alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

Pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pehong Chen, the Chief Executive Officer ofBroadVision, Inc. (the “Company”) and William E. Meyer, the Chief FinancialOfficer of the Company, hereby certify that, to the best of their knowledge:

 

**1.**             The Company’s Quarterly Report onForm 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2004, and to which this Certificationis attached as Exhibit 32.1 (the “Periodic Report”), fully complies with therequirements of section 13(a) or section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Actof 1934, and

 

**2.**             The information contained in thePeriodic Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financialcondition and results of operations of the Company.

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, theundersigned have set their hands hereto as of the 10th day of May,2004.

 

 
|   | /s/ Pehong  Chen         |
|--------|--------------------------|
|   | Pehong Chen              |
|   | Chief  Executive Officer |
|   |                     |
|   | /s/ William  E. Meyer    |
|   | William E.  Meyer        |
|   | Chief  Financial Officer |

 

----
#### Bobby COBURN, Appellant, v. POLK COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS and Commercial Risk Management, Appellees.

No. 1D10-0251.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Dec. 21, 2010.

Scott F. Eldridge of Smith, Feddeler, Smith *&*Miles, P.A., Lakeland, Susan W. Fox of Fox & Loquasto, P.A., Tampa, and *552Wendy S. Loquasto of Fox & Loquasto, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Thomas P. Vecchio of Ross Vecchio, P.A., Lakeland, for Appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Bobby Coburn, claimant, appeals a final order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) which determined that Co-burn’s claim was barred by the one-year statute of limitations in section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes (2009). Claimant sought authorization of an appointment with an authorized treating provider to address problems with claimant’s hearing aids that had been provided as a result of his com-pensable hearing loss caused by injuries incurred in a 1999 industrial accident. Based on a finding that more than one year had passed since the last payment, treatment or care relating to the hearing loss, the JCC concluded the statute of limitations barred the claim.

Here, it is undisputed that the claimant’s hearing aids are prosthetic devices which are being used to mitigate the effects of a compensable injury. Under our recent holding in *Gore v. Lee County School Board,*43 So.3d 846, 848-49 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), the statute of limitations would have been tolled, if the employer or carrier had knowledge of claimant’s continued use. Such knowledge is an issue of fact not reached by the JCC (most likely because the order on appeal was entered without the benefit of our decision in Gore). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. On remand, the JCC need only determine whether the employer or carrier had knowledge, whether express or implied, of the claimant’s continuous use of his hearing aids. *See Gore,*43 So.3d at 850; *Sapp v. Warner,*105 Fla. 245, 141 So. 124, 127 (1932) (explaining distinction between express actual notice and implied actual notice).

REVERSED.

KAHN, VAN NORTWICK, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Binika HANKTON.

No. 2010-KK-1797.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Aug. 5, 2010.

In re Hankton, Binika; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 493-937; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-0924.

STAY DENIED. WRIT DENIED.
#### Richard Dean ELSTON, Jr. and Ashley Bruscato Elston v. Jo Nell V. MONTGOMERY and Michael F. Montgomery.

No. 2011-C-1292.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 23, 2011.

*1166In re D.A. Richlen Land Company Inc.; Elston Jr., Richard Dean et al.; Elston, Ashley Bruscato; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 124,660; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,262-CA.

Denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
consolidated balance sheet and the consolidated statement of operations and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to said statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                       1,739,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                3,164,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                  4,230,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            10,117,000
<PP&E>                                       2,632,000
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,420,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              22,225,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        9,889,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                      8,000
<COMMON>                                        18,000
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                22,225,000
<SALES>                                      6,225,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             6,225,000
<CGS>                                        3,775,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,597,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             483,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                377,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                    15,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            362,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   262,000
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.06
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.06
        


</TABLE>
**Exhibit
      32.1**





**Certification
      of Chief Executive Officer**





In
      connection with the Annual Report On Form 10-K (the “Report”) under the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934 of Atlantic Express Transportation Corp. (the
      “Company”), I, Domenic Gatto, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, do hereby
      certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
      906
      of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my
      knowledge:





(i)
      the
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d),
      as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(ii)
      the
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/
            Domenic GattoDomenic Gatto*Chief Executive Officer*





Date:
      September 26, 2008





The
      foregoing certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report
      pursuant to 18 U.S.C Section 1350, and is not being filed for purposes of
      Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not to
      be
      incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before
      or
      after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in
      such
      filing.
#### STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Yvonne Michelle COUSINS, Respondent.

No. 5D10-3359.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

May 13, 2011.

Rehearing Denied June 8, 2011.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Pamela J. Roller, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Petitioner.

Yvonne Michelle Cousins, Miami, Pro se.

PER CURIAM.

The State of Florida petitions this court for a writ of certiorari. We grant the writ and quash the trial court’s order which modified the completed criminal sentence of the respondent, Yvonne Cousins, to reflect a withhold of adjudication.

The trial court’s order was entered following a hearing on a letter it received from Cousins, which the court treated as a motion. In the letter, Cousins requested that her criminal history records be expunged or sealed. She explained that there were extenuating circumstances surrounding her conviction and that she had not been in trouble in the ten years since her conviction. Cousins also noted that she had secured employment as a security officer, but she would be in danger of losing that job if she could not obtain a security officer’s license from the Department of Agriculture. She advised that she could not obtain such a license unless her criminal record was expunged.

While the trial court held a hearing to consider Cousins’ request, it took no action on her motion because she could not provide a certificate of eligibility as required by section 943.0585, Florida Statutes.1 Instead, the trial court entered an order modifying Cousins’ judgment and sentence to reflect a withhold of adjudication so that she could obtain a certificate of eligibility and file a proper motion to seal or expunge her criminal record.

The State objected below, and argues here, that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify Cousins’ completed sentence. We agree. As a general matter, a trial court loses jurisdiction to modify or change a sentence 60 days after the sentence is imposed or becomes final. *See State v. Nichols,*629 So.2d 970, 972 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); *cf. Schlabach v. State,*37 So.3d 230 (Fla.2010); *Davis v. State,*887 So.2d 1286 (Fla.2004). Certainly, a trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify a legal sentence several years after it has been completed by the defendant.

Although the trial court had the best of intentions in modifying Cousins’ criminal sentence, it acted without jurisdiction. Therefore, the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the order of the trial court modifying Cousins’ judgment and sentence is quashed.

PETITION GRANTED; ORDER QUASHED.

SAWAYA, TORPY and JACOBUS, JJ., concur.

1

. Section 943.0585 requires a person to obtain a certificate of eligibility from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement before seeking expunction of a criminal history record.
Exhibit 31.2

 

 

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANTTOSECTION 302**

**OFTHESARBANES-OXLEYACT**

 

I, Terry L. Stevens, certify that: 

 

|   | 1. | I have reviewed this amended quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Highwoods Properties Inc.; |
|--------|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

|   | 2. | Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report; |
|--------|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

|   | 3. | Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report; |
|--------|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

Date: March 2, 2008

 

| /s/ TERRYL.STEVENS                                                |   |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Terry L. StevensSenior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer |   |

 

| * | Paragraphs 4 and 5, omitted here, are included in Exhibit 31.2 to the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q filed by Highwoods Properties, Inc. on August 9, 2007. |
|---|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 725 

AN ACT 

To amend title 28, United States Code, to prevent fraudulent 

joinder. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

•HR 725 EH

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Innocent Party Protec3 tion Act’’. 

4 SEC. 2. PREVENTION OF FRAUDULENT JOINDER. 

5 Section 1447 of title 28, United States Code, is 

6 amended by adding at the end the following: 

7 ‘‘(f) FRAUDULENT JOINDER.— 

8 ‘‘(1) This subsection shall apply to any case in 

9 which— 

10 ‘‘(A) a civil action is removed solely on the 

11 basis of the jurisdiction conferred by section 

12 1332(a); 

13 ‘‘(B) a motion to remand is made on the 

14 ground that— 

15 ‘‘(i) one or more defendants are citi16 zens of the same State as one or more 

17 plaintiffs; or 

18 ‘‘(ii) one or more defendants properly 

19 joined and served are citizens of the State 

20 in which the action was brought; and 

21 ‘‘(C) the motion is opposed on the ground 

22 that the joinder of the defendant or defendants 

23 described in subparagraph (B) is fraudulent. 

24 ‘‘(2) The joinder of a defendant described in 

25 paragraph (1)(B) is fraudulent if the court finds 

26 that— 
3 

•HR 725 EH

1 ‘‘(A) there is actual fraud in the pleading 

2 of jurisdictional facts with respect to that de3 fendant; 

4 ‘‘(B) based on the complaint and the mate5 rials submitted under paragraph (3), it is not 

6 plausible to conclude that applicable State law 

7 would impose liability on that defendant; 

8 ‘‘(C) State or Federal law clearly bars all 

9 claims in the complaint against that defendant; 

10 or 

11 ‘‘(D) objective evidence clearly dem12 onstrates that there is no good faith intention 

13 to prosecute the action against that defendant 

14 or to seek a joint judgment including that de15 fendant. 

16 ‘‘(3) In determining whether to grant or deny 

17 a motion under paragraph (1)(B), the court may 

18 permit the pleadings to be amended, and shall con19 sider the pleadings, affidavits, and other evidence 

20 submitted by the parties. 

21 ‘‘(4) If the court finds that all defendants de22 scribed in paragraph (1)(B) have been fraudulently 

23 joined under paragraph (2), it shall dismiss without 

24 prejudice the claims against those defendants and 
4 

•HR 725 EH

1 shall deny the motion described in paragraph 

2 (1)(B).’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives March 9, 

2017. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 

115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 725 

AN ACT 

To amend title 28, United States Code, to prevent 

fraudulent joinder.
#### STATE ex rel. Domino JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-1271.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 3, 2011.

In re Johnson, Domino; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 409-155; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-0219.

Denied.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Wayne K. JONES, Jr.

No. 11-400.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

Nov. 2, 2011.

*1279Peggy J. Sullivan, Monroe, LA, for Defendant/Appellant, Wayne K. Jones, Jr.

John F. Derosier, District Attorney, David Palay, Carla S. Sigler, Assistant District Attorneys, Lake Charles, LA, for Appellee, State of Louisiana.

Court composed of ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge, BILLY HOWARD EZELL, and J. DAVID PAINTER, Judges.

PAINTER, Judge.

hFor the reasons set forth in the companion case hereto, *State v. Jones,*11-399 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/11), 76 So.3d 1274, Defendant’s convictions are affirmed. However, because Defendant’s habitual offender sentence is indeterminate, the habitual offender sentence is vacated and remanded to the trial court for resentenc-ing. The trial court is directed to clarify which count or counts it is enhancing and to impose separate sentences for each conviction.

Additionally, the trial court is directed to advise the Defendant of the prescriptive period for filing post-conviction relief as required by La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8.

AFFIRMED; HABITUAL OFFENDER SENTENCE VACATED; AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
EXHIBIT 31.3





CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO


EXCHANGE ACT RULE 13A-14(A)/15D-14(A)


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 302


OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





I, Larry Jasinski, certify that:





1. I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to annual report on Form 10-K of ReWalk Robotics Ltd.; and





2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.





/s/ Larry JasinskiLarry JasinskiChief Executive Officer(Principal Executive Officer)





Date: April 27, 2017
y



### MANDATE



## Court of Appeals

**First District of Texas**

NO. 01

- 10

- 01153

- CV

KAREN KRISTINE SILVI O , Appellant

V.

MICHAEL B. NEWMAN , Appellee

Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 1 of Harris County. (Tr. Ct. No. 945526 ).

TO THE COUNTY CIVIL COURT AT LAW N O. 1 OF HARRIS COUNTY,

GREETINGS:

Before this Court , on the 8th day of July 2014 , the case upon appeal to revise or to

reverse your judgment was determined. This Court made its order in these words:

This case is an appeal from the final judgment signed by

the trial court on July 7, 2010. After submitting the case on

the appellate record and the arguments properly raised by the

parties, the Court holds that the trial court’s judgment contains

no rever sible error. Accordingly, the Court affirms the trial

court’s judgment.

The Court orders that the appellant, Karen Kristine

Silvio, pay all appellate costs.

The Court orders that this decision be certified belowfor observance.

Judgment rendered July 8, 2014.

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Higley and

Brown. Opinion delivered by Chief Justice Radack.

WHEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of our said Court in

this behalf and in all things to have it duly recognized, obeye d, and executed.

January 2, 2015

Date CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE

CLERK OF THE COURT
Exhibit 99.2 

HMN FINANCIAL, INC.

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of HMN Financial, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Jon Eberle, Interim Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company. 

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to HMN Financial, Inc. and will be retained by HMN Financial, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

Date:  May 12, 2003                 	_/s/ Jon Eberle                      ___                                                	Jon Eberle,                                                Interim Chief Financial Officer                                                (Principal Financial Officer)
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Alphonso WILLIAMS.

No. 2010-KK-1842.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 29, 2010.

In re Williams, Alphonso; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 4, No. 281,292; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-807-KW.

Denied.
No. 13,528.

#### The Town of Noblesville *v.*Vestal et al.

Filed March 9, 1889.

Instructions to Jury.— *When too Late to Bequest.*— It is not error for the court to refuse to give instructions when the request is made at the time that the court is giving its instructions to the jury.

From the Hamilton Circuit Court.

*W. S. Christian, I. W. Christian*and *G. S. Christian,*for appellant.

A. *F. Shirts*and *G. Shirts,*for appellees.

Elliott, C. J.

We are compelled by settled rules to sustain the point of the appellees that the record fails to show that the instructions refused were asked at the proper time. The record shows that at the time the court was giving its instructions the appellant requested.it to give those which were refused. This was too late.

We should violate a long established rule if we disturbed the verdict. Although the plaintiffs’ case is not a strong one, yet there is evidence from which all the facts essential' to the support of the verdict may be inferred.

Judgment affirmed.
#### Samuel Alfonso CHILDS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 2D09-111.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Sept. 22, 2010.

*217James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Megan Olson, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Samuel Alfonso Childs, pro se.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Timothy A. Freeland, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appel-lee.

VILLANTI, Judge.

This is an appeal pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Samuel Alfonso Childs was convicted of robbery with a firearm after a jury trial and was sentenced to twenty years in prison. After careful review of the record, we find no error and affirm Childs’ conviction and sentence. However, we remand the case to the trial court to enter a written order of competency.

The record reflects that the trial court orally found Childs competent to stand trial, but there is no written order of competency. Therefore, we remand for entry of a written order nunc pro tunc. *See, e.g., Hampton v. State,*988 So.2d 103, 106 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); *Corbitt v. State,*744 So.2d 1130, 1130 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).

Affirmed with directions.

NORTHCUTT and CRENSHAW, JJ, Concur.