Opinion filed May 12, 2016

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals 

__________

No. 11-15-00074-CV

__________

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY

AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES, Appellant

V.

WANDA WHITMAN, Appellee

On Appeal from the 161st District Court

Ector County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. B-136,946

O P I N I O N

Wanda Whitman filed suit against the Texas Department of Family and 

Protective Services in connection with two sexual harassment claims and a 

retaliation claim. The Department filed a plea to the jurisdiction, and the trial court 

denied it. We reverse and render.
2

I. Background Information

In July 2012, Whitman accepted a position with the Department as a 

“Conservatorship Worker II” in Odessa. Shortly after Whitman accepted the 

position, she attended new employee training with another recent hire, Yesenia 

Villanueva, in Amarillo. During the three months of training, Villanueva made

several comments with sexual content, connotations, or references that made 

Whitman uncomfortable.

1 On one such occasion during the training, Villanueva 

referred to something as a “long bone” and asked Whitman if she knew what “long 

bone” meant. Whitman contended that Villanueva made similar inappropriate 

comments throughout the training, but Whitman could not remember any other

examples.

In October 2012, Whitman and Villanueva completed their training in 

Amarillo, and both returned to Odessa. There, Villanueva continued to make 

comments with sexual content, connotations, or references to Whitman, as did 

another employee, Courtney Reese. Whitman recalled several specific instances in 

Odessa of what she believed to be sexual harassment. On one of those occasions, as 

Whitman was eating a corn dog for lunch, Villanueva remarked that Whitman “just 

like[d] the weenie.” On another occasion, Villanueva asked Whitman if she used a 

vibrator. When Whitman declined to answer, Reese told her she would sleep better 

if she used a vibrator. On yet another occasion, Reese asked Whitman about a man 

who lived in an RV on Whitman’s property and suggested that Whitman “g[ot] off

at night peeking in his windows.” When Whitman, as part of her job duties, met 

with police officers, Reese asked Whitman, “Did they have hard bodies? Could you 

see if they had [hard bodies] below the belt?” During an office lunch, Reese and 

 

1The Department denied that any of its employees made sexually inappropriate statements. 

However, because of the posture of this case, we accept all of Whitman’s allegations as true. See Tex. Dep’t 

of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004).
3

Villanueva commented that a tube of bath gel “could be used for other things even 

if it was a little short.” Also, on several occasions, Reese and Villanueva asked 

Whitman, an unmarried person, whether she missed “having sex.” Although

Whitman recalled these specific instances, she contended that her suit was not 

limited to them. Instead, she alleged that the harassment was “continuous and 

unrelenting.”

Rachel Flores was a supervisor in the Odessa branch of the Department. 

Shortly after Villanueva asked Whitman whether she used a vibrator, Whitman told 

Flores that she did not appreciate Villanueva and Reese “asking [her] questions like 

that.” Flores told Whitman to “[j]ust ignore them.” Flores evaluated Whitman in 

March 2013 and stated in her report, which was signed by Flores and three others in

the Department’s supervisory structure, that Whitman “[w]as doing good.” 

However, the Department subsequently indicated that Whitman (1) had difficulty 

with some clients, the county attorney, and one of the representatives of the Court 

Appointed Special Advocates (CASA); (2) was unprepared to give court testimony

in a case; (3) had failed to get a courtesy worker in another case; and (4) had 

disclosed confidential information.

On May 6, 2013, while Whitman was still a probationary employee, Flores 

recommended that Whitman be discharged. Flores recommended that Whitman be 

discharged because Whitman failed to (1) perform her job duties, (2) meet health 

and human services’ standards for job performance, and (3) exhibit courtesy and 

respect in all interactions with clients, peers, and coworkers. Four days later, 

Whitman was discharged.

II. Procedural History

Whitman filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission and the Texas Workforce Commission in June 2013 in which she 
4

alleged sexual harassment by the Department. Whitman received a right-to-sue

letter on December 4, 2013, and she filed this suit against the Department. She 

claimed quid pro quo harassment, hostile work environment harassment, and 

retaliation.

The Department filed its “Plea to the Jurisdiction and Motion for Summary 

Judgment,” and the court held a hearing on both. After the hearing, the trial court 

denied the Department’s plea to the jurisdiction and its motion for summary 

judgment. The Department appealed the denial of its plea to the jurisdiction.

III. Issues Presented

The Department first asserts that the trial court erred when it denied the 

Department’s plea to the jurisdiction because Whitman failed to show that she timely 

exhausted her administrative remedies. Second, the Department asserts that the trial 

court erred when it denied the plea to the jurisdiction because Whitman failed to 

make a prima facie showing or raise a material issue of fact on jurisdictional issues 

related to her claims and failed to establish that the trial court had subject-matter 

jurisdiction.

IV. Standard of Review

A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea, the purpose of which is to defeat a 

cause of action without regard to the merits of the claim. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 

Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). When a court analyzes a plea to the 

jurisdiction, the court must not weigh the merits of the claim but should consider 

only the plaintiff’s pleadings and the evidence pertinent to the jurisdictional inquiry. 

Cty. of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002). We review de novo 

the trial court’s decision on a plea to the jurisdiction when it involves a question of 

law related to subject-matter jurisdiction. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226.
5

When, as here, the plea challenges jurisdictional facts, we consider relevant 

evidence submitted by the parties. Id. at 227; Blue, 34 S.W.3d at 555. The standard 

of review applicable to a trial court’s ruling in such situations “generally mirrors” 

the standard that applies to a traditional summary judgment under Rule 166a(c) of 

the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228. We take as true 

all evidence favorable to the claimant, and we indulge every reasonable inference 

and resolve any doubts in favor of the claimant. Id. If the evidence creates a material 

issue of fact on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court must deny the plea to the 

jurisdiction, and the fact issue must be resolved by the factfinder. Id. at 227–28. 

“However, if the relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question on 

the jurisdictional issue, the trial court rules on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter 

of law.” Id. at 228.

V. Discussion and Analysis

The Department asserts that the trial court erred when it denied the 

Department’s plea to the jurisdiction because, after the Department established 

undisputed facts that there was no subject-matter jurisdiction, Whitman then failed 

to raise a material issue of fact on subject-matter jurisdiction. Because the resolution 

of the Department’s second issue on subject-matter jurisdiction is dispositive, we 

address that issue first. 

A. Issue Two: Failure to Demonstrate Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

The Department contends that Whitman failed to make a prima facie showing

or raise a material issue of fact on the question of whether the trial court had subjectmatter jurisdiction over her sexual harassment and retaliation claims. The 

Department, as a governmental entity, is generally immune from suit. See San 

Antonio Water Sys. v. Nicholas, 461 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tex. 2015). However, the

legislature has waived immunity for suits properly brought under the Texas 
6

Commission on Human Rights Act2(the Act). Id. This waiver extends only to those 

claims in which the plaintiff “actually alleges a violation of” the Act “by pleading 

facts that state a claim thereunder.” Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 

S.W.3d 629, 636 (Tex. 2012). Thus, “[i]n a suit against a governmental employer, 

the prima facie case implicates both the merits of the claim and the court’s 

jurisdiction.” Id. at 635–36. A trial court’s inquiry into these jurisdictional facts is 

not an inquiry into the substance of the complaints. Further, a trial court has the 

discretion to decide that the inquiry is reaching too far into the substance of the 

claims and should, therefore, await a fuller development of the merits. Id. at 637–

38. Sexual harassment is a recognized category of sex discrimination under the Act.

Soto v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 942 S.W.2d 671, 677 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, 

writ denied).

1. Quid Pro Quo Harassment

Under Title VII3and the Act, an employer may be held vicariously liable for 

quid pro quo harassment by its supervisor. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,

524 U.S. 742, 753 (1998); Ewald v. Wornick Family Foods Corp., 878 S.W.2d 653, 

659 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied). Quid pro quo sexual 

harassment consists of discriminatory behavior by a supervisor who, by that conduct,

compels an employee to choose between yielding to sexual demands or forfeiting 

job benefits, continued employment or promotion, or otherwise suffering tangible 

job detriments. Ewald, 878 S.W.2d at 658.

A prima facie case of quid pro quo harassment requires a showing that (1) a

supervisor (2) because of sex (3) subjects an employee to (4) unwelcome conduct 

that (5) affects a tangible aspect of the employment relationship. Wal-Mart Stores, 

 

2TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. ch. 21 (West 2015).

3Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17.
7

Inc. v. Itz, 21 S.W.3d 456, 470 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied).

Consequently, a quid pro quo harassment suit may not be brought for an action 

committed by a coworker who has no supervisory authority over the plaintiff. See

Bartkowiak v. Quantum Chem. Corp., 35 S.W.3d 103, 110 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 

2000, no pet.) (noting that, “[w]ithout any evidence of [coworker’s] supervisory 

authority over [the plaintiff, the plaintiff] may not maintain a sex discrimination quid 

pro quo sexual harassment claim.”).

There is no evidence that Villanueva or Reese had supervisory authority over 

Whitman. Whitman testified that neither Villanueva nor Reese was her supervisor.

She instead testified that Flores was her supervisor, and she specifically denied that 

she asserted a quid pro quo harassment claim based on Flores’s conduct. Whitman

has failed to make a prima facie showing or raise a material issue of fact on her quid 

pro quo harassment claim. See Mission, 372 S.W.3d at 635–36; Bartkowiak, 35 

S.W.3d at 110. We hold that the trial court erred when it denied the Department’s 

plea to the jurisdiction on Whitman’s quid pro quo harassment claim. 

2. Hostile Work Environment Harassment

A prima facie case of hostile work environment harassment requires a 

showing that (1) the plaintiff belonged to a protected group; (2) the plaintiff was 

subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was 

based on sex; (4) the harassment complained of affected a “term, condition, or 

privilege” of employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the 

harassment and failed to take remedial action. Harvill v. Westward Commc’ns, 

L.L.C., 433 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(quoting Woods v. Delta Beverage Grp., Inc., 274 F.3d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 2001)); 

Mayfield v. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist., 467 S.W.3d 706, 712 (Tex. App.—El Paso 

2015, no pet.). We look to federal precedent for interpretive guidance to meet the 
8

legislative mandate that the Act is intended to “provide for the execution of the 

policies of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its subsequent amendments.”

LAB.CODE § 21.001(1); see also Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473,

474 (Tex. 2001).

Same-sex sexual discrimination is actionable under Title VII and the Act, but 

only if the plaintiff can “prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with 

offensive sexual connotations” but actually exposed a member of one sex, but not 

the other sex, “to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment.” Oncale v. 

Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80–81 (1998). In short, the 

harassment must have been “discrimination because of sex.” Id.; accord City of San 

Antonio v. Cancel, 261 S.W.3d 778, 784 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. denied).

In Oncale, the Supreme Court outlined three examples of ways to show same-sex

harassment: (1) by showing the alleged harasser made explicit or implicit proposals 

of sexual activity and providing credible evidence that the harasser was homosexual;

(2) by demonstrating the harasser was motivated by general hostility to the presence 

of members of the same gender in the workplace; or (3) by offering direct 

comparative evidence of how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in 

a mixed-gender workplace. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80–81; La Day v. Catalyst Tech., 

Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 2002). The Fifth Circuit, as well as several other 

circuit courts, has interpreted the Oncale methods as “illustrative, not exhaustive.”

Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 455–56

(5th Cir. 2013).

As directed by the Fifth Circuit, in a case of alleged same-sex harassment, we 

must first “determine whether the harasser’s conduct constitute[d] sex 

discrimination.” La Day, 302 F.3d at 478. If so, we then “decide whether the 

challenged conduct meets the applicable standards for either a quid pro quo or hostile
9

[work] environment claim.” Id. We have already addressed Whitman’s quid pro 

quo harassment claim. For the hostile-work-environment harassment claim, 

Whitman does not contend that either Villanueva or Reese were homosexual; in fact, 

she expressly testified that they were not. Likewise, she did not allege that any of 

the alleged harassment included gender-specific derogatory terms or was motivated 

by hostility against women. Finally, Whitman testified explicitly that Villanueva 

and Reese teased both men and women in the office, independent of their gender. 

Whitman has failed to make a prima facie showing or raise a material issue of fact 

on any of the traditional Oncale methods of proving gender motivation. See Oncale, 

523 U.S. at 80–81.

Instead, Whitman alleges gender motivation through a conclusory statement 

that “male employees were not subjected to the same harassment that she was.” In 

Gumpert v. ABF Freight System, Inc., the Dallas court cautioned against a very 

similar theory because it “fail[ed] to distinguish between harassment that happens to 

be directed at persons of a particular gender and harassment that is directed at 

persons because of their gender. Only the latter can be discriminatory.” 293 S.W.3d 

256, 261–62 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied) (citing Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80).

First, as we have said, the record shows that Villanueva and Reese teased men 

as well as women. In one specific instance—referred to by Whitman in an 

interrogatory response—the women teased a male employee named Kendrick

Ragland. The women teased him about “him being cute or him liking something.”

The record also shows that the women’s comments that contained sexual content, 

connotations, or references—the gravamen of Whitman’s claim—were not limited 

to interactions with women or even with Whitman herself. We have already referred 

to the bath gel comment. Although this instance is included in Whitman’s 

complaint, Villanueva’s and Reese’s statements were not directed at her and were
10

instead directed generally at all men and women in attendance. Even if we take as 

true all evidence favorable to Whitman and indulge every reasonable inference and 

resolve any doubts in her favor, her evidence did not support her contention that 

Villanueva and Reese harassed her because of her gender. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 

80; Gumpert, 293 S.W.3d at 261–62; see also Martinez v. Temple-Inland Forest 

Prods. Corp., No. 12-06-00213-CV, 2007 WL 2045336, at *4 (Tex. App.—Tyler 

July 18, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.). We hold that Whitman has failed to raise a 

material issue of fact that Villanueva and Reese harassed her because of her gender.

But even if we were to assume that Villanueva’s and Reese’s actions 

constituted discrimination based on gender, Whitman has not alleged how their

actions affected a “term, condition, or privilege” of her employment. For conduct 

to affect the “terms, conditions, or privileges” of employment, a plaintiff must show 

“the workplace [was] permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and 

insult that [was]sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s 

employment and create an abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., 

Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord 

Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); Waffle House, Inc. v. 

Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796, 805–06 (Tex. 2010). We use a cumulative review of all 

of the offensive behavior that comprised the alleged hostile work environment to 

determine whether the workplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation, 

ridicule, and insult that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms, 

conditions, or privileges of the victim’s employment. Waffle House, Inc., 313 

S.W.3d at 806; Cancel, 261 S.W.3d at 786; Wal-Mart Stores, 21 S.W.3d at 473. 

Even taking as true all evidence favorable to Whitman and indulging every 

reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in her favor, we are left with limited

facts. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228. Villanueva and Reese made sexually based
11

statements to Whitman. These included, but were not limited to, the following 

instances: Villanueva stated that Whitman “just like[d] the weenie”; Villanueva

asked her if she used a vibrator; Reese suggested that Whitman “g[ot] off” peeking 

into the windows of a man residing on her property; Reese asked Whitman if a group 

of officers she met with had “hard bodies” “below the belt”; and Reese and 

Villanueva asked Whitman if she missed “having sex.” Villanueva and Reese also 

stated that a tube of bath gel “could be used for other things even if it was a little 

short.”

The actions of Villanueva and Reese, while inappropriate, are similar to 

conduct that several of our sister courts have already held does not raise a material 

issue of fact because the conduct did not permeate the workplace with discriminatory 

intimidation, ridicule, and insult that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 

terms, conditions, or privileges of the victim’s employment.

4

 For example, in 

Staller v. Service Corp. International, the San Antonio court affirmed the trial 

court’s order by which it granted summary judgment in favor of an employer, who 

was sued for a hostile work environment, where the plaintiff alleged that one of her 

supervisors:

[M]ade sexually inappropriate remarks to her such as “I’ll bet you like 

it big,” whenever she used the word “big” in conversation, . . . made 

comments to her about the size of her breasts, . . . referred to male 

employees of the company as her “lover,” . . . stood over her when she 

sat at her desk and attempted to look down her shirt, and . . . came 

toward her in a menacing fashion as if to grab her in a sexual manner.

 

4The Fourth Court of Appeals recently held in Clark that a string of non-severe but pervasive 

conduct raised a material issue of fact on whether the harassment altered the terms, conditions, or privileges 

of a plaintiff’s employment. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, No. 04-14-00746-CV, 2015 

WL 6163252, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 21, 2015, pet. filed) (mem. op.). There, the employee 

alleged a litany of instances where she was subjected to sexual harassment at work. Id. at *1–5. Whitman’s 

conclusory allegation that her harassment was “continuous and unrelenting,” even with the limited 

examples that she alleged, is both less severe conduct and less pervasive conduct than the facts alleged in 

Clark.
12

Staller v. Serv. Corp. Int’l, No. 04-06-00212-CV, 2006 WL 3018039, at *5 (Tex. 

App.—San Antonio Oct. 25, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (emphasis added). The court 

held that the plaintiff had failed to raise a material issue of fact that the employer’s 

actions altered a term, condition, or privilege of the plaintiff’s employment. Id.

Likewise, in Garcia v. Schwab, the Corpus Christi court affirmed the trial 

court’s order in which it granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, who 

was sued for a hostile work environment, where the plaintiff alleged that her 

supervisor:

[S]tar[ed] at and comment[ed] on her breasts; touch[ed] his genitals; 

frankly discuss[ed] highly personal and sexual matters with her; 

remark[ed] on her appearance; star[ed] at and comment[ed] on the 

photograph of a female client; comment[ed] on the appearance of other 

women; ma[de] repeated sexual references which she felt were intended 

to arouse her; [and] insult[ed] her.

Garcia v. Schwab, 967 S.W.2d 883, 884–85 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998, no 

pet.) (emphasis added). Again, the court held that the plaintiff did not raise a 

material issue of fact to show that the employer’s actions altered a term, condition, 

or privilege of the plaintiff’s employment. Id. at 887. These examples outline how

our sister courts have held that certain conduct did not raise a material issue of fact 

in relation to the existence of a hostile or abusive work environment. And our sister 

courts also have held that even more severe conduct failed to raise a material issue 

of fact about whether the conduct altered the terms, conditions, or privileges of 

employment. See, e.g., Spring v. Walthall, Sachse & Pipes, Inc., No. 04-09-00474-

CV, 2010 WL 2102988, *5–6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 26, 2010, no pet.)

(mem. op.); Cancel, 261 S.W.3d at 778; Cox & Smith Inc. v. Cook, 974 S.W.2d 217, 

227 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied). Thus, Whitman did not raise a 

material issue of fact relevant to whether the workplace was permeated with 
13

discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that was severe or pervasive enough 

to alter the terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment.

Whitman also failed to raise a material fact question as to the subjectivity 

requirement for a prima facie showing of her hostile-work-environment harassment 

claim. A hostile work environment must be both (1) one that a reasonable person 

would find hostile or abusive and (2) one that the victim in fact perceived to be so.

City of Houston v. Fletcher, 166 S.W.3d 479, 489 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2005, pet. 

denied); Green v. Indus. Specialty Contractors, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 126, 132 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.); Garcia, 967 S.W.2d at 885 (citing Harris,

510 U.S. at 22). Whitman indicated that she never contemplated quitting her 

position at the Department because she enjoyed her job, liked her coworkers, and 

thought of Villanueva as a friend. Further, in a self-evaluation that Whitman filled 

out in December 2012, she stated, “I love my job.” Even if we take as true all 

evidence favorable to Whitman, indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any 

doubts in her favor, her allegations do not raise a material issue of fact as to the 

subjectivity requirement. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228; Staller, 2006 

WL 3018039, at *6.

Because Whitman failed to raise a material issue of fact on the jurisdictional 

requirements of her hostile work environment claim, we hold that the trial court erred 

when it denied the Department’s plea to the jurisdiction as to that claim. See

Mission, 372 S.W.3d at 635–36; Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228; Gumpert, 293 S.W.3d 

at 261–62; Martinez, 2007 WL 2045336, at *4; Staller, 2006 WL 3018039, at *6;

Garcia, 967 S.W.2d at 884–85.

3. Retaliation

Whitman also brought a retaliation claim against the Department. We must

review this claim, even though we have held that the trial court erred when it denied 
14

the Department’s plea to the jurisdiction. We do that because an employee who

brings a retaliation claim is not required to show that an unlawful practice actually 

existed; instead, she must only show that she held a good faith, reasonable belief that 

the employer engaged in activity made unlawful by Title VII or the Act. Lucan v. 

HSS Sys., L.L.C., 439 S.W.3d 606, 613 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2014, no pet.) (citing 

Cox & Smith, 974 S.W.2d at 224). 

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the Act, a plaintiff must 

show (1) that she engaged in a protected activity listed in Section 21.055 of the Labor 

Code, (2) that an adverse employment action occurred, and (3) that a causal link 

existed between her participation in the protected activity and the adverse 

employment action. Lucan, 439 S.W.3d at 611.

However, engaging in a protected activity requires a complaint of 

discrimination covered by the Act. Id. (citing Spinks v. Trugreen Landcare, L.L.C.,

322 F. Supp. 2d 784, 796 (S.D. Tex. 2004)). Protected activities under Section 

21.055 consist of (1) opposing a discriminatory practice; (2) making or filing a 

charge; (3) filing a complaint; and (4) testifying, assisting, or participating in any 

manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing. Id. at 611. “A vague charge of 

discrimination will not invoke protection under the statute.” Spinks, 322 F. Supp.

2d at 797. Consequently, a plaintiff must show “that she complained about 

harassment or discrimination based on race, color, disability, religion, sex, national 

origin, or age for the complaint to qualify as a protected activity for the purpose of 

establishing a prima facie case of retaliation.” Barnes v. Tex. A&M Univ. Sys., 

No. 14-13-00646-CV, 2014 WL 4915499, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

Sept. 30, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.); accord Harris-Childs v. Medco Health 

Solutions, Inc., 169 F. App’x 913, 916 (5th Cir. 2006); Lucan, 439 S.W.3d at 613.
15

Whitman spoke to Flores about Villanueva’s and Reese’s statements.

Although Whitman did not recall the specific date, she said that, shortly after 

Villanueva asked her whether she used a vibrator, Whitman told Flores that she 

“didn’t appreciate” Villanueva and Reese asking her questions “like that.” Flores 

responded that she should “[j]ust ignore them.” This was the only occasion on which 

Whitman complained to Flores, and Whitman did not make a complaint to anyone 

else. Whitman did not assert or even imply that the women’s harassment was based 

on her gender. Her vague complaint to Flores that she did not appreciate her 

coworkers’ statements was not specific enough about sexual harassment to invoke 

the protection of the Act. See Lucan, 439 S.W.3d at 613; Spinks, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 

797; see also Harris-Childs, 169 F. App’x at 916 (affirmed summary judgment on a 

Title VII retaliation claim because plaintiff never “specifically complained of racial 

or sexual harassment, only harassment”). Consequently, Whitman has failed to raise 

a material issue of fact on the specificity element of her retaliation claim, which is a 

jurisdictional requirement. See Harris-Childs, 169 F. App’x at 916; Mission, 372 

S.W.3d at 635–36.

But even if we assume that her complaint did involve protected activity, 

Whitman also failed to raise a material issue of fact to establish by direct or 

circumstantial evidence a causal connection between her complaint and her 

termination. However, close timing between an employee’s protected activity and 

an adverse action against her may provide the “causal connection” required to make 

out a prima facie case of retaliation. Swanson v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 110 F.3d 1180, 

1188 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Armstrong v. City of Dallas, 997 F.2d 62, 67 (5th Cir.

1993)). Although there is no precise time frame or limit, the causal inference for 

temporal proximity can be raised when the complaint and adverse employment 

action are separated by weeks, not months. Fields v. Teamsters Local Union 
16

No. 988, 23 S.W.3d 517, 529 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).

Whitman cannot rely on close timing to show a causal connection because she 

testified that she could not recall the date on which she complained to Flores. 

Whitman also never complained to Flores or anyone else about the statements. 

Because Whitman cannot provide a specific date for her complaint to Flores, she has 

not alleged facts, even if taken as true, that raise a material issue of fact to raise a 

rebuttable inference of a causal connection between her complaint and her 

termination. As such, Whitman has not made a prima facie case for retaliation. We

hold that the trial court erred when it denied the Department’s plea to the jurisdiction 

by which the Department attacked jurisdiction in connection with Whitman’s 

retaliation claim. We sustain the Department’s second issue.

B. Issue One: Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Because our resolution of the Department’s second issue is dispositive of this 

appeal, we need not address the Department’s first issue.

VI. This Court’s Ruling

We reverse the judgment of the trial court, and we render judgment dismissing

Whitman’s suit against the Department.

MIKE WILLSON

JUSTICE 

May 12, 2016

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

Willson, J., and Bailey, J.