IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 

CALIFORNIA

Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of K.P.

PUBLIC GUARDIAN OF LOS ANGELES, 

as Conservator, etc.,

Petitioner and Respondent,

v.

K.P.,

Objector and Appellant.

S258212

Second Appellate District, Division Two

B291510

Los Angeles County Superior Court

ZE032603

June 28, 2021

Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 

Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Liu, Cuéllar, 

Kruger, Groban, and Jenkins concurred.
1

Conservatorship of K.P.

S258212

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act or Act; Welf. & 

Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.)

1 provides one-year conservatorships 

for those “gravely disabled as a result of a mental health 

disorder or impairment by chronic alcoholism.” (§ 5350.)2 Those 

subject to a conservatorship petition are entitled to a court or 

jury trial to decide if they are “gravely disabled.” (§ 5350, 

subd. (d)(1).) The question here is whether the trier of fact must 

find, in addition, that the individual is unwilling or unable to 

voluntarily accept treatment. This is an issue of statutory 

interpretation on which the Courts of Appeal have differed. We 

granted review to resolve the conflict and now hold that capacity 

or willingness to accept treatment is a relevant factor to be 

considered on the issue of grave disability but is not a separate 

element that must be proven to establish a conservatorship.

I. BACKGROUND

The Los Angeles County Superior Court established a 

conservatorship for 23-year-old K.P. in May 2008 and renewed 

it annually over the next nine years. In April 2018, the county’s 

public guardian (Public Guardian) filed another renewal

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.

2 Because this case involves only mental disorders, we 

generally dispense with further mention of chronic alcoholism.
Conservatorship of K.P.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

2

petition, alleging K.P. remained gravely disabled. This time, 

K.P. demanded a jury trial. 

A psychologist from K.P.’s residential facility testified that 

he suffered from schizophrenia, with auditory hallucinations 

and paranoid delusions. For example, on the morning of trial he 

asked to enter a witness protection program because he believed 

a fellow resident was planning to attack him. In another

incident, K.P. chased and threatened someone he believed had 

intentionally hit him with a basketball. He could not be 

redirected and was hospitalized. K.P. also displayed “grossly 

disorganized behaviors,” lack of motivation, and difficulty 

speaking and socializing. The psychologist concluded K.P. 

lacked significant insight into his disorder. He minimized his 

symptoms and believed they were caused by medications. His 

mother had expressed the same belief. K.P. resisted taking his 

prescriptions or participating in therapy and other services. The 

psychologist concluded K.P. could not provide for his basic needs 

without medication and did not believe he would take them 

consistently or correctly without a conservator’s supervision. 

The day before trial, K.P. almost gave himself a double dose of 

one potentially toxic pharmaceutical. The psychologist believed

K.P. needed round-the-clock supervision and lacked the 

initiative and insight necessary to obtain treatment himself. 

Although he had opportunities to do so, K.P. had never left the 

facility without his therapist or mother. 

K.P.’s mother understood that he had a mental illness. If 

he were released from the conservatorship, she testified that she 

would help him take his medications and attend therapy 

appointments. She could not provide housing but would help 

him find a place to live. 
Conservatorship of K.P.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

3

K.P. also testified. He had not lived outside a hospital or 

treatment facility since 2013. After some conflicting answers, 

he agreed to stay in his current placement until he could find a 

place to live. K.P.’s mother had previously been his conservator 

but later became homeless and moved away. K.P. agreed he 

needed a psychiatrist and said he would see a therapist if 

released, but he denied having any mental illness. He thought 

his problems might stem from a childhood brain injury. K.P. 

asserted he did better without his psychiatric drugs and said he 

would not take them if released from the conservatorship. To 

supplement his Social Security benefits, K.P. planned to become 

an entrepreneur. 

The court gave two Judicial Council of California Civil 

Jury Instructions (CACI) relevant to the issue here. CACI No. 

4000, as given, stated: “The Office of the Public Guardian claims 

that [K.P.] is gravely disabled due to a mental disorder and 

therefore should be placed in a conservatorship. In a 

conservatorship, a conservator is appointed to oversee, under 

the direction of the court, the care of persons who are gravely 

disabled due to a mental disorder. To succeed on this claim, the 

Office of the Public Guardian must prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt all of the following: [¶] (1) That [K.P.] has a mental 

disorder; and [¶] (2) That [K.P.] is gravely disabled as a result 

of the mental disorder.” 

CACI No. 4002, as given, explained the meaning of

“gravely disabled”: “The term ‘gravely disabled’ means that a 

person is presently unable to provide for his or her basic needs 

for food, clothing, or shelter because of a mental disorder. 

[¶] Psychosis, bizarre or eccentric behavior, delusions or 

hallucinations are not enough, by themselves, to find that [K.P.] 

is gravely disabled. He must be unable to provide for the basic 
Conservatorship of K.P.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

4

needs of food, clothing, or shelter because of a mental disorder. 

[¶] If you find [K.P.] will not take his prescribed medication 

without supervision and that a mental disorder makes him 

unable to provide for his basic needs for food, clothing, or shelter 

without such medication, then you may conclude [K.P.] is 

presently gravely disabled. [¶] In determining whether [K.P.] is 

presently gravely disabled, you may consider evidence that he 

did not take prescribed medication in the past. You may 

consider evidence of his lack of insight into his medical 

condition. [¶] In determining whether [K.P.] is presently 

gravely disabled, you may not consider the likelihood of future 

deterioration or relapse of a condition. [¶] In determining 

whether [K.P.] is presently gravely disabled, you may consider 

whether he is unable or unwilling voluntarily to accept 

meaningful treatment.” (Italics added.)

K.P. requested a modification of CACI No. 4000 to require, 

as a separate element, a finding that he was “unwilling or 

unable voluntarily to accept meaningful treatment.” He argued 

the final sentence of CACI No. 4002 directing the jury’s 

attention to this issue was inadequate because it was “thrown 

in at the bottom of [a] less consequential later jury instruction.” 

The court denied the request, observing that resistance to 

voluntary treatment is appropriately considered as an aspect of 

grave disability but is not a separately required element that 

must be proven. 

The jury found that K.P. was gravely disabled, and the 

reappointment petition was granted. On appeal, K.P. 

challenged the refusal to modify CACI No. 4000. The Court of 
Conservatorship of K.P.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

5

Appeal concluded there was no error. We granted review and 

now reach the same conclusion.3

II. DISCUSSION

Although couched as a complaint about jury instructions, 

K.P. essentially claims that a finding of unwillingness or 

inability to accept voluntary treatment is required for a 

conservatorship to be established. This is a legal question 

subject to de novo review. (John L., supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 142; 

see Conservatorship of P.D. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1163, 1167.) 

Our goal in construing the LPS Act is to effectuate the 

Legislature’s intent. (John L., at p. 143.) We consider 

individual statutes in the context of the entire Act so that each 

part may be harmonized and given effect. (See Moyer v. 

Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230; 

Conservatorship of Joseph W. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 953, 963.)

A. Overview of the LPS Act

The LPS Act has many purposes, including “end[ing] the 

inappropriate, indefinite, and involuntary commitment of 

persons with mental health disorders” (§ 5001, subd. (a)), 

“provid[ing] prompt evaluation and treatment” (id., subd. (b)), 

and “provid[ing] individualized treatment, supervision, and 

3 The conservatorship challenged here ended, rendering the 

appeal technically moot. This problem frequently arises 

because a conservatorship’s duration is short, compared to the 

appellate process. (See, e.g., Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 

48 Cal.4th 131, 142, fn. 2 (John L.).) The Court of Appeal 

concluded the issue K.P. raises is capable of repetition but likely 

to evade review. (Conservatorship of K.P. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 

254, 257, fn. 2; see Conservatorship of David L. (2008) 164 

Cal.App.4th 701, 709.) We agree and elect to decide this 

otherwise moot appeal.
Conservatorship of K.P.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

6

placement services by a conservatorship program” (id., 

subd. (e)). The Act defines persons as “ ‘gravely disabled’ ” if 

they are unable to provide for basic personal needs of food, 

clothing, or shelter, as a result of a mental disorder. (§ 5008, 

subd. (h)(1)(A); see § 5350, subd. (e).) 

The overall statutory scheme describes a detailed,

calibrated system for intervention when circumstances indicate 

a person may be suffering from a mental health disorder. In 

addition to conservatorships, the Act permits 3-day, 14-day, and 

30-day involuntary detentions for intensive treatment.4

1. Chapter 2: Involuntary Detentions

Under chapter 2 of the Act, those gravely disabled by a 

mental health disorder may be held for up to 72 hours for 

evaluation and treatment. (§ 5150, subd. (a).) Before such a 

detention can begin, a professional must assess whether the 

person “can be properly served without being detained.” (Id., 

subd. (c).) In such a case, services must be provided “on a 

voluntary basis.” (Ibid.) After 72 hours, the person may be 

detained for up to 14 days of intensive treatment if three 

conditions are met: (1) a professional has found that the person 

is gravely disabled due to a mental health disorder (§ 5250, 

subd. (a)); (2) the facility providing treatment agrees to admit 

the person (id., subd. (b)); and (3) the person “has been advised 

of the need for, but has not been willing or able to accept, 

treatment on a voluntary basis” (id., subd. (c)). This 14-day 

4 Our discussion is confined to the provisions for persons 

gravely disabled due to a mental health disorder, but such 

detentions are also available for individuals who are imminently 

dangerous to themselves or others, or are impaired by chronic 

alcoholism. (See §§ 5150, 5250, 5260, 5300.)
Conservatorship of K.P.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

7

period can be extended by up to 30 days if the professional staff 

finds that the person remains both gravely disabled and 

“unwilling or unable to accept treatment voluntarily.” 

(§ 5270.15, subd. (a)(2).)

Someone certified for a 14-day or 30-day detention has the 

right to a prompt certification review hearing. (§§ 5254, 5256, 

5270.15, subd. (b).) The only question to be decided at such a

review hearing is whether the person is gravely disabled by a 

mental health disorder (see § 5256.5). If there is insufficient

probable cause to find grave disability, the person must be 

released. (§§ 5256.5–5256.6.)5

As an alternative to a certification review hearing, those 

detained have the right to habeas corpus review. (§ 5275.) 

Unlike a review hearing, habeas review tests all the initial 

certification requirements. The court must order an immediate 

release if it finds that the detained person is not gravely 

disabled, or “had not been advised of, or had accepted, voluntary 

treatment,” or that the facility is not designated by the county 

or is not equipped and staffed to provide intensive treatment. 

(§ 5276, 2d par.) These statutes apply only to chapter 2 

detentions, however, and not chapter 3’s more lengthy

conservatorships. Although habeas corpus relief may be 

appropriate “in extraordinary circumstances” (In re Gandolfo

(1984) 36 Cal.3d 889, 899), ordinarily the statutory rehearing 

provisions (§ 5364; see also § 5358.3) and the right to appeal 

5 Release is also required at the end of an involuntary 

detention period, unless the gravely disabled person is certified 

for an additional 14 or 30 days of intensive treatment, is the 

subject of a petition for conservatorship or confinement of a 

dangerous person (see § 5300), or agrees to receive treatment 

voluntarily. (§ 5257, subd. (b).)
Conservatorship of K.P.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

8

from a conservator’s appointment or reappointment provide 

available and adequate remedies for aggrieved conservatees. 

(Gandolfo, at pp. 898–900; see Michelle K. v. Superior Court

(2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 409, 433; 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. 

Criminal Law (4th ed. 2020) Criminal Writs, § 25, pp. 630–631.)

2. Chapter 3: Conservatorships

Chapter 3 of the Act goes on to provide for the imposition 

of a conservatorship under specifically described circumstances. 

A “series of temporary detentions may culminate in a proceeding 

to determine whether the person is so disabled that he or she 

should be involuntarily confined for up to one year. (§§ 5350, 

5361.) Because of the important liberty interests at stake, 

correspondingly powerful safeguards protect against erroneous 

findings.” (Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 541 

(Ben C.).) Conservatorships can involve confinement and other 

“disabilities” that may be imposed by the court, such as the loss 

of driving privileges, the right to enter contracts or vote, and the 

right to refuse medical and other treatments. (§ 5357.)

Section 5352 sets out the requirements for a professional 

recommendation to initiate conservatorship proceedings. The 

first paragraph of section 5352 addresses recommendations for 

individuals who have already been detained for evaluation and 

treatment under chapter 2. When the professional in charge of 

an agency providing comprehensive evaluation, or of a facility 

providing intensive treatment, “determines that a person in his 

or her care is gravely disabled as a result of mental disorder or 

impairment by chronic alcoholism and is unwilling to accept, or 

incapable of accepting, treatment voluntarily, he or she may 

recommend conservatorship to the officer providing 

conservatorship investigation of the county of residence of the 
Conservatorship of K.P.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

9

person prior to his or her admission as a patient in such facility.” 

(§ 5352, 1st par., italics added.)6 Thus, before a professional 

may recommend the initiation of a conservatorship for a 

detained inpatient, that professional must conclude the person 

is not willing or able to consent to voluntary treatment. This 

requirement recognizes that if a person is able and willing to 

accept inpatient treatment, there may be no need to pursue the 

additional constraints of a conservatorship. It also recognizes 

that when a person is committed for inpatient treatment, but 

unwilling or unable to consent to that treatment, an additional 

measure of authority over the person may be necessary for 

treatment to be successful and for other services, like general 

medical care, to be provided.

The recommendation standards are different for those

presently receiving outpatient treatment, however. The second 

paragraph of section 5352, which addresses outpatients, does 

not mention a willingness or ability to accept treatment. Under 

that paragraph, the professional agency in charge of “providing 

comprehensive evaluation or a facility providing intensive 

treatment, or the professional person in charge of providing 

mental health treatment at a county jail, or his or her designee, 

may recommend conservatorship for a person without the 

person being an inpatient in a facility providing comprehensive 

evaluation or intensive treatment, if both of the following 

conditions are met: (a) the professional person[,] or another 

professional person designated by him or her[,] has examined 

and evaluated the person and determined that he or she is 

6 These requirements also apply when conservatorship is 

considered for someone who is already subject to a Probate Code 

conservatorship. (§ 5350.5, subd. (a).)
Conservatorship of K.P.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

10

gravely disabled; (b) the professional person or [designee] has 

determined that future examination on an inpatient basis is not 

necessary for a determination that the person is gravely 

disabled.”7 The distinction between the two paragraphs reflects 

that those not in a county jail are entitled to remain on 

outpatient status if services can be effectively provided on a 

voluntary basis (see §§ 5150, subd. (c) [72-hour period], 5250, 

subd. (c) [14-day period], 5270.15, subd. (b) [30-day period]), 

even when a conservatorship is necessary.8

Under either paragraph of section 5352, the professional’s 

recommendation simply starts the conservatorship process. If 

the county’s investigative office agrees with the 

recommendation, it initiates court proceedings. (§ 5352.) The 

county then conducts a comprehensive investigation of available 

alternatives to conservatorship, examining “all relevant aspects 

of the person’s medical, psychological, financial, family, 

7

If an inpatient placement is necessary for a proper 

determination of grave disability, the detention process under 

chapter 2 may be initiated.

8 K.P. offers a different reading of section 5352. He asserts

the statute’s second paragraph merely provides an alternate 

mechanism for outpatient recommendations and does not alter 

the substantive standards set forth in the first paragraph. In 

particular, he contends the first paragraph’s requirements 

should be incorporated into the second paragraph. This 

interpretation is contradicted by the statutory language, which 

clearly establishes only two requirements for an outpatient 

recommendation and does not reference or incorporate the first 

paragraph’s inpatient recommendation requirements. More 

importantly, as will be discussed, nothing in section 5352 

evinces a legislative intent to incorporate the guidelines for a 

treatment provider’s initiation of conservatorship proceedings 

into the factual findings required to impose a conservatorship.
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

11

vocational, and social condition, and information obtained from 

the person’s family members, close friends, social worker, or 

principal therapist.” (§ 5354, subd. (a).) After this 

investigation, the county is empowered to “recommend 

conservatorship to the court only if no suitable alternatives are 

available.” (Ibid.) A conservator may then be appointed if the

person is found to be gravely disabled as a result of a mental 

health disorder. (§ 5350.)

Proposed conservatees have the right to a jury trial to 

determine whether they are gravely disabled. (§ 5350, 

subd. (d)(1).) The determination must be unanimous and upon 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (Conservatorship of Early

(1983) 35 Cal.3d 244, 248 (Early); Conservatorship of Roulet

(1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 235 (Roulet).) If grave disability is found, 

the court appoints a conservator (§ 5350), imposes disabilities 

on the conservatee as needed (§ 5357), and determines the least 

restrictive appropriate placement (§ 5358, subd. (a)(1)(A)). The 

conservatee’s home, or that of a relative, is to be given first 

priority, as an alternative to confinement. (§ 5358, subd. (c)(1).) 

A conservatorship automatically ends after one year and may be 

reestablished only by a new petition (§ 5361), subject to the 

same jury trial rights (see § 5350, subd. (d); Roulet, at pp. 225–

226; Baber v. Superior Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 955, 959).

The court must terminate a conservatorship before the 

one-year period expires, however, if a progress review 

determines that “the goals [of treatment] have been reached and 

the person is no longer gravely disabled.” (§ 5352.6, 2d par.) In 

addition to the right to appeal the judgment imposing 

conservatorship, conservatees may twice petition for rehearing 

on their status as a conservatee. (§ 5364.) At such a rehearing, 

petitioners need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
Conservatorship of K.P.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

12

that they are no longer gravely disabled. (John L., supra, 48 

Cal.4th at p. 152.) A conservatee’s willingness or ability to 

accept voluntary treatment is not a basis for rehearing (see 

§ 5364) or for an early conservatorship termination (see 

§ 5352.6).

If a conservatorship is still needed at the end of the oneyear term, the conservator may petition for reappointment. 

(§ 5361.) Such a petition must include the opinion of two 

physicians, or other described professionals, “that the 

conservatee is still gravely disabled as a result of mental 

disorder or impairment by chronic alcoholism.” (Id., 1st par.) 

Section 5361 focuses on grave disability alone and makes no 

mention of the conservatee’s amenability to voluntary 

treatment. A “reestablishment hearing is conducted according 

to the same rules that govern the initial establishment of a 

conservatorship. [Citations.] The state has the burden to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the conservatee remains gravely 

disabled.” (Conservatorship of Deidre B. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 

1306, 1312; see § 5350, subd. (d)(3).)

B. Statutory Analysis

Reading chapter 3’s provisions together, it is clear the Act 

requires consideration of willingness or ability to accept 

voluntary treatment only when a professional recommends the

initiation of conservatorship proceedings for a person who is 

currently being treated as an inpatient (§ 5352) or is subject to 

a Probate Code conservatorship (§ 5350.5). Applicable 

provisions do not mention such a requirement for outpatient 

recommendations (see § 5352) or for reappointment petitions 

(see § 5361).
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

13

Nor does the Act make amenability to voluntary treatment 

an issue that must be separately decided at trial. Section 5350 

authorizes the court to appoint a conservator “for a person who 

is gravely disabled as a result of a mental health disorder.” (See 

also § 5361 [authorizing reappointments].) It grants “the right 

to demand a court or jury trial on the issue of whether [the 

subject] is gravely disabled.” (§ 5350, subd. (d)(1), italics added; 

see also § 5352.1 [temporary conservatorship].) Section 5350 

thus expressly limits conservatorship trials to the issue of grave 

disability. It does not mention whether the proposed 

conservatee is willing or able to accept treatment voluntarily. 

This subject is also absent from the statutory definition of 

“gravely disabled,” which considers only whether the “person, as 

a result of a mental health disorder, is unable to provide for his 

or her basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter.” 

(§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A); see § 5350, subd. (e)(1).)9 Read 

together, sections 5350 and 5008 establish only two 

requirements for the creation of a conservatorship: (1) The 

subject has a mental health disorder; and (2) as a result of the 

disorder, the subject is unable to meet basic survival needs.

The Legislature amended section 5350 in 1989 to clarify 

that there is no grave disability if a proposed conservatee can 

survive safely with the assistance of responsible friends, family 

members, or others willing and able to help meet these basic 

9

It should be recalled, however, that those potentially 

subject to conservatorship will often have been found unwilling 

or unable to accept treatment by the professional initially 

recommending conservatorship (§ 5352) and as part of the 

involuntary detention process (see §§ 5150, subd. (c), 5250, 

subd. (c), 5270.15, subd. (a)), in which the determination is 

subject to habeas corpus review (§ 5275).
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

14

needs. (See § 5350, subd. (e), as amended by Stats. 1989, 

ch. 999, § 2, p. 3484.) Notably, the modification did not amend 

section 5350, or any other provision of the Act, to require 

separate findings on a person’s amenability to voluntary 

treatment as a prerequisite to imposition of a conservatorship. 

Theoretically, someone who is willing and able to accept 

voluntary treatment may not be gravely disabled if that 

treatment will allow the person to meet the needs for food, 

clothing, and shelter. Under the statutory scheme, however, 

this is an evidentiary conclusion to be drawn by the trier of fact. 

If credible evidence shows that a proposed conservatee is willing 

and able to accept treatment that would allow them to meet 

basic survival needs, the fact finder may conclude a reasonable 

doubt has been raised on the issue of grave disability, and the 

effort to impose a conservatorship may fail. It may be necessary 

in some cases for the fact finder to determine whether the 

treatment a proposed conservatee is prepared to accept will 

sufficiently empower them to meet basic survival needs. In 

some cases of severe dementia or mental illness, there may 

simply be no treatment that would enable the person to “survive 

safely in freedom.” (Early, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 255; see 

Conservatorship of Symington (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1464, 1467

(Symington).)10 As a practical matter, evidence about 

amenability to voluntary treatment will generally be in the 

proposed conservatee’s own hands. Placing a burden on 

10 K.P. has presented no evidence or argument suggesting he 

was willing to submit to inpatient treatment. Generally, the 

relevant question in a conservatorship trial is whether the 

proposed conservatee is able to “survive safely in freedom,” 

either alone or with the willing help of others. (Early, supra, 35 

Cal.3d at p. 255, italics added.)
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

15

counties “to negate all reasonable doubts as to the possible 

existence of” a treatment the person might voluntarily accept 

would be counter-productive and potentially contrary to the 

goals of the Act. (Early, at p. 254.)11

Our reading of the statutes is consistent with statements 

in a number of conservatorship cases observing that the “only” 

question at trial is whether the proposed conservatee is unable 

to provide for essential needs due to a mental illness. (Roulet, 

supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 232; Conservatorship of P.D., supra, 21 

Cal.App.5th at p. 1168; see Conservatorship of Jesse G. (2016) 

248 Cal.App.4th 453, 460–461.) However, K.P. points to other 

cases to support a contrary conclusion. We now address these 

arguments.

C. K.P.’s Argument and Reliance on Contrary Authority

In support of his position that inability or unwillingness 

to accept voluntary treatment must be separately proven at 

trial, K.P. points to a single statutory provision and early cases 

construing it. He cites section 5352, which, as noted, requires a

professional determination of such inability or unwillingness 

before the professional recommends conservatorship for a 

11 Similarly, a person who can survive safely with the 

responsible help of others is not gravely disabled. If proper 

evidence of such assistance is presented, the county must prove 

that the assistance would not enable the proposed conservatee 

to survive safely without involuntary detention. But the 

county’s burden on this topic extends only to assistance put at 

issue by the evidence. Section 5350, subdivision (e)(2) requires 

that, “unless they specifically indicate in writing their 

willingness and ability to help, family, friends, or others shall 

not be considered willing or able to provide this help.” The mere 

possibility of assistance from others is not sufficient to defeat a 

conservatorship.
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

16

person receiving inpatient treatment. As explained above, this 

reliance is misplaced. By its terms, section 5352 speaks only to 

a professional decision to recommend that a conservatorship be 

established. That recommendation, if accepted, is followed by a 

structured investigation that may culminate in a trial on grave 

disability and, if a conservatorship is imposed, on the court’s 

determination whether confinement is necessary.

K.P. relies on two cases from the 1980s that held

resistance to voluntary treatment is an additional element that 

must be proven before conservatorship can be imposed. 

Conservatorship of Davis (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 313 (Davis) was

a public guardian’s appeal from a finding that the proposed 

conservatee was not gravely disabled. The trial court had given

a special instruction at Davis’s request stating, “ ‘before you may 

consider whether Mary Davis is gravely disabled you must first 

find that she is, as a result of a mental disorder, unwilling or 

unable to accept treatment for that mental disorder on a 

voluntary basis.’ ” (Id. at p. 319.) It also gave a special 

instruction directing that the jury could not find Davis gravely 

disabled if she was capable of surviving safely with the help of 

willing family members. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal concluded 

it was not error to give these instructions. (Id. at p. 329.) It

attempted to harmonize the various conservatorship statutes by 

concluding that any trial on conservatorship encompassed 

review of all preceding steps, including initiation (§ 5352) and 

investigation (§ 5354). “Thus, although section 5350 states that 

the issue at trial is ‘whether [the person] is gravely disabled,’ ” 

the court reasoned, “it appears from a reading of the entire act 

that this phrase must be broadly construed to include the 

determination of whether the establishment of a 

conservatorship is necessary in light of all the relevant facts.” 
Conservatorship of K.P.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

17

(Davis, at p. 323.) Drawing on considerations in sections 5352 

and 5354, Davis concluded the LPS statutes “necessarily require 

the trier of fact . . . to determine the question of grave disability, 

not in a vacuum, but in the context of suitable alternatives, upon 

a consideration of the willingness and capability of the proposed 

conservatee to voluntarily accept treatment and upon 

consideration of whether the nondangerous individual is 

capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the 

help of willing and responsible family members, friends or other 

third parties.” (Davis, at p. 325.)12

Two years later, we approved one of the Davis holdings: 

that grave disability cannot be established if the person can 

safely survive with the capable assistance of others. (Early, 

supra, 35 Cal.3d 244.) That holding was consistent with United 

States Supreme Court precedent that a state “ ‘cannot 

constitutionally confine . . . a nondangerous individual who is 

capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the 

help of willing and responsible family members or friends.’ ” (Id.

at pp. 251–252, quoting O’Connor v. Donaldson (1975) 422 U.S. 

563, 576.)

12 The Davis decision was essentially followed in 

Conservatorship of Baber (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 542, which 

involved similar instructions. Although it approved the 

instructions in principle, however, Baber found error in the 

voluntary assistance instruction’s phrasing because it asked 

only if the proposed conservatee was “unwilling” to accept 

voluntary treatment, not whether he was “ ‘unwilling or 

unable’ ” to do so. (Id. at p. 552, italics omitted.) Thus, a verdict 

of no grave disability would have been required if the jury found 

merely that Baber was willing to accept treatment, even if he 

were incapable of doing so. (Ibid.)
Conservatorship of K.P.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

18

Early concluded this constitutional principle had been 

incorporated into the LPS Act (Early, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 252) 

and reasoned that section 5008’s definition of grave disability 

“was intended to encompass a consideration of whether the 

person could provide these basic needs with or without the 

assistance of willing and responsible family members, friends, 

or other third parties.” (Early, at p. 254.) The principle was 

later codified by legislative amendment of section 5350. (See 

§ 5350, subd. (e), as amended by Stats. 1989, ch. 999, § 2, 

p. 3484.) Notably, however, Early stopped short of imposing a 

potentially “insuperable” burden on public guardians “to negate 

all reasonable doubts as to the possible existence of third party 

aid.” (Early, at p. 254.) Early held only that the trier of fact 

“must consider the availability of third party assistance” on the 

issue of grave disability “if credible evidence of such assistance 

is adduced” at trial, and that an instruction regarding this 

evidence must be given upon the proposed conservatee’s request 

if the case is tried to a jury. (Ibid., italics added.) Of course, the 

burden of proof remains on the public guardian. If a proposed 

conservatee chooses to produce evidence on this topic, the 

question is whether any such evidence casts the issue of grave 

disability into reasonable doubt.

Early did not address Davis’s related holding about a 

voluntary treatment element. Although the trial court had 

refused to give an instruction like the one in Davis, requiring a 

finding on voluntary treatment before consideration of grave 

disability, we did not decide whether that refusal was erroneous

because the evidence showed Early had consistently refused 

treatment for his disorder. (Early, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 255–

256.) Nevertheless, there are parallels between the third party 

assistance considered in Early and acquiescence to voluntary 
Conservatorship of K.P.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

19

treatment, in that treatment professionals may provide 

assistance that enables a person to meet survival needs. As we 

held with regard to third party assistance in Early, evidence of 

a proposed conservatee’s amenability to voluntary treatment is 

relevant and should generally be admitted for the fact finder’s 

consideration. (See id. at p. 254; see also Davis, supra, 124 

Cal.App.3d at p. 325.) Such evidence will defeat a 

conservatorship if it raises a reasonable doubt about whether 

the person is gravely disabled.

K.P. also relies on Conservatorship of Walker (1987) 196 

Cal.App.3d 1082 (Walker). There, the jury was instructed: “ ‘If 

you find that John Thomas Walker can survive safely in freedom 

by himself or with the help of this available, willing and 

responsible family member, friend or other third party and that 

John Thomas Walker is willing and capable of accepting 

voluntary treatment, then you must find that John Thomas 

Walker is not gravely disabled.’ ” (Id. at p. 1091, italics 

omitted.) The Court of Appeal found fault with this instruction. 

(Id. at p. 1092.) Relying on section 5352 and Davis, it held that

a conservatorship may be established only upon proof of both

grave disability, as defined in section 5008, and unwillingness 

or inability to accept voluntary treatment. (Walker, at pp. 1092–

1093.) Because Davis established that a “proposed conservatee 

has the right to have a jury determine all the issues relevant to 

the establishment of the conservatorship” (Walker, at p. 1092, 

citing Davis, supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at p. 324), the court 

reasoned: “The jury should determine if the person voluntarily 

accepts meaningful treatment, in which case no conservatorship 

is necessary. If the jury finds the person will not accept 

treatment, then it must determine if the person can meet his 

basic needs on his own or with help, in which case a 
Conservatorship of K.P.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

20

conservatorship is not justified.” (Walker, at pp. 1092–1093.) 

Because the instruction at issue allowed Walker’s jury to reject 

conservatorship only if it found that Walker was both capable of 

meeting his basic needs and willing and able to accept voluntary 

treatment, the court held it was erroneous. (Id. at p. 1093.)

As K.P. acknowledges, other cases have declined to follow

Davis and Walker. The first, Symington, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d 

1464, involved a bench trial. The trial court found the proposed 

conservatee gravely disabled and observed that it was 

unnecessary to decide in addition whether she was willing or 

able to accept voluntary treatment. (Id. at p. 1466.) Symington 

challenged the absence of this finding on appeal, asserting that 

grave disability “ ‘by definition includes an unwillingness and/or 

inability on the part of the proposed conservatee to voluntarily 

accept treatment for the mental disorder . . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 1467.) 

The Court of Appeal expressed doubt that a finding of 

unwillingness or inability to accept treatment was required, 

explaining that this language is not found elsewhere in the 

conservatorship statutes but only in section 5352, a provision

“apparently designed to allow treatment facilities to initiate 

conservatorship proceedings at the time a patient is accepted 

where the individual may prove uncooperative. It appears to 

have been enacted for that limited purpose, not as an additional 

element to be proved to establish the conservatorship itself.” 

(Symington, at p. 1467.) The court concluded section 5352’s 

reference to unwillingness or inability to accept voluntary 

treatment “is not intended to be a legal term, but is a standard 

by which mental health professionals determine whether a 

conservatorship is necessary.” (Symington, at p. 1468.) 

Sensitive to the facts of the case before it, which involved an 

octogenarian with severe intellectual and memory impairment 
Conservatorship of K.P.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

21

from senile dementia (id. at p. 1466), the court observed that 

“many gravely disabled individuals are simply beyond 

treatment. Under the interpretation of the statutory scheme 

urged upon us, they presumably could not be the subject of an 

LPS Act conservatorship at all.” (Id. at p. 1467.)

The issue did not resurface for 30 years, until K.P.’s appeal

here and Conservatorship of D.P. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 794, 

review granted and held February 11, 2020. In both cases, the 

juries were given a version of CACI No. 4000 that did not 

include unwillingness or inability to accept voluntary treatment 

as a required element for conservatorship. (D.P., at p. 799; 

Conservatorship of K.P., supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 263.)13 

However, both juries were also given a modified version of CACI 

No. 4002, which explained that they could consider willingness 

or ability to accept voluntary treatment in deciding whether the 

proposed conservatees were gravely disabled. (D.P., at p. 799; 

K.P., at p. 263.) On appeal, the courts determined these 

instructions accurately reflected the law. The court here found 

Symington’s reasoning persuasive and agreed that section 5352 

does not require additional proof. (K.P., at p. 268.) The Court 

of Appeal in D.P. also agreed with Symington’s statutory 

analysis. (D.P., at pp. 802–803.) It further noted that 

section 5352 does not apply to reappointment petitions, and the 

applicable statute requires only a finding that the person 

“ ‘remains gravely disabled.’ ” (D.P., at p. 804; see § 5352.)

13 The Judicial Council’s form instruction for CACI No. 4000 

includes this requirement in brackets. A use note explains, with 

citations to Symington, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at page 1467 and 

Davis, supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at page 328, that “[t]here is a split 

of authority as to whether element 3 is required.” (Use Note to 

CACI No. 4000 (2020) p. 976.)
Conservatorship of K.P.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

22

Thus, even if a finding about amenability to voluntary 

treatment were required in the initial appointment of a 

conservator, there was no statutory basis for imposing it in 

reappointment proceedings. (D.P., at pp. 803–804.)

We agree with these recent decisions that Davis and 

Walker are not persuasive as to the role that acceptance of 

voluntary treatment appropriately plays in a conservatorship 

trial. As in Early, Davis was partially correct to the extent it 

held a trier of fact may consider a proposed conservatee’s 

openness to treatment when evaluating whether the constraints 

of conservatorship are necessary under all attendant 

circumstances. Naturally, a trier of fact can consider all 

relevant evidence, which is defined as that “having any tendency 

in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of 

consequence to the determination of the action.” (Evid. Code, 

§ 210.) Evidence that a person is willing and able to accept 

meaningful treatment is certainly relevant to the ultimate 

question whether a conservatorship is necessary. But there is a 

difference between relevant evidence and the elements that 

must be proven to determine an action. In a conservatorship 

trial, the only elements that must be proven are that the person 

(1) suffers from a mental health disorder that (2) renders him or 

her gravely disabled. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5350.) Evidence 

bearing on the person’s ability and willingness to accept 

treatment may assist the fact finder in resolving that question. 

But such willingness is neither an element that must be proven 

nor itself dispositive of the issue of grave disability.14 

14 In this way, amenability to treatment is similar to the role 

of motive in a homicide trial. Motive is not an element of any 

homicide offense; however, evidence of motive may be relevant 
Conservatorship of K.P.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

23

Particularly for those suffering from mental illness, openness to 

treatment may not be a fixed status. It may wax and wane 

depending on many variables, including medication status and 

the particulars of housing status or confinement. Evidence on 

the topic may also be disputed, or of varying degrees of 

persuasiveness. Early’s caution against imposing on public 

guardians the insuperable burden of disproving a negative is 

equally applicable here. (See Early, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 254.)

Thus, the Davis decision went too far to the extent it called 

for proof of an additional element not found in the statutory 

definition. Courts may not expand statutory language under the 

guise of interpretation. (In re Miller (1947) 31 Cal.2d 191, 199; 

see Code Civ. Proc., § 1858.) The Walker court strayed even 

further afield from the statutory framework. It endorsed a twostep procedure under which a jury would not even consider the 

issue of grave disability if it concluded the proposed conservatee 

was willing and able to accept treatment. (See Walker, supra, 

196 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1092–1093.) These cases did not have the 

benefit of the Legislature’s 1989 amendment of section 5350, 

which codified the holdings in Davis and Early on third party 

assistance but did not embrace the additional expansion Davis

suggested for amenability to voluntary treatment. They also 

upset the carefully calibrated statutory approach through which 

the Legislature has endeavored to protect both the mentally ill 

and the public, and to ensure that those in need can receive 

prompt, appropriate treatment tailored to their individual 

condition and circumstances. Conservatorship of Davis, supra, 

124 Cal.App.3d 313, Conservatorship of Walker, supra, 196 

to show the offender’s mental state, which is a required element. 

(See People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 740–742.)
Conservatorship of K.P.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

24

Cal.App.3d 1082, and Conservatorship of Baber, supra, 153 

Cal.App.3d 542 are therefore disapproved to the extent they are 

inconsistent with the decision here.

D. Due Process

Finally, even assuming the LPS Act does not require it, 

K.P. contends state and federal due process principles prohibit 

the appointment of a conservator unless the state can prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that the conservatee is unwilling or 

unable to accept treatment voluntarily.

“The liberty interests at stake in a conservatorship 

proceeding are significant.” (Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 540; 

see Roulet, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 228.) A conservatorship can 

result in involuntary confinement, which “ ‘ “entails a ‘massive 

curtailment of liberty’ in the constitutional sense.” ’ ” (Roulet, 

at p. 224.) A person found gravely disabled also faces 

stigmatization and the loss of personal rights like the freedom 

to drive, vote, enter contracts, and decide about medical 

treatment. (See Ben C., at p. 540; John L., supra, 48 Cal.4th at 

p. 150; see also § 5357.) This potential deprivation of liberty 

implicates due process concerns.

K.P. contends, “limiting the jury’s consideration to the sole 

issue of grave disability as defined by the statute would 

seriously infringe on the conservatee’s due process rights.” His 

argument takes an unduly narrow view of what “grave 

disability” means in a conservatorship trial. We agree that that 

the fact finder must be allowed to consider all credible evidence 

bearing on the issue of grave disability, including whether the 

person is capable of receiving voluntary treatment. A 

conservatorship is not be necessary if the mentally ill person is 

willing and able to accept specified, available treatment that 
Conservatorship of K.P.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

25

will enable the person to survive safely without involuntary 

detention. (See §§ 5008, 5350, subd. (e)(1).) The fact finder 

should be able to evaluate competent evidence of the person’s 

amenability to voluntary treatment, and a jury should receive 

appropriate instructions on how the evidence should be 

considered. But the question here is not just whether the fact

finder may consider evidence; it is whether due process requires 

that the state prove a proposed conservatee’s resistance to 

voluntary treatment as a separate element. We are not 

persuaded that the federal or state Constitutions require a 

separate finding on the voluntary treatment issue. 

K.P. has not explained why a proposed conservatee’s 

constitutional rights are not sufficiently protected by the fact

finder’s consideration of amenability to voluntary treatment in 

connection with grave disability, or why the state must instead 

be tasked with proving this issue separately. We have 

previously declined to create such a new requirement. Early

held that a person who can provide for basic survival needs with 

assistance from others is not gravely disabled. This holding was 

constitutionally required under United States Supreme Court 

precedent. (See Early, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 251–252, citing 

O’Connor v. Donaldson, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 576.) Yet, though 

Early concluded evidence of third party assistance could be 

considered by the fact finder when offered, it also observed that

“the burden of proving grave disability [as statutorily] defined 

could well become insuperable if those alleging such disability 

had to negate all reasonable doubts as to the possible existence 

of third party aid.” (Early, at p. 254.) 

Similar to third party assistance, the fact finder may 

conclude there is no grave disability if a person is both willing 

and able to accept treatment that will ensure basic survival 
Conservatorship of K.P.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

26

needs are met. Amenability to voluntary treatment is thus 

relevant to the ultimate question of grave disability. As in 

Early, we conclude evidence on the voluntary treatment issue is 

admissible for the fact finder’s consideration. But the 

Legislature has not made resistance to voluntary treatment a 

separate element to be proven by the state, nor does any 

constitutional precedent require that it do so. It has long been 

held that the gravely disabled standard is constitutionally 

sufficient to justify the imposition of a conservatorship. 

(Conservatorship of Chambers (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 277, 285.)

K.P. has not demonstrated that more is required.

E. Application

At the trial below, both the Public Guardian and K.P. 

presented evidence about K.P.’s willingness and ability to accept 

voluntary treatment. A psychologist explained that K.P.’s lack 

of insight into his schizophrenia would hinder his ability to 

continue with medications and therapy on a voluntary basis. 

The psychologist believed K.P. needed a conservator’s 

supervision to ensure he would take his medications 

consistently and correctly. K.P. confirmed this assessment 

when he testified. He denied having a mental illness and 

admitted he would not continue taking his medications if 

released from conservatorship. 

The court also gave appropriate instructions on how this 

evidence could be considered. After instructing on the Public 

Guardian’s obligation to prove that K.P. had a mental disorder 

and was gravely disabled as a result (CACI No. 4000), the court 

gave a modified version of CACI No. 4002 that specifically 

referenced K.P.’s willingness and ability to accept voluntary 

treatment. Because evidence on amenability to voluntary 
Conservatorship of K.P.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

27

treatment was properly admitted, and the jury was properly 

instructed on its relevance, there was no error. The jury’s 

finding of grave disability was sufficient to appoint a 

conservator.

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

CORRIGAN, J.

We Concur:

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

LIU, J.

CUÉLLAR, J.

KRUGER, J.

GROBAN, J.

JENKINS, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 

argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Conservatorship of K.P.

__________________________________________________________________

Procedural Posture (see XX below)

Original Appeal 

Original Proceeding 

Review Granted (published) XX 39 Cal.App.5th 254

Review Granted (unpublished) 

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S258212

Date Filed: June 28, 2021

__________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior 

County: Los Angeles 

Judge: Robert S. Harrison 

__________________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Christopher L. Haberman, under appointment by the Supreme Court,

and Christian C. Buckley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Objector and Appellant.

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Rosanne Wong and Joyce M. 

Aiello, Assistant County Counsel, Jose Silva, Principal Deputy County 

Counsel, and William C. Sias, Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner 

and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 

publication with opinion):

Christopher L. Haberman

Attorney at Law

P.O. Box 521

Visalia, CA 93279

(559) 384-0703

William C. Sias

Deputy County Counsel

500 West Temple St., Suite 648

Los Angeles, CA 90012

(213) 407-4947