alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NO. 01-14-01015-CV

______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST DISTRICT

HOUSTON, TEXAS

______________________________________________________________________________

SANDRA NZE

Appellant

V.

UCHENNA NWABUEZE

Appellee

______________________________________________________________________________

APPELLANT'S RESPONSE TO APPELLE'S MOTION

TO DISMISS APPEAL AS MOOT

Appellant, Sandra Nze, through counsel, Nwadi Nwogu asks the Court to deny Appellee's

motion to dismiss appeal as moot and retain matter on the Court's docket.

On March 26, 2015, Appellant filed with the court, a brief detailing the lack of subject

matter jurisdiction by the justice court that rendered judgment in the eviction matter. The

judgment of the justice court and the judgment affirmed by the County Court on December 31,

2014 are void.

Appellee's brief was due on June 25, 2015 but is yet to be filed.

On June 10, 2015, Appellee served Appellant with a Writ of Possession based on the void

order of the court requiring her to vacate her property within 24 hours. Appellant sought

protection from the court through a Writ of Mandamus and a Motion for Emergency Stay of the ACCEPTED

01-14-01015-CV

FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS

6/26/2015 5:48:20 PM

CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERKWrit of Possession

- Case No. 01-15-00526-CV. The Court denied the motion and petition. On

June 18, 2015, Appellant filed a Motion for Rehearing of the Court's Opinion and paid the

applicable fees. That Motion is still pending with the Court. Appellant also requested from the

Court a consolidation of the matters. On June 22, Appellee executed his Writ of Possession.

Appellant requests the Court to issue its opinion striking the order on which the writ is

based as void, make an order restraining Appellee from selling the property and restore

Appellant to her rightful home pending the equitable division of the property by the divorce

court.

The matter before this Court is not Moot. Appelle's arguments and allegations are untrue.

The issue is whether the Justice Court had jurisdiction to decide title to the parties' property and

the answer is NO.

For these reasons, Appellant asks the Court to deny Appellee's motion to dismiss this

appeal as moot and retain Appellant's suit on the Court's docket.

Respectfully submitted,

ODUNZE NWOGU LAW GROUP, P.C.

By : /s/ NWADI NWOGU

NWADI NWOGU

Texas Bar No. 24074826

6001 SAVOY DRIVE

SUITE 302

HOUSTON, Texas 77036

Tel. (713)334

- 8080

Fax. (713)334

- 3533

Email address: NWADI@ONLAWGROUP.COM

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on June 26, 2015 a true and correct copy of this document was served via email facsimile transmission on Carlette White.

/s/ NWADI NWOGU

NWADI NWOGU
#### Miguel MALDONADO and Chris Keith, Esq., Petitioners, v. STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, ex rel. Sonia GUERRA, Respondent.

No. 3D10-3385.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

April 13, 2011.

Chris Keith, Boca Raton, for petitioners.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and William H. Branch, Tallahassee, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.

Before SALTER and EMAS, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Based on the respondent’s proper confession of error, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari and quash the Order to Appear and Show Cause as to both petitioners.

Certiorari granted; order quashed.
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<NET-INCOME>                               (3,159,010)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.23)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.23)
        

</TABLE>
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BARRY M. ATKINS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

CALYPSO SYSTEMS, INC., a California 

corporation; EDEN KIM, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-15125 

D.C. No. 2:14-cv-02706-NVW 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Neil V. Wake, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 18, 2017**

Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

Barry M. Atkins appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment 

in his diversity action alleging state law claims in connection with a dispute over a 

debt-to-stock conversion. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

DEC 20 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-15125 

review de novo, Lukovsky v. City of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 

2008), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Atkins’ contract 

claims because they are barred by the applicable statute of limitations under 

California law. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 337(1) (four-year statute of limitations 

for any action upon a contract); Krieger v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc., 285 Cal. 

Rptr. 717 (Ct. App. 1991) (section 337(1) applies to claims of breach of covenant 

of good faith and fair dealing). The district court properly concluded that Atkins 

was not entitled to equitable estoppel. See Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 

F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1991) (a party cannot create an dispute of fact with an 

affidavit contradicting his prior deposition testimony); Vu v. Prudential Prop. & 

Cas. Ins. Co., 33 P.3d 487 (Cal. 2001) (equitable estoppel under California law

requires reliance be reasonable).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Atkins’ tort claims 

because they are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations under Arizona law. 

See Hullett v. Cousin, 63 P.3d 1029, 1034 (Ariz. 2003) (two-year statute of 

limitations for negligent misrepresentation); Walker v. Walker, 500 P.2d 898, 899-

900 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (two-year statute of limitations for conversion); San
3 17-15125 

Manuel Copper Corp. v. Redmond, 445 P.2d 162, 166 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968) (fouryear statute of limitations for unjust enrichment). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees 

pursuant to its inherent powers. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-

46, 50 (1991) (stating standard of review and explaining that a court may assess 

attorney’s fees when a fraud has been practiced upon it).

Appellees’ request for attorney’s fees on appeal, set forth in their answering 

brief, is denied without prejudice to filing a motion in accordance with the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure and Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.6.

AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT
32.1





HERITAGE
OAKS BANCORP




Quarterly
report on Form 10Q


for the
quarter ended June 30, 2009





CERTIFICATION





Pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





The
undersigned, who is the Chief Executive Officer of Heritage Oaks Bancorp (the
“Company”), hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 USC Section 1350, that to my
knowledge, (i) the Quarterly Report on Form 10Q for the quarter ended June 30,
2009, as filed by the Company with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
“Quarterly Report”), to which this Certification is an Exhibit, fully complies
with the applicable requirements of Section 13(a) and 15(d) of the Exchange Act;
and (ii) the information contained in this Quarterly Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.





Dated:  August
      10, 2009
            /s/ Lawrence P. WardLawrence
      P. Ward,President
      and Chief Executive Officer





A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required
by Section 906, has been provided to Heritage Oaks Bancorp, and will be retained
by Heritage Oaks Bancorp and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Henrietta WILLIAMS.

No. 2009-KP-2832.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 12, 2010.

PER CURIAM.

Writ granted; the ruling of the court of appeal ordering an evidentiary hearing on several issues raised in respondent’s application for post-conviction relief is reversed and the district court’s summary dismissal of the petition is reinstated. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed the application without an hearing, tacitly concluding that the “factual and legal issues c[ould] be resolved based upon the application and answer, and supporting documents, including relevant transcripts, depositions and other rehable documents submitted by either party or available to the court.” La.C.Cr.P. art. 929(A); *State ex rel. Tassin v. Whitley,*602 So.2d 721, 722 (La.1992).
EX-10.13





 Exhibit 10.13 
  





 
  
 COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE 

28 June 2021 
 Mr Adrian Hinton 

By email: 
 Dear Adrian 

Amendment to your Consultancy Agreement dated 18 March 2019 

I write to confirm that Bionomics would like to amend your consultancy services (which was last changed on 24 March 2021) by changing the daily
rate of $1,500 (plus GST) as set out on Schedule 3 of the agreement dated 18 March 2019, to $20,000 per month and be paid via Bionomics payroll system, for the period 1 July 2021 to 25 March 2022. 

All other terms and conditions of your Consultancy Agreement remain unchanged. 

Please confirm your agreement to this amendment on the terms outlined in this letter by signing and dating both copies of this letter and returning one
copy to me at your earliest convenience. 
 Yours sincerely 
  

	
	 /s/ Errol De Souza

	 Errol De Souza

	 Executive Chairman


  

					
	 /s/ Adrian
Hinton                                        
     
	 		  	
29/6/21                       
                      

	 Mr Adrian Hinton
	 		  	 Date
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<CASH>                                         10,147
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               10,927
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              3,400
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<NET-INCOME>                                    1,119
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     .13
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     .13
        

</TABLE>
#### STATE ex rel. Tyrone ALLEN v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2009-KH-2218.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 28, 2011.

In re Allen, Tyrone; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 92-5998; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Nos. 93-KA-844, 97-KH-331.

Granted. Pursuant to this Court’s order in *State v. Cordero,*08-KH-1717 (La.10/3/08), 993 So.2d 203, the application is transferred to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal to address according to the procedures adopted by the court in its en banc order of September 9, 2008.

*955WEIMER, J.,

concurs in part and dissents in part for the reasons assigned in *Cordero,*08-1717 (La.10/3/08), 993 So.2d 203.
#### Caleb Daniel CLIFTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D10-6268.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 2, 2011.

*860Caleb Daniel Clifton, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

We affirm the summary denial of appellant’s Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion. As to Ground Ten of that motion, we note that jurisdiction to entertain a request for a belated appeal lies with the District Court of Appeal and not the circuit court. *See*Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(c)(2); *Bowers v. State,*939 So.2d 337 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).

AFFIRMED.

KAHN, DAVIS, and HAWKES, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 31.3

CERTIFICATION

I, Robert E. Ward,
certify that:

1. I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of Eloxx
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; and

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material
fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.

Date: April 19, 2018



|                                                                                           
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Robert E. Ward                                                                         
|Chairman of the Board of Directors, Chief Executive Officer and Principal Executive Officer
```

[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 196 (Tuesday, October 12, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 62570]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-25206]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division

Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and 
Production Act of 1993--Marine Well Containment Venture

    Notice is hereby given that, on August 18, 2010, pursuant to 
Section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 
1993, 15 U.S.C. 4301 et seq. (``the Act''), Marine Well Containment 
Venture (``MWCV'') has filed written notifications simultaneously with 
the Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission disclosing (1) 
the identities and nationalities of the parties to the production 
venture and any person who controls a party to the venture and (2) the 
nature and objectives of the venture. The notifications were filed for 
the purpose of invoking the Act's provisions limiting the recovery of 
antitrust plaintiffs to actual damages under specified circumstances.
    Pursuant to Section 6(b) of the Act, the identities of the parties 
to the venture are: Chevron USA, Inc., Houston, TX; ConocoPhillips Co., 
Houston, TX; ExxonMobil Development Co., Houston, TX; and Shell 
Offshore Inc., Houston, TX. The general area of MWCV's planned activity 
is (i) to design, produce (assemble and/or construct), operate, 
maintain, and own a system to provide emergency hydrocarbon well 
containment and related non-emergency services in the Gulf of Mexico 
and potentially in other regions; and (ii) to perform and sponsor 
related research and development activities.

Patricia A. Brink,
Deputy Director of Operations, Antitrust Division.
[FR Doc. 2010-25206 Filed 10-8-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-11-M
```
Exhibit 32.1



Certification of Chief Executive Officer



Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of
CV Therapeutics, Inc. (the Company) hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge, that:



(i) the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2004, (the
Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and



(ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                       |  |  |  |                                    |  |                                                    
|---------------------- |  |  |  | ---------------------------------- |  | ---------------------------------------------------
|                       |  | 
|Dated:    May 10, 2004 |  |  |  | /s/    LOUIS G. LANGE, M.D.,
PH.D.
|                       |  |  |  |                                    |  | Louis G. Lange, M.D., Ph.D. Chief Executive
Officer
#### Travis A. WELSH, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D11-0181.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Feb. 7, 2011.

Rehearing Denied March 25, 2011.

Travis A. Welsh, pro se, Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied without prejudice to the court’s consideration of the merits of the pending appeal of the order denying petitioner’s motion for postconviction relief.

KAHN, PADOVANO, and CLARK, JJ., concur.
#### James E. LANG, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D11-1447.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 21, 2011.

Rehearing Denied May 31, 2011.

James E. Lang, pro se, Petitioner.

*1185Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

James E. Lang’s “petition for permission to file a habeas corpus petition alleging manifest injustice in the county where incarcerated, or motion to certify conflict with Second District Court of Appeal concerning habeas corpus usage, or motion for permission to file manifest injustice habeas corpus with this court” will be-treated by this court as a habeas corpus petition. In case number 1D11-0739 Lang has appealed the order of the Circuit Court for Dixie County which transferred his habeas corpus petition to the Circuit Court for Pinel-las County, where Lang was sentenced. Because he has invoked an adequate and available legal remedy in that appeal, the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

BENTON, C.J., WEBSTER and VAN - NORTWICK, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 751 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 751

    To authorize the President to award the Medal of Honor to James 
    Megellas, formerly of Fond du Lac, Wisconsin, and currently of 
 Colleyville, Texas, for acts of valor on January 28, 1945, during the 
                  Battle of the Bulge in World War II.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 30, 2017

 Mr. Grothman introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To authorize the President to award the Medal of Honor to James 
    Megellas, formerly of Fond du Lac, Wisconsin, and currently of 
 Colleyville, Texas, for acts of valor on January 28, 1945, during the 
                  Battle of the Bulge in World War II.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. AUTHORIZATION FOR AWARD OF THE MEDAL OF HONOR TO JAMES 
              MEGELLAS FOR ACTS OF VALOR DURING BATTLE OF THE BULGE.

    (a) Waiver of Time Limitations.--Notwithstanding the time 
limitations specified in section 3744 of title 10, United States Code, 
or any other time limitation with respect to the awarding of certain 
medals to persons who served in the Armed Forces, the President may 
award the Medal of Honor under section 3741 of such title to James 
Megellas, formerly of Fond du Lac, Wisconsin, and currently of 
Colleyville, Texas, for the acts of valor during World War II described 
in subsection (b).
    (b) Acts of Valor Described.--The acts of valor referred to in 
subsection (a) are the actions of James Megellas on January 28, 1945, 
in Herresbach, Belgium, during the Battle of the Bulge when, as a first 
lieutenant in the 82d Airborne Division, he led a surprise and 
devastating attack on a much larger advancing enemy force, killing and 
capturing a large number and causing others to flee, single-handedly 
destroying an attacking German Mark V tank with two hand-held grenades, 
and then leading his men in clearing and seizing Herresbach.
                                 <all>
```
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Julius BAGLEY.

No. 2011-KK-0781.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 3, 2011.

In re Bagley, Julius; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 491-188; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0129.

Denied.