alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
| (logo) WELLS

           FARGO | Commercial Mortgage Servicing

D1086-120, 12th Floor

550 South Tryon Street

Charlotte, NC 28202

1-800-326-1334 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

ANNUAL STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE

 

Reference is hereby made to that certain Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of March 1, 2014, by and among CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES INC., as Depositor, WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as  Master Servicer, MIDLAND LOAN SERVICES, A DIVISION OF PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIAITON, as Special Servicer, SITUS HOLDINGS, LLC as Operating Advisor, U.S.BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Certificate Administrator and Trustee, with respect to Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,  Series 2014-GC19 (the "Agreement"). Capitalized terms used herein not otherwise defined shall have the meanings assigned in the Agreement.

 

Pursuant to Section 10.08 of this Agreement, I, Daniel Bober, Executive Vice President of Commercial Mortgage Services do hereby certify that:

 

·                A review of the activities of the Master Servicer during the period from March 1, 2014 through December 31, 2014 (the “Reporting Period”),  and of its performance per the Agreement during such period has been made under my supervision, and 

 

·                To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the Reporting Period.

 

 

 

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this Certificate as of the 6th day of March 2015.

                                                                                                                          

/s/ Daniel Bober

Daniel Bober

Executive Vice President                         

Wells Fargo Bank

 

 

 

 

 

 
| Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. | (logo) Together we’ll go far |
|------------------------|------------------------------------|
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7230 Enrolled Bill (ENR)]

        H.R.7230

                     One Hundred Fifteenth Congress

                                 of the

                        United States of America

                          AT THE SECOND SESSION

         Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday,
           the third day of January, two thousand and eighteen

                                 An Act

 
To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 
 226 West Main Street in Lake City, South Carolina, as the ``Postmaster 
                     Frazier B. Baker Post Office''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. POSTMASTER FRAZIER B. BAKER POST OFFICE.
    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 226 West Main Street in Lake City, South Carolina, shall be 
known and designated as the ``Postmaster Frazier B. Baker Post 
Office''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Postmaster 
Frazier B. Baker Post Office''.

                               Speaker of the House of Representatives.

                            Vice President of the United States and    
                                               President of the Senate.
```
#### STATE of Louisiana v. David LEE.

No. 2010-KK-1742.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

July 29, 2010.

In re State of Louisiana;- — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 491-849; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-0704.

Writ granted. Based on the objective information available to the officers at the time of the defendant’s arrest, it was reasonably probable under the totality of the circumstances that a crime had been or was in the process of being committed and that the defendant was directly or indirectly involved in the commission of that crime. Accordingly, the ruling of the district court granting in part the defendant’s motion to suppress the oral and written statements made post-arrest is reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
I 

115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 710 

To amend the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act to better align 

the grace period required for non-payment of premiums before discontinuing coverage under qualified health plans with such grace periods 

provided for under State law. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 27, 2017 

Mr. FLORES introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 

to better align the grace period required for non-payment 

of premiums before discontinuing coverage under qualified health plans with such grace periods provided for 

under State law. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Health Coverage State 

5 Flexibility Act of 2017’’. 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 710 IH

1 SEC. 2. ALIGNING QUALIFIED HEALTH PLAN GRACE PE2 RIOD REQUIREMENTS WITH STATE LAW 

3 GRACE PERIOD REQUIREMENTS. 

4 Section 1412(c)(2) of the Patient Protection and Af5 fordable Care Act (42 U.S.C. 18082(c)(2)) is amended— 

6 (1) in subparagraph (B)(iv)(II), by striking ‘‘a 

7 3-month grace period’’ and inserting ‘‘a grace period 

8 specified in subparagraph (C)’’; and 

9 (2) by adding at the end the following new sub10 paragraph: 

11 ‘‘(C) GRACE PERIOD SPECIFIED.—For pur12 poses of subparagraph (B)(iv)(II), the grace pe13 riod specified in this subparagraph is— 

14 ‘‘(i) for plan years beginning before 

15 January 1, 2018, a 3-month grace period; 

16 and 

17 ‘‘(ii) for plan years beginning during 

18 2018 or a subsequent year, such grace pe19 riod for non-payment of premiums before 

20 discontinuing coverage as is applicable 

21 under the State law of the State in which 

22 the Exchange operates to health insurance 

23 coverage offered in the individual market 

24 (or, in the case such a State law is not in 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 710 IH

1 place for the State involved, a 1-month 

2 grace period).’’. 

Æ 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 97-7804

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus JOHNNY RAY PARKER, Defendant - Appellant.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Sr., District Judge. (CR-95-209, CA-96-903) Submitted: June 18, 1998 Decided: July 2, 1998 Before MURNAGHAN and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.Johnny Ray Parker, Appellant Pro Se. Scott Patrick Mebane, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find noreversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. United States v. Parker , Nos. CR-95-209; CA-96-903 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 24, 1997). Appellant’s motions for production of a trial transcript are denied. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 22-0054

SHANDOR S. BADARUDDIN,

Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF MONTANA &

THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT,

Appellees.

ORDER

Pursuant to authority granted under Mont. R. App. P. 26(1), 

Appellee the State of Montana is given an extension of time until 

November 24, 2022 to prepare, file and serve its answer brief. 

Electronically signed by:

Bowen Greenwood

Clerk of the Supreme Court

October 11 2022

10/11/2022

Case Number: DA 22-0054
#### George RANGE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D10-0639.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

July 7, 2010.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, Tallahassee, and Richard B. Gordon, Assistant Public Defender, Jacksonville, for Appellant.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant concedes that the notice to invoke discretionary jurisdiction with this Court has been untimely filed. *See St. Moritz Hotel v. Daughthry,*249 So.2d 27 (Fla.1971). We therefore dismiss this appeal as it is untimely.

DISMISSED.

HAWKES, C.J., BENTON, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM EXPROFUELS,
INC. AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED AUGUST 31, 1997 AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH EXPROFUELS, INC. FORM 10KSB FOR
THE YEAR ENDED AUGUST 31, 1997
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          AUG-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             SEP-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               AUG-31-1997
<CASH>                                          31,647
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  151,754
<ALLOWANCES>                                    10,000
<INVENTORY>                                    400,517
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               608,077
<PP&E>                                         508,098
<DEPRECIATION>                                 270,436
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 890,838
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,086,700
<BONDS>                                        516,602
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        40,000
<OTHER-SE>                                   (752,464)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   890,838
<SALES>                                      1,126,010
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,126,010
<CGS>                                        1,514,250
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,718,228
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              52,321
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,620,642)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (1,620,642)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,620,642)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.41)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 99.14

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                            18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In  connection  with  the  Annual  Report  of  Industrial  Minerals,  Inc.  (the
"Company")  on Form 10-KSB for the year ending  December  31, 2002 as filed with
the Securities  and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report").  I,
John Melnyk, Chief Financial Officer of the company, certify, pursuant to 18 USC
Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of
2002, that to the best of my knowledge and belief.

        (1)     The Report fully complies with the requirements of Sction 13(a)
                or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

        (2)     The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
                material respects, the financial condition and results of
                operations of the Company.


                                                /s/ John Melnyk
                                                --------------------------------
                                                John Melnyk, CFO

Dated:  4/11/03
868 A.2d 1009

#### IN THE MATTER OF PHILIP J. BATTAGLIA, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 023901981).

March 11, 2005.

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its decision in DRB 04-295, concluding that PHILIP J. BATTAGLIA of CLIFTON, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1981, and who has been suspended from the practice of law since June 19, 2002, by Orders of the Court filed June 19, 2002, and April 26, 2004, should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three months for violating *RPC*8.1(b) (failure to cooperate with ethics authorities), and *RPC*8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice);

And the Disciplinary Review Board having concluded that the suspension should be retroactive to December 18, 2003, the date *591on which respondent filed his *Rule*1:20-20 Affidavit of Compliance;

And the Disciplinary Review Board having further concluded that prior to reinstatement to practice, respondent should be required to submit proof of his fitness to practice law and proof that he is continuing his treatment for alcoholism;

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that PHILIP J. BATTAGLIA is suspended from the practice of law for a period of three months and until the further Order of the Court, retroactive to December 18, 2003; and it is further

ORDERED that prior to reinstatement to practice, respondent shall submit proof of his fitness to practice law as attested to by a mental health professional approved by the Office of Attorney Ethics; and it is further

ORDERED that prior to reinstatement, respondent shall submit proof to the Office of Attorney Ethics that he continues to receive treatment for alcoholism; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this State; and it is further

ORDERED that pursuant to *Rule*1:20 — 20(e), respondent’s failure to comply with the Affidavit of Compliance requirement of *Rule*l:20-20(b)(15) may (1) preclude the Disciplinary Review Board from considering respondent’s petition for reinstatement for a period of up to six months from the date respondent files proof of compliance; (2) be found to constitute a violation of *RPC*8.1(b) and *RPC*8.4(c); and (3) provide a basis for an action for contempt pursuant to *Rule*1:10-2; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for appropriate administrative costs incurred in the prosecution of this matter.
Order entered January 31, 2022

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-22-00043-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF J.C., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 305th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. JC-20-00975-X

ORDER

This is an accelerated appeal in a child protection case. The clerk’s record 

has been filed; the reporter’s record is overdue. 

The clerk’s record reflects the trial court found Mother and Father to be 

indigent and appointed trial counsel for each of them. The record further reflects 

trial counsel was “released” from this case when the final decree was signed. 

While appellate counsel has been appointed for Mother, nothing before the Court 

reflects Father, who is presumed to remain indigent through any appeals absent 

changed circumstances, has been appointed appellate counsel. See In re P.M., 520 

S.W.3d 24, 26 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (citation omitted). 
Accordingly, we ORDER the trial court to appoint counsel to represent 

Father on appeal and to transmit to this Court, no later than February 4, 2022, a 

supplemental clerk’s record containing the order appointing counsel. 

We note that on January 28, 2022, Mother filed written verification that she 

had requested the reporter’s record. Accordingly, we ORDER Pamela Sumler, 

Official Court Reporter for the 305th Judicial District Court, to file the record no 

later than February 7, 2022. To ensure the timely filing of the record, the trial 

court must arrange for a substitute reporter if necessary. See TEX. R. APP. P.

28.4(b)(1). 

 We DIRECT the Clerk of this Court to send a copy of this order to the 

Honorable Cheryl Lee Shannon, Presiding Judge of the 305th Judicial District 

Court; Dallas County District Clerk Felicia Pitre; Ms. Sumler; and, all parties.

We ABATE the appeal to allow the trial court an opportunity to comply 

with this order. It shall be reinstated no later than February 9, 2022. 

/s/ CRAIG SMITH

JUSTICE
Exhibit
13.2



CERTIFICATION



The certification
set forth below is being submitted in connection with Affimed N.V.’s Annual Report on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2016 (the “Report”) for the purpose of complying with Rule 13a-14(b) or Rule 15d-14(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code.



Florian Fischer,
Chief Financial Officer of Affimed N.V., certifies that, to the best of his knowledge:



| | 1. | the Report fully complies with
                                         the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and
| | -- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | the information contained in
                                         the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
                                         of operations of Affimed N.V.
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Date: March
30, 2017



|/s/ Florian Fischer     | 
|----------------------- | 
|Name: Florian Fischer   | 
|Chief Financial Officer |
#### AETNA CASUALTY *&*SURETY COMPANY, Appellant, v. Carey WESTON, Appellee. Carey WESTON, Appellant, v. AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 20575.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

May 27, 1964.

John T. Cooper, Adams & Reese, New Orleans, La., for Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.

Robert J. Mack, Sims and Mack, Hammond, La., for Weston.

Before HUTCHESON, PRETTY-MAN * and JONES, Circuit Judges.

*

 Of the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting by Designation.

PER CURIAM.

Weston sued for workmen’s compensation and medical benefits under the Louisiana workmen’s compensation laws.1 Judgment was rendered in his favor, though for total and temporary disability rather than total and permanent disability as he had prayed. Both parties appealed this judgment. There is no merit in either appeal, the judgment is affirmed.

The only substantial issue raised by Aetna is that the facts do not support the trial judge’s conclusion that the relationship between Richardson, the insured, and Andrews, the employer of Weston, was that of principal and contractor.2 After a thorough examination of the record we are unable to say that *286the trial court’s findings of fact, from which within the framework of the jurisprudence of Louisiana he could conclude that the relationship of principal and contractor existed, were clearly erroneous.

Weston’s specifications of error concerning as they do objections to findings of facts and acts of discretion are without merit.

Affirmed.

1

. LSA-R.S. 23:1021 et seq.

2

. LSA-R.S. 23:1061:

> “Where any person (in this section referred to as principal) undertakes to execute any work, which is a part of his trade, business, or occupation or which he had contracted to perform, and contracts witli any person (in this section referred to as contractor) for the execution by or under the contractor of the whole or any part of the work undertaken by the principal, the principal shall be liable to pay to any employee employed in the execution of the work or to his dependent, any compensation under this Chapter which he would have been liable to pay if the employee had been immediately employed by him * *
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-60545

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CALVIN PARNELL,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

(3:96-CV-97-D)

_________________________________________________________________

February 27, 1997

Before KING, JOLLY, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Calvin Parnell appeals from the denial of his successive 28

U.S.C. § 2255. Parnell argues that the evidence was insufficient

to show that he actively used a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)

in light of United States v. Bailey, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995), and

that his firearm conviction must be reversed because the jury was

instructed as to the liberal pre-Bailey definition of use, and
2

they were not instructed as to the meaning of “carrying” under § 924(c).

To the extent that Parnell is required to file a certificate

of appealability (COA) in order to appeal the district court’s

order, we conclude that Parnell has not made a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2). Without deciding whether a COA is required, we

conclude that the evidence is sufficient to prove that Parnell

both actively used and carried the firearm under Bailey: Parnell

carried the rifle to the motel; it was not concealed in his

clothing but displayed because the surveillance officers saw the

weapon. See Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at 508. Because the trial

evidence demonstrated that Parnell used the rifle as defined by

Bailey and also carried it, any error from the giving of preBailey jury instructions did not seriously affect the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceeding, or amount

to a due process violation. United States v. Anderson, 987 F.2d

251, 259 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 853 (1993).

AFFIRMED. COA DENIED.