alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-6846

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DAVID R. SPECYALSKI, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at 

Greenville. Bruce H. Hendricks, District Judge. (6:16-cr-00774-BHH-1)

Submitted: September 26, 2019 Decided: October 1, 2019

Before NIEMEYER and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit 

Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

David R. Specyalski, Jr., Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

David R. Specyalski, Jr., appeals the district court’s text order denying his motion 

for a sentence reduction. Initially, we conclude that Specyalski brought this motion 

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2012) and that the motion should not be construed as 

arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012). Cf. Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 383 

(2003) (holding that district court must warn pro se litigant of intent to recharacterize 

pleading as § 2255 motion, explain procedural consequences, and provide litigant 

opportunity to respond). A defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction under 

§ 3582(c)(2) only if his Sentencing Guidelines range has been lowered by the Sentencing 

Commission. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Because Specyalski did not establish that he is 

eligible for relief under that criterion, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying his

motion. See United States v. Martin, 916 F.3d 389, 395 (4th Cir. 2019). Accordingly, we

affirm the district court’s judgment. United States v. Specyalski, No. 6:16-cr-00774-BHH1 (D.S.C. June 4, 2019). We deny Specyalski’s motion for a remedy. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Jose Munoz MARTINEZ v. REPFUND HAYWOOD APARTMENTS, L.L.C. Repipmd, Inc., Entergy Louisiana, L.L.C. and State Roofing Company, Inc.

No. 2010-CC-2357.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 29, 2010.

In re State Roofing Company, Inc.; — Defendant; . Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 640-361; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-C-497.

Not considered; not timely filed. See *State v. Crandell,*05-1060 (La.3/10/06), 924 So.2d 122; *Morris v. Stueben,*01-0137 (La.3/16/01), 781 So.2d 1220.
#### HARPER, administratrix, *v.*SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO.

On the facts recited in the certified question, the trial judge had jurisdiction of the motion for new trial at the time and place and in- the circumstances.

New Trial, 29 Cye. p. 922, n. 21.

No. 6342.

March 15, 1928.

Rehearing denied April 16, 1928.

Question certified by Court of Appeals (Case No. 18132).

*T. J. Lewis, A. B. Knowles, Taylor Smith,*and *J. K. Jordan,*for plaintiff.

*Lloyd Thomas, Griffith & Matthews,*and *Maddox, Matthews & Owens,*for defendant.

Gilbert, J.

The Court of Appeals propounds the following question: While Judge Price Edwards, one of the judges of the superior courts of Georgia, was presiding over the superior court *176of Haralson County, one of the counties of his home circuit, the case of Mrs. Zether Harper, administratrix of the estate of W. T. Harper, *v.*Southern Eailway Company was tried, a verdict rendered, and a judgment entered. The next week, while Judge James Maddox, of the Eome circuit, was presiding for Judge Edwards in the superior court of Haralson County, and while Judge Maddox was actually engaged in presiding over the trial of another case, or while the trial of said case was temporarily suspended, did Judge Edwards, to whom a motion for a new trial in the case of Harper, administratrix, v. Southern Railway Company was presented “at the corner of the court grounds,” have any right to assume jurisdiction of a motion for a new trial presented by the railway company, issue a rule nisi thereon, and order the plaintiff to show cause why a new trial should not be granted in the case ?

We answer that Judge Edwards had jurisdiction of the motion presented at the time and place and under the circumstances stated in the question. According to the facts stated, the judge acted in term time. See *Chattanooga &c. R. Co.*v. *Owen,*90 *Ga.*265, 267 (15 S. E. 853). *Pendergrass*v. Duke, 140 *Ga.*550 (79 S. E. 129), and *Cross*v. State, 150 *Ga.*786 (105 S. E. 371), are not in point, as they dealt with the powers of superior-court judges, who had been presiding in a circuit other than their own, to assume jurisdiction of motions after their services in such circuits had ceased and the duties of the office were being performed by another or the regularly elected judge.

*All the Justices concur.*
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 194 (Thursday, October 7, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 62135]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-25332]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Emergency Management Agency


Notice of Adjustment of Countywide Per Capita Impact Indicator

AGENCY: Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: FEMA gives notice that the countywide per capita impact 
indicator under the Public Assistance program for disasters declared on 
or after October 1, 2010, will be increased.

DATES: Effective Date: October 1, 2010, and applies to major disasters 
declared on or after October 1, 2010.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tod Wells, Recovery Directorate, 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street, SW., Washington, DC 
20472, (202) 646-3834.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Response and Recovery Directorate Policy No. 
9122.1 provides that FEMA will adjust the countywide per capita impact 
indicator under the Public Assistance program to reflect annual changes 
in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers published by the 
Department of Labor.
    FEMA gives notice of an increase in the countywide per capita 
impact indicator to $3.27 for all disasters declared on or after 
October 1, 2010.
    FEMA bases the adjustment on an increase in the Consumer Price 
Index for All Urban Consumers of 1.1 percent for the 12-month period 
ended in August 2010. The Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. 
Department of Labor released the information on September 17, 2010.

    Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance No. 97.036, Public 
Assistance Grants.


W. Craig Fugate,
Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency.
[FR Doc. 2010-25332 Filed 10-6-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9111-23-P
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.2 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 The undersigned, Mary Dridi, the Chief Financial Officer and Executive Vice
President of webMethods, Inc. (the Company), has executed this certification
in connection with the filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission of
the Companys Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended March 31,
2004 (the Report). The undersigned hereby certifies that: (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. Date: June 11, 2004
    
    
    
    /s/ MARY DRIDIName: Mary Dridi
Title:   Chief Financial Officer and            Executive Vice President
#### G.E.G. v. STATE of Alabama.

CR-07-0036.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

July 30, 2010.

Thomas M. Goggans, Montgomery; and Trina S. Williams, Montgomery, for appellant.

Troy King, atty. gen., and Stephanie E. Reiland, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.

*After Remand from the Alabama Supreme Court*

WELCH, Judge.

This Court’s judgment in *G.E.G. v. State,*54 So.3d 941 (Ala.Crim.App.2008), reversing G.E.G.’s convictions for possession of drug paraphernalia and second-degree possession of marijuana,1 violations of §§ 13A-12-260(c) and 13A-12-214, Ala. Code 1975, has been reversed by the Alabama Supreme Court in *Ex parte G.E.G.,*54 So.3d 949 (Ala.2010). Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s opinion, this Court’s judgment entered on December 19, 2008, insofar as it reversed two drug convictions is hereby set aside, and we now affirm G.E.G.’s convictions for possession of drug paraphernalia and second-degree possession of marijuana.

AFFIRMED.

*958WISE, P.J., and KELLUM and MAIN, JJ., concur. WINDOM, J., recuses herself.

1

. This Court affirmed G.E.G.'s conviction for sexual torture. *See*§ 13A-6-65.1, Ala.Code 1975.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 11, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-50082

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JUAN ALVAREZ-CASTRO,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas 

USDC No. 3:05-CR-2067-ALL

--------------------

Before JOLLY, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Juan AlvarezCastro raises arguments that are foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres

v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), which held that

8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) is a penalty provision and not a separate

criminal offense. The Government’s motion for summary affirmance

is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                             896
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  110,637
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
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<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               5,851,616
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           13,812
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 5,851,616
<SALES>                                        551,615
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               557,575
<CGS>                                          126,446
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  416,982
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                140,593
<INCOME-TAX>                                   140,593
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            140,593
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   140,593
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
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</TABLE>
#### Marcos B. GUIRGIS, Appellant, v. Suzana GUIRGIS, Appellee.

No. 2D09-4265.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Oct. 22, 2010.

*157Ramy N. Fares of Ramy N. Fares, P.A., Holiday, for Appellant.

Suzana Guirgis, pro se.

MORRIS, Judge.

Marcos Guirgis, the husband, appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. He first argues that the trial court erred by applying the principle of equitable adoption and ordering him to pay child support for a child he claims he never adopted. We find this argument to be without merit, *see C.C.A. v. J.M.A.,*744 So.2d 515, 517 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); *Wade v. Wade,*586 So.2d 1158, 1160 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), and we affirm this portion of the order without further comment.

His second argument is that the combined alimony and child support awards consume too much of the income imputed to him by the trial court. Notably, however, the trial court found that

> [t]he [hjusband clearly has *some*ability to pay in that he has been able to make the mortgage payment on his new business and ... pay his monthly bills.... [T]he court finds that he has drastically minimized his income for the purposes of this hearing.

Clearly then, the trial court believed that the husband was earning more than the minimum wage amount imputed to him and based the financial award on that belief. Our review of this issue is hampered by the lack of a transcript, and the husband has not convinced us there is an error on the face of the record. *See Esaw v. Esaw,*965 So.2d 1261, 1264 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (holding that “[t]he most salient impediment to meaningful review of the trial court’s decision is not the absence of findings, but the absence of a transcript” and that because “[t]he appellant has the burden of providing a proper record to the reviewing court ... the failure to do so is ‘usually fatal’ to the appellant’s claims” (quoting *Casella v. Casella,*569 So.2d 848, 849 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990))).

Furthermore, we note that the alimony award was a bridge-the-gap provision which began in July 2009 and which terminates eighteen months thereafter. Thus, a large portion of the financial award will disappear by the end of 2010. Because we must consider the overall scheme of the financial award and not merely refer to the percentages involved, *see Pastore v. Pastore,*497 So.2d 685, 638 (Fla.1986); *Vick v. Vick,*675 So.2d 714, 718 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996), and due to the lack of a transcript, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering the award.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, C.J., and KELLY, J., Concur.
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 194 (Thursday, October 7, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 62140]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-25356]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Bureau of Land Management

[WY-923-1310-FI; WYW159733]


Notice of Proposed Reinstatement of Terminated Oil and Gas Lease 
WYW159733, Wyoming

AGENCY: Bureau of Land Management, Interior.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Under the provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, as 
amended, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) received a petition for 
reinstatement from Sun Cal Energy Inc. for competitive oil and gas 
lease WYW159733 for land in Sublette County, Wyoming. The petition was 
filed on time and was accompanied by all the rentals due since the date 
the lease terminated under the law.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Bureau of Land Management, Julie L. 
Weaver, Chief, Fluid Minerals Adjudication, at (307) 775-6176.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The lessee has agreed to the amended lease 
terms for rentals and royalties at rates of $10 per acre or fraction 
thereof, per year and 16\2/3\ percent, respectively. The lessee has 
paid the required $500 administrative fee and $163 to reimburse the 
Department for the cost of this Federal Register notice. The lessee has 
met all the requirements for reinstatement of the lease as set out in 
Sections 31(d) and (e) of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920 (30 
U.S.C. 188), and the BLM is proposing to reinstate lease WYW159733 
effective February 1, 2008, under the original terms and conditions of 
the lease along with the increased rental and royalty rates cited 
above. The BLM has not issued a valid lease to any other interest 
affecting the lands.

Julie L. Weaver,
Chief, Fluid Minerals Adjudication.
[FR Doc. 2010-25356 Filed 10-6-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4310-22-P
EX-4.14






Exhibit 4.14



The following is a summary of amendments to the Ford Motor Company Savings and Stock Investment
Plan for Salaried Employees, effective January 23, 2009:





	 	•	 	The Fidelity Freedom Funds will be replaced with Barclays Global Investors (BGI)
LifePath® Index Funds as the target-date fund option.
	 
	 	•	 	The following BGI LifePath® Index Funds, rather than the Fidelity Freedom
Funds® will become the designated default investment options:




BGI LifePath® Index Retirement Fund

BGI LifePath® Index 2015 Fund

BGI LifePath® Index 2020 Fund

BGI LifePath® Index 2025 Fund

BGI LifePath® Index 2030 Fund

BGI LifePath® Index 2035 Fund

BGI LifePath® Index 2040 Fund

BGI LifePath® Index 2045 Fund

BGI LifePath® Index 2050 Fund
#### STATE ex rel. Leroy WILSON v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-1248.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 3, 2011.

In re Wilson, Leroy; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or. Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 876-288; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-0494.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; *State ex rel. Glover v. State,*93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.
#### Andre FLORENCE, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D10-2707.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Oct. 29, 2010.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 6, 2011.

Andre Florence, pro se, Petitioner.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

DENIED. Fla. RApp. P. 9.141(c)(4)(B).

BENTON, PADOVANO, and CLARK, JJ., concur.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE LUIS CEJA-GARCIA,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 07-73317

Agency No. A076-690-128

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted January 11, 2010** 

Before: BEEZER, TROTT, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges. 

Jose Luis Ceja-Garcia, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of

the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) orders dismissing his appeal from an

immigration judge’s (“IJ”) removal order. Our jurisdiction is governed by

8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

FILED

JAN 19 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

With respect to adjustment of status, Ceja-Garcia points to no evidence in

the record, and we find none, that he requested a further continuance of the August

11, 2003, hearing. We therefore reject Ceja-Garcia’s contention that the IJ abused

his discretion in denying a continuance.

With respect to cancellation of removal, we lack jurisdiction to review CejaGarcia’s due process claim that the BIA disregarded certain evidence in assessing

hardship because the claim is not colorable. See Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 424

F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]raditional abuse of discretion challenges recast

as alleged due process violations do not constitute colorable constitutional claims

that would invoke our jurisdiction.”). 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part, DISMISSED in part.
#### Daniel Aaron NICHOLSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D09-4497.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

June 13, 2011.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Glen P. Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jennifer J. Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant challenges criminal convictions which were obtained in a joint trial with a codefendant. In this appeal, the appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions for trafficking in hydrocodone, and for possession of cocaine and drug paraphernalia. The appellant also contends that the use of a jury instruction with an “and/or” conjunction between his name and the code-fendant’s name was fundamental error. These same issues were addressed by this court in the codefendant’s separate appeal in *Nicholson v. State,*38 So.3d 107 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), where the codefendant’s trafficking conviction was reversed, and his possession of cocaine and paraphernalia convictions were affirmed. *Nicholson*is controlling authority as to these matters, and the appellant’s conviction for trafficking is likewise reversed, while his convictions for possession of cocaine and paraphernalia are affirmed. In light of the reversal of the trafficking conviction, the appellant’s sentences are vacated and the case is remanded for resentencing under a corrected scoresheet. *See Vroom v. State,*48 So.3d 82 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); *Smith v. State,*687 So.2d 308 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).

ROBERTS, CLARK, and WETHERELL, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

In Re: AMERICAN HOUSEHOLD, 

INCORPORATED, formerly known as

Sunbeam Corporation; STEPHEN T.

MOFFETT, Esq., THOMAS L. VITU,

 No. 03-1919 Esq., JOHN E. HALL, Esq., R. SCOTT

LONG, Esq., and BARBARA A. ALLEN,

Esq.,

Petitioners. 

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

(CA-99-144-5)

Argued: September 26, 2003

Decided: February 27, 2004

Before WIDENER, MICHAEL, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Petition dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

ARGUED: John Emmert Hall, Andrew G. Fusco, ECKERT, SEAMANS, CHERIN & MELLOTT, P.L.L., Morgantown, West Virginia,

for Petitioners. William J. Hansen, MCDERMOTT, HANSEN &

MCLAUGHLIN, L.L.P., Denver, Colorado, for Respondents. ON

BRIEF: George E. McLaughlin, MCDERMOTT, HANSEN &

MCLAUGHLIN, L.L.P., Denver, Colorado, for Respondents.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

This case is before us on a petition for a writ of mandamus. Petitioners assert that mandamus relief is appropriate because the magistrate judge, to whom the case had been referred, improperly

conducted criminal contempt proceedings against them. Petitioners

seek an order from this court removing the case from the magistrate

judge and directing the district judge to conduct appropriate proceedings de novo. 

After the petition was filed, the magistrate judge entered a report

and recommendation on the matters before him, and the parties filed

objections to that report. On September 26, 2003, we conducted oral

argument on an expedited basis. Four days later, the district judge —

having considered the report and the objections — entered an order

accepting the magistrate judge’s recommendations. Petitioners have

now appealed the district court’s order. See Bradley v. American

Household, Inc., No. 03-2341. 

The authorities are uniform that mandamus may not be used as a

substitute for appeal, which procedure we think is being attempted in

this case. We are satisfied and hold that all the claims of error in this

case may be reached on their merits by appeal from the decisions and

orders of the district court and magistrate judge entered in that case,

Bradley et al. v. Sunbeam Corp., No. 5:99CV144 (N.D.W.Va. filed

Oct. 21, 1999). 

In light of these circumstances, we conclude that the petition is

now moot. Accordingly, we dismiss the petition. 

PETITION DISMISSED

2 IN RE: AMERICAN HOUSEHOLD, INC.