[Cite as State v. Chambers, 2011-Ohio-1305.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

HANCOCK COUNTY 

 

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 5-10-29 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, 

 v. 

ISHMIAL K. CHAMBERS, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from Hancock County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. 2009-CR-0217 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: March 21, 2011 

 

APPEARANCES: 

Scott B. Johnson for Appellant 

Alex K. Treece for Appellee 
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PRESTON, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Ishmial K. Chambers (hereinafter “Chambers”), 

appeals the Hancock County Court of Common Pleas’ decision overruling his 

motion to suppress evidence seized as the result of a traffic stop. We affirm. 

{¶2} On October 19, 2009, Trooper Kurt Beidelschies of the Ohio State 

Highway Patrol stopped Chambers on southbound U.S. Interstate 75 (“I-75”) 

following a probable violation of R.C. 4511.33. (June 2, 2010 Tr. at 8-12). A 

canine from the Hancock County Sheriff’s Office alerted on Chambers’ vehicle, 

and a subsequent search of the vehicle’s trunk revealed several bags of marijuana 

and a baseball-sized bag of cocaine. (Id. at 17-18). 

{¶3} On October 20, 2009, the Hancock County Grand Jury indicted 

Chambers on one count of possession of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A). 

(Doc. No. 1). On October 28, 2009, Chambers pled not guilty and was released on 

bond. (Doc. No. 5). A pretrial was scheduled for November 6, 2009. (Id.). 

{¶4} On November 6, 2009, the case was continued to allow Chambers 

time to file a motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of the traffic stop. 

(Doc. No. 10). On December 1, 2009, Chambers filed his motion to suppress 

alleging that: (1) there was no probable cause, nor clear articulable facts to stop his 

vehicle; (2) there was no probable cause, nor clear articulable facts to justify his 

continued detention beyond the time necessary to issue a minor traffic citation; (3) 
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there was no factual basis to justify his continued detention while a canine unit 

was summoned; and (4) there was no probable cause for the search of his vehicle. 

(Doc. No. 12). 

{¶5} On June 2, 2010, the trial court held a hearing on the motion and, 

afterwards, took the matter under advisement. (Doc. No. 49). On July 16, 2010, 

the trial court held a hearing to announce its decision on the motion. (Doc. No. 

61). The trial court overruled Chambers’ motion to suppress at the hearing, and 

filed its decision noting the same on July 23, 2010. (Id.). 

{¶6} On September 13, 2010, Chambers withdrew his previously tendered 

plea of not guilty and entered a plea of no contest to the indictment. (Doc. No. 70). 

Thereafter, the trial court found Chambers guilty and sentenced him to five (5) 

years of incarceration. (Doc. No. 72). 

{¶7} On October 1, 2010, Chambers filed a notice of appeal. (Doc. No. 95). 

Chambers now appeals raising one assignment of error for our review. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 

SEIZED PURSUANT TO A DE MINIMUS TRAFFIC STOP 

WHERE THERE WAS NO PRIOR OR CONCURRENT 

EVIDENCE OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY. 

{¶8} In his first assignment of error, Chambers argues that the fact he 

slowed his vehicle to fifty-seven miles per hour (57 M.P.H.) in a sixty-five mile-
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per-hour (65 M.P.H.) zone and that he was a person of color did not provide 

Trooper Beidelschies with probable cause to stop his vehicle. Additionally, 

Chambers argues that Trooper Beidelschies did not have further indicia of 

criminal activity to justify his further expansion of the traffic stop, i.e. to request 

canine assistance. 

{¶9} A review of the denial of a motion to suppress involves mixed 

questions of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 

797 N.E.2d 71, ¶8. At a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of 

trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the 

credibility of witnesses. Id., citing State v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366, 

582 N.E.2d 972. 

{¶10} When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, deference is given 

to the trial court’s findings of fact so long as they are supported by competent, 

credible evidence. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, at ¶8. With respect to the trial 

court’s conclusions of law, however, our standard of review is de novo, and we 

must decide whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. State v. 

McNamara (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 710, 707 N.E.2d 539. 

{¶11} Trooper Kurt Beidelschies of the Ohio State Highway Patrol, Findlay 

Post 32, testified that he was parked in a marked cruiser facing southbound I-75 

traffic while working from 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. on October 19, 2009. (June 2, 
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2009 Tr. at 8-10). Trooper Beidelschies testified that he observed Chambers 

rapidly slow down to fifty-seven miles per hour (57 M.P.H.) while passing his 

parked cruiser traveling southbound on I-75, even though no other traffic was 

around Chambers’ vehicle at the time. (Id. at 10). Trooper Beidelschies testified 

that he pulled out behind Chambers’ vehicle and observed Chambers driving 

extremely close (within a tire’s width) to the solid white edge line. (Id.). Trooper 

Beidelschies further testified that Chambers drifted over the white edge line twice 

by a tire’s width each time, so he initiated a traffic stop for a marked lanes 

violation. (Id. at 10-11). 

{¶12} Trooper Beidelschies approached Chambers’ vehicle, informed him 

of the reason for the stop, and requested Chambers’ driver’s license, registration, 

and proof of insurance. (Id.). Chambers provided Trooper Beidelschies his 

license, but produced several rental agreements for the car instead of the 

registration. (Id. at 12). Some of the rental agreements had Chambers’ name on 

them and others did not, so Trooper Beidelschies requested that Chambers have a 

seat in the front of his cruiser to sort through the paperwork. (Id. at 12-13). 

Among the several agreements Chambers provided, Trooper Beidelschies located 

a rental agreement from Hertz rental service in Patricia Board’s name that listed 

Chambers as an additional driver. (Id. at 13). Trooper Beidelschies contacted 

dispatch in order to verify the rental agreement. (Id.). Trooper Beidelschies 
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testified that Chambers informed him that he had left Owensboro, Kentucky that 

day to drive to Detroit, Michigan to drop off his nephew at his grandmother’s 

house, and that he was returning to Owensboro, Kentucky. (Id. at 14). Chambers 

also told Trooper Beidelschies that he rented the car to drive from Kentucky to 

Michigan to drop off his nephew because his car was broken down and had been 

overheating. (Id.). Trooper Beidelschies testified that he found this “confusing” 

given that the rental agreement covered several days (Oct. 16-20), and Chambers 

had expressed to him how extremely expensive it was to rent vehicles. (Id.). 

Trooper Beidelschies also testified that he was “confused” why the car was rented 

by individuals associated with Chambers long before October 16, 2009. (Id. at 15). 

{¶13} Trooper Beidelschies testified that he ran a LEADS check on 

Chambers’ driver’s license, and that it can take longer to process an out-of-state 

license, such as Chambers’ Kentucky driver’s license. (Id.). Trooper Beidelschies 

further testified that he talked with Travar Board, Chambers’ step-son and a 

passenger in the vehicle, about their travel. (Id. at 12, 14, 16). Board told Trooper 

Beidelschies that he had been in Michigan for about a week for a funeral, and that 

his aunt had driven him from Kentucky to Michigan. (Id. at 16). Board told 

Trooper Beidelschies that he did not know how Chambers arrived in Michigan. 

(Id.). Trooper Beidelschies testified that Board’s story conflicted with Chambers’ 

story, because Chambers indicated that Board accompanied him from Kentucky to 
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Michigan to drop off his nephew. (Id.). Trooper Beidelschies also testified that 

Chambers appeared nervous when he was talking with him in the cruiser, and that 

Board was even more nervous than Chambers. (Id.). When Board reached his 

hand out to retrieve his driver’s license, his hand was visibly shaking and his voice 

was shaky, according to Trooper Beidelschies. (Id.). After discovering the two 

conflicting stories and witnessing this nervous behavior, Trooper Beidelschies 

contacted the Hancock County Sheriff’s Office and requested canine assistance. 

(Id. at 17). 

{¶14} Deputy Smith and canine, Becky, arrived approximately five (5) 

minutes later and alerted on Chambers’ vehicle. (Id. at 17-18). At that point in 

time, Trooper Beidelschies explained to Chambers and Board that they were under 

investigative detention and placed them in the back seat of his cruiser. (Id. at 18). 

Trooper Beidelschies testified that they located numerous bags of marijuana and a 

baseball-sized bag of cocaine in a bag of dirty clothes in the vehicle’s trunk. (Id.). 

At that time, Trooper Beidelschies returned to his cruiser and informed Chambers 

and Board of their Miranda rights, and asked the two of them about the drugs. 

(Id.). At first, both men denied knowledge of the drugs, but Chambers later 

admitted that the drugs belonged to him, and he did not want his step-son, Board, 

to get into trouble for what he had inside the vehicle. (Id.). Trooper Beidelschies 
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testified that it took approximately fifteen (15) minutes from the time he stopped 

Chambers’ vehicle until the canine alerted. (Id. at 19). 

{¶15} On cross-examination, Trooper Beidelschies testified that his cruiser 

was facing west so he could see southbound traffic, and he had his spotlight 

illuminating the roadway. (Id. at 19-20). Trooper Beidelschies testified that the 

purpose of using the spotlight was to determine the number of occupants in the 

vehicle for officer safety. (Id. at 20). He further testified that the use of the 

spotlight was a standard operating procedure. (Id. at 25). Trooper Beidelschies 

could not recall how many leasing companies were on the agreements that 

Chambers provided, nor could he recall the number of lease agreements that 

Chambers provided. (Id. at 20-21). Trooper Beidelschies also could not recall 

whether Chambers’ driving status came back valid prior or subsequent to his call 

for canine assistance. (Id. at 21). He did not copy all of the lease agreements but 

only the valid lease agreement, which he identified and which was marked as 

defendant’s exhibit A. (Id. at 22, 25, 40). Trooper Beidelschies testified that 

Chambers’ speed was not the reason for the stop, but that Chambers’ rapid 

deceleration was an indication of possible impairment, which is why he decided to 

follow Chambers. (Id. at 26, 27). Trooper Beidelschies testified that he did not 

witness Chambers’ vehicle weaving from side to side, fishtailing, or driving 

erratically, nor did he smell an odor of alcoholic beverage upon Chambers or 
Case No. 5-10-29 

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witness any signs of impairment during the stop. (Id. at 27). Trooper Beidelschies 

testified that he followed Chambers for approximately two (2) miles and witnessed 

Chambers drift over the white edge line by a tire’s width twice. (Id. at 28). He 

further testified that he did not observe any drugs or drug paraphernalia in plain 

sight in the vehicle when he shined his light into Chambers’ vehicle. (Id. at 29-30). 

Trooper Beidelschies testified that the video recording system for his cruiser was 

not working that evening. (Id. at 32). When asked whether dispatch informed him 

that the rental agreement from Hertz was valid prior to him calling for canine 

assistance, Trooper Beidelschies testified, “[p]erhaps, but I doubt it, because 

typically * * * there is a delay between the time our dispatch calls Hertz and Hertz 

is able to pull up the information.” (Id. at 35). 

{¶16} On re-direct examination, Trooper Beidelschies testified that he 

initiates between ten to fifteen (10-15) traffic stops each work night, each 

averaging between fifteen to twenty (15-20) minutes in duration. (Id. at 38). 

Trooper Beidelschies testified that, generally, numerous rental agreements, 

multiple occupants, nervous behavior by occupants of a vehicle, and conflicting 

stories all can prolong the duration of a traffic stop. (Id. at 38-39). 

{¶17} Hancock County Sheriff’s Deputy Fred Smith testified that he was 

working on October 19, 2009 with his canine, Becky, who is trained and certified 

for detection of marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin, and their 
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derivatives. (Id. at 41-43). Deputy Smith testified that canine assistance was 

requested for southbound I-75 at mile marker 155. (Id. at 43-44). Deputy Smith 

testified that he arrived at the scene six (6) minutes after receiving the dispatch. 

(Id. at 44). He testified that his canine, Becky, indicated on the passenger side rear 

door of Chambers’ vehicle before Becky even made it around the entire vehicle. 

(Id. at 44-45). Deputy Smith further testified that Trooper Beidelschies discovered 

marijuana and cocaine in the trunk of Chambers’ vehicle during the search. (Id. at 

45). On cross-examination, Deputy Smith testified that he has been a dog handler 

since 2001, and he was certified with Becky in 2005. (Id. at 46). Deputy Smith 

testified that there have been “very few” times when Becky has falsely indicated, 

only when a distraction odor with his scent or somebody’s scent that Becky would 

be familiar with was used. (Id. at 47-48). On re-direct, Deputy Smith testified that 

he received the call for canine assistance at 2:02 a.m. and arrived on scene at 2:08 

a.m. (Id. at 49). 

{¶18} We now turn to Chambers’ arguments. Chambers first argues that 

the fact he slowed his vehicle to fifty-seven miles per hour (57 M.P.H.) in a sixtyfive mile-per-hour (65 M.P.H.) zone did not provide Trooper Beidelschies with 

probable cause to stop his vehicle. 

{¶19} In order to constitutionally stop a vehicle, an officer must, at a 

minimum, have either: (1) a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and 
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articulable facts, that criminal behavior has occurred, is occurring, or is imminent; 

or (2) a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that the 

vehicle should be stopped in the interests of public safety. State v. Moore, 3d Dist. 

No. 9-07-60, 2008-Ohio-2407, ¶10, citing State v. Andrews, 3d Dist. No. 2-07-30, 

2008-Ohio-625, ¶8, citing State v. Chatton (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 59, 61, 463 

N.E.2d 1237, certiorari denied by 469 U.S. 856, 105 S.Ct. 182, 83 L.Ed.2d 116; 

State v. Purtee, 3d Dist. No. 8-04-10, 2006-Ohio-6337, ¶9, citing State v. Norman

(1999), 136 Ohio App.3d 46, 53-54, 735 N.E.2d 453. 

{¶20} An officer’s “reasonable suspicion” is determined based on the 

totality of the circumstances. Moore, 2008-Ohio-2407, at ¶11, citing Andrews, 

2008-Ohio-625, at ¶8, citing State v. Terry (1998), 130 Ohio App.3d 253, 257, 719 

N.E.2d 1046, citing State v. Andrews (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87, 565 N.E.2d 

1271. ‘“Specific and articulable facts’ that will justify an investigatory stop by 

way of reasonable suspicion include: (1) location; (2) the officer’s experience, 

training or knowledge; (3) the suspect’s conduct or appearance; and (4) the 

surrounding circumstances.” Purtee, 2006-Ohio-6337, at ¶9, citing State v. 

Gaylord, 9th Dist. No. 22406, 2005-Ohio-2138, ¶9, citing State v. Bobo (1988), 37 

Ohio St.3d 177, 178-79, 524 N.E.2d 489. 

{¶21} Trooper Beidelschies testified that he began to follow Chambers after 

he noticed Chambers decelerate very rapidly as Chambers approached his parked 
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cruiser, because he was concerned that Chambers was driving impaired. (June 2, 

2010 Tr. at 26-27). Trooper Beidelschies further testified that he did not stop 

Chambers because of his speed, but because Chambers crossed over the white 

edge line twice. (Id. at 10-11). “[A] traffic stop is constitutionally valid when a 

law-enforcement officer witnesses a motorist drift over the [right white edge line] 

in violation of R.C. 4511.33, even without further evidence of erratic or unsafe 

driving.” State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, 

¶25. See, also, State v. Burwell, 3d Dist. No. 12-09-06, 2010-Ohio-1087, ¶11; 

State v. Anthony, 3d Dist. No. 13-09-26, 2009-Ohio-6717, ¶¶12-14. After 

witnessing Chambers cross over the white edge line, Trooper Beidelschies had 

probable cause, and thus a reasonable articulable suspicion, that Chambers 

violated R.C. 4511.33; and therefore, the stop was constitutionally valid. Mays at 

¶¶21, 24; Burwell at ¶11; Anthony at ¶13 

{¶22} Chambers also argues that the fact that he was a person of color did 

not provide Trooper Beidelschies with probable cause to initiate the traffic stop. 

Although we generally agree with Chambers’ proposition of law, the trial court, as 

trier of fact, specifically found that the record lacked sufficient evidence that 

Chambers’ race played a role in initiating the traffic stop. (July 16, 2010 Tr. at 18-

19). Additionally, even if this Court were to assume that Trooper Beidelschies 

initiated the traffic stop based upon Chambers’ race, that fact does not affect the 
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reasonableness of the stop for Fourth Amendment purposes. As the Ohio Supreme 

Court has noted, “[w]here a police officer stops a vehicle based on probable cause 

that a traffic violation has occurred or was occurring, the stop is not unreasonable 

under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution even if the officer 

had some ulterior motive for making the stop[.]” Dayton v. Erickson (1996), 76 

Ohio St.3d 3, 665 N.E.2d 1091, syllabus. See, also, Whren v. U.S. (1996), 517 

U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (“We of course agree with 

petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based 

on considerations such as race. But the constitutional basis for objecting to 

intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not 

the Fourth Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probablecause Fourth Amendment analysis.”); U.S. v. Bullock (C.A. 4, 1996), 94 F.3d 896, 

899 (law enforcement’s alleged racial motivation for traffic stop is irrelevant to the 

legitimacy of the stop under Fourth Amendment); U.S. v. Navarro-Camacho (C.A. 

6, 1999), 186 F.3d 701, 705 (same); U.S. v. Robinson (C.A. 7, 2003), 314 F.3d 

905, 907 (same); U.S. v. Gomez Serena (C.A. 8, 2004), 368 F.3d 1037, 1041 

(same); U.S. v. Adkins (C.A. 10, 2001), 1 Fed. Appx. 850 (same); State v. Harden, 

2nd Dist. No. 19880, 2004-Ohio-664, ¶11 (same). Since Trooper Beidelschies had 

probable cause to conclude that Chambers violated R.C. 4511.33, the traffic stop 

was reasonable, and Trooper Beidelschies’ ulterior motives, if any, are irrelevant. 
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Furthermore, even if Chambers’ race motivated Trooper Beidelschies to initiate 

the traffic stop, suppression of the evidence seized during the traffic stop is not an 

available remedy. U.S. v. Nichols (C.A. 6, 2008), 512 F.3d 789, 794, overruled on 

other grounds by U.S. v. Buford (C.A. 6, 2011), ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 447048. 

See, also, U.S. v. Chavez (C.A. 5, 2002), 281 F.3d 479, 486-87 (suppression of 

evidence is not an available remedy for violations of Fifth or Fourteenth 

Amendments). For these reasons, we must reject Chambers’ argument that the 

trial court erred by overruling his motion to suppress based upon alleged racial 

profiling. 

{¶23} Finally, Chambers argues that Trooper Beidelschies did not have 

further indicia of criminal activity to justify his further expansion of the traffic 

stop, i.e. to request canine assistance. 

{¶24} “‘[W]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may 

delay a motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or a warning.’” State 

v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204, 865 N.E.2d 1282, ¶12, quoting 

State v. Keathley (1988), 55 Ohio App.3d 130, 131, 562 N.E.2d 932. See, also, 

State v. Whitman, 184 Ohio App.3d 733, 2009-Ohio-5647, 922 N.E.2d 293, ¶11. 

“This measure includes the period of time sufficient to run a computer check on 

the driver’s license, registration, and vehicle plates.” Batchili at ¶12, citing State v. 

Bolden, 12th Dist. No. CA2003-03-007, 2004-Ohio-184, ¶17, citing Delaware v. 
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Prouse (1979), 440 U.S. 648, 659, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660. Further, “‘[i]n 

determining if an officer completed these tasks within a reasonable length of time, 

the court must evaluate the duration of the stop in light of the totality of the 

circumstances and consider whether the officer diligently conducted the 

investigation.’” Batchili at ¶12, quoting State v. Carlson (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 

585, 598-99, 657 N.E.2d 591, citing State v. Cook (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 521-

22, 605 N.E.2d 70, and U.S. v. Sharpe (1985), 470 U.S. 675, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 

L.Ed.2d 605. 

{¶25} “The use of a drug-detection dog does not constitute a “search,” and 

an officer is not required, prior to a dog sniff, to establish either probable cause or 

a reasonable suspicion that drugs are concealed in a vehicle.” Whitman, 2009-

Ohio-5647, at ¶9, citing Illinois v. Caballes (2005), 543 U.S. 405, 409, 125 S.Ct. 

834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842; United States v. Place (1983), 462 U.S. 696, 707, 103 S.Ct. 

2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110; Carlson, 102 Ohio App.3d at 594; United States v. Seals

(C.A.5, 1993), 987 F.2d 1102, 1106. A law enforcement officer needs no 

suspicion or cause to “run the dog around” a stopped vehicle if he does it 

contemporaneously with the legitimate activities associated with the traffic 

violation. Whitman, 2009-Ohio-5647, at ¶9, citing Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409. 

{¶26} The record herein demonstrates that Chambers’ vehicle was lawfully 

detained based upon probable cause of a violation of R.C. 4511.33. The record 
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herein further demonstrates that Trooper Beidelschies requested canine assistance 

while he was verifying Chambers’ authorization to drive the rental vehicle from 

the multiple Hertz rental agreements Chambers provided him and checking 

Chambers’ driver’s license. Therefore, Trooper Beidelschies was permitted to run 

the canine around the Chambers’ vehicle without any reasonable suspicion that 

drugs were concealed in the vehicle, contrary to Chambers’ argument. Whitman, 

2009-Ohio-5647, at ¶9, citations omitted. Furthermore, the record reflects that the 

canine arrived on the scene five to six (5-6) minutes after Trooper Beidelschies 

requested canine assistance, and the total duration from the initial traffic stop to 

the canine alerting was fifteen (15) minutes. Although not specifically mentioned 

by the trial court, the five-to-six-minute wait for the canine to arrive was not 

unreasonable. See, e.g., State v. French, 9th Dist. No. 24252, 2009-Ohio-2342, 

¶18 (10 minute wait was reasonable); State v. Ramirez, 9th Dist. No. 04CA0024-

M, 2004-Ohio-6541, ¶¶11-12 (26 minute wait was reasonable); State v. French

(1995), 104 Ohio App.3d 740, 748, 663 N.E.2d 367 (45 minute wait was 

reasonable). The trial court did conclude that a fifteen-minute traffic stop was 

reasonable in light of the multiple rental agreements Chambers presented and the 

time needed to verify whether Chambers had a lawful right to operate the rented 

motor vehicle at the time. (June 16, 2010 Tr. at 12). We agree with the trial court 

that fifteen (15) minutes was not an unreasonable amount of time to detain 
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Chambers for the traffic stop. In fact, Trooper Beidelschies testified that traffic 

stops average between fifteen to twenty (15-20) minutes each. (June 2, 2009 Tr. at 

38). See e.g. State v. Bordieri, 6th Dist. No. L-04-1321, 2005-Ohio-4727, ¶21, 

citing State v. Cook (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 605 N.E.2d 70 (15 minutes 

reasonable). See also, Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 687. (20 minute detention reasonable 

when investigation was diligent and reasonable). For all these reasons, we must 

reject Chambers’ argument that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to 

suppress evidence because of an impermissible lengthy detention. 

{¶27} Chambers’ assignment of error is, therefore, overruled. 

{¶28} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the 

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Judgment Affirmed 

WILLAMOWSKI, J., concurs. 

ROGERS, P.J., concurs in Judgment Only. 

/jnc