2020 IL App (4th) 180298-U 

NO. 4-18-0298 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

 v. 

KIMBERLY M. BEASLEY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Champaign County 

No. 15CF633 

Honorable 

Thomas J. Difanis, 

Judge Presiding.

 

 JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court. 

 Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice Holder White concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The circuit court did not err by dismissing defendant’s postconviction petition at 

the first stage of the proceedings. 

¶ 2 In October 2017, defendant, Kimberly M. Beasley, filed pro se a postconviction 

petition arguing her fourth amendment rights (U.S. Const., amend. IV) were violated when she 

was placed under arrest and she received ineffective assistance of counsel for several reasons. In 

an October 2017 written order, the Champaign County circuit court dismissed defendant’s 

postconviction petition, finding the petition was frivolous and patently without merit. 

¶ 3 Defendant appeals, contending the circuit court erred by dismissing her 

postconviction petition because it stated the gist of a constitutional claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel. We affirm.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

NOTICE

This order was filed under Supreme 

Court Rule 23 and may not be cited 

as precedent by any party except in 

the limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 

FILED

June 12, 2020 

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL
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¶ 5 On May 2, 2015, the police arrested defendant without a warrant after they found 

defendant’s roommate and friend, James Torrince, dead in the apartment they shared. The State 

charged defendant with one count of aggravated domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a-5) (West 

2014)) and four counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2014)) for 

Torrince’s death. Two days later, defense counsel filed a motion for the appointment of a 

psychiatrist, asserting a bona fide doubt existed as to defendant’s fitness and sanity. On June 30, 

2015, the circuit court found defendant unfit to plead or stand trial. In September 2015, the court 

found defendant was then fit to plead or stand trial.

¶ 6 On May 4, 2016, the circuit court held a plea hearing. The parties’ plea 

agreement provided defendant would plead guilty to a new charge of second degree murder (720 

ILCS 5/9-2(a)(2) (West 2014)), the State would seek dismissal of the other five charges, and 

defendant would receive a sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment. Defense counsel stated the 

following at the hearing: 

“[F]or the benefit of the Court and my client, as the Court knows, originally my 

client was found unfit. She was sent to [the Department of Human Services], 

restored to fitness. I had Dr. Jeckel evaluate her for—for sanity. He was unable 

to come to a conclusion, and so the Court was gracious enough and I was able to 

get Dr. Terry Killian from Springfield to examine [defendant] for sanity. He 

found that she would have been insane at the time. And obviously, [defendant] 

knows that if she were to proceed to trial, I would be obligated to present that [not 

guilty by reason of insanity] defense, and it’s her—we’re here of her own 

choosing. She decided to plead guilty.” 

The court reiterated defense counsel would have to present an insanity defense if the case went to 
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trial. The court then asked defendant if it was her decision to accept the plea agreement for 20 

years’ imprisonment with the other charges dismissed, and defendant responded in the 

affirmative. After hearing the factual basis, the court again confirmed defendant wanted to plead 

guilty. The court accepted the parties’ plea agreement and sentenced defendant to 20 years’ 

imprisonment. Defendant did not file a direct appeal.

¶ 7 On October 19, 2017, defendant filed pro se a postconviction petition asserting 

(1) unreasonable search and seizure when she was arrested, (2) defense counsel failed to explain 

her right to a speedy trial, (3) defense counsel failed to explain the laws and her rights to her, and 

(4) defense counsel failed to present defendant’s case fully to the State. On October 31, 2017, 

the circuit court entered a written order, dismissing defendant’s petition as frivolous and patently 

without merit. The court noted defendant’s unreasonable search and seizure argument was not 

supported by attached documents and the other allegations were vague and unsupported. On 

April 9, 2018, defendant filed pro se an amendment to her postconviction petition. 

¶ 8 On April 20, 2018, defendant filed a timely motion for leave to file a late notice of 

appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). See Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(d) 

(eff. July 1, 2017) (providing the supreme court rules governing criminal appeals apply to 

appeals in postconviction proceedings). This court granted defendant’s motion, and defendant 

filed her late notice of appeal, which sufficiently complied with Rule 606(d). Accordingly, this 

court has jurisdiction under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(a) (eff. July 1, 2017). 

¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 On appeal, defendant argues the circuit court erred by dismissing defendant’s 

postconviction petition where the petition stated the gist of a constitutional claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel because it is arguable defense counsel improperly required defendant to 
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choose between a guilty plea and an insanity plea and failed to oppose the State’s use of 

defendant’s statements improperly obtained by the police. The State argues (1) defendant 

forfeited her issues on appeal because she did not include them in her original petition and

(2) the circuit court properly dismissed the postconviction petition. We agree with the State 

defendant has forfeited her appellate claims.

¶ 11 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Postconviction Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.

(West 2016)) “provides a mechanism for criminal defendants to challenge their convictions or 

sentences based on a substantial violation of their rights under the federal or state constitutions.” 

People v. Morris, 236 Ill. 2d 345, 354, 925 N.E.2d 1069, 1074-75 (2010). A proceeding under 

the Postconviction Act is a collateral proceeding and not an appeal from the defendant’s 

conviction and sentence. People v. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 21, 987 N.E.2d 371. The 

defendant must show he or she suffered a substantial deprivation of his or her federal or state 

constitutional rights. People v. Caballero, 228 Ill. 2d 79, 83, 885 N.E.2d 1044, 1046 (2008). 

¶ 12 The Postconviction Act establishes a three-stage process for adjudicating a 

postconviction petition. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 23. Here, defendant’s petition was 

dismissed at the first stage. At the first stage, the circuit court must review the postconviction 

petition and determine whether “the petition is frivolous or is patently without merit.” 725 ILCS 

5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2016). To survive dismissal at this initial stage, the postconviction 

petition “need only present the gist of a constitutional claim,” which is “a low threshold” that 

requires the petition to contain only “a limited amount of detail.” People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 

410, 418, 675 N.E.2d 102, 106 (1996). Our supreme court has held “a pro se petition seeking 

postconviction relief under the [Postconviction] Act for a denial of constitutional rights may be 

summarily dismissed as frivolous or patently without merit only if the petition has no arguable 
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basis either in law or in fact.” People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12, 912 N.E.2d 1204, 1209 

(2009). A petition lacks an arguable legal basis when it is based on an indisputably meritless 

legal theory, such as one that is completely contradicted by the record. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 16, 

912 N.E.2d at 1212. A petition lacks an arguable factual basis when it is based on a fanciful 

factual allegation, such as one that is clearly baseless, fantastic, or delusional. Hodges, 234 Ill. 

2d at 16-17, 912 N.E.2d at 1212. “In considering a petition pursuant to [section 122-2.1 of the 

Postconviction Act], the court may examine the court file of the proceeding in which the 

petitioner was convicted, any action taken by an appellate court in such proceeding and any 

transcripts of such proceeding.” 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(c) (West 2016); see also People v. Brown, 

236 Ill. 2d 175, 184, 923 N.E.2d 748, 754 (2010). 

¶ 13 Our review of the first-stage dismissal of a postconviction petition is de novo. 

People v. Dunlap, 2011 IL App (4th) 100595, ¶ 20, 963 N.E.2d 394. With the de novo standard, 

the reviewing court affords no deference to the circuit court’s judgment or reasoning. People v. 

Walker, 2018 IL App (1st) 160509, ¶ 22, 128 N.E.3d 978. Essentially, the reviewing court 

performs the same analysis the circuit court would have performed. Walker, 2018 IL App (1st) 

160509, ¶ 22. Additionally, the reviewing court may affirm the circuit court’s judgment on any 

basis found in the record. Walker, 2018 IL App (1st) 160509, ¶ 23. 

¶ 14 First, we address defendant’s contention this court can consider the additional 

materials she filed on April 9, 2018, which was more than five months after the circuit court’s 

dismissal of her postconviction petition. In support of her argument, defendant cites People v. 

Coleman, 2012 IL App (4th) 110463, ¶ 63, 981 N.E.2d 1178, which suggests courts can consider 

materials attached to a motion to reconsider a first stage dismissal. Here, defendant did not 

timely file a motion to reconsider, and thus the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to address the 
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new material she filed more than 30 days after the dismissal of her postconviction petition. See 

People v. Moore, 2015 IL App (5th) 130125, ¶ 28, 32 N.E.3d 30 (noting the circuit court 

generally loses jurisdiction to vacate or modify its judgment 30 days after the judgment’s entry). 

Unlike in Coleman, the record is clear the circuit court in this case never considered the April 

2018 materials. Accordingly, we will not consider the additional materials defendant filed in 

April 2018. 

¶ 15 On appeal, defendant argues her trial counsel was ineffective because counsel 

improperly insisted she plead not guilty by reason of insanity and failed to advise her of her right 

against self-incrimination or oppose the use of her statements to the police as a basis for her 

guilty plea. However, in her October 2017 postconviction petition, defendant contended her trial 

counsel failed to (1) explain to her the procedure of a speedy trial, (2) present to her the motion 

of discovery, (3) explain the laws and her rights, and (4) present her case fully to the State. No 

materials were attached to the petition to clarify the lack of specificity in defendant’s 

postconviction petition.

¶ 16 In an appeal from the first stage dismissal of a postconviction petition, a petitioner 

and his or her postconviction appellate counsel may not raise an issue for the first time that was 

not included in the postconviction petition and never considered by the circuit court. People v. 

Cathey, 2012 IL 111746, ¶ 21, 965 N.E.2d 1109; People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 470, 861 

N.E.2d 999, 1006 (2006); see also 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2016) (“Any claim of substantial 

denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or [in] an amended petition is 

[forfeited]”). As our supreme court has explained, this is more than a routine matter of 

forfeiture; rather, it is a procedural bar that safeguards the integrity of the appellate process and 

as such it is a matter we cannot overlook. Cathey, 2012 IL 111746, ¶¶ 20-21; Pendleton, 223 Ill. 
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2d at 475, 861 N.E.2d at 1009. Additionally, our supreme court has stated the following: 

“Our detailed discussion of this issue is intended to stress that our appellate court 

is not free, as this court is under its supervisory authority, to excuse, in the context 

of postconviction proceedings, an appellate [forfeiture] caused by the failure of a 

defendant to include issues in his or her postconviction petition.” People v. Jones, 

213 Ill. 2d 498, 508, 821 N.E.2d 1093, 1099 (2004). 

¶ 17 Here, defendant’s appellate briefs take liberties with the record when claiming her 

ineffective assistance claims were raised below. Among other things, a postconviction petition 

must, “clearly set forth the respects in which [the] petitioner’s constitutional rights were 

violated” (725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2016)), and any claim not set forth in the petition is forfeited 

(725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2016)). “ ‘[W]hile a pro se petition is not expected to set forth a 

complete and detailed factual recitation, it must set forth some facts which can be corroborated 

and are objective in nature or contain some explanation as to why those facts are absent.’ ” 

Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 10, 912 N.E.2d at 1208 (quoting People v. Delton, 227 Ill. 2d 247, 254-55, 

882 N.E.2d 516, 520 (2008)). While our task in reviewing a first stage dismissal is to examine 

the petition liberally and “ ‘with a lenient eye’ ” (Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 21, 912 N.E.2d at 1214 

(quoting Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 (2d Cir. 1983)), our review is not toothless. 

The claim in the defendant’s petition “must bear some relationship to the issue raised on appeal” 

for “[l]iberal construction does not mean that we distort reality.” People v. Mars, 2012 IL App 

(2d) 110695, ¶ 32, 985 N.E.2d 570. 

¶ 18 In this case, defendant raised very vague claims against her defense counsel in her 

postconviction petition. Defendant in no way raised an issue regarding counsel’s advice 

regarding an insanity defense or the admissibility of defendant’s statements to the police. Thus, 
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we find defendant has forfeited the ineffective assistance of counsel issues she raises on appeal 

because defendant failed to include them in her October 2017 postconviction petition. 

¶ 19 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 20 For the reasons stated, we affirm the Champaign County circuit court’s judgment. 

¶ 21 Affirmed.