In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐1599

LAURA J. HATCHER,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF SOUTHERN

ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY, and  

KIMBERLY KEMPF‐LEONARD,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Illinois.

No. 3:13‐cv‐00407 — Nancy J. Rosenstengel, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 30, 2015 — DECIDED JULY 14, 2016

____________________

Before ROVNER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and SHAH,

District Judge.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Dr. Laura Hatcher was denied ten‐

ure by Southern Illinois University (SIU), and claims that it

was because she is a woman, assisted a student in reporting

                                                 

 Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
2   No. 15‐1599

an incident of sexual harassment by an SIU faculty member,

and filed a charge against SIU with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission. SIU responds that it denied Dr.

Hatcher tenure because she produced insufficient scholar‐

ship. We agree with the district court that Dr. Hatcher did not

produce evidence from which a jury could conclude that SIU

was lying about its reason for denying her tenure. We also

agree that she was not engaging in speech protected under

Title VII or by the First Amendment when she assisted the

student with the sexual harassment report. But because her

complaint stated a plausible claim of retaliation under Title

VII for filing a charge with the EEOC, we reverse and remand

the dismissal of that claim.

I. BACKGROUND

In July 2006, SIU hired Dr. Hatcher as a non‐tenured assis‐

tant professor in the political science department of the Col‐

lege of Liberal Arts (COLA). Dr. Hatcher was up for tenure

and promotion to associate professor in September 2011. SIU

denied Dr. Hatcher tenure in March 2012, and shortly after

terminated her contract.

Like at many universities, reviewing candidates for tenure

at SIU involves a multi‐level process. Candidates are evalu‐

ated first by an external review committee, second by the ten‐

ured faculty and chairperson of their respective departments,

third by the COLA promotion and tenure committee consist‐

ing of 10 tenured faculty members across departments, fourth

by the dean of the COLA, and finally by the provost and vice

chancellor of SIU. At each step, the decision‐makers consider

the candidate’s scholarship, teaching, and service.  
No. 15‐1599   3

About a year before she was up for tenure, Dr. Hatcher

assisted a graduate student in the political science department

in making a complaint to SIU about a faculty member who the

student claimed was sexually harassing her. Dr. Hatcher tes‐

tified that she believed she was required to help the student

make the report based on Dr. Hatcher’s job description.

Before submitting her tenure dossier, Dr. Hatcherreceived

positive annual evaluations. The evaluations from her exter‐

nal reviewers, which were made a part of her dossier, all rec‐

ommended her for tenure. In reviewing her tenure dossier,

the political science department voted 4‐2 in favor of promo‐

tion and tenure for Dr. Hatcher. In light of that vote, the de‐

partment chair, Roger Clinton, recommended that Dr.

Hatcher receive tenure and promotion. At the next step of the

process, the COLA committee voted 5‐4 in favor of tenure and

5‐4 against promotion. The chair of the COLA committee

wrote in his letter to the dean of the COLA, Kimberly Kempf‐

Leonard, that the COLA committee recognized Dr. Hatcher’s

success in teaching and service, but was concerned about her

lack of academic publications in prestigious political science

journals. So the COLA committee recommended that Dr.

Hatcher receive tenure, but not promotion.  

After receiving the COLA committee’s recommendation,

Dean Kempf‐Leonard made her own independent review. In

November 2011, Dean Kempf‐Leonard sent a letter to the

provost, John Nicklow, in which she wrote that while it was a

difficult decision, Dr. Hatcher “has not demonstrated excel‐

lence in research” and recommended that Dr. Hatcher receive

neither tenure nor promotion. Dean Kempf‐Leonard found

that “Dr. Hatcher has a lack of publications in both high‐pro‐

file venues and a lack of publications in mainstream political
4   No. 15‐1599

science venues.” However, Dean Kempf‐Leonard also noted

that Dr. Hatcher’s work was of high quality. After reviewing

her tenure file, Provost Nicklow also noted Dr. Hatcher’s lack

of peer‐reviewed publications, and recommended against

awarding her both tenure and promotion.  

During the same tenure cycle, two male professors in Dr.

Hatcher’s department, Roudy Hildreth and Stephen Bloom,

were also considered for tenure and promotion. The political

science department voted 6‐0 in favor of promotion and ten‐

ure for Dr. Hildreth. Only 3 voted in favor of promotion and

tenure for Dr. Bloom, 1 voted against tenure, and 2 members

abstained. The COLA Committee voted 10‐0 in favor of ten‐

ure and promotion for Dr. Bloom, and 10‐0 in favor of tenure

and 9‐1 in favor of promotion for Dr. Hildreth. Dean Kempf‐

Leonard recommended tenure and promotion for both male

candidates, and the provost and vice chancellor adopted

those recommendations.

In April 2012, Dr. Hatcher filed a non‐contractual griev‐

ance with the University’s Judicial Review Board (JRB). The

JRB is limited to procedural review of tenure decisions. It

found that Provost Nicklow did not sufficiently outline the

reasons for denying tenure and promotion to Dr. Hatcher. As

a remedy, it recommended that Dr. Hatcher be awarded pro‐

motion and tenure. In reviewing the grievance proceedings,

Chancellor Rita Cheng agreed that the provost should have

been more specific in his denial, but declined to reverse Dr.

Hatcher’s denial of tenure. Instead, she ordered Provost Nick‐

low to rewrite his denial letter in greater detail, which he did.

Chancellor Cheng issued her final decision denying tenure to

Dr. Hatcher on November 27, 2012.
No. 15‐1599   5

In the meantime, on October 3, 2012, Dr. Hatcher filed a

charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Oppor‐

tunity Commission, claiming that she was unfairly denied

promotion because of her gender. After the denial became fi‐

nal, in April 2013, Dr. Hatcher filed a lawsuit against SIU,

Chancellor Cheng, and Dean Kempf‐Leonard, claiming dis‐

crimination and retaliation. The district court granted the de‐

fendants’ motion to dismiss Dr. Hatcher’s Title VII retaliation

and First Amendment claims. Her remaining claim of gender

discrimination was dismissed at summary judgment. Dr.

Hatcher now appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Dr. Hatcher argues that the district court erred

in granting the defendants’motion to dismiss her Title VII and

42 U.S.C. § 1983 retaliation claims, abused its discretion in

denying her motion to reconsiderits dismissal of those claims,

and erred in granting summary judgment for her Title VII

gender discrimination claim. We review the district court’s

dismissal of Dr. Hatcher’s Title VII and § 1983 claims de novo.

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983). We review the

denial of Dr. Hatcher’s motion to reconsider under an abuse

of discretion standard. Gonzalez‐Koeneke v. West, 791 F.3d 801,

808 (7th Cir. 2015). We review the district court’s grant of sum‐

mary judgment de novo and construe all the evidence in the

light most favorable to Dr. Hatcher. Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d

979, 985 (7th Cir. 2009).

A. Dismissal of Retaliation Claims  

To survive a motion to dismiss, a claim must be plausible

ratherthan merely conceivable or speculative. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
6   No. 15‐1599

556 (2007). The plaintiff must include enough details about

the subject matter of a case to present a story that holds to‐

gether, but the proper question to ask is “could these things

have happened, not did they happen.” Carlson v. CSX Transp.,

Inc. 758 F.3d 819, 826–27 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Swanson v. Citi‐

bank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404–05 (7th Cir. 2010)).

1. Title VII Retaliation Claim for Filing EEOC

Charge Was Sufficiently Pled

To state a claim for Title VII retaliation, a plaintiff must

plead that she engaged in a statutorily protected activity and

was subjected to materially adverse actions as a result of that

activity. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S.

53, 57 (2006). Title VII specifically prohibits retaliation for fil‐

ing a charge with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐3(a).

Dr. Hatcher argues on appeal that the district court im‐

properly dismissed her Title VII retaliation claims. She says

her complaint makes out two plausible claims of retaliation:

first, that she was denied tenure because she assisted a grad‐

uate student in making a report of sexual harassment, and

second, that she was denied tenure because she filed a charge

of employment discrimination against SIU with the EEOC.

The defendants respond that assisting a graduate student in

making a complaint of sexual harassment is not statutorily

protected activity under Title VII. They further argue that be‐

cause Dr. Hatcher filed her charge with the EEOC long after

Dean Kempf‐Leonard and Provost Nicklow made their rec‐

ommendations to deny her tenure, Dr. Hatcher cannot estab‐

lish causation between a protected activity and a materially

adverse action by SIU. Finally, they claim that the district

court was correct to dismiss the retaliation count because Dr.

Hatcher failed to specifically plead that Chancellor Cheng’s
No. 15‐1599   7

final tenure decision was retaliation for filing a charge at the

EEOC.

While Dr. Hatcher’s complaint mentions in a few places

that she reported sexual harassment internally on behalf of a

student and discussed shortcomings of the sexual harassment

policy, there is no allegation in the complaint itself that the

student was an employee of SIU. That omission is crucial for

Title VII purposes. Under Title VII, an employee must identify

an unlawful employment practice that is prohibited by that

statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000r‐3(a). Without this essential infor‐

mation, there is no suggestion in the complaint that in sup‐

porting the student, Dr. Hatcher was opposing unlawful em‐

ployment discrimination, and therefore engaging in a statuto‐

rily protected activity.1 See Roots P’ship v. Lands’ End, 965 F.2d

1411, 1417 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding dismissal proper where

complaint fails to allege an essential element of plaintiff’s

claim.). So the district court properly dismissed that claim.  

More difficult is the issue of whether Dr. Hatcher properly

pled retaliation on the basis of her own filing of an EEOC

charge. We have held that a plaintiff must specifically identify

the protected activity that she alleges was the source of retal‐

iation. Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc. 758 F.3d 819, 828 (7th Cir.

2014). But the Supreme Court instructed in Swierkiewicz v.

Sorema that Title VII is not subject to a heightened pleading

standard. 534 U.S. 506, 513–15 (2002). Rather, all that is re‐

quired is a short and plain statement showing the pleader is

                                                 

1 We have not ruled on whether allegations of retaliation against faculty

who support students in bringing sexual harassment claims to university

officials could state a claim for retaliation under Title IX, but Dr. Hatcher

does not make this argument so we do not address it here.
8   No. 15‐1599

entitled to relief. Id. Swierkiewicz survived the Twombly and Iq‐

bal standard of pleading. Luevano v. Wal‐Mart Stores, 722 F.3d

1014, 1028 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Swanson, 614 F.3d at 404. We

have also noted that requiring pleading of unknown details

before discovery would improperly deny plaintiffs the oppor‐

tunity to prove their claims. EEOC v. Cocentra Health Servs.,

Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 781–82 (7th Cir. 2007).  

Dr. Hatcher made the following relevant factual allega‐

tions in her complaint: (1) she filed her EEOC charge asserting

discrimination on the basis of gender on October 3, 2012, (2)

during his testimony at the JRB hearing on October 12, 2012,

Provost Nicklow told the panel that Dr. Hatcher had filed a

charge of discrimination, and (3) on November 27, 2012,

Chancellor Cheng declined the JRB’s recommendation to

grant Dr. Hatchertenure, and instead denied hertenure. After

making these general factual allegations, the complaint con‐

tains a retaliation count which simply states that “by the con‐

duct described above,” SIU retaliated against Dr. Hatcher for

engaging in a statutorily protected activity. To be sure, the

count could have more clearly incorporated the above factual

allegations. But it is hard to conclude that the complaint was

so poorly drafted that SIU did notreceive notice of facts which

supported Dr. Hatcher’s claim that SIU retaliated against her,

and “the intent of the liberal notice pleading system is to en‐

sure that claims are determined on their merits rather than

through missteps in pleading.” Id. at 779. And SIU could have

asked for a more definite statement if it truly did not under‐

stand the nature of the allegations against it. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(e).

Dr. Hatcher’s complaint specified a protected activity (fil‐

ing a charge at the EEOC for gender discrimination) and an
No. 15‐1599   9

adverse employment action (denial of tenure). It further pled

that SIU retaliated against her for engaging in a protected ac‐

tivity. The short timing between the filing of the charge and

Chancellor Cheng’s decision, the fact that the Chancellor de‐

clined to act on the JRB’s recommendation, and a lack of other

allegations in the complaint which rule out retaliation as a

cause for the decision, all take Dr. Hatcher’s retaliation claim

from the realm of the possible into the realm of plausible. See

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. While Chancellor Cheng may very

well have made her decision without any retaliatory motive,

this is precisely the type of factual question which entitles a

plaintiff to discovery. So we find that the district court erred

in dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim of Title

VII retaliation, and remand that claim for further proceed‐

ings.                                                                                                                                                    

2. First Amendment Retaliation Claim

Properly Dismissed

Dr. Hatcher next argues that the district court erred in dis‐

missing her claim that SIU retaliated against her for engaging

in protected speech under the First Amendment by speaking

on behalf of a student about sexual harassment. SIU responds

that Dr. Hatcher’s speech was not protected under the First

Amendment because she made it pursuant to her employ‐

ment.  

In order for a public employee to make out a claim of First

Amendment retaliation against a government employer, the

employee must first establish that he or she was engaging in

protected speech. “The threshold inquiry is whether the em‐

ployee was speaking as a citizen; only then do we inquire into

the content of the speech.” Spiegla v. Hull, 481 F.3d 961, 965

(7th Cir. 2007). When a public employee speaks on matters
10   No. 15‐1599

pursuant to employment duties, that speech is not protected

under the First Amendment. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,

422 (2006). This is because “restricting speech that owes its ex‐

istence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities

does not infringe on any liberties the employee might have

enjoyed as a private citizen.” Id. A mere speculative possibil‐

ity that an employee speaks as a citizen is no longer enough

to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements. Abcarian v.

McDonald, 617 F.3d 931, 937 (7th Cir. 2010). So Dr. Hatcher

needed to plead specific facts that plausibly suggested her

speech was not made pursuant to her faculty role, but rather

was made in her capacity as a private citizen.  

Dr. Hatcher argues she spoke as a citizen because of the

absence of mandatory reporting requirements for her posi‐

tion. But “the listing of a given task in an employee’s written

job description is neither necessary nor sufficient to demon‐

strate that conducting the task is within the scope of the em‐

ployee’s professional duties.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424–25. We

instead take a “practical approach” to determining whether

an employee’s speech is pursuant to her employment. Id.; see

also McCardle v. Peoria Sch. Dist. No. 150, 705 F.3d 751, 754 (7th

Cir. 2013) (“the question of whether speech is ‘pursuant to’ a

public employee’s duties is not answered by mere reference to

the definitions of the speaker’s legal obligations or job de‐

scription”); Mills v. City of Evansville, 452 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir.

2006) (employee speech unprotected because it contributed to

formation and execution of an official policy); cf. Morales v.

Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 598 (7th Cir. 2007) (statements a police of‐

ficer made pursuant to deposition subpoena were not em‐

ployee speech because he was not employed to give deposi‐

tions).  
No. 15‐1599   11

Employees’ unsolicited reports of misconduct can be diffi‐

cult to view as part of their employment duties, since their

employers would often prefer that they keep quiet. But we

have rejected the notion that Garcetti applies only to speech

expressly commanded by an employer. Fairley v. Andrews, 578

F.3d 518, 523 (7th Cir. 2009). Instead, we have repeatedly held

that an employee’s speech about misconduct affecting an area

within her responsibility is considered pursuant to her em‐

ployment even when she is not strictly required to make it.

See Vose v. Kliment, 506 F.3d 565, 570 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding

that while sergeant went “above and beyond” in reporting

misconduct of detectives not under his supervision, it was not

beyond his official duty to ensure security and property of his

unit’s operations); Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1091

(7th Cir. 2008) (agency administrator had a duty to see law

was administered properly, which encompassed duty to bring

alleged wrongdoing within agency to relevant public author‐

ities); McArdle, 705 F.3d at 754 (7th Cir. 2013) (school official

speaking about predecessor and superior’s misconduct was

speech about matters that directly affected her area of respon‐

sibility).

Dr. Hatcher’s complaint first alleges that she was a man‐

dated reporter of sexual harassment. It goes on to allege that

“Hatcher told Kempf‐Leonard that female students subjected

to sexual harassment came to her because she (Hatcher) was

the senior female faculty in the Department.” Based on these

allegations, SIU filed a motion to dismiss the claim, arguing

that Hatcher essentially admitted that she considered the re‐

port of sexual harassment to Dean Kempf‐Leonard to be part

of her faculty duties. In her response to SIU’s motion to dis‐

miss, Hatcher changed course, asserting for the first time that

she mistakenly believed that she was a mandated reporter at
12   No. 15‐1599

the time she discussed sexual harassment issues with Dean

Kempf‐Leonard, but that Dean Kempf‐Leonard knew that she

was not required to make such a report.

In Heffernan v. City of Paterson, decided after oral argument

in this appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that the government

could be liable for demoting an employee based on the em‐

ployer’s mistaken belief that the employee engaged in pro‐

tected political activity. 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1419 (2016). Dr.

Hatcher appears to make an inverted argument: SIU knew her

speech was protected, and so it violated her rights, even if at

the time she made the speech, she believed she made it in the

course of her employment duties. But Heffernan does not ap‐

ply here because beliefs about whether Dr. Hatcher was a

mandated reporter do not determine whether her speech is

protected.

Rather, Dr. Hatcher must provide a plausible basis for

speaking as a citizen and not an employee of SIU. Her

amended complaint fails to do this. She nowhere explains

why she felt compelled to report the misconduct apart from

the fact that she was a professor at SIU and she believed it was

her job to do so. Because Dr. Hatcher’s amended complaint

indicates her speech was made pursuant to her faculty role,

and she failed to make any factual allegations indicating oth‐

erwise, Garcetti bars her retaliation claim. Abcarian, 617 F.3d at

938.  

Dr. Hatcher also argues that the district court abused its

discretion by denying her motion to reconsider the dismissal

of her retaliation claims. She argued in that motion that the

district court should have permitted her to amend her com‐

plaint, rather than dismissing it with prejudice for failure to

state a claim. Fatal to Dr. Hatcher’s motion to reconsider was
No. 15‐1599   13

her failure to explain how an amended complaint would cure

the deficiencies in her original complaint. Gonzalez‐Koeneke,

791 F.3d at 808. Even on appeal, Dr. Hatcher has not explained

how she would plead additional facts that demonstrate that

SIU had any reason to believe she was speaking as a citizen,

and not an employee, when she reported sexual misconduct

and noted shortcomings in the harassment policy. And she

also failed to attach an amended complaint or otherwise clar‐

ify her student’s employment status with SIU for Title VII pur‐

poses. The district court did not abuse its discretion.

B.  Summary Judgment Proper for Title VII Gender Dis‐

crimination Claim

Finally, Dr. Hatcher argues that the district court erred in

granting summary judgment to SIU on her Title VII claim of

gender discrimination. A plaintiff can survive summary judg‐

ment on a Title VII gender discrimination claim by providing

either direct or indirect evidence of discrimination. Morgan v.

SVT, LLC, 724 F.3d 990, 995 (7th Cir. 2013). Under the direct

method, a plaintiff can provide a convincing mosaic of cir‐

cumstantial evidence that allows a jury to infer intentional

discrimination by a decision‐maker. Phelan v. Cook Cnty., 463

F.3d 773, 779 (7th Cir. 2006). Such circumstantial evidence

could include (1) suspicious timing, ambiguous statements,

or comments directed at other employees in the protected

group, (2) evidence, statistical or otherwise, that similarly sit‐

uated employees outside of the protected group systemati‐

cally received better treatment, or (3) evidence that the em‐

ployer’s stated reason for the differential treatment is unwor‐

thy of belief. Rudin v. Lincoln Land Cmty. Coll., 420 F.3d 712,

720–21 (7th Cir. 2005). If the plaintiff can “assemble from var‐

ious scraps of circumstantial evidence enough to allow the
14   No. 15‐1599

trier of fact to conclude discrimination occurred, then sum‐

mary judgment forthe defendant is not appropriate.” Muham‐

mad v. Caterpillar, Inc., 767 F.3d 694, 700 (7th Cir. 2014).

Under the indirect method, an employee must show that

she is a member of a protected class, she was qualified for ten‐

ure, she was denied tenure, and a similarly situated applicant

outside the protected class was granted tenure. Sun v. Bd. of

Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 473 F.3d 799, 812 (7th Cir. 2007). If a

plaintiff succeeds in establishing these four elements, the bur‐

den shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate non‐dis‐

criminatory reason for the adverse employment action. And

if it is able to do so, the plaintiff must then produce evidence

showing that the stated reason is merely pretext for a discrim‐

inatory motive. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,

802 (1973). To create a triable issue of pretext, a plaintiff must

present evidence suggesting that her employer is dissem‐

bling. O’Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 635 (7th

Cir. 2011). “An inquiry into pretext requires that we evaluate

the honesty of the employer’s explanation, rather than its va‐

lidity or reasonableness.” Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965, 968

(7th Cir. 2013).

Nothing in Title VII bans outright an employer’s use of

subjective evaluation criteria, and differences in qualifications

between job candidates, on their own, cannot be evidence of

discrimination unless those differences are so favorable to the

plaintiff that there can be no dispute among reasonable per‐

sons of impartial judgment that the plaintiff was clearly better

qualified for the position at issue. Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280

F.3d 1169, 1176, 1179 (7th Cir. 2002), but see David v. Caterpillar,

Inc., 324 F.3d 851, 863 (7th Cir. 2003) (clarifying that Millbrook

is not controlling when plaintiff offers additional evidence of
No. 15‐1599   15

discrimination). In the academic context, we have held that

scholars are in the best position to make the highly subjective

judgments reviewing scholarship and tenure. Farrell v. Butler

Univ., 421 F.3d 609, 616 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Namenwirth v.

Bd. of Regents, 769 F.2d 1235, 1242 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Mere qual‐

ification [for a job] depends on objective measures ... but ten‐

ure requires something more; it requires the department be‐

lieve that the candidate have a certain amount of promise.”).

We have noted that

Because so many factors influence the tenure

process and because statistical inferences of dis‐

crimination are difficult to draw when there is

only a small number of observations ... it can be

difficult to infer the presence of an invidious in‐

fluence such as the sex of a candidate merely by

comparing successful and unsuccessful tenure

applicants.  

Blasdel v. Northwestern Univ., 687 F.3d 813, 817 (7th Cir. 2012).

But “faculty votes should not be permitted to camouflage dis‐

crimination, even the unconscious discrimination of well‐

meaning and established scholars.” Namenwirth, 769 F.2d at

1243; see also Novak v. Bd. of Trs., 777 F.3d 966, 976 (7th Cir.

2015) (“Congress did not intend that institutions of higher

learning enjoy immunity from the Nation’s anti‐discrimina‐

tion statutes.”).

Dr. Hatcher argues that the evidence in her case is suffi‐

cient under both the direct and indirect methods of proof. The

two methods are somewhat intertwined, because evidence

that an employer’s reasons for denying tenure are unworthy

of belief can serve both as circumstantial evidence under the
16   No. 15‐1599

direct method and as evidence of pretext to rebut a proffered

legitimate motive under the indirect method.  

To support both theories, Dr. Hatcher points to the follow‐

ing evidence: (1) the similarity of her publication record to

male colleagues who received tenure, (2) testimony from de‐

partment colleagues that she should have been promoted and

was treated unfairly, (3) an email from the Executive Commit‐

tee Chair of the COLA committee to Dean Kempf‐Leonard

stating that “Bloom and Hatcher were much more close than

the vote, something is going on with the Bloom vote in the

department,” (4) Dr. Hatcher’s contention that Dean Kempf‐

Leonard “cherry‐picked” seemingly negative comments from

external reviewers for Dr. Hatcher’s tenure review, and did

not do the same for her male colleagues, (5) testimony from

Dean Kempf‐Leonard that she ignored Dr. Hatcher’s attempts

to correct factual errors in her denial letter, and (6) the politi‐

cal science department operating paper which recommends

that a tenure candidate’s scholarship should be judged by the

department. Dr. Hatcher argues that these facts point to a tri‐

able issue of the true motivations behind Dean Kempf‐Leon‐

ard’s recommendation against tenure.

The problem with Dr. Hatcher’s argument is that none of

the above evidence points to a lie by Dean Kempf‐Leonard, or

by extension, SIU, about the reason she was denied tenure.

Particularly problematic for heris that Dean Kempf‐Leonard’s

recommendation was based in large part on the findings of

the COLA Committee, which Dr. Hatcher does not appear to

contend were discriminatory. Dr. Hatcher’s tenure vote was

more divided than her comparators, so she cannot argue she

was clearly better qualified for the position at issue. And

while some colleagues expressed frustration and suspicion
No. 15‐1599   17

about Dean Kempf‐Leonard’s decision to recommend against

tenure, none provided testimony that pointed to dissembling

by SIU. Their testimony is the type of subjective disagreement

with a tenure decision that we have found insufficient to sup‐

port a claim of discrimination.  

It is possible that the dean and provost were harder on Dr.

Hatcher than on her male colleagues during tenure review,

and some of her colleagues seemed to think that was the case.

It should not be a source of pride for SIU that Dr. Hatcher is

the first woman to be considered for tenure in the political sci‐

ence department in almost 20 years. The subjectivity of the

tenure review process can obscure bias, making it exceedingly

difficult to address entrenched inequalities which not only

have a negative impact on female faculty with tenure aspira‐

tions, but also on the institutions of higher learning that are

deprived of their contributions. However, Title VII only per‐

mits us to go so far in addressing this problem; in order for a

plaintiff to prevail at summary judgment, she cannot simply

show she was treated differently. She must provide evidence

that creates a material dispute over whether the reason her

employer gives for the differential treatment is unworthy of

belief. We see no evidence from which a reasonable jury could

draw that conclusion here. So the district court did not err in

granting summary judgment to SIU on the gender discrimi‐

nation claim.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in

part and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opin‐

ion.