### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03- 06 -00 397 -CV

In the Matte r of S. C.

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 98TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. J-2 1,43 3 , HO NORAB LE W. JEANNE MEURER , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N

I n Marc h 2002, the trial cour t foun d that S.C., who was six teen at the time, had committed the offe n s e o f ca p i tal murder when he shot a nd killed J esse Rang el, J r., duringan ag g ravated robbe ry , adjudicate d him delinquent, and committed him to the custody of the Te x as Yo uth Com mis sio n f

or a de te rm inate fo rt

y -ye ar s e nte nc e . In F e br

ua ry 20 06 , T YC a sk e d to have S.C. transfe rre d from TYC custody to the Texas D epar

tment of Criminal J ustice to serve the re mainder of his sentenc e. On Apr il 6, 2006, the trial court held a hear ing on T YC’s tran sfer reque st (the “tra nsfer /relea se hea

ring ”), see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.11 (West Supp. 2007) ( on rec eipt of TYC reque st for transf

er to T DC J , co u rt must hold hearingand dec ide whethe r to transfe r juvenile or rele ase juve nile under supe rvision), and or d e r e d S.C. t ransf err ed to TDCJ custody

for the c ompletion of hi s sentenc e. S.C. appea ls, arguing that the trial court e rre d in admitting into evidence a re cent psy cholog ical eva luation of S.C. on which TYC relied in part for its transfe r request. We affir m the trial court’ s transfe r orde r.

At the transf

er/re lease hear ing, L eonar d Cucolo, court liaison for T YC , provided

c op ie s o f T YC ’s bu sin e ss r e c or ds re late d to S.C. Whe n T YC so ug ht t o a dmi t th e re c or ds , S. C.See M iranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966). 1 The thre e exhibits toge ther c onsist of more than 1,000 pag es of r eports. 2 I n his brief, S.C. presents a rg ument exclusiv el y re l at ed to his Fifth Amendment rig ht 3 a g a ins t se lf

-i nc ri min a tio n. Al tho ug h h e re fe rs in his state me nt of his po int s of er ro r t o th e F ourt e e nth Amendment and to a

rticle I , sections 10 and 19 of the Texas Constitution, he does not pr esent a ny argume nt r e late d to tho se pr ov isi on s, no r d id he re fe r to a ny thi ngoth e r t

ha n h is Miranda rig hts at trial. S.C. has there fore waived any state and F ourtee nth Amendment complaints. See Tex. R. App. P. 3 3. 1( a )( 1) , 3 8. 1( h) ; De wbe rry v . S tate , 4 S.W. 3d

73 5, 74 8 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ); Sta hlev . S tate , 97 0 S. W.2 d 6 82 , 6 92 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 1 99 8, pe t. r e f’ d) ; Ma rti ne z v . S tate , 969 S.W .2d 497, 499 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.). 2 objected that the rec ords included pre- sentenc e repor ts f rom the Austin Police Depa rtment. The tria l court stated that it wa s admitting the exhibi ts but would not consider the police r eports. S.C. then immediately

objected “ with reg ard to the psy cholog ical evaluation” perf ormed in O ctober 2005 by

a sso c ia te ps y c ho log ist

Jac kie Da iss , c omp la ini ngthat S. C. w a s n ot f or ma lly wa rn e d of h is Miranda 1 rig hts. The cour

t noted that S.C. had alrea d y b ee n sentenc ed and the n overr uled S.C.’s objection when his attorney could produce no case law to suppor t his objection. On appea l, S.C. complains that the trial court err ed in admitting Daiss’s r eport be cause the lack of Miranda war nings violate d his constituti onal rig hts ag ainst self-incr imination.

TY C in iti a lly

c on te nd s th a t S.C. wa ive d any ob je c tio n to Da iss ’s re po rt

be c a us e his objection was untimely , made immediately afte r the trial c ourt admitted the re cords with the cave at that it wo uld no t c on sid e r t

he pr e -s e nte nc ingpo lic e r e p o r t s , a nd no t su ff ic ie ntl y sp e c if ic be c a us e S.C. did not specify

exactly wher e in the exhibits the objectionable r eport wa s located. We disag ree and 2 hold that S.C., by

raising his objection immediately afte r his objection to the police r eports and by sp e c if yingthat it

wa s D a iss ’s re port to wh ic h h e ob je c te d, su ff

ic ie ntl y pr e se rv e d h is c omp la int s related to his Fifth Amendment r ights unde r the fe dera l constituti on. 33 Af te r o bje c tin g to t

he a dmi ssi on

of Da iss ’s re po rt , S.C. ca lle d he r as a wi tne ss. Da iss essentially

testified to the same information that was include d in her re port. She said that S.C. had

ma de g oo d pro g re ss unt il he wa s tra ns fe rr e d to a diff

e re nt uni t, that he cl a ime d he sh ot t he vic tim in s e lf -d e fe ns e , a

nd tha t he sh ow e d a

la c k o f e mpathy

and re mor se fo r t

he of fe ns e . Sh e be lie ve d S. C.

w a s d i s h o n e s ti nt a k i n g a p s y c h o l o g i c a l t e s tan d

r e c o m m e n d e d

t h a th e be tr a ns f

e r r e d t o T D C J. Da iss ’s re po rt re c ite s the same op ini on s and state s tha t the e va luatio n wa s re qu e ste d to aid TY C in “dete rmining w hether

[S .C.] should be returne d to c ourt for a possible waiver of his minimum period of conf inement or be transfe rre d to” TDCJ

. At the beg inning of the assessment, S.C. “wa s informed that th e re su lts of

ps y c ho log ic a l te sti ngand c lin ic a l in te rv ie w w ou ld n ot b e c on fi de nti a l and wo uld be used to a ssist” TYC in making a rec ommendation in S.C.’s case . Daiss explained to S.C . “that the eva luation would become pa rt of his perm an ent record available to all dec ision-making authorit i es , ” an d S.C. said he understood the purpose of the a ssessment and ag ree d to participate

.

S.C. also called as witnesses hi s TYC case worke r, who testified that he had not made sufficie nt prog ress with his treatment and s eeme d to have developed a s elf-de feating attitude; and five juvenile corr ections office rs who supervised him a nd testified that he h ad b ee n co o perative, po lit e , a nd re sp e c tf ul a nd wa s n ot d isr

up tiv e . A t th e c on c lus ion of the he ari ng , th e tr ia l c ourt sa id it was taking as true S.C.’s cla im of self-de fense and stated,

[W ]hether y ou fee l like y ou had som e jus tification for this murder or not, there has to be an e motional reac tion to what y ou saw a nd experience d and what h ap p ened. And I don’t see a

ny . I haven’ t se en any today

. I don’t see a ny in the rec ords. I

don’t see a ny ability to have a ny fee ling f or human life. That makes y ou, sir, a dang erous pe rs on . . . . B ut I

do n’ t c are ho w y ou pla

y it o ut, wh e the r you

kil le d th is m an in

c old blood, or wa n t to believe, a nd it’s true in y our hea

rt, that it was self- defe nse, y ou be tte r f ind so me a bil ity to c onne c t w ith

y our c on sc ie nc e . Y ou

be tte r f ind so me rea son to chang e.4 We r e vie w a tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r t ra ns fe rr inga

juv e nil e to T DC J cus tod

y fo r a n a bu se of discre tion. In re F.D

. , 2 4 5 S

. W

. 3 d 1 1 0 , 1 1 3 ( T e x. A p p . — D a l l a s 2 0 0 8 , n o p e t

. ); In re D. L. , 19 8 S.W. 3d 22 8, 22 9 ( Te x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 20 06 , p e t. d e nie d) ; In re C.L. , J r. , 874 S.W .2d 880, 886 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, no writ).

S.C. complains t

h a t t h e a d mi s s io n o f D a is s ’ s r e p o rt during the transf er/re lease hear ing violated his F if

th A me n d me nt p r iv il eg e ag ainst self-incr imination. Assumi ng that S.C. di d not waive any err or by calling Daiss to testify about t he conclusions she re ache d and included in he r re port, see Le da yv . S tate , 98 3 S .W .2 d 7 13 , 7 17 -1 8 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ) ( “ ov e rr uli ngan o bje c tio n to evidenc e will not result in reve rsal whe n other such e vidence was re ceive d without objection, either be fo re or a ft e r t he c omp la ine d- of

ru lin g ” ), a

tr ans fe r/ re le a se he ari ngis n ot a

tr ia l—a juv e nil e ’s g uil t or innoce nce has alre ady been deter mined and a se ntence imposed. In re M .M. , No. 03-06-00396- CV, 2008 Tex. App. L EXI S 981, at *9-10 (Te x . App.—Austin Fe b. 6, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re D. L. , 1 98 S.W. 3d a t 23 0; In re C.L. , J r. , 8 74 S.W. 2d

a t 88 4- 85 . T he c on du c t f or wh ic h S. C. is b e ingpunis he d w a s a lr e a dy c on sid e re d b y

the tr ia l c ourt , and S.C. wa s se nte nc e d to a te rm of fo rt y y ear s. I n this transfer

/relea se heari n g, t h e t rial cour t was simply

consideringwhether

to continue S.C.’s confinement or a llow his supervised re lease . Thus, in this “second cha nce he aring ,” “due proce ss require ments are not as string ent as those in an a ctual trial.” In re J .M.O. , 980 S.W .2d 811, 8 1 3 ( T e x. A p p . — S anA n t o n i o 1 9 9 8 , p e t

. d e n i e d) ; see In re D. L. , 1 98 S.W. 3d a t 23 0; In re D.S. , 921 S.W .2d 383, 387 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996, writ di sm’d w.o.j.).

Sectio n 5 4

. 1 1, which g overns tra nsfer /relea se hea

ring s, provides that a tria l court consideringwhether

to relea se a juve nile under supe rvision or trans fe r him to TDCJ custody may consider “ written re ports from probation officer s, profe s s i o n al court e mploy ees, pr ofessionalS e e I n r e D

. W. , 9 33 S.W. 2d

35 3, 35 8 ( Te x. Ap p. —B e a umo nt 1 99 6, wr it d e nie d) (j uv e nil e 4 argued that admission of psy cholog ical re cords violated h is Fifth Amendment r ights; cour t overrule d point as inadequately briefe d beca use i t was mul tifarious and beca use j uvenile did not “produc e any argument or authority

in support of a challeng e to the constitutionalit y of [section 54.11(d)] which e xp r e s s l y p r o v i d e s t h e t r i a l c o u rtm ay c o n s i d e r t h e w r i t t e nr e p or ts” ); s ee also In re J.M.O

. , 980 S.W .2d 811, 813 (Tex. App.—San Antoni o 1998, pet. denied) (consider ing juve nile’s ar g ument that use of TY C report in transf er/re lease hear ing violate d his r ight to confront witnesse s and holding that due proc ess re quirements ar e less strict in transfe r/rele ase he aringthan in actua l trial and that beca use juvenile must be g iven re ports in advanc e, “[s]houl d there be a que stion reg ardingthe g enuinene ss of these r eports, the j u v en i l e’s attorney may call the a

uthors of the re ports for the purpose of

cross-e x amination. This proce ss adequately provides for

the conf rontation rig hts of the juvenile.” ( citation omitted)). 5 consultants or employ ees of ” TYC, provide d that the j uvenile is allowed “acc ess to all written matter to be consider ed by

the cour t” and “ previous examination of all re ports on and eva luations and examinations of or relati n g t o h i m that may be used in the he aring .” Te x . Fam. Code Ann. § 54.11(d), ( e). As we r ece ntly said in In re M

.M. : 4 Thus, beca

use a tra nsfer hear ing is not a stag e of a criminal prosec ution, the he aring do e s n ot r e qu ir e the same str ing e nt r e qu ir e me nts a s a tr ia l in wh ic h a pe rs on ’s g uil t is determined, a

nd the statute expressly prov i d es for

the consider ation of the [psy cholog ical eva luation conducted f or the purposes o f the tra nsfer hear ing], we hold that the trial court did not er r in admitting the e valuation. 2008 Tex. App. L EXI S 981, at *11. S .C. has prese nted us with no argument or authority explaining why we should not follow our ear lier dec ision. Further , in In re F.D

. , our si ster court held that the trial court’ s consideration of a psy cholog ical ex am conducted for a transfer/r elea se hearing when the ps y c ho log ist

did no t a pp e ar f or the he ari ng did

no t vi olate the juv e nil e ’s Sixth A me ndme nt r ig hts ,S e e a ls o I n re N.B. , No. 03-97-00766- CV, 1999 Tex. App. L EXI S 2775, at *2-4 5 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 15, 1999, no pet.) (not desig nated f or publication) ( in appea l from orde r cer tify ing juve nile for tria l as adult, court f ollowed sister courts and overr uled argument that use of co u rt -o rd er edp s y ch o l o gi ca l ev al u at i o nv i o l at edri gh taga i n s ts el f- i n cr i m i n at i o n ) ( ci t i n g In re J .C.J. , 90 0 S .W. 2d

75 3, 75 4 ( Te x. Ap p. —T y le r 1 99 5, no wr it) ; In re C.J.P. , 6 5 0 S. W. 2 d 4 6 5 , 466 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th D ist .] 19 83 , n o w ri t) ; I n r e A.D.P. , 6 46 S.W .2d 568, 569 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14t h Di st. ] 1 98 2, no writ ); In re K.W .M. , 598 S.W .2d 660, 661-62 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1980, no writ)). 6 noting that the tr ansfe r hea ring “is dispositi onal rather than adjudicative in nature .” 245 S.W.3d at 113-14. 5 We h old

that th e tr ia l c ourt

did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in

a dmi tti ngDa iss ’s re po rt

int o evidenc e duringS.C.’s transfer /relea se hea

ring . We overrule S.C.’s sole issue on appeal a nd aff irm the trial cour

t’s transfe r orde r.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear , and Pember ton Affir med Filed: Jul y

3, 2008