United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

December 22, 2005

Before

Hon. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

Hon. JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

Hon. DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

Nos. 01-3853, 01-3865

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JAMES P. YOUNG & EDWARD L.

JACKSON, JR.,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeals from the United States

District Court for the Northern

District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 96 CR 815

Charles P. Kocoras, Chief Judge.

O R D E R

James P. Young and Edward L. Jackson, Jr., are part of a group of former

members of the Chicago Police Department (CPD) who were charged with

racketeering, extortion, robbery, drug, and weapons violations. See United States v.

Moore, 363 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 2004). On appeal, both initially challenged only their

convictions, which were affirmed. However, in a supplement to their petition for

certiorari, each objected to his sentence for the first time, making arguments based on

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). On January 24, 2005, the Supreme Court

granted their petition, vacated this court’s judgment, and remanded the case to us for

further consideration in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). In an

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
Nos. 01-3853 & 01-3865 Page 2

order dated May 10, 2005, we recognized that the district court at the 2001 sentencing

hearing understandably violated the Sixth Amendment by treating the Sentencing

Guidelines as mandatory. As neither Young nor Jackson originally raised a Sixth

Amendment challenge before the district court, we reviewed their sentencing

proceedings for plain error only. See United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471 (7th Cir.

2005). As in Paladino, we remanded to the district court to learn whether it would

impose a different sentence now that it knew that the Guidelines are merely advisory.

At the original sentencing, Jackson was sentenced – based on a properly

calculated Guidelines range – to 360 months on 15 counts, including racketeering,

extortion, and conspiracy, and to a consecutive 1,020 months for five firearms

violations. Adding the two together, Jackson received a total sentence of 1,380 months.

Young was convicted of extortion and an accompanying firearm offense; he was

sentenced to 111 months. 

The district court has informed us that it would impose the same sentence

against both defendants under the now-advisory Guidelines. The defendants’ primary

argument before the district court was that their exemplary behavior in prison merits

reduced sentences. The district court appropriately rejected post-sentencing good

behavior and good deeds as a basis for altering the sentences imposed. See United

States v. Re, 419 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2005). The question before the district court

on the Paladino remand was whether the court would have imposed a different

sentence had it known the Guidelines were advisory. The defendant may call to the

court’s attention and the court may consider the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),

which previously were not part of the sentencing calculation, but the court may not

consider either events or the defendants’ actions after the date of sentencing. See Re,

419 F.3d at 584 (“[I]n a Paladino remand the conduct or circumstances that bear on

the § 3553(a) factors must have been in existence at the time the original sentence was

imposed. . . . Post-sentencing events or conduct simply are not relevant to that

inquiry.”).

Where, as here, the district court indicates that it would impose the same

sentence, we must consider whether that sentence is reasonable. Sentences within the

ranges properly calculated under the Guidelines are presumptively reasonable. See

United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir.2005). That presumption,

however, is rebuttable.

In this case, Jackson contends that his properly calculated sentence of 1,380

months, or 115 years, is “just not reasonable” and that a lesser sentence would be

reasonable because it would provide “just punishment and deterrence and protect[] the

public.” Jackson contends that prior to his convictions he lead “an otherwise exemplary

life,” was an active member of his community, and loving family man and that a lesser
Nos. 01-3853 & 01-3865 Page 3

sentence such as 20 years in prison would be sufficient to punish and deter without

incarcerating him for the rest of his life (as 115 years in prison will certainly do).

Jackson also relies on his post-sentencing conduct in prison to argue that he is “no

longer a danger to the community,” but, as we noted above, his post-sentencing conduct

plays no part in our plain error calculation. 

There can be no doubt that the functional life sentence imposed on Jackson is

severe. But is it so severe as to be unreasonable as measured against the factors listed

in § 3553(a)? Section 3553(a) requires that the sentence imposed be “sufficient, but not

greater than necessary,” to deal with concerns including the “nature and circumstances

of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;” “the seriousness

of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the

offense;” “adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;” and the need to “protect the public

from further crimes of the defendant.” In this case, Jackson has received a very severe

sentence, but he also committed a very serious crime. He and his fellow police officers

betrayed their duty to protect the public from gangs and drugs by instead personally

exploiting and profiting from those unsavory elements in our society. As the district

court noted, “The offenses here were severe, extreme, and significantly exacerbated by

Defendants’ misuse of their positions of trust and authority. This reality is most

starkly demonstrated by the fact that these substantial sentences were the sum of all

of the minimum punishments allowable once all the applicable factors were taken into

consideration. The offenses were significant; the punishment was commensurately

significant.” Jackson’s crime involves a special kind of problem that arises when the

police officers upon whom society depends for protection instead exploit their positions

to perpetuate and profit from, rather than thwart, crime. It is important that the

punishment imposed deters not only Jackson from future crimes, but other law

enforcement officers from following his disturbing path. In such circumstances, even

a sentence of 115 years cannot be deemed unreasonable.

Unlike Jackson, Young did not respond to the district court’s statement that it

would have imposed the same sentence upon him had it known the Guidelines were

advisory. His sentence of 111 months is within the properly calculated Guideline range.

He has thus not overcome the presumption of reasonableness that accompanies such

a sentence. See Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d at 608.

We find that the sentences imposed upon both Jackson and Young were

reasonable. The judgment is therefore AFFIRMED.