2003 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

6-10-2003

Taylor Milk Co Inc v. Intl Brhd Teamsters

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 02-3461

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Recommended Citation

"Taylor Milk Co Inc v. Intl Brhd Teamsters" (2003). 2003 Decisions. Paper 468.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 02-3461

___________

TAYLOR MILK COMPANY, a Pennsylvania Corporation,

 Appellant

v.

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, AFL-CIO, an

unincorporated association and labor organization;

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, DAIRY CONFERENCE -

USA AND CANADA, an unincorporated association and labor

organization; SERVICE PERSONNEL AND EMPLOYEES OF THE DAIRY

INDUSTRY TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 205, an unincorporated

association and labor organization

___________

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

(D.C. Civil No. 95-cv-01663)

District Judge: The Honorable D. Brooks Smith

___________

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

May 23, 2003

BEFORE: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, SLOVITER, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.

(Filed June 10, 2003)
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___________

OPINION OF THE COURT

___________

NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.

Taylor Milk Company appeals from an order of the District Court 

determining that Taylor did not suffer cognizable damages from an illegal secondary

boycott orchestrated by the Appellees, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, et al. On

appeal, Taylor argues that the District Court erred in its interpretation of the collective

bargaining agreement and abused its discretion by failing to allow additional damage

evidence regarding the profitability of alternative plans. We have plenary review over the

District Court’s interpretation of the bargaining agreement and we review the

determination to prohibit reopening of the record for abuse of discretion. Finding no fault

with the decision of the District Court, we will affirm.

I.

The issue of damages has been before a panel of this court previously in

Taylor Milk Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 248 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2001)

(Taylor I). In Taylor I, we addressed both the issue of IBT’s liability for the secondary

boycott and whether the District Court’s award of $50,000 in damages was correct. After

affirming the District Court’s determination that IBT was liable for damages resulting

from the secondary boycott, we turned to the proper determination of damages. In
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reversing the District Court, we noted that “[o]ur review of the record reveals that the

District Court did not commit clear error insofar as it found that TMC had failed to prove

the profitability of Plan B and Plan C.” Id. at 247. We were concerned, however, that the

District Court had erred in its evaluation of the profitability of Plan A by failing to

consider the viability of the Plan as it related to the collective bargaining agreement. In

remanding, we gave specific instructions to the District Court:

If, upon remand, the District Court determines that

TMC would not have prevailed at arbitration and

maintains its determination that Plans B and C would

not have been profitable, it is clear that TMC could

have suffered no damage from IBT's actions, as the

loss of TMC's right to purchase the Borden plant

would have placed it in no worse of an economic

position than if it had purchased the plant. In other

words, If TMC could not have profited from

purchasing the Borden plant, there can be no basis for

awarding TMC damages.

Id. at 249.

On remand, the District Court reaffirmed its previous decision as to Plans B

and C, and acknowledged the need to determine if the language of the collective

bargaining agreement prohibited the implementation of Plan A. Focusing on a notransfer clause in the collective bargaining agreement, the District Court found that Plan

A could not have been successfully implemented via arbitration. We agree. The notransfer clause in the bargaining agreement states:

No work or services presently performed or hereafter assigned

to the collective bargaining unit with the exceptions listed

above, will be subcontracted, transferred, leased or assigned,
1. The paragraph referenced by the no-transfer provision lists the following as the

only exceptions: “ orange juice, dips, sour cream, cottage cheese, yogurt, butter, oleo,

eggs, sterile products, nutrish and cultured products, novelties, ice cream mix, Weight

Watchers ice cream, and diet ice cream.” Art. II, Sec. 6(a).

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in whole or in any part to any other person, firm or

corporation or non-unit employees unless otherwise expressly

provided in this Agreement.

Article II, Section 6(a), at App. 70. As Plan A will transfer work done by Appellees to a

new facility, Taylor must avoid this provision to demonstrate a likelihood of success at

arbitration. 

There are two possible exceptions built into the provision. First, Taylor

could avoid the no-transfer clause by showing that the product to be transferred was

found in “the exceptions listed” in the preceding paragraph. This option is unavailing,

however, because Plan A involved transferring fluid milk production and fluid milk is not

one of the enumerated exceptions in the preceding section.1 The second exception to the

no-transfer clause is when such action is “otherwise expressly provided” in the bargaining

agreement. The District Court correctly found that all the provisions identified by Taylor

failed in one material respect—none of the provisions “expressly provided” for the

transfer of fluid milk production. On appeal, Taylor cites a portion of section 6(d), which

provides that “[n]othing in this Section shall be interpreted as limiting the Employer’s

right to sell or merge its business or go out of business in while or in part.” Taylor now

argues that the “real intent of Plan A” was to effect a merger, which would satisfy the
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“expressly provided” exception to the no-transfer clause. Taylor’s reliance on this

provision is misplaced. Plan A clearly contemplates the outright purchase of the Borden

facility, not a merger of operations with Borden. Expanding a business by purchase of a

new facility is not a “merger” contemplated by section 6(d). Thus, Taylor has failed to

identify a provision in the collective bargaining agreement that expressly provides

authorization to transfer production of fluid milk to the Borden facility and, therefore,

cannot demonstrate the profitability of Plan A.

Taylor also alleges that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to

reopen the record and admit additional expert testimony regarding the alternative plans. 

This argument does not withstand scrutiny. In reaching its decision, the District Court

correctly applied the factors we enunciated in Rochez Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d

891, 894 n.6 (3d Cir. 1975). We see no reason to disturb the substantial discretion

afforded to the District Court to reopen the record after a remand.

II.

For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the order of the District Court.
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_________________________

TO THE CLERK:

Please file the foregoing opinion.

/s/ Richard L. Nygaard

Circuit Judge