alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
FILED 

OCT 21 2009 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Clerk, U.S. District and 

Bankruptcy courts 

La Vonne Davis, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Superior Court, 

Defendant. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Action No. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

09 1995 

This matter is before the Court on plaintiffs pro se complaint and application to proceed 

in forma pauperis. The Court will grant plaintiffs application and dismiss the complaint for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction. 

The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth 

generally at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under those statutes, federal jurisdiction is available 

only when a "federal question" is presented or the parties are of diverse citizenship and the 

amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. A party seeking relief in the district court must at least 

plead facts that bring the suit within the court's jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Failure to 

plead such facts warrants dismissal of the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 

Plaintiff, a District of Columbia resident, sues the Superior Court of the District of 

Columbia. She states that "[t] there is a case in Family Court ... pertaining to one of my kids, 

where there should be one case including both of my kids," and seeks assistance with presenting 

her case "to the appropriate judge" to get her children out of foster care. Compi. at 1. The 

complaint neither presents a federal question nor provides a basis for diversity jurisdiction. 

3 
Accordingly, the complaint must be dismissed.! A separate Order accompanies this 

Memorandum Opinion. 

Date: October --1.b.-, 2009 S?~tes~J-----

! Plaintiffs recourse lies, if at all, in the District of Columbia Superior Court. 

2
Filed by Bowne Pure Compliance





Exhibit 10.1




December 22, 2008




Mr. David Borshell

c/o Image Entertainment, Inc.

20525 Nordhoff Street, Suite 200

Chatsworth, CA 91311




Re: Amendment to Employment Letter Agreement




Dear David:



This amendment letter shall confirm that the Term of your Employment Letter Agreement with
Image Entertainment, Inc. (“Image”) will be extended by ninety (90) days. Accordingly, the “Term”
of the Employment Letter Agreement will now expire on June 29, 2009 and any notice for extending
the Term in the future shall be communicated to you in writing by no later than March 31, 2009
(three months prior to the expiration of this extended Term).



All other terms of the Employment Letter Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.
This amendment letter contains the entire agreement of the parties with respect to the subject
matter herein. This amendment letter may only be modified in writing, signed by you and a duly
authorized representative of Image’s Board of Directors.



If you wish to accept this extension of the Term of your Employment Letter Agreement, please
so indicate by signing below.



Sincerely,




/s/ ROBERT MCCLOSKEY




Robert McCloskey

Director and Chairman of the

Compensation Committee of

the Board of Directors




THE ABOVE IS ACCEPTED AND AGREED.



	 	 	 
	/s/ DAVID BORSHELL

	 	12/22/08
	 
	DAVID BORSHELL

	 	DATE
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED OCTOBER 30, 2020

NO. 03

- 20

- 00427

- CV

Jennifer Fleck, Appellant

v.

Justin Berry, Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 459TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES GOODWIN, BAKER, AN D SM ITH

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE SMITH

This is an appeal from the judgment signed by the tr i a l court on August 24, 2020 . Having

reviewed the record , the Court holds that Jennifer Fleck has not prosecuted her appeal and did

not comply with a notice from the C lerk of this C ourt

. Therefore, the Court dismisses the appeal

for want of p rosecution

. The appellant shall pay all costs relating to this appeal, both in this

Court and in the court below.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1



                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Northfield Laboratories Inc. on Form
10-Q for the period ended August 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Steven A. Gould, M.D.,
Chief Executive Officer of Northfield Laboratories Inc., certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of Northfield Laboratories Inc.


Date: October 14, 2003


/s/ Steven A. Gould, M.D.
-----------------------------------
Steven A. Gould, M.D.
Chief Executive Officer
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Health and Human Services

###### Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality

                    On page 55334, Volume 75, Number 175,                     **Federal Register**                     notice publication dated September 10, 2010, under “                    **ADDRESSES**                    ” section, the correct e-mail address is:                     *Kishena.Wadhwani@AHRQ.hhs.gov.*

Dated: September 17, 2010.

Carolyn M. Clancy,

Director, AHRQ.

[FR Doc. 2010-24425 Filed 9-29-10; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4160-90-M
#### Deidre THOMAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D09-2885.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

March 30, 2011.

Deidre D. Thomas, Vero Beach, pro se.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Don M. Rogers, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The trial court denied appellant’s postconviction motion following this court’s remand in *Thomas v. State,*997 So.2d 526 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). We disagree with the trial court’s purely legal conclusion that trial counsel acted reasonably in relying on information on a non-official Bro-ward Sheriffs Office webpage and refusing to investigate the client’s allegation of a violation of the speedy trial rule. The webpage upon which counsel and the court relied expressly disclaims: “The information on this web site should not be relied upon for any type of legal action.” In relying exclusively on the Broward Sheriffs Office webpage, trial counsel failed to attempt to obtain any of the underlying source documents, such as the Short Arrest Information Form, Magistrate’s Prob*292able Cause Order or the Booking Report, all of which would have corroborated appellant’s claim that she had been arrested in Broward County based on the subject Indian River County charge — an arrest which took place 223 days before the information was filed. Appellant established conclusively that she was entitled to discharge based on a violation of the speedy trial rule and that the State was not entitled to a recapture window. *See Trout v. State,*927 So.2d 1052 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); *Dumas v. State,*877 So.2d 941 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); *Trainer v. Broome,*666 So.2d 1019 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).

Accordingly, we hold that in this case, counsel performed deficiently in failing to investigate and obtain available official-record information that his client told him existed and would prove she was entitled to discharge. Appellant’s claim is not speculative. Because the State was not entitled to a recapture period as a matter of law, she demonstrates prejudice.

We reverse and remand. The trial court shall vacate appellant’s conviction in this case.

*Reversed and remanded.*

WARNER, STEVENSON and GERBER, JJ., concur.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Ron Stewart MARTIN.

No. 2011-K-1441.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 16, 2011.

In re Martin, Ron Stewart; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Vernon, 30th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 71609; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-32.

Denied.
Second Amendment to Standard Employment Agreement, dated December 31, 2008



 EXHIBIT 10.2 
 AMENDMENT 
 TO 
 STANDARD EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
 This Second Amendment to the Standard Employment Agreement (this
“Amendment”) is dated December 31, 2008 (the “Effective Date”) and is made to by and between Bioject Inc. (“BI”) and Bioject Medical Technologies Inc. (“BMT”) (BI and BMT shall be collectively referred to
herein as “Bioject”), and Christine Farrell, an individual (“Employee”) (together the “Parties”). 
 RECITALS

 WHEREAS, the Parties entered into a Standard Employment Agreement on or about January 24, 1997 (the “Original Agreement”),
as amended by the First Amendment to Standard Employment Agreement dated November 8, 2004 (the “First Amendment”); and 
 WHEREAS, the Parties now want to amend the Employment Agreement to make clear that Bioject’s obligations under the Original Agreement, as amended by the First Amendment, are binding on any successor of Bioject. 
 AGREEMENT 
 NOW, THEREFORE, for good and
valuable consideration, and in consideration of the mutual covenants and conditions herein set forth, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the Parties agree as follows: 
 1. New Section 11. A new Section 11 is hereby added to the Original Agreement, to read in its entirety as follows: 
 “11. Successors. 
 (a) Bioject’s Successors. This Agreement shall be binding upon any successor (whether direct or indirect and whether by purchase, lease, merger, consolidation, liquidation or otherwise) to all or
substantially all of Bioject’s business and/or assets and Bioject shall cause any such successor to expressly assume in writing the obligations hereunder as a condition precedent to becoming such a successor. For all purposes under this
Agreement, the term “Bioject” shall include any successor to Bioject’s business and/or assets which becomes bound by this Agreement. 
 (b) Employee’s Successors. This Agreement and all rights of Employee hereunder shall inure to the benefit of, and be enforceable by, Employee’s personal or legal representatives, executors,
administrators, successors, heirs, distributees, devisees and legatees.” 







 2. No Other Amendments. Except as set forth in Section 1, the terms of the Original
Agreement, as amended by the First Amendment, are unchanged and remain in full force and effect. 
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto
have caused this Second Amendment to be duly executed as of the day and year first above written. 
  

			
	BIOJECT INC.
		
	By:	 	/s/ Ralph Makar
	Name:	 	Ralph Makar
	Title:	 	President and Chief Executive Officer
	
	BIOJECT MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES INC.
		
	By:	 	/s/ Ralph Makar
	Name:	 	Ralph Makar
	Title:	 	President and Chief Executive Officer
	
	/s/ Christine Farrell
	Christine Farrell


  

 2
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<MULTIPLIER>                                            1000

<S>                           <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                 12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                JUL-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                    AUG-1-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                     JUL-31-2000
<CASH>                                                 4,739
<SECURITIES>                                           7,754
<RECEIVABLES>                                         12,618
<ALLOWANCES>                                             600
<INVENTORY>                                                0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                      27,610
<PP&E>                                                12,348
<DEPRECIATION>                                         6,309
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                        49,010
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                 14,581
<BONDS>                                                    0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                      0
<PREFERRED>                                                0
<COMMON>                                                 166
<OTHER-SE>                                            33,705
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                          49,010
<SALES>                                               22,319
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                      50,977
<CGS>                                                 10,224
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                         48,175
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                        (612)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         327
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                        54
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                        3,414
<INCOME-TAX>                                           1,885
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                    1,529
<DISCONTINUED>                                             0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                            0
<CHANGES>                                                  0
<NET-INCOME>                                           1,529
<EPS-BASIC>                                              .10
<EPS-DILUTED>                                            .09



</TABLE>
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 21.1

                       CENTENNIAL HEALTHCARE CORPORATION


Subsidiaries of Centennial HealthCare Corporation
-------------------------------------------------

CENTENNIAL HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
A Georgia corporation

CENTENNIAL HEALTHCARE PROPERTIES CORPORATION
A Georgia corporation

CENTENNIAL/ASHTON PROPERTIES CORPORATION
A Georgia corporation

CENTENNIAL PROFESSIONAL THERAPY SERVICES CORPORATION
A Georgia corporation

CENTENNIAL ACQUISITION CORPORATION
A Georgia corporation

CENTENNIAL HEALTHCARE HOSPITAL CORPORATION
A Georgia corporation

TRANSITIONAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC.
A Georgia corporation


Subsidiaries of Centennial HealthCare Properties Corporation
------------------------------------------------------------

CENTENNIAL HEALTHCARE INVESTMENT CORPORATION
A Georgia corporation


Subsidiaries of Centennial Acquisition Corporation
--------------------------------------------------

CENTENNIAL SERVICE CORPORATION - GRANT PARK
A Georgia corporation

CENTENNIAL SERVICE CORPORATION - MONTCLAIR
A Georgia corporation
<PAGE>

Subsidiaries of Transitional Health Services, Inc.
--------------------------------------------------

THS PARTNERS I, INC.
A Delaware corporation

THS PARTNERS II, INC.
A Delaware corporation

PARAGON REHABILITATION, INC.
A Delaware corporation

TRANSITIONAL FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.
A Delaware corporation


Subsidiaries of Paragon Rehabilitation, Inc.
--------------------------------------------

TOTAL CARE CONSOLIDATED, INC.
A Georgia corporation


Subsidiaries of Total Care Consolidated, Inc.
---------------------------------------------

TOTAL CARE, INC.
A North Carolina corporation

TOTAL HEALTH CARE SERVICES, INC.
A North Carolina corporation

HCC HOME HEALTH OF LOUISIANA, INC.
A Louisiana corporation


Subsidiaries of Total Health Care Services, Inc.
------------------------------------------------

TOTAL CARE OF THE CAROLINAS, INC.
A North Carolina corporation
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

September 5, 2014

No. 04-14-00588-CR

IN RE Abelardo GONZALEZ

Original Mandamus Proceeding1

ORDER

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Marialyn Barnard, Justice

On September 4, 2014, relator filed a motion requesting an extension of time to file a 

motion for rehearing in this original proceeding. The motion is GRANTED IN PART. Under the 

rules of appellate procedure, relator’s motion for rehearing would be due in this court within 

fifteen days after the order denying his petition for writ of mandamus, or by September 3, 2014. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 49.1. Relator is GRANTED a 30-day extension of time. Any motion for 

rehearing will be due in this court no later than October 3, 2014. 

It is so ORDERED on September 5th, 2014.

_____________________________

Marialyn Barnard, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 5th day of September, 2014.

_____________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court

1 This proceeding arises out of Cause Nos. 2008CRR000657-D1; 2008-CRR-000662-D1; 2008-CRR-000665-D1, 

styled The State of Texas v. Abelardo Gonzalez, pending in the 49th Judicial District Court, Webb County, Texas, 

the Honorable Jose A. Lopez presiding.
Exhibit 32.1





                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF
                         THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the filing of the Annual Report on Form 10-K of
South Jersey Gas Company (the "Company") for the period ended December 31, 2004
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Edward J. Graham, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby
certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.





/s/ Edward J. Graham
-------------------------------------
Name:  Edward J. Graham
Title:  Chief Executive Officer
March 7, 2005
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Daniel B. PRINCE.

No. 2011-KK-0704.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 6, 2011.

In re State of Louisiana; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Acadia, 15th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 72,189; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 11-00423.

Denied.
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 184 (Thursday, September 23, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 57969]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-23867]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Institute of Biomedical Imaging and Bioengineering; 
Notice of Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended (5 U.S.C. App.), notice is hereby given of the following 
meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: National Institute of Biomedical Imaging and 
Bioengineering Special Emphasis Panel; ZEB1 OSR-D(J1)S Trainingand K 
Award Grant Review 2011/.
    Date: November 18, 2010.
    Time: 8 p.m. to 5 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: Gaylord National Hotel & Convention Center, 201 
Waterfront Street, National Harbor, MD 20745.
    Contact Person: John K. Hayes, PhD, Scientific Review Officer, 
6707 Democracy Boulevard, Suite 959, Bethesda, MD 20892, 301-451-
3398, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#244c455d41574e6449454d480a4a4d4c0a434b52"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="81e9e0f8e4f2ebc1ece0e8edafefe8e9afe6eef7">[email protected]</span></a>.

    Dated: September 17, 2010.
Jennifer S. Spaeth,
Director, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 2010-23867 Filed 9-22-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-P


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</html>
#### Jorge PEREZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 2D10-4838.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

May 11, 2011.

Jorge Perez, pro se.

WHATLEY, Judge.

Jorge Perez filed a motion to vacate plea, judgment, and sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The postconviction court issued an order and explained simply that the court heard legal argument at a September 3, 2010, hearing, made findings on the record at that hearing, and denied the motion under the totality of the circumstances. However, the postconviction court did not attach a copy of the transcript of this hearing to its order, and the clerk of the circuit court has verified that no transcript of this hearing has been filed in the circuit court record.

The problem this court encounters with the postconviction court’s order is not unlike that created when a postconviction judge simply stamps “denied” on a motion: we are left to review a barebones order without any insight into the court’s reasoning. *See Dorsey v. State,*36 So.3d 690, 690 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); *Suleiman v. State,*861 So.2d 1175, 1175-1176 (Fla. 2d DCA *5672003). When denying a motion for post-conviction relief, the court “must provide an explanation of the reasons for the denial and attach any relevant portions of the record to support the denial.” *Perry v. State,*872 So.2d 1017, 1017 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).

Accordingly, we reverse this order. On remand, if the postconviction court again summarily denies the motion, it shall enter an explanatory order and attach relevant portions of the record to refute Mr. Perez’s claim.

Reversed and remanded.

CRENSHAW and BLACK, JJ., Concur.
#### Dejoyce BRUMFIELD; Sandra K. Bridges and Linda Magee. v. Michael G. LIND, United States Fire Insurance Company, John Doe, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.

No. 2011-C-0243.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 25, 2011.

In re Bridges, Sandra K.; Brumfield, Dejoyce; —Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. K, No. 2009-4074; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-CA-1011.

Denied.
#### Kerry Delane DeYOUNG, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D10-5574.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Nov. 15, 2010.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 6, 2011.

*640Kerry Delane DeYoung, pro se, Petitioner.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

DENIED. *Logan v. State,*846 So.2d 472 (Fla.2003).

WEBSTER, DAVIS, and ROWE, JJ„ concur.