[Cite as State v. Williams, 2019-Ohio-2323.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

 

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 107133 

 v. : 

 

ANGELO WILLIAMS : 

 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 13, 2019 

 

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-17-622706-A 

 

Appearances: 

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Brad Meyer, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee. 

Joseph V. Pagano, for appellant. 

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.: 

Defendant-appellant Angelo Williams (“Williams”) appeals his guilty 

verdict and sentence and asks this court to vacate his convictions. After a review of 

the record, we affirm. 
Williams was convicted of trespass in a habitation when a person is 

present or likely to be present, a fourth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2911.12(B); 

menacing by stalking, a fourth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2903.211(A)(1), 

with a specification alleging a prior conviction; aggravated menacing, a first-degree 

misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 2903.21(A); and criminal damaging, a seconddegree misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 2909.06(A)(1). Williams was sentenced to 

17 months on Counts 1 and 2, six months on Count 3, and 90 days on Count 4, to be 

served concurrently for a total of 17 months in prison. The trial court also waived 

court costs and awarded Williams 178 days of jail-time credit. 

I. Facts and Procedural History 

On the night of September 30, 2017, Joie Graham (“Graham”) was 

spending the night at the home of Yarnell Brown (“Brown”). Along with Graham 

and Brown, Tony Foreman (“Foreman”) and three other people were sleeping at the 

home. Graham and Foreman slept in the living room, while Brown, Brown’s 

partner, and Graham’s two children slept on the second floor. During the night, 

Graham and Foreman were awakened by what sounded like someone trying to get 

into the home through the front door. Graham thought it was the wind, and both 

went back to sleep. A few moments later, Graham was awakened again by a noise 

coming from upstairs. Shortly thereafter, she saw someone peek around a doorway 

across the room. Graham walked towards the doorway and discovered Williams in 

the house. At the time, Graham did not know how Williams entered the house. 

Williams ordered Graham to “get your a** on the couch.” (Tr. 146.) Graham sat on 
the couch, and Foreman woke up due to the commotion. When Williams realized 

that Foreman was present, he exited the home out the front door, ran down the 

street, jumped on his bicycle, and rode away. 

The next morning, Graham observed damage to the screen door from 

the upstairs bathroom to the balcony. The screen door was cut, and the interior door 

was pulled away from the frame near the lock. There was no known damage to the 

door prior to everyone going to sleep the night before. 

Prior to this incident, Graham and Williams were in a romantic 

relationship that began around 2010. At the time of this incident, Graham was 

involved in a relationship with Foreman. Graham testified that during the time she 

was romantically involved with Williams, he was physically abusive and would stalk 

her. Graham, a postal carrier, testified that Williams would follow her on her mail 

route and threatened to harm her and her dog. In 2016, Williams pleaded guilty to 

cruelty to animals, attempted burglary, and menacing by stalking. Graham and her 

dog were the victims. Williams’s defense counsel stipulated to the authenticity of 

the state’s journal entry of the 2016 conviction but filed a motion in limine regarding 

other acts and prior convictions. The trial court denied the motion in limine. 

Graham then testified regarding several instances when Williams physically abused 

her, but she did not notify the police. The defense objected, and the trial court 

overruled those objections. 

At the end of the trial, the jury found Williams guilty. Williams filed 

this timely appeal assigning three errors for our review: 
I. The trial court erred by denying appellant’s motion in limine 

and allowing the state to introduce hearsay and other acts 

evidence in violation of Evid.R. 401, 402, 403, and 404(b) and 

appellant’s constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial and 

Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses; 

II. Appellant’s convictions were not supported by sufficient 

evidence, and the trial court erred by denying his motion for 

acquittal; and 

III. The convictions were against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. 

II. Hearsay and Other Acts Evidence 

 A. Standard of Review 

Accordingly, 

[w]e review motions in limine on an abuse of discretion standard.

Mayfield v. Cuccarese, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89594, 2008-Ohio1812, ¶ 29. In general, the decision whether to admit or exclude 

relevant evidence lies within the discretion of the trial court. Rigby v. 

Lake Cty., 58 Ohio St.3d 269, 271, 569 N.E.2d 1056 (1991). An 

appellate court will not reverse that decision absent an abuse of 

discretion and a showing of prejudice. Id. Cohen & Co. v. Breen, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100775, 2014-Ohio-3915, ¶ 18. 

B. Whether the Trial Court Erred by Denying Appellant’s 

Motion in Limine and Overruling the Defense 

Objections by Admitting Other Acts Evidence and 

Irrelevant Evidence 

Williams argues that the trial court erred by allowing Graham’s 

testimony that Williams continuously stalked her because the incidents were too 

remote in time, and that a pattern of conduct had not been established. Williams 

contends that by allowing the jury to hear testimony that referred to events where a 

time frame was not identified, he was unfairly prejudiced. 
Evid.R. 404(B) precludes the admission of evidence regarding a 

defendant’s prior criminal acts when such evidence is offered to prove 

the defendant’s character and that his actions were in conformity with 

that character. State v. Herring, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104441, 

2017-Ohio-743, ¶ 12. However, evidence of the defendant’s prior 

criminal acts may be admissible for other purposes, such as to prove 

“motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 

or absence of mistake or accident.” Id. 

State v. Nunez, 2017-Ohio-4295, 92 N.E.3d 294, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.). 

In State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 521, 2012-Ohio-5695, 983 

N.E.2d 1278, ¶ 19, the court stated that, 

[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of an accused tending to 

show the plan with which an act is done may be admissible for other 

purposes, such as those listed in Evid.R. 404(B) — to show proof of 

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 

absence of mistake or accident — and in considering other acts 

evidence, trial courts should conduct a three-step analysis. 

Under the three-step analysis, first the trial court had to “consider 

whether the other acts evidence is relevant to making any fact that is of consequence 

to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without 

the evidence. Evid.R. 401.” Id. at ¶ 20. Second, the trial court had to “consider 

whether evidence of the other crimes, wrongs, or acts is presented to prove the 

character of the accused in order to show activity in conformity therewith or whether 

the other acts evidence is presented for a legitimate purpose, such as those stated in 

Evid.R. 404(B).” Id. Third, the trial court had to “consider whether the probative 

value of the other acts evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice. See Evid.R 403.” Id. 
The state contends that the testimony was offered to demonstrate a 

pattern of conduct by Williams as a necessary element to establish that Williams 

stalked Graham. “Menacing by stalking is governed by R.C. 2903.211(A)(1), and 

provides that ‘[n]o person by engaging in a pattern of conduct shall knowingly cause 

another person to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to the other 

person or cause mental distress to the other person.’” State v. Hersh, 2012-Ohio3807, 974 N.E.2d 161, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). R.C. 2903.211(D)(1) states that “a pattern of 

conduct means two or more actions or incidents closely related in time.” 

Williams contends that the state failed to establish a pattern of 

conduct, or that the events were closely related in time, and thus the testimonies 

regarding his prior behavior is inadmissible hearsay. However, 

R.C. 2903.211 does not specifically state what constitutes incidents 

“closely related in time.” Thus, whether incidents should be deemed 

closely related in time should be resolved by the trier of fact 

“‘considering the evidence in the context of all the circumstances of 

the case.’” Middletown v. Jones, 167 Ohio App.3d 679, 2006-Ohio3465, 856 N.E.2d 1003 (12th Dist.), ¶ 10, quoting State v. Honeycutt, 

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19004, 2002-Ohio-3490, ¶ 26, citing

State v. Dario, 106 Ohio App.3d 232, 238, 665 N.E.2d 759 (1st 

Dist.1995). 

State v. Kronenberg, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106118, 2018-Ohio-1962, ¶ 31. 

 The state argues that Williams’s actions are sufficient to demonstrate 

that Williams stalked Graham and that Graham’s testimony was necessary to 

establish the pattern of conduct. We agree. This court, in Hersh, was presented with 

the same issue, where Hersh argued that the state failed to present sufficient 

evidence that demonstrated a pattern of conduct, after she was convicted of 
menacing by stalking. The state argued that Hersh, in 2006, stalked and harassed 

the victim. Hersh was convicted in 2008. However in 2009, the victim saw Hersh 

at the grocery store and filed a police report. Hersh was again convicted in 2009 of 

menacing by stalking the victim, as a result of the grocery store encounter. Hersh 

argued that the encounters in 2006 and then in 2009 were too remote in time to 

establish a pattern of conduct. We agreed with Hersh. However, unlike in Hersh, 

where this court decided that the encounters between Hersh and the victim did not 

establish a pattern of conduct, the facts in this instant case are different. Most 

distinguishable in Hersh, is that the encounters were three years apart. Here 

Graham testified that Williams, in 2016, stalked her while she worked her postal 

route. (Tr. 140-141.) The postal inspector got involved after Williams threatened to 

harm Graham and her dog if Graham did not talk to him. (Tr. 138-139.) Williams 

pleaded guilty to cruelty to animals, attempted burglary, and menacing by stalking. 

After that conviction, Graham testified that Williams continued to stalk her on her 

postal route while riding his bike. (Tr. 140-141.) Graham alerted friends to contact 

Williams to dissuade him from following her. (Tr. 141.) Neighbors noticed Williams 

following Graham because Williams always made a scene. (Tr. 142.) These actions 

continued until the September 2017 incident, when Williams unlawfully entered 

into the home where Graham was sleeping. We do not find that the trial court 

violated Evid.R. 404 when it allowed Graham’s testimony. 

Williams goes on to contend that besides the testimony regarding his 

prior conviction for aggravated menacing, none of Graham’s testimony reflect the 
commission of any crime and should not have been admitted. In other words, 

Williams argues that all of the testimony regarding these generalized other acts was 

inadmissible and unconstitutionally prejudiced the jury against him. However, “[i]n 

determining what constitutes a pattern of conduct, courts must take every action of 

the respondent into consideration, even if some of the actions in isolation do not 

seem particularly threatening.” State v. Derrick, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100010, 

2014-Ohio-1073, ¶ 22, citing Middletown v. Jones, 167 Ohio App.3d 679, 2006-

Ohio-3465, 856 N.E.2d 1003, ¶ 10 (12th Dist.). We find that Williams’s contention 

is misplaced. 

Regarding remoteness in time, Williams relies on State v. Sawyer, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 79197, 2002-Ohio-1095o, which states, “[i]n order to be 

admissible, the other acts used must not be too remote in time, and must be closely 

related in nature, time, and place to the offense charged. State v. Henderson, 76 

Ohio App.3d 290, 294, 601 N.E.2d 596 (1991).” However, Graham’s testimony 

demonstrated that Williams’s actions were closely related in nature, time, and place 

to the offense charged. Williams pleaded guilty in 2016 to menacing by stalking. 

After the guilty plea, Williams continued to follow and threaten Graham. Graham 

testified that these events continued until the incident that caused Williams’s arrest 

in 2017. We find that the trial court did not err when it admitted the other acts 

testimony where the conviction of menacing by stalking in 2016 and the 2017 events 

where Williams continued to follow Graham on her route, continued to threaten her, 

and unlawfully entered a home where Graham was sleeping, are closely related in 
nature, time, and place to the 2017 charge of menacing by stalking and trespass. 

Additionally, “[s]ince ‘closely related in time’ is not defined by the statute, the trier 

of fact is permitted to determine what is ‘closely related in time’ on a-case-by-case 

basis. State v. Thomas, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-130620, C-130623, C-130621, C130624, and C-130622, 2014-Ohio-2803, ¶ 9, citing Ellet v. Falk, 6th Dist. Lucas 

No. L-09-1313, 2010-Ohio-6219, ¶ 22.” State v. Brown, 2018-Ohio-253, 104 N.E.3d 

214, ¶ 43 (7th Dist.). 

We find that Graham’s testimony regarding Williams’s prior acts of 

stalking were relevant, were presented for a legitimate purpose, and that the 

probative value of the other acts testimony was substantially outweighed by the 

danger of unfair prejudice. We determine that the trial court did not err in denying 

Williams’s motion in limine. 

Williams’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

III. Sufficient Evidence 

 A. Standard of Review

Claiming insufficient evidence 

raises the question whether the evidence is legally sufficient to 

support the verdict as a matter of law. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio 

St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). In reviewing a sufficiency 

challenge, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the 

evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier 

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 

N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. 

State v. Herring, 2017-Ohio-743, 81 N.E.3d 133, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). 
Additionally, 

[a] Crim.R. 29(A) motion for acquittal tests the sufficiency of the 

evidence. State v. Capp, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102919, 2016-Ohio295, ¶ 19. Crim.R. 29 mandates that the trial court issue a judgment 

of acquittal where the state’s evidence is insufficient to sustain a 

conviction for an offense. Id. Accordingly, an appellate court reviews 

a trial court’s denial of a defendant’s motion for acquittal using the 

same standard it applies when reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence 

claim. Id.

State v. Hoskin-Hudson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103615, 2016-Ohio-5410, ¶ 7. 

B. Whether Appellant’s Convictions were Not Supported 

by Sufficient Evidence and the Trial Court Erred by 

Denying Appellant’s Motions for Acquittal 

Williams argues that the state failed to provide sufficient evidence to 

support his convictions. 

“The test for sufficiency requires a determination of whether the 

prosecution met its burden of production at trial. State v. Bowden, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92266, 2009-Ohio-3598, ¶ 13. An appellate 

court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at 

trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince 

the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Id. at ¶ 12. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), 

paragraph two of the syllabus.” 

State v. Carter, 2018-Ohio-2238, 114 N.E.3d 673, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. 

Pridgett, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101823, 2016-Ohio-687, ¶ 15. 

Williams was convicted of trespass in a habitation when a person is 

present or likely to be present, in violation of R.C. 2911.12(B); menacing by stalking, 

in violation of R.C. 2903.211(A)(1), with a specification alleging a prior conviction; 

aggravated menacing, a first-degree misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 2903.21(A); 
and criminal damaging, second-degree misdemeanor in violation of 

R.C. 2909.06(A)(1). The statutes read as follows: 

No person, by force, stealth, or deception, shall trespass in a 

permanent or temporary habitation of any person when any person 

other than an accomplice of the offender is present or likely to be 

present. 

R.C. 2911.12(B). 

No person by engaging in a pattern of conduct shall knowingly cause 

another person to believe that the offender will cause physical harm 

to the other person or a family or household member of the other 

person or cause mental distress to the other person or a family or 

household member of the other person. In addition to any other basis 

for the other person’s belief that the offender will cause physical harm 

to the other person or the other person’s family or household member 

or mental distress to the other person or the other person’s family or 

household member, the other person’s belief or mental distress may 

be based on words or conduct of the offender that are directed at or 

identify a corporation, association, or other organization that employs 

the other person or to which the other person belongs. 

R.C. 2903.211(A)(1). 

No person shall knowingly cause another to believe that the offender 

will cause serious physical harm to the person or property of the other 

person, the other person’s unborn, or a member of the other person’s 

immediate family. In addition to any other basis for the other person’s 

belief that the offender will cause serious physical harm to the person 

or property of the other person, the other person’s unborn, or a 

member of the other person’s immediate family, the other person’s 

belief may be based on words or conduct of the offender that are 

directed at or identify a corporation, association, or other 

organization that employs the other person or to which the other 

person belongs. 

R.C. 2903.21(A). 
No person shall cause, or create a substantial risk of physical harm to 

any property of another without the other person’s consent: 

Knowingly, by any means. 

R.C. 2909.06(A)(1). 

Williams argues that the state failed to establish that he trespassed in 

Brown’s home. “Trespass means any entrance (remaining in), knowingly made 

(done), in a (structure) (residence) (dwelling) (building) of another is unlawful if it 

is without authority, consent or privilege to do so.” State v. Morton, 147 Ohio 

App.3d 43, 54, 2002-Ohio-813, 768 N.E.2d 730 (8th Dist.). Brown testified that 

Williams did not have permission to enter her home. However, Williams argues that 

he may have believed he had permission to enter the property because of his “onagain, off-again” relationship with Graham. The testimony reveals that Williams 

entered the home through an upstairs bathroom door, not the front door. Neither 

Brown, Graham, nor anyone else present invited Williams into the home. Graham 

testified that she was startled when she saw Williams and did not know how he got 

inside. Finally, it was later discovered that the screen door was cut and the interior 

door was pulled away from the frame near the lock. We find that Williams has not 

demonstrated that he had permission to be in the home. Therefore, we find that 

there was sufficient evidence to convict Williams of trespass. 

Williams further argues that the state did not prove the mental 

distress element of menacing by stalking. 

R.C. 2903.211(D)(2) defines “mental distress” as either of the 

following: 
(a) [a]ny mental illness or condition that involves some temporary 

substantial incapacity; (b) [a]ny mental illness or condition that 

would normally require psychiatric treatment, psychological 

treatment, or other mental health services, whether or not any person 

requested or received psychiatric treatment, psychological treatment, 

or other mental health services. 

“Mental distress need not be incapacitating or debilitating.” 

Jenkins [v. Jenkins, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-652, 2007-Ohio422], ¶ 19. Furthermore, “[i]t is the duty of the trier of fact to 

determine whether a victim suffered mental distress as a result of the 

offender’s actions.” Taylor v. Taylor, 2d Dist. Miami No. 2012-CA14, 2012-Ohio-6190, ¶ 16. “Expert testimony is not required to 

establish mental distress, and the trier of fact ‘may rely on its 

knowledge and experience in determining whether mental distress 

has been caused.’” Strausser [v. White, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 92091, 2009-Ohio-3597], ¶ 32. Further, the testimony of the 

victims themselves as to their fear is sufficient to establish mental 

distress. Id., citing State v. Horsley, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP350, 2006-Ohio-1208, ¶ 48. 

Elkins v. Manley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104393, 2016-Ohio-8307, ¶ 15. 

Graham testified that Williams had physically abused her, threatened 

to harm her and her dog, and stalked her on her postal route. Williams was 

convicted of stalking in 2016. After the conviction, Williams continued to follow 

Graham on her postal route. Graham testified that at times she would work her 

route out of order. (Tr. 141.) Graham called mutual friends to ask them to tell 

Williams to get off of her route. Id. The night in question, when Graham saw 

Williams inside of the home, she was hysterical because she could not believe that 

Williams was inside of the house. (Tr. 146.) When Graham saw Williams, she stated 

“And I’m, like, Oh, my God. Oh, my God, why are you in here?” (Tr. 147.) We find 
that the state presented sufficient evidence to support the element of mental 

distress. 

Williams further argues that the evidence was insufficient to 

demonstrate that a pattern of conduct has been established. R.C. 2903.211(D)(1) 

states that “a pattern of conduct means two or more actions or incidents closely 

related in time.” 

R.C. 2903.211 does not specifically state what constitutes incidents 

“closely related in time.” Thus, whether incidents should be deemed 

closely related in time should be resolved by the trier of fact 

“‘considering the evidence in the context of all the circumstances of 

the case.”’ Middletown v. Jones, 167 Ohio App.3d 679, 2006-Ohio3465, 856 N.E.2d 1003, ¶ 10 (12th Dist.), quoting State v. Honeycutt, 

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19004, 2002-Ohio-3490, ¶ 26, citing 

State v. Dario, 106 Ohio App.3d 232, 238, 665 N.E.2d 759 (1st 

Dist.1995). 

State v. Kronenberg, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106118, 2018-Ohio-1962, ¶ 31. 

Graham testified that after Williams’s 2016 conviction for stalking he 

continued to show up on her postal route threatening her. This conduct continued 

until the 2017 arrest. We have previously determined, in the first assignment of 

error, that Williams’s actions demonstrated a pattern of conduct. Therefore, we find 

that there was sufficient evidence presented by the state to establish a pattern of 

conduct. 

Williams also contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict 

him of aggravated menacing because Graham did not believe that Williams was 

going to cause her any physical harm. Graham testified that when she saw Williams 

in the house, she was hysterical. She also testified that she did not know what to 
expect because of Williams’s past physical abuse of her. Graham also testified that 

Williams told her to “get your a** on the couch.” She started to obey Williams’s 

order because she was worried something physical could happen. 

This court recently held that “[f]or the offense of aggravated 

menacing, ‘[i]t is sufficient to prove that the victim, in the moment, 

believed the defendant to be in earnest and capable of acting.’ 

‘Evidence of a person’s belief that an offender will cause serious 

physical harm can be proven with circumstantial evidence.’” 

(Citations omitted.) Cleveland v. Reynolds, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 105546, 2018-Ohio-97, ¶ 6. 

Cleveland v. Garrett, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106512, 2018-Ohio-4713, ¶ 19. 

We find that because of Williams’s past aggressive and abusive 

behavior towards Graham, it is reasonable to believe that Graham believed that 

Williams would cause her serious physical harm. Therefore, the evidence was 

sufficient to convict Williams of aggravate menacing. 

Finally, Williams contends that the evidence was insufficient to 

convict him of criminal damaging because the police did not dust for fingerprints or 

test for DNA on the broken screen. 

In State v. Apanovitch, 33 Ohio St.3d 19, 27, 514 N.E.2d 394 (1987), 

the Ohio Supreme Court held the following: 

“A conviction based on purely circumstantial evidence is no less sound 

than a conviction based on direct evidence. Consideration of 

circumstantial evidence as a mitigating factor would inevitably lead to 

undercutting the underlying conviction itself by implying that a 

conviction based on circumstantial evidence is inherently less reliable 

than a conviction based on direct evidence.” 

“In fact, a conviction based upon purely circumstantial evidence may 

be just as reliable as a conviction based on direct evidence, if not more 

so.” 
Cleveland v. Battles, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104984, 2018-Ohio-267, ¶ 16. 

Graham testified that she was awakened by a sound from the upstairs 

of the home. Graham then saw Williams inside of the home. The next morning, she 

discovered damage to the door from the balcony to the upstairs bathroom. The 

screen door was cut, and the interior door was pulled away from the frame near the 

lock that was latched. The door was not damaged prior to that night. After the police 

arrived, they took pictures of the broken door. The state entered the photos into 

evidence. In light of Graham’s testimony and the photo evidence, we find that the 

circumstantial evidence that Williams damaged the upstairs door was sufficient to 

convict Williams of criminal damaging. 

Williams’s second assignment of error is overruled. 

IV. Manifest Weight of the Evidence 

A. Standard of Review 

In State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 

1264, ¶ 25, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the standard of review for a criminal 

manifest weight challenge, as follows: 

The criminal manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard was 

explained in State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541 

(1997). In Thompkins, the court distinguished between sufficiency of 

the evidence and manifest weight of the evidence, finding that these 

concepts differ both qualitatively and quantitatively. Id. at 386. The 

court held that sufficiency of the evidence is a test of adequacy as to 

whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a verdict as a 

matter of law, but weight of the evidence addresses the evidence’s 

effect of inducing belief. Id. at 386-387. In other words, a reviewing 

court asks whose evidence is more persuasive — the state’s or the 
defendant’s? We went on to hold that although there may be sufficient 

evidence to support a judgment, it could nevertheless be against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. Id. at 387. “When a court of appeals 

reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a 

‘thirteenth juror’ and disagrees with the factfinder’s resolution of the 

conflicting testimony.” Id. at 387, citing Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 

42, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982). 

Cleveland v. Garrett, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106512, 2018-Ohio-4713, ¶ 14. 

Also, 

[a]n appellate court may not merely substitute its view for that of the 

jury, but must find that “in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury 

clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice 

that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” 

Thompkins at 387. Accordingly, reversal on manifest weight grounds 

is reserved for “the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs 

heavily against the conviction.” Id. 

Garrett at ¶ 15. 

 B. Whether Appellant’s Convictions are Against the 

Manifest Weight of the Evidence 

Williams argues that the evidence was not reliable to support the 

commission of any crime. However, that argument is misplaced. The evidence 

revealed that Williams had been previously convicted of stalking Graham on her 

postal route. Williams continued to show up on Graham’s route causing her to 

solicit the help of mutual friends. Additionally, neighbors were aware of Williams’s 

antics because on Graham’s postal route, Williams would cause a scene. On the date 

in question, the evidence reveals that Williams unlawfully entered Brown’s home 

with the intention of confronting Graham. Williams entered the home through an 

upstairs balcony, after damaging a door. Once inside of the home, Williams caused 
Graham to be fearful when he ordered her to “sit her a** on the couch.” Graham 

was hysterical because, at that time, she did not know how Williams got inside. 

Graham then testified that she was worried that Williams may cause physical harm 

to her. 

In reviewing the evidence, we find that the jury did not lose its way. 

The jury found the evidence and the testimony of the witnesses to be credible. 

Although, we review credibility when considering the manifest weight 

of the evidence, we are cognizant that determinations regarding the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the testimony are primarily 

for the trier of fact. The trier of fact is best able “‘to view the witnesses 

and observe their demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections, and use 

these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered 

testimony.”’ State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 

865 N.E.2d 1264, ¶ 24 quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 

Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984). 

State v. Bridges, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105440, 2018-Ohio-1388, ¶ 12. 

Williams contends that the evidence was unreliable, that the interest 

of the witnesses were impeached, and that the evidence presented was vague, 

fragmented, and uncertain. During trial, the factfinder had the opportunity to listen 

and observe all of the witnesses’ demeanors, gestures, and voice inflections. “The 

trial court was in the best position to decide whether to credit the state’s witnesses 

or appellant’s witnesses.” State v. Hughley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90323, 2008-

Ohio-6146, ¶ 48. We conclude that Williams’s convictions were supported by 

competent, credible evidence. We do not find that the convictions were against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. 

Williams’s third assignment of error is overruled. 
Judgment is affirmed. 

 It is ordered that the appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

 The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s 

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. 

 A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to 

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

_________________________________ 

ANITA LASTER MAYS, PRESIDING JUDGE 

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., and 

RAYMOND C. HEADEN, J., CONCUR