J-S35017-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: V.L.D.H., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: A.R., MOTHER No. 2897 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order entered September 3, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Domestic 

Relations, at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000397-2014, 

CP-51-DP-0000811-2013

BEFORE: MUNDY, OLSON, and PLATT*, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JUNE 24, 2015

A.R. (“Mother”) appeals from the order dated and entered on 

September 3, 2014, granting a petition filed by the Philadelphia County 

Department of Human Services (“DHS” or the “Agency”) to involuntarily 

terminate Mother’s parental rights to V.L.D.H. (“Child”), a female, who was 

born in January of 2012.1 We affirm.

 

* Retired Senior Judge specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 DHS filed the petition pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b) 

of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), and 

sought to change Child’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption, 

pursuant to Section 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f). On 

September 3, 2014, the trial court continued the hearing on the goal change 

petition to November 20, 2014. On November 21, 2014, the trial court 

entered a decree involuntarily terminating the parental rights of Child’s 

father, V.P.H., granting his petitions to confirm consent to adoption and his 

petition for voluntary relinquishment filed on October 23, 2014, and 

changing Child’s permanency goal to adoption, pursuant to Section 6351(f) 

of the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f). Father has not filed a notice of 

appeal from the decree terminating his parental rights, nor is he a party to 

the instant appeal. 
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The record reflects that DHS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate 

Mother’s parental rights to Child on August 13, 2014. On September 3, 

2014, the trial court held the termination hearing. At the hearing, DHS 

presented the testimony of Erica G. Williams, Psy.D., the Director of Forensic 

Programming at Assessment and Treatment Alternatives, Inc., (“ATA”), who 

performed a parenting capacity evaluation of Mother. N.T., 9/3/2014, at 18, 

28-29. DHS then presented the testimony of Joanna Pecora, who previously 

was employed by Volunteers of America as a caseworker, and who 

supervised the visitation between Child and Mother between November of 

2013 and June of 2014, when her agency closed. Id. at 45-47. Next, DHS 

presented the testimony of Tiffany Byrd, the foster care worker assigned to 

Child’s case through Lutheran Children Parenting Services. Id. at 18, 67-68. 

DHS also presented the testimony of Barbara Forest, DHS social services 

manager currently assigned to Child’s case. Id. at 17, 78-80. Finally, 

Mother testified on her own behalf.

Based on the testimonial and documentary evidence, the trial court set 

forth the factual background and procedural history of this case as follows:

On January 28, 2013, DHS received an Emergency General 

Protective Services report (“EGPS”), alleging that Child fell 

three times while in Mother’s care. On March 12, 2013, the 

Department of Human Services (“DHS”) visited Mother and 

Child at Peoples’ Emergency Center (“PEC”). Mother 

explained to DHS that it was difficult for her to manage [] 

Child in the stroller. On April 3, 2013, during another DHS 

visit, Mother stated that she had obtained employment at 

PEC, that she had planned to return to mental health 

treatment, and that [] Child will attend daycare. DHS then 
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learned that PEC intended to discharge Mother due to her 

non-compliance and continuous altercations with other 

residents, and[, in] fact, Mother was discharged on April 9, 

2013. On April 10, 2013, Mother was residing at the 

Episcopal Community Services (“ECS”) St. Barnabas 

Mission. On April 18, 2013, DHS learned that Mother was 

non-compliant with ECS policies and had frequent 

altercations with ECS staff. On April 19, 2013, DHS 

received an [EGPS] report [], alleging that Child had a 

severe ear infection and Mother was not administering 

medicine, as directed. DHS learned that St. Barnabas 

planned to discharge Mother as of April 13, 2013.

On April 19, 2013, DHS obtained an Order of Protective 

Custody (“OPC”) and Child was placed under paternal aunt’s 

care. Mother was no longer residing at [ECS] St. Barnabas 

Mission[.] At the shelter care hearing on April 22, 2013, 

Child was temporarily committed to DHS. On April 29, 

2013, Child was adjudicated dependent and fully committed 

to DHS. The court ordered Mother to have supervised visits 

at the agency and she was referred to the Behavioral Health 

System (“BHS”) for a psychological evaluation. On May 

23[, 2014,] a Family Service Plan (“FSP”) was completed for 

Mother. The FSP objectives were: to meet Child’s daily 

basic needs including food and clothing; to provide Child 

with safe living conditions and supervision; to stabilize her 

mental health; maintain the relationship with her Child 

through regular visitation; and participate in placement 

activities. On July 30, 2013, in a permanency review 

hearing, the court found that Mother was minimally 

compliant with her FSP objectives. Mother was referred to 

the Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”) twice but she 

was discharged due to her non-compliance. Mother was 

ordered to attend the North East Treatment Center (“NET”) 

for mental health on a consistent basis, but eventually 

shortly thereafter stopping attending. On August 28, 2013, 

Mother attended a second FSP meeting. Mother re-engaged 

mental health treatment at NET on October 14, 2013. On 

October 29, 2013, in a permanency review hearing, the 

court found that Mother was moderately compliant with the 

FSP. Mother was ordered to continue attending NET, to 

keep searching for appropriate housing, and to attend coparenting counseling. 
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On January 27, 2014, in a permanency review hearing, the 

court found that Mother was compliant with her FSP

objectives. Mother was ordered to have supervised visits 

with [] Child and take a parenting capacity evaluation. The 

court took notice that Mother was living in Horizon House 

Shelter. On January 31, 2014, Mother and [F]ather had an 

altercation at ARC. On February 10, 2014, Mother obtained 

a Protection from Abuse (“PFA”) against [F]ather. Mother 

attempted to include [] Child [in] the [PFA] order[,] but it 

was denied. On February 18, 2014, DHS received notice 

from ARC that Mother was discharged for declining services. 

On April 23, 2014, a PFA order was issued against [F]ather 

as to Child. On April 25, 2014, Mother’s parenting capacity 

evaluation recommended that Mother was to receive 

treatment for trauma-informed therapy; to participate [in] a 

psychiatric evaluation; to participate in a program to 

support employment; and to explore housing options 

independent from DHS. The evaluation concluded that if 

Mother were able to demonstrate observable progress, for a 

period of six months, unsupervised visitation would be 

recommended.

On April 28, 2014, in [a] permanency review hearing, the 

court found Mother to be minimally compliant with her FSP 

objectives. Mother only attended seven of the thirteen 

supervised visits. The court ordered visitation to remain

supervised and [in] the community, only if Mother 

provide[d] four[-]day advance notice to the agency. The 

FSP objectives remained the same. DHS filed a petition for 

involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights on May 

28, 2014. On July 17, 2014, a FSP meeting was held[,] and 

[] Child[’s] permanency goal was changed to adoption. 

Mother’s parental rights were terminated on September 3, 

2014. Mother was present at the termination hearing. On 

the same day, the court found that DHS made reasonable 

efforts towards reunification[,] and Mother was minimally 

compliant with FSP objectives.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/23/2014, at 1-3.
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On October 1, 2014, Mother timely filed a notice of appeal along with a 

concise statement of matters complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). 

In her brief on appeal, Mother raises eight issues, as follows:

A. Whether the court erred in failing to find that for the six 

months immediately preceding the filing of the petition, 

when [] Child was bonded with [Mother] and [M]other 

completed a parenting class, stabilized her mental health 

issues, obtained trauma informed and based therapy, was 

visiting [] [C]hild, obtained employment training, was 

seeking housing for herself and [] Child, was seeking 

employment, completed the majority of her family services 

plan objectives, and did not intend to relinquish her claim to 

[] Child or refused and/or failed to perform parental 

duties[?]

B. Whether the court erred in failing to find that for the six 

months immediately preceding the filing of the petition[,] [] 

[M]other had consistent contact and visits with [] [C]hild, [] 

[C]hild was bonded with her and [] [M]other completed a 

parenting class, stabilized her mental health issues, 

obtained trauma informed and based therapy, was visiting 

[] Child, obtained employment training, was seeking 

housing for herself and [] Child, was seeking employment, 

completed the majority of her family services plan 

objectives[?]

C. Whether the court erred in finding that there were repeated 

and continuing findings of incapacity, abuse, neglect and/or 

dependency of [] [C]hild by [] [M]other, when [] Child was 

bonded with her and [] [M]other completed a parenting 

class, stabilized her mental health issues, obtained trauma 

informed and based therapy, was visiting [] [C]hild, 

obtained employment training, was seeking housing for 

herself and [] [C]hild, was seeking employment, and 

completed the majority of her family services plan 

objectives[?]

D. Whether the court erred in finding that the conditions that 

led to the removal or placement of [] [C]hild continue to 
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exist, as to [M]other, when [] [C]hild was bonded with her 

and [] Mother completed a parenting class, stabilized her 

mental health issues, obtained trauma informed and based 

therapy, was visiting with [] [C]hild, obtained employment 

training, was seeking housing for herself and [] [C]hild, was 

seeking employment, and completed the majority of her 

family services plan objectives[?]

E. Whether the court erred in finding that the conditions that 

led to the removal or placement of [Child] continue to exist 

and the termination of parental rights would best serve the 

needs and welfare of [] [C]hild, when [] [M]other can 

remedy the conditions within a reasonable period of time, 

and when [] [C]hild was bonded with her[,] and [] [M]other 

completed a parenting class, stabilized her mental health 

issues, obtained trauma informed and based therapy, was 

visiting [] [C]hild, obtained employment training, was 

seeking housing for herself and [] [C]hild, was seeking

employment, completed the majority of her family services 

plan objectives[?]

F. Whether the court erred in finding that DHS made, or did 

not have to make, reasonable efforts towards reunification, 

by either failing and/or refusing to help find a viable options 

or to consider options other than terminating [M]other’s 

parental rights, when [] Child was bonded with her[,] and 

[][M]other completed a parenting class, stabilized her 

mental health issues, obtained trauma informed and based 

therapy, was visiting [] [C]hild, obtained employment 

training, was seeking housing for herself and [] [C]hild, was 

seeking employment, completed the majority of her family 

services plan objectives[?]

G. Whether the court erred in terminating the rights of [] 

[M]other, when the sole reason she was unable to provide 

housing, provide income, clothing and medical care for the 

care and maintenance of [] [C]hild, was her lack of income, 

which was changing, since she completed the job training 

and was actively seeking employment[?]

H. Whether the court erred in terminating the rights of [] 

[M]other where it was not supported by clear and 

convincing evidence and not in the best interest of [] 

[C]hild, and there was a bond between [] [M]other and 
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[C]hild and the termination of parental rights would have a 

negative effect on the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs of [] [C]hild, pursuant to 23 

Pa[.]C[.]S[.]A[.] Section 2511(b)[?]

Mother’s Brief, at 3-5 (unpaginated). 2

Mother argues that the trial court erred in terminating her parental 

rights under Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). She asserts that she 

obtained training for employment, was seeking housing for herself and Child, 

obtained mental health and trauma-based therapy, and was continuing to 

live in a shelter, where she complied with their rules. Mother also alleges 

that she applied to housing programs and completed the majority of her FSP 

objectives. Mother asserts that she did not intend to relinquish her claim to 

Child, nor did she refuse and/or fail to perform parental duties. She claims 

that the sole reason she was unable to obtain housing and provide medical 

care for Child was economic, due to her lack of income. Mother claims that 

her lack of income situation was changing, because she had registered with 

employment agencies. See Mother’s Brief, at 9. Mother contends that the 

trial court erred by determining that termination would best serve Child’s 

needs and welfare. Mother claims that she was consistently visiting Child, 

there was a bond between them, and that Child would suffer harm by 

 

2

In her statement of questions involved in her brief, Mother did not raise the 

issue of the change of Child’s permanency goal to adoption under Section 

6351 of the Juvenile Act. She, therefore, waived any challenge to the goal 

change to adoption. See Krebs v. United Refining Company of 

Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that any issue 

not set forth in or suggested by an appellate brief’s statement of questions 

involved and concise statement is deemed waived). 
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severing that bond. Mother requests that this Court reverse the trial court’s 

order. Id. at 18. 

We review an appeal from the termination of parental rights in 

accordance with the following standard:

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion 

standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a 

petition for termination of parental rights. As in 

dependency cases, our standard of review requires an 

appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility 

determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the 

record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 

2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error

of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., 36 A.3d 567, 

572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion). As has been often 

stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely 

because the reviewing court might have reached a different 

conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors 

America, Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v. 

Ely, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision 

may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon 

demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.

As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for 

applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these 

cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate 

courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific 

determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are 

observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often 

presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child 

and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even 

where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often 

the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate 

court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court 

and impose its own credibility determinations and 

judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long 

as the factual findings are supported by the record and the 

court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law 
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or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, 650 

A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994). 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-827 (Pa. 2012).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). “The 

standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so 

‘clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to 

a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in 

issue.’” Id., quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003).

This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the termination of 

parental rights with regard to any one subsection of Section 2511(a). See 

In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). After we 

determine that the requirements of Section 2511(a) are satisfied, we 

proceed to review whether the requirements of Section 2511(b) are 

satisfied. See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super. 

2008) (en banc). This Court has stated that the focus in terminating 

parental rights under Section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child 

pursuant to Section 2511(b). Id. at 1008.

Section 2511(a)(1),(2), (5), (8), and (b), provide, in relevant part, as 

follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
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(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

* * *

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with 

an agency for a period of at least six months, the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of the 

child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not 

remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of 

time, the services or assistance reasonably available to 

the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which 

led to the removal or placement of the child within a 

reasonable period of time and termination of the parental 

rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the 

child.

* * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with 

an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the 

date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to 

the removal or placement of the child continue to exist 

and termination of parental rights would best serve the 

needs and welfare of the child.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 
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child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.

In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under Section 

2511(b), our Supreme Court recently stated as follows:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are 

met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of 

the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and 

welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to 

include “[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and 

stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). 

In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court 

held that the determination of the child’s “needs and 

welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds 

between the parent and child. The “utmost attention” 

should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of 

permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 

A.3d at 791.

In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

This Court has stated that, in conducting a bonding analysis, the court 

is not required to use expert testimony, but may rely on the testimony of 

social workers and caseworkers. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. 

Super. 2010). This Court has observed that no bond worth preserving is 

formed between a child and a natural parent where the child has been in 

foster care for most of the child’s life, and the resulting bond with the 
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natural parent is attenuated. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 764 (Pa. Super. 

2008).

We reviewed the certified record, the parties’ briefs, the relevant law, 

and the trial court’s opinion entered on December 23, 2014. We find that the 

trial court aptly discussed the evidence against the requirements of Section 

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We will not impose our own credibility 

determinations and re-weigh the evidence. We must defer to the trial 

judge’s determination, as the factual findings are supported by the record, 

and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an 

abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. The trial 

court determined that Mother “has been inconsistent and her compliance 

with the FSP objectives has never been higher than moderate” and, at times 

was “minimally compliant[.]” Trial Court Opinion, 12/23/2014, at 6. The 

trial court stated that “Mother is unable to obtain housing on her own[,]” 

noting that two different shelters discharged her for failing to comply with 

rules and she declined housing services from the ARC program. Id. The trial 

court also concluded Mother failed to accomplish her FSP objectives to obtain 

employment or to complete recommended mental health treatment. Id. at 

6-7. Moreover, the trial court recognized that “Mother only attended seven 

of the [13 supervised] visits granted” with Child and “never reached the 

point to be granted unsupervised visits.” Id. at 7. In examining those 

visits, the trial court determined that Mother did not exhibit appropriate 
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parenting skills, despite completing parenting classes, and, thus, the trial 

court “had grave concerns about Mother’s ability to provide parental 

supervision on her own.” Id. at 8. The trial court acknowledged, “Child has 

been in care since April 19, 2013, for a period of [18] months, as to the date 

in which the termination petition was filed.” Id. at 11. Based upon all of the 

foregoing, we conclude the competent evidence in the record supports the 

trial court’s findings with regard to Section 2511(a). 

Moreover, the competent evidence in the record supports the trial 

court’s determination that, under Section 2511(b), termination of Mother’s 

parental rights would best serve Child’s needs and welfare. The evidence as 

presented supports the trial court’s finding that there is no parent/child bond 

between Mother and Child, Child does not identify Mother as a parent, and 

that termination of Mother’s parental rights would not harm Child. See N.T., 

9/3/2014, at 161. The trial court found that there is a strong bond between 

Child and her foster parent, the foster parent is providing appropriate care, 

and that “Child will suffer serious harm if she is removed from [the] foster 

parent’s home.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/23/2014, at 13. We will not disturb 

the trial court’s decision regarding Section 2511(b). In re Adoption of 

S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-827.3

 

3 We note that, with regard to Mother’s argument that DHS failed to make 

reasonable efforts to provide services to reunify her with Child prior to the 

termination of her parental rights, as previously stated, Mother waived this 

issue. Regardless, our Supreme Court recently held that neither subsection 

(a) nor (b) of Section 2511 requires the trial to consider reasonable efforts 
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Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decree terminating Mother’s 

parental rights to Child pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b) 

of the Adoption Act on the basis of the trial court opinion filed on December 

23, 2014. We conclude that there has been no error or abuse of discretion 

in this case and that the December 23, 2014 opinion meticulously, 

thoroughly, and accurately disposes of Mother’s issues on appeal. 

Therefore, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion and adopt it as 

our own. Because we have adopted the trial court’s opinion, we direct the 

parties to include the trial court’s opinion in all future filings relating to our 

examination of the merits of this appeal, as expressed herein.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/24/2015

 

in relation to a decision to terminate parental rights. In the Interest of: 

D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 675 (Pa. 2014). The trial court, in the instant 

matter, considered the reasonable efforts on the part of DHS to reunify Child 

with Mother, and concluded that DHS did make reasonable efforts. Our 

review of the record shows that there is ample evidence to support the trial 

court’s determination that DHS made reasonable efforts, and, despite being 

offered reasonable services and completing parenting classes, Mother failed 

to satisfy her FSP goals.