F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

M A R I O A L B E R

T O G A R C I A , individually and as class representative, Plaintiff-Appellee
,

v

.

C O U N T Y O F R I V E R S I D E , Defendant
,

and

C O U N T Y O F L O S A

N G E L E S ; L O S A N G E L E S C O U

N T Y S H E R

I F F ’ S D E P A R T M E N T ; L E E B A C A , in his personal and individual capacity
,

Defendants-Appellants

. N o. 13-56857

D.C. No. 5:13-cv-00616- J GB -SP

ORDER AND AMENDED OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California J esus G. B ernal, District J udg e , Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted D ecember 11, 2015—Pasadena, California

F iled F ebruary

3, 2016 Amended April 8, 2016G A R C I A V

. C T Y

. O F R I V E R S I D E 2

B efore: Ronald M. Gould and Marsha S. B erz on, Circuit J u dg es, and J ack Z o uhary
, * District J udg e.

Order; O pinion by

J udg e Gould

SUMMARY * *

Civil Rights

The p anel amend e d its prior o pinion, published at 811 F .3d 1220, and denied the petition f o r rehearing a

nd rehearing en banc. I n the amended o p i n i on the panel affirme d t h e d istrict court’s denial of qualified immunity
, absolute (quasi-judicial) immunity
, and immunity under two C a l i f ornia statutes in an action b roug h t by Mario A. Garcia
p u rsuant to 4 2 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law alleg ing that h e

was wrong fully incarcerat e d b y the L os Ang e les County Sheriff’s Department based on the misapplication of a felony
warrant issued in 1994 for Mario L

. Garcia, who h as the same date of birth as plaintiff.

The panel first held that former L os Ang eles Sheriff L ee B aca in his individ u a l ca pacity may appeal the d enial o f absolute quasi-judicia l i m m unity for the same reasons he
may a p p e a l denial of qualified immunity in his individual

* T h e Ho n o rab le J ack Z o u h ary , District Ju d g e f o r th e U.S. District Co u rt f o r th e No rth ern District o f Oh io , sittin g b y

d esig n atio n

.

** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p ar t o f t h e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.G A R C I A V

. C T Y

. O F R I V E R S I D E 3

capacity

. The panel held that L os Ang eles County a nd the L os Ang eles Sheriff’s Department could not appeal denial o f quasi-judicial immunity because they could not as s e r t an absolute immunity in the first place. T h e panel held that it had jurisdiction over defendants’ appeals from denial of statelaw immunity because t h e district court’s denial determined rig hts c ollateral t o t h ose asserted in the action, and like the denial of qualified immunity
, the district court’s decision was effectively

unreviewable on appeal from a final judg ment.

The panel held t h a t plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded a F ourteenth Amendment v iolation arising fr o m l a w enforcement’s failure to investig ate h is clai m o f mistaken identity after he was arrested. T h e p a n el stated that an obvious phy sical discrepancy between a warrant subject a nd

a booked individual, such as a nine-inch difference in heig ht, accompanied by a detainee’s complaints of misidentification, should prompt officers to eng ag e in r e a d i l y available a nd resource-efficient identity checks, su ch as a fing erprint comparison, to ensure that they are not d e taining the wrong person. T he panel f

urther held that She r i f

f Baca was not entitled to qualified immuni t y b e cause a t the time o f plaintiff’s November 2 012 incarcera t i on, the standards for determining whether alleg ed police conduct violated the F ourteenth Amendment were clearly established.

T h e panel held that Sheriff B aca was not entitl e d t o

a b s o l u t e , q u a s i

-

j u d i ci a l i m m u n i t y b e ca u s e p l a i n t i f f challeng ed not just the fact of his i n carceration but a lso the lack of procedures to prevent the misidentification. F inally
, the panel rejected d e f

e n dants’ contention that they were immune from plaintiff’s state-law claim s because o f immunities provided in California Pen a l C o de § 847 a nd C a l i f ornia Civil Code § 43.55. T he panel held that t h o s eG A R C I A V

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. O F R I V E R S I D E 4

statutes do not shield defendants from liability under state law because thei r a p plication is premised on reasonable beliefs, and the c rux of plaintiff’s claim is that it w as unreasonable for officers to believe that he was the person who was described in the warrant without g reater investig ation.

COUNSEL

Scott E. Caron (arg

ued), Paul B

. B each, and M i c h a e l D

. Allen, L awrence B e a ch Allen & Choi, P.C., Glendale, California, for Defendants-Appellants.

Donald W

. Cook, L os Ang e l es, California, for PlaintiffAppellee.

ORDER

The o pi n ion filed o n F ebruary 3, 2 016, and published at 811 F .3d 1220, is hereby a mended as follows:

1. Slip op. at 18–19, delete “These statutes do not shield Defendants f

rom liability under state law because Plaintiff is
not asserting claims “ arising out of an[ ] arrest” or ag ainst the arresting officer. See Cal. Pen. Code § 8 47(b). According to these statutes’ tex t, they apply o nly to arresting officers. Moreover, these statu t ory immunities are premised on reasonable beliefs, and the crux of Plaintiff’s claim is that it

was unreasonable for officers t o b e l i eve that he w as the
person w h o was described in the warrant without g reater investig ation.” Replace deleted tex t with “These statutes do
not shield Defendants from liability under state law because their application is p r emised on reasonable bel iefs, a nd theG A R C I A V

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. O F R I V E R S I D E 5

crux of Plaintiff’s cl a i m is that it was unreasonable for officers to believe that he was the p erson who was described in the warrant without g r eater investig ation.”

W ith this ame n d m e nt, the panel has voted to deny the
p e tition for r ehearing

. J udg e Gould and J udg e B erz o n h a v e voted to deny the p e t i t i on for rehearing en banc, a nd J udg e Z o uhary has so recommended. The full court ha s been advised of th e petition for rehearing en banc, and no judg e has requested a vote o n whether to rehear the matter en banc. F ed. R. App. P. 35. The p etitions for rehearing and rehearing

en banc are DENIED

. No f uture p e t itions for rehearing o r rehearing en banc will be entertained.

OP INION

GOUL D, Circuit J udg e :

L os Ang eles County
, L A County Sheriff’s Department (L A SD), and former L A Sheriff L ee B aca appeal the district court’s d enial o f qualified immunity
, absolut e ( q uasi-judicial) immunity
, and immunity under two California statutes in this suit by Plaintiff Mario A. Garcia. Plaintiff asserted c laims under 42 U.S.C. § 1 9 83, the California Constitution, and state tort l a w , alleg ing that he was wrong fully incarcerated b y L ASD based on the misapplication of a f e lony warrant issued in 1994 for Mario L

. Garcia
, w h o has the same date o f birth as Plaintiff. F or the reasons that follow, we affirm.G A R C I A V

. C T Y

. O F R I V E R S I D E 6

I

Plaintiff was arrested for driving under the influence in Riverside County
, Cali f

o rnia, on November 2 6, 2 012. He

was booked in a Riverside County jail. A booked individual is electronically fing e rprinted t h roug h a sy stem called “L ivescan.” The L iv e s c a n imag e is then sent to the California Department of J ustice (CDOJ ), which responds in

one of two way s. I f the arrestee’s fing e r prints a re already on file, the subject’s criminal identification and information (CI I ) n u m ber and criminal history are sent to the arresting
age n c y

. I f the arrestee’s f ing erprints are not on file, a new C I I number is a ssig ned. This number is linked to fing erprints, name, birth date, address, and o ther identifiers such as Social Securit y number. L os Ang eles County
ag encies also assig n a fing erprint- based “L A Main” number
to their warrants. CI I and L A Main numbe r s a re often used to g enerate an arrestee’s c r iminal history , which can include the subject’s full name, birth date, residential addresses, a nd Social Security a

nd driver’s license n u m b e rs. The numbers

are also searched in a warrant database, such as the L A -based County w ide W arrant Sy stem (CW S) or the statewide W anted Persons S y s tem (W PS), to determine whether the arrested individual has an outstanding warrant.

W h en Riverside County She r i ff’s D epartment (RCSD) officers searched fo r Plaintiff “Mario Garcia” in W PS, they found a felony warrant for Mario L

. Garcia issued by the L os Ang eles S u p er i or Court in 1994. The warrant described Mario L

. Garcia using only his first and last name, date o f birth, heig h t, and weig ht. The fi r st and last n a me and birth date matched Plaintiff’s own. B u t Plaintiff alleg es that when RCSD contacted L A SD personnel to r eport the “hit,” L ASD did n ot forward informat ion on Mario L

. Garcia’s b iometricG A R C I A V

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. O F R I V E R S I D E 7

identifiers, middle n a me, or c r iminal record, all o f whic h differed from Plainti f

f’s. RCSD matched Plaintiff to the
warrant and told him that he would be detained, despite Plaintiff’s protests that he was not M a r i o L

. Garcia and that h e had been mistakenly detained before based o n the s a m e warrant.

The nex t day Plaintiff w as transferred to an L A County jail, where h e alleg e s that h e repeated his complaints to L ASD officers. Plaintiff contends that L A SD knew or should have known that he was not Mario L

. Garcia fo r several

reasons: (1) their middle names do not match; (2) their heig ht and weig h t differ c onsiderably (Mario L

. Garcia is listed a s 5' 1"
, 130 lbs. Plaintiff is 5' 1 0"
, 1 70 lbs.); (3) Plaintiff’s biometric identifiers, including fing erprints and CI I number, did not match the subject’s; and (4 ) Plaintiff’s criminal history
, w hich was linked in the sy stem to his fing erprin t s , did not match the subj ect’s. Plaintiff contends that it is the policy o f L ASD to ig nore CI I numbers for i d e n t ification
p u r p o s e s , t o i g n o r e p r i s o n e r s ’ c o m p l a i n t s o f misidentification, and to accept a n outside ag e ncy ’s determination that an arrestee is th e subject of a warrant rather than conduct a n i n d ependent identity check upon booking in L A County

.

Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleg ing violations of the F ourth Amendment a n d F ourteenth Amendment b y L A SD, L A County
, B aca, and several Doe defendants. He also broug ht state-law claims a g ainst L ASD a nd L A County

. 1 The district court denied Defendants’ moti o n to dismiss Plaint i ff ’ s section 1983 claim of wrong ful incarceration in

1 Plain tif f settled h is claim s ag ain st Riv ersid e Co u n t y an d th e Riv ersid e Co u n ty Sh erif f ’ s Dep artm en t , w

h ich are n o lo n g er p arties to th is actio n

.G A R C I A V

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. O F R I V E R S I D E 8

violation of the F ourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause,

c o ncluding that Plaintiff h ad a lleg ed detention bey ond t h e point w hen L ASD officers should have known to release him. T he d istrict court denied B aca’s request for q uali fi e d immunity and Defendants’ r equest for quasi-ju d i cial immunity and state-law immunity

. Defendants appealed via 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II

Plaintiff conte sts jurisdiction o ver D efendants’ appeals from denial of immunity

. He con cedes that we have juris d i ction over B aca’s a ppeal of denial of qualified immunity

. See M

itchell v. Forsyth
, 472 U.S. 5 1 1, 530, 526 (1985). B aca may only a s s e r t qualified immunity in his individual capacity
, not in h i s o f ficial capacity

. See Eng v

. Cooley
, 552 F .3d 1062, 1064 n.1 ( 9 t h Cir. 2009); Owen v

. City of Independence, Mo.
, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980)). However, we h old that B aca in his indi v i d u a l capacity may appeal denial of absolute quasi-judici a l i m munity
, for the same reasons he may

appeal denial of qualified immunity in his individual capacity

. See Mitche l l
, 472 U.S. at 526–27 (noting that absolute immunity
, like qualified immunity
, is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine).

L A Coun t y and L ASD may n ot appeal denial o f quasi-judicial immunity
, be c a u s e they may not a ssert an absolute immunity in the first place. See Monell v. Dep’t of S o c

. Servs.
, 436 U.S. 6 58, 701 (1978) (holding that “municipal bodies sued under § 1983 cannot be entitled to an absolute immunity
, lest our decision that such bod i e s a r e subject to suit under § 1983 ‘b e d r ained of meaning ’”) (quoting Scheuer v

. Rhodes
, 416 U.S. 232, 248 (1974)). However, o u r cases do not foreclose Defendants’ appea l o fG A R C I A V

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. O F R I V E R S I D E 9

the district cour t ’ s denial of state-law statutory immunity

. W e have jurisdiction over D efendants’ appeals from denial o f state-law immunity because the district cou rt ’s denial determined rig hts collateral to those a sserted in the action, and like the denial of qualified immunity
, the district court’s decision is effectivel y unreviewable on appeal from a final judg ment. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.
, 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949); Mitchell
, 472 U.S. at 527. I n sum, L A County and L ASD may only app ea l denial of state-law statutory im munity

. See Owen
, 445 U.S. 622, 650 ( 1 980); Monell
, 4 3 6 U

. S

. at 701. B aca, in his individual capacity
, may appeal denial of q

ualified immunity and o f quasi-judicial immunity

. See Mitchell
, 472 U.S. at 528. B aca did not assert state-law immunity because Plaintiff’s state-law claims were ag ainst L A County

and L ASD only

.

III

D ef endants contend that B aca is entitled to qualified immunity as to the alleg ed violation o f Plaintiff’s due process rig hts. Qualified immunity applies u n less the facts alleg ed make out (1) a violation of a constitutio n a l r ig ht, which (2) was “clearly establishe d ” a t t h e time of the defendant’s alleg ed misconduct. Pearson v

. Callahan
, 555 U.S. 2 2 3, 236 (2009). B a ca asserts that b o th stag es of the Pearson analy sis entitle him to qualified immunity

.

The parties disag ree whether Plaintiff has alleg ed a F ourteent h A m endment violation. Defendants arg ue that Ba k e r v. McCollan
, 443 U.S. 137 (1979), forecloses Plaintiff’s claim. That is not so.

I n Baker
, a warrant was issued under the p laintiff’s name because the p laintiff’s brother, the warrant subject, h adG A R C I A V

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. O F R I V E R S I D E 10

obtained a copy of the plaintiff’s dr i v e r ’s license and h ad replaced the plaintiff’s photo with h i s o w n. W hen the plaintiff was stopped for runni n g a red lig h t, he was taken into custody on the warrant intended fo r h i s b rother. Id. at 141. He was released several day s later after offici a l s compared his appearance to a file photog raph of his brother. Id. The Supreme Co u rt held that althoug h the plaintiff h ad been falsely imprisoned, h is d etention was not a constitutional violation bec au s e, without more, “a person arrested p u r s u ant to a [ valid] warrant

. . . is not constitutio n a lly e ntitled to a separate judicial determination that there is probable cause to detain h im pending trial.” Id. at 143–45.

W h ile the f

acts in Baker did not a mount to a due process violation, Baker d id not creat e a categ orical bar on d ue process c laims a

rising f rom law e nforcement’s failure to i n v e stig a te an arrestee’s claim of mistaken identity

. To the contrary , as we have noted, Baker “ sug g ested that incarceration based on mistaken identi ty might violate the Due Process Clause i n s o m e circumstances.” Rivera v

. County of Los Angeles
, 745 F .3d 384, 390 (9th Ci r

. 2 014) (emphas is added). And we have found such violations in several cases. See, e.g. , Lee v. City of Los Angeles
, 250 F .3d 668, 684 ( 9 t h Cir. 2001). Lee held that a g roup of plaintiffs had alleg ed a F ourteenth Amendment violation based on city officials’ “conscious failure to train their employ e es in t h e procedures nece s sary to avoid” mistaken misidentifications. Id. Accordi n g t o L e e , a plaintiff’s burden is to show that defendants did not g ive him “minimum due p r ocess appropriate to the circumstances to ensure that his liberty was not a rb i t rarily abrog ated.” Id. (quoting Oviatt v. Pearce
, 954 F .2d 1470, 1475 (9th C i r

. 1 992)) (internal alterations omitted). Our cases hol d i ng that a mistaken incarcerationG A R C I A V

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. O F R I V E R S I D E 11

violated the Due P ro c e ss Clause fit into at least one of two categ ories. Either “(1) the circu m s tances indicated to the defendants that further investig ation was warranted, or (2) the defendants d enied the plaint i f f a cc ess to the courts for an

ex tended period of time.” Rivera
, 745 F .3d at 391. B ecause Plaintiff does not alleg e that he was denied access t o t he courts, he must alleg e that “further investig ation was warranted” based on the facts of his detention. Id

.

As observed in Rivera
, the “ further investig ation” cases have involved sig nificant differences b etween t h e arrestee and the true warrant subj e ct

. Id

. F or instance, in Fairley v

. Luman
, 281 F .3d 913, 915 (9th Cir. 2002) (per c u r i a m ), the
p l a i n t iff and the true warrant subject (who were twins) h a d different first names and differed in weig h t b y 6 6 pounds. The booking serg eant knew t h a t t he plaintiff had a twin brother, but approved the plainti f f’ s b ooking based on a similarity in phy sical descriptions alone, without p erforming

a readily available f

ing erprint comparison. Id. W e concluded that the plaintiff had pleaded a due process violation in lig ht of his detention “ without any p roced u r a l safeg uard in place
to verify the w arrant he w as deta i n ed o n w as his and in the face of his repeated prote s t s o f i n n ocence.” Id. at 918. I n lig ht of the plaintiff’s li b er t y interest, and the “ minimum burden” to the city of instituting procedures to verify identity
, the city ’s procedures violated the Due Process Clause. Id.

More recently
, in Rivera
, plaint i f f S antiag o Rivera was misidentified and detained on a warrant meant for a different
person with the same name, s a m e d a t e of birth, and similar phy sic a l c h aracteristics (within one inch in heig ht and ten pounds in weig ht). Rivera
, 7 4 5 F .3d at 387. Holding that Rivera’s detention did n ot v iolate the Due Process Clause, we disting uished Fairley
, which i n volved circumstances thatG A R C I A V

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. O F R I V E R S I D E 12

c o u ld alert the defendants to a misidentification, such a s differences in first n ame and weig ht. Id. at 390–91. Rivera, by contrast, had not p resented any evidence t h a t the defendants knew he w as not t h e true subject of the warrant,

or t h a t f urther investig ation into his identity was called for b a s ed on what defendants did know. Id. at 391. I n s t e ad
, a s in Baker , deputies reasonably c oncluded that Rivera was the true warrant subject. Id. ; see also Baker , 443 U.S. at 141.

F inally
, in Gant v. County of Los A ngeles
, 772 F .3d 608, 622–23 (9th Cir. 2014), we h e l d that plaintiff J ose V entura, who w as d etained based o n a warrant meant for a nother man with the same name, had plausibly alleg ed that o ne of the defendants, L A County
, violated his due process rig hts because “they should have known that he was not the subject of the ‘J ose Ventura’ warrant.” The plaintiff and the warrant subject differed by seven inches in heig h t and 120 pounds in

w eig ht. Id. at 618. The district court dismissed t h e c l a i m

a ga i nst L A County
, finding that the plaintiff h ad not sufficiently c omplained to o fficers th a t he w as wrong f ully detained. We reversed, h olding that the conflicting evidence about whether the p laintiff had comp l a ined that he w as the
wrong person raised a g enuine issue of material fact. I d. at 623.

W h ether L ASD had to investig ate in the face of Plaintiff’s protests a nd compl a ints that he wasn’t the person described in the out s t a n d i ng w arrant is a n important question. No person deserves to be incarcerated without g ood reason, and incarceration on a warrant without a reasonable investig ation of identity
, when the c ircumstances demand it, is subject to review u nder the Due Proce s s C l a u s e. The issue is whether L ASD’s treatment of Plain t i f f’s contention that he was not the warrant su bject was so superficial, under theG A R C I A V

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. O F R I V E R S I D E 13

circumstances, that it ig n ored a d uty to i n vestig ate a

nd offended due process.

De f e n d a nts contend that according to Baker
, L ASD h ad

n o d uty to investig ate Garcia’s identity
, e ven thoug h h e complained that he was not the subject of the warrant, even thoug h the phy sical description in the warrant w as far off from G a r c i a’s, and even if L ASD had or could have easily obtai n e d information that would have ex onerated him. Garcia’s alleg ations are, however, sig nificantly different than those in Baker

. The detention in Baker followe d a n arrest pursuant to a v alid warrant, where the warrant ex act l y

m a t c hed the plaintiff’s identify ing information because the suspect had obtained a c opy of the plaintiff’s driver’s license. B ecause the warrant did not contain the suspect’s photog raph, the arresting officers “ unde r s tandably c oncluded that they h ad their man.” Baker
, 443 U.S. at 141. This is not true for Garcia. Althoug h Garcia’s arrest for d r i v ing under the influence was valid, the warrant on which h e was later h eld matched only his first and last name a nd date of birth. Garcia is nine inches taller and forty pounds heavier than the warrant subject. Even a cursory comparison of Garcia to the warrant subject should have led officers to question whether the
person described in the warrant was Garcia. I nformation that raised questions about Ga r c i a ’ s identity should have prompted the L ASD to investig ate more deliberately

.

F urthermore, in deny ing the p laintiff’s constitutional claim in Baker
, the Supreme Court ex pressed relu c t ance to impose the ex pense of a

n “error-free investig ation” of c laims of mistaken identity on sheriff’s d epartments nationwide. Id

. at 146. B ut those concerns are de minimis here. Plaintiff has al leg ed that L ASD knew that his fing erprint-matched CI I number did not match the warrant subject’s, and within a fewG A R C I A V

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. O F R I V E R S I D E 14

seconds could have used his CI I number to check his criminal history
, which also did n ot match t h e w a rrant subject’s. A simple procedure to check individuals’ basic information
upon transfer and booking in a county jail, to certify it
mat c h es the w arrant subject, is n ot the ty pe of costly “error-free investig a tion” the Supreme Court was r eluctant to impose in Baker

. Id

. Similarly
, like the plaintif fs in Lee
, Garcia has alleg ed Defendants’ “ fai l ure to train their employ ees in the procedures necessary to avoid” misidentifications. Lee
, 250 F .3d at 684. Garcia alleg es that it is the policy of L ASD
to ig nore CI I numbers f or identification purposes and to ig nore a pri s oner’s complaints of misidentification, thereby deny ing him “minimum d u e process appropriate to the ci r c u m stances to ensure that his liberty was not arbitrarily abrog ated.” Id. (internal quotation mark s and alterations omitted). A nd like the p laintiff in F airley
, Garcia has alleg ed that his jailers had reason to know that he had b een mistaken for the true warrant subject, and that Def endants’ deficient procedures are to blame for the misidentification. See Fairley
, 281 F .3d at 918. As in Fairley
, Garcia’s alleg ations hig hlig ht the procedures Defendants could have used, with “minimum burden,” to disting uish him from the wa r r ant subject. Id

.

Rivera does not foreclose Plain tiff’s F ourteenth Amendment c laim either. H ere, even limiting officers to the information on the w ar r ant, they could n ot have “understandably concluded that they had their man.” Baker
, 443 U.S. at 141. The ex treme d ifference in heig ht of n ine inches between the warrant subject and Garcia, which could
not be ex plained as a normal g rowth process for an adult, was

a red f lag
, as was, to a lesser deg ree, the forty po u n d w eig htG A R C I A V

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. O F R I V E R S I D E 15

differential. These differences, coupled with Garcia’s protests, should h ave “indicated to the defendants that f urther investig ation was warranted.” Rivera , 745 F .3d at 391.

Rivera
, of c ourse, held that officers do not have a duty to independently investig a te “all u n c orroborated claims o f innocence” if the suspect will soon have an opportunity to appear in court. Id. at 384. However, an obvious phy sical discrepancy between a w arrant subject a n d a b ooked individual, such as a nine

- inch difference in heig ht, accompanied by a detainee’s complaints of misidentification, should prompt officers to eng age i n readily available a nd resource-efficient identity chec k s , such as a fing erprint

c o mparison, to ensure that they a r e not detaining the wro n g person. Here Plaintiff’s claim of mistaken identity w as not uncorroborated, because of the heig h t a nd weig ht differences, and he also alleg es that o f ficers al r e ady had all the information they needed to differentiate him from the warrant subject. See Rivera , 745 F .3d at 391 n.4.

This case also differs from Rivera becau s e there, it took several day s f

or L A County staff t o locate the true subject’s fing erprints; when they found them and performe d a comparison, the court released the plaintiff. Rivera
, 745 F .3d
at 387. Here, Pl a intiff alleg es that L A County had the warrant subject’s fing erprints and CI I number on file during the entirety o f his detention, and neither for w a r d ed that information to arresting officers in Riverside C o u nty nor compared it to Plaintiff’s identify ing information w hen they booked him. 2

2 A lt h o ug h Def

en dan ts co n t en d th at “ it is clear f ro m th e alleg atio n s of th e co m p lain t th at L A SD p erso n n el co u ld n ot h av e h ad actu al k n o w led g e

o f th e w arran t su

b j ect’ s CII an d L A Main n

u m b ers,” th e Seco n d A m en dedG A R C I A V

. C T Y

. O F R I V E R S I D E 16

W h ile Defendants contend that differences in heig ht a nd weig ht a re not sufficient, by t h emselves, to trig g er a duty to investig ate a detainee’s identity
, the authority c ited in the ir brief involves c ircumstances different than those a l l e g e d h ere. F or ex ample, in Johnson v. Miller , 680 F .2d 39, 40 (7th Cir. 1982), the p laintiff w a s arrested on a warrant matching her

name and y ear of birth, but not her heig ht, day and month o f birth, or race. T h e S e venth Circuit held that there was no constitutional violation, despi t e the discrepancies in information. Id. at 41. W e have cited Johnson f or the proposition that “arresting officers do not have a constitutional o blig ation to review warrants f or discrepancies between the description in the warrant and the appearance o f the person to be a rrested.” A rnsberg v. United States
, 757 F .2d 971, 981 ( 9 t h C i r

. 1985). That may make some

sense when dealing w ith arresting officers in the f i eld w ho
cannot alway s pause to make inqui r ies on a warrant. B ut Garcia was not initially arrested pu rsuant to a warrant. Riverside County officers booked him o n the Mario L

. Garcia
warrant after he had already b een arres t e d and booked for driving under the influence in Riverside County

.

Defendants contend that in the face of many similarities,

one material difference will not make a n arrest unreasonable, citing the Eleventh Circuit decis i o n Rodriguez v. Farrell
, 280 F .3d 1341, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002). That principle mig ht

a pply where no sing le material difference would l e a d

reason a b le law enforcement personnel to question the identification. B ut here, the nine-inch d ifference in heig ht,

even if standing alone, is s o inex plicable ex cept b y misidentification that the booking officers clearly h ad a duty

Co m p lain t alleg es th at L A SD h ad actu al k n o w l ed g e o f t

h e tru e w arran t

su b j ect’ s CII n u

m b er, L A Main n u m b er, an d f u l l n am e.G A R C I A V

. C T Y

. O F R I V E R S I D E 17

to make r eadily available inquiries. And those f urther inquiries would have shown more material differences, such

as different arrest record, middle initial, a n d h o me address. Moreover, like Johnson
, Rodriguez involved c laims ag ainst

a r resting officers in the f ield, who are u nder d iffer e n t demands than booking officers. Id. at 1343.

IV

B e cause we hold that Garcia has suffic i e n t l y p leaded a F ourteenth Amendment violation, whether B aca is e ntitled to qualified immunity depends on whether the rig ht that Garcia
asserts was “clearly established” at the time of the alleg ed misconduct. Pearson
, 5 55 U.S. at 232. Defendants contend that until Rivera
, our cases have applied Baker unevenly a nd inconsistently

. However, t h e holding s of Lee
, Fairley
, Rivera
, and G ant are ex plained by differences in the facts, not b y inconsistent statements of law. Rivera
, decided a fter the district c ourt’s second o r der, summariz es ex isting law: officers violate the F ourteenth Amendment if they wrong ly detain a person where “ the circumstances indicated to [ them] that further investig ation was w a r r anted.” Rivera
, 745 F .3d at 391.

Gant also reinforces this statement of law as having been clearly e sta b l i shed at the time Garcia was arrested a nd h eld

on the warrant. W e a ffirmed summary judg ment f or the San B ernardino County defendants because p laintiff J ose Ventura had not rais e d a m a t erial issue of fact as to whether those defendants had a policy of n o t r e quiring fing erprint comparisons, a

nd af f i r m e d summary judg ment f

or L A County

on p laintiff Kelvin Gant’s F ou rteenth Amendment c laims because Gant had not called his case o f m i s t aken identity to t h e defendants’ attention and was g iven a prompt hear i n g.G A R C I A V

. C T Y

. O F R I V E R S I D E 18

Gant
, 772 F .3d at 6 2 0 –23. B ut we reversed summary j u d g m e n t on Ventura’s c laims a g ainst L A County
, concludi n g that a factual issue ex isted whether Ventura complained to the L A defendants that they had the wrong person. Id

. Ri v era and Gant apply p recedent fr o m the Supreme Court and our circuit to different alleg ations by different plaintiffs. They do

n o t m ak e new law. I n sum, a t the time of Plaintiff’ s November 2012 incarceration, the standards for d etermining whether alleg ed police conduct violates the F ourteenth Amendment w ere clearly established. B aca is not entitled to qualified immunity

.

V

Defendants also collectively a ssert that th ey are entitled
to absolute, quasi-judicial immunity

. As ex plained above, L A County and L ASD cannot assert quasi-judicial immunity
at all. M o n e l l
, 4 36 U .S. at 701. This appeal of the district court’s denial of quasi-judicial immunity applies only to B aca.

B ac a claims that because there w as lawful authority for Plaintiff’s detention, by way o f a “presumptively reasonable” seiz ure, he should not b e penaliz e d f or any constitutional violation that may have occurred. L aw e nforcement officers, B aca asserts, h ave no duty to “g o behind [ a] judicial order

. . . to inquire into the validity of the procedure lea d i ng up to its issuance.” Francis v. Lyman
, 2 16 F .2d 583, 585 ( 1 s t C ir. 1954). B ut Plaintiff is not challeng ing the validity of the
warrant itself, o r its issuance in 1994; h e is claiming that it

was wrong fully applied t o him. Taking simple, readily

ava i l a b l e steps to verify that they had booked the man they
soug h t, in the presence o f m a r k ed phy sical differences a nd Plaintiff’s protestations of misidentification, does not requireG A R C I A V

. C T Y

. O F R I V E R S I D E 19

officers to “inquire into the validit y ” o f a warrant o r its issuan ce

. Rather, the question is whether the L ASD
p r o cedures w ere reasonably calculated to determine that a n arrestee was the person described in the o utstanding warrant.

I t i s true that “prison officials charg ed with ex e cuting fac i ally valid court orders enjoy absolute immunity from section 1983 liability for c onduct prescribed by those orders.” Engebretson v. Ma honey
, 724 F .3d 1034, 1039 ( 9th Cir. 2013). H owever, absolute immunity applies “only to the fact of a prisoner’s incarceration pursuant to a facially valid court order— i.e.
, the prison o fficial in question must act within his

or her authority and strictly compl y w i th the order.” Id. at 1041 (emphas i s i n orig inal). Here, according to Plaintiff’s alleg ations, B aca did not strictly comply with the order, as it

was applied to the wrong person, and Plaintiff challeng ed not just the fact of h is incarceratio n , b u t a lso the lack o f procedures to p revent the misidentification. B ecause the facts Plaintiff has alleg ed g o bey o nd the limits of q u a s i-judicial immunity , this immunity

does not apply

to B a ca.

F inally
, L A County a

n d L ASD asse r t that they a re i mmune f

rom Plaintiff’s state-law claims (wrongf u l incarceration p ursu a n t to Cal. Const., Art. I § 13, and false imprisonment) because of immunities provided in California Pena l C o d e § 847 and California Civil Code § 43.55. The first provision, section 847, prohibits causes of action ag ainst
any peace officer, a cting within h is authority
, “for false arrest

or false imprisonment arising o ut o f any arrest,” if the officer
at least “had re a s o n able cause to believe the arrest was lawful.” Cal. Pena l C o d e § 847(b). The second, section 43.55, precludes causes of action ag ainst “ a n y p eace officer

w h o makes a

n arrest pursuant to a warrant o f arrest reg ular
upon its face,” if the officer “acts without malice and in theG A R C I A V

. C T Y

. O F R I V E R S I D E 20

reasonable belief that the person arres t e d is the one referred
to in the warrant.” Cal. Civ. Code § 43.55(a). These statutes do not shield Def

e n d a n ts from liability u nder state law be ca u s e their application is premised on reasonable beliefs, and the crux of Plaintiff’s cl a i m i s that it was unreasonable for officers to believe that he was the person who was described in the warrant without g rea t er investig ation. Plaintiff has not challeng ed his arrest for driving under the influence ; rather, he challeng es Defendants’ decision to detain him based on a warrant for another person.

W h ether the o f

ficers who subjected Pla i n tiff to imprisonment on the warrant a cted reasonably i s a question that must be determined i n this litig ation assessing the boundaries of due p rocess. There is at this time no applicable state or federal law immunity

.

AF F IRMED

.