alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 10-3662

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

v. * Eastern District of Missouri.

*

Rocky Joseph Gendron, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: April 15, 2011

Filed: April 19, 2011

___________

Before LOKEN, MURPHY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Rocky Gendron pleaded guilty to

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of “cocaine base

(crack cocaine)” in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. The district court1

sentenced him to 120 months in prison and 5 years of supervised release. On appeal,

his counsel has moved to withdraw and has filed a brief under Anders v. California,

386 U.S. 738 (1967). Gendron has filed two supplemental briefs.

1

The Honorable Catherine D. Perry, Chief Judge of the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.
The plea agreement in this case contains a waiver of Gendron’s right to appeal

all nonjurisdictional and sentencing issues, except those relating to his criminal history

and career offender status. We will enforce the appeal waiver: the transcript of

Gendron’s plea hearing shows that he entered into both the plea agreement and the

appeal waiver knowingly and voluntarily; the arguments raised on appeal fall within

the scope of the waiver; and we cannot see any miscarriage of justice that would result

from enforcing the waiver in these circumstances, especially because Gendron

received the statutory minimum sentence. See United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886,

889-92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

Finally, having reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio,

488 U.S. 75 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues outside the scope of the waiver. 

Accordingly we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we dismiss this appeal, on

the condition that counsel inform Gendron about procedures for seeking rehearing or

filing a petition for a writ of certiorari.

______________________________

-2-
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

SHEILA FERGUSON,

Petitioner

v.

DERRICK MORTON AND 

PHILADELPHIA CYCLE CENTER,

Respondents

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 219 EAL 2016

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of December, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of 

Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Wecht did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.
## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 06-4016

___________ Douglas Brueckner, Colette Brueckner, * * Appellants, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of Nebraska. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe * Railway Company, a Corporation; * [UNPUBLISHED] Brown’s Crew Car, doing business as * Armadillo Express, * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: July 3, 2008 Filed: July 14, 2008

___________ Before MURPHY, COLLOTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Douglas and Colette Brueckner, husband and wife, filed this action against the Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company (BNSF) and its agent Brown’s Crew Car, also known as Armadillo Expre ss (Armadillo), alleging they negligently caused injuries to Douglas while he was working as a conductor for BNSF. According to the complaint, on October 3, 2001, Brueckner was ri ding in a van owned and operated by Armadillo when the driver drove over a crossing at an excessive speed, causing Brueckner to be thrown agains t the ceiling of the van and injured. The1 The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, United St ates District Judge for the District of Nebraska. -2- Brueckners claimed that Armadillo was liable to them under Nebraska state law for negligently operating the vehicle, and that BNSF was liable under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60, based on its own negligence and the negligence of its agent, Armadillo. Follo wing a five-day trial, the jury found for defendants. The district court 1 entered judgment on the verdict and denied the Brueckners’ motions for judgment as a matter of law (JAML) and for a new trial. The Brueckners argue on appeal that the eviden ce did not support the jury’s verdict, and that the jury instructions were erroneous.

We find that the district court did not abuse its discre tion in denying the Brueckner’s motions for JAML and for a ne w trial because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to defendants, supports the jury’s verdict. See Boudreau v. Wal-Mart Stores , 249 F.3d 715, 717-18 (8th Cir. 2001) (in reviewing motion for JAML, court resolves factual conflicts in favor of nonmovant and affirms if evidence would allow reasonable jurors to differ); Batiste-Davis v. Lincare, Inc. , 526 F.3d 377, 381 (8th Cir. 2008) (denial of new trial ba sed on verdict against weight of evidence is virtually unassailable; this court review s for abuse of discretion, viewing evidence most favorably to verdict). We also fi nd that the instructions given by the court adequately presented the case to the jury. SeeCampos v. City of Blue Springs, Mo. , 289 F.3d 546, 551-52 (8th Cir. 2002) (jury-instruction review is for abuse of discretion, limited to whether instructions as a whole fairly and adequately represent evidence and law).
Accordingly, we affirm.

______________________________
Exhibit 15.1

April 20, 2015

Momo Inc. (the Company)

20th Floor, Block B

Tower 2, Wangjing SOHO

No.1 Futongdong Street

Chaoyang District, Beijing 100102

Peoples Republic of China

Ladies and Gentlemen:

We have acted as legal advisors as to the laws of the Peoples Republic of China to the Company in connection with the filing by the Company with the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission of an annual report on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2014 and any amendments thereto (the Annual Report). We hereby consent to the use and reference to our name and
our opinions and views in the Annual Report, and further consent to the incorporation by reference of the summaries of our opinions in the Annual Report into the Companys registration statement on Form S-8 (File No. 333-201769) dated
January 30, 2015, pertaining to Momo Inc. 2012 Amended and Stated 2012 Share Incentive Plan and 2014 Share Incentive Plan.

We further consent to the
filing of this letter as an exhibit to the Annual Report.



|                       
|-----------------------
|Sincerely yours,       
|                       
|/s/ Han Kun Law Offices
|Han Kun Law Offices
#### Edward COLLINS v. STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY and Reggie Glass.

No. 2011-C-0378.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 8, 2011.

In re Collins Sr., Edward; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. L, No. 06-9573; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-CA-0769.

Denied.
#### David HARRICHARAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D10-102.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Feb. 25, 2011.

Rehearing Denied April 7, 2011.

Richard C. Klugh, of Richard C. Klugh, PLLC, and Mark Seiden, of Law Offices of Mark Seiden, P.A., Miami, for Appellant.

*1163Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General; Tallahassee, and Douglas T. Squire; Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.

PER CURIAM.

David Harrieharan appeals an order denying his postconviction motion after an evidentiary hearing. We affirm as to all issues and write only to address Harri-charan’s argument that the case should be remanded so that he can amend his post-conviction motion to include a claim of fundamental error based upon *State v. Montgomery,*39 So.3d 252 (Fla.2010) (holding that the standard manslaughter by act jury instruction’s second element— that the defendant “intentionally caused the death of (victim)” — erroneously required the jury to find proof that the defendant intended to kill the victim in order to find him guilty of that crime).

With respect to this claim, we conclude that *Montgomery*does not apply to cases such as Harricharan’s, which were final before *Montgomery*was decided. *See, e.g., Reed v. State,*837 So.2d 366, 370 (Fla.2002) (finding fundamental error in giving of standard jury instruction for aggravated child abuse, but applying holding only to “cases pending on direct review or not yet final.”); *Smith v. State,*598 So.2d 1063, 1066 (Fla.1992) (“[W]e hold that any decision of this Court announcing a new rule of law, or merely applying an established rule of law to- a new or different factual situation, must be given retrospective application by the courts of this state in every case pending on direct review or not yet final- To benefit from the change in law, the defendant must have timely objected at trial if an objection was required to preserve the issue for appellate review.”) (citations omitted); *see also, Rozzelle v. State,*29 So.3d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (holding that First District’s decision in *Montgomery v. State,*— So.3d -, 2009 WL 350624 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), which was approved in the Supreme Court’s *Montgomery*opinion, did not apply retroactively to cases that were final before the decision was issued).

AFFIRMED.

GRIFFIN, SAWAYA, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.
##### 



Exhibit 32.4 LIBERTY PROPERTY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP CERTIFICATIONS REQUIRED BY
RULE 13a-14(b) UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 
 In connection the Quarterly Report of Liberty Property Trust (the Company) on Form 10-Q for
the quarterly period ended March 31, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
the date hereof (the Report), I, GEORGE J. ALBURGER, JR.,
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Liberty
Property Trust (the sole general partner of the Company), certify, in connection with Rule
13a-14(b) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, that based on my knowledge: (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and result of operations of the Company. /s/
GEORGE J. ALBURGER, JR.George J. Alburger, Jr.Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer

of Liberty Property Trust, its sole general partner
 Date: May 6, 2005
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

YAKO RESTORATION GROUP CORP., (a/a/o Gladys Guillen)

, Appellant,

v.

CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION

, Appellee

.

No. 4D 21

- 468

[ November 24, 2021 ]

Appeal from the C ounty Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County ; Edward A. Garrison , Judge; L.T. Case No s

. 2017SC9707

and 2020AP81

.

Erik D. Diener of The Diener Firm, P.A., Plantation, for appellant.

Michelle Diverio and Alejandro Sanchez Parraga of Lydecker Diaz, LLC, Miami, for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed.

M AY

, K LINGENSMITH and A RTAU

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-2275

JOYCE JOANNE WOOLRIDGE,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

SECURITAS SECURITY SERVICES USA, INCORPORATED,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, District

Judge. (3:06-cv-00573-REP)

Submitted: March 22, 2007 Decided: March 27, 2007

Before WIDENER and WILKINSON, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Joyce Joanne Woolridge, Appellant Pro Se. Robert G. Ames, Lesley

Anne Pate, VENABLE, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Joyce Joanne Woolridge appeals the district court’s order

granting the Defendant’s motion to dismiss her civil action without

prejudice. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible

error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the

district court. See Woolridge v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc.,

No. 3:06-cv-00573-REP (E.D. Va. filed Nov. 21, 2006; entered Nov.

22, 2006). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
585 A.2d 365

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. ALONZO KOON.

September 4, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
584 A.2d 205

#### MARGUERITE HENDERSON v. CAPITAL CITIES COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

May 1, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

GLUE WILKINS,

Petitioner

v.

DAUPHIN COUNTY PR ESIDENT JUDGE

RICHARD A. LEWIS AND HONORABLE

FRANCIS T. CHARDO, III, DISTRICT

ATTORNEY,

Respondents :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 80 MM 2018

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 13th day of July , 2018, the Application for Leave to File Original

Process is GRANTED, the “King’s Bench Matter” is DENIED, and the Application for

Leave to File Nunc Pro Tunc Answer is DISMISSED AS MOOT. The Prothonotary is

DIRECTED to strike the jurist’s name from the caption.
#### Kuran ADAMS, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE o/b/o Keya T. LONGSTREET, Appellee.

No. 3D10-297.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Nov. 10, 2010.

Kuran Adams, in proper person.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General; Toni C. Bernstein, Tallahassee, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Child Support Enforcement, for appellee.

Before GERSTEN and LAGOA, JJ„ and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. *See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee,*377 So.2d 1150 (Fla.1980); *Giallanza v. Dep’t of Revenue o/b/o Giallanza,*799 So.2d 256 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                            3077
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   31,158
<ALLOWANCES>                                       123
<INVENTORY>                                      7,016
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                10,211
<PP&E>                                           1,714
<DEPRECIATION>                                     749
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 140,903
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           42,118
<BONDS>                                         79,187
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            37
<OTHER-SE>                                      11,421
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   140,903
<SALES>                                          8,126
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                17,367
<CGS>                                            7,361
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   17,426
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               3,793
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   (59)
<INCOME-TAX>                                      (22)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               (37)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                      (37)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.01)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.01)


</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1714 Engrossed in House (EH)]

  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
110th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 1714

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
To clarify the boundaries of Coastal Barrier Resources System Clam Pass 
                              Unit FL-64P.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REPLACEMENT OF CERTAIN COASTAL BARRIER RESOURCES SYSTEM 
              MAPS.

    (a) In General.--The map subtitled ``FL-64P'', relating to the 
Coastal Barrier Resources System unit designated as Coastal Barrier 
Resources System Clam Pass Unit FL-64P, that is included in the set of 
maps entitled ``Coastal Barrier Resources System'' and referred to in 
section 4(a) of the Coastal Barrier Resources Act (16 U.S.C. 3503(a)), 
is hereby replaced by another map relating to that unit entitled 
``Coastal Barrier Resources System Clam Pass Unit, FL-64P'' and dated 
July 21, 2005
    (b) Availability.--The Secretary of the Interior shall keep the map 
referred to in subsection (a) on file and available for inspection in 
accordance with section 4(b) of the Coastal Barrier Resources Act (16 
U.S.C. 3503(b)).

            Passed the House of Representatives July 14, 2008.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
110th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                               H. R. 1714

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

To clarify the boundaries of Coastal Barrier Resources System Clam Pass 
                              Unit FL-64P.
```
| (logo) WELLS FARGO | **Corporate Trust Services**

  MAC R1204-010  9062 Old Annapolis Road  Columbia, MD 21045  Tel: 410 884 2000  Fax: 410 715 2380 |
|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

Deutsche Mortgage & AssetReceiving Corporation 

60 WALL ST

NEW YORK, New York 10005-2836

 

 

RE: Annual Statement ofCompliance for COMM 2014-UBS3 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates

 

 

Per the Pooling and ServicingAgreement dated as of June 1, 2014 (the "Agreement"), theundersigned, a duly authorized officer of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., asCertificate Administrator ("Wells Fargo"), hereby certifies asfollows as of and for the year ending December 31, 2016 (the "ReportingPeriod"):

 

(a) A review of Wells Fargo'sactivities during the Reporting Period and of its performance under theAgreement has been made under such officer's supervision; and

 

(b) To the best of suchofficer's knowledge, based on such review, Wells Fargo has fulfilled all of itsobligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout theReporting Period.

 

 

February 27, 2017

 

 

/s/ Brian Smith 

BRIAN SMITH

Vice President

 

 

/s/ Jeffrey Coletta

Jeffrey Coletta

Assistant Secretary

 

 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Stephen J. Markman, Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein

Kurtis T. Wilder

Elizabeth T. Clement, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 September 12, 2018

d0905

Order 

Clerk

September 12, 2018

156438(25)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 156438

COA: 338053

Wayne CC: 89-000877-FC

LAVARON ANTOINE MORRIS,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s May 29, 2018 

order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was 

entered erroneously.
#### David C. LARSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 00-3426.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 27, 2000.*

Decided Jan. 3, 2001.

*504Before Hon. JOEL M. FLAUM, Chief Judge, Hon. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, and Hon. MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judges.

Order

Midway through his criminal trial, David Larson pleaded guilty to a federal crime. Delay in entering the plea until it became clear that conviction was inevitable, coupled with efforts to withdraw that plea, led the district court to deny Larson any reduction for acceptance of responsibility.

In this proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Larson contends that his lawyer rendered ineffective assistance by not informing him that his position was hopeless, so that he could enter a guilty plea well in advance of trial in order to obtain the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. After an evidentiary hearing, the district judge denied the petition. Larson’s lawyer testified that such advice had indeed been provided, but that Larson had refused to listen. The district judge believed counsel’s testimony, concluded that Larson’s contrary testimony was untrue, and added that Larson would not have received a reduction no matter when he had pleaded guilty, because his entire course of conduct evinces refusal to accept responsibility for his offense.

Larson’s appeal is frivolous, because it is predicated on his version of events, which the district judge did not accept. The judge’s credibility findings cannot be deemed clearly erroneous. See *Anderson v. Bessemer City,*470 U.S. 564, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). Indeed, the district judge should not have issued a certificate of appealability, because the issue *for appeal*is not substantial. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The district judge stated that she was obliged to issue a certificate because she had deemed the claim sufficient to require an evidentiary hearing. But the reason for the hearing was a conflict in the evidence, not a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right”, and the only issue on appeal — which cannot be thought “substantial” by any measure — is whether the district judge’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous. Such a question rarely meets the statutory standards for a certificate of appealability.

*505Larson contends that the district judge should have recused herself. This argument was not covered by the certificate of appealability and does not entail a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right”. Larson contends that the district judge must be prejudiced because she harshly criticized him when denying his petition. The criticism arises from Larson’s conduct revealed in the record and therefore does not require recusal. *Liteky v. United States,*510 U.S. 540, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994). District judges are not required to pull their punches when describing the conduct of persons who not only have been convicted of federal crimes but have committed new ones (in this case, perjury) in an effort to escape punishment.

Affirmed
584 A.2d 236

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. SENEN MEDINA.

May 30, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.