Filed 2/1/21 (unmodified opinion attached)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

NICOLE NAGEL ET AL.,

 Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

TRACY A. WESTEN ET AL.,

 Defendants and Respondents.

2d Civil No. B300552

(Super. Ct. No. 15CV01178)

(Santa Barbara County)

ORDER DENYING PETITION 

FOR REHEARING AND 

MODIFYING OPINION

(No Change in Judgment)

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on January 7, 

2021, be modified as set forth below: 

1. On page 1, the second sentence in the first paragraph is 

modified to read as follows: They sold it to appellants Nicole 

Nagel and “ESY Investments” (Nagel) in 2011 for $4.12 million. 

2. On page 1 and 2, the second sentence in the second 

paragraph is modified to read as follows: It awarded Nagel over 

$4.5 million for the loss of the home, which it held added no value 

to the land on which it stands. 
2

3. On page 2, the second sentence in the first full 

paragraph is modified to read as follows: By the time ensuing 

and relatively fruitless efforts at collection were undertaken, 

Sellers had allegedly sent the bulk of their assets out of 

California including applying the proceeds of the sale to an 

expensive home in Texas to take advantage of that state’s 

unlimited homestead exemption; and, with aid and counsel of 

Tracy Westen’s siblings, placing additional assets in a variety of 

funds, annuities and investments in Nevada and Minnesota.

No change in judgment. 

Appellants’ petition for rehearing is denied. 

GILBERT, P.J. YEGAN, J. PERREN, J.
Filed 1/7/21 (unmodified opinion)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

NICOLE NAGEL et al.,

 Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

TRACY A. WESTEN et al.,

 Defendants and Respondents.

2d Civil No. B300552

(Super. Ct. No. 15CV01178)

(Santa Barbara County)

In the early 1990’s, Tracy Westen and Linda Lawson 

(Sellers) built and lived in an architecturally significant home in 

the Brentwood area of West Los Angeles. They sold it to 

appellants Nicole Nagel and “ESY Investments” (Nagel) in 2011 

for $2.2 million. Shortly after the sale Nagel learned that over 

the 19 years Sellers owned the home it had suffered extensive 

water intrusion, that Sellers knew this and that the home was 

uninhabitable despite Nagel's best efforts to repair and to save it. 

Nagel sued.

In the ensuing arbitration, the arbitrator found that Sellers 

had failed to disclose material facts regarding the water damage, 

that the house was worthless and its only value was the land. It 
2

awarded Nagel over $4.5 million for the loss of the home, the 

futile efforts to repair it, plus attorney fees and costs. This, 

however, was just the beginning, not the end of the litigation. 

As the arbitration was winding down, the likely result 

became clear to Sellers. By the time ensuing and relatively 

fruitless efforts at collection were undertaken, Sellers had sent 

the bulk of their assets out of California including applying the 

proceeds of the sale to an expensive home in Texas to take 

advantage of that state’s unlimited homestead exemption; and, 

with aid and counsel of Tracy Westen’s siblings, masking 

additional assets in a variety of funds, annuities and investments 

in Nevada and Minnesota. 

This appeal is from a subsequent lawsuit filed by Nagel to 

unwind these transfers under the Uniform Voidable Transactions 

Act (UVTA). (Civil Code, § 3439 et seq.)1 The action was 

dismissed, however, because Nagel could not identify a “thirdparty transferee” who received Westen and Lawson’s assets; or as 

respondents describe it, “a meritless attempt to raid deeper 

pockets.” The Court reasoned that no transfer had occurred 

when Westen and Lawson simply converted their assets from 

non-exempt to exempt but did not relinquish ownership or 

control. 

The order dismissing the case is reversed in part and 

affirmed in part. We reverse the order to the extent it dismissed 

plaintiffs’ causes of action for statutory fraudulent transfer and 

the companion claims for conspiracy and aiding and abetting. We 

1 Unlabeled statutory references in this opinion are to the

Civil Code.
3

affirm the order’s dismissing of plaintiff’s common law cause of 

action for fraudulent transfer. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Nagel bought the Brentwood house of Westen and Lawson

in 2011. Westen and Lawson had commissioned Los Angelesbased Eric Owen Moss, a renowned avant-garde architect, to 

design the structure in the early 1990s. It served as the couple’s 

primary residence until the sale. 

Nagel later discovered pervasive mold and structural 

damage caused by long term water intrusion. An arbitrator 

awarded her over $4.5 million for repairs, attorney’s fees, costs, 

and interest. The Los Angeles Superior Court confirmed the 

award and entered judgment against Westen and Lawson.2 

In the instant matter, Nagel alleges Lawson and Westen

enlisted Westen’s brothers, attorneys Derek and Peter Westen, to 

help them design and implement an “Asset Protection plan” when 

it became apparent the arbitrator would rule in Nagel’s favor. 

The plan had three components. First, they converted 

respondent Westen Family Group, LLC (“WFG”), of which 

Lawson and Westen held a 20.7 percent membership interest, 

from a California LLC into a Nevada LLC. Second, they placed a 

portion of the Brentwood sale proceeds into an annuity. Third, 

they bought a house in Texas and improved it with the balance of 

their sale proceeds. Nagel further alleges Lawson and Westen

promptly moved to Texas upon receiving the arbitrator’s 

preliminary award so they could invoke the state’s unlimited 

2 Nicole Nagel et al v. Tracy A. Westen et al. (Super. Ct. Los 

Angeles County, 2013, No. SS023693).
4

homestead exemption to shield the new house and annuity from 

creditors. 

Nagel filed this action when she learned about these asset 

protection measures. She named Lawson and Westen as 

defendants along with Derek Westen, Peter Westen, WFG, and 

two Westen family trusts. Her first amended complaint included 

three causes of action at issue here: (1) to set aside fraudulent 

transfer of assets under both the UVTA3 and common law (as to 

WFG only); (2) civil conspiracy (as to all parties); and (3) aiding 

and abetting (as to Derek Westen, Peter Westen, WFG, and the 

family trusts).4 Nagel sought to annul the transfers and to 

restrain Lawson and Westen from disposing of their assets, 

among other remedies. 

Nearly four years of pleading challenges, discovery 

disputes, and law and motion proceedings followed. Nagel 

supplemented her complaint with allegations about post-filing 

conduct, including Lawson’s and Westen’s petitioning for 

bankruptcy in Texas.5 A sojourn to Minnesota courts yielded 

3 Nagel pleaded her claim under the UVTA’s former title, 

the “Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act” or “UFTA.” The 

Legislature retitled the UFTA as the UVTA effective January 1, 

2016. We use the current title throughout this opinion.

4 Nagel dismissed her fourth cause of action for imposition 

of constructive trust.

5 We granted the request of respondents WFG, Derek 

Westen, Peter Westen, and both Westen trusts for judicial notice 

of Lawson’s and Westen’s order of discharge in bankruptcy, 

among other materials. (In re Tracy A. Westen and Linda 

Lawson, No. 17-40030 (E.D.Tex. Jan. 3, 2017.) We take judicial 

notice on our own motion of the bankruptcy court’s order dated 
5

partial satisfaction of the arbitration award when Nagel collected 

the proceeds of the couple’s annuity. She also obtained a charge 

order directing WFG to direct the couple’s share of membership 

proceeds to her. This brought the Texas house purchase to center 

stage as trial approached. 

The trial court received 42 motions in limine and competing 

versions of nearly all pre-trial filings, including witness lists, 

verdict forms, and jury instructions. It heard argument in the 

course of conducting nine pre-trial conferences over a two month 

period. The instructions for Nagel’s first cause of action for 

fraudulent transfer, particularly CACI 4200, “Actual Intent to 

Hinder, Delay, or Defraud a Creditor,” were hotly contested. 

Nagel proposed modifying CACI 4200 to include not just 

third-party transfers but any transaction intended to evade 

creditors. Defining “transfer” more broadly, she argued, was 

“entirely harmonious with the premise of fraudulent transfer 

theory under California common law and as reflected in its 

statutory embodiment.” WFG and Derek Westen proposed CACI 

4200 in its standard configuration. Their version instructed the 

jury to decide whether Lawson and Tracy Westen “transferred 

the property [to WFG] with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud 

one or more of their creditors.” They argued Nagel could not 

maintain a cause of action for fraudulent transfer without 

identifying a third party transferee who received their assets. 

Defining internal asset shifts like a house purchase for one’s self 

as actionable transfers, they contended, strayed far beyond the 

UVTA and what little case law informed the issue. The court 

September 18, 2017 granting Nagel’s motion for relief from 

automatic stay to continue the case giving rise to this appeal.
6

invited the parties to offer modifications to CACI 4200 and other 

4200-series instructions to better reflect the current state of law. 

Shortly after this pre-trial conference, Nagel sought to 

amend her first amended complaint by adding Lawson and 

Westen as defendants to her first cause of action for fraudulent 

transfer. She described the amendment as correcting a “labeling 

oversight.” The couple would suffer no prejudice, she reasoned, 

because her prior pleading clearly described their role in the 

scheme. In opposition, Lawson and Westen described the 

proposed amendment as a belated about-face with a profound 

conceptual flaw – the couple would need to wear the hats of both 

“transferor” and “transferee” of their own assets at trial. 

At the final pre-trial conference, the trial court said it had 

not yet decided the third-party transferee issue. The court told 

the parties it would consider supplemental briefing and directed 

them to return a week later prepared to select a jury. The parties 

promptly submitted briefs reiterating their positions. 

The court issued a tentative ruling the day before trial 

denying leave to amend. It found Nagel could not maintain a 

cause of action under the UVTA against Lawson and Westen 

without identifying a third party transferee who benefitted from 

the debtor’s transfer. While their establishing a Texas 

homestead affected Nagel’s ability to enforce her judgment, the 

court reasoned, the purchase did not convey assets to a third 

party or otherwise alter the couple’s rights with respect to their 

property. It refrained from deciding whether a common law 

cause of action existed because Nagel could not articulate its 

elements or explain how to instruct the jury on such a claim. 

The parties appeared for trial the next day. Nagel’s counsel 

explained how the court’s tentative ruling would eliminate a 
7

critical component of his client’s case and leave little incentive to 

proceed with trial if adopted. He requested a stay to seek writ 

relief of the third-party transferee issue as a matter of first 

impression in California. The court expressed concern that writ 

review would result in a “postcard” denial and leave the case in 

the same position four or five weeks later. Defendants shared 

this concern. After a brief recess, WFG and Derek Westen moved 

to dismiss on the grounds they, like Lawson and Westen, could 

not face liability under the UVTA in the absence of an actionable 

transfer. Peter Westen joined the motion. The court granted it 

as both a common law motion for judgment on the pleadings and 

a dispositive motion in limine. In addition, it granted a separate 

motion in limine filed by Lawson and Westen to preclude all 

evidence relating to Nagel’s first cause of action for fraudulent 

transfer. 

The clerk entered an order dismissing the entire action on 

July 9, 2019. Nagel appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review the first amended complaint de novo, assuming 

the truth of all factual allegations, “‘to determine whether it 

alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal 

theory.’” (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County 

Bd. of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42.) We review the trial 

court’s rulings on the pre-trial motions for abuse of discretion. 

(Freeny v. City of San Buenaventura (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 

1333, 1339; Piedra v. Dugan (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1493.)

B. The Uniform Voidable Transactions Act

The UVTA is a contemporary retooling of the common law 

remedies available to unsecured creditors seeking payment from 
8

debtors who evade collection. (See Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 

Cal.App.5th 811, 817 [“The purpose of the UVTA is to prevent 

debtors from placing, beyond the reach of creditors, property that 

should be made available to satisfy a debt”].) Originally enacted 

as the “Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act” in 1986, its retitling in 

2016 reflected the Legislature’s intent to “reduce misconceptions 

that the law requires proof of fraudulent intent.” (Sen. Com. on 

Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill. No. 161 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) p. 

2.) Little else changed in substance. (See § 3439.14, subd. (d) 

[“The provisions of this chapter, insofar as they are substantially 

the same as the provisions of this chapter in effect on December 

31, 2015, shall be construed as restatements and continuations, 

and not as new enactments”].)

The UVTA provides a variety of tools to achieve its ends. 

For example, the court may void a transfer of assets, attach 

assets, or employ equitable remedies such as injunctive relief or 

receivership. (§ 3439.07.) A creditor may also supplement the 

UVTA’s remedies with any others available at law or in equity. 

(§ 3439.12 [“Unless displaced by the provisions of this chapter, 

the principles of law and equity, . . . supplement its provisions”].) 

The UVTA enumerates eleven characteristics or “‘badges of 

fraud’” to help the trier of fact discern when a debtor has crossed 

the often blurry line between legitimate asset protection planning 

and voidable maneuvering. (PGA West Residential Assn., Inc. v. 

Hulven Internat., Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 156, 174 (PGA West); 

§ 3439.04, subd. (b).)

C. Nagel Stated a Cause of Action for Fraudulent Transfer 

Under the Plain Language of the UVTA

Nagel alleges respondents’ asset protection efforts bear the 

hallmarks of a fraudulent transfer. We are, however, confronted 
9

with a narrower and more foundational question – did a 

“transfer” under the UVTA occur in the first place? Specifically, 

do Nagel’s allegations give rise to a cause of action for fraudulent 

transfer if Lawson and Westen, in essence, transferred assets to 

themselves? We look to the UVTA’s text for our answer. (See 

Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1113, 1119 [a 

statute’s words “‘“‘generally provide the most reliable indicator of 

legislative intent’”’”]; Estate of Griswold (2001) 25 Cal.4th 904, 

910 [“In statutory construction cases, our fundamental task is to 

ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the 

purpose of the statute”].) “‘“We give the words their usual and 

ordinary meaning [citation], while construing them in light of the 

statute as a whole and the statute’s purpose [citation].”’” (Ceja, 

at p. 1119, quoting Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc. (2011) 

51 Cal.4th 524, 529-530.) “‘“‘If there is no ambiguity in the 

language, we presume the Legislature meant what it said and 

the plain meaning of the statute governs.’”’” (Ceja, at p. 1119 

quoting In re Ethan C. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 610, 627.)

“‘In order for a fraudulent transfer to occur, among other 

things, there must be a transfer of an asset as defined in the 

UFTA.’” (PGA West, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 169, quoting 

Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. v. Schroeder (2009) 179 

Cal.App.4th 834, 841.) “‘Transfer’ under the [UVTA] has a broad 

meaning.” (Sturm v. Moyer (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 299, 308.) The 

term is defined as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or 

conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting 

with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of 

money, release, lease, license, and creation of a lien or other 

encumbrance.” (§ 3439.01, subd. (m).) The law defines “‘[a]sset’” 

broadly as well. An asset includes the “property of a debtor” with 
10

just three exceptions: (1) property encumbered by a valid lien; (2) 

property exempt under nonbankruptcy law; and (3) property held 

in tenancy in the entireties “to the extent it is not subject to 

process by a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant.” 

(§ 3439.01, subd. (a).) The UVTA uses the term “transferee” 

throughout its text but does not define it. (E.g., §§ 3439.06 to 

3439.08.)

The first amended complaint alleges Lawson and Westen 

moved their personal belongings and financial assets, including a 

portion of the Brentwood sale proceeds, to a foreign jurisdiction. 

It further alleges they used the Brentwood sale proceeds to buy 

and improve foreign real estate for the purpose of shrinking the 

corpus of assets available for collection. We hold that under the 

UVTA, physically relocating personal property and transmitting 

or transporting sale proceeds out of state, then transmuting them 

into a different legal form, may constitute a direct or indirect 

mode of parting with assets or one’s interest in those assets. As 

such, Nagel adequately alleged a “transfer” under the UVTA. In 

this posture the trier of fact must now determine if grantor’s title 

is but, “a mere cloak under which is hidden the hideous skeleton 

of deceit . . . .”6

The issue as framed is a matter of first impression. (See 

Renda v. Nevarez (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1231, 1236, italics 

omitted [“Although these cases suggest the UFTA does not 

authorize entry of a money judgment against a debtor under any 

circumstances, we need not (and do not) decide that broad issue 

to resolve this appeal”].) We recognize most authorities concern 

transactions in which a third party received the debtor’s assets. 

6 Cortez v. Vogt (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 917, 936.
11

We also note the term “‘third party’” embedded in high court dicta 

defining “fraudulent conveyance.” (See Kirkeby v. Superior Court

(2004) 33 Cal.4th 642, 648, quoting Yaesu Electronics Corp. v. 

Tamura (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 8, 13 [“‘A fraudulent conveyance is 

a transfer by the debtor of property to a third person undertaken 

with the intent to prevent a creditor from reaching that interest 

to satisfy its claim’”].) The existing landscape of authorities left 

the trial court few clear reference points. However, this did not 

warrant grafting a third-party transferee requirement onto a 

broad but plainly worded statute.

Reading the definition of “transfer” in context with other 

UVTA provisions leads us to the same conclusion. Section 

3439.04(b) anticipates imaginative debtors will employ an array 

of tactics to evade payment obligations. For example, the trier of 

fact may look to whether “the transfer or obligation was to an 

insider”; “the debtor retained possession or control of the property 

transferred after the transfer”; or “the debtor removed or 

concealed assets.” These badges of fraud indicate one’s liability 

under the UVTA is not contingent upon recruiting conspirators. 

It may include situations in which the debtor “parts” with 

property without alienating ownership rights or possession. 

Further, the UVTA does not limit its enforcement measures to 

third parties. (See § 3439.07, subd. (a)(3)(C) [creditor may obtain 

avoidance, injunctive relief, receivership, or “[a]ny other relief the 

circumstances may require”].) 

D. Limiting the UVTA to Third-Party Transfers Would Neither 

Conform to Legislative Intent nor Serve the Public’s Interest 

Resolving this appeal does not require us to look beyond the 

UVTA’s text. (See In re Ethan C. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 610, 627

[court turns to extrinsic aids “‘“[o]nly when the statute’s language 
12

is ambiguous or susceptible of more than one reasonable 

interpretation”’”].) If it did, however, we would again arrive at 

the same result.7

“[A] creditor-debtor relationship can alter an owner’s power 

over the property owned.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of 

Sen. Bill. No. 161 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) p. 2.) “Unsecured 

creditor-debtor relationships necessarily raise questions as to a 

creditor’s rights and remedies when the debtor manipulates 

property to defeat the creditor’s potential interest in that 

property.” (Ibid.) It is not surprising the UVTA defines the term 

“asset” not from the debtor’s perspective, but from that of a 

creditor with a potential interest in any property that could 

satisfy the underlying debt. (See, e.g., Yaesu Electronics Corp. v. 

Tamura, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at p. 13 [“a conveyance will not be 

considered fraudulent if the debtor merely transfers property 

which is otherwise exempt from liability for debts”]; Tassone v. 

Tovar (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 765, 769 [“The February 1986 

conveyance of the property by grant deed to appellant . . . did not 

affect respondents’ rights. Respondents were left in the same 

position as they were in before the conveyance: with no claim to 

the property.”].)

Nagel alleges Lawson and Westen transferred property 

during the closing stages of arbitration that otherwise would 

have been available to satisfy her judgment. Her interest had 

already arisen at the time of transfer. Creating a bright line 

7 Nagel requests judicial notice of the UFTA and UVTA as 

approved by the NCCUSL in 1984 and 2016, respectively, in 

addition to legislative history materials for Senate Bills 2150 

(1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) and 161 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.). We grant 

appellants’ request. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subds. (c) & (h), 453.)
13

“third-party transferee” requirement would allow debtors to 

unilaterally extinguish this interest, and, it follows, their UVTA 

liability, by simply manipulating an asset’s form or location 

without vesting legal title or ownership in a third party. This 

result would contravene the UVTA’s stated purpose: “to prevent 

debtors from placing, beyond the reach of creditors, property that 

should be made available to satisfy a debt.” (Chen v. Berenjian, 

supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 817.) Statutes such as the Fair Debt 

Collections Practices Act (28 U.S.C. § 3001 et seq.) and Rosenthal 

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (§ 1788 et seq.) focus on 

protecting debtors’ rights and restraining creditors’ collection 

practices. The UVTA does not. It focuses on creditors’ rights and 

restraining debtors’ evasive maneuvering. We decline to 

interpret the statute in a way that not only subordinates 

creditors’ interests to debtors, but encourages debtors to devise 

new and more creative ways to circumvent valid obligations.

PGA West, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th 156 presented the Fourth 

District with a situation similar in concept (if not fact) to ours. 

Debtor recorded a deed of trust on his condominium. He named 

an unincorporated sham entity as the deed’s beneficiary and then 

foreclosed to insulate his equity from a creditor’s claims. Many 

years later the creditor tried to avoid the UVTA’s seven-year 

period of repose by arguing a transfer did not occur until debtor 

incorporated the sham entity. Prior to then, the creditor argued, 

debtor had effectively given a property interest to himself. The 

Fourth District declined to adopt the creditor’s rigid 

characterization of the term “transfer” by focusing on the legal 

distinctions between the debtor and the purported transferee. 

The debtor’s intent to insulate his assets and defraud creditors 

brought the transaction within the UVTA. (See id. at p. 174 
14

[“although Mork never incurred a real obligation to Hulven under 

the deed of trust and note, and Hulven apparently never really 

existed as a corporate entity, Mork’s fraudulent attempt to 

transfer the equity in his condominium to Hulven to insulate that 

asset from potential creditors constitutes a ‘transfer’ as defined in 

section 3439.01, subdivision (m)”].) We agree. The creditor’s 

interests should drive the court’s interpretation of the term 

“transfer” rather than the form of debtors’ asset manipulations. 

E. Nagel’s Common Law Cause of Action for Fraudulent Transfer

Nagel styles her first cause of action as one for fraudulent 

transfer under both the UVTA and common law. The trial court 

remarked in its ruling that “[p]recisely what the Plaintiff claims 

to be the elements of a common law cause, and how such would 

be reflected in jury instruction, remains unclear.” Perhaps 

Nagel’s allegations do give rise to such a claim.8 We decline to 

decide the issue where, as here, the opening brief does not 

address this part of the trial court’s ruling. (Tisher v. California 

Horse Racing Bd. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 349, 361, citing Balboa 

Ins. Co. v. Aguirre (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1010 [“plaintiffs’ 

failure to raise an issue in their opening brief waives the issue on 

appeal”].)

CONCLUSION

We reverse the order dismissing Nagel’s causes of action for 

fraudulent transfer under the UVTA, for conspiracy, and for 

aiding and abetting. We affirm the order to the extent it 

8 See Berger v. Varum (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1013, 1019 

(“Traditionally, creditors could bring fraudulent transfer cases 

under common law. [Citations.] Because the UVTA is not 

intended to replace such common law but merely supplement it, 

we conclude Berger may bring such a claim under common law.”).
15

dismisses Nagel’s common law cause of action for fraudulent 

transfer. Appellants shall recover their costs on appeal. 

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

PERREN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

YEGAN, J.
16

Colleen K. Sterne, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

Valle Makoff, Jeffrey B. Valle and Jennifer Laser, for 

Plaintiffs and Appellants.

The Law Office of John Derrick, John Derrick, for 

Defendants and Respondents, Westen Family Group, LLC, Derek 

Westen, Peter K. Westen & Westen Family Trust.

Schley Look Guthrie & Locker, Ian M. Guthrie, for 

Defendants and Respondents Tracy A. Westen, Linda Lawson, 

and the Westen-Lawson Trust.

Rogers, Sheffield & Campbell, Scott B. Campbell and 

Nathan C. Rogers, for Defendant and Respondent Westen Family 

Group, LLC, Derek Westen, and Westen Family Trust