SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NOS. A-3275-17T4

 A-3382-17T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

GEORGE T. THOMPSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

BRIAN D. THOMPSON,

a/k/a BOO THOMPSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

 

Submitted May 6, 2019 – Decided June 19, 2019

Before Judges Messano and Rose.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-3275-17T4

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Cape May County, Indictment No. 15-12-

1009.

Stefankiewicz & Belasco, LLC, attorneys for appellant 

in A-3275-17 (David A. Stefankiewicz, on the briefs).

Wayne Powell, attorney for appellant in A-3382-17.

Jeffrey H. Sutherland, Cape May County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Gretchen A. Pickering, 

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the briefs).

PER CURIAM

These two appeals, calendared back-to-back and consolidated for 

purposes of our opinion, arise out of a single indictment charging defendants 

George T. Thompson and his brother, Brian D. Thompson,1 with several 

weapons-related offenses. The charges ensued from an early morning 9-1-1 call 

reporting gunshots were fired near an intersection in Middle Township. 

Defendants lived with their mother in a nearby home. 

Following the denial of their joint motion to suppress evidence, 

defendants pled guilty to separate counts of the indictment, charging seconddegree unlawful possession of a handgun without a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) 

and N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4, pursuant to negotiated plea agreements with the State. 

 

1 Because defendants share the same last name, we refer to them throughout this 

opinion by their first names. In doing so, we intend no disrespect.
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A-3275-17T4

On February 15, 2018, the court sentenced both defendants in accordance with 

the State's recommendations. Defendants now appeal from a June 17, 2016 Law 

Division order denying their suppression motion; neither defendant challenges 

his sentence. 

On appeal, George raises the following points for our consideration:

POINT I

THE POLICE TRESPASSED UPON THE 

CURTILAGE OF THE [THOMPSON] HOME TO 

CONDUCT THE SEARCH OF THE VEHICLES 

THEREON, AND, THEREFORE, THE EVIDENCE 

WHICH DERIVED FROM THIS ILLEGAL ENTRY 

MUST BE SUPPRESSED. 

POINT II

THE POLICE UNLAWFULLY ENTERED THE 

THOMPSON RESIDENCE WITHOUT WARRANT 

[SIC] AND ALL EVIDENCE WHICH DERIVED 

THEREFROM MUST BE SUPPRESSED. 

POINT III

EVEN IF THE COURT CONCLUDES THAT 

GEORGE'S CAR WAS NOT ON PROTECTED 

CURTILAGE THE SEARCH OF IT AND THE 

ENSUING WARRANT MUST BE EXCLUDED AS 

FRUITS OF THE POISONOUS TREE DUE TO THE 

ANTECEDENT ILLEGALITY. 
4

A-3275-17T4

POINT IV

THE SEARCH WARRANT AS TO GEORGE'S CAR 

WAS TAINTED BY FALSE, MISLEADING AND 

ILL-GOTTEN EVIDENCE AND IS, THEREFORE, 

INVALID AND/OR OTHERWISE ENTITLES 

[GEORGE] TO A TESTIMONIAL HEARING TO 

CHALLENGE THE INFORMATION THEREIN. 

POINT V

EVEN WITH THE FALSE, MISLEADING AND ILLGOTTEN EVIDENCE THE SEARCH WARRANT 

APPLICATION STILL LACKED SUFFICIENT 

INFORMATION TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE 

CAUSE TO SEARCH GEORGE'S CAR AND 

THEREFORE ALL EVIDENCE SEIZED 

THEREFROM MUST BE SUPPRESSED. 

Brian offers the following arguments in his brief:

POINT I

THE COURT BELOW COMMITTED ERROR BY 

DENYING [BRIAN]'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE 

EVIDENCE SEIZED

A. THE WARRANTLESS ENTRY ONTO THE 

CURTILAGE OF [THE THOMPSON] HOME AND 

SEARCH OF A VEHICLE LOCATED THERE 

CONSTITUTED A VIOLATION OF [BRIAN'S] 

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM 

UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES. 

B. POLICE WERE WITHOUT VALID CONSENT TO 

ENTER THE [THOMPSON] HOME AND ANY 

EVIDENCE RESULTING FROM THE UNLAWFUL 

INTRUSION SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED. 
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C. THE ARREST OF [BRIAN] WAS WITHOUT 

PROBABLE CAUSE AND WAS OTHERWISE 

UNLAWFUL AS POLICE WERE WITHOUT A 

WARRANT TO ARREST HIM IN HIS HOME.

We reject defendants' contentions, with the exception of George's Point II 

and Brian's Point IB, finding police entry into the Thompson home was unlawful 

and the evidence seized therein should have been suppressed. We therefore 

affirm in part and reverse in part. 

I.

We derive the salient facts from the record developed at the suppression 

hearing. Three members of the Middle Township Police Department (MTPD) 

testified on behalf of the State: Patrolman Joseph Gamble; Corporal Phillip 

Johnson; and Detective Kenneth Martin. Among other items, the State moved 

into evidence, without objection, photographs and an aerial view of the exterior 

of the Thompson residence and surrounding area. Defendants did not testify nor 

present any evidence. 

At approximately 2:55 a.m. on August 9, 2015, MTPD officers were 

dispatched to an intersection in Middle Township, after a caller reported 

gunshots had been fired from the direction of "a large house party" in the area. 

Upon his arrival at the scene, Officer Jonas McInnis radioed that he heard a 

gunshot. About twenty to fifty people "were scattering" from the area when 
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police approached. They were unwilling to speak with police. Gamble met with 

McInnis, who "was trying to gain control of some of the subjects in the 

surrounding area." McInnis had detained one suspect and told Gamble he was 

also looking for Brian, who was known to the MTPD for his "adverse contacts" 

and because he had been the victim of a shooting. 

While searching for Brian, Gamble recovered a spent cartridge amid 

debris in the street near the corner of the intersection. Gamble testified that the 

cartridge looked as though it recently had been discharged because it was clean 

and shiny. The cartridge was labeled "9X19." 

Gamble then noticed Brian, who was standing next to a blue Mercury sport 

utility vehicle (SUV). The SUV was parked on the grass in a side lot more than 

twelve yards from the Thompson home and about ten to fifteen feet from the 

street. Other vehicles were parked in the lot. Gamble approached Brian, asking 

"why he was at the vehicle" which "made [Brian] walk away" from the car. 

Using his flashlight to see whether anyone was inside the car, Gamble noticed 

an AR-15 rifle laying across the rear seat. Dispatch confirmed the SUV was 

registered to Brian. 

After Gamble observed the rifle, he saw Brian walking toward the front 

door of the Thompson residence. Gamble and McInnis then knocked on the 
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door, which was answered by defendants' mother. While the officers were 

speaking with her, they saw Brian standing in the rear of the living room, about 

twenty feet from the door. The officers asked Brian to step outside. Instead of 

complying with their request, Brian "stood there. He reached his hand in his 

pocket, threw a few items on the ground behind him as [the officers] went in to 

get him." Those items included two .223 ammunition rounds, which matched 

an AR-15 rifle. Gamble had taken "one step" inside the residence when he saw 

Brian toss the items to the floor. The officers immediately arrested Brian inside 

the home and recovered an additional .223 round during a protective pat down. 

On cross-examination by Brian's counsel, Gamble said defendants' mother 

gave consent for the officers to enter the home while she was speaking with 

McInnis at the front door, but he could not recall their exact conversation. 

Gamble acknowledged his report did not mention he and McInnis entered the 

Thompson residence based on the consent of defendants' mother. No testimony 

was elicited as to whether defendants' mother was advised she had the right to 

refuse consent. 

Meanwhile, MTPD officers looked inside most of the cars in the vicinity, 

especially in areas "where people were walking." A black Lincoln sedan, 

registered to George, was parked partially "at the foot of the [Thompson] 
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A-3275-17T4

driveway . . . almost on the street." The front of the car was parked on the 

Thompson's lawn, appearing as though it had "crashed into the tree . . . in the 

front yard." Using a flashlight, Johnson looked inside the sedan and saw "a bag 

on the floor . . . [that] looked like it contained . . . a box . . . [of] bullets." 

Thereafter, police towed Brian's SUV and George's sedan to the MTPD 

impound lot while Martin applied for warrants to search both vehicles. Pertinent 

to this appeal, Martin's affidavits indicated Brian's vehicle was "parked in a 

vacant lot" next to the Thompson property. The affidavits also stated the MTPD 

"observed a black duffle bag containing an ammunition box labeled 9X19" on 

the floor of George's vehicle. 

Following issuance of the search warrants, officers recovered from Brian's 

SUV the AR-15 assault rifle Gamble had observed on the rear seat; a .38 caliber 

revolver; and a case, scope and ammunition box for the AR-15 rifle. A search 

of George's sedan revealed a .45 caliber handgun, two loaded magazines for that 

handgun, twenty-six rounds of nine millimeter bullets, and thirty-six rounds of 

hollow-point bullets. The nine millimeter ammunition matched the 9X19 spent 

cartridge Gamble recovered earlier from the street. 

After the hearing concluded, the motion judge reserved decision. 

Thereafter, the judge rendered an oral opinion, denying defendants' motion. On 
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June 16, 2016, the judge issued a supplemental written opinion correcting 

certain factual findings, but reaching the same conclusion.

After reviewing the record and canvassing the relevant case law, the judge 

made credibility and factual findings, which were largely consistent with the 

recitation of facts set forth above. The judge found "all three law enforcement 

officers who testified were highly credible and reliable." Ultimately, the judge 

determined both motor vehicles were located outside the protected curtilage of 

the Thompson home; the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Brian; 

defendants' mother granted the officers permission to enter the Thompson home; 

and any discrepancies in Martin's search warrant affidavit did not necessitate a 

Franks2 hearing. 

II.

Well-settled legal principles guide our analysis. Our review of a trial 

court's decision on a suppression motion is circumscribed. We defer to the 

court's factual and credibility findings, as long as they are supported by 

sufficient credible evidence in the record. State v. Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521, 538 

(2017). Deference is afforded because the "findings of the trial judge . . . are 

substantially influenced by his [or her] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses 

 

2 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). 
10 A-3275-17T4

and to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." State 

v. Reece, 222 N.J. 154, 166 (2015) (first alteration in original) (quoting State v. 

Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999)). We disregard a trial court's factual and 

credibility findings only if clearly mistaken. State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 

262 (2015). "We accord no deference, however, to a trial court's interpretation 

of law, which we review de novo." Dunbar, 229 N.J. at 538. 

A.

Initially, we address defendants' overlapping arguments that their motor 

vehicles were located on the Thompson home's protected curtilage and, as such, 

the officers had no right to search the vehicles without first obtaining warrants. 

In New Jersey, it is well settled that "[c]ertain lands adjacent to a dwelling 

called the 'curtilage' have always been viewed as falling within the coverage of 

the Fourth Amendment." State v. Johnson, 171 N.J. 192, 208 (2002) (alteration 

in original). However, "[a]n area within the curtilage to which the public is 

welcome, such as a walkway leading to an entrance to a home, is not afforded 

Fourth Amendment protection because the resident has given implicit consent 

to visitors to approach the home that way." State v. Domicz, 188 N.J. 285, 302 

(2006); see also Johnson, 171 N.J. at 209 (declaring the Fourth Amendment is 

not offended "when the police come on to private property to conduct an 
11 A-3275-17T4

investigation or for some other legitimate purpose and restrict their movements 

to places visitors could be expected to go"). In addition to walkways, curtilage 

may also include porches and driveways. Domicz, 188 N.J. at 302. 

The appropriate inquiry is whether the officers have intruded into an area 

the resident seeks to preserve as private. Accordingly, when the police restrict 

their movements on private property to places visitors could be expected to 

enter, observations they make from such vantage points are not protected by the 

Fourth Amendment. Johnson, 171 N.J. at 209. No user of curtilage that can be 

accessed by multiple persons can have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 

that area. Ibid. 

As the motion judge recognized here, the extent to which curtilage is 

protected against unreasonable searches and seizures depends on the wellknown factors set forth by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. 

Dunn (Dunn factors): 

[T]he proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to 

the home, whether the area is included within an 

enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses 

to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the 

resident to protect the area from observation by people 

passing by. 

[480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987).]
12 A-3275-17T4

New Jersey courts have utilized the Dunn factors in determining the propriety 

of a search in curtilage. See Domicz, 188 N.J. at 302; Johnson, 171 N.J. at 208-

09; State v. Lane, 393 N.J. Super. 132, 145 (App. Div. 2007). 

However, as support for their arguments, defendants cite Collins v. 

Virginia, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 1663 (2018). Collins, which was decided by 

the United States Supreme Court nearly two years after the motion judge 

rendered her decision here, specifically addressed whether the automobile 

exception applies to a vehicle parked in a partially enclosed section of a 

residential driveway. Id. at 1670-73. Notably, the defendant's motorcycle was 

parked under a tarp in the top portion of the driveway, which was "enclosed on 

two sides by a brick wall about the height of a car and [on] a third side by the 

house." Id. at 1670. Under those facts, the Court determined the curtilage of 

the house included the top portion of the driveway because it was "an area 

adjacent to the home and to which the activity of home life extends." Id. at 1671 

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7 

(2013)).

Conversely, the facts of the present case support the motion judge's 

conclusion that neither vehicle was located within the Thompson home's 
13 A-3275-17T4

protected curtilage. In particular, applying the Dunn factors to Brian's SUV, the 

judge aptly determined the vehicle

was outside the curtilage because, as Gamble testified, 

it was several yards away from the house itself, not 

within an area enclosed by the house fence, there was 

no objective indication that the spot where the car was 

parked was used for intimate activities associated with 

the home, and there was no protection from observation 

by those standing on the sidewalk or in the street. 

Indeed, other individuals even had their cars parked 

around the same spot and were coming and going as 

officers arrived on the scene.

The judge also found "[f]or the same reasons" that George's sedan "was not 

located in the protect[ed] curtilage either." 

From our review of the record, we conclude the totality of the 

circumstances sufficiently supports the judge's findings, which were based on 

the judge's assessment of the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified and the 

judge's feel of the case. Accordingly, we defer to her findings. Reece, 222 N.J. 

at 166. We simply note George's car was even more removed from the curtilage 

of the Thompson home than was Brian's. As Gamble testified, the sedan was 

"barely on the driveway . . . part[ly] on the driveway, part[ly] on the grassy 

area[.]" 

Moreover, police had a duty to investigate the early morning 9-1-1 call of 

gunshots fired from the direction of a large party in a residential neighborhood. 
14 A-3275-17T4

That call was corroborated by the events that quickly unfolded after officers 

were dispatched to the scene: McInnis heard a gunshot; the crowd scattered and 

was uncooperative; Gamble recovered a "fresh spent round"; and Brian walked 

away from Gamble when questioned about his reason for being near the SUV. 

Accordingly, the officers' entry onto the Thompson property also was justified 

by the exigency of those circumstances. See State v. Hathaway, 222 N.J. 453, 

468 (2015) (quoting State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6, 30 (2009)) (recognizing 

"'exigent circumstances are present when law enforcement officers do not have 

sufficient time to obtain any form of warrant' because of the immediate and 

urgent circumstances confronting them").

B.

Next, we consider defendants' arguments that police unlawfully entered 

the Thompson home. Defendants maintain the State failed to establish their 

mother permitted police to enter the home: George cites Gamble's inability to 

recount the conversation between McInnis and defendants' mother, during which 

she allegedly gave consent; Brian contends the State failed to establish her 

consent was voluntary and that she was informed she had a right to refuse 

consent to enter. 
15 A-3275-17T4

Under New Jersey law, the police are not obligated to advise a person of 

his or her right to refuse, at least where, as here, the person being asked for 

consent is not in custody. State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 354 (1975). 

Interpreting Johnson on precisely this point, we have explicitly held "Johnson

does not compel the police to specifically advise the property owner . . . of the 

affirmative right to refuse an inspection." State v. Farmer, 366 N.J. Super. 307, 

314 (App. Div. 2004). 

Nonetheless, "[w]hile the State need not prove that the third person was 

informed of a right to refuse consent, the State has the burden of demonstrating 

knowledge on the part of the third party that he had a choice in the matter." State 

v. Douglas, 204 N.J. Super. 265, 277 (App. Div. 1985) (citations omitted). 

"[T]he State is required to prove voluntariness by clear and positive testimony." 

Ibid. (citing State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352 (1965)); see also State v. Chapman, 

332 N.J. Super. 452, 466 (App. Div. 2000) (alteration in original) 

("Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances

. . . ."); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973). 

In the present case, the judge concluded defendants' mother granted the 

officers permission to enter the Thompson home. The judge did not, however, 

make any specific findings regarding the voluntariness of her consent. From the 
16 A-3275-17T4

scant testimony elicited from Gamble, who did not speak directly with 

defendants' mother nor specifically recall the conversation between her and 

McInnis, it is difficult to discern whether she knew she "had a choice in the 

matter." See Douglas, 204 N.J. Super. at 277. Indeed, the prosecutor did not 

ask Gamble any questions whatsoever relating to consent. Nor was any 

testimony adduced about defendants' mother's demeanor or the duration of her 

conversation with McInnis before police entered the Thompson home. Rather, 

the sequence of events suggests Gamble saw Brian in the living room as soon as 

defendants' mother opened the door; Gamble asked Brian to exit; instead Brian 

discarded the ammunition, all of which occurred while Gamble had one step 

inside the door. The record therefore does not establish, directly or 

circumstantially, that defendants' mother voluntarily permitted police to enter 

her residence. 

Accordingly, we are constrained to suppress the evidence seized from the 

Thompson home. Although we disagree with the trial judge's determination 

regarding consent, we hasten to add our decision has no impact on the validity 

of the searches of either vehicle.3 Excising the references to the ammunition 

 

3 Arguably, police could have seized the AR-15 rifle from Brian's SUV without 

first obtaining a search warrant pursuant to the plain-view exception to the 
17 A-3275-17T4

seized from the Thompson home from both search warrant affidavits does not 

defeat probable cause for their issuance. As we have long recognized

otherwise admissible evidence should not be excluded 

because a portion of the warrant authorizes the seizure 

of [evidence] . . . in excess of that justified by the 

supporting affidavit. The proper remedy is 'redaction,' 

the striking of those portions of the warrant which are 

invalid for want of probable cause, and preserving those 

severable portions that satisfy the Fourth Amendment, 

and our state constitutional counterpart.

[State v. Burnett, 232 N.J. Super. 211, 217 (App. Div. 

1989).]

See also United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 754 (3d Cir. 1982) ("Materials 

seized under the authority of those parts of the warrant struck for invalidity must 

be suppressed, but the court need not suppress materials seized pursuant to the 

valid portions of the warrant."). 

III.

Lastly, we address George's challenges to the validity of the search 

warrant for his sedan and his renewed request for a Franks hearing. George 

claims Martin's affidavit failed to establish probable because, among other 

things, it contained two material misstatements: (1) the misidentification of the 

 

warrant requirement. See, e.g., State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 102-03 (2016); 

State v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328, 341 (2010).
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grassy area on which Brian's car was located as a "vacant lot"; and (2) the 

reference to the specific type of ammunition, i.e., "9X19," when Johnson's report 

generically referenced that he viewed "a box of ammunition" in George's car. 

We are unpersuaded by George's challenges to the search warrant 

affidavit, recognizing we review a trial judge's ruling regarding the need for a 

Franks evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. See State v. Broom-Smith, 

406 N.J. Super. 228, 239 (App. Div. 2009). We do not substitute our "own 

judgment for that of the trial court, unless the trial court's ruling was so wide of 

the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted." State v. Brown, 170 N.J. 

138, 147 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

A reviewing court gives substantial deference to a judge's determination 

that probable cause existed to issue a search warrant. State v. Mosner, 407 N.J. 

Super. 40, 61 (App. Div. 2009). "A search warrant is presumed to be valid, and 

defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the warrant was issued without 

probable cause[.]" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 

355, 381 (2003)). "Doubt as to the validity of the warrant 'should ordinarily be 

resolved by sustaining the search.'" State v. Keyes, 184 N.J. 541, 554 (2005) 

(quoting State v. Jones, 179 N.J. 377, 389 (2004)). 
19 A-3275-17T4

For that reason, a defendant is only entitled to a Franks evidentiary hearing 

to challenge the veracity of a warrant affidavit when he "makes a substantial 

preliminary showing" of either "material misstatements[,]" State v. Howery, 80 

N.J. 563, 566 (1979), or "[m]aterial omissions[,]" State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 

193 (1997), in a search warrant affidavit. See also Pressler & Verniero, Current 

N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 3 on R. 3:5-3 (2019). A misstatement is material if the 

warrant affidavit "no longer contains facts sufficient to establish probable cause" 

in its absence. Howery, 80 N.J. at 568 (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 171). 

However, if probable cause exists despite the errant information, the search 

warrant remains valid and a hearing is not necessary. See ibid. 

"The limitations imposed by Franks are not insignificant." Id. at 567. The 

burden placed on the defendant is onerous because "a Franks hearing is not 

directed at picking apart minor technical problems with a warrant application[,]" 

but rather, "it is aimed at warrants obtained through intentional wrongdoing by 

law enforcement agents." Broom-Smith, 406 N.J. Super. at 240. Thus, a 

defendant must identify "with specificity the portions of the warrant that are 

claimed to be untrue" and support the allegations with "an offer of proof 

including reliable statements by witnesses, [which] must be proved by a 

preponderance of the evidence." Howery, 80 N.J. at 567-68 (citation omitted). 
20 A-3275-17T4

In the present case, the motion judge concluded George failed to meet his 

burden for a Franks hearing. Specifically addressing the affidavit's inaccurate 

reference to the "vacant lot," the judge found, 

there was no fraud on the part of law enforcement in 

applying for the warrant and there were no 

misrepresentations made. The information was reliable 

to the best of the officer's ability, supporting claims 

were provided to the issuing judge, the information was 

fresh, and . . . there was no illegally obtained 

information in the affidavit.

We agree. During cross-examination, Martin explained his familiarity 

with the lot: "I've worked [for MTPD] for [sixteen] years. I've always just seen 

that as the vacant lot next to the Thompson house. I've never . . . had any 

reason to believe it was part of their property." The aerial photograph of the 

Thompson property and vicinity corroborates Martin's testimony. Indeed, the 

record is devoid of any indication that the lot was developed, enclosed, or 

otherwise indicative of residential use. Accordingly, Martin's misnaming of the 

lot was an inconsequential misstatement and a far cry from the "material 

misstatements" contemplated by Franks. See 438 U.S. at 171. 

Nor are we persuaded George established the affidavit's specific reference 

to the "ammunition box labeled 9X19" was a material misstatement or 

falsehood. To support his argument, George claims Johnson equivocated about 
21 A-3275-17T4

his ability to observe the box of ammunition on the floor of George's sedan. 

Seizing on Johnson's answers during cross-examination that the box "looked 

similar to a box of ammunition[,]"4and he told "that" to Martin, George 

maintains Martin "prematurely viewed" the box of ammunition before obtaining 

the search warrant. His argument, however, is unsupported by the record. 

George failed to produce sufficiently reliable proof of Martin's purported 

wrongdoing. Rather, George relies on parsed portions of Johnson's testimony. 

Notably, George failed to question Martin whatsoever about the source of the 

statement. 

Although the motion judge did not specifically address George's argument 

concerning the box of ammunition, she determined Martin was a reliable and 

credible witness, and George generally failed to demonstrate Martin acted in bad 

faith or made false and misleading statements to obtain the warrants. See State 

v. Martinez, 387 N.J. Super. 129, 140 (App. Div. 2006) (deferring to the judge's 

credibility findings that there was no intentional falsehood or reckless disregard 

 

4 To further support his argument, George filed a reply appendix, including a 

poor-quality photograph of the bag containing ammunition. The photograph is 

unmarked and, as such, it is unclear whether it is the same photograph that was 

shown to Johnson at the hearing, i.e., a photograph marked "2D-3" for 

identification. Regardless, because George did not move any exhibits into 

evidence at the hearing, the photograph is inappropriate for our review. See

Zaman v. Felton, 219 N.J. 199, 226-27 (2014). 
22 A-3275-17T4

of truth in a search warrant affidavit). Because defendant did not make a 

substantial preliminary showing of a material misstatement in the search warrant 

affidavit, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial judge.

To the extent we have not specifically addressed George's remaining 

arguments, we find they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in our

opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). 

Affirmed in part; reversed in part. We do not retain jurisdiction.