* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-60014

(Summary Calendar)

FRANCES MAE WALKER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

MARK HENDERSON, in his individual

capacity; JIM EDWARDS, in his individual

capacity,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

(1:97-CV-214-P)

November 16, 2000

Before JOLLY, STEWART, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The issue before us is whether the district court erred in dismissing the 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(1994) claim of Frances Mae Walker (“Walker”) against Mark Henderson and Jim Edwards

(“Henderson”) pursuant to F E D

. R. C IV

. P.12(b)(6) for failure to plead facts with particul arity

sufficient to establish a constitutionally protected violation of her right to intimate association. For

the following reasons, we affirm the district court.2 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Walker is an African-American woman who lived on the same rural road in Clay County as

Henderson. During the time that Walker and Henderson lived o n t his road, Henderson was, and

remains, a Mississippi Highway Patrol officer. Walker was the only African-American residing in the

community and alleges that Henderson, a white man, was incensed by her presence. Walker alleges

that Henderson’s racial intolerance prompted an intense campaign to drive her from her residence by

unrelentingly harassing her and arbitraril y st o pping her family and friends when they tried to visit.

Walker claims that Henderson’s behavior continued until she was ultimately forced to move in March

1996.

Walker filed suit against Henderson on July 8, 1997, alleging violations of her rights under

the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Subsequently, Henderson filed a motion to dismiss alleging

that Walker had failed to plead facts that would overcome his affirmat ively pled defense of qualified

immunit y. The district court allowed Walker to amend her complaint. She added Jim Edwards as

a defendant and included a First Amendment freedom of association claim in an attempt to make a

more factual and detailed statement in response to Henderson’s motion to dismiss. Henderson then

filed another motion to dismiss, and the court granted it. Walker now appeals to this court.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Hall v. Thomas

,

190 F.3d 693, 696 (5 th Cir. 1999). “This disfavored motion should not be granted unless ‘it appears

beyond a doubt that a plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle

him to relief.’” Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson

, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 803

(1957)). Therefore, the district court must liberally construe the complaint in the plaintiff’s favor and

assume that all facts pleaded are true. Hall , 190 F.3d at 696.

II. § 1983 Pleading Requirements

When the complaint invokes § 1983, the plaint iff “must allege ‘with particularity all material

facts on which [she] contends [she] will establish [her] right to recovery,

. . . .’” M orrison v. City of

Baton Rouge

, 761 F. 2d 242, 244-45 (5 th Cir. 1985) (quoting Elliot v. Perez

, 751 F. 2d 1472, 1482

(5 th Cir. 1 985)). This heightened pleading requirement does not, however, place a burden on the

plaint iff to “fully anticipate the defense [of qualified immunit y] in [he r] complai nt at the ri sk of

dismissal under Rule 12.” S chultea v. Wood

, 47 F.3d 1427, 1430 (5 th Cir. 1995) (Schultea II). The

plaint iff need only plead more than mere conclusory allegations. I d. (standing by the court’s view of

the application of F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 8 to § 1983 cases as stated in Elliot , 751 F.2d at 1479).

In so doing, t he plaintiff should strive to state her best case. S chultea v. Wood

, 27 F. 3d

1112, 1118 (5 th Cir. 1994). The liberal pleading and amendment standards of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure are designed to allow claimants an opportuni ty to state such a cognizable case, if it

can be made. I d. Ho wever, courts are not mandated to allow plaintiffs “to amend or supplement

their pleadings until they stumble upon a formula that carries them over the threshold.

. . . At some

point a court must decide that a plaintiff had a full and fair opportuni ty to make [her] case; [and] if,

after that time, a cause of act io n has not been established, the court should dismiss the suit.” I d.

(citing Jacquez v. Procunier , 801 F.2d 789, 792 (5 th Cir. 1986)).

II. § 1983 and Qualified Immunity

In a § 1983 suit, we must make two separate inquiries to determine whether a public official

is entitled to qualified immunity. Williams v. Bramer , 180 F. 3d 699, 702 (5 th Cir. 1999). First we4

must discern whether the plaint iff has alleged the violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Id. ( citing Siegert v. Gilley , 500 U.S. 226, 231-32, 111 S. Ct. 1789, 114 L. Ed. 2d 277 (1991);

Lampkin v. Ci ty of Nacogdoches , 7 F. 3d 430, 434 (5 t h Cir. 1993)). Upon finding that a

constitutional right has been violated, we then inquire whether the government official’s actions were

objectively reasonable. W illiams

, 180 F. 3d at 702 (citing Anderson v. Creighton

, 483 U.S. 635, 639,

107 S. Ct. 3034, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987)).

“We define this reasonableness in the light of the legal rules that were clearly established at

the time the actions were taken.” W illiams

, 180 F. 3d at 702 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald

, 457 U.S.

800, 819, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982)). First, we address whether Walker’s pleadings

were stated with sufficient particularity to demonstrate that her right of intimate association with her

family and friends was clearly established at the time Henderson allegedly engaged in harassing

behavior, and whether Walker’s pleadings were , therefore, adequate to withstand dismissal under

F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 12(b)(6). We do not consider whether Henderson’s conduct was objectively

reasonable unless we find t hat the district court erred in its analysis of the clearly established

constitutional right prong.

III. Intimate Association

The sem inal Supreme Court decision addressing the constitutional right of intimate associati on

is Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees , 468 U.S. 609, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984). In Jaycees , the

Court reasoned that its decisions “have referred to constitutionally protected ‘freedom of association’

in two distinct senses.” I d

. at 617. One set of decisions concludes that “choices to enter into and

maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State

because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our5

constitutional scheme.” I d. (emphasis added). The other line of cases recognizes “a right to

associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment....” Id.

at 618.

Freedom of association in the former sense has historically been couched in terms of family.

Marriage, childbirth, raising and educating children, and cohabitation with one’s relatives are all

intimate associ at io ns t hat the Court has very willingly recognized as worthy of constitutional

protecti on. I d. (citations omitted). From the nature of these family relationships, the Court gleaned

its basis for determining when other relationships may warrant treatment as constitutionally protected

intimate associations.

Init ially the inquiry must focus on whether by its na t ure t he relationship at issue involves

“deep attachments and commitments to necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not

only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects

of one’s life.” Id. at 620. Several factors elucidate the types of attachments and commitments that

the Court would con sider constitutionally protected intimate associations. They include “such

attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions t o begin and maintain the

affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship.” Id.

These guideposts establish certain general parameters. As such, the Constitution imposes

constraints on the State’s power to control the selection of one’s spouse that would be inapplicable

to regulations affecting one’s choice of fellow employees. I d. “Between these poles. . . lies a broad

range of human relationships that may make greater or lesser claims to constitutional protecti on from

particular [State] incursions. . . .” Id. Accordingly, determining which intimate associations merit

constitutional limit s on State intrusion “entails a care ful assessment of where that relationship’s1 The framework Jaycees articulated to determine whether a particular relationship rises to

the level of a constitutionally protected int imate association sparked some criticism. One such

commentator found the framework problematic not only because it “fail[ed] to make the necessary

c onnection between familial and no nfamilial relations[,]” but also because the Court gave n o

instruction regarding the relative importance of any factor. It also did not detail the fine contours of

the right to intimate association. Neal E. Devins, The Trouble With Jaycees

, 34 C ATH

. U

. L. R EV

. 901, 910 (1985) (noting that the highly unstructure d framework of J aycees necessitates ad hoc

determination of which associations warrant constitutional protection).

6 objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate to the most attenuated of

personal attachments.” 1 Id.

Following Jaycees

, the Court again addressed the right of int ima te associati on stati

ng that

“freedom to enter into and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a fundamental element

of liberty protected by the Bill or Rights.” Board of Dir. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte

, 481

U.S. 537, 545, 107 S. Ct. 1940, 95 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1987). R ecognizing that such relationships take

various forms, the Court stated that it had not “attempted to mark the precise boundaries of this type

of constitutional protecti on.” I d. Moreover, the Court unambiguously reasoned that such protection

is not restricted to relationships among family members. S ee id. The Court later qualified this view,

ho wever, expressing doubt that the “Constitution recognizes a generalized right of ‘social

association.’” City of Dallas v. Stanglin

, 490 U.S. 19, 25, 109 S. Ct. 1591, 104 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1989).

Courts in this circuit have asserted that whether the intimate association right includes

relationships beyond the familial context depends upon the extent to which the persons share qualities

distinctive to family relationships. T illman v. City of West Point

, 953 F. Supp. 145, 151 (N.D. Miss.

1996) (citing Louisiana Debating & Literary Ass’n v. City of New Orleans

, 42 F.3d 1483, 1494 (5 th

Cir. 1995)). This rat io nale is consistent with the J aycees ’ factors analysis and underscores the

inappropriateness of using “bright line det ermination[s] of familial relationships” to establish the7

constitutional right of intimate association. Tillman , 953 F. Supp. at 150. Nonetheless, basing the

intimate association analysis on “qualities distinctive to family relati o nships” can be challenging

because “t he definitional boundaries that limit the types of associations that constitute ‘family

relationships’ are blurred.” Kipps v. Caillier , 205 F.3d 203, 206 (5 th Cir. 2000).

III. Analysis

Because Walker’s First Amendment right of intimate association claim was init ially asserted

in her amended complaint, it and the subsequent pleadings are partic ularly relevant to our inquiry.

The amended complaint states in paragraphs V through VII:

During the time complained of, Plaint iff suffered from various illnesses and/or

injuries and either did not have access to a vehicle or, at other times, was physically

unable to drive. Plaintiff relied upon family members and friends to come visit her to

help take care of her and to transport her whenever necessary.

When the Plaint iff’s family members or friends, almost all o f whom were

black, would come down the road Plaint iff lived on, the Defendants would frequently

get into their vehicle and follow such persons and either stop them or wait until they

were leaving to stop them. On other occasions, t he Defendants would come back

down the road and stop black persons who were visiting the Plaintiff.

Henderson and Edwards would pull o ver vehicles of friends and family

members of the Plaint iff for absolutely no reason. They would, o n occasion, make

occ upant s get out of the car and search the car without any probable cause or

permission.

In paragraph XV(b), Walker asserts that these facts created Henderson’s legal liabilit y, because “[t]he

Defendant intentionally interfered with Plaint iff’s First Am endment rights to freely associate with

friends and family members, by intimidating such persons into not coming to Plaintiff’s house.”

After answering that Walker failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that

the complaint failed to state a cause of action cognizable under § 1983, Henderson moved to dismiss

pursuant to those grounds. Walker’s response merely attached a copy of her amended complaint as

an exhibit and stated that “the amended complaint is fact specific and clearly outlines the factual basis2 S ee Wilson v. Taylor

, 733 F.2d 1539 (11 th Cir. 1984)(stating that “[w]e

. . . align ourselves

with recent cases holding that the [F]irst [A]mendment freedom of association applies

. . . to purely

social and perso nal associations”). This court notes that W ilson was decided less than one month

before the Supreme Court decided Jaycees

.

8 of her cause of action against Defendant.

. . . Plaint iff has adequately identified the legal and factual

bases for her complaint.”

There is caselaw in this circuit that establishes family relationships as clearly subject to

constitutional protecti on. K ipps

, 205 F.3d at 206 (“[A]lthough it is clear that ‘family relationships’

are subject to constitutional protection

, the definitional boundaries that limit the types of associations

that constitute ‘family relationships’ are blurred.”) (emphasis added). In addition, the Supreme Court

has reasoned that friendships may also merit constitutional protection. See Rotary Club

, 481 U.S.

at 545 (announcing that “we have not held that constitutional protecti on is restricted to relationships

among family members”). W alker, however, undergirded her contention that she and her family and

friends shared a constitutionally protected intimate association on an Eleventh Circuit case. 2

In this court, the precedent of our sister circuits is not binding in an analys is o f clearly

established law under the doctrine of qualified immunit y. S ee Boddie v. City of Columbus

, 989 F.2d

745, 748 (5 t

h Cir. 1993). Thus, Walker failed to cite any controlling authority sufficient t o

demonstrate the intimate association right that she claimed was clearly established. But caselaw alone

cannot solve Walker’s quandary because her pleadings failed to set f orth facts wi th the degree of

specificity necessary to fit within the framework of relevant authority.

Noting this deficiency and the very general and conclusory manner in which Walker pled the

purportedly relevant facts of her claim, the district court was unpersuaded that Walker had met the

pleading requirements of Schultea II and Elliot

. After giving Walker a full and fair opportunity to9

state a cognizable claim, the court opined that neither Walker’s first complaint, amended complaint,

nor her response to Henderson’s motion to dismiss addressed the type of relationship that Walker had

with her family and friends. Thus, the court held that Walker’s complaint on its face did not present

a factual basis to support her allegation that she and her fa mily and friends shared the “deep

attachments and commitments” requisite to establish a constitutionally protected right of association

.

Relying on Tillman

, the court further reasoned that merely stating that s o me of her visitors were

family did not allege facts demonstrating a protected intimate association, becau se “a bright line

determination of familial relationship does not establish the right [of intimate association].” Tillman

,

953 F. Supp. at 150 (emphasis added).

Walker’s failure to show that her right of intimate association with her family and friends was

clearly established during the period of Henderson’s alleged harassment is fatal in light of his qualified

immunit y defense. Having been given several opportunities to state her best case, we conclude that

Walker can prove no set of facts in support of her claim that Henderson violated a constitutionally

protected right that would entitle her to relief.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in granting Henderso n’s motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim and AFFIRM its decision.

AFFIRMED.10