alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Alfredo SILVA.

No. 2011-KK-0391.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 4, 2011.

In re Silva, Alfredo; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 501^64; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0060.

Denied.
```

Exhibit 99.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                    AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with Form 10-KSB Annual Report of Winmax Trading Group, Inc. (the
"Company") for the period ended December 31, 2002, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned
hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

        o   the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
            13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

        o   the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.

May 9, 2003
By: /s/ Gerald E. Sklar
    -------------------
Gerald E. Sklar, President, Chief Executive Officer,
Chief Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer
```
No. 52.

#### James Long and others, plaintiffs in attachment, and plaintiffs in error *vs.*Kinchen Strickland claimant, and defendant in error.

'[1.] The security to the appeal bond in the Court below must be made a party to the writ of error.

[2.] The writ of error may be amended so as to include such security, but only upon the production to the Court of the written consent of such security, together with a waiver of tire notice to which he is entitled.

From Madison Superior Court Attachment against Barkley Sims, in which the defendant in error was claimant of the property levied on under the attachment.

It appeared that the cause was tried in the Court below on the appeal, and that Richardson Hancock, one of the securities to the appeal bond was not made a party to the writ of error.

Motion to dismiss writ of error on this ground.

Cobb, for plaintiffs in error.

Mitchell, for defendant in error.

*349
      *By the Court*

Warner, J.

delivering the opinion.

In this case there was a motion to dismiss the writ of error, on the ground that Richardson Hancock, one of the securities to the appeal bond in the Court below was not made a party. This ques- [1.] tion was settled by this Court in the case of John Dill et al. vs. Gabriel Jones, 2 Kelly, 79, and re-affirmed in the case of James Morris *vs.*Wiley Parish & Co. Ib. 287. In both of those cases we held, for the reasons therein stated, that the security on the appeal bond in the Court below, was a necessary party to the writ of error in this Court, and that is to be considered as the established rule of this Court from which we do not consider ourselves at liberty to depart. The writ of error may be amended, but in our judgment [2.] there should be produced to the Court the *mitten*consent of the party whose name is sought to be introduced, together with a waiver of the notice to which he is entitled, which the party moving the amendment in this case has failed to exhibit to the Court. Let the writ of error therefore be dismissed.
No. 3.

#### Moore *vs.*Ferrell et al.

*Motion to dismiss Writ.*

. . motion was made to dismiss the writ of error on the ground that the order of the Judge below, dissolving the injunction, was made at Chambers. And that the Sugjpreme Court possesses no jurisdiction over decisions made by Judges of the SupeCourts in vacation.

Akin for the motion.

Underwood and Trippe contra.

*By the Court*

Lumpkin, Judge.

The 25th section of the Act of 1811 provides that, “All bills of injunction granted by the Superior Courts, or any of them, or which may hereafter be granted, shall stand and be considered as open for argument and amendment at the *first Term*of the Superior Court which may be holden after the passing of this act, in and for the county were the suit originated ; or the *first Term*after the granting of such Bill of Injunction,” &c. This court will not decide, because it is hot necessary, how far the Rule in Equity, authorizing applications to dissolve injunctions to be made *before*the *first Term*of the court to which the same is returnable, is warranted by the statute just quoted. Were the alternative presented of rescinding this Rule of Practice, promotive as it may be of public justice, or retaining jurisdiction of decisions made out of Term time we should not *hesitate:*We find ourselves, however, in no such dilemma. The 4th section of the Act creating this tribunal provides that “ all causes of a criminal or civil nature may, for alleged error in any *decision,*sentence, *judgment*or decree, of any such Superior Court, be carried up from the counties in the respective districts aforesaid to the Judges of the Supreme Court, at the respective terms thereof for such district, to be by the said Supreme Court revised and determined.” The only inquiry then is, was the order of the judge below, dissolving the injunction, a “ decision, sentence, judgment or decree” of the Superior Court ? If so, the right of this court to revise and determine it is clearly given.

It is true that in another part of the same section the law provides that the costs shall bje paid, and the bond given within four days after the *Term*at which the exceptions were taken. A different phraseology obtains, however, in the previous part of the section specifying the mode in which causes are to be carried up, namely: that it is to *be*done within four days after the *trial*of the cause in which the decision or sentence has been made. Were it otherwise, we should still hold that the session of the court below, although intermediate the *regular*Terms, was nevertheless a *Term*quoad the judgment, or decree complained of.

Motion overruled.
#### Jose BRUNO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D10-267.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Sept. 3, 2010.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 15, 2010.

Jose Bruno, Mayo, pro se.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Wesley Heidt, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

We review an order denying a Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus that alleged *75the victim of the underlying offense — sexual activity with a child in familial or custodial authority — executed a written statement recanting her prior statements and denying that the defendant committed the crime for which he was convicted. We reverse the order denying the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and remand this case to the trial court to consider the petition as a motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to rule 3.850, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, and to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding the victim’s written statement. *See Doby v. State,*25 So.3d 598 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (explaining why defendant’s petition for habeas corpus was properly treated by trial court as a motion under rule 3.850); *Watts v. State,*985 So.2d 21, 22 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (“Therefore, the circuit court should have treated Watts’ petition as a motion for postconviction relief, despite its improper title.” (citing *Bixler v. State,*971 So.2d 934, 935 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (holding that circuit court should have treated the habeas petition as a motion for postconviction relief); *Valdez-Garcia v. State,*965 So.2d 318, 319 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (noting that where defendant filed petition for ha-beas corpus in circuit court in which he was convicted, court should have treated petition as a motion seeking postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850))), *review denied,*4 So.3d 678 (Fla.2009); *Curtis v. State,*870 So.2d 186, 186 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); *Harris v. State,*789 So.2d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

MONACO, C.J., SAWAYA and COHEN, JJ., concur.
| (logo) WELLS            FARGO | Corporate Trust Services

MAC R1204-010 9062 Old Annapolis Road

Columbia, MD 21045

 

Tel:  410 884-2000

Fax: 410 715 2380 |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

 

 

J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.

270 Park Avenue, 

New York, NY 10017

 

RE:  Annual Statement of Compliance

 

The undersigned, a duly authorized officer of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Certificate Administrator for the Westminster Mall Whole Loan (in such capacities, “Wells Fargo”), hereby certifies as follows as of and for the year ending December 31, 2014 (the “reporting period”):

 

 

(c)     A review of Wells Fargo’s activities during the reporting period and of its performance under the applicable servicing agreement(s) listed on Schedule A hereto (the “Servicing Agreement(s)”) has been made under my supervision; and

 

(d)     To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, Wells Fargo has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Servicing Agreement(s) in all material respects throughout the reporting period, except as noted on Schedule B.

 

 

 

March 19, 2015

 

 

/s/ Brian Smith

Brian Smith

Vice President

 

 

 

 

To:  J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.

 

Schedule A

 

 

List of Servicing Agreement(s) and Series

 

2.        Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of July 1, 2014 by and among J.P. MORGAN CHASE COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES CORP., as Depositor, WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Master Servicer, MIDLAND LOAN SERVICES, A DIVISION OF PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Special Servicer, WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Certificate Administrator, WILMINGTON TRUST, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee and PENTALPHA SURVEILLANCE LLC, as Senior Trust Advisor relating to the Series JPM 2014-C21 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, relating to the Westminster Mall Whole Loan, a pari passu portion of which is included in the Series JPM 2014-C20 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates transaction.

 

 

 

 

 

To:  J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.

Schedule B

 

 

Material Non-Compliance with Servicing Obligations

 

Not Applicable
#### Dennis Joseph Healey *v.*State of Indiana.

[No. 172A14.

Filed November 15, 1972.]

*56
      *John Martin Smith, Charles L. Quinn, Smith and Quinn,*of Auburn, for appellant.

*Theodore L. Sendak,*Attorney General, *John McArdle,*Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.

Hoffman, C.J.

This appeal arises from the conviction of defendant-appellant Dennis Joseph Healey of the crimes of illegal sale and possession of marijuana.

Defendant Healey was charged by amended affidavit in two counts. Count One of the amended affidavit charged the illegal possession and control of “a dangerous drug, to-wit: cannabis to-wit marihuana, [marijuana] * * Count Two of the amended affidavit charged the illegal sale of “a dangerous drug to-wit: cannabis to-wit: marihuana, [marijuana] * * Both counts of the amended affidavit were phrased in the terms of the Indiana Dangerous Drug Act. [IC 1971, 16-6-8-1 to 16-6-8-10, Ind. Ann. Stat. §§35-3331 to 35-3339 (Burns 1972 Cum. Supp.) ].

Appellant contends that at the time of his trial marijuana was not legally considered a dangerous drug. We agree, at least insofar as it was not defined as such by the Legislature. Marijuana was explicitly defined, and its possession and sale were made illegal under the Indiana Uniform Narcotic Drug Act [IC 1971, 35-24-1-1 to 35-24-1-26, Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 10-3519 to 10-3543 (Burns 1972 Cum. Supp.)].

Had Healey filed a timely motion to quash, the amended affidavit would have been subject to such motion. *Burk*v. *State (1971),*257 Ind. 407, 275 N.E.2d 1.

However, no motion to quash the amended affidavit was filed by Healey. Rather, Healey contends that having proceeded to trial under the amended affidavit, there was a failure of proof that marijuana was a dangerous drug, and thus his motion for a directed finding should have been sustained.

*57The amended affidavit charged Healey with the *sale and possession of a dangerous drug,*namely, marijuana. Healey was not charged with the sale and possession of a narcotic drug, nor was he charged with the sale and possession of marijuana. He was charged with the *sale and possession of a dangerous drug.*The prosecution did not prove marijuana was a dangerous drug, in fact it was legally barred from doing so because at the time of the trial in the instant case the possession and sale of marijuana were made illegal not by the Indiana Dangerous Drug Act, but by the Indiana Uniform Narcotic Drug Act. In the amended affidavit Healey was charged under the wrong statute and trial proceeded on such charges. The conviction and the sentence were based on different crimes than were charged and the conviction was not for a lesser included offense of the crimes charged. Such a variance cannot be upheld. *Hobbs*v. *State*(1969), 253 Ind. 195, 252 N.E.2d 498, 500.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed with instructions to grant Healey’s “motion for a directed finding.”

Judgment reversed with instructions.

Sharp and Staton, JJ., concur.

Note. — Reported at 288 N.E.2d 781.
Exhibit 32.1

Certification Pursuant To

18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

as Adopted Pursuant To

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

The undersigned hereby certifies, in my capacity as an officer of
NSTAR, for purposes of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:



| | (i) | the enclosed Annual Report of NSTAR on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2007, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (ii) | the information contained in such Annual Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of NSTAR.
| | ---- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                         |  |  |  |                                                
|------------------------ |  |  |  | -----------------------------------------------
|                         |  | 
|Dated: February 11, 2008 |  |  |  | /S/    THOMAS J. MAY                           
|                         |  |  |  | Thomas J. May                                  
|                         |  |  |  | Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer
News United States Air Force
 Around the Air Force: May 20Published May 20, 2016
                        
                        By Air Force TV
                
                 **FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, Md. (AFNS)** – This look around the Air Force features a B-52 Stratofortress accident at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam; Gen. Lori Robinson assumed command of North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command; and Edwards AFB, California, tested the RQ-4 Global Hawk in icy conditions, without ice. Hosted by Staff Sgt. Traci Keller.
For previous episodes, click here.
Related links:
- Robinson assumes command of NORAD, NORTHCOM 
- Flight plan outlines next 20 years for RPAATAF 



B-52 



Andersen AFB 



Guam 



NORAD 



Edwards AFB 



California 



Global Hawk
857 A.2d 182

#### COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Kenneth E. CHASE, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted Jan. 13, 2004.

Decided July 22, 2004.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 22nd day of July, 2004, the order of the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas is reversed insofar as it declared the Registration of Sexual Offenders Act unconstitutional, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. *See Commonwealth v. Williams,*574 Pa. 487, 832 A.2d 962*535(2003); *Commonwealth v. Maldonado,*576 Pa. 101, 838 A.2d 710(2003).

Justice EAKIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>   9

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                               14,960
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                                    0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                          0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                          0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                              380,722
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                359,850
<LOANS>                                           1,253,216
<ALLOWANCE>                                           4,076
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                    1,710,467
<DEPOSITS>                                        1,117,807
<SHORT-TERM>                                         68,190
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                                  24,514
<LONG-TERM>                                         386,561
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                     0
<PREFERRED>                                               0
<COMMON>                                                 60
<OTHER-SE>                                          113,335
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                    1,710,467
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                      23,327
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                     7,093
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                         16
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                     30,436
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                                   13,202
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   21,364
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                                 9,072
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                           200
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                        0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                       5,021
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                       4,910
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                            3,176
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                           0
<CHANGES>                                                 0
<NET-INCOME>                                          3,176
<EPS-BASIC>                                            0.41
<EPS-DILUTED>                                          0.39
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                         7.18
<LOANS-NON>                                           2,374
<LOANS-PAST>                                              0
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<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                      3,983
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                           107
<RECOVERIES>                                              0
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<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                                   0


</TABLE>
#### STATE ex rel. Kevin JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-1183.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 27, 2011.

In re Johnson, Kevin; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 570193; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 CW 587.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.
No. 75-657.

#### Local 3489, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, et al. *v.*Usery, Secretary of Labor.

C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 424 U. S. 907.] Motion of petitioners for leave to file supplemental brief after argument granted.
#### STATE ex rel. Dwayne SIMMS v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2009-KH-2481.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 29, 2010.

In re Simms, Dwayne; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 00-6313; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-WR-928.

Denied.
627 A.2d 155

#### IN THE MATTER OF GARY M. KAMINSKY, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW.

July 22, 1993.

ORDER

The Office of Attorney Ethics having filed a petition with the Supreme Court recommending that GARY M. KAMINSKY of MARLBORO, be immediately temporarily suspended from the practice of law, and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that GARY M. KAMINSKY is temporarily suspended from the practice of law, effective immediately, and until further Order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that the Office of Attorney Ethics take such protective action, pursuant to *Rule*l:20-ll(c), as may be appropriate to gain possession and control of the legal files, records, practice and trust assets of GARY M. KAMINSKY, wherever situate, pending further Order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that all funds, if any, currently existing in any New Jersey financial institution maintained by GARY M. KAMINSKY, pursuant to *Ride*1:21-6, shall be restrained from disbursement except upon application to this Court, for good cause shown, pending the further Order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that GARY M. KAMINSKY show cause before this Court on September 14, 1993, at 2:00 p.m., Supreme Court Court*162room, Hughes Justice Complex, Trenton, New Jersey, why his temporary suspension and the restraints herein should not continue pending final disposition of any ethics proceedings pending against him and further why the funds restrained from disbursement should not be transmitted by the financial institutions who are the present custodians to the Clerk of the Superior Court for deposit in the Superior Court Trust Fund, pending the further Order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that David E. Johnson, Jr., Esquire, or his designee, present this matter to the Court; and it is further

ORDERED that GARY M. KAMINSKY be restrained and enjoined *from*practicing law during the period of his suspension and that he comply with Administrative Guideline No. 23 of the Office of Attorney Ethics dealing with suspended attorneys.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

December 21, 2009 

1214 

Order 

 

December 21, 2009 

139757 

HAROLD J. HOPSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v SC: 139757 

 COA: 292482 

WCAC: 08-000236 

SELECT AUTO PARTS, INC., and STATE 

FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 26, 2009 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.