T hi s opi ni on i s s ubj e ct t o r e vi s i on b e f or e f i nal p u bli ca tion i n th e P ac i

f i c R ep orter 2015 UT 23

I N T HE 

### S UPR EM E 

### C OU RT OF TH E 

### S TA TE O F 

### U TAH

C H ARLE S D A HL , Pe ti ti o ner a nd A pp ell ee,

v. K I M D A HL , Responden t and Appellant.

K I M D A HL , Appellant,

v. M ARLE TT E E NTER PR I S ES , LL C; C. R OBERT D A HL , D AH L F AM I LY I RR EVOC ABLE T RUST ; and C H ARLE S D A HL ,

Appe lle es.
Nos. 20100683, 20111077 Filed January 30, 2015

Fou rth D is tric t, Provo D ep ’t Th e H ono rab le Ja me s R. T ayl or The Honorable Lynn W. Davis Nos. 064402232, 090402989

Att or neys: Steve S. Christensen, Craig L. Pankr atz, Samuel J . Sorensen, Salt Lake City , Sara Pfrommer, Park Cit y, for pet itioner and appellant Rosemond G. Blakelock, Ry an D. P eter sen, Pro vo ,

fo r res pon de nt a nd ap pe ll ee
J UST I CE P ARRIS H authore d the opinion of the Co urt, in which A S S OC I ATE C H IEF J UST I CE N EHR I NG , J UDG E T ODD M. S H AU GH NE SSY ,

and J UDG E W. B RE NT W EST concu rr ed. J UST I CE D UR HAM authore d an opinion concu rr ing in part and

diss enting as to Par t II I.C.2.d. Having r ecus ed themselves, C H IEF J UST I CE D UR R ANT and J UST I CE L EE did not part icipate herein; D I S TR I CT J UD GE S T ODD M. S H AU GH NE SSY and W. B RE NT W ES T s at.D A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

D.D. an d C.D. were six and eleven years old, respec tive ly, at t he 1 time the divo rce action was ini tiated.

2 J UST I CE P ARRIS H , opi ni on o f the Cou rt:

INTRODUCTION ¶1 Thes e inte rrel ate d c as esari s e f rom the mar r ia g e dis s olu tion of Dr. Charles Dahl and Ms. Kim D ahl. On appeal of the divor ce
c as e, Ms . D ah l c ha ll en ges the di s tric t c ou rt’s s ub s tantiverul in gs on alimony, child cu st o d y, and distribution of the marit al estate. She additionally challeng es the district court’ s rulings on ju dicial b ias, evidentiar y issues , a nd atto rney fees. Ms. Dahl als o appeals the

ou tc om e of a s ep ara te, bu t rel ate d, la w s ui t involvi ng m ari talas s ets

c ont ai ned in the D ah l Fa mi ly I rrevoc ab le Tru s t ( Tru s t) . Al tho ugh these cases came b efore t his c ourtseparately , we consolidate them,

sua s ponte for the purposes of app e a l a nd r emand, bas ed on our conclu sion that the Trust should have been joined as a party t o the divor ce action.
FACTU AL AND PRO CEDURAL BACKGROUN D ¶2 Due to the c omplex f actual and procedural his tor y of these

c as es , we provi de onl y a bri ef overvi ew of the un de rlyi ng f ac ts he re. We w il l di s c us s the rel eva nt f ac ts in mo re d eta ilbe lowas the y rel ate to o ur resolutio n of the var ious is sues

. ¶3 D r. C ha rle s D ah l a nd Ms . Ki m D ah l w ere m arried fo r nearly eig ht e e n y ears. Dr. Dahl is a practicing cardiolog ist. Ms. Dahl earned a mas ter ’s degree in educ ation and work ed a s an interi or de s ign er a nd s c hoo l c ou ns el or pri or to her marri age to D r. D ah l. D uri ng the co uple’s ma rria ge, Ms . D ah l w as the pri ma ry
c are give r to th e c ou pl e’s tw o c hi ld ren, D. D . and C. D ., an d did not 1

w ork ou ts id e th e h om e. ¶4 Dr. Dahl filed for divorce on October 24, 2006. Follo wing year s of pr e t r ial proceedings, the divo rce court conducted a bench tria l ove r fo ur t een

nonc ons ec ut ive da ys , b egi nnin g in S ep tembe r 2009. The div or ce cour t issued i ts Findings of Fact and Conclus ions of Law on April 5, 2010, and t he Decree of Divor ce was enter ed July 20, 2010. ¶5 The divorce proceedings were ext remely contentious. The parties fiercely disputed cus tody of their children, Ms. Dahl’s right to tempora ry an d pe rma ne nt a li mo ny, an d th e p rope r di s trib ut ionCite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

3 of the ma rita l es tate

. Th e di s c overy proc es s w as rife w ith ab us es on both sides, w hich

delayed tr ial. The pretrial disclosure process was
s im il arl y frau ghtan d ul tim ate ly res ul ted in the exc lu s ion of mo s t of Ms . D ah l’ s tria l e xhibi ts an d e xpe rt wit ne s s es . T he di s tric t c ou rt aptly described the pret rial pro ceedings as a “tr ain wreck.” ¶6 On appeal of the divo rce action, Ms. Dahl as serts sever al claim s of e r ro r: (1) that t he district court judge, Judge Taylor , was biased agains t her; (2) that the district court abus ed its disc ret ion in vari ou s evi de nti ary ru li ngs ; ( 3) that t he di s tric t c ou rt ab us ed its disc ret ion when it fa i l e d to awar d Ms. Dahl temporary and permanent alimony ; (4) that the district courtunfai rly div ided the marital assets in f avo r o f Dr. Dahl ; (5) that the district court err ed in not consideri ng joint custody of the couple’s children; and ( 6) that the di s tric t c ou rt erred in not orde rin g D r. D ah l to pay M s. Dahl’ s attorney fees . W e a ffirm in par t , r ev er se i n p art, an d re ma nd fo r further pr oceedings. ¶7 Ms . D ah l b rou ghta s ep ara te a c tion aga ins t th e T rus t, Mar lette Enterpr ises, L.L.C., Dr. Dahl’s real estat e i nv estment company, and C. Rober t Dahl, D r. Dahl’s brother who served as the Tru s t’s inves tm ent tru s tee (c oll ec tive ly T rus t Def en da nts ). In

essenc e, Ms. Dahl s ought a share o f the Trustassets, w hich she

c la im ed w ere m ari tal prop erty. S pe c ific al ly, s he s ou ghtde c la ratory j ud gm ent as t o t he pa rtie s ’ ri ght s an d ob li gati ons un de r the Tru s t, arg uing that the Tr ust was nu l l a nd vo id, that the Tr ust was

revoc ab le as a m atte r of la w , th at Ms . D ahl w as a s ettl or of the Tru s t, and that she was entitled t o an accounting fr om the Trust. The parties filed cross-m otio ns f or summary judgment, and the district

c ou rt granted the Tru s t D efen da nts ’ m otio n, di s mi s s in g Ms . D ah l’ s claim s. She ass ert s that the district court err ed when it declared t hat she had n o enfor ceable inter est in Trust ass ets. We agr ee and the ref ore re vers e. ¶8 Ms. Dahl’s appeals of both the divor ce actio n and t he trust action came bef or e the courtof appeals. Th e co urt o f appeals

c erti fie d bo th a pp ea ls to u s . W e h ave j uri s di c tion pu rs ua nt t o
s ec tion 78 A- 3- 10 2( 3) (b ) o f the Uta h C ode

.

AN AL YSI S
I. CONSOLIDATIO N OF THE DIVORCE

AND TRUSTACTIONS ¶9 As an initial matt er, we addr ess Ms. Dahl’s failure to join the Tru s t in

the di vorc e a c tion . Des pi te years of pre tria l p roc eed in gsD A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

Rule 19(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro ce d ur e p r ov ides in 2 pert inent part: “A person w ho i s subject to serv ice of process and whose j oinder will not depr ive t he court o f ju risdiction ove r t he sub ject matter of action sh a ll b e jo ined as a party in t he action if . . . in his ab senc e complete relief cannot be accorded among t hose already parties.” (Emphas is added)

. D r. Da hl fi le d a s ug ges tion of mo otn es s in

the di vorc e a c tion

on 3 Februar y 28, 2013, ar guing that Ms. Dahl’s claim s to a share of the Trust ass ets were moo ted by t he grantof summary judgment in favor of the T rust D efendants in the parallel Trust action. B e cause (continued...)

4 in the divor ce action, couns el for Ms. Dahl failed to join the T rust as

a defendant. T h e n, j u s t w e e ks b e f or e th e s ta rtof th e d i vo rc e tr i al, Ms . D ah l’ s attorneys initi ate d th e s ep ara te law s ui t aga in s t th e T rus t. The div or ce cour t refused t o consider t he Trust ass ets in distributing the marital estat e, ruling t ha t t he eve o f trial was too lat e to join a new party and thatit could not consider Trust assets that were the sub ject of other pending litigatio n. Given Ms. Dahl ’s failu re t o join the T ru s t a s a d e f e n d a n t i n th e d i vo rc e a c ti on, w e d o n ot f a u l t the divor ce court for refusing to consider the Trust assets. ¶10 Court s may “make a legall y bindin g adjudic ation o nly between t he parties actually joined in the action.” Hil ts ley v. Ryder , 738 P.2d 1024, 1025 (Utah 1987); see a lsoR.M .S. Co rp . v . B a ldw in , 576 P.2 d 8 8 1 , 8 8 3 ( Ut a h 1 9 7 8 ) ( h ol d i n g th a t n o j u d gm e n t could be enter ed against a corpo rat ion not joined as a party before t he court). Becaus e of Ms. Dahl’s f ailure to add the Trust as a party, t he district court was corre ctthat ithad no power to adjud icate the part ies’ right s in the Trus t assets. ¶11 The Trust assets inclu ded marital propert y. Withou t the pow er to c ons id er a nd di s trib ut e th e T rus t as s ets , th e d is tric t c ou rt la c ked the au tho rity to fu ll y an d fa irl y di s trib ut e the ma rita l e s tate

. Accordingly, t he Trust should have been jo i ne d as a party t o the divor ce action. Counsel’s f ailure to join the Trust prev ented the 2 di s tric t c ou rt from c ons id eri ng the Tru s t an d its as s ets an d th eref ore pre vented a compl ete di s trib ut ion of the ma rita l es tate . Bu t w e a re
now in a pos iti on to c ons id er the Tru s t an d its as s ets be c ause both the Trus t an d d ivorc e c as es are be fo re u s . An d “ ap pe ll ate c ou rts may raise the issue [ of joinder] sua sponte .” Hil ts ley, 738 P.2d at 1025. Ac c ordi ngl y, w e h ereby c ons oli da te the Tru s t an d di vorc e c as es fo r pu rpos es of

ap pe al

. An d we rem an d both c as es to the d is tric t c ou rt

3Cite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

(...continued) 3

w e a re reve rs in g th e d is tric t c ou rt in the Tru s t ac tion an d c ons oli da ting these two c ases on remand, Ms. Dahl’s claim s against the Trust

are notmo ot. Ms

. D ah l a ls o initi al ly a rgu ed tha t th e d is tric t c ou rt erre d w he n 4 it g r anted s umma ry j ud gm ent in fa vor of the Tru s t D efen da nts on Ms. Dahl’s alter ego theor y without first all o wi ng he r t o conduct fu rthe r di s c overy. Be c au s e Ms . D ah l w ith dre w thi s c ha ll en ge i n h er rep ly b rie f, w e d o no t ad dre s s it.

5 tha t ha nd le d the di vorc e cas e and di rec t it to j oin the Tru s t asa p arty to t he divor ce action.

II. TH E T RUST A CT ION ¶12 On J ul y 31 , 2 00 9, Ms . D ahl br o ug ht a n a c tion s eek in g a declaration o f he r right s in the Trus t assets and requesting an

accounting o f t he Tr us t ’s activities and a copy of the Trust agre em ent. Fol low in g di s c overy, bo th p arti es mo ved fo r s umma ry judgment. Th e district court he ld a hearing on t he parties’ cro ssmotions o n Au gu s t 3 1 , 2 0 1 1

. At th e c onc l u s i on of th e h e a ri n g, the court instru c ted c ounsel for both part ies to pre pare o rder s cons istent

w ith the ir re s pe c tive pos iti ons . Ul tim ate ly, th ed i s tr i c t c ou rt granted

summary judgment in favor of the Trust Defendants and signed the

or der pr epared by t heir counsel. ¶13 In adopting t he order , the district court held thatthe Trust was i rr evo cable an d that Ms. Dahl had no enforceable interest in t he Trust ass ets. Though the Trust agr eement c ontained a c hoice-of-law prov isio n, t he or der did not specify whether the court was construing the Trust according to Utah or Neva d a law. Bu t it appears to hav e construed the Trust accor d i ng t o both Ut ah and Nevada law. ¶14 On a pp ea l, Ms . D ah l a rgu es (1 ) tha t th e d is tric t c ou rt erre d in its ch oice-of-lawanalysis, ( 2) that the court err ed when it held that the Trust was irrev ocable and t ha tMs. Dahl h ad no enforceable intere s t in

Tru s t as s ets , and (3) tha t th e d is tric t c ou rt exc eed ed its

au tho rity wh e n

i topi ne d th at th e s tatu te of li mi tati ons ha d l ap s ed on
s evera l c la im s notac tu al ly b ef ore i t. 4 ¶15 Summary ju d g ment is appropriat e when “ there is no genuine iss ue as to any mater ial fac t and . .

. t he moving par ty is

e n ti tl e d to a j u d gm e n t a s a m a tt e r of law.” U T A H R. C IV

. P. 56(c ).D A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

6 Ac c ordi ngl y, w e r eviewthe di s tric t c ou rt’s grant of s umma ry j ud gm ent f or c orrec tne s s an d ta ke “ the fa c ts an d [ any] infe renc es to be drawn therefro m in the light most favor abl e t o the no nmoving party .” Pe te rso n v. Co ca -Co laUSA , 2002 UT 42, ¶ 7, 48 P.3d 941. ¶16 B e ca us e Utah has a strongpubli c policy interest in the equitable division of mar i ta la s s e ts , we wil l not enfor ce the choice- oflaw pr ov ision contained in t he Trust. Instead, we construe the Trust

ac c ordi n gt o U t a hl a w

. W e h o l d t h a tt h e T r u s ti s r e v o c a b l e u n de r Utah law and that Ms. D ahl has an interest in the T rust pro pert y as
a s ettl or of

the Tru s t. W e furt he r hol d th at th e d is tric t c ou rt erre d

w he n i t pu rport e d t o ad j ud ic ate c la im s notprop erl y b ef ore i t. B ef ore we address Ms. D ahl’s s pecifi c cl aims of error , we first turn our atte ntion to an inc onsistency in the dis tr ict court’s or der g ranting

summary judgment in favor of the Trust Defendants.

A. Th e Di st ric t Co urt ’s N o ve mb er 1 1, 20 11 Order Is In te rna lly

In co nsis te nt ¶17 Th e dis tric t c ou rt ad opte d the orde r dra ft ed byc ou ns elfo r the Trust Defendants. That or der was internally inconsis tent. The

or der first addr essed Ms. D ahl’s request for declarat or y judgment

c onc ern in g th e ri ght s an d d ut ie s of the pa rtie s vis -à -vi s the Tru s t. After rev iewin g th el a wre l a ting to declarator y judgment actions, the orde r s tate d th at th e c ou rt c ou ld “r efu se to ren de r or enter a declarator y judgment or decree where a judgment o r decree, if

ren de red or entere d, w ou ld nott er min ate the unc erta inty or

c o ntro vers y” b etw een

the pa rtie s . It the n s tate d th at b ec au s e a declarator y judgment would not ter minate the par ties’ dispute, it

w o u l d d e c l i n e “ t o u n d e r t a k e t h e s e e m i n g l y m e a n i n g l e s s t a s k of declaring the r ights and duties of the parties to [the] action.” ¶18 D es pi te thi s la ngu age , w hi c h s tate s tha t the di s tric t co urt was d eclinin g to or der any declarat or y relief, the or der goe s o n t o do jus t that . The order states that t he Trust could n ot be r endered “null and void” on t he basi s of the f acts presented b y Ms. Dahl, that Ms. Dahl h ad no legally enfor ceable inter est in t he Trust ass ets, and that the Tru s t w as irre voc ab le as a m atte r of la w

. Fin al ly, the orde r s tate s that M s. Dahl did not h ave the right to a general accounting from t he Trust. B ecaus e these rulings constitute a declaratio n as to the matt e r s i n dispute, they are inconsistent with the prior ruling that the courtwas d eclinin g to declare the r ights of the par ties i n thisCite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

This c as e i ll us trate s the pote nti alpi t fal ls of rel ia nc e on orde rs 5 drafted by counsel. Su ch orders do no t necessarily reflect the

rea so ni ngof the courtand, acc or dingly, court s sh ould exer cis e
c au tion w he n a s kin g c ou ns elto draft them . More over, c ou ns el

s hou ld take c are to en s ure tha t an y o r de r t he y dra ftdoe s not

ov err each.

7 ma tter. 5 ¶19 When confronted with an ambi guous o rder , we wil l construe it using the same rul e s t ha t apply t o all legal documents. Culb ertso n v. Bd . of Cn ty . Co mm’ rs , 2001 UT 108, ¶ 15, 44 P.3d 642, overruled on other grounds by Madsen v. JPMo r g an Ch as e Bank, N.A. , 2012 UT 51, 296 P.3d 671. We fi rst “loo k to the l a ng uag e of the

or d e r, ” a n d “ [ m a y] re s or t to th e p l e a d i n gs a n d f i n d i n gs .” Id. Our task is to “inte rpr et a n ambiguity [in a m anner that mak es] the j ud gm ent m ore reas ona bl e, effe c tive , c onc lu s ive , a nd [tha t] bri ngs the judgment into harmony with t he facts an d the law.” Id. (alterat ions in or iginal) (inter nal quot ation marks omitt ed). And we will “construe any ambiguities in the order against the p r evailing parties who drafted it .” Id. ¶20 Th ou gh p urp o r t ing to den y de c la ratory re li ef

, th e ord er goe s into gr eat det ail in articulating the part ies’ respectiveri ghts and du tie s as to th e T rus t. Ind eed , i t c are fu ll y arti c ul ate s Ms . D ah l’ s
var i ou s c l a i m s a n d ru l e s on e a c h

. An d b e c a u s e th e or d e r w as dra ft e d by counsel f or the Trust Defendants, w e construe any

amb i gu i tyi nf a vo r o f Ms

. D a h l

. Ac c or d i n gl y, w e s tr i ke th ose paragr aphs of the order declini ng to award d e clarator y r elief as surplus age t hat is inc onsistent with the or der as a whole. ¶21 Ha vin g de al t w ith the inc ons is tenc y in the di s tric t c ou rt’s

or der, we turn o ur att ention to Ms. Dahl’s sub stantive claims.

B. We Construe the Trust Accordin g to Utah Law ¶22 Ms. Dahl a r g ues thatthe district courterr ed when it applied Nevada law and construed the T rust as irr evo cabl e

. She arg ues that construing the Trust a s ir rev ocable und er Nev ada law would violate U tah public policy by creating“a serious inequity” in the dis trib ut ion

of the ma rita l e s tate . In

res pon s e, D r. D ah l a rgu es that t he Trust is irrevo cable u nder both Ut ah and Nevada law and , there fore, t he Trust’s ch oice-of-lawprov ision is “not material in this case.” D r. Dahl concedes thatMs. Dahl h as an enf or ceable inter est in the Tru s t as s ets i f w e fin d th e T rus t to b e revo c ab le . Whi le bo thD A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

Surprisingly, both part ies rely almost ex clus ively o n Utah law 6 in their briefing. Throughout both parties’ briefs, o nly one Nev ada statute—Nev ada Revised Statu t e s section 163.560—is c ited, and neither par ty adequat ely briefs the effect of Nevada law on the Trust’s revo cabil ity. Becau se we c onclude that Utah’s public policy intere s t in

the equi tab le di vis ion

of the ma rita l es tate requi res us to construe th e T ru s t a c c or d i n g t o U ta hl a w , w e n e e d n otd e te rm i ne whether the Trust would be rev ocable und er Nev ada law.

8 pa rtie s agre e th at a ppl ication of Ne vad a l aww ou ld requi re u s to hold the Trust irr evo cable, they disagr ee as to the result under Utah 6 law. Acc or dingly, our first task is to det erm i ne whic h state’s law govern s c ons tru c tion

of the Tru s t. ¶23 Be c au s e Uta h i s the fo rum s tate , Ut ah c hoi c e- of-l awrul es apply. Waddo ups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co. , 2002 UT 69, ¶ 14, 54 P.3d 10 54 . Un de r Uta h c hoi c e- of-law ru le s , w e w il l ge ne ral ly e nf orc e a choice- of-law prov ision contained in a tr ust document, unless d oing so would un dermine a stro ng p ublic policy of the State of Utah. See U T A H C ODE § 75- 7- 10 7 & c mt . ( “T hi s s ec tion doe s notatte mp t to

s pe c if y th e s tron g pu bl ic pol ic ie s s uf fi cie nt t o inval id ate a s ettl or’s choice of gove rning law.”); see also Ja cobsen Constr. C o. v. Teto n Bui lde rs , 2 00 5 UT4, ¶ 19 , 1 06 P.3 d 7 19 (re fu s in g to al lowpa rtie s to “employ choice of law provi si ons to for ce forum states to enfor ce contractual ter ms wholly repugnant to local public policy”). T hus , we will refuse t o enforce a settlo r’s choice-of-l aw prov ision if d oing

s o w ou ld un de rmi ne s tron g pu bl ic pol ic y goal s of thi s s tate

. ¶24 Section 5.4.6 of the Trust agr eement pro vides: Governing L aw . T he val id ity, c ons tru c tion an d e ffec t of the pro visions of this Agreement in a l l respects shal l be g o v erned and reg ulated according to and by the la w s of the S tate of

Ne vad a. Th e a dm inis trati on o f each Trus t shall be gov erned b y the laws of the state in whic h the Trust is bein g administered.
Issues concerning the m eaning of tr ust ter ms, the legal effect of tho se term s , a nd the s tatu s of

in di vid ua ls vis -à -vi s the Tru s t are al l m atte rs of tr ust cons tr uction. SeeB LA CK ’ S L A W D I CT I O NA RY 355, 592 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “construction” and “effect”). Conver sely, questions relat ed to t he perfor manc e of the t ru stee’s duties and the management of tr ust ass ets are issues of tr ust administratio n. See id. at 49 (defining “adminis tr ation”); 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 225. The centr alCite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

9 di s pu te b etw een

the pa rtie s in thi s c as e c onc ern s the revoc ab il ity o f the Trust. This i s an is sue of trust construction to whic h we w ould

or dinarily apply Nev ada l aw. But we c annot apply Nev ada law

w ith ou t viol ati ng U tah pu bl ic pol ic y. ¶25 Utah has a long-establish ed policy in favor of the equitable distribution of marital assets in divorce cases. See U T A H C ODE § 30- 3- 5( 1) (a uthori zi ng Utah c ou rts to enter “ equi tab le orde rs rel ati ng t o the children, proper t y , d e bt s or o bligations, and parties” in a divor ce); seea lsoEng ler t v . E ngl ert , 576 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1978) (“The import of our decisions implementing [sec tion 30-3-5] is that proc eed in gs in

r eg ar d t o the fa mi ly a re equi tab le in a h igh de gree ; and th a t t he court may t ake into consideration all of the per tinent circum stances . It is our opinion that t he corr ect view under our law is th at th is enc om pa s s es al l of the as s ets of

everyna tu re p os s es s ed by the p a rt ies, wh enever obtained and from whatever source de rive d. ”). We hav e p r ev io usly ind ica t ed t hat t he pur po se of s ec tion 30 -3- 5 of the Uta h C ode is to empow er c ou rts to “e nf orc e, after divor ce, the duty of supportwhic h exists between a hu sban d and wife.” Ca lli ster v . Ca lli ster , 26 1 P .2 d 9 44 , 9 48 (U tah 19 53 ). Moreove r, “[ t ] h e o v e r a r c h i n g a i m o f a p r o p e r ty d i v i s i o n, a n d o f t h e d ec ree o f

w hi c h it an d the al im ony aw ard are s ub s id ia ry pa rts , is to ac hi eve a fair, jus t, and equitable result between the part ies.” Nob le v. No bl e, 761 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988). T hus , by legislative enactment and our lo ng-standing precedent, Utah has an int erest in ensuring that marital assets ar e fairly and equitably distributed during divo rce and that divo rcing sp o uses both re tain suffici ent assets to av oid be c om in g a p ub li c c ha rge. ¶26 To thi s en d, Uta h l awpr esu mes th at p rope rty ac qu ire d during a marr iage is marital pro pert y subj ect to equit able distribution. SeeW

o o dw a rd v. W o o dw a rd, 656 P.2d 431, 432– 33 (Utah 19 82 ) ( “T he es s entia l c rite rion is w he the r a ri ght t o t he be ne fi t or asset has a ccrued in whole or in par t during t he marriag e. To the ext ent thatthe rig ht ha s so accrued it is s ubj ect to equitable distribution.”). Th us , to t he exte nt that t he Trust corpus c ontains marital pro pert y, Ut ah has a s tr ong inter est in ensu r i ng that such proper ty is equitably divided in the par ties’ divo rce action. ¶27 D r. D ah l a dmi t s t ha t at l ea s t s om e of the Tru s t as s ets origi na ted as ma rita l prop erty. For exa mp le , Ms

. D ah l c onve yed he r intere s t in

the c ou pl e’s ma rita l h om e to the Trus t viaa w arra nty de ed . In ad di tion , Ms . D ah l c la im s to h ave c onve yed to th e T rus t he r interest in M arlet te Enter prises and other marit al prop e r t y wi th aD A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

Though Dr. Dahl a r g ues thatMs. Dahl received half of the 7 marital assets in the div or ce pr oceedings, t he marital assets c ontr ibut e d t o t he Trust were not considered by t he district court in the divor ce action. The f act that t hese ass ets were contr ibuted to t he Tru s t doe s notc ha nge the ir ma rita l qu al ity a nd Ms . D ah l i s the ref ore entitled t o her fair share of these assets. Ms. Dahl as serts that such an unr estricted power to amend 8 violat es the sole benefic iary r ule bec ause D r. Da hl could s imply amend the T rust to make himself the s ole b enefici ary

. And once he becam e the s ole b enefici ary , Dr. Dahl could give unanim ous cons ent as settlor and sole beneficiary to diss olve the Trust. SeeU T A H C ODE § 75- 7-41 1( 1) (“ A n onc ha rita bl e, irre voc ab letru s t m ay b e m odi fi ed

o r ter mi na te dup on c ons ent of the set tl o r a nd a ll b ene

fici a rie s , even if the modific ation o r t ermination is incons istent with a material purpose of the t rust.”(Emphas is added) .). We need not address this argu me nt b ec au s e w e c onc lude t hat the u nre s tric ted pow er to amend, by itself, renders the Trust rev ocable und er Ut ah law.

10 val ue o f a tl e a s t$ 2m i l l i o n

. B e c a u s e U t a hh a s a s t r o n gp o l i c y of 7 equitable distribution of marital assets, we dec line to e nfo rce the Trust’s ch oice-of-lawprov ision on the gr ounds that doing so would de ny the di s tric t c ou rt the ab il ity t o ac hi eve a n e qu ita bl e d ivi s ion of the ma rita l e s tate . W e th eref o r e c ons tru e th e T rus t ac c ordi ng t o Utah law.
C. Because the Tru st Is Revocable Under Utah Law, Ms. Dahl Has an

Enforceable Interest in the Tru st Property ¶28 Having dete rmined th a t we will c onstrue t he Trust according to Utah law, we turn our atte ntion to whether the Trust is

rev ocable and, if

so, what interest M s. Dahl has in the Trust assets.
1. Th e T rus t Is Revoc ab le Be c au s e D r. D ah l R es erved an Unres tric ted Power to Amend ¶29 Ms. Dahl argues that the Trust is r evo cable under Utah law becau se Dr. Dahl , as settlor of the Trust, re served in the Tr ust agre em ent an

unres tric ted pow er to am en d the Tru s t. We empl oy 8 famili ar pr incip les of cont ract interpr etat ion when c onstruing t rust instruments. Ma k off

v. Ma k o ff , 528 P.2d 797, 798 (Utah 1974). We be gin ou r an al ys is w ith the l an gu ageof the tru s t agre em ent to ascertain the intent o f the settlor

. Id. Becaus e we presume that the settlor knew and intended the legal effect of the lan guage used, we give the words used in the trust agr eement their or dinary and usualCite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

D r. D ah l a ls o rel ie s on s ec tion 16 3. 560 of

the Ne vad a Re vis ed 9 Statutes, entitled “I rr evo cable trust not t o be construed as rev ocabl e, ” to s up port his as s erti on tha t th e T rus t is irre voc ab le . S ec tion 163.560 states: 1. If the s ett lor of any trust spec ific ally declares in the in s tru me nt c rea tin g the tru s t tha t s uc h tru s t is irre voc ab le it s ha llbe irre v o cable f or al l p urp os es , e ven tho ugh th e s ettl or is al s o the be ne fi c ia ry of s uc h tru s t. 2 . Suc h trust shall, un der no circumstanc es, be c ons tru ed to be r ev o c ab le fo r the rea s on tha t th e s ettl or and beneficiary is the same person. Having c oncluded that Utah law applies, we need not address these prov isions. And in any eve nt, section 163.560 only clarifies that an other wis e irr evo cable trust will not be construed r evo cable m erely becau se the settlor is also named as a benefic iary. This section is b est read as abro gating the sole benefic iary r ule in Nevada. See De Lee v. Hicks , 611 P.2d 211, 212 (N ev. 1980) (explaining t ha t the sole benefic iary r ule renders an other wis e i rr evo cable trust rev ocable). It p r o v i d e s n o i n s i g h ta s t o w h e t h e r t h e T r u s ts h o u l d b e d e e m ed irre voc ab le in

the fi rs t in s tanc e.

11 meaning. See76 A M

. J UR

. 2 D Trusts § 33 ( 20 05 ) ( “[ T] he w ords us ed in a tr u s t i n s tr u m e n t a re to b e ta ke n i n th e i r or d i nary and gramma tic als en s e u nl es s a c le ar i nte nti on t o u s e th em in an oth er
sens e can be as certained.”). ¶30 Section 5.5 of the Trust agr eement s tate s, “ Trust Irrev o ca bl e

. The Trus t he r e by establish ed is irrev ocable. Settlor reserv es a ny po wer wh ats o ev er

to alt er o r amend a nyof the te rms or pr ov isions her e o f.” (Emphasis added). D r. Dahl argues that t he Trust is irr evo cable b ecaus e i t is entitled “The Dahl Family Irr evo cable Tru s t” a nd s ec tion 5. 5 dec la res it to be irre voc ab le

. D r. D ah l furthe r 9 argu es th a t s e c t i o n 5

. 5 “ d o e s n o t c r e a t e a ny r i g h t f o r D r

. D a h l to unilaterally alte r o r amend the Trust. Rather, the language simply

res erves the rights of

everys ett lo r of

an irre voc ab le tru s t . . . to amend, alter or ter minate the irrevo cable tr ust if th e r e i s consent from all benefic iaries.” We are unpersuaded. ¶31 A “settlo r has power to modify the trust if and to t he exte nt that by t he ter ms of the t r us t he r eserve d suc h a power.” R ES TATE M ENT (S EC OND ) O F T RUS TS § 331(1) ( 1959). The s econd sentence of sec tion 5.5 r eserve s for Dr. D ahl, as settlor , a ny p o we r to amend a ny

provi s ion

of the Tru s t. T hou gh D r. D ah l u rges us toD A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

See, e.g. , Rubin son v. Rubin son , 620 N.E.2d 1271, 1280 (Ill. App. 10 Ct. 19 93) (r eco gniz ing“t he lo ng -se t t le d r ule and t he ple t ho ra of c as es tha t ha ve hel d th at w he re th e s ettl or res erves the unres tric ted pow er to am e nd a tr ust, . . . that power may be us ed to t erminate t he tr ust”); De Le e, 611 P.2d at 212 (“An unrestricted power to modify . . . an interv ivos tr ust inc ludes the power to r e v o ke t he trust . . . .”); Manice v. Howard Sav. Inst. , 1 04 A.2 d 74, 75 (N .J . Su pe r. Ct. Ch. D iv. (continued...)

12 construe section 5.5 as reserv ing only those powers to a me nd that are consistent with the creatio n of an irrev ocable trust , the plain la ngu age of

s ec tion 5. 5 contai ns no su c h li mi tati on. By the term s of the Trust, Dr. Dahl can mod ify any and all Trust prov isions, inc lu di ng the provi s ion s tha t pu rport t o m ake the Tru s t irre voc ab le

. SeeM ARY F. R ADF OR D E T AL ., T H E L A W O F T R US T S AN D T RUS TEE S § 993 (3 d ed

. 20 08 ) (“ Al tho ugh the hol de r of a pow er to mo di fy may not directly r evo ke t he trust, he or she m a y d o so indirectly by first

mo di fy in g th e tru s t by the in s erti on of a pow er to revoke an d th en
exe rc is in g tha t pow er. ” ( fo otn ote omitte d) ). S uc h abro ad ly d rafted provi s ion

c anno t fa irl y b e rea d a s res tric tin g D r. D ah l’ s pow er to

am en d to o nl y th os e p ow ers c ons is tent wit h an irrevoc ab le tru s t. Thus , by the Trust’s plain language, Dr. Dahl h as reserv ed an unrestricted power to amend. ¶32 In In re Estate o

f Flake, we he ld tha t a s ettl or’s unres tric ted pow er to am en d a tru s t inc lu de s , by de fi ni tion , the pow er to revoke the tr ust. 2003 U T 17, ¶ 13, 71 P.3d 589, sup ers eded o n o th er g ro unds
, Patterson v. Pat te rson , 2011 UT 68, 266 P.3d 828 ( “Or dinarily, if a pow er to m odi fyis s ub j ec t to n o res tric tion s , th en a re s erved pow er to amend or m odify includ es the power to r evo ke.”). Fo llowing our decis ion in Flake, the Legislature e nacted the Uta h U niform Trust Code (UUTC), whic h gov erns th e cr e ation, administratio n, and adjud ication of tr usts in Utah. See U T A H C ODE §§ 75-7-101 to -1201;

seea lsoPa tters o n v. Pa tters o n, 2011 UT 68, ¶ 33, 2 6 6 P. 3 d 828 (d isc us s in g th e a dop tion of the UUT C) . Mod el ed on the Un if orm Tru s t Cod e, Uta h C ode s ec tion 75 -7-6 05 govern s a s ettl or’s pow er to

r e v o k e o r amend a tr ust. Consis tent with our ruling in Flake, the

c om me nts to s ec tion

75 -7-6 05 ma ke c le ar that an unres tric ted pow er to amend a tr ust inc ludes the power to r evo ke it. U T A H C ODE § 75-7- 605 cm t

. (“A n unrestricted power t o amend may also incl ude the power t o r evo ke a tr ust.”). And on this p oint, Ut ah law is consis tent

w ith the w el l- es tab l i s h ed rul e fromoth er j uri s di c tion s

. Be c au s e D r. 10Cite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

(...continued) 10 19 54 ) ( “[ A] n u nre s tricte d po wer to m odi fyinc lu de s a p ow er to

rev oke the tr ust.”); Stahler v. Sevin or , 84 N

. E

. 2 d 4 47, 448– 49 (Mass. 1949) (hol d i ng that an unrestr icted power to amend inc ludes the power t o r e v o k e ); seea lsoR ES TATE M ENT (S EC OND ) O F T RUS TS § 331 cmt

. h ( “ If the p ow e r to m od i fy i s s u b j e c t to n o re s tr i c tions, it inclu des a power to revok e the trust.”); C H ARLE S E. R OUNDS , L OR I NG : A T RUS TEE ’ S H A ND B OO K 384 (2002) ( “[I]nherent in the rig ht to amend is the r i g h tt o i n s e r tb y a m e n d m e n ti n t o t h e t r u s ta r e v o c a t i on prov ision.”).

13 Dahl reserved an unrestr ict e d power to amend any and all provi s ion s of

the Tr ust , we h old tha t th e T rus t is revoc ab le un de r Utah law. Having s o held , we now turn our at tentio n to what r ights, if any, Ms. Dahlhas in

the Trust assets.
2. Ms. Dahl H as the Right t o Withdr aw Her Contr ibutions to the Trust ¶33 Dr. Dahl argues that Ms. Dahl has no enforceable intere st in the Trust be ca us e , even if she is a settlor of the Trust, Ut ah law proh ib its he r fro m w ith dra w in g he r as s ets fro m an irre voc ab le tru s t. SeeU T A H C ODE § 75-7 -6 0 5 (2 ). But we have held that the Tr ust is

rev ocable und er Utah law. Thu s, the relev ant inquiry center s on Ms. Dahl’s right s in relation to a rev o ca bl etru s t. ¶3 4 Any i n te re s t re ta i n e d b y Ms

. D a h l i n th e T ru st mus t

ne c es s ar ily be ba s ed on h er c ont rib ut ion of prop erty to the Tru s t. This is s o b ec au s e Ms

. D ah l is not a s ign atory t o th e T rus t agre em ent. Nor is she named as a settlor or tr ustee. And Ms. Dahl ’s stat us as a be ne fi c ia ry of

the Tru s t is de pe nd ant on he r st at us as D r. D ah l’ s
s po u s e

. I n s e c t i o n 1

. 2 o f t h e T r u s t a g r e e m e n t, t h e b e n e f i c i a rie s are li s ted as “th e S ettl or du rin g hi s li fe tim e, ” “ the Set tl o r’s sp o use,” “the Settlor ’s iss ue,” and “any ch aritable o r t ax-exempt o rg anization that may be added as a b enefici ary .” (E mp ha sis added). Bec ause Ms. D ah l i s na me d a s a ben efic ia ry on ly i n h er c ap ac ity a s D r. D ah l’ s
s pou s e, he r be ne fi c ia ry s tatu s term in ate d w ith the c ou pl e’s di vorc e. As a r e s u l t, w e m u s td e t e r m i n e t h e e x t e n tt o w h i c hM s

. D a hl ’s contribution o f marital pro pert y to the Trust create s an enf or ceable intere s t in

the Tru s t prop erty. ¶3 5 Tho u gh

w e h a ve n otp re vi ou s l y a d d re s s e d th i s s p e c i f ic iss ue, the go ver ning statute is clear. Se ction 75-7-103(1) (k) of the Uta h C ode de fi ne s “s ettl or” as “a pe rs on .

. . w ho c rea tes , orD A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

14 c ont rib ut es prop erty to, a tru s t. If mo re tha n one p ers on c rea tes or
c ont rib ut es prop erty to a tru s t, eac h pers on i s a s ettl or of the porti on of the tr ust proper ty at tr ibutable to that per son’s contribution . . . .” ¶36 In this cas e, Ms. Dahl is not ackno wl e d g e d as a settlor in the Trust agre ement, even t hough Dr. Dahl adm its that M s. Dahl

c ont rib ut ed prop erty to the Tru s t. T he Un if ormLa wComme nts rela t i ng to the UUTC’s definition of “settlo r,” o n whi ch the Utah statute is modeled, directly addr ess s uch a situation.
D ete rmi ni ng the id entity of the “s ettl or” is us ua ll y no t an iss ue. The s ame perso n wi ll both sign the tr ust instrument a nd fu nd the tr ust. Asc ert aining the id entityof

the s et t lor be c om es mo re d iffi c ul t w he n
mo re th an

one pe rs on s ign s the tru s t in s tru me nt o r fund s the trust. The fact that a person is designated as the “s et tl o r”by the term s o f t hetrust is no t n ece ssa ril y determinative

. . . . S hou ld mo re th an one pe rs on contribute t o a tr ust, all o f the contributor s wi ll

or dinarily be tr eated as settlor s in propo rt ion to t heir respective contributions, reg ardless of which o ne
s ign ed the tru s t in s tru me nt.
U T A H C ODE § 75-7-103 c mt. (emphas is added)

. ¶37 A tru s t is c rea ted bythe tran s fe r of prop erty b y th e ow ne r to another person acting as tr ustee. SeeU T A H C ODE § 75-7-401( 1)(a) ; R ES TATE M ENT (S EC OND ) O F T RUS TS § 17(b) (“ A trus t may b e c rea ted by

. . . atran s fe r inte r v ivos bythe ow ne r of prop erty to a nothe r pe rs on a s tru s tee

. . . .” ). Rega rdl es s of w he the r Ms

. D ah l i s na me d

as a s ettl or in

the Tru s t agreement, s he in di s pu tab ly c ont rib ut ed proper ty to the Trust. And there are no facts to supp or t an inference t hat Ms. Dahl knowingly or intentionally f or feited her s tatus as a settlor . Indeed, Ms. Dahl m aintains that she w as never g iven a copy of the Trust agr eement and was unaw are o f its terms, incl uding the fact t hat s h e w a s n otn a m e d a s e tt l ora n d th a t h e r s ta tu s a s a T ru st be ne fi c ia ry w as de pe nd ent u pon he r s tatu s as D r. Da hl ’s s pou s e. D r. D ah l a dm its tha t Ms

. D ah l “h ad nothi ng t o do w ith the pre pa rati on of the Tru s t agre em ent

. . . an d d id nots ign the Tru s t or an

y rel ate d documents.” Under these facts, we cannot conclu de that M s. Dahl relinquished her legal status as a settlor

. Accordingly, we hold that Ms. Dahl remains a settlor of the T rust, regardless of the fact that she is nots o na me d i n th e T rus t agre em ent.Cite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

S ub s ec tion (a ) ap pe ars to app ly onl y to p rope rty in c om mu ni ty 11 p r o p e r t y states. But sub section (b) allows Ms. D ahl to r evo ke t he Tru s t as to an

y m ari talor s ep ara te p rope rty s he c ont rib ut ed to it

. For exa mp le , Ms . D ah l m ay re voke th e T rus t as to th e m ari talhom e,
w hi c h s hou ld bew ith dr aw n fromthe Tru s t in its entire ty an d i ts val ue s pl it e qu ita bl y b etw een D r. a nd Ms . D ahl. Al tern ati vel y, should D r. Dahl wis h t o ret ain t he marital proper ty in t he Trust, the di s tric t c ou rt m ay a w ard an equi tab le offs et of

ha lf the prop erty’ s value to Ms. Dahl. We emphasi ze that t he district cour t’s deter mination relating 12 to th e n atu re of the prope rty sho ul d b e gu id ed byw el l- es tab li s he d principles of Utah family law. SeeW o o dw a rd v. W o o dw a rd, 656 P.2d 43 1, 43 2– 33 (U t ah 1982 ) ( hol di ng tha t al l p rope rty rights ac qu ire d dur ing t he pe nd enc y of the ma rria ge a re m ari talprop erty) . For

e xa m p l e , h owth e p ro p e rty i s ti tl e d i s of n o c on s e q u e n c e

. Fo r t he

(continued...)

15 ¶38 Be c au s e Ms . Da hl is a s ettl or of the Tru s t, s he may revoke that po rt ion of the Trust funded w ith either her s eparat e or marital proper ty. Section 75-7-605(2) of the Utah Code stat es: If a rev ocable trust is created or fund ed by more t han

one s ettl or: (a ) t o th e ex tent th e tru s t c ons is ts of c om mu ni ty proper ty, t he trust may be r evo ked by eit her spouse

ac tin g al one bu t may be am en de d only by j oint ac tion of both spouses; an d (b ) t o th e ex tent th e tru s t c ons is ts of pr o pe r ty oth er tha n c om mu ni ty pro pe rty, e ac h s ettl or m ay re voke or amend t he tr ust with reg ard to the port ion of the tr ust proper ty at tr ibutable to that set tlor ’s contribution. 11 By i ts pl ai n la ngu age , s ec tion 75 -7-6 05 al low s Ms

. D ah l, as a s ettl or of the Tru s t, to re voke th e T rus t as it re la tes t o he r c ont rib ut ed proper ty—e ither marital or separate. Seea lsoR ES TATE M ENT (T H I RD )

O F T RUS TS § 63 cmt. k (2003) (“If a rev ocable t rust has mor e than one

s ettl or, .

. . ea c h s ettl or . . . may r ev o k e or a me nd the tru s t w ith reg ard to that po rt i o n o f the tr ust proper ty at tr ibutable to the settlor ’s contr i bu t i on.”). On remand, the district court should consider the pro pert y contain e d wit hin the Trust and determine

w he t h e r i ti s f a i r l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d a s c o m m u n i ty , m a r i t a l , or
s ep ara te. It s hou ld the n a ll owMs . D ah l to r evoke the Tru s t w ith

12D A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

(...continued) 12 pu rpos e of

equi tab le di s trib ut ion, th ec o urtmu s t de term in e w he the r the prop erty was ac qu ire d d uri ng the ma rria ge. Onc e th e c ou rt deter mines that a p a rt icul ar piece of pro pert y is marital, Ms. Dahl may rev oke her contribution of that pr oper ty in its entir ety , and the

c ou rt m ay th en

di vid e th e p rope rty equi tab ly.
We re w e to c ons tru e th e T rus t as irre voc ab le , i t w ou ld c rea te a 13 serious confli ct between trust law and d i v o r ce law i n Utah. The quest i on of w h e th e r a s p ou s e c ou l d c re a te a n i rr e vo c a b l e tr u s t in whic h he or she placed marita l p r o p ert y, ther eby frustrat ing the equi tab le di s tribution o f p rope rty in the event of

a d ivorc e, is not before us in this c ase. Accordingly, we tak e no position o n a likely

ou tc om e of

s uc h c onfli c t. R ather, w e b rin g th e p otentia l p itf al ls to the Legislature’ s attentio n.

16 rega rd to the porti on o f the Tru s t prop erty a ttrib ut ab le to ei the r he r
s ep ara te p rope rty or an y m ari talprop erty. ¶39 S uc h ares ul t ac c ords w ith fu nd am entalpri nc ip le s gov erning marit al proper ty under Utah law. Were we to decide that Ms. Dahl h ad no e nf o r ce a ble interest in the Trust, despite having contributed marit al proper ty t o it, t he result would be to allow a spouse to shield m arital pr oper ty fr om equita bl e d i vision in the eventof divor ce. And that is exactly what Dr. Dahl attempted to do in thi s c as e. He c rafted a tru s t agr ee men t pu rporti ng t o el im in ate

any intere s t Ms . D ah l h ad in the Tru s t prop erty u pon the c ou pl e’s di vorc e. Bu t Uta h l aw doe s not al low s pou s es to pl ac e m ari talas s ets in revo cable t r us ts and then shi eld those assets from equitable prop erty d ivi s ion

in the event of

a d ivorc e. 13
D. The Distric t Court Erred When It Purported to

Rul e on Issues Not Before It ¶40 In its Nove mb er 1 1, 20 11 orde r, the di s tric t c ou rt granted

s umma ry j ud gm ent in

fa vor of the Tru s t D efen da nts on M s . D ah l’ s request for a deter mination that the Trust was “null and vo id.” The court r ecognized, corr ectly, that “null and vo id” is not a valid cau se of action. Itwent on to note, “T he r e a re no mat erial factual al le gati ons in the Am en de d Com pl ai nt tha t ac c us e th e D efen da nts of fraud, mis take , duress, u ndue influenc e, illegality or other wis e contend that t he trust is violat ive of publi c policy or contrar y to law

or s tatu te. ” D es pi te th e acknow le dgm ent tha t s uc h cl ai ms w ere n ot be fo re i t, th e ord er s tate s in a f ootn ote:Cite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

17 However , even if the Plain t i ff wer e to make suc h a claim, the statute of limitations has pas sed on all

caus es o f action related t o tho se theor ies. U.C.A. 78B2-30 5 ( 2 0 1 0 a s Am e n d e d ) l i m i ts a c ti on s b a s e d on the gr ounds of fraud or mistake to three year s. 78B-2- 307 (2010 a s A mended) l imits ac tions based u pon a cont r a ct , obligatio n, or liability no t founded upon an in s tru me nt i n w riti ng a s w el l a s oth er a c tio ns not detailed in the statute t o four y ears. 78B-2-309 (2010 as Am en de d) li mi ts ac tion s ba sed upon any c ont rac t, obligatio n, or liability founded upon an instrument in writing, t o six year s. ¶41 Ms . D ah l a rgu es tha t it w as improp er f or th e d is tric t c ou rt to ren de r an

ad vis ory op inion

on c la im s notbe fo re it. We agre e. As the orde r c onc ed es , Ms . Da hl di d not bri ng cl ai ms of fra ud , m is take , duress, or undu e influ ence as grounds for findin g the Tr ust void ab le . As s uc h, any pos s ib le de fe ns es to s uc h c la im s c annotha ve been fu lly and fairly litigat ed be fo r e the district court . Thus , the district court’ s pronouncement with respect to t he validity of suc h potent ial claims c an have no pre clus ive effect. See Macris & Assocs., In c. v . Neways, I

nc. , 2000 UT 93, ¶ 37, 16 P.3d 1214 (requiring that an “‘i s s ue mu s t ha ve b een c om pe tently, fu ll y , and fa irl y li tiga ted ’” t o have pre clus ive effect). ¶42 In summary, because the dis tr ict court’s Nov ember 11, 2011 or der was internally inconsis tent, we str ike tho se paragr aphs of the orde r in di c ati ng tha t it d ecline d t o enter ade c la ratory judgment as i nconsi stent with the holding of t he co ur t

. As to M s. Dahl’s sub stantive claims, w e construe the Tr us t agr eement according to Utah law based on Utah’s long-standing publi c policy interest in t he equitable division of marital as sets upon divor ce. We conclu de that Dr. Dahl reserv ed an unrestricted power to amend the Tru s t in the Tru s t agre em ent. U nd er Uta h l aw , th is unres tr ic ted pow er to a me nd gave D r. D ah l th e p ow er to re v o k e the Tru s t, there by render ing t he Trust rev ocable. Becau se Ms. Dahl

c ont rib ut ed ma rita l p rope rty to th e T rus t, s he reta in s the s tatu s of

s ettl or an d m ay re voke th e T rus t as to h er c ont rib ut ion of bo th h er separate pr oper ty and any mar ital assets. We therefor e remand the tr ust cas e, whic h we have consolidated with the divor ce cas e, to the divor ce court for purposes of e q uitably distributing those Trust

as s ets tha t are ma rita l p rope rty. Fi na ll y, w e vacat e th at p ortio n ofD A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

18 the court’s Nove mber 11, 2011 or der purpo rt ing to opine on claims notbe fo re i t.
II I. THE DI VO RC E C ASE ¶43 We now turn to Ms. Dahl’s appeal in the divor ce cas e. Ms. Dahl raises multiple c laims of err or and requests that w erev erse and remand the case for an entirely new tr ial. First, Ms. Dahlcontends that she is en t i tled to a new trial becaus e the district judge was bi as ed aga in s t he r. S ec ond , Ms . D ah l a s s erts tha t th e d is tric t c ou rt abus ed its disc ret ion in several o f its pret rial evidentiary rulings by (1 ) f ai li ng t o c om pe l d is c overy, (2 ) ex c lu di ng m any of Ms . D ah l’ s prop os ed tria l e xhibi ts , a nd (3 ) li mi tin g the tes tim onyof Ms . D ah l’ s exp ert w itn es s es . T hi rd, M s. Dahl a rgu es tha t th e d is tric t c ou rt ab us ed its di s c reti on w he n it refus ed to aw ard Ms . D ah l te mp orary
or permanent alimony. Fo urth, Ms. Dahl argues that t he district

c ou rt abu s ed its di s c reti on w he n i t f ai le d to d ivi de the c ou pl e’s marital assets evenly and equitably. Fifth, Ms. D ahl ass ert s that the distri c t c ou rt e rr e d w h e n i t re fu s e d to a l l ow Ms

. D a h l to file an

am en de d p le ad in g in

orde r to s eekj oint c us todyof t he c ou pl e’s

c hi ld ren . Fi na ll y, Ms . D ah l argu es tha t the di s tric t c ou rt ab us ed its disc ret ion when it denied her motion for at t o r ne y fe es. For the reasons disc uss ed below, we affirm in pa r t , r ever se in part, and remand for furt her pro ceedings c onsistent with this opinion. A. Judge Taylor W

as Not Subject to Disqualification ¶44 On at least three occ asions during the pr oceedings below, Ms. Dahl as serted that the district judge presiding over the divo rce case, J udge Taylor , was b iased against her and sh ould be di s qu al ifie d. Firs t, on Nove mb er 2 6, 20 07, Ms . D ah l fil ed a m otio n to disqualify Jud ge Tayl o r , arg uing that his comm ents and actions dur i n g t h e c ou rs e of th e d i vo rc e p ro c e e d i n gs c re a te d the “appearance of impropriet y and partiality.” Specifically, Ms. Dahl alleged (1) that Judge Taylor ha d d enied her equal acc ess to the court by pr eferentially g ranting Dr . Dahl’s motions while denying her mot ions and ( 2) that Judge Taylor had indicated bias against Ms. Dahl an d her counsel w hen he made c omments expressing

annoy anc e w ith

the la c k of

c oope rati on b etw een

the pa rtie s . As requi red byrul e 6 3 of the Uta h R ul es of

Ci vilPr o ced ur e, Ju dge Taylor ce r t i fied M s. Dahl’s motion to the presiding judge of the Four th District, who denied the motion. ¶45 Second, on October 21, 2009, Judge Taylor disc losed to t he pa rtie s tha t hi s w ife was s c he du le d to un de rgo a s urgic alproc ed ureCite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

19 that would be perfor med by a cardiolog ist who was a member of the

same m edical group thatemployed Dr. Dahl. Ms. Dahl filed a notice in di c ati ng tha t s he w ou ld notw ai vethi sp o t e nt i a lc onfli c t of intere s t. Eve n th ou gh M s . D ah l h ad pre viou s ly fil ed a ru le 63 mo t ion to disq ualify, Ju dge Taylor sub mitted the question o f the potent ial

co nflic t to the presiding judge for r eview. SeeU T A H R. C IV

. P. 63(b) (1)( C) (“No party may file more than one motion t o disqualif y in an ac tion .” ). After c ons id eri ng affi da vits s ub mi tted bythe pa rtie s and condu cting a telephone conference on t he matter , the presiding judge determined that Judge Taylo r need notbe disqu alified. ¶46 Fin al ly, after th e divorc e trialc onc lu de d, Ms . D ah l a rgu ed that she shoul d be grante d a new trial becaus e Judge Taylor was biased. S pecifi cally, sh e alleged thatshe and J udge Taylor had interacted t wenty year s previo usly when she w as a wi tness in a c ase in whic h J ud ge T ayl or w as s ervi ng a s a p ros ec ut or. She fu rthe r al le g ed tha t J ud ge T ayl or ha d i na pp ropri ate ly que s tioned he r commitment to t he LDS faith. With respect to the prior inter action, Ms . D ah l a ll ege d th at th en-p ros ec ut or T ayl or b ec am e u ps et w he n Ms . D ah l s ug ges ted tha t th e s tate pros ec ut e LD S Churc h of fi c ia ls fo r failing to r epor t a church m ember who had engag e d in ch ild molestation. M s. Dahl maintains that Ju dge T aylor harbor ed ill wil l tow ard he r on the ba s is of thi s pre viou s interac tion , w hi c h i n tu rn
caus ed him to question her commitment to the LDS f aith during the divor ce tr ial. Judge Taylor denied Ms. Dahl’s motion for a new tr ial, in di c ati ng tha t he ha d n o in de pe nd ent rec oll ec tion of Ms . D ah l’ s involve me nt i n th e c as e d ec ad es pri or. ¶47 On a pp ea l, Ms . Da hl c ont inue s to as s ert th at J ud ge T ayl or
w as bi as ed aga in s t he r an d th eref ore s hou ld ha ve b een di s qu al ifie d (1) b ecaus e he made negative comments ab out her and is sued m any rulings adverse t o her, ( 2 ) because Jud ge Taylo r’s wife was sch eduled to undergo surgery with a memb er o f Dr. Dahl ’s medic al g r o u p , a n d ( 3 ) b e c a u s e J u d g e T a y l o r w a s b i a s e d a g a i n s t h e r ba s ed on the ir i nte ract io ns in the pri or c as e. Th e que s tion of disqu alific ation due to judi cial b ias is a question of law thatwe
rev iew for corr ectness, giving no deference to the de ci si on below. State v. Alo nzo , 9 73 P .2 d 9 75 , 9 79 (U tah 19 98 ). We fi nd no ba sis for conclu ding that Judge Taylor should h ave been disqualified.
1. Adver se Rulings and Indications of Fr ustratio n Are I nsu ffic ient to Demonstr ate JudicialBias ¶ 4 8 Ms

. D a h l a s s e r t s t h a t a n o b j e c t i v e a n a l y s i s o f

Ju dge Taylor’ s c om me nts an d ru li ngs w ou ld le ad a r ea sona bl e p ers on t oD A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

20 qu es tion hi s impa rt ia li ty an d th eref ore J ud ge T ayl or s hou ld ha ve be en di s qu al ifie d. In

s up port o f h er a s s erti on, Ms . D ahl poi nts to

s evera l a dve rs e ru li ngs Ju dge Taylor ma de aga in s t he r an d to J ud ge Taylor ’s statement that“Ms. Dahl an d her co un se l annoyed him.” We are not p ersuaded that t hese ins tances s uggest judicialbias an d hol d th at Ju dge Taylor’ s ad vers e rul in gs an d on e- tim e s tate me nt o f fru s trati on a re i nsuffic ie nt i nd ic ati ons of pa rtia li ty to requi re disqu alific ation. ¶49 A judge should b e disqual ified when circum stances arise in whic h the j udge’s “impartiality mightreasonably be questioned.” Sta tev. Ga rd ner

, 789 P .2 d 273 , 278 (U tah 19 89 ). Ju dge s are pre s um ed to be qualified and a party alleg ing bias on the par t of the judge has t he burden of demonstrating t hat the judge is not qualified. In re Af f i d avit of Bias , 9 4 7 P

. 2 d 1 1 5 2 , 1 1 5 3 ( U t a h 1 9 9 7 ) ( M e m . of Zimmerman, C.J.); seea lso46 A M

. J UR

. 2 D Ju dg es § 129 (2008) ( “The law presum es th a t a judge is u nbias ed and unp rejudiced.”)

. Moreove r, p arti es c la im in g bi as mu s t de mo ns trate tha t th e a ll ege d bias s tems fr o m an ex tr ajudi cial s ource. State v. Mungu ia, 20 11 UT 5, ¶ 1 7, 2 5 3 P.3d 1082 (“In other wor ds, the bias or prejudice must

usu ally stem from an ext rajudici al source, not fro m occu r r e nces in the pro ceedings b efore t he jud ge.” (emphasis omitte d) (int e rnal quotat ion marks omitt ed)); seea lso46 A M

. J UR

. 2 D Ju dg es § 131 (2008) (“[T ]he alleged b ias and prejudice of a judge mus t s te m f r o m an ext rajudici al source and result i n an opinion on the merits on some ba s is oth er than w ha t the j ud ge l ea rne d fromhi s or he r pa rtic ip ati on in the case . . . .”)

. ¶50 In Sta tev. Mungui a , w e w ere as ked to de term in e w he the r a j ud ge s hou ld ha ve d is qu al ifie d h im s el f b ec au s e of ne gati ve comments h e made to t he defendant in a criminal case. 2011 UT 5, ¶¶ 15–20. In that case, the ju dge challenged t he d efendant about whether he understood who was at fault or whether the defendant still thought his actions wer e a goo d exper ience for the victims. Id. Th ou gh we ac kno w le dge d th at “ w e ex pe c t ou r j ud ges to b e p ati ent, dignified, and c ourt eous to litigants, jurors, w itnesses , lawyers, and other s” with whom they interact in an official capac ity , we nonetheless held thata judge’s s how of anger o r frustr ation with a defend a n t, b a s e d on th a t d e f e n d a n t’ s b e h a vi ord u ri n g t he proceedings, was not g ro unds for disqualifi cation. Id. ¶ 20 (internal quotat ion marks omitt ed). ¶51 In thi s c as e, Ms . D ah l c la im s tha t J ud ge T ayl or w as bi as ed aga in s t he r be c au s e h e s tate d, “I a m c an did ly a nn oyed tha t I’mCite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

In suppl emental briefing, Ms. Dahl contends that rule 63 of the 14 (continued...)

21 get ting so many r equests for rev iew and obj ections . . . . It is counter-p ro d u c ti veto ge tt i n g t h i s c a s e re s ol ve d

. ” On i ts f a c e , thi s
s tate me nt of fr ustra tion aros e from

the proc eed in gs be fo re J ud ge Taylor, notfro m s om e ex traj ud ic ia l s ou rc e. F urthe rmo re, Ju dge Ta ylor d i r e c t e d h i s s t a t e m e n t t o a l l c o u n s e l a t t r i a l

. H e d id not single out any part icul ar litig ant or couns el. On these facts, w e find nothing suggesting judicial b ias. ¶52 Ms. Dahl als o contends that a r easona bl e p e rson would qu es tion Ju dge Taylor’ s impa rtia li ty b ec au s e of the nu mb er of rulings he made ag a inst her. This contention is wholly without

me r it

. We ha ve rep ea ted ly h el d th at a dve rs e ru li ngs al one are insu ffic ient to establish the existence of judic ial bias

. In re A ffi da vit of Bias , 947 P.2d at 1154 (“[N] o dedu ction of bias and prejudic e may be ma de fro m a dve rs e ru li ngs bya j ud ge. ” ( intern alqu o t a t i o n m a rks

om i tte d)); In re Inquiry C oncern ing a Judge , 2003 UT 35, ¶ 7, 81 P.3d 75 8 (p er cu ria m) (“ Th ere is ne ith er afa c tu alnor ale galba s is

. . . f or conclu ding t hat a judge wh o r ules agains t a part y on a par ticular legal issu e is biased ag ainst t hat party .”). To hold other wis e would expose judges to accus ations of bias in ever y case becaus e ever y case
ne c e s s a ri l y re q u i re s ru l i n gs a d ve rs e to on e p a rty or th e ot her. We the ref ore h old tha t J ud ge Taylor w as not s ub j ec t to di s qu al ific ati on becau se there is no ev idence in the re cord of ex tr ajudi cial b ias.
2. The S chedu led Su rg ery of Judge Taylor ’s Wife Is Not a Suffic ient Basis to Establish Ju dicial B ias ¶53 We ne xt tu rn to Ms . D ah l’ s al le gati on tha t J ud ge T ayl or
s hou ld ha ve b een

di s quali fie d b ec au s e h is w ife w as s c he du le d to

un de rgo c ard ia c s urg ery p erf orm ed byan oth er c ard iol ogis t in D r. D ah l’ s me di c al pra c tic e group

. D uri ng tria l, Ju dge Taylor d is c los ed the up c om in g s urg ery to th e p arti es an d re qu es ted tha t b othpa rtie s consider waiving any pote ntial conflic t. Dr. Dahl agree d, but Ms. Dahl refus ed. ¶54 Ms. Dahl argues that she sh ould have been allowed to file another formal motio n to disqualify Ju dge T aylor but she w as barred fr om doing so because s he had previo usly filed s uch a
mo tion . Ru le 63 of the Uta h Ru le s of Ci vil P roc ed ure al low s pa rtie s to move fo r d i s q u a l i f i c a ti on of a j u d ge , b u t i t l i m i ts p a rt i e s to one motion t o disqualif

y in any action. U T A H R. C IV

. P. 63(b )(1) (C). 14D A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

(...continued) 14 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure limits a part y’s ability to ensure a fair tria l. S he argu es tha t a ju dge w ou ld ha ve “ c arte bl anc he to b e b ia s ed

once a rule 63 motion has been denied,” becau se a party can file only one motio n to disqualify a ju dge. We ar e not per suaded. A s ingle motion t o disqualif

y is suf fici ent in most cases and parties ret ain the ab il ity t o s eekan

extra ordi na ry w rit in c as es w he re th e a pp li c ati on of the rul e w ou ld c rea te a s ub s tantia l in j us tic e. Ms

. D ah l urg es us to adopt a standard similar to tha t applied in the federal courts, in

w hi c h a j ud ge may be di s qu al ifie d if the re is c ond uc t th at m anifes ts a “ de ep -s ea ted fa v o r i t i s m o ra nt a g o ni s m

tow ard a p arty. ” H ow ever, the manifes tatio n of bias alleged by Ms. Dahl wo uld not establish j ud ic ia l b i a s u n d e r t h a tr u l e e i t h e r , a n d w e d e c l i n e M s

. D a h l ’s invitat ion to adopt a new standard for judicial di squali fication.

22 This limitation, however , did not adv ersely affect Ms. Dahl b ecaus e Judge Taylor nev ert heless sub mitted the matt er t o t he presiding judge for c o ns i d erat ion, and the presiding judge determined that disqu alific ation was not re quired. M s. Dahl argues that this was error b ec au s e the r e was a pos s ib il ity tha t D r. D ah l c ou ld ha ve trea ted Ju dge Taylor’ s w ife h ad he c overe d rota tion s fo r the oth er doc tors in

hi s pra c tic e. We fi nd no e rror. ¶55 As w e have discu ssed, a j udge may be proper ly disqu a l ifi e dif a party demo nstrates the ex istence of bias or prejudice

s temmi ng froman

extra j udic ia l s ou rc e, s uc h a s a s oc ia l or professional relatio nshi p. Mungui a , 2011 UT 5, ¶ 17. Ms. Dahl h as identified a potential pro fess ional rel a t i o nshi p. But a potent ial relat ionship i s not eno ugh. And to show an actual professi onal relat ionship, Ms. D ahl would h ave needed to e stablis h that Dr. Dahl

cover ed r o t a tions for o ther do ctor s in the gro up and that those rotati ons c ou ld inc lu de trea tm ent of Ju dge Taylor’ s w ife. ¶56 Ms. Dahl di d not meet her burden. Dr. Dahl s ubm itted an affidavit in the district c ourt testifying to the following: (1) D r. Dahl doe s notkno wJu dge Taylor’ s w ife a nd ha s ne ver seen h er c ha rt; (2 ) J ud ge Taylor’ s w ife w as not a p ati ent of D r. D ah l; (3 ) the doc tors at Ut ah Central Clinic had their o wnpatients and the patients of a pa rtic ul ar d oc tor are notc li ents of the c lin ic; (4 ) the doc tor pe rfo rmi ng the s urg ery on Ju dge T ayl or’s w ife, D r. Hw an g, be lon ged to a s ep ara te group wit hi n th e c li ni c an d th eref ore D r. D ah l h ad no fin anc ia l ti es w ith the s urg ery; an d ( 5) D r. D ah l i s not on the Boa rd of

D ire c tors of

the c li ni c an d ha s no s ay i n th e p rac tic esCite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

23 of ot her docto rs in the c linic

. In short, there was no possibil ity t hat Dr. Dahl c ould be involved in the t reat ment of Judge Taylor’ s wi fe

or that he could financ ially benefit from that tr eatment. Becaus e the only connection established by the ev idence w as that Dr . Dahl work ed in the same b ui lding as another surgeo n who would pe rfo rmt h e s u r g e r y o nJ u d g e T a y l o r ’ s w i f e , J u d g e T a y l o r w a s n ot sub ject to disqualification.
3. Ju dge Taylor’ s Int er action w ith Ms . D ah l Tw enty- Three Y ea rs P revi ou s ly D id Not R equi re D is qu al ific ati on ¶57 Ms. Dahl’s final alleged basis f or judi cial b ias w as an interactio n she had wi t h J ud g e Ta y l o r t we nt y -t hr e e y e a r s p r e v i o us ly in wh ich h e had allegedly criticized he r religio us devotio n. Ac c o r d i n gt o M s

. D a h l , J u d g e T a y l o r , w h o w a s t h e na p r o s e c u t or,
was involv ed in the prosecu tion of a man accu sed o f sexually abus ing children. M s. Dahl was a witness for t he prosecution at t he sentencin g hearing. The defendant had confess ed to hi s c hurch leaders, but the leaders had failed to re port the abuse to legal authorit ies. Ms. Dahl alleges that when she requested that t henpros ec ut or T ayl or pros ec ut e th e c hu rc h le ad ers fo r fa il ure to rep ort, he c om pa red he r to a “s on of pe rdi tion .” Ms

. D ah l as s erts tha t J ud ge Tay l o r continued to harbor ill wil l toward her and improperly compared her and Dr. Dahl’s religious devot ion. ¶58 Ms

. D ah l’ s c la im

is s impl y no t s up porte d b y th e evi de nc e. In hi s orde r de nyi ng M s

. D ah l’ s mo tion fo r a n ewtria l, Ju dge Taylor found:
1. The Court f i nd s that with reg ard to [Ms. Dahl’s] claim s reg arding the [prior ] case, that the Courthas no independent recollection of the case bec ause as a pros ec ut or, th e c as e w as pros ec ut ed 23 yea rs ago. 2. T h e C ou rtf i n d s th a t i t h a s n o i n d e p endent recollection of any i nvolv ement with Mrs. Dahl and in fact Mrs. Dahl apparently had a different name at the tim e. 3. The Court finds that the [prio r] case w as one that involv ed child abu se and that[defendant] plead gu il ty. T he Cou rt rec al ls tha t t he c as e w as ap pe al ed and that the r esult was achieved and aff i r med. [Defendant] served a mandator y prison t erm.D A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

24 4. The Court f i nd s t hat it is not aware o f wh at ha pp en ed to [ de fe nd ant] s inc e the tim e fram e s et f orth 23 yea rs ago, exc ep t tha t [d efen da nt] w as s entenc ed to prison.
5. The Court find s t ha t it do es not ev en create an ap pe ara nc e of improp rie ty. Th e .

. . c as e from23 yea rs ago has absolutely no involv ement in this c ase and denies the Mo tion for a New Trial bas ed upon that claim

. ¶59 Th e f ac t th at th ee v e nt sal le ged byMs . D ah l h ap pe ne d ove r tw e nt y year s ago, thatMs. Dahl w ent by a different name at t he time, and that Judge Taylor had no independent r ecollection of the

events de scr ib ed byMs . D ah l i s ampl e s up port f or J ud ge T ayl or’s denial of the motion for disqu alific ation. ¶60 Sim ilarly, t he recor d d o e s not supp or t Ms. Dahl’s c laim tha t J ud ge T ayl or improp erl y c om pa red he r rel igi ou s de votio n to that o f Dr. Dahlor that he criticized her for failure t o adhere t o the pri nc iples of the LDSfaith. To sup port her claim, Ms. D ahl selectively cites the district court ’s F indings of Fact and Conclus ions of Law. But the di strict c ourt ’s find ings and c onclus ions as a w hole undermine her position. The court found: Although [Ms. Dahl] profess ed , d uring testimony , a commitment to t he LDSreligio n, there was

un di s pu ted tes tim onythat s he ha s exp res s ed frustratio n with the chu rch to [her daught er, C .D.], and has acquies ced in [ C.D.’s] d ecisi on to cease c hurch activity . [Dr. Dahl ] continues to a t t e nd with [ D.D]

. [D.D ] was recently baptized. It is no t th e p la ce o r intent

o f t his Co urt tojud geo r co mpa re t

helev el o f a ct ivi ty in a pa rtic u la r re lig io n, exce

pt toth e ex te nt

th a t d isa greem ent on this point may impact the family. Th e evide nc e d oes not demonstr ate any d i sagreement o r conduct that

ma kes a m ea ni ngfuldi fferenc e i n th e f am il y. (Emph asis added). Despi te the fact t hat the district court ex pressly declined to compare the religious activity of either party , Ms. Dahl st i l l m a i n ta i n s th a t t h e c ou rti m p ro p e rl y c omp a re d h e r r e ligious de votio n to tha t of

D r. D ah l. Bu t th at s ug ges tion is simp ly n ot supp or ted by t he facts. The court’s observ ation o f t he parties’ religio us practices and its conc lusi on that t hose practices had n oCite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

See U T A H R. J UD

. A D M IN . 4 -9 03 (5)(E)( vi) (e xpl ai ni ng tha t a 15

cus tody evaluatio n mus t consider “r eligious compatibility with the child ”).

25 bearing on it s cu stody det ermination were no t improper

. Ms. Dahl 15 has therefor e failed to demonstrat e that disqual ific ation was warrante d. ¶61 In s umma ry, J ud ge Taylor w as nots ub j ec t to di s qu al ific ati on i n thi s cas e b ec au s e Ms . D ah l h as fa il ed to demonstrate the existence o f bi a s or pr ejudic e stemming from an extra j ud ic ia l s ou rc e. B. The District Court Di d Not Ab use Its Disc retion in Its Pretrial

Evidentiary Ru lings ¶ 6 2 Ms

. D a h l n e x ta r g u e s t h a tt h e d i s t r i c tc o u r ta b u s e d i ts di s c reti on by ( 1) de nyi ng M s . D ah l’ s mo tion s to c om pe l d is c overy, (2) exclu ding many of Ms. Dahl’s propo sed trial exhibits, and (3) limiting the testimony of two of Ms. Dahl’s exper t witnesses . We fi nd no a bu s e of

di s c reti on. Rathe r, th e ru li ngs w ere a pp ropri ate be c au s e Ms . D ah l’ s c ou ns elfa il ed to compl y w ith ba s ic rul es of proc ed ure

. 1. The Di strict Co urt Di d N ot A bus e Its Disc ret ion in Denying Ms . D ah l’ s Moti ons to Compe l D is c overy ¶63 Dis cover y in this cas e was h ighly a c ri m oni ous. The di strict court apt ly described the disc ov ery process as “a train wreck” in whic h it was f or ced to i nt erv ene on numerous occas ions. As a gener al rule, we grantdistrict co urts a gr eat deal of defere nce in

ma tters of

di s c overy a nd revi ewdi s c overy ord ers fo r ab us e of disc ret ion. Green v. Lo ude r , 2001 UT 62, ¶ 37, 29 P. 3d 638. Ac c or d i n gl y, w e “ w i l l n ot f i n d a b u s e of d i s c re ti on a b sent an

err oneous conclu sion of law or where ther e is no evidentiar y basis for t he trial court ’s ruling.” Id. (internal quotat ion marks omitt ed). ¶64 On a pp ea l, Ms . D ah l a rgu es tha t th e dis tric t c ou rt ab us ed its d i s c r e t i o ni nt w o w a y s

. F i r s t, M s

. D a h l a l l e g e s t h a tD r

. D ah l’ s responses to her r eque st s for writte n disc ov ery were deficient and that t he district court should have gr anted her Aug ust 8, 2007 motion t o compel furt her discover y. Second, Ms. Dahl argues that the district courtshould h ave compelled Dr. Dahl to supplem ent his di s c overy re s pon s es pri or to tri al s o tha t s he w ou ld notbe fo rc ed toD A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

26 li t i g a t e h e r c a s e w i t ho u t

- o f

- d a t e i nf o r m a t i o n

. W e a d d r e s s e a c hof Ms. Dahl’s claim s in turn.

a. Ms. Dahl Has No t Adequately Briefed Her Ar gument that t he D is tric t Cou rt S hou ld Ha ve G ranted He r Moti on t o Compe l ¶65 The sc hedulin g or der adopt ed by the district court was dra ft ed byMs . D ah l’ s c ou ns el

. It set ade ad li ne fo r fa c t di s c overy of S ep tem be r 1, 20 07

an d l im ite d th e p arties t o a t otalof tw enty- fi ve interr ogat or ies, inc luding su bparts; four de p os i ti onsf orc u stody fact witness es; and s ix depositions for financ ial fact witnesses. Ms. D ahl

s erved he r fi rs t an d only s et of int erroga torie s an d re qu es ts fo r prod uc tion

of doc um ents on Ju ne 1, 20 07, j us t thre e m onths pri or to the di s c overy d ea dl in e. Ac c ordi ng t o Ms . Da hl , sh e n ever re c ei ved a response from Dr. Dahl, prompting her to file her August 8, 2007 Mot ion to Compel Disc ov ery Responses. ¶66 Th e c om mi s sioner c ons id ered Ms . D ah l’ s mo tion at a he ari ng o n Oc tob er 2 3, 20 07 . Attha t he ari ng , t he c om mi s s ion er orde red the pa rtie s to m ake the ir fil es ava il ab le fo r opp os in g c ou ns el to c opy. On a pp ea l, ne ith er p arty’ s br ie f provi de s argu me nt o r citations to t he recor d relatingto t his hearing. Instead, both part ies’ briefs refer to a July 17, 2007 hearing in whic h Ms. Dahl alleged that Dr. Dahl’s d isc ov ery responses were deficient. But a review of t he

recor d r e v e a ls that the July 17, 2007 hearing actually invo lved two di fferent m otio ns t o comp eltha t ha d b een fi le d a gai ns t Marl ette Enterp r ise s an d D r. C ha rle s M. D ah l, M.D . P C, D r. D ah l’ s professional corpor ation. Indeed, there is no su gge stion in the July 17 hearing t hat Ms. Dahl w as compl aining about the adequacy of the disc ov ery responses filed by Dr. Dahl in his personal c apacity. Ms. D ah l’ s c ha ll en ge on ap pe al c onc ern s onl y th e Au gu s t 8, 20 07 mo tion to c om pe l, w hi c h wa s fi le d agai ns t D r. Da hlin hi s pe rs ona l c ap ac ity. In short, t he parties’ briefing r efers to a hear ing on the wro ng motions to compel and f ails to direct t he court to the port ions of the

recor d that addre ss the c hallenged motion. ¶67 We ha ve rep ea ted ly s tate d tha t “[ a] pp el la te c ou rts are not a depositor y in whic h [a party] may du mp the burden of argument and research.” ASC

Uta h, In c. v . W

o lf Mo unta in Re so rts, L.C. , 2 01 3 UT 24 , ¶ 1 6, 30 9 P .3 d 2 01 (al t er ation s in origi na l) (i nte rna l quo tati on marks omitt ed); seea lsoAl len v . Friel , 2008 UT 56, ¶ 9, 194 P.3d 903. The record in this case s pans over t welve thousand pages. Ms. Dahl , as the appellant, bears the burden of directing our atte ntion to those porti ons of the rec ord th at s up port h er c la im tha t th e d is tric t c ou rt ab us ed its di s c reti on w he n i t d e ni e d h e rm o t i o n t o c om pe l d is c overy.Cite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

Rule 26(e) has been redesignated as rule 26(d) in the c urrent 16 Uta h R ul es of

Ci vilP roc ed ure

. We w il l refe r to the 200 9 versi on o f the rul es s inc e th os e ru le s govern ed thi s c as e.

27 SeeU T A H R. A PP

. P. 24(a) (9) (r equiring citatio ns to “part s of the

recor d relied on”); ASC Utah , 20 13 UT 24 , ¶ 16

. Eve n if Dr. Dah l’ s disc ov ery r e sp o nses were unsatisf actor y, we cannot conclu de that the di s tric t c ou rt ab us ed its di s c reti on ba s ed on M s . D ah l’ s bri efin g,
an d w e de c li ne to un de rtake the garga ntu an tas k of s iftin g throu gh the rec ord i n this c as e to m ake Ms . D ah l’ s argu me nt f or he r. b. Th e D is trict Court D id Not A bu s e Its D is c reti on Whe n I t D en ie d Ms . D ah l’ s Moti on t o Compe l Sup pl em entati on o f D is c overy ¶68 Ms . D ah l’ s s ec ond c la im o f er r or is tha t th e d is tric t c ou rt abus ed its disc ret ion when it denied her m otio n to compel D r. Dahl to supplement his d isc ov ery responses pr i o r t o tr ial. On July 31, 20 09 , Ms . D ah l fil ed a Moti on t o Compe l Supple mentati on o f Dis cover y Requests. In her support ing memorand um , M s. Dahl argu ed tha t D r. D ah l’ s res pon s es to h er J une 1 , 2 00 7 d is c overy requests were incomplete. Ms. Dahl also arg ued that Dr. Dahl had failed to supplem ent his dis cover y r esponses sinc e Dec e mb e r 19, 2007, when h e first responded to her initial discovery requests. ¶69 Rel yin g on

rul e 2 6( e) of

the Uta h Ru le s of Ci vilP roc ed ure , Ms . D ah l a rgu ed in

the tria l c ou rt th at Dr. D ah l had an ong oin g du ty to s up pl em ent hi s di s c overy re qu es ts

. Ru le 26 (e ) requi res pa rtie s 16
to s up pl em ent any di sclo sur es or res pon s es if tw o c ond iti ons are met. Fi r st , a party mus t supplement if the part y lear ns that the info rma tion

di s c los ed in its initi al di s c los ure s or in res pon s e to p rior interroga torie s , re qu es ts fo r prod uc tion , or re qu es ts fo r ad mi s s ion “is in some material respect incomplete or incorrect.” U T A H R. C IV

. P. 26(e) (1)– (2) (2009). Second, this duty to supp lement arises only if the corr ective information has not alr eady been made known to t he oth e r p a r t ies. Id. Th e d is tric t c ou rt de ni ed Ms . D ah l’ s mo tion to compel su pplementation becaus e it was fil ed “too late” and becaus e it was “not specifically focu sed enough t o be ch aracter ized as

s up pl em entati on. ” W e a gree

. ¶70 As thed i s tr i c t c ou rtnoted in its September 15, 2009 hearing on the ma tter, Ms . D ah l did not not if y D r. Da hl tha t s he c ons id ered hi s di s c overy re qu es ts to b e d efic ie nt u nti l J ul y 21 , 2 00 9. Th e c ou rt

s pe c ific al ly no t ed tha t Ms . D ah l’ s c ou ns elha d re c ei ved D r. D ah l’ sD A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

28 disc ov ery responses in D ecember 2007, but wai t e d until Ju ly 20 09 —l es s tha n tw o m onths be fo re th e S ep tembe r 20 0 9tr i a ld a t e— to request supplementat ion or to challenge the suffic iency of the

res pon s es . An d c ou ns el offe red no e xpl an ati on f or th e l ong de la y. We cannotc onc lu de tha t th e d is tric t c ou rt ab us ed its di s c reti on when it found that M s. Dahl’s motion was “too lit tle to o late.” ¶71 Moreove r, ru le 26 doe s not requi re aw hol es al e u pd ate to everydi s c overy re s ponse. P arti es mu s t s up pl em ent on ly i f the y disc ov er their initial responses were incomplete or incorrect in some importa nt w ay and that the corr ective information was n ot alr eady kno w n to the oth er p arty. D r. D ah l c la im s that all d oc um entati on
w as p rodu c ed as requi red , e ith er throu gh his initi aldi s c overy respon s e s or thro u gh re s p on s e s to va ri ou s s u b p oe n a s

. An d Ms. Dahl h as not identified any speci fic d o cu me nts introduced at tr ial de mo ns trati ng tha t D r. D ah l’ s initi al res pon s es w ere i nc om pl ete or that counsel did nothave the appr opriat e corr ective infor mation. In s tea d, s he ma kes onl y gen era li ze d a ll ega tion s tha t th e i nf orm ati on
wa s “ o ut of date” by t he time of tr ial. On these facts an d this bri e f i n g, w e c a nn o tc o n c l u d e t h a tt h e d i s t r i c tc o u r ta b u s e d i ts disc ret ion. Accordingly, we affirm.
2. Th e D is tric t Cou rt D id Not Ab us e Its D is c reti on Whe n I t Li mi ted the Number of Exhibits Ms. Dahl Was Allowed to Int ro duce at Trial ¶ 7 2 At a J u n e 1 7, 2 0 0 9 p r e t r i a l c o nf e r e n c e , t h e d i s t r i c tc ou rt

or d e red t he parties to exchange “an actual sc hedule of the people [the y pl anne d] to c al l a nd the exh ib its [the y pl anne d] to u s e” no l ate r than two weeks b efore the first day of trial. The court explained that the part ies were to “care fully contemplate who they [were] actually goingto call” and cautioned the parties against simply listing multitud e s o f potential witnesses. The court also r epeatedly emphas ized that the parties were to exchange the “actual exhibits” they planned to use at trial. ¶73 Th e exh ib it l is t s ub mi tted byMs . D ah l’ s c ou ns elfa il ed to comply with the court’s o rder . Nor did it compor t with any reasonable standards of pretr i a l disc losure. The exhibit list encompassed t he entire univer se of potential ex hibits an d was accompanied by a CD containing digital copi es of over 8,000 documents. For ex ample, the first exhibit listed was “[a]ny and all documents exch anged by the par ties as potential ex hibits in this matter on August 31, 2 0 0 9, to t he exte nt that t hey are admis sibl e.” Oth er l is ted exh ib its inc lu de d “ [a ]n y an d alldoc um ents ma intai ne d in the Court ’s file”; “[a]ll affidavits filed in this matter”; “[a]ll emailCite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

Th e tri alw as c ond uc ted ov er fourte en nonc ons ec ut ive da ys 17 between September and November 2009.

29 commu nications and other writte n commu nications between the pa rties”; “[a ]ny and al l a dmi ssibl e i nfo r mat io n, r ece iv ed pur suan tto S ub poe naD uc es Te c um or o t her di s c overy m eth od i n th e a bo veentitled matt er”; and “[ a]ny rebuttal exhibits.” The lis t was so broad and ov e ri n c l u s i ve a s to b e m e a n i n gl e s s

. It f a i l e d to i d e n ti fy any pa rtic ul ar e xhibi t b y an id entif yin g numbe r or a p arti c ul ari ze d de s c r i p t i o n a n d m a d e n o e ff o r t t o l i nk t h e g e n e r a l c a t e g o r ie s of doc uments to the elec tron ic doc um ents c ont ai ne d on the CD . In

s hort, th e ex hibi t li s t f ai le d to i de nti fyany s in gle doc um ent w ith

en ou gh p arti c ular it y t o al lowthe c ou rt or op pos in g c ou ns elto identify it as one Ms. Dahl planned to int ro duce at trial. ¶74 At t he final p ret rial m otio n hearing on Septemb er 15, 2009, the c ou rt c ons id ered D r. D ah l’ s ob j ec tion s to Ms . D ah l’ s exh ib it l is t. Th e c ou rt no ted the prob le ms w ith the exh ib it l is t, s tati ng: I tho ught my directio n to y ou was clear. It’ s the same direction I give to e ver y litig ant who prepar es for tr ial. I tell t hem to pre pare a list of the actu al exhibits, one byone tha t th ey i nte nd to introd uc e and you ’ve gi ven
me a l ist that says all the documents m aintained, all the a ff i davits, all the r ecords relied upon, all the

m a ri ta l c om m u n i c a ti on s

. T h a t’ s c om p l e te ly

unw or kable. I’m notgoingt o allow yo u to simply du mp al l your d is c overy on myde s k an d te llme to

s ort itou t. ¶75 Th e c ou rt th erea ft er s tru c k th e ex hibi t li s t an d ord ered

c ou ns elto res ub mi t a li s t tha t w ou ld id entif y pa rtic ul ar d oc um ents tha t he w ou ld us e w ith pa rtic ul ar w itn es s es

. In res pon s e, Ms . D ah l’ s
couns el filed an am ended exhibit list on S eptember 22, 2009, the first da y of tria l. Th e a me nd ed li s t, th ou gh i mp roved , c ont inu ed to

17 inclu de des i gna ti onss u c h as “[ a]ny and all docu ments exchanged by the pa rtie s as pote nti al exh ib its in thi s ma tter on Au gu s t 31 , 2 00 9, to the exte nt the y are ad mi s s ib le .” Th e c ou rt aga in exp res s ed its di s pl ea s ure at c o u n s e l ’ sfa i l u re to s pe c ific al ly i de nti fyw hi c h e xhibi ts he p l a nn e d to u s e a t t ri a l , c i ti n g t h e n e e d to gi ve a l l p a rt i e s fair notice. But the c ourtreserv ed its ruling on the amended exhibit list

untilthe ne xt s c he du le d tri alda y.D A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

Ms . D ah l a ls o de sig nat ed tw o oth er ex pe rt w itn es s es , Mr. 18 Th aye r an d Mr. Brou gh. Al tho ugh the di s tric t c ou rt al s o exc lu de d (continued...)

30 ¶76 On the next tr ial date, the court not ed that counsel for Ms. Dahl h ad yet t o subm it an acceptable w itness or e x hibit list. By Oc tob er 7, t he fi fth d ay of tria l, c ou ns elc ont inue d to a ttempt to intro duc e exhibits that had not pr evio usly been di scl osed to t he

c ou rt o r o p p o s i n g c o u n s e l

. T h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t p r o p e r l y r e fu s ed to al l o wt h e s e e x h i b i t s

. O nO c t o b e r 2 3 a n d N o v e mb e r 4 , c o u n s e l f or Ms. Dahl filed su pplemental e xhibit lists, w hich identified particular doc uments , b ut did no t id entif y w hi c h w itn es s w ou ld be us ed to introdu c e th e do cume nt s . B ec au s e Ms . D ah l’ s c ou ns elfa il ed to

s ub m i ta p r o p e r e x h i b i tl i s t, t h e d i s t r i c tc o u r tw a s c o nfr o n t e d w i th the daunting tasko f d e t e r mi ni ng , o n a d o cu me nt -b y -d o cu me nt basis during the cour se of trial, which exhib its had been previously produced. If a document had b een prev iously prod u c e d to op p os i ng
c ou ns el , th e tri alc ou rt ad mi tted it. If not, th e c ou rt exc lu de d i t. ¶77 M s . D ah l a rgu es tha t th e d is tric t c ou rt ab us ed its di s c reti on
w he n it excl ud ed mo s t of he r exh ib its ba s ed on c ou ns el ’s fa il ure to sub mit a proper exhibit list. Spec ific ally, M s. Da hl ar gues that the di s tric t c ou r t ’s pre tria l ord er requi rin g th at th e p arti es exc ha nge
w itness li s ts an d e xhibi ts w as unc le ar b ec au s e i t di d n ot s pe c if y a pa r t i c u l a r f o r m a tf o r t h e l i s t s

. W e d i s a g r e e

. T h e d i s t r i c tc o u rt’s orde r c le arly di rec ted the pa rtie s to de s ign ate pa rtic ul ar d oc um ents to be used w ith part icul ar witnesses an d to ex change those doc uments w ith

opp os in g c ou ns el . An d e ven if the di s tric t c ou rt’s orde r w ere u nc le ar, c ou ns elw as give n num erou s opp or t uni t ies to recti fy the situation and failed to do so. The district court would ha ve b een

j us tifie d i n re fu s in g to exc lu de al l of Ms . D ahl’ s exh ib its ba s ed on he r fa il ure to s ub mi t a prop er exh ib it li s t pri or to th e s tart of tr ial. And it appropr i a tely e xer cis ed its disc ret ion when it excluded all docu ments except those that t he parties stipulated had be en pre viou s ly d is c los ed du rin g di s c overy. 3. Th e D is tric t Cou rt D id Not Ab us e Its D is c reti on Wh en It L im ite d the Te s tim onyof

Ms . D ah l’ s Exp ert W itn es s es ¶78 Ms . D ah l a rgu estha t th e d is tric t c ou rt ab us ed its di s c reti on
w he n i t limite d th e te s tim onyof tw o of he r exp ert w itn es s es , D r. Barden and Dr. Mejia. Ms. Dahl timely des ignated D rs. Barden and Mej iaas exp erts pri or to tri al

. Al tho ugh the di s tric t c ou rt al low ed 18Cite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

(...continued) 18 their t estimony, Ms. Dahl does not ch allenge that ruling on appeal.
In 2 0 1 2 , rule 26(a)(3) was redesignated as rule 26(a) (4) in the 19

c urre nt U tah

Ru le s of Ci vilP roc ed ure . For con s is tenc y, we refer to the 20 09 vers ion

thro ughou t.

31 the s e tw o exp erts to tes tif y, it l im ite d th e s c ope of the ir te s tim onyto the re port s and affidavits the exper ts had file d e a rlier in the li tiga tion

. M s. Dahl a s s erts tha t th is li mi tati on w as an ab us e of di s c reti on. We di s agre e. ¶79 Rule 26(a)( 3) of t he Utah Rules o f Civ il Pr ocedure go ver ns exp ert te st imo ny. For ea c h e xpe rt w itn es s w hom a p arty e xpe c ts 19 to testi fy , the party is requi red to s ub mi t a w ritte n re port p rep are d by the exper t. U T A H R. C IV

. P

. 2 6 ( a ) ( 3 ) ( B ) ( 2 0 0 9 )

. I n r e l e v a nt p art, the rule r equires: The repor t shall c ontain the subjec t matt er o n whi ch the exper t is expected to testify; t he sub stance of the fa c ts an d op inion s to w hi c h th e ex pe r t is expe c ted to testify; a summary of thegr ounds f or each opinion; the q u a l i f i c a ti on s of

th e w i tn e s s , i n c l u d i n g al i s t o f a ll publi cations auth o r e d by the witness w ithin the pre c ed in g ten

yea rs ; th e c o mpen s ati on t o b e p ai d f or the s tu dy a nd tes tim ony ; and a listin g of any oth er
cases in which the witnes s has testified as an expert at tr ial or by deposition within the preceding four y ears. Id. Th ou gh c ou ns elfo r Ms. Dah l fil ed w ha t w ere s tyle d a s exp ert

w itn es s rep orts fo r D rs . B ard en an d Mej ia , n ei the r rep ort c om pl ie d with the requirements of r ule 26. ¶80 The expertrepo rt for Dr. Barden c onsisted of a mere four pages, contained no summary o f Dr. Barden’s qualifications or list of his publi cations, and identified the proposed sub ject matter of his tes tim ony onl y in the mo s t c urs ory w ay. For exa mp le , D r. B ard en’s exper t r epor t pro posed that he would “testify r e g a r d ing the importance of pro per me t hodolog y and responsible behavior in

c hi ld c us todyinves tiga tion s , evalu ati ons , a nd li tiga tion .” As g r o un ds fo r D r. B ard en’s opi ni on, the rep ort c ite d D r. B ard en’s “e du c ati on, kno w le dge , tra inin g, a nd experi enc e i n th e fie ld s of clin ical, c hild-c linic al, and forensic p sychology .” As the district

c ou rt no ted , th e expe rt rep ort w as “f ar l es s tha n a de qu ate ” to i nf ormD A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

32 the c ou rt or op pos ing partie s as to th e s c ope an d c ont ent of D r. Ba rde n’ s tes tim ony

. ¶81 The expertrepo rtfor Dr. M ejia was si mi l a rly d e ficient. The repo rtwas l ess than two pages and c ontain e d o nl y v ague de s c rip tion s of D r. Mej ia ’s prop os ed tes tim ony . T he rep ort f ai le d to inclu de a list of Dr. Mejia’s pub licatio ns or of pre vious cases in whic h he had testified. ¶82 Despi te these shortcomings, the di strict courtallowed Drs. Mejia and Barden to t est i fy , but limited their testimony to t hat consis tent with r epor ts they ha d fi l ed prev iously in the litigatio n. Gi ven Ms . D ah l’s fa il ure to pro vid e th e ki nd of prop er n otic e of exp ert tes tim ony c ont empl ate d by rul e 26, the di s tric t c ou rt di d n ot ab us e i ts di s c reti on in

li mi tin g th es e ex pe rts ’ tes tim onyin thi s w ay. ¶83 Pretr ial disc ov ery and dis closure are basi c skills that we expect all atto rneys to p ossess

. Our already over work ed d i st rict court jud ge ss h ou ld not be requir ed to pr ov ide remedial instructions to counsel on how to pr oper ly conduct disco v e r y , designate tr ial exhibits, or pr epare ex pertrepo rt s. Our courts r ely heavily o n the competence and dil igence of couns e l

. The ev identiary rulings Ms. D ah l compl ai ns of w ere la rgel y the res ul t of he r c ou ns el ’s in ab il ity to f oll owba s ic rul es of proc ed ure an d prop erl y ma na ge d is c overy. Ac c ordi ngly , w e c onc lu de tha t th e d is tric t c ou rt di d n ot ab us e i ts disc ret ion in its pretr ial evidentiar y r ulings.
C. T heDis trict

Co urt Did No t A bu se I ts Dis cre ti o n in De nyi ng Ms. Da hl’s Re qu ests fo r B o thTe mpo ra ry a nd P erm a nent

Al imo ny ¶84 Ms . D ahl n ext c ha ll en ges the di s tric t c ou rt’s de ni alof he r reques t s fo r t emporar y and permanent alimony. We r eview a district court’ s alimony det ermination for an abus e of discretion and “w il l n ot dis tu rb [i ts ] rul in g on al im ony as lon g as the c ou rt exe rc is es its di s c reti on w ithi n th e b ou nd s an d u nd er th e s tan da rds w e h ave set and has s upporte d its decis ion with adeq uate findings an d conclu sions.” Co nnel l v. Co nnel l , 2010 UT App 139, ¶ 5, 233 P.3d 836 (internal quotat ion marks omitt ed). We concl ude that althoug h Ms. Dahl ma y have qualified for an award of both tempor ary and permanent alimony, the district court did notabus e its disc ret ion in refus in g to m ake such an aw ard be c au s e Ms . D ah l’ s c ou ns el rep ea ted ly f ai le d t o provi de the c red ib le fi na nc ia l d oc um entati on
necess ary for t he district court t o make an adequate finding as to Ms. Dahl’s financ ial need.Cite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

33 1. The Dis tr ict Court Did Not A bus e Its Disc ret ion in Denying Ms. Dahl’s Request for Tempor ary Alimony ¶85 Ms. Dahl made several requests for t emporar y alimony in the yea rs be tw een the initi al di vorc e fil in g an d the t ria l. In a m otio n fo r orde r to s howc au s e fil ed s hort ly a ft er D r. D ah l p eti tioned fo r divor ce, Ms. Dahl m ov ed the courtfor an or der t o show why, among oth er reque s ts , “ [D r. D ah l] s hou ld notbe orde red to pa y tempora ry alimony in the amount of $9,300 per month.” Ms. Dahl attached as an exhibit to her motion a list of her alleged monthly liv ing expenses, whic h tot aled jus t ov er $1 1 , 0 00. But Ms. Dahl f ailed to include any fi na nc ia l d oc um entati on t o s ub s tantia te th es e all ege d expe ns es . In hi s res pon s e to Ms . D ah l’s moti on, D r. D ah l re fu ted ne arl y eve ry expense and instead arg ued that reasonable living ex penses for M s. Dahl w ould tot al approx imately $6,000 per month. ¶86 At th e h ea rin g on Ms . D ah l’ s fi rs t reque s t f or tempora ry al im ony , th e c om mi s s ion er d ete rmi ne d th at Ms. D ah l’ s de c la rati on
w as nots uf

fi c ie ntl y de tai le d a nd di d n ot h ave en ou gh e vid entia ry supp or t for him to comply with the rules, statutes, a nd case law gov erning alimony awards. The commis sioner als o f ound that Ms. Dahl’s alleged $11,000 in monthly expenses had been “based on the

as s umpti o n th at s he w ou ld be aw ard ed c us todyof the mi nor
c hi ldr en .” Be c au s e D r. D ah l h ad s inc e b een aw ard ed tempora ry
c us todyof

the c hi ld ren, th e c om mi s s ion er fo un d th at Ms . D ah l’ s exp en s es , “ w ere n o lon ger re le vant to th e te mp orary c irc um s tanc es of the pa rtie s .” Ci tin g to Whitehead v. W hitehead, 836 P.2d 814 (Utah Ct. Ap p

. 1 9 92), superse ded by statute on other grounds , U T A H C ODE § 7 8B -1 2- 11 2, an d to ru le 10 1 of the Utah Rule s of

Ci vilP roc ed ure , the commissio ne r held that “t he Courtis un able to consider [Ms. D ah l’ s ] r eq ues ts

. . . b as ed on the in ad equa te i nf orm ati on [ s he ] prov ided to t he Court .” ¶87 Tw o m onths la ter, Ms . D ah l fi le d an affi da vit i n s up port o f he r reque s t f or tempora ry al im ony . T he affi da vit, how ever, di d n ot inclu de any ver ific ation o f the expenses s he cl a i med, nor did it inc l u d e a ny v e ri f i c a ti on of h e r c u rr e n t fi n a n c i a l c on d i ti on orn eed. Instead, Ms. Dahl attached a 2005 tax r eturn and an appraisal of the

ma rita l h om e i n w hi c h sh e was no l ong er l ivi ng. Th e c om mi s s ion er aga in fo un d th e evi de nc e i ns uf fi c ie nt t o s up port a n a li mo ny a w ard

an d ord ered Ms . D ah l to fil e afi na nc ia l d ec la rati on tha t c om pl ie d

w ith rul e 1 01 (d ) o f the Uta h R ul es of Ci vilP roc ed ure

. ¶88 A third hear ing on this iss ue was held, bu t Ms. Dahl had notyet c om pl ie d w ith the c ou rt’s pri or orde r tha t s he provide aD A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

34 fi na nc ia l d ec la rati on. Th e c om mi s s ion er aga in, rel yin g on the Ru le s of Ci vilP roc ed ure , th e Uta h C ode , an d rel eva nt c as e l aw , d ec li ne d to awar d tempor a r y a l imony. The matter was then raised in the di s tric t c ou rt at ahe ari ng j us t f ou r da y s la ter. Th e d is tric t c ou rt orde red Ms . D ahl t o co mpl y w ith the c ommi s s ion er’s orde r fo r a financ ial declaration. ¶89 Ms . D ah l m ad e athi rd a ttempt at docu me nti ng h er fi na nc ia l n eed a m onth and a half l ate r w he n s he fi le d a“V eri fi ed Financial D eclaration.” I n contrast to he r first declaratio n, where she tes tifie d to j us t over $ 11 ,0 00 in mo nthly e xpe ns es, s he tes tifie d to

ov er $40,000 in mont hly expenses in add ition to $281,428.62 in legal fees and an additional $148,000 in projected fees

. But Ms. Dahl again fa il ed to pro vid e veri fi c ati on of any of the s e ex pe ns es . She provi de d no pro of of income, no bills , no checks, no lease agr eement, no bank

s tat e me nt s

. I n

s h o r t, s he provi de d a bs olu tel y no evi de nc e to s up port the claimed ex penses

. The commiss ioner ag ain ruled that Ms. Dahl had failed to prov ide suf fici ent ev idence to support an alimony

aw ard un de r Uta h l aw . S pe c ific al ly, he s tate d tha t he w as un ab le to make the ne ce ss a ry factual findings du e to a lack of credible evidence. When the d i st rict courtrev iewed and ruled on the

c ommis s ion er’s rec om me nd ati on, Ms . D ah l h ad s til l n ot c om pl ie d with the commis sioner’s or der for a financi a l d e claration, and the district court t herefor e adopted the commiss ioner’ s fin dings. Th e district c ourt expr essed dism ay w ith the f act that M s. Da hl had

o r i g i na ll y atte s ted to $1 1, 00 0 i n m onthl y exp en s es fo r he rs el f a nd he r two children and had s ubs equently att ested to $40,000 in monthly expenses for herself alone. The district c ourt found that “those two amounts [c ould not] be reconciled” and that Ms. Dahl’s financ ial de c la rati on w as the ref ore n ot c red ib le . T hu s the c ou rt de c li ne d to

aw ard Ms . D ah l te mp orary a li mo ny. ¶90 Nearly a year after the divo rce petit ion had been fi led, Ms. Dahl filed another motion f or tempor ary alimony, accompanied by

a n ewaffi da vit. In

thi s affida v it, Ms . D ah l c la imed exp en s es of $3 3, 16 6 p er m onth. Aga in, the re w as no s up porti ng d oc um entati on for t his am ount. O ne day prio r t o the hear ing on the mot ion, Ms. D ah l s ub mi tted a not ic e of erra ta to h er a ffid avi t, w hi c h fin al ly, after a ye ar of l iti gati on, inc lu de d ac opy o f arent c he c k, oth er c he c ks writt e nf oru nkn ow np u rp os e s , u ti l i tyb i l l s , a n d p a s t- d u e m e d i cal bills . These b ills totaled $2,651.78. ¶91 At t he hearing the next day, the commiss ioner t reat ed this second m otio n for te mporar y alimony as a motion t o r econsider theCite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

35 court’s prio r r ulings that no tempor ary alimony was w arr anted. The commis sioner de nied Ms. Dahl’s motion to reconsider, r easoning that M s. Dahl ha d been given ample oppor tunity t o file an acceptable affi d a vi t ( oneye a r of dis cover y and at least five hear ings), and that the court ’s prior ruling denyin g t e mporar y alimony was

nowthe la wof

the c as e. ¶92 Th e d is tric t c ou rt u lti ma tel y ad opte d t he c om mi s s ion er’s recommendation on the alimony issue. T he district court found that “[Ms. Dahl’s] [ c]ouns el was p rev iously p e r mit ted to re-file this Mot ion sever al times” bu t each time had failed to inclu de the

necess ary supp or ting documents. The courtthere fore r uled that Ms. D ah l “ ha d f ai le d to m eethe r bu rde n of proof” a nd aga in

de ni ed he r reque s t f or tempora ry al im ony

. Al tho ugh the c ou rt ne ver gra nte d Ms . Da hl an offi c ia l aw ard of tempora ry al im ony , s he w as aw ard ed a smallnumb er o f o ne-time pay ments t otaling $19,000, and Dr. Dahl volunt ari ly ga ve Ms . D ah l $ 4, 00 0 amo nth thro ughou t th e entire

c our se o f the di vorc e p roc eed in gs . In total , Ms . D ah l re c ei ved $1 62 ,0 00 fro m D r. D ah l w hi le the di vorc e w aspe nd in g. ¶93 On a pp ea l, Ms . Da hlargu es tha t th e d is tric t c ou rt ab us ed its disc ret ion in failing to award her temporar y alimony. According to M s. Da hl, she demonstrat ed her need for alimony during the pendency of t he divor ce pr oceedings. Alter natively , she argues that D r. D ah l’ s fi na nc ia l d ec la rati ons w ere s uf fi c ie nt to de mo ns trate he r need. Spec ific ally, s he asserts that sh e prov ided the c ourt with “at le as t five fi na nc ia l d ec la rati ons , a lon g w ith s evera l oth er fil in gs
s up por t ing her n eedfo r al im ony , p rovid in g c opi es of he r veri fi ed statements of income and expenses .” ¶94 Th e Utah Alimony Stat ute, U T A H C ODE § 3 0

- 3

- 5 (8), art icul ates seven factors thata cour t must consider in making an alimony deter mination: (i) the fin ancial c ondition and needs of the re ci p i e nt

s pou s e; (i i) the rec ip ie nt’s ea rni ng c ap ac ity o r ab il ity t o prod uc e i nc om e; (i ii ) the ab il ity of the pa yor s pou s e to p rovid e s up port; (i v) the le ngth of

the ma rria ge; (v) w he the r the rec ip ie nt sp ou s e has c us todyof mi nor
c hi ld ren requi rin g s up port; (vi) whether the r ecipient spous e work ed in a bu sines s owned or o perat ed by the payo r spouse; and (vi i) w he the r the rec ip ie nt s pou s e d ire c tly c ont rib ut edD A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

We note t hat t he type o f fin ancial d ocumentation that t he 20 dist r i ct court o rder ed Ms. Dahl to pro vide is now automatically requi red un de r rul e 2 6. 1 of the Uta h R ul es of

Ci v ilP roc ed ure

. Indeed, rule 26.1 p r o v i d e s a detailed list of the documents that (continued...)

36 to a ny i ncr ease in the payor spouse’s skill by paying fo r ed uc ati on re c ei ved bythe pa yor s pou s e or enabling the payor spouse to att end school during t he

ma rria ge. U T A H C ODE § 30-3-5( 8)(a)

. ¶95 The first three fac tor s are a codification of our analy sis in Jo nes v. Jo nes , 700 P .2 d 1072, 10 75 (U tah 19 85 ), an d a re often

referred to as the Jo nes fa c tors . A p arty s eek in g al im onybe ars the bu rde n of d e mo nstrating t o the cour t thatthe Jo nes f a c t o r s s u p p o r ta na w ard of alimony. See Whitehead, 836 P .2 d at 817 (a ffirm in g a dis tric t c ou rt’s de ci si o n to deny an award o f alimony where the recipient spouse “failed to prov e her financialneeds”); seea lsoBro eme r v . B ro eme r , 109 S o. 3 d 2 84 , 2 88 (Fla

. Dis t. C t. A pp . 2 01 3) (e xpl ai ni ng tha t w he re fo rme r w ife s ou ghtan aw ard of

al im ony , s he ha d “ the bu rde n to prov e her actual need and the former hus band’s ab ili ty t o pay
a limony”); Hage do rn v . Ha ge do rn , 8 2 2 N

. W

. 2 d 7 1 9 , 7 2 2 ( S

. D

. 2012) (h old in g th at “ [t ]h e p arty re qu es tin g al im onyha s the b ur de n to establish that t hey h ave a need for su pport and that t heir spouse has suffici ent means and ab ilities to pr ov ide for par t or all of that need” (internal quotat ion marks omitt ed)); In re M a rri ageo f Ro be rt , 820 N.W.2d 158 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012) (collecting cases fro m v arious j uri s di c tion s tha t have hel d tha t “th e party s eek in g s pou s als up port bears the burden of proo f”). ¶96 To satisfy this b urden, a party seeking a l i mo ny must prov ide the court with a credible financ ial declaration and financ ial doc umentati on t o de mo ns trate tha t th e Jo n es factors support an award of alimony. Bakanowsk i v. Baka nowski , 2003 UT App 357, ¶ 9, 80 P.3d 153 (explaini ng that befor e awarding alimony, “the t r ial

cour t i s r equired to make adequate factual fin dings on all material iss ues, u nless the facts in the record ar e clear, uncontrov ert ed, and

c ap ab le of

s up porti ng o nl y a fin di ng i n fav o r of the j ud gm ent” (internal quotat ion marks omitt ed)); seea lsoU T A H R. C IV

. P. 101(d) (1) (“Attachments for motio ns and responses regar ding alimony shall inc lu de inc om e veri fi c ati on a nd a fi na nc ia l d ec la rati on. ”)

. Fai lu re 20Cite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

(...continued) 20 parties to a divor ce mu st include i n t heir financ ial declarations. While this rule was not i n place at t he time of the Dahls’ divorce litigat ion and is t hu s not contro lling in this m atte r, t he fact that de tai le d fin anc ia l d oc um entati on i s nowau tom atic ally re qu ire d

s up ports the not ion

tha t th e dis tric t c ou rt di d not abu s e i ts di s c reti on in orde rin g s uc h d oc um entati on i n this c as e.

37 to c ons id er th e Jo nes fa c tors w he n d ete rmi ni ng a n a pp ropri ate alimony award “constitutes an abus e of discretion.” Pa ffe l v. Pa ffe l , 732 P.2d 96, 101 (Utah 1986). But where a party seeking alimony fa il s to s ati s fy its bu rde n, a d is tric t c ou rt w il l ge ne ral ly n ot ab us e i ts di s c reti on i n d ec li ni ng t o aw ard al im ony

. ¶97 For example, in Whitehead, the court of appeals affirmed a distr i ctcourt’s decision to deny a r equest for alimony where t he

rec i p i e nt spouse “f ailed to pr ov ide evidence of her needs” and where her allege d monthly living ex penses were “unsu bstantiated.” 836 P.2d at 817. And in Bakanowsk i , the court of appeals rever sed a tria l c o ur t ’s d eci sio n t o awa r d a lim o ny , ho ldi ngt hat “[t ]he t r ia l court abus ed its disc ret ion by failing to make adequat e finding s in awarding alimony.” 2003 UT App 357, ¶ 17; see a lsoBe ll v . B ell , 810 P .2 d 4 89 , 4 92(U t ah Ct. Ap p. 19 91 ) ( “[ T] he tria l c ou rt m us t m ake suffici ently detailed findin gs of fact on each [Jo nes ] fac tor to e nable

a re vie w ing c ou rt to en s ure tha t th e tri alc ou rt’s di s c reti ona ry deter mination was rat ionally based upon these three factor s.”). ¶98 In this cas e, although Dr. Da hl su bmitted suffici ent evidence to t he court t o dem onstrat e his ability to pay alimony, Ms. D ah l’ s c ou ns el rep ea ted ly fa il ed to c om pl y w ith the di s tric t c ou rt’s

or der t o supply the court with documentation demonstr ating t he

rem ai ni ng tw o Jo nes factors—Ms. D ahl’s financ ial need and earning capac ity. When t he commis sioner denied Ms. Dahl’s initial request for $11,000 per month in te mporar y alimony, he indicated that he would reconsider the request if Ms. Da hl would pro vide credible doc umentati on o f h er fin anc ia l n eed

. In s tea d of s up pl yin g th e c ou rt

w ith the reque s ted doc um entati on, Ms . Da hls ub mi tted a n ew declaration, r equesting ov er $40,000 in mon t hly alimony. The commis sioner and distr ict court found this amount even less

cre d i ble. A nd bec ause Ms. D ahl’s c ounsel again prov ided no evi de nc e to s ub s tantia te Ms. D ah l’ s al le ged mo nthly e xpe ns es or earning ability, t he district court app ro priately denied her requestD A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

Ms. Dahl testified that although she held und erg raduate and 21 grad ua te d egre es an d h ad be en empl oyed as a h igh

s c hoo l c ou ns el or pri or to h er m arri age , s he w as un ab le to w ork in he r pri or profes s ion be c au s e sh e had a nu mb er of med ic alprob le ms , i nc lu di ng C rohn’s di s ea s e, ul c era tive c o l iti s , a nd inters titi alc ys titi s . W ith res pe c t to h er spendin g during t he ma r riage , she testified that she had the fo ll ow in g m onthl y exp en s es : $ 50 0 f or ha nd ym an s ervi c es ; $ 2, 50 0 f or yard an d p ool m ai nte na nc e; $2 ,0 00 fo r up kee p of the ma rita l h om e; (continued...)

38 for t emporar y alimony. We therefor e affirm the di strict c ourton this is s ue

. 2. Th e Distr ict CourtDid Not Abuse Its Dis cretio n in D enying Ms. Dahl’s Request for Per manent Alimony ¶99 Ms . D ah l n ext a rgu es tha t, even if s he fa il ed to es tab li s h he r fi na nc ia l nee d prior to tri al , h er tri altes tim onyw as s uf fi c ie nt t o demonstrate a need for per manent alimony . Thus , she as serts that the di s tric t c ou rt ab us ed its di s c reti on w he n it d en ie d h er reque s t f or pe rma ne nt a li mo ny. We di s agre e. ¶100 As outlined abo v e , M s. Dahl failed to comply with the dis t r ict cou rt’s orde r tha t s he provi de c red ib le evi de nc e of he r fi na nc ia l n eed pri or to tri al. By the tim e of tria l— after n ea rly three year s of litigatio n—Ms. Dahl ’s counse l ha d still not filed an acceptable financ ial declaration. This f act was brought to the district court’s atte ntion when Dr. Dahl’s couns el noted that Ms. Dahl h ad not included a financi al declaration in her tr ial e xhibit list. When the district court aske d Ms. Dahl’s couns el about this apparent

overs ight, c ou ns elres pon de d th at Ms . D ahl w ou ld be rel yin g on financ ial information she had presented ov er two year s ear lier, the

s am e info rma tion tha t the c ou rt ha d a lre ad y ru le d to b e i ns uf fi c ie nt. ¶101 True to her couns el ’ s word, Ms. Dahl’s tr ial testimony mirro red her prev iously filed financ ial declarations in t hat it was de void of

s up porti ng e vid enc e. Al tho ugh Ms . D ah l a ttempte d to admit i n to e vi d e n c e a s u m m a ryof th e D a h l s ’ l i vi n g e xp e n s e s , the district court su stained Dr. Dahl’s objection to its admis sion bec ause Ms. Dahl’s couns el had not disclosed the d o cu me nt prio r t o tr ial. And Ms. Dahl f ailed to introduce any s upporting evidence suc h as thi rd-p ar t y tes tim ony , b ank s tate me nts , or b il ls to s up port h er requ e s t. In stead, she relied solely on her r ecollection of her spending ha bi ts , c urre nt e xpe ns es , a nd he r ab il ity t o w ork. 21Cite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

(...continued) 21 $4 00 fo r gifts ; $5 ,3 00 fo r c loth es an d fo od; $1 ,0 00 fo r enterta inme nt; $1 ,5 00 to $2,0 00 fo r trav e l ; $ 9 0 0 f o ra u t o m o b i le ma inten anc e ; an oth er $500 for clot he s; $ 4 0 0 –$ 5 0 0 fo r C o st co ; a nd $ 2 0 0 –$ 3 0 0 for depar tment

s tore c ard s . As to h er on goin g ex pe nse s , Ms . D ah l te s tifie d th at a hom e equi val ent to the ma rita l h om e w ou ld c os t $8 ,0 00 a m onth to rent a nd t ha tsh e r e q ui r e d t ho us a nd s o f d o l l a r s f o r me d i cal expenses , $4 ,4 00 fo r he al th i ns ura nc e, $2 00 fo r TV and Inte rne t, a nd $5 00 fo r maintenanc e of a cabin at T i mber Lake. But she prov ided no documentation to sub stantiate t hese alleged expenses.

39 ¶1 0 2 In c ontr a s t, w h e n D r. D a h l te s ti f i e d a s to h i s i n c ome and exp en s es , h e p res ente d a fi na nc ia l d ec la rati on tha t ha d b een prod uc ed as pa rt of

hi s pre tria l d is c los ure s an d th at w as s up porte d with fin ancial d ocuments s uch as bank and credit card stat ements, tax r eturns, and bills

. ¶103 In its Findings of Fact an d Conclus ions of Law, the district

c ou rt m ad e sp ec ific fi nd in gs w ith rega rd to eac h of the fa c tors li s ted in the Alim ony S tatut e. It first found that Ms. Dahl presented no

c red ib le tes tim ony t o es tab li s h h er c urre nt fin anc ia l n eed . In compar i ng Ms. Dahl’s testimony with thatof Dr. Dahl, the district court found that while Dr. Dahl “b ased his testimony aboutfamily expenses upon a s tudy of the accounts used to make the payments,” Ms . D ah l’ s tes tim ony“w as ba s ed up on agen era l i mp ressio n or estimate,” whic h w a s“ c ons i s tent with her characterizatio n of herself as having an u nl i mi ted budget.” Therefo re, while the court fo und Ms . D ah l’ s tes t imony inc red ib le an d u ns ub s tantia ted , i t f ou nd D r. Dahl’s testimony “cr edible and n ot r ebutted by ot her competent evidence.” ¶104 As to t he second ali mony factor , the district court found that M s. Dahl was not employ able in her prior occupation or as an interi or de s ign er, bu t f ou nd tha t “[ w ]h eth er s he is c ap ab le of oth er employment was not addressed in the evidence.” And in ass essin g Dr. Dahl’s ab ility t o pro vide support, t he court found he was capabl e of pa yin g $9 ,1 93 pe r mo nth in al im ony

. ¶105 As to t he remaining statuto ry factors, the courtfound that the part ies had b een married for seventeen y ears and seven months, that M s. Dahl would not hav e cus tody of the part ies’ minor children, th a t Ms

. D a h l w or ke d a s a s c h oo l c ou n s e l or fro m 1 9 8 5 to 1 9 9 2but had not worked outside of the h ome sinc e, and that “ther e [was ] noD A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

40 evidence that [Ms. Dahl] c ontr ibuted to [Dr. Dahl’s] pr o fe ss ional ability or skill or t hat she in any way co nt r i bu ted to the cost of his education.” ¶106 Upon applying t he relev ant law to t hese fac tual findin gs, the di s tric t c ou rt c onc lu de d th at Ms . D ah l “ fa il ed to m eethe r bu rde n to e s ta b l i s ha b a s i s f ora c l a i mf ors p ou s a l s u p p or t. ” B e c a u s e Ms

. D ah l d id notprovi de a cred ib le ac c ou nt o f h er c urre nt fin anc ia l n eed as required by the A limony Statute, t he co ur t found it “imp o ss i ble . . . t o dete rmine what level of spouse su pportis prese nt l y ne cess ary to r esult in a s tandard o f living at pr esent that would approach the prev ious liv ing condition.” The court thus held that by “ado pt[ing] the tr ial tactic of relying solely upon [Ms. D ahl’s]

es tim ate of exp en s es fro m the pe riod of ma rita l c oha bi tati on ra the r than prov iding realistic testimony abou t her curr ent assets, needs and ex penses ,” Ms. Dahl had precluded t he court fro m cons idering

an aw ard of

al im ony

. ¶10 7 On a pp ea l, Ms . D ah l a rgu es tha t th e dis tric t c ou rt ab us ed its di s c reti on i n f ai li ng t o aw ard he r pe rma ne nt a li mo ny. S pe c ific al ly, s he a l l e g e sth at ( 1) s he pre s ented the evi de nc e n ec es s ary to demo nstrate her need for alimony, (2) the court failed t o make t he

necess ary factual findings, ( 3) the co ur t failed to specif y the t ime pe riod it u s ed to ma ke its al im onyde term in ati on, an d (4) the c ou rt’s de c is ion to d e n yp e r m a ne nta l i m o n

yc r e a t e d as ub s tantia l i ne qu al ity. We address each argument in turn.

a. Ms . D ah l D id Not S ati s fyHe r Bu rde n of S how in g He r Fin anc ia l N eed ¶108 As the part y seeking an award o f permanent alimony, Ms. Dahl b or e the burden of pro viding the distr ict court with sufficient credible evidence of each f actor listed i n t he Alimony Statute. M s. Dahl argues that she “sh owed t ha t she had expenses an d had the

ne ed fo r an aw ard of al im ony ” and tha t he r tes tim onyw asc red ib le

. Bu t as exp la in ed ab ove, Ms . Da hl ’s tes tim ony c ons is ted s ole ly of he r recollection o f her marital e xpenses. She prov ided no financ ial de c la rati on, no s up porti ng fi na nc ia l doc um entati on, an d no ex pe rt testimony. No r did she prov ide t e stimony about whether she had

any no nm ari talprop erty or a sset s. Ms . D ah l’ s un s ub s tantia ted testimony did notsatisfy her burden o f showing her financi al need. ¶10 9 Al tern ati vel y, Ms

. D a hla r gu e sth a te v e n if th ed i s tric t c ou rt

corr ectly dete rmined that she failed to establish h er financial need,

s he s hou ld be rel ie ved fro m thi s bu rde n b ec au s e s he di d n ot h aveCite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

41 acces s to the mar it a l r e cords. This arg ument, however, is

uns upporte d by the record, w hich demonstrate s that Ms. Dahl had

over ayea r of disc overy, du rin g w hi c h ti me he r c ou ns elis s ue d hundreds of s ubpoenas to financ ial ins titutio ns to obtain doc umentary e vid enc e of the D ahls’ fi na nc es . In fa c t, Ms . D ah l’ s
ow n fin anc ia l e xpe rt, Mr. Brough, s ub mi tted an affi da vit to the c ou rt

ov er two and a half year s prior to t rial wherein he stated thathe saw over 2 0, 00 0 d oc um ents fro m the s e fin anc ia l in s titu tion s an d op in ed tha t th ou s an ds mo re w ou ld be prod uc ed du rin g di s c overy. In s hort, Ms

. Dahl’s arg ument that she was denied acc ess to the marit al

rec ords is w ith ou t m eri t. W e th erefore c onc lu de tha t Ms . D ah l f ai le d t o m e e th e r b u r d e no f s h o w i n gh e r f i n a n c i a l n e e d

— a n e c e s s a ry pre requi s ite to an

aw ard of

pe rma ne nt a li mo ny. b. T h e D i s tr i c t C ou rtMa d e S u ff i c i e n t F i n d i n gs a s to E a ch S tatu tory Al im onyFac tor ¶11 0 Ms . D ah l a ls o argu es tha t the di s tric t c ou rt fa il ed to m ake the ne c es s ary f ac tu alfi nd in gs to s up port i ts refus alt o o r d e ra li mo ny. Spec ific ally, she ass ert s t hat the district court failed t o consider the length of t he parties’ marr iage. But this arg um e nt is c ompletely

uns upporte d by the re cord. In t he district cour t’s findings of f act

an d c onc lu s ion s of

la w , th e c ou rt e x p l i c itl y ac kno w le dge d th e l en gth of the marr iage in its disc uss ion of al imony. The district c ourtalso

ma de s pe c ific fa c tu al fi nd in gs w ith rega rd to the oth er s ix s tatu tory al i m o n yfa c tors . C ont rary to M s . D ahl’ s as s erti on, the di s tric t c ou rt’s decis ion to deny Ms. Dahl’s ali mony re quest was n ot t he result of a failure to consider the necessary factor s. Instead, the court was ha mp ered pri ma ril y by Ms . Da hl ’s fa il ure to provid e the c ou rt w ith

any c red ib le evi de nc e reg ard in g he r fi na nc ia l n eed . W e ther efore hol d th at th e d is trict c ou rt m ad e th e f ac tu alfi nd in gs ne c es s ary to

s up port i ts rul in g. c. Th e District CourtProper ly Required Ev ide nc e of Curr ent Fin anc ia l N eed in

Ad di tion

to Evi de nc e of

Ms . D ah l’ s Pri or Standard of Living ¶111 Ms. Dahl n extarg ues that the district courtimproper ly required ev idence of her current fin ancial need rat her than relying

s ole ly on evi de nc e of

he r s tan da rd of li vin g du rin g the ma rria ge. As Ms . D ah l c orrec tly p oints ou t, the pri ma ry pu rpos e of al im onyis “to enable the receiving spouse to maintain a s ne a rly a s p o ssi bl ethe standard of living enjoy ed d ur i ngthe marr iage and to prev ent the spouse fro m becoming a public charge.” Co nnel l v. Co nnel l , 2 01 0 UT Ap p 1 39 , ¶ 9 , 2 33 P .3 d 8 36 (e mp ha s is ad de d) (intern alqu otati onD A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

42 ma rks om itte d) . An d wh il e th e Al im onyS tatu te i ns tru c ts c ou rts to “look to the standard of living, existing atthe time of separat ion, in deter minin g alimony,” it also ex plains that a d i st r ict court “shall

c onsid er a ll releva nt

fa cts a nd e qu ita bl e p rinc ipl es an d m ay, in its disc ret ion, base alimony on the standard of living t hat existed atthe t i me o f t rial.” U T A H C ODE § 30-3-5( 8)(e) ( emphas is added)

. Th eref ore, w hi le an

al im onyaw ard w ou ld id ea ll y al lowbo th spo u s e s to m a i n ta i nth e s ta n d a rd of l i vi n g e n

j oy e d d u ri n g the marriag e, the court is nev ert heless obligated t o support any alimony award with specific factual findings as to e ach s tatut or y factor and is permitted to deviate from the g eneral rule in light of the relev ant facts an d equities. ¶112 Contr ary to Ms. Dahl’s assertion, the district court in t his

c as e d id lookto Ms. Da hl ’s s tan da rd of li vin g du rin g th e m arri age , bu t c onc lu de d th at b ec au s e Ms . D ah l h ad fa il ed to s ati s fyhe r bu rde n of showing her p resent need, it was “imposs ible” to dete rmine the amount ofalimony “necess ary to r esult in a s tandard o f living at present thatwould approach the prev ious living condition.” And, as d i sc us sed below, w here M s. Dahl prov ided no evidence to t he

c ou rt to s u gg e s t th a t h e r s u b s ta n ti a l p ro p e rty a w a rd w ou ld not be suffici ent to maintain a standard of living similar to that which s he

en j oyed du rin g th e m arri age , th e d is tric t c o ur t di d n ot ab us e i ts di s c reti on i n d ec li ni ng t o aw ard Ms . D ah l p erm an ent al im ony

. d. Becaus e Ms. Dahl Receive d a Sizeable Proper ty A ward, the Dis tr ict CourtDid Not Creat e a Sub stantial Inequality in Denying Ms. Dahl’s Request for Per manent Alimony ¶113 Ms. Dahl arg ues that the district c ourt created a su bstantial in equa li ty w he n i t f ai le d to a w ard he r per man en t al im ony , e ven tho ugh it c onc lu de d th at D r. D ah l w as c ap ab le of payin g u p to $9 ,1 39 pe r mo nth . S pe c ific al ly, s he c ont en ds tha t w ith ou t an aw ard of permanent alimony, Dr. Dahl will b e able t o continue to “live[] in luxury,” while Ms. Dahl will live “as a pauper with no income and a marital pro pe r t y a ward insu ffic ient to pay ev en her current obligatio ns.” ¶114 In Bakanowsk i , the co ur t of appeals explained that if a district court considers each of the statuto ry alim ony factor s, “we

w il l n ot di s tu rb i ts aw ard ab s ent a s how in g th at su ch a serio us ineq uit y h a s re sulted as t o manifest a clear abus e of discretion.” 2003 UTAp p 3 57 , ¶ 10 , ( emph as is ad de d) (i nte rna l quo tati on m arks

om itte d) . In

tha t c ase, the di s tric t c ou rt aw ard ed Ms . B aka now s ki $1,000 per month in p e r manent alimony. Id . ¶ 5 . T he c ou rt ofCite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

As the di s tric t c o ur t ex plai ne d, Ms . D ah l’ s attorney fees 22 constituted “[ b]y far the large st debt identified in these proceedings, the sheer size of the claim t hr e atens to swallow the entire mar ital estate.”

43 appeals rever sed the a l i mony award, concludi ng that t he district court had “fail[ed] to enter specific findin gs on [Ms. Bakanowski’s] fi na nc ia l n eed s an d con di tion , and the pe rtin ent fa c ts in the rec ord [w ere] notc le ar, unc ont roverte d, an d c ap ab le of s up porti ng o nl y a findin g in favor of the judgment.” Id. ¶ 11 (i nte rna l quo tati on m arks

om itte d) . T he c ou rt of

ap pe al s he ld tha t it w as error f or th e c ou rt to award alimony i n a n effort t o “simply equalize inc ome” without considering each of the statutor y alimony factor s. Id. ¶ 12. ¶115 He r e , Ms. Dahl as ks us to or der t he same type of income equalization that t he court o f appeals rejected in Bakanowsk i

. Although t he distr ict court in this cas e att empted to evaluate each sta t ut o r y alimony factor, itwas p rev ented fro m making all the

necess ary fa ct ual fin dings due to Ms. Dahl’s f ailure to prov ide

c red ib le evi de nc e of

he r fi na nc ia l need

. An d w ith ou t s uc h e vid enc e, any al imony aw ard w ould have been merely an at tempt t o equalize inc om e. ¶116 In divor ce cas es wh ere t here is insu ffic ient evidence of one of the s tatut or y alim ony fac tor s, courts m ay impute figures. See, e.g., Co nnel l , 2010 UT App 139, ¶¶ 14–20 ( imputing hus band’s i ncome from a prior job t o deter mine his ability to pay alimony); Leppert v. Leppe rt , 2009 UT App 10, ¶ 12, 200 P.3d 223 (h olding thatthe district

c ou rt di d n ot ab us e i ts dis c reti on i n i mp ut in g an inc om e figu re f or wife w hen the decis ion was “ad equately support ed” by the district court’s findings)

. In this case, the district court could have similarly impu ted a fi gu re to de term in e Ms

. D ah l’ s fi na nc ia l ne ed ba s ed ei the r
o n D r

. D a h l ’ s r e c o r d s o f t h e p a r t i e s ’ p r e d i v o r c e e x p en s es or a
rea s ona bl e es tim ate of Ms

. D ah l’ s ne ed s

. Bu t it w as notrequi red to do s o b ec au s e Ms

. D ah l rec ei ved a s uf fi c ie ntl y la rge p rope rty aw ard to s up po r t a comfo rtab le s tan da rd of li vin g. T he di s tric t c ou rt

aw ard ed Ms . D ah l over $1 .5 mi ll ion in ma rita l p rope rty. I n l ight of thi s aw ard , i t w as unne c es s ary f or th e distri c t c ou rt to i mp ut e a fi gu re f or Ms . D ah l’ s ne ed

. An d wh il e it m ay b e tru e th at Ms . D ah l’ s award was “i nsu ffic ient to p a y e v e n her current o bligations,” the obligatio ns r eferr ed to consis t large ly of her atto rney fees, whic h, 22

as exp la in ed be low, w e c onc lu de are unrea s ona bl e. In de ed , bu t f or her unreasonably high att or ney fees, Ms. Dahl ’sp ro p e rty award wasD A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

To the ex tent t hese defici encies are due to the negligence of Ms. 23 Dahl’s couns el, her r emedy lies in a civil actio n for malpractice. But atto rney neg ligence does not pro vide a ba si s for us to sidestep the legal standard thatour stat utes and c ase law p rescribe for alimony deter minations.

44 suffici ently lar ge t o prevent any “serious inequity” arisi ng fro m the di s tric t c ou rt’s refus alto aw ard pe rma ne nt a li mo ny. ¶11 7 In s umma ry, w e hol d th at th e d is tric t c ou rt ac ted w ith in its di s c reti on i n d enyin g Ms . D ahl’s reque s t f or pe rma ne nt a li mo ny. Ms

. D ah l fa il ed to provi de the c ou rt w ith the evi de nc e ne c es s ary to demonstrate her financi al need. The record clearly indicates that t he district court was mindfu l of the statuto ry alimony factors and made all of the findings it could based on the evidence before it. Any harm Ms. Da hl ma y have suffered by r eceiving no per manent alimony was n ot a result of error on the par t of t he district court, but instead was due to her couns e l ’ s fa ilure to present the ev idence

ne c es s ary to s up por tan a war d o f pe r man en tal imo ny

. Wethe refore 23 affi rm the di s tric t c ou rt’s de c is ion de nyi ng Ms

. D ah l’ s reque s t for pe rma ne nt a li mo ny.

D. T heDis trict

Co urt Er red in P a rt in I ts Div isi o n of the Ma rital Assets ¶11 8 Ms . D ah l n ext a rgu es tha t th e d is tric t c our t ab us ed its di s c reti on i n d ivi di ng the ma r it al assets by(1 ) f ai li ng t o m ake adequate findings of fact to supportits distribution deter mination, (2 ) d is trib ut in g th e l iqui d as s ets in equi tab ly, (3 ) conc lu di ng tha t D r. Dahl’s IRA accounts were no t ma rital pr oper ty, (4) finding that certain re al proper ty subjec t to a series of exchanges pursu ant to 26 U.S .C . § 10 31 was s ep ara te p rope rty, a nd (5 ) f ai li ng t o c ons id er
c om mi ngl in g of

ma rita l a s s ets w ith

D r. D ah l’ s pre ma rita l p en s ion plan. For the reasons disc uss ed below, we affirm in part, re ver se in p a rt, a n d re m a n d f or fu rt h e r p ro c e e d i n gs c on s i s te n t w i th this opinion. ¶11 9 Ge ne ral ly, di s tric t c ou rts ha ve c ons id era bl e d is c reti on concerning proper ty distribution in a divor ce proceeding and their deter minat i o ns “enjoy a presumption of validity .” El ma n v. El ma n, 2002 UT App 83, ¶ 17, 45 P.3d 1 7 6

. Thus , we wil l uphold the decis ion of the district courton appeal “unles s a cl ear and prejudicial abus e o f d i sc ret ion is demons tr ated.” Kei te r v . Ke iter , 2010 UT App 169, ¶ 16, 235 P.3d 782.Cite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

45 1. Th e D is tric t Cou rt Mad e S uf fi c ie nt Fin di ngs of

Fac t to S up port I ts D is trib ut ion

of Mari talAs s ets ¶12 0 Ms . D ahl a rgu es gen era ll y th at th e d is tric t c ou rt fai led to make adequate findin gs of fact t o supp or t its distribution of marit al assets. Sp e ci fi cally, she c laims that t he district court did notfully

account for the personal pr op e rty, s u c h a sfu rnis hings, located ins ide the ma rita l h om e. We di s agre e an d hol d tha t the c ou rt’s Fin di ngs of Fac t an d C onc lu s ion s of La ware s uf

fi c ie nt t o s up port i ts di s trib ut ion of the ma rita l p rope rty. ¶121 Before a distr ict court dis tr ibutes marital as sets, it mus t (1) “i d e nt i fy the pro pert y in dispu te and deter mine w hether [it] is

ma rita l or s ep ara te p rope rty,” (2 ) “ c ons id er w he the r t he re a re
exc ep tion alc irc um s tanc es tha t overc om e th e ge ne ralpre s umpti on that marital proper ty be div ided e qually,” (3) “as sign values to each item of marital pr o p e r t y so that [a] distribution strat egy . . . can b e impl em ented ,” an d (4) di s trib ut e the ma rita l a s s ets “c ons is tent w ith thed i s tr ib ution strat egy .” Sto neh o cker v . Sto neh o cker , 2008 UT App 11, ¶ 15, 176 P.3 d 4 76. Dis tr ict courts mus t then ente r findings of fac t establishing that t he court’s “judgment or decr ee follows logically fro m, a n d i s s u p p or te d b y, th e e vi d e n c e

. ” Gar dn erv. Ga rd ner , 748 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988). In r e v i e wi ng a pro pert y distribution,

w e w il l n ot s et a s id e fin di ngs of fact, wh eth er b as ed on o ralor documentary ev idence, u nless they ar e clea rly e rr oneous, and we give due regar d to the district court’s superior position fro m wh ich to judge t he credibility of witnesses

. Sto neh o cker , 20 0 8 U T App 11, ¶ 17. ¶122 The distr ict court in this cas e pro perly fo llowed the approach establish ed in Sto neh o cker in dis tr ibut i n g th em a ri ta la s sets. Firs t, i t id entifie d th e i tem s in di s pu te, ran gin g fro m hom e furnitu re
an d a ut omo bil es to bu s in es s es an d re ales tate , a nd de term in ed

w he the r s uc h prop erty wa s prop erl y c la s s ifie d a s ma rita l p rope rty

or separate pr oper ty. Next, the courtadopted a str ategy of dividing the ma rit al as s ets evenly b etw een D r. D ah l a nd Ms . D ah l. In its Findings of Fact and Conclus ions of La w, it itemized the marit al proper ty and det ermined that t he value of the pr oper ty should be di vid ed evenly b etw een the pa rtie s . T he c ou rt th en as s ign ed val ue s to th e p rope rty in

di s pu te b as ed on e vid enc e p res ented at tria l. For example, the court itemized the items contained in the marital ho me and ass igned a value. Finally, t he district co ur t distributed the prop erty ac c ordi ng to its di s trib ut ion s trate gy of

di vid in g th e a s s ets

evenly.D A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

46 ¶123 Based on its thoro ugh evaluation o f the marital and separate pr oper ty, we hold t hat the district cour t made suffici ent fi nd in gs of

fa ct t o s up port i ts c onc lu s ion rega rdi ng the di vis ion of the ma rita l a s s ets

. We fu rthe r hol d tha t the fi nd in gs w ere b as ed on the ev idence presented to t he district court and were suffic i e nt ly de tai le d to d is c los e th e s tep s byw hi ch it rea c he d th e u lti ma te distribution.
2. The Di strict Co urt Er red in Par t i n I t s Di stribution of the Liquid As s ets an d L iti gati on C os ts ¶124 Ms . D ah l’ s ne xt cla im s of error c onc ern

the di s tric t c ou rt’s distribution of specific liqu id ass ets and litigatio n costs. Ms. Dahl arg ues t ha t the district courtabus ed its disc ret ion by (1) order ing Ms . D ah l to re tu rn $ 16 2, 00 0 th at D r. Da hl ha d vol untari ly gi ven he r
over the c ou rs e of

the di vorc e p roc eed in gs ; ( 2) orde rin g Ms . D ah l to pay one-half of the supervision, guardian ad litem, and cu stody evaluatio n costs incurred by the par ties; (3) orderingMs. Dahl to pay for t he trial t ranscripts; (4) finding that a Visa credit card was m arital debt; and (5) n ot v aluing und isc losed marital assets. On rev iew, we

w il l u ph old the di s tric t c ou rt’s rul in g u nl es s it c le arl y abus ed its disc ret ion. Sto neh o cker

, 2008 UT App 11, ¶ 8. We address each of Ms. Dahl’s claim s of erro r in turn.

a. The Trial Court Err ed in Requiring Ms. Dahl to Refund to the Mar ital Estate $162,000 t hat Dr. Dahl Voluntarily Paid Ms. Dahl Over th e Co urs e of

the D ivorc e Proc eed in gs ¶125 Duringthe pendency of the divo rce action, Dr. Dahl remained in posses sion of the marital ho me with acc ess to marital fund s, w hi l e M s. Dahl lived outside the marit al home and had n o
suc ha c c e s s

. W h i l e th e d i vo rc e a c ti on w a s p ro c e e d i n g, th e d i s tr ict

c ou rt orde red D r. D ah l to p ay M s. Dahl three o ne -t im e p aym ents total in g $1 9, 00 0, an d D r. D ah l vol untari ly p ai d Ms . D ah l $ 4, 00 0 p er
mo nth . Al l tot al ed , Ms . D ah l re c eiv ed $1 62 ,0 00 in pa ym ents fro m D r. D a h l d u ri n g t h e p e n d e n c y o f th e d i vo rc e p ro c e e d i n g. D u ring this period, Dr. Dahl had acces s t o the ent iret y of t he marital funds

an d c ont inue d to u s e th os e fu nd s to pay for his ow n l ivi ng e xpe ns es
an d th e ex pe ns es of

the c ou pl e’s c hi ld ren . T he di s tric t c ou rt orde red Ms. Dahl to repay to t he marital es tate the $162,000 she had received, but did not r e q ui r e Dr. Dahl to repay the marital funds he s pent during the y ears the divo rce was proceeding. Ms. Dahl argues that thi s w as an

ab us e of di s c reti on. We agre e.Cite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

47 ¶12 6 P rior to the entry of a d ivorc e d ec ree, al l p rope rty ac qu ire d by part ies t o a marriag e is marit al proper ty, o wned equal ly by each party

. SeeBe rg er v . B erger , 713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985) (explaining that a “marit al estate should be valued as of the time of the divo rce decree”). For this reason, it is improper to allo w one spous e acces s to m ari talfu nd s to pay fo r rea s ona bl e a nd ordi na ry li vin g exp en s es while the divorce is pending, whi le denying the o ther spous e the

same ac cess

. A l l o wing both spouses equal acc ess to marital funds du rin g th e p en de nc y of a divorc e prom otes the goal of a “ fa ir, j us t, and equitable” distribution of marital propert y. No bl e v . No bl e, 761 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988). ¶127 This p r i ncipl e is illu strat ed in In re Marriage of M arriott , a
c as e i n w hi c h th e Co urtof Ap pe al s of

Ill in ois w as a sked to deter mine w hether money paid by the husb and to t he wife during the divo rce p r o ce eding was a prelimin ary distribution of marital assets. 636 N.E .2d 1141 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). In that case, the husb and

an d w ife l ive d i n s ep ara te h ou s ing duri ng the di s s olu tion proc eed in gs w ith

the husba nd rem ai ni ng i n th e m ari talhom e. Id at 1149. The wife receiv e d a lump s um of money from the hus band that she us ed to pay for liv ing expenses and periodic tempor ary maintenanc e. Id. at 1145. The dis tr ict court held that t he lump s um w as a preliminary distribution o f the marital assets. Id. at 1149. But the I llinois Co ur t of Appeals reve rsed, reasoning t hat the sum was an

allowance f or living ex penses

. Id. at 1 15 1. Th e c ou rt conclu ded that marit al ass ets used by a spouse who is not living in the marital ho me during the pendency of a divor ce should not be tr eated differ e nt l y than the marital assets enjoyed by the spouse living in the marit al home so long as the funds a r e spent o n living expenses. Id. ¶128 Here, like the wife in Marriot t, Ms. Dahl li ved o utside the marital home during t he pe nd e nc y of t he divor ce, wh ile Dr. Dahl remained in the marital home. Similarly, Dr. Dahl re ma i ne d in contro l of the marital funds a nd ma r ital bank accounts, w hile Ms. Dahl h a d n o s u c h a c c e s s

. In d e e d , h e r onl y a c c e s s to m a ri ta l fund s
was thro ugh the thr ee one-time payments or dered by t he court and the $4,000 payment fro m the mari t a l e st ate t hat Dr. Dahl made

vo luntarily. And the r e co r d r e flects that Ms. Dahl, l ike the wife in Marriot t, u s ed the mo ne y s he w asgive n to pa y f or li vin g exp en s es du rin g th e p en de nc y of the di vorc e. ¶12 9 It w as an

ab us e of dis c reti on for the di s tric t c ou rt to ord er Ms. Dahl to repay the $162,000. This or der had the effect of allowingD A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

48 one spouse to use marital funds to pay for liv ing expenses during the pe nd enc y of the di vorc e, w hi le de nyi ng s uc h u s e to th e oth er
s pou s e. We ac c ordi ngl y reve rs e. b. Th e T ria l C ou rt Erre d Whe n I t Orde red Ms . D ah l to P ay f or One -H al f o f C erta in

Li tiga tion

Cos ts ¶13 0 D uri ng the pe nd enc y of the di vorc e, D r. D ah l p ai d a llof the costs ass ociated w i th the di vo rce action, includ ing $16,475 for t he

c us tody ev alu ati on; $2 1, 60 0 p lu s an un de term in ed am ou nt o f fees fo r the gu ard ia n a d l ite m; an d $ 60 ,5 28 .6 0 f or s up ervi s ed pa rent tim e. Th e d is tric t c ou rt de term in ed tha t th es e c os ts w ere j ointly i nc urre d by the parties and r educed Ms. Dahl’s share of the marital estat e by the value o f one-half

of the to tal costs. Ms. Dahl argues that it was inequitable for th e co ur t to r educe her postjudgment sh are o f the marital estat e when D r. Dahl paid for those costs usin g marit al fund s. Becau se Dr. Dahlus e d marital funds to pay for t hese costs, Ms. Dahl reasons t hat both part ies’ share in the marital estate was de c rea s ed byequa l a mo unts , a nd the ref ore h er s ha re shou ld not ha ve b een

ad di tion al ly re du c ed . W e a gree

. ¶13 1 As di s c us s ed ab ove, “[ t] he overa rc hi ng ai m of a p rope rty [dis tr ibution] . . . is to achieve a fair, jus t, and equitable result b e tw e e n th e p a rt ies.” Noble, 761 P.2d at 1373. Before t he district

c ou rt c an

un de rtake the di s trib ut ion, it mus t de term in e the va lu e of the as sets. Sto neh o cker

, 200 8 UT App 11 , ¶ 1 5. An d i t is w el l- s ettl ed that assets should be valued at the time of the divo rce decree. Dunn

v. Dunn , 802 P.2d 1314, 1319 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). O n r eview, the district cour t ’ s fa ct ua l findi ngs as to the v alue of ass ets will not be disturbed unl ess they are clearly err oneous. Id. at 1317. ¶132 In this cas e, the district court c or rectly conclu ded that t he supervision, guardian ad litem, and cu stody ev aluation costs sh ould be shared equally by the part ies from the marital estat e. The dis tr ict court also concluded that inasmuch as Dr. Dahl had already paid t he fu llam ou nts , Ms

. D ah l’ s s ha re of thees tate mu s t b e red uc ed fo r he r share of the costs. ¶133 But the district courtov erlo oke d the fact that Dr. Dahl had paid these costs an d fees u sing the marit a l bank acc ount, which consis ted of marit al fun ds. Bec ause D r. Dahl paid for the costs usi ng marital funds , the value o f t he marital estat e was reduc ed by the amount of those co st s. Thus, when the district courtdivided the

mar i t a l e state, bot h parties had effec tive ly paid one-half of these

c os ts . B y orde rin g Ms . D ah l to re pa y D r. D ah l on e- ha lf of the cos tsCite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

49 from her individual share of the marit al estate, t he district court in effe c t requi red Ms . D ah l to p ay tw ic e. In s hort, s he w as requi red to bear the ent ire burden of these costs. ¶134 Suc h a result c onstituted cl ear erro r. We therefor e rev erse the di s tric t c ou rt’s rul in g b ec au s e Ms . D ah l s hou ld notha ve b een requi red to pay f or on e- ha lf of the fe es fro m he r s ha re of the es tate when D r. Dahl us ed marital funds to pay for t he costs du ring t he litigat ion.
c. Th e Trial Court Cor rectly Concluded that Ms. Dahl Mus t Pay fo r the Tri alTra ns c rip ts ¶13 5 Ms

. D ah l orde red da il y tran s c rip ts of the tria l p roc eed in gs at atota l co st of

$3 5, 21 7. 65 . T hedi s tric t c ou rt granted Ms . D ah l’ s request for tr ansc ripts on t he understanding that she would, as the requesting party, be required to bear the c ost. On appeal, Ms. Dahl argu es tha t the di s tric t c ou rt ab us ed its di s c reti on by requi rin g he r to pay for t he transcripts without m aking findings of fac t r egar ding he r ab il ity t o pa y. W e d is agre e. ¶13 6 Uta h c ou rts no l ong er r ou tin el y empl oy li ve c ou rt repo rt ers. Instead , tr ial transcripts are pr epared fro m digital

recor dings. During a pret rial m otio n hearing on September 15, 2009, Ms. D a h l ’s a tt or n e y r e q u e s te d th a t d a i l y t ra n s c ri p ts of th e tr i a l be prepar ed by a live courtrepo rt er. The district courtoffe r e d the al tern ati ve of

provi di ng d ai ly c opi es of the rec ordi ng d is k to minimize expenses. But Ms. Dahl’s atto rney r efus ed t he o ffer and requested per miss ion to use a live cour t r epor ter for daily tr ansc ripts. The district court g ranted the request, but infor med Ms. Dahl’s atto rney t hat, as the part y r equesting the live r epor ter , Ms. Dah l w ou l d b e s ol e l y re s p on s i b l e f or p a yi n g a l l re p or te r f e e s

. Ms. Dahl’s couns el agr eed. ¶137 Sub sequently, Ms. Dahl requested that D r. D a hlp ay for the repo rt er costs, but the di strict c ourt or dered that Ms. Dahl b ear t he entire cost. We hold that itwas n ot an abuse of disc ret ion for t he dist r i ct co urt t o r equire thatMs. Dahl pay all of the repor ter costs. It was, after all, Ms. Dahl wh o r equested the live r e p o r t e r a nd sh e pe rs is ted in

tha t r eque s t eve n a ft er th e d is tric t c ou rt info rme d h er that she would be responsib le for all the ass ociated c osts. The dis tr ict court o ffered the alter native o f releasing the audio di sk, but Ms. Dahl’s atto rney declined the offer. U nder thes e circum stances , it

w asan ap propri at e e x er cise o f t he dis t r ictco ur t ’s d iscr et io n t o assi gn those costs entirely to M s. Dahl.D A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

50 d. The D istrict Cour t Did Not Abuse It s Di sc r etion by Concludin g thatCert ain Unsec ured Debt Was Marital Debt ¶13 8 Ms . D ah l’ s ne xt c la im of error i nvol ves the di s tric t c ou rt’s distribution of the par ties’ unsec ured debt. As of J ul y 3 1, 2009, a We ll s Fargo V is a a c c ou nt ha d a ba la nc e of $24, 05 3. Th e d is tric t c ou rt found that this balance was a marital debt and reduced both part ies’ share of the marit al estate equally. M s. Dahl argues that t his finding

was err oneous. Spec ific ally, Ms. Dahl arg ues that the Visa c ard was not listed on Dr. Dahl’s 2006 Statement of Income, Expenses, Assets, and L i a bi l ities repor t (2006 Repor t), whic h was filed near the inception o f t he divor ce pr oceeding. Ms. Dahl reasons that, becaus e the Wells Far go Vis a account w as not lis ted on the 2006 re port , any ba la nc e on

the ac c ou nt mus t th eref ore h ave be en the res ul t of

D r. D ah l’ s pos ts ep ara tion

s pe nd in g. ¶139 Under Ut ah Code section 30-2-5(1) (b) , neither spouse is personally liable for t he separate debts incu rr ed by the other spouse during the marr iage. But bot h spous es are re sponsib le for family

e xpenses. U T A H C ODE § 3 0

- 2

- 9 ( 1 )

. N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e r e i s no f ixe d formula for det ermining the division of debts in a d i v o r ce action. We requi re only tha t the di s tric t c ou rt’s al loc ati on o f d eb t b e b as ed on adequate factual fin dings. S to neh o ck er, 2008 UT App 11, ¶ 46. And we wi ll not dis turb those fin dings abs ent an abus e of discretion. Id. ¶14 0 He r e, the di s tric t c ou rt de term in ed tha t th e W el ls Fargo Visa w as marital debt. Ms. Dahl c hallenges that r uling, ass ert ing tha t D r. D ah l’ s fa il ure to tes tif y as to th e n atu re of

the de btma nd ate d the conclu si o n that itwas his s eparat e debt. But during tr ial, the di s tric t c ou rt he ard exte ns ive tes tim onyfro m D r. D ah l’ s exp ert witness , Mr . Stoddard, r egar ding a l l o f Dr . Dahl’s accounts. Ms. D ah l p oints to n o evi de nc e i n t he rec ord to refut e Mr. S todd ard ’s testimony t hat the Visa acc ount was a marital d e bt . We conclu de that M r. Stoddar d’s testimony was sufficient to supportthe district court’s finding that the d e btwas m arital. We t herefor e affirm the di s tric t c ou rt’s rul in g.

e. Ms . D ah l’ s Arg ume nt tha t th e D is tric t Cou rt Fai le d to Equitably Dis tr ibute So me Personal Propert y Is Inadequately Bri efed ¶14 1 Fin al ly, Ms . Da hl argu es the di s tric t c ou rt ab us ed its di s c reti on i n th e di s trib ut ion of ma rita l prop erty b ec au s e i t di d n ot consider all of the tangible assets located in the marit a l home, inCite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

51 whic h Dr. Dahl continues to reside. But Ms. Dahl has failed to point to an y s pe c ific ite ms tha t w ere e xc lu de d fromthe prop erty di s trib ut ion . W e h ave rep ea ted ly s tate d th at “[ a] pp el la te c ou rts are nota d ep os itoryin

w hi c h [ a p arty] may du mp the bu rde n of arg ument and r esearch.” ASC Uta h, In c. v . W

o lf Mo unta in Re so rts, L.C. , 2 01 3 UT24 , ¶ 16, 3 09 P .3 d 2 01 (i nte rna l quo tati on m arks omitte d) (alternations in orig inal); see also Peterson v. Sun rider Corp. , 2002 UT 43, ¶ 23 n.9, 48 P.3d 918 ( “A single, vague sentence without

c ita tion to th e rec ord or l ega l au tho rity i s in ad equa te. ”) . T he rec ord in thi s c as e s pa ns tho us an ds of pa ges an d th e a s s ets involve d a re valued in the millions of dollars. As app ellant, Ms. Da hl be ars the bu rde n of

di rec tin g ou r atte nti on t o s pe c ific facts in the rec ord to supp or t her cont ention thatthe di strict courtabus ed its disc ret ion. Ms. D a hlc a nn ot

s imply ass erterr or without explanatio n or ev idence

an d exp ec t thi s c ou rt to revers e the fi nd in g of the di s tric t co urt. Ac c ordi ngl y, w e are not p ers ua de d b y th is in ad equa tel y b rie fe d argu me nt.
3. Th e D is tric t Cou r t D id Not A bu s e Its D is c reti on Whe n I t Conc lu de d T ha t th e IR A an d S EPIRA Rem ai ne d S ep ara te Prope rty ¶14 2 Th e d is tric t c o ur t foun d th at anu mb er of D r. D ah l’ s reti rem ent ac c ou nts , i nc lu di ng atrad iti ona l I RA and aS EPIRA,

w ere e s tab li s he d a nd fu nd ed byD r. Da hl pr ior to hi s ma rria ge to Ms . D ah l a nd the ref ore h el d th at th es e a ccounts w ere D r. D ah l’ s separate pr oper ty. M s. Dahl arg ues thatthis holding was err oneous. Ms . D ah l a c kno w le dge s tha t th e I RA acc ou nts w ere e s tab li s he d before t heir marr iage, but asserts that t hey lost t he i r identity as separate pr oper ty when Dr. Dahl c omming l e d them with marital fund s. S pecifi cally, Dr. Dahl w ithdrew funds from the I RA t o pay off ahom e equi ty lo an s ec ure d b y th e m ari talhom e a nd the n rep le ni s he d the fu nd s us in g a ma rita l ba nk ac c ou nt. Ms . D ah l a rgu es tha t th is ac tion

c onve rte d th eIRAs to m ari talprop erty. We di s agre e. ¶1 43 “G enera lly, p r e mari talprop erty, gifts , andin he ritanc es[are considered] se p a r a t e proper ty, and t he spous e bringing such . . . prop erty i nto the ma rria ge m ay re tai n i t” i n th e event of a d ivorc e. Kei te r v . Ke iter

, 2010 UT App 169, ¶ 22, 235 P.3d 782 (inter nal quotat ion marks omitt e d ) (inter nal alterat ions omitted). But pre m a r i t a lp r o p e r tym ayl o s e i ts s ep ara te c ha rac ter w he re th e p arti es ha ve i ne xtric ab ly c om mi ngl ed it w ith the ma rita l estate, or w he re one spouse has contributed all or par t of t he proper ty t o the mar ital estate with the intentthat it become joint proper ty. Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1320. Co urts loo k to a party ’s actions as a manifestation o f aD A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

52 s pou s e’s intent to c ont rib ut e s ep ara te p rope rty to th e m ari tales tate

. Kimb a ll v . Ki mb a ll , 2009 UT App 233, ¶ 28, 217 P.3d 733. On review,

w e wi ll up hol d th e d is tric t c ou rt’s de c is ion tha t th e IR As rem ai ne d D r. D ah l’ s s ep ara te p rope rty u nl es s t he di s tric t c ou rt ab us ed its disc ret ion. Sto neh o cker

, 2008 UT App 11, ¶ 8. ¶14 4 Ms . D ah l c la im sth a tth eI RAa c c o u nt sb e c a mec om mi ngl ed with marital assets. Bu t Dr. Da hl ’ s I RA accounts never lost t heir

s ep ara te i de nti ty. Dr. D ah l w ith dre wmo ne y fromhi s IRA a c c ou nts so that he co ul d pay off a home equity lo an sec ured by the marit al hom e. After p aying off the loa n, D r. D ah l re pl ac ed the am ou nts withdrawn from the IRA accounts with fund s from the marital bank

ac c ou nt. T hi s tran s ac tion is be s t c ha rac teri ze d a s a l oan fro m D r. Dahl to the marit al estate, which was in turn re paid with m arital fu nd s

. Th ere is nothi ng ab ou t the s e tra ns ac tion s s ug ges tin g th at D r. D ah l inten de d to c om mi ngl e hi s IRA fun ds w ith the ma rita l e s tate

. And Dr. Dahl’s proper ty did notbecome so “ine x t ricably commin gled . . . into t he marital estate ” tha t t he district court was incapab le of tr acing it. Dunn , 802 P.2d at 1321. ¶145 We ther efore affirm t he district court’s conclu sion that the IRA acc ounts are separate p ro pert y. The evidence supp o r t s t he di s tric t c ou rt’s c onc lu s ion tha t D r

. Dah l did notinten d f or th e IR A

ac c ou nts to b ec om e j oint prop erty an d tha t the IRA a c c ou nt d id not los e i ts s ep ara te i de nti ty s impl y be c au s e D r. D ah l m ad e aloa n from the account to pay off a home equity loan.
4. The Dist r i ct C ourtDid Not Abuse Its Dis cretio n When It Fo und Th at th e 1 03 1 Prope rty Ex c ha nge s We re S ep ara te Prope rty ¶1 4 6 Dr. Dah l c l a i m e d th a t f ou r p a rc e l s of re a l p ro p e rty ( 1 031 Proper ties) were separate pr o p e rt y, despite being acquired during the ma rria ge. Th e di s tric t c ou rt c onc lu de d th at th e f ou r pa rc el s w ere
a c q u i re d vi a a s e ri e s of e xc h a n ge s p u rs u a n t to s e c ti on 1 0 3 1 of the Intern alReve nu e Co de (1 03 1 e xc ha nge s ). 26 U.S .C . § 10 31 . S ec tion 1 0 3 1 a l l o w s a p a r ty t o e x c h a n g e o n e p a r c e l o f r e a l p r o p e r ty fo r another without incurring any t ax burden. See id. § 1031(a)( 1). (“No gai n or los s s ha ll be rec ogn iz ed on the exc ha nge of prop erty h el d f or productive use in a tr ade or bus iness or for investment i f s uch proper ty is exchanged solely for proper ty o f like kind whic h is to be he ld ei the r fo r prod uc tive us e i n atrad e or b us in es s or f or inves tm ent.” ). A s pou s e c an mai nta in the s ep ara te i de nti ty of pre ma r ital pro pert y by utilizing section 1031 exchanges to av oid

c omminglingsep ar at e p r o pe r ty wit h ma r it al pr o pe rty. Fo r exa mp le , a spouse m ay use the pro ceeds o f t he sale o f a house h e or sheCite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

53 inherited to purchas e another proper ty t hroug h a sec tion 1031

exc ha nge , a ll ow in g th e n ewprop erty to re tai n t he s am e s ep ara te character as the house whose proceeds were us e d t o purchase the new propert y. See S mith v. Smi th , Nos. CT2003-0008, CT2003- 0020, 20 04 WL19 30 41 (O hi o Ct. Ap p. Ja n. 22 , 20 04 ) (h old in g tha t prop erty

s ub j ec t to a s ec tion

10 31 exc ha ngerem ai ne d s ep ara te p rope rty f or the purposes of distribution in a divor ce action). ¶14 7 Ms . D ah l a rgu es tha t th e d is tric t c ou rt ab us ed i t s di s c reti on
w he n i t de term in ed t hat the prop erti es de rive d fromthe s al e or tr ansfer o f Dr. Dahl ’s separate pro pert y thr ough sect ion 1031

exc ha nge s rem ained D r. D ah l’ s s ep ara te p rope rty. A t tria l, D r. Dahl’s exper t witness , Mr

. Stoddard, testified ext ensively re gar ding the ac qu is iti on o f the 10 31 P rope rtie s . Re lyi ng o n Mr. S todd ard ’s testimony, t he district court found that t he 1031 Pro p e r ties, aside from 14 percent o f on e p r o p e r ty, wer e Dr. Dahl’s s eparat e assets. Ms . D ah l re c ei ved c red it f or on e- ha lf of the 14 pe rc ent de term in ed to be marital proper ty, while Dr. Dahl was awarded t he remaining 1031 Proper ties. ¶14 8 Ms . D ah l c ha ll en ges thi s rul in g on s evera l grou nd s . Fi rs t, Ms . D ah l a rgu es tha t th e tri alexh ib its r elie d on byMr. S todd ard

w ere i na dm is s ib le . S ec ond , Ms . D ah l c la im s tha t D r. D ahl d id not prov ide suf

fici ent ev idence to pro ve that the Lamona pro pert y, the initi alprop erty s old byme an s of a 10 31 exc ha nge , w as entire ly D r. Dahl’s separate p r o p e r ty. Third, M s. Dahl argues that all o f the sub sequent 1031 exchanges could n ot be pr oper ly tr aced bac k to the pre ma rita l a s s et, the La mo na prop erty, du e to inc om pl ete evi de nc e. Finally, Ms. Dahl claims that the fund s from the 1031 exchanges had been comm ingled with marital assets. ¶149 At heart, Ms. Dahl’s challen ge to the district court ’s ruling on the 1031 Pr oper ties is a c hallenge to t he suf fici ency of the evide nce . Her c entralas s erti on i s tha t th e d is tric t c ou rt la c ked

s uf fi c ie nt e vid enc e to c onc lu de tha t th e 1 03 1 Prope rtie s origi na ted from premar ital assets. A party challenging a district court ’s fac tual findin gs on appeal bear s a heavy burden o f per suas ion. See Drake v. In dus . Co mm’ n , 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). Our rev iew of su ch fin d ings is highly deferent ial, and w e will rever se only if the findin gs are clearly err oneous. Id. Mor eov er, a par ty c ha l lenging factual findings on suffici ency of the evidence gr ounds “w ill almost

c erta inly f ai l to c arry its bu rde n of pe rs ua s ion on ap pe al if it f ai ls to

ma rs ha l” the evi de nc e s uf fi c ie nt t o o verc om e “ the he al thydos e ofD A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

54 d e fe r e nc e owed to factual findings.” Sta tev. Nie lse n , 2 0 1 4 UT1 0, ¶¶ 41–42, 326 P .3d 645. ¶150 Ms. Dahl ha s fa i led to meether burden in this c ase. The district court made factual find ings r egar ding the source of the 1031 Proper ties based on testimony from Dr. Dahl and exper t te stimony fro m M r. S todd ard . T hou gh M s . D ah l c om pl ai ns tha t Mr. S todd ard relied on inadmiss ible evidence in h is testimony, suc h reliance is clearly per mitted by o ur r ul e s o f evidence. SeeU T A H R. E V ID . 703 (“If expert s in the particular field wo uld reasonably rely o n those kin ds of fa c ts or da ta i n f orm in g an opi ni on on the su bj ec t, th ey n eed not be admiss ible for the o pinion to be a dmitted.”). Sim ilarly, M s. D ah l a rgu es tha t D r. D ah l’ s tes tim ony w as s el f- s ervi ng an d th at D r. D a h l f a i l e d t o p r o v i d e a l l o f t h e d o c u m e n t a t i o nh e c o u l d ha ve provi de d to s ub s tantia te h is and Mr. S todd ard ’s tes tim ony . B uta district court is not p re c l u d ed from re lying on self-serving te stimony and a party need not o ffer into ev idence every document on whi ch his expert witness relied. SeeU T A H R. E V ID . 7 05 . T hu s , Ms . D ah l’ s arg um e nt comes down to a challenge to the credibility o f Dr. Dahl and M r

. Stoddard. But it is the distr ict court’s ro le to judge t he credibility of w itnesses and to weigh t heir testimony . And Ms. Dahl can point to not hing suggesting that t he evidence r e l i ed on by the district court was legally insufficient to supportits factual findings. Accordingly, we affirm.
5. The District Co urt Did Not A bus e Its Disc ret ion in Ruling on the Character of Dr. Dahl’s Premarit al Pens ion Plan ¶151 The dis tr ict court deter mined thata numb er o f retir ement

acco unts w ere established and funded b y Dr. Dahl prior to his marriag e to Ms. Dahl, includ ing the Charles F. Dahl M.D. PC Profit Sharing Trust (Pro fit Sharing Trust). Bec ause it found that t he Profit S ha rin g T rust was fun de d p rior to the ma rria ge, the di s tric t c ou rt

c onc lu de d th at i t rem ai ne d Dr. D ah l’ s s ep ara te p rope rty. Ms . D ah l’ s final c laim of erro r as to the distribution of marit al ass ets is that the di s tric t c ou rt f ai le d to c ons id er c om mi ngl in g of ma rita l a s s ets w ith the Profit Sharing Tr ust. A t tr ial, Dr

. Dahl testified that $533.86 was tr ansferr ed into his profit sh aring plan on a m onthly basis. Bec ause Dr. Dahl testified that he co uld not recall from which account the de pos its origi na ted , M s. Dah l a rgu es tha t D r. D ah l f ai le d to p rove that t his m onthly depo sit came fro m nonmarital funds

. ¶152 Ms. Dahl’s arg ument is a c hallenge to t he suf fici ency of the evidence relied upon by the district court. And again, Ms. Dahl h as failed to meet her bu r den of persuasion. T hough Dr. Dahl didCite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

55 ac kno w le dge tha t he c ou ld notbe c erta in as to th e acco unt from
w hi c h the mo nthly d ep os it ori gin ate d, he tes tifie d th at h e b el ie ved the re curring deposit was from a li mited real estat e part nership that paid a dividend ever y m onth and that this partner shi p wa s his

s ep ar a t e p r o p e r ty

. I nt h e a b s e nc e o f a ny e v i d e n c e t o t h e c o ntra ry fro m M s . D ah l, w e c annotc onc lu de tha t th e d is tric t c ou rt ab us ed its di s c reti on i n d ete rmi ni ng tha t the P rofit S ha rin g Tru s t w as fu nd ed

w ith pre marita l p rope rty an d therefo r e r ema ine d Dr . Da hl’ s sep ara te proper ty. A ccordingly, we affirm.
E. Th e Di st ric t Co urt

Did No t A bu se I ts Dis cre ti o n in A wa rd ingDr. Da hl S o le Physic a l a nd Le ga l Cus to dy

o f t hePa rties ’ Mino r Ch ild ren ¶153 Initially, bot h Dr. Dahl and Ms. Dahl requested sole legal

an d p hys ic alc us todyof the c hi ld ren . Beca use the y w ere b oth seeking sole custody, neither party filed a pr oposed parent ing plan in acc or dance w ith section 30-3-10.8 of the U tah Code, which requires any par ty seek ing joint legal o r physical cus tody to submit

suc h a plan. Four months before t rial, an inde p endent cus tody evalu a t o r su bmitted a cus tody evaluatio n to t he court. The evaluatio n recommended t ha t Dr. Dahl b e awarded sole legal

c us tody . In rega rd to p hys ic alc us tody , th e eva lu ator re c om me nd ed

a var iety o f possible arrang ement s, i ncluding some joint cus tody

arr angements. The ev aluator did no t, however , inclu de among the opti ons aw ard in g Ms . D ah l s ole phys ic alc us tody

. ¶154 One week befor e tr ial, Ms. Dahl fi l e d a motion t o amend her counter claim t o seek joint legal and physical c ustody. She supp or ted thatmotion with a propo sed par enting plan. Th e district

c ou rt de ni ed he r reque s t as untim el y, re as oni ng tha t th e l an gu age of sectio n 3 0 -3 -10.8 required thatany parent ing plan be fi led with an

or iginal pleading. Thu s, Ms. Da hl could not file a pare nting plan

w ith an am en de d p le ad in g. Ms

. D ah l argu es tha t th e d is tric t c ou rt mi s interp rete d s ec tion 30 -3 -1 0. 8 and t ha t s he s hou ld ha ve b een gr anted leave to amend her pleadings t o request joint cus tody and fi le a pare nti ng p la n. Al tho ugh w e a gree tha t th e d is tric t c ou rt misi nterpr eted section 30-3-10.8, we nevertheless affirm the district court’s custody dete rmination on alt ernate gr ounds.
1. P arti es May Fi le a P are nti ng P la n w ith Am en de d P le ad in gs ¶155 “In cus tody matter s, appellate co ur ts gener ally giv e the [d is tric t] c ou rt c ons id era bl e d is c reti on b ec au s e th e [ di s tric t] c ou rt’s prox imity to the ev idence plac es it in a bette r p o si t ion than an appellate court t o choose the best c ustody ar rangement.” TrubetzkoyD A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

56 v. Trubetzkoy, 2009 UT App 77, ¶ 6, 205 P. 3 d 891 (citation omitt ed). But this broad d i scret ion “mus t be guided by the g ov erning law adopted by t he Utah Legislature.” Id. An d on matt ers of s tatu tory interpr etat ion, we r eview for cor rectness. Ba ird v. Ba ird, 2014 UT 08, ¶ 16, 322 P.3d 728. ¶156 A district court“may or d e r jo int legal custody or joint physicalcus tody or both if o ne o r both parent s have filed a parenting plan in ac cordance with S ection 30-3-10.8 and it de term in es tha t j oint le galc us tody or j oint phys ic alc us todyor b oth is in the best intere st of the child.” U T A H C ODE § 30-3-10.2( 1). Thu s, the s tatu te e s tab li s he s tw o pre requi s ite s fo r a di s tric t c ou rt’s aw ard of joint cus t o d y : (1 ) the filing of a parenting plan and (2) a de term in ati on tha t j oint c us tody is in the c hi ld ’s be s t intere s t. Section 30-3- 10.8 r e quires that a part y r equesting joint cus tody file hi s or he r pa rentin g pla n “at th e ti meof the fi li ng o f the ir original petition o r at the tim e of fi li ng the ir a ns w er or co unterc la im .” (Emph asis added). ¶157 In this cas e, both parties initially sought sole custody of the child ren. Therefor e, neither par ty filed a parenting plan with their

or iginal pleading. We mus t ther efore consider wh ether section 30-3- 10 .8 c onfin es reque s ts fo r j oint c us tody to initi alpl ea di ngs or whether the stat ute al lows a party to seek joint cus tody thro ugh an

am en de d p le ad in g. ¶158 Altho ug h this is a qu estion of first impression for this court, our c ourt of appeals considered a related issue in Trubetzkoy

. In Trubetzkoy, th e c ou rt of ap pe al s revers ed a d is tric t c ou rt’s aw ard of joint cus tody becau se neither parenthad filed a p arentingplan. 2 0 0 9 UT App 77, ¶ 13. The dis tr ict court in this cas e relied o n the T r ub e tzko y de c is ion

in de term inin g th at i t w as pre c lu de d from considerin g joint cus tody in the absenc e of a parent ing plan. Al tho ugh w e agree w ith the c ou rt of

ap pe al s tha t th e c om pl ete absenc e of a parenting plan pr ecludes an award of joint cus tody , see U T A H C ODE § 30-3-10.2, Trubetzkoy offe rs no i ns ight into th e que s tion of whether section 30-3-10.8 allows parties t o amend their initial pleadings to later seek joint c usto dy and to file a pare nting plan in connection with those amended pl eadings. ¶15 9 Ou r pri ma ry goalw he n in t erpreti ng s tatu tes is to effectuate t he intent of t he Legislature. Sta tev. W a tkins , 2013 UT 28, ¶ 18 , 30 9 P .3 d 20 9. Ou r s tarti ng p oint is the ref ore th e p la in la ngu age of th e s ta tute. Mari o n Ene rgy, In c. v . KFJ Ra nch P ’sh ip , 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14, 267 P.3d 863. Further , “we interpre t[] statutes to g ive meaningCite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

In 2012, the Legislature amended sub section 10(1)(b), es tablish- 24 ing “a rebutt able presump tion t hat joint legal custody .

. . is in the best interest of the child,” except in a narro w range of cases. U T AH C ODE § 30-3-10( 1)(b ) (2012). Becaus e we are r eviewing the distr ict

c ou r t fo r ab us e of

di s c reti on, w e a pp ly th e vers ion of s ub s ec tion 10(1)(b) that was i n force at t he t i me of the court ’s ruling. See T h ro ns o n v

. T

h ro nson , 810 P.2d 428, 433 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (applying the statute t hat was in place at the t i me of the district

c ou rt’s de c is ion

, ra the r tha n retroac tive ly a pp lyi ng the ne wvers ion of the s tatu te, w he n re vie w in g th e c ou rt u nd er a n ab us e of di s c reti on standard).

57 to al l p arts , a nd avoi d[ ] re nd eri ng p ortio ns o f t he s tatu te superflu ous.” W

a tk ins , 2 01 3 UT28 , ¶ 2 3 ( intern alqu otati on m arks omitte d) (alteratio ns in or iginal). To do so , “ we read t he plain language of the stat ute as a whole, a nd i nt e r pretits prov isions i n ha rmo ny w ith o t her s tatu tes in the s am e c ha pte r an d re la ted chapters.” State v. Ba rrett, 2005 UT 88, ¶ 2 9 , 1 2 7P.3d 682 (i nternal quotat ion marks omitt ed). ¶ 1 6 0 Section 30-3 -1 0

. 8 r e q ui r e s t ha tp a r t i e s s e e k i ngjoint cus tody file a propos e d p a rentingplan “at the time of t he filin g of t heir origi na l p eti tion

or at the t ime of fi li ng the ir a ns w er or
c ounte rc la im .” D r. D ah l s ug ges ts tha t th is la ngu age pre c lu de s parties who initially seek sole custody fro m a me nding their pl ea di ngs to see k j oint c us tody , e ven if the y la ter b ec om e c onvi nc ed that joint custod y wo ul d be best for their child ren. But such a reading would conflic t with ot her statut or y prov isions i n whi ch the Legislature has p laced a high value on joint cus tody . The Le gis la tu re h as ma nd ate d th at d istr ict c ou rts “s ha ll , i n e very c as e, consider jointcus tody .” U T A H C ODE § 30-3-10( 1)(b ) (2009)

. 24 Mor eov er, custody d e t e rminations are equitable in nature and require t he court t o consider the best inter ests of the child “[i]n deter minin g any form of cus tody .” Id. § 3 0- 3- 10 (1 )( a) . If pa rtie s are
un ab le to am en d th ei r pl ea di ngs to fil e a pa rentin g pl an, th e c ou rt’s equitable mandate to consider t he best interests of the child would be severely impaired. ¶16 1 A m ore pe rs ua s ive c ons tru c tion of s ec tion 30 -3 -1 0. 8 b rin gs it i n l in e w ith

ou r rel ati vel y libe rals tan da rds fo r am en dments to pleadings. Rule 15(a) of the Ut ah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a pa rty to am en d a pl ea di ng w ith pe rmi s s ion fro m the di s trict co urt and directs that “leave [to amend] sh all be freely giv en when j usticeD A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

58 so requires.” Surely justice is served by allowing parents, and the district court, t o consider whether joint custody would be in the best intere s tso f chi ldr enin a div o r ce a ct io n. R at he r t hant r ap pin gparents into t he cus tody optio n they select at t he time of their initial pl ea di ng, w ith

no a ll ow anc e f or c ha nge d ci rc um s tanc es , abe tter

rea di ng o f s ec tion

30 -3 -1 0. 8 w ou ld al low pa rents to fi le an am en de d pl ea di ng t o inc lu de a p are nti ng pl an, if s uc h an am en dm ent s ati s fi es rul e 1 5. Ac c ordi ngl y, w e c onc lu de tha t the di s tric t c ou rt erre d i n i ts interp reta tion of s ec tion 30 -3 -1 0. 8 an d tha t it s hou ld h av e all ow ed Ms . D ah l to fil e apar en t in g pl an in the event th at i t granted he r motion t o amend

. Ho we ver , for t he reasons disc uss ed below, we affirm on the alter nate gr ound that the dis t rict courtdid not abuse its disc ret ion in denying Ms. Dahl’s m otio n to amend.
2. The Di strict Co urt’s Denial o f M s. Dahl’s Mot ion to Amend Was Not a n A bu s e of

D is c reti on ¶162 As noted abov e, rul e 1 5 (a ) of the Utah Rules of Civil P roc ed ure pe rmi ts li tiga nts to am en d th ei r pl ea di ngs w ith pe rmi s s ion

of the c ou rt an d di rec ts tha t le ave “s ha ll be fre el y give n
w he n j us tic e s o requi res .” D is tric t c ou rts “s hou ld lib er ally a ll ow amendments unles s t he amendments inclu de untimely, unj ustified, [or] prejudicial f actor s.” Da niel s v. Ga mmaW . B ra chy th erapy

, LLC , 2009 UT 66, ¶ 58, 221 P.3d 256. A m otio n is untimely if it is “filed in the advance d procedural stage s of the litigat ion pro cess .” Id. ¶ 59 (i nte rna l quo tati on ma rks om itte d) . “ Moti ons are pre j ud ic ia l w he n the nonmov ing part y wou ld have little t ime to pr epare a r esponse before t rial.” Id. “And many other factors, suc h as delay, bad f aith, or fut il ity o f the amen dm ent, ma y w ei gh aga in s t the [d is tric t] c ou rt’s allowing the ame nd ment.” Id. ¶ 58 . ( intern alqu otati on m arks omitte d). “Becaus e a district court is best positioned to evaluate t he motion t o amend in the cont e xt o f the scope and du rat ion of the laws uit, we will rev erse a denial of leave t o amend only if the district court abused its dis cretio n.” Hud ge ns v

. Pr osp er, I

nc. , 2010 UT 68, ¶ 18, 243 P.3d 1275 (inter nal quotatio n marks omitte d). ¶163 Our r eview of the r ecord r eveals that t he district court did not ab us e its di s c reti on in thi s c as e by de nyi ng Ms

. D ah l’ s mo tion fo r leave t o amend becau se Ms. Dahl’s motion was untimely and prejudici al and her propo sed amendment would have been futile in any eve nt. The cu stody pr oceedings in this c ase were highly contentious. The cu stody ev aluation makes c l e a r th a t th ep a rt ies and their counsel behaved in ways that stymied the cus tody process and ultimately delayed it s compl etion. As a r esult, the cus todyCite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

59 evaluatio n was not completed until May 2009. O n August 31, 2009, D r. D ah l fil ed a m otio n to exc lu de c ons id era tion of j oint c us todyon the ba s is tha t no pa rentin g pl an ha d b een

fil ed . On e w eekbe fo re tr ial, on September, 9, 2009, Ms. Dahl filed her motio n to amend. ¶164 We have consis tently refused t o establish a b right -line rule for when a motion t o amend under rule 15 is untimely. See Kelly v. Ha rd Mo ney Fund in g, In c. , 2004 UT App 44, ¶ 29, 87 P.3d 734 (col l e ct i ng cases ). But we have recognized t hat timeliness i s intricately tied to t he p o t ential for pr ejudic e to the ot her part ies. “W e h ave c ons is tently h el d th at a [d is tric t] c ou rt doe s notab us e i ts di s c reti on w he n i t de ni es as untim el y la s t mi nu te m otio ns on the eve of tr ial.” Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins. Co. , 2 0 0 7UT3 7, ¶ 1 7, 1 6 3 P

. 3d 61 5 ( c oll ec ting c as es ). An d th at c ons id era tion is di s pos iti ve h ere. Despi te r eceiving the child cu stody ev aluation in May, M s. Dahl

w ai ted ne arl y f ou r mo nth s , u ntil t he week b ef ore tri al , to m ove to

amen d her counter claim and seek joint cus tody . Given that t he

cus tody evaluatio n was not finished u ntil late in the litigat ion, Ms. D ah l’ s de la y m ight ha ve b een exc us ed ha d s he fi le d qui c kly a ft er
rec e i v i n g t h e e v a l u a t i o n

. B u t s h e h a s o ff e r e d n o e x p l a n a t i o nfo r waiting until the eve o f trial to seek an amendment, and Dr. Dahl would s urely hav e been prejudic ed had he been required to oppose joint cus tody at thatlate date. On these facts, the distr ict court did not abuse its dis cretio n when it denied Ms. Dahl’s motion to amend. ¶165 Mor eov er, o ur rev iew of the recor d convinces u s that any

error on the pa rt of

the di s tric t c ou rt in de nyi ng Ms

. D ah l’ s mo tion to amend was harmless becaus e the ev idence does not suggest that joint cu s to d y w ou l d h a ve b e e ni nth e b e s t i n te re s ts of th e D a h l s’

c hi ld ren . In

de nyi ng Ms. D ah l’ s mo tion to ame nd , the d is tric t c ou rt stated:
Fr ankly, I t hink it unlikely thatI wo ul d or der joint

cus tody in this c ase bec ause I do n’t per ceive that t hese parties ar e a bl e t o effectively cooper ate t o r aise the child ren. I’ m open to ar gument and I’l l co ns i der t he best interests [of the children] w hen I hear all the evi de nc e b ut as of

right no w , I think th is is nota particularly im p o r tant question because I think it unlike l y thatjoint cus tody is going to be the result he re. An d n oth in g in

the evi de nc e offe red at tri als ug ges ted oth erw is e. In de ed , the c us todyeva lu ati on i ts el f e mp ha s iz ed the ne ed to minimize interactio n between Dr. Dahl and Ms. Dahl in any cus todyD A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

T h i s c l a i mf o r f e e s d o e s n o ti n c l u d e a ny f e e s i n c u r r e d a ft er 25 January 2010, inclu ding fees related to this appeal.

60 arr angement. Given the distr ict court’s stated r eservati onsab ou t the pa rtie s ’ ab il ity to c oope rate in the ir c hi ld ren’s be s t intere s ts an d i ts deter mination that “t he best interests of the children dictates that [Dr. Dahl ] receive sole leg al and physical cu stody,” any err or in denying Ms. Dahl’s m otio n to amend was h armless.
F. The Dis trict Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Refu sed to

Award A tto rney F ees to Ms. Dahl ¶ 1 6 6 Ms

. D a h l ’ s f i n a l c l a i m o f e r r o r i s t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c ou rt abus ed its disc ret ion when it denied her request for at tor ney fees. Ms . D ah l’ s attorneys s ub mi tted a c la im fo r $2 ,1 86 ,5 68 in

attorney fees, litig ation costs, and inter est charges thro ugh Janu ary 31, 2010. 25 At tri al , Ms . D ah l re qu es ted an o r de r t ha t D r. D ah l b e requi red to

c ont rib ut e to th e p aym ent of he r attorney fees an d e xpe n s e si nc u r r ed in the di vorc e a c tion

. Th e di s tric t c ou rt de ni ed Ms . D ah l’ s reque s t, findin g th a t M s

. D a h l , thro u gh h e r c ou n s e l , h a d f a i l e d to p re s e nt evi de nc e of

he r fi na nc ia l n eed an d b ec au s e th e fee s an d c os ts claim ed by Ms. Dahl’s attor neys were unreasonable

. Th e district

c ou rt al tern ati vel y de ni ed the reque s t on the g r ou nd tha t th e fee
a rr angement between Ms. Dahl and her att or neys constituted a proh ib ite d c ont in genc y f ee a gree me nt i n adom es tic ma tter. ¶16 7 Ms . D ah l a rgu es tha t th e d is tric t c ou rt ab us e d its di s c reti on
w he n i t de ni ed he r reque s t f or atto rne y f ees . S pe c ific al ly, s he argu es tha t he r fe e a rran gement w ith he r attorney w as nota p rohibi ted

c ont in genc y f ee a gree me nt. S he al s o as s erts th at th e d is tric t c ou rt allowed Dr. Dahl to pay his own atto rney fees out o f marital funds , while den

ying her the same right. She asks us to order that Dr. Dahl be requi red to pay he r fe es an d ad di tion al ly reque s ts tha t w e a w ard her the at tor ney fees she h as expended on this appeal.
1. Ms. Dahl Was Not Entit led to an Award o f Fees B e ca use She Fai le d to D em ons trate He r Fin anc ia l N eed an d H er Cl ai med Fees Were U nreasonable ¶168 “In Ut a h, atto rney fees are awardable only if authorized by statute or by contract.” Dix ie Sta teBa nk v. Bra cken , 764 P.2d 985, 988 (U tah 19 88 ). S ec tion

30 -3 -3 (1 ) of th e Uta h C ode au tho riz es c ou rts to award atto rney fees and costs in di vo rce cases if doing so would “enable the other party to pr osecute or defend the actio n.” “Su ch an award mus t b e based on evidenc e of the r eceiving spouse’s financ ialCite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

T h e p a rt i e s d o n otd i s p u te D r. D a h l ’s a b i l i tyto p a y f orMs

. 26 Dahl’s atto rney fees.

61 ne ed , th e p ayor sp ou s e’s ab il ity t o pa y, an d th e rea s ona bl en es s of 26 the re quested fees.” Levin v. Carlton , 2009 UT App 170, ¶ 27, 213 P.3d 884 (i nternal quot ation marks omitte d). The party r equesting an award o f fees h as the burden of prov iding suc h evidence. Griffith v. Griffith , 9 59 P .2 d 101 5, 10 20

– 21 (U tah Ct. Ap p. 19 98 ). Th e d ec is ion of whether to award atto rney fees pursuant to section 30-3-3 of the Uta h C ode res ts in

the s ou nd di s c reti on o f the distric t c ou rt. A s
suc h, we review the district cour t’s award or denial of fees f or abus e of disc ret ion. Kimb a ll v . Ki mb a ll , 2009 UT App 233, ¶ 19, 217 P.3d 73 3. An aw ard ba s ed on in s uf fi c ie nt fa c tu al fi nd in gs is an ab us e of disc ret ion and requires remand. Leppe rt v. Leppe rt

, 2009 UT App 10, ¶ 25, 200 P.3d 223. ¶16 9 Th e d is trict co urt refus ed Ms . D ah l’ s reque s t f or f ees pursuant to section 30-3-3 for two reasons. First, t he court found, as a f ac tu alma tter, tha t Ms . D ah l h ad ad op t e d ac o n s is tent tria l s trate gy
w he rei n s he de c li ne d to provi de “c om pe tent and compl ete evi de nc e” of

he r fi na nc ia l n eed . T hu s , s he fa il ed to me et h er b urd en of es tab li s hi ng fin anc ia l n eed . S ec ond , th e c ou rt fo un d tha t the fe es claim ed by Ms. Dahl’s atto rneys were unreasonable. Thus , she fai l e d to m e e t h e r b u rd e n of e s ta b l i s h i n g th e re a s on a b l e n e s s of the requested fees. Ms. Dahl as serts that bo th finding s a re er ro neous. We di s agre e.

a. Ms . D ah l Fa il ed to P rovid e E vid enc e of He r Fin anc ia l N eed ¶170 W he n det ermining the financi al need of the requesting

s pou s e , w e “ g e n e r a l l y l o o kt o t h e r e q u e s t i n gs p o u s e ’ s i n c o m e, inclu ding alimony received as the resul t of a divor ce d e cr e e ; the prop e r tyr e c e iv e d v i athe prop erty d is trib ut ion aw ard ; a nd hi s or he r expenses.” Kimb a ll , 2009 UT App 233, ¶ 46. Pa r t ies to a divo rce action often incur debt to r etain counsel. Wh ile the existence of such indebtedness may tend to show financ ial need, id. , i t is not de term in ati ve i f o the r fa c tors , su c h a s a p rope rty aw ard , a re p res ent. ¶171 Here, t he district court ex plicitly found that Ms. Dahl “presented no cr edible testimony to establish her currentfinanc ial

nee d

. ” Despi te ex plicit direction from the distr ict court t hat any claim s for spousal s up p o r t or for access to mar ital assets w ould require e vidence of Ms. Dahl’s financ ial need, sh e co ns i stently “prov ided only a ro ugh estimate of what was available to her in theD A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

Ms. Dahl argues that, onc e she mad e a prima facie s howing that 27

s he c ou ld notw ork, th e “ bu rde n s hou ld ha ve s hi ft ed to D r. D ah l to demonstrate [her] earning capacity.” This is a mi sstatement of the gov erning law. The bu rden of pro of rests with the part y r equesting (continued...)

62 year s bef or e separatio n” and dec lined to pro vide any specific

e v i d e n c e o f

h e r p o s t s e p a r a t i o nf i n a n c e s

. I nf a c t, t h e d i s t r i c tc o urt in s tru c ted Ms . D ah l’ s c ou ns elon n o le s s tha n five oc c as ion s to prov ide a financial declaration that would satisfy the court . But Ms. D ah l f ai le d to d o s o. Prior to tria l, the di s tric t c ou rt co nsid er ed whether to dism iss Ms. Dahl’s claim fo r a l i mo ny becaus e she had failed to designate a financialdeclaration in her pr etr ial exhibit s. Ms. Dahl’s couns el “confirmed that no financi al declaration would be pres ented du rin g tria l” an d th at “ he inten de d to re ly u pon financ ial information presented in 2007.” ¶172 Although M s. Dahl continues to assert that she had no in de pe nd ent mea ns of

pa yin g f or he r attorney fees an d c ou ld not workbecau se o f he r medicalproblems, she f ails to point t o any evi de nc e refu tin g th e d is tric t c ou rt’s tho ughtfulan d e xten s ive fi nd in gs of

fa c t. And s he ma kes no a ttempt to exp la in he r fa il ure to sub mit a suffici ent financ ial declaration. She does not dispu te t hat she dec lined to pre sent a financia l d e claration attr ial and ins tead rel ie d on fi na nc ia l info rma tion

fro m 2 00 7, the n m ore th an tw o yea rs out of date

. N ord oe s s h e d i s p u te th e d i s tr i c t c ou rt ’s f a c tu al deter mination that her testimony at tr ial was not credible. Instead, Ms. Dahl merely restat es the same arguments sh e made at tr ial, whi c h re l y on th e ve ry te s ti m ony th e d i s tr i c t c ou rt f ou nd to be

nonc red ib le

. ¶173 P arti es c ha ll en gin g the fa c tu alfi nd in gs of the di s tric t c ou rt bear a heav y burden of persuasi on. See Drake v. I ndus . Comm’n of Utah , 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). Our r eview of such findin gs is hi ghl y de fe rentia l a nd we wil l revers e th e d is tric t c ou rt on ly i f i ts f i n d i n gs a re c l e a rl y e rr on e ou s. Id. W e giv e this deference to t he di s tric t c ou rt “b ec au s e it s tan ds in a s up eri or pos iti on fromw hi c h to evaluate and weigh the evidence and asses s the c redib i l i t y and

accu racy o f witnes ses’ recollections.” Id. Ms. Dahl has not met this burde n. She points to no ev idence that would s upport t he

conc l us i on that t he district court’ s fin dings of fac t were clearly

err oneous. 27Cite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

(...continued) 27 an award of fees. Griffith v. Griff ith, 95 9 P. 2d 10 15 , 102 0– 21 (U tah Ct. App. 1998).

63 ¶17 4 Fin al ly, Ms . D ah l’ s c la im of fi na nc ia l n eed i sn o tp e r s ua s ive be c au s e s he fa il s to ac kno w le dge the s ub s tantia l p rope rty distribution she was awarded from the marit al a ss e t s. Th e district

c ou rt c ou ld prop erl y take thi s di s trib ut ion into ac c ou nt w he n
eva lu ati ng M s . D ah l’ s fi na nc ia l n eed . G ive n Ms . D ah l’ s fa il ur e to refute t he district court’s factual findings, as well as the subs tantial proper ty distr ibution she was awarded, we cannot conclu de that t he di s tric tc o u r tab u s e d i ts di s c reti on i n d ec li ni ng M s . D ah l’ s reque s t f or fees.
b. Ms. Dahl’s Claim f or A t tor ney Fee s and Costs Was Unreasonable ¶175 Th e d is tric t c ou rt al s o f ou nd Ms . D ah l’s cla im f or m ore than $2.1 million in atto rney fees and costs was u nreasonable. Ms. Dahl argues that this findi ng was an ab use of discr e tion. We di s agre e. ¶17 6 Wh en

eva lua t in g th e rea s ona bl en es s of a re qu es t f or attorney fees pu rs ua nt t o s ec tion 30 -3 -3 , c ou rts lookto a va rie ty of factors.
Reasonable atto rney[] fees are not measu red by what

an attorney a c tu al ly b il ls , n or is th e numbe r of hou rs spent on the case determinative in compu ting fees. . . . A court may co nsider, amo ng ot her factor s, the diff icul ty o f the litigat ion, the efficienc y of t he attorneys in

pre s entin g th e c as e, the rea s ona bl en es s of the nu mb er of

ho ur s spent on

the c as e, the fe e
cus to m a ri ly c harged in the lo cality for similar serv ices, the amount invo lved in the case an d t he result attained, and the ex pert ise and experie nc e of the atto rneys invo lved.
Ca brerav. Co tt rel l , 694 P.2d 622, 624– 25 (Utah 1985); seea lsoU T A H R. P R OF ’ L C ONDUC T R. 1.5(a) (es tablishing factor s to be considered in deter minin g the r easonablenes s of an attor ney’s fees). ¶177 A rev iew of the district court’ s fin dings of fact and conclu sions of law rev eals that the courtcarefully and thoughtfully

c ons ide r ed the fe e a ffid avi t s ub mi tted byMs . D ah l’ s attorney,D A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

64 Mr. C hri s tia ns en, w hi c h d eta il ed the fe es reque s ted byal l of Ms . D ah l’ s vari ou s attorneys

. Th e cou rt ma de exte ns ive fi nd in gs of fact on the issu e of att or ney fees. It found that the claim for fees and costs su bmitted by Mr . Christensen was “ex t r a or dinarily larg e,” tot aling $2,186,568.57 in fees, costs, expenses, and interest ch arg es. In pa rtic ul ar, the c ou rt no ted tha t Mr. C hri s tensen’s c la im fo r fe es was “[ b]y far the larg est debt identified in th[e] p ro ceedings.” ¶178 Ms . D ah l w as rep res ented bys evera l d iffe ren t attorneys and law fi rms. The c ourtcarefully consi dered t he appropr iateness of the hours claimed by ea ch a t t o rney. I n consi dering t he

rea s ona bl en es s of

he r fe e reque s t, the di s tric t c ou rt fo un d th at e ven if the hou rs bi ll ed byMs . D ah l’ s fi rs t s evera l a ttorn eys w ere reasonable, those fees could not fairly be said to hav e advanced the li tiga tion be c au s eM s

. D ah l op ted to s tart ove r w ith ne wc ou ns el , Mr. Christensen, in J anuary 2007. ¶17 9 As fo r Mr. C hri s ten s en an d h is fi rm, the d is tric t c ou rt fo un d t h a tt h e h o u r s c l a i m e d w e r e “ u nr e a s o n a b l y l a r g e

. ” F or
exa mp le , th e fi rm bi ll ed 2, 98 1 h ou rs in the ten mo nth s fro m J anua ry thro ugh Oc tob er 2 00 9. Mr. C hri s ten s en reque s ted hu nd red s of thousands of dollars i n fees relat ed to disc ov ery of financ ial matter s. Bu t th e c ou rt f ou nd , b as ed on M r. C hr i s t e n s e n’ sn o nc om pl ia nc e w ith disc ov ery or ders and g eneral lack of prepar ation for tr ial, that “the disc ov ery was n ot car efully managed o r focused, and that the ext remely high fees relat ed to t he proc e ss were notwarrante d.” Additionally, t he court found t ha t Mr . Christensen pursu ed a strat egy involv ing the “aggr essive use of motions to r econsider and

c la rif y,” w hi c h “ s ub s tantia ll y inc r e a s e d a t t o r ne yh o u r sa n d e xpe ns es
w ith ou t m ate ria ll y ad vanc in g th e c as e. ” Mor e t el li ngl y, th e c ou rt found that the “huge, al most imposs ible hours recorded during t he tria l m onths

. . . a pp ea r to b e a n a ttempt to gai n an un de rs tan di ng o f evidence and fac ts that should have been mas ter ed months earlier.” In short, t he court’s e xte nsive factual findings pai nt a picture of a litigat ion strat egy that was inefficient, ineffective, and unju stifiabl y
c os tly. ¶180 Ms. Dahl argues that “[t]he complexity o f the [marital]

es tate its el f g en era ted ad di tion alle galfe es .” Bu t th e d is tric t c ou rt exp res s ly f ou nd tha t th e i s s ue s pre s ented in the di vorc e a c tion w ere not p a r t i cularly uniqu e and could b e addressed with “the application of well es tablished rules of law.” ¶18 1 The exp en s es fo r Ms . D ah l’ s exp ert w itn es s es w ere pa rtic ul arl y trou bl ing. As w e h ave pre viou s ly d is c us s ed , Mr.Cite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

Ms . D ah l a ls o argu es tha t, ev enif he r c la im ed fe es w ere 28

unrea s ona bl e, the di s tric t c ou rt erre d w he n i t aw ard ed he r no fe es at a ll . T hou gh we agre e th at th e p rope r res pon s e to afi nd in g of unreasonable fees might be for t he district court t o r educe the requested amount to an “asc ert ainable, reasonabl e figure,” see Kimb a ll v . Ki mb a ll , 2009 UT App 233, ¶ 50, 217 P.3d 733, any err or in thi s c as e w as ha rml es s be c au s e th e d is tric t c ou rt de ni ed fe es un de r
s ec tion 30 -3 -3 on the in de pe nd ent b as is tha t Ms . D ah l h ad fa il ed to establis h her financi al need. Becau se we affirm that holding, M s. D ah l w o u l d n o tb e e n t i t l e d t o a ny a w a r d o f f e e s , e v e ni f

s u c hf e es
w ere re as ona bl e.

65 Christensen failed to proper ly designate ex pertwitnesse s for Ms. Dahl an d failed to submit exper t r epor ts in acc or dance w ith the requirements of r ule 26. As a result, her e x pert s’ testimony was sub stantially limited. The dis tr ict court spe ci fically not ed that t his fa il ure to prope rly d es ign ate an d d is c los e ex pe rt w itn es s es ren de red their t estimony “inconsequential to the final determi na t ion of the

c as e. ” Ye t, Mr. Chris ten s en reque s ts an aw ard c overi ng the s e ex pe rt witness es’ sub st antial fees, totaling appr oximate ly $327,000. We agr ee with the district courtthat these claim ed fees for exper ts who

were never proper ly disclosed an d were thus rendered useles s to the li tiga tion w ere u nre as ona bl e. ¶182 Finally, Ms. Dahl’s b riefing has failed to effectively challen ge t he factual findings of the dis tr ict court. The court made over f orty fac tu al fi nd in gs rel ate d to the is s ue of attorney fees . Ye t, Ms . D ah l’ s bri ef

fa il s to eve n me nt ion any of the di s tric t c ou rt’s

s pe c ific fi nd in gs . In s tea d, he r bri ef rel ie s on g en era li ze d s tate me nts tha t th e c as e w as c om pl ic ate d a nd the ma rita l e s tate w as c om pl ex,
ne c es s ita tin g hi ghe r fee s . S uc h c onc lu s ory al le gati ons are insu ffic ient to ov ercome our highly deferential rev iew o f the district court’s findings of fac t. See Drake, 939 P.2d at 181. ¶183 In sum, we co nclu de that t he district court did notabus e its disc ret ion when it dec lined to award atto rney fees to Ms. Dahl

. 28 The court’s careful and thor ough review of her r equest is apparent from its ext ensive findin gs o f fact and c onclus ions of law. And despite devo ting s event een pages of her appell ate brief to t he topic of att or ney fees, Ms. Dahlhas f ailed to marshal any ev idence that would s upport a findin g of clear er ro r. Accordingly , we affirm. We

nowtu rn ou r atte nti on to w he the r Ms . D ah l’ s fe e a rran gem ent w ith Mr. C hri s ten s en

w as prop er.D A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

Foll ow in g th e d is tric t c ou rt’s de term in ati on tha t Mr. 29 Chris ten s en

ha d e nte red into a p rohibi ted c ont in genc y f ee a gree
me nt w ith

Ms . D ah l, D r. D ah l s ub mi tted an info rma l c om pl ai nt t o the Office o f Pro fess ional Conduct (OPC). Following an inquiry, the OP C con c l u d e d t h a tM r

. C hr i s t e n s e nd i d n o tv i o l a t e t h e R u l e s of (continued...)

66 2. Mr. C hri s ten s en’s Fee Agree me nt w ith Ms . D ah l W as Improp er ¶184 As an alternat i v e gr ound for denying M s. Dahl’s request fo r attorney fees , th e d is tric t c ou rt al so fo un d th at th e fee
arra nge me nt b etw een Ms

. D ah l an d Mr. Chris ten s en am ou nte d to a prohibited continge ncy fee agreement. M s. Dahl argue s t hat this fi nd in g w as an

ab us e of

di s c reti on. M r . Chri s ten s en, i n b rie fi ng, argues t hat Ms . D ah l i s ob li gate d to p ay th e entire ty of hi s fe e, “re g a r d l e ss of the outcome” of the case, and that the “fee was gener ated by t he calculation of the hour s worked atthe applicabl e rate and

. . . d id notfl uc tu ate ba s ed up on the am ou nt o f p rope rty [Ms. Dahl] was awarded.” ¶185 The dis tr ict court r ejected this fee arrangem e nt as an improp er c ont in genc y f ee a gree me nt i n w hic h Mr. Chris ten s en “c rea ted , b y co nt r ac t, ame c ha ni s m t o s ei ze as mu c h a s the entire proc eed s aw ard ed to [his ] c li ent fro m the es tate to pay th e b il l w he n
a recov ery was ac hieved.” In declaring t he fee agree men t to be proh ib ite d, the c ou rt rel ie d pri ma ril y on rul e 1. 5( d) (1 ) of ou r Ru le s of P rof es s ion al Con du c t, w hi c h proh ib its attorneys fro m “ enter[ in g] int o a na r r a n g e m e n tf o r

. . . a ny f e e i na d o m e s t i c r e l a t i o n s m a t t er, the pa ym ent or am ou nt o f w hi c h i s c ont in gent up on the s ec uri ng o f a d ivorc e or u pon

the am ou nt o f a li mo ny o r s upp o r t, or p rope rty

s ettl em ent in

li euthe reof .” Th e c ou rt ob s erved tha t Mr. C hri s ten s en had made no attempt t o collect any o f his fees and i nstead “simply allowed the fees and costs to accu mulate with s ubs tantial inter est.” It rea s one d th at th e “ onl y log ic alc onc lu s ion ” w as tha t Mr. Christensen’ s pay ment had “always d epended upon a recover y in favor of [Ms. Dahl ].” ¶18 6 We ne ed notde termine w he the r Mr. C hri s ten s en’s fe e
arr angement constituted a pr ohibited contingency fee agr eement in

a domestic matter becau se we invalidate t he fee arrang ement on the alter nate gr ound that it was prohibited under Ut ah Code section 38- 2-7(9) and rules 1.8 and 1.5 of the Utah R ules of Pro fess ional Con du c t. SeeBa iley v . B a yle s , 2002 UT 5 8 , ¶ 10, 52 P.3d 1158

29Cite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

(...continued) 29 Professional Co nduc t. Mr . Christensen offers the OPC’s findi ngs in de fe ns e of

his f ee a rran gem ent w ith Ms . D ah l. Bu t th e OP C’s decis ion not t o impose disc ipline in this instanc ed oe sn ot u n d e rmine the district court ’s find ings and c onclus ions. Accordingly, we gr ant no d eferenc e to th e OP C’s opi ni on i n this ma tter. Th e d is t ric t c ou rt de term in ed tha t Mr. C hri s ten s en’s c la im ed 30 fe es are unrea s ona bl e i n th e c ont ext of de term inin g w he the r D r. Dahl s hould be required to contribute t o Ms. Dahl’s attor ney fees. Th ou gh o ur a na lys is fo c u s e so n w he the r Mr. C hri s ten s en’s fe es w ere unreasonable un der r ule 1.5 of t he U t a h Rules of Pro fess ional Conduct, the legal standard in the t wo context s is large ly identical. Thus , the district court ’s factual findin gs are equally relev ant to our
an al ys is he re.

67 (holding that an appellate courtmay affirm a judgment “‘on any legal gr ound or t heory apparent o n the recor d’”). Spec i fi ca l l y , we hold that M r. Chr istensen ac quired a pro hibit e d i nt erest in the

s ub j ec t m atte r of

hi s rep res entati on o f M s . D ah l a nd tha t hi s c la im ed fe es are unrea s ona bl e. Ac c or di ngl y, w e i nva li da te h is fe e 30

arr angement with M s. Dahl and refer M r. Chr istensen to the Office of P rof es s ion alCon du c t.

a. Mr . Christensen Improper ly Acquired a Propr ietar y Int erest in the S ub j ec t Matt er of

the Rep res entati on ¶18 7 Ms . D ah l e nte red into tw o s ep ara te fee a gree me nts w ith Mr

. Christensen. The first agr eement, d ated J anuary 2 5 , 2 0 0 7,

cover ed the time in whic h Mr. Chr ist e ns e n was the owner and manager o f the firm Hirschi Christensen, P L L C

. The sec ond agr eement, dated January 21, 2010, but effec tive Nove mber 1, 2009,

w as w ith Mr. C hri s ten s en’s ne wfi rm, Chris ten s en Th ornt on, P LL C. Both agreements c ontained paragraphs entitled “Liens

. ” Th ese paragrap hs pu rpor ted to gr ant Mr . Christensen’s fi rms a contractual lien on the entiret y of any aw ard that Ms. Dahl reco v e r e d i n t he di vorc e c as e. ¶188 Spec ific ally, the January 2007 ag reement stat es: Pursu ant to § 38-2-7( 2)(a) , Utah Code Annotat ed 2001, I h ave a l ie n i n th e a mo unt of my unp ai d a ttorn ey’s fe es , p lu s intere s t w hi c h a ttac he s to any s ettl em ent or

a w a rd i nyo u r f a vo r a n d to th e p ro c e e d s th ereo f, pending payment of my bill. This lien attaches to anyD A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

68 ver dict you re ceive (even if I do not repr esent you at the time of ju d gment or settlement in yo ur case if I withdraw for go od cause or am dis charged by yo u). You s pe c i f i c a l l y a g r e e t o g r a n ta ni m m e d i a t e l i e non you r porti on o f the mar ital h om e a t 43 22N. Vi nta ge Drive[,] Prov o, Ut ah 84606 pursuant to this paragr aph

an d a gr e eto grant th e a bo ve a ttorn ey’s li en w he the r or not t he above cited stat ute would permit suc h a lien by signing this paragraph. ¶18 9 Th e l an gu age of

the Ja nu ary 2 01 0 a gree me nt is even mo re
s w eep in g: By s igning this paragr aph, you agree to gr ant immediately a consens ual lien agains t yo ur present interest and t he int erest t o be awarded to you in the action whic h you have filed in the Fo urth District Courtof Utah ag ainst Charles Dahl and an Irr evo cable Trust, No. 090402989 ( “Trust Action”). You als o gr ant immediately a consens ual lien against yo ur present interest in all marital assets and against any atto rneys’ fee award and supp or t aw ard to b e awarded to you in the divo rce ac tion t hat is the sub ject of this litigation, whether or not t he above cited stat ute would grant an atto rney’ s lien at th i s time. At the t ime divor ce is decreed by the court in a signed or der t his c onsensu al li en w il l m erge into an

attorney’s li en

on al l r ig hts to inc om e a nd as s ets aw ard ed to youbythe c ou rt. Pursu ant to § 38-2-7( 2)(a) , Utah Code Annotat ed 2001, the firm has a lien i n the amo un t o f it s unpaid atto rney’ s fees plus int e rest which w ill attach to t he proceeds of yo ur c ase, inclu ding but not limited to all supp or t payments you are awarded, as well a s all

as s ets an d a llj ud gm ents aw ard ed to you . T hi s li en will attach w hether o r notwe represent y ou at the tim e th e j ud gm ent or supp ort is aw ard ed . You authorize a nd dir ect all payments you make t o be made to Chr istensen T hornt on, PLLC b a lances due first and then towar ds the payments due t o Hirschi Chris ten s en, P LL C. ¶190 Mr . Christensen sought to p e r fe ct the security inter est purpor tedly g rant e d in the fee agree ments by fili ng a UCC-1 fi na nc in g s tate me nt on Ja nu ary 10 , 20 08

. Th at s tate me nt d es c rib edCite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

69 the collater al as “all proceeds fro m cas e numb er 064402 232 in the Fou rth D is tric t Cou rt . . . i nc lu di ng, but no t li mi ted to al l a li mo ny, proper ty r ights, bus iness interests, and 401 K and other ret irement savings and pension awards.” Each of these docu ments purport ing to grant Mr. Chris ten s en an enfo rc ea bl e intere s t in any awa rd granted to Ms . Da hl in the di vorc e act ion w ent into effec t lon g b ef ore the entr y of t he divor ce decree on July 19, 2010. ¶19 1 Th e que s tion

be fo re u s c onc ern s the pr opri ety of Mr. Chris ten s en’s li en aga in s t Ms

. D ah l’ s intere s t in the ma rita l e st ate pri or to the entry of a dec ree of di vorc e. Ru le 1. 8( i) of the Uta h R ul es of Professional Conduc t pro hibits attor neys from acquir i ng“a prop rie tary i nte res t in

the c au s e of

ac tion or th e s ub

j ec t m atte r of litigat ion the lawyer is c onducting for a client.” The rule does allow, in ap prop ria te c irc um s tanc es , a n a ttorn ey to “ ac qu ire a lie n authorized by law to sec ure the lawyer’s fee or expenses.” U T A H R. P R OF ’ L C ONDUC T R . 1 .8 (i )( 1) . Mr. Chris ten s en rel ie s on thi s exc ep tion to defend t he liens c ontained in his retainer ag reements with Ms. Dahl. Bu t such

reliance is m isplac ed. ¶192 The plain

language of the rule au thor izes only those liens “authorized by law.” Id. To me et this ex cep t io n, Mr. C hri s ten s en rel ie s on s ec tion

38 -2 -7 (2 ) o f the Uta h C ode , w hi c h gra nts attorneys a l ie n on any m one y or pro pe rty ow ne d b y the cli en t as s ec uri ty against unpaid fees. S pecifi cally, sec tion 38-2-7(2) au thor izes liens on prop erty tha t is the s ub j ec t of the li tiga tion

fo r w hi c h th e a ttorn ey
w as reta in ed

. We re th is the en d of the ma tter, Mr. C hri s ten s en’s pos iti on might b e te na bl e. Bu t s ec t i o n 3 8

- 2- 7( 9) s pe c ific al ly p rohibi ts liens in domestic relations matter s. ¶19 3 Uta h C ode s ec tion 38 -2 -7 (9 ) d oes nota uthori ze an attorney to acquire a lien in the re presentati o n o f a cl ient in a domestic relat ions matter unless a fi nal order of divor ce has been sec ured. The

s tatu te a uthori ze s attorney l ie ns in di vorc e a c tion s only w he n (a ) .

. . the dom es tic rel at io ns matte r ha s be en conclu ded by the securing of a final o r d e r of divor ce
ort he a t t o r ne y / cl i e nt r e l a t i o nship has terminated; and (b) the client has f ailed to fulfill the cl ient’s financ ial ob li gati ons to th e a ttorn ey. U T A H C OD E § 38-2-7( 9) (emp hasis added).D A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

Th e lie ns c ont ai ne d in the reta in er a gree me nt w ere e ffec tive on 31 January 25, 2007, and No vember 1, 2009, r espectively. The UCC-1

s t a t e m e n t w a s f i l e d o n J a nu a r y 1 0 , 2 0 0 8

. T h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t d i d not enter a final di vo rce decree until July 19, 2010. Even if Mr. C hristensen could acquire a va l i d interest in the 32 marital estat e to secu r e hi s fees, he could do so only by complying with the heightened dem ands of rule 1.8(a). S uch an action would be appr op ri a te onl y i f th e te rm s of

th e tr a n s a c ti on

w e re f a i r and reasonable to the client, the ter ms w ere fully disclosed, the c lient was advised to seekoutside couns el, and the client gave full and informed consent. U T A H R. P R OF ’ L C ONDUC T R. 1 .8 (a ). We ha ve serious r eservat ions as to whether this t ransaction could s atisfy rule 1.8(a).

70 ¶194 Here, t he liens and UCC-1 filing statement w ent into e ffec t pri or to th e entry of the D ah ls ’ d ec ree o f d ivorc e. Th ou gh s ec tion 31 38-2-7 allows an atto rney t o tak e a lien in the su bjec t matt er o f the litigat ion for t he purposes of sec uring payment o f hisfees,

s ub s ec tion

9 li mi ts thi s au tho riz ati on i n d om es tic rel ati ons ma tters in wh ich a final order of divor ce has yetto be e nt ered. Given t his statuto ry directive , Mr

. Christensen’s liens were not“authorized by la w .” As s uc h, he c annot rel y on the exc ep tion to rul e 1 .8 (i )’ s prohibition ag ainst atto rneys ac quiring a p ro prietar y inter est in the sub ject matter o f their r epresentat ion. 32 ¶195 Other jurisdi ctions have reached the s ame concl usion, refusing to allow att or ne y s to acquire a pro prietar y inter est in the

ma rita l e s tate in

di vorc e a c tion s pri or to th e ti me tha t al l i ssu es relat ing to the use, posses sion, sale, a nd dis tr ibution of the marital proper ty ar e conclu sively adjudic ated. See In re Fish er , 202 P.3d 1186, 11 95

– 98 (C olo. 20 09 ) ( up hol di ng d is c ip li na ry ac tion w he n a ttorn ey too k a deed of tr ust in the marital home); In re May, 538 P.2d 787, 790 (I da ho 1975 ); Va . S tate Ba r, L ega l E thi c s Op. 16 53 (1 99 5) (“ In

sum mary, a s a m e a n s to s e c u re p a ym e n t o f l e ga lf e e s i na d i vorce matter , an atto rney may not ente r into an arrang ement with a client

w he rei n th e a ttorn ey a c qu ire s an intere s t in the ma rita l p rope rty, or proceeds from the sale ther eof, unless a fi na l o r der o r decree has be en entere d .

. . .” ); Mas s

. Ba r As s ’n, Op. No. 91 -1 (1 99 1) ; Me . B d. of Ov erseer s of t he Bar, Op. 97 (1989) ( “[T] he taking o f an interest in the marital pro pert y by t he atto rney inappro priately i nterjects the interests of t he atto rney int o the issues i n the divor ce cas e, creatingCite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

71 an unac ceptable r isk that t he jud gment of t he atto rney will be affec ted by his acqu isition of the inter est.”). ¶196 There is goo d reason to preclude atto rneys fro m acqu iring a l ie n in the prop erty of

a m ari tales tate pri or to th e entry of a d ec ree of di vorc e. Th e va lu e a nd di s trib ut ion o f mar ita l p rope rty is often hotly contested by the par ties to a div or ce. For example, it may be in the client’s be st i nt erest t o r elinquis h her claim to the marit al hom e a s a m ea ns of

facili t at ing afa vorab le s ettl em ent. If he r attorney has an

intere s t in

the hom e, the attorney’s intere s ts are the n direc t l y at odds with the client’s. Mor eov er, marit al proper ty still

s ub j ec t to equi tab le di s trib ut ion bythe c ou r t shou ld rem ai n free from encumb rances that might serv e to hind e r the efficient li qu id ati on a nd di s trib ut ion of tha t prop erty. ¶19 7 In thi s c as e, Mr. Chris ten s en’s atte mp t to ac qu ire a li en on the entire ty of

Ms . D ah l’ s s ha re of

the m ar it al es tate run s af ou l of rule 1.8(i) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct and sec tion 38- 2- 7( 9) of the Uta h C ode

. We ac c ordi ngl y hol d tha t Mr. C hri s ten s en’s reta in er agre em ent w ith Ms

. D ah l c ons titu ted a proh ib ite d fee

arra nge me nt. b. Mr. C hri s ten s en’s Fee s We re Unrea s ona bl e, in Vio la t ion of Rule 1.5(a) of the Utah Rules of Professi onal Conduct ¶19 8 Mr. C hri s ten s en’s fe es notonl y viol ate d ru le 1. 8, the y w ere unreasonable. Rule 1.5(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduc t proh ib its an

attorney fromma kin g arra nge me nt f or, c ha rgin g, or
c oll ec tin g u nr e a s o n ab l efe es or u nre as ona bl e ex pe ns es . T he rul e l is ts

a var iety o f fac tor s courts should consider when deter mi ni ngthe reasonableness of an

atto rney’ s fee r equest, incl uding reasonable

asses smen t s o f the time and labor invo lved, the amount in contro ver sy and the results o btained, t he novelt y of t he legal issu es, the c us tom aryfe e sf o rs i mi la r s ervi c es , a ny t im e c ons trai nts impos ed bythe c irc um s tanc es , a nd the exp eri enc e a nd ab il ity o f t he la w yer perfor ming services. U T A H R. P R OF ’ L C ONDUC T R. 1.5(a). ¶199 At the time of tr ial, Mr

. Christensen claim ed M s. Dahl owed him over $2.1 million in attor ney fee s, co st s, expenses, an d intere st . As d is c us s ed ab ove, the di s tric t c ou rt m ad e ex ten s ive fi n d i n g s o f

f a c tr e g a r d i n gM r

. C hr i s t e n s e n’ s c l a i m e d f e e s

. T h ou gh the district c ourt ’s analysis was made in the c ontex t of considering

rea s ona bl en es s as a f ac tor in de terminin g w he the r to requi re D r. Dahl to pay Ms. Dahl’s attor ney fees pursuant to section 30-3-3 of the Ut ah Code, the s e fa c tu al fi nd in gs are equa ll y rel eva nt to aD A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

72 deter mination of reasonableness u nder rule 1.5(a). SeeCa brera, 694 P

. 2 d a t 6 2 4 ( r e c o gn i z i n g t h a t r e a s o n a b l e n e s s o f a f ee a w ard inc orpora tes thes t a n d a r d sfo r rea s ona bl en es s c ont ai ne d i n th e Ru le s of Professional Conduc t). ¶200 The dis tr ict court’s detailed factual findi ngs persuasi vely establish that M r. Chr istensen’s fees were unreasonable. Th e district

cour t was espec ially tr oubled by Mr. Chr istensen’s testimony t hat “th e fee a rran gem ent with the li en w as s tru c tu red s o th at h is fi rm would receive payment, r egar dless of a ny ruling by [the district court] thatthe fees were or were n ot reasonable.” We are similarly tr oubled. ¶20 1 Th e d is tric t c ou rt c are fu ll y c onsidered Mr. Chris ten s en’s affi da vit i n s up port o f hi s fe e requ es t an d conc lu de d th at th e h ou rs
c la im ed w ere “ unrea s onab lyl arge .” For exa mp le , Mr. Chris ten s en’s fi rm b il le d Ms. D ah l for 1,9 00 hou rs in 20 07, only 5 3. 3 of

w hi c h w ere
a ccounted for by court appear ances and depositions. Th e district

c ou rt no ted tha t “[ t] he bill fo r 20 07 w as the equi val ent of a s in gle , fu lltim e a ttorn ey b il le d a t s om ew he re b etw een $1 80 and $25 0 p er hou r.” For 20 09 , th e firm bi ll ed 2, 98 1 h ou rs t hr o ug h th e en d of October . Al t ho ug h t he co ur ta ck no wl e d g e d t ha tprepar ation fortr ial

can require significant hours, it f ound that the “hug e , almost imposs ible hours recorded during the tr ial mo nths . . . appear to be

an atte mpt to gain an understanding of evidence and fa ct s t hat should h ave been mastered months ear lier.” The dis tr ict court also qu es tioned Mr. Chris ten s en’s c la im fo r hu nd red s of hou rs s pe nt o n “rev iew” of the case file, findi ng that “t he t i me attr ibuted to t hat activity in his case [ was] gr ossly inappropriat e.” ¶20 2 Moreove r, th e d istr ic t c ou rt f ou nd tha t th e s trate gy employed by Mr

. Christensen was wholly ineffec tive at pro duci ng fa vorab le res ul ts fo r Ms

. D ah l. For exa mp le , Mr. C hri s ten s en fa il ed to pro vid e c om pe tent evi de nce as to Ms . D ah l’ s fi na nc ia l n eed fo r alimony or an atto rney fee award. As a result of this deliberate and il l- c onc ei ved c hoi c e, Ms . D ah l re c ei ved ne ith er te mp orary n or permanent alimony and the district court declined to award her any

a tto rney fees. Mr . Christensen also employed a litigat ion tactic involv ing “agg ressive use of m o t i o ns to reconsider and clarify.” Ac c ordi ng t o th e u nre fu ted fa c tu alfi nd in gs of the di s tric t c ou rt: Virtually ev ery ruling of the Co ur t or the Commiss ioner .

. . was followed by a flurry o f motions to challenge, r econsi d e r or delay the impact of the

or iginal decis ion. These m otio ns serv ed to delayCite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

73 complianc e wit h or ders of the Co urt, and rar ely prod uc ed impo rtant or n ec es s ary c la rific ati on. Th ey also sub stantially increase d atto rney ho urs and exp en s es w ith ou t m ate ria ll y ad vanc in g th e c as e. We agr ee with the district co ur t thatthese tactics delayed the proceedings and served o nl y to increase the fees c harged t o Ms. Dahl. ¶203 Mr . Christensen’s han dling of discov ery was s imilarly fraught with diffic ulties. Des pite an or der closing fact disc ov ery in January 2009, Mr . Christensen co nt inued to pursue additional di s c ov e ryc onn e c te d w i th th e D a h l s ’ c h i l d re nw e l l a fte r t h a t d a te

. In hi s af fi da vit, Mr. C hri s ten s en c la ims “hu nd red s of

tho us an ds of dollars wort h of time and fees related to disc ov ery of financ ial

ma tters .” Yet, on the eve o f tria l, Mr. Chri s ten s en c ont inue d to s eek di s c overy a s to fin anc ia l m atte rs . W e a g r ee w ith the di s tric t c ou rt tha t “ t h e o n l y p o s s i b l e c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t t h e d i s c o v e r y w as not

c are fu ll y m an age d or f oc us ed , a nd tha t th e ex trem el y high f ees relat ed to t he process were not warr anted.” ¶20 4 Fin al ly, w e a re ex tremely trou bl ed byMr. C hri s ten s en’s handlin g of t he pretr ial disclosure process. As w e have discus sed, de s pi te re pe ate d r eq ue s ts fro m the di s tric t c ou rt, Mr. Chris ten s en failed to pro p e r l y disc lose the exhibits he intended to o ffer at tr ial. As a res ult , the district courtexcluded most of Ms. Dahl ’s trial exh ib its , lea vin g Ms . Da hl at a s ub s tantia l dis ad vantage . S im il arl y, Mr. C hri s ten s en

fa il ed to pro pe rly d es ignat e M s. D ah l’ s exp ert witness es or t o subm it pro per ex p e r t witness repo rt s. Th e district

c ou rt c orrec tly re fu s edto a llo w t he ex pe r t s’ t est imo ny , wh ich f ur t her pre j udi ced M s. Da hl. An d y et , M r . C hr ist en sen ’s a ffid av its eek sover $327,000 in fees f or these exper ts—ex p e r t s who did not materially ai d i n th e r esolut ion

of the c as e b ec au s e th ey w ere n ot al low ed to tes tif y. ¶20 5 Ta ken

togeth er, the di s tric t c ou rt’s fac tu alfi nd in gs ad equa tel y s up port i ts c onclus ion tha t Mr. C hri s ten s en’s c la im ed fe es are unrea s ona bl e. By ch argi ng the s e u nre as ona bl e fees , Mr. Christensen has violat ed rule 1.5(a). Th e issu es presented in this

c as e w ere n ot s o no velor di ffic ul t as to requi re ex traord in ary s kil l on the pa rt of

an attorney. In de ed , mos t of the fe es an d expe ns es s eem to hav e been driven by M r. Chr ist e ns en’s inab ility t o effectively manage basic disc ov ery and pretr ial disc losure p r ocedures. The

ma rita l e s tate w as s ub s tantia l, bu t Mr. C hri s ten s en’ se f f o r t so b tai ne d

no m ore, an d a rgu ab ly muc h le s s , th an Ms . D ah l w ou ld ha ve b eenD A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

74 entitl ed to u nd er a ny c irc um s tanc es . Mr. Chris t en sen fa il ed to pre s ent evi de nc e th at w ou ld h av e entit le d Ms . D ah l to b oth tempor ary and permanent alimony. He failed to join the Trust in the divor ce action, despite the fact that the Trust contained marital proper ty. A s a result, the district court declined to awar d Ms. Dahl an equitable offs et for her share of t he proper ty con t ained in the Tru s t. ¶20 6 In s hort, f or al l th e th ou s an ds of hou r s bil le d b y Mr. Christensen in the course of this lit i gatio n and his more t han $2.1 million bi ll, the results he obta ined for Ms. Dahl could only be

c ha rac teri ze d a s extre me ly d is ap poi nti ng fromhe r s tand poi nt. In de ed , Mr. Chris ten s en’s mu lti mi ll ion do llar b il l, if al low ed to stand, wil l consu me the entire ty o f Ms. Dahl’s proper ty awar d. Whe n a n atto rney pr oceeds competently, but nonetheless is

unsuc ce ss ful f or his c lient, we asc ribe no er ro r. But when an atto rney consistently f a i ls to perfo rm basic skills in a competent manner, and the client is harmed as a result, we will not allow that atto r ne y to c oll ec t pa tently u nre as ona bl e fees . W e h old tha t Mr. Christensen violate d rule 1.8(i) of the Utah Rules of Professional Con du c t a n d s e c t i o n 3 8

- 2

- 7 ( 9 ) o f t h e U t a h C o d e b y p u r p o r t i n g to acquire an enforceable int e r est in the sub ject matter o f the li tiga tion— t he mar it al est at e. We fur t he r ho ld that Mr. Chris tens en’s fees w ere unreasonable in violat ion of rule 1.5(a). We now tur n our atte nti on t o th e rem ai nd er of Ms . D ah l’ s argu me nts rel ati ng t o atto rney fees.
3. Ms . D ah l Fa il ed to Pres erve He r Argu me nt Th at the D is tric t Cou rt Improp erl y Al lo wed Dr. D ah l to P ay f or Hi s Attorn ey Fe es fro m Mari talAs s ets ¶207 Ms. Dahl as serts that Dr . Dahl w as allo we d to pay his atto rney fees fro m marital assets, w hile sh e was deni e d t he same pri vil ege . T hou gh w e agre e th at s uc h ares ul t w ou ld be in equi tab le , Ms. Dahl h as fail ed to demo nstrate t hat she preserv ed this argument fo r ap pe al

. Ge ne ral ly, w e w il l not c ons id er an is s ue th at was not preserv ed in t he district court. Ba ird v. Ba ird, 2014 UT 08, ¶ 20, 322 P .3 d 72 8. For an

is s ue to b e p res erved , i t m us t ha ve b een pre s ented to t he district court in such a m anner that t he court had “a meaningfu l oppor tunity t o r ule ” on it. Hill v. S uperior Prop. Mgmt. Ser vs ., In c. , 2 01 3 UT60 , ¶ 46 , 321 P .3 d 1 05 4. Fu rthe r, ru le 24 (a )(5) (A ) of the Ut ah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires parties to inclu de a “citation to the recor d showin g that the iss ue was preserv ed in the tr ial court.”Cite as: 2015 UT 23 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

75 ¶20 8 In he r bri ef , Ms . D ah l p rovid es tw o c ita tion s to tran s c rip ts in whic h Dr. Dahl testified that he paid his atto rneys fr o m a Wells Fargo a c c ou nt en di ng in 95 66

. Ou r ow n exa mi na tion of the rec ord

revea ls tha t the di s tric t c ou rt de term in ed tha t th is ac c ou nt c ont ai ne d marital funds

. Thus , it appears that M s. Dahl has id entified fac tual

s up port f or he r as s erti on. Bu t th ere a re n o in di c ati ons in Ms . D ah l’ s ap pe ll ate bri efin g th at s he ever obj ec ted to Dr. Da hl ’s c ond uc t b ef ore the district co urt. We find no indication that the distr ict court was

ever asked to det ermine whether Dr. Dahl was , in fac t, utilizing

ma rita l re s ou rc es to pay his attorney fee s or tha t Ms . D ah l re qu es ted a credit for suc h fees in the pro pert y distribution. Witho ut some in di c ati on tha t the di s tric t c ou rt w as give n a n op portu ni ty to ru le on Ms. Dahl’s claim s, we cannot deter mine if the c ourterr ed. And we de c li ne to u nd erta ke the o v erwh el mi ng t as k of s ea rc hi ng throu gh the vo lumin ous record in pursuit of such an ind ication. Ac c ordi ngl y, w e w il l n ot c ons id er th is is s ue

. 4. Ms. Dahl Is N ot Ent itled to Att or ney Fee s Incu rr ed on Appeal ¶20 9 Fin al ly, Ms . D ah l re qu es ts tha t w e a w ard he r attorney fees and costs as sociated with this app eal. “Generall y , wh e n t he trial

c ou rt aw ards fee s in

a d om es tic ac tion

to th e p arty w ho the n sub stantially prev ails on appeal, fe e s wi ll also be aw arded to that party on appeal.” Kimb a ll , 2 00 9 UT Ap p 23 3, ¶ 52(i nte rna l quo tati on
ma rk s om i tt e d )

. W e d e c l i n e to a w a rd Ms

. D a h l h e r f e es on this appeal becau se sh e was n ot t he prev ailing party below and s he has not substantially prev ailed on appeal.
5. We Invalidate Mr . Christensen’s Fee Agr eements with Ms. D ahl and Refer Mr . Christensen to t he Office of Pro fess ional Conduct ¶210 Our r eview of Ms. Dahl’s claim for attor ney fees leaves us hi ghl y trou bl ed . W e a re p arti c ul arl y trou bl ed bythe rel ati ve atte nti on p ai d to the c la im fo r attorney fees in

Ms . D ah l’ s ap pe ll ate bri ef . For e xampl e, Ms . D ah l’ s c ounse l devote d n ea rly s eventee n pages of her appellate br i e f t o her r equest for at tor ney fees whi le devo ting less than two pages to M s. Dahl’s request for joint custody of her children. While counse l is c ert ainly entitled t o pursue an
aw ard of fe es on his c li ent’s be ha lf, t he fo c us on the attorney fees iss ue to t he exclusi on of issu es su ch as cus tody raises serious

concerns. ¶21 1 We agree w ith

the di s tric t c ou rt th at Mr. Chris ten s en’s claim ed fees in this matt er are stag ger ingly larg e and unreasonable

as a m atte r of la w , esp ec ia ll y in li ghtof the poor re s ul ts ac hi eved fo rD A HL v. D A HL Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

Any legal o r equitable obligation owed to M r. Chr istensen by 33 Ms. Dahl i s be y o nd t he sc ope of t his opinion in asmu ch as any fu rthe r atte mp t b y Mr. C hris ten s en to rec over fees in

thi s ma tter

mus t be accomplis hed thro ugh a separate suit. S ee McDonald v. M cDo na ld, 866 P.2d 1253, 1254– 55 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (noting t hat an atto rney is nota part y t o t he underlying action and must the ref ore b rin g a s ep ara te a c tion to rec over fe es ). Bu t ou r revi ewof thi s c as e le av es us w ith s eri ou s dou bt s as to th e qua li ty of Mr. Chris ten s en’s rep res entati on o f M s . Da hl

. We ac kno w le dge tha t no t al l of the fa c ts are be fo re u s . Bu t tho s e that a re b ef ore u s evi de nc e a
s tu nnin g f ai lu re to c om pe tently re pre s ent M s. D ah l. For exa mp le , Mr . Christensen’s fai lure to proper ly designa te expertwitness es and disc lose tr ial exhibits left Ms. Dahl without any exper t te stimony rel a t i n gt o t h e d i v i s i o no f t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s

. M r

. C hr i s t e n s en ’s fa il ure to c ond uc t effe c tive di s c overy c ont ribu ted to Ms . D ah l’ s in ab il ity t o ful ly a s s ert h er c la im s to vari ou s asse t s. Co un s el ’s approach to Ms. Dahl’s claim for t emp or ary and permanent alimony is es pe c ia ll y trou bl in g. T hou gh i t w as pos s ib le t hat Mr. Chris ten s en’s fa il ure to c om pl y w ith the di s tric t c ou rt’s o r de r s to pro d uce a pro per financialdeclaration was compound ed by a lack

o f coo perat ion from Ms. Dahl, the recor d before us su gge sts the failur e w a s p ri m a ri l y o n e of c ou n s e l

. If

s o, c ou n s e l ’s f a i l u re l i ke ly

(continued...)

76 Ms . D ah l. We are fu rthe r trou bl ed by Mr. Chris ten s en’s atte mp t to obtain an enforceable interest in Ms. Dahl’s s har e o f the marital estate through liens and a UCC-1 filing statement

. Th e clear language of r ule 1.8 prohibits an attor ney fro m obtaining suc h an int e r e s ti nt h e s u b

j e c tm a t t e r o f

t h e l i t i g a t i o n

. M r

. C hr i s ten s en ign ored thi s c le ar d ire c tive , a lon g w ith the pl ai n la ngu age of s ec tion 38 -2 -7 (9 ) of the Uta h C ode , w he n h e p urp orted to tak e a n i mm ed ia te lien on the marital estat e. We agr ee with the district courtthat t he onl y rea s ona bl e c onc lu s ion to dra w is tha t Mr. C hri s ten s en inten de d to rec over h is exorb ita nt fees , re gard le s s of any fin di ng o f

rea s ona bi li ty b y th e c ou rt. B ec au s e Mr. Ch r is ten s en’s fe e
arr angement with Ms. Dahl violated r ules 1

. 8 and 1.5 of the Utah Rules of Profess ional Co nd uc t a nd sec tion 38-2-7(9) of the Utah Cod e, we he reb y inval id ate the fe e a gree me nts an d re fe r Mr. Chris ten s en t o t he Offi c e of P rof es s ion alCon du c t f or furthe r disc iplinary pro ceedings. Mr. Christensen may not r ely on his ret ainer agr eements with Ms. D ahl as a b asis to collect his fees. 33Cite as: 2015 UT 23 J UST I CE D UR HAM , diss enting

(...continued) 33

c os t Ms . D ah l th e a li mo ny t o w hi c h s he may oth er wise ha ve b een entitled.

77 CONC LUSION ¶21 2 Be c aus e w e c onc lu de tha t th e T rus t s hou ld ha ve b een joined as a party t o the divor ce actio n, we consolidate t he trust and di vorc e c as es an d rem an d the c ons oli da ted c as e to th e d ivorc e c ou rt fo r fu rthe r proc eed in gs c ons is tent w ith thi s opi ni on. As to th e T rus t,

w e h old tha t Uta h l awap pl ie s , tha t the Tru s t is revoc ab le as a m atte r of law, and that Ms. Dahl i s e nt i t led to withdraw her share o f the

ma rita l p rope rty she c ont rib ut ed to th e T rus t as a s ettl or. On

rem an d, the di s tric t c ou rt s hou ld de term in e w ha t prop erty

c ont ai ne d i n th e T rus t is prop erl y c ha rac teri ze d as ma rita l p rope rty and either creditMs. Dahl w ith a n o ffs et equal to the value o f that prop erty or a ll owMs . D ah l to w ith drawhe r s ha re of the prop erty. ¶21 3 In the di vorc e act ion, we firs t ho ld tha t Ms . D ah l h as fa il ed to es tablish any grou nd s fo r fi nd in g th at J ud ge T ayl or w as bi as ed aga inst he r. S ec ond , w e c onc lu de tha t th e d is tric t c ou rt di d n ot abus e its disc ret ion in its evidenti a ry rulings. Third, we h old that the di s tric t c ou rt di d n ot ab us e i ts di s c reti on w he n i t de c li ne d to award Ms. Dahl either tempor ary or permanent alimony. Four th, as to t he district court’ s division of the marital pro pert y, we affirm in part, rev erse in par t, and r emand for further pr oceedings consi stent with this opinion. Fifth, we hold that the district court did notabus e its disc ret ion when it awarded Dr. Dahl so l e legal and physical

cus tody o f t he couple’s c hildren. Finally, we hold that t he district

c ou rt di d n ot er r w he n i t de c li ne d to a w ard Ms . D ah l h er a ttorn ey fe es in the di vorc e act ion

. Fu rthe r, w e i nva li da te Mr. Chris ten s en’s fe e agreem ents w ith Ms . Da hl on the grou nd s tha t the y viol ate rul es 1. 5 a nd 1. 8 of

ou r Ru le s of

P rof es s ion alCon du c t and r efe r Mr. Chris ten s en

to th e Offi c e of

P rof es s ional Co nd uc t f or di s c ip li na ry proceedings arising fro m these rule violat ions.

J UST I CE D UR HAM , d is s entin g: ¶214 I agr ee with almost all of the majority opinion and complim ent the autho r’s comprehensive tr eatme nt o f a complex and challen gin g ca se. I cannot agr ee in the end, however , with the holding a ffirming the trial court ’s failu re t o impute to Ms. Dahl s ome need for basic l i v i ng expenses cons istent with the part ies’ lifes tyleD A HL v. D A HL J UST I CE D UR HAM , diss enting

78 during the marr iage. There is no question that, dur ing their marriag e, Dr. and Ms. Dahl enjoyed considerable wealth and m ade

c om me ns ura te c hoi c es ab ou t the ma teri alqu al ity o f the ir l ife. Th ere is al s o li ttle qu es tion

, i n my m in d, tha t Ms . D ah l, give n h er a ge, he r health, and her l a ck of any employment ex perience for t he last tw enty yea rs , h as li ttle or no s ignific ant ea rning c ap ac ity, w hi le D r. D ah l’ s c ap ac ity f or extre me ly h igh ea rni ngs c ont inue s

. Th e rec ord reflects that during t heir separatio n, Dr. Dahl voluntarily paid Ms. D ah l ove r $4 ,0 00 pe r mo nth fo r he r ma inten anc e. ¶21 5 It i s tru e th at Ms . D ah l’ s tes tim onyab ou t he r exp en s es appears to hav e been unrealistic an d exagg era t e d , as wellas
u n d o c u m e n t e d

. G i v e nt h e o v e r a l l d i s m a l a n d i n a d eq ua te pe rfo rma nc e of

he r c ou ns el , h ow eve r , I be li eve the di s tric t c ou rt

s ho u l d h a v e a ff o r d e d M s

. D a h l s o m e l e n i e n c y , a n d a c k n o w l e d g ed that all per sons have basic needs for housing, food, tr ansportat ion, medicalexpenses, cl othing, and the lik e. In these circums tances, an imputatio n of basi c expenses p redicated on r eadily available inf orm ati on a bo utthe c os t of li vin g in

Uta h w ou ld prob ab ly h ave yie ld ed a na l i m o ny a w a r d a tl e a s ti nt h e v i c i n i ty o f D r

. D a h l ’s

vo luntary t emporar y payments. And giv en the part ies’ his tor ic li fe s tyle c hoi c es , w hi c h D r. D ah l is fre e to c ont inu e, I b el ie ve, contrar y to the majority ’s concl usion, that this is a case w here t he fail ur e to awar d alimony runs counter to o ne of the underlying policy jus tifications of b r i ng i ng the r ecipient spous e as near the

s tan da rd of

li vin g en

j oyed du rin g th e m arri age as pos s ib le

. ¶216 The maj or ity sees the quest ion differently, r elying

exc lu s ive ly a s I und ers tan d it, on the $ 1. 5 m il li on d oll ar a w ard fro m the m arital estate to Ms. Dahl, and the c onclus ion that t his am ount “would enab le her to enjoy a ver y comfort able standard of living.” It is tr ue that this amount is a c o ns i d e rable sum, b ut it is not atall clear to me that Ms. Dahl, wh o apparently h as no i ncome and little prospect of a cquiring any, will b e able to enjoy anything like t he

ma rita l s t a n d a rd of

li vin g, or th e c ont inui ng s tan da rd e nj oyed byD r. Dahl, as a result of this award. The ear nings and c apital stemming from this award will n eed to cover not just Ms. Dahl’s current liv ing exp en s es , b utal s o he r reti rem ent need s . A c urs ory revi ewof pu bl ic ly a vai la bl e i nfor mat ion reve al s tha t at c urre nt i nte res t rate s and withdrawal levels that will allow her funds to see her thro ugh, Ms. Dahl w ill be lu cky to h ave fifty to si xty thousand dollars a year on whic h to liv e. See, e.g., Jeff S ommer, For Retirees, a Million-Dollar Illusion , N .Y. T I M ES , June 9, 2013, at BU1 (citing a four percent annualCite as: 2015 UT 23 J UST I CE D UR HAM , diss enting

79 w ith dra w alrate as “ac om mo n, rul e- of-thu mbdra w dow n” fo r a ret irement account). For most people, of course, that amount would be more t han a dequate, but it does notremot ely compare with the marital s tandard of living, or w ith Mr

. Dahl ’ s po stdivor ce exp ec tati ons . T hu s , i n this c as e, I w ou ld hol d th at th e d is tric t c ou rt abus ed its disc ret ion in failing to impute basic costs of living ev en in the absenc e of complianc e by Ms. Dahl’s couns el with the (perfectly

rea s ona bl e) reque s ts of the c ou rt. Ms . D ahl’ s pros pe c ts are
s ignific antly d is prop ortio na te to th at of he r fo rme r spo use , a nd to th e e x p e c t a t i o n s t h a ts h e s h o u l d h a v e b e e ne n t i t l e d t o a ft e r a l o n gterm ma rria ge c ond uc ted in

c irc ums t a nc e so f

gr e a tm a t eri alc omfo rt. ¶217 I also find that the district court applied t he wrong leg al

s tan dar d t o it s de t er min at io n t o de ny pe r man en tal imo ny . Th e cou rt rul ed tha t “a li mo ny m ay n ot b e aw ard ed w ith ou t s pe c ific fi nd in gs of the ne ed of the rec ip ie nt s pou s e. ” I di s agre e w ith thi s c onc lu s ion of la w . T he c ont roll in g s tatu te ma nd ate s tha t c ou rts “s ha llc ons id er” seven enumerated “factor s in determining alimony,” includ ing “the financ ial condition and needs of the recipient s pouse.” U T A H C ODE § 30-3-5( 8)(a) ; a cco rd Jo nes v. Jo nes , 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985) (“fin ancial c onditions and needs” of the recipient spous e “ must be

c ons id ered in

fi xin g a re as ona bl e a li mo ny a w ard ”)

. A l th o u gh c ou rts

c erta inly mus t c ons id er th e fin anc ia l n eed of the rec ip ie nt s pou s e, among ot her mandator y f actor s, the ab senc e of evidence on an y one factor do es not re quire the court to deny an award of alimony. The lack of evidence of need ma y ce r t a inly affec t the cour t’s alimony deter mination, but it is notnecess arily dispositive. Because need is a factor r elevant t o a holistic alimony deter minat i o n, rat her than a required element, I would hold that the district court err ed when it rul e d that t he absence of credible evidence of need required a complete denial of an alim ony award.

____________