alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit
      31.2





**CERTIFICATION
      OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**


**PURSUANT
      TO RULES 13A-14 AND 15D-14**


**OF
      THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934**





I,
      Ronald
      S. Bass, Principal Accounting Officer of Cardinal Communications, Inc. (the
      "Company"), certify that:





I
      have
      reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-KSB/A of Cardinal Communications,
      Inc.





Based
      on
      my knowledge, this Annual Report does not contain any untrue statement of a
      material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
      made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made,
      not
      misleading with respect to the period covered by this Annual
      Report.





Based
      on
      my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included
      in the report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,
      results of operations and cash flows of the Company as of, and for, the periods,
      presented in the report.





I
      am
      responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures
      (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the Company and
      have:





(a)
      designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
      controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
      material information relating to the Company, including its consolidated
      subsidiaries, is made known to me by others within those entities, particularly
      during the period in which the periodic report is being prepared;





(b)
      [Paragraph omitted in accordance with SEC transition instructions contained
      in
      SEC Release 34-47986]; and





(c)
      disclosed in this Annual Report any change in the Company's internal control
      over financial reporting that occurred during the Company's most recent fiscal
      quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
      affect, the Company's internal control over financial reporting;
      and





I
      have
      disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over
      financial reporting, to the Company's auditors and to the audit committee of
      the
      Board of Directors (or persons fulfilling the equivalent function):





(j)
      all
      significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal control over
      financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the
      Company's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial
      information; and





(ii)
      any
      fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees
      who
      have a significant role in the Company's internal control over financial
      reporting.




Dated: October 5, 2007/s/ Ronald
                S.
                BassName:
                Ronald S. BassPrincipal Accounting
                Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000920941
<NAME> RED ROOF INNS, INC.
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-28-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-28-1996
<CASH>                                          12,083
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   10,712
<ALLOWANCES>                                       464
<INVENTORY>                                      9,268
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                36,127
<PP&E>                                         762,338
<DEPRECIATION>                                  62,293
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 822,418
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           60,027
<BONDS>                                              0
<COMMON>                                           284
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                     318,856
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   822,418
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               244,400
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  123,373
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                49,083
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   184
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              31,326
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 40,434
<INCOME-TAX>                                    16,329
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             24,105
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    24,105
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .88
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .88
        

</TABLE>
Unassociated Document


    


      


      Exhibit
10.5.5

      


      Ratification
and Extension Agreement 


      THIS Agreement is made and
entered into this 14th day of October, 2008, by and between Millennium Group
Worldwide Incorporated, a Florida corporation with its principal place of
business at 2825 N. 10th
Street, St. Augustine, Florida 32084 ("MGW”), and Wandana International Jambo
Coffees & Teas, Inc with a principal place of business at (“Wandana”), 200
Business Circle #106, St. Augustine, FL.32905 and Jax Roasters, Inc. (“Jax”),
located at 200 Business Circle #106, St. Augustine,
FL.32905   (collectively  “we, us, the parties or the
group hereinafter referred to as “Wandana”).

      
WHEREAS,
MGW have entered into a Shareholders Agreement dated 25th February, 2007 (the “Prior
Shareholders Agreement”);

      
WHEREAS,
the Prior Shareholders Agreement (at third WHEREAS paragraph) and the Prior
Amendment (Now Therefore, Paragraph 2) was conditioned upon MGW obtaining
adequate funding under its Form S-1 Registration, such period of time having
already expired as a function of the registration and review
process;

      
WHEREAS,
both MGW and Wandana wish to ratify the Prior Shareholders Agreement Amendment
and extend the period that will satisfy the Now Therefore, Paragraph 2 condition
as to timing.

      
NOW,
THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows:

      


      
        	
                1.  

              	
                MGW
      and Wandana hereby ratify the Prior Shareholders Agreement and Amendments
      in all respects;

              


      

      
        	
                2.  

              	
                Section,
      Now Therefore, Paragraph 2  of the Amendment relating to timing
      of funding is extended to no later than March 15, 2009, or immediately
      after the appropriate funding is available from the offering;
      and

              


      

      
        	
                3.  

              	
                This
      Agreement, together with the Prior Shareholders Agreement and Amendments
      as hereby incorporated by reference, constitutes the entire understanding
      between the parties relating to the subject matter hereof, and no
      amendment or modification to this Agreement shall be valid or binding upon
      the parties unless made in writing and signed by each
    party.

              


      

      


      IN
WITNESS WHEREOF the parties hereto have executed this Agreement as of the date
first written above.

      


      MILLENNIUM
GROUP WORLD INCORPORATED

      


      /s/ Julius Jackson,
Sr.                                                                

      (Signature)

      Julius
Jackson, Sr.- Chairman

      


      WANDANA
INTERNATIONAL JAMBO COFFEES & TEAS, INC.

      


      /s/ Simon K.
Nyagah                                                                

      (Signature)

      Simon K.
Nyagah, President

      JAX
ROASTERS, INC.

      


      /s/_Simon K. Nyagah____

      (Signature)

      Simon K.
Nyagah, President
1 The HONORABLE RICHARD G. KOPF, Chief Judge, United States District

Court for the District of Nebraska.



## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 00-1464

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of Nebraska. Michael A. Ealey, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: July 26, 2000 Filed: July 31, 2000

___________ Before BEAM, FAGG, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Michael Ealey pleaded guilty to bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). At sentencing, he objected to his designation as a career offender, arguing that one of his prior felony convictions--burglary of a commercial building--should not be considered a crime of violence for the purposes of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 4B1.1 and 4B1.2 (1998). The district court 1 overruled Ealey’s objection-2-

andimposed a sentence of 121 months imprisonment, 3 years supervised release, and restitution. Ealey appeals, again challenging his career-offender status. Having carefully reviewed the record, we determine that Ealey was properly designated a career offender. He did not contest the presentence report’s (PSR) findings that he was over the age of 18, that the instant offense was a crime of violence, an d that he had two prior felony convictions. See § 4B1.1; Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(6)(D) (district court may accept unobjected-to portions of PSR as findings of fact). We reiterate our prior holding that commercial burglaries constitute crimes of violence for the purposes of §§ 4B1.1 and 4B1.2. See UnitedStates v. Hascall , 76 F.3d 902, 904 (8th Cir.), cert. denied , 519 U.S. 948 (1996). Accordingly, we affirm. A true copy. Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1610 Introduced in House (IH)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1610

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to reduce the tax on beer to 
                          its pre-1991 level.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 20, 2007

 Mr. Pomeroy (for himself and Mr. English of Pennsylvania) introduced 
  the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and 
                                 Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to reduce the tax on beer to 
                          its pre-1991 level.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REPEAL OF 1990 TAX INCREASE ON BEER.

    (a) In General.--Paragraph (1) of section 5051(a) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to imposition and rate of tax on beer) 
is amended by striking ``$18'' and inserting ``$9''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

       
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Balance Sheet at September 30, 1997 (unaudited) and Statements of Income for
the three months ended September 30, 1997 (unaudited) and is qualified in its
entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

<S>                                    <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                    3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                       8,418,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                3,742,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                   265,000
<INVENTORY>                                    871,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            12,939,000
<PP&E>                                       3,306,000
<DEPRECIATION>                              (1,484,000)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              16,702,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,600,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     7,457,000
<OTHER-SE>                                   7,645,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                15,102,000
<SALES>                                      7,341,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             7,341,000
<CGS>                                        4,561,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                4,561,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,392,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,562,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                   578,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            984,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   984,000
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .29
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .29

        

</TABLE>
#### E. W. Rush v. W. B. Lester.

(No. 1842.)

Appeal from Delta County.

Opinion by

White, P. J.

§ *ÍÍ2. Pleading in justice's court; a plea which is abandoned in justice's court cannot be entertained on appeal in the county court.*Appellant sued appellee in justice’s court upon a promissory note. Appellee pleaded fraud, on the part of appellant in obtaining the execution of said note, and also pleaded failure of consideration. He, however, expressly abandoned the plea of failure of consideration, and that issue was not tried in justice’s court. On a trial *de novo,*upon appeal to the county court, appellee in that court renewed his plea of failure of consideration, and appellant moved to strike out said plea, because it was inadmissible to plead a defense in the county court which had not been pleaded and relied upon in the court *a quo.*This motion was overruled and judgment was rendered for appellee. *Held:*The plea of fail*391ure of consideration, not being presented in the justice’s court first trying the cause, could not be presented and relied,upon in the county court on appeal. Having" been abandoned in the justice’s court, the proposition to plead it again in the county court was, in effect, the same as though it were a new plea, presented for the first time in the county court. On appeal from justice’s court, a defendant cannot plead a defense in the county court which he did not plead and rely upon in the'justice’s court. [W. & W. Con. Rep. § 239.] It was error to overrule appellant’s motion to strike out said plea.

November 26, 1884.

Reversed and remanded.
#### Rufus GELSEY, Appellant, v. Walter A. McNEIL, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Appellee.

No. 1D10-0934.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

July 28, 2010.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 22, 2010.

Rufus Gelsey, pro se, Appellant.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Kathleen Von Hoene, General Counsel, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. *Mobley v. McNeil,*989 So.2d 1215 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

WEBSTER, DAVIS, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
627 A.2d 106

#### IN THE MATTER OF RICHARD D. SILVERBLATT, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW.

July 1, 1993.

ORDER

RICHARD D. SILVERBLATT of NEW YORK, NEW YORK who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1983, and who was disbarred by the State of New York on November 12,1985, having pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to one count of willfully and knowingly presenting false documents to the INS in violation of 18 *U.S.C.A.*§ 1001, and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that pursuant to *Rule*1:20 — 6(b)(1), RICHARD D. SILVERBLATT is temporarily suspended from the practice of law pending the final resolution of ethics proceedings against him, effective immediately and until the further Order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that RICHARD D. SILVERBLATT be restrained and enjoined from practicing law during the period of his suspension; and it is further

*67ORDERED that RICHARD D. SILVERBLATT comply with Administrative Guideline No. 23 of the Office of Attorney Ethics dealing with suspended attorneys.
## NO. 12-09-00125-CR IN THE COUR T OF APP EALS TWELFTH COURT OF APP EALS D ISTR ICT

TYLER, TEXA S

CHAR LES BASS, § APP EAL FRO

M T HE T HIR D APPELLANT V. § JUDICIAL DISTRI CT COURT OF
TH E ST ATE OF TEX

AS, APP ELL EE § AN DE RSON C OU

NT Y, TEX

AS
MEMORA NDUM OPIN ION PER CU RIAM This appeal i s b ei n g dismiss ed for want of jurisdiction. Appe llant was convic ted of possession of a c ontrolled substance . Sentence was imposed on Februa ry 12, 2009. Texa s Rule of Appellate Procedur e 26.2 provide s that an appe al is perf ecte d when notice of
a pp e a l is fi le d w ith in thirty da ys a ft e r the da y se nte nc e is imp os e d or su sp e nd e d in op e n c ou rt un le ss
a motion for new trial is timely filed. T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 26.2(a) (1). Wher e a timely moti on for ne w trial has bee n filed, not ice of appea l shall be filed within ni nety days a fter the sentenc e is imposed or suspende d in open court. T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 26 .2 (a )( 2)

. Ap pe lla nt d id n ot f ile a mot ion fo r n e w t

ri a l. There fore , his notice of appe al was due to have been filed on or before March 16, 2009. Howeve r, Appellant did not file his notice of a ppeal until April 29, 2009 and did not file a motion for extension of time to file his notice of a ppeal a s permitted by Texa s Rule of Appellate Procedur e 26.3. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 26.3 (appe llate court may extend time for filing notice of appe al if, wit h i n fiftee n days afte r dea dline for f

iling noti ce of

appea l , ap p ellant files notice of appea l in trial court and motion complying with Texas Rule of Appe llate Proce dure 10.5( b) in appe llate cour t). On April 30, 2009, this court notified Appe llant that there w as n o notice of a ppeal f iled within the time allowed by rule 26.2 and no timely motion for an exte nsion of time as permitted by rule 26.3. Appellant was further informed that the appea l would be dismissed unless, on or befor e2

Ma y 1 1, 20 09 , th e inf

or ma tio n r e c e ive d in thi s app e a l wa s ame nd e d to show the jur isd ic tio n o f this
c ou rt . A pp e lla nt h a s n e ith e r s ho wn the jur isd ic tio n o f t his c ou rt or oth e rw ise re sp on de d to its April 30, 2009 notice. Because this court has no authority to allow the late filing of a n o t i ce of appea l exce pt as provided by R u l e 26.3, the appe al must be dismissed. See Sla ton v . St ate , 981 S.W.2d 208, 210 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ); Ol iv o v . St ate , 918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) . Acc ordingly, the a pp e a l is dismiss ed for want of juri sdiction

. Opinion delivere d May 13, 2009. P an el consi s t ed of

W ort hen, C. J. , G r i

f f i t h, J. , and H oyl e, J.

(DO N OT PUBLISH)
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Leonard J. KNOTT, a/k/a Jamel, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 00-4419.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 20, 2000.

Decided Jan. 11, 2001.

*195Scott Brettschneider, Anthony G. Spencer, Brettschneider & Didio, Kew Gardens, NY, for appellant. J. Rene Josey, United States Attorney, Robert H. Bickerton, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, SC, for appellee.

Before WILKINS, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Leonard J. Knott appeals a 188 month sentence made pursuant to his guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute, and possession with intent to distribute, cocaine, cocaine base, and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994). Knott asserts that the district court erroneously sentenced him as a career offender.

Knott had previously been arrested and sentenced in New York for two crimes that took place in 1991. On September 22, 1991, Knott, then seventeen years old, was arrested for the criminal sale of controlled substances, which Knott had committed earlier that day. On November 3, 1991, Knott, then eighteen years old, was arrested for robbery. Knott pled guilty to both charges and, on April 20, 1992, Knott was sentenced to eighteen to fifty-four months imprisonment.

A defendant is sentenced as a career offender if he has at least two prior felony convictions for either a crime of violence or a serious drug offense. *See*USSG § 4B1.1 (1998). The sentences for the two prior felonies must be counted separately under USSG § 4A1.1. USSG § 4B1.2(c). Sentences for prior offenses that were not separated by an intervening arrest are considered related cases and counted as one sentence, *see*USSG § 4A1.2(a)(2), if they resulted from offenses that (a) occurred on the same occasion, (b) were part of a single common scheme or plan, or (c) were consolidated for trial or sentencing. USSG § 4A1.2, comment, (n. 3).

On appeal, Knott argues that his prior offenses were consolidated for sentencing, though there was never a formal consolidation order. We disagree.

For cases to be related under USSG §§ 4A1.1-2, the offenses must be factually related or be formally consolidated. *United States v. Allen,*50 F.3d 294, 296-98 (4th Cir.1995). Knott fails to show a factual relationship between his prior offenses, and since there is no consolidation order, these cases are not related for sentencing. *See United States v. Rivers,*929 F.2d 136, 139 (4th Cir. 1991) (noting that even cases consolidated for plea bargaining are not related under the guidelines); *United States v. Lopez,*961 F.2d 384 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that offenses sentenced on the same day by the same judge are not related under the guidelines).

Accordingly, Knott is a career offender and was properly sentenced as such. We therefore affirm Knott’s sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid in the deci-sional process.

*AFFIRMED.*