alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1


CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER


Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





I, David C. Rupert, certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:


|    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
|--- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|(i) | The Annual Report on Form 10-K of Griffin-Benefit Street Partners BDC Corp. (the “Company”) for the annual period ended December 31, 2015 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m); and

|     |                                                                                                                                                     
|---- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|(ii) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated:March 30, 2016By:/s/ David C. RupertDavid C. RupertChief Executive Officer(Principal Executive Officer)
Exhibit 15.1





CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM




We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement No. 333-203384 on Form S-8 of our report dated March 15, 2016, relating to the financial statements of Check-Cap Ltd. (the “Company”)  appearing in this Annual Report on Form 20-F of the Company for the year ended December 31, 2015.





/s/Brightman Almagor Zohar & Co.


Brightman Almagor Zohar & Co.


Certified Public Accountants


A Member Firm of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu





Tel Aviv, Israel


March 15, 2016
No. 13,614.

#### Monks *v.*Monks.

Filed April 4, 1889.

*Slander.*— Charging *that One has Loathsome Disorder.*— It is actionable slander to maliciously speak and publish of another that he has contracted and is suffering from a loathsome disorder.

From the Randolph Circuit Court.

*W. A. Thompson, A. O. Marsh, J. W. Thompson, E. L. Watson*and *J. E. Watson,*for appellant.

*T. F. Colgrove, L. A. Canada*and *F. Garrett,*for appellee.

Elliott, C. J.

We are of the opinion that taking the slanderous words set forth in the complaint in connection with the circumstances under which they are alleged to have been spoken, they relate to what was then present and not merely to what was past. We think that the complaint charges that the defendant maliciously slandered the plaintiff by speaking and publishing of him that he had contracted a loathsome disorder, from the effects of which he was still suffering. ■ We are also of the opinion that counsel for the appellant are in error in treating the words as separate sets. We do, not so understand or construe the pleading.

Judgment affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                           4,190
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   39,265
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,201
<INVENTORY>                                    172,500
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               222,532
<PP&E>                                         185,023
<DEPRECIATION>                                  61,499
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 351,376
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           51,362
<BONDS>                                         80,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        50,107
<OTHER-SE>                                     163,930
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   351,376
<SALES>                                        267,765
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               267,765
<CGS>                                          136,225
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  136,225
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               115,984
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               4,365
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 11,191
<INCOME-TAX>                                     4,307
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              6,884
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     6,884
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.40
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.40


</TABLE>
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Marcus QUINN, Sr.

No. 2010-K-1355.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 7, 2011.

In re Quinn Sr., Marcus; —Defendant; Applying For Writ on Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 04-1397; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KA 09-1382.

Denied.
United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

Nos. 00-2326

01-1543

RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT,

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND,

Plaintiffs, Appellees,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; ELAINE CHAO,

SECRETARY OF LABOR; OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

ADMINISTRATION; CHARLES N. JEFFRESS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY

OF LABOR FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH;

RUTH E. MCCULLY, REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR REGION 1,

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION,

Defendants, Appellants,

BEVERLY MIGLIORE; BARBARA RADDATZ; JOAN TAYLOR,

Defendants.

ERRATA SHEET

The opinion of this Court issued on April 8, 2002, is amended

as follows:

On page 30, line 12: Replace "Forth" with "Fourth".
#### Henry REMMERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. George EGOR, d/b/a Egor Tool and Die Company, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 413, Docket 28625.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued April 10, 1964.

Decided May 6, 1964.

*104Eleanor Remmers, New York *City,*for plaintiff-appellant.

I. Robert Bassin, Jamaica, N. Y., for defendant-appellee.

Before MOORE, SMITH and KAUFMAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Alleging that he was compelled to work in excess of 40 hours per week during the period extending from January 4, 1957 until December 8, 1958, plaintiff Remmers brought this action under the Fair Labor Standards Act to recover the sum of $5,327.75, as time-and-a-half compensation for his overtime, and an equal amount in statutory penalties, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). At the conclusion of the trial without a jury, Judge Mishler determined that Remmers was not an employee “engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce,” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 and 207, and hence was not included within the coverage of the Act.

 Although recognizing that the Fair Labor Standards Act “has been construed liberally to apply to the furthest reaches consistent with congressional direction,” Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Assocs., 358 U.S. 207, 211, 79 S.Ct. 260, 264, 3 L.Ed.2d 43 (1959), we find no basis in the present record for overturning Judge Mishler’s determination. Thus," the evidence revealed that during the period in question, Remmers was employed as a tool-and-die maker for Egor, at the latter’s three-man shop on Long Island. The only testimony which pertained to the interstate character of either Remmers’ work or Egor’s business simply established that once, in the entire two-year period, Remmers had wrapped a package or packages which were shipped to a company in Providence, Rhode Island, and that on another occasion, Egor himself had delivered a die in Massachusetts. These two isolated instances hardly constitute a showing that “a substantial part” of Remmers’ work was related to interstate commerce. See Divins v. Hazeltine Electronics Corp., 163 F.2d 100 (2d Cir.1947). As the Supreme Court indicated in Mabee v. White Plains Pub. Co., 327 U.S. 178, 66 S.Ct. 511, 90 L.Ed. 607 (1946), “sporadic or occasional shipments of insubstantial amounts of goods” are insufficient to bring an employee within the coverage of the act.

The judgment is affirmed.
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

**The following certification is furnished pursuant to the requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission and shall not be deemed “filed” for the purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, orotherwise subject to the liability of that section. Such certification shall not be deemed incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, except to the extent that suchcertification is specifically incorporated by reference by the registrant.**

**CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEFFINANCIAL OFFICER**

**PURSUANT TO RULE 13a-14(b) OR RULE 15d-14(b)**

**OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

In connection with thequarterly report of Metro One Telecommunications, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), we,James F. Hensel, Chief Executive Officer, and William K. Hergenhan, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of theCompany. 

/s/ James F. Hensel 

James F. Hensel

Director and President and Chief Executive Officer 

Metro OneTelecommunications, Inc. 

August 8, 2008 

/s/ WilliamK. Hergenhan 

William K. Hergenhan 

Senior Vice Presidentand Chief Financial Officer 

Metro One Telecommunications, Inc. 

August 8, 2008
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.1
 STATEMENT FURNISHED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
   (A)
    
    the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)) and(B)
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company
as of the dates and for the periods covered by the Report.
   November 14, 2007
    /s/  George C. PlattDate
    George C. PlattChief Executive Officer
Exhibit 10.1


 


AMENDMENT
TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT


 


This Amendment to Employment Agreement (this “Amendment”)
attaches to and forms part of the Employment Agreement dated as of July 15,
2005 (the “Agreement”), between Aon Corporation (the “Company”) and Andrew M.
Appel (the “Executive”).


 


WHEREAS, the Executive has recently assumed additional
responsibilities as the Chief Executive Officer of Aon Re;


 


WHEREAS, the Company and the Executive mutually desire
to amend the Agreement, as provided in this Amendment;


 


NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and
the mutual agreements contained herein, the parties hereby agree as follows:


 


1.             The
first sentence of Section 3(a), “Base Salary,” is deleted in its entirety
and replaced with the following:


 


“During the portion of the Employment Period
commencing March 13, 2008, and in recognition of the Executive’s
additional responsibilities, the Company will pay the Executive a base salary
of $950,000 per annum (“Base Salary”), payable semi-monthly in accordance with
the Company’s executive payroll policy.”


 


2.             The
following sentence is added at the end of Subsection 3(b), “Annual Bonus”:


 


“Notwithstanding the foregoing, for performance during
2008 and later years the Executive’s annual bonus target will be 150% of his
Base Salary in effect at the end of the year, and the maximum annual bonus
payable will be three times such target.”


 


3.             This
Amendment is effective as of March 13, 2008.


 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed
this Amendment to the Agreement as of the date set forth above.


 


	
  AON
  CORPORATION

  	
   

  	
  EXECUTIVE:

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  By: 

  	
  /s/ Jeremy G.O.
  Farmer

  	
   

  	
  /s/ Andrew M.
  Appel

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Andrew M. Appel

  
	
  Title:  

  	
  Senior Vice
  President and

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Head of Human
  Resources
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 13a0706n.06

No. 12-6319

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MARK ALLEN WYNN,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

ON APPEAL FROM THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE WESTERN

DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

BEFORE: GIBBONS, SUTTON, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Mark Allen Wynn appeals his sentence. Wynn pled guilty to being a felon

in possession of ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The district court determined that,

by virtue of his offense and his prior convictions, Wynn was an armed career criminal under USSG

§ 4B1.4(a). It found that Wynn’s total offense level was 31 and that his criminal history category

was VI, resulting in a guidelines range of 188 to 235 months. The district court sentenced Wynn to

200 months in prison.

On appeal, Wynn argues that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA),

which the district court relied on when determining that he was an armed career criminal, is

unconstitutionally vague. Wynn also argues that the district court plainly erred by concluding that

he was subject to the provisions of the ACCA because his predicate convictions were not set forth

in the indictment and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
No. 12-6319

United States v. Wynn

We review de novo the legal question of whether a criminal statute is unconstitutionally

vague. United States v. Hart, 635 F.3d 850, 856 (6th Cir. 2011). A defendant is subject to an

enhanced sentence under the ACCA when he is convicted under § 922(g) and he has three previous

convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1); United States v.

Taylor, 696 F.3d 628, 630 (6th Cir. 2012). The residual clause defines in part the term “violent

felony” as a crime involving “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to

another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii); Taylor, 696 F.3d at 631. 

As Wynn concedes, his challenge to the constitutionality of the residual clause must fail. We

have previously rejected the argument that the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague, and this

panel cannot reconsider that decision. See Taylor, 696 F.3d at 633. In addition, the district court

did not err, plainly or otherwise, by concluding that Wynn was subject to the provisions of the

ACCA. In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), the Supreme Court held that

the fact of a prior conviction does not need to be set forth in the indictment and proven beyond a

reasonable doubt. See United States v. Anderson, 695 F.3d 390, 398 (6th Cir. 2012). Despite

Wynn’s argument to the contrary, the Court’s decision in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151

(2013), did not undermine the rule set forth in Almendarez-Torres. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2160

n.1.

Accordingly, we affirm Wynn’s sentence.

-2-
#### Marcel Wayne WILLIAMS *v.*STATE of Arkansas

CR 97-949

970 S.W.2d 267

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Opinion delivered June 11, 1998

*Herbert T. Wright, Jr.,*for appellant.

*581No response.

Per Curiam.

The procedural background in this death case is set forth in *owe per curiam*opinion delivered on April 23, 1998. *Williams v. State,*332 Ark. 671, 963 S.W.2d 221 (1998). Attorney Herbert T. Wright, Jr., counsel for petitioner Marcel Wayne Williams, was ordered to appear before this court on January 8, 1998, to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for his failure to file Mr. Williams’s brief as of the final extension date of March 23, 1998. Mr. Wright appeared on May 7, 1998, entered a plea of guilty to the contempt citation, and accepted responsibility for failing to file Mr. Williams’s brief. In mitigation, he told the court that his case load had been unusually heavy during this period of time.

Based on the foregoing, we hold that Mr. Wright is in contempt of court for fading to file Mr. Wdliams’s brief in a timely manner. We note that Mr. Wright filed the brief on May 26, 1998. We assess a fine of $250.00. A copy of this order will be forwarded to the Committee on Professional Conduct.
#### Morrison B. ORR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 15577.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

May 19, 1964.

Frank E. Bazler, Troy, Ohio, Robert S. Miller of Miller & Bazler, Troy, Ohio, on the brief), for appellant.

Clifford R. Curtner, Dayton, Ohio (Curtner, Brenton & Selva, Dayton, Ohio on the brief), for appellee.

Before WEICK, Chief Judge, CECIL, Circuit Judge, and WILLIAM E. MILLER, District Judge.

PER CURIAM.

This cause is before the Court on appeal of Morrison B. Orr, plaintiff-appellant, from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granting judgment to Trans World Airlines, Inc., defendantappellee.

The plaintiff-appellant claimed that he was injured while a passenger on one of appellee’s airplanes in flight from New York International Airport to Cox Municipal Airport, Vandalia, Ohio. He alleged that the defendant-appellee was negligent in that the plane made a sudden abrupt maneuver which caused him to fall to the floor of the plane. In a trial to the court, the judge found that the pilot of appellee’s plane was confronted with an emergency by the sudden appearance of an unidentified plane in front of him and that he was not negligent in operating the plane under the circumstances.

Upon consideration of the record as set forth in the appendix, the briefs of the parties and the oral arguments of counsel, we conclude that the findings of fact of the trial judge are supported by the evidence and are not clearly erroneous. The conclusions of law as stated by the trial judge are correct and applicable to the facts.

Judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
#### Bandy *v.*Bandy.

Opinion delivered July 12, 1926.

Divorce — premature' decree — waiver' of *'defense.*— A. petition to set aside a decree of divorce on the ground that it was prematurely-rendered after the case had been postponed to give petitioner an opportunity to defend, *held*properly ref.us.ed where petitioner 'was in the court room and made no defense when the .case was called. '

- Appeal from Lawrence Chancery Court, .Eastern District; *Lyman F. Reeder,*Chancellor;

affirmed.

*718STATEMENT OE EACTS.

On the 2d day of December, 1924, Joe Bandy filed a petition in the chancery court of Lawrence County to set aside a divorce decree against him rendered by said court on October 31, .1924.

According to the allegations-of his petition and the proof made by him, on September 19, 1924, his wife, Fredea Bandy, filed a complaint for divorce against him on the statutory ground that he had offered such indignities to her person as to render her condition in life intolerable.

On October 28, 1924, Joe Bandy filed an. answer in which he denied the allegations of the complaint. On the 31st day of October, 1924, the chancery court tried the case upon the complaint and answer and the oral testimony introduced by the plaintiff. It was decreed that the plaintiff, Fredea. Bandy, be divorced from the defendant, Joe Bandy. No appeal was taken from this decree.

The motion to set aside the divorce decree was filed at a subsequent term to its rendition.

Joe Bandy has duly prosecuted an appeal from an order or decree of the chancery court denying his petition to set aside the divorce decree against him.

*Cooley, Adams & Fufar,*for appellant.

*Smith, Jackson & Blackford,*for appellee.

Hart, J.,

(after stating the facts). Joe Bandy filed his motion to set aside the divorce decree in favor of his wife, on the second day of December, 1924, and it was overruled by the court on January 5, 1925, which was during the same term of the court. The sole ground relied upon to set aside the divorce decree was that it w;as prematurely rendered. The record show's that it was the practice of the court to hear divorce cases on oral testimony; and the case against the defendant, Joe Bandy, was postponed for the purpose of giving him an opportunity to defend the suit.

When the case was called for hearing, the defendant, Joe Bandy, was present in the courtroom, and made no defense to the action. Under these circumstances, *719his presence in court amounted to a consent that the case should he heard and determined. He had the opportunity to make any defense to the action that he might have, and, having failed to do so, he is not in an attitude to complain that the court refused to set aside the divorce decree.

.The record shows that the plaintiff, Fredea Bandy, acted throughout in the. utmost good- faith, and, since the decree of divorce was determined, has married another man in the State of Missouri.

It follows that the decree of the chancery court refusing to set aside the divorce decree should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.
#### David Michael CHAMPION, Appellant, v. Carolyn Colleen CHAMPION, Appellee.

No. 1D11-5457.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Oct. 26, 2012.

David Michael Champion, pro se, Appellant.

No appearance for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a post-dissolution Order on Petitioner’s Motion for Enforcement and Request for Sanctions. In the order, the trial court “approved, affirmed, and adopted as an Order of this court,” the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendations, and found appellant’s exceptions to the report, filed in accordance with Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.490(f), “not sufficient to require hearing.” Chief among appellant’s exceptions was the trial court’s failure to adhere to the mandate in rule 12.490(b)(1), that “[n]o matter shall be heard by a general magistrate without an appropriate order of reference and the consent to the referral of all parties.” Having ascertained that no such order of reference exists of record in this case, we are compelled to reverse the order on appeal and remand for further proceedings consistent with rule 12.490. *See Hand v. Kushmer,*695 So.2d 858 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).

REVERSED and REMANDED.

ROBERTS, WETHERELL, and SWANSON, JJ., concur.