alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions

that have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________ No. 95-10326 Conference Calendar

__________________ EZREE CROWLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus D BROWN, #7803; E SMITH, #2451; M J FALLS, #3820; CITY OF DALLAS, TEXAS Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:94-CV-1170-P

- - - - - - - - - - August 22, 1995 Before KING, JOLLY, and WIENER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Ezree Crowley has appealed the dismissal, with prejudice, of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action. His complaint requests damages for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution relative to a burglary conviction for which he is serving a lengthy sentence. We AFFIRM the district court's judgment. Crowley contends that the district court should have either placed his action in abeyance or dismissed it without prejudice.No. 95-10326 -2- He argues that the dismissal with prejudice was contrary to Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994). Crowley also asserts that the district court should have allowed him "to present his claim." "Under Heck , when a state prisoner brings a § 1983 action seeking damages, the trial court must first ascertain whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the § 1983 action would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence." Boyd v. Biggers , 31 F.3d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 1984). In the event that "it would, the prisoner must show that his conviction has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus, in order to state a claim." Id
. (citation and quotation marks omitted). If the prisoner cannot make such a showing, his § 1983 action should be dismissed with prejudice. Id . at 283-84. The court need no longer hold proceedings in abeyance or dismiss without prejudice, because the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the conviction is invalidated. Stephenson v. Reno , 28 F.3d 26, 27-28 (5th Cir. 1994). Crowley concedes, as he must, that his burglary conviction remains in effect. For the district court to have awarded him damages on grounds that he was maliciously prosecuted for the burglary "would necessarily imply the invalidity of [that] conviction." Boyd , 31 F.3d at 283; see Pete v. Metcalfe , 8 F.3d 214, 219 (5th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, the district court was correct in dismissing Crowley's § 1983 action with prejudice. Boyd , 31 F.3d at 283-84.No. 95-10326 -3-

AFFIRMED.
647 A.2d 467

#### IN THE MATTER OF JANE KISSLING, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW.

September 19, 1994.

ORDER

JANE KISSLING of CLIFFSIDE PARK, having been Ordered to Show Cause on September 12, 1994, why she should not be temporarily suspended from the practice of law and why the restraints imposed on her by Order of the Court dated July 6, 1994, should not continue pending the final disposition of ethics proceedings against her, and respondent having failed to appear on the return date of the Order to Show Cause, and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that JANE KISSLING of CLIFFSIDE PARK be and hereby is temporarily suspended from practice, *29effective immediately and until further Order of the Court; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent be restrained and enjoined from practicing law during the period of her suspension and that she comply with Regulation 23 of the Administrative Guidelines Governing Suspended Attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that the restraints imposed against respondent by Order of this Court dated July 6, 1994, remain in effect until further Order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that the Office of Attorney Ethics shall take such protective action pursuant to *Rule*l:20-ll(c) as it deems appropriate, including the transfer to the Clerk of the Superior Court for deposit in the Superior Court Trust Fund the attorney account funds held in any financial institution by JANE KISSLING, which funds were restrained from disbursement by this Court’s Order of July 6, 1994.
#### Ferris G. SINGLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James HODGES, Governor of South Carolina; William D. Catoe, Director of the South Carolina Department of Corrections; Benjamin Montgomery, Deputy Director of Operations for the South Carolina Department of Corrections; State of South Carolina; Charles M. Condon, Attorney General of the State of South Carolina, all in their individual and official capacities, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 00-7133.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 21, 2000.

Decided Jan. 8, 2001.

Ferris G. Singley, pro se. Steven Michael Pruitt, Robert W. Cone, McDonald, Patrick, Tinsley, Baggett & Poston, Greenwood, SC, for appellees.

Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Ferris G. Singley appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp.2000) complaint. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion accepting the magistrate judge’s recommendation and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm substantially on the reasoning of the district court.**Singley v. Hodges,*No. *147CA-99-3120 (D.S.C. July 20, 2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*

*

 We note that the district court’s opinion refers to multiple plaintiffs. Although there were other plaintiffs listed on the complaint, Sing-ley was not entitled to represent others. *See Oxendine v. Williams,*509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir.1975). Further, only Singley signed *147the notice of appeal, so he is the only Appellant. *Covington v. Allsbrook,*636 F.2d 63, 64 (4th Cir. 1980). Accordingly, this action resolves only those claims raised by Singley personally.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-07-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUL-02-1999
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</TABLE>
|   | (1) | The      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and |
|--------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | The      information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the      Company. |
|--------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                      |                                                                                                                  |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Date:      April 30, 2010 | By:/s/ Robert      DinningName:      Robert DinningTitle:      Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive  Officer) |
##### 



Exhibit 32.1
 STATEMENT FURNISHED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
   (A)
    
    the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)) and(B)
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company
as of the dates and for the periods covered by the Report.
   November 14, 2006
    
    /s/ George C. PlattDate
    
    George C. PlattChief Executive Officer
 1




---



##### 



Exhibit 32.1
 STATEMENT FURNISHED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
   (A)
    
    the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)) and(B)
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company
as of the dates and for the periods covered by the Report.
   November 14, 2006
    
    /s/ Laurie L. LathamDate
    
    Laurie L. LathamChief Financial Officer
 2
EXHIBIT 31.2

 

CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICERPURSUANT TO SECTION 302

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

I, Kevin Hershberger, certify that:

 

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-Kof ReWalk Robotics Ltd.;

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not containany untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3. [Intentionally Omitted];

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) andI are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for theregistrant and have:

 

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, orcaused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relatingto the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly duringthe period in which this report is being prepared;

 

(b) Designed such internal control over financial reporting,or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assuranceregarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordancewith generally accepted accounting principles; 

 

(c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosurecontrols and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures,as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

 

(d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by the annual report that has materially affected,or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) andI have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditorsand the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

 

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknessesin the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

 

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves managementor other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.

 

 

Date: May 5, 2016
Exhibit 32.2



Certification of Chief Financial Officer



Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of
CV Therapeutics, Inc. (the Company) hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge, that:



(i) the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2004, (the
Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and



(ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                        |  |  |  |  |  |                             |  |                                             
|----------------------- |  |  |  |  |  | --------------------------- |  | --------------------------------------------
|                        |  |  | 
|Dated:     May 10, 2004 |  |  |  |  |  | /s/    DANIEL K.
SPIEGELMAN
|                        |  |  |  |  |  |                             |  | Daniel K. Spiegelman Chief Financial Officer
#### In the Interest of J.L.R., JR., and N.R., children. S.W-R., Appellant, v. Department of Children and Family Services and Guardian Ad Litem Program, Appellees.

No. 2D10-5391.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

July 15, 2011.

*1284David A. Dee, Tampa, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kimberly G. Gore, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee Department of Children and Family Services.

Jennifer S. Paullin, Tavares, for Appel-lee Guardian ad Litem Program.

VILLANTI, Judge.

S.W-R., the mother, challenges the circuit court’s order placing two of her children, J.L.R., Jr., and N.R., in a permanent guardianship with their maternal grandmother. We affirm all aspects of the order except as to the visitation schedule between S.W-R. and the children. On that single point, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Section 39.6221(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2010), requires the circuit court’s written order to “[sjpecify the frequency and nature of visitation or contact between the child and his or her parents.” This plain language mandates that the court establish a specific visitation schedule rather than leaving visitation to the discretion of either of the parties. *See R.N. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs.,*55 So.3d 685, 685-86 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). An order that does not comply with the requirements of section 39.6221 must be reversed. *See, e.g., J.S. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs.,*18 So.3d 712, 714 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); *R.T., Sr. v. Dep’t of Children & Families,*27 So.3d 195, 196 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).

In this case, over S.W-R.’s objection, the circuit court failed to “[sjpecify the frequency and nature of visitation or contact between” S.W-R. and her children. Instead, in a somewhat ambiguous fashion, the written order provides for visitation biweekly for an hour to an hour and a half “or at the discretion of the caregiver.” Thus, the order places complete discretion concerning the frequency and duration of visitation with the maternal grandmother. Aside from the violation of the statutory language, this order creates a significant problem in this case in which S.W-R. has a strained relationship with the maternal grandmother. And the court’s oral suggestion that the parties “compromise” does not provide any guidance to the parties as *1285to the court’s intent concerning the extent of the maternal grandmother’s discretion.

Therefore, we reverse the circuit court’s order appointing a permanent guardian to the extent that it leaves the nature and frequency of any visitation between S.WR. and the children to the maternal grandmother’s unfettered discretion and remand for the trial court to delineate S.W-R.’s visitation rights with her children in accordance with section 39.6221(2)(c).

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

NORTHCUTT and WALLACE, JJ„ Concur.
No. 87-121.

#### Dugger, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. *v.*Adams.

C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed *informa pauperis*granted. Certiorari granted.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Robert SMITH.

No. 2010-KK-2474.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 17, 2010.

In re State of Louisiana; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. 4, No. M517-390; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 10-K-1463.

Denied.
II 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 7164 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

NOVEMBER 29, 2018 

Received 

AN ACT 

To add Ireland to the E–3 nonimmigrant visa program. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

HR 7164 RDS

1 SECTION 1. E–3 VISAS FOR IRISH NATIONALS. 

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 101(a)(15)(E)(iii) of the 

3 Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 

4 1101(a)(15)(E)(iii)) is amended by inserting ‘‘or, on a 

5 basis of reciprocity as determined by the Secretary of 

6 State, a national of Ireland,’’ after ‘‘Australia’’. 

7 (b) EMPLOYER REQUIREMENTS.—Section 212 of the 

8 Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182) is 

9 amended— 

10 (1) by redesignating the second subsection (t) 

11 (as added by section 1(b)(2)(B) of Public Law 108– 

12 449 (118 Stat. 3470)) as subsection (u); and 

13 (2) by adding at the end of subsection (t)(1) 

14 (as added by section 402(b)(2) of Public Law 108– 

15 77 (117 Stat. 941)) the following: 

16 ‘‘(E) In the case of an attestation filed with re17 spect to a national of Ireland described in section 

18 101(a)(15)(E)(iii), the employer is, and will remain 

19 during the period of authorized employment of such 

20 Irish national, a participant in good standing in the 

21 E–Verify program described in section 403(a) of the 

22 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Respon23 sibility Act of 1996 (8 U.S.C. 1324a note).’’. 

24 (c) APPLICATION ALLOCATION.—Paragraph (11) of 

25 section 214(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 

26 U.S.C. 1184(g)(11)) is amended to read as follows: 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
3 

HR 7164 RDS

1 ‘‘(11)(A) The Secretary of State may approve 

2 initial applications submitted for aliens described in 

3 section 101(a)(15)(E)(iii) only as follows: 

4 ‘‘(i) For applicants who are nationals of 

5 the Commonwealth of Australia, not more than 

6 10,500 for a fiscal year. 

7 ‘‘(ii) For applicants who are nationals of 

8 Ireland, not more than a number equal to the 

9 difference between 10,500 and the number of 

10 applications approved in the prior fiscal year 

11 for aliens who are nationals of the Common12 wealth of Australia. 

13 ‘‘(B) The approval of an application described 

14 under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be deemed for nu15 merical control purposes to have occurred on Sep16 tember 30 of the prior fiscal year. 

17 ‘‘(C) The numerical limitation under subpara18 graph (A) shall only apply to principal aliens and 

19 not to the spouses or children of such aliens.’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives November 28, 

2018. 

Attest: KAREN L. HAAS, 

Clerk. 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
#### Frank L. PERRY, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D10-1374.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

July 23, 2010.

*356Frank L. Perry, pro se, Petitioner.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Anne C. Conley, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied on the merits.

THOMAS, CLARK, and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>





                                                                  EXHIBIT 10(ee)

April 26, 2002

Mr. Horace T. Ardinger, Jr.
Ardinger Family Partnership, Ltd. (Note holder)
1990 Lakepointe Drive
Lewisville, TX 75057

Re: Letter Agreement for reduction of loan principal

Dear Horace,

ViewCast currently owns 1,140,310 common shares of DynTek, Inc. ("DYTK") public
stock that closed at $2.10 on April 26, 2002 and had a most recent 10-day
trading range of $2.00 to $2.10. As of March 31, 2002, the loan balance of the
Note dated February 28, 2001 is $6,595,831.33. ViewCast proposes to reduce the
outstanding loan balance by relinquishing control and transferring all of the
DYTK stock to the Ardinger Family Partnership, Ltd. for the following
consideration:

          1. The loan balance would be reduced by $2,910,641.28 or approximately
          $2.55 per share on the transfer day of the stock to the Noteholder.

          2. If subsequent to the transfer day of the stock to the Noteholder,
          the loan balance would be reduced further by 50% of the stock value
          between $4.50 per share and the highest value attained. The value of
          the stock is determined as either (i) the price for which a share was
          sold on the open market less broker expenses from the effective date
          of this agreement through February 14, 2003 or (ii) for shares not
          sold by February 14, 2003, the average of the ending per share trading
          price over the consecutive trading days from December 1, 2002 to
          December 31, 2002.

          3. If the loan balance has previously been reduced to zero, then any
          loan balance reductions due to ViewCast under Item #2 above would be
          either (i) applied toward redeeming a portion of the Preferred Stock
          Series B or Series C issued by ViewCast and held by Mr. H.T. Ardinger
          at $10.00 per share or (ii) paid in cash to ViewCast when due at the
          Noteholder's option.

This proposal would be effective upon acceptance by the Noteholder. Please
indicate acceptance by signing below and returning to ViewCast.

Regards,

 /s/ Laurie L. Latham

Laurie L. Latham
Chief Financial Officer

Agreed to by the Ardinger Family Partnership:


By:  /s/ H.T. Ardinger, Jr.                           Date:   May 6, 2002
     -----------------------------------------             ---------------------
         H.T. Ardinger, Jr.



Cc: George C. Platt
#### STATE ex rel. Charlonda HYMES v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2009-KH-2430.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 29, 2010.

In re Hymes, Charlonda; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 88-3779; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-WR-924.

Denied.