NUMBER 13-13-00125-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

MIRANDA NICOLE CISNEROS, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the 214th District Court

of Nueces County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Garza

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Garza

A jury convicted appellant Miranda Cisneros of three counts of aggravated 

robbery, a first-degree felony, see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.03 (West 2011), and one 

count of child endangerment, a state-jail felony, see id. § 22.041. As to the three 

aggravated robbery counts, the jury assessed punishment at eleven, ten, and five years’ 

imprisonment, respectively, and it assessed punishment at two years’ confinement in 

state jail for the child endangerment count. By a single issue, appellant complains that 
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she “was denied due process of law throughout the voir dire process.” Specifically, in 

sub-issues, appellant contends that: (1) by intervening in the voir dire process, the trial 

court prevented defense counsel from properly questioning potential jury members 

regarding whether they could consider the full range of punishment; (2) the trial court 

erred in refusing to strike a particular juror for cause; (3) the trial court made improper 

comments during the voir dire process; and (4) the trial court erred in denying defense 

counsel’s motion for mistrial. We affirm. 

I. VOIR DIRE QUESTION

By her first sub-issue, appellant complains that the trial court prevented her 

defense counsel from asking venire members whether they would consider the full 

range of punishment, including probation. Specifically, appellant complains that when 

defense counsel attempted to question the venire members regarding punishment, the 

trial court intervened with its own questions, which confused the panel. 

We review a trial court’s restrictions on particular voir dire questions for an abuse 

of discretion. Rodriguez-Flores v. State, 351 S.W.3d 612, 621 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, 

pet. ref’d) (citing Barajas v. State, 93 S.W.3d 36, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). A trial 

court abuses its discretion when it prohibits a proper question about a proper area of 

inquiry. Id. 

The State argues that appellant failed to preserve any issue for review because 

she did not object to the trial court that she was prevented from questioning venire 

members as to whether they would consider the full range of punishment. We agree. 

“To preserve a complaint for appellate review, the record must show that a 

specific and timely complaint was made to the trial judge and that the trial judge ruled 

on the complaint.” Lovill v. State, 319 S.W.3d 687, 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see 
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TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1). Here, appellant’s counsel did not object that he was 

prevented from questioning the venire members regarding whether they would consider 

the full range of punishment, including probation. Moreover, the record shows that 

appellant’s counsel did question the venire members repeatedly regarding whether they 

would consider the full range of punishment, including probation, and that the venire 

members answered those questions. Questions by defense counsel included the 

following:

What I need to ask all of you and what we need to know, Ms. Cisneros 

and I is, how many of you would consider then probation as an 

appropriate punishment depending on the facts that you heard during this 

entire trial?

So with this indictment, in order for us to go forward with this jury we need 

to know, if Ms. Cisneros was found guilty of even one count of aggravated 

robbery with a deadly weapon, could you consider a sentence of 

probation? How many people don’t think you would consider probation?

Now the question is, if you find somebody guilty of these four counts in 

this indictment, three aggravated robbery, one child endangerment[,] it 

doesn’t matter, because you have to be able to say even if I found her 

guilty of all four of these counts I would still consider probation as a 

possible punishment, if you can’t say that[,] then you should raise your 

card and honestly and say no I won’t consider probation if I found her 

guilt[y] of these four counts. 

So if you are honest with us and you say, we’ll listen to all the evidence if 

we find this person guilty of these four charges, we’ll consider anything 

from probation to life then that is the correct answer to be eligible. Do y’all 

understand? Will you consider the full range, that’s the only question that 

you have all been being asked, okay?

Appellant failed to preserve any issue for review. See Lovill, 319 S.W.3d at 691. We

overrule appellant’s first sub-issue.

II. CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE 

By her second sub-issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in refusing a 

challenge for cause to venire member thirteen. Appellant argues that venire member
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thirteen said several times that she would not consider probation, but subsequently said 

that, based on the trial court’s explanation, she could consider the full range of 

punishment, including probation. Appellant also complains that venire member thirteen 

should have been disqualified because she had seen news reports regarding the 

incident at issue. 

Venire member thirteen did not serve on the jury. Appellant’s brief states that 

“trial counsel had no choice but to use a preemptory [sic] strike against these 

individuals.”1 

We reverse a trial court’s ruling on a challenge for cause only upon a clear abuse 

of discretion. Cardenas v. State, 305 S.W.3d 773, 776 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009), 

aff’d, 325 S.W.3d 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In determining whether the trial court 

abused its discretion, we review the total voir dire record in context. Id. To preserve 

error on her challenge for cause, appellant was required to: (1) assert a clear and 

specific challenge for cause, (2) use a peremptory challenge on the complained-of 

venire member, (3) exhaust all of his peremptory challenges, (4) request and be denied 

additional peremptory challenges, and (5) be forced to accept an objectionable juror on 

the jury. Id. at 780. 

Here, the record does not show that defense counsel exercised any peremptory 

challenges. He clearly did not request, and the trial court did not deny, any request for 

additional peremptory challenges. Finally, he did not identify an objectionable juror that 

he was forced to accept. See id. Accordingly, no issue has been preserved for review. 

See id. We overrule appellant’s second sub-issue. 

 

1 We note that appellant specifically complains only of the trial court’s denial of her challenge to 

venire member thirteen. 
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III. TRIAL JUDGE’S COMMENTS

By her third sub-issue, appellant complains that the trial judge made several 

improper comments during voir dire. Specifically, appellant complains of the following 

comments by the trial judge: (1) “We have a tendency the higher the accusation[,] the 

more serious[,] we have a tendency to believe that it is true”; (2) the trial judge’s 

admission that he himself had watched news coverage of the incident at issue and had 

already formed an opinion; and (3) various comments regarding how many jurors the 

trial court needed to keep in order to save the panel. 

“Most appellate complaints must be preserved by a timely request for relief at the 

trial level.” Unkart v. State, 400 S.W. 3d 94, 98 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). “The ‘traditional 

and preferred procedure’ for seeking relief at trial for a complaint that must be preserved 

is ‘(1) to object when it is possible, (2) to request an instruction to disregard if the 

prejudicial event has occurred, and (3) to move for a mistrial if a party thinks an 

instruction to disregard was not sufficient.’” Id. at 98–99 (quoting Young v. State, 137 

S.W.3d 65, 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). “A party may skip the first two steps and 

request a mistrial, but he will be entitled to one only if a timely objection would not have 

prevented, and an instruction to disregard would not have cured, the harm flowing from 

the error.” Id. at 99. 

Here, appellant did not object to any of the trial judge’s comments about which 

he now complains. Accordingly, he failed to preserve any issue regarding the trial 

judge’s comments. See id. We overrule appellant’s third sub-issue.

IV. MOTION FOR MISTRIAL

In a final sub-issue, appellant complains that the trial court erred in denying his 

motion for mistrial during voir dire. We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for 
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mistrial for abuse of discretion. Archie v. State, 340 S.W.3d 734, 738–39 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2011). During voir dire, the trial judge read count one of the indictment to the 

panel. Defense counsel stated, “Your Honor, I’m going to ask the Court for a mistrial at 

this point. I think this panel is already prejudice[d] and I don’t believe that I can get a 

fair trial. I’m moving for a mistrial—.” The trial judge said he did not agree. A few 

moments later, defense counsel repeated his request, and the trial court denied the 

request. Defense counsel’s request for a mistrial was not preceded by an objection or a 

request for an instruction to disregard. The context suggests that counsel’s motion for 

mistrial was based on the trial judge’s reading count one of the indictment to the jury. 

However, counsel did not object to the trial judge’s statement, nor did he request an 

instruction to disregard the comment. The trial court did not err in denying counsel’s 

request for a mistrial. See id. We overrule this final sub-issue. 

V. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

DORI CONTRERAS GARZA

Justice

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the

5th day of December, 2013.