Present: Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and Lemons, 

JJ., and Stephenson, S.J. 

VAUGHN, INC. 

v. Record No. 003042 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 

 November 2, 2001 

HOWARD J. BECK, JR., ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROANOKE COUNTY 

J. Howe Brown, Jr., Judge Designate 

 In this appeal, we consider the issue whether under Code 

§ 55-70.1, a purchaser of a new home is required to notify the 

builder of a defect in construction within the statutory 

warranty period before bringing an action against the builder 

for breach of that warranty. 

 Howard J. Beck, Jr., and his wife, Lauren S. Beck 

(collectively, the Becks), entered into a contract with Vaughn, 

Inc. (Vaughn) to purchase certain real estate, including a house 

and a well, in a residential development in Roanoke County. The 

Becks obtained title and took possession of the property on 

December 9, 1996. 

 Within one year of that date, the Becks began to experience 

problems with an inadequate flow of water from their well. As a 

result of the inadequate water flow, the Becks did not have 

sufficient water to perform routine household functions, such as 

washing dishes, washing clothes, and bathing. In addition, the 

Becks were not able to provide water for their lawn and 
shrubbery. Because of the inadequate water flow, the Becks were 

required to dig and install a second well. 

 The Becks did not notify Vaughn of their difficulties with 

the original well because they thought that the problem was 

caused by a faulty water pump, which Vaughn would not have been 

obligated to correct. At a later date, however, the Becks 

concluded that Vaughn was responsible for correcting the defect 

in the well, but they took no action to notify Vaughn of the 

defect. 

 On December 7, 1998, within two years of the date that the 

Becks obtained title and took possession of the property, they 

filed a motion for judgment in the trial court against Vaughn. 

The Becks alleged that the defect in the well installed by 

Vaughn was caused by Vaughn's failure to drill, construct, and 

prepare the well in a workmanlike manner, free from structural 

defects. The Becks asserted, among other things, that based on 

Vaughn's actions and omissions regarding the well, Vaughn 

breached the statutory warranty for new dwellings provided by 

Code § 55-70.1. 

 Vaughn filed an answer in which he admitted that "[t]he 

warranties given are the statutory warranties" under Code § 55-

70.1. However, Vaughn denied any breach of those warranties and 

asserted as an affirmative defense the Becks' failure to provide 

Vaughn notice of the defect within the one-year statutory 

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warranty period. In response, the Becks conceded that they had 

not given Vaughn notice of the defect within one year from the 

date on which they obtained title to the property and took 

possession of the dwelling. 

 In a preliminary ruling, the trial court addressed Vaughn's 

affirmative defense and held that 

[i]n accordance with rules of statutory construction, 

the Court looks to the plain meaning of the language 

of the statute. The statute does not require notice 

to the builder or vendor. In other statutes the 

legislature has required notice. . . . If notice of 

breach by the buyer is required in every case, there 

would be no reason for the legislature or the 

contractor to specify a notice provision in certain 

cases. 

 The case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury returned a 

verdict in favor of the Becks in the amount of $20,000, and the 

trial court entered judgment in accordance with the verdict. 

Vaughn appeals from this judgment. 

 Vaughn argues that Code § 55-70.1 required the Becks to 

give Vaughn notice of the defect in the well within the one-year 

statutory warranty period as a condition precedent to 

maintaining an action against Vaughn for breach of the statutory 

warranty. Vaughn asserts that a notice requirement is implied 

from the statutory language, and that a contrary result would be 

unreasonable because it would deprive a builder of the 

opportunity to determine whether a homeowner’s claim for damages 

has any merit. Vaughn also contends that in Davis v. Tazewell 

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Place Associates, 254 Va. 257, 492 S.E.2d 162 (1997), this Court 

recognized a builder’s right under Code § 55-70.1 to receive 

such notice of a defect that forms the basis of an action for 

breach of the statutory warranty. We disagree with Vaughn’s 

arguments. 

 Under basic rules of statutory construction, we examine the 

language of Code § 55-70.1 in its entirety and determine the 

intent of the General Assembly from the words contained in the 

statute, unless a literal construction of the statute would 

yield an absurd result. Cummings v. Fulghum, 261 Va. 73, 77, 540 

S.E.2d 494, 496 (2001); Earley v. Landsidle, 257 Va. 365, 369, 

514 S.E.2d 153, 155 (1999). When the language of a statute is 

plain and unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning of that 

language. Cummings, 261 Va. at 77, 540 S.E.2d at 496; Earley, 

257 Va. at 370, 514 S.E.2d at 155; Ragan v. Woodcroft Vill. 

Apartments, 255 Va. 322, 326, 497 S.E.2d 740, 742 (1998). Thus, 

when the General Assembly has used words of a plain and definite 

import, courts cannot place on them a construction that amounts 

to holding that the General Assembly meant something other than 

that which it actually expressed. See Advanced Marine Enters., 

Inc. v. PRC Inc., 256 Va. 106, 125, 501 S.E.2d 148, 159 (1998); 

Abbott v. Willey, 253 Va. 88, 91, 479 S.E.2d 528, 530 (1997). 

We also consider the fact that Code § 55-70.1 is a statute 

in derogation of the common law. At common law, a purchaser of 

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a dwelling did not acquire an implied warranty in conjunction 

with the sale of that dwelling. Davis., 254 Va. at 261, 492 

S.E.2d at 164; see Bruce Farms, Inc. v. Coupe, 219 Va. 287, 289, 

247 S.E.2d 400, 402 (1978). Because Code § 55-70.1 changed the 

common law by creating certain statutory warranties, those 

warranties are limited to the provisions expressly stated in the 

statute or necessarily implied by its language. See Mitchem v. 

Counts, 259 Va. 179, 186, 523 S.E.2d 246, 250 (2000); Boyd v. 

Commonwealth, 236 Va. 346, 349, 374 S.E.2d 301, 302 (1988). 

 Code § 55-70.1 provides, in relevant part: 

B. In addition, in every contract for the sale of a 

new dwelling, the vendor, if he is in the business of 

building or selling such dwellings, shall be held to 

warrant to the vendee that, at the time of transfer of 

record title or the vendee's taking possession, 

whichever occurs first, the dwelling together with all 

its fixtures is sufficiently (i) free from structural 

defects, so as to pass without objection in the trade, 

(ii) constructed in a workmanlike manner, so as to 

pass without objection in the trade, and (iii) fit for 

habitation. 

. . . . 

D. If there is a breach of warranty under this 

section, the vendee, or his heirs or personal 

representatives in case of his death, shall have a 

cause of action against his vendor for damages. 

E. The warranty shall extend for a period of one year 

from the date of transfer of record title or the 

vendee's taking possession, whichever occurs first, 

except that the warranty pursuant to subdivision (i) 

of subsection B for the foundation of new dwellings 

shall extend for a period of five years from the date 

of transfer of record title or the vendee's taking 

possession, whichever occurs first. Any action for 

its breach shall be brought within two years after the 

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breach thereof. As used in this section, the term 

"new dwelling" shall mean a dwelling or house which 

has not previously been occupied for a period of more 

than sixty days by anyone other than the vendor or the 

vendee or which has not been occupied by the original 

vendor or subsequent vendor for a cumulative period of 

more than twelve months excluding dwellings 

constructed solely for lease. The term "new dwelling" 

shall not include a condominium or condominium units 

created pursuant to Chapter 4.2 (§ 55-79.39 et seq.) 

of this title. 

 We conclude that the language of Code § 55-70.1 plainly 

does not require the purchaser of a new dwelling to give notice 

of a defect in construction to the builder within the one-year 

statutory warranty period as a prerequisite for bringing a 

breach of warranty action under the statute based on that 

defect. Subsection (D) of Code § 55-70.1 provides the purchaser 

of a new dwelling a cause of action against the builder for a 

breach of the warranty created by the statute. Subsection (E) 

of the statute provides that the warranty shall extend for a 

period of one year from the date that record title is 

transferred to the purchaser, or the date that the purchaser 

takes possession of the property, whichever occurs first. Any 

action for such breach of warranty must be brought within two 

years after the breach occurs. Id. Thus, a breach by the 

builder, not a tendering of notice, is the only condition that 

the statute imposes for bringing an action against that builder 

within two years of the date of the breach. 

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 The contrary statutory interpretation advanced by Vaughn 

would require us to add new language to the statute. We reject 

that interpretation because, in the absence of a specific notice 

requirement, we may not construe the statute’s plain language in 

a manner that amounts to holding that the General Assembly meant 

to add a requirement to the statute that it did not actually 

express. See Advanced Marine Enters., Inc., 256 Va. at 125, 501 

S.E.2d at 159; Haislip v. Southern Heritage Ins. Co., 254 Va. 

265, 268, 492 S.E.2d 135, 137 (1997). 

 We also disagree with Vaughn's assertion that our decision 

in Davis implicitly recognized a notice requirement under Code 

§ 55-70.1. The issue presented and decided in Davis was whether 

the defendant builder had met its burden of proving that the 

plaintiffs' cause of action was barred by the two-year statute 

of limitations in Code § 55-70.1. 254 Va. at 260-61, 492 S.E.2d 

at 164. We did not consider the question whether notice by a 

purchaser is an element of a cause of action under Code § 55-

70.1. 

 The facts in Davis involved purchasers who, after buying a 

new house, observed various defects in the dwelling. Although 

not required by Code § 55-70.1 to do so, the purchasers provided 

the builder notice of those defects. Id. at 259, 492 S.E.2d at 

163. We stated that when a purchaser notifies the builder of 

any defect covered by the statutory warranty within the one-year 

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warranty period, and the builder does not remedy that defect, 

the purchaser may file an action against the builder within two 

years from the date that the notice was given. Id. at 261, 492 

S.E.2d at 164. 

 We held that the defendants failed to prove that the 

statute of limitations had expired before the plaintiffs filed 

their action. Id. Incorporated in this holding was the fact 

that the purchasers gave notice to the builder within the 

statutory warranty period. See id. Thus, our decision in Davis

is limited to this factual context and does not impose a notice 

requirement under Code § 55-70.1. 

Nevertheless, as Vaughn observes, our interpretation of 

Code § 55-70.1 in Davis may have the effect of permitting an 

extension of the statute of limitations in cases when a 

purchaser has provided timely notice of a construction defect to 

the builder. This potential result, however, cannot be remedied 

through judicial construction by imposing a notice requirement 

that effectively would add new language to the statute. Any 

such change to the statute must be a legislative, rather than a 

judicial, undertaking. See Advanced Marine Enters., Inc., 256 

Va. at 125, 501 S.E.2d at 159; Abbott, 253 Va. at 91, 479 S.E.2d 

at 530. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court correctly 

held that Code § 55-70.1 does not impose a notice requirement as 

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a prerequisite for maintaining an action for breach of the 

statutory warranty. 

 For these reasons, we will affirm the trial court's 

judgment. 

Affirmed.

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