United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 18-3264

___________________________

Kristin Naca

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant

v.

Macalester College

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee

 ____________

Appeal from United States District Court

for the District of Minnesota

 ____________

 Submitted: October 17, 2019

Filed: January 16, 2020

[Published]

____________

Before SMITH, Chief Judge, GRUENDER and BENTON, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM. 

Kristin Naca, an assistant professor of poetry at Macalester College, was

diagnosed in 2011 with a long-term illness causing chronic pain and fatigue, but not

impairing her intellect. She requested accommodations, including time off and

assistance with her work, which Macalester partly granted after many back-and-forth

communications and meetings. Naca remained competitive for tenure until May
2015, when a former student who had also served as her work-study assistant, “Jane

Doe,” made a written complaint that Naca had sex with her. Macalester found, as

Naca acknowledged, that while Doe was still a student—about a week and a half

before graduation—Naca had invited Doe to her home and discussed their potential

mutual sexual attraction. Naca admitted she asked Doe, “Do you want me to make

a pass at you?” Three days after Doe graduated, she and Naca began a sexual

relationship. The provost recommended terminating Naca for violating Macalester’s

policies on student-teacher relationships. The faculty personnel committee and the

president agreed. After a formal investigation, a hearing, and at least five layers of

review, Macalester terminated Naca.

Naca sued Macalester, alleging 35 claims. The district court1dismissed about

two-thirds of them for failure to state a claim. Of these, Naca appeals the claims for

discriminatory discharge based on disability under three statutes—§ 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794; the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42

U.S.C. § 12101 etseq.; and the Minnesota HumanRights Act(“MHRA”), Minn. Stat.

§ 363A.01 et seq. After de novo review, this court concludes that the district court

properly dismissed these claims as lacking sufficient facts to be plausible. See 8th

Cir. R. 47B.

On appeal, Naca arguesthat the departing provost—who handled her disability

accommodations and the initial response to Jane Doe’s allegations—used the

incoming provost, faculty personnel committee, and college president as a “cat’s

paw” to terminate Naca for her disability. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411,

419 (2011). Naca did not raise this theory to the district court. This court does not

consider an argument raised for the first time on appeal unless it is purely legal and

requires no additionalfactual development, or if a manifest injustice would otherwise

1The Honorable Patrick J. Schiltz, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota. 

-2-
result. Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 297 F.3d 720, 725 (8th Cir. 2002). When

presenting her disability discrimination claims in the district court, Naca never

alleged that the former provost had influenced the decision-makers who fired her. 

True, when opposing summary judgment on her claim for discriminatory discharge

on the basis of sex, Naca cited the Staub case to illustrate “procedural irregularities,”

including “ignoring exculpatory evidence.” But, even as to sex discrimination, Naca

did not identify facts to support a cat’s paw theory. Most importantly, Naca never

made a cat’s paw argument in support of disability discrimination. This courtreviews

only the specific arguments raised before the district court, “as opposed to those

argumentsthe district court might have deduced from the record as a whole.” Gilbert

v. Des Moines Area Cmty. Coll., 495 F.3d 906, 915 (8th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in

original). See 8th Cir. R. 47B. 

The district court denied Naca’s motion to amend her complaint to add claims

under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et. seq. Naca v. Macalester

Coll., 2017 WL 6622505, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 28, 2017). For the reasons stated by

the district court, it did not abuse its discretion in ruling that this motion was untimely

and futile. See id., at *1–2. See also 8th Cir. R. 47B. 

The district court later granted summary judgment on the claims for

discriminatory discharge based on (1) sex under Title IX of the Education

Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.; (2) race/ancestry under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981; (3) sex, race/ancestry, and religion under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; and (4) sex, race/ancestry, religion, and sexual

orientation under the MHRA, Minn. Stat. § 363A.01 et seq. Naca v. Macalester

Coll., 2018 WL 4516950, at *11, 21 (D. Minn. Sep. 20, 2018). After accurately and

precisely identifying the undisputed facts, the district court stated:

The Court does not believe that Naca has established a

prima facie case of discrimination. Nothing about the

-3-
circumstances of this case gives rise to an inference of

discrimination. In May 2015, when Doe made her

complaint, Macalester was beginning the process of

approving Naca for tenure. Up to that point, Naca’s career

was progressing smoothly. What changed after May 2015

was not Doe’s race/ancestry, sex, sexual orientation, or

religion; what changed is that a former student made a

formal complaint of sexual misconduct.

Id. at *11. Even assuming Naca made a prima facie case, this court concludes, on de

novo review, that Macalester articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for

termination—her sexual relationship with Doe—that Naca does not counter with

sufficient evidence of pretext. See id. at *12–16 (rejecting Naca’s contentions about

possible comparators, procedural irregularities, and shifting explanations); cf. Amir

v. St. Louis Univ., 184 F.3d 1017, 1026 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding a genuine issue of

material fact about pretext where the decision-maker issued a new policy just before

taking adverse action). See also 8th Cir. R. 47B.

The district court also granted summary judgment on Naca’s claim for failure

to accommodate her disability under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Naca, 2018 WL

4516950, at *16–19. Naca admitted that with the accommodations provided, she was

performing the essential functions of an assistant professor, which, on de novo

review, defeats her claim as a matter of law. See Burchett v. Target Corp., 340 F.3d

510, 518 (8th Cir. 2003) (affirming summary judgment where plaintiff did not show

inability to perform her essential job functions with the accommodations provided). 

See also 8th Cir. R. 47B.

Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms the judgment of

the district court. 

______________________________

-4-