I 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 7123 

To condemn gross human rights violations of ethnic Turkic Muslims in 

Xinjiang, and calling for an end to arbitrary detention, torture, and 

harassment of these communities inside and outside China. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 13, 2018 

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey (for himself, Mr. SUOZZI, Mr. MCCAUL, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. CHABOT, Mr. SHERMAN, Mrs. COMSTOCK, Mr. CONNOLLY, Mr. 

HULTGREN, and Mr. MCGOVERN) introduced the following bill; which 

was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the 

Committees on Intelligence (Permanent Select), and the Judiciary, for a 

period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for 

consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To condemn gross human rights violations of ethnic Turkic 

Muslims in Xinjiang, and calling for an end to arbitrary 

detention, torture, and harassment of these communities 

inside and outside China. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Uyghur Human Rights 

5 Policy Act of 2018’’. 


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1 SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE. 

2 The purpose of this Act is to direct United States 

3 resources to address gross violations of universally recog4 nized human rights, including the mass internment of over 

5 1,000,000 Uyghurs and other predominately Muslim eth6 nic minorities in China and the intimidation and threats 

7 faced by United States citizens and legal permanent resi8 dents. 

9 SEC. 3. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES. 

10 In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional 

11 committees’’ means— 

12 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

13 Committee on Armed Services, the Select Committee 

14 on Intelligence, the Committee on Banking, Hous15 ing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on the Judi16 ciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 

17 Senate; and 

18 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

19 Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent Select 

20 Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Finan21 cial Services, the Committee on the Judiciary, and 

22 the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 

23 Representatives. 

24 SEC. 4. FINDINGS. 

25 Congress makes the following findings: 


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1 (1) The Government of the People’s Republic of 

2 China (PRC) has a long history of repressing ap3 proximately 13,000,000 Turkic, moderate Sunni 

4 Muslims, particularly Uyghurs, in the nominally au5 tonomous Xinjiang region. These actions are viola6 tions of international treaties and covenants to 

7 which the People’s Republic of China is a party, in8 cluding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 

9 and the International Covenant on Civil and Polit10 ical Rights. 

11 (2) In recent decades, central and regional Chi12 nese government policies have systematically dis13 criminated against Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and 

14 other Muslims in Xinjiang by denying them a range 

15 of civil and political rights, including the freedoms of 

16 expression, religion, movement, and due process, 

17 among others. 

18 (3) Increased unrest in the Xinjiang region as 

19 a result of the central government’s severe repres20 sion is used in Orwellian fashion by the Government 

21 of the People’s Republic of China as evidence of 

22 ‘‘terrorism’’ and ‘‘separatism’’ and as an excuse for 

23 further disproportionate response. 

24 (4) In 2014, Chinese authorities launched their 

25 latest ‘‘Strike Hard against Violent Extremism’’ 


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1 campaign, in which the pretext of wide-scale, inter2 nationally linked threats of terrorism were used to 

3 justify pervasive restrictions on, and gross human 

4 rights violations of, the ethnic minority communities 

5 of Xinjiang. 

6 (5) Those policies included— 

7 (A) pervasive, high-tech surveillance across 

8 the region, ranging from the arbitrary collection 

9 of biodata, including DNA samples from chil10 dren, without their knowledge or consent; 

11 (B) the use of QR codes outside homes to 

12 gather information on how frequently individ13 uals pray; 

14 (C) facial and voice recognition software 

15 and ‘‘predictive policing’’ databases; and 

16 (D) countless checkpoints across the region 

17 to control movement, all in a context with no 

18 enforceable privacy rights. 

19 (6)(A) The August 2016 transfer of former 

20 Tibet Autonomous Region Party Secretary Chen 

21 Quanguo to become the Xinjiang Party Secretary 

22 prompted an acceleration in the crackdown across 

23 the region. 

24 (B) Local officials in Xinjiang have used 

25 chilling political rhetoric to describe the purpose of 


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1 government policy including ‘‘eradicating tumors’’ 

2 and ‘‘spray[ing] chemicals’’ on crops to kill the 

3 ‘‘weeds’’. 

4 (C) Uyghurs are forced to celebrate Chinese 

5 cultural traditions, such as Chinese New Year, and 

6 unique Uyghur culture is facing eradication due to 

7 state control over Uyghur cultural heritage, such as 

8 muqam and meshrep, and due to elimination of the 

9 Uyghur language as a medium of instruction in 

10 Xinjiang schools and universities. 

11 (7) In 2017, credible investigations found that 

12 family members of Uyghurs living outside of China 

13 had gone missing, that Chinese authorities were 

14 pressuring those outside the country to return, and 

15 that individuals were being arbitrarily detained in 

16 large numbers. 

17 (8) There is ample credible evidence provided 

18 by scholars, human rights organizations, journalists, 

19 and think tanks substantiating the establishment by 

20 Chinese authorities of ‘‘political reeducation’’ camps, 

21 for which there is no legal basis. 

22 (9) Chinese security forces have never been held 

23 accountable for credible reports of mass shootings in 

24 Alaqagha (2014), Hanerik (2013), and Siriqbuya 


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1 (2013), as well as the extrajudicial killings of 

2 Abdulbasit Ablimit (2013) and Rozi Osman (2014). 

3 (10) Independent organizations conducted 

4 interviews and received testimonies from Kayrat 

5 Samarkan and Omir Bekali, along with others who 

6 had been detained in such facilities, who described 

7 forced political indoctrination, torture, uncertainty 

8 as to the length of detention, humiliation, and denial 

9 of religious, cultural, and linguistic freedoms, and 

10 confirmed that they were told by guards that the 

11 only way to secure release was to demonstrate suffi12 cient political loyalty. Uyghurs Muhammed Salih 

13 Hajim (2018), Yaqupjan Naman (2018), 

14 Abdughappar Abdujappar (2018), Ayhan Memet 

15 (2018), Abdulreshit Seley Hajim (2018), 

16 Nurimangul Memet (2018), Adalet Teyip (2018), 

17 Abdulnehed Mehsum (2017), Hesen Imin (2017), 

18 Sawut Raxman (2017), Tursungul (2015), Memet 

19 Ibrahim (2015), and Perhat Mollahun (2013) died 

20 while in the custody of the Chinese authorities with21 out proper investigation of the circumstances. 

22 (11) Uyghurs and Kazakhs, who have now ob23 tained permanent residence or citizenship in other 

24 countries, attest to receiving threats and harassment 

25 from Chinese officials. 


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1 (12) Under pressure from the Government of 

2 the People’s Republic of China, countries have forc3 ibly returned Uyghurs to China in violation of the 

4 non-refoulement principle and their well-founded 

5 fear of persecution. States returning Uyghurs in6 clude Egypt (2017), the United Arab Emirates 

7 (2017), Malaysia (2011, 2013), Thailand (2011, 

8 2015); Laos (2010); Burma (2010); Cambodia 

9 (2009); Vietnam (2014); Kazakhstan (1999, 2001, 

10 2003, 2006); Uzbekistan (2007), Tajikistan (2011), 

11 Pakistan (2003, 2009, 2011), Nepal (2002), India 

12 (2016). 

13 (13) Six journalists for Radio Free Asia’s 

14 Uyghur service have publicly detailed abuses their 

15 family members in Xinjiang have endured in re16 sponse to their work exposing abusive policies across 

17 the region. 

18 (14) Several United States-based companies are 

19 conducting business with Xinjiang authorities with 

20 unclear due diligence as to how their business oper21 ations may create or contribute to human rights vio22 lations. 

23 (15) The Government of the People’s Republic 

24 of China is increasingly investing in the ‘‘Belt and 

25 Road Initiative’’ across Xinjiang and throughout 


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1 Central Asia, extending its influence through organi2 zations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza3 tion without regard to the political, cultural, or lin4 guistic rights of ethnic minorities. 

5 (16) The Secretary of State, Congressional-Ex6 ecutive Commission on China, Tom Lantos Human 

7 Rights Commission, and individual members of the 

8 executive branch and Congress have all expressed 

9 growing concern regarding the pervasive human 

10 rights abuses across Xinjiang and the ‘‘political re11 education’’ camps. 

12 (17) In August 2018, the United Nations Com13 mittee to Eliminate Racial Discrimination challenged 

14 the Government of the People’s Republic of China 

15 over abuses in Xinjiang, including the establishment 

16 of mass arbitrary detention camps. 

17 (18) In September 2018, newly appointed 

18 United Nations High Commissioner for Human 

19 Rights Michele Bachelet noted in her first speech as 

20 High Commissioner the ‘‘deeply disturbing allega21 tions of large-scale arbitrary detentions of Uighurs 

22 and other Muslim communities, in so-called re-edu23 cation camps across Xinjiang’’. 

24 (19) Between August and September 2018, 

25 Chinese authorities responded to these allegations by 


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1 either flatly denying them or insisting that the facili2 ties are ‘‘vocational training centers’’. 

3 (20) On September 18, 2018, the Washington 

4 Post wrote, ‘‘At stake is not just the welfare of the 

5 Uighurs, but also whether the technologies of the 

6 21st century will be employed to smother human 

7 freedom.’’ 

8 (21) Experts have described the Xinjiang region 

9 as ‘‘a police state to rival North Korea, with a for10 malized racism on the order of South African apart11 heid’’ and the repression in the Xinjiang region as 

12 a ‘‘slow motion Tiananmen’’. 

13 SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

14 It is the sense of Congress that— 

15 (1) the President should condemn abuses 

16 against Turkic Muslims by Chinese authorities in 

17 Xinjiang and call on Chinese President Xi Jinping 

18 to recognize the profound abuse and likely lasting 

19 damage of China’s current policies, and immediately 

20 close the ‘‘political reeducation’’ camps, lift all re21 strictions on internationally guaranteed human 

22 rights across the region, and allow for reestablish23 ment of contact between those inside and outside 

24 China; 


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1 (2) the United States Government should de2 velop a strategy to support the United Nations High 

3 Commissioner for Human Rights and numerous 

4 United Nations Special Rapporteurs’ urgent calls for 

5 immediate and unfettered access to Xinjiang, includ6 ing the ‘‘political reeducation’’ camps; 

7 (3) the Secretary of State should consider the 

8 establishment of a new position within the Depart9 ment of State, the United States Special Coordi10 nator for Xinjiang, who will coordinate diplomatic, 

11 political, public diplomacy, financial assistance, sanc12 tions, counterterrorism, and security resources with13 in the United States Government to respond to the 

14 gross violations of universally recognized human 

15 rights occurring in the Xinjiang region, including by 

16 addressing the mass detentions of Uyghurs and 

17 other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities, the 

18 deployment of technologically advanced surveillance 

19 and police detection methods, and the counterter20 rorism and counter-radicalism claims used to justify 

21 the policies of the Government of the People’s Re22 public of China in Xinjiang Province; 

23 (4) if the objectives of the Special Coordinator 

24 position described in paragraph (3) are accom25 plished, the Secretary of State may terminate the 


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1 position, but must inform the appropriate congres2 sional committees 45 days before the termination; 

3 (5) the Secretary must consult with the chair4 man and ranking minority members of the appro5 priate congressional committees prior to the designa6 tion of the Special Coordinator; 

7 (6) the Secretary of State should consider the 

8 applicability of existing authorities, including the 

9 Global Magnitsky Act (subtitle F of Public Law 

10 114–328), to impose targeted sanctions on members 

11 of the Government of the People’s Republic of 

12 China, the Chinese Communist Party, and state se13 curity apparatus, including Xinjiang Party Secretary 

14 Chen Quanguo and other officials credibly alleged to 

15 be responsible for human rights abuses in Xinjiang 

16 and elsewhere; 

17 (7) the Secretary of State should fully imple18 ment the provisions of the Frank Wolf International 

19 Religious Freedom Act (Public Law 114–281) and 

20 consider strategically employing sanctions and other 

21 tools under the International Religious Freedom Act 

22 (22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq.) and to employ measures re23 quired as part of the ‘‘Country of Particular Con24 cern’’ (CPC) designation for the Government of the 


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1 People’s Republic of China that directly address par2 ticularly severe violations of religious freedom; 

3 (8) the Secretary of Commerce should review 

4 and consider the prohibition on the sale or provision 

5 of any United States-made goods or services to any 

6 state agent in Xinjiang, and add the Xinjiang 

7 branch of the Chinese Communist Party, the 

8 Xinjiang Public Security Bureau, and the Xinjiang 

9 Office of the United Front Work Department, 

10 among others, to the ‘‘entities’’ list administered by 

11 the Department of Commerce; 

12 (9) the Secretary of State should explore appro13 priate mechanisms to establish a voluntary database 

14 to which United States citizens or permanent family 

15 members of the Uyghur diaspora can provide details 

16 about missing family members, with a view towards 

17 pressing for accountability, and take appropriate 

18 measures to expedite the asylum claims of Uyghurs, 

19 Kazakhs, and other Turkic Muslim minorities; 

20 (10) United States companies and individuals 

21 selling goods or services or otherwise operating in 

22 Xinjiang should take steps, including in any public 

23 or financial filings, to publicly assert that their com24 mercial activities are not contributing to human 

25 rights violations in Xinjiang or elsewhere in China; 


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1 (11) the Federal Bureau of Investigation and 

2 appropriate United States law enforcement entities 

3 should track and take steps to hold accountable offi4 cials from China who harass, threaten, or intimidate 

5 United States citizens and legal permanent resi6 dents, including Turkic Muslims, Uyghur-Americans, 

7 Chinese-Americans, and Chinese nationals legally 

8 studying or working in the United States; 

9 (12) the Secretary of State should work with 

10 traditional United States allies and partners to take 

11 similar steps and coordinate closely on targeted 

12 sanctions and visa restrictions; and 

13 (13) the work of Radio Free Asia’s Uyghur lan14 guage service should be commended for providing a 

15 detailed and accurate account of current events fac16 ing Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in China 

17 despite efforts by the Government of the People’s 

18 Republic of China to intimidate their reporting 

19 through threats and detention of family members 

20 living in China. 

21 SEC. 6. NATIONAL SECURITY REPORT. 

22 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

23 date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 

24 Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State, 

25 shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees 


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1 a classified and unclassified report to assess regional secu2 rity threats posed by the crackdown across Xinjiang and 

3 the frequency with which Central and Southeast Asian 

4 governments are forcibly returning Turkic Muslim refu5 gees and asylum seekers. 

6 (b) ANNEX.—The report required under subsection 

7 (a) shall include an annex with a list of all Chinese compa8 nies involved in the construction or operation of the ‘‘polit9 ical education’’ camps, or the provision or operation of 

10 surveillance technology or operations, across Xinjiang. 

11 SEC. 7. REPORT ON STOPPING INTIMIDATION OF CITIZENS 

12 AND RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES. 

13 Not later than 90 days after the date of the enact14 ment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of 

15 Investigation, in consultation with the Secretary of State, 

16 shall provide a report to the appropriate congressional 

17 committees that outline efforts to provide information to 

18 and protect United States citizens and residents, including 

19 ethnic Uyghurs and Chinese nationals legally studying or 

20 working temporarily in the United States who have experi21 enced harassment as described under section 5(9). 

22 SEC. 8. REPORT ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY. 

23 Not later than 120 days after the date of the enact24 ment of this Act, the CEO of the United States Agency 


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1 for Global Media shall submit to the appropriate congres2 sional committees a report that— 

3 (1) describes the current status and reach of 

4 United States broadcasting to the Xinjiang region 

5 and Uyghur speaking communities globally, barriers 

6 to the free flow of news and information to these 

7 communities, and, if appropriate, detailed technical 

8 and fiscal requirements necessary to increase broad9 casting and other media to these communities glob10 ally; 

11 (2) describes efforts to intimidate Radio Free 

12 Asia and Voice of America reporters reporting on 

13 human rights issues in the People’s Republic of 

14 China; and 

15 (3) in consultation with the Global Engagement 

16 Center at the Department of State, describes and 

17 assesses disinformation and propaganda by the Gov18 ernment of the People’s Republic of China or other 

19 members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

20 targeting Uyghur communities globally and efforts 

21 to downplay gross violations of universally recog22 nized human rights occurring in the Xinjiang region. 

23 SEC. 9. ANNUAL REPORT. 

24 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

25 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, 


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1 the Secretary of State, after consulting relevant civil soci2 ety organizations, shall submit to the appropriate congres3 sional committees and make available on the website of 

4 Department of State an interagency report that in5 cludes— 

6 (1) an assessment of the number of individuals 

7 detained in political ‘‘reeducation camps’’ and condi8 tions in the camps for detainees in the Xinjiang re9 gion, including whether detainees endure torture, 

10 forced renunciation of faith, or other mistreatment; 

11 (2) a description, as possible, of the methods 

12 used by People’s Republic of China authorities to 

13 ‘‘reeducate’’ Uyghur detainees as well as the Peo14 ple’s Republic of China agencies in charge of reedu15 cation; 

16 (3) an assessment of the number of individuals 

17 being arbitrarily detained, including in pretrial de18 tention centers and prisons; 

19 (4) an assessment of the level of access People’s 

20 Republic of China authorities grant to diplomats, 

21 journalists, and others to the Xinjiang region and a 

22 description of measures used to impede efforts to 

23 monitor human rights conditions in the Xinjiang re24 gion; 


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1 (5) an assessment of the repressive surveillance, 

2 detection, and control methods used by People’s Re3 public of China authorities in the Xinjiang region, 

4 and a list of individuals who hold senior leadership 

5 positions and are responsible for ‘‘high-tech’’ polic6 ing, mass incarceration, and reeducation efforts tar7 geting Uyghur and other predominately Muslim eth8 nic minorities in the Xinjiang region; and 

9 (6) a description of United States diplomatic ef10 forts to address the gross violations of universally 

11 recognized rights in the Xinjiang region, including in 

12 multilateral institutions and through bilateral rela13 tions with the People’s Republic of China, the na14 tions of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation 

15 (OIC), and other countries. 

16 (b) TERMINATION.—The Secretary of State may ter17 minate the report required under subsection (a) if the Sec18 retary determines that the gross violations of universally 

19 recognized human rights and mass detention of Uyghurs 

20 and other predominately Muslim ethnic minorities has 

21 ended in the Xinjiang region. 

Æ 


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