alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In re Vicki Kemp CRUSE.

No. 2011-B-0487.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 8, 2011.

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.

PER CURIAM.*

The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent failed to refund an unearned fee to a client. This misconduct occurred in the same time frame as the misconduct forming the basis of respondent’s earlier disciplinary matter. Prior to the filing of new formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Vicki Kemp Cruse, Louisiana Bar Roll number 19531, be adjudged guilty of additional violations which warrant discipline and which may be considered in the event *1258she applies for reinstatement from her suspension in *In re: Cruse,*09-0028 (La.6/26/09), 15 So.3d 63, after becoming eligible to do so.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty-days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

*

 Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion.
(logo)CWCapital 

ASSET MANAGEMENT 

 

 

**Annual Statement asto Compliance**

**For the Period ofJanuary 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018**

 

 

**WFRBS 2014-C21**

 

 

Inaccordance with Item 1123 of Regulation AB and with the requirements detailed in§11.12 of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (the “Agreement”) for theabove-mentioned CMBS pool, CWCapital Asset Management LLC (“CWCAM”), inits capacity as Special Servicer, is providing this Officer’s Certificate withrespect to the following:

 

(A)    a review of CWCAM’sactivities during the preceding calendar year or portion thereof (the “ReportingPeriod”) and of CWCAM’s performance under the Agreement has been made undersuch officer’s supervision; and

 

(B)    to the best of suchofficer’s knowledge, based on such review, CWCAM has fulfilled all itsobligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout theReporting Period.

 

 

Shouldyou have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.

 

Sincerely,

CWCapitalAsset Management LLC

 

/s/James P. Shevlin

 

JamesP. Shevlin

President/ChiefOperating Officer

 

 

7501Wisconsin Avenue | Suite 500 West | Bethesda, MD | 20814
#### Becky J. PERRONE, Appellant, v. FLORIDA UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION and Wealthbuilders Financial Group, Appellees.

No. 1D10-614.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

June 21, 2010.

*32Becky J. Perrone, pro se, Appellant.

Geri Atkinson-Hazelton, General Counsel, and M. Elaine Howard, Deputy General Counsel, for Appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Becky Perrone appeals a final order of the Unemployment Appeals Commission (“Commission”) finding she is disqualified from receiving benefits because she voluntarily left employment without good cause attributable to the employer. In its order, the Commission adopted the referee’s findings of fact:

> The claimant worked, as a full-time marketing assistant, for a financial services provider from May 2006, through June 2009. The claimant’s job duties, as a marketing assistant, involved taking care of existing clients, establishing new clients, answering telephones, and scheduling appointments. Prior to separation, the claimant’s immediate supervisor informed the claimant that she needed to establish new clients for the company. The claimant informed her immediate supervisor that it was becoming more difficult to establish new clients through old client referrals. The claimant informed her immediate supervisor that the company should begin to host more public seminars to attract potential clients. The claimant’s immediate supervisor informed the claimant that seminars were cut, due to a lack of productivity, and the cost it involved to host them. The claimant attempted to further explain to her immediate supervisor her rationale, and was threatened to be fired. On June 24, 2009, the claimant voluntarily quit, due to believing she no longer had employment security.

The appeals referee found Ms. Perrone quit her job with good cause attributable to her employer, and thus, deemed her qualified for unemployment compensation benefits. The Commission reversed the referee’s decision, finding that the facts do not show Ms. Perrone had good cause to voluntarily leave work. We agree.

Section 443.101(l)(a), Florida Statutes, provides that an individual shall be disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits for voluntarily leaving work without good cause attributable to the employing unit. Fear of being fired does not constitute good cause for quitting one’s job under section 443.101(l)(a). See *Diaz-Pema v. Evens,*833 So.2d 795, 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (affirming order denying unemployment benefits where appellant quit his job because he believed he either was going to be fired or would suffer a pay cut).

AFFIRMED.

WEBSTER, WETHERELL, and MARSTILLER, JJ. concur.
648 A.2d 722

#### IN THE MATTER OF LEE JASPER ROGERS, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW.

November 1, 1994.

ORDER

This matter having been duly presented to the Court, it is ORDERED that LEE JASPER ROGERS of RED BANK, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1981, and who was by Order of this Court dated December 6, 1991, suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years, effective January 1,1992, be restored to the practice of law, effective immediately; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent provide certified annual audits of his attorney books and records for a period of two years and until further Order of the Court; and it is further

*84ORDERED that respondent satisfy in full on a schedule approved by the Disciplinary Review Board the outstanding administrative costs of $2,373.50; and that it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Lawyers Fund for Client Protection for the $1,661.76 paid by the Fund on claims filed against him, on a schedule approved by the Fund.
[No. C033134.

Third Dist.

May 24, 2001.]

#### THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MICHELLE LYNN SHOUP, Defendant and Appellant.

*421Counsel

Anita Susan Brenner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen G. Herndon and David Andrew Eldridge, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Opinion

THE COURT.*

Appellant Michelle Lynn Shoup appeals from Sacramento County action Nos. 98M09139 and 96F07655.

It appears that action No. 98M09139 was at all times a prosecution for misdemeanor offenses only, which resulted in misdemeanor convictions by a jury. Action No. 96F07655 was a proceeding to revoke probation in a felony case which was consolidated for hearing with action No. 98M09139. At the conclusion of the misdemeanor trial/probation revocation hearing, the trial court revoked probation based on its independent evaluation of the evidence.

This court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate an appeal in action No. 98M09139; an appeal in said action must be taken to the appellate division of the superior court. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11; Pen. Code, § 1466.) The appeal from action No. 98M09139 is hereby dismissed.

The appeal from action No. 96F07655 remains properly pending in this court. However, the parties, in their briefs, have raised issues and cited law that apply to trials and not necessarily to probation revocation proceedings. All briefs of appellant and respondent are hereby stricken.

Appellant shall file, within 30 days, a new opening brief that raises issues, if any, as are appropriate to the probation revocation proceeding. Respondent *422shall file its brief within 30 days of the filing of appellant’s new opening brief. Appellant may thereafter file a reply brief within the time designated by the California Rules of Court.

*

Before Sims, Acting P. J., Nicholson, J., and Morrison, J.
#### Michael J. KURGAN, Appellant, v. MORTON D. WEINER/AMPAC, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee.

No. 3D10-14.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Dec. 22, 2010.

Michael J. Kurgan, in proper person.

Bernstein Chackman Liss & Rose and Neil Rose, Hollywood, for appellee.

*343Before WELLS, CORTINAS, and LAGOA, JJ.

LAGOA, J.

Appellant Michael J. Kurgan appeals from a final judgment awarding attorney’s fees and costs to appellee Morton D. Weiner/AMPAC, Inc., under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2009). Based on appel-lee’s confession of error and this Court’s own review of the record, we reverse the trial court’s entry of final judgment.

Because the order on appeal assesses attorney’s fees without making the statutory findings required under section 57.105 to support the award, we are compelled to reverse. *See Valdes v. Lovaas,*784 So.2d 474 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); *Russo & Baker, P.A. v. Fernandez,*752 So.2d 716 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); *Broad & Cassel v. Newport Motel, Inc.,*636 So.2d 590 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); *Warshaw v. Monroy,*515 So.2d 307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); *see also Shortes v. Hill,*860 So.2d 1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); *Goldberg v. Watts,*864 So.2d 59 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).

We note that this Court’s reversal does not mean to imply that we agree or disagree with the imposition of fees in this case, but only that the record and order on appeal lack the findings necessary for the imposition of fees pursuant to the statute. *See Valdes,*784 So.2d at 475 n. 2. The final judgment is therefore reversed and we remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.
I 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 7129 

To require the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to provide training in the 

use of medical cannabis for all Department of Veterans Affairs primary 

care providers, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 14, 2018 

Mr. MOULTON (for himself, Mr. GAETZ, and Mr. CORREA) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 

A BILL 

To require the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to provide training in the use of medical cannabis for all Department 

of Veterans Affairs primary care providers, and for other 

purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. TRAINING IN USE OF MEDICAL CANNABIS FOR 

4 DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS PRI5 MARY CARE PROVIDERS. 

6 (a) TRAINING.—Not later than one year after the 

7 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Vet8 erans Affairs shall provide for all primary care providers 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 7129 IH

1 of the Department of Veterans Affairs an initial training 

2 in the use of medical cannabis. The Secretary shall provide 

3 supplemental training as necessary. 

4 (b) PARTNERSHIPS WITH MEDICAL SCHOOLS.—In 

5 developing and providing the training to be provided under 

6 subsection (a), the Secretary shall enter into partnerships 

7 with medical schools that have incorporated education on 

8 medical cannabis into their curricula. 

Æ 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of Fisher Communications, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Form 10-K), I David D. Hillard, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:



| | (1) | The Form 10-K fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Dated: March 11, 2004



/s/    DAVID D. HILLARDDavid D. Hillard Senior Vice President Chief Financial Officer
#### Leonard Davidson, Respondent, v Long Island Rail Road Company, Appellant. (And a Third-Party Action.)

[774 NYS2d 834]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Long Island Rail Road Company appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Grays, J.), dated March 17, 2003, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

On a motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint based upon lack of notice of a dangerous condition, a defendant is required to make a prima facie showing affirmatively establishing the absence of notice as a matter of law *(see Wood v Food Emporium,*267 AD2d 380 [1999]; *Ostuni v East Rockaway Vil. Tavern,*238 AD2d 558 [1997]). Here, the defendant Long Island Rail Road Company failed to make the required showing. *571Thus, the Supreme Court properly denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Ritter, J.P., H. Miller, Goldstein and Mastro, JJ., concur.
867 A.2d 478

#### IN THE MATTER OF GLADYS J.M. GARBIN, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 013831989).

February 7, 2005.

ORDER

This matter having been duly presented to the Court pursuant to *Rule*l:20-10(b), following a motion for discipline by consent of GLADYS J.M. GARBIN, formerly of PATERSON, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1989;

And the Office of Attorney Ethics and respondent having signed a stipulation of discipline by consent in which it was agreed that respondent violated *RPC*1.1(a) (gross neglect), *RPC*1.4(a) (failure to communicate with client) and *RPC*1.16(d) (failure to promptly return the file to client);

And the parties having agreed that respondent’s conduct violated *RPC*1.1(a), *RPC*1.4(a) and *RPC*1.16(d), and that such conduct warrants a reprimand;

And the Disciplinary Review Board having determined that a reprimand is the appropriate discipline for respondent’s ethics violations and having granted the motion for discipline by consent;

And the Disciplinary Review Board having submitted the record of the proceedings to the Clerk of the Supreme Court for entry of an order of discipline in accordance with *Rule*l:20-16(e);

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that GLADYS J.M. GARBIN is hereby reprimanded effective immediately; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be mad a permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this State; and it is further

*433ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for appropriate administrative costs incurred in the prosecution of this matter.
##### 



WESTERN OHIO FINANCIAL CORPORATION Exhibit 32 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Western Ohio
Financial Corporation (the Company) for the quarterly period ending June 30,
2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the Report), I, John W. Raisbeck, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  (1)
    
    the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
the Company. Date: August 14, 2004
    /s/ John W. RaisbeckJohn W. Raisbeck, Chief Executive Officer In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Western Ohio
Financial Corporation (the Company) for the quarterly period ending June 30,
2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the Report), I, Robert A. Kuehl, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  (1)
    
    the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
the Company. Date: August 14, 2004
    /s/ Robert A. KuehlRobert A. Kuehl, Chief Financial Officer 27.
#### Cleveland LONG, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D10-5549.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Feb. 11, 2011.

Cleveland Long, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. All associated pending motions before the Court are hereby denied. However, the Court notes that the *855appellant’s appeal of the posteonviction court’s final order dated July 27, 2010, “granting in part and denying in part motion to correct illegal sentence and order modifying judgment and sentence,” remains before the Court for review in case 1D10-5411.

BENTON, C.J., DAVIS and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
No. 14,268.

#### The Central Union Telephone Company *v.*Falley.

Filed Feb. 2, 1889;

petition for a rehearing overruled April 3, 1889.

From the Tippecanoe Circuit Court.

*J. R. Coffroth, T. A. Stuart*and *A. H. Thomas,*for appellant.

*W. D. Wallace, S. P. Baird*and *F. S. Chase,*for appellee.

Olds, J.

This action was brought by the appellee against the appellant, under the act of April 8th, 1885, entitled “An Act prescribing certain duties of telegraph and telephone companies, prohibiting discrimination between patrons, providing penalties therefor, and declaring an emergency,” for the penalty of one hundred dollars for the failure and refusal on the part of the appellant to furnish to the appellee a telephone and telephonic connections, facilities and service, and involves the same questions that were decided in the case of *Central U. Tel. Co.*v. *State, ex rel., ante,*p. 194. On the authority of that case the judgment of the court below is affirmed, with costs.
##### 



HMN FINANCIAL, INC.
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
 Date: November 2, 2007
    
    /s/ Michael McNeilMichael McNeilPresident/Chief Executive Officer(Principal Executive Officer)/s/ Jon EberleJon EberleSenior Vice President/Chief Financial Officer(Principal Financial Officer)
(logo) CWCAPITAL

ASSET MANAGEMENT

 

Annual Statement as to Compliance

For the Period of January 1, 2014 to December 31, 2014

 

 

WFRBS 2014-C21  

 

                

In accordance with Item 1123 of Regulation AB andwith the requirements detailed in Section 11.12 of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (the “Agreement”) for the above-mentioned CMBS pool, (the “CMBS Pool”), CWCapital Asset Management LLC (“CWCAM”), in its capacity as Special Servicer, is providing this Officer’s Certificate with respect to the following:

 

(A)          a review of CWCAM’s activities during the preceding calendar year or portion thereof (the “Reporting Period”) and of CWCAM’s performance under the Agreement has been made under such officer’s supervision and;

 

(B)           to the best of such officer’s knowledge, based on such review, CWCAM has fulfilled all its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the Reporting Period.

 

 

Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.  

 

Sincerely,

CWCapital Asset Management LLC

 

 

/s/ David B. Iannarone

David B. Iannarone

President

 

 

 

7501 Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 500 West, Bethesda, MD 20814

www.cwcapital.com
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Kent Dale SIMON.

No. 2011-K-1008.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 4, 2011.

In re Simon, Kent Dale; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson Davis, 31st Judicial District Court Div. O, No. CR-797-09; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KA 10-1111.

Denied.
Exhibit 31.1

CERTIFICATION

I,
Jennifer M. Davis, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed in respect
of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2014-3 (the Exchange Act periodic reports);

2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit
to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period
covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

4. Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance
statement required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the servicing agreement in all material respects; and

5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on
assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this
report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: U.S. Bank,
National Association.



By:

/s/ Jennifer M. DavisName:

Jennifer M. DavisTitle:

Deputy Chief Financial OfficerDate:

August 19, 2016
#### STATE of Louisiana v. William HUNTER.

No. 2011-KP-0038.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 3, 2011.

In re Hunter, William; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 459-230; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1492.

Denied.