J-S60044-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JOSEPH DANIEL MILLER

Appellant No. 684 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 18, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-01-CR-0000594-2013

BEFORE: OTT, J., STABILE, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 02, 2014

In this direct appeal, Joseph Miller argues that the evidence was 

insufficient to sustain his conviction for defrauding a secured creditor1, 

because there was no evidence that he acted intentionally, the mens rea for 

this offense. After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court accurately summarized the evidence adduced during 

Miller’s bench trial as follows:

[Miller]'s conviction stems from a civil judgment 

entered against him which was referred to the 

Adams County Sheriff’s Office for collection. On 

November 15, 2012, Deputy Angel Garcia and 

Deputy Eddie Minor went to [Miller]'s residence at 

1865 Hilltown Road, Biglerville, Pennsylvania in 

Adams County to serve [Miller] with paperwork 

notifying him of the writ of execution on judgment 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 4110.
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and to levy [Miller]'s personal property. N.T. 6:7-17. 

When the deputies arrived, they saw a vehicle in the 

driveway, but were unable to contact any individuals 

at the residence. N.T. 7:3-16. One of the deputies 

then called County Control to verify ownership of the 

vehicle parked in the driveway. N.T. 8:5-9. The 

search revealed that the vehicle, a Ford Bronco, was 

registered to [Miller]. N.T. 8:14. Deputy Minor filled 

out a document which listed the property on which 

the levy had been placed—the Ford Bronco—along 

with other information notifying [Miller] of the levy 

and the sheriff’s sale of the property. N.T. 8:19-25; 

9:1-7; 10:10-15. The document also specifically 

states that all items will be sold subject to any liens 

and encumbrances. N.T. 10:7-8; Com. Ex. 1. At the 

bottom, the document includes the text of section 

4110 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, which sets 

forth the elements and penalties associated with the 

crime of defrauding secured creditors. Com. Ex. 1. 

Before leaving the residence, the deputies left the 

document and a note stating that [Miller] should 

contact the sheriff’s office. N.T. 10:16-19. 

On December 15, 2014, Deputies Garcia and Minor 

returned to [Miller]'s residence for the purpose of 

serving the writ of execution on [Miller]. N.T. 11:10-

22. When the deputies knocked on the door to 

[Miller]'s home, [Miller]’s son answered and agreed 

to accept the paperwork on behalf of his father. N.T. 

11:23-25; 12:1-11. Subsequently, Sergeant Jason 

Kirkner of the Adams County Sheriff’s Office sent 

formal notice of the time, date, and place of the 

sheriff’s sale to [Miller] via mail approximately thirty 

(30) days prior to the sale date. N.T. 21:5. On March 

8, 2013, the date set for the sheriff’s sale, Deputy 

Garcia and Sergeant Kirkner arrived at [Miller]'s 

residence around 8:45 a.m. for the sale scheduled to 

occur at 9 a.m. N.T. 14:5. Upon arriving, Deputy 

Garcia and Sergeant Kirkner noticed that there were 

no vehicles in [Miller]'s driveway. N.T. 13-15. After 

searching the property for the Ford Bronco and 

knocking on the front door of [Miller]'s residence, 

Deputy Garcia and Sergeant Kirkner found neither 

the vehicle nor any individuals on the property. N.T. 
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14:23-25; 15:1-11, Deputy Garcia and Sergeant 

Kirkner stayed at [Miller]'s property until 

approximately 9:10 or 9:15 a.m., at which point 

they left to go back to the sheriff’s office. N.T. 24:5-

17. 

While en route, Sergeant Kirkner received a 

telephone call from [Miller]. N.T. 24:20-21. [Miller] 

asked Sergeant Kirkner why members of the sheriff’s 

office were at his home. N.T. 25:4-5. Sergeant 

Kirkner responded that a sheriff’s sale had been set 

for that date, but because the Ford Bronco was not 

at the residence, [Miller] was going to be charged 

with defrauding secured creditors. N.T. 25:5-6. 

[Miller] stated that he needed the vehicle for work. 

N.T. 25:5-6. Sergeant Kirkner further advised 

[Miller] that he would not charge [Miller] with 

defrauding secured creditors if [Miller] paid the 

judgment amount. N.T. 25:12-13. Despite his 

promise to pay the amount within one (1) to two (2) 

weeks, [Miller] failed to make payment. Sergeant 

Kirkner filed the instant defrauding secured creditors 

charge on May 5, 2013. N.T. 25:17-21.

Trial Court Opinion, pp. 1-3. The court found Miller guilty under section 

4110 and sentenced him to 12 months’ probation. Miller filed a timely notice 

of appeal, and both Miller and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

The lone issue in this appeal is Miller’s challenge to the sufficiency of 

the evidence. Our standard of review for such challenges is well-settled:

[W]hether[,] viewing all the evidence admitted at 

trial in the light most favorable to the 

[Commonwealth as the] verdict winner, there is 

sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find 

every element of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may not 

weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts 

and circumstances established by the 
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Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility 

of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s 

guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a 

matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn 

from the combined circumstances. The 

Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving 

every element of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Troy, 832 A.2d 1089, 1092 (Pa.Super.2003) (citations 

omitted). 

18 Pa.C.S. § 4110, entitled “Defrauding Secured Creditors,” provides: 

“A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he destroys, 

removes, conceals, encumbers, transfers or otherwise deals with property 

subject to a security interest or after levy has been made thereon with intent 

to hinder enforcement of such interest.” Miller contends that the evidence 

was insufficient to establish the element of intent. We disagree.

“A person acts intentionally with respect to a material element of an 

offense when. . .if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result 

thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to 

cause such a result.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(1)(i). In this case, the evidence, 

construed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, establishes that 

Miller’s “conscious object[ive]” was to conceal or transfer his Ford Bronco in 

a manner that hindered enforcement of the judgment creditor’s secured 

interest. Id. As the trial court explained:
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The Commonwealth presented evidence 

demonstrating that the sheriff’s office had placed a 

levy on [Miller]'s Ford Bronco. Trial testimony also 

showed that [Miller] received notice of the levy and 

the date, time, and place set for the sheriff’s sale. 

Deputy Garcia testified that he traveled to [Miller]'s 

residence on November 15, 2012 and left paperwork 

notifying [Miller] of the property which was to be 

exposed to public sale due to the levy placed on it. 

Deputy Garcia later went to [Miller]'s residence and 

left the writ of execution with [Miller]'s son. Sergeant 

Kirkner testified that, approximately thirty (30) days 

prior to the scheduled date of the sheriff’s sale, he 

mailed notice of the sale to [Miller]. He also stated 

that notice of the sheriff’s sale of [Miller]'s vehicle 

was posted publicly in the sheriff’s office.

[Miller] admitted that he received notice of the sale 

and was aware of the consequences which would 

result if he interfered with the property on which a 

levy had been placed with the intent to hinder 

enforcement of the creditor’s interest. [Miller] also 

admitted that he authorized his wife to take the Ford 

Bronco to work on the date scheduled for the 

sheriff’s sale. Based on [Miller]'s admissions and the 

testimony of Deputy Garcia and Sergeant Kirkner, 

[Miller]'s intent to hinder enforcement of the security 

interest can be inferred.

Trial Court Opinion, p. 5.

Miller provides several arguments in support of his claim that he 

lacked the intent to hinder enforcement of the security interest. We agree 

with the trial court’s analysis of these arguments:

[Miller] argues that, despite receiving notice of the 

sale to occur on that date, he did not believe that a 

sheriff’s sale would take place because he did not 

see notice of the sale in the newspaper. Despite 

[Miller]'s belief that the sale could not go forward 

because the sheriff’s office had not advertised the 
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sale in a newspaper, the sheriff’s office fulfilled all 

the requirements required by law for the sale of 

levied property. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 

Rule 3128 requires, inter alia, that the sheriff give 

notice of sale of personal property "at least six (6) 

days prior to sale by handbills posted at the sheriff’s 

office, the place of sale and the place of levy, if 

different from the place of sale." Pa.R.C.P. 3128. 

Noticeably absent from the rules governing the sale 

of personal property is any requirement that the sale 

be advertised in a newspaper. Consequently, 

[Miller]'s contention that he did not believe that a 

sheriff’s sale of his Ford Bronco was going to take 

place lacks merit.

[Miller] also claims that he did not believe that a sale 

of the Ford Bronco could go forward because it was 

owned by 30 West Auto. However, both the notice of 

the lien that [Miller] received on November 15, 2012 

and the notice of the sheriff’s sale that was sent to 

[Miller] approximately thirty (30) days prior to the 

date set for the sale explicitly stated: "All items are 

sold subject to any liens and encumbrances." 

Consequently, [Miller], who admitted receiving notice 

of the sheriff’s sale, cannot argue that his subjective 

belief that a levy could not be placed on the Ford 

Bronco would prevent the sale from taking place. 

The lien on the Ford Bronco by 30 West Auto is not 

material to the issue of whether [Miller] acted to 

hinder the sheriff’s sale by facilitating the removal of 

the vehicle with the knowledge that a sheriff’s sale 

was to take place on the date in question, especially 

given the explicit language on the notices he 

received.

For these reasons, we hold that Miller’s challenge to the sufficiency of 

the evidence is devoid of merit.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/2/2014