1

Filed 9/13/24; Modified and Certified for Partial Pub. 10/3/24 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Yolo)

----

YOLO LAND AND WATER DEFENSE et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

COUNTY OF YOLO et al.,

Defendants and Respondents;

TEICHERT INC.,

Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

C099086

(Super. Ct. No. CV2022-0277)

Teichert, Inc. (Teichert) sought permission from the County of Yolo (Yolo 

County) to mine sand and gravel on specified property and then to reclaim a portion of 

the mined area to farmland, a lake, grasslands, and riparian habitat. Yolo County 
2

prepared a draft environmental impact report (EIR) for the project and later a final EIR. 

Concluding that the benefits of the project overrode the significant and unavoidable 

environmental impacts, the Yolo County Board of Supervisors (the Board) certified the 

final EIR and approved the mining permit.

The Sierra Club and Yolo Land and Water Defense (appellants) filed a petition for 

writ of mandate against Yolo County and the Board (collectively the County) challenging 

the certification of the EIR and approval of the project. The trial court denied the writ 

petition and also denied appellant’s challenge to a portion of the memorandum of costs 

filed by the County.

Appellants now contend (1) the EIR improperly included pollutants and emissions 

from other Teichert operations in the baseline for the project, (2) the EIR did not 

adequately address the potentially significant impacts of an increase in methylmercury in 

the reclaimed lake, (3) substantial evidence does not support a mitigation measure 

conclusion that 113 acres of prime farmland, equivalent in quality and capacity to 

existing prime farmland, will be reclaimed, and (4) it was improper to award the County 

costs for preparation of the administrative record, and the amount of the award was 

excessive and not supported by documentation.

We conclude (1) it was proper for the EIR to use existing conditions as the 

baseline for environmental analysis, and substantial evidence supports Yolo County’s 

determination of the existing conditions; (2) the EIR adequately addressed the potentially 

significant impacts of the potential for an increase in methylmercury in the reclaimed 

lake; (3) substantial evidence supports the goal in mitigation measure 4.2-1 to reclaim 

mined land to a state equivalent in quality and capacity to existing prime farmland; and 

(4) it was proper to award the County costs for preparation of the administrative record,

and appellants have not shown that the awarded amount was unsupported or 

unreasonable.
3

We will affirm the judgment and the order denying appellants’ motion to tax the 

County’s record preparation costs.

BACKGROUND

Teichert sought permission to mine sand and gravel at a 319.3-acre site in Yolo 

County within the boundaries of the Cache Creek Area Plan. The proposed project is 

known as the Teichert Shifler Mining and Reclamation project (Teichert Shifler or the 

project). The Cache Creek Area Plan contains an aggregate resources management plan 

for a portion of Lower Cache Creek that establishes a regulatory framework for offchannel mining. The project must comply with the Cache Creek Area Plan requirements. 

The project provides that following mining activities, approximately 113 acres of 

the mining area will be reclaimed to agricultural use. Another portion of the mining area 

will be reclaimed to a lake, grasslands, and riparian woodland. In addition, there will be 

a transfer of permitted production from a Teichert Esparto mining operation (Teichert 

Esparto) and a Teichert Schwarzgruber mining operation (Teichert Schwarzgruber) to the 

Teichert Shifler operation.

Yolo County is the lead agency responsible for preparing the EIR for the project. 

(Pub. Resources Code, § 21080.1, subd. (a).)

1 A notice of preparation was released on 

August 16, 2019. Yolo County then prepared a draft EIR. After a public meeting to 

discuss the project and receive oral comments on the draft EIR, Yolo County prepared a 

final EIR.

The Board issued findings of fact and a statement of overriding considerations, 

concluding that the benefits of the project overrode the significant and unavoidable 

environmental impacts. It certified the final EIR and approved a mining permit for 

Teichert Shifler for a maximum term of 30 years to extract a maximum of 35.4 million

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Public Resources Code. 
4

tons of material. It also approved the transfer of specified mining tonnage allocations

from Teichert Esparto and Teichert Schwarzgruber to Teichert Shifler upon completion 

of the Teichert Esparto and Teichert Schwarzgruber operations.

Appellants filed a petition for writ of mandate under the California Environmental 

Quality Act (CEQA) (§ 21000 et seq.) and Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 or 

1085 against the County, challenging the certification of the EIR and approval of the 

project. Appellants also filed a notice of election to prepare the administrative record 

pursuant to section 21167.6, subdivision (b)(2). Following a hearing, the trial court 

issued an order denying appellants’ writ petition and entered judgment in favor of the 

County.

The County filed a memorandum of costs seeking, among other things, $3,813.45 

for the cost to prepare the administrative record. Appellants filed a motion challenging 

that cost but the trial court denied the motion.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review in a CEQA case is abuse of discretion. (§ 21168.5; 

Sierra Club v. County of Fresno (2018) 6 Cal.5th 502, 512.) But we determine de novo 

whether the EIR’s discussion of environmental impacts, mitigation measures or other 

required information is adequate, that is, whether the discussion is “ ‘ “ ‘sufficient to 

enable those who did not participate in its preparation to understand and to consider 

meaningfully the issues raised by the proposed project.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 516; see id. at 

pp. 513-516.) In doing so, we keep in mind that our role is to determine whether the EIR 

is sufficient as an informational document, not whether the agency’s conclusions are 

correct. (Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California

(1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 392 (Laurel Heights Improvement Assn.); see CEQA Guidelines, 
5

§§ 15003, subd. (i), 15151 (Guidelines).)2 And we review the agency’s factual 

determinations for substantial evidence. (Sierra Club, at p. 516; Vineyard Area Citizens 

for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova (2007) 40 Cal.4th 412, 435; 

Habitat & Watershed Caretakers v. City of Santa Cruz (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1277, 

1296 (Habitat & Watershed Caretakers).) Under that standard, we accord deference to 

substantive factual conclusions, we do not set aside a determination on the ground that an 

opposite conclusion would have been equally or more reasonable, we do not reweigh 

conflicting evidence, and we resolve reasonable doubts in favor of the findings and 

decision. (Sierra Club, at p. 512; Berkeley Keep Jets Over the Bay Com. v. Board of Port 

Commissioners (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1356.) Further, we presume the challenged 

EIR is adequate. The party challenging the EIR bears the burden of proving it is 

inadequate or that insufficient evidence supports one or more of its conclusions. (Rialto 

Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of Rialto (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 899, 924-925

(Rialto); Protect the Historic Amador Waterways v. Amador Water Agency (2004) 116 

Cal.App.4th 1099, 1106; Al Larson Boat Shop, Inc. v. Board of Harbor Commissioners

(1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 729, 740 (Al Larson).)

DISCUSSION

I

Appellants contend the EIR improperly included greenhouse gas emissions and 

criteria pollutants from the Teichert Esparto and Teichert Schwarzgruber mining 

operations as part of the environmental baseline.

A

As explained in the draft EIR, criteria pollutants are pollutants for which national 

or state ambient air quality standards have been established. Greenhouse gases trap heat 

2 California Code of Regulations, title 14, section 15000 et seq.
6

in the Earth’s atmosphere. The draft EIR describes criteria pollutant and greenhouse gas 

emissions from existing agricultural, mining and aggregate processing activities. It 

discloses that it uses existing emissions from agricultural activities at the project site, 

mining operations at Teichert Esparto and Teichert Schwarzgruber, and processing 

activities at Teichert Esparto and a Teichert processing plant in Woodland, California 

(Teichert Woodland), as the environmental baseline for analyzing the effects of the 

project’s predicted criteria pollutant and greenhouse gas emissions. Tables 4.3-10 and 

4.3-19 of the draft EIR compare greenhouse gas emissions and criteria pollutants from 

existing agricultural, mining, and processing activities with predicted emissions from the 

project.

Yolo County approved the Teichert Esparto operation in December 1996 

for a maximum term of 30 years and a maximum annual production rate of 

1,176,471 tons mined. According to the draft EIR, the Teichert Esparto permit 

expires on January 1, 2028. The Teichert Schwarzgruber operation was approved in 

November 2012 for a maximum term of 30 years and a maximum annual production rate 

of 1,176,471 tons mined. Mining at Teichert Schwarzgruber was anticipated to be 

completed in 2021, depending on market demand. The project would transfer the annual 

production allotment from Teichert Esparto and Teichert Schwarzgruber to Teichert 

Shifler when mining activities at Teichert Esparto and Teichert Schwarzgruber cease.

Appellants contend the baseline used in the EIR is inaccurate because it includes 

emissions from Teichert Esparto and Teichert Schwarzgruber even though those 

operations will cease on January 1, 2028, or when the maximum amount of removal is 

reached. According to appellants, Teichert Esparto and Teichert Schwarzgruber permits 

are tied to those locations only. Those arguments are nearly identical to comments to the 

draft EIR submitted by the Sierra Club Yolano Group (the Yolano Group). The Yolano 

Group asserted that the draft EIR did not properly analyze the impacts of criteria 

pollutant and greenhouse gas emissions related to the applicable standards of 
7

significance, a phrase appellants also use. The Yolano Group urged that emission 

entitlements for Teichert Esparto and Teichert Schwarzgruber will expire in January 2028 

and cannot be transferred. Yolo County responded that the draft EIR used existing 

conditions as the environmental baseline and the existing conditions included emissions 

from operations at the project site and Teichert Esparto, Teichert Schwarzgruber, and 

Teichert Woodland. Yolo County said that in considering the project’s impacts, the EIR 

accounted for the transfer of production tonnage, which was a component of the project, 

and emissions from the transferred tonnage allotment.

B

Environmental baseline refers to the physical conditions at the site of a proposed 

project. (Center for Biological Diversity v. Department of Fish & Wildlife (2015) 

234 Cal.App.4th 214, 248 (Center for Biological Diversity).) Comparing the existing 

physical conditions with the physical conditions predicted to exist after a proposed 

project is implemented, a lead agency can determine whether the project may cause 

environmental effects and whether those effects are significant under CEQA. 

(Association of Irritated Residents v. Kern County Bd. of Supervisors (2017) 

17 Cal.App.5th 708, 724 (Association of Irritated Residents).) If the description of the 

environmental baseline is inaccurate, incomplete or misleading, the EIR cannot 

adequately analyze the environmental impacts of the proposed project. (Cleveland 

National Forest Foundation v. San Diego Assn. of Governments (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 

413, 439-440; see San Franciscans for Livable Neighborhoods v. City and County of San 

Francisco (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 596, 615.)

Typically, the baseline for environmental analysis is the existing conditions 

of the environment at the time the notice of preparation is published, from both a local 

and regional perspective. (Guidelines, §§ 15125, subd. (a), 15126.2, subd. (a); 

Neighbors for Smart Rail v. Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority (2013) 

57 Cal.4th 439, 455; Center for Biological Diversity, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 249.) 
8

Where environmental conditions vary over time, it is necessary to consider conditions 

over a range of time. (San Francisco Baykeeper, Inc. v. State Lands Com. (2015) 

242 Cal.App.4th 202, 217-218 [dredge mining of sand]; Pfeiffer v. City of Sunnyvale City 

Council (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1552, 1570-1573 [traffic conditions]; see Communities 

for a Better Environment v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 

310, 327-328 (Communities for a Better Environment) [petroleum refinery production].) 

“[A]n agency enjoys the discretion to decide, in the first instance, exactly how the 

existing physical conditions without the project can most realistically be measured, 

subject to review, as with all CEQA factual determinations, for support by substantial 

evidence.” (Communities for a Better Environment, at p. 328.)

The draft EIR did not depart from the norm. Unlike the EIR in Communities for a 

Better Environment, which used the maximum production authorized under existing 

permits instead of actual production as the analytical baseline, the draft EIR in this case 

used actual, existing criteria pollutants and greenhouse gas emissions as the baseline for 

analyzing the project’s environmental impacts. (Communities for a Better Environment, 

supra, 48 Cal.4th 310 at pp. 318, 322.) Inasmuch as the existing conditions at the time of 

the notice of publication included emissions from agricultural activities at the project site, 

processing at Teichert Esparto and Teichert Woodland, and mining activities at Teichert

Esparto and Teichert Schwarzgruber, it was proper for Yolo County to use those 

emissions as the baseline for environmental analysis. (Guidelines, §§ 15125, subd. (a), 

15126.2, subd. (a); Association of Irritated Residents, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 724

[stating that baseline measures the state of the environment absent the project].) The 

draft EIR and Yolo County’s response to the comment by the Yolano Group provide 

substantial evidence supporting the EIR’s identification of the existing physical 

conditions for criteria pollutant and greenhouse gas emissions.

Appellants contend that the Teichert Esparto and Teichert Schwarzgruber permits 

cannot be transferred. But appellants do not cite any legal authority for their assertion 
9

and do not establish abuse of discretion on that basis. (Rialto, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th 

at pp. 924-925 [stating that the party challenging the EIR bears the burden of proving 

the EIR is inadequate]; Okasaki v. City of Elk Grove (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1045, 

fn. 1 [holding that a contention not supported by any citation to authority is forfeited].) 

In addition, although appellants claim the permits, agreements or entitlements for 

Teichert Esparto and Teichert Schwarzgruber do not allow a transfer of emissions, the 

portion of the record cited -- an e-mail from the Yolano Group to a Yolo County staff 

member -- does not state facts supporting the claim.

II

Appellants next argue the EIR does not adequately address the potentially 

significant impacts of an increase in methylmercury in the reclaimed lake.

The draft EIR and response to comments to the draft EIR explained that mercury 

was present in the Cache Creek watershed because of mercury mining in the upper 

watershed in and around Lake County and subsequent natural flood deposition 

downstream, and the State of California and Yolo County had been closely monitoring 

the mercury issue for decades. Yolo County disclosed that there was no substantive 

human or wildlife health risk related to mercury in the soil, but there were concerns about

mercury in reclaimed lakes. As explained in the final EIR, approximately 91 acres of 

mined land would be reclaimed to a lake.

Although the EIR did not explain what methylmercury is, how it is formed, or how 

it bioaccumulates in fish, the EIR did describe what would be done to monitor, identify, 

and respond to an increase in methylmercury in the reclaimed lake. According to the 

draft EIR, the reclaimed lake must comply with specified regulations, including 

requirements for monitoring mercury concentration in fish tissue, expanded analyses to 

identify and assess potential factors linked to elevated methylmercury production and/or 

bioaccumulation, and development of a lake management plan to be approved by the 

County Administrator if results exceed specified thresholds. Potential methods to reduce 
10

mercury concentration in fish tissue could include the addition of oxygen to, or the 

physical mixing of, anoxic bottom waters; the alteration of water chemistry; and the 

removal or replacement of affected fish populations. The draft EIR stated that lake 

management activities must include a recommendation for continued monitoring and 

reporting and be appropriate to the phase of the operation. If activities under a lake 

management plan do not demonstrate declining mercury levels, further specified 

obligations would apply.

The response to comments to the draft EIR further explained that regulations 

require ongoing monitoring of mercury levels in Cache Creek for comparison to 

monitored mercury levels in reclaimed lakes, and fish in reclaimed lakes have been

monitored annually for methylmercury pursuant to those requirements. The response to 

comments is part of the final EIR. (Guidelines, § 15362, subd. (b); Cleveland National 

Forest Foundation v. San Diego Assn. of Governments (2017) 3 Cal.5th 497, 516-517.) 

Yolo County explained that if levels of concern are identified in fish from reclaimed 

lakes, remedial actions will be required. The draft and final EIRs adequately address the 

potential increase of methylmercury and its bioaccumulation in the reclaimed lake.

In addition, the record shows that the public was informed about the possible 

increase in methylmercury and its bioaccumulation. A written staff report regarding the 

project, prepared for a January 11, 2022 Board public meeting, described the presence of 

mercury in the Cache Creek area, the monitoring and reporting requirements of the Cache 

Creek Area Plan, and the problem of methylmercury in reclaimed lakes. During the 

meeting, Yolo County staff member Elisa Sabatini reported on mercury monitoring as 

part of the Cache Creek Area Plan and available remedial actions if methylmercury in 

lake fish exceeds ambient levels in the watershed. Sabatini also described the results of 

various studies relating to mercury and the status of required Cache Creek Area Plan

actions. Dr. Darell Slotton, an expert on mercury bioaccumulation and a consulting 

expert on the Cache Creek Area Plan, also provided information to the Board about 
11

methylmercury and bioaccumulation of mercury in fish. He explained how mercury is 

converted into methylmercury and how methylmercury enters the food chain and 

becomes concentrated as it moves up the food chain and into fish. He explained the 

findings from analyses of fish samples across the Cache Creek watershed, the monitoring 

of off-channel mining ponds in the Cache Creek area, findings from monitoring data, and 

how the findings triggered expanded testing at three pond sites. Dr. Slotton responded to 

questions and concerns from board members, including a concern that methylmercury 

was a potent neurotoxin that adversely affected neurological development in children. 

Dr. Slotton and a County staff member explained that removal of fish and filling of 

reclaimed ponds were possible solutions if a management plan did not adequately 

remediate a methylmercury problem.

Appellants cite reports by Dr. Slotton and Shaun Ayers about fish mercury testing 

at certain off-channel, wet-pit mining ponds in the Cache Creek area that did not involve 

the Teichert Shifler site, and appellants criticize the EIR for not discussing those reports. 

But the 2020 Slotton-Ayers report concluded that a realistic mitigation approach to 

methylmercury production could not be developed without site-specific information, and 

the draft EIR explained that the reclaimed lake for the project would not exist until after 

mining at Teichert Shifler ceased.

The party challenging an EIR must show an error that misled the agency or 

the public, understated a problem, or caused other prejudice. (Al Larson, supra,

18 Cal.App.4th at pp. 748-749.) Appellants have not shown how omission of 

information from the Slotton-Ayers reports misled decision makers or the public and 

precluded informed decision making and public participation as to the project. 

Appellants have not made the required showing with regard to omission of the SlottonAyers reports.

The contention regarding methylmercury in the reclaimed lake lacks merit.
12

III

Appellants also contend that substantial evidence does not support the mitigation 

measure 4.2-1(a) conclusion that 113 acres of prime farmland, equivalent in quality and 

capacity to existing prime farmland permanently converted as a result of the project, will 

be reclaimed.

A significant portion of the project site is designated as prime farmland. 

The project includes activities to reclaim a portion of the mined area to agricultural uses. 

However, the draft EIR recognized that impacts related to the conversion of prime 

farmland to mining uses would be significant and unavoidable.

When an EIR identifies significant effects on the environment that would occur 

if a project is approved or carried out, the EIR must describe feasible measures that could 

minimize the significant effects. (§ 21100, subd. (b)(3); Guidelines, § 15126.4, 

subd. (a)(1); see § 21081, subd. (a); Guidelines, § 15091, subd. (a).) And the public 

agency must mitigate or avoid the significant effects the project would have on the 

environment. (§ 21002.1, subd. (b).) We review for substantial evidence an agency’s 

conclusion that the mitigation measures identified in an EIR will reduce the adverse 

effects of the project. (Laurel Heights Improvement Assn., supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 407; 

King & Gardiner Farms, LLC v. County of Kern (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 814, 866; 

Habitat & Watershed Caretakers, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 1306.)

Appellants appear to contend that mitigation measure 4.2-1 requires the soils in 

mined areas to be reclaimed to the quality and capacity of pre-mining, prime-farmland

soils. The mitigation measure does not specifically reference soil condition, but it does 

require Teichert to reclaim 113.2 acres “of Prime Farmland onsite, equivalent in quality 

and capacity to existing Prime Farmland permanently converted as a result of the 

project.” The draft EIR stated the reclamation plan for the project requires reclaimed 

agricultural land to have productivity that is equal to or greater than existing productivity. 

As explained in the draft and final EIR, the Surface Mining Reclamation Ordinance, 
13

which is part of the regulations that implement the Cache Creek Area Plan, requires 

“all off-channel, prime agricultural land . . . at the time that mining commences . . . [to] 

be reclaimed to an agriculturally productive state equal to or greater than that which 

existed before mining commenced.” Moreover, under the Surface Mining and 

Reclamation Act (SMARA [§ 2710 et seq.]) Performance Standards for Prime 

Agricultural Land Reclamation, “[r]eclamation shall be deemed complete when 

productive capability of the affected land is equivalent to or exceeds, for two 

consecutive crop years, that of the premining condition or similar crop production 

in the area.” (Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 14, § 3707, subd. (c).)

Substantial evidence supports Yolo County’s finding that mitigation measure 4.2-1 

would mitigate impacts on agricultural resources. The Agricultural Reclamation 

Feasibility Study, which is appended to the final EIR, concludes that with the application 

of irrigation and fertilization practices commonly used in the region, yields from the 

reclaimed agricultural land could reasonably be expected to meet regulatory performance 

criteria, based on soil survey data and analysis of soils, monitoring of soil temperatures at 

various sites, and crop production and value data. That conclusion is supported by the 

report of expert Greg House, which was discussed in the final EIR.

House reported that results from his study of three reclaimed agricultural fields 

showed those fields met the SMARA two-year standard of productivity, provided strong 

indications that they would meet the standard soon, or demonstrated that the required 

standard could be achieved. House stated that crops grown on reclaimed agricultural land 

could reach desired productivity standards.

The House report and the Agricultural Reclamation Feasibility Study provide 

substantial evidence supporting the goal in mitigation measure 4.2-1. (Oakland Heritage 

Alliance v. City of Oakland (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 884, 903-904.)
14

IV

Appellants further challenge the award to the County of record preparation costs. 

They contend the County cannot recover those costs because appellants elected to prepare 

the record pursuant to section 21167.6, subdivision (b)(2). They also argue the amount of 

the award is excessive and not supported by documentation.

A

The interpretation of section 21167.6, and whether a claimed cost is recoverable,

are questions of law which we review de novo. (Coalition for Adequate Review v. City 

and County of San Francisco (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1050-1051 (Coalition for 

Adequate Review).)

Section 21167.6 governs the preparation and certification of the administrative 

record in a CEQA case. Subdivision (b)(2) of the statute authorizes a writ petitioner to 

elect to prepare the administrative record instead of asking the public agency to prepare 

it. (§ 21167.6.) But here, appellants asked Yolo County to produce the documents 

comprising the administrative record. The administrative record consists of 29,745 

pages. In addition, the public agency must certify the accuracy of the administrative

record within the time period described in subdivision (b)(1). (§ 21167.6, subd. (b)(2).) 

Because section 21167.6, subdivision (b)(2) refers to subdivision (b)(1), the two must be 

read together. (Coalition for Adequate Review, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 1055.) 

Section 21167.6, subdivision (b)(1) addresses the payment of costs. (Coalition for 

Adequate Review, at pp. 1052, 1058; see generally Black Historical Society v. City of San 

Diego (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 670, 677.) That appellants elected to prepare the record 

under section 21167.6, subdivision (b)(2) did not mean the County had no costs 

associated with preparation of the administrative record, and it did not preclude an award 

of record preparation costs to the County. (Landwatch San Luis Obispo County v. 

Cambria Community Services Dist. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 638, 642-644; Coalition for 
15

Adequate Review, at p. 1055; St. Vincent’s School for Boys, Catholic Charities CYO v. 

City of San Rafael (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 989, 1016-1017 (St. Vincent’s).)

In general, and except as otherwise provided by statute, a prevailing party is 

entitled to recover costs. (Civ. Proc. Code, § 1032, subd. (b); see Chaparral Greens v. 

City of Chula Vista (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1151-1152.) Appellants do not dispute 

that the County prevailed in the writ proceeding. Section 21167.6 does not provide that a 

public agency prevailing in a CEQA action may not recover reasonable costs associated 

with the preparation of the administrative record that were actually incurred.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, referenced in the writ petition, further 

provides that except when otherwise prescribed by statute, the cost of preparing the 

record shall be borne by the petitioner. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (a).) If an 

expense associated with preparation of the record has been borne by the prevailing party, 

the expense shall be recoverable as costs. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (a); The Otay 

Ranch, L.P. v. County of San Diego (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 60, 68-72 (The Otay Ranch, 

L.P.).) Under section 21167.6 and Code of Civil Procedure sections 1032 and 1094.5, 

appellants must pay any reasonable costs the County actually incurred associated with the 

preparation of the administrative record. 

Appellants also challenge the cost award on the ground that Yolo County 

produced administrative record documents pursuant to a Public Records Act request and 

there is no basis for the recovery of staff and consultant time associated with that 

production. But the court in St. Vincent’s rejected a similar attempt to avoid payment of 

costs. (St. Vincent’s, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1019, fn. 9.)

B

Appellants further urge that the amount of the cost award is excessive and not 

supported by documentation.

Labor costs incurred to prepare an administrative record is recoverable under 

section 21167.6, subject to trial court review for necessity and reasonableness. (Code 
16

Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c); The Otay Ranch, L.P., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at pp. 68-

70; Coalition for Adequate Review, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 1059; River Valley 

Preservation Project v. Metropolitan Transit Dev. Bd. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 154, 182.) 

A verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence of the necessity and 

reasonableness of cost items that appear to be proper charges on their face. (Jones v. 

Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1266-1267 (Jones).) A party need not provide 

copies of bills or other documents with the memorandum of costs. (Id. at p. 1267.) 

Where a statute expressly allows a cost item and the cost appears proper on its face, the 

party seeking to tax costs must demonstrate that the challenged cost was unnecessary or 

unreasonable. (Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 131; County of Kern v. 

Ginn (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 1107, 1113-1114.)

The County sought an award of $3,813.45 in costs associated with preparation of 

the administrative record. That amount consisted of the following staff time and other 

charges: Natural Resources Manager Elisa Sabatini (3 hours at $130.90/hour); Lead 

Consultant Heidi Tschudin (6.75 hours at $229/hour); Legal Secretary Stephanie 

Richburg (6.5 hours at $100/hour); Legal Secretary Kendra Ledoux (7 hours at 

$100/hour); and AmeriTechnology Group for e-mail conversion ($525). Appellants 

did not show how the claimed costs were excessive, such as by showing that the number 

of hours or the hourly rates were unreasonable. Appellant’s motion to tax costs was 

insufficient to rebut the County’s prima facie showing. (Jones, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 1266.)

As we have explained, appellants asked Yolo County to produce the documents 

comprising the administrative record. The administrative record consists of 29,745

pages. The staff and consultant time and costs incurred to produce an administrative 

record of that size (23.25 hours; 13 cents per page) is not unreasonable. Appellants did 

not meet their initial burden on the motion, and Yolo County was not required to submit 
17

supporting documents in that circumstance. (Jones, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 1267.) 

Appellants have not shown that the awarded amount was unsupported or unreasonable.

DISPOSITION

The judgment, and the order denying appellants’ motion to tax costs, are affirmed. 

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)

 /S/

MAURO, J.

We concur:

 /S/

EARL, P. J.

 /S/

MESIWALA, J.
1

Filed 10/3/24

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Yolo)

----

YOLO LAND AND WATER DEFENSE et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

COUNTY OF YOLO et al.,

Defendants and Respondents;

TEICHERT INC.,

Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

C099086

(Super. Ct. No. CV2022-0277)

ORDER MODIFYING 

OPINION AND GRANTING 

REQUESTS FOR 

PUBLICATION

[NO CHANGE IN 

JUDGMENT]

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Yolo County, David 

Rosenberg, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Office of Donald B. Mooney and Donald B. Mooney, for Plaintiffs and 

Appellants.

Philip J. Pogledich and Eric May, County Counsel; Downey Brand, Andrew M. 

Skanchy and Samuel D. Bacal-Graves, for Defendants and Respondents.

Taylor, Wiley & Keasling, John M. Taylor, Jesse J. Yang, Matthew S. Keasling, 

and Marissa C. Fuentes, for Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

*

 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, this opinion is certified 

for publication with the exception of the Standard of Review section, and parts I through 

III and IV.B of the Discussion.
2

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed in this case on September 13, 2024, be modified 

as follows:

On page 2, delete the last paragraph beginning with “We conclude” and replace with the 

following paragraphs:

In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we conclude (1) it was proper for the 

EIR to use existing conditions as the baseline for environmental analysis, and substantial 

evidence supports Yolo County’s determination of the existing conditions; (2) the EIR 

adequately addressed the potentially significant impacts of the potential for an increase in 

methylmercury in the reclaimed lake; (3) substantial evidence supports the goal in 

mitigation measure 4.2-1 to reclaim mined land to a state equivalent in quality and 

capacity to existing prime farmland; and (4) as to the second part of appellants’ fourth 

contention, appellants have not shown that the awarded amount was unsupported or 

unreasonable.

In the published portion of this opinion, we address the first part of appellants’ 

fourth contention and conclude it was proper to award the County costs for preparation of 

the administrative record.

On page 14, part IV of the Discussion, first full paragraph, first sentence, remove the 

word “further” so that the sentence now reads:

Appellants challenge the award to the County of record preparation costs. 

This modification does not change the judgment.

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on September 13, 2024, was not 

certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause it now appears that the 

opinion should be published in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.
3

FOR THE COURT:

 /S/

MAURO, Acting P. J.

 /S/ , 

MESIWALA, J.