RENDERED: AUGUST 16, 2024; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2022-CA-1092-MR

CARLTON E. MCINTOSH, SR. APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE JOHN R. GRISE, JUDGE

ACTION NOS. 05-CR-00347-002 AND 05-CR-00643

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: ACREE, KAREM, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

ACREE, JUDGE: Appellant, Carlton McIntosh, Sr., appeals the Warren Circuit 

Court’s July 29, 2022 Order denying him post-conviction relief. Having reviewed 

the record, we affirm.

In 2008, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed a 2006 judgment of 

conviction upon a jury trial for Appellant’s 2005 first-degree robbery of a Bowling 

Green bank. McIntosh v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-SC-000421, 2008 WL 
-2-

2167894, at *1 (Ky. May 22, 2008), as modified on denial of reh’g (Oct. 23, 2008)

(hereinafter McIntosh I). Because the jury determined Appellant was a first-degree 

persistent felony offender (PFO), his sentence was enhanced to life in prison. Id. 

The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions on all grounds. Id.

at *9-10. One of those grounds is identical, or nearly so, to the claim of error here. 

The Supreme Court said:

He contends that his PFO status was determined on the 

basis of incompetent evidence. . . . He argues that the 

Commonwealth relied upon inadmissible hearsay to prove 

his last discharge date and thus that it failed to prove the 

required temporal connection between this current offense 

and a prior one.

. . . [B]ecause Mcintosh has not shown that he was 

prejudiced by the detective’s hearsay, its admission cannot 

be deemed a palpable error.

Id. at *9.

In 2012, McIntosh filed an RCr

1 11.42 motion challenging the 

effectiveness of his trial counsel. He repeated his claim there. This Court of 

Appeals said:

McIntosh next argues trial counsel failed to object 

to evidence of his prior felony convictions and thus 

subjected him to an enhanced sentence. We discern no 

basis for relief on this ground for various reasons. First, 

on direct appeal, our Supreme Court held sufficient 

evidence supported McIntosh’s PFO I enhancement and 

rejected his claim of palpable error. “It is not the purpose 

1 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
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of RCr 11.42 to permit a convicted defendant to retry 

issues which could and should have been raised in the 

original proceeding, nor those that were raised in the trial 

court and upon an appeal considered by this court.” 

Thacker v. Commonwealth, 476 S.W.2d 838 (Ky. 1972) 

(internal citations omitted).

The specific claim on direct appeal was that a 

detective repeated inadmissible hearsay to establish 

McIntosh’s last discharge date. He now claims his PFO 

status was based on other incompetent evidence. All 

known claims should have been raised on the direct 

appeal. Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 857 

(Ky. 1983) (direct appeal must state “every ground of error 

which it is reasonable to expect that he or his counsel is 

aware of when the appeal is taken.”). McIntosh does not 

claim he only recently learned of the flaws about which he 

now complains. Nor does he offer any explanation for 

omitting the new claims from his direct appeal. There 

must be finality to litigation; piecemeal attacks are not 

permitted.

Finally, status as a PFO I requires proof of just two 

prior felonies; the Commonwealth “introduced 

exemplified copies of four prior felony convictions.” 

McIntosh [I], at *9.

McIntosh v. Commonwealth, No. 2012-CA-000527-MR, 2014 WL 3765496, at *6 

(Ky. App. Aug. 1, 2014) (hereinafter McIntosh II) (emphasis added) (footnote 

omitted).

On July 7, 2021, fifteen (15) years after the trial, Appellant filed a 

motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to CR2 60.02(e) and (f), and later asked 

2 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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the court to amend this motion for relief pursuant to CR 60.03. He again claims 

the evidence of prior convictions was based on the police witness’s hearsay 

testimony and other proof of prior felonies that did not satisfy the requirements of 

the enhancement statute. The court denied Appellant the relief requested, 

reasoning that his motions were untimely. This appeal follows.

We review a CR 60.02 motion’s denial for abuse of discretion by 

determining “whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, 

or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 

941, 945 (Ky. 1999) (citations omitted). “[I]n granting or denying a CR 60.02 

motion,” the circuit court shall determine “whether the passage of time between 

judgment and motion was reasonable in light of the fading memories of witnesses.” 

Stoker v. Commonwealth, 289 S.W.3d 592, 596 (Ky. App. 2009) (citing Harris v. 

Commonwealth, 296 S.W.2d 700 (Ky. 1956)). 

Appellant asks this Court to find the circuit court abused its discretion 

by failing to find palpable error amounting to manifest injustice. We decline. The 

reason can be stated in several ways, all related and all based on the fact that 

Appellant’s same argument has been presented and rejected already.

First, if the issue was not preserved in McIntosh I, it could have been 

and should have been, as this Court held in McIntosh II. “Civil Rule 60.02 is not 

intended merely as an additional opportunity to relitigate the same issues which 
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could ‘reasonably have been presented’ by direct appeal or RCr 11.42 

proceedings.” McQueen v. Commonwealth, 948 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky. 1997).

Second, Appellant’s specific claim (to the extent he nuanced a

distinction from what he presented in McIntosh I) was directly addressed in 

McIntosh II and this Court, in that case, denied Appellant the same relief he seeks 

here. “Final disposition of the [RCr 11.42] motion shall conclude all issues that 

could reasonably have been presented in the same proceeding.” RCr 11.42(3).

Third, relief pursuant to RCr 10.26 requires “a determination that 

manifest injustice has resulted from the error.” Because Appellant asked the 

Courts in both McIntosh I and McIntosh II to find manifest injustice in the 

testimony and evidence of his prior convictions presented to support the finding of 

his PFO status, that determination has already been made. In both cases, though he 

presented slightly different arguments, both Courts determined there was no 

manifest injustice. Appellant is now precluded from raising the issue again.

Fourth, palpable error is defined in RCr 10.26 as an error “which 

affects the substantial rights of a party[.]” A party has no right, much less a 

substantial one, to have a reviewing court consider the same argument in 

successive appeals. Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky. 1983). 

“The obvious purpose of this principle is to prevent the relitigation of issues which 
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either were or could have been litigated in a similar proceeding.” McQueen, 948 

S.W.2d at 416.

Furthermore, as the circuit court held, Appellant knew the claim too 

well and too long ago for a court to reach any conclusion other than too much time 

passed since the trial for the filing of the motion to be deemed within a reasonable 

time. CR 60.02(e) and (f). 

Finally, Appellant was entitled to no relief under CR 60.03 because 

“[r]elief shall not be granted in an independent action [under CR 60.03] if the 

ground of relief sought . . . would be barred because not brought in time under the 

provisions of that rule.” CR 60.03. We just affirmed the circuit court’s 

determination to that very effect. Appellant’s pursuit of a claim pursuant to CR 

60.03 was properly denied.

We find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s finding that 

Appellant’s motions were untimely, having been filed fifteen (15) years after his 

conviction and when he knew or reasonably should have known of the claim of 

error. Under the facts of this case, the filing was not within a reasonable time.

Accordingly, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it 

found Appellant’s motion to be untimely.

We affirm.
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ALL CONCUR. 

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

Carlton E. McIntosh, Sr., pro se

Lexington, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron

Attorney General of Kentucky 

Ken W. Riggs

Assistant Attorney General

Frankfort, Kentucky