J-S41001-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

TYSHEEM CROCKER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1539 MDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 23, 2019,

in the Court of Common Pleas of York County,

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0000186-1998.

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED OCTOBER 20, 2020

Tysheem Crocker appeals pro se from the order denying his fifth petition 

filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 

We affirm.

In a prior memorandum, this Court summarized the pertinent facts as 

follows:

[Crocker] and Melvin Bethune were members of a gang in 

the York, Pennsylvania, area called “The Cream Team.” Also 

in the York area was a rival gang called “The Gods.” On 

October 5, 1997, following a dispute between the two 

groups, [Crocker] and Bethune traveled from York to New 

York to recruit manpower in order to retaliate against 

members of The Gods. The motivation for the retaliation 

was that members of The Gods had assaulted Bethune 

earlier that day.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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[Crocker] and Bethune returned from New York with three 

individuals, including a man named “Corleone.” This group 

and fellow Cream Team member Danny Steele (“Steele”) 

went to the Super 8 Motel in York to plan the assault. The 

men decided they would shoot “Do-Work,” who was the 

head of The Gods and whomever was with him. They 

planned to attack The Gods at its usual hangout on Maple 

Street.

[Crocker] and the others left the motel and drove to Maple 

Street. They parked their car and entered a home on Maple 

Street where they had stored guns. They retrieved their 

guns and proceeded to a corner where they had been 

advised members of The Gods were playing dice. Do-Work 

was playing dice along with a number of people including 

Raymond Clark (“Clark.”)

[Crocker] and his co-conspirators approached. [Crocker] 

drew a gun on Do-Work and stated, “What’s up now, yo?” 

N.T. Trial, 1/11/99, at 54. [Crocker] attempted to fire his 

gun at Do-Work, but it jammed. Immediately thereafter, 

other members of The Cream Team began firing at the 

people playing dice. The dice players ran, and [Crocker’s] 

group chased them.

Steele, Corleone, and another unnamed co-conspirator 

chased Clark. Corleone shot Clark twice, fatally wounding 

him. Do-Work escaped. [Crocker], Steele, and Bethune 

were all identified by witnesses as having been involved in 

the shootings and were arrested. Steele agreed to testify for 

the Commonwealth in return for unspecified consideration 

in the criminal proceedings against him. Bethune went to

trial with [Crocker] for Clark’s murder and was also found 

guilty of first-degree murder and conspiracy.

Commonwealth v. Crocker, 106 A.3d 149 (Pa. Super. 2014), unpublished 

memorandum, at 1-3 (citation omitted).

This Court also summarized Crocker’s trial testimony as follows:
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At trial, [Crocker] testified in his own defense as follows. He 

has been friends with Steele and his co-defendant, Bethune, 

for at least 10 years. He was part of a group called “the 

Cream Team,” but they were not a gang. Earlier in the day 

on October 5, 1997, The Gods surrounded a house where 

the Cream Team was staying. [Crocker] ran out of the back 

of the house because The Gods were carrying guns. Later, 

Bethune stated that he had been attacked from behind, and 

that he did not see who did it. [Crocker] stated that he had 

an idea who it was, and that he was going to talk to DoWork to get rid of the problem. He and Bethune drove to 

New York City, went shopping for approximately one hour 

on Canal Street, and arrived back in York at approximately 

10:00 or 10:30 that night. In total, [Crocker] spent between 

six and eight hours on the road to do one hour of shopping.

When [Crocker] arrived back in York, Steele told him that 

Steele was having problems with Do-Work. Steele was very 

agitated, and said that he had guns in a third party’s house. 

[Crocker] stated that he could talk to Do-Work without 

guns. Nevertheless, he retrieved a gun from the house and 

approached Do-Work. Do-Work walked toward [Crocker], 

and they met on a corner. [Crocker] did not see anyone else 

during his conversation with Do-Work. A few words were 

exchanged between [Crocker] and Do-Work, but [Crocker] 

did not draw a gun. [Crocker] heard gunshots from an 

unknown source, ran away, and left the gun near a fence. 

At first, [Crocker] stated that he knew the gun was broken 

as he approached Do-Work, but later he testified that he did 

not know the gun was broken until after he ran away from 

the gunshots. At one point, [Crocker] began to say that the 

gun “jammed,” but later he stated that he simply knew the 

gun was broken. He did not go to a motel before this incident 

took place. He did, however, go to a motel after midnight 

on the night of the shooting.

Crocker, supra, unpublished memorandum at 3.

On January 15, 1999, the jury convicted Crocker of first-degree murder 

and criminal conspiracy. That same day, the trial court imposed the 

mandatory life in prison sentence for the murder conviction, and a concurrent 

term of twenty to forty years for the criminal conspiracy conviction. Crocker 
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filed a timely appeal. In an unpublished memorandum filed on December 6, 

1999, this Court affirmed Crocker’s judgment of sentence and our Supreme 

Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal on December 5, 2000. 

Commonwealth v. Crocker, 750 A.2d 366 (Pa. Super. 1999), appeal denied, 

761 A.2d 548 (Pa. 2000).

On September 14, 2000, Crocker filed a timely pro se PCRA, in which 

he raised claims of ineffectiveness involving trial and PCRA counsel. After an 

evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court dismissed Crocker’s PCRA petition on 

March 2, 2001.

Crocker’s PCRA counsel failed to file a direct appeal on Crocker’s behalf. 

Thereafter, Crocker was granted leave to file an appeal nunc pro tunc. 

However, PCRA counsel once again did not file the appeal. After Crocker filed 

a successful second PCRA petition, however, the PCRA court appointed new 

counsel, who promptly filed an appeal to this Court. In that appeal, Crocker 

raised several claims of ineffectiveness on the part of trial and PCRA counsel, 

as well as a claim that the PCRA court erred by failing to grant a new trial 

based on Steele’s “recantation” testimony at the PCRA hearing. In 2002, we 

described the PCRA court’s treatment of this issue as follows:

In rather roundabout fashion, Steele stated at the PCRA 

hearing that some of his trial testimony was true but that 

other elements were embellished to show that [Crocker] 

had the specific intent to kill. According to Steele, his own 

counsel indicated that these embellishments would help him 

receive a more lenient sentence on his own conspiracy 

charge. For example, Steele testified that during the 

meeting at the motel, he did not believe that [Crocker] and 
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his associates were going to commit murder; rather, he 

thought they would simply talk out the problem with The 

Gods.

The PCRA court refused to order a new trial. The court 

reasoned that Steele’s testimony was not substantially 

different from his trial testimony, and that any “recantation” 

at the PCRA hearing was motivated by [Steele’s] motivation 

to protect himself from retaliation at the hands of [Crocker] 

and [Crocker’s] friends. The court also noted that Steele 

told the whole truth at trial, rather than the whitewashed 

version he wanted to tell, because the only way he would 

obtain a favorable deal with the Commonwealth was to tell 

all of the incriminating details to the jury. Finally, the court 

noted that the only real difference between Steele’s trial 

testimony and his PCRA testimony was the issue of whether 

[Crocker] discussed the murders beforehand at the hotel. 

According to the court, the revised testimony would not 

have changed the outcome [of Crocker’s trial] in light of the 

circumstantial evidence that [Crocker] traveled to New York 

and obtained reinforcements, and that they armed 

themselves before confronting The Gods. Thus, the court 

found that Steele’s PCRA testimony was untrustworthy and 

not sufficient to obtain a new trial.

Commonwealth v. Crocker, 809 A.2d 954 (Pa. Super. 2002), unpublished 

memorandum at 16-17 (citations omitted). Our review of the record 

supported the PCRA court’s credibility determination, and because Crocker’s 

ineffectiveness claims failed, we affirmed the PCRA court’s order denying 

Crocker post-conviction relief. Crocker did not seek further review.

On May 15, 2003, Crocker filed his third PCRA petition in which he raised 

several claims, including his assertion that he was entitled to a new trial based 

on newly discovered evidence that would conclusively establish he did not rent 

a hotel room prior to the confrontation that resulted in Clark’s death. By order 

entered June 11, 2003, the PCRA court dismissed this petition as untimely 
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filed. Crocker filed an appeal to this Court. In an unpublished memorandum 

filed on May 1, 2004, we agreed that Crocker’s third PCRA petition was 

untimely, and concluded that Crocker failed to meet his burden with regard to 

the newly-discovered evidence exception to the PCRA’s time bar. 

Commonwealth v. Crocker, 855 A.2d 129 (Pa. Super. 2004). On January 

20, 2005, our Supreme Court denied Crocker’s petition for allowance of 

appeal. Commonwealth v. Crocker, 868 A.2d 1197 (Pa. 2005).

Shortly after filing his third PCRA petition, Crocker also sought relief in 

the federal courts, ultimately ending when a panel of the United States Court 

of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued a non-precedential opinion affirming the 

District Court’s denial of Crocker’s habeas corpus petition. See Crocker v. 

Klem, 450 Fed. Appx. 136 (3d Cir. Pa 2011).

On August 20, 2012, Crocker filed his fourth PCRA petition in which he 

alleged newly-discovered evidence of Steele’s recantation of his trial 

testimony. Crocker attached Steele’s affidavit to the petition, in which Steele 

states that he never saw Crocker put a gun to Do-Work’s head and pull the 

trigger but rather that scenario was invented by the district attorneys, who 

pressured him to give false testimony, as well as a claim that the PCRA court 

erred by failing to grant a new trial based on Steele’s “recantation” testimony. 

After a change of counsel and a January 22, 2013 hearing, the PCRA court 

determined that Steele’s recantation testimony was not credible, and the court 

denied relief. 
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Crocker filed a timely appeal to this Court. We first agreed with the 

PCRA court’s determination that Crocker’s fourth petition was untimely filed. 

We then explained that Crocker could not establish he acted with due diligence 

in discovering this “new” evidence because he offered no explanation for his 

failure to uncover Steele’s latest recantation until 2012. Indeed, at the PCRA 

hearing Steele conceded that he knew at the time that he testified in support 

of Crocker’s first PCRA hearing in 2001, that his trial testimony in which he 

stated Crocker pointed a gun at Do-work’s head was false. Thus, we 

concluded that “Crocker’s lack of due diligence bars assertion of Steele’s 

recent recantation as satisfying the unknown facts exception” to the PCRA’s

time bar.

When affirming the PCRA court’s dismissal of Crocker’s fourth petition 

as untimely, we further stated that, even if the petition was timely, the record 

supports the PCRA court’s determination that Steele’s most recent recantation 

was unworthy of belief. We explained:

Mindful that credibility determinations rest within the 

[PCRA] court’s sound discretion, we would find that the 

PCRA court’s assessment reveals no abuse of discretion. 

The PCRA court considered its prior credibility determination 

regarding Steele’s 2001 PCRA testimony as a factor in not 

believing his second attempt at recanting his testimony. 

Moreover, the PCRA court reasoned that Steele’s new 

testimony in which he added something which happens to 

be the main stumbling block to relief, was another factor 

that entered into its consideration. The PCRA court further 

considered Steele’s credibility in light of Crocker’s 

arguments concerning (1) the corroborating preliminary 

hearing testimony of the intended victim, Do-Work, (2) the 

“corroborating” effect of after discovered evidence of the 
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motel check-in clerk, presented at Crocker’s co-defendant’s 

PCRA hearing, and the improvement of Steele’s testimony 

during the course of trial. The PCRA court rejected these 

arguments, explaining: (1) it did not find Do-Work’s 

preliminary testimony to be credible nor fully corroborative 

of Steele’s recantation, (2) it did not find the motel checkin clerk’s testimony to be significant enough to have any 

weight regarding Steele’s credibility, and (3) it did not find 

Crocker’s conclusion that Steele’s testimony for the 

Commonwealth improved during the course of trial to be 

enough by itself to conclude that Steele testified correctly in 

the PCRA hearing that his testimony was induced by 

improper activity by the prosecutor.

Crocker, 106 A.3d 149 (Pa. Super. 2014), unpublished memorandum at 13-

14 (citations omitted). Thus, because Crocker’s fourth PCRA petition was 

untimely and did not meet any exception to the PCRA’s timeliness 

requirements, we affirmed the PCRA court’s order denying Crocker postconviction relief. On February 25, 2015, our Supreme Court denied Crocker’s 

petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Crocker, 112 A.3d 649 

(Pa. 2015).

On April 30, 2015, Crocker filed the PCRA petition at issue, his fifth. In 

this petition, Crocker asserted that he established an exception to the PCRA’s 

time bar in the form of the newly discovered testimony of Kendo “Do-Work”

Hemphill which corroborated Danny Steele’s recantation that Crocker did not 

put a gun to Do-Work’s head and attempt to fire it. On April 12, 2016, the 

PCRA Court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss Crocker’s 

fifth PCRA petition without a hearing because it was untimely filed, and 

because Crocker failed to establish a time-bar exception.
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After the PCRA court granted Crocker an additional twenty days to 

respond, counsel entered her appearance on Crocker’s behalf. On June 29, 

2016, counsel filed Crocker’s Rule 907 response. In addition, counsel 

requested an evidentiary hearing and sought leave to amend Crocker’s 

petition.1 The PCRA court scheduled an evidentiary hearing that was 

continued several times. On August 10, 2017, new counsel entered their 

appearance on Crocker’s behalf. Ultimately, the PCRA court held an 

evidentiary hearing at which various witnesses testified, including Do-Work. 

After the hearing, the PCRA court requested that the parties file supporting 

briefs within thirty days following receipt of the hearing transcript. 

Counsel filed Crocker’s brief on November 6, 2017. After being granted 

two extensions, the Commonwealth filed its brief on February 12, 2018. 

Crocker filed a pro se reply brief on June 27, 2018. By order entered on 

August 23, 2019, the PCRA court dismissed Crocker’s fifth petition. This pro 

se appeal followed.2 The PCRA court did not require Pa.R.A.P. 1925 

compliance.

Crocker now raises the following issues:

I. Did the [PCRA court] commit error, and abuse its 

discretion, by finding [Crocker’s] claim was untimely 

and previously litigated because [Crocker’s] attorney 

talked to [Do-Work] in 2013, and his newly discovered 

____________________________________________

1 Although being granted an extension of time to do so, counsel failed to file 

an amended brief.

2 Subsequently, Crocker’s counsel was granted leave to withdraw.
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testimony was similar to a 1998 transcript raised in 

2013 at a hearing on [Crocker’s] previous (4th) PCRA 

petition?

II. Does the record fail to support the PCRA court’s 

finding that [Do-Work’s] 2017 testimony is a 

recantation, and did the PCRA court commit legal 

error and abuse its discretion by applying a credibility 

standard applicable to recantations?

III. Did the PCRA court commit legal error by failing to 

assess the credibility of [Do-Work’s] newly discovered 

testimony independently of the 4th PCRA court’s 

finding that there was no credibility to the recantation 

of [Steele]?

IV. Did the PCRA court abuse its discretion by rejecting 

[Do-Work’s] newly discovered testimony because 

[Do-Work] didn’t show “emotion” and “animus” 

regarding his 20-years-bygone confrontation with 

[Crocker]?

V. Did the PCRA court abuse its discretion by failing to 

make credibility determinations of the testimony of 

Shameka Sanders and Omar Jennett?

VI. Did the PCRA court abuse its discretion by allowing its 

decision to be swayed by the court’s own unfounded 

suspicion that there had been improper influence upon 

[Do-Work]?

Crocker’s Brief at 5 (excess capitalization omitted; some formatting altered).

This Court’s standard of review regarding an order dismissing a petition 

under the PCRA is to ascertain whether “the determination of the PCRA court 

is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. The PCRA 

court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings 

in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191-92 

(Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted).
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Before addressing the issues raised by Crocker, we must first determine 

if the PCRA court correctly concluded that his fifth petition was untimely. 

Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or 

subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment 

is final unless the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an exception 

to the time limitation for filing the petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. sections 

9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii), is met.3 A PCRA petition invoking one of these 

statutory exceptions must be filed within 60 days of the date the claims could 

have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).4 Asserted exceptions to the 

time restrictions for a PCRA petition must be included in the petition, and may 

____________________________________________

3 The exceptions to the timeliness requirement are:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference of government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States.

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized 

by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and 

has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii).

4 Section 9545(b)(2) has since been amended to permit filings within one year 

of the date the claim could have been presented. Because Crocker filed the 

PCRA petition at issue in 2015, the shorter 60 day period applies.
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not be raised for the first time on appeal. Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 

A.3d 90 (Pa. Super. 2016).

Here, this Court has previously held that Crocker’s judgment of sentence 

became final on December 5, 2000. See Crocker, 855 A.2d 129 (Pa. Super. 

2004), unpublished memorandum at 4. Because Crocker filed his fifth PCRA 

petition almost fifteen years later, it is patently untimely, unless Crocker has 

satisfied his burden of pleading and proving that one of the enumerated 

exceptions applies.

Crocker failed to prove the applicability of any of the PCRA’s time-bar 

exceptions. As noted above, in his fifth PCRA petition, Crocker argued the 

newly-discovered testimony from Do-Work rendered his petition timely. 

According to Crocker, he could not discover Do-Work’s whereabouts until 

2012, and it took the intercession of a mutual friend to obtain the notarized 

affidavit upon which his 2017 PCRA hearing testimony was based. Crocker 

claims he filed his fifth petition within sixty days of receiving the affidavit.

With this claim, Crocker attempted to establish the PCRA’s timeliness 

exception found at section 9545(b)(1)(ii). 

The timeliness exception set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) 

requires a petitioner to demonstrate he did not know the 

facts upon which he based his petition and could not have 

learned of those facts earlier by the exercise of due 

diligence. Due diligence demands that the petitioner take 

reasonable steps to protect his own interests. A petitioner 

must explain why he could not have learned the new fact(s) 

earlier with the exercise of due diligence. This rule is strictly 

enforced. Additionally, the focus of this exception is on the 
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newly discovered facts, not on a newly discovered or newly 

willing source for previously known facts.

The timeliness exception set forth at Section 

9545(b)(1)(ii) has often mistakenly been referred to as the 

“after-discovered evidence” exception. This shorthand 

reference was a misnomer, since the plain language of 

subsection (b)(1)(ii) does not require the petitioner to allege 

and prove a claim of “after-discovered evidence.” Rather, 

an initial jurisdictional threshold, Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) 

requires a petitioner to allege and prove that there were 

facts unknown to him and that he exercised due diligence in 

discovering those facts. Once jurisdiction is established, a 

PCRA petitioner can present a substantive after-discovered 

evidence claim. 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations 

omitted).

In concluding that Crocker could not establish the timeliness exception, 

the PCRA court initially determined that Crocker could not establish due 

diligence because he was aware of Do-Work’s statements in 2013, and his 

fourth PCRA petition was still pending before the PCRA court when he 

“discovered” the new evidence:

First, [Crocker] failed to file his claim within 60 days of 

discovering [Do-Work’s] statements. . . . [Crocker] states 

in his petition that he became aware of [Do-Work’s] 

potentially corroborating testimony in June 2012. [Crocker] 

recruited Shameka Sanders to visit [Do-Work] in New York 

the week of June 18-24, 2012, where she presented him the 

transcript from [Steele’s] preliminary hearing [at which DoWork testified]. Sanders and [Do-Work] then reached out 

to [Crocker’s PCRA counsel]. While initial efforts failed, 

[PCRA counsel] was able to reach [Do-Work] prior to the 

hearing on [Crocker’s] fourth PCRA petition held on January 

22, 2013. [PCRA counsel] proceeded to raise [Do-Work’s 

preliminary hearing] testimony in an effort to corroborate 

[Steele’s] recantation. Hence, [Crocker] was aware of [DoWork’s] testimony prior to the hearing on January 22, 2013, 
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at the absolute latest. [Crocker] had no reason not to bring 

this claim earlier.

[Crocker] is incorrect in his assertion that he could not 

have filed a PCRA petition based on Commonwealth v. 

Lark, 746 A.2d 585, 588 (Pa. 2000). Lark clearly states 

that its holding does not preclude a [PCRA] court from 

granting leave to amend a PCRA petition that is currently 

pending before that court. [Lark, 746 A.2d at 494 n.2]. 

[Crocker’s] calculation that [his fifth] PCRA [petition] could 

be filed within 60 days of his [third] PCRA petition being 

affirmed and the Supreme Court denying his petition for 

[allowance of] appeal is therefore incorrect. Instead, 

[Crocker] could have amended his [fourth] PCRA petition to 

include his claim involving [Do-Work] prior to the hearing. 

As such, [Crocker’s] claim does not qualify under the newlydiscovered evidence exception.

Rule 907 Notice, 4/12/16, at 2-3.

Our review of the record supports the PCRA court’s conclusions.5 

Crocker’s claim fails because Do-Work’s affidavit and testimony constitutes 

only a “newly willing source of previously known facts.” Commonwealth v. 

Ward-Green, 141 A.3d 527, 533 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). Such 

a source does not qualify as a fact unknown to the petitioner. 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d at 176. 

____________________________________________

5 The PCRA court also found that, even if Lark rendered Crocker’s newlydiscovered evidence claim timely, the claim involving Do-Work’s testimony 

“was raised and addressed previously during his most recent PCRA hearing on 

January 22, 2013.” Rule 907 Notice, 4/12/16, at 3-4. The PCRA court

expressly found Do-Work’s preliminary hearing testimony lacked credibility. 

Id. at 4. In a footnote, the court further acknowledged that, although DoWork’s preliminary hearing testimony failed to include a specific statement 

that Crocker did not point a gun at Do-Work’s head, at the 2013 PCRA hearing, 

PCRA counsel argued that Do-Work’s testimony could be considered in this 

manner. Id. at 4 n.5.

 
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The PCRA court further determined that, even if he had met a timeliness 

exception, Crocker would be unable to establish that the after-discovered 

evidence of Do-Work’s testimony would have entitled him to relief in the form 

of a new trial.

To address the PCRA court’s conclusion, we first note the test applied to 

after-discovered evidence. When discussing the test in the context of a PCRA 

appeal, our Supreme Court recently summarized:

[W]e have viewed this analysis in criminal cases as 

comprising four distinct requirements, each of which, if 

unproven by the petitioner, is fatal to the request for a new 

trial. As stated, the four-part test requires the petitioner to 

demonstrate the new evidence: (1) could not have been 

obtained prior to the conclusion of trial by the exercise of 

reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely corroborative or 

cumulative; (3) will not be used solely to impeach the 

credibility of a witness; and (4) would likely result in a 

different verdict if a new trial were granted. The test applies 

with full force to claims arising under Section 9543(a)(2)(vi) 

of the PCRA. In addition, we have held the proposed new 

evidence must be producible and admissible.

Commonwealth v. Small, 189 A.3d 961, 972 (Pa. 2018) (citations omitted).

In addition, we note that credibility determinations are an integral part 

of determining whether a PCRA petitioner has presented after-discovered 

evidence that would entitle him to a new trial. See, e.g., Small, 189 A.3d at 

978-79 (remanding for the PCRA court to make relevant credibility 

determinations). We have stated, prior to granting a new trial based on afterdiscovered evidence, “a court must assess whether the alleged afterdiscovered evidence is of such a nature and character that it would likely
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compel a different verdict if a new trial is granted.” Commonwealth v. 

Padillas, 997 A.2d 356, 365 (Pa. Super. 2010). “In making this 

determination, a court should consider the integrity of the alleged afterdiscovered evidence, the motive of those offering the evidence, and the overall 

strength of the evidence supporting the conviction.” Id. 

Here, the PCRA court concluded that Crocker’s proposed afterdiscovered evidence would not likely result in a different verdict if a new trial 

were granted, for several reasons, including the fact that Do-Work’s testimony 

lacked credibility. After recounting Do-Work’s testimony at the 2017 PCRA 

hearing, the PCRA court concluded:

The sheer lack of animus, the ambivalence, and the 

nonchalance exhibited by [Do-Work] gives this Court great 

pause regarding [his] willingness or ability to truthfully 

recount the color of the sky. Assuming, for a moment, that 

[Crocker] did not point a firearm at [Do-Work], [Crocker] 

was nonetheless part of an armed vigilante group seeking 

vengeance against a rival gang of which [Do-Work] was the 

leader. Moreover per the Superior Court’s statement of the 

case [in Crocker’s direct appeal], [Do-Work] was the main 

target. [Do-Work’s] seeming lack of emotion in his 

testimony does not square with the events of that fateful 

night. This emotional void, combined with [Do-Work’s] 

inability or unwillingness to recall the victim, [his] lack of 

surety regarding his “friend” Shameka Sanders’ name, [DoWork’s] changing answers regarding whether or not 

[Crocker] possessed a firearm on the night in question, and 

[Do-Work’s] statement that he did not even wish to be 

present at the PCRA hearing leave this court confused as to 

whether [Do-Work] was accompanied into the courtroom by 

any nefarious motives. This confusion is immaterial. The 

Commonwealth adduced no actual evidence of a conspiracy 

between rival gangs to exchange favorable PCRA testimony 

for one another’s members [although the Commonwealth 

did make this argument at the evidentiary hearing.] The 
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inconsistencies of [Do-Work’s] testimony and his demeanor 

are what matter. The sum of it all is that, for the reasons 

stated, this Court did not find [Do-Work] to be credible.

PCRA Court Opinion, 8/23/19, at 12-13.

Initially, we reiterate that, because the record supports the PCRA court’s 

conclusion that Crocker failed to establish due diligence, we could affirm on 

this basis alone. Brown, supra. Nevertheless, our review of the record 

supports the PCRA court’s conclusion that Crocker’s after-discovered evidence 

was unworthy of belief, given Do-Work’s demeanor, and the “overall strength 

of the evidence supporting [Crocker’s] conviction.” Padillas, supra. In 

rejecting Crocker’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 

first-degree murder conviction this Court stated:

The Commonwealth presented extensive evidence that 

[Crocker] had knowledge of the specific crime. This 

evidence of prior knowledge includes a receipt from Super 8 

Motel, the motel where Steele testified the group met to

plan the killings. There is further testimony from Steele that 

[Crocker] traveled to New York specifically to recruit 

manpower to assist the group in this assault. Steele 

testified that he and his co-conspirator’s, including 

[Crocker], planned to shoot Do-Work and anyone who was 

with him. 

The Commonwealth has likewise fulfilled the requirement 

that [Crocker] participated in the crime charged. The 

Commonwealth presented the testimony of several 

eyewitnesses who stated they saw [Crocker] approach DoWork, draw and point a gun at Do-Work’s head, and then 

pull the trigger only to have the gun jam. While [Crocker] 

did not pull the trigger of the gun which killed Clark, clearly 

his overt acts indicated that he was a participant in the 

overall conspiracy. Viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, we find that the evidence 

was sufficient to sustain the verdict.
J-S41001-20

- 18 -

Commonwealth v. Crocker, 755 A.2d 366 (Pa. Super. 1999), unpublished 

memorandum at 10-11. Although, throughout his brief, Crocker asserts 

multiple reasons why the PCRA court’s credibility determination is faulty, 

Crocker’s latest attempt to disturb the jury’s verdict and obtain a new trial 

fails. 

In sum, Crocker’s fifth PCRA petition is untimely and he has not 

established a time-bar exception. Moreover, even if Crocker’s fifth PCRA 

petition were considered timely, his after-discovered evidence would not 

entitle him to post-conviction relief.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/20/2020