alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE

F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER ON M OTION

November 7, 2008 Revision Cause number: 01

- 1 3

- 0 0 900

- C R

Style: Raymond Lee Cavitt

v The State of Texas

Date motion filed * : April 16 , 201 4

Type of motion: Motion for extension of time to file appellant’s brief

Party filing motion: Appellant

Document to be filed: Appellant ’s brief

If motion to extend time:

Original due date: February 3, 2014

Number of extensions granted: 2 Current Due date: April 21 , 2014

Date Requested: May 6 , 2014

Ordered that motion is:

 Granted

If document is to be filed, document due: May 6 , 2014

 No further extensions of time will be granted

 Denied

 Dismissed ( e.g. , want of jurisdiction, moot )

 Other: _____________________________________

The motion is granted. Appellant’s brief shall be filed no later than May 6, 2014.

No further extensions of time for the filing of appellant’s brief will be granted.

Judge's signature: /s/ Sherry Radack



Panel consists of

____________________________________________

Date: April 2 2 , 2014
I 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1610 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to reduce the tax on beer 

to its pre-1991 level. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 20, 2007 

Mr. POMEROY (for himself and Mr. ENGLISH of Pennsylvania) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to reduce 

the tax on beer to its pre-1991 level. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. REPEAL OF 1990 TAX INCREASE ON BEER. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Paragraph (1) of section 5051(a) 

5 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to imposi6 tion and rate of tax on beer) is amended by striking ‘‘$18’’ 

7 and inserting ‘‘$9’’. 


rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with BILLS
2 

•HR 1610 IH

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

2 subsection (a) shall take effect on the date of the enact3 ment of this Act. 

Æ 


rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with BILLS
#### H. *&*T. C. R’y Co. v. A. Simon.

(No. 1526.)

Appeal from Washington County.

Opinion by

Will-son, J.

§ 99. *Certiorari; petition for must show want of jurisdiction, or that injustice has been done without fault of applicant; petition held insufficient.*This suit was originally brought in justice’s court by appellee to recover of appellant $116.83, the alleged value of a box of goods alleged to have been shipped over appellant’s road from Brenham, Texas, to A. Zekind, at Hastings, Minnesota. Appellant pleaded general denial, and specially that the box of goods had been delivered at the place of destination. In justice’s court judgment was rendered against appellant in favor of appellee for the amount sued for, interest and cost. Appellant brought the case before the county court by *certiorari.*Upon motion of appellee the *certiorari*was dismissed, and judgment for costs was rendered against appellant, and that a writ *oí procedendo*issue commanding the justice of the peace to enforce the judgment of his court, etc.

We are of the opinion that the court did not err in sustaining the motion to dismiss the *certiorari.*It is pro*81videcl by statute that, “in order to constitute a sufficient cause (for *certiorari),*the facts stated must show either that the justice of the peace had not jurisdiction, or that injustice was done to the applicant by the final determination of the suit or proceeding, and that such injustice was not caused by his own inexcusable neglect.” [R. S. art. 303.] It is not pretended in this case that the justice’s court was without jurisdiction to render the judgment. As the only cause for *certiorari*it is alleged that at the time of the trial the box of goods, the value of which was sued for, had been delivered at Hastings, Minnesota, the place to which they had been shipped. It is not alleged, however, that this fact was proved or attempted to be proved on the trial before the justice of the peace, nor is any reason shown why appellant’ did not *then*make proof of the fact. Appellant had pleaded a delivery of the goods, and, to make good this defense, of course the fact would have to be proved, and the burden of producing such proof devolved upon appellant. Failing to produce such proof, of course this defense failed, and there was no error in the judgment of the justice, if appellee proved his cause of action and the value of the goods, and it is not claimed that he failed to do this. If appellant went to trial without evidence to prove its defense,, it was a neglect of its own of which it cannot be heard to complain. We think the petition fails to show that injustice has been done appellant by the judgment of the justice, or that, if any injustice has been so done it, the same was not caused by its own inexcusable neglect. A party is not entitled to have a *certiorari*on account of any matter of which he might have availed himself before the justice, but which, without any apparent excuse, he neglected to urge. TW. & W. Con. Rep. § 853.]

January 23, 1884.

Affirmed.
#### Phillip CHAFETZ, Appellant, v. UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD’S LONDON, Appellee.

No. 20859

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

May 13, 1964.

Eugene C. Heiman, Philip Bloom, Myers, Heiman & Kaplan, Phillip Chafetz, Miami, Fla., (Eugene C. Heiman, Miami, Fla., of counsel), for appellant.

George J. Baya, Miami, Fla., for appellee.

Before RIVES, BELL and WRIGHT* Circuit Judges.

*

 Of the D.C.Circuit, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal is by the plaintiff in a suit on a fire insurance policy from a judgment entered on a jury verdict adverse to him. There was sufficient evidence to warrant the submission to the jury of the defense based on the allegation that the fire was of an incendiary origin, and of appellant’s connection thereto. Moreover, there was no error in the charge to the jury, considering it as a whole, with respect to the standard of proof applicable to this defense. Cf. Hanover Fire Insurance Co. of N. Y. v. Argo, 5 Cir., 1958, 251 F.2d 80.

Affirmed.
No. 13,317.

#### The Western Union Telegraph Company *v.*Jones.

Telegbaph *Company.*— Negligence.—Penalty.—Under the act of 1885 a telegraph company is not liable for the penalty prescribed therein where the only wrong proved is a negligent one.

*Same.*— Special *Finding.*— Presumption.—In an action to recover a penalty imposed by law, it can not be presumed, in aid of a special finding, that the defendant violated the law; the presumption is that the law was obeyed.

From the Bartholomew Circuit Court.

*J. E. McDonald, J. M. Butler*and *A. L. Mason,*for appellant.

*G. W. Cooper*and *G. B. Cooper,*for appellee.

*362Filed Nov. 15, 1888.

Elliott, J.

The facts stated by the court and the conclusions of law drawn by it, very clearly show that the appellant was held liable for the statutory penalty because it negligently failed to deliver a telegram sent by the appellee to Samuel Jones. There is no finding of bad faith or partiality, and none can be presumed.

It is quite clear that, in an action to recover a penalty imposed by law, it can not be presumed, in aid of a special finding, that the defendant violated the law; on the contrary, the presumption is that the law was obeyed and the statutory duty performed. The case must, therefore, be regarded as. one of negligence only, and the question is whether, under the act of 1885, a telegraph company can be made to pay the penalty prescribed by that act where the only wrong proved is a negligent one. This question is settled against the appellee by the decisions of this court. *Western U. Tel. Co.*v. *Swain,*109 Ind. 405; *Western U. Tel. Co.*v. *Steele,*108 Ind. 163.

It is to be remembered that the right to a penalty is purely a statutory one, and a penalty is only recoverable in the cases prescribed by the statute. It is also to be remembered that a penal statute can not be extended by construction. It follows, therefore, that unless a statute clearly gives the right to a penalty none exists. As the act of 1885 does not prescribe a penalty for a negligent breach of duty, no penalty can be recovered. *We*are not, it may not be improper to remark, dealing with a claim for damages, but with a claim to a statutory penalty.

Judgment reversed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              MAR-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-1997
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<SECURITIES>                                   1,000,000
<RECEIVABLES>                                  1,044,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                           0
<INVENTORY>                                      856,054
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               3,323,717
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<DEPRECIATION>                                 1,306,514
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 2,242,368
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          6,250,242
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   6,250,242
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               1,318,512
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                27,754
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (398,030)
<INCOME-TAX>                                      (1,741)
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</TABLE>
NUMBER 13

- 13

- 00 370

- C R



### COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI

- EDINBURG

____________________________________________________________

ANTONIO DEALLEN DEAN

, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

, Appellee.

____________________________________________________________

On a ppeal from the 199 th District Court

of Collin County, Texas.

____________________________________________________________



### ORDER

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Garza and Benavides

Order Per Curiam

This Court has received the appellate record with the exception of Exhibit Nos. 8,

9, and 11

. The clerk of the trial court is ORDERED to forward Exhibit Nos. 8, 9, and 11

admitted at trial in Cause No. 199

- 82063

- 2012 to this Court within ten days from the date

of this order

.2

IT IS SO ORDERED.

PER CURIAM

Do not publish.

See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 47.2(b).

D elivered and filed the

1st day of Ju ly , 201 5

.
#### Steven NIEDERKORN, Appellant, v. Melissa TRIVINO, Appellee.

No. 5D10-3009.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Sept. 2, 2011.

Robert L. Sirianni, Jr. and Paetra T. Brownlee of Brownstone, P.A., Winter Park, for Appellant.

No Appearance for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Mr. Steven Niederkorn timely appeals the denial of his petition for injunction for protection against dating violence. Both he and the Appellee, Melissa Trivino, filed petitions for protection against dating violence arising out of the same incident. At the trial on the merits of both parties’ claims, Mr. Niederkorn advised the court that he had no objection to the entry of Ms. Trivino’s injunction against him. Ms. Trivino, however, objected to an injunction being entered against her, and the case proceeded to an evidentiary hearing.

During the hearing, Mr. Niederkorn testified as to the events that occurred. The court then asked Ms. Trivino if she had any questions for Mr. Niederkorn. She had no substantive questions for him. The court then called Ms. Trivino as a witness and examined her as to the events that had occurred and did not permit Mr. Nied-erkorn to cross-examine her. The court then called Ms. Trivino’s sister to testify as to the events that occurred and again did not permit Mr. Niederkorn to cross-examine the witness. After the testimony of Ms. Trivino’s sister, the court denied Mr. Niederkorn’s injunction. It is from that order that Mr. Niederkorn appeals.

This court has dealt with this subject in the past. We recognize that trial courts are pressed for time and that typically on a domestic violence hearing day there are *992numerous hearings that need to be heard. As a result, trial courts tend to move them along quickly and expeditiously and sometimes by doing so deny litigants fundamental due process.

In this case, Mr. Niederkorn was entitled to a full evidentiary hearing which includes direct examination of witnesses, cross-examination of witnesses, and the presentation of any other evidence. He was denied that right. *See Ohrn v. Wright,*963 So.2d 298 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); *see also Pope v. Pope,*901 So.2d 352 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). The final judgment denying Mr. Niederkorn’s petition for protection against dating violence is reversed, and the case is remanded for a full eviden-tiary hearing in accordance with section 741.30(5)(c), Florida Statutes.

REVERSED and REMANDED for full evidentiary hearing.

TORPY, EVANDER and JACOBUS, JJ., concur.
#### Kevin L. HALL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D10-6473.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Feb. 17, 2011.

Kevin L. Hall, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. *See Edwards v. State,*36 Fla. L. Weekly D216 (Fla. 1st DCA Feb. 4, 2011).

KAHN, DAVIS, and HAWKES, JJ., concur.
# Fourth Court of Appeals **San Antonio, Texas** JUDG MENT Nos. 04 - 13 - 00222 - CR, 04 - 13 - 000223 - CR, 04 - 13 - 000224 - CR & 04 - 13 - 000225 - CR Francisco R. HERNANDEZ , Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee From the 227th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court Nos. 2010CR0819, 2011CR2469, 2012CR2586 & 2012CR3718A Honorable Philip A. Kazen, Jr., Judge Presiding BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE STONE , JUSTICE ANGELINI , AND JUSTICE MARION In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, these appeals are DISMISSED. SIGNED May 22, 2013.

_________________________________ Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
I 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1631 

To amend section 245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act to eliminate 

the deadline for classification petition and labor certification filings. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 21, 2007 

Mr. RANGEL introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend section 245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality 

Act to eliminate the deadline for classification petition 

and labor certification filings. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. ELIMINATION OF DEADLINE. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 245(i)(1) of the Immigra5 tion and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1255(i)(1)) is amend6 ed— 

7 (1) in subparagraph (A), by adding ‘‘and’’ at 

8 the end; 

9 (2) in subparagraph (B)— 

mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with BILLS

2 

•HR 1631 IH

1 (A) in clause (i), by striking ‘‘204 that’’ 

2 and all that follows through the semicolon and 

3 inserting ‘‘204;’’; and 

4 (B) in clause (ii), by striking 

5 ‘‘212(a)(5)(A) that’’ and all that follows 

6 through ‘‘and’’ at the end and inserting 

7 ‘‘212(a)(5)(A);’’; and 

8 (3) by striking subparagraph (C). 

9 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

10 subsection (a) shall take effect as if included in the enact11 ment of the Legal Immigration Family Equity Act (as en12 acted into law by Public Law 106–553). 

Æ 

mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with BILLS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Nos. 11-3440/12-1027/12-1936

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

 Petitioner

1199 SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST, N.J. REGION,

 Intervenor

v.

NEW VISTA NURSING AND REHABILITATION,

 Respondent

SUR PETITION FOR PANEL REHEARING

_______________________

Before: SMITH, GREENAWAY, Jr., and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges

________________________

AND NOW, upon consideration of the petition for rehearing, the supplement to the 

petition, and the answer filed by New Vista, it is hereby ORDERED that the NLRB’s 

petition for rehearing before the original panel is GRANTED.

By the Court,

s/ D. Brooks Smith

Circuit Judge

Dated: August 11, 2014

Tmk/cc: all counsel of record
EXHIBIT 31.2
                            SECTION 302 CERTIFICATION



<PAGE>


                                 CERTIFICATIONS

I, John Melnyk, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10K of Industrial Minerals, Inc.;

2.  Based on my  knowledge,  this  annual  report  does not  contain  any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact  necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the  circumstances  under which such statements
were made,  not  misleading  with  respect to the period  covered by this annual
report;

3.  Based  on my  knowledge,  the  financial  statements,  and  other  financial
information  included  in this annual  report,  fairly  present in all  material
respects the financial  condition,  results of operations  and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;

4.  The  registrant's  other  certifying  officers  and  I are  responsible  for
establishing and maintaining  disclosure  controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have:

         a) designed  such  disclosure  controls and  procedures  to ensure that
material  information  relating to the  registrant,  including its  consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,  particularly
during the period in which this annual report is being prepared;

         b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's  disclosure controls
and  procedures  as of a date  within 90 days prior to the  filing  date of this
annual report (the "Evaluation Date"); and

         c)  presented  in  this  annual  report  our   conclusions   about  the
effectiveness of the disclosure  controls and procedures based on our evaluation
as of the Evaluation Date;

5. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation,  to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of
registrant's   board  of  directors  (or  persons   performing   the  equivalent
functions):

         a) all significant  deficiencies in the design or operation of internal
controls  which  could  adversely  affect  the  registrant's  ability to record,
process,  summarize  and  report  financial  data  and have  identified  for the
registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and

         b) any fraud whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls; and



<PAGE>


6. The  registrant's  other  certifying  officers  and I have  indicated in this
annual report whether there were significant  changes in internal controls or in
other factors that could  significantly  affect internal controls  subsequent to
the date of our most recent  evaluation,  including any corrective  actions with
regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.

Date: March 16, 2005

/s/John Melnyk
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Melnyk, Chief Financial Officer, Secretary/Treasurer and Director
#### STATE ex rel. Gary WILSON v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-0545.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 4, 2011.

In re Wilson, Gary; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. L, No. 453-109; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-K-1732.

*467Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 980.3; *State ex rel. Melinie v. State,*93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.
#### James MARTIN, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 3D10-692.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Feb. 16, 2011.

Rehearing Denied March 10, 2011.

James Martin, in proper person.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Heidi Milan Caballero, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.

Before RAMIREZ, C.J., and GERSTEN and SHEPHERD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

James Martin petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus raising various claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. We conclude that all claims, except claim one, are procedurally barred as successive and/or because they previously were raised on direct appeal. *See Allen v. State,*917 So.2d 906 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). Accordingly, we deny the petition as to these claims. Further, we deny the petition with regard to claim one without prejudice to petitioner’s right to file a motion to correct a scrivener’s error in the sentence or the trial court’s right to correct the sentence on its own motion.

Petition denied.
#### A STOP PAIN MANAGEMENT, LLC, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Respondent.

No. 1D11-1070.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 15, 2011.

*433Anthony Vitale and Jon May, Miami, for Petitioner.

Mark Graham Hanson, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Health, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition for review of non-final administrative action is denied on the merits.

WOLF, WEBSTER, and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 23.1

            CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM


We consent to the  incorporation by reference in the  Registration  Statement on
Form S-8 (No 333-27555)  pertaining to the 1997 Stock  Incentive Plan of Journal
Register  Company of our  reports  dated  March 25,  2005,  with  respect to the
consolidated  financial  statements  and schedule of Journal  Register  Company,
Journal  Register  Company  management's  assessment  of  the  effectiveness  of
internal  control over financial  reporting,  and the  effectiveness of internal
control over financial  reporting of Journal Register  Company,  included in the
Annual  Report  (Form  10-K) of  Journal  Register  Company  for the year  ended
December 26, 2004.




                                                           /s/ ERNST & YOUNG LLP


MetroPark, New Jersey
March 25, 2005