NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JIMMY RILEY, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

CARPE DIEM COLLEGIATE HIGH SCHOOL, an Arizona non-profit 

corporation, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 20-0234

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yuma County

No. S1400CV201801018

The Honorable Levi Gunderson, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Jimmy Riley, Yuma

Plaintiff/Appellant

Grasso Law Firm, PC, Chandler

By Robert Grasso, Jr., N. Patrick Hall

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

FILED 6-8-2021
RILEY v. CARPE DIEM

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Chief Judge Peter B. Swann delivered the decision of the court, in which 

Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop 

joined.

S W A N N, Chief Judge:

¶1 Jimmy Riley brought an action against Carpe Diem Collegiate 

High School (“the School”) under A.R.S. § 33-420(C) after the School 

declined to release a voluntary lien it held on Riley’s residence. We affirm 

the superior court’s entry of summary judgment for the School. The 

punitive damages authorized by A.R.S. § 33-420(C) are available only when 

the defendant refuses to release an encumbrance knowing that the 

encumbrance is invalid. Here, the undisputed evidence established goodfaith grounds for the School’s conduct.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In 2010, the School loaned Riley $150,000, and Riley executed 

and recorded a Notice of Voluntary Lien on his residence as security. Riley 

did not repay the entire loan. In June 2017, the School agreed to accept

certain construction work from Riley as payment in full. Riley performed 

at least some of the work. But despite Riley’s written request that the School 

release the lien, the School refused because it believed Riley had not fully 

performed his contractual obligations.

¶3 Riley brought a single-claim action against the School for 

violation of A.R.S. § 33-420. The parties filed competing motions for 

summary judgment. The superior court granted summary judgment for 

the School on the damages claim but ordered the lien to be released because

Riley had cured any deficient performance during the pendency of the case.

The court made the judgment appealable under Ariz. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 

54(b) and authorized the School to apply for attorney’s fees (which were 

ultimately awarded). Riley appeals from the Rule 54(b) judgment.

DISCUSSION

¶4 We review summary judgment rulings de novo. Andrews v. 

Blake, 205 Ariz. 236, 240, ¶ 12 (2003). Summary judgment is appropriate 

when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving 
RILEY v. CARPE DIEM

Decision of the Court

3

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We 

apply clear and unambiguous statutory language according to its plain 

meaning. Butler Law Firm v. Higgins, 243 Ariz. 456, 459, ¶ 7 (2018).

¶5 As an initial matter, we note that Riley pursued only one 

cause of action: violation of § 33-420. Further, he does not assert on appeal 

that he was entitled to relief on any theory. We therefore examine § 33-420 

only, and express no opinion regarding other claims that Riley might have 

brought.

¶6 Section 33-420 serves to “protect property owners from 

actions clouding title to their property.” Stauffer v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n., 

233 Ariz. 22, 28, ¶ 25 (App. 2013) (quotation omitted). The statute provides, 

as relevant here, that

[a] person who is named in a document which purports to 

create an interest in, or a lien or encumbrance against, real 

property and who knows that the document is forged, 

groundless, contains a material misstatement or false claim or 

is otherwise invalid shall be liable to the owner or title holder 

for the sum of not less than one thousand dollars, or for treble 

actual damages, whichever is greater, and reasonable 

attorney fees and costs as provided in this section, if he 

wilfully refuses to release or correct such document of record 

within twenty days from the date of a written request from 

the owner or beneficial title holder of the real property.

A.R.S. § 33-420(C).

¶7 We need not decide today whether § 33-420(C) applies to 

encumbrances that, though not void ab initio, become invalid because they 

have expired or otherwise should be released. Riley’s claim fails even 

assuming that § 33-420(C) applies to his voluntary lien. The damages 

authorized by the statute are punitive, and therefore require scienter on the 

part of the defendant. Wyatt v. Wehmueller, 167 Ariz. 281, 286 (1991); Fagerlie 

v. Markham Contracting Co., 227 Ariz. 367, 376, ¶ 49 (App. 2011). Section 33-

420(C) plainly provides that recovery can be had only when the defendant 

“knows” of a lien’s invalidity and “wilfully refuses” to release or correct it. 

Damages are unavailable when the defendant has a good-faith basis for its 

conduct. Fagerlie, 227 Ariz. at 376, ¶¶ 51–52. Here, the undisputed evidence 

established that the School had a good-faith basis for not releasing the lien: 

Riley admitted that he did not provide an invoice as promised; Riley agreed 

that the School would bear no construction costs yet an unpaid 
RILEY v. CARPE DIEM

Decision of the Court

4

subcontractor threatened litigation against the School; and the parties 

disputed the sufficiency of Riley’s work with respect to baseboards. The 

superior court therefore did not err by entering summary judgment for the 

School with respect to Riley’s § 33-420(C) claim.

CONCLUSION

¶8 We affirm the Rule 54(b) judgment. We deny the School’s 

requests for sanctions under ARCAP 25 and attorney’s fees under A.R.S. 

§ 12-341.01. As the prevailing party, the School is entitled to recover its 

costs upon compliance with ARCAP 21.