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GRIFFITH V. LG CHEM AMERICA

Cite as 315 Neb. 892

John Edward Griffith II and Christina M. Griffith, 

appellants, v. LG Chem America, Inc., and 

Shoemaker’s Truck Station, Inc., doing business 

as Shoemaker’s Shell Travel Center 

and E-Titan, LLC, appellees.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed February 9, 2024. No. S-22-840.

1. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. An appellate court affirms a 

lower court’s grant of summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted 

evidence show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts or 

as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from the facts and that 

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

2. ____: ____. An appellate court reviews the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the record in the light most favorable 

to the nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in that 

party’s favor.

3. Motions to Dismiss: Jurisdiction: Pleadings: Evidence. When a trial 

court relies solely on pleadings and supporting affidavits in ruling on a 

motion to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff need 

only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction to survive the motion. 

However, if the court holds an evidentiary hearing on the issue or 

decides the matter after trial, then the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.

4. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. An appellate court examines the question of whether the nonmoving party has established a prima facie case 

of personal jurisdiction de novo.

5. Motions to Dismiss: Appeal and Error. In reviewing the grant of a 

motion to dismiss, an appellate court must look at the facts in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve all factual conflicts 

in favor of that party.

6. Limitations of Actions: States. Nebraska has adopted the Uniform 

Conflict of Laws Limitations Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-3201 through 

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

02/09/2024 08:06 AM CST
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25-3207 (Reissue 2016). Under the act, if a claim is based on the substantive law of Nebraska, then Nebraska’s statute of limitations will 

apply. If a claim is substantively based upon the law of another state, 

however, then the limitation period of the other state will apply.

7. Courts: Jurisdiction: States. Before entangling itself in messy issues 

of conflict of laws, a court ought to satisfy itself that there actually is a 

difference between the relevant laws of the different states.

8. Jurisdiction: States. In conflict-of-law analysis, an actual conflict 

exists when a legal issue is resolved differently under the law of two 

states.

9. Torts: Appeal and Error. To resolve conflicts of law that sound in 

tort law, courts apply the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 

§ 146 (1971).

10. Jurisdiction: States. When there are no factual disputes regarding state 

contacts, conflict-of-law issues present questions of law.

11. Jurisdiction: Words and Phrases. Personal jurisdiction is the power of 

a tribunal to subject and bind a particular entity to its decisions.

12. Constitutional Law: Due Process: Jurisdiction. The Due Process 

Clause of the U.S. Constitution limits a state court’s power to exercise 

jurisdiction over a defendant. It protects an individual’s liberty interest 

in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he 

or she has established no meaningful contacts, ties, or relations.

13. Jurisdiction: States. The constitutional touchstone for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident is whether the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts in the forum state.

14. ____: ____. The minimum contacts requirement protects the defendant 

against litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum and ensures that 

states do not exceed the limits imposed by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.

15. Jurisdiction. There are two kinds of personal jurisdiction: general 

(sometimes called all-purpose) jurisdiction and specific (sometimes 

called case-linked) jurisdiction.

16. ____. A state court may exercise general jurisdiction only when a 

defendant is essentially at home in the state.

17. Jurisdiction: States. To be subject to specific personal jurisdiction of a 

state, a nonresident defendant must take some act by which it purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the 

forum state, and the plaintiff’s claims must arise out of or relate to the 

defendant’s contacts with the forum.

18. Due Process: Jurisdiction: States. The benchmark for determining if 

the exercise of personal jurisdiction satisfies due process is whether the 
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defendant’s minimum contacts with the forum state are such that the 

defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.

19. ____: ____: ____. The analysis of whether the defendant’s minimum 

contacts with the forum state are such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there is not simply mechanical or 

quantitative, but requires that a court consider the quality and nature 

of the defendant’s activities to ascertain whether the defendant has the 

necessary minimum contacts with the forum to satisfy due process.

20. Jurisdiction: Words and Phrases. For specific personal jurisdiction, 

there must be a substantial connection between the defendant’s contacts 

with the forum state and the operative facts of the litigation.

21. Jurisdiction: Time. The requisite minimum contacts must exist either 

at the time the cause of action arose, at the time the suit was filed, or 

within a reasonable period of time immediately prior to the filing of the 

lawsuit.

22. Jurisdiction: States. Contacts with the forum state unrelated to the 

action have no bearing on a specific personal jurisdiction analysis.

23. ____: ____. It is essential to personal jurisdiction that in each case there 

be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the 

privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking 

the benefits and protections of its laws.

24. ____: ____. There must be fair warning that a particular activity might 

subject the nonresident defendant to the jurisdiction of the foreign sovereign, giving a degree of predictability to the legal system by allowing 

potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them 

liable to suit.

25. ____: ____. Unilateral activity of a plaintiff who claims some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of 

contact with the forum state.

Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: Lori 

A. Maret, Judge. Affirmed.

Christopher P. Welsh, of Welsh & Welsh, P.C., L.L.O., for 

appellants.

Mark A. Fahleson, of Rembolt Ludtke, L.L.P., for appellee 

LG Chem America, Inc.

Matthew V. Rusch, of Erickson | Sederstrom, P.C., L.L.O., 

for appellee Shoemaker’s Truck Station, Inc.
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Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, 

Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

Miller-Lerman, J.

NATURE OF CASE

John Edward Griffith II purchased two lithium-ion 

rechargeable batteries at a Shoemaker’s Shell Travel Center 

store in Lincoln, Nebraska. Several months later, when he 

was at his home in Sharpsville, Pennsylvania, the batteries 

exploded and combusted in his pocket. John Griffith and his 

spouse, Christina M. Griffith, filed suit in the district court 

for Lancaster County, Nebraska, against LG Chem, Ltd., the 

lithium-ion batteries’ South Korean manufacturer and distributor; LG Chem America, Inc. (LGCAI), the manufacturer’s American distributor; Shoemaker’s Truck Station, Inc. 

(Shoemaker’s), the owners of the travel center; and E-Titan, 

LLC, the owners of an electronic cigarette kiosk from which 

the batteries were bought.

LG Chem was dismissed for lack of service. The district 

court determined, inter alia, that the Griffiths’ claims for negligence were not timely under Pennsylvania’s 2-year statute 

of limitations for personal injury actions and granted summary judgment and dismissed all claims against Shoemaker’s 

and E-Titan. Subsequently, the district court determined that 

it lacked personal jurisdiction over LGCAI and dismissed 

LGCAI. The Griffiths appeal. We affirm.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

John Griffith purchased two 18650 lithium-ion rechargeable battery cells (18650 batteries) on November 6, 2015, 

from an electronic cigarette kiosk that was owned and operated by E-Titan and that was located inside the travel center 

owned by Shoemaker’s. E-Titan is a Nebraska corporation 

with its principal place of business in Grand Island, Nebraska. 

Shoemaker’s is a Nebraska corporation with its principal 

place of business in Lincoln. The Griffiths allege that the 

18650 batteries were designed and manufactured by LG 
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Chem, a Korean corporation, and distributed by its American 

subsidiary, LGCAI.

On March 12, 2016, John Griffith was injured while replacing two 18650 batteries in his electronic cigarette. He was 

carrying the batteries in his pocket when they exploded and 

burst into flames, resulting in serious burns to his body and 

other permanent injuries.

On June 27, 2019, the Griffiths filed suit against LG 

Chem, LGCAI, Shoemaker’s, and E-Titan in Nebraska in the 

district court for Lancaster County. The Griffiths claimed 

negligence, products liability (defective design and manufacturing defect), breach of warranty, and loss of consortium 

by Christina Griffith. LG Chem was never served with summons in the district court and, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 25-217 (Reissue 2016), was dismissed as a matter of law in 

December 2019.

Motion For Summary Judgment Against 

Shoemaker’s and E-Titan.

Shoemaker’s and E-Titan moved for summary judgment 

on the basis that the Griffiths’ claims against them were 

time barred under the 2-year limitation period provided by a 

Pennsylvania statute of limitations regarding personal injury 

actions. See 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524(2) (West 

2019). In contrast, the Griffiths contended that Nebraska 

law applied and that their negligence claims were timely 

filed within Nebraska’s 4-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-207(3) and 

25-224(1) (Reissue 2016).

On October 29, 2020, the district court determined that there 

was an actual conflict between the laws of Pennsylvania and 

those of Nebraska. The court noted that the Griffiths’ negligence and loss of consortium claims would be barred under 

Pennsylvania law, but not under Nebraska law. It determined 

that the claims for negligence are substantively based on 

Pennsylvania law and that Pennsylvania, as the state where 
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the injuries occurred, has the dominant interest in the matter 

and the most significant relationship to the occurrence and 

the parties. The district court noted that with respect to the 

breach of warranty claims, the Griffiths conceded that there 

were no genuine issues of material fact regarding those claims 

as against Shoemaker’s and E-Titan. The court granted the 

motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims against 

Shoemaker’s and E-Titan based on the Pennsylvania 2-year 

statute of limitations.

Claims Against LGCAI and Challenge 

to Personal Jurisdiction.

In the complaint, the Griffiths alleged that the batteries were 

designed and manufactured by LG Chem, a Korean corporation, and its wholly owned and controlled subsidiary, LGCAI, 

a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in 

Atlanta, Georgia. The complaint alleged that LG Chem is one 

of the world’s leading manufacturers of lithium-ion rechargeable batteries. The Griffiths further alleged that LG Chem 

and LGCAI, either directly or indirectly or through a wholly 

owned subsidiary, were engaged in the business of designing, 

engineering, manufacturing, assembling, testing, inspecting, 

providing with warnings and instructions, labeling, marketing, 

distributing, selling, and otherwise putting into the stream of 

commerce lithium-ion rechargeable batteries that were purchased throughout the United States, including the State of 

Nebraska. These lithium-ion rechargeable batteries included 

the 18650 batteries that are the subject matter of the present 

case. The complaint alleged that LGCAI is one of the principal 

marketing, sales, and trading subsidiaries for LG Chem in the 

United States.

According to the record, LGCAI primarily sells and distributes various petrochemical materials and products, including ABS resin, engineered plastic, rubbers, acrylate, super 

absorbent polymer, and specialty polymers. LGCAI does not 

have any manufacturing plants, and its business is focused on 
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sales and distribution. LGCAI uses a warehouse in Nebraska 

to sell petrochemical materials and products but has never 

sold or distributed any 18650 batteries in Nebraska. LGCAI 

has never designed, manufactured, distributed, advertised, or 

sold any lithium-ion batteries for use by individual consumers 

as standalone, replaceable rechargeable batteries in electronic 

cigarettes or vaping devices. LGCAI has never conducted any 

business with Shoemaker’s or E-Titan and has never authorized Shoemaker’s or E-Titan to sell or distribute “LG-brand” 

lithium-ion batteries for any purpose.

In 2015, LGCAI had three customers located in Illinois or 

Texas for the purchase of lithium-ion batteries, such as the 

18650 batteries. When one of the customers issued a purchase 

order for lithium-ion batteries, LGCAI would purchase the 

product from LG Chem and then ship it directly to the customer. LGCAI would issue an invoice to the customer, collect 

payment from the customer, and pay LG Chem. LGCAI did 

not facilitate the sale of batteries to customers in Nebraska or 

facilitate the sale of batteries to individuals. LGCAI stopped 

facilitating the sale of batteries after May 2016.

LGCAI filed a special appearance and a motion to dismiss 

pursuant to Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. § 6-1112(b)(2) on the grounds 

that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over it. On 

October 17, 2022, after limited jurisdictional discovery and 

a hearing at which the court received affidavits accompanied 

by exhibits, the district court found that it lacked personal 

jurisdiction over LGCAI. The district court acknowledged 

that there was uncontroverted evidence that LGCAI rented 

warehouse space in Lincoln to store petrochemical products, 

LGCAI sold petrochemical products to at least two customers 

in Nebraska, and LGCAI’s logistics team visited the warehouse annually to check inventory. However, the district court 

found that these contacts were insufficient to confer general 

or special personal jurisdiction over LGCAI, because its dealings in Nebraska related only to its petrochemical products, 

not to the sale of 18650 batteries at issue in this case. LGCAI 
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does not have an office in Nebraska and has no relationship 

with other companies in Nebraska other than those concerning petrochemical sales.

The district court first determined that the Griffiths did 

not satisfy their burden of demonstrating that the court had 

general jurisdiction over LGCAI because LGCAI’s activities 

in the State of Nebraska are not substantial. With respect to 

specific jurisdiction, it found that LGCAI had not purposefully directed its activities to the residents of Nebraska or, 

through its actions, purposefully availed itself of the privilege 

of conducting activities in the state, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of Nebraska laws. The court concluded 

it lacked specific jurisdiction and could not exercise personal 

jurisdiction over LGCAI.

The Griffiths appeal.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

The Griffiths claim, summarized and restated, that the district court erred when it (1) applied the Pennsylvania statute 

of limitations and granted summary judgment in favor of 

Shoemaker’s and E-Titan on all claims and (2) dismissed 

LGCAI as a party for lack of personal jurisdiction.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

[1,2] An appellate court affirms a lower court’s grant of summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted evidence show 

that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts or as to 

the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from the facts and 

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Rose v. American Family Ins. Co., ante p. 302, 995 N.W.2d 650 

(2023). An appellate court reviews the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment de novo, viewing the record in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Id.

[3] When a trial court relies solely on pleadings and supporting affidavits in ruling on a motion to dismiss for want 

of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff need only make a prima 
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facie showing of jurisdiction to survive the motion. Central 

States Dev. v. Friedgut, 312 Neb. 909, 981 N.W.2d 573 (2022). 

However, if the court holds an evidentiary hearing on the issue 

or decides the matter after trial, then the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating personal jurisdiction by a preponderance 

of the evidence. Id.

[4] An appellate court examines the question of whether the 

nonmoving party has established a prima facie case of personal 

jurisdiction de novo. Id.

[5] In reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss, an appellate court must look at the facts in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party and resolve all factual conflicts in favor 

of that party. Id.

ANALYSIS

The Griffiths contend that the district court erred when it 

determined that claims against Shoemaker’s and E-Titan were 

time barred and granted the motion for summary judgment of 

Shoemaker’s and E-Titan. The Griffiths also claim the district 

court erred when it dismissed claims against LGCAI for lack 

of personal jurisdiction. As discussed below, we find no merit 

to these contentions and affirm the rulings of the district court 

with respect to both issues raised in this appeal.

The District Court Did Not Err When It Granted Summary 

Judgment in Favor of Shoemaker’s and E-Titan With 

Respect to Negligence and Loss of Consortium 

and Dismissed Claims Against Them.

The Griffiths claim that the district court erred when it 

applied Pennsylvania’s 2-year statute of limitations for negligence, 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524(2), and 

determined that the Griffiths’ negligence and loss of consortium claims against Shoemaker’s and E-Titan were time 

barred. The district court granted summary judgment in favor 

of Shoemaker’s and E-Titan and dismissed claims against 

them. The Griffiths do not contest the portion of the order 

that granted summary judgment in favor of Shoemaker’s and 
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E-Titan on their breach of warranty claims; only the rulings 

regarding negligence and loss of consortium are before us in 

this appeal.

[6] Nebraska has adopted the Uniform Conflict of Laws 

Limitations Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-3201 through 25-3207 

(Reissue 2016). Under the act, if a claim is based on the 

substantive law of Nebraska, then Nebraska’s statute of limitations will apply. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-3203(1)(b). If a 

claim is substantively based upon the law of another state, 

however, then the limitation period of the other state will 

apply, including the other state’s relevant statutes and rules 

governing tolling and accrual for computing the limitation 

period. See §§ 25-3203(1)(a) and 25-3204. We agree with 

the district court that the Griffiths’ negligence-related claims 

against Shoemaker’s and E-Titan are substantively based on 

Pennsylvania law and were barred by the 2-year limitation period provided by 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. 

§ 5524(2).

[7,8] We have stated that “before entangling itself in messy 

issues of conflict of laws, a court ought to satisfy itself that 

there actually is a difference between the relevant laws of 

the different states.” In re Estate of Greb, 288 Neb. 362, 375, 

848 N.W.2d 611, 622 (2014). An actual conflict exists when a 

legal issue is resolved differently under the law of two states. 

O’Brien v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 298 Neb. 109, 903 N.W.2d 

432 (2017).

The parties submit, and we agree, that an actual conflict 

exists between the laws of Nebraska and Pennsylvania in this 

case. Pennsylvania limits actions involving personal injury to 

those filed within 2 years after the cause of action accrues. 

See 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524(2). In contrast, 

Nebraska requires that personal injury actions be brought 

within 4 years of the accrual of the cause of action. See 

§§ 25-207(3) and 25-224(1). Because the Griffiths filed this 

suit on June 27, 2019, more than 2 years after John Griffith 

was injured on March 12, 2016, an actual conflict arises 
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because the negligence claims that would have been timely 

under Nebraska law would be barred under Pennsylvania law.

[9] When, as here, the action in which the conflict of law 

arises sounds in tort law and alleges personal injury caused 

negligently, we apply the general rule from the Restatement 

(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 146 at 430 (1971) that “the 

local law of the state where the injury occurred determines 

the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to 

the particular issue, some other state has a more significant 

relationship.” The question of whether some other state has a 

more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties 

will depend largely on whether some other state has a greater 

interest in the determination of the particular issue than the 

state where the injury occurred. Restatement, supra, § 146, 

comment c.

The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 at 

414 (1971) sets forth what we have called the “most significant relationship” test to determine whether a state other 

than the one where the injury occurred has a more significant 

relationship to the occurrence and the parties. See O’Brien v. 

Cessna Aircraft Co., supra; Restatement (Second) of Conflict 

of Laws § 6(2) (1971). Under the most significant relationship test, the factors, or contacts, are “to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular 

issue” and include: (a) the place where the injury occurred; 

(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; 

(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties; and (d) the place 

where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. 

Restatement, supra, § 145(2) at 414. We have emphasized 

that under the most significant relationship test, courts should 

not assign each contact equal weight and employ a mechanical approach. See O’Brien v. Cessna Aircraft Co., supra. The 

significance of each contact analyzed in § 145(2) is evaluated 

according to the following principles relevant to the applicable rule of law:
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(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,

(b) the relevant policies of the forum,

(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and 

the relative interests of those states in the determination 

of the particular issue,

(d) the protection of justified expectations,

(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field 

of law,

(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and

(g) ease in the determination and application of the law 

to be applied.

Restatement, supra, § 6(2) at 10. With tort claims, the more 

relevant principles under § 6(2) tend to be subsections (a), 

(b), (c), and (g). Restatement, supra, § 145, comment b. See 

Malena v. Marriott International, 264 Neb. 759, 651 N.W.2d 

850 (2002).

The district court noted that there is no dispute in the record 

that John Griffith was injured in Pennsylvania at his residence 

while using 18650 batteries. In accordance with the presumption that the law of the place of injury applies, the district 

court placed greater significance on the contact between the 

injury and Pennsylvania. See Restatement, supra, §§ 145(2)(a) 

and 146.

The district court next considered the remaining contacts 

under § 145(2). With respect to the second consideration, 

it found that that neither Pennsylvania nor Nebraska had a 

particularly significant relationship with the conduct that 

caused the injury, which it determined was the place where 

the allegedly defective batteries were designed, marketed, 

or manufactured. The Griffiths claim that the 18650 batteries were sold out of E-Titan’s kiosk at Shoemaker’s travel 

center in Nebraska, but there is no evidence that the 18650 

batteries were designed and manufactured in Nebraska or 

by Shoemaker’s or E-Titan. The complaint alleged that the 

18650 batteries were designed and manufactured by LG 

Chem, a Korean corporation with its principal executive 
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offices in South Korea, and LG Chem’s American subsidiary, 

LGCAI. The 18650 batteries exploded when John Griffith 

placed them in his pocket in Pennsylvania, causing them to 

come into contact with each other.

With respect to the third consideration, i.e., the importance 

of the parties’ domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business, the district court found that 

Griffiths’ residence in Pennsylvania could be grouped with 

the place of injury and was particularly likely to be the state 

of applicable law. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 

Laws § 145, comment e. (1971).

Analyzing the fourth factor in § 145(2), the district court 

noted that before the batteries exploded and John Griffith was 

injured, the parties lacked any prior relationship, as is often 

typical with cases of personal injuries resulting from alleged 

defective products. See, e.g., Crisman v. Cooper Industries, 

748 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. App. 1988).

Finally, the district court balanced the above factors with 

the principles of conflicts of law and the policies of the 

forum state and the other interested state, and their interests in determining the particular issues in the case. See 

Restatement, supra, § 6. The court observed that Nebraska’s 

only contact with the events giving rise to this case was 

the purchase of the 18650 batteries. The district court noted 

that Pennsylvania’s contacts are more substantial than those 

of Nebraska. Pennsylvania was the state where the product 

was being used at the time of the injury, the state where the 

injury occurred, and the state where the Griffiths had a settled 

relationship as residents. See Restatement, supra, § 146, comment e. (explaining that law where injury occurred is more 

likely to apply when injured person has settled relationship to 

that state).

Each state has a policy interest in applying its tort rules to 

personal injury claims by residents who were injured within 

its borders. See, Malena v. Marriott International, supra; 

Restatement, supra, § 145 comment c. However, state tort 
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rules that limit liability are entitled to the same consideration 

in the choice-of-law process as other states’ rules that impose 

liability. Malena v. Marriott International, supra. Numerous 

contacts in this case support Pennsylvania’s strong interest in 

applying its tort rules, including its statute of limitations, to 

the Griffiths’ personal injury action that, as we have noted, 

was based on an incident occurring in Pennsylvania to one of 

its residents. We agree with the district court’s determination 

that Pennsylvania has the dominant interest in this matter and 

has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and 

the parties. Having found the claim was substantively based 

in Pennsylvania, the district court found Pennsylvania law 

should be applied. See § 25-3203(1)(a).

[10] When there are no factual disputes regarding state contacts, conflict-of-law issues present questions of law. Johnson 

v. United State Fidelity & Guar. Co., 269 Neb. 731, 696 

N.W.2d 431 (2005). There are no facts in dispute on the issue 

of the limitation period applicable to the Griffiths’ personal 

injury claims against Shoemaker’s and E-Titan in this case. 

After reviewing the evidence in the record in a light most 

favorable to the Griffiths, and applying the Restatement factors set forth above, we reject the Griffiths’ argument that 

Nebraska has the dominant interest in the determination of the 

statute of limitations issue.

We agree with the district court that the significant contacts 

between Pennsylvania and the Griffiths and their injuries favor 

applying Pennsylvania law. Applying the Pennsylvania 2-year 

statute of limitations provided by 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. 

Ann. § 5524(2), the Griffiths’ claims were untimely filed and 

are time barred. The district court did not err when it granted 

summary judgment in favor of Shoemaker’s and E-Titan and 

dismissed them on this basis.

The District Court Correctly Ruled That It Lacked 

Personal Jurisdiction Over LGCAI.

LGCAI filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. § 6-1112(b)(2). The district 
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court sustained the motion and dismissed LGCAI. The Griffiths 

claim the district court erred in so ruling; we disagree.

The Griffiths contend that the district court disregarded 

certain activities by LGCAI that established specific personal jurisdiction. As we explain below, the Griffiths failed to 

carry their burden to establish contacts between Nebraska and 

LGCAI that sufficiently relate to their suit.

[11] We begin by setting forward the applicable principles 

of law. Personal jurisdiction is the power of a tribunal to subject and bind a particular entity to its decisions. Wheelbarger 

v. Detroit Diesel, 313 Neb. 135, 983 N.W.2d 134 (2023). 

Nebraska’s long-arm statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-536 (Reissue 

2016), confers personal jurisdiction over nonresidents to the 

fullest extent constitutionally permitted, so we must determine whether LGCAI had sufficient minimum contacts with 

Nebraska so that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would 

not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See Wheelbarger v. Detroit Diesel, supra.

[12-14] The Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution 

limits a state court’s power to exercise jurisdiction over a 

defendant. See Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. 

Court, ___ U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 209 L. Ed. 2d 225 

(2021). It protects an individual’s liberty interest in not being 

subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he 

or she has established no meaningful contacts, ties, or relations. Wheelbarger v. Detroit Diesel, supra. The constitutional 

touchstone for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident is 

whether the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts in the forum state. Id. The minimum contacts requirement protects the defendant against litigating in a distant or 

inconvenient forum and ensures that states do not exceed the 

limits imposed by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system. Id.

[15,16] There are two kinds of personal jurisdiction: “general (sometimes called all-purpose) jurisdiction and specific 

(sometimes called case-linked) jurisdiction.” Ford Motor Co. 
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v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 141 S. Ct. at 1024. See 

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 

915, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 180 L. Ed. 2d 796 (2011). A state court 

may exercise general jurisdiction only when a defendant is 

“‘essentially at home’” in the state. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. 

Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 141 S. Ct. at 1024. For a corporation, its place of incorporation and principal place of business 

ordinarily establish general jurisdiction. Id. The Griffiths do 

not claim that Nebraska may exercise general jurisdiction 

over LGCAI. In any event, general jurisdiction is not supported by the record that shows, inter alia, that LGCAI is 

incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business 

in Atlanta.

[17] Specific jurisdiction (the only type at issue in this case) 

covers defendants less intimately connected with a state, but 

only as to a narrower class of claims. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. 

Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, supra. Specific jurisdiction “is 

different” from general jurisdiction and can be exerted over a 

defendant only in a particular case. Id., 141 S. Ct. at 1024. As 

discussed below, to be subject to specific personal jurisdiction, 

a nonresident defendant must take some act by which it purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities 

within the forum state, and the plaintiff’s claims must arise 

out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum. 

Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, supra. 

In other words, there must be an affiliation between the forum 

and the underlying controversy. Wheelbarger v. Detroit Diesel, 

313 Neb. 135, 983 N.W.2d 134 (2023). See Ford Motor Co. v. 

Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, supra.

[18-20] We have said that the benchmark for determining 

if the exercise of personal jurisdiction satisfies due process 

is whether the defendant’s minimum contacts with the forum 

state are such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate 

being haled into court there. Wheelbarger v. Detroit Diesel, 

313 Neb. 135, 983 N.W.2d 134 (2023). For example, the forum 

state can assert specific personal jurisdiction if a nonresident 
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corporation continuously and deliberately exploited the forum 

state’s market and must reasonably anticipate the potentiality 

of defending actions based on products causing injury there.

See Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court,

supra. This analysis is not simply mechanical or quantitative, 

but requires that we consider the quality and nature of the 

defendant’s activities to ascertain whether the defendant has 

the necessary minimum contacts with the forum to satisfy due 

process. Wheelbarger v. Detroit Diesel, supra. For specific 

personal jurisdiction, there must be a substantial connection 

between the defendant’s contacts with the forum state and the 

operative facts of the litigation. Id.

[21,22] The requisite minimum contacts must exist either 

at the time the cause of action arose, at the time the suit was 

filed, or within a reasonable period of time immediately prior 

to the filing of the lawsuit. Id. Contacts with the forum state 

unrelated to the action have no bearing on a specific personal 

jurisdiction analysis. See id. In this regard, we note that 

the U.S. Supreme Court recently rejected a strict causationonly approach that had been employed by some jurisdictions 

and reiterated that the relationship among the defendant, the 

forum, and the litigation must be close enough to support specific personal jurisdiction such that the claims arise out of or 

relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum. Ford Motor 

Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, ___ U.S. ___, 141 

S. Ct. 1017, 209 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2021).

[23-25] It is essential to specific personal jurisdiction that 

in each case there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities 

within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Wheelbarger v. Detroit Diesel, supra. This 

requirement ensures that a defendant will not be subject to 

litigation in a jurisdiction solely due to random, fortuitous, 

or attenuated contacts. Id. There must be fair warning that a 

particular activity might subject the nonresident defendant to 

the jurisdiction of the foreign sovereign, giving a degree of 
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predictability to the legal system by allowing potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum 

assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render 

them liable to suit. Id. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 

471 U.S. 462, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985). 

Unilateral activity of a plaintiff who claims some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum state. Wheelbarger v. Detroit 

Diesel, supra.

We have reviewed the record and determine that the 

Griffiths are unable to identify contacts between LGCAI and 

Nebraska that are sufficiently related to the operative facts of 

the complaint. The 18650 batteries were shipped directly from 

South Korea, and LGCAI did not have physical possession of 

and did not participate in the distribution of the 18650 batteries in Nebraska. Although LGCAI participated in sales of petrochemicals, it does not generate other revenue in Nebraska. 

LGCAI has not contracted for business with Shoemaker’s or 

E-Titan and has not initiated the sale of the 18650 batteries for electronic cigarettes or vaping devices. In our view, 

LGCAI’s acts do not satisfy the “relatedness” requirement of 

Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, supra. 

In contrast, because, inter alia, LG Chem and LGCAI shipped 

its 18650 batteries to customers located in Texas, the Texas 

Supreme Court found that a consumer’s claims were sufficiently related to LGCAI’s contacts with Texas to satisfy due 

process for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. LG Chem 

America, Inc. v. Morgan, 670 S.W.3d 341 (Tex. 2023).

The Griffiths emphasize that LGCAI rents warehouse space 

in Nebraska as part of its sales of petrochemical materials 

and products, such as rubber. No LGCAI employees work at 

the warehouse, and a third-party distributor delivers products 

from the warehouse to the customer when such petrochemical 

sales occur. The record suggests that at least two customers 

in Nebraska bought rubber products from LGCAI. However, 

LGCAI’s petrochemical sales and activities associated with 
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distribution of other products were not related to LG Chem’s 

sale of the 18650 batteries involved in this suit and are 

not enough to create a substantial connection of LGCAI to 

Nebraska for purposes of satisfying due process.

In this case, the Griffiths have not demonstrated specific 

relatedness of LGCAI’s contacts with Nebraska and this lawsuit to satisfy due process to support the exercise of personal 

jurisdiction. Accordingly, LGCAI was properly dismissed as 

a party.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons recited above, we determine that the 

Griffiths’ negligence and loss of consortium claims against 

Shoemaker’s and E-Titan are substantively based in 

Pennsylvania and that its rules for limitation on actions are 

applicable. Applying Pennsylvania’s 2-year limitation period 

for actions for personal injury, the Griffiths’ claims against 

Shoemaker’s and E-Titan are untimely. Summary judgment 

was properly granted with respect to these claims. We further 

determine that the district court did not err when it concluded 

that it lacked personal jurisdiction over LGCAI. Accordingly, 

we affirm the rulings of the district court.

Affirmed.