J. A17038/19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

MIGUEL MALDONADO, : No. 323 EDA 2018

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, January 19, 2018,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0008023-2015

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 13, 2019

Miguel Maldonado appeals from the January 19, 2018 aggregate 

judgment of sentence of 12 to 25 years’ imprisonment, followed by 7 years’ 

probation, imposed after a jury found him guilty of rape, aggravated indecent 

assault, simple assault, and endangering the welfare of children – parent or 

guardian.

1

 After careful review, we affirm.

The lengthy factual history of this case was set forth by the trial court

in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion and need not be reiterated here. (See trial 

court opinion, 7/19/18 at 2-8.) In sum, appellant was convicted of the 

aforementioned offenses following his violent rape and physical assault of his 

ex-girlfriend while in the presence of their infant son.

 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(a)(1), 3125(a)(1), 2701(a)(1), and 4304(a)(1), 

respectively.
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Procedurally, a criminal complaint against [appellant] 

was filed on June 9, 2015. Police found and arrested 

[appellant] on June 25, 2015. The court then 

scheduled a preliminary hearing on July 7 (or 16), 

2015, and on that date the Commonwealth was 

prepared to proceed but [appellant] was never 

brought down [from custody]. The court then 

scheduled and held an Indicting Grand Jury [(“IGJ”)] 

hearing (where the case was held for court) on 

August 7, 2015, an arraignment on August 28, 2015,

a scheduling conference on September 11, 2015, and 

a 60-day IGJ discovery status hearing on April 12, 

2016. On all of those dates, Commonwealth was 

prepared to proceed.

The court then scheduled and held a pre-trial 

conference on June 20, 2016. A trial was scheduled 

for June 22, 2016 and the Commonwealth was 

prepared to proceed on that date, but defense 

requested a six-day continuance (conceded as 

excludable time, which changed the adjusted run date 

to June 15, 2016). At a status hearing six days later 

on June 28, 2016, [appellant] rejected a plea offer and 

so the court scheduled a trial status hearing for 

January 11, 2017. At the status hearing upon joint 

request for a continuance, the court scheduled a 

scheduling conference for January 19, 2017. On 

January 19, 2017, upon joint request for a 

continuance, the court scheduled a [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 600

motion hearing for September 11, 2017 and a trial 

date for September 12, 2017. On September 11, 

[2017,] the Court denied [appellant’s Rule] 600 

motion (but granted his motion to preclude late

discovery) and after a jury trial, [appellant] was found 

guilty of [the aforementioned offenses] on 

September 1[5], 2017.

Id. at 8-9.
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As noted, appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 12 to 

25 years’ imprisonment, followed by 7 years’ probation, on January 19, 2018. 

Appellant did not file any post-sentence motions. This timely appeal followed.2

Appellant raises the following issue for our review: 

Did not the trial court erroneously deny appellant’s 

motion to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A),

where appellant was tried well beyond the 

rundate [sic] and the Commonwealth did not establish 

due diligence, as it failed to provide discovery in a 

timely manner?

Appellant’s brief at 3.

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600 provides, in relevant part, 

that “[t]rial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the 

defendant shall commence within 365 days from the date on which the 

complaint is filed.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). The final day of that period is 

called the “mechanical run date.” Commonwealth v. Ramos, 936 A.2d 

1097, 1101 (Pa.Super. 2007) (en banc), appeal denied, 948 A.2d 803 (Pa. 

2008). If the proceedings are delayed for reasons enumerated in Rule 600, 

then such periods may be excluded from the computation of time at the trial 

court’s discretion, and the mechanical run date may be adjusted accordingly. 

See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1)-(3). If trial takes place beyond 365 days (plus 

excludable time as set forth in Rule 600(C)), then the defendant is entitled to 

dismissal with prejudice. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D)(1). 

 

2 The record reflects that appellant and the trial court have complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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Our standard of review of a trial court’s decision to deny a Rule 600 

motion is well settled.

In evaluating Rule [600] issues, our standard of 

review of a trial court’s decision is whether the trial 

court abused its discretion. Judicial discretion 

requires action in conformity with law, upon facts and 

circumstances judicially before the court, after 

hearing and due consideration. An abuse of discretion 

is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching 

a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied or the 

judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the 

result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown 

by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.

Commonwealth v. Leaner, 202 A.3d 749, 765-766 (Pa.Super. 2019) 

(citation omitted; brackets in original), appeal denied, 2019 WL 2754197 

(Pa. 2019).

In determining whether an accused’s right to a speedy 

trial has been violated, consideration must be given to 

society’s right to effective prosecution of criminal 

cases, both to restrain those guilty of crime and to 

deter those contemplating it. However, the 

administrative mandate of Rule 600 was not designed 

to insulate the criminally accused from good faith 

prosecution delayed through no fault of the 

Commonwealth.

So long as there has been no misconduct on the part 

of the Commonwealth in an effort to evade the 

fundamental speedy trial rights of an accused, 

Rule 600 must be construed in a manner consistent 

with society’s right to punish and deter crime. 

Ramos, 936 A.2d at 1100 (citation and brackets omitted).
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This court has recognized that the determination of whether Rule 600 

requires dismissal of charges against a defendant requires consideration of 

the following three factors:

First, Rule 600(A) provides the mechanical run date. 

Second, we determine whether any excludable time 

exists pursuant to Rule 600(C). We add the amount 

of excludable time, if any, to the mechanical run date 

to arrive at an adjusted run date.

If the trial takes place after the adjusted run date, we 

apply the due diligence analysis set forth in 

Rule 600([D]). As we have explained, Rule 600[] 

encompasses a wide variety of circumstances under 

which a period of delay was outside the control of the 

Commonwealth and not the result of the 

Commonwealth’s lack of diligence. Any such period of 

delay results in an extension of the run date. Addition 

of any Rule 600[] extensions to the adjusted run date 

produces the final Rule 600 run date. If the 

Commonwealth does not bring the defendant to trial 

on or before the final run date, the trial court must 

dismiss the charges.

Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 74 A.3d 228, 236 (Pa.Super. 2013) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted; brackets in original), 

affirmed, 107 A.3d 735 (Pa. 2014).

Due diligence is a fact-specific concept that must be 

determined on a case-by-case basis. Due diligence 

does not require perfect vigilance and punctilious 

care, but rather a showing by the Commonwealth that 

a reasonable effort has been put forth. Reasonable 

effort includes such actions as the Commonwealth 

listing the case for trial prior to the run date to ensure 

that [defendant] was brought to trial within the time 

prescribed by Rule [600].
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Commonwealth v. Staten, 950 A.2d 1006, 1010 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted). “This Court will find that the 

Commonwealth acted with due diligence if, prior to the expiration of the 

[mechanical] run date, the prosecutor indicates readiness to try the case and 

requests the earliest possible trial date[.]” Id. (citation omitted). 

In Commonwealth v. Mills, 162 A.3d 323 (Pa. 2017), our supreme 

court addressed when time is properly excluded for speedy trial purposes. The 

Mills court held that “time attributable to the normal progression of a case 

simply is not [an excludable period of] ‘delay’ for purposes of Rule 600.” Id.

at 325. The trial court must instead distinguish the “time necessary to 

ordinary trial preparation [from] judicial delay arising out of the court’s own 

scheduling concerns.” Id. Mills clearly stated that the time which passes in 

the “normal progression of a case” must be included in the Rule 600 

computation unless the Commonwealth can show it exercised due diligence 

during the period or the record establishes that the judiciary or the defense 

was responsible for the delay. Id.; Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C).

Here, appellant contends that “[n]o time other than the 6-day defense 

request [for a continuance] was excludable” and the “Commonwealth’s 

repeated failure to provide discovery constituted a lack of due diligence.”

(Appellant’s brief at 8-9.) Consequently, appellant avers, the trial court 

abused its discretion in denying his motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 600(A). 

(Id.) We disagree.
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As recognized by the trial court, the complaint against appellant was 

filed on June 9, 2015, and thus, the mechanical run date was 365 days later 

– on June 9, 2016. Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). Because appellant’s trial did 

not commence until September 12, 2017, the trial court was required to

examine whether any periods of excludable time existed, so as to create an 

adjusted run date. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C). The trial court properly found 

22 excludable days, which resulted in an adjusted run date of July 1, 2016, 

based on the following:

[Appellant] was in hiding at the time of the complaint 

and was not arrested until June 25, 2015, despite 

diligent attempts by the police to locate him. There 

was also a defense continuance from June 22, 2016 

to June 28, 2016. The adjusted run date is therefore 

twenty-two days later than June 9, 2016, on July 1, 

2016.

Trial court opinion, 7/19/18 at 12. 

Thereafter, the trial court engaged in a due-diligence analysis pursuant 

to Rule 600(D), concluding that the Commonwealth “was duly diligent 

throughout the pendency of th[is] case” and was “prepared to proceed at each 

listing.” (Id. at 11, 13.) The record supports a finding that the 438-day delay 

between July 1, 2016, the adjusted run date, and September 12, 2017, the 

first day of trial, were not attributable to the Commonwealth. Specifically, the 

trial court found that:

although the trial did not occur until September 12, 

2017, there was a significant amount of excusable 

time that sanctions this delay. There were no 

Commonwealth continuances at any time, and every 
J. A17038/19

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date set was due to court scheduling (which is not 

attributable to the Commonwealth). See Mills, 162 

A.3d at 325. [Appellant] acknowledged during the 

hearing that in “this case admittedly, there were no 

trial continuances, at least where the Commonwealth 

represented on the record to my knowledge that the 

complainant was unavailable.” The Commonwealth 

noted during the same hearing that “all of the time is 

excludable” and that “we were ready to go at every 

trial listing.” Since the Commonwealth did not fail to 

exercise due diligence during this time, it should be

omitted from the final Rule 600 computation.

There was an issue of whether the Commonwealth 

was truly ready for some of the court listings as 

[appellant] argued that they were still providing 

discovery two months before trial. The

Commonwealth addressed this issue and argued that 

“discovery is a continuing and an ongoing process”

and that it was the Commonwealth who had reached 

out to [appellant] to make sure that they had 

everything a month in advance of trial and provided 

additional information immediately upon 

request.[Footnote 1]

[Footnote 1] Although the court denied

[appellant’s Rule] 600 motion, it did grant 

[his] request to preclude the

Commonwealth’s most recent batch of 

shared discovery (consisting of interviews 

and possible testimony from an additional 

Commonwealth witness) from the trial as 

it had been shared less than a month 

before trial. 

Id. at 12-13 (citations to notes of testimony omitted).

Here, we can find no reason to disturb the trial court’s finding that the 

Commonwealth acted with sufficient due diligence in bringing appellant to trial

and, accordingly, discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court 

in this regard. We specifically note that, with regard to the judicial delay in 
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this case, it is well settled that “judicial delay can support the grant of an 

extension of the Rule 600 run date.” Commonwealth v. Trippett, 932 A.2d 

188, 197 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). This is particularly true where, 

as here, there is no indication that the trial court did not schedule the criminal 

proceedings at the earliest possible date consistent with the trial court’s 

business or that the Commonwealth contributed to the delay in any way. 

Based on the foregoing, we find that appellant’s Rule 600 challenge merits no 

relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/13/19