alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.2


                      TOTAL ENTERTAINMENT RESTAURANT CORP.
                      REPORT ON FORM 10-K DECEMBER 30, 2003

                 CERTIFICATION BY STEVEN M. JOHNSON PURSUANT TO
                  18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     The undersigned, Chief Executive Officer of Total Entertainment Restaurant
Corp. (the "Company"), hereby certifies, to the best of my knowledge, that the
Form 10-K of the Company for the year ended December 30, 2003 (the "Annual
Report") accompanying this certification fully complies with the requirements of
the Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m
or 78o(d)) and that the information contained in the Annual Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company. The foregoing certification is incorporated solely
for purposes of complying with the provisions of Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and is not intended to be used for any other purpose.




     Date  March 29, 2004                    /s/ JAMES K. ZIELKE
         ----------------------              -----------------------------------
                                             James K. Zielke
                                             Chief Financial Officer,
                                             Secretary and Treasurer
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED AUGUST 16, 2022

NO. 03

- 22

- 00244

- CV

Author Manning II , Appellant

v.

General Motors , Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 459TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE BYRNE, JU STICES TRIANA AND SMI TH
DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE SMITH

Author Ma nning , Jr., has filed an appeal attem pting to challen ge the timing of certain

proceedings at the di strict court

. Having reviewed the record

, it appears that the C ourt lacks

jurisdiction over the appeal

. Therefore, the C ourt dismisses the appeal for want of jurisdiction

.

Because appellant is indigent and unable to pay costs, no a djudication of costs i s made.
Exhibit 13.2



CERTIFICATION BY THE
PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002



The certification set forth below is being
submitted in connection with the Annual Report on Form 20-F of Advanced Accelerator Applications S.A. (the “Company”)
for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2016 (the “Report”), I, Heinz Mäusli, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:



| | 1. | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Date: July 17, 2017



|By: | /s/ Heinz Mäusli                 | 
|--- | -------------------------------- | 
|    | Name:	Heinz Mäusli               | 
|    | Title:	  Chief Financial Officer |
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Jason MATTHIS.

No. 2009-KP-2440.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 29, 2010.

In re Matthis, Jason; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 405-829; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-K-1213.

Denied.
[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 97-4427

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 94-8681-CIV-JAG

JANE ROE, II,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ROBERT BUTTERWORTH, Attorney

General of the State of Florida,

Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida _________________________

(November 24, 1997)

Before COX and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and FAY, Senior

Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM:
2

 This suit and appeal involve a challenge to the laws of the state of Florida

prohibiting prostitution. The contentions are that such laws violate several

provisions of and rights recognized under the United States Constitution. The

district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. 

 We affirm the judgment of the district court for the reasons set forth in its

thorough opinion published at 958 F. Supp. 1569 (S.D. Fla. 1997).

 AFFIRMED.
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis

LINDA JULIA MILLER

v. Record No. 0855-95-4 MEMORANDUM OPINION * PER CURIAM LAUBSCHER, PRESTA & LAUBSCHER SEPTEMBER 19, 1995 AND STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION (Robert B. Adams; Ashcraft & Gerel, on brief), for appellant. (Ruth N. Carter; Midkiff & Hiner, on brief), for appellees.

Linda Julia Miller contends that the Workers' Compensation Commission erred in suspending her compensation benefits. Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily

affirm the commission's decision. Rule 5A:27.

* Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication. On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the employer, the prevailing party below. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. Mullins , 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). Factual findings made by the commission must be upheld by this Court if supported by credible evidence. James v. Capitol Steel Constr. Co. , 8 Va. App. 512, 515, 382 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1989). Miller argues that the record contains no credible evidence2 that she failed to cooperate with employer's vocational rehabilitation efforts. In granting employer's application seeking to suspend Miller's compensation benefits, the commission

found as follows: We do not find that [Miller] cooperated with rehabilitation efforts. According to the treating physician, Dr. [Khosrow] Matini, [Miller] had the ability to perform sedentary work, including writing with a pencil, pushing buttons, and driving a standard shift automobile. Yet [Miller] has portrayed herself to potential employers as essentially unemployable, thus sabotaging efforts to find employment. It appears from the record that [Miller] was unwilling to attempt even a part-time job allowing her to work on the telephone at home scheduling truck pick-ups.

The commission's findings are supported by Dr. Matini's medical reports and the testimony of the rehabilitation consultant, Patricia Wendy Held. Therefore, those findings are binding and conclusive upon us on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the commission's decision to suspend benefits until Miller demonstrates a good faith effort to cooperate with rehabilitation

efforts.

Affirmed.
#### F. Daniel BENNETT, Appellant, v. The SOCIETY OF LLOYD’S, Appellee.

Nos. 3D10-200, 3D10-893.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Dec. 22, 2010.

F. Daniel Bennett, in proper person.

Shutts & Bowen, Maxine M. Long and Patrick G. Brugger, Miami, for appellee.

Before GERSTEN, CORTINAS, and SALTER, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

F. Daniel Bennett (“Bennett”) appeals from an order denying his claim of exemption and a final judgment in garnishment. We reverse.

The Society of Lloyds (“Lloyds”) obtained a judgment against Bennett. Thereafter, Lloyds sought to satisfy the judgment through garnishment proceedings. The trial court issued a post-judgment writ of garnishment directed to Regions Bank where Bennett maintained two accounts.

Subsequently, Bennett filed a claim of exemption, alleging that the bank accounts contained his direct deposited Social Security benefits, which are exempt from garnishment. Bennett attached a bank trans*569action history showing several deposits, including the Social Security benefits. Bennett requested a hearing on his claim of exemption. Due to a death in his family, Bennett failed to appear for the scheduled hearing.

The trial court denied the claim of exemption without prejudice, allowing Bennett ten days to file a motion for rehearing showing “a meritorious substantive defense.” Bennett, who is a pro se litigant, filed a motion for rehearing addressing only the reason for his failure to appear at the hearing. The trial court denied the motion for rehearing and later entered a final judgment in garnishment.

On appeal, Bennett asserts that the trial court erred in ruling on his claim of exemption without a hearing. Lloyds, on the other hands, contends the trial court properly ruled based on the bank transaction history, showing a commingling of exempt and non-exempt funds. We agree with Bennett.

In *Beardsley v. Admiral Insurance Co.,*647 So.2d 327, 329 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), this Court stated “it is not correct to say that the commingling of a nonexempt deposit with an exempt account will automatically cause the entire account to lose its exempt status.” Instead, the Court held that in these circumstances, if possible, the trial court should make an allocation between exempt and non-exempt funds.

Here, the trial court did not attempt to allocate between the exempt and nonexempt funds. Consistent with *Beardsley,*we, therefore, reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing giving Bennett an opportunity, if possible, to prove the source of funds in the bank accounts. The trial court then can determine which funds in the bank accounts are exempt from garnishment.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.
585 A.2d 387

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. MARTHA LEE REYES.

October 10, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
**EXHIBIT 31.1**
 **CERTIFICATIONS**
 
 I, Lawrence P. Ward, Chief Executive Officer, certify that:
 
 1.
I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Heritage Oaks Bancorp; 
 2.
Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 
 3.
Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 
 4.
The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d -15(e) for the registrant and we have: 
 a)
Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;  b)
Intentionally Left Blank  c)
Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and  d)
Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and  5.
The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal controls over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function); 
 a)
all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and  b)
any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.  ****Date: October 19, 2004
By:
/s/ Lawrence P. WardLawrence P. WardChief Executive Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
     JUNE 30, 1998 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS 
     ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                    1,000
           
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                  JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                    JUN-30-1998                              
<CASH>                          3,630               
<SECURITIES>                        0           
<RECEIVABLES>                       0           
<ALLOWANCES>                        0           
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<CURRENT-ASSETS>                6,876                             
<PP&E>                        187,149                 
<DEPRECIATION>                  6,083               
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                187,942                                
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           6,368                         
<BONDS>                        90,807                                      
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>               0                         
<PREFERRED>                         0           
<COMMON>                           84                                    
<OTHER-SE>                     67,082                
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>  187,942                 
<SALES>                             0          
<TOTAL-REVENUES>               16,240                
<CGS>                               0           
<TOTAL-COSTS>                       0           
<OTHER-EXPENSES>               10,434                
<LOSS-PROVISION>                    0           
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>              2,390              
<INCOME-PRETAX>                 2,499               
<INCOME-TAX>                        0           
<INCOME-CONTINUING>             2,499               
<DISCONTINUED>                      0           
<EXTRAORDINARY>                   838           
<CHANGES>                           0           
<NET-INCOME>                    1,661               
<EPS-PRIMARY>                    0.20            
<EPS-DILUTED>                    0.20              
        



</TABLE>
#### Blaise DiBENEDETTO v. NOBLE DRILLING COMPANY, et al.

No. 2011-CC-0163.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 21, 2011.

In re DiBenedetto, Blaise; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. M, No. 2008-7754; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-0089.

Denied.
#### STATE ex rel. Tyrone NOEL v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-0689.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 1, 2011.

In re Noel, Tyrone; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 04-514; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-WR-1003.

Denied.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1271 

KA 14-01061 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, LINDLEY, VALENTINO, AND WHALEN, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DWAYNE HANDLEY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

DAVID J. FARRUGIA, PUBLIC DEFENDER, LOCKPORT (JOSEPH G. FRAZIER OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

DWAYNE HANDLEY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PRO SE.

MICHAEL J. VIOLANTE, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, LOCKPORT (THOMAS H. BRANDT OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Niagara County

(Richard C. Kloch, Sr., A.J.), rendered April 8, 2014. The judgment

revoked defendant’s sentence of probation and imposed a sentence of

imprisonment. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment revoking the

sentence of probation previously imposed upon his conviction of

attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal

Law §§ 110.00, 265.03 [3]) and sentencing him to a determinate term of

imprisonment of seven years plus three years of postrelease

supervision. We reject defendant’s contention that the sentence is

unduly harsh and severe. Although defendant was sentenced to the

maximum sentence permitted by law and has a minimal criminal history,

he repeatedly fired a gun at another person, and one of the errant

bullets went through the window of a nearby home. Moreover, shortly

after being placed on probation, defendant essentially ignored all of

the terms and conditions of probation and then absconded for the next

year and a half. Under the circumstances, we perceive no basis upon

which to modify the sentence as a matter of discretion in the interest

of justice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [b]; see generally People v Leggett,

101 AD3d 1694, 1695, lv denied 20 NY3d 1101). 

Defendant’s contentions in his pro se supplemental brief that his

plea was involuntarily entered and that he was deprived of effective

assistance of counsel at the time of the plea are not properly before

us. The only notice of appeal in the record is from the judgment

entered upon sentencing for the violation of probation, and there is
-2- 1271 

KA 14-01061 

no notice of appeal from the underlying judgment of conviction (see

People v Postula, 50 AD3d 1581, 1581, lv denied 10 NY3d 938; People v

Parente, 4 AD3d 793, 793-794). 

Entered: December 31, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-7690

ANTOINE MARTWAIN HILL-EL, a/k/a Antoine Martwain Hill, a/k/a Antoine M. 

Hill,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

CALVIN JOHNSON,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. 

Theodore D. Chuang, District Judge. (8:18-cv-01654-TDC)

Submitted: March 23, 2021 Decided: March 29, 2021

Before THACKER, QUATTLEBAUM, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Antoine Martwain Hill-El, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Antoine Martwain Hill-El seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing as 

untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 148 & n.9

(2012) (explaining that § 2254 petitions are subject to one-year statute of limitations, 

running from latest of four commencement dates enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)). 

The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate of appealability will not issue 

absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(2). When, as here, the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the 

prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable and that 

the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Gonzalez, 565 

U.S. at 140-41 (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). 

On appeal, we confine our review to the issues raised in the informal brief. See 4th 

Cir. R. 34(b). Because Hill-El’s informal brief does not challenge the dispositive 

timeliness determination by the district court, he has forfeited appellate review. See 

Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The informal brief is an important 

document; under Fourth Circuit rules, our review is limited to issues preserved in that 

brief.”). Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

DISMISSED
No. 13,455.

#### Grimsley *v.*The State, ex rel. Cohen et al.

Filed Sept. 22, 1888.

Township Trustee.— *Void Promissory Notes.*— Action *Upon Official*Bond,.— Promissory notes illegally executed by a township trustee are void in their inception. Holders are bound to know this as matter of law, and they can not maintain, an action upon the official bond of the trustee.

From the Daviess Circuit Court.

*J. Baker*and *A. J. Padgett,*for appellant.

*W. R. Gardiner*and *S. H. Taylor,*for appellees.

Elliott, J.

The relators sought and secured a recovery against the appellant upon his official bond as township trustee. It was alleged, among other things, that he had wrongfully and illegally executed promissory, notes of the township to R. B. Pollard.

The relators base their claim to a recovery on the fact that they are good-faith purchasers of the notes, and were misled by the wrongful acts of the township trustee. The claim is without foundation. The notes were void in their inception, and this the relators were bound to know as matter of law. They can not, therefore, have any' cause of action upon the official bond. Whether they may maintain a different action we do not decide. The question is fully discussed in *State, ex rel.,*v. *Hawes,*112 Ind. 323, and it is unnecessary for us to again discuss it.

Judgment reversed, for the reason that the complaint does not state a cause of action.
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<NAME> THE QUANTUM GROUP, INC., AND SUBSIDIARIES

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