UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ JACQUELINE ANGELA STOKES, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. ROBERT HASTINGS ; STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants - Appellees. No. 16-6292 (D.C. No. 5:15- CV-01316-R) (W.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before KELLY , MATHESON , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Jacqueline Angela Stokes appeals the district court’s order dismissing her complaint with prejudice. 1 Because she has not shown th e district court erred, we affirm.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

1 Stokes’ notice of appeal identifie s only the September 8, 2016, order dismissing her complaint. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### March 31, 2017
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 I. Background Stokes sued Robert Hastings for da mages related to a traffic accident, 2 and the two quickly became involved in a discovery dispute. Stokes did not respond to Hastings’ interrogatories, requests for production, and request for medical authorization. Instead, she moved for a protective order, claiming Hastings was harassing her with discovery requests. The district court denied the motion and told Stokes it was “incumbent on her to participate in the discovery process.” R. at 89. It instructed Stokes she was “ob ligated to provide answers to the interrogatories and requests for production,” and warned her that “continued failure to participate in discovery may lead to dismissal.” R. at 89-90. When Stokes still refused to participat e in discovery, Hastings filed a motion to compel. The district court again orde red Stokes to respond to Hastings’ discovery requests and warned her that “[f]ailure to respond in a timely and complete manner [would] result in dismissal . . . with prejudice without further notice” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. R. at 151 & n.5. This prompted Stokes to answer Has tings’ interrogatories, but she did not attend her scheduled deposition or submit to a medical exam ination. As a result, Hastings filed a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d). When Stokes failed

2 Stokes also brought claims on behalf of her minor son and against Hastings’ insurance company, State Farm . The district court dismis sed these claims early in the litigation.3 to timely respond, the district court d eemed the motion confessed under W.D. Okla. Civ. R. 7.1(g) and dismissed Stokes’ complaint with prejudice. 3
II. Discussion Even under the liberal standard we a pply to pro se pleadings, Stokes’opening brief is inadequate to preser ve any issues for review. We construe her brief liberally and hold it to a less stri ngent standard than pleadi ngs drafted by lawyers. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer , 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). And we ignore technical deficiencies so long as “we can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on whic h [she] could prevail.” Diversey v. Schmidly , 738 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation mark s omitted). But Stokes must “follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants” and we cannot serve as her attorney by “constructing argum ents and searching the record.” Garrett , 425 F.3d at 840 (internal quot ation marks omitted). Stokes’ opening brief explai ns why she sued Hastings and asks us to quash his motion to dismiss. But it cites no legal au thority or parts of the record supporting her request. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A) (“[A] ppellant’s brief must contain . . . citations to the authorities and parts of th e record on which the appellant relies.”); see also Garrett , 425 F.3d at 841 (Rule 28 applies equally to pro se litigants). And more importantly, Stokes’ brief cont ains no real argument that the district court erred by

3 W.D. Okla. Civ. R. 7.1(g) provides that “[e]ach part y opposing a motion shall file a response within 21 days” and “[a]ny motion that is not opposed within 21 days may, in the discretion of the court, be deemed confessed.” Stokes did not file a response until nearly a week after the district cour t’s order of dismissal.4 dismissing her complaint. See Champagne Metals v. Ken-Mac Metals, Inc ., 458 F.3d 1073, 1092 (10th Cir. 2006) (declining to address an issue when appellant “ma[de] no real argument (other than c onclusory statements that th e district court erred) and cite[d] no legal authority in support of its po sition”). Because ev en the most liberal construction of Stokes’ brief reveals no valid claim that th e district court erred, she has forfeited any argument on the issue. See Bronson v. Swensen , 500 F.3d 1099, 1105 (10th Cir. 2007) (issues inade quately briefed are forfeited). III. Conclusion We affirm the district court’s order dismissing Stokes’ complaint.

Entered for the Court
Carolyn B. McHugh Circuit Judge