J-S44006-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DONALD ANTHONY BURKHART, JR. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1916 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 26, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-36-CR-0007022-2018

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2020

Appellant, Donald Anthony Burkhart, Jr., appeals from the judgment of 

sentence of an aggregate term of 3-7 years’ incarceration, imposed following 

his conviction for two counts of terroristic threats, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706. Herein, 

Appellant challenges the trial court’s admission of hearsay testimony, its

imposition of separate sentences at each count, and the jurisdiction of the 

court to order conditions on Appellant’s state parole. After careful review, we 

vacate Appellant’s sentence for the misdemeanor-graded count of terroristic 

threats, and vacate any portion of the sentencing order purporting to set 

conditions on Appellant’s state sentence or parole beyond the minimum and 

maximum terms of incarceration. We affirm Appellant’s sentence with respect 

to the charge of terroristic threats graded as a felony. 

The trial court summarized the relevant procedural history of this case 

and the facts adduced at Appellant’s jury trial as follows:
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On June 7, 2019, [Appellant] was found guilty of one count each 

of terroristic threats graded as a felony of the third degree and 

terroristic threats graded as a misdemeanor of the first degree. 

The convictions relate to multiple threats [Appellant] made to 

certain staff at UPMC [Pinnacle] Lititz hospital throughout the day 

on November 20, 2018. [Appellant] was at the hospital that day 

with his partner for the delivery of his child by means of a 

scheduled cesarean section. [Appellant] first manifested his anger 

to Dr. Jill Satorie and to his partner in the operating room when 

he claimed a male anesthesiologist saw his partner’s “butt crack.” 

After the delivery, [Appellant]’s agitated demeanor continued to 

escalate[,] with [Appellant] and his partner continually arguing 

with each other, [Appellant] discouraging an examination of his 

partner that was recommended, threatening Dr. Satorie that his 

partner might kick her and hurt her if the examination were 

performed, [Appellant’s] asking Nurse Dana Mastromatteo when 

they could perform a paternity test on the baby, explaining that 

he wanted to know if the baby was a miracle or “something else”

because [Appellant] had a vasectomy[,] and [Appellant’s] 

becoming agitated [and] confrontational about wanting to bring 

his pit bull into the hospital room.

Later, when a decision was made to move the baby to the NICU 

due to respiratory issues and the atmosphere in the room, 

[Appellant] became particularly agitated and stated that he felt 

like the hospital was kidnapping the baby. When a clinical nurse 

manager, Eliza Zeidman, came to speak with [Appellant] about 

the transfer of the baby, [Appellant] pointedly told her that he had 

previously done time in jail and was not going to go back and then 

he asked if she understood what he was saying. Nurse Zeidman 

reported the threat to her boss who she believes reported it to 

security. [Appellant] was overheard on two other occasions 

making similar statements about his time in jail over his temper 

to a visitor and then a house supervisor.

[Appellant]’s anger seemed to peak over hospital staff refusing to 

permit his partner to smoke in the room or to go outside to smoke. 

He threatened Dr. Satorie that if anyone laid a hand on his partner 

when she attempted to go outside to smoke he would become 

angry, punch the wall in and hurt somebody. He informed both 

Dr. Satorie and Nurse Mastromatteo separately when discussing 

the smoking issue that he was the president of a motorcycle gang 

and that he would have that gang come to the hospital and make 

things ugly[,] like he did on a prior occasion at a hospital in 

Williamsport. In response to this final, specific threat, Dr. Satorie 
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and Nurse Mastromatteo contacted hospital administration[,]

which resulted in security and police being contacted and 

responding. Due to the nature of the threats concerning the 

motorcycle gang, a decision was made to put the hospital into a 

lockdown situation.[1] [Appellant] was arrested and the hospital 

remained in lockdown from approximately 6:00 p.m. on 

November 20, 201[8,] until sometime between 6:30 a.m. and 

8:00 a.m. on November 21, 201[8].

After completion of a [pre-sentence investigation report], 

[Appellant] was sentenced on August 26, 2019 to three to seven 

years of incarceration on the felony count of terroristic threats and 

a concurrent one to five years of incarceration on the 

misdemeanor count of terroristic threats. [Appellant] filed a postsentence motion on September 4, 2019, which was denied by 

Order dated October 25, 2019. [Appellant] filed a [timely] notice 

of appeal on November 22, 2019.

Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 1/21/20, at 1-4 (footnotes omitted). 

Appellant filed a timely, court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and 

the trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion on January 21, 2020. Appellant 

now presents the following questions for our review:

I. Did the trial court err in admitting significant hearsay testimony 

regarding [Appellant’s] alleged statements, under the guise of 

explaining Jeffrey Hatfield’s course of conduct, where the 

testimony was extremely prejudicial, there was great risk that the 

jury would accept the testimony for its truth, and the jury was not 

given a limiting instruction regarding the use of said testimony?

II. Did the trial court err in imposing separate sentences for Count 

3, terroristic threats, graded as a first-degree misdemeanor, and 

Count 1, terroristic threats, graded as a third-degree felony, 

where the two offenses charged a violation of 18 Pa.C.S. §

2706(a)(1), both charges addressed identical conduct, and the 

sole difference was the additional element resulting in felony three 

grading, as set forth in 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(c), for causing the 

____________________________________________

1 The decision to lock down the hospital was made by the Security Supervisor 

at UPMC Pinnacle Lititz, Jeffrey Hatfield. 
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occupants of the building to be diverted from their normal or 

customary operations?

III. Did the trial court err in imposing a condition of no contact 

with the victims and in banning [Appellant] from UPMC Pinnacle

[Lititz], where the court had no jurisdiction to impose such 

conditions, which are the province of Pennsylvania Probation and 

Parole?

Appellant’s Brief at 6-7.

Hearsay

In his first claim, Appellant alleges that the trial court erred when it 

admitted hearsay through the testimony of Jeffrey Hatfield. As explained by 

Appellant, 

Jeffrey Hatfield, a security supervisor for UPMC Pinnacle for a 

region including UPMC Pinnacle’s Lititz hospital, testified that at 

4:26 p.m. he was notified of a potential security situation at the 

hospital. [N.T., 6/7/19-6/9/19, at] 230. As Mr. Hatfield began 

describing what he had been told about the situation, defense 

counsel objected that what he had been told was hearsay. [Id.

at] 231. The [prosecutor] argued that what he had been told went 

to his course of conduct. [Id.] The court overruled the objection 

after a sidebar discussion. [Id.] Mr. Hatfield then testified that 

Dave Schmidt, the chief nursing officer for the Lititz hospital, told 

him that [Appellant] was harassing the staff and making threats. 

[Id. at] 231-[]32.

The [prosecutor] asked Mr. Hatfield what threat contributed to his 

decision to lock down, and defense counsel objected, arguing that 

the specific threat was hearsay. [Id. at] 234-[]35. Again, the 

[prosecutor] argued that the specific threat was relevant to Mr. 

Hatfield’s course of conduct, and the court overruled the 

objection. [Id.]. Mr. Hatfield testified that he was advised that 

[Appellant] was supposedly a president of a motorcycle gang, and 

that he would have hundreds of motorcycles descend on the 

hospital to get his way, and that there had been a shooting in 

Chicago the day before and he would make it happen in Lititz. 

[Id. at] 235.

Appellant’s Brief at 11-12. 
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Appellant argues that the trial court erred by overruling his objection

because the details of the testimony were more prejudicial than probative, 

and that the error was not harmless because the jury was not specifically 

instructed as to the statement’s limited, non-hearsay purpose. We conduct 

our analysis of Appellant’s claim with the following in mind:

Admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial 

court and will be reversed only where the court clearly abused that 

discretion. Proper judicial discretion conforms to the law and is 

based on facts and circumstances before the court. An abuse of 

discretion is not a mere error of judgment but, rather, involves 

partiality, prejudice, bias, ill-will, or manifest unreasonableness. 

Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make any fact that 

is of consequence to the case more or less probable. Pa.R.E. 401. 

All relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise provided by 

law. Pa.R.E. 402. Although relevant, a trial court may exclude 

evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of 

unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury. 

Pa.R.E. 403.

...

Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant 

while testifying at trial, offered into evidence to prove the truth of 

the matter asserted. Pa.R.E. 801(c). Sometimes, out-of-court 

statements are offered not to prove the truth of the matter 

asserted but, for example, to explain the course of conduct 

undertaken by an investigating police officer. Commonwealth 

v. Dent, 837 A.2d 571, 577 (Pa. Super. 2003). Such statements 

are not hearsay. Id.

Even if a court does wrongly admit hearsay, this Court will not 

disturb a verdict on that basis alone if the admission constitutes 

harmless error. Id. at 582 n.2. Error is harmless if: (1) the 

prejudice to the appellant was nonexistent or de minimis; (2) the 

erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other 

untainted, substantially similar and properly admitted evidence; 

or (3) the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence was so 

overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so 
J-S44006-20

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insignificant by comparison that the error could not have 

contributed to the verdict. Id.

Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 776-77 (Pa. Super. 2007) (some 

citations omitted). 

Here, the trial court determined that the

record clearly establishes that this testimony was not offered for 

the truth of the matter asserted or to demonstrate that 

[Appellant] actually made the threats. The testimony was offered 

to show the information upon which the witness acted and to 

explain the witness’s course of conduct and why he felt a lockdown 

was necessary at the facility.

Furthermore, the admission of such testimony did not cause 

[Appellant] any prejudice. Two separate witnesses had already 

testified that [Appellant] made the threat concerning the 

motorcycle gang. In fact, those witnesses went into greater 

detail, explaining that [Appellant] had supported his threat by 

telling them that he had caused it to happen on a prior occasion 

at another facility to get his way. Therefore, this portion of the 

testimony was merely cumulative. While it is true that the 

security supervisor went on to mention a shooting in Chicago, the 

way that portion of the testimony was offered also did not cause 

[Appellant] any prejudice. [P]rior to the testimony, it was 

explained, in the presence of the jury, that the witness was not 

testifying from personal knowledge or memory of what was said 

by [Appellant] and that such testimony was not being offered as 

to the truth of what happened. The actual victims of [Appellant]’s 

threats never stated that [Appellant] made threats concerning a 

shooting or any facility in Chicago. In fact, it could be argued that 

the security supervisor’s testimony could have benefited 

[Appellant]. To obtain a conviction for a felony count of terroristic 

threats, the burden was on the Commonwealth to demonstrate 

that [Appellant]’s threats caused the occupants of the building to 

be diverted from their normal or customary operations. The 

security supervisor’s statement that the decision to put the facility 

on lockdown was made because of threats concerning a 

motorcycle gang and threats of a shooting undermined the 

Commonwealth’s case. The jury could have found that the 

lockdown was caused not by [Appellant]’s threats, but by 

miscommunication, misunderstanding or exaggeration.
J-S44006-20

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TCO at 7-8.

We agree with the trial court that the at-issue testimony was relevant 

for a non-hearsay purpose—to explain Hatfield’s course of conduct leading to 

the decision to lock down the hospital. The Commonwealth charged Appellant 

with terroristic threats graded as a felony. As such, the Commonwealth was 

required to prove that the terroristic threats caused “the occupants of the 

building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation to be diverted 

from their normal or customary operations[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706. Hatfield’s 

testimony established a causal link between his decision to lock down the 

hospital and Appellant’s threats. 

Appellant argues that the prejudice stemming from this testimony 

nevertheless outweighed its probative value. He contends that the details 

conveyed by Hatfield—in particular, the specific threat to have hundreds of 

gang members target the hospital, and the reference to a shooting in 

Chicago—were unduly prejudicial, and that Hatfield could have explained his 

course of conduct by simply stating “that he called police and locked down the 

hospital because of threats attributed to” Appellant. Appellant’s Brief at 24

(unnumbered page). However, we agree with the trial court that Hatfield’s 

testimony was cumulative of the testimony of two witnesses who directly 

heard Hatfield’s threats.

As to Appellant’s assertion that the trial court failed to instruct the jury 

regarding the limited purpose of Hatfield’s at-issue testimony, Appellant never

requested a limiting instruction when the court issued its ruling. See N.T., 
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6/7/19-6/9/19, at 234-35. Accordingly, Appellant has waived this aspect of 

his claim. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are 

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). Thus, we ascertain 

no clear abuse of discretion by the trial court in admitting Hatfield’s courseof-conduct testimony. For that reason, Appellant’s first claim lacks merit.

Merger

Next, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred when it issued separate, 

concurrent sentences for each count of terroristic threats. He argues that both 

charges “addressed identical conduct, and the sole difference was the 

additional element resulting in felony[-]three grading....” Appellant’s Brief at 

26 (unnumbered page). To the contrary, the trial court determined that 

Appellant “communicated several distinct threats to several distinct individuals 

on separate occasions throughout the day[,]” and that some “of his threats 

resulted in reports to hospital administration causing a diversion of regular 

activity for the hospital and some of them did not.” TCO at 10. Thus, the trial 

court ruled that the offenses did not merge because they applied to separate 

criminal acts. 

“A claim that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence by failing to 

merge sentences is a question of law. Accordingly, our standard of review is 

plenary.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 874 A.2d 66, 70 (Pa. Super. 2005)

(cleaned up). 

Whether these offenses merge turns on Section 9765 of our 

Sentencing Code, which provides:
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§ 9765. Merger of sentences

No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the 

crimes arise from a single criminal act and all of the 

statutory elements of one offense are included in the 

statutory elements of the other offense. Where crimes 

merge for sentencing purposes, the court may sentence the 

defendant only on the higher graded offense.

42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9765.

“The statute’s mandate is clear. It prohibits merger unless two 

distinct facts are present: 1) the crimes arise from a single 

criminal act; and 2) all of the statutory elements of one of the 

offenses are included in the statutory elements of the other.”

Commonwealth v. Baldwin, ... 985 A.2d 830, 833 ([Pa.] 2009). 

Accord Commonwealth v. Wade, 33 A.3d 108 (Pa. Super. 

2011) (holding Section 9765 prohibits merger of sentences unless 

strict two-part test met).

Commonwealth v. Martinez, 153 A.3d 1025, 1030 (Pa. Super. 2016).

Here, it is undisputed that all of the elements of the misdemeanorgraded terroristic threats offense are included within the felony-graded 

offense. However, the record clearly reflects that Appellant made numerous 

threats on several occasions on the day in question. Nevertheless, Appellant 

argues that the separate charges in the amended criminal information filed by 

the Commonwealth “involved identical conduct, and were based on the same 

series of statements [Appellant] allegedly made over the course of the day.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 29 (unnumbered page). Appellant also challenges the trial 

court’s reliance on Commonwealth v. Petterson, 49 A.3d 903 (Pa. Super. 

2012). 
J-S44006-20

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Initially, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with two counts of the 

felony-level grading of terroristic threats at counts 1 and 2.2 See Criminal 

Information, 12/28/18, at 1. That criminal information stated, verbatim, as 

follows:

COUNT 1 - TERRORISTIC THREATS - 18 Pa.C.S.A. 2706 (A1)-

(FELONY 3)

Person commits the crime of terroristic threats if the person 

communicates, either directly or indirectly, a threat to commit any 

crime of violence with intent to terrorize another; TO WIT: Actor 

did state to UPMC hospital staff that, “For your sake I don’t 

want what happened in Williamsport to happen here.” 

Actor also stated to the staff, “I’ve spent five years in jail, 

I’m not doing that again. I can’t control my temper and I 

will start punching holes in the wall.” The staff said that 

they feared for their lives causing UPMC to go on lock down 

causing the hospital to divert from their normal operations. 

Said offense occurring 1500 Highlands Drive, Warwick 

Township, Lancaster, PA on November 20, 2018 at 

approximately 1645 hours.

COUNT 2 -TERRORISTIC THREATS CAUSE SERIOUS PUBLIC 

INCONV. - 18 PS 2706 (A)(3)-(FELONY 3)

Did communicate directly or indirectly, and caused serious public 

inconvenience, or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such 

terror or inconvenience; TO WIT: Actor did state to UPMC 

hospital staff that, “For your sake I don’t want what 

happened in Williamsport to happen here.” Actor also 

stated to the staff, “I’ve spent five years in jail, I’m not 

doing that again. I can’t control my temper and I will start 

punching holes in the wall.” The staff said that they feared 

for their lives causing UPMC to go on lock down causing the 

hospital to divert from their normal operations. Said 

offense occurring 1500 Highlands Drive, Warwick 

Township, Lancaster, PA on November 20, 2018 at 

approximately 1645 hours.

____________________________________________

2 The Commonwealth also charged Appellant with disorderly conduct at count 

3.
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Id. (emphasis in description added). The amended criminal information was 

identical to the initial criminal information but for the addition of count 4, 

which stated, verbatim:

COUNT 4 - TERRORISTIC THREATS - 18 PS 2706(A1) -

(MISDEMEANOR 1)

Did threaten to commit any crime of violence with the intent to 

terrorize another or to cause evacuation of a building, place of 

assembly, or facility of public transportation, or otherwise to cause 

serious public inconvenience, or in reckless disregard of the risk 

of causeing such terror or inconvenience; TO WIT: Actor did 

state to UPMC hospital staff that, “For your sake I don't 

want what happened in Williamsport to happen here.”

Actor also stated to the staff, “I've spent five years in jail, 

I'm not doing that again. I can't control my temper and I 

will start punching holes in the wall.” The staff said that 

they feared for their lives causing UPMC to go on lock down 

causing the hospital to divert from their normal operations. 

Said offense occurring 1500 Highlands Drive, Warwick 

Township, Lancaster, PA on November 20, 2018 at 

approximately 1645 hours.

Amended Criminal Information, 5/17/19, at 2 (emphasis in description 

added). 

It is clear from the emphasized passages above that the factual basis 

for all three terroristic threats offenses in the criminal information described 

identical conduct by Appellant. The jury acquitted Appellant at count 2, and 

convicted him at counts 1 and 4.3 As noted above, the trial court determined 

that Appellant was convicted for separate criminal acts; however, there is no 

____________________________________________

3 The jury was not charged with deciding Appellant’s guilt for disorderly 

conduct. Thus, count 4 of the amended criminal information was presented 

to the jury as count 3. For ease of disposition, we will continue to refer to 

that charge as count 4. See Verdict Slip, 6/7/19, at 1. 
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indication in the jury’s verdict slip that the conduct addressed by count 1 was 

distinct from that of count 4. Id. The Commonwealth argues that no relief is 

warranted, pointing to the fact the offense descriptions contained in the 

amended criminal information contained multiple, distinct threats directed at 

multiple victims. The Commonwealth, like the trial court, also relies on 

Petterson. 

In Petterson, the defendant broke into the victim’s house, found her in 

her bedroom, hit her in the head with a hammer, and then dragged the victim 

out of her room. Petterson, 49 A.3d at 906. Petterson “then stabbed her in 

excess of ten (10) times in the chest and back area. He then placed a plastic 

bag over her head and tried to suffocate her.” Id. at 906–07. The 

Commonwealth ultimately charged Petterson with three counts of aggravated 

assault and three corresponding counts of simple assault. Convinced that this 

constituted one criminal episode, the magistrate dismissed two counts of 

aggravated assault and two counts of simple assault. Id. at 907-08. 

However, the Commonwealth refiled a criminal information,

4 charging three 

counts of each offense, for which Petterson was tried and convicted in the trial 

court. Id. at 908. 

On appeal, Petterson alleged that all of the charged assaults were part 

of the same criminal episode. Id. at 911. The Petterson Court disagreed, 

____________________________________________

4 While the Petterson Court determined that the Commonwealth’s refiling of 

charges violated Pa.R.Crim.P. 544, the Court held that the violation did not 

warrant relief. 
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concluding that Petterson had “engaged in at least three separate, criminal 

acts, and that each individual act could independently fulfill the elements of 

aggravated assault.” Id. at 912. The trial court had previously determined 

that the three simple assaults merged with the three aggravated assaults for 

sentencing purposes. Id. at 907. Notably, there was no discussion in 

Petterson of the manner in which the separate assaults were described in 

the criminal information. 

We agree with Appellant that Petterson is not controlling here. The 

question in that case was whether the Commonwealth could pursue separate 

charges for each act in a series of assaults that occurred close in time. Here, 

the Commonwealth charged Appellant with two counts of terroristic threats

for the entire series of threats issued by Appellant at count 1 and at count 2 

under the felony grading, and for identical conduct at count 4. Count 4 thus 

appears on its face to have been a lesser-included offense to either count 1 or 

2, not a distinct offense addressing distinct conduct, just as Petterson was 

charged separately with simple assault for each count of aggravated assault. 

Nothing in the amended criminal information or in the jury’s verdict slip 

suggests that counts 1 and 4 addressed distinct conduct. Moreover, we have 

reviewed the trial court’s jury charge, and we cannot find any directions 

suggesting that the jury could only consider separate acts for purposes of 

ascertaining guilt at each count. See N.T., 6/7/19-6/9/19, 418-23. 

Consequently, we agree with Appellant that his misdemeanor-graded 

and felony-graded terroristic threats convictions should have merged for 
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sentencing purposes, as count 4 was a lesser-included offense of count 1, both 

were charged for identical conduct in the amended criminal information, and 

nothing in the record suggests that the jury considered separate conduct as 

the factual basis for each offense. The trial court therefore erred when it 

imposed a separate, albeit concurrent sentence for the misdemeanor-graded 

count of terroristic threats. Accordingly, we vacate Appellant’s sentence for 

the count of terroristic threats that was graded as a misdemeanor. Because 

that sentence was concurrent to and shorter than the sentence imposed for 

the felony-graded count of terroristic threats, we need not remand for 

resentencing, as our disposition does not affect the sentencing scheme of the 

trial court. 

Conditions of Parole

In his final claim, Appellant argues that the trial court issued an illegal 

sentence by imposing conditions on his state-level sentence, specifically, by 

ordering him to have no contact with the victims, and banning him from UPMC 

Pinnacle “as part of the sentence.” See N.T., 8/26/19, at 18. The trial court 

construes the conditions as only advisory and, therefore, permissible. See

TCO at 9. The Commonwealth adopts the position of the trial court, and 

contends that Appellant is not entitled to any form of relief. See

Commonwealth’s Brief at 20. We note that the conditions were not 

memorialized in a written sentencing order. However, those conditions were 

presented by the trial court in the recommendation section of its DC-300B 

sentencing form. See Form DC-300B, 8/27/19, at 2.
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An issue concerning “the statutory authority for the imposition of a 

condition of sentence ... is a challenge to the legality of the sentence. 

Challenges to an illegal sentence cannot be waived and may be reviewed sua 

sponte by this Court.” Commonwealth v. Mears, 972 A.2d 1210, 1211 (Pa. 

Super. 2009) (footnote omitted). 

The scope and standard of review applied to determine the legality 

of a sentence are well established. If no statutory authorization 

exists for a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject 

to correction. An illegal sentence must be vacated. In evaluating 

a trial court’s application of a statute, our standard of review is

plenary and is limited to determining whether the trial court 

committed an error of law.

Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Leverette, 911 A.2d 998, 1001–02 (Pa.

Super. 2006)). 

When a defendant is sentenced “to a maximum term of incarceration of 

two or more years,” his or her “parole would be under the exclusive 

supervision of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (“PBPP”) and 

not the Court of Common Pleas.” Id. at 1212. “Therefore, any condition the 

sentencing court purported to impose on” the defendant’s “state parole is 

advisory only.” Id. 

Here, the trial court and the Commonwealth both essentially concede 

that the court was not permitted to set conditions on Appellant’s state 

sentence beyond the minimum and maximum terms of incarceration. 

Consistent with this concession, the DC-300B form filed by the court sets forth 

the at-issue conditions merely as recommendations. However, it does appear

from the sentencing hearing that the trial court ordered the conditions as part 
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of Appellant’s sentence. Thus, out of an abundance of caution, we vacate any 

portion of the sentencing order that can be construed as setting mandatory 

conditions on Appellant’s sentence or parole beyond the minimum and 

maximum terms of incarceration. Again, no remand is necessary because this 

does not affect the sentencing scheme of the trial court, which admits that it 

only intended to recommend the conditions to the PBPP. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed in part, vacated in part. Jurisdiction 

relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/18/2020