FOURTH D IVISION DOYLE , P. J., MILLER and DIL LA RD, JJ.
N O TICE: Motions for reconsideration must be p hy sically received

in our cl erk’s offi ce within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.

http:/ /www .gaappeal s.us/rul es/ July 15, 2014



## In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A14A0603. JANE D OE v. A RCHDI OCESE

OF AT LANTA et al. D ILL ARD , Judge. Jane Doe appeals from the trial court’ s dismissal of her l awsuit ag a inst the Archdioc ese of Atlant a and Holy Cross Catholic Church (collectively, “ the Church”),

on the ground t

hat the suit , filed u sing a

pse udo nym, was a leg al n ull ity. Because we hold that the trial court erred in concluding that the complaint was void, we reverse. We further hold that t

h e trial c ourt has the

discretio n to consider

whether Doe is entitled to procee d under a ps eudonym and, ther

efor e , remand the ca se for consider ation of t hat issu e in a manner cons istent wit h this op inion. The undisputed f

acts are as follow s. On Se

ptemb e r 4, 201 2, Doe f iled a compl aint against the

Church using the pseudon ym “Jane Doe” and allegedthat she,

now the age of

maj ority, had been th e victim of childhood

sexual abuse from a form er1 Counsel fo r the Chur ch advised D oe’s co unsel that i t would n ot consent to Doe proceedi ng with her complaint us ing a pseu donym.

2 See OCGA § 9-3-33.1 (b) (“Any civil action for recovery of damages suffered as a result o f

childhood

sexual abus e shall be c ommenced wi thin five years of t he date the plaintiff attains the age of majority .”). 2 Church emplo yee. Three d ays la ter, D oe’s co unsel sent t he Church a copy

of the compl aint with a le tter rev ealing Do e’s ide ntity and explaining that, “give n the sensitive nature of

the allega

tions,” th e com

plaint had been filedund er a p seu don ym in order “ to protect the identit

y and a void future

in jury to [Doe ]” and a sking the Church to advise if it objec ted to her doing so. 1 And then on Septem ber 14, 201 2, Doe fileda “no tice of dis closure of identity of plaintif

f Jane Doe,” in which she identified herself under seal to the trial court. E ach of the foregoing actions transpire d prior to the expira

tion of the s tatute of l imita tions on Doe ’s claims. 2 The Church an swered a

nd filed a m

otion to d ismiss , asser ting that D oe’s compl aint was a procedural nullity

because i t had not been filed in the name of a real person and that, as the statute of limitations had since expired, she could not ame nd her compl aint so as to relate back to the originally filed pleading. The trial court agreed and dismissed Doe’s l awsuit with prejudice. Thi s appeal fo llows.3 See OCGA § 9-11-10 (a ) (requir ing a com plaint to “in clude the n ames of all the parties . . .”).

4 See OCGA § 9-11-17 (a ) (“ Every action s hall be prosecu

ted in the na

me of the real part y in interest.”)

.

5 122 Ga. 774 (50 SE 978) (1905). 3 We b egin by

noting that t

his case in

volves two independent

issues for

our considera tion. The fir st is wheth er Doe’ s filing of a lawsuit usin g a pse udo nym rendered it a nullity , such tha

t Doe is now

barred— due to the e xpiration of

the statute of limit ations—fr

om am ending the c omplaint o r o th erw is e li ti gat in g h er c lai ms against th e Chur ch. If not, the second question is whether Doe must am end her compl aint so a s to reve al h er id ent ity, or whether she may proceed with the l awsuit using a fic titious nam

e. For t he reasons se t forth infra , we answ er the first questio n in the negative and rem

and this ca se to the trial cour t for it to e xercise i ts discret ion in determinin g the secon d issue. 1. In general, Georgi a law mandates that parties to a law suit identify themselves in their re spective pl eadings 3 and that ever y action be prose cuted in the

name of the re al party

in interes t. 4 And prior

to the passage of the C ivil Prac tice Ac t, the Supreme Court of

Georgia , in

W. &A.R. Co. v. Dalton Marble W orks, 5 held that if a lawsuit is “brought in a name w hi ch is neit her that of a natural pe rson, a6 Id . at 775.
7 Id

. 8 See also Russell v . O’D onnell , 132 Ga. App. 29 4, 295 (2) ( 208 SE2d 107 ) (1974) (opinion re lied upo n by the tri al court in its order), abrogation by s tatute recognized

in Community Magazi ne, LLC v. Color X

press , ___ Ga. App. ___ ( 756 SE2d 564, 568) (2014).

9 See OCGA § 9-11-1 et seq
. 10 OCGA § 9-11-17 (a). 4 corporation, nor

a par tne rsh ip, it i s a mer e nu lli ty” 6 and, as su ch, cann ot be amended by inse rting the na

me of the proper

party in interest, “the re being not hing to amend by.” 7 It is this la

nguage that

both the Chur

ch and tria

l court cont end re nders Doe’s compl ain t a n ull ity. 8 When passing the Civil Pra ctice A ct in 1966, 9 however, the GeneralAssem bly expressly provided tha

t [n]o action sha ll be dismis sed on the ground t

hat it is not prosecute d in the name of the re al party

in interes t until a

reasonable time has been allowed a fter obj ection for ratific ation of co mm encem ent of theaction by, or joinder or substitution of, the r e al party in interest; and such ratific ation, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been comm enced in the n ame of the re al party in interes t. 1011 See OCGA § 9-11-15 (a) (“A party may ame nd his pleading as a matter of course and without leave of court at any tim e befo re the en try of a pretrial order. Thereafter

the part y may amend his ple adi ng o nly b y leave of c ourt or by written consent of the adverse party . Leave shall be f reely given when justice so requires.”).
12 OCGA § 9-11-8 (f)

. 13 122 Ga. 774 (50 SE 978) (1905).
14 Block v. Voyager Life Ins. Co ., 251 Ga. 162, 163 (1) (303 SE2d 742) (1983).
15 Id. 5 Furthermore, the Gene ral Asse mbly included a

n exp licit manda

te that par

ties be freely permitted to ame nd pleadings 11 and that “ [a]ll pleadings . . . be so construed as to do sub stantial justice.” 12 After th e en act ment of t he C iv il Pra cti ce A ct, ou r Su pre me Court reexamined the issue presente d in Dalton Marble Works 13 in order to consider whether under that Act “plea din gs may be am ended to substitute a nam ed party

plaintiff when suit i s filedin th e na me of aparty which is n ot a legal en tity.” 14 The Cour t concluded

that, contrary to the preexisting law, when “theparty

plaintiff name d in a com

plaint is not

a legal enti ty but is reas onably recognizable as a misnomer for a legal entity which is the real

party plainti f f, the misnomer may be corrected by amendment.” 15 In so doing, the Court recognized the forgiv ing policies c ontained in t he Civil Pr

actice A ct, explaining

that “ pleadings a

re not an e nd in them selves bu t onl y a m

ethod to assi st16 Id . (emphasis supplied).
17 See Franklyn Gesner F

ine Painti ngs, Inc. v. Ketc ham , 252 Ga. 537, 538 (314 SE2d 903) (1984) (disapprov ing of this Cour t’s “ overly

restric tive constr

uction” of OCGA § 9-11-17 (a

) and allowing substitution o f the cor poration—t

he real pa rty in interest—for

the individua

l by w hom the corporat ion was closely held because there was “no inj ustice in permit ting the am

endment”); Color Xpre

ss , 326 Ga. App. at 335 (3) (perm itting substit

ution in lawsuit filed using

a trade n ame while re cognizing th at, in Block , the Supreme Co urt “im plicitly disapprov[ed]” that such suits were “ mere nullities”); Memar v . Styblo , 293 Ga. App. 528, 531 (667 SE2d 388) (2008) (allowing amen dment

to substitute the administrator of the estat e as the proper party plaintiff after the expira

tion of the r

epose peri od in a m edical-m alpracti ce action

originally filedin the nam

e of the e state, a

non-legal entity

); Rooks v. Tenet Health system GB, Inc ., 292 Ga . App. 4 77, 47 9 (1) ( a) (66 4 SE2d 861) (200 8) (rev ersin g tria l cou rt’s dismissal of wrongf

ul-death a ction a

nd reman ding case t o substitute r eal party in interest wh en o riginally -nam ed plaintif f lacked c apacity

to bring suit

); see also Comm. for

Better Gov’t v. Black

, 216 Ga. App. 173, 174 (1) (453 SE2d 772) (1995); U.S. Xpress, Inc. v. W. Timothy Askew & Co. , 194 Ga. App. 730, 731 (391 SE 2d 707) (1990). 6 in reaching the

merits of the case .” 16 And since that time, Georgia ’s appe llate courts have readily

permitted amendmentof

complaints to substitute proper party plaintiffs in the abse nce of a s howing of ha rm to the defen dants. 17 Given the foregoing analytical fram ework, we conclude that the trial court

er red in h old ing tha t Doe ’s co mplai nt wa s a n ull ity d ue t o he r us e of a pse udo nym . Sign ifica ntl y, Doe reve aled her i dentity to both the tr

ial court a

nd the Churc h prior18 We lea ve for ano ther day

the questio n of

whether the failureto disclosethe identity of a pseudo nym

to the trial cour

t and/or oppo sing party

prior to the

expiratio n of a statut e of lim

itations w ould require a different result.
19 In a nut shell, t he Church is arguing t hat it is never permissible to file a lawsuit in Geo rgi a us in g a p seu do nym. But if acompl aint brought by som eone using a pse udo nymis a nullity , and thus i s void from the very moment it is fi led, then any party who seeks to shield his or her identi ty fr

om the public has n o mea

ns by which to do so. But

see Qu alls v. R umsfeld

, 228 FRD 8, 10 (D.D.C. 2005) (noting that although the court “

has not tac kled the pr

opriety of pseudony

mous li tigation head on,

. . . [it ] has de veloped an ad-hoc proc ess that ac comm odates thepractice

[by a llowing a] litigant seeking to proceed under pseudony m [to ] ask the Chief Judge, ex parte, f

or leave to file a c omplaint omi tting the litigan t’s rea l name and full address.” ). And i f a party is unable to invoke the jurisdiction of a court without first revealing his or her na me, the n ps eud onymo us l awsu its are a dea d le tte r in our sta te. S uffi ce it to s ay, such a rule w ould place Georgia far ou tside the mainstream

of American jurisprud ence, and we dec line to ad opt it. 7 to the expira

tion of the s tatute of l imita tions. 18 And for this reason, we reje ct t he Churc h’s overly

rigi d ar gument

that, bec ause Doewas not publicly identified, her compl aint failed to import

a natural person and should be tre ated as a nul lit y ( i.e. , as thoughDoe did not

exist). 19 Doe is in dee d a n atu ral per so n; it i s o nl y her name that is (at leas t tem

porarily ) being shie lde d from

publ ic disclosure. But neither the trial court nor the Church were left wondering

as to who w as assert

ing these claims, nor
was either m

isled or de ceived in a

ny wa y. U nder these

circum stanc es, there is no injustice in allowing D oe’s la wsuit to remain p ending and, to the exte nt that thetrial20 It is wor th noting that there

are numerous publis hed opinions of this Court and the Supreme C ourt of

Georgia involving law suits brought by a pl aintiff us ing a ps eud on ym. See, e.g., Doe v. Prudentia l-Bache/A.G. Spanos Realty Partn ers, L.P. , 268 Ga. 604, 604 (492 SE 2d 865) (1997) (lawsuit involving cla

ims br ought by a

Jane Doe against the

ow ners and operators of the apartment com plex in which she lived after she was r

aped and robbe d when par

king her ca

r undernea

th the apar

tment building); In re Doe , 262 Ga. 389, 389 (41 8 SE2d 3) ( 1992) (a de clarator y-j udgmen

t action involving “several difficult issues relating to medical decision-m aking for a terminally ill child[,] Jane Doe

. . . . ”); Doe I v. Young Wom en’s Chris tian Ass’n of Greater Atlanta, Inc. , 321 Ga. A pp. 403 , 404 n.1 ( 740 SE2d 453 ) (2013) ( “The appellants are using p seudony ms in t his action p ursuant to a protective order entered by the trial court.” ); Doe v. Andujar , 297 Ga. App. 696, 696 n.1 (678 SE 2d 16 3) (2009) (“T

he appellant s are using

pseudony

ms in this action

pursuant to a protect

ive order entered by the trial court.”); Metropolit an Atlanta R apid Transit

Auth. v. Doe , 292 Ga. App. 532, 533 n.1 (664 SE2d 893) (2008) (“The plaintiff’ s actual name was not used so as to protect her priva cy.” ); Doe v. HGI Re alty, Inc. , 254 Ga. A pp. 181, 181 (56 1 SE2 d 45 0) (2 002 ) (la wsu it b rou ght by a J ane Doe “ for damages after she was robbed and sexually assaulted while workin g in a stor e . . . .”); Post Prop erties, Inc. v. Doe , 230 Ga. A

pp. 34, 34 ( 495 SE2d

573) (1997) (lawsuit

brought by

a Jane Doe against

the owner and operator of the apartment com plex where she lived after she was rap ed inside he r apartm ent.); Doe v. Briargate Apartments, Inc. , 227 Ga. App. 408, 408 (489 SE2d 170) (1997) (same) ; Doe v. Bd. of Regents o f Univ. Sys. of Ga. , 215 Ga. A

pp. 684, 68 4 (452 SE2 d 776) (1994) (“T he plaintif

f, using th e ps eud onym Jan e Doe, filed a c omplaint against the Board

of Regent s of the Universi ty

System of Georgia seeking a temporary restraining order

and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against disclosure.”). 8 court deem s it necess ary t o do so (see d iscussion infra ), in per

mitting her to ame nd the com plaint. 2021 See Ga. Unif. Sup. Ct. R. 21 (“All court re cords are public a nd are to be

available for public inspection unless publicaccess i s limi ted by l aw or bythe procedure set forth [in Rule 21 ].”) ; In re Gwi nnett Cnty . Grand J

ury , 284 Ga. 510, 511 (668 SE2d

682) (2008) ; Green v. Drinnon, Inc ., 262 Ga. 264, 264 (1) (417 S E2d 11) (1992) (“In

this state, the public and t he press ha

ve traditi onally

enjoy ed a right of acces s to court records.” (punctuation omitted)); see also Judicial Q ualifica tions Comm’n Op. (Aug. 28, 2013) (noting that “[a] bsen t spe cific le gal authori ty, pu blic access to court proceedings should be unfettered and unobstructed.”). 9 2. The next q

uestion is w

hethe r Doe m

ust publicly

reveal her identity

or whether sh e is per mitt ed i ns tea d t o p ros ecu te h er c ase us in g a p seu do nym. We lea ve this inquiry

in the fir st instance

to the sound di scretion o f the trial court. Georgia law requires that parties disclose their names in judicial pleadings a

nd presumes the public’ s right to ac cess this in form ation in addi tion to the entirety of the court rec ords. 21 This is not merely a procedural formality . Indeed, Georgia has long recognizedthat the right to public access to judicial proceedings “pro tects litigants both present and future, because justice faces it s gravest t hreat wh en courts dispense22 Atlanta Jo urnal v. L ong , 258 Ga. 410 , 411 (1) ( 369 SE2d 755 ) (1988)

opinion corr ected , 377 SE 2d 150 (1989); see State v. Brown , 293 Ga. 493, 496 (1) (748 SE2d 376) (2013) (a ffirm ing the dism

issal of a criminalindictm ent becaus e it wa s not return ed in a cour troom open to the p ublic); R. W . Page C orp. v. L umpkin , 249 Ga . 576, 576, n.1 (292 S E2d 815) ( 1982) (“ This cour t has sought to o pen th e doors of Geor

gia’s c ourtroom s to the public and to attract public inte rest in al l courtroom

proceedings because

it is believedthat open courtrooms are a sine qua non of an effe ctive and

resp ected judicial system which, in turn, is one of the principal cornerstones of a free society.”)

.

23 Doe v. Stegall , 653 F2d 180, 185 (IV) ( 5th Cir. 1 981); accord Doe v. Barrow County , 219 FRD 189 , 191-94 (II ), (III) (N.D. Ga . 2003); see genera lly Rich mond Newspaper

s, Inc. v. Virginia , 448 U.S. 555, 575-76 (III) (A) (100 SCt 2814, 65 LE2d 973) (1980) (“ The Fir st Am endment goes beyond protect ion of the press a

nd the self-e xpression

of individuals to prohibit governm ent from

limit ing the stoc k o f information from

which mem

bers of the public may draw .” (punctuation omitted)); see also id. at 579 (II I) (C), n.17 (re cognizing th at “[ w]het her the publ ic has a r

ight to attend tri als of civi l cases [ was] a que stion not rais ed b y [ Richard N ewspapers, Inc .], but [noting] that histor ically both civil a

ndcrim inal trials have been presumptivel y open”).

24 Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 21.2; see Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 2 1.1 (“U pon moti on by any pa rty to any c ivil o r crimina l action, or upon the court’s own motion, after 10 itsecretly.” 22 Additional ly, F irst Amendmentguarante es are im plicated w

hen a court decides to restrict pu blic scrut iny of judicial proceedin gs.” 23 But the presum

ption of open judicial proceedings is not absolute. Georgia law perm its a court to limit or even prohibit public ac cess t o its records in exceptional circum stances if

it determines “that the harm otherwise resulting to the privacy of a person in interes t clearl

y outw eighs the pub lic inter est .” 24 And this Court hashearing, the court may lim it access to court f

iles respe cting that acti on. The o rder of limit ation shall specify

the part of

the file t o which ac cess is limit ed, the na ture and duration of the lim

itation, a nd t he reason

f or limitation.” ); Ct.A

pp. R. 45 (j) (“

All pleadings, briefs, orders, transcripts, exhibits and any other wr itten or recorded materialthat are part of the record [of a Parental Notificati on Ac t case] shal l be considered and treat ed by th e Court as confidenti al. Upon concl usion of the appell ate proceedin gs, the record shall be sealed , and the conten

ts of the record shal l not be disclosed, except upon ord er of this Court or the Supreme Court of Georgia. ”); Savannah Coll. of A rt & Design v. Sch. of Visual Arts, Inc. , 270 Ga. 791, 793 (51 5 SE2d 370) (1999) (“[ I]n ca ses of cl ear necessity, identified as instances where privacy rights are in j eopardy , the rig ht of public access should y ield.”) ; Long , 258 Ga. at 411 (1) (notin g that altho ugh the purpos e of Rule 21 “is to preser ve the tra ditional ri ght of acces s” to court

records, it “also preser

ves another

traditional right—the

right of superior c ourts in

exceptiona

l cases to shield cour

t records from

public view ”); see also Nixon v. Wa rner Comm c’ns, In c ., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (I I) (A) (98 SCt 130 6, 55 LEd2d 570) (1978) (“It

is uncontest ed . . . that the r ight to inspect and copy judicial records is not absolute.”).

25 260 Ga. App. 421 (579 SE2d 838) (2003).
26 See id . at 423. 11 recognize d, on at least

one occas ion, that a tri al court m ay exercise its discretio n to allow a party to procee d with a

lawsuit under a pseudonym. I n Doe v. Hall , 25 we held that the trial court retained the discretion to det ermi ne whether an HIV -positive plaintiff could use a pseudony

m to pr osecute a case against his docto r for im properly disclosing c onfidential medi cal infor matio n. 26 Likewise, although we are certainly not bound by decisions from other jurisdic tions, ther e is a con si der abl e bo dy o f pr ece den t fo r de par ti ng fro m a27 Stegall , 653 F2d at 185 (IV); see Doe v. Frank , 951 F2d 320, 324 (11th Cir.1992) (“A

plaintiff should be per

mit te d to procee d anonym

ously onl y in thos e exceptional cases involvi ng matters of a highly sensitive and personal nature, rea l danger of physical harm, or where the injury litigated against would be incurred a s a result of the disclosu

re of theplaintiff

’s identity.” ); see also Doe v. Blue Cross & BlueShield Uni ted of Wis., 112 F3d 869, 872 (7t

h Cir. 199 7) (noting

that “ fictitious names are allo wed whe n necessar y to protect t

he privacy

of children, rape v ictim s, and other par ticularly vulnerable

parties or witnesse s”); Stegall , 653 F2d at 186 (IV) (allowin g a mot

her and he r childre n to procee d under fic titious nam es in their law suit challengin g the constitution ality of pray er in publicschools due to “the special st atus and vulnerabil ity of

the child- litigants, the showin g of possible threaten ed harm

and serious social ostr

acizatio n based u

pon mil itant rel igious attit udes, and t

he fundamental privatene ss of the religious bel iefs. . . .”); Doe v. Barrow Co unty , 219 FRD 189, 191-94 (II) , (I II) (N.D. G a. 2003) (allowing plaintiff to proceed under a pse udo nymwhen cha llenging the display of the Ten Comm

andm ents at the courthousebecause, in part, “re ligion is perhaps the quintes sentially private matter”); see also Roe v. Wade , 410 U. S. 113, 1 20 (II) n .4 (93 SCt 705, 3 5 LE2d 147 (1973). 12 “pr ocedura l custom fraught with constitutional overtones to accommodate a plai ntif f’s ass erte d ne ed t o pr oce ed a non ym ously th r ough the use o f a ficti tious name.” 27 And numer

ous courts —both fede ral and sta te—have a dopted bala

ncing te st s d esigned t o weigh the

countervailing interests involve d when a pl aintiff s eeks to shield his or her n ame; and, more specifica lly, s eve ral hav e de ter min ed t hat cla ims predicated

upon allegations of childhood sexual abuse may invoke a privacy

interest28 See, e. g. , Plaintif f B v. Franc is , 631 F3d 131 0, 1317 (I II) (11t h Cir. 201 1) (revers ing trial cour

t’s deni al of

two ou t of fo ur pl aint iff’s petition to proceed under a pseudony

m bec ause “ [t]heissues involv ed . . . could not be of a m ore sensit ive and highly personal n ature—they involve descripti ons of the [p]laintiffs in various stages of nudity and engaged in explicit sexual conduct while they were m inors who were coerced by the [d]efendants into those a ctivities”) ; Doe v. St. John’ s Episcopal

Parish Day School, I nc ., Case No. 8:13-cv-2467-T-27EAJ, 2014 WL 585767, at *8 (III) (c) (4) (M.D. Fla., Feb. 12, 2014) (“Plaintiff’s allegations of childhood sexual abuse by mem bers of the clergy an d empl oyees of the Church, School, and/or Di ocese wh ile he was a minor are

. . . of a sensitive and highly personal nature . . . and therefore [p]laintiff may proceed anonymously

at this time.”); John Doe 140 v. Archdioc ese of Portland in Oregon , 249 FRD 358 , 361 (I) (D. Or. 2008 ) (allow ing allege d victim of childhood

sexual ass ault to proceed a nonym ously in part beca use “[ t]he experience of sex ua l abuse ca

n be deeply

psycho logically

traum atic, a

nd public know ledge of such abuse can trigger new trauma even y ear s after th e fact” ); Doe No. 2 v. Kolko , 242 FRD 193, 1 95 (E .D. N .Y. 200 6) (“ [S]ex ual assault victim s are a pa radigm atic exam ple of those entitled to a grant of anonymity .”); Does v. Covington C nty. Sch. Bd. , 884 F. Supp. 462, 465 (II) (M.D. Ala. 199 5) (granting plaintiffs leave to proceed without disclosin g their name s while “ recognizi ng the vulner

ability and tender

age of each plaintiff, a s well as the sensitive issues in volved in the case” ); Doe v. Brown , 2009 WL 5322462, at

*3 (Conn. Super. C t. Dec . 11, 2009) (holding “ the plain tiff’s use of a p seu don ym

will ser ve the overridin g interest of protec ting the plaintiff fr om e xposure in the community of her private situation, which involves her al legation s that . . . she was sexuall y, physically, and emotiona lly abused. . . .”). But see Doe v. Wolowit z , Case No. 01-73907, 2002 WL 1310614 (E.D. Mi ch. May 28 , 2002) (deny ing plain tiff’s motion to use a fi ctitious na

me in lawsuit alleging sexual abus e by her psy chologist be cause “[ t]his will be a case involving direct and personal atta c ks upon the reputation and integrity of the defendant and in which personal credibili ty

will play a large r ole in the issue s in the cas e”); Doe v. Shakur , 164 FRD 359, 362 (S.D . N.Y . 1996) (b alancing sever al factors, including that media was already awareof plaintif

f’s re sidence a

nd place of

emplo ym ent, bef

ore concl uding 13 so great as to warrant the unusu al practi ce of all owing the pl aintiff t o litigate using a ps eud on ym. 28that the “

public hum

iliation an d emba

rrassment” assoc iated wit h h er allega

tions of sexual assault w ere insuf

ficient t o overcom

e the pres umption

of public a ccess to the parties’ name s in judic ial proce edings); Doe v. Univ. of Rhode Isl

and , 28 Fed . R. Serv.3d 366 (D. R .I. 1993 ) (requir ing plaintif

f to reve al her ide nt ity in suit against college alleging th at she was sexually assaulted as a result of school ’s negli gence in partbecause her “claim

[d id] not involve a

ny adm ission on her

part that she has or will be engaged

in any illegal ac tivity, that she ha s violated t he l aw or tha

t she willingly engages in unaccepted sexual practices”).

29 Hall , 260 Ga. App. at 4 23.
30 Frank , 951 F2d at 323; see also B arrow County , Ga. , 219 FRD at 193 (III). 14 W e agree w ith courts t hat have c oncluded tha t a trial court m ay, in extraordinary

cases, “emplo y i ts sound discr etion in det ermi

ning whether or not a pse udo nymmay

be used . . ., c onsidering t he effec ts of such de cision on the rights o f the individual pa

rties and c onsidering t

he right of

the publi c to open judicial proceedin gs.” 29 In so doing, the ultim ate test

is whether the plaintiff has a “substantial privacy right whic h outweighs the custom ary a nd constituti o nally -embedded presum ption of openne ss in judi cial procee dings.” 30 And in m aking its de termination, the trial court can consider many factors, including, but not lim ited to, th e following : (1) whether

the lawsuit involves “

matters of sensi tive and high ly personal n ature”; ( 2) whether the plainti ff or an innocent non- party risks suff

ering phy sical or psychological harm

if the plaintiff is identifie d, taking into considera tion the age

of31 Francis , 631 F3d at1316 (III); see gener ally Jame s v. Jaco bson , 6 F3d 233, 238 (III) (4th Cir. 1993 ) (col lecting re levant cit ations); Frank , 951 F2d a

t 324; Shakur , 164 FRD at 361.

32 Additional

factors to consider

in other types of cases have included whether the suit challenges a governmental activity, and whether the plaintiff is “com pelled to adm it[his or her] intention to engage in illegal conduct, thereby risking criminal prosecut ion.” Stegall , 653 F2d at 186 (IV); see also ge nerally Frank , 951 F2d a

t 323; Barrow County, G

a. , 219 FRD at 193 (III). We note that the cases cited throughout this opi n ion contem

plate var ied versio ns of the factors set f orth supra . We h ave attem pted to d raw fr

om the se cases a

nd create a condense d, non-exh austive lis t of factors so as to provid e guidance t o the trial courts, b ut in so doing, we do not in tend to createa rigid, inflexible test for det ermining the p ropriety of part y anonymity. See Doe v. Hart

z , 52 FSupp2 d 1027, 10 46 (II) (A) (3) (a) (N.D. Iowa 1999). We further n ote that “ [t]he m

ere pres ence of on e factor [is] not mea nt to be dispos itive, but rather, these factors were highlighted merely as factors deserving consideration.” Id. ; see also Ste

gall , 653 F2d at 185 (III).
33 Doe v. Bell At

l. Bus. Sys. Serv

s., Inc ., 162 FR

D 418, 420 ( II) (D . Mass. 1995); see also Frank

, 951 F2d at 324 (“[T] he fact that [a plaintiff] may su ffe r so me personal embarrassment, standing alone, does not require the granting of his [or her] request to proceed under a pseudonym.”)

. 15 the plaintiff; and (3) w

hether the plaintiff ’s anony mity impose s a risk

of fundamental unfairne ss to t he o ppo sin g pa rty. 31 In conside ring the fore going facto rs, 32 as well as
a ny other relevant considerations, we emphasize that “ [e]conomic harm or mere emba rrassment are not suf

fic ient to override the st

rong pub lic interes t in discl osure.” 33 And to the extent the trial court determines that anonym ity in the case sub judice is warra

nted, thecou rt i s fr ee t o “fa sh io n i ts ord er o n t he u se o f a p seu do nym,34 Hall , 260 Ga. App. at 423.
35 Id

. 36 Id

. 37 See Jaco bson , 6 F 3d 233, 238 ( 4th Cir. 1 993) (“ The deci sion whether to perm itparties to proceed anonymously attrial is on e of m any inv olving m anagem ent of the trial process that for o bvious reas ons are co mm itted in the first instance to trial court discretion.”). 16 as justice may require, and indeed, must ensure that the righ ts of the partie s to full discovery is not interfered w ith by th e use of apseudon ym.” 34 The trial court shoul d continuously

monito r the proc eedings so a s to minimiz e th e im pact o n the defen dant ’s rights and “sho ul d p ermi t the use of [the ] plaint iff’s real nam

e [when] such use is required in order t o ensure adeq uate disco very.” 35 Finally , the tri al court is free to u se other devices, “such

as sealing certain re cords and or ders of nond

isclosure in conjunction wi th the pl aintiff’ s use of a ps eudonym , in order to balance

lawful dis cov ery re qui remen ts, whil e pro vid ing all reas ona ble con fid ent ial ity. 36 In sum, we hold that Doe’ s complaint filed using a pseudonym is not a legal nullity and reverse the trial court’ s ruling on tha

t issue. W e further

rem and the ca se for the trial court’s consideration of whether Doe is perm itted to proceed under a fictitious name

in a m anner cons istent wit h this opinion. 3717

Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction. Doyle, P. J. , and Mill er, J., con cur .