alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
857 A.2d 671

#### ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Edward ROCHE, Plenary Guardian of the Person and Estate of Diane Roche, an Incapacitated Person, and in his Own Right and William J. Scharfenberger, Trustee Allegheny Health, Education and Research Foundation and Allegheny University Hospitals, East, Including its Wholly Owned Operating Division, Allegheny University Hospital-Hahnemann Division and Lexington Insurance Company c/o Caronia Corporation and Medical Professional Liability Catastrophe Fund and Allegheny Health Services Providers Insurance Company, Ltd. and Continental Casualty Company and Steadfast Insurance Company, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Oct. 27, 2003.

*539
      *REVISED ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 27th day of October, 2003, we affirm the Order of the Commonwealth Court.

Justice LAMB did not participate in the consideration or decision of this ease.
#### STATE ex rel. Donald R. NELSON v. STATE Of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-0166.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 7, 2011.

In re Nelson, Donald R.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 469-103; to the *882Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2008-KA-0584.

Denied.
#### Robert HILL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D10-4313.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

March 18, 2011.

Robert Hill, Carrabelle, pro se.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Anthony J. Golden, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.

JACOBUS, J.

Robert Hill appeals the summary denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence, filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). In his motion, Hill argued his habitual felony offender sentences were illegal because he lacked the requisite predicate felonies. Hill further asserted the trial court erred in relying on the pre-sentence investigation report to support the habitual felony offender enhancement. The trial court denied Hill’s motion, finding his claims were not cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) motion. We reverse.

To the extent that Hill’s motion challenged the procedure used to enhance his sentence, the trial court was correct that it was not cognizable under rule 3.800(a). However, to the extent that Hill claimed he did not have the predicate felonies required to support a habitual felony offender designation, his motion was cognizable under rule 3.800(a). *See Bover v. State,*797 So.2d 1246, 1247 (Fla.2001) (“[WJhere the requisite predicate felonies essential to qualify a defendant for habitu-alization do not exist as a matter of law and that error is apparent from the face of the record, rule 3.800(a) can be used to correct the resulting habitual offender sentence.”). The trial court’s order did not include record attachments refuting this claim. Accordingly, this cause is reversed and remanded to the trial court for the attachment of those portions of the record that conclusively refute Hill’s claim that the requisite predicate felonies do not ex*906ist. *See Rodriguez v. State,*919 So.2d 576 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).

REVERSED and REMANDED.

TORPY and COHEN, JJ., concur.
#### ROTO-ROOTER SERVICES CO. and Specialty Risk Services, Appellants, v. Angel SEPULVEDA, Appellee.

No. 1D10-0365.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Oct. 18, 2010.

Shawna G. Andres of Pallo, Marks & Hernandez, Gechijian and DeMay, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, for Appellants.

Kimberly A. Hill of Kimberly A. Hill, P.L., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

In this workers’ compensation case, the Employer/Carrier (E/C) appeals an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) awarding Claimant temporary partial disability (TPD) benefits not to exceed the statutory maximum of 104 weeks. We affirm the JCC’s finding of entitlement to TPD benefits for the periods requested because it is supported by competent substantial evidence. Because, however, the JCC failed to determine the number of weeks of TPD benefits for which the E/C remains hable, we reverse and remand for further findings.

The E/C raised the payment of 104 weeks of temporary indemnity benefits as a defense to Claimant’s request for additional TPD benefits. *See*§ 440.15(4)(e), Fla. Stat. (2005). This defense was based, in part, on a mediation agreement between the parties wherein the E/C agreed to pay Claimant $7,750.00 in full and final satisfaction of all past indemnity benefits through the date of the agreement. Although the JCC found that the E/C paid a total of 66 weeks of temporary indemnity benefits, the JCC failed to specify whether the parties’ mediation agreement encompassed these 66 weeks or if the agreement represented some other, indeterminate number of weeks paid by the E/C. On remand, the JCC should determine the number of weeks of TPD benefits left to be paid by the E/C. In doing so, the JCC should interpret the parties’ mediation agreement and specify what effect, if any, the agreement had on the E/C’s defense. REVERSED and REMANDED for further findings.

WOLF, ROBERTS, and WETHERELL, JJ., concur.
#### Cynthia BRIDGES, Secretary, Louisiana Department of Revenue v. HERTZ EQUIPMENT RENTAL CORPORATION.

No. 2010-C-2328.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 20, 2011.

Antonio Charles Ferachi, Sessions, Fish-man, Nathan & Israel, LLC, Max Nathan, Jr., New Orleans, for Applicant.

Phelps Dunbar, LLP, Christopher Kent Ralston, Harry Allan Rosenberg, New Orleans, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

We granted the Department of Revenue’s application for a writ of certiorari in this case on December 17, 2010. After hearing oral arguments and reviewing the record of the matter, we conclude the judgment below does not require the exercise of this court’s supervisory authority. Accordingly, we recall our order of December 17, 2010 as improvidently granted, and we deny the writ application.

KIMBALL, Chief Justice, dissents.

JOHNSON, Justice, disssents.

WEIMER, Justice, dissents.
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 166 Introduced in House (IH)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 166

 To amend the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 to reform 
  funding for the Seniors Farmers' Market Nutrition Program, and for 
                            other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 4, 2007

  Ms. Kaptur introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                        Committee on Agriculture

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 to reform 
  funding for the Seniors Farmers' Market Nutrition Program, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SENIORS FARMERS' MARKET NUTRITION PROGRAM.

    (a) Funding.--Subsection (a) of section 4402 of the Farm Security 
and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (7 U.S.C. 3007; Public Law 107-171; 
116 Stat. 334) is amended to read as follows:
    ``(a) Establishment.--The Secretary of Agriculture shall use funds 
available to the Commodity Credit Corporation to carry out and expand a 
seniors farmers' market nutrition program in the following amounts:
            ``(1) For fiscal year 2007, not less than $25,000,000.
            ``(2) For fiscal year 2008, not less than $50,000,000.
            ``(3) For fiscal year 2009, not less than $75,000,000.
            ``(4) For fiscal years 2010 through 2012, not less than 
        $100,000,000.''.
    (b) Purposes.--Subsection (b)(1) of such section is amended--
            (1) by striking ``unprepared'' and inserting ``minimally 
        processed''; and
            (2) by striking ``and herbs'' and inserting ``herbs, and 
        other locally produced farm products as the Secretary considers 
        appropriate''.
    (c) Administrative Costs; Unexpended Funds.--Such section is 
further amended by adding at the end the following new subsections:
    ``(d) Administrative Costs.--Not more than 10 percent of the funds 
made available for a fiscal year under subsection (a) may be used to 
pay administrative costs incurred in carrying out this section.
    ``(e) Unexpended Funds.--To the extent the funds made available 
under subsection (a) for a fiscal year are not expended in that fiscal 
year, the Secretary may use such funds in a subsequent fiscal year for 
the same purpose.''.
                                 <all>
```
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02-19-00189-CV

IN THE ESTATE OF GUS W. RIEFLER,

JR., DECEASED

§

§

§

§

On Appeal from the County Court at 

Law

of Cooke County (PR-17203-1)

December 3, 2020

Memorandum Opinion by Justice 

Birdwell

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that there 

was error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of the trial 

court is reversed, and we render a judgment that Danny Joe Jonas Jr. take nothing. 

It is further ordered that appellee Danny Joe Jonas Jr. shall pay all of the costs 

of this appeal, for which let execution issue.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

By /s/ Wade Birdwell

 Justice Wade Birdwell
EXHIBIT 32.2
 STATEMENT FURNISHED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
   (A)
    
    the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)) and
 (B)
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company
as of the dates and for the periods covered by the Report.
   May 17, 2010
    
    /s/ Laurie L. LathamDate
    
    Laurie L. LathamChief Financial Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                                            9
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1000
<CURRENCY>                                     US DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   MAR-31-1997
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                           3,501
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                           3,400
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                 1,620
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    322,942
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                         320,615
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                             2,327
<LOANS>                                        420,980
<ALLOWANCE>                                      2,942
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 782,874
<DEPOSITS>                                     400,700
<SHORT-TERM>                                   297,266
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                             14,542
<LONG-TERM>                                     29,444
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     15,281
<COMMON>                                            33
<OTHER-SE>                                      25,548
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 782,874
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                  7,557
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                5,249
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                    31
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                12,837
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               5,705
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               4,173
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            2,959
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                      243
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                 238
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  1,725
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,229
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       1,229
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                          355
<NET-INCOME>                                       874
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.36
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.36
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    1.71
<LOANS-NON>                                     11,057
<LOANS-PAST>                                     3,478
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                   433
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                 12,137
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 2,760
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                       68
<RECOVERIES>                                         6
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                2,941
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                             2,941
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                          2,421
        


</TABLE>
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EARNEST S. HARRIS,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

E. Mc CUMSEY, Ms.; Senior Librarian, The

Law Library, Pelican Bay State Prison,

Defendant

- Appellee. No. 18

- 15422

D.C. No. 3:16

- cv

- 01487

- JST

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Jon S. Tigar, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 19, 2019 **

Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Earnest S. Harris appeals pro se from the district

court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging an access

- to

courts claim. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de n ovo.

Brodheim v. Cry , 584 F.3d 1262, 1267 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

FEB 25 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Harris failed

to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he suffered an actual injury

as a result of defen dant’s conduct. See Lewis v. Casey , 518 U.S. 343, 3 53

- 54

(1996) (setting forth elements of access

- to

- courts claim and actual injury

requirement ).

We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See

Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.
#### Michelle BERTHIAUME, Appellant, v. JUSTICE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMISSION, Appellee.

No. 2D10-4485.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

July 15, 2011.

Michelle Berthiaume, pro se.

Stephen M. Presnell, General Counsel, and Christian D. Lake, Assistant General Counsel, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

CRENSHAW, Judge.

Michelle Berthiaume served as private, court-appointed counsel to a criminal defendant and filed a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to section 27.5304, Florida Statutes (2009), to receive compensation for her representation. She now challenges the summary denial of her motion, and we treat the appeal as a petition for certiorari. *See Justice Admin. Comm’n v. Peterson,*989 So.2d 663, 665 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). We conclude, and the Justice Administrative Commission (JAC) concedes, that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by summarily denying Berthiaume’s motion for attorney’s fees. We grant the petition, quash the trial court’s order denying the motion for fees, and remand for further proceedings.

When Berthiaume filed her motion pursuant to section 27.5304(12)(a), requesting fees in excess of the statutory limits, the JAC objected to the proposed billing, and the trial court scheduled a hearing on the motion. On the day of the hearing, scheduled for 10:30 a.m., Berthiaume failed to appear by 10:45 a.m. Because of Berthi-aume’s failure to appear, the trial court— without further inquiry — summarily denied her motion for attorney’s fees. Ber-thiaume’s motion for rehearing offered an explanation for her absence, but it was also summarily denied by the court.

Section 27.5304(12)(b) requires the trial court to (1) hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion to exceed the fee limits and (2) enter a written order detailing the trial *1283court’s findings. Further, Florida courts have a longstanding policy of adjudication of disputes on the merits. *See, e.g., Kubel v. San Marco Floor*& *Wall, Inc.,*967 So.2d 1063, 1064 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (remanding for adjudication of the lawsuit on the merits where the trial court had dismissed a negligence claim based upon a finding that plaintiff committed fraud on the court). Here the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law because it failed to make the required findings based on the merits of Berthiaume’s motion.

Petition granted.

NORTHCUTT and BLACK, JJ„ Concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                             428
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   93,213
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                93,641
<PP&E>                                       7,115,383
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,020,390
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               6,202,703
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            6,122
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 6,202,703
<SALES>                                        606,517
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               618,237
<CGS>                                          187,964
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  487,036
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                131,201
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            131,201
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   131,201
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 31.1

                                 CERTIFICATIONS

I, Michael McNeil, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of HMN Financial, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

      a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

      b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

      c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal
control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and
15d-15(f)) that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter that
has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent functions):

      a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

      b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.

Date: November 9, 2004                        By   /s/ Michael McNeil
                                          President/Chief Executive Officer