[Cite as State v. Lewis, 2014-Ohio-4559.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee 

 v. 

JOHNNL LANIER LEWIS 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 27222 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO 

CASE No. CR 13 05 1193 (A) 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: October 15, 2014 

 

HENSAL, Judge. 

{¶1} Appellant, Johnnl Lanier Lewis, appeals his convictions in the Summit County 

Court of Common Pleas. For the following reasons, this Court affirms in part and reverses in 

part. 

I. 

{¶2} On April 6, 2013, McDonald’s employee, John Lehman, was fatally shot as he 

exited the restaurant to take out the garbage. The Grand Jury indicted Mr. Lewis for aggravated 

murder in violation of Revised Code Section 2903.01(B), felony murder in violation of Section 

2903.02(B), aggravated robbery in violation of Section 2911.01(A)(1) and (3), having weapons 

under disability in violation of Section 2923.13(A)(2), and tampering with evidence in violation 

of Section 2921.12(A)(1). The aggravated murder, felony murder, and aggravated robbery 

charges also included firearm specifications under Section 2941.145. 
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{¶3} Mr. Lewis pleaded not guilty to the charges. He subsequently withdrew his not 

guilty pleas and entered guilty pleas to aggravated murder with the firearm specification, 

aggravated robbery, having weapons while under disability, and tampering with evidence. The 

felony murder charge and attendant firearm specification along with the gun specification for the 

aggravated robbery charge were dismissed. The trial court merged the aggravated robbery and 

aggravated murder convictions. Mr. Lewis was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison for 

aggravated murder, three years in prison on the attendant gun specification, three years in prison 

for having weapons under disability, and three years in prison for tampering with evidence. He 

was ordered to serve the sentence for the aggravated murder gun specification first and 

consecutive to the aggravated murder sentence. The trial court further ordered Mr. Lewis to 

serve the sentences for having weapons under disability and tampering with evidence 

concurrently with each other but consecutive to the aggravated murder with gun specification 

sentences for a total of 31 years to life in prison. The sentencing entry ordered Mr. Lewis to pay 

the costs of prosecution including attorney’s fees. Mr. Lewis appeals raising six assignments of 

error for our review. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I 

[THE] TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PLAIN ERROR IN 

ACCEPTING APPELLANT LEWIS’S GUILTY PLEA WITHOUT STRICTLY 

COMPLYING WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF CRIMINAL RULE 

11(C)(2)(C). 

{¶4} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Lewis argues that his guilty pleas should be 

vacated because the trial court failed to properly advise him that he had the constitutional right to 

compulsory process to obtain witnesses in his favor. We disagree. 

{¶5} “When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be made 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders enforcement of 
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the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.” 

State v. Barker, 129 Ohio St.3d 472, 2011-Ohio-4130, ¶ 9, citing State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 

525, 527 (1996). Criminal Rule 11(C)(2)(c) provides that, prior to accepting a guilty plea in a 

felony case, a court must inform the defendant that he is waiving certain rights. These rights 

include: (1) the right to a jury trial; (2) the right to confront witnesses against him; (3) the right 

to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and (4) the right to require the 

state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which he cannot be compelled to 

testify against himself. The court must strictly comply with Rule 11(C)(2)(c) when informing a 

defendant of his constitutional rights prior to accepting his change of plea. State v. Veney, 120 

Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, syllabus. 

{¶6} While the “preferred method” is that the trial court recite the Rule 11(C)(2)(c) 

language verbatim, a “trial court’s failure to literally comply with Crim.R. 11(C) does not 

invalidate a plea agreement if the record demonstrates that the trial court explained the 

constitutional right ‘in a manner reasonably intelligible to that defendant.’” (Emphasis deleted.) 

Barker at ¶ 14, quoting Veney at ¶ 27. “An alleged ambiguity during a Crim.R. 11 oral plea 

colloquy may be clarified by reference to other portions of the record * * *.” Id. at paragraph 

two of the syllabus. 

{¶7} Mr. Lewis changed his plea on the day of trial. The court advised him that, by 

pleading guilty, he was giving up certain rights. Regarding his right to compulsory process, the 

court told him: “You’d have the right to present your own evidence and witnesses, and you 

could even subpoena people to come to court to testify for you.” Mr. Lewis acknowledged that 

he understood that he was giving up those rights prior to entering his guilty plea. He also denied 
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having any questions about the rights he was waiving as a result of his plea when specifically 

asked by the court. We note that the record does not contain a written change of plea form. 

{¶8} Mr. Lewis challenges the court’s use of the word “could” to describe his right to 

subpoena witnesses. He argues that use of the word “could” connotes that compulsory process 

was a possibility rather than a guaranteed constitutional right that he was giving up by pleading 

guilty. 

{¶9} We conclude that the court’s description of Mr. Lewis’s right to compulsory 

process was sufficient to advise him of such a right in a “reasonably intelligible” manner. 

Barker, 129 Ohio St.3d 472, 2011-Ohio-4130, at ¶ 14, quoting Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-

Ohio-5200, at ¶ 27. The Ohio Supreme Court noted in Barker that “[t]he underlying purpose, 

from the defendant’s perspective, of Crim.R. 11(C) is to convey to the defendant certain 

information so that he can make a voluntary and intelligent decision whether to plead guilty.” Id. 

at ¶ 15, quoting Veney at ¶ 18. We note that this is not a case wherein the court completely 

omitted any discussion of a constitutional right. See Veney at ¶ 30. The language the court 

employed in this case to describe Mr. Lewis’s right to compulsory process was within the 

general context of what the court described as his “right” to present his own evidence and 

witnesses. Although the court did not use the specific word “right” when advising Mr. Lewis 

about his ability to subpoena witnesses, the court grouped this right together with other rights in 

its explanation. Further, it is clear from the context of the plea colloquy that the court was 

informing him of this right using “common, everyday words” that would be more understandable 

to a lay person like Mr. Lewis than the technical term of “compulsory process.” Barker at ¶ 20. 

This Court further notes that Mr. Lewis indicated to the court that he understood the rights he 

was waiving by pleading guilty, that he did not have any questions about those rights, and he was 
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represented by counsel throughout the proceedings. See State v. Coleman, 9th Dist. Summit No. 

26008, 2012-Ohio-1712, ¶ 11. Accordingly, his first assignment of error is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II 

[THE] TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PLAIN ERROR IN 

ACCEPTING APPELLANT LEWIS’[S] GUILTY PLEA WITHOUT 

SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLYING WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF 

CRIMINAL RULE 11(C)(2)(A). 

{¶10} Mr. Lewis argues in his second assignment of error that his guilty pleas were not 

entered voluntarily, intelligently, or knowingly because the court improperly advised him he was 

eligible for post-release control when he was not so eligible and that the court’s discussion about 

post-release control on his other charges was inaccurate. This Court disagrees. 

{¶11} Criminal Rule 11(C)(2)(a) provides that, before accepting a guilty plea, the court 

must “[d]etermin[e] that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the 

nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved, and if applicable, that the defendant 

is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at the 

sentencing hearing.” “While trial courts must strictly comply with the constitutional 

notifications of the rule, they need only substantially comply with the nonconstitutional 

notifications.” State v. Ross, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 13CA0015, 2014-Ohio-1675, ¶ 7, citing, 

Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, at ¶ 14, 18. “Substantial compliance requires that 

the defendant subjectively understand the implications of his plea based on a totality of the 

circumstances.” Id., citing Veney at ¶ 15. “[F]ailure to comply with nonconstitutional rights 

[subject only to substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)] will not invalidate a plea unless the 

defendant thereby suffered prejudice.” Id., quoting State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-

Ohio-4415, ¶ 12. “The test for prejudice is ‘whether the plea would have otherwise been 

made.’” Id., quoting State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990). 
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{¶12} Mr. Lewis argues that the court did not substantially comply with Criminal Rule 

11(C)(2)(a) because it discussed post-release control on the having weapons under disability and 

tampering with evidence charges when he was only subject to parole due to his plea on the 

aggravated murder charge. He acknowledges that his aggravated murder conviction itself does 

not include the possibility for post-release control since it is an unclassified felony. See State v. 

Brown, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 11CA0054, 2013-Ohio-2945, ¶ 62. The practical result of his 

aggravated murder conviction is that, if he is ever released from prison, he will be supervised on 

parole rather than post-release control. See R.C. 2967.28(F)(4)(a) (“If a period of post-release 

control is imposed upon the offender and if the offender also is subject to a period of parole 

under a life sentence, * * * and if the period of post-release control ends prior to the period of 

parole, the offender shall be supervised on parole.”). 

{¶13} The court advised him as follows: 

COURT: You also need to know about the post-release control 

options. And on the weapon under disability charge and 

the tampering with evidence charge, you need to know that 

if you were sent to the penitentiary on those sentences and 

served those entire sentences, upon your release the Ohio 

Department of Corrections would have the option of 

placing you on post-release control for a period of up to 

three years. If during that period of time if you violated 

post-release control, you could be sent back to the 

penitentiary potentially for up to half your original prison 

sentence. You understand? That’s only on the two lesser 

charges. On the murder charge you would be facing parole, 

and that may supersede post-release control * * *. 

[ATTORNEY]: Judge, we understand that you’re required to do that. We 

didn’t talk a whole lot about post-release control. That’s 

why, because - - 

COURT: It’s similar to parole. 

[ATTORNEY]: - - because he has the life tail. 
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COURT: And if you, in fact, plead guilty to the ag murder and these 

other lesser charges and were to receive parole, you would 

be on parole, you would not be on post-release control. * * 

* You understand? * * * 

[MR. LEWIS] Yes. 

COURT: If you have any questions on that, you can ask them. 

{¶14} This Court concludes that the court substantially complied with Criminal Rule 11. 

Mr. Lewis does not separately challenge his sentence on the basis that the trial court should not 

have imposed post-release control on the having weapons while under disability and tampering 

with evidence convictions. Rather, the substance of his argument is that the trial court did not 

adequately explain, prior to accepting his plea, that, if he were ever released from prison, he 

would be supervised on parole rather than post-release control. Assuming arguendo that the 

court’s colloquy was unclear or confusing to Mr. Lewis, it cleared up any ambiguity when it 

explained that, if he pleaded guilty to aggravated murder, he would be subject to parole rather 

than post-release control. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we have determined that 

Mr. Lewis subjectively understood that he would be subject to parole rather than post-release 

control on the having weapons under disability and tampering with evidence charges if he 

pleaded guilty to aggravated murder. 

{¶15} In addition, Mr. Lewis also argues that, if the trial court was required to discuss 

post-release control despite the fact he was not eligible due to his aggravated murder plea, it 

failed to do so as it pertained to his plea for aggravated robbery. The State argued at the change 

of plea hearing that the aggravated robbery and aggravated murder charges should merge and 

elected to proceed on the aggravated murder charge. The court agreed and indicated that, since it 

would not sentence Mr. Lewis on the aggravated robbery charge due to the merger, “there’s no 
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issue of post-release control on that charge.” Consequently, the court did not inform him about 

post-release control in regard to the aggravated robbery charge. 

{¶16} Revised Code Section 2941.25(A) provides that a defendant may be charged with 

two or more allied offenses of similar import, but may only be convicted of one offense. R.C. 

2941.25(A); State v. Whitfield, 124 Ohio St.3d 319, 2010-Ohio-2, ¶ 17. A conviction for 

purposes of Section 2941.25 consists of a guilty verdict and a sentence. Whitfield at ¶ 12. “[T]o 

ensure that there are not improper cumulative punishments for allied offenses, courts must be 

cognizant that R.C. 2941.25(A) requires that ‘the trial court effects the merger at sentencing.’” 

Id. at ¶ 18, quoting State v. Gapen, 104 Ohio St.3d 358, 2004-Ohio-6548, ¶ 135. Accordingly, 

because the aggravated robbery offense merged with the aggravated murder charge, which is 

ineligible for post-release control, the court did not commit error when it did not discuss postrelease control on that charge with Mr. Lewis. See State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-

Ohio-3748, ¶ 38. 

{¶17} Having concluded that the court substantially complied with Criminal Rule 11, we 

need not address the merits of Mr. Lewis’s argument that he was prejudiced. We note, however, 

that there is nothing in the record to support his assertions that he would not have pleaded guilty 

and instead proceeded to trial if the court had discussed post-release control. Mr. Lewis’s second 

assignment of error is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III 

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PLAIN ERROR BY 

SENTENCING LEWIS TO CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES IN VIOLATION OF 

R.C. 2929.14(C). 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV 

LEWIS WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT TRIAL WHEN HIS TRIAL COUNSEL 
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FAILED TO ARGUE THAT THE TRIAL COURT’S IMPOSITION OF 

CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES WAS CONTRARY TO LAW. 

{¶18} In his third assignment of error, Mr. Lewis argues that the trial court erred by 

sentencing him to consecutive sentences without making the required factual findings under 

Revised Code Section 2929.14(C)(4). We agree. 

{¶19} Section 2929.14(C)(4) states: 

If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions of multiple 

offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison terms 

consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to protect 

the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive 

sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and 

to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of the 

following: 

(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the 

offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed 

pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was 

under post-release control for a prior offense. 

(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more 

courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple 

offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for 

any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct 

adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct. 

(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive 

sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the 

offender. 

{¶20} The Ohio Supreme Court recently held in State v. Bonnell, Slip Opinion No. 

2014-Ohio-3177 that, in order to impose consecutive sentences, “a trial court is required to make 

the findings mandated by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and incorporate its 

findings into its sentencing entry * * *.” Id. at syllabus. The court does not, however, have to 

state reasons to support its findings. Id. 
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{¶21} The court ordered Mr. Lewis to serve the firearm specification sentence 

consecutively to the aggravated murder sentence. It further ordered Mr. Lewis to serve the 

sentences for having weapons under disability and tampering with evidence concurrently but 

consecutively to the aggravated murder and firearm specification sentences. 

{¶22} Mr. Lewis concedes that the court found that (1) consecutive sentences were not 

disproportionate to the seriousness of his conduct and to the danger he poses to the public, (2) at 

least two of the multiples offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, 

and (3) no single prison term would adequately reflect the seriousness of the offense. He argues, 

however, that the court failed to find that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the 

public from future crime or to punish him. 

{¶23} The court noted at the sentencing hearing that it considered Mr. Lewis’s conduct 

“an extremely serious form of the offense” which was motivated by greed in attempting to rob 

the restaurant. It considered his conduct “inexplicable” for killing Mr. Lehman, who was a 

complete stranger to him and who had his hands up in the air when he was shot. The court 

expressed that it believed Mr. Lewis knew what he was doing was wrong and that he “was being 

greedy[,] * * * selfish[,] and only thinking of [himself].” We note that the trial court did make 

the required findings pursuant to Section 2929.14(C)(4) in its sentencing entry. 

{¶24} The Ohio Supreme Court’s holding in Bonnell, however, requires the trial court to 

make the Section 2929.14(C)(4) findings at both the sentencing hearing and in the sentencing 

entry. Bonnell at ¶ 29. Because the trial court did not make the correct findings under Section 

2929.14(C)(4) at the time of sentencing, the imposition of consecutive sentences is contrary to 
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law and the matter must be remanded for resentencing.1 State v. King, 9th Dist. Summit No. 

27069, 2014-Ohio-4189, ¶ 18. Accordingly, Mr. Lewis’s third assignment of error is sustained. 

{¶25} Mr. Lewis further argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object 

to the court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. Given our resolution of Mr. Lewis’s third 

assignment of error, we conclude that his fourth assignment of error is moot. See App.R. 

12(A)(1)(c). 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR FIVE 

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PLAIN ERROR IN 

ASSESSING COURT COSTS AGAINST LEWIS WHEN IT WAIVED 

IMPOSITION OF THOSE COSTS AT SENTENCING[ ] AND WITHOUT 

COMPLYING WITH R.C. 2947.23(A)(1)(A). 

{¶26} Mr. Lewis argues in his fifth assignment of error that the trial court erred when 

the sentencing entry assessed him court costs and fees after it stated at the sentencing hearing 

that it would waive those costs since he was indigent. He further maintains that the court erred 

in imposing costs without complying with the community service notification requirements of 

Revised Code Section 2947.23(A)(1)(a). The State concedes the error. 

{¶27} Section 2947.23(A)(1)(a) provides: 

In all criminal cases, including violations of ordinances, the judge * * * shall 

include in the sentence the costs of prosecution, including any costs under section 

2947.231 of the Revised Code, and render a judgment against the defendant for 

such costs. If the judge * * * imposes a community control sanction or other 

nonresidential sanction, the judge * * *, when imposing the sanction shall notify 

the defendant of both of the following: 

(i) If the defendant fails to pay that judgment or fails to timely make 

payments towards that judgment under a payment schedule approved by 

 1

 We note that Section 2929.14(C)(1)(a) requires that his sentence on the firearm 

specification be served first and consecutively to the sentence on the aggravated murder 

conviction. Because the statute requires a consecutive sentence, the trial court is not required to 

make Section 2929.14(C)(4) findings before imposing a consecutive sentence on that particular 

conviction. See State v. A.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98622, 2013-Ohio-2525, ¶ 20-21. 
12 

 

the court, the court may order the defendant to perform community service 

in an amount of not more than forty hours per month until the judgment is 

paid or until the court is satisfied that the defendant is in compliance with 

the approved payment schedule. 

(ii) If the court orders the defendant to perform the community service, the 

defendant will receive credit upon the judgment at the specified hourly 

credit rate per hour of community service performed, and each hour of 

community service performed will reduce the judgment by that amount. 

{¶28} Former Section 2947.23(A)(1)(a) provided that the trial court must notify the 

defendant when imposing its sentence that he may be subject to the community service 

requirement. See R.C. 2947.23(A)(1)(a), effective Sept. 28, 2012. That subsection was revised 

effective March 22, 2013, to require that the court advise the defendant of the community service 

notification only when it imposes either a community control sanction or other nonresidential 

sanction. As the trial court imposed neither in this case, the court was not obligated to advise 

him about the possibility of community service. 

{¶29} The sentencing hearing transcript reflects that the court waived the imposition of 

court costs due to Mr. Lewis’s indigency. The sentencing entry, however, orders Mr. Lewis to 

pay the costs of prosecution and renders a judgment against him. The Ohio Supreme Court has 

held that the defendant must be given an opportunity at the sentencing hearing to seek a waiver 

of the payment of court costs. State v. Joseph, 125 Ohio St.3d 76, 2010-Ohio-954, ¶ 22. By first 

waiving court costs and then imposing them in the sentencing entry, the trial court has effectively 

deprived Mr. Lewis of the opportunity to seek a waiver of the costs if he is indigent. 

Accordingly, Mr. Lewis’s fifth assignment of error is sustained. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR SIX 

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PLAIN ERROR IN 

ASSESSING ATTORNEY FEES AGAINST LEWIS WITHOUT DOING SO IN 

OPEN COURT, AND WITHOUT MAKING AN ‘ABILITY-TO-PAY’ 

FINDING AS REQUIRED UNDER R.C. 2941.51(D). 
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{¶30} In his sixth assignment of error, Mr. Lewis argues that the trial court erred by 

imposing attorney’s fees against him without first making the ability-to-pay finding required by 

Revised Code Section 2941.51(D). The State concedes the error. 

{¶31} Section 2941.51(D) provides that: 

The fees and expenses approved by the court under this section shall not be taxed 

as part of the costs and shall be paid by the county. However, if the person 

represented has, or reasonably may be expected to have, the means to meet some 

part of the cost of the services rendered to the person, the person shall pay the 

county an amount that the person reasonably can be expected to pay. 

“R.C. 2941.51(D) allows a trial court to order a defendant to pay some or all of his courtappointed attorney fees, but only after finding that the defendant is financially capable of doing 

so.” State v. Eader, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26762, 2013-Ohio-3709, ¶ 23, quoting State v. ElJones, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26136, 2012-Ohio-4134, ¶ 37. “When the trial court fails to 

determine that the defendant has the ability to pay at either the sentencing hearings or in the 

sentencing entries but nonetheless orders the defendant to pay attorney fees, the trial court fails 

to comply with R.C. 2941.51(D).” Id., quoting State v. Clark, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26673, 

2013-Ohio-2984, ¶ 21. “The appropriate remedy for such an error ‘is a remand for a 

determination of [the defendant’s] financial ability to pay for his court-appointed counsel.’” Id., 

quoting State v. Warner, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 96CA006534, 2001 WL 1155698, *4 (Sept. 21, 

2001). 

{¶32} Our review of record reveals that the court failed to find that Mr. Lewis had the 

ability to pay attorney’s fees at either the sentencing hearing or in the sentencing entry. Because 

the court failed to consider Mr. Lewis’s ability to pay his attorney’s fees prior to imposing them, 

this matter must be remanded for a determination of his ability to pay. See Eader at ¶ 24. Mr. 

Lewis’s sixth assignment of error is sustained. 
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III. 

{¶33} Mr. Lewis’s first and second assignments of error are overruled, and his third, 

fifth, and sixth assignments of error are sustained. His fourth assignment of error is moot. The 

judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 

the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Judgment affirmed in part, 

reversed in part, 

and cause remanded. 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed equally to both parties. 

 

 JENNIFER HENSAL 

 FOR THE COURT 
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MOORE, J. 

CONCURS.

BELFANCE, P. J. 

CONCURRING.

{¶34} I concur. I write separately to briefly address Mr. Lewis’ third assignment of 

error. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court was required to make the findings outlined in 

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). See State v. Bonnell, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-3177, syllabus. In the 

instant matter, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court focused much of its discussion on the 

seriousness of the offense but did not address whether consecutive sentences were necessary to 

protect the public from future crime or to punish Mr. Lewis. See R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Thus, it 

failed to make all of the findings required by the statute. Accordingly, I agree that Mr. Lewis’ 

third assignment of error has merit. 

APPEARANCES:

NEIL P. AGARWAL, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN DIMARTINO, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.