Affirmed and Opinion Filed August 24, 2022 

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In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-21-00534-CR LAXAVIER LAMAR WHITTLEY, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TE XAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 417th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 417-81486-2020 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Pedersen, III, and Nowell Opinion by Justice Partida-Kipness Appellant Laxavier Lama r Whittley appeals his conviction for aggravated sexual assault. In two issues, Whittley challe nges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s guilty verdict and the admission of expert testimony from forensic DNA analyst Cassandra Canela. We overru le Whittley’s issues and affirm the judgment.–2– BACKGROUND Around 5:30 a.m. on July 8, 2019, sixty-one-year-old P.B. 1 awoke when she felt something brush against her leg in bed. Her husband had already left for the day, and her two adult daughters were sleeping in their rooms. P.B. sat up and saw the silhouette of a man with a gun at the foot of the bed. P.B. described him as “just a total black silhouette.” She told the jury he was wearing “all bl ack” and what looked like a black jacket. P.B. “was scared” when she saw the attacker had a gun and begged him not to hurt her. The attacker told her to “hush, be quiet” and instructed her to lie face down “crossways on the bed.” She did so and, “within a matter of seconds,” P.B. “felt a sharp, rough object stuck into” he r vagina that seemed “like a glove or something.” P.B. told the ju ry the attacker then stuck “rough objects into [her] rearend.” P.B. assumed the objects were the gun, his gloved hand, and his penis. P.B. recalled this “was horribly painful,” and she “was just begging him to stop hurting [her].” She avoided looking at the attacker because she thought that was her “best chance of survival.” P.B. tried to defend herself by grabbing a lamp and swinging it at him, but the lamp was “s o cumbersome” the attack di d not work. At some point, the attacker asked whether she had any cash in the house. P.B. told him she did not keep cash, but he could take he r purse, which was downstairs.

1 We refer to the complainant, P.B ., by initials to protect her identity. See T EX

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. P. 9.8(a).–3– As the assault continued, the attacker “came up beside [h er] and demanded oral sex.” P.B. complied. When her alarm went off around 6:30 a.m., P.B. told the attacker it was “getting light outside” and her “neighbors leave early for work.” P.B. told the jury she was “hoping he would r ealize, you know, I probabl y need to escape, it’s not dark anymore.” The attacker did not immediately leave. Instead, he got up, moved behind P.B., and bega n rubbing his penis on her back. P.B. felt wetness on her back and believe d it to be semen. P.B. testified that when the attacker fi nished, he told her to “stay there, lay down, and pull the covers over your head.” P.B. “laid there quietly” and “just listened.” She was worried th e attacker would go after he r daughters next. “After a few minutes [P.B.] realized that he probabl y had left” because she had not heard her daughters’ voices. At that point, P.B. ran to her younger daughter’s bedroom and asked her to call 911. P.B. testified she could tell the attack er was African Amer ican from the color of his penis. In her written statement to police, P.M. said the attacker “sounded black” but did not say she was able to determ ine the color of his skin. P.B. was taken to the hospital and treated by Stephanie Barnes, a sexual assault nurse examiner. Barnes testified P.B. had bruising in her vaginal area and tears and bruising in her anal area so severe Barnes called the emerge ncy room to see if P. B. required sutures. Barnes collected DNA swabs of the areas wh ere the attacker had reportedly touched P.B.: orally, anally, va ginally, and on her back.–4– There is an alleyway behind P.B.’s home that leads to a nearby apartment complex. Police found a bandana stuffed insi de a glove and a footprint on top of a trashcan in the alleyway. Poli ce theorized the attacker had used the trashcan to climb over a wall between P.B.’s house and the apartment complex. Surveillance video from the home showed the attacker had short hair and was wearing black clothing and red, checkered Vans shoes. A security officer at the adjacent apar tments referred police to an “apartment of interest.” Through interviews, author ities learned Jaevon Murphy lived in the apartment of interest and Whittley was living with Murphy and sleeping on his couch. Police took DNA swabs from both men along with two other suspects associated with the apartment. While se arching the apartment, police found a single black glove in the bedroom closet and a handgun with red stains on the barrel hidden inside an ottoman near the couch wher e Whittley slept. Police also discovered Murphy owned a pair of red, checkered Vans shoes. Howeve r, Murphy had long dreadlocks, which did not match the surveill ance images of the short-haired attacker. DNA testing shed further light on the atta cker’s identity. The DNA evidence linked Whittley to the offense and excluded the other suspects. Whittley was sixteen years old at the tim e of the offense. The trial court certified and tried him as an adult. Th e jury found Whittley committed aggravated sexual assault and asse ssed punishment at fifty-five y ears. The trial court rendered judgment on the verdict. This appeal followed.–5– STANDARD OF REVIEW In a sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether a ny rational factfinder could have found the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Queeman v. State , 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). We may not reevaluate the evidence’s we ight and credibility or substitute our judgment for the factfinder’s. Queeman , 520 S.W.3d at 622. In stead, we determine whether the necessary inferences are re asonable based on the cumulative force of the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Murray v. State , 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim . App. 2015). We presume the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that resolution. Id.
at 448–49. A trial judge’s ruling on the admissibilit y of expert testimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion and will not be disturbed if it is within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Wolfe v. State , 509 S.W.3d 325, 335 (Tex . Crim. App. 2017). In sorting untested or invalid theories from those grounded in “ good” science, trial judges are called upon to se rve as gatekeepers. Id. at 336. The trial court’s essential gatekeeping role is to ensure evidence lacking a basis insound scientific methods is not admitted. Id. “The court in discharging its dut y as gatekeeper must determine how the reliability of particular testimony is to be assessed.” Vela v. State , 209–6– S.W.3d 128, 134 (Tex. Crim. A pp. 2006). “The reliability i nquiry is, thus, a flexible
one.” Id.
ANALYSIS Whittley brings two issues on appeal. Fi rst, he maintains the evidence was legally insufficient to support the conviction. Second, he asserts the trial court erred by admitting the expert testimony of a fore nsic DNA analyst. We will address each issue in turn. I. Sufficiency of the Evidence At trial, Whittley did not dispute whether a sexual assault occurred, only whether he was the one who committed the crime. He take s the same approach in his first issue on appeal. Whittley notes P.B. was unable to identify the man who assaulted her. He maintains the othe r evidence connecting him to the crime amounted to no more than speculation and fell short of the standard required to sustain a conviction. We disagree. The St ate’s DNA evidence, when paired with other circumstantial evidence of guilt, was sufficient to prove Whittley’s identity as the attacker. The State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the accused is the person who committed the crime charged. Johnson v. State , 673 S.W.2d 190, 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Identity may be pr oved by either direct or circumstantial evidence coupled with all reasona ble inferences fro m the evidence. Gardner v. State , 306 S.W.3d 274, 285 (Tex. Cr im. App. 2009). “Eyewitne ss identification is not–7– required, and DNA evidence alone may estab lish an attacker’s identity in a rape prosecution.” Molina v. State , 587 S.W.3d 100, 109 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019), aff’d , 632 S.W.3d 539 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); accord Coria-Gonzalez v.
State , No. 03-18-00645-CR, 2020 WL 465856, at*4 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 29, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., notdesignated for publication) (collecting cases); Allen v.
State , Nos. 05-11-00056-CR, 05-11-00057 -CR, 2012 WL 2106530, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 12, 2012, pet. ref’d ) (not designated for publication). Multiple DNA samples were taken fro m P.B.’s person and from objects associated with the offense. At the hospita l, Barnes collected swabs from the places P.B. reported the attacker had touched her: he r mouth, genitals, anus, and back. Presumptive testing showed blood was pr esent on the barrel of the handgun found hidden in the apartment wher e Whittley was staying, so lab technicians took swabs of the weapon’s grip, trigger, and release. They also swabbed the glove and bandana found in the alleyway where police be lieved the attacker fled the scene. Testing showed male DNA was present on P.B.’s anal, vaginal, and back swabs, though the oral swab was inconclu sive. Y-STR DNA testing of the back swabs found two distinct DNA profiles matching P.B. and Whittley. According to the State’s DNA expert, Cassandra Canales, tests showedit was 196 septillion times more likely the DNA came from P.B. and Whittley than from P.B. and one unrelated, unknown individual. Wh ittley could not be excluded as the contributor of the male–8– DNA on the vaginal and anal swabs, though all the other suspect s were excluded as contributors there. Testing of the swabs from the handgun’s grip, trigger, and release revealed three DNA profiles, with P.B. as the mo st likely contributor of 93% of the DNA present. Canales testifie d it was 3.74 decillion times more likely the DNA on the handgun came from P.B., Whittley, and an unknown individu al than from P.B. and two unknown, unrelated individuals. Those te st results were inconclusive as to Murphy but excluded the other suspects as possible contributors. Testing of the blood DNA found on the barrel of the gun suggested it was 14.6 septillion times more likely the blood DNA came from P.B. than an unrelated, unknown individual. Testing of the glove s howed four DNA profiles present inside. P.B. was found to be 415 quinti llion times more likely to have contributed a majority of the glove DNA than unknown indivi duals, and the probability Whittley contributed 21% of the remaining DNA wa s 39.6 million times greater than the probability of it coming from unknown indivi duals. Together, the probability P.B. and Whittley were the sources of most of the DNA inside the glove was 237 nonillion times greater than the probability of obtaining this profile from unrelated, unknown individuals. The other suspects, includi ng Murphy, were excluded as possible contributors to the DNA found in the glove. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has describe d DNA forensics narrowing the odds of a random match to one in 19,900,000 (an eight-digit number) as–9– “impressive statistics” that “support[ed] the jury’s conclusion that appellant, as opposed to some unidentified ‘suspect’ also sharing the same DNA profile, sexually assaulted” the victim, when those statistic s were paired with other circumstantial evidence indicating guilt. Hinojosa v. State , 4 S.W.3d 240, 245 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see Guo v. State , No. 05-19-01178-CR, 2022 WL 224815, at *5 (Tex. App.— Dallas Jan. 26, 2022, pe t. ref’d) (mem. op., not designate d for publication) (similar). We conclude the forensic data in this case, some of which placed the odds at one to a thirty-four-digit number, is also sufficient to support the verdict when paired with the other circumstantial evidence linking Whittley to the crime. Other circumstantial evidence tied Whittle y to the crime in a variety of ways. The apartment complex where Whittley lived was adjacent to P.B.’s house, and his regular presence in the vicinity would have provided an opportunity to commit the crime. See Mason v. State , 416 S.W.3d 720, 732 (Tex. A pp.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d). Opportunity alone is generally not suffi cient to prove identity, but it is nonetheless a “circumstance[] i ndicative of guilt,” and thus identity. Temple v.
State , 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex . Crim. App. 2013); Merritt v. State , 368 S.W.3d 516, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). One black glove was found in the alleyway leading from the house to the apar tments, and another black glove was found in the apartment where Whittley was staying. P.B. described her attacker as an African American wearing all black wielding a ha ndgun. Whittley is African American, and the police found clothing of similar descri ption and a handgun sm eared with P.B.’s–10– blood stuffed inside an ottoman in the ap artment in which Whittley was living at the time. The fact the complain ant’s blood was found on a weapon associated with the crime and hidden in the furniture near where Whittley slept sp eaks volumes as to identity. See, e.g. , Terry v. State , No. 05-08-00165-CR, 2009 WL 1240132, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 7, 2 009, pet. ref’d, untimely f iled) (not designated for publication) (holding victim’s blood found on defendant’s articles to be persuasive evidence of identity). Finally, as a resi dent of Murphy’s apartment, Whittley had access to Murphy’s pair of distinctive, red-checkered Vans shoes, which were identical to the ones the attacker wore on the surveillance video. See Castellon v.
State , 302 S.W.3d 568, 576 (Tex. A pp.—Amarillo 2009, no pe t.) (mem. op.) (color of shoes used to prove identity); cf. Segundo v. State , 270 S.W.3d 79, 88 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (discussing “‘the mark of Zorr o’ mode of proving identity” in which a single “unusual fact” points strongly to the defendant). “Proof of identity by circumstantial evid ence is not subject to a more rigorous review than proof by direct eviden ce, since both are equally probative.” Castellon , 302 S.W.3d at 575; accord Zavala v. State , No. 05-02-01773-CR, 2004 WL 625626, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 30, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Here, the circumstantial evid ence is sufficient to prove Whittley’s identity as the man who attacked P. B. We overrule his first issue.–11– II. Admissibility of Expert Testimony In his second issue, Whittley contests the admission of expert testimony concerning Y-STR DNA tests connecting him to the crime. The State sponsored the DNA evidence through Canela. Whittley challe nges Canela’s qualifications. He also disputes the reliability of the software Canela used to conduct Y-STR testing, a program called STRmix. The Texas Rules of Evidence set out thr ee separate conditions before expert testimony can be admitted: the witness qualifies as an expert by reason of his knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education; the subject matter of the testimony is an appropriate one for e xpert testimony; and admitting the expert testimony will actually assist the factfinder in deciding the case. Rhomer v. State , 569 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Cr im. App. 2019) (quoting Vela , 209 S.W.3d at 131). These conditions are commonly referred to as qualification, reliability, and relevance. Id. “The three requirements raise distin ct questions and issues, and an objection based on one of these requirements does not preserve error as to another.” Shaw v. State , 329 S.W.3d 645, 655 (Tex. App.—Hous ton [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d); accord Procella v. State , Nos. 05-11-01290-CR, 05-11-01291-CR, 2013 WL 222274, at *2 (Tex. App.—D allas Jan. 17, 2013, no pe t.) (not designated for publication). Whittley did not object to Canela ’s qualifications in the trial court. His challenge to her qualifications is, ther efore, not preserved for our review. See T EX

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. P. 33.1(a).–12– Whittley objected to Canela’s tes timony only on the ground that the technology was unreliable. He rea sserts that challenge here. The Kelly test for reliability of evidence derived from a scien tific theory requires the offering party prove the following: (1) the underlying sc ientific theory must be valid, (2) the technique applying the theory must be valid , and (3) the technique must have been properly applied on the occasion in question. Wells v. State , 611 S.W.3d 396, 426 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citing Kelly v. State , 824 S.W.2d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). To aid its determin ation of reliability under Kelly , the trial court may refer to seven nonexclusive factors: (1) the extent to which the underlying scientific theory and technique are accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community; (2) the qualifications of any expert testifying; (3 ) the existence of literature supporting or rejecting the underlying scientific theory a nd technique; (4) the pot ential rate of error of the technique; (5) the availability of ot her experts to test and to evaluate the technique; (6) the clarity with which the unde rlying scientific theory and technique can be explained to the c ourt; and (7) the experience a nd skill of any person who applied the technique on the occasion in question. Kelly , 824 S.W.2d at 573. “[R]eliability depends upon whether the evid ence has its basis in sound scientific methodology. This demands a certain technical showing.” Vela , 209 S.W.3d at 133 (quoting Jordan v. State , 928 S.W.2d 550, 555 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). That showing gives a trial judge the opportunity to weed out testimony pertaining to socalled “junk science.” Id. (quoting Jordan , 928 S.W.2d at 555). “The trial court’s–13– gatekeeping function under Rule 702 does not supplant cross-examination as ‘the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.’” Wolfe , 509 S.W.3d at 336 (quoting Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc. , 972 S.W.2d 713, 728 (Tex. 1998)). Canela has a bachelor’s degree in chemis try and a master’s degree in forensic science. She had worked for the Texas Department of Pub lic Safety’s Crime Laboratory in Garland, Texas, for over six y ears at the time of trial. At trial, Canela provided an overview of fo rensic genetics and her la b’s multistep process for analyzing DNA. According to Canela, she begi ns a DNA analysis in a case involving sexual assault with an initial screening using chemical reagents to detect the presence of semen and male DNA. Th is initial screening helps to determine whether the sample is a suitable candidate for Y-STR testing, which is designed to analyze male DNA on the Y-chromosome. Criteria for suita bility include the quantity of DNA as well as its level of contamination. Canel a then extracts the DNA from the subject material and quantifies it. Canela explained the next step is am plification, in which an enzymatic “polymerase chain reaction” pr ocess was used to make billi ons of copies of the most salient segments of DNA to facilitate thei r analysis while tagging the segments to allow for better identification. Canela desc ribed how, at the fourth step, she feeds the separated and amplified DNA strands in to the STRmix machine. The machine then analyzes the DNA and ge nerates an output file, which Canela uses to interpret–14– as a DNA profile. She next de termines whether the profile is partial or full and how many people contributed to the DNA pr ofile by evaluating whether the data coalesced around discernable “peak height” values for certain alleles, while accounting for and guarding against the e ffects of statistical noise and sample degradation. During this step, she al so makes comparisons to any known DNA profiles submitted for analysis. From these measurements, th e analyst and the STRmix software generates a comparative statistic called a likelihood ratio, which Canela described as “a mathematical relationship fr om two competing [hypothes es] which explains . . . which hypothesis best describe s the data.” The comparative statistic is calculated in part through reference to probabilities de rived from a national genetic statistics database. She then verifies the resu lts using her training and experience. Canela told the jury the STRmix is used “in other laboratories across the country” and “worldwide.” She also explai ned the software’s reliability had been vetted through testing on two levels: throug h generalized, universally applicable testing by the software devel opers and scientists, and by individualized validation at each laboratory where the software was implemented, including the Garland crime lab where Canela worked. At the Garland la b, the validation process consisted of running DNA samples with known contributors in set ratio s through the software, with mixtures ranging from one to four contributors and with different concentrations meant to mimic the real conditions under which tests would be–15– conducted. Testers at the Ga rland lab had repeatedly r un these samples through all the machines in the lab to ensure they returned similar likelihood ratios and to guarantee the results were re producible. The testers then verified the software was accurately separating the mixtures into their individual components. According to Canela, through the Garland lab’s validation process, the system was tuned to account for the quirks of the other lab in struments used in processing DNA. Separate studies were run on each aspect of STRmix in a process that took “months.” Canela further testified the lab had used the syst em reliably in the four years since it was implemented in 2017. And Ca nela agreed she followed all lab-required and fieldapproved procedures when testi ng the samples in this case. Canela also offered testim ony corresponding with the Kellyfactors. She testified STRmix is considered reliable in her field, it is a generally accepted tool in her scientific community, and it will help the jury in understanding the DNA in this case. According to Canela, th e scientific theory underlying STRmix is the Markov Chain Monte Carlo method, which is a widely accepted mathematical modeling technique used in many disciplines, such as code breaking, physics, social science, and computer linguistics. We conclude Canela’s testim ony sufficiently established the reliability of STRmix. Moreover, DNA testing in general as well as Y-ST R testing have been found reliable and to have a s ound scientific foundation. E.g. Jessop v. State , 368 S.W.3d 653, 671 (Tex. App.—Austin 2 012, no pet.) (“DNA evidence has certainly been held–16– admissible in Texas.”); see also Curtis v. State , 205 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref’d) (upholding determination that “Y[-]STR evidence was reliable”); People v. Zapata , 2014 IL App (2d) 120825, ¶ 16, 8 N.E.3d 1188, 1194 (Y-STR testing reliable). The acceptance of a scientific theory by other courts is a relevant consideration in assessing a tria l judge’s ruling on questions of reliability. Wolfe , 509 S.W.3d at 337. “When evaluating a trial judge’s gatekeeping decision, appellate courts may take judicial notice of other a ppellate opinions concerning a specific scientific theory or technique.” Somers v. State , 368 S.W.3d 528, 536–37 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); see Morris v. State , 361 S.W.3d 649, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Regarding the STRmix software in partic ular, we take judicial notice of the many opinions from other jurisdictions holdin g the software satisfies the state and federal equivalents of Texa s Rule of Evidence 702. See United States v. Gissantaner , 990 F.3d 457, 465–67 (6th Ci r. 2021) (collecting cases and concluding STRmix satisfies federal rule of ev idence 702 and is the “product of reliable principles and methods”); see also United States v. Christensen , No. 17-CR-20037-JES-JEH, 2019 WL 651500, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 2019) (denying motion to exclude DNA results on reliability ground and concluding STRmix met reliability standards); United States v. Russell , No. CR-14-2563 MCA, 2018 WL 7286 831, at *8 (D.N.M. Jan. 10, 2018) (holding STRmix met reliability requirements). Such decisions document various peer-reviewed studies validating th e software and its lo w rate of error. See,–17– e.g. , Gissantaner , 990 F.3d at 465 (“When examini ng ‘false inclusions,’ one peerreviewed study concluded, ba sed on an analysis of th e DNA of 300,000 people who were known not to be in a mixture, thatSTRmix had accurately excluded the noncontributors 99.1% of the time,” and obser ving the software gave low-confidence estimates in cases of false inclusion); United States v. Lewis , 442 F. Supp. 3d 1122, 1128–29 (D. Min. 2020) (rely ing on a government study compiling data from thirtyone laboratories, which “show[s ] persuasively that STRmix is capable of producing accurate results with extremel y low error rates: STRmix not only works, it seems to work extremely well, at least when used inthe manner it was used in these studies”); United States v. Washington , No. 8:19CR299, 2020 WL 3265142, at *3 (D. Neb. June 16, 2020) (relying on same government study and citing Lewis ); United States v. Pettway , No. 12-CR-103S, 2016 WL 6134493, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. 2016) (overruling Daubert objection to STRmix based in part on testimony “STRmix and its underlying principles have been peer-review ed in more than 90 articles”). Courts have also noted the method used by ST Rmix is reliable because “there are internal . . . validation checks” to ensure reliable application. See, e.g. , State v. Hudson , No. 1809009750, 2021 WL 4851971, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 2021);
Lewis , 442 F. Supp. 3d at 1129. Further, STRmix software has achieved gene ral acceptance through its use “in several federal laborator ies, in more than forty states, and in at least thirteen other countries.” Washington , 2020 WL 3265142, at *4. “At this point, STRmix is the–18– market leader in probabilis tic genotyping software.” Gissantaner , 990 F.3d at 466 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Consis tent with this reality, numerous courts have admitted STRmix over ch allenges to its general ac ceptance in the relevant scientific community.” Id. (collecting cases). To our knowledge, onl y one federal court has wholly rejected STRmix on reliability grounds, but the decision was later reversed by the Sixth Circuit, which held STRmix satisfied the mandate of Daubert

. See United States v. Gissantaner , 417 F. Supp. 3d 857, 885 (W.D. Mich. 2019), rev’d , 990 F.3d 457 (6th Cir. 2021). In shor t, “the STRmix method has been subjected to extensive empirical testing an d found to be accurate and reliable by the FBI and numerous forensic laboratories.” People v. Davis , 290 Cal. Rptr. 3d 661, 680 (Cal. App. 2022). We reach the same conclusion here. Finally, we conclude the underlying scie ntific theory and technique can be clearly explained to the court. Canela’s te stimony was clear and direct. Further, the principles on which the software depends are well established and noncontroversial.
See Lewis , 442 F. Supp. 3d at 1135–65 (offering an exhaustive evaluation of STRmix’s inner workings); see also People v. Bullard-Daniel , 42 N.Y.S.3d 714, 721 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 2016) (“[T]he ma thematical models [behi nd STRmix] are themselves non-controversial and have been widely usedin fields such as weather forecasting, computational biology, lingui stics, genetics, engineer ing, physics, aeronautics, finance, and social sciences.”). STRmix’s creator explained these principles in a Michigan proceeding as follows:–19– So if I split the construction of the software into having two fundamental principles, the mathema tical principles and the molecular biology principles, the mathema tical principles are standard mathematical principles and they date back to the early 1900s. And they’re called [Markov Chain Monte Carlo] and they’re a dominant method now in mathematical pro cedures treating these types of problems. If we come to the molecular biology these are based on empirical studies of the variability of peak and stutter heights in different multiplexes and at different template levels and they’re published in peer-reviewed articles. People v. Muhammad , 931 N.W.2d 20, 30 (Mich. App. 2018). Indeed, as the court
in Lewis noted, the software has few drawb acks and many strengths, including its compliance with three sets of interna tional standards for probabilistic genotyping software. See 442 F. Supp. 3d at 1150–51. Overall, the case for reliability was compelling here. Canel a’s testimony laid a thorough reliability predicate, explaining each step in the STRmix process, their scientific underpinnings, and the principles and protocols that kept the process in line. Through judicial notice, this predicat e is reinforced by the many courts across the country that have assesse d STRmix and found it trustworthy. Taking all this into account, we cannot say the trial court abused its di scretion by overruling Whittley’s rule 702 objection and admitting testim ony concerning STRmix. We overrule Whittley’s second issue.
CONCLUSION Under this record, we c onclude the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Canela’s–20– testimony. Accordingly, we overrule Whittley’ s appellate issues and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
LAXAVIER LAMAR WHITTLEY, Appellant

No. 05-21-00534-CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 417th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 417-81486- 2020.Opinion delivered by Justice PartidaKipness. Justices Pedersen, III and Nowell participating. Based on the Court’s opinion of this da te, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED

. Judgment entered this 24th day of August, 2022.