IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA SEPTEMBER 2018 TERM


### FILED

_____________ 

### October 11, 2018 released at 3:00 p.m. No. 18-0816 EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

_____________ SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex rel. MARGARET L. WORKMAN, Petitioner

V.

MITCH CARMICHAEL, as President of the Senate; DONNA J. BOLEY, as President Pro Tempore of the Senate; RYA N FERNS, as Senate Majority Leader, LEE CASSIS, Clerk of the Senate; and the WEST VIRGINIA SENATE, Respondents

________________ ____________________________________ ________________ WRIT OF PROHIBITION GRANTED

________________ ____________________________________ ________________ Filed: October 11, 2018

Marc E. Williams J. Mark Adkins Melissa Foster Bird Floyd E. Boone, Jr. Thomas M. Hancock Richard R. Heath, Jr. Christopher D. Smith Lara Brandfass Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough Bowles Rice Huntington, West Virginia Charleston, West Virginia Attorneys for Petitioner A ttorneys for RespondentsACTING CHIEF JUSTICE JA MES A. MATISH delivered the Opinion of the Court. ACTING JUSTICE LOUI S H. BLOOM concurs in part and dissents in part and reserves the right to file a separate opinion. ACTING JUSTICE JACO B E. REGER concurs in part and dissents in part and reserves the right to file a separate opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE WORKMAN is disqualified. JUSTICE ALLEN H. LOUGHR Y II suspended, therefore not participating JUSTICE ELIZABETH WALKER is disqualified. JUSTICE PAUL T. FA RRELL sitting by temporary a ssignment is disqualified. JUSTICE TIM ARMSTEAD did not participate. JUSTICE EVAN JE NKINS did not participate. ACTING JUSTICE RUDOLP H J. MURENSKY, II, and ACTING JUSTICE RONALD E. WILSON sitting by temporary assignment.SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1. In the absence of legislation providing for an appeal in an impeachment proceeding under Ar ticle IV, § 9 of the Constituti on of West Virginia, this Court does not have jurisdiction over an ap peal of a final decision by the Court of Impeachment.

2. An officer of the state who has been impeached under Article IV, § 9 of the Constitution of West Virginia, may seek redress for an alleged violation of his or her constitutional rights in the impeachment proceedings, by filing a petition for an extraordinary writ under the original jurisdiction of this Court.

3. To the extent that syllabus point 3 of State ex rel. Holmes v. Clawges , 226 W. Va. 479, 702 S.E.2d 611 (2010) may be interp reted as prohibiting this Court from exercising its constitu tional authority to issue an extraordinary writ against the Legislature when the law requires, it is disapproved.

4. West Virginia Code § 51-9-10 (1991) violates the Separation of Powers Clause of Article V, § 1 of the West Virginia Constitution, insofar as that statute seeks to regulate judicial appointment matters that are regulated exclusively by this Court

ipursuant to Article VIII, § 3 and § 8 of the West Virginia Constitution. Consequently, W.Va. Code § 51-9-10, in its entirety, is unconstitutional and unenforceable.

5. This Court has exclusive author ity and jurisdiction under Article VIII, § 8 of the West Virginia Constitution and the rules promulgated thereunder, to sanction a judicial officer for a violation of a Canon of the West Virgin ia Code of Judicial Conduct. Therefore, the Separation of Powers Clause of Article V, § 1 of the West Virginia Constitution prohibits the Court of Impeachment from prosecuting a judicial officer for an alleged violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

6. The Due Process Clause of Ar ticle III, § 10 of the Constitution of West Virginia requires the House of Delegate s follow the procedures that it creates to impeach a public officer. Failure to follow such rules will invalidate all Articles of Impeachment that it return s against a public officer.

iiMatish, Acting Chief Justice: The Petitioner, the Honorable Margaret L. Workman, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, broug ht this proceeding under the original jurisdiction of this Court as a petition for a writ of mandamus that seeks to halt impeachment proceedings agai nst her. The Respondents na med in the petition are the Honorable Mitch Carmichael, President of th e Senate; the Honorable Donna J. Boley, President Pro Tempore of the Senate; the Honor able Ryan Ferns, Senate Majority Leader; the Honorable Lee Cassis, Clerk of the Senate; and the West Virginia Senate. 1 The Petitioner seeks to have this Court prohibit the Respondents from prosecuting her under three Articles of Impeachment returned ag ainst her by the West Virginia House of Delegates. The Petitioner has briefed the follo wing issues to support her contention that

1 It will be noted that the Petitioner failed to name as a respondent the Acting Chief Justice, the Honorable Justice Paul T. Farre ll, that is presiding over the impeachment proceeding that she seeks to halt. Ordinarily the judicial officer presiding over a proceeding that is being challenged is named as a party in a proceeding in this Court. However, the omission of Acting Chief Justice Farrell as a named party in this matter is not fatal to the relief that is being requested. Pursuant to rules adop ted by the Senate to govern the impeachment proceedings, the Acting Chief Justice was stripped of his judicial authority over motions, objections a nd procedural questions. This authority was removed under Rule 23(a) of Se nate Resolution 203 as follows: All motions, objections, and procedural questions made by the parties shall be addressed to the Presiding Office r [Acting Chief Justice], who shall decide the motion, objection, or pro cedural question: Provided, That a vote to overturn the Presidi ng Officer’s decision on an y motion, objection, or procedural question shall be taken, without debate, on the demand of any Senator sustained by one tenth of the Senators present, and an affirmative vote of a majority of the Senators present and voting shall overturn the Presiding Officer’s decision on the motion, objection, or procedural question. As a result of Rule 23(a) Acting Chief Justice Farrell is not an indispensible party to this proceeding.

1she is entitled to the relief sought. The Pe titioner has alleged several issues which we have distilled to the essence as alleging that the Articles of Impeachment against her violate the Constitution of West Virginia because (1) an ad ministrative rule promulgated by the Supreme Court supersede statutes in c onflict with them; (2) the determination of a violation of the West Virginia Code of J udicial Conduct rests exclusively with the Supreme Court; (3) the Articles of Impeachment were filed in violati on of provisions of House Resolution 201. Upon caref ul review of the briefs, the appendix record, and the applicable legal authority, we grant relief as outlined in this opinion. 2

INTRODUCTION Although the Petitioner in this matter request ed oral argument under Rule 20 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, and even though this case presents issues of first impression, raises constitutional issues, and is of fundamental public importance, the Respondents, however, waived that right as follows: Oral argument is unnecessary because no rule to show cause is warranted. This case presents the straightfo rward application of unambiguous provisions of the Constitution of We st Virginia that, under governing precedent of this Court, the Supreme Court of the United States and courts across the nation unquestionably affirm th e West Virginia Senate’s role as the Court of Impeachment.

2 We are compelled at the outset to note that this Court takes umbrage with the tone of the Respondents brief, insofar as it asserts “tha t a constitutional crisis over the separation of powers between the Legislature and Judicial Branches” would occur if this Court ruled against them. This Court is the arbiter of the law. Our functi on is to keep the scales of justice balanced, not tilted in favor of a party out of fear of retribution by that party. We resolve disputes based upon an unbiased application of the law.

2This Court further notes that the Respondents declined to address the merits of the Petitioner’s arguments. The Respondents stated the following: At the outset, it important to note that Respondents take no position with respect to facts as laid out by Petitione r, or the substantive merits of the legal arguments raised in the Pet ition. In fact, it is constitutionally impermissible for Respondents to do so , as they are currently sitting as a Court of Impeachment in judgment of Petitioner for the allegations made in the Articles adopted by the House. The Respondents have not cite d to any constitutional provision which prevents them from responding directly or through the Board of Managers (the prosecutors), to the merits of the Petitioner’s arguments. It is expressly provided in Rule 16(g) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure that “[i]f the response does not contain an argument in response to a question presented by the petition, the Court w ill assume that the resp ondent agrees with the petitioner’s view of the issue.” In light of the Respondent’s waiver of oral argument and refusal to address the merits of the Pe titioner’s arguments, this Court exercises its discretion to not require oral argument a nd will rule upon the written Petition, Response, Reply, and various appendices. 3
Our forefathers in establishi ng this Country, as well as the leaders who established the framework for our State, had the forethou ght to put a procedure in place to address issues that could arise in the future; in the ensuing years that system has served us well. What our forefathers did not envision is the f act that subsequent leaders would not have

3 This Court is aware that transparency is important. However, the Respondents have closed the door on themselves by declinin g to have oral arguments and taking the untenable position of not responding to the merits of the arguments. This Court would have appreciated well-researched arguments from the Respondents on the merits of the issues.

3the ability or willingness to read , understand, or to follow those guidelines. The problem we have today is that people do not bother to read the rules, or if they read them, they decide the rules do not apply to them. There is no question that a governor, if duly qualified and serving, can call a special session of the Legislature. There is no question that the House of Delegates has the right to adopt a Resolu tion and Articles of a Bill of Impeachment. There is no question that the Senate is the body which conducts the trial of impeachment and can establish its own rules for that trial and that it must be presided over by a member of this Court. This Court should not intervene with any of those proceedings because of the separation of powers doctrine , and no one branch may usurp the power of any other co

equal branch of government. However, when our constitutional process is violated, this Court must act when called upon. Fundamental fairness requires this Court to review what has happened in this state over the last several months when all of the procedural safeguards that are built into this system have not been followed. In this case, there has been a rush to judgment to get to a certain point without following all of the nece ssary rules. This case is not about whether or not a Justice of the Supreme Court of A ppeals of West Virginia can or should be impeached; but rather it is about the fact that to do so, it must be done correctly and constitutionally with due process. We are a nati on of laws and not of men, and the rule of law must be followed. By the same token, the separation of powe rs doctrine works six ways. The Courts may not be involved in legislative or executive acts. The Execu tive may not interfere

4with judicial or legislative acts. So the Legisl ature should not be dealing with the Code of Judicial Conduct, which authority is li mited to the Supreme Court of Appeals. The greatest fear we should have in this country today is ourselves. If we do not stop the infighting, work together, and follow the rules; if we do not use social media for good rather than use it to de stroy; then in the process, we will destroy ourselves.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The Petitioner was appointed as a judge to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, by former Governor John D. Rockefeller, IV, on November 16, 1981. She was later elected in 1982 by the voters to fill out the remainder of the unexpired term of her appointment. She was subseque ntly elected again in 1984 for a full term. In 1988, the Petitioner was elected by the voters to fill a v acancy on the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. She served a full term and left office in 2000. The Pe titioner ran again for a position on the Supreme Co urt in 2008 and won. In late 2017, the local media began publiciz ing reports of their investigations into the costs for renovating the offices of the Supreme Court Justices. Those publicized reports led to an investigati on by the Legislative Auditor in to the spending practices of the Supreme Court in general. The Auditor’s o ffice issued a report in April of 2018. This report was focused on the conduct of Jus tice Allen Loughry and Justice Menis Ketchum. The report concluded that both Justices may have used state property for personal gain in violation of the state Ethics Act. The report indicated that the matter was referred to the

5West Virginia Ethics Commissi on for further investigation. 4 In June of 2018 the Judicial Investigation Commission charged Justice Loug hry with 32 violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules of Prof essional Conduct. Justice Loughry was subsequently indicted by the federal government on 22 charges. 5 On June 25, 2018, Governor Jim Jus tice issued a Proclamation calling the Legislature to convene in a second extraordinary session to consider the following: First: Matters relating to the removal of one or more Justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virg inia, including, bu t not limited to, censure, impeachment, trial, convic tion, and disqualification; and Second: Legislation author izing and appropriating the expenditure of public funds to pay the expenses fo r the Extraordinary Session. Pursuant to this Proclamation, the Legislat ure convened on June 26, 2018, to carry out the task outlined therein. The record indicates that on June 26, 2 018, the House of Delegates adopted House Resolution 201. This Resolution empowered the House Committee on the Judiciary to investigate impeachable offenses against the Petitioner and the other four Justices of the Supreme Court. 6 Under the Resolution, the Judiciary Committee was required to report to the House of Delegates its findings of fact s and any recommendations consistent with

4 The Auditor’s office issued a second report involvin g the Petitioner, Justice Robin Davis and Justice Elizabeth Walker. That report did not recommend an ethics investigation of those Justices. 5 Additional charges were later brought agai nst Justice Loughry. He was suspended from office.
6 On July 11, 2018 Justice Ketchum resigned/re tired effective July 27, 2018. As a result of his decision the Judiciary Committee did not consider im peachment offenses against him.

6those findings of fact; and, if the recommenda tion was that of impeachment of any of the Justices, the Committee had to present to the House of Delega tes a proposed resolution of impeachment and proposed ar ticles of impeachment. Upon receipt of a proposed Resolution of Impeachment and Articles of Impeachment by the House of Delegates, Resolution 201 authorized the House to adopt a Resolution of Impeachment and formal articles of impeachment as prep ared by the Judiciary Committee, and deliver the same to the Senate for consideration. The Judiciary Committee conducted impeac hment hearings between July 12, 2018 and August 6, 2018. On Augu st 7, 2018, the Judiciary Committee adopted fourteen Articles of Impeachment. The Petitioner wa s named in four of the Articles of Impeachment. On August 13, 2013, the House of Delegates voted to approve only eleven of the Articles of Impeachment. The Petitioner was impeached on three of the Articles of Impeachment. 7 First, the Petitioner and Justice Davis were named in Article IV, 8 which alleged that they improperly authorized the overpaymen t of senior-status judges. 9 Second, the Petitioner was named exclusively in Artic le VI, which alleged that she improperly authorized the overpayment of senior-status judges. 10 Third, the Petitioner was named, along with three other justi ces, in Article XIV, which se t out numerous allegations

7 Justice Walker was named in 1 Article; Ju stice Davis was named in 4 Articles; and Justice Loughry was named in 7 Articles.
8 Justice Davis retired from office on August 13.
9 The text of the Article is set out in the Discussion section of the opinion.
10 The text of the Article is set out in the Discussion section of the opinion.

7against them which included charges that they failed to implement various administrative policies and procedures. 11 Subsequent to the House of Delegates’ adoption of the Articles of Impeachment they were submitted to the Senate for the pu rpose of conducting a trial. On August 20, 2018 the Senate adopted Senate Resolution 203, which set fort h the rules of procedure for the impeachment trial. A pre-trial conference was held on Septembe r 11, 2018. At that conference the Petitioner, Justice Walker, an d the Board of Managers submitted a “Proposed Stipulation and Agre ement of Parties” that would have required the charges against both of them be dismissed. 12 The Senate voted to reject the settlement offer. Thereafter Acting Chief Justice Farrell set a separate trial date for the Petitioner on October 15, 2018. The Petitioner subsequently filed this proceeding to have the Articles of Impeachment against her dismissed.

II. THIS COURT’S JURISDICTION TO ADDRESS CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ARISING FROM TH E COURT OF IMPEACHMENT Before we examine the meri ts of the issues presente d we must first determine whether this Court has jurisdiction over issu es arising out of a legislative impeachment

11 The text of the Article is set out in the Discussion section of the opinion.
12 The Board of Managers are “a group of me mbers of the House of Delegates authorized by that body to serve as prosecutors before the Senate in a trial of impeachment.” Rule 1, Senate Resolution 203.

8proceeding. The Respondents c ontend that this C ourt does not have ju risdiction over the impeachment proceeding. 13 This is an issue of first impression for this Court. Resolution of this issue requires an an alysis of constitutional principles. In undertaking our analysis we ar e reminded that the United Stat es Supreme Court stated in Baker v. Carr , 369 U.S. 186, 211, 82 S.Ct. 691, 706, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), that the determination of whether a matter is exclus ively committed by the constitution to another branch of government “is itself a delicate ex ercise in constitutional interpretation and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate inte rpreter of the Constitution.” We are also guided by the principle that A constitution is the fundamental law by which all people of the state are governed. It is the very genesis of go vernment. Unlike ordinary legislation, a constitution is enacted by the peopl e themselves in their sovereign capacity and is therefore the paramount law. State ex rel. Smith v. Gore , 150 W.Va. 71, 77, 143 S.E.2d 791, 795 (1965). Further,

13 One of the arguments made by the Respondent s is that this Cour t should not address the merits of the Petitioner’s arguments, becaus e she has raised a sim ilar challenge to the Articles of Impeachment in th e proceeding pendi ng before them that has not been ruled upon. Ordinarily this Court would defer to a lower tribunals ruling on a matter before this Court will address it. However, we have carved out a narrow exception to this general rule. In this regard, we have held that “[a] constitutional issue that was not properly preserved at the trial court level may, in th e discretion of this Court, be addressed on appeal when the constitutional issue is the cont rolling issue in the reso lution of the case.” Syl. pt. 2, Louk v. Cormier , 218 W.Va. 81, 622 S. E.2d 788 (2005). See Simpson v. W. Virginia Office of Ins. Com'r , 223 W. Va. 495, 504, 678 S.E.2d 1, 10 (2009) (“Nevertheless, we may consider this cons titutional issue for the first time on appeal because it is central to our resolution of this case.”); State v. Allen , 208 W. Va. 144, 151 n.12, 539 S.E.2d 87, 94 n.12 (1999) (“this Court may, under the appropriate circumstances, consider an issue initially pr esented for consideration on appeal.”). We exercise our discretion to address the merits of the constitutional issues presented in this matter. See also, State ex rel. Bd. of Educ. of Kanawha Cty. v. Casey , 176 W. Va. 733, 735, 349 S.E.2d 436, 438 (1986) (recognizing that exhaustion of an alternative remedy is not required “where resort to available proc edures would be an exercise in futility.”).

9It is axiomatic that our Constitution is a living document that must be viewed in light of modern realitie s. Reasonable cons truction of our Constitution ... permits evolution and ad justment to changing conditions as well as to a varied set of facts.... Th e solution [to problems of constitutional interpretation] must be found in a study of the specific provision of the Constitution and the best method [und er current conditions] to further advance the goals of the framers in adopting such a provision. State ex rel. McGraw v. Burton , 212 W. Va. 23, 36, 569 S.E. 2d 99, 112 (2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As an initial matter, we observe that “[ q]uestions of constitutional construction are in the main governed by the same general rules applied in statutory construction.” Syl. pt. 1, Winkler v. State Sch. Bldg. Auth ., 189 W.Va. 748, 434 S.E. 2d 420 (1993). We have held that “[t]he object of cons truction, as applied to written co nstitutions, is to give effect to the intent of the people in adopting it.” Syl. pt. 3, Diamond v. Parkersburg–Aetna Corp ., 146 W.Va. 543, 122 S.E.2d 436 (1961). This Court held in syllabus point 3 of State ex rel. Smith v. Gore , 150 W. Va. 71, 143 S.E.2d 791 (1965) that “[w]here a provision of a constitution is clear in its term s and of plain interpre tation to a ny ordinary and reasonable mind, it should be applied an d not construed.” Therefore, “[i]f a constitutional provision is clear in its terms, a nd the intention of the electorate is clearly embraced in the language of the provision its elf, this Court must a pply and not interpret the provision.” Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Trent v. Sims , 138 W.Va. 244, 77 S.E.2d 122 (1953). On the other hand, “if the language of the constitutional pr ovision is ambiguous, then the ordinary principles employed in statutory construction must be applied to ascertain such intent.” State ex rel. Forbes v. Caperton , 198 W.Va. 474, 480, 481 S.E.2d 780, 786 (1996) (internal quot ations and citations omitted). An ambiguous provision in a

10constitution “requires interpretation consistent w ith the intent of both the drafters and the electorate.” State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship , 157 W. Va. 100, 127, 207 S.E.2d 421, 436-437 (1973). Although we are empower ed with the authority “to construe, interpret and apply provisions of the Constitution, ... [we] may not add to, distort or ignore the plain mandates thereof.” State ex rel. Bagley v. Blankenship , 161 W.Va. 630, 643, 246 S.E.2d 99, 107 (1978). It is axiomatic that “in ev ery case involving the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision, analysis must begi n with the language of the constitutional provision itself.” State ex rel. Mountaineer Park, Inc. v. Polan , 190 W.Va. 276, 283, 438 S.E.2d 308, 315 (1993). The framework for impeaching and removing an officer of the state is set out under Article IV, § 9 of the Constitution of We st Virginia. The full text of Section 9 provides as follows: Any officer of the state may be impeached for maladministration, corruption, incompetency, gross immorality, neglect of duty, or any high crime or misdemeanor. The House of De legates shall have the sole power of impeachment. The Senate shall have the sole power to try impeachments and no person shall be convicted withou t the concurrence of two thirds of the members elected thereto. When s itting as a court of impeachment, the president of the supreme court of a ppeals, or, if from any cause it be improper for him to act, then any other judge of that court, 14 to be designated by it, shall preside; and the senators shall be on oath or affirmation, to do justice according to law and evidence. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold any office of ho nor, trust or profit, under the state; but the party convicted shall be liabl e to indictment, trial judgment, and punishment according to law. The Sena te may sit during the recess of the Legislature, for the trial of impeachments.

14 “Prior to the Judicial Reorganization Amen dment [of 1974], the Ju stices of the Court were referred to as ‘Judges’ and the Chie f Justice was referred to as ‘President.’” State v. McKinley , 234 W. Va. 143, 150 n.3, 7 64 S.E.2d 303, 31 0 n.3 (2014).

11Pursuant to Section 9 “[t]he House of Dele gates has the sole power of impeachment, and the Senate the sole power to try impeachments.” Slack v. Jacob , 1875 W.L. 3439, 8 W. Va. 612, 664 (1875). To facilitate the tria l of an impeachment proceeding Section 9 created a Court of Impeachment. It is clear from the text of Section 9 that it does not provide this Court with jurisdiction over an appeal of a final decision by the Court of Impeachment. 15 Consequently, and we so hold, in the absence of legislation pr oviding for an appeal in an impeachment proceeding under Ar ticle IV, § 9 of the Constituti on of West Virginia, this Court does not have jurisdiction over an ap peal of a final decision by the Court of Impeachment. Although it is clear that an appeal is not authorized from a decision by the Court of Impeachment, we do find under th e plain language of Section 9, the actions or inactions of the Court of Impeachment may be subj ect to a proceeding under the original jurisdiction of this Court. 16 The authority for this proposition is contained in the Law and Evidence Clause found in Section 9, which states: “t he senators shall ... do justice according to law and evidence.” The Law and Evidence Clau se of Section 9 uses the word “shall” in requiring the Court of Im peachment to follow the law. We have

15 The Constitution of West Virginia grants authority to the Legi slature to provide appellate jurisdiction to this Court for areas of law that are not set out in the constitution. See W.Va. Const. Art. VIII, § 3 ([The Suprem e Court] “shall have such other appellate jurisdiction, in both civil and criminal cases, as may be prescribed by law.”).
16 Article VIII, § 3 of the Constitution of We st Virginia provides that “[t]he supreme court of appeals shall have original juri sdiction of proceedings in habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition and certiorari.”

12recognized that “[t]he word ‘shall,’ ... shoul d be afforded a mandatory connotation[,] and when used in constitutions and statutes, [it] leaves no way open for the substitution of discretion.” Silveti v. Ohio Valle y Nursing Home, Inc ., 240 W. Va. 468, 813 S.E.2d 121, 125 (2018) (internal quotation marks a nd citations omitted). See Syl. pt. 3, State ex rel.
Trent v. Sims , 138 W.Va. 244, 77 S.E.2d 122 (1 953) (“As used in constitutional provisions, the word ‘shall’ is generally us ed in the imperative or mandatory sense.”). Insofar as the Law and Evid ence Clause imposes a mand atory duty on the Court of Impeachment to follow the law, th ere is an implicit right of an impeached official to have access to the courts to seek redress, if he or she believes actions or inactions by the Court of Impeachment violate his or her rights under the law. 17

17 It must be clearly understood that the La w and Evidence Clause is not superfluous language. Under the 1863 Constitution of We st Virginia the impeachment provision was set out in Article III, § 10. The original version of the impeachment provision did not contain a Law and Evidence Clause. The 1863 version of the impeachment provision read as follows: Any officer of the State may be impeached for maladministration, corruption, incompetence, neglect of duty, or any high crime or misdemeanor. The house of delegate s shall have the sole power of impeachment. The senate shall have th e sole power to try impeachments. When sitting for that purpose, the senato rs shall be on oath or affirmation; and no persons shall be convicted withou t the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present. Judg ment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit, under the State; but the party convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable and subject to indictment, trial judgment, and punishment according to law. The Sena te may sit during the recess of the legislature, for the trial of impeachments. The Law and Evidence Clause was specifically added to the impeachment provision in the constitution of 1872. The affirmative creation and placement of the Law and Evidence Clause in the new constitution suppor ts the significance this Court has given to that clause. A similar Law and Evidence Clau se appears in the impeachment laws of 11

13The implicit right of redress in the courts found in the Law and Evidence Clause, is expressly provided for in Article III, § 17 of the Constitution of West Virginia. Section 17 provides as follows: The courts of this state shall be open , and every person, for an injury done to him, in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law; and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay. The Certain Remedy Clause of Section 17 has be en found to mean that “[t]he framers of the West Virginia Constitution provided citizen s who have been wron ged with rights to pursue a remedy for that wrong in the court system.” Bias v. E. Associated Coal Corp ., 220 W. Va. 190, 204, 640 S. E.2d 540, 554 (2006) (Sta rcher, J., dissenting). See O'Neil v. City of Parkersburg , 160 W.Va. 694, 697, 237 S.E.2d 504, 506 (1977) (“[T]he concept of American justice ... pronounces that for every wrong there is a remedy. It is incompatible with this concept to de prive a wrongfully injured party of a remedy[.]”); Gardner v. Buckeye Sav. & Loan Co ., 108 W.Va. 673, 680, 152 S.E. 530, 533 (1930) (“It is the proud boast of all lovers of justice th at for every wrong there is a remedy.”); Lambert v.
Brewster , 97 W.Va. 124, 138, 125 S.E. 244, 2 49 (1924) (“As for public policy, the states. See Ariz. Const. Art. VIII, Pt. 2 § 1 (1910); Colo. Const. Art. XIII, § 1 (1876); Kan. Const. Art. II, § 27 (1861); Md. Const. Art. III, § 26 (1867); Miss. Const. Art. 4, § 49 (1890); Nev. Const. Art. VII, § 1 (1864) ; N.D. Cent. Code A nn. § 44-09-02 (1943); Ohio Const. Art. II, § 23 (1851); Utah Const. Art. VI, § 18 (1953); Wash. Const. Art. V, § 1 (1889); Wyo. Const. Art. III, § 17 (2016). Th ere does not appear to be any judicial decisions from those jurisdictions addressi ng the application of the Law and Evidence Clause. It is also worth noting that under th e 1863 Constitution of West Virginia there was no provision for a presiding judicial o fficer. The 1872 Constituti on of West Virginia added the provision requiring a judicial officer preside over an impeachment proceeding. This requirement is further evidence that an impeachment proceeding was not beyond the jurisdiction of this Court, insofar as it solidified the qu asi-judicial nature of the proceeding.

14strongest policy which appeals to us is that fundamental theory of the common law that for every wrong there should be a remedy.”). In the leading treatise on the Constitution of West Virginia, the following is said, The second clause of section 17, pr oviding that all persons “shall have remedy by due course of law” ... limits ... the ability of the government to constrict an individual’s right to invoke the judicial process[.] Robert M. Bastress, The West Virginia State Constitution , at 124 (2011). This Court has held that “enforcement of rights secured by the Constitution of this great State is engrained in this Court's inhere nt duty to neutrally an d impartially interpret and apply the law.” State ex rel. Biaf ore v. Tomblin , 236 W. Va. 528, 544, 782 S.E.2d 223, 239 (2016). That is, “[c]ourts are not c oncerned with the wisdom or expediencies of constitutional provisions, and the duty of th e judiciary is merely to carry out the provisions of the plain language stated in the constitution.” Syl. pt. 3, State ex rel. Casey

v. Pauley , 158 W.Va. 298, 210 S.E.2d 649 (1975). Insofar as an officer of the state faci ng impeachment in the Court of Impeachment has a constitutional right to seek redress for an alleged viol ation of his or her rights by that court, we now hold that an officer of the state who has been impeached under Article IV, § 9 of the Constitution of We st Virginia, may seek redress for an alleged violation of his or her constitutional rights in the impeac hment proceedings, by filing a petition for an extraordinary writ under the original jurisdiction of this Court. 18 See Kinsella v. Jaekle ,

18 The Respondents have argued in a footnote of their brief that “the Impeachment Clause vests absolute discretion in the context of impeachment in the Legislature.” The Respondents cite to the decision in Goff v. Wilson , 32 W. Va. 393, 9 S.E. 26 (1889) as support for that proposition. Goff does not support the proposition and is not remotely

15192 Conn. 704, 723, 475 A.2d 243, 253 (1984) (“A court acting under the judicial power of ... the constitution may exercise jurisdic tion over a controve rsy arising out of impeachment proceedings only if the legislature's action is clearly outside the confines of its constitutional jurisdiction to impeach any ex ecutive or judicial officer; or egregious and otherwise irreparable viola tions of state or federal c onstitutional guarantees are being or have been committed by such proceedings.”); Smith v. Brantley , 400 So. 2d 443, 449 (Fla. 1981) (“The issue of subject matter jurisdiction for impeachment is properly determined by the judiciary, of course. Our c onclusion on this questi on is that one must be such an officer to be impeachable.”); Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation Proceedings , 332 Pa. 342, 345, 2 A.2d 802, 803 (1938) (“the courts have no jurisdiction in impeachment proceedings, and no control over their conduct, so long as actions taken are within constitutional lines .”) (emphasis added); People ex rel. Robin v. Hayes , 82 Misc. 165, 172–73, 143 N.Y.S. 325, 330 (Sup . Ct. 1913) (“[A court] has no jurisdiction to inquire into the sufficienc y of charges for which a Govern or may be impeached, nor, I take it, whether the proceedings looking to that end were properly conducted, unless at their foundation, in their exercise, cons titutional guaranties are broken down or limitations ignored .”) (emphasis added). 19

relevant to this case. In Goff the petitioner wanted this Court to declare that he received the highest number of votes for the office of governor, before the Legislature carried out its duties in certifying the results of the elec tion. We declined to intervene because no authority permitted this Court to intervene. Contrary to the Respondents’ assertion, that the Legislature has absolute discretion in impeachment matters, the Law and Evidence Clause of the constitution strips the Legislatur e of “absolute” discretion in such matters. 19 This is not the first time that we have perm itted access to this Court, under our original jurisdiction, when no right of appeal existed from a quasi-judicial proceeding. For

16It will be noted that this C ourt held in syllabus point 3 of State ex rel. Holmes v. Clawges , 226 W. Va. 479, 702 S.E. 2d 611 (2010) that “[u]nde r the Separation of Powers doctrine, Article V, Section 1 of the Cons titution of West Virgin ia, courts have no authority—by mandamus, prohibition, contem pt or otherwise—to interfere with the proceedings of either house of the Legislature. ” This holding is not a pplicable to the issue under consideration in the instant matter. 20 In Holmes the Court was called upon to address the issue of a circuit court issuing an order that required the Clerk of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Delegates remove references to a pardon by the Governor in the official journals of the Senate and th e House of Delegates. Wh en the Clerks refused to obey the order, the ci rcuit court issued a rule to show cause as to why they shou ld not

example, a litigant in th e former Court of Claims had no right to appeal a decision from that tribunal. However, this Court found that constitutional principles permitted access to this Court under our or iginal jurisdiction: [T]his Court obviously may review deci sions of the court of claims under the original jurisdiction granted by article VIII, section 2 of our Constitution, through proceedings in ma ndamus, prohibition, or certiorari. Review in this fashion is necessary because the court of claims is not a judicial body, but an entity created by and otherwise accountable only to the Legislature, and judicial recourse must be available to protect basic principles of separation of powers. G.M. McCrossin, Inc. v. W. Virginia Bd. of Regents , 177 W. Va. 539, 54 1 n.3, 355 S.E.2d 32, 33 n.3 (1987). See Syl. pt. 3, City of Morgantown v. Ducker , 153 W. Va. 121, 121, 168 S.E.2d 298, 299 (1969) (“ Mandamus is the proper remedy to require the State Court of Claims to assume jurisdiction of a monetary claim against the Board of Governors of West Virginia University.”). The Court of Cl aims was renamed in 2017 and is now called the “West Virginia Legislative Claims Co mmission.” See W. Va. Code § 14-2-4 (2017).
20 The Respondents cited to this case three ti mes in their brief, but did not provide any discussion of the case.

17be held in contempt. This Court determined that the judicial order encroached on the exclusive authority of the Legi slature to maintain journals: [T]he Clerks argue that it is beyond the authority of a circuit court to compel them to alter the Journals, whether in their printed form or in their electronic form published on the internet . The Clerks generally assert that the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction, because the Journals are a protected legislative f unction under the Constituti on of West Virginia. The Constitution of West Virginia vest s the State's legislative power in a Senate and a House of Delegates. W.Va. Const., Art. VI, § 1. Each house of the Legislature is charged with determ ining its own internal rules for its proceedings and with choo sing its own officers. W.Va. Const., Art. VI, § 24. The Constitution mandates that each house must keep and publish a “journal of its proceedings.” Ar ticle VI, Section 41 states: Each house shall keep a journa l of its proceedings, and cause the same to be published from time to time, and all bills and joint resolutions shall be desc ribed therein, as well by their title as their number, and the yeas and nays on any question, if called for by one tenth of th ose present shall be entered on the journal. A variation of this mandate has been in our Constitution since the founding of our State in 1863. The foundi ng fathers indicated during the constitutional convention that there are two goals underlying this provision: to ensure that the votes of legislator s are correctly record ed, and to make a public record of the actions of legislators. Holmes , 226 W. Va. at 483–84, 702 S.E.2d at 61 5–16. The facts giving rise to syllabus point 3 in Holmes clearly establish the limitations of that syllabus point. That is, the facts of the case concerned a trial court interfering in legislativ e administrative matters when no legal authority permitted such interference. Neither the opinion nor syllabus point 3 were intended to limit the author ity of this Court to entertai n an extraordinary writ against the Legislature when the law permits. For example, the case of State ex rel. Cooper v.
Tennant , 229 W. Va. 585, 730 S.E. 2d 368 (2012) involved several consolidated actions for prohibition and mandamus against the Sp eaker of the House of Delegates and

18government officials concerning the constitutionality of redist ricting. This Court denied the writs and in doing so held that In the absence of constitutional infirm ity, as the precedent evaluated above irrefutably establishes, the developmen t and implementation of a legislative redistricting plan in the State of We st Virginia are en tirely within the province of the Legislature. The role of this Court is limited to a determination of whether the Legislatur e's actions have violated the West Virginia Constitution. Cooper , 229 W. Va. at 614, 730 S.E.2d at 397. See State ex rel. W. Virginia Citizen Action Grp. v. Tomblin , 227 W. Va. 687, 715 S.E.2d 36 (2011) (granting mandamus in part against the Governor, Speaker of the House of Delegates and other government officials requiring a speci al election be called); State ex rel. League of Women Voters of
W. Virginia v. Tomblin , 209 W. Va. 565, 578, 550 S.E. 2d 355, 368 (2001) (finding that mandamus would be issued agai nst the President of the Sena te, Speaker of the House of Delegates and other government officials that required “the Le gislature to only include as part of the budget digest information that ha s been the subject of discussion, debate, and decision prior to final legislative enactment of the budget bill.”); State ex rel. Meadows v. Hechler , 195 W. Va. 11, 19, 462 S.E.2d 586, 594 (1995) gr anting mandamus against the President of the Senate and Speaker of th e House of Delegates that required “the Legislature to promptly draft legislation to replace the unconstitutional section of article 29A and additionally, to consider passage of legislation that would exempt certain administrative regulations from conformanc e with APA implementation requirements, such as where complian ce with federal law is mandated.”). In view of the foregoing, we hold that to the extent that syllabus point 3 of State ex rel. Holmes v. Clawges , 226 W.

19Va. 479, 702 S.E.2d 611 (2010) may be interpreted as prohibiting this Court from exercising its constitutional authority to issue an extraordin ary writ against the Legislature when the law requires, it is disapproved. The Respondents have cited to the decision in Nixon v. United States , 506 U.S. 224, 113 S. Ct. 732, 122 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1993) as authorit y for the proposition that the judiciary does not have jurisdicti on over impeachment proceedings. In Nixon , a federal district judge was impeached and removed from office, in a proceeding in which the United States Senate allowed a committee to take testimon y and gather evidence. The former judge filed a declaratory judgment acti on in a district court seeking a ruling that the Senate’s failure to hold a fu ll evidentiary hearing before th e entire Senate violated its constitutional duty to “try” all impeachments. The District Court denied relief and dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The United St ates Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the constitutional requirement that the Senate “try” cases of impeachment precludes the use of a committee to hear evidence. The opinion held that the issue presented could not be brought in federal court. The Court reasoned as follows: We agree with the Court of Appeals that opening the door of judicial review to the procedures used by the Senate in trying impeachments would “expose the political life of the country to months, or perhaps years, of chaos.” This lack of finality would mani fest itself most dramatically if the President were impeached. The leg itimacy of any successor, and hence his effectiveness, would be impaired seve rely, not merely while the judicial process was running its course, but during any retrial that a differently constituted Senate might conduct if its first judgment of conviction were invalidated. Equally uncertain is the question of what relief a court may give other than simply setting aside the judgment of conviction. Could it

20order the reinstatement of a convicted federal judge, or order Congress to create an additional judgeship if the se at had been filled in the interim?
Nixon , 506 U.S. at 236, 113 S. Ct. at 739. The decision in Nixon is not controlling and is distinguishable. See Peters v. Narick , 165 W. Va. 622, 628 n.13, 270 S.E.2d 760, 764 n.13 (1980), modified on other grounds by Israel by Israel v. W. Virgin ia Secondary Sch. Activities Comm'n , 182 W. Va. 454, 388 S.E.2d 480 (1989) (“States have the power to interpret state constitutional guarantees in a manner different than the Un ited States Supreme Court has interpreted comparable federal constitutional guarantees.”). The narrowly crafted text of the impeachment provision found in the Constitu tion of the United States prevented the Supreme Court from finding a basis for a llowing a constitutional challenge to the impeachment procedure adopted by the Senate. The text of the federal impeachment provision is found in Article I, § 3 of th e Constitution of the Unite d States and provides the following: The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oa th or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Ch ief Justice shall pr eside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concu rrence of two thirds of the Members present. Judgment in Cases of Impeachment sha ll not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United Stat es: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. It is clear that Article 1, § 3 does not contain the Law and Ev idence Clause that is found in Article IV, § 9 of the Constitution of West Virginia . Therefore, our constitution

21provides greater impeachment protections th an the Constitution of the United States. 21
See State ex rel. K.M. v. W. Virgin ia Dep't of Health & Human Res ., 212 W. Va. 783, 794 n.15, 575 S.E.2d 393, 404 n.15 (2002) (“it is clear that our Constitu tion may offer greater protections than its federal counterpart.”); State ex rel. Carper v. W. Virginia Parole Bd ., 203 W. Va. 583, 590 n.6, 5 09 S.E.2d 864, 871 n. 6 (1998) (“This Court has determined repeatedly that the West Virginia Constitu tion may be more protective of individual rights than its fede ral counterpart.”); State v. Bonham , 173 W. Va. 416, 418, 317 S.E.2d 501, 503 (1984) (“[T]he United States Supr eme Court has also recognized that a state supreme court may set its own constitutional protections at a higher level than that accorded by the federal cons titution. There are a number of cases where state supreme courts have set a higher leve l of protection under their ow n constitutions.”); Syl. pt.2, Pauley v. Kelly , 162 W. Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979) (“The provisions of the Constitution of the State of West Virginia ma y, in certain instances, require higher standards of protection than afforded by the Federal Constitution.”). Moreover, Nixon was not called upon to address the substantive type of issues presented in this case. The case was focused upon the right of the Se nate to craft rules of procedure for impeachment. The Respondents have cited to the decision in In re Judicial Conduct Comm ., 145
N.H. 108, 111, 751 A.2d 514 , 516 (2000). In that case the New Hampshire House Judiciary Committee began an impeachment investigation into conduct by the state

21 Even the Respondents have conceded in th eir brief that “West Virginia’s Impeachment Clause is significantly broader than its c ounterpart in the United States Constitution.”

22Supreme Court chief justice and other member s of that court. The state Supreme Court Committee on Judicial Conduct filed a motio n seeking an order requiring the House Committee to allow it to attend any House Co mmittee deposition of any Judicial Conduct member or employee. The state Supreme Co urt held that the issue presented was a nonjusticiable political question and theref ore denied relief. However, the opinion was clear in holding that the judiciary had au thority to intervene in an impeachment proceeding: The [House Judiciary Comm ittee] first argues that the judicial branch lacks jurisdiction over any matter relate d to a legislative impeachment investigation. We disagree. The investigative power of the Legislature, however penetrating and persuasive its sc ope, is not an absolute right but, like any right, is “limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy which ar e other than those on which [that] right is founded, and which become st rong enough to hold their own when a certain poi nt is reached.” United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 44 [7 3 S.Ct. 543, 97 L.Ed. 770]; Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 [28 S.Ct. 529, 52 L.Ed. 828]. The contendi ng principles involved here are those underlying the power of the Legislature to investigate on the one hand and those upon which are based certain individual rights guaranteed to our citizens by the State and National Constitutions. Nelson v. Wyman , 99 N.H. 33, 41, 105 A.2d 756, 764 (1954). *** The court system is available for adju dication of issues of constitutional or other fundamental rights.... In such circ umstances, Part I, Article 17 of the New Hampshire Constitution does not de prive persons whose rights are violated from seeking judicial redress simply because the violation occurs in the course of an impeachment investigation. *** The constitutional authority of the Ho use of Representatives to conduct impeachment proceedings wi thout interference from th e judicial branch is extensive, but not so extensive as to pr eclude this court's ju risdiction to hear matters arising from legislative impeachm ent proceedings. “It is the role of this court in our co-equ al, tripartite form of government to interpret the

23Constitution and to resolve di sputes arising under it.” Petition of Mone , 143 N.H. at 133, 719 A.2d at 631 (quoting Monier , 122 N.H. at 476, 446 A.2d at 455; citing Merrill v. Sherburne , 1 N.H. 199, 20 1-02 (1818)). However, upon briefing and argument, it is appare nt that the specifi c issue raised by the JCC is nonjusticiable. Accordingl y, the JCC's request for its special counsel to attend HJC depositions of JCC members and employees is denied. In re Judicial Conduct , 145 N.H. at 110-113, 751 A.2d at 515. Although the Respondents cited to the decision in In re Judicial Conduct , it is clear that the constitutional principles of law discussed in the case are consistent with this Court’s ruling, i.e., the judiciary may intervene in an impeach ment proceeding to protect constitutional rights. The Respondents cited to the decision in Larsen v. Senate of Pennsylvania , 166 Pa. Cmwlth. 472, 646 A.2d 694 (1 994) without any discussion. In Larsen a former justice on the state Supreme Court was sentenced to removal from office by a trial court after he was found guilty of an infam ous crime. The former justice filed for a preliminary injunction to prevent a senate impeachmen t trial and asserted numerous grounds for relief, that included: (1) he was no longer in office a nd could not be removed by the senate, (2) senate rules were unconstitutional, (3) the senate could not permit a committee to hear the case, and (4) he was denied suffi cient time to prepare. The court, relying on the decision in Nixon , found that the state’s impeachm ent clause was similar to the federal clause and therefore denied relief. However, the opinion noted that the decision by the state Supreme Court decision in Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation Proceedings , 332 Pa. 342, 345, 2 A.2d 802, 803 (1938) held that “the courts have no jurisdiction in impeachment pr oceedings and no control over their conduct, so long as actions taken are within constitutional lines...” Larsen , 166 Pa. Cmwlth. at 482, 646 A.2d

24at 699. The opinion limited Dauphin’s qualification on judicial intervention to impeachment proceedings that had ended. The decision in Larsen is distinguishable because that state’s impeachment clause was aligned with the federal impeachment clause, and did not have a Law and Eviden ce Clause like the Constitution of West Virginia. Moreover, Larsen re cognized that it could not overrule the state Supreme Court’s ruling in Dauphin , which left open the door for in tervention in an impeachment proceeding for “actions [not] take n within constitutional lines.” Larsen limited intervention to post-impeachment. The Respondents have also cited to the decision in Mecham v. Arizona House of Representatives , 162 Ariz. 267, 782 P.2d 1160 (1989) . In that case the state Governor filed a petition for injunctive relief with the state Supreme Court, to prevent the state senate from conducting an impeachment trial ag ainst him until his criminal trial was over. The Governor also challenge d the impeachment procedures. The state Supreme Court denied relief as follows: [W]e can only conclude that the pow er of impeachment is exclusively vested in the House of Representatives and the power of trial on articles of impeachment belongs solely to the Senate. The Senate's task is to determine if the Governor should be removed fro m office. Aside from disqualification from holding any other state position of “honor, trust, or profit,” the Senate can impose no greater or lesser penalty than removal and can impose no criminal punishment. Trial in the Se nate is a uniquely legislative and political function. It is not judicial. Mecham , 156 Ariz. at 302, 751 P. 2d at 962. The decision in Mecham is factually distinguishable because it did not involve allegations of a violation of substantive constitutional rights. More importa ntly, even though the court in Mecham denied the

25requested relief, it made clear that the j udiciary could intervene in an impeachment proceeding to protect the constitutional rights of an impeached official: This Court does have power to ensure that the legislature follows the constitutional rules on impeachment. For instance, shou ld the Senate attempt to try a state officer withou t the House first voting articles of impeachment, we would not hesita te to invalidate the results. Mecham , 156 Ariz. at 302-303, 7 51 P.2d at 962-963. See Mecham v. Gordon , 162 Ariz. 267, 782 P.2d 1160 (1989) (declining to re view impeachment of state Governor because constitutional requirements were met). In the instant proceeding the Petitioner ha s alleged that the impeachment charges brought against her are unlawful and violate her constitutional rights. In view of the above analysis, we have jurisdiction to c onsider the validity of these allegations. 22

22 The Respondents have argued that interven tion in the impeachment proceeding violates the Guarantee Clause of the federal constituti on. This clause provid es as follows: “The United States shall guarantee to every Stat e in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when th e Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.” U.S. Conts. Art. IV, § 4. The Respondents contend that the Guarantee Clause requires that a state have “separat e and coequal branches” of government. In a convoluted manner th e Respondents contend that this Court’s intervention in this matter would destroy the “separate and coequal branches” of government. The Respondents have not cited to an opinion by any court in the country that supports the proposition that issuance of a writ against another branch of government violates the Guarantee Clause. See New York v. United States , 505 U.S. 144, 184, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2432, 120 L. Ed. 2d 120 (1992) (“In most of the cases in which the Court has been asked to apply the [Guarantee] Clause, the Court has found the claims presented to be nonjusticiable under the ‘political questi on’ doctrine.”). We find no merit in the contention. Further, the issue of the separati on of powers doctrine is fully addressed in the Discussion section of this opinion.

26III. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Petitioner filed this matter seek ing a writ of mandamus to prohibit enforcement of the Articles of Impeachment filed against her. This Court has explained that the function of mandamus is “the enfo rcement of an established right and the enforcement of a corresponding imperative duty created or imposed by law.” State ex rel. Ball v. Cummings , 208 W. Va. 393, 398, 540 S.E.2d 917, 922 (1999). It was held in syllabus point two of State ex rel. Kucera v. City of Wheeling , 153 W.Va. 538, 170 S.E.2d 367 (1969) that A writ of mandamus will not issue unless th ree elements coexist—(1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the relief sought; (2) a legal duty on the part of respondent to do the thing which th e petitioner seeks to compe l; and (3) the absence of another adequate remedy. In our review of the type of relief the Petitioner seeks we do not believe that mandamus is the appropriate remedy. “In appropr iate situations, this Court has chosen to treat petitions for extraordinary relief accordi ng to the nature of the relief sought rather than the type of writ pursued.” State ex rel. TermNet Merch. Servs., Inc. v. Jordan , 217
W. Va. 696, 699, 619 S. E.2d 209, 212 (2005). See State ex rel. Potter v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of State , 226 W. Va. 1, 2 n.1, 697 S.E.2d 37, 38 n.1 (2010) (“this Court has, in past cases, treated a request fo r relief in prohibition as a petition for writ of mandamus if so warranted by the facts. Acco rdingly, we consider the present petition as a request for mandamus relief.”); State ex rel. Beirne v. Smith , 214 W. Va. 771, 774, 591 S.E.2d 329, 33 2 (2003) (“Although Mr. Bradley bro ught his case as a petition for a writ

27of prohibition, while Mr. Beirne requested a writ of mandamus, we choose to treat each as a petition for a writ of mandamus, becau se both petitioners wish to compel the Commissioner to do an affirmativ e act, i.e., pay benefits.”); State ex rel. Wyant v. Brotherton , 214 W. Va. 434, 437, 58 9 S.E.2d 812, 815 (2003) (“Because we find this case to be in the nature of prohibition as op posed to mandamus, we will henceforth treat it as a petition for writ of prohibition.”); State ex rel. Riley v. Rudloff , 212 W. Va. 767, 771–72, 575 S.E.2d 377, 381–82 (2002) (“This case was initia lly brought as a petition for writ of habeas corpus and/or mandamus. We granted the writ of habeas corpus, leaving for resolution only issues rela ted to mandamus. Upon further consideration of the issues herein raised, however, we choose (as we have done in many appropriate cases) to treat this matter as a writ of prohibition.”); State ex rel. Sandy v. Johnson , 212 W. Va. 343, 346, 571 S.E.2d 333, 336 (2002) (“Although this case was brought and granted as a petition for a writ of prohibition, we choose to treat it as a writ of mandamus action.”); State ex rel. Conley v. Hill , 199 W.Va. 686, 687 n. 1, 4 87 S.E.2d 344, 34 5 n. 1 (1997) (“Although this case was brough t and granted as a petition for mandamus, we choose to treat this matter as a writ of prohibition.”). In light of the issues ra ised by the Petitioner, we find that the more appropriate relief lies in a writ of prohibition. As a qua si-judicial body the Cour t of Impeachment is subject to the writ of prohibition. See State ex rel. York v. W. Virginia Office of Disciplinary Counsel , 231 W. Va. 183, 187 n.5, 7 44 S.E.2d 293, 29 7 n.5 (2013) (“prohibition lies against only judicial and ‘quasi-judicial tribunals’[.]”); Lewis v. HoChunk Nation Election Bd. , No. CV 06-109, 2007 WL 5297075 (H o-Chunk Trial Ct.

28Apr. 17, 2007) (“Therefore, the House may in stitute a case against a sitting president after determining probable cause of offici al wrongdoing, and, through designated managers, present the matter before the Sena te, which assumes a quasi-judicial role in hearing and deliberating the charges.”); Mayor & City Council of Baltimore ex rel. Bd. of Police of City of Baltimore , 1860 WL 3363, 15 Md. 376, 459 (1860) (“the present Constitution, invested the Legislature with qu asi judicial functions, in exercising the power of impeachment and puni shment, as therein provided.” ). The purpose of the writ is “to restrain inferior courts from proceeding in causes over which they have no jurisdiction [.]” Syl. pt. 1, in part, Crawford v. Taylor , 138 W.Va. 207, 75 S.E.2d 370 (1953) (emphasis added). “The writ [of prohibition] lies as a matter of right whenever the inferior court (a) has not jurisdiction or (b ) has jurisdiction but exceeds its legitimate powers and it matters not if the aggrieved party has some other remedy adequate or inadequate.” State ex rel. Nelson v. Frye , 221 W. Va. 391, 394, 655 S.E.2d 137, 140 (2007) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). See W. Va. Code § 53-1-1 (1923) (“The writ of prohibition shall lie as a matter of right in all cases of usurpation and abuse of power, when the inferior court has not juri sdiction of the subject matter in controversy, or, having such jurisdiction, ex ceeds its legitimate powers.”). In syllabus point 4 of State ex rel. Hoover v. Berger , 199 W.Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12 (1996), we set forth the followi ng guideline for issuance of a writ of prohibition that does not involve lack of jurisdiction: In determining whether to entertain and issue th e writ of prohibition for cases not involving an absence of juri sdiction but only where it is claimed that the lower tribunal exceeded its legitimate powers, this Court will

29examine five factors: (1) whether th e party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as direct app eal, to obtain the desired relief; (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal; (3) whether the lower tribunal's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) whether the lower tribunal's order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law; and (5) whether the lo wer tribunal's order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression. These factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting point for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohib ition should issue. Although all five factors need not be satisfied, it is clear that the third factor, the existence of clear error as a matter of law, sh ould be given substantial weight. With the foregoing in mind, we tu rn to the merits of the case.
IV. DISCUSSION The Petitioner has presented several issues that she contends u ltimately require the dismissal of the impeachment charges against her. 23 All of the arguments presented by the Petitioner have one common thread: they expressly or implicitly contend that the charges are brought in violation of the se paration of powers doctrine. Because this common theme permeates all of her arguments, we will provide a separate discussion of that doctrine before we address the me rits of each individual issue.

23 It was previously noted in this opinion that the Respondents chose not to address the merits of the issues presented. Even tho ugh the Respondents ha ve not presented any sufficiently briefed legal arguments against the merits of Petitioner’s arguments, they have referenced in general as to why certain claims by the Petitioner are not valid.

30A. The Separation of Powers Doctrine “[T]he separation of powers doctrine [i s] set forth in our State Constitution.” Erie Ins. Prop. & Cas. Co. v. King , 236 W. Va. 323, 329, 779 S.E.2d 591, 597 (2015). The doctrine is set out in Article V, § 1 of th e Constitution of West Virginia as follows: The legislative, executive and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct, so that neither shall exer cise the powers properly belonging to either of the others; nor shall any person exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time, except that justices of the peace shall be eligible to the legislature. 24 With regard to this provisi on, this Court has stated: The separation of these powers; the i ndependence of one from the other; the requirement that one department sha ll not exercise or encroach upon the powers of the other two, is fundamenta l in our system of Government, State and Federal. Each acts, and is intende d to act, as a check upon the others, and thus a balanced system is mainta ined. No theory of government has been more loud ly acclaimed. State ex rel. W. Virginia Citizen Action Grp. v. Tomblin , 227 W. Va. 687, 695, 715 S.E.2d 36, 44 (2011), quoting State v. Huber , 129 W.Va. 198, 209, 40 S.E.2d 11, 18 (1946). It has been held that “Article V, s ection 1 of the Constitution ... is not merely a suggestion; it is part of the fu ndamental law of our State and, as such, it must be strictly

24 Under the 1863 Constitution of West Virg inia the separation of powers doctrine was found in Article I, § 4. The doc trine was worded slightly differe ntly in its original form as follows: The legislative, executive and judicial departments of the government shall be separate and distinct. Neither sh all exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others. No person shall be invested with or exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time. The 1872 Constitution of West Virginia rewrote the separa tion of powers doctrine and placed it in its present location.

31construed and closely followe d.” Syl. pt. 1, in part, State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin , 167
W. Va. 155, 279 S.E.2d 622 (1981). We have observed that The separation of powers doctrine imp lies that each branch of government has inherent power to “keep its own hous e in order,” absent a specific grant of power to another branch.... This th eory recognizes th at each branch of government must have sufficient powe r to carry out its assigned tasks and that these constitutionally assigned tasks will be performed properly within the governmental branch itself. State v. Clark , 232 W. Va. 480, 498, 752 S.E.2d 907, 925 (2013). Further, the “separation of powers doctrine ensures that the three branches of government are distinct unto themselves and that they, ex clusively, exercise the right s and responsibilities reserved unto them.” Simpson v. W. Virginia Office of Ins. Com'r , 223 W. Va. 495, 505, 678 S.E.2d 1, 11 (2009). It has also been observed that The Separation of Powers Clause is not self-executing. Standing alone the doctrine has no force or effect. The Se paration of Powers Clause is given life by each branch of government working exclusively within its constitutional domain and not encroach ing upon the legitimate powers of any other branch of gove rnment. This is the essence and longevity of the doctrine. State ex rel. Affiliated Constr. Trades Found. v. Vieweg , 205 W.Va. 687, 702, 520 S.E.2d 854, 869 (1999) (Davis, J., concurring). Pr ofessor Bastress has pointed out the purpose and application of the separation of powers doctrine as follows: A system of divided powers advances several purposes. First, it helps to prevent government tyranny. By a llocating the powers among the three branches and establishing a system of checks and balances, the constitution ensures that no one person or ins titution will become too powerful and allow ambition to supers ede the public good.... *** Thus, under the current doctrine, the co urt’s role is to apply Article V to ensure that the system of government in the state remains balanced and that no one branch assumes powers specif ically delegated to another, or

32imposes burdens on another, or passe s on its own respons ibilities to another branch in such a manner as to threaten the ba lance of power, facilitate tyranny, or weaken the system of government. Bastress, West Virginia State Constitution , at 141-144. See Syl. pt. 2, Appalachian Power Co. v. Public Serv. Co mm'n of West Virginia , 170 W.Va. 757, 296 S.E.2d 887 (1982) (“Where there is a direct and fundamental encroachment by one branch of government into the traditional powers of another branch of government, this violates the separation of powers doctrine contained in Secti on 1 of Article V of the West Virginia Constitution.”). The decision in State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship , 157 W. Va. 100, 207 S.E.2d 421 (1973) summarized the development of the separation of powers doctrine as follows: From the time of its adherence to by Mo ntesquieu, the author or at least an early supporter of the concept of sepa ration of powers, the political merit of that design of government has not be en seriously questioned. Hodges v. Public Service Commission, 110 W.Va. 649, 159 S.E. 834; Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 26 L.Ed. 377. That concept was invoked in the early consideration of the formul ation of our federal Constitution. Reflecting the import which he attribut ed to the concept of separation of powers in government, James Madiso n, in support of the proposed Constitution, wrote: ‘The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, wh ether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-a ppointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. * * * where the Whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the Whole *114 power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted.’ Speaking of the judiciary, Madison, quoting Montesquieu, wrote: “Were it (judicial power) joined to the executive power, The judge might behave with all the violence of An oppressor.” The Federalist Papers, Hamilton, Ma dison and Jay (Rossiter, 1961). Commenting on the relationship between the three recogniz ed branches of government and the urgency of maintain ing a wholly independent judiciary, Alexander Hamilton, in Essay No. 78 of The Federalist Papers, noted: ‘The

33executive not only dispenses the honors but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only co mmands the purse but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no in fluence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even fo r the efficacy of its judgments.’ With the real affirmative powers of government reposing in the hands of the executive and legislative branches, it becomes urgent that the judiciary department, one function of which under our fundamental la w is to prevent encroachment by the other two bran ches, remains free and completely independent. As noted by Mo ntesquieu in Spirit of Laws, Vol. 1, page 181: ‘* * * there is no liberty if the powe r of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.’ Thus, judicial independence is essential to liberty—lest the exec utive sword become a ‘Sword of Damocles', precariously and intimidati ngly suspended over the judicial head and the legislative law making power be used to usurp the rights granted by the Constitution to the people. Brotherton , 157 W. Va. at 113–14, 207 S.E.2d at 430. We have recognized that “[t]he system of ‘checks and balanc es’ provided for in American state and federal constitutions and secured to each bran ch of government by ‘Separation of Powers’ clauses theoretically and practically compel s courts, when called upon, to thwart any unlawful actions of one branch of government which impair the constitutional responsibilities and functions of a coequal branch.” Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Frazier v. Meadows , 193 W.Va. 20, 454 S.E.2d 65 (1994). We have also determined that “the role of this Court is vital to the preservation of the constitutional separation of powers of government where that separa tion, delicate under normal conditions, is jeopardized by the usurpatory actions of the executive or legislative branches of government.” State ex rel. Steele v. Kopp , 172 W. Va. 329, 337, 305 S.E.2d 285, 293 (1983). See State ex rel. W. Virginia Citizens Acti on Grp. v. W. Virginia Econ. Dev.

34Grant Comm ., 213 W. Va. 255, 264, 580 S.E.2d 869, 878 (2003) (“Un derlying any encroachment of power by one br anch of government is the paramount concern that such action will impermissibly foster[ ] ... dominan ce and expansion of power.”). Moreover, this Court has never “hesitated to utilize the doctrine where we felt there was a direct and fundamental encroachment by one branch of government into the traditional powers of another branch of government.” Appalachian Power Co. v. PSC , 170 W.Va. 757, 759, 296 S.E.2d 887, 889 (1982). See, e.g., State ex rel. West Virginia Citizens Action Group

v. West Virginia Economic Dev. Grant Comm ., 213 W.Va. 255, 580 S.E.2d 869 (2003) (finding statute that gave legislature a role in appointing members of the West Virginia Economic Grant Committee violated Separation of Powers Clause); State ex rel. Meadows v. Hechler , 195 W.Va. 11, 462 S. E.2d 586 (1995) (find ing statute which permitted administrative regulati ons to die if legislature fa iled to take action violated Separation of Powers Clause); State ex rel. State Bldg. Comm'n v. Bailey , 151 W.Va. 79, 150 S.E.2d 449 (1966) (finding statute naming legislative officers to State Building Commission violated Separa tion of Powers Clause). The United States Supreme Court in O'Donoghue v. United States , 289 U.S. 516, 53 S.Ct. 740, 77 L.Ed. 1356 (1 933) articulated the need for separating the powers of government into thr ee distinct branches: The Constitution, in distributing the powers of government, creates three distinct and separate departments—the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. This separation is not mere ly a matter of convenience or of governmental mechanism. Its object is basic and vital, Springer v. Government of Philippine Islands , 277 U.S. 189, 20 1, 48 S.Ct. 480, 72 L.Ed. 845; namely, to preclude a comming ling of these essentially different powers of government in the same hands....

35If it be important thus to separate the several departments of government and restrict them to the exercise of their appointed powers, it follows, as a logical corollary, equally important, that each department s hould be kept completely independent of the others—independent no t in the sense that they shall not cooperate to the common end of carryi ng into effect the purposes of the Constitution, but in the sense that the acts of ea ch shall never be controlled by, or subjected, directly or indirectly, to, the coercive influence of either of the other departments . James Wilson, one of the framers of the Constitution and a justice of this court, in one of his law lectures said that the independence of each department required that its proceedings “should be free from the remote st influence, direct or indirect, of either of the other two po wers.” 1 Andrews, The Works of James Wilson (1896), Vol. 1, p. 367. And th e importance of such independence was similarly recognized by Mr. Justice Story when he said that in reference to each other, neither of the departments “ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence in the administration of their respective powers.” 1 Story on the Constitution, 4th ed. s 530. O’Donoghue , 289 U.S. at 530–31, 53 S.Ct . at 743 (emphasis added). 25
It must also been understoo d that this Court “has long recognized that it is not possible that division of power among the thre e branches of government be so precise and exact that there is no overlapping whatsoever.” State ex rel. Sahley v. Thompson , 151 W.Va. 336, 341, 151 S.E.2d 870, 873 (1966), overruled in part by State ex rel. Hill v. Smith , 172 W. Va. 413, 305 S.E.2d 771 (1983). See Appalachian Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of West Virginia , 170 W. Va. 757, 759, 296 S. E.2d 887, 889 (1982) (“we have recognized the need fo r some flexibility in interpre ting the separation of powers doctrine in order to meet the realities of modern day government[.]”). “While the Constitution contemplates the inde pendent operation of the thre e fields of government as to all matters within their resp ective fields, there can be no doubt that the people, through

25 Although federal courts recognize the sepa ration of powers doctrine, “the federal Constitution has no specific provision analog ous to [Article V, § I].” Bastress, West Virginia State Constitution , at 141.

36their Constitution, may authorize one of the departments to exercise powers otherwise rightfully belonging to another department.” State ex rel. Thompson v. Morton , 140 W.Va. 207, 223, 84 S.E.2d 791, 800–801 (1954). With these general principles of the separation of powers doctrine guiding our analysis, we now turn to the me rits of the issues presented.
B. An Administrative Rule Pr omulgated by the Supreme Court Supersede Statutes in Conflict with Them The first issue we address is the Petitione r’s contention that tw o of the Articles of Impeachment against her are i nvalid, because they can only be maintained by violating the constitutional authority of th e Supreme Court to promulgate rules that have the force of law and supersede any statute that c onflicts with them. The two Articles of Impeachment in question are Article IV 26 and Article VI. 27 Both of those Articles charge

26 The text of Article IV was set out as follows: That the said Chief Justice Margaret Workman, and Justice Robin Davis, being at all times relevant Justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, and at various relevant times individually each Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia unmindful of the duties of their high offices, and contrary to the oaths taken by them to support the Constitution of the State of West Vi rginia and faithfully discharge the duties of their offices as such Justices, while in the exercise of the functions of the office of Justices, in violation of their oaths of office, then and there, with regard to the discharge of the du ties of their offices, commencing in or about 2012, did knowingly and intenti onally act, and each subsequently oversee in their capacity as Chief Justi ce, and did in that capacity as Chief Justice severally sign and approve the c ontracts necessary to facilitate, at each such relevant time, to overpay certain Senior Status Judges in violation of the statutory limited maxi mum salary for such Judges, which overpayment is a violation of Artic le VIII, §7 of the West Virginia Constitution, stating that Judges "shall receive the salaries fixed by law"

37the Petitioner with improperly overpaying senior-status judges. The Petitioner argues that the statute relied upon by Article IV and Article VI is in conflict with an administrative order promulgated by the Chief Justice.

and the provisions of W.Va. Code §51-2-13 and W.Va. Code §51-9-1 0, and, in violation of an Administ rative Order of the Supreme Court of Appeals, in potential violation of 15 the provisions of W.Va. Code §61-3

- 22, relating to the crime of falsification of accounts with in tent to enable or assist any person to obtai n money to which he was not entitled, and, in potential violation of the provisions set forth in W.Va. Code §61-3-24, relating to the crime of obtaining mone y, property and services by false pretenses, and, all of the above are in violation of the prov isions of Canon I and Canon II of the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct.
27 The text of Article VI was set out as follows: That the said Justice Margaret Work man, being at all times relevant a Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, and at certain relevant times individually Chief Jus tice of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, unmindful of the du ties of her high offices, and contrary to the oaths taken by her to support the Constitution of the State of West Virginia and faithfully di scharge the duties of her office as such Justice, while in the exercise of the functions of the office of Justice, in violation of her oath of office, then and there, with regard to the discharge of the duties of her office, did in the year 2015, did in her capacity as Chief Justice, sign certain Forms WV 48, to retain and compensate certain Senior Status Judges the execution of which form s allowed the Supreme Court of Appeals to overpay those certain Senior Status Judges in violation of the statutorily limited maximum salary for such Judges, whic h overpayment is a violation of Article VIII, § 7 of th e West Virginia Constitution, stating that Judges "shall receive the salaries fixed by law" and the provisions of W.Va. Code §51-2-13 and W. Va. Code §51-9-10; her authorization of such overpayments was a violation of the clear statutory law of the state of West Virginia, as set forth in those relevant Code sections, and, was an act in potential violation of the provisions set forth in W.Va. Code §61-3-22, relating to the crime of falsification of accounts with intent to enable or assist any person to obtai n money to which he was not entitled, and, in potential violation of the provisions set forth in W.Va. Code §61-3-24, relating to the crime of obtaining mone y, property and services by false pretenses, and all of the above are in violation of the prov isions of Canon I and Canon II of the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct.

38We begin by observing that the 1974 J udicial Reorganization Amendment of the Constitution of West Virginia cen tralized the administration of the state’s judicial system and placed the administrative authority of the courts in the hands of this Court. 28 See State ex rel. Casey v. Pauley , 158 W. Va. 298, 300, 210 S.E.2d 649, 651 (1975) (“The Judicial Reorganization Amendment was rati fied by a large majo rity throughout the state.”). The Amendment rewrote Article VII I, substituting §§ 1 to 15 for former §§ 1 to 30, amended § 13 of Artic le III, and added §§ 9 to 13 to Article IX. Justice Cleckley made the following observati ons regarding the changes: These changes include the entirety of the Reorganization Amendment and its concept of a unified court system administered by this Court and not the legislature. More specifically, that same amendment altered Section 1 of Article VIII to provide that the judicial power of the State “shall be vested solely ” in this Court and its inferior courts. The predecessor provision to Section 1, though similarly worded, did not include the limiting adverb “solely.” In addition, the Modern Budget Amendment insulated the judiciary from political retaliati on by preventing the governor and legislature from reducing the judiciar y's budget submissions. W.Va. Const., art. V, § 51; State ex rel. Bagley v. Blankenship , 161 W.Va. 630, 246 S.E.2d 99 (1978); State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship , 157 W.Va. 100, 207 S.E.2d 421 (1973). Ta ken together, these amendm ents create a strong and independent ju diciary that can concentrat e on delivering a high quality, fair, and efficient system of justice to the citizens of West Virginia. Such measures are particularly useful in a State such as ours that continues, and appropriately so, to elect judges to fi xed terms of office. That is, because judges remain ultimately be holden to the electorate, the need is even greater to insulate the judiciary from the more routine politic s of the annual budget process and legislative or executive manipulation. *** [A]ltering the administrative structure di d not negate all prior laws that are tangentially related to administrati ve matters. To the contrary, the Reorganization Amendment provides us with a hierarchy to be used in resolving administrative conflicts and problems. As we explained in

28 “The Judicial Reorganization Amendmen t was ratified on November 5, 1974.” State ex rel. Dunbar v. Stone , 159 W. Va. 331, 333, 2 21 S.E.2d 791, 792 (1976).

39Rutledge , this Court's “exclusive authority over the administration, and primary responsibility for establishing rules of practice and procedure, secures businesslike management for the courts and promotes simplified and more economical judicial procedur es.” 175 W.Va. at 379, 332 S.E.2d at 834. Under the Amendment, the Judiciary, not the executive branch, is vested with the authority to reso lve any substantial, genuine, and irreconcilable administrative conflic ts regarding court personnel. The judicial system was revised, among other things, to simplify the administrative process and to comple ment prior nonconflicting statutory and case law. Clearly, the administrative structure requires that if there is a conflict, we must not only consider th e concerns of the parties, but also look at the hierarchy of the court syst em. The administration of the court is very important to the unobstructed fl ow of court proceedings and business. Court actions are complicated enough w ithout adding to th eir complexity a struggle over every administrative de cision to be made. The purpose of judicial administrative authority is to enhance and simplify our court system and not to burden it. State ex rel. Frazier v. Meadows , 193 W. Va. 20, 26-28, 45 4 S.E.2d 65, 71-73 (1994). Professor Bastress has compared the general authority of the Supreme Court before and after the Reorganization Amendment as follows: The third and fourth paragraphs, a dded by the Judicial Reorganization Amendment of 1974, establish the unitary judicial system in West Virginia. The first of those grants the court the power to promulgate rules of procedure relating to all aspects of judicial proceedings in the state. Although the court had previously asserted that as an inherent power, it also conceded that the legislature retained the ultimate author ity. After the 1974 amendment, however, the court has ru led, in justifiable reliance on the language of section 3, that the cour t’s rules supersede any legislation in conflict with a court-promulgated rule. Bastress, West Virginia State Constitution , at 227. See Foster v. Sakhai , 210 W. Va. 716, 724 n.3, 559 S.E.2d 53, 61 n. 3 (2001) (“the constitutional po wer and inherent power of the judiciary prevent another branch of government from usurping the Court's authority.”).

40One of the most important changes that the Reorganization Amendment made was to provide this Court with the exclusive constitutional authority to promulgate administrative rules for the effective manageme nt of the judicial system, that “have the force and effect of statutory la w and operate to supersede any law that is in conflict with them.” Syl. pt. 1, in part, Stern Brothers, Inc. v. McClure , 160 W.Va. 567, 236 S.E.2d 222 (1977). This authority is found in Ar ticle VIII, § 3 of the Constitution of West Virginia. We will address the relevant text of both provisions separately. 29 To begin, we will look at the Rule-Making Clause of Section 3. The relevant text of the Rule-Making Clause of Section 3 provides as follows: The court shall have power to pr omulgate rules for all cases and proceedings, civil and criminal, for all of the courts of the state relating to writs, warrants, process, practice and pr ocedure, which shall have the force and effect of law. Section 3 unquestionably provid es this Court with the sole constitutional authority to promulgate rules for the judicial system, and demands that those rules have the force of law. See Syl. pt. 5, State v. Wallace , 205 W. Va. 155, 517 S.E. 2d 20 (1999) (“The West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure are the paramount authority controlling criminal proceedings before the circuit courts of th is jurisdiction; any st atutory or common-law procedural rule that conflicts with these Rule s is presumptively withou t force or effect.”); Syl. pt. 10, Teter v. Old Colony Co ., 190 W. Va. 711, 714, 4 41 S.E.2d 728, 731 (1994) “Under Article VIII, ... Section 3 of the C onstitution of West Virg inia (commonly known as the Judicial Reorganization Amendment), administrative rules promulgated by the

29 The authority of the Court to promulgate rules is also c ontained in Article VIII, § 8. This provision is discussed in th e next section of this opinion.

41Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia have the force and effect of statutory law and operate to supersede any law that is in conflict with them.”); Syl. pt. 1, Bennett v.
Warner , 179 W. Va. 742, 372 S.E. 2d 920 (1988), superseded by statute as stated in Miller

v. Allman , 240 W. Va. 438, 813 S.E.2d 91 (2018) (“Under article eight, section three of our Constitution, the Supreme Co urt of Appeals shall have the power to promulgate rules for all of the courts of the State related to process, practice, and procedure, which shall have the force and effect of law.”). The responsibility imposed on this Court by Section 3 was articulated in State ex rel. Bagley v. Blankenship , 161 W.Va. 630, 246 S.E.2d 99 (1978): The Judicial Reorganization Amendment, Article VIII, Section 3, of the Constitution, placed heavy responsibilities on this Court for administration of the state's entire court system. The mandate of the people, so expressed, commands the members of the Court to be alert to the needs and requirements of the court system throughout the state. Bagley , 161 W.Va. at 644–45, 246 S.E.2d at 107. “Not only does our Constitution explicitly vest the judiciary with the control over its own administrative business, but it is a fortiori that the judiciary mu st have such control in order to maintain its independence.” Syl. pt. 2, State ex rel. Lambert v. Stephens , 200 W.Va. 802, 490 S.E.2d 891 (1997). In carrying out the responsibility imposed by Section 3, this Court has not been hesitant in finding statutes void when they we re in conflict with any rule promulgated by this Court. See Syl. pt. 1, Witten v. Butcher , 238 W. Va. 323, 794 S.E.2d 587 (2016) (“The provision in W. Va. Code § 3-7-3 (1963) requiring oral argument to be held in an appeal of a contested election, is invalid because it is in conflict with the oral argument criteria of Rule 18 of the West Virginia Ru les of Appellate Procedure.”); Syl. pt. 6, State

42Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Prinz , 231 W. Va. 96, 743 S.E.2d 907 (2013) (“Because it addresses evidentiary matters th at are reserved to and regulat ed by this Court pursuant to the Rule–Making Clause, Article VIII, § 3 of the West Virginia Constitution, West Virginia Code § 57–3–1 (1937), commonly refe rred to as the Dead Man's Statute, is invalid, as it conflicts with the paramount authority of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence.”); Syl. pt. 3, Louk v. Cormier , 218 W. Va. 81, 622 S.E. 2d 788 (2005) (“The provisions contained in W. Va. Code § 55–7B–6d (2001) were enacted in violation of the Separation of Powers Clause, Ar ticle V, § 1 of the West Virg inia Constitution, insofar as the statute addresses procedural litigation ma tters that are regulated exclusively by this Court pursuant to the Rule –Making Clause, Article VIII, § 3 of the West Virginia Constitution. Consequently, W. Va. Code § 55 –7B–6d, in its entirety, is unconstitutional and unenforceable.”); Games-Neely ex rel. W. Virginia State Police v. Real Property , 211
W. Va. 236, 245, 565 S.E.2d 35 8, 367 (2002) (“Rule 60(b) has the force and effect of law; applies to forfeiture proceedings unde r the Forfeiture Act; and supersedes West Virginia Code § 60A–7–705(d) to the extent th at Section 705(d) can be read to deprive a circuit court of its grant of discretion to review a default judgment order.”); Oak Cas. Ins. Co. v. Lechliter , 206 W. Va. 349, 351 n.3, 524 S.E. 2d 704, 706 n.3 (1 999) (“We note, however, that to any extent that W. Va. Co de § 56–10–1 may be in conflict with W. Va.
R. Civ. P. Rule 22, it has been superseded.”); W. Virginia Div. of Highways v. Butler , 205
W. Va. 146, 150, 516 S.E.2d 769, 773 (1999) (“if W.Va . Code § 37–14–1 et seq., unambiguously prohibited anyone but a licensed or certified appraiser from testifying with regard to the value of real estate in a court proceeding, th is prohibition would be

43contrary to the Rules of Evidence promulgate d by this Court, pursuant to article eight, section three of our Cons titution, and, thus, the pr ohibition would be void.”); State v. Jenkins , 195 W. Va. 620, 625 n. 5, 466 S.E.2d 471, 476 n.5 (1995) (finding W.Va. R. Evid. Rule 901 superseded W.Va. Code § 57-2-1); Syl. pt. 2, Williams v. Cummings , 191
W. Va. 370, 445 S.E.2d 757 (1994) (“West Virginia Code § 56-1-1 (a)(7) provides that venue may be obtained in an ad joining county ‘[i]f a judge of a circuit be interested in a case which, but for such interest, would be pr oper for the jurisdiction of his court....’ This statute refers to a situation under which a ju dge might be disqualified, and therefore it is in conflict with and superseded by Tr ial Court Rule XVII, which addresses the disqualification and temporar y assignment of judges.”); Mayhorn v. Logan Med. Found ., 193 W. Va. 42, 454 S.E.2d 87 (1994) (finding W.Va. Code , 55-7B-7, whic h outlined the qualifications of an expert in a medical ma lpractice case, was superseded by W.Va. R. Evid. 702); Teter v. Old Colony Co ., 190 W. Va. 711, 726, 4 41 S.E.2d 728, 743 (1994) (“a legislative enactment which is substantia lly contrary to provisions in our Rules of Evidence would be invalid.”); Syl. pt. 2, State ex rel. Gains v. Bradley , 199 W. Va. 412, 484 S.E.2d 921 (1997) (“Rule 1B of the Administrative Ru les for Magistrate Courts supersedes W.Va. Code § 50-4-7 (1992), and prospectively provides there is no automatic mandatory right of a party to have a magistrate disqualified.”); Gilman v. Choi , 185 W. Va. 177, 178, 406 S. E.2d 200, 201 (1990), ove rruled on other grounds by Mayhorn v. Logan Med. Found ., 193 W. Va. 42, 454 S.E.2d 87 (1994) (“W.Va. Code, 55–7B–7 [1986], being concerned primarily with the competency of expert testimony in a medical malpractice action, is valid under Rule 601 of the West Virginia Rules of

44Evidence.”); Syl. pt. 2, State v. Davis , 178 W. Va. 87, 88, 357 S.E.2d 769, 770 (1987), overruled on other grounds State ex rel. R.L. v. Bedell , 192 W. Va. 435, 452 S.E.2d 893 (1994) (“Rule 7(c)(1) of the We st Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure supersedes the provisions of W.Va. Code, 62-9-1, to the exte nt that the indorsemen t of the grand jury foreman and attestation of the prosecutor ar e no longer required to be placed on the reverse side of the indictment. Such indorsement and attestation ar e sufficient if they appear on the face of the indictment.”); Hechler v. Casey , 175 W.Va. 434, 333 S.E.2d 799 (1985) (invalidating a statute in part that was in conflict with W. Va. R.App. P., Rule 23); State ex rel. Quelch v. Daugherty , 172 W. Va. 422, 425, 3 06 S.E.2d 233, 236 (1983) (“W.Va. Code, 30-2-1, as am ended, is an unconstitutional usurpation of this Court's exclusive authority to regulate ad mission to the practice of law in this State.”); Syl. pt. 2, in part, Carey v. Dostert , 170 W. Va. 334, 294 S.E.2d 137 (1982) “(West Virginia Code, 30-2-7 and a circuit court's common-law power to disbar are obsolete and have been superseded by ... the Judicial Reorganizatio n Amendment of our Constitution, Article VIII.”); State ex rel. Askin v. Dostert , 170 W. Va. 562, 567, 29 5 S.E.2d 271, 276 (1982) (holding that to the extent W.Va. Code § 30-2-1 required secur ity from attorneys to insure their good behavior, it “conflicts with the rules promulgated by this Court [and] must fall.”). Before we address the issue of overpa yment of senior-status judges, we must examine the text of the Senio r-Status Clause found in Artic le VIII, § 8 of the Constitution of West Virginia provides as follows:

45A retired justice or judge may, with his permission and with the approval of the supreme court of appeals, be recalled by the chief justice of the supreme court of appeals for temporary assignment as a justice of the supreme court of appeals, or judge of an intermediate appellate court, a circuit court or a magistrate court. The issue of the authority of the Chief Justice to appoint judges for te mporary service has been addressed in two cases by this Court. First, in State ex rel. Crabtree v. Hash , 180 W. Va. 425, 376 S.E.2d 631 (1988) the judge for the Fifth Judicial Circuit (consisting of Calhoun, Jackson and Roane counties) retired from office. A special judge was elected and appointed to fill the va cancy by several members of the Jackson County Bar Association, pursuant to W.Va. Code § 51-2-10. 30 The Administrative Director of this Court filed a writ of prohibition to prev ent the newly appointed judge from holding office. The opinion succin ctly held that the statute was void as follows: W.Va. Const. art. VIII, §§ 3 and 8, and all administrative rules made pursuant to the powers derived from article VIII, supersede W.Va. Code, 51-2-10 [1931] and vest the Chief Jus tice of the Supreme Court of Appeals with the sole power to appoint a judge for temporary service in any situation which requires such an appointment. *** Any election conducted pursuant to W. Va. Code, 51-2-10 [1 931] is void as the constitutional power to assign judges for temporary service rests with the Chief Justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Crabtree , 180 W. Va. at 428, 376 S.E.2d at 634. In a footnote in Crabtree this Court made further observations relevant to this proceeding: W.Va. Const. art. VIII, governing th e judiciary, has only been amended twice in the State's histor y, in 1880 and 1974. Pr ior to 1974, the Supreme Court of Appeals had no constitutionally derived ad ministrative authority over the lower tribunals of the State. In stead, the legislature had substantial authority, including the power to creat e laws concerning special judges.

30 This statute was subsequently repealed.

46W.Va. Const. art. VIII, § 15 (repeal ed) stated: “The legislature shall provide by law for holding regular and special terms of the circuit courts, where from any cause the judge shall fail to attend, or, if in attendance, cannot properly preside.” The upshot of this authority was W.Va. Code, 51-2-10 [1931]. By virtue of former art. VIII, § 15, this Court had no constitutional authority to act in such matters. However, as a result of the Judicial Reorganization Amendment of 1974, the legislature was divested of all ad ministrative powers over state court judges. No provision simila r to former art. VIII, § 15 exists. Instead, this Court was given “general supervis ory control over all intermediate appellate courts, circuit courts and magi strate courts,” and the Chief Justice, as “administrative head of all the cour ts,” was specifically given the power of temporary assignment of circuit judges. Crabtree , 180 W. Va. at 427 n.3, 37 6 S.E.2d at 633 n.3 (int ernal citations omitted). The decision in Stern Bros. v. McClure , 160 W. Va. 567, 236 S.E.2d 222 (1977) addressed the issue of statutes that attempte d to control assignments of judges, but were in conflict with an administra tive rule of this Court. In Stern the defendants filed a writ of prohibition with this Court to have a substitute trial judg e removed from their case. The trial judge was appointed by the Chief Justice of this Court because the original judge was disqualified. The defendants argued that the manner in which the substitute judge was appointed was inconsistent with the st atutory scheme for appointing a substitute judge when the original judge is disqualifie d. This Court found th at the administrative rule adopted by this Court for the appointment of a subs titute judge invalidated the statutes. The opinion reasoned as follows: Procedures for appointment of a subs titute judge were pr omulgated by this Court on May 29, 1975, in an admi nistrative rule dealing with the temporary assignment of circuit court judges where a particular judge is disqualified from handling a case.... The power to promulgate administrativ e rules is expressly conferred upon this Court under the Judicial Re organization Amendment, and under

47Section 8 explicit recognition is made of the inherent rulemaking power of the Court, which prior to the Judici al Reorganization Amendment had been utilized by this Court to adopt judicial rules. Such rules have the force and effect of statutory law by virtue of Article VIII, Section 8 of the Judicial Reor ganization Amendment.... Prior to the adoption of the Judicial Reorganizati on Amendment, there may have been some question as to this Court's superv isory powers over lower courts. It is now quite clear under the Judicial Reorganization Amendment that considerable supervisory powers have been conferred upon this Court. There was also some confusion prio r to the Judicial Reorganization Amendment as to what further action a disqualified judge could take in the case. This arose partly out of the fact that there was no clear authority in the Supreme Court to temporarily assi gn judges in such situations. Consequently, the disqualif ied judge had either to initiate the election of a special judge pursuant to W.Va. Code, 51 -2-10, or to attempt to transfer the case to another circuit court in acc ordance with W.Va. Code, 56-9-2. The statute relating to disqualifica tion of judges contained a proviso permitting the judge “. . . to enter a formal order designed merely to advance the cause towards a final hear ing and not requiring judicial action involving the merits of the case.” W.Va. Code, 51-2-8.... Undoubtedly, one of the reasons behind the Judicial Reorganization Amendment was to provide a more simplified system of handling the problem of securing a replacement ju dge where the original judge is disqualified. The former procedures were cumbersome at best. Special judge elections were constantly att acked and in many instances overturned because of some technical failur e to follow W.Va. Code, 51-2-10. The administrative rule promulgate d by this Court now controls the procedure for selection of a temporary judge where a disqualification exists as to a circuit court judge. Under Article VIII, Section 8 of the West Virginia Constitution, it operates to supersede the existing statutory provisions found in W.Va. Code, 51-2- 9 and -10, and W. Va. Code, 56-9-2, insofar as they relate to the selection of special judges or the assignment of the case to another circu it judge when a circuit judge is disqualified.
Stern , 160 W. Va. at 572-575, 236 S.E.2d at 225-227. 31

31 It will be noted that the Legislature re pealed W.Va. Code §§ 51-2-9 and 10 in 1992. Although W.Va. Code § 56-9-2 , which was enacted in 1868 an d last amended 1923, was invalidated by Stern the Legislature has not repealed it.

48In the final analysis, the foregoing disc ussion instructs this Court that statutory laws that are repugnant to the constitutionally promulgated rules of this Court are void. With these legal principles in full view, we turn to the merits of the issue presented. Two of the Articles of Im peachment brought against th e Petitioner, Article IV and Article VI, charge her with overpaying seni or-status judges in violation of the maximum payment allowed under W.Va. Code § 51-9-10. The Articles of Impeachment also state that the overpayments violated W.Va. Code § 51-2-13, W.Va. Const. Art. VIII, § 7, an administrative order of the Supreme Court a nd Canon I and II of the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct. The Articles also alle ge that the overpayments “potentially” violate two criminal statutes: W.Va. Code § 61-3-22 (falsification of accounts) and W.Va. Code § 61-3-24 (obtaining money by false pretenses). 32 The viability of all of the alleged violations in the two Article s hinge upon whether the Petiti oner overpaid senior-status judges. The determination of overpayment is controlled by W.Va. Code § 51-9-10, which limits the payment to senio r-status judges. The full text of W.Va. Code § 51-9-10 provides as follows: The West Virginia supreme court of appeals is authorized and empowered to create a panel of senior judges to utilize the talent and experience of former circuit court judges and supreme court justices of this state. The supreme court of appeals shall promulga te rules providing for said judges and justices to be assigned duties as needed and as feasible toward the objective of reducing caseloa ds and providing speedie r trials to litigants throughout the state: Provided, That reasonable payment shall be made to said judges and justices on a per di em basis: Provided, however, That the

32 We must note that “potentially” violati ng a criminal statute is not wrongful impeachable conduct. Therefor e the language in the Articles of Impeachment that state that W.Va. Code § 61-3-22 an d W.Va. Code § 61-3-24 were “potentially” violated are meaningless allegations.

49per diem and retirement compensation of a senior judge shall not exceed the salary of a sitting judge , and allowances shall also be made for necessary expenses as provided for special judges under articles two and nine of this chapter. 33 (Emphasis added.) The Petitioner does not dispute that she authorized the payment of senior-status judges, when necessary, in excess of the limitation imposed by the statute. Although the Petitioner has advanced several arguments as to why her conduct wa s valid, we need only address one of her arguments. That ar gument centers on an administrative order promulgated by the Chief Justice on May 17, 2017. 34 The order expressly authorized the payment of senior-status judges in excess of the limitation imposed by W.Va. Code § 51

- 9-10. The order stated that it was being prom ulgated under the aut hority of Article III, §§ 3, 8, and 17. The order also stated the re ason for the decision to authorize payment in excess of the statutory limitation: In the vast majority of instances, the statutory proviso [W.Va. Code § 51

- 9-10] does not interfere with provid ing essential services. However, in certain exigent circumstances invo lving protracted illness, lengthy suspensions due to ethical violations, or other extraordinary circumstances, it is impossible to assure statewide con tinuity of judicial services without exceeding the payment limitation im posed by the statutory proviso. The Petitioner provided an illustration of a situation where it was necessary to pay a senior-status judge in excess of the statutory limitation: For example, in 2017, the Supreme Court of Appeals suspended a newly elected circuit court judge of Nichol as County for two years because of violations of the code of judicial ethics in certain campaign advertisements. In re Callaghan , 238 W.Va. 495, 503, 796 S. E.2d 604, 612, cert. denied sub. nom., Callaghan v. W. Vi rginia Judicial Investigation Comm’n , 138

33 This statute was originally enacted in 1949 and was amende d in 1975 and 1991.
34 The Chief Justice at that time was Justice Loughry.

50S.Ct. 211, 199 L.Ed.2d 118 (2017). Because the newly elected Judge was suspended for two years, and because Nicholas County is a single judge judicial circuit, an extr aordinary need for temporar y judicial services arose in order to provide the pe ople of Nicholas County with court services and to avoid the unconstitutiona l denial of access to the speedy administration of justice. The Chief Justice appointed senior status Judge James J. Rowe to serve as the temporary circuit judg e of Nicholas Co unty. Judge Rowe travels from his home in Lewisburg each day to perform this service. Judge Rowe serves the people of Nicholas County effectively, attending to the cases on the circuit court’s docket. Usi ng one senior status judge, rather than parading multiple judges throug h the courthouse, allows for the efficient and consistent adjudication of the matters pending in Nicholas County. Prior to the Reorganization Amendment, “the Supreme Court of Appeals had no constitutionally derived administrative authority over the lower tribunals of the State. Instead, the Legislature had substantial auth ority, including the power to create laws concerning special judges.” State ex rel. Crabtree v. Hash , 180 W. Va. 425, 427, 376 S.E.2d 631, 633 (1988). This authority is evident in W.Va . Code § 51-9-10 which, as noted, was enacted in 1 949. We have observed as a gene ral matter that “[t]he 1974 Judicial Reorganization Amen dment to our State Constitutio n also recognized that previously enacted laws re pugnant to it were voided.” Carey v. Dostert , 170 W. Va. 334, 336, 294 S.E.2d 137, 139 (1982). See W.Va. Cons t. Art. VIII, § 13 (“Except as otherwise provided in this article, such parts of the common law, and of the laws of this state as are in force on the effectiv e date of this article and are not repugnant thereto , shall be and continue the law of this state until altered or repealed by the Legislature.”) (emphasis added). West Virginia Code § 51-9-10, in its entirety, is repugnant to Article VIII, § 3 and § 8. The statute seeks to control a function of the judici al system, appointing seniorstatus judges for temporary service, when Article VIII, § 8 has expressly given that

51function exclusively to the Supreme Court. Moreover, the statute’s limitation on payment to senior-status judges is void and unenfor ceable, because of the administrative order promulgated on May 17, 2017. 35 See Syl. pt. 4, State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship , 157 W.Va. 100, 207 S.E.2d 421 (1973) (“Th e judiciary department has the inherent power to determine what funds are necessary for its efficient and effective operation.”). Finally, as we have long held , “[l]egislative enactments whic h are not compatible with those prescribed by the judiciary or with its goals are unconstitutional violations of the separation of powers.” State ex rel. Quelch v. Daugherty , 172 W. Va. 422, 424, 306 S.E.2d 233, 235 (1983). To be clear, and we so hold, West Virginia Code § 51-9-10 (1991) violates the Separation of Powers Clause of Article V, § 1 of the West Virginia Constitution, insofar as that st atute seeks to regulate judicial appointment matters that are regulated exclusively by this Court pursuant to Article VIII, § 3 and § 8 of the West Virginia Constitution. Conseq uently, W.Va. Code § 51-9- 10, in its entirety, is unconstitutional an d unenforceable. 36

35 It is not relevant that the administrative order was entered several years after the Petitioner’s authorized payments. The stat ute was void at the time in which the Respondents sought to impeach her.
36 We summarily dispense with the Articles of Impeachment’s reference to the Salary Clause of Article VIII, § 7 as a source of legi slative authority for regulating payments to senior-status judges. This clause does not provide such authority . The Salary Clause provides as follows: Justices, judges and magistrates shall receive the salaries fixed by law, which shall be paid entirely out of the state treasury, and which may be increased but shall not be diminished du ring their term of office, and they shall receive expenses as provided by law. The salary of a circuit judge shall also not be diminished during hi s term of office by virtue of the

52In light of our holding, the Petitioner did not overpay any senior-status judge as alleged in Article IV and Ar ticle VI of the Articles of Impeachment, therefore the Respondents are prohibited from further prosecution of the Pe titioner under those Articles. C. The Supreme Court has Exclusive Jurisdic tion to Determine whether a Judicial Officer’s Conduct Violates a Canon of the Code of Judicial Conduct The Petitioner next contends that Artic le XIV of the Impeachment Articles is invalid because it is base d upon alleged violations of the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct, which, she conte nds, is constitutionally regulated by the Supreme Court. 37 To

statutory courts of record of limited jurisdiction of his circuit becoming a part of such circuit as provided in section five of this article. It is clear from the plain text of the Salary Cl ause that it only applies to salaries of judges “during their term of office.” See Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Trent v. Sims , 138 W.Va. 244, 77 S.E.2d 122 (1953) (“If a c onstitutional provision is clear in its terms, and the intention of the electorate is clearly embraced in the langua ge of the provision itself, this Court must apply and not interpret the provision.”). Seni or-status judges are retir ed judges and do not hold an office. Therefore, th e Salary Clause does not pr ovide the Legislature with authority to regulate the per diem payment of senior-status judges.
37 The text of Article XIV was set out as follows: That the said Chief Justice Margaret Workman, Justice Allen Loughry, Justice Robin Davis, and Justice E lizabeth Walker, being at all times relevant Justices of the Supreme Co urt of Appeals of West Virginia, unmindful of the duties of their high o ffices, and contrary to the oaths taken by them to support the Constitution of the State of West Virginia and faithfully discharge the duties of their o ffices as such Jus tices, while in the exercise of the functions of the office of Justices, in violation of their oaths of office, then and there, with regard to the discharge of the duties of their offices, did, in the absence of any po licy to prevent or control expenditure, waste state funds with little or no conc ern for the costs to be borne by the tax payers for unnecessary and lavi sh spending for various purposes including, but without limit ation, to certain examples, such as: to remodel

53state offices, for large increases in travel budge ts-including unaccountable personal use of state vehicles, for un needed computers for home use, for regular lunches from restaurants, a nd for framing of personal items and other such wasteful expenditure not necessary for the administration of justice and the execution of the duties of the Court; and, did fail to provide or prepare reasonable and proper superv isory oversight of the operations of the Court and the subordinate courts by failing to carry out one or more of the following necessary and prope r administrative activities: A) To prepare and adopt su fficient and effective travel policies prior to October of 2016, and failed thereafter to properly effectuate such policy by excepting the Justices from said policies, and subjected su bordinates and employees to a greater burden than the Justices; B) To report taxable fringe be nefits, such as car use and regular lunches, on Federal W-2s, despite full knowledge of the Internal Revenue Service Regulations, and further subjected subordinates and em ployees to a greater burden than the Justices, in this rega rd, and upon notification of such violation, failed to speedily co mply with requests to make such reporting consistent with applicable law; C) To provide proper supervision, control, and auditing of the use of state purchasing cards leading to multiple violations of state statutes and policies regul ating the proper use of such cards, including failing to obt ain proper prior approval for large purchases; D) To prepare and adopt sufficient and effective home office policies which would govern the Justices' home computer use, and which led to a lack of oversight which encouraged the conversion of property; E) To provide effective superv ision and control over record keeping with respect to the us e of state automobiles, which has already resulted in an ex ecuted information upon one former Justice and the indict ment of another Justice. F) To provide effective s upervision and control over inventories of state property owned by the Court and subordinate courts, which led directly to the undetected absence of valuable state prope rty, including, but not limited to, a state-owned desk and a state owned computer;

54be blunt, Article XIV is an unwieldy compila tion of allegations that culminate with the accusation that the Petitioner’s conduct, with re spect to the allegations, violated Canon I 38
and Canon II 39 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. 40 We agree with the Petitioner that this Court has exclusive constitutional jurisdiction ov er conduct alleged to be in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The controlling constitutional authority is set out under Article VIII, § 8 of the Constitution of West Virginia. We have held that “[p]ursuant to article VIII, section 8 of the West Virginia Constitution, this Court has the inherent and express authority to ‘prescribe, adopt, promulgate and amend rules prescribing a judicial code of ethics, and a code of regulations and standards of condu ct and performances fo r justices, judges and

G) To provide effective supervision and control over purchasing procedures which dire ctly led to inadequate cost containment methods, includ ing the rebidding of the purchases of goods and services utilizing a system of large unsupervised change orders, all of which encouraged waste of taxpayer funds. The failure by the Justices, individually and collectively, to carry out these necessary and proper administrative activities constitute a violation of the provisions of Canon I and Canon II of the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct.
38 Canon I states the following: A judge shall uphold and promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and sha ll avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety. 39 Canon II states the following: A judge shall perform the duties of j udicial office impartially, competently, and diligently.
40 We will note that Article IV and Article VI of the Articles of Impeachment also contained allegations that Can on I and Canon II were violated.

55magistrates, along with sancti ons and penalties for any viola tion thereof [.]’” Syl. pt. 5, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Karl , 192 W.Va. 23, 449 S.E.2d 277 (1994). The relevant text of Section 8 provides as follows: Under its inherent rule-making po wer, which is hereby declared, the supreme court of appeals shall, from time to time, pr escribe, adopt, promulgate and amend rules prescribi ng a judicial code of ethics, and a code of regulations and standards of conduct and performan ces for justices, judges and magistrates, along with sa nctions and penalties for any violation thereof, and the supreme court of appe als is authorized to censure or temporarily suspend any justice, judge or magistrate having the judicial power of the state, including one of its own members, for any violation of any such code of ethics, code of regul ations and standards, or to retire any such justice, judge or magistrate who is eligib le for retirement under the West Virginia judges' re tirement system (or any successor or substituted retirement system for justices, judges and magistrates of this state) and who, because of advancing years a nd attendant physical or mental incapacity, should not , in the opinion of the supreme court of appeals, continue to serve as a jus tice, judge or magistrate. *** When rules herein authorized are pr escribed, adopted and promulgated, they shall supersede all laws and part s of laws in conflict therewith, and such laws shall be and become of no furt her force or effect to the extent of such conflict. This Court’s express constitu tional authority to adopt rule s of judicial conduct and discipline is obvious from the language of Sec tion 8. Pursuant to this express authority, we have adopted the Code of Judicial Cond uct and the Rules of Judicial Disciplinary Procedure. Under Rule 4.10 and Rule 4.11 of the Rules of Judicial Disciplinary Procedure, this Court has the exclusive authorit y to determine whether a justice, judge, or magistrate violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. The record does not disclose that this Court has found that the Petitioner violat ed Canon I or Canon II, based upon the allegations alleged in Article XIV of the Ar ticles of Impeachment. Mo reover, even if the

56record had disclosed that the Petitioner wa s previously found to have violated the Canons in question, th ose violations could not have formed the basis of an impeachment charge. This is because of th e limitations imposed upon th e scope of a Canon violation that is found by this Court. The following is provid ed in Item 7 of the Scope of the Code of Judicial Conduct: The Code is not designed or intende d as a basis for civil or criminal liability. Neither is it inte nded to be the basis for litigants to seek collateral remedies against each other or to obtai n tactical advantages in proceedings before a court. It is quite clear that Item 7 prohibits a Canon violation from being used as the “basis” of a civil or criminal charge and, thus, could not be used as a basis for impeaching the Petitioner. 41 This Court observed in In re Watkins , 233 W. Va. 170, 757 S.E.2d 594 (2013): Just as the legislative branch has the power to examine the qualifications of its own members and to discipline them , this Court has the implicit power to discipline members of the judicial branch. The Court has this power because it is solely responsible for the protection of the judicial branch, and because the power has not been constitu tionally granted to either of the other two branches. Watkins , 233 W. Va. at 177, 757 S.E.2d at 601. It is quite evident to this Court that the impeachment proceedings under Article XIV of the Articles of Impeachment require s the Court of Impeachment to make a

41 It has long been recognized that an impe achment proceeding is civil in nature. See Skeen v. Craig , 31 Utah 20, 86 P. 487, 487-488 (1906) (“The question as to whether [impeachment] proceedings of this kind to rem ove from office a public official are civil or criminal has been before the courts of other states, and, while the decisions are not harmonious, yet the great weight of authority, and as we think the better reasoned cases hold that such actions are civil.”).

57determination that the Petitioner violated Canon I and Canon II. Such a determination in that forum violates the separation of powers doctrine, because pursuant to Article VIII, § 8 of the Constitution of West Vi rginia, this Court has the excl usive authority to determine whether the Petitioner violated either of those Canons. In other words, and we so hold, this Court has exclusive authority and juri sdiction under Article VIII, § 8 of the West Virginia Constitution and the ru les promulgated thereunder, to sanction a judicial officer for a violation of a Canon of the West Virginia Code of J udicial Conduct. Therefore, the Separation of Powers Clause of Article V, § 1 of the West Virginia Constitution prohibits the Court of Impeachment from prosecuting a j udicial officer for an alleged violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Respondents have argued that “to hol d that the Legislature cannot consider the Code of Judicial Conduct in its deliber ation of impeachment proceedings against a judicial officer would have the absurd re sult of prohibiting removal from office for any violations of the Code of Judicial C onduct.” This argument misses the point. Unquestionably, the Legislature can consider in its deliberations whether there was evidence showing that this Court found a judici al officer violated a Canon. However, the Canon violation itself cannot be the basis of the impeachment charge--at most it could only act as further evidence for removal based upon other valid charges of wrongful conduct. In light of our holding, the Court of Im peachment does not have jurisdiction over the alleged violations set out in Article XIV of the Articles of Impeachment, therefore the

58Respondents are prohibited from further pros ecution of the Petitioner under that Article

as written. 42
D. The Articles of Impeachment were Filed in Violation of Provisions of House Resolution 201 Although we have determin ed that the Petitioner is entitled to relief based upon the foregoing, we believe that the remaining issues involving the fa ilure to comply with two provisions of House Reso lution 201 are not moot. This Court set forth a three-prong test to determine whether we should rule on the merits of technically moot issues in syllabus point 1 of Israel by Israel v. West Virg inia Secondary Schools Activities
Commission , 182 W.Va. 454, 3 88 S.E.2d 480 (1989): Three factors to be considered in d eciding whether to address technically moot issues are as follows: first, th e court will determine whether sufficient collateral consequences will result from determination of the questions presented so as to justify relief; second, while technically moot in the immediate context, questions of great public interest may nevertheless be addressed for the future guidance of the bar and of the public; and third, issues which may be repeatedly presen ted to the trial court, yet escape review at the appellate level because of their fleeting and determinate nature, may appropriately be decided.

42 We must also note that even if Article XIV of the Articles of Impeachment had set out a valid basis for impeachment, it would still not pass constitutional muster on due process grounds, because it is vague and ambiguous. See State v. Bull , 204 W. Va. 255, 261, 512 S.E.2d 177, 18 3 (1998) (“Claims of unc onstitutional vagueness in [charging instruments] are grounded in the constitutional due process cl auses, U.S. Const. am end. XIV, Sec. 1, and W.Va. Const. art. III, Sec. 10.”). As dr afted, the Article failed to specify which Justice committed any of the myriad of conduct allegations. The Petitioner had a constitutional right to be “adequately info rmed of the nature of the charge[.]” State v. Hall , 172 W. Va. 138, 144, 304 S.E.2d 43, 48 (1983). See Single Syllabus, Myers v. Nichols , 98 W. Va. 37, 126 S.E. 351 (1925) (“While charges for the removal of a public officer need not be set out in the strict form of an indictme nt, they should be sufficiently explicit to give the defendant notice of what he is required to answer.”).

59We believe that there may be collateral conse quences in failing to address the issues, the issues are of great public importance, and the issues may present themselves again. State ex rel. McKenzie v. Smith , 212 W. Va. 288, 297, 569 S. E.2d 809, 818 (2002) (“Because of the possibility that the Division's contin ued utilization of this system may escape review at the appellate level, we address the merits of this case under the ... exception to the mootness doctrine.”). The Petitioner has argued that Hous e Resolution 201 required the House Committee on the Judiciary to set out findings of fact in the Article s of Impeachment and required the House of Delegates adopt a resolution of impeachment. The Petitioner contends that neither of these required task s were performed and that her right to due process was violated as a consequence. We agree. We begin by noting that “[t]he threshold question in any inquir y into a claim that an individual has been denied procedural due process is whether the interest asserted by the individual rises to the level of a ‘property’ or ‘liberty’ interest protected by Article III, Section 10 of our constitution.” Clarke v. West Virgin ia Board of Regents , 166 W.Va. 702, 709, 279 S.E.2d 169, 175 (1981). 43 See Syl. Pt. 1, Waite v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n , 161 W.Va. 154, 241 S.E.2d 164 (19 77), overruled on other grounds West Virginia Dep't of Educ. v. McGraw , 239 W. Va. 192, 800 S.E.2d 230 (2017) (“Th e Due Process Clause, Article III, Section 10 of the West Virginia Constitution, requires procedural safeguards

43 Article III, § 10 of the Constitution of West Virginia provides as follows: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, and the judgment of his peers.

60against state action which affects a liberty or property interest.”). We have held as a general matter that “[a]n administrative body must abide by the remedies and procedures it properly establishes to conduct its affairs.” State ex rel. Wilson v. Truby , 167 W. Va. 179, 188, 281 S.E.2d 2 31, 236 (1981). The Pe titioner has both a liberty 44 and property 45 interest in having the impeac hment rules followed. The Petitione r has a liberty interest in not having her reputati on destroyed in the legal community and public at-large by being impeached and removed from office; and she ha s a property interest in obtaining her pension when she chooses to retire. We begin by noting the record suppor ts the Petitioner’s c ontention that House Resolution 201 required the Judiciary Committee to set out findings of fact, and that this was not done. Rule 3 a nd 4 of Resolution 201 required th e Judiciary Committee to do the following:
3. To make findings of fact based u pon such investigation and hearing(s);

44 See Syl. pt. 2, Waite v. Civil Serv. Comm'n , 161 W. Va. 154, 154 , 241 S.E.2d 164, 165 (1977), overruled on other grounds West Virginia Dep't of Educ. v. McGraw , 239 W. Va. 192, 800 S.E.2d 230 (2017) (“The ‘liberty in terest’ includes an individual's right to freely move about, live and work at his chosen voca tion, without the burden of an unjustified label of infamy. A liberty intere st is implicated when the St ate makes a charge against an individual that might seriously damage his st anding and associations in his community or places a stigma or other disability on hi m that forecloses future employment opportunities.”). 45 See Syl. pt. 3, Waite v. Civil Serv. Comm'n , 161 W. Va. 154, 154 , 241 S.E.2d 164, 165 (1977), overruled on other grounds West Virginia Dep't of Educ. v. McGraw , 239 W. Va. 192, 800 S.E.2d 230 (2017) (“A ‘property interest’ includes not only the traditional notions of real and personal property, but al so extends to those benefits to which an individual may be deemed to have a legitim ate claim of entitlement under existing rules or understandings.”).

614. To report to the House of Delegates its findings of facts and any recommendations consistent with t hose findings of fact which the Committee may deem proper. The record demonstrates that the Judiciary Committee was aware that it failed to carry out the above duties, but refused to correct the error. The followi ng exchange occurred during the proceedings in the House regard ing the failure to follow Rules 3 and 4:
MINORITY VICE CHAIR FLUHAR TY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Counsel, I was going through these Artic les. Where are the findings of fact? MR. CASTO: Well, there--there are no findings of fact there. The Committee-- MINORITY VICE CHAIR FLUHARTY: Where? MR. CASTO: I said, sir, ther e are no findings of fact. MINORITY VICE CHAIR FLUHARTY: Th ere are no findings of fact? All right. Have you read House Resolution 201? MR. CASTO: I have sir, but I have not read it today. MINORITY VICE CHAIR FLUHARTY : Well, do you know that we’re required to have findings of fact? MR. CASTO: I think, sir, that my understanding is--based upon the Manchin Articles--that the term “findi ngs of fact” which was used at the same time, that the profferment of thes e Articles is indeed equivalent to a findings of fact. The--but that, ag ain, is your interpretation, sir. MINORITY VICE CHAIR FLUHARTY: So based upon the clear wording of House Resolution 201, it says we’re “To make findings of fact based upon such investigation and hearings;” and “To report to the Legislature its findings of facts and any recommendatio ns consistent with those findings of facts which the Committee may deem proper.” I mean, you’re--you’re aware how this works in the legal system. You draft separate findings of fact. I’m just wondering why we haven’t done that. MR. CASTO: Because, sir, that is not the manner in which impeachment is done. MINORITY VICE CHAIR FLUHARTY: We ll, findings of fact in House Resolution 201 are referenced se parate from proposed Articles of Impeachment. Am I wrong in that observation? MR. CASTO. I don’t believe that you’re wrong in that. The record also discloses that the Judiciary Committee was warned by one of its members of the consequences of its failure to follow its own rules:

62MINORITY CHAIR FLEISCHAUER: Thank you, Mr.--t hank you, Mr. Chairman. I think the gentleman has rais ed a valid point. If we look at the Resolution that empowers this Committee to act, it--it says that we are to make findings of fact based upon such investigation and hearing and to report to the House of Delegate s its findings of fact and any recommendations consistent with thos e findings, of which the Committee may deem proper. *** And I’m just a little concerned that if we don’t have findings of fact that there could be some flaw that could mean that the final Resolution by the House would be deemed to be not valid. *** So I think we--if there--the re would be some wisdom in trying to track the language of the Resolution, and it wo uld be consistent with any other proceeding that we have in West Virg inia that when there are requirements of findings of fact and--in this case, it’s not conclusions of law, but it’s recommendations--that we should follow that. As previously stated, the Petitioner has al so asserted that the House of Delegates failed to adopt a resolution of impeachment. Ru le 2 of the last Further Resolved section of Resolution 201 provides as follows: Further resolved ... that the House of Delegates adopt a resolution of impeachment and formal articles of impeachment as prepared by the Committee; and that the House of Delega tes deliver the same to the Senate in accordance with the procedures of the House of Delegates, for consideration by the Senate according to law. A review of the Articles of Impeachmen t that were submitted to the Senate unquestionably shows that the House of Dele gates failed to include language indicating that the Articles were ad opted by the House. We are gravely concerned with the proced ural flaws that occurred in the House of Delegates. Basic due process principles de mand that governmental bodies follow the rules they enact for the purpose of imposing sanc tions against public officials. This right to due process is heightened when the Legislature attempts to impeach a public official.

63Therefore we hold, in th e strongest of terms, that the Du e Process Clause of Article III, § 10 of the Constitution of West Virginia requires the H ouse of Delegates follow the procedures that it creates to impeach a public officer. Fail ure to follow such rules will invalidate all Articles of Impeachment th at it returns against a public officer. We must also poin t out that the Petitioner was denied due process because none of the Articles of Impeachment returned against her contained a statement that her alleged wrongful conduct amounted to maladministr ation, corruption, incompetency, gross immorality, neglect of duty, or any high crime or misdemeano r, as required by Article IV, § 9 of the Constitution of West Vi rginia. This is the equivalent of an indictment failing to allege the essential elements of wrongful conduct. See Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Combs v. Boles , 151 W. Va. 194, 151 S.E.2d 115 (1966) (“In order to lawfully charge an accused with a particular crime it is imperative that th e essential elements of that crime be alleged in the indictment.”).
V. CONCLUSION We have determined that prosecution of Petitioner for the allegations set out in Article IV, Article VI and Ar ticle XIV of the Articles of Impeachment violates the separation of powers doctrine . The Respondents do not have jurisdiction over the alleged violations in Article IV and Article VI. Th e Respondents also do not have jurisdiction over the alleged violation in Artic le XIV as drafted. In additi on, we have determined that the failure to set out findings of fact, and to pass a resolution ad opting the Articles of Impeachment violated due process principl es. Consequently, the Respondents are

64prohibited from proceeding against the Petiti oner for the conduct al leged in Article IV and Article VI, and in Article XIV as drafte d. The Writ of Prohibition is granted. The Clerk is hereby directed to issue the mandate contemporaneously forthwith. Writ granted.

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