IN RE: )

Claim for benefits of PAUL HOWARD, ) under the Missouri Employment Security Law, ) ) Claimant, ) ) vs. ) No. SD33251 ) Filed: September 24, 2014 JOPLIN STONE COMPANY, ) ) Employer/Respondent, ) ) and MISSOURI DIVISION ) OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, ) ) Appellant. )

APPEAL FROM THE LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMM ISSION

APPEAL DISMISSED This appeal arises out of a claim for unemployment benefits by claimant Paul Howard (“Claimant”), which was contested by his employer, Joplin Stone Company (“Joplin Stone”).

After an initial determination that Claimant was no t disqualified from receiving benefits for misconduct, Joplin Stone appealed the deputy’s dete rmination utilizing the form from the Missouri Division of Employment Security (“Division ”), supplemented by an appeal letter submitted by Michelle Brown (“Brown”), who was iden tified as the “Human Resource Manager” for Joplin Stone.2

Subsequently, the Appeals Tribunal determined that Joplin Stone did not file a lawful appeal because the appeal was “drafted, signed, and filed by an employee of Springfield Underground, Inc.; a different employer subject to the Missouri Employment Security law[,] [and that] appeal was not filed by an officer or em ployee of Joplin Stone Company; the employer that employed the claimant.” 1 The Appeals Tribunal did not reach the merits of whether Claimant was disqualified from receiving benefits. Joplin Stone then filed an Application for Review before the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (“Commission”), which reversed the Appeal Tribunal’s decision and held that Joplin Stone did file a lawful appeal, and tha t Claimant was not disqualified from benefits. In a single point relied on, the Division asserts that the Commission erred in finding that the appeal was lawfully filed because Brown, who fi led Joplin Stone’s notice of appeal to the Commission, was not an officer or full-time manager ial employee of Joplin Stone, and that this attempt at appeal constituted the unauthorized prac tice of law so that any appeal was void. We conclude the Division has no standing to assert this appeal. The parties do not raise the issue of standing, but “[c]ourts have a duty to determine if a party has standing prior to addressing the substantive issues of the case. For this reason, [a challenge to] standing cannot be

waived.” CACH, LLC v. Askew , 358 S.W.3d 58, 61 (Mo. banc 2012) (quoting Farmer v.

Kinder , 89 S.W.3d 447, 451 (Mo. banc 2002)). A party see king relief has the burden to establish that it has standing to maintain its claim. Borges v. Missouri Public Entity Risk Management

Fund , 358 S.W.3d 177, 181 (Mo.App. W.D. 2012). Whether a party has standing is an issue of

law we review de novo

. Manzara v. State , 343 S.W.3d 656, 659 (Mo. banc 2011).

1 Springfield Underground, Inc., is the parent compa ny of Joplin Stone.3

The Division appropriately cites section 288.210 2 as the standard of review before this Court when examining a decision of the Commission. Section 288.210 provides that “the director or any party aggrieved” by a decision of t he Commission may appeal that decision. The key language in this section is that a party must b e “aggrieved” by the decision of the Commission. Here, there is no doubt that the Divis ion is an appropriate party. However, the Division has not been aggrieved by this decision.

In Bydalek v. Brines , 29 S.W.3d 848 (Mo.App. S.D. 2000), this Court not ed that a party is “aggrieved” when the judgment operates prejudicially and direct ly on a party’s personal or property rights or interests and such effect is an immediate and not merely a possible remote consequence. . . . [A]n examinatio n of the whole body of case law on this subject impels the conclusion that whet her or not a [party] is ‘aggrieved’ may not be determined by application of any definition or formula but depends upon the circumstances of the particular si tuation at hand.

Id. at 852 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (footnote omitted) (alternation in original). Here, the Division has urged us to conclude that i t has standing to pursue this appeal, and is aggrieved because it must dismiss appeals if the y are not presented appropriately by a licensed attorney or a representative. 3 The Division takes this position although Rule 5. 29(c) 4 provides: In any employment security proceeding before the s tate division of employment security, a corporation, partnership or other business entity authorized by law may be represented by an officer of the entity or a person in the full time employment of the entity in a managerial capacity who shall be afforded the opportunity to participate in the proceeding. Rule 5.29(c).

2 All references to statutes are to RSMo 2000, unles s otherwise indicated.

3 While not decisive here, we note that our Supreme Court has held that the representation of a party b y a nonlawyer in an unemployment compensation claim is not jurisdictional, and any objection to the represent ation not timely levied and preserved is waived. Haggard v. Division of Employment Sec. , 238 S.W.3d 151, 157 (Mo. banc 2007).

4 All rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2 014).4

The Division’s contention is not to vindicate a ri ght it has as a party. Instead, the Division argues that this appeal was lodged to purp ortedly protect attorneys employed by the Division from anticipated discipline by the Office of the Disciplinary Counsel. However, the Division fails to cite authority or otherwise persu ade us that it has standing to assert an interest that only affects the adjudicative personnel who de cide unemployment claims. During oral argument, counsel for the Division admitted there w ere other alternatives to accomplish that function as opposed to an appeal as presented by th is record.

We find the Division has no stake in this outcome and is not aggrieved by this decision. 5 The Division has no standing. Appeal dismissed.

WILLIAM W. FRANCIS, JR., C.J./P.J. – OPINION AUTHOR JEFFREY W. BATES, J. – Concurs DANIEL E. SCOTT, J. – Concurs

5 If we were to entertain the Division’s appeal on i ts merit, the record discloses that a lawful appeal was presented. The Claimant, who received his unemployment benefit s and did not file an appeal here, testified that B rown was Joplin Stone’s human resources manager, he was disc harged by her, and other substantial evidence was p resented that she was engaged to perform, or assist in perfo rming, her work for Joplin Stone in a managerial ca pacity.