## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### JUN 16 1998 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

OLAF PETER JUDA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. DENNIS MICHAEL NERNEY, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Northern District of California; STEPHEN R. KOTZ, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico; JOHN J. KELLY, U.S. Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico; MICHAEL YAMAGUCHI, U.S. Attorney, San Francisco, California; ROBERT L. HOLLER, District Director, U.S. Customs Service, El Paso, Texas; LEONARD S. WALTON, Acting Assistant Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service, Washington, D.C.; BONNIE L. GAY, FOIA Unit, attorney-in-charge, Washington, D.C.; JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-25; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendants-Appellees.

OLAF PETER JUDA,

Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 97-2192 (D.C. No. CIV-96-584-JP) (D. N.M.)* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. -2- v. UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE, ROBERT L. HOLLER, JOY M. HUGHAN, DANIEL LUAR, RITA ALFARO, DOLORES PAYAN, GINA E. FUENTES, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, GEORGE TERPACK, CAROLYN LEONARD, TIMOTHY A. TOWNS, JOHN DOES, JANE DOES,

Defendants-Appellees. No. 97-2326 (D.C. No. CIV-97-227-LH) (D. N.M.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before PORFILIO , BARRETT , and HENRY , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ases are therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.-3-

Olaf Peter Juda, proceeding pro se, filed these law suits to recover property administratively forfeited by the United States Cus toms Service and to obtain damages for alleged violations of his due process r ights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The d istrict court dismissed all claims. In case No. 97-2192, we affirm in part andreverse in part; in case No. 97-2326, we affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND I. The Criminal Case On July 17, 1991, Juda was arrested by the United S tates Coast Guard and incarcerated in California for participating in a hashish smuggling scheme. He pled guilty to two counts of drug smuggling and one count of arson on the high seas on January 14, 1993, and was sentenced to a term of 262 months’ imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed on appeal. See United States v. Juda , 46 F.3d 961, 969 (9th Cir. 1995).

II. Forfeiture Proceedings After Juda’s arrest, the Customs Service, with the assistance of the office of the United States Attorney for the District of N ew Mexico, obtained federal seizure warrants and began forfeiture proceedings a gainst his real and personal1 The government also obtained a warrant for 2.1671 a cres of unimproved

land owned by Juda. After executing the warrant an d filing a complaint, it decided not to proceed with forfeiture. The 2.1671 acre lot is not involved in this appeal. -4- property located in Albuquerque, Santa Fe, and Taos , New Mexico. The timing and sequence of the government’s actions are of particular significance.

A. Real Property Juda had entered into a contract with a developer t o purchase a house under construction on a 1.010 acre lot in Taos County for$150,000. Before Juda left Taos to begin the smuggling venture which led to hi s conviction, he had paid either the full $150,000 (according to Juda) or $14 0,000 (according to the government). The developer retained legal title to the property. On June 9, 1992, Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) Ste phen Kotz of the United States Attorney’s Office for the Distric t of New Mexico obtained a warrant from the district court, authorizing seiz ure of the property on the grounds that it was used in connection with drug of fenses, money laundering, and transactions in property derived from unlawful activity. 1 Instead of having the warrant executed, however, Kotz entered into an agr eement with the developer, under which the developer would sell the property t o another buyer for $150,000 and give the proceeds to the government.2 A July 29, 1994, letter to Juda from Leonard S. Wal ton, Acting Assistant

Commissioner, Office of Enforcement, Department of the Treasury states that the decision was based on “the inadvertent omission of serving prior notice to [Juda] of the seizure of these proceeds.” Appellant’s Add endum at 64(b). -5- On August 5, 1992, a New Mexico title and abstract company sent a $150,000 check to the United States Marshals Servic e. Juda was not notified of the warrant, the agreement, the sale of the property, or the seizure of the check. On December 9, 1992, the district court granted Kot z’s motion to seal the seizure warrant and supporting affidavit. The check for $1 50,000 remained with the Marshals Service until February 1994. In the meantime, Juda began a series of inquiries and requests under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) about the seizure of his property, directed to the Office of the United States Attorney in the Northern District of California, where he was being prosecuted; the Office of the Un ited States Attorney in the District of New Mexico, where his property was located; the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C.; and the Customs Service. He wrote his initial inquiry in December 1993, and first received a resp onse in April 1994. In February 1994, AUSA Kotz met with Customs agents and advised that he would not pursue judicial forfeiture of the check proceeds. 2 The check was converted to a treasury check for $150,000 and sentto the Customs Service to begin administrative forfeiture proceedings. On Ap ril 8, 1994, the Customs3 Apparently through a clerical error, some notices l isted Taos instead of (continued...) -6- Service sent Juda a notice of seizure with intent t o forfeit the treasury check. The letter stated that the check had been seized Ma rch 4, 1994, and that it was subject to forfeiture as the proceeds of unlawful a ctivity, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 981, 1956, 1957. An enclosure provided general informat ion on how to oppose the forfeiture. Juda responded with letters acknowledging an intere st in real property of approximately the same value as the treasury che ck, but disclaiming an interest in the check itself. A notice of forfeiture was se nt to Juda on May 6, 1994. The check was declared administratively forfeited on Ju ne 26, 1994.

B. Personal Property Juda’s personal property, seized during the summer of 1991, included: (1) a 1990 Jeep Cherokee; (2) $40,000 from a Santa Fe bank safe deposit box; (3) $50,000 from a Taos safe deposit box; (4) $19,8 30 from an Albuquerque bank account; (5) $19,882 from a Taos bank account; (6) $8,753 from an Albuquerque bank account; and (7) miscellaneous items valued at$1,134 from a storage locker. The Customs Service forfeited each item separately, and attempted to provide notice by certified mail to the address in Santa Fe which Juda had provided on a 1989 passport application. 3 As some federal agents were aware, Juda had3 (...continued)

Santa Fe as the city designation, but had the corre ct zip code. -7- moved to Taos some two years earlier and, in any ev ent, he was in federal detention in California at the time of the mailings

. The notices were sent on August 13, 1991 (for the b ank account seizures), August 15, 1991 (for the safe deposit box seizures) , August 16, 1991 (for the Jeep Cherokee), and October 8, 1991 (for the miscellaneo us property). The United States Post Office in Santa Fe forwarded the notice s to Taos, where Juda’s tenant accepted many of them. The tenant brought Juda’s m ail to another friend, who transmitted the mail received as of August 13 to Mark Donatelli, an attorney retained by Juda’s criminal attorney, Joseph Vodnoy . Donatelli sent this mail by federal express to Vodnoy in California. The trans mittal letter, dated August 13, 1991, noted that there was “only one notice of seiz ure” included in the packet. R., Vol. I, Doc. 12 at 74. Sometime in September 1 991, Vodnoy visited Juda in prison, bringing the mail sent by Donatelli on Augu st 13, and offering advice on forfeiture proceedings. The Customs Service sent notices of forfeiture Sept ember 12-18 and November 12, 1991. Most of these notices were retu rned as undeliverable.4 Initially, Juda alleged that the Customs Service fa iled to publish notice of

administrative forfeiture of the personal propertie s. He has withdrawn the allegation. -8- The personal property was declared administrativelyforfeited October 27 and December 13, 1991. 4

III. The Civil Actions A. Case No. 97-2192 Acting pro se and in forma pauperis, Juda filed mot ions under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e) in the United States Distric t Court for the Northern District of California, to recover the forfeited real and pe rsonal property. Later, he filed an action against prosecutors, Customs Service agents, agents of the Internal Revenue Service, and other federal officials, claim ing entitlement to damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388 (1971), for an allegedly illegal taking of his property and conspiracies involving prosecutors, Customs Service agents, Inte rnal Revenue Service agents, and respondents to his FOIA requests. The court tr ansferred the actions to the United States District Court for the District of Ne w Mexico. In New Mexico, the district court consolidated Juda ’s filings and assigned the matter to a magistrate judge for review under 2 8 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which provides for sua sponte dismissal of an in fo rma pauperis action that is5 The magistrate judge cited § 1915(d), which has bee n revised and

re-enacted as § 1915(e)(2)(B). -9- frivolous, fails to state a claim on which relief m ay be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant with immunity from such relief. 5 The magistrate judge issued a report recommending dismissal of (1) the m otion for return of the real property, on the grounds that Juda had lacked legal title to the property and had failed to contest the administrative forfeiture of the $150,000 check, and (2) the Bivens action, on the grounds that no constitutional viol ation had taken place, that the prosecutors were immune from liability, and that Juda had only vague allegations to support his conspiracy claims agains t the other defendants. On the personal property claim, the magistrate judge determined that there was insufficient evidence to decide whether Juda had re ceived adequate notice of the administrative forfeiture and directed the governme nt to submit relevant documentation. Juda filed objections to the dismissal recommendati ons, a motion to amend the Bivens action to include IRS agents as participants in th e conspiracy, and argument on the personal property issues. The gove rnment submitted a response and documents relating to notice. In a second analysis, the magistrate judge conclude d that Juda’s objections were without merit and that the proposed amendment to the Bivens action did not-10-

affect his earlier decision. On the adequacy of no tice issue, he determined that Juda had received actual notice because his “friend forwarded the notices to [his] attorneys, who in turn apprised [him] of the impend ing forfeitures.” R., Vol. I, Doc. 16 at 9. The magistrate judge recommended dis missal of all claims with prejudice and denial of the motion to amend. The d istrict court reviewed Juda’s objections de novo, adopted the magistrate judge’s findings and conclusions, and dismissed the case.

B. Case No. 97-2326 Juda filed a second Bivens action in the District Court for the District of New Mexico, asserting that Customs Service agents v iolated his constitutional rights by conspiring to deprive him of adequate not ice of forfeiture proceedings, and that, in retaliation for his opposition to the forfeitures, I.R.S. agents conspired with officials of the Department of Justice. The d istrict court dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review Generally, we review a district court’s denial of amotion for return of property under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e) for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Deninno , 103 F.3d 82, 84 (10th Cir. 1996). However, we ap ply a de novo-11-

standard to the ultimate conclusion of whether a cl aimant’s due process rights have been violated, see United States v. One Parcel of Real Property Descr ibed as Lot 41, Berryhill Farm Estates , 128 F.3d 1386, 1391 (10th Cir. 1997), and a clearly erroneous standard to findings of fact, United States v. Francis , 646 F.2d 251, 262 (6th Cir. 1981). We construe the pleading s and papers of a pro se appellant liberally. See Haines v. Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).

II. Analysis “Proceedings surrounding the motion for return of p roperty seized in a criminal case are civil in nature,” United States v. Maez , 915 F.2d 1466, 1468 (10th Cir. 1990), and based on equitable principles, see United States v. Madden , 95 F.3d 38, 40 (10th Cir. 1996). [W]here the property sought to be returned has beenadministratively forfeited, the Court should not exercise Rule 41(e) jurisdiction if the movant has failed to challenge the forfeiture throu gh the appropriate administrative and judicial procedures. However, f ederal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is available for the limited purpose of considering collateral due process attac ks; that is, deciding whether the forfeiture offended due proces s rights. If an administrative forfeiture does not have any procedu ral defects, other challenges to the forfeiture, which could have been addressed under the statutory and regulatory procedures, must be co nsidered waived. Deninno , 103 F.3d at 84-85 (citations and parentheticals o mitted).6 The rule announced in Good applies retroactively to all cases not finally

decided at the time of the decision. See, e.g. , United States v. 2751 Peyton Woods Trail , 66 F.3d 1164, 1166 n.2 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. All Assets & Equip. of West Side Bldg. Corp. , 58 F.3d 1181, 1191 (7th Cir. 1995). -12- A. Case No. 97-2192 1. Real property a. Seizure In United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property , 510 U.S. 43, 62 (1993), the Supreme Court held that “[u]nless exige nt circumstances are present, the Due Process Clause requires the Government to a fford notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before seizing r eal property subject to civil forfeiture.” 6The Court reasoned that the immobility of real pr operty ordinarily eliminates grounds for dispensing with preseizure proceedings. Id. at 57. To unravel the issues relating to Juda’s real prope rty claims, we must begin with an analysis of his ownership interest in 1992, when AUSA Kotz and the developer agreed on the sale of the house. The mag istrate judge accepted the government’s argument that no preseizure hearing wa s required because the developer, not Juda, had legal title to the property. However, under the doctrine of equitable conversion applied in New Mexico, a pe rson who has contracted to purchase real property is “treated as the owner of the land and holds an interest7 The government, citing the case of Marshall v. Chater , 75 F.3d 1421, 1426

(10th Cir. 1996), asserts that Juda waived the due process argument, in that he made it for the first time in objecting to the repo rt of the magistrate judge. As the government must be fully aware, the Marshall holding, made in the context of an administrative agency review, has no applicationhere. The magistrate judge was charged with reviewing a pro se, in forma paupe ris complaint for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). An objection to the magistrate judge’s report presented Juda’s first opportunity to provide legal argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (providing that a pleading must set forth a“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to r elief”). -13- in real estate . . . . [T]he Vendor holds the bare legal title as a trustee for the vendee.” Marks v. City of Tucumcari , 595 P.2d 1199, 1200 (N.M. 1979). Accordingly, Juda was the owner of real property, and, absent exigent circumstances, was entitled to notice and a hearing before seizure. The unorthodox agreement between AUSA Kotz and the deve loper deprived Juda of the “valuable rights of ownership, including the right of sale, the right of occupancy, the right to unrestricted use and enjoym ent, and the right to receive rents.” Good , 510 U.S. at 54. The resulting sale amounted to agovernmental seizure, without notice to Juda and without any sho wing of exigent circumstances. Plainly, the seizure violated Juda’s due process ri ghts and, as discussed below, Juda is entitled to an equitable remedy. 7-14- b. Forfeiture “The illegality of the seizure, however, does not n ecessarily invalidate the forfeiture.” United States v. 51 Pieces of Real Property, Roswell, N.M. , 17 F.3d 1306, 1315 (10th Cir. 1994). To contest the forfei ture itself, the claimant must demonstrate a procedural fault in the forfeiture ac tion and prejudice affecting his substantial rights. See Deninno , 103 F.3d at 85-86. Here, Juda argues that there were two procedural defects: (a) lack of adequate notice, and (b) an almost twoyear delay between the seizure of the real propertyand the forfeiture proceedings. “[T]he government is required to give notice to all persons who have or claim an interest in real property being administratively forfeited.” United States v. Clark , 84 F.3d 378, 380 (10th Cir. 1996). Due process c onsiderations compel “‘notice reasonably calculated, under all the circu mstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford th em an opportunity to present their objections.’” Id. (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. , 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). Juda concedes that he received timely notice of the forfeiture, but claims that the content of the notice was deficient, in th at it failed to specify the source of the check or detail the illegal acts authorizing forfeiture. It is apparent from the record that Juda was aware that the check repre sented the proceeds from the sale of his real property. Moreover, we have foundno case law supporting Juda’s8 We note that, after weighing these factors, the Cou rt allowed a delay of

eighteen months between seizure and forfeiture. See $8,850 , 461 U.S. at 568-70 (no due process violation in delay due to pending c riminal proceedings, lack of evidence that the claimant desired early commenceme nt of forfeiture, and absence of a showing that the delay prejudiced claimant’s a bility to defend against the forfeiture). See also United States v. $292,888.04 in U.S. Currency , 54 F.3d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1995) (thirty-month delay permissible); United States v. United States Currency in the Amount of $228,536.00 , 895 F.2d 908, 917 (2d Cir. 1990) (almost four-year delay permissible). -15- suggestion that we require a particularized narrati ve of allegedly illegal acts. We decline to adopt Juda’s proposal. After a review o f the record, we agree with the magistrate judge’s finding that Juda received const itutionally adequate notice. Juda’s second attack on the forfeiture proceeding r elates to the delay of almost two years between seizure and forfeiture. A n unreasonable delay in instituting a forfeiture proceeding may constitute a violation of due process.
See United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. Currency , 461 U.S. 555, 564-65 (1983). In determining whether the government brought the proceeding within a reasonab le time, courts are to consider the “length of delay, the reason for the d elay, the [claimant’s] assertion of his right, and prejudice to the [claimant].” Id. at 564. 8 To some extent, the length of the delay is a “‘trig gering mechanism’” requiring an inquiry into the remaining factors. Id. at 565 (quoting Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)). In $8,850 , an eighteen-month delay was sufficient to trigger the full inquiry. See id. ; see also United States v.9 We reject the government’s disingenuous argument th at there was no delay

because the Customs Service sent a seizure notice o n April 8, 1994, and completed administrative forfeiture proceedings two months later. Although the Customs Service may have acted promptly after it re ceived the check from the Marshals Service, Juda had been stripped of his pro perty rights by the 1992 sale. -16- Forty-Seven Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty Dollars ($ 47,980) in Canadian Currency , 804 F.2d 1085, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1986) (fourteen- month delay sufficient to trigger inquiry). 9Here, the almost two-year gap between seizure and forfeiture requires consideration of the remain ing factors. The magistrate judge, however, did not address the delay issue. W e therefore remand to the district court for further proceedings in order to make findings on the interrelated factors of the length of the delay, the reasons forthe delay, and resulting prejudice to the plaintiff.

c. Remedy Because we cannot determine whether the delay amounted to a due process violation, we do not reach the issue of what remedy , if any, is appropriate for the alleged procedural defect in the forfeiture proceeding. See $8,850 , 461 U.S. at 560 n.8 (declining to reach issue where a judicial forfeiture was still pending, but no due process violation was present). For the pre seizure infringement, the scope of the remedy is related to the district court’s de cision on the validity of the forfeiture. The government should be required to “ account for the profits or rent-17-

which it denied the claimant during the period of illegal seizure.” United States v. Marsh , 105 F.3d 927, 931 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing 51 Pieces of Real Property, Roswell, N.M. , 17 F.3d at 1316)) Accordingly, the district court must first determine the length of the period of illegal seizu re, then determine the appropriate amount of profits or rent.

2. Personal property Juda contends that his personal property should be returned because the government failed to send him notice of the forfeit ures. We have explained that if “the government can reasonably ascertain the nam e and address of an interested party, due process requires the government to send ‘[n]otice by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice.’” United States v. Clark , 84 F.3d 378, 380 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams , 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983)). “When the government is aware th at an interested party is incarcerated, due process requires the government t o make an attempt to serve him with notice in prison.” Id. at 381. However, there is no need to overturn an administrative forfeiture for a claimant who had ac tual notice of forfeiture proceedings, notwithstanding the government’s failu re to make reasonable efforts to provide notice. See United States v. Rodgers , 108 F.3d 1247, 1254-55 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Sarit v. United States Drug Enforcement Admin. , 987 F.2d 10, 15 n.3 (1st Cir 1993)).-18-

Here, the magistrate judge acknowledged that the go vernment should have sent Juda notice of the forfeiture proceedings in prison, as required by Clark

. He found, however, that Juda had received actual no tice through the mailings accepted by his tenant and friend on or before Augu st 13, 1991, taken to attorney Donatelli, sent to attorney Vodnoy, and given to Ju da during Vodnoy’s prison visit in September. This finding of fact is clearl y erroneous. The government’s records show that, as of August 13, when the relay began, only one notice of seizure had been mailed. This is confirmed in the transmittal letter from Donatelli to Juda, which notes the enclosure of onl y one notice. Vodnoy did not receive a complete set of notices to hand off to Ju da. Although it is certainly conceivable that Juda rece ived actual notice of the forfeitures through some other channel of communication, there is no such indication in the record. On remand, the district court is to hold further proceedings in order to make findings of fact on Ju da’s knowledge of the pending forfeitures before their completion. If necessary, it may proceed to evaluate the merits of Juda’s arguments as to why the property i s not subject to forfeiture. It would serve no purpose to upset the forfeitures forprocedural faults if Juda has no basis for return of the property. See Deninno , 103 F.3d at 86.-19-

3. Bivens action In his Bivens claim, Juda accuses AUSA Kotz, the United States Attorney for the District of New Mexico, prosecutors in the California criminal action, and agents of the Customs Service of illegally taki ng his real property, and participation in a conspiracy with the Department o f Justice officials and Internal Revenue Service agents. The district court correct ly dismissed the entire claim. The prosecutor defendants are covered by absolute i mmunity from civil liability when functioning as advocates in judicial proceedings, see Buckley v. Fitzsimmons , 509 U.S. 259, 269-70 (1993), and qualified immuni ty when functioning as administrative or investigative officers, see id. at 273. Here, these defendants are entitled to absolute immunity in con nection with initiating the criminal action, filing the seizure warrant, and ad vising on criminal and judicial or administrative forfeiture matters. The Californ ia prosecutors and the United States Attorney for the District of New Mexico enga ged solely in this type of activity and are absolutely immune from liability t o Juda. AUSA Kotz is also entitled to absolute immunity in performance of the se functions. Additionally, Kotz entered into an extrajudicial ag reement with the developer for the seizure of Juda’s real property i nterest, without providing Juda with notice and an opportunity to be heard. For th is action, absolute immunity does not apply, but he is shielded by qualified imm unity “insofar as [his] conduct-20-

[did] not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Until 1993, when the S upreme Court explained the extent of process due to owners upon seizure of their real property,

see Good , 510 U.S. 43, there was no controlling case law onthe issue. Kotz made the agreement in July 1992. He is therefore entitle d to qualified immunity from liability for his involvement in the seizure. As to the other defendants, Juda failed to provide anything more than conclusory allegations of illegal conspiracy. The magistrate judge correctly determined that these allegations are insufficient to withstand review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Boddie v. Schneider , 105 F.3d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1997) (“‘[A] complaint containing only vague, concl usory, or general allegations of conspiracy to deprive a person of constitutional rights cannot withstand a motion to dismiss.’”); see also Northington v. Jackson , 973 F.2d 1518, 1521 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that although a court should co nstrue a pro se plaintiff’s complaint liberally, “the court should not assume the role of advocate, and should dismiss claims which are supported only by vague an d conclusory allegations”). We affirm the dismissal of the Bivens claim.10 The district court determined that the claims are b arred by res judicata, as

to defendants named in the earlier action, and coll ateral estoppel, as to newlynamed defendants. Because we determine that Juda’s Bivens claims are vague, conclusory, and general, we need not reach the meri ts of this ruling. -21- B. Case No. 97-2326 On appeal, Juda argues that the district court erre d in dismissing this Bivens action, in which he makes two claims of conspiracyby federal officials. First, Juda asserts that Customs Service agents con spired to deprive him of notice that his personal property was subject to forfeitur e. These allegations, made against defendants Holler, Hughan, Luar, Alfaro, Payan, Fuentes, and the Doe defendants, are identical to those made against def endant Holler and the Doe defendants in Case No. 97-2192. Second, Juda alleg es that, in retaliation for challenging the forfeitures, Internal Revenue Servi ce agents sent tax notices and imposed a lien pursuant to a conspiracy with Department of Justice officials. Case No. 97-2192 included a similar allegation. As we have previously explained, Juda’s bald allegations of a conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights cannot avo id sua sponte dismissal pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B). After reviewing the r ecord and submissions, we determine that dismissal was the appropriate disposition of this action. See Boddie , 105 F.3d at 862; Northington , 973 F.2d at 1521. 10-22- CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, we REVERSE the judgme nt in case No. 97-2192 and REMAND to the district court for fu rther proceedings consistent with this order and judgment on Juda’s claims of du e process violations in the seizure and forfeiture of his real property and the forfeiture of his personal property. After considering all of Juda’s contenti ons, we AFFIRM the district court’s ruling on all other aspects. We AFFIRM the judgment in case No. 97-2326 in its e ntirety. Juda’s motion to reconsider our denial of his motion to co nsolidate the appeals is DENIED. The motion for change of venue is DENIED.

Entered for the Court

Robert H. Henry Circuit Judge