alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Andre Isaiah DUNBAR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D08-4214.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

April 30, 2010.

Rehearing Denied May 21, 2010.

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Leonard R. Ross, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Andre I. Dunbar, Milton, pro se.

No Appearance for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

In this *Anders*appeal,1 appellate counsel advised this Court that in good faith, he could not argue that reversible error occurred in the trial court. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of *Anders,*and the instruction of the Florida Supreme Court in *State v. Causey,*503 So.2d 321 (Fla.1987), we undertook an independent review of the record. Although we affirm the convictions and sentences, our review revealed a sentencing error that was not preserved by objection at sentencing or by motion to correct sentence. As a result, the issue is not preserved for appellate review and we are constrained to affirm.

Andre Dunbar was convicted of two counts of attempted second-degree murder *55with a firearm, and two counts of robbery with a firearm. The jury also made a special finding that Dunbar discharged the firearm. On each count, Dunbar was sentenced to forty years imprisonment.2 Attempted second-degree murder is a second-degree felony. *See*§§ 782.04(2), 777.04(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (2009). If, as in the instant case, the offense is committed with a firearm, the crime is reclassified to a first-degree felony pursuant to section 775.087(1)(b), subject to an enhanced sentence not to exceed thirty years. *See Miller v. State,*460 So.2d 373, 374 (Fla.1984); *see also*§ 775.082(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2009).

The concurrent forty-year sentences that Dunbar received for his convictions of attempted second-degree murder are clearly in excess of the statutory maximum. However, sentencing errors that occur after the effective date of the amendments to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b), even if formerly deemed fundamental or patent on the face of the record, cannot be reviewed by an appellate court if, as here, the issue was not raised at sentencing or in a timely post-sentencing proceeding pursuant to rule 3.800. *See generally Maddox v. State,*760 So.2d 89 (Fla.2000); *Washington v. State,*814 So.2d 1187 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). Accordingly, we affirm Dunbar’s convictions and sentences without prejudice to his right to seek appropriate and timely postconviction relief. *Wilson v. State,*898 So.2d 191 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); *Lewis v. State,*827 So.2d 1052 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).

AFFIRMED.

ORFINGER, TORPY and EVANDER, JJ., concur.

1

. *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).

2

. The trial court also imposed the mandatory minimum term of twenty years pursuant to section 775.087(2)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2009), for discharge of a firearm.
EXHIBIT 12.1  STATEMENT RE: COMPUTATION OF RATIO
OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES
AND RATIO OF EARNINGS TO COMBINED FIXED CHARGES
 LIBERTY PROPERTY TRUST / LIBERTY PROPERTY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
(Amounts in thousands except ratio amounts)
 Nine months endedSeptember 30, 2009Earnings before fixed charges:Income before allocation of minority interest
and income from investments in unconsolidated
subsidiaries
    
    $
    128,641Add: Interest expense
    
    
    107,710Depreciation expense on capd interest
    
    
    1,119Amortization of deferred
financing costs
    
    
    3,754Earnings before fixed charges
    
    $
    241,224Fixed charges:Interest expense
    
    $
    107,710Amortization of deferred financing charges
    
    
    3,754Capitalized interest
    
    
    7,349Fixed charges
    
    
    118,813Preferred share distributions
    
    
    Preferred unit distributions
    
    
    15,759Combined fixed charges
    
    $
    134,572Ratio of earnings to fixed charges
    
    
    2.03Ratio of earnings to combined fixed charges
    
    
    1.79
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-60484

Summary Calendar

CLAVER J. SMITH,

Plaintiff–Appellant

v.

ALCORN STATE UNIVERSITY,

Defendant–Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 5:10-CV-198

Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Claver Smith, the Appellant, alleges that Alcorn State University, the

Appellee, unlawfully discriminated against her based on her age in violation of

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), specifically 29 U.S.C.

§ 623(a). Smith filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) on September 23, 2009. On August 23, 2010, the EEOC

issued Smith a right-to-sue letter. Smith did not, however, file her suit until

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

November 30, 2011

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

Case: 11-60484 Document: 00511680294 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/30/2011
No. 11-60484

December 16, 2010—116 days after the issuance of the right-to-sue letter. The

Appellee filed a motion to dismiss based on Eleventh Amendment immunity and

a motion for summary judgment based on the time bar. The district court

granted both motions.

“A plaintiff alleging employment discrimination must file a civil action no

more than ninety days after she receives statutory notice of her right to sue from

the EEOC. The ninety-day window is strictly construed and is a precondition to

filing suit in district court.” Duron v. Albertson’s LLC, 560 F.3d 288, 290 (5th

Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks, citations, and footnotes omitted). Smith

claims that she filed her suit on November 22, 2010 (within the ninety-day

window), but there is no evidence in the record to support this. We therefore

AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Appellee.

AFFIRMED.

2

Case: 11-60484 Document: 00511680294 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/30/2011
584 A.2d 237

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. JOSEPH NATHAN RHYM.

May 30, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-7770
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus RANDALL WAYNE GILBERT, Defendant - Appellant.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Winston-Salem. Frank W. Bullock, Jr., Chief District Judge. (CR-91-53-WS, CA-96-385-6) Submitted: February 17, 1998 Decided: March 12, 1998 Before WIDENER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Randall Wayne Gilbert, Appellant Pro Se. Benjamin H. White, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997). We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find noreversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. United States v. Gilbert , Nos. CR-91-53-WS; CA-96-385-6 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 16, 1996). We deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03

- 24

- 00060

- CV

Silicon Hills Campus LLC; WC Hirshfeld Moore, LLC; WC 805

- 809 East Sixth, LLC; WC 320 Congress, LLC; WC 901 East Cesar Chavez, LLC; WC 1212 East Sixth, LLC; WC 9005 Mountain Ridge, LLC; WC 103 East Fifth, LLC; and WC 422 Congress, LLC , Appellant s

v.
ATX Debt Fund 1, LLC; ATX Debt Fund 2, LLC; Congress Avenue Holdings, LLC; Karlin Real Estate, LLC; Karlin Asset Management, Inc.; Pennybacker Capital, LLC; Congress Avenue Holdings GP, LLC; Congress Avenue Holdings, LP ; Karlin Cesar Chavez, LLC; Karlin River Place, LLC; Karlin East Sixth, LLC; Karlin Mountain Ridge, LLC; Karlin Phillips Building, LLC; Karlin 320 Congress, LLC; and Karlin 422 Congress, LLC , Appellee s

FROM THE 261ST DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D

- 1

- GN

- 21

- 002896 , THE HONORABLE CATHERINE MAUZY , JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant s Silicon Hills Campus LLC; WC Hirshfeld Moore, LLC; WC 805

- 809

East Sixth, LLC; WC 320 Congress, LLC; WC 901 East Cesar Chavez, LLC; WC 1212 East

Sixth, LLC; WC 9005 Mountain Ridge, LLC; WC 103 East Fifth, LLC; and WC 422 Congress,

LLC ha ve filed an unopposed moti on to dismiss this appeal. We g rant appellant s’ motion and

dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a)

. All pending motions are dismissed as moot.2 __________________________________________ Edward Smith, Justice

Before Justices Baker, Smith, and Theofanis

Dismissed on Appellant s’ Motion

Filed: August 2, 2024
Exhibit 35.1

OFFICERS CERTIFICATE

I, Karen Montbach, a
Managing Director of Citibank, N.A. (the Company), hereby certify, with respect to the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, dated as of August 1, 2014, (the Agreement), by and among Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc., as
Depositor; Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as , Master Servicer; Rialto Capital Advisors, LLC, as Special Servicer; Pentalpha Surveillance LLC, as Trust Advisor; Citibank, NA as Trustee, Certificate Administrator, Certificate Registrar and
Authenticating Agent; and Wells Fargo Bank, National Association as Custodian the following:

Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc., as depositor, Wells Fargo
Bank, National Association, as master servicer, Rialto Capital Advisors, LLC, as special servicer, Pentalpha Surveillance LLC, as trust advisor, Citibank, N.A., as trustee, Certificate Administrator, (the Certificate Administrator), and
Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as Custodian the following:

(A) A review of the Companys activities as Certificate
Administrator during the reporting period ending December 31, 2016 and its performance under the Agreement has been made under my supervision.

(B) To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, as of and for the reporting period ending December 31, 2016, the Company has
fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the reporting period.

This statement is given by the undersigned
as an authorized officer of the Company and not in the undersigneds individual capacity.

Date: February 27, 2017



Citibank, N.A.By:

/s/ Karen MontbachName:

Karen MontbachTitle:

Managing Director


MSBAM 2014-C17
{00041703.DOC}**EXHIBIT 35.1****SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT**Re:  Mercedes-Benz Financial Services USA LLC in its capacity as Servicer (the "Servicer") under the Sale and Servicing Agreement, dated as of July 1, 2014, among Mercedes-Benz Auto Receivables Trust 2014-1, as Issuer, Daimler Retail Receivables LLC, as Depositor, and Mercedes-Benz Financial Services USA LLC, as Seller and Servicer (the "Servicing Agreement"), for the period from July 9, 2014, to December 31, 2014 (the "Reporting Period"). I, Brian T. Stevens, certify that: (a) A review of the Servicer's activities during the Reporting Period and of its performance under the Servicing Agreement has been made under my supervision. (b) To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Servicing Agreement in all material respects throughout the Reporting Period. Dated:  March 23, 2015   /s/ Brian T. Stevens Name: Brian T. Stevens Title: Vice President and Controller
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. He Kang LIN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 00-10030.

D.C. No. CR-99-00027-1-ARM.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 20, 2000.*

Decided Jan. 9, 2001.

Before LAY,** D.W. NELSON, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

**

 The Honorable Donald Lay, Senior Circuit Judge of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM1

He Kang Lin appeals his conviction for attempted alien smuggling to a place other than a designated port, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A). On appeal, Lin argues that the district court erred in finding that venue was proper in the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands (“CNMI”).2 The identical issue was previously considered by this court in *United States v. Zhou Liang,*224 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir.2000), in which we agreed with Lin’s co-defendant, Zhou Liang, that venue in the CNMI was improper. Therefore, for the reasons stated in *United States v. Zhou Liang,*224 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir.2000), filed September 13, 2000, we reverse the district court and dismiss the indictment.

REVERSED.

1

. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts in this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

2

. We need not consider Lin's argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction over this case.
#### Patrick Craig MORROW, Jr. and Nicole B. Morrow v. WELLINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.

No. 2010-CC-1845.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 29, 2010.

In re Catlin Specialty Insurance Company; Wellington Insurance Company et al; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 08-C^342-B; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 10-00538.

Denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                       1,856,221
<SECURITIES>                                10,897,456
<RECEIVABLES>                                  261,536
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                  4,262,777
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            17,535,816
<PP&E>                                         797,358
<DEPRECIATION>                                 200,576
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              18,219,721
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          789,743
<BONDS>                                        601,183
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         6,655
<OTHER-SE>                                  33,516,325
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                18,219,721
<SALES>                                        148,373
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               148,373
<CGS>                                           94,547
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   94,547
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             3,861,786
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              32,627
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (3,400,720)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (3,400,720)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (3,400,720)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.51)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.51)
        

</TABLE>
866 A.2d 979

#### IN THE MATTER OF MICHAEL A. DEMIRO, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 010011976).

February 23, 2005.

ORDER

This matter having been duly presented to the Court, it is ORDERED that MICHAEL A. DeMIRO of VERONA, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1976, and who has been suspended from the practice of law since June 2, 2003, pursuant to Orders of this Court filed June 2, 2003, and January 10, 2005, be restored to the practice of law, effective immediately.
584 A.2d 237

#### COLLEEN KREHELY v. MONMOUTH MEDICAL CENTER AND RONALD POVOLO.

May 30, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
585 A.2d 397

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. JAMES KOEDATICH.

October 16, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
584 A.2d 208

#### LUCIEN CLANET v. COOPER HOSPITAL/UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER.

May 7, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
585 A.2d 357

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. ALBERT CUNNINGHAM AND EVERETT E. CUNNINGHAM, ET AL.

July 17, 1990.

Leave to appeal granted and the matter is summarily remanded to the Appellate Division for reconsideration in light of *State v. Thomas E. Lund/State v. Michael X. Harrison,*119 *N.J.*35, 573 A.2d 1376 (1990).

Jurisdiction is not retained.
# In the United States Court of Federal Claims

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 15-771V Filed: October 26, 2015

UNPUBLISHED

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * CARRIE PAYNE, *

* Petitioner, * Ruling on Entitlement; Concession; * Influenza (Flu) Vaccine; Left Shoulder * Injury; Shoulder Injury Related to SECRETARY OF HEALTH * Vaccine Administration (SIRVA); AND HUMAN SERVICES, * Special Processing Unit (SPU).

* Respondent. *

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Lawrence R. Cohan, Anapol, Schwartz, et al., Philadelphi a, PA, for petitioner. Christine Mary Becer, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.

RULING ON ENTITLEMENT 1

Dorsey , Chief Special Master:

On June 23, 2015, Carrie Payne (“petiti oner”) filed a petiti on for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compens ation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et

seq

. , 2 [the “Vaccine Act” or “Program”]. Petitioner alleges that as a result of receiving the influenza (“flu”) vaccine on October 14, 2014, she suffered a left ro tator cuff injury that was caused in fact by her flu vaccination. Petition at 3. The case was assigned to the Special Processing Unit of the Office of Special Masters.

On October 26, 2015, respondent filed her Rule 4(c) report in which she concedes that petitioner is entitled to compen sation in this case. Respondent’s Rule 4(c) Report at 3. Specifically, respondent states “that a preponderance of the medical evidence establishes that the injury to petit ioner’s left shoulder was caused-in-fact by
the administration of her Oct ober 14, 2014 flu vaccine, and that petitioner’s injury is not

1 Because this unpublished ruling contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, I intend to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205, 116 Stat. 2899, 2913 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2006)). In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I agree that the identified mate rial fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access.

2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Ac t will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa (2012).2 due to factors unrelated to the administration of the flu vaccine.” Id. at 3. Respondent
further states that the record s show that petitioner suffered the sequela of her injury for more than six months. Id. Thus, respondent states that she “ has concluded that [petitioner’s] left shoulder injury is compens able as a ‘caused-in-fact’ injury under the
Act.” Id.

In view of respondent’s concession and the evidence presented, the undersigned finds that petitioner is entitled to compensation.

s/Nora Beth Dorsey Nora Beth Dorsey Chief Special Master
Exhibit
      32.1





HERITAGE
      OAKS BANCORP




Quarterly
      Report on Form 10Q


for
      the
      quarter ended March 31, 2007





CERTIFICATION





Pursuant
      to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002




The
      undersigned, who is the Chief Executive Officer of Heritage Oaks Bancorp (the
      “Company”), hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 USC Section 1350, that to my
      knowledge, (i) the Quarterly Report on Form 10Q for the quarter ended March
      31,
      2007, as filed by the Company with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
      “Quarterly Report”), to which this Certification is an Exhibit, fully complies
      with the applicable requirements of Section 13(a) and 15(d) of the Exchange
      Act;
      and (ii) the information contained in this Quarterly Report fairly presents,
      in
      all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
      the
      Company.




Dated:
              May 9, 2007
            
            /s/
                Lawrence P. WardLawrence
                P. Ward,
              President
                and Chief Executive Officer




A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
      authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
      in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required
      by Section 906, has been provided to Heritage Oaks Bancorp, and will be retained
      by Heritage Oaks Bancorp and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
      or its staff upon request.