1

Filed 1/15/14 In re J.S. CA1/4 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION FOUR 

In re J.S., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law. 

MARIN COUNTY HEALTH & HUMAN 

SERVICES, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

J.S., et al., 

 Defendants and Appellants. 

 A137671 

 (Marin County 

 Super. Ct. No. JV25193A) 

 J.S. (Father) and A.R. (Mother) appeal an order of the juvenile court continuing its 

supervision of their daughter, J.S. (Minor) and requiring Father to submit to a polygraph 

test as part of his service plan. We shall affirm the order. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 We are familiar with the background of this case through our review of an earlier 

appeal in this matter, which challenged jurisdictional and dispositional orders of the 

juvenile court with respect to Minor. (In re K.S. (Mar. 26, 2012, A131951) [nonpub. 

opn.].)1

 

 1

 We take judicial notice of the record on appeal in In re K.S., A131951. 
2

 As we explained in In re K.S., Marin County Health and Human Services (the 

Department) filed petitions in October 2010 pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code2

section 300 on behalf of two half-sisters, then 12-year-old K.S. and then two-year-old 

Minor. Mother is the mother of both K.S. and Minor. Father is K.S.’s stepfather (and 

paternal uncle) and Minor’s father. Evidence from the jurisdiction report and the 

jurisdictional hearing indicated K.S. had told a social worker that Father had been 

touching her inappropriately for three years. He had touched her on her knees and thighs, 

and had tried to touch her on her breast and between her legs. K.S. reported Father had 

touched her on her “ ‘ private part,’ ” and had “ ‘put his penis in [her] private.’ ” K.S. 

also reported that Father would look through the curtain in her room when she was 

changing her clothes.3

 At the jurisdictional hearing, K.S. testified that Father had 

intercourse with her on more than one occasion. On one of these occasions, as she told 

him to stop, Father said, “ ‘Oh no, you’re gonna see how good it feels having it, having 

sex.’ ” Minor was sleeping in the bedroom on a couple of occasions when Father 

molested her. Mother would call K.S. “ ‘a slut, a whore, a prostitute’ ” because she went 

out with boys, and K.S. testified that Mother hit her regularly and yelled at her without 

provocation. Mother and Father would hit Minor. 

 There was conflicting evidence about whether K.S. told Mother that Father had 

sexually abused her. Mother told a social worker she thought K.S. was lying in order to 

separate Mother and Father or because Father had restricted her television and radio use. 

Mother later expressed uncertainty about whether the abuse had taken place. Father 

denied having sexually abused K.S. However, Mother had sought and obtained 

temporary orders restraining Father from having contact with the children except courtordered visitation and reported that he had moved out of the family home. 

 2

 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 

3

 At the time, Mother, Father, K.S. and Minor shared a bedroom, which contained 

a bunk bed and a separate bed, with a curtain between the beds. Mother had told a police 

officer she slept in the separate bed, K.S. slept on the top bunk, and Father and Minor 

slept on the bottom bunk. 
3

 The juvenile court found K.S.’s testimony “ ‘compelling, credible, and 

trustworthy,’ ” found that Mother not only had failed to protect K.S. but would also fail 

to protect Minor, and found it had jurisdiction over both children. 

 After a dispositional hearing, the juvenile court continued Minor in foster care. 

Both Mother and Father received reunification services for Minor. 

 Mother and Father appealed the jurisdictional and dispositional orders, and in In re 

K.S., we affirmed the orders, concluding they were supported by substantial evidence. In 

doing so, we concluded that the evidence supported a conclusion that Father’s actions in 

sexually abusing K.S. placed Minor at risk of harm. (In re K.S., supra, at p. 18.) 

 In August 2011, the juvenile court granted the Department discretion to place 

Minor in Mother’s care, and Minor returned to Mother at the end of that month. K.S. 

remained in foster care. 

 A report prepared for a September 2011 six-month status review hearing indicated 

that Father had participated in sex offender therapy because it had been mandated by the 

court in order for him to reunify with Minor, but that he continued to maintain that he had 

not engaged in any sexually inappropriate behavior with K.S. Father said he had treated 

group therapy as an opportunity to learn about the mistakes of others, but he did not 

believe it was necessary for his own rehabilitation or for the healing of his family. 

Father’s therapist reported that Father had been consistent in denying that he had done 

anything inappropriate; the therapist believed there was a “50/50 chance” that Father had 

behaved inappropriately toward K.S. Father had expressed interest in taking a lie 

detector test, something the therapist said most clients would be afraid to take. The 

juvenile court continued its jurisdiction over Minor and ordered continued family 

maintenance services. 

 The Department prepared a status report for a March 2012 family maintenance 

review hearing. (§ 364.) The report indicated that Minor was still living in Mother’s 

care, and that Mother’s parenting skills had improved. Father had attended his sex 

offender group therapy regularly, and continued to deny having behaved inappropriately 

toward K.S. or Minor. The group therapist stated that Father had been cooperative in 
4

therapy and had participated in the group, and recommended that Father return home and 

continue to receive family maintenance services. Mother believed the family therapy she 

had been attending had improved her skills as a parent, did not believe the dependency 

case should continue, and believed she could “be protective” if Father returned to the 

home and that Minor would be safe with him. The juvenile court continued its 

supervision of Minor, ordered continued family maintenance services, and allowed Father 

to return to the home.4

 

 In preparation for a status review hearing, the Department filed a report in 

September 2012, noting that Minor was living with Mother and Father. Mother reported 

that Minor and Father had a positive relationship, Minor had told a social worker she 

liked playing with Father, and the social worker said their games appeared to be 

appropriate. Father, Mother, and Minor had attended family therapy, and Mother was 

attending individual therapy. Mother’s therapist reported that Mother said she provided 

constant supervision of Minor, and the therapist believed Mother would seek help if she 

saw anything of concern. Father had been allowed to leave his group sex offender 

therapy at the end of April 2012. He had not acknowledged behaving inappropriately 

toward K.S. Father had begun individual sex offender therapy in May 2012, but had 

found it difficult to attend consistently because of health problems, and had participated 

since about August 2012. 

 Father’s individual therapist was concerned that Father seemed to have no 

empathy for K.S., and said that empathy was a “barrier to abuse.” She told the social 

worker that Father had “not met any of the goals of therapy including understanding the 

cycle of abuse, understanding patterns and impulses that cannot be controlled, acquiring 

skills to work with triggers, developing empathy for the victim, and repairing the 

relationship.” She said that “if [Father] did not receive the treatment that he needed, and 

was actually a sex offender, he would offend again.” The therapist recommended that 

 4

 The court also ordered a permanency planning hearing for K.S. pursuant to 

section 366.26. In doing so, it noted that it continued to believe K.S.’s version of events 

over that of Father. 
5

Father submit to a polygraph test for therapeutic purposes; such a test could be used as “a 

way to confront clients about their denial, encourage them to be honest, and to be 

accountable for their actions,” and recommended that Father continue his treatment to 

prevent possible recidivism. The therapist recommended that Father not see Minor 

changing clothes, and that he not provide sexual education to Minor. Mother agreed to 

abide by these recommendations. 

 The Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) recommended that the case be 

dismissed. Among other things, the CASA stated that Mother appeared to have applied 

many of the positive parenting techniques she had learned, and that the bond between 

Father and Minor appeared strong. 

 The Department filed an addendum report in December 2012. According to this 

report, Minor told a social worker at the end of September that she slept with Father. 

Minor asked the social worker not to tell her former foster parent because the former 

foster parent would take her away from her home if she knew. Minor also told the social 

worker she would change clothes in front of Father, and asked the worker not to tell the 

former foster parent. Minor said that neither Father nor anyone else had touched her 

inappropriately. The social worker spoke with Mother, who said Minor wanted Father by 

her side, and that Father stayed with Minor in bed until Minor fell asleep. Mother and 

Father would then switch places, so that Mother slept with Minor and Father slept alone. 

Mother denied that Minor changed clothes in front of Father. Mother agreed to comply 

when the social worker told her Father could not sleep with Minor. 

 The addendum report also explained that, in October 2012, Minor told the social 

worker “that she no longer sleeps with her father however then she stated that she 

‘sometimes’ sleeps with her father.” When this happened, according to Minor, Father 

was clothed and Minor was wearing a nightgown or pajamas, and Father touched only 

her arms. Minor did not report any inappropriate play. Mother said Minor had not been 

sleeping with Father. The social worker asked Father about sleeping in the same bed 

with Minor, and Father said he “felt this ha[d] been made into a big issue when it was just 

a small thing.” He believed it was natural for a father to sleep with his young children, 
6

and that it was “ ‘crazy’ ” to think he would harm his daughter. He also said Minor was 

having trouble adjusting to the new routine of not sleeping with Father, but that he and 

Mother had been firm about enforcing this rule. 

 Finally, the addendum report explained that Father stated that he would be willing 

to take the polygraph as long as he did not have to pay for it.5

 At a contested review 

hearing, the social worker testified that Father’s sex offender therapist was concerned that 

Father had made so little progress and that a polygraph would allow him to be more 

honest and make more progress within his therapy. She also said that if the polygraph 

test indicated there had been no sexual abuse, there would be no reason to keep the 

dependency case open. If the test indicated sexual abuse had occurred, the information 

would be used only in a therapeutic setting, and the social worker would recommend that 

the Department provide six months more of services and that Father continue to 

participate in individual sex offender therapy. The Department would have the results of 

the polygraph test, and the social worker did not know whether the results would be 

included in any report to the court. 

 The juvenile court continued its jurisdiction over Minor, finding that conditions 

that would justify the initial assumption of jurisdiction under section 300 still existed or 

were likely to exist if supervision were withdrawn. The court continued family 

maintenance services pursuant to an updated case plan, which included the requirement 

that Father submit to a polygraph test. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Continued Jurisdiction 

 Appellants contend there is no substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s 

finding that Minor was at continued risk of harm in the absence of court supervision. “In 

reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, we look to the entire record for 

substantial evidence to support the findings of the juvenile court. [Citations.] Evidence 

 5

 Father’s prior willingness to accept a polygraph test when he was talking with 

social workers is at odds with his comment in his reply brief that “[f]or [Father], the test 

is offensive and reprehensible.” 
7

sufficient to support the court’s finding must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of 

solid value; it must actually be substantial proof of the essentials that the law requires in a 

particular case.” (In re N.S. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 167, 172.) We consider the evidence 

in a manner favorable to the prevailing party, resolve all conflicts in favor of the juvenile 

court’s order, and uphold the trial court’s order unless no rational fact finder could have 

reached the same conclusion. (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1401; In re 

Athena P. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 617, 629.) 

 Applying these standards, we conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile 

court’s finding. In the previous appeal in this dependency, In re K.S., we reviewed the 

evidence that Father molested Minor’s sister and that Mother did not assist her daughter, 

and concluded it provided substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s assumption 

of jurisdiction over Minor. (In re K.S., supra, A131951, [at p. 18].) We recognize that 

since that time, Father has participated in group sex offender therapy and that there have 

been no allegations that he sexually abused Minor. However, there was evidence that 

Father’s therapist believed he had not met any of the goals of therapy, including 

understanding the cycle of abuse, working with triggers, and developing empathy for the 

victim. There was also evidence that even after extensive therapy, Father lay in bed with 

Minor as she fell asleep, was present while she was changing her clothes, and was aware 

that those activities might cause concern in the dependency proceedings, and that Mother 

did not prevent him from doing so. From these facts, the juvenile court could reasonably 

conclude continued therapy and supervision were necessary to protect Minor. 

 Appellants also argue that Father’s refusal to admit abusing K.S., standing alone, 

is insufficient to continue jurisdiction, and that it would be “Kafkaesque” to require him 

to admit to sexual abuse he contends never happened in order to end juvenile court 

jurisdiction over his daughter. (See Blanca P. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 

1738, 1752–1753 [recognizing risk that innocent parent might feel compelled to admit to 

sexual abuse in order to receive reunification services].) Our conclusion, however, is 

based on the record as a whole, which provides evidence that Father did indeed sexually 
8

abuse K.S. and that the progress he and Mother have made is insufficient to protect 

Minor in the absence of continued juvenile court supervision. 

 We are not persuaded otherwise by appellants’ reliance on In re N.S., supra, 97 

Cal.App.4th 167, 169–170, in which the Court of Appeal concluded the evidence did not 

support the continuation of juvenile court jurisdiction. The jurisdiction there was 

originally based on the father’s inability to manage his stress and anger. (Id. at pp. 172–

173.) In the ensuing six months, however, there was no evidence the father had acted 

impulsively or had a temper outburst, and the evidence showed he had complied 

completely with his case plan and made good progress in therapy, and his therapist could 

identify no factors that left the minor at risk in the father’s care. (Id. at p. 173.) Here, as 

we have explained, Father’s therapist had expressed concern about his lack of progress in 

therapy; moreover, in the context of this case, the evidence that Father got into bed with 

Minor at bedtime and was present as she changed clothes could reasonably raise concerns 

for Minor’s safety. 

B. Polygraph Test 

 Appellants contend the juvenile court erred in requiring Father to submit to a 

polygraph test as part of his case plan. 

 A juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve a child’s 

interest and fashion a dispositional order, which may include therapy for a parent. (In re 

Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006; In re Lamonica H. (1990) 220 

Cal.App.3d 634, 649–650; In re Gabriel L. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 644, 652; § 362, 

subd. (a).) Appellants have not shown an abuse of that discretion here. It is clear that 

Father’s therapist recommended, and the juvenile court ordered, a polygraph test in order 

to further the purposes of Father’s therapy; that is, in order to assist him in being honest 

in therapy and in taking responsibility for the actions that led in part to the dependency. 

The therapist had opined that if Father was actually a sex offender and did not receive the 

treatment he needed, he would offend again. The juvenile court could reasonably 

conclude the polygraph test would assist Father in benefitting from that treatment and 

thereby reduce the risk of harm to Minor. 
9

 We note that in a different context, the court in Brown v. Superior Court (2002) 

101 Cal.App.4th 313, 320–321, considered the propriety of requiring, as a condition of 

probation, that a probationer submit to polygraph testing as part of his therapy. In 

response to the probationer’s challenge, the court concluded that “periodic polygraph 

examinations in furtherance of [the probationer’s] stalking therapy program is a valid 

condition of probation because it is reasonably related to the crime of which [he] was 

convicted and to possible future criminality.”6

 (Id. at p. 321, italics omitted.) Similarly 

here, we see no abuse of the lower court’s discretion in ordering a polygraph test as part 

of Father’s sex offender therapy. 

 Appellants argue, however, that under Evidence Code section 351.1, subd. (a), the 

results of a polygraph examination are inadmissible in court, that future recommendations 

of the therapist and social worker will be based on those inadmissible results, and that 

therefore they will impermissibly influence the court in making future decisions 

regarding Father’s parental rights.7

 This argument fails. First, Evidence Code 

section 351.1 provides that the results of a polygraph examination are not admissible “in 

any criminal proceeding . . . or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, 

. . . unless all parties stipulate to the admission of such results.” (Italics added.) This 

 6

 The court concluded, however, that the condition was overbroad because it did 

not limit the questions to those relating to the successful completion of the stalking 

therapy program and the crime of which the defendant was convicted. (Brown v. 

Superior Court, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 321.) Here, the juvenile court ordered 

services “as modified in the updated case plan.” That case plan provides, “Per the 

recommendation of [Father’s] sex offender therapist, [Father] will participate in weekly 

individual therapy and submit to a polygraph test.” It appears to us sufficiently clear that 

the polygraph test may relate only to those matters pertinent to Father’s sex offender 

therapy. 

7

 Appellants do not contend Father’s Fifth Amendment rights are implicated by the 

requirement of a polygraph test, and we see no cause for such concern. It does not appear 

that Father has been prosecuted for sexually abusing K.S. In any case, it is well 

established that a person subject to prosecution in the criminal courts is entitled to use 

immunity for statements made during court-ordered therapy in a dependency case. (In re 

Lamonica H., supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 649; In re Jessica B. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 

504, 521.) 
10

statute does not prohibit use of polygraph tests in dependency proceedings. (See In re 

Kathleen W. (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 68, 72.) Rather, subject to a foundational hearing, 

the results of a polygraph test may be admissible if the results are relevant to the primary 

issue before the court. (Id. at p. 73; In re Jordan R. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 111, 122.) 

In any case, based on this record, it would be speculation to conclude the trial court will 

make orders based on the results of a polygraph test, whether or not admissible. In fact, 

the juvenile court indicated that if the results of a polygraph test were in a social worker’s 

report, the court would disregard that information. Accordingly, we reject appellants’ 

argument. 

III. DISPOSITION 

 The order appealed from is affirmed. 
11

 _________________________ 

 Rivera, J. 

We concur: 

_________________________ 

Reardon, Acting P.J. 

_________________________ 

Humes, J.