UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-1291

BROTHERHOOD MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

BERLETTE MCMILLAN; RHONDA TABRON, Individually, and as 

Parent and Natural Guardian of D.T.; SHANK SHREEVES,

Defendants – Appellants,

and

LATISHA CARTER, Individually, and as Parent and Natural 

Guardian of W.C., N.C. and M.C.; RAYANNE CARTER, 

Individually, and as Parent and Natural Guardian of C.W. and 

C.C.; TANIKIA JONES,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District 

Judge. (8:11-cv-01326-AW)

Submitted: July 13, 2012 Decided: August 1, 2012

Before NIEMEYER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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Dennis F. O’Brien, DENNIS F. O’BRIEN, P.A., Bel Air, Maryland; 

Charles G. Monnett, III, CHARLES G. MONNETT III & ASSOCIATES, 

Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellants. Stephen S. 

McCloskey, Eric M. Leppo, SEMMES, BOWEN & SEMMES, Baltimore, 

Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

This appeal stems from an interpleader action filed by 

Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company (“Brotherhood”). After the 

Appellants, among others, were injured in a single-car accident 

involving an automobile insured under a policy issued by 

Brotherhood, Brotherhood filed an interpleader action in the 

district court, depositing $1 million into the court registry 

and asking to be released from the case so that the injured 

parties could litigate among themselves regarding the proper 

apportionment of the insurance payout. The Appellants filed a 

declaratory judgment counterclaim, seeking a declaration that 

the applicable limit under the relevant business auto insurance 

policy (the “Policy”) was $2 million rather than $1 million. 

Brotherhood denied the Appellant’s claim, and the Appellants 

filed a partial motion for summary judgment while Brotherhood 

filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on the Appellants’ 

counterclaim. 

The district court entered an order denying the 

Appellants’ partial motion for summary judgment and granting 

Brotherhood’s cross-motion for summary judgment on the 

Appellants’ counterclaim, construing the Policy as providing for 

only a $1 million aggregate coverage limit per accident,

regardless of whether Brotherhood was required to pay under the 

liability insurance coverage provisions or under the 
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underinsured motorist coverage provisions. The Appellants noted 

an appeal to the district court’s order,* and, having reviewed 

the record, we affirm.

The Appellants’ argument on appeal is the same as that 

urged in the district court; namely, that because the claimants’ 

damages exceeded the Policy’s $1 million liability limit, they 

may recover up to an additional $1 million under the Policy’s 

underinsured motorist coverage provisions. Review of a summary 

judgment determination is de novo, and reasonable inferences are 

drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 

United States v. Bergbauer, 602 F.3d 569, 574 (4th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 131 S. Ct. 297 (2010). The parties agree that the 

Policy is governed by Maryland law, under which insurance 

contracts are not construed against the insurer except where the 

contract’s language is ambiguous. Cheney v. Bell Nat’l Life 

Ins. Co., 556 A.2d 1135, 1138 (Md. 1989).

Although the Appellants contend that the pertinent 

provisions of the Policy are ambiguous and support a reading in 

 * We note that “as a general rule an order granting 

interpleader is interlocutory” and therefore unappealable. Ergo 

Science, Inc. v. Martin, 73 F.3d 595, 597 (5th Cir. 1996). 

Nevertheless, the district court subsequently entered a final 

order in this case, rendering the previously-filed notice of 

appeal effective to permit this court to exercise its 

jurisdiction. In re Bryson, 406 F.3d 284, 288 (4th Cir. 2005); 

Barrett v. Atl. Richfield Co., 95 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 1996).
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their favor, our review of the applicable language convinces us 

that the Policy straightforwardly precludes Appellants from 

recovering any more than a $1 million aggregate sum per 

accident, regardless of under which form of coverage they press 

their claims. Nor do we deem it necessary, as the Appellants 

request, to certify a question of law to the Maryland state 

courts prior to reaching this result.

“Where there is no ambiguity in an insurance contract, 

the court has no alternative but to enforce the policy’s terms.” 

Kendall v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 702 A.2d 767, 773 (Md. 1997). 

Accordingly, we deny the Appellants’ request that we certify a 

question of law to the Maryland state courts, and we affirm the 

district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED