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Filed 8/13/21 P. v. Gonzalez CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CECILIO GONZALEZ, 

Defendant and Appellant.

 B305263

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BA480612)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los

Angeles County, Terry A. Bork, Judge. Affirmed.

Lillian Hamrick, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and 

Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorneys General, Paul M. 

Roadarmel, Jr. and Stephanie A. Miyoshi, Deputy Attorneys 

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________
2

Cecilio Gonzalez appeals from a judgment after a jury 

convicted him of assault with a deadly weapon. Gonzalez 

contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury with 

CALCRIM No. 875, which defined a deadly weapon as either one 

that is inherently deadly or one used in a way that is capable of 

causing and likely to cause death or great bodily injury. 

Gonzalez argues the weapon here, a metal pole, was not 

inherently deadly as a matter of law, and therefore the trial 

court’s instruction of the jury on the definition of an inherently 

deadly weapon was prejudicial error under the Supreme Court’s 

decision in People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1 (Aledamat). 

Gonzalez also contends, the People concede, and we agree that 

Gonzalez was entitled to 368 days of presentence custody credit 

instead of the 212 days awarded by the trial court. 

We modify the judgment to award Gonzalez the full 368

days of presentence custody credits and order that the abstract of 

judgment be corrected. We affirm the judgment as modified.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Information

The amended information charged Gonzalez1 with a single 

count of assault with a deadly weapon, a metal pipe. (Pen. Code, 

§ 245, subd. (a)(1).)2 The information further alleged Gonzalez 

had previously been convicted of three serious or violent felonies 

1 The original information charged Gonzalez as David 

Alboniga. The court amended the information on the first day of 

trial after Gonzalez stated his true name. 

2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the 

Penal Code.
3

under the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j), and 1170.12), 

and one of the prior convictions was of a serious felony within the 

meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1). 

B. The Evidence at Trial

1. The prosecution case

On August 22, 2019 Los Angeles Police Officer Eduardo 

Gutierrez was on “camera detail,” monitoring and controlling 

multiple cameras that were placed on the streets of the “skid 

row” area in downtown Los Angeles. The cameras were set up so 

an officer in a remote location could control the camera with a 

joystick and zoom in and out of the scene. At around 6:00 a.m. 

Officer Gutierrez observed on one of the video cameras an 

altercation between two people taking place around San Pedro 

and Fifth Streets. As described by Officer Gutierrez, Gonzalez 

can be seen walking next to a wall on the south curb of Fifth 

Street and then holding what appeared to be a metal pole. 

Holding the pole behind his back, Gonzalez walked up behind an 

unidentified man (John Doe) and “swung at the victim, struck 

him [on] what appeared to be on his head.” Doe then fled west 

onto Fifth Street. Officer Gutierrez zoomed the camera out, but

he could not see where Doe was headed. Officer Gutierrez did not 

see Doe assault Gonzalez or anyone else. The surveillance video 

showing the incident was played for the jury; it did not have any 

audio. 

Officer Gutierrez informed Los Angeles Police Officer 

Gerardo Valvaneda about the incident and provided him the 

location and a description of Gonzalez. Several hours after the 

incident, Officer Valvaneda drove to the area depicted in the 

video, which was an area lined with multiple tents on the 
4

sidewalk. Officer Valvaneda observed Gonzalez sitting on a chair 

on the south curb of Fifth Street near San Pedro Street. Officer 

Valvaneda canvassed the area, but he could not locate Doe. 

Officer Valvaneda had a brief interaction with Gonzalez, then 

returned to the police station. 

At the police station, Officer Valvaneda reviewed the video 

of the altercation to confirm Gonzalez was the person who struck 

Doe. After reviewing the video, Officer Valvaneda was confident 

Gonzalez was the suspect seen in the video. Officer Valvaneda 

then returned to Fifth and San Pedro Streets with a supervisor. 

Officer Valvaneda located the weapon used to assault Doe next to 

a wheelchair leaning against a gate near the curb where Officer 

Valvaneda had earlier encountered Gonzalez. At this point 

Officer Valvaneda arrested Gonzalez. 

The weapon was admitted into evidence at trial. The 

prosecutor described the weapon as a “metal object” and a “metal 

rod.” The object was passed around the jury box for the jurors to 

touch and hold, so they could, as the prosecutor described,

“ascertain its strength by feeling it.” Defense counsel referred to 

the weapon in his opening statement and during trial as a fishing 

pole.3

3 At side bar in the context of Gonzalez’s motion to dismiss 

under section 1118.1, the trial court described the object: “And I 

have People’s 9 in my hand, and there do appear to be parts that 

are metallic and then a part that is wood and then some padded 

parts as well. So it’s not entirely metallic, although it does—the 

actual pole itself seems to be largely metallic, if not entirely.” 

Gonzalez’s counsel argued, “The information suggests that there 

is a piece of pipe like for plumbing or something like that. I don’t 

think this is a weapon, per se. So I suppose that’s part of my 

motion, your honor.” The court agreed the weapon was not a 
5

2. The defense case

Gonzalez testified he woke up around 6:00 a.m. on the day 

of the incident. After talking with some friends, Gonzalez gave 

Doe $5 to buy Gonzalez breakfast.4 Another person also gave Doe

money to buy the person food. Doe did not return for an hour or 

two. After Doe returned without food, Gonzalez confronted him

about Gonzalez’s food and money. Gonzalez got in a “scuffle”

with Doe in which Doe threw him to the ground, causing 

Gonzalez to scrape his left elbow and thigh. As Gonzalez started 

to get off the ground, Doe pushed him down again. Gonzalez 

believed Doe was “high off spice.”5

The scuffle occurred near the corner of Sixth Street and 

Crocker Avenue. After the scuffle, Doe went “around the corner 

and started arguing with the other man that gave him money to 

eat.” At this point the surveillance video (at time stamp 6:04:13 

a.m.) shows Doe arguing with an elderly man in the street a few 

minutes prior to the incident. The elderly man held a cane. As 

plumbing pipe, explaining, “[B]ut I think it can accurately be 

called a pipe even though you would probably in common 

parlance more likely call it a metal rod or a metal tube or 

something along those lines. But I don’t think the word “‘pipe’” is 

inaccurate, per se.” The court denied Gonzalez’s motion. 

4 Gonzalez did not know Doe’s true name; Gonzalez and his 

friends called him “Rico.” 

5 “Spice” is a “synthetic cannabinoid” (the active ingredient 

in cannabis). (See <http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/

drugfacts/spice-synthetic-marijuana> (National Institute on Drug 

Abuse) [as of Aug. 12, 2021].)
6

Doe walked away, the elderly man walked toward the middle of 

the street and continued arguing with Doe. 

Gonzalez was concerned for the safety of the elderly man 

and believed Doe needed to be stopped. Gonzalez testified he 

“grabbed a metal pipe,” walked up to Doe, and tried “to scare him 

off.” Gonzalez added, “I swung the pipe but never hit . . . the 

gentleman.” Doe flinched when Gonzalez swung the metal pole, 

but Gonzalez fell and never struck Doe with the pole. Five to 10 

minutes had elapsed between the time of the initial scuffle and 

when Gonzalez swung the metal pole. Gonzalez testified the 

metal pole shown in court “looks like a different metal pole to me 

. . . .” He added, “No. That’s not the metal pole I had . . . .” 

On cross-examination, the prosecutor played the video 

(with audio) from Officer Valvaneda’s body camera showing his

initial interaction with Gonzalez. Gonzalez acknowledged at trial 

that when he first spoke with Officer Valvaneda, he gave a false 

name, David Alboniga. Officer Valvaneda stated to Gonzalez 

that he saw Gonzalez sneak up on Doe and then “crack[] him on 

the back.” Gonzalez responded, “No you didn’t see[] the earlier 

part . . . . See he threw me on the ground man. Come on man.” 

Officer Valvaneda responded, “Hey regardless of what it is. You 

can’t do that. Okay?” Gonzalez replied, “You are right.” Officer 

Valvaneda then added, “You compare . . . what you did to what 

he did, you can’t do that.” Gonzalez responded, “You[’re] right 

sir, man. You know when you are mad. When you are mad, 

when somebody do[es] something to you, and then—that was my 

reaction at the time because I was upset.” The prosecutor 
7

followed up and asked, “You attacked the victim because you 

were mad, right?” Gonzalez replied, “Yeah, man.”6

Defense counsel recalled Officer Valvaneda, who clarified 

that when he stated to Gonzalez that he saw Gonzalez “crack[] 

him in the back,” Officer Valvaneda was basing this on his single 

viewing of the surveillance video, at which time it was his opinion 

that Gonzalez “had possibly got struck in the back.” 

C. The Verdict and Sentencing

The jury found Gonzalez guilty of assault with a deadly 

weapon. In a bifurcated proceeding, Gonzalez admitted the prior 

conviction allegations were true. The trial court sentenced 

Gonzalez to an aggregate prison term of 13 years. The court 

imposed the upper term of four years for the assault with a 

deadly weapon, doubled under the three strikes law,7 plus an 

additional five-year prison term pursuant to section 667, 

subdivision (a)(1). The court awarded Gonzalez 184 actual days

plus 28 days conduct credit (calculated pursuant to section 

2933.1) for a total of 212 days of prejudgment custody credit. 

Gonzalez timely appealed. 

6 Gonzalez admitted during cross-examination he had 

previously been convicted of robbery, driving without the owner’s 

consent, and receiving stolen property. 

7 The trial court granted Gonzalez’s motion to strike two of 

his prior strikes under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 

13 Cal.4th 497. 
8

DISCUSSION

A. The Trial Court Did Not Prejudicially Err by 

Instructing the Jury with CALCRIM No. 875

Gonzalez contends the trial court erred in instructing the 

jury with a version of CALCRIM No. 875 that defined an

“inherently deadly” weapon because the weapon used here was 

not inherently deadly as a matter of law. The People contend the 

court did not err because the various descriptions of the weapon, 

including a metal pole and a metal pipe, and the fact the pole was 

made of solid metal, could have led the jury to conclude the 

weapon was inherently deadly. We conclude that even if the trial 

court erred in instructing the jury on the definition of an 

inherently deadly weapon, any error was harmless.

1. The trial court’s instruction with CALCRIM No. 875

and closing arguments 

The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 875 

on the elements of assault with a deadly weapon. As the court 

instructed, “The defendant is charged in count 1 with assault 

with a deadly weapon other than a firearm, in violation of Penal 

Code section 245. To prove that the defendant is guilty of this 

crime, the People must prove that: One, the defendant did an act 

with a deadly weapon other than a firearm that by its nature 

would directly and probably result in the application of force to a 

person; [¶] Two, the defendant did that act willfully; [¶] Three, 

when the defendant acted, he was aware of facts that would lead 

a reasonable person to realize that his act by its nature would 

directly and probably result in the application of force to 

someone; [¶] Four, when the defendant acted, he had the 
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present ability to apply force with a deadly weapon to a person; 

[¶] And, five, the defendant did not act in self-defense or in 

defense of others. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] A deadly weapon is any object, 

instrument, or weapon that is inherently deadly or one that is 

used in such a way that it’s capable of causing and likely to cause 

death or great bodily injury. An object is inherently deadly if it is 

deadly or dangerous in the ordinary use for which it is designed. 

In deciding whether an object is a deadly weapon, consider all the 

surrounding circumstances.” 

The trial court further instructed the jury with CALCRIM 

No. 200 in relevant part that “[s]ome of these instructions may 

not apply depending on your findings about the facts of the case. 

Do not assume, just because I give a particular instruction, that I 

am suggesting anything about the facts. After you have decided 

what the facts are, follow the instructions that do apply to the 

facts as you find them.” 

The prosecutor argued in his closing argument that 

Gonzalez used the metal pole as a deadly weapon, asserting,

“[Gonzalez] had plenty of time to pick up a weapon, to ascertain 

the strength of that weapon, and to hold that weapon for a 

considerable amount of time, and then waiting for the right 

moment to go behind John Doe in an obscure manner so that he 

couldn’t be noticed, and then striking John Doe with a deadly 

weapon. This is a textbook assault with a deadly weapon 

case . . . . [¶] . . . But what I’m . . . getting at, ladies and 

gentlemen, is the force that this carries . . . when you hold it from 

the very end. And I’m not even gonna try to swing it here 

because I’m scared . . . . But the momentum that this would come 

with, the centrifugal force that it would impart on a person, huge. 

Huge.” 
10

Gonzalez’s counsel argued that the metal pole was “a 

fishing pole” because it had grooves where a wheel would be

attached, and it was never intended to be used as a weapon. 

Further, Gonzalez acted “reasonably under the circumstances” 

and was protecting the elderly man by scaring off Doe. Moreover,

bystanders watching the incident “were basically thanking him” 

for “defusing the situation” by giving Gonzalez a fist bump and 

clapping. Gonzalez’s counsel added that Gonzalez “only swung 

once. He didn’t chase him down afterwards to try to hurt him or 

anything like that. He basically solved the problem.” 

During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court with 

three questions: “1. How do you define significant or great bodily 

injury? [¶] 2. Can we get clarification on the definition of “deadly 

weapon?” [¶] 3. Can we get the transcript of when the defendant 

swung and missed? What area of the body?” The court 

responded by rereading portions of CALCRIM No. 875 to the jury, 

including the definitions of a “deadly weapon” and “inherently 

deadly” weapon, and it directed the court reporter to read back 

the relevant testimony about the incident. 

2. The weapon used by Gonzalez was not inherently 

deadly

“‘Some few objects, such as dirks and blackjacks, have been 

held to be deadly weapons as a matter of law; the ordinary use for 

which they are designed establishes their character as such. 

[Citation.] Other objects, while not deadly per se, may be used, 

under certain circumstances, in a manner likely to produce death 

or great bodily injury. In determining whether an object not 

inherently deadly or dangerous is used as such, the trier of fact 

may consider the nature of the object, the manner in which it is 
11

used, and all other facts relevant to the issue.’” (Aledamat, 

supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 6; accord, People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 

1055, 1065.) As the Supreme Court in Aledamat explained with 

respect to a box cutter, it is “‘a type of knife’ that, ‘because it is 

designed to cut things and not people,’ is not an inherently deadly 

weapon as a matter of law . . . .’” (Aledamat, at p. 6.)

Like the box cutter in Aledamat, and unlike dirks and 

blackjacks that have no ordinary use other than as a deadly 

weapon, a metal pole can have various uses such as a metal pipe 

for construction, a parking bollard, or a walking stick. The 

People failed to present any evidence that the metal pole was 

designed to be used as a deadly weapon. Further, the prosecutor 

described the pole as a metal pipe, which by its nature would be 

used for an innocent purpose, not as a deadly weapon.8 

3. Aledamat and alternative-theory error

Gonzalez argues it was reversible error for the trial court to

instruct the jury with both a legally correct theory (that the 

weapon was deadly as used) and a legally incorrect theory (that 

8 People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, relied on by the 

People, does not support their argument the weapon used here 

was inherently deadly. In Jurado, the Supreme Court considered 

whether there was substantial evidence the weapon the 

defendant possessed in jail was a deadly weapon within the 

meaning of section 4574, which makes it a felony for a county jail 

inmate to possess a deadly weapon. (Id. at p. 137.) The court 

concluded there was substantial evidence the defendant 

possessed a steel object 12 to 18 inches long, and the defendant 

did not dispute that if the weapon was a steel object, it was a 

deadly weapon. (Ibid.) The court therefore never addressed 

whether the steel object was an inherently deadly weapon.
12

the weapon was inherently deadly), relying on Aledamat, supra, 

8 Cal.5th 1. 

In Aledamat, the Supreme Court held a trial court commits 

instructional error when it instructs the jury with CALCRIM No. 

875 that it can find a weapon is a deadly weapon because it is 

inherently deadly, where the weapon is not inherently deadly as 

a matter of law. (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 4, 6; see 

People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129 (Guiton) [“It is error 

to give an instruction which, while correctly stating a principle of 

law, has no application to the facts of the case.”].) However, the 

Aledamat court distinguished between a factually inadequate 

theory where “the theory is incorrect only because the evidence 

does not support it” and a legally inadequate theory where “the 

theory is incorrect because it is contrary to law.” (Aledamat, 

supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 7; accord, Guiton, at p. 1128.) The 

Aledamat court explained, “[I]f the inadequacy of proof is purely 

factual, of a kind the jury is fully equipped to detect, reversal is 

not required whenever a valid ground for the verdict remains, 

absent an affirmative indication in the record that the verdict 

actually did rest on the inadequate ground.” (Aledamat, at p. 7; 

accord, Guiton at p. 1129.) But when the jury is instructed with a 

legally inadequate theory,9 the “‘beyond a reasonable doubt’

standard of review established in [Chapman v. California (1967) 

9 The Aledamat court gave as an example of a legally 

inadequate theory, the instructional error in People v. Green

(1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, where the Supreme Court concluded 

movement of the victim 90 feet in that case was legally 

insufficient to constitute asportation for kidnapping. (Aledamat, 

supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 7; accord, Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 

1128.)
13

386 U.S. 18, 24], for federal constitutional error applies.” 

(Aledamat, at p. 3.) Under this standard, “[t]he reviewing court 

must reverse the conviction unless, after examining the entire 

cause, including the evidence, and considering all relevant 

circumstances, it determines the error was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 14)

The Aledamat court concluded the trial court’s instruction 

that the jury could find the box cutter was a deadly weapon

because it was inherently deadly was based on a legally invalid 

theory because the jury was not provided the definition of an

inherently deadly weapon, and therefore “the jury would not be 

equipped to know that, contrary to what the instruction 

suggested, a box cutter is not an inherently deadly weapon.” 

(Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 8.) However, the court 

concluded the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 

under the more stringent Chapman harmless error standard. 

(Aledamat, at p. 15.) 

In contrast to Aledamat, the trial court instructed the jury 

on the definition of an inherently deadly weapon, correctly 

explaining an object “is inherently deadly if it is deadly or 

dangerous in the ordinary use for which it is designed.” The 

court also instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 200 that not all 

instructions provided by the court will apply to the case. 

Accordingly, the jury here was equipped to determine whether 

the weapon Gonzalez used was inherently deadly in the manner 

in which it was used. Therefore, any error in instructing the jury 

was factual error subject to review under the standard set forth

in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818. (Guiton, supra, 4 

Cal.4th at p. 1130 [“The error is therefore one of state law subject 

to the traditional Watson test.”].) “Under Watson, reversal is 
14

required if it is reasonably probable the result would have been 

more favorable to the defendant had the error not occurred.” 

(Guiton, at p. 1130.)

4. Any instructional error was harmless

As discussed, the trial court instructed the jury on the 

definition of an inherently deadly weapon, and therefore the jury 

was well equipped to determine whether the metal pole used here 

was inherently deadly. Further, the trial court directed the jury 

to consider all the surrounding circumstances to determine 

whether the object used was a deadly weapon, which the jury 

reasonably would have interpreted as applying to a 

determination of whether the weapon was deadly as used or 

inherently deadly. (See Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 14-15.) 

As the Aledamat court explained, “The jury would likely view the 

‘inherently deadly’ language in light of this additional instruction 

that it had to consider all of the circumstances. Given this 

additional instruction, it seems unlikely the jury would simply 

view the box cutter as inherently deadly without considering the 

circumstances, including how defendant used it.” (Ibid.)

In addition, as Gonzalez acknowledges, the prosecutor did 

not argue in his closing argument that the weapon was

inherently deadly. “Courts look to the prosecutor’s argument as a 

relevant circumstance in determining whether instructional error 

is harmless.” (People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 715.) 

In his closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury he was 

afraid to swing the weapon due to the centrifugal force it would 

create, which would be “huge.” The prosecutor emphasized that

Gonzalez first held the weapon to ascertain its strength, then 

snuck up behind Doe and struck him with it. And as in 
15

Aledamat, there was no suggestion from the prosecutor or 

defense counsel that the jury could find the metal pole was a 

deadly weapon under one of two alternative theories. (See

Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 14.)

Gonzalez argues the jury’s questions relating to whether 

the metal pole was a deadly weapon signaled it was struggling to 

determine whether the pole was a deadly weapon. Questions 

asked by a jury may show the jury based its verdict on an 

erroneous theory. (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 12.) Here,

the jury requested the definition of a deadly weapon and the term

“great bodily injury,” as well as readback of the testimony about 

Gonzalez swinging the weapon. Nothing about the jury’s 

questions suggests the jurors were considering whether the 

weapon was inherently deadly. To the contrary, the jurors 

appear to have focused on whether the metal pole was deadly as 

used, requesting to hear the testimony about how Gonzalez 

swung the pole. Further, the trial court responded to the 

questions by rereading the instruction that defined an inherently 

deadly weapon and directed the jury to consider all the 

circumstances of the incident in deciding whether the weapon 

was deadly, again providing the jury with the tools to determine 

whether the weapon was inherently deadly or deadly as used. 

And as discussed, the jury was instructed that not all 

instructions applied to the facts of the case.

Moreover, in finding Gonzalez guilty of assaulting Doe with 

a deadly weapon, the jury must have found the following 

elements to be true: (1) Gonzalez acted with a deadly weapon 

(either inherently or as used) that by its nature would directly 

and probably result in force being applied; (2) Gonzalez acted 

willfully; (3) Gonzalez was aware of facts that would lead a 
16

reasonable person to know his act would directly and probably 

result in force being applied to Doe; (4) Gonzalez had the ability 

to apply force with a deadly weapon to Doe; and (5) Gonzalez did 

not act in self-defense or in self-defense of others. As the 

Aledamat court observed, a reasonable jury could not make these 

findings without also finding the defendant used the object in a 

manner that was capable of causing and likely to cause great 

bodily injury. (See Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 15 [“‘[n]o 

reasonable jury that made all of these findings could have failed 

to find’ that defendant used the box cutter in a way that is 

capable of causing or likely to cause death or great bodily 

injury”].) Thus, it is not reasonably probable the verdict would 

have been more favorable to Gonzalez had the trial court not 

instructed the jury on an inherently deadly weapon. (Guiton, 

supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1130.)

B. The Trial Court Must Correct Gonzalez’s Custody Credits

Gonzalez contends, the People concede, and we agree the 

trial court erred in calculating Gonzalez’s prejudgment actual 

custody credits at 212 instead of 368 days. Section 2933.1, 

subdivision (a), limits presentence conduct credit to 15 percent for 

persons convicted of violent felonies listed in section 667.5, 

subdivision (c). (In re Reeves (2005) 35 Cal.4th 765, 768; accord, 

People v. Hernandez (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 192, 201.) The trial 

court awarded Gonzalez 184 days of actual custody credits and 28 

days conduct credits based on the assumption the 15 percent 

limitation under section 2933.1 applied. However, assault with a 

deadly weapon in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1), is 

not one of the listed felonies under section 667.5, subdivision (c). 

Accordingly, Gonzalez was entitled to 368 days of presentence 
17

conduct credit, including 184 actual days and the full 184 days of 

conduct credits. (§ 4019, subd. (f).) 

DISPOSITION

The judgment of conviction is modified to award Gonzalez 

368 days of presentence custody credits. As modified, the 

judgment is affirmed. The superior court is directed to prepare a 

corrected abstract of judgment proving a total of 368 days of 

presentence credits (184 actual days plus 184 days of conduct 

credits), and to forward a copy of the corrected abstract of 

judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

 

FEUER, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

IBARRA, J.*

* Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned 

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.