[Cite as Washington Mut. Bank v. Beatley, 2020-Ohio-4658.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Washington Mutual Bank, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 19AP-614 

v. : (C.P.C. No. 06CV-9066)

Jack K. Beatley et al., : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendants-Appellants : 

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., : 

 Intervenor-Appellee. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on September 29, 2020 

 

On brief: Kevin E. Humphreys, for appellants. 

On brief: Brickler & Eckler, LLP, and Daniel C. Gibson, for 

intervenor-appellee. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

BROWN, J. 

{¶ 1} This is an appeal by defendants-appellants, Jack K. Beatley and 64 W. 

Northwood Avenue, LLC (collectively "appellants"), from a judgment of the Franklin 

County Court of Common Pleas overruling appellants' objections to a magistrate's 

decision denying their motion for contempt against intervenor-appellee, JPMorgan Chase 

Bank, N.A. (hereafter "Chase"). 

{¶ 2} On July 14, 2006, Washington Mutual Bank, N.A. (hereafter "Washington 

Mutual"), filed a complaint in foreclosure, naming as defendants Jack K. Beatley 

(individually "Beatley"), 64 W. Northwood Avenue, LLC, and Don Breckenridge. The 
No. 19AP-614 2 

complaint alleged that Washington Mutual was the holder of a note and mortgage secured 

by property located at 64 W. Northwood Avenue, Columbus, and that Beatley was in 

default. 

{¶ 3} On September 1, 2006, appellants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, 

pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B), asserting that Washington Mutual lacked standing to bring the 

action because its name was an unregistered fictitious name as defined under R.C. 

1329.01. By decision and entry filed October 26, 2006, the trial court granted the motion 

to dismiss. 

{¶ 4} In 2008, following appeals by the parties to this court and the Supreme 

Court of Ohio, the Supreme Court substituted the Federal Deposit Insurance Company 

("FDIC"), in its capacity as receiver of Washington Mutual, as the party plaintiff and real 

party in interest. In June 2009, the Supreme Court dismissed appellants' appeal as 

improvidently granted, and the matter was ultimately remanded to the trial court. 

{¶ 5} On March 17, 2010, FDIC filed a notice of removal to the Southern District 

of Ohio. Chase subsequently sought, and was granted, leave to intervene in the federal 

action. In March 2011, the claims between FDIC and appellants were resolved pursuant 

to a settlement and dismissal with prejudice, leaving intervenor Chase and appellants as 

the only remaining parties. In February 2012, Chase filed a complaint in foreclosure in 

the federal action, and appellants then filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction. The federal court subsequently granted appellants' motion to dismiss, 

remanding the matter to the trial court. 

{¶ 6} On April 26, 2013, Chase filed a motion for summary judgment in the trial 

court, asserting it was the holder of the subject note and mortgage. Appellants filed a 

memorandum contra Chase's motion for summary judgment. On April 18, 2014, the trial 

court filed a decision and entry denying Chase's motion for summary judgment and 

dismissing the action. 

{¶ 7} On December 21, 2017, appellants filed a motion for contempt against 

Chase seeking an order by the trial court holding Chase in contempt for "failing to obey 

the Court's Order of April 18, 2014, pursuant to R.C. 2705, et seq." (Appellants' Mot. for 

Contempt at 1.) In its memorandum in support, appellants argued that Chase had 

reported information to the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") "for the issuance of a Form 
No. 19AP-614 3 

1099-C for Tax Year 2014 against Beatley." (Appellants' Mot. for Contempt at 4.) 

Appellants asserted that issuance of the 1099-C form was in contravention of the trial 

court's decision and entry of April 18, 2014 (hereafter "the 2014 decision") in which the 

trial court found that any losses or consequences to be borne as a result of Chase's failure 

to act as to any claims related to the note and mortgage should be borne by Chase and not 

appellants. 

{¶ 8} On January 8, 2018, Chase filed a memorandum in opposition to the 

motion for contempt, asserting the underlying dispute came to an end when the trial court 

entered the 2014 decision dismissing the action and, therefore, the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction to consider a civil contempt motion. Chase further argued the 2014 decision 

did not affirmatively direct it to refrain from issuing a 1099-C form. On May 25, 2018, 

appellants filed a reply to Chase's memorandum contra. 

{¶ 9} The matter was referred to a magistrate of the trial court who conducted a 

hearing on the contempt motion. On May 29, 2018, the magistrate issued a decision 

denying appellants' motion for contempt. The decision of the magistrate included the 

following findings of fact: 

On April 18, 2014, this Court issued a Decision and Entry. 

That Entry terminated the litigation. 

At a point in time after the April 18, 2014 Entry, Chase or 

someone on behalf of Chase prepared an IRS Form 1099-C. 

The IRS form 1099-C is used to report a discharge of 

indebtedness. 

Nowhere within the April 18, 2014 Entry is there language 

that orders Chase to do or refrain from doing any act 

concerning the 1099-C. 

(Mag. Decision at 2.) 

{¶ 10} The magistrate's conclusions of law provided in part: "The undersigned 

reviewed the Court's Entry within the framework of contempt. The undersigned could not 

locate any language that orders Chase to do or refrain from doing any act directly related 

to the 1099-C. Hence, * * * Chase cannot be held in contempt – civil or criminal." (Mag. 

Decision at 3.) 
No. 19AP-614 4 

{¶ 11} On June 8, 2018, appellants filed objections to the magistrate's decision. In 

its objections, appellants argued that, while "Beatley conceded during the hearing [that] 

the April 18, 2014 Entry did not specifically address a Form 1099-C, Beatley submits that 

a direct reference is not necessary to find contempt." (Appellants' Objs. at 4.) On June 12, 

2018, Chase filed a memorandum in opposition to appellants' objections, asserting in part 

that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the contempt motion to the extent it 

seeks a finding of civil contempt. Chase further argued that the 2014 decision was not 

sufficiently specific to support the requested contempt sanction. 

{¶ 12} On August 14, 2019, the trial court issued a decision and entry overruling 

appellants' objections. In its decision, the trial court held in part that appellants "failed to 

prove by clear and convincing evidence that Chase failed to abide by the April 18, 2014 

court order." (Aug. 14, 2019 Decision at 3.) The trial court additionally determined that 

the relief sought by appellants was "remedial rather than punitive," making the motion 

"one for civil contempt." (Aug. 14, 2019 Decision at 3.) The court therefore concluded 

that the contempt motion was moot because "the underlying case was terminated upon 

the filing of the April 18, 2014 court order." (Aug. 14, 2019 Decision at 3.) 

{¶ 13} On appeal, appellants set forth the following two assignments of error for 

this court's review: 

[I.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 

ITS CONCLUSION THAT IT HAD NO JURISDICTION TO 

HOLD CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AFTER THE FILING OF 

THE COURT'S APRIL 18, 2014, DECISION AND ENTRY 

WHICH TERMINATED THE ACTION. 

[II.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY INCORRECTLY 

INTERPRETING JUDGE REECE'S APRIL 18, 2014, 

JUDGMENT, AND ENTERING A FINDING THAT CHASE'S 

POST-JUDGMENT ISSUANCE OF A 1099-C AGAINST MR. 

BEATLEY WAS NOT CONTRARY TO THE ADJUDICATION 

BY JUDGE REECE'S [sic] SET FORTH IN THE APRIL 18, 

2014 DISMISSAL ENTRY. 

{¶ 14} Appellants' assignments of error are interrelated and will be considered 

together. In these assignments of error, appellants contend the trial court erred in: 

(1) determining it had no jurisdiction to hold contempt proceedings following the filing of 
No. 19AP-614 5 

the 2014 decision, and by (2) incorrectly interpreting the 2014 decision and failing to find 

Chase in violation of that order for issuing a 1099-C form. 

{¶ 15} Under the first assignment of error, appellants challenge the trial court's 

jurisdictional determination as to the contempt motion, asserting the trial court had 

inherent as well as statutory authority to enforce the findings and conclusions of the court 

in the 2014 decision. In support, appellants rely in part on R.C. 2705.02(A) (providing 

that a party may be punished for contempt if found guilty of "[d]isobedience of, or 

resistance to, a lawful writ, process, order, rule, judgment, or command of a court or 

officer"). 

{¶ 16} In response to the first assignment of error, Chase argues appellants 

brought a motion for civil (as opposed to criminal) contempt, for which the trial court had 

no continuing jurisdiction. According to Chase, because the 2014 decision involved an 

unconditional dismissal by the trial court which contains no reservation of jurisdiction, 

the court in the instant proceeding correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction over a civil 

contempt motion. 

{¶ 17} The Supreme Court has recognized that "in general, when a trial court 

unconditionally dismisses a case or a case has been voluntarily dismissed under Civ.R. 

41(A)(1), the trial court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed." State 

ex rel. Hummel v. Sadler, 96 Ohio St.3d 84, 2002-Ohio-3605, ¶ 22, citing Page v. Riley, 

85 Ohio St.3d 621, 623 (1999). See also State ex rel. Rice v. McGrath, 62 Ohio St.3d 70, 

71 (1991) (the trial court, "having unconditionally dismissed the underlying case, patently 

and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over it"). 

{¶ 18} However, despite a dismissal, "a trial court may consider certain collateral 

issues not related to the merits of the action." Hummel at ¶ 23. One such collateral issue 

is contempt, and "a court may exercise continuing jurisdiction depending upon the nature 

of the contempt proceeding." State ex rel. Conkle v. Sadler, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-438, 

2002-Ohio-6104, ¶ 9. In addressing this issue, courts "distinguish between civil and 

criminal contempt proceedings." State ex rel. Corn v. Russo, 90 Ohio St.3d 551, 554 

(2001). In the case of a civil contempt "[w]here the parties have settled the underlying 

case that gave rise to the civil contempt motion, the contempt proceeding is moot, since 

the case has come to an end." Conkle at ¶ 9, citing Corn at 555. A trial court, however, 
No. 19AP-614 6 

"may consider the collateral issue of criminal contempt even after the underlying action is 

no longer pending." Id., citing Corn at 556. See also State ex rel. Benbow v. Runyan, 99 

Ohio St.3d 410, 2003-Ohio-4127, ¶ 7, citing Corn at 556; Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx 

Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 396 (1990) ("even when a trial court has unconditionally dismissed a 

case, the court retains jurisdiction to consider the collateral issue of criminal contempt"). 

{¶ 19} In determining if a contempt proceeding is civil or criminal, "the pertinent 

test is 'what does the court primarily seek to accomplish by imposing sentence?' " Conkle 

at ¶ 10, quoting Corn at 555, citing Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966). 

Under Ohio law, "[c]ivil contempt sanctions are designed for remedial or coercive 

purposes and are often employed to compel compliance with a court order." Id. By 

contrast, criminal contempt sanctions "are punitive in nature and are designed to 

vindicate the authority of the court." Id., citing Corn at 555; Denovchek v. Bd. of 

Trumbull Cty. Commrs., 36 Ohio St.3d 14, 15 (1988). Accordingly, "civil contempts are 

characterized as violations against the party for whose benefit the order was made, 

whereas criminal contempts are most often described as offenses against the dignity or 

process of the court." Id., citing Corn at 555. 

{¶ 20} As noted under the facts, the trial court in the instant case determined that 

"[t]he requested relief is remedial rather than punitive, making Beatley's motion one for 

civil contempt." (Aug. 14, 2019 Decision at 2.) On review, we agree. 

{¶ 21} In their memorandum in support of the motion for contempt, appellants 

asserted that Chase's action in reporting tax information (i.e., filing the Form 1099-C) 

"cause[d] damages to Beatley" by "attributing Beatley with income for the year 2014." 

(Appellants' Mot. for Contempt at 4.) Based on that allegation, appellants' motion sought 

"a Judgment in favor of Beatley and against Chase for the amount of Beatley's tax liability, 

penalties, and interest to the Internal Revenue Service caused by Chase's failure to comply 

with the Order plus any related expenses and costs, as well as reasonable attorney fees, 

caused by Chase's contemptuous conduct, including * * * costs and fees incurred in 

bringing this Motion." (Appellants' Mot. for Contempt at 5-6.) 

{¶ 22} Under Ohio law, if sanctions sought in a contempt proceeding "are 

primarily designed to benefit the complainant through remedial or coercive means, then 

the contempt proceeding is civil." Denovchek at 16. As set forth above, the contempt 
No. 19AP-614 7 

motion alleged damages to appellants and requested monetary compensation (i.e., the 

amount of Beatley's tax liability, penalties and interest, as well as any related expenses, 

costs and attorney fees) as a result of Chase's issuance of the tax reporting form. As 

determined by the trial court, the relief sought under the motion is fairly characterized as 

remedial, i.e., for the benefit of appellants and, therefore, in the nature of civil contempt, 

not criminal. Further, the record supports Chase's contention that the 2014 decision of 

the trial court dismissing the underlying action contained no language reserving 

jurisdiction. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's conclusion that it lacked 

jurisdiction to consider a subsequent civil contempt motion. 

{¶ 23} However, even assuming the alleged contempt could be characterized as 

criminal in nature (i.e., to vindicate the authority of the court), we find no error by the 

trial court in its further determination that appellants failed to prove Chase was in 

violation of the 2014 decision. As noted above, appellants' second assignment of error 

challenges the trial court's interpretation of the 2014 decision and its failure to find Chase 

in contempt for violating that decision. 

{¶ 24} In asserting before the trial court that Chase was in contempt, appellants 

relied on the following language from the 2014 decision: "Therefore, the Court finds any 

losses or consequences to be borne as a result of Chase's failure to act – timely or 

otherwise – with respect to any claims related to the subject note and mortgage should be 

borne by Chase and/or the FDIC, not by the Beatley Defendants." (Apr. 18, 2014 Decision 

at 25.) 

{¶ 25} The magistrate, on review of the 2014 decision, found no language "that 

orders Chase to do or refrain from doing any act directly related to the 1099-C." (Mag. 

Decision at 3.) The trial court similarly determined the 2014 decision contained no 

language prohibiting Chase "from filing a 1099 tax document." (Aug. 14, 2019 Decision 

at 3.) The court therefore concluded: "Beatley has failed to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that Chase failed to abide by the April 18, 2014 court order." (Aug. 14, 2019 

Decision at 3.) 

{¶ 26} A reviewing court "will not reverse the decision of the court below in a 

contempt proceeding in the absence of a showing of an abuse of discretion." State ex rel. 

Ventrone v. Birkel, 65 Ohio St.2d 10, 11 (1981). In order to be "guilty of contempt for 
No. 19AP-614 8 

failure to comply with a court order, there must be an order with which the person 

charged has failed to comply." Godward v. Kory, 5th Dist. No. 2010-CA-00350, 2011-

Ohio-5265, ¶ 20, citing S. Euclid Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 80 v. D'Amico, 29 Ohio 

St.3d 50 (1987). Further, "[i]f the contempt charge is premised on a party's failure to obey 

an order of the court, then the order must be clear and definite, unambiguous and not 

subject to dual interpretations, and the contemnor must have knowledge of the order." 

Id. See also Doles v. Doles, 4th Dist. No. 1085 (May 9, 1985) ("In determining whether an 

order has been violated in the context of contempt proceedings, the order will not be 

expanded by implication beyond the meaning of its terms."). 

{¶ 27} A review of the 2014 decision supports the findings of the magistrate and 

trial court that there is no language expressly prohibiting Chase from issuing a tax 

information form, and we note appellants acknowledge such fact in their brief. We 

further note that the language in the 2014 decision regarding any losses or consequences 

to be borne by Chase and/or FDIC appears to be, in context, directed to the trial court's 

discussion of the fact there was a purchase and assumption agreement between Chase and 

FDIC and that appellants were "not parties" to that agreement. (Apr. 18, 2014 Decision 

at 25.) Again, however, the 2014 decision contains no directive (or even reference) to tax 

reporting issues. 

{¶ 28} In general, "[p]roceedings for contempt for noncompliance will not lie 

where the order does not expressly address the alleged act of disobedience." Cortland 

United Methodist Church v. Knowles, 11th Dist. No. 2006-T-0110, 2007-Ohio-3383, ¶ 34. 

Here, given the absence of any specific order prohibiting the complained conduct (and 

assuming, arguendo, the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the motion), we find no 

abuse of discretion by the trial court in declining to hold Chase in contempt for an alleged 

violation of the 2014 decision. 

{¶ 29} Based on the foregoing, appellants' two assignments of error are overruled, 

and the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is hereby affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

KLATT and BEATTY BLUNT, JJ., concur. 

____________________