[Cite as State v. C.W., 2019-Ohio-2058.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF WAYNE ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee 

 v. 

C. W. 

 Defendant 

 and 

STEVE KNOWLING 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 18AP0020 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF WAYNE, OHIO 

CASE No. 2016 CRC-I 000399 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: May 28, 2019 

 

SCHAFER, Presiding Judge. 

{¶1} Appellant, Steve Knowling, trial counsel for the defendant in the underlying 

criminal matter, appeals from the March 19, 2018 judgment entry of the Wayne County Court of 

Common Pleas approving Mr. Knowling’s application for appointed counsel fees but reducing 

the amount of fees requested, and the subsequent April 3, 2018 order denying Mr. Knowling’s 

motion to reconsider. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

I. 

{¶2} Defendant, C.W.1

, was indicted on September 27, 2016, for one count of unlawful 

sexual conduct with a minor in violation of R.C. 2907.04(A), a felony of the fourth degree. C.W. 

 1

 C.W. is not a party to this appeal. 
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appeared for arraignment, without counsel, on December 28, 2016. The trial court entered a plea 

of not guilty on C.W.’s behalf, and appointed the public defender as counsel for defendant. 

{¶3} The assigned public defender filed a motion to withdraw as counsel on January 3, 

2017, citing a conflict of interest. The trial court approved the motion to withdraw as counsel, 

and appointed counsel for C.W. on January 6, 2017. Thereafter, C.W. informed the trial court 

that he wished to hire his own attorney. On June 27, 2017 the trial court noted C.W.’s request 

for the appointment of counsel during a pretrial, and again appointed the public defender to 

represent him. Once again, the public defender moved to withdraw as counsel based on a 

conflict of interest. The trial court granted the motion to withdraw and, on June 21, 2017, 

appointed Mr. Knowling to represent C.W.. The matter was set for trial but, ultimately, C.W. 

changed his plea to guilty as to an amended count of importuning in violation of R.C. 

2907.07(B)(1), a felony of the fifth degree. The trial court accepted C.W.’s plea and entered his 

conviction on February 23, 2018. 

{¶4} On March 16, 2018, Mr. Knowling filed a motion, entry, and certification for 

appointed counsel fees. In his application, Mr. Knowling requested a total of $2,056.00 in 

appointed counsel fees and provided an itemized fee statement and summary of work performed. 

The trial court approved the fee application on March 19, 2018, but the judge reduced the 

amount of the fee to $500.00. Mr. Knowling then filed a motion to reconsider the judgment 

entry reducing assigned counsel fees without explanation or, in the alternative, seeking 

extraordinary fees in the amount of $2,056.00. The trial court denied the motion to reconsider 

and stated: “The fee requested by counsel was excessive and completely out of proportion to 

those requested by other assigned counsel in similar cases.” 
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{¶5} Mr. Knowling appealed from the judgment entry raising one assignment of error 

for our review. 

II. 

Assignment of Error 

The trial court abused its discretion by summarily reducing assigned 

counsel’s fee request by seventy-five percent without holding a hearing to 

determine whether counsel’s services were reasonable and necessary. 

{¶6} An appellate court reviews the trial court’s decision regarding appointed counsel 

fees for an abuse of discretion. State v. Weimer, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2013-L-022, 2014-Ohio1354, ¶ 7. An abuse of discretion is more than an error of judgment; it means that the trial court 

was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable in its ruling. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio 

St.3d 217, 219, (1983). When applying this standard, a reviewing court is precluded from simply 

substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio 

St.3d 619, 621 (1993).

{¶7} Mr. Knowling filed his initial application seeking appointed counsel fees totaling 

$2,056.00, along with documentation to show the time he expended and services he performed. 

Without explanation for the reduction in fees, the trial judge simply crossed off the amount Mr. 

Knowling requested, and wrote in and initialed $500.00 as the approved amount. Thereafter, the 

trial court denied Mr. Knowling’s motion for reconsideration and explained that it found his 

request to be “excessive” and disproportionate to fees requested for similar work performed. 

{¶8} On appeal, Mr. Knowling asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by 

disallowing the full amount of the fees without a hearing to determine reasonableness or 

necessity. He contends that he was denied the opportunity to establish that the time he expended 

was essential to an effective defense because, without a hearing, he “was unable to present any 
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evidence or make an argument in support of his assigned counsel fee application[.]” In the 

absence of a hearing, Mr. Knowling contends, “there can be no independent analysis of whether 

the fees requested were reasonable and necessary.” 

{¶9} Counsel appointed by the court to represent an indigent person “shall be paid by 

the county” for their services and shall receive “compensation and expenses that the trial court 

approves.” R.C. 2941.51(A); R.C. 120.33(A)(4). Further, R.C. 2941.51(B) provides that the 

board of county commissioners must establish a schedule of fees, either per case or on an hourly 

basis, for the payment of services provided by appointed counsel. “Compensation and expenses 

shall not exceed the amounts fixed by the board of county commissioners” in the schedule of 

fees. R.C. 2941.51(A). 

{¶10} Mr. Knowling notes in his brief that the $2,056.00 in fees he requested “is less 

than the $3,000.00 maximum for a [third] degree felony set by the State Public Defender’s 

Office.” Aside from the fact that Mr. Knowling’s client was not charged with a third-degree 

felony, but rather a felony of the fourth degree, Mr. Knowling avoids mention of the maximum 

fee schedule for assigned counsel established by the Board of County Commissioners for Wayne 

County. Pursuant to Wayne County’s approved fee schedule, appointed counsel will be 

reimbursed a maximum of $40.00 per hour for out-of-court services and $50.00 per hour for incourt services. The maximum fee permitted for representation on a felony of the fourth degree is 

$1,500.00. We are compelled to point out that Mr. Knowling made his initial application to the 

trial court requesting fees in excess of $1,500.00 without an accompanying request for 

extraordinary fees. On appeal, however, Mr. Knowling has not challenged the applicability of 

the schedule to his request for fees, nor has he raised any issues regarding requests for 

extraordinary fees. We confine our analysis accordingly. 
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{¶11} Mr. Knowling has assigned as error the trial court’s failure to hold a hearing prior 

to approving fees in an amount less that the requested $2,056.00. In support of his contention 

that a trial court must “conduct a hearing and articulate its reasons before reducing assigned 

counsel attorney fees[,]” Mr. Knowling cites to three probate court cases: In re Estate of 

Murray, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2004-T-0030, 2005-Ohio-1892; In re Guardianship of 

Simballa, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 05-MA-8, 2005-Ohio-5934; In re Estate of Campbell, 7th 

Dist. Mahoning Nos. 02 CA 186 and 02 CA 187, 2003-Ohio-7040. However, each of these 

cases involved a probate court’s allowance of reasonable attorney fees paid by the executor or 

administrator of an estate pursuant to R.C. 2113.36 and, are simply inapposite in our review of 

fees awarded pursuant to R.C. 2941.51. Additionally, Mr. Knowling directs us to State v. 

Whitfield, 167 Ohio App.3d 211, 2006-Ohio-3044, (2d Dist.) and State v. Torres, 174 Ohio 

App.3d 168, 2007-Ohio-6651, (8th Dist.) for the proposition that a trial court abuses its 

discretion when it limits fees without holding a hearing. Whitfield and Torres are likewise 

inapplicable to the present matter. Those cases addressed issues concerning a trial court’s 

approval of expert witness fees and private investigator’s fees pursuant to R.C. 2929.02, but the 

appointed counsel fees at issue in the present case were not implicated in Whitfield or Torres. 

{¶12} We conclude that Mr. Knowling’s reliance on the aforementioned cases is 

misplaced. Although payment for appointed counsel’s services is required by statute and the 

maximum fee is established by the relevant fee schedule, the actual amount of the compensation 

is left to the trial court’s discretion. See State ex rel. Martin v. Corrigan, 25 Ohio St.3d 29, 31 

(1986). Mr. Knowling has not provided any relevant authority to support his claim that the trial 

court was required to hold a hearing before exercising its discretion to approve appointed counsel 

fees in an amount less than counsel requested. In a case such as this, the trial court is “clearly in 
6 

 

the best position to make an assessment of the reasonableness of a request for extraordinary 

attorney fees[,]” having observed the pretrial discussions, plea negotiations, the substantial legal 

issue Mr. Knowling alleges required extensive legal review, and “the relative efficiencies and 

decision making related to trial counsel’s performance.” Weimer, 2014-Ohio-1354 at ¶ 14. 

{¶13} This Court does not doubt that Mr. Knowling expended the amount of time that 

he deemed necessary to present an effective defense for his client. However, by accepting 

appointment as counsel in this matter, Mr. Knowling impliedly accepted and agreed to be bound 

by the fee schedule. See In re Ashton B., 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-03-003, 2003-Ohio-3092, ¶ 

3. We are not insensitive to the reality that appointed counsel are quite often inadequately 

compensated for their services. Nevertheless, based on the foregoing, we cannot say the trial 

court abused its discretion by entering its judgment approving a reduced amount of fees without 

conducting a hearing. Mr. Knowling’s assignment of error is overruled. 

III. 

{¶14} Mr. Knowling’s sole assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the 

Wayne County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Wayne, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 
7 

 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 JULIE A. SCHAFER 

 FOR THE COURT 

CALLAHAN, J. 

CONCURS. 

CARR, J. 

DISSENTING. 

{¶15} I respectfully dissent. I would dismiss this appeal for lack of a final, appealable 

order as this case does not involve a substantial right. As the majority explained, appointed 

counsel shall receive "compensation and expenses that the trial court approves.” R.C. 

2941.51(A). Although appointed counsel has a right to be paid by the county per R.C. 

120.33(A)(4) to the extent that an amount is approved by the trial court, there is no substantial 

right to the approval of a sum certain. 

APPEARANCES: 

STEVE KNOWLING, Attorney at Law, pro se, for Appellant. 

DANIEL R. LUTZ, Prosecuting Attorney, and NATHAN R. SHAKER, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for Appellee.