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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 16-BG-762

IN RE DORRANCE DICKENS, RESPONDENT,

and

IN RE DEBORAH LUXENBERG, RESPONDENT.

(Bar Registration Nos. 450751 and 215657)

On Report and Recommendation 

of the Board on Professional Responsibility

(BDN-271-11, BDN-10-12, BDN-11-12, and BDN-272-11)

(Argued April 25, 2017 Decided December 7, 2017)

Richard J. Berwanger, Jr., with whom Edward J. Hutchins, Jr., was on the 

brief, for Respondent Luxenberg.

Julia L. Porter, Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, with whom Wallace 

E. Shipp, Jr., Disciplinary Counsel at the time the brief was filed, and Jennifer P. 

Lyman, Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, were on the brief, for the Office of 

Disciplinary Counsel.

Before GLICKMAN and FISHER, Associate Judges, and REID, Senior Judge.

REID, Senior Judge: This attorney disciplinary case involves the main 

partner in a small law firm, respondent Deborah Luxenberg, and an attorney, 

respondent Dorrance Dickens, who started at the firm as a law clerk but became an 

12/7/2017
2

associate and eventually a partner. Disciplinary Counsel1charged Ms. Luxenberg 

with several violations of the District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct 

after Mr. Dickens allegedly stole at least $1,434,298.50 from three estates, 

including that of Ms. Luxenberg‘s client, Michelle Seltzer. Following his theft, 

Mr. Dickens fled to an island outside of the United States. 

The Board on Professional Responsibility (―the Board‖) has recommended 

that Mr. Dickens be disbarred from the practice of law due to his violation of 

multiple rules of professional conduct, including Rule 1.15 (a) and (c), 

commingling and misappropriation, and Rule 8.4 (c), conduct involving 

dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.

2

 The Board also has recommended 

 

1 When this case began, ―Disciplinary Counsel‖ was known as ―Bar 

Counsel,‖ but the name later changed. For convenience, we use ―Disciplinary 

Counsel‖ throughout this opinion.

2 Mr. Dickens did not respond to Disciplinary Counsel‘s charges, take 

exception to the Board‘s Report and Recommendation, or file an appellate brief. 

The factual summary section of this opinion includes facts pertinent to the cases of 

both Mr. Dickens and Ms. Luxenberg. However, since Mr. Dickens did not 

participate in the disciplinary proceedings, and did not contest the Hearing 

Committee‘s and the Board‘s findings and conclusions, the analysis section of this 

opinion focuses only on arguments presented by Ms. Luxenberg. Furthermore, 

since Mr. Dickens has not contested the case against him, we conclude that 

Disciplinary Counsel has proven by clear and convincing evidence that he violated 

Rules 1.1 (a), 1.1 (b), 1.3 (b)(1) and (b)(2), 1.4 (a) and (b), 1.7 (b)(4), 1.15 (a) and 

(c), 8.1 (b), and 8.4 (b), (c), and (d) in the Harris, O‘Brien, and Seltzer matters, and 

(continued...)
3

that Ms. Luxenberg be suspended from the practice of law for six months due to 

her violation of Rules 1.3 (a), 5.1 (a), and 5.1 (c)(2), relating to the responsibility 

of partners in law firms to ensure competency and ethical behavior by attorneys in 

the firm. 

Ms. Luxenberg argues on appeal that the Board erred by (1) considering 

evidence from disciplinary matters to which she was not a party; (2) finding that 

she violated Rules 1.3 (a), 5.1 (a), and 5.1 (c); and (3) recommending a ―harsh‖

sanction that is inconsistent with this court‘s case law and that is greater than the 

45-day sanction recommended by the Board‘s Hearing Committee. Disciplinary 

Counsel argues that the Board erred by failing to find that Ms. Luxenberg also 

violated Rules 1.3 (b)(1) and (2) pertaining to (a) a lawyer‘s intentional failure to 

seek the lawful objectives of a client and (b) prejudice or damage to the client;

Rule 1.7 (b)(4) concerning a lawyer‘s representation of a client where the lawyer‘s 

professional judgment may be affected by her own interest; and Rule 8.4 (a)

regarding a lawyer‘s professional misconduct by knowingly assisting or inducing

 

(...continued)

he is hereby disbarred from the practice of law in the District of Columbia, and as a 

condition of reinstatement he is required to make restitution in the amount of 

$1,434,298.50, with interest at the legal rate.
4

another to violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct. 

Disciplinary Counsel also asserts that given the record in this case, the proper 

sanction for Ms. Luxenberg is a one-year suspension, with a fitness requirement.

For the reasons stated below, we accept the recommendation of the Board. 

FACTUAL SUMMARY

The findings of fact contained in the voluminous Report and 

Recommendation of the Board‘s Hearing Committee Number 12, and supporting 

record evidentiary documents, reveal the following factual context. Ms. 

Luxenberg commenced her practice of law as a member of the District of 

Columbia Bar in 1975. Eventually she was joined in practice by her husband, 

Stephen Johnson. While Mr. Dickens was completing his legal studies, he became 

a law clerk at the firm; he was hired in October 1995 because of his computer 

skills. His status changed to that of an associate in the firm in October 1996 when 

he became a member of the District of Columbia Bar. 
5

In 1998, the firm incorporated in Maryland as Luxenberg and Johnson, and 

in 2003, when Mr. Dickens became a partner, the firm changed its name to 

Luxenberg, Johnson and Dickens. The firm had no partnership agreement but Ms. 

Luxenberg always retained a 52% interest in the firm. Ms. Luxenberg‘s practice 

has been devoted to family matters such as divorce and custody. Although she has 

never been the managing partner of the firm, she decided which clients the firm 

would represent and who would handle the client matters. Mr. Johnson also had a 

family law practice, and he took on cases in other areas of the law. 

Mr. Dickens handled some cases with Ms. Luxenberg and some with Mr. 

Johnson, but also took on cases on his own, such as the representation, beginning 

in 2000, of Vernon Harris in the probate of Mr. Harris‘s sister‘s estate, and the 

representation of the personal representative of the estate of Dr. JoAnne S. O‘Brien 

in April 2008 (the ―Garrity/O‘Brien‖ matter). There was a different arrangement 

in the case of Ms. Seltzer whose separation and divorce Ms. Luxenberg had 

handled in 1994. When Ms. Seltzer sought Ms. Luxenberg‘s representation in 

2004 to update her estate plan, which included a revocable trust created in 1990 

(the ―1990 trust‖), Ms. Luxenberg explained to Ms. Seltzer that she did not do that 

type of legal work; however, during a meeting at the law firm, Ms. Luxenberg 
6

introduced Ms. Seltzer to Mr. Dickens as the person who could do the required 

work. Mr. Dickens made a few amendments in 2004 to the 1990 trust, and he 

prepared a general power of attorney as well as a healthcare power of attorney for 

Ms. Seltzer. In response to Ms. Seltzer‘s request, Ms. Luxenberg became a cotrustee of the trust; Ms. Seltzer remained as the other co-trustee. In mid-November 

2004, Ms. Seltzer executed the amended trust as grantor and trustee, and Ms. 

Luxenberg signed the document as trustee. 

In early 2007, Ms. Luxenberg and Mr. Johnson decided to move the main 

office of the firm from the District of Columbia to Maryland, and to maintain 

satellite offices in the District and Virginia. By this time Mr. Johnson‘s law 

practice was limited and his time centered on administration of the firm. Even 

though he was not a member of the Virginia Bar and Ms. Luxenberg had 

knowledge of that fact, Mr. Dickens worked out of the Virginia office that the firm 

leased in February 2007; the lease was signed by Mr. Dickens but the firm paid the 

rent for several months before delegating that responsibility to Mr. Dickens. 

The management of the small firm was not rigorous after the 2007 move of 

the main office to Maryland and Mr. Dickens‘ relocation to the Virginia office. 
7

Although the firm appears to have some policies and procedures to ensure 

compliance with ethical obligations, these were either loosely followed or not 

enforced with respect to matters handled by Mr. Dickens. Generally, the firm held 

biweekly staff meetings during which open cases were reviewed; however, Mr. 

Dickens‘ attendance at these meetings decreased significantly, his participation by 

phone was sporadic, and there were occasions on which he simply could not be 

reached. Moreover, despite the firm‘s record-keeping policies, Mr. Dickens failed 

to execute retainer agreements with clients that he represented, maintain proper 

billing records, and save electronic client documents to the firm‘s computer server. 

Even when the firm discovered that Mr. Dickens had clients for whom the main 

office had no records, or when the firm received checks, sometimes for substantial 

amounts of money, without documentation – as in the Garrity/O‘Brien matter – the 

firm made little or no effort to ensure that Mr. Dickens followed its policies and 

procedures, as well as the ethical rules of the legal profession.

There was limited contact between Ms. Seltzer and the Luxenberg firm in 

2006 and 2007 regarding her trust. In late 2007, Ms. Seltzer was diagnosed with 

Stage IV colon cancer. She underwent surgery, followed by chemotherapy 

treatment which she received through 2009. During that period of time, in addition 
8

to Ms. Luxenberg‘s role as co-trustee of Ms. Seltzer‘s trust, Ms. Seltzer and Ms. 

Luxenberg became friends. 

Sometime in early 2009, Mr. Dickens advised Ms. Luxenberg that he 

planned to leave the firm to spend time on other interests, but that he could still 

handle some legal matters; he traveled quite a bit, apparently in connection with a 

Middle East telecommunications venture and also business at the Vatican. Around 

April 2009, Ms. Seltzer contacted Ms. Luxenberg because she desired some 

changes in her estate plan, to ensure that she properly provided for her adult 

children, Eric Seltzer and Jerri Seltzer Falk. She stated in an email on May 11 that 

if Ms. Luxenberg was too busy to handle her request and would like for Mr. 

Dickens to do so, that would be ―okay.‖ On the same day, Ms. Luxenberg 

responded that Mr. Dickens ―would have to deal with any trust questions.‖ 

Thereafter, Ms. Luxenberg sent Mr. Dickens an email detailing information about 

Ms. Seltzer‘s children and the family trusts; she ended the email by saying, in part, 

―I have told Michelle [Ms. Seltzer] I will still be involved and will talk to her and 

if necessary do conference calls with her and you.‖ In addition, Ms. Luxenberg 

informed Ms. Seltzer that the firm would charge a discounted hourly rate of $375 

―because of our long relationship with you.‖ 
9

When she had not heard from Mr. Dickens, Ms. Seltzer sent emails to Ms. 

Luxenberg on July 6, and again on August 10, about the lack of communication 

from Mr. Dickens. On August 12, 2009, Ms. Luxenberg sent an email to Mr. 

Dickens, saying ―I need to know if you can do this realistically. Otherwise we 

need to get someone else to do it.‖ Mr. Dickens sent Ms. Seltzer a responsive 

communication and Ms. Luxenberg arranged for Ms. Seltzer and Mr. Dickens to 

speak by phone on a certain date. After speaking with Ms. Seltzer on August 18, 

2009, Mr. Dickens sent an email to Ms. Luxenberg outlining the work to be 

performed on the trust and other documents, and he included mention of ―[a] new 

trust‖ for Ms. Seltzer.

Because Ms. Seltzer had not received any draft documents from Mr. Dickens

and had learned that her cancer had ―metastasized and spread,‖ she again reached 

out to Ms. Luxenberg on September 14, 2009, saying in part: ―If this is an 

undertaking that [Mr. Dickens] is not interested in doing, I understand and perhaps 

I should find someone else. I do put my trust in both of you and that is why I felt 

you and [Mr. Dickens] could help me.‖ Mr. Dickens claimed he had sent the 

documents by regular mail, then said he spelled the name of Ms. Seltzer‘s street 
10

incorrectly, and subsequently, he sent a package to Ms. Seltzer by FedEx on 

September 16, which she received. Ms. Luxenberg and Mr. Dickens apparently 

had a tense telephone conversation during which Ms. Luxenberg requested copies 

of the Seltzer documents for the firm‘s central files; Mr. Dickens apparently took 

offense at the tone and content of the conversation. By September 21, 2009, it 

became clear that the only document Mr. Dickens had sent to Ms. Seltzer at that 

point was the new trust, which he discussed directly with Ms. Seltzer on September 

21. Both Ms. Seltzer and Mr. Dickens informed Ms. Luxenberg on September 22 

and 23, that they were making progress on the trust. Later, Ms. Seltzer‘s son 

(undoubtedly at the request of his mother) sent Mr. Dickens a list of Ms. Seltzer‘s 

assets, including account numbers. 

Sometime thereafter, Mr. Dickens traveled to Rome. Upon his return, he 

sent Ms. Seltzer an email on October 20, 2009, acknowledging her calls and 

questions while he was away, the potential need for some changes in the trust, and 

the need to schedule a date for signing the trust. Between October 20 and October 

26, Mr. Dickens and Ms. Seltzer exchanged emails regarding a date for the signing 

of the new trust. Although Eric and Jerri were included in the email exchange, Ms. 

Luxenberg was not, except for an October ―FYI‖ email to her from Mr. Dickens on 
11

October 26, which included the chain of emails beginning on October 20. On the 

day of the signing of the new trust, November 2, 2009, Mr. Dickens met with Ms. 

Seltzer, Eric, and Jerri in the Luxenberg firm‘s Maryland office. Mr. Dickens did 

not provide a copy of the new trust, labeled the ―Michelle S. Seltzer Family Trust,‖ 

to Ms. Seltzer‘s children before the meeting, and the schedule of Ms. Seltzer‘s 

assets was neither attached to the document she signed nor discussed during the 

meeting. Ms. Luxenberg did not see Ms. Seltzer or her children until the meeting 

had concluded; she claimed she did not know about the meeting or the signing. 

One month after the execution of the new trust, Ms. Seltzer sent Mr. Dickens 

an email inquiring about her will, and advising that she wanted to complete 

everything before going to Johns Hopkins for further treatment. She followed that 

email with another on December 4 stating, ―if you still have any documents to 

complete could we take care of that now?‖ Subsequently, on December 11, 2009, 

Ms. Seltzer signed her new will, which essentially mirrored her old will, except 

that Mr. Dickens was appointed as personal representative of her will; the will

named Stephen Johnson as Mr. Dickens‘ successor. The will was witnessed by a 

non-lawyer employee of the firm, Stephen Gleichman, and by Billy Tollar, Mr. 

Dickens‘ friend who later became his spouse. Apparently Ms. Luxenberg did not 
12

see the new will before it was presented to Ms. Seltzer, but Ms. Luxenberg was 

copied on a December 8, 2009, email that scheduled the will signing for December 

11.

On December 23, 2009, Mr. Dickens was supposed to meet Ms. Seltzer at 

her bank, but did not appear. Ms. Luxenberg sent an apologetic email to Ms. 

Seltzer the following day stating that Mr. Dickens ―went away for Christmas.‖ But 

Mr. Gleichman had earlier informed Ms. Seltzer that Mr. Dickens was 

―unfortunately stuck in court for a vicious case,‖ as the reason for his failure to 

keep the bank appointment with Ms. Seltzer; Ms. Luxenberg reiterated that reason 

in a later communication to Ms. Seltzer. In response to Ms. Luxenberg‘s email, 

Ms. Seltzer discussed her cancer treatments, and stated, ―I‘m sorry [Mr. Dickens] 

didn‘t relay where and why we were meeting since it wasn‘t extremely urgent. If 

he still wants to introduce himself to the officers of my bank, we‘ll have to do it 

after the first [of the year].‖ 

In late January and early February 2010, Mr. Dickens filed an application for 

an IRS EIN number for the new Michelle Seltzer trust; the information he sent to 

the IRS identified himself as ―Grantor‖ and ―Trustee‖ of the trust. He also notified 
13

Ms. Luxenberg about a change in his cellular service ―[i]n preparation for my 

move to Italy,‖ and he received confirmation from the State Corporation 

Commission for the Commonwealth of Virginia that articles of incorporation for 

the limited liability corporation, JECRAL, LLC had been filed successfully. 

Earlier on December 11, 2009, (according to Mr. Dickens‘ First Account for the 

Seltzer Family Trust, filed on March 25, 2011), Ms. Seltzer had purchased an 

Assignment of a 1% interest in JECRAL and FRW Telecom with a demand note 

payable to Mr. Dickens in his individual capacity in the amount of $685,000. 

Ms. Seltzer‘s condition continued to deteriorate, and her daughter notified 

Mr. Dickens on February 14, 2010, that Ms. Seltzer had been placed in hospice 

care at Casey House in Maryland. Ms. Luxenberg bought several plants and went 

to see Ms. Seltzer on February 23. Until Ms. Luxenberg encountered Mr. Dickens 

in the parking lot of Casey House, she was unaware that Mr. Dickens planned to 

visit Ms. Seltzer on the same day to obtain her signature on a legal document. 

When Ms. Luxenberg arrived in Ms. Seltzer‘s room, Ms. Seltzer asked her to 

witness papers that Mr. Dickens had brought for Ms. Seltzer‘s signature. Ms. 

Luxenberg did not read the document she was asked to witness but she understood 

that it pertained to ―marshall[ing] assets for the trust for Michelle Seltzer . . . that 
14

were left in the PNC Bank.‖ Ms. Luxenberg did not recall Mr. Dickens reading or 

explaining the document to Ms. Seltzer; nor did Ms. Luxenberg question Mr. 

Dickens about the document which stated: ―To Any and All Officers of PNC 

Bank[,] Please cash-in or liquidate all of the Certificates of Deposit that I have in 

your bank, including, but not limited to all those listed on the attached two sheets 

and give the proceeds to Dorrance D. Dickens, who is my attorney.‖ Ms. 

Luxenberg did not see ―the two attached sheets‖ because they were not affixed to 

the document that Ms. Seltzer signed. The other person who witnessed the 

document was Carolyn Hohlfeld, then a human resources employee with 

Montgomery County government who had assisted Ms. Seltzer while she was still 

working and receiving cancer treatments. She happened to be visiting with Ms. 

Seltzer on February 23 and Mr. Dickens asked her to witness a document. Like 

Ms. Luxenberg, Ms. Hohlfeld did not read the document and did not recall seeing 

any attachments, but Ms. Hohlfeld questioned Ms. Seltzer to be sure Ms. Seltzer

was aware of the nature of the document she was about to sign. 

Armed with the February 23 document, Mr. Dickens proceeded to the PNC 

Bank on February 26, 2010, and transferred Ms. Seltzer‘s PNC assets to another 

PNC account for which he was the sole signatory, the ―Michelle Seltzer Family 
15

TRT, Dorrance D. Dickens Trustee‖ account. He deposited $20,000 of the funds 

into his personal account at another bank, the United Bank, on February 26, 2010. 

A few days later, on March 5, Ms. Seltzer succumbed to her illness. Mr. Dickens 

removed a total of $60,000 from Ms. Seltzer‘s trust funds from two checks written 

on March 8 and 11; he again deposited the funds in his personal account at United

Bank. He also wrote a check to the Luxenberg firm on the Seltzer trust account on 

March 11, in the amount of $4,478 indicating on the memo line of the check 

―Legal Fees.‖ The firm‘s bookkeeper posed an email question to Mr. Dickens 

about the missing bill that would explain the check; Mr. Dickens‘ return 

explanation was limited to, ―[A]s soon as I decompress I will log on and handle it.‖ 

Nevertheless, the firm cashed the check without any record confirming that it was 

entitled to funds from Ms. Seltzer‘s trust, a fact that Ms. Luxenberg acknowledged

during her testimony before the Board. 

Not long after Ms. Seltzer‘s memorial service on March 11, her children, 

Eric Seltzer and Jerri Seltzer Falk, communicated with Mr. Dickens by phone and 

email to inquire whether he was ready to meet with them about their mother‘s 

estate, but he ―kept putting [them] off.‖ Eventually, on March 23, 2010, he 

notified the Seltzer children that he had been ―traveling outside the country‖ but 
16

had returned; however, he did not indicate when he would meet with Mr. Seltzer 

and Ms. Falk. When Ms. Falk‘s April 1 email to Mr. Dickens, inquiring as to 

when they might meet ―to discuss [the] will and other details,‖ received no 

response, Stuart Plotnick, the trustee of the trust created for Eric Seltzer by his 

father, called and requested Ms. Seltzer‘s will and trust. A paralegal at the 

Luxenberg firm reported the call by email to both Mr. Dickens and Ms. Luxenberg 

on April 15, 2010.3 Mr. Seltzer informed Mr. Dickens on April 19 that he still had 

not received the requested documents. Finally, on April 20, the firm‘s paralegal 

sent the trust without the statement of assets, but not the will, to Mr. Plotnick. Mr. 

Plotnick immediately asked about the schedule of assets and Mr. Dickens 

responded via email, with a copy to Ms. Luxenberg, that he did not yet have a 

schedule of assets since ―[m]ost of the assets will be coming from the estate per the 

will.‖ Mr. Dickens sent another email to Mr. Plotnick on April 21, with a copy to 

Ms. Luxenberg saying, in part, that he was ―in the process of going through the 

papers to locate the assets‖ and mentioning the assets of ―a revocable trust‖ as well 

as the irrevocable family trust that he had created for Ms. Seltzer. After Ms. Falk 

pressed the issue of Mr. Dickens‘ non-response in an email dated April 23, Mr. 

 

3 Ms. Luxenberg billed Ms. Seltzer‘s account for a trip to PNC Bank on 

April 16, 2010, with Mr. Dickens to transfer assets from the 1990 trust.
17

Dickens sent her a check and cash around April 26 to cover Ms. Seltzer‘s funeral 

expenses and honorarium for the rabbi who officiated at Ms. Seltzer‘s memorial 

service. It was in April and again in July 2010 that Ms. Luxenberg went to the 

PNC Bank with Mr. Dickens to transfer assets belonging to the 1990 trust to the 

2009 trust.4 Ms. Luxenberg billed Ms. Seltzer‘s account for the second trip to PNC 

Bank with Mr. Dickens on July 13, 2010. As Trustee of Ms. Seltzer‘s amended 

1990 trust and in accordance with Mr. Dickens‘ direction, she transferred 

 

4 While he was avoiding sending documents to or meeting with Mr. Seltzer, 

Ms. Falk, and Mr. Plotnick, Mr. Dickens continued to siphon funds from Ms. 

Seltzer‘s family trust to benefit his personal account at United Bank, including 

$30,000 on March 12, $70,000 on March 23, and $35,000 on April 2, 2010. Mr. 

Seltzer and Ms. Falk continued to seek a meeting with Mr. Dickens, as well as a 

list of assets, and proceeds from the trust in May and June 2010. In addition, Ms. 

Luxenberg attempted to reach Mr. Dickens by phone in late June after Mr. Johnson 

indicated that there was ―an immediate deadline‖ regarding the Seltzer matter. Ms. 

Luxenberg sent Mr. Dickens a follow-up email on June 23, 2010, asking ―when the 

deadline is or what [she] h[ad] to do,‖ and closing the email with ―we need to get 

Seltzer done and I need to know what you want me to do.‖ In the face of these 

requests for information Mr. Dickens removed more funds from the trust and 

placed them into his personal account including, $12,300 on May 10, 2010, $7,500 

on May 26, $15,000 on June 10, and $10,000 on June 24. He transferred another 

$50,000 to James Frelk on June 7; Mr. Frelk was not a beneficiary of Ms. Seltzer‘s 

trust or will and was not connected to Ms. Seltzer. He dipped into the Seltzer trust 

again in July 2010, taking $3,500 on July 8, and paying $43,719.05 to Tysons Audi 

on July 14 for a car that he and Mr. Tollar co-purchased. By that time, he had 

lifted approximately $360,000 from the trust, leaving only about $200 as the 

balance at the end of July. He failed to properly deposit a $25,035.59 benefits 

payment from Montgomery County to the Seltzer trust, instead depositing it in his 

personal account on July 20, 2010. 
18

$27,742.12 from the Michelle S. Seltzer Trust funds at the bank to the Michelle 

Seltzer Family Trust, although she thought the funds were being transferred to ―the 

irrevocable trust.‖ On the same day she transferred a smaller sum for a total of 

more than $33,000. 

By early August 2010, Mr. Seltzer and Ms. Falk had not received the 

information they had requested from Mr. Dickens about the assets of the trust. Mr. 

Seltzer reported to his sister on August 2 that he had spoken with Mr. Dickens who 

said ―he ha[d] run into complications with [Ms. Seltzer‘s] assets because [she] has 

two trusts.‖ Mr. Seltzer added that Mr. Dickens ―[s]ays he will know soon how 

much is in the estate and then I imagine [he] will also work on getting checks out 

to us that were promised at the end of last month.‖ On August 9 Mr. Seltzer again

pressed Mr. Dickens by asking for an accounting of the assets in the Seltzer trust 

set up by Mr. Dickens, requesting ―copies of the first trust‖ as well as an 

accounting, and inquiring ―where the assets are being kept (for example, where 

[his] half of [his mother‘s] life insurance proceeds are.‖ Mr. Dickens sent an 

extensive response on August 10, outlining what purportedly were the steps he still 

had to take, promising to send Mr. Seltzer and Ms. Falk $5,000 each that day, and 

indicating that Ms. Luxenberg ―is cooperating to get this done as efficiently as 
19

possible.‖ Ms. Falk sent a rapid response to Mr. Dickens, with a copy to Ms. 

Luxenberg, asserting in part that more important than a distribution was ―a full and 

accurate accounting of the assets that are supposed to be in the trust.‖ Shortly after 

receiving her copy of Ms. Falk‘s email, Ms. Luxenberg asked Mr. Dickens for ―all 

of the documents in the Seltzer file,‖ informed him that she had neither the trust 

documents nor the will, and reminded him that he had promised to submit the 

Seltzer file ―a while ago when [he was] traveling the globe.‖ Although Mr. 

Dickens sent Ms. Luxenberg some files, he did not transmit the schedule of assets 

or information about any of the trust bank accounts.5

 

5 Between August and November 2010, when Mr. Seltzer, Ms. Falk, and 

Ms. Luxenberg were seeking information from him, Mr. Dickens began to collect 

and take for himself funds from Ms. Seltzer‘s estate that were earmarked for her 

1990 trust. These included funds from T. Rowe Price investments - $10,000 taken 

on August 9, $42,000 on August 25, $15,000 on September 3, $10,000 on 

September 20, and $17,000 on September 28 for a total of $94,000; funds from 

Vanguard Mutual investments - $27,886 on October 8, $29,000 on October 15, 

$20,000 on November 10, $15,000 on November 18, (and later $29,985.86 on 

March 19, 2011), for a total of $121,871.86. In late November an attorney for Ms. 

Falk, Carole Gelfeld, tried to reach Mr. Dickens; after learning that he was 

reportedly ill, Ms. Gelfeld tried to reach Mr. Johnson, the successor trustee to the 

Seltzer family trust and successor personal representative for Ms. Seltzer‘s will. 

Mr. Johnson informed Ms. Luxenberg about the communication from Ms. Gelfeld. 

Ms. Luxenberg sent Mr. Johnson an email on November 30 stating ―I can talk to 

[Mr. Dickens] about this. If you don‘t want to. Someone has to.‖ Mr. Johnson in 

turn sent an email the same day to Mr. Dickens, with a copy to Ms. Luxenberg, 

stating in part ―DDD: HELP!!!!!!!!!!! Please call her and me.‖ Later that day, 

Ms. Luxenberg sent an email to Michelle DeLuca, President of the firm‘s Virginia 

(continued...)
20

As the December 6, 2010, deadline approached for the filing of Ms. Seltzer‘s 

Maryland Estate Tax return, Ms. Gelfeld sent a formal letter to Mr. Dickens and 

Mr. Johnson expressing (1) concern that the estate might owe Maryland estate tax, 

and (2) concern not only about the absence of an accounting of estate and trust 

assets but also about the ―[i]nability of Trustee to administer the Trust on a 

reasonable and timely basis.‖ Ms. Luxenberg was aware of Ms. Gelfeld‘s letter 

through Mr. Johnson. Mr. Dickens sent an immediate defensive and partly 

dishonest response to Ms. Gelfeld claiming that he saw ―no reason not to file the 

return by the deadline,‖ denying that the Luxenberg firm had any ―responsibility 

for anything under either the trust or estate,‖ asserting that he had the responsibility 

and that Mr. Seltzer and Ms. Falk had ―received a copy of the trust and Schedule A

[listing Ms. Seltzer‘s assets] . . . on the morning Ms. Seltzer signed the trust 

agreement,‖ declaring that Ms. Seltzer personally transferred her PNC bank assets 

to her new trust, insisting that he was ―administering the Estate and Trust in a 

 

(...continued)

lessor who provided administrative services to the firm. Mr. Johnson was copied 

on the email which stated, ―We need to find out what to do in . . . [the] Seltzer‖ 

matter; Ms. Luxenberg also indicated that she did not ―want to call [Mr. Dickens] 

and spring this on him.‖ Ms. Luxenberg was aware that Mr. Dickens had had a 

heart attack. 
21

reasonable and timely manner,‖ and failing to mention that he had already pilfered 

a large chunk of Ms. Seltzer‘s assets. Mr. Dickens offered to meet with Ms. 

Gelfeld on the morning of December 15. On December 8, an associate in the 

office of Gary Altman, Mr. Seltzer‘s attorney, sent a letter to Mr. Dickens 

indicating that Mr. Altman could participate in the December 15 meeting by 

phone.6 

As the new year dawned, Ms. Luxenberg became aware that Mr. Dickens 

had billed over $25,000 in personal expenses to a firm credit card that she thought 

had been closed out by Mr. Dickens after the firm had paid off $27,000 on the card 

in July 2007. Although Ms. Luxenberg had received calls from creditors about the 

credit card bill, she had hung up on the callers because she thought the card had 

been cancelled. Nevertheless, she began to communicate with Ms. DeLuca on 

January 5, 2011, asking her to get Mr. Dickens, who was facing heart surgery, to 

take care of the matter. Ms. Luxenberg explained during her hearing testimony 

 

6

Instead of a face-to-face meeting with Ms. Gelfeld, Mr. Dickens spoke 

with her and Mr. Altman by phone on December 15. Mr. Dickens claimed that he 

had filed the Maryland tax return on December 6 but acknowledged that he had not 

paid the tax that was due. Nor had he sent copies of the return to Ms. Gelfeld or 

Mr. Altman. Mr. Dickens agreed that modifications to the Seltzer family trust 

were required, and that he would step down as trustee in favor of an individual 

(continued...)
22

that she was communicating with Ms. DeLuca instead of Mr. Dickens because ―he 

wasn‘t returning her calls.‖ However, Mr. Dickens sent a letter to Ms. Gelfeld and 

Mr. Altman on January 6, 2011, disclaiming that he had ever been asked to do an 

estate plan for Ms. Seltzer and asserting that had he done a plan for her he ―would 

certainly [have] had a greater knowledge of her assets and their whereabouts and

disposition than [he] actually did.‖ He insisted that neither he nor Mr. Johnson had 

ever wanted to be a trustee of the trust or a personal representative of Ms. Seltzer‘s 

estate, and that after closing out the estate and the tax year, he would hand over the 

trusteeship. As the month of January drew to a close, Ms. Luxenberg was trying to 

locate Mr. Dickens through Ms. DeLuca on January 21 to wish him a happy 

birthday, while Ms. Gelfeld and Mr. Altman were writing to Mr. Dickens about 

serious problems they were discovering with his handling of Ms. Seltzer‘s assets 

and Mr. Dickens was trying to explain away their discoveries. 

By February 1, 2011, Mr. Dickens agreed to accept the recommendation of 

Ms. Gelfeld and Mr. Altman that Peg Shaw, an attorney licensed in the District of 

Columbia, prepare a Seltzer trusts/estate accounting. As Ms. Shaw worked on the 

 

(...continued)

acceptable to the beneficiaries of the trust. 
23

estate accounting, she raised questions with Mr. Dickens about missing items such 

as Ms. Seltzer‘s pension funds, and Mr. Dickens sought to deflect the questions. 

Before Ms. Shaw completed the draft estate accounting on February 21, based on 

the information provided by Mr. Dickens, he had taken more money from Ms. 

Seltzer‘s assets - $3,184.40 on February 10, and $6,000 and $12,000 on February 

14. As Ms. Shaw began working with Mr. Dickens, but not Ms. Luxenberg, on the 

trust accounting in early March, she sent Mr. Dickens an email on March 2, 2011, 

informing him that a page from the estate tax return – listing the assets relating to 

―Mortgages, Notes, and Cash‖ – was missing. On that same day Mr. Dickens took 

$25,000 from Ms. Seltzer‘s assets. The following day Ms. Shaw sent Mr. Dickens 

an email attaching the draft trust accounting and stating in part, ―Please review the 

document called Missing Assets. This shows what I can account for and what I 

can‘t account for. We need to find the missing stuff.‖7 Ms. Shaw sent a final draft 

accounting to Mr. Dickens on March 14 with an extensive email identifying 

problems, including ―what happened to the approximately $300,000 in CD‘s 

 

7 On March 9, 2011, Ms. Shaw sent Mr. Dickens an email attaching a 

revised draft of the accounting and listing missing items, including those related to 

the T. Rowe Price and Vanguard Mutual investments; information about Ms. 

Seltzer‘s alleged purchase of an interest in FRW Telecom; and statements from the 

PNC trust account and the United Bank trust account.
24

owned by [Ms. Seltzer] until she liquidated them . . . a few days before her death.‖8 

On March 18, 2011, Ms. Shaw sent Mr. Dickens yet another email identifying 

missing items from the estate and trust accountings. That same day Mr. Dickens 

lifted $15,000 from Ms. Seltzer‘s assets, and on March 29, he took $29,985.86 in 

proceeds from the Vanguard Mutual investment.9 Also on March 29, 2011, Mr. 

Dickens made a handwritten note on the $685,000 demand note that Ms. Seltzer 

had signed on December 11, 2009, stating ―This note is hereby satisfied, cancelled, 

and released this 29th day of March, 2011.‖

Mr. Altman sounded the alarm on March 29, 2011, when he attempted to 

reach Ms. Luxenberg, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Dickens by phone. He left a message 

 

8 Ms. Shaw sent another email to Mr. Dickens on March 17, 2011, attaching 

a revised draft of the accounting, indicating that she was ―able to reconcile the 

Family Trust First Account‖ but raising a question about the retirement plan 

payment and advising Mr. Dickens that there was no disclosure of his ―personal 

United Bank account where the retirement fund proceeds were deposited.‖ The 

accounting contained a footnote regarding the Assignment of Interest purchased by 

Ms. Seltzer on December 11, 2009, and the use of over $300,000 from the PNC 

Bank accounts to pay part of the Demand Note.

9 As of March 15, 2011, Ms. Luxenberg was aware of Mr. Dickens‘ 

decision to move to a Caribbean island; an email sent from Ms. Luxenberg to Ms. 

DeLuca stated that Mr. Johnson would call her to ―discuss arrangements for 

continuing with [her] as a satellite office after [Mr. Dickens] leaves to go to St. 

Kitts.‖ 

 
25

saying it was ―an absolute emergency.‖ Ms. Luxenberg tried to reach Mr. Dickens 

through Ms. DeLuca.

10

 Mr. Altman followed his call with a letter dated March 30, 

2011, indicating that there should be approximately $1,485,842 in Ms. Seltzer‘s 

estate and demanding a distribution of $750,000 each to Ms. Seltzer‘s children, as 

well as Mr. Dickens‘ resignation, and that of Ms. Luxenberg, from their respective 

roles in Ms. Seltzer‘s estate and trust. Mr. Dickens sent letters to Ms. Gelfeld and 

Mr. Altman on April 7, April 19, 2011, and May 2, 2011, in an attempt to resolve 

the matter. He met with Mr. Altman and Ms. Gelfeld on April 27, admitted that 

his ―telcom deal‖ had been worthless since around August 2010, defended the 

Demand Note that Ms. Seltzer had signed, and promised to close out the Seltzer 

estate before departing on May 6, 2011. On April 29, Mr. Dickens removed 

another $11,000 from Ms. Seltzer‘s trust, allegedly for ―fees.‖ Ms. Falk and Mr. 

Seltzer filed a multi-count lawsuit against Mr. Dickens, Ms. Luxenberg, and the 

Luxenberg firm on May 5, 2011. The parties settled and Ms. Falk and Mr. Seltzer 

dismissed the lawsuit against Ms. Luxenberg and the Luxenberg firm with 

 

10 In her email to Ms. DeLuca, Ms. Luxenberg reported that Mr. Altman‘s 

message said that she ―had better call the malpractice carrier . . . and the State Bar‖ 

because of her role as a trustee, and that she had ―conspired to steal money from 

the trust.‖ Ms. Luxenberg reported that she did not ―know anything about what 

has been happening in the case‖ and that she was ―frightened‖ because of the threat 

of malpractice. 
26

prejudice, and dismissed the action against Mr. Dickens without prejudice on 

August 16, 2012.11 Disciplinary Counsel began its investigation of Ms. Luxenberg 

and Mr. Dickens in July 2011.12

Both Ms. Luxenberg and Disciplinary Counsel filed Briefs before the 

Hearing Committee supporting their respective exceptions to the Committee‘s 

Report and Recommendation, as well as oppositions to the other‘s Brief. In 

 

11 Ms. Gelfeld testified before the Board that Ms. Seltzer‘s estate originally 

had approximately $1.6 million, and was ―left with well under $700,000‖ after Mr. 

Dickens‘ theft of Seltzer assets. 

12 After Disciplinary Counsel filed specification of charges against Mr. 

Dickens and Ms. Luxenberg, the Board‘s Hearing Committee Number Twelve 

conducted the proceedings against both attorneys. In response to Disciplinary 

Counsel‘s motion, to which neither Mr. Dickens nor Ms. Luxenberg filed a 

response, on November 27, 2013, the Board issued an order assigning Mr. 

Dickens‘ and Ms. Luxenberg‘s cases to the same hearing committee and sua 

sponte consolidated the specifications of charges in both cases. Subsequently, on 

February 14, 2014, the Hearing Committee issued an Order in which it stated, in 

part, that ―[Ms.] Luxenberg is on notice that when considering the charges against 

her, the Hearing Committee may consider evidence presented in connection with 

[the Dickens‘ matters], as well as [the Luxenberg matters].‖ Nevertheless, the 

Hearing Committee stated in its conclusions of law relating to the Seltzer matter 

that ―the Committee has considered against [Ms.] Luxenberg only the charges 

against her that are set forth in the Specification of Charges in which she is 

named.‖ The Hearing Committee added, ―to the extent that certain of those 

charges address [Ms.] Luxenberg‘s responsibility for [Mr.] Dickens‘ misconduct, 

the Committee has considered only whether she is responsible for [Mr.] Dickens‘ 

violations in the Seltzer matter, not whether she is responsible for [Mr.] Dickens‘ 

violations in the Harris or O‘Brien matters.‖ 
27

addition, both Disciplinary Counsel and Ms. Luxenberg filed exceptions to the 

Board‘s Report and Recommendation, on August 16 and August 18, 2016, 

respectively. Mr. Dickens took no exception to the Board‘s Report and did not 

respond to this court‘s order to show cause why he should not be suspended; 

consequently, on October 3, 2016, this court suspended Mr. Dickens from the 

practice of law, pending the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings against him. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 9 (h)(1) provides that ―the Court shall accept the 

findings of fact made by the Board unless they are unsupported by substantial 

evidence of record . . . .‖ See also In re Downey, 162 A.3d 162, 167 (D.C. 2017). 

However, we owe no deference to the Hearing Committee‘s or the Board‘s 

findings of ultimate fact or conclusions of law, which we review de novo. In re 

Samad, 51 A.3d 486, 495 (D.C. 2012). ―The decision on sanction is committed, in 

the final analysis, to this Court‘s discretion.‖ In re Cater, 887 A.2d 1, 12 (D.C. 

2005) (citation omitted). ―In exercising that discretion, our policy is to  ̳adopt the 

recommended disposition of the Board unless to do so would foster a tendency 
28

toward inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct or would otherwise be 

unwarranted.‘‖ Id. (citing D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9 (g)).

ANALYSIS

Did Ms. Luxenberg Violate Rules 1.3 (a), 1.3 (b)(1), and 1.3 (b)(2) of the 

Rules of Professional Conduct?

Rule 1.3 of the District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct provides 

that:

(a) A lawyer shall represent a client zealously and 

diligently, within the bounds of the law.

(b) A lawyer shall not intentionally:

(1) Fail to seek the lawful objectives of a 

client through reasonably available 

means permitted by law and the 

disciplinary rules; or

(2) Prejudice or damage a client during 

the course of the professional 

relationship.

(c) A lawyer shall act with reasonable promptness in 

representing a client.
29

Ms. Luxenberg contends that ―[t]he Board incorrectly concluded [that she] 

neglected Ms. Seltzer‘s trust and estate matters in violation of Rule 1.3 (a).‖ She 

argues that the Board ―in essence‖ determined that she violated Rule 1.3 (b) rather 

than Rule 1.3 (a), and that the Board‘s conclusions are ―based on findings that are 

unsupported by the record.‖ Disciplinary Counsel argues that the Board correctly 

found that Ms. Luxenberg violated Rule 1.3 (a), and that the record also establishes 

a Rule 1.3 (b) violation because Ms. Luxenberg ―knowingly and intentionally 

defaulted on her obligations to serve her client [Ms. Seltzer] in violation of Rules 

1.3 (a), 1.3 (b)(1) and 1.3 (b)(2).‖ 

Our analysis of the Rule 1.3 issue is guided by the following legal principles. 

Rule 1.3 (a) which mandates that ―[a] lawyer shall represent a client zealously and 

diligently, within the bounds of law[,]‖ clearly requires the existence of an 

attorney/client relationship. The trier of fact determines whether an attorney-client 

relationship exists, In re Lieber, 442 A.2d 153, 156 (D.C. 1982), and this court 

―consider[s] the totality of the circumstances to determine whether an attorneyclient relationship exists,‖ In re Fay, 111 A.3d 1025, 1030 (D.C. 2015) (per 

curiam). ―[N]either a written agreement nor the payment of fees is necessary to 

create an attorney-client relationship.‖ In re Lieber, supra, 442 A.2d at 156. 
30

―Furthermore, it is not necessary for an attorney to take substantive action and give 

legal advice in order to establish such a relationship.‖ Id. ―An attorney‘s ethical 

responsibilities exist independently of contractual rights and duties; consequently, 

the obligations imposed by the Rules arise from the establishment of a fiduciary 

relationship between the attorney and client.‖ In re Fay, supra, 111 A.3d at 1030 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

―All that is required [to create an attorney-client relationship] is that the 

parties explicitly or by their conduct, manifest an intention to create the attorney[-

]client relationship.‖ In re Ryan, 670 A.2d 375, 379 (D.C. 1996) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). In that regard, ―a client‘s perception of an 

attorney as his counsel is a consideration in determining whether a relationship

exists.‖ In re Lieber, supra, 442 A.2d at 156 (citation omitted). ―Doubt about 

whether a client-lawyer relationship still exists should be eliminated by the lawyer, 

preferably in writing, so that the client will not mistakenly suppose the lawyer is 

looking after the client‘s affairs when the lawyer has ceased to do so.‖ District of 

Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.3, Comment 9. 
31

Once an attorney-client relationship is established, Rule 1.3 (a) requires the 

lawyer ―to represent the client zealously within the bounds of the law, including 

the Rules of Professional Conduct and other enforceable professional regulations‖; 

thus, ―[a] lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the 

client‖; with the realization that ―unreasonable delay can cause a client needless 

anxiety and undermine confidence in the lawyer‘s trustworthiness‖; and with 

awareness that a lawyer has an ―obligation of diligence‖ with respect to client 

matters. District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.3, Comments

1, 8; see also In re Starnes, 829 A.2d 488, 503 (D.C. 2003) (per curiam) (Rule 1.3 

(a) is ―directed at the lawyer‘s obligation of due diligence [and] zealous 

representation‖). The words of Rule 1.3 (b)(1) and Rule 1.3 (b)(2) plainly require 

a finding of intentional conduct on the part of the lawyer. ―Neglect ripens into an 

intentional violation when the lawyer is aware of his neglect of the client matter, or 

the neglect is so pervasive that the lawyer must be aware of it.‖ In re Anderson, 

979 A.2d 1206, 1222 (D.C. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Here, neither the Hearing Committee nor the Board explicitly addressed 

whether an attorney-client relationship generally existed between Ms. Luxenberg 

and Ms. Seltzer regarding the trusts and estates matter, although both briefly 
32

addressed whether Ms. Luxenberg acted in a legal capacity when she witnessed 

Ms. Seltzer‘s signing of the letter of instruction in February 2010. Nevertheless, 

the Committee and Board disagreed as to whether Ms. Luxenberg violated Rule 

1.3 (a) – the Committee determined that she did not, and the Board that she did 

violate Rule 1.3. On this record we first conclude that there was an attorneyclient/fiduciary relationship between Ms. Luxenberg and Ms. Seltzer with respect 

to the trusts and estates matter. Second, we conclude that the record contains 

substantial evidence supporting the Board‘s conclusion that Ms. Luxenberg 

violated Rule 1.3 (a).

First, there is no doubt that Ms. Seltzer and Ms. Luxenberg had an attorneyclient relationship, beginning in 1994 when Ms. Seltzer engaged Ms. Luxenberg to 

handle her divorce action. Later, Ms. Seltzer approached the Luxenberg firm in 

2004 to update her estate plan, and although Ms. Luxenberg clearly informed Ms. 

Seltzer that she did not handle cases involving trusts and estates, she introduced

Mr. Dickens, a partner in the firm, as a person who could do that type of work. 

Moreover, Ms. Luxenberg agreed to become a co-trustee of the 1990 Seltzer trust, 

replacing Ms. Seltzer‘s brother in that role. Again, in 2009 Ms. Seltzer requested 

Ms. Luxenberg‘s assistance to make additional changes to her estate plan. 
33

Although Ms. Luxenberg clearly stated that Mr. Dickens ―would have to deal with 

any trust questions,‖ Ms. Luxenberg informed Mr. Dickens that she would ―still be 

involved and [would] talk to [Ms. Seltzer] and if necessary do conference calls 

with her and you,‖ manifesting an intention that both she and Mr. Dickens would 

have an attorney-client relationship with Ms. Seltzer. See In re Ryan, supra, 670 

A.2d at 379. Because Mr. Dickens had not performed any work during an 

approximate three-month period, Ms. Seltzer suggested to Ms. Luxenberg that 

perhaps she should find someone else to do the necessary work. Significantly, Ms. 

Seltzer also stated in the same communication that she ―put [her] trust in both [Ms. 

Luxenberg and Mr. Dickens] and that is why [she] felt that [Ms. Luxenberg and 

Mr. Dickens] could help [her],‖ clearly indicating Ms. Seltzer‘s perception that 

both Ms. Luxenberg and Mr. Dickens were her attorneys. See In re Lieber, supra,

442 A.2d at 156. Consequently, the record supports the existence of an attorneyclient relationship between Ms. Luxenberg/Mr. Dickens and Ms. Seltzer regarding 

the trusts and estates matter.

Second, even though the Board and the Hearing Committee disagreed as to 

whether Ms. Luxenberg violated Rule 1.3 (a), our review of the record convinces 
34

us that Ms. Luxenberg violated the duty of diligence that the Rule mandates.13 

Indeed, Comment 8 to the Rule emphasizes that ―unreasonable delay can cause a 

client needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the lawyer‘s trustworthiness,‖ 

and the Rule also underscores the fact that ―[n]eglect of client matters is a serious 

violation of the obligation of diligence.‖ District of Columbia Rules of 

Professional Conduct, Rule 1.3, Comment 8; see also In re Reback, 487 A.2d 235, 

238 (D.C. 1985) (neglect means ―indifference and a consistent failure to carry out 

the obligations which the lawyer has assumed to [her] client or a conscious 

disregard for the responsibility owed to the client‖). The duty or obligation of 

diligence was particularly compelling in this case because Ms. Seltzer had been 

battling a terminal illness since 2007 and both Ms. Luxenberg and Mr. Dickens 

were aware of the illness.

The record reveals Ms. Luxenberg‘s failure to recognize, at least by July 

2009 that her longstanding trust in Mr. Dickens was not warranted, especially in 

the face of Ms. Seltzer‘s declining health and anxiousness to complete work on the 

documents reflecting her wishes to protect and provide for her adult children. 

 

13 We do not agree with Disciplinary Counsel‘s argument that the Board ―in 

essence‖ decided that Ms. Luxenberg violated Rule 1.3 (b)(1) and Rule 1.3 (b)(2).
35

Although Ms. Luxenberg had become a seasoned lawyer with an admirable track 

record of service to her clients and the legal profession, her actions and omissions 

manifested a consistent failure to carry out her obligation of diligence to Ms. 

Seltzer. Ms. Luxenberg ignored clear warning signs that the trust and confidence 

Ms. Seltzer had placed in her and Mr. Dickens was no longer justified. The 

warning signs included (a) Mr. Dickens‘ long delay in addressing Ms. Seltzer‘s 

2009 request for additional modifications of her trust and estate documents; (b) Mr. 

Dickens‘ frequent travels abroad while work on Ms. Seltzer‘s matter was pending, 

and his notice to the Luxenberg firm that he would be moving to Italy; (c) Mr. 

Dickens‘ failure to honor Ms. Luxenberg‘s September 2009 request that he submit 

copies of the Seltzer trusts and estate documents to the firm‘s central files; (d) Mr. 

Dickens‘ failure to notify Ms. Luxenberg about Ms. Seltzer‘s November 2009 visit 

to the Luxenberg firm‘s Maryland office to sign the Seltzer Family Trust 

agreement; (e) the delay in Mr. Dickens‘ transmittal of the redraft of the Seltzer 

will to the client; (f) Mr. Dickens‘ failure to meet Ms. Seltzer at the bank on 

December 23, 2009, as planned and Ms. Luxenberg‘s confusion as to the reason 

for his failure; and (g) Mr. Dickens‘ lack of notice to Ms. Luxenberg, a co-trustee 

of the 1990 amended trust, that he would seek Ms. Seltzer‘s signature, on February 
36

23, 2010, on a letter of instruction regarding the transfer of assets from the 1990 

amended trust to the Seltzer Family Trust created by Mr. Dickens. 

The events surrounding the letter of instruction substantiated Ms. 

Luxenberg‘s consistent failure to carry out her obligation of diligence to her client, 

Ms. Seltzer. Notwithstanding Ms. Luxenberg‘s friendship with Ms. Seltzer, Ms. 

Luxenberg had an attorney-client, and hence, a fiduciary relationship with Ms. 

Seltzer. That relationship not only covered the legal work that Ms. Seltzer had 

requested in 2009 which had been unduly delayed, but also Ms. Luxenberg‘s 

fiduciary role as co-trustee of Ms. Seltzer‘s 1990 trust. Yet, Ms. Luxenberg had 

little idea about the content of the document – the letter of instruction – that Ms. 

Seltzer asked her to witness on February 23. Nevertheless, Ms. Luxenberg 

understood that the document concerned ―marshall[ing] assets for the trust for 

[Ms.] Seltzer that were left in the PNC Bank.‖ Even with this limited 

understanding, Ms. Luxenberg as co-trustee of Ms. Seltzer‘s 1990 trust did not 

bother to read the one sentence instruction to the officers of the PNC Bank, 

―[p]lease cash-in or liquidate all of the Certificates of Deposit that I have in your 

bank, including, but not limited to all those listed on the attached two sheets and 

give the proceeds to Dorrance D. Dickens, who is my attorney.‖ Because she did 
37

not read the one-sentence instruction, she of course did not realize that nothing was 

attached to the letter of instruction, and did not comprehend the significance of the 

missing schedule of Ms. Seltzer‘s assets. Ms. Luxenberg‘s failure to carry out her 

obligation of diligence to Ms. Seltzer under Rule 1.3 (a) left a clear path not only 

for Mr. Dickens to go to the PNC Bank on February 26 to transfer some of Ms. 

Seltzer‘s PNC assets to an account over which he had control, but also paved the 

way for Mr. Dickens to return to the bank in April and July 2010, with Ms. 

Luxenberg, to transfer assets from the amended 1990 trust to the 2009 trust, assets 

that Mr. Dickens began to transfer into his personal account.

Ms. Luxenberg‘s obligation of diligence and her fiduciary duty to Ms. 

Seltzer included not only reading the letter of instruction, but also obtaining and 

reading copies of the 1990 trust, the 2004 amendments, and the 2009 trust. As a 

result of reading these documents, Ms. Luxenberg would have been aware of 

important provisions of the documents and would have had a proper context for 

understanding the significance of the letter of instruction. She would have known 

at least the following. The beneficiaries of the 1990 trust were Ms. Seltzer‘s 

children, Mr. Seltzer and Ms. Falk, and the co-trustees were Ms. Seltzer and her 

brother, Charles Schaffer; Article 8 (A) of the 1990 trust specified that when one of 
38

the co-trustees ceased to serve, the sole successor trustee could appoint a cosuccessor. Article 10 outlined the extensive fiduciary powers of the trustees. 

Under the 2004 Amended Michelle S. Seltzer Revocable Trust, Ms. Seltzer 

designated herself and Ms. Luxenberg as the co-trustees; Article 8 (B) provided 

that upon the death of either Ms. Seltzer or Ms. Luxenberg, ―the other shall be the 

sole successor co-trustee‖ and could ―appoint a corporate trustee or a child of the 

grantor, if over the age of 21, as a co-successor or successor trustee.‖ The 2004 

amendment did not alter Article 10 regarding fiduciary powers, including Article 

10 (1) concerning the power to transfer investments and property of the trust. A 

reading of these documents also would have made Ms. Luxenberg cognizant of the 

fact that instead of again amending the 1990 trust in 2009, Mr. Dickens created a 

new trust, the Michelle S. Seltzer Family Trust. The trust document specified that 

that trust was between Ms. Seltzer as Grantor or Settlor and ―Dorrance D. Dickens, 

trustee, of Luxenberg, Johnson, and Dickens, P.C.‖ The new trust did not 

reference the 1990 trust, nor provide for the transfer of assets or the conveyance of 

legal title of the 1990 trust assets to the new trust, and the Schedule A of assets that 

was attached to the new trust, did not mention the assets of the 1990 trust. Mr. 

Dickens and Mr. Johnson were named as trustees of the new trust, and Ms. Seltzer 

and her children as beneficiaries. Since she had not read the trust documents even 
39

though she was a co-trustee of the amended 1990 trust, Ms. Luxenberg was 

negligent in failing to determine her powers and duties under Article 8 (B) and 

Article 10 (1) of the 1990 amended trust, before witnessing the letter of instruction, 

and before accompanying Mr. Dickens to the PNC Bank for a transaction that 

resulted in the transfer of assets from the 1990 trust to the trust which Mr. Dickens 

had created, ostensibly for Ms. Seltzer, but actually to advance his own interests.

14

 

In short, the record contains substantial clear and convincing evidence supporting 

the Board‘s conclusion that Ms. Luxenberg violated Rule 1.3 (a).

Although we agree with the Board that Ms. Luxenberg violated Rule 1.3 (a), 

we conclude the record does not support by clear and convincing evidence

Disciplinary Counsel‘s contention that Ms. Luxenberg also violated Rule 1.3 (b)(1) 

and Rule 1.3 (b)(2). Like the Hearing Committee and the Board, we see no 

substantial evidence in the record to support a finding that Ms. Luxenberg violated 

 

14 In light of our conclusion, we see no need to fully address the Board‘s 

acceptance of two other arguments initially presented by Disciplinary Counsel 

before the Hearing Committee and later restated by the Board – that Ms. 

Luxenberg violated Rule 1.3 (a), first by ―delegat[ing] [Ms.] Seltzer‘s 2009 matter 

to [Mr.] Dickens while knowing that he was not licensed in Maryland, was rarely 

around, and already had made plans to leave the firm and practice of law,‖ and 

second ―[Ms.] Luxenberg neglected [Ms.] Seltzer‘s matter because she knew [Mr.] 

Dickens was not working on the Seltzer matter for four months, but took no actions 

(continued...)
40

Rule 1.3 (b)(1) because she intentionally ―[f]ail[ed] to seek the lawful objectives of 

[her] client[, Ms. Seltzer,] through reasonably available means permitted by law 

and the disciplinary rules,‖ or Rule 1.3 (b)(2) because she intentionally 

―[p]rejudice[d] or damage[d] [Ms. Seltzer] during the course of the professional 

relationship.‖ District of Columbia Rules of Professional Responsibility, Rules 1.3 

(b)(1) and 1.3 (b)(2).

Rule 1.3 (b) does not ―require proof of intent  ̳in the usual sense of the 

word.‘‖ In re Ukwu, 926 A.2d 1106, 1116 (D.C. 2007). ―Rather, neglect ripens 

into an intentional violation when the lawyer is aware of [her] neglect of the client 

matter; or put differently, when a lawyer‘s inaction coexists with an awareness of 

[her] obligations to [her] client.‖ Id. (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). ―[I]n assessing intent, the court must consider the entire context.‖ Id. 

Here the record does not contain evidence of intentional or deliberate conduct or 

evidence showing that Ms. Luxenberg‘s inaction coexisted with her awareness of 

her obligations to Ms. Seltzer under the trust documents. For example, unlike the 

respondent in In re Alexander, 865 A.2d 541, 542 (D.C. 2005), who was found to 

 

(...continued)

to ensure that [Ms.] Seltzer was receiving proper representation.‖ 
41

have violated Rule 1.3 (b)(2), Ms. Luxenberg did not engage in fraudulent 

misappropriation or theft of client assets. Nor did she, unlike the respondent in In 

re Mance, 869 A.2d 339, 340 (D.C. 2005), fail to correct the problem after 

receiving formal notice that his client‘s appeal was untimely. In sum, we cannot 

agree with Disciplinary Counsel that Ms. Luxenberg violated Rules 1.3 (b)(1) and 

1.3 (b)(2).

Did Ms. Luxenberg violate Rules 5.1 (a), 5.1 (c)(2), 1.7 (b)(4), and 8.4 

(a)?

Rules 5.1 (a) and 5.1 (c)(2) provide in pertinent part:

(a) A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who 

individually or together with other lawyers possesses 

comparable managerial authority in a law firm . . ., 

shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm 

has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance 

that all lawyers in the firm . . . conform to the Rules of 

Professional Conduct . . . .

(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer‘s 

violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if:

. . . .
42

 (2) The lawyer has direct supervisory authority over 

the other lawyer or is a partner or has comparable 

managerial authority in the law firm . . . in which the 

other lawyer practices, and knows or reasonably should 

know of the conduct at a time when its consequences can 

be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable 

remedial action.

Rule 1.7 (b)(4) states in relevant part:

[A] lawyer shall not represent a client with respect to a matter if:

 . . . .

(4) The lawyer‘s professional judgment on behalf 

of the client will be or reasonably may be adversely 

affected by the lawyer‘s responsibilities to or interests in 

a third party or the lawyer‘s own financial, business, 

property, or personal interests.

Rule 8.4 (a) provides:

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

(a) [v]iolate or attempt to violate the Rules of 

professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce 

another to do so, or do so through the acts of 

another. . . .

With respect to Rule 5.1 (a) Ms. Luxenberg first contends that ―Disciplinary 

Counsel failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that [Ms.] Luxenberg 

had sufficient managerial authority within her [f]irm to place her in charge of 
43

putting in place policies and procedures to ensure that [Mr.] Dickens, a named 

partner in the [f]irm, complied with the Rules of Professional Conduct.‖15 

Disciplinary Counsel supports the finding of the Hearing Committee and the Board 

that Rule 5.1 (a) applies to Ms. Luxenberg and that she violated that rule. 

Specifically, Disciplinary Counsel maintains that Ms. Luxenberg had managerial 

authority within the firm because ―the Board noted [her] roles as founder, decision-

 

15

 As a threshold matter, Ms. Luxenberg insists that the Board violated her 

due process rights under D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 8 (c) by considering evidence 

introduced in the Harris and O‘Brien matters, even though she was not charged in 

those matters. The Board acknowledged that the Hearing Committee considered 

evidence presented in the Harris, O‘Brien, and Seltzer matters in examining 

whether Ms. Luxenberg violated Rules 5.1 (a) and 5.1 (c)(2) because the evidence 

involved the administration of the Luxenberg firm. Section 8 (c) states in part, that 

the petition initiating disciplinary proceedings ―shall be sufficiently clear and 

specific to inform the attorney of the alleged misconduct.‖ In its order of February 

14, 2014, the Hearing Committee stated that ―Respondent Luxenberg is on notice 

that when considering the charges against her, the Hearing Committee may 

consider evidence presented in connection with the [Harris and O‘Brien matters].‖ 

Since Ms. Luxenberg‘s hearing did not begin until March 31, 2014, she had ample 

and reasonable notice that evidence regarding the administration of her firm that 

might be presented in the Harris and O‘Brien matters might be used in determining 

violations in the Seltzer matter, and as the Board found, the pertinent evidence 

introduced ―directly related to the charges in the Seltzer matter.‖ Furthermore, in 

prior cases, we have indicated that the Hearing Committee and the Board should 

consider such evidence. For example, in In re Ukwu, supra, we declared that ―the 

Hearing Committee and the Board were required to consider . . . all five 

representations [of the lawyer] in determining whether [a specified rule] was 

violated.‖ 926 A.2d at 1117. See also In re Godette, 919 A.2d 1157, 1165-66 

(D.C. 2007); In re Shillaire, 549 A.2d 336, 343 (D.C. 1988), both stating, 

respectively, that the Board should have considered specified uncharged conduct or 

(continued...)
44

maker, and business-generator, her controlling interest and her husband‘s low 

practice profile,‖ all of which ―established her as a partner and lawyer with 

managerial authority in the firm, even if she called her husband  ̳managing 

partner.‘‖ 

The plain words of Rule 5.1 (a) assign ―partners,‖ and lawyers who have 

―managerial authority in a law firm‖ the responsibility of making ―reasonable 

efforts to ensure‖ that the firm‘s lawyers ―conform to the Rules of Professional 

Conduct.‖ District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5.1 (a), and

Comment 1. Rule 5.1 (a) of the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of 

Professional Conduct is virtually the same as the District‘s Rule 5.1 (a), and 

Comment 1 to the rule states that ―Paragraph (a) applies to lawyers who have 

managerial authority over the professional work of a firm.‖ However, the 

comment further specifies that ―[t]his includes members of a partnership.‖ ABA 

Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5.1 (a), and Comment 1; see also 

Center for Professional Responsibility, ABA, Annotated Model Rules of 

Professional Conduct, 443 (5th ed. 2003).

 

(...continued)

statements. 
45

Ms. Luxenberg argues that ―there are no cases [in this jurisdiction] in which 

this [c]ourt sanctioned a partner under Rule 5.1 (a) for the actions of another 

partner‖ (emphasis in original). She maintains that our ―cases discussing Rule 5.1 

deal exclusively with situations in which the respondent has supervisory control 

within the firm or over the offending attorney.‖ She specifically cites In re 

Robinson, 74 A.3d 688 (D.C. 2013), a case involving a partner who hired his sonin-law, also an attorney, to supervise the firm‘s escrow account; this court agreed 

with the Board‘s finding that the partner ―fail[ed] to ensure firm compliance with 

the Rules of Professional Conduct‖ because he ignored warning signs and ―was on 

notice that matters relating to the trust account were awry‖ due to two overdrafts 

on the account. Id. at 693, 696. Ms. Luxenberg also cites In re Cohen, 847 A.2d 

1162 (D.C. 2004), but that case involved Rule 5.1 (c)(2) rather than 5.1 (a).

In the factual context of this case, however, we agree with the Board that 

Rule 5.1 (a) applies to Ms. Luxenberg. The Hearing Committee found that she was

the majority owner (52%) of Luxenberg, Johnson & Dickens, and she generally 

made the decisions as to what clients the firm would represent and who would

handle the client matters. Indeed, she identified and introduced Mr. Dickens to 
46

Ms. Seltzer as the firm lawyer who would handle Ms. Seltzer‘s 2004 request, and 

later her 2009 request.

Despite Ms. Luxenberg‘s effort to distance herself from Mr. Dickens with 

respect to Ms. Seltzer‘s trusts and estates matter, it is clear that Mr. Dickens 

considered himself a member of the Luxenberg firm; indeed, he clearly identified 

himself in the 2009 trust document as ―Dorrance D. Dickens, trustee, of 

Luxenberg, Johnson and Dickens, P.C.‖ Ms. Luxenberg‘s actions also reflected 

her belief that Mr. Dickens was still a member of the Luxenberg firm; she sent 

communications to him at the firm‘s Virginia satellite office, and continued efforts 

to reach Mr. Dickens through the administrator of the firm‘s Virginia office. 

Moreover, Ms. Luxenberg had made clear to Mr. Dickens in 2009, in writing, that 

she would continue to be ―involved‖ in the Seltzer matter. In short, the record 

contains substantial evidence that even though Ms. Luxenberg did not have the title 

of managing partner, she was a ―partner‖ with ―managerial authority‖ during the 

time the firm handled Ms. Seltzer‘s trusts and estates matter; therefore, she fell 

under the coverage of Rule 5.1 (a).
47

While the firm had some policies and practices that would assure its lawyers 

conformed to the Rules of Professional Conduct, Ms. Luxenberg did not make 

―reasonable efforts‖ to make certain these policies and procedures actually were in 

effect and followed. Notably, she took no action when Mr. Dickens began to and 

continued to miss firm meetings during which firm client matters were reviewed, 

and despite the firm‘s policy that all client records should be sent to the firm‘s 

main files, she did not make ―reasonable efforts‖ to ensure Mr. Dickens‘ 

compliance with the policy after he did not respond to repeated requests for the 

Seltzer documents, or to Ms. Luxenberg‘s admonition about the missing 

documents in a tense phone call around September 2009, prior to the execution of 

the 2009 trust document.

As we indicated in discussing Rule 1.3 (a), Ms. Luxenberg ―was on notice 

that matters relating to [Ms. Seltzer‘s] trust . . . were awry.‖ In re Robinson, supra, 

74 A.3d at 696. Ms. Luxenberg may have ―assume[d]‖ that Mr. Dickens would 

follow the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5.1 (a), Comment 3, but she did not 

make ―reasonable efforts‖ to ensure that Mr. Dickens‘ behavior conformed to the 

Rules of Professional Conduct. Since the firm was very small initially, informal 

enforcement of policies and procedures and ―occasional admonition ordinarily 
48

might be sufficient,‖ Rule 5.1 (a), Comment 3. However, as we asserted in In re 

Robinson, once warning signs appeared, suggesting clear problems regarding 

ethical behavior, informal enforcement and occasional admonition no longer 

sufficed.

Similar conclusions were reached in Attorney Grievance Comm’n of 

Maryland v. Kimmel, 955 A.2d 269 (Md. 2008) and In re Fonte, 905 N.Y.S.2d 173 

(N.Y. App. Div. 2010). In Kimmel, the founding partners of a Pennsylvania law 

firm opened a branch office in Maryland and hired a Maryland attorney for the 

office. In discussing Maryland Rules 5.1 (a) and 5.1 (b), which are comparable to 

the District‘s rules, the court asserted that ―[t]he executive attorneys at [the firm] 

had a responsibility to establish and maintain the new office on solid principles of 

professional conduct,‖ id. at 285, and that to ensure that the firm‘s lawyers 

conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct, ―partners must establish policies 

and procedures that, inter alia, are designed to . . . identify dates by which actions 

must be taken in pending matters . . .‖ id. at 284. In re Kimmel also pointed out 

that periodic review ordinarily is sufficient for a small firm with experienced 

attorneys, but that ―other or different circumstances may indicate the need for 

 ̳more elaborate‘ supervisory measures.‖ Id. One of the differences is the 
49

―[p]hysical isolation of an attorney from peers,‖ necessitating ―a heightened need 

to adapt supervisory strategies [or periodic review] to ensure compliance with the 

Rules.‖ Id. at 287.

Here, as of 2007, not only was Mr. Dickens in a new office in a jurisdiction 

where he was not licensed to practice law, Virginia, but he also decreased his 

attendance at meetings in the firm‘s Maryland office, a jurisdiction in which he 

was also not licensed to practice law. He was no longer in the same office with his 

mentors and partners. Particularly when warning signs appeared that things 

definitely were not in order with respect to Mr. Dickens‘ work on the Seltzer trusts 

and estates matter, as a partner with managerial authority over the Seltzer matter, 

Ms. Luxenberg should have instituted periodic reviews and intervened to make 

certain that Mr. Dickens was doing the Seltzer work in a timely manner and was 

conforming to the Rules of Professional Conduct in his handling of the Seltzer trust 

assets. As the court said in In re Fonte, supra, ―[i]n the face of . . . warning 

[signs], [especially of improper handling of trust assets], greater oversight and 

immediate intervention was warranted.‖ Id. at 177. In sum, the record contains 

substantial evidence to support the Board‘s finding and conclusion that Ms. 

Luxenberg violated Rule 5.1 (a).
50

Second, Ms. Luxenberg contends that ―[t]he Board‘s conclusion [that she 

violated Rule 5.1 (c)(2)] is incorrect inasmuch as Disciplinary Counsel failed to 

establish by clear and convincing evidence that [she] had  ̳comparable managerial 

authority‘ over [Mr.] Dickens or that [she] was his direct supervisor in connection 

with Ms. Seltzer‘s estate and trusts matter.‖ Disciplinary Counsel argues that 

―[t]he Board and Committee found that [Ms.] Luxenberg had enough of a 

supervising role for Rule 5.1 (c)(2) to apply, including  ̳direct supervisory 

authority‘ over [Mr.] Dickens in the Seltzer matter.‖ Disciplinary Counsel 

maintains that Ms. Luxenberg knew or should have known of Mr. Dickens‘ 

misconduct because she ―was very much involved in Ms. Seltzer‘s case, not only 

as her lawyer, but as a trustee of one of her trusts – a position derived from being 

Ms. Seltzer‘s lawyer.‖ 

The District‘s Rule 5.1 (c)(2) differs from that of the ABA Model Rule 5.1 

(c)(2) in one noticeable way. The District‘s rule contains ―know or reasonably 

should know‖ language while the ABA Model Rule contains only the word 

―know.‖ Under the District‘s Rule, there is substantial evidence supporting the 

Board‘s conclusion that Ms. Luxenberg ―reasonably should [have] know[n] of [Mr. 
51

Dickens‘] conduct at a time when its consequences [could have] be[en] avoided 

but fail[ed] to take reasonable remedial action.‖ Rule 5.1 (c)(2). This court 

previously rejected a contention that the District‘s Rule is ―unfair‖ because it 

―subjects [a lawyer] to discipline for the dishonesty or misrepresentations of 

another attorney of which the [lawyer] had no knowledge.‖ In re Cohen, supra, 

847 A.2d at 1166. We said that, ―as the Board recognized, in going beyond the 

model rule, Rule 5.1 (c)(2) reflects what this jurisdiction has determined to be a 

fair and necessary balance. [Rule 5.1 (c)(2)] is not a rule of imputed liability for 

the underlying conduct.‖ Id. (emphasis added). However, Comment 4 to Rule 5.1 

(c)(2) specifies that ―paragraph (c) sets forth general principles of imputed 

responsibility for the misconduct of others,‖ and ―[s]ubparagraph (c)(2) extends 

that responsibility to any lawyer who is a partner or person in comparable 

managerial authority in the firm in which the misconduct takes place.‖ District of 

Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5.1 (c)(2), Comment 4. The 

―reasonably should have known standard‖ is an ―objective‖ one ―based on 

evaluation of all the facts, including the size and organizational structure of the 

firm, the lawyer‘s position, and responsibilities within the firm, the type and 

frequency of contacts between various lawyers involved, the nature of the 

misconduct at issue, and the nature of the supervision or other direct responsibility 
52

(if any) actually exercised‖; ―[t]he mere fact of partnership or a position as a 

principal in a firm is not sufficient, without more, to satisfy the standard.‖ Id., 

Rule 5.1 (c)(2), Comment 5. 

We emphasize that there is no record evidence that Ms. Luxenberg 

participated in Mr. Dickens‘ acts of misconduct or had actual knowledge of Mr. 

Dickens‘ misappropriation/theft of the Seltzer assets, before his misconduct was 

discovered—after the fact—by Ms. Shaw and the attorneys for Mr. Seltzer and Ms. 

Falk. However, Ms. Luxenberg was the main, majority partner in a very small 

firm with, as of 2007, a central office in Maryland and satellite offices in Virginia 

and the District of Columbia. The Hearing Committee found that Ms. Luxenberg 

brought most of the business to the firm, and Ms. Seltzer not only was Ms. 

Luxenberg‘s client but Ms. Luxenberg also was the co-trustee of Ms. Seltzer‘s 

1990 trust, as amended in 2004. While Ms. Luxenberg‘s contacts with Mr. 

Dickens were frequent when the firm‘s main office was in the District of Columbia 

and Mr. Dickens worked out of that office, the contacts were increasingly less 

frequent after Ms. Luxenberg and Mr. Johnson moved their offices to Maryland 

and Mr. Dickens chose to work out of the Virginia office. Under these 

circumstances – and at the first signs that Mr. Dickens was not adhering to firm 
53

policies (including attendance at firm meetings), failed to complete the work on the 

Seltzer matter in a reasonable time period, failed to send the Seltzer documents to 

the firm‘s central files, missed a meeting with Ms. Seltzer, failed to inform Ms. 

Luxenberg of the new 2009 trust document which implicated the 1990 amended 

trust of which Ms. Luxenberg was a co-trustee, and failed to inform Ms. 

Luxenberg of the date of the execution of the 2009 trust or the nature of the letter 

of instruction that Ms. Luxenberg was asked to witness – Ms. Luxenberg should 

have become more vigilant in monitoring Mr. Dickens‘ adherence to the Rules of 

Professional Conduct. At these warning signs, and others discussed above in our 

consideration of Ms. Luxenberg‘s violation of Rule 1.3 (a), ―[w]e believe a lawyer 

of reasonable prudence and competence would have made the inquiry necessary to 

determine‖ whether Mr. Dickens was properly handling Ms. Seltzer‘s trusts and 

estates matter in a timely fashion. In re Cohen, supra, 847 A.2d at 1167.

With respect to Ms. Luxenberg‘s alleged violation of Rules 1.7 (b)(4) and 

8.4 (a), Disciplinary Counsel essentially argues that Ms. Luxenberg placed her own 

interests and those of Mr. Dickens above Ms. Seltzer‘s interests, repeatedly 

displayed her unwillingness to challenge Mr. Dickens, and knowingly assisted or 

aided and abetted Mr. Dickens in his violation of (a) Rule 1.3 (discussed above), 
54

(b) Rule 1.15 (a) and (c) (misappropriation of entrusted funds), and (c) Rule 5.5 (a) 

(delegated the Seltzer matter to Mr. Dickens while knowing he was not licensed to 

practice in Maryland). Our review of Disciplinary Counsel‘s arguments and the 

voluminous evidence presented in this case convinces us that Ms. Luxenberg 

violated neither Rule 1.7 (b)(4) nor Rule 8.4 (a).

Rule 1.7 (b) ―provides a general description of the types of circumstances in 

which representation is improper in the absence of informed consent.‖ District of 

Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7 (b), Comment 7. Subparagraph 

(b)(4) ―require[s] disclosure and informed consent in any situation in which the 

lawyer‘s representation of a client may be adversely affected by representation of 

another client‖ or ―by the lawyer‘s responsibilities to or interests in a third party or 

the lawyer‘s own financial, business, property, or personal interests.‖ Id., and 

Comment 10. The record is devoid of substantial evidence showing that Ms. 

Luxenberg‘s representation of Ms. Seltzer was adversely affected by her 

representation of another client, or that her responsibilities to or interests in Mr. 

Dickens adversely affected her representation of Ms. Seltzer, or that her own 

interests adversely affected those of Ms. Seltzer. In fact, the Hearing Committee 

found no conflict of interest. The gravamen of Disciplinary Counsel‘s Rule 8.4 (a) 
55

argument against Ms. Luxenberg is that she knowingly assisted or aided and 

abetted Mr. Dickens in his illegal actions, but just as the record contained no 

substantial evidence of Ms. Luxenberg‘s intentional action with respect to Rules 

1.3 (b)(1) and (2), the record lacks substantial evidence establishing that Ms. 

Luxenberg knowingly assisted, aided, or abetted Mr. Dickens‘ illegal actions. 

Most significantly, as the Board pointed out, Ms. Luxenberg‘s credited testimony 

reveals her steadfast belief that as soon as the 2009 trust became effective, the 

assets of the 1990 trust were transferred to the 2009 trust. 

What is the Appropriate Sanction for Ms. Luxenberg’s Violation of 

Rules 1.3, 5.1 (a), and 5.1 (c)(2)? 

We are mindful that the Board‘s recommended six-month sanction comes to 

us ―with a strong presumption in its favor.‖ In re Silva, 29 A.3d 924, 926 (D.C. 

2011). If the recommended sanction ―falls within a wide range of acceptable 

outcomes, it will be adopted and imposed.‖ In re Goffe, 641 A.2d 458, 463-64 

(D.C. 1994). In reviewing the recommended sanction, we consider various nonexclusive factors including ―(1) the seriousness of the conduct at issue; (2) the 

prejudice, if any, to the client which resulted from the conduct; (3) whether the 
56

conduct involved dishonesty and/or misrepresentation; (4) the presence or absence 

of violations of other provisions of the disciplinary rules[;] (5) whether the attorney 

had a previous disciplinary history; (6) whether or not the attorney acknowledged 

his or her wrongful conduct; and (7) circumstances in mitigation of the conduct.‖ 

In re Pelkey, 962 A.2d 268, 281 (D.C. 2008).

Here, there can be no doubt of the seriousness of Ms. Luxenberg‘s conduct 

because her lack of diligence and failure to ensure that Mr. Dickens‘ behavior 

conformed to the Rules of Professional Conduct enabled him to siphon away 

substantial assets of the Seltzer trust belonging to Ms. Luxenberg‘s longstanding 

client, Michelle Seltzer. We recognize that Ms. Luxenberg made it quite clear that 

she did not specialize in trusts and estates but that does not serve as an excuse for 

failing to carry out her fiduciary duty to Ms. Seltzer as both her lawyer and the cotrustee of the amended 1990 trust. Ms. Luxenberg‘s violation of Rules 1.3 (a), 5.1 

(a), and 5.1 (c)(2) undoubtedly played a role in Mr. Dickens‘ misappropriation of 

the Seltzer trust assets that clearly prejudiced Ms. Seltzer who was dedicated to 

ensuring her children were provided for and protected after her death. However, 

Ms. Luxenberg was not charged with dishonesty, misrepresentation, or 

misappropriation. Moreover, Ms. Luxenberg cooperated with Disciplinary 
57

Counsel, has no prior disciplinary history, and was found not to have violated other 

professional conduct rules. Notably, as the proceedings before the Hearing 

Committee revealed, and as the Board recognized, Ms. Luxenberg has a ―very high 

reputation in the legal community,‖ and has shown her commitment to public 

service and to the Bar of the District of Columbia.

Although there is no clear precedent in this jurisdiction for the type of 

sanction that is appropriate in Ms. Luxenberg‘s case, under the circumstances 

discussed in this opinion we do not believe Disciplinary Counsel‘s advocacy of a 

one-year suspension with a fitness requirement is appropriate, given the absence of 

intentional conduct and the lack of substantial evidence that Ms. Luxenberg 

knowingly assisted or aided and abetted Mr. Dickens‘ misappropriation. Nor do 

we think that a simple reprimand as advocated by Ms. Luxenberg, or a 45-day 

suspension as recommended by the Hearing Committee would reflect the 

seriousness of Ms. Luxenberg‘s violations. Rather, in reviewing the sanctions 

imposed in some of our cases, we believe Ms. Luxenberg‘s case falls within the 

range of sanctions imposed in In re Robinson, supra, which included a violation of 

Rule 5.1 (a) (as well as Rules 1.15 (a) and (b)), and in In re Cater, which included 

a violation of Rule 5.3 (b) (comparable to Rules 5.1 (a) and (b) but relating to 
58

supervision of a nonlawyer) (as well as Rules 1.1 (a), 8.1 (b), and 8.4 (d)). In 

Robinson, which included a Rule 1.15 (a) violation (negligent misappropriation)

we imposed a seven-month suspension, and in Cater, which included a Rule 8.4 

(d) violation (seriously interfering with the administration of justice), we imposed 

a 180-day suspension plus a fitness requirement. Consequently, consistent with the 

presumption in favor of the Board‘s recommended sanction, we accept the 

recommendation of the Board that a six-month suspension be imposed without a 

fitness requirement.16 

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, respondent Deborah Luxenberg is 

hereby suspended from the practice of law in the District of Columbia for a period 

of six months, effective 30 days from the date of this opinion. Respondent‘s 

attention is called to the requirements of D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14, including the 

affidavit of compliance.

So ordered. 

 

16 This court did not temporarily suspend Ms. Luxenberg pending the 

outcome of her disciplinary proceeding.