alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Richard W. HOBSON, Appellant, v. Sherman H. CROUSE, Warden, Kansas State Penitentiary, Lansing, Kansas, Appellee.

No. 7657.

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.

June 9, 1964.

Phil S. Hurst, Norman, Okla., for appellant.

Richard H. Seaton, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Kansas (William M. Ferguson, Atty. Gen. of Kansas, on brief), for appellee.

Before MURRAH, Chief Judge, and PICKETT and LEWIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

By this application to the District Court for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner seeks to annul a state imposed sentence on the grounds that having been forcibly brought into the state for trial, his conviction violated due process of the Fourteenth Amendment.

This application was filed after similar application had been denied by the Kansas sentencing court, and appeal had failed otherwise than on its merits. The State suggests that other corrective process is available in the form of an original application to the Kansas Supreme Court; that petitioner has not, therefore, exhausted presently available state remedies; and, that he consequently has no standing in the Federal court.

The trial Court discharged the writ on the ground that petitioner had not exhausted his state remedies required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254; and on the further substantive ground that unlawful extradition from the State of North Carolina into the State of Kansas was not such a denial of due process as to deprive the sentencing court of jurisdiction to accept a plea of guilty, citing Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 72 S.Ct. 509, 96 L.Ed. 541.

 It may be that petitioner has further state remedies which he may be required to exhaust before coming to the Federal court, but we prefer to place affirmance on the firmly established rule of Frisbie v. Collins, ibid, to the effect that “ * * * the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court’s jurisdiction by reason of a ‘forcible abduction’ * * * ;” and, that “ * * * due process of law is satisfied when one present in court is convicted of crime after having been fairly apprised of the charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards.”

While conceding the Frisbie rule, appointed counsel ingeniously argues that it has been impliedly overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, according to which all such “shortcut methods in law enforcement” are forbidden; and that under the expanded concept of due process and the availability of habeas corpus to vouchsafe it under the Fourteenth Amendment, we should overrule Frisbie v. Collins and grant the writ. We can find *562nothing in Mapp v. Ohio, ibid, or Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837, which impels or even encourages us to take the bold step suggested by counsel.

The judgment is affirmed.
857 A.2d 183

#### Bernard TAYLOR, Appellant, v. PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued March 18, 2004.

July 29, 2004.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 29th day of July, 2004, the Order of the Commonwealth Court is hereby AFFIRMED.
Destiny Media Technologies, Inc.: Exhibit 4.1 - Filed by newsfilecorp.com


    

    DESCRIPTION OF CAPITAL STOCK

    Common Stock

    Our authorized capital consists of 20,000,000 shares of common stock with a par value of $0.001 per share.

    Holders of our common stock have no preemptive rights to purchase additional shares of common stock or other subscription rights. The common stock carries no conversion rights and is not subject to redemption or to any sinking fund provisions. All of our issued common stock is entitled to share equally in dividends from sources legally available, when, as and if declared by our Board of Directors, and upon our liquidation or dissolution, whether voluntary or involuntary, to share equally in our assets available for distribution to security holders.

    Our Board of Directors is authorized to issue additional shares of common stock not to exceed the amount authorized by our Articles of Incorporation, on such terms and conditions and for such consideration as the Board may deem appropriate without further security holder action.

    Voting Rights

    Each holder of our common stock is entitled to one vote per share on all matters on which such stockholders are entitled to vote.  Since the common stock does not have cumulative voting rights, the holders of more than 50% of the shares voting for the election of directors can elect all the directors if they choose to do so and, in such event, the holders of the remaining shares will not be able to elect any person to the Board of Directors.

    Dividend Policy

    Holders of our common stock are entitled to dividends if declared by the Board of Directors out of funds legally available for the payment of dividends. Since our inception, we have not declared any dividends, nor do we intend to issue any cash dividends in the future. Our foreseeable plans include retaining earnings, if any, to finance the development and expansion of our business.
<PAGE>


                                  EXHIBIT 23.1

                         CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

We consent to the  incorporation by reference in the  Registration  Statement on
Form S-8 (No 333-27555)  pertaining to the 1997 Stock  Incentive Plan of Journal
Register  Company of our report  dated  February  2, 2001,  with  respect to the
consolidated  financial  statements  and  schedule of Journal  Register  Company
included in the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Journal  Register  Company for the
year ended December 31, 2000.

                                    /S/ ERNST & YOUNG LLP
                                    ------------------------------

MetroPark, New Jersey
March 30, 2001
Exhibit 32.2

Certification Pursuant to18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
| The undersigned hereby certifies, in my capacity as an officer of NSTAR, for purposes of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge: |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   (i)                                                                                                                                                                                      | the enclosed Annual Report of NSTAR on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and |
|   (ii)                                                                                                                                                                                     | the information contained in such Annual Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of NSTAR. |
| Dated: March 1, 2004      |  | By:   | /s/ James J. Judge      

James J. Judge Senior Vice President, Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer |
|---------------------------------------------------------|--|-----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
#### Christian De BERDOUARE, Appellant, v. CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION, Appellee.

No. 3D12-1374.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Oct. 31, 2012.

Ligman Martin, P.L., and Michael R. Seward, Miami, for appellant.

Jonathan D. Franklin, Miami, for appel-lee.

Before WELLS, C.J., and SHEPHERD and LAGOA, JJ.

WELLS, Chief Judge.

Christian de Berdouare appeals from a final summary judgment entered in Citizens Property Insurance Corporation’s favor. Based on Citizens’ commendable confession of error, we reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings in the court below.

Reversed and remanded.
#### STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. A. F. HINDS, Appellee.

No. 18099.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

April 18, 1960.

*442Herbert W. Peterson, Birmingham, Ala., Claude D. Scruggs, Guntersville, Ala., Rives, Peterson, Pettus & Conway, Birmingham, Ala., of counsel, for appellant.

Joe Starnes, Starnes and Starnes, Guntersville, Ala., for appellee.

Before RIVES, Chief Judge, and HUTCHESON and BROWN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

This attempted appeal from an order denying defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but granting its alternative motion for a new trial is not an appeal from a final decision of which this Court has jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.A. 1291; Ford Motor Co. v. Busam Motor Sales, 6 Cir., 1950, 185 F.2d 531; Balicki v. Central Greyhound Lines, Inc., 3 Cir., 1945, 150 F.2d 402. The appeal is therefore

Dismissed.
# In the Missouri Court of Appeals

Eastern District

DIVISION FIVE

KARMANN CHRISTNER, ) No. ED102076

)

Claimant/Appellant, )

)

vs. ) Appeal from the Labor and

) Industrial Relations Commission

WA L

- MART ASSOCIATES, INC. and )

DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, )

) Filed : December 23, 2014

Respondents. )

Claimant, Karmann Christner

, h as filed a notice of appeal from the Labor and Industrial

Relations Commission's (Commission) decision concerning his cla im for unemployment

benefits

. We dismiss the appeal.

A deputy of the Division of Employment Security (Division) concluded that Claimant

was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits . Claimant appealed to the Appeals

Tribunal of the Division , whic h dismissed her appeal. She then filed an application for review

with the Commission, which affirmed the order of the Appeals Tribunal. T he Commission

mailed its decision to Claimant on August 14, 2014

. Claimant filed a notice of appeal to this

Cou rt

.

This Court issued an order directing Claimant to show cause why his appeal should not

be dismissed as untimely. Claimant has not f iled a response t o the order.2

The notice of appeal to this court was not filed within the time limits set forth in s ection

288.210, RSMo 2000, which provides: “ Within twenty days after a decision of the commission

has become final, the director or any party aggrieved by such decision may appeal the d ecision to

the appellate court . . . .” T he Commission’s decision becomes fi nal ten days after it is mailed to

the parties. Section 288.200.2, RSMo 2000

. Here, the Secretary to the Commission certified she

mailed its decision to Claimant on August 14, 2014 . Under Chapter 288, Claimant’s notice o f

appeal to this Court was due on or before Monday, September 15, 2014

. Sections 288.200.2,

288.210 , 288.240, RSMo 2000. Claimant sent the notice of appeal by facsimile to the

Commission on September 24, 2014. Thus, the notice of appeal is untimely.

The unemployment statutes fail to provide a procedure f or filing a late notice of app eal

.

Ross v. Division of Employment Sec. , 332 S.W.3d 922 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011). While there are

procedures for filing a late notice of appeal in other civil matters, such procedures do not apply

to specia l statutory proceedings, such as unemployment matters under Chapter 288. Heffner v.

Division of Employment Sec. , 345 S.W.3d 393, 394 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011). T herefore, this

court’s only option is to dismiss Claimant’s appeal. The appeal is di smissed.

__________________________________ ANGELA T. QUIGLESS

, CHIEF JUDGE

LISA VAN AMBURG , J. and

PHILIP M. HESS , J., Concurs.
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATIONS

The undersigned, as the Chief Executive Officer of Valley Financial Corporation,
certify that the Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2007, which accompanies this certification, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the
information contained in the periodic report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Valley Financial Corporation at the dates and for the periods indicated. The foregoing certification is made
solely for purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United States Code and is subject to the knowledge and willfulness qualifications contained in Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350(c).

Dated: May 14, 2007



/s/ Ellis L. GutshallChief Executive Officer




42
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 188 (Wednesday, September 29, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 60142]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-24379]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employment and Training Administration

[TA-W-73,071]


ArvinMeritor, Incorporated, Currently Known as Camryn Industries 
LLC, Including On-Site Leased Workers From QPS Companies, Belvidere, 
IL; Amended Certification Regarding Eligibility To Apply for Worker 
Adjustment Assistance

    In accordance with Section 223 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended 
(``Act''), 19 U.S.C. 2273, the Department of Labor issued a 
Certification of Eligibility to Apply for Worker Adjustment Assistance 
on June 23, 2010, applicable to workers and former workers of 
ArvinMeritor, Incorporated, including on-site leased workers from QPS 
Companies, Belvidere, Illinois (subject firm). The Department's Notice 
of determination was published in the Federal Register on July 7, 2010 
(75 FR 39047).
    At the request of the State agency, the Department reviewed the 
certification for workers of the subject firm. The workers are engaged 
in activities related to the production of automotive chassis and 
modules.
    New information shows that ArvinMeritor, Incorporated was purchased 
by Camryn Industries LLC in August 2010 and is currently known as 
Camryn Industries LLC. Workers separated from employment at the subject 
firm may have had their wages reported under a separate unemployment 
insurance (UI) tax account under the name Camryn Industries LLC.
    Accordingly, the Department is amending this certification to show 
a change in ownership of the subject firm.
    The intent of the Department's certification is to include all 
workers of the subject firm who were adversely affected as a secondary 
component supplier of automotive chassis and modules to a firm covered 
by an active TAA certification.
    The amended notice applicable to TA-W-73,071 is hereby issued as 
follows:

    All workers of ArvinMeritor, Incorporated, currently known as 
Camryn Industries LLC, including on-site leased workers from QPS 
Companies, Belvidere, Illinois, who became totally or partially 
separated from employment on or after December 9, 2008, through June 
23, 2012, and all workers in the group threatened with total or 
partial separation from employment on date of certification through 
two years from the date of certification, are eligible to apply for 
adjustment assistance under Chapter 2 of Title II of the Trade Act 
of 1974, as amended.

    Signed at Washington, DC, this 17th day of September, 2010.
Del Min Amy Chen,
Certifying Officer, Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance.
[FR Doc. 2010-24379 Filed 9-28-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-FN-P
#### Roger CLAUSEN, Appellant, v. NORTH CENTRAL BLOOD SERVICES, formerly known as St. Paul Regional Blood Services, a division of the American Red Cross, a foreign corporation; Immanuel-St. Joseph’s Hospital, a division of the Mayo Health System, Appellees.

No. 00-1103.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 28, 2000.

Decided Jan. 9, 2001.

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, HANSEN, and BYE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Roger Clausen appeals from the District Court’s1 grant of summary judgment to defendants in his action against North Central Blood Services and Immanuel-St. Joseph’s Hospital under theories of negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, and negligent misrepresentation.

To establish each of his pleaded claims, Clausen had to demonstrate that contaminated blood was the proximate cause of his injury. After de novo review, we conclude the judgment was proper because the un-controverted evidence clearly demonstrated an absence of causation. See *Dulany v. Carnahan,*132 F.3d 1234, 1237 (8th Cir. 1997) (standard of review); *Smith v. Brut-ger Co.,*569 N.W.2d 408, 423-14 (Minn. 1997) (negligent misrepresentation); *Johnson v. Minnesota,*553 N.W.2d 40, 49 (Minn.1996) (negligence); *Drager by Gutz-man v. Aluminum Indus. Corp.,*495 N.W.2d 879, 882 (Minn.App.1993) (strict products liability); *Craft Tool & Die Co. v. Payne,*385 N.W.2d 24, 26 (Minn.App.1986) (breach of warranty). We also conclude the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Clausen’s motion for a continuance. See *Dulany,*132 F.3d at 1238 (standard of review); *United States v. Light,*766 F.2d 394, 397-98 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (nonmoving party must show that opposition is meritorious, and must affirmatively demonstrate how postponement of ruling will enable him to rebut moving party’s showing of absence of genuine issue of fact).

Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

1

. The Hon. James M. Rosenbaum, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota, adopting the report and recommendations of the Hon. Franklin L. Noel, Chief Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota.
#### Emmett SPOONER, Sr. and Cheryl W. Spooner v. East Baton Rouge Sheriff “Sid” GAUTREAUX, State of Louisiana, and Capital One National Association, Inc.

No. 2011-CC-2398.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 16, 2011.

In re Spooner Sr., Emmett; Spooner, Cheryl W.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 569,834; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 0780.

Not considered; not timely filed. See *State v. Crandell,*05-1060 (La.3/10/06), 924 So.2d 122; *Morris v. Stueben,*01-0137 (La.1/26/01), 781 So.2d 1220.
#### G., H. & S. A. R’y Co. v. A. Hodge.

(No. 1785.)

March *7,*1885.

Appeal from Gonzales County.

Opinion by

White, P. J.

§ 619. *Appeal bond in justice's court; clerical error in, does not vitiate; case stated.*Appellant appealed to the county court from a judgment rendered against it in justice’s court. In the county court the appeal was dismissed because the appeal bond appeared to have been executed, approved and filed on April 13, when the judgment appealed from was rendered on April 14, the day after the execution, etc., of the bond. *Held:*Evidently the date of the execution, approval and filing of the bond was a clerical error of the justice. The original appeal bond, which has been sent up with the transcript, recites, after otherwise properly describing the judgment appealed from, that said judgment was rendered on April 14, 1884, which was in fact the day on which said judgment was rendered. This recital makes manifest that the date of the execution, etc., of the bond was a mere' clerical mistake, because of which the appeal should not have been dismissed.

§ 620. *Same; approval of, nunc pro tunc.*The court should have permitted the justice to indorse his approval of the bond *nunc pro tunc,*as of the proper date. *{Ante,*§ 553.]

Reversed and remanded.
649 A.2d 1282

#### CHARLES HICKS v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ET AL.

September 13, 1994.

Petition for certification is denied.
Exhibit 10.3
 EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
  RECITALS
      ARTICLE I
DEFINITIONS
 Confidential Information .
 Invention .
 - 1 -




---



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ARTICLE II
EMPLOYMENT, COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
 Employment With MakeMusic .
 Term .
 Duties .
     Outside Activities .
 - 2 -




---



##### 



Base Salary .
 Fringe Benefits From MakeMusic .
   Vacation .
 Expenses .
 ARTICLE III
TERMINATION
 Events of Termination .
 - 3 -




---



##### 



Compensation Upon Termination of Executives Employment .
   - 4 -




---



##### 



- 5 -




---



##### 



- 6 -




---



##### 



Return of MakeMusic Property .
 - 7 -




---



##### 



ARTICLE IV
PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS AND
CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS DATA
 Confidential Information .
 Maintain in Confidence .
     - 8 -




---



##### 



Return of Information .
 ARTICLE V
COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE
 Noncompete and Nonsolicitation .
    - 9 -




---



##### 



Understandings .
 Additional Consideration .
 ARTICLE VI
INVENTIONS
 Disclosure .
    - 10 -




---



##### 



Assignment of Ownership .
 Excluded Inventions .
     Prior Inventions .
 Specific Performance .
 ARTICLE VII
ARBITRATION
 Agreement to Arbitrate .
 - 11 -




---



##### 



Discovery .
 Costs .
 ARTICLE VIII
CERTAIN MAKEMUSIC REMEDIES; ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS
 Certain MakeMusic Remedies .
 Payment of Fees and Expenses .
 ARTICLE IX
INDEMNIFICATION
 Indemnification .
 ARTICLE X
MISCELLANEOUS
 Survival of Provisions .
 - 12 -




---



##### 



Notification of Restrictive Covenants
 Severability
 Governing Law .
 Successors .
 Waiver .
 Notices .
    Modification .
 - 13 -




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##### 



Code Section 409A
 Counterparts .
 No Strict Construction .
 - 14 -




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##### 



IN WITNESS WHEREOF
 EXECUTIVE/s/ Ronald B. RaupRonald B. Raup MAKEMUSIC, INC./s/ Karen L. VanDerBoschKaren L. VanDerBoschChief Financial Officer - 15 -