Filed 12/21/20 Aslan v. McHale CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication 

or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published 

for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF 

CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION FOUR

CHARLES ASLAN,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

PAULA McHALE,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B300972

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC674294)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Richard J. Burdge, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.

Jance M. Weberman for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Stimpert & Ford and Daniel P. Stimpert for Defendant

and Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

Appellant Charles Aslan challenges the trial court’s 

grant of respondent Paula McHale’s motion for summary 

judgment, following its grant of summary adjudication as to 

his cause of action for conversion.

1 That cause of action 

alleged that McHale converted several hundred ceramic tiles 

fashioned by noted early 20th century artist Ernest Allan 

Batchelder. On appeal, Aslan acknowledges that the court 

granted McHale’s motion because it found he would be 

unable to demonstrate the second element of conversion, 

viz., that McHale had wrongfully converted the tiles. 

Nevertheless, Aslan’s brief is devoted to arguing that he 

established a triable issue of material of fact as to the first 

element of conversion, viz., whether he had lawful 

possession of the tiles. Even after McHale noted in her 

respondent’s brief that Aslan had ignored the central issue 

on appeal, Aslan failed to file a reply brief. He has, 

therefore, waived any argument that the trial court erred in 

ruling he would be unable to establish the second element of 

1 The trial court also granted summary adjudication as to 

Aslan’s remaining causes of action -- intentional and negligent 

infliction of emotional distress -- but Aslan does not appeal those 

rulings.
3

conversion. Moreover, our review of the record supports the 

trial court’s ruling. We therefore affirm.2

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

In June 2019, McHale moved for summary judgment 

on the operative complaint, which alleged three causes of 

action against her: conversion, intentional infliction of 

emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional 

distress.

3 According to the motion, Aslan alleged in his 

complaint that his uncle, Moses Aslan, had given him the 

right to lease, manage, and restore the premises located at 

217 West Sixth Street, Los Angeles, California (the 

Premises), “including the right to remove all items of 

personal property he found during the reconstruction 

process.” Aslan further alleged that while restoring the 

Premises, he discovered boxes containing tiles and murals by 

Batchelder worth over $3,000,000. 

McHale claimed that Aslan’s conversion cause of action 

was based on allegations that she had initiated an action to 

evict him from the Premises, had notified the Los Angeles 

2 We also note that Aslan’s opening brief failed to comply 

with the rules of court by failing to “[s]upport any reference to a 

matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number 

of the record where the matter appears.” (Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) While we decline to strike the brief, we note 

the defect. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(e)(2)(C).)

3 Aslan failed to include any iteration of the complaint in the 

record on appeal. 
4

Police Department (LAPD) that he had “absconded with 

valuable murals and tiles that belonged to her,” had caused 

Aslan to be arrested and charged with grand theft, and had 

“converted the tiles.” She also claimed his infliction of 

emotional distress causes of action were based on her 

allegedly false reports to the police that Aslan had stolen the 

tiles. McHale argued that any eviction action she initiated, 

or any statements she made to the police, were privileged, 

and therefore could not be the basis for any of Aslan’s causes 

of action. She further argued that she could not be liable for 

converting the tiles because they were voluntarily 

surrendered by Aslan’s mother, Sophia Aslan, and McHale 

was not even present when the surrender occurred. 

Filed with McHale’s motion were declarations from 

Detective Scott Vostad of the LAPD, Carson Elder, and Tony 

Anthony. Detective Vostad declared that, after being 

notified by McHale that Moses Aslan believed Charles Aslan 

had removed certain ceramic tiles from the Premises, he 

“began a thorough investigation” and, after speaking with 

numerous individuals, including McHale, Moses Aslan, 

Sophia Aslan (Charles’s mother), and Charles Aslan, and 

reviewing documents, concluded “there was probable cause 

to believe that Charles Aslan had removed and was in 

possession of personal property that did not belong to 

Charles Aslan.” Detective Vostad further declared that, on 

the morning of Aslan’s arrest, he received a call from Sophia 

Aslan, stating that she had the tiles in question and wanted 

to return them. Detective Vostad asked Carlson Elder, an 
5

acquaintance of Moses Aslan’s, to accompany him to retrieve 

the tiles. Detective Vostad declared that he “repeatedly 

made it clear to Sophia Aslan that . . . [he] was there merely 

to assist her in voluntarily returning the ceramic tiles with 

her consent.” Detective Vostad stated that Sophia Aslan 

turned the tiles over to Elder and another individual. 

Elder’s declaration substantially corroborated Detective 

Vostad’s recitation of events, and identified the other 

individual as Tony Anthony. Anthony’s declaration 

substantially corroborated Detective Vostad’s and Elder’s 

accounts. McHale also filed a declaration from Scott Wells, 

who claimed to have known Aslan for several years, 

attesting that in April 2016, he agreed to lend Aslan 505 

Batchelder tiles that he expected would be returned (the 

Wells Tiles). The Wells Tiles were apparently among those 

given to the LAPD by Sophia Aslan, and were eventually 

returned to Wells. 

In opposing McHale’s motion, Aslan did not dispute 

that his two remaining causes of action for intentional and 

negligent infliction of emotional distress were based on 

McHale’s statements to the police.4 However, he claimed his 

conversion cause of action was based on the fact that the 

Wells Tiles belonged to Wells. With respect to the evidence

that his mother had voluntarily surrendered the tiles, Aslan 

4 Nor, according to the trial court’s order, did Aslan raise any 

argument regarding these claims in opposition to McHale’s 

motion.
6

argued only that the declarations attesting to this were not 

credible, presenting no contrary evidence of his own. 

In August 2019, the trial court granted McHale’s 

motion for summary judgment. With respect to Aslan’s 

emotional distress causes of action, the court found that 

McHale’s alleged eviction lawsuit or reports to the police

could not be the basis of any cause of action, because such 

actions were privileged. Regarding Aslan’s conversion cause 

of action, the trial court found that McHale had submitted 

“evidence establishing that ‘the subject tiles were 

surrendered voluntarily by [Plaintiff’s Mother] Sophia Aslan’ 

to the Los Angeles Police Department,” that McHale was not 

present when they were surrendered, and that she was not 

the claimant in the criminal filing which precipitated their 

return. The court found this evidence “sufficient to negate 

the second element of the conversion cause of action—

defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of the 

property rights—and to shift the burden to Plaintiff to 

establish the existence [of] a triable issue of material fact 

. . . .” The court further found that while Aslan disputed 

the assertion of voluntary surrender and contended the tiles 

were stolen from his home, he failed to cite evidence that 

either established that the tiles were stolen, or undermined 

or rebutted McHale’s evidence. Accordingly, the court found 

Aslan had failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to the 

voluntary surrender of the tiles, granted McHale’s motion for 

summary judgment, and entered judgment in her favor. 

Aslan timely appealed. 
7

DISCUSSION

A. Aslan Has Waived the Only Issue on Appeal

“‘“‘The elements of a conversion claim are: (1) the 

plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of the property; 

(2) the defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or 

disposition of property rights; and (3) damages.’”’” (Lee v. 

Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1240.) Aslan acknowledges 

this in his appellate brief. He also acknowledges that his 

appeal arises from “the trial court’s granting of summary 

judgment, in favor of defendant, PAULA MCHALE, 

(MCHALE) by her alleging material facts that negate the 

second element of the conversion cause of action and ‘ ... shift 

the burden to Plaintiff to establish the existence of a triable 

issue of material fact as to whether defendant can be held 

liable.’” 

Despite recognizing the legal basis for the court’s grant

of summary adjudication on the conversion cause of action, 

Aslan proceeds to ignore this issue in his appellate brief, in 

favor of arguing that he established a triable issue of 

material fact regarding the first element of conversion, viz., 

whether he had lawful possession of the tiles. Even after 

McHale noted in her respondent’s brief that Aslan had 

ignored the central issue on appeal, Aslan failed to file a 

reply brief addressing the basis for the court’s ruling. “Even 

when our review on appeal ‘is de novo, it is limited to issues 

which have been adequately raised and supported in [the 

appellant’s opening] brief. [Citations.] Issues not raised in 
8

an appellant’s brief are deemed waived or abandoned.’” 

(State Water Resources Control Bd. Cases (2006) 136 

Cal.App.4th 674, 836.) By knowingly ignoring the 

dispositive issue on appeal, Aslan has waived any argument 

that it was wrongly decided. Moreover, as discussed below, 

even had he preserved the argument, we would affirm on the 

merits.

B. The Court Did Not Err in Granting 

Summary Judgment

On a motion for summary judgment, “a defendant 

meets its burden of showing that a cause of action has no 

merit ‘if that party has shown that one or more elements of 

the cause of action . . . cannot be established . . . .’ Once the 

defendant meets the foregoing burden, ‘the burden shifts to 

the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more 

material facts exists as to that cause of action . . . [and] set 

forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of 

material fact exists as to that cause of action . . . .’” (Saelzler 

v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 780.) “On 

appeal after a motion for summary judgment has been 

granted, we review the record de novo, considering all the 

evidence set forth in the moving and opposition papers 

except that to which objections have been made and 

sustained.” (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 

317, 334.)

As established above, the trial court granted summary 

adjudication on the conversion cause of action because 
9

McHale demonstrated that Aslan could not establish that

she converted the tiles by a wrongful act or disposition of 

property rights, and Aslan failed to cite to evidence either 

establishing his contention that the tiles were stolen from 

him, or rebutting McHale’s evidence. We agree. Detective 

Vostad submitted a declaration that Charles’s mother called 

him on the day Charles was arrested, and stated that she 

had the ceramic tiles in question and wanted to return them. 

Detective Vostad, Carson Elder, and Tony Anthony all 

submitted declarations establishing that they were present 

when Sophia Aslan voluntarily relinquished the tiles. Aslan 

points to no contrary evidence.5 Therefore, regardless of 

Aslan’s waiver of the only issue on appeal, we find the trial 

court did not err in granting summary adjudication on the 

conversion cause of action and summary judgment on the 

operative complaint.

5 On appeal, Aslan questions the credibility of Detective 

Vostad and Anthony (though not Elder), asserting without 

citation to evidence that it was “highly unlikely” that Detective 

Vostad had numerous telephone conversations with Moses Aslan, 

and that a meeting that Anthony claimed occurred around June 

15, 2016, did not occur. But “the law is clear that summary 

judgment may not be denied solely on the basis of the credibility 

of the moving party’s witnesses.” (Ayon v. Esquire Deposition 

Solutions, LLC (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 487, 496.)
10

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded her 

costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL

REPORTS.

MANELLA, P. J.

We concur:

WILLHITE, J.

COLLINS, J.