alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C o u rt o f

A p p ea ls

o f t h e S t a te o f

G eo rg ia

ATLANTA,_

_ _ __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _
Th e Co u rt

o f Ap p ea l s h er eb y p a s s es t h e f

o ll owi n g o r der :

A2 2 A0 94 9 . I N THE I NTEREST OF O. M., A CHI LD (MOTHER).

Th e Ap p el l an t i n t h e ab ov e-s t y l ed cas e h as fi l ed a m o t i o n en t i t l ed M o t i o n To
Di s m i s s

. Th e Co u rt co n s tru es t h i s as a m o t i o n t o w i t hd raw t he ap p eal pu rs u an t to
Co u rt Ru l e 4 1 (g )(1 ). Sai d m o t i o n i s h ereb y GRANTED.

C o u r t o f A p p e a l s o f t h e S t a t e o

f G e o r g ia C le r k ’ s O f f i c e , A t la n t a ,

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I c e r ti fy t h a t t h e a b o v e i s a t r u e e x t r a c t f r o m
t h e m i n u t e s o

f t h e C o u r t o

f A p p e a l s o f G e o r g i a

. W i t n e s s m y s i g n a t u r e a n d th e s e a l o

f s a i d c o u r t h e r e t o a f f i x e d t h e d a y a n d y e a r l a s t a b o v e w r i t t e n

.

, C l e r k

. 

## February 22, 2022

02/22/2022
#### Veronica BOWMAN and Gregory Bowman v. The RIVERSIDE COURT CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION PHASE II, INC., Air Conditioning Ambulance Service, Inc., and Eustis Insurance, Inc.

No. 2011-CC-1836.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 14, 2011.

In re Air Conditioning Ambulance Service Inc.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 678-619; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-C-671.

Granted and remanded to court of appeal for briefing, argument, and opinion.
#### Reichstatter & Hanna v. W. L. Hall and Padgitt Bros.

(No. 2847.)

Appeal from Dallas County.

*(Transferred from, Austin.)*

Shepard & Miller, counsel for appellants.

Wright & Wright, counsel for appellees.

Opinion by

White, P. J.

§ 416. *Failure yf consideration of a note; liability of payee in, to maker of; case stated.*One Maxwell was indebted to Padgitt Bros. $385.65. Padgitt Bros, agreed that if appellants would sign Maxwell’s note for said indebtedness, said note to be made payable when convenient, they, Padgitt Bros., would sell Maxwell more goods. Said note was executed by Maxwell, and signed also by *489appellants, and made payable to Padgitt Bros, eight months after date. Said note was received by Padgitt Bros., but they wrote to appellants that it was not satisfactory, as the payment thereof was deferred for too long a time, but that they would be satisfied with a note payable ninety days from date. Appellants declined to execute another note and demanded of Padgitt Bros, the return of the note they had executed, but Padgitt Bros, had sold and delivered said note to appellee Hall and could not return it. Padgitt Bros, did not let Maxwell have any goods in consideration of said note. Hall, who had purchased said note, instituted this suit thereon against the makers, and against Padgitt Bros., the indorsers thereof. Appellants pleaded and proved the facts as above stated, and prayed for judgment over against Padgitt Bros, in case Hall recovered against appellants. Judgment was rendered in favor of Hall against all the defendants for the amount of said note and costs; in favor of Reichstatter & Hanna against Maxwell for the same amount; and in favor of Padgitt Bros, against all the makers of said note for the same amount. *Held:*In so far as appellants are concerned, the consideration of said note had failed, and they were not bound upon said note to Padgitt Bros, after the latter had declined to accept it and the former had demanded its return to them. It then became théir property, and was no longer the property of Padgitt Bros. But the latter having transferred it before maturity, appellants were bound upon it to Hall, he being an innocent purchaser thereof for value, without notice of any defense thereto. The proposition is elementary that, when the consideration for which a note sued on was given has wholly failed, there can be no recovery had on it; but if the note has been transferred to a third party for value, before maturity, and without notice to him of the failure of consideration, the maker of such note is liable thereon, but is entitled to judgment over against the payee for the amount thereof. In this case appellants *490were entitled to a judgment over against Padgitt Bros, for the amount of said note and costs.

December 5, 1888.

Reversed and remanded.
#### STATE ex rel. Anthony DONALDSON v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-0160.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 7, 2011.

In re Donaldson, Anthony; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 244559; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KW 1846.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATIONS

The undersigned, as the Chief Executive Officer of Valley Financial Corporation,
certifies that the Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2008, which accompanies this certification, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the
information contained in the periodic report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Valley Financial Corporation at the dates and for the periods indicated. The foregoing certification is made
solely for purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United States Code and is subject to the knowledge and willfulness qualifications contained in Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350(c).

Dated: November 13, 2008



/s/ Ellis L. GutshallChief Executive Officer
|                                   |   |                   |         | Exhibit      21 |
|----------------------------------------|--------|------------------------|--------------|-----------------|
|                                   |   |                   |         |            |
|                                   |   |                   |         |            |
|                                   |   |                   |         |            |
| SOUTH      JERSEY GAS COMPANY          |
| SUBSIDIARIES      OF REGISTRANT        |
| AS      OF DECEMBER 31, 2008           |
|                                   |   |                   |         |            |
|                                   |   |                   |         |            |
|                                   |   |                   |         |            |
|                                   |   | Percentage      of     |         |            |
|                                   |   | Voting      Securities |         | State      of   |
|                                   |   | Owned      by Parent   | Relationship | Incorporation   |
|                                   |   |                   |         |            |
| South      Jersey Gas Company          |   | Registrant             | Parent       | New      Jersey |
|                                   |   |                   |         |            |
| SJG      Capital Trust                 |   | 100                    | Subsidiary   | Delaware        |
| (inactive      as of November 5, 2003) |   |                   |         |            |
|                                   |   |                   |         |            |

----
#### N. N. CAPILI, Appellant, v. Ned SHOTT, B. L. Jackson, Jr.; E. G. Watkins; A. D. Coppinger, Sr.; H. Edward Steele; Bluefield Municipal Building Commission; Douglas M. Parker; American Medicorp Management Services, Inc.; David H. Gatherum; Thomas Mathew; Edward H. Bowles; and Bluefield Anesthesia Associates, Appellees.

No. 78-1568.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued Dec. 3, 1979.

Decided April 14, 1980.

*439Paul S. Hudgins, Bluefield, W.Va., for appellant.

J. W. Feuchtenberger, Bluefield, W.Va. (Kwass, Stone, McGhee & Feuchtenberger, Bluefield, W.Va., on brief), Guy W. Perkins, Bluefield, W.Va. (Katz, Kantor, Katz, Perkins & Cameron, Bluefield, W.Va., Richard L. Hirshberg, Washington, D.C., on brief), for appellees.

Before PHILLIPS and SPROUSE, Circuit Judges, and HOFFMAN, District Judge.*

*

 Honorable Walter E. Hoffman, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Capili, a physician, brought this action seeking injunctive relief and monetary damages after he was denied anesthesiology privileges at a public hospital because the hospital’s governing body elected to enter into a contract granting a professional medical corporation the exclusive right to provide anesthesiology services at the hospital. Capili, who specializes in anesthesiology, contended below as he does here that the defendants’ refusal to grant him such privileges based on that exclusive contract constitutes a violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1*et seq.,*and violates his civil rights as protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The district court dismissed the antitrust claim upon defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion. It held that Capili’s factual allegation could not support plaintiff’s contention that interstate commerce was “substantially affected.”

Thereafter, the district court, following a hearing on the merits of the remaining § 1983 claim, granted defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 41(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court concluded that the question of whether the governing body of a public hospital can constitutionally treat physicians differently is governed by the traditional rational basis inquiry. The Court went on to find the defendants’ actions in entering into the exclusive contract, which provided for anesthesiology services on a 24-hour-per-day, 7-day-per-week basis, was reasonable and justified by the community’s and hospital’s needs. The requirements for provision of proper care and services to surgical patients formed a rational basis for the exclusive contract decision.

We have examined the record and considered the written and oral arguments, and are of the opinion that the district court’s judgment is fully supported by the law and the evidence. We, therefore, affirm.

*AFFIRMED.*
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATIONS

The undersigned, as the Chief Executive Officer of Valley Financial Corporation,
certify that the Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2007, which accompanies this certification, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information
contained in the periodic report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Valley Financial Corporation at the dates and for the periods indicated. The foregoing certification is made solely for
purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United States Code and is subject to the knowledge and willfulness qualifications contained in Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350(c).

Dated: August 10, 2007



/s/ Ellis L. GutshallChief Executive Officer




43
#### Robert P. SHOLES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION and Secure Environmental Electronics, Appellees.

No. 4D10-2218.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Feb. 2, 2011.

Robert P. Sholes, Plant City, pro se.

M. Elaine Howard, Deputy General Counsel, for appellee, State of Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission.

PER CURIAM.

*Affirmed. See Hernandez v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n,*28 So.3d 824 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2009).

GROSS, C.J., MAY and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.
No. 11,498.

#### The Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Railway Company *v.*Argenbright.

*Baiuroad.*— Killing *Slock.*— Complaint *before Justice of the Peace.*— In an action under the statute, before a justice of the peace, against a railroad company for killing stock, a complaint is not bad for failure to allege that the road was not fenced where the animal entered upon the track; nor for failure to show by direct averment that the plaintiff was damaged, or that the damages are due and unpaid, where the value of the stock killed is alleged-

From the Floyd Circuit Court.

*A. Dowling,*for appellant.

*G. B. Cardwill,*for appellee.

Hammond, J.

Action by the appellee to recover damages-for killing her cow by the appellant’s locomotive. It is averred that the railroad was not fenced where the animal was killed, but there is no averment that it was not fenced at the point where it entered upon the track. The latter allegation is essential in cases commenced in the circuit court, but as to cases like the present, begun before a justice of the. peace, the complaint is good without such averment. *Ohio, etc., R. W. Co.*v. *Miller,*46 Ind. 215; *Ohio, etc., R. W. Co.*v. *McClure,*47 Ind. 317; *Wabash R. W. Co.*v. *Forshee,*77 Ind. 158; *Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co.*v. *Sims,*92 Ind. 496.

It is also objected to the complaint,that it “did not aver that the plaintiff was damaged by the killing of the cow, nor that any damages were due, nor that they were unpaid.” It is alleged that the animal was of the value of one hundred dollars and was killed. This shows that the plaintiff was damaged, and, in such case, the direct charge that the injury was to the plaintiff’s damage, etc., is not essential. *Kent*v. *Cantrall,*44 Ind. 452.

The rule that a complaint, based upon contract, must allege directly, or show by necessary inference, that the plaintiff’s claim is due and unpaid, does not apply to an action for tort. The appellee recovered judgment in the court below, *255to which the appellant had appealed from the justice, in the sum of one hundred dollars. It is claimed this was excessive. If we were governed by the weight of evidence as it appears in the record, we would probably have to say that the cow was not worth more than seventy-five dollars.' There was, however, evidence tending to show that she was worth one hundred, and even one hundred and fifty dollars; and we can not, therefore, under well established rules of practice, reverse the judgment on account of the amount of the recovery.

Filed Nov. 14, 1884.

■ The learned counsel for the appellant, in urging that the evidence fails to show that the railroad was not fenced at the point at which the animal entered upon it, has inadvertently overlooked the testimony of one of the appellee’s witnesses, who testified clearly and explicitly that the railroad was not fenced at that place.

The record discloses no error. Affirmed, with costs.
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

 

**Certifications Under Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

JohnR. Lyon and Howard Sampson hereby certify that:

 

1.               Theyare the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer, respectively, ofVista Medical Technologies Inc. 

 

2.               The Form 10-K/A report of Vista MedicalTechnologies Inc. that this certification accompanies fully complies with therequirements of section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 

 

3.               The information contained in the Form10-K/A report of Vista Medical Technologies Inc. that this certificationaccompanies fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial conditionand results of operations of Vista Medical Technologies Inc. 

 

Dated: August 6, 2004

 

 

| /s/ John R. Lyon   |   |
|--------------------|--------|
| **John R. Lyon**   |   |
|               |   |
|               |   |
| /s/ Howard Sampson |   |
| **Howard Sampson** |   |

 

----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

WESTERN DISTRICT 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

 Respondent 

 v. 

JAMES CLAYTON GRACE, 

 Petitioner 

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 413 WAL 2015 

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court 

ORDER 

PER CURIAM 

AND NOW, this 30th day of March, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED. 

Justice Donohue did not participate in the decision of this matter.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Defense

###### Office of the Secretary

# AGENCY:

Defense Information Systems Agency, DoD.

# ACTION:

Notice.

# SUMMARY:

This notice announces the appointment of the members of the Performance Review Board (PRB) of the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). The publication of PRB membership is required by 5 U.S.C. 4314(C)(4).

# DATES:

Effective October 1, 2010.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Rebecca Polansky, DISA SES Program Manager, Defense Information Systems Agency, Arlington, Virginia, (703) 607-4411.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

The Performance Review Board (PRB) provides fair and impartial review of Senior Executive Service performance appraisals and makes recommendations regarding performance ratings and performance scores to the Director, DISA.

In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 4314(C)(4), the following executives are appointed to the Defense Information Systems Agency PRB:

Major General Ronnie D. Hawkins, Jr., USAF,

John J. Penkoske,

Anthony S. Montemarano,

Paige R. Atkins.
      ( print page 60091)    
Executives listed will serve a one-year renewable term, effective October 1, 2010.

Dated: September 24, 2010.

Mitchell S. Bryman,

Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.

[FR Doc. 2010-24428 Filed 9-28-10; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 5001-06-P
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 188 (Wednesday, September 29, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 60125]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-24401]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM


Change in Bank Control Notices; Acquisition of Shares of Bank or 
Bank Holding Companies

    The notificants listed below have applied under the Change in Bank 
Control Act (12 U.S.C. 1817(j)) and Sec. [thinsp]225.41 of the Board's 
Regulation Y (12 CFR 225.41) to acquire a bank or bank holding company. 
The factors that are considered in acting on the notices are set forth 
in paragraph 7 of the Act (12 U.S.C. 1817(j)(7)).
    The notices are available for immediate inspection at the Federal 
Reserve Bank indicated. The notices also will be available for 
inspection at the office of the Board of Governors. Interested persons 
may express their views in writing to the Reserve Bank indicated for 
that notice or to the offices of the Board of Governors. Comments must 
be received not later than October 14, 2010.
    A. Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (Michael E. Collins, Senior 
Vice President) 100 North 6th Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19105-
1521:
    1. The George W. Connell Revocable Trust, Radnor, Pennsylvania; to 
acquire voting shares of Drexel Morgan & Co., and thereby indirectly 
acquire voting shares of The Haverford Trust Company, both of Radnor, 
Pennsylvania.

    Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, September 24, 
2010.
Jennifer J. Johnson,
Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. 2010-24401 Filed 9-28-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6210-01-S
Exhibit 31.1

Sarbanes - Oxley Section 302 Certification

I, Thomas J. May, certify that:



|1. | I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K/A of NSTAR;
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------



|2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                     |  |  |  |     |  |                                                
|-------------------- |  |  |  | --- |  | -----------------------------------------------
|Date: April 29, 2011 |  |  |  | By: |  | /s/ THOMAS J. MAY                              
|                     |  |  |  |     |  | Thomas J. May                                  
|                     |  |  |  |     |  | Chairman, President and
Chief Executive Officer
No. 11,656.

#### Ammerman et al. *v.*The State, ex rel. Wasson, Auditor.

*Judgment.*— Motion *to Set Aside Default.*— Diligence.—Where there is a delay of seventeen mouths before moving to set aside a default under section 396, R. S. 1881, and when on the hearing of the motion it appears that the default was taken, not in consequence of the excusable neglect of the party, but because he had determined not to make a defence to the action, the motion is properly overruled.

From the Montgomery .Circuit Court.

*T. E. Ballard*and *M. E. Clodfelter,*for appellants.

*W. H. Thompson, M. Thompson*and *W. B. Herod,*for appellee.

Bicknell, C. C.

The appellants filed a written motion to set aside a default and a judgment taken against them in a foreclosure suit.

The motion was heard upon affidavits and oral testimony, and judgment was rendered against the appellants, overruling the motion with costs. The question presented by the assignment of errors is, ought the default and judgment to have been set aside ?

The statute, R. S. 1881, section 396, requires the court to grant relief upon such a motion, filed within two years, where the judgment has been taken through mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.

The default was entered on December 6th, 1881. The judgment was rendered on May 25th, 1882. The motion *166was filed on November 28th, 1883, after a delay of nearly seventeen months.

Filed Oct. 31, 1884.

In the foreclosure suit the appellants were duly served with process. The motion was duly verified; it stated a meritorious cause of defence, and alleged, as excusable negligence on the part of the appellants, that after being notified of the commencement of the foreclosure suit, they employed an attorney to defend it, who, shortly after such employment, fell dangerously sick and became unable to attend to legal business and so remained until.long after said default was taken and said judgment rendered.

The motion, taken by itself, might have been regarded as sufficient, but, except in its statement of a meritorious defence, it must be considered in connection with the other evidence given at the hearing.

There was evidence tending to show that the appellants were fully apprised of the nature of the foreclosure suit, and that the default was taken against them, not in consequence of their excusable neglect, or of such neglect upon the part of their attorney, but because they had determined not to make any defence to the suit for the reason that their interest in the land mortgaged would not warrant it. The testimony, taken in connection with the fact that the appellants, without any excuse for the delay, waited nearly seventeen months before filing their motion, tends to sustain the finding of the court below. *Birch*v. *Frantz,*77 Ind. 199.

Therefore the judgment ought to be affirmed.

Pee Cueiam. — It is therefore ordered, on the foregoing opinion, that the judgment of the court below be and the same is hereby in all things affirmed, at the costs of the appellants.