NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

SCOTTY THOMPSON, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2D13-5874

)

STATE OF FLORIDA, )

)

Appellee. )

___________________________________)

Opinion filed July 15, 2015.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk 

County; Catherine L. Combee, Judge.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and 

Sharon Morgan Vollrath, Special Assistant 

Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, and Brandon R. Christian, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for 

Appellee.

KHOUZAM, Judge.

Scotty Thompson appeals his convictions and sentences for manufacture 

of methamphetamine; possession of a listed chemical; actual or constructive 

possession of a structure used for trafficking, sale, or manufacture of controlled 

substances; and possession of drug paraphernalia. Thompson argues that the trial 
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court erred in denying his motion to suppress and motion for judgment of acquittal. We 

affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

The record shows that in response to a burglary, officers traced a phone 

found at the victim's residence to a codefendant at the address of Thompson's sister. 

Officers testified that Thompson's sister invited them into the house. Thompson's sister, 

however, testified that the police asked if Thompson was there and she said, "yes" while 

gesturing toward Thompson who was sitting on the couch. She maintained that she did 

not invite them in, instead testifying that she was pushed out of the way by the police 

officers. Thompson offered testimony stating

[w]ell, I noticed that somebody knocked on the door and my 

sister answered the door, and I heard them ask for me and 

she said, 'Yeah' and she pointed at me. Like I was on the 

couch. And then they walked right by her and asked me to 

get up and asked me if I could talk to them.

Officers spoke with Thompson and asked for permission to search his bedroom. 

Thompson refused, stating that he did not want his bedroom searched because there 

were needles with methamphetamine in the bedroom. Based on this and other 

statements, the officers obtained a search warrant. They discovered stolen items as 

well as illegal drugs in the residence. Thompson was charged with burglary while 

armed; two counts of grand theft; manufacture of methamphetamine; possession of a 

listed chemical; actual or constructive possession of a structure used for trafficking, 

sale, or manufacture of controlled substances; possession of methamphetamine; 

possession of drug paraphernalia; and possession of cannabis. 
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The defense moved to suppress evidence resulting from the search on the 

grounds that the officers did not have Thompson's sister's consent to enter the home 

and that the officers had omitted this information in bad faith in the application for a 

warrant. The court denied the motion to suppress, finding that Thompson's sister's 

testimony was not credible. The court also found no merit in the allegations concerning 

the application for a search warrant. 

A jury trial was held. Defense moved for a judgment of acquittal on the 

ground that the contraband was found in a room where Thompson was a joint occupant. 

Thompson argued that the State failed to prove he had the ability to exert dominion and 

control over the items. He also pointed out that there was no presumptive testing or 

chemical analysis on the contraband. The motion was denied. Ultimately, the jury 

found Thompson guilty of manufacture of methamphetamine; possession of a listed 

chemical; actual or constructive possession of a structure used for trafficking, sale, or 

manufacture of controlled substances; and possession of drug paraphernalia and 

acquitted him on the remaining counts. He was sentenced to seven years in prison. 

II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS

A ruling on a motion to suppress reaches review clothed with a presumption 

of correctness, and the reviewing court must interpret the evidence and reasonable 

inferences in a manner consistent with the trial court's ruling. Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 

598, 608 (Fla. 2001). However, the application of the law to the facts, in particular whether 

a suspect is "in custody," is a legal question subject to de novo review. Id.

Thompson argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to 

suppress because the law enforcement officers did not have consent to enter the home. 
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The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits warrantless searches;

however, a warrantless search may be validated if the State proves "the search falls into 

an established constitutional exception to the warrant requirement, such as consent."

Alamo v. State, 891 So. 2d 1059, 1061 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); see also Schneckloth v. 

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). Whether consent is voluntarily given is a 

question of fact determined considering the totality of the circumstances. Schneckloth,

412 U.S at 227. Consent can be given by the suspect himself or by a third party. See

Cooper v. State, 706 So. 2d 369, 370 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Further, "police may accept 

an invitation to make a warrantless entry into premises only under circumstances that 

would cause a man of reasonable caution to believe that the person making the 

invitation is authorized to do so." Id. at 372 (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 

(1990)). Although there was conflicting evidence as to whether Thompson's sister had 

invited the officers into the residence, sufficient evidence exists to support a finding that 

the officers reasonably perceived Thompson's sister's response (in the form of a 

gesture) as an invitation to enter the residence and she in fact had the authority to invite 

them inside. 

Furthermore, Thompson argues that his incriminating statement should 

have been suppressed because he made it pursuant to an interrogation; however, 

evidence was presented showing he volunteered the information. Incriminating 

statements are admissible where they are made voluntarily and spontaneously and are 

not the product of interrogation. Hayward v. State, 24 So. 3d 17, 36 (Fla. 2009), as 

revised on denial of reh'g (Dec. 10, 2009) (quoting Rosher v. State, 319 So. 2d 150, 152 

(Fla. 2d DCA 1975)). The determination of whether the evidence should have been 
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suppressed depends on the type of encounter that occurred between law enforcement 

and the defendant. A consensual encounter involves minimal police contact. As the 

Florida Supreme Court described in Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185, 186 (Fla. 1993), 

"[d]uring a consensual encounter a citizen may either voluntarily comply with a police 

officer's requests or choose to ignore them. Because the citizen is free to leave during 

a consensual encounter, constitutional safeguards are not invoked." Therefore, a 

consensual encounter is not an interrogation and does not trigger Miranda1 warnings. 

In the instant case, the officers testified that they asked Thompson for 

consent to search the bedroom and he refused, answering that there were needles with 

methamphetamine in the room. Thompson did not provide the information in response 

to an inquiry about the contents of the room; instead, it was volunteered pursuant to a 

consensual encounter between Thompson and the officers. Thompson was free to 

simply reply "no" to the search request or ignore the officers rather than volunteering 

information about the contents of the bedroom. Accordingly, the court did not err in 

denying Thompson's motion to suppress. 

III. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL 

A motion for judgment of acquittal is a ruling on an issue of law, thus the 

trial court's order is reviewed de novo, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to 

the State. See Gizaw v. State, 71 So. 3d 214, 217 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). 

Thompson argues that the court erred in denying his motion for judgment 

of acquittal because the State failed to prove that he had knowledge of or the ability to 

exercise dominion and control over the contraband found in a jointly occupied room. 

 

1Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Additionally, Thompson argues the State did not prove he possessed listed chemicals 

knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that they would be used to unlawfully 

manufacture a controlled substance. 

"A motion for judgment of acquittal should be granted in a circumstantial 

evidence case if the [S]tate fails to present evidence from which the jury can exclude 

every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt." State v. Law, 559 So. 2d 187, 188 

(Fla. 1989). However, "[t]he [S]tate is not required to 'rebut conclusively every possible 

variation' of events which could be inferred from the evidence, but only to introduce 

competent evidence which is inconsistent with the defendant's theory of events." Id. at 

189 (citation omitted).

In the instant case, the evidence was sufficient to support Thompson's 

conviction and rebut his allegation that he did not know the chemicals were to be used 

for the production of methamphetamine or that he did not possess them. In addition to 

the testimony showing Thompson refused to allow a search of the bedroom because 

there were needles containing methamphetamine, detectives found in the bedroom the 

chemicals needed to produce methamphetamine with the "one pot" method (ether, 

ammonium nitrates, pseudoephedrine, lithium). Detectives also found glass pipes and 

baggies that tested positive for methamphetamine as well as digital scales often used to

weigh methamphetamine for sale. Although the chemicals were not tested, they were 

found in their original packaging and a detective testified as to the labels on the bottles 

and their contents. Additionally, Thompson admitted that he smoked 

methamphetamine, his girlfriend also admitted that they used methamphetamine 

together, and Thompson's brother admitted that he received methamphetamine from 
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Thompson. Testimony showed that Thompson was staying in that bedroom of his 

sister's residence with his girlfriend, where they both shared access and control of the 

room. This evidence was sufficient to support Thompson's conviction and was 

inconsistent with Thompson's claim that he did not know the chemicals were to be used 

for the production of methamphetamine or that he did not possess them. The trial court 

did not err in denying Thompson's motion for judgment of acquittal, and thus we affirm 

his conviction and sentence. 

Affirmed. 

VILLANTI, C.J., and LUCAS, J., Concur.