Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-251| January 31, 2024 Page 1 of 13

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Joseph N. Williams

Williams & Piatt, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

David G. Field

Gaius G. Webb 

Schultz & Pogue, LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Amanda Ping,

Appellant-Plaintiff

v.

Margaret Inman, M.D.,

Appellee-Defendant.

January 31, 2024

Court of Appeals Case No.

23A-CT-251

Appeal from the Marion Superior

Court

The Honorable Kurt M. Eisgruber, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49D06-2006-CT-20070

Opinion by Judge Pyle

Judges Vaidik and Tavitas concur.

Pyle, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-251| January 31, 2024 Page 2 of 13

Statement of the Case

[1] In this medical malpractice case, Amanda Ping (“Ping”) appeals following a 

jury verdict in favor of Margaret Inman, M.D. (“Dr. Inman”). Ping challenges 

the trial court’s denial of her motion to correct error based on juror misconduct. 

Ping argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her request 

for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing on her juror misconduct claim. 

Concluding that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her request 

for an evidentiary hearing, we reverse and remand with instructions to hold an 

evidentiary hearing on the issue of juror misconduct. 

[2] We reverse and remand with instructions.

Issue

Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Ping’s 

motion to correct error based on juror misconduct. 

Facts

[3] Ping was a patient of Dr. Inman, and Dr. Inman performed an exploratory 

laparoscopy on Ping. In 2017, Ping filed a proposed medical malpractice 

complaint with the Indiana Department of Insurance pursuant to the Indiana 

Medical Malpractice Act. In her complaint, Ping alleged that Dr. Inman had 

committed medical malpractice when Dr. Inman had sewn Ping’s vaginal cuff 

to her bladder during her exploratory laparoscopy. In 2020, a medical review 

panel found no medical malpractice, and Ping filed her suit with the trial court.
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[4] In November 2022, the trial court held a jury trial. Ping presented four experts 

to testify during her case. These experts were Aaron Ludwig, M.D. (“Dr. 

Ludwig”), Mark Kappelman, M.D. (“Dr. Kappelman”), Samuel Feinberg, 

M.D. (“Dr. Feinberg”), and Maret Cline, M.D. (“Dr. Cline”). Dr. Inman 

presented two experts to testify in her defense, Jocelyn Logan, M.D. (“Dr. 

Logan”) and William Cheadle, M.D. (“Dr. Cheadle”).

[5] During voir dire, the trial court read the names of the expert witnesses for both 

the plaintiff and the defendant. While reading the names, the following 

exchange occurred between Juror 11 (“Juror 11”) and the trial court:

THE COURT: . . . Does anyone recognize any of those names? 

You do? And that –

[Juror 11]: Aaron Ludwig.

THE COURT: You recognize?

[Juror 11]: Dr. Aaron Ludwig.

THE COURT: Dr. Aaron Ludwig. And I’m sorry, your name?

[Juror 11]: [C.B.]

THE COURT: [C.B.] Okay.

[Juror 11]: And who was the first [name]? There was a third 

person after him, too?
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THE COURT: There was another name you –

[Juror 11]: Yeah. Right after Dr. Aaron Ludwig?

THE COURT: Dr. Kappelman?

[Juror 11]: No.

THE COURT: Dr. Fineberg?

[Juror 11]: No.

THE COURT: Dr. Maret Cline?

[Juror 11]: Yes.

THE COURT: You know her too?

[Juror 11]: Know of her, yes.

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 17-18). Juror 11 did not acknowledge that she recognized Dr. 

Cheadle.

[6] Later during voir dire, the prospective jurors were asked about having any 

background in the medical field. Juror 11 explained that she worked as a 

medical device vendor. Juror 11 further explained that she worked closely with 

“nurses, physicians, mainly in breast surgery and breast oncology.” (Tr. Vol. 2 

at 25). After she disclosed this information, the following exchange occurred 

between Ping’s counsel and Juror 11:
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[Ping’s Counsel]: Thank you. So I take it – do you actually go in 

and meet with doctors and nurses, [and] both sell and then also 

train them on how to use the equipment?

[Juror 11]: Correct.

[Ping’s Counsel]: Okay. So I want to ask you the same question 

I asked the gentleman upfront, brutal honesty, knowing that 

when this case is over you’ve got your job to do, which is interact 

with all sorts of doctors and nurses. If the evidence supports a 

verdict against [Inman], what trouble would you have knowing 

that the folks you work with on a day-to-day, who may be 

medical professionals themselves, they ask you about your 

service in this case?

[Juror 11]: I don’t think I would have an issue with it, it’s 

whatever the information, and – that’s presented, that’s to be 

evaluated, and if it supports it, and my vote is in that favor or 

against I would stick to it.

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 25).

[7] Juror 11, along with five other jurors and an alternate, were selected by the 

parties, and the trial court gave preliminary instructions to the jury. During 

opening statements, Dr. Inman’s counsel talked about Dr. Cheadle’s upcoming 

testimony. Juror 11 did not mention her familiarity with Dr. Cheadle. 

[8] When Ping’s counsel called Dr. Cline as her first witness, the alternate juror 

(“Alternate Juror”) recognized the expert witness and immediately notified the 

trial court. The trial court sent the jury out of the courtroom and questioned the 

Alternate Juror. During this questioning, the Alternate Juror revealed that her 
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“brain [had not been] fully with [her]” when the trial court had said Dr. Cline’s 

name during voir dire. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 112). The Alternate Juror told the trial 

court that Dr. Cline had been one of her obstetrician/gynecologists during her 

pregnancy and that she had seen Dr. Cline two or three times. The trial court 

and the Alternate Juror had the following exchange:

THE COURT: Would your experience with Dr. Cline impact 

your ability to be objective in this case?

[Alternate Juror]: I don’t think so.

THE COURT: So, and you do understand that and experience 

you had with Dr. Cline is separate and distinct –

[Alternate Juror]: Yeah.

THE COURT: – from the events here? You understand that?

[Alternate Juror]: Yes.

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 115). The trial court gave both Ping’s and Dr. Inman’s counsels 

the opportunity to question the Alternate Juror before sending her back to the 

jury room. Both Ping’s and Dr. Inman’s counsels allowed the Alternate Juror 

to remain on the jury as an alternate.

[9] During Ping’s case-in-chief, Dr. Cheadle’s name was mentioned multiple times 

during testimony. Later during the trial, Dr. Inman’s counsel called Dr. Logan, 

who also mentioned Dr. Cheadle in her testimony. Finally, Dr. Inman’s 
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counsel called Dr. Cheadle to the stand. Dr. Cheadle testified that he believed

that Dr. Inman had met the standard of care during Ping’s procedure. Juror 11 

did not mention that she recognized Dr. Cheadle at any point during the trial.

[10] At the conclusion of the jury trial, the jury ruled in favor of Dr. Inman. The 

trial court allowed counsel for both sides to informally speak with the jury. 

Ping’s attorneys, Dr. Inman’s attorney, the trial court judge, the six jurors, and 

the Alternate Juror were present in this off-the-record meeting. 

[11] There is no record of this meeting between the attorneys and the jurors. 

However, both of Ping’s attorneys and Dr. Inman’s attorney provided affidavits 

attesting to what had been said. During this post-trial meeting, Ping’s attorney 

Joseph Williams (“Attorney Williams”) alleged that Juror 11 had “volunteered 

that while Dr. Cheadle may be theatrical[,] she was familiar with him through 

her work and knew him to be credible.” (App. Vol. 2 at 35). Ping’s attorney 

Robert Johnson (“Attorney Johnson”) alleged that Juror 11, when asked by the 

trial court about her opinion of the expert witnesses, had answered that “she 

found the testimony of Dr. []Cheadle to weigh more than the plaintiff’s 

experts.” (App. Vol. 2 at 37). Attorney Johnson also alleged that Juror 11 had 

stated that she “had heard of Dr. Cheadle from the University of Louisville 

before” but had “never had a chance to work with him or interact [with him].” 

(App. Vol. 2 at 37). Finally, Attorney Johnson alleged that Juror 11 had said 

that she had been “aware of Dr. Cheadle as a leading expert in the field of 

medicine during her work in hospitals.” (App. Vol. 2 at 37). On the other 

hand, Dr. Inman’s attorney David Field (“Attorney Field”) alleged that Juror 
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11 “did not state that she knew Dr. Cheadle to be credible based on her 

familiarity with him through her work.” (App. Vol. 2 at 46). 

[12] After the off-the-record meeting, Ping’s attorneys sent an email to the trial court 

and Attorney Field. In this email, Attorney Williams notified the parties that 

he was researching the juror misconduct issue. Thereafter, Ping filed a motion 

to correct error. In her motion, Ping argued that she was entitled to a new trial 

due to juror misconduct. Ping also argued that she was entitled to an 

evidentiary hearing to determine whether Juror 11 was biased. In support of 

her motion, Ping attached affidavits from Attorney Williams and Attorney 

Johnson that outlined the comments that Juror 11 had allegedly made during 

the off-the-record meeting. Dr. Inman filed a response in opposition to Ping’s 

motion. Dr. Inman attached an affidavit from Attorney Field that challenged 

whether Juror 11 had stated that she found Dr. Cheadle to be more credible due 

to her familiarity with him through her work. The trial court denied Ping’s 

motion to correct error without a hearing.

[13] Ping now appeals.

Decision

[14] Ping argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her motion 

to correct error based on juror misconduct. We review a trial court’s judgment 

on a motion to correct error for an abuse of discretion. Diehl v. Clemons, 12 

N.E.3d 285, 295-96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion 
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occurs when the court’s decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances before it, or if the court misinterprets the law. Id. at 296. 

[15] Ping challenges the trial court’s denial of her motion to correct error requesting 

a new trial or an evidentiary hearing based on juror misconduct. Generally, 

“[p]roof that a juror was biased against the [moving party] or lied on voir dire 

entitles the [party] to a new trial.” McDaniels v. State, 375 N.E.2d 228, 232 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 1978). “In such claims of juror misconduct under the Indiana 

Constitution, to warrant a new trial, there must be a showing that the 

misconduct was gross, and that it probably harmed the moving party.” Id. at 

296 (cleaned up). 

[16] “A [party] seeking a hearing on juror misconduct must first present some 

specific, substantial evidence showing a juror was possibly biased.” Lopez v. 

State, 527 N.E.2d 1119, 1130 (Ind. 1988) (citing Berkman v. State, 459 N.E.2d 

44, 46 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)). See also Diehl, 12 N.E.3d at 296; Thompson v. 

Gerowitz, 944 N.E.2d 1, 8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. “‘[W]hen [the 

moving party] presents evidence that a juror was possibly biased, and concealed 

this bias on voir dire, the trial court generally must hold an evidentiary hearing 

to determine whether the juror was in fact biased.’” Diehl, 12 N.E.3d at 296

(quoting Berkman, 459 N.E.2d at 46). 

[17] Here, our review of the record reveals that Juror 11 did not disclose her 

familiarity with Dr. Cheadle until after the jury had rendered its verdict. There 
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was no opportunity for Ping, Dr. Inman, or the trial court to probe into Juror 

11’s possible bias due to her familiarity with Dr. Cheadle. 

[18] We find the facts before us to be similar to those of Barnes v. State, 330 N.E.2d 

743 (Ind. 1975). In Barnes, a juror at trial was married to a second cousin to 

one of the prosecutor’s staff who had been slightly involved in the trial. The 

juror did not disclose this relationship during voir dire. The prosecutor’s staff 

member asserted that he had been unaware of the relationship at the time of 

trial and had not seen his cousin for eleven years. Our supreme court noted the 

following:

Nevertheless, the possibility of bias existed. If the juror lied, his 

misconduct was ground for a new trial. If the answer was 

inaccurate, it prevented the defendant from investigating a 

possible source of future bias in favor of the prosecution. Even 

though the juror may not have been aware at the time of the voir 

dire question of his relationship, if at any time prior to the verdict 

he discovered such a fact; the possibility of bias existed. In such 

a situation the defendant would need to have the opportunity to 

probe the juror and, if he chose, to challenge for cause.

Id. at 747 (internal citation omitted). Ultimately, our supreme court remanded 

for an evidentiary hearing and instructed the trial court to question the juror 

about whether he was aware of his relationship to the prosecutor’s staff during 

voir dire or any time before the jury’s verdict. Id. If the answer to either of 

these questions was an affirmative, our supreme court instructed the trial court 

to order a new trial. Id.
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[19] Furthermore, in Diehl, which dealt with a trial to determine damages after a car 

accident, a juror did not disclose on a juror questionnaire that he had previously 

been a defendant in a case resulting from a vehicular collision. However, the 

case had occurred twelve years prior to his service as a juror and the case had 

been dismissed for a failure to prosecute. Diehl, 12 N.E.3d at 290. Also during 

voir dire, the plaintiff’s attorney spoke favorably of the attorney who had 

represented the plaintiff in the juror’s previous vehicle collision case. Id. at 292. 

Further, during voir dire, the juror stated that: 

there are absolutely times when lawsuits are appropriate such as 

wrongful death, wrongful injury, damage to property, things like 

that, I think, where clearly a law has been broken and the person 

bringing the lawsuit feels that for whatever reason the extent of 

justice they’ve received so far isn’t commensurate to what they 

feel they need.

Id. (cleaned up). We held that “standing alone, the possibility of bias or 

prejudice is not enough to set aside a jury verdict.” Id. at 297. But, we 

remanded the case back to the trial court and ordered the trial court to hold an 

evidentiary hearing to determine whether the juror was biased or prejudiced. 

Id. at 298.

[20] Here, the facts before us are similar to those of Barnes and Diehl. Our review of 

the record reveals that Juror 11 did not disclose during voir dire or the entirety 

of the trial that she knew Dr. Cheadle. After the jury entered a verdict in favor 

of Dr. Inman, Juror 11 disclosed that she had been familiar with Dr. Cheadle 

through her work but had never interacted with or worked with him. Further, 
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Juror 11 disclosed that “she found the testimony of Dr. []Cheadle to weigh 

more than the plaintiff’s experts.” (App. Vol. 2 at 37). Juror 11’s statements 

are the kind of “specific, substantial evidence” of possible bias that merit an 

evidentiary hearing. Lopez, 527 N.E.2d at 1130. See also Barnes, 330 N.E.2d at 

747 (holding that a juror who did not disclose that he was a second cousin to a 

prosecutor’s staff required an evidentiary hearing to determine if the juror was 

aware of his relationship to the prosecutor’s staff); see also Diehl, 12 N.E.3d at 

298 (holding that a juror in a vehicle collision damages case who had been a 

defendant in a vehicle collision case twelve years prior to his service as a juror 

required an evidentiary hearing to determine bias or prejudice). 

[21] Because the record shows that there was a possibility of juror bias, the trial 

court should have held an evidentiary hearing. See Lopez, 527 N.E.2d at 1130. 

At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court can determine the extent of Juror 11’s 

knowledge of Dr. Cheadle and if it interfered with her ability to render a verdict 

solely on the evidence presented at trial. Much like we had previously held in 

Diehl, “the inquiry that should have occurred during voir dire must now occur 

in a post-trial evidentiary hearing.” Diehl, 12 N.E.3d at 298. Accordingly, we 

remand to the trial court with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing to 

determine whether Juror 11 was actually biased or prejudiced against Ping due 

to her familiarity with Dr. Cheadle through her work as a medical device 

vendor.
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[22] Reversed and remanded with instructions.

Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.