alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1708 

To amend title 49, United States Code, to expand passenger facility fee 

eligibility for noise compatibility projects. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 27, 2007 

Ms. HARMAN (for herself and Ms. WATERS) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

A BILL 

To amend title 49, United States Code, to expand passenger 

facility fee eligibility for noise compatibility projects. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. EXPANDED PASSENGER FACILITY FEE ELIGI4 BILITY FOR NOISE COMPATIBILITY 

5 PROJECTS. 

6 Section 40117(b) of title 49, United States Code, is 

7 amended by adding at the end the following: 

8 ‘‘(7) NOISE MITIGATION FOR CERTAIN

9 SCHOOLS.— 


hmoore on PROD1PC68 with HMBILLS
2 

•HR 1708 IH

1 ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—In addition to the 

2 uses specified in paragraphs (1), (4), and (6), 

3 the Secretary may authorize a passenger facility 

4 fee imposed under paragraph (1) or (4) at a 

5 large hub airport (as defined in section 47102) 

6 that is the subject of an amended judgment and 

7 final order in condemnation filed on January 7, 

8 1980, by the Superior Court of the State of 

9 California for the county of Los Angeles, to be 

10 used for a project to carry out noise mitigation 

11 for a building, or for the replacement of a 

12 relocatable building with a permanent building, 

13 in the noise impacted area surrounding the air14 port where such building is used primarily for 

15 educational purposes, notwithstanding the air 

16 easement granted or any terms to the contrary 

17 in such judgment and final order, if— 

18 ‘‘(i) the Secretary determines the 

19 building is adversely affected by airport 

20 noise; 

21 ‘‘(ii) the building is owned or char22 tered by the school district that was the 

23 plaintiff in Case No. 986,442 or Case No. 

24 986,446 that was resolved by such judg25 ment and final order; 


hmoore on PROD1PC68 with HMBILLS
3 

•HR 1708 IH

1 ‘‘(iii) the project is for a school identi2 fied in the settlement agreements effective 

3 February 16, 2005, between the airport 

4 and the school districts; 

5 ‘‘(iv) in the case of a project to re6 place a relocatable building with a perma7 nent building, the eligible project costs are 

8 limited to the actual structural construc9 tion costs necessary to mitigate aircraft 

10 noise in instructional classrooms to an in11 terior noise level meeting current stand12 ards of the Federal Aviation Administra13 tion; and 

14 ‘‘(v) the project otherwise meets the 

15 requirements of this section for authoriza16 tion of a passenger facility fee. 

17 ‘‘(B) ELIGIBLE PROJECT COSTS.—In sub18 paragraph (A)(iv), the term ‘eligible project 

19 costs’ means the difference between the cost of 

20 standard school construction and the cost of 

21 construction necessary to mitigate classroom 

22 noise to the standards of the Federal Aviation 

23 Administration.’’. 

Æ 


hmoore on PROD1PC68 with HMBILLS
| (logo) WELLS FARGO | **Commercial Mortgage Servicing**D1086-120, 12th Floor 550 South Tryon Street Charlotte, NC 28202 1-800-326-1334 |
|--------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 **ANNUAL STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE**  Reference is hereby made to that certain Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of June 1, 2014, by and among J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., as Depositor, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as Master Servicer, Torchlight Loan Services, LLC, as Special Servicer, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as Certificate Administrator, Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, as Trustee, and Pentalpha Surveillance LLC, as Senior Trust Advisor with respect to Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2014-C20 (the "Agreement"). Capitalized terms used herein not otherwise defined shall have the meanings assigned in the Agreement. Pursuant to Section 11.09 of this Agreement, I, Daniel Bober, Executive Vice President of Commercial Mortgage Services do hereby certify that: 1. A review of the activities of the Master Servicer during the period from January 1, 2015 through December 31, 2015 (the “Reporting Period”), and of its performance per the Agreement during such period has been made under my supervision, and 2. To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the Reporting Period. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this Certificate as of the 4th day of March 2016.  /s/ Daniel BoberDaniel BoberExecutive Vice PresidentWells Fargo Bank   

| Wells Fargo Bank, N.A |  (logo) Together we’ll go far |
|-----------------------|------------------------------------------|
##### 



HMN FINANCIAL, INC.
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the
financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
 Date: May 5, 2008
    /s/ Michael McNeilMichael McNeilPresident/Chief Executive Officer
(Principal Executive Officer)/s/ Jon EberleJon EberleSenior Vice President/Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial Officer)
Exhibit 13.1  CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with the Annual Report of Cnova N.V. (the Company) on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2014 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Emmanuel Grenier, do certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:  (1)           The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2)           The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.  /s/ Emmanuel GrenierEmmanuel GrenierCo-Chief Executive OfficerDate: March 31, 2015
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                             591
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   11,053
<ALLOWANCES>                                       188
<INVENTORY>                                      6,984
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                19,048
<PP&E>                                          27,675
<DEPRECIATION>                                   4,912
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 138,167
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            5,672
<BONDS>                                         86,595
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            10
<OTHER-SE>                                      40,741
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   138,167
<SALES>                                         68,257
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                68,257
<CGS>                                           41,786
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   41,786
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 6,463
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    66
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               7,204
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 10,046
<INCOME-TAX>                                     3,986
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              6,060
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     6,060
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     6.07
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     6.07
        

</TABLE>
#### Raquel CARVALHO, Appellant, v. UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION, Appellee.

No. 5D10-299.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Jan. 7, 2011.

*602Raquel Carvalho, Holly Hill, pro se.

Louis A. Gutierrez, Tallahassee, for Ap-pellee.

PER CURIAM.

Raquel Carvalho appeals a final order of the Unemployment Appeals Commission (UAC) affirming the appeals referee’s ruling that she was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. The UAC adopted the referee’s findings that Carval-ho was discharged for misconduct connected with work. We affirm.

Carvalho argues on appeal that her failure to perform her duties appropriately was the result of mental illness, not intentional misconduct. We cannot review the evidentiary basis of the referee’s ruling because Carvalho neither provided a transcript nor asked the UAC to provide the court with a transcript of the proceedings below. Carvalho has the burden to demonstrate error. *See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee,*377 So.2d 1150, 1152 (Fla.1979) (holding that without record of trial proceedings, court cannot properly resolve underlying factual issues so as to conclude that trial court’s judgment is not supported by evidence or by alternative theory). Because there is no transcript, we must assume that the referee’s finding of work-related misconduct is supported by the evidence. *See Roach v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n,*873 So.2d 617 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).

AFFIRMED.

GRIFFIN, ORFINGER and LAWSON, JJ., concur.
#### Terry LONG, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D09-4813.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Dec. 14, 2011.

*1287Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Ellen Griffin, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Katherine Y. Mclntire, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

In this case, appellant raises an ineffectiveness of counsel claim on direct appeal. We affirm because the ineffectiveness complained of is not apparent on the face of the record. *See Dennis v. State,*696 So.2d 1280 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); *Ross v. State,*726 So.2d 317 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); *Henley v. State,*719 So.2d 990 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).

MAY, C.J., WARNER and GROSS, JJ., concur.
#### CRYSTAL CLEAR HOLDINGS, LLC, Appellant, v. Theodore GOSMAN, Appellee.

No. 3D10-1267.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 9, 2011.

Albert D. Rey, for appellant.

S. Alan Johnson Law, and S. Alan Johnson and Lei Ru, Hollywood, for appellee.

Before GERSTEN and SALTER, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. § 49.041, Fla. Stat. (2009); *Miller v. Partin,*31 So.3d 224 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).
EX-10.1




 Exhibit 10.1 

Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC 

November 24, 2021 
 Cheniere Marketing International LLP

 3rd Floor, The Zig Zag Building 
 70 Victoria Street 

London SW1E 6SQ, United Kingdom 
 Attn: Commercial Operations 

 

	 	Re:	 Letter Agreement regarding the Base SPA (“Letter Agreement”) 



Dear Sir or Madam: 
 The Parties have entered
into that certain Amended and Restated LNG Sale and Purchase Agreement (FOB) dated August 5, 2014 between Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC and Cheniere Marketing International LLP (as assignee of Cheniere Marketing, LLC) (as amended and assigned,
the “Base SPA”). Capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings given them in the Base SPA. This Letter Agreement sets forth the terms of certain sales and purchases of LNG under the Base SPA. 

The Parties hereby agree that, notwithstanding Section 9.2 and subject to Section 14 of the Base SPA, the FPC (expressed in USD per
MMBtu) applicable to the following number of cargoes shall equal USD one decimal ninety-seven per MMBtu (US$1.97/MMBtu): 
  

	 	(a)	 up to fifty-one (51) cargoes scheduled to be delivered in the 2023
Contract Year; 


  

	 	(b)	 up to between sixty-one (61) cargoes and sixty-five
(65) cargoes scheduled to be delivered in the 2024 Contract Year, such number to be nominated by Seller during the ADP process for the 2024 Contract Year; and 



 

	 	(c)	 up to between fifty-one (51) cargoes and fifty-nine
(59) cargoes scheduled to be delivered in the 2025 Contract Year, such number to be nominated by Seller during the ADP process for the 2025 Contract Year. 



Please indicate Buyer’s agreement with the terms of this Letter Agreement by executing a copy of this Letter Agreement where indicated
below and returning it to Seller. 
  

			
	Sincerely,
	
	Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Zach Davis

		 	Zach Davis
		 	Chief Financial Officer


 700 Milam Street, Suite 1900, Houston, Texas 77002 

+1 713-375-5000 












 Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC 

 

 Accepted and Agreed: 

Cheniere Marketing International LLP 
 acting by its managing
member, Cheniere Marketing, LLC 
  

			
	By:	 	 /s/ Anatol Feygin

		 	Anatol Feygin
		 	Executive Vice President and Chief Commercial Officer


  
 700 Milam Street,
Suite 1900, Houston, Texas 77002 
 +1
713-375-5000
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Kenneth MOSLEY.

No. 2010-KK-2713.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 12, 2011.

In re State of Louisiana; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 475-292; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1670.

Denied.
## NO. 12

- 21

- 00142

- CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

RODNEY RAY

, APPELL A NT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

, APPELLEE §

§

§ APPEAL FROM THE 173RD

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

HENDERSON COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM

Appellant , Rodney Lamont Ray, filed a motion to dismiss this a ppeal. The moti on is

signed by Appella nt and his counsel. No decision has been delivered in this appeal.

Accordingly, Appellant’s motion to dismiss is granted, and the appeal is d ismissed

. See T EX

. R.

A PP

. P. 42.2 (a).

Opinion delivered October 20, 20 21.

Panel consis ted of Worthen, C.J., Hoy le, J., and Neeley, J.

( D O N O T PUBLISH )

## COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

OCTOBER 20

, 2021

NO. 12

- 21

- 00142

- CR

RODNEY RAY

, Appellant

V.

THE STAT E OF TEXAS

, Appellee

App eal from the 173rd District Court

o f Henderson County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. CR16

- 0742

- 173 )

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the motion of the Appellant to dismiss

the appe al herein, and the same being considered, it is hereby ORDERED , ADJUDGED and

DECREED by this Court that the motion to dismi ss be granted and the appeal be dismissed, and

that the decision be certified to the court below for observance.

By per curiam opinio n

. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J. and Neeley, J.
(logo)Prudential

 

 

**PrudentialAsset Resources**

PGIMReal Estate Finance

2100Ross Avenue, Suite 2500, Dallas TX 75201

Tel214-777-4500

 

Abusiness of Prudential Financial, Inc.

 

WellsFargo Bank, National Association

CommercialMortgage Servicing

MACD1086

550South Tryon Street, 14th Floor

Charlotte,North Carolina 28202

Attention:Asset Manager

 

RE:         **RBS 2014-C21**

Period: **January 1, 2019 to December 31, 2019(the “Reporting Period”)**

 

**AnnualCompliance Statement**

 

 

I,Joni Brown-Haas, in my capacity as President and Managing Director ofPrudential Asset Resources, Inc. (the “Company”) hereby certify with regard tothe Company’s role as Sub-Servicer under the Sub-Servicing Agreement, (the“Agreement”) dated as of August 1, 2014, pertaining to the above-referencedcertificates, that:

 

(i)      areview of the activities of the Company under the Agreement during the periodnoted above, and of the performance of the Company under the Agreement duringthe relevant period has been made under my supervision, and

 

(ii)    to thebest of my knowledge, based on such review, the Company has fulfilled all itsobligations under the Agreement throughout the relevant period, and

 

(iii)   to the best of myknowledge, based on such review, the Company has fulfilled its obligationsunder its sub-servicing agreement in all material respects, and

 

(iv)    the Company hasmaintained an effective internal control system over the servicing of mortgageloans including the Loans serviced by the Company, and

 

(v)    theCompany has not received any notice regarding qualification, or challenging thestatus of the Lower Tier REMIC or the Upper Tier REMIC as a REMIC, from the IRSor any other governmental agency or body.

 

 

Effectiveas of February 21, 2020

 

/s/Joni Brown-Haas

JoniBrown-Haas

Presidentand Managing Director

PrudentialAsset Resources, Inc.
#### Robert M. YOUNG, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D10-1682.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Dec. 28, 2010.

Robert M. Young, Kissimmee, pro se.

No Appearance for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Robert M. Young appeals the summary *577denial of his rule 3.850 motion.1 Young’s postconviction motion made several claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Two of those claims merit discussion and warrant reversal.

Young was convicted by a jury of one count of lewd and lascivious exhibition. The crime was perpetrated when an adult male, allegedly Young, exposed his genitalia under the stall of a department store restroom to a young boy in the adjoining stall. The State’s argument at trial was that Young had to be the perpetrator, in part because no other person was in the restroom at the time.

At trial, the testimony of the investigating officer revealed that there was a surveillance videotape depicting the entrance to the restroom area. In his postconviction motion, Young asserted that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to discover the videotape prior to trial and for failing to move for a mistrial when he learned of the tape at trial. These claims should not have been summarily denied. Young alleges that the tape would have confirmed his contention that other men entered and exited the restroom during the time when the State’s witnesses testified that only Young and the victim occupied the room. Because the record attachments do not conclusively refute these allegations, Young is entitled to an eviden-tiary hearing on the claims.

REVERSED and REMANDED for an evidentiary hearing.

LAWSON and EVANDER, JJ., concur.

JACOBUS, J., concurs and concurs specially, with opinion.

1

. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850.

JACOBUS, J.,

concurring specially.

It is troubling to this judge that the surveillance tape was not originally secured by the investigating officer. It would be apparent to anyone that the tape would be a critical piece of evidence and a copy, at the minimum, should have been secured. It is also troubling that the officer was permitted to discuss the contents of the tape before the jury since that testimony was clearly inadmissible hearsay. Once the existence of the tape was discovered by Young’s counsel, it would seem that Young would be entitled to a *Richard*son2 hearing, even though, as the State claims, the tape was never offered into evidence and was never in its possession.

2

. *Richardson v. State,*246 So.2d 771 (Fla.1971).
#### Weldon, Appellee, *v.*Fleisher, Appellant.

(No. 6179 —

Decided April 19, 1943.)

*Mr. Ralph Becker*and *Mr. Robert J. Harris,*for appellee.

*Mr. Harry Falk,*for appellant.

*348By the Court.

This is an appeal on questions of law from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton county.

It appears from the transcript that the Court of Common Pleas made an entry reversing an order of the Municipal Court and remanding the case to the latter court for a new trial.

An examination of the transcript of the docket and journal entries shows that on August 16, 1938, the Municipal Court of Cincinnati, in a trial to the court without a jury, in an action at law, entered judgment for the defendant.

On the same day, a request was made by the plaintiff for separate findings of fact and conclusions of law, and, on such day, findings of 'fact and conclusions of law separately stated were filed.

On the following day, August 17, 1938, a motion for a new7 trial was filed by the plaintiff. On September 10, 1938, this motion was overruled. No final judgment was ever entered in the Municipal Court of Cincinnati.

Appeal was taken by the plaintiff, on September 23, 1938, to the Court of Common Pleas.

The Court of Common Pleas had no jurisdiction to entertain such appeal, for the reason that no final judgment was ever made in the Municipal Court of Cincinnati. See *Boedker*v. *Warren E. Richards Co.,*124 Ohio St., 12, 176 N. E., 660.

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas is reversed and the cause remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton county, with instructions to dismiss the appeal from the Municipal Court of Cincinnati.

*Jtidgment reversed and cause*remanded.-

Ross, P. J., Hildebrant and Matthews, *J.T.,*concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>  5
<MULTIPLIER>  1
       
<S>                                                                  <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                                      6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                            DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                               JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                                 JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                                            85354
<SECURITIES>                                                          0
<RECEIVABLES>                                                    269676
<ALLOWANCES>                                                          0
<INVENTORY>                                                           0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                                 355030
<PP&E>                                                          5413436
<DEPRECIATION>                                                  1572562
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                                  4207622
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                            359062
<BONDS>                                                               0
<COMMON>                                                          67794
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                                 0
<PREFERRED>                                                      525000
<OTHER-SE>                                                      2568266
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                                    4207622
<SALES>                                                           68926
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                                  68926
<CGS>                                                             21777
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                                    258038
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                                      0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                                      0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                                18290
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                                 (207183)
<INCOME-TAX>                                                          0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                             (207183)
<DISCONTINUED>                                                        0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                       0
<CHANGES>                                                             0
<NET-INCOME>                                                    (207183)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                                      (.03)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                                      (.03)
        

</TABLE>