NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_______________ No. 17

- 2915

_______________ 

### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,

v. ERIK JOHNSON, a/k/a TANK, Appellant

_______________ On Appeal from t he United States District Court for the District of New Jersey ( D.C . No. 2:0 1

- c r - 00538

- 002 ) District Judge: Honorable Jose L. Linares

_______________ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

on March 2 2 , 2018 Before: SMITH, Chief Judge , and HARDIMAN and BIBAS , Circuit Judges

( Opinion Filed: August 16, 2018 )

_______________ OPINION *

_______________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent.2

BIBAS , Circuit Judge

. E ven a succinct statement of reasons can suffice to explain a jud ge’s decision to grant or deny a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) . Erik Johnson appeals the District Court’s decision to reduce his life sentence to forty rather than thirty years’ imprisonment. We will affirm.
I. Johnson led the Third World Crips gang , which operated in a Newark housing project. With his two codefendants, he oversaw a conspiracy that sold heroin, powder cocaine, and crack cocaine to more than a thousand people. The gang was brutal: G ang members shot, beat, and attacked resid ents with dogs. Once, when Johnson and his confederates suspected a woman of stealing drugs stored in her apartment, they held her face against a radiator. After nearly a decade of running this drug ring, Johnson was convicted of conspiring to distribute, and possessing with intent to distribute, heroin, cocaine, and cocaine base. His prior felony drug conviction triggered an additional twenty

- year minimum sentence. The District Court sentenced Johnson to life imprisonment plus twenty years, finding that J ohnson was “the most dominant” of the violent gang members. App. 2 8. We affirmed. United States v. Johnson , 89 F . App ’ x 781, 788 (3d Cir. 2004).In 2014, the Sentencing Commission issued Amendment 782, which retroactively lowered base offense levels for se veral drug quantities. U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 782 ( 2014 ); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d). This amendment lowered Johnson’s base offense level, so his now

advisory Guidelines range became 360 months to life. Johnson asked the District Court to3

reduce his sentence. T he government at first disputed Johnson’s calculation, but on appeal confessed error. We summarily remanded to the District Court.On remand, the District Court lowered Johnson’s sentence from life to forty years, rather than the thirty years he had reque sted. Instead of issuing an opin ion, the Court filled out form AO

- 247, checking two boxes and filling in several blanks. The check marks noted that Johnson had moved to reduce his sentence and that the C ourt granted the motion, reducing his sentence from life to 480 months. The form also included preprinted language stating that the judge had “considered [Johnson’s] motion, and tak[en] into account the policy statement set forth at USSG § 1B1.10 and the sente ncing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent they are applicable.” App. 6. Finally, t he C ourt also attached

a one - paragraph Statement of Reasons explaining that it had considered the parties’ arguments, Johnson’s offense conduct, his condu ct in prison , and his age in light of the length of his sentence. Johnson appeals.
II. Johnson claims the District Court erred proc edurally by not applying the statutory sentencing factors reasonably and not explaining its decision adequately. We review th e denial of a sent ence - reduction motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for abuse of discretion. United States v. Thompson , 825 F.3d 198, 203 (3d Cir. 2016). Proceedings under § 3582(c)(2) are a “limited adjustment to an otherwise final sentence.” Dillon v. United States , 560 U.S. 817, 826 (2010). The Supreme Court has declined
to opine on whether § 3582(c)(2) decisions require the same level of explanation as original4

sentencings. Chavez

- Meza v. United States , 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1965 (2018). The Court assumed “purely for argument’s sake” that they do, drawing on its original

- sentencing decisions to set guideposts for how extensively judges must explain their § 3582(c)(2) decisions. Id. T he explanation needed depends “upon the circumstances of the particular cas e ,” leaving “much to the judge’s own professional judgment.” Id. at 196 5

- 6 6 (internal quotation mark s omitted). Here, Johnson objects that the District Court did not “reference the reasons behind Amendment 782.” Appellant’s Br. 20. He argue s that a thirty

- year sentence would have sufficed, because his range already incorporated his enhancements for possessing a gun, helping to lead the gang, and using minors to distribute drugs. He also argue s that because he is over forty years old, he is less likely to recidivate and so pose s less of a threat to public safety

. His prison record too supports relief, “ [ d ] espite [a] rocky start.” Id. at 2 2. Although “ [ h ] e incurred nine disciplinary infractions during his first 13 years of incarceration”

— out of fifteen that he has served

— “Johnson made a clean start when he learned that there was a possibility of relief from his life sentence.” Id. at 21, 22.
T he record shows that the District Court exercised its discretion properly. Its statement, though brief

, and the accompanying record , adequately explained the reasons for Johnson’s new sentence. It was well within the C ourt’s “professional judgment” not to credit Johnson’s newfound good behavior. Chavez

- Meza , 138 S. Ct. at 1968. That is especially true beca use one of his infractions, in 2013, included “orchestra[ing a] narcotics drug introduction scheme” in prison. App. 86.5

The District Court had Johnson’s entire record before it when it weighed his motion.
Th at record included Johnson’s violent crimes and t he testimony of his victims. It also included the finding by his original sentencing judge that Johnson had a “proclivity to violence” and a “demonstrate[d] .

. . disregard for authority.” App. 29. Given the heinousness of Johnson’s crimes and his poor rec ord in prison, “it is unsurprising that the judge considered a sentence somewhat higher than the bottom of the reduced range to be appropriate.” Chavez

- Meza , 138 S. Ct. at 1967. The District Court also properly considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors and policy statements. It considered Johnson’s argument s , the conduct underlying his conviction, his prison record, and his age in light of his remaining sentence. This “explanation (minimal as it was) fell within the scope of the lawful professional judgment that the law confers upon the sentencing judge.” Chavez

- Meza , 138 S. Ct. at 1968. So the C ourt did not abuse its discretion. We will affirm.