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Filed 12/31/20 P. v. Walker CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and 

Respondent,

v.

TAMMY LOUISE WALKER,

Defendant and 

Appellant.

 A155507

 (Contra Costa County

 Super. Ct. No. 51802115)

Defendant was convicted of a number of charges, including two counts 

of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and causing injury within 10 

years of another DUI offense, and driving on a suspended license. The jury 

also found true great bodily injury enhancements. 

The trial court imposed, but suspended execution of, a six-year prison 

sentence and placed defendant on probation subject to a number of terms and 

conditions, including that she wear a SCRAM device at all times, enter and 

complete a 12-to 18-month alcohol rehabilitation program, waive all credits 

for time served prior to sentencing, waive her right to appeal, and waive any 

objection to the court’s imposing the maximum, aggravated sentence for her 

DUI offenses. The court also made the requisite findings to support the 

aggravated term, stating as follows: “I’m going to make the finding that the 
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aggravated term in this case is the appropriate, and given the seriousness of 

the misconduct, the nature of the driving, the devastating nature of the 

lifetime injuries sustained by our [Highway Patrol] officer in the case, there 

is no question that this, especially given the history of the defendant, 

required the aggravated sentence.” 

The court had considerable reservations about placing defendant on 

probation and made it clear to her that if she failed, for any reason, to enter 

and complete the program, the court would revoke probation and remand her 

to state prison:

“[Court]: . . . So, Miss Walker, you understand that I have a very 

difficult decision in front of me here?

“[Defendant]: Yes, your Honor.

“[Court]: And you understand that a big part of that decision depends 

on you, and your willingness and ability to be a successful patient in a 

treatment program on probation?

“[Defendant]: Yes. [¶] . . . [¶]

“[Court]: Do you also understand that in the future, if you violate 

probation, you’ll be back here sitting in the courtroom, probably with 

your family members[,] asking me to forgive your relapse, you 

understand that’s a likely scenario?

“[Defendant]: Yes, I understand.

“[Court]: And do you understand that if I were to give you a chance, 

that I will absolutely not give you a second chance, no matter how 

slight that relapse may be?

“[Defendant]: Yes, I understand.

“[Court]: Okay. So that means if you go and you take some cough 

medication that’s not permitted under this program, and it gives a 

positive read on the SCRAM, you’ll be back here, and you will be 
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remanded to serve your six-year term. Do you understand it’s the 

slightest violation of any law, including the SCRAM program, including 

the rules of this treatment program?

“[Defendant]: Yes, I understand.

“[Court]: Do you think you’re capable of doing that?

“[Defendant]: Yes, your Honor.” 

“[Court]: . . . So I guess this is the time, Miss Walker, before I do this, 

that I want to make sure that you and I are on the same page, because 

I don’t want there to be any misunderstandings about when you come 

back here. Because you understand [the prosecutor] has said I’m 

making a big mistake by giving you this chance.

“He has said that I–I’m making a mistake, and he thinks that the 

mistake is going to show itself by you hurting someone. He might be 

right in this sense. I don’t think you will hurt someone, but I think he 

might be right that you might not ready to do this, and you might be 

required to do state prison time in the sense that you’re not going to 

take this program seriously, which will show itself to me by you not 

paying attention, or worse, by taking medications or alcohol. Do you 

understand what I’m saying?

“[Defendant]: Yes.

“[Court]: If you come back here and we find that there’s some kind of 

violations with the program rules, or you’ve consumed alcohol, no 

matter how traumatic your excuse is, you understand this sentence will 

be imposed?

“[Defendant]: Yes.” 

Within weeks, the prosecution filed a petition to revoke defendant’s 

probation, alleging she had “not been accepted into the [rehabilitation] 

program.” Following a contested hearing, the court revoked and terminated 

probation and remanded defendant to serve her six-year prison sentence. 
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Defendant challenges the revocation of her probation and also 

challenges the fines and fees imposed for several reasons, including on the 

basis of People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas). We affirm 

the revocation of probation and execution of the suspended sentence. As to 

two of the fines, we reverse and remand for the trial court to identify their 

statutory basis; we otherwise also affirm the fines and fees.

Revocation of Probation

A decision to revoke probation involves two components: (1) a 

retrospective factual question whether the probationer has violated a 

condition of probation, and (2) a discretionary determination by the court 

whether the violation warrants revocation of probation and sentencing to

prison. (Black v. Romano (1985) 471 U.S. 606, 611.) The court has discretion 

to revoke, modify, or continue probation as originally set, depending upon its 

analysis of the circumstances before it. (People v. Hawthorne (1991) 

226 Cal.App.3d 789, 792; Pen. Code, § 1203.2, subd. (b)(1).)

The facts supporting a revocation of probation need only be proven by a 

preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 

439 (Rodriguez).) But the evidence must support a conclusion the 

probationer willfully violated the terms and conditions of probation. (People 

v. Cervantes (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 291, 295 (Cervantes).) 

A willful violation requires “ ‘simply a purpose or willingness to commit 

the act . . . ,’ without regard to motive, intent to injure, or knowledge of the 

act’s prohibited character. [Citation.] The terms imply that the person 

knows what he is doing, intends to do what he is doing, and is a free agent. 

[Citation.] Stated another way, the term ‘willful’ requires only that the 

prohibited act occur intentionally.” (In re Jerry R. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 

1432, 1438.) “Where a probationer is unable to comply with a probation
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condition because of circumstances beyond his or her control and defendant’s 

conduct was not contumacious, revoking probation and imposing a prison 

term are reversible error.” (Cervantes, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 295, id., 

at pp. 293, 295 [while in custody of immigration authorities probationer did 

not willfully fail to attend hearing]; accord People v. Zaring (1992) 

8 Cal.App.4th 362, 379 [probationer’s late court appearance due to 

unforeseen circumstances was not willful].) 

We review a factual finding that the defendant violated his or her 

probation for substantial evidence. Under this standard, we determine only 

whether, in view of the entire record, there is substantial evidence, 

contradicted or uncontradicted, to support the trial court’s decision. (People 

v. Kurey (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 840, 848–849.) To be “ ‘substantial,’ ” 

evidence must be “ ‘of ponderable legal significance[,] reasonable in nature, 

credible, and of solid value.’ ” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576; 

People v. Cole (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1672, 1678.) We give great deference to 

the trial court and resolve all inferences and intendments in favor of the 

judgment. (Kurey, at pp. 848–849.)

Once the trial court has found a violation of probation it must “decide 

whether under all of the circumstances the violation of probation warrants 

revocation.” (People v. Avery (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1198, 1204.) On this 

second step the trial court is vested with broad discretion (People v. Jones

(1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1309, 1315), and its decision is reviewed only for abuse 

of that discretion. (Rodriguez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 442.) “ ‘[O]nly in a very 

extreme case should an appellate court interfere with the discretion of the 

trial court in the matter of denying or revoking probation. . . .’ ” (Id. at 

p. 443.)
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At the revocation hearing, Belinda Thomas, a co-founder and the CEO 

of the REACH program, testified in pertinent part as follows: She personally 

conducts many of the screening interviews for women who are slated to go 

into the program. As part of that process, she looks for “certain warning 

signs” that indicate an individual may not be “the right fit for the program.” 

“I look for attitude. Resistance. If they can follow instructions appropriately. 

Those are the bigger things. And we also look for faithfulness in people 

coming to class on time.” 

Thomas had met defendant prior to sentencing while defendant was 

attending in-jail classes, and during that time “she was pretty faithful to the 

class, and we got to know [defendant] pretty well . . . most of the times she 

was pretty faithful. . . .” “Out of four times a month, she might come three or 

two. . . . So she was not every Thursday, but she was one of the regulars.” 

After sentencing, Thomas conducted the formal intake interview 

necessary for defendant to move from the jail to the program. “[T]he 

screening was to make sure she got all her paperwork that she needed to 

start Ujima West right away, which is the rehab program.” Thomas brought 

the paperwork with her to the jail. As she started to go over it with 

defendant, “she, you know, got hostile and said, what do you mean, this is the 

paperwork? I thought I was going to REACH. I’m not going. I didn’t know I 

was going to be going to no rehab.” Thomas explained that was what the 

court required, to make sure defendant remained sober for “this whole year.” 

At this point, defendant “became very sluggish and labile.” Thomas then 

turned to assist another inmate and left defendant to start “filling out [the] 

paperwork.” 

Thomas also told defendant she would need to call the “access line” to 

“screen for . . . Ujima West.” Defendant responded that she had already 
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called the access line and “they didn’t even do nothing for me. They had me 

calling all these–so she was mainly argumentative, and didn’t want to do the 

access line. But I explained to her the necessity of it.” 

After about a half hour, defendant told Thomas she had not completed 

the paperwork. Thomas said that was fine, but defendant needed to at least 

call the access line. At this point, defendant said she didn’t know any of the 

phone numbers. 

Thomas, by this time, was concerned about “all the excuses that 

[defendant] came up with [¶] . . . [¶] the resistance.” And compared with 

other screening interviews Thomas had conducted, she found defendant to be 

“[e]xtremely uncooperative.” Defendant did not even “pretend that she really 

wanted to be with us.” 

Thomas therefore left the jail with considerable doubt as to whether 

defendant would be admitted into the program. But both Thomas and the 

board of directors of the program deferred judgment, since defendant had the 

remainder of the day (a Friday) and the weekend to complete the paperwork, 

call the access line and then get in touch with the program. 

However, there was no call. Accordingly, the board made the decision 

to reject defendant. “[O]nce she never called on Monday, the board said, no

. . . if she’s resisting now, it would be too hard. . . .” 

Defendant also testified at the hearing. She denied being resistant to 

Thomas’s instructions, pointing out the paperwork consisted of six pages 

printed on both sides. She made a number of calls to the access line, and 

within several days of the intake interview had gotten the required TB test 

paperwork in order. Acknowledging that her daughter had indicated a lack 

of support for her entering the rehabilitation program, defendant stated the 

program physician had asked defendant how she felt. “So I said, well, since 
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it’s a court order, then let’s go ahead with it, and I felt no way otherwise.” 

Defendant did not believe anything had gone “wrong” at the intake session. 

Following testimony, the prosecutor and defense counsel argued to the 

court. 

The prosecutor asserted there was ample evidence defendant had not 

entered the program as required and the court should credit Thomas’s 

opinion that defendant had demonstrated she was not serious about sobriety 

and recovery and not ready for the rigors of the recovery program. 

Defense counsel argued there had been a “misunderstanding” about, 

and not a violation of, probation and defendant had not had sufficient time to 

complete the paperwork. Counsel urged the court not to view defendant’s 

“giv[ing] Miss Thomas attitude” as “conclusive proof” defendant was not 

receptive to treatment, asserting there could have been “a number of other 

explanations” as to “why the two women clearly were not seeing eye-to-eye on 

that day.” On inquiry by the court, defense counsel acknowledged defendant 

never completed the paperwork required to enter the program. Nor did 

counsel dispute that defendant could have taken steps to do so. 

The court commenced its oral ruling by stating it had been “a very 

difficult decision . . . to avert doing what I think the law required me to do, 

which was impose a state prison sentence given the seriousness of the 

defendant’s conduct.” After investigation and discussion with the directors of 

two rehabilitation programs, the court had selected REACH, which oversees 

a number of programs, including the Ujima rehabilitation program. 

The court found the defendant’s “paperwork argument” “just one 

measure of the failure of the defendant to fulfill the suspended sentence 

condition.” Even before the screening interview, “the defendant had backed 

off. Her attendance had changed, an[d] she was not attending every 
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Thursday.” Then Thomas observed “the behavior of defendant was not a 

normal demeanor.” “She noticed that the defendant became hostile to the 

paperwork, and was sluggish and labile, dismissive and argumentative. 

None of these are positive factors.” And had defendant displayed these 

behaviors at the time of sentencing, the court would not have discussed 

probation and would “have simply imposed the aggravated term of six years 

and there would have been no further discussion about it.” The court also 

reemphasized the justifications for the aggravated sentence. 

The court then noted there were several ways of looking at what had 

transpired. One, that admission into the program was a condition precedent 

to probation, which failed to occur. Two, that failure to enter the program 

was a violation of the terms and conditions of probation. And three, that the 

basis for defendant’s agreement to probation and suspended execution of 

sentence was entry into the program. The court went on to state it made no 

difference how one looked at the case, however, as the result would be the 

same—the court would impose the aggravated, six-year prison term. 

Defendant complains the trial court did not make an express finding 

that she “willfully” violated probation. However, defendant never requested 

an express finding; nor is such an express finding statutorily required. (See 

Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981 [“ ‘[u]nder the doctrine of 

implied findings, the reviewing court must infer, following a bench trial, that 

the trial court impliedly made every factual finding necessary to support its 

decision’ ”]; Finney v. Gomez (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 527, 545 [“reviewing 

court will infer all findings necessary to support the [ruling] and then 

examine the record to see if the findings are based on substantial evidence”].)

Defendant next maintains there is no evidence she “willfully” violated 

her probation. She claims it was the rehabilitation program “not [defendant], 
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who decided [defendant] was not ‘a good fit’ for its program.” In other words, 

defendant asserts it was the rehabilitation program’s fault, not hers, that she 

failed to enter the program.

However, as we have recited in detail, the program’s decision to reject 

defendant was precipitated by, and a consequence of, defendant’s conduct. 

Not only did defendant’s “hostile” and “argumentative” conduct at the Friday 

intake session cause Thomas and the board of directors grave concern about 

defendant’s willingness and ability to commit to overcoming her alcohol 

addiction, but when, even in the face of this “resistance,” defendant was given 

the opportunity to complete the intake process over the weekend and call in 

to the program on Monday, she failed to do so, resulting in the decision to not 

accept her. In short, defendant, not the program, was responsible for her 

failure to comply with the pivotal condition of her probation, to enter and 

complete the rehabilitation program. 

Generally speaking, “[w]illfully implies no evil intent; ‘ “it implies that 

the person knows what he is doing, intends to do what he is doing and is a 

free agent.” ’ ” (People v. Bell (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1030, 1043, abrogated on 

another ground in People v. Athar (2002) 105 Cal.App.4th 479, 488.) In 

statutory language, “willfully” generally “defines a general criminal intent, 

absent other statutory language that requires ‘an intent to do a further act or 

achieve a future consequence.’ ” (People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 85.) 

There is no suggestion in the record that defendant was either unaware 

of her own actions or that she was prevented by some unforeseen 

circumstance from completing the intake process required to transition into 

the rehabilitation program. Accordingly, this case is not like the immigration 

detention and deportation cases on which defendant relies. (Cervantes, 
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supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 295–297; People v. Galvan (2007) 

155 Cal.App.4th 978, 983–984.) 

Defendant lastly maintains the trial court erred in imposing the 

suspended six-year prison sentence. She bases this claim on the trial court’s 

musing that there were three different ways one could view the situation. 

Defendant asserts it was error for the court to impose the sentence “without 

deciding which one was correct.” 

To begin with, the trial court mused that these were only “possible 

argument[s]” the parties might have advanced. (Italics added.) Two of these 

were either suggested or expressly advocated by the prosecution. Only the 

third—that admission into the rehabilitation program was the basis for 

defendant’s agreement to probation—might have been advanced by the 

defendant. Further, as to the latter argument, defendant never made the 

factual claim that she agreed to probation, rather than proceeding with 

immediate execution of the six-year prison sentence, only because she 

assumed she would be admitted into the rehabilitation program. She 

therefore has waived any such claim on appeal. (See Sea & Sage Audubon 

Society, Inc. v. Planning Com. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 412, 417 [issues not raised in 

the trial court, which do not present a purely legal question on undisputed 

facts, cannot be raised for the first time on appeal]; Royster v. Montanez

(1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 362, 367 [factual issues not presented to the trial court 

are generally waived on appeal].) Indeed, what the record makes clear is that 

defense counsel and the trial court made an exceptional effort to avoid what 

the court had already made clear was going to be an aggravated six-year 

prison term. Thus, as the trial court additionally pointed out, whichever way 

the case was argued, the result was going to be the same—because the court 
12

had suspended execution of sentence (and not imposition of sentence), once 

probation was off the table, defendant was going to serve the six-year term.

Defendant also appears to be claiming the court, after finding a 

probation violation, failed to exercise its discretion to decide whether to 

reinstate probation, modify probation, or execute the sentence. The record 

leaves no doubt, however, as to why the court chose not to reinstate 

probation. And on this record, the court certainly acted within its discretion 

in executing on the suspended sentence. 

Failure to Identify Statutory Basis of Fine and Fee

The trial court imposed a $1,749 fine without specifying the statutory 

basis for it, in contrast to other fines and fees, which were identified by 

description or statutory reference. 

The Attorney General contends the only fair reading of the record is 

that this fine was required by Vehicle Code section 23560 which provides, in 

pertinent part: “If a person is convicted of a violation of Section 23153 and 

the offense occurred within 10 years of a separate violation of Section 23103 

. . . that person shall be punished by imprisonment . . . and by a fine of not 

less than three hundred ninety dollars ($390) nor more than five thousand 

dollars ($5,000).” (Veh. Code, § 23560.) 

While we agree the $1,749 fine is very likely the statutory fine required 

under Vehicle Code section 23560, we also agree with defendant the law 

requires the court to specify the statutory basis for any fine or fee and the 

abstract of judgment to likewise identify the basis for the fine or fee. 

In People v. Hartley (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 620, 636–637 (Hartley), for 

example, the trial court imposed a number of fines and fees, all of which were 

statutorily identified except a $100 fine. The court reversed and remanded 

for the trial court to identify the statutory basis for the fine. 
13

Citing to People v. High (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1200 (High), the 

Hartley court explained, “ ‘[a]lthough . . . a detailed recitation of all the fees, 

fines and penalties on the record may be tedious, California law does not 

authorize shortcuts. All fines and fees must be set forth in the abstract of 

judgment.’ Moreover, ‘[a] detailed description of the amount of and statutory 

basis for the fines and penalty assessments imposed would help the parties 

and the court avoid errors in this area.’ (People v. Hamed (2013) 

221 Cal.App.4th 928, 939 . . . (Hamed).) [¶] . . . Hamed recognized several 

ways for a trial court to perform this duty. ‘A trial court could recite the 

amount and statutory basis for any base fine and the amounts and statutory 

bases for any penalty assessments on the record, as High suggests should be 

done. (High, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1200.) Or, in cases where the 

amounts and statutory bases for the penalty assessments have been set forth 

in a probation report, a sentencing memorandum, or some other writing, the 

court could state the amount and statutory basis for the base fine and make a 

shorthand reference in its oral pronouncement to “penalty assessments as set 

forth in the” probation report, memorandum, or writing as authorized in 

(People v. Sharret (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 859 . . . [(Sharret)] and People v. 

Voit (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1353 . . .).’ ” (Hartley, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 636–637, quoting Hamed, at pp. 939–940.)

Further, “[a]ll fines and fees must be set forth in the abstract of 

judgment. [Citations.] The abstract of judgment form . . . provides a number 

of lines for ‘other’ financial obligations in addition to those delineated with 

statutory references on the preprinted form. If the abstract does not specify 

the amount of each fine, the Department of Corrections cannot fulfill its 

statutory duty to collect and forward deductions from prisoner wages to the 

appropriate agency. [Citation.] At a minimum, the inclusion of all fines and 
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fees in the abstract may assist state and local agencies in their collection 

efforts. (Pen. Code, § 1205, subd. (c).) Thus, even where the Department of 

Corrections has no statutory obligation to collect a particular fee, . . . the fee 

must be included in the abstract of judgment.” (High, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 1200.) In Sharret, the Court of Appeal recognized that “trial courts 

frequently orally impose the penalties and surcharge . . . by a shorthand 

reference to ‘penalty assessments.’ The responsibility then falls to the trial 

court clerk to specify the penalties and surcharge in appropriate amounts in 

the minutes and, more importantly, the abstract of judgment.” (Sharret, 

supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 864.)

Defendant also complains the trial court did not recite the statutory 

basis for the $176 probation report fee. There is no doubt this is a probation 

report fee authorized by Penal Code section 1203.1b, as the court orally 

stated, and the court minutes describe it as “Prob. Report Fee $ 176.” 

However, for the reasons stated above, on remand, the court’s minutes should 

also specify the statutory basis for this fee, and the abstract of judgment 

should be corrected as necessary. 

Ability to Pay Hearing

Defendant lastly maintains the trial court erred in failing to conduct a 

“Dueñas” hearing on her ability to pay before imposing certain fines.

The Attorney General maintains defendant waived this issue given the 

following colloquy with the court at the time the court imposed, but 

suspended execution of, sentence:

“[Court:] CCA fee of $90, and COA fee of $120, $176 probation report, 

and I think that sums it up. 

“Do you have any questions, Miss Walker?

“[Defendant]: How does this work out if I don’t have money right now?
15

“[Court]: As far as the fines are concerned, I think your question is 

going to the fines that I’ve just now imposed?

“[Defendant]: Yes, sir.

“[Court]: If you don’t have an ability to pay those fines, I believe all you 

have to do is go to Alliance One, and they make a payment schedule, 

which does take into account what you can pay. And I think, you know, 

is zero, if that’s all you can afford to pay. So you’ve got to make those 

arrangements with them directly.

“I think for $90, and the $120 fine, those are subject to the discretion of 

the Court. And if you’re saying you have no money, perhaps we can 

waive that now, instead of setting a hearing. Those two, I think, are 

discretionary. 

“So, Aletha, you can strike that $120 fine. And we’ll strike those.

“All right. I think that concludes it. If you have any further questions, 

Miss Walker, let me know.” 

Defendant does not take issue with the $176 probation report fee on 

ability to pay grounds—understandably since the statute requires probation 

to make that determination in the first instance. (Pen. Code, § 1203.1b, subd. 

(a).) She does, however, take issue with the $300 restitution fine and $300 

probation revocation fine the court subsequently imposed. 

Even assuming defendant did not waive her Dueñas claim as to these 

two fines since she was sentenced prior to Dueñas, the case is 

distinguishable.

In Dueñas, the defendant was a chronically-ill, unemployed homeless 

woman with cerebral palsy and a limited education who supported her two 

children through public aid. (Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1160–

1161.) She had lost her driver’s license because of her inability to pay her 

juvenile citations and then had acquired three misdemeanor convictions for 
16

driving without a license because the accumulating fines and fees prevented 

her from clearing the citations and recovering her license. (Id. at p. 1161.) 

She thus experienced a series of “cascading consequences” because of “a 

series of criminal proceedings driven by, and contributing to, [her] poverty,” 

and she had already been ordered to pay the charges by the end of her 

probation period. (Id. at pp. 1160, 1163–1164.) The Court of Appeal reversed 

the challenged assessments, holding “the assessment provisions of 

Government Code section 70373 and Penal Code section 1465.8, if imposed 

without a determination that the defendant is able to pay, are . . . 

fundamentally unfair [and] imposing these assessments upon indigent 

defendants without a determination that they have the present ability to pay 

violates due process. . . .” (Dueñas, at p. 1168.) It ordered the trial court to 

stay the restitution fine “unless and until the People prove that [the 

defendant] has the present ability to pay it.” (Id. at pp. 1172–1173.)

Here, defendant has not suffered a series of “cascading consequences” 

because of a “series of criminal proceedings” which have resulted in her 

inability to pay the two $300 fines. (See People v. Lowery (2020) 

43 Cal.App.5th 1046, 1056 [“unique concerns addressed in Dueñas” were 

“lacking;” “Nothing establishes or even reasonably suggests that appellants 

face ongoing unintended punitive consequences.”].) Furthermore, she has 

been sentenced to a lengthy prison term. And while at the time of 

sentencing, she may have had an inability to pay, nothing in the record 

indicates she will be ineligible for or unable to perform prison work 

assignments. One can therefore reasonably infer that an amount sufficient to 

cover the $600 in fines will be deducted from her prison wages over the 

course of her time there. (See People v. Aviles (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1055, 

1076 [court “can infer defendant . . . has the ability to pay the fines and fees 
17

imposed upon him from probable future wages, including prison wages”]; 

People v. Johnson (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 134, 139–140 [any Dueñas error was 

harmless given long prison term and no evidence of inability to work]; see 

also People v. Adams (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 828, 832 [unlike in Dueñas, 

defendant made no showing of “compelling and extraordinary reasons” 

pursuant to which trial court has discretion to waive restitution fine under 

Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (c)].)1

DISPOSITION

The trial court is directed to identify the amounts and statutory bases 

of the fines, fees, and penalty assessments imposed, in a manner consistent 

with this opinion, and the abstract of judgment is to be amended or corrected 

as necessary. In all other respects, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

1 We therefore need not, and do not, weigh in on the correctness of 

Dueñas’s reasoning, an issue on which the Supreme Court has granted 

review. (People v. Hicks (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 320, rev. granted Nov. 26, 

2019, S258946; People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, rev. granted Nov. 

13, 2019, S257844.)
18

_________________________

Banke, J.

We concur:

_________________________

Humes, P.J.

_________________________

Margulies, J.

A155507, People v. Walker