P ABLO FIG UEROA, P la in t if f,
v. DI STRIC T OF CO LU M BIA METROP OLIT AN P OLICE DE P AR TM EN T, Defendan t.

UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

Ci vi l A cti on 07 -01 99 2 (H HK) (A K)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION Metropolitan Police Off

icer s Pablo Figueroa , Michae l J . Fa rish, Br ian A. Murphy , Ty rone Dodson, L ance D. Har

rison, Sr., Dery

l M. J ohnson, and Curtis R. S loan (c ollectively “plaintiffs” ) bringthis action ag ainst the Metropolitan Police De partment (“ MPD”) alleg ing that MPD failed to pay them basic a

nd overtime c ompensation for f ulfilling the duties of “ detec tive serg eants.” Th e y a lle g e that th is n on

pa y me nt v iol ate d D .C. Cod e § 5 -5 43 .0 2( c ) a nd pr ov isi on s o f t

he F a ir L abor Standa

rds Act ( “F L SA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. Be fore the Court are MPD’s motion for judgme nt on the pleading s or, in the alter native, for summary

judgme nt [ #50] and plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgme nt [ #38]. Upon consideration of the motions, the opposit ions thereto, and the rec ord of this ca se, the Court conclude s that judgme nt should be entere d in favor of MPD.The CB A states that “a rbitration is the method of re solving g rieva nces which have 1 not been satisfactorily

resolved pur suant to the Grieva nce Proc edure ,” which c oncludes upon rec eipt of a de cision from the Chief of Police. (De f.’s Mot. for J. on Pl eading s Ex . 6 at 33 (CBA )). 2 I. BACKG ROUND Under District of Columbia law, any member of

MPD “promoted . . . to the ra nk of detec tive serg eant sha ll rece ive, in addition to his scheduled rate of ba sic compensation, $595 per annum.” D.C. Code § 5- 543.02(c) . Some MPD officer s believe that they fulfilled the responsibilities of detec tive serg eants but did not rec eive pa y ment pursuant to this provision. On D e c e mb e r

1 2 , 2 0 0 3 , M P D S e r g e an t s P a b l o F i g u e r o a , B r i anM ur

p h y , D o n a l d

Y at e s , Jo h nJ. Br ennan, a

nd Curtis S loan filed a

g rieva nce thr oug h their union, the F rate rnal Or der of Police (“union” ), to contest the nonpa y ment of dete ctive ser g eant c ompensation. The Chief of Police denied the grieva

nce. Followingthe proc edure descr ibed in Article 19 of the union’s Collective B arg aining Ag ree ment (“CB A”) with MPD, the union then broug ht the matter to ar bitration on behalf of 1 Serg eants F igue roa, Mur

phy , Yates, B renna

n, and Sloan. On June 28, 2004, Arbitrator Richa rd G. Trotter deter mined that: (1) the grieva nce w as not barr ed as untimely ; (2) D.C. Code § 5- 543.02 applied to the ca se bec ause the g rieva nts “perf orm[ed] the func tions of Detec tive Serg eant” ; and (3) the arbitrator had jurisdiction under the CBA to rule on this matter. (De f.’s Mot. for J. on P leading s Ex . 3 at 7 (Op. & Awar d by Arbitrator)). Ar

bitrator Trotter

awa rded the g rieva nts “bac k pay

of $595.00 re troac tive to the date that e ach grieva nt was assig ned to the position of Detective Ser g eant” and stated that the awa rd “a pplies to all simi larly -situated employ ees a s descr ibed in the g rieva nce.” ( Id. at 8).Plaintiffs maintain that, although some of them rec eived pa

rtial awa rds af ter 2 PERB issued its ruling, none have be en fully compensated for the ir work a s detec tive serg eants. The union filed a

n action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia seekingconfirmation of the a rbitration awa

rd, and in F ebrua

ry 2008 the Superior Court rule d in the union’s favor
. MPD ha s b ro ug ht a

n a pp e a l of the Sup e ri or

Court ’s or de r i n th e D. C. C ourt of Ap pe a ls. 3 MPD re qu e ste d r e vie w o f t he arb itr atio n a

wa rd by the Di str ic t of

Col umb ia

Pub lic Employ ee Re lations Boar d (“PERB” ). On Septembe r 30, 2005, PERB rule d that Arbitrator Trotter a cted “ well within the ambit of his authority when he conclude [d] that the under lying g rieva nce is timely” and that the awa rd of ba ck pay

was ne ither improper

under the CBA nor contra ry to law and public policy . (De f.’s Mot. for J. on Pl eading s Ex . 4 at 4 (De cision & O rder of PERB)) . PERB’s orde r stated that it was “ final upon issuance .” ( Id. at 5). MPD did not ap p ea l th e P E R B r

u l i n g. 2 Plaintiffs filed this action on November 5, 2007, asser

ting in their se cond ame nded complaint (“c omplaint”) four claims arisingfrom MPD’s alleg ed fa ilure to pay eac h plaintiff the additional $595 for e ach year he fulfilled the r esponsibiliti es of a detec tive serg eant. In counts 1, 2, and 3, plaintiffs c laim that MPD viol ated the L abor Standa rds Act ( FL SA) by

failingto (1) compensate them pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 206(b), the F L SA’s minimum wag e provision, (2) compensate them in a timely manner pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 206(b), and ( 3) take the additional compensation due them into account in ca lculatingthe over time pay ments to which they

are entitled as is require d for c ompliance with 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) , the FL SA’s overtime provision. In count 4, plaintiffs asse rt that MPD violated D.C. Code § 5-543.02.B e c a us e the Court ’s de c isi on

re lie s o n f

a c ts t ake n f

ro m outsi de the ple a din g s, it 3 applies the standa

rd appr opriate f

or consider ation of MPD’s motion for summary judgme nt, the mot ion MPD su bmi ts a s an a lte rn ativ e to i ts m oti on fo r j ud g me nt o n th e ple a din g s p ur su ant t o Rule 12(c) of the F eder al Rules of Civil P roce dure. 4 II. LEGAL STANDARD Summary jud g me nt m ay

be g ra nte d o nly wh e n th e “ ple a din g s, de po sit ion s, ans we rs to interrog atories, a

nd admissions on file, toge ther with the a ffidavits, if any , show that there is no g enuine issue of

materia l fac t and the movingparty is entitled to judgment as a matter of la

w.” F e d. R. C iv. P. 5 6( c ); Bu rk e v . G ou ld , 2 86 F .3 d 5 13 , 5 17 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 2)
. A m ate ri a l f a c t is 3 one that is ca

pable of aff ectingthe outcome of

the litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A g enuine issue is one where the “e vidence is such that a re asonable jury could re turn a ve rdict for

the nonmoving pa

rty ,” as oppose d to evidence that “is so one-sided that one par ty must prevail as a

matter of la

w.” Id. at 248, 252. A cour t consideringa motion for summary judgme nt must draw all “justifiable infe renc es” f rom the evide nce in f

avor of the nonmovant. Id. at 255. B ut the nonmoving pa rty ’s opposition must consist of more than me re unsupported alleg ations or denials a nd must be supported by

aff idavits or other c ompetent
e vid e nc e se tti ngfo rt

h s pe c if ic fa c ts s ho wi ngtha

t th e re is a

g e nu ine iss ue fo r t

ri a l. F e d. R. C iv. P. 56 (e ); Ce lote

xCor p. v . Ca tre tt , 477 U.S. 317 (1986).

III . A NA LY SIS A . P la in t if

fs ’ D . C . C o de C la imis Ba r r e d b y t he D o c t r in e o f Re s J udic ata . In count 4 of their c omplaint, plaintiffs assert that MPD’s fa ilure to pay them the additional compensation owed to detec tive serg eants c onstitut es a violation of D.C. Code § 5- 543.02. This claim is barre d by the doctrine of re

s ju dic ata , or cla im preclusion.Under the circ umstances he re, ne ither par ty ’s intere st would be serve d by raising 4 the issue of c laim prec lusion; certainly the plaintiffs would not ask the Court to find their own c la ims ba rr e d, and MPD did no t pr e va il i n th e pr e vio us pr oc e e din g . It is the re fo re pa rt ic ula rl y appropr iate in this case f

or the Court to apply

a princ iple that serve s the interests of the Court “or, more pre cisely , those of socie ty .” Stanton , 127 F.3d at 77. 5 Ne ith e r p art

y ha s r a ise d th is i ssu e , s o th e Court no te s f ir st that it is a pp ro pr iate fo r t

his Court to raise the matter

sua sponte. Se e Sta nto n v . D .C. Cou rt o f A pp e als , 127 F.3d 72, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (statingthat beca use res judicata “belong s to courts as we ll as to lit iga nts,”
c ourt s c an c on sid e r i t e ve n if the pa rt ie s h ave wa ive d it ); Coleman v. PotomacElec. Powe r Co. , 310 F. Supp. 2d 154, 161 & n.5 (D.D.C. 2004) (su a s po ntedismiss ing statutory discrimination
c l a i m s a s b ar

r e d b y re s ju dic ata ). Pe rm itt ingc ourt s to dis po se of c la ims on

thi s g ro un d o n th e ir
own in iti ativ e “ is f

ull y c on sis te nt w iththe po lic ie s und e rl yingre s ju dic ata : it is n ot b a se d s ole ly on the def endant’ s interest in avoidingthe burde ns of twice de fendinga suit, but is also based on the avoidanc e of unne cessa ry judicial waste.” Ar izo na v . Ca lif or nia , 530 U.S. 392, 412 (2000) (qu o t i n g United States v. Sioux Nation , 448 U.S. 371, 432 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., di ssenting) ) (interna l quotation marks omitted). 4 Re s ju dic ata or cla im preclusion doctrine is comprised of thre e ele ments: (1) the pre sence of the same pa

rt ie s o r t he ir pr ivi e s in a pr e vio us and

c ur re nt s uit ; ( 2) c la ims ari sin gfr om t he same
cause of ac tion in the previous suit as those in the curr ent suit; and (3) a final judg ment on the merits in the previous suit. Apotex, I nc. v. F ood &Drug Admin. , 393 F.3d 210, 217 ( D.C. Cir. 2004). Eac h element of

the doctrine is present he re. First, the Court re cog nizes that a binding a rbitration proc eedingis a final judg ment on the merits and oper ates a s the functional e quivalent of a judgme nt in a lawsuit. Sanders v. W ash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. , 8 19 F .2 d 1 15 1, 11 57 (D .C. Cir . 1 98 7) ; Schattner v. G irard, Inc. , 668The CB A states that if the union de mands arbitration to settl e a grieva nce, “ [t ]he 5 decision of the a

rbitrator sha ll be binding upon both par ties and all employ ees dur ing the life of this Agr eeme nt.” (De f.’s Mot. for J. on Pl eading s Ex . 6 at 35 (CB A)).

F ur the rm or e , in

a pp ro pr iate c ir c ums tanc e s, “ [a] n on pa rt y may be c on sid e re d in 6 p r i v i ty w i tha

p arty t o th e p r i o r

a c t i o ni f th e n o np arty’ s i n t e r e s t s ar e ‘ a d e qu at e l y r e p r e s e n t e d b y a party to the orig inal action.’” Le wan do wsk i v . Pro p. Cle rk, 2 09 F . Su

pp . 2 d 1 9, 21 -2 2 ( D. D. C. 2 0 0 2 ) ( qu o t i n g Am. Forest Re s. Council v. Shea , 172 F. Supp. 2d 24, 31 (D.D .C. 2001)). The alig nment of the intere sts between the new plaintiffs in this case and the union in re prese nting the orig inal g rieva

nts is evident. The newplaintiffs, as employ ees who alleg e they did the work of detec tive serg eants a

nd seek c ompensation for that work, ar e in the same position as were the orig inal g rieva

nts. They even a ppear to have be en indirec tly

repr esente d at the ar

bitration proce eding ; the resultingawa rd applied to e mploy ees “ simil arly situated” to the named g rieva nts. (D e f. ’s Mo t. f

or J. onPle a din g s E x. 3 at 8 ( Op . & Aw ard by Ar bit ra tor)) . A nd

the ne w p la int if

fs , as co- parties with F igue roa, Mur phy , and Sloan, now bringthe same a ction, make joint argume nts , a

nd re qu e st i de nti c a l r e lie f b e fo re thi s Co ur t a s d o th os e or ig ina l g ri e va nts . 6 F.2d 1366, 1368 ( D.C. Cir. 1981). To reiter ate, ther e has be en an a rbitration proc eedingand a resultingbinding a

war d, aff irmed upon re view by

PERB. Moreove r, the pa rties to the 5 arbitration procee ding w ere the same or in privity with the parties c urre ntly befor e the Court. P ab l o Fi gu er o a, Br i an M urp h y , an d C urt i s S l o an we re gri ev an t s b ef o re th e a rb i tra t o r. T h o u gh Mic ha e l F ari sh , T y

ro n D od so n, L anc e Ha

rr iso n, a nd De ry l John so n w e re no t na

me d g ri e va

nts in the ar bitration proce eding , they are , as MPD employ ees, me mbers of the union. There fore , for purposes of c laim prec lusion analy sis, they are in privity

with the union and its members who
wer e par ties in the arbitration procee ding. See A dams v. Pe nsion Ben. Guar. Corp. , 332 F. Supp. 2 d 2 3 1 , 2 3 8 n . 8 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 4 ) ( ci t i n g Mo na ha n v . Ne w York City De pt. of C orrs. , 214 F.3d 275, 28 5 ( 2d Cir . 2 00 0) ); se e als o H

itc he ns v . Co un ty

of M on tgo me ry , 2004 WL886266, at *6 (3d C i r. Ap ri l 2 6 , 2 0 0 4 ) ( ci t i n g Handley v . Phillips , 715 F. Supp. 657, 666-67 (M.D . Pa. 1989); Stokes v . Bd. of Tr. of T

emple U niv. , 683 F. Supp. 498, 502 (E.D. Pa. 1988) , aff’d , 872 F.2d 413 (3d Cir. 1989)). Consequently , the first and third e lements of cla im preclusion doctrine are 6 prese nt.The Court is not unsy mpathetic to plaintiffs’ a lleg ation that they have not r ece ived 7 compensation from MPD despite the outcome of the ar bitration proce eding . But a n enfor ceme nt a c tio n is pe nd ingin t

he D. C. c ourt s, and

thi s Co ur t w ill no t igno re the pr inc ipl e s o f c la im prec lusion because the plaintiffs have not y et re ceive d the bene fit of their a war d. 7 Th e se c on d a

nd re ma ini nge le me nt o f t

he do c tr ine—c la ims ari sin gfr om t he same c a

us e of ac tion in the previous suit as those in the curr ent suit—is also present. At ar bitration, the union argued that the g rieva nts “have perf

ormed the job func tion of Detec tive Serg eant . . . [and] should be compensated ac cording ly as provided f

or under the terms of D .C. Code Section 5- 54 3. 02 (c ). ” (D e f. ’s Mo t. f or J. onPle a din g s E x. 3 at 4 ( Op . & Aw ard by Ar bit rator)) . H e re , in count 4 of their c omplaint, plaintiffs alleg e that “the individual Pl aintiffs have held the status of Detec tive Serg eant” but MPD has failed “ to pay the statutorily

mandated $595 pe r annum a s require d by

D.C. Code § 5-543.02.” ( Compl. §§ 72, 74). The claims bef ore the arbitrator and the claims set forth in count 4 a re ide ntical. Prec luding plaintiffs f rom prosec uting the c laims they
a sse rt in c ount 4 is c on sis te nt w iththe pr op os iti on tha t “ a pa rt y wh o o nc e ha s h a d a

c ha nc e to litigate a claim bef

ore a n appropr iate tribunal usually oug ht not to have another chanc e to do so.” SB C Co mm c ’n s. In c . v . FCC , 407 F.3d 1223, 1229 ( D.C. Cir. 2005) (interna l quotation marks omitted). 7 Res judicata do e s n ot b ar t he c la ims se t f

or th i n c ounts 1, 2, and

3 o f t he c omp la int , howeve r. These claims are based on a lleg ed violations of the F L SA. Whi le as a g ener al matter,
c ourt s d o n ot p e rm it “ c la ims that sh ou ld have be en submitted to arbitration, eve n if they wer e not actua lly hear d” to be br oug ht in a subsequent lawsuit, Sa nd e rs , 819 F.2d at 1157 (quoting Schattner , 668 F.2d at 1368) (interna l quotation marks omitted), the Supreme Court has he ld that
an ac tion in federa l court alleg ing c laims under the F L SA may proce ed eve n wher e a pr iorA collec tive barg ainingag ree ment may require arbitration of statutory claims and 8 thus bar individuals from see king r edre ss on those claims in a judicial forum, but only if the ag ree ment’s ar

bitration provision ex pressly cover s statutory

rig hts. 14Pe nn Plaz a LLC v . P y e tt , 129 S.Ct . 1456, 1468-69 (2009) . Her e, plaintiffs’ CB A does not state that it cove rs statutory claims. Instead, it provides that “ [o] nly an alleg ation that there has bee n a violation, misapplication or misinterpretation of the terms of this Ag ree ment shall constitute a g rieva nce under the provisions of this Grievanc e Proce dure.” (De f.’s Mot. for J. on Pl eading s Ex . 6 at 27 (CBA )). 8 arbitration based on the same fac ts has alre ady occur red. Barrentine v. Ark

ansas-Best Freight Sy s. , 450 U.S. 728, 729-30 (1981). This rule re flec ts the signific ance of the Cong ressional g rant 8 of individual wag e and hour protec tions as well as the intent to provide “ broad a cce ss to the courts” to e nforc e those rights. Id. at7 3 9
- 4 0
. T h o u g hn o tb ar r e d b y re s ju dic ata , p la int if

fs ’ claims based on a lleg ed violations of the F L SA nonetheless fa il because they are time barre d. B. P lai nt iffs’ F LSACl aim s a r e Tim e Bar r e d. MPD argues that plaintiffs’ F L SA claims are time barre d by the applica

ble statute of limit ations beca

use plaintiffs have been on notice that they would not rec eive c ompensation as detec tive serg eants since MPD eliminated the position twenty -five year s ag o. Plaintiffs respond that th e y have su bmi tte d e vid e nc e de mon str atin gthat th e po sit ion c on tin ue s to e xist. Th e y

a lso argue that their c laims did not accrue until the PER B de cision beca me final in late 2005. The Court nee d not resolve the pa rties’ dispute about the e x istence of the detec tive
se rg e ant p os iti on . E ve n if pla int if fs are c or re c t th at th e y

se rv e d a s d e te c tiv e se rg e ants , it is appar ent from the r ecor d that they did so before Dec ember

12, 2003, when they

filed a grieva

nce seekingcompensation pursuant to D.C. Code § 5-543.02(c) . Contrary to plaintiffs’ asser

tion, their cla ims do not arise out of MPD’s nonpay ment of the a

rbitration awa

rd, but instead fr om the failure to compensate them at the time they alleg edly fulfilled the re sponsibili ties of detec tivePlaintiffs are not se ekingenfor ceme nt of the ar bitration awa

rd; as noted, suc h an 9 a c tio n is pe nd ingin t

he D. C. c ourt s. Th e y

argue tha t th e fi na lizatio n o f t

he PERB de c isi on

wa s a “c o n d i t i o np re ce d en t ” t o th e a cc ru al o f t h ei r F L S A c l ai m , ci t i n g Cook v. United States , 855 F.2d 848 (F ed. Cir. 1988), in which “ the rig ht of fire fig hters to statutory overtime de pended on” a study by the Secr etar

y of L abor. Id. at 851. B ut the Fe dera l Circuit acknowledg ed in Cook that the fa ctual cir cumstance s of the ca se we re aty pical, see id. at 85 1 ( “ Th is [d e lay in a c c ru a l] is contra ry to the usual rule, i.e. , that a cla im for unpaid over time under the F L SA acc rues at the end of e ach pa

y period whe n it is notpaid.”) , and the a ccr ual was de lay ed only

beca use the plaintiff fire fig hters “c ould not have stated a claim” until the study , which dete rmined “how many hours could be w orked be fore overtime liability beg an,” w as published, see id. at 849, 851. No similar circ umstances e x ist here. Plaintiffs’ c ause of action existed, and they

could have filed suit assertingtheir F L SA claims, at least as e arly as the date they

contested the nonpay

ment of wag es throug h the CBA grieva nce pr ocedur es. Cf. Moreno v. United States , 82 Fe d. Cl. 387, 404 (2 0 0 8 ) ( d i s t i n gu i s h i n g Cook w h e r e “ th e p l a i n t i f f s c l e ar l y could have sue d any time after

the pay periods duringwhich they worke d a six th day

per w eek . . . but did not re ceive overtime for it”). 9 serg eants. See M

arsans v. Commc’ns W

orkers of Am. , 1989 WL43831, at *9 (D.D .C. Apr. 19, 19 89 ) ( “ A c a

us e of a c tio n a c c ru e s und e r t

his se c tio n at th e tim e the [F L SA] w a s a lle g e dly
v i o l at edan d

o v ert i m e p ay

m en t s we re al l ege d l y

d u e. ” ( ci t i n g Unex celled Che m. Corp. v. United States , 345 U.S. 59, 65 (1959)))
. As has bee n explained, there is nothingto preve nt plaintiffs 9 from prose cutingclaims in fede ral c ourt based on a lleg ed violations of the F L SA rather than following union gr ievanc e proc edure s. Howeve r, plaintiffs’ pur suit of remedie s under a collective ba

rg ainingag ree ment does not toll the tim e within which they wer e re quired to bring their F L SA-based c laims. See A bbott v. United States , 1 44 F .3 d 1 , 6 (1 st C ir . 1 99 8) (s tatin g , in aff irming a district court’s dismissal of FL SA claims as time barr ed followingthe pursuit of a union’s g rieva

nce pr ocedur es, that “[t] he Supreme Court has square ly held in Unex celled Che m. Corp. v. United States , 345 U.S. 59, [ 66] (1953) that the FL SA’s statute of limitations i s not subject to tolling on the ba sis of pendingadministrative proc eeding s”). The time limitation for bring ing F L SA claims is two y ear s, though it is extended to three y ear s if, as plaintiffs alleg e her e, the violation was w illful. 29 U.S.C . § 255(a) . More than thr ee10

y ear s passed be tween D ece mber 2003 a nd the filing of the c omplaint in thi s case in November 20 07 . T he re fo re , r e g ard le ss o f whic h li mit atio n p e ri od a pp lie s, pla int if

fs ’ F L SA c la ims are tim e barr ed. III . C ON CL USI ON F or the fo re g oin gre a so ns , th e Cou rt c on c lud e s th at summa

ry jud g me nt m

us t be e nte re d in favor of MPD and that plaintiffs’ motion for pa rtial summary

judgme nt must be denied. An appropr iate orde r ac companies this memora ndum opinion.
Henr y H. Kenne dy , J r. Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge