uardr ail. Mr. B rown wa s not seriously

injured in the wre ck; J ennife r, on the other hand, wa s sever ely

injured. Tests take n shortly afte r the a ccide nt reve aled Hug hes B rown’s blood a lcohol level to be .17%

. 2

I . Recove ry

Of Medic al Expenses - Amendment To A dd Father The orig inal complaint here in was filed on Oc tober 2, 1998, na ming a s the plaintiff Jennifer Biscan, by

her ne x t friend a nd natura l gua rdian, Robert S. Bi s ca n , an d seeking damag es for Jenn if e r’ s in jurie s. I t is un dis pu te d tha t Mr. B isc a n did not orig ina lly

su e in h is i nd ivi du a l c apa c ity fo r d a ma g e s h e su staine d a s Jen nif e r’ s p are nt. Twenty -two months after the complaint was f

iled, Mr. Worley moved for partial summaryA l l t he o t her d efend ant s f i l ed a m o t i o n fo r p art i al summ ary judgm ent as t o m ed i cal exp enses and ad o p t ed t he 3

ar gu ment s an d pl eadi ng s f i l ed by M r
. W orl ey on t hi s i s s ue. 3 judgme nt as to any

claim for me dical expenses. He also asked the court to prec lude proof of medica l
e xpe ns e s u nle ss Je nn if

e r B isc a n c ou ld p ro ve sh e pers on a lly pa id the e xpe ns e s o r w a s le g a lly obligated to pay them. I n the memora ndum in support of this mot ion, Mr. Worley also arg ued that J ennife r’s pa

rents we re ba

rre d from bring ing a

cause o f action for

J ennife r’s medic al expenses beca use the statute of

limit ations had expired. 3

Soo n the re a ft e r a nd in r e sp on se , Jen nif e r B isc a n mo ve d f

or le a ve to ame ndhe r c omp la int to a ddMr . B isc a n a s a

plaint if f i n h is i nd ivi du a l c apa c ity . T he a me nd me nt w a s r e qu e ste d to avoid any potential technica l pleading issue by asserting a

di re ct claim by

Plaintiff Robert S. Biscan, the father of Plaintiff Jennifer L . Biscan, to rec over any medical
e xpe ns e s in c ur

re d a s a re su lt o f the inj urie s to Jenn if e r L . Bi sc a n tha t mi g ht b e he ld not rec overa

ble by J ennife r B iscan he rself be cause she wa s a minor. . . .
The trial c ourt denied the defe ndants’ motion for partial summary judgme nt and g rante d the Biscan motion to amend the complaint. On appe al, Mr. Worley and Mr. B rown a

rg ue that Robert B isc a n w a s n ot a

plaint if f i n th e orig ina l c omp la int ; th a t the ne xt f ri e nd of a min or plaint if f i s n ot a party plaintiff; and that he f

ailed t o b ri n g a claim in his indivi dual ca pacity within the one-y ear statute of limitations. Therefor e, def endants a ssert, he c annot sue for or re cover

any d am age s he
su ffere d in div idu a lly

a s Jen nif

e r’ s p are nt. Th e y

a sse rt thea me nd me nt t o a ddMr . B isc a n a s a plaint if f w a s impr op e rl y

g rante d. Th e y

a lso arg ue that si nc e Mr . B isc a n w a s n ot a plaint if f i n h is individual capac ity , no damag es for medical e x penses we re r ecove rable beca use Jennifer B iscan wa s no t e nti tle d to da ma g e s sh e did no t inc ur
. Th e y arg ue sh e wa s a min or , he r pa re nts we rere sp on sib le fo r tho se e xpe ns e s, a ndsh e did no t pay fo r m e dic a l e xpe ns e s.
The B iscans, on the other hand, arg ue that Mr. Worley and Mr. B rown we re g iven notice of the ac cident which is the subjec t of the suit, the alleg ations o f t h ei r fault in contributing to the
acc ident and injuries, and the fac t that the lawsuit was intended to r ecove r all ele ments of damag es relating to the injuries Jennifer B iscan sustained. Further, Mr. Worley and Mr. Br own wer e provide d
c op ie s of J e nn if

e r B isc a n’ s med ic a l bi lls thr ou g ho ut d isc ov e ry . Co ns e qu e ntl y , th e B isc a ns a sse rt , the amendme nt adding Robert B iscan a s a sepa rate party relates bac k to the filing of the orig inal complaint pursuant to Tenn. R. C iv. P. 15.03 and is therefor e not time barr ed. In the alternative, they
assert that J ennife r B iscan is entitled to maintain her ow n action for th e rec overy

of her medical expenses, the orig inal complaint seeks r edre ss for Jennifer B iscan’s e ntire injury , and ther ef o re, Robert B iscan ha s relinquished his direc t cause of ac tion to J ennife r B iscan.

I f Mr. B iscan wa s properly added a s a plaintiff in his individual capac ity and that ame ndment related bac k to the filing of the orig inal complaint, then it i s undisputed he could re cover medical expenses attri b u t ab le to J ennife r’s injuries. B eca use we find the ame ndment was prope r, that determination is di spositive of the question, and ther e is no need to e x amine the other issues r aised.4

Th e qu e sti on s a

bo ut the a me nd me nt t o a ddMr . B isc a n a s a plaint if f a reg ov e rne d b y

Rul e 15.03 of the Te nnessee Rules of Civil P roce dure. “The g oal behind Rule 15, as with all the Rules of Civil Procedur e, is ‘to insure that case s and controversies be determined upon their merits and not upon leg al technic alities or proc edura l niceties.’” Doy le v . Fro st , 49 S.W .3d 853, 856 (Tenn. 2001) (q u o t i n g Ka ra sh v . P igo tt , 5 30 S. W. 77 5, 77 7 ( Te nn . 1 97 5) ). Th us , T e nn . R. Civ . P. 15 .0 3 is construed liber ally

in order to pr omote the consider ation of cla ims on their merits. Floyd v. Re ntrop , 67 5 S. W.2 d 1 65 , 1 68 (T e nn . 1 98 4) ; Townes v. Sunbeam Oste r Co., Inc. , 50 S.W .3d 446, 451 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) ; McCracken v. Brentwood United Methodist Church , 958 S.W .2d 792, 797 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. 19 97 ). Th e ru le in q ue sti on pr ov ide s:
Whenever

the claim or de fense asserted in am en d ed pleading s arose out of the conduct, transaction, or oc curr ence set forth or attempted t o b e s et forth in the
o ri gi n al p l ea d i n g, t h e am en d m en tre l at es b ac k t o t h e d at e o f t h e o ri gi n al p l ea d i n g. An a me nd me nt c ha ng ing the pa rty or thena min g of the pa

rty by or a g a ins t w ho m a claim is asserte d relates bac k if the foreg oing provision is satisfied and if, within the period provide d by

law for commencing an ac tion or wi t h i n 120 day s after
commence ment of the a ction, the pa rt y to be broug ht in by

amendment ( 1) has
re ce i v ed such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudice d in maintaining a defe nse on the merits, an d (2 ) k n ew or should have known that, but f

or a mistake conce rning the identity of the prope r party , the ac tion would have be en broug ht ag ainst the party

. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03. The princ ipal purpose of

the Rule is “to enable a plainti ff to corr ect a pleading err or af

ter the statute of limitations has run if the cor rec tion will not prejudice his a dversa ry in any way .” Doy le , 4 9 S

. W

. 3 d at8 5 6 -5 7 (q u o t i n g Schiavone v. Fortune , 477 U.S. 21, 38, 106 S. Ct . 2379, 2389 (1986) (Stevens, J. di ssenting) ).
The B iscans’ amendment her ein is cover ed by the sec ond sentenc e of Te nn. R. Civ. P . 15.03 beca use it adds a pa

rty by whom a cl ai m i s as s erte d. “Chang ing” a party under the rule include s a d d in g , d r o p p in g o r s u b s ti tu ti n g a p ar ty . 6A C H A R LES A. W R I GHT , E T AL ., F ED ER A L P RACTI CE & P R O C E D U RE § 1 4 9 8 ( 2 d e d

. 1 9 9 0 )

. Wh e n th e a me n d me n t s e e k s to c h a n g e o r a d d a p ar ty to the lawsu it , th e c laim a s s e r te d b y o r a g a in s t th a t n e w p ar ty w il l b e c o n s id e r e d f il e d o n th e date of

the orig inal pleading when the r equire ments of the rule are met. Doy le , 49 S.W .3d at 856.

Ma ny c a se s d e a lin g wi th Te nn . R. Civ. P. 15.0 3 ad dr e ss wh e the r the a me nd e d c omp la int wi ll
r e l a t e b a c k

t o t h e d a t e o f

f i l i n g o f t h e o r i g i n a l c o m p l a i n t w h e n a d d i n g a d e f e n d a n t t o a n a c t i o n
. In the case here in, how ever , the Biscans soug ht to add Robert Biscan as a party plaintiff. Even prior to the a do pti on of

Rul e 15 , Te nn e sse e la w al low e d an a me nd me nt that add e d a new plaint if f t o r e la te back to the fil ing of the original sui t without it being barr ed by a statute of limitations. See Advisory Commi ssion Cm t. to Tenn. R. Civ. P . 15.03. The rule did not c hang e that principle. “ [A] plaintiff may usually amend, under the relation ba ck provision .

. . to substitute or add as plainti ff t h e realT he B i s can s as s er t t hat t he proof s howed t hat H ug hes B r own pri mari l y dran k beer he al r eady had, s uch t hat 4 hi s i nt o xi cat i o n co ul d not b e at t ri b ut ed t o t he b eer purchased fo r hi m b y D ana B i scan and , co nsequentl y , t here was no sh o w ing tha t D a n a ’s p ro v id ing h im th e b e e r w a s a c a u se o f t h e a c c id e n t. B e c a u se the ju ry w a s n o t allo w e d to a llo c a te
a n y fau lt to D a n a B isc a n , w e c a n n o t p re su m e w h a t i ts c o n c lus io n m igh t ha v e b e e n re g a rd ing the so u rc e o f t h e b e e r. 5 party in interest.” Br

as we ll v . Ca ro the rs , 863 S.W .2d 722, 726 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p
. 1 993) (quoting Osborne Enters., Inc . v. City of Chattanooga , 561 S.W .2d 160, 163 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977))

. I n c a se s se e kin g to a dda

ne w p arty

plaint if f a ft e r the e xpir a tio n o f the statut e of lim itatio ns , the test is “(1) w hether

the def endant rec eived adequate notice of the claim ag ainst him; (2) whether the re lation back of

such ame ndment would unfairly prejudice the def endant; and ( 3) whe ther ther e is an ‘identity of interest’ betwee n the orig inal party plaintiff and the new pa rty plaintiff.” Osborne , 561 S.W .2d at 164.
The e ssential requ i re m en t is that the defendant not only have notice about the oper ational fac ts but also “must have had fair notice that a leg al claim exis ted in, and was in e ffe ct being asserted by ” the plaintiff bel at ed l ybroug ht in. Br as we ll , 863 S.W .2d at 726. The e x istence of fair notice from the origina l complaint that the newly -adde d pl ai n t iff’s c laim is invol ved ensur es that the defe ndants suffe r no pre

judice fr om the amendment. Id . at 727. Prejudice is the key consideration.
The re quirements of Te nn. R. Civ. P. 15.03 wer e met here in. The ame ndment clea rly arises out of the same c onduct and oc curr ence as the orig inal complaint. The original complaint put Mr. Worley and Mr. Br own on notice of the alleg ations ag ainst them. I t sought da mag es for all injuries to J ennife r re sulting fr om the acc ident. They also had notice that medical e x penses r esulted fr om J ennife r’s inj uries, that J ennife r was a minor, and that her father wa s acting as her next friend and natura l gua

rdian. Mr. Worley and Mr. B rown we re not pre judiced in their de fense by the delay ed addition of Mr. B iscan in his individual capac ity and have not alleg ed any specific prejudice

. Consequently , we a ffirm the trial court’s g rant of the Biscans’ motion to amend to add Mr. Biscan as a pla intiff in his individual capa city and the amendment’ s relation back to the f iling of the
orig ina l c omp la int

. I I . D a na B isc a n’ s Ro le Prior to the Ashley

Worley party , a fe w of the minors involved, including J ennife r B iscan, Hu g he s B ro wn , a nd Dana B isc a n, Jenn if e r’ s tw in s ist e r, g a the re d at th e ho me of a no the r f ri e ndto watch a football g ame. Dana, Hug hes, and another friend left to purc hase be er
. Dana Biscan purcha sed seve ral twe lve packs of beer for “eve ry one,” including H ug hes B rown. Hug hes drank two be e rs that heha d inhis c ar w hil e driving to the Wor le y pa rty . A ft e r a

rrivi ng a t th e pa

rty , h e g ot a twelve- pack of

beer from Dana. 4

Pursuan t t o T e n n
. R. Ci v
. P. 8

. 0 3 , inh is a n s w e r to th e o r ig in a l c o mp lain t, H u g h e s B r o wn identified Da na B is ca n as a n o n party who should bear

fault, or to whom some fa ult should beT he B i scans t hen f i l ed a sep arat e l awsui t a gai nst D ana B i scan, the convenience s t o re where s he p urchased t he 5 b eer, a nd the b usi ness located i n N ashvi l l e where she p urchased her f ake i d ent i f i cat i o n. P ri o r t o t he t ri al at i ss ue herei n, ho wever, t he B i scans non-s ui t ed t hat l awsui t

. In t he case before us , t he B i scans al so f i l ed a m o t i o n i n l i m i ne se e k ing to
exc l ude e vi dence of t he l aws ui t aga i ns t D ana
. T he t r i al cour t gr ant ed t hat mo t i on, an d t he defendan t s al s o app eal t hat d e c isio n . W e a g re e w ith the trial c o u rt o n tha t i ssu e sinc e the c o u rt p ro p e rly ru le d tha t no fau lt c o u ld b e a ttrib u te d to D ana B i scan.

T hey ci t e T enn. C o d e A nn. §§ 1-3- 1 1 3 (b), 57

- 5

- 3 0 1 (b)(I )( 3 ), and 57

- 4

- 2 0 3 (e)( 2 )( A ) and (B ). 6
6 allocate d, beca

use of he r conduc t in providing be er to other minors including himself. 5 Subsequently , the plaintiffs filed a m o t ion for judg ment on the pleading s or partial summary judgme nt asking , in part, that the c ourt prec lude any apportionment of fault to Dana Biscan. That motion wa s appar ently

not ruled on until it was raised in the tele phone conf ere nce shortly

befor e the start of the trial. An order ref lecting that confe renc e call, but e ntere d afte r the trial ha d beg un, stated, “the pa rties shall be permitted to assig n compar ative fault on Dana Biscan.” However , the issue was also raised by motions for direc ted verdic t a fter the close of plaintiffs’ proof and af ter the c lose of all the proof, and the trial court refuse d to allow the jury to allocate any

fault to Dana

Biscan. On appe al, Mr. B rown a nd Mr. W orley assert the ruling of the trial c ourt ref using to a llow the jury to al loc a te fa

ult to Da na B isc a n wa s er ro ne ou s. Th e y

a lso a sse rt

thetria l c ou rt

imp ro pe rl y excluded evidenc e re g arding her posse ssion of false ide ntification.

A. Fa ult Attributed to Dana B iscan Unde r Ne g lige nce T heory

I n o rd e r t o li mit

the ir po te nti a l li abil ity

un de r c omp arativ e faul t pri nc ipl e s, the de fe nd a nts had indicate d that Dana

Biscan should be included in those parties to whom some fault should be allocate d. See R idings v. The Ralph M. Parsons Co. , 914 S.W .2d 79, 83-84 (Te nn. 1996). The Biscans sought a ruling prec luding the allocation of any fault t o Dana Biscan on the basis that the Dra m Shop Act, Tenn. Code An n
. § § 5 7 -1 0-101 & -102, cuts off civil liabilit y

for the me re furnishing of alc ohol to someone who then causes i njury to a thi rd person. The trial court pre dicated its ruling o n t h o s e statutes and f ound that the jury

could not apportion fault to Dana B iscan. The
c o u r te x p l a i n e d t o t h e j u r y:
After r e v ie w in g th e la w v e r y c ar e f u ll y , th e s e la w y e r s h a v e ar g u e d v e r y c ap ab ly , I have g rante d a dire cted ve rdict on one portion of this trial, which means y ou are not to consider Dana B iscan in any way at fault for providing beer . The law is clear that that’ s th e int e nt o f the la w andso thi s Co urt mu st e nf or c e that in te nt.
The de fendants assert that the Dr am Shop A ct has no a pplication to someone who doe s not se ll a lc oh ol. B e c aus e Dana B isc a n is not a sel le r of a lc oh ol an d did not se ll the be e r i n q ue sti on to Hug hes B rown, but instead pur chase d it for him and others, the de fendants assert she is not entitled to the limit ation on liabilityprovided by the statutes. They

arg ue she is subject to liabilityfor he r actions on the ba sis of neg lige nce and, b e c a u se she violated va

rious statutes prohibiting the pur chase , possession, and consumption of alcoholic bever ag es by a minor, as we ll as statutes prohibiting the 6T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 5

- 1 5

- 4 0 4 (2) and § 5 7

- 3

- 4 1 2 (a)( 4 ). 7
7 furnishing of alc oholic bever ag es to a minor, she is a lso g uilty of neg lige nce pe r se . They contend 7 her pr oviding be er to Hug hes B rown be fore the party was a substantial fac tor contributing to the injuries J ennife r re ceive d.
The Te nnessee Dra m Shop Act i s comprised of two separ ate se ctions, and the fir st, Tenn. Cod e An n. § 5 7- 10 -1 01 , p ro vid e s:
T h e g e n e r a l a s s e mb ly h e r e b y f in d s a n d d e c la

r e s th a t the consumption of any al co h o lic bever ag e or be er r ather than the furn ishi ng of any alcoholic be vera g e or beer is the proxi mate ca u s e of injuries inflicte d upon another by an intox icated person. ( emphasis adde d.)
As is clear

from the lang uag e, the statute doe s not ref er to selling alcohol. Instead, it provides that the furnishing of alcohol or beer is not the prox imate cause of injuries c aused by someone who consumed the a lcohol. Thus, wher e it applies, the statute remove s, as a matter of law, the require d element of

leg al causation.
To establish a ne g lige nce c ause of action, a plaintiff must show (1) a duty of ca re ow ed by the de fe nd a nt t o th e plaint if f, (2 ) c on du c t by the de fe nd a nt br e a c hin g that du ty , ( 3) a n in jury or los s to the pl aintiff, (4) causation in fac t, and (5) proxi mate or leg al cause. Mc Cal l v . W ild e r, 913 S.W .2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995) . The c oncept of leg al cause, formerly

known as proximate cause , connotes a po lic y de c isi on to e sta

bli sh a bo un da ry of le g a l li abil ity

a ndto d e ny

lia bil ity fo r c on du c t th a t w ou ld
o t herw ise be a ctionable or result in liability

. W

a s t e M a n a g e m e n t

, I n c
. v
. S o u th Ce ntr

al B e ll Telephone Co. , 15 S.W .3d 425, 430 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). O ur Supreme Court ha s expl ained:

. . . prox i m at e cause, or le g al cause, conc erns a determination of whether leg al liabilityshould be imposed wher e ca use in fac t has bee n established. Prox imate or le g a l c aus e is a

po lic y de c isi on ma de by

the le g isl a tur e or

the c ou rt s to den y

lia bil ity for otherwise ac tionabl e co n d u ct base d on considerations of logic, c ommon sense, policy , prec edent a nd “our more or less inadequately expressed idea s of what justice demands or of

what is administratively

possible and conve nient.”

W hite v. Lawrence , 9 7 5 S

. W

. 2 d 5 2 5 , 5 2 9 (T en n
. 1 9 9 8 ) ( q u o t i n g Snyder v . LTG. L ufttechnische GmbH, 955 S.W .2d 252, 256 n. 6 (Tenn. 1997) (citations omitted)).
Wit h the adoption of Te nn. Code Ann

. § 57-10-101, the G ener al Assembly has made the pol i cy d ec i s i o n that the mere furnishing of alc ohol cannot be the leg al cause of injuries r esulting from the actions of a

person who c onsumed that alcohol. It is true that the leg islature cr eate d, in the second section of the Dra m Shop Act, an exception to the g ener al immunit y from li ab i l i t yfor fu rn ish ing a lc oh ol, bu t th a t e xce pti on is a pp lic able on ly to se lle rs of a lc oh oli c be ve ra g e s a ndon lyT e n n . C o d e A n n . § 5 7 -1 0 -1 0 2 , en tit le d “sta n d a rd o f p ro o f” p ro v id e s tha t: 8

N o t wi t hst and i ng t he p rovis i o ns o f § 57

- 1 0

- 1 0 1 , no judge o r jury m ay p rono unce a judgm ent award i ng d am ages t o or o n be hal f of any p art y who has suf fered p ers o nal i njury o r death agai nst any pe rs o n who has s ol d any al cohol i c bev er age or beer , un l es s s uch j ur y of t wel ve ( 12 ) per s ons ha s f i r s t as cer t ai ned b eyond a rea so n ab l e d o ub t t hat t he sal e b y s uch p ers o n of t he al co ho l i c b everage o r beer was t he p roximate cause of t he p ers o nal i njury or d eat h s ust ai ned and t hat s uch p ers o n: (1) So l d t he al co ho l i c b everage o r b eer t o a pe rs o n know n t o be unde r t he age o f t wenty

- o ne (21 ) y ears and s uch p ers on ca u s ed t h e per s on al i n j u r y or dea t h as t h e di r ec t r es u l t of t h e con s u mpt i on of t he al coh ol i c bev er ag e or be er s o s ol d; or (2) So l d the alcoho l i c b everage o r b eer to an o b vi o usl y int o xi cat ed pe rs o n and s uch p ers o n caused t he p erso na l i nju ry or d ea t h as t he d i rec t re sult o f the c o nsum p t i o n o f

the a l co ho l i c b ev era ge o r b ee r so so ld

.

A l t ho ugh t he C o urt u se d th e p hras e “ f urni shi ng of i nt o xi cant s” i n t hi s o ne i nst ance i n Br ooki ns , t he ca se 9 i n v ol v ed t h e i l l eg al s al e of a l coh ol t o mi n or s , a n d i t i s c l ea r f r om t h e opi n i on i n i t s en t i r et y t h at t h e Cour t ’ s s t at eme n t of t he l aw referred t o s el l ers of al co ho l , not t ho se who p rovide i t i n a s o ci al s et t i ng. 8 in s pe c if ie d c ir c ums ta nc e s. Te nn . Co de An n. § 5 7- 10 -1 02

. I n fac t, this c ou rt ha s f ou ndthat a 8 require ment for a ny

liabilityunder the statutory exception in Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-10-102 is a sale. LaRue v. 1817 Lake Inc. , 9 66 S.W. 2d42 3, 42 6 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 7) ; se e als o W or ley v . W

e ige ls, Inc. , 9 19 S.W. 2d 58 9, 59 3 (T e nn . 199 6) (h old ing that the e xce pti on on ly app lie s whe re the re is a s a le and that the injuries m u s t b e ca u s ed by the purc haser ’s consumption). It is undisput ed that Da na Biscan is not a seller of a lcoholic beve rag es and did not sell the bee r in question to Hug hes B rown. Thus, we a g ree with both sides that Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-10-102 doe s not apply to Dana or

her conduct herein. The consequenc e, however, is that the statutory exception that allows the impositi on of liabilitydoes not apply to her.
The de fendants arg ue, howe ver, that the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 57- 10-101 ar e l i k ew i s e i n ap plicable to Dana bec ause she is not a seller of a lcoholic beve rag es and not a “dram sh op ” de fe nd a nt. On app e a l, Mr

. B ro wn a nd Mr

. Wor le y arg ue that the tr ial cou rt im pr op e rl y expanded the scope of Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 57-10-101& -102 to encompass an individual who was clea rly not a dra m shop defendant, because the Ac t was cr eate d wi t h the leg islative intent of pr ote c tin g se lle rs of

int oxic a tin g be ve ra g e s f ro m li abil ity , no t pu rc ha se rs . Ind e e d, ou r S up re me Cou rt ha s f ou ndtha t th e le g isl a tur e ’s int e nt w a s to c ha ng e thec omm on la w r ule re g ard ing lia

bil ity of se lle rs of

a lc oh ol andto p ro te c t se lle rs fr om l ia bil ity e xce pt i n very di stinc t c ir c ums ta nc e s. W orley , 919 S.W .2d at 592.
Prior to the enac tment of the statutes at issue, the liability of a se ller of a lcoholic beve rag es to ano the r f

or inj urie s caus e d by that othe r’ s in toxic a tio n w a s g ov e rn e d b y c omm on la w p ri nc ipl e s, and cour ts ge nera lly

rec og nized that “the furnishing of intox icants may be the pr ox imate cause of
a n in ju r y r e s u lt in g f

r o m in to xic a ti o n , th e n e g li g e n c e c o n s is ti n g o f th e c r e a ti o n o f a s itua tion or condition which involves unrea sonable risk be cause of the fore seea ble action of another.” Brookins 9
v . Th e Ro un d Ta ble , 6 24 S.W. 2d54 7, 54 9 ( Te nn . 1 98 1) . T he rule of fo re se e abil ity

state d inT he al l egat i o ns i n C e c il i ncl uded t he cl ai m t hat t he pas s eng er i n a ca r t hat s t r uck an d ki l l ed a bi cy cl i s t was 10 l i ab l e b ecause he pro vi d ed be er t o hi s f ri end , t he i nt o xi cat ed dri ver.

9 Brookins was re place d b y Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 57- 10-101 and - 102. W orley , 919 S.W .2d at 592. Thus, the statutes in question provided prote ction from liability to sellers that did not exi st before their passa g e.
Ho we ve r, prior

to the e na c tme nt of the statut e s in que sti on , und e r co mmo n la w p ri nc ipl e s, those who provided a lcoh ol in a social setting wer e tre ated diff ere ntly from seller s. Those ca ses gen er al l y h el d t h att h er e w as n o l i ab i l i t y fo r ap er s o n wh o p ro v i d ed al co h o l i n a s o ci al s et t i n g.
At c o mm o n la w , a n in d iv id u a l w h o f u r n is h e d a lc o h o l t o a n o th e r w a s n o t l ia

b le f or any damag es re sulting fr om the other’s intoxi cation, even if those dama g es we re fore seea ble, in part beca

use the other’ s acc eptanc e of the intox icants wa s considere d an indepe ndent interve ning c ause, c utting off any liability

. Courts of this state have modified the common law rule in the past, hol ding, f or instance , that liabilitymight be imposed in ce rtain circ umstances on c ommercia l purvey ors of l iquor who provided it to an intox icated c ustomer. Howe ver, we have found no dec ision, and none h as b een cited to us, in which such liability has bee n imposed on those who provided intox icating bever ag es in a soc i al co n t ex t, as Har din did here, nor do we believe that we should set such a prece dent. So gr eat a departure fr om settled law,
w ith it s my

ria d imp li c a ti o n s f

o r c a s u a l s o c ia l in te r c o u r s e , is b e tt e r le f t to the leg islature.

Ce c il v . H ar din , 575 S.W .2d 268, 271 (Tenn. 1978) (citations omitted). 10 The leg islature has ma de no depa rture f rom the pri n ci p l es d iscussed in Ce c il . Ins te a d, it adopted Te nn. Code Ann. §§ 57-10-101 and -102. Nothing in the l ang uag e of those statutes can be
re a d to imp os e li abi lity

up on so me on e wh o me re ly fu rn ish e s a lc oh ol. Whil e the prima ry pu rp os e of the e nactment of

the two statutes may have been to c hang e the law to provide protec tion to sellers of alcohol except in spe cified circ umstances, the le g islation also codified the e x isting common law rule that no liability

attache s to those who provide alcohol in a soc ial setting. Indeed, T enn. Code Ann. § 57-10-101 e mploy ed the c ausation ana ly sis previously used by the courts.
B e c aus e theGe ne ra l A sse mbl y ha s e sta bli sh e d a statut ory c on c lus ion a s to c aus a tio n, c ou rt s are no t f re e to dis re g ard thi s sta te me nt of pu bli c po lic y or to sub sti tut e ou r j ud g me nt f or that c le arl y stated by the leg islature. The leg islature sets public policy

. Va nTr an v . S tate , 66 S.W .3d 790, 804 (Tenn. 2001) . “The determination of public policy is primari l y a fu nction of the leg islature,” and the judiciary

may determine public policy only in the absenc e of legi s l at i v e determination and decla ration. Tay lor

v . B e ar d , 104 S.W .3d 507, 511 (Tenn. 2003); Alcazar v. Hay es , 982 S.W .2d 845, 851 (Tenn. 1998 ). Ou r role is sim ply to determine w hether

Tenn. Code Ann. § 57- 10-101 applies to someone who mere ly provides, but doe s not se ll, a lcohol. For the re asons stated a

bove,
a ndba se d u po n th e auth oriti e s d isc us se d b e low , w e c on c lud e it d oe s.O n e wa s t h at h e ai ded an d a bet t ed h i s f r i en d, the d ri ver , i n t h e i l l eg al a ct i v i t y of dr i v i n g w h i l e i n t ox i ca t ed. 11 T he jur y ret urned a verd i ct i n f avo r of t he p ass enger. O n ap p eal , t he p l ai nt i f f chal l enged t he jur y i nst ruct i o n t hat “ t he
m ere f urni shi ng of an al co ho l i c b everage o r b eer al o ne i s i nsuf f i ci ent t o est ab l i sh l i ab i l i t y fo r ai d i ng and ab et t i ng dri vi ng und er t he i nf

l uence o f

an i nt o xi cant

. ” T hi s co urt fo und that t he i nst ruct i o n was t aken f rom t he C e c il ca se a nd wa s a c o rr e c t state m e n t o f t h e law . T h e p la intiff a lso a rg u e d tha t C e c il w a s d isting u ish a b le b e c a u se tha t c a se in v o lve d a d u lts and t he f urni shi ng of al co ho l t o a m i no r coul d be co nsi d ered an el em ent o f ai d i ng an ab et t i ng. A l t ho ugh t hi s co urt fo und t he r ecor d bef ore i t di d not es t abl i s h t he dri ver ’ s ag e, i t al s o not ed t hat t he C e c il c a se m a d e no su c h d istinc tio n
. M a u ld in , 1993 W L 312686, a t * 3.

A holdi ng i n W orl ey , 9 1 9 S .W .2 d a t 5 9 3 , sup p o rts o u r c o n c lus io n
. A ltho u g h th e S u p re m e C o u rt w a s p rim a rily 12 ad d res si ng a pro ced ural i ss ue as t o t he ap p l i cab i l i t y of est o p p el t o al t ernat i ve p l ead i ngs, t he C o urt revers ed t he C o urt of Ap peal s and af

f i r med t he t r i al cour t ’ s gr ant of s ummary j udgment t o def endan t s
. I n t hat ca s e, t he un dera ge dri nk er who caused t he accident was pro vi d ed al co ho l by another pe rs o n be l o w t he l egal age fo r p u rc h asi ng and co nsumi ng alco ho l , S co t t i e G o o sey, w ho ha d ac t ua l l y pu rch ase d t he b ee r. T he t rial co urt ha d he l d t ha t M r. G o o sey d i d no t ca use t he i njury , but i nst ead gave t he b eer to ano t her m i no r who d i d c ause t he i njury

. A l t ho ugh no t e xp l i ci t l y st at i ng s o , t he S u p re m e C o u rt a p p e a rs to ha v e a p p ro v e d the trial c o u rt’s re a so n ing , an d tha t i n te rp re ta tio n w o u ld b e c o n siste n t with W orl ey ’ s co ncl usi o n t hat t he i njuri es must be caused b y t he p urchaser ’ s co nsump t i o n. 10 I n Larue , 9 66 S.W. 2d 42 3, thi s c ou rt c on sid e re d th e tw o s ta tut e s in the c on te xt of lia bil ity for the death of a passeng er of an intox icated motorcy cle driver who had c onsumed alcohol at a local
re staur a nt a nd ba

r. Th e c omp la int

a lle g e d th a t th e de fe nd a nt b ar andits e mpl oy e e s h a d n e g lig e ntl y serve d both the undera g e driver and the undera g e passeng er. This court held that for the exception in § 57-10-102 to appl y , t h e p l aint iffs we re r equire d to prove be y ond a re asonable doubt that the defe ndants sold an alcoholic be vera g e to the drive r and pa sseng er. Id

. at 426. Be cause they failed to meet that burde n, the direc ted ver dict for de fendants was upheld. Mauldin v. Gray , No

. 0 2 A0 1 -9 2 0 8 -C V- 0 0 2 4 0 , 1 9 9 3 W L 3 1 2 6 8 6 , at* 3 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. Au g. 18 , 1 99 3) (p e rm . a

pp . d e nie d F e b. 22 , 19 94 ), inv olv e d a situatio n inwh ic h tw o h ig h s c ho ol s tud e nts , afte r a day

of drinking beer , riding around, and attending a party , wer e involved in an a ccide nt that resulted in serious injuries to a pedestria n. The pedestrian sued the passenge r on various theories 11 and ar g ued on appea l that a juryinstruction taken esse ntially verbatim from Tenn. Code Ann. § 57- 10-101 wa s an err oneous statement of the law under the fac ts and that the jury should a lso have be en char g ed with the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-10-102. This court held, howe ver, that -102 did not applyto th o s e w h o f u r n is h a lc o h o l o r

b e e r to a n o th e r

“ a s mi g h t o c c u r

ina s o c ia l s e tt ing.” Id . at *5. Thus, our c ourts have unif ormly held t h at t h e i m p o sition of liabili ty under Te nn. Code An n. §§ 57 -1 0- 10 1 a nd-1 02 is l imi te d to se lle rs in the sp e c if ie d c ir c ums ta nc e s. 12

Th e pr e c ise qu e sti on of wh e the r Te nn
. Cod e An n. § 57 -1 0- 10 1 a pp lie s to pr e c lud e lia

bil ity to one who furnishes alcohol in a social setting has been answer ed even m ore directly in the re cent case of Do wne n v . Te sta , No. E2002-01320- COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 2002411 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 1, 2003) (pe rm. app. g rante d Dec . 8, 2003). I n Downen , a g roup of minors attended a party at the Testas ’ h ome following a hig h school g raduation cere mony . After the party , Adam Downe n was killed while riding with a frie nd who had a l s o att ended the party and who wa s intox icated. T he famil y of Ad a m D ow ne n b ro ug ht s uit a g a ins t th e so c ia l ho sts

.In D ow en , t h e cou r t a l s o s t at ed, “ wh i l e t h i s re s u l t m ay not be w h at t h e l eg i s l at u r e i n t en ded wi t h r eg ar d t o a 13

s i t uat i on i nv ol vi ng mi nor s , t hi s cour t ca nn ot i gn ore t he l egi s l at ur e’ s s t at ement of publ i c pol i cy
. ” T he cour t al s o not ed t h at a n u mber of

s t at es , by s t at u t e or by c ou r t de ci s i on , h ad i mpos ed s oci al h os t l i abi l i t y w h en al co h ol i s s er v ed t o a mi n or , bu t t h at ou r l eg i s l at u r e h ad dec l i n ed t o i mpos e l i abi l i t y for t h e f u r n i s h i n g of al coh ol t o pe r s on s u n der t h e ag e of tw e n ty-o n e in o u r m o st re c e n t l e g islativ e se ssio n . 2 0 0 3 W L 2 0 0 2 4 1 1 , at *4 n.2 , ci t i ng SB / H B 1758/ 1916.
11 The trial c ourt g rante d summary judgme nt for the soc ial hosts as to their lia bilityfor furnishing alcohol on the g round that the consumption of the alcohol a nd not the furnishing of the alcohol was the proxi mate cause of death due to the lang uag e of Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-10-101. O n appea l, this court affirmed the g rant of summary judgme nt on that issue and specifically held, “B ased on the wording of the statute a nd the fore g oing a uthorities, the plaintiffs ’ ar g ument that the leg islature intended T enn. Code Ann. § 57- 10-101 apply only to se llers of alcohol is w ithout merit.” Downen , 2003 WL 2002411, at *3. Trac ing the leg islative history of the statutes, this court found:
Th e le g isl a tiv e his tory

of theAc t c le arl y

sh ow s th e le g isl a tur e e xpre sse d it s in te nt t o limit the exception to sales. In the State and L ocal Gove rnment committee mee ting held on Fe bruary 25, 1986, Senator Moore (sponsor of the bill) ex plained that he ha d
rec eived an opinion from the attorney g ener al which state d that the bill would relieve host liabili ty

and plac e the bur den o n s el lers. Senator Moore r eiterated this in the Senate he aring held on Fe bruary 27, 1986, and explained that “this was a n issue for
a lot of pe op le .” Se nator

Da rn e ll p ro po se d a n am end men t to th e bil l w hic h w ou ld ha ve , a mon g oth e r thin g s, re pla c e d th e “ so ld” la ng ua g e in the e xce pti on s w ith “furnished,” a nd thus would have i m p o sed liabilityon social hosts, but the amendment wa s voted down. Ther e is no question that the l eg islature int ended that s o c i a l h o s t s w o u l d b e i n s u l a t e d f r o ml i ab i l i t y.
Id . at *4. 13 Taking the strong est leg itimate view of the e vidence in the ligh t m o s t fa v orable to the defe ndants, and disca

rding all evidenc e contr ary to that view, Alexande r v. Arme ntrout , 24 S.W .3d 267, 271 (Tenn. 2000) ; State Farm Gen. I ns. Co. v. W

ood , 1 S.W .3d 658, 662 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), there was no e v i d en ce o f a s ale by Dana Biscan, and she w as only shown to have f

urnished the alcoholic be vera g es to Mr. B rown a nd others. The re is no other alleg ation of neg lige nt conduct by Dana Biscan. For

example, there is no alleg ation she could ha ve p re v en t ed Hug hes B rown fr om driving or Jennifer fr om becoming his passeng er.
Be cause , as a matter of law, her c onduct cannot be consider ed a pr ox imate cause of Jennifer’ s injuries, Dana

Biscan cannot be held liable f or those injuries in a ne g lige nce- based c ause of action, and the tria l court cor

rec tly conclude d that the jury could not a llocate f ault to her. Conseque ntly , we aff irm the trial court’s g rant of a direc ted ver dict in favor of the B iscans on that issue.12 B . D a na B isc a n’ s Lia

bil ity Un de r the Th e ory

of Ne g lig e nc e Pe r S e
Mr . Worl e y a nd Mr . Br ow n als o ar g ue that the jury sh ou ld h a ve be e n a ble to a pp ortio n f ault to D a na B isc a n b e c aus e sh e wa s n e g lig e nt pe r se in purcha sing the bee r and in providing it to other minors because those a ct s v i olated pena l statutes. Under the doctrine of neg lige nce pe r se , the specifi c c o n d u c t r e q u ir e d b y a p e n a l s tatu te r e p la c e s th e “ r e a s o n ab le p e r s o n u n d e r s imilar
c ir c u ms tan c e s ” s tan d ar d o f c ar e g e n e r a ll y ap p li c ab le in n e g li g ence case s. Cook v. Spinnake r’s of Rivergate, I

nc. , 87 8 S.W. 2d 93 4, 93 7 (T e nn . 1 99 4) ; King v. Danek Med., I nc . 37 S.W .3d 429, 460 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). Conduc t that violates a penal statute may be re ndere d neg lige nt as a matter of law. See R E S TA TE ME NT (S EC OND ) O F T OR TS § 874A cmt. e (“The common law tort of ne g lige nce is n ot c ha ng e d, bu t the e xpre ssi on of the stand ardof c arein c e rt a in f

a c t si tuatio ns is m od if

ie d; i t is chang ed fr om a g ener al standar d to a spec ific rule of conduct.” )

Howeve r, while such c onduct m ay establish the dut y of ca re and brea ch of duty

elements of a neg lige nce a ction, a plaintiff must still prove the other r equire d elements , i n cl u d ing c ausation

. Br own v . S mi th , 604 S.W .2d 56, 59 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980). Thus, even if Dana Biscan’s violation of statutes re g arding the purc hase, posse ssion, and consumption by a minor or the f

urnishing to a minor of alcoholic be vera g es established he r neg lige nce pe r se , she co u l d not be liable under that doctrine unle ss that neg lige nce w ere a leg al cause of J en n i fe r’ s injuries. Kirksey v . Ove rton Pub, Inc ., 739 S.W .2d 230, 235 (T en n
. C t

. App. 1987). As ex plained above , by statute it is the
c on su mpt ionof

a lc oh ol, no t th e fu rn ish ing of it, that is the pr oximate or le g a l caus e of the inj urie s, as a matter of law

. I n addition, in W

orley , our Supreme Court held that, with the e nactment of Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 57-10-101 and -102, the leg islature
has made a def

inite disti nction betwee n the basis for c ivil li ability and the ba sis for criminal liabilityincident to the sale of alcoholic be vera g es. These statutes, rat h er than the duties imposed by criminal statutes, dete rmine the c ivil li ability of the seller.

W orley , 919 S.W .2d at 593.
Al tho ug h th e Cou rt

sp ok e wi th r e g ardto s e lle rs of a lc oh ol ic bev e ra g e s, the princ ipl e is equally applicable t o t h o s e who mer ely furnish them, since the two statutes apply to the broad cate g ory of alc ohol-related injuries. Essentially , the leg islature has de termined that the me re furnish in g o f a lc o h o l is n o t to b e s u b je c t to n e g li g e n c e li ab il ity , a s is e v id e n c e d b y it s use of proxi mate ca

usation lang uag e in Tenn. Code A nn. § 57-10-101. W hether or not violation of the pe na l st a tut e s at is su e e sta bli sh e s a du ty that wa s br e a c he d, the le g isl a tur e ha s de te rm ine d th e c ivi l liabilitydoes not att ac h t h er et o . We affirm the trial court’ s determination that fault could not be attributed to Dana

Biscan on the theory

of neg lige nce per se.13 C. Poss ession of F ake I dentification by Dana Biscan
The B iscans filed a

motion in limine seeking to pr ohibit any evidenc e fr om being introduced
abo ut D a na Bis can bu y ing be e r f or Hu g he s B ro wna ndoth e rs a ndus ing fa lse ide nti fi c a tio n to purcha se that bee r on the nig ht of the party . The trial c ourt g rante d this mot ion in part, determining that evidenc e could be introduced showing that Hu g hes B rown g ot beer from Dana B iscan on the night of the ac cident, but excluding any ref ere nce w hatsoeve r to fake identification

. The c ourt de te rm ine d th a t su c h e vid e nc e wa s ir re le va nt andpr e

jud ic ia l.
Ge n e r a l l y , e v i d e n c e t h a t m e e t s o t h e r r e q u i r e m e n t s i s a d m i s s i b l e i f i t i s r e l e v a n t , T e nn . R. Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendenc y to make the e x istence of any fac t that is of conseque nce to the de termination of the a ction more prob ab l e o r l es s probable than it would be wi tho ut the e vid e nc e .” Te nn . R. Ev id. 40 1. Ho we ve r, e ve n r e le va nt e vid e nc e ma y be e xclu de d if its probative value is substantially outweig hed by

the dan ger o f unfair prejudice , confusion of the issues, misleading the jury , or for other re asons. Tenn. R. Evid. 403.
“One of t he trial court’s essential responsibilities is to control t he flow of evidence to the jury by ruling on the admissibilit y of e v i d en ce , controll ing the order of the proof

, and dete rmining the scope of examination of the witnesses.” Ove rstreet v. Shoney’s , 4 S.W .3d 694, 702 (Tenn. 1999)

. Th e de c isi on to a dmi t o r ex clu de evid e nc e re sts wi thi n th e so un d d isc re tio n o f the tr ia l c ou rt

. Acc ording ly , trial courts are acc orded a wide deg ree of latitude in making such dete rminations, and will be overturne d on appea l only upon a showing of abuse of discre tion. Rothstein v. Orange Grov e Center, Inc

. , 6 0 S.W. 3d80 7, 81 1 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) ; Otis v. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co. , 850 S.W .2d 439, 442 (Tenn. 1992)

. Under the abuse of discre tion standard, a trial court’s r uling “ will be upheld so long
as re asonable minds can disag ree as to the propriety of the de cision made.” A trial
cou rt ab u s es its discretion only when it “a

pplies an incorr ect leg al standar d, or
re a c he s a de c isi on wh ic h is a g a ins t lo g ic or re a so nin g or that c aus e s a n in jus tic e to the party compl aining .” The abuse of discretion standa

rd does not permit the
app e llate c ou rt

to s ub sti tut e its jud g me nt f or that of the tria l c ou rt

. Eldridge v. Eldridge , 42 S.W .3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001) (citations omitted).
Ou t of thepr e sen ce of th e jury , it wa s e sta

bli sh e d th a t D a na

B isc a n p os se sse d f

a lse ide nti fi c a tio n. Ne ith e r Dana no r a ny on e e lse c ou ld re me mbe r i f s he us e d th a t f ake i.d . to pu rc ha se the bee r in question. We ag ree with the tr

ia l c o u r t’ s decision to exclude evidenc e re g arding the fa lse identification. I t is sim ply

not relevant to any determinative issue. I f t his lawsuit involved the potential liabilityof the seller of

the bee r, how Dana was ab l e to buy it would be rele vant to the question of the application and e ffe ct of Te nn. Code Ann. § 57-10- 102(1). That is not an issue he rein. The fa ct that Dana illega lly boug ht beer

and g ave some to Hug hes B rown be fore the party was e stablished. TheA ne c e ssa ry e le m e n t o f an y ne g lige n c e c a u se o f ac tio n is a d u ty o f ca re o w e d b y the d e fen d a n t t o the p la intiff

. 14 S t a p l es v. CB L & A s s oc. , Inc. , 1 5 S .W .3 d 8 3 , 8 9 (T e n n . 2 0 0 0 ); Col n v
. Ci t y of Sav annah , 966 S. W

. 2d 34, 39 (T enn. 1 9 9 8 ); M c C lu n g v . D e lta S q u a re L td . P a rtn e rsh ip , 93 7 S.W

. 2 d at 89 4 (T enn. 19 9 6 ).
14 jury was fr ee to dr aw whatever infere nces it wa nted from that information.
Th e de fe nd a nts a sse rt

that th e e xhibi tin g of

fa lse ide nti fi c a tio n to pu rc ha se a lc oh oli c bever ag es by a person under 21 is illega l pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-3-412. Although the y conce de ther e wa s no evidenc e she a ctually used the fa lse identification to purc hase the beer at issue, they nonetheless a ssert she wa s g uiltyof neg lige nce per se by violating Te nn. Code Ann. § 57-3-412 and that the jury could have inferr ed that violation f rom the evidenc e excluded. As explained above, whether or not Dana

Biscan committed violations of penal statutes in the purcha se of the beer , she cannot be held liable for

J ennife r’s injuries. Other than as a basis for allocating fault to Dana , the Def endants ha ve off

ere d no other explanation f or the rele vance of the evidenc e. F urther, e ven if we could find some re levanc e to the dete rminative issues in the case befor e us, we ag ree with the trial court that the dang ers of

prejudice and jury

confusion outweig h any

sli gh t p ro b at i ve value of the evidenc e.
Withre g ardto the de fe nd a nts ’ a sse rt iontha t D a na ’s me repo sse ssi on of a fa ke i.d . is probative of

her c redibility , the def

endants ha ve off

ere d no example of how Dana ’s cr edibility , or lack ther eof, w as plac ed at issue reg arding the fac ts of this c ase. Additionally , the jury was informed of he r i lle g a l c on du c t in p ur c ha sin g the be e r anddis tr ibu tin g it amon g the oth e r m ino rs a ndc ou ld draw the same conclusions reg arding her cre dibilit y from that proof as def endants a ssert could ha ve been dr awn f

rom evidenc e she posse ssed fa lse identification.

I I I . Liabilityof Mr. Worley

I n th e ir c la im a g a ins t Paul Wo rl e y , th e B isc a ns all eged th at he wa s n e g lig e nt andthat hi s neg lige nce w as a pr ox imate cause of Jennifer B iscan’s injuries. Mr . Worley filed a mo t i o n for summary judgme n t ar guing that the cause of ac tion ag ainst him should be dism issed beca use he owed no duty

to J ennife r B iscan. Shortly befor e trial, the trial court denied the motion for summary 14 judgme nt. On appea l, Mr. Worley asserts that this denial was err or.
Mr. Worley ’s motion for summary judgme nt was base d upon arg uments that (1) Te nnessee ’s Dra m Shop Act prec luded assig nment to a furnisher of alcohol in a social setting o f l i ab i l i t yfor injuries cause d by

an intox icated pe rson; (2) a social host who provides a lcohol even to a minor
c a n n o t b e li ab lef

o r in ju r ie s c au s e d b y

th a t m in o r ’ s in to xic a ti o n ; ( 3 ) T e n n e s s e e d o e s n o t r e c o g n iz e the social host-g uest relationship as a specia l r elationship that cre ates a duty on the host to control the conduct of guests t o preve nt them from neg lige nt conduct; (4) a lthough no spe cific Te nnessee authority exis ts, c ourts in other states ha ve dec lined to impose liabili ty on social hosts who do not furnish alc ohol to minors, but allow it to be consumed on the ir property ; and (5) that there was no basis for the aider a nd abettor the ory for attribution of neg lige nce pe r se t o M r
. W o r l e y.15

Th e B isc a ns op po se d th e mot ionon theba sis Mr . Worl e y ow e d a com mon la w dut y to u se rea sonable c are to refr ain from c onduct t h at co u l d foreseea bly injure others and that a heig htened duty exis ts when dea ling with minors. They al s o ar gued that Mr. Worley violated the statutes prohibiting c ontributing to the de linquency of mino rs , T en n
. Code Ann. § 37-1- 156; that he was
c ri min a lly

re sp on sib le un de r T e nn . Co de An n. § 3 9- 11 -4 02 fo r H ug he s B ro wn ’s ve hic ula r a ssa ult be c aus e he a ide d H ug he s B ro wnin the ill e g a l c on su mpt ionof a lc oh ol b y

pr ov idi ng a

pla c e to possess and consume it; an d t h at he participated in a c onspiracy to violate the statute prohibiting minors from consuming alcohol, all alleg ations of neg lige nce pe r se . T he B isc a ns a lso arg ue d th a t, reg ardle ss of the ex istence of a common law or

statutory duty , Mr. Worley

had voluntarily

assumed duties to prevent minors who dr ank fr om driving and had bre ache d those assumed duti es. Mr. Worley ’s motion did not address this issue. Summary judgme nts enable c ourts to resolve c as es on dispositi ve leg al issues. Summary judgme nt is appropriate when the filings supporting t he mot ion show that there is no g enuine issue of material fac t and that the moving party is e ntitled to judgme nt a s a matter of law. Te nn. R. Civ. P. 5 6. 04 ; By rd

v . H all , 8 47 S.W. 2d20 8, 21 0 ( Te nn . 1 99 3) . Su mma ry jud g me nts arepr op e r i n a c a se that can be resolved on the basis of leg al issues alone. Fruge v. D oe , 952 S.W .2d 408, 410 (Tenn. 19 97 ); By rd , 847 S.W .2d at 210; Church v. Pe rales , 39 S.W .3d 149, 156 (Tenn. Ct. A p p
. 2 0 00)

. Howeve r, summary

judgme nt is seldom appropriate in a ne g lige nce c ase, Fruge , 952 S.W .2d at 410; Lett v. Colli er Foods, Inc

. , 6 0 S. W.3 d 9 5, 98 (Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 1) , b e c aus e of the fa c t sp e c if

ic
natur e of su c h a c la im. Whe re , h ow e ve r, the dis po sit ive iss ue is w he the r the de fe nd a nt o we d a d uty of car e to the plaintiff, summary judgme nt may be appropriate in a ne g lige nce c ase. Le tt , 60 S.W .3d
a t 98 ; Nic ho ls v . A tni

p , 844 S.W .2d 655, 658 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). T hat is because the e x istence of a duty is a question of law to be determined by the court. Staples v. C

BL & Assoc., Inc

. , 15 S.W. 3d83 , 8 9 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) ; Ri c e v . Sab ir , 9 79 S.W. 2d30 5, 30 8 ( Te nn . 1 99 8) ; Co l n v. C i ty of Savannah , 966 S.W .2d 34, 39 (Tenn. 1998)

. Nevertheless, summary

judgme nt is not ap p ro p ri at e w h en gen u i n e d i s p u t es reg ardingmaterial fa c ts e xist. Te nn . R. Civ . P. 56 .0 4. Th us , a mot ionfo r s umm ary

jud g me nt s ho uldbe g rante d o nly when the undisputed f

acts, a nd the infer ence s rea sonably draw n from the undisput ed fa cts, support one conc lusion - t hat t he party seeking the summary judgme nt is entitl ed to a judg ment as a matter of law. W

ebber v . State Farm Mut. Auto, Ins. Co. , 4 9 S. W.3 d 2 65 (T e nn . 2 00 1) ; Brown v. Birman M a n a g e d Ca re, Inc

. , 4 2 S.W .3d 62, 66 (Tenn. 2001) ; Go od loe v . S tate , 36 S.W .3d 62, 65 (Tenn. 2001). Summary

judgme nt should not be used to r esolve disputes of f act or infere nces to be draw n from the e vidence

. Church , 39 S.W .3d at 156.
A trial court’s decision on a motion for summar y j u d gm ent enjoy s no presumption of
c o rr e c tn e s s o n ap p e a l. Ca r vell v. Bottoms , 9 00 S.W. 2d23 (T e nn . 1 99 5) ; Le tt , 60 S.W .3d at 99; Gonzales v. Al ma n Constr. C o. , 8 57 S.W. 2d42 , 4 4 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 3) . T his c ou rt ’s ro le in revie w of the g rant of s u m m ar y j u d gment is to review the r ecor d and dete rmine whe ther the
re q uirements of Te nn. R. Civ. P . 56 have be en met. Staples , 15 S.W .3d at 88. We, like the trial
c ou rt , mu st r e vie w the e vid e nc e pr e se nte d at the su mma ry jud g me nt sta g e in the lig ht m os t f a vo ra ble to the non-moving party , here the Biscans, afford all rea sonable inferenc es to that party , and disca rdE vi d ence at t ri al regard i ng t hese event s canno t be co nsi d ered i n our revi ew o f t he t ri al co urt ’ s summ ary 15 j udgment deci s i on. B eca us e t he defendan t s ha ve not ch all en ge d the s uf f i ci enc y of

t he evi dence s uppo r t i ng t he t r i al
c o u rt’s ve rd ic t, w e ne e d no t se t o u t t h e a d d iti o n a l fa c ts tha t m a y ha v e c o m e o u t at tria l.
16 al l countervailing e vidence

. Bradshaw v. Daniel , 8 54 S.W. 2d86 5, 87 0 ( Te nn . 1 99 3) ; B y rd , 847 S.W .2d at 210-11. Consequently , the question prese nted is whether , based upon the filin g s supporting the
m o t i o n a n d r e s p o n s e , M r
. W o r l e y w a s e n t i t l e d t o j u d g m e n t a s a m a t t e r o f l a w
. M o r e s p e c i f

i c a l l y, the question is whether

the undisputed materia l fac ts established that Mr. Worley owed or assumed no duty of ca re to Jennifer B iscan. Viewing the evidenc e in the re quired light, the materia l f acts a re a s follows. Mr. Worley

15 hosted the party

for his daug ht er As h l ey ’s eig hteenth birthday at his residenc e. No written inv itatio ns w e r es e nt; As hle y Wor le y pe rs on a lly

inv ite d f ri e nd s. Othe r s tud e nts he ardabo ut the pa rty by word-of mouth. Every one who showe d up at t h e Worley home on the nig ht of the party was welcome d by

the Worley s. Mr. Worley

did not intend to serve any alcoholic be vera g es, and did not. However, he was awa re that some of the minors attendin g t h e p ar t ywould bring beer and drink it at the pa

rty . He expected that to occur
. Mr. Worley told Ashley

prior to the party

that if any

of the g uests consumed alcoholic be vera g es they

would not be permitted to leave the pa rty and would be r equire d to stay the night. He testified t hat t his was his “r ule.” The deposition ex cer pt filed in opposition t o the motion i n cl u d ed t h e f

o l l o wi n g: [A] s we talke d about having a party , the topic of drinking came up. I was c oncerned that there would be people drinking . I knew from my past experience with my

son and with - - just my

g ener al kno wl ed ge of the kids’ behavior that some drank and
so me did n’ t, andso I

a sk e d - - I

ta lke d w ithAs hle y

abo ut that, w hat to do , ho w to deal with that, and she said that, and I ag ree d, that rea lly whateve r my

wishes might be we re irr elevant, that the kids that c hose to drink w ould f ind a way to do so. I

was conce rned a

bout if there w as drinking , y ou kno w, t h at there would be the drinking and driving issue. I

was wor ried a bout t h at happe ning. A nd so based upon that
conver sation and base d upon my past experience s with the teena g ers, I decide d that the best thing - - the sa fest thing I could do would be to ask t h e k i d s to spend the ni ght so th at wh e the r o r n ot the y dr a nk the y wo uldno t th e n g o o ff

drivi ng . So As hle y wa s g oin g to i nv ite he r c los e frie nd s in the se nio r c la ss, a ndsh e wa s to ld t o tell them to come to the party , that there would be food and soft drinks and that in no event wa s any one - - that every one was invited and encoura g ed to spend t he nig ht and in no event - - if any

body drank, in no e vent wer e they to leave the property

.

**** That wa s my

rule.17

Mr. Worley

did not hims elf notify

the g uests of this require ment p ri o r to the party , but expected Ashley to. There wer e a numbe r of c hildren that attende d the party , howeve r, that we re not sp e c if ic a lly in vi ted by As hle y . A t le a st s ome app are ntl y kn e w o r l e arn e d a

bo ut the ru le . B oth B isc a n g ir ls a

rrive d in te nd ing to s pe ndthe nig ht, a ndthe ir pa re nts we rea wa

reof tho se plans
. Once at the party , some of the minor g uests consumed a lcohol in and around a barn which contained a

rec room. None of

this alcohol was provide d by the Worley s. Once the party was underw ay , Mr. Worley

became awa

re that some of the childre n broug ht beer , as he ha d expected might happe n. Mr. Worley

also testified in his de position that he was the only adult on the pre mises; that h e w a s in c o n tr o l o f th e p r e mi s e s ; a n d th a t h e w a s in c h ar g e o f s u p e r v is ing the party . He acknow ledg ed that he f

urnished a pla ce w here the g uests’ par ents could re asonablyexpect there would be a rea sonable adult to supe rvise and chape rone the party

. He testified that it was his intent and that he undertook to “ keep an ey e on things and make sure nobody g ot hurt.” In further ance of that un de rt akin g , h e “

jus t patr oll e d a ndwa lke d a ro un d. ” He didno t ma

ke a po int of sp e aki ng to min or s w ho we re drinking to t ry to a sse ss the ir

c on dit iona nddidno t pi c k u p a ny one ’s ke y s to preve nt them from driving until very late in the evening , around 2:00 a .m., a fter he wa s informed of the ac cident. Mr. Worley

spent most of his tim e in the house, watching TV in a centr al living room and later “ camping out” in an ea sy chair in a bac k room. He dozed of f approximately a half hour bef ore he wa s awa

kened by sirens on the way

to the acc ident.
A. Du ty
“A d u t y , i n neg lige nce c ases, may be def ined as a n obligation, to which the law will g ive
rec og nition and eff

ect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct towa rd anothe r.” Lindsey v. Miami Dev . Co. , 6 8 9 S. W. 3 d 8 5 6 , 8 5 8

- 5 9 ( T e n n
. 1 9 8 5 ) ; W

. P AGE K EE TON E T AL ., P R OS S ER AND K EETON ON THE LA W O F T OR TS § 53 (5 ed. 1984). In this contex t, duty is simpl y a leg al obligation th owed by a def endant to conf

orm to a re as o n ab le per son standard of car e for the protec tion of the plaintiff ag ainst unrea sonable risks of ha rm. Staples , 1 5 S

. W

. 3 d a t 89 ; Mc C a l l v. W ilder , 913 S.W .2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995)

. The “ imp o s it io n o f

a le g a l d u ty

r e f le c ts s o c ie ty ’ s c o n te mp o r a r y p o li c ie s a n d social require ments conce rning the rig ht of individuals and the g ener al public to be protec ted from another ’s act or conduct.” Bradshaw v. Daniel , 854 S.W .2d at 870. “Indeed, it has be en stated that ‘duty is not sancrosanc t in its elf, b u t i s o n l y an e xpre ssi on of

thesum tot a l of

tho se c on sid e ratio ns of

po lic y wh ic h le a d th e la w t o say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection.’” Id . (quoting W. Keeton, Prosser and Ke e ton on the Law o

f To rts § 53 at 35 8 ( 5 e d. 19 84 )) ; ac c or d Cr aig v . A .A .R . R e alt

y th Corp. , 576 A.2d 688, 692 (De l. Sup. 1989) (duty is “ fre quently an expression by the court of e volving public policy .”)O t her ca s es mer el y ci t e W i l ke r s on fo r t he p rop o si t i o n t hat t hi s st at e has no t ad o p t ed Se ct i o n 31 8 , even where 16 tha t se c tio n is no t at issu e in the c a se
. S e e e .g ., N ic h o ls , 8 4 4 S .W .2 d a t 6 6 2 ; Newt on , 9 70 S

. W

. 2d at 490

. O t her ca s es l i s t t he propert y owner
- gu es t r el at i on as one i ncl uded i n t he R es t at ement , wi t hout d i s t i ng ui s hi ng i t f r om t he ot her s peci al
re la tio n s. See , e
. g. , L e tt , 6 0 S .W .3 d a t 1 0 0 ; M ar r v
. M ont gom er y El ev at or Co. , 922 S. W

. 2d 526, 529 ( T en n
. Ct

. App. 1 9 9 6 ).
18 Mc Clu ng v . D e lta Sq ua re Lim ite d P ar tne rsh ip , 937 S.W .2d 891, 894-95 (Te nn. 1996). Over the y ear s, courts have adopted principles to defi n e t h e d uty or standar d of ca

re app li cable to s pe c if

ic situatio ns or

re la tio ns hip s. As a

g e ne ra l rule , a ll p e rs on s h a ve a du ty to u se rea sonable c are under the circ umstances to re fra in from conduc t that will for esee ably cause injury to others. Doe v . Linder Const r. Co., Inc. , 8 45 S.W. 2d 17 3, 17 8 (T e nn . 199 2) . How e ve r, ind ivi du a ls do not ordinarily

have a duty to act affirmatively to protec t others from conduct other than their own. Nic ho ls , 844 S.W .2d at 661. In o t h er words, one g ener ally does not have a duty

to control the
c o n d u c t o f a n o th e r s o a s to p r e v e n t th a t p e r s o n f r o m in ju r in g a th ir d p ar ty

. Me s s er Griesham Industries, Inc. v . Cryotech of Kingsport, Inc. , 45 S.W .3d 588, 599 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001); Le tt , 60 S.W .3d at 99-100 (T enn. Ct. App. 2001). Despite this g ener al rule, suc h a duty may arise when a “spec ial relation” exis ts betwee n the defe ndant and e ither (1) the per son whose conduct threatens to c ause harm or (2) the per son exposed to harm. Bradshaw , 8 54 S.W. 2da t 87 1; Messe r Griesham , 4 5 S

. W

. 3 d a t59 9; Le tt , 60 S.W .3d at 99 -1 00 ; Newton v. Tinsl ey , 9 70 S.W. 2d49 0, 49 2 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 7). B y re c og nizi ng thi s exception, Tennesse e courts have a dopted t he R estateme nt (Second) of Torts § 315, which describe s the exception as arising whe re a specia l relation imposes a duty to control t he thi rd per son’s conduc t or g ives another

person a rig ht of protec tion. R E S TA TE ME NT (S EC OND ) O F T OR TS , § 315.

I n subsequent sections, the Restatement lists and desc ribes some of those specia l relations g iving rise to the gene ral duty set out in § 315. These include pare nt and minor child, employ er and employ ee, property owner and g uest. R E S TA TE ME NT (S EC OND ) O F T OR TS §§ 31 6, 31 7, a nd31 8; Le tt , 60 S.W .3d at 100. Section 318 rec og nizes the relationship of a possessor of land and a pe rson using
or ca rrying on an activity

on that land wit h the pos sessor’s permission as creating a duty to control the conduc t of third persons to pre vent for es ee ab le risks of harm. This dutyapplies whe re the po sse sso r o f the la ndis p re se nt du ring its us e a nd , th e re fo re , h a s th e abil ity a ndop po rtun ity

to control the c onduct of other s on the property . R E S TA TE ME NT (S EC OND ) O F T OR TS § 318, cmt. b.

Tenne ssee c ourts have y et t o specific ally adopt S ection 318. I n only one ca se, howe ver, ha s the c ou rt e xpre ssl y

de c lin e d to a do pt i t. W ilk e r s o n v
. A ltizer , 8 4 5 S.W .2d 744 (Tenn. Ct. App. 16 1992). I n that case , this court noted that no Tenne ssee c ourt has adopte d the sec t i o n o r h eld t hat
owner s of pre mises had a duty to control t he conduct of per sons on their property to preve nt them from ac ting ne g lige ntly

and d eclined to be the first to so hold. Id ., 845 S.W .2d at 747-48. The W ilkerson c ou rt

a lso fo un d th a t the a do pti on of Se c tio n 3 18 wo uldimp os e a g re a te r d uty

on private hosts than our Supreme Court had been wil ling to place on the owner s of business premises, r ely ingIn W i l ke r s on , t he i s s ue of t he s oci al host ’ s d ut y was r ai s ed i n t he cont ext of t he t r i al cour t ’ s r ef

us al t o i ns t r uct 17 the ju ry o n S e c tio n 3 1 8 , an d this c o u rt h e ld th a t t h e trial c o u rt’s re fus a l wa s n o t re v e rs ib le e rr o r b e c a u se the o v e ra ll ch arg e i nc l ud ed lan gu ag e reg ard i ng a h o st ’ s d uty to e xe rcise rea so na b l e co ntro l o ve r t he co nd uc t o f his o r he r gue st s, whi ch was s ubs t ant i vel y t he s ame as Sect i on 318

. T hu s , i t i s ar gu abl e t hat t he cour t ’ s r ef us al t o ado pt Sect i on 318 was n o t ne c e ssa ry to the re so lutio n o f t h e c a se a n d , t h e re fo re , di ct um
.

In C o rn p ro st , t he Supre me C our t had hel d t hat bus i nes s es had no dut y t o prot ect t hei r cu s t om er s f r om cr i mi nal 18 act s o f t hi rd p art i es unl ess t hey knew o r h ad reas o n t o know t hat s uch act s were o ccurri ng or ab o ut t o oc cur on t he p re m ise s tha t p o se d im m ine n t p ro b a b ili ty o f h a rm to a c u sto m e r. C o rn p ro st , 5 2 8 S

. W

. 2 d a t 19 8

. I n M cCl ung , t he C o urt
r e- ex ami n ed t h at h ol di n g , f i n di n g t h at i t w as t wo dec ade s ol d a n d r en der ed wi t h l i t t l e ca s e l aw on t h e s u bj ec t t o g u i de t he C our t i n i t s deci s i on, but t hat nu merous cour t s an d com ment at ors ha d cons i dere d t he i s s ue s i nce C o rn p ro st

. T he C our t di s car ded t he C o rn p ro st rul e i n fa v o r o f th e m ajo ri t y po si t i o n, as ref l ect ed i n Sec t i o n 43 3 of t he R est at em ent (Seco nd ) of

T o rt s, t hat busi ness es have a dut y t o pro t ect cust o m ers f rom fo res eeab l e cri m i nal act s and rej ect ed t he C o rn p ro st li m itatio n o n f o re se e a b ili ty. Id

. 89 8- 99

. T he C our t s peci f i cal l y hel d t hat i t s bal anc i ng of f act ors approach t o a de t er mi n at i on of

t h e ex i s t en ce of

a du t y w as t o be a ppl i ed.

19 on Cornprost v. Sloan , 528 S.W .2d 188 (Tenn. 1975)

. The Te nnessee Supreme Court in McClung , 17 937 S.W .2d 891, 899 (Tenn. 1996) has since ove rruled Cor np ro st , thus c alling into question the 18 continuing va lidityof W

ilkerson

. The Te nnessee Supreme Court has found that the s ocial host -g uest relationship is a specia l
re la tio n th a t c re a te s a d ut y to rend er aid t o a no the r i n p e ri l w he resu c h d uty wo uldno t othe rw ise exis t. Lindsey , 689 S.W .2d at 859-60. Whil e the duty at issue in Lindsey is d if fe re nt f ro m th e du ty at i ssue herein and in Restateme nt § 315, Lindsey certainly stands for the pr oposition t hat a soc ial host may have a duty to his or her g uests that would not exi st without t hat re lationship.

For two rea sons we do not think that the resol u t i o n o f t h e dutyissue in this case depe nds upon the adoption or re

jection of Sec tion 318. F irst, the list of recog nized special re lations set out in the Restatement is not an exclusive one. Newton , 970 S.W .2d at 493. I n addition, Tennesse e has adopted Sec tion 315 of the Restatement, Le tt , 60 S.W. 3da t 99 ; Newton , 970 S.W .2d at 492, and our
c ou rt s h a ve fo un d th a t a

sp e c ia l r e la tio n to e ith e r the ind ivi du a l w ho se c ondu ct thr e a te ns to c aus e harm or to the individual exposed to the harm cre ates an exception to the g ener al rule that one does
n o th av e a d u t y t o co n tro l t h e co n d u ct o f a th i rd p er s o n s o as t o p re v en t t h at p er s o n fr o mi n j u ri n g a third party

. Me sse r G rie sh e im , 4 5 S

. W

. 3 d a t59 9; Newton , 970 S.W .2d at 492. Our c ourts have consistently

held that for a

duty to a rise beca use of a specia l r elation the defe ndant must ha ve the ability , capa city , means, or a uthorit y t o co n t ro l the other pe rson. Le tt , 6 0 S. W.3 d at 10 0; Marr v. Montgomery Elevator Co. , 922 S.W. 2d 52 6, 53 0 (T e nn . Ct. App . 1 99 6) ; Newton , 970 S.W .2d at 493. Mr. Worley

intended to exerc i s e ex ac t ly the control that would ha ve pre vented Hug hes Br own from driving a way from the pa

rty in an intox icated state. He had, and believed he had, the ability to exercise that contr ol and had exerc ised that control in the past at parties g iven by his son. He a sse rt e d th e ri g ht t o c on tr ol w he n h e imp os e d h is “ ru le ” that t ho se mi no rs who drank we re to s p e n d t h e n i g h ta s a

c o n d i t i o n o f

t h e u s e o f

h i s p r o p e rt y.20

I n th is c on te xt, a no the r w e ll- se ttled pri nci ple mus t bec on sid e re d, be c aus e thi s w a s n ot a ty pic a l so c ia l ho st- g ue st situatio n, bu t in ste a d in vo lve d mi no rs . It ha s lo ng be e n th e la w o f this state that individuals ha ve a heig htened duty of ca re r eg arding children. Townsl ey v . Y ellow Cab C o. , 145 Tenn. 91, 237 S.W

. 58 (Tenn. 1922). I n that case , the Supreme Court stated that persons who a re c ha rg e able wi th a

du ty of c are tow ardc hil dr e n mu st anti c ipate that c hil dr e n wi ll a c t up on c hil dis h instincts and impuls es. Id ., 145 Tenn. at 94, 237 S.W . at 58. The le vel of pre caution nec essary for a very y oung child might differ from that for a teena g er, Ha wk ins Co. v . D av is , 216 Tenn. 262, 391 S.W. 2d65 8 ( Te nn . 1 96 5) , b e c aus e the e xpe ri e nc e of the old e r c hil d wo uld make so me c on du c t le ss fo re s ee ab l e
. N o n e t h e l e s s , t e e n a g e r s , l i k e y o u n g e r c h i l d r e n , ar e o f

t e n h e e d l e s s o f

d a n g e r s o r

w arn i n gs and exerc ise less discre tion i n avoidi ng potential harm than a dults. Thus, the reasona bleness of
c on du c t to wa

rdsu c h in div idu a ls mus t ta ke int o c on sid e ratio n th e se fo re se e able we akn e sse s.
Ou r l e g isl a tur e ha s d e te rm ine d th a t pe rs on s u nd e r the a g e of tw e nty -o ne areinc omp e te nt t o re sp on sib ly

c on su me a lc oh ol. Th e re c a n be no do ub t th a t th e la w atte mpt s to pr ote c t mi no rs , a s w e ll as the g ener al public, from the c onsequenc es of their consuming alco h o l by

prohibiting the po sse ssi on or

pu rc ha se of

a lc oh ol b y

min or s a ndthe sa le of alc oh ol to m ino rs . A s o ur Sup re me Court has stated:
These br oad prohibitions are intended not only to protect mi nors from the f olly of the ir ow n a c tio ns , b ut a

re fo r the pr ote c tio n o f m e mbe rs of the g e ne ra l pu bli c a s w e ll. They are direc ted to minors as a class in rec og nition of their susceptibilities and the intensification of da ng ers inhere nt in the consumption of alcoholic be vera g es, whe n c o n s u m e d b y a

p e r s o n l a c k i n g i n m a t u r i t y a n d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y.
Brookins , 624 S.W .2d at 550. Thus, the law re cog nizes both t he dang ers inher ent in consumption of a lc oh ol b y

min or s a ndthe ir

we akn e sse s in jud g me nt.
Th e mor e c omp e lli ng re a so n w hy theapp lic abil it y of Se c tio n 3 18 is n ot d e te rm inativ e is beca use duty is a flexible concept and depende nt upon the circ umstances of the situatio n . The Tenne ssee Supre me Court h as i n re ce n t y ear s consistently and re peate dly

held that the prope r analytical framework f

or dete rmining the exis tence or non-ex istence of duty is a balancing approa ch based on principles of fairne ss and justice. See, e .g. , Staples , 1 5 S. W.8 3 at 89 ; Sa bir , 979 S.W .2d
a t 30 8; Col n , 966 S.W. 2da t 39 ; Turner v. Jordan , 9 57 S.W. 2d81 5, 81 8 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) ; McClung , 937 S.W .2d at 901.

Be cause every

person ha s a duty to act re asonably under the circ umstances to prote ct others ag ainst unrea sonable risks of harm, the purpose of the balanc ing is to dete rmine whe ther the risk of ha rm to the plaint if

f w a s u nr e a so na

blein the c ir c ums ta nc e s.
I n McCall v. W

ilder , 9 13 S.W. 2d15 0 ( Te nn . 1 99 5) , w e ob se rv e d th a t “ [a] risk is
un reas on ablea ndg ive s rise to a du ty to a c t w ithdu e c areif the fo re se e able probability and gra vity of harm posed by defe ndant’s conduct outweig h the burde n upon d efendant to eng ag e in alternative conduc t that would have pr evente d the21

harm.” Mc Cal l v. W

ilder , 913 S.W .2d at 153. We have al s o n o t ed t hat seve ral fac tors are to be consider ed in dec iding whe ther a ris k i s an unre asonable one, there by g iving rise to a duty . “Those f actor s include t he for esee able pr obability of t h e h ar mo r

i n j u r y o c c u rr i n g ; t h e p o s s i b l e m a g n i t u d e o f t h e p o t e n t i a l h ar mo r i n j u r y; the importance or social va lue of the a ctivity eng ag ed in by

defe n dant; the usefulness of

the conduc t to defendant; the fea sibili ty or al t er n at i v e, saf

er c onduct and the r elative c osts and burdens a ssociated with that conduc t; the relative usefulness of t h e s afe r conduc t; and the re lative safe ty of alternative conduc t.” Id. at 153. McClung, 937 S.W .2d at 901. The que stion of whether M r. Worley owed a duty to J ennife r B iscan to pre vent Hug hes Br own from driving in an int ox icated state afte r having consumed beer at t he party , with or without a passe ng er, or

to preve nt J ennife r from riding in the car with Hug hes B rown must be answ ere d by balanc ing the deg ree of foresee ability of harm ag ainst the burde n upon Mr. Worley to avoid the harm b y a c ti n g d if

f ere ntly

. Id . at 901. The de g ree of for esee ability of harm and the mag nitude of that potential harm must be bala nced a g ainst the on er o u s n es s of the burde n involved in alternative
co n d u ct

. “O f course , a duty of ca re is depe ndent upon fore seea bility .” Pittman v. Upjohn , 8 90 S.W .2d 425, 431 (Tenn. 1994)

. Apply ing the rele vant fa ctors to the cir cumstance s prese nted in this case, it is clea r that it was fore seea ble that a minor g uest who drank at the party would become intox icated an d t h at if an intox icated minor drove a car , there would be an acc ident. The potential for r esulting ha rm to the driver, any

passeng ers, and other motorists was g reat. Reg arding the possible ma g nitude of potential harm, the Supre me Court rec ently stated:

We n e e d look no fu rthe r tha n the a ll too c omm on e xamp le of DU I -r e la te d a c c ide nts to appre ciate thepossible mag nitude of harm or injury that can re sult from an imp a ir e d d ri ve r. De a ths a ndse ri ou s in jurie s tr a g ic a lly

oc c ur e ve ry day a s the re su lt
o f i m p a i r e d d r i v e r s w h o ar e o p e r a t i n g m o t o r v e h i c l e s o n o u r r o a d s a n d h i g h w a y s
. In addition to the devastation such a ccide nts can wr eak on individuals a nd families, our society also incurs substantial costs (both human a nd economic) as a result of impaired drive rs. Burroughs v. Mage e , 118 S.W .3d 323, 332 (Tenn. 2003)

. On the other side of the equation, the burden place d on Mr. Worley to pr ev en t t h e h arm c aus e d b y a n in toxic a te d mi no r dri ve r l e a vin g Mr . Wo rl e y ’s ho me wa s n ot o nerous
. He hims e lf devised a plan which mere ly require d him to enfor ce the rule he attempted to impose. He only had to retrieve car key s or make the car s inacc essible. Of c ourse, he also could have banned a lcohol or
r e f u s e d t o h a v e t h e p ar t y.For a t hor ough di s cus s i on of t he s t at i s t i cal evi dence r ega r di ng t he cons equen ces of D U I

- r el at ed an d under age
19 D U I-re la te d inc id e n ts, s ee A . E a sle y, Vendor Li abi l i t y f or t he Sal e of

Al cohol t o an U nderag e Per s on , 21 C AM PB

. L. R EV

. 27 7 , 29 1

- 3 0 0 (19 9 9 ).

W e re co gn i ze an ap p are nt ano m aly i f an ad ult ho st w ho serv ed alco ho l t o a m i no r co uld no t b e li ab l e b ec au se 20

o f th e D ra m S h o p A c t, b u t a h o st w h o a c te d w ith g o o d in te n tio n s a s M r. W o rle y d id c o u ld fa c e lia b ili ty. W e sim p ly no te t ha t t he ca se b efo re u s d o es no t i nv o l ve a d efen d an t wh o serve d alco ho l t o m i no rs, an d we are no t ca l l ed up o n to ad d ress t hat s i t uat i o n. Furt her, al l o wi ng an i nt o xi cat ed m i no r t o d ri ve when i t co ul d have b een p revent ed i s a cause of t he i njury separat e f

rom and ad d i t i o nal t o t he i nt o xi cat i o n. 22 Mr. Worley

does not arg ue that injury to J ennife r was not forese eable or that alternative conduct on his part would ha ve bee n onerous. Instead, he relies upon g ener alized principles limiti ng social host liability , including authority from other

states. We have c are fully and throug hly

revie wed the ca ses re lied upon by

Mr. Worley

as we ll as those arg ued by the Biscans. I n addition, we have conducte d our own re sear ch, consulti ng additional case s from other states and numerous law r eview and other article s. Suffice it to say that, whil e i n t er es t i n g and educ ational, that re sear ch provide d littl e g uidance for r esolution of the case before us. The materia l review ed compe ls the conclusion that Tenne ssee c oncepts of duty must be applied to the facts of t his case and that our Supre me Court ha s to ld u s h ow to a

pp ly tho se c on c e pts

. Ba sed upon our analy sis of those fac tors, we c onclude that the fore seea bilityand g ravity

of harm g reatly

outweig hed any

burden on Mr . Worley

to ta ke action to pr event the harm. I n addition to the fac tors rele vant to the balanc ing a pproac h set out above, considerations of public policy are also important in determining whether a duty of ca re e x isted in a particula

r ca se. Ba in v . W

e lls , 936 S.W. 2d 61 8, 62 5 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) ; Bradshaw , 854 S.W .2d at 870. As our Supre me Court has stated, duty ref lects society ’s re quirements and c ontemporane ous public policy reg arding the entit lement of individuals or the g ener al public to protec tion from another ’s conduc t. Estate of Amos v. Vanderbilt University, 62 S.W. 3d13 3, 13 8 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) ; McClung , 937 S.W .2d at 894. I n Nic ho ls , this court observe d that future e x ceptional c ases mig ht cause inroads into the rule that a def endant owes no duty

to control the conduc t of another person, spe cifica lly

stating, “ The public’s c oncern ov e r the tr a g ic e pid e mic of inj ury a ndde a th cau sed b y

dr un k d ri ve rs ma y

ve ry we ll p ro vid e so me of these e x ceptional c ases.” 844 S.W .2d at 662.
There c an b e n o q uestion that the public policy of this state is to lessen the instance s of driving while intox icated. Statutory chang es reg arding punishment and conseque nces of violating the prohibition on driving while i ntox icated clearly demonstrate the seriousness of the commitment to era dicating this threat to public safe ty . There c an al s o be no question that intox icated minor drive rs po se a

se ri ou s th re a t to the ir

ow n s a fe ty

a ndthat of oth e rs
. Ou r state ’s pu bli c po lic y is t o 19 eliminate this dang er.
I mposing a

duty to act reasonably

to preve nt driving by

an intox icated minor in a situation wher e the a dult defendant has the authority and opportunit y to take non- onerous a ction to prec lude that driving further s such publ ic policy

. We find Mr. Worley owed a duty of re asonable car e under 20 the circ umstances to Jennifer B iscan.23 B . A ssu mpt ionof

Du ty
The B iscans ar g ue that whe ther o r n o t a duty exis ted under

common law, Mr. Worley
v o l u n tarily

assumed a duty

and then f

ailed to per form that assumed duty with rea sonable c are
. L iabilitycan be imposed for neg lige nt perf ormanc e of a volunt ary

undertaking. Ste war t v . S tate , 33 S.W. 3d78 5, 79 3 ( Te nn . 2 00 0)

. Th e qu est ionof wh e the r a

pe rs on ha s a ssu me d a

du ty to a c t is a question of law, at least wher e the mate rial fac ts g iving rise to the duty are undisputed. Id . at 793. Thus, this iss ue is appropriate for resolution by summary

judgme nt if the materia l fac ts are undisputed.

“ On e wh o a ssu me s to a c t, e ve n tho ug h g ratui tou sly , ma y the re by be c ome su bje c t to the du ty of acting car efully .” Id

. , q u o t i n g Ma rr , 922 S.W .2d at 529. Se e als o Le tt , 6 0 S. W.3 d at 10 4; Nidif fer v. Clinchfield Railroad Co. , 600 S.W .2d 242 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980) . Whether Tenne ssee’ s version of this well-settled rule equate s to an adoption of § 324A of t he Restateme nt (Second) of Torts is not entirely clea r. See Messer Grie sham, 45 S.W. 2da t 60 4; Le tt , 60 S.W. 3d a t 10 4; Ma rr , 922 S.W .2d
a t 52 9; Downen , 2003 WL 2002411, at * 6. Section 324 provides that one who undertakes to re nder
se rv ic e s to a no the r w hic h h e sh ou ld r e c og nize a s n e c e ssa ry fo r the prote c tio n o f a

thi rdpe rs on is
su bje c t to lia

bil ity fo r p hy sic a l ha

rm to that th ir d p e rs on re su lti ng fr om h is f a ilu re to e xer c ise
rea sonable c are , if such failure incre ases the ri s k of harm. Reg ardle ss of whethe r Tenne ssee ha s specific ally

adopted Sec tion 324, one who assumes to a ct assumes a duty to act with re asonable car e. Messe r Griesham, 45 S.W .2d at 604.

I n D ownen , t h i s co urt fac ed the que stion of assumption of dutyin a similar fac t situation. I n that case , the adult hosts of a party wher e they

had furnished alcohol to minors beg an taking up car key s at some point, but discontinued the prac tice as the night wor e on and as they became more int oxic a te d th e mse lve s. Th e c ou rt de te rm ine d th a t si nc e the rewa s e vid e nc e that th e de fe nd a nts rec og nized the haz ards of allowing teena g ers to drive while intox icated and this concern led them to v olu nta ri ly a ssu me the re sp on sib ili ty of c oll e c tin g ig nit ionke y s, the rewa s su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e to withstand summary

judgme nt on the issue of duty

. Downen , 2003 WL 2002411, at * 6.

I n the ca se bef

ore us, Mr. Worley

did not actually

take up an y k ey s
. No n etheless, his own de po sit ionte sti mon y

e sta bli sh e d h is u nd e rt akin g a nd int e nt w ithre g ardto s a fe g ua rd ing theg ue sts an d t h e ge n er al p u b l i c. C o n s eq u en t l y , t h e ev i d en ce b ef o re t h e co u rt at t h e s u m m ar y j u d gm en ts t age was suff icient for it to conc lude that Mr. Worley voluntarily

assumed a duty

to ensure that minors wh o h ad b ee n d ri n k i n g d i d n o tl ea v e t h e p ar t y b y d ri v i n g.
Be cause the law imposed a duty upon Mr. Worley and/or beca use he voluntarily assumed a du ty , th e tr ia l c ou rt

pr op e rl y de nie d h is m oti on fo r s umm ary jud g me nt. I t w a s le ft

to the jury

toA t t r i al , M r
. W orl ey mo ved f or a di r ect ed ve r di ct on t he al l ega t i ons of ne gl i gen ce p er se an d t h e r equ es t for 21 p uni t i ve d am ages. B ecause t he jur y found that M r. W o rl ey was no t li ab l e fo r puni t i ve d am ages, t hat i ss ue i s m o o t

. M r. W orl ey ap peal s t he deni al o f d i r ect ed ver di ct wi t h r ega r d t o neg l i gen ce p er se
. T hos e cl ai ms wer e al l ege d a s one of t hr ee a lter n a tive so u rc e s fo r th e d u ty o w e d b y M r. W o rle y. B e c a u se w e ha v e fo u n d tha t t h e o the r tw o so u rc e s w e re su ff ic ie n tly al l eg ed and p roved t o a l l ow M r
. W or l ey ’ s n eg l i g en ce t o g o t o t h e j u r y , a n d be ca u s e t h e j u r y ’ s g en er al v er di ct of
n e g lige n c e o n his p a rt c o u ld ha v e b e e n b a se d up o n its d e te rm ina tio n th a t h e b re a c h e d e ithe r th e d u ty i m p o se d up o n him by l aw or t he dut y he vol un t ar i l y as s umed, or bo t h, we nee d not r eac h t he neg l i gen ce p er se i ssue s. 24 decide if he bre ache d the duty of re asonable car e. 21

I V. I ssu e s Re g ard ing F ault of Ea c h Pa rty
Th e de fe nd a nts ha ve raise d a nu mbe r o f iss ue s tha t ca n g e ne ra lly be de sc ri be d a s r e la tin g to the jury ’s a llo c a tio n o f f

ault a mon g the pa

rt ie s. Th e fi rs t de a ls wi th w he the r the de fe nd a nts c ou ld be he ld l ia

bleto any e xten t.
A. I nte rv e nin g Caus e
Th e tr ia l c ou rt

ins truc te d th e jury

on ho w to a llo c a te fa

ult a mon g the pa

rt ie s w ho se n egl i gen ce t h e j u ryd et er m i n ed co n tri b u t ed t o J en n i fe r’ s i n j u ri es
. I n a d d i t i o n t o t h o s e t h o ro u gh instructions, Mr. Worley

reque sted that the court also include an instruction on intervening cause
. I n arg uing f

or inclusion of the inst ruction, counse l for Mr. Worley stated that eve n if Mr. Worley had be e n n e g lig e nt, “ thene g lig e nt a c ts o f Je nn if e r a ndHu g he s w e rethepr oximate c aus e of thea c c ide nt. That would bre ak the c hain of Paul Worley . . .”
The trial c ourt ref

used to include that instruction, and on ap p ea l M r. W o rley asserts that decision was err oneous. Trial courts shoul d g ive requested jury instructions wher e those instructions
are supported by

the evidenc e, embody

the party ’s theory , and ar e cor rec t statemen t s o f the law. Ot is , 850 S.W .2d at 445. Converse ly , a trial court can ref use to g ive a reque sted char g e to the jury if it i s n ot s up po rt e d b y

the e vid e nc e , it s su bs ta nc e is a lr e a dy c ov e re d intheg e ne ra l c ha rg e , o r i t is incorre ct or incomplete in any respe ct. Ingram v. E arthman , 993 S.W .2d 611, 635 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). Only

when the de nial of a r equeste d instruction that could have be en g iven under the previo u s ly

s tate d ru le s p r e

ju d ic e s th e r ig h ts o f

th e r e q u e s ti n g p ar ty

mu s t th is c o u r t v a c a te the judgme nt. Souter v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. , 895 S.W .2d 681, 684 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).
The instruction re quested by Mr. Worley

was ba sed upon the doc trine of indepe ndent intervening cause which, whe re a pplicable, will re lieve a ne g lige nt actor f rom liability

. Separate and dis tin c t se qu e nti a l ac ts by dif fe re nt d e fe nd a nts ma y

be c on tr ibu tin g c aus e s o f an in jury , b ut the c ha in of leg al causation betwee n the first neglig ent act and the eventua l injury may be broken by a new , independe nt, intervening cause
. McClenahan v . Cooley , 806 S.W .2d 767, 775 (Tenn. 1991) ; W as te Managem ent, Inc . of Tennessee v . South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. , 15 S.W .3d 425, 432 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). The intervening cause doctrine ha s b een called a common-law liability -shifting device

. W aste Managem ent, Inc

. , 15 S.W .3d at 432.25

Simpl y stated, the doc trine provides that a neg lige nt actor w ill be relieve d from liability when
a ne w, ind e pe nd e nt a nd un fo re se e n c aus e int e rv e ne s to pr od uc e a re su lt that th e ne g lig e nt a c tor c ou ld not have r easona

bly fore seen. [A] n independe nt intervening cause brea ks the cha in o f p ro x imate causation and there by prec ludes rec overy
. The law is equally clea r, howe ver, that ‘[a] n intervening
ac t , wh i ch i s a n o rm al r e s p o n s e c re at ed b y n egl i gen ce , i s n o ta s u p er s ed i n g, intervening cause so as to relieve the orig inal wrong doer of liabilit y , p ro v i d ed the intervening act c ould have r easona bly been f orese en and the conduct [of the origina l
w r o n g d o e r ] w a s a

s u b s t a n t i a l f

a c t o r i n b r i n g i n g ab o u t t h e h ar m
. ’

. . . A c c o r d i n g l y, ‘an intervening act will not exculpate the orig inal wrong doer unle ss it is shown that the interve ning a ct could not have been r easona bly anticipated.’

W hite v. Lawrence , 975 S.W .2d at 529, quoting McClenahan , 806 S.W .2d at 775.
Thus, fore seea

bilityis the critical question in an analy sis of intervening cause
. “The test of lia bil ity un de r the la w o f i nte rv e nin g c aus e re qu ir e s a pe rs on to anti c ipate or

fo res e e wh a t us ua lly will happen.” Fly v. Cannon , 836 S.W .2d 570, 574 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

I n the ca se bef

ore us, Mr. Worley

asserts that the interve n i n g acts we re H ug hes B rown’s intox ication and de cision to d ri v e an d t he dec ision byJ ennife r B iscan to lea ve the pa rty with the int oxic a te d B ro wn . N ot o nly do we be lie ve that th e se a c ts we re fo re se e able by Mr . Worl e y , b ut h is
ow n te sti mon y

e sta bli sh e s th a t he a nti c ipate d that min or s wo uld drink a lc oh ol a t the pa rty a ndwo uld drive a fterw ard if allowed to. He was conce rned a bout the conseque nces of

their drinking and then driving . That conc ern pr ompted him to impose, althoug h ineffe ctively , the rule r equiring attendee s who dra nk to spend the night. He should ha ve rea sonably anticipated the dang er to a n intox icated min ordri v e r a n d t o a n y m i n o r p a s s e n g e r s o f t h a t d r i v e r
. H i s t e s t i m o n y e s t ab l i s h e s t h a t he did
a nti c ipate that a ndoth e r p ote nti a l dang e rs
. Simi larly , Hug hes Bro wn ar gu es on appeal that re asonable minds could find that J ennife r B isc a n’ s n e g lig e nt d e c isi on to a c c e pt a ri de wi th h im c on sti tut e d a n in te rv e nin g or su pe rs e din g c aus e of her i n juries. Of c ourse, to be an intervening cause , the neg lige nt act must occur betwee n the orig inal tortfea sor’s neg lige nce and the injury

. J ennife r’s decision to be come Hug hes’s pa sseng er came befor e, not af

ter, Hug hes B rown’s ne g lige nt driving that r esulted in the acc ident and Jennifer’s inj urie s.
Con s e q u e n tl y , th e f

a c ts o f th is c a s e d o n o t s u p p o r t a d e f e n s e o f in d e p e n d e n t i n te r v e n ing
c aus e that w ou ld r e lie ve e ith e r M r. W or le y or Hu g he s B ro wn of

lia bil ity fo r the ir ne g lig e nt a c ts. Acc ording ly , the trial court properly declined to g ive the re quested instruction.26 B. A llocation of F ault to J ennife r B iscan

An oth e r g ro up of

iss ue s r a ise d b y

the de fe nd a nts inv olv e s Jen nif e r B isc a n’ s rel ative fa

ult

. On appe al the def

endants a ssert that ce rtain evide n t i ar y and jury instruction decisions by

the trial court we re e rrone ous. I t is important to note t hat t he jury allocate d 15% of the fault for her injuries to Je nn if e r’ s o wnne g lig e nc e . T hu s, the imp lic a tio n of de fe nd a nts ’ a rg ume nts is that th e jury

wo uld have or may have a llocated a

g reater pe rce ntag e of f

ault to J ennife r if the trial court’s r ulings we re oth e rw ise . F or

pu rp os e s o f the fo llo wi ng dis c us sio n, it is a lso imp orta nt to n ote that th e de fe nd a nts have c onsistentlyidentified Jennifer’s ne g lige nce a s her de cision to ge t into the car with Hug hes Br own, who wa s intox icated.

I t is well settled that passeng ers in motor vehic les have a duty to exercise re asonable or ordinary car e for

their own saf

ety

. Cole v. W

oods , 5 48 S.W. 2d64 0, 64 3 ( Te nn . 1 97 7) ; Harrison v. Pittman , 5 34 S.W. 2d31 1, 31 5 ( Te nn . 1 97 6) ; Schwartz v. Johnson , 152 Ten n
. 5 8 6 , 280 S.W .3d (1 92 6) ; Gra n d

s t a f f v. Haw ks , 3 6 S. W.3 d 4 82 , 4 92 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 0) ; Brown v. Chesor , 6 S.W. 3d 47 9, 48 2 (T e nn . Ct. A pp . 1 99 9) ; Ma ns fie ld v
. Col on ial Fre igh t Sy s. , 862 S.W .2d 527, 531 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). This duty includes the duty

to refr ain from riding in an a utomobile operate d by an int ox icated or

rec kless driver. Col e , 5 48 S.W. 2da t 64 3; Chesor , 6 S.W. 3da t 48 2; Ma ns fie ld , 86 2 S. W.2 d at 53 1; Harvey v. W heele r , 57 Tenn. App. 642, 646, 423 S.W.2d 285 (1967).

B e fo re Te nn e sse e ’s a do pti on of c omp arativ e fa ult , a pa sse ng e r’ s n e g lig e nc e in ridi ng wi th an intox icated driver could prec lude any rec overy on the basis of c ontributory neg lige nce or

implied assumption of the risk. Ma ns fie ld , 862 S.W .2d at 531. Under the l aw as it ex isted then, a pa sseng er who knowing ly

rode w ith an int ox icated driver could not, as a g ener al m atter, r ecove r for injuries
cause d by the intox icated driver’ s neg lige nce be cause of the pa sseng er’ s own neg lige nce in f ailing to avoid a known risk. W ilson v. Tranbarger , 218 Tenn. 208, 2 2 7 , 4 0 2 S

. W.2d 449, 457 (1965); Hi c k s v . H e rb e rt , 173 Tenn. 1, 6, 113 S .W.2d 1197, 1199 (1938); Sc hwa rtz , 152 Tenn. at 592, 280 S.W. a t 33 ; Harvey , 57 Tenn. App. at 646, 423 S.W .2d at 285.
Under compar ative fault principles applicable to this ca se, a pla intiff’s neg lige nce in f ailing to a c t r e a so na

bly is n o lo ng e r a com pl e te ba r t o r e c ov e ry

fo r i nju ri e s f

ro m a ne g lig e nt d e fe nd a nt. Ea ton v . M

cLai n , 8 91 S.W. 2d58 7, 59 2 ( Te nn . 1 99 4) ; Perez v . McConke y , 872 S.W .2d 897, 905 (Tenn . 1 99 4) ; McI

ntyre v . Balentine , 8 3 3 S

. W

. 2 d 5 2 , 5 6

- 5 7 ( T e n n
. 1 9 9 2 )

. C o n s e q u e n t l y , a s w ith oth e r type s o f p la int if

fs , th e re a so na

bleness of

the pa sse ng e r’ s c on du c t in lig ht o f the kn ow n risk associate d with riding in a car with an intox icated driver must be compar ed with the neg lige nce of the driver and other s. Spinmaker’ s , 8 78 S.W. 2da t 93 9; LaRue , 966 S.W .2d at 427.
Whethe r a passe ng er w as neg lige nt, or failed to use rea sonable c are , is measure d by the standard of

whether the passenge r “knew or should have known of t he driver’s int ox ication at the time th e gu es t -p as s eng er voluntee red to ride in the automobile.” Ma ns fie ld , 862 S.W .2d at 531, q u o t i n g Harvey v. W

heele r , 5 7 T e n n
. A p p
. a t 6 4 6 , 4 2 3 S. W. 2 d a t 2 8 5

. T h e r e a s o n ab le n e s s o f the passeng er’ s decision to ride with the drive r is a question l eft to the t rier of fac t. Chesor , 6 S.W .3d
a t 48 3; LaRue , 9 66 S.W. 2da t 42 6. Th e pa sse ng e r’ s c on du c t is me a su re d b y that of an o rd ina

ri ly27

prudent pe rson in the same c ircumstance s. Chesor , 6 S.W. 3da t 48 2- 83 ; Harvey , 57 Tenn. App. at 647, 423 S.W .2d at 285.

I n the ca se bef

ore us, the jury

considere d the evidenc e and concluded that J ennife r’s de cision to ride with Hug hes Br own was not r easona ble under the circ umstances and, conseque ntly , she ac ted neg lige ntly . There is no challeng e to this determination.
Once the j u ry

decide s that the plaintiff as we ll as the defe ndant(s) w ere neg lige nt, the allocation of f

ault for the injuries among the neglig ent parties is a question of f act within the jury ’s province . The S upreme Court of Tennessee has made it clea r that the que stion of how to apportion fa ult a mon g thepa

rt ie s is ult imate ly de pe nd e nt up on the c ir c ums ta nc e s of the c a se a ndon e that is left to the jury ’s common sense and experience when the jury is properly

instructed on the r eleva nt fac tors. Eaton , 891 S.W .2d at 593. The Court ha s also explained some o f t h e fa ct o rs to be considere d:
. . . [T] he per centa g e of fault assigned to each pa rty should be depe ndent upon all the circ umstances of

the ca se, including such fa ctors as: (1) the re lative closene ss of the
causa l relatio n s h ip betwee n the conduc t of the def endant and the injury

to the plaintiff; (2) the rea sonablene ss of the party ’s conduct in confronting a risk, such a s wh e the r the pa

rty kn e w o f the ri sk , or shou ld h a ve kn ow n o f i t; ( 3) the e xten t to which the de fendant failed to re asonably utiliz e an exis ting opportunity to a void the inj ury to the plaint if

f; (4 ) the e xiste nc e of

a su dd e n emer g e nc y

re qu ir ing a

ha sty decision; (5) the signific anceof what the pa rty was attempting to ac complish by the conduct, suc h as an attempt to save another ’s l i fe ; and (6) the party ’s particular capa cities, such as a g e, maturity , training , education, and so forth.
Id . at 592 (footnotes omitted). The def en d ants here in have not dire ctly attacke d the jury ’s
app ortio nme nt.
1. F a c ts
Be cause o f h e r in

ju rie s Je n n if

e r w a s u n ab le to r e me mb e r mu c h o f th e p ar ty o r a n y of the de ta ils c on c e rn ing he r d e c is io n to ri de wi th H ug he s B ro wn . Jen nif e r t e sti fi e d at tria l prima

ri ly reg arding her life and ac tiviti es afte r her injuries. She was not questioned a bout the events lea ding up to the accident, and the defendants did not cross-e x amine her at all. I nstead, pa rt of her pre- trial deposition was re ad into evidenc e. The jury did hear evidenc e that for some y ear s prior to the accident Jennifer suff ere d from anxiety , acc ompanied by

panic attacks. At t he party , J ennife r encountere d her f ormer boyfriend’ s new g irlfriend and was upset by their intera ction. She left the a rea wher e mo s t of the g roup had g ather ed and e nded up g etting into a pa rked c ar oc cupied by

some boy s she kn ew. Som ething ha pp e ne d inthe c ar that ma de he r u nc omf orta ble . Sh e g ot o ut o f the c ar andran in to h e r l on g tim e friend H ug hes B rown.T he B i scans q uest i o n the cred i b i l i t y o f thi s st at em ent b ased o n o t her s t at em ent s m ad e b y H ughes t hat were 22 refuted b y ph ysi ca l ev i d en ce
. F o r ex am p l e, H ug he s also testi f i ed t ha t a fte r h e g o t in t o t he ca r he go t o ut t w o b ee rs, han ded o ne t o Jenn i fer , wh o op ene d i t , an d kept o ne for hi msel f , whi ch he o pened and began dri nk i ng
. N o pers onnel at t h e s ce n e of

t h e ac ci den t fo und a ny o pen ed ca n s of be er i n t h e ca r or i n t h e v i ci n i t y , a n d t h er e wa s n o e v i den ce of
re c e n tly sp ill e d b e e r i n the c a r o r o n the o c c u p a n ts. In a n y e v e n t, the ju ry is the a rb iter o f cr e d ib ili ty. T h e ju ry h e re in
w a s a b le to a sse ss th is sta te m e n t alo n g w ith o the r te stim o n y. 28 Hu gh es wa s ab o u tt o l ea v e t h e p ar t y t o geth o m e b y h i s 1 1 : 3 0 p
. m
. cu rf ew
. Al t h o u gh J ennife r came to t he party with the intention of spending the nig ht, she now wa nted to leave

. Ac c or din g to H ug he s, Jenn if e r a sk e d h im t o g ive her

a ri de . H ug he s te sti fi e d th a t a ft e r s he g ot i n th e c ar Je n n if e r a s k e d h im

h o w man y

b e e r s h e h a d d ru n k , a n d h e to ldh e r a t l e a s t s ix. 22

Whil e there was testimony from some party g oers that Hug hes B rown a ppear ed intox icated to them b ef

o re h e l ef t the party , others who sa w and spoke with him testi fied he did not appear intox icated. Further, the law enf orce ment and emer g ency personne l w ho first appe are d on the sce ne of the a ccide nt testified that Hug hes B rown did not appe ar intoxi cate d, but instead appe are d coher ent and orie nted , an d g ave no sig ns of intox ication until subjected to a fie ld sobriety test. A serie s of such tests reve aled sig nificant impairment and led to Hug hes’s immediate a rre st for driving under the influenc e. Hug hes B rown t es t ified that he c onsumed two bee rs bef ore he went to the party . After he g ot the re , h e g ot a

tw e lve -p a c k of be e r fr om Da na B isc a n, a s pre vio us ly arr a ng e d. He c arrie d th is beer around during the party

. He admitted drinking seven or eig ht beer s. After

the ac cident, Hug hes threw a partial c arton of beer over the rail, and the l aw enforc ement officer on the sce ne found the bo x withfi ve or

six un op e ne d c a ns of

be e r i n it

. I n part of he r deposition rea d to the jury , J ennife r testified that she kne w th e ef fe ct s of alcohol. He r father ha d had discussions with J ennife r about alcohol. I nformation about alcohol and its e ff e c ts h a d b e e n g ive n to thestu de nts in h e r s c ho ol.

Be cause the jury

found Jennifer neg lige nt and allocate d fault to he r, it obviouslyfound the above- described evidenc e suff icient t o d etermine that J ennife r knew or should have know n that Hu g he s B ro wnwa s in toxic a te d w he n s he g ot i n th e c ar w ithhim

.

2. J ennife r’s History

Wit h Consumpti on of Alcohol
The de fendants sough t t o i n t roduce evidenc e of Jennifer B iscan’s c onsumption of alcohol at times befor e the day

of the party , primarily throug h the testimony of other teena g ers who had see n J en n i fe r d ri n k

i n t h e p as t

. T h e B i s ca n s s o u gh t t o p re v en t th e in tro d u ct i o n o f s u ch ev i d en ce t h ro u gh a motion in limine reque sting the e x clusion of evidenc e o f Jennifer’s history of alc oholAt t h e h ea r i n g on t h e mot i on s , c ou n s el for H u g h es B r own ar g u ed t h at Je n n i fer ’ s pr i or ex per i en ce w i t h a l coh ol 23

was r el evant “ t o s ho w what she knew or shoul d have kno wn ab o ut t he ef fect s o f al co ho l ” b ecause M r. B row n’ s p ri m ary d efense was “t hat J enni fer B i scan was at f aul t and negl i gent fo r beco m i ng a pa ss enger i n a vehi cl e wi t h a pe rs o n s he kn ew w as dri nk i ng
. ” C ouns el for M r
. B r own ar gu ed t hat he wan t ed t o be abl e t o pr ove t hat “ at t he t i me s he acc ept ed
a rid e w ith H u g h e s B ro w n to lea v e the p a rty, th a t s h e c o u ld re c o g n iz e
. . . T h a t she kn e w the sign s o f alc o h o lic
con s u mpt i on
. ” O n t h e ot h er s i de, cou n s el for Je n n i fer B i s ca n ar g u ed t h at wh i l e t h e def en dan t s cou l d i n qu i r e i n t o h ow m uch Jenni fer drank o n t he ni ght o f t he p art y , whet her s he was i nt o xi cat ed t hen, how m uch H ughes B row n had t o dri nk t h at n i g h t , a n d w h et h er J en n i fer h ad ev er s ee n H u g h es B r own h av i n g t r ou bl e dr i v i n g be for e, h er pe r s on al c on s u mpt i on of al cohol pri or t o t he day of t he acc i dent was not r el eva nt an d was hi gh l y pre j udi ci al

. T he B i s can s ’ coun s el ar gu ed t hat t he d efend ant s i nt end ed t o po rt ray Jenni fer as a pa rt y gi rl wi t h p rejudi ci al ef fect o n her cred i b i l i t y and o n her r eco very of da mag es
. H e al s o r el i ed on T en n
. R. Evi d. 609 a s pr ec l u di n g e v i den ce of pr i or ba d a ct s , ot h er t h an c on v i ct i on s of
c rim e , f o r p u rp o se s o f atta c k ing a w itne ss’s c re d ib ili ty.

O ut s i de t he pres enc e of t he j ur y , bo t h M r
. W orl ey an d M r
. B r own pr offer ed t es t i mo ny by s eve r al of Jen ni fer 24 B isc a n ’s cla ssm a te s a n d fe llo w a tten d e e s o f th e p a rty a t th e W o rle y h o m e r e g a rd ing th e fre q u e n c y o f J e n n ifer B isc a n ’s pri or al cohol co ns umpt i on. O f t he ne ar l y t en wi t nes s es , onl y a h andf ul wer e a bl e t o re cal l an y s peci f i c i ns t anc es i n w hi ch J e n n ifer B isc a n c o n su m e d a lc o h o l p rio r to the d a y o f t h e p a rty.

29 consumption. 23 Ultimately , the trial court determined that J ennife r B iscan’s know ledg e of the eff ects of alcohol wa s relevant to the rea sonablene ss of her de cision to acc ept a ride with Mr. Brown when she knew that he had been drinki ng
. The trial court allowed evidenc e on that issue, but determined that J ennife r’s own pe rsonal prior drinking e x perie nce w as not rele vant and, even if rele vant, was more pr e jud ic ia l th a n p ro bativ e . T he pr op os e d te sti mon y wa s p re se rv e d th ro ug h ju ry -o ut p ro ff e rs
. 24 On appe al, the def

endants assert that the trial court’s ref usal to allow them to “fully develop” J ennife r B iscan’s history with r egard to her c onsumption of alcohol prior to the ac cident wa s reve rsible er

ror. The y arg ue that her history with alcohol was relevant to the rea sonablene ss of her decision t o acc ept a ride with an intox icated H ug hes B rown. In particula r, they rely on two of the fac tors enumer ated in Eaton : (1) whe ther the pa rty knew or should ha ve known of the risk and (2) the parties’ particular c apabilities, such as a g e, maturity , training , education.
The de fendants primarily

rely on two case s for the pr opos it ion that a minor’s prior e x perie nce in drinking a lcohol is releva nt. I n Brookins , 624 S.W .2d 547, a minor who illegal l yp urcha sed alcoholic be vera g es sued the storewher e he pur chase d the beve rag es and t h e re staurant whe re he drank a beer for inj u ri es he re ceive d in an ac cident re sulting fr om the neg lige nce of the driver , an intox icated friend under the leg al ag e for drinking who had share d in the alcohol. The minor plaintiff arg ued that if he had not been drinking himself, he would not have ridden wit h his intox icated f riend. He arg ue d th a t hi s o wndrinking dim ini sh e d h is ca pa c ity to exe rc ise re a so na ble c are fo r his sa fe ty and pre vented him from r ealizing the seriousness of the dang er in riding with his int ox icated f riend. The Supreme Court h el d t h at beca use the plaintiff w as a minor, his judg ment and ca pacity to act re sp on sib ly

wa s p ut at is su e . T he Cou rt he ld that mi no ri ty

its e lf, w ith its imp lic it l a c k o f c apa c ity and judg ment, was suff

icient to defe at summary judgme nt “pre d i ca t ed u pon the conduc t of the plaintiff af

ter he purcha sed the a lcoholic beve rag es.” Id. at 550. Turning to the fa ctual question ofT her e wa s s om e evi dence t hi s r es ul t coul d h ave been at t r i but ed t o m edi cat i on gi ven he r upon h er ar r i val at 25 the ho sp ital a n d b e fo re the b lo o d a lc o h o l t e st. 30 the plaintiff’s c apac ity

to act re sponsibly , the Court noted that the only evidenc e in the re cord at the summary judgme nt stag e showe d that the minor plaintiff had no ex perie nce w ith alcohol and, there fore , h ad no rea son to suspect he a nd his friend would be come intoxi cate d on the amount of alcohol purc hased.
The Brookins ho ldi ng is b a se d o n tw o p ri nc ipl e s. Th e fi rs t is that a pe rs on wh o v olu nta ri ly become s intox icated c an be f ound neg lige nt if his or her c onduct does not mee t the standard of ca re require d of a sobe r per son; voluntary intox ication doe s n o t relieve a per son of his or her own neg lige nce. Kirksey , 7 39 S.W. 2da t 23 5; Ru sse ll v . S mi th , No. 88-366-II , 198 9 W L 71045, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. J une 30, 1989) (no Te nn. R. App. P. 11 application filed). The second is that bef ore a minor’s intox icat i o n ca n b e consi dere d voluntary , the minor must be shown to have ha d the
ca p acityto act re sponsiblyin deciding whether to consume the a lcohol. Brookins , 624 S.W .2d at 55 0; Ru sse ll , 1989 WL

71045, at *2.

Ru sse ll involved a mi nor who was kil led when he ran out into a hig hway while intox icated and wa s hit bytraff

ic. His pare nts br oug ht a wrong ful death action ag ainst the owner s of the liquor store where the minor alleg edly purcha sed the a lcohol. This court conc luded that the jury decide d that it was the minor’s willful consumption of alcohol, not its sale, that was the c ause of his death. B e c aus e on e wh o be c ome s vo lun tari ly int oxic a te d may be he ld l ia

ble fo r h is c on du c t, andbe c aus e the dec ease d was a

minor, the determinative question was whe ther the de cea sed m i n o r h ad the capa city to become intoxicated voluntarily . 1989 WL 71045, at * 2. The court conclude d that there
was a mple evidenc e of the minor’s prior consumption of alc ohol and prior dr unkenness f

rom which the jury could have conclude d that the minor had the capa city to r ealize the conseque nces of drinking the amount of a lcohol he consume d on the nig ht in question. C o n s eq uently , the jury could have
c on c lud e d th a t th e min or ’s int oxic a tio n w a s v ol u n t a r y an d , th e r e f

o r e , h ew a s c o n t

ribu torily ne g lig e nt.
A third ca se cited by

defe ndants, Kirksey , 8 04 S.W. 2d 68 , inv olv e d a wr on g fu l de a th c la im for the de ath of a n adult from the e ffe cts of ten or more “ Z ombie s ” consum ed, on a be t, within a short period of time. The owner , barte nder, and waitre ss from the bar serving the dec ease d wer e sued, along with the person who w ag ed the be t with the dece ased. Th e dece ased’ s contributory neg lige nce was an issue. The decea sed’s parents arg ued on appea l that it was err or for the trial court to a dmi t e vid e nc e of

the de c e a se d’ s p ri or

us e a ndabu se of

a lc oh ol and dr

ug s. Th is c ou rt

he ld otherwise, and stated that in a wrong ful death action (in that case involving death from consumption of the a lcohol itself), “a

dece ased’ s persona l habits as to sobriety are admissible.” Id . at 74.
All these ca ses involved the question of voluntary intox ication, an d

p rio r drinking e x perie nce was rele vant to that issue. The decision to ride with an intox icated driver, howe ver, is diffe rent fr om the dec ision to drink alcohol. While there was evidenc e indicating J ennife r drank something at the pa rty , a te st take n a t the ho sp ita l re ve a le d h e r b loo d a lc oh ol l e ve l to be on ly .0 32

. Th e de fe nd a nts 25 do not assert that Jennifer’ s consumption of alcoholic be vera g es at the party had any eff ect on he rT hey al so argue t hat T enn. R

. E vi d

. 6 0 8 (c), d eal i ng wi t h evi d ence of charact er o r co nd uct o f a wi t ness rel evant 26 t o t he wit ne ss’ s t ruthful ne ss, p rec l ud es a d m i ssi o n o f t he p ro f fere d ev i d en ce
. T ha t rule p ro vid es:

E v id e n c e o f sp e c ifi c ins ta n c e s o f c o n d u c t o f a w itne ss co m m itt e d w h ile t h e w itne ss wa s a ju v e n ile is g en er al l y n ot admi s s i bl e u n der t h i s r u l e. T h e cou r t may , h owe v er , a l l ow ev i den ce of s u ch c on du ct of a wi t ness other t han t he accused i n a cri m i nal case i f t he co nd uct w o u ld b e ad m i ss i b l e t o at t ack t he
c r e d ib ili ty o f an a d u lt a n d the c o u rt is sa tisf ie d tha t ad m issio n in e v id e n c e is ne c e ssa ry fo r a fair d et erm i nat i o n i n a ci vi l act i o n or cri m i nal pro ceed i ng. 31 decision to ride with Hug hes B rown. To the c ontrary , they specific ally

arg ued to the trial c ourt that J ennife r’s a lcohol consumption on the night of the ac cident wa s not relevant “except for the fac t that she wa s sober a nd even ha d a better chanc e to under stand.”

B e c aus e the de fe nd a nts he re in do not atte mpt to ar g ue that J e nn if e r’ s dri nking of

a lc oh oli c bever ag es at the pa

rty affecte d her judg ment in riding w ith Hughe s Br own, the ca ses re g arding
vo lun tary int oxic a tio n ar e no t app lic able . Prior kn ow le dg e of

thee ff e c t of a lc oh ol o n o ne ’s se lf

is
re le va nt t o th e de c isi on to dri nk a ndto the vo lun tari ne ss of int oxic a tio n. Kn ow le dg e of thee ff e c ts o f a lc o h o l o n a n o th e r ’ s ab il ity to d r iv e is n o t d e p e n d e n t o n p e r s o n a l e xp e r ie n c e w ith a lc o h o l. We note that defe ndants did not examine Jennifer with r eg ard to he r prior observation of Hug hes B rown d ri n k i n g o r o p er at i n g a c araf t erd ri n k i n g. On appe al, the B iscans asse rt that, to the extent the proffe red evidenc e that Jennifer may have
c on su me d a lc oh ol o n p ri or oc c a sio ns wa s p ro bativ e of he r kno wl e dg e of al coh ol, it w a s me re ly cumulative to other e vidence rele vant to that issue. I n light of the jury ’s finding that J ennife r wa s neg lig e n t, w ith th e n e c e s s ar y imp li c a ti o n th e r e f

r o m th a t s h e k n e w o r

s h o u ldh a v e k n o w n H ug hes Br own was intoxi cate d, we a g ree with the Biscans’ position. Obviously , the jury hear d sufficie nt e vid e nc e of

Jenn if e r’ s kno wl e dg e of the e ff

e c ts o f a lc oh ol t o c aus e it t o d e te rm ine sh e wa s p art ia lly
a t f ault fo r h e r i nju ri e s.
Be cause other e vidence rele vant to Jennifer ’s assessment of Hug hes’s leve l of intox ication and the dang ers associate d there with w as prese nted, the Biscans assert the proff ere d evidenc e wa s properly excluded beca

use its potential unfair pr ejudice outwe ighe d its probative value, r ely ing on Tenn. R. Evid. 403. I n apply ing Rule 403, a trial c ourt must eng ag e in a ba lancing proce ss. W hite 26
v . V an de rb ilt Un iv ., 21 S.W .3d 215, 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
As dis c us se d a

bo ve , th e pr ob a tiv e va lue of te sti mon y

that Jen nif

e r h a d c on su me d a lc oh oli c bever ag es in the past wa s, at best, minimal on the issue of whether she knew or should have known of the ri sk s a sso c ia te d w ithri din g wi th H ug he s B ro wn
. I ts po te nti a l pr e jud ic e , h ow e ve r, is o bv iou s. Def endants’ attempts to portray J ennife r as previously rec kless with reg ard to her own consumption of alc ohol would have c onfused that prior conduc t with the only basis upon which the a lleg ations of neg lige nce on he r part rested: the de cision to acc ept a ride with Hug hes B rown.
Ha vin g r e v i e w e d t h e r e c o r d , w e c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e tr i a l c o u r t d i d n o t e xc e e d o r ab u s e its discretion in excluding the p ro ff er ed evidenc e. State v. Gilliland , 22 S.W .3d 266 (Tenn. 2000) ;32

He rb e rt e x re l. H e rb e rt v . B ra ze ale , 9 02 S.W. 2d93 3 (Ten n. Co de App . 1 99 5) . It pr op e rl y considere d the re l evanc e, probative value, and prejudice of the e vidence and rule d within the discretion g rante d in Rule 403. See R ichardson v. Miller , 4 4 S. W. 3 d 1 ( T e n n
. Ct

. A p p
. 2 0 0 0 )

. We af fi rm t h e t rial court’s g rant of the motion to ex clude the pr offe red e vidence reg arding J ennife r Biscan’s prior history

of alc ohol consumption.
3. J uvenile Court Recor ds Reg arding J ennife r B iscan One spe cific a

rea of evide nce r eg arding J ennife r B iscan’s prior ex p erience w ith alcohol
co n s u m p t i o n t h att h e d ef en d an t s w a n t ed t o i n tro d u ce i n v o l v ed h erj u v en i l e r ec o rd , i n cl u d i n g a juv e nil e c ou rt

a dju dic a tio n su sp e nd ing he r dri ve r’ s li c e ns e . T he tr ia l c ou rt g rante d th e B isc a ns ’ motion to exclude that evidenc e, specifically excluding “testimonyreg arding J ennife r B iscan’s prior juv e nil e c ou rt

re c or d a ndthe su sp e ns ionof he r dri ve r’ s li c e ns e .” Th e re c or d b e fo reus inc lud e s o nly a copy of a juve nile court orde r that was marke d for identification. I n a jury -out proff er, Jennifer’ s fathe r testified that he was a war e that J ennife r had re ceive d juvenile court citations on two occa sions prior to the ac cident. He explained the fac t situations s urroundi n g t h e cit ations, as he unde rstood them, and neithe r i n volved J ennife r ac tually drinking alcohol. With reg ard to the se cond, which
app are ntl y

re su lte d inthea dju dic a tio n a lso pr of fe re d, Mr . Bi sc a n wa s ang ry wi th Je nn if e r b e c aus e she allowe d a boy in her car with a can of bee r, eve n though he r father ha d told her not to be ar ound people who drink. Consequently , Mr. B iscan would not hire a lawy er f or Jennifer and r equire d her to g o to court and “take her punishment.” The defendants have refe rre d us to no other prof fer s of evidenc e they

assert was wrong ly

excluded.
The de fendants arg ue that “the fac ts underly ing” the juvenile court citations and the loss of her driver’s lice nse we re important e vidence “of Jennifer B iscan’s history of alc ohol possession and
c on su mpt ion .” I n a dd iti on , th e y arg ue that Jen nif

e r’ s f a ilu reto h e e d h e r fathe r’ s a dv ic e to r e fr a in from consuming alcohol af ter the c itations was “re levant to the is sues of her e x perie nce w ith alcohol and maturity

level at the time she acc epted a ride with an intoxi ca t ed Hug hes B rown.” Thus, the defe ndants make essentially the s ame arg ument here as they made with re g ard to Jennifer’ s history of per sonal alcohol c onsumption. Aga in, the arg ument does not dist i n gu ish betwee n J ennife r’s
n egl i gen ce i n ri d i n g wi t h Hu gh es Br o wn an d h er co n d u ct i n d ri n k i n g att h e p ar t y t o a s m al l en o u gh deg ree that the def

endants do not ar g ue it aff ecte d her judg ment. On appe al, the B iscans assert t h at t h e trial c ourt’s orde r wa s proper based on Te nn. Code Ann. § 37-1-133( b) and Te nn. R. Evid. 608(c) & 609(d) and also arg ue that the pr offe red e vidence
w a s i rr e l e v a n t , u n f

a i r l y p r e j u d i c i a l , c o n f

u s i n g , a n d w o u l d h a v e b e e n m i s l e a d i n g t o t h e j u r y. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37- 1-133(b) bars the a dmission of juvenile adjudications and evide nce a dd uc e d injuv e nil e c ou rt he ari ng s in su bs e qu e nt p ro c e e din g s. I t st a te s: The disposition of a child and e vidence adduce d in a hearing in juvenile court may no t beus e d a g a ins t su c h c hil d ina ny pr oceedi ng in any

c ou rt oth e r tha n a

juv e nil e court, whe ther be fore or af ter re aching majority , exc ept i n d i s p o s i t i o n al p ro ce ed i n gsO ur cour t s ha ve adop t ed anot her except i on t o t he ge ner al rul e expre s s ed i n t he s t at ut e. T hat ex cept i on al l ows 27 im p e a c h m e n t o f a c h a ra c te r w itne ss, a t l e a st o n e fo r a d e fen d a n t i n a c rim ina l c a se , th ro u g h q u e stio n ing o f t h e w itne ss’s k n o w le d g e o f ju v e n ile c h a rg e s a g a ins t t h e d e fen d a n t, b u t i s su b je c t t o a nu m b e r o f l im itatio n s. S tep h e n y v . S ta te , 570 S .W .2 d 3 5 6 , 3 5 9 (T e n n . C rim . A p p . 1 9 8 7 ); St at e v. Se xt on , N o. E2000- 01779- CC A- R3- CD , 2002 W L 1787946, a t * 13- 1 6 (T en n. C rim. A p p
. A ug
. 2 , 2 0 0 2 ). D efen d an t s hav e n o t arg ue d t ha t t his exc ep t i o n a p p l i es.

T he A d vi sory C o m m i ss i o n C o m m ent s t o thi s sect i o n st at e i t fol l o ws t he current phil o sop hy exp res sed i n T enn. 28 C o d e A nn. § 3 7

- 1

- 1 3 3 (b).
33 a ft e r c on vic tio n o f a

fe lon y or the pu rp os e s o f a pr e -s e nte nc e inv e sti g a tio n a ndre po rt

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37- 1-133(b) (empha s i s ad d ed). This statute would c lear ly prohibit the introduction of the adjudication proffe red by the def endants herein and any

testimonyreg arding the evidenc e adduc ed in juvenile court. The statutory exception c lear ly does not a pply in the case here in. See State v . Stockton , 73 3 S.W .2d 111, 112 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986) (holding that a juvenile’ s re c or d ma y be c on sid e re d “ in dis po sit ion a l pr oc e e din g s a ft e r c on vic tio n of a fe lon y fo r the pu rp os e of a pr e-se ntence investigation and report”). 27

The de fendants provide no explanation a s to w hy Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-133( b) should not app l y , i n s t ea d m er el y

ar gu i n g t h atJ en n i fe r’ s h i s t o rywi t h al co h o l , i n cl u d i n g t h e juvenile court rec ord, is relevant to assessing her neg lige nce. They also arg ue that the holding in Ru sse ll v . S mi th , su pr a , allows for the introduction of t he prior juvenile adjudication. In Ru sse ll , the jury considere d the fa ct that a min or ha d pre vio us ly

be c omeso int oxic a te d th a t he wa s a rr e ste d b y the po lic e a ndtake n to a juv e nil e de te nti on c e nte r a s p art of it s det erm inat ionof

wh e the r the min or

ha d th e c apa c ity

to become voluntarily

intox icated. Id . at *2. Ru sse ll is disting uishable in that there was a ppare ntly no attempt to introduce the a ctual juvenile c ourt dispositi on or fa cts from the he aring

. I n addition to the statute, the rules of evidenc e indicate a re luctance to allow the use of ba d
c on du c t a s a

juv e nil e or

a juv e nil e c ou rt

re c or d. F or

e xamp le , T e nn . R. Ev id. 60 9( d) pr ov ide s: 28

Evidence of juvenile a djudications is g ener ally not a dmissibl e under this rule . The court may , howeve r, allow evidenc e of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the a c c us e d ina

c ri min a l c a se if

c on vic tio n o f the of

fe ns e wo uldbe a dmi ssi ble to attack the cre dibilit y

of an a dult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence i s n ec es s ar y

fo r afa i r d et er m i n at i o n i n a c i v i l ac t i o n o r c ri m i n al p ro ce ed i n g.
I n a dd iti on to the sp e c if

ic pr ote c tio n g ive n b y

the statut e a nd th e rule s to juv e nil e re c or ds , the evidenc e soug ht to be introduced he rein is still subje ct to the probative va lue - pre judicial eff

ect balanc ing of

Tenn. R. Evid. 403. For the same rea sons w e conclude d that the trial court did not err in excluding evidenc e re lating to Jennifer’ s prior consumption of alc ohol, we find that the tria l court
a c t e d w i t h i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n e x c l u d i n g t h e j u v e n i l e c o u r ta d j u d i c a t i o n a n d p r o f

f e r e d t e s t i m o n y.M r
. B r own r ef er s t o ju r y o ut t es t i mo ny t hat Jenni fer B i s can cons umed al cohol i n t he pas t , an d t hat ev i dence 29 was excl ud ed

. H e al so ref ers t o evi d ence t hat Jenni fer was at t he W o rl ey p art y where t here was underage d ri nki ng and sh e in fa c t d ra n k a lc o h o l at tha t p a rty. 34 4

. Am n es i ac C h ar ge
On appea l, H ug hes Br own arg ues that the trial court erre d in char g ing the jury reg arding the law in Tenne ssee o f t he pre sumption afforde d an amne siac. At trial, it was pr oved that Jennifer Biscan had no memory

of the a ccide nt, and little memory of t he events on the day of t he party befor e the a c c ide nt. Th e tr ia l c ou rt c ha rg e d th e jury

a s f oll ow s:
Where the loss of memory rende rs a party incapa ble of testify ing as to an i n ci d ent be fo re theCou rt , and th is loss o f m e mory is a ttribu ta ble to that in c ide nt, y ou mus t presume that the party

exercised r easonable ca

re during the time leading up to the inc ide nt andthat th e pa

rty e xer c ise d r e a so na

ble c area t th e tim e of the inc ide nt. Th is presumption i s re b uttable. I f y ou determine that the def endants ha ve introduce d evidenc e to the contr ary , y ou shall weig h that ev i dence ag ainst any evidenc e introduced at trial that tends to show the plaintiff ac ted with rea sonable c are
. This instruction accur ately stated the law . I n Tenne ssee, an amnesiac i s af forde d the presu mp ti o n th a t h e o r s h e a c te d w ith d u e c ar e a s to e v e n ts ab o u t w h ic h th e a mn e s ia c h a s no memory
. Am mo ns v . B on ill a , 88 6 S.W. 2d 23 9, 24 5 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 4) ; Oder v . Parks , 34 Tenn. Ap p. 30 3, 23 7 S.W. 2d 57 1, 57 6 (1 94 8)

. Th is pr e su mpt ion , lik e that app lic able to a de a d p e rs on , is int e nd e d to pr e se rv e fair ne ss b e c aus e of on e pa rty ’s ina bil ity to t e ll h is o r h e r v e rs ionof the e ve nts

. Howeve r, as the jury

instruction made cle ar, t h e p re s u m p tion is rebuttable by evidenc e that the amnesiac did not act with due ca re. Jeffrey s v. L ouisville & N. R.R. Co., Inc. , 560 S.W .2d 920, 921 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977). On appe al, Hug hes B rown a rg ues that the jury

char g e wa s inappropriate bec ause ( 1) it was
never contende d that J ennife r B iscan wa s g uiltyof neg lige nce during H ug hes B rown’s ope ration of the vehicle; (2) there was evidenc e that J ennife r ac ted without due ca re a s to her saf

ety ; and (3) the 29 fac t that the jury

was c harg ed that Jennifer B iscan ha d a pre su m p t i o n o f d ue ca re unf airly and inappropriately

sent a messa g e to the jury that all of her actions t hat nig ht were rea sonable. Since the on ly ne g lig e nc e a ttribu te d to Jenn if e r b y the de fe nd a nts wa s h e r d e c isi onto ride in the c ar w ith the int oxic a te d H ug he s B ro wndrivi ng , w e fi ndlittle re le va nc e in the fi rs t a ndla st a rg ume nt.
Wit h reg ard to the a

rg ument that the amnesia c instruction should not have be en g iven be c aus e th ere wa s so me e vid e nc e that Jen nif e r d id n ot a c t w ithdu e c arein d e c idi ng to ride wi th Hug hes B rown, we disag ree with Mr. Brown’s interpretation of authority on that issue. His relianc e on Lemons v. Me mphis Transi t Manageme nt Co. , 56 Tenn. App. 7 3 7 , 413 S.W .2d 88 (1966) a nd Jeffrey s , 5 60 S.W .2d at 922, is misplaced. In Lemons , th is c o u r t d e te r mi n e d th a t th e tria l c o u r t’ s partial instruction f

ailed to pr operly instruct the jury on the pre sumption of due car e. In Jeffrey s , th is court a ffirme d the trial court’s g rant of a direc ted verdic t to the defe ndants beca use all the evidenc eAs c ou n s el for M r
. W or l ey l at er ac kno wl edg ed, t h i s w as a mi s s t at eme n t

. D r
. M i t ch el l i s a pr ofes s or of 30 p a tho lo g y. 35 introduced c ontradicte d the pre sumption t hat t he amnesiac a cted with due c are in crossing a railroad trac k.

I n the ca se bef

ore us, ther e wa s conflicting evidenc e as to whether J ennife r ex erc ised due c are in riding w ith Hughe s; i.e., whether she knew or should h av e known he was intox icated. In that circ umstance, the question of re asonable ness was a question of fa ct for the jury to resolve, and the instruction on the presumption was prope r. In Fergus v. Ac tion Cart age & Distributi on, Inc. , 1990 WL 43463, at * 4 (Te nn. Ct. App. April 17, 1990), this c ourt addre ssed the same arg ument raised here in and held the presumption was appropriately char g ed bec ause it wa s for the jury to determine if evidenc e ex isted to the contrary

. The court further stated, “D efe ndants have not cited to this Court a si ng le case t hat s tands for the proposition that when any evidenc e of la ck of due car e is introduced, the cha rg e re g arding presumption of due c are should not be g iven.” Id

. We ag ree with the Fergus
c ou rt a ndits ho ldi ng s.
Mo re ov e r, a s th e B isc a ns po int ou t, the jury

app ortio ne d f

if te e n p e rc e nt o f the fa

ult to J e n n i f e r B i s c a n a f t e r h e ar i n g t h e c h ar g e a n d ap p l yi n g t h e e v i d e n c e t h a tw a s i n tr o d u c e d

. O b v i o u s l y, the jury determined that the pre sumption was rebutted by the evidenc e. Thus, we cannot se e how Mr. B rown wa s harmed by the instruction.
5. Exc lus ionof

Te sti mon y

of Dr . M itc he ll
The de fendants assert it was e rror for the trial court to ref

use t o allow their propose d expert witness, Dr. Willi am Mitchell, to testify

. The defendants proposed to have Dr. Mi tchell t estify as to the eff ects of intoxication related to blood alc ohol level. He w ould ha ve opined that base d on the tox icolog y

report that Hug hes B rown’s blood a lcohol level wa s .17% after the a ccide nt, Mr. Br own would have e x hibited signs of intox ication at the t ime of t he accident. Thus, this proof w ould have been c u mu lati v e to o th e r e v id e n c e in tr o d u c e d to s h o w th a t Je n n if e r B is c a n k n e w o r s h ould have known Hug hes B rown wa s intox icated.

I mportant to our analy sis is the proce dural posture of the issue at the time o f t h e c o u rt ’s
ru lin g
. Ap pr oximate ly a mon th be fo re tr ia l, Mr

. Wor le y su pp le me nte d his int e rr og a tory a ns we rs , pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 26, to notify the plaintiffs that he anticipated calling Dr. Mitchell, who was identified a s a professor of toxicology , to testify as an e x pert. In addition to the opinion 30
re g ard ing Hu g he s B ro wn ’s lik e ly dis play of the si gns of intoxic a tio n, the Rul e 26 dis c los ur e a lso stated, “Mor eover , relatively inexperience d teena g e drivers would be ex pecte d to demonstrate the full eff ects of intoxication with l i t t l e ab i l i t y to mask the adve rse e ffe cts on motor function and speec h.” A c opy

of Dr. Mitche ll’s report wa s attache d.
The B iscans then de posed Dr. Mitche ll. They filed a motion in li m ine t o ex cl u de Dr

. Mitchell’s testimony . At the hea ring on that motion, the court had befor e it the Rule 26 disclosureW e n ot e t h at , a t t h e en d of t h e pr of fer , t h e def

en dan t s ’ cou n s el as k ed t h e cou r t i f i t wa s “ s t i ck i n g by ” i t s pr i or 31

ru ling , an d the c o u rt a ff irm e d it w a s. T h e re c o rd d o e s n o t re flec t t h a t t h e c o u rt w a s a sk e d p rio r to the p ro ff e r to
r econs i der i t s r ul i ng ex cl udi ng D r. M i t che l l ’ s t es t i mo ny
. At t hat poi nt i n t he procee di ng s , t he cour t woul d hav e been j us t i f i ed i n den y i ng a mot i on t o re cons i der and a r eques t t o put on pr oo f t o estab l i s h t he qual i f i cat i ons t he cour t ha d p revi o usl y fo und m i ss i ng
. Se e Robi ns on v
. Le Cor ps , 83 5 S.W

. 3 d 71 8 , 72 5 (T enn. 20 0 2 ).
36 a ndthe de po sit iontr a ns c ri pt. Mr

. Wor le y did no t su pp le me nt this inf orma tio n o r c a ll D r. Mit c he ll to testify at the pre -trial hea

ring on the B iscans’ motion. Dr. Mitchell did later testify in a jury -out pr of fe r n e ar the e ndof

thetr ia l. N o e xpla natio n o f the pr of fe r p re c e de d it , a ndit w a s p re su ma bly made f o r th e p u rp o s e o f p r e s e r v in g th e w it n e s s ’ s te s ti mo n y
. Co n s e q u e n tl y , w e a g r e e with the Biscans that the court’ s ruling must be examined ba sed on the information prese nted to the court at the time of the he aring on the motion. 31

The Biscans moved to e x clude Dr. Mitchell on the g rounds that he was not qua lifie d by knowledg e, skill, ex perie nce, tr aining or education to pr ovide expert testimonyas to the matters the de fe nd a nts ha d id e nti fi e d in th eir Ru le 26 dis c los ur e . T he y a sse rt e d th a t D r. Mit c he ll b a se d h is conclusions as to the effec t of alcohol on his experience as a dormitory headma ster in the ea

rly 1960s and on his rea ding of

literature on the subject, of which he had de stroy ed all but two articles. The mot iona lso state s th a t “ Whe n c ha lle ng e d, ho we ve r, a s to the ba sis of his c on c lus ion that, a t a c e rt a in blo od a lc oh ol le ve l, ‘ 90 pe rc e nt’ of te e na g e rs wo ulde xhibi t c e rt a in e ff e c ts o f a lc oh ol, Dr . M itc he ll admitted that his basis for that conc lusion was ‘just observation.’” Thus, t h ey ar g ued, his opinion was not base d upon the types of data or information require d by Tenn. R. Evid. 702 and would not
su bs ta nti a lly

a ssi st the tr ie r o f f

a c t.
The de fendants joint ly

responde d to the motion. They pointed out t hat the B iscans had place d too much emphasis on Dr. Mitche ll’s passing me ntion o f his observation of tee nag ers a nd alcohol as a

dormitory

headma ster. The y

also stated that Dr . Mitchell was a boa rd ce rtified clinica l path o lo g is t w ith o v e r

tw e n ty

- f

iv e y e ar s o f

e xp e r ie n c e , w h o h a d te a c h in g a n d rese arc h responsibilities. They

arg ued that the court should allow Dr. Mitchell to testify and ag ain re iterate d that he wa s e xpe c te d to te sti fy that H ug he s B ro wn ’s blo oda lcoho l lev e l w ou ld h a ve “ c aus e d h im to be visiblyintox icated at the time of the ac cident.”
The trial c ourt g rante d the B iscans’ motion and indicated in the order that its de cision was b a s e d o n T e n n
. R. E v id

. 7 0 2 & 703, and Mc Da n iel v. CSX Transp., Inc. , 955 S.W .2d 257, 265 (Tenn. 1997) , “on the g rounds that Will iam Mitchell is not qualified as an expert to te stify as to the issues on which De fe n d an t s ’ have tender ed him, as re quired by Tenn. R. Evid. 702, that Wil liam Mitchell has no scientific, technica l, or otherwise specia liz ed knowledg e on the issues . . . a nd the fac ts and data unde rly ing William Mit chell’s opinion indicate a lack of trustworthiness.”

I n g ener al, questi ons reg arding admissibili ty , qualifications, relevanc y , and compe tency or expert testimonyare left to the discretion of the trial court. Id . at 263-64. Expert testimony reg arding
sc ie nti fi c the ory

or ba se d o n te c hn ic a l or sp e c ia lize d kn ow le dg e mus t be bo th r e le va nt andre lia ble to be admissible. State v. Stev ens , 7 8 S. W.3 d 8 17 , 8 32 -3 3 ( Te nn . 2 00 2). Trial c ou rt s p e rf orm a “g ateke eping ” func tion to ins ure that proposed expert testimonymeets the leve ls of rele vance and37

reliability established in Tenn. R. Evid. 702 & 703. Those rule s state:
I f scientific , technica l, or other spe cialized knowledg e will substan t i ally assist the tr ie r o f f a c t to un de rs ta ndthe e vid e nc e or to d e te rm ine a

fa c t in iss ue , a

wi tne ss qualified a s an ex p er t b y knowledg e, skill, ex perie nce, tr aining , or educ ation may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Tenn. R. Evid. 702.
The fa cts or data

in the particula

r ca se upon which an expert bases a n opinion or infere nce may

be those pe rce ived by

or made known to the expert at or be fore the he ari ng . I f o f a

ty pe re a so na

bly re lie d u po n b y

e xpe rt s inthe pa

rt ic ul ar fi e ld i n forming opinions or infere nces upon the subject, t h e fa cts or data need not be admissible in evidenc e. The court shall disallow testimonyin the form of an opinion or infer enceif the underly ing f acts or data indicate la ck of trustworthiness.
Tenn. R. Evid. 703.
Th e prima

ry inq uiry un de r the se ru le s is wh e the r the e xpert op ini on te sti mon y wi ll substantially

assist the trier of f

act to under stand the evidenc e or to determine a fa ct in issue. Prior to the adoption of t he standa rd set out in Rule 702, expert testimonywas a dmissibl e only if it was
nece ssary
. State v. Shuck , 95 3 S. W.2 d 6 62 , 6 68 (T e nn . 1 99 7) ; Cas on e v . S tate , 193 Tenn. 303, 246 S.W .2d 22, 26 (1952) ( holding that “ the subject unde r ex amination must be one that re quires that the court and jury

have the aid of knowle dg e or e x perie nce suc h as men not spe cially skilled do not have, and such there fore as c an n o t b eo btained fr om ordinary witnesses.”) The ne cessity require ment no longe r applies, but
[w] hile the substantial assistance standard of Rule 702, Tenn. R. Evid., is a rela x ation of the co m m o n law nec essity require ment, it is som ewhat stricter than the compar able fede ral rule of evidenc e which pe rmits ex pert testimony upon a finding that it me re ly a ssi sts thetr ia l of

fa c t.
Shuck , 953 S.W .2d at 668. Thus, in T ennesse e, the probative forc e of the testimony must be strong er than that re quired unde r the fe dera l rules. McD aniel , 955 S.W .2d at 265.
The trial c ourt must also make a determination as to the witness’s qua lification by knowledg e, skill, ex perie nce, tr aining or educ ation to ex p re ss an opinion within the lim its of the demon s tr a te d e xp e r ti s e
. A s to th is q u e s ti o n , th e d e te r mi n a ti v e f a c to r is “ w h e th e r

th e w it n e ss’s qualifications authorize him or her to g ive an informed opinion on the subject at issue .” Steve ns , 78 S.W .3d at 834.

I n a dd i t i o n t o d e t e r m i n i n g t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n o f t h e e xp e r t , t h e c o u r t i s a l s o r e qu ir e d to determine whether

the expert evidenc e is rel i able or valid. Van Tran , 6 6 S. W.3 d at 81 9; State v.38

Farner , 66 S.W .3d 188, 207 (Tenn. 2001). One purpose of this examination is for the court to assure itself that the opinions of the expert “ar e base d on rele vant scientific me thods, processe s, and data , and not upon an e x pert’s me re spe culation.” Farner , 6 6 S

. W

. 2 d at2 0 7 -2 0 8 , q u o t i n g McD aniel , 955 S.W. 2da t 26 5. Am on g theno nd e te rm inativ e a ndno nex clu si ve fa c tor s th a t c a n b e c on sid e re d in d et er m i n i n g re l i ab i l i t y

ar e ( 1 ) w h et h ert h e s ci en t i fi c e v i d en ce h as b ee n t es t ed an d t h e m et h o d o l o gy with which it has bee n tested; (2) w hether th e evidence ha s been subjec ted to peer revie w or pu bli c a tio n; ( 3) wh e the r a po te nti a l r a te of er

ro r i s kno wn ; ( 4) wh e the r the e vid e nc e is g e ne ra lly
acc epted in the scientific community ; and (5) whether the expert’s rese arc h in the fi el d h as been conducte d independe nt of l itigation. Steve ns , 7 8 S. W.3 d at 83 2, 83 5; McD aniel , 955 S.W .2d at 265.

T h e t ri al co u rt m u s ten s u re t h att h e b as i s fo r t h e e x p er twi t n es s ’s o p i n i o n (e

. g. t es t i n g, rese arc h, studies, or experience -base d observations) adequately supp o r ts that ex pert’s c onclusion or, in other words, w hether

there is an ana ly tical g ap b et we en the data r elied upon and the opinion proff ere d. Steve ns , 78 S.W .3d at 834. A conne ction betwee n the underly ing data and the c onclusion must ex ist. Id . This connec tion “is of espec ial importance when de t ermining the re liabilityof experience -base d testimon y , beca use obser vation and experienc e ar e not ea silyverifia ble by the court.” Id

. Throug h the lang uag e of Tenn. R. Evid. 703, Tennessee courts ar e enc ourag ed to take
a more active r ole (a s compare d to fede ral c ourts) in the eva luating the rea sonablene ss of the expert’s relianc e on the pa

rticul ar fa ct s or data that form the basis for the expert testimony

or opinion. Se ffe rn ic k v . Sain t Th om as Ho sp ., 96 9 S. W.2 d 3 91 , 3 93 (T e nn . 1 99 8) ; McD aniel , 955 S.W .2d at 265.
The trial court ha s broad discr etion reg arding the admission of expert testimony

. Robinson v. LeCorps , 8 3 S. W.3 d 7 18 , 725 (T e nn . 2 00 2) ; Steve ns , 7 8 S. W.3 d at 83 2; McD aniel , 955 S.W .2d at 263. Consequently , a trial court’s ruling on the admissibil ity of such e vidence may

be overturned
o n ap p e a l o n ly if th e d is c r e ti o n is e xe r c is e d ar b it r ar il y o r is ab u sed. S t ev ens , 78 S.W .3d at 832; Seffernick , 9 69 S.W. 2da t 39 3; Shuck , 953 S.W .2d at 669. A finding of abuse of discretion is proper when the trial court a

pplied an incor

rec t leg al standar d or re ache d a dec ision ag ainst l o gi c or rea soning that cause d an injusti ce to the party complaining

. Steve ns , 7 8 S. W.3 d at 83 2; Shuck , 953 S.W .2d at 669. Appellate courts wil l set aside a discretionary

decision only

wher e the tria l court has misidentified, misconstrue d, or misapplied the controlling leg al principles or the dec ision is contrary to the substantial weig ht of the evide nce. W hite , 21 S.W .3d at 223. An appe llate court should not sub stitut e its judgme nt on a discre tionary decision and should permit the trial court’s exerc ise of discretion to sta nd if rea sonable judicial minds could differ a s to its s oundness. W hite , 21 S.W .3d
a t 22 3; Ove rstreet , 4 S.W .3d at 709.
Even if a trial court imprope rly

excludes admissible ex pert e videnc e , r e v e r s al o f th ejudgme nt is not require d if the evidenc e would not ha ve aff ecte d the outcome of the trial eve n if it had bee n admitted. W

hite , 21 S.W .3d at 223. A judgme nt should be set a side only if, considering the rec ord
a s a wh ole , a n e rr or mo re pro bably than n ot a ff

e c te d th e ou tc ome of

thetr ia l. T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 36 (b ); Pa nkow v . Mitc he ll , 737 S.W .2d 293, 297 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). Thus, a court’s exclusion of otherw ise admissible evidenc e will not require reve rsal if it did not aff ect the jury ’s ver dict, if the
e xclu de d e v i d e n c e w o u l d n o t h a v e s tr e n g t h e n e d t h e p o s i t i o n o f t h e p ar t y c l a i m i n g e rr o r in i ts exclusion, or if the substance of the excluded evidenc e g ot to the jury throug h another

source
. Id

.39

at 298.
Whe re the jury ha s oth e r e vid e nc e re le va nt to the iss ue it is t o d e c ide , a ndwh e rethejury is able to e valuate that evidenc e without the opinion of an expert, the exclusion of e x p er t t es t imony
c a nn ot b e sa id to ha ve mor e pr ob ably than n ot a ff

e c te d th e ou tc ome . See Shuc k , 953 S.W .2d at 670- 71 (holding that beca

use a jury “may not b e ab l e t o p ro p erly

evaluate the ef

fec t of a de fendant’s cog nitiv e and psy cholog ical cha rac teristics on the existence of induc ement and pr edisposition,”
e xclu sio n o f a dmi ssi blee xpe rt te sti mon y on that is su e wa s n ot h arm le ss e rr or un de r T e nn . R. Cr im. P. 52(a) whe re e ntrapment wa s a def ense)

. I n his deposition filed in support of t h e Bi s cans’ motion to ex clude his testimony , Dr. Mitchell testified that he had been a laboratory -base d clinical patholog ist for 25 y ear s. He wa s part of a re se a rc h pro je c t in toxic olo g y fi ft e e n to tw e nty y e ars a g o, bu t th e pr oje c t di d n ot i nv olv e a lc oh ol. He ha d never

perf ormed pe rsonal re sear ch into t h e co rre lation of the clinica l effe cts of alc ohol tox icity and blood alcohol leve ls. He did a li terature searc h on the issue in connec tion with thi s case , bu t it ha d b e e n at le a st t e n y e ars sin c e he ha d d on e a sim ila r s e arc h, a ndthat w a s in c on ne c tio n w ith another lawsuit. He identifie d an article on alcohol toler ance and a c hapter from a te x tbook as the best source s he re lied upon. He stated he had revie wed other article s, but he had not kept them, a nd believed the two he mentioned we re authoritative.

He a lso testified as to when, i.e ., a t w hat bl oo d a lc oh ol le ve l, pe rs on s wo uld e xhibi t c e rt a in signs of intox ication, and ag ree d that there would be a dif fer ence betwee n an inexperienc ed and an experience d drinker. A t that point, h e testi fied that, ba sed on his experience as a dormitory headma ster fr om 1962 to 1966, whe re he had re sponsibili ty for 18 y ear

olds, ge nera lly

inexperience d drinkers, “ it doesn’t take ve ry much alcohol to make them act like fools.” B ased on those pe rsonal observations, he also opined that y oung er, ine x perie nced drinkers become obvious ly intox icated on far less alcohol than a dults “that at least had some experience with drinking.”
When asked whe ther he could tell f rom these past persona l observations that eve ry person at a pa rticular blood a lcohol conce ntration was g oing to a ppear intox icated, he replied “ no.” Simi larl y , h e a c kn ow le dg e d th a t hi s a ne c do ta l ob se rv a tio ns c ou ld n ot f orm th e ba sis of

a n a rt ic le in a pee r re view journa l. The following exchang e also oc curr ed: Q. And t here ’s not hing in those observations that y ou could re ally testify about that w ouldn’t be the ty pe of anecdota l information that a lay person c ould pick up on their own?
A. Every one has the ir own experienc es in observing people drink.

He a lso testified that based on 35 y ear s of obser ving te enag ers, it was his opinion that 90% of tee nag ers who ha d a blood alcohol leve l of .17 would stag g er, stumble, we ave, and show other signs of intox ication. His observations of teens had not be en made with control fac tors or any methodology

for mea suring or re cording the amount of a lcohol act u al l y co nsumed or the priorT enn. R

. E vi d

. 70 1 al l o ws a l ay wi t ness to o f fer o p i ni o ns rat i o nal l y b ased o n the wit ness ’ s p ercep t i o ns and 32 h e lp ful to a n un d e rs ta n d ing o f t h e tes tim o n y o r d e te rm ina tio n o f a fac t in i ssu e
. “C o n se q u e n tly, a la y w itne ss m a y tes tif y t h at a pe r s on was ‘ dr u n k ’

. . . . Advi s or y C omm. C mt

. t o T en n
. R

. E v i d. 701. Su ch a c on cl u s i on w ou l d, of c ou r s e, be bas ed upon t he wi t nes s ’ s obser vat i on of t he pers on an d knowl edge of wh at a dr un k per s on ac t s l i ke.

D efen d an t s m ak e n o arg um en t t ha t i t wo uld ha ve , i nstea d f o cu si ng o n D r. M i t ch ell ’ s q ua l i f i ca t i o ns. 33
40 drinking his tory

of tho se ob se rv e d. He a c kn ow le dg e d th a t hi s 9 0% e sti ma te pr ob ably wo uldno t ho ld up as p u b li s h ab leina

p e e r r e v ie w jo u r n a l w ith o u t c li n ic a l d a ta to b a c k it u p
. I t i s c le ar

th a t the witness’s per sonal observation was not based on scientific study or methodolog y

and did not differ fr om n on e xpe rt

ob se rv a tio ns
. As to the other b ases f

or the e x pert opinion, the article re lied upon by Dr. Mitchell wa s published in 1943 in a Scandinavian journal. That article involved results of a study of tolera nce to al c oh ol of ine xpe ri e nc e d, mod e rate , an d ch ro nic drink e rs . The pu rp os e of the stu dy , a s st a te d in the art ic le , w a s to “ stu dy qu a nti ta tiv e ly

thede g re e of

dis turb ance of

c e rt a in f un c tio ns in m a n, to re pe a t th e se e xpe ri me nts on dif fe ri ng g ro up s of i nd ivi du a ls u nd e r d if fe re nt c on dit ion s, a ndfi na lly to e va luate the po ssi ble re la tio ns hip be tw e e n sy mpt oms a nd blo od a lc oh ol le ve l.” On e of the po int s wa s to ide nti fy

te sts that w ou ld mor e re lia bly ind ic a te int oxic a tio n, su c h a s tho se no w i nc lud e d in fi e ld s ob ri e ty

te sts . T he te xtboo k c ha

pte r, fr om C EC I L T EX T BO O K O F M ED I C I NE , incl ud ed a ta ble sh ow ing blo ode thano l le ve ls andthe ir e ff e c ts andsympt oms in “ sp or a dic dri nk ers ” a nd“ c hr on ic drinkers,” and Dr . Mitchell fre quently ref err ed to this table.
The trial c ourt here in applied the corr ect leg al principles. Ba sed upon the authorities cited above and our revie w of the rec ord, we conclude that the trial court acted w ithin it s broad discr etion i n e x c l u d i n g D r
. M i t c h e l l ’ s p r o f f e r e d t e s t i m o n y.
At i s s u e h er ein was whether Jennifer Biscan should have known that Hug hes B rown wa s intox icated w hen she g ot into the car w ith h i m
. T h e re cord inc ludes testimony from various witnesses as to whe ther Hughe s demonstrated any signs of intox ication. Whether a person exhibit ed signs o f i n t o x i cation has been the subjec t of lay witness testimony , and testimony from law enfor ceme nt and emer g ency personne l with more expertise or experienc e, in hund reds, if not tho us a nd s, of

c a se s in thi s state . Co ns e qu e ntl y , it is q ue sti on able that e xpe rt te sti mon y

ba se d o n p a st persona l observation and g ener alized pr i n ci p l es within the knowledg e of the g ener al population would have a dded anything to the pr oof or would ha ve subst antially assisted the trier of fa ct. The fac t that the law assig ns to a passeng er, pr esumably a lay person, the r esponsibilityof asse ssing the risk of riding with a driver who may be intox icated le ads to the obvious conclusion that the que stion of whe ther someone showed the e ffe cts of intox ication does not re quire e x pert proof

. 32

I n addition, even if the expert opinion that Hughe s Br own would have demonstrated obvious signs of intox ication should have been admitted, we cannot find, based on the re cord a s a whole, that Dr. Mitchell’s testimony , sub j ec t ed to cr oss-examination, would have more pr obably than not aff ecte d the outcome. There was other testimonyby

ey ew i t n esses reg arding Hug hes B rown’s 33 demonstration of visible sig ns of intox ication. Despite the testimony of emerg ency personne l on the41

scene who saw him firsthand a fter the acc ident that he wa s not obviouslyintox icated, the jury found the c on tr ary

te sti mon y

a nde vid e nc e su ff

ic ie nt t o c on c lud e that Jen nifer Bis c a n w a s n e g lig e nt i n riding with him. W e cannot conclude that an expert’s testimony that he would have exhibi ted sig ns of intox ication, base d upon statistical likelihood from rese arc h studies, would have a ltered the jury ’s decision. Consequently , reve rsal would not be warranted even if the t estimony should not have bee n excluded.

6

. Ad u l tS t an d ar d C h ar ge
Th e tria l c ou rt

pr op e rl y ins truc te d th e jury th at Hugh e s B ro wn wa s to be he ld t o a n a du lt stand ard of c are be c aus e he wa s e ng a g e d in a n a du lt a c tiv ity , d ri vin g . O n th is i ssu e , o ur Sup re me Court has stated:
in a sse ssi ng a

min or ’s negli g e nc e , th e min or is g e ne ra lly

no t he ld t o th e sa me standard of

car e im posed on adults. I nstead, the minor is cha rg ed with such c are as a re a so na bly pr ud e nt p e rs on of

lik e a g e , c apa c ity , kno wl e dg e a nde xpe ri e nc e wo uld be expected to e x erc ise under the same c ircumstance s. Although the law is c lear that
a minor’s conduct is g ener ally not to be judge d by an adult standard of car e, the law is e q u a l l y c l e ar t h a tw h e r e t h e m i n o r

i s e n g a g e d i n a

d a n g e r o u s a c t i v i t y

no rm a lly undertaken only

by adults, such as driving a car, no specia l allowanc e is made f or the min or’s li mi te d e xpe ri e nc e or a g e a nd , th e re fo re , th e min or is h e ld t o a n a du lt
s t a n d ar d o f c ar e
. . . . T h e ru l e t h a ta l l d r i v e r s o f m o t o r v e h i c l e s o n p u b l i c h i g h w a ys are held to an adult standa rd of c are applies to driving while intox icated.
Cook , 878 S.W .2d at 937-38.
On app e a l, M r. B ro wndo e s n ot a rg ue that th e ins truc tio n w a s impr op e r anda g re e s th a t it states the prope r standar d of ca re a s to him. However, he asserts that the trial court e rre d in failing to i ns truc t th e jury

that:
I f they found that Jennifer B iscan wa s eng ag ed in a danger o u s ac t i vity no specia l allowanc es ar e made for the minor’ s limi ted experienc e or a g e and, the ref ore, the minor is held to an adult standard of car e.
The problem cause d by the trial court’s failure to g ive this requeste d instruction is described b y M r
. B r o w n t h u s l y:
I n the absence of the fore g oing instruc tion, the jury was for ced to c onclude that the conduct of J en n i fe r B iscan of a cce pting a ride with an intoxi cate d driver w ould be based on a

standard of

car e of a minor and not an a dult at the time.
The a ctivity

J ennife r eng ag ed in was be coming a passe ng er in a car . This is not a dang erous activity normally undertaken only by adults. I t is eng ag ed in by children and adults alike. F or that42

rea son, “The Supreme Court .

. . has expressly declined to e x tend that standar d [t he adult standa rd] to a minor g uest p as seng er.” Br own v . S mi th , 604 S.W .2d 56, 58 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980) ( citing Duvall Transfer & Delive ry Serv . v. Be aman , 218 Tenn. 348, 403 S.W.2d 315 (1966) and Houser v. Pe rsinger , 57 Te nn
. Ap p. 40 1, 41 9 S.W. 2d 17 9 (1 96 7) ). Th e arg ume nt m a de he re in atte mpt s to equate the activity

(bec oming a

passeng er) with the neg lige nce ( knowing ly becoming a passe ng er of an intoxi cate d driver.)
We theref ore find that the t rial court made no rever sible err or in ref using to c harg e the jury that J ennife r B iscan should be he ld to an adult standard of car e.
C. Allocation of Fa

ult to Hughe s Br own - Te stimonyby Police Offic ers a nd Medica l Personnel About His Post-Accide nt Be havior
Police office rs and emer g ency medical technicia ns who wer e prese nt at the ac cident sce ne testified re g arding the fac ts of the acc ident and their activities at the scene , including any medical treatment give n and their a ssessment of the c ondition of t h e d ri v er an d the passeng er. B eca use a major issue in the ca se wa s whether J ennife r B iscan should have obser v ed v i s i b l e si g ns of intox ication in Hug hes B rown, these witnesses we re a sked various questions about M r. Brown’s de me a no r a ft e r the a c c ide nt.
On ap p ea l , Mr. B rown a sserts that, over objection, the trial c ourt improperly allowed te sti mon y by the se va ri ou s ind ivi du a ls that a ft e r the a c c ide nt M r. B ro wn app e are d u nc on c e rn e d w ith the condition of Jennifer B iscan. In his brief, Mr. B rown points us to onlyone example of the testimonycomplained of. The witness was, at the t ime of t he wreck, a volunteer pa rame dic with the Wil liamson CountyRescue Squad. B eca use part of his role wa s to chec k the m edica l condition of the driver , Hug hes B rown, a nd to look for sig ns of a he ad inj u ry , t h is witness was questioned thoroug hly

about his interac tion with Mr. Brown, Mr. Br own’s appe arance, and his demeanor . As part of the direc t e x amination by the B iscans’ attorney , the witness testified that he a sked the drive r for the pa sseng er’ s nam e an d “h e would not g ive me her name.” The following examination
occur red: Q

. D i d h e a s k

yo u a ta n y p o i n tw h e t h e r s h e w a s o k a y?
A. No, sir. Q. Di d h e se e m c on c e rn e d w ithhe r at a ll?
A. No, sir. Q. W h atwa s h e d o i n g?
A. He w as more w orried a bout his car than he was the - - Jennifer.43

Therewas no objec tion made to these que stions or response s. During cross-e x amination of t h i s wi t n es s , M r. Br o wn ’s at t o rn eyp u rs u ed t h e f o l l o wi n g l i n e o f q u es t i o n i n g: Q. You just testified that he wouldn’t g ive y ou the name of his passeng er. A. Yes, sir. Q. That’s a very

unusual response , considering the seve rity of the a ccide nt, wouldn’t y ou ag ree ?
A. Yes, sir, I

do. Q. Did he seem to y ou to be unconcerned with her? That would be a very unusual
re sp on se , w ou ldn ’t

it?
A. Yes, sir, it would. Q. And being conce rned about the car rathe r than his passeng er w ould also be a ve ry un us ua l r e sp on se , w ou ld i t no t?
A. Yes, sir, it would.
The c ross examination also que stioned the witness’s ability to r emember details of a w rec k that occur red f our y ear s earlier in view of the n u mber of a ccide nts the witness had bee n called to. I n the porti o n o f the testimony that is the subject of the issue r aised on a ppeal, c ounsel for the Biscans asked the w itness what made this ac cident stand out in his mind. The witness responde d, the re action of the driver, and when a sked why that was, the witness answe red, “ Appea red to me he had no conc ern ove r the pa ssen ger
. ” C o unsel for Mr . Br own objecte d to the witness’s
c h ar a c te r iz a ti o n , a n d th e c o u r t o v e rru le d th e o b je c ti o n
. T h is s tate me n t is th e s o le b a s is for the
c on te nti on raise d o n a

pp e a l.
The other emer g ency

personne l who testified ea rlier in the tria l also made statements about Mr. Br own’s appar ent lack of conce rn for his pa sseng er. When the first such witness was asked whether Mr. B rown “ seeme d” to be c oncerned about J ennife r, counse l objected, and the trial court s u s t ai n ed t h e o b

j ec t i o n wi t h t h e d i re ct i o n t h att h e w i t n es s j u s t b e a s k ed wh atM r. Br o wn wa s d o i n g. The witness wa s later a sked, without objection, whether Mr. B rown e ver a sked how the pa sseng er was a nd whether

he appe are d to be paying attention to the g irl. Both a nswers w ere no. The off icer who ar rested Mr. Br own t hat ni g ht after investigation and field sobriety tests was also aske d, without objection, whethe r Mr. B rown e ver a sked him a bout Jennifer or expressed any conce rn about he r. Ag ain, the answ ers we re no.
Th is la w e nf

or c e me nt of

fi c e r, on c ro ss- e xami natio n by Mr

. B ro wn ’s c ou ns e l, w a s a sk e d to respond to a hy

pothetical, the point of whic h was whe ther someone c ould “sober up” quickly in aT h e re w a s b le e d ing a n d sw e lli n g b e tw e e n he r sk u ll a n d he r b ra in. T h e re w a s b le e d ing a n d b ru ising in b o th 34 f r ont al l ob es of

he r bra i n, t ear i ng i n t he corpus cal l osu m, and bl eedi ng i n t he t hal mus
. T her e we r e a l s o m ul t i pl e s hea r inj u rie s thr o u g h o u t he r b ra in a n d a b ra in ste m inj u ry. 44 situation such as that fac ed by Mr. B rown, includi n g knowing that his friend wa s hurt and unconscious. The witness replied:
Gene rally , i f t h at wer e the c ase, the y ’re usually more hy pera ctive. He wasn’t hypera ctive. He was laid ba ck. He was very calm. He was very - - I know he thre w it [ the bee r ca

rton] over to protect himself but that was a calc ulated move. He didn’t do it justbeca

use of this adre naline rush. And a s far as their f riend wa s just hurt, he
seeme d like he was no more concerned about that than whether som eone was on the
moon. No objection wa s interposed to this answer responding to a question asked by Mr. B rown’s lawy er. Thus, there was only one unsustained objec tion made her ein to a witne sses’s cha rac terization of Mr. B rown’s appar ent lack of conce rn for J ennife r Biscan. This response and the objection we re pr e c e de d b y

sim ila r s ta temen ts made b y

oth e r w itn e sse s n ot o bje c te d to , a ndso me in r e sp on se to questioning by

Mr. B rown’s c ounsel. Consequently , Mr. Br own waive d his right to complain a bout the admission of those statements. Te n n
. R

. E v id. 103 (a)( 1); Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a)

. Se e als o W o o d s o n v. Porter Brown Limestone Co. , 9 1 6 S. W. 2 d8 9 6 , 9 0 7 n
. 1 0 ( T e n n
. 1 0 0 6 ) ( s tati n g th at “obviously [t he complaining party ] was require d to object to the evidenc e at the time of its admissi on in order to pr eserve its int ro d u ct i on as er ror” ). We ca nnot see how the admission of the one statement objec ted to can ha ve had any impact on the o u t co m e o f t he ca se in view of the prior testimony . We find this is sue to be without merit.
V. Evidenc e Relate d to Damag es
J ennife r B iscan suff

ere d sever e brain injuries in the acc ident. When she was taken to the 34 ho sp ita l a ndfo r a

we e k th e re a ft e r, me dic a l pe rs on ne l di d n ot be lie ve sh e wo uldsu rv ive he r i nju ri e s. She rema ined in a coma

for ove r two and a half wee ks. She went throug h months of reha bilitation. I t was a month af

ter the w rec k befor e she c ould respond to simple commands. Fo r al m o s t two months she could not speak.
The medic al proof at trial showed that J ennife r re mains permane ntly impaired a s a re sult of the injuries she sustained in the a ccide nt. She remains cogn i t i v el yimpaired a nd has emotional control diffic ulties associated w ith severe brain injury . She is functioning at the emotional level of a nine y ear old. She also suffer s from depr ession and anxiety . Her memory , conce ntration, and de c isi on -m akin g abil iti e s a re imp a ir e d. She ha s dif

fi c ulty wi th ne w le arn ing , p la nn ing , ju dg me nt, so c ia l si tuatio ns , atte nti on , a ndimp uls ivi ty

. She a lso ha s we akn e ss in he r arm s, sp e e c h p ro ble ms, memory problems, sleep diff

iculties, and double vision.Jen ni fer was excl uded f r om t he cour t r oo m dur i ng t he medi cal t es t i mo ny r el at i ng t o her progn osi s
. H er coun s el 35

m a d e this re q u e st so tha t she w o u ld no t b e d e te rr e d fro m e ff o rt a t an d e x p e c ta tio n o f i m p ro v e m e n t.

A s exp l ai ned earl i er, t he jury ap p o rt i o ned 1 5 % o f t he f aul t fo r her i njuri es t o Jenni fer B i scan, t hereb y reducing 36 the a w a rd to he r b y tha t am o u n t.

A my G r ant was t he cu r r ent gi r l f r i end o f Jenni fer B i s can ’ s ex- bo y f r i end a nd he r prof

fer ed t es t i mo ny was t hat 37

o n o n e o c c a sio n sh e o b se rv e d J e n n ifer B isc a n “sip ” b e e r fro m a b o ttl e “m a yb e fi v e ti m e s” o v e r le ss th a n a n ho u r. 45 B e c aus e of

the se c on dit ion s, Jenn if

e r r e ma ins on a

re g ime n o f m e dic a tio n; s he wi ll n e e d to
se e a ps y c hiatr ist fo r the re st of he r l if e ; w ill c on tin ue to h a ve dif fi c ulty wi th h e r l e ft

arm ; a ndwi ll likely need a car etake r af

ter he r par ents ca n no longe r take car e of he r.
J ennife r missed a y ear

of school, but then returne d and g raduated from high school. She has taken c ourses at colleg e, where special accommodations and her hard w ork and e fforts have re sulted in good g rade s. Her pro fe s s o rs testified, howeve r, that she will have incre asing difficulty as she moves bey ond introductory course s. Her e mploy ment opportunities are also limit ed.

J ennife r testified that she lives he r life like a fair l y normal tee nag er. She stated that her 35 g rade s are g ood, that she has a driver’ s license a nd drives, and that she h as b een on trips. She testified that since the acc ident, she is more de termined, more achie vement orie nted, happier , and a better person.
After hearing a ll the evidence , the jury awa rd ed a ver dict of $3,954,810, comprised of 36 $1,000,000 for lost earning capa city , $650,000 for future medical car e, $400,000 for past pain and suffe ring , $1,500,000 for permane nt impairment; and $204,810 for past medical ex penses. The jury did not awar d damag es for past or future loss of enjoy ment of life.
Th e de fe nd a nts do no t di re c tly c ha lle ng e the a mou nt o f the verd ict or the ba se s f

or it. Ho we ve r, the y

raise tw o e vident iar y issue s th at arere la te d to the pr oo f o f d a ma g e s. We mus t presume that their posi tion is that if the evidentiary ruling s had been ot herw ise, the jury would not have a war ded the a mount in damag es.

A. J ennife r B iscan’s Consumption of Alcohol Subsequent to the Ac cident
The B iscans also filed a

motion i n l i mi ne s e e kin g to prohibit any testimonyreg arding J ennife r B isc a n’ s c on su mpt ion of

a lc oh ol at a ny

tim e a ft e r the nig ht o f the c ar a c c ide nt a s ir re le va nt, un fair ly prejudicia l, and conf

using and misleading to the jury

. At the hea

ring on the motion in limine , the ar g ument cente red a round the fa ct that there was cont r a d ic to r y te s ti mo n y r e g a r d ing Jennifer

Biscan’s alcohol c onsumption after the a ccide nt. J ennife r Biscan admitted that on one occa sion a fter the wre ck, she had c onsumed alcohol, but not to the point of intox ication. Amy Gra nt, on the other hand, was predic ted to te stify that she had se en Jennifer 37 Biscan consume a lcohol on two occa sions after the wre ck. The defe ndants also soug ht to introduce46

the testimony of Ashley Worley , daug hter of Mr. W orley , that she saw J ennife r Biscan take a drink of what appea

red to be champa g ne at a

prom party

. After hearing the arg uments, the t ri al court de termined that Jennifer B iscan c ould be qu e sti on e d r e g ard ing he r a lc oh ol co ns ump tio n fol low ing the a c c ide nt “i f a fo un datio n wa s laid w ith
me dic a l wi tne sse s that oc c a sio na l drinking ha s a lr e a dy a ff e c te d he r re c ov e ry

or pr og no sis be c aus e of interac tion with J ennife r Biscan’s medications.” The trial court further held that “De fendants may not offer any

testimonyor evide nce r elating to J ennife r B iscan’s post-w rec k drinking other than throug h questioning of

J ennife r Biscan, except that Def endants may call Amy

Gra nt to testify

at trial for the limited purpose of impeaching J ennife r B iscan’s te stimony .”
The medic al testimony

at the trial offe red by Dr. Cy nthia Rector, Jennifer B iscan’s tre ating psy chiatrist, showed that as long as the alcohol consumption w as not a “whole lot in amount” the re would be no long- term eff ect on Jennifer B iscan’s f uture medic al condition or the e ffe ctiveness of her me dication. As a result of the evidenc e provided at trial, the court excluded testimonyreg arding J ennife r B iscan’s c onsumption of alcohol subsequent to the wr eck be cause the prope r foundation was not laid.
On app e a l, the de fe nd a nts arg ue that the tr ia l cou rt e rr e d by re fu sin g to a llo w the m “ to f ull y explore the dang ers a ssociated with Jennifer B iscan’s c onsumption of alc ohol while taking psy chiatric presc ription medications .

. . afte r the a ccide nt.” They assert that the evidenc e that she
c on su me d a lc oh ol a g a ins t th e a dv ic e of he r doc tor s and he r pare nts wa s re le va nt to he r cl a im f or los s of enjoyment of life. Since the jury awa rded no damag es for

loss of enjoy ment of life, this arg ument is m oo t. T he y

a lso a sse rt

that th e us e of a lc oh ol “c ou ld we ll ag g ra vate a ndc omp ou nd ” he r i nju ri e s. That is exa ct l ythe evidenc e that the c ourt requir ed to be pr esente d befor e the pr offe red e vidence would be admitted. De fendants never pr esente d proof of a conne ction b etwee n occa sional
con s u m ption of a small amount of alc ohol and any adver se impact on Jennifer’ s rec overy or prog nosis.
As stated previously , Tenn. R. Evid. 401 define s rele vant evidence as “evide nce ha ving any tendenc y to make the e x istence of

any fac t that is of conseque nce to the de termination of the a ction more proba

ble o r l es s p robable than it would be without the evidenc e.” In light of the medical testimonythat small amounts of alcohol would have n o eff ect on Jennifer B iscan’s r ecove ry or pr og no sis , te sti mon y

that sh e c on su me d a

sma ll a mou nt o f a lc oh ol o n tw o s e pa rate oc c a sio ns wo uld have no “ conseque nce to the de termination” of the damag es. We ag ree with the trial court that the evidenc e wa s not rele vant and, there fore , properly excluded. The trial c ourt’s dec ision to gra nt the motion in limine reg arding alcohol consumption subsequent to the wr eck is a ffirme d.

B . T e sti mon y

of Dr . N e tte rv ill e
At tria l, th e jury

he ardthete sti mon y

of Dr . Jam e s N e tte rv ill e , Jen nif e r B isc a n’ s lo ng tim e pe diatr ic ia n. He is a

bo ardc e rt if

ie d p e diatr ic ia n w ho ha d tr e a te d th ou sa nd s o f c hil dr e n du ri ng his tenure as a phy sician. Dr. N etterville testified ex t ensively about his treatment of

J ennife r B iscan47

prior to the a c c ide nt. He wa s c a lle d o n th e nig ht o f the a c c ide nt, a ndwe nt a lmo st i mme diate ly to the ho sp ita l, w he re he stay e d th e nig ht w ithMr . a ndMrs. Bis c a n, mon ito ri ng Jenn if e r’ s p ro g re ss. After J ennife r’s fir st night in the hospital, Dr. Ne tterville co n tinued to monitor her prog ress by
makin g re g ula

r v isi ts, re vie wi ng he r c ha rt s, a ndta lki ng to h e r t

re a tin g ph y sic ia ns
. He c on tin ue d to monitor her prog ress c losely afte r her transfe r to the re habilitation facility and until she was r elea sed from that fa cility . After

that time, he saw Jennifer on a reg ular basis at the Maryland Fa rms YMCA, wher e both she and Dr. Netterville e x erc ised on a reg ular basis, wher e he questioned her a bout her prog ress a nd observe d her r ecove ry
. Prior to trial, M r. Br o wn fi led a motion in limine seeking to exclude the testimonyof Dr. Ne tte rv ill e on theba sis that he ha d n ot t re a te d o r e xami ne d Jen nif e r B isc an si nc e the a c c ide nt, a lth ou g h he ha d se e n he r in wh a t Mr

. B ro wn de sc ri be d a s a so c ia l se tti ng
. Citi ng no pa rt ic ula r r ule of evidence which would exclude Dr. Netterville’s testi mony , Mr. B rown re lied on Porter v. Gre en , 7 4 5 S. W. 2 d 8 7 4 ( T e n n
. Ct

. A p p
. 1 9 8 7 )

. I n Porter , this court determined that the opinion of a ph y sic ia n te sti fying abo ut me dic a lly re la te d issu e s must be re a so na

bly c e rt a in, bo th a s to the c aus e of the phy sical condition and its future e ffe ct. Mr. B rown arg ued that Dr . Netter ville could not possiblytestify

with rea sonable medic al ce rtain t y as t o what the f uture holds for Jennifer

Biscan beca use he ha s not tr eate d her profe ssionally since the acc ident. Wit h reg ard to the motion in limine , the court determined:

I td ep en d s o n wh att h e t es t i m o n y i s
. I f h e ca n co gn i t i v el y t es t i fy as t o s o m e t h i n gs that he ob se rv e s as a doc tor , the n I ’m g on g to l e t hi m te sti fy to that. O the rw ise , I ’l l in s tr u c t h im th a t th e r e main d e r is p e r s o n a l op in io n s , a f te r [th e r e h ab il it a ti o n f

a c il ity ], when he saw he r after S tallworth. Be fore then, Ithink it was strictlyprofe ssional.
The trial c ourt g rante d the motion in limine to prec lude Dr. Netter ville from testi fying as an expert as to future e ffe cts of Jennifer B iscan’s injuries. Howeve r, the trial c ourt determined that Dr. Ne tte rv ill e c ou ld t e sti fy

a s to Jenn if

e r B isc a n’ s p a st andc ur

re nt m e di c al c on dition , th e natur e , e xten t, and permanenc y

of her injuries, and the curr ent impairment she wa s experiencing as a r esult of her inj urie s. On appe al, M r. Brown complains that the t rial court permitted Dr. Netterville to testify “at leng th a s to Jennifer Biscan’s medical treatment a s well as off er nume rous profe ssional opinions.” I n add i t i o n , h e particularly cites as e rror

the trial court’s overr

uling of his objection to Dr. Netterville’s testimonythat althoug h J ennife r’s condition w as incre mentally better tha n a y ear ag o, “that improveme nt is going to slow and slow and stop.” T he primary basis for the a ssertion of er ror is that th e tr ia l c ou rt

a llo we d Dr. Ne tte rv ill e to t e sti fy a s to are a s o uts ide his me dic a l e xpe rt ise , in pa rt be c aus e he ha d n ot p ro fe ssi on a lly tr e a te d h e r s inc e be fo rethe a c c ide nt.
Wit nesses “ should be permitted to g ive expert opinions .

. . [reg arding the particular subjec t a t is su e ] if

the y po sse ss s c ie nti fi c , tec hn ic a l, o r o the r s pe c ia lize d kno wl e dg e de ri ve d f ro m th e ir kn ow le dg e , skil l, expe ri e nc e , traini ng , or ed uc a tio n tha t will su bs ta nti a lly a ssi st the tria l of

fa c t to understand the evidenc e or to de termine a fac t in issue.” Ma rti n v . S ize mo re , 78 S.W .3d 249, 27548

(T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 1) . F urthe r, “ Te sti mon y of a ph y sic ia n a s to the pr ob able e ff e c t of the inj ury

is admissible, but it s hould show that such r es u l t i s rea sonably certain and not a mer e likelihood or possibili ty .” Porter , 7 4 5 S

. W

. 2 d at8 7 7 , q u o t i n g Re se rv e Life In s. c o. v . W hit te mo re , 59 Tenn. App. 495, 512-13, 442 S.W.2d 266, 274 (1969).

Dr. Ne tterville was a

ble to testify

to J ennife r B iscan’s c ondition both prior to and after the
acc ident; he was the only

medical e x pert who ha d such per sonal knowledg e. With re g ard to the brief ref ere nce to he r future improvement cited a bove, ther e is no indication in the record that a tra ined and experienc ed pediatrician would not be competent to make that determination. I n any event, we fi n d n o ab u s e o f d i s cr et i o n i n t h e t ri al co u rt ’s ru l i n g.
A number of

other medic al witnesses testified a s to J ennife r’s injuries , co n dition, and prog nosis for recovery , including the head pe diatric re habilitation at Stallworth, J ennife r’s tre ating psy chiatrist, her

treating psy cholog ist, and an ex pert on neuropsy cholog y . The de fendants have not challeng ed this testimonyreg arding the seriousne ss and extent o f J en n i fe r’s injuries a nd her pr og no sis . T hu s, e ve n if pa rt of Dr

. Ne tte rv ill e ’s te sti mon y wa s ina dmi ssi ble , it is h ig hly un lik e ly that exclusion of that evidence would have a ffe cted the o u t co m e o f t h e ca se or the amount of damag es aw arde d.

VI . Conclusion

For the fore g oing r easons, weaff irm the dec ision of the trial court and remand the case for any further proce eding s which may be necessary
. The costs of t he appeal are tax ed equa lly to Paul Worley and Franklin Hug hes B rown.

___________________________________ PATRI CI A J . COTTRELL , J UDGE