alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1


CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER


Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





I, David C. Rupert, certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:


|    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
|--- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|(i) | The Annual Report on Form 10-K of Griffin-Benefit Street Partners BDC Corp. (the “Company”) for the annual period ended December 31, 2016 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m); and

|     |                                                                                                                                                     
|---- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|(ii) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated:March 31, 2017By:/s/ David C. RupertDavid C. RupertChief Executive Officer(Principal Executive Officer)
I 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 7242 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow certain areas affected 

by certain Federally declared disasters to be designated as opportunity zones. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 10, 2018 

Mr. MEADOWS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow certain areas affected by certain Federally declared disasters to be designated as opportunity zones. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Disaster Recovery and 

5 Opportunity Act of 2018’’. 

6 SEC. 2. TREATMENT AS OPPORTUNITY ZONES. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 1400Z–1 of the Internal 

8 Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end 

9 the following new subsection: 

10 ‘‘(g) CERTAIN DISASTER ZONES.— 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 7242 IH

1 ‘‘(1) DESIGNATION.—With respect to a Feder2 ally declared disaster, the chief executive officer of 

3 a State may designate under this paragraph not 

4 more than 5 percent of the applicable disaster tracts 

5 in such State with respect to such disaster. 

6 ‘‘(2) NO EFFECT ON LIMITATION ON NUMBER

7 OF DESIGNATIONS.—An applicable disaster tract 

8 designated under paragraph (1) shall not be taken 

9 into account in determining the limitation under 

10 subsection (d). 

11 ‘‘(3) APPLICABLE DISASTER TRACT.—The term 

12 ‘applicable disaster tract’ means, with respect to a 

13 Federally declared disaster, a population census 

14 tract in the disaster area related to such disaster. 

15 ‘‘(4) FEDERALLY DECLARED DISASTER; DIS16 ASTER AREA.—In this subsection, the term ‘Feder17 ally declared disaster’ and the term ‘disaster area’ 

18 have the meaning given such terms in section 165(i). 

19 ‘‘(5) APPLICABLE START DATE.— 

20 ‘‘(A) QUALIFIED OPPORTUNITY FUND

21 BUSINESSES AND PROPERTY.—In the case of an 

22 applicable disaster tract designated under para23 graph (1), subparagraphs (B)(i)(I), (C)(i), and 

24 (D)(i)(I) of section 1400Z–2(d)(2) shall each be 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 7242 IH

1 applied by substituting ‘the applicable start 

2 date’ for ‘December 31, 2017’. 

3 ‘‘(B) EXTENSION OF DETERMINATION PE4 RIOD.—In the case of an applicable disaster 

5 tract designated under paragraph (1), section 

6 (c)(2)(B) shall be applied by substituting ‘the 

7 applicable start date’ for ‘the date of the enact8 ment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act’. 

9 ‘‘(C) APPLICABLE START DATE.—The term 

10 ‘applicable start date’ means, with respect to a 

11 disaster area, the earliest incident date specified 

12 in the declaration to which such area relates.’’. 

13 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

14 this section shall apply with respect to Federally declared 

15 disasters declared after the date of the enactment of this 

16 Act. 

Æ 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
#### STATE ex rel. William JOURNEE v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-0661.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 1, 2011.

In re Journee, William; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. 2, No. 06-03-*1242407; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KW 1820.

Denied.
NO. 12-21-00142-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

RODNEY RAY, 

APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE

§

§

§

APPEAL FROM THE 173RD 

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

HENDERSON COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM

Appellant, Rodney Lamont Ray, filed a motion to dismiss this appeal. The motion is 

signed by Appellant and his counsel. No decision has been delivered in this appeal.

Accordingly, Appellant’s motion to dismiss is granted, and the appeal is dismissed. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 42.2(a).

Opinion delivered October 20, 2021.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)
COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

OCTOBER 20, 2021

NO. 12-21-00142-CR

RODNEY RAY,

Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

Appeal from the 173rd District Court

of Henderson County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. CR16-0742-173)

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the motion of the Appellant to dismiss 

the appeal herein, and the same being considered, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and 

DECREED by this Court that the motion to dismiss be granted and the appeal be dismissed, and 

that the decision be certified to the court below for observance.

By per curiam opinion. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J. and Neeley, J.
##### 



EXHIBIT 23.1 Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm The Board of Directors
Plumtree Software, Inc.: We consent to the incorporation by reference in the
registration statements (Nos. 333-89766, 333-102520, 333-112095,
333-114100 and 333-122535) on Form S-8 of Plumtree Software, Inc. of our
reports dated March 7, 2005, with respect to the consolidated balance
sheets of Plumtree Software, Inc. and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2004
and 2003 and the related consolidated statements of operations,
stockholders equity and comprehensive income (loss), and cash flows for
each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2004, and
the related managements assessment of the effectiveness of internal
control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2004 and the
effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting as of December
31, 2004, which reports appear in the December 31, 2004 annual report on
Form 10-K of Plumtree Software, Inc. /s/ KPMG LLP
Mountain View, California
March 11, 2005
#### State of Indiana, Alcoholic Beverage Commission *v.*Blake.

[No. 19,831.

Filed February 25, 1963.]

*349
      *Edwin K. Steers,*Attorney General, *Harold Kohlmeyer*and *Paul H. Frazier,*Deputy Attorneys General, for appellant.

*Kelley, Arnold & Kelley*and *Vincent Kelley,*of Anderson, for appellees.

Ryan, J.

The appellee filed his application on Form 9 for workmen’s compensation for injuries which allegedly were occasioned while the appellee was in the employment of the appellant, Appellant filed a special answer, which in substance alleges that the appellee was intoxicated at the time of the accident and that such intoxication, with the resulting impairment of his faculties, was the proximate cause of the accident. A hearing was had before a single member of the Board, and compensation was awarded. The appellant filed its application for a review by the Full Board, and the Full Board affirmed the award of compensation. From such award the appellant now appeals.

Appellant’s argument is twofold, one being that the only issue of fact for determination was whether or not the appellee was intoxicated at the time of the accident, and that the Board failed to make a specific finding on such question, and secondly, that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain such award.

As to appellant’s first contention, the Board included in its finding the following language:

> “It is further found that at the time of the said accidental injury the plaintiff was not intoxicated . . . ”.

*350
      *349Appellant urges, however, that it was necessary for the Board to determine in their own minds the *350amount of alcohol which had been consumed by the appellee, and since they would have to determine this question in their own minds that determination should be included in the finding upon which they based their award. The requirement on the Board to make findings serves the purpose of enabling the court on review to determine if there was proper foundation for the award. To a great extent our courts have perhaps not required the precision in such findings which might be desirable. See Small’s *Workmen’s Compensation Law of Indiana,*§12.7.

However, in this particular instance it seems only reasonable that the finding by the Board that the appellee was not intoxicated sufficiently covers the subject, and we see no compelling reason to require the Board to spell out each and every separate and specific evidentiary fact which led to its finding of the ultimate fact that appellee was not intoxicated. *Sollitt Construction Co. Inc.*v. *Walker et al.*(1956), 127 Ind. App. 213, 135 N. E. 2d 623.

As to the appellant’s second contention, that the evidence does not sustain such award, a recitation of such evidence would serve no great purpose and would merely prolong this opinion. Suffice it to say that a rather careful study does not compel us to reverse such award, since the evidence was in conflict and there is competent evidence, in our opinion, to support such award.

The award of the Board is therefore affirmed.

Cooper, C. J., and Carson and Clements, JJ., concur.

Note. — Reported in 188 N. E. 2d 116.
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1503 Engrossed in House (EH)]

  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1503

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
     To amend the Reclamation Wastewater and Groundwater Study and 
     Facilities Act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to 
participate in the Avra/Black Wash Reclamation and Riparian Restoration 
                                Project.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Avra/Black Wash Reclamation and 
Riparian Restoration Project''.

SEC. 2. PROJECT AUTHORIZATION.

    (a) In General.--The Reclamation Wastewater and Groundwater Study 
and Facilities Act (Public Law 102-575, title XVI; 43 U.S.C. 390h et 
seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

``SEC. 16__. AVRA/BLACK WASH RECLAMATION AND RIPARIAN RESTORATION 
              PROJECT, PIMA COUNTY, ARIZONA.

    ``(a) Authorization.--The Secretary, in cooperation with Pima 
County, Arizona, may participate in the planning, design, and 
construction of water recycling facilities and to enhance and restore 
riparian habitat in the Black Wash Sonoran Desert ecosystem in Avra 
Valley west of the metropolitan Pima County area.
    ``(b) Cost Sharing.--The Federal share of the cost of the project 
described in subsection (a) shall not exceed 25 percent of the cost of 
the project.
    ``(c) Limitation.--Federal funds provided under this section shall 
not be used for operation or maintenance of the project described in 
subsection (a).
    ``(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated to carry out this section $14,000,000.
    ``(e) Use of Funds.--Federal funds provided under this section 
shall only be used for the design, planning and construction of water-
related infrastructure.''.
    (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for Public Law 102-
575 is amended by inserting after the last item relating to title XVI 
the following:

``Sec. 16__. Avra/Black Wash Reclamation and Riparian Restoration 
                            Project, Pima County, Arizona.''.

            Passed the House of Representatives July 23, 2007.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
110th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                               H. R. 1503

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

     To amend the Reclamation Wastewater and Groundwater Study and 
     Facilities Act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to 
participate in the Avra/Black Wash Reclamation and Riparian Restoration 
                                Project.
```
#### D.C.H., A Child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D09-4585.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Aug. 20, 2010.

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Noel A. Pelella, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Ann M. Phillips, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appel-lee.

SAWAYA, J.

The appellant, a child, appeals the restitution order rendered by the trial court. Prior to rendition of that order, the appellant filed a notice of appeal seeking review of his adjudication of delinquency. Thereafter, and prior to issuance of the mandate in that appeal, the trial court entered the order that is the subject of the instant appeal. Both the appellee and the appellant agree that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter the restitution order, and they further agree that the order must be reversed and the case remanded to allow the trial court to conduct another hearing to determine restitution.

Based on the concession of the parties and our review of the record, we reverse the restitution order and remand this case to the trial court for another restitution hearing. *See Renfroe v. State,*20 So.3d 1027, 1027 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (“The State correctly concedes that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter this order because Mr. Renfroe already had filed his notice of appeal from the judgments and sentences. ‘A trial court does not have jurisdiction to hold a restitution hearing or enter an order of restitution after a notice of appeal has been filed, even though the trial court may have previously ordered restitution and reserved jurisdiction only as to the amount.’” (quoting *Pearson v. State,*686 So.2d 721, 721 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997))); *Jenkins v. State,*954 So.2d 738, 738 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (“A party’s filing of a notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction to enter a restitution order.”).

REVERSED and REMANDED.

GRIFFIN and PALMER, JJ., concur.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Stephen J. Markman

, Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen

Kurtis T. Wilder,

Justices 

# Order

July 25, 2017

154631(55)

JOHN DOE 11, JOHN DOE 12, JOHN DOE 13,

JOHN DOE 14, JOHN DOE 15, JOHN DOE 16,

JOHN DOE 17, JOHN DOE 18, and JANE

DOE 1, on behalf of themselves and a class o f all

others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs

- Appellees,

v SC: 154631

COA: 332260

Washtenaw CC: 13

- 001196

- CZ

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

DIRECTOR OF MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR

OF MDOC CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES

ADMINISTRATION, FORMER DEPUTY

DIRECTOR OF MDOC CORRECTIONAL

FACILITIES ADMINISTRATION, CHIEF

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF MDOC

CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES

ADMINISTRATION, WARDEN OF CARSON

CITY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, WARDEN

OF CHARLES EGELER RECEPTION AND

GUIDANCE CENTER, WARDEN OF

EARNEST C. BROOKS CORRECTIONAL

FACILITY, WARDEN OF GUS HARRISON

CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, WARDEN OF

RICHARD A. HANDLON CORRECTIONAL

FACILITY, WARDEN OF OAKS

CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, WARDEN OF

THUMB CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,

WARDEN OF CHIPPEWA CORRECTIONAL

FACILITY, WARDEN OF MARQUETTE

BRANCH PRISON, WARDEN OF BELLAMY

CREEK CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, WARDEN

OF KINROSS CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,

WARDEN OF NEWBERRY CORRECTIONAL

FACILITY, WARDEN OF MICHIGAN

REFORMATORY, and W ARDEN OF

SAGINAW CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,

Defendants

- Appellants.

_________________________________________/I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

July 25, 2017

d0717 2

Clerk On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s April 4, 2017

order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was

entered erroneously.
#### Ross, Inc. *v.*Legler et al.

[No. 19,952.

Filed March 28, 1963.]

*D. Bailey Merrill*and *J. William Kleindorfer,*both of Evansville, for appellant.

*Willaim P. Foreman, Joe S. Hatfield, John G. Bunner,*and *F. Wendell Lensing,*all of Evansville, for appellees.

On Motion to Dismiss or Affirm

Cooper, C. J.

This matter is now before us on the motion and petition of appellees to dismiss or in the alternative to affirm and to transfer this appeal to the Supreme Court of Indiana.

It appears from the record now before us that this is an action brought by one of the appellees, namely, Evansville School Corporation, against the appellant, Ross, Inc., and other appellees herein for the condemnation of real estate for school purposes.

It affirmatively appears that the appellee’s motion and petition are based entirely upon the theory that this cause was a condemnation proceeding for the *415appropriation of land for public use, and that the Supreme Court of Indiana has exclusive jurisdiction of all appeals for condemnation proceedings.

In reviewing §4-214, Burns’ Ind. Stat. Anno., the pertinent statute involved herein, we find the following pertinent provision:

> “Hereafter all appeals in appealable cases in the following classes shall be taken directly to the Supreme Court, viz.: . . .

> “Seventh. Condemnation proceedings for the appropriation of lands for public use. . . .”

In construing the foregoing statute, our court held, in substance, that prior to the 1907 amendment, jurisdiction of appeals in condemnation proceedings was in the Appellate Court; however, after the 1907 amendment, all appeals in condemnation proceedings for the apportionment of public lands for public use should be taken directly to the Supreme Court of Indiana. See *Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co.*v. *Darling et al.*(1958), 128 Ind. App. 456, 149 N. E. 2d 702.

By reason of what we have heretofore stated, we are of the opinion that this court has no jurisdiction of this appeal, except to transfer the same to the Supreme Court of Indiana, pursuant to §4-217, Burns’ Ind. Stat. Anno., and Rule 2-41 of the Supreme Court.

This appeal is now ordered transferred to the Supreme Court of Indiana.

Note. — Reported in 188 N. E. 2d 920.
This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports.

Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum

opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain

computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of

Appeals and does not include the filing date. 

1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 WM SPECIALTY MORTGAGE, LLC,

3 Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellee,

4 v. No. 35,166

5 GREG JOHNSON, a/k/a 

6 GREGORY P. JOHNSON; and

7 OLGA JOHNSON, 

8 Defendants/Counterclaimants-Appellants,

9 and

10 HOME LOAN SERVICES, INC.,

11 f/k/a NATIONAL CITY MORTGAGE CO.,

12 Defendants,

13 and

14 GREG JOHNSON and OLGA JOHNSON,

15 Third-Party Plaintiffs, 

16 v. 

17 ACCREDITED HOME LENDERS, INC.; 

18 NATIONWIDE CREDIT, INC.;

19 BANK OF AMERICA HOME LOANS;
2

1 WM SPECIALTY MORTGAGE, LLC;

2 NATIONAL CITY MORTGAGE, INC.;

3 FINANCIAL MORTGAGE GROUP, LLC;

4 and MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 

5 REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., 

6 Third-Party Defendants. 

7 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY

8 Nan G. Nash, District Judge

9 Montgomery & Andrews, P.A.

10 Seth C. McMillan

11 Santa Fe, NM 

12 Quilling, Selander, Lownds Winslett & Moser, P.C.

13 Marcie L. Schout

14 Dallas, TX

15 for Appellee WM Specialty Mortgage, LLC 

16 JRSPC, LLC

17 Joshua R. Simms

18 Albuquerque, NM

19 for Appellants and Third-Party Plaintiffs Greg and Olga Johnson

20 MEMORANDUM OPINION

21 VIGIL, Judge.

22 {1} Summary reversal was proposed for the reasons stated in the notice of proposed

23 summary disposition. No memorandum opposing summary reversal has been filed

24 and the time for doing so has expired.

25 {2} IT IS SO ORDERED.

26 {3} REVERSED.
3

1 __________________________________

2 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge

3 WE CONCUR:

4 ___________________________

5 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge

6 ___________________________

7 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 15

                         ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF INDEPENDENT
                          CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
                REGARDING INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS' REVIEW REPORT

The Board of Directors
Northfield Laboratories Inc.:

With respect to registration statements (Nos. 33-84264, 333-15877, 333-51681,
333-79579, 333-102672, and 333-110110) on Form S-8 and the registration
statement (No. 333-106615) on Form S-3 of Northfield Laboratories Inc., we
acknowledge our awareness of the use therein of our report dated December 29,
2003 related to our review of interim financial information.

Pursuant to Rule 436(C) under the Securities Act of 1933, such report is not
considered to be a part of a registration statement prepared or certified by an
accountant or a report prepared or certified by an accountant within the meaning
of sections 7 and 11 of the Act.

Very truly yours,

/s/ KPMG LLP

Chicago, Illinois
January 13, 2004