alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED February 23, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-40410 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus JORGE ANGEL-LEONARDO, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 1:04-CR-853-1

-------------------- Before GARZA, DENNIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Jorge Angel-Leonardo appeals his conviction and sentence for being found unlawfully present in the United States following deportation and after being convicted of an aggravated felony. Angel-Leonardo was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 27 months to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release. Angel-Leonardo argues that the enhancement provisions in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b), which provides for increased sentences based on prior convictions, are unconstitutional in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000). He contends that hisNo. 05-40410 -2- conviction should be reduced to the lesser included offense in § 1326(a)(2) and that his sentence should be reduced to no more than two years of imprisonment. Angel-Leonardo’s constitutional challenge is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224 (1998). Although Angel-Leonardo contends that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court would overrule Almendarez-Torres in light of Apprendi , we have repeatedly rejected such arguments on the basis that Almendarez-Torres remains binding. See United States v. Garza-Lopez , 410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 126 S. Ct. 298 (2005). Angel-Leonardo properly concedes that his argument is foreclosed in light of Almendarez-Torres and circuit precedent, but he raises it here to preserve it for further review.
AFFIRMED.
#### Wayfair Restaurant *v.*Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division et al.

[No. 19,840.

Filed March 28, 1963.]

*William S. McMaster,*of Indianapolis, for appellant.

*Edwin K. Steers,*Attorney General and *Keith Campbell,*Deputy Attorney General, for appellee, Review Board.

*413Cooper, C. J.

This matter comes before us for a judicial review from a decision of the Eeview Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division wherein said Board held, in substance, that the appellee, Aleen Pennington, “did not refuse a suitable offer of re-employment without good cause on October 18, 1961.”

It is apparent from the record and papers now before us that the appellee, Aleen Pennington, has not seen fit to file a brief in support, of the Eeview Board’s award. Counsel for the Eeview Board has filed and requested us to decide this matter without the benefit of an answer brief on behalf of said Eeview Board.

The appellees have not favored us with a brief in answer to the brief of appellant; however, this being a proposed review of an administrative board, it seems proper to give adequate consideration to the questions involved notwithstanding the want of assistance from the appellees.

In reviewing and considering the appellant’s brief filed herein, together with the record, we are impressed that the appellant has made and demonstrated a very forceful case for reversal.

Upon the record we are forced to the conclusion that the Eeview Board was in error in its decision hereby reviewed and that the same should be reversed.

Decision reversed.

Carson, Clements, and Eyan, JJ., concur.

Note. — Eeported in 188 N. E. 2d 921.
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7118 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 7118

To amend section 242 of title 18, United States Code, to forbid the use 
of chokeholds by persons subject to that provision's prohibitions, and 
                          for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            November 6, 2018

Mr. Jeffries (for himself, Ms. Bass, Ms. Clarke of New York, Mr. Clay, 
 Mr. Cohen, Mr. Danny K. Davis of Illinois, Ms. DeLauro, Mr. Hastings, 
Mr. Johnson of Georgia, Ms. Kelly of Illinois, Ms. Lofgren, Mr. Nadler, 
  Ms. Norton, Mr. Richmond, Mr. Serrano, and Ms. Lee) introduced the 
  following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend section 242 of title 18, United States Code, to forbid the use 
of chokeholds by persons subject to that provision's prohibitions, and 
                          for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Excessive Use of Force Prevention 
Act of 2018''.

SEC. 2. CHOKEHOLDS AS CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.

    Section 242 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding 
at the end the following: ``For the purposes of this section, the 
application of any pressure to the throat or windpipe which may prevent 
or hinder breathing or reduce intake of air is a punishment, pain, or 
penalty.''.
                                 <all>
```
A93A0545.

#### DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES v. ESTES.

(432 SE2d 613)

Blackburn, Judge.

On April 27, 1989, the Department of Human Resources (DHR) commenced this action against Albert Estes, seeking recovery of child support and current support for a minor child on whose behalf DHR paid public assistance benefits in late 1988. Originally, service was attempted at Estes’ last known address in Georgia, but the current resident informed the process server that Estes had moved out of state.

DHR then moved for service on Estes outside of the state, pursuant to OCGA § 19-7-41. Although conceding that the factual showing contained in DHR’s motion was sufficient to authorize such service, the trial court denied the motion on the grounds that compelling Estes to incur the expense of defending the matter in Georgia, based upon the mere allegation of his liability for a support obligation, did not appear to be consistent “with the ends of justice.” This court then granted DHR’s application for an interlocutory appeal.

OCGA § 19-7-41 provides that “[i]n a proceeding under this article, the court . . . may order service úpon a person outside the state upon a finding that there is a constitutionally permissible basis for jurisdiction over the person arising out of the fact that the child was conceived as a result of an act of sexual intercourse within this state while either parent was a resident of this state and the person on whom service is required is the alleged father of the child.” In *Bell v. Arnold,*248 Ga. 9 (279 SE2d 449) (1981), the Supreme Court held that out-of-state service based upon the minimum contacts required under this statute does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

In the instant case, it was shown that the minor child was conceived as a result of sexual intercourse between the child’s mother and Estes in Georgia in February 1985, and that the child’s mother continued to reside in Georgia. The trial court did not dispute this showing of the necessary factual predicate for service under OCGA § 19-7-41, and erred in finding that out-of-state service upon Estes pursuant to that statute would be inconsistent “with the ends of justice.” *Bell v. Arnold,*supra.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Johnson and Smith, JJ., concur.*

*873Decided June 8, 1993.

*Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, William C. Joy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Teresa E. Lazzaroni, Staff Attorney,*for appellant.

Albert J. Estes, *pro se.*
Exhibit
      32.1





**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**





SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
      connection with the Annual Report of Cardinal Communications, Inc. (the
      "Company") on Form 10-KSB/A for the period ending December 31, 2005, as filed
      with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
      I, Edouard A. Garneau, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
      to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 3(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.








Dated:
                April 17, 2006
              
              /s/
                Edouard A. Garneau
              ------------------------------------
              Name:
                Edouard A. Garneau
              Chief
                Executive Officer
IIB 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1725 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JULY 11, 2007 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural 

Resources 

AN ACT 

To amend the Reclamation Wastewater and Groundwater 

Study and Facilities Act to authorize the Secretary of 

the Interior to participate in the Rancho California 

Water District Southern Riverside County Recycled/NonPotable Distribution Facilities and Demineralization/Desalination Recycled Water Treatment and Reclamation 

Facility Project. 


pwalker on PROD1PC71 with BILLS
2 

HR 1725 RFS

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Rancho California 

5 Water District Recycled Water Reclamation Facility Act 

6 of 2007’’. 

7 SEC. 2. PROJECT AUTHORIZATION. 

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Reclamation Wastewater and 

9 Groundwater Study and Facilities Act (Public Law 102– 

10 575, title XVI; 43 U.S.C. 390h et seq.) is amended by 

11 adding after section 16ll the following: 

12 ‘‘SEC. 16ll. RANCHO CALIFORNIA WATER DISTRICT 

13 PROJECT, CALIFORNIA. 

14 ‘‘(a) AUTHORIZATION.—The Secretary, in coopera15 tion with the Rancho California Water District, California, 

16 may participate in the design, planning, and construction 

17 of permanent facilities for water recycling, 

18 demineralization, and desalination, and distribution of 

19 non-potable water supplies in Southern Riverside County, 

20 California. 

21 ‘‘(b) COST SHARING.—The Federal share of the cost 

22 of the project described in subsection (a) shall not exceed 

23 25 percent of the total cost of the project or $20,000,000, 

24 whichever is less. 


pwalker on PROD1PC71 with BILLS
3 

HR 1725 RFS

1 ‘‘(c) LIMITATION.—Funds provided by the Secretary 

2 under this section shall not be used for operation or main3 tenance of the project described in subsection (a).’’. 

4 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of items in 

5 section 2 of Public Law 102–575 is amended by inserting 

6 after the item relating to section 16ll the following: 

‘‘Sec. 16ll. Rancho California Water District Project, California.’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives July 10, 2007. 

Attest: LORRAINE C. MILLER, 

Clerk. 

By DEBORAH M. SPRIGGS, 

Deputy Clerk. 


pwalker on PROD1PC71 with BILLS
THE STATE OF TEXAS 

### M A N D A T E

TO THE 186TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BEXAR COUNTY, GREETINGS:

Before our Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas on April 29, 2015, the cause upon appeal to revise

or reverse your judgment between

Michael S. Eisenhauer, Appellant(s)

V.

The State of Texas, Appellee(s)

No. 04

- 15

- 00197

- CR and Tr. Ct. No. 2014CR0043

was determined, and therein our Court of Appeals made its order in these words:



## In accordance with the court’s opinion of this date, this appeal is

DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.

WHEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of our said Court of Appeals for the Fourth

District of Texas, in this behalf and in all things have the order duly recognized, obeyed, and executed.

Witness the Hon. Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas,

with the seal of the Court affixed and the City of San Antonio on June 30, 2015.

KEITH E. HOTTLE, CLERK

Cynthia A. Martinez

Deputy Clerk, Ext. 53853
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-7472

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

MARTELL WHITAKER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Rock Hill. C. Weston Houck, Senior District

Judge. (CR-98-1016; CA-01-3207)

Submitted: June 30, 2005 Decided: July 20, 2005

Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Martell Whitaker, Appellant Pro Se. Jane Barrett Taylor, OFFICE OF

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Martell Whitaker, a federal prisoner, seeks to appeal the

district court’s order denying relief on his motion filed under 28

U.S.C. § 2255 (2000). An appeal may not be taken from the final

order in a § 2255 proceeding unless a circuit justice or judge

issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)

(2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue for claims

addressed by a district court absent “a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000).

A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable

jurists would find both that the district court’s assessment of his

constitutional claims is debatable or wrong and that any

dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also

debatable or wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-

38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v.

Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently

reviewed the record and conclude that Whitaker has not made the

requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of

appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Billy R. TAYLOR.

No. 2010-K-1319.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 7, 2011.

In re State of Louisiana; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 434251; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KA 2060.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant.
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 193 (Wednesday, October 6, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 61706]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-25222]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Foreign-Trade Zones Board

[Order No. 1708]


Reorganization of Foreign-Trade Zone 113 Under Alternative Site 
Framework; Ellis County, TX

    Pursuant to its authority under the Foreign-Trade Zones Act of 
June 18, 1934, as amended (19 U.S.C. 81a-81u), the Foreign-Trade 
Zones Board (the Board) adopts the following Order:

    Whereas, the Board adopted the alternative site framework (ASF) in 
December 2008 (74 FR 1170, 01/12/09; correction 74 FR 3987, 01/22/09) 
as an option for the establishment or reorganization of general-purpose 
zones;
    Whereas, the Ellis County Trade Zone Corporation, grantee of 
Foreign-Trade Zone 113, submitted an application to the Board (FTZ 
Docket 4-2010, filed 01/14/10) for authority to reorganize under the 
ASF with a service area of Ellis County, Texas, adjacent to the Dallas/
Fort Worth Customs and Border Protection port of entry, and FTZ 113's 
existing Site 1 would be categorized as a magnet site;
    Whereas, notice inviting public comment was given in the Federal 
Register (75 FR 3705, 01/22/10; 75 FR 17125, 04/05/10) and the 
application has been processed pursuant to the FTZ Act and the Board's 
regulations; and,
    Whereas, the Board adopts the findings and recommendations of the 
examiner's report, and finds that the requirements of the FTZ Act and 
Board's regulations are satisfied, and that the proposal is in the 
public interest;
    Now, therefore, the Board hereby orders:
    The application to reorganize FTZ 113 under the alternative site 
framework is approved, subject to the FTZ Act and the Board's 
regulations, including Section 400.28, and to the Board's standard 
2,000-acre activation limit for the overall general-purpose zone 
project.

    Signed at Washington, DC, September 24, 2010.
Ronald K. Lorentzen,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Import Administration, Alternate 
Chairman, Foreign-Trade Zones Board.
    Attest:
Andrew McGilvray,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2010-25222 Filed 10-5-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
#### Gloria CLAY v. OUR LADY OF LOURDES REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC.

No. 2010-C-1579.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 8, 2011.

In re Our Lady of Lourdes Regional Medical Center Inc.; - Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Comp. - Dist. 04, No. 06-03500; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 09-1219.

Remanded to the court of appeal for consideration in light of *Hargrave v. State,*
      *750through *DOTD,*2010-1044, (La 1/19/11), 54 So.3d 1102, 2011 WL 150199.
exv10w29






January 5, 2007




Brian Legried, President

Cofina Financial

5500 Cenex Drive

Inver Grove Heights, MN 55077




Dear Mr. Legried:



AgStar Financial Services, PCA, d/b/a ProPartners Financial
(“ProPartners”), Cofina Financial, LLC (“Cofina”) and CHS Inc.
(“CHS”) are parties to an Amended and Restated Loan Origination and
Participation Agreement dated October 31, 2006 (“Agreement”) whereby
Cofina has agreed to originate and participate to ProPartners certain
loans under Cofina’s agricultural production and processing financing
program (“the Program”) based on terms and conditions set forth in
the Agreement. All capitalized terms used herein and not otherwise
defined shall have the meanings given to them in the Agreement.



Cofina and ProPartners hereby agree that the Agreement shall be
amended as follows: All Participated Loans placed into the 15%
Recourse Pool that have a 50% first risk of loss guaranty by CI IS
shall have the ProPartners’ portion of the interest collected equal
to Prime Rate less 155 basis points instead of Prime Rate less 115
basis points for all other loans in the 15% Recourse Pool as cited in
Section 3.04 of the Agreement. The guaranty limits as defined in
Section 5.02(c) of the Agreement still apply to all 15% Recourse
Loans in total. The 50% first risk of loss guaranty by CHS is defined
in the Cofina Financial Loan Operating Agreement dated May 1, 2006
between Cofina and CHS.



Please acknowledge your agreement with the foregoing by
executing this letter agreement in the space provided below.




AGSTAR FINANCIAL SERVICES, PCA

D/B/A PROPARTNERS FINANCIAL




	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	By:
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Name:

	 	 

	 	 	 	 
	Its:

	 	 

	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	 

	 	 	 	 






Agreed and acknowledged this                      day of January, 2007.




COFINA FINANCIAL,, LLC




	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	By:
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Name:

	 	 

	 	 	 	 
	Its:
Exhibit
      32.1





HERITAGE
      OAKS BANCORP




Quarterly
      report on Form 10Q


for
      the
      quarter ended June 30, 2007




CERTIFICATION





Pursuant
      to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002








The
      undersigned, who is the Chief Executive Officer of Heritage Oaks Bancorp (the
      “Company”), hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 USC Section 1350, that to my
      knowledge, (i) the Quarterly Report on Form 10Q for the quarter ended June
      30,
      2007, as filed by the Company with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
      “Quarterly Report”), to which this Certification is an Exhibit, fully complies
      with the applicable requirements of Section 13(a) and 15(d) of the Exchange
      Act;
      and (ii) the information contained in this Quarterly Report fairly presents,
      in
      all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
      the
      Company.


Dated: July
              27, 2007
            
            /s/ Lawrence
              P. WardLawrence
              P. Ward,President
              and Chief Executive Officer







A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
      authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
      in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required
      by Section 906, has been provided to Heritage Oaks Bancorp, and will be retained
      by Heritage Oaks Bancorp and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
      or its staff upon request.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                          12,237
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                          0
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                         375,720
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                           380,879
<LOANS>                                      1,117,828
<ALLOWANCE>                                      2,869
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,566,418
<DEPOSITS>                                   1,083,284
<SHORT-TERM>                                    62,750
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                             19,006
<LONG-TERM>                                    297,037
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            60
<OTHER-SE>                                     104,281
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>               1,566,418
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                 20,199
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                7,036
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                     3
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                27,238
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                              12,648
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              18,944
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            8,294
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                      175
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  4,672
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  4,462
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       2,851
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,851
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.33
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.31
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    7.16
<LOANS-NON>                                      4,532
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                 1,406
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                  5,938
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 2,776
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                       82
<RECOVERIES>                                         0
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                2,869
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                             2,869
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>