I 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 7180 

To limit the availability of funds to extend the implementation of the New 

START Treaty, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 28, 2018 

Ms. CHENEY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in 

each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To limit the availability of funds to extend the implementation of the New START Treaty, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Stopping Russian Nu5 clear Aggression Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS TO EX7 TEND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW 

8 START TREATY. 

9 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 


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1 (1) The New START Treaty provides that, 

2 ‘‘[w]hen a Party believes that a new kind of stra3 tegic offensive arm is emerging, that Party shall 

4 have the right to raise the question of such a stra5 tegic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral 

6 Consultative Commission’’. 

7 (2) Russian Federation President Vladimir 

8 Putin stated in a March 1, 2018, public speech 

9 that— 

10 (A) ‘‘I will speak about the newest systems 

11 of Russian strategic weapons that we are cre12 ating . . . we have embarked on the develop13 ment of the next generation of missiles.’’; 

14 (B) ‘‘We started to develop new types of 

15 strategic arms that do not use ballistic trajec16 tories at all when moving toward a target.’’; 

17 (C) ‘‘One of them is a small-scale heavy18 duty nuclear energy unit that can be installed 

19 in a missile like our latest X–101 air-launched 

20 missile . . . . In late 2017, Russia successfully 

21 launched its latest nuclear-powered missile at 

22 the central training ground. During its flight, 

23 the nuclear-powered engine reached its design 

24 capacity and provided the necessary propul25 sion.’’; 


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1 (D) ‘‘[i]n December 2017, an innovative 

2 nuclear power unit for this unmanned under3 water vehicle completed a test cycle that lasted 

4 many years . . . [t]he tests that were con5 ducted enabled us to begin developing a new 

6 type of strategic weapon that would carry mas7 sive nuclear ordnance’’; 

8 (E) ‘‘[b]y the way, we have yet to choose 

9 names for these two new strategic weapons, the 

10 global range cruise missile and the unmanned 

11 underwater vehicle. We are waiting for sugges12 tions from the Defense Ministry’’; 

13 (F) ‘‘A real technological breakthrough is 

14 the development of a strategic missile system 

15 with fundamentally new combat equipment—a 

16 gliding wing unit, which has also been success17 fully tested . . . [w]e called it the Avangard’’; 

18 and 

19 (G) ‘‘I want to specifically emphasize that 

20 the newly developed strategic arms—in fact, 

21 new types of strategic weapons—are not the re22 sult of something left over from the Soviet 

23 Union. Of course, we relied on some ideas from 

24 our ingenious predecessors. But everything I 

25 have described today is the result of the last 


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1 several years, the product of dozens of research 

2 organizations, design bureaus and institute.’’. 

3 (3) During the House Armed Services Com4 mittee hearing on April 12, 2018, Secretary of De5 fense James Mattis was asked whether Russia 

6 should honor the terms of the treaty and limit its 

7 new strategic offensive arms under the New START 

8 Treaty as it requires and he stated, ‘‘Sir, I believe 

9 they should.’’. 

10 (4) At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee 

11 Hearing on September 18, 2018, Under Secretary of 

12 State for Arms Control and International Security 

13 Andrea Thompson stated that, ‘‘The value of any 

14 arms control agreement is derived from our treaty 

15 partners maintaining compliance with their obliga16 tions and avoiding actions that result in mistrust 

17 and the potential for miscalculation. Russia con18 tinues to violate a series of arms control obligations 

19 that undermine the trust the United States can 

20 place in treaties.’’. 

21 (5) At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee 

22 Hearing on September 18, 2018, Deputy Undersec23 retary of Defense for Policy David Trachtenberg 

24 stated that— 


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1 (A) ‘‘The bottom line is that arms control 

2 with Russia is troubled because the Russian 

3 Federation apparently believes it need only 

4 abide by the agreements that suit it. As a re5 sult, the credibility of all international agree6 ments with Russia is at risk’’; and 

7 (B) ‘‘Any decision on extending the treaty 

8 will, and should be, based on a realistic assess9 ment of whether the New START treaty re10 mains in our national security interests in light 

11 of overall Russian arms control behavior’’. 

12 (b) LIMITATION.—Notwithstanding any other provi13 sion of law, no funds authorized to be appropriated or oth14 erwise made available for fiscal year 2019 and subsequent 

15 fiscal years may be obligated or expended to extend the 

16 implementation of the New START Treaty beyond the 

17 current expiration date in 2021 unless the President cer18 tifies to the appropriate congressional committees that— 

19 (1) extending the New START Treaty is in the 

20 national security interest of the United States; and 

21 (2) the Russian Federation has— 

22 (A) agreed to include all covered Russian 

23 systems under the limits set by the New 

24 START Treaty; and 


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1 (B) per paragraph (a)(12) of the Resolu2 tion of Ratification for the New START Treaty 

3 adopted in the Senate on December 22, 2010 

4 (Treaty Document 111–5), entered into an 

5 agreement with the United States to address 

6 the disparity between the nonstrategic (tactical) 

7 nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian Fed8 eration and of the United States by securing 

9 and reducing in a verifiable manner Russian 

10 tactical nuclear weapons. 

11 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

12 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT13 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com14 mittees’’ means— 

15 (A) the Committee on Armed Services of 

16 the Senate and the Committee on Armed Serv17 ices of the House of Representatives; and 

18 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 

19 the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Af20 fairs of the House of Representatives. 

21 (2) NEW START TREATY.—The term ‘‘New 

22 START Treaty’’ means the Treaty between the 

23 United States of America and the Russian Federa24 tion on Measures for the Further Reduction and 

25 Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at 


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1 Prague, April 8, 2010, and entered into force Feb2 ruary 5, 2011. 

3 (3) COVERED RUSSIAN SYSTEMS.—The term 

4 ‘‘covered Russian systems’’ means the following: 

5 (A) The heavy intercontinental missile sys6 tem known as ‘‘Sarmat’’, or otherwise identi7 fied. 

8 (B) An air-launched nuclear-powered 

9 cruise missile known as ‘‘X–101’’, or otherwise 

10 identified. 

11 (C) An unmanned underwater vehicle 

12 known as ‘‘Status 6’’, or otherwise identified. 

13 (D) The long-distance guided flight 

14 hypersonic weapons system known by 

15 ‘‘Avanguard’’, or otherwise identified. 

Æ 


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