IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-10150

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff–Appellee

v.

RICHARD CHARLES MARCEL,

Defendant–Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:05-CR-270-1

Before DENNIS, OWEN, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Richard Charles Marcel appeals the 24-month sentence imposed after 

his third revocation of supervised release. The sentence was the statutory 

maximum and 15 months above the advisory guidelines range.

Marcel argues that the district court imposed a procedurally 

unreasonable revocation sentence because it considered the improper factor of 

punishment when sentencing him. We typically will uphold a revocation 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 30, 2018

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 18-10150

2

sentence as long as it is not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Miller, 634 

F.3d 841, 843 (5th Cir. 2011). Because Marcel did not object that the district 

court relied on an improper factor, we review this claim for plain error only. 

See United States v. Whitelaw, 580 F.3d 256, 259 (5th Cir. 2009). To succeed 

under this standard, Marcel must show a clear or obvious error that affects his 

substantial rights. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). If 

he makes this showing, this court has the discretion to correct the error if it 

seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial 

proceedings. See id.

To the extent that the district court impermissibly referenced 

punishment, the remark, standing alone, does not establish plain error. See 

United States v. Walker, 742 F.3d 614, 616 (5th Cir. 2014). The court 

mentioned the factor only once and did not engage in a lengthy or repeated 

discussion of the need to provide just punishment for the offense. Further, it 

took into account other factors, including deterrence and protection of the 

public, both of which were appropriate considerations. See Miller, 634 F.3d at 

844; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), (C); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Just punishment for 

the offense was not a dominant factor in the court’s decision to impose the 24-

month revocation sentence, see Walker, 742 F.3d at 616, and, thus, the district 

court did not commit a clear or obvious procedural error, see Puckett, 556 U.S. 

at 135.

Marcel also argues that the district court imposed a substantively 

unreasonable sentence because it was more than twice the advisory guidelines 

range of imprisonment and contends that the facts and circumstances of his 

case do not justify the sentence.

We review the substantive reasonableness of a challenged sentence for 

abuse of discretion. United States v. Winding, 817 F.3d 910, 913 (5th Cir. 

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2016). A revocation sentence is substantively unreasonable if the district court 

did not take into account a factor that was entitled to significant weight, gave 

significant weight to factors that were irrelevant or improper, or made a clear 

error in judgment when balancing sentencing factors. United States v. Warren, 

720 F.3d 321, 332 (5th Cir. 2013).

The district court implicitly considered the Chapter Seven policy 

statements as well as Marcel’s mitigation arguments and ultimately concluded 

that the 24-month sentence was necessary to provide adequate deterrence and 

to protect the public from future crimes—factors that were appropriate for the 

district court to consider in imposing the revocation sentence and which we

will not reweigh. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see also

§ 3583(e). As for the length of the sentence, we have “routinely affirmed 

revocation sentences exceeding the advisory range, even where the sentence 

equals the statutory maximum.” Warren, 720 F.3d at 332 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). Marcel has not shown that his revocation 

sentence is substantively unreasonable. See id.

AFFIRMED.

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