UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

CARL R. BROOKS, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SOUTHEASTERN PUBLIC SERVICE

AUTHORITY; DURWOOD CURLING,

No. 95-2260

Executive Director; IRVIN GENTRY,

Director of Operations; TONEY

SAUNDERS, Superintendent of

Transportation; RICHARD HAINS,

Supervisor of Transportation,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.

J. Calvitt Clarke, Jr., Senior District Judge.

(CA-94-590)

Argued: December 6, 1996

Decided: January 7, 1997

Before WILKINS, HAMILTON, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

ARGUED: Scott Meadows Reed, SCOTT M. REED, P.C., Virginia

Beach, Virginia, for Appellant. Sharon Maitland Moon, LECLAIR,
RYAN, P.C., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: David

L. Arnold, PENDER & COWARD, P.C., Virginia Beach, Virginia,

for Appellee Hains; William M. Furr, T. Scott McGraw, WILLCOX

& SAVAGE, P.C., Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellees Southeastern, et

al.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Carl R. Brooks, Jr. appeals an order of the district court granting

summary judgment to Southeastern Public Service Authority (the

Authority) and various individuals (collectively,"SPSA") on his

claims of discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West

1994 & Supp. 1996), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of

1990, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West 1995 & Supp. 1996), and

the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and his

claim that he was deprived of a property interest in his employment

without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finding no error, we affirm.

Brooks was employed by the Authority as a truck driver from April

1992 until November 1993. In November 1992, Brooks asserts, he

began to experience discrimination based on his disability and his

refusal to join a "conspiracy" to bring about the termination of a black

coworker. The discrimination took the form of refusals to accommodate his disability and a low performance evaluation. On April 22,

1993, Brooks surreptitiously tape-recorded a meeting with his supervisor during which the latter displayed racial animosity toward

Brooks' coworker. Brooks delivered the recording to Authority officials, who terminated the supervisor. Brooks maintains that as a result

of his actions, he was verbally abused by employees supportive of the

terminated supervisor.

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On October 20, 1993, Brooks met with Irvin Gentry and Toney

Saunders, two of his superiors at the Authority, to discuss his claims

of harassment. At the beginning of the meeting, Gentry inquired

whether Brooks possessed a recording device and stated that he did

not wish to be recorded. In response, Brooks produced a tape recorder

and allowed Saunders to remove it from the room. Subsequently,

however, Brooks implied to Saunders that he had recorded the meeting with a second recording device; he also told fellow employees

that he had recorded the meeting. Shortly thereafter, Brooks was terminated for insubordination on the basis that he had defied a superior's order not to record the meeting.

Brooks brought this action, alleging discrimination, retaliation,

denial of equal protection, and denial of procedural due process. The

district court granted summary judgment to SPSA on all counts. With

respect to the discrimination and retaliation claims, the district court

concluded that Brooks had failed to establish a prima facie case of

discrimination or retaliation. And, the court concluded, even if Brooks

successfully had alleged a prima facie case, SPSA nevertheless

was entitled to summary judgment because it had alleged a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge--namely, Brooks'

insubordination--and Brooks had failed to show that the asserted reason was pretextual. The district court granted summary judgment on

the equal protection claim because it was merely derivative of the

Title VII and ADA claims and thus failed for the same reasons.

Finally, the district court granted summary judgment to SPSA on the

procedural due process claim because, assuming Brooks had a property interest in his employment with the Authority, he received adequate predeprivation and postdeprivation process.

Having had the benefit of oral argument and the parties' briefs, and

after careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, we

conclude that the district court correctly granted summary judgment

to SPSA. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district

court. See Brooks v. Southeastern Pub. Serv. Auth., No. 94-590 (E.D.

Va. May 19, 1995).

AFFIRMED

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