Filed 2/5/16 P. v. Medina CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ROMMEL DAMIAN VASQUEZ MEDINA,

Defendant and Appellant.

F069560

(Super. Ct. No. F13905859)

OPINION

THE COURT*

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Hilary A. 

Chittick, Judge.

Cynthia L. Barnes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney 

General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Sally Espinoza, Deputy Attorneys General, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.

-ooOoo-

 

* Before Levy, Acting P.J., Franson, J. and Peña, J.
2

Defendant Rommel Damian Vasquez Medina pled no contest to assault with a 

firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2))1 and admitted a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, 

subd. (b)(1)). The trial court sentenced him to the middle term of three years in prison, 

plus a consecutive five-year term on the gang enhancement. On appeal, he contends the 

trial court erred by failing to conduct a competency hearing because it was presented with 

substantial evidence of his incompetence to stand trial. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

On March 14, 2014, defendant entered his no contest plea with no indication of the 

sentence he would receive. The sentencing hearing was set for April 14, 2014. 

On April 14, 2014, defense counsel stated he had not received the probation 

officer’s report and thus could not complete the memorandum he wished to submit. The 

trial court noted it had received a fax from the Central Valley Regional Center (CVRC) 

and stated it wanted to confirm that everyone had received a copy. The court stated: 

“It’s a letter and a psychological evaluation. The evaluation is old, but the letter is 

updated, and the letter questions whether [defendant is] competent.” The court agreed to 

continue sentencing to May 12, 2014. 

On May 9, 2014, defense counsel filed a statement in mitigation, asking the court 

to stay the gang enhancement and sentence defendant to the middle term of three years. 

The statement described defendant’s background as follows:

“[Defendant] was born [in] 1988 in Fresno, California. He has lived 

in California’s Central Valley for most of his life with the exception of a 

brief stay in Utah from 2002 through 2003. In 2007, [defendant] was 

diagnosed as ‘an individual who is functioning between mild retardation 

and borderline intelligence.’ (See Exhibit A)

“[Defendant’s] low functioning resulted in an inability to hold down 

a steady job. [Defendant] reported that he was laid off from several jobs 

 

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
3

because he was unable to remember what he was taught. Since that time, 

[defendant] has been a client of the [CVRC].

“Unable to succeed in school or hold down a job, [defendant] drifted 

toward gangs, alcohol and drugs. In 2011, [defendant] was placed on 

probation by Tulare County for narcotics violations.” 

The statement then set out an argument for mitigation of his sentence:

“[Defendant] continues to contend that he did not commit the assault 

to which he pled no contest. Based on the significant risk of proceeding to 

trial, however, [defendant] decided to accept the District Attorney’s offer to 

resolve the case. [Fn. omitted.]

“Even assuming that [defendant] is guilty, several factors should 

operate to mitigate his punishment. [Defendant] lacks an extensive 

criminal history. He is mentally challenged and therefore an easy target of 

manipulation by his so-called ‘friends’ in the Norteno criminal street 

gang....[2] The Court could consider all of the above factors under 

[California Rules of Court, r]ule 4.413 as facts demonstrating unusual 

circumstances.

“The court should also view with skepticism some of the claims 

made by the probation officer in her report and recommendation. Other 

than the instant case there is no evidence that [defendant] ‘has engaged in 

violent conduct’. Utilizing this as an aggravating factor is nonsensical as 

every assault with a firearm is—by definition—violent conduct. The 

probation officer uses the commission of the current crime as a factor to 

aggravate the punishment for the current crime, something that cannot be 

countenanced.

“Nor can it be said that [defendant’s] prior convictions are 

‘numerous’ as he has only two such prior convictions. And while assault 

with a firearm is arguably more serious than the narcotics violations for 

which [defendant] was on probation, the sample size is far too small to 

suggest that the ‘increasing seriousness’ of his criminal behavior is a factor 

in aggravation.

“Neither can the court properly use the dismissed counts as factors in 

aggravation. Each of the dismissed counts were alternative methods for 

charging the same conduct. The fact that the district attorney’s office files 

 

2 Omitted here is a sentence lined out by the trial court when defense counsel 

explained he had made an error. 
4

multiple charges criminalizing the same conduct does not aggravate the 

conduct that is charged.

“The Court can also consider the following factors in mitigation:

“[California Rules of Court, r]ule 4.423(b)(2): The defendant was 

suffering from a mental or physical condition that significantly reduced 

culpability for the crime: As discussed above, [defendant’s] mental health 

challenges provide a partial excuse for his conduct.

“[California Rules of Court, r]ule 4.423(b)(5): The defendant 

made restitution to the victim: *** [No information is referenced by these 

asterisks.]

“[California Rules of Court, r]ule 4.423(b)(6): The defendant’s 

prior performance on probation or parole was satisfactory: While probation 

uses the fact that [defendant] was on felony probation at the time the crime 

was committed as a circumstance in aggravation, the Court should note that 

[defendant] had successfully served just over two years of his three year 

probationary term. He was not violated prior to his arrest for the instant 

offense.” 

Attached to the statement in mitigation were three documents—a fax cover sheet, 

a brief cover letter to the trial court, and a 2007 psychological evaluation of defendant.

The brief cover letter was from Jose Rodriguez, Counselor/Service Coordinator at 

CVRC, dated April 10, 2014. It stated the following:

“The above named defendant was last seen before the court on 

3/14/14. [Defendant] has been a client of [CVRC] since 2004. Please note 

that [defendant] has been in Special Education classes since an early age 

and is diagnosed as Borderline Intellectual Functioning status through 

Sullivan Center for Children, therefore competency would be questionable 

according to current diagnosis. Please find the enclosed Psychological

Evaluation dated 12/21/2007 for your review.” 

The psychological evaluation was performed by Michael Kesselman, Ph.D. in 

2007 when defendant was 19 years old. Defendant had been referred for the 

psychological evaluation by CVRC “to assess his intellectual and adaptive level of 

functioning.” Kesselman observed:
5

“[Defendant] is neatly groomed and casually dressed. He is 

cooperative and puts forth a good effort. [He] is able to carry on a basic 

conversation. He speaks in both simple and complex sentences which are, 

for the most part, grammatically correct. [He] knows both Spanish and 

English but is more familiar with English.” 

The report stated that defendant’s family began to notice he was slow and behind 

other children when he was six years old and starting school. Defendant told Kesselman 

that he lived with his mother and sister. He said he had never lived on his own and could 

not do so. He said he could cook simple foods like hamburgers or eggs, but not foods 

requiring cooking, mixing, and measuring. He had never learned to wash his clothes. He 

could not manage money or pay bills. He could sometimes count correct change from a 

purchase. He was able to walk around his hometown of Parlier, but did not take the bus. 

He got nervous around a lot of people. He had never had mental health counseling or 

taken any medications. He said he had had several jobs, but had been laid off from most 

of them. Employers did not understand why he could not remember what they told him 

to do from one day to the next. He said he would like to participate in a program to help 

him find a job. 

Kesselman administered tests and came to the following conclusions:

“On the WAIS-III today, [defendant] obtained a Full Scale IQ of 67. 

This which would suggest mild retardation. However, three previous 

cognitive assessments have found borderline intelligence. Therefore, I have 

given [defendant] a provisional diagnosis of borderline intelligence. 

Consistent with a diagnosis of an individual who is functioning between

mild retardation and borderline intelligence would be results from academic 

achievement scores.

“[Defendant] does appear to have a number of substantial handicaps. 

He has a substantial handicap in his learning, as measured by his academic 

achievement scores and low IQ scores. He has a substantial handicap in his 

capacity to live independently, as he is unable to cook anything but simple 

foods, cannot manage his money, does not always count the correct change, 

and is unable to get around his home town independently. Additionally, 

[he] is unable to wash clothes. [He] has a substantial handicap in his 

capacity for economic self-sufficiency. He has been laid off from several 
6

of the jobs he has had after a short period of time. The employers get 

frustrated when [he] cannot remember from one day to the next what they 

have taught him.

“[Defendant’s] relatively high score on the Street Survival Skills 

Questionnaire suggests he might benefit from an independent living 

program and might, in fact, be able to live independently. [He] does have 

some relatively good non-verbal skills. He might be taught some type of 

vocational task. I would consider working in conjunction with vocational 

rehabilitation as [he] may fit in better with individuals who are of 

borderline intelligence vocationally.

“Should the [CVRC] accept [defendant] as a client, 1 would consider 

re-evaluating [him] in three years or possibly sooner if the case worker has 

reports that [he] is able to live independently. He does seem to have this 

potential but is unable to do so now. 1 believe that this inability is due to 

cognitive deficits.” 

On May 13, 2014, the sentencing hearing took place and the following occurred:

“THE COURT: All right. We are on the record in the matter of 

[defendant]. Today is the date set for sentencing. The court has received 

and had an opportunity to review the report and recommendation of the 

probation department. I have also received and had an opportunity to

review the victim impact statement ... and have considered that. ·I have 

also received the statement in mitigation filed on behalf of [defendant] as 

well as the psychological evaluation from 2007 done by Mr. Kesselman and 

the note from Jose Rodriguez, the CVRC counselor service coordinator. 

[¶] ... [¶]

“The recommendation in this matter is for nine years. That would be 

the aggravated term plus the five years for the 186.22(a) consecutive.· The 

court has indicated in chambers a thought to give either seven or eight years 

in this matter, however, I’ll hear from both counsel. [¶] [Defense counsel], 

you wish to be heard?

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor. [¶] ... [¶] 

[T]he statement in mitigation references an Exhibit A which was not 

attached.· The Exhibit A that was being referenced was the letter from 

CVRC which the court has referenced in its remarks and I just want to 

make that clear.

“THE COURT: Okay.
7

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, with respect to the court’s 

ruling I would just reiterate the points made in the statement in mitigation 

regarding the probation officer’s analysis of this case. The aggravating 

factors that are listed in this particular case are stretched at to get this. You 

cannot use the aggravating factor that [defendant] has engaged in violent 

conduct which presents a danger to society because that’s not aggravating 

to the crime which he has pled to. The crime itself is the violent conduct.· 

You can’t aggravate the crime by using the crime. That’s improper 

analysis by the probation officer.

“Furthermore, I think it is a stretch to suggest because [defendant] 

committed a more serious offense arguably than his narcotics offense out of 

Tulare County that he has a criminal history that is numerous or increasing 

in seriousness. We have evidence of two distinct convictions that 

[defendant] has. That’s far too small of a sample size to make the 

comments that the probation officer makes, nor was it appropriate to—for 

the court to use the dismissed counts as an aggravating factor in this case 

because the dismissed counts were simply different ways of pleading the 

same conduct. No counts were dismissed that aren’t, in fact, part of the 

plea agreement with the possible exception of the personal use allegation, 

but that is, I think, part and parcel of the agreement anyway. We all 

understand what [defendant] has pled to here.

“On the mitigating side of things, clearly [defendant] suffers from a 

mental condition.· It’s set forth in the letter from CVRC the diagnosis from 

CVRC.· He’s been receiving services from [CVRC] for several years. And 

while I disagree with the letter suggesting that there are competency issues 

in this case, I think [defendant] understands what the nature of the charges 

are, understands the court proceedings and can effectively assist counsel in 

his own defense.· That doesn’t go as far as to say that he is sufficiently 

sophisticated to engage in planning, to engage in the type of planning that 

would be involved in this particular incident.· And it is clear that to the 

extent that [defendant] was involved, he was involved as the patsy of his 

other so-called friends in the street gang who manipulated him and preyed 

upon him in order to get him to commit criminal conduct on their behalf, 

pretending to be friends of his, pretending to give, you know, give him a 

home in the place where he can feel accepted.

“I think it’s striking that [defendant] made every effort in his young 

adult life to be a positive contributor to society. He had several jobs. He 

studied hard.· He worked hard at the [CVRC]. And in each one of his 

employment situations he was let go because he was unable to perform to 
8

the level of expectations required of him due to his mental disabilities. The 

same thing happened at school.

“So what we see in [defendant] is a person who, through no fault of 

his own, has been marginalized, has been made to feel other[,] left out of 

society in the sense that he’s not been able to contribute in a positive way, 

and he’s been sort of left on the margins, and those unfortunately are the

type of people that gang members prey upon.· They give them a sense of 

belonging, a sense of community, a sense of family, a sense that they are 

valuable, and based on that induce them to committing criminal activity 

that otherwise they probably would not engage in.

“We discussed in chambers, and I will not make any further 

reference to the restitution that [defendant] has attempted to provide to the 

County of Fresno. 

“And I would note that apart from this case [defendant] was 

performing well on the terms of his Tulare County probation.· There were 

no violations.· He did not appear to have dropped out of contact with 

probation or failed to report to his drug treatment for his drug treatment 

obligations. [¶] ... [¶]

“ ... And finally, Your Honor, just noting that the basis for 

[defendant’s] plea was for sentencing benefit. Clearly he was exposed to a 

significant amount of time in custody were he to have proceeded to trial 

and lost. [Defendant] steadfastly denies that he’s the person who shot at 

[the victim].... [¶] I would submit on those comments. [¶] ... [¶]

“ ... Your Honor, the one comment that I would make with respect 

to the prior conviction is that it is commonly testified to by the detectives 

on the MAGEC unit that a tactic of street gangs, especially organized street 

gangs like the Nortenos in particular, is to utilize other people’s houses for 

the placement of their guns and their drugs so as to deflect attention from 

themselves.· While [defendant] did plead guilty to those charges and we 

cannot now argue that he has not been convicted of those charges, I would 

caution the court about how much weight to put on the facts of that case 

given that we don’t know the basis for the search warrant in the case.· We 

don’t know exactly what [defendant’s] role in this was other than that guns 

and drugs were found in the home of a gang member.· And a gang member 

who has mental challenges and can provide those individuals with an 

easy—an easy mark and a good patsy for taking the fall for their cases, and 

I would submit on those comments and the comments of misstatement [sic] 

of mitigation.· We’re asking the court to sentence [defendant] to the 

mitigated term. 
9

“THE COURT:· Okay.· Anything further?

“[PROSECUTOR]: No, Your Honor. Thank you.

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Submitted, Your Honor.

“THE COURT: Okay.· The statement in mitigation asked the court 

to stay or strike the gang enhancement punishment and sentence 

[defendant] to the middle term of three years.· The court is not going to do 

that because it does seem to the court that it would be inappropriate for the 

court to stay or strike the gang enhancement in this case.· [Defendant] 

participated in this—this shooting was purely a gang shooting.· And it was 

against not a rival gang, but against a completely innocent individual who 

had the bad luck to wear the wrong color T-shirt.· So unusual 

circumstances are required in this case for probation.· The court does not 

find unusual circumstances to grant probation and so probation in this case 

is denied.

“The circumstances in aggravation that the court does find are that 

the defendant was [on] probation or parole when the crime—probation 

when the crime was committed.· The facts of this case in the court’s mind 

are particularly egregious. The gun was actually fired.· The victim was 

actually injured. The statement that the victim wrote to the court details the 

difficulties that he now has as a result of the injuries that he sustained.· The 

court will consider that as a factor in aggravation.

“With respect to factors in mitigation, the defendant did plead at an 

early stage although he denies any wrongdoing. The court does believe the 

defendant’s diminished mental capacity are a factor in mitigation relating to 

the defendant, and the court will find therefore that the aggravating and 

mitigating circumstances are in balance.

“Sentence the defendant to the middle term of three years.· The 

enhancement pursuant to 186.22(b)(1) is an additional five years.· As I 

interpret that under 1192.7(a) this was a personal use of a gun and therefore 

it’s a five-year as opposed to a two, three, four or a ten which are the other 

options that are available.· So the addition of five years for a total of term 

of eight years.” 

DISCUSSION

I. Law

Both the federal Constitution and our state statutes forbid criminal prosecution of a 

person who is mentally incompetent. (Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375, 378; 
10

§ 1367, subd. (a).) The constitutional test is whether the defendant “‘has sufficient 

present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 

understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the 

proceedings against him.’” (Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402.) Similarly, 

state statutes forbid prosecution while the defendant, “as a result of mental disorder or 

developmental disability ... is unable to understand the nature of the criminal 

proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner.” 

(§ 1367, subd. (a).)

Section 1368 provides that, when “a doubt arises in the mind of the judge as to the 

mental competence of the defendant, [the judge] shall state that doubt in the record and 

inquire of [defense counsel] whether, in the opinion of [defense counsel], the defendant is 

mentally competent.” (§ 1368, subd. (a).) If defense counsel then “informs the court that 

he or she believes the defendant is or may be mentally incompetent, the court shall order 

that the question of the defendant’s mental competence is to be determined in a hearing 

which is held pursuant to Sections 1368.1 and 1369. If counsel informs the court that he

or she believes the defendant is mentally competent, the court may nevertheless order a 

hearing.” (Id., subd. (b).) When the court has ordered a hearing to make a determination 

into the defendant’s competence, it must suspend the criminal prosecution until the 

question of the defendant’s mental competence has been determined.3(Id., subd. (c).)

The provisions of section 1368 have been interpreted to afford a constitutional 

right. If the judge makes an express declaration of doubt as to a defendant’s competence, 

the court is required to hold a competency hearing and make a formal determination 

regarding the defendant’s competence. (People v. Marks (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1335, 1340.) 

 

3 “Although it arises in the context of a criminal trial, a competency hearing is a 

special proceeding, governed generally by the rules applicable to civil proceedings. 

[Citations.] A defendant is presumed competent unless the contrary is proven by a 

preponderance of the evidence.” (People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 131.)
11

If the judge does not make an express declaration of doubt, but a defendant has 

nevertheless presented substantial evidence that he is incompetent, the court is similarly 

required to conduct a hearing and make a formal determination. (People v. Hale (1988) 

44 Cal.3d 531, 539; People v. Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508, 518-519 (Pennington).)

“‘Substantial evidence’ has been defined as evidence that raises a reasonable 

doubt concerning the defendant’s competence to stand trial.” (People v. Welch (1999) 

20 Cal.4th 701, 738.) Substantial evidence of incompetence may come from any source, 

and the trial court, in deciding whether substantial evidence of incompetence exists, 

“must consider all of the relevant circumstances.” (People v. Howard (1992) 

1 Cal.4th 1132, 1164; Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162, 180.) “In People v. 

Pennington, supra, 66 Cal.2d at page 519, [the Supreme Court] enunciated the following 

standards regarding what would constitute substantial evidence of incompetence to stand 

trial: ‘If a psychiatrist or qualified psychologist [citation], who has had sufficient 

opportunity to examine the accused, states under oath with particularity that in his 

professional opinion the accused is, because of mental illness, incapable of understanding 

the purpose or nature of the criminal proceedings being taken against him or is incapable 

of assisting in his defense or cooperating with counsel, the substantial-evidence test is 

satisfied.’” (People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 738.)

When substantial evidence appears, a doubt as to the defendant’s competence 

exists, “no matter how persuasive other evidence—testimony of prosecution witnesses or 

the court’s own observations of the accused—may be to the contrary.” (Pennington, 

supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 518; see id. at p. 519 [defendant presented substantial evidence he 

was incompetent and prosecution presented substantial evidence he was competent; 

“however, once it is determined that defendant’s showing was substantial, it is immaterial 

that the prosecution’s evidence may seem more persuasive”; “conflict can only be 

resolved upon a special trial before the judge or jury, if a jury is requested”].) At this 

point, if the court proceeds with a criminal prosecution without first making a formal 
12

determination that the defendant is, in fact, competent to stand trial, the defendant is 

denied his constitutional right to a fair trial. (See People v. Ary (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 

1016, 1020; see also Pate v. Robinson, supra, 383 U.S. at pp. 384-385.)

If, on the other hand, the evidence of the defendant’s incompetence is less than 

substantial (and the court has not expressed a doubt as to his competence), the decision to 

conduct a hearing is in the trial court’s discretion. (Pennington, supra, 66 Cal.2d 

at p. 518.) The court may first choose to hold further informal hearings to assist it in 

determining whether there is substantial evidence of incompetence. (People v. Johnson

(1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1157, 1162, citing People v. Ashley (1963) 59 Cal.2d 339, 363.)

When a trial court is required to make a formal competency determination, 

defense counsel cannot waive that determination on behalf of the defendant. (See 

People v. Marks, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1340.) If a trial court fails to make a formal 

determination once it is required to do so, that court’s order directing the reinstitution of 

criminal proceedings is an act in excess of its jurisdiction. (Id. at p. 1337.)

II. Analysis

In this case, the trial court did not express a doubt as to defendant’s mental

competence. Thus, the question here is whether the court was presented with substantial 

evidence of defendant’s mental incompetence, such that the court was required to 

conduct a hearing a make a formal determination of his competence. (People v. Hale, 

supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 539; Pennington, supra, 66 Cal.2d at pp. 518-519.)

Defendant asserts that the documents supplied by CVRC and attached to his 

statement in mitigation provided the necessary substantial evidence of his incompetence. 

We disagree.

In considering all of the relevant circumstances, the trial court was required to 

consider defense counsel’s “undoubtedly relevant” opinion regarding defendant’s 

competence. (People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1164.) Defense counsel was of 

the unambiguous opinion that defendant was competent to stand trial. Counsel stressed 
13

that the psychological evaluation he was presenting did not demonstrate defendant’s 

incompetence, but was for the sole purpose of justifying the court’s imposition of a 

mitigated sentence on the ground that defendant’s lack of sophistication to engage in the 

planning required of this particular crime demonstrated that he had been manipulated and 

preyed upon to commit criminal conduct on behalf of gang members. Defense counsel 

specifically explained to the court that he did not believe defendant’s mental condition 

rendered him incompetent, and that he believed defendant understood the nature of the 

charges and the court proceedings, and could effectively assist counsel in his own 

defense. Consequently, defense counsel’s opinion did not raise any doubt as to 

defendant’s competence to stand trial.

Furthermore, the content of the psychological evaluation itself did not raise a 

reasonable doubt concerning defendant’s competence to stand trial. Kesselman observed 

that defendant was well groomed, cooperative, and made a good effort. He could speak 

two languages. He spoke in both simple and complex sentences and with generally 

correct grammar. He described himself as a 19 year old who lived with his family and 

did not know how to cook or wash clothes. He walked around town, but did not ride the 

bus and did not always count correct change. He had trouble learning and remembering 

what employers asked of him on previous days. He was interested in getting another job. 

Kesselman concluded defendant was provisionally borderline intelligent, and possibly 

mildly retarded. He scored relatively high on “Street Survival Skills” and had some 

relatively good non-verbal skills, such that he might be able to live independently in the 

future.

This evaluation in no way suggested that defendant’s mental deficits were so great 

that he could not understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or rationally assist 

defense counsel in presenting a defense. Rather, it suggested that despite those deficits, 

at 19 years old, he was able to present himself in a favorable manner and communicate 

moderately well, and he was even likely able to live independently (which he may or may 
14

not have done in the following seven years). We also note that Kesselman’s evaluation 

of defendant was not performed for the purpose of determining his competence to stand 

trial, a topic Kesselman never mentioned and which, if he had, would nevertheless have 

been outdated by seven years. Kesselman’s observations and conclusions regarding 

defendant’s mental deficits, while certainly relevant to the court’s consideration, were 

made to assess 19-year-old defendant’s ability to live, work, and function on his own, not 

to assess 26-year-old defendant’s ability to understand the nature of the criminal 

proceedings and rationally assist counsel in presenting a defense.4

We conclude there was no substantial evidence defendant was incompetent to 

stand trial. Accordingly, the trial court was not required to conduct a competency 

hearing, and it did not abuse its discretion in declining to do so. (Pennington, supra,

66 Cal.2d at p. 518.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

 

4 For that reason, many of Kesselman’s observations, such as 19-year-old 

defendant’s lack of domestic skills such as cooking or doing laundry, had little 

application to his competence to stand trial.