## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

People v . Lam pley , 2011 IL App (1st) 090661- B

Appellate Court Caption THE PEOPL E OF THE STATE OF I L L I NOI S, Plaintiff-Appe l lee, v. BRUCE LAMPL EY, De fenda nt-Appellant.

District & N o. First District, Third Division Docke t No. 1-09-0661

Filed Dec ember 14, 2011

Held (Note : Thi s syl lab us

con s t it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed b y the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) Def endant’ s sentenc e to 14 y ear s’ imprisonment as a Class X offe nder for burg lary was upheld over his contentions th at t h e t rial court interfe red with his rig ht to testify by defe rringits ruling on his motion in limine to bar evidenc e of his prior convictions, failed to pro p er l y question
prospec tive jurors about the Zehr pri n ci p les, imposed an excessive
sentenc e, and imposed a three -year term of mandatory supervised rele ase rathe r than a two-year term, since any err or in delay ing a ruling on defe ndant’s motion was harmless beyond a rea sonable doubt, the failure
to comply with Supreme Court Rule 431(b) was no t re versible err or, defe ndant’s sente nce w as not an a buse of discr etion, and the MSR term for Class X off

enses attached to the se ntence imposed on defe ndant.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from t h e C i rcuit Court of Cook County
, No. 07-CR-24455; the Hon. Michae l Brown, J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Affir med.Counsel on

Appea l Michae l J

. Pell et i er , Patricia Unsinn, and J essica Wy nne Arizo, all of State Appellate D efe nder’ s Offic e, of Chica g o, for a ppellant.

Anita M. Alvare z, State’s Attorney
, of Chicag o (Alan J

. Spellberg
, Carol L

. Gaines, and Molly E. Donnelly
, Assistant State’s At torney s, of counsel), f

or the People.

Panel J USTI CE MURPHY delivered the judgme nt of the court, with opinion.
J ustices Quinn and Steele concur red in the judg ment and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Following a jury trial, defe ndant, Br uce L ampley
, was found guilty of bu rg la ry (720 I L CS 5/19-1 (West 2006)). Ba sed on his crimi n al h i s t ory , and pursuant to the Unified Code of Correc tions (730 I L CS 5/5- 5 -3 (c )(8) (West 2006)), defe ndant was sentenc ed as a Class X offe nder to 14 year s’ imprisonment. On appea l, defe ndant contends that: (1) the trial cour t interfe red with his rig ht to testify when it de fer red ruling on his motion in limine to ba r the introduction of his prior convictions; (2) the trial court failed to proper ly question potential jurors as to whether they understood and acc epted the principles outlined in People v. Zehr
, 103 I ll. 2d 472 (1984), and Supreme Court Ru l e 4 3 1 (b ) (I ll. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (ef f. May 1, 1997)); (3) the trial court imposed an excessive sentenc e; and (4 ) t he trial court err ed in imposing a three -year term of mandatory supervised rele ase (MSR) instead of a t wo -year term as r equire d for Class 2 fe lonies. ¶ 2 Our supreme court enter ed a supervisory order direc ting this court to vac at e our prior holding and rec onsider the judgme nt in light of People v. Mullins
, 242 I ll. 2d 1 (2011). That judgme nt was vacated. For the following rea sons, we aff irm defe ndant’s convictions and
sentenc e.

¶ 3 I . BA CKGROUND ¶ 4 Def

endant was arr ested on November 12, 2007, for burg lary and possession of burg lary tools. Def endant elec ted to proce ed to a jury trial on the char g es. The State moved to nol-pros the possession of burg lary tools charg e and proce eded to trial on the one count of burg lary

. During j ury selec tion, when the venire was brought into the courtroom, the trial court admonished t he entire panel on sever al concepts and pr i n ci p l es o f l aw. In particula r, prior
to swear ing in a

nd questioning the venire , the trial cour t advised:
“In other words, the expression ‘whe re there ’s smoke, there ’s fire’ has no place in a court of la

w. In fac t, under our law a defe ndant is presumed to be innocent of the charg es ag ainst

-2-him in the indictment. This presumpti o n o f innocenc e remains with the defendant throughout every stag e of the trial and during your deliberations on a verdic t. It must be kept in your mind at all times during the prese ntation of evidenc e. This presumption of innocenc e is not overc ome unless from all of the evidenc e in the

case you are convince d beyond a re asonable doubt that the defe ndant is guilty

. The defe ndant is not require d to prove his innocenc e, nor is he require d to testify or prese nt any

evidenc e whatsoever on his be half. The State ha s the burden of provingthe guilt of t he defenda nt beyond a reasonable doubt, and this burden rema ins on the State throug hout ever y stag e of the trial and during
your deliber ations on a ver dict.” ¶ 5 Following a lunch brea k, the jury panel was sworn and questioning of the venire beg an. The trial cour t i m m ed i ately proce eded by asking “four questions of all of you at the same time.” The court reque sted that the prospec tive jurors stand i f t h ei r answers to any of the questions wer e in the aff

irmative. The trial court asked the venire if they knew any of t he parties or attorney s involved and whether they wer e curr ently in v o lv ed in any litigation. After excusing two prospec tive jurors involved in litigation, the trial court continued to query the venire as follows:
“F olks, the third question is t h i s : As I have previously stated, the defe ndant is presumed innocent and does not have to offe r any evidenc e on his own behalf but must be prove n guilty

beyond a re asonable doubt by the State.
Does a nyone her e have any

problems with those conc epts? I f so, please stand up?
* * * Folks, the fourth and final question for you is this: As I have also previously stated, the def endant doe s not have to testify on his own behalf.
I f the defe ndant decide s not t o testify
, you must not hold that decision ag ainst the defe ndant.
I f the defe ndant dec ides not to testify
, is there anyone here who believes that,
reg ardle ss of what I have just said, you would hold that decision ag ainst the defe ndant? I f so, please stand up.
L et the re cord r efle ct that no one ha s stood up.” ¶ 6 The jury was selec ted and sent home to return the next day for trial. Be fore the jury was called, the trial court considere d defe ndant’s motion in limine to ba r the use of evidenc e of defe ndant’s five prior convictions for burg lary to impeach hi s credibilit y

. The trial court stated that it would enter and continue the motion until the close of the State’s case , beca use at that point a prior r

uling would be “advisory” and w as not war rante d. ¶ 7 The State prese nted the t es t i m o n y o f S h ar o n Ha ndelsman. Hande lsman, a re sident phy sician, t es t i fi ed that on the morning of November 12, 2007, she parke d her 1996 Geo Prism in the Rush Presby

terian Hospital parking g ara g e. After parking
, she place d her purse in the trunk of her car and closed and locked the trunk and doors of her car befor e g oing into the hospital to work her shift. Hande lsman t estified that she returne d to her vehicle at

-3-approximately 4:30 p.m. and could not open the trunk of her car with her ke y . She enter ed her car , opened the trunk with the latch rele ase inside her car , and re trieved he r purse from the trunk. She then discovere d that her cell phone and wallet (conta ining her driver’ s license, cash a nd cre dit cards) wer e missing. ¶ 8 Hande lsman testified that she drove toward the exitand asked the parking a ttendant to notify the secur ity office that those items wer e missing from her purse. S h e s p o k e wi th a

secur ity offi ce r an d parke d her vehicle at the side of the parking g ara g e. Hande lsman was

escor ted to the secur ity office
, wher e the office rs showed her the items that wer e stolen. She then left the g ara g e, lea

ving he r ca

r there for se curity

to investigate. ¶ 9 Dennis Gar den, a securi t y gu ar d at the parking g ara g e testified that at 4:35 p.m. on November 12, 2007, he saw a man he identified as defe ndant car rying a backpa ck and exit ing the parking g ara g e. Def

endant walked west on West Har rison Street and continued to w alk when Gar den called for him to stop. Gar den called t h e d i s p atcher to repor t defe ndant’s
appea ranc e and loc ation. ¶ 10 Edwar d Altman, another secur ity office r at t h e p ar k i n g gar age , testified that he saw d efe ndant, who matched the descr iption g iven by Gar den, crossing West Har rison St re et

. Altman stopped defe ndant at the northwest corne r of the intersec tion of West Har rison Street and South Wood Street. Altman testified that when he asked to look in defe ndant’s backpa ck, defe ndant allowed him to do so. Altman found women’s jewelr y and a half-ope n wallet that display ed a white woman’s driver’ s license. Altman testified that ot her office rs arri ved on the scene and he then place d defe ndant in custody and handcuf fed him. Altman patted down defe ndant and discovere d a razor knife in his pocket. At the secur ity office
, the office rs also discovere d a came ra, a CD play er, cellular phone, scre wdriver
, and CDs in defe ndant’s bag

. ¶ 11 Altman te s ti f

ie d th a t th e d riv er’ s license in the bag belong ed to Hande lsman. Hande lsman

arr ived l at er at the s ecur ity office and identified the wallet and cellular phone as hers. She stated that the items had been taken that day from the trunk of her car

. Altman testified that the sec urity

office rs contac ted Chicag o police. ¶ 12 The S tate also prese n t ed evidence concer ning a finger

print lift taken from the t runk of Hande lsman’s car on November 12, 2007. The latent fing erp rint was compar ed with a known fing erpr int standard of defe ndant. The ridg e details of the two fing erprints wer e found to be

a match. Additionally
, a videotape taken from the parking g ara g e video surveillance sy stem

was offe red into evidenc e. The video depicted an Afric an-America n man wea

ring a baseba ll
cap and backpa ck walk toward Hande lsman’s car , open the trunk, enter the trunk, stand up wi t h his backpa ck and walk awa y from the vehicle. L ater , the videotape showed a wh i t e fema le approa ch the vehicle, have difficulty opening the trunk, and then pop the trunk from inside the vehicle. Due to the g rainy quality of the imag e, no positive identification could be made with the video. ¶ 13 The State re sted and de fenda nt moved for a direc ted verdict. The trial court denied the

m otion and considere d defe ndant’s motion in limine to bar the introduction of p ri o r convictions. The State indicated that, if defe ndant took the stand, it would seek to introduce evidenc e of defe ndant’s 2001 conviction for burg lary in order for the jury to proper ly weigh defe ndant’s cre dibilit y

. T h e trial court reje cted defe ndant’s argument that evidenc e of the

-4-conviction was too prejudicia l and denied the motion. The court rec og nized the prejudicia l

impact as the prior conviction was for the same kind of c rime, but since it occ urre d within 10 y ear s and had probative value as a crime of dishonesty
, the use of proper jury instructions could minimiz e that pre

judice. ¶ 14 Def

endant chose to testify

. Def endant testified that he was homeless and on November 1 1
, 2007, he had slept at the Rush Presby terian Hospital parking g ara g e and as he wa s leaving the g ara g e, defe ndant found a wallet and cellular telephone on the g round. Def endant put them in his backpa ck, which alre ady contained DVD movies, CDs, ear ring s, a Palm Pilot
, a Nikon came ra, watche s and other items. As he left, defe ndant passed one office r and then another office r. The second office r stopped him and asked to look into his backpa ck. Def endant testified he was taken into custody and eventua lly transporte d to the police station about 1.5 hours later

. ¶ 15 Def

endant testified that when he arr ived at the police station, a uniformed police off icer drivinga g old GMC vehicle pulled up next to the squa d car that he wa s in. The offic er g ot out of the ca

r, wa lked t o the trunk and r emoved de fenda nt’s backpa ck. De fenda

nt testified that he was let out of the squad car and he and the two other office rs stood at the rea r of the
g old GMC talking. Whil e they talked, defe ndant leane d ag ainst the GMC vehicle. Def endant denied stea ling the w allet and c ellular phone

. ¶ 16 On rebuttal, the State prese nted the testimony of Offic er Donald Verd o n

. V e r d on testified that he drove Hande lsman’s car to the police station and parke d 50 to 60 fee t from the squad

car containing defe ndant. Ver don testified that when he arr ived, defe ndant had alre ady been

escor ted into the police station. Ver don further t estified that defe ndant did not touch the trunk of Ha

ndelsman’s ve hicle at a

ny time in his presence

. ¶ 17 The jury found defe ndant guilty

. Def endant filed a motion for new trial, the motion was denied, and defe ndant was sentenc ed. The parties offe red arguments in ag g ravation and mitigation. The State cited to defe ndant’s extensive history of burg lary convictions and lack of reh ab i l itation despite y ear s in prison and a lack of truthfulness in his postsentence investigation interview wher e he den i ed a past drug problem. The State soug ht the mid to upper rang e of the statutory provi s i o n for Class X felonies of 6 to 30 year s. Def endant

conce ded that he was elig ible to be sentenced as a C lass X felon, but ar gu ed i n m i tigation that his curr ent conviction was not for an act of violence and that his prior convictions wer e almost all over 10 y ear s old. The trial court considere d the fac tors and sentenc ed defe ndant
to 14 y ear s’ imprisonment

. De fe ndant filed a motion to rec onsider sentenc e, which was denied, a nd this appeal followe d.

¶ 18 I I . ANALYSI S ¶ 19 A. Def endant’ s Montgomery

Motion ¶ 20 Def

endant first argues that the trial court err ed when it de fer red ruling on his motion in limine seeking to bar the State from introducing his 2001 conviction for burg lary for
purposes of impeachme nt. The trial co u rt did not conduct the balanc ing test pursuant to People v. Montgomery
, 47 I ll. 2d 510, 516 (1971), until afte r the State rested i t s case

. Def endant did not include this issue in his posttrial motion and the State argues that this issue

-5-was not prese rved for revie w. People v. Enoch
, 122 I ll. 2d 176, 186 (1988). Def endant argues that his claim should be considere d under plain-er ror revie w. People v. Herron
, 215 I ll. 2d 167, 186-87 (2005)

. ¶ 21 The plain-e rror doctrine a llows a revie wing court to r eview a n unprese rved e rror

when either (1) the evidenc e is c lose, reg ardle ss of the ser iousness of the er ror, or (2) the err or is serious, reg ardle ss of the closene ss of the evidenc e. Id. Under the first prong , the defe ndant
must show that the evidenc e at trial was so closely balanc ed that the err or alone “thre atene d
to tip the scale s of justice ag ainst him.” Id. at 187. For the second prong , the defe ndant must prove that the err or was so serious that it aff ecte d the fa irness of the trial and questions the integ rity of the judicial proc ess. Id. at 187. ¶ 22 We first must deter mine whet h er t h e t ri al court committed any err or at all. Def endant
argues that the trial court’s decision to defe r ruling on his motion in limine limit ed his ability
t o p roac tively deal with his prior convictions during opening arguments. Fur thermore
, defe ndant argues t hat hi s cre dibilit y was absolutely cruc ial to his case

. His prese ntation of the fa cts–that he simply

found t he wallet and cell phone–wa s diametrica lly opposed t o the State’s theory of what happene d. There fore
, defe ndant contends that establishing his

cre dibilit y was essential and re quired rulingon his motion at the ear liest possible moment. ¶ 23 Def

endant argues that Peopl e v. Patrick
, 233 I ll. 2d 62 (2009), holds that when a trial
court has sufficie nt information but fails to make a ruling on a motion in limine conce rning the admissibili ty of prior convictions, it c ommits reve rsible err or. In Patrick
, the trial court followed a blanket policy in ever y criminal case in ref

using to rule on the defe ndant’s motion in limine on the admissibili ty of prior convictions until afte r the defe ndant testified. Id. at 74. Our supreme court found that the defen d an t wa s unjustifiably require d to make a tactica l decision wit hout the abili ty to evaluate the impact it would have on his defense
, for which the defe ndant’s testimony was critica l. Id. at 75. Be cause the trial court’s ref u s al wa s not based on any specific fac ts, but purely due to the bl anket policy
, “the trial court abused i ts discretion by

ref using to e x erc ise any

specific discretion.” Id. at 74. ¶ 24 Whil e the trial court in this case did not follow an a bsolute blanket policy

and ruled on defe ndant’s motion at the close of the State’s case -in-chie f, defe ndant points to the Patrick court’s discussion of the impact on a defe ndant of defe rring such a decision. He argues that he was prejudice d by h av i n g to make tactica l decisions, such as whether to introduce evidenc e of his prior c onvictions during ope ning arguments to lessen the pre judicial eff

ect of them, without the ability to evaluate the impact on his de fense . See Id. at 75. Def endant
argues t hat this court has followe d Patrick in case s such as People v . Hogan , 388 I ll. App. 3d 885
, 8 9 1 -9 4 (2 0 0 9), and People v. Hernande z , 394 I ll. App. 3d 527, 533 (2009), and

asser ts this emer g ing line of case law supports a finding that the trial court abused its discretion. ¶ 25 The State responds that Patrick onl y s t an d s for the proposition that a defe ndant has a rig ht to have all of the rele vant information befor e he chooses to exercise his constitutional rig ht to testify
, not afte r he testifies. The State asser ts that the trial court complied with Patrick by decidingdefe ndant’s motion in limine befor e def endant de cided whe ther or not
to testify and, there fore
, no err or was made. The State adds that, in considering the prejudice

-6-to a defe ndant in this situation, our supreme court has rec ently added to this discussion and

consideration of Patrick in People v. Ave rett , 237 I ll. 2d 1 (2010). Followi ng Patrick
, the Ave rett court conclude d that defe rring ruling until afte r the defe ndant testified was an abuse

o f discretion, but that did not war rant reve rsal as a violation of defe ndants’ constituti o n al rig hts to testify

beca use the e rror

was ha rmless beyond a re asonable doubt. Id. at 18. ¶ 26 As noted above, subsequent to this court’s orig inal opinion, our supreme court issued its opinion in People v. Mullins
, 242 I ll. 2d 1 (2011), which considere d Patrick and Ave rett

. The Mullins court stated that Patrick and Ave rett rec ognized that rese rving ruling on a motion in limine to exclude prior convictions for impeachme nt constitutes an abuse of discretion–abse nt “ra

re case s.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 21. The court highlighted that Ave rett

clar ified Patrick
, noting that the rese rved- ruling err or was serious, but not structura l. As such, automatic reve rsal is unwar rante d and a court of revie w must deter mine whether the err or in delay ing ruling was harmless beyond a rea sonable doubt. Id. at 22-23. Under this standa rd, the State has the burden to pr ove beyond a re asonable doubt that the err or did not aff

ect the outcome of the proce eding

. Id. at 23. The revie wing court will consider: the defe ndant’s need to testify in order to prese nt a defe nse; whet h er the parties mentioned th e d e f

e n d a nt’ s p rior conviction during argument; and the streng th of the evidenc e ag ainst the defe ndant. Id. at 23-24. ¶ 27 I n t h i s case , defe ndant’s theory of the case was that he found the wallet an d ce l l u l ar telephone on the g round and that he leane d on Hande lsman’s car at the police station, leaving the fing erpr int the police identified as h i s

. T h i s testimony was the only way to prese nt defe ndant’s explanation for possessing Hande lsman’s wallet and phone. In addition, it was the only way to try and ex plain his fing erpr int on the vehicle. As for the second f actor , the parties did not improperly raise the argument conce rningthe def endant’ s cre dibilit y

due to the fa ct he ha d been c onvicted on a pr ior occ asion. ¶ 28 Most importantly
, as argued by the State, the evidenc e in this ca s e wa s overwhelming
ag ainst defe ndant. The State prese nted testimony from the secur ity guards who appre hended defe ndant and sear ched his backpa ck, as well as testimony from Hande lsman, who identified the s tolen items. The surveillance video that showed a man dressed like def en d ant g o into the trunk of Hande lsman’s car wa s prese nted, as well as video that corr oborate d Ha n delsman’s testimony that she was unable to acc ess her trunk with her key when s h e returne d to her car

. Evidence of a fing erpr int lifted from the trunk of Hande lsman’s car that matched de fenda

nt’s prints was also prese nted. Def endant testified that he found the items in his backpa ck, but the State’s evidenc e rebuts defe ndant’s theory

. I f the court’s err or wer e

remove d, the re sult at retrial would have been the same ; theref ore, the trial court’ s err or in delay ing r uling wa s harmless bey

ond a re asonable doubt.

¶ 29 B. Supre me Court Rule 431(b) ¶ 30 Next, defe ndant argues that his conviction should be reve rsed beca use the trial court did
not proper ly question prospec tive jurors about the principles enumer ated in People v. Zehr
, 103 I ll. 2d 472 (1984), and require d pursuant to Supreme Court Rul e 4 3 1 (b) (I ll. S. Ct. R. 431(b))

. In Zehr
, our supreme court held t h at “esse ntial to the qualification of jurors in a

-7-criminal case is that they know” that the defe ndant: (1) is presumed innocent; (2) is not

require d to offe r any evidenc e on h i s own behalf ; (3) must be proved guilty beyond a

rea sonable doubt; and (4) may decide not to testify on his own behalf and that cannot be held
ag ainst him. Zehr
, 103 I ll. 2d at 477. It follows that this qualification must come at the outset of trial beca

use if a juror has a bias ag ainst any of these basic guara ntees, an instruction g iven
at the end of the trial will have littl e eff ect. Id. at 477. Rule 431(b) was amende d in 2007 to impose a sua sponte duty on t h e t ri al court to question eac h individual juror as to whether he or she understands and acc epts the Zehr principles. People v. Gilbert
, 379 I ll

. Ap p

. 3d 106, 110 (2008). ¶ 31 The State argues that defe ndant forf eited this issue by failing to object at trial or raise the issue in his posttrial motion and defe ndant ag ain argues that this issue should be considere d under pla in-err or re view. In numerous rece nt case s, this court has applied the rea soning of People v. Glasper
, 234 I ll. 2d 173 (2009), to the amende d version of Rule 431 in concluding the err or at trial was n o t s t ru ct ural and, there fore
, not subject to automatic reve rsal. See People v. Magallanes
, 397 I ll. App. 3d 72, 94-97 (2009). Our supreme court rec ently aff irmed this conclusion and held that such an err or does not nece ssarily rende r a trial fundame ntally unfair o r u nreliable and does not require automatic reve rsal. People v. Thompson , 238 I ll. 2d 598, 611 (2010). ¶ 32 In Thompson
, the trial co u rt v i o l at ed Ru l e 4 3 1 (b ) in that it failed to question the
prospec tive jurors on the third principle and whether they acc epted the first principle. Id. at 607. Whil e compliance with Rule 4 3 1 (b ) i s cer tainly important, the Thompson court deter mined, as in Glasper , that this was not a structura l e rror requiring reve rsal. Id. at 611. Since the defe ndant forf

eited appellate revie w of this issue by failing to object at trial or raise the issue in his posttrial motion, the court also considere d the forf eiture rule and plain-er

ror doctrine. It c oncluded that, wher e there is no compelling rea son to relax the forf eiture rule, such as evidenc e of a biased jury
, the plain-er ror rule may be followed to a llow r eview of a defe ndant’s cla im of a 431(b) violation. Id. at 612. ¶ 33 Ha v i n g deter

mined the trial court err ed in failing to comply with Rule 431(b) an d t h e defe ndant did not argue that the evidenc e was closely balanc ed, the court considere d whether the err or was so serious it aff ecte d the fairne ss of the trial. The court noted that the amende d rule does not indicate that compliance is indispensable for a fair trial. There fore it found that the holding in Gl a s

p er stands and a violation does not implicate a fundame ntal rig ht or constitutional protec tion. Id. at 614-15. Def endant did not prese nt any evidenc e of jury bias and there fore failed to meet his burden of showing that the err or aff ecte d the fairne ss of his trial and did not satisfy the second prong of plain-er ror revie w. Id. at 615. The court conclude d by declining the defe ndant’s reque st for a brig ht-li n e rule of reve rsal for ever y violation of Rule 431(b). Id. at 616. ¶ 34 In the insta n t ca s e, d ef endant forf

eited this issue and has not prese nted a compe lling

rea son to relax that rule. There fore
, we first consider whether the trial cou rt er re d

. Rule 431(b) pr ovides as follows: “[T] he court shall ask eac h potential juror, individually or in a group, whether that juror understands and acc epts the following principles: (1) that the d ef en dant is presumed

-8-innocent of the char g e(s) ag ainst him or her; (2) that befor e a defe ndant can be convicted
t h e S t at e must prove the defe ndant guilty beyond a rea sonable doubt; (3) that the defe ndant is not require d to offe r any evidenc e on his or her own behalf ; and (4) that the defe ndant’s failure to testify cannot be held ag ainst him or her; howe ver, no inquiry of

a p rospective juror shall be made into the defe ndant’s failure to testify when the defe ndant objects. The court’s method of inquiry shall provide eac h juror an opportunity to respond to specific questions conce rning the principles set out in this section.” I ll. S. Ct. R. 431(b). ¶ 35 In this case , the parties agree that the trial court admonished the entire panel on the four fac tors. Howeve r, def

endant a rgues that i t is clear

that the trial cour

t failed to comply

with Rule 431(b) as “it is simply not enough to rec ite the principles an d as k a question about them.” We agree with defe ndant that this failure to ask more than whether any of the venire h ad “a n y problems with those concepts” was err or. The trial court in the instant cas e admonished the venire on eac h of the Zehr principles and asked if the prospec tive jurors had “any problems” with the principles. We agree that the trial court should have followed a straig htforwa

rd questioning of the Zehr principles as outlined by Rule 431(b) and, as a result, committed err or. Pursuant to Thompson
, we do n o t fi n d that the trial court’s approa ch require s automatic re versa l; rather, w e conduc t a plain-e rror revie w. ¶ 36 In applying the first prong of the plain-er ror rule, we h av e alre ady conclude d that the evidenc e ag ainst defe ndant was overwhelming and defe ndant’s argument that the evidenc e

was closely balanc ed is reje cted. For the second prong , the failure t o specific ally question

eac h juror on eac h individual principle was not so seri o u s to overc ome the overwhelming evidenc e. The jury was questioned on all four principles. Whil e the trial court could have d o n e a better job complying with the spirit of Rule 431(b) to assure understandi n g an d

acc eptanc e of e ach pr inciple, this was not reve rsible er ror. ¶ 37 The rec ord indicates that not only wer e the p ro s p ec t i v e j u ro rs ad m o n i s h ed of the principles, they wer e g iven a clea r opportunity to speak. No evidenc e or quest i o n s o f bias

wer e raised by either party reg arding any of the jurors. Acc o rd i n gl y , n ot only was the evidenc e overwhelming, but the jury was apprised of the principles, and qu es tioned sufficie ntly to elicit comments. There was no err or so serious to quest i on the fairne ss of defe ndant’s trial a

nd require reve rsal.

¶ 38 C. Ex cessive Sente nce ¶ 39 Next, defe nd an t argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentenc ing him to a term of 14 year s’ imprisonment. For se ntencingissues, we c onsider whe ther the trial court abused its discretion in handing down a sentenc e. People v. Shaw
, 278 I ll. App. 3d 939, 953 (1996). As defe ndant notes, it is imperative that the trial court car efully consider the persona l history of the defe ndant and the nature and circ umstances of the crime in imp o s ing a sentenc e. People v. Maldonado
, 240 I ll. App. 3d 470, 485-86 (1992). Howeve r, as the
sentenc ing cou rt is in the best position to analy ze these fac tors as well as the defe ndant’s

cre dibilit y , demea

nor, g ener al moral char acte r, mentality
, social environments, habits, ag e, and potential for reha

bilitation, g reat defe renc e is g rante d its decision. People v. Ramos
, 353

-9-I ll. App. 3d 133, 137 (2004).

¶ 40 Def

endant asser

ts that this defe renc e is not unfetter ed and notes this court has not shie d

awa y from reve rsing a sentenc e wher e fac tors have not been considere d
, ev en wh ere the
sentenc e imposed lies within the statuto ry gu i d el i n es. He cites People v. Steffens
, 131 I ll. App. 3d 141, 151-53 (1985), People v. Center
, 198 I ll. App. 3d 1025, 1032-35 (1990), and People v. Gibbs
, 49 I ll. App. 3d 644, 648 (1977). In fac t, as highlighted by the Center court,

our constitution mandates balanc ing of the retributive and reha bilitative purposes of punishme n t b y co nsidering the nature of the offe nse with the objective of restoring the offe nder to useful citiz enship. Center
, 198 I ll. App. 3d at 1032-33 (citing I ll. Const. 1970,
art. I
, § 11). Neve rtheless, wher e the fac t o rs h av e been considere d, it is within the trial court’s discretion to deter

mine what signific ance is g iven to eac h ag g ravating and mitigating fac tor. People v. Saldivar
, 113 I ll. 2d 256, 2 7 2 (1986). Unless the sentenc e is g rossly dispropo rt ionate to the nature of the offe nse committed, the sentenc e should be aff irmed. People v . Phillips , 265 I ll. App. 3d 438, 449 (1994). ¶ 41 Def

endant argues that the trial court ignor ed sever al mitigating fac tors, in particula r that his offense did not involve violence or a threat of harm and the “minimal proc eeds” of the burg lary wer e returne d to the victim. He contends that this c ase is similar to Center
, wher e the defe ndant was e ligible f or sentenc ing a s a Class X offe nder ba sed on two prior Class 2 felony convictions. Center
, 1 9 8 I ll. App. 3d at 1032. In Center
, the defe ndant had been convicted four y ear s’ ear lier, at ag e 19, of the robber y of a bicycle from a 9-year -old boy and for the burg lary o f t h e same laundromat for which his conviction at issue involved. Def endant wa s sentence d as a Class X f elon to 15 year s’ imprisonment with the trial court stating, w ithout elaboration, that it had consider ed all the f actor s raised. Id. at 1034. ¶ 42 This court found the term imposed excessive as it was nine y ear s more than the minimum for Class X felonies and one y ear more than the maxi mum extended sentenc e for the crime. The court noted that the circ umstances of the offe nse showed the laundromat was closed, the defe ndant was a lookout
, no proce eds wer e obtained, and none of defendant’ s convictions involved or resulted in bodily harm. Fur thermo re , the court cited to defe ndant’s persona l background o f being raised in a normal home environment, a high school g raduate, employ ed, and acc epted into a f ire f ig hte r

- p a r a me d ic tra in ing program. Acc ording ly
, the court conclude d that a 15-year sentenc e did not furt h er t h e objectives of reha bilitation and
restoration to useful citiz enship. Id. at 1035. ¶ 43 In this case , defe ndant notes that his criminal history
, tho u gh m o re extensive than the defe ndant’s in Center
, is also entirely nonviolent. He notes that his history does not paint the picture of a dang erous criminal, but of a nonviolent homeless man who err ed in brea king into the t runk of a car. He asser ts that this s entenc e, more than quadruple of hi s prior sentence, is ex cessive a

nd does not serve the purpose of reha bilitation. ¶ 44 We agree with the State that, considering the discretion v es t ed i n t h e t ri al court, the fac tors prese nted in ag g ravation and mitigation, and th at t h e sentenc e imposed falls well within the statutory guidelines, we do not find the sentenc e excessive. The State notes that, wher e mitigation evidenc e is befor e a court , i t is presumed that the court considere d that evidenc e, absent evidenc e to the contra ry

. People v. Canet
, 218 I ll. App. 3d 855, 864 (1991).

-10-In handingdown the sente nce, the trial court stated that it revie wed the evidence befor e it,

including defe ndant’s prese ntence investigation repor t, which contained the information defe ndant uses for

support. ¶ 45 I t is important to note that defe ndant’s most re cent conviction re sulted in a sentenc e of four year s’ probation; howeve r, that turned into a three -year pris o n t er m when defe ndant violated the terms of his probation. Whil e the jump from that to a 14-year sentenc e is larg e, based on the i nformation before the trial court, it is not per seexcessive. As the t rial court noted, t h at sentenc e resulted from defe ndant’s elec tion to be treated as a drug addict. Fur thermore
, unlike Center
, defe ndant had five prior felony convictions and serve d terms in prison. The prior convictions wer e not mere ly for robber y of a bicycle and a Class 2 burg lary

. Def endant is an elementa

ry school dropout with a history of drug issues and five prior convictions. Ba sed on the rec ord, the trial court did not abuse i t s d i s cr eti on in imposing a sentenc e we ll within t he statutory guidelines.

¶ 46 D. Def endant’ s Term of Ma

ndatory Supervised Relea se ¶ 47 Finally
, defe ndant argues t hat t he three-year MSR term i mposed b y t h e t rial court was in err or. Defenda

nt argues that, whil e his rec ord allowed the t rial court to sent en ce h i m as

a Class X offe nder, he contends that he committed a Class 2 offe nse that require s only a twoy ear term of MSR. Def

endant contends that the three -year term imposed is void. Def endant contends that ou r s up reme court’s rea soning in People v. Pullen
, 192 I ll. 2d 36 (2000), require s corr ection of the mitti mus to ref lect the proper MSR term of two y ear s. We disag ree with defe ndant’s application of Pullen and agree with the State that defe ndant was proper ly
sentenc ed. ¶ 48 I n P ullen
, beca use of his prior convictions, the defe ndant was sentenc ed as a Class X offe nder following his neg otiated plea of guilty to five co u n t s of burg lary

. Def endant’ s sentenc e resulted in an ag g reg ate term of 30 year s’ imprisonment, two year s’ g reater than the

sum of maxi mum permissible extended-term sentenc es for two Class 2 offe nses. Id. at 42-43. There was no dispute that the defe ndant was to be sentenc ed as a Class X offe nder, but the issue was whe ther the max imum was the sum of the maxim um permissible extended-term
sentenc es for Class X or Class 2 offe nses. The Pullen court conclude d that the offe nse was expli citly define d as a Class 2 felony and the c hara cter

and cla ssification of those off enses

rema ined, reg ardle ss of whethe r the de fenda nt w as subject to the sentenc e enhanc ement or not. There fore
, since the sentenc e imposed exceede d the maxi mum ag g reg ate term for Class 2 felonies, the se ntence was void. Id. at 46. ¶ 49 Unlike i n P u l l en , t h i s ca s e does not involve the char acte r and classification of the convictions. This case is in line with the decisions of this c ourt on this issue. See People v. Anderson
, 272 I ll. App. 3d 537 (1995); People v. Smart
, 311 I ll. App. 3d 415 (2000); People

v. W atkins
, 387 I ll. App. 3d 764 ( 2009); People v . Lee , 397 I ll. App. 3d 1067 ( 2010). Eac h of these case s found that by the p lain languag e of the statute, the MSR term is part of the
sentenc e. In fac t, the Lee court specifica lly reje cted defenda nt’s argument here that Pullen mandates a chang e in his MSR term. Lee
, 397 I ll. App. 3d at 1072-73. Ther ef o re , wh en subject to the enhanc ement, the MSR term for Class X offe nses attache s to the sentenc e

-11-imposed.

¶ 50 I I I . CONCLUSI ON ¶ 51 For

the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm defe ndant’s convic tions and sentence

.

¶ 52 Affir

med.

-12-