UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4886

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DAVID ISAAC PARKER, a/k/a David Green, a/k/a David Smith, 

a/k/a Jay Smith,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District 

Judge. (8:11-cr-00459-JFM-1)

Argued: May 15, 2014 Decided: June 16, 2014

Before WILKINSON and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, 

Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

ARGUED: Michael Daniel Montemarano, MICHAEL D. MONTEMARANO, PA, 

Columbia, Maryland, for Appellant. Paul Nitze, OFFICE OF THE 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON 

BRIEF: Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Baltimore, 

Maryland, Deborah A. Johnston, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

A federal grand jury returned a three-count second 

superseding indictment against Appellant David Isaac Parker 

(“Appellant”) charging him with conspiracy to import cocaine in 

an amount greater than five kilograms, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 960 and 963; importing more than 500 grams of cocaine, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 960; and possession with intent to 

distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Following a jury trial, where Appellant 

served as his own counsel, Appellant was convicted of all three 

counts. On appeal, Appellant raises a single issue: whether the 

district court conducted a constitutionally adequate inquiry 

regarding Appellant’s desire to serve as his own counsel.

Because Appellant’s election to proceed pro se was 

clear and unequivocal, as well as knowing and intelligent, we 

conclude that the district court conducted a constitutionally 

adequate inquiry regarding Appellant’s desire to serve as his 

own counsel. Therefore, we conclude the district court did not 

err in granting Appellant’s request to waive counsel and proceed 

pro se. Accordingly, we affirm. 

I.

Appellant was first arrested on July 20, 2011, when 

the United States Postal Service executed a controlled delivery 

of a package containing cocaine that was addressed to, and 
3

accepted by, Appellant. Subsequent to his arrest, Appellant was 

charged in a sealed criminal complaint on July 26, 2011, 

followed by a sealed indictment on August 22, 2011, and a 

superseding indictment on November 2, 2011. Finally, on May 23, 

2012, Appellant was charged in the second superseding 

indictment, the charging document upon which the trial 

ultimately proceeded. 

Throughout the pendency of this case, Appellant had 

multiple court appearances in front of both the magistrate court 

and the district court, and had the benefit of both appointed 

and retained counsel. During these appearances, Appellant was 

repeatedly advised of his rights. For example, at an initial 

appearance in magistrate court on October 24, 2011, where 

Appellant was represented by retained counsel, the court engaged 

in a lengthy explanation with Appellant about his constitutional 

rights as well as the nature of the charges against him. During 

this colloquy, Appellant continually insisted that he did not 

understand even the most basic concepts. Appellant’s assertions 

prompted the court to observe, “I think that [Appellant] is 

playing games with the [c]ourt.” J.A. 26.1 Shortly thereafter, 

 1 Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed 

by the parties in this appeal.
4

Appellant ultimately stated that he understood, but just did not 

agree. 

[APPELLANT]: I am reading the Indictment[;]

I understand what you are saying. But as 

far as the wording on the Indictment I don’t 

agree with.

THE COURT: That is fair. Nothing wrong with 

you not agreeing with it, that is exactly 

where your Counsel wants you to be. Not a 

problem. But do you understand what they 

are claiming you have done wrong?

(Pause)

[APPELLANT]: Yes, I understand for the 

record on this paper what they are accusing 

me of, yes.

Id. at 28. Further, Appellant told the magistrate court that he 

had no mental condition, illness, or defect that affected his 

judgment. 

Appellant appeared before the district court at a 

December 20, 2011 motions hearing to address a suppression 

motion filed by Appellant’s retained counsel. At this hearing, 

Appellant’s retained counsel represented to the court that 

Appellant wished to proceed pro se. According to counsel, 

Appellant desired to litigate motions he had previously filed 

pro se which presented a sovereign citizen defense. After 

denying those motions, the district court inquired at length of 

Appellant as to whether he wished to continue serving as his own 

counsel.
5

THE COURT: [Your attorney] has expressed on 

your behalf that you want to represent 

yourself in this matter. Is that true?

[APPELLANT]: Yes.

THE COURT: You understand that you have a 

right to be represented by counsel, and that 

these are legal issues in which counsel are 

trained to represent the client’s interest, 

which would include, you know, moving to 

suppress any statements that were made or 

any evidence that was seized. Do you 

understand that?

[APPELLANT]: You’re asking me do I 

comprehend? Yes. 

. . . 

[APPELLANT]: [My attorney] stated earlier 

that he would like to take a back seat and 

just be my advisor.

THE COURT: Is that, is that -- do you want 

him as standby counsel, then, essentially, 

to advise you, and have you represent 

yourself?

[APPELLANT]: Yes.

. . . 

THE COURT: But, Mr. Parker, as I understand 

it, with the advice of [your attorney], the 

questions you want to ask, you want to ask 

them yourself and you want to pursue any 

motions that you deem appropriate, is that 

what I understand you want to do? Or do you 

want to have him ask the questions of the 

witnesses?

[APPELLANT]: If I can have more time to get 

myself prepared for that, I would like to do 

that myself.
6

THE COURT: We will postpone the hearing

. . . . But the question is when we do have 

the hearing, when we do it, do you really 

want to put yourself in the position where 

you are asking the questions of the 

witnesses?

[APPELLANT]: Yes.

THE COURT: And assuming, which I have no 

idea because I haven’t heard the evidence 

yet, but assuming I deny the motions, do you 

want to represent yourself at trial as well?

[APPELLANT]: Yes.

THE COURT: And you understand that by 

proceeding in this way, you are, although 

[your attorney] is there to advise you, I 

mean, there are certain, I mean, I’m not 

going to let you testify from the counsel 

table. I mean, if you want to testify, 

you’re going to have to take the witness 

stand yourself and be subject to the 

penalties of perjury, if you choose to 

testify. Of course, you don’t have to 

testify if you don’t want to. 

But you understand that you can’t 

essentially testify by asking questions of 

the witnesses. Do you understand that?

[APPELLANT]: I comprehend well.

J.A. 52-55. Per Appellant’s request, the district ultimately 

appointed retained counsel to serve as standby counsel. 

After Appellant advised the court that he was taking 

medication for bipolar disorder, the court ordered a competency 

evaluation. Following his competency evaluation, Appellant 

appeared before the district court again on April 27, 2012, for 

another motions hearing. Because Appellant’s retained counsel, 
7

now serving as his standby counsel, was extremely late, the 

court commenced the hearing with counsel, who was still a great 

distance from the courthouse, on the telephone. The court 

admonished counsel for his irresponsibility, and Appellant

stated he no longer wished for retained counsel to serve as 

standby counsel. 

The district court again confirmed with Appellant that 

he wanted to serve as his own counsel. After the court asked 

Appellant if he wished to continue to represent himself, 

Appellant responded, “I can’t represent myself. I’m going to be 

myself.” J.A. 62. Clearly frustrated, the court responded, “I 

don’t know what I’m supposed to advise you. What am I supposed 

to advise him about representing himself?” Id. The court then 

engaged in an extensive colloquy with Appellant about his 

understanding of the nature of the charges against him and his 

desire to serve as his own counsel. Appellant again frustrated 

the matter by claiming he “comprehend[ed]” but did “not 

understand.” Id. at 63. Appellant explained that 

“comprehend[ing]” means he “intelligently hear[s]” what is being 

said. Id. The court then explained to Appellant, 

THE COURT: You are facing a serious charge 

and you’re subject to very serious 

penalties, including a $100 special 

assessment, which I don’t think was 

mentioned. . . . That’s trivial compared to 

the prison sentence you face. So whether 

you comprehend or you understand, the fact 
8

of the matter is you’ve been examined and 

have been found competent to stand trial. 

And also, you had a lawyer, who I really 

don’t think has been very good, to tell you 

the truth. 

I don’t know whether you’re indigent or 

not, but I’ll arrange to have counsel 

appointed to represent you, if you want. 

I don’t want any injustice done in this 

case. And I want you to understand that you 

are subject to a very serious charge, and 

you’re subject to very serious penalties, 

and that this case is going to proceed in 

accordance with the law and in accordance 

with the Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure, which are not easy to understand 

in all respects, [and] the Federal Rules of 

Evidence. 

If you want to proceed representing 

yourself, you have an absolute right to do 

so. I can’t stop you. On the other hand, I 

think that -- my own judgment is you would 

be well advised to have a lawyer 

representing you. 

Do you want to proceed with or without 

a lawyer?

[APPELLANT]: Without. 

Id. at 64-65. 

The court then proceeded to conduct a hearing on 

Appellant’s suppression motion in which Appellant served as his 

own counsel and made many objections. After denying Appellant’s 

suppression motion, the court again discussed Appellant’s desire 

to serve as his own counsel: 

[THE COURT:] As I say, if you want to 

represent yourself, you’re absolutely free 

to do so and I am not going to do anything 

to prevent you from doing so. On the other 

hand, I want to make sure that your 

interests are properly represented. And I 
9

take it -- I don’t know. Do you still, do 

you want a lawyer or you don’t want a 

lawyer?

[APPELLANT]: No, I do not.

J.A. 91-92. Appellant then confirmed several more times that he 

wished to serve as his own counsel. Therefore, the district 

court found that Appellant “voluntarily decided to represent 

himself,” stating, 

I make that finding. I make it reluctantly 

because I want the defendant’s rights to be 

protected. But it could not be more clear 

that he wants to proceed pro se without 

representation of counsel or the assistance 

of standby counsel. And I so find. . . . 

There’s already been a competency 

evaluation. We had the doctor examine Mr. 

Parker, and he found him competent to stand 

trial. I can’t do any more.

Id. at 94.2

On July 30, 2012, the first day of Appellant’s trial, 

before empaneling the jury, the district court again engaged in 

a lengthy discussion with Appellant and his appointed standby 

counsel regarding Appellant’s wishes to proceed pro se. Despite

having been through numerous colloquies on several occasions 

with the court, Appellant asserted that he did not “understand 

 2 Although Appellant continually asserted at this hearing 

that he did not want standby counsel, new standby counsel was 

appointed to him and a notice of appearance for standby counsel

was entered on June 12, 2012. 
10

anything.” J.A. 110. In response to his continued assertions, 

the court stated,

We have a finding, because there were 

allegations, there were assertions made 

earlier in the proceedings that Mr. Parker, 

quote, “did not understand”, we had an 

examination. And the conclusion of the 

examination is that Mr. Parker was competent 

to understand the proceedings against him. 

That is the record and we are proceeding on 

that basis. Continued assertions or 

allegations that I don’t understand do not 

change that finding. . . . I mean, the 

result of that finding has all kinds of 

legal effects itself. If I were to find 

that you didn’t understand the proceedings 

against you -- and I have no reason to think 

you don’t understand. You just aren’t 

happy.

 

Id. at 132. The court then thoroughly explained to Appellant

the trial process, including picking a jury, opening statements, 

witness testimony, the role of standby counsel, and what the 

jury was permitted to consider. 

During trial, Appellant participated in jury 

selection, gave an opening statement, cross-examined witnesses,

made numerous objections to the Government’s evidence, raised a 

suppression issue with regard to the timing of the warrant, and 

made a closing argument. After three days of trial, on August 

1, 2012, the jury found Appellant guilty of all counts. The 

district court sentenced Appellant on October 26, 2012, to 121 

months imprisonment. This timely appeal followed.
11

II.

It is clear “[w]e review a district court’s denial of 

a defendant’s right to self-representation de novo.” United 

States v. Bush, 404 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2005) (emphasis 

supplied). Appellant contends we should also review the 

district court’s decision to allow Appellant to proceed pro se 

de novo. See, e.g., United States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091, 

1097 n.3 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Determination of a waiver of the 

right to counsel is a question of law, and thus we review it de 

novo.” (internal citations omitted)). The Government counters

that Appellant raises this issue for the first time on appeal, 

and thus, our review is only for plain error. See, e.g., United 

States v. Bernard, 708 F.3d 583, 588 (4th Cir. 2013) (applying 

plain error review because Appellant raised the issue of 

competency to waive the right to counsel for the first time on 

appeal). 

We need not and do not decide the question of which 

standard of review is appropriate here because Appellant’s 

argument fails when measured against either standard. See, 

e.g., United States v. Stanley, 739 F.3d 633, 645 (11th Cir. 

2014) (declining to select a standard of review when a 

defendant’s challenge to the validity of his waiver of right to 

counsel failed under both plain error and de novo review). For 

that reason, we examine the constitutional adequacy of the 
12

court’s inquiry into Appellant’s desire to serve as his own 

counsel by the less deferential of the two standards, that is,

de novo. 

III.

We begin our analysis “with the fundamental tenet that 

a criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to selfrepresentation.” United States v. Bernard, 708 F.3d 583, 588 

(4th Cir. 2013); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 

819 (1975). A defendant seeking to represent himself “may waive 

the right to counsel and proceed at trial pro se only if the 

waiver is (1) clear and unequivocal, (2) knowing, intelligent, 

and voluntary, and (3) timely.” Bernard, 708 F.3d at 588.3 

However, the “right to self-representation is not absolute, and 

the government’s interest in ensuring the integrity and 

efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant’s 

interest in acting as his own lawyer.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Ultimately, “[t]he determination of whether 

there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel 

must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and 

circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, 

 3 At the outset, it is important to identify that unlike in

Bernard, Appellant does not claim that he was not competent to 

represent himself at trial or not competent to waive his right 

to counsel. Appellant argues only that his waiver was neither 

(1) clear and unequivocal; nor (2) knowing and intelligent. 
13

experience, and conduct of the accused.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 

U.S. 458, 464 (1938); see also United States v. Singleton, 107 

F.3d 1091, 1097 (4th Cir. 1997). 

Moreover, while a trial court must determine if a 

waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent, no particular 

interrogation of the defendant is required, so long as the court 

warns the defendant of the dangers of self-representation such

that “‘his choice is made with his eyes open.’” United States 

v. King, 582 F.2d 888, 890 (4th Cir. 1978) (quoting Faretta, 422 

U.S. at 835); see also Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88 (2004)

(“We have not . . . prescribed any formula or script to be read 

to a defendant who states that he elects to proceed without 

counsel.”). As we have stated, 

the court must assure itself that the 

defendant knows the charges against him, the 

possible punishment and the manner in which 

an attorney can be of assistance. The 

defendant must be made aware that he will be 

on his own in a complex area where 

experience and professional training are 

greatly to be desired. 

King, 582 F.2d at 890 (internal citations omitted). 

Here, Appellant argues the district court failed to 

ensure that he actually desired to represent himself, and 

further, that he actually comprehended his right to counsel in 

an adequate fashion so as to enter a constitutionally effective 

waiver of his right to counsel.
14

A.

Clear and Unequivocal

First, Appellant contends the district court 

“misunderstood” some of his statements as a request to represent 

himself. Appellant’s Br. 10. Instead, Appellant argues he 

simply did not “understand.” Id. at 11-12. According to 

Appellant, this is evidenced by his continued assertions of the 

same. This argument is contrary to the record. Appellant was 

repeatedly, clearly, and directly asked at several different 

court appearances if he wished to represent himself, and he

consistently and clearly answered in the affirmative. 

Specifically, the district court asked Appellant multiple times

whether he wished to represent himself at both of the motions

hearings on December 20, 2011, and April 27, 2012, as well as on

the first day of trial on July 30, 2012. In each of the many

instances Appellant was questioned, he confirmed that he wanted 

to represent himself. For example:

THE COURT: [Y]ou want to represent yourself 

in this matter. Is that true?

 

[APPELLANT]: Yes.

J.A. 52.

THE COURT: [D]o you want to represent 

yourself at trial as well? 

[APPELLANT]: Yes. 

Id. at 54.
15

[THE COURT:] Do you want to proceed with or 

without a lawyer? 

[APPELLANT]: Without. 

Id. at 65.

[THE COURT:] Do you still, do you want a 

lawyer or you don’t want a lawyer? 

[APPELLANT]: No, I do not.

Id. at 91-92.

THE COURT: Now, what role would you like 

[standby counsel] to play in the trial? 

[APPELLANT]: None. 

Id. at 111. 

THE COURT: Mr. Parker, do you want [standby 

counsel] to represent you –

[APPELLANT]: No, sir. 

THE COURT: as full counsel? 

[APPELLANT]: No. 

THE COURT: No? 

[APPELLANT]: No, sir. 

Id. at 121.

Based on the record before us, there is no question 

Appellant’s waiver of his right to counsel was clear and 

unequivocal. 
16

B.

Knowing and Intelligent

Next, Appellant argues the district court failed to 

ensure that he comprehended what representing himself entailed, 

rendering constitutionally infirm his waiver of his right to 

counsel. This argument is likewise contrary to the record. 

When Appellant first expressed his desire to represent himself 

at the December 20, 2011 hearing, the district court explained

at length what that would require, i.e., presenting motions, 

questioning witnesses, and presenting evidence. Then, before 

empaneling the jury on the first day of trial, the district 

court spent significant time confirming Appellant’s desire to 

represent himself and explaining the particulars of each phase 

of the trial. We therefore have little trouble concluding that 

the court’s colloquy with Appellant was constitutionally 

sufficient, and that Appellant certainly made his choice “with 

his eyes open.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (internal quotation

marks omitted).4 

We therefore conclude Appellant’s election to proceed 

pro se was not only clear and unequivocal, but also knowing and 

 4 In attempt to support his argument to the contrary, 

Appellant simply cherry-picks snippets of the district court’s 

conversation with him. However, when viewing the record as a 

whole, it is clear the court’s conduct was more than 

constitutionally adequate.
17

intelligent. The record reflects that at the time he waived his 

right to counsel, Appellant understood the legal proceedings and 

was aware of the nature of the charges against him and the 

penalties he faced if convicted, even though he often claimed he 

did not understand. On multiple occasions, Appellant was 

informed of the perils of serving as his own counsel and exactly 

what was involved in undertaking such a task. Despite these

warnings, Appellant elected to proceed pro se. Moreover, 

Appellant demonstrated that he was capable of representing 

himself by presenting an opening statement, questioning 

witnesses, raising objections, and presenting a closing 

argument.

IV.

Faced with a difficult situation, the district court 

did all it could in this case to protect Appellant’s 

constitutional rights. “A trial court evaluating a defendant’s 

request to represent himself must traverse a thin line between 

improperly allowing the defendant to proceed pro se, thereby 

violating his right to counsel, and improperly having the 

defendant proceed with counsel, thereby violating his right to 

self-representation.” Fields v. Murray, 49 F.3d 1024, 1029 (4th 

Cir. 1995) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and alterations

omitted). In traversing this line here, the district court went 

so far as to provide Appellant with the added safeguard and 
18

assistance of standby counsel, even though it was not 

constitutionally required to do so. See United States v. 

Beckton, 740 F.3d 303, 307 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[A] pro se 

defendant has no right to standby counsel when he chooses to 

proceed pro se.”). 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the 

district court is

AFFIRMED.