alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1718 

To provide additional student loan forgiveness to teachers of foreign 

languages. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 27, 2007 

Mr. MOORE of Kansas (for himself, Mr. HASTINGS of Florida, Ms. HIRONO, 

Mr. HOLT, Mr. MCCAUL of Texas, Mr. REYES, Mr. SHAYS, and Mr. 

WEXLER) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Education and Labor 

A BILL 

To provide additional student loan forgiveness to teachers 

of foreign languages. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Foreign Language 

5 Education Expansion Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. ADDITIONAL LOAN FORGIVENESS FOR TEACHERS 

7 OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES. 

8 (a) FFEL LOANS.—Section 428J(c)(3)(A)(ii) of the 

9 Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1078– 


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2 

•HR 1718 IH

1 10(c)(3)(A)(ii)) is amended by striking ‘‘mathematics or 

2 science’’ and inserting ‘‘mathematics, science, or a foreign 

3 language’’. 

4 (b) DIRECT LOANS.—Section 460(c)(3)(A)(ii) of 

5 such Act (20 U.S.C. 1087j(c)(3)(A)(ii)) is amended by 

6 striking ‘‘mathematics or science’’ and inserting ‘‘mathe7 matics, science, or a foreign language’’. 

8 (c) NEW BORROWER ELIGIBILITY.—An individual 

9 who is a teacher of a foreign language shall not qualify 

10 under the amendments made by this section unless such 

11 individual is a new borrower (as such term is defined in 

12 section 103 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 

13 U.S.C. 1003)) on or after October 1, 2001. 

Æ 


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```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7260 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 7260

    To allow for safety regulation of vehicles that are modified to 
           increase seating capacity, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           December 11, 2018

  Mr. Faso (for himself, Mr. Tonko, and Ms. Stefanik) introduced the 
   following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and 
                                Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To allow for safety regulation of vehicles that are modified to 
           increase seating capacity, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Limousine Safety Modernization 
Act''.

SEC. 2. SAFETY REGULATION OF LIMOUSINES.

    Section 30102(a)(6) of title 49, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``or'' at the end;
            (2) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period and 
        inserting ``; or''; and
            (3) by inserting at the end the following:
                    ``(C) altering a motor vehicle that has already 
                been purchased by the first purchaser (as such term is 
                defined in subsection (b)) by increasing the wheelbase 
                of the vehicle so that the vehicle has increased 
                seating capacity.''.
                                 <all>
```
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

ANTHONY BRACY,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 19 EAL 2021

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 19th day of January, 2022, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
#### Ann BERNARD, et al. v. Antoinette ELLIS, et al.

No. 2011-CC-0329.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 31, 2011.

In re Imperial Fire & Casualty Insurance Company; —Defendants; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Orleans First City Court, No. 10-50054; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-C-1495.

Granted. The matter is remanded to the court of appeal for en banc consideration in order to reconcile its holding in the instant case with its holding in *Knight v. Imperial Fire & Casualty,*10-1474 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/7/11), writ denied, 11-0245 (La.3/4/11), — So.3d -. The court may also consider the effect, if any, of the 2009 amendment to La.R.S. 22:1282.
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATIONS



The undersigned, as the chief financial officer of Valley Financial Corporation, certifies that the Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended June 30, 2004, which
accompanies this certification, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the periodic report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of Valley Financial Corporation at the dates and for the periods indicated. The foregoing certification is made solely for purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United States Code and is
subject to the knowledge and willfulness qualifications contained in Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350(c).



Dated: August 13, 2004



/s/ A. Wayne LewisChief Financial Officer




37
| (logo)  WELLS FARGO | **Commercial  Mortgage Servicing**D1050-084,  8th Floor  401 South Tryon St.  Charlotte, NC 28202  1-800-326-1334 |
|---------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

**ANNUAL STATEMENT OFCOMPLIANCE**

 

Reference is hereby made to that certainPooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of June 1, 2014, by and among J.P.Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., as Depositor, Wells FargoBank, National Association, as Master Servicer, Torchlight Loan Services, LLC,as Special Servicer, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as CertificateAdministrator, Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, as Trustee, and PentalphaSurveillance LLC, as Senior Trust Advisor with respect to Commercial MortgagePass-Through Certificates Series 2014-C20 (the "Agreement").Capitalized terms used herein not otherwise defined shall have the meaningsassigned in the Agreement.

 

Pursuantto Section 11.09 of this Agreement, I, Daniel Bober, Executive Vice Presidentof Commercial Mortgage Services do hereby certify that:

 

1.      A review of the activities of the Master Servicer during the period fromJanuary 1, 2017 through December 31, 2017 (the “Reporting Period”), and of itsperformance per the Agreement during such period has been made under mysupervision, and

 

2.      To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer hasfulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respectsthroughout the Reporting Period.

 

 

INWITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this Certificate as of the 28thday of February 2018.

 

 

/s/Daniel Bober

DanielBober

ExecutiveVice President 

WellsFargo Bank

 

 

| Wells  Fargo Bank, N.A. | (logo)  Together we’ll go far |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-6678

BOBBY M. NICHOLSON, JR.,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

AIR FORCE D.O.C./I.I.C.,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, District Judge. (1:19-cv-00398-LO-MSN)

Submitted: June 20, 2019 Decided: June 25, 2019

Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Bobby Maurice Nicholson, Jr., Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Bobby M. Nicholson, Jr., appeals the district court’s order dismissing his civil

complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) (2012). We have reviewed the 

record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the 

district court. Nicholson v. Air Force D.O.C./I.I.C., No. 1:19-cv-00398-LO-MSN (E.D. 

Va. filed Apr. 15 & entered Apr. 16, 2019). We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
EXHIBIT 31.2
 CERTIFICATION
 I, Laurie L. Latham, certify that:
 1.
    
    I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of ViewCast.com, Inc.;
 2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this report;
 3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in
this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
report;
 4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and
15d-15(e)) and internal controls over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules
13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have:
     5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the
audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):
   Date:  November 15, 2010
    /s/  Laurie L. LathamLaurie L. LathamChief Financial Officer
I 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 7310 

To amend the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to 

authorize the Attorney General to make grants to States and units 

of local government to deploy and implement gunfire detection and location technology, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 13, 2018 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER (for himself and Mr. JEFFRIES) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 

Act of 1968 to authorize the Attorney General to make 

grants to States and units of local government to deploy 

and implement gunfire detection and location technology, 

and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. GUNFIRE DETECTION TECHNOLOGY GRANT 

4 PROGRAM. 

5 Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 

6 Streets Act of 1968 is amended by inserting after part 

7 MM the following: 


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2 

•HR 7310 IH

1 ‘‘PART NN—GUNFIRE DETECTION TECHNOLOGY 

2 GRANT PROGRAM 

3 ‘‘SEC. 3041. GRANT AUTHORITY. 

4 ‘‘The Attorney General is authorized to make grants 

5 to States and units of local government to deploy and im6 plement gunfire detection and location technology. 

7 ‘‘SEC. 3042. APPLICATIONS. 

8 ‘‘The chief executive officer of a State or unit of local 

9 government seeking a grant under this part shall submit 

10 to the Attorney General an application at such time, in 

11 such manner, and containing such information as the At12 torney General may reasonably require. 

13 ‘‘SEC. 3043. FUNDING. 

14 ‘‘Of the total amount made available to carry out sub15 part 1 of part E, the Attorney General shall allocate not 

16 less than $10,000,000 for grants under this part for each 

17 of fiscal years 2020 through 2023.’’. 

18 SEC. 2. CONFORMING AMENDMENT. 

19 Section 505(a)(1) of the Omnibus Crime Control and 

20 Safe Streets Act of 1968 (34 U.S.C. 10156(a)(1)) is 

21 amended by inserting after ‘‘paragraph (2)’’ the following: 

22 ‘‘and section 3043’’. 

Æ 


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<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report of Targeted Genetics
Corporation on Form 10-Q for the period ending July 30, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Todd E.
Simpson, Vice President, Finance and Administration, Chief Financial Officer,
Secretary and Treasurer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
     15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
     material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
     Company.

July 31, 2003                   /s/ TODD E. SIMPSON
Date                            ------------------------------------------------
                                Todd E. Simpson
                                Vice President, Finance and Administration,
                                Chief Financial Officer, Secretary and Treasurer
##### 



Exhibit 99.3

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Liberty Property Limited
Partnership (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2003 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, WILLIAM P. HANKOWSKI, Chief Executive Officer of Liberty Property
Trust (the sole general partner of the Company), certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that based on my knowledge:

(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations
of the Company.

|                                                                                                                                          |  | 
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  | 
|/s/ WILLIAM P. HANKOWSKY

William P. Hankowsky
Chief Executive Officer of Liberty Property Trust,
the sole general partner of the Company |  |
#### Walter A. McNEIL, etc., Petitioner(s) v. COUNCIL FOR SECULAR HUMANISM, INC., et al., Respondent(s).

No. SC10-957.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 8, 2010.

This cause having heretofore been submitted to the Court on Certified Great *216Public Importance pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b), Florida Constitution (1980), and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.0S0(a)(2)(A)(v), and the Court having determined that it should decline to exercise jurisdiction, it is ordered that the Petition for Review is denied.

No Motion for Rehearing will be entertained by the Court. See Fla. RApp. P. 9.330(d)(2).

PARIENTE, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

POLSTON, J., concurs with an opinion.

POLSTON, J.,

concurring.

Because of the procedural posture of this case, I agree that we should not exercise our discretion to accept jurisdiction at this time.

In the decision below, the First District Court of Appeal certified the following question as one of great public importance:

> WHETHER THE NO-AID PROVISION IN ARTICLE I, SECTION 3 OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS THE STATE FROM CONTRACTING FOR THE PROVISION OF NECESSARY SOCIAL SERVICES BY RELIGIOUS OR SECTARIAN ENTITIES?

*Council for Secular Humanism, Inc. v. McNeil,*— So.3d-,-, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D956, D958, 2010 WL 1658788 (Fla. 1st DCA April 27, 2010). The First District held that the no-aid clause of the Florida Constitution is not limited to the school context and, therefore, applies to the provision of social services. *Id.*Because the trial court had ruled otherwise when granting judgment on the pleadings against the Council for Secular Humanism on its claim that sections 944.473 and 944.4731, Florida Statutes (2007), violate article I, section 3, the First District remanded the case for further proceedings. *Id.*

The certified question is certainly one of great public importance that this Court should answer. But this Court will be better able to address this significant issue of law in context after the trial court has applied the no-aid clause to the particular social services at issue in this case. *See Glendale Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. State,*485 So.2d 1321, 1325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (“The wisdom of [allowing the plaintiff to adduce evidence] is particularly evident in this case where we have been asked to rule for the first time on constitutional questions of considerable magnitude, without the benefit of any record except the various complaints and motions directed to the complaints .... ”); *see also Floridians Against Expanded Gambling v. Floridians for a Level Playing Field,*945 So.2d 553, 567 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (Padavano, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that certification of a question of great public importance was premature because reversing the summary judgment and remanding the case was “merely an intermediate step in the litigation” and did not “resolve the controversy”). Accordingly, I concur with the decision of this Court to decline jurisdiction at this time.
#### Floyd E. JOHNSON, Appellant, v. Sherman H. CROUSE, Warden Kansas State Penitentiary, Lansing, Kansas, Appellee.

No. 7679.

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.

May 20, 1964.

Rehearing Denied June 23, 1964.

*418Robert P. Grueter, Denver, Colo., for appellant.

Robert J. Lewis, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., of Kansas (William M. Ferguson, Atty. Gen., of Kansas, on the brief), for appellee.

Before BREITENSTEIN, HILL and SETH, United States Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

The appeal is from a denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.1 Appellant, now a prisoner confined in the Kansas State Penitentiary, was charged in the District Court of Marion County, Kansas, with second degree burglary and . grand larceny. .The trial judge appointed counsel to represent him, although Johnson stated at that time that he understood all the points involved and the appointment of counsel was not necessary. After consultation with his appointed counsel, he appeared before the court, waived arraignment arid, entered a plea of guilty to both counts of the information, stating then to the court that he did so voluntarily and after consultation with his counsel. The county attorney then gave notice, in open court, that he was invoking the Kansas habitual criminal act (Kan.G.S.1949, 21-107a) and offered into evidence certified copies of two journal entries of judgment, each showing a separate prior felony conviction. The county attorney, at this stage of the proceedings stated, “I would like to offer into evidence, and give the accused and his counsel opportunity to study these whatever time is necessary.” Upon inquiry in open court by his attorney, Johnson admitted the two prior convictions and thereafter the journal entries were admitted into evidence and sentence was pronounced pursuant to the mandatory sentencing provisions of the Kansas statutes.

Appellant makes two contentions here: (1) That he was not afforded adequate or effective assistance of counsel; and (2) that he was not given proper notice of the State’s intention to proceed against him under the habitual criminal statutes of the State.

These questions were resolved against Johnson by the Supreme Court of Kansas in an original habeas corpus proceeding had in that court prior to the filing of this case in the court below.2 Both that court and the trial court in this case found that Johnson had failed to sustain his factual burden and, in addition, found as facts, as well as under the law, that appellant’s two contentions were without merit.

We have carefully considered the entire record, including that of all proceedings had in the state district court, and we agree with the Supreme Court of Kansas and with the court below. An exhaustive opinion on the questions involved would only reiterate what the other two courts have already said.

Affirmed.

1

. Johnson v. Crouse, 224 F.Supp. 864 (D.Kan.1964).

2

. Johnson v. Crouse, 191 Kan. 694, 383 P.2d 978.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Roy R. PECOT.

No. 2011-K-0123.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 27, 2011.

In re Pecot, Roy R.; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 04-5081; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KA-261.

Denied.
#### Casey BILLIESON, et al. v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, et al.

No. 2011-CC-2443.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 14, 2011.

In re Billieson, Casey et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. E, No. 94-19231; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-1399.

Denied.
#### In re Oliver J. COUNCE.

No. 11-OB-1057.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 1, 2011.

PER CURIAM.*

After reviewing the evidence and considering the law, we conclude petitioner, Oliver J. Counce, is immediately eligible to be conditionally admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana, subject to a probationary period of two years. The probationary period shall commence from the date petitioner, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, and the probation monitor execute a formal probation plan. During the probationary period, petitioner shall comply with all of the terms and conditions of the consent agreement executed by him with the Louisiana Supreme Court Committee on Bar Admissions, and such other conditions as may be imposed upon him by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. Should petitioner fail to make a good faith effort to satisfy these conditions, or should he commit any misconduct during the period of probation, his conditional right to practice may be terminated or he may be subjected to other discipline pursuant to the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement.

CONDITIONAL ADMISSION GRANTED.

*

 Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion.
(a)  A review of Toyota Motor Credit Corporation’s activities and of its performance under the Sale and Servicing Agreement, dated as of June 18, 2014 (the “Sale and Servicing Agreement”), among Toyota Auto Finance Receivables LLC, as seller, Toyota Motor Credit Corporation, as servicer (in such capacity, the “Servicer”) and sponsor, and Toyota Auto Receivables 2014-B Owner Trust, as issuer, during the year ended December 31, 2016 has been made under my supervision.
 
 (b)  To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Sale and Servicing Agreement in all material respects throughout the aforementioned period.
 
  
 By: /s/ Wei Shi