UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

ISAIAS JIMENEZ JUAREZ, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

WILLIAM P. BARR, United States 

Attorney General, 

 Respondent. 

No. 18-9577 

(Petition for Review) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before BRISCOE, MATHESON, and EID, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Isaías Jiménez Juárez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of a 

final order of removal in which the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denied 

his motion to remand. In that motion, Mr. Jiménez Juárez argued that he may be 

eligible to apply for cancellation of removal based on the Supreme Court’s decision 

in Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018). 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, 

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It 

may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

July 14, 2020

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court
2 

We deny the Government’s motion to continue the abatement of this matter, 

and we lift the abatement. Exercising jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), we grant 

the petition for review and remand to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with 

this decision. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Mr. Jiménez Juárez first entered the United States without inspection in 

October 2006. In February 2014, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 

instituted removal proceedings by serving a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) on him. 

Rather than specify the date and time of the removal hearing, the NTA listed the date 

and time as “[t]o be set.” Admin. R. at 25. About two weeks later, DHS served 

Mr. Jiménez Juárez with a Notice of Hearing (“NOH”) directing him to appear before 

the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) in September 2014. 

Mr. Jiménez Juárez admitted the allegations in the NTA and conceded 

inadmissibility. He applied for asylum, restriction on removal, and protection under 

the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). After the hearing, the IJ denied those 

requests and granted voluntary departure. Mr. Jiménez Juárez appealed the IJ’s 

decision to the BIA. While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued 

Pereira. 

Pereira addressed the impact of a deficient NTA on the “stop-time rule.” 

Noncitizens who are subject to removal proceedings and who have accrued 10 years 

of continuous physical presence in the United States may be eligible for cancellation 
3 

of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).1

 Under the stop-time rule, however, the 

period of continuous presence ends when the government serves an NTA. See id.

§ 1229b(d)(1)(A). Pereira held that when an NTA fails to designate the specific time 

and place of a removal proceeding, it does not trigger the stop-time rule for 

cancellation of removal. 138 S. Ct. at 2109-10. As noted, Mr. Jiménez Juárez’s 

NTA lacked that information. 

Based on Pereira, Mr. Jiménez Juárez asked the BIA to remand his case to the 

IJ to pursue cancellation of removal, arguing he had accrued the requisite 10 years of 

continuous physical presence because his NTA was deficient.2

 

1

 More specifically, the Attorney General may grant cancellation of removal to 

a noncitizen who is subject to removal from the United States if the noncitizen 

(A) has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period 

of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of such 

application; 

(B) has been a person of good moral character during such period; 

(C) has not been convicted of an offense under [8 U.S.C. §§] 1182(a)(2), 

1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3) . . . ; and 

(D) establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely 

unusual hardship to [his] spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the 

United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. 

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). 

2

 Mr. Jiménez Juárez has two U.S. citizen children who are the qualifying 

relatives for purposes of establishing eligibility for cancellation of removal under 

§ 1229b(b)(1)(D).
4 

The BIA concluded that the NTA and the NOH, in combination, vested the IJ 

with jurisdiction over the removal proceedings under In re Bermudez-Cota, 27 I. & 

N. Dec. 441 (BIA 2018). Though it did not specifically analyze Mr. Jiménez Juárez’s 

Pereira stop-time argument, it summarized and implicitly rejected the argument, 

concluding that Mr. Jiménez Juárez “cannot meet the 10-year continuous physical 

presence requirement for cancellation of removal,” Admin. R. at 4. The BIA denied 

the motion to remand, upheld the IJ’s finding of removability, and dismissed the 

appeal. 

Mr. Jiménez Juárez’s petition for review challenges only the BIA’s ruling on 

his motion to remand. 

II. DISCUSSION 

We review the BIA’s legal determinations de novo and its factual findings for 

substantial evidence. See Luevano v. Holder, 660 F.3d 1207, 1211 (10th Cir. 2011). 

“We review the denial of a motion to remand for an abuse of discretion.” Witjaksono 

v. Holder, 573 F.3d 968, 978-79 (10th Cir. 2009). The BIA abuses its discretion 

when it makes an error of law. Qiu v. Sessions, 870 F.3d 1200, 1202 (10th Cir. 

2017). 

Mr. Jiménez Juárez argues the BIA abused its discretion because its decision 

was contrary to Pereira. The Government counters that the BIA properly applied the 

stop-time rule. After briefing concluded in this appeal, we held that “the stop-time 

rule is not triggered by the combination of an incomplete notice to appear and a 

notice of hearing.” Banuelos-Galviz v. Barr, 953 F.3d 1176, 1184 (10th Cir. 2020). 
5 

It “is triggered by one complete notice to appear rather than a combination of 

documents.” Id. at 1178. The Government acknowledged in its recent status report 

that Banuelos-Galviz may be dispositive of the petition for review. See Resp’t Status 

Report at 2 (June 24, 2020). 

Although the BIA’s decision focused on a jurisdictional issue that the parties 

did not raise and failed to analyze the stop-time argument that Mr. Jiménez Juárez 

did raise, it ultimately rejected his Pereira argument. Its conclusion that the stoptime rule applies to Mr. Jiménez Juárez conflicts with Banuelos-Galviz and 

constitutes an abuse of discretion. 

III. CONCLUSION

We lift the abatement of this matter, grant the petition for review, reverse the 

BIA’s decision denying the motion to remand, and remand to the BIA to consider 

Mr. Jiménez Juárez’s motion to remand in light of Banuelos-Galviz. 

Entered for the Court 

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. 

Circuit Judge