United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 21-3190

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Diante Turman

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

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Submitted: October 17, 2022

Filed: December 9, 2022

[Unpublished]

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Before SMITH, Chief Judge, BENTON and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

After Diante Turman pled guilty to one count of possession of cocaine base 

with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, the district court1 sentenced 

him to 120 months imprisonment, followed by 3 years of supervised release. 

1

The Honorable Stephen R. Clark, United States District Judge for the Eastern 

District of Missouri. 
-2- 

Turman appeals, arguing that the district court erroneously applied the United States 

Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) § 4B1.1 “career offender” provision in calculating 

his Guidelines range. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

Turman was indicted on five separate counts arising from the discovery of 

significant amounts of crack cocaine, cocaine, and marijuana, as well as several 

firearms in his vehicle and home. Turman entered a guilty plea to one count of 

possession of cocaine base, and, at sentencing, the district court adopted the 

Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) prepared by the United States Probation 

Office. The PSR determined that Turman qualified as a career offender under USSG 

§ 4B1.1(a), based on two previous convictions under Missouri law for a crime of 

violence and, as relevant to this appeal, a controlled substance offense: possession 

of marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of Missouri Revised Statutes

§ 195.211 (2016). The district court ultimately calculated Turman’s total offense 

level at 29, with a criminal history category of VI, resulting in a Guidelines range of 

151 to 188 months imprisonment. The district court then varied downward and 

imposed a sentence of 120 months. Finally, the district court dismissed the 

remaining counts against Turman.

On appeal, Turman asserts that the district court erroneously applied the 

career-offender provision because his previous marijuana conviction cannot qualify 

as the requisite controlled substance offense. Specifically, Turman argues that, at 

the time of his marijuana conviction, Missouri law defined marijuana to include 

hemp, but both Missouri and federal law have since revised the definition of 

marijuana to exclude hemp. According to Turman, a prior conviction must qualify 

as a controlled substance offense under the Guidelines in effect at the time of the 

federal sentencing, not at the time of the prior conviction, so his marijuana

conviction is categorically overbroad and cannot qualify as a controlled substances 

offense. “We review de novo whether a prior conviction is a sentencing 

enhancement predicate.” United States v. Henderson, 11 F.4th 713, 716 (8th Cir. 

2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1696 (2022). 
-3- 

This Court has recently rejected similar claims regarding the delisting of hemp 

as part of the definition of marijuana under other states’ statutes and federal law. In 

United States v. Jackson, No. 20-3684, 2022 WL 303231 (8th Cir. Feb. 2, 2022) (per 

curiam), cert. denied, No. 21-8127, 2022 WL 4653426 (Oct. 3, 2022), we stated the 

following:

We determined in Henderson that U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) contains “no 

requirement that the particular substance underlying the state offense is 

also controlled under [the CSA].” Instead, we agreed with the Fourth 

Circuit’s interpretation that the “ordinary meaning of . . . ‘controlled 

substance,’ is any type of drug whose manufacture, possession, and use 

is regulated by law.” Jackson concedes he was convicted of delivering 

and possessing with intent to deliver marijuana, a drug regulated by 

Iowa law. Whether the statute additionally proscribed hemp within the 

definition of marijuana is immaterial.

Attempting to distinguish Henderson, Jackson emphasizes that Iowa, 

too, has removed hemp from its marijuana definition since his 

convictions occurred. But we may not look to “current state law to 

define a previous offense.” Jackson’s uncontested prior marijuana 

convictions under the hemp-inclusive version of Iowa Code 

§ 124.401(1)(d) categorically qualified as controlled substance offenses 

for the career offender enhancement.

Id. at *1-2 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). Although Jackson was not 

precedential, see 8th Cir. R. 32.1A, in United States v. Bailey, 37 F.4th 467 (8th Cir. 

2022), we “adopt[ed Jackson’s] reasoning” in a published, precedential opinion. Id.

at 469. This reasoning is equally applicable to Turman’s claims. However Turman’s 

argument may be construed, he does not meaningfully distinguish it from the 

argument we considered and rejected in Jackson. We thus reject Turman’s claims 

that his previous conviction was overbroad and could not serve as a basis for 

application of the career offender provision. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

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