alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Roger L. JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D10-2530.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Nov. 12, 2010.

Roger L. Johnson, Orlando, pro se.

No Appearance for Appellee.

PALMER, J.

Roger L. Johnson (defendant) appeals the trial court’s order denying his post-*378conviction motion filed pursuant to rule 3.800(a) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. In his motion, the defendant alleged that he was illegally sentenced for the second degree felony of leaving the scene of an accident involving a death because he was sentenced to eight years of incarceration followed by 12.5 years of probation. In the order denying the defendant’s motion, the trial court noted that, at the time the defendant committed the offense, the crime was classified as a second-degree felony punishable by up to 15 years in prison, and that the defendant received a legal sentence of eight years of incarceration followed by five years of probation. *See*§ 316.027(l)(b) Fla. Stat. (2007). However, the trial court did not attach the judgment and sentence to its order. Accordingly, this matter is remanded to the trial court for the attachment of the portions of the record that conclusively refute the defendant’s claim. *See Rodriguez v. State,*919 So.2d 576 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).

REVERSED and REMANDED.

TORPY and LAWSON, JJ., concur.
#### Drema Darlene BRAYTON, Appellant, v. Richard William BRAYTON, Appellee.

No. 5D09-4570.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Oct. 22, 2010.

*143Drema D. Brayton, Deltona, pro se.

No Appearance for Appellee.

LAWSON, J.

Drema Darlene Brayton appeals, pro se, from a final judgment dissolving her marriage to Richard William Brayton. In her one-page brief, which argues facts that are not part of the record on appeal,1 Appellant complains that the trial court erred by failing to order her former husband to pay alimony, and by giving her former husband a timeshare property that she owned prior to the marriage. Because the record demonstrates no trial court error, we affirm.

“In appellate proceedings the decision of a trial court has the presumption of correctness and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate error.” *Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee,*377 So.2d 1150 (Fla.1979). With respect to alimony, the trial court found that: “Alimony has never been pled and is not an issue in this case.... ” Appellant has not pointed to any portion of the record demonstrating any error in this finding. Nor have we found any pleading or other filing in the record containing a request for alimony, or noting that alimony was an issue for trial. The record contains a pretrial statement filed by the former husband, pro se, listing the issues that remained for trial after the parties had entered a mediated settlement agreement. That document does not list alimony as an issue for trial. The record contains no pretrial statement from Appellant.

*144With respect to the timeshare issue, the final judgment states that: “Wife testified that she does not want them [the timeshare properties] and that he [the former husband] could have them both.” Because Appellant has not provided us with a trial transcript, we must presume that the final judgment accurately reflects her testimony at trial. *See Applegate,*377 So.2d at 1152 (“[without a record of the trial proceedings, the appellate court cannot properly resolve the underlying factual issues so as to conclude that the trial court’s judgment is not supported by the evidence”).

Because Appellant has demonstrated no error, we affirm the final judgment.

AFFIRMED.

ORFINGER and EVANDER, JJ., concur.

1

. An appellate court is not allowed to consider matters outside of the record. *Dep’t of Transp. v. Baird,*992 So.2d 378, 382 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008). For Appellant’s benefit, we note that the "record” consists of the pleadings filed with the trial court; transcripts of proceedings held before the trial court; and evidence submitted during the trial or at other relevant hearings. We have not considered any of the non-record matters argued by Appellant, but have limited our review to the record on appeal — as we are required to do. *Id.*
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                      Three months ended          Six months ended
                                         September 30,              September 30,
                                      1999         1998          1999         1998
                                   ----------   ----------    ----------   ----------
<S>                             <C>          <C>           <C>          <C>
Net income as reported . . . . .   $1,235,000   $1,061,000    $2,251,000   $2,060,000
                                   ==========   ==========    ==========   ==========


BASIC:
    Weighted average number of
      common shares outstanding.    4,809,989    4,892,025    4,805,199     4,896,902
                                   ==========   ==========   ==========    ==========

  Basic net income per share . .        $0.26        $0.22        $0.47         $0.42
                                   ==========   ==========   ==========    ==========


DILUTED:
  Common and common equivalent shares
  outstanding:
    Weighted average number of
      common shares outstanding.    4,809,989    4,892,025    4,805,199     4,896,902
    Common stock equivalents from
      options computed on the
      treasury-stock method using
      the average fair market
      value of common stock
      outstanding during the
      period . . . . . . . . . .      324,139      186,674      271,835       203,134
                                    ---------    ---------    ---------     ---------
    Shares used in the
      computation. . . . . . . .    5,134,128    5,078,699    5,077,034     5,100,036
                                    =========    =========    =========     =========

  Diluted net income per share .        $0.24        $0.21        $0.44         $0.40
                                    =========    =========    =========     =========

</TABLE>

All number of shares data has been retroactively restated to reflect a 3-for-2
stock split distributed September 23, 1999.
I 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 7346 

To provide for the compensation of Federal contractor employees that may 

be placed on unpaid leave as a result of the Federal Government shutdown, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 19, 2018 

Ms. NORTON introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

A BILL 

To provide for the compensation of Federal contractor employees that may be placed on unpaid leave as a result 

of the Federal Government shutdown, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Low-Wage Federal 

5 Contractor Employee Back Pay Act of 2018’’. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
2 

•HR 7346 IH

1 SEC. 2. COMPENSATION FOR FURLOUGHED FEDERAL CON2 TRACTOR EMPLOYEES. 

3 Title VII of Division E of the Consolidated Appro4 priations Act, 2018 (Public Law 115–141) is amended by 

5 adding at the end the following new section: 

6 ‘‘SEC. 750. If a Federal contractor that provides re7 tail, food, custodial, or security services to the Federal 

8 Government places the employees of such contractor on 

9 unpaid leave as a result of any lapse in appropriations 

10 which begins in fiscal year 2019, the Government shall 

11 provide compensation to such employees at their standard 

12 rate of compensation for the period of such lapse.’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
UNAUDITED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AND STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUL-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             AUG-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JAN-31-2000
<CASH>                                           2,803
<SECURITIES>                                     9,938
<RECEIVABLES>                                   11,269
<ALLOWANCES>                                       429
<INVENTORY>                                     11,970
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                36,736
<PP&E>                                           5,014
<DEPRECIATION>                                   4,729
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  38,717
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            7,077
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             9
<OTHER-SE>                                      31,631
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    38,717
<SALES>                                         20,444
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                20,444
<CGS>                                           16,178
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   16,178
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  (212)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              (212)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     (212)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.04)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.04)


</TABLE>
T hi s di s pos i t i on i s notappr opr i a t e f orpubl i c a t i on and i s notpr e c e de nt * e xc e pta s pr ovi de d by9th C i r . R . 36- 3.

T he pa ne l una ni m ous l yc onc l ude s thi s c a s e i s s ui t abl e f orde c i s i on ** w ith o u t o r a l ar g u m e n t. See F ed. R . A pp . P . 34 (a )( 2). NOT F OR P UB L I CAT I ON UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS FOR T HE NI NTH CI RC UI T C AR L OS B AL DE L OMAR - VI S C AR R A; M ARI A CEC I LI A CI SNER OS- CHAV EZ , P et i t i o n ers, v. E R I C H . H O L D E R , J r ., A tto rn e yG e n e r a l, R e s p o n d e n t. N o. 11- 71858 A ge nc yN os . A 098- 451- 078

A 098- 451- 079 ME MOR AN DU M *

O n P e t i t i on f

orR e vi e w of

a n O r de rof

the B o a r do f I m m ig r a tio n A p p e a ls S ubm i tt e d J anua ry15, 2013 ** B efo re: S IL V E R M A N , B E A , an dN G U Y E N , C i rcu i tJu d g es. C a r lo s B a ld e lo m a r - V is c a rr a , an a tiv e a n dc itiz e n o f B o liv ia , an dM ar ia C e c i l i aC i s ne r os - C ha ve z , ana t i ve a nd c i t i z e n of M e xi c o, pe t i t i on f

orr e vi e w of

the B oard of Im m i grat i on A pp ea l s’ (“ B IA ”) deci si on denyi ng thei r m ot i on t o reopen 

# FI LED JAN 17 2 013 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS11- 71858 2 re m ov alproceedi ng s. O ur j uri sdi ct i on i s gov erned b y 8 U . S . C . § 1 25 2. W e r evi ew f o rab u s e o f

d is c r e tio n th e d e n ia l o f am o tio n to r e o p e n . G a r c ia v . H o lde r, 621 F . 3d 906, 912 ( 9th C i r . 2010) . W e de nyi n parta nd di s m i s s i n partthe pe t i t i on f or r e v i e w. T h e B I A d idn o t ab u s e its d is c r e tio n b yd e n y in g p e titio n e r s ’ m o tio n to r e o p e n b e c au s e th e B I A c o n s id e r e dth e e v id e n c e th e ys ub m itte da n da c te dw ith in i t s br oa d di s c r e t i on i n de t e rm i ni ng tha tthe e vi de nc e w a s i ns uf f i c i e ntt o w arr ant r e o p e n in g . Se e S i n gh v . I NS , 29 5 F . 3d 10 37 , 10 39 (9th C i r. 20 02 ) ( the deni alof a m o tio n to r e o p e n s h a ll b e r e v e r s e dif it is “a rb itr ary , irr a tio n a l, o rc o n tr aryto law .” ) . W e l a c k j ur i s di c t i on t o c ons i de rpe t i t i one r s ’ c l a i m tha tthe ym ayqua l i f yf or p r o s e c u to r ia l d is c r e tio n . See V i lchi z- So to v. H

older , 68 8 F . 3d 64 2, 64 4 (9th C i r. 20 12 ) ( order) . P E T IT IO N F O R R E V IE W D E N IE D i n p art; D IS M IS S E D i n p art.
#### Carter Dean HEUTON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D11-0797.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 31, 2011.

Rehearing Denied June 2, 2011.

Carter Dean Heuton, pro se, Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

DENIED. Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(c)(4)(B).

THOMAS, WETHERELL, and ROWE, JJ., concur.
#### Kissner, Appellee, *v.*Ohio Bureau of Credits, Inc., Appellant.

(No. 3409

Decided May 26, 1942.)

*Mr. W. B. Cockrell,*for appellee.

*Mr. W. B. McLeskey,*for appellant.

By the Court.

This matter is before the court upon a motion by the defendant to require the plaintiff to make an additional deposit as security for costs. The plaintiff is a resident of Delaware county, and brought an action against the defendant in Franklin county, seeking judgment of the court in reference to the -disposition of certain rents derived from real estate located in Delaware county. The plaintiff deposited with the clerk of the Common Pleas Court $25 as security under the provision of the statute. Section 11615, General Code, provides that the plaintiff may deposit with the clerk of the court such sum of money as security for costs in the case as in the opinion of the clerk shall be sufficient for the purpose. The plaintiff recovered judgment in the court below, and the defendant appealed. The necessity for-additional costs arises out of the action of the defendant in this court *166and the services giving rise to the necessity have already been performed. Although the original deposit for costs was made in the Court of Common Pleas, yet on a proper showing the plaintiff may be required to give additional costs. *Sterwerf*v. *Smith, 73*Ohio St., 62, 75 N. E., 944. See, also, *Devine*v. *Detroit Trust Co., Receiver,*52 Ohio App., 446, at page 452, 3 N. E. (2d), 1001.

“A nonresident plaintiff in error may be required to give security for costs.” *Ebert*v. *Ebert, Exr.,*14 Ohio Law Abs., 714. (Opinion by this court.)

“Security for costs can be exacted in the Court of Appeals in an error proceeding, notwithstanding the case has gone to judgment in the trial court without requiring such security.” *American Caster Co.*v. *American Laundry Machinery Co.,*13 Ohio Law Abs., 64.

The fact that the case is before us on an appeal by the defendant in the court below, does not deprive this court of the right to require the plaintiff to give additional security for costs if the same is justified.

However, when we consider that the plaintiff secured judgment against the defendant in the court below and that the appeal is taken by the defendant to this court, and that the defendant has incurred the costs since judgment was rendered against it in the court below, we are not inclined to require the plaintiff to give any additional security. The purpose of security is well stated in *Devine*v. *Detroit Trust Co., Recr., supra,*and it does not occur to us that any of the reasons thereof obtain to the extent that we should order additional costs.

*Motion overruled.*

Geiger, P. J., Barnes and Hornbeck, JJ., concur.
| (logo) WELLS            FARGO | Corporate Trust ServicesMAC R1204-010 9062 Old Annapolis Road

Columbia, MD 21045

 

Tel:  410 884 2000

Fax: 410 715 2380 |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

 

 

J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.

383 Madison Avenue

31st Floor

New York, New York 10179

 

 

 

 

RE: Annual Statement of Compliance for J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2014-C20 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2014-C20

 

 

Per the Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated  as of June 1, 2014 (the "Agreement" ), the undersigned, a duly authorized officer of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Certificate Administrator ("Wells Fargo"), hereby certifies as follows as of and for the year ending December 31, 2014 (the "Reporting Period" ) :

 

(a) A review of Wells Fargo's activities during the Reporting Period and of its performance under the Agreement has been made under such officer's supervision; and

 

(b) To the best of such officer's knowledge, based on such review, Wells Fargo has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects  throughout the Reporting Period.

 

 

 

 

February 25, 2015

 

 

 

/s/ Brian Smith 

BRIAN SMITH 

Vice President

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
#### STATE ex rel. Carlos COOPER v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-1329.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 3, 2011.

In re Cooper, Carlos; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 302960; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 0431.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; *State ex rel. Glover v. State,*93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; *State v. Parker,*98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; *State ex rel. Melinie v. State,*93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.
EXHIBIT
10.2

      


      ADDENDUM

       

      TO

       

      SUBSCRIPTION
AGREEMENT

      


      


      1.      Nevada
Gold Holdings, Inc. (the “Company”) is presently engaged in a private placement
offering (the “Offering”) of shares of the Company’s common stock (the
“Shares”), at a purchase price of $0.25 per Share.  You are executing
or have previously executed a Subscription Agreement relating to the
Offering.

      


      2.      The
initial paragraph of the Subscription Agreement provides that the Offering is
for a minimum of 1,000,000 Shares (the “Minimum Amount”) and a maximum of
1,600,000 Shares.  The Subscription Agreement is hereby amended to
provide that the Minimum Amount is 200,000 Shares.

      


      3.      In
the event of any conflict between the provision of this Addendum and the
provisions of the Subscription Agreement, the provisions of this Addendum shall
control.  Otherwise, the provisions of the Subscription Agreement
shall remain in full force and effect.

      


      


      ACCEPTED
AND AGREED:

      


      


      ________________________

      Name:

      Date:
## State of N ew York Su p reme Cou rt, A p p ellate Division Third J u dicial Dep artment Decided and Entered: January 28, 2016 1 06988

________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v MEMORANDUM AND ORDER CAMERON BARNHILL, Appellant.

________________________________ Calendar Date: December 15, 2015 Before: Peters, P.J., Garry, Rose and Devine, JJ.

__________ Lisa A. Burgess, Indian Lake, for appellant. Kathleen B. Hogan, District Attorney, Lake George (Emilee B. Davenport of counsel), for respondent.

__________ Devine, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Warren County (Hall Jr., J.), rendered January 8, 2014, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. In satisfaction of a four-count indictment, defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and purportedly waived his right to appeal. Consistent with the plea agreement, County Court sentenced defendant, a second felony offender, to 41⁄2 years in prison to be followed by three years of postrelease supervision. Defendant appeals, and we affirm.-2- 106988

Initially, we find that defendant's waiver of appeal was not valid. During the plea allocution, County Court failed to adequately explain the nature of the right to appeal or the consequences of waiving that right, and a written waiver executed by defendant is not included in the record before us (see People v Bradshaw, 18 NY3d 257, 265 [2011]; People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; cf. People v Ramos, 7 NY3d 737, 738 [2006]). As defendant's understanding of the waiver is not "evident on the face of the record," it is not valid (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d at 256). Defendant's argument that the agreed-upon sentence is harsh or excessive is properly before us as a result (see id. at 255- 256); nevertheless, we reject it. The record reflects that defendant's guilty plea was accepted only after two psychiatrists conducted CPL article 730 examinations, concluding that he was not incapacitated. In agreeing to a sentence that greatly reduced defendant's potential sentencing exposure under the indictment, County Court took into consideration his mental health and substance abuse problems (see People v Eggsware, 90 AD3d 1231, 1234 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 923 [2012]). Given defendant's serious criminal history, we do not find that the sentence imposed constituted an abuse of discretion or that extraordinary circumstances are present so as to warrant a reduction in the sentence (see CPL 470.15 [6] [b]; People v Crump, 107 AD3d 1046, 1047 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1014 [2013]). Peters, P.J., Garry and Rose, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

ENTER:

Robert D. Mayberger Clerk of the Court
#### Leon L. MORANT, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D11-1725.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 27, 2011.

Rehearing Denied June 13, 2011.

Leon L. Morant, pro se, Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied on the merits.

DAVIS, VAN NORTWICK, and CLARK, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 11
                   HMN Financial, Inc.
            Computation of Earnings Per Share


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                           Three months ended March 31,
                                           ----------------------------
                                               2000           1999
                                            -------------------------
<S>                                       <C>            <C>
Weighted average number of common shares
  outstanding used in basic earnings per
  common share calculation                  3,998,038      4,509,368

Net dilutive effect of:
 Options                                      114,964        186,223
 Restricted stock awards                        1,953         26,551
                                            ---------      ---------

Weighted average number of shares
  outstanding adjusted for effect of
  dilutive securities                       4,114,955      4,722,142
                                            =========      =========

Income available to common shareholders    $1,529,714      1,602,000

Basic earnings per common share            $     0.38           0.36

Diluted earnings per common share          $     0.37           0.34

</TABLE>
#### Theophilus BESSELLIEU, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D10-6100.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Feb. 15, 2011.

Rehearing Denied March 28, 2011.

Theophilus Bessellieu, pro se, Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jennifer J. Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM..

The petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied on the merits.

WOLF, HAWKES, and WETHERELL, JJ., concur.