MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 201 6 ME 141 Docket: BCD

- 15

- 430 Argued : April	7,	2016 Decided: September	13,	2016
Panel: ALEXANDER , MEAD, GORMAN ,	JABAR , HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. Majority : MEAD, GORMAN ,	HJELM,	and	HUMPHREY,	JJ. Dissent : ALEXANDER and JABAR ,	JJ.

ALEC	T.	SABINA	et	al.

v. JPMORGAN	CHASE	BANK,	N.A.

GORMAN ,	J. [¶1] Alec	T.	and	Emma	L.	Sabina appeal	from a	judgment entered	in the Business	 and	 Consumer	 Docket	 ( Murphy,	 J. ) dismissing their action against JPMorgan	Chase	Bank,	N.A. , (Chase) ,	in	which	they	claimed	that	Chase	failed	to comply	 with the statute	 governing the	 discharge	 of	 a mortgage , 33	 M.R.S. § 551	 (2015)

. We vacate the	 judgment and	 remand	 the	 matter	 for	 further proceedings

. I.		BACKGROUND [¶2 ] The	 Sabinas	 filed their amended	 complaint against	 Chase	 in	 the Business	and	Consumer	Docket	on	April	27,	2015 .		They alleged the	following2 facts ,	which	we	view	as	admitted for	purpose s of this appeal

. See Andrews	v. Sheepscot	Island	Co. ,	2016	ME	68,	¶ 2, 138 A.3d 1197

. [¶3 ] In	March	of	2011,	the	Sabinas	received	a	loan	from	Chase that	was secured	by	a mortgage	on their real	property	in	Portland. When	the y finished
pa ying off	 the	 mortgage	 in	 October	 of	 2013,	 Chase	 executed	 a	 written mortgage	 release	 and	 recorded	 that document in	 the Cumberland	 County
R egistry of	Deeds

. The registry then r eturned	the recorded	mortgage	release
to	Chase

. Chase mailed	a	copy	of	the	document	to	the	Sabinas , but it retained
the actual document that	it	 received	 from	 the	 registry

. The	Sabinas claim ed that	 Chase	 violated	 33	 M.R.S.	 §	 551	 by	 failing	 to mail them	 the	 “original” mortgage	release	document. 1 [¶4 ] Chase mo ved to	 dismiss	 the	 action pursuant	 to	 M.R.	 Civ.	 P. 12(b)(6) .	 	 After a	 hearing in	 July	 of	 2015 , the	 court granted	 Chase’ s	motion and	 dismissed	 the	 case	 with	 prejudice. T he	 court	 concluded	 that	 33	 M.R.S. § 551	is	ambiguous	as	to	whether	a	mortgagee compli es	with the	statute when
it mails a	 copy	 of	 the	 mortgage	 release ,	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 “original,”	 to	 the mortgagor. C onstruing	 section	 551	 strictly	 as	 a	 “penal”	 statute,	 the	 court
concluded	 that mailing	 a	 copy	 of	 the	 recorded	 document	 accomplishes	 the

1 The	Sabinas	also	brought	their	claim	as	a	class	action	on	behalf	of	similarly	situated	borrowers. See M.R.	Civ.	P.	23.		Their	class	action	allegations	are	not	at	issue	in	this	appeal.3
purpo se	 of	 the	 statute, noting	 that the	 statute	 does	 not	 contain	 the	 word “original

. ” This	appeal	followed.
II.		DISCUSSION [¶5 ] Reviewing	a	trial	court’s	dismissal	for	failure	to	state	a	claim	upon which	 relief	 can	 be	 granted	 pursuant	 to	 M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 12(b)(6), “ we view the facts	alleged	in	 the	complaint	as	if	 they	were	admitted.” Nadeau v.	Frydrych , 2014 ME	 154,	 ¶ 5,	 108	 A.3d	 1254 (per	 curiam) (quotation	 marks	 omitted)

.

“ We review	 the	 legal	 sufficiency	 of	 t he	 complaint	 de	 novo	 and	 view the complaint	in	 the	light	most	 favorable	 to	 the	plaintiff	 to	determine	whether	it sets	forth	elements	of	a	cause	of	action	or	alleges	facts	that	w ould	entitle	the plaintiff	 to	 relief	 pursuant	 to	 some	 legal	 theory.” Id. (quotation	 marks omitted). [¶6 ] We	re view a trial	court’s	i nterpret ation	of	a statute de	novo as	a question	 of	 law

. Efstat hiou	 v.	 Aspinquid,	 Inc. , 2008	 ME	 145,	 ¶ 57 , 956	 A.2d
110

. We	look first	to	the	plain	language	of	the	statutory	provision	at	issue	to determine	its	meaning, and	“we	interpret	[statutory]	provisions	according	to their	 unambiguous	 meaning	 unless	 the	 result	 is	 illogical	 or	 absurd.” MaineToday	 Media,	 Inc.	 v.	 State , 2013	 ME	 100,	 ¶	 6,	 82	 A.3d	 104	 (quotation marks	 omitted). I nterpreting	 the	 plain	 language	 of	 a	 statute also	 involves4 consider ing the	 statute’s	 “subject	 matter	 and	 purposes .	 .	 .	 and	 the consequences	 of	 a	 particular	 interpretation. ” Dickau	 v.	 Vt.	 Mut. Ins.	 Co. , 2 014 ME	158,	¶	21,	107	A.3d	621. “[O]nly	if	the	statute	is	ambiguous	will	we look	 to	 extrinsic	 indicia	 of	 legislative	 intent	 such	 as	 relevant	 legislative history

. ” Strout	 v.	 Cent.	 Me.	 Med.	 Ctr. ,	 2014	 ME	 77,	 ¶	 10,	 94	 A.3d	 786 (quotation	marks	om itted)

. [¶7 ] When	 a	 mortgag or performs his	 or	 her payment obligations according	 to	 the	 mortgage ,	 the	 mortgagee’s	 security	 interest	 in	 the	 subject property	 is	 extinguished. 4	 Richard	 R.	 Powell, Powell	 on	 Real	 Property § 37.33[1]

- [2]	at	37

- 226	(Michael Allan	Wolf	ed.,	2005). Generally,	s o	that	the cloud	on	 the	pro perty	owner’s	 title	is	 removed, the	mortgagee must execute and	 record a	 formal	instrument	 of	 release	 or	 satisfaction. Id

. In	Maine,	 the discharge	of	a	mortgage	is	governed	by	33	M.R.S.	§	551. 2

2 Title	33	M.R.S.	§	551 (2015)	provides ,	in	its	entirety : §	551. Entry	on	record;	neglect	to	discharge A	mortgage	only	may	be	discharged	by	a	written	instrument	acknowledging the	 satisfaction	 thereof	and	 signed	and	acknowledged	 by	 the	mortgagee	 or	 by	 the mortgagee’s	 duly	 authorized	 officer	 or	 agent,	 personal	 represent ative	 or	 assignee. The instrument	must	recite	the	name	or	identity	of	the	mortgagee	and	mortgagor,	or their	 successors	 in	 interest	 and	 the	 record	 location	 of	 the	 mortgage	 discharged. The instrument,	 when	 recorded,	 has	 the	 same	 effect	 as	 a	 deed	 of	 release duly acknowledged	and	recorded. Within	60	days	after	full	performance	of	the	conditions	of	the	mortgage,	the mortgagee	shall	record	a	valid	and	complete	release	of	mortgage	together	with	any5 [¶8 ] Section	 551 first	 explains	 how	 mortgages	 are	 discharged	 after payment	in	 full:	 “by	a	written	instrument	acknowledging	 the	 satisfaction ” of the	mortgage that ,	 “when	 recorded,	 has	 the	 same	effect	as	a	 deed	 of	 release duly	acknowledged	and	recorded.”		33	M.R.S.	§	551. N ext,	the	statute	requires the	mortgagee	to	undertake	two	actions: f irst, within	a	specific	time	period, it
instrument	of	assignment	necessary	to	establish	the	mortgagee’ s	record	ownership of	 the	 mortgage.	 	 Within	 30	 days	 after	 receiving	 the	 recorded	 release	 of	 the mortgage	 from	 the	 registry	 of	 deeds,	 the	mortgagee	 shall	 send	 the	 release	 by	 first class	mail	 to	 the	mortgagor’s	address	as	listed	in	 the	mortgage	agreement	or to	an address	 specified	 in	 writing	 by	 the	 mortgagor	 for	 this	 purpose.	 	 As	 used	 in	 this paragraph,	the	term	“mortgagee”	means	both	the	owner	of	the	mortgage	at	the	time it	is	satisfied	and	any	servicer	who	receives	the	final	payment	satisfying	the	debt.		If a	release	is	not	transmitted	to	the	registry	of	deeds	within	60	days,	the	owner	and any	such	servicer	are	jointly	and	severally	liable	to	an	aggrieved	party	for	damages equal	to	exemplary	damages	of	$200	per	week	after	expiration	of	the	60	days,	up	to an aggregate	 maximum	 of	 $5,000	 for	 all	 aggrieved	 parties	 or	 the	 actual	 loss sustained	by	the	aggrieved	party,	whichever	is	greater.		If	multiple	aggrieved	parties seek	exemplary	damages,	the	court	shall	equitably	allocate	the	maximum	amount.		If the	release	i s	not	sent	by	first	class	mail	to	the	mortgagor’s	address	as	listed	in	the mortgage	agreement	or	to	an	address	specified	in	writing	by	the	mortgagor	for	this purpose	within	30	days	after	receiving	the	recorded	release,	the	mortgagee	is	liable to	 an	 aggriev ed	 party	 for	 damages	 equal	 to	 exemplary	 damages	 of	 $500.	 	 The mortgagee	 is	 also	 liable	 for	 court	 costs	 and	 reasonable	 attorney’s	 fees	 in	 any successful	 action	 to	 enforce	 the	 liability	 imposed	 under	 this	 paragraph.	 	 The mortgagee	may	charge	 the	mortgagor	 fo r	any	recording	 fees	incurred	in	recording the	release	of	mortgage	and	any	postage	fees	incurred	in	sending	the	release	to	the mortgagor. With	respect	 to	a	mortgage	securing	an	open

- end	line	of	credit,	 the	60

- day period	 to	deliver	a	release	commences	aft er	 the	mortgagor	delivers	 to	 the	address designated	for	payments	under	the	line	of	credit	a	written	request	to	terminate	the line	and	 the	mortgage	 together	with	payment	in	 full	of	all	amounts	secured	by	 the mortgage.		The	mortgagee	may	designate	in	writing a	different	address	for	delivery of	written	notices	under	this	paragraph. All	 discharges	 of	 recorded	 mortgages,	 attachments	 or	 liens	 of	 any	 nature must	 be	 recorded	 by	 a	written	instrument	 and,	 except	 for	 termination	 statements filed	pursuant	 to	Title	11 ,	section	9

- 1513,	acknowledged	in	same	manner	as	other instruments	presented	for	record	and	no	such	discharges	may	be	permitted	by	entry in	the	margin	of	the	instrument	to	be	discharged.6
must “record [ 3 ] a	valid	and	complete release	of	mortgage ”;	second, “[w]ithin
30 days	after	receiving	the	recorded	release	of	the	mortgage	from	the	registry of	 deeds,	 the	 mortgagee	 shall	 send	 the	 release	 by	 first	 class	 mail	 to	 the mortgagor’s	 address

. ” 33 M.R.S.	 §	 551. The	 statute also provides	 for exemplary damag es	in	 the	event	 that	 the	mortgagee	 fails	 to	 complete	either
action. 33	M.R.S.	§	551. [¶9 ] Based	 on	 the	 statute’s	 plain	 language,	 w e	 conclude	 that it unambiguously	 requires	 the	 mortgagee	 to	 send	 to	 the	 mortgagor	 the mortgage	release	document	that	it	receives	 from	the	registry,	and	not	a	copy
of	 that	 document. After	 requiring	 the	 mortgagee	 to	 record	 “a	 valid	 and complete	 release	 of	mortgage,”	 the	 statu te	 then	 states,	in	 the	 next	 sentence, that	within	thirty	days	after	receiving	“ the recorded release ”	from	the	registry of	deeds,	 the	mortgagee	must mail “ the	 release ”	 to	 the	mortgagor. 33	M.R.S. § 551	(emphases	added). The Legislature’s	use	of	 the	defini te	article	“the”

— as	 opposed	 to	 the	 indefinite	 article	 “a”	 or	 the	 phrase	 “a	 copy	 of”

— indicates that	it	intended	 to	 require	 the	mortgagee	 to mail the	 same document	 that it

3 Used	in	this	sense, the “recording”	of	a	document	like	a mortgage release involves	no	more	and no	 less	 than	 sending	 the	 document	 to	 the	 appropriate registry with	 the	 required	 fee. Compare Black’s	 Law	 Dictionary 1465 ( 10 th	 ed.	 20 14 )	 ( defining	 the	 verb	 “record”	 as	 “[t]o	 deposit	 (an original	or	authentic	official	copy of a	document)	with	an	authority ”	and	providing,	as	an	example, “she	recorded	the	deed	in	the	county	property	office”) , with id. at 1473 (defining	“register	of	deeds” as	“[a]	public	official	who records deeds,	mortgages,	and	other	instruments	affecting	real	p roperty” (emphasis	added))

.7 receives	from	the	registry	of	deeds

. 4 See	Lydon	v.	Sprinkler	Servs. ,	2004 ME	16, ¶¶ 13

- 14,	841	A.2d	793. [¶10] Although	the	dissent	is	correct	to	note	that ,	at	one	time, the only purpose	of	the	statute	was	to	ensure	that	discharges	are	filed	with	the	county registries, see Dissenting	 Opinion	 ¶	 16, that	 changed in 2011 ,	 when the Legislature	 added	 the two sentences	 that	 are	 at	 issue	 here. See P.L.	 2011,
ch. 146,	 §	 1	 (effective	 Sept. 28,	 2011). Th e relevant language	 added	 by	 the Legislature is highlighted	below: Within	 60	 days	 after	 full	 performance	 of	 the	 conditions	 of the	 mo rtgage,	 the	 mortgagee	 shall	 record	 a	 valid	 and	 complete release	 of	mortgage	 together	with	any	instrument	 of	assignment neces sary	 to	 establish	 the	 mortgagee’ s	 record	 ownership	 of	 the mortgage. Within	 30	 days	 after	 receiving	 the	 recorded	 release	 of the	mort gage	from	 the	registry	of	deeds,	 the	mortgagee	 shall	 send the	release	by	fi rst	class	mail	to	the	mortgagor’ s	address	as	listed	in the	mortgage	agreement	or	to	an	address	specified	in	writing	by	the mortgagor	 for	 this	 purpose. As	 us ed	 in	 this	 paragraph,	 the term “mortgagee” means	both	the	owner	of	the	mortgage	at	the	time	it is	 satisfied	 and	 any	 servicer	 who	 receives	 the	 final	 payment satisfying	 the	debt. If	a	release	is	not	 transmitted	 to	 the	registry of	 deeds	 within	 60	 days,	 the	 owner	 and	 any	 such	 service r	 are jointly	 and	 severally	 liable	 to	 an	 aggrieved	 party	 for	 damages equal	to	exemplary	damages	of	$200	per	week	after	expiration	of

4 Because	we	conclude	that	section	551’s	mailing	provision	is	unambiguous,	we	do	not address the	 parties’	 arguments regarding	 the	 “penal”	 or	 “remedial”	 nature	 of	 the	 sta tute. See Violette	 v. Macomber ,	125	Me.	432,	434,	1 3 4	A.	561	(1926)	(“The	rule	of	strict	construction	of	a	penal	law	is subordinate to	the	rule	of	reasonable,	sensible	construction	.	.	.	.”) ; see	also 3	Norman	J.	Singer	&	J.D. Shambie	 Singer, Statutes	 and	 Statutory	 Construction §	 58:1	 at	 103	 (7th	 ed.	 2008) (“S trict construction	cannot	be	used	to	defeat	the	clear	intent	of	the	statute .	.	.	.”); id. §	59:8	at	22 8	(“ [W]hen legislative	intent	can	be	determined	from	the	language	of	the	statute,	it	will	be	given	effect	without resort	to	other	aids	of	construction

. ” )

.8 the	 60	 days,	 up	 to	 an	 aggregate	 maximum	 of	 $5,000	 for	 all aggrieved	 parties	 or	 the	 actual	 loss	 sustained	 by	 the	 aggrieved p arty,	 whichever	 is	 greater. If	 multiple	 aggrieved	 parties	 seek exemplary	 damages,	 the	 court	 shall	 equitably	 allocate	 the maximum	amount. If	the	release	is	not	sent	by	first	class	mail	to	the mortgagor’ s	address	as	listed	in	 the	mortgage	agreement	 or	 to	a n address	 specified	 in	 writing	 by	 the	 mortgagor	 for	 this	 purpose within	30	days	after	receiving	the	recorded	release,	the	mortgagee is	 liable	 to	 an	 aggrieved	 party	 for	 damages	 equal	 to	 exemplar y damages	of $ 500. The	mortgagee	is	also	liable	for	cour t	cost s	and reasonable	attorney’ s	 fees	in	any	successful	action	 to	enforce	 the liability	 imposed	 under	 this	 paragraph. The	 mortgagee	 may charge	the	mortgagor	for	any	recording	fees	incurred	in	recording the	release	of	mortgage	and	any	postage	fees	incurred	in	s ending the	release	to	the	mortgagor.
Id. (emphase s	 added). We	 agree	 that	 we	 must	 always	 endeavor	 to	 avoid creating	 an	 absurd	 result	 when	 attempting	 to	 determine	 the	 Legislature’s intent.		Here,	however,	where	the	language	is	not	ambiguous,	we	must	accept that,	 by	 adding	 this	 language,	 the	 Legislature	 intended	 to	 c reate	 a	 new obligation	for	mortgagees. See	Wong	v.	Hawk ,	2012	ME	125,	¶	8,	55	A.3d	425 (“Words	in	a	statute	must	be	given	meaning	and	not	treated	as	meaningless	or superfluous.” (quotation	marks	omitted)). [¶1 1 ] The	Legislature ’s	choice	not	 to use	 the	w ord	“original”	does	not
make	the statute ambiguous. In	fact,	a s	became	c lear	at	oral	argument,	use	of the	word	 “original”	would	likely have create d ambiguity

. Chase	 argues	 that many	registries now accept	submission	of	electronic	documents	for	recording,9 and	 so the	 “wet	 ink	 original”	 may	 never reach	 the	 registry. E lectronic recording w as	 not alleged	 in	 this	 case but, assuming that such	 a possibility exists, a	mortgagee	that	submits a	document	electronically can still	mail to	the mortgagor the	 release	 that it	 receives	 from	 the	 registry , as	 required	 by	 the

statute

. 5 [¶1 2 ]		To	the	extent	that	the	Sabinas	argue	that	section	551	requires	a mortgagee	 to mail	 to	 the	 mortgagor	 the	 “wet	 ink	 original”	 document,	 even
where t he	 registry of	 deeds	 never	 receives	 that	 document,	 we can not	 agree that	 the	 statute	 imposes	 such	 a	 requirement. The	 mailing	 requirement
commands the	 mortgagee	 to	 give	 the	 legally	 operative	 mortgage	 release document	 to	 the	mortgagor. The document	 the	mortgagee	must mail	 to	 the mortgagor ,	 therefore, is	 the recorded mortgage	 release document that the mortgagee	 receives	 from	 the	 registry	 of	 deeds , even when that document is

not the	“wet	ink	original

. ” [ ¶1 3 ]		Here,	in	their	amended	complaint,	the	Sabinas	alleged	that	Ch ase mailed	 a	 copy	 of	 the	 recorded	 mortgage	 release	 document	 that	 it	 received from	 the	registry,	in stead	of	 the	actual	document.		Because	 t he se	allegations

5 Neither	 party	 has	 asserted	 that	 Maine’s	 registries	 return recorded mortgage	 releases to mortgagees	only	in	electronic	format. If	the	registries	start	to	do	so,	however,	the	Legislature	may wish	 to	 clarify	 how	 a	 mortgagee	 could	 “send	 the	 release	 by first	 class	 mail”	 to	 a	 mortgagor , 33 M.R.S.	§	551

.10 were	sufficient	to	state	a	claim	that	Chase	violated	section	551,	the	trial	court
erred when	it dismissed	the	action,	and	we	vacate	the	judgment	and	remand the	case	for	further	proceedings. 6 The	entry	is: Judgment vacated

. Remanded	 for	 further proceedings	consistent	with	this	opinion.

J ABAR ,	J., with	whom	ALEXANDER,	J.,	joins, dissenting. [¶1 4 ] I	 respectfully	 dissent	 because	 the	 copy	 of	 the	 recorded instrument	 sent	 to	 the	mortgagor	accomplishes	 the	intended	 purpose	 of	 the

statute. I	 agree	with	 the	 C ourt	when	it	 states	 that	 “we	interpret	 [statutory] provisions	 according	 to	 their unambiguous	 meaning	 unless	 the result	 is illogical	or	absurd.” This	is	a	case where	interpreting	a	statute	according	to	its unambiguous	meaning	leads	to	an	absurd	result

. [¶ 1 5 ] We	have	noted: In	 determining	 the	 legislative	 intent,	 we	 look	 first	 to	 the plain meaning	of	the	statutory	language,	and	we	construe	that	language to	 avoid	 absurd,	 illogical	 or	 inconsistent	 results. In	 addition	 to examining	 the	 p lain	 language	 we	 also	 consider the	 whole

6 We	 are	 not	 persuaded	 by	 Chase’s	 argument	 that our	 interpretation	 renders	 section	 551 unconstitutionally	 vague. Se e Me.	 Milk	 Producers,	 Inc.	 v.	 Comm’r	 of	 Agric.,	 Food	 &	 Rural	 Res. , 483 A.2d	1213,	1220

- 21	(Me.	1984) ; see	also Village	of	Hoffman	Estates	v.	Flipside,	Hoffman	Estates, Inc. ,	455	U.S.	489,	498

- 99	(1982).11 statutory	scheme	of	which	the	section	at	issue	forms	a	part	s o	that a	 harmonious	 result,	 presumably	 the	 intent	 of	 the	 Legislature, may	be	achieved. Jordan	 v

. Sears,	 Roebuck	 &	 Co., 651	 A

. 2d	 358, 360	 ( M e.	 1994) (citations omitted)	(quotation	marks	omitted) ; see	also Sunshine	v	Brett , 2014	ME	146 , ¶ 13,	106	A

. 3d	112 3. [¶ 1 6 ] Although	 I believe that the	 language of	 the	 statute is

un ambiguous,	 we	 must	 construe	 the	 language	 in	 such	 a	 way as to	 avoid

“ absurd	and	illogical”	results. The	main	purpose	of	Title	33 M.R.S. § 551	is	to ensure	 that	 mortgagees	 file	 discharges with	 the	 registry	 immediately following	 a	mortgagor’s	 payment	 of	 the	mortgage ,	 and	 notify	 the	mortgagor that	the	discharge	was	filed. Section	551 was	enacted	to	address	the	problem associated	with	banks	failing	to	record	discharges	when	mortgagors	pay	off a note	and	the	accompanying	mortgage. In Currier	v	Huron ,	2008	ME	19, ¶ 21,
940	A

. 2d	1085 , we	stated	that	the	purpose	of	section	551	is	to	“ensure	timely discharges , ” because “ [m] ortgages	hav e	become	a	national	enterprise	.	.	.	[and]
with	 this	 national	 e xpansion[,] there	 has	 been	 a	 proliferation	 of	mortgagees failing	to	timely	file	discharge	mortgages.” [¶ 1 7 ] The	 failure	 of	 mortgagees to record these discharges	 create s problems	 for	 mortgagors	 when	 they	 later	 attempt	 to	 convey	 or	 encumber12 their	 property. In	 response	 to	 these	 problems,	 legislatures	 have	 enacted statutes	 providing	 for	 penalties	 to	 encourage mortgagors	 to	 promptly	 file these	 discharges

. The	 requirement that	 the	 mortgagee	 send	 the mortgagor evidence	of	such	recordings	is	not	to	give	the	mor tgagor	any	type	of	valuable
document ;	 rather	it	is to	 force mortgagees	like	 JPMorgan	 Chase to promptly
record discharges	and	to	inform	the	mortgagor	that	the	discharge has	indeed
been	 recorded

. The	 written document	 sent	 to	 the	 mortgagor

— whether	 a
release deed or	another	instrument	meeting	the	statutory	requirements

— has
no	inherent	value	other	than to	show that	the	discharge	has	been recorded in the	 registry	 of	 deeds. 7 S ending a	 photocopy	 of	 the	 discharge	 performs	 the
same	function	as does	sending the original. [¶ 1 8 ] In	 holding	 that	 section	 551	 requires	 mortgagees	 to	 provide mortgagors	 with	 the	 original	 release	 instrument, the	 C ourt	 places	 much emphasis	on	the	term	“the	release

. ” T here	is	no	special	significance	to	the	use
of the	 term “release” in	 the statute. The caption	 to	 551	 reads : “Entry	 on record;	neglect	to	discharge.” The	text	of	section	551	does	not	use	the	term s “original”	or	“ copy . ” Furthermore,	the	first	paragraph of	section	551	uses	the
term	“ written	instrument , ”	but	later	in	the	sectio n	the	term	“release”	is	used.

7 The	 filing	 of	 the	 discharge	 with	 the	 registry	 of	 deeds	 is	 what	 affords	 the	 mortgagor	 title protection.		Title	16	M.R.S.	§	453	(2015)	provides	that	properly	attested	copies	of	documents	filed in	the	registry	of	deeds	may	be	used	in	evidence.13 The	statute	also provides that although the	instrument	filed	by	the mortgagee need	not	be	a	deed	of	 release ; once	it	has	been	properly	 recorded it	has	 the

sa me	effect	as	a	deed	of	release. Id. However	we	characterize	 the recorded document, its	requirements	are	clear:	it must	contain	the	name	or	identity	of the	mortgagee	and	the	mortgagor	and	their	successors	in	interest	in	addition to	 the	record	location	of	 the	mortgage	discharged. Id. T hat	 the	statute	does not	clearly	s pecify	what	type	of	instrument	must	be	recorded	is	further	proof that	the	purpose	of	section	551 is	to facilitate	recording with	the	registry , and

to require	mortgagees	to	promptly inform	the	mortgagor	that the rel ease	was recorded

. [¶ 19 ] The	C ourt	has interpreted	the	language of	section	551 according to	 its	 unambiguous	 meaning , but	 I	 believe	 the	 result	 is	 illogical	 or	 absurd. Penalizing	 a	 bank	 $500	 per	 violation	 for	 noncompliance	 with	 the	 statute, when	 the	 bank	 accomplishes	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 statute

— r ecording the discharge	 with	 the	 registry	 and	 sending	 a	 photocopy	 of	 the	 discharging instrument	to	the	mortgagor

— does not make	sense. The	mortgagor	is	put	in exactly	the	same	legal	position	by	receiving	a	p hotocopy	of	the	instrument	as
she	 or	 he	 would	 have been	 had	 she	 or he	 received	 the	 original	 written
instrument.14 [¶ 2 0 ] It	 does	 not	 make	 any	 difference w hether	 the	 statute	 is
characterized	as penal	 or	 remedial : we	must	apply	 common	 sense when	we interpret	it

. And	it	 does	 not	make	 sense

— or , stated	 differ ently,	it w ould	 be “illogical	and	absurd ”

— to	penalize	 the	bank	$500	 for	supplying	 the	required information	 to	 the	 mortgagor	 by	 sending	 a	 photocopy	 of	 the	 discharging
instrument. [¶ 2 1 ] For	these	reasons,	I	would	affirm.

On	the	briefs: Michael	 R.	 Bosse,	 Esq.,	 Daniel	 J.	 Mitchell,	 Esq.,	 and	 Meredit h	 C.	 Eilers, Esq.,		Bernstein	Shur,	Portland,	 for	appellants	Alec	T Sabina	and	Emma L.	Sabina Todd	 S.	 Holbrook,	 Esq .,	 Morgan,	 Lewis	 &	 Bockius,	 Boston, Massachusetts,	 and	 Robert	M.	 Brochin, Esq.,	 and	 Brian	M.	 Ercole, Esq., Morgan,	Lewis	&	Bockius,	Miami,	Florida,	 for	appellee	 JPMorgan	Chase Bank,	N.A.
At	oral	argument: Daniel	J.	Mitchell,	Esq., for	appellants	Alec	T Sabina	and	Emma	L.	Sabina Robert	M.	Brochin, Esq., for	appellee	JPMorgan	Chase	Bank,	N.A.

Business	and	Consumer	Docket	docket	number	CV

- 2014

- 61 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY