Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack,

 Chief Justice

David F. Viviano,

Chief Justice Pro Tem

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh,

Justices

Order 

December 30, 2020

160150

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v SC: 160150

COA: 339668 

Ionia CC: 2015-031675-AR

ANTHONY MICHAEL OWEN,

Defendant-Appellee. 

_________________________________________/

On November 12, 2020, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave 

to appeal the July 23, 2019 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the 

application is again considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the 

question presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

ZAHRA, J. (dissenting). 

I dissent from the Court’s denial of leave. In my view, the Court of Appeals 

clearly erred by concluding that the arresting deputy sheriff made an unreasonable 

mistake of law regarding the applicable speed limit that justified the traffic stop of the 

defendant’s vehicle. The Court of Appeals failed to assess this case from the objective 

perspective of the deputy. I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 

reinstate the judgment of the circuit court, which ruled that the deputy’s actions were 

objectively reasonable and highlighted the absence of any indicia of bad faith on the 

deputy’s part. 

In 2015, defendant was stopped by a deputy of the Ionia County Sheriff’s 

Department for speeding on southbound Parsonage Road while driving at 43 miles per 

hour; evidence obtained as a result of the stop resulted in his arrest for operating a vehicle 

while visibly impaired, MCL 257.625(3), and being a concealed pistol licensee in the 

possession of a firearm while intoxicated, MCL 28.425k(2). 

At that time, the vicinity of the road at which defendant was stopped displayed no 

southbound-posted speed limit, but there was a northbound-posted speed limit of 25 

miles per hour. The 25-miles-per-hour sign was not legally posted, according to the 

circuit court. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and I accept the premise that the legal 

speed limit—both northbound and southbound—was 55 miles per hour, and that 

defendant was driving slower than 55 miles per hour when he was stopped. The sole 

issue here, accepting the above premise, is whether the traffic stop violated the Fourth 

Amendment.
I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 December 30, 2020 

t1229

2

Clerk

“A traffic stop for a suspected violation of law is a ‘seizure’ of the occupants of 

the vehicle and therefore must be conducted in accordance with the Fourth 

Amendment.”1 Such a “seizure[] based on mistakes of fact can be reasonable.”2 

Similarly, such a seizure “can rest on a mistaken understanding of the scope of a legal 

prohibition.”3 However, “the Fourth Amendment tolerates only reasonable mistakes, and 

those mistakes—whether of fact or of law—must be objectively reasonable.”4 In my 

view, it was objectively reasonable for an officer in the deputy sheriff’s position to 

believe that: (a) the applicable speed limit was 25 miles per hour on northbound 

Parsonage Road by the explicit posting of such a limit; (b) there was no distinctive traffic, 

safety, or other signage of southbound Parsonage Road compared to northbound 

Parsonage Road; and (c) the applicable speed limit statutes in effect at the time, MCL 

257.627, MCL 257.628, and MCL 257.629,5reflect a single speed limit for a particular 

“highway segment[]” or “highway[],” as those terms may reasonably be understood as 

contemplating that lanes of travel on a single highway extend in both directions of the 

highway, and if not otherwise signaled, the speed limit would be the same in both 

directions. Accordingly, although he was mistaken, it was objectively reasonable for the 

deputy sheriff to have surmised that the applicable speed limit was 25 miles per hour on 

southbound Parsonage Road and to therefore stop defendant on the basis of that 

understanding. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from our order denying leave to 

appeal. I would instead reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate 

defendant’s convictions and sentences.

MARKMAN and VIVIANO, JJ., join the statement of ZAHRA, J.

 

1 Heien v North Carolina, 574 US 54, 60 (2014). 

2

Id. at 61. 

3

Id. at 60. 

4

Id. at 66. 

5 This section has since been repealed. See 2016 PA 445.