NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

__________________________ 

TASHIEK TERESSA HAWKINS, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, 

Respondent. 

__________________________ 

2011-3013 

__________________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in case no. DC0752100663-I-1. 

_________________________ 

Decided: May 11, 2011 

_________________________ 

TASHIEK TERESSA HAWKINS, of Bristow, Virginia, pro 

se. 

KATHERINE M. SMITH, Attorney, Office of the General 

Counsel, Merit Systems Protection Board, of Washington, 

DC, for respondent. With her on the brief were JAMES M.

EISENMANN, General Counsel, and KEISHA DAWN BELL, 

Deputy General Counsel. 

__________________________ 
HAWKINS v. MSPB 2

Before LOURIE, GAJARSA, and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

Tashiek Teressa Hawkins, pro se, petitions for review 

of the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board (“Board”) dismissing her appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Because we find that the adverse actions Hawkins 

alleges do not fall within the Board’s jurisdiction, we 

affirm. 

BACKGROUND

The sparse record in this case consists only of the following. On June 12, 2010, Hawkins resigned from her 

position as Unit Secretary with the Bureau of Prisons. 

On June 29, 2010, she appealed to the Board alleging that 

her resignation was involuntary, submitting the following 

statement in support of her appeal: 

First, the agency was wrong on the decision of discrimination due to the facts of condoning an 

ACTING Supervisor to harass me constantly and 

place me on [absence without leave (“AWOL”)] 

several times after being in an ACTING capacity 

for ONLY a couple of weeks. Based on my belief, 

knowledge, and the investigative report, it is obvious that I was being targeted, harassed and 

treated disparately from all other employees by an 

ACTING Supervisor who apparently had prejudice [sic] feelings and issues with me as an individual, not an employee. Prior to his ACTING 

capacity, I was an Exceedingly/Outstanding employee and did not have any other issues with 

anyone (staff or inmate) regarding job responsibilities or attendance. 
3 HAWKINS v. MSPB

Second, the agency was wrong in the decision of 

retaliation because I was constructively forced to 

resign. Based on my belief, knowledge, and the 

investigative report, it is obvious I was trying to 

maintain employment by exhausting every avenue 

possible before submitting a letter of resignation 

i.e., LWOP, FMLA, Transfer, etc. In addition, all 

of my requests to maintain employment were denied even though I expressed to many managerial 

officials that due to being placed on AWOL status 

(and other factors of the initial EEO complaint) 

and not being paid for those days I was unable to 

stay afloat of my financial obligations in [North 

Carolina] and that the only option I had was to 

move in with my family who all live in the Washington, DC metropolitan area until I could reinstate my financial stability. I was also given false 

hope that a transfer would be probably which led 

to the progression of my relocating. 

Respondent’s Appendix (“RA”) 39. Hawkins also requested a hearing before an administrative judge. 

Two days later, on July 1, 2010, the Board issued an 

Acknowledgement Order noting that the Board may lack 

jurisdiction over Hawkins’s appeal because resignation 

and retirement actions are presumed to be voluntary and, 

thus, are not appealable. The order stated that “your 

appeal will be dismissed unless you amend your petition 

to allege that your resignation or retirement was the 

result of duress, coercion, or misrepresentation by the 

agency,” and notified Hawkins that she had fifteen days 

to file evidence and argument establishing the Board’s 

jurisdiction. RA 18. On the same day, the Board issued 

an Order to Show Cause detailing the law and the relevant jurisdictional standards and tests. This order reiterated that Hawkins must submit evidence within fifteen 
HAWKINS v. MSPB 4

days.

Hawkins did not respond to the Board’s orders and 

failed to submit any evidence in support of her allegations. Accordingly, on July 29, 2010, the Board issued an 

Initial Decision dismissing Hawkins’s appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction. Hawkins v. Dep’t of Justice, MSPB Docket 

No. DC-0752-10-0663-I-1 (Initial Decision July 29, 2010) 

(“Initial Decision”). The Board found that Hawkins failed 

to submit evidence to demonstrate that her working 

conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person in 

her position would have felt compelled to resign. Id. at 5. 

As to Hawkins’s assertions about being placed on AWOL 

status, the Board found that these charges were insufficient to “support a conclusion that the employee was 

effectively deprived of free choice in the matter such that 

the employee had no alternative but to resign or retire.” 

Id. at 4 (citations omitted). Finally, the Board found that 

Hawkins was not entitled to a hearing on jurisdiction 

because she failed to make a non-frivolous allegation that 

her resignation was involuntary. Id. at 5-6. 

Hawkins did not petition for review of the Board’s Initial Decision, and it became final on September 2, 2010. 

Hawkins appealed to this court, arguing that the Board 

“did not take into account any facts,” but she did not 

identify any facts or evidence in particular. She also 

contends that the Board should have considered relief on 

the grounds of discrimination or retaliation. We construe 

these arguments as challenging the Board’s ruling that it 

lacked jurisdiction. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Board’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction 

is a question of law that we review de novo. Forest v. 

Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 47 F.3d 409, 410 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 

Because the Board dismissed Hawkins’s appeal without 
5 HAWKINS v. MSPB

affording her a jurisdictional hearing, we review the 

record de novo to determine whether Hawkins raised a 

non-frivolous allegation of jurisdiction. Coradeschi v. 

Dep't of Homeland Sec., 439 F.3d 1329, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 

2006). “Non-frivolous allegations cannot be supported by 

unsubstantiated speculation in a pleading submitted by 

petitioner.” Kahn v. Dep't of Justice, 528 F.3d 1336, 1341 

(Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Dorrall v. Dep't of the Army, 301 

F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002), overruled on other 

grounds by Garcia v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 437 

F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc)). 

DISCUSSION

The appellant bears the burden of proof to establish 

by a preponderance of evidence that the alleged action is 

within the Board’s jurisdiction. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(a)(2)(i). 

The Board has limited jurisdiction to hear appeals only 

from specific adverse actions enumerated by statute, such 

as removal, a suspension for more than fourteen days, a 

reduction in grade or pay, or a furlough of thirty days or 

less. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7701(a), 7512. The Board does not 

have jurisdiction to hear appeals from voluntary acts. See

Garcia, 437 F.3d at 1328. “Resignations are presumed 

voluntary, and the burden of showing that the resignation 

was involuntary is on the petitioner.” Terban v. Dep’t of 

Energy, 216 F.3d 1021, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 

We have adopted a three-part test for establishing involuntary coercion by an agency, which requires that an 

employee show the following: “(1) the agency effectively 

imposed the terms of the employee’s resignation or retirement; (2) the employee had no realistic alternative but 

to resign or retire; and (3) the employee’s resignation or 

retirement was the result of improper acts by the agency.” 

Garcia, 437 F.3d at 1329. The test is an objective one 

under the totality of the circumstances, requiring a show-
HAWKINS v. MSPB 6

ing that “a reasonable employee confronted with the same 

circumstance would feel coerced into resigning.” Id.

(citations omitted). Our case law demonstrates that “the 

doctrine of coercive involuntariness is a narrow one.” Id.

(citing Staats v. United States Postal Serv., 99 F.3d 1120, 

1124 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 

Applying these standards, we affirm the Board’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction over Hawkins’s appeal. 

As an initial matter, we note that the record is devoid of 

sufficient information to find that Hawkins has made a 

non-frivolous allegation of jurisdiction largely because 

Hawkins did not respond to the Board’s orders to supplement the record. Although Hawkins is proceeding pro se, 

the Board’s orders were clear and unambiguous in stating 

that it would dismiss Hawkins’s appeal unless she submitted additional argument or evidence. See Mendoza v. 

Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 966 F.2d 650, 653-54 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 

(“The court does not expect a pro se litigant to be made to 

jump through a confusing array of procedural hoops,” but 

“there was nothing mysterious or incomprehensible in the 

Show Cause Order”). The burden is on Hawkins to establish jurisdiction, and her failure to respond in the face of 

such an order, given the paucity of her original submission, substantially impairs her ability to satisfy that 

burden. 

The only evidence and argument we have from Hawkins is her initial submission in support of her appeal to 

the Board, in which she makes two assertions. First, she 

contends that she was the subject of discrimination when 

her acting supervisor targeted and harassed her, placing 

her on AWOL several times. The Board correctly concluded that a charge of AWOL, by itself, is not an appealable adverse action, as it does not fall under any of the 

types of adverse actions covered in 5 U.S.C. § 7512. In 

certain circumstances, personnel actions that remove an 
7 HAWKINS v. MSPB

employee’s duties and cause a loss in pay can be “constructive suspensions” that fall within the Board’s jurisdiction. Perez v. Merit Syst. Prot. Bd., 931 F.2d 853, 855 

(Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing Pittman v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 

832 F.2d 598 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). In this case, because 

Hawkins did not respond to the Board’s Order to Show 

Cause and Acknowledgement Order, we have no information relating to the circumstances surrounding Hawkins’s 

AWOL placements, including the reasons, terms, or 

duration of the placements. Accordingly, we cannot 

conclude that the AWOL placements in this case 

amounted to a “constructive suspension.” 

With respect to Hawkins’s claims of discrimination 

and disparate treatment, in the absence of an appealable 

adverse action, the Board has no jurisdiction to adjudicate 

discrimination claims. Garcia, 437 F.3d at 1342-43. 

Contrary to Hawkins’s contentions to this court, moreover, the Board gave her claims proper attention, noting 

that “[d]iscrimination allegations in an appeal of an 

alleged involuntary action are considered by the Board for 

the limited purpose of determining whether they support 

a finding of duress or coercion.” Initial Decision at 3 

(citations omitted). Because Hawkins did not provide any 

specific evidence or argument to demonstrate that her 

working conditions were so intolerable that a “reasonable 

employee confronted with the same circumstance would 

feel coerced into resigning,” Garcia, 437 F.3d at 1329, the 

Board correctly concluded that there was insufficient 

evidence to support such a finding. 

Hawkins’s second argument appears to be that being 

placed on AWOL status resulted in a financial hardship 

that left her no choice but to resign. Again, we lack any 

evidence or information surrounding her AWOL status to 

make any determinations based on that claim. It is also 

well established that “the fact that an employee is faced 
HAWKINS v. MSPB 8

with an unpleasant situation or that his choice is limited 

to two unattractive options does not make the employee’s 

decision any less voluntary.” Staats, 99 F.3d at 1124. 

Hawkins bears the burden of establishing that her allegations fall within the Board’s jurisdiction, and she has 

failed to meet that burden here. For the same reasons, 

the Board also correctly concluded that Hawkins was not 

entitled to a hearing on jurisdiction, as she did to present 

a non-frivolous allegation that her claim falls within the 

Board’s jurisdiction. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the decision of the 

Board dismissing Hawkins’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction 

is affirmed. 

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs. 

AFFIRMED