UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16–1231

ZULMA YANETH ZAVALETA-POLICIANO; O. M. P.; Z. A. P.; M. E. P.,

Petitioners,

v.

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Argued: March 23, 2017 Decided: July 26, 2017

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Petition for review granted, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further 

proceedings by unpublished opinion. Chief Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in which 

Judge Wilkinson and Senior Judge Davis joined. Judge Wilkinson wrote a concurring 

opinion.

ARGUED: Tamara L. Jezic, YACUB LAW OFFICES, Woodbridge, Virginia, for 

Petitioners. Michael Christopher Heyse, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 

JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Benjamin C. Mizer, 

Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Mary Jane Candaux, Assistant Director, 

Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 

JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
2

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

GREGORY, Chief Judge:

Zulma Yaneth Zavaleta Policiano petitions for review of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals (“BIA”) decision ordering her removed to her native El Salvador. The BIA 

upheld the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of Zavaleta Policiano’s asylum claim, 

affirming the finding that she failed to show past persecution or fear of future persecution 

on account of her family membership. We now conclude that the BIA erred and 

accordingly grant Zavaleta Policiano’s petition for review, reverse in part and vacate in 

part the BIA’s order, and remand for further proceedings.

I.

On August 27, 2012, Zavaleta Policiano and her three children entered the United 

States without inspection near Eagle Pass, Texas.1

 The following day, the Department of 

Homeland Security served each family member with a Notice to Appear, charging them 

as aliens present in the United States without proper admission or parole as required 

under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Zavaleta 

Policiano conceded removability but filed an application for asylum, withholding of 

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Zavaleta Policiano 

filed several exhibits in support of this application, including a sworn affidavit testifying 

to the alleged persecution she suffered at the hands of an El Salvadoran gang. 

Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 163; 210–11.

 1 Zavaleta Policiano’s children are derivative beneficiaries of her asylum 

application. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A).
4

In January 2014, the parties appeared for a hearing before the IJ, at which the 

Government stated, “I have no reason to doubt the veracity of the respondent’s statement. 

I believe this to be solely a legal issue, as to whether or not the facts, as they are right 

here, would actually give rise to a claim for asylum, withholding, or [CAT] protection.” 

A.R. 65. When the IJ asked whether the Government stipulated to the credibility of 

Zavaleta Policiano’s affidavit, Government counsel responded, “Yes, your honor.” 

A.R. 65. Zavaleta Policiano did not provide live testimony at the hearing in light of the 

Government’s stipulation. See A.R. 66. And both the IJ and BIA acknowledged the 

Government’s stipulation in their respective written opinions. See A.R. 50 (IJ 

recognizing stipulation); A.R. 4 (BIA recognizing stipulation and noting that, pursuant to 

the stipulation, “the respondent did not provide testimony”).

As recounted in her affidavit, Zavaleta Policiano was born in El Salvador and 

grew up in the town of Lourdes Colon in the Department of La Libertad. Throughout 

Zavaleta Policiano’s childhood, her father, Jeremias de Jesus Zavaleta Barrientos, owned 

a wholesale business in La Libertad that sold items such as “sodas, oil, flours, [and] 

legumes” to smaller stores in the area. A.R. 210. Her father’s business—“Agencia 

Policiano”—bore the family name. A.R. 210.

After Zavaleta Policiano married in 1998, Zavaleta Barrientos helped her start a 

small convenience store of her own. Zavaleta Policiano stocked items from her father’s 

store, and the two shops were located one block apart. Both stores were “very well 

known” in the region, and it was also known that Zavaleta Policiano and her father “were 

related and part of the Policiano family.” A.R. 210.
5

Over time, the Mara Salvatrucha gang (“MS-13”) infiltrated the town of Lourdes 

Colon and began to extort Zavaleta Barrientos. The gang initially demanded $100 per 

month, which he paid to avoid any problems. But the amount kept increasing—to $200 

per month, then $500 per month, and eventually $1,000 per month. A.R. 210. It became 

impossible for Zavaleta Policiano’s father to meet these demands, and MS-13 “began to 

threaten him and threaten that they would kill his family.” A.R. 210. Barrientos feared 

for his life and fled to Mexico. When Barrientos left he asked his daughter to come with 

him, but because Zavaleta Policiano was concerned about fleeing with three children, she 

decided to stay in El Salvador.

Zavaleta Policiano explains that “[i]mmediately after [her] father left, in the 

month[s] of January and February of 2012,” she started “receiving threatening notes and 

phone calls.” A.R. 210. On multiple occasions, the gang also sent a child to Zavaleta 

Policiano’s store with a prepaid phone, and the child told her that she had a phone call. 

When she picked up the phone, the caller stated that Zavaleta Policiano “needed to give 

the child money or else.” A.R. 210. The caller threatened that if she did not comply with 

the gang’s demands, MS-13 would kidnap her daughter. Fearful of these threats, 

Zavaleta Policiano handed over money to the child multiple times. At least two times, 

the gang gave the child a note to pass to Zavaleta Policiano, which she retained and 

entered into the record. The translated version of the first note reads:

Mrs. Sulma we the salvaruchos [the gangs] inform you that we will begin to 

collect la renta [rent]. For the sake of you and your family [do] not notify a 

la Chota [the police] because this is not a game and we know all your 

moves . . . .
6

A.R. 144 (first, second, and fourth alterations in original). The second note reads as 

follows:

Mrs. Zulma you were already notified and now el barrio [the gangs] tell 

you that a morrita [person] will collect every Wednesday 100 baros [the 

money] renta [income] to you to pay. We thank you for your cooperation 

and if you do not want to pay you will pay with the blood of your children.

A.R. 146 (alterations in original). Zavaleta Policiano “was terrorized” and did not let her 

children leave the family’s home for two months. A.R. 211.

Zavaleta Policiano filed a complaint with the police in March 2012. The police 

officer told her “to be careful with [her] children and that if [she] could [she] should 

leave.” A.R. 211. Soon thereafter, Zavaleta Policiano sold what she could of her store’s 

inventory and decided to leave for the United States. Zavaleta Policiano expressed in her 

affidavit, “I fear returning to El Salvador. As a member of the well[-]known Policiano 

family, all of whom have fled in lieu of continuing being extorted by the gangs, I fear for 

my safety and the safety of my children.” A.R. 211.

Zavaleta Policiano asserted an asylum claim before the IJ, arguing that she had 

suffered past persecution and had a well-founded fear of future persecution, on account of 

(1) her membership in the Policiano family, (2) her membership in the social group of El 

Salvadoran business owners who have been deprived of the right to work by the demands 

of gangs, and (3) her political opinion. She separately asserted a withholding of removal 

claim and a CAT claim.

The IJ denied the asylum claim, holding that Zavaleta Policiano had not 

adequately shown persecution based on a protected ground. Although the IJ recognized 
7

that family ties qualified as a protected ground, the IJ found that Zavaleta Policiano had 

“failed to produce evidence that she was threatened and harassed because of her 

relationship to her father.” A.R. 51–52. The IJ further held that Zavaleta Policiano was 

not extorted because of her political opinion, that her proposed group concerning El 

Salvadoran business owners was not a cognizable social group, and that alternatively, 

there was no nexus between that proposed group and the gang’s threats. Because 

Zavaleta Policiano failed to meet the requirements for asylum, the IJ accordingly held 

that she was not entitled to relief for withholding of removal under that claim’s 

heightened burden of proof.

The IJ also denied CAT protection. Finding “little evidence in the record” to 

suggest Zavaleta Policiano would be tortured if removed to El Salvador, the IJ concluded 

that she had not carried her burden on the CAT claim. A.R. 53.

In a three-page, single-member opinion, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision in full. 

A.R. 3–5. Most important here, the BIA upheld the IJ’s finding that Zavaleta Policiano 

failed to establish the gang’s threats were motivated by her family ties.

Zavaleta Policiano timely filed a petition for review of the BIA’s decision in this 

Court.

II.

The Immigration and Nationality Act permits the Attorney General to grant 

asylum to eligible applicants. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). To prove eligibility under 

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), Zavaleta Policiano must show that she (1) has suffered past 
8

persecution or “has a well-founded fear of persecution; (2) on account of a protected 

ground; [and] (3) by an organization that the Salvadoran government is unable or 

unwilling to control.” Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944, 949 (4th Cir. 2015).

Where the BIA “issues its own opinion without adopting the IJ’s reasoning,” as it 

did here, this Court focuses its review on the BIA’s order.2

 Id. at 948; see also Martinez

v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902, 908 (reviewing only BIA order when it did not adopt the IJ’s 

opinion, as the BIA decision “constitutes the final order of removal”). But if the BIA 

holds that the IJ did not clearly err in making a factual finding, we “must also examine 

the IJ’s factual finding on this issue.” Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d at 951. We review 

factual findings under the substantial evidence standard, accepting them as “conclusive 

‘unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” Id.

at 948 (quoting Cordova v. Holder, 759 F.3d 332, 337 (4th Cir. 2014)). And we review 

legal questions de novo. Marynenka v. Holder, 592 F.3d 594, 600 (4th Cir. 2010).

Ultimately, this Court must affirm a BIA decision unless it is “manifestly contrary 

to the law and an abuse of discretion.” Tassi v. Holder, 660 F.3d 710, 719 (4th Cir. 

2011); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D). The BIA abuses its discretion when it does not 

 2 We note that single-member, non-precedential BIA decisions are entitled to the 

level of deference outlined in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 

Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902, 909–10 (4th Cir. 2014). This means that “we can rely 

on the agency’s opinions as a ‘body of experience and informed judgment’ to which we 

may ‘properly resort for guidance.’” Id. at 910 (quoting A.T. Massey Coal Co. v. 

Holland, 472 F.3d 148, 168 (4th Cir. 2006)). This “modest deference” hinges on “the 

thoroughness evident in [the BIA’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its 

consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it 

power to persuade.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting A.T. Massey Coal, 472 F.3d at 

168).
9

“offer a reasoned explanation for its decision, or if it distort[s] or disregard[s] important 

aspects of the applicant’s claim.” Tassi, 660 F.3d at 719.

III.

A.

Regarding the first element of an asylum claim, this Court has repeatedly and 

“expressly held that ‘the threat of death qualifies as persecution.’” Hernandez-Avalos, 

784 F.3d at 949 (quoting Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 126). We have 

also held that “[e]xtortion itself can constitute persecution, even if the targeted individual 

will be physically harmed only upon failure to pay.” Oliva v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 53, 59 (4th 

Cir. 2015). And “[a]pplicants who demonstrate past persecution are presumed to have a 

well-founded fear of future persecution.” Naizgi v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 484, 486 (4th Cir. 

2006). Here, Zavaleta Policiano credibly testified by affidavit that MS-13 threatened and 

extorted her after her father left El Salvador; MS-13 threatened to kill her children if she 

did not meet the gang’s demands; and she felt terrorized by the threats and fears for her 

safety and the safety of children. The Government has not challenged this evidence, and 

we thus conclude that Zavaleta Policiano has met the first requirement of eligibility for 

asylum.3

 3 The IJ and BIA both referenced the facts underlying Zavaleta Policiano’s 

persecution and appear to have implicitly found that she suffered persecution before 

skipping ahead to consider whether that persecution occurred on account of a protected 

ground. See, e.g., A.R. 4 (BIA discussing “the threats and harassment that [Zavaleta 

Policiano] and her family suffered from gang members”); A.R. 51 (IJ noting “that the 

(Continued)
10

B.

The IJ and BIA here based their respective rulings on the second prong of 

eligibility for asylum, which requires a petitioner to show the persecution occurred “on 

account of a protected ground.” Both the IJ and the BIA properly recognized that family 

membership qualifies as a protected ground. See Crespin-Valladares, 632 F.3d at 125 

(4th Cir. 2011). The IJ and BIA, however, went on to hold that Zavaleta Policiano had 

not established she was persecuted by MS-13 on account of her membership in the 

Policiano family.

As this Court has made clear, “[p]ersecution occurs ‘on account of’ a protected 

ground if that ground serves as ‘at least one central reason for’” the persecution. Id. at 

127 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)). The applicant need not prove that the 

protected ground was “the central reason or even a dominant central reason for 

persecution”; she need only show that the protected ground was more than “an 

‘incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate’ reason” underlying the persecution. 

Quinteros-Mendoza v. Holder, 556 F.3d 159, 164 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting In re J-B-N-, 

24 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 2007)).

 

lead respondent has submitted evidence which demonstrates that the Mara Salvatrucha 

gang coerced her and her father to pay periodic ‘rent’ in exchange for the safety of their 

children and family members”). Because “this Court is entitled to draw its own legal 

conclusions from the undisputed facts in the record that was created by the Board of 

Immigration Appeals,” Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d at 953 n.10, we make explicit the 

finding that Zavaleta Policiano has satisfied the first element of her asylum claim.
11

Zavaleta Policiano submits that the BIA erred in upholding the IJ’s finding that 

she was not persecuted on account of her family membership. Zavaleta Policiano 

specifically contends that her relationship with her father was “at least one central 

reason” she was targeted and threatened by MS-13. Whether the gang’s threats against 

Zavaleta Policiano were motivated by her family membership is a “classic factual 

question.” Crespin-Valladares, 632 F.3d at 128. We thus start with the IJ’s underlying 

factual finding before reviewing the BIA’s rationale for accepting that finding.

The IJ acknowledged the record evidence that MS-13 coerced Zavaleta Policiano 

and her father to pay periodic “rent” in exchange for the safety of their children and 

family members. The IJ nevertheless concluded that Zavaleta Policiano “failed to 

produce evidence” that the gang threatened her because of her ties to her father. A.R. 51. 

In so doing, the IJ paid particular attention to the gang’s notes in the record. The IJ 

stated, “[t]he notes [Zavaleta Policiano] received from the gang merely state that they 

seek her money in return for the safety of her family; they make no indication that she is 

being targeted for any reason other than garnering power and control over the 

community.” A.R. 52. The IJ added that, generally speaking, “the gangs in El Salvador 

target various groups of individuals and seek to terrorize society in general as a means of 

obtaining greater influence and power in the region.” A.R. 51. Thus, the IJ concluded 

that Zavaleta Policiano was not targeted by the gang on account of a protected ground.

The BIA held that the IJ’s factual finding was not clearly erroneous. A.R. 4. It 

characterized the gang’s “demands of money” as “acts of extortion” unrelated to Zavaleta 

Policiano’s family ties. A.R. 4. The BIA also summarily stated that the instant case was 
12

distinguishable from Hernandez-Avalos, where this Court found that a mother who 

received death threats after refusing to allow her son to join a local gang had established 

persecution on account of family membership. A.R. 4–5 (citing Hernandez-Avalos, 784 

F.3d at 949–50).

We hold that the BIA abused its discretion in affirming the IJ’s clearly erroneous 

factual finding. To start, the IJ unjustifiably relied on the fact that the threatening notes 

themselves did not explain why Zavaleta Policiano was targeted. As this Court recently 

explained, the single-minded focus on the “articulated purpose” for the threats while 

“failing to consider the intertwined reasons for those threats” represents “a misapplication 

of the statutory nexus standard.” Cruz v. Sessions, 853 F.3d 122, 129 (4th Cir. 2017). It 

is unrealistic to expect that a gang would neatly explain in a note all the legally 

significant reasons it is targeting someone. The IJ’s heavy reliance on the fact that El 

Salvadoran gangs target various groups of people in the country was similarly misguided. 

That “the criminal activities of MS-13 affect the population as a whole,” we have 

explained, is simply “beside the point” in evaluating an individual’s particular claim. 

Crespin-Valladares, 632 F.3d at 127.

More fundamentally, the IJ and BIA failed to appreciate, or even address, critical 

evidence in the record. It is this Court’s responsibility to “ensure that unrebutted, legally 

significant evidence is not arbitrarily ignored by the factfinder.” Baharon v. Holder, 588 

F.3d 228, 233 (4th Cir. 2009). The IJ did discuss the threatening notes (although while 

drawing unwarranted conclusions, as discussed above). But the IJ failed to address, or to 

assign any weight to, the significant body of unrebutted, indeed, undisputed, probative 
13

evidence giving meaning and context to the threatening notes: (1) Zavaleta Policiano and 

her father’s stores, as well as their familial relationship, were well-known in the 

community; (2) MS-13 threatened Zavaleta Policiano several times by phone; 

(3) Zavaleta Policiano’s statement that MS-13 “threatened me because my father had 

left;” and (4) the threats against Zavaleta Policiano began immediately after her father 

fled to Mexico. These are inexcusable omissions in the agency’s analysis.

The Government asks us to reject much of the overlooked evidence, characterizing 

it as Zavaleta Policiano’s “subjective beliefs [] as to the gangs’ motives.” Appellees’ Br. 

22–23. This argument does not explain away the IJ’s and BIA’s wholesale failure to 

discuss the evidence, however. See Ai Hua Chen v. Holder, 742 F.3d 171, 179 (4th Cir. 

2014) (explaining that the IJ and BIA must “offer a specific, cogent reason for rejecting 

evidence” (quoting Tassi, 660 F.3d at 720)). What is more, Zavaleta Policiano’s affidavit 

includes much more than her “subjective beliefs”—it contains key evidence of the 

context, nature, frequency, and timing of the gang’s threats against her and her family. 

By stipulating to the credibility and veracity of the affidavit, the Government forwent the 

opportunity to probe and weaken the evidentiary basis of Zavaleta Policiano’s claims.

When considering the unchallenged record evidence, we are compelled to 

conclude that Zavaleta Policiano’s familial relationship to her father was “at least one 

central reason” MS-13 targeted and threatened her. The evidence shows that MS-13 

explicitly threatened to kill Zavaleta Policiano’s father and his family if he did not pay 

the extortion demands, and that “[i]mmediately after” he fled El Salvador, the gang began 

threatening Zavaleta Policiano. A.R. 210. The timing of the threats against Zavaleta 
14

Policiano is key, as it indicates that MS-13 was following up on its prior threat to target 

Barrientos’s family if he did not accede to the gang’s demands. This explanation appears 

especially probable given the absence of record evidence that Zavaleta Policiano was 

ever threatened before her father’s departure. Beyond the timing, Zavaleta Policiano’s 

affidavit outlines the well-known relationship between the two businesses and the 

Policiano family, and contextualizes her statement that she was threatened because her 

father left. And just as MS-13 threatened Zavaleta Barrientos and his children, the gang 

threatened Zavaleta Policiano and her children, suggesting a pattern of targeting nuclear 

family members. The totality of this undisputed evidence demonstrates that Zavaleta 

Policiano was persecuted on account of her family membership.

We add that the BIA’s attempt to distinguish our precedent is unpersuasive. The 

BIA found, in a single sentence without any analysis, that Zavaleta Policiano’s claim is 

distinct from the one at issue in Hernandez-Avalos. A.R. 4 (mentioning HernandezAvalos, 784 F.3d at 949–50). But that decision actually bolsters Zavaleta Policiano’s 

position. There, the BIA denied asylum to a mother who was threatened by an El 

Salvadoran gang after she refused to allow her son to join the gang. The BIA held that 

the mother was not threatened on the basis of familial ties, but rather “because she would 

not consent to her son engaging in a criminal activity.” Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d at 

949 (citation omitted). In other words, the BIA determined that the gang’s threats against 

the mother were motivated by its desire to recruit the son. This Court rejected that 

“excessively narrow reading of the requirement that persecution be undertaken ‘on 

account of membership in a nuclear family.’” Id. We instead found that the nexus 
15

requirement was satisfied, explaining that the mother’s relationship “to her son is why 

she, and not another person, was threatened with death if she did not allow him to join 

[the gang].” Id. at 950. The same logic applies here. MS-13 warned Zavaleta Barrientos 

that it would target his family if he did not pay the extortion demands, and the gang in 

fact threatened Zavaleta Policiano immediately after her father left. Zavaleta Policiano’s 

relationship to her father is why she, rather than some other person, was targeted for 

extortion.

For all the reasons outlined above, we conclude that the BIA erred by affirming 

the IJ’s clearly erroneous finding. Zavaleta Policiano was not required to prove that the 

gang’s threats were “exclusively” motivated by her family ties—such “a requirement 

defies common sense.” See Cruz, 853 F.3d at 130. She only needed to show that the 

relationship with her father was “at least one central reason” MS-13 threatened her. 

Because Zavaleta Policiano made this showing, we find the BIA decision to be 

manifestly contrary to law and an abuse of discretion. See Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d 

at 953 n.10. By establishing that she was persecuted on account of her family 

membership, Zavaleta Policiano has satisfied the first two requirements of her asylum 

claim.

C.

The final requirement for asylum eligibility is whether the Salvadoran government 

is either unwilling or unable to control the MS-13 gang members who threatened 

Zavaleta Policiano and her family. The BIA did not reach this question, and we thus 

remand to the BIA to consider this factual issue in the first instance. See INS v. Ventura, 
16

537 U.S. 12, 16–17 (2002). Although “we are not empowered to consider” this factual 

issue without the BIA’s input, Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d at 953 n.10, we note that the 

undisputed evidence concerning the police officer’s handling of Zavaleta Policiano’s 

complaint is relevant to this determination, see id. at 953 (relying in part on “evidence of 

police ineffectiveness” in evaluating whether the Salvadoran government was unable or 

unwilling to control the Mara 18 gang).

IV.

The BIA also denied withholding of removal relief to Zavaleta Policiano, 

reasoning that if she could not meet her burden for the asylum claim, she could not carry 

the heightened burden for the withholding claim. Because this determination rested on 

the BIA’s erroneous asylum holding, we must vacate the BIA’s order denying the 

withholding of removal claim and remand to the BIA for further consideration. Cordova, 

759 F.3d at 340 n.7 (citing Li Fang Lin v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 685, 649 (4th Cir. 2008)).

V.

For the foregoing reasons, we grant Zavaleta Policiano’s petition for review, 

reverse the BIA’s determination that she failed to show persecution on account of her 
17

family membership, vacate the BIA’s decision with respect to her withholding of removal 

claim, and remand to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.4

PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED,

REVERSED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND

REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

 4 Zavaleta Policiano also asks this Court to hold that she has established eligibility 

for relief under the CAT. In light of our resolution of Zavaleta Policiano’s asylum claim, 

we do not address the CAT claim at this time. See Cruz, 853 F.3d at 130 n.6; Illunga v. 

Holder, 777 F.3d 199, 214 n.5 (4th Cir. 2015). If “the BIA declines to grant asylum or 

withholding of removal on remand, the BIA should reconsider her CAT claim in a 

manner consistent with the conclusions set forth in this opinion.” Cruz, 853 F.3d at 130 

n.6.
18

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I am pleased to concur in the opinion of the court. I agree that, “by stipulating to 

the credibility and veracity of the affidavit, the Government forwent the opportunity to 

probe and weaken the evidentiary basis of Zavaleta Policiano’s claims.” Maj. Op. at 13.