UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

____________________________________

)

SANTOS F. BONILLA, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 10-cv-0224 (ABJ)

)

SIMON WAINWRIGHT, )

Warden, )

D.C. Central Detention Facility )

)

Respondent. )

____________________________________)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Petitioner Santos F. Bonilla, a prisoner at the D.C. Central Detention Facility (“D.C. 

Jail”), filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to vacate a

conviction and sentence imposed by the Superior Court for the District of Columbia.

Respondent Simon Wainwright, warden at the D.C. Jail, has moved to dismiss petitioner’s 

request for lack of jurisdiction. For the reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss will be 

granted.

BACKGROUND

On March 27, 1998, petitioner was arrested and charged with second-degree murder 

while armed, in violation of D.C. Code law. Pet. at 2.1 After a jury trial in D.C. Superior Court, 

he was found guilty of first-degree murder while armed (premeditated) and conspiracy to assault 

and commit murder. Id.; Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (“Resp.’s Mot. Dismiss”) at ¶ 4. The 

trial court judge sentenced petitioner to a term of imprisonment of thirty years to life for the first1 Because the petition for writ of habeas corpus does not include numbered paragraphs, the 

Court will cite to the page number. 
2

degree murder and a concurrent term of twenty to sixty months on the conspiracy offense. Pet. 

at 2.

Petitioner filed a motion for a new trial on November 5, 2001, claiming that there was

newly-discovered evidence that the prosecutor had coerced a government witness, Hugo 

Aleman, to testify falsely in the grand jury about petitioner’s involvement in the crime. Pet. at 2.

Petitioner also claimed that the prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence concerning Aleman’s

intoxication at the time of the offense and his prior contradictory statements about the crime. Id.

Following an evidentiary hearing on petitioner’s claims, the trial court denied his motion for a 

new trial on October 10, 2002. Id.

2

On appeal in February 2005, the government disclosed exculpatory information regarding 

another key government witness, Rosa Garcia, in an oral argument in the D.C. Court of Appeals.

Pet. at 3. Petitioner then filed a motion under section 23-110 of the D.C. Code (“section 23-110 

motion”), asking the Superior Court to vacate his conviction. Id. Petitioner’s motion was based 

on evidence that Garcia had provided a fake Social Security number and passport to the 

government when she sought admittance to the witness protection program. Id. Petitioner also 

argued that the government failed to disclose its agreement with Garcia in exchange for her 

testimony, which allegedly included not prosecuting her for any crimes and not notifying 

Immigration and Naturalization Services that she was living in the United States illegally. Id.

After an evidentiary hearing, the D.C. Superior Court found that there was no such agreement, 

2 The court found that the witness’s grand jury testimony – in which he both advanced the 

prosecution’s case, but also was unable to provide many details that would have been helpful to 

the government – was more credible than his blanket recantation, in which he claimed that all 

aspects of his grand jury testimony – including the parts where he testified that he had not seen 

something – were false. See Resp.’s Mot. Dismiss at 6, citing Pet. at Ex. S, United States v. 

Bonilla, Crim. Nos. F-2332-98, at 7–8 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Oct. 10, 2002). The court also noted that 

during the trial, the witness had been cross-examined about both his drinking and his prior 

inconsistent statements. Id. at 8.
3

and it denied the section 23-110 motion on September 1, 2006. United States v. Bonilla, Crim. 

Nos. F-2332-98, slip op. at 22 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Sept. 1, 2006); see also Pet. at Ex. EE. Petitioner 

appealed this decision. Pet. at 3.

The D.C. Court of Appeals consolidated his appeal on the 23-110 motion with the direct 

appeal. Pet. at 3. On March 26, 2009, the court held that the trial judge gave constitutionally 

deficient instructions as to aiding and abetting first-degree murder but found there was sufficient 

evidence to convict petitioner of second-degree murder. The court remanded the case to the 

Superior Court. Id. The Court of Appeals also held that the prosecutor abused the grand jury’s 

subpoena power and suppressed exculpatory evidence but that those errors did not prejudice the 

petitioner. Id.

The Court of Appeals denied his petition for rehearing en banc, and the U.S. Supreme 

Court denied certiorari. Pet. at 3. Petitioner was resentenced in D.C. Superior Court on 

December 11, 2009, to concurrent prison terms of 18 years to life for second-degree murder and 

20 to 60 months for conspiracy. Id. Petitioner filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus on 

February 16, 2010, asking the Court to vacate his conviction and the sentence imposed by the 

D.C. Superior Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court must “treat the complaint’s factual 

allegations as true . . . and must grant plaintiff ‘the benefit of all inferences that can be derived 

from the facts alleged.’” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 

2000), quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (citations omitted).

Nevertheless, the Court need not accept inferences drawn by the plaintiff if those inferences are 
4

unsupported by facts alleged in the complaint, nor must the Court accept plaintiff’s legal 

conclusions. Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 

When considering a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, plaintiff bears the burden 

of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See Lujan v. Defenders of 

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); Shekoyan v. Sibly Int’l Corp., 217 F. Supp. 2d 59, 63 (D.D.C. 

2002). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and the law presumes that “a cause lies 

outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 

(1994); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. EPA, 363 F.3d 442, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“As a court of 

limited jurisdiction, we begin, and end, with examination of our jurisdiction.”). Because 

“subject-matter jurisdiction is ‘an Art[icle] III as well as a statutory requirement . . . no action of 

the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court.’” Akinseye v. District of 

Columbia, 339 F.3d 970, 971 (D.C. Cir. 2003), quoting Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des 

Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982).

Moreover, unlike when deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court “is 

not limited to the allegations of the complaint . . . .” Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 241 

(D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds, 482 U.S. 64 (1987). Rather, a court “may consider 

such materials outside the pleadings as it deems appropriate to resolve the question whether it 

has jurisdiction to hear the case.” Scolaro v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 104 F. Supp. 2d 18, 

22 (D.D.C. 2000). See, e.g., Herbert v. Nat’l Acad. of Sciences, 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 

1992); see also Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
5

ANALYSIS

I. The Court Considers Petitioner a State Prisoner.

Petitioner filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the federal 

law generally governing petitions for writs of habeas corpus in federal court. See Pet. at 1. 

However, “[t]he D.C. Circuit has consistently held that when considering a writ of habeas

corpus, a prisoner of the District of Columbia is considered a State prisoner, when the prisoner is 

held under a conviction of the D.C. Superior Court.” Banks v. Smith, 377 F. Supp. 2d 92, 94 

(D.D.C. 2005), citing Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also Madley v. U.S. 

Parole Comm’n, 278 F.3d 1306, 1308–1310 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (concluding that “a court of the 

District of Columbia is a state court” for purposes of federal habeas cases); Milhouse v. Levi, 548 

F.2d 357, 360 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (same). Because petitioner is in custody pursuant to a 

judgment of the D.C. Superior Court, which is the equivalent of a state court in a habeas 

proceeding, the Court will construe the petition as brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the federal 

law governing petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed in federal courts by state prisoners. See 

Williams v. Apker, --- F. Supp. 2d ---, Civ. No. 10-0522, 2011 WL 118497, at *6 n. 1 (D.D.C. 

Mar. 28, 2011); Banks, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 94. 3

3 Petitioner argues that his petition is properly brought under section 2241 because 

“[s]ection 2241 is the only statute that confers habeas jurisdiction to hear the petition of a federal 

prisoner who is challenging . . . the execution of his sentence.” Petitioner’s Opposition to 

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (“Pet.’s Opp.”) at 2, citing Coady v. Vaugh, 251 F.3d 480, 485 

(3d Cir. 2001). But section 2241 does not afford a remedy in this case for two reasons. First, the 

law is clear that petitioner is considered to be a state prisoner and not a federal prisoner. Second, 

a number of circuits have held that motions challenging the “execution of sentence” pursuant to 

section 2241 relate to the “the manner, location, or conditions” of the sentence, and not the 

fairness of the trial. Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 242 (3d Cir. 2005), 

quoting Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000). See also Jiminian v. Nash,

245 F.3d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 2001) (“A motion pursuant to § 2241 generally challenges the 

execution of a federal prisoner’s sentence, including such matters as the administration of parole, 

computation of a prisoner’s sentence by prison officials, prison disciplinary actions, prison 
6

II. Petitioner Fails to Show that D.C. Code § 23-110 is an Inadequate or Ineffective 

Remedy.

Petitioner seeks habeas relief challenging his conviction and sentence on two grounds: he 

claims that (1) his Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the trial court’s admission of a codefendant’s confession in their joint trial, see Pet. at 1, 33–40; and (2) that the government 

withheld exculpatory evidence and information concerning a key witness’s intoxication and prior 

contradictory statements about the crime. Pet. at 1, 40–53. Respondent has moved to dismiss 

petitioner’s claims, arguing that they have been fully litigated and rejected by the D.C. Superior 

Court and the D.C. Court of Appeals, and that petitioner has failed to establish that D.C. Code §

23-110 is an ineffective or inadequate remedy by which to challenge his convictions. Resp.’s 

Mot. Dismiss at 2. 

A claim for habeas relief under Section 2254 requires a petitioner to meet certain 

pleading thresholds. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); D.C. Code § 23-110(g).4 Specifically, D.C. 

law provides that a federal court may not consider a habeas petition unless the local remedy is 

“inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of the detention. D.C. Code § 23-110(g).5 See

transfers, type of detention and prison conditions.”); Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 865 

(10th Cir. 2000) (“[A]n attack, focusing on where [the prisoner’s] sentence will be served, seems 

to fit better under the rubric of § 2241.”) Despite petitioner’s claim that he is challenging the 

execution of his sentence, he does not allege any of the above and therefore cannot proceed 

under section 2241.

4 Section 23-110 of the D.C. Code sets forth the relationship between federal habeas 

review under section 2254 and the remedies for petitioners in the District of Columbia, 

commonly referred to as “local remedies.” D.C. Code § 23-110(g). 

5 “An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to 

apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section shall not be entertained by the Superior Court 

or by any Federal or State court if it appears that the applicant has failed to make a motion for 

relief under this section or that the Superior Court has denied him relief, unless it also appears 

that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” D.C. 

Code § 23-110(g).
7

also Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381, 384 (1977) (stating that section 23-110 includes an 

“unequivocal statutory command” to federal courts not to entertain a petition for habeas relief 

unless it appears that the remedy under section 23-110 is inadequate or ineffective); Byrd v. 

Henderson, 119 F.3d 34, 36–37 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (internal footnote omitted) (holding that a 

District of Columbia prisoner has no recourse to a federal judicial forum unless the local remedy 

is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”). A remedy is inadequate or 

ineffective if it deprives a defendant of “any opportunity for judicial rectification of so 

fundamental a defect in his conviction as having been imprisoned for a nonexistent offense.” In 

re Smith, 285 F.3d 6, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2002), quoting In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 

1998). 

In the District of Columbia, the local remedy available to a prisoner is a motion under 

section 23-110(a) of the D.C. Code, which provides that “[a] prisoner in custody under sentence 

of the Superior Court claiming the right to be released . . . may move the court to vacate, set 

aside, or correct the sentence.” D.C. Code § 23-110(a). If a prisoner is unsuccessful in raising a 

claim through a section 23-110 motion, that does not automatically render the remedy 

inadequate or ineffective. See Byrd, 119 F.3d at 38; see also Plummer v. Fenty, 321 Fed. App’x

7, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“The § 23-110 remedy . . . is not considered inadequate or ineffective 

simply because the requested relief has been denied.”); Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 727 

(D.C. Cir. 1986) (“It is the inefficacy of the remedy, not a personal inability to utilize it, that is 

determinative . . .”).

Petitioner did pursue the local remedy available to him by filing a section 23-110 motion 

in June 2005. The trial court denied his motion after holding an evidentiary hearing, and its

determination was upheld by the D.C. Court of Appeals. Pet. at 3. In his current habeas petition 
8

before the Court, petitioner recites the facts he included in his section 23-110 motion, including 

the information about Rosa Garcia’s alleged agreement with the government and her use of a 

false social security number and passport. But he does not contend that the trial or appellate 

post-conviction proceedings in the D.C. courts were inadequate or ineffective in any way. Pet. 3,

24–32 (detailing the evidence petitioner included in his section 23-110 motion and that the trial 

court heard at its hearing on the motion). Indeed, the entire thrust of his opposition to the motion 

to dismiss is that he does not have to address this issue.6

In the absence of any argument or allegation that the 23-110 motion was an inadequate or 

insufficient means for testing the legality of the conviction, this Court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction over this case. See Swain, 430 U.S. at 378 (holding that a D.C. prisoner has no 

recourse to a federal habeas court unless the local remedy is inadequate or ineffective); Byrd, 119 

F.3d at 36 (same).

III. Petitioner Fails to Overcome the Jurisdictional Bar.

Where a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is otherwise barred, a petitioner may obtain 

relief if “‘a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually 

innocent.’” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995), quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 

496 (1986); see also Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) (requiring federal courts to 

entertain successive habeas petitions “only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional 

6 Instead of addressing the adequacy or sufficiency of the 23-110 motion, petitioner argues 

that “the District Court should view him as it would any person convicted in the courts of a state 

or U.S. territory.” Pet.’s Opp. at 3. The Court agrees and, for that precise reason, has construed 

his habeas petition as brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as other district courts have done in cases 

where state prisoners bring habeas claims under the wrong statute. See Brennan v. Wall, 100 

Fed. App’x 4, at *1 (1st Cir. 2004), affirming 2010 WL 256582 (D. R.I. 2010) (treating section 

2241 claim as a section 2254 claim). 
9

claim with a colorable showing of factual innocence.”). Actual innocence requires means factual 

innocence, not legal sufficiency. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623–24 (1998). 

“[A] petitioner must produce ‘new reliable evidence . . . that was not presented at trial.’”

Eastridge v. U.S., 372 F. Supp. 2d 26, 34 (D.D.C. 2005), quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. In 

light of all the evidence, the petitioner must demonstrate that “it is more likely than not that no 

reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., quoting 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327.

Petitioner challenges his conviction under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the U.S. 

Constitution and claims that he would have been found innocent if these alleged violations of his 

rights had not occurred. It is the conviction for second degree murder and conspiracy that is 

before this Court. But petitioner points to no new evidence that suggests that he was in fact 

innocent or that would support a finding that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror 

would have found him guilty. While the evidence established that he played a more limited role 

in the beating and stabbing of the decedent than others, there were witnesses besides Aleman and 

Garcia who observed petitioner drive up to the scene of the ongoing beating, and who observed 

men armed with knives get out of his car. Perez v. United States, 968 A.2d 39, 58–64 (D.C. 

2009). There was a witness other than Aleman or Garcia who testified that petitioner himself got 

out of the car. Id. And the evidence established that it was petitioner who drove the assailants 

away from the brutal stabbing. Id. at 103–106. Petitioner testified on his own behalf at trial, and 

the jurors had the opportunity to fully consider his exculpatory version of the events. While on 

direct, he denied knowing he was delivering armed men to the fray, he conceded on cross 

examination that he had told the police that he thought the men had their knives when they got 

into his car. Id. The Court finds no reason to reject the determinations made by the D.C. 
10

Superior Court and the D.C. Court of Appeals, which reviewed the record of the trial in detail, 

expressly considered the new evidence petitioner asserts here, and determined that it did not

undermine his conviction. See Perez, 968 A.2d at 58–64; 67–71.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant respondent’s motion to dismiss. A

separate order will issue. 

AMY BERMAN JACKSON

United States District Judge

DATE: July 22, 2011