alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

CRYSTAL N. RODGERS,

Petitioner

v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,

Respondent

______________________

2024-1682

______________________

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. SF-0752-22-0229-I-1.

______________________

Before PROST, TARANTO, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

O R D E R

Crystal N. Rodgers filed an appeal at the Merit Systems Protection Board challenging her removal from federal service and raising, in relevant part, an affirmative 

defense of discrimination. The Board’s final decision affirmed. She petitioned this court for review and her filings 

indicate that she wishes to continue to pursue her discrimination and retaliation claims. ECF No. 2 at 1–3; ECF No. 

1-2 at 13. Responding to this court’s show cause order, the 

United States Postal Service urges dismissal or transfer. 

Case: 24-1682 Document: 14 Page: 1 Filed: 07/23/2024
2 RODGERS v. USPS

Ms. Rodgers responds and appears to argue the merits of 

the case, including her discrimination claims. 

We transfer this case. Federal district courts, not this 

court, have jurisdiction over “[c]ases of discrimination subject to the provisions of [5 U.S.C.] § 7702,” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7703(b)(2), which involve an allegation of an action appealable to the Board and an allegation that a basis for the 

action was covered discrimination. Perry v. Merit Sys. Prot. 

Bd., 582 U.S. 420, 437 (2017). Here, Ms. Rodgers continues 

to pursue the allegations she made before the Board that 

her removal was the result of covered discrimination, so jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision lies in district 

court. We agree with the agency that transfer to the 

United States District Court for the Central District of California, where the employment action appears to have occurred, is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631. 

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

This matter and all case filings are transferred to the 

United States District Court for the Central District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. 

July 23, 2024

 Date

FOR THE COURT

 

Case: 24-1682 Document: 14 Page: 2 Filed: 07/23/2024
#### Richard S. HONEYCUTT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D10-5098.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Dec. 14, 2011.

Richard S. Honeycutt, Monticello, pro se.

No appearance required for appellee.

WARNER, J.

We affirm the denial of appellant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence. He claims that the court illegally enhanced his aggravated battery conviction pursuant to section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes, by reason of the use of a weapon, when his aggravated battery conviction was not subject to reclassification because the use of a weapon was an essential element of the crime. However, based upon the record, the sentence was not illegally enhanced, because the use of a weapon was not an essential element in this case. We thus affirm.

Appellant was charged with attempted second degree murder. The information alleged that he used a knife and specifically referred to section 775.087(1), indicating that the state was seeking an enhancement of the sentence under that statute. At trial, the jury was instructed on the lesser offense of aggravated battery pursuant to section 784.045(l)(a)l., defining the crime as “[ijntentionally or knowingly causing] great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement.” The jury was *not*instructed on aggravated battery pursuant to section 784.045(l)(a)2., which consists of the use of a deadly weapon. For purposes of enhancement, a special interrogatory asked the jury to determine whether the appellant used a knife during the incident, to which it answered “yes.”

*Lareau v. State,*573 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla.1991), states: “[Ejection 775.087(1) permits reclassification and the consequential enhancement of penalties for the crime of aggravated battery causing great bodily harm, section 784.045(l)(a), when a weapon is used to commit the crime.” That is what occurred in this case.

*Affirmed.*

POLEN and STEVENSON, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT
      32.2




HERITAGE
      OAKS BANCORP




Quarterly
      report on Form 10Q


for
      the
      quarter ended March 31, 2008





CERTIFICATION




Pursuant
      to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





The
      undersigned, who is the Chief Financial Officer of Heritage Oaks Bancorp (the
      “Company”), hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 USC Section 1350, that, to my
      knowledge, (i) the Quarterly Report on Form 10Q for the quarter ended June
      30,
      2007, as filed by the Company with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
      “Quarterly Report”), to which this Certification is an Exhibit, fully complies
      with the applicable requirements of Section 13(a) and 15(d) of the Exchange
      Act;
      and (ii) the information contained in this Quarterly Report fairly presents,
      in
      all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
      the
      Company.





Dated:
                May 9, 2008
            /s/
                Margaret A. TorresMargaret
                A. TorresExecutive
                Vice PresidentChief
                Financial Officer(Principal
                Financial and Accounting Officer)




A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
      authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
      in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required
      by Section 906, has been provided to Heritage Oaks Bancorp, and will be retained
      by Heritage Oaks Bancorp and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
      or its staff upon request.
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 193 (Wednesday, October 6, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 61771]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-25117]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Office of the Secretary


Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council; Renewal of the Public 
Advisory Committee

AGENCY: Office of the Secretary, Department of the Interior.

ACTION: Notice of reestablishment.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

    In accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee 
Act, as amended (5 U.S.C., App. 2), following the recommendation and 
approval of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, and in 
consultation with the General Services Administration the Secretary of 
the Interior hereby renews the charter for the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill 
Public Advisory Committee.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Court Order establishing the Exxon 
Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council also requires a public advisory 
committee. The Public Advisory Committee was established to advise the 
Trustee Council, and began functioning in October 1992. The Public 
Advisory Committee consists of 10 members representing the following 
principal interests: Sport hunting and fishing, conservation and 
environmental, public-at-large, recreation users, commercial tourism, 
science/technical, subsistence, commercial fishing, aquaculture and 
mariculture, and Native landowners.
    In order to ensure that a broad range of public viewpoints 
continues to be available to the Trustee Council, and in keeping with 
the settlement agreement, the continuation of the Public Advisory 
Committee is recommended.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Douglas Mutter, Department of the 
Interior, Office of Environmental Policy and Compliance, 1689 ``C'' 
Street, Room 119, Anchorage, Alaska, (907) 271-5011.

Certification

    I hereby certify that the renewal of the Charter of the Public 
Advisory Committee is necessary and in the public interest in 
connection with the performance of duties mandated by the settlement of 
United States v. State of Alaska, No. A91-081 CV, and is in accordance 
with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act of 1980, as amended and supplemented.

Ken Salazar,
Secretary of the Interior.
[FR Doc. 2010-25117 Filed 10-5-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4310-RG-P
NO. 07

- 12

- 00404

- CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL B
OCTOBER 24 , 2012

CECIL R. MCDONALD , APPELLANT

v. RICK THALER, DIRECTOR OF TDCJ , APPELLEE

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Cecil R. McDonald, filed a document, on September 7, 2012, entitled “Contest the Certification Decision” that appears to express a desire to appeal a
decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of T exas that was
entered in cause number 5:08

- CV

- 00255

- C. We dismiss the appeal.

On September 18 , 201 2 , the Court sent McDonald a letter acknowledging receipt
of the above

- described document. This letter further explained to McDonald that this
Court does not have authority to review the actions of a federal court. Finally, the letter directed McDonald to show cause, within ten days of the letter, how this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal or the appeal would be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
M cDonald has failed to respond in any manner.2 Accordingly, having no jurisdiction over a federal court and due to McDonald’s failure to comply with a directive of this Court, we now dismiss this appeal. See T EX

. R.
A PP

. P. 42.3(a), (c).

Mackey K. Hancock Justice
#### STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Hervey Lee OWENS, Appellee.

No. 5D08-3677.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

July 23, 2010.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Wesley Heidt, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Dee Ball, Assistant Public Defender, Day-tona Beach, for Appellee.

COHEN, J.

The State appeals the trial court’s order suppressing statements Appellee, Hervey Owens, made to law enforcement officers. We reverse.

Owens was charged with two counts of lewd and lascivious battery, one count of lewd or lascivious molestation, and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Prior to his interview with law enforcement, Owens was read the following:

> You have the right to remain silent; do you understand?

> Anything you say may be used against you in court; do you understand?

> You have a right to talk to a lawyer before and during questioning; do you understand?

> If you cannot afford a lawyer and want one, one will be provided for you before questioning, without charge; do you understand?

Owens responded affirmatively to each question. He also acknowledged that no one had threatened him or promised him anything to induce a confession.

The trial court, relying upon *State v. Powell,*998 So.2d 531 (Fla.2008), granted the motion to suppress. During the pen-dency of this appeal, that decision was reversed by the United States Supreme Court in *Florida v. Powell,*— U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 1195, — L.Ed.2d - (2010), *353which held that Miranda1 is satisfied when a suspect is informed he has “the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of [the law enforcement officers’] questions,” and that he can invoke this right “at any time ... during th[e] interview.” The Court explained:

> In determining whether police officers adequately conveyed the four warnings, we have said, reviewing courts are not required to examine the words employed “as if construing a will or defining the terms of an easement. The inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably ‘eonve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required by *Miranda.’*” (citations omitted).

*Id.*at 1204.

In this case, the *Miranda*warning given to Owens sufficiently parallels the standard warnings given by the Federal Bureau of Investigation quoted, in pertinent part, and described as “exemplary” in *Powell:*“You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions. You have the right to have a lawyer with you during questioning.” *Id.*at 1206.

Since *Powell,*the Florida Supreme Court specifically rejected the argument that a *Miranda*warning was deficient because it failed to advise of “the right to appointed counsel both before and *during*the interrogation.” *Miller v. State,*42 So.3d 204 (Fla.2010).

The warnings given Owens satisfy *Miranda.*

REVERSED.

MONACO, C.J., and PALMER, J., concur.

1

. *Miranda v. Arizona,*384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
| (logo) WELLS FARGO | **Commercial Mortgage  Servicing**D1050-084, 8th Floor  401 South Tryon Street  Charlotte, NC 28202  1-800-326-1334 |
|--------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

**ANNUAL STATEMENT OFCOMPLIANCE**

 

Reference is hereby made tothat certain Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of March 1, 2014, by andamong CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES INC., as Depositor, WELLS FARGOBANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Master Servicer, MIDLAND LOAN SERVICES, ADIVISION OF PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Special Servicer, SITUSHOLDINGS, LLC  as Operating Advisor, U.S.BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, asCertificate Administrator and Trustee, with respect to Commercial MortgagePass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-GC19 (the "Agreement").Capitalized terms used herein not otherwise defined shall have the meaningsassigned in the Agreement.

 

Pursuant to Section 10.08 of thisAgreement, I, Daniel Bober, Executive Vice President of Commercial MortgageServices do hereby certify that:

 

1.  A review of theactivities of the Master Servicer during the period from January 1, 2016through December 31, 2016 (the “Reporting Period”), and of itsperformance per the Agreement during such period has been made under mysupervision, and

 

2.  To the best of myknowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer has fulfilled all of itsobligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout theReporting Period.

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, theundersigned has executed this Certificate as of the 28th day ofFebruary 2017.

 

 

/s/ Daniel Bober

Daniel Bober

Executive Vice President 

Wells Fargo Bank

 

 

 

 

| Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. | (logo) Together we’ll  go far |
|------------------------|-------------------------------------|
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

**400 KA 12-00917**  PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., FAHEY, PERADOTTO, SCONIERS, AND VALENTINO, JJ.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,

V ORDER
LESLIE J. PELTIER, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. (APPEAL NO. 1.)

THOMAS R. VILLECCO, JERICHO, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
JON E. BUDELMANN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, AUBURN (CHRISTOPHER T. VALDINA OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.

Appeal from a judgment of the Cayuga County Court (Thomas G. Leone, J.), rendered January 7, 2010. The judgment convicted defendant, upon her plea of guilty, of attempted assault in the first degree. It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Entered: May 2, 2014 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

In the Matter of 

W. DAWN BUSBY 

PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT 

FROM INACTIVE STATUS 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

No. 206 DB 2015 (No. 13 RST 2016) 

Attorney Registration No. 51672 

(Out of State) 

O R D E R 

PER CURIAM 

AND NOW, this 17th day of February, 2016, the Report and Recommendation of 

Disciplinary Board Member dated February 5, 2016, is approved and it is ORDERED 

that W. Dawn Busby, who has been on Inactive Status, has never been suspended or 

disbarred, and has demonstrated that she has the moral qualifications, competency and 

learning in law required for admission to practice in the Commonwealth, shall be and is, 

hereby reinstated to active status as a member of the Bar of this Commonwealth. The 

expenses incurred by the Board in the investigation and processing of this matter shall 

be paid by the Petitioner. 

 Mr. Justice Eakin did not participate in the consideration or decision of this 

matter.
585 A.2d 360

#### DONALD DIESO, INDIVIDUALLY; AND RENEWABLE EARTH PRODUCTS OF NEW JERSEY, A PARTNERSHIP v. MIDDLE-SEX COUNTY UTILITIES AUTHORITY, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY; AND VFL TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION, A CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA.

July 26, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
Exhibit 32.1

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANTTOSECTION 906**

**OFTHESARBANES-OXLEYACT**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Highwoods Properties, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Edward J. Fritsch, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|   | 1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|--------|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

| /s/ EDWARDJ.FRITSCH                                    |   |
|--------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Edward J. FritschPresident and Chief Executive Officer |   |
| November 7, 2008                             |   |

 

 

45
A93A0299.

#### TRUITT v. THE STATE.

(432 SE2d 119)

Johnson, Judge.

Robert Willie Truitt appeals from his burglary conviction. His sole enumeration of error, that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction, is deemed abandoned because it is not supported by argument, reference to the record or citation of authority. Court of Appeals Rule 15 (c) (2); *Parnell v. State,*204 Ga. App. 488 (1) (420 SE2d 42) (1992). Even if the enumeration was not abandoned, it is without merit. The State presented the testimony of an eyewitness who had known Truitt for five years. The witness testified that she saw Truitt on the porch of the victim’s house and heard glass break. She then saw Truitt leave the house with a television, a video cassette *736recorder and a box full of miscellaneous items. The eyewitness made both in-court and out-of-court identifications of Truitt as the burglar. The victim testified that one of her house windows was broken and that she had not given anyone permission to enter her house and take her belongings. Truitt testified that he did not break into the victim’s house, but he could not recall where he was on the date of the burglary. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found Truitt guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of burglary. *Jackson v. Virginia,*443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

Decided May 26, 1993.

*Charles R. Sheppard,*for appellant.

*Michael C. Eubanks, District Attorney, Richard E. Thomas, J. Wade Padgett, Assistant District Attorneys,*for appellee.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Blackburn and Smith, JJ., concur.*
(logo)           CURCIO

WIESELTHIER

+COHEN

 

CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS PC 7 PENN PLAZA, SUITE 1500 NEW YORK NY 10001

TEL: 212 557-9800 • FAX: 212 557-9819 • website: www.cwccpafirm.com

 

 

Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

 

Managing Member

Park Bridge Lender Services LLC

New York, NY

 

 

We have examined management’s assertion, included in the accompanying Management’s Report on Assessment of 2014 Compliance by Park Bridge Lender Services LLC with Regulation AB Servicing Criteria (“Management’s Report”), that Park Bridge Lender Services LLC (the “Company”) complied with the servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122(d) of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s Regulation AB as of and for the year ended December 31, 2014, excluding those criteria noted as not applicable (N/A) within Exhibit B to Management’s Report. The transactions covered by this report are only those transactions processed by the Company in its capacity as trust advisor or operating advisor for the asset backed securities transactions (the “Platform”) identified in Management’s Report. Reference Exhibit A to Management’s Report for the transactions covered by this examination. Management is responsible for the Company’s compliance with the applicable servicing criteria. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on management’s assertion based on our examination.

 

Our examination was conducted in accordance with attestation standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States) and, accordingly, including examining, on a test basis, evidence about the Company’s compliance with the applicable servicing criteria and performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. Our examination included testing of a selected sample of the servicing activities related to the Platform, determining whether the Company performed those selected activities in compliance with the applicable servicing criteria during the specified period. Our procedures were limited to the selected transactions and servicing activities performed by the Company during the period covered by this report. Our examination was not designed to detect material noncompliance arising from errors that may have occurred prior to or subsequent to our tests, that may have affected the Company’s servicing activities during the period covered by this report. We believe that our examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. Our examination does not provide a legal determination on the Company’s compliance with the applicable servicing criteria.

 

In our opinion, management’s assertion that the Company complied with the aforementioned applicable servicing criteria identified in Exhibit B to Management’s Report with respect to the transactions identified in Exhibit A to Management’s Report as of and for the year ended December 31, 2014, for the Platform, is fairly stated in all material aspects.

 

 

/s/ Curcio, Wieselthier & Cohen, C.P.A.’S, P.C. 

 

Curcio , Wieselthier & Cohen, C.P.A.’S, P.C.  New York, NY 

February 20, 2015

 

 

MEMBER OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
#### Nicole HELTZ v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LSU A & M COLLEGE.

No. 2011-CC-0094.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 12, 2011.

In re Heltz, Nicole; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. M, No. 2010-8897; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-0037.

Stay denied; writ denied.
584 A.2d 249

#### IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF AMALIO PAGAN, A/K/A AMALIO PAGAN AVILES, DECEASED.

June 11, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.