alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of John I., a Neglected Child. St. Lawrence County Department of Social Services, Respondent; Lisa J., Appellant.

[775 NYS2d 602]

Peters, J.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court of St. Lawrence County (Rogers, J.), entered August 30, 2002, which granted petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Ct Act article 10, to extend the placement of respondent’s child.

In 1998, Family Court (Nelson, J.) found respondent’s children, John (born in 1991) and Donnie (born in 1994), to be neglected; they were placed in the care and custody of petitioner. At a hearing held in 2002, both respondent and the children’s biological father consented to John’s continued placement in foster care. Family Court determined that John’s placement was appropriate and extended it until July 12, 2003. Respondent appeals.

Since the order appealed from has expired *(see Matter of Nikita ZZ.,*307 AD2d 415, 416 [2003]; *Matter of Catherine MM. v Ulster County Dept, of Social Servs.,*293 AD2d 778, 779 [2002]) and no appeal had been taken from the subsequent order which further extended John’s placement *(see Matter of Trebor UU.,*287 AD2d 830, 830 [2001]), the appeal is moot *(see Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne,*50 NY2d 707, 714 [1980]). Had we not found the appeal moot, it would nonetheless be dismissed because no appeal lies from an order entered on consent *(see*
      *992
      *Matter of Forbus v Stolfi,*300 AD2d 852, 852 [2002], *lv denied*99 NY2d 642 [2003]; *Matter of Amanda PP.,*260 AD2d 951, 952 [1999]).

Furthermore, even if we were to review respondent’s contention that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel, we would find it without merit. While the right to counsel, in a proceeding of this type, is guaranteed by statute *(see*Family Ct Act § 262 [a] [i]), to determine whether an individual has received effective assistance, “the evidence, . . . law, and the circumstances of a particular case, [must be] viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation” *(People v Baldi,*54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]; *see Matter of Matthew C.,*227 AD2d 679, 682 [1996]). Counsel here vigorously advocated on respondent’s behalf by cross-examining witnesses and rebutting the information set forth by petitioner. Counsel also proffered all available evidence demonstrating respondent’s attempts to improve her parenting skills by actively participating in the service plan devised by petitioner. Although respondent further contends that counsel should have objected to John’s continued placement in foster care, she failed to demonstrate how this alleged deficiency would have produced a different outcome.

Crew III, J.P., Spain, Mugglin and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the appeal is dismissed, as moot, without costs.
RENARDO A. SMITH , Appellant,

v. STATE OF FLORIDA , Appellee

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
CASE NO. 1D 16

- 1691

_______ ______________________/ Opinion filed May 31, 2017. An appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County

. Jennie M. Kinsey , Judge

. Renardo A. Smith , pro se, Appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Michael Schaub, Assistant Attorney General, T allahassee , for Appellee.

PER CURIAM. Appellant has filed a rule 3.850 postconvict ion motion in which he asserts that his trial counsel acted ineffectively by failing to advise him that he qualified2 for a mandatory sentence, in addition to othe r penalties, pursuant to the prison releasee reoffender (“PRR”) statute, section 775.082(9)(a)1., Florida Statutes (2012) , prior to his rejection of two plea offers. He asserts counsel’s failure to advise him of his PRR eligibility cause d him to reject the offers and proceed to a bench trial , where he was convicted

. Thereafter, the state filed notice that he qualified to be sentenced as a PRR . The court sentenced him as a PRR to the mandatory 15 years for the second

- degree felony, which also barred his el igibility
to earn gain time as well as participation in work release and early release
programs . We reverse. The trial court denie d the claim after finding that A ppellant would have proceeded to trial even if he had knowledge he qualified for PRR enhance ment, because he knew his sentence exposure was up to 25 years’ imprisonment when he rejected the plea offers . Appell ant argues the 25

- year collective sentence was a possibility, but not mandated, as is the situation with the PRR statute, which requires i mposition of a statutory maximum sentence. Further, under PRR enhancement, a defendant must serve the entirety of the sentence, with no
oppo rtunity to earn gain time , work release, or early release.
A ppellant’ s claim is not conclusively refuted by the re cord

. See Alcorn v.
State , 121 So. 3d 419 (Fla. 2013) (discussing four prongs for consideration when evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance for failure to properly advise of actual3 sentence exposure ); Armstrong v. State , 148 So. 3d 124 , 126 ( Fla. 2d DCA 2014) ( stating “ ‘ [p]rejudice . . . is determined based upon a consideration of the circumstances as viewed at the time of the offer and what would have been done with proper and adequate advice ’ ” ) (quoting Alcorn , 121 So. 3d at 432) (emphasis in origi nal). We therefore reverse and remand for the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing, which will provide the court with “the opportunity to receive evidence and evaluate the credibility of any witnesses in deciding whether Appellant would have accepte d the plea, or would have continued to state, ‘I didn’t do it, ’ and insist on trial.” Mathis. v. State , 848 So. 2d 1207, 1209 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).
REVERSED AND REMANDED

. WOLF, RAY, and BILBREY , J J

. , CONCUR.
**Exhibit 23.1**




**CONSENT
OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**
 
 We
consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement No.
333-83781-01 on Form S-3 of Camden Summit Partnership, L.P., formerly known as
Summit Properties Partnership, L.P., of our report dated March 30, 2005, which
report expresses an unqualified opinion and includes an explanatory paragraph
relating to the adoptions of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.
144, *Accounting
for the Impairment or Disposal of Long-Lived Assets* , on
January 1, 2002, the fair value recognition provisions of Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 123, *Accounting
for Stock-Based Compensation* , on
January 1, 2003, and Financial Accounting Standards Board Interpretation No. 46, *Consolidation
of Variable Interest Entities* , as
amended by Financial Accounting Standards Board Interpretation No. 46 (revised
December 2003) on July 1, 2003, appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of
Camden Summit Partnership, L.P. for the year ended December 31,
2004.
  /S/ Deloitte & Touche LLP
 Charlotte,
North Carolina
 March 30,
2005
#### William BROWNING, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D10-5317.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Nov. 1, 2010.

William Browning, pro se, Petitioner.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

*354PER CURIAM.

The petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied on the merits.

WOLF, DAVIS, and WETHERELL, JJ., concur.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

ROBBIE O. THOMAS,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 415 EAL 2016

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 14th day of February, 2017, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED.
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-40138 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus RODNEY EDGE, Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 6:94-CR-56

- - - - - - - - - - March 28, 1997 Before REAVLEY, JONES and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Rodney Edge appeals the district court’s judgment for the Government on his petition to adjudicate interest in property seized from Erskine William Bone and Cathy Edge Bone in conjunction with the Boneses’ convictions on various counts of a 51-count indictment. Despite Edge’s contention otherwise, 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) applies to his petition to bar him from asserting any valid interest in the subject property. Edge does not argue on appeal the district court’s determinations that heNo. 96-40138 - 2 - did not have a security interest in the property and that he could not reasonably have been without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture. The district court’s order of January 22, 1996 correctly disposed of Edge’s claim.
AFFIRMED.
Exhibit
      32.2




**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**





SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
      connection with the Annual Report of Cardinal Communications, Inc. (the
      "Company") on Form 10-KSB/A for the period ending December 31, 2005, as filed
      with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
      I, Ronald S. Bass, Principal Accounting Officer of the Company, certify,
      pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 3(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


Dated: October 5, 2007/s/ Ronald
                  S.
                  BassName:
                  Ronald S. BassPrincipal Accounting
                  Officer
#### STATE ex rel. Stephen C. LOEBER v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2011-KH-1675.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 13, 2012.

In re Loeber, Stephen C.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of W. Baton Rouge, 18th *1244Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 030613; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 0767.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; *State ex rel. Glover v. State,*93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 31.1

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

I, Billy D. Prim, certify that:

1.  I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Blue Rhino Corporation;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recently
completed fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely
to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial
reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent function):

a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.

Date: October 21, 2003

                                         /s/ Billy D. Prim
                                         ------------------
                                         Billy D. Prim
                                         Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
#### Newton M. HARRIS v. ST. TAMMANY PARISH HOSPITAL SERVICE DISTRICT NO. 1 and E.J. Fielding Funeral Home, Inc. Newton M. Harris, Individually and on Behalf of the Estate of Suzanne Halkett Harris v. St. Tammany Parish Hospital Service District No. 1, Michael Iverson, MD and James Wattler, CRNAA.

No. 2012-C-0678.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 20, 2012.

In re Harris, Newton M.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2010-12773 C/W 2007-13187; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 2011 CA 0942, 2011 CA 0941.

Denied.
# Gold Star Mother’s and Families’ Day, 2010 

In a long line of heroes stretching from the greens of Lexington and Concord to the mountains of Afghanistan, selfless patriots have defended our lives and liberties with valor and honor. They have been ordinary Americans who loved their country so profoundly that they were willing to give their lives to keep it safe and free. As we pay tribute to the valiant men and women in uniform lost in battle, we also recognize the deep loss and great strength of those who share in that ultimate sacrifice: America’s Gold Star Mothers and Families.

For those in our Armed Forces who gave their last full measure of devotion, their loved ones know the high cost of our hard-won freedoms and security. An empty seat at the table and missed milestones leave a void that can never be filled, yet the legacy of our fallen heroes lives on in the people they loved. Their exceptional spirit of service dwells in the pride of Gold Star parents, who instilled the values that led these brave men and women to service. It grows in the hearts of their children, who know that, despite their absence, they gave their lives so others might be free. And, it echoes in the enduring love of their spouses—the backbone of our military families—who supported the person they cherished most in the world in serving our Nation. Though our Gold Star families have sacrificed more than most can ever imagine, they still find the courage and strength to comfort other families, support veterans, and give back to their communities.

It is from these examples of unwavering patriotism that we witness the values and ideals for which our country was founded, and for which America’s sons and daughters have laid down their lives. As members of a grateful Nation, we owe a debt we can never repay, but hold this sacred obligation forever in our hearts, minds, and actions.

The Congress, by Senate Joint Resolution 115 of June 23, 1936 (49 Stat. 1895 as amended), has designated the last Sunday in September as “Gold Star Mother’s Day.”

NOW, THEREFORE, I, BARACK OBAMA, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, do hereby proclaim Sunday, September 26, 2010, as Gold Star Mother’s and Families’ Day. I call upon all Government officials to display the flag of the United States over Government buildings on this special day. I also encourage the American people to display the flag and hold appropriate ceremonies as a public expression of our Nation’s sympathy, support, and respect for our Gold Star Mothers and Families.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-fourth day of September, in the year of our Lord two thousand ten, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and thirty-fifth.

[FR Doc. 2010-24647

Billing code 3195-W0-P
#### Edwin COOPER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D10-1947.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

May 11, 2011.

Edwin Cooper, Okeechobee, pro se.

No appearance required for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Edwin Cooper appeals the summary denial of his rule 3.800(a) motion to correct illegal sentence. We affirm without prejudice to Cooper’s right to exhaust all administrative remedies at the Department of Corrections with regard to any entitlement to gain time credit. *See Jackson v. State,*971 So.2d 208 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). Inasmuch as Cooper asserts a conclusory entitlement to jail credit, we affirm. *See Petscher v. State,*936 So.2d 639, 639 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (Orfinger, J., concurring specially).

*Affirmed.*

GROSS, C.J., WARNER and POLEN, JJ., concur.
#### Tori MOORE, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D10-5904.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Nov. 29, 2010.

Tori Moore, pro se, Petitioner.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. *See Baker v. State,*878 So.2d 1236 (Fla.2004).

PADOVANO, ROBERTS, and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 93 (Thursday, June 8, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H5693-H5694]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

       WHAT MASSIVE REPUBLICAN BUDGET CUTS MEAN TO RURAL MISSOURI

  (Mr. VOLKMER asked and was given permission to address the House for 
1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. VOLKMER. Mr. Speaker, the Republicans say ``Listen to me, listen 
to my words, but don't watch what I do.'' What I am alluding to is a 
budget, a Republican budget that passed the House and also the one that 
passed the Senate, with massive cuts in Medicare and Medicaid in order 
to give tax relief to the wealthy. [[Page H5694]] 
  What do these massive cuts for Medicare and Medicaid mean to rural 
Missouri, where I am from? It means loss, a huge loss in revenues for 
my hospitals. It means many of my senior citizens who are on a low 
income and Social Security will have to pay money they do not have in 
order to give tax cuts of $20,000 for those who earn over $250,000 a 
year. That is not right. That is not fair. That is mean-spirited.
  We need rural hospitals in rural Missouri. We do not need them to be 
shut down because they want to give tax cuts to the wealthy. Mr. 
Speaker, think twice before you act.

                          ____________________
```
#### Norma STONE and Huie Stone v. Mark DODSON, M.D.

No. 2011-CC-0921.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 6, 2011.

In re Dodson M.D., Mark; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedí*130al Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 239,387; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 11-00519.

Denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE DECEMBER
31, 1997 FORM 10-KSB OF ON STAGE ENTERTAINMENT, INC. AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                           2,323
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      455
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                        119
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 3,647
<PP&E>                                           5,009
<DEPRECIATION>                                   2,553
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   6,477
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            1,851
<BONDS>                                            550
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            66
<OTHER-SE>                                       4,010
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     6,477
<SALES>                                         15,726
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                15,726
<CGS>                                            7,742
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   11,414
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 6,418
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 834
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (2,939)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         7
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (2,946)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (2,946)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.55)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.55)


</TABLE>
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Bobby D. HIGGINBOTHAM.

No. 2010-KK-2487.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 17, 2010.

In re State of Louisiana; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tensas, 6th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 79,152; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,-101-KW.

Denied.