alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### STATE ex rel. Allen JAMES v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-OK-0638.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 4, 2011.

In re James, Allen; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, Nos. 00-5760, 01-2077; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 09-K-946.

Denied.
583 A.2d 311

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. ELIZABETH HORNSTEIN.

January 23, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                           1,098,000
<SECURITIES>                                     6,242,000
<RECEIVABLES>                                    1,796,800
<ALLOWANCES>                                      (112,200)
<INVENTORY>                                              0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 9,180,000
<PP&E>                                           4,926,700
<DEPRECIATION>                                  (1,963,300)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  12,144,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                              907,000
<BONDS>                                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                         4,386,000
<OTHER-SE>                                       6,375,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    12,144,000
<SALES>                                          3,382,700
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 3,465,900
<CGS>                                            1,519,700
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    2,541,700
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                         0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                       0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    924,200
<INCOME-TAX>                                       363,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                      0
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                       561,200
<EPS-BASIC>                                            .17
<EPS-DILUTED>                                          .17


</TABLE>
Exhibit 10.3


 


FIRST AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT


 


This First Amendment to Employment Agreement (“Amendment”), is made and
entered into as of the 31st day of December, 2008, by and between CORPORATE
OFFICE PROPERTIES, L.P. (the “Employer”), CORPORATE OFFICE PROPERTIES TRUST (“COPT”)
and STEPHEN E. RIFFEE.


 


RECITALS


 


A.                                   The
Executive and the Employer executed an Employment Agreement dated July 31,
2006 (the “Employment Agreement”) providing for the employment of the Executive
by the Employer upon the terms and conditions therein stated.


 


B.                                     The
Executive and the Employer have agreed to modify this Employment Agreement as
concerns the timing of the post-termination severance payment.


 


NOW,
THEREFORE, in consideration of the Executive’s continued employment under the
Employment Agreement, and pursuant to paragraph 11(b) of the Employment
Agreement, it is covenanted and agreed by and between the parties hereto as
follows:


 


1.                                       AMENDMENT
OF SECTION 4(b)(iii).  Section 4(b)(iii) of
the Employment Agreement is deleted and the following in inserted in lieu
thereof:


 


(iii)                               The
cash payments under this paragraph (b) of Section 4 will be made
monthly over twelve (12) months, unless otherwise mutually agreed by the
parties to minimize the Executive’s tax burden in any year.


 


2.                                       NO
OTHER AMENDMENTS.  Except to the extent
set forth above, this Amendment does not affect or otherwise supersede any
other provisions of the Employment Agreement or otherwise limit its
enforceability in any way.


 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Amendment as of the
date first written above.


 


	
  “Employer”

  	
   

  	
  “Executive”

  
	
  CORPORATE OFFICE PROPERTIES,

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  L.P., a
  Delaware limited partnership

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  By

  	
  :    /s/ Randall M. Griffin

  	
   

  	
  /s/ Stephen E. Riffee

  
	
  Randall M. Griffin

  	
   

  	
  Stephen E. Riffee

  
	
  President and Chief Executive Officer

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  CORPORATE OFFICE PROPERTIES

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  TRUST, a
  Maryland real estate investment trust

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  By

  	
  :    /s/ Randall M. Griffin

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Randall M. Griffin

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  President and Chief Executive Officer
<PAGE>
                                     EXHIBIT 11.1

                           VISTA MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

                      STATEMENT RE-COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE DATA
                    (AMOUNTS IN THOUSANDS, EXCEPT PER SHARE DATA)


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                         FISCAL YEARS ENDING DECEMBER 31
                                     -------------------------------------
                                         1995         1996        1997
                                     -----------  -----------   -----------
<S>                                  <C>          <C>           <C>
Net income (loss)                    $   (3,274)  $   (7,439)   $  (16,877)
                                     ----------   ----------    ----------
                                     ----------   ----------    ----------
Average common shares outstanding            37          201         6,731
Effect of assumed conversion of
  preferred stock from date of
  issuance                                2,645        6,836         4,340
                                     ----------   ----------    ----------
Shares used in Basic per share
  computations                            2,682        7,037        11,072
                                     ----------   ----------    ----------
                                     ----------   ----------    ----------
Net income (loss) per share - Basic  $    (1.22)  $    (1.06)   $    (1.52)
                                     ----------   ----------    ----------
                                     ----------   ----------    ----------

Net effect of dilutive common share
  equivalents based on the treasury
  stock method                               --           --          --
Shares used in Diluted per share
  computations                            2,682        7,037        11,072
                                     ----------   ----------    ----------
                                     ----------   ----------    ----------
Net income (loss) per
  share - Diluted                    $    (1.22)  $    (1.06)   $    (1.52)
                                     ----------   ----------    ----------
                                     ----------   ----------    ----------
</TABLE>
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 21-30665

Summary Calendar

Katrina Smith, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Wal-Mart Louisiana, L.L.C., 

Defendant—Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

No. 1:19-CV-447

Before Smith, Stewart, and Graves, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

This is a retail slip-and-fall case brought to federal court by diversity 

of citizenship. The plaintiff, Katrina Smith, alleged, under the Louisiana 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances 

set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 16, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 21-30665 Document: 00516242258 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/16/2022
No. 21-30665

2

Liability Act, La. Rev. Stat. § 9.2800.6, that she slipped on a clear liquid 

and was injured. 

In a concise but comprehensive Memorandum Ruling issued on September 2, 2021, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendant, Wal-Mart Louisiana, L.L.C. The court concluded that “Smith fails to 

provide any positive evidence establishing constructive notice and ʻ[m]ere 

speculation . . . is not sufficient to meet [Smith’s] burden and [this court] will 

not infer constructive notice for purposes of summary judgment where[her] 

allegations are no more likely than any other potential scenario.’” (district 

court’s alterations) (quoting Bagley v. Albertson’s, Inc., 492 F.3d 328, 330 (5th 

Cir. 2007)). 

In so deciding, the court took careful note of Smith’s theory that surveillance video supported her claim. We agree with the district court’s conclusions based on its application of Louisiana law and the summary judgment 

evidence.

On appeal, Smith avers that the district court should have allowed her 

to amend to add a complaint against a non-diverse store employee who 

walked directly by a spill. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e), “[i]f after removal the 

plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and 

remand . . . .” The district court was well within its discretion to deny amendment to add a non-diverse hourly employee who was in the course of performing general administrative duties.

The summary judgment is AFFIRMED, essentially for the reasons 

amply explained in the Memorandum Ruling. 

Case: 21-30665 Document: 00516242258 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/16/2022
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Sherri Ann SEPULVADO.

No. 2011-K-1151.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 14, 2011.

In re Sepulvado, Sherri Ann; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Sabine, 11th Judicial District Court No. 62620; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-435.

Denied.
627 A.2d 1127

#### IN THE MATTER OF OPINION # 608 OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS.

March 9, 1993.

ORDER

This matter having been remanded to a Special Master by Order of the Court filed April 15, 1992, and the Master having duly filed the record and his report with the Court;

And the Legislature having subsequently amended *N.J.S.A.*46H0A-6 (L.1993, e. 33);

And the Court having referred the report of the Special Master and the legislation to the Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics to determine whether any modification of Opinion # 608 was required;

And the Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics having concluded that L.1993, c. 33 has superseded Opinion # 608 and its Supplement and that a Notice to the Bar so indicating should be authorized by the Court and published in due course;

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that the Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics is hereby authorized to prepare and publish a Notice to the Bar stating that Opinion #608 and the Supplement to Opinion # 608 have been superseded by L.1993, c. 33; and it is further

*416ORDERED that in light of the foregoing, the within appeals are dismissed as moot. No costs to any party.
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 19

- 14596 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 0:17

- cr
- 60186

- KMM

- 1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff

- Appellee,

versus JOHN VINCEN T SMITH, Defendant

- Appellant.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

___________________ _____ ( September 16, 2020 )
Before MARTIN , ROSENBAUM and LUCK , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Kristen Kawass , appointed counsel for John Smith in this direct criminal appeal, has moved to withdraw from further representation of the appellant and

Case: 19-14596 Date Filed: 09/16/2020 Page: 1 of 22 filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Smith, in turn, has filed a motion for appointment of new counsel. Our independent review of the
entire record reveals that Kawass ’s assessment of the relative merit of the appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED , Smith’s conviction
and sentence are AFFIRMED , and Smith’s motion for appointment of new
counsel is DENIED as MOOT

.

Case: 19-14596 Date Filed: 09/16/2020 Page: 2 of 2
#### MARKETFARE ST. CLAUDE, LLC, et al. v. UNITED FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, et al.

No. 2010-CC-2778.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 4, 2011.

In re Marketfare St. Claude LLC et al.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. I, Nos. 2009-10823, 2006-8176; to the Court of Appeal, *478Fourth Circuit, Nos. 2010-C-0840, 2010-C-1233.

Denied.
#### Johnny RICHENDOLLAR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D10-2652.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Oct. 6, 2010.

Johnny Richendollar, pro se, Appellant.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Joshua R. Heller, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant challenges the summary denial of his postconviction motion. The postconviction court treated the appellant’s motion as though it were filed pursuant to rule 3.800(c) and denied it as untimely. However, the appellant’s motion alleges that the portion of his sentence which prohibits contact with anyone under the age of 18 is illegal. If such a condition is included in the appellant’s sentence, it is not statutorily authorized and is impermissibly vague. *See Johnson v. State,*27 So.3d 211 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); *Calidonio v. State,*951 So.2d 87 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). Because the appellant’s motion should have been considered as timely filed pursuant to rule 3.800(a), we reverse for consideration of the appellant’s motion on the merits.

Accordingly, we hereby REVERSE the postconviction court’s order and RE*101MAND for consideration of the appellant s motion on the merits.

BENTON, PADOVANO, and CLARK, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                      EXHIBIT 21

                LIST OF SUBSIDIARIES OF CRESCENT OPERATING, INC.

<TABLE>
<S>                                                                 <C>
Name of Subsidiary                                                  State of Incorporation or Organization

COI Hotel Group, Inc.                                               Texas

WOCOI Investment Company                                            Texas

RoseStar Management LLC                                             Texas

Desert Mountain Development Corporation                             Delaware

Woodlands Land Company, Inc.                                        Texas

RSCR Arizona Corp.                                                  Delaware

RSSW Corp.                                                          Delaware

Crescent Machinery Company (formerly, Moody-Day, Inc.)              Texas

COPI Colorado, LP                                                   Delaware

CRL Investments, Inc.                                               Texas

Crescent Development Management Corp.                               Delaware

Desert Mountain Properties, LP                                      Delaware

Western Traction Company                                            California

E.L. Lester & Company, Inc.                                         Texas

Solveson Crane Rental, Inc.                                         California

COPI Cold Storage, LLC                                              Delaware

Crescent Development Management Corp. II                            Delaware
</TABLE>
#### The State of Ohio, Appellee, *v.*Hardy, Appellant.

*465(No. 166

Decided December 22, 1941.)

*Mr. James W. Williamson,*prosecuting attorney, for appellee.

*Mr. Edwin 8. Barger,*for appellant.

Lloyd, J.

Defendant, Herman Hardy, appeals to this court on questions of law from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, entered on a finding of guilty of unlawfully operating, on September 29, 1941, in the county of Lucas, *“a*certain farm truck on a public highway in said county aforesaid'for commercial purposes and for purposes other than exclusively in farm use as defined in Section 6292 of the Ohio General Code, and contrary to the provisions of said section.”

The facts are not in dispute. Hardy was an employee of Saunders Mills, Inc., an Ohio corporation having an office in Toledo and engaged in the business of handling, harvesting and processing alfalfa hay and producing therefrom alfalfa meal. It produces two types of alfalfa meal: (1) Sun-cured, made of hay cured or dried on the fields where grown, and (2) dehydrated, made of ground alfalfa, cured after being hauled from the fields to the dehydrating plant. Saunders Mills, Inc., purchased of a farmer nine and one-half acres of growing alfalfa for $40, to be cut and harvested by the company. At the time of his arrest, Hardy was transporting a load of this alfalfa to the plant of the company. The tractor and truck bore “farm” license plates, the tax paid therefor being the limited fee provided by Section 6292, General Code, for trucks used *466exclusively by farmers in farm use as therein defined. It is contended by Hardy that, as an employee of Saunders Mills, Inc., he was so using the truck and tractor in the transportation of the alfalfa which had been cut and harvested by his employer for the reason that his employer, to the extent that it had the right to go upon the land of the farmer to cut and harvest the growing alfalfa, was a farmer engaged in the business of farming. This contention seems not to have been within the contemplation and intent of the statute as expressed therein. It provides in part that:

“For each farm truck which is owned, controlled or operated by one or more farmers exclusively in farm use as hereinafter defined, and not for commercial purposes ** * *.*

“For the purposes of this act, use of a farm truck is defined as one used in the transportation from the farm of products of the farm, including livestock and its products, poultry and its products, floricultural and horticultural products * *

The primary and, in fact, only business of Saunders Mills, Inc., as shown by the record herein, was the processing of alfalfa hay and producing meal therefrom. Its vocation was not that of a farmer. Clearly it did not own, control or operate a farm within the meaning of the statute and it was not entitled to the benefit of the license fee which the statute accords to farmers.

The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas is therefore affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Overmyer and Carpenter, JJ., concur.
855 A.2d 760

#### COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. David Michael SMITH, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted Jan. 13, 2004.

Decided Aug. 18, 2004.

Donald R. Totaro, Janna Rae Steinruck, for Com. of Pa.

Michael Victor Marinaro, Lancaster, for David Michael Smith.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 18th day of August, 2004, the order of the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas is reversed insofar as it declared the Registration of Sexual Offenders Act unconstitutional, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. *See Commonwealth v. Williams,*574 Pa. 487, 832 A.2d 962 (2003); *Commonwealth v. Maldonado,*576 Pa. 101, 838 A.2d 710 (2003).

Justice EAKIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
#### Charlie J. BURROUGHS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D11-3464.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

July 22, 2011.

Charlie J. Burroughs, pro se, Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

For the third time, Charlie Burroughs petitions the court for relief on the theory that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. Burroughs’ first petition raising this claim was untimely and denied as such. His second petition was likewise untimely, failed to allege any meritorious basis for an exception to the time limitation, and in addition was determined to be impermissibly successive. Burroughs has now presented the same claim again, and as with his last petition, we determine that this claim is procedurally barred both as untimely under rule 9.141(d)(5) and imper-missibly successive under rule *11769.141(d)(6)(C). Petitioner is cautioned that the filing of any further procedurally barred petitions claiming that appellate counsel was ineffective in this case may result in the imposition of sanctions, including but not limited to an order prohibiting petitioner from filing any further pro se pleadings in this court.

Petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel DENIED and DISMISSED.

VAN NORTWICK, WETHERELL, and ROWE, JJ., concur.
#### UNITED INSURANCE GROUP, INC., Appellant, v. Hiram FIGUEREDO, Appellee.

No. 3D10-1727.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Aug. 10, 2011.

*1217Infante, Zumpano, Hudson & Miloch and Theodore C. Miloch II and Michael C. Mikiciuk, Coral Gables, for appellant.

Marin Eljaiek & Lopez and Anthony M. Lopez, Coconut Groove and Joseph Rene Ruiz, for appellee.

Before WELLS, C.J., and LAGOA and EMAS, JJ.

*CONFESSION OF ERROR*

PER CURIAM.

United Insurance Group, Inc. (“United”), appeals an order denying its motion to set aside a Clerk’s Default and Final Judgment in favor of appellee Hiram Fi-gueredo (“Figueredo”). On appeal, Fi-gueredo confessed error. We agree with Figueredo, and we reverse.

Through a non-attorney, corporative representative, United timely served a response to the complaint at issue in the form of a letter. Because this response was sufficient to require Figueredo to provide notice to United of his applications for default and final judgment, it was improper for the trial court to treat United’s response to the complaint as a nullity. *See J.A.R., Inc. v. Universal Am. Realty Corp.,*485 So.2d 467 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.500(b); *see also Colby Materials, Inc. v. Caldwell Constr., Inc.,*926 So.2d 1181 (Fla.2006); *Szteinbaum v. Kaes Inversiones y Valores, C.A.,*476 So.2d 247 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), *approved in part by Torrey v. Leesburg Reg’l Med. Ctr.,*769 So.2d 1040 (Fla.2000). Because it is undisputed that Figueredo did not provide the required notice to United, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in denying United’s motion to vacate the Clerk’s Default and Final Judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand with instructions for the trial court to set aside the Clerk’s Default, Final Judgment, and the subsequently issued writs and judgment in garnishment.

Reversed and remanded.