20-712

Cadmelema-Morocho v. Garland

BIA

Brennan, IJ

A208 912 062/208 782 488

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION 

TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED 

AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS 

COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX 

OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A 

PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY 

NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 17th 4 day of May, two thousand twenty-two.

5

6 PRESENT:

7 MICHAEL H. PARK,

8 BETH ROBINSON,

9 MYRNA PÉREZ,

10 Circuit Judges.

11 _____________________________________

12

13 EDWIN F. CADMELEMA-MOROCHO,

14 JESSICA MARIANA SUMBA-VELECELA,

15 Petitioners,

16

17 v. 20-712

18 NAC

19 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 

20 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,

21 Respondent.

22 _____________________________________

23

24 FOR PETITIONER: Michael Borja, Esq., Jackson 

25 Heights, NY.

26

27 FOR RESPONDENT: Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Acting 

28 Assistant Attorney General; John 
2

1 W. Blakeley, Assistant Director; 

2 Elizabeth K. Fitzgerald-Sambou, 

3 Trial Attorney, Office of 

4 Immigration Litigation, United 

5 States Department of Justice, 

6 Washington, DC.

7 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

8 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

9 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

10 is DENIED.

11 Petitioners Edwin F. Cadmelema-Morocho and Jessica 

12 Mariana Sumba-Velecela, natives and citizens of Ecuador, seek 

13 review of a February 6, 2020 decision of the BIA affirming an

14 April 10, 2018 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying 

15 asylum and withholding of removal. In re Cadmelema-Morocho, 

16 No. A 208 912 062/208 782 488 (B.I.A. Feb. 6, 2020), aff’g

17 No. A 208 912 062/208 782 488 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. Apr. 10, 

18 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

19 underlying facts and procedural history.

20 We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified and 

21 supplemented by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of 

22 Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005); Yan Chen v. 

23 Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable 

24 standards of review are well established. See Paloka v. 
3

1 Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014) (reviewing factual 

2 findings for substantial evidence and questions of law and 

3 application of law to undisputed facts de novo).

4 To demonstrate eligibility for asylum or withholding of 

5 removal, “the applicant must establish that race, religion, 

6 nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 

7 political opinion was or will be at least one central reason 

8 for persecuting the applicant.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); 

9 see also id. § 1231(b)(3)(A). To constitute a particular 

10 social group, a group must be: “(1) composed of members who 

11 share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with 

12 particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society 

13 in question.” Paloka, 762 F.3d at 196 (quoting Matter of M14 E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014)); see also 

15 Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 72–74 (2d Cir. 2007). 

16 We find no error in the agency’s conclusion that Petitioners 

17 did not establish their membership in a cognizable particular 

18 social group of witnesses to gang activity.

19 A group of witnesses may constitute a cognizable 

20 particular social group. See Gashi v. Holder, 702 F.3d 130, 

21 137 (2d Cir. 2012). In Gashi, the group members witnessed 
4

1 war crimes and cooperated with a war crimes investigation, 

2 their names appeared on a public list of potential witnesses, 

3 and the number of cooperating witnesses was “finite, and . . 

4 . quite limited.” Id. In contrast, the Petitioners here 

5 interacted with the police only briefly: once when the police 

6 were called to the scene when Petitioner Cadmelema-Morocho

7 was attacked, and once when they attempted to file a police 

8 report. Although they attempted to file a police report, they

9 did not cooperate in an investigation of or testify against 

10 the criminal gang, nor did they publicly voice their 

11 opposition to the gang. On this record, petitioners have not 

12 established membership in a sufficiently particular, well13 defined and socially distinct group to qualify as a cognizable 

14 “particular social group.” See Paloka, 762 F.3d at 196 

15 (explaining that “[a]lthough a persecutor’s perception can be 

16 indicative of whether society views a group as distinct, a 

17 persecutor’s perception alone is not enough to establish a 

18 cognizable social group.”)

19 We also deny the petition as to the CAT claim.

20 Petitioners do not acknowledge in their brief to this Court

21 that the BIA concluded that they had waived the CAT claim, 
5

1 and do not argue that the BIA erred in doing so.1 See Norton 

1 Petitioners checked a box for CAT relief on their 

application. In her oral decision, the IJ stated she would 

not reach the CAT claim because she found petitioners not 

eligible for asylum “under the lower burden for asylum.” CAR

38. Petitioners’ brief on appeal to the BIA did not address 

the IJ’s decision not to reach the CAT claim; instead 

petitioners suggested that the IJ had reached and rejected 

the CAT claim on its merits, and challenged that purported 

decision. See CAR 12. On appeal, the BIA concluded that 

petitioners did not pursue protection under CAT before the IJ

and thus “it was appropriate for the Immigration Judge to not 

consider it.” CAR 4. Because petitioners’ brief to this 

Court does not raise these inconsistencies, we do not address 

them here.

However, petitioners may seek to file with the BIA a motion 

to reopen removal proceedings based on ineffective assistance 

of counsel before the IJ or the BIA with respect to their CAT 

claim. We express no opinion as to the merits of a claim, 

or whether this case would warrant equitable tolling. See 8 

U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (requiring motion to reopen be 

filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative 

decision); Rashid v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 127, 130 (2d Cir. 2008)

(“[I]neffective assistance of counsel can...afford an alien 

additional time beyond the limitations period for a motion to 

reopen and relieve a petitioner from the numerical bar.”). 

To qualify for equitable tolling—i.e., additional time beyond 

the ninety-day statutory limitation period to file a motion 

to reopen—an individual must first “show that [their] 

counsel’s performance was so ineffective that it impinged 

upon the fundamental fairness of the hearing in violation of 

the fifth amendment due process clause,” and second, they 

must “demonstrate that [they have] exercised due diligence in 

pursuing [their claim].” Rashid, 533 F.3d at 130-31 (cleaned 

up).

In addition, an individual pursuing a claim for ineffective 

assistance of counsel in relation to their representation in 
6

1 v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Issues not 

2 sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and 

3 normally will not be addressed on appeal.”).

4 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

5 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 

6 stays VACATED.

7 FOR THE COURT: 

8 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,

9 Clerk of Court

10

removal proceedings must comply with certain procedures laid 

out in Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988). 

Specifically, they must file the following with the BIA: “(1) 

an affidavit setting forth in detail the agreement with former 

counsel concerning what action would be taken and what counsel 

did or did not represent in this regard; (2) proof that the 

alien notified former counsel of the allegations of 

ineffective assistance and allowed counsel an opportunity to 

respond; and (3) if a violation of ethical or legal 

responsibilities is claimed, a statement as to whether the 

alien filed a complaint with any disciplinary authority 

regarding counsel’s conduct and, if a complaint was not filed, 

an explanation for not doing so.” Twum v. INS, 411 F.3d 54, 

59 (2d Cir. 2005).