[Cite as State v. Smith, 2020-Ohio-760.]

Atty. Dan Fry, Belmont County Prosecutor, 147-A West Main Street, St. Clairsville, Ohio 

43950, for Plaintiff-Appellee, No Brief Filed, and 

Atty. Neal Schuett, Rittgers & Rittgers, 121 West High Street, Oxford, Ohio 45056, for 

Defendant-Appellant. 

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

BELMONT COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

CORY JULIUS SMITH, 

Defendant-Appellant.

 

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY 

Case No. 19 BE 0013 

 

Criminal Appeal from the 

Court of Common Pleas of Belmont County, Ohio 

Case No. 17 CR 209 

BEFORE: 

David A. D’Apolito, Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Judges. 

JUDGMENT: 

Affirmed. 
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Case No. 19 BE 0013

Dated: February 26, 2020 

D’Apolito, J. 

{¶1} Appellant, Cory Julius Smith, appeals from the March 21, 2019 judgment of 

the Belmont County Court of Common Pleas convicting him for possession of drugs and 

assault upon a peace officer following a jury trial and sentencing him to 11 years in prison. 

On appeal, Appellant argues (1) his sentence is contrary to law, (2) Appellee, the State 

of Ohio, presented insufficient evidence, (3) his convictions were against the manifest 

weight of the evidence, and (4) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no 

reversible error, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶2} On August 3, 2017, Appellant was indicted by the Belmont County Grand 

Jury on four counts: count one, possession of drugs, a felony of the second degree, in 

violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(4)(d); count two, possession of drugs, a felony of the 

second degree, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(6)(d); and counts three and four, 

assault upon a peace officer, felonies of the fourth degree, in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A) 

and (C)(5).1 Appellant was appointed counsel and pleaded not guilty at his arraignment. 

{¶3} A jury trial commenced on February 21, 2019. 

{¶4} The State presented three witnesses: Deputies Jason Schwarck and Brian 

Carpenter, with the Belmont County Sheriff’s Department; and Patrolman Henry Sam 

Martin, with the Bellaire Police Department. 

{¶5} At around 11:00 p.m. on June 14, 2017, Deputy Schwarck stopped Tabitha 

Burch’s car due to a vehicle defect and a traffic violation, i.e., no license plate light and 

failure to use a turn signal. (2/21/19 Jury Trial T.p. 190). Burch was the driver, Shermika 

Griffin was the front seat passenger, and Appellant was the backseat, driver’s side 

passenger. It “caught [Deputy Schwarck’s] attention” when he first observed Appellant 

with “his arm laying over his leg in between his two legs in the backseat, which was an 

uncommon place for his arm to be laying straight down in between his legs[.]” (T.p. 191). 

 

1 Count two was dismissed prior to trial. 
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Case No. 19 BE 0013

Appellant’s positioning drew Deputy Schwarck’s attention down to the area of Appellant’s 

crotch, where he saw a “bulge.” (T.p. 200). 

{¶6} Deputy Carpenter and Patrolman Martin arrived at the scene for back-up 

assistance. Deputy Carpenter testified that Appellant’s body language was “dramatically 

different” than the two front passengers, who appeared “normal” and not “too nervous.” 

(T.p. 268-269). Appellant exhibited “very - - suspicious-looking behavior.” (T.p. 269). 

Deputy Carpenter explained “[n]ot Appellant’s physical appearance, but the way he 

presented himself, the rigidness, his arm between his legs.” (T.p. 270). “[Appellant] was 

soft spoken, didn’t really want to have a conversation, and the fact that it looked like he 

was trying to conceal something.” (Id.). Deputy Carpenter also “saw a bulge * * * kind of 

his lower waistband.” (Id.). 

{¶7} At that point, Deputy Schwarck deployed his K-9 and the occupants were 

asked to step out of the vehicle. Deputies Schwarck and Carpenter believed Appellant 

needed to be patted down for a weapons check. Appellant refused. Deputy Carpenter 

told Appellant to put his hands on the back of the car and the officers patted him down. 

Deputies Schwarck and Carpenter felt something in Appellant’s crotch/waistband area. 

Deputy Carpenter described that it felt “firm,” about “the size of a baseball.” (T.p. 274). 

Deputy Carpenter could hear something “crinkling,” like “a plastic baggy-type object.” 

(Id.). Based on his training and experience, Deputy Carpenter “felt overly confident that 

it was narcotics” and he knew “it was a lot of it.” (Id.). 

{¶8} The officers advised Appellant that he was being detained. Deputy 

Carpenter put Appellant’s right hand in a handcuff and then Appellant “began to pull away, 

tense up, and eventually tried to run.” (T.p. 202). Patrolman Martin described Appellant 

as “feisty” and “started to resist.” (T.p. 247-248). A struggle ensued and the officers and 

Appellant ended up on the ground slightly underneath the car. While trying to control 

Appellant’s legs, Patrolman Martin was struck several times. 

{¶9} Deputy Carpenter further testified that Appellant’s right arm was under the 

vehicle. Deputy Schwarck indicated that Appellant tossed something underneath, toward 

the front of the car, which turned out to be one large bag with multiple bags of cocaine 

inside. The total amount was 24.6 grams of cocaine. (T.p. 356-357). Appellant bit Deputy 
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Case No. 19 BE 0013

Schwarck’s hand before the officer was able to get the handcuff on Appellant’s other 

hand. 

{¶10} At the close of the State’s case, defense counsel moved for an acquittal 

pursuant to Crim.R. 29, which was overruled by the trial court.

{¶11} Appellant presented one witness: Griffin, a good friend of Appellant’s and 

the front seat passenger. Griffin has struggled with drug addiction over the years. On 

the night at issue, she and Burch were on their way to purchase drugs and later ended 

up smoking crack cocaine in the car. While driving, they saw Appellant walking down the 

street and picked him up. After Burch’s vehicle was stopped by police, Griffin and Burch 

were told to exit and stand in front of the car, while Appellant exited and stood in the back. 

Griffin claimed that officers were “attacking” Appellant. (T.p. 401). On cross-examination, 

Griffin testified she did not throw anything under the vehicle and did not see Burch throw 

anything under the vehicle. 

{¶12} The jury found Appellant guilty of counts one (possession of drugs, cocaine, 

in excess of 20 grams but less than 27 grams), three (assault upon a peace officer, 

Deputy Schwarck), and four (assault upon a peace officer, Patrolman Martin). 

{¶13} On March 21, 2019, the trial court sentenced Appellant to eight years on 

count one and 18 months each on counts three and four. The court ordered the 

sentences be served consecutively for a total of 11 years, with 111 days credit for time 

served. The court further advised Appellant that post-release control is mandatory up to 

a maximum of three years. Appellant filed a timely appeal and raises four assignments 

of error. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

THE DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE WAS CONTRARY TO LAW. 

{¶14} This court utilizes R.C. 2953.08(G) as the standard of review in all felony 

sentencing appeals. State v. Michaels, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 17 MA 0122, 2019-Ohio497, ¶ 2, citing State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, 

¶ 1. 

{¶15} R.C. 2953.08(G) states in pertinent part: 
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Case No. 19 BE 0013

(2) The court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of this section 

shall review the record, including the findings underlying the sentence or 

modification given by the sentencing court. 

The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence 

that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence and remand 

the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing. The appellate court’s 

standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its 

discretion. The appellate court may take any action authorized by this 

division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following: 

(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under 

division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 

2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, 

if any, is relevant; 

(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. 

{¶16} Although trial courts have full discretion to impose any term of imprisonment 

within the statutory range, they must consider the sentencing purposes 

in R.C. 2929.11 and the guidelines contained in R.C. 2929.12. 

{¶17} R.C. 2929.11(A) provides that the overriding purposes of felony sentencing 

are (1) “to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others”; and (2) “to 

punish the offender * * * using the minimum sanctions that the court determines 

accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local 

government resources.” Further, the sentence imposed shall be “commensurate with and 

not demeaning to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim, 

and consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.” 

R.C. 2929.11(B). 

{¶18} R.C. 2929.12 provides a nonexhaustive list of sentencing factors the trial 

court must consider when determining the seriousness of the offense and the likelihood 

that the offender will commit future offenses. The court that imposes a felony sentence 

“has discretion to determine the most effective way to comply with the purposes and 
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Case No. 19 BE 0013

principles of sentencing.” R.C. 2929.12(A). The factors a trial court may consider include 

the “more serious” factors, such as “[t]he physical or mental injury suffered by the victim 

of the offense due to the conduct of the offender was exacerbated because of the physical 

or mental condition or age of the victim” and “[t]he victim of the offense suffered serious 

physical, psychological, or economic harm as a result of the offense.” R.C. 2929.12(B)(1) 

and (2). The court may also consider the “less serious” factors, any recidivism factors, 

and any mitigating factors listed in R.C. 2929.12(C)-(F). 

R.C. 2929.11 does not require the trial court to make any specific findings 

as to the purposes and principles of sentencing. State v. Wilson, 129 Ohio 

St.3d 214, 2011-Ohio-2669, 951 N.E.2d 381, ¶ 31. Similarly, R.C. 2929.12 

does not require the trial court to “use specific language or make specific 

findings on the record in order to evince the requisite consideration of the 

applicable seriousness and recidivism factors.” State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio 

St.3d 208, 215, 724 N.E.2d 793 (2000). 

State v. Shaw, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 15 BE 0065, 2017-Ohio-1259, ¶ 36. 

{¶19} Appellant specifically contends the trial court erred in considering a 

dismissed charge before imposing the maximum sentence. 

{¶20} “Although the trial court’s belief that a defendant committed dismissed 

charges cannot be the sole reason for imposition of a maximum sentence, the trial court 

can consider dismissed charges when determining an offender’s likelihood to recidivate.” 

State v. Osting, 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-18-09, 2019-Ohio-1278, ¶ 24. 

{¶21} Here, the record is clear that the trial court did not base its maximum 

sentence solely on the belief that Appellant committed the dismissed charge. Rather, the 

court also considered the circumstances surrounding the incident, the injury to the peace 

officers, and Appellant’s criminal record. 

{¶22} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court heard from the attorneys and from 

Appellant and indicated that it reviewed the presentence investigation report.2 The trial 

judge proceeded by stating the following: 

 

2 The PSI lists Appellant’s criminal background which is two pages long. 
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Case No. 19 BE 0013

THE COURT: All right. Again, the Court has already considered all of the 

various requirements under the law. The factors that indicate more serious 

conduct, more likelihood of recidivism include the following, some of which 

the State has referred to already: As an adult, Mr. Smith has felony 

convictions for having weapons under disability; sent to the penitentiary. 

Escape; sent to the penitentiary. Trafficking in drugs as a second-degree 

felony; sent to the penitentiary. Trafficking in drugs as fifth-degree felonies; 

there’s two of those, sent to the penitentiary for both. Sale of counterfeit 

drugs; again, a prison sentence. Improper handling of firearms in a motor 

vehicle resulted also in a prison sentence. 

As an adult, he has misdemeanor convictions for endangering children; 

falsification; resisting arrest and drug abuse, there’s two of those. Of the 

seven felony convictions, with those seven prison sentences, and I 

understand [defense counsel’s] point that some of those were maybe 

concurrent. And this is something I have to say, I see this quite often from 

the judges in the larger counties. I think if the penalties were a little more 

harsh, maybe recidivism would be less likely. * * * So, again, seven prison 

sentences, but the aggregate total is nowhere near what this Court believes 

they should have been for the seriousness of the conduct. * * * 

The Court is also going to find that there was another charge against him 

that was dismissed. In other words, he was not prosecuted. There was, as 

a result of that matter, found to be – he was found to be in possession of 

Carfentanil, as the drug that he possessed at that time. But again, he was 

not prosecuted for that. The Court is aware of that; I’m not going to put that 

out of my mind, as far as sentencing is concerned. 

His refusal to provide information deprives me of any chance for mitigating 

findings, such as counseling efforts. I understand his comments today. His 

record appears to be worsening. He’s not responded favorably to prior 

sanctions, as I’ve already explained. * * * The Court does find, based on 
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Case No. 19 BE 0013

the testimony, that there was evidence of * * * physical harm and emotional 

distress to the two peace officers who were involved, and the Court is going 

to find that there’s been no showing of genuine remorse. 

On the other hand, the factors that indicate less serious conduct, less 

likelihood of recidivism are absent in this matter. 

Again, I’ve considered the purposes and principles of sentencing. I’ve also 

considered the need for consecutive prison terms. And I’m going to find 

that those are necessary in this action, so as to protect the public from future 

crime and to punish this defendant. Consecutive terms are not 

disproportionate with his conduct, as cited above. The danger he poses to 

the public is certainly something that must be considered, based on his 

record. These offenses were committed as part of a course of criminal 

conduct. The potential harm was so great and unusual that no single prison 

term adequately reflects the seriousness of his * * * conduct. Finally, his 

history of criminal behavior shows that consecutive terms are needed to 

protect the public from him. Therefore, more than minimum sentence is 

necessary and is otherwise appropriate and reasonable, as are consecutive 

sentences. A short sentence or a non-consecutive sentence and/or any 

type of a community control sentence with any combination of sanctions 

would not adequately punish him and protect the public from future crimes, 

and would demean the seriousness of his conduct. The factors decreasing 

seriousness are greatly outweighed by those increasing seriousness. 

There’s more likelihood of recidivism if he is given a short or nonconsecutive sentence. All of my findings, I believe, are in accordance with 

the statutory and case law in effect now in the State of Ohio. 

Therefore, Mr. Smith, on Count I, you’ll be sentenced to serve eight years 

in the penitentiary. On Count III, you’ll be sentenced to serve 18 months in 

the penitentiary. And on Count IV, you’ll be sentenced to serve 18 months 
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Case No. 19 BE 0013

in the penitentiary. Those sentences will all be served consecutive to each 

other, for a total of 11 years in the penitentiary. * * * 

(3/18/19 Sentencing Hearing T.p. 7-12). 

{¶23} Also, in its March 21, 2019 judgment entry, the trial court stated: 

The Court has considered the record, oral statements, the Presentence 

Investigation Report with attached Risk Assessment Summary of 

Undetermined due to Defendant’s choice to not respond, and the report 

from the Eastern Ohio Correction Center (EOCC) finding Defendant 

inappropriate for placement, as well as the principles and purposes of 

sentencing in Revised Code 2929.11 and has balanced the seriousness 

and recidivism factors under Revised Code 2929.12. 

(3/21/19 Judgment Entry p. 2). 

{¶24} Accordingly, the record reflects the trial court gave due deliberation to the 

relevant statutory considerations. The court considered the purposes and principles of 

felony sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and balanced the seriousness and recidivism 

factors under R.C. 2929.12, as evidenced from the record. 

{¶25} As stated, Appellant was sentenced to a total of 11 years in prison following 

a jury trial. Specifically, the trial court consecutively sentenced Appellant to eight years 

in prison on count one, possession of drugs, a felony of the second degree, in violation 

of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(4)(d); and 18 months each on counts three and four, assault 

upon a peace officer, felonies of the fourth degree, in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A) and 

(C)(5). Thus, the court sentenced Appellant within the statutory ranges under R.C. 

2929.14(A)(2)(b) (“For a felony of the second degree committed prior to the effective date 

of this amendment, the prison term shall be a definite term of two, three, four, five, six, 

seven, or eight years”);3 and R.C. 2929.14(A)(4) (“For a felony of the fourth degree, the 

prison term shall be a definite term of six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, 

fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, or eighteen months”). 

 

3 The effective date of the amendment is March 22, 2019. 
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Case No. 19 BE 0013

{¶26} Further, the record reveals the trial court properly advised Appellant 

regarding post-release control. Therefore, the court complied with all applicable rules 

and statutes. As a result, we do not find by clear and convincing evidence that the record 

does not support Appellant’s sentence or that the sentence is contrary to law. 

{¶27} Appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

THE STATE PRESENTED INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT 

APPELLANT OF POSSESSION OF DRUGS AND ASSAULT ON A 

POLICE OFFICER. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS WERE AGAINST THE 

MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 

{¶28} Because Appellant’s second and third assignments of error call into 

question the sufficiency and weight of the evidence adduced at trial, we will address them 

together to avoid repetition. 

“When a court reviews a record for sufficiency, ‘(t)he relevant inquiry is 

whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ State v. 

Maxwell, 139 Ohio St.3d 12, 2014-Ohio-1019, 9 N.E.3d 930, ¶ 146, quoting 

State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two 

of the syllabus; Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 

560 (1979). 

In determining whether a criminal conviction is against the manifest weight 

of the evidence, an Appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the 

evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of 

witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, 
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Case No. 19 BE 0013

the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage 

of justice that the conviction must be reversed. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio 

St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997); State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67, 

2011-Ohio-6524, 960 N.E.2d 955, ¶ 119.* * * 

The weight to be given to the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses 

are nonetheless issues for the trier of fact. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 

230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967). The trier of fact “has the best opportunity to 

view the demeanor, attitude, and credibility of each witness, something that 

does not translate well on the written page.” Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio 

St.3d 415, 418, 674 N.E.2d 1159 (1997). 

State v. T.D.J., 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 16 MA 0104, 2018-Ohio-2766, ¶ 46-48. 

{¶29} “‘(C)ircumstantial evidence and direct evidence inherently possess the 

same probative value.’” State v. Biros, 78 Ohio St.3d 426, 447, 678 N.E.2d 891 (1997), 

quoting Jenks, supra, paragraph one of the syllabus. 

{¶30} For the reasons addressed below, we determine the judgment is not against 

the manifest weight of the evidence and further conclude it is supported by sufficient 

evidence. 

{¶31} Appellant takes issue with the guilty finding for possession of drugs, a felony 

of the second degree, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(4)(d), which states:

(A) No person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled 

substance or a controlled substance analog.

* * *

(C) Whoever violates division (A) of this section is guilty of one of the 

following:

* * *

(4) If the drug involved in the violation is cocaine or a compound, mixture, 

preparation, or substance containing cocaine, whoever violates division (A) 
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Case No. 19 BE 0013

of this section is guilty of possession of cocaine. The penalty for the offense 

shall be determined as follows:

* * *

(d) If the amount of the drug involved equals or exceeds twenty grams but 

is less than twenty-seven grams of cocaine, possession of cocaine is a 

felony of the second degree, and the court shall impose as a mandatory 

prison term a second degree felony mandatory prison term. 

R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(4)(d). 

{¶32} Appellant also takes issue with the guilty findings for assault upon a peace 

officer, felonies of the fourth degree, in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A) and (C)(5), which 

states: 

(A) No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to 

another * * *.

* * *

[(C)](5) If the victim of the offense is a peace officer * * * while in the 

performance of their official duties, assault is a felony of the fourth degree. 

R.C. 2903.13(A) and (C)(5). 

{¶33} “A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware 

that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a 

certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that 

such circumstances probably exist.” R.C. 2901.22(B). 

{¶34} This court’s review of the record establishes that there was ample proof that 

Appellant knowingly possessed cocaine weighing between 20 and 27 grams and that he 

knowingly caused or attempted to cause physical harm to two peace officers while in 

performance of their official duties pursuant to R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(4)(d) and R.C. 

2903.13(A) and (C)(5). 
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Case No. 19 BE 0013

{¶35} As stated, Deputy Schwarck stopped Burch’s car due to a vehicle defect 

and a traffic violation. Burch was the driver, Griffin was the front seat passenger, and 

Appellant was the backseat passenger. It “caught [Deputy Schwarck’s] attention” when 

he first observed Appellant with “his arm laying over his leg in between his two legs in the 

backseat, which was an uncommon place for his arm to be laying straight down in 

between his legs[.]” (2/21/19 Jury Trial T.p. 191). Deputy Schwarck saw a “bulge” near 

the area of Appellant’s crotch. (T.p. 200). 

{¶36} Back-up officers, Deputy Carpenter and Patrolman Martin, arrived at the 

scene. Deputy Carpenter testified that Appellant’s body language was “dramatically 

different” than the two front passengers; Appellant exhibited “very - - suspicious-looking 

behavior;” i.e., “[n]ot Appellant’s physical appearance, but the way he presented himself, 

the rigidness, his arm between his legs.” (T.p. 268-270). Deputy Carpenter further 

indicated that Appellant “didn’t really want to have a conversation;” it appeared Appellant 

“was trying to conceal something;” and Deputy Carpenter also “saw a bulge” near 

Appellant’s lower waistband. (T.p. 270). 

{¶37} The occupants were asked to step out of the vehicle. Deputies Schwarck 

and Carpenter believed Appellant needed to be patted down for a weapons check. 

Appellant refused. Deputy Carpenter told Appellant to put his hands on the back of the 

car and the officers patted him down. Deputies Schwarck and Carpenter felt something 

in Appellant’s crotch/waistband area. Deputy Carpenter described that it felt “firm,” about 

“the size of a baseball.” (T.p. 274). Deputy Carpenter could hear something “crinkling,” 

like “a plastic baggy-type object.” (Id.). Based on his training and experience, Deputy 

Carpenter “felt overly confident that it was narcotics” and he knew “it was a lot of it.” (Id.). 

{¶38} Deputy Carpenter put Appellant’s right hand in a handcuff and then 

Appellant “began to pull away, tense up, and eventually tried to run.” (T.p. 202). 

Patrolman Martin described Appellant as “feisty” and “started to resist.” (T.p. 247-248). 

A struggle ensued and the officers and Appellant ended up on the ground slightly 

underneath the car. While trying to control Appellant’s legs, Patrolman Martin was struck 

several times. 

{¶39} Deputy Carpenter further testified that Appellant’s right arm was under the 

vehicle. Deputy Schwarck indicated that Appellant tossed something underneath, toward 
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Case No. 19 BE 0013

the front of the car, i.e., one large bag with multiple bags of cocaine inside. The total 

amount was 24.6 grams of cocaine. (T.p. 356-357). Appellant bit Deputy Schwarck’s 

hand before the officer was able to get the handcuff on Appellant’s other hand. 

{¶40} Pursuant to Jenks, supra, there is sufficient evidence upon which the jury 

could reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the elements of possession 

of drugs and assault upon a peace officer were proven. Thus, the trial court did not err in 

overruling Appellant’s Crim.R. 29 motion.

{¶41} Also, the jury chose to believe the State’s witnesses. DeHass, supra, at 

paragraph one of the syllabus. Based on the evidence presented, as previously stated, 

the jury did not clearly lose its way in finding Appellant guilty of possession of drugs and 

assault upon a peace officer. Thompkins, supra, at 387. 

{¶42} Appellant’s sufficiency and manifest weight arguments contained in his 

second and third assignments of error are without merit. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO DUE 

PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL WERE VIOLATED WHEN HE RECEIVED 

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 

In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant must 

show that trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonable representation, and prejudice arose from the deficient 

performance. State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 141-143, 538 N.E.2d 373 

(1989), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 

L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Both prongs must be established: If counsel’s 

performance was not deficient, then there is no need to review for prejudice. 

Likewise, without prejudice, counsel’s performance need not be 

considered. State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 389, 721 N.E.2d 52 

(2000). 

In Ohio, a licensed attorney is presumed to be competent. State v. Calhoun, 

86 Ohio St.3d 279, 289, 714 N.E.2d 905 (1999). In evaluating trial counsel’s 
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Case No. 19 BE 0013

performance, appellate review is highly deferential as there is a strong 

presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance. Bradley at 142-143, citing Strickland at 689. 

Appellate courts are not permitted to second-guess the strategic decisions 

of trial counsel. State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 558, 651 N.E.2d 965 

(1995). 

Even instances of debatable strategy very rarely 

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Thompson, 33 

Ohio St.3d 1, 10, 514 N.E.2d 407 (1987). The United States Supreme Court 

has recognized that there are “countless ways to provide effective 

assistance in any given case.” Bradley at 142, citing Strickland at 689. 

To show prejudice, a defendant must prove his lawyer’s deficient 

performance was so serious that there is a reasonable probability the result 

of the proceeding would have been different. Carter at 558. “It is not enough 

for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on 

the outcome of the proceeding.” Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 at fn. 1, 538 

N.E.2d 373, quoting Strickland at 693. Prejudice from defective 

representation justifies reversal only where the results were unreliable or 

the proceeding was fundamentally unfair as a result of the performance of 

trial counsel. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d at 558, 651 N.E.2d 965, citing Lockhart 

v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993). 

* * * 

[A]n ineffective assistance of counsel claim cannot be predicated upon 

supposition. State v. Watkins, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 07 JE 54, 2008-Ohio6634, ¶ 15. Likewise, proof of ineffective assistance of counsel requires 

more than vague speculations of prejudice. Id. ¶ 55, citing State v. Otte, 74 

Ohio St.3d 555, 565, 1996-Ohio-108, 660 N.E.2d 711. 

State v. Rivers, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 17 MA 0078, 2019-Ohio-2375, ¶ 20-23, 27. 
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Case No. 19 BE 0013

{¶43} Appellant specifically contends that trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to 

suppress constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress does not constitute ineffective 

assistance of counsel per se. State v. Brown, 115 Ohio St.3d 55, 2007-

Ohio-4837, 873 N.E.2d 858, ¶ 65, citing State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 

378, 389, 721 N.E.2d 52 (2000). A defendant must prove there was a basis 

to suppress the evidence in question. Brown, 115 Ohio St.3d 55 at ¶ 65.

State v. Albright, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 14 MA 0165, 2016-Ohio-7037, ¶ 58. 

{¶44} Generally, the decision not to file a motion to suppress does not constitute 

ineffective assistance of counsel “when doing so was a tactical decision, there was no 

reasonable probability of success, or there was no prejudice to the defendant.” State v. 

Nields, 93 Ohio St.3d 6, 34, 752 N.E.2d 859 (2001). 

{¶45} Appellant insists that his trial attorney should have filed a motion to 

suppress because the stop was not valid. However, Deputy Schwarck testified at the jury 

trial that he stopped Burch’s car, in which Appellant was a passenger, due to a vehicle 

defect and a traffic violation, i.e., no license plate light and failure to use a turn signal. 

(2/21/19 Jury Trial T.p. 190). Thus, the stop was valid. See State v. McMillon, 7th Dist. 

Columbiana No. 18 CO 0016, 2019-Ohio-2716, ¶ 11, citing State v. Ward, 7th Dist. 

Columbiana No. 10 CO 28, 2011-Ohio-3183, ¶ 35, citing Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio 

St.3d 3, 11, 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 

889 (1968) (“There are two types of valid traffic stops: (1) where police have probable 

cause that a traffic violation has occurred or was occurring and (2) where police have 

reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred.) 

{¶46} In addition, Appellant insists that his trial attorney should have filed a motion 

to suppress because the search and seizure were not valid. However, as stated, Deputies 

Schwarck and Carpenter testified that Appellant acted differently than his front seat 

counterparts. Appellant sat in a suspicious manner with his arm between his legs as if 

trying to conceal something. The officers saw a “bulge” near Appellant’s crotch/lower 

waistband area. 
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Case No. 19 BE 0013

{¶47} Deputies Schwarck and Carpenter believed Appellant needed to be patted 

down for a weapons check. Appellant refused. Deputy Carpenter told Appellant to put 

his hands on the back of the car and the officers patted him down. The officers felt 

something in Appellant’s crotch/waistband area. Deputy Carpenter believed it was 

narcotics. He put Appellant’s right hand in a handcuff and then Appellant “began to pull 

away, tense up, and eventually tried to run.” (T.p. 202). 

{¶48} A struggle ensued and the officers and Appellant ended up on the ground 

partially underneath the car. While trying to control Appellant’s legs, Patrolman Martin 

was struck several times. Deputy Schwarck indicated that Appellant tossed something 

underneath, toward the front of the car, which turned out to be one large bag with multiple 

bags of cocaine inside. Appellant bit Deputy Schwarck’s hand before the officer was able 

to get the handcuff on Appellant’s other hand. 

{¶49} Based on the facts presented, the search and seizure were valid. See State 

v. Hughley, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 09 MA 200, 2010-Ohio-6010, ¶ 10, citing Terry v. 

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968) (“[A]n officer is authorized to perform a limited 

pat-down search for weapons as a safety precaution if there is a reasonable suspicion 

that the person stopped may be armed and dangerous”); State v. McCoy, 6th Dist. Lucas 

No. L-97-1393, 1998 WL 526734, *2 (Aug. 21, 1998), citing U.S. v. Craft (C.A.8 1994), 30 

F.3d 1044, 1045 (drug seizure valid during pat down search when incriminating character 

immediately apparent by touch); U.S. v. Ashley (D.C.Cir.1994), 37 F.3d 678, 680-682 

(drugs felt during pat down search valid because immediately apparent to experienced 

officer). 

{¶50} Accordingly, a motion to suppress would not have been successful and 

Appellant can show no prejudice in trial counsel’s tactical decision not to file one. 

Pursuant to Strickland, supra, Appellant fails to show that his counsel’s performance was 

deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 

{¶51} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error is without merit. 

CONCLUSION

{¶52} For the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s assignments of error are not welltaken. The judgment of the Belmont County Court of Common Pleas convicting Appellant 
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Case No. 19 BE 0013

for possession of drugs and assault upon a peace officer following a jury trial and 

sentencing him to an 11-year sentence is affirmed. 

Waite, P.J., concurs. 

Robb, J., concurs. 
[Cite as State v. Smith, 2020-Ohio-760.]

 

 

For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of error 

are overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of 

the Court of Common Pleas of Belmont County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to be waived. 

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate 

in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that 

a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into 

execution. 

 

 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.