Opinions of the Colorado Supreme Court are available to the 1 public and can be accessed through the Judicial Branch’s homepage at 2 http://www.courts.state.co.us

. Opinions are also posted on the 3 Colorado Bar Association ’s homepage at http://www.cobar.org

. 4 5 ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE 6 November 21, 2016 7 8 20 16 CO 74 9 10 No. 14SC94, People v. Adams
— Criminal La w — Sentence Enhancements
— 11 Extraordinary Aggravating Circumstances
— Consecutive Sentencing. 12 13 In this case, the supreme court considers whether two different sentence 14
enhancements

— the “general” enhancement, which requires an aggravated term

- of

15 years range, and the “special” enhancement, which requires consecutive sentencing

— 16 can be applied simultane ously to a sentence for second degree assault on a correctional 17 officer. The supreme court concludes, based on the plain language of the relevant 18 statutes, that the two enhancement provisions do not conflict and that effect can be 19 given to both. The supr eme court contemplates People v. Andrews , 871 P.2d 1199 20 (Colo. 1994) , in which it held that the general enhancement does not apply to crimes of 21 escape, but the court ultimately distinguishes Andrews as limited to crimes of escape 22 only. Accordingly , the su preme court reverses the portion of the court of appeals’ 23 judgement vacating the defendant’s aggravated sentence for second degree assault and 24 remands for further proceedings. 251 2 The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado 3 2 East 14 th Avenue • Denver, Colorado 80203 4

2016 CO 74 5 Supreme Court Case No. 14SC94 6 Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals 7 Court of Appeals Case No. 10CA2454 8
Petitioner : 9 The People of the State of Colorado , 10

v. 11 Respondent : 12 Curtis Gordon Adams

. 13 Judgment Reversed 14 en banc 15 November 21, 2016 16 Attorneys for Petitioner : 17 Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General 18 William G. Kozeliski, Assistant Attorney General 19 Denver, Colorado 20 21 Attorneys for Respondent : 22 Douglas K. Wilson, Public Defender 23 Co ry D. Riddle, Deputy Public Defender 24 Denver, Colorado 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 JUSTICE HOOD delivered the Opinion of the Court. 352

¶1 A jury found respondent, Curtis Adams, guilty of assaulting a correctional
officer

. The presumptive sentencing range for that offense is two to six years, but
b ecause Adams committed the assault while serving a sentence for a prior felony
conviction , t he trial court imposed an aggravated sentence

— twelve years in the Department of Corrections t o be served consecutively to Adams’s remaining sentences.
¶2 This case arises at the intersection of two sources of sentence enhancement . One requires an aggravated term

- of

- years range; the other requires consecutive sentencing. The court of appeals concluded Adams was not subject to the term

- of

- years enhancement applied by the trial court . T he People now urge us to reverse the court of appeals ; they contend the trial court was required to apply both enhancements.
¶3 Based on the plain language of the statutes, we conclude both enhan cements apply. Because the two provisions do not conflict, w e give effect to both. Therefore, we reverse the portion of the judgment of the court of appeals vacating the defendant’ s
sentence

. 

### I. Facts and Procedural History
¶4 While serving a sentence in Colorado State Penitentiary for a prior felony
conviction , Adams kicked and head

- butted a correction al officer

. As a result of that altercation, t he People charge d Adams with second degree assault

. ¶5 The statute defining that offense provides in relevant part: (1) A person commits the crime of assault in the second degree if:

. . . (f)

. . . while lawfully confined or in custody as a result of being charged with or convicted of a crime

. . . he or she knowingly and violently app lies physical force against a person engaged in the performance of his or her3

duties while employed by or under contract with a detention facility

. . . and the person committing the offense knows or reasonably should know that the victim is

. . . a person engaged in the performance of his or her duties while employed by or under contract with a detention facility

. . . . § 18

- 3

- 203(1)(f), C.R.S. ( 2016 ). P aragraph (f) further provides that a sentence imposed for this form of second degree assault “ shall be served in the department of corrections and shall run consecutively with any sentences being served by the offender

. ” Id. As a
class four felony, the presumptive sentencing range for second degree assault is t wo to
six years
. See § § 18

- 1.3

- 401(1)(a)(V)(A) ; 18

- 3

- 203(2)(b) , C.R.S. ( 2016 )

. ¶6 T he People also filed a notice of extraor dinary aggravating circumstance s
. Specifically, they alleg ed that when Adams committed the assault he “ was under confinement, in prison, or in any correctional i nstitution as a convicted felon

. ” See § 18

- 1.3

- 401(8)(a)(IV), C.R.S. ( 201 6 ). The general sentencing statute provides that the
p resence of an extraordinary aggravating circumstance “ shall require the court, if it sentences the defendant to incarceration, to sentence the defendant to a term of at least the midpoint in the presumptive range but not more than twice the maximum term authorized in the presumptive range for the punishment of a felony.” § 18

- 1.3

- 401(8)(a) , C.R.S. (2016)

. Thus, for a class four felony , proof of this extraordinary
aggrav ating circumstance shifts the sentencing range upward t o between four and twelve years.
¶7 Following the lead of the parties and the court of appeals, we refer to the
enhancement found in the second degree assault statute (requiring consecutive sentencing) as the “special” enhancement to distinguish it from the “general”4

enhancement for extraordinary aggravating circumstance s found in the general sentencing statute (requiring a sentence of midpoint to twice

- max presumptive)

. ¶8 A jury convicted Adams o f the s econd degree assault charge. Applying the general enhancement , the trial court sentenced Adams to twelve years i n the
D epartment of C orrections

. The court also ordered this sentence to be served
consecutive to his remaining sentences

. ¶9 Adams appealed , and t he court of appeals affirmed his conviction but vacated
his sentence. See People v. Adams , No. 10CA2454 (Colo. App. Jan. 9, 2014) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f))

. Adams argued he was not subject to the general
enhancement because the jury never found the extraordinary aggravat ing circumstance
prov en beyond a reasonable doubt. But t he court of appeals did not reach this
contention because it concluded Adams was not subject to the general enhancement for
a different reason : The court of appeals looked to one of its prior decisions in which

a n other di vision , f aced with the same issue , concluded the general enhancement in
section 18

- 1.3

- 401 ( 8 )(a)(IV) does not apply to second degree assault under section
18

- 3

- 203(1)(f). See P eople v. Willcoxon , 80 P.3d 817, 82 1

– 2 2 (Colo. App. 2002)

. The
Willcoxon court , relying on our decision in People v. Andrews , 871 P.2d 1199 (Colo. 1994), determined the General Assembly did not intend for the general enhancement to apply to this form of second degree assault because the assault statute contains its own sentencing enhancement

— the requirement for consecutive sentencing . 80 P.3d at 822

. P ersuaded by Willcoxon , the court of appeals vacated Adams’s sentence and remanded for resentencing.5

¶10 We granted the People’s petition for certiorari

. 1 

### II. Analysis
¶11 We begin our analysis with the statutory text . Because the provisions at issue concern different aspects of Adams’s sentence and can be applied together without

c onflict, we give effect to b oth

. We then address Adams’s argument that Andrews compels a different result and conclude it does not. We therefore reverse that portion of
the judgment of the court of appeals vacating the defendant’s sentence.


### A. Standard of Review ¶12 The proper interpret ation of a sentencing statute presents a question of law , which we review de novo. Chavez v. People , 2015 CO 62, ¶ 7, 359 P.3d 1040, 1042.

“ Our primary goal in construing a sentencing statute is to give effect to the legislative
intent.” Lehner t v. People , 244 P.3d 1180, 1186 (Colo. 2010) (citing Vensor v. People , 151 P.3d 1274, 1275 (Colo. 2007)). To do this , we first look to the language of the statute.
I d. We read statutes “ as a whole in order to accord consistent, harmonious, and
sensible effect to all their parts .” A.S. v. People , 2013 CO 63, ¶ 10, 312 P.3d 168, 171 ; see also People v. Diaz , 2015 CO 28, ¶ 12, 347 P.3d 621, 624

. “ If the statute is unambiguous and does not conflict with other statutory provisions, this court looks no furt her

. ”
Frazier v. People , 90 P.3d 807, 810 (Colo. 2004)

. Where there exists an irreconcilable
conflict between a general statutory provision and a special or local provision, the

1 We granted certiorari to review the following issue: “ Whether the mandatory sentencing aggravator in section 18

- 1.3

- 401(8)(a)(IV), C.R.S. ( 2014 ) applies to the crime of second degree assault as defined in sect ion 18

- 3

- 2 03(a)(f), C.R.S. ( 2014 ) [sic]

. ”6

special or local provision typically prevails , but we strive to give effect to both provisions

. See § 2

- 4

- 205, C.R.S. ( 201 6 ).


### B
. Plain Language
¶13 The People argue this case can be resolved based on the plain language of the statutes. They contend the trial court imposed a legal sentence by selecting a term of
between four and twelve years as required by section 18

- 1.3

- 401 ( 8 )(a)(IV) and by ordering consecutive sentencing as required by section 18

- 3

- 203(1)(f). They argue these two statutes can be read together and applied without conflict . We agree.
¶14 The statutes before us concern different aspects of sentencing . The special
enhancement under s ection 18

- 3

- 203(1)(f) addresses when a sentence will be served

. A prison sentence imposed for this form of second degree assault “shall run consecutively
with any sentences being served by the offender.” § 18

- 3

- 203(1)(f). T his provision seeks
to deter assaults against correctional officers and other personnel ; the statute mandates
that offenders who commit such assaults face a n additional penalty and guarantee s a new sentence will not be incorporated into the time an offender must already serve

. See
Diaz , ¶ 20, 347 P.3d at 625 (discussing legislative purpose).
¶15 The general enhancement under section 18

- 1.3

- 401(8)(a)(IV) addresses another aspect of a sentence , namely its duration

. When an extraordinary aggravating circumstance is present, t he General Assembly has chosen to expose defendants to a

more severe sentencing range — the midpoint of the presumptive range up to twice the presumptive m aximum . One such cir cumstance is the commission of a felony by a7

defendant who was “under confinement, in prison, or in any correctional institution as a convicted felon.” § 18

- 1.3

- 401(8)(a)(IV)

. ¶16 The plain language of these two statutes permits us to give effect to both
pro visions. A specific or local provision may appl y to the ex clusion of a general provision , but that rule only applies where “ the conflict between the provisions is irreconcilable.” § 2

- 4

- 205; s ee also People v. M ojica

- Simental , 73 P.3d 15, 18 (Colo. 2003) (“While we favor a more specific provision over a general one when there is conflict between statutory provisions, in the absence of such a conflict, we give effect to both statutes.”). Here, there is no such conflict . A def endant can be sentenced to a greater number of years based on the general aggravator, and he can be made to serve that sentence following completion of his other sentences. We therefore apply both provisions.
¶17 That would close this case, but Adams also arg ues that the special enhancement provision applies to the exclusion of the general enhancement based on our decision in
Andrews

. We turn to that contention now.


### C. Andrews
¶18 The defendant in Andrews escaped from a community corrections facility.
871 P.2d at 1200. Police apprehended him a few weeks later and took him to a parole office for processing. Id. He escaped again , but this time he only made it to a nearby parking lot

. Id. T he defendant pled guilty to two felony escape offenses

. Id. At the
P eople ’s urging , the trial court applied the general enhancement for committing a felony offense while under confinement as a convicted felon , then codified at section8

18

- 1

- 105(9)(a)(V), 8B C.R.S. (1986 and 1992 Supp.) , to the second escape conviction. I d.
T he court of appeals vacated the sentence. Id.
¶19 We granted review to address whether the gener al enhancement applied to
escape crimes

. Id. at 1199 . Looking to the overall statutory scheme, we observed that if
the general enhancement did apply , then every person convicted of class three felony escape would be subject to the enhancement. Id. at 1202 & nn.7

– 8. This “would effectively render meaningless” the legislature’s decision to classify escape as a class
three felony

— automatic application of the enhancement would shift the penalty range
such that the relevant range would never correspond to the class three range
. Id. at
1202. We noted this construction was contrary to our practice of reading statutes in
their entiret y to “giv[e] force and effect” to every provision

. I d. ( citing People v. Dist

. Court , 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo. 1986); Ingram v. Cooper , 698 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Colo.
1985 ) ). Finding the legislative intent “not so clear,” we ultimately resolved this interpretive difficulty by concluding the general enhancement did not a pply

. Id. at
1203. On our way to that conclusion, we observed that the legislature had “provided for enhanced punishment of crimes of escape elsewhere.” Id. Special enhancements required sentences for escape crimes to run consecutively to other sentences. Id. (discussing §§ 18

- 8

- 208.1 , - 209, 8B C.R.S. (1986)).
¶20 However, we limited our conclusion in Andrews to crimes of escape. We recognized t hat in cases involving se ntencing for non - escape crimes, we had allowed “an element of an underlying offense [to] also provide the basis for an increased sentence, effectively mandating an escalated penalty for that offense.” Id. at 1202. In9

those cases, we had distinguished escape as not subject to enhanced sentencing based
on confinement as an aggravating circumstance

. See i d. at 1203 & n.10 ; see People v.
Chavez , 764 P.2d 356, 358

– 59 (Colo. 19 8 8) ( treating confinement as aggravating
circumstance for c ontraband

- related offe nse , while acknowledging that it cannot apply

as aggravating circumstance for escape ) ; People v. Leonard , 755 P.2d 447, 449

– 51 (Colo. 1988) ( same )

. Because the legislature took no action to the contrary, we inferred that the general enhancement did not apply to escape

. Andrews , 871 P.2d at 1203.
¶21 Thus, Andrews was a traditional exercise in statutory interpretation

. W e attempted to discern the legislature’s intent , see id

. at 1201 (“Legislative intent is the linchpin of statutory construction.”), and we tried to give “consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all parts” of the statutes , id. at 1203. Andrews did not establish that a special sentencing provision necessa rily controls over a general one , n or did it set down any clear

- statement rule for the legislature to overcome before we will apply m ultiple sentencing provisions to a single count. See People v. Leske , 957 P.2d 1030, 1045 n.20 (Colo. 1998) (“Our holding [in Andrews ] was limited

. . . to the crime of escape, and was not based upon the fact that proof of the sentence aggravator also tended to prove an element of the underlying offense.”)

. Andrews was based on the idiosyncratic results o f applying the general enhancement to the unique crime of escape, and its reach is
limited to that crime.
¶22 Accordingly, t he Willcoxon court , on which the division below relied, erred in

constru ing Andrews to mean that a special sentencing provision alone p reclude s application of the general enhancement

. See 80 P.3d at 822

. The court likewise erred in10

concluding that the general enhancement in section 18

- 1.3

- 401 ( 8 )(a)(IV) cannot apply to second degree assault as described in section 18

- 3

- 203(1)(f) simply because the latter provi des for consecutive sentencing. Id. As a result, we overrule Willcoxon . Because
we overrule Willcoxon , we conclude the division below erred in using Willcoxon ’s
rationale

. 2
¶23 We therefore reject Adams’s reliance on Andrews and apply the statutes as
written. By their plain meaning , both enhancements apply here

. 

### III. Conclusion ¶24 The portion of the court of appeals’ judgment vacating Adams’s sentence is

r eversed, and we remand to the court of appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

2 Adams also argues that the General Assembly’s failure to amend the relevant statutes in the years since Willcoxon demonstrates legislative acquiescence to the interpretation put forward in that case. Regardl ess of the merits of discerning legislative intent through legislative inaction, the plain language of the statutes establishes that Adams is subject to both enhancements here

.