alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 24 (Friday, February 5, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 6032-6033]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-2496]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION


Property Obtained Through the Use of Charge Cards; Notice of GSA 
Bulletin FMR B-25

AGENCY: Office of Governmentwide Policy, General Services 
Administration (GSA).

ACTION: Notice of a bulletin.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This notice announces GSA Federal Management Regulation (FMR) 
Bulletin B-25 which provides guidance to all agencies acquiring 
property using the government charge card.

DATES: The bulletin announced in this notice became effective January 
25, 2010.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For clarification of content, contact 
General Services Administration, Office of Governmentwide Policy, 
Office of Travel, Transportation and Asset Management, at (202) 501-
1777. Please cite Bulletin FMR B-25.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

A. Background

    Although charge cards provide a great benefit in streamlining 
procurement of needed items, the property obtained in this way presents 
special management and accountability challenges to agencies. Appendix 
B of OMB Circular A-123 prescribes policies and procedures to agencies 
regarding how to

[[Page 6033]]

maintain internal controls that reduce the risk of fraud, waste, and 
error in Government charge card programs. As provided in Appendix B of 
OMB Circular A-123, agencies must have reasonable, effective internal 
controls so that this property can be accounted for and to ensure 
property is limited to use for official purposes.
    The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Open Government Directive 
instructs agencies to take specific actions to implement the principles 
of transparency, participation and collaboration. Agencies are 
accountable for the quality and objectivity of internal controls over 
the spending information. Agencies must make certain that information 
conforms to OMB guidance on information quality.

B. Procedures

    Bulletins regarding asset management are located on the Internet at 
www.gsa.gov/fmrbulletin as Federal Management Regulation (FMR) 
bulletins.

    Dated: January 29, 2010.
Robert Holcombe,
Director, Personal Property Management Policy.
[FR Doc. 2010-2496 Filed 2-4-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6820-14-P
EXHIBIT
32.1





STATEMENT
FURNISHED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE


SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002, 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350





The
undersigned, David T. Stoner, is the Chief Executive Officer of ViewCast.com,
Inc. (the “Company”).  This statement is being furnished in connection
with the filing by the Company of the Company’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q
for the quarter ended September 30, 2009 (the “Report”).




By
execution of this statement, I certify that:




(A)
            the
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or
      78o(d)) and




(B)
            the
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company
      as of the dates and for the periods covered by the
  Report.




This
statement is authorized to be attached as an exhibit to the Report so that this
statement will accompany the Report at such time as the Report is filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350.  It is not
intended that this statement be deemed to be filed for purposes of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.




A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.




November 16, 2009
                      
                      /s/  David T.
    StonerDate
                      
                      David
      T. StonerChief
      Executive Officer
#### N. A. Kidd v. D. D. Dugan.

(No. 1592.)

November 24, 1883.

Appeal from Grayson County.

Opinion by

"Will-son, J.

§ 50. *Assignments of error.*This case was tried by the judge. There are but two assignments of error, as follows: “1st. The court erred in not rendering judgment for the defendant and against the plaintiff.” “ 2d. The court erred in not rendering judgment for the defendant for the amount of his damages.” *Held:*These assignments are not in compliance with the rules. [Rules 24, 25, 26; 47 Tex. 602.] Where the trial is had before the judge without a jury, rule 27 requires that the rules above cited shall govern, as in cases tried by jury. The correct practice is for the party who desires to appeal from the decision of the judge, to request the judge to state in writing, and file in the record, the conclusions of fact found by him, separately from the conclusions of law, as a predicate for a specific assignment of errors. [Hardin v. Abbey, 57 Tex. 582.] There being no proper assignment of error, and no fundamental error apparent in the record, the judgment is

Affirmed.
#### Franklin Armando CANALES-ORDONEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D10-2101.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Aug. 2, 2011.

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Noel A. Pelella, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rebecca Roark Wall, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. *See State v. Pate,*656 So.2d 1323 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).

ORFINGER, C.J., GRIFFIN and COHEN, JJ., concur.
#### Lee E. JONES, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D10-2911.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

July 23, 2010.

Lee E. Jones, pro se, Petitioner.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied on the merits.

THOMAS, CLARK, and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Nathaniel DOWL, Jr.

No. 2010-KO-1325.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 7, 2011.

In re Dowl Jr., Nathaniel; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 474-843; to the *885Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-KA-0989.

Denied.
#### STATE ex rel. Edward R. WYNN v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2011-KH-0478.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 14, 2011.

In re Wynn, Edward R.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 272-987; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No.

The application is transferred to the district court with instructions to the district judge to act on relator’s post-conviction relief application filed via certified mail receipt on December 18, 2009. The district court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of its judgment.
EXHIBIT 32.2


CERTIFICATIONS





The undersigned, as the Chief Financial Officer of Valley Financial Corporation, certifies that the Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2010, which accompanies this certification, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the periodic report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Valley Financial Corporation at the dates and for the periods indicated.  The foregoing certification is made solely for purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United States Code and is subject to the knowledge and willfulness qualifications contained in Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350(c).




Dated:  August 10, 2010

/s/Kimberly B. SnyderChief Financial Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM
     THE JUNE 30, 1996 FINANCILA STATEMENTS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY
     BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>                                              
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               DEC-31-1996       
<PERIOD-START>                  APR-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                    JUN-30-1996
<CASH>                          637,166
<SECURITIES>                          0       
<RECEIVABLES>                         0
<ALLOWANCES>                          0
<INVENTORY>                           0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                663,864
<PP&E>                        9,721,325        
<DEPRECIATION>                  864,169
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                9,583,380         
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           347,016       
<BONDS>                       5,681,403
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                 0
<PREFERRED>                           0
<COMMON>                          5,250
<OTHER-SE>                    3,549,712
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>  9,583,380
<SALES>                       1,000,825
<TOTAL-REVENUES>              1,020,554
<CGS>                                 0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                         0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                540,826
<LOSS-PROVISION>                      0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>              189,203    
<INCOME-PRETAX>                  92,250      
<INCOME-TAX>                          0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>              92,250
<DISCONTINUED>                        0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                       0
<CHANGES>                             0
<NET-INCOME>                     92,250
<EPS-PRIMARY>                      0.18 
<EPS-DILUTED>                      0.18
        


</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-7884

SHAHID L. A. MAJID, a/k/a Arthur Moseley,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

RN RICHARDS, in individual capacity; RN BELSER, in individual capacity; MS. 

BARBARA, Kitchen Supervisor, in individual capacity; CPT. CARTER, in 

individual capacity; KAROL BERRY, Health Services Headquarters, in individual 

capacity; MR. WOODHAM, Kitchen Supervisor, in individual capacity; SGT. 

SUMMERS, in individual capacity; SCDC; RN MS. HEATHER VARNADORE; 

LT. C. PARKER, in individual capacity,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Rock 

Hill. Mary G. Lewis, District Judge. (0:19-cv-01793-MGL)

Submitted: June 24, 2021 Decided: June 28, 2021

Before KING and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Shahid L. A. Majid, Appellant Pro Se. Andrew Lindemann, LINDEMANN & DAVIS, 

P.A., Columbia, South Carolina; Amy Lynn Neuschafer, COLLINS & LACY, P.C., 

Murrells Inlet, South Carolina, for Appellees.
2

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

Shahid L.A. Majid seeks to appeal the district court’s amended order adopting the 

magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissing Majid’s civil action, as well as denying 

his requests for injunctive relief. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because 

the notice of appeal was not timely filed. 

In civil cases, parties have 30 days after the entry of the district court’s final 

judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court 

extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period under 

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a 

jurisdictional requirement.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). 

The district court entered judgment on October 20, 2020. Shahid filed the notice of 

appeal on November 25, 2020.

*

 Because Shahid failed to file a timely notice of appeal or 

to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we grant Defendants’ motions to 

dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED

* For the purpose of this appeal, we assume that the date designated by Majid in his 

certificate of service is the earliest date Majid could have delivered the notice to prison 

officials for mailing to the court. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1); Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 

276 (1988).
#### Ballenger, next friend, *v.*Rock Run Iron Company *et al.*

No. 6235.

June 12, 1928.

Petition for injunction. Before Judge Edwards. Haralson superior court. August 13, 1927.

Atkinson, J.

1. Section 56 of the Georgia workmen’s compensation act (Acts 1920, pp. 167, 197; Park’s Code Supp. 1922, § 3154(ddd) : Michie’s Code (1926), § 3154(56) ) in part provides that if an employer and the injured employee or his dependents'fail to reach an agreement in regard to compensation under said act, either party may make application to the commission for a hearing in regard to the matters at issue, and for a ruling thereon; and that the commission shall set a date for a hearing, “and shall notify the parties at issue of the time and place of such hearing.”

2. Section 59 of the same act (Acts 1920, pp. 167, 198; Park’s Code Supp.-1922, § 3154(ggg) ; Michie’s Code (1926), § 3154(59)) affords a right of appeal to the superior court by either party from an award of the industrial commission provided for in said act. On appeal the order of the industrial commission shall be set aside if it be found “that the industrial commission acted without or in excess of its powers.”

3. If the industrial commission, on the filing of an application by an employer as provided in said section 56, causes written notice as required by that section of the act to be served upon the injured employee or his dependents, the person so notified may object to the jurisdiction of the industrial commission on any ground that will show an absence of authority of the commission to inquire into the matter.

4. Where the industrial commission causes notice to be served as indicated above, the employee or his dependents having a remedy at law as stated in the preceding note, by filing with the industrial commission objections to the jurisdiction of that body, a court of equity will not entertain a petition by such injured employee or his dependents, in which ¿he only relief sought is a writ of injunction to prevent the industrial commission from taking and exercising jurisdiction in the matter.

5. In this case the petition for injunction was dismissed on demurrer. One of the grounds of demurrer was that the petition showed on its face that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law. This ground of demurrer was meritorious, and related to a controlling question in the case. It is unnecessary to make any ruling upon other grounds of demurrer, and specific reference will not be made to them.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*

*491
      *8. Holderness*and *M. J.*Head, for plaintiff.

*George M. Napier, J). B. Howe,*and *J. M. McBride,*for defendants.
#### SEABOARD CORPORATION and Angelo C. Rodrigues, a/k/a Angelo C. Rodriguez, Appellants, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC CAPITAL CORPORATION, Appellee.

No. 4D10-1854.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Aug. 3, 2011.

Max R. Whitney of Max R. Whitney, P.A., Deerfield Beach, for appellants.

Leo Benitez and Lizette P. Benitez of Benitez & Associates, Coral Gables, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

*Affirmed. See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee,*377 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 1979).

WARNER, POLEN and GERBER, JJ., concur.
#### The JUSTICE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. Felicia SHAMAN, Respondent.

No. 4D11-148.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

May 11, 2011.

Christian D. Lake, Assistant General Counsel, Tallahassee, for petitioner.

Felicia Shaman of the Law Offices of Felicia Shaman, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The Justice Administrative Commission (“JAC”), petitions this court for a writ of certiorari to quash a circuit court’s attorney’s fee order. The trial court awarded appointed counsel a fee amount above the flat fee detailed within Paragraph XI(6) of *1232the JAC agreement. *See*§§ 27.5804(1) *&*(12)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010). We grant the petition upon concluding that the fee order departs from the essential requirements of law.

The most recent agreement signed by respondent and JAC provides that it superseded and terminated all other agreements and that it applied to specific civil cases appointed on or after July 1, 2007. Counsel was appointed in June, 2010. By its express terms, the agreement provides that an attorney cannot seek compensation in excess of the.flat fee in civil cases unless the compensation on an hourly basis at a rate of $75.00 would be at least double the flat fee. Counsel’s billing did not meet the minimum threshold.

Accordingly, we grant the petition and quash the trial court’s order to the extent it permitted a fee in excess of the $800.00 flat fee.

GROSS, C.J., WARNER and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.
#### STATE ex rel. Ray RATTLER a/k/a Don Williams v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-1272.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 3, 2011.

In re Rattler a/k/a, Ray; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, Nos. 249-352, 249-197; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-0615.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; *State ex rel. Glover v. State,*93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; *State v. Parker,*98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; *State ex rel. Melinie v. State,*93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.
#### Robert LEFTWICH, Petitioner, v. Kenneth S. TUCKER, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Respondent.

No. 1D12-2554.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Oct. 19, 2012.

Robert Leftwich, pro se, Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Joy A. Stubbs, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of mandamus is granted and the Circuit Court in and for Leon County is directed to issue a final order in *Leftwich v. Tucker,*case number 2010 CA 004091, within a reasonable time not to exceed 30 days from issuance of mandate in this cause.

PETITION GRANTED.

DAVIS, PADOVANO, and RAY, JJ., concur.
649 A.2d 1280

#### JAY H. KATZ, ET AL. v. NEW JERSEY SPORTS AND EXPOSITION AUTHORITY, ET AL.

July 26, 1994.

ORDER

Leave to appeal is granted and the matter is summarily remanded to the trial court to reconsider the motion for summary judgment based on the new evidence presented by movants to this Court.
#### MONI ENERGY SERVICES CORP. v. Robert H. RHYNE, Jr. and Brent Trauth.

No. 2011-CC-1937.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 14, 2011.

In re Rhyne Jr., Robert H. et al.; Trauth, Brent; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 09-3396; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 11-00397.

Denied.
#### Perry M. GUYNN *v.*STATE of Arkansas

CR 98-278

968 S.W.2d 61

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Opinion delivered May 7, 1998

*Jack R. Kearney,*for appellant.

No Response.

*207Per Curiam.

Appellant, Perry M. Guynn, by his attorney, Jack R. Kearney, has filed a motion for leave to file a belated appeal. Appellant’s attorney admits that the notice of appeal was prematurely filed due to an error on his part. Ark. R. App. P. 4.

We grant the motion for a belated appeal upon counsel’s admission of error, and direct that a copy of this opinion be forwarded to the Committee on Professonal Conduct. *Woods v. State,*316 Ark. 705, 873 S.W.2d 563 (1994).
#### STATE ex rel. Johnathan MYERS v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2009-KH-2731.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 19, 2010.

In re Myers, Johnathan; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial *401Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 06-4969; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No 09-KH-868.

Denied.
I 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 7211 

To amend the Mineral Leasing Act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior 

to regulate hydraulic fracturing operations on Federal lands, and for 

other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 30, 2018 

Mr. SOTO introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Natural Resources, and in addition to the Committee on Energy and 

Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, 

in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To amend the Mineral Leasing Act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to regulate hydraulic fracturing 

operations on Federal lands, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. AUTHORITY OF BLM TO REGULATE HYDRAULIC 

4 FRACTURING OPERATIONS. 

5 (a) AUTHORITY OF BLM TO REGULATE HYDRAULIC

6 FRACTURING OPERATIONS.—The Mineral Leasing Act 

7 (30 U.S.C. 181 et seq.) is amended— 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
2 

•HR 7211 IH

1 (1) by redesignating section 44 as section 45; 

2 and 

3 (2) by adding after section 43 the following: 

4 ‘‘SEC. 44. HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OPERATIONS. 

5 ‘‘(a) REGULATORY AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of 

6 the Interior, acting through the Director of the Bureau 

7 of Land Management, shall regulate hydraulic fracturing 

8 operations on Federal lands under the administration of 

9 such Secretary with respect to the purposes of this Act. 

10 ‘‘(b) REQUIREMENTS ON OPERATORS.—The Sec11 retary of the Interior, acting through the Director of the 

12 Bureau of Land Management, shall require as a condition 

13 of receiving a permit or other authorization under this sec14 tion an operator to— 

15 ‘‘(1) conduct baseline water testing; and 

16 ‘‘(2) disclose to the public on an Internet 

17 website the chemicals used by such operator to con18 duct hydraulic fracturing operations. 

19 ‘‘(c) DEFINITION OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OP20 ERATIONS.—The term ‘hydraulic fracturing operations’— 

21 ‘‘(1) means those operations conducted in an 

22 individual wellbore designed to increase the flow of 

23 hydrocarbons from the rock formation to the 

24 wellbore through modifying the permeability of resVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:47 Dec 04, 2018 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H7211.IH H7211

kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
3 

•HR 7211 IH

1 ervoir rock by applying fluids under pressure to frac2 ture it; and 

3 ‘‘(2) does not include enhanced secondary re4 covery such as water flooding, tertiary recovery, re5 covery through steam injection, or other types of 

6 well stimulation operations such as acidizing.’’. 

7 (b) DEFINITION OF UNDERGROUND INJECTION.— 

8 Section 1421 of the Safe Drinking Water Act (42 U.S.C. 

9 300h) is amended— 

10 (1) by amending subsection (d)(1)(B) to read 

11 as follows: 

12 ‘‘(B) excludes the underground injection of 

13 natural gas for purposes of storage.’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS