UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4574

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ANDRE JERYANN JONES,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, 

Chief District Judge. (3:06-cr-00117-FDW-1)

Submitted: January 27, 2014 Decided: February 12, 2014

Before KING and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Henderson Hill, Director, Elizabeth A. Blackwood, Ann Hester,

FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Andre Jeryann Jones pled guilty in 2006 to being a 

felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to seventy 

months’ imprisonment. He began his term of supervised release 

on April 12, 2012. In May 2013, Jones’ probation officer filed 

a petition to revoke his supervised release, alleging three 

violations. At the hearing, Jones admitted to one of the 

violations — testing positive for marijuana, a Grade C 

violation. The district court revoked Jones’ supervised 

release. 

With a criminal history category of VI, Jones’ Policy 

Statement range was eight to fourteen months’ imprisonment. See

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG) § 7B1.4(a) (2012). The 

statutory maximum was twenty-four months’ imprisonment. See 18 

U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012). The court imposed a ten-month 

term, followed by twenty-four months of supervised release. 

Jones noted a timely appeal. Jones’ attorney has filed a brief 

in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in 

which he asserts that there are no meritorious issues for appeal 

but questioning whether Jones’ sentence is plainly unreasonable. 

Although advised of his right to file a supplemental pro se 

brief, Jones has not done so.

The district court has broad discretion to impose a 

sentence upon revoking a defendant’s supervised release. United 
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States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). We will 

affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release 

if it is within the governing statutory range and not plainly 

unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439–40 

(4th Cir. 2006). Before determining whether the sentence is 

“plainly unreasonable” we must decide whether it is 

unreasonable. Id. at 438. In doing so, the court “follow[s] 

generally the procedural and substantive considerations” used in 

reviewing original sentences. Id.

A sentence or revocation is procedurally reasonable if 

the district court has considered the policy statements 

contained in Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines and the 

applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, Crudup, 461 F.3d 

at 440, and has adequately explained the sentence chosen, though 

it need not explain the sentence in as much detail as when 

imposing the original sentence. Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547. A 

sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court 

states a proper basis for its imposition of a sentence up to the 

statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. If, after 

considering the above, the appeals court decides that the 

sentence is not unreasonable, it should affirm. Id. at 439. In 

this initial inquiry, the court takes a more deferential posture 

concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion than it 

does applying the reasonableness review to post-conviction 
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Guidelines sentences. United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 

656 (4th Cir. 2007). Only if this court finds the sentence 

unreasonable must the court decide whether it is “plainly” so. 

Id. at 657.

We find that Jones’ sentence is not unreasonable. A 

review of the record establishes that the district court 

considered the advisory Policy Statement range and took into 

account specific § 3553(a) factors (e.g., need for deterrence, 

nature and circumstances of the offense, and history and 

characteristics of the defendant) in determining the proper 

sentence. Accordingly, we conclude that Jones’ ten-month 

revocation sentence was not unreasonable, nor was it plainly so.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.

We therefore affirm the revocation of Jones’ supervised release 

and his sentence. This court requires that counsel inform 

Jones, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of 

the United States for further review. If Jones requests that a 

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition 

would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for 

leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must 

state that a copy thereof was served on Jones. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 
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adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED