[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-12512

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

BELCALIS MARLENIS ALMANZAR, 

Plaintiff-Counter Defendant-Appellee,

versus

LATASHA TRANSRINA KEBE, 

a.k.a. Latasha Transrina Howard,

Defendant-Counter Claimant-Appellant,

STARMARIE EBONY JONES,

Defendant, 

USCA11 Case: 22-12512 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 03/21/2023 Page: 1 of 5
2 Opinion of the Court 22-12512

KEBE STUDIOS LLC,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-01301-WMR

____________________

Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

There are two issues here. One is whether the jury had sufficient evidence to hold appellants—Latasha Kebe and others—liable for defamation (and other privacy torts) against appellee 

Belcalis Almanzar (better known as ‘Cardi B’). The other is 

whether the district court erred by excluding evidence. We hold 

that Kebe hasn’t preserved either issue for appeal.

A 

“[A] party is not entitled to pursue a new trial on appeal unless that party makes an appropriate postverdict motion in the district court.” Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 

U.S. 394, 404 (2006). A party can make that kind of post-verdict 

motion under either Rule 50(b) or Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of 

USCA11 Case: 22-12512 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 03/21/2023 Page: 2 of 5
22-12512 Opinion of the Court 3

Civil Procedure. See id. at 396 (noting that the respondent filed 

neither a Rule 50(b) nor a Rule 59 motion). Rule 50(b) “sets forth 

the procedural requirements for renewing a sufficiency of the evidence challenge after the jury verdict and entry of judgment.” Id. 

at 400. Rule 59 allows district judges to order new trials “for any 

reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(1)(A). When a party

fails to invoke these rules in the district court, we “ha[ve] no authority to consider [an] appeal from the jury verdict.” Hi Ltd. 

P’ship v. Winghouse of Fla., Inc., 451 F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir. 

2006). 

Defendant Latasha Kebe asks for a new trial, saying that 

there was insufficient evidence for the jury verdict against her. But 

as she all but admits, she didn’t make either of the required postverdict motions in the district court. As a result, we have no authority to consider her insufficiency-of-the-evidence argument on 

appeal. 

Kebe’s response is unavailing. She seems to assert that she

can seek a new trial on appeal not because she did so below, but 

rather because she didn’t. She seeks to distinguish her case from 

Unitherm on the ground that, unlike the losing party there, she 

didn’t even make a pre-verdict insufficiency-of-the-evidence motion, let alone a post-verdict one. So while she apparently (and correctly) accepts that making one pre-verdict insufficiency-of-the-evidence motion isn’t enough to preserve the right to challenge the 

USCA11 Case: 22-12512 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 03/21/2023 Page: 3 of 5
4 Opinion of the Court 22-12512

sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, she seems to think that one

can preserve that right by making no insufficiency motions at all.

That is incorrect. Under Unitherm, a party “forfeit[s] its 

right to [seek a new trial] on appeal” if it “never sought a new trial 

before the District Court.” 546 U.S. at 404. The only way to seek 

a new trial before the district court is through a post-verdict motion; a pre-verdict motion won’t do. Id. (explaining that a party 

can’t seek a new trial through a pre-verdict motion). So Kebe gains 

nothing by pointing out that she never made a pre-verdict insufficiency-of-the-evidence motion. All that matters is that she “never 

sought a new trial before the District Court” through a post-verdict 

motion and has “thus forfeited [her] right to do so on appeal.” Id.

B

Kebe also failed to preserve her evidentiary arguments. “[A] 

party cannot argue an issue in its reply brief that was not preserved 

in its initial brief.” Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr. v.

Bowen, 815 F.2d 1435, 1446 n.16 (11th Cir.1987). An appellant fails 

to preserve an issue when, in her opening appellate brief, she “either makes only passing references to it or raises it in a perfunctory 

manner without supporting arguments and authority.” Sapuppo 

v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014). “An 

appellant’s brief must include an argument containing ‘appellant’s 

contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies.’” Singh 

v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 561 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting 

Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A)) (emphasis added). “If an argument is 

USCA11 Case: 22-12512 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 03/21/2023 Page: 4 of 5
22-12512 Opinion of the Court 5

not fully briefed (let alone not presented at all) to the Circuit Court, 

evaluating its merits would be improper both because the appellants may control the issues they raise on appeal, and because the 

appellee would have no opportunity to respond to it.” Access 

Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004).

Kebe didn’t adequately brief her challenges to the district 

court’s evidentiary rulings. Specifically, she never tells us where in 

the 5500-page record the district court’s alleged errors can be 

found. That lapse violates the rule that appellants must identify the 

“parts of the record on which [they] rel[y].” Singh, 561 F.3d at 1278 

(quoting Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A)). Because Kebe’s brief falls well 

short of what we require, she has abandoned this argument.

AFFIRMED. 

USCA11 Case: 22-12512 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 03/21/2023 Page: 5 of 5