alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
WESTERN OHIO FINANCIAL CORPORATION
EXHIBIT 31.2
**CERTIFICATIONS FOR QUARTERLY REPORT ON FORM 10-Q**
I, Robert A. Kuehl certify that:
1) I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Western OhioFinancial Corporation; 2) Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omitto state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances underwhich such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 3) Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in thisreport, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cashflows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4) The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I am responsible for establishing and maintainingdisclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13(a)-15(e) and 15(d)-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known tous by others within those entities, particularly during the period inwhich this report is being prepared;  b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controlsand procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the endof the period covered by this report based on such evaluations; and  c) Disclosed in this report any changes in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’smost recent fiscal quarter, that has materially affected, or isreasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting; and
5) The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluationof internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee ofregistrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
 a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the designor operation of internal control over financial reporting which arereasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability torecord, process, summarize and report financial information; and  b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management orother employees who have a significant role in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting.
Date: August 14, 2004   /s/ Robert A. Kuehl Robert A. Kuehl, Chief Financial Officer   
26.
#### Berry, Appellant, *v.*Michael et al., Bd. of Twp. Trustees of Scott Twp., Appellees.

(No. 387

Decided May 5, 1941.)

*Messrs. Ludwig & Busich,*for appellant.

*Mr. Alexander L. Hyser,*prosecuting attorney, for appellees.

Lloyd, J.

A demurrer to the petition of the plaintiff, Mollie J. Berry, having been sustained by the-Court of Common Pleas, she filed an amended petition, *427to which also a demurrer was sustained, followed by a judgment in favor of the defendants. From this judgment the plaintiff now appeals to this court on questions of law.

The amended petition alleges that the defendants, Gr. J. Michael, O. K. Swainsgood and E. E. Brown, are the duly elected, qualified and acting Board of Township Trustees in and for Scott township, Sandusky county, Ohio; that Chestnut Ridge Cemetery, located in Scott township, is, and for more than a century has been, a public burying ground under the supervision and control of the Board of Township Trustees of Scott township; that the plaintiff continuously since March 16, 1918, has been the owner of lot Ño. 164 therein, in which her husband, who died March 15, 1918, was interred; “that as near as she has been able to ascertain, at some time during the month of February in the year 1939, without her knowledge or con- ■ sent or the consent of any of her immediate family, the defendant board of township trustees entered upon the •cemetery lot hereinbefore named, so purchased and • owned by said plaintiff, and carelessly, recklessly and illegally disinterred the remains of her deceased husband and removed the same to some unknown place without the knowledge or consent of this plaintiff”; and that by the “carelessly, reckless, merciless, and wrongful acts of the defendant board of township trustees in so breaking into the grave of her deceased husband and so removing his remains” she has suffered “untold mental anguish and humiliation.”

In the petition it is also alleged as a second cause •of action that the defendant board, without the consent or knowledge of the plaintiff, recklessly and -carelessly entered upon her cemetery lot “and dug up *428the earth and soil and carted the same away.” The prayer of the petition is for a judgment against the-defendant board in the sum of $6,000.

The petition is obviously deficient in the statement of facts necessary to constitute a cause of action. No. facts are alleged therein from which it can be inferred that the board was engaged in the discharge of any official duty which, to create a cause of action, it is essential to allege. If, as stated in briefs of counsel, the-fact is that the board removed the body incident to the establishment of a driveway through the cemetery,, then it was engaged in the discharge of an official duty and if this fact were alleged in appropriate language-in conjunction .with the other facts alleged in the-amended petition, it would state a cause of action. Section 3298-17, General Code; *Berber, Admr.,*v. *Bd. of Trustees of Berlin Twp.,*47 Ohio App., 449, 191 N. E., 444.

The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas is-affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Overmyer and Carpenter, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999             DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999             DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                          75,313                   7,232
<SECURITIES>                                         0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   59,098                   1,033
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0                       0
<INVENTORY>                                     21,207                       0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               161,118                   8,265
<PP&E>                                       1,501,233                 248,679
<DEPRECIATION>                               (421,786)                 (1,412)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              19,545,169                 333,659
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,221,650                 249,071
<BONDS>                                              0                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                       0
<PREFERRED>                                          0                       0
<COMMON>                                         1,279                     850
<OTHER-SE>                                  14,439,030                  83,738
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                19,545,169                 333,659
<SALES>                                      2,547,225                   5,440
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,547,225                   5,440
<CGS>                                        1,152,721                       0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               11,860,758               1,035,464
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             2,097,761                       0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              19,309                   8,603
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           (12,583,324)             (1,037,626)
<INCOME-TAX>                                 1,653,161                       0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                       (10,930,163)             (1,037,626)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                       0
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                              (10,930,163)             (1,037,626)
<EPS-BASIC>                                   (0.96)                  (0.14)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0                       0


</TABLE>
#### Edward DUNKLE, Petitioner, v. Edwin G. BUSS, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Respondent.

No. 1D11-2415.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

June 10, 2011.

Edward Dunkle, pro se, Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. *See Baker v. State,*878 So.2d 1236 (Fla.2004).

DAVIS, ROBERTS, and ROWE, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                          14,456
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   17,646
<ALLOWANCES>                                       793
<INVENTORY>                                     19,224
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                54,876
<PP&E>                                         236,616
<DEPRECIATION>                                  62,780
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 250,935
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           54,171
<BONDS>                                              0<F1>
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                      16,088
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   250,935
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               505,761
<CGS>                                          388,244
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  485,533
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 1,400
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0<F1>
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              14,935
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  3,893
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              3,893
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  2,016
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,877
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1>NOT SEPARATELY IDENTIFIED IN THE CURRENT FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OR
ACCOMPANYING NOTES THERETO.
</FN>


</TABLE>
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

400 

KA 12-00917 

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., FAHEY, PERADOTTO, SCONIERS, AND VALENTINO, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V ORDER

LESLIE J. PELTIER, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

(APPEAL NO. 1.) 

 

THOMAS R. VILLECCO, JERICHO, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

JON E. BUDELMANN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, AUBURN (CHRISTOPHER T. VALDINA OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Cayuga County Court (Thomas G.

Leone, J.), rendered January 7, 2010. The judgment convicted

defendant, upon her plea of guilty, of attempted assault in the first

degree. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Entered: May 2, 2014 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
# U ni te d S ta te s Co ur t of A pp ea ls For the Eig hth Circu it

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ _ No. 1 6- 11 72

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ _ Met ro po li ta n Li fe In su ran ce Co m pa ny
ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll l Pla in ti

ff

v. Kay e Me li n
ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll l Defe nd

an t - Ap pe ll an t
Ash le y Sv een ; An to ne Sv een
ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll l Defe nd

an ts - App el le es

__ __ __ __ __ __ App eal fro m

Uni te d S ta te s Di st ric t Co ur t fo r th e Dis tri ct of M in ne so ta - Mi nn eap ol is

__ __ __ __ __ __ Su bm it te d: Ju ly 18, 2 01 8 Fi le d: Aug us t 1 5, 2 01 8 [Pu bl is he d]

__ __ __ __ __ Befo re BENTON an d S HEPHERD, Circ ui t J ud ge s, an d EBI NGER 1 , Dis tri ct Ju dg e.

__ __ __ __ __ __

1 The Hon or ab le Reb ecca Goo dg am e Ebi ng er, Uni te d St at es Dis tri ct Ju dg e fo r th e So ut he rn Dis tri ct of I owa , si tt in g b y de si gn at io n.PER CURI AM.

Thi s cas e is on rem an d fro m th e Su pr em e Co ur t of th e Uni te d St at es

. Sv een v. Mel in , 13 8 S. Ct

. 18 15 (2 01 8)

. In 19 98 , Mar k A. Sv een de si gn a t e d h i s th en -wif e, Kay e L. Mel in , as t h e p r i mar y be ne fic ia ry of hi s li fe in su ran ce po li cy , an d hi s ch il dr en as co nt in ge nt be ne fic ia rie s. In 20 02 , Mi nn es ot a ex te nd ed it s
rev oc at io n- up on -d iv or ce st at ut e to li fe in su ran ce po li ci es

. Sv een an d Mel in di vo rced i n 2 0 0 7. W he n Sv een di ed in 20 11 , Mel in was st il l th e pr im ary be ne fic ia ry o n t h e po li cy

. The in su r a nc e co m pa ny fil ed an in te rp le ad er to de te rm in e th e pr op er be ne fic ia rie s. Mel in an d th e ch il dr en cro ss -cl ai m ed fo r th e pr oc eed s. The d i s t ric t

co ur t award ed th e pr oc eed s to th e ch il dr en , reject in g Mel in ’s arg um en t th at ap pl y in g th e st at ut e ret ro act iv el y is an im pe rm is si bl e im

pa irment un de r th e Co nt ract s Cl au se

. Thi s co ur t reve rs ed an d rem an de d, ho ld in g th at th e st at ut e is un co ns ti tu ti on al whe n ap pl ie d ret ro act iv el y
. Met ro po li ta n Li fe In s. Co

. v. Mel in , 85 3 F.3 d 41 0, 41 1- 12 (8 th Ci r. 20 17 ). The Su pr em e Co ur t rev ers e d an d rem an de d, ho ld in g th at ret ro act iv e ap pl ic at io n of Mi nn es ot a’s rev oc at io n- up on -d iv or ce s t a tu te di d no t vi ol at e th e Co nt ract s C la us e. Sv een , 13 8 S . Ct. at 18 18

.

In li gh t of th e Su pr em e Co ur t’s de ci si on in Sv een , th is co ur t affi rm s th e di st ric t

co ur t’s g ran t o f su m

m ary jud gm en t awa rd in g t he po li cy pro ceed s t o t he ch il dr en

.

* * * * * * *

The cas e is rem an de d to th e di st ric t co ur t fo r pr oc eed in gs co ns is te nt wit h th is op in io n.

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __

-2

-
#### Brett Zane BASS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D10-5226.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Jan. 19, 2011.

Brett Zane Bass, pro se, Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Brooke Poland, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition is granted and Brett Zane Bass is hereby afforded belated appeal from the order denying postconvictiori relief in Santa Rosa County case number 04-115-CFA. Upon issuance of mandate in this cause, a copy of the opinion shall be provided to the clerk of the circuit court who shall treat it as a notice of appeal. Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(c)(5)(D).

PETITION GRANTED.

WOLF, KAHN, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1696 Referred in Senate (RFS)]

  1st Session
                                H. R. 1696

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             July 31, 2007

                                Received

                             August 3, 2007

       Read twice and referred to the Committee on Indian Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
  To amend the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and Alabama and Coushatta Indian 
  Tribes of Texas Restoration Act to allow the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo 
  tribe to determine blood quantum requirement for membership in that 
                                 Tribe.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. BLOOD QUANTUM REQUIREMENT DETERMINED BY TRIBE.

    Section 108(a)(2) of the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and Alabama and 
Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act (25 U.S.C. 1300g-7(2)) 
is amended by striking ``if the descendant'' and all that follows 
through the end of the paragraph and inserting ``if the descendant is 
enrolled by the tribe''.

            Passed the House of Representatives July 30, 2007.

            Attest:

                                            LORRAINE C. MILLER,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
O rder filed May 31 , 2018



### In The 

# Eleventh Court of Appeals

__________

No. 11

- 1 7

- 00 319

- CV

__________

ROBERT C. TURNER AND ROGER M. TURNER , Appellant s

V.

SECURITY BANK , Appellee

On Appeal from the 385 t h District Court

Midland County, Texas

T rial Court Cause No. CV52380

O R D E R

Robert C. Turner and Roger M. Turner timely filed a n appeal from a judgment

signed by the trial court on August 16, 2017

. Security Bank ha s now filed in this

court a suggestion of bankruptcy

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 8.1. Security Bank indicat es

that on April 26, 2018, each of the appellants filed a petition for relief under

Chapter 11 of the U nited States Bankruptcy Code

. The notice of bankruptcy

complies with T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 8.1

. Therefore, p ursuant to T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 8.2, w e2

abate this appeal

. The parties are requested to inform this c ourt of the resolution of

the bankruptcy proceeding s or any other event that would allow this appeal to be

reinstated. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 8.3.

This appeal is abated.

PER CURIAM

May 31 , 2018

Panel consists of: Willson, J., Bailey, J., and Wright, S.C.J. 1

1 Jim R. Wright, Senior Chief Justice (Retired), Court of Appeals, 11th District of Texas at Eastland, sitting by assignment.
Slip Op. 00-101 UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE BEFORE: SENIOR JUDGE NICHOLAS TSOUCALAS

_________________________________ : SKF USA INC. and SKF GmbH, : : Plaintiffs, : : v. : Court No. 99-08-00473 : UNITED STATES, : : Defendant, : : THE TORRINGTON COMPANY, : : Defendant-Intervenor : _________________________________: JUDGMENT This Court having received and reviewed the United States Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration’s (“Commerce”) Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand, SKF USA Inc. v. United States , 24 CIT ___, Slip Op. 00- 28 (March 22, 2000) (“Remand Results”), Torrington’s comments to the Remand, and Commerce having complied with the Court’s remand, and no other responses to the Remand Results having been submitted by the parties, it is hereby ORDERED that the Remand Results filed by Commerce on June 20, 2000 are affirmed in their entirety; and it is further ORDERED that since all other issues have been decided, this case is dismissed.

_________________________________ NICHOLAS TSOUCALAS SENIOR JUDGE

Dated: August 18, 2000

New York, New York
##### 



Exhibit 32.4 LIBERTY PROPERTY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP CERTIFICATIONS REQUIRED BY
RULE 13a-14(b) UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934   In connection the Quarterly Report of Liberty Property Trust (the
Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2004, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report),
I, GEORGE J. ALBURGER, JR., Chief Financial Officer of Liberty Property Trust
(the sole general partner of the Company), certify, in connection with Rule
13a-14(b) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, that based on
my knowledge: (1)       The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2)       The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company. /s/ GEORGE J. ALBURGER, JR.  
 Date: May 7, 2004
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-7320

BRYANT K. MCARTHUR,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

MARYLAND PAROLE COMMISSION; WARDEN, Maryland

Correction Institution; ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR

THE STATE OF MARYLAND,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. Andre M. Davis, District Judge.

(CA-04-2223-AMD)

Submitted: October 7, 2004 Decided: October 15, 2004

Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Bryant K. McArthur, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Bryant K. McArthur, a Maryland prisoner, seeks to appeal

the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed

under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000). This order is not appealable unless

a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability.

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will

not issue for claims addressed by a district court absent “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find both that his

constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive

procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or

wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003);

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d

676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the

record and conclude that McArthur has not made the requisite

showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and

dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process. 

DISMISSED
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Water Polo I, L.P., :

Appellant : CASES CONSOLIDATED

:

v. : No. 360 C.D. 2022

:

West Hanover Township :

Sewer Authority :

Water Polo I, L.P. :

:

v. : No. 392 C.D. 2022

:

West Hanover Township :

Sewer Authority, :

Appellant :

PER CURIAM O R D E R

NOW, September 26 , 2023

, having considered Designated A ppellant ’ s

application for reargument and Designated A ppellee’s answer in response thereto

,

the application is DENIED

.
#### In re Michael Wayne MONTGOMERY, a/k/a Shaka Macumba Zulu Z, Plaintiff-Appellant.

No. 00-7109.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 11, 2001.

Decided Jan. 17, 2001.

*250Michael Wayne Montgomery, pro se.

Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and KING, Circuit JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Michael Wayne Montgomery appeals the district court’s order denying his petition for relief from a properly imposed prefil-ing injunction. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. *In re: Montgomery,*No. MISC-95-136-6 (D.S.C. July 26, 2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
#### Ian GARDNER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D12-3985.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Oct. 15, 2012.

Ian Gardner, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. *See State v. Adkins,*96 So.3d 412 (Fla.2012).

PADOVANO, MARSTILLER, and SWANSON, JJ., concur.