alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### GIANTHONY HOMES, INC. and Avondale Diversified, Inc., Appellants, v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, etc., et al., Appellees.

No. 5D10-715.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Jan. 28, 2011.

George J.F. Werner, Ybor City, for Appellant.

No Appearance for Appellee.

EVANDER, J.

Gianthony Homes, Inc. and Avondale Diversified, Inc., appeal from an *ex parte*order setting aside a foreclosure sale and directing the Clerk to not issue them a certificate of title. We reverse because the record reflects that the order was obtained without notice to the appellants.

Appellee, U.S. Bank National Association, obtained a final judgment of foreclosure against Raphael Mendes. Appellants were the high bidders at the foreclosure sale, paid the price bid, and were issued a *839certificate of title. Shortly thereafter, U.S. Bank filed an “Ex Parte Agreed Motion to Set Aside Foreclosure Sale, Not Issue Certificate of Title and Reset Foreclosure Sale.” In the motion, U.S. Bank recited that appellants had agreed to the granting of the motion. The certificate of service reflected that a copy of the motion had been mailed to appellants. Thereafter, the trial court (understandably) entered the “Ex Parte Agreed Order Setting Aside Foreclosure Sale, Not Issue Certificate of Title and Reset Foreclosure Sale,” submitted by U.S. Bank’s counsel.

After appellants filed their initial brief (and after the time in which to file an answer brief had passed), this court relinquished jurisdiction to the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether appellants had, in fact, agreed to an order setting aside the foreclosure sale and certificate of title. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that neither appellant had stipulated to the setting aside of the foreclosure sale or the certificate of title, notwithstanding the inclusion of the word “agreed” in the titles of both U.S. Bank’s motion and proposed order. The trial court further determined that no notice had been given to either appellant prior to the submission of the *ex parte*motion and proposed order. Finally, the trial court found that neither appellant had received notice of the entry of the court’s order until after the time for service of a motion for rehearing had expired.

Based on these findings, it is clear that appellants’ procedural due process rights were violated. *Shlishey the Best, Inc. v. CitiFinancial Equity Servs., Inc.,*14 So.3d 1271 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (purchasers’ right to procedural due process violated where trial court entered order that vacated foreclosure sale and certificate of title when purchaser had neither notice nor opportunity to be heard). Appellants were entitled to receive a copy of U.S. Bank’s motion and an opportunity to be heard thereon. Dept. *of Transp. v. Baird,*992 So.2d 378, 381 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).

REVERSED and REMANDED.

LAWSON and JACOBUS, JJ., concur.
627 A.2d 1128

#### TERRANCE LOVENGUTH AND JEANETTE LOVENGUTH, HIS WIFE v. RUTH C. D’ANGELO AND FRANK D’ANGELO.

March 29, 1993.

ORDER

ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

OLGA SEGREAVES,

Respondent

v.

ROSS SEGREAVES,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 239 MAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 6th day of December, 2022

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED

.
#### Kay KATO; Jane Yano; Makoto Ogura; Shizue Ogura; Kenjiro Ogura; Yasuo Ogura, aka Yasuo Okui, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 00-55673.

D.C. No. CV-99-10719-JSL (Ex).

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Dec. 11, 2000.

Decided Jan. 3, 2001.

Before SCHROEDER, Chief Judge, NOONAN and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM1

The plaintiffs seek damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1985 for their internment by the United States during the 1940s because of their Japanese ancestry. The complaint was filed in 1999, more than 50 years after the internment ceased. The district court dismissed, and plaintiffs appeal.

Plaintiffs contend that their claims are not barred by the relevant statutes of limitations because the government maintained a policy of invidious discrimination *631against persons of Japanese descent even after the internment, and that the government is therefore guilty of a continuing violation of their rights. The plaintiffs, however, have had no relationship with the United States government that is any way related to these claims since the internment ended, and the cases upon which plaintiffs rely are therefore inapposite. *See, e.g., Gutowsky v. County of Placer,*108 F.3d 256 (9th Cir.1997)(continuing violation for employee’s entire term of employment was properly alleged where defendant county denied female clerical employee the opportunity to become a heavy equipment operator for the duration of the employment relationship).

We need not determine whether the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims would fall within any statutory waiver of sovereign immunity.

AFFIRMED.

1

. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36.3.
#### J.E.R., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 2D09-3742.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Jan. 28, 2011.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Cynthia J. Dodge, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Susan D. Dunlevy, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Fifteen-year-old J.E.R. was hiding in a friend’s bedroom when he should have been in school. The friend’s father found him upon returning from taking his son to school. The father had left the home vacant and unlocked. The father removed J.E.R. from the home and returned him to the area near the school that J.E.R. told him he attended. The father then discovered that several valuable items were missing from the home. One of these items was found in J.E.R.’s possession later that day.

*822Based on these events, the State filed a petition alleging delinquency against J.E.R. for burglary of a dwelling and grand theft. The court acquitted him of the burglary charge, adjudicated him delinquent for the grand theft, adjudicated him, and imposed substantial restitution for the items that were never recovered. He appeals, raising two issues: first, that there was insufficient evidence to support the grand theft and, second, that he was denied allowable credit for time served in secure detention.

We find no merit in his first issue and affirm the adjudication of delinquency without further discussion. The State properly concedes error on the second issue.1 We therefore remand for correction of the amount of time served to reflect credit for time served in secure detention. *See A.M. v. State,*958 So.2d 461 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

Affirmed but remanded for correction of the amount of time served. Appellant need not be present for this correction.

CASANUEVA, C.J., and KELLY and BLACK, JJ., Concur.

1

. The court committed J.E.R. to the Department of Juvenile Justice for the third-degree felony of grand theft until his twenty-first birthday or the maximum allowed by law. J.E.R. notes, and we agree, that this language is ambiguous given his young age at disposition. *See L.W.G. v. State, 785*So.2d 696, 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) ("[L]anguage committing a juvenile for an indeterminate period of time no longer than a specific birthday or the maximum term of imprisonment is error because such language could allow the sentence to be construed as running longer than the statutory maximum provided for the particular offense.”). We trust that on remand any correction the court makes to the disposition order will take this issue into account also.
#### W. T. Murry v. J. F. Blanchard.

(No. 1798.)

December 3, 1884.

Appeal from Van Zandt County.

Opinion by

Will-son, J.

§ 479. *Distress ivarrant; sufficient affidavit for.*The affidavit for the distress warrant is sufficient. It states that the amount sued fqr is for rent; that it was then due; and that the warrant was not sued out for the purpose of vexing and harassing the defendant. These facts entitled the plaintiff to the writ. [E. S. arts. 3107, 3112, 3113.] That the affidavit stated additional grounds for the warrant, did not vitiate it.

§ 480. *Same; insufficient bond for.*The bond for the warrant is defective and should have been quashed. It is conditioned as follows: “Defendant will prosecute his suit to effect, and will pay all such damages and costs as shall be adjudged against him for *wrongfully*suing out such distress warrant.” The statutory condition of such a bond is that “the plaintiff will pay the defendant such damages as he may sustain in case such warrant has been *illegally and unjustly*sued out.” [E. S. art. 3113.] “The remedy by distress warrant is speedy, effectual and harsh. When the landlord seeks to avail himself of it he must strictly comply with every requirement of the law upon which his right to it depends.” [W. & W. Con. Eep. § 790.] “ Statutory bonds must contain fully and clearly all the conditions prescribed by the statute.” The bond for distress warrant is invalid unless it be conditioned that the plaintiff will pay the defendant such damages as he may sustain in case such warrant has been *illegally and unjustly*sued out. [W. & W. Con. Eep. § 1286; *ante,*§ 57.]

Eeversed and remanded.
**EXHIBIT
        32.2**
 
 **CERTIFICATE
        PURSUANT TO**
 **18
        U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**
 **AS
        ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**
 **SECTION
        906 OF THE**
 **SARBANES-OXLEY
        ACT OF 2002**
 
 In
        connection with the Quarterly Report of Targeted Genetics Corporation (the
        “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2006 as filed with
        the Securities & Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I,
        David J. Poston, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
        to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
        Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:
 
 (1)          The
        Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
        the
        Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 (2)          The
        information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
        the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
  Dated: 
                  November 9, 2006
                By:
                /s/ 
David
                  J.
                  PostonDavid
                  J. PostonVice
                  President and Chief Financial Officer
  A
        signed
        original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
        provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished
        to the
        Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
  This
        certification is being furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
        as
        Exhibit 32 to the Form 10-Q pursuant to Section 906 of the
        Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of
        Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code) and in accordance
        with Item 601(b)(32)(ii) of Regulation S-K. This certification is not being
“filed” for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
        and is not and should not be deemed to be incorporated by reference into
        the
        Form 10-Q or any filing under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities
        Exchange Act of 1934.
   26
Petition for Writ of Mandamus Denied and Memorandum Majority and 

Dissenting Opinions filed October 14, 2021.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-21-00374-CV

IN RE DARRELL ARCHER, Relator

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

WRIT OF MANDAMUS

County Civil Court at Law No. 4

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1145555

MEMORANDUM MAJORITY OPINION

On July 8, 2021, relator Darrell Archer filed a petition for writ of mandamus 

in this Court, followed by an amended petition for writ of mandamus filed July 27, 

2021. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221; see also Tex. R. App. P. 52. In the 

amended petition, relator asks this Court to compel the Honorable Lesley Briones, 

presiding judge of the County Civil Court at Law No. 4 of Harris County, to vacate 
2

the court’s June 22, 2021, order granting plaintiffs’ motion to compel discovery in 

aid of judgment. 

Relator has not established that he is entitled to mandamus relief. 

Accordingly, we deny relator’s petition for writ of mandamus.

/s/ Kevin Jewell

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Wise, Jewell, and Spain. (Spain, J., dissenting).
#### Veronica GILES v. OAKDALE HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS, LLC, et al.

No. 2012-C-1250.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 12, 2012.

In re Carpenter, Joanna M.; Oakdale Healthcare Systems, LLC, et al.; Rapides Healthcare System, L.L.C. D/B/A/ Oak-dale Community Hospital; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Allen, 33rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2008-059; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit,' No. 11-1197.

Writ granted. For the reasons expressed by the dissenting judges below, the court of appeal’s decision is reversed, and the district court’s judgment in favor of the defendants is reinstated.

JOHNSON, KNOLL and WEIMER, JJ., would deny.
#### Jerry STARR, Individually and on Behalf of His Minor Daughter, Jamie Starr v. STATE of Louisiana, through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT. John M. Byrd, Eugene Moore, Chris Navarro and Joseph Michael Williams v. State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Development.

No. 2012-CC-2146.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 12, 2012.

*878In re Byrd, John M.; Moore, Eugene; Navarro, Chris; Starr, Jerry; Williams, Joseph Michael; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caldwell, 37th Judicial District Court Div. 0, Nos. 24606, 24602; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Nos. 46,-227-CA, 46,226-CA, 47848-CW CONSOLIDATED WITH 47849-CW.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                                            9
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM " THE
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS" AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE
TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                           4,052
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                   100
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     48,875
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                           1,471
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                             1,455
<LOANS>                                        115,273
<ALLOWANCE>                                        351
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 176,016
<DEPOSITS>                                     106,256
<SHORT-TERM>                                    28,600
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              2,051
<LONG-TERM>                                     10,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        21,597
<OTHER-SE>                                       7,512
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 176,016
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                  7,432
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                3,277
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                     0
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                10,709
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               3,625
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               5,099
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            5,610
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                      140
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  3,251
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,841
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       2,841
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,770
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.94
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.94
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    3.65
<LOANS-NON>                                          0
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                   215
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                        5
<RECOVERIES>                                         1
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                  351
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                                 0
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                            351



</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1718 Introduced in House (IH)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1718

 To provide additional student loan forgiveness to teachers of foreign 
                               languages.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 27, 2007

Mr. Moore of Kansas (for himself, Mr. Hastings of Florida, Ms. Hirono, 
 Mr. Holt, Mr. McCaul of Texas, Mr. Reyes, Mr. Shays, and Mr. Wexler) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
                          Education and Labor

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To provide additional student loan forgiveness to teachers of foreign 
                               languages.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Foreign Language Education Expansion 
Act''.

SEC. 2. ADDITIONAL LOAN FORGIVENESS FOR TEACHERS OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES.

    (a) FFEL Loans.--Section 428J(c)(3)(A)(ii) of the Higher Education 
Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1078-10(c)(3)(A)(ii)) is amended by striking 
``mathematics or science'' and inserting ``mathematics, science, or a 
foreign language''.
    (b) Direct Loans.--Section 460(c)(3)(A)(ii) of such Act (20 U.S.C. 
1087j(c)(3)(A)(ii)) is amended by striking ``mathematics or science'' 
and inserting ``mathematics, science, or a foreign language''.
    (c) New Borrower Eligibility.--An individual who is a teacher of a 
foreign language shall not qualify under the amendments made by this 
section unless such individual is a new borrower (as such term is 
defined in section 103 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 
1003)) on or after October 1, 2001.
                                 <all>
```
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Terrell J. SUGGS.

No. 2011-KO-1366.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 16, 2011.

In re Suggs, Terrell J.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 08-6038; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KA-599.

Denied.
#### James David WATTS, Husband, Appellant, v. Amy Alwine WATTS, Wife, Appellee.

No. 1D10-6199.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 16, 2011.

Tomislav D. Golik of the Golik Law Firm, PLLC, Jacksonville, for Appellant.

William Bruce Muench of Muench & Luca, Jacksonville, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Whereas the notice of appeal failed to timely invoke the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, the appeal is hereby dismissed. *See Olson v. Olson,*704 So.2d 208, 210 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).

DISMISSED.

DAVIS, HAWKES, and WETHERELL, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.2

Certification Pursuant To

18 U.S.C.
Section 1350,

as Adopted Pursuant To

Section 906 of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection
with the Annual Report of NSTAR (the Company) on Form 10-K for the year ending December 31 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, James J. Judge, Senior Vice
President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:



|(i) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(ii) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|---- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                       |  |     |  |                            
|---------------------- |  | --- |  | ---------------------------
|Date: February 5, 2010 |  | By: |  | /S/    JAMES J.
JUDGE      
|                       |  |     |  | James J. Judge             
|                       |  |     |  | Senior Vice President      
|                       |  |     |  | and Chief Financial Officer
I 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 7121 

To amend title 40, United States Code, to prohibit the Commission of Fine 

Arts from exercising authority over non-Federal property in the District 

of Columbia, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 13, 2018 

Ms. NORTON introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

A BILL 

To amend title 40, United States Code, to prohibit the Commission of Fine Arts from exercising authority over nonFederal property in the District of Columbia, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Commission of Fine 

5 Arts District of Columbia Home Rule Act’’. 


rfrederick on DSKBCBPHB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 7121 IH

1 SEC. 2. PROHIBITING COMMISSION OF FINE ARTS FROM 

2 EXERCISING AUTHORITY OVER NON-FED3 ERAL PROPERTY IN THE DISTRICT OF CO4 LUMBIA. 

5 (a) LIMITING AUTHORITY OVER LOCATION OF STAT6 UES, FOUNTAINS, AND MONUMENTS.—Section 9102(a)(1) 

7 of title 40, United States Code, is amended by striking 

8 ‘‘District of Columbia’’ and inserting ‘‘District of Colum9 bia which are owned by the Federal Government’’. 

10 (b) CLARIFICATION OF LIMITATIONS ON AUTHOR11 ITY.—Section 9102(c) of such title is amended to read as 

12 follows: 

13 ‘‘(c) NONAPPLICATION.—The authority of the Com14 mission under this section does not apply to any of the 

15 following: 

16 ‘‘(1) The United States Capitol. 

17 ‘‘(2) Any building of the Library of Congress. 

18 ‘‘(3) Any building, property, or project which is 

19 owned by the District of Columbia. 

20 ‘‘(4) Any private building, property, or 

21 project.’’. 

Æ 


rfrederick on DSKBCBPHB2PROD with BILLS