Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:

R. JOHN WRAY

Fort Wayne, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

DENNIS FAHLSING, )

)

Appellant-Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) No. 57A05-1211-CC-584

)

SHANNON FAHLSING and ANGELA )

TAYLOR, )

)

Appellees-Defendants. )

APPEAL FROM THE NOBLE CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable G. David Laur, Judge

Cause No. 57C01-1106-CC-25

April 9, 2013

MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION

RILEY, Judge
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant-Plaintiff, Dennis Fahlsing (Father), appeals the trial court’s denial of his 

motion for summary judgment in favor of Shannon Fahlsing (Shannon) and Angela 

Taylor (Angela) (collectively, the Daughters) and its order staying the action and 

compelling arbitration.

We affirm.

ISSUES

Father raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as follows:

(1) Whether the trial court erred by denying Father’s motion for summary 

judgment on his claims of unjust enrichment; and 

(2) Whether the trial court erred by ordering the parties to arbitration.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 This is a family limited partnership dispute. Landmark Legacy LP (Landmark) is 

an Indiana limited partnership. On February 8, 2005, Father executed a limited 

partnership agreement (Agreement) for Landmark. The cover page of the Agreement 

listed Landmark’s name, Father’s name, and the words “living trust.” (Appellant’s App. 

p. 105). The Agreement recited that Father made a capital contribution of $993,392.76 to 

Landmark and received one general partnership unit and 99 limited partner units in 

exchange. The capital contribution represented a 73% interest in Stroh Landmark, LP 

(Stroh) that Father received from Hugh G. Stroh (Hugh). Hugh filed a gift tax return for 
3

the transfer of Stroh interests to Father. On February 9, 2005, a Certificate of Indiana

Limited Partnership was filed on behalf of Landmark with the Indiana secretary of state. 

 On February 16, 2005, Father assigned and transferred 44 of his 99 Landmark 

limited partnership units to each of the Daughters. The transfer was memorialized in two 

documents bearing only Father’s signature and entitled “Assignment of Partnership 

Interest.” (Appellant’s App. pp. 49, 53). These provided that each Daughter received 

their respective limited partnership units “in exchange for the loan this date from [Father] 

to her in the sum of [$437,092.81] together with interest at the rate of eight percent (8%) 

per annum.” (Appellant’s App. p. 49, 53). However, no date of expected repayment was 

stated. The Daughters also received the right to Landmark’s profits, losses, and 

distributions that Father, as a limited partner, would have received. Father, as 

Landmark’s general partner, also executed two certificates of ownership attesting to the 

transfer of 88 limited partnership units to the Daughters. As a result of the transfers, 

Father had 1 general partner unit and 11 limited partner units, while the Daughters each 

had 44 limited partner units. Father did not file a gift tax return for the transfers of the 

partnership units to the Daughters “because the assignment was in exchange for a loan by 

[him] to [the Daughters].” (Appellant’s App. pp. 30-31). 

In April 2009, the Daughters’ mother (Mother) filed for dissolution of her 

marriage to Father. On July 12, 2010, Father was deposed. He stated that Hugh was a 

close family friend who intended for the Daughters to receive part of the Stroh interests

given to Father. Father had also transferred his remaining 11 limited partnership units to 
4

another person at Hugh’s direction. Angela had received distributions from Landmark, 

but Father did not know how many or how much. Father did not know whether he ever 

spoke to the Daughters about Landmark or how much money they should expect for it. 

On June 29, 2011, Father filed his complaint alleging that as of July 1, 2011, the 

Daughters each owed Father $659,830.33, the value of the purported loans plus accrued 

interest. Father alleged that Landmark had increased in value based on its acquisition of

additional properties and interests of Hugh and Stroh. Since receiving their limited 

partnership units, the Daughters had “failed and refused to pay [Father].” (Appellant’s 

App. p. 8). Father also alleged that both Daughters had “been unjustly enriched as a 

result of their unpaid interest to [Father] for the assigned interest of [Father] to them in 

Landmark.” (Appellant’s App. p. 8).

On August 15, 2011, the Daughters filed their answer denying all of the 

allegations except Landmark’s formation, asserting affirmative defenses, and seeking 

attorney fees for a frivolous claim. Specifically, the Daughters denied 1) that they were 

unjustly enriched, 2) any knowledge of the Agreement, 3) Father’s transfers of limited 

partnership units to them, and 4) the creation of loans in exchange for the limited 

partnership interests. As affirmative defenses to the complaint, the Daughters asserted 

that Father failed to attach necessary documents and estoppel. In particular, the 

Daughters alleged that Father’s claim was “barred in that [Father], under oath in another 

cause of action with this [c]ourt, testified that no such loan existed by that the interest of 
5

[the Daughters] in [Landmark was] established as a plan of estate planning and gift by 

[Father] in conjunction with [Hugh].” (Appellant’s App. p. 21).

On November 9, 2011, Father filed his motion for summary judgment asserting no 

genuine issues of material fact and his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law based 

on the Daughters’ lack of capital contribution to Landmark, their acceptance of the 

transferred units, and their failure to make any loan repayments to Father. Father 

designated his affidavit, the Agreement, and limited partnership unit transfer 

documentation in support. In his affidavit, Father stated that the Daughters had “both 

filed claims seeking to terminate and entirely liquidate Landmark with each of them 

claiming a respective [44%] of the liquidated cash without either of them paying [Father] 

for their original assigned ownership interest.” (Appellant’s App. p. 32). Father argued 

that the circumstances entitled him to judgment under the theory of either unjust 

enrichment or promissory estoppel, which Father contended “permit recovery where no 

express written contract in fact exists.” (Appellant’s App. p. 58). Father asserted that he 

had a reasonable expectation of payment from the Daughters, that the limited partnership 

interests had appreciated in value, and that the Daughters “consistently represented 

themselves as 44% owners of Landmark.” (Appellant’s App. p. 57). Given the 

Daughters’ refusal to repay the loans and to decline the benefits of Landmark ownership, 

Father contended that the Daughters had been unjustly enriched. 

On December 6, 2011, the Daughters filed their response to Father’s motion for 

summary judgment, disputing the existence of the loans and their receipt of “any 
6

distributions of profit or any amounts from [Father] in exchange for the interest[s] 

assigned to them in [Landmark]” as genuine issues of material fact. (Appellant’s App. p. 

66). The Daughters designated their affidavits, the Agreement, documentation recording 

the transfer of limited partnership units to them, and portions of Father’s deposition 

testimony in his dissolution action. Further, the Daughters also designated Father’s 

revocable living trust deed and documentation recording the transfer of Father’s 

“partnership interest in [Landmark]” to his living trust for no consideration. (Appellant’s 

App. p. 150). Although conceding that Father had informed them of their limited 

partnership interest in Landmark and that the limited partnership property was indirectly 

provided by Hugh, the Daughters asserted that they never knew of nor had Father ever 

mentioned the purported loans in exchange for their limited partnership interests. The 

Daughters also pointed to the dissolution action, in which Father and Mother “vigorously 

contested” Landmark’s affairs along with the marital property. (Appellant’s App. p. 62). 

Had the loans existed, the Daughters argued that they would have been part of the marital 

estate and required disclosure to Mother. However, Father did not reveal the existence 

of the loans at any time throughout the dissolution action and even up to the filing of his 

complaint. On January 4, 2011, the trial court issued its order denying Father’s motion 

for summary judgment and appointed a mediator. 

On August 30, 2012, Daughters filed a demand for arbitration with the American 

Arbitration Association regarding their fiduciary duty claims against Father. On 

September 20, 2012, the Daughters filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative to stay 
7

the action pending arbitration with the trial court citing Section 10.15 of the Agreement

as the basis for seeking arbitration. On September 20, 2012, Father opposed the motion 

to dismiss, arguing that the dispute over the transfer of partnership units was outside the 

scope of Section 10.15 and that the Daughters had waived any right to arbitration. On 

November 13, 2012, the trial court ordered the litigation stayed and the parties to arbitrate 

their dispute. 

Father now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Summary Judgment

Father first contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for summary 

judgment in favor of the Daughters. Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no 

genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). A fact is material if its resolution would affect the outcome 

of the case. Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. 2009). An issue is genuine if a 

trier of fact is required to resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth or if the 

undisputed facts support conflicting reasonable inferences. Id. 

In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on summary judgment, this court stands in the 

shoes of the trial court, applying the same standards in deciding whether to affirm or 

reverse summary judgment. First Farmers Bank & Trust Co. v. Whorley, 891 N.E.2d 

604, 607 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. Thus, on appeal, we must determine 

whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the trial court has correctly 
8

applied the law. Id. at 607-08. In doing so, we consider all of the designated evidence in 

the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 608. 

We note that the Daughters did not file a brief. When an appellee does not submit 

a brief, an appellant may prevail by making a prima facie case of error. Village of 

College Corner v. Town of West College Corner, 766 N.E.2d 742, 745 (Ind. Ct. App.

2002). Prima facie in this context is defined as “at first sight, on first appearance, or on 

the face of it.” Id. Such a rule protects this court and relieves it from the burden of 

controverting arguments advanced for reversal, a duty which properly remains with 

counsel for the appellee. Id.

Father asserts that there was no issue of genuine fact and, as a matter of law, the 

Daughters have been unjustly enriched by their receipt of Landmark limited partnership 

units. He argues that the undisputed facts show that the Daughters have not paid for such 

limited partnership units nor made any capital contribution to Landmark. Father 

contends that the transfer documentation reflects that he reasonably expected payment for 

the units based on his purported loans to the Daughters to acquire them. Pointing to his 

affidavit and deposition testimony, Father argues there is no evidence that he intended the 

units to be gifts for the Daughters.

To prevail on a claim of unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must establish that a 

measurable benefit has been conferred on the defendant under such circumstances that 

the defendant’s retention of the benefit without payment would be unjust. Inlow v. Inlow, 

797 N.E.2d 810, 816 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. Principles of equity prohibit 
9

unjust enrichment in cases where a party accepts the unrequested benefits another 

provides despite having the opportunity to decline those benefits. Id. Thus, a party 

seeking to recover under this theory must demonstrate that the benefit was rendered to 

another at the express or implied request of such other party, and allowing the other party 

to retain the benefit without paying for it would be unjust, and that he expected payment 

for his services. See Kelly v. Levandoski, 825 N.E.2d 850, 861 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), 

trans. denied. However, a benefit gratuitously conferred upon the other party is not 

unjust enrichment. See Coleman v. Coleman, 949 N.E.2d 860, 867 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). 

We conclude that genuine issues of fact exist and therefore affirm the trial court. 

First, the Daughters designated facts that they had no knowledge of the purported loans. 

Contrary to Father’s affidavit, they denied that Father had ever loaned them any property 

or funds. The Daughters stated that Father had given them a copy of “the entire 

partnership records and documents from Landmark.” (Appellant’s App. p. 87). 

However, the transfer documentation for the Daughters’ limited partnership units was not 

included. Consequently, Father’s claim that the Daughters did not decline ownership is 

not dispositive in light of their disavowal of the loans. 

Second, the Daughters relied on their affidavits and Father’s deposition testimony 

to establish that the transfers were gifts and Father brought this action in retribution. 

Father testified that the capital contribution itself was a gift to him from Hugh, who also 

wanted the Daughters to be recipients. Although Father claimed there had been 

distributions from Landmark to Angela, he could not recall how many or when such 
10

distributions occurred. Father testified that Angela “owes” Landmark “a house” that she

was “supposed to put [...] back in the partnership.” (Appellant’s App. p. 166). In their 

affidavits, each Daughter stated that after they had filed for an accounting of Landmark, 

Father said that he would “destroy my life and my sister’s life[,”] and thereafter 

immediately filed the case at bar. (Appellant’s App. pp. 70, 88). In sum, we conclude 

that genuine issues of material fact exist on Father’s claim of unjust enrichment and 

therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of summary judgment in favor of the Daughters.

II. Arbitration

A. Standard of Review

Father next challenges the trial court’s order compelling the parties to arbitrate. 

We apply a de novo standard of review to a trial court’s determination regarding a motion 

to compel arbitration. State ex rel. Carter v. Philip Morris Tobacco Co., 879 N.E.2d 

1212, 1214-215 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. The party seeking to compel 

arbitration must demonstrate the existence of an enforceable arbitration agreement and 

that the disputed matter is the type of claim that is intended to be arbitrated under the 

agreement. Medical Realty Associates, LLC v. D.A. Dodd, Inc., 928 N.E.2d 871, 874 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Whether the parties agreed to arbitrate any disputes is a matter of 

contract interpretation. Id. Thus, we decide whether the dispute, on its face, is covered 

by the language of the arbitration provision. Id. In doing so, we will apply ordinary 

contract principles governed by state law. Id. If we determine that the parties have 

agreed to arbitrate, Indiana policy favors arbitration. Id.
11

B. Agreement to Arbitrate

Father first contends that the transfer of limited partnership units is not subject to 

arbitration under the Agreement. Section 10.15 of the Agreement governs arbitration and 

provides as follows: 

Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement shall 

only be settled by arbitration according to the rules of the American 

Arbitration Association, by one Arbitrator, and shall be enforceable in any 

court having competent jurisdiction.

(Appellant’s App. p. 135). The clause is broad since it specifies that arbitration must be 

used to settle any controversy or claim. See PSI Energy, Inc. v. AMAX, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 

96, 99 (Ind. 1994). When a valid contract contains a broad arbitration clause, resolution 

of disputes about various other clauses should be through arbitration. Id.

Father contends that the transfer of his limited partnership units to the Daughters 

does not arise out of or relate to the Agreement for the following reasons. First, Father 

alleges that there was no written agreement with an arbitration provision “in the personal 

transfer of units on February 16, 2005, from [Father] to [the Daughters].” (Appellant’s 

Br. p. 9). Second, he contends that the Daughters never had direct dealings with 

Landmark, including the acquisition of their units. Neither reason is persuasive. 

The Agreement regulates the transfer of limited partnership units; therefore, 

claims regarding their transfer are subject to arbitration. Article VI of the Agreement 

addresses the transfer of Landmark limited partnership units. It contains material

restrictions on transfer such as a right of first refusal and prohibitions on transfers in 

violation of “the Internal Revenue Code of 1986” or “federal or state securities laws.” 
12

(Appellant’s App. p. 126). Further, all certificates of ownership memorializing the 

transfer of units to the Daughters state “[t]he transfer of these interests is limited by the 

[Agreement] and any transferee should examine said Agreement to determine said 

limitation.” (Appellant’s App. p. 16, 18). This unambiguous language brings any dispute 

about the transfer of limited partnership units to the Daughters within the scope of the 

Agreement’s arbitration clause. See Isp.com LLC v. Theising, 805 N.E.2d 767, 776 (Ind. 

2004). 

C. Waiver

Father also argues that the Daughters waived their right to arbitrate. Although a 

written agreement to submit a dispute to arbitration is valid and enforceable, the right to 

require such arbitration may be waived by the parties. Tamko Roofing Products, Inc. v. 

Dilloway, 865 N.E.2d 1074, 1079 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Such a waiver need not be in 

express terms and may be implied by the acts, omissions or conduct of the parties. Id. 

Whether a party has waived the right to arbitration depends primarily upon whether that 

party has acted inconsistently with its right to arbitrate. Id. Waiver is a question of fact 

under the circumstances of each case. Id. In determining if waiver has occurred, courts 

look at a variety of factors, including the timing of the arbitration request, if dispositive 

motions have been filed, and/or if a litigant is unfairly manipulating the judicial system 

by attempting to obtain a second bite at the apple due to an unfavorable ruling in another 

forum. Id.
13

Father raises four grounds to assert waiver. First, he argues that arbitration is an 

affirmative defense under Ind. Trial Rule 8(C) and Daughters have therefore waived 

arbitration by failing to raise it in their responsive pleading. Second, because the 

Daughters have substantially participated in this litigation, Father accuses them of acting 

inconsistently with any right to arbitrate. Third, by failing to raise arbitration more than a 

year past the filing of the complaint, Father argues that the Daughters’ motion to compel 

arbitration is untimely. Finally, Father asserts waiver because the Daughters did not raise 

his claim as an issue in their American Arbitration Association filing. 

We conclude that the Daughters did not waive their right to arbitrate. Although 

styled as a motion to dismiss or stay pending arbitration, we view Daughters’ motion as 

one to compel arbitration. See Tamko, 865 N.E.2d at 1078. Thus, the failure to raise it as 

an affirmative defense is inapposite. Next, we cannot conclude that the Daughters have 

fully litigated the issues by filing a responsive pleading and opposing Father’s motion for 

summary judgment. See Shahan v. Brinegar, 390 N.E.2d 1036, 1041 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1979). Neither does their year delay in requesting arbitration persuade us to find waiver. 

See MPACT Const. Group, LLC v. Superior Concrete Constructors, Inc., 802 N.E.2d 

901, 910-11 (Ind. 2004). Finally, Father cites no authority for his argument that the 

Daughters’ American Arbitration Association filing forecloses arbitration of his unjust 

enrichment claim. Though seeking resolution of the Daughters’ fiduciary duty claims 

against Father, once the trial court determines that a dispute is subject to arbitration, all 

additional concerns, including issues regarding the merits of the underlying claim or 
14

procedural arbitrability, are for the arbitrator. Wilson Fertilizer & Grain, Inc. v. ADM 

Milling Co., 654 N.E.2d 848, 853 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied. Consequently, 

we find that no waiver of the Daughters’ right to arbitrate has occurred and affirm the 

trial court. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying 

Father’s motion for summary judgment. We also conclude that the trial court did not err 

by ordering the parties to resolve their dispute in arbitration.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J. and BARNES, J. concur