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*********************************************** 
REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE NETWORK, INC. v.

LAURA SQUILLANTE ET AL.

(AC 39229)

DiPentima, C. J., and Sheldon and Harper, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned

by the named defendant, S. The trial court rendered a judgment of strict

foreclosure and subsequently granted S’s motion to open and vacate

the judgment, and extended the law day. Prior to the new law day, S

filed a motion to reopen, which the court denied, but the court extended

the law day again so that it fell on the same day as the final day in

which S could have filed a timely appeal from denial of the motion to

reopen. That law day passed without any appeal or the filing of any

additional motions. Approximately nine months after the law day, S

filed a second motion to reopen, which the trial court denied as moot

on the ground that title had vested in the plaintiff after the law day

passed. Thereafter, S appealed to this court, claiming that the trial court

improperly had denied her second motion to reopen because, although

it was filed nine months after the law day, title had not vested in the

plaintiff, and the court had jurisdiction to reopen the judgment. S specifically claimed that, irrespective of whether an appeal was actually filed

on or before the law day, a law day that is set to fall within an applicable

appeal period is invalid because it impermissibly shortens that appeal

period. Held that the trial court correctly concluded that S’s second

motion to reopen was moot, as S’s right to appeal from the trial court’s

denial of her first motion to reopen ended on the law day at 5 p.m., in

accordance with the applicable rule of practice ([2015] § 7-17), whereas

her right to redeem did not end until midnight on that law day, and,

accordingly, because the setting of the law day did not shorten the time

period within which to appeal, the law day was valid, and title vested

in the plaintiff when S failed to redeem on that day; moreover, because

titled vested in the plaintiff and the trial court thus lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over S’s second motion to reopen, the court should have

dismissed rather than have denied the second motion to reopen.

Argued April 16—officially released August 28, 2018

Procedural History

Action to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the named defendant, and for other relief,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district

of Hartford, where the defendants were defaulted for

failure to plead; thereafter, the court, Wahla, J., granted

the plaintiff’s motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure

and rendered judgment thereon; subsequently, the

court, Scholl, J., granted the named defendant’s motion

to open and vacate the judgment; thereafter, the court,

Scholl, J., denied the named defendant’s motion to

reopen and vacate the judgment; subsequently, the

court, Wahla, J., denied the named defendant’s motion

to reopen the judgment and extend the law day, from

which the named defendant appealed to this court.

Improper form of judgment; judgment directed.

Matthew S. Carlone, for the appellant (named

defendant).

Joseph R. Dunaj, with whom, on the brief, was S.

Bruce Fair, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

DiPENTIMA, C. J. The defendant Laura Squillante1

appeals from an order of the trial court denying her

motion to reopen a judgment of strict foreclosure. On

appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred

in denying her motion because, although it was filed

approximately nine months after the applicable law day,

title had not vested in the plaintiff, Real Estate Mortgage

Network, Inc., and, thus, the court had jurisdiction to

reopen the judgment of strict foreclosure. We do not

agree.

The following uncontroverted facts are relevant to

this appeal. On March 7, 2013, the plaintiff commenced

an action for strict foreclosure against the defendant.

In its complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant

had executed a promissory note with a principal amount

of $447,700, secured by a mortgage on real property

located at 32 Frazer Fir Road in South Windsor. The

plaintiff alleged that the defendant was in default, and,

as holder of the mortgage and note, the plaintiff was

electing to accelerate the balance of the note and foreclose on the mortgage.

On January 7, 2015, following the expiration of the

foreclosure mediation period, the defendant was

defaulted for failure to plead. Five days later, on January

12, 2015, the trial court rendered a judgment of strict

foreclosure and scheduled the law day for April 27,

2015. Prior to the law day, on April 22, 2015, the defendant filed a motion to open and vacate the judgment

of foreclosure.2 The court granted the defendant’s

motion on April 27, 2015, and extended the law day

until June 8, 2015. Prior to the new law day, on June

3, 2015, the defendant filed a motion to reopen, citing

similar grounds as those pleaded in her prior motion

to open. The court denied her motion on June 8, 2015,

but extended the law day to June 29, 2015. The law

day passed without any appeal or additional motions

being filed.

Approximately nine months after the June 29, 2015

law day, on March 24, 2016, the defendant filed a second

motion to reopen the judgment of strict foreclosure. In

her motion, the defendant claimed that the court had

jurisdiction to open the judgment because title had not

vested in the plaintiff. Specifically, the defendant argued

that the June 29, 2015 law day was invalid because it

fell within the appeal period following the court’s denial

of the defendant’s first motion to reopen.3 Because the

law day was purportedly invalid, the defendant contended that title could not vest even though no appeal

was filed. The trial court disagreed and concluded that

title had vested in the plaintiff following the June 29,

2015 law day. Accordingly, the trial court denied the

defendant’s motion as moot.

In her appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court
erroneously denied her most recent motion to reopen

because a law day set within an applicable appeal period

is invalid. The defendant argues that, irrespective of

whether an appeal is filed, title cannot vest following

a law day that impermissibly shortens the period in

which to appeal a court’s ruling. For the reasons set

forth in this opinion, we conclude that the June 29,

2015 law day did not shorten the defendant’s appeal

period and was therefore valid. Because the law day was

valid, title vested in the plaintiff, and the defendant’s

second motion to reopen was moot.

We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of

review for a claim that the trial court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction. ‘‘When the court draws conclusions

of law, our review is plenary and we must decide

whether those conclusions are legally and logically correct.’’ Continental Capital Corp. v. Lazarte, 57 Conn.

App. 271, 273, 749 A.2d 646 (2000).

Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to open a

judgment of strict foreclosure is generally dependent

on whether title has vested in the encumbrancer.4 See

General Statutes § 49-15 (a) (1) (upon written motion

by interested person, court may open and modify any

judgment of strict foreclosure as it deems reasonable,

‘‘provided no such judgment shall be opened after the

title has become absolute in any encumbrancer’’

[emphasis added]). ‘‘When a motion to open and a subsequent appeal from the denial of the motion to open

are filed after title has vested in an encumbrancer, no

practical relief can be granted and so the appeal

becomes moot.’’ First National Bank of Chicago v.

Luecken, 66 Conn. App. 606, 612, 785 A.2d 1148 (2001),

cert. denied, 259 Conn. 915, 792 A.2d 851 (2002).

Normally, in an action for strict foreclosure, the running of the law day vests title in the encumbrancer. See

Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB v. Charles, 95 Conn. App.

315, 324, 898 A.2d 197 (noting that passing of law day

extinguishes right of equitable redemption and vests

title absolutely in mortgagee), cert. denied, 279 Conn.

909, 902 A.2d 1069 (2006); Barclays Bank of New York

v. Ivler, 20 Conn. App. 163, 166, 565 A.2d 252 (‘‘[u]nder

our law, an action for strict foreclosure is brought by

a mortgagee who, holding legal title, seeks not to

enforce a forfeiture but rather to foreclose an equity

of redemption unless the mortgagor satisfies the debt

on or before his law day’’), cert. denied, 213 Conn. 809,

568 A.2d 792 (1989). In order to be a valid law day,

however, the date cannot shorten any applicable period

of appeal. See Continental Capital Corp. v. Lazarte,

supra, 57 Conn. App. 273–74. To permit otherwise would

deprive a party the opportunity for judicial review and

thus violate her right to due process of law. Id.

Here, the defendant claims that the law day was

invalid because it fell on the same day as the final

day in which she could have timely appealed from the
court’s denial of her first motion to reopen. The defendant argues that the concurrent expiration of the period

to appeal and the period for equitable redemption is

tantamount to shortening the period to appeal. Accordingly, the defendant argues that the June 29, 2015 law

day was invalid and that title could not have vested in

the plaintiff when she failed to redeem on that day. We

are not persuaded.

In First Federal Savings & Loan Assn. of Rochester

v. Pellechia, 37 Conn. App. 423, 425–26, 656 A.2d 688,

cert. granted, 234 Conn. 905, 659 A.2d 1206 (1995)

(appeal withdrawn February 5, 1996), for the purpose of

determining whether a motion for deficiency judgment

was timely, we held that the period for equitable

redemption ends at midnight on the law day. Prior to

then, the mortgagor can seek to satisfy the debt and

redeem equitable title in the property. See id. Thus, this

right, although likely to be affected by the practical

limitations of normal business hours, is not actually

extinguished until the law day has ended at midnight.

Conversely, with respect to the applicable period in

which to appeal, Practice Book (2015) § 7-17 provided

that the Superior Court clerk’s office5

shall be open

until 5 p.m. Accordingly, any filing received by the

clerk’s office after 5 p.m. ‘‘shall be deemed filed on the

next business day upon which such office is open.’’

Practice Book (2015) § 7-17. Thus, if a party wishes to

file an appeal on the last available day, she must ensure

that her filing is received by the clerk’s office no later

than 5 p.m. that day. Otherwise, the appeal shall be

deemed to have been filed on the next business day

and will be untimely.

In light of the separate constraints governing the

deadline to appeal and the deadline to redeem, we conclude that, with respect to the June 29, 2015 law day,

the defendant’s right to appeal ended at 5 p.m., while her

right to redeem did not end until midnight. Therefore,

because the setting of the law day did not shorten the

time period in which to appeal, the date was valid and

title vested in the plaintiff when the defendant failed

to redeem on that day. We must note, however, that

because we conclude that title vested in the plaintiff,

the court lacked jurisdiction and should not have

denied, but rather should have dismissed, the defendant’s second motion to reopen.

The form of the judgment is improper, the judgment

is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to

dismiss the motion to reopen the judgment of strict

foreclosure as moot.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The complaint also named Sharafl, LLC, a junior lienholder, as a defendant. On January 7, 2015, Sharafl, LLC, was defaulted for failure to plead.

It has not participated in this appeal. We refer to Squillante as the defendant

in this opinion.

2

In her motion to open, the defendant argued a change in financial circumstances and a renewed willingness to participate in foreclosure mediation
and pursue available financing options.

3

‘‘Unless a different time period is provided by statute, an appeal must

be filed within twenty days of the date notice of the judgment or decision

is given.’’ Practice Book § 63-1 (a). Here, the defendant was given notice of

the decision in open court on June 8, 2015. Because June 28, 2015, was a

Sunday, it would have been permissible for the defendant to file an appeal

on Monday, June 29, 2015. See Practice Book (2015) § 7-17 (‘‘[i]f the last

day for filing any matter in the clerk’s office falls on a day on which such

office is not open . . . then the last day for filing shall be the next business

day upon which such office is open’’).

4 We note that pursuant to an agreement by all appearing parties, a judgment of strict foreclosure may be opened after title has vested with the

encumbrancer, provided (1) no judgment may be opened more than four

months from the date the judgment was rendered or more than thirty days

after title became absolute in any encumbrancer, whichever is later, and

(2) the rights and interests of all parties are restored to their original status

as they existed on the date judgment was rendered. See General Statutes

§ 49-15 (a) (2). There also are rare circumstances where a trial court will

have jurisdiction to open a judgment of strict foreclosure, after title has

vested with the encumbrancer, without the consent of all appearing parties.

See, e.g., New Milford Savings Bank v. Jajer, 244 Conn. 251, 258–60, 708

A.2d 1378 (1998) (trial court had jurisdiction to open judgment of strict

foreclosure to correct scrivener’s error in foreclosure complaint); Wells

Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Melahn, 148 Conn. App. 1, 12, 85 A.3d 1 (2014) (trial court

had jurisdiction to open judgment where encumbrancer falsely certified

compliance with court’s judgment of strict foreclosure).

5 Practice Book (2015) § 63-3 provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a]ny appeal

may be filed in the original trial court or the court to which the case was

transferred or in any judicial district court in the state . . . .’’