alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### C. B. Carter Lumber Co. v. Antonia De Grazier.

(No. 2371.)

Appeal from Kaufman County.

T. L. Stanfield, Manion & Huffmaster, and Allen & Vesey, counsel for appellant.

Word & Charlton, counsel for appellee.

Opinion by

Will-son, J.

§176. *Attachment; affidavit for, by treasurer of a private corporation, held sufficient; case stated.*Appellant sued appellee in the county court to recover an alleged indebtedness, and sued out an attachment which was levied upon certain real estate belonging to appellee. The affidavit for the attachment was made by B. M. Carter, who stated therein that he was the treasurer of the O. B. Carter Lumber Co., which company was alleged in the petition to be a private corporation incorporated under the general incorporation law of this state. Upon motion of appellee the attachment was quashed upon the ground that said affidavit did not show upon its face that it was made by the plaintiff, his agent or attorney. *Held,*error. If B. M. Carter, the affiant, was treasurer of said corporation, he was a member thereof, because the law creates said office of treasurer, and requires that it shall be filled. [R. S. art. 580.] *Prima facie,*said B. M. Carter is one of the plaintiffs in this suit, and entitled to make the affidavit, and his authority to do so cannot be questioned by a mere motion to quash. [Evans v. Lawson, Smith & Co. 64 Tex. 199; Messner v. Lewis, 20 Tex. 222; Messner v. Hutchins, 17 Tex. 597; Baker v. Stewart, 4 Tex. Law Rev. 243; W. & W. Con. Rep. § 830.]

§ 177. *Homestead right; county court cannot adjudicate.*Appellee pleaded and claimed that the real estate levied upon under the attachment was his homestead, and therefore exempt. This plea upon exception made thereto *221by appellant was stricken out. *Held*correct. The county court was without jurisdiction to entertain and determine said plea, as it involved title to land. [W. & W. Con. Rep. § 1061.]

November 17, 1886.

Reversed and remanded.
#### Eric BROOKS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D10-5728.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Nov. 29, 2010.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 14, 2011.

Eric Brooks, pro se, Petitioner.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied on the merits.

PADOVANO, ROBERTS, and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.
#### ESTATE OF Melinda Ellen Flynn WALKER, by its Administrator, De-nyse R. WAUGH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joseph D. McGRATH, Defendant. Estate of Brian J. McGrath, by its Administrator, Melinda Atess, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 00-1752.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 10, 2001.

Decided Jan. 19, 2001.

*601Before WOLLMAN, Chief Judge, FAGG, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Melinda Walker and Brian McGrath were killed when their automobiles collided. Walker’s estate brought this diversity action against McGrath’s estate for wrongful death, and a jury trial was conducted on the issue of damages only. The jury awarded Walker’s estate $102,034.35 for loss of accumulation to the estate, burial and ambulance expenses, past loss of financial support, and future loss of financial support. Although Walker had been married for six weeks at the time of the accident, the jury awarded no damages for past loss of spousal consortium or future loss of spousal consortium. Applying Iowa law, the district court denied a post-judgment motion for a new trial, deciding the verdict was not outside the wide boundaries of substantial justice. Walker challenges this decision on appeal. Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the new trial, and thus affirm this state-law diversity case without an extended opinion. *See*8th Cir. R. 47B.
EX-31 Rule 13a-14(d)/15d-14(d) Certifications.

 

 

I, Scott Epperson, certify that:

 

1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports onForm 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this reporton Form 10-K of the GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2014-GC22 (the "ExchangeAct periodic reports");

 

2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, takenas a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit tostate a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading withrespect to the period covered by this report;

 

3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing andother information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the periodcovered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

 

4. Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statementsrequired in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except asdisclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicers have fulfilledtheir obligations under the servicing agreements in all material respects; and

 

5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicingcriteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports onassessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securitiesrequired to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 ofRegulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as anexhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Anymaterial instances of noncompliance described in such reports have beendisclosed in this report on Form 10-K.

 

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied oninformation provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties:

 

Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as Master Servicer,CWCapital Asset Management LLC, as Special Servicer, Deutsche Bank TrustCompany Americas, as Trustee, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, asCertificate Administrator, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, asCustodian, Pentalpha Surveillance LLC, as Operating Advisor, CoreLogicSolutions, LLC, as Servicing Function Participant, Computershare Trust Company,National Association, as Servicing Function Participant for the CertificateAdministrator, Computershare Trust Company, National Association, as ServicingFunction Participant for the Custodian, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association,as Primary Servicer for the Maine Mall Mortgage Loan, LNR Partners, LLC, asSpecial Servicer for the Maine Mall Mortgage Loan, U.S. Bank NationalAssociation, as Trustee for the Maine Mall Mortgage Loan, U.S. Bank NationalAssociation, as Custodian for the Maine Mall Mortgage Loan, Park Bridge LenderServices LLC, as Operating Advisor for the Maine Mall Mortgage Loan, andCoreLogic Solutions, LLC, as Servicing Function Participant for the Maine MallMortgage Loan.

 

 

 

Dated:March 27, 2023

 

 

/s/ Scott Epperson

Scott Epperson

Chief Executive Officer

(seniorofficer in charge of securitization of the depositor)
In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-22-00041-CR

CURTIS TROY CROWSEY, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 6th District Court

Lamar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 29362

Before Morriss, C.J., Stevens and Carter,* JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Stevens

___________________________

*Jack Carter, Justice, Retired, Sitting by Assignment
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Curtis Troy Crowsey pled guilty to manufacture or delivery of a penalty group 1

controlled substance in an amount greater than four grams and less than two hundred grams.1 

Pursuant to a plea bargain with the State, Crowsey was sentenced to twelve years’

imprisonment.2 The trial court certified that this was a plea-agreement case and that Crowsey 

had no right of appeal; nonetheless, Crowsey, acting pro se, filed a notice of appeal. Because we 

find that we are without jurisdiction over this case as a result of Crowsey’s plea bargain with the 

State, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

The Texas Legislature has granted a very limited right of appeal in plea-bargain cases. 

Rule 25.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure details that right as follows:

(2) . . . . In a plea bargain case—that is, a case in which a defendant’s 

plea was guilty or nolo contendere and the punishment did not exceed the 

punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant—a

defendant may appeal only:

(A) those matters that were raised by written motion filed and

ruled on before trial, or

(B) after getting the trial court’s permission to appeal.

TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). There is no indication in the record before this Court that Crowsey 

either (1) filed a motion that was ruled on before trial or (2) obtained the trial court’s permission 

to appeal. To the contrary, the trial court’s certification of Crowsey’s right of appeal indicates 

that he has no right of appeal. Pursuant to Rule 25.2(d) of the Texas Rules of Appellate 

1TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(d).

2

In conjunction with the plea agreement, Crowsey waived his right of appeal. 
3

Procedure, this Court is required to dismiss an appeal if, as in this case, the trial court’s 

certification indicates no right of appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d).

We informed Crowsey of this apparent defect in our jurisdiction over his appeal and 

afforded him an opportunity to respond and, if possible, cure such defect. Crowsey did not 

respond to our letter.

Because Crowsey has no right of appeal as a result of his plea bargain with the State and 

because the trial court’s certification correctly indicates that he is without a right of appeal, we 

dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Scott E. Stevens

Justice

Date Submitted: April 21, 2022

Date Decided: April 22, 2022

Do Not Publish
#### PARISH OF ST. CHARLES through the DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND ZONING v. Wanda Fontenot, Wife of and Douglas E. BORDELON and Southern Crane Services, Inc.

No. 2010-C-2552.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 28, 2011.

PER CURIAM.*

The court of appeal’s ruling is vacated and the ruling of the trial court is reinstated. Louisiana Revised Statute 9:5625(A)(3) clearly states, “With reference to violations of use regulations all such actions ... must be brought within five years from the date the parish ... first had been actually notified in writing of such violation.” The statute further states, “The provisions of this Section shall supersede any other provisions of law inconsistent herewith.” La. R.S. 9:5625(E). The Parish received written notice of the violation in 1999 and did not file suit until 2007. Thus, the action is prescribed under La. R.S. 9:5625(A)(3).

COURT OF APPEAL RULING VACATED; RULING OF TRIAL COURT IS REINSTATED.

VICTORY, J., concurs in result.

*

 KIMBALL, C J., not participating.
#### Jean MENTOR, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D08-3092.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Sept. 15, 2010.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 30, 2010.

*196Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Amy Weber and Stephen J. Wein-baum, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Rolando A. Soler, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before CORTINAS and LAGOA, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Jean Mentor appeals his convictions and sentence for second-degree murder, armed robbery and armed burglary.1 We affirm Mentor’s convictions without comment. However, we agree with Mentor’s contention that his sentence must be vacated because the trial court impermissibly considered his protestation of innocence in determining his sentence. The State correctly concedes error on this point.2

“[A] trial court may not hold a defendant’s protestation of innocence against that defendant in either the guilt or penalty phase of the trial.” *Johnson v. State,*948 So.2d 1014, 1016 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). A review of the sentencing hearing indicates that the trial judge impermissibly considered Mentor’s protestation of innocence and lack of remorse. The trial judge’s statement “can reasonably be read only as conditioning the sentence, at least in part, upon appellant’s claim of innocence, in violation of established law.” *Jackson v. State,*39 So.3d 427, 428 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), and cases cited at 428; *see Bracero v. State,*10 So.3d 664 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); *Dorvil v. State,*997 So.2d 1138, 1139 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); *Soto v. State,*874 So.2d 1215 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004); A.S. *v. State,*667 So.2d 994 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); *see also Whitmore v. State,*27 So.3d 168, 171 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), and cases cited at 171. Such consideration is impermissible and Mentor must be re-sentenced even if his claim of innocence is “but one of several factors considered by the court in imposing sentence.” *Johnson,*948 So.2d at 1017; *see also Soto,*874 So.2d at 1217; AS., 667 So.2d at 996. Accordingly, we vacate Mentor’s sentence and remand for resentencing by a different judge.

Convictions affirmed, sentence vacated, and cause remanded for resentencing.

1

. The jury found that Mentor was not in actual possession of a firearm.

2

. The State also concedes that the prosecutor incorrectly informed the trial court that Mentor faced a mandatory life sentence as a habitual felony offender.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

ROY R. MOSES,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 226 EAL 2018

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 18th day of October, 2018

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
EX-16.1

                   Resignation of Michael Johnson & Co., LLC.


April 11, 2003

Michael Johnson & Co., LLC.
Certified Public Accountants
9175 East Kenyon Ave., Suite 100
Denver, Colorado 80237
(303) 796-0099
FAX (303) 796-0137

John Melnyk
Industrial Minerals, Inc.
(formerly PNW Capital, Inc.)
One Dundas Street West, Suite 2500
Toronto, Ontario, Canada  M5G 1Z3

Dear Mr. Melnyk:

This is to confirm  that the  client-auditor  relationship  between PNW Capital,
Inc.  (Commission  File Number  000-30651)  and Michael  Johnson & Co., LLC. has
ceased at the request of PNW Capital,  Inc. Such termination of relationship was
not as a result of any disagreement with management on any matter.

In connection with the audit of the two most recent fiscal years, no disagree-
ment(s) exist with any former accountant on any matter of accounting, principles
or practices, financial statement disclosure, or auditing scope or procedure,
which disagreement(s), if not resolved to the satisfaction of the former
accountant would have caused them to make reference in connection with their
report to the subject of the disagreement(s).

The audit report by Michael  Johnson & Co., LLC. for the year ended December 31,
2001 did not contain an adverse  opinion or  disclaimer  of opinion,  nor was it
qualified or modified as to uncertainty, audit scope, or accounting principles.


Sincerely,


/s/ Michael Johnson & Co., LLC.
----------------------------------
Michael Johnson & Co., LLC.
#### Keith CANTY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D11-605.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

April 13, 2011.

Keith Canty, in proper person.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.

Before WELLS, CORTIÑAS, and EMAS, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Keith Canty appeals from the summary denial of his motion, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), to correct illegal sentence (styled as a “Motion for Jail Time Credits”). On appeal from a summary denial of a Rule 3.800 *295motion, this Court must reverse unless the postconviction record conclusively shows that defendant is entitled to no relief. Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(b)(2)(d).

Because the record now before us fails to make the required showing, we reverse the order and remand for a hearing or for the attachment of record excerpts conclusively showing that the appellant is entitled to no relief.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.
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<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
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<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                          27,375
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     0
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<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>               2,488,854
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<INTEREST-INVEST>                               14,994
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                     0
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                42,879
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                              20,003
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              26,151
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           16,728
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                      475
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                               (146)
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                 11,059
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  6,285
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     4,084
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.26
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.26
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    7.25
<LOANS-NON>                                      5,282
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<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 6,988
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                       62
<RECOVERIES>                                         0
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                7,401
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                                 0
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                          7,401
        

</TABLE>
| (logo) WELLS FARGO | **Commercial Mortgage  Servicing**D1050-084, 8th Floor  401 South Tryon St.  Charlotte, NC 28202  1-800-326-1334 |
|--------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

**ANNUAL STATEMENT OFCOMPLIANCE**

 

 

Reference is hereby made tothat certain Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of July 1, 2014, by and amongJ.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., as Depositor, WellsFargo Bank, National Association, as Master Servicer, Midland Loan Services, ADivision of PNC Bank, National Association, as Special Servicer, Wells FargoBank, National Association, as Certificate Administrator, Wilmington Trust,National Association, as Trustee, and Pentalpha Surveillance LLC, as SeniorTrust Advisor with respect to Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through CertificatesSeries 2014-C21 (the "Agreement"). Capitalized terms used herein nototherwise defined shall have the meanings assigned in the Agreement.

 

Pursuant to Section 11.09 ofthis Agreement, I, Daniel Bober, Executive Vice President of CommercialMortgage Services do hereby certify that:

 

1. A review of the activitiesof the Master Servicer during the period from January 1, 2016 through December31, 2016 (the “Reporting Period”), and of its performance per theAgreement during such period has been made under my supervision, and

 

2. To the best of my knowledge,based on such review, the Master Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligationsunder the Agreement in all material respects throughout the Reporting Period.

  

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, theundersigned has executed this Certificate as of the 28th day of February2017.

 

/s/ Daniel Bober

Daniel Bober

Executive Vice President 

Wells Fargo Bank 

 

 

| Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. | (logo) Together we’ll  go far |
|------------------------|-------------------------------------|
#### Desmond T. KENNER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Nos. 5D09-90, 5D09-166.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Nov. 12, 2010.

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Noel A. Pelella, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Desmond T. Kenner, Lake Butler, Pro se.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Douglas T. Squire, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.

*118PER CURIAM.

Appellant challenges his conviction for second-degree murder on several grounds, only one of which merits discussion. Appellant contends that the jury instruction for the lesser-included offense of manslaughter by act was fundamentally flawed, requiring a new trial. We agree and reverse.

Appellant was charged and tried for second-degree murder. In addition to instructing the jury on the second-degree murder charge, the trial judge also instructed the jury, without objection, using the then-standard instruction for manslaughter by act, a category one lesser-included offense of the murder charge. Subsequent to the trial, our supreme court held that the use of this instruction constitutes fundamental error. *State v. Montgomery,*39 So.3d 252 (Fla.2010). Although the State concedes that a new trial is required if *Montgomery*is applicable, it attempts to distinguish it based on *Joyner v. State,*41 So.3d 306 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), which distinguished *Montgomery*on two grounds, neither of which are applicable here. Here, the jury was not instructed on manslaughter by culpable negligence because defense counsel did not believe that the facts supported the instruction. Nor did counsel invite the error here in the manner identified by the court in *Joyner.*Accordingly, *Montgomery*compels a new trial.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

PALMER, TORPY and COHEN, JJ., concur.