alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>
                                                                      EXHIBIT 99

                      NOTICE REGARDING ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP

         Section 11(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, provides that
if any part of a registration statement at the time it becomes effective
contains an untrue statement of a material fact or an omission to state a
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements
therein not misleading, any person acquiring a security pursuant to the
registration statement (unless it is proved that at the time of the acquisition
the person knew of the untruth or omission) may sue, among others, every
accountant who has consented to be named as having prepared or certified any
part of the registration statement or as having prepared or certified any report
or valuation which is used in connection with the registration statement with
respect to the statement in the registration statement, report or valuation
which purports to have been prepared or certified by the accountant.

         Prior to the date of this Form 10-K/A the Arthur Andersen partners who
reviewed the audited financial statements of (i) The Woodlands Operating
Company, L.P. and (ii) The Woodlands Land Development Company, L.P. and
Subsidiary, in each case as of December 31, 2000 and 1999 and for each of the
three years in the period ended December 31, 2000, resigned from Arthur
Andersen. As a result, after reasonable efforts, Crescent Operating has been
unable to obtain Arthur Andersen's written consent to the inclusion of its audit
report with respect to such financial statements in this Annual Report on Form
10-K/A incorporated by reference into (i) Registration Statement on Form S-8
(No. 333-29069) related to the Company's Stock Incentive Plan; and (ii)
Registration Statement on Form S-8 (No. 333-43291) related to the Company's
Management Stock Incentive Plan.

         Under these circumstances, Rule 437a under the Securities Act permits
Crescent Operating, Inc. to file this Annual Report on Form 10-K/A without a
written consent from Arthur Andersen. Accordingly, Arthur Andersen will not be
liable to you under Section 11(a) of the Securities Act because it has not
consented to being named as an expert in the registration statement.
#### Tacho Theodore RAMOFF, Appellant v. John W. HOLLAND, District Director of Immigration and Naturalization.

No. 13219.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Argued May 6, I960.

Decided May 11, 1960.

George Gershenfeld, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.

Richard Reifsnyder, Asst. U. S. Atty., Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee.

Before KALODNER, HASTIE and FORMAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Upon review of the record we find no error. The Order of the District Court will be affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1472 Introduced in House (IH)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1472

To amend title 38, United States Code, to eliminate the deductible and 
 change the method of determining the mileage reimbursement rate under 
    the beneficiary travel program administered by the Secretary of 
               Veterans Affairs, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 12, 2007

Mr. Barrow (for himself, Mr. Baca, Mr. Burton of Indiana, Mr. Boswell, 
    Ms. Bordallo, Mr. Boucher, Mr. Abercrombie, Mr. Boren, and Mr. 
  Courtney) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                     Committee on Veterans' Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend title 38, United States Code, to eliminate the deductible and 
 change the method of determining the mileage reimbursement rate under 
    the beneficiary travel program administered by the Secretary of 
               Veterans Affairs, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Disabled Veterans Fairness Act''.

SEC. 2. VETERANS BENEFICIARY TRAVEL PROGRAM.

    (a) Elimination of Deductible.--Subsection (c) of section 111 of 
title 38, United States Code, is repealed.
    (b) Determination of Mileage Reimbursement Rate.--
            (1) Determination.--Paragraph (1) of subsection (g) of such 
        section is amended to read as follows:
    ``(1) In determining the amount of allowances or reimbursement to 
be paid under this section, the Secretary shall use the mileage 
reimbursement rates for the use of privately owned vehicles by 
Government employees on official business, as prescribed by the 
Administrator of General Services under section 5707(b) of title 5, 
United States Code.''.
            (2) Conforming amendment.--Subsection (g) of such section 
        is further amended by striking paragraphs (3) and (4).
    (c) Source of Funds.--Such section is further amended by adding at 
the end the following new subsection:
    ``(i) Funds for payments made under this section shall be 
appropriated separately from other amounts appropriated for the 
Department.''.
    (d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this Act shall apply 
with respect to travel expenses incurred after the expiration of the 
90-day period that begins on the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>


<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM SPECTRUMEDIX
CORPORATION AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED MARCH 31, 1999 AND
1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1999             MAR-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1998             APR-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999             MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                          20,318               1,680,643
<SECURITIES>                                         0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   55,319                  12,806
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0                       0
<INVENTORY>                                    527,979                 381,393
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               608,198               2,124,268
<PP&E>                                         658,432                 385,124
<DEPRECIATION>                                (194,896)               (105,407)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,545,372               2,788,757
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,580,835               1,143,581
<BONDS>                                              0                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                       0
<PREFERRED>                                          0                       0
<COMMON>                                         4,059                   4,042
<OTHER-SE>                                  (1,142,795)              1,611,917
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,545,372               2,788,757
<SALES>                                        317,672                 341,813
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               317,672                 341,813
<CGS>                                          831,164                 321,086
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  831,164                 321,086
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             2,431,571               2,561,961
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              13,527                 133,372
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0                       0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0                       0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (2,942,532)             (4,301,616)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                 252,396
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                               (2,942,532)             (4,049,220)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.84)                  (1.42)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.84)                  (1.42)



</TABLE>
#### SHIH CHANG HU v. EVERGREEN OF THE SOUTH, d/b/a Taste of China Restaurant and Yi Hua and Fang Hua.

No. 2011-CC-0929.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 6, 2011.

In re Hua, Fang; Hua, Yi; —Defendants); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 562,149; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 0806.

Stay Denied. Writ Denied.
|                                             |   |                             |         | **Exhibit                21** |
|--------------------------------------------------|--------|----------------------------------|--------------|-------------------------------|
|                                             |   |                             |         |                          |
|                                             |   |                             |         |                          |
|                                             |   |                             |         |                          |
| **SOUTH                JERSEY GAS COMPANY**      |
| **SUBSIDIARIES                OF REGISTRANT**    |
| **AS                OF DECEMBER 31, 2006**       |
|                                             |   |                             |         |                          |
|                                             |   |                             |         |                          |
|                                             |   |                             |         |                          |
|                                             |   | Percentage                of     |         |                          |
|                                             |   | Voting                Securities |         | State                of       |
|                                             |   | Owned                by Parent   | Relationship | Incorporation                 |
|                                             |   |                             |         |                          |
| South                Jersey Gas Company          |   | Registrant                       | Parent       | New                Jersey     |
|                                             |   |                             |         |                          |
| SJG                Capital Trust                 |   | 100                              | Subsidiary   | Delaware                      |
| (inactive                as of November 5, 2003) |   |                             |         |                          |
|                                             |   |                             |         |                          |
645 A.2d 135

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN THE INTEREST OF J.L., A JUVENILE.

June 11, 1994.

Petition for certification is granted and the matter is summarily reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in light of *State in the Interest of J.L.A.,*136 N.J. 370, 643 A.2d 538 (1994).
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Timothy SANTINI.

No. 2011-KO-0984.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 4, 2011.

*922In re Santini, Timothy; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 08-1257; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KA-594.

Denied.
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 15** 
**- 7366** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,
Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v.

ARTHUR LARON NILES ,
Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Florence

. C. Weston Houck , Senior District Judge. ( 4:01

- cr
- 00198

- CWH

- 1 )

Submitted : January 26, 2016 Decided: March 16, 2016

Before WYNN , FLOYD, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Arthur Laron Niles , Appellant Pro Se. Alfred William Walker Bethea, Jr., Assistant U nited S tates Attorney , Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:

Arthur Laron N iles appeals the district court’s order
denying his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2012) motion and its order
denying reconsideration. * We have reviewed the record and find
no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons
stated by the district court. United States v. Niles , No. 4:01

-

cr
- 00198

- CWH

- 1 (D.S.C. Dec. 28, 2012; Aug. 18, 2015). We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisi onal process.

AFFIRMED

* We decline to sua sponte dismiss Niles’ appeal of these orders as untimely. Rice v. Rivera , 617 F.3d 802, 810 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Urutyan , 564 F.3d 679, 685 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Mitchell , 518 F.3d 740, 744, 750 (10th Cir. 2008).
**Exhibit 23.2**

 

**CONSENT OFINDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

We consent to the incorporation by reference in theRegistration Statements on Form S-8 (Nos. 333-30591, 333-85380, 333-109478 and333-123060) pertaining to the 1997 Stock Option Plan/Stock Issuance Plan andthe Employee Stock Purchase Plan and in the Registration Statement on Form S-3(No. 333-116940) pertaining to the registration of common stock of our reportdated September 22, 2004, with respect to the consolidated financial statementsand schedule of iVOW, Inc. (f/k/a Vista Medical Technologies, Inc.) included inits Annual Report (Form 10-K/A) for the year ended December 31, 2003, filedwith the Securities and Exchange Commission. 

 
|   |   |   |   | /s/ Ernst & Young  LLP |   |
|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------------------------|--------|

 

Boston,Massachusetts 

March28, 2005

 

----
exv10w4






Exhibit 10.4




FIRST AMENDMENT

TO THE

KAISER ALUMINUM FABRICATED PRODUCTS

RESTORATION PLAN




     Kaiser Aluminum Fabricated Products, LLC, pursuant to Section 9.3 of the Kaiser Aluminum
Fabricated Products Restoration Plan (the “Plan”), hereby adopts the following amendments to the
Plan.



     1. Section 2.1(n) of the Plan is amended in its entirety to read as follows:




	 	(n)	 	Election Form. The document executed by an Eligible Employee pursuant
to which the Eligible Employee elects a form of payment of his vested Account balance
following his or her Separation from Service.





     2. Section 2.1(kk) of the Plan is amended in its entirety to read as follows:




	 	(kk)	 	Separation from Service. Separation from Service means a “separation
from service” within the meaning of Section 409A of the Code.





     3. The second paragraph of Section 3.2(a) of the Plan is amended in its entirety to read as
follows:




Such Election Form shall be completed prior to the date the Employee becomes a Participant;
provided, however, that an Employee may complete his or her Election Form within the first
30 days following the date the Employee first becomes a Participant and such Election Form
shall apply with respect to services to be performed after the election. An Election Form
once made shall be irrevocable, except as otherwise provided in (b) below. In the event
that the Participant fails to make a timely election as to the form of payment of all or a
portion of the Participant’s Account following the Participant’s Separation from Service,
such portion of the Participant’s vested Account balance shall be paid in a single lump sum
distribution in the 90-day period after the date that is six (6) months following the
Participant’s Separation from Service.



     4. The second sentence of Section 7.1 of the Plan (“Death Benefits”) is amended in its
entirety to read as follows:




All payments and distributions pursuant to this Section 7.1 shall be in single lump sums and
shall be paid in the 90-day period following the date of the Participant’s death.



     5. The amendments described above will be effective as of May 1, 2005. Except as specifically
amended hereby, the Plan will continue in full force and effect.



 









 





     Executed this 31st day of December, 2008.



	 	 	 	 	 
	 	KAISER ALUMINUM FABRICATED PRODUCTS, LLC

 	 
	 	By  	/s/ John M. Donnan
 	 
	 	 	Name:  	John M. Donnan 	 
	 	 	Title:  	Senior Vice President and General
Counsel 	 
	 




2
#### Eric M. AYLUARDO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D11-427.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

April 1, 2011.

Eric Ayluardo, Blountstown, pro se.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Allison Leigh Morris, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant challenges the summary denial of his rule 3.800 motion. He claims that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. As the State points out, Appellant’s sentence does not exceed the maximum sentence if it was properly reclassified based upon a jury finding that he used a weapon during the commission of the crime. Based upon the limited record before us, we cannot tell whether the jury made the necessary finding. The trial judge did not attach portions of the record to refute the claim. Accordingly, as the State properly concedes, reversal is necessary with instruction for the trial court to grant the relief or attach the proper records to refute the claim.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

MONACO, C.J., ORFINGER and TORPY, JJ., concur.
No. 87-1519.

#### Board of Operatives of the American Cast Iron Pipe Co. et al. *v.*Board of Management of the American Cast Iron Pipe Co. et al.

Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.
#### Haifa Y. ALKHOURY, former wife, Appellant, v. Basem J. ALKHOURY, former husband, Appellee.

No. 1D10-5498.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 2, 2011.

H. Leon Holbrook, III, for Appellant.

Basem J. Alkhoury, pro se, Appellee.

KAHN, J.

The trial court, without elaboration, granted a motion filed by appellee, the *642former husband, to dissolve a permanent injunction against domestic violence. Appellant, the former wife, seeks review. Because the circumstances that gave rise to the injunction had not changed, we reverse.

Having thoroughly reviewed the extremely graphic testimony presented at the hearing, we have no difficulty concluding that the circumstances that originally justified the injunction had not changed. We also conclude that the former husband made no showing that the injunction did not remain necessary to fulfill the purposes of section 741.80(6)(b), Florida Statutes (2010) (“In determining whether a petitioner has reasonable cause to believe he or she is in imminent danger of becoming a victim of domestic violence, the court shall consider and evaluate all relevant factors alleged.... ”).

Although section 741.30(10), Florida Statutes, provides that either party may move for modification or dissolution of a domestic violence injunction at any time, the statute does not directly speak to the burden of proof upon the movant. As a general rule, permanent injunctions, which remain indefinitely in effect, may be modified by a court of competent jurisdiction “whenever changed circumstances make it equitable to do so.... ” *Hale v. Miracle Enters. Corp.,*517 So.2d 102, 103 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). The requirement to show changed circumstances applies equally to modification or dissolution of a protective injunction. *See Knight v. Waters,*786 So.2d 1289 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); *Simonik v. Patterson,*752 So.2d 692 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). Also, and by analogy, a party seeking an extension of a domestic violence injunction “must present evidence from which a trial court can determine that a continuing fear exists and that such fear is reasonable, based on all the circumstances.” *Sheehan v. Sheehan,*853 So.2d 523, 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).

Here, we find no indication whatsoever that the former husband presented evidence sufficient to successfully carry the burden of changed circumstances. We also find no evidence to demonstrate that the former wife did not reasonably maintain a continuing fear of becoming a victim of domestic violence. In the specific context of a domestic violence injunction, we believe the “changed circumstances” rule can best be carried out by a requirement that a party, against whom a domestic violence injunction has been entered, must, if such party seeks to dissolve the injunction, demonstrate that the scenario underlying the injunction no longer exists so that continuation of the injunction would serve no valid purpose. Because the former husband presented no such evidence, we find that the trial court should not have dissolved the injunction.

REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions that the injunction against domestic violence be reinstated.

DAVIS and HAWKES, JJ., concur.