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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 10, 2004 Decided October 29, 2004

No. 01-7203

CYNTHIA JACOBS CARTER,

APPELLANT

v.

GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cv03134)

Karl W. Carter, Jr. argued the cause and filed the briefs

for appellant. Nathaniel H. Speights entered an appearance.

Karen A. Khan argued the cause and filed the brief for

appellee.

Before: SENTELLE, TATEL, and ROBERTS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.
2

TATEL, Circuit Judge: George Washington University denied appellant, an African American born in 1951, promotions

to all three positions she applied for over the course of a year.

Resigning from GW, appellant sued, claiming race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42

U.S.C. § 1981, age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, retaliation, constructive

discharge, and breach of contract. Appellant’s trial counsel,

however, conducted virtually no discovery, and GW moved for

summary judgment, which the district court granted on all

counts. Seeing insufficient evidence in the record from which

a jury could find in appellant’s favor, we affirm.

I.

After beginning a job at appellee George Washington University, appellant Cynthia Carter received three promotions

over five years while earning a master’s degree and pursuing

a Ph.D. From 1994 onward, Carter worked as Director of

Reunions and Events in the Alumni Relations Office. According to Carter, because she spoke out about what she

considered discriminatory treatment within that office, her

relationship with Michael Worth, GW’s Vice President for

Development and Alumni Affairs, began deteriorating.

In 1997 and 1998, Carter applied for the positions of

Executive Director of Alumni Relations, Director of Development at Mount Vernon College (a former women’s college

now owned by GW), and Director of Corporate and Foundation Relations. She obtained none of these promotions. Carter then resigned, taking a higher-paying job at Howard

University.

Following the second promotion denial, Carter filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

which she later amended to cover the third denial. When the

EEOC chose not to pursue the complaint, Carter sued GW in

the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,

raising claims based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e(16); 42 U.S.C. § 1981; the

Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (‘‘ADEA’’), 29
3

U.S.C. §§ 621-634; and common law. Specifically, she

claimed race discrimination regarding all three promotion

denials, age discrimination regarding the first two denials,

retaliation regarding the last two denials, retaliation regarding an adverse evaluation, constructive discharge, and breach

of contract.

Despite what the district court termed ‘‘ample opportunity

to conduct discovery,’’ Carter’s trial counsel (she is now

represented by different counsel) deposed no witnesses,

served no interrogatories, and requested no admissions. Carter v. George Washington Univ., 180 F. Supp. 2d 97, 107

(D.D.C. 2001); Carter v. George Washington Univ., No. 99-

3134 (D.D.C. May 17, 2001). At the very end of the discovery

period, Carter’s counsel did ask GW to produce certain

documents, but because he failed to comply with the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure in submitting this request, ‘‘discovery TTT ended and plaintiff [had] taken no discovery whatsoever.’’ Carter, No. 99-3134 (D.D.C. May 17, 2001). GW then

moved for summary judgment. As part of her opposition,

Carter attached her own affidavit, but submitted no sworn

statements from any one else. Claiming that Carter’s affidavit included ‘‘inadmissible hearsay, speculation and conclusions,’’ GW moved to strike numerous paragraphs. Though

the district court did not address GW’s motion to strike, it

granted GW’s motion for summary judgment on all counts

without referring to Carter’s hearsay statements. See 180 F.

Supp. 2d at 99-102, 111. The district court later denied

Carter’s motion for reconsideration. Carter v. George Washington Univ., No. 99-3134 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2003).

II.

Before addressing the merits of Carter’s appeal, we consider GW’s motion in this court to strike several of Carter’s

exhibits and those parts of her opening brief that reference

them. Specifically, GW argues that certain pages from Carter’s deposition and the university’s personnel manual were

never presented to the district court and thus cannot be part

of the record on appeal. Conceding that her lawyer failed to
4

file these documents in opposition to GW’s motion for summary judgment, Carter insists that counsel did file them as

attachments to her motion for reconsideration. GW responds

that even were this true, Carter may not have a ‘‘second bite

at the apple’’ by including in her motion for reconsideration

evidence which she could have submitted to the district court

prior to summary judgment.

We need not consider GW’s latter argument, for our review

of the district court’s docket sheet and file convinces us that

Carter’s trial counsel never filed the disputed documents as

attachments to the motion for reconsideration, although the

motion itself made reference to them. This circuit will not

normally consider evidence that a party never presented to

the district court. Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Willoughby, 863 F.2d

1029, 1035-36 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see Fed. R. App. P. 10(a)

(describing the composition of the record on appeal). To be

sure, in Eureka Investment Corp. v. Chicago Title Insurance

Co., 743 F.2d 932, 945 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1984), we treated as

part of the record an exhibit never formally moved into

evidence in the district court, but we did so because all

parties and the district court treated the exhibit as evidence.

In this case, by contrast, GW objected to the documents from

the first possible moment, and the district court never mentioned them in its denial of Carter’s motion for reconsideration, Carter, No. 99-3134 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2003).

We therefore grant GW’s motion to strike and will disregard the disputed exhibits in the remainder of this opinion.

III.

This brings us, then, to Carter’s challenges to the district

court’s entry of summary judgment for GW. As usual, we

review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo

and will affirm only if, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to Carter and drawing all reasonable inferences

accordingly, we conclude that no reasonable jury could reach

a verdict in Carter’s favor. See Holbrook v. Reno, 196 F.3d

255, 259-60 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
5

Because Carter never claimed in the district court, as she

does here, that the record contains direct evidence of discrimination, she has waived this argument. See Ben-Kotel v.

Howard Univ., 319 F.3d 532, 535 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding

direct-evidence argument waived when not raised below).

We will therefore evaluate her claims under the burdenshifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under McDonnell Douglas, in order to

establish a prima facie case for a discrimination claim, the

plaintiff must show that (1) she ‘‘belongs to a’’ protected class;

(2) she ‘‘applied and was qualified for a job for which the

employer was seeking applicants’’; (3) ‘‘despite [her] qualifications, [she] was rejected’’; and (4) ‘‘after [her] rejection, the

position remained open and the employer continued to seek

applicants from persons of [her] qualifications.’’ McDonnell

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. For a retaliation claim, the plaintiff must show that ‘‘(1) she engaged in a statutorily protected

activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and

(3) there is a causal connection between the two.’’ Taylor v.

Small, 350 F.3d 1286, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2003). ‘‘Where, as

here, the plaintiff claims that the retaliation took the form of

a failure to hire, the plaintiff must also show: 4) that [she]

applied for an available job; and 5) that [she] was qualified

for that position.’’ Morgan v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp.,

328 F.3d 647, 651 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

If the plaintiff satisfies her prima facie case, then the

employer must ‘‘produce admissible evidence that, if believed,

would establish that [its] action was motivated by a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.’’ Teneyck v. Omni Shoreham Hotel, 365 F.3d 1139, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Once the

employer has met this burden of production, the burdenshifting framework disappears, and a court reviewing summary judgment looks to whether a reasonable jury could infer

intentional discrimination or retaliation from all the evidence,

including ‘‘(1) the plaintiff’s prima facie case; (2) any evidence

the plaintiff presents to attack the employer’s proffered explanation for its action; and (3) any further evidence of

discrimination that may be available to the plaintiff (such as

independent evidence of discriminatory statements or atti-
6

tudes on the part of the employer).’’ Waterhouse v. District

of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989, 992-93 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting

Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1289 (D.C. Cir.

1998) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Kidd v. District of Columbia, 206 F.3d 35, 46 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

Because the McDonnell Douglas framework governs all of

Carter’s Title VII, ADEA, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims, Hall

v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 1074, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1999)

(applying framework to ADEA claims); Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodman Local, 843 F.2d 1395, 1412 n.7 (D.C.

Cir. 1998) (applying framework to § 1981 claims), we shall

apply it to each of her three promotion denials in turn.

Executive Director of Alumni Relations

When GW’s Executive Director of Alumni Relations resigned in 1997, Carter applied for the position along with

many other candidates. Michael Worth, Vice President for

Development and Alumni Affairs, appointed a ten-person

search committee to review applications, interview candidates,

and then recommend at least three finalists to him for the

final decision. Joe Hall, Associate Vice President for University Development, served as the nonvoting committee chair;

the committee also had four alumni and five administrators,

including two African Americans. The committee narrowed

the field and interviewed only five candidates: Carter, two

white men under age forty, and two white women. It recommended only the four white candidates to Worth, who ultimately picked one of the men, Keith Betts. Betts had

recently received a Ph.D. in Higher Education Administration

and, like Carter, had worked as a director in the Alumni

Relations Office since 1994. He had started working there a

few months after Carter and occupied a lower salary grade.

According to Joe Hall, the committee decided against recommending Carter for several reasons, including poor interviewing skills and lack of qualifications. Most committee

members ranked her last. During her deposition Carter

testified that a few weeks after the interview, she sought out

an African-American committee member for advice, and that
7

member suggested that she adopt a new approach to interviews.

Carter filed her complaint with the EEOC more than 180

days after GW’s decision to select Betts and more than 240

days after learning that the committee had declined to send

her name forward to Worth. Asserting that Title VII requires the filing of complaints within 180 days of the time the

employee learns of the challenged employment action, GW

argues that Carter’s claims are untimely. But 29 C.F.R.

§ 1601.13(a)(4)(ii)(A) provides that employees have up to 300

days to file where a worksharing agreement exists between

the EEOC and a local fair employment practices agency.

Since the EEOC had such an agreement with the D.C. Office

of Human Rights at the time of Carter’s complaint, see Pl.’s

Ex. 14, J.A., vol. 1, tab 14, Carter had up to 300 days to file

with the Commission. By any count, she met this deadline,

thus preserving her right to sue.

As GW concedes, Carter has established a prima facie case

under McDonnell Douglas for both race and age discrimination. An African American over forty, Carter belongs to two

protected classes; she possessed the qualifications identified

as necessary for the position in GW’s job description; and the

committee rejected her while advancing four other applicants.

To survive summary judgment, however, she must also present evidence to rebut GW’s proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reason that she interviewed poorly.

We review subjective considerations like GW’s given reason

with ‘‘caution,’’ since employers can easily use such criteria to

‘‘mask discrimination.’’ See Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr.,

156 F.3d 1284, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc). In Aka, for

example, the employer offered the plaintiff’s lack of enthusiasm as a basis for the decision not to hire, but the plaintiff

claimed that he ‘‘expressed enthusiasm at his interview’’ and

introduced corroborating evidence suggesting high motivation. Id. at 1297-98. Specifically, Aka presented evidence

that he had volunteered at the Washington Hospital Center in

hopes of getting hired, that he had applied for numerous

other jobs at the hospital, and that in a related hiring dispute
8

an arbitrator had described him as ‘‘highly intelligent and

motivated.’’ Id. at 1298. Based on this evidence, we found

that a reasonable jury could disbelieve the employer’s proffered reason for refusing to hire Aka. Id. at 1298-99.

Carter’s situation differs quite significantly from Aka’s.

She neither claimed that her interview went well nor offered

a sufficiently concrete description of her interview from which

we might infer that it did. Indeed, to rebut GW’s proffered

reason, she offers only one admissible piece of evidence: the

affidavit of Dr. Graeme Baxter, Executive Dean of GW’s

Mount Vernon campus, which described Carter as seeming

‘‘very professional’’ in an interview conducted several months

later for a different job. In combination with other evidence,

this fact might well prove useful for rebutting GW’s reason,

as did Aka’s evidence that an arbitrator thought highly of

him. Standing alone, however, the affidavit falls far short, for

we cannot see how a reasonable jury could use a single

positive description of Carter’s behavior during a job interview to infer that she interviewed well during a different

interview conducted by different decision-makers months earlier.

In her affidavit, Carter states that while two of the other

candidates told her that the committee asked them only five

or six questions, the committee asked her around nineteen

questions. We have no need to consider whether such evidence could counter GW’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason, however, because Carter’s trial counsel failed to depose

any of the candidates or committee members, and we cannot

consider inadmissible hearsay evidence presented by one

party where, as here, the other party objected and moved to

strike. Commercial Drapery Contractors, Inc. v. United

States, 133 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e).

In short, Carter presents no admissible evidence from

which a reasonable jury could infer that GW’s claim that she

interviewed poorly was pretextual. Given this, we have no

need to address whether she can rebut GW’s second nondis-
9

criminatory reason—that the committee found her less qualified than other candidates.

Finally, we note that Carter has offered very little other

evidence that the committee might harbor discriminatory

animus. While she makes factual allegations which, if true,

might suggest discriminatory intent on the part of Michael

Worth, he was not a decision-maker at the committee level,

nor does Carter suggest that he exercised discriminatory

animus in selecting the committee members. Indeed, responding to GW’s specific interrogatories, Carter named none

of the committee’s voting members as discriminatory actors;

she named only Keith Betts, Joe Hall, and Michael Worth.

Because no reasonable jury could find sufficient evidence to

infer intentional discrimination from the evidence before us,

the district court correctly granted summary judgment to

GW on Carter’s race and age discrimination claims related to

this promotion denial.

Director of Development

In the spring of 1998, Carter applied for the position of

Director of Development at GW’s recently absorbed Mount

Vernon campus. GW sought to hire a director who would

work with Baxter to identify, cultivate, and solicit major gifts.

The job description called for a bachelor’s degree, with a

‘‘master’s degree TTT preferred,’’ and a minimum six years of

fundraising experience. Baxter and Hall interviewed Carter

and two other applicants, including Sarah Morgan. A thirtythree-year-old white woman, Morgan worked as GW’s Associate Director of Development for Major Gifts and had at least

nine years of experience in fundraising, including a year spent

working at a women’s college. When Baxter identified Morgan as the best candidate, Hall agreed to hire her. According

to Baxter, she selected Morgan because of Morgan’s experience managing fund-raising campaigns and working at a

women’s college. Carter was ‘‘not a viable candidate,’’ Baxter

concluded, because she ‘‘had no pertinent experience working

with potential major donors, and had never directed a fundraising campaign of any size, let alone a major fund-raising
10

campaign for a college or university.’’ No evidence suggests

that Baxter knew of Carter’s prior complaints about discrimination.

Carter alleges that GW rejected her for this promotion due

to her race and age, and in retaliation for her allegations that

she had experienced discrimination in her earlier promotion

denial. The district court found that Carter had not established a prima facie case for these claims because she failed to

show that she and Morgan were ‘‘similarly qualified for the

position.’’ 180 F. Supp. 2d at 107. To make out a prima facie

case in this circuit, however, a plaintiff need not show that

she is as qualified as the successful applicant, only that she is

qualified ‘‘relative to the entire pool from which applications

are welcome.’’ Mitchell v. Baldrige, 759 F.2d 80, 85 (D.C.

Cir. 1985). We need not determine whether Carter would

meet the prima facie requirements for qualifications under

the Mitchell standard, however, for she has failed to present

evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder could infer that

GW’s proffered reason for hiring Morgan over Carter was

pretextual. See Morgan, 328 F.3d at 653-54 (not addressing

whether plaintiff met prima facie requirements where plaintiff could not rebut legitimate nondiscriminatory reason).

Nor, for the same reason, need we address whether Carter

has made out a prima facie case for retaliation. If she has

failed to provide evidence which could lead a jury to doubt

GW’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason—that it hired Morgan because she was the better candidate—then Carter cannot survive summary judgment in any event.

Under Aka, ‘‘[i]f a factfinder can conclude that a reasonable

employer would have found the plaintiff to be significantly

better qualified for the job, but this employer did not, the

factfinder can legitimately infer that the employer consciously

selected a less-qualified candidate.’’ 156 F.3d at 1294. Comparing Carter’s background to Morgan’s, however, a jury

could not reasonably conclude that Carter was significantly

better qualified for the position. Although Carter had a

master’s degree at the time—Morgan’s highest degree was a

bachelor’s—Morgan had far more experience in fundraising.

Carter’s resume described her experience as ‘‘including 6
11

years of soliciting companies and organizations to provide

funds for GW campus and Off-Campus Programs.’’ Her

resume supported this assertion with the following specific

descriptions: she (1) ran the Distinguished Alumni Awards

program ‘‘resulting in the cultivation of numerous recipients

who became GW donors’’; (2) ‘‘[p]articipated in monthly

meetings related to the university Centuries Campaign’’; (3)

‘‘[w]rote a proposal that won a grant from the National

Geographic Society’’; (4) ‘‘[s]olicited and obtained the sponsorship of corporate tables at GW events’’; (5) ‘‘[s]olicited and

generated funds from alumni by including a ‘gift option’ on

mailings and announcements’’; and (6) participated in a telephone fundraiser.

By contrast, Morgan’s resume presented far more extensive and intensive fundraising experience. Among her current job responsibilities, she listed items like (1) ‘‘[m]anage

pool of 200 major gift prospects to support endowment and

current operating objectives of the Columbian School’s $30

million portion of the University’s $300 million Centuries

Campaign’’; (2) ‘‘[s]uccessfully identify, cultivate, solicit, and

steward major gift prospects’’; and (3) ‘‘[p]repare written

proposals, endowment agreements, and other solicitation materials needed to secure major gifts.’’ In prior jobs at GW

and other schools, moreover, Morgan listed such accomplishments as (1) ‘‘[i]dentified, cultivated, solicited, and stewarded

200 prospects to secure multi-year commitments for the

School’s Dean’s Fund, Department Chair’s Fund, and Special

Projects’’; (2) ‘‘[d]eveloped five-year strategic plan for annual

fund campaign during the University’s Centuries Campaign’’;

(3) ‘‘[d]eveloped and implemented prospect tracking system

for the University’s 1,500 leadership giving prospects’’; (4)

‘‘[i]mplemented volunteer-driven alumni corporate campaign

among 2,000 alumni’’; and (5) ‘‘[d]eveloped and implemented

comprehensive student telemarketing program geared toward

special gift campaign prospects and increasing long-term

leadership giving.’’

Given Morgan’s far more substantial experience in fundraising, we see no basis for a jury to find that a reasonable

employer would have found Carter more qualified—let alone
12

significantly more qualified—for the position of Director of

Development at Mount Vernon. Because Carter offers no

other evidence to attack Baxter’s reason as pretextual and

indeed offers no other evidence from which a jury could infer

discriminatory or retaliatory intent on the part of Baxter, we

affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on all

counts related to this promotion denial.

Director of Corporate and Foundation Relations

Following the two denials of promotion described above,

Carter applied for yet a third GW position—Director of

Corporate and Foundation Relations. That position entailed

responsibility for coordinating the university’s grant management and soliciting funds from corporations and foundations.

Such contributions made up a major part of GW’s fundraising

total: from 1995 to 1997, GW received between eleven and

seventeen million dollars annually from corporations and

foundations.

The university hired a consulting firm to do the initial

screening. That firm prepared a list of required job qualifications, which included a bachelor’s degree (master’s

preferred); ‘‘[c]omprehensive professional experience in

university corporate and foundation relations’’; and a

‘‘[d]emonstrated track record of successful fund raising activities and a demonstrated ability to solicit high-level

gifts.’’

The consultant in charge of the search, Katherine White,

interviewed Carter but did not recommend her for further

consideration. According to Carter, White informed her that

‘‘irrespective of the qualifications that she thought I possessed, per the instructions of Mr. Joseph Hall, I was being

denied the opportunity to interview and compete for the

position.’’ Sometime after this conversation, White wrote a

letter to Hall which stated that she had met with Carter,

found her unqualified due to lack of experience, and, after

consulting with Hall, called her to say that GW would consider her no further. GW later withdrew the position for lack of

qualified applicants and then, several months later, restruc-
13

tured the position, increased the salary, and convinced the

employee who had last held the position to return.

Carter challenges this promotion denial as both racially

discriminatory and retaliatory. The district court found that

Carter failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination

because she had not shown ‘‘that the position was filled by a

member outside of the protected class,’’ 180 F. Supp. 2d at

108, a requirement which the court deemed necessary under

McDonnell Douglas’s fourth element. Since then, however,

we held in Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 144-45 (D.C. Cir.

2002), that under McDonnell Douglas a plaintiff need not

show that the position was filled by someone outside her

protected class in order to make a prima facie case, though

the plaintiff must show that the position was not withdrawn

simply for lack of a vacancy, see Teneyck, 365 F.3d at 1152-53.

Here, the position not only remained unfilled, but, as shown

by GW’s later efforts to bring back the former employee, the

university still needed someone to occupy the position. Under Stella, then, Carter’s claim does not fail based on McDonnell Douglas’s fourth element.

As GW points out, Carter still fails to make out a prima

facie case for both discrimination and retaliation because she

has not shown that she was qualified for the position. The

resume Carter submitted to GW nowhere indicates expertise

in fundraising. That resume even fails to list the fundraisingrelated activities included in the resume Carter submitted for

the Mount Vernon job. Even supposing that Carter told

White about these additional activities during their meeting,

they fall short of ‘‘a demonstrated ability to solicit high-level

gifts.’’ Nor does her resume reveal much experience with

university corporate and foundation relations. The only relevant references appear in two lines of her two-and-a-half page

resume: in its description of her earlier GW job as Director

of Off Campus Programs, Carter’s resume states that she

‘‘solicited participation from corporate, foundation, and military offices’’ and ‘‘maintained database and corresponded with

various corporate, foundation, and governmental prospects.’’

We think no reasonable jury could find that this quite modest
14

description measures up to ‘‘comprehensive’’ experience in

university corporate and foundation relations.

Carter thus fails to meet the minimum objective criteria for

the position of Director of Corporate and Foundation Relations. Given this, and given that Carter showed neither that

these criteria were unnecessary for the job, cf. Barbour v.

Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1274, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding

that plaintiff met his prima facie case despite lacking one

objective qualification sought by the employer because a jury

could determine that this criterion was unnecessary), nor that

White recommended other candidates who lacked these objective criteria, cf. Kinsey v. First Reg’l Sec., Inc., 557 F.2d 830,

836-37 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that plaintiff met her prima

facie case despite lacking certain objective criteria because

‘‘these criteria were not applied alike to all applicants’’), she

has failed to show that she meets the qualifications requirement of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to GW on all counts related to this promotion denial.

IV.

Carter also challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment to GW on three other counts: retaliation from

a negative evaluation, constructive discharge, and breach of

contract. These arguments are either waived or unsupported. Carter’s opening brief never challenged the district

court’s ruling on her negative-evaluation claim, and we do not

consider claims raised for the first time in a reply brief.

Fitts v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, 236 F.3d 1, 3 n.2 (D.C. Cir.

2001) (per curiam). Carter’s constructive discharge claim

fails as it must be predicated on a showing of either intentional discrimination, see Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788

F.2d 781, 789-90 (D.C. Cir. 1986), or retaliation, and we have

upheld summary judgment on each of her claims that could

have formed the basis for this showing. Finally, Carter’s

breach-of-contract claim depends on her argument that the

GW personnel manual created a contract requiring the university to abide by federal antidiscrimination laws. But as
15

we noted above, Carter’s trial counsel failed to present the

relevant parts of this manual to the district court, and Carter

nowhere mentioned the manual’s antidiscrimination clauses

during the portions of her deposition that are part of the

record. Without these clauses, no reasonable fact-finder

could infer the existence of such a contract. Moreover, as

with Carter’s constructive discharge claim, this claim cannot

survive summary judgment because she cannot show illegal

discrimination in the first place.

V.

Because Carter has failed to offer any evidence from which

a reasonable jury could find in her favor, we affirm the

district court’s grant of summary judgment to GW on all

counts.

So ordered.