In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-14-00150-CR 

SHARISSA VALENE TOLLISON, APPELLANT 

 

V. 

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

 

On Appeal from the 108th District Court 

Potter County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 64,550-E, Honorable Douglas Woodburn, Presiding 

 

October 29, 2014 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ. 

Appellant, Sharissa Valene Tollison, appeals from a judgment revoking her 

community supervision and sentencing her to two years confinement and a fine of 

$5,000 for the offense of theft with two prior convictions of theft. She contends 1) she

did not receive effective assistance of counsel because the trial court denied her the

right to make a closing argument and 2) the order cumulating her sentence was void. 

We affirm the judgment.
2

Assistance of Counsel

Appellant argues that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel since 

she was not afforded the right to present closing argument. However, the complaint 

was not preserved. 

To preserve error, not only must the defendant inform the trial court of his desire 

to make closing argument but the trial court must also refuse it. Habib v. State, 431 

S.W.3d 737, 741-42 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2014, pet. ref’d). Here, the record reveals 

that immediately after appellant testified, her counsel asked the court to take judicial 

notice of a bill of costs. After the court engaged in a brief discussion of those costs, 

appellant announced “we’ll rest,” and both parties announced “close.” Following that, 

the court pronounced sentence. Neither the State nor appellant requested an 

opportunity to present closing argument.1 Nor did appellant complain about the lack of 

opportunity to present a closing argument via a motion for new trial. Consequently, 

appellant failed to preserve her complaint for review.

Consecutive Sentence

Next, appellant alleges that the trial court’s order that the sentence in this cause 

run consecutively to another is void. This is purportedly so because the order mandating 

that the sentences run consecutively insufficiently described the cause, conviction, and 

sentence which had to expire before the sentence at bar began to run. 

 

1 We do not construe counsel’s statement that he “[c]lose[d]” to be a request for closing argument 

but rather a statement that he closed his evidence. See State v. Barragan, 421 S.W.3d 16, 20 (Tex. 

App.—Waco 2013, no pet.) (noting that after both sides rested and “closed” the evidence, the trial court 

recessed to prepare the jury charge); Phillips v. State, 878 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 

1994, no pet.) (noting appellant moved to re-open the evidence after both sides had “closed” the evidence 

prior to the reading of the jury charge or commencement of argument). 
3

Contained in the judgment at bar is the statement:

The Court ORDERS that the sentence in this conviction shall run 

consecutively and shall begin only when the judgment and sentence in the 

following case has ceased to operate: 10,989 (Hutchinson County) . . . . 

To the extent that simply mentioning a cause number and county or prior conviction 

insufficiently describes the sentence that must first expire, see Hicks v. State, No. 09-

12-00474-CR, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 8355, at *8-9 (Tex. App.—Beaumont, June 13, 

2013 pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (stating that a “cumulation 

order . . . which recites only the cause number and county of a prior conviction, is 

insufficient when the prior judgment is from a different county”), an appellate court may 

modify the order when the record contains the necessary data for reformation. Id.; see 

also Banks v. State, 708 S.W.2d 460, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (reforming the written 

sentence to reflect the record of the proceedings and contain the requisite elements). 

Normally there are five items that should be mentioned in a cumulation order. 

They consist of 1) the trial court number of the prior conviction, 2) the correct name of 

the court rendering the prior conviction, 3) the date of the prior conviction, 4) the prison 

sentence rendered in the prior conviction, and 5) the nature of the prior conviction. 

Barela v. State, 180 S.W.3d 145, 148 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Banks v. State, 708 

S.W.2d at 461. Yet, as recognized by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Barela, a

cumulation order with less than the five items has been upheld. Barela v. State, 180 

S.W.3d at 148 n.6. Indeed, such an order will be upheld as long as the description in 

the judgment is “sufficiently specific to allow the Texas Department of Criminal Justice -

Institutional Division (TDCJ - ID), to identify the prior with which the newer conviction is 

cumulated.” Ex parte San Migel, 973 S.W.2d 310, 311 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); see also 
4

Williams v. State, 675 S.W.2d 754, 764 (Tex Crim. App. 1984) (op. on reh’g). Here, the 

record contains the identity of the convicted individual (i.e., Sharissa Valene Tollison), 

the nature of the crime (i.e., theft), the cause number (10,989), the date of the crime 

resulting in the conviction (i.e., August 16, 2012), the county from which the conviction 

issued (i.e., Hutchinson County, Texas), and the sentence (i.e., nine months in a state 

jail facility). The record does not reflect the court rendering the prior conviction or the 

date of the conviction. Nonetheless, what it does reflect is substantial and sufficiently 

specific to allow prison authorities to identify the prior conviction with which the newer 

conviction is cumulated. 

Accordingly, we 1) overrule each issue, 2) modify the judgment to read that “the 

sentence in this conviction shall run consecutively and shall begin only when the 

judgment and sentence in the following case has ceased to operate: Sharissa Valene 

Tollison v. State, Cause No. 10,989, Hutchinson County, Texas, for the crime of theft, 

wherein Tollison received a nine month sentence in a state jail facility,” and 3) affirm the 

judgment as modified. 

Brian Quinn 

Chief Justice 

Do not publish.