[Cite as Pramco CV6, L.L.C. v. Aberdeen Invests., Inc., 2014-Ohio-32.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 100130

PRAMCO CV6, L.L.C. 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

ABERDEEN INVESTMENTS, INC., ET AL. 

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS 

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED 

Civil Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CV-622242 

BEFORE: Keough, J., Stewart, P.J., and Celebrezze, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 9, 2014 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS 

Thomas C. Pavlik 

Rochelle L. Paley 

Novak Pavlik Deliberato, L.L.P. 

Skylight Office Tower 

1660 West 2nd Street, Suite 950 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 

James A. Amodio 

Aaron M. Harrison 

Brown, Amodio & Chandler L.P.A. 

109 West Liberty Street 

P.O. Box 1117 

Medina, Ohio 44256 
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.: 

{¶1} This cause came to be heard upon the accelerated calendar pursuant to 

App.R. 11.1 and Loc.R. 11.1. 

{¶2} Defendants-appellants, James T. Caldwell, Sr. and Barbara J. Caldwell (the 

“Caldwells”), appeal the trial court’s decision denying their motion to void judgment and 

quash attachment proceedings. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

{¶3} In 2007, Pramco CV6, L.L.C. filed a foreclosure action against Aberdeen 

Investments, Inc. (“Abderdeen”) and the Caldwells on a default mortgage for real 

property commonly known as 6012 Linwood Avenue, Cleveland. On September 9, 

2009, Sopramco, CV6, L.L.C., as successor-in-interest, received a judgment against 

Aberdeen and the Caldwells, jointly and severally. The property was subsequently sold 

at sheriff’s sale, with the court confirming the sale on November 20, 2009. In addition to 

the judgment obtained in the foreclosure action, Sopramco was awarded attorney fees 

incurred as a result of the foreclosure action. 

{¶4} In January 2013, Sopramco assigned its judgment to plaintiff-appellee, 

ACM Browncroft Trust. In its effort to collect on the outstanding judgment, ACM 

Browncroft filed three bank attachments on the Caldwells’ bank accounts — two at 

KeyBank and one at Charter One Bank on a trust account. 

{¶5} In response to the bank attachments, the Caldwells moved to void the 

September 9, 2009 judgment and quash the attachment proceedings claiming that the 

collection actions were barred by the two-year statute of limitations as provided in R.C. 
2329.08 and, therefore, ACM Browncroft was prohibited from collecting any deficiency. 

Specifically, the Caldwells argued that their son, James T. Caldwell, Jr. (now deceased), 

lived at the Linwood property, which was a single family dwelling, and effectively 

executed the mortgage because he was a shareholder. According to the Caldwells, in 

light of these facts, the protections under R.C. 2329.08 applied. 

{¶6} ACM Browncroft opposed the motion, arguing that R.C. 2329.08 did not 

apply because although James T. Caldwell, Jr. was a shareholder of Aberdeen, his 

shareholder status alone does not mean he executed the mortgage on behalf of Aberdeen. 

{¶7} The trial court denied the Caldwells’ motion to void judgment and quash 

attachment proceedings, finding that the Caldwells “failed to provide sufficient evidence 

and grounds in support of their motion.” The Caldwells now appeal from this judgment, 

contending in their sole assignment of error that “the trial court erred in failing to void the 

judgment in the within matter and quashing the attachment proceedings.”1

{¶8} A trial court has discretion in determining whether to grant a motion for relief 

from judgment, and an appellate court will not reverse that determination absent an abuse 

of discretion. Rose Chevrolet, Inc. v. Adams, 36 Ohio St.3d 17, 20, 520 N.E.2d 564 

(1988); Doddridge v. Fitzpatrick, 53 Ohio St.2d 9, 11, 371 N.E.2d 214 (1978). An abuse 

of discretion implies that the court’s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or 

unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 

 1

Although the trial court’s order also denied the Caldwells’ motion to quash 

attachment proceedings, the Caldwells make no argument on appeal regarding the 

legality of the attachment proceedings. Therefore, we do not address this issue.
(1983). 

{¶9} In support of their appeal, the Caldwells rely on the language of R.C. 

2329.08. The relevant portion of the statute provides: 

Any judgment for money rendered in a court of record in this state upon any 

indebtedness which is secured or evidenced by a mortgage, or other 

instrument in the nature of a mortgage, on real property or any interest 

therein, upon which real property there has been located a dwelling or 

dwellings for not more than two families which has been used in whole or 

in part as a home or farm dwelling or which at any time was held as a 

homestead by the person who executed or assumed such mortgage or other 

instrument, or which has been held by such person as a homesite, shall be 

unenforceable as to any deficiency remaining due thereon, after the 

expiration of two years from the date of the confirmation of any judicial 

sale of such property completed subsequent to the rendition of such 

judgment. 

{¶10} Thus, under the statute, the Caldwells are entitled to relief if the evidence 

shows that either the real property (1) has upon it a dwelling or dwellings for not more 

than two families which has been used in whole or part as a home, farm dwelling, or held 

as a homestead by the person who executed or assumed the mortgage or other instrument, 

or (2) has been held by such person as a homesite. 

{¶11} Although the Caldwells argue on appeal that their son, James, used the 

property as a homesite, the legal definition of “homesite” as explained by the Ohio 

Supreme Court, is “[a] location suitable for a home”; whereas, “homestead” is “[a] 

family’s dwelling place, with the inclosure or ground immediately contiguous; an abode; 

a home.” Mut. Bldg. & Invest. Co. v. Efros, 152 Ohio St. 369, 372, 89 N.E.2d 648 

(1949). Because a dwelling already existed on the real property, the Caldwells are not 

entitled to relief under the “homesite” option under R.C. 2329.08. See id. 
{¶12} Therefore, the Caldwells are entitled to relief if the real property has upon it 

a dwelling or dwellings for not more than two families that has been used in whole or part 

as a home, farm dwelling, or held as a homestead by the person who executed or assumed 

the mortgage or other instrument. 

{¶13} The Caldwells contend that because James was a shareholder of Aberdeen, 

he executed the mortgage. We disagree. 

{¶14} The mortgage on the real property was given by Aberdeen, the corporate 

entity that owned the real property. The mortgage was executed by James T. Caldwell, 

Sr., in his capacity as president of Aberdeen. It was also executed by James T. Caldwell, 

Sr. and Barbara G. Caldwell, individually as co-makers. James T. Caldwell, Jr., was 

merely a shareholder of Aberdeen and his signature does not appear on any of the 

mortgage documents. His part ownership of the corporate mortgagor does not change 

the fact that the corporate mortgagor was a separate person from him. “It is well settled 

that a corporation is a separate legal entity from its shareholders, even when the 

corporation only has one shareholder.” My Father’s House #1, Inc. v. McCardle, 

2013-Ohio-420, 986 N.E.2d 1081, ¶ 27 (3d Dist.). James Jr.’s shareholder status is 

insufficient to satisfy “the person who executed or assumed the mortgage or other 

instrument” protection of R.C. 2329.08. 

{¶15} Accordingly, the Caldwells’ sole assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶16} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellants costs herein taxed. 
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into 

execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE 

MELODY J. STEWART, P.J., and 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR