Filed 2/20/14 Desmet v. Martindale CA2/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

VICKI M. BROWN DESMET,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.
JAMES H. MARTINDALE et al.,
Defendants and Respondents. B240472
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. KC054535)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Su perior Court of Los Angeles County, Salvatore Sirna, Judge. Modified and affirmed. J. Cranor Richter for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Sloan Law and James D. Sloan for Defendants and Respondents.

_____________ ____________2 Plaintiff Vicki M. Brown Desmet (Desme t) appeals from a judgment in favor of
defendants James H. Martinda le and Lynette A. Martindale in which the trial court determined that an easement running over the Martindales’ property does not benefit real property owned by Desmet. De smet also challenges the tria l court’s determination that the easement was extinguished. We affirm the judgment as to Desmet. We modify as overbroad the portions of the judgment th at determine the easement in question is extinguished, and the Martindales’ propert y is no longer burdene d by the easement because a necessary and indispensable part y was not a party to this action.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1 Desmet’s property is at 442 Oak Knoll (Lot 14 of Tract No. 240 24) in the City of
Glendora and also includes the east 70 feet of Lot 13 of Tract No. 24024, which is the adjacent property. In June 19 64, the owner of Lot 13 (Sierra Jose, Inc.) su bdivided the lot without approval from the City of Glendora and sold Lot 13 “excepting therefrom the Easterly seventy (70) feet thereof.” The Ma rtindales’ property at 502 Oak Knoll (Lot 11) is adjacent to Lot 13 . The easement in question is for “ingress and egress,” over the southwest portion of 502 Oa k Knoll along the southern border of Lot 13. Desmet filed a declaratory relief action against the Martindales, alleging the
easement benefited the east 70 feet of Lot 13 and sought to establish an easement by express grant, implication, operation of law, or prescription. She also stated a cause of action to quiet title and sought injunctive relie f. The Martindales re sponded with a crosscomplaint for statutory abandonment of ea sement (Civ. Code, § 887.040), declaratory relief seeking a judicial determination of the rights and duties of Desmet and “any
unknown cross-defendants’ assertion of an interest” in the ease ment, and injunctive relief. By the time of trial, the Martindale s’ second amended cross-complaint did not
assert a cause of action fo r statutory abandonment. During the four-day bench trial, several witnesses testified.

1 When the challenge is to th e sufficiency of the evidence, we recite the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. ( Greenwich S.F., LLC v. Wong (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 739, 747.)3 1. History of the Haubrock Easement In June 1964, following the subdivisi on of Lot 13, A. Charles Haubrock and Phyllis Noreen Haubrock purchased Lot 13 , with the exception of the east 70 feet, commonly referred to as 450 Oak Knoll. 2 In November 1964, Martin C. Bonar and Rosebud E. Bonar, owners of 442 Oak Knoll (L ot 14), bought the east 70 feet of Lot 13, creating a flag lot. The east 70 feet of Lot 13 and the eastern portion of Lot 14 include a steep slope and flat plateau. 442 Oak Kno ll (Lot 14) is accessible by common driveway
from Oak Knoll Drive. The east 70 feet of Lot 13 is accessible from stairs located on 442 Oak Knoll (Lot 14). In December 1964, the owner of 502 Oak Knoll granted the Haubrocks an easement over the southern portion of the pr operty. The “Haubrock Easement” reads: “For a valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, [¶] Willis E. McKnight and Dorothy G. McKnight, husba nd & wife, [¶] hereby grants to [¶] A.
Charles Haubrock and Phyllis Noreen Haubrock . . . [¶] . . . [a]n easement for ingress and egress” over the southwestern portion of 502 Oak Kn oll. (Capitalization omitted.) The
location of the easement and extent of the easement is described by reference to a recorded subdivision map. The easement runs the entire length of Lot 13, including the east 70 feet. The Haubrocks, however, did not own the east 70 feet of Lot 13.
The Haubrock Easement a ppears in the chain of title to 450 Oak Knoll as it was transferred by mesne conveyan ce from the Haubrocks to the present owner, Lee Charles Garver, who acquired the property in 1997. Since 1980, 442 Oak Knoll and the east 70
feet of Lot 13 have been sold as a single parcel. 3 The Haubrock Easement does not appear in the chain of title to 442 Oak Knoll.

2 For a period of time, the Bonars also owned 450 Oak Knoll. In 1972, the Bonars conveyed 450 Oak Knoll to their son and his wife.

3 In 1970, the Bonars conveyed 442 Oak Kno ll to their son, Ryan Bonar. In 1979, Ryan Bonar executed a deed c onveying title to 442 Oak Knoll, but not the east 70 feet of Lot 13. Litigation ensued over the east 70 feet of Lot 13. Ryan Bonar, thereafter, conveyed the east 70 feet of Lot 13 to the buyers of 442 Oak Knoll.4 The Martindales were aware of the Ha ubrock Easement when they purchased
502 Oak Knoll.
2. Use of the Haubrock Easement Ryan Bonar, the Bonars’ son, testified there was a dirt ro ad on the Haubrock
Easement that reached the east 70 feet of Lot 13. For several years, he drove “100 loads” of horse manure up to his mother’s garden on a plateau portion of the east 70 feet of Lot 13. Sometime in 1985 or 1986, he construc ted a fence around 450 Oak Knoll that had a gate to access the east 70 feet of Lot 13 fro m the Haubrock Easement on 502 Oak Knoll.
He testified that in 1986 there was no fence on 502 Oak Knoll separating the properties. This testimony, however, was controverted by the former owner of 502 Oak Knoll. Geraldine Atchley owned 502 Oak Knoll from 1972 through 1998. She testified
there was no dirt road or dirt path on her property that coul d have been used to access the east 70 feet of Lot 13. Atchley installed an electric gate across her driveway that would not permit any access. She also testified th at a chain link fence, running east and west along the southern border of 502 Oak Knoll, w ith no access to the east 70 feet of Lot 13, already was in place when sh e bought the property in 1972 . The Bonars’ fence ran parallel to her fence along the southern property line. By 1999, when the Martindales bought 502 Oak Knoll, the southern border of the property encompassing the Ha ubrock Easement was densel y landscaped with trees and
shrubs. The chain link fence remained in place on the Mar tindales’ property and there was no gate that permitted access to the east 70 feet of Lot 13. There also was no access
road to the east 70 feet of Lot 13. Garver, the current owner of 450 Oak Kn oll, bought the prop erty in 1997 and
testified there is no road on 502 Oak Knoll. He also testified there is a fence between his property and 502 Oak Knoll.
3. Desmet Attempts to Use the Haubrock Easement In 2002, Desmet first appr oached the Martindales abou t an easement through their property to access the east 70 f eet of Lot 13. She engaged a title company to investigate the accessibility of her property through easements on the adjo ining properties. The title5 company representative came to the conclusion that the Haubrock Easement benefited the
east 70 feet of Lot 13. Desmet wrote a lette r to the Martindales in which she asked the Martindales to “remove the portion of the fence at the old gate access so [she could] start removing the debris, grade a road to the prop erty, and start accessing the property.”
4. Experts’ Opinions on the Haubrock Easement The parties’ experts presented differing opinions as to wh ether the Haubrock
Easement benefited the east 70 feet of Lot 13. Desmet’s expert opined that because the Haubrock Easement extended the length of Lot 13 and was not necessary to access the front half of the property, its sole purpose wa s to access the east 70 feet of Lot 13. The expert testified that based upon the topograp hy map he prepared, an existing graded road indicated the easement “was basically there to serve the upper portion of Lot 13.” The Martindales’ expert disagreed with testimony that a road existed on 502 Oak
Knoll to access the east 70 feet of Lot 13. The expert also questioned the reliability of the contours on the topography map prepared by Desmet’s expert that indicated an access road existed. The Martindales’ expert compared the topogr aphy map with his
measurements and concluded th ere had never been a road to access the east 70 feet of Lot
13.
5. The Statement of Decision, Judgment, Appeal In its final statement of decision, the trial court concluded the Haubrock Easement was created by express grant deed. “The op erative words of conv eyance are clear and unambiguous, creating a right of access in favo r of the Haubrocks over a specific portion of 502 Oak Knoll, at the time owned by the McKnights.” The Haubrocks owned Lot 13,
with the exclusion of the east 70 feet of Lo t 13. The court also concluded that the Haubrock Easement is appurtenant to th e land. “In other words, the Haubrock [E]asement attaches to and runs with (passe s with) the easement holder’s land, in this case, Lot 13 (450 Oak Knoll); not the east 70 feet of Lot 13.” 4

4 The statement of decision concluded Desmet did not have an easement by implication, easement by prescription, or easement by necessity. Desmet does not challenge these conclusions on appeal.6 In ruling on the Martindales’ declarator y relief action, the trial court concluded
that the Haubrock Easement was ex tinguished by prescription. The court entered an amended judgment (judgment) against Desmet. The judgment states:
“Defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor and against Plaintiff on their cross-claim for declaratory relie f, the Court finding as follows: “1. The Haubrock Easement, as identified in the gran t deed recorded in the official records of Los Angeles County December 29, 1964 [Instrument No. 4339] is extinguished a nd of no further effect;
“2. The Haubrock Easement never attach ed or became appu rtenant to the east 70 of Lot 13 of Tract No. 24024, City of Glendora, California; “3. The property owned by Defendants, commonly known as 502 Oak Knoll Drive, Glendora, California, is fre e of the burden of the Haubrock Easement; and “4. No easement has been created by imp lication, necessity and/or prescription in favor of Plaintiff and/or the prop erty commonly known as 442 Oak Knoll Drive, Glendora, California (consisting of Lot 14 and the east 70 feet of Lot 13 of Tract No. 24024, Glendora, California), and against Defendants and/or the property commonly known as 502 Oak Knoll Drive, Glendora,
California.” Desmet timely appealed.
CONTENTIONS Desmet challenges the judgment and ra ises the following three contentions: (1) the statement of decision is inadequate because the trial court “failed to properly consider appellant’s legal argument that an illegal subdivision of the property resulted in the owner of the east 70 feet of Lot 13 having a sufficient legal and/or equitable interest in the property for the Haubro ck Easement to attach and run with the land to successive purchasers”; (2) the judgment improperly ex tinguished the Haubrock Easement because the Martindales’ amended cross-complaint did not include a cause of action for statutory7 abandonment of easement; and (3) insuffici ent evidence supports the trial court’s
conclusion that the Haubrock Easeme nt has been extinguished.
DISCUSSION
1. Adequacy of Statement of Decision Desmet challenges the adequa cy of the statement of deci sion, arguing that the trial court was obligated to address her legal argu ments regarding the effect of the illegal subdivision of Lot 13. On app eal, as in the trial court, Desm et argues that because of the illegal subdivision of Lot 13 in 1964, the purchaser of the east 70 feet of Lot 13 (the Bonars) had “a sufficient legal and/or equitable interest in the proper ty for the Haubrock
Easement to attach and run with the land to successive purchasers.” Stated another way,
in 1964 when the Ha ubrocks and the Bonars each acquire d a portion of Lot 13, the seller (Sierra Jose) “retained equitable title to the east 70 feet of Lot 13 until such time as compliance with the Su bdivision Map Act and/or local regulations of the City of
Glendora is obtained.” Desmet raised thes e same arguments in her closing argument briefs and in her objections and reply to the proposed statement of decision.
The trial court does not have to address a ll the legal issues raised by the parties. ( Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 547, 559.) Code of Civil Procedure section 632 provides that at th e request of any party, a court must issue a statement of decision explaining “the factual a nd legal basis for its decision as to each of the principal controverted issues at trial.” The 25-page statement of decision sets forth the factual and legal basis for the court’s conclusion that the operative words in the Haubrock Easement were “clear and unambiguous, creating a right of access in favo r of the Haubrocks over a specific portion
of 502 Oak Knoll.” Because the court concl uded the Haubrock Easement is an easement appurtenant to the land, it a ttaches and runs with the ea sement holder’s land, which
excluded the east 70 feet of Lot 13. The statement of decision also addressed and rejected Desmet’s expert testimony that the Haubrock Easement was intended to benefit8 the east 70 feet of Lot 13. The trial court’ s determination on this issue satisfied its statutory obligation. 5 Moreover, the statement of decision actually did address the subdivision of Lot 13.
The trial court determined th at no easement was created by implication to which Desmet may claim a benefit to the east 70 feet of Lot 13. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court analyzed the significance of the subdivision of Lot 13. “When Sierra Jose split Lot 13 without City of Glendora ap proval on June 17, 1964 and sold Lot 13, except the east 70 feet, to the Haubrocks, and [sold] the east 70 feet of Lot 13 to the Bonars, a potential easement by implication was created. Howe ver, Plaintiff does not seek such relief from the owner of 450 Oak Knoll (Lot 13, except the east 70 feet), and the requirement cannot
be satisfied as to Defendant Martindale.”
Desmet’s contention is not th at the statement of decision is inadequate, but that the trial court legally erred in concluding the Haubrock Easement did not benefit her property. Although th e Haubrock Easement does not sp ecifically identify Lot 13, with the exception of the east 70 feet, the trial c ourt relied on the well-settled legal principle that the benefit of an appu rtenant easement attaches only to the land of the easement holder; it cannot be extended to benefit a dditional property that was not part of the
dominant tenement at the time the easement was created. ( Buehler v. OregonWashington Plywood Corp. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 520, 527; se e Civ. Code, § 1104; 6 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (3d ed. 2006) Ease ments, § 15:6, p. 15-25.) The evidence presented at trial established the Haubrocks owned 450 Oak Knoll, with the exception of

5 As the Martindales point out, the statemen t of decision also reads: “The court has read and considered the objections to th e Proposed Statement of Decision Filed by Plaintiff VICKI M. BROWN DESMET and by Defendants JAME S H. MARTINDALE and LYNETTE A. MARTINDALE, including each parties’ respective replies thereto.” The trial court overruled Desmet’s objection th at the conclusions of law “fail to address the issues raised by Plaintiff that the illega l subdivision caused by the conveyance by Sierra Jose to Haubrock (as to Lot 13, excepting the east 70 feet of Lot 13) and the conveyance by Sierra Jose to Bonar (as to the east 70 feet of Lot 13) created legal title in Haubrock as to Lot 13, and an equitable title in Bonar as to the easterly 70 feet of Lot 13.”9 the east 70 feet of Lot 13, at the time the Haubr ock Easement was created. Thus, the trial
court did not err. Desmet repeats the argument that becau se Lot 13 was not legally separated in compliance with the Su bdivision Map Act (Gov. Code, § 66 410 et seq.) and approved by the City of Glendora, the Haub rocks actually held legal title to all of Lot 13 at the time the Haubrock Easement was created, and the Bo nars held equitable title to the east 70 feet of Lot 13. Alternatively, Desmet argues equ itable title remained in the name of Sierra Jose, the company that subd ivided Lot 13. These argum ents are buttressed by the testimony of the City of Glendora planning ma nager who stated the city considers Lot 13 as a whole. Thus, it is Desmet’s position that until Lot 13 is subdi vided in compliance with the Subdivision Map Act and the local re gulations of the City of Glendora, the
Haubrock Easement benef its all of Lot 13. Desmet has no legal support for her position. 6 The remedy for a violation of the Subdivision Map Act is agains t the grantor of the illegally subdivided prop erty, not to further burden the servient tenement. Any d eed of conveyance, sale or contract to sell real property that has been divided, or has resulted from a division, in violation of the Subdivision Map Act or local ordinances en acted pursuant to the Subdivision Map Act is voidable at the sole option of the grantee, buye r or person contracting to purchase, heirs, personal representatives, or trustees in insolven cy or bankruptcy with in one year after the

6 Desmet relies on cases that discuss equ itable remedies and equitable title but not in the context of failure to comply with statutory require ments to subdivide properties (e.g., O’Keefe v. Aptos Land & Water Co. (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 772, 780-782), or she relies on cases in which the purchaser, upon disc overy that the seller illegally subdivided property, can either affirm the agreement or disaffirm the agreement and recover the sums paid less any offsets ( Perkins v. Sommers (1953) 117 Cal.App. 2d 32, 34). (See also Wilson v. Anderson (1930) 109 Cal.App. 467, 473-475 [in complaint seeking quiet title, the court may enter such judgment as equitie s of the case may require].) Desmet also cites Moylan v. Dykes (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 561, 571-572. Moylan is inapposite because it holds the conveyance of the domin ant tenement transfers all appurtenant easements to the grantee, even though the easements are not specifically mentioned in the deeds. Moylan further concludes that an easement for ingress and egress reserved in a deed may be appurtenant to a parcel it does not touch. ( Id . at p. 573.)10 date of discovery of the violation. (Gov. Code, § 66499.32, subd. (a).) Any grantee may within one year of the date of discovery of such violatio n, bring an action against the person who illegally subdivided the proper ty or successors who have actual or constructive knowledge of the division. (Gov. Code, § 66499. 32, subd. (b).) The additional remedy of injunctive relief is availa ble to enjoin any attempted or proposed subdivision that does not comp ly with the Subdivision Map Act or local ordinances. (Gov. Code, § 66499.33.) Thus, the failure to comply with the statutory requirements to
subdivide Lot 13 does not burden the servient tenement (t he Martindales’ property) beyond the express grant in the Haubrock Easement.
2. Statutory Abandonment Was Not Addre ssed in the Statement of Decision
Desmet next contends the trial cour t exceeded its jurisdiction because the statement of decision effectively rules on the Martindales’ statutory abandonment of the easement (Civ. Code, § 887.040), ev en though that claim had been dismissed before trial. The proposed statement of decision incorrec tly referred to the first amended crosscomplaint and addressed the statutory abandonm ent cause of action. Desmet objected.
The trial court corrected the error. The st atement of decision and judgment supersede any tentative decision. ( Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 268.)
The statement of decision addresses the Marti ndales’ declaratory relief action, which was properly before the court.
3. Judgment Extinguishing the Haub rock Easement is Overbroad
Desmet also contends the evidence does not support the trial court’s conclusion that the Haubrock Easement has been extingui shed by prescription because the statement of decision contains no finding s of hostile use, citing only ev idence of no nuse by the
owners of 450 Oak Knoll. “An easement obtained by grant . . . may indeed be lost by prescription, e.g., when the owner of the serv ient tenement makes a use of his or her own
land in a manner which is adverse to the rights represented by the easement.” ( Tract Development Services, Inc. v. Kepler (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1374, 1386; see also Sevier
v. Locher (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1082, 1084-1085.)11 In light of our conclusion that the Haub rock Easement did not benefit Desmet’s property, we need not address Desmet’s argum ent that there is insu fficient evidence to support the judgment in favor of the Martindales as it pertai ns to extinguishing Desmet’s rights to the Haubrock Easement. Desmet acknowledges that the Martindale s could seek a declaration extinguishing any rights she might have with respect to the Haubrock Easement. But, she challenges the judgment insofar as the tr ial court extinguished the Haub rock Easement and declared the Martindale property no longer burdened by the Haubrock Easement because it affects the rights of others, including Garver, the cu rrent owner of 450 Oak Knoll and successor in interest to the Haubrocks, who is not a party to the action. 7 In this case, Garver is a necessary and indispensable party to a determination that the Haubrock Easement is extinguished. A ne cessary party is one who claims an interest relating to the subject matter of the litigation. (Code Civ. Proc., § 389, subd. (a).) Such a party is indispensable if a ruling may impair th e ability to protect his interest and leaves a party to the action subject to a substantial risk of multiple or inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. ( Ibid .)
Garver is a successor in inte rest to the Haubrocks, and he has an interest in the adjudication of the Martindales’ claim to exti nguish the Haubrock Ea sement. He is an indispensable party because his absence impair s his ability to protect that interest, and subjects the Martindales to a substantial risk of otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of Garver’s interest. Thus, to the ex tent the court limited its adjudication to the interests of parties participating in this action – the Martindales and Desmet – its judgment is not overbroad. Because the j udgment on the cross-complaint appears to go beyond the parties to the action and extinguish th e Haubrock Easement as to all parties, it

7 Garver testified he was not aware of any easement that would give him the right of ingress and egress over the Martindale property. “Q Now, are you aware of an easement to the North of your property that’s on the Ma rtindale’s property th at would give you a right of ingress and egress over to their proper ty? [¶] A No, I ha ve no right other than Martindale’s permission, but no legal ri ght, to trespass onto his driveway.”12 is overbroad. The court could not adjudicate the easement rights, if any, of Garver, the
current owner of 450 Oak Knoll.
DISPOSITION The judgment on the Martindales’ cro ss-complaint for declaratory relief is modified as follows: Finding 1 is modified to read: “The Haubrock Easement, as identified in the grant deed recorded in official reco rds of Los Angeles County December 29, 1964 [Instrument No. 4339] is extinguished only as against Desmet.” Finding 3 is deleted as overbroad as stated in the opinion. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The parties are to bear th eir own costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ALDRICH, J.

We concur:

KLEIN, P. J.

KITCHING, J.