COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges McClanahan, Haley and Senior Judge Willis

SARAH DICKENSON MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 2712-08-3 PER CURIAM MAY 12, 2009 MICHAEL CLARK

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RUSSELL COUNTY Michael L. Moore, Judge (Hugh F. O’Donnell; Client Centered Legal Services of Southwest Virginia, on brief), for appellant. No brief for appellee. (David R. Tiller; Tiller & Tiller, P.C., on brief), Guardian ad litem for minor child
Sarah Dickenson (mother) appeals the trial c ourt’s ruling regarding the termination of father’s parental rights. Moth er argues that the tria l court erred in not accepting a petition to terminate father’s parental rights because no foster plan existed. For purposes of this appeal, we

assume arguendo that mother has standing to ch allenge the trial court’s ruling. Laurels of Bon Air, LLC v. Medical Facilities of Am erica LIV Limite d Partnership , 51 Va. App. 583, 589, 659 S.E.2d 561, 564 (2008). Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, 1 we conclude that this

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.

1 Pursuant to Rule 5A:8, appellant prepared a written statement of facts in lieu of a transcript. She filed it with the trial court a nd provided the necessary notice; however, the trial judge did not sign the written stat ement of facts. We have re viewed the record, including the judge’s opinion letter and the final order, and our review i ndicates that the wr itten statement of facts, even if signed, would not affect the dis position of this appeal. Therefore, it is not necessary to remand for acti on by the trial judge on the wr itten statement of facts.- 2 - appeal is without merit. Acco rdingly, we summarily affirm th e decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.
BACKGROUND On April 25, 2008, Michael Clark (father) filed a petition in the juve nile and domestic relations district court (the JDR court), reques ting that his parental rights to his child be terminated pursuant to Code § 16.1-283. On May 23, 2008, the JDR court found that father’s petition was “contrary to public policy and the law” and would not terminate father’s parental rights. Mother appealed the JDR court’s decision to the trial court and requested that father’s parental rights to the child be terminated. The tr ial court held that it c ould not terminate father’s parental rights without the filing of a fost er plan. Mother timely noted her appeal.
ANALYSIS Mother argues that the trial court erred in holding that it could not terminate father’s parental rights because of the absence of a foster care plan. Mother argues that it is in the child’s best interests to terminate father’s parental rights. “Under Virginia’s statutory scheme, the circumstances providing authority for the termination of parental rights, and the at tendant obligation of support, are limited.” Church v. Church , 24 Va. App. 502, 506, 483 S.E.2d 498, 500 (1997). The statutory scheme for the cons titutionally valid termination of residual parental rights in th is Commonwealth is primarily embodied in Code § 16.1-283. That scheme provides detailed procedures designed to protect th e rights of the parents and their child. These procedures must be st rictly followed before the courts are permitted to sever the natural and legal bond between parent and child. Rader v. Montgomery County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 5 Va. App. 523, 526, 365 S.E.2d 234, 235-36 (1988).- 3 - “The obligation to comply with the statut ory scheme that has been designed by the legislature to protect parents and children cannot be abandoned by a j udge under the guise of seeking to ‘promote the best interests of the child.’” Willis v. Gamez , 20 Va. App. 75, 82, 455 S.E.2d 274, 278 (1995) (citation omitted). Here, no foster care plan existed as re quired by Code § 16.1-283. Since the parties did not comply with Code § 16.1-283, the trial court c ould not terminate father’s parental rights. Mother argues that Code § 16.1-283 should be read with “leeway” because Code § 16.1-283 leads to an “absurd result” when a chil d, such as the one in this case, does not fall under the provisions for a foster care plan. We reject mother’s argument because the “Supreme Court has stated that ‘statutes terminating the legal relationship between parent and child should be interpreted consistently with the governme ntal objective of preserving, when possible, the parent-child relationship.’” Willis , 20 Va. App. at 83, 455 S.E.2d at 278 (quoting Weaver v. Roanoke Dep’t of Human Res. , 220 Va. 921, 926, 265 S.E.2d 692, 695 (1980)). Accordingly, we summarily affirm the trial court’s ruling. Rule 5A:27. Affirmed.