COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Elder and Overton 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

DELLA SMALL WILSON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0118-97-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 MARCH 3, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Robert W. Duling, Judge 

 Patricia P. Nagel, Assistant Public Defender 

(David J. Johnson, Public Defender, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Daniel J. Munroe, Assistant Attorney General 

(Richard Cullen, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 Della Small Wilson (appellant) appeals her conviction of 

attempted murder of a police officer with the intent of 

interfering with the performance of his official duties. She 

contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her 

conviction. She argues that the evidence failed to support the 

trial court's conclusion that she specifically intended (1) to 

"kill" Officer Carnes or (2) to interfere with the performance of 

his official duties when she threw a large butcher knife at him. 

 For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

 "On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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inferences fairly deducible therefrom." Martin v. Commonwealth, 

4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). This Court does 

not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact. See

Cable v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 236, 239, 415 S.E.2d 218, 220 

(1992). Instead, the trial court's judgment will not be set 

aside unless it appears that it is plainly wrong or without 

supporting evidence. Josephs v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 87, 

99, 390 S.E.2d 491, 497 (1990) (en banc). 

 "'An attempt to commit a crime is composed of two elements: 

 (1) The intent to commit it; and (2) a direct, ineffectual act 

done towards its commission.'" Haywood v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. 

App. 562, 565, 458 S.E.2d 606, 607-08 (1995) (quoting Merritt v. 

Commonwealth, 164 Va. 653, 657, 180 S.E. 395, 397 (1935)). Code 

§ 18.2-31(6) states that the crime of capital murder includes the 

"willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of a 

law-enforcement officer . . . for the purpose of interfering with 

the performance of his official duties." 

 "The intent required to be proven in an attempted crime is 

the specific intent in the person's mind to commit the particular 

crime for which the attempt is charged." Wynn v. Commonwealth, 5 

Va. App. 283, 292, 362 S.E.2d 193, 198 (1987); see also Merritt, 

164 Va. at 660-61, 180 S.E. at 398-99 (stating that "while a 

person may be guilty of murder though there was no actual intent 

to kill, he cannot be guilty of an attempt to commit murder 

unless he has a specific intent to kill"). "Intent is the 
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purpose formed in a person's mind and may be, and frequently is, 

shown by circumstances. It is a state of mind which may be 

proved by a person's conduct or by his statements." Barrett v. 

Commonwealth, 210 Va. 153, 156, 169 S.E.2d 449, 451 (1969); see 

also Nobles v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 548, 551, 238 S.E.2d 808, 

810 (1977). "[A] person is presumed to intend the immediate, 

direct, and necessary consequences of his voluntary act." 

Nobles, 218 Va. at 551, 238 S.E.2d at 810. 

 "[W]hether the required intent exists is generally a 

question for the trier of fact." Id. "The inferences to be 

drawn from proved facts are within the province of the [trier of 

fact], so long as the inferences are reasonable and justified." 

Barrett, 210 Va. at 156, 169 S.E.2d at 451. Where, as here, the 

Commonwealth relies solely on circumstantial evidence to prove 

the intent of the accused, the evidence must exclude every 

reasonable hypothesis of innocence. See Coffey v. Commonwealth, 

202 Va. 185, 188, 116 S.E.2d 257, 259 (1960). 

 All necessary circumstances proved must be 

consistent with guilt and inconsistent with 

innocence. It is not sufficient that the 

evidence create a suspicion of guilt, however 

strong, or even a probability of guilt, but 

must exclude every reasonable hypothesis save 

that of guilt. 

Webb v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 24, 34, 129 S.E.2d 22, 29 (1963). 

 Appellant's intent to kill Officer Carnes could be 

reasonably inferred from her conduct during the confrontation in 

her bedroom on June 7. The record established that, after 
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appellant retrieved the eleven-inch-long knife from the right 

side of her bed, she waved it angrily in the air and appeared 

"angry" and "hysterical." Officer Carnes was standing about 

eight feet from where appellant was sitting in her bed. When 

Officer Carnes ordered her to put down the knife, appellant 

refused to comply. Instead, she told Officer Carnes that she 

"would let him have it" and threw the knife at the officer's 

chest. She threw the knife by extending her arm "straight out" 

while holding the handle of the knife. The manner in which 

appellant released the knife caused the blade and the handle to 

flip "end-over-end" as it traveled through the air toward Officer 

Carnes. The knife struck Officer Carnes in the left side of his 

chest with the blade pointing toward the officer. Officer Carnes 

was not harmed by the impact of the knife as it hit the strap of 

his bullet-proof vest. The dangerous manner in which appellant 

released the knife, her decision to aim her throw at the left 

side of Officer Carnes' chest while sitting about eight feet away 

from the officer, and the nature of the object she chose to throw 

-- a large knife with a six-and-a-half-inch blade -- support the 

trial court's conclusion that she specifically intended to kill 

Officer Carnes. This evidence likewise excludes as a reasonable 

hypothesis the theory that appellant's sole intent when she threw 

the knife at Officer Carnes was merely to commit an assault and 

battery upon the officer. 

 We also hold that the evidence was sufficient to prove that 
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appellant intended to interfere with the exercise of Officer 

Carnes' official duties. The record established that Officer 

Carnes was on duty and in uniform when he entered appellant's 

bedroom in response to an earlier call from her apartment. 

Appellant threw the knife at Officer Carnes' chest after he 

ordered her to put it down. The trial court could have 

reasonably inferred from appellant's actions that her attempt to 

kill Officer Carnes was also an attempt to thwart his effort to 

neutralize the dangerous confrontation between herself and the 

others in the bedroom. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm appellant's conviction 

of attempted capital murder. 

 Affirmed.