alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 21.1

                 Subsidiaries of the Registrant



NSTAR
   BEC Energy
      Boston Edison Company
      Harbor Electric Energy Company
      BEC Funding LLC
   Boston Energy Technology Group, Inc.
      Northwind Boston LLC
      NSTAR Communications, Inc.
         NSTAR Communication Securities Corporation
      Coneco Corporation
   Commonwealth Energy System
      Commonwealth Electric Company
      Cambridge Electric Light Company
      Canal Electric Company
      NSTAR Gas Company
      NSTAR Steam Corporation
      Hopkinton LNG Corp.
      Advanced Energy Systems, Inc.
         MATEP, LLC
         Advanced Energy Systems Management Company, Inc.
         Medical Area Total Energy Plant, Inc.
      COM/Energy Services Company
      COM/Energy Cambridge Realty
      Darvel Realty Trust
      Energy Investment Services, Inc.
  NSTAR Services Corporation
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1364 

KA 10-00551 

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, VALENTINO, AND WHALEN, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SHAMEL X. SMITH, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

FRANK H. HISCOCK LEGAL AID SOCIETY, SYRACUSE (PIOTR BANASIAK OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

WILLIAM J. FITZPATRICK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, SYRACUSE (SUSAN C.

AZZARELLI OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County

(John J. Brunetti, A.J.), rendered June 9, 2009. The judgment

convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal sale of a

controlled substance in the third degree (three counts), criminal

possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (four

counts), criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth

degree and unlawful possession of marihuana. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously modified as a matter of discretion in the interest of

justice by reducing the period of postrelease supervision imposed on

each count to a period of one year and as modified the judgment is

affirmed. 

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him

upon his plea of guilty of, inter alia, three counts of criminal sale

of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.39 [1])

and four counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in

the third degree (§ 220.16 [1]). As part of the plea agreement,

Supreme Court stated that it would sentence defendant to concurrent

five-year terms of imprisonment with a one-year period of postrelease

supervision. We agree with defendant that the court erred in

enhancing the sentence by imposing a 11⁄2-year period of postrelease

supervision that was not included in the plea agreement (see generally

People v Pickett, 90 AD3d 1526, 1527). Although defendant failed to

preserve his contention for our review “because [he] did not object to

the enhanced sentence, nor did he move to withdraw the appeal or to

vacate the judgment of conviction” (People v Sprague, 82 AD3d 1649,

1649, lv denied 17 NY3d 801), we nevertheless exercise our power to

review it as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see

CPL 470.15 [6] [a]). We therefore modify the judgment by reducing the

period of postrelease supervision to one year. As modified, the
-2- 1364 

KA 10-00551 

sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.

Entered: December 21, 2012 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
#### Valerie L. FAVORITE, Appellant, v. LAURA’S CLASSY CANINES, INC., and State of Florida, Unemployment Appeals Commission, Appellees.

No. 4D09-2855.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Feb. 2, 2011.

Valerie L. Favorite, Davie, pro se.

Steven A. Feinman of Law Offices of Steven A. Feinman, Davie, for appellee, Laura’s Classy Canines, Inc.

M. Elaine Howard, Deputy General Counsel, Tallahassee, for appellee, Unemployment Appeals Commission.

*840PER CURIAM.

*Affirmed. See Suarez v. Unemployment Appeals Commission,*871 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).

GROSS, C.J., MAY and LEVINE, JJ., concur.
#### Scott HASEMEIER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D11-0808.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 4, 2011.

Scott Hasemeier, pro se, Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

DENIED. *See*Fla. RApp. P. 9.141(c)(4)(A).

BENTON, C.J., PADOVANO and WETHERELL, JJ., concur.
Order entered March 26, 2015

In The 

## Court of Appeals **Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**
No. 05
- 15
- 00245
- CV
IN THE INTEREST OF J .C., A CHILD On Appeal from the 304th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 13
- 00345W 

### O RDER
T he reporter’s record in this termination of parental rights appeal is overdue. By postcard dated March 13, 2015, we notified Court Reporter Martha Grant that the reporter’s record was overdue in this case. We directed Ms. Grant to file the record within ten days and cautioned her that any request for an extension must be submitted in writing explaining the extraordinary reasons for the delay. To date, Ms. Grant has not responded. Accordingly, we ORDER Martha Grant, Official Court Reporter for the 304th Judicial District Court, to file, within TEN DAYS , either (1) the reporter’s record; or (2) written verification that appellant has not requested the record. Because this is a parental termination case, we remind both the trial court and Ms. Grant that i t is the responsibility of the Court Reporter to prepare, certify, and timely file the reporter’s record and that the trial court must direct Ms. Grant to immediately commence the preparation ofthe reporter’s record. The trial court must arrange a substi tute reporter if necessary. T EX
. R.
A PP
. P. 28.4(b)(1). We notify appellant that if we receive verification that no request for the record has been made, the appeal will be submitted without the reporter’s record. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 37.3(c).
We DIRECT t he Clerk of the Court to send copies of this order, by electronic transmission, to the following persons:

Honorable Andrea Martin Presiding Judge of the 304th Judicial District Court Ms. Martha Grant Official Court Reporter, 304th Judicial District Court All parties

/s/ ELIZABETH LANG

- MIERS JUSTICE
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Kenneth Charles HERNANDEZ.

No. 2011-K-2740.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 13, 2012.

In re Hernandez, Kenneth Charles;— Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 03-09-0730; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KA 0565.

Denied.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Gene A. RUDOLPH.

No. 2011-KK-1724.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 14, 2011.

In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 10-0630; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0895.

Denied.

VICTORY and KNOLL, JJ., would grant.
110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1725 

AN ACT 

To amend the Reclamation Wastewater and Groundwater 

Study and Facilities Act to authorize the Secretary of 

the Interior to participate in the Rancho California 

Water District Southern Riverside County Recycled/NonPotable Distribution Facilities and Demineralization/Desalination Recycled Water Treatment and Reclamation 

Facility Project. 
2 

•HR 1725 EH

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Rancho California 

5 Water District Recycled Water Reclamation Facility Act 

6 of 2007’’. 

7 SEC. 2. PROJECT AUTHORIZATION. 

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Reclamation Wastewater and 

9 Groundwater Study and Facilities Act (Public Law 102– 

10 575, title XVI; 43 U.S.C. 390h et seq.) is amended by 

11 adding after section 16ll the following: 

12 ‘‘SEC. 16ll. RANCHO CALIFORNIA WATER DISTRICT 

13 PROJECT, CALIFORNIA. 

14 ‘‘(a) AUTHORIZATION.—The Secretary, in coopera15 tion with the Rancho California Water District, California, 

16 may participate in the design, planning, and construction 

17 of permanent facilities for water recycling, 

18 demineralization, and desalination, and distribution of 

19 non-potable water supplies in Southern Riverside County, 

20 California. 

21 ‘‘(b) COST SHARING.—The Federal share of the cost 

22 of the project described in subsection (a) shall not exceed 

23 25 percent of the total cost of the project or $20,000,000, 

24 whichever is less. 
3 

•HR 1725 EH

1 ‘‘(c) LIMITATION.—Funds provided by the Secretary 

2 under this section shall not be used for operation or main3 tenance of the project described in subsection (a).’’. 

4 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of items in 

5 section 2 of Public Law 102–575 is amended by inserting 

6 after the item relating to section 16ll the following: 

‘‘Sec. 16ll. Rancho California Water District Project, California.’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives July 10, 2007. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 
110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1725 

AN ACT 

To amend the Reclamation Wastewater and 

cility Project. Recycled Water Treatment and Reclamation Fation Facilities and Demineralization/Desalination Riverside County Recycled/Non-Potable Distributhe Rancho California Water District Southern ize the Secretary of the Interior to participate in Groundwater Study and Facilities Act to author-
#### Paul CHERAMIE v. Richard E. NOREM, II, M.D.

No. 2011-C-2403.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 16, 2011.

In re Cheramie, Paul; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 235,970; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CA 11-184.

Denied.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-1620

In Re: ANDRE D. WHITFIELD,

 Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

(3:07-cr-00300-HEH-1)

Submitted: September 23, 2016 Decided: October 4, 2016

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and KING and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Petition dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Andre D. Whitfield, Petitioner Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Andre Whitfield, a federal prisoner, filed an original 28 

U.S.C. § 2241 (2012) petition, challenging his various 

convictions on the ground that the district court lacked 

jurisdiction over the criminal matter. We ordinarily decline to 

entertain an original § 2241 petition, and this case presents no 

reason to depart from this general rule. Further, we find that 

the interest of justice would not be served by transferring the 

matter to the appropriate district court, see 28 U.S.C. § 1631 

(2012); Fed. R. App. P. 22(a), as Whitfield previously filed a 

§ 2241 petition in the district court raising the same claim 

that he does in this court. We therefore deny leave to proceed 

in forma pauperis and dismiss the petition. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. We deny the 

motion for summary disposition. 

PETITION DISMISSED
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Erik G. TYLER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 00-4626.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 20, 2000.

Decided Jan. 8, 2001.

James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Beth M. Farber, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, MD, for appellant. Lynne A. Battaglia, United States Attorney, Steven M. Dettelbach, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, MD, for appellee.

Before WILKINS, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.

*141PER CURIAM.

Eric G. Tyler appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (West Supp.2000). We affirm.

Tyler contends that the district court erred by excluding photographic evidence presented by defense counsel. “[D]eci-sions regarding the admission and exclusion of evidence are peculiarly within the province of the district court, not to be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” *United States v. Ellis,*121 F.Bd 908, 926 (4th Cir.1997) (citation omitted).

We have reviewed the record and briefs and find that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the photograph. Accordingly, we affirm Tyler’s conviction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
#### STATE ex rel. Leon J. HORNE v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2009-KH-2604.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 17, 2010.

In re Home, Leon J.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 283-104; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KW 1440.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; *State ex rel. Glover v. State,*93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; *State ex rel. Melinie v. State,*93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report of Targeted Genetics
Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2004
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, H. Stewart Parker, President and Chief Executive Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
     15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

     (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
     material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
     Company.

Date: November 4, 2004                                 /s/ H. Stewart Parker
                                                       -----------------------
                                                       H. Stewart Parker
                                                       President and
                                                       Chief Executive Officer
#### T. Ratto & Co. v. St. Paul’s L. & M. Ins. Co.

(No. 1616.)

Appeal from Galveston County.

Opinion by

Will-son, J.

§ 117. *Fraud; notice of; burden of proof; proof of findings of fact by judge.*Appellants alleged fraud in the transfer of certain policies of insurance. There was positive evidence that the transfer was *bona fide,*for a valuable consideration, and without actual notice to 'the purchaser of any fraudulent intent on the part of the seller. Appellants contended, however, that the purchaser had constructive notice of such fraudulent intent, in that he had knowledge, or might have obtained such knowledge by the use of ordinary diligence, of facts sufficient to constitute such notice. The case was tried by the judge without a jury. *Held,*this was a question of fact to be determined by a consideration of all the evidence. There was evidence both ways bearing upon the-issue. It devolved upon appellants to establish the affirmative of the issue by a preponderance of evidence to the satisfaction of the judge, and the judge, like a jury would have been, was to determine as to the credibility of the witnesses, and his finding upon the facts has the same conclusive foi’ce as the verdict of a jury, and when it is not without evidence to support it, nor contrary to-the evidence, it will not be set aside on appeal. [W. & W. Oon. Eep. § 1219.] Fraud must be proved, and cannot be presumed. While it may be proved by circumstances,, still those circumstances must be strong enough to produce a reasonable conviction of its existence, and a bare-suspicion of its existence will not be sufficient.

§ 118. *New trial; neivly discovered evidence.*It is well settled that a new trial will not be granted on the ground1 of newly discovered evidence, whex-e the object of such evidence is merely to impeach the credit of a witness who testified upon the trial, nor where the evidence is merely *111cumulative, nor where its production would not be likely to change the result on another trial. [R. R. Co. v. Forsyth, 49 Tex. 171; Scranton v. Tilley, 16 Tex. 182; W. & W. Con. Rep. §§ 598, 711, 1078, 1113.]

March 5, 1884.

Affirmed.
##### 



Exhibit 99.1


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report on
Form 10-Q of Western Ohio Financial Corporation (the
Company) for the quarterly period ending
March 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, John
W. Raisbeck, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| |     |                                                                                                                                                            
| | --- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | (1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements
    of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
    1934; and                              
|
| | (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly
    presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
    result of operations of the Company.

By: /s/ John W. Raisbeck

Name: John W. Raisbeck


Chief Executive Officer


May 15, 2003


A signed original of this written statement required
by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained
by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.






23.
#### EBANO-SOBERON, INC., Petitioner, v. The CURY GROUP, INC., 470 South Ocean, L.L.C., and Berkley Regional Insurance Company, Respondents.

No. 4D09-5127.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

May 26, 2010.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 24, 2010.

*6Brian S. Dervishi and Marc I. Goldsand of Weissman, Dervishi, Borgo & Nordlund, P.A., Miami, for petitioner.

Ryan V. Kadyszewski and John A. Hoc-kin of Linkhorst & Hockin, P.A., Jupiter, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

Ebano-Soberon, Inc. (ES) seeks certio-rari review of a trial court order that granted a motion for partial summary judgment, effectively vacating a lien for failure to furnish a final payment affidavit, as required by section 713.06(3)(d), Fla. Stat. We find the order to be reviewable by certiorari. *See, e.g., A & M Painting v. Jennings,*598 So.2d 335 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).

Our review of this matter reveals that there remain material issues of fact as to whether ES was a laborer, material supplier, contractor or subcontractor, such that whether ES is obligated to furnish a final payment affidavit is not certain at this stage of the case. Included among the issues is whether ES was a subcontractor and, thus, not required to furnish a final payment affidavit. *See Art Berman Concrete, Inc. v. Sey Constr. Corp.,*247 So.2d 791 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971). For these reasons, the partial summary judgment should not have been entered. *See Architectural Complements, Inc. v. R.G. Brown Props., Inc.,*686 So.2d 678 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).

We grant the petition, quash the trial court’s order granting partial summary judgment, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

TAYLOR, DAMOORGIAN and GERBER, JJ., concur.
#### Richard BLANE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D08-4179.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Feb. 7, 2011.

Glenn M. Swiatek, Criminal Defense Attorney, Shalimar, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General and Trisha Meggs Pate, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant seeks review of his convictions and sentences for trafficking in methamphetamine, possession of cannabis, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Appellant raises four issues on appeal, including a claim that the trial court erred in failing to renew the offer of conflict free counsel at sentencing and resentencing as required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(5). The state properly concedes that the court erred, warranting reversal of Appellant’s sentence. *Parker v. State,*539 So.2d 1168 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); *Kepner v. State,*911 So.2d 1256 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). Therefore, Appellant’s sentences are VACATED and the cause is remanded for resentencing. We affirm the remaining claims without further comment.

WOLF, HAWKES and WETHERELL, JJ., concur.
#### Jimmy ANDRIAL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D10-2273.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Sept. 17, 2010.

*207Jimmy Andrial, Avon Park, pro se.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Megan Saillant, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appel-lee.

ORFINGER, J.

Jimmy Andrial appeals the denial of his motion for additional jail credit filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). The trial court correctly concluded that Andrial was entitled to credit from August 5, 2009, the time of his arrest, until February 8, 2010, the date that he was sentenced. However, due to a miscalculation, the trial court awarded Andrial only 173 days as credit for that time instead of the 188 days that he was due, as that is the correct number of days between those dates. Accordingly, we reverse the order denying Andrial’s motion and remand this matter so that the trial court can enter a corrected judgment, awarding Andrial 188 days of jail credit against his sentence. Resentencing is not necessary.

To the extent that Andrial asserted other claims in his motion, those matters are more properly considered in a timely-filed motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We offer no comment on the merits of any claim that Andrial might assert in a post-conviction motion.

REVERSED and REMANDED FOR CORRECTION OF SENTENCE.

EVANDER and JACOBUS, JJ„ concur.
EXHIBIT 13.1





CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18
U.S.C.


SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF
THE


SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Annual Report on Form 20-F of Cresud S.A.C.I.F.
y A (the “Company”) for the fiscal year ended June
30, 2016 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
the date hereof (the “Report”), Alejandro G. Elsztain,
as Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certifies,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:








(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, except as
disclosed in “Item 15. Controls and Procedures
̶  A. Disclosure Controls and Procedures” of
the Report; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.











Cresud S.A.C.I.F y A.October
31, 2016
By:
/s/ Alejandro
G. ElsztainAlejandro
G. ElsztainChief
Executive Officer





This certification accompanies the Report pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except as to the
extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed
by the company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Paul L. TURNER, Jr.

No. 2010-KO-2383.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 25, 2011.

In re Turner Jr., Paul L.; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 474-324; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-KA-0038.

Denied.