62592 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 196 / Tuesday, October 12, 2010 / Notices 

Foundation announces the following 

meeting: 

Name: Committee on Equal Opportunities 

in Science and Engineering (1173). 

Dates/Time: October 25, 2010, 8:30 a.m.– 

5:30 p.m., October 26, 2010, 8:30 a.m.–2 p.m. 

Place: National Science Foundation (NSF), 

4201 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 

22230. 

To help facilitate your access into the 

building, please contact the individual listed 

below prior to the meeting so that a visitor’s 

badge may be prepared for you in advance. 

Type of Meeting: Open. 

Contact Person: Dr. Margaret E.M. Tolbert, 

Senior Advisor and CEOSE Executive 

Liaison, Office of Integrative Activities, 

National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson 

Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22230. 

Telephone Numbers: (703) 292–4216, 703– 

292–8040; mtolbert@nsf.gov. 

Minutes: Minutes may be obtained from 

the Executive Liaison at the above address or 

the Web site at http://www.nsf.gov/od/oia/ 

activities/ceose/index.jsp. 

Purpose of Meeting: To study NSF 

programs and policies and provide advice 

and recommendations to the National 

Science Foundation (NSF) concerning 

broadening participation in science and 

engineering. 

Agenda 

Monday and Tuesday, October 25–26, 2010 

Opening Statements by the CEOSE Chairs 

Presentations and Discussions: 

✔ Expanding Minority Participation: 

America’s Science and Technology Talent 

at the Crossroads 

✔ Reports from CEOSE Liaisons to NSF 

Advisory Committees 

✔ Progress Report on Correcting the MultiRace Coding Error in the Survey of 

Doctorate Recipients 

✔ The Process for Filling CEOSE 

Membership Vacancies 

✔ Appointment of CEOSE Liaisons to NSF 

Advisory Committees 

✔ Establishment of CEOSE Ad Hoc 

Subcommittees 

✔ An Update on Plans to Establish the 

Science of Broadening Participation 

Program 

✔ A Conversation with the Leader(s) of the 

National Science Foundation 

Dated: October 6, 2010. 

Susanne Bolton, 

Committee Management Officer. 

[FR Doc. 2010–25525 Filed 10–8–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7555–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[NRC–2010–0308] 

Applications and Amendments to 

Facility Operating Licenses Involving 

Proposed No Significant Hazards 

Considerations and Containing 

Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards 

Information and Order Imposing 

Procedures for Access to Sensitive 

Unclassified Non-Safeguards 

Information 

I. Background 

Pursuant to section 189a. (2) of the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended 

(the Act), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (the Commission or NRC 

staff) is publishing this notice. The Act 

requires the Commission publish notice 

of any amendments issued, or proposed 

to be issued and grants the Commission 

the authority to issue and make 

immediately effective any amendment 

to an operating license upon a 

determination by the Commission that 

such amendment involves no significant 

hazards consideration, notwithstanding 

the pendency before the Commission of 

a request for a hearing from any person. 

This notice includes notices of 

amendments containing sensitive 

unclassified non-safeguards information 

(SUNSI). 

Notice of Consideration of Issuance of 

Amendments to Facility Operating 

Licenses, Proposed No Significant 

Hazards Consideration Determination, 

and Opportunity for a Hearing 

The Commission has made a 

proposed determination that the 

following amendment requests involve 

no significant hazards consideration. 

Under the Commission’s regulations in 

Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.92, 

this means that operation of the facility 

in accordance with the proposed 

amendment would not (1) involve a 

significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of 

a new or different kind of accident from 

any accident previously evaluated; or 

(3) involve a significant reduction in a 

margin of safety. The basis for this 

proposed determination for each 

amendment request is shown below. 

The Commission is seeking public 

comments on this proposed 

determination. Any comments received 

within 30 days after the date of 

publication of this notice will be 

considered in making any final 

determination. 

Normally, the Commission will not 

issue the amendment until the 

expiration of 60 days after the date of 

publication of this notice. The 

Commission may issue the license 

amendment before expiration of the 60- 

day period provided that its final 

determination is that the amendment 

involves no significant hazards 

consideration. In addition, the 

Commission may issue the amendment 

prior to the expiration of the 30-day 

comment period should circumstances 

change during the 30-day comment 

period such that failure to act in a 

timely way would result, for example in 

derating or shutdown of the facility. 

Should the Commission take action 

prior to the expiration of either the 

comment period or the notice period, it 

will publish in the Federal Register a 

notice of issuance. Should the 

Commission make a final No Significant 

Hazards Consideration Determination, 

any hearing will take place after 

issuance. The Commission expects that 

the need to take this action will occur 

very infrequently. 

Written comments may be submitted 

by mail to the Chief, Rules, 

Announcements and Directives Branch 

(RADB), TWB–05–B01M, Division of 

Administrative Services, Office of 

Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC 20555– 

0001, and should cite the publication 

date and page number of this Federal 

Register notice. Written comments may 

also be faxed to the RADB at 301–492– 

3446. Documents may be examined, 

and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC’s 

Public Document Room (PDR), located 

at One White Flint North, Public File 

Area O1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first 

floor), Rockville, Maryland. 

Within 60 days after the date of 

publication of this notice, any person(s) 

whose interest may be affected by this 

action may file a request for a hearing 

and a petition to intervene with respect 

to issuance of the amendment to the 

subject facility operating license. 

Requests for a hearing and a petition for 

leave to intervene shall be filed in 

accordance with the Commission’s 

‘‘Rules of Practice for Domestic 

Licensing Proceedings’’ in 10 CFR Part 

2. Interested person(s) should consult a 

current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, which is 

available at the Commission’s PDR, 

located at One White Flint North, Public 

File Area O1F21, 11555 Rockville Pike 

(first floor), Rockville, Maryland, or at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/cfr/part002/part002– 

0309.html. Publicly available records 

will be accessible from the Agencywide 

Documents Access and Management 

System’s (ADAMS) Public Electronic 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 196 / Tuesday, October 12, 2010 / Notices 62593 

Reading Room on the Internet at the 

NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/ 

reading-rm.html. If a request for a 

hearing or petition for leave to intervene 

is filed within 60 days, the Commission 

or a presiding officer designated by the 

Commission or by the Chief 

Administrative Judge of the Atomic 

Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will 

rule on the request and/or petition; and 

the Secretary or the Chief 

Administrative Judge of the Atomic 

Safety and Licensing Board will issue a 

notice of a hearing or an appropriate 

order. 

As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a 

petition for leave to intervene shall set 

forth with particularity the interest of 

the petitioner in the proceeding, and 

how that interest may be affected by the 

results of the proceeding. The petition 

should specifically explain the reasons 

why intervention should be permitted 

with particular reference to the 

following general requirements: (1) The 

name, address, and telephone number of 

the requestor or petitioner; (2) the 

nature of the requestor’s/petitioner’s 

right under the Act to be made a party 

to the proceeding; (3) the nature and 

extent of the requestor’s/petitioner’s 

property, financial, or other interest in 

the proceeding; and (4) the possible 

effect of any decision or order which 

may be entered in the proceeding on the 

requestor’s/petitioner’s interest. The 

petition must also set forth the specific 

contentions which the requestor/ 

petitioner seeks to have litigated at the 

proceeding. 

Each contention must consist of a 

specific statement of the issue of law or 

fact to be raised or controverted. In 

addition, the requestor/petitioner shall 

provide a brief explanation of the bases 

for the contention and a concise 

statement of the alleged facts or expert 

opinion which support the contention 

and on which the requestor/petitioner 

intends to rely in proving the contention 

at the hearing. The requestor/petitioner 

must also provide references to those 

specific sources and documents of 

which the petitioner is aware and on 

which the requestor/petitioner intends 

to rely to establish those facts or expert 

opinion. The petition must include 

sufficient information to show that a 

genuine dispute exists with the 

applicant on a material issue of law or 

fact. Contentions shall be limited to 

matters within the scope of the 

amendment under consideration. The 

contention must be one which, if 

proven, would entitle the requestor/ 

petitioner to relief. A requestor/ 

petitioner who fails to satisfy these 

requirements with respect to at least one 

contention will not be permitted to 

participate as a party. 

Those permitted to intervene become 

parties to the proceeding, subject to any 

limitations in the order granting leave to 

intervene, and have the opportunity to 

participate fully in the conduct of the 

hearing. 

If a hearing is requested, and the 

Commission has not made a final 

determination on the issue of no 

significant hazards consideration, the 

Commission will make a final 

determination on the issue of no 

significant hazards consideration. The 

final determination will serve to decide 

when the hearing is held. If the final 

determination is that the amendment 

request involves no significant hazards 

consideration, the Commission may 

issue the amendment and make it 

immediately effective, notwithstanding 

the request for a hearing. Any hearing 

held would take place after issuance of 

the amendment. If the final 

determination is that the amendment 

request involves a significant hazards 

consideration, any hearing held would 

take place before the issuance of any 

amendment. 

All documents filed in NRC 

adjudicatory proceedings, including a 

request for hearing, a petition for leave 

to intervene, any motion or other 

document filed in the proceeding prior 

to the submission of a request for 

hearing or petition to intervene, and 

documents filed by interested 

governmental entities participating 

under 10 CFR 2.315(c), must be filed in 

accordance with the NRC E-Filing rule 

(72 FR 49139, August 28, 2007). The EFiling process requires participants to 

submit and serve all adjudicatory 

documents over the internet, or in some 

cases to mail copies on electronic 

storage media. Participants may not 

submit paper copies of their filings 

unless they seek an exemption in 

accordance with the procedures 

described below. 

To comply with the procedural 

requirements of E-Filing, at least ten 

(10) days prior to the filing deadline, the 

participant should contact the Office of 

the Secretary by e-mail at 

hearing.docket@nrc.gov, or by telephone 

at (301) 415–1677, to request (1) a 

digital ID certificate, which allows the 

participant (or its counsel or 

representative) to digitally sign 

documents and access the E-Submittal 

server for any proceeding in which it is 

participating; and (2) advise the 

Secretary that the participant will be 

submitting a request or petition for 

hearing (even in instances in which the 

participant, or its counsel or 

representative, already holds an NRCissued digital ID certificate). Based upon 

this information, the Secretary will 

establish an electronic docket for the 

hearing in this proceeding if the 

Secretary has not already established an 

electronic docket. 

Information about applying for a 

digital ID certificate is available on 

NRC’s public Web site at http:// 

www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/ 

apply-certificates.html. System 

requirements for accessing the ESubmittal server are detailed in NRC’s 

‘‘Guidance for Electronic Submission,’’ 

which is available on the agency’s 

public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/ 

site-help/e-submittals.html. Participants 

may attempt to use other software not 

listed on the Web site, but should note 

that the NRC’s E-Filing system does not 

support unlisted software, and the NRC 

Meta System Help Desk will not be able 

to offer assistance in using unlisted 

software. 

If a participant is electronically 

submitting a document to the NRC in 

accordance with the E-Filing rule, the 

participant must file the document 

using the NRC’s online, Web-based 

submission form. In order to serve 

documents through EIE, users will be 

required to install a Web browser plugin from the NRC Web site. Further 

information on the Web-based 

submission form, including the 

installation of the Web browser plug-in, 

is available on the NRC’s public Web 

site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/esubmittals.html. 

Once a participant has obtained a 

digital ID certificate and a docket has 

been created, the participant can then 

submit a request for hearing or petition 

for leave to intervene. Submissions 

should be in Portable Document Format 

(PDF) in accordance with NRC guidance 

available on the NRC public Web site at 

http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/esubmittals.html. A filing is considered 

complete at the time the documents are 

submitted through the NRC’s E-Filing 

system. To be timely, an electronic 

filing must be submitted to the E-Filing 

system no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern 

Time on the due date. Upon receipt of 

a transmission, the E-Filing system 

time-stamps the document and sends 

the submitter an e-mail notice 

confirming receipt of the document. The 

E-Filing system also distributes an email notice that provides access to the 

document to the NRC Office of the 

General Counsel and any others who 

have advised the Office of the Secretary 

that they wish to participate in the 

proceeding, so that the filer need not 

serve the documents on those 

participants separately. Therefore, 

applicants and other participants (or 


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62594 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 196 / Tuesday, October 12, 2010 / Notices 

their counsel or representative) must 

apply for and receive a digital ID 

certificate before a hearing request/ 

petition to intervene is filed so that they 

can obtain access to the document via 

the E-Filing system. 

A person filing electronically using 

the agency’s adjudicatory E-Filing 

system may seek assistance by 

contacting the NRC Meta System Help 

Desk through the ‘‘Contact Us’’ link 

located on the NRC Web site at http:// 

www.nrc.gov/site-help/esubmittals.html, by e-mail at 

MSHD.Resource@nrc.gov, or by a tollfree call at (866) 672–7640. The NRC 

Meta System Help Desk is available 

between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., Eastern 

Time, Monday through Friday, 

excluding government holidays. 

Participants who believe that they 

have a good cause for not submitting 

documents electronically must file an 

exemption request, in accordance with 

10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper 

filing requesting authorization to 

continue to submit documents in paper 

format. Such filings must be submitted 

by: (1) First class mail addressed to the 

Office of the Secretary of the 

Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC 20555– 

0001, Attention: Rulemaking and 

Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, 

express mail, or expedited delivery 

service to the Office of the Secretary, 

Sixteenth Floor, One White Flint North, 

11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 

Maryland, 20852, Attention: 

Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff. 

Participants filing a document in this 

manner are responsible for serving the 

document on all other participants. 

Filing is considered complete by firstclass mail as of the time of deposit in 

the mail, or by courier, express mail, or 

expedited delivery service upon 

depositing the document with the 

provider of the service. A presiding 

officer, having granted an exemption 

request from using E-Filing, may require 

a participant or party to use E-Filing if 

the presiding officer subsequently 

determines that the reason for granting 

the exemption from use of E-Filing no 

longer exists. 

Documents submitted in adjudicatory 

proceedings will appear in NRC’s 

electronic hearing docket which is 

available to the public at http:// 

ehd.nrc.gov/EHD_Proceeding/home.asp, 

unless excluded pursuant to an order of 

the Commission, or the presiding 

officer. Participants are requested not to 

include personal privacy information, 

such as social security numbers, home 

addresses, or home phone numbers in 

their filings, unless an NRC regulation 

or other law requires submission of such 

information. With respect to 

copyrighted works, except for limited 

excerpts that serve the purpose of the 

adjudicatory filings and would 

constitute a Fair Use application, 

participants are requested not to include 

copyrighted materials in their 

submission. 

Petitions for leave to intervene must 

be filed no later than 60 days from the 

date of publication of this notice. Nontimely filings will not be entertained 

absent a determination by the presiding 

officer that the petition or request 

should be granted or the contentions 

should be admitted, based on a 

balancing of the factors specified in 10 

CFR 2.309(c)(1)(i)–(viii). 

For further details with respect to this 

amendment action, see the application 

for amendment which is available for 

public inspection at the Commission’s 

PDR, located at One White Flint North, 

Public File Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville 

Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. 

Publicly available records will be 

accessible electronically from the 

ADAMS Public Electronic Reading 

Room on the Internet at the NRC Web 

site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ 

adams.html. If you do not have access 

to ADAMS or if there are problems in 

accessing the documents located in 

ADAMS, contact the PDR Reference 

staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, 

or by e-mail to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. 

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, LLC, 

R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, LLC, 

and Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, 

LLC, Docket Nos. 50–317, 50–318, 50– 

244, 50–220, and 50–410, Calvert Cliffs 

Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 

(CCNPP), R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power 

Plant (Ginna), Nine Mile Point Nuclear 

Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (NMPNS), 

Calvert County, Maryland, Wayne 

County, New York, and Oswego County, 

New York, Respectively 

Date of amendment request: July 16, 

2010. 

Description of amendment request: 

This amendment request contains 

sensitive unclassified non-safeguards 

information (SUNSI). The proposed 

amendments to the Renewed Facility 

Operating Licenses include: (1) The 

proposed Cyber Security Plan for 

CCNPP, Ginna, and NMPNS, (2) an 

implementation schedule, and (3) a 

proposed sentence to be added to the 

existing physical protection license 

condition for CCNPP, Ginna, and 

NMPNS requiring the licensee to fully 

implement and maintain in effect all 

provisions of the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission-approved Cyber Security 

Plan for CCNPP, Ginna, and NMPNS as 

required by 10 CFR 73.54. A Federal 

Register notice dated March 27, 2009, 

issued the final rule that amended 10 

CFR Part 73.54. The regulations in 10 

CFR 73.54, ‘‘Protection of Digital 

Computer and Communication Systems 

and Networks,’’ establish the 

requirements for a cyber security 

program. This regulation specifically 

requires each licensee currently 

licensed to operate a nuclear power 

plant under Part 50 of this chapter to 

submit a cyber security plan that 

satisfies the requirements of the Rule. 

Each submittal must include a proposed 

implementation schedule, and 

implementation of the licensee’s cyber 

security program must be consistent 

with the approved schedule. The 

background for this application is 

addressed by the NRC Notice of 

Availability, Federal Register Notice, 

Final Rule 10 CFR Part 73, Power 

Reactor Security Requirements, 

published on March 27, 2009, 74 FR 

13926. 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the 

licensee has provided its analysis of the 

issue of no significant hazards 

consideration, which is presented 

below: 

1. The proposed change does not involve 

a significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated. 

The proposed change is required by 10 

CFR 73.54. The Cyber Security Plan conforms 

to the template provided in NEI 08–09, 

Revision 6, with the exception of the 

definition of cyber attack, and provides a 

description of how the requirements of the 

rule will be implemented at CCNPP, NMPNS 

and Ginna. The plan establishes the basis for 

the cyber security program for the three 

stations. 

The proposed Cyber Security Plan does not 

require any plant modifications, alter the 

plant configuration, require new plant 

equipment to be installed, alter accident 

analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or 

affect the function of plant systems or the 

manner in which systems are operated, 

maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. 

The plan establishes how to achieve high 

assurance that nuclear power plant digital 

computer and communication systems and 

networks associated with certain systems and 

functions are adequately protected against 

cyber attacks. This protective function has no 

impact on the probability or consequences of 

an accident previously evaluated. 

The proposed change to the license 

condition in the licenses of CCNPP, NMPNS 

and Ginna adds a sentence to the existing 

license condition for physical protection to 

require implementation and maintenance of 

the Cyber Security Plan. This change is 

administrative and has no impact on the 

probability or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated. 

Therefore, it is concluded that this change 

to the CCNPP, NMPNS and Ginna license 


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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 196 / Tuesday, October 12, 2010 / Notices 62595 

conditions does not involve a significant 

increase in the probability or consequences 

of an accident previously evaluated. 

2. The proposed change does not create the 

possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated. 

The proposed change is required by 10 

CFR 73.54. The Cyber Security Plan conforms 

to the template provided in NEI 08–09, 

Revision 6, with the exception of the 

definition of cyber attack and provides a 

description of how the requirements of the 

rule will be implemented at CCNPP, NMPNS 

and Ginna. The plan establishes the basis for 

the cyber security program for the three 

stations. 

The proposed Cyber Security Plan does not 

require any plant modifications, alter the 

plant configuration, require new plant 

equipment to be installed, alter accident 

analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or 

affect the function of plant systems or the 

manner in which systems are operated, 

maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. 

The plan establishes how to achieve high 

assurance that nuclear power plant digital 

computer and communication systems and 

networks associated with certain systems and 

functions are adequately protected against 

cyber attacks. This protective function has no 

impact on the possibility of a new or 

different kind of accident from any accident 

previously evaluated. 

The proposed change to the license 

condition in the licenses of CCNPP, NMPNS 

and Ginna adds a sentence to the existing 

license condition for physical protection to 

require implementation and maintenance of 

the Cyber Security Plan. This change is 

administrative and has no impact on the 

possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated. 

Therefore, it is concluded that this change 

to the CCNPP, NMPNS and Ginna license 

conditions does not create the possibility of 

a new or different kind of accident from any 

previously evaluated. 

3. The proposed change does not involve 

a significant reduction in a margin of safety. 

The margin of safety in this case is that the 

implementation of the Cyber Security Plan 

does not adversely affect systems or 

equipment important to the operation of the 

plant. 

The proposed change is required by 10 

CFR 73.54. The Cyber Security Plan conforms 

to the template provided in NEI 08–09, 

Revision 6, with the exception of the 

definition of cyber attack and provides a 

description of how the requirements of the 

rule will be implemented at CCNPP, NMPNS 

and Ginna. The plan establishes the basis for 

the cyber security program for the three 

stations. 

The plan establishes the basis for the cyber 

security program for the three stations and 

does not require any plant modifications, 

alter the plant configuration, require new 

plant equipment to be installed, alter 

accident analysis assumptions, add any 

initiators, or affect the function of plant 

systems or the manner in which systems are 

operated, maintained, modified, tested, or 

inspected. The plan establishes how to 

achieve high assurance that nuclear power 

plant digital computer and communication 

systems and networks associated with certain 

systems and functions are adequately 

protected against cyber attacks. This 

protective function has no impact on the 

operation of vital systems or equipment. 

Therefore, the implementation of the 

proposed Cyber Security Plan does not 

involve a significant reduction in a margin of 

safety. 

The proposed change to the license 

condition in the licenses of CCNPP, NMPNS 

and Ginna adds a sentence to the existing 

license condition for physical protection to 

require implementation and maintenance of 

the Cyber Security Plan. This change is 

administrative and does not involve a 

significant reduction in a margin of safety. 

Therefore, the proposed change to the 

CCNPP, NMPNS and Ginna license 

conditions and implementation of the 

proposed Cyber Security Plan do not create 

a significant reduction in a margin of safety. 

Based on the above, we conclude that the 

proposed change presents no significant 

hazards consideration under the standards 

set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and accordingly, 

a finding of no significant hazards 

consideration is justified. 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensee’s analysis and, based on this 

review, it appears that the three 

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff 

proposes to determine that the 

amendment request involves no 

significant hazards consideration. 

Attorney for licensee: Carey Fleming, 

Sr. Counsel—Nuclear Generation, 

Constellation Generation Group, LLC, 

750 East Pratt Street, 17th floor, 

Baltimore, MD 21202. 

NRC Branch Chief: Nancy L. Salgado. 

Carolina Power and Light Company, 

Docket Nos. 50–325 and 50–324, 

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 

and 2, Brunswick County, North 

Carolina 

Florida Power Corporation, et al., 

Docket No. 50–302, Crystal River Unit 

No. 3 Nuclear Generating Plant, Citrus 

County, Florida 

Carolina Power & Light Company, 

Docket No. 50–261, H. B. Robinson 

Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2, 

Darlington County, South Carolina 

Carolina Power & Light Company, et al., 

Docket No. 50–400, Shearon Harris 

Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Wake and 

Chatham Counties, North Carolina 

Date of amendment request: July 8, 

2010. 

Description of amendment request: 

This amendment request contains 

sensitive unclassified non-safeguards 

information (SUNSI). The proposed 

amendments would establish a fleet 

Cyber Security Plan in conformance 

with the model Cyber Security Plan 

contained in Appendix A of Nuclear 

Energy Institute (NEI) document NEI 

08–09, ‘‘Cyber Security Plan for Nuclear 

Power Reactors,’’ Revision 6, dated April 

2010, with one deviation regarding the 

definition of a Cyber Attack as described 

in the licensees’ letter. The license 

amendment requests include the Cyber 

Security Plan, proposed changes to the 

(Renewed) Facility Operating Licenses 

(FOLs), and a proposed Cyber Security 

Plan Implementation Schedule for each 

facility. The proposed fleet Cyber 

Security Plan was submitted in 

accordance with Title 10 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations, Section 73.54, 

‘‘Protection of digital computer and 

communication systems and networks.’’ 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the 

licensees provided their analysis of the 

issue of no significant hazards 

consideration, which is presented 

below: 

Criterion 1: The Proposed Change Does Not 

Involve a Significant Increase in the 

Probability or Consequences of an Accident 

Previously Evaluated 

The proposed change incorporates a new 

requirement, in the FOL, to implement and 

maintain a Cyber Security Plan as part of the 

facility’s overall program for physical 

protection. The Cyber Security Plan itself 

does not require any plant modifications. 

Rather, the Cyber Security Plan describes 

how the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54 are 

implemented in order to identify, evaluate, 

and mitigate cyber attacks up to and 

including the design basis threat, thereby 

achieving high assurance that the facility’s 

digital computer and communications 

systems and networks are protected from 

cyber attacks. The proposed change requiring 

the implementation and maintenance of a 

Cyber Security Plan does not alter the plant 

configuration, require new plant equipment 

to be installed, alter accident analysis 

assumptions, add any accident initiators, or 

affect the function of plant systems or the 

manner in which systems are operated, 

maintained, modified, tested, or inspected; 

therefore, the inclusion of the Cyber Security 

Plan as a part of the facility’s other physical 

protection programs specified in the FOL has 

no impact on the probability or consequences 

of an accident previously evaluated. 

Criterion 2: The Proposed Change Does Not 

Create the Possibility of a New or Different 

Kind of Accident From Any Accident 

Previously Evaluated. 

The proposed change incorporates a new 

requirement, in the FOL, to implement and 

maintain a Cyber Security Plan as part of the 

facility’s overall program for physical 

protection. The creation of the possibility of 

a new or different kind of accident requires 

creating one or more new accident 

precursors. New accident precursors may be 

created by modifications of the plant’s 

configuration, including changes in the 


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62596 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 196 / Tuesday, October 12, 2010 / Notices 

allowable modes of operation. The Cyber 

Security Plan itself does not require any 

plant modifications, nor does the Cyber 

Security Plan affect the control parameters 

governing unit operation or the response of 

plant equipment to a transient condition. 

Because the proposed change does not 

change or introduce any new equipment, 

modes of system operation, or failure 

mechanisms, no new accident precursors are 

created. Therefore, the proposed change does 

not create the possibility of a new or different 

kind of accident from any accident 

previously evaluated. 

Criterion 3: The Proposed Change Does Not 

Involve a Significant Reduction in a Margin 

of Safety 

The proposed change incorporates a new 

requirement, in the FOL, to implement and 

maintain a Cyber Security Plan as part of the 

facility’s overall program for physical 

protection. Plant safety margins are 

established through Limiting Conditions for 

Operation, Limiting Safety System Settings 

and Safety Limits specified in the Technical 

Specifications. Because the Cyber Security 

Plan does not require any plant modifications 

and does not alter the operation of plant 

equipment, the proposed change does not 

change established safety margins. Therefore, 

the proposed change does not involve a 

significant reduction in a margin of safety. 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensees’ analysis and, based on this 

review, it appears that the three 

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff 

proposes to determine that the 

amendment requests involve no 

significant hazards consideration. 

Attorney for licensee: David T. 

Conley, Associate General Counsel II— 

Legal Department, Progress Energy 

Service Company, LLC, Post Office Box 

1551, Raleigh, North Carolina 27602. 

NRC Branch Chief: Douglas A. 

Broaddus. 

Entergy Gulf States Louisiana, LLC, and 

Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50– 

458, River Bend Station, Unit 1, West 

Feliciana Parish, Louisiana 

Date of amendment request: July 22, 

2010. 

Description of amendment request: 

This amendment request contains 

sensitive unclassified non-safeguards 

information (SUNSI). The proposed 

amendment would approve the River 

Bend Station (RBS) Cyber Security Plan, 

in accordance with 10 CFR 73.54. In 

addition, the amendment would revise 

the RBS facility operating license to add 

a sentence to require the licensee to 

fully implement and maintain in effect 

all provisions of the Commissionapproved RBS Cyber Security Plan. The 

proposed change is consistent with 

Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 08–09, 

Revision 6, ‘‘Cyber Security Plan for 

Nuclear Power Reactors.’’ 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the 

licensee has provided its analysis of the 

issue of no significant hazards 

consideration, which is presented 

below: 

1. Does the proposed change involve a 

significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has 

submitted a cyber security plan for NRC 

review and approval for River Bend Station 

(RBS). The RBS Cyber Security Plan does not 

alter accident analysis assumptions, add any 

initiators, or affect the function of plant 

systems or the manner in which systems are 

operated, maintained, modified, tested, or 

inspected. The RBS Cyber Security Plan does 

not require any plant modifications which 

affect the performance capability of the 

structures, systems, and components relied 

upon to mitigate the consequences of 

postulated accidents. The RBS Cyber 

Security Plan is designed to achieve high 

assurance that the systems within the scope 

of the 10 CFR 73.54 Rule are protected from 

cyber attacks and has no impact on the 

probability or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated. 

The second part of the proposed change is 

an implementation schedule, and the third 

part adds a sentence to the existing operating 

license condition for Physical Protection. 

Both of these changes are administrative in 

nature and have no impact on the probability 

or consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

involve a significant increase in the 

probability or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated. 

2. Does the proposed change create the 

possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has 

submitted a cyber security plan for NRC 

review and approval for RBS. The RBS Cyber 

Security Plan does not alter accident analysis 

assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the 

function of plant systems or the manner in 

which systems are operated, maintained, 

modified, tested, or inspected. The RBS 

Cyber Security Plan does not require any 

plant modifications which affect the 

performance capability of the structures, 

systems, and components relied upon to 

mitigate the consequences of postulated 

accidents. The RBS Cyber Security Plan is 

designed to achieve high assurance that the 

systems within the scope of the 10 CFR 73.54 

Rule are protected from cyber attacks and 

does not create the possibility of a new or 

different kind of accident from any accident 

previously evaluated. 

The second part of the proposed change is 

an implementation schedule, and the third 

part adds a sentence to the existing operating 

license condition for Physical Protection. 

Both of these changes are administrative in 

nature and do not create the possibility of a 

new or different kind of accident from any 

accident previously evaluated. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

create the possibility of a new or different 

kind of accident from any accident 

previously evaluated. 

3. Does the proposed change involve a 

significant reduction in a margin of safety? 

Response: No. 

As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has 

submitted a cyber security plan for NRC 

review and approval for RBS. Plant safety 

margins are established through limiting 

conditions for operation, limiting safety 

system settings, and safety limits specified in 

the technical specifications. Because there is 

no change to these established safety 

margins, the proposed change does not 

involve a significant reduction in a margin of 

safety. 

The second part of the proposed change is 

an implementation schedule, and the third 

part adds a sentence to the existing operating 

license condition for Physical Protection. 

Both of these changes are administrative in 

nature and do not involve a significant 

reduction in a margin of safety. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

involve a significant reduction in a margin of 

safety. 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensee’s analysis and, based on this 

review, it appears that the three 

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff 

proposes to determine that the 

amendment request involves no 

significant hazards consideration. 

Attorney for licensee: Joseph A. 

Aluise, Associate General Counsel— 

Nuclear, Entergy Services, Inc., 639 

Loyola Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana 

70113. 

NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. 

Markley. 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 

Docket Nos. 50–003, 50–247, and 50– 

286, Indian Point Nuclear Generating 

Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3, Westchester 

County, New York 

Date of amendment request: July 8, 

2010. 

Description of amendment request: 

This amendment request contains 

sensitive unclassified non-safeguards 

information (SUNSI). The proposed 

amendment to the Facility Operating 

Licenses (FOLs) includes: (1) The 

proposed Cyber Security Plan, (2) an 

implementation schedule, and (3) a 

proposed statement to be added to the 

existing FOL Physical Protection license 

conditions requiring Entergy to fully 

implement and maintain in effect all 

provisions of the Commission-approved 

Cyber Security Plan as required by 10 

CFR 73.54. The Federal Register notice 

dated March 27, 2009, issued the final 

rule that amended 10 CFR Part 73. The 

regulations in 10 CFR 73.54, ‘‘Protection 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 196 / Tuesday, October 12, 2010 / Notices 62597 

of digital computer and communication 

systems and networks,’’ establish the 

requirements for a cyber security 

program. This regulation specifically 

requires each licensee currently 

licensed to operate a nuclear power 

plant under Part 50 of this chapter to 

submit a cyber security plan that 

satisfies the requirements of the Rule. 

Each submittal must include a proposed 

implementation schedule, and 

implementation of the licensee’s cyber 

security program must be consistent 

with the approved schedule. The 

background for this application is 

addressed by the NRC Notice of 

Availability, Federal Register Notice, 

Final Rule 10 CFR Part 73, Power 

Reactor Security Requirements, 

published on March 27, 2009, 74 FR 

13926. 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the 

licensee has provided its analysis of the 

issue of no significant hazards 

consideration, which is presented 

below: 

1. Does the proposed change involve a 

significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has 

submitted a cyber security plan for NRC 

review and approval for Indian Point Nuclear 

Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3. The Indian 

Point Energy Center (IPEC) Cyber Security 

Plan does not require any plant modifications 

which affect the performance capability of 

the structures, systems, and components 

relied upon to mitigate the consequences of 

postulated accidents. The IPEC Cyber 

Security Plan does not alter accident analysis 

assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the 

function of plant systems or the manner in 

which systems are operated, maintained, 

modified, tested, or inspected. The IPEC 

Cyber Security Plan is designed to achieve 

high assurance that the systems within the 

scope of the 10 CFR 73.54 Rule are protected 

from cyber attacks and has no impact on the 

probability or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated. 

The second part of the proposed change is 

an implementation schedule, and the third 

part adds a sentence to the existing operating 

license condition for Physical Protection. 

Both of these changes are administrative in 

nature and have no impact on the probability 

or consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

involve a significant increase in the 

probability or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated. 

2. Does the proposed change create the 

possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has 

submitted a cyber security plan for NRC 

review and approval for Indian Point Nuclear 

Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3. The IPEC 

Cyber Security Plan does not require any 

plant modifications which affect the 

performance capability of the structures, 

systems, and components relied upon to 

mitigate the consequences of postulated 

accidents. The IPEC Cyber Security Plan does 

not alter accident analysis assumptions, add 

any initiators, or affect the function of plant 

systems or the manner in which systems are 

operated, maintained, modified, tested, or 

inspected. The IPEC Cyber Security Plan is 

designed to achieve high assurance that the 

systems within the scope of the 10 CFR 73.54 

Rule are protected from cyber attacks and 

does not create the possibility of a new or 

different kind of accident from any accident 

previously evaluated. 

The second part of the proposed change is 

an implementation schedule, and the third 

part adds a sentence to the existing operating 

license condition for Physical Protection. 

Both of these changes are administrative in 

nature and do not create the possibility of a 

new or different kind of accident from any 

accident previously evaluated. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

create the possibility of a new or different 

kind of accident from any accident 

previously evaluated. 

3. Does the proposed change involve a 

significant reduction in a margin of safety? 

Response: No. 

As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has 

submitted a cyber security plan for NRC 

review and approval for Indian Point Nuclear 

Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3. Plant safety 

margins are established through limiting 

conditions for operation, limiting safety 

system settings, and safety limits specified in 

the technical specifications. Because there is 

no change to these established safety margins 

as [a] result of the implementation of the 

IPEC Cyber Security Plan, the proposed 

change does not involve a significant 

reduction in a margin of safety. 

The second part of the proposed change is 

an implementation schedule, and the third 

part adds a sentence to the existing operating 

license condition for Physical Protection. 

Both of these changes are administrative in 

nature and do not involve a significant 

reduction in a margin of safety. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

involve a significant reduction in a margin of 

safety. 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensee’s analysis and, based on this 

review, it appears that the three 

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff 

proposes to determine that the 

amendment request involves no 

significant hazards consideration. 

Attorney for licensee: Mr. William C. 

Dennis, Assistant General Counsel, 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 440 

Hamilton Avenue, White Plains, NY 

10601. 

NRC Branch Chief: Nancy L. Salgado. 

Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50– 

313 and 50–368, Arkansas Nuclear One, 

Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Pope County, 

Arkansas 

Date of amendment request: July 9, 

2010. 

Description of amendment request: 

This amendment request contains 

sensitive unclassified non-safeguards 

information (SUNSI). The proposed 

amendment would approve the 

Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Units 1 

and 2 cyber security plan and associated 

implementation schedule, and revise 

the physical protection license 

condition to require the licensee to fully 

implement and maintain in effect all 

provisions of the NRC-approved Cyber 

Security Plan. The proposed change is 

consistent with Nuclear Energy Institute 

(NEI) 08–09, Revision 6, ‘‘Cyber Security 

Plan for Nuclear Power Reactors.’’ 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the 

licensee has provided its analysis of the 

issue of no significant hazards 

consideration, which is presented 

below: 

1. Does the proposed change involve a 

significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has 

submitted a cyber security plan for NRC 

review and approval for Arkansas Nuclear 

One (ANO), Units 1 and 2. The ANO Cyber 

Security Plan does not alter accident analysis 

assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the 

function of plant systems or the manner in 

which systems are operated, maintained, 

modified, tested, or inspected. The ANO 

Cyber Security Plan does not require any 

plant modifications which affect the 

performance capability of the structures, 

systems, and components relied upon to 

mitigate the consequences of postulated 

accidents. The ANO Cyber Security Plan is 

designed to achieve high assurance that the 

systems within the scope of the 10 CFR 73.54 

Rule are protected from cyber attacks and has 

no impact on the probability or consequences 

of an accident previously evaluated. 

The second part of the proposed change is 

an implementation schedule, and the third 

part adds a sentence to the existing operating 

license condition for Physical Protection. 

Both of these changes are administrative in 

nature and have no impact on the probability 

or consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

involve a significant increase in the 

probability or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated. 

2. Does the proposed change create the 

possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

As required by 10 CFR 73.54[,] Entergy has 

submitted a cyber security plan for NRC 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
62598 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 196 / Tuesday, October 12, 2010 / Notices 

review and approval for ANO. The ANO 

Cyber Security Plan does not alter accident 

analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or 

affect the function of plant systems or the 

manner in which systems are operated, 

maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. 

The ANO Cyber Security Plan does not 

require any plant modifications which affect 

the performance capability of the structures, 

systems, and components relied upon to 

mitigate the consequences of postulated 

accidents. The ANO Cyber Security Plan is 

designed to achieve high assurance that the 

systems within the scope of the 10 CFR 73.54 

Rule are protected from cyber attacks and 

does not create the possibility of a new or 

different kind of accident from any accident 

previously evaluated. 

The second part of the proposed change is 

an implementation schedule, and the third 

part adds a sentence to the existing operating 

license condition for Physical Protection. 

Both of these changes are administrative in 

nature and do not create the possibility of a 

new or different kind of accident from any 

accident previously evaluated. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

create the possibility of a new or different 

kind of accident from any accident 

previously evaluated. 

3. Does the proposed change involve a 

significant reduction in a margin of safety? 

Response: No. 

As required by 10 CFR 73.54[,] Entergy has 

submitted a cyber security plan for NRC 

review and approval for ANO. Plant safety 

margins are established through limiting 

conditions for operation, limiting safety 

system settings, and safety limits specified in 

the technical specifications. Because there is 

no change to these established safety margins 

as result of the implementation of the ANO 

Cyber Security Plan, the proposed change 

does not involve a significant reduction in a 

margin of safety. 

The second part of the proposed change is 

an implementation schedule, and the third 

part adds a sentence to the existing operating 

license condition for Physical Protection. 

Both of these changes are administrative in 

nature and do not involve a significant 

reduction in a margin of safety. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

involve a significant reduction in a margin of 

safety. 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensee’s analysis and, based on this 

review, it appears that the three 

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff 

proposes to determine that the 

amendment request involves no 

significant hazards consideration. 

Attorney for licensee: Joseph A. 

Aluise, Assistant General Counsel— 

Nuclear, Entergy Services, Inc., 639 

Loyola Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana 

70113. 

NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. 

Markley. 

Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50– 

382, Waterford Steam Electric Station, 

Unit 3, St. Charles Parish, Louisiana 

Date of amendment request: July 15, 

2010. 

Description of amendment request: 

This amendment request contains 

sensitive unclassified non-safeguards 

information (SUNSI). The proposed 

amendment would approve the 

Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 

(Waterford 3) cyber security plan and 

associated implementation schedule, 

and revise the physical protection 

license condition to require the licensee 

to fully implement and maintain in 

effect all provisions of the NRCapproved Cyber Security Plan. The 

proposed change is consistent with 

Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 08–09, 

Revision 6, ‘‘Cyber Security Plan for 

Nuclear Power Reactors.’’ 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the 

licensee has provided its analysis of the 

issue of no significant hazards 

consideration, which is presented 

below: 

1. Does the proposed change involve a 

significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

As required by 10 CFR 73.54[,] Entergy has 

submitted a cyber security plan for NRC 

review and approval for Waterford 3. The 

Waterford 3 Cyber Security Plan does not 

require any plant modifications which affect 

the performance capability of the structures, 

systems, and components relied upon to 

mitigate the consequences of postulated 

accidents. The Waterford 3 Cyber Security 

Plan does not alter accident analysis 

assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the 

function of plant systems or the manner in 

which systems are operated, maintained, 

modified, tested, or inspected. The Waterford 

3 Cyber Security Plan is designed to achieve 

high assurance that the systems within the 

scope of the 10 CFR 73.54 Rule are protected 

from cyber attacks and has no impact on the 

probability or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated. 

The second part of the proposed change is 

an implementation schedule, and the third 

part adds a sentence to the existing operating 

license condition for physical protection. 

Both of these changes are administrative in 

nature and have no impact on the probability 

or consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

involve a significant increase in the 

probability or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated. 

2. Does the proposed change create the 

possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

As required by 10 CFR 73.54[,] Entergy has 

submitted a cyber security plan for NRC 

review and approval for Waterford 3. The 

Waterford 3 Cyber Security Plan does not 

require any plant modifications which affect 

the performance capability of the structures, 

systems, and components relied upon to 

mitigate the consequences of postulated 

accidents. The Waterford 3 Cyber Security 

Plan does not alter accident analysis 

assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the 

function of plant systems or the manner in 

which systems are operated, maintained, 

modified, tested, or inspected. The Waterford 

3 Cyber Security Plan is designed to achieve 

high assurance that the systems within the 

scope of the 10 CFR 73.54 Rule are protected 

from cyber attacks and does not create the 

possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated. 

The second part of the proposed change is 

an implementation schedule, and the third 

part adds a sentence to the existing operating 

license condition for physical protection. 

Both of these changes are administrative in 

nature and do not create the possibility of a 

new or different kind of accident from any 

accident previously evaluated. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

create the possibility of a new or different 

kind of accident from any accident 

previously evaluated. 

3. Does the proposed change involve a 

significant reduction in a margin of safety? 

Response: No. 

As required by 10 CFR 73.54[,] Entergy has 

submitted a cyber security plan for NRC 

review and approval for Waterford 3. Plant 

safety margins are established through 

limiting conditions for operation, limiting 

safety system settings, and safety limits 

specified in the technical specifications. 

Because there is no change to these 

established safety margins as result of the 

implementation of the Waterford 3 Cyber 

Security Plan, the proposed change does not 

involve a significant reduction in a margin of 

safety. 

The second part of the proposed change is 

an implementation schedule, and the third 

part adds a sentence to the existing operating 

license condition for physical protection. 

Both of these changes are administrative in 

nature and do not involve a significant 

reduction in a margin of safety. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

involve a significant reduction in a margin of 

safety. 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensee’s analysis and, based on this 

review, it appears that the three 

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff 

proposes to determine that the 

amendment request involves no 

significant hazards consideration. 

Attorney for licensee: Joseph A. 

Aluise, Assistant General Counsel— 

Nuclear, Entergy Services, Inc., 639 

Loyola Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana 

70113. 

NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. 

Markley. 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 196 / Tuesday, October 12, 2010 / Notices 62599 

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating 

Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50–334 

and 50–412, Beaver Valley Power 

Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Beaver 

County, Pennsylvania 

Date of amendment request: July 22, 

2010. 

Description of amendment request: 

This amendment request contains 

sensitive unclassified non-safeguards 

information (SUNSI). The proposed 

amendment to the Renewed Facility 

Operating License (FOL) includes: (1) 

The proposed Beaver Valley Power 

Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (BVPS–1 and 

2) Cyber Security Plan, (2) an 

implementation schedule, and (3) a 

proposed sentence to be added to the 

existing renewed FOL Physical 

Protection license condition for BVPS– 

1 and 2 requiring FirstEnergy Nuclear 

Operating Company (FENOC, the 

licensee) to fully implement and 

maintain in effect all provisions of the 

Commission-approved BVPS–1 and 2 

Cyber Security Plan as required by 

Section 73.54 of Part 73 of Title 10 of 

the Code of Federal Regulations (10 

CFR). Federal Register notice dated 

March 27, 2009, issued the final rule 

that amended 10 CFR Part 73. The 

regulations in 10 CFR 73.54, ‘‘Protection 

of digital computer and communication 

systems and networks,’’ establish the 

requirements for a cyber security 

program. This regulation specifically 

requires each licensee currently 

licensed to operate a nuclear power 

plant under Part 50 of this chapter to 

submit a cyber security plan that 

satisfies the requirements of the Rule. 

Each submittal must include a proposed 

implementation schedule and 

implementation of the licensee’s cyber 

security program must be consistent 

with the approved schedule. The 

background for this application is 

addressed by the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) Notice of 

Availability, Federal Register Notice, 

Final Rule 10 CFR Part 73, Power 

Reactor Security Requirements, 

published on March 27, 2009 (74 FR 

13926). 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the 

licensee has provided its analysis of the 

issue of no significant hazards 

consideration, which is presented 

below: 

Criterion 1: The Proposed Change Does Not 

Involve a Significant Increase in the 

Probability or Consequences of an Accident 

Previously Evaluated 

The proposed change is required by 10 

CFR 73.54 and includes three parts. The first 

part is the submittal of the Plan for NRC 

review and approval. The Plan provides a 

description of how the requirements of the 

rule will be implemented at the BVPS Unit 

Nos. 1 and 2. The Plan establishes the 

licensing basis for the FENOC cyber security 

program for the BVPS Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The 

Plan establishes how to achieve high 

assurance that nuclear power plant digital 

computer and communication systems and 

networks associated with the following are 

adequately protected against cyber attacks up 

to and including the design basis threat: 

1. Safety-related and important-to-safety 

functions, 

2. Security functions, 

3. Emergency preparedness functions 

including offsite communications, and 

4. Support systems and equipment which 

if compromised, would adversely impact 

safety, security, or emergency preparedness 

functions. 

Part one of the proposed change is 

designed to achieve high assurance that the 

systems are protected from cyber attacks. The 

Plan itself does not require any plant 

modifications. However, the Plan does 

describe how plant modifications which 

involve digital computer systems are 

reviewed to provide high assurance of 

adequate protection against cyber attacks, up 

to and including the design basis threat as 

defined in the rule. The proposed change 

does not alter the plant configuration, require 

new plant equipment to be installed, alter 

accident analysis assumptions, add any 

initiators, affect the function of plant 

systems, or affect the manner in which 

systems are operated. The first part of the 

proposed change is designed to achieve high 

assurance that the systems within the scope 

of the rule are protected from cyber attacks 

and has no impact on the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated. 

The second part of the proposed change is 

an implementation schedule. The third part 

adds a sentence to the existing FOL license 

condition 2.D for BVPS Unit No. 1 and 2.E 

for BVPS Unit No. 2 for Physical Protection. 

Both of these changes are administrative and 

have no impact on the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated. 

Therefore, it is concluded that this change 

does not involve a significant increase in the 

probability or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated. 

Criterion 2: The Proposed Change Does Not 

Create the Possibility of a New or Different 

Kind of Accident From Any Accident 

Previously Evaluated 

The proposed change is required by 10 

CFR 73.54 and includes three parts. The first 

part is the submittal of the Plan for NRC 

review and approval. The Plan provides a 

description of how the requirements of the 

rule will be implemented at the BVPS Unit 

Nos. 1 and 2. The Plan establishes the 

licensing basis for the FENOC cyber security 

program for the BVPS Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The 

Plan establishes how to achieve high 

assurance that nuclear power plant digital 

computer and communication systems and 

networks associated with the following are 

adequately protected against cyber attacks up 

to and including the design basis threat: 

1. Safety-related and important-to-safety 

functions, 

2. Security functions, 

3. Emergency preparedness functions 

including offsite communications, and 

4. Support systems and equipment which 

if compromised, would adversely impact 

safety, security, or emergency preparedness 

functions. 

Part one of the proposed change is 

designed to achieve high assurance that the 

systems within the scope of the rule are 

protected from cyber attacks. The Plan itself 

does not require any plant modifications. 

However, the Plan does describe how plant 

modifications which involve digital 

computer systems are reviewed to provide 

high assurance of adequate protection against 

cyber attacks, up to and including the design 

basis threat defined in the rule. The proposed 

change does not alter the plant configuration, 

require new plant equipment to be installed, 

alter accident analysis assumptions, add any 

initiators, affect the function of plant 

systems, or affect the manner in which 

systems are operated. The first part of the 

proposed change is designed to achieve high 

assurance that the systems within the scope 

of the rule are protected from cyber attacks 

and does not create the possibility of a new 

or different kind of accident from any 

previously evaluated. 

The second part of the proposed change is 

an implementation schedule. The third part 

adds a sentence to the existing FOL license 

condition 2.D for BVPS Unit No. 1 and 2.E 

for BVPS Unit No. 2 for Physical Protection. 

Both of these changes are administrative and 

do not create the possibility of a new or 

different kind of accident from any 

previously evaluated. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

create the possibility of a new or different 

kind of accident from any previously 

evaluated. 

Criterion 3: The Proposed Change Does Not 

Involve a Significant Reduction in a Margin 

of Safety 

The proposed change is required by 10 

CFR 73.54 and includes three parts. The first 

part is the submittal of the Plan for NRC 

review and approval. The Plan provides a 

description of how the requirements of the 

rule will be implemented at the BVPS Unit 

Nos. 1 and 2. The Plan establishes the 

licensing basis for the FENOC cyber security 

program for the BVPS Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The 

Plan establishes how to achieve high 

assurance that nuclear power plant digital 

computer and communication systems and 

networks associated with the following are 

adequately protected against cyber attacks up 

to and including the design basis threat: 

1. Safety-related and important-to-safety 

functions, 

2. Security functions, 

3. Emergency preparedness functions 

including offsite communications, and 

4. Support systems and equipment which 

if compromised, would adversely impact 

safety, security, or emergency preparedness 

functions. 

Part one of the proposed change is 

designed to achieve high assurance that the 

systems within the scope of the rule are 

protected from cyber attacks. Plant safety 


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margins are established through Limiting 

Conditions for Operation, Limiting Safety 

System Settings and Safety Limits specified 

in the Technical Specifications, methods of 

evaluation that establish design basis or 

change Updated Final Safety Analysis. 

Because there is no change to these 

established safety margins, the proposed 

change does not involve a significant 

reduction in a margin of safety. 

The second part of the proposed change is 

an implementation schedule. The third part 

adds a sentence to the existing FOL license 

condition 2.D for BVPS Unit No. 1 and 2.E 

for BVPS Unit No. 2 for Physical Protection. 

Both of these changes are administrative and 

do not involve a significant reduction in a 

margin of safety. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

involve a significant reduction in a margin of 

safety. 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensee’s analysis and, based on this 

review, it appears that the three 

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff 

proposes to determine that the 

amendment request involves no 

significant hazards consideration. 

Attorney for licensee: David W. 

Jenkins, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating 

Company, FirstEnergy Corporation, 76 

South Main Street, Akron, OH 44308. 

NRC Branch Chief: Nancy L. Salgado. 

Florida Power and Light Company, et 

al., Docket Nos. 50–335 and 50–389, St. 

Lucie Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, St. Lucie 

County, Florida 

Date of amendment request: August 2, 

2010. 

Description of amendment request: 

This amendment request contains 

sensitive unclassified non-safeguards 

information (SUNSI). The proposed 

amendment includes three parts: The 

proposed Plan, an Implementation 

Schedule, and a proposed sentence to be 

added to the existing renewed facility 

operating licenses (FOL) Physical 

Protection license condition to require 

Florida Power and Light Company to 

fully implement and maintain in effect 

all provisions of the Commission 

approved cyber security plan as 

required by amended 10 CFR Part 73. 

The proposed Cyber Security Plan was 

submitted in accordance with Title 10 of 

the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 

73.54, ‘‘Protection of digital computer 

and communication systems and 

networks.’’ 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the 

licensees provided their analysis of the 

issue of no significant hazards 

consideration, which is presented 

below: 

1. Does the proposed change involve a 

significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed amendment incorporates a 

new requirement in the Facility Operating 

License to implement and maintain a Cyber 

Security Plan as part of the facility’s overall 

program for physical protection. Inclusion of 

the Cyber Security Plan in the Facility 

Operating License itself does not involve any 

modifications to the safety-related structures, 

systems or components (SSCs). Rather, the 

Cyber Security Plan describes how the 

requirements of 10 CFR 73.54 are to be 

implemented to identify, evaluate, and 

mitigate cyber attacks up to and including 

the design basis cyber attack threat, thereby 

achieving high assurance that the facility’s 

digital computer and communications 

systems and networks are protected from 

cyber attacks. The Cyber Security Plan will 

not alter previously evaluated Final Safety 

Analysis Report (FSAR) design basis accident 

analysis assumptions, add any accident 

initiators, or affect the function of the plant 

safety-related SSCs as to how they are 

operated, maintained, modified, tested, or 

inspected. 

Therefore, the proposed amendment does 

not involve a significant increase in the 

probability or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated. 

2. Does the proposed change create the 

possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed amendment provides 

assurance that safety-related SSCs are 

protected from cyber attacks. Implementation 

of 10 CFR 73.54 and the inclusion of a plan 

in the Facility Operating License do not 

result in the need for any new or different 

FSAR design basis accident analysis, and no 

new equipment failure modes are created. It 

does not introduce new equipment that could 

create a new or different kind of accident, 

and no new equipment failure modes are 

created. As a result, no new accident 

scenarios, failure mechanisms, or limiting 

single failures are introduced as a result of 

this proposed amendment. 

Therefore, the proposed amendment does 

not create a possibility for an accident of a 

new or different type than those previously 

evaluated. 

3. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant reduction in a margin of safety? 

Response: No. 

The margin of safety is associated with the 

confidence in the ability of the fission 

product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, reactor 

coolant pressure boundary, and containment 

structure) to limit the level of radiation to the 

public. The proposed amendment would not 

alter the way any safety-related SSC 

functions and would not alter the way the 

plant is operated. The amendment provides 

assurance that safety-related SSCs are 

protected from cyber attacks. The proposed 

amendment would not introduce any new 

uncertainties or change any existing 

uncertainties associated with any safety 

limit. The proposed amendment would have 

no impact on the structural integrity of the 

fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure 

boundary, or containment structure. Based 

on the above considerations, the proposed 

amendment would not degrade the 

confidence in the ability of the fission 

product barriers to limit the level of radiation 

to the public. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

involve a significant reduction in a margin of 

safety. 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensees’ analysis and, based on this 

review, it appears that the three 

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff 

proposes to determine that the 

amendment requests involve no 

significant hazards consideration. 

Attorney for licensee: M.S. Ross, 

Attorney, Florida Power & Light, P.O. 

Box 14000, Juno Beach, Florida 33408– 

0420. 

NRC Branch Chief: Douglas A. 

Broaddus. 

Indiana Michigan Power Company, 

Docket No. 50–315 and 50–316, Donald 

C. Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP), Units 1 

and 2, Berrien County, Michigan 

Date of amendment request: July 20, 

2010. 

Description of amendment request: 

This amendment request contains 

sensitive unclassified non-safeguards 

information (SUNSI). The licensee 

proposed an amendment to the 

Renewed Facility Operating Licenses for 

DCCNP1&2. The licensee requested NRC 

approval of the CNP Cyber Security 

Plan, provided a proposed 

implementation schedule, and proposed 

to add a sentence to License Condition 

2.D, ‘‘Physical Protection,’’ of CNP’s 

Renewed Facility Operating Licenses 

DPR–58 and DPR–74, respectively, to 

read as follows: ‘‘Indiana Michigan 

Power Company shall fully implement 

and maintain in effect all provisions of 

the Commission-approved Donald C. 

Cook Nuclear Plant Cyber Security Plan 

submitted by letter dated July 19, 2010, 

and withheld from public disclosure in 

accordance with 10 CFR 2.390.’’ 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by Title 10 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 

50.91(a), the licensee has provided its 

analysis of the issue of no significant 

hazards consideration (NSHC). The NRC 

staff has performed its own, which is set 

forth below: 

(1) Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed amendment incorporates 

new requirements in the Renewed Facility 

Operating Licenses to implement and 

maintain a Cyber Security Plan (Plan) as part 


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of the facilities’ overall program for physical 

protection. Inclusion of the Plan in the 

Renewed FOLs itself does not involve any 

modifications to the safety-related structures, 

systems or components (SSCs). Rather, the 

Plan describes how the requirements of 10 

CFR 73.54 are to be implemented to identify, 

evaluate, and mitigate cyber attacks up to and 

including the design-basis cyber attack 

threat, thereby achieving high assurance that 

the facilities’ digital computer and 

communications systems and networks are 

protected from cyber attacks. The Plan and 

any plant modifications will not alter 

previously evaluated Updated Final Safety 

Analysis Report (UFSAR) design-basis 

accident analysis assumptions, add any 

accident initiators, or affect the function of 

the plant safety-related SSCs as to how they 

are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or 

inspected. Therefore, the proposed 

amendment does not involve a significant 

increase in the probability or consequences 

of an accident previously evaluated. 

(2) Does the proposed amendment create 

the possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed amendment provides 

assurance that safety-related SSCs are 

protected from cyber attacks. Implementation 

of 10 CFR 73.54 and the inclusion of a Plan 

in the Renewed FOLs do not result in the 

need of any new or different USAR designbasis accident analysis. It does not introduce 

new equipment that could create a new or 

different kind of accident, and no new 

equipment failure modes are created. As a 

result, no new accident scenarios, failure 

mechanisms, or limiting single failures are 

introduced as a result of these proposed 

amendments. Therefore, the proposed 

amendment does not create a possibility for 

an accident of a new or different type than 

those previously evaluated. 

(3) Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant reduction in a margin of safety? 

Response: No. 

The margin of safety is associated with the 

confidence in the ability of the fission 

product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, reactor 

coolant pressure boundary, and containment 

structure) to limit the level of radiation to the 

public. The proposed amendment would not 

alter the way any safety-related SSC 

functions and would not alter the way the 

units are operated. This amendment provides 

assurance that safety-related SSCs are 

protected from cyber attacks. The proposed 

amendment would not introduce any new 

uncertainties or change any existing 

uncertainties associated with any safety 

limit. The proposed amendment would have 

no impact on the structural integrity of the 

fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure 

boundary, or containment structure. Based 

on the above considerations, the proposed 

amendment would not degrade the 

confidence in the ability of the fission 

product barriers to limit the level of radiation 

to the public. Therefore, the proposed 

amendment does not involve a significant 

reduction in a margin of safety. 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensee’s analysis and, based on the 

NRC staff’s own analysis, it appears that 

the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) 

are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff 

proposes to determine that the proposed 

amendment involves no significant 

hazards consideration. 

Attorney for licensee: James M. Petro, 

Jr., Senior Nuclear Counsel, Indiana 

Michigan Power Company, One Cook 

Place, Bridgman, MI 49106. 

NRC Branch Chief: Robert J. 

Pascarelli. 

Luminant Generation Company LLC,, 

Docket Nos. 50–445 and 50–446, 

Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, 

Units 1 and 2, Somervell County, Texas 

Date of amendment request: July 15, 

2010. 

Description of amendment request: 

This amendment request contains 

sensitive unclassified non-safeguards 

information (SUNSI). The proposed 

amendment would approve the Cyber 

Security Plan for Comanche Peak 

Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP), Units 1 

and 2, in accordance with 10 CFR 

Section 73.54. In addition, the 

amendment would revise Renewed 

Facility Operating License Nos. NPF–87 

and NPF–89 for Units 1 and 2, 

respectively, to add a sentence to the 

existing Physical Protection license 

condition to require CPNPP to fully 

implement and maintain in effect all 

provisions of the Commission-approved 

Cyber Security Plan. The proposed 

change is consistent with Nuclear 

Energy Institute (NEI) 08–09, Revision 6, 

‘‘Cyber Security Plan for Nuclear Power 

Reactors.’’ 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the 

licensee has provided its analysis of the 

issue of no significant hazards 

consideration, which is presented 

below: 

1. Do the proposed changes involve a 

significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed amendment incorporates a 

new requirement in the Facility Operating 

License (FOL) to implement and maintain a 

Cyber Security Plan as part of the facility’s 

overall program for physical protection. 

Inclusion of the Cyber Security Plan in the 

FOL itself does not involve any modifications 

to the safety-related structures, systems or 

components (SSCs). Rather, the Cyber 

Security Plan describes how the 

requirements of 10 CFR 73.54 are to be 

implemented to identify, evaluate, and 

mitigate cyber attacks up to and including 

the design basis cyber attack threat, thereby 

achieving high assurance that the facility’s 

digital computer and communications 

systems and networks are protected from 

cyber attacks. The addition of the Cyber 

Security Plan to the Physical Security Plan 

will not alter previously evaluated [F]inal 

Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) design basis 

accident analysis assumptions, add any 

accident initiators, or affect the function of 

the plant safety-related SSCs as to how they 

are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or 

inspected. 

Therefore, the proposed changes do not 

involve a significant increase in the 

probability or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated. 

2. Do the proposed changes create the 

possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

This proposed amendment provides 

assurance that safety-related SSCs are 

protected from cyber attacks. Implementation 

of 10 CFR 73.54 and the inclusion of a plan 

in the FOL do not result in the need of any 

new or different FSAR design basis accident 

analysis. It does not introduce new 

equipment that could create a new or 

different kind of accident, and no new 

equipment failure modes are created. As a 

result, no new accident scenarios, failure 

mechanisms, or limiting single failures are 

introduced as a result of this proposed 

amendment. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

create the possibility of a new or different 

kind of accident from any previously 

evaluated. 

3. Do the proposed changes involve a 

significant reduction in a margin of safety? 

Response: No. 

The margin of safety is associated with the 

confidence in the ability of the fission 

product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, reactor 

coolant pressure boundary, and containment 

structure) to limit the level of radiation to the 

public. The proposed amendment would not 

alter the way any safety-related SSC 

functions and would not alter the way the 

plant is operated. The amendment provides 

assurance that safety-related SSCs are 

protected from cyber attacks. The proposed 

amendment would not introduce any new 

uncertainties or change any existing 

uncertainties associated with any safety 

limit. The proposed amendment would have 

no impact on the structural integrity of the 

fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure 

boundary, or containment structure. Based 

on the above considerations, the proposed 

amendment would not degrade the 

confidence in the ability of the fission 

product barriers to limit the level of radiation 

to the public. Therefore, the proposed change 

does not involve a significant reduction in a 

margin of safety. 

Therefore the proposed change does not 

involve a reduction in a margin of safety. 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensee’s analysis and, based on this 

review, it appears that the three 

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff 

proposes to determine that the 

amendment request involves no 

significant hazards consideration. 

Attorney for licensee: Timothy P. 

Matthews, Esq., Morgan, Lewis and 


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Bockius, 1800 M Street, NW., 

Washington, DC 20036. 

NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. 

Markley. 

Nebraska Public Power District, Docket 

No. 50–298, Cooper Nuclear Station, 

Nemaha County, Nebraska 

Date of amendment request: July 20, 

2010. 

Description of amendment request: 

This amendment request contains 

sensitive unclassified non-safeguards 

information (SUNSI). The proposed 

amendment would approve the cyber 

security plan and implementation 

schedule, and revise the license 

condition regarding physical protection 

to require the licensee to fully 

implement and maintain in effect all 

provisions of the NRC-approved cyber 

security plan. 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the 

licensee has provided its analysis of the 

issue of no significant hazards 

consideration, which is presented 

below: 

1. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed amendment incorporates a 

new requirement in the FOL [facility 

operating license] to implement and maintain 

a Cyber Security Plan as part of the facility’s 

overall program for physical protection. 

Inclusion of the Plan in the FOL itself does 

not involve any modifications to safetyrelated structures, systems or components 

(SSCs). Rather, the Plan describes how the 

requirements of 10 CFR 73.54 are to be 

implemented to identify, evaluate, and 

mitigate cyber attacks up to and including 

the design basis threat, thereby achieving a 

high assurance that the facility’s digital 

computer and communications systems and 

networks are protected from cyber attacks. 

The Plan and any associated plant 

modifications will not alter previously 

evaluated design basis accident analysis 

assumptions, add any accident initiators, or 

affect the capability of SSCs to perform their 

design function. 

Therefore, the proposed amendment does 

not involve a significant increase in the 

probability or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated. 

2. Does the proposed amendment create 

the possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed amendment provides 

assurance that safety-related SSCs are 

protected from cyber attacks. Implementation 

of 10 CFR 73.54 and the inclusion of a Cyber 

Security Plan in the FOL do not result in the 

need for any new or different design basis 

accident analysis. It does not introduce new 

equipment that could create a new or 

different kind of accident, and no new 

equipment failure modes are created. As a 

result, no new accident scenarios, failure 

mechanisms, or limiting single failures are 

introduced as a result of this proposed 

amendment. 

Therefore, the proposed amendment does 

not create a possibility for an accident of a 

new or different type than those previously 

evaluated. 

3. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant reduction in a margin of safety? 

Response: No. 

The margin of safety is associated with the 

ability of the fission product barriers (i.e., 

fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure 

boundary, and containment structure) to 

limit the level of radiation to the public. The 

proposed amendment will not alter the way 

any safety-related SSC functions and will not 

alter the way the plant is operated. The 

amendment provides assurance that safetyrelated SSCs are protected from cyber attacks. 

The proposed amendment will not introduce 

any new uncertainties or change any existing 

uncertainties associated with any safety 

limit. The proposed amendment has no 

impact on the structural integrity of the fuel 

cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary, 

or containment structure. Based on the above 

considerations, the proposed amendment 

will not degrade the ability of the fission 

product barriers to limit the level of radiation 

to the public. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

involve a significant reduction in a margin of 

safety. 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensee’s analysis and, based on this 

review, it appears that the three 

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff 

proposes to determine that the 

amendment request involves no 

significant hazards consideration. 

Attorney for licensee: Mr. John C. 

McClure, Nebraska Public Power 

District, Post Office Box 499, Columbus, 

NE 68602–0499. 

NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. 

Markley. 

NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC (the 

licensee), Docket Nos. 50–266 and 50– 

301, Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP), 

Units 1 and 2, Town of Two Creeks, 

Manitowac County, Wisconsin 

Date of amendment request: 

December 8, 2008, as supplemented by 

letters dated. 

January 16, January 27, February 20, 

April 17 (two letters), May 8, May 15, 

June 1, July 24, August 20, September 4 

(two letters), September 10, October 2, 

November 20, November 25, and 

December 17 of 2009; and January 14, 

February 4 (two letters), March 5, April 

20, July 8, July 29, August 12, and 

September 3 of 2010. 

Description of amendment request: 

This amendment request contains 

sensitive unclassified non-safeguards 

information (SUNSI). The proposed 

amendment would revise the PBNP 

Units 1 and 2 current licensing bases to 

implement the alternate source term 

(AST) through reanalysis of the 

radiological consequences of the Final 

Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Chapter 

14 accidents. The following technical 

specifications (TS) are requested to be 

modified: 

TS 1.1 will be reduced from 0.4 

percent of containment air weight per 

day to 0.2 percent of containment air 

weight per day at peak design 

containment pressure. 

Surveillance Requirement (SR) 

3.4.16.2 will be revised to change the 

specific activity of the reactor coolant 

from [dose equivalent iodine] DEI–131 

less than or equal to 0.8 microCurie per 

gram (μCi/gm) to less than or equal to 

0.5 μCi/gm. 

TS 3.7.9 will be modified to address 

Technical Specification Task Force 

(TSTF) Traveler TSTF–448, Revision 3, 

Control Room Habitability, and joint 

NRC and industry guidance regarding 

control room habitability. 

SR 3.7.9.3 and SR 3.7.9.6 will be 

revised to delete the word ‘‘makeup.’’ 

TS 3.7.13 will be revised to change 

the specific activity of the secondary 

coolant from less than or equal to 1.00 

μCi/gm to less than or equal to 0.1 μCi/ 

gm DEI–131. 

TS 3.7.14, ‘‘Primary Auxiliary 

Building Ventilation (VNPAB),’’ will be 

added to the technical specifications as 

a result of the VNPAB system exhaust 

function being credited in the AST Loss 

of Coolant Accident (LOCA) Emergency 

Core Cooling System (ECCS) leakage 

analysis. 

TS 5.5.15c will be revised to change 

the maximum allowable containment 

leakage rate, from 0.4 percent to 0.2 

percent of containment air weight per 

day. 

TS 5.5.18, ‘‘Control Room Envelope 

Habitability Program,’’ will be added to 

address AST-related commitments. 

TS 5.6.4 will add WCAP–16259–P–A 

‘‘Westinghouse Methodology for 

Application of 3–D Transient 

Neutronics to Non-LOCA Analyses’’ to 

the list of approved analytical methods. 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the 

licensee has provided its analysis of the 

issue of no significant hazards 

consideration which is presented below: 

1. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The results of the applicable radiological 

design-basis accident (DBA) re-evaluation 


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demonstrated that, with the requested 

changes, the dose consequences of these 

limiting events are within the regulatory 

limits and guidance provided by the NRC in 

10 CFR 50.67 and [Regulatory Guide] RG 

1.183, ‘‘Alternative Radiological Source 

Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents 

at Nuclear Power Plants,’’ July 2000, for the 

AST methodology. The AST is an input to 

calculations used to evaluate the 

consequences of an accident and does not by 

itself affect the plant response or the actual 

pathway of the activity released from the 

fuel. It does, however, better represent the 

physical characteristics of the release, such 

that appropriate mitigation techniques may 

be applied. 

The change from the original source term 

to the new proposed AST is a change in the 

analysis method and assumptions and has no 

effect on the probability of occurrence of 

previously analyzed accidents. Use of an 

AST to analyze the dose effect of DBAs 

shows that regulatory acceptance criteria for 

the new methodology continues to be met. 

The dose consequences in the control room 

(CR), the exclusion area boundary, and the 

low population zone (LPZ) do not exceed the 

regulatory limits provided by the NRC in 10 

CFR 50.67 and Regulatory Guide 1.183 for 

the AST methodology. 

For the locked rotor (LR) event, an NRC 

approved methodology RAVE (Westinghouse 

WCAP–16259–P–A, ‘‘Westinghouse 

Methodology for Application of 3–D 

Transient Neutronics to Non-LOCA Accident 

Analysis,’’) is used to determine rods in 

[departure from nucleate boiling] DNB. The 

use of an NRC approved methodology 

provides an input assumption to the 

radiological dose consequences calculations. 

The use of the new methodology does not 

change the sequence or progression of the 

accident scenario. 

The proposed TS changes reflect the plant 

configuration that is required to implement 

the AST analyses. The equipment affected by 

the proposed changes is mitigating in nature 

and relied upon after an accident has been 

initiated. The operation of various filtration 

systems, the residual heat removal (RHR) and 

the containment spray (CS) systems, 

including associated support systems, has 

been considered in the evaluations of these 

proposed changes. The operation of this 

equipment has been evaluated for emergency 

diesel generator loading and fuel 

consumption. The evaluation demonstrated 

that the diesel generator loading and fuel 

consumption do not exceed the diesel 

generator criteria. While the operation of 

these systems does change with the 

implementation of an AST, the affected 

systems are not accident initiators, and 

application of the AST methodology itself is 

not an initiator of a DBA. 

The operation of containment spray on 

sump recirculation has been evaluated for 

increased strainer blockage or reduction in 

flow from the sump. The evaluation 

demonstrated that the increase in 

containment spray will not adversely affect 

the operation of the emergency core cooling 

systems during the sump recirculation phase 

of a DBA. 

The VNPAB exhaust is relied upon after an 

accident has been initiated to provide the 

AST LOCA ECCS equipment leakage activity 

release location for the control room dose 

calculation. The results of the LOCA 

radiological analysis demonstrate that while 

operating the VNPAB exhaust system, as 

supported by the proposed TS, the dose 

consequences of this limiting event are 

within the regulatory limits and guidance 

provided by the NRC in 10 CFR 50.67 and 

RG 1.183. 

The Control Room Envelope Habitability 

Program adds administrative controls to the 

TSs ensuring control room habitability with 

an operable control room emergency 

filtration system (CREFS). The proposed TS 

changes, including a new habitability 

program and additional testing, produce 

more stringent TS requirements than the 

existing TSs, enhancing the protection of 

control room occupants. 

Therefore, the proposed changes do not 

involve a significant increase in the 

probability or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated. 

2. Does the proposed amendment create 

the possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The changes proposed in this license 

amendment request involve the use of a new 

analysis methodology and related regulatory 

acceptance criteria. The proposed TS changes 

reflect the plant configuration that is required 

to implement the AST analyses. No new or 

different accidents result from utilizing the 

proposed changes. Although the proposed 

changes require modifications to the [control 

room ventilation system] VNCR system, as 

well as modifications to the RHR system and 

CS system, the changes will not create a new 

or different kind of accident since they are 

related to system capabilities that provide 

protection from accidents that have already 

occurred. The operation of this equipment 

has been evaluated for emergency diesel 

generator loading and fuel consumption. The 

evaluation demonstrated that the diesel 

generator loading and fuel consumption do 

not exceed the diesel generator criteria. 

The operation of containment spray on 

sump recirculation has been evaluated for 

increased strainer blockage or reduction in 

flow from the sump. The evaluation 

demonstrated that the increase in 

containment spray will not adversely affect 

the operation of the emergency core cooling 

systems during the sump recirculation phase 

of a DBA. 

As a result, no new failure modes are being 

introduced that could lead to different 

accidents. These changes do not alter the 

nature of events postulated in the FSAR nor 

do they introduce any unique precursor 

mechanisms. 

For the LR event, an NRC approved 

methodology RAVE (Westinghouse WCAP– 

16259–P–A, ‘‘Westinghouse Methodology for 

Application of 3–D Transient Neutronics to 

Non-LOCA Accident Analysis,’’) is used to 

determine rods in DNB. The use of an NRC 

approved methodology provides an input 

assumption to the radiological dose 

consequences calculations. The use of the 

new methodology does not alter the nature of 

events postulated in the FSAR nor do they 

introduce any unique precursor mechanisms. 

The proposed VNPAB TS reflects the plant 

configuration that is required to implement 

the AST analyses, and no new or different 

accidents result from utilizing the proposed 

changes. The LOCA control room dose 

analysis assumes that the ECCS equipment 

leakage activity release pathway X/Q to be at 

the location of the primary auxiliary building 

vent stack. Operation of the VNPAB exhaust 

fans assures this release point. The VNPAB 

system operates during normal unit 

operation. 

No new or different kinds of accidents 

result from performance of the revised TS 

surveillances or from the addition of the 

Control Room Envelope Habitability 

Program. The proposed changes do not 

involve a physical alteration of the CREFS or 

a significant change in the methods 

governing normal plant operation. The 

proposed TS changes, including a new 

habitability program and additional testing, 

produce more stringent TS requirements than 

the existing TSs, enhancing the protection of 

control room occupants. 

Therefore, the proposed changes do not 

create the possibility of a new or different 

type of accident from any accident 

previously evaluated. 

3. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant reduction in a margin of safety? 

Response: No. 

The changes proposed in this license 

amendment involve the use of a new analysis 

methodology and related regulatory 

acceptance criteria. The proposed TS changes 

reflect the plant configuration that is required 

to implement the AST analyses. Safety 

margins and analytical conservatisms have 

been evaluated and have been found to be 

acceptable. The analyzed events have been 

carefully selected and, with plant 

modifications, no significant reduction of 

margin has occurred and analyses adequately 

bound postulated event scenarios. The 

proposed changes continue to ensure that the 

dose consequences of DBAs at the exclusion 

area and LPZ boundaries and in the CR are 

within the corresponding acceptance criteria 

presented in RG 1.183 and 10 CFR 50.67. The 

margin of safety for the radiological 

consequences of these accidents is provided 

by meeting the applicable regulatory limits, 

which are set at or below the 10 CFR 50.67 

limits. An acceptable margin of safety is 

inherent in these limits. 

For the LR event, an NRC approved 

methodology RAVE (Westinghouse WCAP– 

16259–P–A, ‘‘Westinghouse Methodology for 

Application of 3–D Transient Neutronics to 

Non-LOCA Accident Analysis,’’) is used to 

determine rods in DNB. The use of an NRC 

approved methodology provides an input 

assumption to the radiological dose 

consequences calculations. The use of the 

new methodology does not reduce any 

margins of safety for the LR event; therefore, 

the proposed change does not involve a 

significant reduction in a margin of safety. 

The proposed VNPAB TS reflects the plant 

configuration that is required to implement 

the AST analyses. The VNPAB assures the 

proper X/Q for airborne radiological 

protection for control room personnel, as 

demonstrated by the control room dose 

analyses for the LOCA. Safety margins and 


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analytical conservatisms have been evaluated 

and have been found to be acceptable. The 

proposed changes ensure that the dose 

consequences in the control room due to the 

DBA LOCA are within the acceptance criteria 

presented in 10 CFR 50.67. The margin of 

safety for the radiological consequences of 

these accidents is provided by meeting the 

regulatory limit. 

The proposed changes do not alter the 

manner in which safety limits, limiting safety 

system settings, or limiting conditions for 

operation are determined. The proposed 

changes do not affect safety analysis criteria, 

and will not result in plant operation in a 

configuration outside the design basis for an 

unacceptable period of time without 

compensatory measures. The proposed TS 

changes, including a new habitability 

program and additional testing, produce 

more stringent TS requirements than the 

existing TSs, enhancing the protection of 

control room occupants. 

Therefore, the proposed changes do not 

involve a significant reduction in a margin of 

safety. 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensee’s analysis and, based on this 

review, it appears that the three 

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff 

proposes to determine that the 

amendment request involves no 

significant hazards consideration. 

Attorney for licensee: William Blair, 

Senior Attorney, NextEra Energy Point 

Beach, LLC, P. O. Box 14000, Juno 

Beach, FL 33408–0420. 

NRC Branch Chief: Robert J. 

Pascarelli. 

Northern States Power Company— 

Minnesota (NSPM), Docket No. 50–263, 

Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant 

(MNGP), Wright County, Minnesota 

Date of amendment request: July 20, 

2010. 

Description of amendment request: 

This amendment request contains 

sensitive unclassified non-safeguards 

information (SUNSI). The licensee 

proposed an amendment to the 

Renewed Facility Operating Licenses for 

MNGP and Prairie Island Nuclear 

Generating Plant (PINGP); this notice 

only addresses the application as it 

pertains to MNGP. The licensee 

requested NRC approval of the NSPM 

Cyber Security Plan, provided a 

proposed implementation schedule, and 

proposed to add a sentence to License 

Condition 2.C.3, ‘‘Physical Protection,’’ 

of MNGP’s Renewed Facility Operating 

License DPR–22 to read as follows: 

‘‘NSPM shall fully implement and 

maintain in effect all provisions of the 

Commission-approved NSPM Cyber 

Security Plan by December 1, 2014.’’ 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by Title 10 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 

50.91(a), the licensee has provided its 

analysis of the issue of no significant 

hazards consideration (NSHC). The 

licensee’s NSHC analysis, written for 

both MNGP and PINGP, addressing each 

issue described above, is reproduced 

below: 

1. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No 

The proposed amendments incorporate 

new requirements in the [Renewed] Facility 

Operating Licenses (FOLs) to implement and 

maintain a Cyber Security Plan (Plan) as part 

of the facilities’ overall program for physical 

protection. Inclusion of the Plan in the FOLs 

itself does not involve any modifications to 

the safety-related structures, systems or 

components (SSCs). Rather, the Plan 

describes how the requirements of 10 CFR 

73.54 are to be implemented to identify, 

evaluate, and mitigate cyber attacks up to and 

including the design basis cyber attack threat, 

thereby achieving high assurance that the 

facilities’ digital computer and 

communications systems and networks are 

protected from cyber attacks. The Plan and 

any plant modifications will not alter 

previously evaluated Updated Safety 

Analysis Report (USAR) design basis 

accident analysis assumptions, add any 

accident initiators, or affect the function of 

the plant safety-related SSCs as to how they 

are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or 

inspected. Therefore, the proposed 

amendments do not involve a significant 

increase in the probability or consequences 

of an accident previously evaluated. 

2. Does the proposed amendment create 

the possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No 

The proposed amendments provide 

assurance that safety-related SSCs are 

protected from cyber attacks. Implementation 

of 10 CFR 73.54 and the inclusion of a Plan 

in the FOLs do not result in the need of any 

new or different USAR design basis accident 

analysis. It does not introduce new 

equipment that could create a new or 

different kind of accident, and no new 

equipment failure modes are created. As a 

result, no new accident scenarios, failure 

mechanisms, or limiting single failures are 

introduced as a result of these proposed 

amendments. Therefore, the proposed 

amendments do not create a possibility for an 

accident of a new or different type than those 

previously evaluated. 

3. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant reduction in a margin of safety? 

Response: No. 

The margin of safety is associated with the 

confidence in the ability of the fission 

product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, reactor 

coolant pressure boundary, and containment 

structure) to limit the level of radiation to the 

public. The proposed amendments would not 

alter the way any safety-related SSC 

functions and would not alter the way the 

plants are operated. These amendments 

provide assurance that safety-related SSCs 

are protected from cyber attacks. The 

proposed amendments would not introduce 

any new uncertainties or change any existing 

uncertainties associated with any safety 

limit. The proposed amendments would have 

no impact on the structural integrity of the 

fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure 

boundary, or containment structure. Based 

on the above considerations, the proposed 

amendments would not degrade the 

confidence in the ability of the fission 

product barriers to limit the level of radiation 

to the public. 

Therefore, the proposed amendments do 

not involve a significant reduction in a 

margin of safety. 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensee’s analysis and, based on this 

review, it appears that the three 

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff 

proposes to determine that the proposed 

amendment involves no significant 

hazards consideration. 

Attorney for licensee: Peter M. Glass, 

Assistant General Counsel, Xcel Energy 

Services, Inc., 414 Nicollet Mall, 

Minneapolis, MN 55401. 

NRC Branch Chief: Robert J. 

Pascarelli. 

Northern States Power Company— 

Minnesota (NSPM), Docket Nos. 50–282 

and 50–306, Prairie Island Nuclear 

Generating Plant (PINGP), Units 1 and 

2, Goodhue County, Minnesota 

Date of amendment request: July 20, 

2010. 

Description of amendment request: 

This amendment request contains 

sensitive unclassified non-safeguards 

information (SUNSI). The licensee 

proposed an amendment to the Facility 

Operating Licenses for PINGP, Units 1 

and 2, and the Renewed Facility 

Operating License for Monticello 

Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP); this 

notice only addresses the application as 

it pertains to PINGP, Units 1 and 2. The 

licensee requested NRC approval of the 

NSPM Cyber Security Plan, provided a 

proposed Implementation Schedule, 

and proposed to add a sentence to 

License Condition 2.C.(3), ‘‘Physical 

Protection,’’ of PINGP’s Facility 

Operating Licenses DPR–42 and DPR–60 

to read as follows: ‘‘NSPM shall fully 

implement and maintain in effect all 

provisions of the Commission-approved 

NSPM Cyber Security Plan by December 

1, 2014.’’ 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by Title 10 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 

50.91(a), the licensee has provided its 

analysis of the issue of no significant 

hazards consideration (NSHC). The 

licensee’s NSHC analysis, written for 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 196 / Tuesday, October 12, 2010 / Notices 62605 

both MNGP and PINGP, addressing each 

issue described above, is reproduced 

below: 

1. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed amendments incorporate 

new requirements in the Facility Operating 

Licenses (FOLs) to implement and maintain 

a Cyber Security Plan (Plan) as part of the 

facilities’ overall program for physical 

protection. Inclusion of the Plan in the FOLs 

itself does not involve any modifications to 

the safety-related structures, systems or 

components (SSCs). Rather, the Plan 

describes how the requirements of 10 CFR 

73.54 are to be implemented to identify, 

evaluate, and mitigate cyber attacks up to and 

including the design basis cyber attack threat, 

thereby achieving high assurance that the 

facilities’ digital computer and 

communications systems and networks are 

protected from cyber attacks. The Plan and 

any plant modifications will not alter 

previously evaluated Updated Safety 

Analysis Report (USAR) design basis 

accident analysis assumptions, add any 

accident initiators, or affect the function of 

the plant safety-related SSCs as to how they 

are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or 

inspected. 

Therefore, the proposed amendments do 

not involve a significant increase in the 

probability or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated. 

2. Does the proposed amendment create 

the possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed amendments provide 

assurance that safety-related SSCs are 

protected from cyber attacks. Implementation 

of 10 CFR 73.54 and the inclusion of a Plan 

in the FOLs do not result in the need of any 

new or different USAR design basis accident 

analysis. It does not introduce new 

equipment that could create a new or 

different kind of accident, and no new 

equipment failure modes are created. As a 

result, no new accident scenarios, failure 

mechanisms, or limiting single failures are 

introduced as a result of these proposed 

amendments. 

Therefore, the proposed amendments do 

not create a possibility for an accident of a 

new or different type than those previously 

evaluated. 

3. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant reduction in a margin of safety? 

Response: No. 

The margin of safety is associated with the 

confidence in the ability of the fission 

product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, reactor 

coolant pressure boundary, and containment 

structure) to limit the level of radiation to the 

public. The proposed amendments would not 

alter the way any safety-related SSC 

functions and would not alter the way the 

plants are operated. These amendments 

provide assurance that safety-related SSCs 

are protected from cyber attacks. The 

proposed amendments would not introduce 

any new uncertainties or change any existing 

uncertainties associated with any safety 

limit. The proposed amendments would have 

no impact on the structural integrity of the 

fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure 

boundary, or containment structure. Based 

on the above considerations, the proposed 

amendments would not degrade the 

confidence in the ability of the fission 

product barriers to limit the level of radiation 

to the public. 

Therefore, the proposed amendments do 

not involve a significant reduction in a 

margin of safety. 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensee’s analysis and, based on this 

review, it appears that the three 

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff 

proposes to determine that the proposed 

amendment involves no significant 

hazards consideration. 

Attorney for licensee: Peter M. Glass, 

Assistant General Counsel, Xcel Energy 

Services, Inc., 414 Nicollet Mall, 

Minneapolis, MN 55401. 

NRC Branch Chief: Robert J. 

Pascarelli. 

Pacific Gas and Electric Company, 

Docket Nos. 50–275 and 50–323, Diablo 

Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 

1 and 2, San Luis Obispo County, 

California 

Date of amendment request: July 22, 

2010. 

Description of amendment request: 

This amendment request contains 

sensitive unclassified non-safeguards 

information (SUNSI). The proposed 

amendment would approve the Diablo 

Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 

(DCPP), Cyber Security Plan, in 

accordance with 10 CFR 73.54. In 

addition, the amendment would revise 

the DCPP Facility Operating License 

Nos. DPR–80 and DPR 82, respectively, 

for Units 1 and 2, to add a sentence to 

require the licensee to fully implement 

and maintain in effect all provisions of 

the Commission-approved DCPP Cyber 

Security Plan. The proposed change is 

consistent with Nuclear Energy Institute 

(NEI) 08–09, Revision 6, ‘‘Cyber Security 

Plan for Nuclear Power Reactors.’’ 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the 

licensee has provided its analysis of the 

issue of no significant hazards 

consideration, which is presented 

below: 

1. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed amendment incorporates a 

new requirement in the Facility Operating 

License (FOL) to implement and maintain a 

Cyber Security Plan (Plan) as part of the 

facility’s overall program for physical 

protection. Inclusion of the Cyber Security 

Plan in the FOL itself does not involve any 

modifications to the safety-related structures, 

systems or components (SSCs). Rather, the 

Cyber Security Plan describes how the 

requirements of 10 CFR 73.54 are to be 

implemented to identify, evaluate, and 

mitigate cyber attacks up to and including 

the design basis cyber attack threat, thereby 

achieving high assurance that the facility’s 

digital computer and communications 

systems and networks are protected from 

cyber attacks. The Plan will not alter 

previously evaluated Final Safety Analysis 

Report (FSAR) design basis accident analysis 

assumptions, add any accident initiators, or 

affect the function of the plant safety-related 

SSCs as to how they are operated, 

maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. 

Any plant modifications necessary to 

implement the Plan will be evaluated 

pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 to assure they will 

not alter previously evaluated FSAR design 

basis accident analysis assumptions, add any 

accident initiators, or affect the function of 

the plant safety-related SSCs as to how they 

are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or 

inspected. Further amendments to the 

operating licenses will be pursued as 

necessary based on the results of these 

evaluations. 

Therefore, the proposed amendment does 

not involve a significant increase in the 

probability or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated. 

2. Does the proposed amendment create 

the possibility of a new or different accident 

from any accident previously evaluated? 

Response: No. 

This proposed amendment provides 

assurance that safety-related SSCs are 

protected from cyber attacks. Implementation 

of 10 CFR 73.54 and the inclusion of a plan 

in the FOL do not result in the need of any 

new or different FSAR design basis accident 

analysis. As noted in response to question 1, 

any plant modifications necessary to 

implement the Plan will be evaluated 

pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 to assure they do 

not introduce new equipment that could 

create a new or different kind of accident, 

and no new equipment failure modes are 

created. Further amendments to the operating 

licenses will be pursued as necessary based 

on the results of these evaluations. 

As a result, no new accident scenarios, 

failure mechanisms, or limiting single 

failures will be introduced as a result of this 

proposed amendment. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

create the possibility of a new or different 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated. 

3. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant reduction in a margin of safety? 

Response: No. 

The margin of safety is associated with the 

confidence in the ability of the fission 

product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, reactor 

coolant pressure boundary, and containment 

structure) to limit the level of radiation to the 

public. The proposed amendment would not 

alter the way any safety-related SSC 

functions and would not alter the way the 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
62606 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 196 / Tuesday, October 12, 2010 / Notices 

plant is operated. The amendment provides 

assurance that safety-related SSCs are 

protected from cyber attacks. The proposed 

amendment would not introduce any new 

uncertainties or change any existing 

uncertainties associated with any safety 

limit. The proposed amendment would have 

no impact on the structural integrity of the 

fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure 

boundary, or containment structure. Based 

on the above considerations, the proposed 

amendment would not degrade the 

confidence in the ability of the fission 

product barriers to limit the level of radiation 

to the public. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

involve a significant reduction in a margin of 

safety. 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensee’s analysis and, based on this 

review, it appears that the three 

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff 

proposes to determine that the 

amendment requests involve no 

significant hazards consideration. 

Attorney for licensee: Jennifer Post, 

Esq., Pacific Gas and Electric Company, 

P.O. Box 7442, San Francisco, California 

94120. 

NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. 

Markley. 

PPL Susquehanna, LLC, Docket Nos. 50– 

387 and 50–388, Susquehanna Steam 

Electric Station (SSES), Units 1 and 2, 

Luzerne County, Pennsylvania 

Date of amendment request: July 22, 

2010. 

Description of amendment request: 

This amendment request contains 

sensitive unclassified non-safeguards 

information (SUNSI). The proposed 

amendment to the Renewed Facility 

Operating License (FOL) includes: (1) 

The proposed SSES Units 1 and 2 Cyber 

Security Plan, (2) an implementation 

schedule, and (3) a proposed sentence to 

be added to the existing renewed FOL 

Physical Protection license condition for 

SSES Units 1 and 2 requiring PPL 

Susquehanna, LLC to fully implement 

and maintain in effect all provisions of 

the Commission-approved SSES Units 1 

and 2 Cyber Security Plan as required 

by 10 CFR 73.54. Federal Register 

notice dated March 27, 2009, issued the 

final rule that amended 10 CFR Part 73. 

The regulations in 10 CFR 73.54, 

‘‘Protection of digital computer and 

communication systems and networks,’’ 

establish the requirements for a cyber 

security program. This regulation 

specifically requires each licensee 

currently licensed to operate a nuclear 

power plant under Part 50 of this 

chapter to submit a cyber security plan 

that satisfies the requirements of the 

Rule. Each submittal must include a 

proposed implementation schedule and 

implementation of the licensee’s cyber 

security program must be consistent 

with the approved schedule. The 

background for this application is 

addressed by the NRC Notice of 

Availability, Federal Register Notice, 

Final Rule 10 CFR Part 73, Power 

Reactor Security Requirements, 

published on March 27, 2009, 74 FR 

13926. 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the 

licensee has provided its analysis of the 

issue of no significant hazards 

consideration, which is presented 

below: 

1. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed amendment incorporates a 

new requirement in the PPL Susquehanna 

Units 1 and 2 FOL to implement and 

maintain a Cyber Security Plan as part of the 

facility’s overall program for physical 

protection. Inclusion of the Cyber Security 

Plan in the FOL itself does not involve any 

modifications to the safety-related structures, 

systems or components (SSCs). Rather, the 

Cyber Security Plan describes how the 

requirements of 10 CFR 73.54 are to be 

implemented to identify, evaluate, and 

mitigate cyber attacks up to and including 

the design basis cyber attack threat, thereby 

achieving high assurance that the facility’s 

digital computer and communications 

systems and networks are protected from 

cyber attacks. The Cyber Security Plan will 

not alter previously evaluated Final Safety 

Analysis Report (FSAR) design basis accident 

analysis assumptions, add any accident 

initiators, or affect the function of the plant 

safety-related SSCs as to how they are 

operated, maintained, modified, tested, or 

inspected. Therefore, the proposed 

amendment does not involve a significant 

increase in the probability or consequences 

of an accident previously evaluated. 

2. Does the proposed amendment create 

the possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

This proposed amendment provides 

assurance that safety-related SSCs are 

protected from cyber attacks. Implementation 

of 10 CFR 73.54 and the inclusion of a plan 

in the PPL Susquehanna Units 1 and 2 FOL 

do not result in the need for any new or 

different FSAR design basis accident 

analysis. The inclusion does not introduce 

new equipment that could create a new or 

different kind of accident, and no new 

equipment failure modes are created. The 

inclusion of the Cyber Security Plan also 

does not affect the function of any safetyrelated SSC as to how they are operated, 

maintained, modified, tested or inspected. As 

a result, no new accident scenarios, failure 

mechanisms, or limiting single failures are 

introduced as a result of this proposed 

amendment. Therefore, the proposed 

amendment does not create a possibility for 

an accident of a new or different type than 

those previously evaluated. 

3. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant reduction in a margin of safety? 

Response: No. 

The margin of safety is associated with the 

confidence in the ability of the fission 

product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, reactor 

coolant pressure boundary, and containment 

structure) to limit the level of radiation to the 

public. The proposed amendment would not 

alter the way safety-related SSCs function 

and would not alter the way PPL 

Susquehanna Units 1 and 2 are operated. The 

amendment provides assurance that safetyrelated SSCs are protected from cyber attacks. 

The proposed amendment would not 

introduce any new uncertainties or change 

any existing uncertainties associated with the 

design basis or any safety limit. The 

proposed amendment would have no impact 

on the structural integrity of the fuel 

cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary, 

or containment structure. Based on the above 

considerations, the proposed amendment 

would not degrade the confidence in the 

ability of the fission product barriers to limit 

the level of radiation to the public. Therefore, 

the proposed change does not involve a 

significant reduction in a margin of safety. 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensee’s analysis and, based on this 

review, it appears that the three 

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff 

proposes to determine that the 

amendment request involves no 

significant hazards consideration. 

Attorney for licensee: Bryan A. Snapp, 

Esquire, Assoc. General Counsel, PPL 

Services Corporation, 2 North Ninth St., 

GENTW3, Allentown, PA 18101–1179. 

NRC Branch Chief: Nancy L. Salgado 

PSEG Nuclear LLC, Docket No. 50–354, 

Hope Creek Generating Station, Salem 

County, New Jersey 

PSEG Nuclear LLC, Docket Nos. 50–272 

and 50–311, Salem Nuclear Generating 

Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Salem 

County, New Jersey 

Date of amendment request: July 14, 

2010. 

Description of amendment request: 

This amendment request contains 

sensitive unclassified non-safeguards 

information (SUNSI). The proposed 

amendments would approve the cyber 

security plan and associated 

implementation schedule for Hope 

Creek Generating Station (Hope Creek) 

and Salem Nuclear Generating Station, 

Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (Salem). In addition, 

the amendments would revise the 

existing license condition regarding 

physical protection in each of the three 

facility operating licenses (FOLs) to 

require the licensee to fully implement 

and maintain in effect all provisions of 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 196 / Tuesday, October 12, 2010 / Notices 62607 

(NRC)-approved cyber security plan. 

The proposed amendment was 

submitted pursuant to Section 73.54 of 

Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR) which requires 

licenses currently licensed to operate a 

nuclear power plant under 10 CFR Part 

50 to submit a cyber security plan (Plan) 

for NRC review and approval. 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the 

licensee has provided its analysis of the 

issue of no significant hazards 

consideration, which is presented 

below, with NRC staff edits in square 

brackets: 

Criterion 1: The Proposed Change Does Not 

Involve a Significant Increase in the 

Probability or Consequences of an Accident 

Previously Evaluated 

The proposed change is required by § 73.54 

(Rule) and includes three parts. The first part 

is the submittal of the Plan for NRC review 

and approval. The Plan conforms to the 

template provided in [Nuclear Energy 

Institute (NEI)] 08–09 Revision 6 and 

provides a description of how the 

requirements of the Rule will be 

implemented at the Salem—Hope Creek 

Generating Station [s]ite. The Plan 

establishes the licensing basis for the SalemHope Creek Cyber Security Program. The 

Plan establishes how to achieve high 

assurance that nuclear power plant digital 

computer and communication systems and 

networks associated with the following are 

adequately protected against cyber attacks up 

to and including the design basis threat: 

1. Safety-related and important-to-safety 

functions, 

2. Security functions, 

3. Emergency preparedness functions 

including offsite communications, and 

4. Support systems and equipment which 

if compromised, would adversely impact 

safety, security, or emergency preparedness 

functions. 

Part one of the proposed change is 

designed to achieve high assurance that the 

systems [within the scope of the Rule] are 

protected from cyber attacks. The Plan itself 

does not require any plant modifications. 

However, the Plan does describe how plant 

modifications which involve digital 

computer systems are reviewed to provide 

high assurance of adequate protection against 

cyber attacks, up to and including the design 

basis threat as defined in the Rule. The 

proposed change does not alter the plant 

configuration, require new plant equipment 

to be installed, alter accident analysis 

assumptions, add any initiators, or [a]ffect 

the function of plant systems or the manner 

in which systems are operated, maintained, 

modified, tested, or inspected. The first part 

of the proposed change is designed to 

achieve high assurance that the systems 

within the scope of the Rule are protected 

from cyber attacks and has no impact on the 

probability or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated. 

The second part of the proposed change is 

an Implementation Schedule. The third part 

adds a sentence to the existing FOL license 

condition for Physical Protection. Both of 

these changes are administrative and have no 

impact on the probability or consequences of 

an accident previously evaluated. 

Therefore, it is concluded that this change 

does not involve a significant increase in the 

probability or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated. 

Criterion 2: The Proposed Change Does Not 

Create the Possibility of a New or Different 

Kind of Accident From Any Accident 

Previously Evaluated 

The proposed change is required by § 73.54 

and includes three parts. The first part is the 

submittal of the Plan for NRC review and 

approval. The Plan conforms to the template 

provided by NEI 08–09 Revision 6 and 

provides a description of how the 

requirements of the Rule will be 

implemented at [the] Salem and Hope Creek 

Generating Station [s]ite. The Plan 

establishes the licensing basis for the SalemHope Creek Cyber Security Program. The 

Plan establishes how to achieve high 

assurance that nuclear power plant digital 

computer and communication systems and 

networks associated with the following are 

adequately protected against cyber attacks up 

to and including the design basis threat: 

1. Safety-related and important-to-safety 

functions, 

2. Security functions, 

3. Emergency preparedness functions 

including offsite communications, and 

4. Support systems and equipment which 

if compromised, would adversely impact 

safety, security, or emergency preparedness 

functions. 

Part one of the proposed change is 

designed to achieve high assurance that the 

systems within the scope of the Rule are 

protected from cyber attacks. The Plan itself 

does not require any plant modifications. 

However, the Plan does describe how plant 

modifications [which involve] digital 

computer systems are reviewed to provide 

high assurance of adequate protection against 

cyber attacks, up to and including the design 

basis threat as defined in the Rule. The 

proposed change does not alter the plant 

configuration, require new plant equipment 

to be installed, alter accident analysis 

assumptions, add any initiators, or [a]ffect 

the function of plant systems or the manner 

in which systems are operated, maintained, 

modified, tested, or inspected. The first part 

of the proposed change is designed to 

achieve high assurance that the systems 

within the scope of the Rule are protected 

from cyber attacks and does not create the 

possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any previously evaluated. 

The second part of the proposed change is 

an Implementation Schedule. The third part 

adds a sentence to the existing FOL license 

condition for Physical Protection. Both of 

these changes are administrative and do not 

create the possibility of a new or different 

kind of accident from any previously 

evaluated. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

create the possibility of a new or different 

kind of accident from any accident 

previously evaluated. 

Criterion 3: The Proposed Change Does Not 

Involve a Significant Reduction in a Margin 

of Safety 

The proposed change is required by § 73.54 

and includes three parts. The first part is the 

submittal of the Plan for NRC review and 

approval. The Plan conforms to the template 

provided by NEI 08–09 Revision 6 and 

provides a description of how the 

requirements of the Rule will be 

implemented at the Salem and Hope Creek 

Generating Station site. The Plan establishes 

the licensing basis for the Salem-Hope Creek 

Cyber Security Program. The Plan establishes 

how to achieve high assurance that nuclear 

power plant digital computer and 

communication systems and networks 

associated with the following are adequately 

protected against cyber attacks up to and 

including the design basis threat: 

1. Safety-related and important-to-safety 

functions, 

2. Security functions, 

3. Emergency preparedness functions 

including offsite communications, and 

4. Support systems and equipment which 

if compromised, would adversely impact 

safety, security, or emergency preparedness 

functions. 

Part one of the proposed change is 

designed to achieve high assurance that the 

systems within the scope of the Rule are 

protected from cyber attacks. Plant safety 

margins are established through Limiting 

Conditions for Operation, Limiting Safety 

System Settings and Safety [L]imits specified 

in the Technical Specifications. Because 

there is no change to these established safety 

margins, the proposed change does not 

involve a significant reduction in a margin of 

safety. 

The second part of the proposed change is 

an Implementation Schedule. The third part 

adds a sentence to the existing FOL license 

condition for Physical Protection. Both of 

these changes are administrative and do not 

involve a significant reduction in a margin of 

safety. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

involve a significant reduction in a margin of 

safety. 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensee’s analysis and, based on this 

review, with changes by the NRC staff 

shown in square brackets, it appears 

that the three standards of 10 CFR 

50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the 

NRC staff proposes to determine that the 

amendment request involves no 

significant hazards consideration. 

Attorney for licensee: Vincent 

Zabielski, PSEG Nuclear LLC–N21, P.O. 

Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038. 

NRC Branch Chief: Harold K. 

Chernoff. 

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating 

Corporation, Docket No. 50–482, Wolf 

Creek Generating Station, Coffey 

County, Kansas 

Date of amendment request: July 19, 

2010. 

Description of amendment request: 

This amendment request contains 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
62608 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 196 / Tuesday, October 12, 2010 / Notices 

sensitive unclassified non-safeguards 

information (SUNSI). The amendment 

requests for approval of the Cyber 

Security Plan in accordance with 10 

CFR Section 73.54. In addition, the 

amendment would revise Section 2.E of 

the Renewed Facility Operating License 

No. NPF–42 to incorporate the 

provisions for implementing and 

maintaining in effect the provisions of 

the approved Cyber Security Plan. 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the 

licensee has provided its analysis of the 

issue of no significant hazards 

consideration, which is presented 

below: 

1. Do the proposed changes involve a 

significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed change incorporates a new 

requirement in the Renewed Facility 

Operating License to implement and 

maintain the Cyber Security Plan as part of 

the facility’s overall program for physical 

protection. Inclusion of the Cyber Security 

Plan in the Renewed Facility Operating 

License itself does not involve any 

modifications to the safety related structures, 

systems or components (SSCs). Rather, the 

Cyber Security Plan describes how the 

requirements of 10 CFR 73.54 are to be 

implemented to identify, evaluate, and 

mitigate cyber attacks up to and including 

the design basis cyber attack threat, thereby 

achieving high assurance that the facility’s 

digital computer and communications 

systems and networks are protected from 

cyber attacks. The implementation and 

incorporation of the Cyber Security Plan into 

the Renewed Facility Operating License will 

not alter previously evaluated Updated 

Safety Analysis Report (USAR) design basis 

accident analysis assumptions, add any 

accident initiators, or affect the function of 

the plant safety related SSCs as to how they 

are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or 

inspected. 

Therefore, the proposed changes do not 

involve a significant increase in the 

probability or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated. 

2. Do the proposed changes create the 

possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

This proposed amendment provides 

assurance that safety related SSCs are 

protected from cyber attacks. Implementation 

of 10 CFR 73.54 and the inclusion of the 

Cyber Security Plan in the Renewed Facility 

Operating License do not result in the need 

of any new or different USAR design basis 

accident analysis. It does not introduce new 

equipment that could create a new or 

different kind of accident, and no new 

equipment failure modes are created. As a 

result, no new accident scenarios, failure 

mechanisms, or limiting single failures are 

introduced as a result of this proposed 

amendment. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

create the possibility of a new or different 

kind of accident from any previously 

evaluated. 

3. Do the proposed changes involve a 

significant reduction in a margin of safety? 

Response: No. 

The margin of safety is associated with the 

confidence in the ability of the fission 

product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, reactor 

coolant pressure boundary, and containment 

structure) to limit the level of radiation to the 

public. The proposed amendment would not 

alter the way any safety related SSC 

functions and would not alter the way the 

plant is operated. The amendment provides 

assurance that safety related SSCs are 

protected from cyber attacks. The proposed 

amendment would not introduce any new 

uncertainties or change any existing 

uncertainties associated with any safety 

limit. The proposed amendment would have 

no impact on the structural integrity of the 

fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure 

boundary, or containment structure. Based 

on the above considerations, the proposed 

amendment would not degrade the 

confidence in the ability of the fission 

product barriers to limit the level of radiation 

to the public. 

Therefore the proposed change does not 

involve a reduction in a margin of safety. 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensee’s analysis and, based on this 

review, it appears that the three 

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff 

proposes to determine that the 

amendment request involves no 

significant hazards consideration. 

Attorney for licensee: Jay Silberg, Esq., 

Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, 

2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 

20037. 

NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. 

Markley. 

Order Imposing Procedures for Access 

to Sensitive Unclassified NonSafeguards Information for Contention 

Preparation 

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, LLC, 

R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, LLC, 

and Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, 

LLC, Docket Nos. 50–317, 50–318, 50– 

244, 50–220, and 50–410, Calvert Cliffs 

Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 

(CCNPP), R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power 

Plant (Ginna), Nine Mile Point Nuclear 

Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (NMPNS), 

Calvert County, Maryland, Wayne 

County, New York, and Oswego County, 

New York, Respectively 

Carolina Power and Light Company, 

Docket Nos. 50–325 and 50–324, 

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 

and 2, Brunswick County, North 

Carolina 

Entergy Gulf States Louisiana, LLC, and 

Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50– 

458, River Bend Station, Unit 1, West 

Feliciana Parish, Louisiana 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 

Docket Nos. 50–003, 50–247, and 50– 

286, Indian Point Nuclear Generating 

Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3, Westchester 

County, New York 

Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50– 

313 and 50–368, Arkansas Nuclear One, 

Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Pope County, 

Arkansas 

Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50– 

382, Waterford Steam Electric Station, 

Unit 3, St. Charles Parish, Louisiana 

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating 

Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50–334 

and 50–412, Beaver Valley Power 

Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Beaver 

County, Pennsylvania 

Florida Power and Light Company, et 

al., Docket Nos. 50–335 and 50–389, St. 

Lucie Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, St. Lucie 

County, Florida 

Indiana Michigan Power Company, 

Docket No. 50–315 and 50–316, Donald 

C. Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP), Units 1 

and 2, Berrien County, Michigan 

Luminant Generation Company LLC,, 

Docket Nos. 50–445 and 50–446, 

Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, 

Units 1 and 2, Somervell County, Texas 

Nebraska Public Power District, Docket 

No. 50–298, Cooper Nuclear Station, 

Nemaha County, Nebraska 

NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC (the 

licensee), Docket Nos. 50–266 and 50– 

301, Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP), 

Units 1 and 2, Town of Two Creeks, 

Manitowac County, Wisconsin 

Northern States Power Company— 

Minnesota (NSPM), Docket No. 50–263, 

Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant 

(MNGP), Wright County, Minnesota 

Northern States Power Company— 

Minnesota (NSPM), Docket Nos. 50–282 

and 50–306, Prairie Island Nuclear 

Generating Plant (PINGP), Units 1 and 

2, Goodhue County, Minnesota 

Pacific Gas and Electric Company, 

Docket Nos. 50–275 and 50–323, Diablo 

Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 

1 and 2, San Luis Obispo County, 

California 

PPL Susquehanna, LLC, Docket Nos. 50– 

387 and 50–388, Susquehanna Steam 

Electric Station (SSES), Units 1 and 2, 

Luzerne County, Pennsylvania 

PSEG Nuclear LLC, Docket No. 50–354, 

Hope Creek Generating Station, Salem 

County, New Jersey 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 196 / Tuesday, October 12, 2010 / Notices 62609 

1While a request for hearing or petition to 

intervene in this proceeding must comply with the 

filing requirements of the NRC’s ‘‘E-Filing Rule,’’ the 

initial request to access SUNSI under these 

procedures should be submitted as described in this 

paragraph. 

2Any motion for Protective Order or draft NonDisclosure Affidavit or Agreement for SUNSI must 

be filed with the presiding officer or the Chief 

Administrative Judge if the presiding officer has not 

yet been designated, within 30 days of the deadline 

for the receipt of the written access request. 

3Requestors should note that the filing 

requirements of the NRC’s E-Filing Rule (72 FR 

49139; August 28, 2007) apply to appeals of NRC 

staff determinations (because they must be served 

on a presiding officer or the Commission, as 

applicable), but not to the initial SUNSI request 

submitted to the NRC staff under these procedures. 

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating 

Corporation, Docket No. 50–482, Wolf 

Creek Generating Station, Coffey 

County, Kansas 

A. This Order contains instructions 

regarding how potential parties to this 

proceeding may request access to 

documents containing Sensitive 

Unclassified Non-Safeguards 

Information (SUNSI). 

B. Within 10 days after publication of 

this notice of hearing and opportunity to 

petition for leave to intervene, any 

potential party who believes access to 

SUNSI is necessary to respond to this 

notice may request such access. A 

‘‘potential party’’ is any person who 

intends to participate as a party by 

demonstrating standing and filing an 

admissible contention under 10 CFR 

2.309. Requests for access to SUNSI 

submitted later than 10 days after 

publication will not be considered 

absent a showing of good cause for the 

late filing, addressing why the request 

could not have been filed earlier. 

C. The requestor shall submit a letter 

requesting permission to access SUNSI 

to the Office of the Secretary, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001, Attention: 

Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, 

and provide a copy to the Associate 

General Counsel for Hearings, 

Enforcement and Administration, Office 

of the General Counsel, Washington, DC 

20555–0001. The expedited delivery or 

courier mail address for both offices is: 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 

Maryland 20852. The e-mail addresses 

for the Office of the Secretary and the 

Office of the General Counsel are 

Hearing.Docket@nrc.gov and 

OGCmailcenter@nrc.gov, respectively.1

The request must include the following 

information: 

(1) A description of the licensing 

action with a citation to this Federal 

Register notice; 

(2) The name and address of the 

potential party and a description of the 

potential party’s particularized interest 

that could be harmed by the action 

identified in C.(1); 

(3) The identity of the individual or 

entity requesting access to SUNSI and 

the requestor’s basis for the need for the 

information in order to meaningfully 

participate in this adjudicatory 

proceeding. In particular, the request 

must explain why publicly-available 

versions of the information requested 

would not be sufficient to provide the 

basis and specificity for a proffered 

contention; 

D. Based on an evaluation of the 

information submitted under paragraph 

C.(3) the NRC staff will determine 

within 10 days of receipt of the request 

whether: 

(1) There is a reasonable basis to 

believe the petitioner is likely to 

establish standing to participate in this 

NRC proceeding; and 

(2) The requestor has established a 

legitimate need for access to SUNSI. 

E. If the NRC staff determines that the 

requestor satisfies both D.(1) and D.(2) 

above, the NRC staff will notify the 

requestor in writing that access to 

SUNSI has been granted. The written 

notification will contain instructions on 

how the requestor may obtain copies of 

the requested documents, and any other 

conditions that may apply to access to 

those documents. These conditions may 

include, but are not limited to, the 

signing of a Non-Disclosure Agreement 

or Affidavit, or Protective Order 2 setting 

forth terms and conditions to prevent 

the unauthorized or inadvertent 

disclosure of SUNSI by each individual 

who will be granted access to SUNSI. 

F. Filing of Contentions. Any 

contentions in these proceedings that 

are based upon the information received 

as a result of the request made for 

SUNSI must be filed by the requestor no 

later than 25 days after the requestor is 

granted access to that information. 

However, if more than 25 days remain 

between the date the petitioner is 

granted access to the information and 

the deadline for filing all other 

contentions (as established in the notice 

of hearing or opportunity for hearing), 

the petitioner may file its SUNSI 

contentions by that later deadline. 

G. Review of Denials of Access. 

(1) If the request for access to SUNSI 

is denied by the NRC staff either after 

a determination on standing and need 

for access, or after a determination on 

trustworthiness and reliability, the NRC 

staff shall immediately notify the 

requestor in writing, briefly stating the 

reason or reasons for the denial. 

(2) The requestor may challenge the 

NRC staff’s adverse determination by 

filing a challenge within 5 days of 

receipt of that determination with: (a) 

The presiding officer designated in this 

proceeding; (b) if no presiding officer 

has been appointed, the Chief 

Administrative Judge, or if he or she is 

unavailable, another administrative 

judge, or an administrative law judge 

with jurisdiction pursuant to 10 CFR 

2.318(a); or (c) if another officer has 

been designated to rule on information 

access issues, with that officer. 

H. Review of Grants of Access. A 

party other than the requestor may 

challenge an NRC staff determination 

granting access to SUNSI whose release 

would harm that party’s interest 

independent of the proceeding. Such a 

challenge must be filed with the Chief 

Administrative Judge within 5 days of 

the notification by the NRC staff of its 

grant of access. 

If challenges to the NRC staff 

determinations are filed, these 

procedures give way to the normal 

process for litigating disputes 

concerning access to information. The 

availability of interlocutory review by 

the Commission of orders ruling on 

such NRC staff determinations (whether 

granting or denying access) is governed 

by 10 CFR 2.311.3

I. The Commission expects that the 

NRC staff and presiding officers (and 

any other reviewing officers) will 

consider and resolve requests for access 

to SUNSI, and motions for protective 

orders, in a timely fashion in order to 

minimize any unnecessary delays in 

identifying those petitioners who have 

standing and who have propounded 

contentions meeting the specificity and 

basis requirements in 10 CFR Part 2. 

Attachment 1 to this Order summarizes 

the general target schedule for 

processing and resolving requests under 

these procedures. 

It is so ordered. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day 

of September 2010. 

For the Commission. 

Annette L. Vietti-Cook, 

Secretary of the Commission. 

ATTACHMENT 1—General Target Schedule 

for Processing and Resolving Requests for 

Access to Sensitive Unclassified NonSafeguards Information in This Proceeding 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
62610 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 196 / Tuesday, October 12, 2010 / Notices 

Day Event/Activity 

0 ........................................... Publication of Federal Register notice of hearing and opportunity to petition for leave to intervene, including 

order with instructions for access requests. 

10 ......................................... Deadline for submitting requests for access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information (SUNSI) with 

information: supporting the standing of a potential party identified by name and address; describing the need 

for the information in order for the potential party to participate meaningfully in an adjudicatory proceeding. 

60 ......................................... Deadline for submitting petition for intervention containing: (i) Demonstration of standing; (ii) all contentions 

whose formulation does not require access to SUNSI (+25 Answers to petition for intervention; +7 requestor/ 

petitioner reply). 

20 ......................................... Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff informs the requestor of the staff’s determination whether the request for access provides a reasonable basis to believe standing can be established and shows need for 

SUNSI. (NRC staff also informs any party to the proceeding whose interest independent of the proceeding 

would be harmed by the release of the information.) If NRC staff makes the finding of need for SUNSI and likelihood of standing, NRC staff begins document processing (preparation of redactions or review of redacted documents). 

25 ......................................... If NRC staff finds no ‘‘need’’ or no likelihood of standing, the deadline for requestor/petitioner to file a motion 

seeking a ruling to reverse the NRC staff’s denial of access; NRC staff files copy of access determination with 

the presiding officer (or Chief Administrative Judge or other designated officer, as appropriate). If NRC staff 

finds ‘‘need’’ for SUNSI, the deadline for any party to the proceeding whose interest independent of the proceeding would be harmed by the release of the information to file a motion seeking a ruling to reverse the NRC 

staff’s grant of access. 

30 ......................................... Deadline for NRC staff reply to motions to reverse NRC staff determination(s). 

40 ......................................... (Receipt +30) If NRC staff finds standing and need for SUNSI, deadline for NRC staff to complete information 

processing and file motion for Protective Order and draft Non-Disclosure Affidavit. Deadline for applicant/licensee to file Non-Disclosure Agreement for SUNSI. 

A ........................................... If access granted: Issuance of presiding officer or other designated officer decision on motion for protective order 

for access to sensitive information (including schedule for providing access and submission of contentions) or 

decision reversing a final adverse determination by the NRC staff. 

A + 3 ..................................... Deadline for filing executed Non-Disclosure Affidavits. Access provided to SUNSI consistent with decision issuing 

the protective order. 

A + 28 ................................... Deadline for submission of contentions whose development depends upon access to SUNSI. However, if more 

than 25 days remain between the petitioner’s receipt of (or access to) the information and the deadline for filing 

all other contentions (as established in the notice of hearing or opportunity for hearing), the petitioner may file 

its SUNSI contentions by that later deadline. 

A + 53 ................................... (Contention receipt +25) Answers to contentions whose development depends upon access to SUNSI. 

A + 60 ................................... (Answer receipt +7) Petitioner/Intervenor reply to answers. 

A + 60 ................................... Decision on contention admission. 

[FR Doc. 2010–25144 Filed 10–8–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

Advisory Committee on Reactor 

Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the 

ACRS Subcommittee on Plant 

Operations and Fire Protection 

The ACRS Subcommittee on Plant 

Operations and Fire Protection will hold 

a meeting on November 1, 2010, Room 

T–2B1, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 

Maryland. 

The entire meeting will be open to 

public attendance. 

The agenda for the subject meeting 

shall be as follows: 

Monday, November 1, 2010—8:30 a.m. 

until 5 p.m. 

The Subcommittee will discuss the 

Draft Final Rule, ‘‘Enhancements to 

Emergency Preparedness Regulations,’’ 

and related regulatory guidance 

documents: Draft Regulatory Guide DG– 

1237, ‘‘Guidance on Making Changes to 

Emergency Plans for Nuclear Power 

Reactors,’’ Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) 

NSIR/DPR–ISG–01, ‘‘Emergency 

Planning for Nuclear Power Plants,’’ and 

NUREG/CR 7002, ‘‘Criteria for 

Development of Evacuation Time 

Estimate Studies.’’ The Subcommittee 

will hear presentations by and hold 

discussions with representatives of the 

NRC staff and other interested persons 

regarding this matter. The 

Subcommittee will gather information, 

analyze relevant issues and facts, and 

formulate proposed positions and 

actions, as appropriate, for deliberation 

by the Full Committee. 

Members of the public desiring to 

provide oral statements and/or written 

comments should notify the Designated 

Federal Official (DFO), Girija Shukla 

(Telephone 301–415–6855 or E-mail 

Girija.Shukla@nrc.gov) five days prior to 

the meeting, if possible, so that 

appropriate arrangements can be made. 

Thirty-five hard copies of each 

presentation or handout should be 

provided to the DFO thirty minutes 

before the meeting. In addition, one 

electronic copy of each presentation 

should be emailed to the DFO one day 

before the meeting. If an electronic copy 

cannot be provided within this 

timeframe, presenters should provide 

the DFO with a CD containing each 

presentation at least thirty minutes 

before the meeting. Electronic 

recordings will be permitted only 

during those portions of the meeting 

that are open to the public. Detailed 

procedures for the conduct of and 

participation in ACRS meetings were 

published in the Federal Register on 

October 14, 2009, (74 FR 58268–58269). 

Detailed meeting agendas and meeting 

transcripts are available on the NRC 

Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/doc-collections/acrs. Information 

regarding topics to be discussed, 

changes to the agenda, whether the 

meeting has been canceled or 

rescheduled, and the time allotted to 

present oral statements can be obtained 

from the Web site cited above or by 

contacting the identified DFO. 

Moreover, in view of the possibility that 

the schedule for ACRS meetings may be 

adjusted by the Chairman as necessary 

to facilitate the conduct of the meeting, 

persons planning to attend should check 

with these references if such 

rescheduling would result in a major 

inconvenience. 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES