alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### City of Dallas v. A. J. Ross.

(No. 2956.)

Appeal from Dallas County.

Opinion by

Willson, J.

■§ 279. *Municipal córporcdion; liability of, for trespass, etc.; petition must allege corporate authority.*“The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or employer must auswer, civilly, for the negligence or want of skill of his agent or servant, in the course or line of his employment, by which another is injured. Municipal cor*211porations, under the conditions herein stated, fall within the operation of this rule of law, and are liable, accordingly, to civil actions for damages, when the requisite elements of liability co-exist. To create such a liability, it is fundamentally necessary that the act done, which is injurious to others, must be within the scope of the corporate powers as prescribed by charter or positive enactment; ... in other words, it must not be *ultra vires,*in the sense that it is not *within*the power or authority of the corporation to act in reference to it, under any circumstances. If the act complained of lies *wholly outside*of the general or special powers of the corporation, as conferred by charter or statute, the corporation can in no event be hable, whether it directly commanded the-performance of the act, or whether it be done by its-officers without its express command; for a corporation cannot, of course, be impliedly hable to a greater extent than it could make itself by express corporate vote or action.” [2 Dillon on Munic. Corp. (3d ed.) § 968.] ’ This was a suit brought by appellee to recover damages of the city for taking certain of his land within the corporate limits, for the purpose of constructing a sewer or ditch thereon, and for injuring other portions of his land by the construction of said sewer or ditch. *Held,*that the petition was insufficient, and that appellant’s exceptions to it should have been sustained, because it did not allege that it was within the scope of the corporate powers of the city to take said land, and cause said sewer or ditch to be dug.

§ 280. *Limitation; actions for injury done to property.*Actions for injury done to the estate or property of another must be commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action shall have accrued, and not afterward. [K. S. art. 3003.] In this case the cause of action was the taking of the plaintiff’s land, and the construction thereon of the sewer or ditch. This was a permanent injury, and the running of the statute of limitations would commence from the time when the act *212which resulted in the injury was committed, and not from the time when the injury was actually sustained. The cause of action aecrued and was complete when the land was taken and the sewer or ditch dug. If two years had elapsed from that time before the bringing of this suit, the cause of action is barred. [Wood on Lim. § 177 et seq.J

June 27, 1884.

Reversed and remanded.
EXHIBIT 31.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO

SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, John P. McAlister, certify that:

1.	I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Tripos, Inc.;

2.	Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.	Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.	The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

	a)	designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

	b)	evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

	c)	disclosed in this quarterly report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5.	The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

	a)	all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

	b)	any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.

Date:  November 9, 2004

 

     /s/ John P. McAlister

     John P. McAlister 

     Chief Executive Officer
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

JUSTIN MICHAEL HICKOX,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 525 MAL 2017

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 23rd day of January, 2018

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED

.
```

[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 91 (Tuesday, June 6, 1995)]
[House]
[Page H5611]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

            WELCOME TO THE REVEREND DWIGHT ``IKE'' REIGHARD

  (Mr. GINGRICH asked and was given permission to address the House for 
1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. GINGRICH. Mr. Speaker, I simply want to take a minute to 
recognize my pastor, Ike Reighard, who I think has combined the eternal 
teachings and wisdom of the Bible with the realities of modern life in 
such a way that I find, at least, and my wife Marian would agree, that 
he is one of the most inspirational and at the same time most practical 
preachers. It is a great honor to us to have him here.
  New Hope Baptist Church is a tremendous institution with a very 
strong commitment to outreach and to evangelism. On my behalf, I 
appreciate very much the House allowing him to lead us in prayer today.

                          ____________________
```
#### Mo. Pac. R’y Co. v. J. H. Hewett.

(No. 3235.)

Appeal from'Dallas County.

Opinion by

Willson, J.

§ 273. *Damages; measure of, in action against carrier for goods lost; interest; rental value of goods lost.*Hewett brought this suit against the railroad company to recover , $58, the alleged value of certain household goods lost by said company, while in transit on its line of railroad,, and for $50 rental value of a sewing machine, which was among said lost goods. He recovered judgment for $78 *206and costs. The case was tried by the judge without a jury, and he allowed Hewett the full value of the goods lost, $58 and $20 as the rental value of the sewing machine. *Held.*This suit was not to recover damages for delay in "transporting arjd delivering the goods, but was to recover damages for failing entirely to deliver the goods. If it had been to recover damages for *delay,*Hewitt would have been entitled, under the evidence, to recover the rental value of his sewing machine during such delay. But in this suit such rental value cannot be estimated as damages. The measure of his damage, in this suit, is the fair market value, at the point of destination, of the goods lost, with legal interest thereon from the date when the goods should have been delivered. [W. & W. Con. Rep. §§ 67, 206, 207, 1254; Fowler v. Davenport, 21 Tex. 627.] Ordinarily, in suits to recovér damages for breach of contract, interest is not recoverable as a part of the damages', but, under the circumstances of this case, the goods being for the personal use of the plaintiff, and not for sale in the market, and the recovery therefor having been delayed at the instanco of the defendant, under promise made to search for and deliver the goods, interest on the value of the same should be estimated as part of the damages.

June 21, 1884.

Reversed and remanded.
#### Alain HERNANDEZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D12-1520.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Oct. 3, 2012.

*1243Ricardo Corona, Coral Gables and Sahar Razzaghi-Awai, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Keri T. Joseph, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before WELLS, C.J., and SHEPHERD and SALTER, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. *See Hernandez v. State,*61 So.3d 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011), *review granted,*81 So.3d 414 (Fla.2012).
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-6023

JUANITA POPE REID, Petitioner - Appellant, versus RONALD J. ANGELONE, Director, Respondent - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, District Judge. (CA-02-300) Submitted: May 4, 2005 Decided: June 14, 2005 Before MICHAEL, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Juanita Pope Reid, Appellant P ro Se. Stephen R. McCullough, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Juanita Pope Reid, a state prisoner, seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on her motion filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), in which she raised a defect in the proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000); Reid v. Angelone , 369 F.3d 363, 367-70 (4th Cir. 2004). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of her constitutional claims is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. SeeMiller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Reid has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. DISMISSED
#### STATE of Louisiana v. James A. BISHOP.

No. 2011-K-1530.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 16, 2011.

In re Bishop, James A.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 439243; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KA 1840.

Denied.
#### Phelan & Co. v. Wiley & Botson.

(No. 3326.)

Appeal from Dallas County.

Opinion by

White, P. J.

§ 735. *Limitation; proceeding to supply destroyed judgment, barred when; casé stated.*On May 24, 1879, Wiley & Botson obtained a judgment against Phelan & Co. On February 4, 1880, said judgment and the record in the cause were destroyed by fire. On February 15, 1884, they commenced this proceeding under the statute [E. S. arts. 4236, 4287, 4288, 4289], to supply, restore and reinstate said judgment and record. Phelan & Co., by special exception, set up the statute of limitation of four years, which exception was overruled, and judgment; rendered supplying, restoring, etc., the destroyed judgment, etc. *Held:*The statute providing for the supplying of lost records is not intended to in any manner affect any other remedy, but to afford an additional remedy to any provided by other laws. [R. S. art. 4287; Craddock v. Scarborough, 54 Tex. 846.] No time is specified in the statute itself within which the right to the particular remedy afforded by it may be enforced as to judgments destroyed. The only limitation mentioned in it is that which provides that original papers which have been preserved where the records have been destroyed, • may, within four years after the records have been destroyed, be again recorded, so as to preserve the force and effect of the original registration. [E. S. art. 4292.] There is, however, a general statute of limitation as follows: “Every action, other than for the recovery of real *646estate, for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed, shall be brought within four years *next*after the right to bring the same shall have accrued,' and not afterward.” [E. S. art. 3207.] With regard to limitation courts of equity will generally “ adopt the statute in analogy to the nature of the claim sought to be enforced, and where ' there is no analogous statute, as where the matter is purely equitable, the court will refuse relief, if the plaintiff has been guilty of laches in asserting his rights; and a demand will often be regarded as stale even though the time which has elapsed is less than the statutory period.” [Wood on Lim. p. 117; Sheppard v. Cumming, 44 Tex. 502.] In Wyatt v. Luton, 10 Heisk. (Tenn.) 45S, it was held that limitation applied in a proceeding to restore a judgment in a suit. We are clearly of opinion that the general statute of limitation above quoted applies to this proceeding, and that appellees’ cause of action is barred, and appellants’ special exception should have been sustained.

May 27, 1885.

Eeversed and dismissed.
Exhibit 31.1

                                  CERTIFICATION

I, Edward J. Graham, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this Form 10-K/A of South Jersey Gas Company;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15 and 15d-15(e)):

      a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

     b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

     c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control
over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent
fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual
report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):

      a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

      b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.




Date: July 28, 2004                         /s/ Edward J. Graham
                                           ------------------------------------
                                            Edward J. Graham
                                            President & Chief Executive Officer
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 95-40028

Conference Calendar

__________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

C. W. FIELDS, also known as

William T. Neilley,

 Defendant-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:94-CV-260

- - - - - - - - - -

February 29, 1996

Before GARWOOD, JONES, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

C.W. Fields appeals the denial of his motion filed pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He argues that the district court erred

when it sua sponte determined that he was procedurally barred

from arguing that the sentencing court was required to give him

notice of an upward departure. 

Because the court's failure to give notice of intent to

upwardly depart is not an error of constitutional or

jurisdictional magnitude, see United States v. Faubion, 19 F.3d 
No. 95-40028

-2-

226, 233 (5th Cir. 1994), and the issue could have been raised on

direct appeal, it may not be considered on collateral review. 

United States v. Capua, 656 F.2d 1033, 1037 (5th Cir. 1981).

AFFIRMED.
Order entered March 22, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-12-01200-CV

HIGHLAND CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES CDO, L.P., Appellant

V.

UBS AG, Appellee

On Appeal from the 192nd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 10-16004

ORDER

We GRANT appellant’s March 18, 2013 unopposed motion for an extension of time to 

file a reply brief. Appellant shall file its reply brief on or before May 2, 2013.

/s/ CAROLYN WRIGHT

CHIEF JUSTICE
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.1 TOTAL ENTERTAINMENT RESTAURANT CORP.
REPORT ON FORM 10-K DECEMBER 28, 2004 CERTIFICATION BY STEVEN M. JOHNSON PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 The undersigned, Chief Executive Officer of Total Entertainment Restaurant Corp. (the
Company), hereby certifies, to the best of my knowledge, that the Form 10-K of the Company for
the year ended December 28, 2004 (the Annual Report) accompanying this certification fully
complies with the requirements of the Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)) and that the information contained in the Annual Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. The
foregoing certification is incorporated solely for purposes of complying with the provisions of
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and is not intended to be used for any other purpose. Date
    

March 25, 2005
    
    
    
    /s/ Steven M. JohnsonSteven M. Johnson
Chief Executive Officer
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