alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1736 Engrossed in House (EH)]

  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1736

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To amend the Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 
1992 to provide for conjunctive use of surface and groundwater in Juab 
                             County, Utah.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CONJUNCTIVE USE OF SURFACE AND GROUNDWATER IN JUAB COUNTY, 
              UTAH.

    Section 202(a)(2) of the Reclamation Projects Authorization and 
Adjustment Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-575) is amended by inserting 
``Juab,'' after ``Davis,''.

            Passed the House of Representatives June 5, 2007.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
110th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                               H. R. 1736

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 To amend the Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 
1992 to provide for conjunctive use of surface and groundwater in Juab 
                             County, Utah.
```
EXHIBIT 99.1

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                     18 U.S.C SECTION 1350,
                     AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
          SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


<S>    <C>                 <C>       <C>
The undersigned hereby certifies, in my capacity as an officer
of NSTAR, for purposes of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that
to the best of my knowledge:

  (i)  the enclosed Annual Report of NSTAR on Form 10-K for the
       year ended December 31, 2002 fully complies with the
       requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
       Exchange Act of 1934; and

  (ii) the information contained in such Report fairly presents,
       in all material respects, the financial condition and
       results of operations of NSTAR.

Dated:  March 27, 2003           By:    /s/ THOMAS J. MAY
                                        Thomas J. May
                                        Chairman, President and
                                        Chief Executive Officer

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>               9
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
QUARTERLY REPORT ON FORM 10-Q FOR QUARTER ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1999 AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000

<S>                               <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                     3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                         4,615
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                         2,525
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                   0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                   0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    9,016
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                         9,016
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                           9,016
<LOANS>                                      252,148
<ALLOWANCE>                                   (2,811)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               326,958
<DEPOSITS>                                   200,949
<SHORT-TERM>                                  10,000
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                            2,523
<LONG-TERM>                                   69,568
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                              0
<PREFERRED>                                        0
<COMMON>                                          26
<OTHER-SE>                                    43,892
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>               326,958
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                4,816
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                154
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                 879
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                               5,849
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                             2,424
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               969
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                          2,457
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                     74
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                 0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                2,048
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  608
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       379
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                    0
<CHANGES>                                          0
<NET-INCOME>                                     379
<EPS-BASIC>                                   0.19
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   0.19
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                  3.15
<LOANS-NON>                                    3,115
<LOANS-PAST>                                   3,115
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                   0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                2,401
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                              (2,805)
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                     84
<RECOVERIES>                                      15
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                             (2,811)
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                          (2,811)
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                            0


</TABLE>
#### Janice DICKERSON v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY.

No. 2012-C-0609.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 27, 2012.

In re Dickerson, Janice; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 557596; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CA 1131.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, § 5.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Edwin F. Diaz, Appellant. Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

[775 NYS2d 607]

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed March 12, 2003, which ruled that claimant’s request for a hearing was untimely.

After losing his job as a restaurant worker, claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because he was terminated due to misconduct. Notices of determination to such effect were mailed to him on June 19, 2001. He admitted receiving such notices, both in English and in Spanish, a few days after they were mailed. He did not, however, request a hearing until October 2001 at the earliest. Upon finding claimant’s request for a hearing untimely, the Administrative Law Judge upheld the initial determinations. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board affirmed this decision, resulting in this appeal.

We affirm. Claimant was required to make his request for a hearing within 30 days of the date of the mailing of the notices of determination *(see*Labor Law § 620 [1] [a]; *Matter of Brown [Commissioner of Labor],*4 AD3d 604 [2004]) and he failed to do so. He was apprised of this requirement by information provided in the notices of determination, at least one version of which was written in his native language. Although he stated that he was “disoriented” and did not understand how to request a hearing, he did not suffer a physical condition or mental incapacity rendering him unable to comply with the statutory requirement nor did he offer a reasonable excuse for his omission *(see Matter of Tobar [Commissioner of Labor],*308 AD2d 651 [2003]; *Matter of McKinley [Commissioner of Labor],*307 AD2d 506 [2003]). Therefore, we find no reason to disturb the Board’s decision.

Spain, J.P., Mugglin, Rose, Lahtinen and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.3

                      LIBERTY PROPERTY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

                           CERTIFICATIONS REQUIRED BY
            RULE 13A-14(B) UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

________________________________________________________________________________

         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Liberty Property Trust (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2004, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, WILLIAM P. HANKOWSKY, Chief Executive Officer of Liberty Property Trust (the
sole general partner of the Company), certify, in connection with Rule 13a-14(b)
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, that based on my knowledge:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.

/s/ WILLIAM P. HANKOWSKY
William P. Hankowsky
___________________________________________________
Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer
of Liberty Property Trust, its sole general partner

Date:  August 5, 2004
#### Andrew D.L. CHU; Andrew D.L. Chu, Trustee of the Chu Family Trust u/a/d November 2, 2000; Yeeho Chu, Trustee of the Chu Family Trust u/a/d November 2, 2000; Yeeho Chu and Josephine Chu, Appellants, v. Sharon Chu SALYER, Appellee.

No. 2D09-4498.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Feb. 9, 2011.

Paul H. Bowen of Paul H. Bowen, P.A., Palm Harbor (withdrew after briefing), for Appellants.

Michael J. McDermott of McDermott & Thacker, P.A., Brandon, for Appellee.

WHATLEY, Judge.

The order appealed is a final, appealable order with regard to Josephine Chu, and we affirm. However, we dismiss Andrew and Yeeho Chu’s appeal of the order because the order is nonfinal and nonap-pealable with regard to them.

Affirmed in part and dismissed in part.

KHOUZAM and BLACK, JJ., Concur.
#### Susan Henderson MONTGOMERY v. ADMINISTRATORS OF THE TULANE EDUCATIONAL FUND.

No. 2010-C-2535.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 18, 2011.

In re Montgomery, Susan Henderson; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. B, No. 2008-8619; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-CA-1670.

Denied.

VICTORY, KNOLL and GUIDRY, JJ., would grant.
#### L.E.P.S. v. R.G.P.

No. 2011-C-0770.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 27, 2011.

In re Pitts, Estate of Ray Gene; Pitts, Ray Gene; —Other(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ca-tahoula, 7th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 19698; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-1128.

Denied.
#### STATE ex rel. Hector LEYVA-MARTINEZ v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-2839.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 16, 2011.

In re Leyva-Martinez, Hector; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 13551-04; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 10-00744.

Denied.
I 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 7208 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow the child tax credit 

with respect to stillbirths. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 30, 2018 

Mr. GRIFFITH (for himself, Mr. HARRIS, Mr. NORMAN, and Mr. ROE of Tennessee) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow the 

child tax credit with respect to stillbirths. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. CHILD TAX CREDIT ALLOWED WITH RESPECT 

4 TO STILLBIRTHS. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 24(c) of the Internal Rev6 enue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the 

7 following new paragraph: 

8 ‘‘(3) SPECIAL RULES FOR STILLBIRTHS.— 

9 ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—In the case of a still10 birth— 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
2 

•HR 7208 IH

1 ‘‘(i) the term ‘qualifying child’ shall 

2 include the unborn child referred to in sub3 paragraph (B) in the same manner as if 

4 the death of such unborn child had oc5 curred immediately after delivery, 

6 ‘‘(ii) subsection (a) shall be applied 

7 without regard to the phrase ‘for which the 

8 taxpayer is allowed a deduction under sec9 tion 151’ if the taxpayer would have been 

10 allowed such deduction if the death of the 

11 unborn child had occurred immediately 

12 after delivery, 

13 ‘‘(iii) subsection (e)(1) shall not apply 

14 if such unborn child would have been eligi15 ble for the taxpayer identification number 

16 described in such subsection if the death of 

17 such unborn child had occurred imme18 diately after delivery, and 

19 ‘‘(iv) subsection (h)(7) shall not apply 

20 if such unborn child would have been eligi21 ble for the social security number described 

22 in such subsection if the death of such un23 born child had occurred immediately after 

24 delivery. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
3 

•HR 7208 IH

1 ‘‘(B) STILLBIRTH.—The term ‘stillbirth’ 

2 means delivery after the involuntary death of an 

3 unborn child who was carried in the womb for 

4 20 weeks or more. 

5 ‘‘(C) UNBORN CHILD.— 

6 ‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘unborn 

7 child’ means a child in utero. 

8 ‘‘(ii) CHILD IN UTERO.—The term 

9 ‘child in utero’ means a member of the 

10 species homo sapiens, at any stage of de11 velopment, who is carried in the womb.’’. 

12 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

13 this section shall apply to taxable years ending after the 

14 date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Crystal BUTLER.

No. 2011-KK-0776.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 20, 2011.

In re Butler, Crystal; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 495-594; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0042.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.
#### Wilbert METAYER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D09-3651.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Aug. 4, 2010.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Gary Lee Caldwell, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

No response for appellee.

*ON MOTION TO REVIEW DENIAL OF BOND PENDING APPEAL*

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, through counsel, requests review of the lower court’s order denying motion for bond pending appeal. The or*692der states no reasons for the denial and is, therefore, contrary to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(h)(8) and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.691(b); *see also Dumas v. State,*889 So.2d 189 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (holding that trial court’s failure to make written findings upon denying defendant’s bond request required reversal). We ordered a response from the State within fifteen days, and the State has failed to respond within that time. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for reconsideration of appellant’s motion for an appeal bond. If the lower court again denies bond, it must make the findings necessary to support the denial.

*Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.*

GROSS, C.J., POLEN and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.
#### Elur J. RAYMONVIL, Appellant, v. Sade Ferrari LEWIS, Appellee.

No. 5D10-827.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Oct. 22, 2010.

Elur J. Raymonvil, Gainesville, pro se.

No Appearance for Appellee.

EVANDER, J.

Raymonvil appeals from an order denying his motion for modification of injunction for protection against domestic violence. The injunction was entered in July 2006 and was to remain in full force and effect until further order of the court. In his motion, filed in February 2010, Ray-monvil sufficiently alleged that circumstances had changed since the entry of the injunction. Specifically, Raymonvil alleged that he had not had contact with the petitioner, was presently incarcerated, and the injunction was impacting his ability to participate in a work-release program. Ray-monvil further claimed that he had stipulated to the entry of the injunction based on an agreement that the injunction would expire after one year. The trial court denied the motion without affording Ray-monvil the opportunity for a hearing. No reasons were given for the denial.

The trial court’s summary denial of Ray-monvil’s motion violated due process requirements. *See, e.g., Colarusso v. Lupetin,*28 So.3d 238 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); *Reed v. Reed,*816 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). Because Raymonvil’s motion *140was legally sufficient, the trial court was required to afford him a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

REVERSED and REMANDED for an evidentiary hearing.

ORFINGER and LAWSON, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-6466

ALECK J. CARPITCHER, Petitioner - Appellant, versus TRACY RAY, Respondent - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Jackson L. Kiser, Senior District Judge. (CA-04-313-7) Submitted: January 13, 2006 Decided: February 13, 2006 Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Christopher Bryan Amolsch, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellant. Michael Thomas Judge, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Aleck J. Carpitcher seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). An appeal may not be taken from the final order in a § 2254 proceeding unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue for claims addressed by a district court absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find both that the district court’s assessment of his constitutional claims is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. SeeMiller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Carpitcher has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. DISMISSED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                           4,011
<SECURITIES>                                    31,410
<RECEIVABLES>                                    4,408
<ALLOWANCES>                                     (500)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                39,646
<PP&E>                                          17,303
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (4,793)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  53,904
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           15,521
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        72,071
<OTHER-SE>                                    (38,304)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    53,904
<SALES>                                          7,684
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 7,684
<CGS>                                            1,490
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    1,490
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                18,511
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   500
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 140
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (11,934)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (11,934)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<NET-INCOME>                                  (11,934)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.45)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
IB 

Union Calendar No. 62 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1676 

[Report No. 110–102] 

To reauthorize the program of the Secretary of Housing and Urban 

Development for loan guarantees for Indian housing. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 26, 2007 

Mr. BOREN (for himself, Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts, Mr. RENZI, and Mr. 

KILDEE) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Financial Services 

APRIL 20, 2007 

Additional sponsors: Mr. HINOJOSA, Mr. MEEKS of New York, Mr. KENNEDY, 

Ms. HERSETH SANDLIN, Mr. YOUNG of Alaska, Mr. BACA, and Mr. GRIJALVA

APRIL 20, 2007 

Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union 

and ordered to be printed 

A BILL 

To reauthorize the program of the Secretary of Housing 

and Urban Development for loan guarantees for Indian 

housing. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


pwalker on PROD1PC71 with BILLS
2 

•HR 1676 RH

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Native American Home 

3 Ownership Opportunity Act of 2007’’. 

4 SEC. 2. LOAN GUARANTEES FOR NATIVE AMERICAN HOUS5 ING. 

6 Section 184(i) of the Housing and Community Devel7 opment Act of 1992 (12 U.S.C. 1715z–13a(i)) is amended 

8 as follows: 

9 (1) OUTSTANDING AGGREGATE LIMITATION.— 

10 In paragraph (5)(C), by striking ‘‘fiscal years 1997 

11 through 2007’’ and inserting ‘‘fiscal years 2008 

12 through 2012’’. 

13 (2) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—In 

14 paragraph (7), by striking ‘‘fiscal years 1997 

15 through 2007’’ and inserting ‘‘fiscal years 2008 

16 through 2012’’. 


pwalker on PROD1PC71 with BILLS

pwalker on PROD1PC71 with BILLS
Union Calendar No. 62 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1676 

[Report No. 110

–102] 

A BILL 

To reauthorize the program of the Secretary of 

antees for Indian housing. Housing and Urban Development for loan guarAPRIL 20, 2007 

Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 

State of the Union and ordered to be printed 


pwalker on PROD1PC71 with BILLS
#### Willie K. PORTER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 5D11-1074.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

May 13, 2011.

Willie K. Porter, Perry, pro se.

Pamela J. Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee and Wesley Heidt, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.

*1154PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. A copy of this opinion shall be filed with the trial court and be treated as the notice of appeal from the order denying his motion for postconviction relief in case nos. 2006-38195-CFAES and 2006-34569-CFAES, in the Circuit Court in and for Volusia County, Florida. *See*Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(c)(5)(D).

PETITION GRANTED.

TORPY, EVANDER and COHEN, JJ., concur.
#### Carl JONES, et al. v. CENTERPOINT ENERGY ENTEX, et al. Steven Joseph, et al. v. Centerpoint Energy Entex, et al.

No. 2011-C-1964.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 14, 2011.

In re Centerpoint Energy Entex et al.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. D, Nos. 04-C-2184-D, 04-C-2357-B; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. 11-0002,11-0003.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.