alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
exv10w5












Exhibit 10.5




FIRST AMENDMENT TO INDEMNITY AGREEMENT




     This Amendment to
Indemnity Agreement is entered into and effective as of December 31, 2008,
by and between Approach Resources Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), and
                                        
(the “Indemnitee”).



W I T N E S S E T H:




     WHEREAS, the Company and the Indemnitee entered into an Indemnity Agreement effective as of
July 12, 2007 (the “Indemnity Agreement”); and



     WHEREAS, the Company and the Indemnitee now desire to amend the Indemnity Agreement for
compliance with Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code and the Treasury Regulations and other
guidance thereunder;



     NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises, the parties do hereby agree as follows:



     1. The Indemnity Agreement is hereby amended to add a new Section 27 to the end thereof to
read as follows:




     27. Internal Revenue Code Section 409A. Expenses payable pursuant to this Indemnity
Agreement are intended to satisfy the indemnification arrangement exception to Section 409A
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the “Code”). Notwithstanding any
provision of this Agreement to the contrary, if any reimbursement of an Expense constitutes
deferred compensation subject to Code Section 409A (other than a “tax gross-up payment”),
such Expense shall be paid by the end of the calendar year next following the calendar year
in which the Expense is incurred, and the amount of such Expenses eligible for reimbursement
during any calendar year will not affect the amount of Expenses eligible for reimbursement
in any other calendar year. With respect to an Expense that is a “tax gross-up payment” as
defined in the Treasury Regulations under Code Section 409A, such tax gross-up payment will
be paid to the Indemnitee by the end of the calendar year following the calendar year in
which the Indemnitee remits the related taxes to the taxing authority. Any provision of
this Agreement to the contrary notwithstanding, if any payment provided for herein would be
subject to additional taxes and interest under Code Section 409A and if Indemnitee’s receipt
of such payment is not delayed until the Section 409A Payment Date, then such payment will
not be provided to Indemnitee (or Indemnitee’s estate, if applicable) until the Section 409A
Payment Date. The “Section 409A Payment Date” is the earlier of (a) the date of
Indemnitee’s death or (b) the date that is six months and one day after Indemnitee’s
“separation from service” as defined in Code Section 409A.



     2. Except as otherwise specifically set forth herein, all other terms and conditions of the
Indemnity Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.



     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Amendment to be executed on the date
first indicated above.



	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	APPROACH RESOURCES INC.	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	By:	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	Name:	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	Title:	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	INDEMNITEE	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	Name:
648 A.2d 1127

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. JAMES BAKER, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Argued September 27, 1994

Decided October 27, 1994.

*Robert L. Sloan,*Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant *(Susan L. Reisner,*Acting Public Defender, attorney).

*Robert A. Suarez,*Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent *(.Andrew K Ruotolo, Jr.,*Union County Prosecutor, attorney; *Mr. Suarez*and *Steven J. Kafiowitz,*Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the letter brief).

*Janet Flanagan,*Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause on behalf of *amicus curiae,*Attorney General of New Jersey *(Deborah T. Poritz,*Attorney General, attorney).

PER CURIAM.

The judgment is affirmed, substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Skillman’s majority opinion for the Appellate Division, reported at 270 *N.J.Super.*55, 636 A.2d 553 (1994).

O’HERN, J.,

dissenting.

I would reverse, substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Kestin’s dissenting opinion, reported at 270 *N.J.Super.*79, 636 A.2d 553 (1994).

For affirmance — Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, GARIBALDI and STEIN — 6.

For reversal — Justice O’HERN — 1.
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

                             LIBERTY PROPERTY TRUST

                           CERTIFICATIONS REQUIRED BY
            RULE 13a-14(b) UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

      In connection with the Annual Report of Liberty Property Trust (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2006, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, GEORGE J. ALBURGER, JR., Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
of the Company, certify in connection with Rule 13a-14(b) under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, that based on my knowledge:

      (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.

/s/ GEORGE J. ALBURGER, JR.
----------------------------
George J. Alburger, Jr.
Executive Vice President and
Chief Financial Officer

Date: August 7, 2006
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 12, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-10312

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

GEORGE GIRARD JOHNSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:04-CR-41-2

--------------------

Before KING, WIENER, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Counsel appointed to represent George Girard Johnson has

requested leave to withdraw from this appeal and has filed a

brief as required by Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 

Johnson has received a copy of counsel’s motion and brief but has

not filed a response. Our independent review of the brief and

the record discloses no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. 

Counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is

excused from further responsibilities, and the APPEAL IS

DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.
EXHIBIT 21

                PARENT CORPORATION AND (STATES OF QUALIFICATION)

1. On Stage Entertainment, Inc., a Nevada corporation (South Carolina, Missouri,
Florida, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Wisconsin and Texas.

     NAME, JURISDICTION AND (STATES OF QUALIFICATION) FOR ALL SUBSIDIARIES

1.  On Stage Theaters, Inc., a Nevada corporation (California*)
2.  On Stage Theaters Surfside Beach, Inc., a Nevada corporation (South 
    Carolina)
3.  On Stage Theaters North Myrtle Beach, Inc., a Nevada corporation (South 
    Carolina)
4. On Stage Theaters  Canada,  Inc., an Ontario  corporation 5. Blazing Piano's,
Inc., a Nevada coropration (Florida) 6. Fort Liberty, Inc., a Nevada corporation
(Florida) 7. King Henry's,  Inc., a Nevada  corporation  (Florida) 8. Wild Bills
California,   Inc.,  a  Nevada  corporation  (California)  9.  On  Stage  Casino
Entertainment,  Inc., a Nevada  corporation  10. On Stage  Merchandise,  Inc., a
Nevada corporation 11. On Stage Events,  Inc., a Nevada corporation 12. On Stage
Marketing,  Inc., a Nevada corporation 13. On Stage Productions,  Inc., a Nevada
corporation 14. Legends in Concert, Inc., a Nevada corporation (Florida)

*On Stage  Theaters,  Inc.  does business as On Stage Dinner  Theaters,  Inc. in
California.
EXHIBIT 31.1

Certification Required by Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 13a-14(a) (Chief
 Executive Officer)

I, Joseph L. LaMonica, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Q of PennFed Financial Services, Inc.
(the "Registrant");

2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the consolidated financial statements, and other
financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material
respects the consolidated financial condition, results of operations and cash
flows of the Registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The Registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Registrant and have:

      a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
      disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision,
      to ensure that material information relating to the Registrant, including
      its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
      entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
      prepared;

      b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the Registrant's disclosure controls and
      procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
      effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures as of the end of
      the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

      c) Disclosed in this report any change in the Registrant's internal
      control over financial reporting that occurred during the Registrant's
      most recent fiscal quarter (the Registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the
      case of the Company's annual report) that has materially affected, or is
      reasonably likely to materially affect, the Registrant's internal control
      over financial reporting.

5. The Registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
Registrant's auditors and the audit committee of Registrant's board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent function):

      a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
      operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
      reasonably likely to adversely affect the Registrant's ability to record,
      process, summarize and report financial information; and

      b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
      employees who have a significant role in the Registrant's internal control
      over financial reporting.

Date: May 14, 2004


/s/ Joseph L. LaMonica
--------------------------------------
Joseph L. LaMonica
President and Chief Executive Officer


                                       28
858 A.2d 585

#### OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL, Petitioner v. David Sangho KIM, Respondent.

No. 946 Disciplinary Docket No. 3.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Aug. 12, 2004.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM:

AND NOW, this 12th day of August, 2004, there having been filed with this Court by David Sangho Kim his verified Statement of Resignation dated June 11, 2004, stating that he *646desires to resign from the Bar of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in accordance with the provisions of Rule 215, Pa.R.D.E., it is

ORDERED that the resignation of David Sangho Kim be and it is hereby accepted and he is DISBARRED ON CONSENT from the Bar of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and it is further ORDERED that he shall comply with the provisions of Rule 217, Pa.R.D.E. Respondent shall pay costs, if any, to the Disciplinary Board pursuant to Rule 208(g), Pa.R.D.E.
1 

15-4150-cv

Riley v. Brook

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed 

on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a 

document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an 

electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order 

must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 23rd day of June, two thousand sixteen. 

PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 

SUSAN L. CARNEY, 

CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, 

Circuit Judges. 

 

KATHLEEN RILEY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 

v. No. 15-4150-cv 

JONATHAN BROOK, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

 

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Sharon L. Annis, Buehler & Annis, P.L.C., 

Brattleboro, VT. 

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Allan R. Keyes & Eric J. Morgan, Ryan 

Smith & Carbine, Ltd., Rutland, VT. 

Appeal from the November 24, 2015 judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Vermont (Christina C. Reiss, Chief Judge). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED. 
2 

Plaintiff-appellant Kathleen Riley appeals from the District Court’s November 24, 2015 

judgment dismissing her complaint as barred by the applicable statute of limitations. “We review de 

novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, including its legal interpretation and application 

of a statute of limitations . . . .” Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v. Quicken Loans Inc., 810 F.3d 861, 865 

(2d Cir. 2015). Applying this standard, we affirm, substantially for the reasons stated by the District 

Court in its thorough and well-reasoned November 24, 2015 opinion and order. See Riley v. Brook, 

No. 2:15-CV-150, 2015 WL 7572308 (D. Vt. Nov. 24, 2015) (citing Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 513 

(2016)). 

CONCLUSION 

We have considered all of Riley’s arguments on appeal and found them to be without merit. 

Accordingly, the November 24, 2015 judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
#### Frederick August TUJAGUE, III v. ATMOS ENERGY and B & K Underground, Inc.

No. 2011-CC-2395.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 16, 2011.

In re Tujague III, Frederick August;— Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 2005-12720; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW1076.

Denied.
News United States Air Force
 Brothers in armsPublished Jan. 12, 2015
                        
                        By Senior Airman Justyn Freeman
                        
                        
                        Air Force Public Affairs Agency
                **HILL AIR FORCE BASE, Utah (AFNS) --**
                Brothers in arms is a common expression among military members, but rarely do actual siblings directly complement each other's contributions to the mission. 
At the 388th Fighter Wing, 1st Lt. Sean Rush, a pilot in the 421st Fighter Squadron, and Staff Sgt. Brandon Rush from the 388th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, are doing exactly that.
When it comes to the relationship between aircraft maintainers and pilots, Sean said that it is important to maintain a close, professional relationship with the crew chief, because every day he steps into a jet his life depends on the work done by the maintenance team.
"We definitely joke about pilot versus maintenance," Sean said. "It is a playful rivalry, but we both realize that we 100 percent rely on each other."
Brandon was assigned to Hill AFB in January 2010, after joining the Air Force more than 10 years ago. When he was just a child, he developed an interest in working with his hands, so when he was asked to build his list of job preferences, he filled all five slots with positions that fell in the mechanical career field.
"The opportunity just kind of fell into my lap," Brandon said. "My grandpa was also in the Air Force, so it has always been in our blood."
Sean also followed in his grandfather’s footsteps, taking on the same career field as the former fighter pilot. While studying at Westminister College in Salt Lake City, Sean was simultaneously working toward a commission through the ROTC program at the University of Utah through a crosstown agreement.
"With Brandon going to the Air Force, a lot of things came together that definitely made me want to fly," Sean said. "My brother actually gave me my first salute when I commissioned three years ago, so that was pretty cool."
After completing pilot training, the entire class of graduating pilots is provided a sheet of available bases to choose from based on his or her respective aircraft training.
"There was one slot to Hill and everyone knew I wanted it," Sean said. "I really like Salt Lake City and my wife wanted to go to school at the University of Utah, which she is doing now. With Brandon being here, it was definitely an added bonus."
Brandon's tour at Hill AFB is coming to a close as he recently received orders to Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, but the brothers agree their time here together was a rarity and therefore, very rewarding.
"My brother went out to help me launch my first flight here at Hill," Sean said. "I am proud of him and what he has done. Having him be there made it more special for me than your average sortie. For him to launch me and give the salute, that was pretty special."brothers 



Hill AFB 



ACC 



388th Fighter Wing 



family 



AF family
<PAGE>   1
                                                                      EXHIBIT 15


                         ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF INDEPENDENT
                          CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
                 REGARDING INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' REVIEW REPORT


The Board of Directors
Northfield Laboratories Inc.:

With respect to registration statements of Form S-8 of Northfield Laboratories
Inc., we acknowledge our awareness of the use therein of our report dated
October 6, 1999 related to our review of interim financial information.

Pursuant to Rule 436(c) under the Securities Act of 1933, such report is not
considered a part of a registration statement prepared or certified by an
accountant or a report prepared or certified by an accountant within the
meaning of sections 7 and 11 of the Act.


                                                /s/ KPMG LLP
                                                -------------------------
                                                    KPMG LLP

Chicago, Illinois
October 13, 1999
#### Henry Van Voorhis v. Florence M. Van Voorhis.

*Divorce*— Appeal *by wife*— Costs.

The defendant having appealed from a decree granting complainant a divorce on the ground of adultery, and it appearing that she is without means, and that he is the owner of at least $25,000 of available property, defendant is allowed the sum of $775 for the expenses of her appeal.

Motion for an order for the payment of the expenses of an appeal from a decree of divorce.

Argued February 9, 1892.

Granted February 10, 1892.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

*277*McGarry & McKnight,*for motion.

*Ward & Ward, contra.*

Per Curiam.

Complainant filed his bill for divorce in the Kent circuit court, in chancery, where a decree was entered dissolving the marriage. Motion is now made in this Court for an order to enable the defendant to appeal.

It appears that the complainant is the owner of at least $25,000 of available property, and that the defendant has no means whatever; that there was a large amount of testimony taken in the court below, the record containing over 3,000 folios, and that the cost of procuring a copy from the stenographer, and printing the record and briefs, together with clerk’s fees, amounts to nearly $800, of which amount the defendant is unable to pay any part. She presents these facts by affidavits which are not very much in dispute. She also shows by the certificate of a member of the bar of this State, in good standing, that her claim of appeal is meritorious, and, in the opinion of the attorney, should be heard in this Court. On the hearing of the motion here the solicitor for the complainant offers, if the order is made requiring the complainant to furnish the means to perfect the appeal, to do the printing, and this is assented to by defendant’s solicitor. Defendant’s solicitor has already procured a. copy of the stenographer’s minutes, but it has not been paid for. It is a case of great importance to the defendant, as the charges against her in the bill are of a character which affect her reputation for chastity.

We therefore grant the motion, and order that the complainant pay to the defendant or her solicitor the sum of $242 (being the cost of stenographer’s minutes already procured by him, and costs of printing briefs, *278and clerk’s fees of this Court) within 10 days after service upon his solicitor of a certified copy of such order; that the complainant cause the whole of said record to be printed within 60 days from that date, and deliver the same to the clerk of this Court. It is further ordered that, unless the said $242 shall be so paid within the time limited herein, the defendant may procure the record to be printed, and that the complainant pay to the defendant or her solicitor, on demand, the full sum of $775 for such expenses. It is further ordered, should the said $242 be so paid, and the complainant refuse or neglect to cause said record to be printed within said 60 days, that defendant cause the same to be printed, and that complainant pay, on demand, the costs and expenses thereof, to the sum of $533.
#### Terry T. RAWLS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 2D10-3659.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 25, 2011.

WALLACE, Judge.

In 1991, Terry T. Rawls pleaded nolo contendere to burglary and sexual battery. He was sentenced to five years in prison for the burglary and to life in prison for the sexual battery. On direct appeal, this court affirmed Mr. Rawls’ judgment and sentences. *Rawls v. State,*596 So.2d 1255 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).

In October 2001, Mr. Rawls filed a motion for postconviction DNA testing. At the time, Mr. Rawls’ nólo contendere plea disqualified him from obtaining the requested relief. *See*§ 925.11(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001); *Smith v. State,*854 So.2d 684, 685 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); *Stewart v. State,*840 So.2d 438, 438 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). In March 2002, citing Mr. Rawls’ nolo contendere plea, the postconviction court denied his motion.

In July 2010, Mr. Rawls filed a second motion for postconviction DNA testing. The postconviction court entered an order denying the second motion based on its earlier order. Unfortunately, the postcon-viction court overlooked that the law now allows postconviction DNA testing in cases where a defendant has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a felony before July 1, 2006. § 925.11(l)(a)(2), Fla. Stat. (2010); *McDole v. State,*46 So.3d 1154, 1155 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); *Menendez v. State,*41 So.3d 1066, 1067 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010); *Glenn v. State,*954 So.2d 732, 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); *Lindsey v. State,*936 So.2d 1213, 1214 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). Accordingly, Mr. Rawls’ nolo contendere plea is no longer a bar to his motion for postconviction DNA testing. The postcon-viction court erred in relying on its earlier order to deny Mr. Rawls’ motion.

For these reasons, we reverse the post-conviction court’s order denying Mr. Rawls’ motion for postconviction DNA testing and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

DAVIS and VTLLANTI, JJ., Concur.