alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
(logo) Rialto CAPITAL

 

 

2016 Annual Statement ofServicer Compliance (Item 1123)

 

 

Pooling and ServicingAgreement (the “Pooling and Servicing Agreement”) dated as of March1, 2014 by and among Deutsche Mortgage & Asset Receiving Corporation asDepositor, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association as Master Servicer, RialtoCapital Advisors, LLC as Special Servicer, U.S. Bank National Association asTrustee, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association as Certificate Administrator,Paying Agent and Custodian and Situs Holdings, LLC as Operating Advisorrelating to the Deutsche Mortgage & Asset Receiving Corporation, COMM2014-LC15 Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates

(COMM 2014-LC15)

 

 

The undersigned, a dulyauthorized officer of Rialto Capital Advisors, LLC, as special servicer (the“Special Servicer”) herein certifies to the following:

 

1. All servicing activitiesand performance of such servicing activities under the Pooling and ServicingAgreement are performed on behalf of the Special Servicer.

 

2. A review of the servicingactivities and performance by the Special Servicer for the period of January 1,2016 to December 31, 2016 (the “Reporting Period”) in accordancewith the Pooling and Servicing Agreement has been conducted under mysupervision.

 

3. To the best of myknowledge, based on such review, the Special Servicer has fulfilled all of itsobligations under the terms of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, in allmaterial respects for the Reporting Period and if there has been a failure tofulfill any such obligations in any material respect, each failure and thenature and status thereof has been specifically identified herein.

 

 

Certified by: /s/ Adam Singer

Adam Singer, Managing Director

Date: March 1, 2017
A92A1915.

#### CAUSEY v. THE STATE.

(430 SE2d 594)

Carley, Presiding Judge.

Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty of possession of cocaine. He appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the trial court on the jury’s verdict of guilt.

1. Pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-211, appellant filed a pre-trial request for a copy of the written scientific reports which the State would seek to introduce. Contrary to appellant’s contentions, the record demonstrates the State’s complete and timely compliance with the requirements of OCGA § 17-7-211. See *Williams v. State,*201 Ga. App. 384, 386 (3) (411 SE2d 316) (1991).

*390Decided January 29, 1993 —

Reconsideration denied April 2, 1993.

Burl E. Causey, Sr., *pro se.*

*Stephen F. Lanier, District Attorney, C. Stephen Cox, Fred R. Simpson, Assistant District Attorneys,*for appellee.

2. It obviously was not error to fail to quash a count of the indictment when no motion to quash that count had ever been filed.

3. The denial of appellant’s motion to suppress is enumerated as error. The record shows that appellant was arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the parole board. See OCGA § 42-9-48 (a). Contrary to appellant’s contentions, this warrant was not invalid on the ground that he was no longer a parolee who was subject to the authority of the parole board. Although appellant’s ten-year sentence for violating state criminal laws had been imposed in 1979, that sentence ran consecutively to the sentence he was serving for violation of federal criminal laws. *Taylor v. Green,*229 Ga. 164 (190 SE2d 66) (1972). Accordingly, appellant’s ten-year state sentence did not begin to run until 1985, when he was released by the federal authorities. It follows that appellant was subject to arrest under the warrant issued by the parole board and that the search of his person pursuant to his arrest under that warrant was authorized. “ ‘Once a defendant has been placed under custodial arrest, police may search his person, incident to that arrest, for weapons or contraband.’ [Cit.] The trial [court] correctly denied the appellant’s motion to suppress.” *Paxton v. State,*160 Ga. App. 19, 20 (1) (285 SE2d 741) (1981).

4. In his motion for new trial, appellant raised the issue of the effectiveness of his trial counsel. After conducting a hearing, the trial court found no merit in this contention. We find no error in the trial court’s ruling in this regard. See *Whitner v. State,*202 Ga. App. 608 (415 SE2d 52) (1992).

5. Appellant having fled after jeopardy had attached, the trial court did not err in failing to declare a mistrial and in allowing the trial to continue in appellant’s absence. *Croy v. State,*168 Ga. App. 241 (1) (308 SE2d 568) (1983). Compare *Pollard v. State,*175 Ga. App. 269 (333 SE2d 152) (1985).

6. Appellant’s remaining enumerations of error have been considered and found to be without merit.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Pope, C. J., and Johnson, J., concur.*
#### STATE ex rel. Joseph GARY v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-0159.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 7, 2011.

In re Gary, Joseph; -Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, *470Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, Nos. 174-061, 174-058, 174-077.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 980.8; *State ex rel. Glover v. State,*93-2830 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.
#### STATE ex rel. Arthur NICHOLAS, III v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2011-KH-1411.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 23, 2011.

In re Nicholas III, Arthur; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 23,209; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KA 1808.

Denied.
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ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION * IN THE 

OF MARYLAND *

 * COURT OF APPEALS 

Petitioner * 

 * OF MARYLAND 

 *

v. * Misc. Docket AG 

 * 

PHILIP JAMES SWEITZER * No. 11 

 *

 * September Term, 2014

Respondent *

 *

 *************************************************** 

ORDER 

This matter, having come before the Court upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or 

Remedial Action pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-771(b), with attached certified copy of a 

judgment of conviction entered against Philip James Sweitzer in the Circuit Court for Howard 

County; and it appearing that the criminal conviction is for a “serious crime” as defined in 

Maryland Rule 16-701(k); and it appearing that Philip James Sweitzer is admitted to the Bar of 

this Court, it is, this 22nd day of September, 2014, 

 ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the Respondent, Philip James 

Sweitzer, be, and he is hereby suspended, effective immediately, from the practice of law in the 

State of Maryland, pending further order of this Court, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-771(c); and 

it is further 

 ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court shall strike the name of Philip James Sweitzer

from the register of attorneys, and pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-760(e), shall certify that fact to 

the Trustees of the Client Protection Fund and the clerks of all judicial tribunals in the State. 

 /s/ Mary Ellen Barbera 

 Chief Judge
### Nebraska Court of Appeals Memorandum Opinions

NOT Selected for Posting to Court Website

(r eleased the week prior to April 19, 2022 

### )

The following memorandum opinions were filed by the Nebraska Court of

Appeals and can be viewed using SSCALES :



### None Available

The above

- listed memorandum opinions c an be viewed online through the

appellate court case search available by subscription through Nebra ska.gov:

http://www.nebraska.gov/subscriber/

.

Current subscribers to Nebraska.gov can search appellate court cases here:

http s ://www.nebraska.gov/courts/s c ca les/

.
Opinion filed July 11, 2019

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals 

__________

No. 11-19-00003-CV

__________

IN THE INTEREST OF A.L.H., A CHILD

On Appeal from the County Court at Law

Brown County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CV1411455

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

In this appeal from an order affecting the parent–child relationship,1two 

notices of appeal were filed: one by A.S. and one by the cross-appellant, J.R.H., II. 

Attorney Shane Britton represents Cross-Appellant in this appeal. CrossAppellant’s brief was originally due to be filed in this court on or before May 3, 

2019. On May 9, 2019, this court notified Britton by letter that his brief was past 

due, and on this court’s own motion, we extended the deadline to May 20, 2019. In 

the May 9 letter, the clerk of this court informed Britton that compliance with this 

 

1We note that the trial court’s order does not involve the termination of parental rights. 
2

court’s deadlines is a serious matter. When Britton failed to respond to this court’s 

letter and failed to file a brief by May 20, this court again wrote Britton, extended 

the due date to June 7, and informed Britton that the failure to file a brief by the 

deadline may result in dismissal of Cross-Appellant’s appeal. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 38.8(a)(1), 42.3(b). On June 13, after again receiving no brief or any other 

response from Britton, this court directed Britton to either (1) file a brief by 5:00 p.m. 

on July 2, 2019, or (2) appear in person in the courtroom of the Eleventh Court of 

Appeals on July 3, 2019, at 10:30 a.m. to explain the delay in the preparation of 

Cross-Appellant’s brief. Britton failed to comply with this court’s directive.

A hearing was conducted in this court on July 3, 2019, at 10:30 a.m., in 

Britton’s absence. During the hearing, the court noted Britton’s absence, his failure 

to file a brief, and this court’s prerogative under Rule 38.8(a)(1) of the Texas Rules 

of Appellate Procedure. That rule provides: “If an appellant fails to timely file a 

brief, the appellate court may . . . dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution, unless 

the appellant reasonably explains the failure . . . .” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(a)(1). In 

open court, the Eleventh Court of Appeals announced its ruling that the cross-appeal 

filed by J.R.H., II shall be dismissed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(a)(1), 42.3(b).

Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal in part. The cross-appeal filed by J.R.H., 

II is dismissed for want of prosecution. The appeal remains active with respect to 

the notice of appeal filed by Appellant A.S.

July 11, 2019 PER CURIAM

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,

Stretcher, J., and Wright, S.C.J.2

(Willson, J., not participating.)

 

2

Jim R. Wright, Senior Chief Justice (Retired), Court of Appeals, 11th District of Texas at Eastland, 

sitting by assignment.
Exhibit 10.28  2010
Base Salaries for Named Executive Officers  Name
  and Title
  
  SalaryJames
  M. GowerChief
  Executive Officer, Chairman of the Board and Director
  
  $
  630,000Donald
  G. Payan, M.D.Executive
  Vice President, President of Discovery and Research
  
  $
  507,150Elliot
  B. Grossbard, M.D.Executive
  Vice President, Chief Medical Officer
  
  $
  472,500Raul
  R. RodriguezExecutive
  Vice President, Chief Operating Officer
  
  $
  451,500Ryan
  D. MaynardVice
  President, Chief Financial Officer
  
  $
  330,000
11 TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND

, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Harold Edward Morgan

, * From the County Court at Law

of Erath County,

Trial Court No. 48859

.

Vs. No. 11

- 2 1

- 00 113

- CR * November 3 , 20 2 2

The State of Texas

, * Memorand um Opinion by Williams , J.

(P anel consists of: Bailey , C.J.,

Trotter , J. , and W illiams, J.

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there is no

error in the judgment below. Therefore, in accordance with this court ’ s opi nion,

the judgment of the trial court is in all things affirmed.
#### Ex parte Henry BURKHARDT. (In re W.G. Yates & Sons, Inc. v. Henry Burkhardt).

1091757.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Nov. 12, 2010.

*1100Peter S. Mackey of Burns, Cunningham & Mackey, PC, Mobile, for petitioner.

Submitted on petitioner’s brief only.

SMITH, Justice.

The petition for the writ of certiorari is denied.

In denying the petition for the writ of certiorari, this Court does not wish to be understood as approving all the language, reasons, or statements of law in the Court of Civil Appeals’ opinion. *Horsley v. Horsley,*291 Ala. 782, 280 So.2d 155 (1973).

WRIT DENIED.

COBB, C.J., and WOODALL, PARKER, and SHAW, JJ., concur.
#### William Kyle LIVINGSTON, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 78-2820.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 23, 1980.

Travis Buckley, Laurel, Miss., for plaintiff-appellant.

Rushton, Stakely, Johnston & Garrett, Charles A. Stakely, James T. Upchurch, III, Montgomery, Ala., for defendant-appellee.

*53Before GODBOLD, TJOFLAT and SAM D. JOHNSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This case is an effort to sue a surety on its bond as a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Western Surety Company is the surety on a $10,000 bond guaranteeing faithful performance of duty by the Attorney General of Alabama, William J. Baxley, during his term of office. The jurisdiction of the district court was invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 (1976). The complaint alleged that Baxley and others conspired to deprive Livingston of his freedom under color of state law through maliciously prosecuting him on a murder charge and committing perjury in connection therewith, and that the conspiracy was consummated. Livingston alleged that he was falsely imprisoned and required to stand trial for murder and was found not guilty. Livingston did not allege any wrongdoing, participation, or even knowledge, on the part of the surety. Its liability was charged solely on the terms of the bond.

The complaint was subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. This was not a pendent state claim asserted in a § 1983 suit against a state officer. The sole defendant is the surety. It was not alleged that the surety, acting under color of state law, in any way subjected Livingston “to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. No authority is shown to us permitting a suit such as this under § 1983, and we find none.

AFFIRMED.
649 A.2d 624

#### IN THE MATTER OF JEFFREY P. RUDDY, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW.

November 28, 1994.

ORDER

This matter having been duly presented to the Court, it is ORDERED that JEFFREY P. RUDDY of NEWARK, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1967, and who was suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years, effective October 16, 1992, by Order of this Court dated September 22, 1992, be restored to the practice of law, effective immediately.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-7804

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

JOHNNY RAY PARKER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Sr.,

District Judge. (CR-95-209, CA-96-903)

Submitted: June 18, 1998 Decided: July 2, 1998

Before MURNAGHAN and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Johnny Ray Parker, Appellant Pro Se. Scott Patrick Mebane, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying

his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998).

We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion

accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find no

reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court.

United States v. Parker, Nos. CR-95-209; CA-96-903 (M.D.N.C. Nov.

24, 1997). Appellant’s motions for production of a trial transcript

are denied. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Celdrick RUCKER, Appellee.

No. 4D09-2435.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

May 11, 2011.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Laura Fisher, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Susan D. Cline, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

We grant the appellee’s motion to dismiss this appeal. The State appeals the trial court’s order mitigating appellee’s sentences for dealing in stolen property, burglary of an unoccupied dwelling, and false verification of ownership. After mitigation, the trial court imposed a sentence of six years in prison for the dealing in the stolen property count and five years for the burglary and false verification of ownership counts, with all sentences to be served concurrently. The lowest permissible sentence under the Criminal Punishment Code was 37.8 months. We find that appellee’s sentence was legal and within the range established by the Criminal Punishment Code. Therefore, we are without jurisdiction to entertain the State’s appeal of the sentence imposed. *See*§ 924.07(e), (i), Fla. Stat.; Fla. R.App. P. *12259.140(c)(1)(M)-(N). This appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

*Dismissed.*

MAY, DAMOORGIAN and LEVINE, JJ., concur.
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