[Cite as State v. Harrison , 2020-Ohio-3920.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT LOGAN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, CASE NO. 8-19-48

v. KANDALE L. HARRISON, O P I N I O N

DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

Appeal from Logan County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. CR 18 03 0091 Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded Date of Decision: August 3, 2020

APPEARANCES:



### Eric C. Stewart for Appellant 

### Tina M. McFall for AppelleeCase No. 8-19-48

-2- SHAW, P.J. {¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, the State of Ohio (the “State”), appeals t he October 16, 2019 judgment of the Logan County Court of Common Pleas gra nting the

motion to dis miss filed by d efendant-appe llee, K andale Harrison (“Harrison”). On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred in finding the warrant for Harrison’s arrest was defective and suppressing the evidence seized as a r esult of the arrest. Alternatively, the State argues that the trial court erred when it found the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply. Procedural History {¶2} On February 2, 2018, the Logan County Drug Task Force conducted a controlled drug buy with a confidential informant who had arran ged to purchase illegal drugs from Harrison in Bellefontaine, Ohio. The confid ential informant met Harrison in a parking area, entered Harrison’s vehicle, and pur chased illegal drugs from Harrison with $120 in prerecorded money. The confidential informant was fitted with a recording device that captured the transaction. The substance purchased by the confidential informant tested positive for 3.7 2 grams of cocaine. {¶3} On February 13, 2018, law enforcement obtained a warrant to pla ce a GPS tracker on Harrison’s vehicle.Case No. 8-19-48

-3- {¶4} On February 27, 2018, law enforcement obtained an arrest warran t for Harrison based upon the February 2, 2018 controlled buy with th e confidential

informant. {¶5} On March 5, 2018, law enforcement stopped Harrison’s vehicle an d executed the arrest warrant in Logan County. While conducting a search incident to arrest, law enforcement found cocaine and a large amount of cash on Harrison’s person. Harrison’s vehicle was also searched. Inside the veh icle, law enforcement found a loaded 9mm pistol and more cash in the glove box. In t he center console, law enforcement found another bag of cocaine, scales, and a sma ll bag of marijuana. The total amount of cash found during the search was $6,225. T he drugs found in the vehicle tested positive for 7.39 grams of cocaine. The fir earm found in the

vehicle was later discovered to be stolen. {¶6} On April 18, 2018, the Logan County Grand Jury returned a nine- count indictment against Harrison alleging that he committed the offe nses of fifth-degree felony trafficking in cocaine; third-degree felony having weapo ns under disability, with a forfeiture specification; fourth-degree felony improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle, with a firearm and forfeiture specificatio ns; fourth-degree felony carrying concealed weapon, with a firearm and forfeiture specifications; thirddegree felony having weapons under disability, with a firearm a nd forfeiture specifications; two fourth-degree felonies for possession of co caine, with a firearmCase No. 8-19-48

-4- and forfeiture specifications; fourth-degree felony trafficking in cocaine, with a firearm and forfeiture specifications; fourth-degree felony rec eiving stolen property, with a firearm specification; and first-degree felony engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, with forfeiture specifications. Harrison entered a p lea of not guilty to the charges. {¶7} On April 4, 2019, Harrison filed a motion to suppress the evide nce obtained from the stop of his vehicle, subsequent arrest, and s earch of his person and vehicle pursuant to the execution of the arrest warrant on March 5, 2018. Harrison argued that, at the time of his arrest, the arrest war rant which formed the basis for the stop was not valid because it did not bear the si gnature of the person who issued the warrant. Therefore, Harrison maintained that th e warrant was defective at the time of execution because it did not comport w ith the requirements of Crim. R. 4(A). {¶8} On April 17 and September 10, 2019, the trial court conducted h earings on Harrison’s suppression motion. 1 The trial court heard testimony from the Municipal Court Clerk and law enforcement officers who requeste d and executed the arrest warrant. Evidence at the hearing revealed that the Municipal Court Judge initialed the complaint finding probable cause to issue the arr est warrant on February 27, 2018. However, the warrant, which was on a separa te page, was not

1 The record reflects a change in trial judge during this timefr ame, with the former judge stepping down from office and the subsequent judge being appointed to sit by assig nment.Case No. 8-19-48

-5- signed by the clerk until it was returned on March 6, 2018, aft er execution of the warrant and Harrison’s arrest on March 5, 2018. In other words , the warrant itself did not bear a signature of the person authorized to issue it a t the time of execution. The testimony at the hearing indicated that this was done pursu ant to a policy in place at the Bellefontaine Municipal Court to prevent arrest wa rrants from being entered into the online docket system prior to execution. The testimony indicated that the rationale supporting this policy was intended to preve nt apprisal of the arrest

warrant to defendants. {¶9} On October 3, 2019, the trial court issued an “Opinion and Find ings,” setting forth its determination that the arrest warrant was def ective because it was not signed by any person authorized to issue the warrant under Crim.R. 4(A) at the

time of execution. The trial court further found that the defe ct was so apparent that it was not objectively reasonable for a law enforcement officer to rely on the legitimacy of the warrant and, therefore, the good faith except ion to the exclusionary rule did not apply. {¶10} On October 16, 2019, the trial court issued a judgment entry gr anting Harrison’s motion to suppress and concluding that all the evide nce obtained by law enforcement from the March 5, 2018 search of Harrison’s person and vehicle must be suppressed.Case No. 8-19-48

-6- {¶11} The State filed an appeal from this judgment, asserting the fol lowing assignment of error.

PURSUANT TO STATE v. HOFFMAN , 141 OHIO St.3d 428. 2014-OHIO-4795, 25 N.E.3d 993, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUPPRESSING THE STATE’S EVIDENCE. {¶12} In its sole assignment of error, the State argues that the tria l court erred when it granted Harrison’s motion to suppress. Specifically, t he State argues that the unsigned arrest warrant was not defective at the time of ex ecution because it was accompanied by a complaint which bore the signature of the muni cipal judge indicating that she had found probable cause to issue the warra nt, thereby complying with Crim.R. 4(A). The State further argues that even if the w arrant is defective, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies and t he State’s evidence should not be suppressed. Standard of Review {¶13} Review of a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress pres ents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Castagnola , 145 Ohio St.3d 1, 2015-Ohio1565, ¶ 32, citing State v. Burnside , 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. The trial court acts as the finder of fact in evaluating a motion t o suppress; therefore, it is in the best position to resolve factual questions and evalua te the credibility of

witnesses. Burnside at ¶ 8. An appellate court must accept the trial court’s find ings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Id . “Accepting theseCase No. 8-19-48

-7- facts as true, the appellate court must then independently dete rmine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the fac ts satisfy the applicable legal standard.” Id

. See also State v. Johnson , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-637, 2014-Ohio-671, ¶ 6 (“We apply a de novo standard in determining whether the trial court properly denied appellant’s motion to suppress.”). Evidence Adduced at the Suppression Hearing {¶14} In opposition to Harrison’s motion to suppress, the State prese nted the testimony of Detective Brent Joseph of the Logan County Joint D rug Task Force. Det. Joseph stated that he had been with the task force for sev en years. Det. Joseph recalled participating in the controlled buy operation between a confidential informant and Harrison on February 2, 2018. He explained that this transaction formed the basis for seeking the arrest warrant for Harrison. {¶15} On February 27, 2018, Det. Joseph presented the municipal court clerk with a complaint, a blank warrant, and his affidavit setting fo rth the facts of the February 2, 2018 controlled buy for the municipal court judge t o review and make a probable cause determination. He explained that prior to thi s instance he has submitted numerous complaints in this manner to the municipal c ourt judge requesting the issuance of arrest warrants. Det. Joseph recall ed signing the complaint accompanying the arrest warrant in front of the clerk . Det. Joseph did not speak to the judge. Rather, he dropped off the paperwork w ith the clerk and wasCase No. 8-19-48

-8- later notified when the warrant was ready to be picked up. He explained that he usually speaks with the judge if she is available when he submi ts his requests for arrest warrants. However, when the judge is in a hearing or ot herwise indisposed, he leaves the paperwork with the clerk. {¶16} Det. Joseph recalled picking up the arrest warrant at issue fro m the municipal court clerk’s office later that day. He explained th at generally when he receives the paperwork from the clerk’s office, he looks for th e municipal court judge’s signature indicating that probable cause has been found . Det. Joseph testified that the judge’s signature signifies to him that he h as an valid arrest warrant

in his hand. {¶17} In this case, Det. Joseph reviewed the paperwork he received fr om the municipal court clerk’s office and found that the judge had ini tialed and stamped the complaint indicating that she found probable cause to issue the arrest warrant for Harrison. He explained that at that point he believed he h ad a valid warrant for

Harrison’s arrest. {¶18} Det. Joseph recalled executing the arrest warrant for Harrison on March 5, 2018. He explained that the GPS tracker on Harrison’s vehicle indicated that Harrison had been traveling from Columbus, Springfield, an d Urbana, making several stops along the way, and was headed back into Logan Cou nty. He testified that Harrison’s travel pattern was consistent with drug traffic king activity. UponCase No. 8-19-48

-9- Harrison entering Logan County, Det. Joseph, with assistance fr om Deputy Joe Layman, initiated a traffic stop and served the arrest warrant on Harrison. Det. Joseph admitted that there was no probable cause to stop or to search Harrison or his vehicle other than serving the arrest warrant. 2 {¶19} Det. Joseph acknowledged at the suppression hearing that the ar rest warrant in this case, which was a separate sheet of paper from the complaint, did not bear a signature at the time of execution, and was not file d stamped and signed by the clerk until March 6, 2018, the day after Harrison’s arre st. However, Det. Joseph reiterated that he relied on the municipal court judge’s initials and stamp on the complaint and testified to his belief that the judge’s init ials and stamp on the complaint indicated to him that he had a valid arrest warrant. {¶20} Det. Joseph discussed the municipal court clerk’s practice of n ot signing an arrest warrant until it is returned after execution. He explained that “a few years ago” the clerk began to enter all filings online. (D oc. No. 264 at 13). Soon after, the drug task force discovered that defendants were able to log onto the municipal court’s website and see that an arrest warrant had be en issued. As a result, the drug task force’s operations were hindered. Det. Joseph ex plained that the task force met with the municipal court judge and clerk and had arra nged for the arrest

2 Incidentally, the record reflects that Harrison was stopped by the Ohio State Highway Patrol while traveling between Columbus and Springfield and he was issued a citation f or a traffic violation. However, Harrison was not arrested at the time because the Trooper who effectuate d the traffic stop was unaware of the outstanding arrest warrant due to the warrant not being entered into the online system at the time.Case No. 8-19-48

-10- warrants not to be entered into the computer system until after they were served and

the defendants were arrested. {¶21} The State also presented the testimony of Karla Stevens, the Cl erk of Courts for the Bellefontaine Municipal Court. Ms. Stevens stat ed that she had been in that position for five years. She acknowledged that it is t he practice of the Bellefontaine Municipal Court clerks not to enter arrest warran ts sought by the drug task force into the computer system until they are advised that the defendant is incarcerated. She recalled that “several years ago” the drug t ask force asked the court not to put the warrant information into the computer syst em to prevent defendants from knowing ahead of time that they had a warrant f or their arrest. (Doc. No. 294 at 13). She indicated the reasons given for the practice was not only for the safety of law enforcement, but to also prevent defendan ts from fleeing. She explained that the municipal court judge had approved this prac tice. {¶22} Ms. Stevens remembered Det. Joseph entering the clerk’s office on February 27, 2018 and requesting an arrest warrant to be issued for Harrison. She recalled that Det. Joseph presented the complaint to her, which was in affidavit form. At the time, he also swore to and signed the complaint i n her presence. Ms. Stevens acknowledged that she notarized Det. Joseph’s attestati on on the complaint. She explained that the municipal court judge was preoccupied at the time, so she took the complaint, the warrant, and a two-page supporting affi davit for the judgeCase No. 8-19-48

-11- to review at a later time. Ms. Stevens recalled that the munic ipal court judge made a probable cause determination by initialing and stamping the c omplaint on February 27, 2018, but that the arrest warrant was not signed a nd file stamped by the clerk until it was returned on March 6, 2018 after Harrison was arrested. She explained that this was consistent with the court’s practice.

Discussion Warrant Requirements under Crim.R. 4 {¶23} Ohio Criminal Rule 4 governs the issuance and contents of arres t warrants and states in pertinent part: (A) Issuance. (1) Upon Complaint. If it appears from the complaint, or from an affidavit or affidavits filed with the complaint, that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the defendant has committed it, a warrant for the arrest of the defendant, or a summons in lieu of a warrant, shall be issued by a judge, magistrate, clerk of court, or officer of the court designated by the judge, to any law enforcement officer authorized by law to execute or serve it.

*** (C) Warrant and Summons: Form. (2) Warrant. The warrant shall contain the name of the defendant or, if that is unknown, any name or description by which the defendant can be identified with reasonable certainty, a description of the offense charged in the complaint, whether the warrant is being issued before the defendant has appeared or was scheduled to appear, and theCase No. 8-19-48

-12- numerical designation of the applicable statute or ordinance. A copy of the complaint shall be attached to the warrant. {¶24} It is interesting to note that Crim.R. 4 refers to issuance of the warrant without any reference to a signature , particularly by a clerk of courts, where a judge’s signature or initials on the attached complaint has alr eady indicated approval

of the warrant. Nor is it clear from the Rule that the issuanc e of the warrant, or the warrant itself, is invalidated simply because the identificatio n of the defendant and the criminal statute is made, as it was in this case, by langua ge on the face of the warrant document referencing those matters as being set forth i n the complaint; especially given that the complaint in this case was attached t o the warrant as mandated by the Rule. {¶25} Perhaps as a result of making some of the same observations abo ut the language of Crim.R. 4, the State argues that the “warrant” shou ld be viewed as a “package” containing the complaint, the warrant, and the suppor ting affidavit. We do not take a position on the State’s argument at this time. H owever, we are also not convinced that the issuance of this warrant with its accomp anying complaint and affidavit, was in direct violation of any specific provision of Crim.R. 4. At the same time, it does not seem unreasonable to us, that the term “issue d” as used in Crim.R. 4, would most commonly be equated with the execution and signat ure of the document being issued—i.e., the warrant itself.Case No. 8-19-48

-13- {¶26} In addition, we are cognizant of the concern expressed by the S tate’s witnesses with entering the warrant information into the online docket prior to execution. In any event, it would seem to us that the better p ractice would clearly be to develop a protocol regarding the entry of these matters i nto the computer that is apart from the formal filing of the documents by the clerk o f courts, and which does not result in the service of an unsigned warrant. The Good Faith Exception {¶27} Notwithstanding the foregoing observations, we need not and do not rule on those issues today because our overall review of this c ase does not end here. The State argues that the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in State v. Hoffman is dispositive of this case. Hoffman , 141 Ohio St.3d 428, 2014-Ohio-4795. In Hoffman , the facts from the suppression hearing revealed that the Tole do Municipal Court pursuant to court policy had been issuing arrest warrants without any probable cause determination, but instead simply relied upon a recitatio n of the statutory elements of the offense stated in the complaint. The Supreme C ourt in Hoffman determined that a “mere conclusory statement that the person wh ose arrest is sought has committed a crime is insufficient to justify a finding of p robable cause” and found Hoffman’s misdemeanor warrants were issued without a prob able-cause

determination and were therefore invalid. Id . at ¶ 14. Notwithstanding the invalid arrest warrant, the Supreme Court also held that suppression of the evidence is notCase No. 8-19-48

-14- an automatic remedy and determined that the evidence should not be suppressed

because the officers relied on the arrest warrant and acted in good faith. Id. at ¶ 24. {¶28} In the case sub judice , the trial court concluded that the evidence from the search of Harrison’s person and vehicle must be suppressed based on the invalid warrant and the unavailability of any good faith exception in t his circumstance. {¶29} The United States Supreme Court has created an “exclusionary rule”—“a deterrent sanction that bars the prosecution from intr oducing evidence obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation.” State v. Dibble , --Ohio St.3d-- , 2020-Ohio-546, ¶ 15, quoting Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229, 231-232 (2011). Exclusion is not meant to serve as a remedy for the in jury caused by an unconstitutional search or seizure but rather as a deterrent ag ainst future violations.

Id . at 236-237. Thus, the question whether the exclusionary sanct ion should be imposed is “ ‘an issue separate from the question whether the F ourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.’ ”

Leon , 468 U.S. at 906, quoting Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 223 (1983). {¶30} Specifically, “the deterrence benefits of exclusion ‘vary with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct’ at issue.” Davis at 239, 131 S.Ct. 2419, quoting Herring v. United States , 555 U.S. 135, 143 (2009) (“To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently delibera te that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such dete rrence is worth theCase No. 8-19-48

-15- price paid by the justice system”). But, when police act in an objectively reasonable manner in executing a search believed in good faith to be legal , there is no bad

conduct to deter. States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 918-920 (1984); State v. Wilmoth , 22 Ohio St.3d 251 (1986). {¶31} The United States Supreme Court has held that the exclusionary rule should not be applied in situations in which an officer has rel ied in good faith on a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate or judicial officer, notwithstanding the fact that the warrant is later found to be invalid. Leon at 913. However, “the officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s probable-c ause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant he issues must be objectively

reasonable.” Id . at 922. Because the exclusionary rule’s purpose is to deter unlawful police conduct, evidence should be suppressed “ ‘only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged w ith knowledge,

that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment .’ ” Leon , 468 U.S. at 919, quoting United States v. Peltier , 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975); State v. George , 45 Ohio St.3d 325 (1989). {¶32} In the instant case, the testimony before the trial court indic ates that Det. Joseph believed he had a valid warrant at the time he arre sted Harrison. Det. Joseph testified that he relied on the Judge’s initials and sta mp on the complaint indicating that probable cause to issue the arrest warrant had been found and theCase No. 8-19-48

-16- warrant had been approved by the municipal court judge. Unlike the warrant in Hoffman —in which the Supreme Court still applied the good faith except ion despite finding the warrants were issued without a probable-cause deter mination—the record in this case establishes that a person authorized under Crim.R. 4(A)(1), and specifically a judge, made a probable cause determination befor e the warrant for

Harrison’s arrest was issued. {¶33} Thus, we conclude that Det. Joseph’s reliance on the municipal court judge’s initials and stamp indicating that probable cause for H arrison’s arrest had been found was done in good faith and was objectively reasonabl e given the testimony regarding the policy put in place by the municipal co urt judge and clerk regarding the delay in signing and file stamping the warrant it self by the clerk until after execution. Accordingly, we disagree with the trial court ’s finding on this issue and conclude that the facts of this case present a scenario tha t falls within the purview of the good faith exception to exclusionary rule and th erefore the evidence obtained by the State subsequent to Harrison’s arrest should no t have been suppressed. {¶34} In sum, even assuming that the arrest warrant issued in this ca se failed to properly comply with Crim.R. 4(A), we nevertheless find that Det. Joseph was relying in good faith on the warrant issued by the municipal co urt judge and clerkCase No. 8-19-48

-17- when he executed the warrant and therefore the exclusionary rul e should not have been applied to suppress the evidence obtained by the State in this case. {¶35} For all these reasons, the assignment of error is sustained, th e judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is reman ded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded ZIMMERMAN, J.J., concurs. WILLAMOWSKI, J., concurs in Judgment Only. /jlr