alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>   1
                                                                Exhibit 15




                        ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF INDEPENDENT
                        CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
                REGARDING INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' REVIEW REPORT



The Board of Directors
Northfield Laboratories Inc.:

With respect to registration statement No. 333-15877 on Form S-8 of Northfield
Laboratories Inc., we acknowledge our awareness of the use therein of our
report dated December 22, 1997 related to our review of interim financial
information.

Pursuant to Rule 436(c) under the Securities Act of 1933, such report is not
considered a part of a registration statement prepared or certified by an
accountant or a report prepared or certified by an accountant within the
meaning of sections 7 and 11 of the Act.


                                    /s/ KPMG PEAT MARWICK LLP


Chicago, Illinois
January 12, 1998
#### Francisco SANTANA, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 00-2259.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 9, 2001.

Decided Jan. 19, 2001.

*606Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, FAGG, and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

A jury convicted Francisco Santana of drug conspiracy and a related charge. We affirmed his convictions and sentences on direct appeal. *See United States v. Ortiz-Martinez,*1 F.3d 662 (8th Cir.1993). Santana then filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 asserting several claims. The district court denied relief, but certified two issues for appeal involving ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Santana must show both that his attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance actually prejudiced him. *See Strickland v. Washington,*466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Santana cannot make this showing. Santana first asserts his appellate attorney should have objected to factual misrepresentations in the government’s appellate brief. The allegedly misrepresented facts were not material to any issue decided on appeal or relied on in our opinion to support affirmance of Santana’s convictions. Thus, Santana cannot show a reasonable probability that his direct appeal would have been successful absent the failure to object to the alleged misrepresentations. For his other ineffective assistance claim, Santana contends his appellate attorney should have challenged the addition of two points to his base offense level for possession of a firearm under U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(b)(l) because there was no evidence to show he possessed firearms. To have prevailed on the claim, however, the attorney would have had to convince us the district court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous, and Santana offers no reasons why they were. Santana cannot show the failure to challenge the § 2Dl.l(b)(l) addition prejudiced him. Besides, the increase properly applies to a defendant like Santana. Although Santana did not personally possess weapons, his coconspirators possessed them and the possession was reasonably foreseeable to him. *See United States v. Turpin,*920 F.2d 1377, 1386 (8th Cir.1990). We affirm the district court.

A true copy.
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 192 (Tuesday, October 5, 2010)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 61356]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-24898]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS

38 CFR Part 3

RIN 2900-AN24


Presumptions of Service Connection for Persian Gulf Service; 
Correction

AGENCY: Department of Veterans Affairs.

ACTION: Correcting amendment.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) published in the 
Federal Register of September 29, 2010, a document amending its 
adjudication regulations concerning presumptive service connection for 
certain diseases. In the regulatory text of that document, VA 
inadvertently omitted a comma following the word ``etiology'' in the 
first sentence of Sec.  3.317(a)(2)(ii). This document corrects that 
omission.

DATES: Effective Date: This correction is effective October 5, 2010.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: William F. Russo, Director of 
Regulations Management (02REG), Department of Veterans Affairs, 810 
Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20420, or call (202) 273-9515 (not 
a toll-free number).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On September 29, 2010, VA published in the 
Federal Register (75 FR 59968), an amendment to 38 CFR 3.317 to 
implement a decision of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs that there is 
a positive association between service in Southwest Asia during certain 
periods and the subsequent development of certain infectious diseases. 
In the first sentence of Sec.  3.317(a)(2)(ii), we inadvertently 
omitted a comma following the word ``etiology.'' This correction 
document adds the comma immediately following the word ``etiology'' in 
that sentence.

List of Subjects in 38 CFR Part 3

    Administrative practice and procedure, Claims, Disability benefits, 
Health care, Pensions, Radioactive materials, Veterans, Vietnam.

    Approved: September 30, 2010.
William F. Russo,
Director, Regulations Management, Office of the General Counsel, 
Department of Veterans Affairs.


0
For the reason set out in the preamble, VA is correcting 38 CFR part 3 
as follows:

PART 3--ADJUDICATION

0
1. The authority citation for part 3, subpart A continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority:  38 U.S.C. 501(a), unless otherwise noted.


Sec.  3.317  [Corrected]

0
2. In Sec.  3.317, paragraph (a)(2)(ii), first sentence, add a comma 
immediately after the word ``etiology.''

[FR Doc. 2010-24898 Filed 10-4-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-6503
FREDERICK BALLENGER, Petitioner - Appellant, versus KEITH E. OLSON, Warden; MARK SIMPSON, Dr., Regional DAP Coordinator; MARGARET HAMBRICK, Regional Director; ED CROSLEY, Administrator; KATHLEEN M. HAWK, Director of BOP; JANET RENO, Attorney General, Respondents - Appellees.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Beckley. David A. Faber, District Judge. (CA-96-1902-5) Submitted: August 14, 1997 Decided: August 21, 1997 Before NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, and BUTZNER and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Frederick Ballenger, Appellant Pro Se. Rebecca A. Betts, United States Attorney, Michael Lee Keller, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals the district court's order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994) petition. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Ballenger v. Olson , No. CA-96-1902-5 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 18, 1997). We deny Appellant's motion for counsel and dispense with oral argument because thefacts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
857 A.2d 1291

#### COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Petitioner, v. Gregory H. KING, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Sept. 28, 2004.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 28th day of September, 2004, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is hereby GRANTED. The order of the Superior Court is VACATED, and this matter is REMANDED to that court for reconsideration in light of our decision in *Commonwealth v. Young,*849 A.2d 1152 (Pa.2004). Jurisdiction relinquished.

Justice RUSSELL M. NIGRO notes his dissent to the per curiam order as he would deny the petition.
627 A.2d 1129

#### IN THE MATTER OF OPINION 667 OF THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS.

March 30, 1993.

ORDER

Petition for review of the Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics Opinion Number 667, entitled, *Imputed Disqualification: Employment of Partner in Adverse Firm,*is denied.
#### In re Madelyn A. Pavon SURIEL.

No. 2009-OB-2488.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 17, 2010.

PER CURIAM.*

After reviewing the evidence and considering the law, we conclude petitioner, Madelyn A. Pavón Suriel, is eligible to be conditionally admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana, subject to a probationary period of two years. During this period, petitioner shall provide evidence to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, on at least a quarterly basis, demonstrating that she has made a good faith effort to satisfy her financial obligations. Should petitioner fail to make a good faith effort to satisfy her financial obligations, or should she commit any misconduct during the period of probation, her conditional right to practice may be terminated or she may be subjected to other discipline pursuant to the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement.

CONDITIONAL ADMISSION GRANTED.

*

 Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion.
No. 87-1313.

#### Dayton Power & Light Co. *v.*Ohio Civil Rights Commission et al.

Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.
EXHIBIT 32.1
                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-0XLEY ACT OF 2002


I, James J. Ling,  Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Empiric Energy,  Inc.
(the "Company"),  certify,  U.S.C.  Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that , to my knowledge:

(1)      The  Company's  Quarterly  Report on Form 10-QSB for the quarter  ended
         September  30,  2003,  as  filed  with  the   Securities  and  Exchange
         Commission on the date here of (the "Report"),  fully complies with the
         requirements of Section 13(a) or 15 (d) of the Securities  Exchange Act
         of 1934; and

(2)      The  information  contained  in  the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         the Company.



                                            /s/ James J. Ling
                                            -----------------
                                            James J. Ling
                                            Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
                                            November 14, 2003


This  certification  accompanies  this  Report  pursuant  to Section  906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,  and shall not be deemed  filed by the  Company for
purposes of Section 18 of the  Securities  Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,  or
otherwise subject to liability under the section.  This certification  shall not
be deemed  incorporated  by reference in any filing under the  Securities Act or
Exchange Act, except to the extent that the Company specifically incorporates it
by reference.

A signed  original of this written  statement  required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form with the  electronic  version  of this  written  statement
required by Section 906,  has been  provided to the Company and will be retained
by the Company and furnished to the  Securities  and Exchange  Commission or its
staff upon request.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Bobby Neal JONES, Jr.

No. 2011-KK-2402.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 16, 2011.

In re Jones Jr., Bobby Neal; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Natchitoches, 10th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 16,382 — 1(B); to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 11-00618.

Denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                       1,302,182
<SECURITIES>                                   100,000
<RECEIVABLES>                                6,642,732
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    201,555
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            11,597,277
<PP&E>                                      64,593,635
<DEPRECIATION>                              21,975,939
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              54,328,621
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        9,002,787
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         3,701
<OTHER-SE>                                  24,154,139
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                54,328,621
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            17,196,909
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               16,451,647
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             295,146
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                450,113
<INCOME-TAX>                                   180,025
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            270,088
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   270,088
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     .073
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     .073
        

</TABLE>
#### G.D., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 2D08-2691.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Aug. 13, 2010.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Robert F. Moeller, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard M. Fishkin, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

WHATLEY, Judge.

This is an appeal pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), of G.D.’s adjudication of delinquency for possession of cannabis and paraphernalia. After careful review of the record, we find no error in G.D.’s adjudication of delinquency.

Appellate counsel has raised an issue of merit regarding the trial court’s assessment of a public defender fee against G.D. without notice and an opportunity to object. G.D. preserved this issue for review by filing a motion to correct sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). His motion was deemed denied when the trial court took no action on it within sixty days. We find merit in this issue and reverse the public defender fee.

Section 938.29, Florida Statutes (2008), authorizes the assessment of a public defender fee and grants the state a lien to secure its payment. Although imposition of the fee is mandatory, *see Cook v. State,*896 So.2d 870 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), the statute requires the trial court to give the defendant notice and an opportunity to object to the amount. *See*§ 938.29(5). In addition, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.720(d)(1) provides that at sentencing, a defendant must be given notice of the right to a hearing to contest the amount of the lien. Here, the trial court failed to provide G.D. notice and an opportunity to contest the public defender fee.

*328Accordingly, we reverse the public defender fee. On remand, the trial court may reimpose the fee once our mandate issues only if it provides G.D. notice of its intent to do so and an opportunity for a hearing on the matter. *See Bruno v. State,*960 So.2d 907 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.

SILBERMAN and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur.
WARNING: THE EDGAR SYSTEM ENCOUNTERED ERROR(S) WHILE PROCESSING THIS SCHEDULE.

<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     This schedule  contains summary  financial  information  extracted from the
Condensed  Consolidated  Statement of Financial  Condition at September 30, 1996
(Unaudited)  and the  Condensed  Consolidated  Statement  of Income for the Nine
Months Ended September 30, 1996  (Unaudited) and is qualified in its entirety by
reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                          0000921178
<MULTIPLIER>                   1,000
       
<S>                            <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                  6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                              17,316
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        1,341
<ALLOWANCES>                                           315
<INVENTORY>                                          1,129
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                    22,028
<PP&E>                                             199,848
<DEPRECIATION>                                      25,812
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                     226,069
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                               20,494
<BONDS>                                            181,857
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               15,971
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                                29
<OTHER-SE>                                           7,718
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                       226,069
<SALES>                                            123,893
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   132,972
<CGS>                                               49,123
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                       49,123
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    52,315
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                       148
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  16,356
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      7,181
<INCOME-TAX>                                            69
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  7,112
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                         7,112
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                          .20
<EPS-DILUTED>                                          .20
        


</TABLE>
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, January 28, 2021. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. 

# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA, January 28, 2021 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A21D0172. VALERIE PORTER v. SHAILESH MANJUNATH. Upon consideration of the Application for Discretionary Appeal, it is ordered that it be hereby DENIED.
LC NUMBERS: 2018CV303190
HMN FINANCIAL, INC.
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
 Date:   August 1, 2008
    /s/ Michael McNeilMichael McNeilPresident/Chief Executive Officer
(Principal Executive Officer)/s/ Jon EberleJon EberleSenior Vice President/Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial Officer)
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-11421

Conference Calendar

 

CORY WINTER RICHARD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

RONALD DREWRY, Head Warden; 

CRAIG RAINES, Assistant Warden,

Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:96-CV-273-BA

- - - - - - - - - -

December 11, 1997

Before BARKSDALE, BENAVIDES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The appeal of Cory Winter Richard, Texas prisoner #710543,

from the district court’s order denying his motion for a

preliminary injunction is DISMISSED. See 5th Cir. R. 42.2. 

Richard’s notice of appeal is untimely; therefore, dismissal for

lack of jurisdiction is mandated. See Robbins v. Maggio, 750

F.2d 405, 408 (5th Cir. 1985); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) and (c).

APPEAL DISMISSED.
#### Theo GORDON, Appellant, v. Berris GORDON, et al., Appellee.

No. 5D09-4327.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Feb. 18, 2011.

Rehearing Denied March 22, 2011.

Michael P. Nordman of Richard W. Taylor, P.A., Deland, for Appellant.

Evelyn W. Cloninger and Paul Bryan Sladek of Cloninger & Files, Oviedo, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Theo Gordon, the son of Llewelyn Gordon (deceased), appeals the order entered by the trial court denying his objection to inventory, approving the amended inventory filed by the personal representative of the deceased’s estate, and authorizing the personal representative to liquidate assets of the estate to protect the deceased’s homestead property. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

First, the trial court’s order denying Theo’s objection to inventory and approving the inventory filed by the personal representative is affirmed because there was competent, substantial evidence in the record supporting the trial court’s finding that the deceased intended to make an *inter vivos*gift of two brokerage accounts to his brother, Berris.

Second, Berris concedes error on the issue of whether the personal representative was entitled to liquidate assets of the estate to protect the deceased’s homestead property, acknowledging that the issue was not properly before the trial court for consideration. As such, the portion of the trial court’s order authorizing the personal representative to liquidate assets is reversed.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

PALMER, TORPY and COHEN, JJ., concur.