H 5648 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE June 7, 1995

Roemer

Rose

Roybal-Allard

Rush

Sabo

Sanders

Sawyer

Schroeder

Schumer

Scott

Serrano

Skaggs

Slaughter

Spratt

Stark

Stenholm

Stokes

Studds

Stupak

Tanner

Taylor (MS)

Tejeda

Thompson

Thornton

Torres

Torricelli

Towns

Tucker

Velazquez

Vento

Visclosky

Volkmer

Waters

Watt (NC)

Waxman

Williams

Wise

Woolsey

Wyden

Wynn

Yates

Young (AK)

NOT VOTING—14

Bonilla

Cubin

Hayes

Houghton

Kleczka

Lofgren

Lucas

Paxon

Pelosi

Peterson (FL)

Riggs

Tauzin

Waldholtz

Watts (OK)

b 1535

Messrs. FLAKE, VOLKMER, MOAKLEY, SCHUMER, and SERRANO

changed their vote from ‘‘yea’’ to

‘‘nay.’’

Mr. HANSEN and Mr. NUSSLE

changed their vote from ‘‘nay’’ to

‘‘yea.’’

So the resolution was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced

as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on

the table.

AMERICAN OVERSEAS INTERESTS

fACT OF 1995

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr.

LAHOOD). Pursuant to House Resolutions 155 and 156 and rule XXIII, the

Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State

of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, H.R. 1561.

b 1538

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself

into the Committee of the Whole House

on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill (H.R.

1561) to consolidate the foreign affairs

agencies of the United States; to authorize appropriations for the Department of State and related agencies for

fiscal years 1996 and 1997; to responsibly reduce the authorizations of appropriations for United States foreign

assistance programs for fiscal years

1996 and 1997, and for other purposes,

with Mr. GOODLATTE in the Chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee of the Whole rose on Wednesday,

May 24, 1995, amendment number 42 offered by the gentleman from Florida

[Mr. HASTINGS] had been disposed of,

and the bill was open for amendment at

any point.

Pursuant to House Resolutions 155

and 156, 6 hours and 35 minutes remain

for consideration of the bill under the

5-minute rule.

Only the following further amendments to the committee amendment in

the nature of a substitute, as modified

and amended, are in order:

Pro forma amendments for the purpose of debate;

Amendments printed before May 25,

1995, in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD;

Amendments en bloc described in

section 2 of House Resolution 155 comprising only amendments printed before May 25, 1995; and

One amendment offered by the chairman of the Committee on International

Relations.

Are there further amendments to the

bill?

AMENDMENTS EN BLOC, AS MODIFIED, OFFERED

BY MR. GILMAN

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer

amendments en bloc, as modified.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendments and report the

modifications.

The Clerk designated the amendments en bloc and proceeded to read

the modifications.

Mr. GILMAN (during the reading).

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the modifications be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection

to the request of the gentleman from

New York?

There was no objection.

The text of the amendments en bloc,

as modified, is as follows:

Amendments en bloc, as modified, offered

by Mr. GILMAN:

Amendment No. 12 offered by Mr. LANTOS:

After section 3211, insert the following new

section:

SEC. 3212. CENTRAL ASIAN ENTERPRISE FUND.

Notwithstanding section 201(d)(3)(A) of the

Support for East European Democracy

(SEED) Act of 1989 (22 U.S.C. 5421(d)(3)(A)),

the Central Asian-American Enterprise Fund

may, in lieu of the appointment of citizens of

the host countries to its Board of Directors,

establish an advisory council for the host region comprised of citizens of each of the host

countries or establish separate advisory

councils for each of the host countries, with

which such Fund shall periodically consult

with respect to the Fund’s policies and proposed activities. Such host country citizens

shall satisfy the experience and expertise requirements set forth in section 201(d)(3)(A)

and (d)(3)(C) of that Act.

Amendment No. 13 as modified, offered by

Mr. LIVINGSTON: Page 47, strike line 9 and all

that follows through line 20 (section 348(e) of

the bill), and insert the following:

(e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

Section 8(a) of such Act (22 U.S.C. 1465f(a)) is

amended in the second sentence by striking

‘‘United States Information Agency’’ and inserting ‘‘Department of State’’.

In section 2101(a)(1)(B), strike ‘‘only’’.

In section 2101(a)(2)(B), strike ‘‘only’’.

In section 2102(b)(2)(A)(i), strike ‘‘only’’.

In section 2102(b)(2)(B)(i), strike ‘‘only’’.

In section 2102(b)(2)(C), strike ‘‘to be made

available’’.

In section 2102(b)(2)(D), strike ‘‘only’’.

In section 2102(b)(2)(E), strike ‘‘only’’.

In section 2102(b)(2)(G), strike ‘‘only’’.

In section 2106(4)(B), strike ‘‘only’’.

In section 2106(4)(C), strike ‘‘only’’.

In section 3222(a)(1)(A), strike ‘‘shall’’ and

insert ‘‘should’’.

In section 3222(a)(1)(B), strike ‘‘shall’’ and

insert ‘‘should’’.

In section 3222(b), strike ‘‘shall’’ and insert

‘‘should’’.

In section 3222(c), strike ‘‘shall’’ and insert

‘‘should’’.

In section 3227(a), strike ‘‘shall’’ and insert

‘‘should’’.

Amendment No. 30, as modified, offered by

Mr. CONDIT: After chapter 2 of title XXXIV

(relating to special authorities and other

provisions), insert the following new chapter

(and redesignate the subsequent chapter accordingly):

CHAPTER 3—FOREIGN AID REPORTING

REFORM ACT OF 1995

SEC. 3421. SHORT TITLE.

This chapter may be cited as the ‘‘Foreign

Aid Reporting Reform Act of 1995’’.

SEC. 3422. ANNUAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE JUSTIFICATION REPORT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—In conjunction with the

submission of the annual requests for enactment of authorizations and appropriations

for foreign assistance programs for each fiscal year, the President shall submit to the

Congress a single report containing—

(1) an integrated justification for all foreign assistance programs proposed by the

President for the coming fiscal year; and

(2) an assessment of when the objective of

those programs will be achieved so that the

assistance can be terminated.

(b) SPECIFIC INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED.—Each such report shall include the

following:

(1) INFORMATION REGARDING A FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM GENERALLY.—For each

foreign assistance program taken as a

whole—

(A) the total amount of assistance proposed to be provided under that program;

(B) the justification for that amount;

(C) the objectives that assistance under

that program is intended to achieve;

(D) an explanation of the relationship of

assistance under that program to assistance

under other foreign assistance programs; and

(E) the President’s estimation of the date

by which the objectives of that program will

be achieved and the program terminated.

(2) INFORMATION REGARDING SPECIFIC ASSISTANCE RECIPIENTS.—For each country or

organization which is a proposed recipient of

assistance under any foreign assistance program—

(A) the amount of each type of assistance

proposed;

(B) the justification for providing each

such type of assistance;

(C) the objectives that each such type of

assistance is intended to achieve;

(D) an explanation of the relationship of

each type of assistance proposed to other

types of assistance proposed for that recipient; and

(E) the President’s estimation of the date

by which the objectives of assistance for

such recipient under each foreign assistance

program will be achieved and assistance

under that program to that recipient terminated.

The information required by subparagraphs

(A) through (E) shall be provided on a recipient-by-recipient basis.

(3) INFORMATION REGARDING CENTRALLYFUNDED PROGRAMS.—For each centrally-funded program under a foreign assistance program—

(A) the amount proposed for such program;

(B) the justification for such program;

(C) the objectives each such program is intended to achieve;

(D) an explanation of the relationship of

such program to other types of assistance

proposed under that foreign assistance program and under other foreign assistance programs; and

(E) the President’s estimation of the date

by which the objectives of such program will

be achieved and such program terminated.

SEC. 3423. DEFINITION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

PROGRAMS.

As used in this chapter, the term ‘‘foreign

assistance program’’ includes—

(1) any program of assistance authorized

by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (such
June 7, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H 5649

as the development assistance program, the

economic support fund program, and the

international military education and training program) or authorized by the African

Development Foundation Act, section 401 of

the Foreign Assistance Act of 1969 (relating

to the Inter-American Development Foundation), or any other foreign assistance legislation;

(2) any program of grant, credit, or guaranty assistance under the Arms Export Control Act;

(3) assistance under the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962;

(4) assistance under any title of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance

Act of 1954;

(5) contributions to the International Monetary Fund;

(6) contributions to the International Bank

for Reconstruction and Development, the

International Development Association, or

any other institution within the World Bank

group; and

(7) contributions to any regional multilateral development bank.

Amendment No. 33, as modified offered by

Mr. GILMAN: At the end of chapter 6 of title

XXXI (relating to other provisions of defense

and security assistance), add the following

new section:

SEC. 3194. RETURN AND EXCHANGES OF DEFENSE ARTICLES PREVIOUSLY

TRANSFERRED PURSUANT TO THE

ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT.

(a) REPAIR OF DEFENSE ARTICLES.—Section

21 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C.

2761) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

‘‘(l) AUTHORITY.—

‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The President may acquire a repairable defense article from a foreign country or international organization,

if such defense article—

‘‘(A) previously was transferred to such

country or organization under this Act;

‘‘(B) is not an end item; and

‘‘(C) will be exchanged for a defense article

of the same type that is in the stocks of the

Department of Defense.

‘‘(2) LIMITATION.—The President may exercise the authority provided in paragraph (1)

only to the extent that the Department of

Defense—

‘‘(A)(i) has a requirement for the defense

article being returned; and

‘‘(ii) has available sufficient funds authorized and appropriated for such purpose; or

‘‘(B)(i) is accepting the return of the defense article for subsequent transfer to another foreign government or international

organization pursuant to a letter of offer and

acceptance implemented in accordance with

this Act; and

‘‘(ii) has available sufficient funds provided

by or on behalf of such other foreign government or international organization pursuant

to a letter of offer and acceptance implemented in accordance with this Act.

‘‘(3) REQUIREMENT.—(A) The foreign government or international organization receiving a new or repaired defense article in

exchange for a repairable defense article pursuant to paragraph (1) shall, upon the acceptance by the United States Government

of the repairable defense article being returned, be charged the total cost associated

with the repair and replacement transaction.

‘‘(B) The total cost charged pursuant to

subparagraph (A) shall be the same as that

charged the United States Armed Forces for

a similar repair and replacement transaction, plus an administrative surcharge in

accordance with subsection (e)(1)(A) of this

section.

‘‘(4) RELATIONSHIP TO CERTAIN OTHER PROVISIONS OF LAW.—The authority of the President to accept the return of a repairable defense article as provided in subsection (a)

shall not be subject to chapter 137 of title 10,

United States Code, or any other provision of

law relating to the conclusion of contracts.’’.

(b) RETURN OF DEFENSE ARTICLES.—Section

21 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 2761), as amended by

this Act, is further amended by adding at the

end the following new subsection:

‘‘(m) AUTHORITY.—

‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The President may accept the return of a defense article from a

foreign country or international organization, if such defense article—

‘‘(A) previously was transferred to such

country or organization under this Act;

‘‘(B) is not significant military equipment

(as defined in section 47(9) of this Act); and

‘‘(C) is in fully functioning condition without need of repair or rehabilitation.

‘‘(2) LIMITATION.—The President may exercise the authority provided in paragraph (1)

only to the extent that the Department of

Defense—

‘‘(A)(i) has a requirement for the defense

article being returned; and

‘‘(ii) has available sufficient funds authorized and appropriated for such purpose; or

‘‘(B)(i) is accepting the return of the defense article for subsequent transfer to another foreign government or international

organization pursuant to a letter of offer and

acceptance implemented in accordance with

this Act; and

‘‘(ii) has available sufficient funds provided

by or on behalf of such other foreign government or international organization pursuant

to a letter of offer and acceptance implemented in accordance with this Act.

‘‘(3) CONDITION.—Upon acquisition and acceptance by the United States Government

of a defense article under paragraph (1), the

appropriate Foreign Military Sales account

of the provider shall be credited to reflect

the transaction.

‘‘(4) RELATIONSHIP TO CERTAIN OTHER PROVISIONS OF LAW.—The authority of the President to accept the return of a defense article

as provided in paragraph (1) shall not be subject to chapter 137 of title 10, United States

Code, or any other provision of law relating

to the conclusion of contracts.’’.

(c) REGULATIONS.—Under the direction of

the President, the Secretary of Defense shall

promulgate regulations to implement subsections (l) and (m) of section 21 of the Arms

Export Control Act, as added by this section.

Amendment No. 34, as modified, read by

Mr. GILMAN: At the end of chapter 1 of title

XXVI (relating to miscellaneous foreign policy provisions), add the following new section:

SEC. 2604. REPEAL OF TERMINATION OF PROVISIONS OF THE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PREVENTION ACT OF

1994.

Part D of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (part D of title VIII of the

Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal

Years 1994 and 1995; Public Law 103–236; 108

Stat. 525) is hereby repealed.

Amendment No. 35, as modified, read by

Mr. GILMAN: Page 203, line 2, strike ‘‘for such

fiscal year’’.

Amendment No. 43, as modified, offered by

Mr. HOKE: At the end of chapter 2 of title

XXXIV of division C (relating to special authorities and other provisions), add the following new section:

SEC. 3420. PROHIBITION ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

NOT IMPLEMENTING EXTRADITION

TREATIES.

(a) PROHIBITION.—Except as provided in

subsection (b), the President may not provide foreign assistance to the government of

any country determined by the President to

have refused to implement an extradition

treaty between such country and the United

States with respect to one or more individuals of significant concern to the United

States who have been charged with or who

have committed felony offenses.

(b) EXCEPTION.—The President may provide

foreign assistance to the government of a

country that would otherwise be prohibited

from receiving such assistance under subsection (a) if the President—

(1) determines that the provision of such

assistance is in the national interest of the

United States; and

(2) notifies the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign

Relations of the Senate of such determination.

(c) DEFINITIONS.—As used in this section:

(1) FELONY OFFENSE.—The term ‘‘felony offense’’ means an offense punishable by death

or imprisonment for a term exceeding one

year.

(2) FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.—The term ‘‘foreign assistance’’ means any funds made

available to carry out any program, project,

or activity under the Foreign Assistance Act

of 1961 or the Arms Export Control Act, except such term does not include funds used

to provide humanitarian assistance.

(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The prohibition contained in subsection (a) applies with respect

to the provision of foreign assistance on or

after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Amendment No. 49 offered by Mr. KING:

Page 196, after line 13, insert the following

section:

SEC. 2712. POLICY TOWARD IRAN.

(a) IRAN’S ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.—The Congress makes the following findings with respect to Iran’s acts of international terrorism:

(1) As cited by the Department of State,

the Government of Iran was the greatest

supporter of state terrorism in 1992, supporting over 20 terrorist acts, including the

bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos

Aires that killed 29 people.

(2) As cited by the Department of State,

the Government of Iran is a sponsor of radical religious groups that have used terrorism

as a tool. These include such groups as

Hezballah, HAMAS, the Turkish Islamic

Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP—

GC).

(3) As cited by the Department of State,

the Government of Iran has resorted to

international terrorism as a means of obtaining political gain. These actions have included not only the assassination of former

Prime Minister Bakhitiar, but the death sentence imposed on Salman Rushdie, and the

assassination of the leader of the Kurdish

Democratic Party of Iran.

(4) As cited by the Department of State

and the Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism, the Government of Iran

has long been a proponent of terrorist actions against the United States, beginning

with the takeover of the United States Embassy in Tehran in 1979. Iranian support of

extremist groups has led to the following attacks upon the United States as well:

(A) The car bomb attack on the United

States Embassy in Beirut killing 49 in 1983

by the Hezballah.

(B) The car bomb attack on the United

States Marine Barracks in Beirut killing 241

in 1983 by the Hezballah.

(C) The assassination of American University President in 1984 by the Hezballah.

(D) The kidnapping of all American hostages in Lebanon from 1984–86 by the

Hezballah.

(5) The Government of Iran provides several hundred million dollars annually in financial and logistical support to organizations that use terrorism and violence as a
H 5650 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE June 7, 1995

tool to undermine the Middle East peace

process.

(6) The Government of Iran provides financial, political, and logistical support and safe

haven to groups that seek the violent overthrow of secular governments in the Middle

East and North Africa.

(b) IRAN’S PROGRAM TO ACQUIRE WEAPONS

OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE MEANS BY

WHICH TO DELIVER THEM.—The Congress

makes the following findings with respect to

Iran’s program to acquire weapons of mass

destruction and the means by which to deliver them—

(1) the Government of Iran has intensified

its efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction and the means by which to deliver

them:

(2) given Iran’s petroleum reserves, the desire of the Government of Iran to obtain gas

centrifuge equipment and light water nuclear power reactors clearly demonstrates

what had already been apparent, that Iran

seeks to develop its nuclear weapons capability; and

(3) Iran has been relentless in its attempt

to acquire the missiles needed to deliver nuclear and chemical weapons.

(c) IRAN’S VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS.—

The Congress makes the following findings

with respect to Iran’s violations of human

rights:

(1) As cited by the 1991 United Nations Special Representative on Human Rights, Amnesty International, and the United States

Department of State, the Government of

Iran has conducted assassinations outside of

Iran, such as that of former Prime Minister

Shahpour Bakhitiar for which the Government of France issued arrest warrants for

several Iranian governmental officials.

(2) As cited by the 1991 United Nations Special Representative on Human Rights and by

Amnesty International, the Government of

Iran has conducted revolutionary trials

which do not meet internationally recognized standards of fairness or justice. These

trials have included such violations as a lack

of procedural safeguards, trial times of 5

minutes or less, limited access to defense

counsel, forced confessions, and summary

executions.

(3) As cited by the 1991 United Nations Special Representative on Human Rights, the

Government of Iran systematically represses

its Baha’i population. Persecutions of this

small religious community include assassinations, arbitrary arrests, electoral prohibitions, and denial of applications for documents such as passports.

(4) As cited by the 1991 United Nations Special Representative on Human Rights, the

Government of Iran suppresses opposition to

its government. Political organizations such

as the Freedom Movement are banned from

parliamentary elections, have their telephones tapped and their mail opened, and are

systematically harassed and intimidated.

(5) As cited by the 1991 United Nations Special Representative on Human Rights and

Amnesty International, the Government of

Iran has failed to recognize the importance

of international human rights. This includes

suppression of Iranian human rights movements such as the Freedom Movement, lack

of cooperation with international human

rights organizations such as the International Red Cross, and an overall apathy

toward human rights in general. This lack of

concern prompted the Special Representative to state in his report that Iran had made

‘‘no appreciable progress towards improved

compliance with human rights in accordance

with the current international instruments’’.

(6) As cited by Amnesty International, the

Government of Iran continues to torture its

political prisoners. Torture methods include

burns, arbitrary blows, severe beatings, and

positions inducing pain.

(d) UNITED STATES POLICY AND RESPONSE.—

The Congress makes the following findings

with respect to United States policy and response to Iran:

(1) The actions by the Government of Iran

identified in subsections (a), (b), and (c)

threaten the national security and offend the

democratic values of the United States and

many other nations in the Middle East and

elsewhere.

(2) In response to this record of violent,

destablizing, and antidemocratic conduct, it

has been the policy of the United States to

seek to isolate the Government of Iran diplomatically and economically, thereby making the continuation of such conduct increasingly costly.

(3) The policies the United States has pursued in an effort to pressure the Government

of Iran diplomatically and economically

have included refusing to conduct normal

diplomatic relations with Iran; barring the

importation of Iranian oil and other products into the United States; prohibiting the

export or reexport to Iran of weapons or of

goods or technology with potential military

uses; voting against all loans to Iran by

international financial institutions; and,

most recently, imposing a total economic

embargo on Iran.

(4) To further increase the cost to the Government of Iran of its objectionable conduct

the United States has urged other countries

with economic ties to Iran to take equivalent steps to isolate Iran economically and

diplomatically.

(e) CONGRESSIONAL DECLARATIONS.—The

Congress makes the following declarations:

(1) The imposition of an economic embargo

on Iran by President Clinton was an important and necessary measure to increase economic and political pressure on Iran.

(2) The President should, as a matter of the

highest priority, intensify efforts to persuade Iran’s leading trade partners and

creditors to join with the United States in

ceasing all trade with Iran and ending any

rescheduling or other relaxation of debts

owed to them.

(3) The President should take whatever

steps are appropriate to dissuade those who

are aiding Iran’s efforts to develop nuclear

weapons and the means by which to deliver

them from continuing such assistance.

(4) The United States should convene a special summit of the world’s leading heads of

state to address the issue of international

terrorism and the means for improving the

efforts to combat international terrorism.

(5) The Secretary of State should promptly

take steps to strengthen each of the existing

multilateral nonproliferation regimes to

make them more effective in counteracting

rogue regimes such as Iran.

(6) The President should make the development of a multilateral economic embargo on

Iran a top priority on the agenda at the

meeting of the G–7 industrial partners scheduled for June 1995 in Halifax, Nova Scotia.

Amendment No. 59, as modified offered by

Mr. ROEMER: At the end of title XXVII of division B (relating to congressional statements), add the following new section:

SEC. 2172. CONFLICT IN CHECHNYA

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds the following:

(1) Russian troops advanced into Chechnya

on December 10, 1994, and were met with

strong resistance from Chechen rebels who

have now moved to the Caucasus mountains

where they are engaging in what even the

most optimistic Russian military officers

predict will be a drawn-out guerrilla war.

(2) The cost of the Chechen battle is estimated to cost the Government of Russia at

least $2,000,000,000 and could exacerbate the

budget deficit of the Government of Russia.

(3) The United States has approved over

$2,400,000,000 in loan guarantees through the

Export-Import Bank of the United States

and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.

(4) The United States has provided Russia

with significant direct assistance to promote

a free market economy, support democracy,

meet humanitarian needs, and dismantle nuclear weapons.

(b) DECLARATION OF POLICY.—The Congress

declares the following:

(1) United States investment in Russia has

been significant in promoting democracy and

stabilizing the economy of Russia and this

progress could be imperiled by Russia’s continued war in Chechnya.

(2) the inability to negotiate an end to this

crisis and the resulting economic implications could adversely affect the ability of

Russia to fulfill its commitments to the

International Monetary Fund, the ExportImport Bank of the United States, and the

Overseas Private Investment Corporation.

(3) In further contacts with President

Yeltsin, it is imperative that President Clinton repeat his call for an immediate end to

the war in Chechnya.

Amendment No. 61, as modified, offered by

Mr. ROHRABACHER: At the end of title XXXIII

(relating to regional provisions), add the following new sections:

SECTION 3314. ASSISTANCE FOR LAOS.

(a) It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) a permanent waiver on the prohibition

of foreign assistance for Laos should be

granted following the fullest possible accounting of all outstanding POW/MIA cases

involving Laos;

(2) the United States should continue to

improve its relationship with Laos as the

mutual cooperation between the two countries on POW/MIA issues improves;

(3) no Lao citizen or government official

should be held accountable by the United

States for activities involved in holding

American POW/MIAs if those citizens or officials cooperate with efforts to return such

POW/MIAs alive or to otherwise account for

such POW/MIAs;

(4) the future relationship of the United

States with Laos should be characterized by

economic cooperation and friendly diplomatic ties;

(5) such bilateral relationship will improve

as respect for human rights in Laos improves, including human rights for Hmong

people; and

(6) in the event an American POW/MIA is

returned alive from Laos, the United States

should view this action as a positive development and as strong incentive for the United

States to rapidly improve our economic and

diplomatic relationship with Laos.

(b) Notwithstanding section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, foreign assistance may be provided for Laos for fiscal

years 1996 and 1997 only if the President determines and certifies to the Congress that

the Government of Laos is cooperating with

the United States on outstanding POW/MIA

cases involving Laos.

Amendment No. 63 offered by Mr. ROTH:

Add a new Section 2604 as follows:

SEC. 2604. ANNUAL ASSESSMENT

The Secretary of State shall assess the impact of the foreign policy of the United

States on the ability of United States entities engaged in the manufacture, sale, distribution, or provision of goods or services to

compete in foreign markets. The Secretary

shall provide such assessments annually to

the Committee on International Relations of

the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate

and shall publish such assessments in the

Federal Register.
June 7, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H 5651

Amendment No. 65 offered by Mr. SAWYER:

At the end of title XXVII (relating to congressional statements) insert the following

new section:

SEC. 2712. UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE

FOURTH WORLD CONFERENCE ON

WOMEN IN BEJING.

It is the sense of the Congress that the

United States delegation to the Fourth

World Conference on Women should include

at least one representative of a United

States-based nongovernmental organization

representing Tibetan women.

Amendment No. 66 offered by Mr. SAWYER:

At the end of chapter 6 of title XXXI (relating to other provisions of defense and security assistance), add the following new section:

SEC. 3194. ANNUAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE REPORT.

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is

amended by inserting after section 654 (22

U.S.C. 2414) the following new section:

‘‘SEC. 657. ANNUAL REPORT ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND MILITARY EXPORTS.

‘‘Not later than February 1 of each year,

the President shall transmit to the Congress

an annual report for the fiscal year ending

the previous September 30, showing the aggregate dollar value and quantity of defense

articles (including excess defense articles)

and defense services, and of military education and training, furnished by the United

States to each foreign country and international organization, by category, specifying whether they were furnished by grant

under chapter 2 or chapter 5 of part II of this

Act, by sale under chapter 2 of the Arms Export Control Act, by commercial sale license

under section 38 of that Act, or by any other

authority.’’.

Amendment No. 69 offered by Mr. SMITH of

New Jersey: In section 2102(b)(2)(C) (relating

to voluntary contributions for the war

crimes tribunal for the former yugoslavia)—

(1) in the heading strike ‘‘FOR THE FORMER

YUGOSLAVIA’’;

(2) strike ‘‘budget for the tribunal’’ and insert ‘‘combined budgets for the tribunals’’;

and

(3) after ‘‘Yugoslavia’’ insert ‘‘and the

United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’’.

Amendment No. 71 Offered by Mr.

TORRICELLI: At the end of Title XXXII (relating to regional provisions) at the following

new section:

SEC. 3314. RESTRICTIONS ON ASSISTANCE FOR

GUATEMALA.

(a) RESTRICTION.—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated for grant assistance under section 23 of the Arms Export

Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763; relating to foreign military financing) or for assistance

under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et seq.; relating to international military education

and training) may be made available to the

Government of Guatemala unless the Secretary of State determines and certifies to

the appropriate congressional committees

that—

(1) substantial progress has been made in

the prosecution of all those responsible for

the human rights abuses against Michael

DeVine, Nicholas Blake, Griffin Davis,

Dianna Ortiz, Myrna Mack, and Efrain

Bamaca Velasquez;

(2) former Guatemalan Lieutenant Colonel

Carlos Rene Ochoa Ruiz, who is under indictment in the State of Florida for narcotics

trafficking, has been extradited to the United States; and

(3) substantial progress has been made in

the dismantling of the Voluntary Civil SelfDefense Committees, curbing their patrols,

and returning their weapons to the Guatemalan military.

(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—For purpose of this section,

the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on

Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations

of the Senate.

Amendment No. 78 Offered by: Mr. ZIMMER:

At the end of title XXXIII (relating to regional provisions), add the following new

section:

SEC. 3314. PROHIBITION ON ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, MILITARY ASSISTANCE OR

ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF MAURITANIA UNLESS APPROPRIATE ACTION IS TAKEN TO

ELIMINATE CHATTEL SLAVERY.

(a) PROHIBITION.—The President may not

provide economic assistance, military assistance or arms transfers to the Government of

Mauritania unless the President certifies to

the Congress that such Government has

taken appropriate action to eliminate chattel slavery in Mauritania, including—

(1) the enactment of anti-slavery laws that

provide appropriate punishment for violators

of such laws; and

(2) the rigorous enforcement of such laws.

(b) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section, the following definitions apply:

(1) ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.—The term ‘‘economic assistance’’ means any assistance

under part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of

1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) and any assistance under chapter 4 of part II of such Act

(22 U.S.C. 2346 et seq.) (relating to the economic support fund), except that such term

does not include humanitarian assistance.

(2) MILITARY ASSISTANCE OR ARMS TRANSFERS.—The term ‘‘military assistance or

arms transfers’’ means—

(A) assistance under chapter 2 of part II of

the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.

2311 et seq.) (relating to military assistance),

including the transfer of excess defense articles under sections 516 through 519 of that

Act (22 U.S.C. 2321j through 2321m);

(B) assistance under chapter 5 of part II of

the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.

2347 et seq.) (relating to international military education and training);

(C) assistance under the ‘‘Foreign Military

Financing Program’’ under section 23 of the

Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763); or

(D) the transfer of defense articles, defense

services, or design and construction services

under the Arms Export Control Act (22

U.S.C. 2751 et seq.), including defense articles

and defense services licensed or approved for

export under section 38 of that Act (22 U.S.C.

2778).

Amendment No. 80 Offered by: Mr.

BILBRAY: Page 100, line 10, strike

‘‘$12,472,000’’ and insert ‘‘$19,372,000’’.

At the end of the bill, add the following:

DIVISION D—ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS

TITLE XLI—FOREIGN BUILDINGS

SEC. 4001. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

Notwithstanding section 2101(a)(4), there

are authorized to be appropriated for ‘‘Acquisition and Maintenance of Buildings

Abroad’’, $369,860,000 for the fiscal year 1997.

Amendment No. 82 Offered by: Mr. BURTON

of Indiana: In paragraph (1) of section 3309(b)

(relating to the future of the United States

military presence in Panama)—

(1) in the matter preceding subparagraph

(A), strike ‘‘a new base rights’’ and insert

‘‘an’’; and

(2) strike subparagraph (B) and insert the

following new subparagraph:

(B) to ensure that the United States will be

able to act after December 31, 1999, to maintain the security of the Panama Canal and

guarantee its regular operation, consistent

with the Panama Canal Treaty, the Treaty

Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and

Operation of the Panama Canal, and the resolutions of ratification thereto; and

Amendment No. 83: Offered by Mr. CHABOT:

At the end of the bill, add the following:

DIVISION D—ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS

TITLE XLI—AUTHORIZATION OF

APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 4101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

(a) FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING PROGRAM.—Notwithstanding section 3101 of this

Act, there are authorized to be appropriated

for grant assistance under section 23 of the

Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) and

for the subsidy cost, as defined in section

502(5) of the Federal Credit Reform Act of

1990, of direct loans under such section—

(1) $3,274,440,000 for fiscal year 1996; and

(2) $3,216,020,000 for fiscal year 1997.

(b) ECONOMIC SUPPORT ASSISTANCE.—Notwithstanding section 3201 of this Act, section

532(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961

(22 U.S.C. 234a(a)) is amended to read as follows:

‘‘(a) There are authorized to be appropriated to the President to carry out the purposes of this chapter $2,346,378,000 for fiscal

year 1996 and $2,238,478,000 for fiscal year

1997.’’.

(c) DEVELOPMENT FUND FOR AFRICA.—Notwithstanding paragraph (2) of section 3221(a)

of this Act, there are authorized to be appropriated $649,214,000 for fiscal year 1996 and

$634,214,000 for fiscal year 1997 to carry out

chapter 10 of part I of the Foreign Assistance

Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2293 et seq.).

Amendment No. 86 Offered by: Mr. Gilman:

After section 510, insert the following new

section:

SEC. 511. TRANSFER OF FUNCTION.

Any determination as to whether a transfer of function, carried out under this Act,

constitutes a transfer of function for purposes of subchapter I of chapter 35 of title 5,

United States Code, shall be made without

regard to whether or not the function involved is identical to functions already being

performed by the receiving agency.

Amendment No. 87 Offered by: Mr. Hamilton: On page 286 after line 19, amend the subsection ‘‘(e)’’ which would be added to Section 222 of the Foreign Assistance Act of

1961, by adding at the end a new sentence as

follows:

‘‘The provisions of this subsection shall

not apply to guaranties which have been issued for the benefit of the Republic of South

Africa.’’

Amendment No. 96, as modified, offered by

Mrs. SCHROEDER: At the end of title XXVII

insert the following new section:

SEC. 2712. FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—

(1) female genital mutilation is a violation

of women’s basic human rights;

(2) female genital mutilation constitutes a

major health risk to women, with lifelong

physical and psychological consequences;

and

(3) female genital mutilation should not be

condoned by any government.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of

the Congress that—

(1) the President should seek to end the

practice of female genital mutilation worldwide through the active cooperation and participation of governments in countries where

female genital mutilation takes place; and

(2) steps to end the practice of female genital mutilation should include—

(A) encouraging nations to establish clear

policies against female genital mutilation

and enforcing existing laws which prohibit

it;

(B) assisting nations in creating culturally

appropriate outreach programs that include
H 5652 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE June 7, 1995

education and counseling about the dangers

of female genital mutilation for women and

men of all ages; and

(C) ensuring that all appropriate programs

in which the United States participates include a component pertaining to female genital mutilation, so as to ensure consistency

across the spectrum of health and child related programs conducted in any country in

which female genital mutilation is known to

be a problem.

Amendment No. 98, as modified, Offered by

Mr. TRAFFICANT: At the end of title XXVII

(relating to congressional statements), add

the following new section:

SEC. 2712. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS REGARDING

SYRIAN OCCUPATION OF LEBANON.

It is the sense of the Congress that—

(1) the Government of Syria should comply

with the Taif Agreement and withdraw all of

its troops from Lebanon;

(2) the United States should use its contacts at the highest level of the Syrian Government to encourage the Government of

Syria to withdraw all of its troops from Lebanon within a timeframe to be negotiated between the Syrian and Lebanese Governments; and

(3) the Secretary of State should inform

the Congress as to the actions the United

States has taken to encourage withdrawal of

all Syrian troops from Lebanon.

Amendment No. 99, as modified, offered by

Mr. TRAFICANT: At the end of chapter 2 of

title XXXIV of division C (relating to special

authorities and other provisions of foreign

assistance authorizations), add the following

new section:

SEC. 3420. LIMITATION ON PROCUREMENT OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.

(a) Funds made available for assistance for

fiscal years 1996 and 1997 under the Foreign

Assistance Act of 1961, for which amounts

are authorized to be appropriated for such

fiscal years, may be used for procurement

outside the United States or less developed

countries only if—

(1) such funds are used for the procurement

of commodities or services, or defense articles or defense services, in the country in

which the assistance is to be provided, except that this paragraph only applies if the

total of such procurement for a project or activity in that country would cost less than

procurement from the United States;

(2) the provision of such assistance requires commodities or services, or defense

articles or defense services, of a type that

are not produced in, and available for purchase from, the United States, less developed

countries, or the country in which the assistance is to be provided;

(3) the Congress has specifically authorized

procurement outside the United States or

less developed countries; or

(4) the President determines on a case-bycase basis that the procurement outside the

United States or less developed countries

would result in the more efficient use of

United States foreign assistance resources,

including to meet unforeseen circumstances

such as emergency situations.

(b) For purposes of this section, the term

‘‘less developed countries’’ includes the recipient country if that country is not a developed country.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House

Resolution 155 and House Resolution

156, the gentleman from New York [Mr.

GILMAN] will be recognized for 5 minutes, and the gentleman from Indiana

[Mr. HAMILTON] will be recognized for 5

minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman

from New York [Mr. GILMAN].

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, the

House is not in order.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

The CHAIRMAN. Members and the

guests in the gallery are advised that

participants in this debate are entitled

to be heard, and they should not conduct conversations on the floor of the

House or in the gallery.

(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given

permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield

myself 1 minute.

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to offer

this amendment, which hopefully will

speed up and simplify the process of

consideration of this bill.

The amendment has been agreed to

on both sides, and I want to thank the

ranking Democratic Member, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON],

for his cooperation in putting together

this list of amendments. These are noncontroversial amendments.

There is only one amendment in this

en bloc amendment that affects funding levels. At the suggestion of the

gentleman from Ohio [Mr. CHABOT] we

have shifted another $20 million per

year into the Development Fund for

Africa. This money comes from the

Economic Support Fund and Foreign

Military Financing functions of the

budget.

It does not increase the deficit or the

overall spending levels in this bill.

I would like to point out to my colleagues that once we will have passed

this amendment, the Africa Development Fund will get 85 cents for every

dollar the general development assistance account receives for the rest of

the world. Right now, the Africa Fund

only gets 62 cents for every dollar the

general fund receives. Although we are

cutting many accounts, comparatively

speaking, Africa is being treated very

well in this bill.

Mr. Chairman, the en bloc amendment contains new language affecting the transfer of

functions between the various agencies to be

consolidated into the State Department under

this Act.

Under the law, when functions are transferred, the employees performing those functions are likewise transferred, and the employees in the new combined agency may or may

not be subject to a reduction in force, depending on the needs of the agency.

However, an unduly restrictive interpretation

of the phrase ‘‘transfer of function’’ has

cropped up in a little known case from the

Merit Systems Protection Board, and the ruling

in that case has unfortunately been adopted in

recent regulations by the Office of Personnel

Management.

Without this amendment, the rights of employees whose functions were shifted to the

Department of State would be adversely affected if they performed a function similar to a

function already carried out in the Department

of State, even if they were the best qualified

employees, were entitled to veterans preference, or otherwise ought to be retained.

In my opinion, the rights of employees

should be protected in a merger regardless of

whether some other employees performing

their function works in a gaining Department.

The gaining Department should have the right

and duty to retain the best personnel of the

combined agency work forces, consistent with

RIF regulations, without giving special preference to Department of State employees.

Accordingly, this section changes the definition of ‘‘transfer of function’’ for the purposes

of this Act. This change rejects, and it is my

explicit purpose to reject for the purposes of

this Act, the restrictive definition of the phrase

‘‘transfer of function’’ in the Office of Personnel Management’s current regulations at 5

C.F.R. Section 351.203 (1995), and the restrictive interpretation of that phrase by the

Court of Claims in Childress v. United States,

650 F.2d 285, 222 Ct. Cl. 557, 558 (1980),

and by the Merit Systems Protection Board in

Kentner v. National Transportation Safety

Board, 20 M.S.P.R. 595 (1984). This provision

is meant to ensure that employees affected by

a transfer of function and any attendant reduction in force are covered by OPM’s regulations

on transfers of functions, 5 C.F.R., Part 351,

Subpart C.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance

of my time.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I

yield myself such time as I may

consume.

Mr. Chairman, the en bloc amendment, as modified, has been cleared by

this side of the aisle. I want to express

my appreciation to the chairman of the

committee for his cooperation in working with us, and his willingness to do

so, to modify several of the amendments so they could be included in the

en bloc.

Mr. Chairman, I urge support of the

en bloc amendment, and I yield 1

minute to the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. GEJDENSON].

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman,

while I have grave reservations about

many parts of the bill, the en bloc is

certainly acceptable. I want to commend the gentleman from New York

[Mr. KING] for the work we have done

together on the Iranian provision within it. There is no country in the world

today that is more active in the support of terrorism that is trying to derail the peace process in the Middle

East to the degree that Iran is.

b 1545

The signal that we must send from

this Congress and from every government official in this country is that

that kind of behavior is unacceptable,

the United States will continue to resist it, and clearly the President’s leadership on this issue is something we

need to stand behind.

As we learned in the first instance

where Americans were taken hostage

in Iran, Iran may begin terrorism elsewhere on the globe but the pain will inevitably come back to us in the United

States. This is something we need to

get our European allies to join us on.

The efforts of this date are tremendous, but they are not sufficient without getting Europe to join us in this effort. Again, I would like to thank the

gentleman from New York [Mr. KING]

for working together on this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to co-sponsor

this amendment with my colleague from New
June 7, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H 5653

York, Mr. KING, who has been a leader on this

issue. This resolution puts our allies and others on notice that the Congress expects their

cooperation in isolating Iran. The administration has no objection to this amendment.

On April 30, the President took a bold and

decisive step by imposing a total embargo on

Iran. It left no room for interpretation. The

United States considers Iran to be an outlaw

and is simply unwilling to make believe that

Iran is among the family of civilized nations.

President Clinton has done the right thing and

the smart thing.

There seems to be little in the way of disagreement as to the United States objectives

in regard to Iran. Iran needs to end its support

for terrorism, much of which is designed to undermine the Middle East peace process. Iran

must cease its development of weapons of

mass destruction and the missiles by which to

deliver them. Iran must significantly alter its

abhorrent record on human rights.

The burden is now on our allies to come

along. Thus far, the strategy of constructive

dialogue embraced by many of our allies has,

to put it delicately, been less than successful;

to put it bluntly, Iran has paid no price for its

support for international terrorism or its efforts

to obtain weapons of mass destruction.

There are countries, even those with which

we have significant differences, where a constructive dialogue could serve to further our

objectives. Iran is not among them. It is a

rogue regime hell bent on fomenting unrest in

the region and determined to acquire weapons

of mass destruction so that it can terrorize not

only the region but the world.

Unlike North Korea, Iran is by no means

isolated. Iran exports $15.5 billion of goods

each year, $14 billion of which is comprised of

oil. In addition, Iran has approximately $25 billion in foreign debt, $12 billion of which was

re-scheduled last year, most of it by our allies.

So, those who purchased Iranian oil and those

who chose not to compel payment of Iranian

debts contributed upwards of $15 billion to

Iran’s ability to obtain weapons of mass destruction and train terrorists.

I fully support efforts to deny United States

exports to Iran. For the last 5 years I have

sponsored legislation that would deny dual

use technology to Iran. To maximize the impact of the embargo, we must get multilateral

cooperation in denying Iran dual use and military equipment, and other items that Iran

seeks to purchase. More important, we must

forge a multilateral consensus to restrict imports from Iran and to limit relief to Iran on the

terms of its foreign debt. We must deny to Iran

the resources it needs to support terrorism

and develop weapons of mass destruction.

Our allies must understand how serious we

are about Iran. An Iran with a nuclear bomb

and the means by which to deliver it is a blueprint for international chaos. It is encumbent

on the administration to apprise our allies on

a regular basis of Iran’s actions in supporting

international terrorism and developing weapons of mass destruction. The administration

must continue to express at the highest levels

the need to isolate Iran. The upcoming G–7

meeting in Nova Scotia is an appropriate

place to raise this issue in very clear terms.

Again, I join with Mr. KING in offering this

amendment and I urge my colleagues to vote

for it.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1

minute to the gentlewoman from Florida [Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN].

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Chairman,

I thank the gentleman for yielding me

the time.

Mr. Chairman, I support the Chabot

amendment to the en bloc, which

would increase funding for the Development Fund for Africa, because there

are important developmental and humanitarian assistance needs on that

continent.

I am also pleased that the amendment of the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. ZIMMER] on slavery in Mauritania has been accepted. It is long past

time for us to take action against any

Nation that tolerates slavery. The

State Department reports that there

may be up to 90,000 slaves in that country. Just one person held as a slave is

reason enough for us, I believe, to

refuse aid to the government that permits slavery to exist.

Finally, I commend the gentleman

from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH] for his

amendment to allow some of the funds

authorized for the War Crimes Tribunal

in Yugoslavia to be used for a similar

tribunal in Rwanda. We must bring to

justice those guilty of the crime of

genocide in Rwanda.

I thank the gentleman from New

York [Mr. GILMAN], the chairman, for

including these important Africa-related amendments in the en bloc amendments.

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr.

TORRICELLI].

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I

thank the gentleman for yielding me

the time.

The Chairman, in the last several

months the American people have

learned a great deal about Guatemala.

Ten Americans lost, disappeared, brutalized or raped. Their families have

come forward to tell the story of their

horrors in Guatemala.

The Drug Enforcement Agency has

told us a story that nearly one-third of

all the cocaine reaching the United

States is now warehoused in Guatemala before being shipped to our own

cities and towns. Yet 11 Guatemalan

military officers indicted in the United

States are protected by that country’s

laws where extradition is refused.

Against this, the backdrop of 150,000

people in Guatemala who have lost

their lives in the last 30 years through

a genocidal campaign against their

own people, led by civil defense patrols

who roam the countryside harassing,

exploiting and murdering poor civilians who are defenseless.

Mr. Chairman, in the weeks since we

have learned many of these things in

the tragic history of Guatemala, President Clinton has suspended United

States military assistance to that

country’s armed forces, demanding cooperation in the investigation of the

deaths of Americans, insisting on cooperation in the extradition of military

officers involved in cocaine trafficking.

I have included in the en bloc amendment an insistence that until there is

cooperation on narcotics, on ending

human rights abuses and on investigating the deaths and abuse of American

citizens, that there be no further assistance. This is indeed legislatively

the equivalent of what President Clinton has already done unilaterally.

I urge its adoption in the bill. I

thank the gentleman from New York

[Mr. GILMAN], the chairman of the committee, for its inclusion in the en bloc

amendments, and the gentleman from

Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON] for his support,

as well. It is simply a proper statement

in this bill.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1

minute to the gentleman from New

Jersey [Mr. SMITH], chairman of the

Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations.

(Mr. SMITH of New Jersey asked and

was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I thank my good friend the gentleman for yielding me the time.

Mr. Chairman, first I would like to

thank the gentlewoman from Florida

[Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN] and the gentlewoman from Georgia [Ms. MCKINNEY]

for cosponsoring this amendment with

me, and for their leadership on the

issue of trying to provide a modest

amount of funds to the War Crimes Tribunal for the people who has suffered

in Rwanda.

Mr. Chairman, the outbreak of warfare in Rwanda was accompanied by an

outbreak of genocidal violence all too

reminiscent of what happened in the

former Yugoslavia. Under cover of

long-standing tribal rivalries, an effort

was launched by leaders of one tribe to

bring about the systematic extermination of another.

It is important that the international community show that this

kind of crime against humanity will be

detected, prosecuted and punished. The

Rwanda tribunal was created by Security Council Resolution 955 on November 8, 1994. Many Members no doubt remember that date for other reasons,

but for Rwandans it was an important

sign of hope that the world had not forgotten their sufferings and there would

be a prosecution for committing these

heinous crimes.

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. I yield

such time as he may consume to the

gentleman from California [Mr.

FILNER].

(Mr. FILNER asked and was given

permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in

support of the en bloc amendment designated as number 80 which is a combination of amendments submitted by

Congressman BILBRAY and myself, to

restore funding required by the International Boundary and Water Commission [IBWC] to operate a critical sewage treatment facility soon to be completed in San Diego.

As many of you know, we are building a critically-needed $240 million
H 5654 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE June 7, 1995

sewage treatment plant in San Diego,

CA. This plant is under construction

and will soon be completed. It is imperative that we provide the funds necessary to operate this treatment

plant—and that we fulfill our commitment to the thousands of American

citizens who suffer from the raw sewage that flows downhill from Mexico

through our community and contaminates the Tijuana River and our beaches. This sewage is more than a nuisance, it is a health hazard!

While this is only a minor technical

correction in the context of the State

Department’s overall budget, this

amendment is critical for the IBWC to

operate the soon-to-be-completed sewage treatment facility. Our failure to

operate this facility would present a

serious health threat to San Diego and

threaten our Nation’s ability to fulfill

an international treaty obligation.

The failure of the federal government

to operate this facility, after it is built,

would be the height of absurdity—and

would mark a tragic new day in our

Nation’s history, I urge my colleagues

to support the bipartisan, FilnerBilbray amendment!

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Colorado [Mrs. SCHROEDER].

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, I

thank the gentleman for yielding me

the time, and I thank my colleagues

for putting a generic form of my

amendment into this area.

Mr. Chairman, this is very historic,

in that it is the first time this body

will speak out and say that our government should recognize female genital

mutilation as a major health risk to

women and a major human rights violation, and we also should do everything we can to make sure that countries do not allow this practice to continue. This was important.

I had wanted to target this to Egypt,

since we give so much aid to Egypt and

since this practice is so rampant there,

and especially since their government

has recently tried to medicalize it

rather than condemn it. This is a more

generic form, but I approve it, and I

think very much all of my colleagues

who worked very hard to take this

very, very important step of saying

violations against women are also

human rights violations and not just

cultural violations. There has never

been any religious reason for this.

There has never been any reason except

cultural, and we are making a great

progressive step today.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1

minute to the gentleman from New

York [Mr. KING], a member of our committee.

Mr. KING. Mr. Chairman, I thank the

gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN] for yielding me the time.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the

en bloc amendment. Iran is an outlaw

state, the major destabilizing force in

the Middle East, and is desperately attempting to obtain nuclear capability.

I am proud I have been able to join my

colleague, the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. GEJDENSON], in sponsoring this amendment, amendment 49,

which will establish on the record as a

sense of Congress that Iran is an outlaw nation.

In addition to that, Mr. Chairman,

this amendment will go one step further than the President’s boycott announcement of April 30, where the

President announced a unilateral boycott against Iran. This was a very important first step but it is not enough.

It is essential that all our allies join

this embargo, and the sense of Congress resolution which is encompassed

in amendment 49 will call upon the

President to make the development of

a multilateral economic embargo on

Iran a major priority at the Halifax G–

7 meeting.

I want to thank the gentleman from

Connecticut [Mr. GEJDENSON] for his

support in working with me. I want to

thank the gentleman from New York

[Mr. GILMAN], the chairman, and the

gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON], the ranking member, for their

support, and I urge support of the en

bloc amendment and indeed final passage of the entire bill.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, with regard to

the amendment offered by Mr. KING, I would

like to congratulate the gentleman on his

amendment and his leadership on our effort to

combat Iran and its terrorist policies. This

amendment makes a positive contribution to

our policy toward Iran and puts a much-needed multilateral focus on the President’s Executive order of May 8 prohibiting U.S. trade and

investment with that country.

This amendment clearly identifies how Iran’s

policies pose a threat to our interests and to

those of our allies in the region and urges the

administration several policy initiatives that

would help to isolate this outlaw regime.

In particular, it directs the President to intensify his efforts to persuade Iran’s leading trade

partners and creditors to join with the United

States in ceasing all trade with Iran and ending any policy of rescheduling of debts owed

to them.

Furthermore, the President is directed to

convene a special summit of world leaders to

address the issue of international terrorism. It

would also call on the President to develop a

comprehensive multilateral policy toward Iran

with the goal of putting Iran on the agenda of

the upcoming G–7 meeting in Canada and

bringing consensus on the need to isolate this

regime.

This administration has finally begun to

transform its rhetoric into a more realistic approach to limiting the ability of this one country

to finance and support terrorism around the

world. The adoption of this amendment will

ensure that the administration remains focused and committed in our fight against

state-supported international terrorism.

Our allies still seem to believe that they can

reap a short-term profit at our expense by

continuing a policy of business as usual with

Iran. They should be aware that there will be

a long-term cost to our relationship and alliances if some kind of multinational consensus

is not achieved on this issue.

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my

time.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield

30 seconds to the gentleman from Ohio

[Mr. CHABOT], another member of the

committee.

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chairman, I thank

the gentleman from New York [Mr.

GILMAN], the distinguished chairman,

and the gentlewoman from Florida [Ms.

ROS-LEHTINEN], the chair of the Subcommittee on Africa, for their leadership in getting this amendment accomplished, and also the gentleman from

California [Mr. ACKERMAN], the cosponsor on the other side of the aisle, for

his assistance in this important

amendment.

While the African continent is making great strides toward democracy,

economic development, free markets

and human rights, many African nations continue to face terrible hardships. This modest amendment will

provide much-needed help to Africa

without costing American taxpayers

any additional dollars.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I want

to thank the gentleman from Ohio [Mr.

CHABOT] for his involvement and for his

addition to our work.

Mr. SAWYER. Mr. Chairman. I would like to

thank the chairman of the International Relations Committee and his staff for their assistance with my amendment which is included in

the amendments en bloc before us.

Mr. Chairman, during the cold war our arms

control efforts were directed at what was

clearly the greatest threat to international security at that time—nuclear weapons. When

we did undertake efforts in the realm of conventional weaponry—they were directed at

large-scale strategic weapons such as planes,

missiles, and tanks which could alter regional

balances of power.

Well, times have changed, but unfortunately

our thinking on arms control is still mired in

the Cold War experience.

Today, the greatest threat to international

security and stability are the growing number

of wars of ethnic hatred and the increasing

cases of government oppression. In these

conflicts, it is light weaponry—AK47s, hand

grenades, and land mines—that are the weapons of choice. The ample supply, falling

prices, and ease of purchase of these weapons has helped to increase the ferocity and

number of conflicts we are witnessing across

the globe—from Liberia to Rwanda to Kashmir.

Of course, I do not mean to downplay the

importance of arms control efforts directed at

strategic weapons. I only wish to point out that

the vast trade in light weapons, which is a real

source of instability today, receives, comparatively little attention.

Before we can begin any control efforts for

small arms, we need an effective mechanism

to monitor their trade. What types and how

many of these deadly weapons are being sent

where and by whom? We need answers to

these questions.

My amendment would reinstate a reporting

requirement which existed from fiscal years

1978 through 1980. During those years the

State Department and the Defense Security

Assistance Agency produced an annual report
June 7, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H 5655

listing all U.S. military transfers and sales on

a country-by-country basis.

The information for this report is maintained

in a readily accessible data base. Producing

the report would not require much more than

the hitting of a print command key and binding

the pages together. In other words, this is not

an onerous reporting requirement.

Congress has a right and, indeed, an obligation to review the information contained in

that data base. However, in 1993, I was denied a request for such information by the

DSAA.

Once we begin to produce this report, we

can use it as leverage to encourage other

arms producing nations to provide greater

transparency for their own activities. With a

comprehensive understanding of the small

arms trade, we can begin to work towards a

regime to control this scourge.

But without good information, we can’t formulate an effective policy. We will be left to

witness the devastating effects of small arms

proliferation and to pay the price both in terms

of costly relief activities and in diminished

international security.

The better approach is to take preventive

action—to avert crises before they begin. This

amendment is the first step in that process.

I urge support for the amendments en bloc.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to make special

mention of Mr. BERMAN and Mr. ROSE who are

coauthors of this amendment. I also would like

to thank the chairman and ranking members

of the International Relations Committee and

the International Operations Subcommittee.

Mr. Chairman, when a government hosts an

international conference, it also accepts certain obligations. The host government must

abide by the terms which govern such gatherings and must uphold agreements it makes.

Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, the Chinese

Government has demonstrated that it does not

intend to be a good host for the Conference

on Women being held in Beijing this summer.

The principle of openness, which is crucial to

the success of this gathering, has run afoul of

the communist instinct to suppress opposing

points of view.

The Chinese Government has worked quietly to exclude groups representing Tibetan

women from the women’s conference. Mr.

Chairman, this is not right, and it is not what

the international community expected when it

agreed to hold the conference in Beijing.

China’s reneging on its obligations does not

stop with the exclusion of groups it disagrees

with. Originally, the Chinese had agreed to

allow a gathering of nongovernmental groups

in a downtown stadium near the official conference site.

However, as the time for the conference

drew nearer, the Chinese Government began

to fear the consequences of their citizens

coming into contact with the thousands of foreigners participating in the nongovernmental

gathering. Mysteriously, the stadium where the

NGO’s were to meet was declared structurally

unsound.

The Chinese Government now wants to

hold the NGO gathering an hour from Beijing

in a remote location near the Great Wall.

Mr. Chairman, China’s leaders need to be

sent a message that they cannot impose their

intolerant standards on the rest of humanity,

and that they cannot turn this gathering into a

platform for advancing their narrow agenda.

My amendment would urge the administration to include a representative of a U.S.-

based group representing Tibetan women in

the official U.S. delegation. This would ensure

that Tibetan women have a voice at this conference. More important, it would send a message to the Chinese that we do not appreciate

their attempt to muzzle groups with which they

disagree.

Mr. Chairman, the Chinese Government has

challenged the international community by excluding these groups. If we allow them to succeed in this, we are legitimizing their actions,

and we should expect more of the same in the

future.

I urge adoption of this amendment.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield

back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on

the amendments en bloc, as modified,

offered by the gentleman from New

York [Mr. GILMAN].

The amendments en bloc, as modified, were agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there further

amendments to the bill?

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an

amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendmemt offered by Mr. HYDE: Strike

section 2707 (relating to recommendations of

the President for reform of war powers resolution) and insert the following new section:

SEC. 2707. REPEAL OF WAR POWERS RESOLUTION.

(a) REPEAL.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93–148; 50 U.S.C. 1541 et seq.)

is repealed.

(2) CONFORMING REPEAL.—Section 1013 of

the Department of State Authorization Act,

Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 (50 U.S.C. 1546a) is

repealed.

(b) CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS.—

(1) PRIOR CONSULTATION.—The President

shall in every possible instance consult with

Congress before introducing United States

Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.

(2) CONSULTATION AFTER INTRODUCTION OF

ARMED FORCES.—The President shall, after

every such introduction, consult regularly

with Congress until United States Armed

Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or

have been removed from such situations.

(c) REPORTING TO CONGRESS.—

(1) INITIAL REPORT.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subparagraph

(B), the President shall, in the absence of a

declaration of war, submit a report to Congress in any case in which United States

Armed Forces are introduced.—

(i) into hostilities or into a situation where

imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;

(ii) into the territory, airspace, or waters

of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for a deployment which relates

solely to supply, replacement, repair, or

training of such forces; or

(iii) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped

for combat already located in a foreign nation.

(B) EXCEPTION.—The requirement that the

President submit a report to Congress in accordance with subparagraph (A) shall not

apply if the President determines that to

submit such a report would jeopardize the

operational success of United States Armed

Forces in a situation described in clause (i),

(ii), or (iii) of such subparagraph.

(2) TIME AND CONTENT OF REPORT.—A report

under paragraph (1) shall be submitted within 48 hours of the introduction of United

States Armed Forces described in that paragraph. Each such report shall be in writing

and shall set forth—

(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces;

(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took

place; and

(C) the estimated scope and duration of the

hostilities or involvement.

(3) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.—The President shall provide such other information as

Congress may request in the fulfillment of

its constitutional responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and

to the use of United States Armed Forces

abroad.

(4) PERIODIC REPORTS.—Whenever United

States Armed Force are introduced into hostilities or into any situation described in

paragraph (1), the President shall, consistent

with the constitutional responsibilities of

the President and so long as such Armed

Forces continue to be engaged in such hostilities or situation, report to Congress periodically on the status of such hostilities or

situation as well as on the scope and duration of such hostilities or situation.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I am offering an amendment that repeals the

War Powers Act and sets up a structure

for consultation and reporting by the

President.

This amendment that I am offering

does three things: In addition to repealing the War Powers Resolution, it

requires ongoing consultation between

Congress and the President, the President to consult with Congress, before

the introduction of troops, ongoing

consultation while they are there and

after the troops are introduced, and the

third thing it does, it requires timely

and comprehensive reports to Congress,

within 48 hours of the engagement, and

in detail. These also are ongoing.

Mr. Chairman, the War Powers Resolution was passed in 1973. In casting

about for the best way to describe it, I

came up with the inelegant phrase

‘‘wet noodle,’’ but that is about what

the War Powers Act has been. It has

never been used. No President have

ever acknowledged that it is there or

that it is constitutional. The vice, the

flaw, the fault with the War Powers

resolution is that the President must

withdraw troops within 60 days after he

has committed them unless Congress

acts specifically to endorse the deployment.

Congress can halt a deployment after

60 days by doing nothing, by dithering,

by debating. If Congress is unsympathetic or opposed to the commitment

of troops, Congress can pass a bill cutting off the funding. The ultimate

weapon, the ultimate power of the

purse under the Constitution, remains

with Congress. Therefore, that is all

the authority we need to halt, to bring

to a screeching halt, any commitment

of troops. But to have on the books a

law that says by doing nothing, by inaction we can halt and reverse and

turn around a military commitment of

troops is really an absurdity. What it

does is provide our enemies with a statutory timetable. They can wait it out

to see if Congress and the President are

not getting along.
H 5656 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE June 7, 1995

There are a couple of things we ought

to always bear in mind. First of all, the

Constitution says that President is

Commander in Chief. That is true

whether Ronald Reagan, George Bush,

or Bill Clinton is President. We are

talking about the institution and constitutional powers that devolve on the

President, whoever that may be.

The second unshakable, immutable,

important point is we always have the

purse strings clutched in our hand. We

can pass a bill, and we have passed several to withhold funding for certain

military operations. That is the effective way to work our will should we

disagree with the President.

Congress alone can declare war but

the President who is charged with the

responsibility of defending this country

needs flexibility, he needs to act quickly, and he should not, and the law

should not provide our enemies, whether it is Saddam Hussein or Raoul

Cedras or anybody else, with the hope,

with the expectation that in 60 days

they will all have to come home.

b 1600

That is a disincentive to settle a dispute and to negotiate.

So, I think that is a mistake and I

think it has been on the books too long

and it ought to be taken off.

No President has ever considered the

war powers resolutions as constitutional. I have letters from President

Ford, President Jimmy Carter, President George Bush. Henry Kissinger said

it should be repealed; it is misleading

and ineffective. Howard Baker when he

was the majority leader in the Senate

said it is an attempt to write in the

margins of the Constitution. It is confusing and gives comfort to our opponents.

Congress has used its power of the

purse to limit and even halt military

operations, many, many times, and I

have a list here from the congressional

reference service. During the Vietnam

war in December of 1970 we prohibited

the use of funds to finance the introduction of ground combat troops into

Cambodia or to provide advisers to or

for Cambodian military forces. In 1973

we cut off funds for combat activities

in Indochina after August 15, 1973. We

did. June 30, 1973, no funds herein or

heretofore appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance directly

or indirectly combat activities by U.S.

military forces in or over, above the

shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the

gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE] has

expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. HYDE

was allowed to proceed for 5 additional

minutes.)

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, we set a

personnel ceiling of 4,000 Americans in

Vietnam 6 months after the enactment

and 3,000 within a year; in Somalia we

did the same. In Rwanda we did the

same. And interestingly enough, the

congressional reference service says,

and I quote, ‘‘With respect to your

question regarding the number of instances when the Congress has utilized

the War Powers Resolution, since its

enactment in 1973, to compel the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from foreign deployments, we can cite no single

specific instance when this has occurred.’’

So it is a useless anachronism and we

ought not to have it on the books. No

Supreme Court test is even possible.

Several attempts have been made to

test it. The courts have said they are

not justifiable. It did not stop what we

did in Somalia, it did not stop what we

did in Haiti. We had a vote on Desert

Storm but nobody conceded that was

pursuant to the War Powers Resolutions.

It provides a false hope to our adversaries; it is confusing.

My amendment does not just wipe

the books clean of the War Powers Resolution, it requires adequate, timely,

prompt consultation with Congress,

and notice of what the President is

going to do, and reporting, comprehensive reporting. There is a Presidential

waiver, but that is for the Entebbe sort

of situation and we still hold the ultimate weapon which is the purse.

We cannot get, as I say, a constitutional test on it, but it emboldens our

adversaries while hamstringing the

President when he most urgently needs

the authority and the flexibility to act.

Permit me just to read from George

Bush’s letter of April 17, this year.

‘‘Deal Henry, you are 100 percent correct in opposing the War Powers Resolution as an unconstitutional infringement on the authority of the President. I hope that you are successful in

your effort to change the War Powers

Resolution and restore proper balance

between the Executive and Legislative

Branches. George Bush.’’

Gerald Ford: ‘‘Dear Henry, I share

your views that the War Powers Resolution is an impractical, unconstitutional infringement on the authority of

the President, I opposed it as a Member

of the House. As President I refused to

recognize it as a constitutional limitation on the power of the commander in

chief.’’

Jimmy Carter to Congressman

HENRY HYDE: ‘‘I fully support your effort to repeal the War Powers Resolution. Best wishes in this good work,’’ et

certa.

So I just say to my colleagues, they

are not yielding anything, they are retaining the power of the purse, which is

the ultimate weapons. But my amendment requires notice, consultation, and

reports, and with that in one hand and

the power of the purse in the other, we

are yielding no autonomy on the issue

of committing troops, but are clearing

off the books of unconstitutional infringement on the President’s power,

And are giving the President flexibility

that the President may need over a

weekend when something happens. And

we are not giving hope and comfort to

our adversaries that if they just wait it

out, 60 days, will elapse, we will be

dithering, we will be debating, and

nothing will happen and the military

engagement will end.

So I respectfully request the support

of the Members in adopting my amendment.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, I

move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I must say I rise to

discuss the amendment by the distinguished chairman of the Committee on

the Judiciary because I know he has

given this very serious thought. But I

think I come down on the other side

and say maybe this is too hasty at this

moment, and to move forward right at

this time without more serious debate

is very troubling.

The gentleman from Illinois and I

were both here when this amendment

went through, and I would be the first

to concede it has not worked as well as

many of us had hoped it would work

when it was passed in 1973.

But let me talk about what I thought

the driving factors were of that war

powers amendment. If we go back and

look at the history, the Constitution

says in article I, section 2, the Congress is the one, the Congress is the

one that gives the money and raises

the army. We are the ones that must

do that. And the President is the commander-in-chief.

If you also look at President Washington’s speeches about foreign entanglements and many other such things,

I think it is very clear that our forefathers and foremothers never really

foresaw a day when we would be deploying hundreds of thousands of

troops overseas. One of the incredible,

unique things about this country is it

had unloaded upon it, whether it wanted it or not, a world leadership role

where even though we are only 3 percent of the world’s population, we have

been carrying a very heavy burden of

maintaining freedom on this globe in

this century, and the War Powers Act

was a modification that came in this

century.

Part of that was we have been one of

the very few governments on the planet that would deploy hundreds and hundreds of thousands of our most precious

treasures, our young people, overseas

for someone else’s freedom. This War

Powers Act would not have occurred if

we had only been acting within our

borders to protect our borders as most

countries do and is much more traditional.

But when you start deploying them

overseas, and we had seen in both the

Korean and the Vietnam war many

hundreds of thousands deployed overseas without a declaration of war,

without a consultation of Congress,

and we were suddenly left there under

article I, section 3 having to raise the

money, and raise the number of troops

through drafts and many other things,

and so this body said no, no, no, there

should be, when we are doing these

massive deployments overseas, a little

more consultation at the beginning.
June 7, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H 5657

The only area I can think of where

this has worked very well since then

has been the gulf war where we had a

very historic debate on this House

floor, and I must say I thought it was

very valuable for the whole Nation. All

over the Nation you could hear people

listening to this debate, and when this

debate ended and when one side won,

everybody shut up and supported those

troops that were over there until it was

time to bring them home.

I think that is important, because

otherwise, if you allow a President to

decide when we are going to commit

troops, whether it would be today in

Bosnia, say the President of the United

States today decided OK, we are going

to go into Bosnia, that is probably option 3. Option 1 would be you help them

withdraw. Option 2 would be we do

nothing. Option 3, we are going to go

gangbusters, we are going to take a

side and we are going to be in there. In

fact, there are some Members out there

now saying that is what we should do.

Do you want the President of the United States to be able to make that decision, send off a half a million men,

which is about what it would take, men

and women, and go over there and just

come tell us about it after they did it,

and our only choice would be that we

cut out the money? I think the War

Powers Act has had an effect, and I

think with the demise of the cold war

I do not see any reason that we cannot

work out a way to maybe make this

better, to maybe make it more efficient, but I am not sure we need to do

it in a haste right now where we just

withdraw as Members of Congress and

say we are going to let all of that fall

on the shoulders of the President of the

United States, and of course if he

messes up or she messes up, then we all

have the prerogative to jump up and

down and scream at him. I would think

that the last few days of Bosnia would

be the greatest reason for why we

should not do this right now, because

you see no matter what the President

does you have all sorts of other voices

jumping up and down saying no not

that, oh why did he do this, oh, you

cannot connect the dots on his policy,

oh, he is not being consistent. He

should do more; he should do less.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the

gentlewoman from Colorado [Mrs.

SCHROEDER] has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mrs.

SCHROEDER was allowed to proceed for 1

additional minute.)

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, it

seems to me that what we would be

saying is we want to be able to criticize, but do not give us any responsibility. I would think the American people

would think that if the President decided we were going to take a side in

the Bosnian war, he would do more

than just come tell us, consult us, and

send someone to brief us on it. I think

they would want their representatives

to be involved in that debate at the beginning, so that we stay behind those

troops when they are overseas in that

difficult point.

But I keep saying the War Powers

Act came because of the new missions

the United States had heaped upon it

as a world leader after World War I and

World War II. And I think it is a very,

very, important addition, and I hope

very much that maybe we take the

concerns of the gentleman from Illinois

[Mr. HYDE] into consideration and we

all work very hard to figure out is

there a better way to do this. But I

think to back off and say we are giving

it up would be the wrong way to go.

Mr. PORTMAN. Mr. Chairman, I

move to strike requisite number of

words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise today to express

my strong support for repealing the

War Powers Resolution with the consultations as set forth in the Hyde

amendment. I understand the history

of the resolution that is described by

the gentlewoman from Colorado, and I

appreciate that, but it is my belief that

this 22-year relic of the Vietnam era is

both unconstitutional and ineffective. I

want to commend the gentleman from

Illinois for raising this issue, for bringing forth the amendment today and for

all of his efforts over the years on this.

I served in the Bush White House in

the counsel’s office, so I saw firsthand

just how this resolution can interfere

with the President’s ability as the

commander-in-chief to defend U.S. interests. I think the Constitution has its

right, particularly in this dangerous

world where rapid deployment is vital,

vital to success. The President must

maintain his authority as commanderin-chief to protect U.S. interests

around the globe. Under the War Powers Resolution, however, as the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE] stated

earlier, if Congress fails to explicitly

endorse the deployment of troops, the

troops must return home. I think this

is a flagrant intrusion on the President’s constitutional rights inherent as

commander-in-chief to defend and protect the Nation. There is a reason that

all four former Presidents, Democrat

and Republican, support repeal. The

Constitution struck the right balance.

It granted the President the right to

act as commander-in-chief to protect

U.S. interests. It also provided appropriate checks for leaving the authority

for funding military operations with

Congress. The War Powers Resolution

tips that healthy balance, tips it too

far, by allowing Congress to override

the President’s constitutional authority by mere inaction. If Congress simply fails to act, 60 days after deployment U.S. troops engaged in hostilities

must be withdrawn. In my mind this is

a taking. It is Congress taking authority away from the President to act as

commander-in-chief.

As important, the practical application of the War Powers Resolution is

essentially rendered ineffective. We

have seen that over the years. It was

noted earlier by both speakers. It has

also increased the danger to U.S. personnel and interests. By requiring the

withdrawal of troops within 60 days unless Congress acts, the resolution permits Congress to drag its feet until policy is established by inaction. More

troubling I think is that the resolution

unwisely undermines U.S. policy. It is

dangerous. Our enemies have a strong

incentive if the War Powers Act acts as

intended to resist negotiations and

wait out the 60 days. Why should they

not? In other words, the effect of the

War Powers Act is really to embolden

our enemies and endanger our military

personnel overseas unnecessarily.

Whether we are dealing with Raoul

Cedras, Manuel Noriega, or Saddam

Hussein, we cannot simply afford to

send our enemies the message that the

actions of our military and the President are not the actions of the United

States, do not constitute the will of

Congress and the people. They must,

until Congress explicitly acts otherwise. If we insist on keeping the War

Powers Resolution, I would urge this

Congress to make changes to it to force

Congress to face the issue.

b 1615

Let us vote up or down on the issue.

Let us openly confront the question of

deployment.

Under the war powers resolution, we

have got it both ways. We have got the

best of both worlds. We can tie the

hands of the President and avoid a direct up-or-down vote on an often tough

issue whether to deploy or not. If we

keep the resolution, I think it would be

better to establish expedited procedures during that 60-day period, forcing

to act by joint resolution on an up or

down vote, either authorizing action or

requiring disengagement.

As President Nixon noted in his veto

of the War Powers Act in 1973, ‘‘One

cannot become a responsible partner

unless one is prepared to take responsible action.’’

Let us act responsibly today, 22 years

later, and end this congressional encroachment.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, will

the gentleman yield?

Mr. PORTMAN. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman yielding, I appreciate his comments and certain

parts of his argument I find very compelling.

Mr. PORTMAN. What part does the

gentleman not find compelling?

Mr. BERMAN. The part I am going to

get into right now. You spoke about

working in the Bush White House and

the War Powers Act tended to create

some uncertainty, tended to immobilize the administration in some fashion, undercut the administration’s

aims.

I would like to develop this more extensively because the way I look at the

War Powers Act, it is a law that no

President recognizes, no court is willing to enforce, and as you pointed out,

in almost every instance the Congress
H 5658 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE June 7, 1995

is not willing to step up to the plate

anyway because they do not want to

take a firm position because they want

to see how it is going before they jump

on the bandwagon.

Mr. PORTMAN. Reclaiming my time,

the gentleman has made an excellent

case for repeal of an ineffective act.

Presidents have ignored the War Powers Act on an official basis. However,

our enemies overseas know it exists. It

is on the books. Frankly, it is a consideration taken into consideration as

Presidents decide whether or not to go

to Congress, as we saw with the Gulf

War, to receive, and in that case approval, so it is something that is not

working. It is unconstitutional.

The reason it is not working, I believe, goes to the Constitution. In

other words, the constitutionality of it

is the reason it is not working.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the

gentleman from Ohio [Mr. PORTMAN]

has expired.

(On request of Mr. BERMAN, and by

unanimous consent, Mr. PORTMAN was

allowed to proceed for 2 additional

minutes.)

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, if the

gentleman will yield further, is the

gentleman saying that without the existence of the War Powers Act, the

President would not have asked Congress to take a position authorizing the

use of force in the Gulf?

Mr. PORTMAN. The answer to that

question, reclaiming my time, I would

say that is a consideration that every

President has to factor in is that it is

a law on the books. It is a pressure applied to the executive branch. It is a

factor when one is considering deployment, and necessarily so. I think it

would also lead to a lot less ambiguity,

as I said earlier, with regard to our foreign adversaries.

Mr. BERMAN. If the gentleman wil

continue to yield, I started out thinking that I would vote for the repeal of

this act. But if the consequences of repealing the act, if the existence of the

act did in fact argue for the President

to come to Congress to ask for authorization for the use of force, you have

given me the most serious, important,

and useful purpose, more than I ever

thought that I had.

Mr. PORTMAN. I would encourage

the gentleman to take a look at the

Hyde amendment carefully because it

requires the kind of notification and

the kind of consultation that, frankly,

I do not think we have now. I think,

under this new iteration, with repealing the War Powers Act, by being required to come to Congress for notification and for consultation, I think

you would find that in fact Congress

would be more of a partner with the executive branch in the future.

Mr. BERMAN. If you just would yield

one more time, but that sort of begs

the question. Consulting, we have all

kinds of consultations, and all kinds of

notifications, the fact is Desert Storm

was a carefully planned, date-certain

decision to use force. If it was not a

war, then there is not any.

You are telling me, it sounds like,

that in the Bush White House one of

the reason they decided to come to

Congress, to not consult, not notify but

to seek authorization for the use of

force, was the existence of the War

Powers Act, which makes a case for the

existence of that act and an argument

against the repeal. I think, perhaps

more than any I had though of, making

me change my mind.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the

gentleman from Ohio [Mr. PORTMAN]

has again expired.

(On request of Mr. HYDE and by unanimous consent, Mr. PORTMAN was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. PORTMAN. I thank the gentleman.

I thank my colleague from Illinois

may have some salient comments on

this. Let me say the power of the

purse, to my friend on the other side of

the aisle, is far more powerful and is a

much more powerful inducement, I believe, to that President and other

Presidents, than any other. Congress

could always have acted to force us to

withdraw troops from the Gulf had we

used the power of the purse and pulled

the appropriations. That is ultimately

where I think our power derives. I

think also, if you look at the amendment, you will see there is consultation and notification that would actually take place.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the

gentleman yield?

Mr. PORTMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. HYDE. I would just tell my

friend from California at that time in

history I was ranking member of the

House Intelligence Committee and,

therefore, I got invited into the consultations, and we spent a lot of time,

many, many days at the White House,

Dante Fascell, Senator NUNN, everybody who had any connection with the

military, foreign affairs and intelligence sat around and this was fully,

fully debated. There was no question

that the President was going to do

something without Congress’s knowledge and acquiescence.

So I do not know what the gentleman

doubts, because we require prior consultation, during consultation, after

consultation, notification within 48

hours, and reports, detailed reports.

Mr. BERMAN. If the gentleman will

yield, I understand there was all kinds

of consultation, and I was in some of

those meetings as well.

But what the gentleman in the well

is saying is, in the end, the decision to

come to Congress and ask for authorization was at least in part made because of the existence of the War Powers Act.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the

gentleman from Ohio [Mr. PORTMAN]

has again expired.

(On request of Mr. HYDE, and by

unanimous consent, Mr. PORTMAN was

allowed to proceed for 2 additional

minutes.)

Mr. HYDE. If the gentleman will

yield, I would just say to the gentleman from California [Mr. BERMAN],

and I hope I do live to see the day that

you are President, I would be very

thrilled and applaud that good judgment by our American voters, but I

would say this——

Mr. BERMAN. Would you endorse me

for reelection.

Mr. HYDE. I did not catch that. What

did you say?.

Mr. BERMAN. I said would you just

endorse me for reelection?

Mr. HYDE. I would not mind. I do not

know who your opponent is.

Mr. PORTMAN. Reclaiming my

time——

Mr. HYDE. You are getting me in

trouble here. I would work very hard

for the gentleman’s vote.

Let me just say this to you: There is

no question that a law on the books

has to be taken into account by a

President. He may think it is unconstitutional, but to just deliberately flout

a law that is on the books and has not

been declared unconstitutional would

be very foolish. So I do not think you

can read into the fact that they considered the existence of this law that it

animated them to do anything. Common sense and the President’s own

military experience and service in Congress required him to consult, and he

did.

Mr. BERMAN. If the gentleman

would yield, but in the end, the Constitution gives the warmaking power

to the Congress. Obviously, statute

cannot repeal or modify or limit the

power. I would have thought that the

President would feel compelled to come

to the Congress and that the use, authorization for use of force was the

substantive equivalent of a declaration

of war, and if in fact that is not the

case, that was not the constitutional

power of that provision that motivated

him to come to Congress but, in part,

was one of the considerations, it makes

me a little concerned about what was,

when I got up, an inclination to vote

for repeal of this law.

Mr. PORTMAN. Reclaiming my time

for what little time remains, I would

just say I would like to echo the comments of the gentleman from Illinois. I

think it has to be a consideration when

it is on the books. I think it is ineffective. I think it violates the constitutional rights of the commander-inchief. I think the reason previous

President may have come to Congress,

including the case the gentleman from

California mentioned, perhaps that was

a factor, but there are other considerations that were overriding.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I

move to strike the requisite number of

words.

Mr. Chairman, the situation in the

world today, there is a lot of focus on

Bosnia.

If this Congress votes to exclude itself in any active way from the process

of engaging military forces around the

globe, it will be very difficult for either
June 7, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H 5659

Republicans or Democrats to come

back here if American troops are committed in a serious way to Bosnia, and

say, ‘‘Wait a minute, we want to get at

this some way.’’

And what is the response going to be?

‘‘Well, you have got consultation. You

are guaranteed to be consulted with.

They will call you in and they will explain there are now troops on the way

to Bosnia.’’ You will say, ‘‘We want to

do something about it.’’ ‘‘Well, there is

going to be another consultation as

soon as the troops get there. When we

get time to take the troops out, you

will get another consultation.’’

The war powers provisions are not

perfect. This is not a world that can

easily accommodate the two branches

of government involved in the decision

to commit American forces in war with

a time frame that is often instantaneous.

But there is no question that the war

powers provision, as is evident from

the comments of the gentleman who

just spoke, have forced Administrations to recognize the need to involve

the Congress.

Now, is there an advantage to giving

the Congress an opportunity to view

the President’s policy before making a

commitment? Well, I would tell you

that many of the Members of Congress

who voted for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution wish that they had not done so.

Why? The most difficult act in American politics is not to be wrong, it is

not to be even voting against your constituents’ interests. It is to be inconsistent, and it is impossible to explain

that the circumstances have changed.

We all remember Mr. Romney when

he ran for President changed his position on Vietnam. He said he was brainwashed. Well, that was probably a bad

choice of terminology. But he was

dead.

It is very hard for a Congress that

has at the ground level jumped in the

boat on a strategy to then review that

strategy. It is almost impossible for an

executive. An executive in his first

term, looking at reelection, takes a

course of action, and then he is going

to come back and say to the American

people, ‘‘I made a mistake. We lost

5,000, we lost 10,000, we lost 300 men.

But it was a mistake being there.’’ No,

he has got to stay the course. That is

what seems to sell politically.

It is a lot better to have a Congress

that has maybe sat back, in some instance out of lack of courage, I will

grant you, but it is also timely, often,

to sit back and view a policy and make

a decision after more of the facts are

in.

This is not a perfect process. But it is

no question that simple consultation,

and I think the desires of the gentleman from Illinois here are honorable, there is no question he is frustrated by what we have done in Congress all too often, and that it sat back

as Presidents took action, fearful to

take a public position, and he is also

probably frustrated by Presidents who

did not come to the Congress and demand we get engaged, but the Presidents do have that authority.

The President did not come here and

ask us to give a declaration of war. The

President can come here, as President

Bush did, and ask for support for what

he is doing, which may not be technically meeting of standards of being

committed to war, but certainly was

basically telling the same thing to the

American people, that both the President and the Congress were on the

same side of this particular issue.

The war powers provisions, I think

have worked. They have worked to

force the dialogue, to force the President to take into account what Congress might do, what Congress’s actions could be if things do not turn out

as rosy as the generals and the CIA tell

them they are going to be.

To change the war powers provisions

is for Congress to abdicate any serious

role in the commitment of troops on

the ground.

Again, whether in the next 4 years or

in the next 5 years, whether a Republican or a Democratic President, think

of yourself as a Member of Congress

who voted to get rid of the war powers

provision, think about yourself at a

town meeting, and they are saying,

‘‘Congressman, my son is in a battlefield today. I want you to bring him

home.’’ Your answer is going to be, ‘‘I

get to be consulted by the President.’’

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the

gentleman yield?

Mr. GEJDENSON. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, why does

the gentleman assume paralysis on the

part of Congress when it comes to appropriating money? Is the gentleman

not aware that we have cut off funds

time and time again for military operations? And the gentleman, as a Member of Congress, could join in the consensus that can be developed and cut

the water off immediately.

Mr. GEJDENSON. The problem with

simply dealing with the funding issue,

we saw at the tail end of the Vietnam

war, we have seen it in so many other

instances, that the Administration,

one has multiple resources.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the

gentleman from Connecticut [Mr.

GEJDENSON] has expired.

(On request of Mr. HYDE, and by

unanimous consent, Mr. GEJDENSON

was allowed to proceed for 1 additional

minute.)

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, Administrations have multiple resources

for smaller wars that they can operate

without direct funding, and additionally, what it leaves us with is only one

option to review the process, and often

an option that is very difficult to bring

to the floor.

My HYDE. I just think the gentleman underestimates the power of

Congress.

Mr. GEJDENSON. I have been here

not as long as has the gentleman from

Illinois, but there is no question the

power of Congress is enhanced by a law

that gives us a role and a positive action in the process rather than simply

being consulted.

b 1630

The consultation process again is a

very weak situation to find yourself in.

The President fulfills the law if he

calls up the Congress and tells them

what he is doing. I think it is much

better, both for Congress’ responsibility and the President’s responsibility,

to force Congress to either take an action or, through its lack of action, to

give the President support for his policies, and also clearly to give Congress

and the American people some time to

view the developments in the field.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. Chairman, I move to

strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, this is an extremely

important debate. Although I was not

going to talk on this issue, this is an

issue that can affect the lives of many,

many Americans, and I think that we

all have to have our say. I rarely disagree with my friend, the gentleman

from Illinois [Mr. HYDE]. He is one of

the best members, by far, that we have

on this committee, and I have sat next

to him in the International Relations

Committee for 10 years.

On this particular issue, which is of

paramount importance, I listened

closely to the comments from our

former Presidents that were quoted

here on the floor and from the people

who worked in the White House. They

are very eloquent. But, as my colleagues know, every president finds

Congress inconvenient and an intrusion, but we are a democracy, not a

monarchy, and that is why it is so important for Congress to be involved.

The American people have a right to

have a say, and the American people,

especially on issues of war where we

send or sons and daughters into harm’s

way, certainly should have a right to

speak out.

I once went on TV and debated the

repeal of the War Powers Act with Representative Solarz. While debating, I

said, yes, we have to repeal the War

Powers Act. But when we stop to consider what we have seen since 1973,

there is a reason why the War powers

Act resolution was passed by this Congress. The history shows as I see it,

that there are only two central issues

involved in the War Powers Act: first,

how to ensure that the president

consults with Congress before U.S.

troops are sent into hostilities; and

second, that Congress must approve

the use of forces or else they will be

withdrawn within 60 days.

Now in the last 22 years there have

been 40 occasions when the Presidents

have consulted with Congress under

provisions of this act, and these have

covered events from Lebanon, to the

Persian Gulf, to Haiti, Somalia and

even to Bosnia. Twice Congress has invoked the act in authorizing the use of

troops in combat, in Lebanon and also

in the gulf war.
H 5660 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE June 7, 1995

However, the crux of the law, which

is forcing the withdrawal of U.S. troops

when Congress does not approve, has

never been invoked. There are some 12

cases that have come before the courts,

and the courts have not become involved. This is the history of the War

Powers Act.

But let me suggest to the members

that this is probably the most important time to debate this resolution, because we are on a brink of war today.

I mean that last night we had some

1,500 troops ordered out of Germany

and flown down into Italy to get ready

to jump into Bosnia, into that civil

war. So this is the time to debate this

issue, because the deepening crisis in

the Balkans may lead us at some point

to invoke the war powers to withdraw

these forces.

After all, the American people are

not in favor of this intervention. In

matters of months, or weeks, or even

days we may be grateful that we have

the War Powers Act on the books. I

want to be able to go back home and

tell my people, You’re darned right, I

spoke up on the floor of Congress about

this. This is an issue that involves the

lives of young men and women here in

our country, and it’s important for us

to speak out.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the

gentleman yield?

Mr. ROTH. I yield to the gentleman

from Illinois.

Mr. HYDE. I want to suggest to the

gentleman I am as concerned as he is

with the lives of young people. I have

been in combat, I was in an invasion,

so I am very sensitive to that.

Now will the gentleman tell me why

is it, does he believe, that Congress is

impotent to stop within one day any

military engagement if we cut off the

funding? Is the gentleman aware of

how many times we have done that?

Mr. ROTH. Yes, I will——

Mr. HYDE. Why are we impotent?

Why do we need this act which is a nullity——

Mr. ROTH. Let me take back the balance of my time, and I will be happy to

respond. I say to the gentleman: With

war powers you’re giving the President

60 days to withdraw those troops. If he

doesn’t withdraw those troops, Congress is intervening.

I feel that Congress has not only a

right, but has an obligation, to speak

out in cases of America getting into

war. That is why I think that the war

powers resolution at certain critical

times is something that we should

have. We should have the power——

Mr. HYDE. When has it been used?

Mr. ROTH. I think twice, once in

Lebanon and once in the gulf war.

Mr. HYDE. Nobody ever conceded

that that was for the War Powers Act.

Mr. ROTH. I know that is your view,

but let me take back the balance of my

time and say the reason the President,

I think, has been more sensitive to

Congress is because we have had the

war powers resolution on the books. I

think, if we had not had the war powers

resolution on the books, the President

may not have been that sensitive to

Congress.

I do feel that it is very important for

the Congress to speak out. In my opinion, repealing war powers is like abolishing the fire department just because

there has not been a fire in the last

couple of years. We are facing an intervention in Bosnia right now. Just because Congress has not used the War

Powers Act——

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the

gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ROTH]

has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. ROTH

was allowed to proceed for 3 additional

minutes.)

Mr. ROTH. For example, I think we

are facing a very perilous time right

now in Bosnia, and, as I mentioned before, there is a looming crisis. If we repeal the War Powers Act now in the

face of a wider war in the Balkans, this

Congress could, in my opinion, be

guilty of dereliction of our duty to the

American people and the young Americans whose lives may be at risk.

I feel that we in Congress have an obligation to speak out, and I am sorry

that we have not been speaking out

more forcefully in Bosnia. If the President is going to put 25,000 troops in

Bosnia, why is this Congress not speaking out? Why are we not debating that

issue on the floors?

On Friday we lost a pilot in Bosnia,

one man, one American, and today it is

Wednesday. We still have not found

him. We do not know if he is alive or

dead. Now we are getting ready to put

25,000 troops into Bosnia, and this Congress is not debating this issue.

I think we are being derelict in our

duty, quite frankly, and I think that is

why the war powers resolution is important, because it keeps Congress in

the act. But if the President, as we

have seen, is listening to people other

than Congress, I think that is why the

war powers resolution is so important.

How many of my colleagues here are

aware just how close we are to fighting

in Bosnia? I certainly hope we are

aware of it. The Clinton Administration has promised to send some 25,000

ground troops into Bosnia. This is very

serious; it is serious for our troops.

Sure, the people here are not going to

be fighting, but the kids off the dairy

farms in Wisconsin, small cities of Wisconsin, are going to be fighting, and I

do not want them going into Bosnia

without my having a right to speak up

on the floor and having this entire Congress debating that issue. That is why

this is important.

We all too often have been derelict in

our duty. We have had 40 engagements

since the War Powers Act was instituted, and only twice, only twice, have

we invoked the war powers, and I think

it is very important, especially at a

time like this, that we not repeal the

war powers resolution.

It has not harmed our foreign policy.

We have had it for 22 years. Show me

one instance where it has done any

harm. It has not done any harm, so

why repeal it?

With this administration seemingly

bent on jumping into the quagmire, we

simply cannot afford the risk.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the

gentleman yield?

Mr. ROTH. I yield to the gentleman

from Illinois.

Mr. HYDE. Can the gentleman envision Saddam Hussein taking comfort in

the fact that after 60 days maybe the

troops would be withdrawn while Congress dithered?

Mr. ROTH. Reclaiming my time, I

say to the gentleman, Congress did not

dither. I was here on the floor, and so

were you, and so was everybody else

when we voted to give George Bush,

the President, the power to go into the

Gulf War. So we were in that decision,

and it didn’t stop, hinder, us in any

way because we had the war powers

resolution.

I do not think that the war powers

resolution ties the hands of a President, and I say, You’re never going to

be able to do that, but I think what it

does is put Congress into the equation,

into the debate. When we go into these

issues of life and death overseas, I

think it’s not only right but it’s proper, and it’s our duty to do that.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the

gentleman yield?

Mr. ROTH. I yield to the gentleman

from Illinois.

Mr. HYDE. I just want to say I was

here in 1975, and I remember it was 2

o’clock in the morning, and we were

debating, and we debated—the total debate lasted three weeks, and President

Ford wanted authority to send troops

to get our people out of Saigon, and

Congress never could reach a decision,

and I remember John Connolly—John

Conlan, I guess his name was, from Arizona—standing there saying, ‘‘It’s Dunkirk over there. We’re getting pushed

in the sea.’’

Congress could never come to closure. The President finally sent the

troops anyway, but that is what it

was——

Mr. ROTH. Reclaiming my time, in

the 22 years that we have had the War

Powers Act on the books, it has not inhibited the President for a second in

any particular time, and the Congress

has got to be involved in these important issues.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the

gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ROTH]

has expired.

(On request of Mr. BERMAN and by

unanimous consent, Mr. ROTH was allowed to proceed for 1 additional

minute.)

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, would

the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. ROTH. I yield to the gentleman

from California.

Mr. BERMAN. Through the gentleman I would like to ask the gentleman from Illinois:

‘‘I think there is a good case that the

60-day provision creates a level of uncertainty and can create an expectation in the enemy that doesn’t serve
June 7, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H 5661

U.S. national interests. But you don’t

need to repeal the War Powers Act to

do that. You need to deal with the 60-

day requirement, and I just wonder

how the gentleman feels about that

particular concern, given that it is not

enough to say the appropriations process. If you are talking about rescinding

the appropriations for the military in

the middle of a fiscal year, you are

talking about getting the votes to pass

it to override a veto. It’s very different

than the majority of the Congress cutting off—as simple as cutting off the

appropriations in the middle of the

year. That can’t happen.’’

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, I move

to strike the requisite number of

words.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank my

colleague from Illinois for graciously

letting me go out of sequence here, although it does keep a continuity of

pro-con, pro-con, and I will try and be

brief here because I have pride of ownership here.

H.R. 1111 was the only bill in either

body all year building up to this debate. I am indebted to my friend, the

gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE], for

carrying this. I am going to put Mr.

HYDE’S article, which I think says it

all, when we go back into full House,

and I will ask permission to do that at

the end of the debate, and I am really

curious to see how this debate is going

to turn out because it has been a excellent debate, and I have got friends all

over this.

As a matter of fact, the reason I am

a bit antsy and about to get a hernia to

get my chance is I have got the Secretary of Defense, William Perry, and

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,

Shalikashvili, sitting there in the National Security Committee, and I do

not want to send one single American

young man or woman, not even fighter

pilots, not ‘‘Deny Flight,’’ not top

cover, not close air support. No American from this country, or Canada for

that matter, should die for Europeans

again in another civil war inside

Bosnia-Herzegovina, and look what is

seemingly contradictory. I am trying

to give the President more power to

act, and the reason I ask for that number 1111 is because this gives the Commander-in-Chief the ability to move

quickly, effectively, unilaterally in our

national interests before a prolonged

debate here brings in Europe, Asia and

Africa’s opinions, and it enables him to

move decisively.

Now obviously I am doing this for future Presidents. Nobody thinks about

some of these military expressions like

over hill or over dale, or off we go into

the wild blue yonder, when you think

of our Commander-in-Chief, let alone

Semper Fidelis or Semper Paratus.

However, I am doing this for history,

for the Presidents to come. I would not

go back through all the President’s letters.

Suffice it to say this:

‘‘Somalia proved the point of Mr.

HYDE and myself, Mr. FUNDERBURK. Somalia proved that the current chain of

command is more concerned about

meeting requirements of the war powers resolution than ensuring that we

deploy adequate combat power when

necessary. If it weren’t for this darned

War Powers Act, we never would have

thought twice about lending one M–1,

one tank, or one Bradley. They had six

of those at Waco. We didn’t have one to

blow through those road blocks on the

ground in those filthy alleys of

Mogadishu. We would have had our AC–

130 Specter gunships in there. American troops would have had the support

they needed, and maybe not one or

most of the 19 of best-trained sergeants

and helicopter crews would have died

in the alleys of Mogadishu.’’

Please support the Dornan-Hyde

amendment. It is time to repeal the

War Powers Act, and I look forward to

an overwhelming vote today, and I tell

the gentleman in front of my colleagues, ‘‘Mr. DURBIN of Illinois, I owe

you one.’’

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Chairman, I move

to strike requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I respect my colleague, the gentleman from Illinois

[Mr. HYDE], and I respectfully disagree

with his amendment.

b 1645

One of the saddest responsibilities of

any Member of Congress is to stand at

the funeral of a fallen soldier. Many of

us have had to do it. After the crack of

the rifles, after the honor guard has

folded the flag from the casket into a

neat tri-corner and handed it to the

family, it is often our responsibility to

walk over to the family of the fallen

serviceman and to strain to find some

words to say.

I do not know that I could walk up to

the family of a soldier who has died in

the invasion of a foreign land, and say

I am very sorry, but Congress voted

just a few weeks ago not to have any

voice in the decision as to whether

your son or daughter would go to war.

You elected me as your Representative,

but I had no voice in a premeditated

declaration of war which ultimately

took the life of your son or daughter.

You gave me your voice in Congress to

represent you, and I gave it away. I

could not say that.

Our Constitution could not make it

clearer. Article I, section 8, clause 11 of

the Constitution confers on Congress,

the House of Representatives and the

Senate alone, alone, the power to declare war, and the War Powers Act, imperfect though it may be, is an effort

to carry out the intent of our Constitution, the clear unambiguous intent of

that Constitution, to require Congress,

and the American people through

them, to enter into a debate and deliberation before we send our sons and

daughters off to die.

I think today, 22 years after the fact,

we may have forgotten the circumstances of the creation of this War

Powers Act. It is said that those who

ignore history are doomed to repeat it.

This act was enacted in 1973 over the

veto of President Richard Nixon. It followed the Vietnam war. It was an extraordinary situation. Congress came

together, Democrats and Republicans,

and rebuked the sitting President of

the United States and said ‘‘We have

learned our lesson. Vietnam has taught

us a bitter lesson. Never, never, never

again will this country allow so many

wonderful young men and women to

give up their lives without the kind of

full-scale national debate of this Nation through its Congress.’’

Then we enacted the War Powers

Resolution, after 58,000 Americans lost

their lives in an undeclared war which

Robert McNamara now concedes as

unwinnable in his infamous apologia.

An America ravaged by the divisive national debate over Vietnam, an America devastated by the loss of so many

good men and women in that war, an

America cynical over being lied to and

misled by Presidents of both political

parties, that America of 1973 passed

this law and vowed to do everything in

its power to avoid any repetition of the

national tragedy of Vietnam.

So today, 22 years later, we come to

repeal the law, to walk away from it,

to basically abdicate our congressional

responsibility, to say to this President

and every President to come, it is your

responsibility. It is your war. Come see

us, consult us, talk to us. If we get

upset with it after it is done, we will

probably try to address it through an

appropriations process.

Like so many other actions we have

taken over the last several months,

this is a further erosion of the power of

everyone sitting in this gallery and everyone listening to my voice who elects

a man or a woman to come and stand

in this well before this microphone and

speak for them. It takes away that

power. It takes away the authority of

your family to be represented in that

national debate.

As I reflect on what I have accomplished in the years that I have served

in the House of Representatives, one of

my proudest moments was to cosponsor a resolution with former Congressman Charles Bennett before the Persian Gulf war. That resolution brought

every Member of the House of Representatives to the floor in an all-night

session to express their most heartfelt

views as to whether or not we should

engage in war. It was the finest hour of

this Chamber in all the years that I

have served. We stood tall for the constitutional principle that it was our responsibility to declare that war and to

decide whether anyone’s life would be

risked. And we passed that resolution,

saying it was the congressional responsibility, by a bipartisan vote of 302 to

131. We then went on to vote on the

question.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the

gentleman from Illinois [Mr. DURBIN]

has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. DURBIN

was allowed to proceed for 3 additional

minutes.)
H 5662 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE June 7, 1995

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Chairman, as was

alluded to by the gentlewoman from

Colorado, after that debate, after the

bipartisan decision that it was Congress’ responsibility to decide whether

we would go to war, we voted on the

question. You could have heard a pin

drop in this Chamber. People were

waiting to see what would happen. It

prevailed. President Bush’s position

prevailed. And even those, and I was

one, who were critical of the idea of engaging in that war then said the debate

is over. We stand behind the men and

women whose lives are on the line. And

we went forward, united as a Nation, to

a swift and decisive victory.

Now, I know when the Constitution

was written wars were conducted in a

much different fashion. It took

months, sometimes years, to muster an

army and to bring about a war. There

was plenty of time for deliberation. We

live in a different time. The Commander in Chief of the United States,

the President, has that express authority in the Constitution. He must respond to emergencies immediately. He

cannot wait for Congress to debate it.

The President of the United States as

Commander in Chief must take defensive actions immediately. He cannot

wait for a committee hearing.

But in a Persian Gulf war situation,

with a premeditated deliberation, we

had a chance as a nation to decide as a

nation what we would do. This decision

today, if we adopt the Hyde amendment, completely walks away from this

congressional opportunity and responsibility.

To argue that we could take the

funds away once the war has started,

sure, that could happen, over months,

maybe even over years, as we debate

back and forth the right language,

whether an appropriation will be

changed, whether we can override a

veto. Sure, Congress has a voice in it,

but only a voice, and a muted one, because of this amendment.

I implore my colleagues not to seize

this amendment as the opportune moment today in today’s circumstances,

but to reflect on the history that led

up to this war powers resolution, the

history of Vietnam, the history that

taught us as a country and as a Nation

we must stand together as a people and

debate whether or not we engage in

premeditated war.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues

to oppose the Hyde amendment.

Mr. FUNDERBURK. Mr. Chairman, I

move to strike the requisite number of

words.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the

gentleman yield?

Mr. FUNDERBURK. I yield to the

gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I just want

to say I listened awestruck by what the

gentleman from Illinois just got

through saying. It appears to me that

he really believes this act, this war

powers resolution, which the Congressional Reference Service 2 days ago

said, with respect to your question regarding the number of instances when

the Congress has utilized the war powers resolution since its enactment in

1973 to compel the withdrawal of U.S.

military forces from foreign deployments, we can cite no single specific

instance when this has occurred.

It has never been used. The gentleman seems to imply that Congress

would be in a state of paralysis if we

got into a combat situation. I would

tell the gentleman, but he knows this,

we have a Committee on Appropriations, a Committee on Armed Services,

a Committee on International Relations, and they would be vigorously

holding hearings and disbursing legislation, and we control the purse. The

existence or nonexistence of the War

Powers Act is utterly irrelevant.

I thank the gentleman.

Mr. FUNDERBURK. Mr. Chairman, I

am proud to stand with Chairman

HYDE and Congressman DORNAN as an

original sponsor of this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, there is no more vocal

critic of this administration’s foreign

policy and its misuse of the military

than this Member. My district borders

Fort Bragg. The soldiers of the 18th

Airborne Corps have borne the brunt of

the Clinton administration’s misadventures in Somalia and Haiti. As we

speak the Clinton administration is

even contemplating action in Bosnia.

But, the issue here is not the competence of Bill Clinton. The issue is

whether we will be faithful to the Constitution and restore the delicate balance of power between the President

and the Congress.

There will be some who say that the

timing of this amendment is wrong.

They argue that with war in Bosnia

looming we should maintain the status

quo. That argument is wrong on two

accounts. First, adhering to the original intent of the Framers is never

wrong. Second, the repeal of the War

Powers Act increases the President’s

responsibility for explaining to the

American people the reasons for expanding our role in Bosnia. Repeal the

War Powers Act now and Mr. Clinton

can’t say his Bosnian policy was hamstrung by the Congress.

Mr. Chairman, despite events in

Bosnia, this isn’t a partisan fight.

Every President since 1973, Republican

and Democrat, has urged the repeal of

the War Powers Act. Plain and simple,

it is a ticking time bomb. If we don’t

diffuse it now, at a time of relative

peace, it has the potential to explode

during a great national crisis. In a

strange way, this act, first promoted

by the so-called peace movement of the

1960’s and 1970’s, reduces deterrence, increases the risk of war, and places our

combat troops in greater danger.

Let me put this debate in some historical context. The conflict between

congressional and Presidential war

powers is as old as the Constitution.

But, until the twin disasters of Watergate and Vietnam, the President’s authority over the deployment of American troops had been relatively undisputed. The War Powers Act, passed

over the veto of President Nixon in

1973, changed that. The act was the

centerpiece of the activist, radical

Vietnam/Watergate Congress.

As Ambassador John Norton Moore

notes, the first problem is that the act

itself is a product of a myth—the myth

that somehow the Vietnam war was ‘‘a

presidential war’’ and if Congress only

had a veto over the President’s war

powers there would have been no lives

lost in Indochina. That myth is nonsense. From the time of the 1964 Gulf of

Tonkin resolution, the Congress passed

appropriation after appropriation to

pay for the increase in troop levels and

material requested by the White House.

The late Sam Ervin, the primary opponent of the War Powers Act and the

leading constitutionalist in the Congress, argued that each Vietnam resolution and appropriation was a ‘‘declaration of war in the Constitutional

sense.’’

Congress was a full and equal partner

in the decision to prosecute the war.

Only when the war became unpopular

did the Congress try to shift the blame

and the result was this misguided legislation.

This act is clearly unconstitutional.

At its heart is an attempt by the Congress to define the war powers of the

President. The Congress has no such

authority. The President’s power

comes solely from the Constitution of

the United States not a temporary majority on Capitol Hill. Congress has the

power to provide the President with an

Army and a Navy and to declare war

but it has no constitutional authority

to deny the President his right to deploy and engage Americans forces in

any action short of offensive war.

Section 5 of the act contains the

most egregious violations of the Constitution.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the

gentleman from North Carolina [Mr.

FUNDERBURK] has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr.

FUNDERBURK was allowed to proceed for

2 additional minutes.)

Mr. FUNDERBURK. Mr. Chairman, it

requires the President to withdraw

troops in any situation in which hostilities are possible within 60 days of

the deployment. It gives the Congress a

legislative veto over the constitutional

prerogatives of the Executive. This is a

flagrant attempt by the Congress to exercise the Commander-in-Chief authority vested by the Framers in the President.

Section 5 is also practically dangerous. It tells friend and foe alike that

the President’s commitment of force is

only good for 60 days, after that American resolve is left to the whim of 535

Secretaries of Defense in the Congress.

It sends a signal that if the Congress

can’t determine the propriety of the

President’s actions, this act automatically assumes that the President is

wrong and it works as a silent veto

over his decision. Knowing that American forces will disappear in 60 days
June 7, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H 5663

might encourage an enemy to fight

harder or wait us out in order to gain

a political victory.

We have been lucky so far. But we

can’t continue to gamble with American security. What happens during a

crisis to a President who considers the

War Powers Act unconstitutional? The

President must either give up his right

to uphold and defend the Constitution

or force a fight with the Congress at a

moment of maximum danger to America. Can we afford to have such a momentous decision left up to the

unelected justices of the Supreme

Court? Let’s head that disaster off

right now. Mr. Chairman, it is long

past time to repeal this dangerous legacy of the Vietnam era—it is time to

dispose of the War Powers Act.

Support the Hyde-Dornan-Funderburk amendment.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask

unanimous consent that all debate on

this amendment and all amendments

thereto be limited to 30 minutes, to be

equally divided and controlled by the

gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE] and

the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON].

b 1700

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection

to the request of the gentleman from

New York?

Mr. HAMILTON. Reserving the right

to object, Mr. Chairman, we are prepared on this side at some point to

enter into a limitation of time and

agree to a unanimous consent request.

We do have a bit of a problem here, because there is an important briefing

going on now in the Committee on National Security on Bosnia. I am informed that several of those Members

would like to speak.

May I ask if the gentleman would

defer his request for maybe 15 or 20

minutes, and we will try to reach an

agreement.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the

gentleman yield?

Mr. HAMILTON. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I will be

pleased to defer for another 15 minutes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I

thank the gentleman for his cooperation.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my unanimous consent request.

The CHAIRMAN. The unanimousconsent request is withdrawn.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I move

to strike the requisite number of

words.

Mr. Chairman, it is interesting, if

you followed the debate, the discussion

of the repeal of the War Powers Act,

what we have here actually is a partial

repeal of the War Powers Act without

due deliberation.

The committees of jurisdiction, the

Committee on International Relations,

has held no hearings and has marked

up no legislation; the Committee on

National Security, which is vitally

concerned, has held no hearings and

has marked up no legislation. Yet before us suddenly springs full blown a

proposal to partially repeal the War

Powers Act and to substitute a shadow

of the constitutional powers delegated

to the Congress by the Constitution.

We would be better served if this

were an absolute repeal. It would be

cleaner, and it would not give anyone

the impression that the role of Congress was ‘‘the President shall in every

possible instance,’’ that is a pretty big

loophole, ‘‘consult with,’’ does that

mean, Congress, who are they? All 435?

I am a member of Congress. Would I be

consulted with? Would I have an opportunity to represent the people of my

district? No. A few people could be selected; one person could be selected.

What does it constitute? This is a shadow of the authority that was granted

to the Congress by the Constitution.

I admit that the War Powers Act is,

in fact, effective and at the end of my

5 minutes I will sketch out a fix. But to

partially repeal it and instead impose a

very weak, prior consultation loopholeridden provision certainly gives solace

to those who believe that the commander in chief, the president, is preeminent. Unfortunately, none of the

Framers of the Constitution felt that

was a very good idea.

If you would refer to James Madison’s notes on the Federal Convention,

he quotes:

Mr. Sharman thought it stood very well.

The Executive should be able to repel and

not to commence war. ‘‘Make’’ better than

‘‘declare,’’ the latter narrowing the power to

much.

Mr. Gerry never expected to hear in the

Republic a motion to empower the executive

alone to declare war.

Mr. Mason was against giving the power of

war to the Executive because not safely to be

trusted with it; nor to the Senate, because

not so constructed as to be entitled to it. He

was for clogging rather than facilitating

war; but facilitating peace. He preferred ‘‘declare’’ to ‘‘make.’’.

On a motion to insert ‘‘declare’’ in place of

‘‘make,’’ it was agreed to.

That is reserved to the United States

Congress, as is the power to raise armies.

The gentleman, the esteemed gentleman from Illinois has pointed out,

certainly we have the powers of the

purse, but once you of deployed troops,

secretly, after consultation with one or

more Members of Congress, if the opportunity arose and it was convenient

for the President, once those troops are

on the ground, under hostile fire, is

this Congress going to stand up and repeal the funds immediately? No. Member after Member will come to the well

and say, we must stand with the Commander in Chief, we must stand behind

those troops, no matter how ill-intentioned the initial deployment. This

Congress is not going to have anymore

guts to cut off the funds than it does to

use the implementation of the act and

to require that the President submit a

report, which has not happened during

my time in this Congress.

The key here is prior restraint before

we get into a shooting war, before we

have had casualties, before emotions

run high. Prior restraint was in the

Senate version of the War Powers Act

and, had we adopted the Senate version

instead of the more watered-down

House version, we would have an effective War Powers Act. We can fix the

War Powers Act. We can require prior

restraint and require consultation as

the Framers of the Constitution intended.

It is no surprise that four former

Presidents have said, ‘‘Repeal the War

Powers Act.’’ Of course, every Executive, as the Framers of the Constitution pointed out, is wont to foreign adventures without the restraint of this

body, without having to go through a

torturous debate before the U.S. Congress on the passing of resolutions.

But remember, again, if we are to do

this through the appropriations of the

powers of the purse, if a President has

gone forward and if the Congress, a majority of the elected representatives of

the people should say,’’ Let us restrain

the President, let us bring the troops

home,’’ the President could veto that

resolution and it would require a

supermajority of the Congress to exert

our constitutional role.

Under this act, if we adopt this

amendment, this is not a repeal of the

War Powers. If we adopt this amendment to the War Powers Act, future

Congresses will require a two-thirds

majority in order to restrain the President’s war-making authority, certainly

nothing that the Framers of the Constitution would have envisioned, nor

endorsed.

There is a fix to War Powers. It is

possible. Three modifications: a return

to the concept of prior restraint, as

was in the original Senate bill, defining in advance those uses of the armed

forces in hostilities for which the

President needs no prior authorization;

a prohibition on any other use of the

Armed Forces in hostile situations and

on any of the permissible uses lasting

longer than 60 days.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the

gentleman from Oregon [Mr. DEFAZIO]

has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. DEFAZIO

was allowed to proceed for 1 additional

minute.)

Mr. DEFAZIO. A prohibition on any

other use of the Armed Forces in hostile situations and on any of the permissible uses lasting longer than 60

days, unless such use is authorized by

Congress, and using purse string restrictions to enforce the prohibition;

and providing for judicial review.

This is key. I am one who has gone to

try and defend the constitutional prerogatives of the Congress several times

in the last decade. But the courts will

not act. We need to give standing so we

need to provide for judicial review by

conferring standing to bring suit upon

Members of Congress in the event of

presidential noncompliance and limiting the court’s discretionary powers to

dismiss such cases.

That would fix War Powers. That

would reassert the war-making powers
H 5664 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE June 7, 1995

of the United States Congress. But if

we adopt this amendment to War Powers, not repeal, we will superimpose

and put in place a mere shadow of the

power of Congress. And, yes, some

Members of Congress might be consulted if it is convenient for the president and then we will have a war. I do

not believe that that is what the American people want.

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman,

I move to strike the requisite number

of words.

Mr. Chairman, the preceding speaker

in the course of his remarks acknowledged that the War Powers Resolution

that we have before us that has been in

effect for the last 22 years is toothless

and weak. It is the weak version that

was adopted that contains no restraint

whatever on the Commander in Chief

exercising the war power legitimately

given to the Congress under the Constitution. In fact, it is a 60-day grace

period during which this resolution unconstitutionally purports to confer

that power for a time on the president.

I rise in wholehearted support of the

amendment of the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE] to repeal the War Powers Resolution. It is now, and has been

every day since it was passed, unconstitutional.

As has been pointed out several times

in the course of this debate, President

Clinton, President Bush, President

Reagan, President Carter, President

Ford and President Nixon all have said

that this War Powers Resolution in effect for the last 22 years is injurious to

the national security of the United

States.

It is harmful to the United States.

This resolution weakens both the

President and the Congress. It is that

bad. In time of crisis, it actually increases the risk of war. Most importantly for purposes of this debate, it offends two centuries of our constitutional history.

First let us take a look at how it

weakens the Congress. It is very important to recognize that that is exactly

what this is all about. It is a 60-day abdication of Congress’s legitimate warmaking power. Article I, Section 8,

clauses 1 and 11 of the Constitution

give to Congress the power to provide

for the common defense and to declare

war. There is no requirement that the

Congress wait 60 days in order to exercise its constitutional authorities in

these respects.

But the War Powers Resolution with

its 60-day grace period purports to give

the President carte blanche to wage

war for a full 2 months without any

congressional authorization, just as

President Clinton did in Haiti. The War

Powers Resolution has provided political cover for this Congress to sit back

and do nothing for months, to abdicate

its responsibility so that later it can

take political pot shots at the President and the Commander in Chief after

our troops are already in the field.

It has bread flabbiness in the real

war-making power of this Congress. It

has caused this body to retreat utterly

and shamelessly as it did in Haiti when

the then-Speaker of the House went so

far as to prevent this House of Representatives from even debating the

use of force in Haiti.

It weakens the Congress as well as

the President. Here is how it is weakening the President. The vesting

clause, Article II, section 1 of the Constitution, unambiguously grants to the

President, not to the Congress, the totality of the executive power. Article

II, section 2 of the Constitution provides that the President shall be the

Commander in Chief of the Army and

Navy. For centuries American Presidents have relied on these sweeping

grants of authority to use our Armed

Forces in a host of contexts without

prior congressional action such as responding to attacks or threats on

American forces, citizens or property,

or when secrecy or surprise are essential.

No one thinks that we ought to have

weeks and weeks of debate before the

Commander in Chief could act in those

circumstances or where the necessity

for an immediate military response

leaves no opportunity for congressional

action. But the War Powers Resolution

in effect over these last 22 years

purports to shrink these historic inherent Presidential powers to just one circumstance: a direct attack on the

United States.

Thankfully the War Powers Resolution was not on the books for a single

one of the major wars in which our Nation has been involved over 200 years.

It is a distortion of our Constitution. It

ignores the entire course of our constitutional history. If it were correct,

then Presidents Adams, Jefferson, Lincoln, Grant, Wilson, FDR, Truman and

Eisenhower were all lawbreakers.

No American President of either

party, including President Clinton, has

ever recognized perversion of our constitutional order. None has ever pretended to follow its terms. It is instructive that in the course of this debate not a single Member has pointed

to a single instance in which the War

Powers Resolution was in fact invoked

to withdraw U.S. troops from combat.

It has not ever happened.

The War Powers Resolution claims to

force an end to hostilities in 60 days

unless Congress has affirmatively

acted. This unwise and inflexible rule

has emboldened our enemies. They

have every reason to doubt our resolve.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the

gentleman from California [Mr. COX]

has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. COX of

California was allowed to proceed for 2

additional minutes.)

Mr. COX of California. It has tempted

our enemies to think that America’s

staying power in any conflict is limited

to those 60 days. It is ironic that this

measure enacted 22 years ago ostensibly for the purpose of limiting the

use of force, minimizing it, has vastly

magnified the risks of war, and it will

continue to do so every day that it is

on the books.

The War Powers Resolution illegitimately pretends to allow Congress by

simple concurrent resolution to compel

the President to break off military action. That is a flatly unconstitutional

legislative veto. As the chairman, the

gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE],

has pointed out so eloquently, through

the exercise of its legitimate constitutional powers this Congress has ample

means to achieve the same result.

Mr. Chairman, we can redress a grave

constitutional injury today. We can

improve the stature and the standing

of Congress. We can protect our legitimate war-making prerogative by repealing the War Powers Resolution. We

can strengthen the Commander in

Chief simultaneously and restore his

legitimate constitutional authority.

And we can better defend the national

security against tyrants and other external enemies by letting the world

know our staying power in any conflict

extends beyond a mere 60 days.

Mr. Chairman, our Constitution is

right. The War Powers Resolution is

wrong. Let us repeal it today for the

sake of our national security and for

the peace of the world.

b 1715

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I

move to strike the requisite number of

words.

Mr. Chairman, let me say first of all

that I think the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. HYDE, has performed a genuine service here in bringing this

amendment forward. There just is not

any doubt at all that the War Powers

Act just has not worked well.

The gentleman from Illinois has a serious amendment. It needs to be and is

being carefully discussed. He very well

points out that there are serious flaws

in the War Powers Resolution. He is

correct when he says that no President

accepts the War Powers Resolution in

its current form. He is correct, I think,

when he says that the 60-day clock provision means the Congress can control

by inaction, and thereby play into the

hands of an adversary.

He is correct, I think, when he says

that the concurrent resolution mechanism does not work. Put aside constitutional questions, which are serious, but that mechanism does not

work. The statute does not define hostilities, and that allows the executive

branch to stretch the meaning of it beyond rationality. The consultative

process could stand a lot of improvement. I concede all that. I acknowledge

that.

On the constitutional level, although

it has not been finally determined, the

concurrent resolution mechanism has

likely been rendered moot by the

Chadha decision on legislative vetoes.

The 60-day clock by which congressional silence or inaction requires a

President to bring the troops home

very likely steps over the line into the

President’s Commander-in-Chief powers.
June 7, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H 5665

Having said all of that, on the constitutionality of the core principle behind the War Powers Resolution, it is

at that point that I think that the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE] and I

disagree. I believe that the Constitution absolutely requires that Congress

share with the President the decision

to send troops abroad for combat. We

do not always do it, we often do not

like to do it, but I do not think that we

should cede the power away. That is

the way I read the gentleman’s amendment.

Mr. Chairman, it is very important

to recognize the advantages of the War

Powers Resolution. Despite all of its

deficiencies, there are some real advantages to it. The decision to commit

American forces to combat is the

gravest decision that a government

makes. Presidents are not infallible.

They do make mistakes. They are surrounded by aides, almost invariably

aides who favor the executive power.

When faced with a judgment about

committing troops abroad, I believe

that the President needs the balanced

judgment from the legislative branch.

The core principle behind the War

Powers Resolution is that sending

troops abroad requires the sound collective judgment of the President and

the Congress. I do not think that principle should be abandoned. The War

Powers Act provides a framework for

shared decision making. It gives the

President strong incentive to consider

the opinion of the Congress, and I

think most of us who served in the

Congress before the War Powers Act

and after the War Powers Act understand that presidents now are much,

much more careful about consulting

with the Congress with the War Powers

Resolution than without it. It provides

a precedent process to get congressional advice to consult with the Congress, and it does, I think, give the

Congress some leverage on this key decision of sending troops into combat.

Mr. Chairman, the argument is made

that the War Powers Resolution weakens the President’s hand. I believe I

would argue just the opposite. When

the Congress goes on record in support

of the President‘s judgment to send

combat troops abroad, that collective

judgment strengthens the President’s

hand. I think it strengthens the role of

the United States in the conflict, because it shows that the Congress and

the American people support the President. Absent the clear indication of

support what a congressional authorization provides, the President and his

policies are vulnerable to every blink

of public reaction when U.S. forces face

hostilities.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the

gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON] has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. HAMILTON was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, we

do a lot of signal sending in this body.

I think the signal sending we do today

is important. I have come down on the

side that repealing the War Powers Act

sends the wrong signal, because, as

others have stated, it represents an abdication of our powers. It gives the

President a kind of a green light for his

action without the legislative branch,

except consultation.

The argument is made, of course,

that we have the power of the purse,

and we certainly do, and that that is

enough. I do not think I can agree with

that. The power of the purse is not

equivalent to Congress sharing the

critical threshold decision, up front,

about whether to send troops at all.

The power of the purse is usually, not

always, but usually exercised after the

fact, weeks after the fact, sometimes

months after the fact.

It is true that we can cut off funding

any time for a given operation. It is

very difficult to cut off funding before

an operations starts, although we have

done it on occasion, but it is difficult

to do. Presidents are going to fight, as

they should, to keep their options

open. However, it is also difficult to

cut funding after the troops are in the

field. Senator Javits I think rightly

pointed out that Congress can hardly

cut off appropriations when we have

American troops fighting for their lives

in the field.

Mr. Chairman, I understand that the

gentleman from Illinois has received a

number of endorsements from former

Presidents. However, I do not think

that should surprise anyone. Former

executives are not exactly disinterested parties in questions about war

powers authority. This discussion goes

to the very heart of what our institutional responsibilities are. Institutional prerogatives govern the war

powers debate. It is not surprising that

Presidents want fewer restrictions on

their ability to take action.

However, I believe that the Congress

should hold tenaciously to the power to

share the tough decision about putting

troops into battle. I look upon the act

of repealing the War Powers Act as an

act of abdication by the Congress of its

power.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the

gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON] has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. HAMILTON was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, the

Congress can stand against a President. The Congress can stand beside a

President. What Congress must not do

is to stand aside. Congress should not

cede its constitutional responsibilities.

We are a co-equal branch of government.

Of course, consultation is necessary

and important, but it is not enough

when it comes to the War Powers Resolution. This is an extraordinarily important debate that the gentleman

from Illinois, [Mr. HYDE] has opened

up. I know him well enough to know,

and I have visited with him about it,

that this amendment is the beginning,

and not the end, of a serious dialogue

on the war powers. It is my hope that

his amendment, if it is adopted, is not

the final proposal, but I do think our

vote today sends a signal.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the

gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON] has expired.

(At the request of Mr. HYDE and by

unanimous consent, Mr. HAMILTON was

allowed to proceed for 3 additional

minutes.)

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, if we

are prepared to cede congressional

power on this important decision, then

the vote is yes. However, if Members

believe, as I do, that Congress has a

role to play when we send these troops

into action, that we ought to be in on

that decision, even though we reluctantly take that decision, or try to

avoid it, then I think Members should

vote against this amendment.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the

gentleman yield?

Mr. HAMILTON. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I thank

my friend for a thoughtful, well reasoned, and illuminating statement,

which is typical of the gentleman. I

just want to simply say in Vietnam

there was not a bullet shot, there was

not a gun held by a GI, that was not

authorized and paid for by this Congress, and this Congress can stop it, or

can make it go ahead any time it

wants.

I suggest again to the gentleman

that my amendment requires us to

know, to be in at the take-off as well as

the landing, to be not only informed

but to be given reports, periodic reports. Then we have the power to stop

it or go ahead, and be a full partner.

We would be the dominating partner,

because the President cannot wage war

without our funding it.

Lastly, the lesson of Vietnam, to

anybody who is not deaf, dumb, and

blind, is that you cannot carry on a

war without the support of the people.

That means the support of Congress.

We are, under the Constitution, under

the power to appropriate and raise the

money and spend it, we are full partners. We are the senior partner with

the executive.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the

gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON] has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. HAMILTON was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, the

gentleman from Illinois, of course, always states well and eloquently his position. I think the problem with the

gentleman’s position is that there

comes a critical point, a very critical

point when you have to decide to commit these troops or not. The power of

the purse really is not involved at that

point. We want the power at that critical point, at the threshold of the decision, to be part of that decision.

It is not enough just to be consulted.

We have to be consulted, but it is not
H 5666 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE June 7, 1995

enough. We are a co-equal branch of

government. This is the most important decision a government makes, and

we ought to be in on that threshold decision when it is made, not later when

we take up the appropriations bill.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, we have

now had 13 Members speak on this debate.

I ask unanimous consent that debate

on this amendment and all amendments thereto be limited to 30 minutes,

to be equally divided and controlled by

the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE]

and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr.

HAMILTON].

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection

to the request of the gentleman from

New York?

Mr. HAMILTON. Reserving the right

to object, Mr. Chairman, the problem I

confront here is that we have a list of

8 speakers on our side remaining. That

could easily jump by a couple. A cut-off

at 6 o’clock, 15 minutes on each side,

would just be extremely limiting.

Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the gentleman would agree to 6:30.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, we only

have three speakers on our side. would

the gentleman agree to 6:15 as a cut-off

time?

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I

would agree only to 6:30.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask

unanimous consent that debate on this

amendment and all amendments thereto be limited to 1 hour, to be equally

divided and controlled by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE] and

the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON].

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection

to the request of the gentleman from

New York?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman

from Illinois [Mr. HYDE] is recognized

for 30 minutes.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3

minutes to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. UPTON].

b 1730

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank

the author of the amendment for yielding me the time as he knows that I am

opposed to his amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to

this amendment for a number of reasons. As the previous speaker indicated, I do believe very strongly that

we need a shared responsibility between the branches of the Government.

I can remember well, probably the biggest vote that I have ever cast, certainly the biggest vote that I have ever

cast was to give President Bush the authority to go into the gulf war. I view

the War Powers Act as one of the

major issues back then as to why the

President came to this body and came

to the American people and persuaded

them convincingly that that was the

right vote. I am not so certain that he

would have done that had there not

been a War Powers Act.

I have talked to Members of Congress

on this floor today who have indicated

that had he not come to the House

floor, they probably would have voted

to impeach him, and yet they still

voted for the resolution as it passed

that night in January on a fairly convincing vote.

Mr. Chairman, I remember well an

earlier vote that same night, the Bennett resolution, a resolution that

passed in this floor 302–131. It expressed

the sense of Congress that the Constitution vested the power to declare

war on Congress and that the President

must gain congressional approval before any offensive military action

could be taken against Iraq. That was

a check and a balance. That is what

this Government is about, a check and

a balance.

As I look at the votes that were cast

on overriding the President’s veto,

President Nixon back in 1973, I look at

a number of my colleagues past and

present. I passed one today, Larry

Coughlin, who voted to override the

President that day. But I look at some

of the names, Mr. Edwards and Dickinson of Alabama, later became the ranking members on the Committee on

Armed Services here in the House and

served in a distinguished way and on

Appropriations as well. I look at Mr.

Rousselot from California who voted to

override, at the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. CRANE], still in the House,

and Mr. Erlenborn and Mr. Anderson. I

look at TRENT LOTT, now the majority

whip in the Senate, who voted to override. I look at my own former Members

from Michigan, Bill Broomfield, who

were ranking Members of this committee. I look at Mr. Frenzel.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the

gentleman yield?

Mr. UPTON. I yield to the gentleman

from Illinois. I wish the gentleman had

been in the Congress in 1973.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I would

just point out to the gentleman that

there was another issue overhanging

that debate and that vote. The President had just gone through the Saturday night massacre. There was nobody

more vulnerable on this planet than

Richard Nixon, and I dare suggest,

without knowing, a lot of those people

wished to show a lack of support for

the President because of the problems

he was having. I could be wrong but I

would just like to offer that. I thank

the gentleman.

Mr. UPTON. Again, I respect the gentleman from Illinois tremendously, but

this is an issue that puts the Congress

as a player in making decisions that

are certainly, I think, the biggest ones

that we make, sending, whether it is

our children or our friends’ and neighbors’ sons and daughters off to war. I

believe that it has to be more than a

consultation process, it has to be one

where we can take some action. Again,

I look at the gulf war. I do not believe

that President Bush may have come to

this body seeking our approval without

that hanging over his head. He did so,

and he did so admirably. He made the

point and we had strong bipartisan support. Thank goodness it was the right

decision for all of us to live by.

I would just suggest that perhaps we

do need reform of the War Powers Act,

having seen it play now for 20 some

years. But I do not know that revocation is the answer. I would certainly

welcome hearings before the Committee on National Security and others to

look at ways that we can improve the

bill rather than repeal it. I urge my

colleagues to vote no.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman

from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON] is recognized for 30 minutes. Does he choose to

yield time?

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I

yield 5 minutes to the distinguished

gentleman from Colorado [Mr.

SKAGGS].

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2

minutes to the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. SKAGGS].

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman

from Colorado [Mr. SKAGGS] is recognized for 7 minutes.

Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, I thank

the gentlemen for yielding me the

time.

Mr. Chairman, I have great respect

for the gentleman from Illinois and believe that he has offered what is almost

a good amendment. In a debate like

this about one of the most significant

powers that the Constitution grants to

the Congress, I think it is well to look

back to the thoughts of one of the

Founders and perhaps the Father of the

Constitution. Madison observed as follows about this power, and I quote:

Those who are to conduct a war cannot in

the nature of things be proper or safe judges

whether a war ought to be commenced, continued or concluded. They are barred from

the latter functions by a great principle of

free government . . . .

In other words, the Executive who

would be charged with the prosecution

of the war should not be considered the

proper authority for determining

whether to commence one.

We clearly have constitutional problems with the current War Powers Resolution. I think in order to understand

those, we really need to parse out the

kinds of situations that we face that

implicate the war power provisions of

the Constitution.

First clearly we have those actions

that truly involve the commencing of

war in a constitutional sense. I would

assume that the gentleman would

agree that in those cases, the power of

Congress is paramount. It is not a matter of consultation or reporting or a

shared power. It is our responsibility,

and no one else’s, to make the decision.

Then there are all other cases, deployments of one sort or another,

emergency responses, humanitarian efforts, all of the variations on the

theme in which I believe we have to

concede a good deal of constitutional

authority to the President of the United States both as Commander in Chief

and as the individual with authority

under our system to conduct the foreign policy of the country.
June 7, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H 5667

The War Powers Resolution impinges

on the constitutional authority on the

one hand of the Congress, by ceding authority to the President in some instances where it is our paramount responsibility to act. And it impinges on

the constitutional authority of the

President as Commander in Chief in

some instances, in those other wideranging examples that fall short of the

commencement of war in a constitutional sense.

It is a defective statute constitutionally with respect to both the executive and the legislative branches and

the responsibilities we each have under

the Constitution.

This amendment is perhaps unfortunate in that it does not go far enough

and simply repeal the War Powers Act

in toto. Or better yet, we should attempt a constitutionally coherent effort to explain and to state the respective roles of the executive and the legislative branches with respect to military action abroad.

Instead, this partial repeal, I fear,

will leave a remainder of the War Powers Resolution that carries an unfortunate implication. And that implication

is that the presidential authority in

war is restrained only by a consultative and reporting requirement. I do

not believe that is what the gentleman

intends. It is certainly not what the

Constitution permits. But relative to

the current state of debate as reflected

in the War Powers statute, that I think

is the only inference to draw from

making this change.

I think we do a great disservice to

the constitutional responsibility of the

Congress under Article I if we appear

to tilt too far in expressing deference

to the executive.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the

gentleman yield?

Mr. SKAGGS. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I think it

is a fact of modern history that declarations of war are gone. I think they

are anachronistic. I do not think they

will happen. Clearly the Constitution

assigns the declarations of war function to Congress and only to Congress.

But declaring war has consequences in

a technologically advanced world that

nobody wants to face.

Had we declared war against Vietnam, the fear was China and Russia

would have had to declare war against

us. So you get into a cascading snowball situation. Instead what you do is

you call it a police action, as we did in

Korea, or you call it something else,

but you do not formally take that

giant leap of declaring war.

So we are back to the President as

Commander in Chief having the authority to move troops around but we

always have the inescapable function

of Congress, and that, too, is constitutional, to provide the appropriations.

Without the appropriations, they cannot get a drink of water.

Mr. Chairman, I just suggest that requiring consultation does not exhaust

Congress’s authority. We have the

untrammeled authority to

unappropriate, disappropriate funds.

That is the key, and that makes us the

king of the hill. I suggest that by repealing the foolish, nonsensical, unusable parts of the War Powers Resolution and requiring the President to

keep us informed comprehensively, we

enhance the use, ultimate use of our

appropriation authority.

Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I simply disagree

with the way the gentleman characterizes the ultimate impact of what he is

proposing. I think it really would be a

default to the executive on the powers

that we must hold.

I think the gentleman makes a good

argument for amending the Constitution, perhaps, to reflect current times.

I would disagree with that step, but

that is the argument he is really making. In fact, I think we need a more

constitutionally subtle and discrete approach to this issue than is encompassed in his amendment, perhaps one

that would be the product of a full

committee hearing and deliberation

process in both the Committee on

International Relations and Committee

on National Security.

In any case, under these circumstances with this debate on this

bill, I would reluctantly urge a ‘‘no’’

vote on the gentleman’s amendment.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4

minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON].

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I

thank the gentleman for yielding me

the time.

Mr. Chairman, I have been in the

Committee on National Security this

afternoon listening to testimony by

the Secretary of Defense and by the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and so I

missed the earlier part of this debate.

I wonder if the gentleman from Illinois would answer some inquiries,

some questions that I have regarding

his amendment.

The first is, would you explain as

briefly as possible just what you repeal. Second, would you please explain

the purpose behind that.

I would like to add, if I may, is it not

correct that Presidents in recent years,

and my recollection is that during my

term in Congress, which is the same as

my friend from Illinois, that the Presidents have complied with the notification portions of the War Powers Act

without acknowledging its force and effect.

Mr. HYDE. If the gentleman will

yield, as a practical matter, the Presidents are wise enough to consult with

Congress, let Congress know because

you can not keep a secret when you

move troops around the world. So the

President has consulted. But no President has acknowledged it was pursuant

to the War Powers Resolution. It was

just common sense and comity between

two co-equal-and-essential-to-eachother branches of government.

Mr. SKELTON. But would the gentleman answer my first question.

Please explain what you repeal and the

basic reason therefor.

Mr. HYDE. Yes. Section 2707(a)1, the

War Powers Resolution, is repealed.

That is the law that requires the President after 60 days to bring the troops

home if we have not acted affirmatively to support the presence of the

troops there. In other words, by doing

nothing, the President has to call everybody home, which gives a false expectation to our adversaries, if they

just wait us out. It has never been tested in court. No President ever, of either party, has recognized it as constitutional. It is unworkable. I am just

trying to clean up the law so we have

left a requirement of consultation and

reporting timely and comprehensive

and we always have that appropriations authority. You will remember the

Boland amendments which cut off

funds for the Contras. We passed one

every year over my objection, but we

did. Just one example of Congress cutting off funds for belligerencies we did

not agree with.

Mr. SKELTON. My next question, if

you recall, deals with a bit of history

back in the 1940 era, early 1941, when

President Roosevelt made certain actions, particularly with the United

States Navy. How would the War Powers Act have affected him?

Mr. HYDE. It would not. What we did

was transferred destroyers to Great

Britain. He declared them surplus.

Mr. SKELTON. No, no, no. In his activities in having patrols acting

against the submarines of the Nazis at

the time in the North Atlantic. Does

that ring a bell?

Mr. HYDE. If he was sending troops

into hostilities or into a place where

hostilities were imminent, that is the

language of the War Powers Resolution.

Mr. SKELTON. So, in other words,

the War Powers Act had it been in effect in 1940–41 would have affected what

President Franklin Roosevelt did at

the time, is that correct?

Mr. HYDE. I do not know what

knowledge Congress had of what was

going on. If they knew and were looking the other way, as I suspect was the

truth, nothing would have happened.

Mr. SKELTON. I thank the gentleman.

b 1745

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I

yield 5 minutes to the distinguished

gentleman from New Jersey [Mr.

TORRICELLI].

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I

thank the gentleman for yielding me

this time.

Mr. Chairman, every American

schoolchild learns to respect and revere

the Constitution of our country and

those who wrote it. It is a near perfect

document, an expression of extraordinary wisdom. But it was not without

flaw.

Among those flaws has been a 200-

year conflict in authority between the

commander-in-chief and the powers incumbent upon him and the war-making
H 5668 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE June 7, 1995

powers of this Congress. The problem

was masked for many years. But time,

changes in technology and diplomacy

made a collision inevitable, the speed

of war, the powers of weapons, the

change of diplomacy. That collision

came most dramatically in Vietnam.

The result was not simply the loss of

life of thousands of Americans after a

constituency for that war in this Congress and among our people had evaporated. There was another price, the

near loss of legitimacy of this Government in its actions.

It has been suggested by the gentleman from Illinois that this Congress

was not without recourse, at any moment we could have abandoned the providing of appropriations, withdrawn

funding, and by doing so expressed the

wishes of our constituencies and ourselves. And indeed in the final analysis,

after more than 10 years of combat

that is exactly what happened. But the

War Powers Act was enacted because

Members of Congress themselves found

that that choice was inadequate. Members were not going to choose to take

away appropriations from our own sons

and daughters who were fighting and

dying while they were in combat. They

would not do it, and neither would we.

It was not a sufficient power. We needed the right to express ourselves before

the Nation engaged in combat.

The War Powers Act itself may not

have been a perfect expression either.

Indeed, from Grenada to Lebanon, for

different reasons and different circumstances, we have seen the flaws in

the act itself. But it has nevertheless

in our own time been a valuable method of expression for this Congress, creating at a minimum a period of consultation, a consultation, a sharing of

power between the Congress and the

Presidency that did not exist when

FDR invaded Nicaragua, or when Lyndon Johnson sent forces to the Dominican Republic.

In our own time that power has been

shared and has been different. Would

the marines have stayed in Haiti for 30

years if the Congress had had power

when Woodrow Wilson acted. Would we

have remained for a generation in

Nicaragua when Roosevelt acted? It

has been different and it has been better because of the War Powers Act.

Maybe George Bush never accepted

its constitutionality. Maybe he did not

agree and maybe today he would like

to see us repeal it. But when he was

faced with a judgment in the Persian

Gulf, he was quick to bring Members of

this Congress to the White House, and

quick despite his objections to seek a

congressional vote, because he understood not a problem, but an opportunity in the War Powers Act. He

wanted Saddam Hussein to know that

this was no Vietnam, you will not divide the American people in combat,

that the Congress and the Presidency

will act together, and so he did not

seek to avoid a vote, he wanted it, because he knew of what it telegraphed

to Iraq. That vote more than anything

else brought the United States allies

and showed solidarity.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the

gentleman from New Jersey has expired.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I

ask unanimous consent for 2 additional

minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. The time is controlled by the gentleman from Indiana

[Mr. HAMILTON].

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I regret I do not have the time.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I

ask unanimous consent the gentleman

from Indiana have 2 more minutes on

his time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Committee is

operating under an existing unanimous-consent agreement which equally

divides the time on the Hyde amendment.

Mr. HYDE. What was the gentleman’s

request?

Mr. TORRICELLI. I asked unanimous

consent for an additional 2 minutes.

Mr. HYDE. We should have an equal

division then.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has

asked unanimous consent that the

amount of time be extended by 2 minutes.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman,

will the gentleman yield 2 additional

minutes?

Mr. HYDE. Of course I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I

thank the gentleman for yielding the

time.

Mr. Chairman, there are many reasons why this system has survived for

so long when so many other constitutional systems around the world have

faltered, but there may be one which is

more important, the idea of refusing to

centralize power in the American constitutional system. Admittedly, this

has been a conservative idea, central to

conservative doctrine in the American

political system, that no one individual

and no one institution would monopolize power.

Ironically, a great Member of this

House, a leader in the conservative

movement, the gentleman from Illinois

[Mr. HYDE], today would repeal this

idea, and leading us back to a different

time when one man, one institution in

this Government could so control constitutional power.

I rise today in defense of that conservative idea, because cutting off appropriations is not an answer, and in

an age with the technology today that

exists, when the gentleman from Illinois is correct that war may no longer

be formally declared, to give that

power to one man is more dangerous

than when Lyndon Johnson had it,

more dangerous than when Franklin

Delano Roosevelt had it. This constitutional system serves best by insisting

that the Congress share in that right,

and that the lessons of Vietnam and

the opportunities of the Persian Gulf

remain with us.

When there is a better way to distribute power, better than the Persian Gulf

war lessons, better than the resolution

we would repeal today, let us do it. It

is not before this House today.

I thank the gentleman for yielding

me the time.

Mr. HYDE. Would the Chair tell me

how much time I have remaining?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman

from Illinois [Mr. HYDE] has 17 minutes

remaining, and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON] has 20 minutes

remaining.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I

yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from

California [Mr. BERMAN].

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank

the gentleman for yielding the time.

Mr. Chairman, I came to the floor

this afternoon planning to support the

Hyde amendment, and have been giving

it a lot of thought since then and have

decided to change my mind, one of

those rare times where the debate on

the floor actually affects somebody’s

decision.

I agree with so much of what the gentleman says. First of all, the argument

that this law could be at the center of

congressional participation in the decisions about whether or not to go to

war. When you get right down to a law

that no President has ever considered

constitutional, no court has ever been

willing to enforce, and in most instances Congress has not even been

willing to implement just does not I

think, make a lot of sense to me.

This is law that at its heart and at

the part that Mr. HYDE wishes to

change and repeal, since once the

President submits a report pursuant to

the War Powers Act, within 60 days

after the hostilities or the imminent

threat of hostilities for U.S. forces

within 60 days either Congress has to

extend, has to grant that authorization

for additional time or the forces must

come back.

In the Lowry case, in the reflagging

of the Kuwaiti tankers, the district

court in response to the lawsuit seeking to compel a determination that the

Presidential information on the

reflagging of the Kuwaiti tankers constituted a report said we are not going

to get into that, we are not going to

declare it a report. If the report has

not been made pursuant to the War

Powers Act, the 60 days do not run. So

the act becomes meaningless and it has

become meaningless in any legal sense.

The more interesting question is

whether the act serves a purpose.

There has been some discussion on the

floor. Initially it was stated on the

floor that in fact President Bush decided to come to the Congress with the

authorization for the use of force in the

Desert Storm because of the existence

of the War Power Act, and that that

played some role in this decision. Others have said that really played no role

in the decision, and of course I do not

know the full story of what went on in

his mind. But what I do know is that

the Committee on International Relations should conduct hearings on this
June 7, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H 5669

subject. We should look at modifications. We should get rid of the 60-days

requirement. I think we should change

the threshold. There are a lot of times

where our forces are in imminent

threat of hostilities where we do not

want to trigger any particular congressional action.

We should look at a meaningful consultative process that has an ongoing

precedent the Executive Branch involved. If we pass the Hyde amendment

today without more attention to what

that consultative process will be, and

that were to go into law, we have no leverage to get the more meaningful consultative process from a President who

would like to see the repeal of the 60-

day requirements and of the requirement for the report which triggers any

time period set.

So I would suggest a better course,

and I do it very reluctantly, is to vote

against the Hyde amendment today,

for the Committee on International Relations have hearings, to draw up a bill

which goes to the heart of what the

gentleman from Illinois, Mr. HYDE,

does but provides for a more meaningful consultative process with the executive branch, and hand the administration a package which allows them to

get out of a requirement which they do

not consider constitutional, which, as

the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE]

points out, in some cases give aid and

comfort to our adversaries by giving

them hope that the Congress will not

act, even though no one argues that

the President will listen to what the

Congress said on this subject anyway

or is legally compelled to listen, get rid

of that 60-days requirement and substitute a more carefully drafted consultative process and I would urge, and

thereby maintain some legislative role

in those decisions.

So I would like to get a separation of

two different kinds of questions. In

Desert Storm I think the President was

constitutionally compelled to come before Congress. I considered it would

have been an impeachable offense for

him to engage in that kind of attack

with time for preparation, with a date

certain set, without coming to Congress. I am not sure Mr. HYDE agrees

with me. I would like to go through a

process where we seek to separate the

more minor incidents, which it does

not work to have a congressional role,

from the more serious incidents where

we want to preserve the core congressional functions.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I am

pleased to yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr.

TORKILDSEN].

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I

yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from

Massachusetts [Mr. TORKILDSEN].

b 1800

Mr. TORKILDSEN. Mr. Chairman, I

rise today in opposition to the amendment offered by my colleague, the distinguished gentleman from Illinois

[Mr. HYDE], the Chair of the Committee

on the Judiciary.

The Constitution grants the President the power of Commander in Chief

of our Armed Forces. Yet, the Founding Fathers also granted Congress the

authority to ‘‘organize, arm, and discipline’’ an army.

At our country’s founding, we were

insulated from attack by foreign powers by two vast oceans. Thus it wasn’t

necessary to keep large peacetime armies. Congress effectively limited the

President’s authority to make war by

not funding large, peacetime standing

armies.

The framers of the Constitution were

so intent on keeping a too-powerful

chief from making war, that not only

did they give the power to make war to

the Congress, they also specifically

prohibited, in the Constitution itself,

any appropriation to raise and support

armies from lasting more than two

years.

But as our country grew, and technology made the insularity of the

oceans limited at best, it became necessary, in our own national interest, to

keep and maintain large armies in

peacetime as well as during conflict.

However, in funding these large peacetime armies, Congress was giving up

much of its constitutionally authorized

role in determining whether or not

make war.

The War Powers Resolution was

passed in 1973 as one way to re-assert

the Congress’ constitutional authority

to determine whether or not any President can make war in the name of the

people of the United States.

With passage of the War Powers Resolution, Congress sought—rightfully

so—to restore its legal authority to determine whether or not U.S. armed

forces are involved in war.

Today we are faced with an amendment which would effectively repeal

the War Powers Act, and replace it

with a requirement for simple consultation by the President with Congress.

As a member of the National Security Committee, I am aware of many

arguments for and against the War

Powers Resolution. Clearly, the War

Powers Act does need to be amended,

both to take into consideration the

many new missions we ask our troops

to perform, and to make it work in

times of crisis. Amending it is far different than repealing it.

Now is not the time for Congress to

give up its role in determining whether

or not troops are committed to combat. I urge my colleagues to defeat the

repeal of the War Powers Act, and

work together for the logical amendment the act requires.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, does

the gentleman have further speakers?

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I have

three more speakers left, and I understand, if I yield the gentleman 2 minutes, we will then be permitted to

close.

Mr. HAMILTON. We are prepared to

let you close, but let me make sure I

understand how this debate plays itself

out. My understanding is that you will

want to call a quorum call?

Mr. HYDE. Correct.

Mr. HAMILTON. That would be toward the end here, after which there

will be four speakers, two on each side?

Is that correct?

Mr. HYDE. That is correct.

Mr. HAMILTON. Although we have

the privilege of closing under the unanimous consent, it is my understanding

the Speaker would like to speak, and

we will be glad to yield him the privilege of speaking last.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I thank

the gentleman.

Does the gentleman require 2 additional minutes?

Mr. HAMILTON. We may before we

are through. The gentleman may hold

them in reserve.

Mr. HYDE. I will hold them in reserve. All right.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to

the distinguished gentleman from

Georgia [Mr. BARR].

Mr. BARR. Mr. Chairman, the War

Powers Act has become a resolution

without meaning, honored in its breach

rather than in its compliance. It has

cost us credibility at home and abroad.

It is time to reform it.

It is time to get back to basics, to a

basic understanding of the separation

and the balance of powers in our carefully crafted system of government.

Coequal does not mean the same.

While the executive branch has certain

powers, Congress likewise has certain

powers. From time to time, in certain

areas, these may converge, but they do

not coincide. There are differences and

shall always and should always remain

differences.

I have been honored over the years to

work very closely on national security

matters. As a matter of fact, at the

time the war powers resolution was

being debated and passed and enacted I

was working in national security matters for the CIA. I know, as do other

Members of this great learned body,

how swiftly the affairs and matters of

national security are, arguably, subject

to the war powers resolution come up,

how quickly they can change, how difficult it is to anticipate, except, of

course, by our adversaries, how the

War Powers Resolution would play itself out and constrict the ability of our

commander-in-chief to operate.

We cannot tie the hands of our commander-in-chief, because when we do

that, when we tie his hands, we cost

the lives of our soldiers, and it is improper and unconscionable to put their

lives at risk.

That is why, Mr. Chairman, for over

25 years our Presidents, Republican

and Democrat alike, have found way

after way after way around the War

Powers Resolution, because it does not

work. It will not work, Mr. Chairman.

The amendment fashioned by the

learned chairman of the Committee on

the Judiciary brings this long out-ofbalance resolution and separation of
H 5670 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE June 7, 1995

powers back into balance for both parties and for both branches of Government, and importantly, also in the eyes

of our allies and adversaries alike in

the world.

Let us remove this cloud, this fog

hanging over the ability of our Government of which we are both a part, the

Congress and the President, to conduct

coherent and effective national security policy around the world in the

most dangerous situations imaginable.

I rise in strong support of the amendment offered by the learned gentleman

from Illinois.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, can the

Chair tell us how much time is remaining on each side?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman

from Illinois [Mr. HYDE] has 15 minutes

remaining, and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON] has 14 minutes

remaining.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I make the

point of order that a quorum is not

present.

The CHAIRMAN. Evidently a quorum

is not present.

Members will record their presence

by electronic device.

The call was taken by electronic device.

The following Members responded to

their names:

[Roll No 358]

Abercrombie

Ackerman

Allard

Andrews

Archer

Armey

Bachus

Baesler

Baker (CA)

Baker (LA)

Baldacci

Ballenger

Barcia

Barr

Barrett (NE)

Barrett (WI)

Bartlett

Barton

Bass

Bateman

Becerra

Beilenson

Bentsen

Bereuter

Berman

Bevill

Bilbray

Bilirakis

Bishop

Bliley

Blute

Boehlert

Boehner

Bonior

Bono

Borski

Boucher

Brewster

Browder

Brown (CA)

Brown (FL)

Brown (OH)

Brownback

Bryant (TN)

Bryant (TX)

Bunn

Bunning

Burr

Burton

Buyer

Callahan

Camp

Canady

Cardin

Castle

Chabot

Chambliss

Chapman

Chenoweth

Christensen

Clayton

Clement

Clinger

Clyburn

Coble

Coburn

Coleman

Collins (GA)

Collins (IL)

Collins (MI)

Combest

Condit

Conyers

Cooley

Costello

Cox

Coyne

Cramer

Crane

Crapo

Cremeans

Cunningham

Danner

Davis

de la Garza

Deal

DeFazio

DeLauro

DeLay

Dellums

Deutsch

Diaz-Balart

Dickey

Dingell

Dixon

Doggett

Dooley

Doolittle

Dornan

Doyle

Dreier

Duncan

Dunn

Durbin

Edwards

Ehlers

Ehrlich

Emerson

Engel

English

Ensign

Eshoo

Evans

Everett

Ewing

Farr

Fattah

Fawell

Fazio

Fields (LA)

Fields (TX)

Filner

Flake

Flanagan

Foglietta

Foley

Forbes

Ford

Fowler

Fox

Franks (CT)

Franks (NJ)

Frelinghuysen

Frisa

Frost

Funderburk

Gallegly

Ganske

Gejdenson

Gephardt

Geren

Gibbons

Gilchrest

Gillmor

Gilman

Gonzalez

Goodlatte

Goodling

Gordon

Goss

Graham

Green

Greenwood

Gunderson

Gutierrez

Gutknecht

Hall (OH)

Hall (TX)

Hamilton

Hancock

Hansen

Harman

Hastert

Hastings (FL)

Hastings (WA)

Hayes

Hayworth

Hefley

Hefner

Heineman

Herger

Hilleary

Hilliard

Hinchey

Hobson

Hoekstra

Hoke

Holden

Horn

Hostettler

Hoyer

Hutchinson

Hyde

Inglis

Istook

Jackson-Lee

Jacobs

Jefferson

Johnson (SD)

Johnson, E.B.

Johnson, Sam

Johnston

Jones

Kanjorski

Kaptur

Kasich

Kelly

Kennedy (MA)

Kennedy (RI)

Kennelly

Kildee

Kim

King

Kingston

Klink

Klug

Knollenberg

Kolbe

LaFalce

LaHood

Lantos

Largent

Latham

LaTourette

Lazio

Leach

Levin

Lewis (CA)

Lewis (GA)

Lewis (KY)

Lightfoot

Lincoln

Linder

Lipinski

Livingston

LoBiondo

Longley

Lowey

Luther

Maloney

Manton

Manzullo

Markey

Martini

Mascara

Matsui

McCarthy

McCollum

McCrery

McDade

McDermott

McHale

McHugh

McInnis

McIntosh

McKeon

McKinney

McNulty

Meehan

Meek

Menendez

Metcalf

Meyers

Mfume

Mica

Miller (CA)

Miller (FL)

Mineta

Minge

Mink

Moakley

Molinari

Mollohan

Moorhead

Morella

Murtha

Myers

Myrick

Nadler

Neal

Nethercutt

Neumann

Ney

Norwood

Nussle

Oberstar

Obey

Olver

Ortiz

Orton

Owens

Oxley

Packard

Pallone

Parker

Pastor

Payne (NJ)

Payne (VA)

Pelosi

Peterson (MN)

Petri

Pickett

Pombo

Pomeroy

Porter

Portman

Poshard

Pryce

Quillen

Quinn

Radanovich

Rahall

Ramstad

Rangel

Reed

Regula

Reynolds

Richardson

Riggs

Rivers

Roemer

Rogers

Rohrabacher

Ros-Lehtinen

Rose

Roth

Roukema

Roybal-Allard

Royce

Rush

Sabo

Salmon

Sanders

Sanford

Sawyer

Saxton

Scarborough

Schaefer

Schiff

Schroeder

Schumer

Scott

Seastrand

Sensenbrenner

Serrano

Shadegg

Shaw

Shays

Sisisky

Skaggs

Skeen

Skelton

Slaughter

Smith (MI)

Smith (NJ)

Smith (TX)

Smith (WA)

Solomon

Souder

Spence

Spratt

Stearns

Stenholm

Stockman

Stump

Stupak

Talent

Tanner

Tate

Tauzin

Taylor (MS)

Taylor (NC)

Tejeda

Thomas

Thompson

Thornberry

Thornton

Thurman

Tiahrt

Torkildsen

Torres

Torricelli

Towns

Traficant

Tucker

Upton

Velazquez

Vento

Visclosky

Volkmer

Vucanovich

Walker

Walsh

Wamp

Ward

Waters

Watt (NC)

Waxman

Weldon (FL)

Weldon (PA)

Weller

White

Whitfield

Williams

Wilson

Wise

Wolf

Woolsey

Wyden

Wynn

Yates

Young (AK)

Young (FL)

Zeliff

Zimmer

b 1828

The CHAIRMAN. Four hundred five

Members have answered to their

names, a quorum is present, and the

Committee will resume its business.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I

yield 3 minutes to the distinguished

gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. TANNER].

(Mr. TANNER asked and was given

permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

b 1830

Mr. TANNER. Mr. Chairman, I thank

my friend from Indiana for yielding. I

do not think I will take all of 2 minutes. I did not intend to speak on this

matter, but I served on a committee

with Larry Hopkins from Kentucky

some years ago as we tried to perfect

the War Powers Act. I served in the

Navy during the Vietnam war, and I

went into the Navy in 1968. By the time

I got off of active duty or discharged in

1972, I saw our country divided as

maybe never before, at least since the

Civil War.

Now, as imperfect at the War Powers

Act is, my friends, it does put the Congress in the mix to express the will of

the people into the equation. I saw during those 4 years our country divided

in a way perhaps it has not been since

the Civil War.

My friends, it does put the Congress

into the mix to express the will of the

people. Any administration, be it the

Kennedy, Johnson, or Nixon administration as it was in Vietnam, is going

to get into matters that it cannot extricate itself. Never again let us go

into war with bullets flying and people

dying without the expressed will of the

American people, at least with some

resolution by the Congress, so that we

do have that critical mass of popular

support for whatever it is we may do. I

really believe it is critical, even

though it is imperfect, that we stay involved in the process.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman

from Illinois [Mr. HYDE] has 15 minutes

remaining, the gentleman from Indiana

[Mr. HAMILTON] has 11 minutes remaining.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I am

pleased to yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MURTHA].

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Chairman, let me

speak from a practical standpoint in

favor of the Hyde amendment. In the

last couple years we have had real

problems with peacekeeping, for instance, and I have always felt that the

President should get authorization

from Congress before be deploys troops

in peacekeeping mission. But I separate peacekeeping from war making.

And I think there is a distinctive difference, and I think it is very difficult

for us to insist on the convoluted war

powers requirements for a President to

make decision on sending troops into

battle.

Now, I remember vividly, and Vietnam war hangs over us with all the

concerns and problems that we had,

but I remember vividly going to meet

with President Bush upstairs in the

White House. And the thing we discussed it how long would the American

public support a war in Saudi Arabia.

As we discussed that, there were recommendations that probably the public

would support it anywhere from 6

months to the next election. And this

all grew out of the hostilities that were

throughout the country during the

Vietnam war.
June 7, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H 5671

My prediction was that the public

would support this deployment for

about 6 months. And after 6 months, if

you remember, we started to get requests, or at least in my office I did, we

started to get requests from people in

my district that were serving overseas

in the hardship position that these

folks ought to come home. It is never

popular to put people in harm’s way.

Nobody believed that the Congress

would pass an authorization to send

troops into harm’s way.

As a matter of fact, I remember after

talking to the public at home, I came

up and called General Scowcroft, who

was the national security advisor at

that time, and I said to him, I think

the Congress, because the public supports the need for national security

and the importance of the Middle East

and the energy supply, they will support an authorization to go to war. An

awful lot of people did not agree with

that. But when the Congress met and

debated, one of the finest debates that

this Congress has ever been involved

in, we did the right thing. By an overwhelming margin in the House we authorized this great Nation to send our

young people into harm’s way.

It worked out fine, and that is the

way it should be. We had public support. We called up the Reserves, and we

did it the right way.

The danger in the War Powers Act in

my estimation is by inaction. We can

stop the President from making a decision. We should have to take action. It

should be hard. No President is going

to send troops into harm’s way without

a national security reason. It is not an

easy thing.

I supported President Reagan all

through the Central American crisis. I

supported President Bush in Saudi Arabia. I opposed him in Somalia because

I felt Somalia was a mistake and we

would not be able to solve it. It was an

internal problem. I oppose using

ground forces in Bosnia except to extract U.N. forces under NATO.

But let me say this: I believe that

when the American people elect a

President, that President should have

the leeway and the right to send people

into harm’s way with the advice and

counsel of the Chiefs of Staff. I do not

believe that in an emotional situation

the Congress should be able to stop this

in any way. I do not think there should

be hope that because we have something on paper that the Congress of the

United States is going to stop the

President from making the right decision.

So I support very strongly what the

gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE] is

trying to do in getting rid of this. Now,

can we do something in the future? I do

not know. But at this time in our history, I think it is up to this Congress

to step up and say that it is the President’s prerogative, and if we want to

take exception to that, we can stop the

appropriation funds.

So I strongly support and urge the

Members of this Congress to vote for

the Henry Hyde amendment and to

eliminate the War Powers Act.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I

yield 5 minutes to the distinguished

gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS].

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I was here many

years ago when we debated the War

Powers Resolution. It was back in my

black haired days and many days have

gone by. And I recall the debate vividly, Mr. Chairman. It was a significant

debate. A freestanding resolution came

to the floor as a product of a deliberative and substantive legislative process.

To the consternation of a number of

my colleagues on this side of the aisle,

I found myself, Mr. Chairman, in opposition to the War Powers Resolution

and was one of the few Democrats who

voted against the resolution. And I did

so for several reasons. One, I felt that

the War Powers Resolution diminished

the clarity of the Constitution on the

issue of Congress’ role in war making.

Second, I felt that it was a mistake

to allow the President to introduce

American forces into a situation and

seek retroactive approval from the

Congress of the United States. I

thought that our Founders thought

brilliantly and thoughtfully and creatively about the issue of war making

and war powers, because that was a

grave decision that the body politic

would engage in.

While I believe, Mr. Chairman, that

the post-cold-war era has introduced a

new period in American and world history and that the War Powers Resolution should be looked at, we may very

well need a new instrument to guide us

through this transitional period into

the new world of the 21st century. But

I would submit, though I believe in the

need for a new instrument and while in

the early 1970 I opposed the War Powers Resolution, I find myself today on

the floor of Congress asking my colleagues to oppose the amendment before us for two reasons: One, on process, and, two, on substance.

With respect to process, Mr. Chairman, the War Powers Act is no small

piece of legislation. The War Powers

Act is not a minor instrument in our

government. This is a high profile instrument. It is a contentious issue.

There are thoughtful people on all

sides of the question of what should be

an appropriate instrument that guides

us in the context of the post-cold-war

world. I believe that this issue is so important that the policy with respect to

war making, the role of the Congress of

the United States vis-a-vis the President, is so significant, that it should

not come to the floor simply and solely

as an amendment. Though I would

agree that there is some debate here,

this is the end product of the legislative process, not where it should begin.

It should begin in subcommittee and

in full committee, where we hear and

understand the subtleties and the nuances of any significant policy that affects our lives and millions of people in

this country and throughout the world.

The War Powers Resolution does just

that.

So I would suggest that we oppose it,

first, because of the process being

flawed. We should not come to the floor

with policy considerations so exceptional and so profound and so extraordinary, and we simply debate them

here on the floor of Congress. It needs

to be substantive, deliberative, and

thoughtful. Hearings were not held,

markups were not held. This is much

too large.

Second, to the issue of substance. As

I understand the resolution, it, A, repeals the War Powers Resolution, and,

two, puts in place the following: A consultative process. The President

consults with the Congress of the United States, with reporting requirements

that are weaker than in the present

War Powers Resolution.

There are some of us, Mr. Chairman,

in the body politic who believe that the

role of Congress goes far beyond simply

one of being consulted. There are times

when this gentleman believes that we

need prior approval.

I would remind a number of my colleagues, some of whom were not here in

the context of the debate on the Persian Gulf that the distinguished former

speaker spoke to, this gentleman took

the President of the United States to

court trying to protect and defend the

Congress’ constitutional prerogatives

in war making.

So there are thoughtful and courageous people on both sides of the issue,

some who think it is simply one of consultation, others who believe that we

should embellish upon that with prior

approval. I am simply saying that this

does not get us here.

Finally, and in conclusion, I think

that the gentleman from Illinois [Mr.

HYDE] is attempting to do something

important. This is not the forum, this

is not the product. I urge my colleagues to oppose the amendment.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I

yield myself the balance of my time on

this side.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is

recognized for 6 minutes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, let

me begin by simply saying that I think

that the gentleman from Illinois [Mr.

HYDE] has performed a genuine service

in bringing before this body the question of a repeal of the War Powers Resolution. There is no doubt that the resolution has many defects to it. The

gentleman from Illinois and others are

quite right when they point out those

defects.

There is no President that accepts

the War Powers Resolution. You are

right about that. The 60-day clock provision means that the Congress can

control whether or not we have combat

troops there by inaction. That does not

make any sense. I acknowledge that.

b 1845

The concurrent resolution mechanism does not work; so all of us agree,
H 5672 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE June 7, 1995

I think, in this Chamber that the War

Powers Resolution needs major revision. But I want to put out to you what

the Hyde amendment says. In its very

first substantive sentence, the War

Powers Resolution is repealed. I want

Members to think a little bit about

what that means.

One of the mysterious attributes of

this body is that we do not sometimes

want the power that the Constitution

gives us. And that is exactly what a repeal of War Powers means here. I believe that the Constitution absolutely

requires the Congress to share with the

President the decision to send troops

into combat. Presidents make mistakes. Presidents are not infallible.

And the gravest decision that a government makes, do you send young men

and women into war, is a decision that

should be made not by any person

alone, even if that person is the president. It should be made with a collective judgment. And is that not the theory of the Constitution, that the war

making power requires a collective

judgment of the President and the legislative branch?

That is the core of the War Powers

Resolution. The other parts of it need

to be corrected; but do not cede away

the core power of the resolution because, when you do that, you are walking away from the constitutional

power of the Congress.

The War Powers Resolution has been

helpful. Any of us in this Chamber who

served before the War Powers Resolution and then served after the War

Powers Resolution knows that presidents today consult a lot more with

the Congress after the War Powers Resolution was enacted.

Now, what does the amendment do by

the gentleman from Illinois, [Mr.

HYDE]? It does not acknowledge that

Congress should share in this most important decision to go to war. It means

that on this most important decision

we are not a coequal branch. We say:

Mr. President, please consult with us.

We do not even require him to consult.

We just say in every possible instance

consult. The President can ignore us

under this amendment if he wants to.

The Congress becomes on this most important power a junior partner who

will be consulted or not as the President chooses. Do not cede away this

power. Work with us to improve it.

I have talked with the sponsor of this

amendment. He is a very reasonable

man. I think he believes that this

amendment is not the end but the beginning of a serious effort to revise and

strengthen the War Powers Act. I believe that to be the case. But repealing

the War Powers Act now sends a signal

to the American people, and that signal is that we abdicate our power in

this body and we give it to the President of the United States carte

blanche, carte blanche authority. I do

not see how we can do that. I do not see

how we can do it and read the Constitution of the United States.

We give a green light unchecked to

the President, and we send that message that we have no role up front.

Now, the point is often made that we

have the power of the purse. But just

think about that. There comes a critical point whenever you are making a

decision to commit troops, we all know

it, there is a critical point. And that

critical point is when the decision is

made to send them in or send them

out. That is when you want the Congress involved, not months later when

you are dealing with the power of the

purse.

Sure, we can cut off funding. But it is

very difficult to cut off funding beforehand because you want to keep your

options open. It is very difficult to cut

off funding after the fact because the

troops are already in the field. I am not

saying we do not ever do it. I am just

saying it is extremely difficult to do it.

I think the Congress of the United

States on this question of war powers

can stand against the President. I

think there are times when we should

stand beside the President, but Congress should not stand aside when

American soldiers go into combat; and

that is precisely what this amendment

puts forward.

I urge a vote in order to keep the

constitutional powers of this institution. I urge Members to vote ‘‘no’’ on

the Hyde amendment.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.

I want to respond very briefly. There

is no carte blanche authority given to

the President by this amendment of

mine. This amendment strengthens.

There is nothing requiring notification

in the War Powers Act. This amendment says the President shall in every

possible—not may—shall report to Congress before, before the troops go in;

and then after the introduction, the

President shall. So we will be informed.

The same thing goes for the report.

We are not required to leave our common sense out in the Rotunda. The

facts of life are Lyndon Johnson could

not even go to his own convention because the people did not support what

he was doing in Vietnam. And that lesson has not been lost on anybody with

a room temperature IQ. So do not

think the War Powers Act forces the

President to consult. No President who

wants to survive another week will

omit consulting.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 9 minutes to

the Speaker of the House, the distinguished gentleman from Georgia [Mr.

GINGRICH].

Mr. GINGRICH. Mr. Chairman, I

thank the gentleman from Illinois for

yielding time to me.

I rise for what some Members might

find an unusual moment, an appeal to

the House to, at least on paper, increase the power of President Clinton.

And here we are in the middle of the

Bosnian exercise with troops in Haiti

and with all sorts of concerns, and yet

I stand here to say that for America,

the right thing to do is repeal these

provisions, for America.

The reason is simple. First of all, I

listened carefully to my good friend,

the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON], who I think is a very serious

and a very committed scholar of this.

But he said something that all of us

need to be aware of. He said, he complained, ‘‘We have no role up front.’’ I

want to make two points about this,

because he is right. We have no role up

front.

We have no role up front because in

an age of instantaneous change, as we

were tragically reminded in Oklahoma

City, there are times and moments

when you need what the Constitution

called ‘‘the Commander in Chief.’’ And

once we have designed the military and

we have paid for the military and we

have established the framework and we

have created the laws, within the legal

framework of those laws in an emergency the Commander in Chief has to

actually act as the Commander in

Chief.

And that has been true of both parties. In fact, it was true of George

Washington. It was true of Thomas Jefferson. People who say I am a Jeffersonian conservative, well, Jefferson

sent the Marines to Tripoli and then

told this Congress.

So the fact is, in the real world, if we

are going to be honest with our constituents, a Commander in Chief exercising those powers with American

troops scattered across the planet and,

I think, over 100 different countries, if

you count various advisory groups,

they are there. We did advise. We

passed the appropriations. We said, we

established the Congress. We maintained the Navy, to use the two terms,

and we established the Army and maintained the Navy, and the fact is they

are there.

And if tomorrow morning somebody

were to attack our troops, there would

be an instantaneous, immediate reaction. And I certainly hope, for one,

they would not stand there taking casualties waiting for the President to

come to the Congress to see if we could

report out a resolution to allow our

troops to defend themselves.

My good friend would say, the War

Powers Act does not stop that. Exactly. What the War Powers Act says is

if the President decides to notify us

that the troops are in imminent danger, then we have 60 days. I have been

through this drill. I was through this

drill with President Reagan. I was

through this drill with President Bush.

I am now going through this drill with

President Clinton. Let me tell you

what happens.

We get committed somewhere. And

then the military comes in and says,

you could pass this. But if you pass

this, you are now saying to every terrorist, why do you not kill some Americans to force them out? Do you want

to set the standard that Americans are

targets so that the Congress can be

pressured and suddenly everybody in

senior leadership in both parties.

Somebody says, Well, maybe we do not
June 7, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H 5673

want to make Americans targets;

maybe we do not want to set up Americans to get killed. What happens?

Let me give you an example from the

Clinton administration. A letter, written July 21, 1993. It said about Somalia,

in a situation where people were being

killed, ‘‘intermittent activity, intermittent military engagements involving U.S. forces overseas, whether or

not constituting hostilities, do not

count.’’ So an ambush in Mogadishu,

the loss of 18 American lives, that does

not count. They are not in imminent

danger.

Nobody jumped up, the Democratic

leadership did not return to the floor,

the then chairman of Committee on

International Relations did not rush to

the floor, did not say, 18 Americans

have died. Clearly, are in imminent

danger.

Instead everybody agreed, let us hold

hands, let us not risk any additional

Americans being killed.

Why, if that is the case, why am I for

repealing this?

Because it sends exactly the wrong

signal to both branches. It says the

Congress is just enough involved to

have everybody downtown wandering

in circles and being confused, and it

says to the Congress, oh, you really

have a role. You want to cut off troops

in Haiti or Somalia or you want to cut

off troops in Bosnia, there is an easy

way to do it. It is called the power of

the purse.

In fact, we have done it before. In the

case of Lebanon, we did it. In the case

of Somalia we did it. We used the appropriations process exactly as the

Federalist Papers described and exactly as the Founding Fathers wanted,

and we had a clean and a decisive

choice.

Where we are responsible, which is

the money, we said, No, after this date

get out, period, end of story.

Now, we negotiated to make sure the

day was a safe one. We negotiated to

protect our troops. But we exercised

the power of the Congress without having a complicated, convoluted, and profoundly dishonest law. Because what

this law does is it says to every administration, do not tell the truth. If

Americans are in imminent danger, do

not say it because if you say it, you

will trigger the War Powers Act. And

by the way, if it triggered the War

Powers Act and we did not pass something and you had a strong President,

they would promptly say, as the Clinton administration said last year, it

does not count. And they would stay.

And guess what, the only way you

could get them out would be to pass an

appropriations bill to cut off the funding or to impeach the President.

So what I am begging for is clarity.

Let us return to a system that worked

from the founding of the country to the

mid-1970’s. Let us return to a system

that says, we in Congress have awesome power. If we do not pass an appropriations bill, nothing happens. There

is no government. There is no Army.

There is no Navy. But if we delegate

powers to the President and we establish a framework of law and we agree

to establish something to happen, let

us actually allow the Commander in

Chief to be Commander in Chief.

And I asked my good friend, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE], to

allow me to close because I think the

American nation needs to understand

that as Speaker of the House and as

the chief spokesman in the House for

the Republican party, I want to

strengthen the current Democratic

president because he is the President of

the United States. And the President of

the United States on a bipartisan basis

deserves to be strengthened in foreign

affairs and strengthened in national security. He does not deserve to be undermined and cluttered and weakened.

When we get to disagreements, we

will have the right place to have them.

But this particular bill was wrong

when it was passed. It has not worked

in 20 years. And it is wrong now. And

we should clean up the law, get it back

to the constitutional framework and

allow the President of the United

States to lead in foreign policy with us

deciding on key issues by our power of

the purse.

b 1900

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on

the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE].

The question was taken; and the

Chairman announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 201, noes 217,

not voting 17, as follows:

[Roll No. 359]

AYES—201

Archer

Armey

Bachus

Baesler

Baker (CA)

Baker (LA)

Ballenger

Barr

Bartlett

Barton

Bass

Bateman

Bilbray

Bilirakis

Bliley

Blute

Boehner

Bono

Borski

Brownback

Bryant (TN)

Bunn

Bunning

Burr

Burton

Buyer

Callahan

Calvert

Canady

Castle

Chabot

Chambliss

Chapman

Christensen

Chrysler

Clinger

Coburn

Collins (GA)

Combest

Cox

Crane

Crapo

Cremeans

Davis

de la Garza

Deal

DeLay

Diaz-Balart

Dickey

Doolittle

Dornan

Dreier

Dunn

Ehlers

Ehrlich

English

Everett

Ewing

Fawell

Fields (TX)

Flanagan

Foley

Forbes

Fowler

Fox

Franks (CT)

Franks (NJ)

Frelinghuysen

Frisa

Funderburk

Gallegly

Ganske

Gekas

Gillmor

Gingrich

Goodlatte

Goodling

Goss

Graham

Greenwood

Gutknecht

Hancock

Hansen

Hastert

Hastings (WA)

Hayworth

Hefley

Heineman

Herger

Hilleary

Hoke

Holden

Horn

Hostettler

Hoyer

Hunter

Hutchinson

Hyde

Inglis

Istook

Johnson, Sam

Jones

Kelly

Kim

King

Kingston

Klink

Klug

Knollenberg

Kolbe

LaFalce

Largent

Latham

LaTourette

Lewis (CA)

Lewis (KY)

Lightfoot

Linder

Livingston

Longley

Manzullo

Martinez

Matsui

McCollum

McCrery

McDade

McHale

McHugh

McIntosh

McKeon

Mica

Miller (FL)

Mink

Molinari

Mollohan

Moorhead

Moran

Murtha

Myers

Myrick

Nethercutt

Neumann

Norwood

Nussle

Ortiz

Orton

Oxley

Packard

Petri

Pickett

Pombo

Porter

Portman

Pryce

Quillen

Radanovich

Roberts

Rogers

Ros-Lehtinen

Royce

Salmon

Sanford

Saxton

Schaefer

Seastrand

Sensenbrenner

Shadegg

Shaw

Shays

Sisisky

Skeen

Smith (MI)

Smith (NJ)

Smith (TX)

Smith (WA)

Solomon

Souder

Spence

Stenholm

Stockman

Talent

Tate

Taylor (NC)

Tejeda

Thornberry

Thornton

Tiahrt

Vucanovich

Walker

Wamp

Weldon (FL)

Weldon (PA)

Weller

White

Whitfield

Wilson

Wolf

Young (AK)

Young (FL)

Zeliff

Zimmer

NOES—217

Abercrombie

Ackerman

Allard

Andrews

Baldacci

Barcia

Barrett (NE)

Barrett (WI)

Becerra

Beilenson

Bentsen

Bereuter

Berman

Bevill

Bishop

Boehlert

Bonior

Boucher

Brewster

Browder

Brown (CA)

Brown (FL)

Brown (OH)

Camp

Cardin

Chenoweth

Clay

Clayton

Clement

Clyburn

Coble

Coleman

Collins (IL)

Collins (MI)

Condit

Conyers

Cooley

Costello

Coyne

Cramer

Cunningham

Danner

DeFazio

DeLauro

Dellums

Deutsch

Dingell

Dixon

Doggett

Dooley

Doyle

Duncan

Durbin

Edwards

Emerson

Engel

Ensign

Eshoo

Evans

Farr

Fattah

Fazio

Fields (LA)

Filner

Flake

Foglietta

Ford

Frank (MA)

Frost

Furse

Gejdenson

Gephardt

Geren

Gibbons

Gilchrest

Gilman

Gonzalez

Gordon

Green

Gunderson

Gutierrez

Hall (OH)

Hall (TX)

Hamilton

Harman

Hastings (FL)

Hayes

Hefner

Hilliard

Hinchey

Hobson

Hoekstra

Jackson-Lee

Jacobs

Jefferson

Johnson (SD)

Johnson, E. B.

Johnston

Kanjorski

Kaptur

Kasich

Kennedy (MA)

Kennedy (RI)

Kennelly

Kildee

LaHood

Lantos

Lazio

Leach

Levin

Lewis (GA)

Lincoln

Lipinski

LoBiondo

Lowey

Luther

Maloney

Manton

Markey

Martini

Mascara

McCarthy

McDermott

McInnis

McKinney

McNulty

Meehan

Meek

Menendez

Metcalf

Meyers

Mfume

Miller (CA)

Mineta

Minge

Moakley

Morella

Nadler

Neal

Ney

Oberstar

Obey

Olver

Owens

Pallone

Parker

Pastor

Payne (NJ)

Payne (VA)

Pelosi

Peterson (MN)

Pomeroy

Poshard

Quinn

Rahall

Ramstad

Rangel

Reed

Regula

Reynolds

Richardson

Riggs

Rivers

Roemer

Rohrabacher

Rose

Roth

Roukema

Roybal-Allard

Rush

Sabo

Sanders

Sawyer

Scarborough

Schiff

Schroeder

Schumer

Scott

Serrano

Shuster

Skaggs

Skelton

Slaughter

Spratt

Stearns

Stokes

Studds

Stump

Stupak

Tanner

Tauzin

Taylor (MS)

Thomas

Thompson

Thurman
H 5674 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE June 7, 1995

Torkildsen

Torres

Torricelli

Towns

Traficant

Tucker

Upton

Velazquez

Vento

Visclosky

Volkmer

Walsh

Ward

Waters

Watt (NC)

Waxman

Williams

Wise

Woolsey

Wyden

Wynn

Yates

NOT VOTING—17

Bonilla

Bryant (TX)

Cubin

Dicks

Houghton

Johnson (CT)

Kleczka

Laughlin

Lofgren

Lucas

Montgomery

Paxon

Peterson (FL)

Stark

Waldholtz

Watts (OK)

Wicker

b 1917

Mr. SCARBOROUGH changed his

vote from ‘‘aye’’ to ‘‘no.’’

So the amendment was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced

as above recorded.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask

unanimous consent that debate on the

amendment about to be considered and

all amendments thereto be limited to

60 minutes, to be equally divided and

controlled by myself and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON].

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection

to the request of the gentleman from

New York?

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, I would like

to ask the distinguished chairman if he

has discussed this at all with the minority.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, if the

gentleman will yield, I do not believe it

has been discussed with the minority.

Mr. ACKERMAN. In that case, I will

be compelled to object, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the

gentleman yield?

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, further reserving the right to object, I

yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, how

many speakers does the gentleman

have on his side on this amendment?

Mr. ACKERMAN. We are not sure

right now, but we would be delighted to

discuss it with the gentleman. We

think it is in the neighborhood possibly

of anywhere from 4 to 6.

Mr. GILMAN. If we could agree on

some reasonable time, if the gentleman

will yield further, we have until 9

o’clock to wind up this evening. We

have one other major amendment to

consider this evening.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I think that we

would be very amenable to discussing

it on a staff level at this point while

this amendment is being debated.

Mr. GILMAN. We will be pleased to

discuss it further with the gentleman’s

staff.

Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my unanimous consent request.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. ACKERMAN

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I

offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. ACKERMAN: On

page 67, after line 9, insert the following new

section:

SEC. 501. CONSOLIDATION REPORT.

(A) REPORT.—No agency of the United

States Government may be abolished or its

functions transferred or consolidated with

another such agency pursuant to this division or any other provision of this Act relating to reorganization unless the Director of

the Congressional Budget Office and the Director of the Office of Management and

Budget independently calculate and submit

to the Congress a joint report analyzing the

costs and benefits of any such action.

(b) CONTENTS OF REPORT.—The cost/benefit

analysis required by subsection (a) shall include, but not be limited to—

(1) An assessment of direct and indirect

costs for the first five years associated with

the implementation of the provisions of this

division or any other provision of this Act

relating to reorganization; and

(2) The effects of consolidation on personnel, management systems, real property, decisionmaking processes, administrative

costs, and costs associated with terminating,

amending, renegotiating, or negotiating existing and new contracts.

(c) FURTHER CONGRESSIONAL ACTION REQUIRED.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this act, if the Director of the Congressional Budget Office and the Director of

the Office of Management and Budget either

jointly or independently determine and report that the costs associated with the consolidation required by this division or any

other provision of this act relating to reorganization exceed the fiscal year 1995 operating

costs of the affected agencies, such provisions shall not become effective unless—

(1) the President determines that such consolidation is in the national interest of the

United States; or

(2) a joint resolution is enacted specifying

that such provisions shall become effective

upon enactment of such resolution.

Redesignate sections 501 through 511 as

sections 502 through 512.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, this

amendment is modeled on principles

that the majority has articulated in

this chamber since January, and it is

my hope that we will have strong bipartisan support for its adoption. Members on both sides of the aisle—whether

they support consolidation within the

State Department or not—should find

this amendment very attractive. We

should know what our actions will cost

or save before we engage in a massive

reorganization.

The amendment is designed to ensure

that this body does not unknowingly

write a blank check in the course of

passing this bill, something that concerns all of us who are trying to save

taxpayer dollars from frivolous Government spending.

For those who are not on the International Relations Committee, let it be

known that there is presently no way

of knowing if the bill, as reported, will

save one penny as a result of reorganization.

Under this bill, we abolish three

agencies and direct the former heads to

report to work and assume new roles

within the State Department. Yet

there is no specific plan on how this

will be accomplished.

There is no plan in place to reduce

any staff. There is no plan in place to

eliminate the cost of maintaining

buildings, if indeed any are found not

to be needed, and there is no plan in

place to determine the costs and savings in buying out leases and service

contracts. In fact, as the legislation is

written, a consolidation plan is not required until March 1996.

How do we do this in the blind? Without this amendment we will be passing

a blank check bill. At this point, there

is simply no way to conduct a cost-benefit analysis because under the bill we

won’t even see a plan until March 1996.

To rectify this problem my amendment does the following:

First, it requires a joint report from

the Director of OMB and the Director

of the CBO, who is a Republican, requiring an analysis of the costs and

benefits of the proposed plan for the

first 5 years it is in effect. The report

will cover effects of consolidation on

personnel, management systems, real

property, decision making processes,

administrative costs and costs associated with terminating, amending or negotiating existing and new contracts.

What if the proposed consolidation

doesn’t save money, but actually costs

more money? That might come as a

surprise to some. But you may want to

go forward anyway—and you can.

Second, if the report indicates that

the costs of the reorganization exceed

the fiscal year 1995 operating costs of

the agencies, the President may determine it is in the national interest and

proceed—and don’t forget, this bill applies to the next president. If the President does not make that determination, the Congress must enact a joint

resolution specifying that the consolidation, if more costly, may proceed.

My goal here is simple: It is to guarantee that the Congress know and understand the costs of its action, and

then proceeds to act with that knowledge. This provision is consistent with

the vision of the Republican majority

who have shown a consistent dedication to rigorous application of costbenefit analysis. I look forward to

strong bipartisan support in adoption

of this amendment.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I

rise in opposition to the Ackerman

amendment.

Mr. Chairman, our colleague, the

gentleman from New York, has put

forth an amendment, but in reality

what the amendment really does is to

put a hold, to absolutely gut the provisions of the bill. This bill, as written in

this section, will allow the consolidation of ACDA, AID and USIA functions

within the State Department.

Of the organizations that are in an

unusual fashion expressing support for

this bill today, the support is coming

because we are in fact consolidating

the agencies that now exist as separate

agencies, AID, ACDA and, of course,

USIA. That is the reason we are having

the taxpayer groups and so many other

conservative groups, who ordinarily

would never come out and suggest that

we ought to vote for a foreign assistance bill, but in fact it is one of the

major ways that we are saving an extraordinary amount of money.

I want to call my colleagues’ attention to a couple of changes that the

committee made in the course of deliberations on the proposal to consolidate
June 7, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H 5675

these agencies. One of the most important concerns I had early in the process

was the fact that we may be burying

ACDA, the arms control agency, and

their recommendations, too deep in the

bureaucracy of the State Department.

So in fact we amended that and moved

the placement so that the director of

ACDA will be making recommendations not through some layer of bureaucracy but directly to the National

Security Council, to the President. It

cannot be delayed, cannot have his recommendations deferred or set aside by

some assistant Secretary of State or

even the Secretary of State.

The other thing I wanted to mention

is the fact that while the concept started in the other body and was once

enunciated in the House bill at its earliest stage of having a separate foundation run what are now the programs of

the Agency for International Development, that concept was jettisoned. Indeed, what we have kept is an assurance by the organization proposed that

the programs of the Agency for International Development in its new home,

it is not being eliminated, it is being

placed and consolidated into the State

Department, that those programs will

in fact be a tool or set of tools to be

implemented by the President of the

United States.

b 1930

After all, the development policies

and the other programs run by the

Agency for International Development

ought to be under the direction of the

President so that they can indeed serve

our national interests, our foreign policy objectives.

So I would say to my colleagues, if

they vote for the Ackerman amendment they are basically gutting the

bill’s savings provisions, the part that

conserves our dollars and makes a better use of them, they are gutting the

consolidation efforts that we have

shown in this bill.

Importantly, the Ackerman amendment gives the Director of the Office of

Management and Budget an independent veto over this consolidation. A new

statute would be required to override

the veto. Now those are the kind of decisions I think properly are left to the

Congress of the United States and not

to CBO and not to OMB. I do not think

we need additional studies. If there are

savings in this approach, I think it is a

rather extraordinary circumstance

that they would have to demonstrate.

It is very clear that the savings in the

bill are in significant part because of

this consolidation.

So I urge my colleagues to reject the

Ackerman amendment and to leave

what we have crafted in the way of a

consolidation effort. I think it focuses

the programs, the decisionmakings

that do relate to our foreign policy

where it ought to be in the State Department but with careful placement of

these three new subcomponents.

I ask my colleagues to vote against

the Ackerman amendment.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to

strike the requisite number of words,

and I rise in support of the Ackerman

amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I support the Ackerman amendment for one very simple

reason: I think the matter of arms control policing is much too important to

be left in the hands of the State Department. I recognize the efforts made

by the committee to try to ensure that

ACDA will in fact still directly report

to the National Security Agency. But

the fact is that so long as the Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency remains in any way a part of the State

Department, it will be under pressure,

regardless of the bureaucratic boxes, it

will be under pressure to follow the

party line of the agency. And with all

due respect to the State Department,

and I have a lot of respect for it, I

think the Congress needs to know that

it has an absolutely independent and

fiercely independent agency which will

call the shots as they see it when they

are evaluating whether other countries

who share this globe with us are in fact

in compliance with arms control agreements or not. And so long as the arms

control agreements or not. And so long

as the arms control agency is folded

into the State Department, we will always have the tendency of the State

Department to want to take into account other factors, and they will bring

pressure on ACDA to take into account

other factors such as our political relationships with those countries.

Political relationships are important. But when it comes to arms control, this Congress needs to be able to

know that it has the unvarnished facts,

and I think there are just too many

pressures on the State Department to

assure that we are going to get those

unvarnished facts, and therefore I

would oppose what the committee does.

I cannot think of any more important information which the Congress

needs to have than to know whether or

not some other country in the world is

either violating or getting close to violating arms control agreements which

they have signed.

I do not want to have even the slightest scintilla of pressure be brought on

an arms compliance evaluating agency

to take into account the fact that we

need to have good relations with another country, or we need to take into

account what is happening with the political opposition in that country. It

just seems to me that the primary obligation of this Congress is to have clear,

straight information, and I think we

risk the fact that we will not have it if

ACDA is submerged into the State Department.

So I would strongly urge that the

Ackerman amendment be supported.

All it says is that this action cannot

take place until there is a cost-benefit

analysis. That to me refutes the argument of my good friend from Nebraska,

with whom I very seldom disagree on

foreign policy issues. It just seems to

me in this case the Congress’ overwhelming interest in having absolutely

neutral, straight, hard-nosed information about whether other countries are

giving us a snow job or not in terms of

their compliance overrides all other

considerations. We ought to vote for

this amendment.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman,

I move to strike the requisite number

of words.

Mr. Chairman, have no doubt about

it, this amendment would gut the reform that the Republicans have

brought to the foreign policy establishment of this country. The American

people voted for change. We have come

forward with a bold plan of reform, and

what we have now is an attempt to derail that reform, to study it to death.

In answer to some of the arguments

that have been made, whether it is

arms control or whether it is AID policy, or whether it is communications

policy, these are not separate efforts.

These are not things that operate and

should operate independently of a global strategy. These are part and should

be part and parcel of a global strategy,

part of the same effort. This is what is

behind our whole reform proposal to

take arms control, AID decisions, and

communications and put them into the

State Department so that we can have

what this country needs, and that is

bold leadership on the part of the executive rather than what we have had in

the last 10 years, which is quite often

nothing more than an attempt by people who hold executive power to reach

a consensus among independent agencies.

The fact is that if we are going to be

efficient in the post-cold war world we

need to make sure that our organizational structure is more efficient, and

is operating with decisive leadership,

which is exactly what you cannot have

when you have different agencies operating independently.

What we are trying to do is consolidate, reform, and restructure the foreign policy apparatus of the United

States in order to bring down costs and

to make the system more efficient.

What this amendment would do is prevent that reform, and maintain an ineffective status quo.

We need to provide American ambassadors, for example, more flexibility in

their decisions with lower budgets, because they will have lower budgets. If

we do not restructure at a time when

we are bringing down the budgets of

our foreign policy establishment, if we

do not give them more flexibility, we

are going to end up with a worse foreign policy apparatus. We need to

change the way our foreign policy establishment has been doing business

because this is a different world. And

there is no way that you can force

these types of reform decisions to be

made than to force this type of restructuring by a reform process.

Again what we have here is a proposal to study our reform measures to

death. Instead it is time to act decisively, time to move forward, time to
H 5676 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE June 7, 1995

change the status quo, and not sit back

in indecisive studying of the problem.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, will

the gentleman yield?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I yield to the

gentleman from New York.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I appreciate the

gentleman’s yielding.

First, Mr. Chairman, the gentleman

misinterprets my intent. I am not intending for anything to be studied to

death. I do not want it to be studied

any more than the time necessary to

make the appropriate decision, but the

gentleman refers, as previous speakers

have referred, to the supposed fact, and

it may or may not be true, that this

bill as constructed is going to save

money. And the only thing that I am

asking and those who support this bill

are asking is, where is the savings? Has

there been, as you have called for time

and time again, a cost-benefit analysis

of any major change? Perhaps it is

going to cost less, perhaps it is going

to cost more. Without any delay, why

can we not have somebody tell us

where the savings are, where is it going

to be more efficient, how many dollars.

Could the gentleman tell me within

$100 million how much we might save?

There is not penny of savings in the

bill.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Reclaiming my

time in order to answer the question,

we are bringing down these budgets,

and by restructuring we are forcing

those people, those managers within

the system, to be more efficient, to

make decisions that will make their

operation more effective within decreased budgets. The fact is that in the

post-cold-war world we need some restructuring, and we perhaps need our

ambassadors in foreign countries to be

able to operate a little bit more independently even though their budgets in

foreign countries will be less than what

they were 10 years ago at the height of

the cold war.

Mr. ACKERMAN. If the gentleman

will yield further, as the gentleman

knows, within the bill presently there

is no plan for restructuring. The bill

calls for a plan to be put forth by

March of 1996. So there is no plan on

which to base any costs. Why is there

opposition to having somebody do an

analysis of whether this will cost or

save money?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. There is a reform plan.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, we have

only one remaining speaker.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would

advise the Members we are under the 5

minute rule.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, in

answer to the gentleman’s question, we

have five additional speakers who are

present in the room right now.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is proceeding under the 5 minute rule.

Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman has five

additional speakers?

Mr. ACKERMAN. That is correct.

Mr. GILMAN. We have only two.

Would the gentleman consent to unanimous consent to wind up all debate by

8 o’clock?

Mr. ACKERMAN. If he will limit

each of his speakers to 1 minute each

and allow us the balance of the time,

the answer is yes, but obviously we

have more speakers than he.

Mr. GILMAN. We are pleased to limit

our speakers so we can wind up by 8

o’clock if we can share the time equally.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I have to object; if

the gentleman has two speakers and we

have five, splitting the time equally

would not be equitable.

Mr. GILMAN. We will be pleased to

try to limit our speakers to 3 minutes

each and reserve the balance for the

gentleman’s side.

Mr. ACKERMAN. We will try to exercise the maximum restraint possible.

We are not interested in dragging this

out, but we do have Members who have

signed up.

Mr. GILMAN. May I further suggest

that we limit the remaining speakers

to 3 minutes each on both sides?

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection

to the request of the gentleman from

New York?

Mr. ACKERMAN. Reserving the right

to object, Mr. Chairman, I withdraw

my reservation to object, but not to

the 8 o’clock ceiling. But we will limit

subsequent speakers to 3 minutes each.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my initial unanimous-consent request and I ask unanimous consent

that each speaker be allowed 3 more

minutes so we can wind up the debate

at an early hour.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection

to the request of the gentleman from

New York?

Mr. ACKERMAN. Reserving the right

to object, Mr. Chairman, I just want to

make it clear we are talking about this

amendment specifically, and we are

not amending the 5-minute rule to now

be known as the 3-minute rule for the

remainder of the debate on this particular bill.

The CHAIRMAN. It is the understanding of the Chair it will be this

amendment and amendments to this

amendment.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I

withdraw my reservation of objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection

to the request of the gentleman from

New York?

There was no objection.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise

in support of the Ackerman amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman

from Indiana is recognized for 3 minutes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I

think what strikes me about the provision in the bill with respect to reorganization is that we simply do not know

what the bill’s impact is on people, on

costs, on the ability to carry out the

mission. I do not know whether we

make any savings with this bill or not,

the reorganization.

b 1945

The chairman of the Subcommittee

on International Economic Policy, during the committee debate, said there

are no savings from the consolidation

in this bill. The word ‘‘abolish’’ is used

several times in the bill to abolish AID,

abolish USIA, abolish ACDA, and put

them all into one organization, but all

of the functions of those agencies are

continued. So we are simply moving

boxes around, as far as I can see.

What it does, the reorganization proposal, is to vastly expand the State Department. It doubles the number of employees in the State Department. It

triples the budget of the State Department.

Now, all of us agree that government

has to be downsized, and I want to say

that the Administration has worked

pretty hard at that. Staff has already

been reduced by 2,300 in the foreign policy agencies. That has contributed $500

million in cost savings thus far. It has

pledged to cut another $5 billion from

the international affairs budget from

1997 through the year 2000.

I want to point out that the Congressional Budget Office has not done any

study on the potential cost savings

that would result from the consolidation mandated by this bill, and it is important to compare the processes here

with the processes used in the Defense

Department and the intelligence agencies, where you really had a bottom-up

review. Compare this bill with the approach taken in the intelligence community today, also a bottom-up review,

but here we have no rationale. We are

not connecting the changes in reorganization with the problems in American foreign policy.

There is no effort to tie these reorganization proposals to any improvement

in American foreign policy, and I simply do not have a good idea of what

this reorganization does in terms of

improving American foreign policy.

The Ackerman amendment gives us

the ability to know what we are buying

into in this bill, and through that

amendment we will find out whether

there is money to be saved or there is

not, whether decisionmaking will be

enhanced or it will not be, whether effectiveness will be improved or it will

be diminished.

So this amendment, which mandates

a cost-benefit analysis of agency reorganization prior to the implementation

of any reorganization or consolidation

plan, makes a lot of sense to me in

terms of management.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. Chairman, I move to

strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that the Members of this Chamber have had a chance

to look at this amendment. You know,

this is a very craftily adopted, created

amendment. This amendment is very

clever. It is Machiavellian in an effort

to undo a major provision of this bill.

I do not know if the people have all

read this amendment, but when you

read it there are a couple of sentences

in here. It say, look at this, ‘‘Unless
June 7, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H 5677

the Director of the Congressional

Budget Office and the Director of the

Office of Management and Budget,

independently, calculate and submit to

the Congress a joint report, nothing

can be done.

In other words, you have got 100 Senators, 435 Congressmen, and two bureaucrats can stifle the entire Congress

and the will of Congress. That is what

this amendment says, if you take a

look at the amendment from line 5 to

line 9. This amendment really guts the

main provision of this bill.

Now, our bill consolidates three outof-date Cold War agencies. And how

many times have you been home when

people have said, ‘‘Hey, our government is too big, our government costs

too much?’’ And basically what we are

trying to do with this bill is take these

three agencies and downsize them.

The American people have loudly and

clearly told us again and again that

our government has gotten too big and

costs too much. What is at issue here is

basically a fight between the people

who want to change what is happening

in our government and the people who

are fighting for a status quo. That is

really at issue here, and the agents opposed to change are fighting a rear

guard action here to gut the bill. It is

the old adage, if you cannot defeat the

bill, gut the bill.

The President actually is given here

a heck of a lot of authority. We are giving the President, under this bill, tremendous authority. He has all the advantages to structure this any way he

wants, plus we are not giving him until

tomorrow morning to do it. We are giving him 3 years to bring about this

change. That certainly is enough. We

are leaning over backwards to be fair.

No one can argue the President is

being disadvantaged. He has got all the

time and all the abilities and all the

advantages in carrying this out.

This amendment merely says that we

want change, and that change has to

come about. This amendment is the old

liberal welfare state philosophy of big

government, of study, study, study,

study. Study? How many studies do

you need? You do not need any more

studies. No matter how many studies

are going to come here, you are going

to make a decision whether to cut the

government or not.

Study, study, study, spend, spend,

spend, but the real objective is to

delay, delay, delay.

What we are saying is we want to

move forward. The American people

have spoken, and we are saying that we

are going to go ahead and downsize this

government.

Yes, we are going to move ahead, and

we want to work with you, but we cannot allow you to totally stymie us and

to keep us from doing what we have

pledged to the American people that we

will do. Let us do what the people have

repeatedly asked us to do.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the

gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ROTH]

has expired.

(On request of Mr. ACKERMAN, and by

unanimous consent, Mr. ROTH was allowed to proceed for 1 additional

minute.)

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, will

the gentleman yield?

Mr. ROTH. I yield to the gentleman

from New York.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I can understand

and appreciate the gentleman’s strong

aversion and opposition to study. But

could the gentleman cite for me one

penny’s worth of savings in this bill

that you do not want to study? Not a

dollar, not a thousand, not a million,

not a billion. One penny. Tell me where

it is saved in this bill.

Mr. ROTH. We are bringing these

three agencies into the State Department.

Mr. ACKERMAN. At what cost?

Mr. ROTH. We are downsizing them

by one-third; each agency will be

downsized by a third. Therefore, the

cost of the agencies should be

downsized by a third. That is what we

are doing in this amendment.

Mr. ACKERMAN. If the gentleman

will explain how much the cost that

offsets that in avoiding or

renegotiating existing contracts.

Mr. ROTH. Reclaiming my time, and

I appreciate the gentleman getting me

more time——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Tell me how that

saves more money on balance.

Mr. ROTH. Reclaiming my time, we

are going to be saving, because when

we put these three agencies into the

State Department, we are mandating

to the President that when he brings

these agencies in, he has to downsize

them by a third.

Mr. ACKERMAN. You do not mandate he saves any money?

Mr. ROTH. Each one of these agencies will be downsized by a third. That

is where the savings are going to be.

This is a poor amendment, and I hope

we all vote against it.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move

to strike the requisite number of

words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the

amendment.

I think, let us step back and take a

look at what is going on. The majority

party has put a bill on the floor which

is a frontal assault on the President’s

authority to conduct foreign relations,

micromanages to a level that the

Democrats during Ronald Reagan’s

presidency never even presumed to go

to, and massively slashes the amount

of money spent on the foreign relations

function.

But they have got a problem because

some of their members said they never

would vote for anything, and the bill

still is a $17 billion bill and they have

got to get their members to vote for it.

So they say, ‘‘Well, this does something else. This reforms the foreign affairs agencies by consolidating them.’’

It gives total discretion, or pretty close

to total discretion, to the executive

branch as to how to consolidate it.

There is no inherent savings in the

consolidation.

The gentleman from New York has

pointed out why the act of consolidation will cost money, but now they can

say it is reform, it is slashing, and it is

attacking the President, so maybe now

they can pick up the votes.

The gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr.

ROTH], my friend, says we are cutting

each by one-third. You could leave the

agencies separate and cut them by onethird. The act of consolidation does

nothing to save money. What it does do

is ensure commercial interests, like

they did in Iraq, will supersede nonproliferation issues when you eliminate

the Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency. What it does take independent

radios and make them subordinate to

the geopolitical relationships between

countries, moves that independence

which allows an accurate voice of what

is going on in a country to be broadcast to that country where there is a

dictatorship, where there is an absence

of free press, and has caused conservatives, who are very much supportive

of bringing that word to those countries, to oppose this consolidation.

What it does is make development assistance goals and humanitarian goals

subordinate to government-to-government relationships. There are major

bad policy consequences from the consolidation.

There are no savings. But now you

can say you slashed and you reformed

and you have attacked the President,

and maybe you can pick up your party’s members who said they would

never vote for an even $17 billion Foreign Assistance Act.

The amendment offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. ACKERMAN]

calls that bluff by saying, through a

cost-benefit analysis, demonstrate the

act of consolidation saves money. It

puts you to the test. If this is the goal

of consolidation, you will have no objection to the Ackerman amendment.

If the goal is simply to put a label of

reform onto a bill, then you probably

want to oppose the Ackerman amendment.

I urge adoption of it.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Chairman, I move to

strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, well, let me just

stress that I think we have probably

exaggerated the debate.

The fact is the Department of State

can well function with the consolidated

basis. The foreign policy of the United

States can well function in a more decentralized basis.

As perhaps the only Member of this

body who has served in one of these

agencies as a Foreign Service Officer,

having spent 2 years in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, it is my

sense that for long term continuity the

country’s foreign policy probably operates better on a decentralized basis. We

have a long and proud history of the

United States Information Agency,

under great leadership, of great independence and respect. Likewise with

the Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency, and while AID is obviously a
H 5678 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE June 7, 1995

controversial mission, we have had distinguished people serve at the Agency

for International Development.

I would only rise to stress whether

one is for or against this bill, it should

not relate to the outcome of this particular amendment.

My view is to be sympathetic to it,

and I will support it, but I would also

stress that one can consolidate and

function effectively. It all is a matter

of leadership at any given point in

time, and here we are involved in kind

of a great political science debate in

the sense of sometimes agencies of government, like business, are better off

consolidated; sometimes, depending on

leadership, they are better off with decentralized leadership. Sometimes

there is a case for flux, where one has

one circumstance to change it. Sometimes, in addition, there is a case for

stability.

Now, having said that and having

noted that one can reach opposite conclusions, I think in the long term the

best interest here is for stability and

for decentralization and, therefore, I

think on balance the Ackerman amendment makes the most sense at this particular time.

Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, I move

to strike the requisite number of

words.

I urge my colleagues to support the

Ackerman amendment. It quite clearly

gives us the opportunity to take a

more careful look at what I think is

the not carefully thought through proposal for consolidation that is in the

base bill.

Mr. Chairman, effective foreign policy should represent the pursuit of enlightened self-interest. One of the most

pressing interests in American foreign

policy today is to control the spread of

weapons of mass destruction. This becomes more and more important as regional and ethnic conflicts continue to

explode across the globe. Today, more

than ever before, it is in our critical

self-interest to maintain an agency

that advocates, negotiates, implements

and verifies effective arms control,

nonproliferation, and disarmament

policies, strategies and agreements.

That agency is the Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency.

Independent status means that ACDA

brings to the policy table an expert and

undiluted arms control viewpoint.

Often, this viewpoint differs from the

State Department’s perspective, which

must be primarily concerned with diplomacy. That is why ACDA was created and that is why ACDA has continued to prove its worth to U.S. national

security over the years.

H.R. 1561 eliminates ACDA’s independent voice on arms control. It

eliminates the ACDA’s Director’s access to the President, the National Security Advisor and the Secretary of

State. It expels ACDA from interagency policymaking process where

significant arms control and nonproliferation decisions are made.

To understand the efficacy of ACDA’s

role in the foreign policy process one

need only to look at recent newspaper

headlines. I find it ironic that earlier

this month, during the same week

when the International Relations Committee proposed its abolition, ACDA’s

director was with the President at a

summit in Moscow working on important national security matters while

ACDA’s deputy director was in New

York securing one of the greatest

American post-Cold War foreign policy

successes—permanent extension of the

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Negotiation of the permanent extension of NPT was reached against the

odds. Without the relentless effort of

ACDA’s expert negotiators over the

last 3 years we might not have the NPT

today. The protection that NPT helps

provide against nuclear proliferation

benefits all Americans.

The supporters of H.R. 1561 claim

that ACDA is a cold war relic. This

claim shows how out of touch the authors of this legislation are with the

realities of the foreign policy environment we face. Given the remaining

dangers of Russian overarmament, and

the new dangers of the post-cold-war

world, ACDA is a relic today only if

weapons of mass destruction are a

rumor and proliferation is a myth.

The authors of H.R. 1561 claim that it

would save money by eliminating an

independent ACDA. In fact, according

to the Congressional Research Service,

it will cost $10 million to eliminate

ACDA.

ACDA’s basic budget is $50 million.

According to the U.S. Strategic Command, the existing strategic arms limitation treaties have saved about $100

billion. Since these treaties took about

a decade to negotiate, you could argue

that there’s a payoff of 200 to 1 from

ACDA. I suspect that the impact of

this ill-conceived legislation will be

the reverse—one bill and 200 new problems caused by the disruption, dislocation, and crippling reductions contained in this bill.

The creation of a mega-bureaucracy

that absorbs ACDA comes at the worst

time—as the U.S. Government is pursuing the biggest and broadest arms control and nonproliferation agenda in history. Now is not the time to be dismantling the one agency whose sole mandate is to fomulate, negotiate, and verify arms control and nonproliferation

policies and agreements.

This bill ought to be called the

‘‘American Leadership Reduction and

Avoidance Act of 1995.’’ By silencing

ACDA’s independent voice on arms

control and nonproliferation issues this

bill presents a serious threat to the future security of this country. The purpose of ACDA is to bring the arms control perspective to the table when foreign policy decisions are made. This

perspective has helped protect America

and the world from dangerous proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction for

a third of a century. Now is not the

time to stop or shrink from responsibilities of leadership.

b 2000

Now is not the time to be dismantling the one agency whose sole mandate is to formulate, negotiate, and

verify arms control and nonproliferation policies and agreements. I urge a

‘‘yes’’ vote for the amendment offered

by the gentleman from New York [Mr.

ACKERMAN].

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Chairman, I move to

strike the requisite number of words

and rise in support of the amendment

before the House.

Mr. Chairman, this amendment requires that the Directors of the Congressional Budget Office and the Office

of Management and Budget to submit a

joint report to the Congress analyzing

the costs and benefits of proposals to

abolish or consolidate the U.S. Agency

for International Development, the

U.S. Information Agency, and the

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. This cost/benefit analysis will allow

this Congress to make an informed decision that fully considers the effects

of consolidation of agencies on the personnel and management systems involved.

I support the goal of achieving a balanced budget over seven years, but I

believe that we need to focus on the

hard working citizens, many who live

in Northern Virginia, who face possible

job loss as a result of the agency consolidations proposed by this bill. I

serve on the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and

Technology where we are currently reviewing the costs and benefits of many

of the consolidation and downsizing

proposals that would reshape the Executive Branch of the Federal government. During our recent hearings, it

has become evident that so-called

downsizing and consolidation efforts

can have the unintended consequence

of actually increasing costs to the federal government. For example, it costs

the federal government an average of

$35,000 for each employee that is terminated from the civil service. This

amendment would provide for enough

time to make an informed decision regarding agency consolidation—a decision that could avoid the unintended

costs associated with massive layoffs.

Earlier this year, I strongly supported several measures that emphasize cost/benefit analysis and informed

decision-making by regulatory agencies. My support for this amendment

on agency consolidation is consistent

with my support for regulatory reform.

Congress has a fudiciary duty to ensure

that it takes the time to consider the

costs of legislative proposals. I urge my

colleagues to join me in support of this

amendment to delay the consolidation

of U.S. AID, USIA, and ACDA, to preserve jobs, and to avoid an unintended

waste of tax dollars.

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, I move

to strike the requisite number of

words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the

amendment offered by the gentleman
June 7, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H 5679

from New York [Mr. ACKERMAN] because it addresses one of the most egregious aspects in this bad bill. The problem with the proposal to gut the Agency for International Development, the

United States Information Agency and

the Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency by putting them into the State

Department is that it compromises the

mission of every one of those agencies.

The mission of the State Department, my colleagues, in diplomacy.

That is not the mission of AID, USIA

and ACDA.

The mission of the United States

Agency for International Development

is to maximize the economic and the

human potential of everyone around

the world and, by doing so, create market opportunities for American industry.

The mission of the U.S. Information

Agency is very simply truth, not truth

that complies with State Department

policy that is politically oriented, that

is acceptable, but simply, plainly credible truth. That is what the USIA delivers around the world.

And the mission of the Arms Control

and Disarmament Agency is to save us

expenditures and arms procurement by

enabling us to control the proliferation

of nuclear, chemical and biological

weapons.

Of all the times in history to think

about gutting the mission of the Arms

Control Disarmament Agency, when we

know how able dictators, tyrants,

crazy nuts around the world have access to lethal weapons, and we are

going to gut the mission of the Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency? Of

all the times to gut the mission, to

compromise the mission or the Agency

for International Development.

Consider the fact that as we move

into the next millennium, the 21st century, there will be five new human

beings born every second of every day,

and three of them are going to go hungry, without adequate housing, without decent medical care. The Agency

for International Development can enable them to become not desperate,

hostile people, but constructive members and contributing to a world of

peace and economic and social stability and, by doing so, create markets

throughout the world for the American

economy.

That is what the Agency for International Development does, and let me

quote just from the New York Times

here on USIA.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the

gentleman from Virginia [Mr. MORAN]

has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. MORAN

was allowed to proceed for 15 additional seconds.)

Mr. MORAN. In his directive granting the United States Information

Agency independence, independence

which would be eliminated by this bill,

President Eisenhower empowered it to

explain imaginatively the correlation

between United States policies and the

legitimate aspirations of other people

of the world. Now is not the time to

tear the United States Information

Agency from that appointed task.

President Eisenhower knew what he

was doing. He would vote against this

bill, but he would certainly support the

amendment offered by the gentleman

from New York [Mr. ACKERMAN].

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, I move to

strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, the opponents of the

amendment offered by the gentleman

from New York [Mr. ACKERMAN] are

saying that what his amendment would

essentially do is gut the bill. I say that

unless we have the Ackerman amendment, we are gutting America’s role in

the world.

I said it before, and I will say it

again. Did we spend billions upon billions of dollars to fight and win the

cold war, only to throw it away after

we are successful? American foreign

aid, only 1 percent of the budget, has

worked. The people pushing this bill—

and I oppose the bill because I think

the bill is an isolationist bill; I think

the President is exactly right on that—

the people pushing this bill are saying

that consolidation of AID, ACDA, and

USIA would be a good thing.

Well, how do we know? I say to my

colleagues, ‘‘If you are for the Contract

for America, then you ought to be for

this amendment. All we are saying is

do a cost-benefit analysis, see if indeed

there will be savings, and then make

an intelligent judgment after we see

what the cost-benefit analysis says.’’

Voting this way is buying a pig in a

poke. We do not know if it is going to

save money. In fact, many of us believe

it will lose money. We do not know if

it is going to be more effective. In fact,

many of us believe it will be less effective.

I like AID, ACDA, and USIA as independent. Do we really want them rolled

into the State Department? They have

different roles. Do we really want them

under the thumb of the State Department? I do not.

I say to my colleagues, ‘‘The only

plausible reason you can make to consolidate is if it saves money, and, my

colleagues, if it doesn’t save money,

then what are we doing this for?’’

So all my colleague from New York

is saying is, ‘‘Let’s do a cost-benefit

analysis, which my friends on the other

side of the aisle often talk about the

cost, they often talk about wasteful

government programs, they often talk

about downsizing and consolidating if

it saves money, but if it doesn’t save

money, what are you doing? You are

shifting the bureaucracy from one part

to the next, and you’re probably making for a less efficient agency.’’

So again, whether my colleagues are

for this consolidation or whether they

are not, and I am not, what detriment

can a cost-benefit analysis do. If it, indeed, saves money, it would seem to me

that my friends on the other side of the

aisle would have something to bolster

their argument to consolidate, and, if

it loses money, I would think a lot of

people on both sides of the aisle would

not want to vote for it anyway.

So let us stop having our heads in the

sand. Let us stop having the fervor of

consolidation and downsizing only. Let

us do something that makes sense.

Where there is fat, let us cut it out. If

it makes sense to consolidate, let us

consolidate, and, above all, let us look

at the cost. A cost-benefit analysis is

right for America.

Again I say to my colleagues, ‘‘If you

supported the Contract, you should be

for this. Everybody ought to be for this

on both sides of the aisle, so I urge my

colleagues to support the Ackerman

amendment.’’

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move

to strike the requisite number of

words.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues

to vote against the amendment offered

by the gentleman from New York [Mr.

ACKERMAN]. It seeks to gut our whole

reorganization structure, and I merely

want to quote from two former Secretaries of State.

James Baker said,

Your proposal is breathtaking in its boldness and visionary in its sweep. It represents

the fundamental reorganization needed if we

are to transform government institutions to

meet foreign policy challenges of the twenty-first century.

Then Larry Eagleberger, former Secretary said:

With regard to the consolidation, I am already on record in testimony before Senator

Helms in enthusiastic support of what his

committee and yours seek to accomplish. By

abolishing the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Agency for International Development, and the U.S. Information Agency, the bill will eliminate bureaucratic overlap, improve efficiency, save

money, and enhance the ability of the Executive branch to advance American interests

abroad.

I urge my colleagues to vote against

the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. ACKERMAN].

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Chairman, there are

many reasons to oppose this bill. It undermines the ability of the U.S. Government to

conduct foreign policy. It abdicates U.S. leadership worldwide. It wastes our resources on

moving boxes when the challenges of the

post-cold-war world demand our attention, and

it ties the President’s hands and eliminates

many of the tools at his disposal. National Security Advisor Tony Lake rightly calls it the

‘‘unilateral disarmament’’ of American foreign

policy.

Under the reorganization provisions of this

bill, we stand to lose a foreign policy tool

which is vital to our national security. The

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is

charged with solving the nuclear, chemical, biological, missile technology and conventional

arms proliferation problems of our day. ACDA

is a small, lean agency with a budget of only

$50 million. Yet the U.S. Strategic Command

tells us that the strategic arms treaties ACDA

administers save the nation’s taxpayers about

$100 billion.

In its present form, ACDA’s Director has an

independent voice and direct access to the

President, the National Security Council and
H 5680 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE June 7, 1995

the Secretary of States. But this bill buries the

director under three levels of bureaucracy. To

make his voice heard, he will first have to

make his case to an Assistant Secretary, then

to an Undersecretary, and then to the Secretary of State.

State Department decisions, by nature, are

often grounded in diplomacy and sensitive to

the political considerations of other nations.

ACDA has no entrenched interest in diplomatic relations. Thirty years ago, it stood

alone in support of a nuclear non-proliferation

treaty that the State Department opposed out

of deference to some of our allies. It stood

alone in support of a ban on deployment of

multiple-warhead land-based missiles in the

SALT treaty negotiated by Richard Nixon.

When that effort failed, it took twenty years to

negotiate a new agreement (START II) to remove the highly-threatening Soviet land-based

missiles. And ACDA was the key to getting the

Soviet Union’s radar at Krasnayarsk removed

as a violation of the ABM treaty in spite of reluctance at the State Department.

An independent ACDA has made tremendous contributions toward peace. Ralph Earle,

Deputy Director of ACDA, recently put it this

way:

If one thinks that arms control implementation and compliance can largely take care

of itself; that the dangers of proliferation are

overblown; that the chemical weapons terrorism in Japan was a fluke; and that we

should let arms and sensitive dual-use technologies flow abroad more freely, then the

proposed legislation may be the way to go.

But, Mr. Chairman, I submit that our President—and our country—needs the full range

of tools to make the most informed and effective decisions. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is a vital agency built around

highly trained arms control specialists. Our national security necessitates its independent

voice, its unique expertise, and its direct access to the highest levels of government. The

reorganization provisions proposed in this bill

will cost us money, disrupt arms control and

non-proliferation progress, and surrender valuable expertise. They are harmful to our nation’s security and I urge their rejection.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on

the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. ACKERMAN].

The question was taken; and the

Chairman announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 177, noes 233,

not voting 24, as follows:

[Roll No. 360]

AYES—177

Abercrombie

Ackerman

Baesler

Baldacci

Barcia

Barrett (WI)

Becerra

Beilenson

Bentsen

Berman

Bevill

Bishop

Bonior

Borski

Boucher

Browder

Brown (CA)

Brown (FL)

Brown (OH)

Clay

Clement

Clyburn

Coleman

Collins (IL)

Collins (MI)

Conyers

Costello

Coyne

Cramer

Danner

Davis

de la Garza

DeFazio

DeLauro

Dellums

Deutsch

Dingell

Dixon

Doggett

Dooley

Durbin

Edwards

Emerson

Engel

Eshoo

Evans

Farr

Fattah

Fazio

Fields (LA)

Filner

Flake

Ford

Frank (MA)

Frost

Furse

Gejdenson

Gibbons

Gonzalez

Gordon

Green

Gutierrez

Hall (OH)

Hamilton

Harman

Hastings (FL)

Hilliard

Hinchey

Holden

Hoyer

Jackson-Lee

Jacobs

Jefferson

Johnson (SD)

Johnson, E. B.

Johnston

Kanjorski

Kaptur

Kennedy (MA)

Kennedy (RI)

Kennelly

Kildee

Klink

LaFalce

Lantos

Leach

Levin

Lewis (GA)

Lipinski

Lowey

Maloney

Manton

Markey

Martinez

Mascara

Matsui

McCarthy

McDermott

McHale

McKinney

McNulty

Meehan

Meek

Menendez

Mfume

Miller (CA)

Mineta

Mink

Moakley

Mollohan

Moran

Morella

Murtha

Nadler

Neal

Oberstar

Obey

Olver

Ortiz

Owens

Pallone

Pastor

Payne (NJ)

Payne (VA)

Pelosi

Pickett

Pomeroy

Poshard

Rahall

Rangel

Reed

Reynolds

Richardson

Rivers

Roemer

Rose

Roybal-Allard

Rush

Sabo

Sanders

Sawyer

Schroeder

Schumer

Scott

Serrano

Sisisky

Skaggs

Skelton

Slaughter

Stokes

Studds

Stupak

Tanner

Tejeda

Thompson

Thurman

Torres

Torricelli

Towns

Traficant

Tucker

Velazquez

Vento

Visclosky

Volkmer

Ward

Waters

Watt (NC)

Waxman

Williams

Wilson

Wise

Wolf

Woolsey

Wyden

Wynn

Yates

NOES—233

Allard

Andrews

Archer

Armey

Bachus

Baker (CA)

Baker (LA)

Ballenger

Barr

Barrett (NE)

Bartlett

Barton

Bass

Bateman

Bereuter

Bilbray

Bilirakis

Bliley

Blute

Boehlert

Boehner

Bono

Brewster

Brownback

Bryant (TN)

Bunn

Bunning

Burr

Burton

Buyer

Callahan

Calvert

Camp

Canady

Cardin

Castle

Chabot

Chambliss

Chapman

Chenoweth

Christensen

Chrysler

Clinger

Coble

Collins (GA)

Combest

Condit

Cooley

Cox

Crane

Crapo

Cremeans

Cunningham

Deal

DeLay

Diaz-Balart

Dickey

Doolittle

Dornan

Doyle

Dreier

Duncan

Dunn

Ehlers

Ehrlich

English

Ensign

Everett

Ewing

Fawell

Fields (TX)

Flanagan

Foley

Forbes

Fowler

Fox

Franks (CT)

Franks (NJ)

Frelinghuysen

Frisa

Funderburk

Gallegly

Ganske

Gekas

Geren

Gilchrest

Gillmor

Gilman

Goodlatte

Goodling

Goss

Graham

Greenwood

Gunderson

Gutknecht

Hall (TX)

Hancock

Hansen

Hastert

Hastings (WA)

Hayes

Hayworth

Hefley

Hefner

Heineman

Herger

Hilleary

Hobson

Hoekstra

Hoke

Horn

Hostettler

Hunter

Hutchinson

Hyde

Inglis

Istook

Johnson, Sam

Jones

Kasich

Kelly

Kim

King

Kingston

Klug

Knollenberg

Kolbe

LaHood

Latham

LaTourette

Lazio

Lewis (CA)

Lewis (KY)

Lightfoot

Lincoln

Linder

Livingston

LoBiondo

Longley

Luther

Manzullo

Martini

McCollum

McCrery

McDade

McHugh

McInnis

McIntosh

McKeon

Metcalf

Meyers

Mica

Miller (FL)

Minge

Molinari

Moorhead

Myers

Myrick

Nethercutt

Neumann

Ney

Norwood

Nussle

Orton

Oxley

Packard

Parker

Peterson (MN)

Petri

Pombo

Porter

Portman

Pryce

Quillen

Quinn

Radanovich

Ramstad

Regula

Riggs

Roberts

Rogers

Rohrabacher

Ros-Lehtinen

Roth

Roukema

Royce

Salmon

Sanford

Saxton

Scarborough

Schaefer

Schiff

Seastrand

Sensenbrenner

Shadegg

Shaw

Shays

Shuster

Skeen

Smith (MI)

Smith (NJ)

Smith (TX)

Smith (WA)

Solomon

Souder

Spence

Stearns

Stenholm

Stockman

Stump

Talent

Tate

Tauzin

Taylor (MS)

Taylor (NC)

Thomas

Thornberry

Tiahrt

Torkildsen

Upton

Vucanovich

Walker

Walsh

Wamp

Weldon (FL)

Weldon (PA)

Weller

White

Whitfield

Young (AK)

Young (FL)

Zeliff

Zimmer

NOT VOTING—24

Bonilla

Bryant (TX)

Clayton

Coburn

Cubin

Dicks

Foglietta

Gephardt

Houghton

Johnson (CT)

Kleczka

Largent

Laughlin

Lofgren

Lucas

Montgomery

Paxon

Peterson (FL)

Spratt

Stark

Thornton

Waldholtz

Watts (OK)

Wicker

b 2029

The Clerk announced the following

pair:

On this vote:

Mrs. Clayton for, with Mrs. Waldholtz

against.

Mr. MASCARA changed his vote from

‘‘no’’ to ‘‘aye.’’

So the amendment was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced

as above recorded.

Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong

opposition to H.R. 1561, the American Overseas Interests Act of 1995. By eliminating important foreign policy functions of the Federal

Government this bill retreats from our obligations as Americans and human beings to the

neediest citizens of the world. As the recent

tragedies in Rwanda and Bosnia clearly demonstrate, this is not time for America to retire

from the world community.

The stated objective of the American Overseas Interests Act, is the elimination of the

Agency for International Development [AID].

The U.S. Information Agency [USIA], and the

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

[ACDA] in addition to slashing $1.8 billion in

foreign aid, international broadcasting, and

diplomatic functions funding from the administration’s requested level. In fact 29 percent of

the development assistance for child survival

programs, African development aid, disaster

assistance, and Latin American and Caribbean

aid will be cut by this draconian legislation.

This shortsighted and rushed legislation will

reorder American foreign policy objectives by

abolishing foreign and peace organizations,

interfering with the foreign policy prerogatives

of the President and substantially cutting assistance to friends of America in great need.

The American Overseas Interests Act of

1995 that we are considering here today is

completely out of balance. H.R. 1561 seeks to

isolate the United States by restricting America’s role in the world. It recklessly cuts U.S.

contributions to the United Nations and U.S.

peacekeeping operations. It would be an abdication of American humanitarian leadership

overseas to support this legislation.
June 7, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H 5681

Contrary to the representations of the supporters of this bill, foreign aid constitutes less

than 1 percent of the U.S. budget. This small

investment is leveraged further by a public-private partnership involving several hundred

U.S.-based charitable organizations. Without

the U.S. contributions of seed money, these

cuts in aid will be devastating.

Foreign aid is no giveaway. These dollars

work as an effective means of developing and

expanding U.S. export markets. In fact, the recipients of U.S. Foreign aid constitute the fastest growing market for U.S. exports. In the

past 10 years, our exports to developing countries have more than doubled from $71 to

$180 billion. This valuable trade results in

thousands of badly needed jobs for American

workers.

Mr. Chairman, H.R. 1561 is not only a bad

deal for the American economy, it also compromises the President’s initiatives in foreign

affairs. In a seven to one decision, the U.S.

Supreme Court in United States v. CurtisWright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) held

that because of ‘‘fundamental differences’’ in

national power with respect to internal and external affairs, the President of the United

States possesses additional prerogatives in

the foreign affairs field that, in my opinion, this

legislation compromises.

This bill imposes restrictions and limitations

on the President’s special authorities that

would hamper the ability of the United States

to respond to rapidly changing international

circumstances. Therefore, the constitutionality

of the American Overseas Assistance Act is in

question and should be carefully examined

prior to any further consideration of this bill.

A dramatic example of the negative impact

this legislation would have on the President’s

prerogatives in foreign affairs is the fact that

H.R. 1561 directly inhibits vital Presidential objectives such as—implementation and funding

for the framework agreement with North

Korea; debt reduction for poorer nations; democracy building and market reform in Russia;

and funding for worldwide family planning activities.

Contrary to the arguments that have been

made by the supporters of H.R. 1561, President Clinton has proposed a budget that reasonably addresses the overseas interests of

the United States. President Clinton’s fiscal

year 1996 foreign affairs budget has two key

initiatives; reasonable consolidation and maintenance of our obligations to our friends and

the world’s neediest people.

The administration has proceeded vigorously with its efforts to streamline AID, ACDA,

USIA, and the Department of State. Under the

administration’s efforts, foreign affairs agencies are reducing staffing by 4,700 positions,

cutting bureaucratic layers and duplication,

eliminating low-priority posts and programs,

reengineering their business processes, and

establishing common administrative services.

The administration has taken these steps to

enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of

these agencies.

By contrast, the approach of H.R. 1561 is to

simply eliminate AID, ACDA and USIA. This

extreme action would result in an unwieldy,

costly, and ineffective compromise of U.S. foreign policy objectives and would constitute an

abdication of American humanitarian leadership overseas.

The ironic truth about H.R. 1561 is that it

will actually weaken our influence overseas

and therefore compromise our national defense, prestige, and effectiveness. As a result

of the bill’s redirection of $1.8 billion away

from programs that help uplift the world’s poor,

American interests will be compromised.

Mr. Chairman, there is no doubt that with

the end of the cold war the United States now

reigns supreme as the world’s only superpower. Over the past 7 years, our foreign policy has undergone a massive undertaking to

adjust to a post-cold-war world which has allowed us to maintain a better balance of our

domestic and foreign interests. Because of

these changes in world politics, the United

States is faced with an unprecedented opportunity to redirect funds to relieve problems

here at home and help improve the lives of

our friends overseas.

Mr. Chairman, unfortunately, as a political

maneuver, the current majority has attached to

this bad bill provisions authorizing aid to Israel

and her Mid-East peace partners. This insulting and cynical attempt to force those of us

who support Israel to endorse the overwhelmingly shortsighted and offensive objectives of

H.R. 1561 will not work.

My record in Congress supporting issues

important to Israel and the Mid-East peace

process has been consistent and steadfast. In

the form of foreign aid, trade relations, and

support for the peace process, I have recognized the wisdom of a vital Israel and a fair

peace process. Despite the fact that I have

been forced to vote against this bill, rest assured I will do all that I can to ensure that the

President’s budgeted aid for Israel and the

Mid-East peace process is delivered by this

Congress.

In closing, H.R. 1561 reflects my colleagues’

desire to sacrifice the interests and obligations

of the American people in exchange for isolationism and inhumanity. I urge my colleagues

to vote against this bill.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move

that the committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and

the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. WALKER)

having assumed the chair, Mr.

GOODLATTE, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of

the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration

the bill (H.R. 1561) to consolidate the

foreign affairs agencies of the United

States; to authorize appropriations for

the Department of State and related

agencies for fiscal years 1996 and 1997;

to responsibly reduce the authorizations of appropriations for United

States foreign assistance programs for

fiscal years 1996 and 1997, and for other

purposes, had come to no resolution

thereon.

CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 1561

SCHEDULE FOR FURTHER

f(Mr. MORAN asked and was given

permission to address the House for 1

minute.)

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, I have

asked unanimous consent to inquire of

the chairman of the Committee on

International Relations the schedule

for tomorrow so that we understand

what amendments might come up. I

would like to inquire of the chairman

of the Committee on International Relations the implications of the decision

to rise at this point.

I understand that there is an hour

and 45 minutes left of debate. We have

at least three Democratic amendments

scheduled: the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. HOYER], the gentleman from

California [Mr. BERMAN], the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. ANDREWS]. However, with an hour and 45

minutes tomorrow, it is conceivable

that, particularly if the chairman was

to oppose the Burton amendment, that

the chairman might have two amendments in succession which would preclude the ability of the Democrats to

offer any of our amendments.

I would like some assurance from the

chairman that the Democrats will be

able to offer an amendment after the

subsequent Republican amendment to

this bill.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, will the

gentleman yield?

Mr. MORAN. I yield to the gentleman

from New York.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I have

been informed that 1 hour and 45 minutes remain on full debate on this bill.

We have a manager’s amendment

which is en bloc, a number of amendments, and then we have the Burton

amendment. And whatever additional

time that may be remaining, we will

try to accommodate the gentleman.

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, I would

suggest to the Chairman that is the

reason for the inquiry because that

may very well take up the full space of

the 1 hour and 45 minutes which means

that there would be two Republican

amendments. There would not be the

opportunity for any Democratic

amendment to be offered, if that were

the schedule. That is the concern of the

minority side.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, if the

gentleman will continue to yield, we

will try to urge the Members to keep

their remarks as brief as possible and

the Berman amendment will be next

following the Burton amendment.

Mr. MORAN. Can the Chairman assure us that we will get a Democratic

amendment, at least one Democratic

amendment considered tomorrow.

Mr. GILMAN. It will depend on the

amount of time that we will be able to

save with the debate on those two

measures.

Mr. MORAN. This side would much

appreciate the Chairman cooperating.

Mr. GILMAN. We will try to do our

best to allow some time for additional

amendments.

(Mrs. SCHROEDER asked and was

ON AMENDMENTS TO H.R. 1561

fgiven permission to address the House

for 1 minute.)

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Speaker, does

that mean that no one else will be able

to offer amendments? We have only got

this 1 hour and 45 minutes and, as you

know, I have a very, I think, important

amendment dealing with immigration,