alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                            7226
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                     7686
<ALLOWANCES>                                        88
<INVENTORY>                                       1539
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 17380
<PP&E>                                           13230
<DEPRECIATION>                                    6386
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   30989
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                             8046
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            32
<OTHER-SE>                                       18852
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     30989
<SALES>                                          11713
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 11713
<CGS>                                             3148
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                     3148
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  9427
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                (93)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  (407)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     (146)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              (261)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     (261)
<EPS-BASIC>                                   (0.08)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.08)


</TABLE>
September 1 6 , 2014



### JUDGMENT


## The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

DOV AVNI KAMINETZKY AKA DOV K. AVNI , Appellant

NO. 14

- 14

- 00450

- CV V.

DOSOHS I, LTD , Appellee

________________________________ Today the Court heard appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal from the judgment signed by the court below on March 7, 2014. Having considered the motion and found it meritorious, we order the appeal DISMIS SED

. We further order that all costs incurred by reason of this appeal be paid by appellant, Dov Avni Kaminetzky aka Dov K. Avni.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE

F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER

Appellate case name: In re Brandon Paree Christopher

Appellate case number: 01

- 20

- 00170

- CV

Trial court case number: 200618875

Trial court: 309th District Court of Harris County

This Court issued a n order on February 25 , 2020 striking relator ’ s brief. We withdraw the

order.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature:

___________ /s / Russ e ll Lloyd

__________________ Acting individually

Date: March 24, 2020
#### In re Leslie E. DAVIS.

No. 2011-OB-2561.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 1, 2011.

ON APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR

PER CURIAM.*

|! After reviewing the evidence and considering the law, we conclude petitioner, Leslie E. Davis, is immediately eligible to be conditionally admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana, subject to a probationary *902period of five years. The probationary period shall commence from the date petitioner, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, and the probation monitor execute a formal probation plan. During the probationary period, petitioner shall comply with all of the terms and conditions of the consent agreement executed by her with the Louisiana Supreme Court Committee on Bar Admissions, and such other conditions as may be imposed upon her by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. Should petitioner fail to make a good faith effort to satisfy these conditions, or should she commit any misconduct during the period of probation, her conditional right to practice may be terminated or she may be subjected to other discipline pursuant to the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement.

CONDITIONAL ADMISSION GRANTED.

*

 Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Daryn GISCLAIR.

No. 2011-K-1031.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 4, 2011.

In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 497-272; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-KA-1410.

Denied.
#### STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of T.W.

No. 2011-CK-0416.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 16, 2011.

In re W., T.; — Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Orleans Parish Juvenile Court, No. 2010-281-02-DQ-C; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-0053.

Denied.
#### Duffard & Hecker v. *D.*G. Herbert.

(No. 1757.)

Appeal from Galveston County.

Opinion by

Hurt, J.

§ 612. *Verdict will not be set aside where evidence is conflicting; case stated.*Appellee sued appellants on a *quantum meruit*for certain services performed by him in managing a pasture, claiming that said services were reasonably worth $200 per month, and that he served for three months. Appellants pleaded specially that the services were performed under a contract which expressly stipulated for the payment therefor at the rate of $20 per month, which had been paid appellee. Appellee recovered judgment for $90 and costs. The evidence in ■ regard to the contract, and the fixed sum stipulated therein for appellee’s services, is conflicting, and sufficient to support a finding either way. Hence, this court will not disturb the verdict and judgment upon the ground that they are against the weight of evidence. In order to justify this court in setting aside a verdict upon this ground, it must clearly appear to be wrong. [Stroud v. Springfield, 28 Tex. 651; Powell v. Haley, id. 53; W. & *W.*Con. Rep. § 16.]

§ 613. *Charge must be confined to the issues made by the pleadings; cause of action not pleaded cannot be recovered upon.*The court charged the jury that the *537plaintiff was entitled to recover the value of certain extra services about which there was evidence, but about which the pleadings were silent. *Held,*error. Such charge was calculated to lead the jury from the issues made between the parties, and cause them to find for the plaintiff upon a cause of action not pleaded.

February 11, 1885.

Reversed and remanded.
N OTE : This order is nonprecedential

. 

# United States Court of Appeals **for the Federal Circuit**

______________________ CRYSTAL N. RODGERS, Petitioner

v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Respondent

______________________

2024

- 1682

______________________ Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection Board in No. SF

- 0752

- 22

- 0229

- I

- 1.

______________________
Before P ROST , T ARANTO , and H UGHES , Circuit Judges.

P ER C URIAM

. O R D E R
Crystal N. Rodgers filed an appeal at the Merit Systems Protection Board challenging her removal from federal service and raising, in relevant part, an affirmative defense of discrimination . The Board’s final decision affirmed . She petition ed this court for review and her filings indicate that she wishes to continue to pursue her discrimination and retaliation claims. ECF No. 2 at 1

– 3; ECF No. 1

- 2 at 13. Responding to this court’s show cause order, the United States Postal Service urges dismissal or tra nsfer. Case: 24-1682 Document: 14 Page: 1 Filed: 07/23/2024RODGERS v. USPS 2

Ms. Rodgers responds and appears to argue the merits of the case , including her discrimination claims

. We transfer this case. Federal district courts, not thiscourt, have jurisdiction over “[c]ases of discrimination subject to the provisions of [5 U.S.C.] § 7702,” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2) , which involve an allegation of an action appealable to the Board and an allegation that a basis for the action was covered discrimination

. Perry v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd. , 582 U.S. 420, 43 7 (2017). Here, Ms. Rodg ers continues to pursue the allegations she made before the Board thather removal was the result of covered discrimination, so jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision lies in district
court. W e agree with the agency that transfer to the United States District Court for the Central District of California

, where the employment action appears to have occurred

, is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
Accordingly

, I T I S O RDERED T HAT : This matter and all case filings are transferred to the United States D istrict Court for the Central District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631.

July 23
, 2024 Date F OR THE C OURT Case: 24-1682 Document: 14 Page: 2 Filed: 07/23/2024
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THE SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM TECHFORCE
CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET MARCH 31, 1997 (IN
THOUSANDS) AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                             702
<SECURITIES>                                     5,336
<RECEIVABLES>                                   14,231
<ALLOWANCES>                                       676
<INVENTORY>                                      4,129
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                27,224
<PP&E>                                          19,423
<DEPRECIATION>                                   7,482
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  48,024
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           12,879
<BONDS>                                          3,213
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            80
<OTHER-SE>                                      29,344
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    48,024
<SALES>                                          7,441
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                17,661
<CGS>                                            5,488
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   12,350
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 3,761
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   676
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,509
<INCOME-TAX>                                       549
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,550
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       960
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.12
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.12
        

</TABLE>
#### Taran LENHARDT, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D10-4600.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Dec. 3, 2010.

Taran Lenhardt, pro se, Petitioner.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Brooke Poland, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner is hereby granted a belated appeal of the October 19, 2009, judgment and sentence in Duval County Circuit Court case number 16-2009-CF-005204-AXXX-MA. Upon issuance of mandate in this cause, a copy of this opinion shall be provided to the clerk of the circuit court for treatment as the notice of appeal. Fla. RApp. P. 9.141(c)(5)(D). If petitioner qualifies for appointed counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel to represent petitioner on appeal.

PETITION GRANTED.

BENTON, C.J., KAHN, and WETHERELL, JJ., concur.
#### Ronald JENKINS, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D09-1892.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Nov. 25, 2009.

Ronald Jenkins, Jr., in proper person.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, for appellee.

Before GERSTEN, SUAREZ, and SALTER, JJ.

SUAREZ, J.

This is an appeal of an order summarily denying a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). On appeal from a summary denial, this Court must reverse unless the post-conviction record shows conclusively that the appellant is entitled to no relief. *See*Fla. RApp. P. 9.141(b)(2)(A), (D).

Because the record now before us fails to make the required showing, we reverse the order and remand for further proceedings. If the trial court again enters an order summarily denying the post-conviction motion, the court shall attach record excerpts conclusively showing that the appellant is not entitled to any relief.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
857 A.2d 183

#### MILLER ELECTRIC COMPANY v. Tate DEWEESE and Just-Mark, Inc. Petition of Tate Deweese. Miller Electric Company v. Tate Deweese and Just-Mark, Inc. v. Birmingham Bistro, Inc. Petition of Birmingham Bistro, Inc. Miller Electric Company v. Tate Deweese and Just-Mark, Inc. Cross-Petition of Miller Electric Company.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

July 22, 2004.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 22nd day of July 2004, we DENY the Petition for Allowance of Appeal captioned at 483 WAL 2003, we GRANT the Petition for Allowance of Appeal captioned at 490 WAL 2003, and we DENY the Cross-Petition for Allowance of Appeal captioned at 520 WAL 2003.
**Exhibit 31.2**

 

**Certificationof Chief Financial Officer**

**Pursuantto Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

I, Neil J.Abitabilo, certify that:

 

1.  I havereviewed this special financial report pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 15d-2of Atlantic Express Transportation Corp.;

 

2.  Based on myknowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3.  Based on myknowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this report;

 

4.  Theregistrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

 

(a) designedsuch disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;

 

(b) evaluatedthe effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and

 

(c) disclosedin this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

 

5.  Theregistrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

 

(a) allsignificant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and

 

(b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves managementor other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting.

 
|   | /s/ Neil J. Abitabilo           |   |
|--------|---------------------------------|--------|
|   |  Neil J. Abitabilo         |
|   | * Chief Financial Officer* |

 

Date: November 16,2005

 

----
Exhibit
32.2

















CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
OF


THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002





In connection with the filing of the
Annual Report on Form 10-K of South Jersey Gas Company (the “Company”) for the
period ended December 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, David A. Kindlick, Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that, to the best of my knowledge:





(1)                      
The Report fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934; and





(2)                      
The information contained in the
Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company.

















/s/
David A.
Kindlick


Name: David A.
Kindlick


Title: Chief Financial
Officer


February 29, 2008
#### In re Medical Review Panel Proceeding of Velda Aline JOHNSON.

No. 2011-CC-1212.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 23, 2011.

In re Christus Health Central D/B/A; St. Frances Cabrini Hospital; — Defendants); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 240588; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. CW 11-00573, CW 11-00526.

Denied.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-6195

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

GEORGE CHAMBERS, a/k/a Dave,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, Chief

District Judge. (3:94-cr-00089-JRS)

Submitted: July 20, 2006 Decided: July 26, 2006

Before WIDENER and WILKINSON, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

George Chambers, Appellant Pro Se. Joan Elizabeth Evans, Assistant

United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

George Chambers seeks to appeal the district court’s

orders construing his petition for writ of audita querela and

motion for reconsideration as successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000)

motions, and dismissing them on that basis. The orders are not

appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate

of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of

appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000).

A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable

jurists would find the district court’s assessment of his

constitutional claims debatable and that any dispositive procedural

rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. See

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-

84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and

conclude that Chambers has not made the requisite showing.

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the

appeal. 

Additionally, we construe Chambers’ notice of appeal and

informal brief as an application to file a second or successive

motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. United States v. Winestock, 340

F.3d 200, 208 (4th Cir. 2003). In order to obtain authorization to

file a successive § 2255 motion, a prisoner must assert claims
- 3 -

based on either: (1) a new rule of constitutional law, previously

unavailable, made retroactive by the Supreme Court to cases on

collateral review; or (2) newly discovered evidence, not previously

discoverable by due diligence, that would be sufficient to

establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the

movant guilty of the offense. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(2), 2255

(2000). Chambers’ claims do not satisfy either of these criteria.

Therefore, we deny authorization to file a successive § 2255

motion.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
#### Wolford *v.*Warfield.

Opinion delivered January 11, 1926.

Appeal and error—acts inconsistent with appeal.—Under Crawford. & Moses’ Dig., § 3703, providing that in actions to recover possession of land a defendant in possession under color of title is entitled to recover the value of improvements and taxes, and that the same shall be paid before the successful party shall have possession, *held*that where a successful party took possession of the land before paying the defendant for his improvements, such party was not entitled to appeal, because she accepted the benefit of the judgment favorable to herself, and it is immaterial that she executed a supersedeas bond to pay the judgment in the event of an affirmance.

Appeal from Phillips 'Circuit Court; *E. D. Robertson,*Judge;

appeal dismissed.

*Sheffield & Coates,*for appellant.

*W. G. Dinning*and *Bevens £ Mundt,*for appellee.

Per Curiam.

Appellee moves to dismiss the appeal under § 2168, Crawford *&*Moses’ Digest, on the ground that appellant has forfeited the right of appeal by accepting benefits under the judgment appealed from.

*83Appellant was plaintiff below, and sued to recover possession of a tract of land. Tbe judgment of tbe circuit court was in appellant’s favor for recovery of tbe land in controversy, but there was a judgment in favor of appellee for the recovery of a sum of money as compensation for improvements made on the land. Appellant gave a supersedeas bond and then took possession of the land. It is contended by appellee that this was such an acceptance of benefits as would be inconsistent with the right of appeal from the judgment awarding those benefits.

The statute (Crawford & Moses’ Digest, § 3703) provides that in actions to recover possession of land a defendant in possession under color of title who has “peaceably” improved the lands in controversy is entitled to recover compensation for the value of such improvements together with the amount of taxes paid by him and those under whom he claims, and that the same shall be paid by the successful party “before the court rendering judgment in such proceedings shall cause possession to be delivered to such successful party.” Appellant was therefore not entitled to take possession of the land until payment of the compensation awarded, and such taking was an acceptance of benefits under the .judgment inconsistent with the right of appeal from the other part of the judgment. *Bolen*v. *Cumby,*53 Ark. 514. The fact that appellant executed a supersedeas bond to pay the judgment in event of an affirmance did not affect the inconsistency of accepting the benefit of the judgment without performing that part of it which awarded compensation to the occupant. The statute requires payment of the compensation before possession is awarded, and if the plaintiff in ejectment takes possession he waives his right to appeal from the judgment awarding compensation.

The conclusion of this court therefore is that the right of appeal has been forfeited, and that the appeal should be dismissed. It is so ordered.