[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-13720

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

CHARNESHA ALEXANDER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

PAUL ROLSTON, 

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket Nos. 4:19-cv-00138-RH-MAF,

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13720

4:18-cv-00177-RH-MAF

____________________

Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Charnesha Alexander appeals the judgment in favor of defendants Paul Rolston and the United States after trial on her claim

that she was sexually abused by Rolston, a physician assistant at 

FCI Tallahassee, during a medical examination at the federal prison 

in September 2016. She sued Rolston individually under Bivens1

for violating her Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and 

unusual punishment. And she brought claims against the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) for negligence 

and vicarious liability. A jury heard the claim against Rolston and 

returned a verdict in his favor. The FTCA claims were submitted 

for a bench trial to the district court, which entered judgment for

the government. Alexander appeals, challenging the district 

court’s handling of various evidentiary matters at trial and its resolution of the FTCA claims. After careful review, we affirm. 

I.

In March 2019, Alexander filed a § 1983 lawsuit alleging that 

she was sexually abused by Physician Assistant Rolston during a 

1 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 

388 (1971). 

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medical examination on September 27, 2016, while she was a federal prisoner at FCI Tallahassee. She asserted that Rolston’s sexual 

abuse amounted to cruel and unusual punishment under the 

Eighth Amendment, and that the government was both negligent 

for failing to protect Alexander and vicariously liable for Rolston’s 

conduct as his employer. 

Alexander’s case went to trial in hybrid form. A jury heard 

her claim against Rolston individually. Her FTCA claims against 

the government, plus some additional evidence not given to the 

jury, were submitted to the district court for resolution by bench 

trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52. 

A.

Before diving into the details of the trial, we start with some 

of the district court’s pretrial evidentiary rulings, which are relevant to several issues on appeal but which Alexander does not directly challenge. In June 2021, following pretrial and status conferences in May 2021, the court entered a pretrial order ruling on the 

parties’ motions in limine and other matters.

In relevant part, the district court put limits on the evidence 

Alexander could present or elicit at trial. The court prohibited Alexander from mentioning to the jury “Rolston’s reputation among 

inmates and comments about [him],” the history of assaults or 

other misconduct by FCI Tallahassee personnel and any related investigations that did not involve Rolston, and settlements with 

other alleged victims, among other information.

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Nonetheless, the district court allowed evidence of other alleged assaults by Rolston, as well as “the conduct of unnecessary 

PAP smears by [him], whether occurring before or after the alleged 

assault of Ms. Alexander.” The latter statement refers to two affidavits prepared in connection with a Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) investigation into Rolston. In the affidavits, Letitia Davis, a nursing 

assistant at FCI Tallahassee, asserted that Rolston conducted Pap 

tests and anal exams when they were not necessary or wanted, and 

that half of the Pap tests she observed Rolston perform were unnecessary. The court explained that Alexander could use the evidence to impeach Davis’s testimony at trial “with a prior inconsistent statement,” but not “as affirmative evidence on its own” because it was hearsay.

B. 

At trial, Alexander testified that Rolston sexually abused her 

during a medical examination in September 2016. Alexander explained that, while she was a prisoner at FCI Tallahassee, she had 

requested to see a doctor for a vaginal bacterial infection. By the 

time she was seen, though, she had used a home remedy to fix the 

problem, and she informed medical staff that the visit was unnecessary when she arrived. Yet Rolston still wanted to do a Pap test

and pelvic exam, even after finding out that Alexander had her period and felt uncomfortable. 

During the exam, Alexander felt Rolston touch her clitoris

twice in circular motions while he inserted his fingers into her 

vagina. The nursing assistant and chaperone, Davis, was not 

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looking at the time. Alexander began to cry once Rolston finished 

the exam and left the room. As she was crying, Rolston returned

and offered to conduct a breast exam, which she refused. Then, 

while Alexander was waiting to leave the medical area, a guard saw 

her crying and advised her to “speak up” for herself and others “[i]f 

he did something to you,” which Alexander understood to refer to 

“the other women that it had happened to that [she] wasn’t aware 

of.”

Five other women testified about similar experiences during 

medical exams conducted by Rolston at FCI Tallahassee. The 

court repeatedly made clear to the jury that it could evaluate this 

testimony for only the purpose of evaluating Rolston’s intent when 

examining Alexander. Several women reported that Rolston 

touched their clitoris, sometimes with circular motions, during a 

pelvic exam or Pap test. A few said he squeezed their breasts or 

pinched their nipples during breast exams in ways that felt inappropriate. Many of these witnesses also testified that they did not report the sexual abuse for fear of retaliation or loss of privileges. Because of complaints by Alexander and others, Rolston was transferred to a men’s facility. 

Rolston testified in his defense and called several witnesses, 

including supervisors and coworkers. After a brief rebuttal witness, 

the case against Rolston was submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict for Rolston, finding he did not engage in a sexual 

act or sexual contact during his exam of Alexander. 

 

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C. 

After Alexander rested her case, the government moved for 

judgment on the two claims against it. The district court noted 

that it could “find facts” on its own as to those claims, in contrast 

to the claim against Rolston, which was for the jury. The court 

heard argument from the parties and then entered judgment for 

the government. 

On the battery claim, the district court found that if Rolston 

committed the sexual acts alleged, he was not “doing the government’s business” or a “slight deviation” from that business, but rather a “profoundly different undertaking than what he was hired to 

do and could appropriately do.” So, in the court’s view, the alleged

conduct was outside the scope of both his employment and the 

government’s vicarious liability. 

On the negligence claim, the district court concluded that 

there was “no failure to use reasonable care” that harmed Alexander. The court explained there was no evidence that the government was aware Rolston had been accused of sexual misconduct 

before July 2016, when an inmate named Shendolyn Blevins complained that Rolston had touched her breasts through her shirt 

without a chaperone present. The court noted, however, that during the prompt BOP investigation of her complaint, Blevins “said 

very clearly nothing inappropriate happened during the exam,” 

and that she just wanted a female provider or chaperone. Because 

Blevins denied improper sexual contact, the court reasoned that 

the government was not negligent in allowing Rolston to continue 

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to perform “well woman” exams. The court also noted that Alexander was not harmed by the lack of a female chaperone because 

one was present for her exam with Rolston.

II.

We start with the district court’s evidentiary rulings, which 

we review for an abuse of discretion. Lamonica v. Safe Hurricane 

Shutters, Inc., 711 F.3d 1299, 1317 (11th Cir. 2013). The court has 

broad authority to control the admissibility of evidence and the 

manner of examining witnesses. United States v. Pon, 963 F.3d 

1207, 1223 (11th Cir. 2020); City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., 

Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 556 (11th Cir. 1998); see Fed. R. Evid. 611(a). 

The abuse-of-discretion standard allows “a range of choice for the 

district court,” so long as the court does not make a mistake of law 

or a clear error of judgment. Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cnty., 402 F.3d 1092, 1103–04 (11th Cir. 2005). 

Even where a district court abuses its discretion on an evidentiary issue, relief is not warranted unless “substantial rights 

were affected.” Proctor v. Fluor Enters., Inc., 494 F.3d 1337, 1352 

(11th Cir. 2007). That standard is met only if “the error probably 

had a substantial influence on the jury’s verdict.” Id. (quotation 

marks omitted). 

Alexander contends that the district court abused its discretion in handling five evidentiary issues, which resulted in an unfair 

trial, but we are not persuaded. We consider each issue in turn. 

 

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A. 

First, the record does not support Alexander’s claim that she 

was “never permitted to explore reasons why a prisoner might be 

afraid to decline unwanted care.” 

The trial transcript shows that the district court allowed Alexander to inquire about these matters so long as the testimony 

was limited to “why the witness did what the witness did” and was 

not simply a conduit for rumors. For instance, Alexander testified 

that she did not feel free to decline treatment in prison because “it’s 

what they say” and “[y]ou are up under their rules.” Blevins testified that she “didn’t question” the medical staff or Rolston 

“[b]ecause [she] didn’t want to go to the SHU,” or the Special Housing Unit, and the jury heard why the SHU was less desirable. Another witness, Daphne Rodriguez, testified that she had suffered 

retaliation after disagreeing with prison medical providers, stating 

that “[t]hey don’t help you at all” and will ignore your requests for 

treatment. In addition, multiple witnesses testified about fear of 

retaliation or loss of privileges for reporting sexual abuse in prison.

Alexander cites two instances where the district court purportedly “shut her counsel down” when inquiring why inmates 

might be afraid to decline care or report abuse. But in those 

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instances, the court appears to have simply sustained narrow objections to specific questions, not imposed any broad prohibitions.2

In one instance, the district court sustained two objections 

to questions of Alexander about refusing medical treatment at FCI 

Tallahassee as leading, and Alexander does not dispute that the 

questions were leading as phrased. Moreover, the questions lacked 

foundation because Alexander had not yet testified about her examination with Rolston or whether she felt free to decline Rolston’s conduct.

In the other instance, a witness was permitted to describe in 

general terms the negative consequences she suffered after disagreeing with prison medical providers. But the district court prohibited counsel from inquiring about “specific episodes of that kind 

of problem.” Because that witness’s testimony was admitted “only 

for the purpose of evaluating Rolston’s intent,” her specific interactions with prison officials other than Rolston were not relevant to 

the issues at trial and instead could have confused the issues and 

wasted time. We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in excluding this evidence. 

2 At some points in the trial transcripts, the basis for or fact of an objection are 

not apparent. The district court addressed this matter at trial, explaining that 

“there will be a number of places where I have said ‘sustained’ without the 

transcript [saying] that anybody said ‘objection’. Because you were standing 

up, and it seemed clear to me what the objection was, and so I said ‘sustained.’” We therefore look to the surrounding context to inform our analysis

of the court’s rulings. 

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B. 

Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in exercising 

control over the examination of Davis, a nursing assistant at FCI 

Tallahassee. As we noted above, Davis prepared affidavits for purposes of a BOP investigation stating her opinions that Rolston conducted Pap tests and anal exams which were not necessary or 

wanted, and that half of the Pap tests she observed Rolston perform 

were unnecessary. Alexander called Davis as a witness during her 

case-in-chief, and her counsel began asking Davis about the prior 

statements in the affidavits on direct examination without first eliciting testimony about the matters covered in the affidavits. 

The district court sustained multiple objections to this line 

of inquiry, ultimately advising Alexander’s counsel, “You may ask

her on the stand what her testimony is. You may not ask her first 

what her testimony was at some other time.” The court then permitted counsel to ask over objection, “Do you believe that Paul 

Rolston did Pap smears 50 percent of the time that were unnecessary?” Davis responded indirectly that prisoners were frequently 

“scheduled for something else but when [Rolston] looked in the 

computer he would say that they would need a Pap smear” as well. 

Alexander’s counsel did not seek further clarification or elaboration

of this response, nor did he attempt to impeach Davis at that time 

with her prior statements. 

Here, Alexander has not shown an abuse of the district 

court’s discretion. In Alexander’s view, the court erred in excluding Davis’s affidavits as hearsay because they were prior 

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inconsistent statements admissible to impeach her. See United 

States v. Khanani, 502 F.3d 1281, 1292 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[P]rior inconsistent statements of a witness are admissible to impeach that 

witness.”). But as the district court explained, counsel attempted 

to ask Davis about the content of the prior statements on direct 

examination without first eliciting testimony that was inconsistent 

with those statements. The court previously had warned counsel 

he could not introduce Davis’s “out-of-court-statement[s] as affirmative evidence on its own.” In our view, the court reasonably required counsel to first elicit testimony at trial inconsistent with Davis’s prior statements before asking her about them. Indeed, a witness cannot be impeached if she has not testified in a way that is 

inconsistent with the prior statement the questioner seeks to use to 

impeach her.

Alexander maintains that it was proper to impeach Davis on 

her response denying that she “ma[d]e any critical comment about 

the way [Rolston] does Pap smears” and stating that she “just said 

he did them different from what I saw other providers do them.”

We disagree. Counsel had not asked Davis any questions about 

her views on the way Rolston did Pap tests or the necessity of the 

procedures he conducted. So again, there was no basis to impeach 

testimony on those points with prior statements. Nor is it apparent 

that Davis’s testimony was inconsistent with the statements in her 

affidavit, which likewise stated that she had never seen a medical 

provider perform Pap tests like Rolston.

 

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C.

We see no support in the record for Alexander’s claim that 

the district court prevented her from rebutting testimony about 

training on or implementation of the Prison Rape Elimination Act

(“PREA”). Again, Alexander mischaracterizes the court’s rulings. 

During cross-examination of Rolston, the district court prevented Alexander’s counsel from asking about “complaints of sexual violations at FCI by other officials” than Rolston. It then instructed the jury that whether “there had been violations of the 

Prison Rape Elimination Act by other officials at the institution” 

had “absolutely nothing to do with this case,” which was solely 

about what “Mr. Rolston might have done.” But the court permitted counsel to question Rolston generally about reporting PREA 

complaints by inmates, and it said counsel could also inquire about 

the incidents described in witness testimony. The court’s actions 

are consistent with its pretrial evidentiary rulings, which Alexander 

does not directly challenge on appeal. We see no abuse of the 

court’s discretion. 

D.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting

reputation testimony supporting Rolston while excluding evidence 

of his reputation in prison. 

As part of his defense, Rolston called several witnesses to offer testimony about his work performance and professionalism 

based on personal knowledge as his coworkers or supervisors. 

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During cross-examination of one of these witnesses—Harold 

White, the assistant health service administrator at FCI Tallahassee—the district court sustained objections to the question, “Have 

people come to you and said that he has multiple women complaining about him?,” and an attempted follow-up question.

Outside the jury’s presence, the district court explained that 

these questions violated the pretrial order’s prohibition on the jury 

hearing evidence of Rolston’s reputation among inmates or comments about him. Alexander’s counsel argued that the questions 

were relevant to the case because “one of the nurses had reported 

to [White] that there were complaints.” The court responded that 

relevance was not an excuse to violate the pretrial order, and that, 

if counsel had grounds for believing “this ought to be admitted, the 

way to deal with it is to raise it with me outside the jury’s hearing.” 

It does not appear the issue was raised again. 

Alexander contends that Rolston opened the door to inquiry 

into Rolston’s reputation by offering witness testimony about his 

professionalism and sterling reputation. Her briefing, however, 

fails to identify an instance where the district court prevented questioning of Rolston’s witnesses about the specific allegations by Alexander and the other women who testified at trial. See Fed. R. 

Evid. 405(a) (“On cross-examination of the character witness, the 

court may allow an inquiry into relevant specific instances of the 

person’s conduct.”). Plus, even assuming the questions by Alexander’s counsel were valid impeachment and would justify overriding the pretrial order, there was no abuse of discretion because, as 

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the court directed, the matter should have been raised with the 

court beforehand. 

Alexander’s real complaint appears to be the district court’s 

pretrial ruling that she could not offer testimony about prison rumors or Rolston’s reputation in prison. In particular, the court 

barred Alexander from offering evidence that it was “common 

knowledge among the inmates that Rolston performed unnecessary pelvic exams and took sexual liberties in the course of those 

exams.” In refusing to admit this testimony, the district court explained that “we don’t try cases on rumors,” and that the rumor 

evidence was not based on personal knowledge.3 Alexander offers 

no rebuttal to the court’s explanation and has not shown that the 

court made a clear error of judgment or a mistake of law by excluding this evidence. 

Moreover, even if the district court abused its discretion by 

improperly limiting cross-examination of White to show that 

“White did nothing,” Alexander has not shown that this “error 

probably had a substantial influence on the jury’s verdict.” Proctor, 

494 F.3d at 1352. White was a brief witness in the three-day trial 

and one of several witnesses who testified about working with or 

supervising Rolston. His testimony was not so significant that it 

prejudiced Alexander, even assuming the court should have 

3 Nevertheless, the district court permitted “evidence that anybody that 

worked for the Bureau of Prisons ever heard the rumor” only for the claims 

against the government. 

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permitted inquiry into White’s knowledge of complaints against 

Rolston. As the district court repeatedly emphasized, the actions 

of other prison official like White were not relevant to the issue 

before the jury, which concerned what happened during the exam 

in September 2016. So evidence that “White did nothing” in response to complaints about Rolston would have properly been excluded as irrelevant and confusing. And we see no indication more 

broadly that Alexander was prevented from effectively impeaching 

Rolston’s witnesses. 

E.

Finally, Alexander claims that the district court should have 

excluded, under Rules 403 and 408, Fed. R. Evid., evidence that Alexander filed a claim with the government—a presuit requirement 

under the FTCA—for $5 million in damages arising from the 

events involving Rolston. The parties dispute whether the damages request on an FTCA claim form is subject to Rule 408, which 

generally prohibits evidence of compromise offers or negotiations, 

but we need not resolve that issue. Even assuming Rule 408 applies, that rule excepts evidence admitted “for another purpose, 

such as proving a witness’s bias or prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 408(b). 

Here, the evidence was offered for impeachment purposes 

on cross-examination and was arguably relevant to Alexander’s valuation of her claim and her biases as a witness. See United States 

v. Hall, 653 F.2d 1002, 1008 (5th Cir. Aug. 1981) (“[A] witness’s motivation for testifying, as well as any potential incentives for 

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falsification, are always relevant lines of inquiry.”).4 Alexander has 

developed no supporting argument for her assertion that the evidence should have been excluded under Rule 403 as substantially 

more prejudicial than probative. In any case, we are not persuaded 

that any error on this point, which was a brief, isolated point on 

cross-examination, had a prejudicial effect on the trial. 

F.

More broadly, Alexander maintains that the district court’s 

evidentiary errors resulted in a one-sided presentation of the evidence and denied her a fair trial. But on closer inspection, her bold 

claims of error, and at times her descriptions of the court’s actions 

more generally, are simply not supported by the record. Rather, 

the record reflects that the district court made and enforced clear, 

reasonable guidelines about permissible evidence and questioning, 

within which Alexander was afforded a full and fair opportunity to 

present her case. No trial is perfect, and any evidentiary errors in 

this case, in our view, fall well short of showing an effect on her 

substantial rights. See Proctor, 494 F.3d at 1352; see also 

McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 

(1984) (“This Court has long held that a litigant is entitled to a fair 

trial but not a perfect one, for there are no perfect trials.”) (cleaned 

up).

4 This Court adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions prior to 

October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 

1981) (en banc). 

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For these reasons, we affirm the judgment for Rolston.

III.

Next, we consider the FTCA claims, which were resolved by

bench trial. “On appeal from a bench trial, the district court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, but its findings of fact shall 

not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.” Compulife Software Inc. 

v. Newman, 959 F.3d 1288, 1301 (11th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). A 

factual finding is clearly erroneous if, based on the record as a 

whole, we are confident that the court made a mistake. Morrissette-Brown v. Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr., 506 F.3d 1317, 1319 

(11th Cir. 2007). But if the court’s account of the evidence is reasonable, we must affirm. Id.

A.

Alexander argues that the district court erred in evaluating 

her FTCA negligence claim by focusing solely on the “74 days” between Blevins’s complaint and Alexander’s examination. In her 

view, evidence of a broader “culture of impunity” at FCI Tallahassee with regard to sexual abuse by staff, including lengthy delays in 

investigating Alexander’s and others’ allegations of sexual abuse, 

foreseeably led to the harm she suffered. 

The FTCA permits claims against the government for “violations of state law by federal employees.” Shivers v. United States, 

1 F.4th 924, 928 (11th Cir. 2021). To succeed on a claim of negligence under Florida law, “a plaintiff must establish the four elements of duty, breach, proximate causation, and damages.” 

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Limones v. Sch. Dist. of Lee Cnty., 161 So. 3d 384, 389 (Fla. 2015). 

Whether a duty exists is a legal question, but “the remaining elements of negligence—breach, proximate causation, and damages—are to be resolved by the fact-finder.” Id.

Alexander’s briefing largely sidesteps the reasons for the district court’s ruling in favor of the government on her negligence 

claim. The court found, in relevant part, that there was no evidence of complaints about sexual misconduct by Rolston before 

July 16, 2016, when an inmate, Blevins, complained that he conducted a breast exam through her shirt without a chaperone present. So, according to the court, the “whole question” was whether

the government “use[d] reasonable care between that date and 

September 27th, 2016, when Ms. Alexander had her examination.”

On that question, the district court noted that Blevins later 

“said very clearly nothing inappropriate happened during the 

exam.” As a result, the court reasoned, it was “not negligent for 

the government to allow Mr. Rolston to continue to conduct well 

woman” exams. The court further explained that, even if the government had been negligent to allow Rolston to have previously

conducted an exam without a same-sex chaperone present, Alexander did not suffer any resulting harm because a chaperone was 

present for her examination. Accordingly, the court determined 

that there was “no failure to use reasonable care” that harmed Alexander.

Here, Alexander has not shown that the district court committed a legal error or made clearly erroneous factual findings. We 

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reject the claim that the court improperly “clos[ed] the door on the 

past conduct of Rolston at FCI Tallahassee.” The court explained 

that Alexander was free to present evidence against the government “that anybody that worked for the Bureau of Prisons ever 

heard the rumor” that “Rolston is a sexual abuser” before the assault on Alexander. But as Alexander’s counsel admitted in the district court, there was “[n]o evidence of any allegation against Mr. 

Rolston before the assault on Ms. Alexander,” apart from Blevins’s 

complaint. We also see no reason to second-guess the court’s ruling that evidence of what prison officials heard or did after Alexander’s September 27, 2016, exam was not relevant to what they 

should have done before that date, which is what the negligence 

claim was about. Negligence committed after Alexander’s injury 

could not have foreseeably caused that injury. 

Despite her broad claims of a “culture of impunity” at the 

prison, Alexander identifies no evidence that would have given 

prison officials reason to credibly suspect Rolston of sexual abuse

at the time he examined her. She admits it was “not . . . clearly 

erroneous” for the court to find that Blevins, after making the complaint, “said very clearly nothing inappropriate happened during 

the exam.” Because the sole complainant before Alexander had denied sexual misconduct, the court reasonably concluded that the 

government did not breach a duty to Alexander and others by permitting Rolston to continue performing “well woman” exams, so 

long as a chaperone was present. See Morrissette-Brown, 506 F.3d 

at 1319; Limones, 161 So. 3d at 389. 

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B.

Next, Alexander challenges the district court’s conclusion

that the government was not vicariously liable under the FTCA because any battery committed by Rolston against Alexander was 

outside the scope of his employment. 

Under the FTCA, the government’s vicarious liability is limited to instances where a government employee was “acting within 

the scope of his or her employment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). 

“[W]hether an employee’s actions are within the scope of his employment for purposes of the [FTCA] is an issue governed by the 

law of the state where the incident occurred.” S.J. & W. Ranch, 

Inc. v. Lehtinen, 913 F.2d 1538, 1542 (11th Cir. 1990), amended, 924 

F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1991). Because the incident here occurred in 

Florida, that state’s law governs. 

Under Florida law, an employee’s conduct is “within the 

course and scope of employment when it (1) is of the kind the employee is hired to perform, (2) occurs substantially within the time 

and space limits authorized or required by the work to be performed, and (3) is activated at least in part by a purpose to serve the 

master.” Goss v. Human Servs. Assocs., Inc., 79 So. 3d 127, 132 

(Fla. 5th DCA 2012). Applying this three-part test, Florida court 

have generally held sexual torts “to be outside the scope of an employee’s employment and, therefore, insufficient to impose vicarious liability on the employer.” Id. (quotation marks omitted); Nazareth v. Herndon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 467 So. 2d 1076, 1078 (Fla. 

5th DCA 2012). 

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Alexander maintains that Rolston’s alleged conduct of 

“[r]ubbing the clitoris without a medical purpose” could be described as a “slight deviation” from the government’s business, not 

an abandonment of it, and that Rolston “intersperse[d] actual work 

in the employer’s behalf with actionable sexual conduct.” She cites 

case law indicating that such “dual purpose” conduct by employees 

may be within the scope of employment. 

Yet, importantly, Alexander concedes that it was for the 

“factfinder” to resolve whether Rolston’s conduct was within the 

scope of his employment. And here, the factfinder was the district 

court, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 52, which found that the alleged sexual 

battery was not motivated by a purpose to serve the government’s 

business, and that it was a “profoundly different undertaking than 

what he was hired to do and could appropriately do.”

We are not convinced that the district court clearly erred in 

finding that Rolston’s alleged sexual abuse was outside the scope of 

his employment. See Morrissette-Brown, 506 F.3d at 1319. Rather, 

the record supports the court’s findings that the alleged sexual 

abuse was not the kind of conduct Rolston was hired to perform 

and was not motivated in any way by a purpose to serve the government. Those findings are also consistent with how Florida law 

generally treats sexual torts by employees. See Goss, 79 So. 3d at 

132 (“[T]he sexual assault was not within the course and scope of 

her employment because the act was not in furtherance of her employment.”). So even assuming the record supported a contrary 

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finding, the district court’s view of the evidence was not clearly erroneous. See Compulife Software, 959 F.3d at 1301.

IV.

For these reasons, we affirm the judgment for Rolston on 

Alexander’s Eighth Amendment claim and for the government on 

her claims under the FTCA. 

AFFIRMED.

USCA11 Case: 21-13720 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2022 Page: 22 of 22