IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs September 7, 2011

IN RE BILLY D. H.1

Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Fentress County

No. J3281 John R. Officer, Judge

No. M2011-00797-COA-R3-PT - Filed December 29, 2011

Mother’s parental rights to her son were terminated on grounds that she was mentally

incompetent to provide for the child and that the conditions which led to the child’s removal

from Mother’s custody persisted. She appeals, contending that the grounds are notsupported

by the evidence and that termination of her rights was not in the best interest of the child.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Affirmed

RICHARD H. DINKINS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK G. CLEMENT,

JR. and ANDY D. BENNETT, JJ., joined.

Kevin D. Poore, Crossville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jerus H. N.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Michelle N. Safer, Assistant Attorney

General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural History

Billy D. H. (“Billy”) was born on September 10, 1998 to Jerus H. N. (“Jerus”) and her

then husband, Michael H. (“Michael”). A divorce action was instituted in Fentress County

Circuit Court on May 17, 2002 and on April 1, 2005, a divorce was granted; Jerus was named

primary residential parent of Billy. On July 19, 2005, Michael filed a petition seeking a

modification of the parenting plan and immediate custody of Billy, alleging that Jerus was

This Court has a policy of protecting the identity of children in parental termination cases by 1

initializing the last names of the parties.
physically, verbally and emotionally abusive to Billy; a restraining order was entered ex parte

on that date enjoining Jerus from removing Billy from Michael’s custody. Following a

hearing on July 28, the court dismissed the restraining order, restored custody of Billy to

Jerus and set the change of custody petition for final hearing. On November 4 the court

entered a Temporary Order of Parenting, naming Michael as primary residential parent,

granting Jerus residential parenting time, and requiring the parents to undergo counseling to

“work on issues of parenting skills, communication skills, parent child relation issues and

issues dealing with the child’s behavior and discipline.” An agreed Permanent Parenting

Plan Order was entered on February 13, 2006 naming Michael as primary residential parent

and granting Jerus parenting time. On May 10, 2006 Michael filed a motion seeking to

suspend Jerus’ parenting time or, alternatively, to require that her parenting time be

supervised on the ground that Jerus was abusing Billy during her time with him. It does not

appear from the record that the motion was responded to or ruled upon by the court.

On July 9, 2008, Denise H. (“Denise”), wife of Michael, filed a sworn “Petition For

Emergency Temporary Protective Custody” in the Circuit Court action. The petition alleged

that Michael died on February 10, 2008; that Billy was in Denise’s care and custody; and

that, since the order entered in 2006 naming Michael primary residential parent, Jerus had

only seen Billy twice for a total of less than four hours. A Protective Custody Order was

entered on August 6, placing temporary care and custody of Billy with the Department of

Children’s Services (“the Department”). As the factual basis for the action, the order recited:

The child’s father is deceased. The child was living with his father and

stepmother, [Denise] at the time of his father’s death. The child has remained

with the stepmother following the father’s death. The child has made

statements that he was physically abused while in the care of his mother,

[Jerus]. The child expressed fear of living with his mother. The allegations

of abuse are significantly severe that the court cannot place the child in the

mother’s care without further investigation and services by DCS. Due to the

father’s death and the allegations of abuse against the mother, the child is

without a parent to care for him.

The case was transferred to the Juvenile Court for Fentress County.

On September 4, 2008, the Guardian Ad Litem moved to terminate or modify Jerus’

visitation on the ground that, based on the Guardian’s observation as well as reports to him

from the Department’s case manager and Billy’s therapist at the Children’s Center for the

Cumberlands, further visitation with Jerus would pose a threat to Billy’ssafety and emotional

well-being. On September 9 the Department filed a similar motion, citing “emotional harm

to the child and refusal of the parent to participate in therapeutic visitation which is designed

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to rectify problems associated with parenting techniques of the mother.” An order was

entered effective September 25 in which the parties agreed that Jerus’ visitation would be

suspended pending Jerus’ psychological assessment ; the order also granted Billy’s maternal

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grandparents supervised visitation.

The instant case was initiated by the Department on November 19, 2009, by the filing

of a petition seeking to terminate Jerus’ parental rights. The petition alleged that the

conditions which led to Billy’s removal persisted and other conditions existed which would

cause Billy to be subject to further abuse or neglect, that Jerus was mentally incompetent to

provide for her son, and that, as a result, termination of her parental rights was appropriate

and in the best interest of the child. Trial was held on August 16 and September 3, 2010 and

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the court entered a Final Decree of Guardianship on March 7, 2011 terminating Jerus’

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parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3) and (8). Jerus appeals,

contending that the grounds for termination of her rights were not shown by clear and

convincing evidence and that termination of her rights was not in the best interest of Billy.

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II. Standard of Review

A parent has a fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of his or her child.

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Nash-Putnam v. McCloud, 921 S.W.2d 170,

The order provided that Jerus would initially seek to have the cost of the assessment paid by her 2

insurance or TennCare and, if denied, the Department was authorized to submit a request for payment. On

June 19, 2009 the court entered an order approving funds for a psychologist “to conduct the necessary

psychological testing of [Jerus] and child, to meet with the child to assess emotional stability and to assess

[Jerus’] parenting abilities and to provide testimony in Court regarding the results.”

Included as an exhibit to the trial of this case was a transcript of the hearing in the dependent and 3

neglect proceeding held in Fentress County Juvenile Court on May 24, and June 7, 14 and 17, 2010. At the

conclusion of this proceeding, the court determined that Billy was dependent and neglected within the

meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(b)(12). The court also held that the Department had complied with

the reasonable efforts requirement and was no longer required to work with Jerus. The court in the

termination proceeding relied upon and adopted the findings in the adjudication proceeding; we have

likewise reviewed the transcript of the adjudication proceeding in our consideration of the issues raised in

this appeal. 

The guardianship order was initially entered on September 17, 2010, but was reentered in 4

accordance with the court’s grant of Jerus’ Rule 60 Motion for Relief. 

In a related proceeding, Michael and Denise filed a petition on August 23, 2007 in Fentress County

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Chancery Court to terminate Jerus’ parental rights and to allow Denise to adopt Billy; the ground stated in

the petition was that Jerus had abandoned Billy. On August 16, 2010, Denise filed a Notice of Voluntary

Dismissal of the petition. 

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174 (Tenn. 1996). Thus, the state may interfere with parental rights only if there is a

compelling state interest. Nash-Putnam, 921 S.W.2d at 174–75 (citing Santosky v. Kramer,

455 U.S. 745 (1982); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 579 (1993). Our termination statues

identify “those situations in which the state’s interest in the welfare of a child justifies

interference with a parent’s constitutional rights by setting forth grounds on which

termination proceedings can be brought.” In re W.B., IV, No. M2004-00999-COA-R3-PT,

2005 WL 1021618, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. April 29, 2005) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-

113(g)). To support the termination of parental rights, petitioners must prove both the

existence of one of the statutory grounds for termination and that termination is in the child’s

best interest. In re D.L.B., 118 S.W.3d 360, 367 (Tenn. 2003); In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d

539, 546 (Tenn. 2002); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c).

Because of the fundamental nature of the parent’s rights and the grave consequences

of the termination of those rights, courts must require a higher standard of proof in deciding

termination cases. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769; Matter of M.W.A., Jr., 980 S.W.2d 620, 622

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). Thus, both the grounds for termination and the best interest inquiry

must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-113(c)(1);

In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d at 546. Clear and convincing evidence “establishes that the truth

of the facts asserted is highly probable . . . and eliminates any serious or substantial doubt

about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence.” In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d

643, 653 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). Such evidence “produces in a fact-finder’s mind a firm

belief or conviction regarding the truth of the facts sought to be established.” Id.

In light of the heightened standard of proof in these cases, the reviewing court must

adapt the customary standard of review set forth by Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). In re M.J.B., 140

S.W.3d at 654. As to the court’s findings of fact, our review is de novo with a presumption

of correctness unless the evidence preponderates otherwise, in accordance with Tenn. R.

App. P. 13(d). Id. We must then determine whether the facts, as found by the trial court or

as supported by the preponderance of the evidence, clearly and convincingly establish the

elements necessary to terminate parental rights. Id.

III. Discussion

A. Termination on the Ground of Mental Incompetence

A parent’srights may be terminated on the ground of mental incompetence if the court

determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent’s mental condition is impaired

to such a degree that the parent cannot adequately provide care and supervision to the child

and it is unlikely that the parent will be able to do so in the near future. See Tenn. Code Ann.

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§ 36-1-113(g)(8)(B). The burden is on DCS to demonstrate two essential facts: (1) that the

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parent is presently unable to care for the subject children and (2) that the parent is unlikely

to be able to care for the children in the near future. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(8)

(2010). In this case, the trial court held as follows with respect to Jerus’ mental

incompetence:

13. Jerus . . . is incompetent to adequately provide for the further care and

supervision of the child because her mental condition is presently so impaired

and is so likely to remain so that it would be unlikely that she will be able to

assume or resume the care of and responsibility for the child in the near future

. . . .

14. Jerus . . . has been diagnosis [sic] with Adjustment Disorder with

Disturbance of Emotions and Conduct, Paranoid Personality Disorder and

Narcissistic Personality Disorder. [Jerus] has a history of abusive discipline

towards all of her children and all of her children are alienated from her.

Dr. William Sewell, qualified by the court as an expert in clinical psychology and

forensic evaluations, testified at trial that he had been asked to perform a forensic evaluation

of Jerus to determine her competence to parent Billy. The report of his evaluation was

introduced into evidence and states the following diagnostic impressions of Jerus:

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(8) provides:

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(g)(8)(A) The chancery and circuit courts shall have jurisdiction in an adoption proceeding,

and the chancery, circuit, and juvenile courts shall have jurisdiction in a separate,

independent proceeding conducted prior to an adoption proceeding to determine ifthe parent

or guardian is mentally incompetent to provide for the further care and supervision of the

child, and to terminate that parent's or guardian's rights to the child;

(B) The court may terminate the parental or guardianship rights of that person if it

determines on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that:

(i) The parent or guardian of the child isincompetent to adequately provide

for the further care and supervision of the child because the parent's or

guardian's mental condition is presently so impaired and is so likely to

remain so that it is unlikely that the parent or guardian will be able to

assume or resume the care of and responsibility for the child in the near

future; and

(ii) That termination of parental or guardian rights is in the best interest of

the child;

(C) In the circumstances described under subdivisions (8)(A) and (B), no willfulness in the

failure of the parent or guardian to establish the parent's or guardian's ability to care for the

child need be shown to establish that the parental or guardianship rights should be

terminated[;]

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Axis I: (309.4) Adjustment Disorder with Disturbance of Emotions

and Conduct

Axis II: (301.0) Paranoid Personality Disorder

(301.81) Narcissistic Personality Disorder

Axis III: (V71.09) None

Axis IV: Major—DCS Parental Rights Removal

With respect to these diagnoses, Dr. Sewell testified:

Q. I want to go to your diagnostic impression. Explain first of all what is

Axis I?

A. Axis I is the axis that relates to clinical mental illness. There are two

types of disorders that psychologists/psychiatrists recognize and deal

with. They are the personality type disorders and then the clinical

disorders. The top axis relates to clinical disorders. And in this case

the diagnosis of adjustment disorder with disturbance of emotions and

conduct is a clinical disorder.

Q. What does that diagnosis mean?

A. It means basically that she is involved in a whole set of circumstances

that she is attempting to adjust to, and has been attempting to adjust to

them for some time. And this diagnosis has been rendered before in

this case, and she was going through these same kinds of things then.

What a person that is adjusting to a situation will do if it becomes

excessive is become disturbed in one way or the other. In other words,

their emotions become extreme; they become very anxious; they

become very angry; then that bleeds over into conduct difficulties such

as doing things that might be illegal, or doing things that are not in

conformance with society.

Q. On Axis II you have two diagnoses. Paranoid personality disorder,

what does that mean?

A. A paranoid personality disorder person has the characteristics of an

individual that believes when a remark is made and it is a benign

remark they have a tendency to think that remark is negative; it implies

the person is being negative toward them when in fact they are not.

That type of person becomes angry about situations and shows that

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particular anger. They blame others for their own shortcomings as

opposed to dealing with things on their own and accepting

responsibility for their problems. So those are the primary three basic

characteristics.

Q. When I asked you about Axis, when you alluded to the fact that Axis

II refers to personality disorder, what is the main difference between.

. . . . . . .

A. (Interposing) Personalities are developed over time. It becomes a

disorder when in fact it is interfering with functioning; it is interfering

with life interactions, interactions in society, and the person’s

relationship to their environment. And those characteristics are

basically intractable, or to put it another way and not be so extreme,

they are very difficult to change. A person say that is 25 and has a

personality disorder, if they develop one, is very likely to be that way

ten years after the fact. And they may be able to modulate that, but for

the most part those characteristics are going to be prominent throughout

their life in one way or another.

Q. The other diagnosis on Axis II is narcissistic personality disorder. Can

you explain that, please?

A. Yes. Those type persons exaggerate their own self worth. They believe

that their interests should be considered and are more important than

anyone else’s interest around them. They do show very little empathy

for others, and they also will in personal relationships have that

individual always doing things for them, but very seldom doing things

for the other person. A narcissistic personality takes from people in the

world, and really severely never gives anything back. And sometimes

will . . . . . . well, I don’t want to give the example because it is too

extreme. But will take real extremes to make sure that their needs are

being met even if it means compromising other people’s needs.

Q. What is the likelihood of successful treatment for either of these Axis

II diagnoses?

A. These characteristics are very difficult to change, very unlikely to

change at all. Sometimes the characteristics can be modified, and some

improvement can be seen, but frequently they never change. They are

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there for life. Maybe not in that extreme at one point in time, but

possibly that extreme for the entire life.

Q. Given [Jerus’] statement to you that she felt she had no problems and

no need for treatment, how does that affect the likelihood of successful

treatment in her particular case?

A. Those characteristics are very difficult to change within the person, and

very difficult for a counselor/therapist/psychiatrist - anyone - to do

things to cause change. When someone is very resistant to treatment

then it almost ensures no success, and that no treatment will help.

Q. Did you find [Jerus] to be very resistant?

A. Yes. She stated so.

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Dr. Julian Sanborn, a permanency clinician with Family and Children’s Services,

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testified that she was engaged to do a “bonding assessment” in the case. In a portion of her

9

report, Dr. Sanborn recounts her interviews with Jerus’ two older children, who are estranged

With respect to Jerus’ competency to parent, Dr. Sewell’s report states: 7

Parental competency includes the ability to care for children in the face of inconveniences

to the parent, maintaining responsibility for the safety of the children, arranging for safe

shelter, using discipline that is not abusive and arranging daily events so that the health of

the child is maintained through nutritional care, health and medical care and rest. The

parent must have a support system that will provide care for the child in the parent’s

absence. She has demonstrated repeated failures to plan ahead. She has ignored requests

for home studies. [That] [s]he was willing for her son to be placed in her home with a male

friend present who had not received an assessment by [Jerus] exhibits an inability or

unwillingness to change. She has not made the connection between a child’s emotional

instability and transitional living. Due to [Jerus’] inability to accept responsibility for her

actions, her narcissistic traits and paranoid tendencies, denial of personal problems,

rejection of the need for treatment, and the likelihood that she will not benefit from

treatment, [Jerus] will not be able to resume independent care of and responsibility for the

children [sic] in the near future.

Dr. Sanborn testified that she has a Bachelor’s degree in social work, a Master’s degree in 8

systematic theology, a doctorate in social ethics, and that she “practice[s] on the doctorate level as a social

worker[.]”

This was described in Dr. Sanborn’s report as assessing “the attachment between [Billy], his 9

biological mother Jerus . . . and the child’s current resource parent, his stepmother, Denise . . .”. 

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from Jerus, and states that the older children “either report being abused by [Jerus] or seeing

her abuse Billy. . .”. Dr. Sanborn also expresses “significantsafety concerns” regarding Billy

based on:

[Jerus’] two older children both report a significant history of abuse

with their mother. . . . [Jerus’] eldest reported to a Department of Children’s

Services case manager that [Jerus] is “very violent” and that “no child would

be safe with her.” He also informed the case manager that while in DCS foster

care as a teen for school issues, he begged to stay in foster care because of his

mother’s abuse.

Billy. . . is consistent in his assertion that he would not be safe with his

mother.

Public school officials have reported their concerns to the Department

of Children’s Services that on one occasion in May 2008 [Jerus] and her

fiancee . . . attempted to take Billy from school without any school official’s

knowledge.

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The testimony of Dr. Sewell and Dr. Sanborn, along with the other evidence in the

record, clearly and convincingly support the court’s finding that Jerus is mentally

incompetent to care for Billy and that, because of the nature of her mental impairment, it is

unlikely that she could reach the necessary level of competence to assume responsibility for

him. Dr. Sewell’s diagnosis of Jerus’ condition and his opinion as to her competency to

parent in light of that diagnosis are unrebutted, as is the proof of Jerus’ abusive behavior

which is the basis of Dr. Sanborn’s safety concerns and which was a part of the court’s

findings in the dependent and neglect proceeding. The Department met its burden under

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(8).

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While the safety concerns expressed by Dr. Sanborn are considered in the resolution of the issue 10

of whether termination of Jerus’ parental rights is in Billy’s best interest, we consider the factual bases of

her concerns–the abusive behavior of Jerus toward her children–in the context of whether Jerus can assume

and be responsible for Billy’s care within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(8) and whether

her home is safe and stable within the contemplation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(3). 

Jerus argues that DCS failed to provide her any assistance in addressing her mental health issues. 11

While Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-166(g)(1) requires the Department to expend reasonable efforts, defined as

the “exercise of reasonable care and diligence . . . to provide servicesrelated to meeting the needs of the child

and the family,” Dr. Sewell testified that Jerus’ two diagnoses are “very difficult to change, very unlikely

to change” and that the level of her resistance to treatment “almost ensures no success, and . . . no treatment

will help.” In light of this testimony, the Department was excused from providing such services. See In re

Keisheal N.E., No. M2009-02527-COA-R3-PT, 2010 WL 2176104, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2010)

(“There are cases in which a parent is proven to be so mentally incapacitated that efforts by the Department

(continued...)

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B. Termination on the Ground of Persistence of Conditions

Tenn Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3) allowsfor the termination of parental rights where

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a child has been removed from the parent’s custody for a period of six months and the

conditions which led to the child’s removal persist. With respect to the persistence of

conditions, the trial court held:

9. The conditions that led to the removal of the child from the home of Jerus

. . . are her past abuse of Billy . . . and the child’s extreme fear of his mother.

10. The conditions that prevent the child’s return to the parent’s home are her

past abuse of Billy . . . her unresolved mental health issues and the child’s

extreme fear of his mother.

The evidence relative to the nature and extent of the various personality disorders

which are the basis of Jerus’ mental impairment also supports the holding that the conditions

which led to Billy’s removal from her home persist and prevent the safe return of Billy to her

home. Significant in this regard is Dr. Sewell’s opinion that, in light of the nature of Jerus’

condition and her resistence to treatment, there is little likelihood that the conditions would

change. The unrebutted concerns of Dr. Sanborn are evidence that continuation of the

parent-child relationship diminishes Billy’s chances of integration into a safe, stable and

permanent home.

(...continued)

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to address the parent’s mental health issues would be in vain. In those cases . . . . the Department is excused

from exerting efforts to reunify the parent and child.”). 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3) provides: 12

(3) The child has been removed from the home of the parent or guardian by order of a court

for a period of six (6) months and:

(A) The conditions that led to the child's removal or other conditions that

in all reasonable probability would cause the child to be subjected to

further abuse or neglect and that, therefore, prevent the child's safe return

to the care of the parent(s) or guardian(s), still persist;

(B) There is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at an

early date so that the child can be safely returned to the parent(s) or

guardian(s) in the near future; and

(C) The continuation of the parent or guardian and child relationship

greatly diminishes the child's chances of early integration into a safe, stable

and permanent home[;]

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C. Best Interest

Once a ground for termination has been proven by clear and convincing evidence, the

trial court must then determine whether it is the best interest of the child for the parent’s

rights to be terminated, again using the clear and convincing evidence standard. The

legislature has set out a list of factors at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i) for the courts to

follow in determining the child’s best interest. The statutory factors are not exhaustive, and

the statute does not require every factor to appear before a court can find that termination is

in a child’s best interest. See In re S.L.A., 223 S.W.3d 295, 301 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (citing

State of Tennessee Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. T.S.W., No. M2001-01735-COA-R3-CV,

2002 WL 970434, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 10, 2002); In re I.C.G., No. E2006-00746-

COA-R3-PT, 2006 WL 3077510, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2006)).

In determining that termination of Jerus’ parental rights was in Billy’s best interest,

the trial court made the following findings:

1. [Jerus] has not made an adjustment of circumstances, conduct or conditions

as to make it safe and in the child’s best interest to be in the home of the

parent.

2. [Jerus] has failed to effect a lasting adjustment after reasonable efforts by

available social agencies for such duration of time that lasting adjustment does

not reasonably appear possible.

3. [Jerus] has not maintained regular visitation or other contact with the child.

Visitation has been terminated and the mother has not taken the necessary

steps to get it reinstated.

4. A meaningful relationship has not otherwise been established between the

child and [Jerus].

5. A change of caretaker and physical environment is likely to have a negative

effect on the child’s emotional, psychological and/or medical condition.

6. [Jerus] has committed brutality and physical, sexual, emotional or

psychological abuse or neglect toward other child in the family or household.

7. [Jerus] mental and/or emotional status would be detrimental to the child

and/or prevent her from effectively providing safe and stable care and

supervision for the child.

8. [Jerus] has not paid a reasonable portion of the child’s substitute physical

care and maintenance when financially able to do so.

9. [Jerus] has shown little or no interest in the welfare of the child.

10. [Jerus] continues to make lifestyle choices that prevent her from being able

to parent the child or to provide a home for the child.

11. The child is placed in relative foster home that wishes to adopt the child.

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12. The child has established a strong bond with the relative foster parent.

13. The child has expressed a desire to have parental rights terminated so that

he can be adopted.

14. The child’s mental health counselor has opined that it is in the child’s best

interest to establish permanency for the child as soon as possible.

15. The children [sic] need to be released from the stigma of being foster

children [sic].

In her brief, Jerus does not take issue with the findings by the court but, rather,

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concedes that “the best interest of Billy would not be served by immediately placing custody”

with her; she asserts that “she is willing to put forth the effort in order to have her son

returned to her care.” The record, however, is void of any evidence to answer affirmatively

the inquiry at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1) as to whether she “has made such an

adjustment of circumstance, conduct, or conditions as to make it safe and in the child’s best

interest to be in the home of the parent.” Given the facts of this case, this inquiry is of

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particular significance.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment terminating Jerus’ parental rights is

AFFIRMED.

___________________________________

RICHARD H. DINKINS, JUDGE

Our review of the record confirms that each is supported by clear and convincing evidence. 13

Jerus also contends, with respect to the best interest inquiry, that had the Department provided 14

her with necessary services assistance, Billy would either be in her custody or eventually returned to her. 

This argument, however, fails to address her resistence to treatment for her mental condition as well as Dr.

Sewell’s opinion as to her competency to parent. 

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