alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-31197

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

BRANDON J. THOMAS,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:10-CR-206-1

Before Davis, Clement, and Costa, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Brandon J. Thomas appeals the 90-month term of imprisonment

imposed on resentencing for his conviction for possession with intent to 

distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base. Thomas argues that the district 

court erroneously based the upward variance on his prior involvement in dog 

fighting and thus his sentence is greater than necessary to comply with the 

purposes set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 4, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

 Case: 13-31197 Document: 00512925990 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/04/2015
No. 13-31197

In response to Thomas’s challenge to the substantive reasonableness of 

his sentence, the Government argues, among other things, that this court 

should dismiss Thomas’s appeal based upon the plea agreement’s appeal 

waiver. Pursuant to the terms of the waiver, Thomas waived the right to 

directly appeal his sentence on any ground, reserving only the right to 

challenge any sentence imposed in excess of the statutory maximum; this 

waiver includes the instant substantive reasonableness challenge. Because 

the appeal waiver was knowing and voluntary and because the Government 

seeks the enforcement of the appeal waiver, the appeal is dismissed. See 

United States v. Walters, 732 F.3d 489, 491 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. 

Ct. 1349 (2014).

 APPEAL DISMISSED.

2

 Case: 13-31197 Document: 00512925990 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/04/2015
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<CIK>                         0000921929
<NAME>                        Frontier Airlines, Inc.

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</TABLE>
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 24 (Friday, February 5, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 6039]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-2562]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Institute of Biomedical Imaging and Bioengineering; 
Notice of Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended (5 U.S.C. App.), notice is hereby given of the following 
meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: National Institute of Biomedical Imaging and 
Bioengineering Special; 2010/05 SBIR Review.
    Date: March 11, 2010.
    Time: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: Gaylord National Hotel & Convention Center, 201 
Waterfront Street, National Harbor, MD 20745.
    Contact Person: John K. Hayes, PhD, Scientific Review Officer, 
6707 Democracy Boulevard, Suite 959, Democracy Two, Bethesda, MD 
20892, 301-451-3398, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#1f777e667a6c755f727e76733171767731787069"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="91f9f0e8f4e2fbd1fcf0f8fdbffff8f9bff6fee7">[email protected]</span></a>.

    Dated: February 1, 2010
Jennifer Spaeth,
Director, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 2010-2562 Filed 2-4-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-P


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Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, November 07, 2018. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. 

# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA, November 07, 2018 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A19I0075. SOLID ROCK PRODUCTIONS, INC. v. RANDALL D. FOX.
Upon consideration of the Application for Interlocutory Appeal, it is ordered that it be hereby DENIED.
LC NUMBERS: 16A61900
EXHIBIT 99.1

                         CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                          18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                          AS ADOPTED PURSUANT BY
               SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


     In connection with the Quarterly Report of Advanced Recycling
Sciences, Inc.,on Form 10-QSB for the period ending March 31, 2003, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), the undersigned, Ehrenfried Liebich, Chief Executive Officer and
John F. Pope, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, that:

          (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13
     (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

          (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
     all material respects, the financial condition and result of
     operations of the Company.



Date: May 20, 2003       /S/  Ehrenfried Liebich
                              -----------------------------------------
                              Ehrenfried Liebich,
                              Principal Executive Officer



Date: May 20, 2003       /S/  John F. Pope
                              -----------------------------------------
                              John F. Pope, Principal Financial Officer
1

The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-1407

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of Minnesota. 

William Edward Miller, * 

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. * 

___________

Submitted: March 12, 2007

Filed: May 7, 2007

___________

Before COLLOTON, BEAM, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

William Miller appeals his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm as

a previously convicted felon. He argues that the district court1

 erred in concluding

that he was an armed career criminal, subject to a statutory minimum sentence of

fifteen years’ imprisonment, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), and by enhancing his advisory

guideline range based on his possession of a firearm in connection with another

felony, USSG § 2K2.1(b)(5) (Nov. 2005). We affirm.
-2-

Miller pled guilty to unlawful possession of the handgun as a previouslyconvicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He was charged after police

found a semi-automatic handgun in a stolen van that Miller was driving at the time of

a traffic accident. 

Prior to the instant offense, Miller had sustained three prior felony convictions

for theft of a motor vehicle, two for attempted theft of a vehicle, and two for

unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18

U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), a statutory minimum sentence of fifteen years’ imprisonment

applies if at least three of Miller’s prior convictions are “violent felonies” under 18

U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). See United States v. Wilson, 406 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir.),

cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 292 (2005). Under our precedent, Miller’s three convictions

for auto theft qualify as violent felonies. Id.; United States v. Barbour, 395 F.3d 826,

827 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 133 (2005); United States v. Sun Bear, 307 F.3d

747, 753 (8th Cir. 2002). These decisions are not undermined by the Supreme Court’s

opinion in Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004), which involved a materially different

statutory provision, see United States v. McCall, 439 F.3d 967, 971 (8th Cir. 2006)(en

banc); Barbour, 295 F.3d at 828, and our precedent, of course, is binding on this

panel. The district court thus properly classified Miller as an armed career criminal

and correctly applied the mandatory minimum term of 180 months’ imprisonment.

Because Miller was sentenced to the statutory minimum term of imprisonment,

a favorable ruling on the question whether he possessed a firearm in connection with

another felony could not reduce his sentence, so we need not consider the issue. The

judgment of the district court is affirmed.

 ______________________________
584 A.2d 229

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. LOUIS K. WATSON.

May 30, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-1702
PALMER RUSSELL FITZGERALD, Plaintiff - Appellant, versusJOHN H. MAJOR, Trading as Major Recording Company, Incorporated, Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Harrisonburg. B. Waugh Crigler, Magistrate Judge. (CA-96-8-H) Submitted: October 3, 1996 Decided: October 9, 1996 Before ERVIN, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Palmer Russell Fitzgerald, Appellant Pro Se. Colin James Steuart Thomas, Jr., TIMBERLAKE, SMITH, THOMAS & MOSES, P.C., Staunton, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* The parties consented to the magistrate judge's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1994). 2 PER CURIAM:Appellant appeals from the magistrate judge's orders dismissing his civil action for lack of federal jurisdiction and granting sanctions against him. * We have reviewed the record and the district court's orders and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the magistrate judge. Fitzgerald v. Taylor , No. CA-96-8-H (W.D. Va. Ma y 6 & 31, 1996). We deny the motions to dismiss the appeal and for summary affirmance without briefs. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
857 A.2d 673

#### Nicholas A. BORSELLO, Jr., Appellant, v. PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION & PAROLE, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Aug. 6, 2004.

*543
      *ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 6th day of August, 2004, probable jurisdiction is noted and the order appealed is affirmed.
#### DADE COUNTY POLICE BENEVOLENT, etc., et al., Appellants, v. The CITY OF NORTH BAY VILLAGE, Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D09-352.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

April 27, 2011.

Rehearing Denied June 3, 2011.

Slesnick & Casey and James C. Casey, for appellants.

Robert D. Soloff, Plantation, for appel-lee.

Before GERSTEN and CORTINAS, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. *See Schnurmacher Holding, Inc. v. Noriega,*542 So.2d 1327 (Fla.1989).
#### Andrew WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D10-928.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

March 18, 2011.

James Dickson Crock, of James Dickson Crock, P.A., Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Ann M. Phillips, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.

PER CURIAM.

We affirm Williams’ convictions and sentences without prejudice to his right to *900seek appropriate and timely post-conviction relief. *See Dunbar v. State,*35 So.3d 54, 55 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (sentencing errors that occur after effective date of amendment to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b), even if formerly deemed fundamental or patent on face of record, cannot be reviewed by appellate court if issue is not raised at sentencing or in timely post-sentencing proceeding pursuant to rule 3.800).

AFFIRMED.

LAWSON, EVANDER and COHEN, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 31.1  302 CERTIFICATION  I, Iryna Clark, certify that:  1. I have reviewed this yearly report on Form 10-K of Lockbox Link, Inc.;  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;  4. I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)), for the registrant and have:  a. Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;  b. Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;  c. Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and  d. Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected or is reasonably likely to materially affect the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and  5. I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):  a. All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and  b. Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal controls over financial reporting.  Date: April 17, 2017  /s/Iryna Clark Iryna Clark Chief Executive Officer Chief Financial Officer
#### URETHANE CORPORATION OF CALIFORNIA, a corporation, Appellant, v. Ralph E. KENNEDY, Individually and as Regional Director for Region Twenty-One (21) of the National Labor Relations Board Appellee, International Chemical Workers Union, Local No. 1, AFL-CIO, Intervenor.

No. 18679.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

May 26, 1964.

McCutchen, Black, Harnagel & Shea, G. William Shea, James K. Herbert, Jr., Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant.

*565Arnold Ordman, Gen. Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, James C. Paras and Stephen B. Goldberg, Attys., N.L.R.B., Washington, D. C., Daniel Harrington, N.L.R.B., Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee.

Bodle & Fogel, Daniel Fogel and Stephen Reinhardt, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee-intervenor International Chemical Workers Union, Local No. 1, AFL-CIO.

Before HAMLEY, HAMLIN and KOELSCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Urethane Corporation of California brought this action against the Regional Director of Region Twenty-One of the National Labor Relations Board to enjoin defendant from ordering or holding a representation election among plaintiff’s employees within twelve months of a previous election. The holding of such an election, it was alleged, would violate section 9(c) (3) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, as amended, 73 Stat. 519, 542; 29 U.S.C. § 159 (c) (3) (1958). Plaintiff also asked for an order directing defendant to certify the results of the previous representation election.

The district court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, and Urethane appealed. At the oral argument counsel for both parties advised the court that there was then pending in the Supreme Court the case of Greyhound Corp. v. Boire, 205 F.Supp. 686 (S.D.Fla.) aff’d 309 F.2d 397 (Fifth Circuit), certiorari granted 372 U.S. 964, 83 S.Ct. 1090, 10 L.Ed.2d 128, the decision in which would be dispositive of this appeal. Following the argument we therefore entered an order providing that the instant case would be deemed submitted when the Supreme Court rendered its decision in the Greyhound case.

The decision of the Supreme Court, sub nom. Boire v. The Greyhound Corp., 84 S.Ct. 894, was rendered on March 23, 1964, and we are advised that no petition for rehearing has been filed therein. It was there held that under circumstances substantially the same as those in the case before us, orders of the National Labor Relations Board in certification proceedings under section 9 (c) of the Act are not directly reviewable in the courts.

The judgment is therefore affirmed.
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585 A.2d 398

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. LEON FIELDS.

October 16, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.