J-S94022-16

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL THOMPSON

Appellant No. 681 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 9, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0002384-2015

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., RANSOM, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: FILED MARCH 10, 2017

Appellant, Christopher Michael Thompson, appeals from the judgment 

of sentence entered on March 9, 2016, following a jury trial resulting in his 

conviction for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, 

paraphernalia, simple possession, and criminal use of a communication 

facility.1 We affirm.

On March 28, 2015, Sergeant Milo Hooper and Officer Nicholas Ishman 

of the City of Harrisburg Police Department were conducting a routine 

morning patrol in a high crime area. See Notes of Testimony (N. T.), 

9/1/15, at 4-5, 11. Sergeant Hooper saw Appellant standing on the corner. 

Id. at 5. When Appellant saw Sergeant Hooper, he turned and began 

____________________________________________

1 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), (a)(32), (a)(16), 18 Pa.C.S. § 7512, 

respectively.
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walking quickly east. Id. The officers circled the block, and Officer Ishman 

got out of the car and proceeded on foot. Id. at 7.

Sergeant Hooper continued to drive and observed Appellant walking 

with another individual towards a car.2 Id. at 8-9. Both men began to get 

into the car but immediately stepped back upon seeing Sergeant Hooper. 

Id. at 9. Sergeant Hooper asked Appellant if he could speak with him. Id.

at 9-10. Appellant appeared nervous and walked, then ran, away. Id. at 9-

10, 19. Sergeant Hooper spoke, instead, to Mr. Johnson, who admitted he 

was there to meet with Appellant and purchase heroin. Id. at 11.

Officer Ishman also attempted to stop Appellant, but he continued to 

run. Id. at 23-24. Additional officers responded to the area and, with 

Officer Ishman, they stopped Appellant outside of 2604 North Sixth Street. 

Id. at 25-26. Appellant gave incorrect information three times prior to 

giving his correct name and birthday. Id. The officers ran Appellant’s 

information and found an active arrest warrant. Id. at 26-27. Officers then 

placed Appellant under arrest and searched him incident to arrest. Id. The 

search revealed that Appellant possessed a bundle of heroin and a cell 

phone.3 Id. at 27.

____________________________________________

2 Appellant’s companion was later identified as Jack Johnson. At trial, Mr. 

Johnson testified on behalf of the Commonwealth. See infra.

3 A “bundle” is approximately ten bags of heroin. Id. at 27.
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Prior to trial, Appellant moved to suppress the narcotics seized from 

him, arguing that officers lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to 

detain him. See Motion to Suppress, 7/24/15, at 1-4. Following a hearing 

in September 2015, the suppression court issued a memorandum opinion 

denying Appellant’s motion to suppress. See Suppression Court Opinion 

(SCO), 10/27/15, at 5-6. Specifically, the court found that based on the 

totality of the circumstances, officers possessed reasonable suspicion to stop 

Appellant due to his nervousness and flight in a high-crime area. Id. 

Accordingly, the court concluded, the officers properly conducted an 

investigatory detention of Appellant and the subsequent search and seizure 

was constitutional. Id. 

In January 2016, the matter proceeded to trial by jury. Jack Johnson 

testified that, at some time prior to March 2015, he met Appellant in a 

convenience store and they exchanged phone numbers. See N. T., 1/12/16, 

at 17-18. Mr. Johnson saved Appellant’s number in his phone under the 

initial “C.” Id. Approximately one week later, Mr. Johnson contacted 

Appellant and purchased heroin from him. Id. at 19, 21. On March 28, 

2015, Appellant sent Mr. Johnson a text message asking if he was “looking 

for anything.” Id. at 21-22. Mr. Johnson replied to the text message that 

he needed five bags of heroin, and the two made arrangements to meet. 

Id. at 27-30. At this meeting, as Mr. Johnson and Appellant spoke, a police 

car pulled up near them. Id. at 29-30.
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Sergeant Hooper and Officer Ishman testified to the same facts elicited 

at the suppression hearing. Id. at 46-65, 75-83. After taking Appellant into 

custody, the officers had Mr. Johnson call the number for “C” from his cell 

phone, and Appellant’s cell phone rang. Id. at 84. 

The Commonwealth also introduced Detective John Goshert as an 

expert witness. Id. at 110. Detective Goshert testified that Appellant 

possessed the heroin with the intent to deliver, due to 1) the location of the 

incident; 2) the interactions between the two men; 3) Mr. Johnson’s 

statements; and 4) the text messages exchanged between Appellant and Mr. 

Johnson.. Id. at 118-120.

Following trial, the jury convicted Appellant of all charges set forth 

above.4 Appellant was sentenced on March 9, 2016, to an aggregate of one 

and one-half to three years of incarceration followed by two years of state 

probation. He filed a post sentence motion which the trial court denied. 

Appellant timely appealed and filed a court-ordered statement of 

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The 

suppression court and trial court issued responsive opinions.

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

I. Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to 

suppress evidence where the police officer illegally detained, 

____________________________________________

4 The jury acquitted Appellant of resisting arrest, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5104. 

Another charge, flight to avoid apprehension, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5126, was 

withdrawn.
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searched, and seized Appellant in violation of Article I, Section 8 

of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to 

the United States Constitution?

II. Whether the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient 

evidence to sustain Appellant’s conviction where the 

Commonwealth did not prove that Appellant possessed the drugs 

with the intent to deliver or use a cell phone to conduct said 

delivery?

III. Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s post 

sentence motion where the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence so as to shock one’s sense of justice where the 

Commonwealth never showed, inter alia, that [Appellant] 

actually possessed the drugs with the intent to deliver, or used a 

cell phone to conduct said deliver?

Appellant’s Brief at 7 (unnecessary capitalization and responses omitted).

Appellant first claims that the suppression court erred in denying his 

motion to suppress evidence. See Appellant’s Brief at 20. Appellant 

contends that the first contact between Appellant and the officers was a 

mere encounter with no attendant duty to stop and that, accordingly, the 

subsequent chase and arrest were illegal. Id. at 22. In the alternative, 

Appellant argues there was no reasonable suspicion to stop him, because his 

flight was not unprovoked. Id. at 25-26.

Our standard of review for an appeal denying a motion to suppress is 

well settled.

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of 

a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the 

suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record 

and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are 

correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the 

suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record 
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as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and 

may reverse only if the court's legal conclusions are erroneous. 

Where ... the appeal of the determination of the suppression 

court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s 

legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose 

duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied 

the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts 

below are subject to our plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010) (citations 

omitted). 

Appellant’s claims turn on the nature of the encounter between 

Appellant and the police.

There are three types of encounters between law enforcement 

officials and private citizens. A “mere encounter” need not be 

supported by any level of suspicion but carries no official 

compulsion to stop or respond. An “investigative detention” 

must be supported by reasonable suspicion and subjects the 

suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but it does not have 

the coercive conditions that would constitute an arrest. The 

courts determine whether reasonable suspicion exists by 

examining the totality of the circumstances. An arrest, or 

“custodial detention,” must be supported by probable cause.

In re J.G., 145 A.3d 1179, 1185 (Pa. Super. 2016).

It is undisputed that the initial contact between Appellant and the 

police was a mere encounter. See Commonwealth v. Lyles, 97 A.3d 298, 

303 (Pa. 2014) (noting that a seizure does not occur where officers merely 

approach a person in public and question the individual or request to see 

identification). However, after police approached Appellant, he fled without 

justification. It is well-settled that unprovoked flight in a high crime area is 

sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop. 
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See In the Interest of D.M., 781 A.2d 1161, 1163–64 (Pa. 2001); see 

also Commonwealth v. Washington, 51 A.3d 895, 898 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(“nervous, evasive behavior and headlong flight all provoke suspicion of 

criminal behavior in the context of response to police presence”);

Commonwealth v. McCoy, --- A.3d ---, at *4, 2017 Pa. Super. 20 (filed 

1/27/17) (noting that Appellant’s evasive and suspicious behavior in a high 

crime area, his unprovoked flight, and officers’ training and experience, 

provided requisite reasonable suspicion).

Here, the suppression court correctly concluded that the totality of the 

circumstances established that police had the requisite reasonable suspicion 

to pursue Appellant, where: he fled unprovoked from police; police again 

encountered Appellant walking with another individual towards a car; 

Appellant did not get into the car when he saw police; Appellant was 

nervous, evasive, and standoffish; and Appellant again ran away. 

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that police possessed 

reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant.5 See McCoy, --- A.3d --- at *4.

Next, Appellant claims that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain 

his convictions for possession with intent to deliver and criminal use of a 

communication facility, where the Commonwealth did not prove that 

____________________________________________

5 The stop led to the police being able to identify Appellant, which in turn 

revealed an active warrant for his arrest. Appellant was not searched until 

he had been placed under arrest.
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Appellant possessed the drugs with intent to deliver or use a cell phone to 

conduct their delivery. See Appellant’s Brief at 32. 

We note that in evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence, we must determine whether, viewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, 

together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, the trier of 

fact could have found that each and every element of the crimes 

charged was established beyond a reasonable doubt. We may 

not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the factfinder. To sustain a conviction, however, the facts and 

circumstances which the Commonwealth must prove must be 

such that every essential element of the crime is established 

beyond a reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. Little, 879 A.2d 293, 296–97 (Pa. Super. 2005) 

(internal citations omitted). 

First, we consider whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient 

evidence to sustain Appellant’s conviction for possession with intent to 

deliver. Section 780-113(a)(30) of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device 

and Cosmetic Act prohibits the following acts:

[T]he manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to 

manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance by a person not 

registered under this act, or a practitioner not registered or 

licensed by the appropriate State board, or knowingly creating, 

delivering or possessing with intent to deliver, a counterfeit 

controlled substance.

35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). The Commonwealth establishes the offense of 

possession with intent to deliver when it proves beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the defendant possessed a controlled substance with the intent to 

deliver it. See Little, 879 A.2d at 297. 
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Appellant acknowledges that he possessed the drugs. See Appellant’s 

Brief at 33. However, Appellant challenges the credibility and reliability of 

Detective Goshert’s testimony, arguing that it did not establish that 

Appellant possessed the heroin with the requisite intent to deliver. Id. at 

34. This is essentially a challenge to the weight rather than the sufficiency 

of the evidence. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wilson, 825 A.2d 710, 

713-14 (Pa. Super. 2003) (a review of the sufficiency of the evidence does 

not include an assessment of the credibility of testimony; such a claim goes 

to the weight of the evidence). In such cases,

“[w]hen the challenge to the weight of the evidence is predicated 

on the credibility of trial testimony, our review of the trial court's 

decision is extremely limited. Generally, unless the evidence is 

so unreliable and/or contradictory as to make any verdict based 

thereon pure conjecture, these types of claims are not 

cognizable on appellate review.”

Commonwealth v. Trippett, 932 A.2d 188, 198 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 863 A.2d 1185, 1191 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (citation omitted)); see also Commonwealth v. Hankerson, 118 

A.3d 415, 420 (Pa. Super. 2015) (noting that this Court may not re-assess 

the credibility of a witness’ testimony when ruling on a weight of the 

evidence claim).

In the instant case, Detective Goshert’s testimony and opinion were 

based on facts in the record, his extensive experience and training in illegal 

narcotics trafficking, and his personal participation in drug investigations and 

arrests. See N. T., 1/12/16, at 118-121. It was the jury’s role to evaluate 
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this testimony and give it such weight as they saw fit, and we decline to 

reassess that determination. Further, as the trial court correctly noted, the 

jury also was free to credit Mr. Johnson’s testimony that he had set up the 

encounter in order to buy heroin from Appellant. See TCO at 5. 

Accordingly, we decline to reassess this credibility determination on appeal. 

See Hankerson, 118 A.3d at 420.

Appellant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his 

conviction for criminal use of a communication facility. See Appellant’s Brief 

at 35. Specifically, he argues that the text messages introduced as evidence 

were not properly authenticated. Id. at 36-37.

The offense of criminal use of a communication facility is defined in 

relevant part as follows:

(a) Offense defined.--A person commits a felony of the third 

degree if that person uses a communication facility to commit, 

cause or facilitate the commission or the attempt thereof of any 

crime which constitutes a felony under this title or under the act 

of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64), known as The Controlled 

Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act. Every instance 

where the communication facility is utilized constitutes a 

separate offense under this section.

...

(c) Definition.--As used in this section, the term 

“communication facility” means a public or private 

instrumentality used or useful in the transmission of signs, 

signals, writing, images, sounds, data or intelligence of any 

nature transmitted in whole or in part, including, but not limited 

to, telephone, wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or 

photo-optical systems or the mail.

18 Pa.C.S. § 7512.
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The Commonwealth presented the following evidence: Mr. Johnson 

had saved Appellant’s number in his phone as “C.” Officer Ishman testified 

that when he called “C” from Mr. Johnson’s cell phone, Appellant’s phone 

rang. Mr. Johnson testified that he had texted Appellant to set up a drug 

transaction. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commmonwealth, its 

evidence was sufficient to establish that Appellant had used a cell phone to 

arrange a drug transaction. Little, 879 A.2d at 296–97.

Finally, Appellant claims that the trial court erred in denying his post 

sentence motion asserting the verdicts were against the weight of the 

evidence. See Appellant’s Brief at 37. Appellant contends that the verdicts 

were so against that weight as to shock one’s sense of justice, because the 

Commonwealth never showed that Appellant actually possessed the drugs 

with the intent to deliver or used a cell phone to arrange the sale. Id.

The law regarding weight of the evidence claims is well-settled.

A claim alleging the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. 

Accordingly, an appellate court reviews the exercise of the trial 

court's discretion; it does not answer for itself whether the 

verdict was against the weight of the evidence. It is well settled 

that the jury is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

and to determine the credibility of the witnesses, and a new trial 

based on a weight of the evidence claim is only warranted where 

the jury's verdict is so contrary to the evidence that it shocks 

one’s sense of justice. In determining whether this standard has 

been met, appellate review is limited to whether the trial judge’s 

discretion was properly exercised, and relief will only be granted 

where the facts and inferences of record disclose a palpable 

abuse of discretion. 
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Commonwealth v. Houser, 18 A.3d 1128, 1135-1136 (Pa. 2011) (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Appellant claims that Mr. Johnson’s testimony was contradictory to the 

evidence in the case, unreliable due to his prior crimen falsi and pending 

criminal charges, and inconsistent with the remainder of the evidence 

introduced at trial. See Appellant’s Brief at 38-39. However, the jury heard 

all of the evidence and was free to believe or disbelieve Mr. Johnson’s 

testimony as they saw fit. See Hankerson, 118 A.3d at 420. Mr. Johnson 

was clear that he text-messaged Appellant to buy heroin. Further, he 

testified that he met with Appellant in order to buy heroin. His testimony 

was supported by expert testimony. Accordingly, we decline to find that the 

trial court abused its discretion. Id.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/10/2017