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BRUCE K. JALBERT ET AL. v. LAWRENCE R.

MULLIGAN ET AL.

(AC 35824)

Keller, Mullins and Schaller, Js.

Argued May 21—officially released September 23, 2014

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Waterbury, Shapiro, J.)

Lawrence R. Mulligan, self-represented, with whom

appeared Paul E. Pollock and Dov Braunstein, for the

appellant (named defendant).

Benjamin M. Wattenmaker, with whom, on the brief,

was John M. Wolfson, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
Opinion

KELLER, J. The defendant, Lawrence R. Mulligan,

appeals from the judgment, rendered after a court trial,

in favor of the plaintiffs, Bruce K. Jalbert and Pamela

D. Jalbert.1 On appeal, he challenges as clearly erroneous the trial court’s findings as to (1) the assumption

of a defense by Chicago Title Insurance Company (Chicago Title), (2) the barter agreement between the parties, and (3) his retention of $135,000 for legal fees

allegedly incurred. He further claims that (4) the barter

agreement between the parties is unenforceable, (5) a

pleading deficiency bars recovery under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes § 42-

110a et seq. (CUTPA), and (6) the court’s erroneous

findings of fact ‘‘result in clearly erroneous judgments

against’’ him. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following relevant findings of fact are set forth

in the court’s detailed memorandum of decision. ‘‘The

[plaintiffs] are husband and wife. Pamela Jalbert did

not graduate from high school and received a [general

equivalency diploma]. Bruce Jalbert is a carpenter. The

defendant acted as the plaintiffs’ attorney between 1995

and 2008, [working on matters that included] real estate

transactions. He represented them when they purchased their home at 35 Tolstoy Lane in Southbury for

$295,000 in 2004. On the defendant’s recommendation,

they purchased title insurance from [Chicago Title]. The

defendant also handled Bruce Jalbert’s father’s estate,

including probate work and real estate transactions.

‘‘The defendant was a close personal friend of the

[plaintiffs]. He testified that he and his wife and the

[plaintiffs] ‘were about as close as you would deem

family.’ . . . During a ten year period, they had dinner

together, socialized at one another’s homes, and traveled together. When they purchased their home in 2004,

the [plaintiffs] were aware that a neighboring owner,

Jean Elin, of 39 Tolstoy Lane, had an easement for a

right-of-way over their land. . . . Pamela Jalbert

described it as a passway to a summer cottage, to be

used for three weeks to three months out of the year,

which was not to be widened or maintained. In 2005,

after friends of the [plaintiffs] learned of an issue concerning rights to use Tolstoy Lane and, as a result,

decided not to purchase 39 Tolstoy Lane, the [plaintiffs]

asked the defendant to represent them concerning the

easement issue.

‘‘To compensate the defendant for his legal services,

the [plaintiffs] and the defendant agreed to a barter

system, contingent on whether Chicago Title provided

representation to the [plaintiffs]. They agreed that if

Chicago Title did not provide representation, the parties

would exchange Bruce Jalbert’s construction work for

the defendant’s legal services. If Chicago Title did provide representation, then the defendant would pay for
Bruce Jalbert’s work. This agreement was not put in

writing.

‘‘Between 2005 and 2007, Bruce Jalbert worked on

severalrenovation projects forthe defendant, at properties located in Connecticut, New York and Rhode Island.

The undisputed value thereof was $84,750. . . .

‘‘Elin sold 39 Tolstoy Lane to WarrenEnterprises, LLC

(Warren Enterprises), in May, 2006. Warren Enterprises

sued the [plaintiffs] in November, 2006, seeking access

to Tolstoy Lane over the plaintiffs’ property (Warren

Enterprises litigation). . . . After receiving the suit

papers, the defendant contacted Chicago Title and then

told Pamela JalbertthatChicago Title’s claims representative informed [him] that Chicago Title was not going

to provide representation for the [plaintiffs]. As a result,

Mrs. Jalbert asked the defendant to represent them. He

represented them at court appearances in December,

2006, and February, 2007.

‘‘After the second appearance in February, 2007, the

defendant informed the plaintiffs that Chicago Title had

hired Attorney Neil Marcus of the law firm of Cohen &

Wolf, P.C., ‘to help him.’ . . . In fact, by letter dated

March 8, 2007 . . . Chicago Title informed the defendant that it had retained Marcus to defend the [plaintiffs], and that it would not be responsible for any fees

or expenses of any other counsel. Marcus filed an

appearance forthe [plaintiffs] in the Warren Enterprises

litigation, in lieu of the defendant, in March, 2007, to

defend the [plaintiffs] against all counts of the complaint in that matter. . . . The defendant did not provide Chicago Title’s letter to the [plaintiffs], and they

saw it only after the Warren Enterprises litigation was

settled in April, 2008, and after they had commenced

suit against the defendant in this matter.

‘‘In May, 2007, the defendant asked the plaintiffs for

$85,000 from Bruce Jalbert’s father’s trust (the trust),

in order to show Chicago Title that the plaintiffs had

paid the defendant for his work. According to the defendant, he could not show Chicago Title that he had been

paid by Bruce Jalbert’s work.2 The defendant agreed to

hold the $85,000 in an escrow account, to be returned to

the trust after the settlement of the Warren Enterprises

litigation. . . . [T]he trust provided the $85,000, which

the [plaintiffs] provided to the defendant by personal

check. . . . The defendant did not return these funds.

‘‘Prior to Marcus’ appearance, the defendant filed no

pleadings in the Warren Enterprises litigation. Marcus

filed pleadings after he appeared. Marcus then worked

with opposing counsel, who also had been retained by

a title insurance company, to settle the Warren Enterprises litigation. No depositions were taken and no

motion practice occurred. As part of the settlement,

Warren Enterprises received a parcel on the north side

of the [plaintiffs’] property for use as a driveway, and
the [plaintiffs] received a parcel as a buffer zone so

that their neighbors could not build near the [plaintiffs’]

house. Also, $50,000 each was paid by Chicago Title

and First American Title Insurance Company, Warren

Enterprises’ title company. [A total of $100,000 in settlement funds was] deposited in the defendant’s client

funds account. . . . [T]he defendant [retained] $50,000

from the settlement.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote

added.)

Approximately two weeks after the Warren Enterprises litigation settled, Pamela Jalbert asked the defendant to return the $85,000 from the escrow account.

The defendant refused to do so, and this civil action

ensued. The operative complaint, the plaintiffs’ December 11, 2012 fourth revised complaint, contains five

counts alleging conversion, statutory theft in violation

of General Statutes § 52-564, violation of CUTPA, fraud

and larceny by false pretenses. In their prayer for relief,

the plaintiffs requested, inter alia, monetary damages,

treble damages pursuant to the statutory theft count,

prejudgment interest, costs and reasonable attorney’s

fees. The matter was tried before the court over the

course of two days in March, 2013, during which all

parties testified.

In its memorandum of decision, the court began its

discussion by observing that ‘‘[t]he resolution of this

matter involves the court’s assessments of credibility

and the fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship.’’ Throughout its decision, the court expressly credited the testimony of the plaintiffs. By contrast, the

court did not find the defendant’s testimony to be credible, detailing numerous assertions and explanations

that the court found to be unpersuasive or lacking in

credibility. The court ultimately ruled in favor of the

plaintiffs on all but the fraud count, concluding in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he evidence is . . . clear and convincing that the defendant intentionally and wrongfully took

and withheld $135,000 from the plaintiffs. The defendant intentionally misled them concerning the $85,000

payment from the trust. The defendant intentionally

misled the plaintiffs into believing that his services were

needed to defend them in the Warren Enterprises litigation, and that he was entitled to be paid therefor, causing them also to agree that he would receive $50,000

from the settlement. He intentionally deprived them of

those funds as well.’’ The court further found that ‘‘[t]he

evidence before the court shows that the plaintiffs, who

were not as well educated as the defendant, an attorney,

were misled by the defendant, who, at the time of the

events at issue, was their friend, attorney and fiduciary.

It is evident that he misled them to believe that Chicago

Title was not providing a defense and that he had

expended vast hours on their behalf in their defense

. . . . The defendant never paid for Bruce Jalbert’s construction services. As a result, the plaintiffs suffered an

additional ascertainable loss of $84,750. . . . This con-
duct . . . was unfair, immoral, unethical, oppressive,

and unscrupulous.’’ (Citation omitted.)

The court awarded the plaintiffs a total of $746,821.11

in damages, which included treble damages on the statutory theft count pursuant to § 52-564, treble prejudgment interest pursuant to General Statutes §§ 37-3a and

52-564, and CUTPA damages. The court further determined that an award of attorney’s fees was warranted

in light of the CUTPA violation, and thus granted the

plaintiffs a period of fifteen days in which to file an

affidavit of attorney’s fees and expenses. From that

judgment, the defendant appealed to this court.3

On appeal, the defendant primarily challenges various factual findings rendered by the court. The standard

of review governing such claims is well established.

‘‘[I]t is axiomatic that [t]he trial court’s [factual] findings

are binding upon [an appellate] court unless they are

clearly erroneous in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the record as a whole. . . . We cannot retry the

facts or pass on the credibility of the witnesses. . . .

A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no

evidence in the record to support it . . . or when

although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing

court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and

firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Greco v. Greco, 275

Conn. 348, 359, 880 A.2d 872 (2005). With that standard

in mind, we turn to the defendant’s claims.

I

The defendant challenges as clearly erroneous certain findings pertaining to Chicago Title’s assumption

of a defense on behalf of the plaintiffs in the Warren

Enterprises litigation. Specifically, the defendant claims

that the court erroneously found that he deceived the

plaintiffs into believing that Chicago Title had declined

to furnish such a defense, particularly when, he alleges,

Marcus advised them to the contrary. For two distinct

reasons, his claims fail.

First, our appellate courts repeatedly have recognized that ‘‘[w]e are not required to review claims that

are inadequately briefed. . . . We consistently have

held that [a]nalysis,ratherthan mere abstract assertion,

is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by

failure to brief the issue properly. . . . [F]or this court

judiciously and efficiently to consider claims of error

raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully

set forth their arguments in their briefs. We do not

reverse the judgment of a trial court on the basis of

challenges to its rulings that have not been adequately

briefed. . . . The parties may not merely cite a legal

principle without analyzing the relationship between

the facts of the case and the law cited. . . . Where the

parties cite no law and provide no analysis of their

claims, we do not review such claims.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Russell v. Russell, 91 Conn. App.

619, 634–35, 882 A.2d 98, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 924,

925, 888 A.2d 92 (2005). The defendant’s appellate brief

fails to cite to any legal authority in regard to these

claims. Rather, his brief consists entirely of bald assertions unaccompanied by substantive analysis thereof.

As a result, the defendant has not adequately briefed

those issues.

Second, even assuming the claims were adequately

briefed, the record before us contains ample evidence

substantiating the court’s findings. At trial, Pamela Jalbert was asked whether the plaintiffs were notified that

Chicago Title had agreed to represent them in the Warren Enterprises litigation. She testified that shortly after

she was served with legal process in the Warren Enterprises litigation, the defendant informed her that he had

contacted Chicago Title and that Chicago Title

responded that ‘‘they weren’t going to represent us.’’4

Later in her testimony, the following colloquy ensued:

‘‘[The Plaintiffs’ Counsel]: . . . [D]id you know that

in March of 2007 [the defendant] had received . . . a

letter from Chicago Title that said that Chicago Title

was hiring [the law firm of] Cohen & Wolf to defend you?

‘‘[Pamela Jalbert]: No. [The defendant] kept telling

us that our title company was not representing us. . . .

‘‘[The Plaintiffs’ Counsel]: . . . [W]hat was your

understanding regarding Chicago Title’s part of this

case?

‘‘[Pamela Jalbert]: That they were not representing

us. That they had hired Neil Marcus to help [the defendant] and that the title company was not representing

us. I did not find out that they were representing us

until after we sued [the defendant], after we started

this lawsuit. Then, subsequently, when he turned over

his files, we found out that . . . they were representing

us. But [the defendant] kept telling us from day one up

until the end, even when we settled, he kept telling us

the title company wasn’t representing us [and that] [w]e

need to sue them for failure to represent.’’

In addition, the March 8, 2007 letter from Chicago

Title to the defendant, in which it formally notified the

defendant that it would be providing a defense on behalf

of the plaintiffs, was admitted into evidence at trial.

Pamela Jalbert testified that the defendant never

showed her and her husband that letter or conveyed

its substance to them. She further testified that ‘‘if we

had known that Chicago Title was representing us from

day one, we would have had no reason to hire [the

defendant]. There would have been no barter

agreement, there wouldn’t have been any exchange of

money because Chicago Title would have been representing us, so we would have had representation. There

would have been no need for any of it. . . . [W]e

wouldn’t have had to have [the defendant] as our
attorney.’’

‘‘It is well established that [i]n a case tried before a

court, the trial judge is the sole arbiter of the credibility

of the witnesses and the weight to be given specific

testimony.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United

Technologies Corp. v. East Windsor, 262 Conn. 11, 26,

807 A.2d 955 (2002). As trier of fact, the court was ‘‘free

to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony

offered by either party.’’(Internal quotation marks omitted.) DiVito v. DiVito, 77 Conn. App. 124, 138, 822 A.2d

294, cert. denied, 264 Conn. 921, 828 A.2d 617 (2003).

The court thus was entitled to credit the aforementioned testimony of Pamela Jalbert.

The record also contains evidence belying the defendant’s assertion that ‘‘all the evidence commands the

conclusion’’ that Marcus had advised the plaintiffs that

Chicago Title was providing a defense on their behalf

in lieu of the defendant. The court thoughtfully considered, and rejected, this argument, finding it unpersuasive. We concur. Marcus testified that, after filing an

appearance on behalf of the plaintiffs, the defendant

‘‘requested that I communicate with the [plaintiffs]

through him, and that . . . if we needed to meet with

the [plaintiffs], he would set up the appointment, he

would attend any of our meetings. Essentially, he was

asking that he be the filter between the [plaintiffs] and

me.’’ Pamela Jalbert similarly testified that, after

informing the plaintiffs that Marcus had been retained

to ‘‘help him’’ with their defense, the defendant ‘‘told

us not to speak with’’ Marcus. As a result, the vast

majority of communications between Marcus and the

plaintiffs ‘‘went through’’ the defendant. Marcus further

testified that ‘‘[a]s we were reaching the final throes of

the settlement agreement, it became apparent to me

that the communications were not working because I

was getting a response allegedly from the [plaintiffs],

which was coming through [the defendant], that didn’t

make sense . . . because it was not, in my opinion at

the time, in the [plaintiffs’] best interest . . . . [A]t

some point I realized that I had to talk directly to the

[plaintiffs], and that was my eye-opener, that I realized

that the communications weren’t working . . . . I

spoke to them directly . . . and at that point I realized

that they had been somewhat confused. They really, at

that point, felt that [the defendant] was representing

them . . . .’’ Marcus’ testimony substantiates the

court’s finding that the plaintiffs were not aware that

Chicago Title had assumed their defense in lieu of the

defendant. We thus cannot say that the court’s finding

was clearly erroneous.5

II

The defendant also contests the court’s findings with

respect to the barter agreement between the parties. In

its memorandum of decision,the court found in relevant

part: ‘‘The defendant acknowledges that he had a barter
agreement with Bruce Jalbert. . . . However, he disagrees with the plaintiffs’ contentions as to its terms

and whether it continued until the settlement of the

Warren Enterprises litigation. Under the barter

agreement, the defendant agreed to pay for Bruce Jalbert’s construction services if Chicago Title provided a

defense to the Jalberts. . . . [T]he defendant misled

the plaintiffs so that they were not aware that Marcus

was defending them on behalf of Chicago Title. The

court credits the plaintiffs’ contentions that the barter

agreement involved an exchange of services based on

hours expended, without, as contended by the defendant, adjustment by an hourly rate differential which

recognized that the defendant’s hourly rates were considerably higher than Bruce Jalbert’s hourly rates. This

was an arrangement between close friends, where the

defendant previously had represented the plaintiffs in

the purchase of their home, when they obtained the

title insurance recommended by the defendant.’’ (Citations omitted.)

The record before us contains evidence substantiating those findings. In particular, Pamela Jalbert testified

at trial that her husband ‘‘was already working for [the

defendant] at his Meadow Road house in Woodbury.

And [the defendant] was in our kitchen and he said, I

came up with an idea, let’s—since you’re already working for me, Bruce, why don’t we work out a barter

system. That if the title company represents you, all

right. Then if [the title company] does not represent

you, we’ll do service for service, legal work for carpentry work. If they do represent you, then Bruce would

get paid, [the defendant] would pay Bruce for all the

work that he did. So, that was the barter agreement

that they came up with.’’ Bruce Jalbert similarly testified

at trial that he never provided any estimates to the

defendant for the various work he performed at the

defendant’s properties ‘‘[b]ecause of the nature of our

barter agreement, it was strictly a service for service

deal. There was never any question about whose service

was worth more or whose was worth less. It was, I do

this for you, you do this for me.’’

The gist of the defendant’s claim is that he offered

evidence that conflicted with that offered by the plaintiffs, which the court should have credited.6 His argument reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the

applicable standard by which we review his claim.

Under the clearly erroneous standard of review, an

appellate tribunal does not weigh the quantum of evidence submitted; it simply inquires as to whether there

is any evidence in the record to support a given finding,

or whether the tribunal otherwise is definitely and

firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. See

Getty Petroleum Marketing, Inc. v. Ahmad, 253 Conn.

806, 811, 757 A.2d 494 (2000).

At its essence, the defendant’s claim asks this court
to engage in an independent review of the credibility

of the respective parties. That we cannot do. ‘‘[I]t is

well established that the evaluation of a witness’ testimony and credibility are wholly within the province of

the trier of fact. . . . Credibility must be assessed . . .

not by reading the cold printed record, but by observing

firsthand the witness’ conduct, demeanor and attitude.

. . . An appellate court must defer to the trier of fact’s

assessment of credibility because [i]t is the [fact finder]

. . . [who has] an opportunity to observe the demeanor

of the witnesses and the parties; thus [the fact finder]

is best able to judge the credibility of the witnesses

and to draw necessary inferences therefrom.’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Schoenborn

v. Schoenborn, 144 Conn. App. 846, 851, 74 A.3d 482

(2013). Forthatreason, ‘‘[i]In reviewing factual findings,

[w]e do not examine the record to determine whether

the [court] could have reached a conclusion other than

the one reached. . . . Instead, we make every reasonable presumption . . . in favor of the trial court’s ruling.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Murtha v.

Hartford, 303 Conn. 1, 13, 35 A.3d 177 (2011).

Although the defendant offered conflicting documentary and testimonial evidence at trial, the memorandum

of decision plainly indicates that the court rejected that

evidence and instead chose to credit that presented by

the plaintiffs. Such is the exclusive prerogative of the

trier of fact, with which this court will not interfere on

appeal. See Ravetto v. Triton Thalassic Technologies,

Inc., 285 Conn. 716, 728, 941 A.2d 309 (2008) (appellate

court must deferto trier of fact’s assessment of credibility); Klein v. Chatfield, 166 Conn. 76, 80, 347 A.2d 58

(1974) (‘‘trier is privileged to adopt whatever testimony

it reasonably believes to be credible’’); Talton v. Warden, 33 Conn. App. 171, 179, 634 A.2d 912 (1993) (‘‘[w]e

cannot . . . pass on the credibility of a witness’’), aff’d,

231 Conn. 274, 648 A.2d 876 (1994). Because there is

supporting evidence in the record and we are not convinced that a mistake was made, the court’s findings

with respect to the barter agreement between the parties are not clearly erroneous.

III

The defendant also challenges the court’s findings

with respect to his retention of $135,000 for legal services he allegedly provided the plaintiffs in the Warren

Enterprises litigation. In its memorandum of decision,

the court found, inter alia, that (1) the barter agreement

‘‘involved an exchange of services based on hours

expended, without . . . adjustment by an hourly rate

differential’’; (2) under the barter agreement, the defendant would be compensated for his work in the Warren

Enterprises litigation, by way of construction services,

only if Chicago Title declined to provide a defense to the

plaintiffs; and (3) ‘‘the defendant converted the $85,000

which he [obtained] from the trust [and] also converted
the $50,000 [he retained] from the Warren Enterprises

litigation settlement.’’ We already have concluded in

part II of this opinion that the court’s findings with

respect to the barter agreement are not clearly erroneous. As a result, given Chicago Title’s representation

of the plaintiffs in the Warren Enterprises litigation,

the court reasonably found that the defendant was not

entitled to any compensation thereunder.7

The defendant nonetheless maintains that the court

improperly found that he was not entitled to any compensation for work performed prior to Chicago Title’s

assumption of a defense. Apart from the terms of the

barter agreement, we note that the court also concluded

that the defendant failed to provide credible evidence

to establish that he was, in fact, entitled to such compensation. The court found the defendant’s testimonial and

documentary evidence regarding his legal fees to be

wholly lacking in credibility. As it stated: ‘‘The defendant’s credibility, including his statements made in documents related to billing, is undermined by his

acknowledged backdating of a retainer agreement with

the [plaintiffs]. In his testimony, the defendant stated

that he prepared a retainer agreement forthe [plaintiffs]

to sign in March, 2007 . . . but dated it February, 2005,

more than two years earlier. . . . He stated that he

did so ‘[b]ecause I felt it would be helpful to have a

memorialization of our agreement in the beginning of

the file for purposes of our ultimate claim against Chicago Title.’ . . . Although the document states that

Bruce Jalbert signed it in February, 2005, the defendant

testified that Bruce Jalbert signed it in March, 2007.

. . . The defendant also testified that, at the time he

wrote this letter, he knew that Chicago Title had provided a defense for the [plaintiffs]. . . . The letter

stated, in its first sentence, ‘Chicago Title may not provide you with a defense against the claims brought by

Jean Elin to cross your property.’ This letter also does

not mention the barter agreement which was in effect

when the defendant wrote it. . . . According to the

defendant, he drafted the letter in March, 2007, to be

correct as of February, 2005. His fabrication of the

document undermines the defendant’s credibility.

‘‘Other examples of misleading documents created

by the defendant also undermine his credibility and his

arguments about being entitled to be paid for legal

services. He prepared a letter addressed to the [plaintiffs], dated May 30, 2007, in which he stated that he

‘and his paralegal combined have in excess of 460 hours

at our regular rate per hour for my time and $55 dollars

per hour for my paralegal’s time resulting in a total

more than $140,000 for my time and about $25,000 for

paralegal time and expenses to date.’ . . . In the next

paragraph, the defendant stated that he and the [plaintiffs] had ‘come to a resolution for a flat fee of $130,000

for all legal fees to date, and $25,000 for paralegal fees

and expenses.’ The last sentence of this letter states, ‘I
look forward to receiving your first payment in this

regard.’Attrial, the defendanttestified that his paralegal

on the case was Pamela Jalbert. . . . Thus, the letter

was a bill to the [plaintiffs], which included charging

them for Pamela Jalbert’s own work. In contradiction

to his own letter, the defendant testified that ‘[i]t was

not my intention that the [plaintiffs] would be paying

my legal fees out-of-pocket at any time.’ . . . The court

does not credit the statement in the letter or the defendant’s trial testimony that an agreement was reached

for payment to the defendant of a flat fee.

‘‘The misleading statements in his May 30, 2007 letter

were followed five days later by the defendant’s June

4, 2007 letter and statement of account to the [plaintiffs]

for professional services from February 19, 2005, to

February 12, 2007. . . . In the June 4, 2007 letter, the

defendant stated, incredibly, that he reduced the total

time reflected since the fees were escalating ‘at a very

rapid pace.’ The statement again billed for paralegal

time. In contrast to the May 30, 2007 letter, which billed

for in excess of 460 hours of attorney and paralegal

time, the June 4, 2007 statement billed for 877.75 hours

of the defendant’s time, an increase of over 410 hours.

The defendant stated that he did not have contemporaneous time records to support either amount; instead,

he leafed through the file and came up with a number.

. . . The defendant’s testimony that both numbers

were ‘reasonably accurate’ . . . lacks credibility. Similarly lacking in credibility is the sheer amount of the

bill, $209,445.97.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis

omitted.)

In his reply brief, the defendant alleges that ‘‘all fees

billed by and earned by him were earned prior to Chicago [Title] assuming [the] plaintiffs’ defense, and no

fees were billed nor any received after [it] assumed

[that] defense in March, 2007 . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted.) The court nevertheless found

that ‘‘[t]he evidence . . . does not establish that the

defendant provided legal services in connection with

the Warren Enterprises litigation which were worth

[the] payment of $85,000 [made by the plaintiffs from

the trust]. The defendant did not engage in discovery,

such as taking or defending depositions, or prepare

witnesses, or prepare for trial, or represent the [plaintiffs] at trial. By comparison, Marcus, who represented

the [plaintiffs] in the Warren Enterprises litigation for

about one year, billed approximately $10,800 for his

services. . . . The defendant’s claimed legal work was

unsupported by contemporaneous time records, and he

acknowledged that it included an inordinate amount of

time reviewing deeds. . . . The court is unpersuaded

by his assertions about the value of and the extent of

the legal work he claims to have performed.’’8

(Citation

omitted.) Those factual findings all are supported by

the record before us. As such, they are not clearly

erroneous.
IV

Despite the fact that none of the causes of action

contained in the plaintiffs’ complaint sound in breach

of contract, the defendant contends that the barter

agreement is unenforceable because (1) ‘‘no consideration was given by [the plaintiffs] to [the] defendant’’

and (2) its terms were not definite and certain. That

claim requires little discussion, as the defendant did not

preserve it before the trial court. Our rules of practice

require a party, as a prerequisite to appellate review,

to distinctly raise its claim before the trial court. See

Practice Book § 5-2 (‘‘[a]ny party intending to raise any

question of law which may be the subject of an appeal

must . . . state the question distinctly to the judicial

authority’’); see also Practice Book § 60-5 (‘‘[t]he court

shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was

distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the

trial’’). ‘‘We have repeatedly held that this court will

not consider claimed errors on the part of the trial court

unless it appears on the record that the question was

distinctly raised at trial and was ruled upon and decided

by the court adversely to the appellant’s claim.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McGuire v. McGuire, 102

Conn. App. 79, 87, 924 A.2d 886 (2007). To review a

claim advanced for the first time on appeal and not

raised before the trial court amounts to a trial by ambuscade of the trial judge. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Lone

Star Industries, Inc., 290 Conn. 767, 798, 967 A.2d 1

(2009). We therefore decline to afford review of this

unpreserved contention.

V

As best we can comprehend, the defendant also

argues that the court improperly found a CUTPA violation stemming from his failure to pay for the construction services that Bruce Jalbert had rendered on his

properties. Amidst a sea of abstract assertion set forth

in part II of his appellate brief—which is titled, ‘‘The

Trial Court Made Clearly Erroneous Findings that the

Assumption of Defense by Chicago Was Relevant to

Defendant’s Receipt of Fees and that Plaintiff Was Not

Aware of its Assumption’’—comes a mere sentence

regarding an alleged CUTPA pleading deficiency. The

brief states: ‘‘Since even if the court had been correct

[in awarding CUTPA damages], no such judgment could

enter as there was no allegation or claim for carpentry

fees set forth in the plaintiffs’ complaint, the estimate

[of construction costs] went unchallenged.’’

To the extent that the defendant submits that this

sentence sets forth a distinct ground of appeal, it is the

quintessence of inadequacy. The statement of issues

makes no mention of that claim. The brief does not

contain a separate heading regarding this point of contention, nor does it identify the applicable standard of

review, in contravention of the mandates of Practice
Book § 67-4 (d). Further, the brief cites no legal authority to support the allegation contained therein.

‘‘In Connecticut, our appellate courts do not presume

error on the part of the trial court.’’ Brett Stone Painting & Maintenance, LLC v. New England Bank, 143

Conn. App. 671, 681, 72 A.3d 1121 (2013). Rather, the

burden rests with the appellant to demonstrate reversible error. Brookfield v. Candlewood Shores Estates,

Inc., 201 Conn. 1, 7, 513 A.2d 1218 (1986) (‘‘[t]he burden

is on the appellant to prove harmful error’’); Harlow v.

Stickels, 151 Conn. App. 204, 210, A.3d (2014)

(‘‘[a]n appellant bears the burden to show that there was

error from which she appeals’’). Such bald assertion as

that set forth in the sentence previously quoted,

divorced from any meaningful analysis or compliance

with the strictures of our rules of practice, does not

satisfy that burden.

VI

As a final matter, the defendant claims that the court’s

erroneous findings of fact ‘‘result in clearly erroneous

judgments against’’ him. Once again, the defendant has

failed to furnish a discussion of any legal authority

whatsoever in support of his claim, which consists

entirely of abstract assertion. His brief contains no

application of facts to the elements of the various

causes of action on which the court ruled in favor of

the plaintiffs. See Grasso v. Connecticut Hospice, Inc.,

138 Conn. App. 759, 769, 54 A.3d 221 (2012). ‘‘We do

not reverse the judgment of a trial court on the basis

of challenges to its rulings that have not been adequately

briefed. . . . [A]ssignments of error which are merely

mentioned but not briefed beyond a statement of the

claim will be deemed abandoned and will not be

reviewed by this court.’’(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Paoletta v. Anchor Reef Club at Branford, LLC,

123 Conn. App. 402, 406, 1 A.3d 1238, cert. denied, 298

Conn. 931, 5 A.3d 491 (2010). To the extent that the

concluding portion of the defendant’s appellate brief

may be construed as anything but a summation of his

prior points of contention, they do not merit further

review.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Although the operative complaint also named Renee T. Mulligan and

Bastille Estates, LLC, as defendants, the plaintiffs withdrew their action

with respect to those parties. Accordingly, we refer to Lawrence R. Mulligan

as the defendant in this appeal.

Additionally, we note that, at oral argument, the defendant introduced

himself as a self-represented party. The record nevertheless contains appearances on his behalf by the firms of Bai, Pollock, Blueweiss & Mulcahey,

P.C., and Slavin, Stauffacher & Scott, LLC. The record reveals that approximately six months after this appeal was commenced, the defendant filed

an appearance herein. That appearance states that it is in addition to an

appearance already on file.

The record further indicates that although his counsel filed an appellate

brief on his behalf on December 19, 2013, the defendant filed a motion for

permission to file a substitute appellate brief on December 30, 2013. This
court granted that motion and the defendant thereafter filed a substitute

appellate brief. That brief, as well as the reply brief filed by the defendant,

is signed by the defendant alone.

2 We reiterate that the court specifically found that the undisputed value

of the construction work performed by Bruce Jalbert on the defendant’s

properties was $84,750.

3 Following the commencement of this appeal, the plaintiffs filed a motion

for attorney’s fees accompanied by a detailed affidavit thereof, as well as

a motion for additur seeking an award of offer of compromise interest

pursuant to General Statutes § 52-192a. After a hearing, the court on August

29, 2013, granted both motions and modified its judgment to reflect a total

amount of $821,664.92 in damages and $125,000 in attorney’s fees awarded

to the plaintiffs. The defendant did not amend his appeal to challenge any

aspect of that modified award. In this appeal, the defendant likewise does

not contest the court’s calculation of damages in any manner.

4 The defendant testified at trial that he learned that Chicago Title had

hired counsel to represent the plaintiffs ‘‘[i]n September or October, 2006.’’

The Warren Enterprises litigation commenced in November, 2006.

5 We likewise disagree with the defendant that the issue of whether Chicago Title would defend the plaintiffs in the Warren Enterprises litigation

was irrelevant to the court’s consideration of his receipt of legal fees. The

court specifically found that the plaintiffs had asked him to represent them

in the Warren Enterprises litigation as a direct result of his false representation that a claims representative of Chicago Title had informed him that

Chicago Title would not provide a defense on their behalf. That finding is

supported by the record before us. As Pamela Jalbert testified at trial, ‘‘if

we had known that Chicago Title was representing us from day one, we

would have had no reason to hire [the defendant]. . . . [W]e wouldn’t have

had to have [the defendant] as our attorney.’’ In addition, the court found that

when Marcus commenced his representation of the plaintiffs, the defendant

falsely advised them that Chicago Title had hired Marcus ‘‘to help him.’’

That representation by the defendant is contrary to the undisputed evidence

that Marcus had filed an appearance on their behalf in lieu of the defendant

and that Chicago Title’s March 8, 2007 letter to the defendant specifically

apprised the defendant that ‘‘[p]ursuant to the terms and conditions of the

policy . . . we have retained Neil Marcus, Esq. of the law firm of Cohen &

Wolf, P.C., to defend the interest of the [plaintiffs] with respect to the

challenge to title as insured. We will not be responsible for any fees or

expenses of any other counsel. Neil Marcus, Esq. is primarily responsible

for handling the matter . . . .’’ In light of the foregoing, we conclude that

the court properly considered Chicago Title’s assumption of a defense in

evaluating the propriety of the defendant’s receipt of legal fees in the present case.

6

In his reply brief, the defendant acknowledges the central tenets of the

clearly erroneous standard of review, noting that findings of fact ‘‘must

stand if, on the basis of the evidence before the court and the reasonable

inferences to be drawn from that evidence, a trier of fact reasonably could

have found as it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The defendant

then submits: ‘‘The reverse is also true. If the trier of fact could not have

found as he did because the weight ofthe evidence prohibiting the conclusion

is so great as to alert the appellate court [that] an error has occurred, the

finding must be reversed.’’ He provides no authority for his novel assertion

that application of the clearly erroneous standard compels consideration of

‘‘the weight of the evidence,’’ nor can we uncover any under Connecticut law.

7

Indeed, the defendant in his reply brief acknowledges that this court’s

resolution of the barter agreement issue ‘‘will determine the result of this

appeal.’’

8 As but one example, we note that the defendant testified at trial that he

spent 312 hours reviewing deeds on behalf of the plaintiffs in 2005—the

year before Warren Enterprises filed suit against the plaintiffs. The defendant

further testified that he spent 758 hours reviewing deeds on behalf of the

plaintiffs in 2006.