alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32

                                CERTIFICATION OF
                           PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                                       AND
                          PRINCIPAL ACCOUNTING OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the accompanying Annual Report on Form 10-KSB (the
"Report") of CIMNET, Inc. (the "Company") for the year ended December 31, 2006,
I, John D. Richardson, III, Chief Executive Officer and Principal Accounting
Officer of the Company, hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best
of my knowledge and belief, that:

         (1)      the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      the information contained in the Report, fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.




                                      BY: /s/ JOHN D. RICHARDSON, III
                                          --------------------------------------
                                          John D. Richardson, III
                                          Chairman of the Board, Chief Executive
                                          Officer and Principal Accounting
                                          Officer



March 30, 2007

                                       53
EXHIBIT 35.1







SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT OF


TOYOTA MOTOR CREDIT CORPORATION





I, Wei Shi, certify that:





(a)           A review of Toyota Motor Credit Corporation’s activities and of its performance under the Sale and Servicing Agreement, dated as of June 18, 2014 (the “Sale and Servicing Agreement”), among Toyota Auto Finance Receivables LLC, as seller, Toyota Motor Credit Corporation, as servicer (in such capacity, the “Servicer”) and sponsor, and Toyota Auto Receivables 2014-B Owner Trust, as issuer, during the period from June 18, 2014 to December 31, 2014 has been made under my supervision.





(b)           To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Sale and Servicing Agreement in all material respects throughout the aforementioned period.





March 25, 2015





By:  /s/ Wei Shi





Wei Shi


Group Vice President - Treasury, Business Intelligence, Analytics and Finance


Toyota Motor Credit Corporation, as Servicer of Toyota Auto Receivables 2014-B Owner Trust
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAY-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JUN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               AUG-31-1996
<CASH>                                      10,479,403
<SECURITIES>                                52,537,281
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            63,815,804
<PP&E>                                      10,877,161
<DEPRECIATION>                               9,585,071
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              65,178,584
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          782,975
<BONDS>                                              0
<COMMON>                                       139,750
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                  64,142,440
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                65,178,584
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (970,280)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (970,280)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<NET-INCOME>                                 (970,280)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.07)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.07)
        

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##### 



Exhibit 32.3 LIBERTY PROPERTY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP CERTIFICATIONS REQUIRED BY
RULE 13a-14(b) UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 
 In connection with the Quarterly Report of Liberty Property Trust (the Company) on Form 10-Q
for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
on the date hereof (the Report), I, WILLIAM P. HANKOWSKY,
Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of Liberty
Property Trust (the sole general partner of the Company), certify, in connection with Rule
13a-14(b) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, that based on my knowledge: (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and result of operations of the Company. /s
WILLIAM P. HANKOWSKYWilliam P. HankowskyChairman, President and Chief Executive Officer
of Liberty Property Trust, its sole general partner
 Date: May 6, 2005
#### The State of Ohio, Appellee, *v.*Higgins, Appellant.

(No. 6071

Decided February 24, 1942.)

*Mr. Carl W. Rich,*prosecuting attorney, and *Mr. 'Theodore M.*Berry,,for appellee.

*Mr. Chester R. Shook, Mr. Froome Barbour*and *Mr. ■George C. Allen,*for appellant.

By the Court.

The evidence adduced at the trial was not brought upon the record by a bill of exceptions. We must assume that the conviction of the appellant of second degree murder was adequately supported by the evidence.

There is in the file an affidavit of one of the jurors that during the trial she was accosted by an unknown person who said to her: “I want you to send her to the penitentiary for life,” and that this person was in attendance during the entire trial. The affidavit is silent as to whether this incident influenced the juror in any way. She did take precaution not to have the' incident repeated.

The trial court refused to grant a new trial on this ground.

We are of the opinion that the incident was not of such gravity as to justify this court in overruling the discretion of the trial judge, in the absence of a bill of *384exceptions. It does not show misconduct on the part of the juror. It does show reprehensible conduct on the part of the person who accosted the juror for which punishment for contempt of court would be entirely justified, but that is not sufficient to invalidate a judgment which is otherwise flawless.

While *Northern Ohio Traction Co.*v. *Mitchell,*21 C. C. (N. S.), 177, 33 C. D., 304, does hold that the receipt of an anonymous letter by a juror requires the granting of a new trial without proof that the juror was influenced by it, the only case relied upon to support that broad rule is *McDaniels, Exr.,*v. *McDaniels,*40 Vt., 363, 94 Am. Dec., 408, from which the court quoted extensively. The quotation shows that the court did not intend to declare that in *all cases*such an incident invalidates the verdict. Indeed, in the quotation relied on, it is stated: “It is quite enough that, *in a doubtful case,*conversations with the jurors have been had during the progress of the trial for the purpose of influencing and directly calculated to influence them to render just the verdict they did.” (Italics ours.)

And that is the general rule. *People*v. *Strause,*290 Ill., 259, 125 N. E., 339, 22 A. L. R., 235, and annotation at 255.

The evidence in the case at bar is not before us. It may have been overwhelming of guilt. Notwithstanding the plea of not guilty, the defendant may have convicted herself by her own testimony. We certainly cannot say that this is a doubtful case, the scales in which might be affected by such a happening.

The judgment is affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Matthews, P. J., Hamilton and Ross, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Consolidated Balance Sheet at June 30, 1999 and the Consolidated Statement of
Operations for the six months ended June 30, 1999 and is qualified in its
entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000921112
<NAME> LIBERTY PROPERTY TRUST
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                          33,555
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    5,780
<ALLOWANCES>                                     2,977
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                39,335
<PP&E>                                       3,167,096
<DEPRECIATION>                                 243,685
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               3,042,405
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           46,853
<BONDS>                                      1,512,879
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                    120,814
<COMMON>                                            66
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,169,955
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 3,042,405
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               127,482
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   30,689
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                24,638
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              25,822
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 46,263
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             46,263
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    40,502
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.61
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.60


</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION
1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002



In connection with the
Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of Sevion Therapeutics, Inc. for the year ended June 30, 2016 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof, the undersigned, David Rector, Chief Executive Officer, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, that:



(1)            The Annual Report fully complies
with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)            The information contained in the
Annual Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Sevion Therapeutics,
Inc.



|Dated:   November 16, 2016 | /s/ David Rector *                   
|-------------------------- | -------------------------------------
|                           | David Rector                         
|                           | President and Chief Executive Officer
|                           | (principal executive officer)        



* A signed original of this written statement
required by Section 906 has been provided to us and will be retained by us and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request.
#### STATE ex rel. Derrick Dewayne FUGLER v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2011-KH-0933.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 3, 2011.

In re Fugler, Derrick Dewayne; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. L, Nos. 12-10-0066, 01-11-0734; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 0128.

Denied.
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 193 (Wednesday, October 6, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 61760]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-25047]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE


Depository Library Council to the Public Printer; Meeting

    The Depository Library Council to the Public Printer (DLC) will 
meet on Monday, October 18, 2010, through Wednesday, October 20, 2010, 
in Arlington, Virginia. The sessions will take place from 8 a.m. to 
5:30 p.m. on Monday through Tuesday, and Wednesday, 8 a.m. to 12 p.m. 
The meeting will be held at the Doubletree Hotel Crystal City, located 
at 300 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, VA. The purpose of this meeting is 
to discuss the Federal Depository Library Program. All sessions are 
open to the public. The sleeping rooms available at the Doubletree 
Hotel will be at the Government rate of $229.00 (plus applicable state 
and local taxes, currently 10.25%) a night for a single or double. The 
Doubletree is in compliance with the requirements of Title III of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act and meets all Fire Safety Act 
regulations.

Robert C. Tapella,
Public Printer of the United States.
[FR Doc. 2010-25047 Filed 10-5-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 1520-01-P
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

WAYNE O. CRIPPEN,

Petitioner

:

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No. 592 MAL 2020

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

WAYNE O. CRIPPEN,

Petitioner

:

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No. 593 MAL 2020

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

WAYNE O. CRIPPEN,

Petitioner

:

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No. 594 MAL 2020

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

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No. 595 MAL 2020

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court
[592 MAL 2020, 593 MAL 2020, 594 MAL 2020 and 595 MAL 2020] - 2

WAYNE O. CRIPPEN,

Petitioner

:

:

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ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 28th day of April, 2021, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h Elizabeth A. Weave r

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathaway, Justices 

# Order

January 27, 2010

139209

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 139209 COA: 281844 Genesee CC: 01-008582-FC ANGELO ROCHELLE MCMULLAN, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 2, 2009 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is GRANTED, limited to the issue whether a rational juror could conclude that defendant acted with a “lesser mens rea of gross negligence or an intent to injure, and not malice,” People v Holtschlag , 471 Mich 1, 21-22 (2004), thus warranting an inst ruction on involuntary manslaughter.

We further ORDER the Genesee Circuit C ourt, in accordance with Administrative Order 2003-03, to determine wh ether the defendant is indige nt and, if so, to appoint Patrick K. Ehlmann, if feasible, to repres ent the defendant in this Court. If this appointment is not feasible, the trial court shall, within the same time frame, appoint other counsel to represent the defendant in this Court.

The Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan, the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan, and th e Criminal Law Section of th e State Bar of Michigan are invited to file briefs amic us curiae. Other persons or groups interested in the determination of the issue pr esented in this case may move the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae.

C ORRIGAN
, J., ( concurring ).

In particular, I would direct the par ties to address whether, even crediting defendant’s version of events, the facts in escapably show that he acted with malice because, at a minimum, he “inten [ded] to do an act in wanton and wilful disregard of theI, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk January 27, 2010
p0120 2

likelihood that the natural tendency of [his] behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm.” People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442, 464 (1998). Defendant admitted that, after a physical altercation with the victim, defendant left to obtai n a loaded gun in order to threaten or scare the victim. He further testified that afte r he returned, the victim was shot in the chest when he and the victim ag ain began to struggle. He does not dispute that the gun was in his hand when it was cocked an d then fired, and the evidence further established that this firearm had to be specifi cally cocked in order to fire. Under these circumstances, I would ask the parties to addr ess whether, as a matter of law, defendant’s assertion that he did not actually intend to kill the vic tim could preclude a finding of malice.

Y OUNG
, J., joins the st atement of C ORRIGAN
, J.
#### Charles Cleve BOLYARD, Appellant, v. The CRYSTAL TISSUE COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 19108.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

June 3, 1964.

*786Lyon & Lyon, Lewis E. Lyon, Charles 'G. Lyon, Hallack W. Hoag, Los Angeles, Cal., for the appellant.

Fulwider, Patton, Rieber, Lee & Utecht, William K. Rieber, Los Angeles, Cal., Wood, Herron & Evans, Edward B. Evans, Cincinnati, Ohio; for appellee.

Before BARNES and BROWNING, Circuit Judges, and TAYLOR, District Judge.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a declaratory judgment holding Letters Patent No. 2,-949,398 and No. 3,055,797, granted to appellant, to be invalid and not infringed. They deal with an ornamented paper “constituted by tissue paper which is impregnated” with sequins.

Jurisdiction below rested on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1338 and 2201. Jurisdiction here rests upon 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

The trial judge made the following findings, among others:

> “There is nothing novel in the subject matter of product patent No. 2,-949,398 or in the subject matter of process patent No. 3,055,797, in view of prior art referred to in Findings Nos. 14 to 19.” (Findings 20 and 22, Tr. p. 483.)

> “If there are any differences between the subject matter of product patent No. 2,949,398 and process patent No. 3,055,797, and the prior art referred to in Findings Nos. 14 to 19, those differences would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having an ordinary skill in the paper making art.”

> (Findings 21 and 23, Tr. p. 483.)

> Findings 14 to 19 related to:

> (a) Beck patent No. 322,034 (1885)

> (b) McDonough patent No. 447,336 (1891)

> (c) Beck patent No. 342,315 (1886)

> (d) “Other prior patents cumulative in effect” (presumably Plee’s British patent No. 2649 and Boese’s patent No. 2,-620,853)

> (e) Strathmore Paper Company’s products “Silverflake” and “Goldflake” (1934)

> (f) International Paper Company’s product “Coronation” (1944-1945)

> Based on these findings of fact, the court concluded that each patent “has failed to meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 102 [prior art] and 35 U.S.C. § 103 [obviousness] and are invalid.”

We cannot, on the record before us, hold these findings of fact are clearly erroneous, having due regard for the opportunity the trial judge had to judge the credibility of witnesses, which opportunity was not afforded us. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52 (a). Monroe Auto Equipment Co. v. Superior Industries, 9 Cir. 1964, 332 F.2d 473, (No. 18998, decided May 22, 1964); Bergman v. Aluminum Lock Shingle Corp. of America, 9 Cir. 1957, 251 F.2d 801, 809; Pressteel Co. v. Halo Lighting Products, Inc., 9 Cir. 1963, 314 F.2d 695, 697, and cases cited.

The decision of Judge Rich, sitting with the District Court of the District of Columbia, is not conclusive on the court below, nor on us, particularly where the same evidence introduced in the court below was not necessarily introduced before Judge Rich.

Finding no error, we affirm.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. James JACKSON.

No. 2010-KK-1960.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Aug. 24, 2010.

WEIMER, J., concurs in part, dissents in part.

JOHNSON, J., would deny with reasons.

WEIMER, J.,

concurring in part, dissenting in part.

hThe trial court did not abuse its great discretion and the State should be barred from presenting any evidence regarding the drug transaction and seized drugs. However, the State should be allowed to present evidence to establish the police officers were in the residence after conducting surveillance and were given consent to search.

JOHNSON, J.,

would deny the writ application.

| defendant was charged by bill of information with two counts: felon in possession of a firearm (violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1) and illegal simultaneous possession of guns and drugs [violation of La. R.S. 14:95(E) ]. The trial court severed the two counts, and the State elected to proceed to trial solely on the felon in possession of a firearm charge. The State’s writ application seeks permission to introduce evidence/testimony relative to NOPD’s surveillance of the defendant for drug activity and NOPD’s finding and seizure of drugs, along with the firearms, as a result of the surveillance. Because the drug charge has been severed from the weapon possession charge, such evidence consti*376tutes inadmissible “other crimes” evidence. Thus, I find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in granting defendant’s motion in limine.
EXHIBIT 99

                                  CERTIFICATION

         Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, each of the
undersigned hereby certifies in his or her capacity as an officer of PennFed
Financial Services, Inc. (the "Company") that the Quarterly Report of the
Company on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended December 31, 2002 fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and that the information contained in such report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company as of the dates and for the periods presented in the financial
statements included in such report.




                                     By:  /s/ Joseph L. LaMonica
                                          -------------------------------------
                                          Joseph L. LaMonica
                                          President and Chief
                                          Executive Officer

                                          Date: February 14, 2003


                                     By:  /s/ Claire M. Chadwick
                                          -------------------------------------
                                          Claire M. Chadwick
                                          Executive Vice President,
                                          Chief Financial Officer and Controller

                                          Date: February 14, 2003