61752 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 193 / Wednesday, October 6, 2010 / Notices 

background, experience and 

qualifications. Prospective candidates 

will be required to fill out the 

‘‘Confidential Financial Disclosure Form 

for Special Government Employees 

Serving on Federal Advisory 

Committees at the U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency’’ (EPA Form 3110– 

48). This confidential form allows 

Government officials to determine 

whether there is a statutory conflict 

between that person’s public 

responsibilities (which includes 

membership on an EPA Federal 

advisory committee) and private 

interests and activities, or the 

appearance of a lack of impartiality, as 

defined by Federal regulation. 

Dated: September 30, 2010. 

Cynthia C. Dougherty, 

Director, Office of Ground Water and Drinking 

Water. 

[FR Doc. 2010–25125 Filed 10–5–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6560–50–P 

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 

COMMISSION 

[AU Docket No. 10–183; DA 10–1711] 

Auction of FM Broadcast Construction 

Permits Scheduled for March 29, 2011; 

Comment Sought on Competitive 

Bidding Procedures for Auction 91 

AGENCY: Federal Communications 

Commission. 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: This document announces the 

auction of certain FM construction 

permits scheduled to commence on 

March 29, 2011 (Auction 91). This 

document also seeks comment on 

competitive bidding procedures for 

Auction 91. 

DATES: Comments are due on or before 

October 13, 2010, and reply comments 

are due on or before October 27, 2010. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, 

identified by AU Docket No. 10–183, by 

any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: http:// 

www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Federal Communications 

Commission’s Web Site: http:// 

fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs2/. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Paper Filers: Parties who choose to 

file by paper must file an original and 

four copies of each filing. Filings can be 

sent by hand or messenger delivery, by 

commercial overnight courier, or by 

first-class or overnight U.S. Postal 

Service mail. All filings must be 

addressed to the Commission’s 

Secretary, Attn: WTB/ASAD, Office of 

the Secretary, Federal Communications 

Commission. 

• All hand-delivered or messengerdelivered paper filings for the 

Commission’s Secretary must be 

delivered to FCC Headquarters at 

445 12th St., SW., Room TW–A325, 

Washington, DC 20554. All hand 

deliveries must be held together 

with rubber bands or fasteners. Any 

envelopes must be disposed of 

before entering the building. 

• Commercial overnight mail (other 

than U.S. Postal Service Express Mail 

and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9300 

East Hampton Drive, Capitol Heights, 

MD 20743. 

• People with Disabilities: Contact the 

FCC to request reasonable 

accommodations (accessible format 

documents, sign language interpreters, 

CART, etc.) by e-mail: FCC504@fcc.gov 

or telephone: 202–418–0530 or TTY: 

202–418–0432. 

• The Wireless Telecommunications 

Bureau requests that a copy of all 

comments and reply comments be 

submitted electronically to the 

following address: auction91@fcc.gov. 

• People with Disabilities: Contact 

the FCC to request reasonable 

accommodations (accessible format 

documents, sign language interpreters, 

CART, etc.) by e-mail: FCC504@fcc.gov 

or phone: 202–418–0530 or TTY: 202– 

418–0432. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, 

Auctions and Spectrum Access Division: 

For auction legal questions: Lynne 

Milne or Howard Davenport at (202) 

418–0660; for general auction questions: 

Roy Knowles or Linda Sanderson at 

(717) 338–2868. Media Bureau, Video 

Division: for service rules questions: 

Lisa Scanlan or Tom Nessinger at (202) 

418–2700. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a 

summary of the Auction 91 Comment 

Public Notice released on September 21, 

2010. The complete text of the Auction 

91 Comment Public Notice, including an 

attachment and related Commission 

documents, is available for public 

inspection and copying from 8 a.m. to 

4:30 p.m. ET Monday through Thursday 

or from 8:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. ET on 

Fridays in the FCC Reference 

Information Center, 445 12th Street, 

SW., Room CY–A257, Washington, DC 

20554. The Auction 91 Comment Public 

Notice and related Commission 

documents also may be purchased from 

the Commission’s duplicating 

contractor, Best Copy and Printing, Inc. 

(BCPI), 445 12th Street, SW., Room CY– 

B402, Washington, DC 20554, telephone 

202–488–5300, fax 202–488–5563, or 

you may contact BCPI at its Web site: 

http://www.BCPIWEB.com. When 

ordering documents from BCPI, please 

provide the appropriate FCC document 

number, for example, DA 10–1711. The 

Auction 91 Comment Public Notice and 

related documents also are available on 

the Internet at the Commission’s 

Web site: http://wireless.fcc.gov/

auctions/91/, or by using the search 

function for AU Docket No.10–183 on 

the ECFS Web page at http:// 

www.fcc.gov/cgb/ecfs/. 

I. Introduction 

1. The Wireless Telecommunications 

and the Media Bureaus (the Bureaus) 

announce an auction of certain FM 

Broadcast construction permits. This 

auction, which is designated Auction 

91, is scheduled to commence on March 

29, 2011. 

II. Construction Permits In Auction 91 

2. Auction 91 will offer 147 

construction permits in the FM 

broadcast service. The construction 

permits to be auctioned are for 147 new 

FM allotments, including 37 

construction permits that were offered 

but not sold in Auction 79. Specifically, 

the vacant FM allotments for which 

construction permits are being offered 

are listed in Attachment A of the 

Auction 91 Comment Public Notice 

along with the reference coordinates for 

each vacant FM allotment. If two or 

more short-form applications specify the 

same FM allotment, they will be 

considered mutually exclusive, and the 

construction permit for that FM 

allotment will be awarded by 

competitive bidding procedures. 

III. Due Diligence 

3. Potential bidders are reminded that 

they are solely responsible for 

investigating and evaluating all 

technical and marketplace factors that 

may have a bearing on the value of the 

construction permits for broadcast 

facilities they are seeking in this 

auction. Bidders are responsible for 

assuring themselves that, if they win a 

construction permit, they will be able to 

build and operate facilities in 

accordance with the Commission’s 

rules. The FCC makes no 

representations or warranties about the 

use of this spectrum for particular 

services. 

4. Applicants should perform their 

due diligence research and analysis 

before proceeding, as they would with 

any new business venture. In particular, 

potential bidders are strongly 

encouraged to review all underlying 

Commission orders. Additionally, 

potential bidders should perform 

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technical analyses and/or refresh any 

previous analyses to assure themselves 

that, should they be a winning bidder 

for any Auction 91 construction permit, 

they will be able to build and operate 

facilities that will fully comply with the 

Commission’s current technical and 

legal requirements. 

5. Applicants are strongly encouraged 

to conduct their own research prior to 

Auction 91 in order to determine the 

existence of pending administrative or 

judicial proceedings, including pending 

allocations rulemaking proceedings that 

might affect their decisions regarding 

participation in the auction. 

6. Participants in Auction 91 are 

strongly encouraged to continue such 

research throughout the auction. The 

due diligence considerations mentioned 

in the Auction 91 Comment Public 

Notice does not comprise an exhaustive 

list of steps that should be undertaken 

prior to participating in this auction. As 

always, the burden is on the potential 

bidder to determine how much research 

to undertake, depending upon specific 

facts and circumstances. 

IV. Bureaus Seek Comment on Auction 

Procedures 

A. Auction Structure 

i. Simultaneous Multiple-Round 

Auction Design 

7. The Bureaus propose to auction all 

construction permits included in 

Auction 91 using the Commission’s 

standard simultaneous multiple-round 

auction format. This type of auction 

offers every construction permit for bid 

at the same time and consists of 

successive bidding rounds in which 

eligible bidders may place bids on 

individual construction permits. 

Typically, bidding remains open on all 

construction permits until bidding stops 

on every construction permit. The 

Bureaus seek comment on this proposal. 

ii. Bidding Rounds 

8. Auction 91 will consist of 

sequential bidding rounds, each 

followed by the release of round results. 

The initial bidding schedule will be 

announced in a public notice to be 

released at least one week before the 

start of the auction. Details on viewing 

round results, including the location 

and format of downloadable round 

results files, will be included in the 

same public notice. 

9. The Commission will conduct 

Auction 91 over the Internet, and 

telephonic bidding will be available as 

well. The toll-free telephone number for 

the Auction Bidder Line will be 

provided to qualified bidders. 

10. The Bureaus propose to retain the 

discretion to change the bidding 

schedule in order to foster an auction 

pace that reasonably balances speed 

with the bidders’ need to study round 

results and adjust their bidding 

strategies. Under this proposal, the 

Bureaus may change the amount of time 

for the bidding rounds, the amount of 

time between rounds, or the number of 

rounds per day, depending upon 

bidding activity and other factors. The 

Bureaus seek comment on this proposal. 

Commenters may wish to address the 

role of the bidding schedule in 

managing the pace of the auction and 

the tradeoffs in managing auction pace 

by bidding schedule changes, by 

changing the activity requirements or 

bid amount parameters, or by using 

other means. 

iii. Stopping Rule 

11. For Auction 91 the Bureaus 

propose to employ a simultaneous 

stopping rule approach. A simultaneous 

stopping rule means that all 

construction permits remain available 

for bidding until bidding closes 

simultaneously on all construction 

permits. More specifically, bidding will 

close simultaneously on all construction 

permits after the first round in which no 

bidder submits any new bids, applies a 

proactive waiver, or withdraws any 

provisionally winning bids (if bid 

withdrawals are permitted in this 

auction). Thus, unless the Bureaus 

announce alternative procedures, 

bidding will remain open on all 

construction permits until bidding stops 

on every construction permit. 

Consequently, it is not possible to 

determine in advance how long the 

auction will last. 

12. Further, the Bureaus propose to 

retain the discretion to exercise any of 

the following options during Auction 

91: (a) Use a modified version of the 

simultaneous stopping rule that would 

close the auction for all construction 

permits after the first round in which no 

bidder applies a waiver, withdraws a 

provisionally winning bid (if 

withdrawals are permitted in this 

auction), or places any new bids on any 

construction permit for which it is not 

the provisionally winning bidder. Thus, 

absent any other bidding activity, a 

bidder placing a new bid on a 

construction permit for which it is the 

provisionally winning bidder would not 

keep the auction open under this 

modified stopping rule; (b) Use a 

modified version of the simultaneous 

stopping rule that would close the 

auction for all construction permits after 

the first round in which no bidder 

applies a waiver, withdraws a 

provisionally winning bid (if 

withdrawals are permitted in this 

auction), or places any new bids on any 

construction permit that is not FCC 

held. Thus, absent any other bidding 

activity, a bidder placing a new bid on 

a construction permit that does not 

already have a provisionally winning 

bid (an FCC-held construction permit) 

would not keep the auction open under 

this modified stopping rule; (c) Use a 

modified version of the simultaneous 

stopping rule that combines (a) and (b); 

(d) Declare that the auction will end 

after a specified number of additional 

rounds (special stopping rule). If the 

Bureaus invoke this special stopping 

rule, they will accept bids in the 

specified final round(s), after which the 

auction will close; and (e) Keep the 

auction open even if no bidder places 

any new bids, applies a waiver, or 

withdraws any provisionally winning 

bids (if withdrawals are permitted in 

this auction). In this event, the effect 

will be the same as if a bidder had 

applied a waiver. The activity rule will 

apply as usual, and a bidder with 

insufficient activity will either lose 

bidding eligibility or use a waiver. 

13. The Bureaus propose to exercise 

these options only in certain 

circumstances, for example, where the 

auction is proceeding unusually slowly 

or quickly, there is minimal overall 

bidding activity, or it appears likely that 

the auction will not close within a 

reasonable period of time or will close 

prematurely. Before exercising these 

options, the Bureaus are likely to 

attempt to change the pace of the 

auction by, for example, changing the 

number of bidding rounds per day and/ 

or changing minimum acceptable bids. 

The Bureaus propose to retain the 

discretion to exercise any of these 

options with or without prior 

announcement during the auction. The 

Bureaus seek comment on these 

proposals. 

iv. Information Relating to Auction 

Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation 

14. For Auction 91, the Bureaus 

propose that, by public notice or by 

announcement during the auction, the 

Bureaus may delay, suspend, or cancel 

the auction in the event of natural 

disaster, technical obstacle, 

administrative or weather necessity, 

evidence of an auction security breach 

or unlawful bidding activity, or for any 

other reason that affects the fair and 

efficient conduct of competitive 

bidding. In such cases, the Bureaus, in 

their sole discretion, may elect to 

resume the auction starting from the 

beginning of the current round, resume 

the auction starting from some previous 

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round, or cancel the auction in its 

entirety. Network interruption may 

cause the Bureaus to delay or suspend 

the auction. The Bureaus emphasize 

that exercise of this authority is solely 

within the discretion of the Bureaus, 

and its use is not intended to be a 

substitute for situations in which 

bidders may wish to apply their activity 

rule waivers. The Bureaus seek 

comment on this proposal. 

B. Auction Procedures 

i. Upfront Payments and Bidding 

Eligibility 

15. For Auction 91, the Bureau 

proposes to make the upfront payments 

equal to the minimum opening bids. 

The specific upfront payments for each 

license are listed in Attachment A of the 

Auction 91 Comment Public Notice. The 

Bureau seeks comment on this proposal. 

16. The Bureaus further propose that 

the amount of the upfront payment 

submitted by a bidder will determine 

the bidder’s initial bidding eligibility in 

bidding units. The Bureaus propose that 

each construction permit be assigned a 

specific number of bidding units equal 

to the upfront payment listed in 

Attachment A of the Auction 91 

Comment Public Notice, on a bidding 

unit per dollar basis. The number of 

bidding units for a given construction 

permit is fixed and does not change 

during the auction as prices change. A 

bidder may place bids on multiple 

construction permits, provided that the 

total number of bidding units associated 

with those construction permits does 

not exceed the bidder’s current 

eligibility. 

17. Eligibility cannot be increased 

during the auction; it can only remain 

the same or decrease. Thus, in 

calculating its upfront payment amount 

and hence its initial bidding eligibility, 

an applicant must determine the 

maximum number of bidding units on 

which it may wish to bid (or hold 

provisionally winning bids) in any 

single round, and submit an upfront 

payment amount covering that total 

number of bidding units. Provisionally 

winning bids are bids that would 

become final winning bids if the auction 

were to close in that given round. The 

Bureaus request comment on these 

proposals. 

ii. Activity Rule 

18. In order to ensure that the auction 

closes within a reasonable period of 

time, an activity rule requires bidders to 

bid actively throughout the auction, 

rather than wait until late in the auction 

before participating. A bidder’s activity 

in a round will be the sum of the 

bidding units associated with any 

construction permits upon which it 

places bids during the current round 

and the bidding units associated with 

any construction permits for which it 

holds provisionally winning bids. 

Failure to maintain the requisite activity 

level will result in the use of an activity 

rule waiver, if any remain, or a 

reduction in the bidder’s eligibility, 

possibly curtailing or eliminating the 

bidder’s ability to place additional bids 

in the auction. The Bureaus seek 

comment on this proposal. 

19. The Bureaus propose to divide the 

auction into at least two stages, each 

characterized by a different activity 

requirement. The auction will start in 

Stage One. The Bureaus propose to 

advance the auction to the next stage by 

announcement during the auction. In 

exercising this discretion, the Bureaus 

will consider a variety of measures of 

auction activity, including but not 

limited to the percentage of licenses (as 

measured in bidding units) on which 

there are new bids, the number of new 

bids, and the increase in revenue. The 

Bureaus seek comment on these 

proposals. 

20. The Bureaus propose the 

following activity requirements, while 

noting again that the Bureaus retain the 

discretion to change stages unilaterally 

by announcement during the auction. In 

each round of the first stage of the 

auction (Stage One), a bidder desiring to 

maintain its current bidding eligibility 

is required to be active on licenses 

representing at least 75 percent of its 

current bidding eligibility. Failure to 

maintain the required activity level will 

result in the use of an activity rule 

waiver or a reduction in the bidder’s 

bidding eligibility for the next round of 

bidding. During Stage One, a bidder’s 

reduced eligibility for the next round 

will be calculated by multiplying the 

bidder’s current round activity by fourthirds (4⁄3). In each round of the second 

stage (Stage Two), a bidder desiring to 

maintain its current bidding eligibility 

is required to be active on 95 percent of 

its current bidding eligibility. Failure to 

maintain the required activity level will 

result in the use of an activity rule 

waiver or a reduction in the bidder’s 

bidding eligibility for the next round of 

bidding. During Stage Two, a bidder’s 

reduced eligibility for the next round 

will be calculated by multiplying the 

bidder’s current round activity by 

twenty-nineteenths (20⁄19). 

21. The Bureaus request comment on 

these activity requirements. Under this 

proposal, the Bureaus will retain the 

discretion to change the activity 

requirements during the auction. For 

example, the Bureaus could decide to 

add an additional stage with a higher 

activity requirement, not to transition to 

Stage Two if they believe the auction is 

progressing satisfactorily under the 

Stage One activity requirement, or to 

transition to Stage Two with an activity 

requirement that is higher or lower than 

the 95 percent proposed herein. If the 

Bureaus exercise this discretion, they 

will alert bidders by announcement in 

the FCC Auction System. 

iii. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing 

Eligibility 

22. Use of an activity rule waiver 

preserves the bidder’s eligibility despite 

the bidder’s activity in the current 

round being below the required 

minimum level. An activity rule waiver 

applies to an entire round of bidding, 

not to a particular construction permit. 

Activity rule waivers can be either 

proactive or automatic and are 

principally a mechanism for auction 

participants to avoid the loss of bidding 

eligibility in the event that exigent 

circumstances prevent them from 

bidding in a particular round. 

23. The FCC Auction System assumes 

that a bidder that does not meet the 

activity requirement would prefer to use 

an activity rule waiver (if available) 

rather than lose bidding eligibility. 

Therefore, the system will automatically 

apply a waiver at the end of any bidding 

round in which a bidder’s activity level 

is below the minimum required unless: 

(1) The bidder has no activity rule 

waivers remaining; or (2) the bidder 

overrides the automatic application of a 

waiver by reducing eligibility, thereby 

meeting the activity requirement. If a 

bidder has no waivers remaining and 

does not satisfy the required activity 

level, its current eligibility will be 

permanently reduced, possibly 

curtailing or eliminating the bidder’s 

ability to place additional bids in the 

auction. 

24. A bidder with insufficient activity 

may wish to reduce its bidding 

eligibility rather than use an activity 

rule waiver. If so, the bidder must 

affirmatively override the automatic 

waiver mechanism during the bidding 

round by using the reduce eligibility 

function in the FCC Auction System. In 

this case, the bidder’s eligibility is 

permanently reduced to bring the bidder 

into compliance with the activity rule. 

Reducing eligibility is an irreversible 

action; once eligibility has been 

reduced, a bidder will not be permitted 

to regain its lost bidding eligibility, even 

if the round has not yet closed. 

25. Under the proposed simultaneous 

stopping rule, a bidder may apply an 

activity rule waiver proactively as a 

means to keep the auction open without 

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placing a bid. If a bidder proactively 

applies an activity rule waiver (using 

the apply waiver function in the FCC 

Auction System) during a bidding round 

in which no bids are placed or 

withdrawn (if bid withdrawals are 

permitted in this auction), the auction 

will remain open and the bidder’s 

eligibility will be preserved. An 

automatic waiver applied by the FCC 

Auction System in a round in which 

there are no new bids, withdrawals (if 

bid withdrawals are permitted in this 

auction), or proactive waivers will not 

keep the auction open. A bidder cannot 

apply a proactive waiver after bidding 

in a round, and applying a proactive 

waiver will preclude a bidder from 

placing any bids in that round. 

Applying a waiver is irreversible; once 

a proactive waiver is submitted, that 

waiver cannot be unsubmitted, even if 

the round has not yet closed. 

26. The Bureaus propose that each 

bidder in Auction 91 be provided with 

three activity rule waivers that may be 

used as set forth above at the bidder’s 

discretion during the course of the 

auction. The Bureaus seek comment on 

this proposal. 

iv. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening 

Bids 

27. A reserve price is an absolute 

minimum price below which an item 

will not be sold in a given auction. 

Reserve prices can be either published 

or unpublished. A minimum opening 

bid, on the other hand, is the minimum 

bid price set at the beginning of the 

auction below which no bids are 

accepted. It is generally used to 

accelerate the competitive bidding 

process. It is possible for the minimum 

opening bid and the reserve price to be 

the same amount. 

28. The Bureaus propose to establish 

minimum opening bid amounts for 

Auction 91. The Bureaus believe a 

minimum opening bid amount, which 

has been used in other broadcast 

auctions, is an effective bidding tool for 

accelerating the competitive bidding 

process. The Bureaus do not propose to 

establish a separate reserve price for the 

construction permits to be offered in 

Auction 91. 

29. For Auction 91, the Bureaus 

propose minimum opening bid amounts 

determined by taking into account the 

type of service and class of facility 

offered, market size, population covered 

by the proposed broadcast facility, and 

recent broadcast transaction data. The 

proposed minimum opening bid amount 

for each construction permit available in 

Auction 91 is set forth in Attachment A 

of the Auction 91 Comment Public 

Notice. The Bureaus seek comment on 

these proposals. 

30. If commenters believe that these 

minimum opening bid amounts will 

result in unsold construction permits, 

are not reasonable amounts, or should 

instead operate as reserve prices, they 

should explain why this is so and 

comment on the desirability of an 

alternative approach. Commenters are 

advised to support their claims with 

valuation analyses and suggested 

amounts or formulas for reserve prices 

or minimum opening bids. In 

establishing the minimum opening bid 

amounts, the Bureaus particularly seek 

comment on factors that could 

reasonably have an impact on valuation 

of the broadcast spectrum, including the 

type of service and class of facility 

offered, market size, population covered 

by the proposed FM broadcast facility 

and any other relevant factors. 

v. Bid Amounts 

31. The Bureaus propose that, in each 

round, eligible bidders be able to place 

a bid on a given construction permit in 

any of up to nine different amounts. 

Under this proposal, the FCC Auction 

System interface will list the acceptable 

bid amounts for each construction 

permit. 

32. For Auction 91, the Bureaus 

propose to use a minimum acceptable 

bid percentage of 10 percent. This 

means that the minimum acceptable bid 

amount for a construction permit will be 

approximately 10 percent greater than 

the provisionally winning bid amount 

for the construction permit. To calculate 

the additional acceptable bid amounts, 

the Bureaus propose to use a bid 

increment percentage of 5 percent. 

33. The Bureaus retain the discretion 

to change the minimum acceptable bid 

amounts, the minimum acceptable bid 

percentage, the bid increment 

percentage, and the number of 

acceptable bid amounts if the Bureaus 

determine that circumstances so dictate. 

Further, the Bureaus retain the 

discretion to do so on a construction 

permit-by-construction permit basis. 

The Bureaus also retain the discretion to 

limit (a) the amount by which a 

minimum acceptable bid for a 

construction permit may increase 

compared with the corresponding 

provisionally winning bid, and (b) the 

amount by which an additional bid 

amount may increase compared with 

the immediately preceding acceptable 

bid amount. For example, the Bureaus 

could set a $10,000 limit on increases in 

minimum acceptable bid amounts over 

provisionally winning bids. Thus, if 

calculating a minimum acceptable bid 

using the minimum acceptable bid 

percentage results in a minimum 

acceptable bid amount that is $12,000 

higher than the provisionally winning 

bid on a construction permit, the 

minimum acceptable bid amount would 

instead be capped at $10,000 above the 

provisionally winning bid. The Bureaus 

seek comment on the circumstances 

under which the Bureaus should 

employ such a limit, factors the Bureaus 

should consider when determining the 

dollar amount of the limit, and the 

tradeoffs in setting such a limit or 

changing other parameters, such as 

changing the minimum acceptable bid 

percentage, the bid increment 

percentage, or the number of acceptable 

bid amounts. If the Bureaus exercise this 

discretion, they will alert bidders by 

announcement in the FCC Auction 

System during the auction. The Bureaus 

seek comment on these proposals. 

vi. Provisionally Winning Bids 

34. Provisionally winning bids are 

bids that would become final winning 

bids if the auction were to close in that 

given round. At the end of a bidding 

round, a provisionally winning bid for 

each construction permit will be 

determined based on the highest bid 

amount received for the construction 

permit. In the event of identical high bid 

amounts being submitted on a 

construction permit in a given round 

(i.e., tied bids), the Bureaus will use a 

random number generator to select a 

single provisionally winning bid from 

among the tied bids. (Each bid is 

assigned a random number, and the tied 

bid with the highest random number 

wins the tiebreaker.) The remaining 

bidders, as well as the provisionally 

winning bidder, can submit higher bids 

in subsequent rounds. However, if the 

auction were to end with no other bids 

being placed, the winning bidder would 

be the one that placed the provisionally 

winning bid. If any bids are received on 

the construction permit in a subsequent 

round, the provisionally winning bid 

again will be determined by the highest 

bid amount received for the 

construction permit. 

35. A provisionally winning bid will 

remain the provisionally winning bid 

until there is a higher bid on the 

construction permit at the close of a 

subsequent round, unless the 

provisionally winning bid is withdrawn. 

Bidders are reminded that provisionally 

winning bids count toward activity for 

purposes of the activity rule. 

vii. Bid Removal and Bid Withdrawal 

36. For Auction 91, the Bureaus 

propose and seek comment on the 

following bid removal procedures. 

Before the close of a bidding round, a 

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bidder has the option of removing any 

bid placed in that round. By removing 

selected bids in the FCC Auction 

System, a bidder may effectively undo 

any bid placed within that round. In 

contrast to the bid withdrawal 

provisions a bidder removing a bid 

placed in the same round is not subject 

to a withdrawal payment. Once a round 

closes, a bidder may no longer remove 

a bid. 

37. The Bureaus also seek comment 

on whether bid withdrawals should be 

permitted in Auction 90. When 

permitted in an auction, bid 

withdrawals provide a bidder with the 

option of withdrawing bids placed in 

prior rounds that have become 

provisionally winning bids. A bidder 

may withdraw its provisionally winning 

bids using the withdraw bids function 

in the FCC Auction System. A bidder 

that withdraws its provisionally 

winning bid(s), if permitted, is subject 

to the bid withdrawal payment 

provisions of the Commission rules. 

38. For Auction 91 the Bureaus 

propose to prohibit bidders from 

withdrawing any bids after the round in 

which bids were placed has closed. This 

proposal is made in recognition of the 

site-specific nature and wide geographic 

dispersion of the permits available in 

this auction which suggests that 

potential applicants for this auction may 

have fewer incentives to aggregate 

permits through the auction process (as 

compared with bidders in many 

auctions of wireless licenses). The 

Bureaus are also mindful that bid 

withdrawals, particularly those made 

late in this auction, could result in 

delays in licensing new FM stations and 

attendant delays in the offering of new 

broadcast service to the public. The 

Bureaus seek comment on this 

approach. 

C. Post-Auction Payments 

i. Interim Withdrawal Payment 

Percentage 

39. In the event that the Bureaus 

allow bid withdrawals in Auction 91, 

the Bureaus propose that the interim bid 

withdrawal payment be 20 percent of 

the withdrawn bid. A bidder that 

withdraws a bid during an auction is 

subject to a withdrawal payment equal 

to the difference between the amount of 

the withdrawn bid and the amount of 

the winning bid in the same or a 

subsequent auction. If a construction 

permit for which a bid has been 

withdrawn does not receive a 

subsequent higher bid or winning bid in 

the same auction, the final withdrawal 

payment cannot be calculated until a 

corresponding construction permit 

receives a higher bid or winning bid in 

a subsequent auction. When that final 

payment cannot yet be calculated, the 

bidder responsible for the withdrawn 

bid is assessed an interim bid 

withdrawal payment, which will be 

applied toward any final bid withdrawal 

payment that is ultimately assessed. 

40. The amount of the interim bid 

withdrawal payment may range from 

three percent to 20 percent of the 

withdrawn bid amount, with the 

percentage generally being higher where 

there is greater risk of bid withdrawals 

being used for anti-competitive 

purposes, such as when there is little 

need for bidders to aggregate permits. 

The Bureaus therefore believe that the 

maximum interim bid withdrawal 

payment percentage allowed by 47 CFR 

1.2104(g)(1) is justified, in the event bid 

withdrawals are allowed. Commenters 

advocating the use of bid withdrawals 

should also address the percentage of 

the interim bid withdrawal payment. 

ii. Additional Default Payment 

Percentage 

41. Any winning bidder that defaults 

or is disqualified after the close of an 

auction (i.e., fails to remit the required 

down payment within the prescribed 

period of time, fails to submit a timely 

long-form application, fails to make full 

payment, or is otherwise disqualified) is 

liable for a default payment under 47 

CFR 1.2104(g)(2). This payment consists 

of a deficiency payment, equal to the 

difference between the amount of the 

bidder’s bid and the amount of the 

winning bid the next time a 

construction permit covering the same 

spectrum is won in an auction, plus an 

additional payment equal to a 

percentage of the defaulter’s bid or of 

the subsequent winning bid, whichever 

is less. 

42. The Commission’s rules provide 

that, in advance of each auction, a 

percentage shall be established between 

three percent and twenty percent of the 

applicable bid to be assessed as an 

additional default payment. As the 

Commission has indicated, the level of 

this payment in each case will be based 

on the nature of the service and the 

construction permits being offered. 

43. For Auction 91, the Bureaus 

propose to establish an additional 

default payment of twenty percent. As 

previously noted by the Commission, 

defaults weaken the integrity of the 

auction process and may impede the 

deployment of service to the public, and 

an additional default payment of more 

than the previous three percent will be 

more effective in deterring defaults. In 

light of these considerations for Auction 

91, the Bureaus propose an additional 

default payment of twenty percent of 

the relevant bid. The Bureaus seek 

comment on this proposal. 

V. Deadlines and Filing Procedures 

44. Comments are due on or before 

October 13, 2010, and reply comments 

are due on or before October 27, 2010. 

All filings related to procedures for 

Auction 91 must refer to AU Docket No. 

10–183. Comments may be submitted 

using the Commission’s Electronic 

Comment Filing System or by filing 

paper copies. The Bureaus strongly 

encourage interested parties to file 

comments electronically. 

45. This proceeding has been 

designated as a permit-but-disclose 

proceeding in accordance with the 

Commission’s ex parte rules. Persons 

making oral ex parte presentations are 

reminded that memoranda summarizing 

the presentations must contain 

summaries of the substance of the 

presentations and not merely a listing of 

the subjects discussed. More than a one 

or two sentence description of the views 

and arguments presented is generally 

required. Other rules pertaining to oral 

and written ex parte presentations in 

permit-but-disclose proceedings are set 

forth in 47 CFR 1.1206(b). 

Federal Communications Commission. 

Gary D. Michaels, 

Deputy Chief, Auctions and Spectrum Access 

Division, WTB. 

[FR Doc. 2010–25195 Filed 10–5–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P 

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 

COMMISSION 

[IB Docket No. 04–286; DA 10–1884] 

Sixth Meeting of the Advisory 

Committee for the 2012 World 

Radiocommunication Conference 

AGENCY: Federal Communications 

Commission. 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: In accordance with the 

Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 

amended, this notice advises interested 

persons that the sixth meeting of the 

WRC–12 Advisory Committee will be 

held at the Federal Communications 

Commission. The purpose of the 

meeting is to continue preparations for 

the 2012 World Radiocommunication 

Conference. The WRC–12 Advisory 

Committee will consider any 

preliminary views and draft proposals 

introduced by the WRC–12 Advisory 

Committee’s Informal Working Groups. 

DATES: October 26, 2010, 11 a.m. to 12 

noon. 

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