OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. CHAVERS. 

[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Chavers (1997), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 

Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Permanent disbarment — Ignoring previous 

order of Supreme Court by continuing to practice law while under 

suspension. 

 (No. 97-1313 — Submitted August 26, 1997 — Decided December 31, 

1997.) 

 ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 

Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 96-71. 

 On November 7, 1990, we indefinitely suspended respondent, Clarence L. 

Chavers of Woodmere, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0024930, from the 

practice of law in Ohio for neglecting client matters and failing to cooperate in the 

ensuing investigation. Disciplinary Counsel v. Chavers (1990), 55 Ohio St.3d 18, 

562 N.E.2d 1386. On that same day, we entered an order requiring, among other 

things, that respondent notify all his clients of his suspension, return to them their 

papers and property and all unearned fees, and notify the court of compliance with 

the order. Respondent did not comply with the order, and on January 16, 1991, we 

issued an order to show cause why he should not be found in contempt. 

Disciplinary Counsel v. Chavers (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 706, 566 N.E.2d 172. 

Respondent failed also to respond to that order, and on February 27, 1991, we 

found him to be in contempt of this court. Disciplinary Counsel v. Chavers

(1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 704, 569 N.E.2d 513. 

 On November 6, 1995, this court received a copy of a letter written by 

Judge Stuart A. Friedman of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, stating 

that respondent was currently appearing before Judge Friedman as counsel of 

record in the case of Onyealilachi F.O. Nwoku v. St. Paul Congregational 
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Methodist Church, case No. 280785. Relator, Disciplinary Counsel, sent two 

letters of inquiry about this allegation to respondent by certified mail. The letters 

were received, but respondent did not reply. In response to relator’s subpoena

duces tecum, respondent appeared for a deposition on May 17, 1996. Respondent 

admitted then that he had not registered with the Supreme Court since the 1987-

1989 biennium and that in July 1991 he received a sanction of $390 for failing to 

meet continuing legal education requirements, which he had not yet paid. 

 Respondent stated in his deposition that after being suspended by this court 

he continued to practice in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern 

District of Ohio in the belief that he could do so because it was a “separate 

entit[y].” Respondent filed a case in that court in December 1990 and another in 

March 1991. On April 14, 1992, the Chief Judge of the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Ohio suspended respondent from the right to 

practice law in that court. In 1993, respondent filed another bankruptcy case in 

the bankruptcy court for the Northern District of Ohio and, in 1995, he was still 

attorney of record in a bankruptcy case filed on April 14, 1992. 

 When respondent failed to answer relator’s October 1996 complaint 

charging that respondent’s activities since his November 1990 suspension violated 

several Disciplinary Rules, relator filed a motion for default judgment. 

Respondent, when contacted by telephone, stated that he did not intend to respond 

to the complaint or the motion. 

 A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the 

Supreme Court (“board”) reviewed the motion and attached exhibits, found the 

facts as alleged, and concluded that respondent’s appearance as counsel in 

Onyealilachi F.O. Nwoku v. St. Paul Congregational Methodist Church 

constituted the practice of law while under suspension in violation of DR 1-
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102(A)(5) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), 1-

102(A)(6) (engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on a lawyer’s fitness to 

practice law), and 3-101(B) (practicing law in a jurisdiction where to do so would 

be in violation of the regulations of the profession in that jurisdiction) and 

Gov.Bar R. V(8)(E) (failure to perform the duties of a suspended attorney). 

 The panel further concluded that respondent’s continued practice of law in 

1990 and later years in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern 

District of Ohio, even after being suspended from practice in that district, violated 

DR 1-102(A)(5), 1-102(A)(6), and 3-101(B), and Gov.Bar R. V(8)(E). 

 In addition, the panel concluded that respondent’s continued practice of law 

while not registered during years after 1988 constituted a violation of Gov.Bar R. 

VI(1) (requiring an attorney to register and pay the registration fee to remain in 

active status). The panel recommended that respondent be permanently disbarred. 

 The board adopted the findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the 

panel. 

__________________ 

Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Sally Ann Steuk, Assistant 

Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 

__________________ 

Per Curiam. Absent any mitigating circumstances, the normal penalty for 

ignoring previous orders of the court and continuing to practice law while under 

suspension is disbarment. Disciplinary Counsel v. McDonald (1995), 71 Ohio 

St.3d 628, 646 N.E.2d 819; Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Shabazz (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 

24, 656 N.E.2d 325. Respondent continued to practice law by appearing in the 

common pleas court while suspended. His activities were not unlike those of the 

lawyer in Akron Bar Assn. v. Thorpe (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 174, 532 N.E.2d 752, 
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where we disbarred a suspended attorney who attempted to settle an accident 

claim. Here, we find no mitigating circumstances as we did in Disciplinary 

Counsel v. Koury (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 433, 674 N.E.2d 1371, and Disciplinary 

Counsel v. Bancsi (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 392, 683 N.E.2d 1072. 

 Moreover, respondent continued to practice in the bankruptcy court after 

being suspended by the Chief Judge of the United States District Court. Contrary 

to respondent’s opinion at his deposition, such practice involved a violation of the 

Disciplinary Rules. Because the bankruptcy court is a unit of the United States 

District Court, Section 151, Title 28, U.S.Code, respondent’s continued practice in 

the bankruptcy court after suspension by the district court constituted the practice 

of law in a jurisdiction where doing so violated the regulations of the profession of 

that jurisdiction. As a consequence, respondent violated DR 3-101(B). Even a 

practice limited to advising and representing clients solely on federal law and 

appearing solely in federal court entails other activities in carrying out the practice 

of law that are not solely federal in nature and warrant state regulation. To file a 

bankruptcy case, a lawyer must counsel his client on Ohio law relating to 

exemptions and preferential and fraudulent transfers, among other matters. 

Respondent, therefore, by necessity counseled his client on Ohio law while he was 

suspended and not in good standing, although he filed the case in the bankruptcy 

court. 

 We accept the findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the board. 

Respondent is hereby permanently disbarred from the practice of law in Ohio. 

Costs of these proceedings are taxed to respondent. 

Judgment accordingly. 

 MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and

LUNDBERG STRATTON,JJ., concur.