COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges McClanahan, Haley and Senior Judge Willis 

SARAH DICKENSON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* 

v. Record No. 2712-08-3 PER CURIAM 

MAY 12, 2009 

MICHAEL CLARK 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RUSSELL COUNTY 

Michael L. Moore, Judge 

 (Hugh F. O’Donnell; Client Centered Legal Services of Southwest 

Virginia, on brief), for appellant. 

 No brief for appellee. 

 (David R. Tiller; Tiller & Tiller, P.C., on brief), Guardian ad litem

for minor child 

 Sarah Dickenson (mother) appeals the trial court’s ruling regarding the termination of 

father’s parental rights. Mother argues that the trial court erred in not accepting a petition to 

terminate father’s parental rights because no foster plan existed. For purposes of this appeal, we 

assume arguendo that mother has standing to challenge the trial court’s ruling. Laurels of Bon Air, 

LLC v. Medical Facilities of America LIV Limited Partnership, 51 Va. App. 583, 589, 659 S.E.2d 

561, 564 (2008). Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties,1 we conclude that this 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 

1

 Pursuant to Rule 5A:8, appellant prepared a written statement of facts in lieu of a 

transcript. She filed it with the trial court and provided the necessary notice; however, the trial 

judge did not sign the written statement of facts. We have reviewed the record, including the 

judge’s opinion letter and the final order, and our review indicates that the written statement of 

facts, even if signed, would not affect the disposition of this appeal. Therefore, it is not 

necessary to remand for action by the trial judge on the written statement of facts. 
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appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See

Rule 5A:27. 

BACKGROUND 

 On April 25, 2008, Michael Clark (father) filed a petition in the juvenile and domestic 

relations district court (the JDR court), requesting that his parental rights to his child be 

terminated pursuant to Code § 16.1-283. On May 23, 2008, the JDR court found that father’s 

petition was “contrary to public policy and the law” and would not terminate father’s parental 

rights. Mother appealed the JDR court’s decision to the trial court and requested that father’s 

parental rights to the child be terminated. The trial court held that it could not terminate father’s 

parental rights without the filing of a foster plan. Mother timely noted her appeal. 

ANALYSIS 

 Mother argues that the trial court erred in holding that it could not terminate father’s 

parental rights because of the absence of a foster care plan. Mother argues that it is in the child’s 

best interests to terminate father’s parental rights. 

 “Under Virginia’s statutory scheme, the circumstances providing authority for the 

termination of parental rights, and the attendant obligation of support, are limited.” Church v. 

Church, 24 Va. App. 502, 506, 483 S.E.2d 498, 500 (1997). 

The statutory scheme for the constitutionally valid termination of 

residual parental rights in this Commonwealth is primarily 

embodied in Code § 16.1-283. That scheme provides detailed 

procedures designed to protect the rights of the parents and their 

child. These procedures must be strictly followed before the courts 

are permitted to sever the natural and legal bond between parent 

and child. 

Rader v. Montgomery County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 5 Va. App. 523, 526, 365 S.E.2d 234, 

235-36 (1988). 
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 “The obligation to comply with the statutory scheme that has been designed by the 

legislature to protect parents and children cannot be abandoned by a judge under the guise of 

seeking to ‘promote the best interests of the child.’” Willis v. Gamez, 20 Va. App. 75, 82, 455 

S.E.2d 274, 278 (1995) (citation omitted). 

 Here, no foster care plan existed as required by Code § 16.1-283. Since the parties did 

not comply with Code § 16.1-283, the trial court could not terminate father’s parental rights. 

 Mother argues that Code § 16.1-283 should be read with “leeway” because Code 

§ 16.1-283 leads to an “absurd result” when a child, such as the one in this case, does not fall 

under the provisions for a foster care plan. We reject mother’s argument because the “Supreme 

Court has stated that ‘statutes terminating the legal relationship between parent and child should 

be interpreted consistently with the governmental objective of preserving, when possible, the 

parent-child relationship.’” Willis, 20 Va. App. at 83, 455 S.E.2d at 278 (quoting Weaver v. 

Roanoke Dep’t of Human Res., 220 Va. 921, 926, 265 S.E.2d 692, 695 (1980)). 

 Accordingly, we summarily affirm the trial court’s ruling. Rule 5A:27. 

Affirmed.