NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BARBARA A. HAASE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of 

Social Security, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-36054 

D.C. No. 3:17-cv-05194-MAT 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Mary Alice Theiler, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 24, 2020**

Before: FARRIS, TROTT, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges. 

Barbara A. Haase appeals the district court’s affirmance of the 

Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability 

insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

FEB 26 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-36054 

Social Security Act (Act). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g). We review de novo, Attmore v. Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 875 (9th 

Cir. 2016), and we affirm.

The ALJ did not err in evaluating the medical record, and substantial 

evidence supports the ALJ’s findings that Haase received conservative treatment, 

had only minimal follow up with recommended treatment, findings on examination 

were normal or “fairly benign,” and there were significant periods with no 

treatment or prescription medication. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 

(9th Cir. 2012) (this court may “reverse only if the ALJ’s decision was not 

supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole or if the ALJ applied the 

wrong legal standard”). See also Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 667 (9th Cir. 

2017) (the aggressiveness of treatment is evaluated in the context of the specific 

condition being treated). The ALJ did not err by not discussing a physical 

therapist’s findings. See Vincent ex rel. Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394-

95 (9th Cir. 1984) (ALJ “need not discuss all evidence” and must only explain why 

“significant probative evidence has been rejected” (emphasis in original)). 

The ALJ provided germane reasons to discount the opinion of physician’s 

assistant Rashpal Raj because the opinion lacked support, Raj assessed limitations 

lasting only six months, and his opinion was less persuasive than that of examining 

physician Derek Leinenbach, who conducted a more thorough examination. See
3 17-36054 

Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111 (ALJ may reject opinions from “other sources,” 

including physician’s assistants, by providing germane reasons). The ALJ did not 

err by giving significant weight to Dr. Leinenbach’s opinion and to the opinion of 

medical advisor Drew Stevick. See Turner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 613 F.3d 1217, 

1223 (9th Cir. 2010) (ALJ did not need to provide reasons where the ALJ did not 

reject the doctor’s conclusions).

The ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing reasons to discount

Haase’s testimony, including a lack of corroborating evidence, conservative 

treatment with minimal follow up, significant periods of time with no treatment or 

prescription medication, inconsistent statements concerning urinary disfunction, 

and because Haase stopped working for reasons unrelated to her impairment. See

Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112; Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750-51 (9th Cir. 2007); 

Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005); Bruton v. Massanari, 268 

F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ did not err in rejecting Haase’s testimony 

that she had not sought treatment because she could not afford it, where the ALJ 

pointed to evidence that Haase had not tried to apply for medical insurance, she 

had not followed through with available treatment, and she had not sought 

alternative treatment from free clinics. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 113-14 (ALJ may 

discount testimony based on a finding that the claimant’s proffered reason for not 

seeking treatment is not believable). Any error in discounting Haase’s testimony 
4 17-36054 

as inconsistent with her activities was harmless. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115. 

The ALJ did not err in formulating Haase’s residual functional capacity 

(RFC) or posing hypotheticals to the vocational expert (VE). Haase’s arguments 

concerning the RFC repeat her allegations that the ALJ erred in evaluating the 

medical evidence and in discounting her symptom testimony. Because Haase did 

not show harmful error in the earlier analysis, these arguments lack support. See 

Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2008).

The ALJ did not err or violate her duty to develop the record by not giving 

the VE a letter from Haase. The ALJ correctly determined that the letter 

challenged the RFC and did not present questions for the VE. The ALJ considered 

Haase’s allegations of pain and other symptoms in formulating the RFC. See 

Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217-18 (9th Cir. 2005) (ALJ did not err 

where the RFC “contained all of the limitations that the ALJ found credible and 

supported by substantial evidence in the record”).

AFFIRMED.