In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________

No. 02-22-00073-CR

___________________________

On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 1

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 1633906R

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Womack, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack

REY ALFARO GUADIAN, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

By indictment, the State charged Rey Alfaro Guadian with three counts of 

aggravated sexual assault of a child and one count of indecency with a child by 

contact. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 21.11(a)(1), 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (iii), (v). In a

repeat offender notice, the State further alleged that Guadian had been previously

convicted of the felony offense of driving while intoxicated (DWI) and felony 

repetition. Guadian pleaded not guilty to all counts of the indictment and not true to 

the repeat offender notice. A jury found him guilty on all counts, found that he was a 

repeat offender, and assessed his punishment for each count at life in prison and a 

fine of $10,000. The trial court ordered all four sentences to run concurrently.

Guadian appeals only his sentences, arguing that the trial court erred in the 

punishment phase by allowing the State to introduce evidence of Guadian’s alleged 

criminal history with a sheriff’s department record that was not properly authenticated

according to the Texas Rules of Evidence. Because we hold that any error Guadian

preserved was harmless, we overrule his issue and affirm the trial court’s judgments.

1

 

1Although Guadian was charged, convicted, and sentenced under one cause 

number, the trial court entered a separate judgment for each count. 
3

II. BACKGROUND

The jury convicted Guadian of three counts of aggravated sexual assault of a 

child and one count of indecency with a child by contact.2 By Guadian’s choice, the 

jury also assessed his punishment. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art 37.07, § 2(b).

At the trial on punishment, Guadian did not testify, and the State called only one 

witness: Corporal Homero Carnero of the Tarrant County Sheriff’s Office. Corporal 

Carnero testified that he works “in the error resolution desk,” whose main duty is to 

maintain the accuracy of the office’s crime records. A few minutes before testifying, 

he took Guadian’s fingerprints. When Corporal Carnero testified, the State offered 

the fingerprint card that he had just created with Guadian’s inked prints, as well as an 

older document with Guadian’s prints that had been filed in the sheriff’s office. Both 

the card (State’s Exhibit 39) and the document from the sheriff’s office (State’s

Exhibit 26) contained Guadian’s name, his county identification (CID) number, his

date of birth, and a full set of his prints, but the older document, which the State and

Corporal Carnero referred to as “the ten-print card,”

3 had a list of the dates and

2Because Guadian only assigns error to the trial court’s ruling at the trial on 

punishment, we need not summarize the facts giving rise to the charged offenses in 

this case.

3We have previously noted that a ten-print card is a card that contains an 

“arrestee’s identifying information, name, date of birth, sometimes . . . the arrest . . . , 

along with the roll prints, which are fingertip to fingertip each digit of each hand, and 

the bottom is just pat-down [palm prints], and that happens during the booking 

process.” Morgan v. State, No. 02-19-00374-CR, 2020 WL 5949917, at *2 n.1 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth Oct. 8, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
4

charges on which Guadian had been arrested from 1988 to 1999. Over Guadian’s 

hearsay objection,4the trial court admitted both exhibits in evidence. 

Corporal Carnero then explained that anyone booked into the Tarrant County 

jail system is assigned a “unique and permanent” CID number that is attached to the 

person’s fingerprints. Like fingerprints, a CID number is unique to the individual; no 

inmate in the Tarrant County jail has the same CID number as any other inmate. The 

State then introduced certified copies of records from the Tarrant County Clerk and 

Tarrant County District Clerk showing Guadian’s convictions on various charges as 

far back as 1988.5 Although the records included more documents from some cases 

than others, each exhibit contained a copy of the docket sheet on the case file jacket, a 

copy of the judgment reflecting Guadian’s conviction and sentence,6and a copy of the 

charging instrument. For every case, all those documents named Rey Alfaro Guadian 

as the defendant, and the charging instruments all contained the same date of birth for 

4When objecting, Guadian told the trial court that he did “not object to the 

fingerprints themselves.” As we will explain in our discussion below, it appears from 

the record that Guadian’s first hearsay objection was limited to statements in the tenprint card, not the newly created card.

5The documents were offered and admitted as twelve separate exhibits, marked

State’s Exhibits 27 through 38.

6

In one case, Guadian’s sentence was probated, and the judgment is thus styled 

a “probation order.” However, the document states that Guadian was adjudged guilty 

of the offense of driving while intoxicated and open container and sentenced to 120 

days in jail and a $400 fine. The court in that case suspended Guadian’s sentence and 

placed him on probation for twenty-four months. 
5

him. Corporal Carnero testified to other identifying information in the exhibits, 

including Guadian’s prints and CID number, as well as the dates of the offenses. He 

referred to both the ten-print card and the inked prints he had taken from Guadian in

court that day. When the State moved to admit State’s Exhibits 27 through 38 into 

evidence, Guadian objected “only to the portions of hearsay that appear in these

documents.” The trial court overruled his objection and admitted all the exhibits in 

evidence. 

State’s Exhibit 27 showed that Guadian pleaded guilty to and was convicted of 

the felony offense of DWI and felony repetition in the Criminal District Court No. 1

of Tarrant County, Texas, in Cause Number 0720498D, on May 28, 1999. The jury 

found that Guadian was a repeat offender. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Preservation of Error

We first address whether Guadian has preserved any error for our review. To 

preserve a complaint for our review, a party must have presented to the trial court a 

timely request, objection, or motion sufficiently stating the specific grounds, if not 

apparent from the context, for the desired ruling. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); 

Montelongo v. State, 623 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Further, the party 

must obtain an express or implicit adverse trial-court ruling or object to the trial 

court’s refusal to rule. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2); Dixon v. State, 595 S.W.3d 216, 223 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2020). Because it is a systemic requirement, this court should 
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independently review error preservation, and we have a duty to ensure that a claim is 

properly preserved in the trial court before we address its merits. Dixon, 595 S.W.3d 

at 223.

Guadian presents his appellate issue as follows: “THE TRIAL COURT 

ERRED IN THE PUNISHMENT PHASE BY ALLOWING THE STATE TO 

INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF APPELLANT’S ALLEGED CRIMINAL

HISTORY WITH A SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT RECORD THAT WAS NOT 

PROPERLY AUTHENTICATED ACCORDING TO THE TEXAS RULES OF 

EVIDENCE.” But Guadian did not make an authentication objection at trial; he 

objected only to hearsay in the documents. The complaint made on appeal must 

comport with the complaint made in the trial court or the error is forfeited. Clark v. 

State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Lovill v. State, 319 S.W.3d 687, 

691–92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“A complaint will not be preserved if the legal basis 

of the complaint raised on appeal varies from the complaint made at trial.”); Pena v. 

State, 285 S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“Whether a party’s particular 

complaint is preserved depends on whether the complaint on appeal comports with 

the complaint made at trial.”). 

In his brief, Guadian correctly states that “State’s Exhibit 26 [the ten-print 

card] was admitted over a hearsay objection by Appellant as a business[-]record 

exception.” He then quotes the business-records (or “Records of a Regularly 

Conducted Activity”) exception to the rule against hearsay, see Tex. R. Evid. 803(6), 
7

and cites Stapleton v. State, 868 S.W.2d. 781 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), in support of his 

argument that the ten-print card should not have been admitted pursuant to this

exception.7 We hold that this comports with his complaint made at trial about the 

hearsay in the ten-print card. However, because he did not object to the other 

records of his criminal history (State’s Exhibits 27 through 38) on any grounds other

than hearsay, and because he does not argue on appeal that those exhibits contained 

inadmissible hearsay, we also hold that he has forfeited all other error for our review. 

See Clark, 365 S.W.3d at 339. We will therefore review only Guadian’s argument that 

the trial court erred in admitting the ten-print card under Rule 803(6) and that such 

error was harmful.

B. Arguments of the Parties

Under Rule 803(6), a record of an act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis is

not excluded by the rule against hearsay if:

(A) the record was made at or near the time by—or from information 

transmitted by—someone with knowledge;

(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted business 

activity;

(C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity;

7

In Stapleton, the Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that a recording of a phone 

call from a citizen to the police department contained inadmissible hearsay.

868 S.W.2d at 787. Because no one engaged in the police activity had personal 

knowledge of the information reported by the citizen, the Court reasoned, the factual

statements made by her on the call were not covered by the business-records 

exception provided by Rule 803(6). Id. at 784–85.
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(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or 

another qualified witness, or by an affidavit or unsworn declaration . . . ; 

and

(E) the opponent fails to demonstrate that the source of information or 

the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of 

trustworthiness.

Tex. R. Evid. 803(6). Guadian argues that this rule should not apply because the State 

never asked whether anyone had personal knowledge of the information contained in 

the ten-print card. The State counters that “the nature of the fingerprint card made 

that specific statement unnecessary” because the card demonstrates that it was made 

at the time that the fingerprints were made and that it was made by a deputy with 

knowledge of its contents who had created and signed it. Guadian also argues that

the exhibit was not sponsored by the custodian of records, but the State rightly 

contends that Rule 803(6) does not require the sponsoring witness to be the custodian 

of records—only a “qualified witness”—and Carnero met this requirement. In the 

alternative, the State argues that the card was admissible under the public-records 

exception to the rule against hearsay. See Tex. R. Evid. 803(8).

C. Our Analysis

Assuming without deciding that the ten-print card contained inadmissible 

hearsay and that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the exhibit over 

Guadian’s hearsay objection, we are not persuaded that any such error is reversible. 

Overruling an objection to evidence will not result in reversal when other such 

evidence was received without objection, either before or after the complained-of 
9

ruling. Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Here, Guadian 

objected to the ten-print card but not the newer card that Corporal Carnero created

during trial. Like the ten-print card, the newer card had Guadian’s full name, date of 

birth, and CID number on it. In addition, Corporal Carnero told the jury multiple

times—without objection—what Guadian’s CID number was. Therefore, Guadian 

was not harmed by the admission of these pieces of identifying information. See id.

at 717–18. 

Further, when clarifying his objection to the trial court, Guadian referenced the 

ten-print card by its exhibit number and stated, “There’s a fair amount of statements 

that are made on the second page.” Thus, his objection was limited to the statements 

on the second page of the document. When only part of the offered evidence is 

admissible, the objecting party must specifically point out which part is inadmissible. 

Whitaker v. State, 286 S.W.3d 355, 369 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Willover v. State,

70 S.W.3d 841, 847 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

Guadian contends that the admission of the ten-print card was harmful because 

it “was the sole basis for admission” of all of his criminal history. The record belies 

his contention. First, the court documents from Guadian’s prior criminal cases were 

admissible as certified copies of public documents, which are self-authenticating. See 

Tex. R. Evid. 902(2). Second, while Corporal Carnero did refer to a few of the dates

listed on the second page of the ten-print card when testifying to the offense dates 
10

that appeared on the court documents from Guadian’s related cases,

8

every exhibit 

from Guadian’s past criminal cases contained other identifying information that 

matched the information on Guadian’s newer fingerprint card. All but two of the 

case files had Guadian’s unique CID number in them,

9

and all showed the same date 

of birth for Guadian. His newer fingerprint card also reflects that he is a white male, 

as do the charging instruments from his past criminal cases.10 We have held that the

State sufficiently linked a defendant to a prior judgment of conviction based on 

similar matching information. See Dehorney v. State, No. 02-17-00157-CR, 2018 WL 

1528479, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 29, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication) (holding that State sufficiently linked defendant to prior

judgment where defendant’s “rather unique name” matched name of defendant in the 

judgment, and documents associated with prior judgment reflected same birthdate, 

race, and sex of defendant). 

8Four of Guadian’s arrests—for DWI in 1994, assault bodily injury family 

violence in 1995 and again in 1997, and DWI-felony repetition in 1999—were listed 

on the third page of the ten-print card and thus not covered by his specific objection.

9

It appears that the case files from the two oldest cases—a 1988 conviction for 

DWI and open container and a 1991 conviction for driving with license suspended—

do not include Guadian’s CID number. 

10All the charging instruments from Guadian’s prior cases indicate his sex as 

“M” for male, but the letters indicating his race do not appear to be legible in the two 

oldest case files. 
11

Through Corporal Carnero’s testimony, the State linked what was arguably the 

most critical of the prior convictions—the 1999 DWI felony that was the basis of the 

repeat-offender charge in the present case—to Guadian by his CID number and the 

date of the offense. And court documents from that 1999 case showed that 

Guadian’s 1988 and 1993 DWI convictions were elements of the felony charge to 

which Guadian had pleaded guilty. Additionally, Corporal Carnero testified that he 

had compared and matched fingerprints from several of the prior case files to the 

prints that he had just taken from Guadian in court.11 Finally, the State elicited the 

following testimony from Corporal Carnero without objection:

Q. And so the prints that you received from the gentleman sitting 

to the far right over there, the defendant in today’s case, the prints that 

you took from him, are they a match to all of the judgments that have 

prints in -- in evidence?

A. They are.

Q. And are the prints that you took in court today from the 

defendant a match to that certified ten-print card that’s kept on file with 

the Tarrant County Jail that’s also associated with that county 

identification number?

A. Yes.

Q. So do you have any concerns about any of the prior

convictions that have been submitted into evidence as to whether or not 

they belong to the defendant in today’s case?

11Specifically, Corporal Carnero matched four of the prior cases to Guadian 

through the prints. Six of the other exhibits contained at least one inked print, but 

Corporal Carnero testified that those prints were not legible. 
12

A. I have no concerns.

Q. Okay. Are they the same person?

A. Yes.

Thus, the State was able to link Guadian to the court documents from his prior 

criminal cases through other, properly admitted evidence. 

Under Rule 44.2(b), we must disregard any nonconstitutional error that does 

not affect an appellant’s substantial rights. Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). A substantial 

right is affected when the error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict.” Haley v. State, 173 S.W.3d 510, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2005); see King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (citing Kotteakos v. 

United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S. Ct. 1239, 1253 (1946)). Conversely, an error 

does not affect a substantial right if the appellate court has a fair assurance from an 

examination of the record as a whole that the error did not influence the jury or that it

had but a slight effect. Macedo v. State, 629 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). 

Based on our foregoing analysis, we have a fair assurance that the admission of the 

hearsay on the second page of the ten-print card did not influence the jury or that it

had but a slight effect, if it was even error. We overrule Guadian’s lone appellate 

issue.
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IV. CONCLUSION

Having overruled Guadian’s issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

/s/ Dana Womack

Dana Womack

Justice

Do Not Publish

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: March 16, 2023