alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
No. 87-6497.

#### Jones *v.*Ralston et al.

C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
I 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 7325 

To provide for the issuance of revenue bonds to fund construction of a 

physical border barrier and related technology, roads, and lighting along 

the United States border with Mexico. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 17, 2018 

Mr. PALAZZO introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means, and in addition to the Committee on Homeland Security, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, 

in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To provide for the issuance of revenue bonds to fund construction of a physical border barrier and related technology, roads, and lighting along the United States border with Mexico. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Border Bonds for 

5 America Act of 2018’’. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
2 

•HR 7325 IH

1 SEC. 2. BORDER BONDS. 

2 (a) ISSUANCE.—The Secretary of the Treasury shall, 

3 pursuant to subchapter I of chapter 31 of title 31, United 

4 States Code, issue bonds, to be known as ‘‘Border Bonds’’. 

5 (b) TRANSFER OF REVENUE.—Proceeds from the 

6 issuance of Border Bonds shall be transferred to the Bor7 der Trust Fund (as defined in section 9512 of the Internal 

8 Revenue Code of 1986). 

9 (c) TERMS AND CONDITIONS.— 

10 (1) TERM.—A bond issued under subsection (a) 

11 shall have a term of 30 years. 

12 (2) FACE AMOUNT LIMITATION.—The face 

13 amount of bonds issued under subsection (a) in any 

14 fiscal year shall not exceed $5,000,000,000. 

15 (3) SUNSET.—No bonds may be issued under 

16 subsection (a) later than 30 years after the date of 

17 the enactment of this Act. 

18 SEC. 3. BORDER BONDS TRUST FUND. 

19 Chapter 98 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is 

20 amended by adding at the end the following new section: 

21 ‘‘SEC. 9512. BORDER BONDS TRUST FUND. 

22 ‘‘(a) CREATION OF TRUST FUND.—There is estab23 lished in the Treasury of the United States a trust fund 

24 to be known as the ‘Border Bonds Trust Fund’, consisting 

25 of such amounts as may be apportioned or credited to such 

26 Trust Fund as provided in this section or section 9602(b). 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
3 

•HR 7325 IH

1 ‘‘(b) TRANSFERS TO TRUST FUND.—There are here2 by appropriated to the Trust Fund amounts equivalent to 

3 revenue from the issuance of Border Bonds under section 

4 2 of the Border Bonds for America Act of 2018. 

5 ‘‘(c) EXPENDITURES FROM TRUST FUND.—Amounts 

6 in the Trust Fund shall be available, without further ap7 propriation, to construct reinforced fencing and provide 

8 for the installation of additional physical barriers, roads, 

9 lighting, cameras, and sensors to gain operational control 

10 of the southwest border under section 102 of the Illegal 

11 Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 

12 1996 (8 U.S.C. 1103 note).’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
No. 11,163.

#### The Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Railway Company *v.*Hurst.

*Railroad.*— Killing *Stock.*— Fences.—Highway.—A railroad company is not required to fence its road where it would obstruct a public highway, and the want of fencing at such place does not make it liable for stock killed or injured.

From the Warren Circuit Court.

*W. F. Stilwell,*for appellant.

*J. A. Stein*and *G. W. Collins,*for appellee.

Hammond, J.

Action by the appellee against the appellant to recover the value of a colt killed by a locomotive at a place where the railroad was alleged not to have been securely fenced. The action, commenced in the superior court of Tippecanoe county, was taken by change of venue to the court below. There was a trial by the court with a finding and judgment for the appellee.

The record properly presents the question whether the evidence was sufficient’to sustain the finding. The evidence shows that the animal entered upon the track and was killed either at a point on the railroad at the crossing of a public highway, or at a place on the railroad where a public highway ran along the side of, and so near to it, that the railroad .at such place could not be fenced without obstructing the highway.

It is well settled that a railroad company is not required to fence its road where a public highway would be obstructed by the *fence;*and where it is excused from fencing its road, the want of such fencing does not make it liable for stock killed or injured by its locomotives, cars, or other carriages. *Louisville, etc., R. W. Co.*v. *Francis,*58 Ind. 389; *Wabash R. W. Co.*v. *Forshee,*77 Ind. 158.

The appellant’s motion for a new trial should have been sus*331tained. Judgment reversed with costs, with instruction to the court below to sustain the appellant’s motion for a new trial.

Filed April 4,1884.

Petition for a rehearing overruled Nov. 14, 1884.
II 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 7318 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

DECEMBER 21, 2018 

Received 

AN ACT 

To amend the Federal Assets Sale and Transfer Act of 

2016 to ensure that the Public Buildings Reform Board 

has adequate time to carry out the responsibilities of 

the Board, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

HR 7318 RDS

1 SECTION 1. FEDERAL ASSETS SALE. 

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 4(c)(2) of the Federal As3 sets Sale and Transfer Act of 2016 (40 U.S.C. 1303 note; 

4 Public Law 114–287) is amended— 

5 (1) by striking subparagraph (B); 

6 (2) by striking the paragraph designation and 

7 heading and all that follows through ‘‘In selecting’’ 

8 in subparagraph (A) in the matter preceding clause 

9 (i) and inserting the following: 

10 ‘‘(2) APPOINTMENTS.—In selecting’’; and 

11 (3) by redesignating clauses (i) through (iv) as 

12 subparagraphs (A) through (D), respectively, and in13 denting appropriately. 

14 (b) TERMINATION.—Section 10 of the Federal Assets 

15 Sale and Transfer Act of 2016 (40 U.S.C. 1303 note; 

16 Public Law 114–287) is amended by striking ‘‘the date 

17 of enactment of this Act’’ and inserting ‘‘the date on which 

18 the Board members are appointed pursuant to section 4’’. 

19 (c) ACCOUNTING SYSTEM.—Section 12(e) of the Fed20 eral Assets Sale and Transfer Act of 2016 (40 U.S.C. 

21 1303 note; Public Law 114–287) is amended in the first 

22 sentence by striking ‘‘the date of enactment of this Act’’ 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
3 

HR 7318 RDS

1 and inserting ‘‘the date on which the Board members are 

2 appointed pursuant to section 4’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives December 21, 

2018. 

Attest: KAREN L. HAAS, 

Clerk. 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Kendall JOHNSON.

No. 2010-KO-2546.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 1, 2011.

*1249In re Johnson, Kendall; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 07-6342; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KA-209.

Denied.
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

**830.1 CAF 10-01379** 
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CENTRA, CARNI, SCONIERS, AND GORSKI, JJ.

IN THE MATTER OF KELLY A. MAIDA, PETITIONER-APPELLANT,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOHN CAPRARO, RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT.

KELLY A. HOBAICA, PETITIONER-APPELLANT PRO SE.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Herkimer County (Anthony J. Garramone, J.H.O.), entered April 27, 2010 in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6. The order granted the motion of respondent to dismiss the petition.

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Petitioner mother commenced this proceeding alleging that respondent father was in violation of a prior order pursuant to which the parties had joint custody of their youngest child, with the mother having primary physical custody. According to the mother, the father violated the order by keeping the child in South Carolina and refusing to allow the mother to bring her to New York. Family Court properly granted the father’s motion to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Where a court of this state has made an initial custody determination, it has “exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until . . . [, inter alia,] a court of this state determines that neither the child, the child and one parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent have a significant connection with this state and that substantial evidence is no longer available in this state concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships” (Domestic Relations Law § 76-a [1] [a]; see Matter of Gulyamova v Abdullaev , 53 AD3d 489). Here, the parties and the child moved to South Carolina in 2007, and the father, with the mother’s consent, has had primary physical custody of the child since December 2007. The mother did not move back to New York until approximately the time she filed the violation petition in February 2010. We thus conclude that the child did not have “a significant connection with New York, and substantial evidence was no longer available in New York” concerning, inter alia, her care ( Gulyamova , 53 AD3d at 490; see Matter of Felicia McM. v Jerrold L.W. , 51 AD3d 501; Matter of Zippo v Zippo , 41 AD3d 915, 916).

Entered: July 1, 2011 Patricia L. Morgan Clerk of the Court
##### 



Exhibit 99.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Liberty Property Trust (the
Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2003 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, WILLIAM P. HANKOWSKY, Chief Executive Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that based on my
knowledge:

(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations
of the Company.

|                                                                       |  | 
|---------------------------------------------------------------------- |  | 
|/s/ WILLIAM P. HANKOWSKY

William P. Hankowsky
Chief Executive Officer |  |
#### Helen BABIN v. PLANET BEACH TANNING SALONS, INC. Helen Babin v. Planet Beach Tanning Salons, Inc.

No. 2011-C-0128.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 4, 2011.

In re Planet Beach Tanning Salons, Inc.; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. E, No. 2007-1774; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Nos. 2010-CA-0862, 2010-C-0736.

Denied.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-7795

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

JAMES T. MORRIS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Charles H. Haden II, Chief

District Judge. (CR-96-173, CA-98-5-2)

Submitted: February 11, 1999 Decided: February 25, 1999

Before ERVIN, NIEMEYER, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James T. Morris, Appellant Pro Se. Michael Lee Keller, OFFICE OF

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

James T. Morris seeks to appeal the district court’s order

denying his motion for reconsideration of the court’s denial of his

motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998). We

have reviewed the record and the district court’s order and find

the appeal is frivolous. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of

appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the

district court as explained in its order denying leave to appeal in

forma pauperis. United States v. Morris, No. CR-96-173; CA-98-5-2

(S.D.W. Va. Dec. 9, 1998). We also deny Appellant’s motion seeking

in forma pauperis status. We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

DISMISSED
Exhibit 32.1

         Certification of Chief Executive Officer of FirstBank NW Corp.
  Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the
                           Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002


     In connection with the accompanying Annual Report on From 10-K of FirstBank
     NW Corp. ("the Company") for the year ended March 31, 2005 (the "Report"),
     I, Clyde E. Conklin, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify
     pursuant to 19 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted to Section 906 of the
     Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

          o    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Sections 13(a)
               and 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,
               and

          o    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
               material respects, the Company's financial condition and results
               of operations.




     /s/ CLYDE E. CONKLIN
     -------------------------------------------
     Clyde E. Conklin, Chief Executive Officer

     Dated:  June 10, 2005
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                             219
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    8,923
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                14,262
<PP&E>                                         445,055
<DEPRECIATION>                                  63,035
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 401,785
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           18,584
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                         30
<COMMON>                                           169
<OTHER-SE>                                     199,820
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   401,785
<SALES>                                          9,650
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 9,808
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   11,977
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   262
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               3,270
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (2,134)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (2,134)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                         (668)
<NET-INCOME>                                    (2,802)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (0.27)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.27)


</TABLE>
649 A.2d 1280

#### IN THE MATTER OF THE SEIZED FIREARM OF JOHN BOSWELL v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY.

July 15, 1994.

ORDER

This matter having come before the Court on an appeal as of right pursuant to *Rule*2:2 — 1(a)(1), and the Court having determined that the matter does not present a substantial constitutional question within the meaning of the *Rule*or applicable caselaw;

It is ORDERED that the within appeal is dismissed.
Exhibit 32.2

Certification of Chief Financial Officer

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as created by
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of CV Therapeutics, Inc. (the Company) hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge, that:

(i) the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended September 30, 2007, (the Report)
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                       |  |  |  |                         
|---------------------- |  |  |  | ------------------------
|                       |  | 
|Dated November 8, 2007 |  |  |  | /s/ DANIEL K. SPIEGELMAN
|                       |  |  |  | Daniel K. Spiegelman    
|                       |  |  |  | Chief Financial Officer
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Lavester GILMORE.

No. 2010-K-2491.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 4, 2011.

In re Gilmore, Lavester; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 479-812; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-KA-0059.

Denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAY-31-2001
<PERIOD-START>                             JUN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               AUG-31-2000
<CASH>                                      11,757,965
<SECURITIES>                                23,765,120
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            36,522,644
<PP&E>                                      14,152,753
<DEPRECIATION>                              11,638,106
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              39,160,571
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,429,438
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       142,424
<OTHER-SE>                                  37,434,488
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                39,160,571
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (2,517,920)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (2,517,920)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (2,517,920)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.18)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.18)


</TABLE>
#### Ira La’Ray LANE, Appellant, v. FLORIDA MEDICAL EXAMINERS COMMISSION, et al., Appellees.

No. 1D10-3613.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 10, 2011.

*880Ira La’Ray Lane, pro se, for Appellant.

Richard C. Rockenstein, Assistant General Counsel, Tallahassee, for Appellees.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from the denial of a petition for writ of mandamus. We treat the appeal as a petition for writ of certio-rari, see Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.040(c), *Sheley v. Florida Parole Commission,*703 So.2d 1202, 1205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), and deny the petition on the merits.

DENIED.

VAN NORTWTCK, THOMAS, and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.
#### Peggy E. ACOSTA, et al. v. Kevin ELLIOT, et al.

No. 2010-CC-1890.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 29, 2010.

In re Essex Insurance Company; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. I, No. 09-2248; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-C-0675.

Denied.

CLARK, J., would grant.
585 A.2d 365

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. NATHANIEL THOMPSON.

September 4, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
584 A.2d 236

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. MAURICE FRED WALKER.

May 30, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
Exhibit 99.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906


OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Merix Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter
ended November 23, 2002, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Form 10-Q), I, Janie S. Brown, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as
adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)    The Form 10-Q
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and





(2)    The information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.








Dated: January 6, 2003





/s/    Janie S. BrownJanie S. Brown Chief Financial Officer
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 194 (Thursday, October 7, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 62151]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-25389]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD


Sunshine Act Meetings

Time and Dates: All meetings are held at 2:30 p.m.

Tuesday, October 5;
Wednesday, October 6;
Thursday, October 7;
Tuesday, October 12;
Wednesday, October 13;
Thursday, October 14;
Tuesday, October 19;
Wednesday, October 20;
Thursday, October 21;
Tuesday, October 26;
Wednesday, October 27;
Thursday, October 28.

Place: Board Agenda Room, No. 11820, 1099 14th St., NW., Washington, DC 
20570.

Status: Closed.

Matters to be Considered:  Pursuant to Sec.  102.139(a) of the Board's 
Rules and Regulations, the Board or a panel thereof will consider ``the 
issuance of a subpoena, the Board's participation in a civil action or 
proceeding or an arbitration, or the initiation, conduct, or 
disposition * * * of particular representation or unfair labor practice 
proceedings under section 8, 9, or 10 of the [National Labor Relations] 
Act, or any court proceedings collateral or ancillary thereto.'' See 
also 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(10).

Contact Person for More Information: Lester A. Heltzer, Executive 
Secretary, (202) 273-1067.

    Dated: October 4, 2010.
Lester A. Heltzer,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2010-25389 Filed 10-5-10; 4:15 pm ]
BILLING CODE P
648 A.2d 722

#### IN THE MATTER OF FRANK J. HOERST, III, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW.

November 2, 1994.

ORDER

This matter having been duly presented to the Court, it is ORDERED that FRANK J. HOERST, III, of WOODSTOWN, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1974, and who was by Order of this Court dated February 18, 1994, suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months, effective March 11,1994, be restored to the practice of law, effective immediately.