alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT 23.1** **CONSENT    OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**     We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration    Statement Nos.    333-68929,333-64242,333-109332    and    333-125245    on    Form S-8    of our reports dated March 13, 2007, relating to the    consolidated financial statements and financial statement    schedule of Gevity HR, Inc. (the “Company”) which    report expresses an unqualified opinion and includes an    explanatory paragraph relating to the Company’s adoption of    Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123R,    *Share-Based Payment*, and on management’s report on    the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting    appearing in this Annual Report on    Form 10-K    of the Company for the year ended December 31, 2006. /s/  Deloitte &    Touche LLP     Tampa, Florida    March 13, 2007
#### Michael GOLDMAN, Appellant, v. Faye RESNICK, Appellee.

No. 3D09-2640.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Nov. 10, 2010.

Rehearing Denied March 4, 2011.

Michael Goldman, in proper person.

Navon and Lavin and Andrew T. Lavin, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

Before GERSTEN and SUAREZ, JJ„ and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. *See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee,*377 So.2d 1150 (Fla.1980).
HMN FINANCIAL, INC.
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
 Date:  November 3, 2009
    /s/ Bradley KrehbielBradley Krehbiel(Principal Executive Officer) /s/ Jon EberleJon EberleSenior Vice President/Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial Officer)
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 97-2216

BRENDA FAYE WRAY, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus GERALD ROBERT HARRISON, Defendant - Appellee.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, District Judge. (CA-97-353-3, BK-96-31492-T) Submitted: October 30, 1998 Decided: December 15, 1998 Before ERVIN and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HALL, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Neil Kuchinsky, KUCHINSKY & ASSOCIATES, P.C., Colonial Heights, Virginia, for Appellant. Gerald Robert Harrison, Appellee Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* In light of this disposition, we deny Wray’s motion for publication of this opinion. 2 PER CURIAM: Brenda Faye Wray appeals the district court’s order affirmingthe bankruptcy court’s order which (1) confirmed the debtor’s proposed Chapter 13 plan and (2) imposed sanctions against her attorney. Our review of the record and the district court’s opinion discloses no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Wray v. Harrison , No. CA-97-353-3 (E.D. Va. Aug. 21, 1997). We dispense with oral argument becausethe facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. *

AFFIRMED
Exhibit 10.2


 


FORM OF WAIVER OF SENIOR EXECUTIVE
OFFICERS


 


United States Department of the Treasury


1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW


Washington, D.C. 20220


 


January 9, 2009


 


	
  Re:

  	
   

  	
  First Financial Service Corporation

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  UST Sequence No. 342

  



 


Ladies and Gentlemen:


 


In consideration for the benefits I will receive as a result of my
employer’s participation in the United States Department of the Treasury’s TARP
Capital Purchase Program, I hereby voluntarily waive any claim against the
United States or my employer for any changes to my compensation or benefits
that are required to comply with the regulation issued by the Department of the
Treasury as published in the Federal Register on October 20, 2008.


 


I acknowledge that this regulation may require modification of the
compensation, bonus, incentive and other benefit plans, arrangements, policies
and agreements (including so-called “golden parachute” agreements) that I have
with my employer or in which I participate as they relate to the period the
United States holds any equity or debt securities of my employer acquired
through the TARP Capital Purchase Program.


 


This waiver includes all claims I may have under the laws of the United
States or any state related to the requirements imposed by the aforementioned
regulation, including without limitation a claim for any compensation or other
payments I would otherwise receive, any challenge to the process by which this
regulation was adopted and any tort or constitutional claim about the effect of
these regulations on my employment relationship.


 


 


	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  Name:

  
	
   

  	
  Title:
#### Jeffrey W. RUSSELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 2D10-102.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Oct. 22, 2010.

DAVIS, Judge.

Jeffrey W. Russell challenges the post-conviction court order striking his motion to reinstate his original postconviction motion and supplemental motion. Because a final, appealable postconviction order has not been rendered, we dismiss the appeal.

Russell filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Concluding that the motion was facially insufficient, the postcon-viction court entered an order dismissing it without prejudice to Russell filing an amended motion. The order also failed to set forth a reasonable time limit within which Russell could amend the claims, as is required by *Spera v. State,*971 So.2d 754, 761 (Fla.2007). Because the dismissal was without prejudice to amend, it is not a final, appealable order. *See Havens v. State,*27 So.3d 803, 804 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); *Christner v. State,*984 So.2d 561, 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).

In response to the postconviction court’s order, instead of amending any of the claims raised in his original postconviction motion, Russell moved to reinstate that original motion and supplement it with one additional claim. The postconviction court entered an order on November 3, 2009, striking the motion to reinstate and supplement, noting that Russell was still within the two-year time limit for filing a rule 3.850 motion. It is this order that is the subject of this appeal.

Because Russell’s rule 3.850 two-year time limit had not yet expired and the trial court had not ruled on the merits of his original postconviction motion when he filed his “motion to reinstate,” it appears that he had the right to supplement his original motion. *See Norris v. State,*832 *152So.2d 969, 970 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (“A defendant may amend a rule 3.850 motion if the trial court has not yet ruled on the motion and the amendment is filed within the two-year time limit.”). But until a final order on the original postconviction motion is entered, we do not have jurisdiction to review interim orders and we must dismiss this appeal. *See Herron v. State,*34 So.3d 206 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).

As set out in *Herron,*the postconviction court should enter a revised order allowing Russell to amend his original motion within thirty days, pursuant to *Spera,*971 So.2d at 761. If Russell fails to amend within that time, the court should then enter a final order disposing of all of Russell’s claims. *See Brown v. State,*38 So.3d 888 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).

Dismissed.

LaROSE and KHOUZAM, JJ., Concur.
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 194 (Thursday, October 7, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 62134]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-25297]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke; Notice 
of Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended (5 U.S.C. App.), notice is hereby given of the following 
meeting.
    The meetings will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable materials, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: National Institute of Neurological Disorders 
and Stroke Special Emphasis Panel; T32 Teleconference.
    Date: October 25, 2010.
    Time: 11 a.m. to 3 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: National Institutes of Health, Neuroscience Center, 6001 
Executive Boulevard, Rockville, MD 20852 (Telephone Conference 
Call).
    Contact Person: Phillip F. Wiethorn, Scientific Review 
Administrator, DHHS/NIH/NINDS/DER/SRB, Neuroscience Center, 6001 
Executive Blvd., Room 3203, MSC 9529, Bethesda, MD 20892-9529, 301-
496-5388, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#285f414d5c40475a58684641464c5b06464140064f475e"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="097e606c7d61667b79496760676d7a27676061276e667f">[email protected]</span></a>.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.853, 
Clinical Research Related to Neurological Disorders; 93.854, 
Biological Basis Research in the Neurosciences, National Institutes 
of Health, HHS)

    Dated: September 30, 2010.
Jennifer S. Spaeth,
Director, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 2010-25297 Filed 10-6-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-P


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#### Adam Wade OWENS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Daniel STIENEKE; T. Shaw, Correctional Officer; Superintendent McDade; Sergeant Warren; Sergeant Henry Williams, Defendants-Appel-lees.

No. 00-6912.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 20, 2000.

Decided Jan. 8, 2001.

Adam Wade Owens, pro se. Dorothy Powers, North Carolina Department of Justice, Raleigh, NC, for appellees.

Before WILKINS and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Adam Wade Owens appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp.2000) complaint. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion accepting the magistrate judge’s recommendation and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. *Owens v. Stieneke,*No. CA-99-354-5-BR (E.D.N.C. May 25, 2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
#### In the Matter of Glenda D., Appellant, v Family Focus Adoption Services, Respondent, et al., Intervenors.

[775 NYS2d 171]

In a proceeding, in effect, to revoke a surrender of a child for adoption, the mother appeals from an order of the Family Court, Richmond County (McElrath, J.), dated March 19, 2003, which, after a hearing, denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The mother, who attempted to revoke the surrender of the subject child for adoption after the child was placed in the home of the intervenors, and more than 30 days after she executed the surrender *(see*Social Services Law § 384 [5]), failed to establish any basis for allowing her to revoke the surrender.

Accordingly, the Family Court correctly denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding. Santucci, J.E, Krausman, Schmidt and Rivera, JJ., concur.
#### Jesse Ronnie STRICKLAND, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D11-18.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

March 18, 2011.

Jesse R. Strickland, Crawfordville, pro se.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Allison Leigh Morris, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Strickland appeals from the summary denial of his motion for post-conviction relief. Although Strickland has designated his motion as being filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800, the trial court treated his motion as a rule 3.850 motion and denied same as untimely. We affirm, except as to Strickland’s claim that the trial court’s oral pronouncement of sentence with regard to costs conflicted with the written judgment.

*907The Florida Supreme Court has held that an alleged discrepancy between the orally pronounced sentence and the written judgment of sentence is cognizable in a Rule 3.800(a) motion to correct illegal sentence. *Williams v. State,*957 So.2d 600 (Fla.2007). The State concedes that, as to this issue, reversal is required because the trial court failed to attach documentation to its order conclusively refuting Strickland’s claim.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED.

PALMER, TORPY and EVANDER, JJ., concur.
A93A0195.

#### McCRARY v. THE STATE.

(432 SE2d 254)

Pope, Chief Judge.

Defendant Terry McCrary was convicted of aggravated assault for stabbing a neighbor in the back with a knife. We affirm the conviction.

1. Defendant first argues the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of the State’s rebuttal witness concerning a threatening statement made by defendant to the victim’s girl friend after the incident. Defendant had testified earlier and denied that he had made any statements to the woman. Defendant argues no proper foundation was laid to present the testimony as a previous contradictory statement pursuant to OCGA § 24-9-83 or to present the testimony as evidence of bad character pursuant to OCGA § 24-9-84. We agree with the State that the testimony was not of the sort covered by either of these statutes but was simply presented to impeach the defendant’s *825testimony pursuant to OCGA § 24-9-82. Moreover, because defendant failed to raise these objections at trial, we cannot now consider them on appeal. See *Price v. State,*204 Ga. App. 288 (1) (419 SE2d 126) (1992). Before the witness testified concerning the statement he heard defendant make to the woman, defendant’s attorney interrupted the questioning of the witness to state that it appeared the testimony would be irrelevant. The trial judge instructed the prosecutor to keep the questioning to matters which were relevant. Even if the statement of defendant’s attorney is considered to be an objection on the ground of relevance, this is not the objection raised on appeal. Moreover, even as to relevance, defendant’s attorney made no further objection and requested no further ruling and her failure to pursue a ruling on the objection results in waiver. See *Harris v. State,*190 Ga. App. 343 (4b) (378 SE2d 912) (1989).

Decided June 3, 1993.

*Janet S. Willy,*for appellant.

*Harry N. Gordon, District Attorney, Richard L. Dickson, Assistant District Attorney,*for appellee.

2. We reject defendant’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. “Although the appellant pleaded justification and self-defense, the testimony of the witnesses . . . authorized the jury in rejecting these defenses and finding the appellant guilty of [aggravated assault].” *Felts v. State,*244 Ga. 503 (1) (260 SE2d 887) (1979). See also *Parham v. State,*204 Ga. App. 659 (420 SE2d 356) (1992).

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Birdsong, P. J., and Andrews, J., concur.*
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Brent GANIER.

No. 2011-KK-2400.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 16, 2011.

In re Ganier, Brent; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 501-482; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-1039.

Denied.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 02-7713
ALEXANDER CAMERON, Petitioner - Appellant, versus DAVID A. GARRAGHTY, Respondent - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior District Judge. (CA-01-1192-AM) Submitted: February 28, 2003 Decided: March 12, 2003 Before WIDENER, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Alexander Cameron, Appellant Pro Se. Thomas Drummond Bagwell, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Alexander Cameron seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). We have reviewed the record and conclude for the reasons stated by the district court that Cameron has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. See Cameron v. Garraghty , No. CA-01-1192-AM (E.D. Va., filed Oct. 9, 2002; entered Oct. 10, 2002). Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert Eugene GRIMES, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 79-5205.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued April 2, 1980.

Decided May 8, 1980.

Thomas P. Flynn (court appointed), Kennedy Legler III, Dayton, Ohio, for defendant-appellant.

James C. Cissell, U. S. Atty., Dayton, Ohio, William R. Martin, Cincinnati, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before EDWARDS, Chief Judge, and WEICK and KENNEDY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant Grimes seeks reversal of his jury conviction for forgery and possession of stolen mail under 18 U.S.C. §§ 495 and 1708 (1976). Grimes’ allegations are that the District Judge failed to follow the Federal Rules of Evidence and thus occasioned the admission of highly prejudicial evidence which he asserts was admitted contrary to said rules.

Our review of the briefs and records does not bear out these contentions. Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence says:

> (b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

It is clear to us that appellant sought to convince the jury, by his own testimony, that he had participated in the cashing of a check made out to one Edward L. Evans, *588knowing that none of the persons who had received the proceeds was Edward L. Evans but in the belief that one of them was entitled to those proceeds. Grimes’ defense was that he did not intentionally participate in forgery and possession of stolen mail.

Under these circumstances, we feel the District Judge committed no abuse of discretion in admitting evidence of other similar crimes engaged in by defendant in order to negate his claim of lack of criminal intent. No other meritorious issue being presented, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
| (logo) WELLS            FARGO | Commercial Mortgage Servicing

D1086-120, 12th Floor

550 South Tryon Street

Charlotte, NC 28202

1-800-326-1334 |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

 

ANNUAL STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE

 

Reference is hereby made to that certain Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of March 1, 2014, by and among Deutsche Mortgage & Asset Receiving Corporation, as Depositor, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as Master Servicer, Rialto Capital Advisors, LLC,  as Special Servicer, U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee, and Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as Certificate Administrator, Paying Agent and Custodian and Situs Holdings, LLC, as Operating Advisor, with respect to Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, COMM 2014-LC15 (the "Agreement"). Capitalized terms used herein not otherwise defined shall have the meanings assigned in the Agreement.

 

Pursuant to Section 10.11 of this Agreement, I, Daniel Bober, Executive Vice President of Commercial Mortgage Services do hereby certify that:

 

1.              A review of the activities of the Master Servicer during the period from March 1, 2014 through December 31, 2014 (the “Reporting Period”),   and of its performance per the Agreement during such period has been made under my supervision, and 

 

2.              To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the Reporting Period.

 

 

 

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this Certificate as of the 6th day of March 2015.

 

 

 

 

/s/  Daniel Bober

Daniel Bober

Executive Vice President

Wells Fargo Bank 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
| Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. | (logo) Together we’ll go far |
|------------------------|------------------------------------|
| (logo) WELLS  FARGO | **Commercial  Mortgage Servicing**D1050-084,  8th Floor  401 South Tryon St.  Charlotte, NC 28202  1-800-326-1334 |
|---------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

** **

** **

**ANNUAL STATEMENT OFCOMPLIANCE**

 

 

Referenceis hereby made to that certain Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of May1, 2014, by and among WELLS FARGO COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES, INC., asDepositor, WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as General Master Servicer,RIALTO CAPITAL ADVISORS, LLC, as General Special Servicer, NCB, FSB, as NCBMaster Servicer, NCB, FSB, as Co-op Special Servicer, PENTALPHA SURVEILLANCELLC, as Trust Advisor, WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as CertificateAdministrator, as Tax Administrator and as Custodian, and WILMINGTON TRUST,NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee, with respect to Commercial MortgagePass-Through Certificates Series 2014-C20 (the "Agreement").Capitalized terms used herein not otherwise defined shall have the meaningsassigned in the Agreement.

 

Pursuantto Section 11.12 of this Agreement, I, Daniel Bober, Executive Vice Presidentof Commercial Mortgage Services do hereby certify that:

 

1.       Areview of the activities of the General Master Servicer during the period fromJanuary 1, 2017 through December 31, 2017 (the “Reporting Period”), and of itsperformance per the Agreement during such period has been made under mysupervision, and

 

2.       Tothe best of my knowledge, based on such review, the General Master Servicer,has fulfilled all of its obligations under this Agreement in all materialrespects throughout the Reporting Period.

 

 

INWITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this Certificate as of the 28thday of February 2018.

 

 

/s/Daniel Bober

DanielBober

ExecutiveVice President 

WellsFargo Bank

 

 

| Wells Fargo Bank,  N.A. | (logo) Together  we’ll go far |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|