Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),

this Memorandum Decision shall no t be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT : ATTORNEYS FOR CO

- APPELLEE DCS : DEIDRE L. MONROE EUGENE M. VELAZCO , JR. Lake County Public Defender‟s Office D epartment of C hild S ervices , Gary, Indiana Lake County Office Gary, Indiana
ROBERT J. HENKE D CS Central Administration Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR CO

- APPELLEE CASA : DONALD W. WRUCK Dyer, Indiana



## IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

IN THE MATTER OF THE INVOLUNTARY ) TERMINATION OF THE PARENT

- CHILD ) RELATIONSH IP OF Ja.B., J.B., J.P., A.P. & ) C.P ., MINOR CHILD REN , AND ) THEI R MOTHER, R.P ., ) ) R.P

. ) ) Appellant

- Respondent, ) ) vs. ) No. 45 A0 3

- 11 1 0

- JT

- 4 5 3 ) INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD ) SERVICES, ) ) Appellee

- Petitioner, ) ) and )2 )

LAKE COUNTY CASA, ) ) Co

- Appellee. )

APPEAL FROM THE LAKE SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable Mary Beth Bonaventura, Senior Judge Cause No s . 45D06

- 1011

- JT

- 194, 45D06

- 1011

- JT

- 195, 45D06

- 1011

- JT

- 196, 45D06

- 1011

- JT

- 198 , 45D06

- 1011

- JT

- 199
April 4, 2012 MEMORANDUM DECISION
- NOT FOR PUBLICATION BRADFORD , Judge Appellant

- Respondent R.P

. (“ Mother ”) appeal s the juvenile court‟s order terminating
h er parental rights to Ja.B., J.B., J.P., A.P., & C.P. (collectively “t he children”). Mo ther allege s that the Indiana Department of Child Services (“ DCS ”) did not provide sufficient evidence to support the termination of h er parental rights

. Concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support the termination of Mo ther ‟s parental rights , we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Mother has five 1 children a t issue in this appeal. 2 Ja.B. was born on August 19, 1997; J.B. was born on May 30, 1995; J. P. was born on January 17, 1999; A.P. was born on December 1 , 200 1 ; and C.P . was born on November 17, 2004

. In December of 2006, Mother and the children were about to be evicted from a homeless shelter when a representative of a

1 Mother has a total of eight children. The termination of her parental rights to the oldes t three children is not at issue in this appeal.

2 The termination of the parental rights of the children‟s fathers is not at issue in this appeal.3

non - profit community organization called Project Neighbors provided beds , mattresses, rugs , furniture , a washer and dryer, and kitchen accessories for the family in a home that was provided for Mother . For nearly three years, Project Neighbors provided the family with
rent

- free housing, clothing, mentoring, support, transportation, and food. In exchange , Mother was required to keep the home clean and to work to further her education. If Mother satisfied these two requirements, Project Neighbors intended to pass the title of the home over to Mother. Mother, however, was not able to do so. Over time, the condition of the home began to deteriorate

. Project Neighbors attempted to counteract the deteriorating condition of the home by putting a new roof on the home and arranging for volunteers to make continual improvements to the home. Project Neighbors w as forced to provide new mattresses and furniture three or four times due to the deteriorating condition of the home. Food was not stored properly . E ventually, the home became infe s ted with mice , and Project Neighbors was forced to replace the stove th ree times after it became infe s ted with maggots. Over the course of the approximately three years, Project Neighbors spent nearly $40,000 in attempts to help the family.
T he children lacked supervision

. Mother‟s oldest child , E.W., attempted to feed and parent the younger children. Mother would not supervise the children but rather would spend her time sleeping, sitting, or wandering. Ja.B. was responsible for setting the alarm and getting her siblings up and ready for school every morning. T wo of the older children repeated ly ran away , and Mother would engage in physical altercations with E.W

. In addition, Mother would occasionally send the children to a relative‟s home, where some of4

the children alleged they w ere sexually molested. DCS first became involved with the children in November of 2008 , after receiving reports that the family was struggling with instability and living in deplorable home conditions, and Mother was without the necessary means to parent and provide for the children. DCS case manager Valerie Washington conducted an assessment of the family‟s living conditions and found that the children were not adequately supervised, the family lack adequate bedding , and the food supply in the home was limited. Case Manager Washington

a lso found that the children‟s attendance at school was “really off the chart” and that they suffered from poor grades. Tr. p. 62. Mother told Case Manager Washington that she suffered from a heart condition and depression, but that she was not taking her medication. Mother also told Case Manager Washington that E.W. was not taking her medication. Based on her assessment, Case Manager Washington rec ommended that with intensive in

- home services, the children could remain in the home, but also recommende d that DCS should initiate proceedings to adjudicate the children as Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”). On December 18, 2008, Mother admitted that the children were CHINS. That same day, the juvenile court adjudicated the children as CHINS and conti nued the children‟s placement with Mother. Even with the aid of DCS service providers, the conditions in the home did not improve. Mother continued to fail to provide adequate supervision for the children, and, although she complied with services, did not make progress toward improving the family‟s situation. Eventually, in May of 2009, the children were removed from Mother‟s care5

because Mother had failed to show improvement in her parenting skills . A dditional safety

concerns had also ar isen after st anding water was found in the home and the conditions of the home had deteriorated to the point that Mother was going to be evicted from the home by representatives of Project Neighbors. After removing the children from Mother‟s care, DCS provided Mothe r with intensive services. Mother generally complied with the services, but failed to improve to a level where she could adequately parent the children. Mother had transportation problems and would often be late or miss therapy sessions . Mother failed t o implement the behaviors she was taught and would allow others to discipline the children during visitation sessions. Mother was unable to locate housing, employment, or a source of income, and she primarily relied on relatives for support. From time to time it would seem that Mother was beginning to make minimal progress, but such progress would be fleeting and Mother would revert back to her old way of doing things. In addition, Mother failed to progress to the point where her visits with the children could be unsupervised. In light of Mother‟s failure to make lasting progress in implementing what she had learned through the services provided by DCS, in June of 2010, DCS case manager Amanda Horton recommended a change in the permanency plan to termin ation of parental rights and adoption because she believed that the children required a sense of safety and stability which Mother had, to that point, been unable to provide . In addition, DCS case manager Maritza
Perez indicated that she felt that termina tion of Mother‟s parental rights was in the best interests of the children because they required a sense of stability and permanency that would6

be best served through adoption. On November 9, 2010, DCS filed a petition seeking the termination of Mother‟s parental rights to the children. As part of the continuing services provided by DCS, Mother was given a parenting assessment in June of 2011 by therapist Amy Stuhlmacher, MSW. Mother scored high to medium risk for abuse and neglect behaviors on all five areas that she was assessed. The results of this parenting assessment indicate d that Mother is a great risk for being abusive or neglectful toward her children , and Stuhlmacher testified that she was

concern ed that Mother would again rely on the older chi ldren to take a p arental role. On Ju ne 27 and August 8, 2011 , the juvenile court conducted a n evidentiary termination hearing at which Mo ther appeared and was represented by counsel. D uring the termination hearing, DCS introduced evidence relating to Mot her‟s failure to implement the parenting techniques learned from the lengthy intensive services provided by DCS and to progress to a level where she could adequately care for the children . DCS introduced evidence that Mother had not shown that she could ad equately superv ise or provide for the children, that she had not proven that she had acquired long

- term stable housing and a permanent source of income, and that Mother was a t great risk for being abus iv e or neglectful toward her children. DCS also provid ed evidence indicating that its plan for the permanent care and treatment of the children was adoption

. Mother presented evidence which she claimed demonstrated that she was beginning to make progress and, as such, should be given more time before her par ental rights were terminated. On August 23 , 2011 , the juvenile court terminat ed Mo ther ‟s parental rights to the children

. Mother now appeals.7 DISCUSSION AND DECISION The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional rig ht of a parent to establish a home and raise h er children. Bester v. Lake Cnty

. Office of Family & Children , 839 N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ind. 2005). Further, we acknowledge that the parent

- child relationship is “one of the most valued relationships of our cultu re.” Id

. However, although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet h er responsibility as

a parent. In re T.F. , 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied . Therefore, parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child ren ‟s interest s in determining the appropriate disposition of a petition to terminate the parent

- child relationship. Id

. The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parent but to protect the child ren . Id . Termination of parental rights is proper where the child ren ‟s emotional and physical development is threatened. Id . The juvenile court need not wait until the child ren

are irr eversibly harmed such that t he i r physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent

- child relationship. Id

. Mother contend s that the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing was insufficient to support the juvenile court‟s order terminating h er parental rights. In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, this court will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights of S.P.H ., 806
N .E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider the evidence that supports the juvenile court‟s decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id . Where, as here, the8

juvenile court includes findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its ord er terminating parental rights, our standard of review is two

- tiered. Id . First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and, second, whether the findings support the legal conclusions. Id

. In deference to the juvenile court‟s un ique position to assess the evidence, we set aside the juvenile court‟s findings and judgment terminating a parent

- child relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences dra wn therefrom to support it. Id . A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact, or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id

. In order to involuntarily terminate a par ent ‟ s parental rights, DCS must establish by clear and convincing evidence that: (A) one (1) of the following exists: (i) the child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) months under a dispositional decree; (ii) a court has entered a finding under IC 31

- 34

- 21

- 5.6 that reasonable efforts for family preservation or reunification are not required, including a description of the court‟s finding, the date of the finding, and the manner in which the finding was made; or (iii) the child ha s been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a county office of family and children or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty

two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed fr o m the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of services or a delinquent child ; (B) th at one (1) of the following is true : (i) There is a reasonable probability that the condit ions that resulted in the child‟ s removal or the re asons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied. (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the9 parent

- child relationship poses a threat to the well

- being of the child. (iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services; (C) termination is in the best interest s of the child; and (D) there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child. Ind. Code § 31

- 3 5

- 2

- 4(b) (2) (20 10 ). Specifically, Mo ther clai ms that DCS failed to establish that either (1) the conditions that resulted in the children ‟s removal or the reasons for t he i r placement outside of her care will not be remedied , or (2) there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent

- child relation ship poses a threat to the well

- being of the children

. Mother also claims that DCS failed to establish that termination of her parental rights was in the children‟s best interests or that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and
treatm ent of the children

.

A. Conditions Resulting in Removal Not Likely to be Remedied In arguing that DCS failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the conditions resulting in the children ‟s removal from h er care will not be remedied and th at the continuation of the parent

- child relationship poses a threat to the children , Mo ther fails to acknowledge that because Indiana Code section 31

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- 4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, the juvenile court need only find either that the condition s resulting in removal will not be remedied or that the continuation of the parent

- child relationship poses a threat to the children. In re C.C. , 788 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied . Therefore, “where, as here, the trial court specifi cally finds that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions which resulted in the removal of the [ child ren] would not be remedied, and there is sufficient evidence in the record supporting the trial court‟s conclusion, it is not necessary10

for [D CS] to prove or for the trial court to find that the continuation of the parent

- child relationship poses a threat to the [ child ren] .” In re S.P.H. , 806 N.E.2d at 882. In order to determine that the conditions will not be remedied, the juvenile court shou ld first determine what conditions led DCS to place the children outside of Mo ther‟s care, and, second, whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will be remedied. Id

. When assessing whether a reasonable probability exists that th e conditions justifying a child ‟s removal and continued placement outside his or her parent ‟s care will not be remedied, the juvenile court must judge the parent ‟ s fitness to care for h er child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into considerat ion evidence of changed conditions. In re A.N.J. , 690 N.E.2d 716, 721 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). The juvenile court must also evaluate the parent ‟ s habitual pattern s of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or depri vation. Id . A juvenile court may properly consider evidence of the parent ‟ s prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate employment and housing. McBride v. Monroe Cnty

. Office of
Fa mily & Children , 798 N.E.2d 185, 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Moreover, a juvenile court “„can reasonably consider the services offered by [DCS] to the parent and the parent‟s response to those services.‟” Id . (quoting In re A.C.C. , 682 N.E.2d 542, 544 (Ind . Ct. App. 1997)). Here, the juvenile court found that DCS presented sufficient evidence to prove that the conditions that resulted in the children‟s removal from Mo ther‟s care were not likely to be remedied, and upon review, we conclude that the juvenile court‟s finding to this effect is11

supported by the record. The record reveals that Mother had a history of instability with respect to housing and income, which continued throughout the CHINS and termination proceedings. Mother was evicted from numerous shelters and homes, including the home provided for her at no cost by Project Neighbors and a family member‟s home.
The record further reveals that although Mother completed many of the s ervices offered by DCS, she did not successful ly implement the te chniques that she learned from these services or successfully demonstrate that she could adequately supervise , care , and provide for the children. As the CHINS and termination proceedings progressed, Mother made minimal progre ss, but such progress was sho rt

- lived and Mother would revert to her prior deficient parenting techniques

. In addition, Mother never progressed to unsupervised visitation with the children and would rely on others to discipline the children during their supervised visits. Multiple D CS case managers testified that despite the intensive services provided to Mother, Mother failed to show adequate progress to indicate that the deficient supervision, care, and housing conditions would be remedied in a timely fashion. When considered as a whole, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the conditions which resulted in the children ‟s removal from Mo ther‟s care will not be remedied. I t was within the province of the juvenile court, as the fi nder of fact, to minimize any contrary evidence of changed conditions in light of its determination that Mo ther‟s failure to provide a safe and stable living environment which led to the children ‟s removal w as unlikely to change. See In re L.S. , 717 N.E.2 d 204, 210 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied

.12

Moreover, contrary to Mo ther‟s claim that the juvenile court “ failed to recognize that [she] had physical and mental issues that affected her ability to quickly complete her case plan ” and, as such, premat urely terminated her parental rights in light of evidence that she claims shows she had acquired suitable housing and sustainable income , Appellant‟s Br. p.
1 0 , it is well

- established that the juvenile court, acting as a trier of fact , wa s not required to believe or assess the same weight to the testimony as Mother. See Thompson v. State , 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004); Marshall v. State , 621 N.E.2d 308, 320 (Ind. 1993); Nelson
v. State , 525 N.E.2d 296, 297 (Ind. 1988) ; A.S.C. Corp. v. First Nat’l Bank of Elwood , 241 Ind. 19, 25, 167 N.E.2d 460, 463 (1960); Haynes v. Brown , 120 Ind. App. 184, 189, 88 N.E.2d 795, 797 (1949), trans. denied

. Mother‟s claim effectively amounts to an invitation for this court to reassess witness credibility and reweigh the e vidence, which, again, we will not do. See In re S.P.H. , 806 N.E.2d at 879. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the juvenile court erred in determining that DCS established that it is unlikely that the conditions resulting in the children ‟s re moval

w ould be remedied. See In re C.M. , 675 N.E.2d 1134, 1140 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Having concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court‟s determination , and finding no error by the juvenile court, we need not consider whether the continuation of the parent

- child relationship poses a threat to the children‟s well

- being because DCS has satisfied the requirements of Indiana Code section 31

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- 4(b)(2)(B) by clear and convincing evidence. B. The Children’s Best Interests13

Next , we address Mother‟s claim that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the children‟s best interests. We are mindful that in determining what is in the best interests of the child ren , the juven ile court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and look to the totality of the evidence. McBride , 798 N.E.2d at 203. In doing so, the juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child ren involved. Id

. Furthermore, this court has previously determined that the testimony of the case worker r egarding the child ren ‟s need for permanency supports a finding that termination is in the child ren ‟s best interests. Id .; see also Matter of M.B. , 666 N.E.2d 73, 79 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied

. Here, the testimony establishes that the children have a need for permanency and stability and that the termination of Mother‟s parental rights would serve the ir best interests. Case Manager Perez testified that s he believe s that the children‟s best interests would be served by the termination of Mother‟s parental rights because the children have a need for permanency and stability and Mother has failed to demonstrate that she is capable of providing the children w ith said permanency and stability. In discussing the children‟s need for permanency and stability, Case Manager Perez indicated that the children are tired of being in foster care and require a sense of permanency to live their desired “normal life” and
t hat she does not believe that it is “fair to the kids that we wait around to see if mom could make those improvements and to see how long it is going to take mom to make those improvements.” Tr. p. 225. Case Manager Perez further testified that the child ren‟s foster mother provides the m with a sense of stability and emotional support that Mother is unable to14

provide. In addition, Case Manager Horton testified that she believed that Mother‟s parental rights should be terminated because the children requ ired a sense of safety and security and should know that they will be well cared for, and that Mother had failed to prove that she could provide the children with the necessary level of stability and care. Just prior to the termination hearing, Mother was given a parenting assessment, the results of which indicated that Mother is a great risk of being abusive or neglectful toward her children in the future. The juvenile court also heard testimony that the children appeared to be happier, more well

adjuste d, and have displayed marked academic and disciplinary improvement since being removed from Mother‟s home. The juvenile court did not have to wait until the children were irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development was per manently impaired before terminating Mother‟s parental rights. See In re C.M. , 675 N.E.2d at 1140. In light of the testimony of Case Manager s Horton and Perez considered with the results of the parenting assessment which was given to Mother just prior to the termination hearing , we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to satisfy DCS‟s burden of proving that termination of Mother‟s parental rights is in the children‟s best interests. Moreover, in arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support t he juvenile court‟s determination that the termination of her parental rights is in the children‟s best interests , Mother alleges that the termination of her parental rights would cause the children to suffer pain. Specifically, Mother claims that the chi ldren would suffer pain because they have15

indicated that they would like to be reunited with Mother, and also because they would no longer have contact with Mother or their older siblings . However, Mother‟s claim in this regard merely amounts to an invita tion for this court to reweigh the evidence, which again, we will not do. See In re S.P.H. , 806 N.E.2d at 879.

C . Satisfactory Plan for Care and Treatment of the Children Mother also claims that DCS failed to establish that it had a satisfactory plan fo r the care and treatment of the children. In making this argument, Mother concedes that DCS‟s stated plan was for adoption, but argues that the plan was unsatisfactory because the children‟s foster mother had not “affirmatively stated that she would adopt these children.” Appellant‟s Br. p. 11. In order for the trial court to terminate the parent

- child relationship, the court must find that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child. In re B.D.J. , 728 N.E.2d 195, 204 (Ind. C t. App. 2000). This plan need not be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of the direction in which the child will be going after the parent

- child relationship is terminated. Id

. In re S.L.H.S. , 885 N.E.2d 603, 618 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) . “ Att empting to find suitable parents to adopt the child [] is clearly a satisfactory plan. ” Lang v. Starke Cnty. Office of Family & Children , 861 N.E.2d 366, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing In re A.N.J. , 690 N.E.2d at 722 )

. “ The fact that there was not a spe cific family in place to adopt the child [] does not make the plan unsatisfactory. ” Id . (citing In re B.D.J. , 728 N.E.2d 195, 204 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2000) )

. Here, it is undisputed that DCS‟s plan for the children ‟s care and treatment was for adoption. Durin g the termination hearing, DCS presented evidence that the children‟s foster16

mother was willing to adopt the children. Mother‟s claim to the contrary effectively amounts to an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence, which again, we will not do. See In re S.P.H. , 806 N.E.2d at 879. Thus, in light of the evidence presented during the termination hearing regarding DCS‟s plan for the care and treatment of the children , we conclude that DCS, by demonstrating that its plan for the care and treatment of the children was adoption, satisfied the statutory requirement set forth under Indiana Code section 31

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- 4(b)(2)(C). Having concluded that the evidence was sufficient to prove the statutory requirements set forth in Indiana Code section 31

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- 4(b)(2) by clear and convincing evidence, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court. The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed. VAIDIK, J., and CRONE, J., concur.