[Cite as State v. R.L.W., 2024-Ohio-1249.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

 No. 23AP-209

v. : (M.C. No. 2022CRX-052122)

[R.L.W.], : (ACCELERATED CALENDAR)

Defendant-Appellant. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on April 2, 2024

On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and 

Kimberly M. Bond, for appellee.

On brief: [R.L.W.], pro se.

APPEAL from the Franklin County Municipal Court

BOGGS, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, R.L.W., appeals a judgment of the Franklin County 

Municipal Court that denied his application to seal the record of the dismissal of a charge 

against him for aggravated robbery. For the following reasons, we reverse that judgment 

and remand for further proceedings.

{¶ 2} On November 18, 2022, R.L.W. filed applications to seal the records in 

multiple municipal court cases pursuant to former R.C. 2953.52. The trial court granted all 

but one application, which is the subject of this appeal. In the appealed case, R.L.W. sought 

to seal records related to a 2016 charge of aggravated robbery, a felony of the first degree in 

violation of R.C. 2911.01(A). The trial court dismissed the aggravated robbery charge less 

than ten days after it was filed. R.L.W. was subsequently indicted in the United States 

District Court for the Southern District of Ohio on charges arising out of the same 
No. 23AP-209 2

circumstances that gave rise to the aggravated robbery charge. R.L.W. was ultimately 

convicted of federal offenses and sentenced to 15 years in prison.

{¶ 3} The trial court denied R.L.W.’s application to seal the record of the dismissed 

charge in a judgment time stamped February 17, 2023, but not entered on the record until 

February 21, 2023.1 The trial court stated that it denied R.L.W.’s application because the 

“municipal court [was] not the appropriate venue for that case number.” (Feb. 17, 2023 

Entry.)

{¶ 4} R.L.W. now appeals the February 17, 2023 judgment. Plaintiff-appellee, the 

State of Ohio, initially argues that this court should dismiss R.L.W.’s appeal as untimely

pursuant to App.R. 4. The state contends that R.L.W. filed his notice of appeal well after 

the 30-day window to appeal the February 17, 2023 judgment had closed. We disagree.

{¶ 5} “An appeal as of right shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk 

of the trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4.” App.R. 3(A). If an appellant fails to 

meet the timing requirements of App.R. 4, then the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to 

hear the appeal. In re H.F., 120 Ohio St.3d 499, 2008-Ohio-6810, ¶ 17.

{¶ 6} Pursuant to App.R. 4(A)(1), “a party who wishes to appeal from an order that 

is final upon its entry shall file the notice of appeal required by App.R. 3 within 30 days of 

that entry.” The timing requirement of App.R. 4(A)(1) is subject to App.R. 4(A)(3), which 

states that, “[i]n a civil case, if the clerk has not completed service of notice of the judgment 

within the three-day period prescribed in Civ.R. 58(B), the 30-day period[ ] referenced in 

App.R. 4(A)(1) * * * begin[s] to run on the date when the clerk actually completes service.” 

According to Civ.R. 58(B):

When the court signs a judgment, the court shall endorse 

thereon a direction to the clerk to serve upon all parties not in 

default for failure to appear notice of the judgment and its date 

of entry upon the journal. Within three days of entering the 

judgment upon the journal, the clerk shall serve the parties in 

a manner prescribed by Civ.R. 5(B) and note the service in the 

appearance docket. Upon serving the notice and notation of 

the service in the appearance docket, the service is complete.

 

1

 We will refer to this judgment as the February 17, 2023 judgment. Ideally, the time stamp on a judgment 

should match the date a judgment is entered on the record.
No. 23AP-209 3

{¶ 7} Construed together, App.R. 4(A)(1) and (A)(3) establish service of the notice 

of judgment as the triggering event that starts the 30-day appeal period. Clermont Cty. 

Transp. Improvement Dist. v. Gator Milford, L.L.C., 141 Ohio St.3d 542, 2015-Ohio-241, 

¶ 6. If timely service is accomplished pursuant to Civ.R. 58(B), then the appeal period 

begins to run on the date of judgment; but where such service is lacking, the appeal period 

is tolled until the clerk completes service. State ex rel. Sautter v. Grey, 117 Ohio St.3d 465, 

2008-Ohio-1444, ¶ 16; accord Gator Milford, L.L.C. at ¶ 7 (“Timeliness is defined as 30 

days from the date of the final order or from the date that the clerk completes service if 

service is not completed within three days of entering the judgment on the journal.”).

{¶ 8} Expungements are civil in nature. State v. Powers, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-422, 

2015-Ohio-5124, ¶ 25. Consequently, we apply App.R. 4(A)(3) and Civ.R. 58(B) to 

determine whether R.L.W. filed a timely appeal. See State v. Hutchen, 191 Ohio App.3d 

388, 2010-Ohio-6103, ¶ 6 (2d Dist.) (noting the civil nature of expungement and applying 

App.R. 4 and Civ.R. 58(B) to determine the timeliness of the appeal from a judgment 

denying an application for expungement). The February 17, 2023 judgment does not 

contain a Civ.R. 58(B) directive to the clerk, and no notation of service of the judgment

appears in the trial court’s journal. Because the clerk did not accomplish service as required 

by Civ.R. 58(B), the period to appeal the February 17, 2023 judgment never began to run. 

R.L.W.’s appeal, therefore, is timely.

{¶ 9} Although R.L.W. filed a timely notice of appeal, he failed to comply with the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure when he filed his brief. Most problematically, R.L.W. does 

not set forth any assignments of error as required in App.R. 16(A)(3). Assignments of error 

are particularly critical to an appeal because courts of appeal decide each appeal “on its 

merits on the assignments of error set forth in the briefs under App.R. 16.” App.R. 

12(A)(1)(b). Courts of appeal have discretion to dismiss appeals that fail to set forth 

assignments of error. State v. Robinson, 10th Dist. No. 20AP-562, 2021-Ohio-2572, ¶ 7; 

Marshall v. Marshall, 10th Dist. No. 20AP-284, 2021-Ohio-2003, ¶ 2; Curry v. Columbia 

Gas of Ohio, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 19AP-618, 2020-Ohio-2693, ¶ 14. However, in the interest 

of serving justice, courts of appeal may instead review the appealed judgment using the 

appellant’s arguments. Jabr v. Columbus, 10th Dist. No. 23AP-182, 2023-Ohio-2781, ¶ 13; 

Marshall at ¶ 2; Curry at ¶ 14. We will do that in this case.
No. 23AP-209 4

{¶ 10} Here, R.L.W. argues that the trial court erred in concluding that it was not 

the “appropriate venue” for his application to seal the dismissal of his aggravated robbery 

charge. (Feb. 17, 2023 Entry.) We agree.

{¶ 11} The statutory law in effect at the time that R.L.W. applied to seal his 

dismissal governs this case. See State v. G.K., 169 Ohio St.3d 266, 2022-Ohio-2858, ¶ 4, 

fn. 1 (“the statutory law in effect at the time of filing an application to seal criminal records 

is controlling”). According to that law, “[a]ny person, * * * who is the defendant named in 

a dismissed complaint, indictment, or information, may apply to the court for an order to 

seal the person’s official records in the case.” Former R.C. 2953.52(A)(1), 2011 Ohio 

Sub.S.B. 268. The outcome of this case depends on the interpretation of this statute, which 

is a question of law. State v. Vanzandt, 142 Ohio St.3d 223, 2015-Ohio-236, ¶ 6; State v. 

Pariag, 137 Ohio St.3d 81, 2013-Ohio-4010, ¶ 9. We thus apply the de novo standard of 

review. Vanzandt at ¶ 6; Pariag at ¶ 9.

{¶ 12} When interpreting a statute, a court’s objective is to ascertain and give effect 

to legislative intent. Vanzandt at ¶ 7; Pariag at ¶ 10. We primarily define legislative intent 

from the plain language of a statute. Vanzandt at ¶ 7; Pariag at ¶ 10. If the meaning of a 

statute is plain, the court applies it as written and undertakes no further interpretation of 

the statute. Vanzandt at ¶ 7; Pariag at ¶ 10. “ ‘To determine the plain meaning of a statute, 

a court relies on the definitions provided by the legislative body.’ ” State v. Bertram, __ 

Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-1456, ¶ 11, quoting Lingle v. State, 164 Ohio St.3d 340, 2020-

Ohio-6788, ¶ 15.

{¶ 13} Because the trial court found that it was not the appropriate venue for 

R.L.W.’s application, we focus on identifying the forum in which former R.C. 2953.52(A)(1) 

required a defendant to file his expungement application. As we set forth above, former 

2953.52(A)(1) stated, “Any person, * * * who is the defendant named in a dismissed 

complaint, indictment, or information, may apply to the court for an order to seal the 

person’s official records in the case.” As used in former R.C. 2953.52(A)(1), “court” meant

“the court in which * * * a dismissal of the complaint, indictment, or information in the case 

is entered on the minutes or journal of the court.” Former R.C. 2953.51(C), 2019 Ohio 

Am.Sub.S.B. 10. Thus, reading the definition of “court” in conjunction with former R.C. 

2953.52(A)(1), we conclude that former R.C. 2953.52(A)(1) permitted a defendant named 
No. 23AP-209 5

in a dismissed complaint to apply to the court in which the dismissal of the complaint was 

entered for an order sealing the records of the dismissed case.

{¶ 14} In this case, the parties do not dispute that the dismissal of the complaint 

charging R.L.W. with aggravated burglary was entered in the trial court. Therefore, the trial 

court was the appropriate venue for R.L.W.’s application to seal the records of the dismissal. 

The trial court erred in finding otherwise and denying R.L.W.’s application on that basis.

{¶ 15} On appeal, the state asserts multiple other grounds for the denial of R.L.W.’s 

expungement application that the trial court did not address. The state asserts that 

R.L.W.’s expungement application should fail because: (1) criminal proceedings remain 

pending against R.L.W., (2) sealing of the dismissal would result in a partial sealing of 

R.L.W.’s criminal record, and (3) the state’s interests in maintaining the record outweigh 

R.L.W.’s interest in sealing the record. Appellate courts, as courts of review, generally do 

not rule on arguments not decided in the first instance by the trial court. Lycan v. 

Cleveland, 146 Ohio St.3d 29, 2016-Ohio-422, ¶ 21; State v. Enyart, 10th Dist. No. 22AP645, 2023-Ohio-3373, ¶ 27. Consequently, we will leave the state’s additional arguments 

for the trial court to sort out, if the state raises them on remand.

{¶ 16} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Franklin County 

Municipal Court, and we remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with the 

law and this decision.

Judgment reversed;

cause remanded.

JAMISON and EDELSTEIN, JJ., concur.