2023 WI App 61

COURT OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN

PUBLISHED OPINION

Case No.: 2022AP2060-CR

Complete Title of Case: 

†Petition for Review filed

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

JOHN J. DRACHENBERG,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.†

Opinion Filed: October 12, 2023

Submitted on Briefs: May 11, 2023

Oral Argument: 

JUDGES: Blanchard, Graham, and Nashold, JJ.

Concurred:

Dissented:

Appellant

ATTORNEYS: On behalf of the defendant-appellant, the cause was submitted on the 

briefs of Christina C. Starner, Green Bay. 

Respondent

ATTORNEYS: On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the 

brief of John D. Flynn, assistant attorney general, and Joshua L. Kaul, 

attorney general. 
2023 WI App 61

COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

October 12, 2023

Samuel A. Christensen

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and 

RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2022AP2060-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2021CF264

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

JOHN J. DRACHENBERG,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Wood County: 

TODD P. WOLF, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Blanchard, Graham, and Nashold, JJ. 

¶1 BLANCHARD, J. This appeal involves the meaning of “execute[]” 

in the statute that sets a five-day deadline for police to execute a search warrant. See

WIS. STAT. § 968.15(1) (2020-21) (“A search warrant must be executed and 

returned not more than 5 days after the date of issuance.”); see also § 968.15(2) 
No. 2022AP2060-CR

2

(“Any search warrant not executed within the [five-day deadline] provided in 

[§ 968.15(1)] shall be void and shall be returned to the judge issuing it.”).1 John 

Drachenberg appeals the judgment of conviction that followed his guilty plea to one 

count of possession of child pornography. Drachenberg argues that the circuit court 

erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence based on what he contends was 

the failure of police to execute a search warrant within five days after a court issued 

the warrant to search his residence and seize digital devices there. 

¶2 Drachenberg does not dispute that the search and seizures occurred 

within five days after the warrant was issued. Nor does he argue that the execution 

exceeded the scope of the warrant. But, under his interpretation of WIS. STAT.

§ 968.15(1), police violated the statute when they took the third of the following 

three steps: (1) submitting an affidavit for a search warrant, which the circuit court 

issued on the same day; (2) three days later, searching the designated places and 

seizing several digital devices, copying digital content stored on the devices, and 

taking both original and copied materials off-site in order to conduct forensic 

analysis that was authorized in the warrant; and (3) not until almost two months 

after the warrant was issued, completing the off-site forensic analysis. 

¶3 We conclude that the circuit court properly denied the motion to 

suppress, because the deadline to execute a search warrant in WIS. STAT.

§ 968.15(1) applies to the search of the places, and seizure of the items, designated 

in a search warrant and does not apply to later, off-site analysis of those items that 

is also authorized in the warrant. In some cases, the later, off-site analysis of seized 

items can be challenged as unreasonably delayed under the Fourth Amendment. But 

 

1

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise 

noted.
No. 2022AP2060-CR

3

here Drachenberg does not rely on the Fourth Amendment. Instead he argues only 

that the circuit court misinterpreted “executed” in § 968.15(1). Accordingly, we 

affirm. 

BACKGROUND

¶4 Police submitted to the circuit court on January 29, 2021, an affidavit 

requesting a warrant authorizing a search of Drachenberg’s residence for designated 

items allegedly containing child pornography. See WIS. STAT. § 968.12(2) 

(“Warrant upon affidavit”). The detailed affidavit included the following 

allegations. An online platform provider passed information to law enforcement 

that included the internet protocol address of one platform user who allegedly 

streamed a video containing child pornography. Law enforcement determined that 

the user’s internet protocol address was associated with Drachenberg’s residence in 

Marshfield. The affidavit was based in part on the detective’s averred knowledge, 

training, and experience regarding the nature of how digital data is generally stored 

on various devices and more specifically how child pornography is transferred and 

possessed. The affidavit requested authority to search Drachenberg’s residence, as 

well as all of the associated buildings and vehicles owned or controlled by occupants 

of the residence. It further requested permission to “[s]eize and remove from the 

premises any computers, computer storage media and any other electronic 

device”—including, for example, cell phones and modems—and then, after the 

search had been completed, to forensically analyze the contents of the devices at 

off-site locations, i.e., places other than the place of the search.

¶5 The circuit court issued the search warrant on the same day it was 

requested. The warrant described in detail the types of items that police were 

authorized to search for, and to seize, on the designated premises. It also specifically 
No. 2022AP2060-CR

4

authorized the following: “the media ... and data contained” in the seized devices

“may be forensically analyzed at a law enforcement facility at a later date in order 

to examine the contents for contraband or other evidence.” Similarly, the warrant 

authorized police to (1) “Obtain exact forensic copies of the [digital] contents of ...

any seized device ... for the purpose of permitting and conducting a full or partial 

digital forensic analysis,” and (2) “Conduct a forensic examination/analysis of the 

devices or the contents of the devices, using accepted digital forensic examination 

tools and techniques.” Regarding both of these investigative steps, the warrant 

stated that “[t]he Court authorizes those items to be removed from the premises 

and analyzed at a later time for this purpose.” (Bolding in original.)

¶6 On February 1, 2021, police searched the places designated in the 

warrant and seized numerous digital devices, including a desktop computer 

belonging to Drachenberg. 

¶7 Also on February 1, police: observed some of the digital contents of 

devices that were seized; completed and filed with the circuit court a return and an 

inventory sheet listing the physical items seized during the search; and began 

“mirror imag[ing]” the hard drive of Drachenberg’s computer.2 

 

2

 “A forensic image, also known as a ‘mirror image,’ will ‘replicate bit for bit, sector for 

sector’ all allocated and unallocated space on a computer’s hard drive, including any embedded, 

residual, and deleted data. A mirror image copy represents a snapshot of the computer’s record.” 

Allied Debt Collection of Va., L.L.C. v. Nautica Entm’t, L.L.C., 2019-Ohio-4055, ¶27, 146 N.E.3d 

1222 (Ct. App.) (quoted source omitted); see also United States v. Ganias, 824 F.3d 199, 202 n.5 

(2d Cir. 2016). This process is referred to in the affidavit here as creating “an exact copy of the 

contents of the hard drive of the computer being examined,” which in turn police planned to 

examine “using specialized computer software.” 
No. 2022AP2060-CR

5

¶8 Drachenberg emphasizes, however, that the forensic analysis of the 

seized devices, which amounted to 14 terabytes (or 14 trillion bytes) of data, was 

not completed until March 29, 2021.3

¶9 The State filed a criminal complaint in April 2021, charging 

Drachenberg with seven counts of violating WIS. STAT. § 948.05(1)(b) (“Sexual 

exploitation of a child”) and three counts of violating WIS. STAT. § 948.12(1m) 

(“Possession of child pornography”).4 The charges were based on allegations that 

between May 1, 2020, and February 28, 2021, Drachenberg recorded and displayed, 

by streaming online, videos depicting children engaged in sexually explicit conduct, 

with knowledge of the character and content of the sexually explicit conduct 

involving the children. The complaint further alleged that police believed that 

approximately 272 image files and five video files found on his computer constitute 

child pornography. 

¶10 Drachenberg moved to suppress the images and videos. Pertinent to 

this appeal, he argued that officers did not fully execute the warrant within five days 

after it was issued as required by WIS. STAT. § 968.15(1), because the forensic 

 

3

 We note for context that it is not clear when, based on the undisputed testimony at a 

hearing on Drachenberg’s suppression motion, investigators completed the process of mirror 

imaging Drachenberg’s computer. Similarly, it is not clear from the record how much of the 

investigators’ examinations of Drachenberg’s computer were done through examination of data 

that had been mirror imaged from his computer’s hard drive, as opposed to through direct 

examination of his computer. In any case, as the issues are argued by the parties these details do 

not affect our analysis of the statutory requirements of WIS. STAT. § 968.15(1).

On a related note, the parties do not address the potential issue of whether images in the 

seized devices that police observed before the five-day period lapsed should be suppressed if 

Drachenberg’s interpretation of WIS. STAT. § 968.15(1) is correct, but we need not address that 

potential issue given our interpretation of the statute. 

4

 Drachenberg was also charged with two counts related to possession of controlled 

substances and related paraphernalia that were later dismissed and read in; those charges are not at 

issue in this appeal. 
No. 2022AP2060-CR

6

analysis of the digital devices authorized in the warrant was not completed until 

almost two months after the warrant was issued. Therefore, he argued, the warrant 

was “void” under § 968.15(2), and all evidence collected pursuant to the warrant

must be suppressed. The circuit court denied Drachenberg’s motion to suppress, 

based on its conclusion that the search warrant was “executed” within the meaning 

of the statute within five days. 

¶11 Following the circuit court’s denial of his suppression motion, 

Drachenberg pleaded no contest to one count of possession of child pornography in 

violation of WIS. STAT. § 948.12(1m). Drachenberg appeals, as he is permitted to 

do under these circumstances, following entry of the conviction based on his plea. 

See WIS. STAT. § 971.31(10). 

DISCUSSION

¶12 To repeat, WIS. STAT. § 968.15(1) states, “A search warrant must be 

executed and returned not more than 5 days after the date of issuance.”5 

Drachenberg argues that, under a plain-meaning interpretation of this sentence, 

police must complete within five days all tasks that the issuing judge has authorized 

in a search warrant, including the later, off-site forensic analysis of all seized items. 

Applied here, he contends, because the warrant includes the off-site forensic 

analysis in its description of what it authorizes police to do, all of that analysis had 

 

5

 As context to the “and returned” aspect of WIS. STAT. § 968.15(1), we note that WIS.

STAT. § 968.17(1) provides in part:

The return of the search warrant shall be made within 48 hours 

after execution to the clerk designated in the warrant. The return 

shall be accompanied by a written inventory of any property taken.

Neither side in this appeal argues that any interpretation of the word “return” in § 968.15(1) or any 

closely related statute could shed light on their dispute as to the meaning of the word “executed” in 

§ 968.15(1). 
No. 2022AP2060-CR

7

to be completed within five days. Because the analysis was not completed for nearly 

two months, the argument continues, the warrant was void and the circuit court 

should have suppressed all evidence produced through the analysis of his computer. 

¶13 The State argues in pertinent part that, when WIS. STAT. § 968.15(1) 

is interpreted in context with closely related statutes, what must be executed within 

five days is limited to the following: all searching conducted in the places 

designated in the warrant and all seizures of physical items designated in the warrant 

that occur during that searching. Under this view, the time limitation does not apply 

to later, off-site testing and analysis of validly seized items, even when that testing 

and analysis is separately authorized by the warrant. As we explain further below, 

we agree with the State.6

¶14 Before beginning our analysis by summarizing pertinent legal 

standards, we emphasize that in this appeal Drachenberg relies solely on the fiveday time limit in WIS. STAT. § 968.15(1). He does not allege a violation of his 

Fourth Amendment rights. Specifically, Drachenberg does not raise a constitutional 

argument that the manner or duration of the retention and analysis of the data found 

on his seized digital devices rendered the warrant’s execution unreasonable. See 

Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 258 (1979) (“[T]he manner in which a warrant 

is executed is subject to later judicial review as to its reasonableness.”); State v. 

Sveum, 2010 WI 92, ¶19, 328 Wis. 2d 369, 787 N.W.2d 317 (the Fourth 

Amendment “requires that warrants be reasonably executed”); see also United 

States v. Jarman, 847 F.3d 259, 266 (5th Cir. 2017) (rejecting argument that 23-

 

6

 Because we conclude that police did not violate WIS. STAT. § 968.15(1), we need not and 

do not address the State’s alternative argument that suppression is not merited because any violation 

of § 968.15(1) did not affect Drachenberg’s substantial rights. See WIS. STAT. § 968.22 (“No 

evidence seized under a search warrant shall be suppressed because of technical irregularities not 

affecting the substantial rights of the defendant.”). 
No. 2022AP2060-CR

8

month delay after seizure in reviewing seized data was unreasonable); State v. Gant, 

2015 WI App 83, ¶14, 365 Wis. 2d 510, 872 N.W.2d 137 (assuming without 

deciding that a 10-month delay in retaining seized computer rendered its seizure 

unlawful). Similarly, Drachenberg does not contend that delay in analyzing the data 

resulted in the dissipation of the probable cause that evidence of a crime would be 

found on his computer. See United States v. Brewer, 588 F.3d 1165, 1173 (8th Cir. 

2009) (limiting reasonability analysis under Fourth Amendment to whether delay in 

analyzing seized data “rendered the warrant[] stale”). 

¶15 Bearing in mind the narrow scope of Drachenberg’s challenge to the 

circuit court’s suppression ruling, we turn to standards of review. We review de

novo issues regarding the proper interpretations of statutes. State v. Peters, 2003 

WI 88, ¶13, 263 Wis. 2d 475, 665 N.W.2d 171. Statutory interpretation “begins 

with the language of the statute. If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily 

stop the inquiry.” State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, 

¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. “Context is important to meaning” in 

addition to “the structure of the statute in which the operative language appears.” 

Id., ¶46. “Therefore, statutory language is interpreted in the context in which it is 

used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of 

surrounding or closely-related statues; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or 

unreasonable results.” Id. 

¶16 No precedent in Wisconsin case law has interpreted the meaning of 

execution of a search warrant under WIS. STAT. § 968.15(1) and whether the statute 

imposes the five-day deadline on all tasks authorized in the warrant, including later, 

off-site analysis of items lawfully seized under the warrant. 
No. 2022AP2060-CR

9

¶17 As Drachenberg notes, “executed” is not explicitly defined in the 

Wisconsin Statutes, and in the absence of a specialized or technical meaning, we 

consider the ordinary, accepted meaning of the word. See Bruno v. Milwaukee 

County, 2003 WI 28, ¶¶8, 20, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656. “When 

interpreting a statute, a court may consult dictionary definitions to ascertain the 

meaning of a term.” State ex rel. Bryson v. Carr, 2022 WI App 34, ¶23, 404 Wis. 

2d 307, 978 N.W.2d 595. 

¶18 Drachenberg starts with a premise we agree with: the word “execute” 

generally conveys the concept of completion. That is, the ordinary, common 

understanding of execute requires the “completion” of some task or event. See

Execute, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“To perform or complete.”); 

Execute, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/execute (last visited Oct. 9, 2023) (“to carry ... out[;] put 

... completely into effect”). But from that premise, Drachenberg takes a leap that 

is too big regarding what it is that must be completed in this context. He contends 

that WIS. STAT. § 968.15(1) dictates that what must be completed is the entirety of 

the tasks authorized by a search warrant, and is not limited to tasks involving the 

search of designated places and the seizures of designated items in those places. 

This is not a proper interpretation of “executed” in § 968.15(1), because as we now 

explain, closely related statutes show that it refers to the search of the designated 

places and seizure of the designated items and not to the later, off-site analysis of 

the seized items.

¶19 “A search warrant is an order signed by a judge directing a law 

enforcement officer to conduct a search of a designated person, a designated object 

or a designated place for the purpose of seizing designated property or kinds of 

property.” WIS. STAT. § 968.12(1) (emphasis added). Based on this definition, a 
No. 2022AP2060-CR

10

search warrant is completely put into effect and its purpose is accomplished under 

WIS. STAT. § 968.15(1) when the designated places are searched and the designated 

items are seized. This undermines Drachenberg’s interpretation of “executed” in 

§ 968.15(1). 

¶20 In a similar vein, as the State notes, WIS. STAT. §§ 968.12(3)(f) and 

968.16 are instructive. These statutes are closely related to WIS. STAT. § 968.15 

because they are found in the same chapter and use similar terms, which include 

variations on the word “executed” in the context of search warrants. See State v. 

Reyes Fuerte, 2017 WI 104, ¶27, 378 Wis. 2d 504, 904 N.W.2d 773 (“Statutes are 

closely related when they are in the same chapter, reference one another, or use 

similar terms”; “[b]eing within the same statutory scheme may also make two 

statutes closely related.”). 

¶21 Under WIS. STAT. § 968.12(3)(f), as part of the procedure for applying 

for a warrant based on oral testimony, “[t]he person who executes the warrant shall 

enter the exact time of execution on the face of [a] duplicate original warrant.” 

(Emphasis added.) This timing reference provides support for the view that, for 

purposes of WIS. STAT. ch. 968’s procedural search warrant provisions, execution 

contemplates a more limited period of time than will sometimes be needed for the 

post-seizure analysis of seized items—particularly in the age of high-powered 

microscopes and both molecular (e.g., DNA) and digital evidence.

¶22 The concept of executing a warrant is referenced again in WIS. STAT.

§ 968.16, which states: “The person executing the search warrant may reasonably

detain and search any person on the premises at the time to protect himself or herself 

from attack or to prevent the disposal or concealment of any item particularly 

described in the search warrant.” (Emphasis added.) “The time” at issue here has 
No. 2022AP2060-CR

11

only one reasonable interpretation: during the searches of places and seizures of 

items authorized by the warrant. Similarly, “the premises” clearly references the 

place designated to be searched and not, for example, places where the seized items 

may be analyzed. Otherwise, if the execution of the warrant were interpreted to 

include subsequent analysis of seized items that have been removed from the scene 

of the search, it would suggest, illogically, that police have the authority to detain 

persons after the police have already left the designated places (in the words of 

§ 968.16, “the premises”) after completing the search.7

¶23 In response to the State’s arguments based on closely-related statutes, 

Drachenberg does not contest that WIS. STAT. §§ 968.12 and 968.16 are closely 

related to WIS. STAT. § 968.15(1), nor does he develop an argument addressing any 

closely related statute.8 Instead, Drachenberg directs us to two Wisconsin court 

 

7

 The State also cites to WIS. STAT. § 968.14 as a closely related statute supporting its 

interpretation as to when a warrant must be executed under WIS. STAT. § 968.15. But we now 

explain why § 968.14 is less clear in referring to the timing aspects of a warrant’s execution. Under 

§ 968.14: “All necessary force may be used to execute a search warrant or to effect any entry into 

any building or property or part thereof to execute a search warrant.” Some potential applications 

of this provision suggest that the execution contemplated in WIS. STAT. ch. 968 involves a 

timeframe consistent with the State’s interpretation, which could include the entry of places 

designated in the warrant to search for, and seize, designated items. This plainly contemplates at 

least in part the use of physical force to breach fences, doors, and the like. But it is not clear that, 

at least when considered in isolation, § 968.14’s reference to use of force might not also 

contemplate, for example, breaking into a locked container after it has been seized and removed 

from the place designated to be searched in the warrant. Because of the potential ambiguity in the 

timing of when the force authorized by § 968.14 takes place, we do not delve further into this topic 

and conclude that this statute does not affect our analysis.

8

 Drachenberg may mean to suggest that closely-related statutes are “extrinsic sources,” 

and that we may not consult them because “executed” is unambiguous in this context. To the 

contrary, as noted in the text above, closely related statutes may be proper sources of authority in 

determining the meaning of WIS. STAT. § 968.15(1) under a plain language interpretation, which 

includes the determination of whether a term is ambiguous or not. See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit

Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (“statutory language is 

interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to 

the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or 

unreasonable results” (emphasis added)).
No. 2022AP2060-CR

12

opinions that he argues “belie[] the argument that execution of a warrant is the 

moment of initial entry for all purposes.” But as we now explain, a review of these 

opinions reveals that Drachenberg merely knocks down a straw-figure argument. 

More specifically, Drachenberg correctly but to no avail establishes that “executed” 

in this context involves activity extending beyond the moment when police enter a 

designated place to conduct searches for designated items. 

¶24 In State v. Herrmann, 2000 WI App 38, 233 Wis. 2d 135, 608 

N.W.2d 406, officers conducted a search of an apartment unit pursuant to a warrant. 

Id., ¶3. In doing so, they unlocked and walked through a door into what they 

believed was another door within the same apartment (but which was in fact a door 

into a neighboring unit), finding what they believed to be a marijuana grow 

operation. Id., ¶¶4-5. We concluded that it was reasonable for officers, as part of 

“the continued execution of [a valid] warrant” for the first apartment, to extend their 

search into the neighboring unit that “they mistakenly, but reasonably, believed was 

another room” of the first apartment. See id., ¶17. We agree with Drachenberg that 

this aspect of Herrmann suggests that the execution of a search warrant includes 

the full duration of the search of the designated places pursuant to the warrant, not 

only the initial entry to the premises. But this is entirely consistent with our 

interpretation of WIS. STAT. § 968.15(1) in light of WIS. STAT. § 968.12 and other 

closely related statutes. 

¶25 In Sveum, 328 Wis. 2d 369, our supreme court addressed police use 

of a Global Positioning System tracker attached to the defendant’s car for 35 days, 

pursuant to a search warrant authorizing the tracking. See id., ¶¶5-10, 12. 

Drachenberg notes that the court referred to the 35-day period of location-data 

gathering as being part of the “execution” of the search warrant authorizing the use 

of the GPS unit. See id., ¶59 (referring to the installation, monitoring for 35 days, 
No. 2022AP2060-CR

13

and removal of GPS unit from defendant’s car as “[e]xecution ... within the confines 

of the authority granted” by the search warrant). Further, the court stated that under 

these facts the warrant was not executed and returned within the five-day deadline 

in WIS. STAT. § 968.15. Sveum, 328 Wis. 2d 369, ¶71 (concluding that defendant’s 

substantial rights were not violated “by the officers’ failure to execute and return 

the warrant within 5 days after the date of issuance”).9 But this again demonstrates 

that the continued search and seizure of items pursuant to a warrant is part of the 

execution of the warrant, without addressing the later, off-site analysis at issue here. 

Officers here, unlike in Sveum, finished their search for and seizure of the items 

designated in the warrant within the five-day time limit, and there was nothing 

resembling continuous data gathering, through a police-operated device attached to 

the defendant’s car, for 35 days.

¶26 We now address a core point made by Drachenberg and why it is 

unavailing. It involves the fact that warrants and supporting affidavits may describe 

investigative activity that may occur after the initial searches and seizures that the 

warrant authorizes; indeed, here the warrant and affidavit did this. In such cases, 

the affidavit anticipates, and the warrant authorizes, that police will undertake tasks 

that can include review and analysis of seized items—tasks that in themselves could 

require prior judicial permission if no Fourth Amendment exception applies. Thus 

 

9

 Since State v. Sveum, 2010 WI 92, 328 Wis. 2d 369, 787 N.W.2d 317, our supreme court 

has clarified that warrants authorizing the use of GPS tracking are not subject to the warrant-related 

statutes in WIS. STAT. ch. 968. State v. Pinder, 2018 WI 106, ¶¶39-42, 384 Wis. 2d 416, 919 

N.W.2d 568 (explaining in part that Sveum “supports the conclusion that courts have the authority 

to issue GPS warrants even though a technical irregularity is present under” WIS. STAT. § 968.15 

rather than setting precedent that ch. 968 applied to GPS warrants). Nonetheless, for current 

purposes we cannot ignore that the Sveum court apparently considered the continuous gathering of 

data, using a device attached to the defendant’s car and pursuant to the warrant at issue in that case, 

to be part of the execution of the warrant for purposes of § 968.15(1). See Zarder v. Humana Ins. 

Co., 2010 WI 35, ¶¶54, 58, 324 Wis. 2d 325, 782 N.W.2d 682 (court of appeals cannot disregard 

statement from case law of our supreme court on the grounds that it is dicta). Rather, as we explain 

in the text, this aspect of Sveum is distinguishable from the facts here. 
No. 2022AP2060-CR

14

here, as Drachenberg emphasizes and as we have summarized above, the warrant 

describes in detail additional authorized investigative steps planned to occur after 

the search for, and seizure of, physical items from Drachenberg’s residence, 

outbuildings, and vehicles: “Conduct a Forensic examination/analysis of the 

devices or the contents of the devices, using accepted digital forensic examination 

tools and techniques” and “obtain exact forensic copies of the contents of the hard 

drive(s) or internal storage media or operating system of any seized device and the 

contents of any seized external storage media ....” The warrant further authorized 

that the seized items “be removed from the premises and analyzed at a later time for 

th[ese] purpose[s].” (Emphasis omitted.) “[A]t a later time” specifically signals 

that all this is anticipated to occur after the warrant has been executed. 

¶27 Drachenberg’s reliance on this aspect of the affidavit and the warrant 

fails on several levels. First, as he acknowledges, the contents of the warrant here 

do not, at least in any direct sense, inform our plain-language interpretation of when 

a warrant is “executed” under WIS. STAT. § 968.15(1), which as we have explained 

does not favor Drachenberg’s interpretation. Further, even if the contents of the 

warrant here could inform our understanding of § 968.15(1), we conclude that they 

are consistent with our interpretation.

¶28 The details in the affidavit and warrant here regarding later, off-site 

analysis reflects the reality that warrants are subject to requirements beyond the 

specific statutory boundaries created by WIS. STAT. §§ 968.12(1) and 968.15(1). 

There are additional requirements that affidavits and warrants must address in order 

to permit law enforcement to obtain viable search warrants from judges. For 

example, the affidavit and proposed warrant must provide the judge with a sufficient 

basis for a finding of probable cause needed to seize data-storing devices and then 

to search through their contents. This requires references to anticipated next steps 
No. 2022AP2060-CR

15

in the investigation as a whole that could ultimately lead to the existence of 

admissible evidence of a suspected crime. See § 968.12(1) (judge to “issue a search 

warrant if probable cause is shown”); see also State v. Pinder, 2018 WI 106, ¶¶48-

51, 384 Wis. 2d 416, 919 N.W.2d 568 (listing constitutional requirements for 

contents of a warrant, including setting forth facts showing a “‘fair probability that 

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place’” (quoted 

source omitted)); State v. Burch, 2021 WI 68, ¶¶37, 84, 92, 398 Wis. 2d 1, 961 

N.W.2d 314 (four justices, through two concurrences, stating that law enforcement 

must generally obtain a warrant to search cell phone data (citing Riley v. California, 

573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014))), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 811 (2022). Thus here, the 

detailed description of anticipated later, off-site analysis of the items to be seized 

assisted the reviewing judge in determining that police had a fair probability of 

uncovering evidence of crime through a process that would begin with the search of 

the designated places and the seizure of digital devices. This provided an 

explanation for the reviewing judge as to how the contents of the seized items could 

become potential evidence of a crime, which in turn allowed the judge to tailor the 

warrant to direct police to maintain a reasonable scope in their searches and to 

minimize unnecessary intrusions into private areas. See Sveum, 328 Wis. 2d 369, 

¶¶27-28 (warrants are constitutionally required to identify the place to be searched 

and items to be seized with particularity, which in part serves the purpose of 

preventing a “general search[],” i.e., reducing unjustified government intrusion).

¶29 Moreover, the details in the affidavit and warrant also reflect the 

practical reality that, while police must conduct the searches of places and seizures 

of items that a warrant authorizes within five days, they may seek further authority 

in the warrant to conduct off-site forensic analysis, which need not occur within the 

five days. The affidavit and warrant do not describe the forensic analysis as a 
No. 2022AP2060-CR

16

continuing execution of the search warrant. Instead, according to the affidavit, the 

forensic analysis is additional government conduct needed to determine the nature 

of the seized items as part of the overall investigation of which the initial search and 

seizure are only two elements. Consistent with our interpretation, the affidavit here 

transparently alerted the reviewing judge that the anticipated forensic analysis 

would be “complicated and time-consuming” and therefore would need to be 

conducted off-site, after execution of the warrant was complete. Indeed, it is 

difficult to understand how the legislature could have intended to require all of the 

sometimes complicated and time-consuming tasks involved in carefully analyzing 

seized evidence be completed within five days in all cases, regardless of the 

circumstances. See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (statutes are to be interpreted to 

avoid unreasonable or absurd results). In contrast, it is easy to understand a 

legislative intent in requiring searches of designated places and seizures of 

designated items to occur within five days.

¶30 Explaining further, in treating the affidavit and warrant as descriptions 

of all tasks that police must complete within five days, Drachenberg loses sight of 

the fact that the search for, and seizure of, physical items pursuant to a warrant is 

always only one part of a criminal investigation. Subject to whatever constitutional 

limits may apply, police are entitled to attempt to bolster the case for probable cause 

by obtaining authorization to analyze any seized item in a way that could be 

reasonably expected to reveal evidence of a crime. Police are also entitled to 

provide the issuing judge with context about how the seized items would be used to 

detect or prove a criminal offense. Under Drachenberg’s interpretation, police could 

not seek an order authorizing planned next steps for seized items in the course of an 

overall investigation without creating a five-day window within which all analysis 

or examination of any seized item would have to be complete. If the legislature 
No. 2022AP2060-CR

17

intended that seemingly surprising result it would have used different language. See 

id.

¶31 At least at times, Drachenberg suggests that under WIS. STAT.

§ 968.15(1) police needed to obtain a second search warrant, supplying further 

probable cause justification, in order to conduct the later, off-site investigative 

steps—and perhaps a new warrant every five days thereafter, until all forensic 

analysis were completed. (Although we understand him to make this suggestion, it 

is a weakness of Drachenberg’s briefing that we cannot discern what specifically 

would be required of police under his interpretation.) In any case, such an argument 

would fail because it depends on Drachenberg’s interpretation of the statute that, for 

the reasons stated above, we do not adopt.10 That is, because the analysis of the 

seized items authorized in the warrant was not subject to the five-day limit, police 

did not need to obtain additional warrants.

¶32 Further, we note that our interpretation of “executed” in WIS. STAT.

§ 968.15(1) comports with the evident purposes of § 968.15 to avoid unreasonable 

delay in executing validly issued warrants. See State v. Edwards, 98 Wis. 2d 367, 

375, 297 N.W.2d 12 (1980) (five-day time limit in § 968.15 “represents a legislative 

 

10

 On the topic of when multiple warrants are needed, the parties dispute the significance 

of two court opinions which state that an additional warrant is not needed to authorize the analysis 

of at least certain kinds of items seized pursuant to a valid warrant. See State v. Petrone, 161 

Wis. 2d 530, 544-45, 468 N.W.2d 676 (1991) (investigators “were justified in developing” film 

because it was “lawfully seized pursuant to [a] warrant”), overruled in part on other grounds by 

State v. Greve, 2004 WI 69, 272 Wis. 2d 444, 681 N.W.2d 479; State v. VanLaarhoven, 2001 WI 

App 275, ¶16, 248 Wis. 2d 881, 637 N.W.2d 411 (“the examination of evidence seized pursuant to 

the warrant requirement or an exception to the warrant requirement is an essential part of the seizure 

and does not require a judicially authorized warrant”). Drachenberg argues that these cases do not 

address his specific contention that police would need to obtain additional warrants to avoid 

violating the time limit in WIS. STAT. § 968.15(1). But as noted in the text, this dispute would 

come into play only if we had instead interpreted § 968.15(1) consistent with Drachenberg’s 

position, or potentially if he were raising a Fourth Amendment challenge and not a statutory 

challenge. Accordingly, we need not address these opinions further. 
No. 2022AP2060-CR

18

recognition that execution of a search warrant within the five-day period satisfies 

any requirement” for timely execution, in addition to constitutional requirements of 

searches based on fresh probable cause). One purpose of the statute is to protect 

against police obtaining a warrant but then excessively delaying in executing it. See

Judicial Council’s Note, WIS. STAT. § 968.15, 1969 Wis. Laws ch. 255. This 

purpose is not undermined by interpreting the execution of a warrant to be the 

carrying out of a search in designated places and the seizure of designated items—

officers have the same incentive to do those things within five days after the warrant 

is issued.

¶33 The State points out that another related and obvious purpose of the 

five-day time limit is to encourage searches and seizures authorized by warrants 

before the probable cause alleged in the affidavit dissipates or becomes stale. See 

People v. Schroeder, 158 Cal. Rptr. 220, 222 (Ct. App. 1979) (the purpose of 

California statute requiring a search warrant be executed and returned within 10 

days after issuance is “to insure that the showing of probable cause which supported 

issuance of a warrant will still exist at the time the warrant is executed.”);11 see also

Judicial Council’s Note, WIS. STAT. § 968.15, 1969 Wis. Laws ch. 255 (search 

warrants are ineffective in addressing criminal activity “if they are not promptly 

served”). This purpose is served by our interpretation of WIS. STAT. § 968.15(1): 

the statute gives police an incentive to search for and preserve evidence through the 

seizure of the designated items within the five days. This is particularly so for cases 

involving the seizure of devices with stored electronic data, because concerns over 

 

11

 We find helpful discussion in case law from other jurisdictions that have addressed the 

same issue or a closely related issue, based on statutory language that matches the Wisconsin 

statute. See State v. Harvey, 2006 WI App 26, ¶20 & n.7, 289 Wis. 2d 222, 710 N.W.2d 482 

(observing that “[w]e may look to other jurisdictions for persuasive authority where there are no 

Wisconsin cases directly on point” and noting cases from other states that have considered the same 

issue regarding the meaning of a term used in a criminal statute).
No. 2022AP2060-CR

19

staleness are greatly diminished once the data has been preserved either through the 

seizure of physical devices or by taking the additional step of mirror-imaging 

them—at least in most cases, the data on the seized device will not change over time 

after seizure of the device. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A

TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AM. § 4.7(a) (6th ed.); State v. Monger, 472 P.3d 270, 

276 (Ct. App. Or. 2020) (“it would be anomalous to conclude that a seizure of an 

electronic device within five days was permissible [under OR. REV. STAT.

§ 133.565(3)] but that the subsequent search or analysis of the same electronic 

device that had been stored in an evidence room after weeks had elapsed somehow 

effected staleness concerns”).

¶34 Drachenberg also directs us to federal case law, including one opinion 

cited in an unpublished decision of this court, for the purported proposition that a 

search warrant, in at least some contexts, is not “executed” until the completion of 

off-site analysis of seized items. Regarding one of these federal cases, we explained 

the following, with emphasis now added:

In United States v. Jarman, 847 F.3d 259, 263, 266 

(5th Cir. 2017), a child pornography case involving seizure 

of hard drives and a computer, the defendant argued that the 

court erred in refusing to grant suppression for violating the 

Fourth Amendment by taking twenty-three months to 

complete a search of the data it seized. According to the 

United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, courts 

addressing this issue have “consistently ‘permitted some 

delay in the execution of search warrants involving 

computers because of the complexity of the search’ and they 

often restrict their ‘analysis of the delay in executing ... 

warrants [to] consider[ing] only whether the delay rendered 

the warrants stale.’” Id. at 266 (alterations in original) 

(citing United States v. Brewer, 588 F.3d 1165, 1173 (8th 

Cir. 2009); United States v. Syphers, 426 F.3d 461, 469 (1st 

Cir. 2005)). Although the court noted that Jarman had not 

argued that the delay caused the warrant to become stale, it 

found that “‘[n]umerous cases hold that a delay of several 

months’ or even years ‘between the seizure of electronic 

evidence and the completion of the government’s review of 
No. 2022AP2060-CR

20

[it] ... is reasonable’ and does not render the warrant stale, 

especially in child-pornography cases.” Jarman, 847 F.3d 

at 267 & n.3 .... 

State v. Plencner, No. 2019AP517-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶19 (WI App Oct. 28, 

2020) (emphasis added; alterations in Plencner; footnote omitted). Drachenberg 

apparently argues that this passage suggests that this court, following federal courts, 

has concluded that, under WIS. STAT. § 968.15(1) (and consistent with the 14-day 

warrant execution deadline in FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(A)(i)), whenever police 

hold and later analyze seized digital data, this is part of the execution of a search 

warrant.

¶35 Drachenberg’s reliance on Plencner and Jarman fails for several 

reasons. First, these cases and their expansive references to the execution of 

warrants come in the context of constitutional challenges to police retention of 

seized digital devices, with defendants arguing that their Fourth Amendment rights 

were violated. See Plencner, No. 2019AP517-CR, ¶12 (defendant argued that trial 

counsel was constitutionally deficient for failing to move to suppress evidence based 

on contention that “the duration of the seizure of his computer was unreasonable 

under the Fourth Amendment”); Jarman, 847 F.3d at 266. As we have emphasized, 

Drachenberg expressly disclaims any argument based on the Fourth Amendment. 

Viewed in this way, we do not see how references in this potentially persuasive 

authority to the execution of a search warrant sheds light on the meaning of 

“executed” in WIS. STAT. § 968.15(1). Further, contrary to Drachenberg’s 

interpretation of the federal case law, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 

explicitly clarify that, in the context of seizures of electronically stored information, 

“[t]he time for executing a warrant” refers to the seizure or on-site copying of the 
No. 2022AP2060-CR

21

information, and not to “any later off-site copying or review.” See FED. R. CRIM. P.

41(e)(2)(B).12 

¶36 Further, we agree with the State that the most relevant persuasive 

authority is consistent with, and its reasoning supports, our interpretation of WIS.

STAT. § 968.15(1). Courts that have addressed this issue in other states with 

identical or nearly identical statutes have reached the same conclusion, with the 

result that statutory time limits analogous to § 968.15(1) are not violated by 

subsequent searches of data in validly seized devices. See, e.g., State v. Sanchez, 

2020-NMSC-017, ¶¶13-14, 476 P.3d 889 (“a search warrant for information stored 

on an electronic device is executed for the purposes of [N.M. STATS. ANN.] Rule 5-

211(C) when that device is seized or when the data stored on that device is copied 

on site”); State v. Nadeau, 2010 ME 71, ¶¶47-48, 1 A.3d 445 (“The execution of a 

search warrant is the act of lawfully searching for and taking possession of property

as authorized by the warrant,” and therefore no violation of ME. R. CRIM. P.

Rule 41(d) when analyzed computer after 10-day limit); State v. Johnson, 831 

N.W.2d 917, 925 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013) (10-day deadline to execute warrant under 

MINN. STAT. § 626.15(a) did not apply to search and analysis of hard drive data 

because this was not a search under “the Fourth Amendment where the hard drive 

 

12

 The pertinent language in FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(B) had been adopted by the time 

both of the federal cases that Drachenberg cites were decided. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory 

committee’s note to 2006 amendment. See United States v. Jarman, 847 F.3d 259, 263 (5th Cir. 

2017); United States v. Metter, 860 F. Supp. 2d 205 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).

The same problems that we note in the text arise with Drachenberg’s reliance on another 

federal case cited by Drachenberg, Metter, in which a federal district court also uses the word 

“execute” in a more comprehensive manner. But as in Jarman, the court in Metter addresses the 

issue of whether a delay in analyzing already seized data was constitutionally reasonable. See 

Metter, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 215 (the following was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment: 

15 months after the government executed its search warrant, the government had not conducted its 

review of the evidence seized to determine whether any evidence fell outside the scope of the search 

warrant).
No. 2022AP2060-CR

22

had been validly seized pursuant to a search warrant issued on probable cause”). 

While it is of course not dispositive to an interpretation of the Wisconsin statute, it 

is notable that Drachenberg does not cite a case from any jurisdiction in which a 

statutory time limit for the execution of a search warrant was deemed to have been 

exceeded due to the post-seizure analysis of seized items. 

¶37 Drachenberg argues that our interpretation “leav[es] a gaping hole in 

the statutory law,” allowing police to hold a seized computer for “weeks, months, 

or years without even beginning the search of the computer.” This argument is 

unsupported by legal authority. Further, it fails to take into account either the 

statutory mechanisms for the return of seized items under WIS. STAT. § 968.20 or 

the constitutional protections against unreasonable delays of the kind to which 

Drachenberg alludes but does not contend occurred here. See United States v. 

Metter, 860 F. Supp. 2d 205, 215 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that the government 

violated the Fourth Amendment when it seized and copied data, then retained it 

“with no plans whatsoever to begin review of” data for 15 months (emphasis in 

original)).

¶38 In sum, for purposes of applying WIS. STAT. § 968.15(1), police here 

“executed” the search warrant within five days after it was issued by finishing their 

search of the designated places for the designated digital devices and seizing them. 

The later, off-site analysis of these devices pursuant to the investigative path 

authorized by the warrant was not part of the warrant’s execution.

CONCLUSION

¶39 For all of these reasons, we affirm the challenged judgment of the 

circuit court.
No. 2022AP2060-CR

23

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.