alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>   1
                                                                EXHIBIT 15

                        ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF INDEPENDENT
                         CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
                REGARDING INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' REVIEW REPORT


The Board of Directors
Northfield Laboratories Inc.:

With respect to the registration statement on Form S-8 of Northfield
Laboratories Inc., we acknowledge our awareness of the use therein of our
report dated March 21, 1997 related to our review of interim financial
information.

Pursuant to Rule 436(c) under the Securities Act of 1933, such report is not
considered a part of a registration statement prepared or certified by an
accountant or a report prepared or certified by an accountant within the
meaning of sections 7 and 11 of the Act.

                                        /s/ KPMG Peat Marwick LLP

                                            KPMG Peat Marwick LLP

Chicago, Illinois
April 8, 1997
**Exhibit 31.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

I, John O’Keefe, certify that:

 

1.    Ihave reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K/A of TEO Foods Inc. (the "Registrant");

 

2.    Basedon my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessaryto make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect tothe period covered by this report;

 

 

June 30, 2020

/s/ John O’Keefe

John O’Keefe

Chief Financial Officer

(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
#### Larry E. WILLIAMS and Joyce M. Williams, Appellants, v. LIBERTY BANCORPORATION, C. David Brown, et al., Appellees.

No. 5D09-1494.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

July 9, 2010.

David S. Oliver, of Baker & Hostetler, LLP, Orlando, for Appellant.

Jamie Billotte Moses and Emery H. Ro-senbluth, Jr., of Fisher, Rushmer, Werren-rath, Dickson, Talley <& Dunlap, P.A., Orlando, for Appellees.

PER CURIAM.

We find no reversible error in the trial court’s determination that appellants’ request for certain documents of Liberty Bancorporation did not comply with section 607.1602, Florida Statutes (2007). Our affirmance does not preclude appellants from submitting an amended request for those documents.

AFFIRMED.

GRIFFIN, PALMER and EVANDER, JJ., concur.
584 A.2d 244

#### NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES v. M.E.

June 11, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
No. 13,840.

#### Berry *v.*The Town of Merom.

*Costs.*— Action *in Circuit Court.*— Recovery *of Less than Fifty Dollars.*— Under the statute (section 5091, R. S. 1881), the plaintiff in an action in the circuit court for a money demand on contract is liable for costs if he recovers less than fifty dollars, exclusive of costs, unless the judgment is reduced'below that amount by set-off or counter-claim.

From the Sullivan Circuit Court.

■ *W. 8.*Maple, *J. T. Beasley*and *A. B. Williams,*for appellant.

*J. O. Briggs,*for appellee.

Olds, J.

This is an action brought in the Sullivan Circuit Court by the appellant against the appellee for money expended for the appellee, and for work and labor performed for appellee by the appellant, at the special instance and request of the appellee, alleging the value of the services at $40, and the money paid to be $20. The cause was put at issue and a trial had resulting in a finding and judgment in favor of appellant for $17.50. Motion by appellee to tax the costs to appellant sustained, and exceptions taken. The ruling on the motion to tax the costs is the only question presented in the case.

The statute provides that, *“*In actions for money demands on contract, commenced in the circuit or superior courts, if the plaintiff recover less than fifty dollars, exclusive of costs, he shall pay costs, unless the judgment has been reduced below fifty dollars by set-off or counter-claim pleaded and proved by the defendant.” Section 5091, R. S. 188L There was neither counter-claim nor set-off pleaded as a defence.

It is contended that the third paragraph of answer sets up *162a counter-claim, but in this we think counsel are in error. The third paragraph is a denial of any request or authority to pay the $20 alleged to have been paid by appellant for appellee at the request of appellee.

Filed Sept. 28, 1889.

The motion to tax the costs to the appellant was properly sustained. There is no error in the record.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.
# FILED

January 31, 1997 Cecil W. Crowson Ap pellate Cou rt Clerk IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TEN NESSEE MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE

THURSTON AND REW HELMS, ) ) Plaintiff/Appellant, ) ) Davidson Chancery ) No. 92-3515-I VS. ) ) Appeal No. ) 01-A-01-9505- CH-00194 MICHAEL C. GREENE, ) COMMISSION ER, TENNESSEE ) DEPART MENT OF SA FETY, ) ) Defendant/Appellee. )



### PA RTIA L DISSENT ING OPINION

I concur in t he result re ached in this case, but conti nue to be troubled bythe question of the appellant’s right to a jury tr ial. Since my two colleagues participated in the cas e of Jones v. Greene , App. No. 01-A-01-9505-CH -00187 (Tenn. App. Dec. 4, 1996), which dec ided this is sue contrary to the appellant’ s position, I will not press the i ssue here. But, I decline to join Part II I of the majority opinion.

_______________________________ BEN H. CAN TRELL, JUDGE
#### Duncan *et al. v.*Coleman.

Gilbert, J.

1. Where error is assigned on a refusal of the court to allow a witness on direct examination to answer a question, and it is not stated what the answer would have been, no point is raised for the consideration of this court. *McElwaney*v. *MacDiarmid,*131 *Ga.*97 (2a) (62 S. E. 20) ; *Wyche*v. *Bank of Campbell County,*161 *Ga.*329 (6) (130 S. E. 566), and cit.; *Eliopolo*v. *Eicholz,*161 *Ga.*823 (3) (131 S. E. 896).

2. Error is assigned on the rejection of evidence, on the ground that the court erroneously ruled that the evidence offered was a conclusion. The evidence rejected was the opinion of the witness that the testatrix “did not know the children of her dead sons and daughter.” Opinion evidence *633is admissible on the question of mental capacity; but the mere opinion here expressed by the witness is not of such materiality that the ruling thereon would require a reversal, even though it were admissible.

No. 6478.

July 12, 1928.

Appeal from probate of will. Before Judge Wood. Cobb superior court. November 18, 1927.

The will of Mrs. M. F. Coleman was probated in common form, and W. A. Coleman, executor, distributed the estate according to the will, which bequeathed all property equally to'the six children of testatrix, with the provision that the executor, one of them, be first paid a specified sum in consideration of having furnished testatrix a home. Certain grandchildren of testatrix called upon the executor to offer the will for probate in solemn form, which he did; and they filed a caveat. The ordinary probated the will in solemn form, and the caveators appealed. After the introduction of evidence, the superior court directed a verdict in favor of the propounder, and the caveators excepted upon the grounds that there was an issue of fact for a jury as to whether they had overcome the prima facie case admitted by the caveat, that such action by the court was contrary to law, and that the evidence did not demand said verdict.

*G. B. Walker, Mozley & Gann,*and *II. B. Moss,*for plaintiffs in error. *Morris, Hcmkins & Wallace,*contra.

3. On the issue as to whether the verdict is demanded by the evidence the entire court of six Justices are equally divided in opinion, Russell, C. J., Beck, P. J., and Hines, J., being of the opinion that the evidence is not sufficient, and Atkinson, Hill, and Gilbert, JJ., being of the contrary opinion; and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed by operation of law on this question.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur, except as slated in the third headnote.*
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

LORENZO BELL, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-30125 

D.C. No. 2:18-cr-00261-JCC-1 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 4, 2020**

Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges. 

Lorenzo Bell appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges his 

guilty-plea conviction and 36-month sentence for possession of cocaine base with 

intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). Pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), Bell’s counsel has filed a brief stating 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

FEB 7 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 19-30125 

that there are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to withdraw as counsel of 

record. Bell has filed a pro se supplemental brief. No answering brief has been 

filed.

Bell waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence. Our 

independent review of the record pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 

(1988), discloses no arguable issue as to the validity of the waiver. See United 

States v. Watson, 582 F.3d 974, 986-88 (9th Cir. 2009). We accordingly dismiss 

the appeal. See id. at 988. 

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED. Bell’s pro se motion to 

appoint counsel is DENIED.

DISMISSED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<LEGEND>
     THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
     MARCH 31, 1998 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS 
     ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
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583 A.2d 737

#### IN THE MATTER OF RAYMOND L. POLING, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW.

January 4, 1991.

ORDER

This matter having been duly presented to the Court, it is ORDERED that the petition for the reinstatement of *RAYMOND L. POLING*of *SEA ISLE CITY*is granted.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


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<LEGEND>
This  schedule  contains  summary  financial   information  extracted  from  the
Consolidated   Condensed  Statement  of  Condition  as  of  September  30,  2000
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months ended September 30, 2000  (unaudited) and is qualified in its entirety by
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</TABLE>
584 A.2d 217

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. WILFREDO ZAYAS.

May 15, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24
- 1256

JIANY I ZHANG , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v. SETHURAMAN PANCHANATHAN, In his official capacity as the Director of the National Science Foundation , Defendant

- Appellee

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Alexandria

. Leonie M. Brinkema , District Judge. ( 1:23

- cv - 01571

- LMB

- LRV )

Submitted : Ju ly 25 , 2024 Decided: July 29, 2024

Before GREGORY, HARRIS, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed as modified by un published per curiam opinion

. Jianyi Zhang, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-1256 Doc: 10 Filed: 07/29/2024 Pg: 1 of 22 PER CURIAM: Jianyi Zhang appeals the district court’s order dismissing his complaint with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, we confine our review to the issues raised in the informal brief. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b). Because Zhang’s informal brief does not challenge the basis for the district court’s disposition, he has forfeited appellate review of the court’s order. See Jackson v. Lightsey , 775 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The informal brief is an important document; under Fourth Circui t rules, our review is limited to issues preserved in that brief.”). To the extent that Zhang challenges the district court’s decision to dismiss his claim rather than granting leave to amend, a court does not abuse its discretion “by declining to grant a motion [for leave to amend] that was never properly made.” Cozzarelli v. Inspire Pharms. Inc. , 549 F.3d 618, 631 (4th Cir. 2008)

. However, because the basis of the court’s dismissal of the complaint was a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the dismissal must be without prejudice. Ali v . Hogan , 26 F.4th 587, 600 (4th Cir. 2022) (“A dismissal for lack of standing

— or any defect in subject matter jurisdiction

— must be one without prejudice, because a court has no power to adjudicate and dispose of a claim on the merits.” (cleaned up)). Acc ordingly , we affirm the district
court’s order as modified to reflect that the dismissal is withou t prejudice . We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED USCA4 Appeal: 24-1256 Doc: 10 Filed: 07/29/2024 Pg: 2 of 2
585 A.2d 381

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. JOSEPH M. SPANN.

September 18, 1990.

Petition for certification granted. (See 236 *N.J.Super.*13, 563 A.2d 1145.)
Exhibit 33.7



|     |  |  |  |                                                               
|---- |  |  |  | --------------------------------------------------------------
|LOGO |  |  |  | 303 E Wacker Drive, Suite 900
Chicago, IL 60601 (312)
233-6440

REPORT ON ASSESSMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSIONS REGULATION AB SERVICING CRITERIA

For the calendar year ending December 31, 2015, National Tax Search, LLC has been a Tax Service Vendor for Wells Fargo Bank(the
Servicer).

National Tax Search, LLC (NTS) is responsible for assessing compliance as of December 31, 2015 and for the period
from January 1, 2015 through December 31, 2015 (the Reporting Period) with the servicing criteria set forth in Title 17, Section 229.1122(d) of the Code of Federal Regulations (the CFR). NTS has used the
servicing criteria communicated to NTS by the Servicer to assess compliance with the applicable servicing criteria. Only servicing criteria 1122 (d) (1)(ii), 1122 (d)1(iv), 1122 (d)2(ii), 1122 (d)2(v), 1122(d)2(vi), 1122 (d)2(vii),
1122(d)(4)(xi), and 1122(d)(4)(xii) (the Applicable Servicing Criteria) are applicable to the activities NTS performs with respect to the transactions covered by this report. NTS has determined that the remaining servicing criteria set
forth in Item 1122 (d) of the SEC Regulation AB are not applicable to the activities it performs with respect to the transactions covered by this report. The transactions covered by this report include all tax payments made on behalf of
the Servicer using NTSs TaxQ system (the Platform Transactions).

NTS, as a vendor, has assessed its compliance with the Applicable
Servicing Criteria for the Reporting Period and has concluded that the NTS has complied, in all material respects, with the Applicable Servicing Criteria as of December 31, 2015 and for the Reporting Period with respect to the Platform
Transactions taken as a whole.

Plante & Moran, PLLC, an independent registered public accounting firm, has issued an attestation report on the
assessment of compliance with the Applicable Servicing Criteria as of December 31, 2015 and for the Reporting Period as set forth in this assertion.



|                                               
|-----------------------------------------------
|National Tax Search, LLC, as Vendor to Servicer
|                                               
|/s/ Lori D. Eshoo                              
|Lori D. Eshoo, President/CEO                   
|January 18, 2016
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868 A.2d 1030

#### LYNN VON HOLLANDER, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v. REINHARD VON HOLLANDER, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

February 16, 2005.

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is granted, and the matter is summarily remanded to the Appellate Division for reconsideration in light of *Caplan v. Caplan,*182 *N.J.*250, 864 A.2d 1108 (2005).

Jurisdiction is not retained.