1

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A13-0445

Court of Appeals Dietzen, J.

Daniel Garcia-Mendoza,

Appellant,

vs. Filed: August 20, 2014

Office of Appellate Courts

2003 Chevy Tahoe,

Vin #1GNEC13V23R143453,

Plate #235JBM, et al.,

Respondents.

________________________

Kirk M. Anderson, Anderson Law Firm, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant.

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Beverly J. Wolfe, Julie K. Bowman, 

Assistant Hennepin County Attorneys, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondents.

Teresa Nelson, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Peter M. Routhier, Bruce Jones, Faegre Baker Daniels LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for 

amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota.

Katelynn McBride, Anthony B. Sanders, Lee U. McGrath, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for 

amicus curiae Institute for Justice. 

Scott A. Hersey, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota County Attorneys 

Association.

Max A. Keller, Keller Law Offices, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae 

Minnesota Society for Criminal Justice.

________________________
2

S Y L L A B U S

1. Appellant has standing as an aggrieved party to challenge the civil 

forfeiture under Minn. Stat. §§ 609.531-.5319 (2012) because he has a colorable interest 

in the seized property. 

2. The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule adopted by the United States 

Supreme Court to deter future Fourth Amendment violations is applicable to civil 

forfeiture actions brought under Minn. Stat. §§ 609.531-.5319. 

Reversed and remanded.

O P I N I O N

DIETZEN, Justice.

This case presents the issue of whether the exclusionary rule adopted by the 

United States Supreme Court to deter future Fourth Amendment violations is applicable 

to civil forfeiture actions brought under Minn. Stat. §§ 609.531-.5319 (2012). Appellant 

Daniel Garcia-Mendoza was stopped by police officers on suspicion that he did not have 

a valid driver’s license, and was issued a traffic citation. During an inventory search of 

respondent 2003 Chevy Tahoe, 225 grams of methamphetamine were discovered. 

Appellant was charged with first-degree possession of a controlled substance, and 

respondents Tahoe and $611 in cash were seized. Appellant, who was served with notice 

of seizure and intent to forfeit the seized property, filed a civil complaint demanding a 

judicial determination of forfeiture. The district court granted the County’s motion for 

summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the Fourth 
3

Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to civil forfeiture actions. Because we 

conclude that the exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture actions brought under Minn. 

Stat. §§ 609.531-.5319, we reverse and remand to the court of appeals. 

On March 19, 2012, a Plymouth police officer and his partner observed appellant 

in respondent 2003 Chevy Tahoe driving 62-63 miles per hour in a 60 mile-per-hour zone 

on Interstate 94. The officer conducted a registration check on the vehicle and 

discovered that the vehicle was registered to Ricardo Cervantes-Perez,

1

but also 

determined there was no driver’s license information associated with the registered 

vehicle. Based upon his experience, the officer concluded that it was likely the driver of 

the vehicle did not have a valid driver’s license. Consequently, the officer stopped the 

Tahoe and asked appellant for his driver’s license. Appellant gave him a Mexican ID 

card that identified him as Ricardo Cervantes-Perez and admitted he did not have a 

Minnesota driver’s license. The other officer spoke with the passenger and learned that 

the passenger did not have a driver’s license. 

Appellant was issued a citation for driving without a Minnesota driver’s license. 

The officer decided to have the vehicle towed because neither occupant could lawfully 

drive the vehicle, and the location of the vehicle created a potential traffic hazard. The 

other officer conducted an inventory search of the vehicle and found a crystal-like 

substance inside a container that he recognized as methamphetamine. The substance later 

tested positive as 225.9 grams of methamphetamine. Appellant and his passenger were 

 

1 Ricardo Cervantes-Perez is an alias of appellant. 
4

arrested and searched, and the officers found $611 in cash on appellant. The Tahoe and 

cash were seized, and appellant was later served with notice and intent to forfeit the 

seized property. The State charged appellant with first-degree possession of a controlled 

substance in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(a)(1) (2012). Appellant 

subsequently filed a civil forfeiture complaint in state district court demanding a judicial 

determination of the forfeiture of the Tahoe and the $611 pursuant to Minn. Stat. 

§ 609.5314, subd. 3. The complaint was stayed pending resolution of appellant’s 

criminal charges. 

In May 2012, appellant was indicted in federal court on three counts alleging that 

appellant distributed methamphetamine on three different occasions from November 2, 

2011, to February 1, 2012; and a fourth count alleging that appellant possessed with the 

intent to distribute methamphetamine on March 19, 2012. The fourth count arose out of 

the incident that resulted in appellant’s arrest and the seizure of the property that is the 

subject of this appeal.2 Appellant moved to suppress the evidence seized on March 19 on 

the ground that the stop and search of his vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment’s 

prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. United States v. CervantesPerez, No. 12cr133, 2012 WL 3288674, at *4 (D. Minn. July 23, 2012). The magistrate 

judge denied the motion, id., and the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report 

and recommendation, United States v. Cervantes-Perez, No. 12-133, 2012 WL 3288946, 

at *1 (D. Minn. Aug. 10, 2012). Appellant subsequently pleaded guilty to and was 

 

2 As a result of the federal indictment, the State dismissed its criminal complaint 

against appellant. 
5

convicted of count two of the federal indictment, which involved the distribution of 

controlled substances on December 22, 2011. The other three counts were dismissed. As 

part of the plea agreement, appellant agreed to: 

[F]orfeit any and all property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds 

[he] obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of [his] violation, as well 

as any and all of [his] property used, or intended to be used, in any manner 

or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of [his] violation.

The County subsequently moved for summary judgment in the state forfeiture 

action. Appellant countered that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies to civil 

forfeiture actions, and that the evidence supporting forfeiture was illegally obtained and 

must be suppressed. The district court rejected appellant’s argument and granted the 

motion, reasoning that appellant agreed in the plea agreement to forfeit the property and 

that 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (2012) (authorizing criminal forfeiture “to the United States”),

required forfeiture of the vehicle and cash. The court observed in dictum that if the 

legality of the stop and seizure was an issue, the court would have suppressed the 

evidence obtained on the ground that “there was neither a reasonable or articulable 

suspicion for the [March 19] stop, nor a legitimate basis for the expansion of it.” 

The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to 

the County, but on different grounds. Garcia-Mendoza v. 2003 Chevy Tahoe, No. A13-

0445, 2013 WL 6152304, at *4 (Minn. App. Nov. 25, 2013). Prior to oral argument, the 

court of appeals struck the federal court orders denying appellant’s motion to suppress on 

the ground that the state district court had concluded the stop and search of appellant’s 

vehicle was unconstitutional, and the County had failed to file a notice of related appeal 
6

to preserve that issue on appeal. Garcia-Mendoza v. 2003 Chevy Tahoe, No. A13-0445, 

Order at 3 (Minn. App. filed Oct. 1, 2013). But the court denied appellant’s motion to 

strike a collateral estoppel argument asserted by the County, concluding that the issue 

was properly before it. Id. at 3-4. Ultimately, the court rejected appellant’s argument 

that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule was applicable to civil forfeiture actions

and affirmed summary judgment in favor of the County. Garcia-Mendoza, 2013 WL 

6152304, at *4. The court reasoned that the property was presumed to be forfeited under 

Minn. Stat. § 609.5314, subd. 1(a)(1)(i), and that appellant failed to rebut the 

presumption. Id. at *3-5. 

We granted review on the issue of whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 

rule applies to civil forfeiture actions brought under Minn. Stat. §§ 609.531-.5319.

3

 

I.

Initially, the County argues that appellant lacks standing to challenge the forfeiture 

because he forfeited all of his right, title, and interest in the property when he pleaded 

guilty and was convicted of count two of the federal indictment. Appellant counters that, 

regardless of his guilty plea, it is undisputed that he was the registered owner of the 

Tahoe and was in possession of the vehicle and cash at the time of the seizure. 

 

3

The County opposed review and requested conditional cross-review, arguing the 

court of appeals erred in (1) failing to take judicial notice of the federal district court’s 

order that the March 19 stop and search was lawful; and (2) failing to conclude that

appellant is collaterally estopped from relitigating the legality of the March 19 stop and 

search. We denied the County’s petition for conditional cross-review. 
7

 Standing is a jurisdictional issue that may be raised at any time. Marine Credit 

Union v. Detlefson-Delano, 830 N.W.2d 859, 864 n.3 (Minn. 2013). The lack of standing 

bars consideration of a claim by the court. In re Custody of D.T.R., 796 N.W.2d 509, 512 

(Minn. 2011). The standing doctrine requires that a party have a sufficient stake in a 

justiciable controversy to seek relief from a court. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 

731-32 (1972); see also McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing, 808 N.W.2d 331, 338 (Minn. 

2011); In re D.T.R., 796 N.W.2d at 512. Whether a party has standing is a question of 

law that we review de novo. In re D.T.R., 796 N.W.2d at 512; State v. McBride, 666 

N.W.2d 351, 360 (Minn. 2003). Because this case is here on a grant of a summary 

judgment motion, appellant must show that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to 

his standing in order to prevail. See Leamington Co. v. Nonprofits’ Ins. Ass’n, 615 

N.W.2d 349, 354 (Minn. 2000) (concluding that issues of material fact as to plaintiff’s 

standing precluded summary judgment). 

A party may acquire standing either by statute or as an aggrieved party who has 

suffered some injury-in-fact. Marine Credit Union, 830 N.W.2d at 864 n.3; Lorix v. 

Crompton Corp., 736 N.W.2d 619, 624 (Minn. 2007). To demonstrate an injury-in-fact, 

the plaintiff must show “a concrete and particularized invasion of a legally protected 

interest.” In re D.T.R., 796 N.W.2d at 512-13 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Moreover, the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the 

defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. 

v. Static Control Components, Inc., __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014). We may 

examine standing at various stages of the proceeding to determine if a party has standing. 
8

In re D.T.R., 796 N.W.2d at 512. Appellant argues that he was an aggrieved party at the 

time of seizure, and therefore has standing.

It is undisputed that appellant was the registered owner of the Tahoe and was in 

possession of the vehicle and the cash at the time of the March 19 stop. Generally, these 

facts are sufficient to create a colorable claim to the seized property. See United States v. 

$304,980 in U.S. Currency, 732 F.3d 812, 818 (7th Cir. 2013) (concluding that the fact 

that the money was found in the claimant’s possession was sufficient to give him a 

colorable claim to the property and established his standing to contest forfeiture); United 

States v. $557,933.89, More or Less, in U.S. Funds, 287 F.3d 66, 78 (2d Cir. 2002) 

(“[A]n allegation of ownership and some evidence of ownership are together sufficient to 

establish standing to contest a civil forfeiture.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). 

The County relies on 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) to argue that appellant lost title to the 

vehicle and cash by pleading guilty to a drug trafficking charge in federal court. The 

federal statute provides in relevant part: 

All right, title, and interest in property [subject to forfeiture under] this 

section vests in the United States upon the commission of the act giving 

rise to forfeiture under this section. Any such property that is subsequently 

transferred to a person other than the defendant may be the subject of a 

special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter shall be ordered forfeited to the 

United States, unless the transferee establishes in a hearing pursuant to 

subsection (n) of this section that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of 

such property who at the time of purchase was reasonably without cause to 

believe that the property was subject to forfeiture under this section.

21 U.S.C. § 853(c). This portion of the federal forfeiture statute is referred to as the 

“relation-back provision” because it provides that the government’s interest in the 
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property relates back to the date of the criminal offense. See, e.g., Caplin & Drysdale, 

Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 627-28 (1989); United States v. Holy Land 

Found. for Relief and Dev., 722 F.3d 677, 686 n.5 (5th Cir. 2013). 

We have not previously had the opportunity to consider whether the relation-back 

provision of 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) operates to divest an owner of any claim to forfeitable

property on the date of the criminal offense. The courts that have considered the issue 

have concluded that the relation-back provision does not automatically divest an owner of 

any claim to forfeitable property as of the date of the criminal offense and therefore does 

not deprive an owner of standing to later challenge the forfeiture. See United States v. 

500 Delaware St., 868 F. Supp. 513, 518 n.2 (W.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d, 113 F.3d 310 (2d 

Cir. 1997). Instead, those courts have concluded that title vests in the United States “at 

the time of the court-ordered forfeiture and then relates back to the [criminal] act.” 

United States v. Bailey, 419 F.3d 1208, 1213 (11th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added); see also 

United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. 111, 131-32 (1993) (Scalia, J., 

concurring) (stating that the relation-back provision “operates only upon entry of the 

judicial order of forfeiture or condemnation”); Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 25 F.3d 109, 

112 (2d Cir. 1994) (interpreting an identical relation-back provision in the civil forfeiture 

statute and concluding that “the statutory provision cannot serve to transfer ownership of 

the property until there is a final judgment of forfeiture”). Put differently, the relationback provision of 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) is not triggered until there is a court-ordered 

forfeiture of the property, and only after such an order does the statute operate to 
10

establish the government’s interest in the property retroactively to the date of the criminal 

act. 

We conclude that a party is aggrieved and can challenge a civil forfeiture under 

Minn. Stat. §§ 609.531-.5319 when the party has a colorable interest in the seized 

property. It is undisputed that when the police seized the vehicle and cash, appellant was 

not only the registered owner of the vehicle, but also had physical possession of the 

vehicle and cash. Based upon these undisputed facts, appellant has established that he 

has a colorable interest in the seized property sufficient to establish standing to challenge 

civil forfeiture. The United States government has a potential interest in the property 

pursuant to appellant’s plea agreement. But that interest does not become effective for 

purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) until the federal court issues a forfeiture order. Here,

there is nothing in the record indicating that the federal court issued a forfeiture order

vesting retroactive title to the seized property in the United States government.

4

 

Consequently, appellant has standing to challenge the County’s forfeiture of the vehicle 

and cash. 

II.

Appellant and several amici5rely upon One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania

(Plymouth Sedan), 380 U.S. 693 (1965), to argue that the Fourth Amendment 

 

4

The parties agreed at oral argument that no federal court forfeiture order has been 

issued. 

5

These amici include American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota, Institute for 

Justice, and Minnesota Society for Criminal Justice.
11

exclusionary rule should apply to civil forfeiture actions brought under Minn. Stat. 

§§ 609.531-.5319. The County and amicus Minnesota County Attorneys Association 

respond that Plymouth Sedan is not controlling because subsequent decisions of the 

United States Supreme Court have implicitly overruled it. 

Whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture 

actions is a legal question that we review de novo. See McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing, 

831 N.W.2d 518, 521 (Minn. 2013). To resolve this issue, we will first provide an 

overview of the controlled-substance forfeiture statutes and then examine the 

applicability of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to this civil forfeiture action.

When property has been used to facilitate drug trafficking or the property

represents proceeds from such trafficking, that property is subject to forfeiture. Minn.

Stat. § 609.5311, subds. 2(a), 4(b).

6 A civil forfeiture action under Minn. Stat. 

§§ 609.531-5319 is an in rem action, generally independent of any criminal prosecution. 

Minn. Stat. § 609.531, subd. 6a(a). When property used to facilitate drug trafficking or 

representing proceeds from drug trafficking is seized, a person claiming an interest in the

property may file a demand for a judicial determination of the forfeiture. Minn. Stat. 

§ 609.5314, subd. 3(a)-(b). The prosecuting agency seeking to forfeit property benefits 

from an evidentiary presumption that money “found in proximity” to controlled 

 

6 Minnesota’s civil forfeiture statutes were significantly revised during the 

pendency of this appeal. Act of May 6, 2014, ch. 201, 2014 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 378, 

378-80 (West) (to be codified at Minn. Stat. §§ 609.531, subd. 6a, 609.5314, subd. 3, 

609.5316, subd. 3, 609.5318, subd. 1 (2014)). Because these amendments do not take 

effect until August 1, 2014, they are not applicable to this proceeding. Id. 
12

substances and motor vehicles containing felony-level amounts of controlled substances

are subject to forfeiture. Minn. Stat. § 609.5314, subd. 1(a)(1)(i), subd. 2. A claimant of 

the money or vehicle bears the burden to rebut this presumption by producing sufficient 

evidence that (1) he or she owns the property; and (2) the property is not connected to 

drug trafficking. Jacobson v. $55,900 in U.S. Currency, 728 N.W.2d 510, 522 (Minn. 

2007); see also Minn. Stat. § 609.531, subd. 6a(c). 

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 

10, of the Minnesota Constitution protect the “right of the people to be secure in their 

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” by the 

government. When evidence is seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the United 

States Supreme Court has determined that the evidence is generally subject to 

suppression in order to deter future Fourth Amendment violations. See Davis v. United 

States, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011). Thus, the Court has established an 

exclusionary rule that, when applicable, forbids the use at trial of evidence obtained in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139 (2009). 

We have likewise concluded that evidence obtained in violation of Article I, Section 10, 

of the Minnesota Constitution must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. State v. 

Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 370 (Minn. 2004). 

In Plymouth Sedan, the United States Supreme Court considered whether the 

Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture actions. 380 U.S. at 696. 

Law enforcement officers had stopped a car because it was “low in the rear”; during a 

subsequent search of the vehicle, they discovered 31 cases of liquor without Pennsylvania 
13

tax seals. Id. at 694. The owner of the car was arrested and charged with illegal 

possession of alcohol, and the Commonwealth brought a petition for forfeiture of the 

automobile.7 Id. The trial court granted the owner’s motion to suppress, but the state 

appellate court reversed, concluding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to civil 

forfeiture actions. Id. at 695. The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment 

exclusionary rule is applicable to civil forfeiture actions. Id. at 702. The Court 

determined that “a forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal in character” and “[i]ts object, 

like a criminal proceeding, is to penalize for the commission of an offense against the 

law.” Id. at 700. The Court reasoned that it would be anomalous to apply the 

exclusionary rule in the criminal case against the owner of the car, but then not apply it in 

the civil forfeiture case based on the same facts. Id. at 701. 

We have previously acknowledged that the United States Supreme Court is the 

“final arbiter of the meaning and application of the United States Constitution.” State v. 

Brist, 812 N.W.2d 51, 54 (Minn. 2012) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Consequently, we have recognized that when we consider matters arising under 

the United States Constitution, we are obligated to apply Supreme Court decisions if they 

are on point and good law. Id. 

 

7

The Pennsylvania forfeiture statute provided in pertinent part: “No property rights 

shall exist in any . . . vehicle . . . used in the illegal manufacture or illegal transportation 

of liquor . . . and the same shall be deemed contraband and proceedings for its forfeiture 

to the Commonwealth may . . . be instituted.” Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 694 n.2

(citation omitted). 
14

Plymouth Sedan is on point and is good law. The question of whether the Fourth 

Amendment exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture actions is the same question that 

confronted the Supreme Court in Plymouth Sedan. And the relevant facts and the 

forfeiture statutes at issue in Plymouth Sedan and this case are similar. As recently as 

1993, the Supreme Court cited the case as authority for the proposition that the 

exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture actions. United States v. James Daniel Good 

Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 49 (1993) (stating that the “Fourth Amendment does place 

restrictions on seizures conducted for purposes of civil forfeiture,” and summarizing 

Plymouth Sedan as holding that “the exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture”). 

The County argues that we should not apply Plymouth Sedan because the Supreme 

Court has limited the application of the exclusionary rule to cases in which exclusion of 

the evidence has a significant deterrent benefit. It is true that the Fourth Amendment 

exclusionary rule has evolved since Plymouth Sedan was decided in 1965. Compare 

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (stating broadly that “all evidence obtained by 

searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, 

inadmissible in a state court”), with Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) 

(stating that the exclusionary rule is only applicable “where its deterrence benefits

outweigh its substantial social costs” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). The current trend toward a more limited application of the exclusionary rule, 

however, does not mean that the Court has abandoned its decision in Plymouth Sedan. 

Cf. Brist, 812 N.W.2d at 57 (“Casting doubt on an opinion’s reasoning, however, is not 
15

the same as overruling the holding of a prior decision.”). Indeed, the Supreme Court has 

not expressly overruled, modified, or clarified Plymouth Sedan. 

Further, the County argues the Supreme Court implicitly overruled Plymouth 

Sedan in United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996). The County’s argument is 

without merit.

8

 In Ursery, the Supreme Court concluded that federal civil in rem 

forfeitures are not “punishment” for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Ursery, 

518 U.S. at 292. The Court’s decision in Ursery did not involve the Fourth Amendment 

exclusionary rule, and the Court did not discuss or cite Plymouth Sedan. We therefore

must follow the Supreme Court’s dictate that “[i]f a precedent of this Court has direct 

application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of 

decisions, [courts] should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court 

the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. 

Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).9

 

8 A few courts have questioned Plymouth Sedan’s reasoning in light of Ursery, but 

no court has concluded that Ursery overruled Plymouth Sedan. See, e.g., In re Forfeiture 

of $180,975, 734 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Mich. 2007) (“[W]hile One 1958 Plymouth Sedan

has not been overruled and, thus, is still applicable, several subsequently decided cases 

indicate that the underpinnings of One 1958 Plymouth Sedan have been weakened.”);

State v. One 1990 Chevrolet Corvette, 695 A.2d 502, 507 (R.I. 1997) (stating in dictum 

that Plymouth Sedan “is of dubious authority in light of Ursery”).

9 Other courts that have been asked to conclude that Plymouth Sedan is no longer 

good law have declined to do so. See, e.g., Matter of Flowers, 474 N.W.2d 546, 548 

(Iowa 1991) (“We are unwilling to anticipate the demise of Plymouth Sedan, however, in 

the absence of a clear indication from the Supreme Court that it is no longer to be 

followed.”); One 1995 Corvette v. Baltimore, 724 A.2d 680, 683-86 (Md. 1999) 

(rejecting the lower court’s conclusion that Plymouth Sedan is no longer good law and 

applying the exclusionary rule to a civil in rem forfeiture action).
16

We conclude that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies to civil 

forfeiture actions brought under Minn. Stat. §§ 609.531-.5319. The United States 

Supreme Court determined in Plymouth Sedan that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 

rule applies to civil forfeiture actions brought under a statute that is similar to the civil 

forfeiture statute in this case. Because Plymouth Sedan is on point and good law, we 

conclude that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture actions 

brought under Minn. Stat. §§ 609.531-.5319.

10

III.

The County argues that even if the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies to 

civil forfeiture actions, we should affirm the court of appeals because: (1) appellant is 

collaterally estopped from relitigating the determination of the federal district court that 

the March 19 stop and search did not violate appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights;

(2) appellant’s factual admissions in the federal guilty plea agreement in which he agreed 

to give up his rights to property obtained as a result of his drug trafficking offense 

provide an independent basis for forfeiture of the seized property; (3) appellant’s 

exclusive remedy to suppress the challenged evidence is Minn. Stat. § 626.21 (2012) (“A 

person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move . . . to suppress the use, as 

evidence, of anything so obtained . . .”), but appellant waived that remedy by not 

 

10 Because we conclude that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies to 

civil forfeiture actions, we need not analyze whether the exclusionary rule applies under 

the Minnesota Constitution. See State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 180 (Minn. 2007) 

(declining to reach whether suppression was required under the Minnesota Constitution 

because suppression was required under the United States Constitution).
17

asserting it; and (4) the district court erred when it observed in dictum that the March 19 

stop and search violated appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights. 

Because we did not grant review on any of the aforementioned four issues, they 

are not before us, and therefore we decline to reach them. Specifically, the County raised 

the collateral estoppel issue in its petition for conditional cross-review, but we denied 

review. See State v. Borg, 806 N.W.2d 535, 537 n.1 (Minn. 2011) (refusing to address 

issues raised in a petition for cross-review that was denied). Moreover, neither appellant 

nor the County raised the plea agreement argument, the exclusive statutory remedy 

argument, or the argument that the state district court erred in observing in dictum that 

the March 19 stop violated appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights in their petitions to this 

court. See Anderly v. City of Minneapolis, 552 N.W.2d 236, 239-40 (Minn. 1996) 

(declining to reach issue “not raised in either a petition for further review or a conditional 

petition for further review”); Hoyt Props., Inc. v. Prod. Res. Grp., 736 N.W.2d 313, 317, 

n.1 (Minn. 2007) (concluding that two issues argued by appellants in their brief but not 

raised in their petition for review were “beyond the scope of th[e] appeal and [would] not 

be considered”).

In summary, we conclude that appellant has standing to challenge the forfeiture of 

the vehicle and cash and that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies to civil 

forfeiture actions brought under Minn. Stat. §§ 609.531-.5319. Accordingly, we reverse 

the court of appeals and remand the case to that court for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion, including for consideration of the County’s other arguments. See

Eagan Econ. Dev. Auth. v. U-Haul Co. of Minn., 787 N.W.2d 523, 539 (Minn. 2010) 
18

(“[W]e reverse and remand to the court of appeals to consider the property owners’ other 

claims.”); Baker v. Baker, 753 N.W.2d 644, 653 (Minn. 2008) (“The court of appeals did 

not address these arguments . . . and they are not before us on review. Accordingly, we 

remand to the court of appeals for consideration of these alternative arguments.”).

The procedural posture and merits of the County’s additional arguments are 

disputed.11 By remanding to the court of appeals, we express no opinion on whether the 

court of appeals was correct in its prior rulings or on whether the court of appeals should 

reconsider its rulings on remand. We also express no opinion on whether the County has 

forfeited its right to raise any of these issues on appeal. On remand, the court of appeals 

must determine whether it will address the merits of each of these issues. 

Reversed and remanded. 

 

11 For example, the court of appeals denied appellant’s motion to strike the County’s 

collateral estoppel argument. Garcia-Mendoza v. 2003 Chevy Tahoe, No. A13-0445, 

Order at 3-4 (Minn. App. filed Oct. 1, 2013). But the court of appeals did not address 

that issue in its decision. Garcia-Mendoza, 2013 WL 6152304, at *3. On the other hand, 

the court of appeals granted appellant’s motion to strike the County’s argument that the 

state district court erred by observing in dictum that the stop and search was unlawful 

because the County did not file a notice of related appeal raising the issue. GarciaMendoza v. 2003 Chevy Tahoe, No. A13-0445, Order at 3 (Minn. App. filed Oct. 1, 

2013).