J-S30030-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

NAFEES JORDAN, 

Appellant.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3436 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, September 25, 2017,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0005373-2016.

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED AUGUST 08, 2019

Nafees Jordan appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed after a 

jury convicted him of intimidating a witness/victim and possession of an 

instrument of crime.1 Immediately following the jury trial, the trial court found 

him guilty of persons not to possess a firearm.2 On appeal, Jordan challenges 

three of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings. We affirm.

The trial court summarized in detail the bizarre facts of this case as 

follows:

The victim is Jarrod Melvin (“Jarrod”), who began classes in 

2014 as a freshman at Temple University (“Temple”). He 

was 18 years’ old and resided in off-campus housing at The 

View apartment building, which is located near Temple’s 

campus in the city and county of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4952(a)(1) and 907, respectively.

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).
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When Jarrod first moved into his 12th floor apartment, he 

had three roommates – Isiah Bounds, David Ortiz, and Brian 

Robinson. Their apartment had two bedrooms, each 

containing two beds and a bathroom. There was a “big 

common area in the middle of the apartment” that contained 

a stove and other amenities. Jarrod roomed with Isiah 

Bounds (“Isiah”), with whom he had attended the same high 

school. [Jordan], whom Jarrod first met in the Fall of 2014, 

is Isiah’s cousin. 

In January or February of 2015, Jarrod arrived home to 

his shared apartment and encountered [Jordan] arguing 

with Isiah about money. [Jordan] asked Jarrod if he knew 

“anything about why there’s money missing” and if he had 

“stolen anything from any of the roommates.” Unaware of 

what [Jordan] was talking about, Jarrod said “no.” Jordan 

responded by threatening Jarrod by asking him if he knew 

that he [(Jordan)] could kill him. Jarrod described [Jordan] 

as being only a foot away from him and very aggressive. 

Jarrod believed [Jordan] was capable of such an act and was 

honestly scared that [he] would be killed.

[Jordan] then proposed that he, his girlfriend Lashonda 

Chandler (“Lashonda”), and Lashonda’s two young 

daughters move into Jarrod’s apartment and that would 

settle the argument over the money. [Jordan] never asked 

Jarrod for permission to move into the premises and Jarrod 

was “scared” at the prospect of [Jordan’s] resolution. 

Nevertheless, [Jordan] stayed in the apartment that very 

night, and about three days later Lashonda moved in with 

her 3-year-old and 4-year-old daughters.

By the time [Jordan] and Lashonda moved in, Jarrod’s 

roommate, David Ortiz, had already moved to another 

apartment. Jarrod’s other roommate, Brian Robinson, 

moved out around a month after [Jordan] moved in. Jarrod 

and Isiah thereafter lived in one bedroom while [Jordan], 

Lashonda, and her children lived in the other bedroom. 

After effectively taking over the apartment, [Jordan] told 

Jarrod that he could no longer have his friends come over 

because it would be “bad for their safety.” Again, Jarrod 

believed the threat and told his friends to stay away.

[Jordan] and Lashonda lived in Jarrod’s apartment from 

February 2015 until the end of August 2015. During 
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Temple’s summer session classes, Isiah moved out because 

he failed to pay his rent. Jarrod temporarily received two 

new roommates who stayed in one bedroom while [Jordan] 

and Lashonda stayed in the other bedroom. Jarrod, 

meanwhile, slept on the couch in the apartment’s common 

area.

Despite being relegated to the couch in his own 

apartment, Jarrod believed [Jordan’s] repeated assurances 

that he and Lashonda were trying to find another 

apartment. Eventually the lease expired and management 

refused to renew it because there were people who weren’t 

on the lease staying in the room. Upon learning he could 

not renew his lease at The View, Jarrod began searching for 

other off-campus student housing.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/11/19, at 2-4 (citations omitted). Although Jarrod 

found a new place to live while attending Temple University, Jordan’s conduct 

toward him followed him. As the trial court explained:

In August 2015, Jarrod moved into “The Edge” apartment 

building located at 1601 North 15th Street. Jarrod’s 9-month 

lease required rental payments of $725.00 per month, 

which his mother paid. On Jarrod’s first day at the new 

apartment, [Isiah] and two other friends visited him. A few 

days later, [Jordan] called Jarrod and asked him if he and 

Lashonda could visit. Either that day or the next, [Jordan] 

visited Jarrod’s new apartment with Lashonda and her two 

kids.

[Jordan] and Lashonda toured Jarrod’s new apartment 

and asked eventually if they could stay for the night. Jarrod 

acceded because he “didn’t feel that he could have said no”

and didn’t think they would actually listen to him anyway. 

The following morning, Jarrod heard Lashonda arguing with 

someone on the telephone and was told by [Jordan] that 

their new apartment was not going to work out. [Jordan] 

and Lashonda therefore again stayed overnight at Jarrod’s 

apartment, this time sleeping in Jarrod’s bed while Jarrod 

slept on the floor. Jarrod believed he would “be met with 

either violence or threats” if he refused [Jordan’s] request 

to stay. [Jordan] and Lashonda soon moved in with their 
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possessions. About one month later, [Jordan] took Jarrod’s 

key cards required for entering the apartment.

[Jordan], Lashonda, and her children stayed in Jarrod’s 

second apartment from August 2015 until May 2, 2016. 

While [Jordan] and Lashonda slept in his bed during this 

period, Jarrod slept in the building’s community areas and 

at [Isiah’s] mother’s house.

In February, 2016, while in the apartment, [Jordan] 

showed Jarrod his gun, which Jarrod took to be a threat.

[Jordan] did not verbally threaten Jarrod at that time.

Remarkably, in addition to occupying Jarrod’s second 

apartment, [Jordan] and Lashonda told Jarrod to register for 

Child Care Information Services (CCIS) and misrepresent 

that he was a child care provider for Lashonda’s children. 

Jarrod was required to write an attendance [letter] for 

[Lashonda’s] children saying he was taking care of them five 

days a week from January 2016.” In exchange for 

registering for CCIS, Jarrod received monthly subsidy 

checks for around $400.00, which he gave to [Jordan] until 

about April of 2016. [Jordan] also directed Jarrod to open 

a bank account so that CCIS checks could be directly 

deposited into the account. The account was opened under 

Jarrod’s name but [Jordan] and Lashonda took possession 

of Jarrod’s debit card. For the entire duration of the 

account, Jarrod withdrew only $100.00 for his personal use, 

when he transferred money into his PayPal account.

Jarrod testified that in February 2016 [his] PayPal 

transaction caused his bank account to be [overdrawn]. 

Because of the overdraft, the bank allocated part of the 

monthly CCIS check to compensate for the balance. Upon 

discovering the overdraft, [Jordan] followed through with 

his threats of violence. He punched Jarrod several times 

and then stuck a gun into his mouth and threatened to kill 

him. [Jordan] threatened that if Jarrod told anyone about 

the incident or went to the police, he would kill Jarrod. 

Lashonda videotaped the entire incident with her cell phone.

[Jordan] additionally told Jarrod to register a vehicle 

under his name and purchase automobile insurance. 

Lashonda had paid for the vehicle, but neither she nor 

[Jordan] possessed a driver’s license and thus they could 

not register the automobile. [Jordan] told Jarrod that he 
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had to drive the car on certain situations [sic] because they 

did not have their licenses so they would not get in trouble 

for having a car.

Moreover, while [Jordan] was not himself employed he 

instructed Jarrod to find a job to help [Jordan] and Lashonda 

get their own apartment and move out eventually. With the 

help of [Jordan’s] cousin, Rafi Johnson, Jarrod therefore 

obtained employment as an attendant for Germantown 

Taxicab Company. Jarrod did not want the job, missed 

numerous classes because of the time it consumed, and only 

took the job because he had been “physically threatened by 

[Jordan] and also because [he] was somewhat hopeful that 

they would be able to get their own place and [he] wouldn’t 

have to deal with them ever again.”

Finally, while Jarrod was driving the car with [Jordan], 

Jarrod backed into the vehicle behind him, prompting 

[Jordan] to punch him several times in the face. On another 

occasion in April 2016, while Jarrod was driving to his first 

day of work with [Jordan] in the passenger seat, [Jordan] 

struck Jarrod with an open hand because Jarrod failed to 

check in with his new employer. [Jordan] then asked Jarrod 

“which one of [his] family members did [he] want to die . . 

. [a]nd waited for [Jarrod] to answer the question.” 

Although Jarrod intended to spend that very next weekend 

with his family members, [Jordan] told him that he couldn’t 

go because his parents would see his swollen face from the 

beating. 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/11/19, at 4-6 (citations and footnotes omitted). 

Jordan’s influence on Jarrod finally came to end in the next month, which, 

after an investigation by local authorities, ultimately resulted in Jordan’s 

arrest. As the trial court explained:

A couple weeks later, on May 1, 2016, Jarrod finally went 

home. When his parents asked how school was going, 

Jarrod didn’t answer. He had missed his final exams for the 

second semester and was failing his classes. While trying 

to think of an excuse for his failing grades, Jarrod broke 

down and told his parents what occurred over the previous 
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months. Jarrod had not previously told his parents about 

his situation with [Jordan] because he was scared for his life 

and the lives [of] his family members. 

Philadelphia Police Officer John Gangloff (“Officer 

Gangloff”) testified that Jarrod and his parents presented to 

police headquarters on the evening of May 1, 2016. Jarrod 

informed Officer Gangloff that [Jordan] had taken over his 

apartment, stolen his identity, and threatened to shoot and 

kill him. Officer Gangloff sent Jarrod to Central Detectives 

where he was interviewed by Detective Michael Sweeney in 

the early morning of May 2, 2016. That same morning 

around 6:00 a.m., Detective Sweeney and fellow officers 

executed a search warrant for Jarrod’s apartment, inside 

which they found [Jordan], Lashonda, and Lashonda’s two 

daughters. The officers’ search yielded a loaded handgun, 

bank statements, “CCIS paperwork,” Lashonda’s cell phone, 

car keys, and a “swipe card” for the premises. 

Pursuant to another search warrant, Detective Sweeney 

submitted Lashonda’s cell phone to the district attorney’s 

office which recovered and preserved the video from 

February 2016 that showed [Jordan] sticking a handgun into 

Jarrod’s mouth and threatening to kill him.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/11/19, at 7-8 (citations and footnote omitted).

Finally, the trial court summarized Jordan’s defense case as follows:

In his defense, [Jordan] presented the testimony of 

several of his cousins, including Fatima Johnson, Warren 

Johnson, Rafi Johnson, and [Isiah]. All of these witnesses 

testified that they were friends with [Jordan], socialized with 

[Jordan] and Jarrod, had visited Jarrod’s apartment(s), and 

had never observed Jarrod in distress while in the company 

of [Jordan]. These witnesses testified that Jarrod and 

[Jordan] always behaved as though they were friends.

Id. at 8 (citation and footnote omitted). 

Based on the above facts, Jordan was convicted of the aforementioned 

charges. Although he was also charged with aggravated assault, robbery, 
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burglary, theft, and criminal conspiracy, the Commonwealth did not move on 

the assault charge at trial, and the jury acquitted him of the other charges. 

See Trial Court Opinion, 1/11/19 at 1. This timely appeal followed. Both 

Jordan and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

As noted above, Jordan challenges three of the trial court’s evidentiary 

rulings. He presents these claims as follows:

1. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion in 

sustaining an objection to a question asking why [Jordan]

placed a gun in [Jarrod’s] mouth because the response 

sought would not have involved inadmissible hearsay but 

rather admissible evidence and even if the response 

would have involved [hearsay] it was admissible because 

the Commonwealth opened the door to that area of 

inquiry?

2. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion in 

overruling an objection asking a police detective whether

he believed [Jarrod] and whether he thought that 

[Jarrod] was telling the truth when the detective 

interviewed [Jarrod]?

3. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion in 

overruling an objection to [the closing argument] made 

by the prosecutor because he asked the jury to place 

itself in [Jarrod’s] shoes and personalized the case by 

saying that he could not have endured what [Jarrod]

endured?

See Jordan’s Brief at 3 (excess capitalization omitted). We will address these 

claims in the order presented.

Jordan’s first two claims involve the admissibility of evidence. 

“Questions regarding the admission of evidence are left to the sound discretion 

of the trial court, and we, as an appellate court, will not disturb the trial court’s 
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rulings regarding the admissibility of evidence absent an abuse of that

discretion. Commonwealth v. Pukowsky, 147 A.3d 1229, 1233 (Pa. Super. 

2016). “In general, relevant evidence, i.e., evidence that logically tends to 

establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or 

less probable, or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding a 

material fact, is admissible.” Commonwealth v. Wilson, 147 A.3d 7, 15 

(Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted).

Jordan’s first issue arose at trial during the Commonwealth’s crossexamination of Rafi Johnson who, on direct, testified that Jordan and the 

victim were on friendly terms during the entire time period at issue. Johnson 

maintained this characterization of the relationship even after Jordan showed 

him the February 2016 video. On cross-examination, the following exchange 

occurred:

Q. You thought they were friends?

A. I knew they were friends.

Q. Have you seen the video, in this case, sir?

A. Say that again.

Q. Have you seen the video that was recovered from 

[Lashonda’s] phone in this case?

A. Yes.

Q. You have? When did see it, sir?

A. (No response.)

Q. When did you see the video?

A. (No response.)
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N.T., 7/14/17, at 95. The trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection 

that the prosecutor was being argumentative. The exchange then continued 

as follows:

Q. Sir, I’m very interested in knowing when you would have 

seen the video in this case.

Do you understand my question?

A. (No response.)

THE COURT: You need to answer.

[JOHNSON]: Where did I see the video?

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[BY THE PROSECUTOR]:

Q. When? 

A. I don’t know. 

Q. Well, it was before it was recovered in this case on May 

1, 2016. It would have had to have been.

Who showed you the video, sir?

A. Who showed me the video?

Q. Correct.

A. [Jordan] did.

Q. He did. And tell us about that. 

What was the contexts [sic] of [Jordan] showing you the 

video of him putting a gun in someone else’s mouth?

A. Who do you mean in contact [sic]?

Q. Were you laughing about it?

A. No.

Q. Was there anything funny about the video, sir?

A. No. At the end of the day, no.
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Q. And had you seen the video of [Jordan] putting the gun 

in [Jarrod’s] mouth before or after you offered [Jarrod] the 

job at the taxi cab company?

A. I don’t remember. I honestly don’t remember that, but 

yeah - - I don’t remember.

Q. So you came into court today after seeing the video of 

[Jordan] putting a gun in [Jarrod’s] mouth and you still said 

that [Jordan] and [Jarrod] were friends?

A. Yeah because at the end of the day, [Jordan] told me 

why he did it.

Q. Sir, have any of your friends ever put a gun in your 

mouth and threatened to kill you?

A. No.

[THE PROSECUTOR]: I don’t have any other questions.

THE WITNESS: [Jordan] took the gun from [Jarrod].

N.T., 7/14/17, at 95-97.

On redirect, the following exchange occurred:

[BY DEFENSE COUNSEL]:

Q. When you say [Jordan] told you why he did it, tell him 

what happened?

[THE PROSECUTOR]: Objection. Calls for - -

THE COURT: Sustained.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, he opened the door.

THE COURT: Hold on. Hold on. Do not answer until I -

THE WITNESS: I just answered all his questions.

THE COURT: You need to not answer if there’s an 

objection until I rule on the objection, sir. That’s how the 

rules work. I’m sustaining the objection.

[BY DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Can you finish your answer?
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THE COURT: I sustained the objection so that means he 

cannot finish.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You’re not going to allow him to 

finish his answer - -

THE COURT: That’s correct.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: - - in response to the question?

THE COURT: That’s correct. Don’t argue with me, 

Counsel.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Just note my objection that 

you’re cutting me off on redirecting this witness when [the 

prosecutor] opened the door.

THE COURT: Your objection is noted.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Fine. I have no further questions.

N.T., 7/14/17, at 97-98.

Jordan argues that, because of the trial court’s erroneous ruling, he 

“suffered reversible error.” Jordan’s Brief at 18. According to Jordan:

The law clearly permitted counsel to ask the disallowed 

question because the response sought would not have 

contained hearsay and even if it would have, the 

Commonwealth had opened the door to the area of inquiry 

thereby allowing the defense to ask the question. [Defense] 

counsel’s questioning on re-direct examination was, indeed, 

“a fair response” to the Commonwealth’s questions on 

cross-examination, as the excluded evidence was both 

relevant and admissible to demonstrate that the incident 

depicted on the cell phone video between [Jordan] and 

[Jarrod] was not adversarial at all.

Id. This claim does not warrant relief for a number of reasons.

Initially, we agree with the Commonwealth’s assertion that Jordan did 

not adequately preserve this claim. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 11. A party
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preserves a claim that the trial court erred in excluding evidence only when 

“a party informs the court of its substance by an offer of proof, unless the 

substance was apparent from the context.” Pa.R.E. 103(a)(2). Jordan made 

no such proffer, and the substance of Jordan’s proposed response was not 

apparent. Although in his brief, Johnson proffers two alternative responses to 

his counsel’s question, in order to preserve the claim, Jordan had to make this 

proffer at the time of the Commonwealth’s objection. See Commonwealth 

v. Parker, 847 A.2d 745, 749-750 (Pa. Super. 2004) (holding defendant 

waived objection to Commonwealth witness’ testimony when he did not raise 

his objection until after both parties rested).

Notwithstanding waiver, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that 

it properly sustained the Commonwealth’s objection because Johnson’s 

response would have been inadmissible hearsay. “[H]earsay is an out-ofcourt statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted and is inadmissible 

unless it falls within an exception to the hearsay rule.” Commonwealth v. 

Manivannan, 186 A.3d 472, 482 (Pa. Super. 2018). Jordan contends that 

the answer to his counsel’s question did not call for a hearsay response

because “the question asked Johnson ‘what happened’ and not what [Jordan] 

may have said while screening the video.” Jordan’s Brief at 19. We disagree. 

Because Johnson was not present when Lashonda recorded the video on her 

phone, he could only know “what happened” by what Jordan told him. As the 

trial court explained:
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The only conceivable relevance of [Jordan’s] out-of-court 

statements would be to establish that [Jordan’s] conduct 

was justified or excused. To possess evidentiary value, 

[Jordan’s] purported declarations depended on the truth of 

[Jordan’s] explanation for the videotaped incident, and they 

therefore were hearsay.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/11/19, at 11 (footnote omitted). It was within the trial 

court’s discretion to infer that counsel’s question called for a hearsay 

response. Pukowsky, supra. 

In addition, the Commonwealth did not “open the door” to defense 

counsel’s inquiry. A litigant opens the door to the introduction of otherwise 

inadmissible evidence “by presenting proof that creates a false impression 

refuted by otherwise prohibited evidence.” Commonwealth v. Nypaver, 69 

A.3d 708, 716 (Pa. Super. 2013). The Commonwealth did not create a false 

impression regarding the video at issue. As seen in the above exchanges,

although the Commonwealth asked Johnson about the context in which Jordan 

showed him the video, Johnson did not respond. N.T., 7/14/17, at 96. 

Further, the Commonwealth did not ask additional questions once Johnson 

stated that Jordan told him “why he did it.” N.T., 7/14/17, at 97. Instead, 

Johnson later gave an unsolicited response that Jordan told him that Jordan 

had taken the gun from Jarrod. N.T., 7/14/17, at 97. With this response, the 

Commonwealth did not “open the door” thereby permitting defense counsel 

to ask additional questions based on Johnson’s initial hearsay response.

Finally, Jordan does not explain how, given all the other evidence, 

including Jarrod’s testimony concerning the video, and the display of the video 
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to the jury on more than one occasion, resulted in “reversible error.” “To 

constitute reversible error, an evidentiary ruling must not only be erroneous, 

but also harmful or prejudicial to the complaining party.” Manivannan, 186 

A.3d at 480 (citation omitted). Jordan has not made such a demonstration. 

Thus, for all of these reasons, Jordan’s first issue fails.

In his second issue, Jordan claims that he is entitled to a new trial 

because the trial court abused its discretion, when, on redirect, the court 

permitted the prosecutor to ask the police detective who interviewed Jarrod 

whether he believed Jarrod was telling the truth when he described Jordan’s 

actions toward him.

Detective Michael Sweeney interviewed Jarrod when he came into 

Central Detectives on May 2, 2016. When called as a witness by the 

Commonwealth, Detective Sweeney detailed various statements Jarrod made 

about Jordan’s interactions with him during the sixteen-month period in 

question. Detective Sweeney also testified that he subsequently learned of 

the cell phone video.

On cross-examination, defense counsel explored with the detective 

what attempts he made to corroborate Jarrod’s statements before seeking the 

search warrant for Jarrod’s apartment and learned there were little to no 

efforts expended. At one point, Detective Sweeney agreed with defense 

counsel’s statement “after [he] saw the video . . . [he] just went with this 

case[.]” N.T., 7/13/17, at 160. The following exchange then occurred:

[BY DEFENSE COUNSEL]:
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Q. I understand. So you gave the statement [sic]. You 

know sometimes when people give statements, they don’t

always tell the truth, right?

A. Yes.

Q. Right?

A. Yes.

Q. So you just believed this, even though sometimes, you 

know, when people give a statement they sometimes don’t 

give the full truth, right?

A. It happens.

N.T., 7/13/17, at 172-73.

On redirect, after going over Jordan’s statement, the prosecutor referred 

back to defense counsel’s cross-examination. The following exchange then 

occurred:

[BY THE PROSECUTOR]:

Q. On cross-examination defense [counsel] asked you, 

Sometimes [sic] people lie in statements; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. When [Jarrod] told you this story on May 2, 2016, at 

around 1:00 a.m., did you believe him?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.

THE COURT: Overruled.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It’s for the jury.

THE COURT: Overruled.

[BY THE PROSECUTOR]:

Q. Why?

A. The detail.
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N.T., 7/13/17, at 180-81.

In support of his claim of reversible error, Jordan asserts “[u]nder 

Pennsylvania jurisprudence, the issue of whether a witness is telling the truth 

or not is a jury function.” Jordan’s Brief at 23 (citing Commonwealth v. Lee, 

956 A.2d 1024, 1029 (Pa. Super. 2008)). In addition, he contends, “a party 

may not present opinion evidence as to whether or not a witness’s testimony

is credible, as this intrudes on the fact-finder’s province.” Id. (citing 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 567 A.2d 1080, 1082 (Pa. Super. 1989), and 

Commonwealth v. Seese, 517 A.2d 920, 922 (Pa. 1986)). According to 

Jordan, “Such testimony is never proper, and for the [trial court] to have 

allowed the testimony was nothing but error poisoning a fundamental aspect 

of a criminal trial: the trial by jury.” Jordan’s Brief at 25. He further argues:

The Commonwealth used the detective to instruct the jury 

that [Jarrod] was a person whom they should believe. In 

the context of this case, such commentary was unassailable 

by the defense because of the fact that the opinion that 

[Jarrod] was believable and truthful came from a police 

detective who by his position and title lent an imprimatur of 

infallibility to the opinion he rendered. As such the ruling 

by the trial court deprived [Jordan] of a fair trial. 

Id.

While we do not disagree with Jordan’s statement of Pennsylvania law, 

we also agree with the trial court that Detective Sweeney’s otherwise 

inadmissible opinion testimony properly was admitted. As the trial court 

explained:
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The questioning on re-direct was substantially the same 

line of questioning elicited by defense counsel on crossexamination, where defense counsel examined Detective 

Sweeney regarding why he believed the statement that 

Jarrod provided. Accordingly, defense counsel opened the 

door to the redirect testimony at issue, and [Jordan’s] claim 

of error is baseless.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/11/19, at 13. Here, defense counsel’s questioning left 

the juror’s with the false impression that Jarrod was not telling Detective 

Sweeney the entire truth. Nypaver, supra.

3

We further agree with the trial court’s conclusion that, to the extent any 

error occurred in permitting Detective Sweeney’s response to a single 

question, any error was harmless. As the trial court further explained:

Furthermore, even if the redirect testimony was 

erroneously admitted, no relief is merited. “[N]ot all errors 

at trial entitle an appellant to a new trial, and the harmless 

error doctrine, as adopted in Pennsylvania, reflects, the 

reality that the accused is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect 

trial.” Commonwealth v. Watson, 945 A.2d 174, 177 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (citations omitted). “Harmless error exists

when: (1) the error did not prejudice the defendant or the 

prejudice was de minimus; or (2) the erroneously admitted 

evidence was merely cumulative of other untainted evidence 

which was substantially similar to the erroneously admitted 

____________________________________________

3

Interestingly, although Jordan relied on the Commonwealth “opening the 

door” as a basis for relief in his first issue, as to this finding by the trial court 

as to his second issue, Jordan argues that “the ‘fair response’ doctrine has 

been the subject of much abuse, has been properly criticized as promoting 

prosecutorial ‘lawlessness,’ and should be abandoned. Jordan’s Brief at 27. 

As Jordan cites no authority for these statements, we do not address them 

further. See Commonwealth v. Tielsch, 934 A.2d 81, 93 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(holding that undeveloped claims will not be considered on appeal).
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evidence; or (3) the properly admitted and uncontradicted 

evidence of guilt was so overwhelming and the prejudicial 

effect of the error so insignificant by comparison that the 

error could not have contributed to the verdict.” Id.

The challenged testimony was “merely cumulative” of the 

testimony that defense counsel elicited on crossexamination, and its admission therefore was harmless. 

Moreover, the jury convicted [Jordan] of intimidating 

[Jarrod] and possessing an instrument of crime. Since there 

was chilling videotape evidence of [Jordan] sticking a gun 

into Jarrod’s mouth and threatening to kill him if he 

disclosed the abuse to anyone, the evidence of guilt “was so 

overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the [alleged] 

error so insignificant by comparison that the error could not 

have contributed to the verdict.” [Watson,] supra.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/11/19, at 13. 

In addition, we note that, given Jordan’s acquittal of other charges, 

including robbery and burglary, Detective Sweeney’s opinion of Jordan’s 

truthfulness did not unduly affect the jury’s deliberations. Thus, for all of the 

above reasons, Jordan’s second issue fails.

Jordan’s third issue involves a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. Our 

standard of review is well settled:

[P]rosecutorial misconduct does not take place unless the 

unavoidable effect of the comments at issue was to 

prejudice the jurors by forming in their minds a fixed bias 

and hostility toward the defendant, thus impeding their 

ability to weigh the evidence objectively and render a true 

verdict. . . . In reviewing a claim of improper prosecutorial 

comments, our standard of review is whether the trial court 

abused its discretion. When considering such a claim, our 

attention is focused on whether the defendant was deprived 

of a fair trial, not a perfect one, because not every 

inappropriate remark . . . constitutes reversible error.
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Commonwealth v. Noel, 53 A.3d 848, 858 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations 

omitted). “Prosecutorial misconduct, however, will not be found where the 

comments were based on evidence or proper inferences therefrom or were 

only oratorical flair.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 884 A.2d 920, 927 (Pa. 

Super. 2005) (citation omitted). In order to evaluate whether comments were 

improper, we must look to the context in which they were made. Id. 

The remark Jordan challenges came at the beginning of the prosecutor’s 

closing. Read in context, it was as follows:

Ladies and gentlemen, during this week, we’ve all heard 

the horrific details of what two people this defendant 

[Jordan] and Lashonda Chandler, did to an 18-year-old kid 

who left home and went to college and was living by himself 

for the first time in his life. And as tough as it was to sit 

here and listen to Jarrod for two days go through all the 

details of what happened to him and what they did to him, 

and as difficult as it was to watch that video and to see the 

violence he endured, it does not compare to what he 

actually went through. It doesn’t even come close. He went 

through this for over a year. Over a year.

When you receive the evidence in this case, you receive 

it in this courtroom. It’s a nice bright courtroom. It’s filled 

with professionals. Everyone is polite. People are wearing 

suits. There’s a Judge making sure we all stay in line. 

There’s sheriffs making sure we’re all safe. And it has to 

be that way because if you allowed yourselves to 

actually experience and see and feel what Jarrod 

experienced, I’m not sure you could all handle it. I 

know I couldn’t.

N.T., 7/14/17, at 157-58 (emphasis). At this point defense counsel objected, 

the trial court overruled it, and the prosecutor continued his closing.
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In support of his claim that the trial court’s failure to sustain his 

objection caused reversible error, Jordan contends “[t]he prosecutor’s 

comment that he could not undergo what [Jarrod] herein did clearly was 

meant to have jury members place themselves in [Jarrod’s] position and feel 

sympathy for him.” Id. at 30. He further asserts his case is controlled by 

Commonwealth v. Cherry, 378 A.2d 800 (Pa. 1977), where our Supreme 

Court found reversible error when the prosecutor invoked the jury’s sympathy 

to explain the inconsistencies in the witness/victim’s testimony. According to 

Jordan, the prosecutor in his closing in this case, “attempted to explain away 

any inconsistencies in [Jarrod’s testimony] by asking the jury members to put 

themselves in his shoes, and in so doing, wrongfully shifted the jurors’ focus 

away from [Jordan’s] guilt or innocence and replaced it with a plea to the jury 

that it consider what [Jarrod] allegedly underwent in this case.” Jordan’s Brief 

at 31. 

Once again, we agree with the Commonwealth’s assertion that Jordan

did not adequately preserve this claim by making a motion for mistrial. See 

Commonwealth v. Boring, 684 A.2d 561, 568 (Pa. Super. 1996) (finding 

claims of prosecutorial misconduct are waived when a defendant’s objection 

to a prosecutor’s statement is granted, but no additional relief is requested).

Notwithstanding waiver, we agree with the following comments by the 

trial court:

Here, the prosecutor’s above-cited comments merely 

stress the indubitable point that hearing testimony about 

violent events in the courtroom setting is less alarming than 
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actually experiencing the events. Moreover, in this case, 

the jury watched the absolutely chilling video recording of 

Jarrod with the gun in his mouth while [Jordan] threatened 

to kill him. To the extent the prosecutor offered his opinion 

about whether he or the jurors could “handle” what Jarrod 

experienced, such trivial surplusage could not possibly have 

“fixed” in the jury a “bias and hostility towards the accused 

which would prevent them from properly weighing the 

evidence and rendering a true verdict.” 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/11/19, at 15-16 (citation omitted).

The above comments by the trial court readily indicate that the trial 

court would have denied Jordan’s motion for mistrial had Jordan made one. 

Based on our review of the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court 

would have abused its discretion. See Commonwealth v. Bryant, 67 A.3d 

716, 728 (Pa. 2013) (explaining an appellate court reviews the denial of a 

mistrial motion for an abuse of discretion). 

Moreover, Jordan’s reliance upon Cherry is misplaced. With the above 

comment, the prosecutor did not ask the jury to place themselves in Jarrod’s 

shoes in order to invoke sympathy for him. Rather, as stated by the 

Commonwealth, “[t]he thrust of the prosecutor’s statement was not to ask 

the jury to put itself in [Jarrod’s] shoes, but to stress the idea that hearing 

testimony of nefarious events is less disturbing than seeing them unfold 

firsthand.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 21. In Cherry, our Supreme Court found 

reversible error occurred because the prosecutor attempted to explain away 

inconsistencies or gaps in the witness/victim’s testimony by referencing her 

status as a victim of crime. Cherry, 378 A.2d at 804-05. 
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Here, by contrast, the prosecutor made no such representations. While 

the prosecutor’s comment that neither he nor the members of the jury could 

“handle” what Jarrod experienced may have been unwise, under the facts of 

this case—a brief statement at the beginning of an otherwise lengthy closing—

we cannot conclude that reversible error occurred. See Commonwealth v. 

Clark, 421 A.2d 374, 379, (Pa. Super. 1980), affirmed, 461 A.2d 794 (Pa. 

1983) (distinguishing cases such as Cherry, supra, and holding that 

reversible error did not occur because the prosecutor’s statements were of 

very limited duration and “were not part of an apparent attempt to focus the 

jury’s attention on issues not before them or invite them to render an 

unreasoned verdict”); see also Commonwealth v. Stafford, 749 A.2d 489, 

499 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citing Clark, supra, when rejecting Stafford’s claim 

that the prosecutor violated “the ‘Golden Rule’ prohibition against asking the 

jury to put themselves in the place of a witness in order to inflame their 

passions”).

Finally, we note that the prosecutor’s comment did not prevent the jury 

from properly weighing the evidence and rendering a verdict, as it acquitted 

Jordan of the four most serious charges he was facing, and convicted him of 

only intimidation of a witness and a firearm violation. Sufficient evidence to 

support these verdicts came from the February 2016 video itself. As the trial 

court stated:

The remarkable course of events over a nearly two (2) year 

period wherein [Jordan] terrorized [Jarrod] by threat of 

violence, and then carried through on those threats by 
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physically assaulting and threatening to kill him while 

shoving a gun in his mouth provided ample evidence upon 

which this jury convicted [Jordan.]

Trial Court Opinion, 1/11/19, at 16.

In sum, because each claim raised by Jordan is waived or otherwise 

meritless, we affirm his judgment of sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

 Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/8/19