62640 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 196 / Tuesday, October 12, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Parts 1, 91, 120, and 135 

[Docket No. FAA–2010–0982; Notice No. 10– 

13] 

RIN 2120–AJ53 

Air Ambulance and Commercial 

Helicopter Operations, Part 91 

Helicopter Operations, and Part 135 

Aircraft Operations; Safety Initiatives 

and Miscellaneous Amendments 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: This proposed rule addresses 

air ambulance and commercial 

helicopter operations, part 91 helicopter 

operations, and load manifest 

requirements for all part 135 aircraft. 

From 2002 to 2008, there has been an 

increase in fatal helicopter air 

ambulance accidents. To address these 

safety concerns, the FAA is proposing to 

implement operational procedures and 

require additional equipment on board 

helicopter air ambulances. Many of 

these proposed requirements currently 

are found in agency guidance 

publications and would address 

National Transportation Safety Board 

(NTSB) safety recommendations. Some 

of these safety concerns are not unique 

to the helicopter air ambulance industry 

and affect all commercial helicopter 

operations. Accordingly, the FAA also is 

proposing to amend regulations 

pertaining to all commercial helicopter 

operations conducted under part 135 to 

include equipment requirements, pilot 

training, and alternate airport weather 

minima. The changes are intended to 

provide certificate holders and pilots 

with additional tools and procedures 

that will aid in preventing accidents. 

DATES: Send your comments on or 

before January 10, 2011. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments 

identified by docket number FAA– 

2010–0982 using any of the following 

methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and follow 

the online instructions for sending your 

comments electronically. 

• Mail: Send comments to Docket 

Operations, M–30; U.S. Department of 

Transportation, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue, SE., Room W12–140, West 

Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 

20590–0001. 

• Hand Delivery or Courier: Take 

comments to Docket Operations in 

Room W12–140 of the West Building 

Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 

9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. 

• Fax: Fax comments to Docket 

Operations at 202–493–2251. 

For more information on the 

rulemaking process, see the 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of 

this document. 

Privacy: We will post all comments 

we receive, without change, to http:// 

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information you provide. 

Using the search function of our docket 

web site, anyone can find and read the 

electronic form of all comments 

received into any of our dockets, 

including the name of the individual 

sending the comment (or signing the 

comment for an association, business, 

labor union, etc.). You may review 

DOT’s complete Privacy Act Statement 

in the Federal Register published on 

April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477–78) or you 

may visit http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov. 

Docket: To read background 

documents or comments received, go to 

http://www.regulations.gov at any time 

and follow the online instructions for 

accessing the docket, or, the Docket 

Operations in Room W12–140 of the 

West Building Ground Floor at 1200 

New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, 

DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

technical questions concerning this 

proposed rule contact Edwin Miller, 

Flight Standards Service, Part 135 Air 

Carrier Operations Branch, AFS–250, 

Federal Aviation Administration, 800 

Independence Avenue, SW., 

Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 

267–8166; facsimile (202) 267–5229; 

e-mail edwin.miller@faa.gov. 

For legal questions concerning this 

proposed rule contact Dean Griffith, 

Office of the Chief Counsel, AGC–220, 

Federal Aviation Administration, 800 

Independence Avenue, SW., 

Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 

267–3073; facsimile (202) 267–7971; 

e-mail dean.griffith@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Later in this preamble under the 

Additional Information section, we 

discuss how you can comment on this 

proposal and how we will handle your 

comments. Included in this discussion 

is related information about the docket, 

privacy, and the handling of proprietary 

or confidential business information. 

We also discuss how you can get a copy 

of related rulemaking documents. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

The FAA’s authority to issue rules on 

aviation safety is found in Title 49 of the 

United States Code. This rulemaking is 

promulgated under the authority 

described in 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(4), 

which requires the Administrator to 

promulgate regulations in the interest of 

safety for the maximum hours or 

periods of service of airmen and other 

employees of air carriers, and 49 U.S.C. 

44701(a)(5), which requires the 

Administrator to promulgate regulations 

and minimum standards for other 

practices, methods, and procedures 

necessary for safety in air commerce and 

national security. 

List of Terms and Acronyms Frequently 

Used in This Document 

AC—Advisory Circular 

ARC—Aviation Rulemaking Committee 

CFIT—Controlled flight into terrain 

CVR—Cockpit voice recorder 

EMS—Emergency medical service 

FDR—Flight data recorder 

GPS—Global positioning system 

HTAWS—Helicopter Terrain Awareness and 

Warning System 

IFR—Instrument flight rules 

IMC—Instrument meteorological conditions 

LARS—Light-weight aircraft recording 

system 

NM—Nautical mile 

NTSB—National Transportation Safety Board 

NVG—Night vision goggles 

NVIS—Night-vision imaging system 

SAFO—Safety Alert for Operators 

TAWS—Terrain Avoidance and Warning 

System 

TSO—Technical Standard Order 

VFR—Visual flight rules 

VMC—Visual meteorological conditions 

Table of Contents 

I. Executive Summary 

II. Background 

A. Statement of the Problem 

B. Helicopter Air Ambulance Operations 

C. FAA Actions 

D. National Transportation Safety Board 

(NTSB) Safety Recommendations 

E. Congressional Action 

III. Discussion of the Proposal 

A. Helicopter Air Ambulance Operations 

1. Operational Procedures 

a. Part 135 Applicability (§ 135.1) 

b. Operations Control Centers (§ 135.617) 

c. VFR/IFR Procedures 

i. Increase VFR Weather Minima 

(§ 135.607) 

ii. IFR Operations at Airports and Heliports 

Without Weather Reporting (§ 135.609) 

iii. IFR to VFR/Visual Transitions 

(§ 135.611) 

iv. VFR Flight Planning (§ 135.613) 

d. Pre-Flight Risk Analysis (§ 135.615) 

e. Medical Personnel Pre-Flight Briefing 

(§ 135.619) 

2. Equipment Requirements 

a. Helicopter Terrain Awareness and 

Warning Systems (HTAWS) (§ 135.605) 

b. Light-Weight Aircraft Recording System 

(LARS) 


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1 ‘‘Air ambulance’’ applies to helicopter air 

ambulance operations. ‘‘Commercial’’ applies to all 

part 135 aircraft operations, excluding helicopter air 

ambulance operations. 

3. Pilot Requirements 

a. Instrument Rating (§ 135.603) 

b. Flight and Duty Time Limitations 

(§§ 135.267 and 135.271) 

B. Commercial Helicopter Operations 

(Including Air Ambulance Operations) 

1. Operational Procedures 

a. IFR Alternate Airport Weather Minima 

(§ 135.221) 

2. Equipment Requirements 

a. Radio Altimeter (§ 135.160) 

b. Safety Equipment for Over-Water Flights 

(§§ 1.1, 135.167, and 135.168) 

3. Training—Recovery From Inadvertent 

Flight Into IMC (§ 135.293) 

C. Miscellaneous 

1. Part 91 Weather Minima (§ 91.155) 

2. Load Manifest Requirements for all Part 

135 Aircraft (§ 135.63) 

IV. Paperwork Reduction Act 

V. International Compatibility 

VI. Regulatory Evaluation, Regulatory 

Flexibility Determination, International 

Trade Impact Assessment, and Unfunded 

Mandates Assessment 

VII. Executive Order 13132, Federalism 

VIII. Regulations Affecting Intrastate Aviation 

in Alaska 

IX. Environmental Analysis 

X. Regulations That Significantly Affect 

Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use 

XI. Availability of Rulemaking Documents 

XII. Additional Information 

Appendix to the Preamble—Additional 

Accident Discussions 

The Proposed Amendment 

I. Executive Summary 

This NPRM proposes requirements for 

all part 135 aircraft, part 91 helicopter 

operations, and air ambulance and 

commercial helicopter operations. The 

proposal aims to address safety 

concerns arising from an increase in air 

ambulance related fatalities from 2002 

to 2008. 

As described in further detail 

throughout this document, the NPRM 

proposes the following requirements: 

Affected entities Proposal 

Part 135—All Aircraft ............................ • Permit operators to transmit a copy of load manifest documentation to their base of operations, in 

lieu of preparing a duplicate copy. 

• Specify requirements for retaining a copy of the load manifest in the event that the documentation is 

destroyed in an aircraft accident. 

Part 91—Helicopter Operations ........... • Revision of part 91 Visual Flight Rules (VFR) weather minimums. 

All Commercial Helicopter Operations 

(Operating Requirements).

• Revision of commercial helicopter instrument flight rules (IFR) alternate airport weather minimums. 

• Require helicopter pilots to demonstrate competency in recovery from inadvertent instrument meteorological conditions. 

• Require all commercial helicopters to be equipped with radio altimeters. 

• Change definition of ‘‘extended over-water operation,’’ and require additional equipment for these operations. 

Air Ambulance Operations (Operating 

Requirements and Equipage).

• Require air ambulance flights with medical personnel on board to be conducted under part 135, including flight crew time limitation and rest requirements. 

• Require certificate holders with 10 or more helicopter air ambulances to establish operations control 

centers. 

• Require helicopter air ambulance certificate holders to implement pre-flight risk-analysis programs. 

• Require safety briefings for medical personnel on helicopter air ambulances. 

• Amend helicopter air ambulance operational requirements to include VFR weather minimums, IFR 

operations at airports/heliports without weather reporting, procedures for VFR approaches, and VFR 

flight planning. 

• Require pilots in command to hold an instrument rating. 

• Require equipage with Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems (HTAWS), and possibly 

light-weight aircraft recording systems (LARS). 

In aggregate, the FAA estimates the 

mean present value of the total 

monetizable costs of these proposals 

(over 10 years, 7% discount rate) to be 

$225 million, with a range of total 

monetizable benefits from $83 million 

to $1.98 billion (over 10 years, 7% 

discount rate). 

The table below summarizes the 

present value range of total aggregate 

monetizable costs and benefits the FAA 

estimates as a result of this rule: 

Summary of monetizable costs and benefits 1 Range (in millions) (over 10 

years, 7% discount rate) 

Air Ambulance ....................................................................................................................................................... $62 to $1,500. 

Commercial ............................................................................................................................................................ $21 to $480. 

Total Benefits .................................................................................................................................................. $83 to $1,980. 

Air Ambulance ....................................................................................................................................................... $136. 

Commercial ............................................................................................................................................................ $89. 

Total Costs ..................................................................................................................................................... $225. 

The FAA requests comments on the 

analysis underlying these estimates, as 

well as possible approaches to reduce 

the costs of this rule while maintaining 

or increasing the benefits. While the 

FAA has concluded that the aggregate 

benefits justify the aggregate costs, 

under some scenarios, the monetizable 

benefits may fall short of the 

monetizable costs. The FAA seeks 

comments on possible changes or 

flexibilities that might improve the rule. 

II. Background 

A. Statement of the Problem 

The helicopter air ambulance industry 

experienced a significant increase in 

fatal accidents in 2008, making it the 

deadliest year on record for the 

industry. During that year, six accidents 

claimed 24 lives, including those of 


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2 GAO, Aviation Safety: Potential Strategies to 

Address Air Ambulance Safety Concerns (2009). 

3The NTSB describes flat-light conditions in 

NTSB Safety Recommendation A–02–33 as ‘‘the 

diffuse lighting that occurs under cloudy skies 

especially when the ground is snow covered. Under 

flat light conditions, there are no shadows cast, and 

the topography of snow-covered surfaces is 

impossible to judge. Flat light greatly impairs a 

pilot’s ability to perceive depth, distance, altitude, 

or topographical features when operating under 

visual flight rules (VFR).’’ 

4AC 00–6A, Aviation Weather for Pilots and 

Flight Operations Personnel, describes whiteout 

conditions as a ‘‘visibility restricting phenomenon 

that occurs in the Arctic when a layer of cloudiness 

of uniform thickness overlies a snow or ice-covered 

surface. Parallel rays of the sun are broken up and 

diffused when passing through the cloud layer so 

that they strike the snow surface from many angles. 

The diffused light then reflects back and forth 

countless times between the snow and the cloud 

eliminating all shadows. The result is a loss of 

depth perception.’’ 

5Brownout conditions occur when sand or other 

particles restrict visibility and depth perception. 

6National Transportation Safety Board: Safety 

Study—Commercial Emergency Medical Service 

Helicopter Operations, NTSB/SS–88/01 (Jan. 28, 

1988), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/Dockets/

Aviation/DCA09SH001/410702.pdf. 

7See GAO, Aviation Safety: Potential Strategies to 

Address Air Ambulance Safety Concerns 4 (2009). 

8Testimony of the Hon. Robert L. Sumwalt, III, 

Board Member NTSB, Before the Subcommittee on 

Aviation, Committee on Transportation and 

Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representatives, April 

22, 2009, available at http://

transportation.house.gov/hearings/

hearingDetail.aspx?NewsID=865; transcript URL: 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?

dbname=111_house_hearings&docid=f:49001.pdf. 

pilots, patients, and medical personnel. 

In addition, there were three non-fatal 

accidents in 2008. However, helicopter 

air accidents were not confined to 2008. 

From 1992 through 2009, there were 135 

helicopter air ambulance accidents, 

including one midair collision with 

another helicopter engaged in an air 

ambulance operation. These helicopter 

air ambulance accidents resulted in 126 

fatalities. In a 2009 report, the U.S. 

Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) recognized that air ambulance 

accidents reached historic levels from 

2003 through 2008.2

Helicopter accidents, however, have 

not been limited to the air ambulance 

industry. The FAA identified 75 

commercial helicopter accidents, 

occurring from 1994 through 2008 with 

causal factors that are addressed in this 

proposal. These accidents involving 

commercial helicopter operations 

resulted in 88 fatalities. These accidents 

do not include the helicopter air 

ambulance accidents discussed above. 

After reviewing the accident data, the 

FAA identified controlled flight into 

terrain (CFIT), loss of control (LOC), 

inadvertent flight into instrument 

meteorological conditions (IMC), and 

accidents during night conditions as 

four common factors in helicopter air 

ambulance accidents. A review of 

commercial helicopter accidents also 

demonstrated that these accidents may 

have been prevented if pilots and 

helicopters were better equipped for 

encounters with inadvertent flight into 

IMC, flat-light,3 whiteout,4 and 

brownout 5 conditions, and for flights 

over water. The FAA also determined 

that enhancements to safety equipment 

for over-water operations and 

establishing more stringent instrument 

flight rules (IFR) alternate airport 

weather minima would enhance the 

safety of all part 135 helicopter 

operations. 

Prior to developing this proposed 

rule, the FAA undertook initiatives to 

address the common factors that 

contribute to helicopter air ambulance 

accidents including issuing notices, 

handbook bulletins, operations 

specifications, and advisory circulars 

(ACs); this proposed rule would codify 

many of these initiatives. 

Additionally, this proposal addresses 

National Transportation Safety Board 

(NTSB) safety recommendations and 

recommendations made by the Part 125/ 

135 Aviation Rulemaking Committee 

(ARC) concerning helicopter air 

ambulance and commercial helicopter 

operations. This includes a proposal to 

adopt amendments to load manifest 

requirements for single-engine part 135 

operations, consistent with an NTSB 

Safety Recommendation developed in 

response to a 1997 accident. 

B. Helicopter Air Ambulance Operations 

The helicopter air ambulance industry 

is relatively young but has experienced 

rapid growth during its existence. The 

industry’s evolution has not produced a 

uniform model of operations; rather 

certificate holders vary in size and 

scope of operations. In addition, as 

discussed below, helicopter air 

ambulance operations present unique 

challenges meriting regulation beyond 

that traditionally applied to part 135 

commercial helicopter operations. 

Helicopter air medical transportation 

was first used prominently during the 

Korean War to move injured soldiers 

from the battlefield. Since then, 

helicopters have been used to transport 

critically injured patients and donor 

organs to hospitals because of their 

capability to provide rapid 

transportation over long distances from 

remote locations. The first commercial 

helicopter air ambulance program began 

operation in 1972. The industry grew 

significantly in the 1980s, and is 

continuing to grow.6 Between 2003 and 

2008, the Association of Air Medical 

Services reported a 54 percent increase 

in the number of helicopters used by its 

members in helicopter air ambulance 

operations.7 The NTSB estimates that 

400,000 patients and transplant organs 

are now transported by helicopter each 

year.8

As of February 2009, the FAA 

authorized 74 certificate holders to 

conduct helicopter air ambulance 

operations. These certificate holders 

operate approximately 850 helicopters 

in air ambulance operations. The size of 

these operations varies greatly. The 

smallest operators only have one or two 

helicopters and operate in one region; 

the largest operators may have hundreds 

of helicopters across the United States. 

Of the 50 largest certificate holders 

operating under part 121 or 135, as 

measured by the number of aircraft 

operated, six conduct helicopter air 

ambulance operations. The tenth largest 

air carrier in the United States, Air 

Methods Corporation, is a helicopter air 

ambulance operator. 

The following is a breakdown of the 

number of helicopter air ambulances 

operated by the 74 certificate holders 

permitted to conduct helicopter air 

ambulance operations as of February, 

2009: 38 certificate holders have 5 or 

fewer helicopters; 14 certificate holders 

have 6 to 10 helicopters; 6 certificate 

holders have 11 to 15 helicopters; and 

16 certificate holders have more than 16 

helicopters. 

Certificate holders’ air ambulance 

programs and operational practices vary 

as to whether they conduct IFR or VFR 

operations, perform formal pre-flight 

risk analyses, or use operations control 

centers. In addition, certificate holders 

equip their helicopters differently. For 

example, some helicopters are 

permanently configured for full-time air 

ambulance operations while others are 

not; some are equipped for IFR 

operations while others are equipped for 

VFR-only operations; and helicopter air 

ambulances have varying situationalawareness technology (such as night 

vision goggles, HTAWS, radio 

altimeters, etc.) on board. 

Helicopter air ambulance operations 

present several unique operating 

characteristics that make them distinct 

from other types of part 135 helicopter 

operations. Such operations are often 

time-sensitive and crucial to getting a 

critically ill or injured patient to a 

medical facility as efficiently as 

possible, which may influence flight 

crews to fly under circumstances that 

they otherwise would not. In addition, 


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9RTCA, Inc. is a private, not-for-profit 

corporation that develops consensus-based 

recommendations regarding communications, 

navigation, surveillance, and air traffic management 

(CNS/ATM) system issues. RTCA, Inc. functions as 

a Federal Advisory Committee. 

these operations often are conducted 

under challenging conditions. For 

example, helicopter air ambulances 

operate generally at low altitudes and 

under varied weather conditions. 

Operations are conducted year-round, in 

rural and urban settings, in 

mountainous and non-mountainous 

terrain, during the day and at night, and 

in IFR and visual meteorological 

conditions (VMC). Remote-site landings 

pose additional challenges. These 

remote sites are often unfamiliar to a 

pilot and, unlike an airport or heliport, 

may contain hazards such as trees, 

buildings, towers, wires, and uneven 

terrain. Additionally, in an emergency, 

patients cannot choose which operator 

provides transportation, and because of 

their injuries, may not be able to 

participate in the decision to use 

helicopter transport. These patients are 

often transported by the first company 

to accept the flight assignment from an 

emergency medical service dispatcher. 

The FAA believes that these individuals 

should therefore be afforded the 

protection of an enhanced regulation for 

helicopter air ambulances. 

As described in the section below, the 

FAA has taken steps through nonregulatory means to improve helicopter 

air ambulance safety; however, in 

consideration of the industry’s accident 

history, characteristics unique to 

helicopter air ambulance operations, 

and the lack of standardization among 

certificate holders’ practices, the FAA 

believes that additional regulations are 

necessary to ensure the safety of these 

flights. 

C. FAA Actions 

In response to the increasing number 

of accidents involving helicopter air 

ambulances, the FAA has developed 

standards over the years for weather 

minima and for helicopter terrain 

awareness and warning systems 

(HTAWS), and formalized dispatch 

procedures. In addition, the FAA has 

issued guidance for operational 

improvements in areas that address 

Crew Resource Management (CRM), 

CFIT, inadvertent flight into IMC, 

operational control, improved access to 

weather information, risk management, 

improvement of organizational safety 

culture, and aeronautical 

decisionmaking skills. The following 

provides a summary of many of the 

actions taken by the FAA. 

On April 8, 2003, the FAA formed the 

Part 125/135 ARC to perform a 

comprehensive review of parts 125 and 

135 and provide recommendations on 

rule changes. ARC members included 

aviation associations, industry 

representatives, employee groups, the 

FAA, and other participants to obtain a 

balance of views, interests, and 

expertise. The ARC made 

recommendations pertaining to 

helicopter air ambulance operations and 

other commercial helicopter operations 

that form the basis of several of the 

proposals in this NPRM, including 

equipping helicopters with radio 

altimeters, increasing weather minima 

for helicopter air ambulance operations, 

requiring additional safety equipment 

for over-water operations, requiring 

pilot testing on recovery from 

inadvertent flight into IMC, and revising 

IFR alternate airport weather 

requirements. 

In August 2004, the FAA established 

a task force to review and guide 

government and industry efforts to 

reduce helicopter air ambulance 

accidents. The task force review of 

commercial helicopter air ambulance 

accidents for the period of January 1998 

through December 2004 revealed that 

CFIT, night operations, and inadvertent 

flight into IMC were the predominant 

factors contributing to those accidents. 

On January 28, 2005, the FAA issued 

Notice 8000.293, Helicopter Emergency 

Medical Services Operations, addressing 

CRM, adherence to procedures, and 

pilot decisionmaking skills in helicopter 

air ambulance operations. This notice 

was later incorporated into Safety Alert 

for Operators (SAFO) 06001, Helicopter 

Emergency Medical Services (HEMS) 

Operations (Jan. 28, 2006). On August 1, 

2005, the FAA issued Notice 8000.301, 

Operational Risk Assessment Programs 

for Helicopter Emergency Medical 

Services, providing guidance on 

operational risk assessment programs, 

including training of flightcrews and 

medical personnel. 

In AC 00–64, Air Medical Resource 

Management, issued September 22, 

2005, the FAA recommended minimum 

guidelines for air medical resource 

management training for all air medical 

service operations team members, 

including pilots, maintenance 

personnel, medical personnel, 

communications specialists, and other 

air medical team members. In Notice 

8000.307, Special Emphasis Inspection 

Program For Helicopter Emergency 

Medical Services, issued September 27, 

2005, the FAA addressed a special 

emphasis inspection program for 

helicopter air ambulance operators, 

focusing on operational control, risk 

assessment, and training programs. On 

January 24, 2006, the FAA issued 

handbook bulletin HBAT 06–02, 

Helicopter Emergency Services (HEMS) 

Loss of Control (LOC) and Controlled 

Flight into Terrain (CFIT) Accident 

Avoidance Programs, to FAA inspectors 

describing acceptable models for LOC 

and CFIT accident avoidance programs. 

In January 2006, the FAA amended 

Operations Specification A021, which is 

issued to all certificate holders 

conducting helicopter air ambulance 

operations, to establish VFR weather 

requirements, including consideration 

of adverse effects of ambient lighting at 

night and mountainous terrain. 

Following the 2008 accidents, the FAA 

again amended Operations Specification 

A021 to address VFR weather 

requirements, applied those weather 

requirements to all flights with medical 

personnel on board, required a flight 

planning requirement, and allowed IFR 

approaches when a pilot could consult 

a weather reporting source within 15 

miles of the landing location. 

In 2006, RTCA, Inc.,9 at the FAA’s 

request, established a special committee 

to develop HTAWS standards. In 

December 2008, the FAA issued 

Technical Standard Order (TSO)–C194, 

Helicopter Terrain Awareness and 

Warning System (HTAWS), based on the 

minimum operational performance 

standards developed by the committee. 

This TSO establishes the technical 

baseline for the HTAWS requirement in 

this proposal. 

The FAA issued AC 120–96, 

Integration of Operations Control 

Centers into Helicopter Emergency 

Medical Services Operations (May 5, 

2008), that provides guidance to 

certificate holders for establishing 

operations control and dispatch centers. 

The information in AC 120–96 formed 

the foundation of this proposal’s 

requirement for certain certificate 

holders to establish operations control 

centers. 

In 2008, through Notice 8900.57, Part 

135 Helicopter Training Program and 

Manual Revisions, the FAA 

implemented several pilot training 

program revisions applicable to part 135 

helicopter training programs in response 

to NTSB safety recommendations A–02– 

34 and A–02–35, including procedures 

for mitigating and recovering from 

brownout, whiteout, and flat-light 

conditions. 

On January 12, 2009, through Notice 

8900.63, Validation of HEMS Safety 

Initiatives, the FAA, in an effort to 

identify how well its voluntary 

programs had been accepted, surveyed 

the operators through their Principal 

Operations Inspectors. Survey results 

indicated that 94 percent of the 


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10Commercial Emergency Medical Service 

Helicopter Operations, Safety Study NTSB/SS–88/ 

01 (Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety 

Board, 1988). 

11 Id. at 7. 

12NTSB, Special Investigation Report on 

Emergency Medical Services Operations (NTSB/ 

SIR–06/01) (Jan. 25, 2006). 

13NTSB, Public Hearing Summary, available at 

http://www.ntsb.gov/Events/Hearing-HEMS/ 

HEMS_Summary.pdf. 

operators had established riskassessment programs, 89 percent had 

training in LOC and CFIT, 89 percent 

were using operations control centers, 

41 percent were using terrain awareness 

and warning systems (TAWS), 11 

percent were using flight data recorders 

(FDR), and 94 percent were using radio 

altimeters. 

D. National Transportation Safety Board 

(NTSB) Safety Recommendations 

In 1988, the NTSB conducted a safety 

study of emergency medical service 

operations that examined 59 

accidents.10 This study determined that 

the helicopter air ambulance accident 

rate was almost twice the estimated 

accident rate of non-scheduled part 135 

helicopter air taxi operations, and were 

3.5 times more likely to be fatal.11 The 

NTSB found reduced visibility to be the 

most common factor associated with 

such crashes. 

In January 2006, the NTSB conducted 

a special investigation of emergency 

medical services operations and issued 

four recommendations to the FAA.12

These recommendations are discussed 

in sections III.A.1.a., III.A.1.b., III.A.1.d., 

III.A.2.a., and III.A.3.b. 

In February 2009, the NTSB held a 

public hearing on ‘‘Helicopter 

Emergency Medical Services’’ to 

examine the safety issues associated 

with these operations and gather 

testimony from government, operators, 

industry associations, manufacturers, 

and hospitals.13 In September 2009, the 

NTSB issued a series of safety 

recommendations based on the findings 

of the February hearing. The 

recommendations that are addressed by 

this rulemaking are discussed in 

sections III.A.1.b., III.A.1.d., III.A.2.b., 

and III.B.3. The FAA has determined 

that the remaining September 2009 

recommendations are not ready for 

rulemaking at this time. 

The NTSB also made 

recommendations to public aircraft 

operators, the Federal Interagency 

Emergency Medical Services 

Committee, and the U.S. Department of 

Health and Human Services’ Centers for 

Medicare & Medicaid Services. 

As a result of its investigations and 

studies, the NTSB identified several 

probable causes of helicopter accidents, 

such as spatial disorientation, lack of 

general awareness, loss of control, poor 

decision making, failure to maintain 

clearance of obstacles, inadequate 

planning, and improper execution of 

standard operating procedures. 

NTSB safety recommendations 

addressed by this rulemaking include 

the following: 

Recommendations on Helicopter Air 

Ambulance Operations 

A–06–12: Recommends that the FAA 

require all emergency medical services 

operators to comply with 14 CFR part 

135 operations specifications during the 

conduct of all flights with medical 

personnel on board. (Discussed in 

sections III.A.1.a. and III.A.3.b.) 

A–06–13: Recommends that the FAA 

require all emergency medical services 

operators to develop and implement 

flight-risk evaluation programs that 

include training all employees involved 

in the operation, procedures that 

support the systematic evaluation of 

flight risks, and consultation with others 

in emergency medical service (EMS) 

flight operations if the risks reach a 

predefined level. (Discussed in section 

III.A.1.d.) 

A–06–14: Recommends that the FAA 

require emergency medical services 

operators to use formalized dispatch 

and flight-monitoring procedures that 

include up-to-date weather information 

and assistance in flight risk assessment 

decisions. (Discussed in section 

III.A.1.b.) 

A–06–15: Recommends that the FAA 

require emergency medical services 

operators to install terrain awareness 

and warning systems on their aircraft 

and to provide adequate training to 

ensure that flight crews are capable of 

using the systems to safely conduct EMS 

operations. (Discussed in section 

III.A.2.a.) 

A–09–87: Recommends that the FAA 

develop criteria for scenario-based 

helicopter emergency medical services 

pilot training that includes inadvertent 

flight into instrument meteorological 

conditions and hazards unique to 

helicopter emergency medical services 

(HEMS) operations, and determine how 

frequently this training is required to 

ensure proficiency. (Discussed in 

section III.B.3.) 

A–09–89: Recommends that the FAA 

require helicopter air ambulance 

operators implement a safety 

management system program that 

includes sound risk management 

practices. (Discussed in sections 

III.A.1.b., III.A.1.d, and III.A.2.b.) 

A–09–90: Recommends that the FAA 

require helicopter air ambulance 

operators install flight data recording 

devices and establish a structured flight 

data monitoring program that reviews 

all available data sources to identify 

deviations from established norms and 

procedures and other potential safety 

issues. (Discussed in section III.A.2.b.) 

The FAA notes that the NTSB used 

the term ‘‘emergency medical services 

operators’’ or ‘‘EMS operators’’ in its 

recommendations. However, the FAA 

uses the term ‘‘helicopter air ambulance 

operators’’ in this proposed rulemaking. 

The FAA also notes that NTSB Safety 

Recommendations A–06–12 through A– 

06–14 addressed both fixed-wing and 

helicopter air ambulance operations. As 

previously noted, while some 

provisions of the proposal extend to 

other types of aircraft and commercial 

helicopter operations more broadly, the 

FAA is focusing largely on helicopter air 

ambulance safety in this rulemaking. 

Although this proposed rule primarily 

focuses on helicopter air ambulance 

safety, it also addresses additional 

NTSB recommendations, listed below. 

Recommendations on Commercial 

Helicopter Operations 

A–02–33: Recommends that the FAA 

require all helicopter pilots who 

conduct commercial, passenger-carrying 

flights in areas where flat-light or 

whiteout conditions routinely occur to 

possess a helicopter-specific instrument 

rating and to demonstrate their 

competency during initial and recurrent 

14 CFR 135.293 evaluation check rides. 

(Discussed in section III.B.3.) 

A–02–34: Recommends that the FAA 

require all commercial helicopter 

operators conducting passenger-carrying 

flights in areas where flat-light or 

whiteout conditions routinely occur to 

include safe practices for operating in 

flat-light or whiteout conditions in their 

approved training programs. (Discussed 

in section III.B.3.) 

A–02–35: Recommends that the FAA 

require the installation of radio 

altimeters in all helicopters conducting 

commercial, passenger-carrying 

operations in areas where flat-light or 

whiteout conditions routinely occur. 

(Discussed in section III.B.2.a.) 

A–06–17: Recommends that the FAA 

require all rotorcraft operating under [14 

CFR] parts 91 and 135 with a transportcategory certification to be equipped 

with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and 

flight data recorder (FDR). (Discussed in 

section III.A.2.b.) 

A–07–87: Recommends that the FAA 

require all existing and new turbinepowered helicopters operating in the 

Gulf of Mexico and certificated with five 

or more seats to be equipped with 

externally mounted life rafts large 


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14 41 of the 55 air ambulance accidents 

highlighted by the NTSB in its 2006 Special 

Investigation Report involved helicopters. See 

NTSB, Special Investigation Report on Emergency 

Medical Services Operations, App’x B (2006). 

15See GAO, Aviation Safety: Potential Strategies 

to Address Air Ambulance Safety Concerns 1 

(2009). 

16Order 8900.1, vol. 4, chapter 5, section 4. 

17NTSB, Special Investigation Report on 

Emergency Medical Services Operations (2006). 

18NTSB, Special Investigation Report on 

Emergency Medical Services Operations (2006). 

enough to accommodate all occupants. 

(Discussed in section III.B.2.b.) 

A–07–88: Recommends that the FAA 

require all offshore helicopter operators 

in the Gulf of Mexico provide their 

flight crews with personal flotation 

devices equipped with a waterproof, 

global-positioning-system-enabled 406 

megahertz personal locater beacon, as 

well as one other signaling device, such 

as a signaling mirror or strobe light. 

(Discussed in section III.B.2.b.) 

Other Recommendations 

A–99–61: Recommends that the FAA 

amend recordkeeping requirements in 

§ 135.63(c) to apply to single-engine as 

well as multiengine aircraft. (Discussed 

in section III.C.2.) 

E. Congressional Action 

Legislation has been introduced in 

both the House of Representatives and 

the Senate in the 111th Congress, and in 

earlier Congresses, addressing several of 

the issues raised in this rulemaking. In 

addition, on April 22, 2009, the House 

Transportation and Infrastructure’s 

Subcommittee on Aviation held a 

hearing on oversight of helicopter 

medical services. The Subcommittee 

heard from a variety of government, 

industry, and public representatives 

who testified on the House helicopter 

air ambulance safety legislation, NTSB 

safety recommendations, and FAA 

actions to mitigate helicopter air 

ambulance accidents. 

III. Discussion of the Proposal 

In determining how to improve the 

safety of helicopter air ambulance 

operations, as well as all other 

commercial helicopter operations, the 

FAA reviewed approximately 4,000 

accidents that involved helicopters in 

the United States (excluding U.S. 

territories). Of those accidents, the FAA 

identified 75 commercial helicopter 

accidents and 127 helicopter air 

ambulance accidents that occurred 

between 1994 and 2008 with causal 

factors that are addressed in this 

proposal. The accidents involving 

commercial helicopter operations 

resulted in 88 fatalities, 29 serious 

injuries, and 42 minor injuries; 28 

(approximately 37 percent) involved 

one or more fatalities, and 47 had no 

fatalities. The accidents involving 

helicopter air ambulance operations 

resulted in 126 fatalities, 50 serious 

injuries, and 42 minor injuries; 46 

(approximately 36 percent) involved 

one or more fatalities, and 81 had no 

fatalities. In addition to injuries and 

fatalities, there also was significant 

damage or complete hull loss for these 

accidents. 

A comparison of the accidents that 

occurred between 2000 and 2008 reveals 

that there were 66 commercial 

helicopter accidents (including 23 fatal 

accidents resulting in 65 fatalities) and 

98 helicopter air ambulance accidents 

(including 35 fatal accidents resulting in 

94 fatalities) during that time. The 

percentage of fatalities between the two 

categories was essentially the same. 

Given the equivalent risk of fatality if 

involved in an accident, the FAA has 

determined that it must focus its efforts 

on reducing the higher risk of helicopter 

air ambulances being involved in an 

accident in the first place. 

This proposal, if adopted, would 

implement new regulations, and revise 

existing regulations, to address the 

causes and factors of commercial and 

helicopter air ambulance accidents 

identified by the FAA and the NTSB. 

The FAA notes that compliance dates of 

the proposed regulations would vary, as 

noted in discussions below. The FAA 

believes that many of the accidents 

reviewed could have been prevented if 

these proposals had been in place 

during this 19-year period. 

The FAA has also determined that the 

safety of commercial air operations 

could be enhanced by requiring a load 

manifest for all part 135 operations and 

is proposing to amend its rules 

accordingly. 

A. Helicopter Air Ambulance 

Operations 

The following provisions would apply 

to all helicopter air ambulance 

operations, conducted under part 135. 

These proposals include new 

operational and equipment 

requirements for these certificate 

holders. This rule does not address 

fixed-wing air ambulance operations. 

The FAA chose to focus on helicopter 

air ambulance operations because a 

predominance of the accidents involved 

helicopter air ambulances,14 and 

approximately 74 percent of the air 

ambulance fleet is composed of 

helicopters.15

1. Operational Procedures 

a. Part 135 Applicability (§ 135.1) 

The FAA is proposing to amend 

§ 135.1 to require that all helicopter air 

ambulance operations with medical 

personnel on board be conducted under 

the operating rules of part 135. This 

includes instances where the medical 

personnel are employees of the operator. 

The safety of helicopter air ambulance 

flights, including the welfare of the 

medical personnel and patients on those 

flights, would be increased if operators 

were required to comply with the more 

stringent part 135 rules. 

Helicopter air ambulance operations 

generally consist of two- or three-leg 

flights. Currently, the non-patientcarrying legs of those operations may be 

conducted under part 91 because 

certificate holders consider medical 

personnel on board the aircraft to be 

crewmembers and the non-patient 

transport legs to be positioning flights. 

This approach is consistent with current 

FAA guidance to inspectors, which 

notes that if medical personnel are 

crewmembers, they are not considered 

passengers, and that flights with only 

crewmembers on board may be 

conducted under part 91.16

However, the FAA notes that the 

primary purpose of having medical 

personnel on board helicopter air 

ambulance flights is to provide medical 

care to the patients being transported, 

and they ‘‘cannot be expected to 

meaningfully participate in the 

decision-making process to enhance 

flight safety or to significantly 

contribute to operational control of the 

flight.’’ 17 Accordingly, the FAA believes 

these individuals should be afforded the 

same safety protections of part 135 as 

those given to patients on board 

helicopter air ambulance flights. 

Air ambulance accidents have 

occurred during all phases of flight. The 

NTSB found that 35 of the 55 accidents 

it studied for its Special Investigation 

Report occurred during part 91 

operations with medical personnel, but 

no patient, on board.18 The NTSB cited 

two examples of fatal accidents that may 

have been prevented if the operations 

had been conducted according to the 

weather minima contained in the part 

135 operations specifications issued to 

certificate holders conducting helicopter 

air ambulance operations in effect at the 

time of the investigation. The first 

accident, which took place in Salt Lake 

City, UT, in 2003, involved a helicopter 

air ambulance that crashed into terrain 

when weather conditions were below 

part 135 minima. The other accident 

occurred in Redwood Valley, CA, when 

a helicopter air ambulance crashed into 

mountainous terrain during high winds 

and heavy rain. The NTSB concluded 


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19Statement from the Association of Air Medical 

Services, Helicopter Association International, and 

Air Medical Operators Association to the NTSB 14 

(Jan. 13, 2009), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/ 

Dockets/Aviation/DCA09SH001/default.htm. 

20NTSB, Special Investigation Report on 

Emergency Medical Services Operations (NTSB/ 

SIR–06/01) 7 (Jan. 25, 2006). 

that air ambulance operations would be 

improved if required to operate under 

the part 135 operating rules and that the 

minimal contribution of medical 

personnel to the safe operation of air 

ambulance flights is not sufficient to 

justify operating under the less-stringent 

part 91 requirements. Those accidents 

formed the basis for the NTSB Safety 

Recommendation A–06–12 that the FAA 

should require all air ambulance 

operators to comply with part 135 

operations specifications while 

conducting flights with medical 

personnel on board. This proposal 

would implement that recommendation 

for helicopter air ambulance operators. 

The major differences between 

operations conducted under part 91 and 

part 135 are the applicable weather 

minima and flightcrew rest 

requirements. The FAA acknowledges 

that these more stringent requirements 

may result in operators turning down air 

ambulance flights that would meet part 

91 weather requirements but not part 

135 weather requirements, or if the 

flight would put a flightcrew member 

over the maximum daily hours of flight 

time. Helicopter air ambulance 

operations are a form of air 

transportation, and the improvements in 

air transportation safety that would 

result from this proposal justifies the 

more stringent part 135 requirement. 

This proposal should not require 

helicopter air ambulance certificate 

holders to make major operational 

changes because their operations 

generally include a part 135 leg on each 

flight. Nevertheless, the FAA calls for 

comments on measures that it could 

take to address this proposed rule’s 

impact on the availability of air 

ambulance services. 

The FAA is proposing in § 135.601 to 

define the term ‘‘helicopter air 

ambulance operation’’ to clarify that 

helicopter air ambulance operations 

include more than just patient-transport 

legs. The definition would establish that 

any flight, including a positioning or 

repositioning flight, conducted for the 

purpose of transportation of patients or 

donor organs is a helicopter air 

ambulance flight, and clarify, through a 

non-exclusive list, the types of 

operations considered to be helicopter 

air ambulance operations. For example, 

a flight initiated for patient transport but 

terminated before patient pick up would 

be considered a helicopter air 

ambulance operation. However, 

maintenance, service flights for 

refueling, or training flights could still 

be conducted under part 91 when no 

medical personnel are on board. 

The FAA also is proposing to define 

the term ‘‘medical personnel’’ in 

§ 135.601 with language based on that 

found in AC 135–14A, with 

modifications. Unlike AC 135–14A, the 

proposed definition does not address 

the types of duties performed by 

medical personnel on the helicopter 

other than providing medical care. The 

proposal would not preclude medical 

personnel from participating in or 

assisting the pilot with certain duties 

(for example, reading checklists, tuning 

radios, and securing doors) as long as 

the individuals have been trained by the 

certificate holder in accordance with its 

FAA-approved training program. 

Additionally, the FAA notes that such 

medical personnel would not be 

considered to be performing safetysensitive functions under 14 CFR part 

120 Industry Drug and Alcohol Testing 

Program, and would therefore not be 

required to undergo drug testing. 

Certificate holders would be required 

to comply with this provision by the 

effective date of the final rule. 

b. Operations Control Centers 

(§ 135.617) 

The FAA is proposing to add 

§ 135.617 to require certificate holders 

with 10 or more helicopters engaged in 

helicopter air ambulance operations to 

establish operations control centers. 

Certificate holders would be required to 

staff these operations control centers 

with operations control specialists 

trained and equipped to communicate 

with pilots, advise pilots of weather 

conditions, and monitor the progress of 

each flight. Each certificate holder 

covered by this requirement would be 

responsible for establishing its own 

individual operations control center. 

Each certificate holder would be 

required to provide enough operations 

control specialists at each operations 

control center to ensure proper 

operational control of each flight. 

FAA regulations currently do not 

require helicopter air ambulance 

operators to have an operations control 

center. In 2008, the FAA issued AC 

120–96, which provides 

recommendations to assist helicopter air 

ambulance operators with the 

development, implementation, and 

integration of an operations control 

center, and enhanced operational 

control procedures similar to those 

found in part 121. Members of the 

helicopter air ambulance industry have 

noted that the AC is a ‘‘product of a 

survey of best practices in the air 

medical industry and gives guidance to 

other air medical services as to the 

benefits of this type of operation.’’ 19 In 

developing this proposal, the FAA 

sought to standardize operations control 

centers by codifying the concepts of AC 

120–96 into a framework appropriate for 

helicopter air ambulance operations. 

The FAA notes that a January 2009 FAA 

survey of inspectors with oversight of 

helicopter air ambulance operations 

showed that 89 percent of helicopter air 

ambulance operators have voluntarily 

established some type of operations 

control center. 

The NTSB, in its 2006 Special 

Investigation Report on Emergency 

Medical Services Operations, identified 

the following four fatal accidents, which 

may have been prevented if formalized 

dispatch and flight-monitoring 

procedures had been in place.20

(1) In a 2004 Pyote, TX, accident in 

which a helicopter air ambulance 

transporting a patient crashed into 

terrain while maneuvering in reducedvisibility conditions, the pilot was not 

aware of expected thunderstorm activity 

in the area because he did not obtain a 

weather briefing before departure. 

(2) In the 2003 Salt Lake City, UT, 

accident in which a helicopter air 

ambulance crashed into terrain when 

weather conditions were below part 135 

minima, the operator’s dispatcher 

encouraged the pilot to accept the flight 

in spite of the fact that another company 

had refused it because of low visibility 

conditions. The NTSB stated that a 

flight dispatcher with specific 

knowledge of flight requirements would 

likely have been able to more fully 

comprehend the importance of the other 

company’s refusal, independently 

gathered and correctly interpreted 

pertinent weather information from all 

available sources, and provided 

appropriate advice to the pilot. 

(3) In a 2004 accident in Newberry, 

SC, a helicopter air ambulance collided 

with trees in poor weather conditions. 

Three flightcrews had declined the 

mission based on their awareness of 

unsafe weather conditions, specifically 

the presence of fog. A 911 dispatcher 

that communicated with the pilot did 

not inform the pilot that the other three 

flightcrews had declined the mission 

because of fog. 

(4) A helicopter air ambulance that 

crashed into mountainous terrain in 

2004 in Battle Mountain, NV, was not 

reported overdue until approximately 

four hours after its departure. The flight 

crossed from one county to another, and 

911 dispatch centers from the two 


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21The FAA notes that this proposal is not 

intended to limit two-way communication between 

the operations control specialist and the pilot to 

traditional two-way radio communication. Rather, 

other means of communication, such as satellite 

phone or data link, also would be acceptable. 

22See section III.A.1.d. of the preamble to this 

NPRM. 

23See section III.A.1.d. of the preamble to this 

NPRM. 

24Aircraft dispatchers, certificated under part 65, 

generally are employed by part 121 air carriers and 

specialize in scheduled air carrier transportation. 25 Id. 

counties were not required to 

communicate with each other directly. 

Responsibility for initiating 

communications when crossing into 

another county dispatch center was 

placed on the pilot. Because the aircraft 

was not reported missing in a timely 

manner, the opportunity for potentially 

life-saving search and rescue operations 

was lost. 

The NTSB concluded that 

‘‘[f]ormalized dispatch and flightmonitoring procedures, including a 

dedicated dispatcher with aviationspecific knowledge and experience, 

would enhance the safety of emergency 

medical services flight operations by 

providing the pilot with consistent and 

critical weather information, assisting in 

go/no go decisions, and monitoring the 

flight’s position.’’ This resulted in NTSB 

Safety Recommendation A–06–14 that 

air ambulance operators be required to 

‘‘use formalized dispatch and flightfollowing procedures that include up-todate weather information and assistance 

in flight risk assessment decisions.’’ This 

proposal would address that safety 

recommendation. 

This proposed regulation, which 

would also partially address NTSB 

Safety Recommendation A–09–89 

regarding the implementation of sound 

risk management practices, could 

contribute to a certificate holder’s 

overall safety program because it would 

be a method of incorporating risk 

management practices into a company’s 

flight operations. In particular, an 

operations control specialist would 

provide additional input on proposed 

operations and be able to monitor 

flights, potentially helping pilots avoid 

dangerous situations. 

Under this proposal, operations 

control specialists would perform the 

following functions: (1) Maintain twoway communications with pilots; 21 (2) 

provide pilots with weather information 

to include current and forecasted 

weather along the planned route of 

flight; (3) monitor the flight progress; 

and (4) participate in pre-flight risk 

analysis.22 This proposal is intended to 

provide an additional measure to help 

prevent CFIT, loss of control, 

inadvertent flight into IMC, and 

accidents at night. 

The FAA is proposing to require 

certificate holders with 10 or more air 

ambulance helicopters to establish 

operations control centers for several 

reasons. The FAA’s analysis of current 

helicopter air ambulance operators 

shows that the vast majority of 

operations are conducted by operators 

with these larger fleets. The FAA’s 

review of operations specifications 

issued to the 74 certificate holders 

authorized to conduct helicopter air 

ambulance operations shows that, as of 

February 2009, there were 24 certificate 

holders with 10 or more helicopters in 

their fleets. Those certificate holders 

operated 620 of the 884 total helicopters 

in helicopter air ambulance operations. 

Additionally, the level of operational 

complexity and management detail 

required for safe operations is greater for 

certificate holders with 10 or more 

helicopter air ambulances. 

Although certificate holders with nine 

or fewer helicopter air ambulances are 

not covered by this provision, the FAA 

finds that the pre-flight risk analysis 

requirement proposed under § 135.615 

may provide a sufficient alternative for 

these operators because of their limited 

scope of operations.23

The FAA requests comments on 

whether the requirement should be 

dependent on fleet size or number of 

operations conducted. The agency asks 

that comments be accompanied by data 

regarding the number of operations 

conducted by helicopter air ambulances 

and/or the typical number of hours 

flown per aircraft. 

The FAA is proposing in § 135.617 to 

require the staffing of operations control 

centers with operations control 

specialists, rather than certificated 

aircraft dispatchers.24 The training 

program associated with FAAcertificated aircraft dispatcher licensing 

is primarily focused on large, fixedwing, transport category aircraft 

operating under part 121. While aspects 

of this training, such as weather 

information and radio communication, 

are relevant to helicopter operations, 

this proposal is designed to permit 

certificate holders to create training 

programs directly applicable to 

helicopter air ambulance operations. 

Accordingly, the FAA sought to 

incorporate the more general elements 

of part 65-certificated aircraft dispatcher 

training into the proposed requirements 

for training operations control 

specialists. Although the FAA is not 

proposing to require formal certification 

of operations control specialists, it may 

consider formal FAA certification of 

these individuals in the future if 

appropriate. 

The FAA notes that certificate holders 

could be subject to enforcement action 

for using inadequately trained 

operations control specialists, or may be 

responsible for errors committed by an 

operations control specialist. Likewise, 

an operations control specialist also 

could be subject to enforcement action 

or civil penalties if he or she failed a 

drug test, functioned as an operations 

control specialist without completing 

training or passing examinations, or 

verified false entries on a pre-flight 

analysis worksheet. 

Certificate holders may want to hire 

certificated aircraft dispatchers, or 

others with general aviation or weather 

knowledge, to serve as operations 

control specialists. This proposal would 

allow a certificate holder to offer 

individuals with recent, relevant 

experience an initial training course that 

features a reduced number of hours of 

initial training, focusing on the 

certificate holder-specific training topics 

addressed below. A reduced training 

program would be permissible because 

of the knowledge these individuals have 

obtained through training for other 

positions that is applicable to the 

operations control specialist position. 

This benefit would be extended to the 

following persons with specific 

aviation-related training—(1) Military 

pilots, flight navigators, and 

meteorologists; (2) civilian pilots, flight 

engineers, meteorologists, air traffic 

controllers, and flight service specialists 

involved in air carrier operations; and 

(3) certificated aircraft dispatchers 

involved in part 121 operations. This 

provision is similar to 14 CFR 65.57, 

which permits individuals who have 

not graduated from an aircraft 

dispatcher school, but who have 

relevant aviation experience, to apply 

for an aircraft dispatcher certificate. 

In addition, with respect to the preflight risk analysis that would be 

required under this proposal for all 

helicopter air ambulance operations,25

the operations control specialist would 

ensure that the pilot completed the preflight risk analysis worksheet, confirm 

and verify the entries on the worksheet, 

and work with the pilot to mitigate any 

identified risk. The operations control 

specialist, along with the pilot in 

command, would be required to 

acknowledge in writing (by signing, 

initialing, or another method as defined 

in the certificate holder’s operations 

manual) that the worksheet had been 

completed accurately. The FAA believes 

that the operations control specialist’s 


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review of the risk assessment will 

provide an additional measure of safety 

to helicopter air ambulance flights. By 

signing the worksheet, the operations 

control specialist will be indicating that 

he or she agrees with the level of risk 

associated with that flight. 

Operations control specialists would 

be performing safety-sensitive functions 

such as providing pre-flight weather 

assessment, assisting with fuel 

planning, alternate airport weather 

minima, and communicating with pilots 

regarding operational concerns during 

flight. These duties are similar to those 

of an aircraft dispatcher, and therefore, 

operations control specialists would be 

subject to the restrictions on drug and 

alcohol use, and to a certificate holder’s 

drug and alcohol testing program as 

described in 14 CFR part 120. 

To ensure operations control 

specialists are capable of performing 

safety-sensitive functions, § 135.617 

would require certificate holders to 

establish and implement an FAAapproved initial and recurrent training 

and testing program for operations 

control specialists. Operations control 

specialists would be required to 

undergo training and testing on— 

(1) General aviation topics such as 

weather, navigation, flight-monitoring 

procedures, air traffic control 

procedures, aircraft systems, and aircraft 

limitations and performance; and (2) 

topics specific to each certificate holder, 

such as aviation regulations and 

operations specifications, crew resource 

management, and the local flying area. 

Initial training would address both the 

general aviation and certificate holderspecific topics. Recurrent training 

would focus on certificate holderspecific topics. The FAA believes that 

the certificate holder-specific topics are 

more likely to change from year to year 

than the more general topics, justifying 

a more frequent rate of testing. 

An individual would need to receive 

initial training and pass an FAAapproved written and practical test 

developed and given by the certificate 

holder before performing duties as an 

operations control specialist. An 

individual would not be able to 

continue as an operations control 

specialist unless he or she completed 

annual recurrent training and passed a 

written and practical test given by the 

certificate holder. The certificate holder 

would be responsible for maintaining 

records of the training and tests given to 

each operations control specialist for the 

duration of that individual’s 

employment and for 90 days thereafter. 

This proposal also would establish 

daily duty periods for operations control 

specialists which are based on the part 

121 aircraft dispatcher duty time 

requirement. A certificate holder could 

schedule an operations control 

specialist for a maximum of 10 

consecutive hours of duty. If an 

operations control specialist’s duty time 

exceeds 10 hours in a 24-hour period, 

then the certificate holder would be 

required to provide at least 8 hours of 

rest before that individual’s next duty 

period. Such a circumstance may occur 

if a flight monitored by the operations 

control specialist is not complete until 

after the end of his or her scheduled 10- 

hour duty period. The operations 

control specialist would be required to 

remain on duty until each flight he or 

she is monitoring is complete, until 

those flights have left the operations 

control specialist’s jurisdiction, or until 

relieved by another operations control 

specialist. The certificate holder must 

provide adequate time at the beginning 

of a shift to allow the operations control 

specialist to become familiar with 

current and expected weather 

conditions for the area of operations. 

The certificate holder must also 

establish a checklist of the subjects to be 

discussed during shift changes. The 

checklist should contain subjects such 

as current and forecasted weather, 

helicopter maintenance status, 

helicopter operations in progress, and 

other relevant information. In addition 

to duty time limitations, this proposal 

would require that every 7 consecutive 

days, an operations control specialist be 

provided 24 consecutive hours of rest. 

This requirement would take effect 2 

years after the effective date of the final 

rule. The FAA believes that this would 

provide certificate holders with ample 

time to establish operations control 

centers, develop training and testing 

programs, and to hire and provide the 

estimated 80 hours of training required 

of operations control specialists. 

Although not specifically proposed 

here, the FAA seeks comment on 

whether to require operations control 

specialists to obtain a certificate of 

demonstrated proficiency from the FAA. 

The FAA is considering this 

requirement because it would enable the 

agency to suspend or revoke an 

operations control specialist’s certificate 

of demonstrated proficiency, thereby 

ensuring that person could not continue 

to hold the operations control specialist 

position if his or her actions merited 

such a response. Individuals would not 

be permitted to serve as an operations 

control specialist without obtaining a 

certificate of demonstrated proficiency. 

It the FAA were to adopt this 

approach, the agency anticipates that it 

would issue a certificate of 

demonstrated proficiency to an 

individual upon notification by a 

certificate holder that the individual has 

successfully completed the certificate 

holder’s FAA-approved initial training 

and testing requirements. Anticipating 

that there may be a period of time 

between notification and issuance of a 

certificate of demonstrated proficiency, 

the FAA would permit a person to serve 

as an operations control specialist from 

the date the certificate holder notifies 

the FAA that the person has met the 

training and testing requirements. 

Certificates of demonstrated 

proficiency would be valid for the 

length of time that an operations control 

specialist works for a certificate holder. 

If a certificated operations control 

specialist were to leave one certificate 

holder to work for another, he or she 

would need to obtain a new certificate 

following completion of the new 

employer’s training and testing program. 

In the full Regulatory Evaluation in 

the public docket for this rulemaking, 

the FAA estimates that the proposed 

requirement for certificate holders with 

10 or more helicopters engaged in 

helicopter air ambulance operations to 

establish operations control centers 

could cost $97 million or $60 million 

present value to implement over 10 

years. The FAA specifically requests 

comments, accompanied by data, on the 

accuracy of this cost estimate. In 

addition, the agency requests comments 

on how effective this requirement 

would be in preventing accidents, as 

well as suggested alternatives for 

achieving comparable safety benefits. 

c. VFR/IFR Procedures 

The FAA is proposing a series of 

operational initiatives to increase the 

safety of helicopter air ambulance 

operations. Specifically, the FAA is 

proposing to—(1) Increase VFR weather 

minima, (2) allow IFR operations at 

locations without weather reporting, 

(3) specify procedures for VFR/visual 

transitions from instrument approaches, 

and (4) require additional VFR flight 

planning. These proposals are intended 

to reduce accidents due to CFIT, 

obstacle collisions, accidents during 

night operations, and accidents 

resulting from inadvertent flight into 

IMC by prescribing more stringent VFR 

requirements and providing more 

opportunity for IFR operations. These 

rules are proposed only for helicopter 

air ambulance operations because of the 

unique environment in which those 

operations are conducted, including offairport or heliport landings and 

potentially time-sensitive operations. 

The FAA notes that these proposals 

address recommendations made by the 

Part 125/135 ARC. 


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The FAA believes that the following 

accident is indicative of the type that 

this section of the proposal is intended 

to prevent. On January 11, 1998, a Bell 

222UT, operating under part 135 with 

no filed flight plan and originating near 

Sandy, UT, encountered inadvertent 

IMC due to extremely poor weather. 

Shortly after take off, the helicopter 

collided with mountainous terrain 

resulting in fatal injuries to all on board. 

The NTSB cited the cause of the 

accident as the pilot’s failure to 

‘‘maintain sufficient clearance or 

altitude from mountainous terrain,’’ and 

continuing into known adverse weather. 

NTSB Accident Report FTW98FA093 

(Oct. 30, 1998). 

The FAA proposes for these 

provisions to take effect at the effective 

date of the final rule. 

i. Increase VFR Weather Minima 

(§ 135.607) 

The FAA is proposing to add 

§ 135.607 to prescribe more stringent 

VFR weather minima for helicopter air 

ambulance operations in uncontrolled 

airspace than those currently 

established in part 135. 

Currently, § 135.205 requires visibility 

of at least 1⁄2 statute mile during the day 

and 1 statute mile at night for VFR 

helicopter operations at an altitude of 

1,200 feet or less above the surface in 

Class G airspace. For certificate holders 

conducting helicopter air ambulance 

operations, Operations Specification 

A021 sets forth more stringent weather 

minima for VFR operations conducted 

in uncontrolled airspace. This rule 

would codify the weather requirements 

of Operations Specification A021. 

The NTSB cited in its 2006 Special 

Investigation Report two examples of 

fatal accidents that may have been 

prevented if the operations had been 

conducted according to the weather 

minima contained in the part 135 

helicopter air ambulance operations 

specifications in effect at the time of the 

investigation. The first was the 2003 

Salt Lake City, UT, accident in which a 

helicopter air ambulance crashed into 

terrain when weather conditions were 

below part 135 minima. The other 

accident occurred in Redwood Valley, 

CA, when a helicopter air ambulance 

crashed into mountainous terrain during 

high winds and heavy rain. The Safety 

Board concluded that EMS operations 

would be improved if all emergency 

medical services were operated under 

part 135. The NTSB subsequently issued 

Safety Recommendation A–06–12 

recommending that the FAA require all 

emergency medical services operators to 

comply with part 135 operations 

specifications while conducting flights 

with medical personnel on board. This 

proposal would address that safety 

recommendation. 

The proposed weather minima for 

uncontrolled airspace are determined by 

whether the flight is taking place in a 

mountainous or non-mountainous area, 

and whether, within those 

classifications, the flight is taking place 

in a certificate holder’s local flying area 

or is a cross-country flight. As defined 

in proposed § 135.601, a local flying 

area is an area that the certificate holder 

designates as one in which its pilots are 

familiar with the terrain and other 

obstacles. Weather minima are less 

stringent in local flying areas because of 

pilots’ increased familiarity with 

obstacles and the operating environment 

as compared with other cross-country 

areas. A local flying area would be 

limited to a 50-nautical mile (NM) 

radius because the FAA believes that a 

pilot would not be able to demonstrate 

detailed knowledge of hazards such as 

towers and high-altitude terrain within 

a larger area. The local flying area 

definition would codify the language of 

Operations Specification A021 issued 

on January 23, 2006. 

Table 1 shows the proposed VFR 

minimum altitudes and visibility 

requirements. 

TABLE 1—VFR MINIMUM ALTITUDES AND VISIBILITY REQUIREMENTS

Location 

Weather Minima 

Day Night Night using an approved 

NVIS or HTAWS 

Nonmountainous local flying areas 800-foot ceiling, 2 statute miles 

visibility.

1,000-foot ceiling, 3 statute miles 

visibility.

800-foot ceiling, 3 statute miles 

visibility. 

Nonmountainous cross-country flying areas.800-foot ceiling, 3 statute miles 

visibility.

1,000-foot ceiling, 5 statute miles 

visibility.

1,000-foot ceiling, 3 statute miles 

visibility. 

Mountainous local flying areas ...... 800-foot ceiling, 3 statute miles 

visibility.

1,500-foot ceiling, 3 statute miles 

visibility.

1,000-foot ceiling, 3 statute miles 

visibility. 

Mountainous cross-country flying 

areas.

1,000-foot ceiling, 3 statute miles 

visibility.

1,500-foot ceiling, 5 statute miles 

visibility.

1,000-foot ceiling, 5 statute miles 

visibility. 

In all flying areas, certificate holders 

conducting operations in a helicopter 

equipped with an FAA-approved nightvision imaging system (NVIS) or FAAapproved HTAWS could apply lower 

weather minima during night 

operations. Those requirements would 

be less stringent than the basic night 

operations minima because of the 

obstacle and CFIT avoidance benefits 

obtained from those devices. An 

approved NVIS would require, at 

minimum, a night vision goggle (NVG) 

system as defined in paragraph 1.2 of 

RTCA/DO–275, Minimum Operational 

Performance Standards for Integrated 

Night Vision Imaging System 

Equipment, which states that the NVIS 

system includes not only the NVGs 

themselves, but also interior and 

exterior lighting, windshield and 

windows, and general crew station 

design requirements. RTCA/DO–275, 

paragraph 1.6.1, defines NVGs as 

binocular systems. Under this proposal 

the FAA does not intend to change the 

term ‘‘NVIS’’ to include systems other 

than NVGs. Therefore, unless equipped 

with HTAWS, operators using systems 

that do not meet the definition of 

‘‘NVIS’’ would not be permitted to use 

the NVIS weather minima in § 135.607. 

Because of the requirement proposed 

in § 135.605 for all helicopter air 

ambulances to be equipped with 

HTAWS within 3 years of the effective 

date of the final rule (discussed in 

section III.A.2.a.), it is anticipated that 

all certificate holders would eventually 

operate under these reduced night 

operations weather minima. The FAA 

seeks comment on the interrelationship 

of these two proposed requirements. 

The FAA believes that requiring all 

VFR legs of a helicopter air ambulance 

operation to comply with more stringent 

weather requirements would be an 

effective method of increasing safety in 

helicopter air ambulance operations. 

The FAA does not believe that 

certificate holders would need to make 

significant changes to their operations 

because this proposed rule would 


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26Exemption Nos. 9490 and 9490B (Regulatory 

Docket No. FAA–2006–26407); Exemption No. 9665 

(Regulatory Docket No. FAA–2008–0169); 

Exemption No. 6175 (Regulatory Docket No. FAA– 

2001–9195) (granting authority for departures only); 

Exemption No. 6175G (Regulatory Docket No. FAA– 

2001–9195). 

27The approaches permitted under IFR PinS 

Copter Special Instrument Approach Procedures, 

and IFR Standard and certain Special Instrument 

Approach Procedures (IAPs) are developed by the 

FAA using standardized methods associated with 

the U.S. Standard for Terminal Instrument 

Procedures (TERPs). IFR Standard and PinS Copter 

Special Instrument Approach Procedures are 

publicly available approaches for use by 

appropriately qualified pilots operating properly 

equipped and airworthy aircraft. Special IAPs 

generally service private-use airports or heliports, 

and the FAA authorizes only certain individual 

pilots or pilots in individual organizations to use 

these procedures. Special IAPs may require 

additional crew training and/or aircraft equipment 

or performance, and may also require the use of 

landing aids, communications, or weather services 

not available for public use. Instrument approach 

procedures that service private use airports or 

heliports are generally special IAPs. 

incorporate the operating limitations 

and the weather minima already 

applicable under Operations 

Specification A021. 

ii. IFR Operations at Airports and 

Heliports Without Weather Reporting 

(§ 135.609) 

The FAA is proposing to add 

§ 135.609 to allow helicopter air 

ambulance operators to conduct IFR 

operations at airports and heliports 

without a weather reporting facility. 

Currently, the regulations only permit 

IFR operations into and out of airports 

with an on-site weather reporting 

source. The proposed rule would allow 

certificate holders to obtain operations 

specifications permitting IFR operations 

into and out of locations without a 

weather reporting facility if they are 

able to obtain weather reports from an 

approved weather reporting facility 

located within 15 NM of the destination 

landing area. The FAA believes that this 

provision would increase the use of IFR 

by helicopter air ambulance operators 

and result in more aircraft operating in 

a positively controlled environment, 

thereby increasing safety. 

The FAA has granted exemptions 

from these regulations to helicopter air 

ambulance operators and based this 

proposal on those exemptions.26 In 

Exemption No. 9490, the FAA 

determined it was ‘‘safer and in the 

public interest to conduct operations 

under IFR rather than VFR particularly 

in low and marginal weather 

conditions’’ because IFR operation is an 

effective method of countering CFIT 

accidents. Additionally, this provision 

would codify a similar provision in 

Operations Specification A021 issued to 

helicopter air ambulance operators. 

The FAA notes that this proposal 

would not relieve a pilot from the 

requirement to assess the landing 

conditions before descending below the 

minimum descent altitude set forth in 

§ 91.175. To operate in this 

environment, certificate holders also 

would be required to implement 

additional safety measures beyond those 

otherwise required for IFR flight to 

ensure the pilot has the appropriate 

tools to operate the helicopter safely 

into locations without weather 

reporting. For example, helicopters used 

in these operations would have to be 

equipped with an autopilot and 

navigation equipment appropriate to the 

approach to be flown, such as an IFRcertified global positioning system 

(GPS) or wide area augmentation system 

(WAAS) receiver. Additionally, to help 

the pilot ascertain the weather in the 

aircraft’s vicinity, § 135.609 would 

require helicopters to be equipped with 

severe weather detection equipment, 

such as weather radar or lightning 

detection equipment. The ‘‘navigation 

equipment appropriate to the approach 

to be flown’’ is necessary because, for 

example, although an ILS approach at 

the nearby municipal airport may 

provide the lowest planning minima, if 

the aircraft is equipped with only a GPS, 

the lower planning minima of the ILS 

are unusable. 

Section 135.609 not only establishes 

aircraft equipment requirements to 

ensure a higher level of safety and to 

mitigate the associated risk, but also 

requires certain training of the 

flightcrew. That training is tailored to 

the operating environment and the 

weather observations needed at those 

locations. These equipment and training 

requirements are found in the 

exemptions referenced above. The FAA 

believes that these additional equipment 

and training requirements are necessary 

to compensate for the lack of specific 

weather information available at the 

destination. 

iii. IFR to VFR/Visual Transitions 

(§ 135.611) 

The FAA is proposing to add 

§ 135.611 to establish weather minima 

for transitions to the VFR segment of an 

instrument approach.27 Pilots 

conducting an IFR approach would, 

upon reaching a point in space at a 

minimum descent altitude, continue the 

flight to the landing area under VFR if 

conditions permit. This provision 

would facilitate operations under IFR 

with their associated safety benefits. 

Proposed § 135.611(a)(1) establishes 

the requirements for instrument 

approaches containing the instruction to 

‘‘proceed visually’’ from the missed 

approach point (MAP). For these 

approaches, the weather minima 

reflected on the approach chart would 

apply. 

For PinS Copter Special Approaches, 

proposed 135.611(a)(2) would permit 

operations under lower weather minima 

than currently allowed for cruise flight 

in uncontrolled airspace when 

transitioning from IFR to a VFR segment 

on approach. These approaches contain 

the instruction to ‘‘proceed VFR.’’ The 

applicable minima are based on the 

distance from the MAP to the landing 

area. The pilot would therefore need to 

evaluate the proximity of the MAP to 

the landing area to determine the 

appropriate VFR minima, which are 

based on the distance from the landing 

area. Under proposed § 135.611(a)(2)(i), 

the visibility must be at least 1 statute 

mile if the MAP is within 1 NM of the 

heliport of intended landing. To make 

the transition from IFR flight to VFR 

from a point in space 3 NM or less from 

the destination, a pilot would need to 

have 2 statute miles of visibility and a 

600-foot ceiling during the day, or 3 

statute miles of visibility and a 600-foot 

ceiling at night in accordance with 

§ 135.611(a)(3). 

The FAA recognizes that the area 

between the MAP and the ‘‘heliport of 

intended landing’’ (i.e. the heliport 

reflected on the approach chart as no 

deviation to another location is 

authorized in this case) has been flight 

checked but may not meet the 

requirements to ‘‘proceed visually.’’ The 

FAA recognizes that obstacles in the 

vicinity of an instrument approach are 

flight-checked and marked on 

instrument approach charts. Approach 

charts are updated more frequently than 

the sectional charts used in VFR 

operations. Therefore, it is less likely 

that pilots would encounter unexpected 

obstacles when following an approach 

documented on an instrument approach 

chart than when en route using a 

sectional chart. 

The FAA recognizes that a helicopter 

air ambulance operator may follow a 

special or standard instrument approach 

to a heliport or airport to descend below 

weather and then transition to VFR 

flight to land at another location. In that 

case, the minima of § 135.611(a)(3) or 

§ 135.611(a)(4) would apply, depending 

on the distance to the intended landing 

area, which could be an off-site location. 

Lastly, if a pilot transitions from IFR 

to VFR from a point in space more than 

3 NM from the destination, the higher 

weather minima of proposed § 135.607 

would apply. The FAA selected 3 NM 

because that distance is the standard 

amount of visibility required for VFR 


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28The FAA has issued other ACs relevant to this 

topic. Advisory Circular 135–14A Emergency 

Medical Services/Helicopter (EMS/H) (June 20, 

1991) included guidance on ‘‘Judgment and 

Decisions,’’ and Advisory Circular 120–51E Crew 

Resource Management Training (Jan. 22, 2004) 

discussed the importance of developing pilot-error 

management skills and procedures. 

29The International Helicopter Safety Team 

(IHST) and the Helicopter Association International 

(HAI) have developed resources, such as IHST’s 

Continued 

operations in controlled airspace in the 

lower altitudes. 

This proposed rule also sets forth 

standards for pilots departing a 

destination if they used the provisions 

of this section to access that location. 

The same weather minima would apply 

to the departure if the pilot has filed an 

IFR flight plan and will obtain IFR 

clearance within 3 NM of the departure 

location, and if the pilot departs 

following an FAA-approved obstacle 

departure procedure. However it is 

important to note that a pilot who 

simply flies the reverse course of the 

approach used when landing would not 

be following an FAA-approved obstacle 

departure procedure, as this procedure 

has not been flight-checked to specific 

departure criteria. 

The FAA believes that flights 

conducted under IFR obtain many safety 

benefits such as obstacle clearance, 

aircraft separation, and possible weather 

avoidance, thereby reducing obstacle 

collisions, CFIT, and wire strikes. The 

proposed rule would benefit pilots by 

enabling them to access more 

destinations by flying within the IFR 

structure, and then continuing on a VFR 

segment that has been flight checked for 

obstacles by the FAA. If the flight can 

be continued, then the pilot would have 

the benefit of operating through an area 

where obstacles have been flight 

checked and marked by the FAA. If the 

flight cannot continue under VFR, then 

the pilot must maintain IFR flight and 

continue to an alternate destination 

consistent with current regulations. 

This proposal would implement Part 

125/135 ARC recommendations. Also, 

this proposal would codify the 

provision of Operations Specification 

A021 regarding weather minima to be 

used during transitions to VFR flight 

with changes pertaining to Copter 

Special Instrument Approaches. 

iv. VFR Flight Planning (§ 135.613) 

The FAA is proposing to add 

§ 135.613 to require helicopter air 

ambulance pilots to perform pre-flight 

planning to determine the minimum 

safe altitude along the planned en route 

phase of flight when conducting VFR 

operations. 

The FAA is proposing to require 

pilots to evaluate, document, and plan 

to clear terrain and obstacles along the 

planned route of flight by no less than 

300 feet for day operations, and 500 feet 

for night operations. The pilot would 

use this minimum safe cruise altitude 

when determining the minimum 

required ceiling and visibility for the 

planned flight. If the weather minima 

would not permit VFR flight at the 

minimum safe cruise altitude, the pilot 

could either conduct the flight under 

IFR, or not conduct the flight. Pilots 

could deviate from the planned flight 

path if conditions or operational 

considerations necessitate a deviation. 

However, during such deviations, the 

pilot would not be relieved from 

weather or terrain/obstruction clearance 

requirements. 

If changes to the planned flight occur 

during flight, the pilot could continue 

along the new route until reaching his 

or her destination without re-planning 

the flight using the requirements of 

proposed § 135.613. However, upon 

reaching an intermediate stop, the pilot 

would have to evaluate the new route 

for terrain and obstacle clearance while 

the aircraft is on the ground before 

departure. 

This proposal is intended to prevent 

obstacle collisions by requiring pilots to 

be aware of the terrain and highest 

obstacles along a planned route. The 

proposal would codify a provision of 

Operations Specification A021, issued 

to all helicopter air ambulance 

certificate holders, which requires the 

identification and documentation of the 

highest obstacle along the planned route 

before VFR operations. 

d. Pre-Flight Risk Analysis (§ 135.615) 

The FAA is proposing to add 

§ 135.615 to require certificate holders 

to implement pre-flight risk-analysis 

programs. The FAA believes that preflight risk analysis may prevent 

accidents by mitigating risks before 

flight. This proposal is intended to 

provide certificate holders with the 

means to assess risk and make 

determinations regarding the flight’s 

safety before launch. 

Pre-flight risk assessment has been the 

subject of FAA guidance, industry best 

practices, and an NTSB study. On 

August 1, 2005, the FAA published 

Notice 8000.301, Operational Risk 

Assessment Programs for Helicopter 

Emergency Medical Services, which 

provided guidance to inspectors on riskassessment programs used in helicopter 

air ambulance operations. The notice 

discussed concepts used in a risk 

management and assessment program, 

and provided examples of risk variables 

that a certificate holder could consider 

in the decision to launch a flight. These 

variables included weather, flight 

crewmember performance, operating 

environment, airworthiness status of the 

helicopter, and weather. The notice also 

included several examples of riskassessment matrices that certificate 

holders could use in their operations, 

and included the concept of consulting 

with management personnel if the risk 

level reached a certain level. The notice 

also encouraged pilots to obtain 

information pertaining to a planned 

operation from a number of sources, 

including mechanics, communications 

specialists, and flight medical 

personnel, when determining risks 

associated with a flight operation. 

Notably, a basic concept of a risk 

assessment program articulated in the 

notice is that the pilot’s authority to 

decline a flight assignment is supreme, 

while his or her decision to accept a 

flight is subject to review if risks are 

identified. The notice stated that once 

the pilot has declined a flight 

assignment, other parties, such as a 

certificate holder’s management 

personnel, should not continue the risk 

assessment pertaining to that flight in an 

effort to override the pilot’s decision to 

decline the assignment. 

On January 28, 2006, the FAA 

published SAFO 06001, which 

recommended that certificate holders 

apply ‘‘safety attributes or risk 

management/assessment strategies to 

each flight.’’ 

In AC 120–96 (May 5, 2008), the FAA 

recognized that operations control 

centers provide improvements in preflight risk analysis and conceptualized 

joint mission responsibility shared by 

pilots and operations control centers. 

This AC also provides practical 

examples of pre-flight risk analyses and 

how such analyses can be integrated 

into helicopter air ambulance 

operations. The AC discusses that 

operations control specialists may assist 

helicopter air ambulance pilots by 

participating in risk analysis, providing 

supplementary information regarding 

weather, route information, and landing 

zones, monitoring flight information 

such as weather, and monitoring flight 

progression.28

A January 2009 FAA survey of 

inspectors with oversight of helicopter 

air ambulance operations found that 94 

percent of helicopter air ambulance 

operators have some type of decisionmaking and risk-analysis programs in 

place. The survey did not reveal the 

extent of these decision-making and 

risk-analysis programs; however, the 

FAA believes that the models currently 

in use incorporate government, 

industry,29 and military risk-analysis 


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‘‘Safety Management System Toolkit,’’ to assist 

operators with implementing risk-analysis 

programs. 30NTSB, Special Investigation Report on 

Emergency Medical Services Operations ((NTSB/ 

SIR–06/01) 4 (Jan. 25, 2006). 

practices as these entities have been the 

primary entities developing such 

programs. 

The NTSB also has addressed the 

need for pre-flight risk analysis. In its 

2006 Special Investigation Report on 

Emergency Medical Services 

Operations, the NTSB concluded, based 

in part on its investigations of three fatal 

helicopter air ambulance accidents, that 

the ‘‘implementation of flight risk 

evaluation before each mission would 

enhance the safety of emergency 

medical services operations.’’ 30 With 

regard to the 2003 Salt Lake City, UT, 

accident in which a helicopter air 

ambulance crashed into terrain in poor 

weather conditions, the NTSB noted 

that had the pilot been required to 

perform a systematic evaluation of the 

flight risks (including assessments of 

weather minima and route of flight), the 

pilot may not have accepted the 

mission. The NTSB also cited the 2004 

Battle Mountain, NV, fatal accident in 

which a helicopter air ambulance 

transporting a patient crashed into 

mountainous terrain while on a direct 

route in deteriorating weather 

conditions, and believed that if the pilot 

had performed a risk evaluation, he may 

have chosen a different route, and the 

accident may have been prevented. The 

NTSB also identified the 2004 Pyote, 

TX, fatal accident, in which a helicopter 

air ambulance transporting a patient 

crashed into terrain while maneuvering 

in reduced-visibility conditions and 

noted that the pilot had not performed 

a risk assessment. 

The FAA’s proposal is intended to 

provide standard guidelines for the 

implementation of pre-flight risk 

analysis procedures. Under the 

proposal, the pilot in command of a 

helicopter air ambulance would be 

required to conduct a pre-flight risk 

assessment before the first leg of each 

helicopter air ambulance operation. 

Helicopter air ambulance operations 

generally consist of two legs, such as a 

hospital-to-hospital transfer, or three 

legs, in which the helicopter departs its 

base to pick up a patient, transfers the 

patient to a hospital, then returns to 

base. The pre-flight analysis only would 

need to be conducted before departure 

on the first leg, but should be conducted 

with consideration for each leg of the 

operation. The pilot also would be 

required to sign the completed risk 

analysis worksheet, and provide the 

date and time of signing. Through this 

requirement, the FAA intends to 

highlight that the pilot is responsible for 

accurately completing this worksheet. 

The FAA proposes to require 

certificate holders to establish their risk 

assessment procedures and document 

them in their operations manuals. A 

pre-flight risk analysis would consist of 

at least the following: (1) Flight 

considerations (for example, a review of 

any obstructions and terrain along the 

entire intended route, altitude 

considerations for the area being flown, 

and fuel considerations); (2) human 

factors (for example, whether a pilot 

may be affected by personal stress, 

knowledge of the patient’s injuries (e.g., 

pediatric, or critical injury), fatigue, and 

experience in the type of operation to be 

conducted); (3) weather along the 

intended route (for example, weather for 

take off, en route, and destination 

airports to include forecasts); (4) 

whether another operator has refused or 

rejected the flight request; and (5) 

strategies for mitigating identified risk, 

including obtaining and documenting 

the certificate holder’s management 

personnel’s approval of the decision to 

accept a flight when the risks are 

elevated. Certificate holders would be 

permitted to add additional categories to 

mitigate risks associated with their 

specific operations. 

As previously noted, certificate 

holders would be required to develop a 

method to determine whether the flight 

request had been offered to another 

company. This provision is intended to 

combat the practice of ‘‘helicopter 

shopping’’ in which a flight request 

turned down by one company will be 

offered to another. If another company 

had been offered and refused the flight, 

it is important to understand why the 

flight was refused. If a flight was refused 

because of weather considerations, that 

information should feature prominently 

in the second company’s pre-flight risk 

analysis. However, if the first company 

turned down the flight because its 

helicopter was inoperative, then that 

refusal likely would not impact the risk 

assessment for the second company in 

determining whether to accept the 

flight. The FAA notes that the helicopter 

air ambulance industry has taken steps 

to address this problem, for example by 

creating a Web site (http:// 

www.weatherturndown.com) where 

companies can report when they do not 

accept a flight and the basis for the 

decision. Nevertheless, the FAA is 

proposing a requirement to ensure that 

this practice is adopted by all certificate 

holders authorized to conduct 

helicopter air ambulance operations. 

In addition, the proposal would 

require certificate holders to establish a 

procedure for obtaining and 

documenting management personnel’s 

decision to launch a flight when the risk 

reaches a predetermined level. This 

provision is designed so that pilots will 

seek a second opinion regarding 

whether to launch. This would be 

particularly effective where the risk is 

not so great that it is clear that the flight 

should be refused, but rather when it is 

at a level where a pilot may be unsure 

about the flight’s safety, and the pilot 

may feel personal pressure to perform 

the flight and perhaps save a life despite 

the identified risks. The FAA 

emphasizes the basic concept 

articulated in Notice 8000.301 that risk 

analysis forms should not be used by a 

certificate holder’s management 

personnel, or others within an 

organization, to override a pilot’s 

decision to decline a flight assignment. 

The FAA’s proposal also would 

require certificate holders to retain the 

original or a copy of completed preflight risk analysis worksheets for at 

least 90 days from the date of the 

operation. Certificate holders would be 

permitted to determine where the 

completed worksheets will be kept, but 

the procedures for collecting the 

worksheets and maintaining the records 

would need to be outlined in certificate 

holders’ operations manuals. 

The FAA notes that this proposal 

would respond to NTSB Safety 

Recommendation A–06–13 in which the 

NTSB recommended that the FAA 

require helicopter air ambulance 

operators ‘‘to develop and implement 

flight risk evaluation programs that 

include training all employees involved 

in the operation, procedures that 

support the systematic evaluation of 

flight risks, and consultation with others 

in EMS flight operations if the risks 

reach a predefined level.’’ This proposal 

also may contribute to a certificate 

holder’s overall safety program because 

a pre-flight risk assessment would be a 

method of incorporating proactive safety 

methods into a company’s flight 

operations. Accordingly, this proposal 

also would partially address NTSB 

Safety Recommendation A–09–89 

regarding the implementation of sound 

risk management practices. 

Certificate holders would be required 

to comply with this provision by the 

effective date of the final rule. 

e. Medical Personnel Pre-Flight Briefing 

(§ 135.619) 

The FAA is proposing to add 

§ 135.619 to require that medical 

personnel on board a helicopter air 

ambulance flight receive a supplemental 

pre-flight safety briefing with 

information specific to helicopter air 


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31HTAWS uses its position sources to determine 

a helicopter’s horizontal and vertical position and 

compare it to surrounding terrain. HTAWS derives 

a helicopter’s ground speed, position, and altitude 

from a global positioning system (GPS) and a preprogrammed algorithm database installed and 

maintained by the HTAWS manufacturer. 

32Notice 8000.293. 

ambulance flights. This information 

would be in addition to the passenger 

briefing currently required under part 

135. As an alternative to the proposed 

pre-flight safety briefing, certificate 

holders would be permitted to provide 

training every 2 years to medical 

personnel through an FAA-approved 

training program. This proposal would 

positively affect the safety of operations 

because as a result of an increased 

familiarity with the aircraft and 

emergency procedures, medical 

personnel would be less likely to 

inadvertently introduce risk to the 

operation when outfitting the passenger 

compartment the purpose of providing 

medical treatment and when providing 

medical care to a patient. 

The following accidents exemplify the 

types of accidents that this proposal is 

intended to prevent. 

On November 9, 2004, the pilot of a 

Bell 206L1 helicopter, operated under 

part 91 near Tulsa, OK, lost control 

during cruise flight and crashed causing 

substantial damage to the helicopter. 

The pilot stated that the medical 

personnel added two oxygen tanks in 

the cargo area before takeoff. The 

oxygen tanks were stacked and reached 

approximately the same height as the 

cargo area’s latch release. The NTSB 

noted the accident was caused by the 

loss of tail rotor drive as a result of a 

blanket coming in contact with the tail 

rotor blades after the baggage 

compartment door unlatched during 

flight. NTSB Accident Report 

DFW05LA019 (Feb. 24, 2005). 

On March 6, 2003, a pilot operating a 

Bell 206L–3 under part 91 lost control 

of the helicopter. No injuries were 

sustained by the flightcrew or medical 

personnel on board. Before takeoff to 

pick up a patient in Llano, TX, medical 

personnel opened and closed the aft 

cargo compartment. The NTSB noted 

that the accident was caused by a 

blanket from the aft cargo compartment 

that entered into the tail rotor blades 

causing the pilot’s loss of control. The 

NTSB determined that the aft cargo 

compartment lock was fully operational, 

and a contributing cause of the accident 

was medical personnel improperly 

securing this compartment. NTSB 

Accident Report FTW03LA104 (Aug. 26, 

2003). 

Under the proposal, certificate 

holders would be required to brief 

medical personnel before flight on 

specific topics including the 

physiological aspects of flight (how 

flight affects the human body), patient 

loading and unloading, safety in and 

around the aircraft, and emergency 

procedures. This briefing would 

supplement the passenger briefing 

requirements found in § 135.117(a) and 

(b). The FAA believes that an additional 

safety briefing is warranted because of 

the unique role of medical personnel on 

helicopter air ambulance flights, which 

may include working around an 

operating helicopter, patient loading 

and unloading, and providing medical 

care within a compact, moving, vehicle. 

The FAA would permit the briefing to 

be provided once per shift for medical 

personnel assigned to a helicopter air 

ambulance base. 

The FAA is proposing to allow 

certificate holders the option to provide 

safety training to medical personnel in 

lieu of the pre-flight briefing. Training 

topics would include the same topics 

addressed in the proposed pre-flight 

safety briefing. The FAA believes that it 

would be advantageous to certificate 

holders to implement medical personnel 

training programs. Training programs 

would help ensure that medical 

personnel serving on board their 

helicopters have enhanced knowledge 

of the required training topics and a 

greater familiarity with the aircraft than 

those who receive only the pre-flight 

briefing. The FAA anticipates that 

certificate holders who fly with a 

consistent group of medical personnel 

would take advantage of this provision 

to expedite operations. The proposal 

would require that the certificate 

holder’s training program be approved 

by the FAA, and that medical personnel 

receive training every 24 months. The 

training program would include a 

minimum of 4 hours of ground training 

and 4 hours of training in and around 

a helicopter air ambulance. In the event 

some medical personnel on board a 

helicopter air ambulance flight have 

received this training, but others have 

not, the pilot in command would be 

required to provide the proposed 

supplemental pre-flight safety briefing. 

The FAA notes that these provisions 

incorporate aspects of agency guidance 

in AC 135–14A, Emergency Medical 

Services/Helicopter, which includes 

suggested training for medical personnel 

in aviation terminology, use of medical 

equipment in the aircraft, physiological 

aspects of flight, and patient loading 

and unloading. This proposal also 

incorporates aspects of AC 00–64, 

including human factors, training, 

encouraging communications, and 

promoting standard operating 

procedures. 

Under the proposal, the FAA would 

require the certificate holder to 

document the training it provides to 

each individual who serves as medical 

personnel, and maintain a record of that 

training for 26 calendar months 

following the individual’s completion of 

training. This record would include the 

individual’s name, the most recent date 

that training was completed, and a 

description, copy, or reference to the 

training materials used. The FAA is 

proposing this period of time because 

the training provided to medical 

personnel would expire after 24 months, 

and the additional 60-day period would 

ensure that the records would be 

available for review by the FAA after the 

training had expired, if necessary. 

Certificate holders would be required 

to comply with this provision by the 

effective date of the final rule. 

2. Equipment Requirements 

a. Helicopter Terrain Awareness and 

Warning Systems (HTAWS) (§ 135.605) 

The FAA is proposing to add 

§ 135.605(a) to require that all 

helicopters used in air ambulance 

operations be equipped with HTAWS. 

The FAA believes that HTAWS would 

assist helicopter air ambulance pilots in 

maintaining situational awareness of 

surrounding terrain and obstacles, and 

therefore help prevent accidents caused 

by CFIT, loss of control, inadvertent 

flight into IMC, and night operations. 

HTAWS has particular relevance to 

helicopter air ambulance operations, 

which often are conducted at night and 

into unimproved landing sites. 

HTAWS 31 is a helicopter-specific 

application of TAWS technology. TAWS 

technology originally was developed for 

airplanes and is required on turbinepowered airplanes configured with six 

or more passenger seats used in part 135 

operations. In 2005, the FAA 

recommended that helicopter air 

ambulance operators consider using 

TAWS for night operations when 

conditions and mission dictate.32

However, TAWS technology presents 

operational difficulties, such as 

nuisance warnings, when used in 

helicopters. HTAWS takes into account 

that helicopters generally do not fly as 

fast as airplanes and typically operate 

closer to the ground in hazard-rich 

environments. HTAWS assesses the 

aircraft’s position over a smaller area of 

terrain than TAWS to prevent warnings 

to pilots of terrain or obstacles that do 

not immediately pose a hazard. The 

FAA believes that the decrease in 

nuisance warnings with HTAWS 

increases the usefulness of the 

equipment. It is because of these 


wwoods2 on DSK1DXX6B1PROD with PROPOSALS-PART 2
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33NTSB/SIR–06/01, p. 11. 

34 Id. 

35Flight Safety Foundation, Helicopter 

Emergency Medical Services (HEMS) Industry Risk 

Profile 43 (2009). 

36Air Medical Physician Association, A Safety 

Review and Risk Assessment in Air Medical 

Transport 15–17 (2002). 

significant differences that the FAA is 

proposing to require certificate holders 

to install HTAWS and would not accept 

TAWS designed for an airplane as an 

alternate means of compliance. 

In 2006, RTCA, Inc. established a 

special committee that developed 

RTCA/DO–309, Minimum Operational 

Performance Standards (MOPS) for 

Helicopter Terrain Awareness and 

Warning System (HTAWS) Airborne 

Equipment. The FAA subsequently 

issued TSO–C194, which sets out the 

minimum performance standards for 

HTAWS. A survey of FAA inspectors 

revealed that 41 percent of certificated 

helicopter air ambulance operators have 

started equipping their helicopter fleets 

with TAWS. However, the FAA did not 

ask in its survey whether these devices 

were compliant with TSOs for TAWS 

(TSO–C151, Terrain Awareness and 

Warning System) or HTAWS (TSO– 

C194). The FAA recognizes that some 

certificate holders voluntarily equipped 

their helicopters with TAWS, or other 

TAWS-like devices, that may not meet 

the standards of TSO–C194 for HTAWS. 

Nevertheless, the FAA is proposing that 

these certificate holders equip their 

helicopter air ambulances with HTAWS 

because of the differences between 

TAWS and HTAWS. The FAA proposes 

to incorporate the standards articulated 

in TSO–C194 by reference in 

§ 135.605(a). 

The FAA believes the following 

accident is illustrative of the type of 

accident that may be prevented if 

helicopters are equipped with HTAWS. 

On March 21, 2002, a Eurocopter AS– 

350B helicopter, returning to its base in 

Susanville, California, collided with the 

surface of a lake. The pilot became 

disoriented as they flew over the ‘‘glassy 

smooth’’ water, and subsequently 

descended ‘‘within 20 to 50 feet of the 

lake surface’’ and eventually struck the 

lake surface causing fatal injuries to the 

pilot and serious injuries to the medical 

personnel. The NTSB determined that 

the causal effect of the accident was the 

pilot’s failure ‘‘to maintain sufficient 

altitude/clearance above the water while 

performing a low altitude flight.’’ The 

NTSB also cited as contributing factors 

the ‘‘the glassy water conditions, and 

lack of visual cues concerning 

perception of altitude.’’ See NTSB 

Accident Report LAX02FA114 (Apr. 28, 

2004). 

In its January 25, 2006, Special 

Investigation Report on Emergency 

Medical Services Operations, the NTSB 

stated that the ‘‘use of terrain awareness 

and warnings systems would enhance 

the safety of emergency medical services 

flight operations by helping to prevent 

controlled flight into terrain accidents 

that occur at night or during adverse 

weather conditions.’’ 33 The NTSB cited 

the 2004 Pyote, TX, fatal accident in 

which a helicopter air ambulance 

transporting a patient crashed into 

terrain while maneuvering in reducedvisibility conditions. The NTSB stated 

that if ‘‘a TAWS had been installed and 

appropriately set to a minimum safe 

altitude setting, the pilots would have 

received ample warning during their 

respective aircraft’s gradual descent into 

terrain * * *.’’ The FAA notes that this 

proposal addresses NTSB Safety 

Recommendation A–06–15, which 

called on the FAA to require helicopter 

air ambulance operators ‘‘to install 

terrain awareness and warning systems 

on their aircraft and to provide adequate 

training to ensure that flight crews are 

capable of using the systems to safely 

conduct EMS operations.’’ 34

The FAA notes that other 

organizations recognize the value of 

HTAWS. The Flight Safety Foundation 

found that HTAWS could address riskassociated low-level VFR operations, 

especially at night.35 The Air Medical 

Physician Association noted that a team 

organized to study helicopter air 

ambulance accidents determined that 

TAWS could be a highly effective 

accident intervention strategy.36 The 

team made its determinations by 

reviewing the technical, financial, 

regulatory, and operational feasibility of 

its proposed interventions. 

Under the proposal, the FAA would 

give certificate holders 3 years from the 

effective date of the final rule to install 

HTAWS that meets the standards of 

TSO–C194. The FAA believes 3 years 

will provide ample time for the 

manufacture of an adequate supply of 

HTAWS units and for these units to be 

incorporated into helicopters. In 

addition, a 3-year compliance period 

will permit certificate holders to spread 

out the cost of compliance over that 

period of time. 

The FAA notes that it considered 

allowing certificate holders to use NVGs 

in lieu of HTAWS. However, the FAA 

has decided against such a proposal 

because NVGs may not be appropriate 

for all operations (for example, 

inadvertent flight into IMC), and 

additional time is needed to research 

the best use of the equipment before 

allowing it to be used as an alternate 

method of compliance. The FAA also 

considered requiring all commercial 

helicopters to be equipped with 

HTAWS; however, the agency believes 

the greatest benefit would be realized by 

helicopter air ambulance operators 

because a much greater percentage of 

their operations are conducted at night 

and in off-airway routing, and involve 

unimproved and unfamiliar landing 

areas. 

The FAA seeks comments on the 

proposed requirement to install 

HTAWS, the proposed implementation 

date, and possible alternatives to this 

provision. Comments should be 

accompanied by appropriate supporting 

documentation, data, and analysis. 

b. Light-Weight Aircraft Recording 

System (LARS) 

The FAA is considering requiring 

certificate holders conducting helicopter 

air ambulance operations to install a 

light-weight aircraft recording system 

(LARS) in their helicopters. The FAA 

would target this proposal towards the 

helicopter air ambulance industry 

because of the number of accidents 

experienced by this segment of the 

commercial helicopter industry. As 

discussed earlier in this NPRM, between 

1994 and 2008 helicopter air 

ambulances suffered a greater amount of 

accidents as compared with other 

commercial helicopters. 

LARS comprises a system or 

combination of systems which record a 

helicopter’s flight performance and 

operational data. The FAA is 

considering requiring the installation of 

LARS in order to provide critical 

information to investigators in the event 

of an accident. The FAA anticipates 

providing 3 years to allow sufficient 

time to procure and install LARS. 

Flight data recording devices are not 

widely used in the commercial 

helicopter air ambulance industry. 

Responses to FAA Notice 8900.63, 

Validation of HEMS Safety Initiatives, 

issued January 12, 2009, indicated that 

approximately 89 percent of existing 

helicopter air ambulance certificate 

holders have not equipped with a flight 

data recorder (FDR) system or an ‘‘FDRlike system.’’ The FAA believes that 

LARS can be used to assist accident 

investigations, as well as to promote 

operational safety, and that an equipage 

requirement may be warranted due to 

the small number of certificate holders 

that are using such devices. 

Currently, § 135.151 requires a 

cockpit voice recorder (CVR) system in 

rotorcraft with a passenger seating 

configuration of six or more seats and 

for which two pilots are required by 

certification or operating rules. In 

addition, § 135.152 requires FDRs in 


wwoods2 on DSK1DXX6B1PROD with PROPOSALS-PART 2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 196 / Tuesday, October 12, 2010 / Proposed Rules 62655 

37NTSB Safety Recommendations A–09–87 

through A–09–96, Sep. 24, 2009, p. 9. 

38See 14 CFR 13.401(e); 14 CFR part 193; 66 FR 

55042 (Oct. 31, 2001); Advisory Circular 120–82, 

Flight Operational Quality Assurance (Apr. 12, 

2004); FAA Order 8000.81, Designation of FOQA 

Information as Protected From Public Disclosure 

Under 14 CFR part 193 (Apr. 14, 2003). 

rotorcraft with a passenger seating 

configuration of 10 or more seats. Most 

helicopters used in air ambulance 

operations are configured with fewer 

than six seats and, therefore, are not 

equipped with CVRs or FDRs. The FAA 

would require installation of LARS for 

all helicopter air ambulances regardless 

of passenger seating capacity or the 

number of pilots required by 

certification or operating rules, unless a 

certificate holder could demonstrate 

that a CVR or FDR could be used to 

comply with any requirements. The 

FAA notes that § 135.152(k) excepts 

certain helicopters manufactured before 

August 18, 1997, from the FDR 

requirements of § 135.152. Nevertheless, 

if such helicopters are used in air 

ambulance operations, certificate 

holders would be required to equip 

those helicopters with LARS. 

The FAA notes that NTSB Safety 

Recommendation A–06–17 

recommended requiring all transportcategory rotorcraft operating under part 

91 or part 135 to be equipped with CVRs 

and FDRs. The FAA is not proposing to 

require traditional CVRs or FDRs in 

helicopter air ambulances, as required 

for other aircraft because of the cost and 

the weight of such equipment. CVR and 

FDR installation is a complex process 

that includes invasive access and 

modifications to install necessary 

sensors and wiring. The costs of a 

supplemental type certificate (STC) and 

the CVR and the FDR equipment could 

prove to be prohibitive for this 

application. In addition, helicopter air 

ambulances tend to be smaller than 

aircraft for which CVRs and FDRs are 

required, and available space and 

weight allotted for personnel and 

medical equipment are at a premium. 

An FAA review of Operations Safety 

System (OPSS) data showed that more 

than 70 percent of the helicopters listed 

on helicopter air ambulance operators’ 

certificates weigh less than 6,000 

pounds. A combination CVR and FDR is 

estimated to weigh up to 10 pounds 

compared with LARS that may weigh 

less than 1 pound to 5 pounds. 

Therefore, the FAA believes the weight 

of a CVR and an FDR would have a 

greater adverse impact on a helicopter 

air ambulance operator’s ability to 

provide medical care to a patient and on 

the performance characteristics of a 

smaller helicopter than LARS. 

LARS would be required to capture 

data according to a broadly defined set 

of parameters including information 

pertaining to the aircraft’s state (such as 

heading, altitude, and attitude), 

condition (such as rotors, transmission, 

engine parameters, and flight controls), 

and system performance (such as full 

authority digital engine control, and 

electronic flight instrumentation 

system). The FAA is considering 

requiring operation of a helicopter’s 

LARS from the application of electrical 

power before take-off until the removal 

of electrical power after termination of 

flight. LARS would have to receive 

electrical power from the helicopter’s 

bus that provides the maximum 

reliability for operation without 

jeopardizing service to essential or 

emergency loads. 

Requiring these devices to capture a 

comprehensive set of parameters, such 

as those in place for FDRs, see 14 CFR 

135.152, would significantly increase 

the cost of these units. The FAA 

estimates that LARS cost $6,450, plus 

installation and software to obtain data 

from the unit. The FAA believes that 

this requirement could be broadly and 

quickly implemented by the helicopter 

air ambulance industry in part because 

of the relatively low cost of these 

devices. 

The FAA acknowledges that LARS 

does not have the same crash 

survivability as CVRs and FDRs which 

are required by regulation to meet a 

crashworthiness standard. Nevertheless, 

the FAA believes that LARS will yield 

beneficial data when used in helicopter 

air ambulances. Helicopter accidents 

usually involve forces much less severe 

than airplane accidents, as the flight 

envelope is usually much smaller. For 

example, helicopter accidents seldom 

involve impact airspeed in excess of 150 

knots. Accidents which occur in hover 

operations typically involve speed less 

than 10 knots. Likewise, altitude ranges 

and vertical speeds are normally 

substantially less than the potential 

airplane accident profiles. These facts 

lend credence to the concept of LARS 

for accident investigation purposes 

using devices that are not hardened to 

the extent required by the Technical 

Standard Order for Flight Data 

Recorders or Cockpit Voice Recorders. 

In addition, the FAA’s Office of 

Accident Investigation and Prevention 

(AVP) reviewed helicopter air 

ambulance accident photographs from 

the last three years and found that the 

rear section of the tailboom (near the tail 

cone, tail rotor attachment and/or tail 

fin) has a high physical survival rate. 

This section of the aircraft often 

experiences the lowest deceleration 

loads (the rest of the aircraft has 

crumpled or disintegrated forward of 

the tail, absorbing or attenuating the 

deceleration), and is furthest from the 

fuel system, and hence usually 

unburned. This is most likely in 

straight-on impact, which is usually 

associated with controlled flight into 

terrain accidents. In loss of control 

accidents, where the mechanics of 

impact may be more varied, the rear of 

the tailboom usually survives. AVP 

estimated a survival rate of the rear of 

the tailboom structure (without 

structural compromise of burn damage) 

to be approximately 70 percent. 

Therefore, the FAA believes that a LARS 

memory module in the rear of the 

tailboom would allow a high potential 

for survival in the event of an accident. 

The FAA also notes that the NTSB 

found that LARS ‘‘are crash-resistant 

and can provide significant information 

for investigators to determine accident 

causation * * *.’’ 37

The proposal under consideration is 

to require the installation of LARS to 

provide event data to aid investigators 

after an accident. Currently, because 

most helicopter air ambulances are not 

equipped with flight data recording 

devices, investigators must piece 

together information pertaining to an 

accident from a variety of sources. LARS 

could provide precise technical data 

regarding the flight, such as heading, 

altitude, and attitude that may 

otherwise be unavailable. The FAA asks 

for comments on whether LARS will 

provide data that is valuable in an 

accident investigation. 

The FAA also invites comments on 

whether operators that are required to 

install LARS for accident investigation 

would also use those systems to 

improve daily operations, including 

whether operators would be more likely 

to participate in an FAA-approved 

Flight Operations Quality Assurance 

(FOQA) program if required to equip 

helicopters with LARS. A LARS could 

be used to collect digital flight data in 

an FAA-approved FOQA program. 

FOQA participants use the collected 

data to improve the safety of their 

operations, while the FAA uses the data 

to observe trends in operations and 

make system-wide safety enhancements 

based on those trends. In order to 

provide an incentive for participation in 

the FOQA program, the FAA protects 

certain voluntarily submitted FOQA 

data against public release and, except 

for criminal or deliberate actions, will 

not use FOQA data obtained from an 

operator’s FOQA program in an 

enforcement action against that operator 

or its employees.38 These protections 


wwoods2 on DSK1DXX6B1PROD with PROPOSALS-PART 2
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39See section III.B.3. of the preamble to this 

NPRM. 

are available only if the data is collected 

by the operator pursuant to a voluntary, 

FAA-approved, FOQA program. 

The FAA is also considering requiring 

certificate holders that conduct air 

ambulance operations to install LARS 

and create a program that would use 

data obtained from the device to analyze 

and mitigate risk. Certificate holders 

could use the LARS data to modify their 

operational and maintenance 

procedures, provide immediate 

feedback to pilots in training, and 

highlight areas in which additional 

training may be needed. Certificate 

holders also could use the data as a 

training tool during flight simulator 

training sessions to reproduce situations 

that actually occurred in its operations. 

Certificate holders would be required 

to collect flight performance and 

operational data that characterizes the 

state of the helicopter and its 

subsystems which the certificate holder 

determines is pertinent to its safety 

program. Each certificate holder would 

be required to document the procedures 

and tools it would use to download and 

analyze the data from LARS, and the 

procedures and criteria it would use to 

identify and evaluate the data from 

LARS to enhance safety in its 

operations. 

The FAA would require a certificate 

holder to establish a method to retrieve, 

analyze, and evaluate data that is 

collected by LARS. Under this proposal, 

the FAA intends to provide flexibility to 

certificate holders with respect to how 

each certificate holder uses its LARS 

data by allowing them to establish an 

individualized program that is unique to 

its operation. 

The FAA notes that this proposal 

would address NTSB Safety 

Recommendation A–09–90 that 

recommends requiring certificate 

holders to install flight data recording 

devices on helicopter air ambulances 

and to ‘‘establish a structured flight data 

monitoring program that reviews all 

available data sources to identify 

deviations from established norms and 

procedures and other potential safety 

issues.’’ Because the FAA would require 

LARS under this scenario, the data 

developed by operators would not be 

eligible for protection under 14 CFR part 

193, Protection of Voluntarily 

Submitted Information. 

Under this proposal, the FAA 

anticipates that certificate holders could 

use FDRs installed in helicopter air 

ambulances to comply with the LARS 

requirement. If the certificate holder is 

required under § 135.152 to have an 

FDR, it would be able to choose to use 

either the FDR or a certified quickaccess recorder (QAR) connected to the 

flight data acquisition unit to comply 

with this requirement. A QAR provides 

a means to access the data collected by 

a FDR without removing the FDR. The 

time and effort required to access and 

download data from the FDR could be 

prohibitive. The additional weight from 

a QAR installation is about 0.5 pounds. 

A QAR unit, STC, and support software 

can cost $10,000 to $15,000, compared 

to the cost and installation of a LARS of 

less than $10,000. In either case, the 

proposed requirement to show how this 

data is being used to improve the safety 

of flight operations would remain 

applicable. 

The FAA considered permitting a 

CVR as an alternate means of complying 

with the proposed requirement to use 

LARS in an accident prevention 

program. However, similar to an FDR, 

the data recorded on a CVR may be 

difficult to retrieve following a flight. 

CVRs may be installed in hard-to-access 

locations inhibiting access to the unit. 

Further, obtaining the data may require 

the certificate holder to remove the CVR 

from the aircraft in order to transfer the 

data in an audible format. This process 

is time-consuming and labor-intensive, 

potentially causing the helicopter to 

remain out of service for a period of 

time. A certificate holder may require an 

inventory of CVRs to replace a removed 

CVR and immediately return the 

helicopter to service. Although CVRs 

provide excellent post-accident 

information, the CVR data alone does 

not provide adequate information for an 

accident prevention program. The FAA 

believes that these inefficiencies, 

combined with the limited usefulness of 

a CVR, could present a significant 

barrier to using CVR information to 

improve the safety of a certificate 

holder’s operations. 

Although CVRs, FDRs, and QARs 

have been successfully implemented in 

several industry accident prevention 

programs, as discussed, the FAA does 

not believe that traditional recorders 

provide the most efficient means to 

collecting flight performance and 

operational data for helicopter air 

ambulances. In light of the fact that 

some helicopters currently used in air 

ambulance operations may be equipped 

with CVRs or FDRs, and given the 

comprehensive amount of data collected 

by and superior crashworthiness of 

those devices, the FAA calls for 

comments regarding how certificate 

holders could incorporate these devices 

into a program to enhance the safety of 

helicopter air ambulance operations. 

3. Pilot Requirements 

a. Instrument Rating (§ 135.603) 

The FAA is proposing to add 

§ 135.603 to require a helicopter air 

ambulance pilot to hold a helicopter 

instrument rating. 

Currently, § 135.243(a) and (b) require 

the pilot in command of a helicopter air 

ambulance to hold, at a minimum, a 

commercial pilot certificate. To obtain a 

commercial pilot certificate with a 

helicopter rating, § 61.129(c) requires 

that a pilot complete 10 hours of 

instrument training. However, 

helicopter air ambulance pilots are not 

required to hold instrument ratings 

unless they will be performing IFR or 

VFR over-the-top operations. In addition 

to other requirements, § 61.65 requires a 

pilot to complete 50 hours of crosscountry flight time as pilot in command 

and 40 hours of actual or simulated 

instrument time to obtain an instrument 

rating. 

As discussed previously, the FAA 

found that inadvertent flight into IMC is 

a common factor in helicopter air 

ambulance accidents. In general, many 

accidents result when pilots who lack 

the necessary skills or equipment to fly 

in marginal VMC or IMC attempt flight 

without outside references. This 

proposal is intended to ensure that 

helicopter air ambulance pilots are 

equipped to handle these situations and 

extract themselves from these dangerous 

situations. A pilot who receives the 

more extensive training on navigating a 

helicopter solely by reference to 

instruments provided by obtaining an 

instrument rating is better able to 

maintain situational awareness and 

maneuver the helicopter into a safe 

environment than a pilot without an 

instrument rating. 

The FAA is not proposing that a 

helicopter air ambulance pilot maintain 

instrument currency. This proposal is 

targeted to VFR operators because 

operators conducting IFR operations 

already must maintain instrument 

currency. The FAA has chosen this 

approach because, for VFR operators, 

this capability may require fewer 

resources than required to meet full 

currency requirements while 

maintaining adequate safety standards. 

Under this proposal, pilots would be 

required to demonstrate the ability to 

recover from inadvertent IMC during 

their annual competency checks.39 The 

FAA believes that pilots who learn basic 

instrument skills while obtaining an 

instrument rating, supplemented by 

preparation for an annual competency 


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40NTSB, Special Investigation Report on 

Emergency Medical Services Operations (NTSB/ 

SIR–06/01) 3 (Jan. 25, 2006). 

41A radio altimeter sends a radio wave to the 

ground and determines the height of aircraft above 

the surface by measuring the time it takes for the 

radio wave to be reflected back to the receiving 

unit. Altitude is then displayed on the aircraft’s 

control panel. Additionally, the pilot can select a 

low altitude indicator to alert him or her of a lowaltitude situation. 

check, will be adequately prepared to 

recover from an inadvertent IMC 

encounter. 

This proposal would take effect 3 

years after the effective date of the rule 

to allow helicopter air ambulance pilots 

who are not instrument-rated adequate 

time to pursue an instrument rating and 

to distribute the costs over a period of 

time. 

b. Flight and Duty Time Limitations 

(§§ 135.267 and 135.271) 

The FAA is proposing to amend 

§§ 135.267 and 135.271 to require 

helicopter air ambulance operations 

conducted with medical personnel on 

board to count towards a pilot’s daily 

flight time limitations. 

Currently, in certain situations, flight 

segments conducted without passengers 

but with medical personnel on board 

the helicopter are conducted under part 

91. Specifically, part 91 segments 

preceding part 135 segments are 

considered ‘‘other commercial flying’’ 

and count towards a pilot’s daily flight 

time limitations. Part 91 segments that 

follow part 135 segments do not count 

towards the daily flight time limitations 

under § 135.267 or § 135.271, although 

these flights count towards a flightcrew 

member’s quarterly and yearly flight 

time limitations because they are 

commercial flights. 

Helicopter air ambulance accidents 

have not been limited to flights 

conducted while patients were on board 

the aircraft. In fact, 35 of the 55 

accidents included in the NTSB’s 

January 2006 Special Investigation 

Report on Emergency Medical Services 

Operations, occurred with medical 

personnel but no patients were on 

board.40 The FAA, therefore, is 

proposing to provide additional 

protections to medical crewmembers on 

flights, which under the current rules, 

would be conducted under part 91. 

As previously discussed, the FAA is 

proposing to apply part 135 rules to all 

helicopter air ambulance flights with 

medical personnel on board. This would 

have the effect of bringing such flight 

segments of a helicopter air ambulance 

operation under the part 135 flight and 

duty rules. The changes proposed to 

§§ 135.267 and 135.271 emphasize that 

all flight time in helicopter air 

ambulance operations would be 

considered flight time that counts 

towards a pilot’s daily fight time 

limitations. 

The FAA notes that these proposed 

changes respond to NTSB Safety 

Recommendation A–06–12. In that 

recommendation, the NTSB recognized 

that part 135 and part 91 differ 

regarding crew rest requirements—part 

135 contains flight time limitations and 

rest requirements while part 91 does 

not. The NTSB emphasized in that 

recommendation that the phases of 

flight that involve transporting medical 

personnel, patient drop-off, and aircraft 

positioning comprise the EMS mission 

and should not be differentiated. The 

NTSB concluded that the safety of EMS 

operations would be improved if the 

entire EMS flight operated under part 

135 operations specifications. 

Certificate holders would be required 

to comply with this provision by the 

effective date of the final rule. 

B. Commercial Helicopters Operations 

(Including Air Ambulance Operations) 

The following provisions would apply 

to all commercial helicopter operations, 

including helicopter air ambulance 

operations, conducted under part 135. 

These proposals include new 

operational and equipment 

requirements for affected certificate 

holders. 

1. Operational Procedures 

a. IFR Alternate Airport Weather 

Minima (§ 135.221) 

The FAA is proposing to amend 

§ 135.221 to revise the alternate airport 

weather minima for helicopter IFR 

operations. Currently, pilots conducting 

IFR operations must designate an 

alternate airport at which the weather 

conditions will be at or above the 

authorized landing minima at the 

estimated time of arrival. 

Under the proposal, for part 97 

instrument approach procedures or 

special instrument approach 

procedures, to designate an airport as an 

alternate, the ceiling at the alternate 

airport would need to be 200 feet above 

the minimum for the approach to be 

flown, and the visibility would need to 

be at least 1 statute mile, but never less 

than the minimum visibility for the 

approach to be flown. For airports 

without a part 97 instrument approach 

or no special instrument approach 

procedure, the ceiling and visibility 

minima would be those allowing 

descent from the minimum en route 

altitude, approach, and landing under 

VFR. 

The FAA notes that the proposal 

recognizes the differences in operating 

characteristics between helicopters and 

airplanes. Helicopters fly shorter 

distances at slower airspeeds than most 

other aircraft, carry less fuel than an 

airplane, and generally remain in the air 

for shorter periods of time between 

landings. As a result, it is often more 

difficult for a helicopter to fly out of a 

weather system to an alternate 

destination. In addition, the destination 

airport and alternate airport are likely to 

be in the same air mass and thus 

experiencing similar weather. Therefore, 

requiring pilots to use increased 

weather minima when selecting an 

alternate airport would improve the 

likelihood of landing at the alternate 

airport if weather conditions in the area 

deteriorate while the helicopter is en 

route. 

The FAA notes that it adapted this 

proposal from the current alternate 

airport weather requirement in § 91.169 

and from the weather minima in 

Operations Specification H105 issued to 

part 135 helicopter operators 

conducting IFR operations. The FAA 

also notes that the Part 125/135 ARC 

recommended a similar change. 

Certificate holders would be required 

to comply with this provision by the 

effective date of the final rule. 

2. Equipment Requirements 

a. Radio Altimeter (§ 135.160) 

The FAA is proposing to add 

§ 135.160 to require radio altimeters for 

all helicopters operated under part 135. 

Certificate holders would have 3 years 

from the effective date of the final rule 

to comply. Currently, part 135 does not 

require radio altimeters for any aircraft. 

However, under FAA Operations 

Specification A050, helicopter operators 

authorized to use night vision goggles in 

night operations are required to use 

radio altimeters. 

Radio altimeters are designed to 

inform the pilot of the aircraft’s actual 

height above the ground.41 A radio 

altimeter can greatly improve a pilot’s 

awareness of height above the ground 

(AGL) during hover, landing in 

unimproved landing zones (rough field 

landings), and landings in confined 

areas where a more vertical approach 

may be required. Additionally, radio 

altimeters help increase situational 

awareness during inadvertent flight into 

IMC, night operations, and flat-light, 

whiteout, and brownout conditions. In 

all of these conditions, pilots lose their 

reference to the horizon and to the 

ground. 

Radio altimeters are proven 

technology that is relatively low-cost, 


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reliable, and user-friendly. According to 

a January 2009 FAA survey of certificate 

holders authorized to conduct 

helicopter air ambulance operations, 89 

percent of helicopter air ambulance 

operators have installed radio altimeters 

on their aircraft. The FAA estimates, 

based on a sampling of certificate 

holders, that 75 percent of helicopters 

used in other part 135 operations are 

currently equipped with radio 

altimeters. 

The FAA believes that the following 

accident illustrates the type of accident 

that may have been prevented with the 

use of radio altimeters. On May 31, 

2006, a Bell 206L–1 helicopter, 

operating under 14 CFR part 135 and 

originating in Juneau, AK, collided with 

terrain while maneuvering in reduced 

visibility over an ice field. The pilot 

encountered whiteout and flat light 

conditions, and fog. The pilot and two 

out of the six passengers received minor 

injuries. During the investigation, the 

pilot stated that he could not ‘‘discern 

the ground below him due to the flat 

light conditions.’’ The NTSB cited ‘‘the 

pilot’s failure to maintain adequate 

altitude/clearance from terrain while 

maneuvering in adverse weather 

conditions’’ as the probable cause of the 

accident. The NTSB further noted that 

the helicopter was not equipped with a 

radio altimeter. See NTSB Accident 

Report ANC06LA066 (Feb. 26, 2007). 

The proposal would respond to NTSB 

Safety Recommendation A–02–35, 

which was issued after the 

investigations of several accidents in 

which flat-light or whiteout conditions 

were mentioned as the probable cause. 

In its recommendation, the NTSB noted 

that radio altimeters, currently not 

required for helicopters, might aid pilots 

in recognizing proximity to the ground 

in flat-light and whiteout conditions. 

In addition, the FAA notes that the 

proposal would respond to the Part 125/ 

135 ARC’s recommendation to require 

installation of radio altimeters in 

helicopter air ambulances. For the 

reasons discussed above, however, the 

FAA is proposing broader use of radio 

altimeters to increase safety in all part 

135 rotorcraft operations. 

The FAA notes that this proposed rule 

would require helicopter air ambulances 

to be equipped with both HTAWS and 

a radio altimeter. Additionally, other 

commercial helicopter operators may 

opt to voluntarily equip their 

helicopters with HTAWS. The FAA 

considered whether to permit devices 

that perform functions similar to radio 

altimeters, such as HTAWS, to satisfy 

the radio altimeter requirement. 

However, the FAA has determined that 

either an FAA-approved radio altimeter, 

or other device that measures an 

aircraft’s altitude by sending a signal to 

the ground, should be required because 

of the accuracy of information obtained 

from those units and the method by 

which that information is collected. 

Some HTAWS are passive and derive 

the aircraft’s ground speed, position, 

and altitude from a GPS and a 

preprogrammed algorithm database 

installed and maintained by the 

HTAWS manufacturer. Additionally, 

altitude indications on such systems 

often rely on the pilot setting the correct 

barometric pressure, which may change 

rapidly, to obtain an accurate reading. 

The FAA is concerned that passive 

systems may not provide as accurate an 

altitude reading for pilots experiencing 

brownout or white-out conditions while 

close to the ground. A radio altimeter is 

an active system that provides real-time 

information to the pilot regarding the 

aircraft’s height above the terrain, 

including elevated heliports and 

buildings, by sending and receiving a 

signal from the aircraft. Radio altimeters 

are also not subject to variations in 

barometric pressure. The FAA notes that 

an HTAWS that incorporates or works 

in conjunction with a radio altimeter 

function would meet the requirements 

of this proposal. The FAA seeks 

comment on the requirement to install 

a radio altimeter, and the safety benefits 

of installing both HTAWS and a radio 

altimeter. The FAA also seeks 

comments on the proposed effective 

date of this provision. 

b. Safety Equipment for Over-Water 

Flights (§§ 1.1, 135.167, and 135.168) 

The FAA is proposing to revise the 

definition of extended over-water 

operation in § 1.1 as it applies to 

helicopters. The FAA also is proposing 

to amend § 135.167 to exclude rotorcraft 

and add § 135.168 prescribing graduated 

emergency equipment requirements for 

rotorcraft based on the distance the 

rotorcraft is operating from the 

shoreline. Certificate holders would 

have 3 years from the effective date of 

the final rule to comply with proposed 

§ 135.168. 

Currently, under § 91.205(b)(12) and 

§ 135.183, a passenger-carrying 

helicopter operating over water at an 

altitude that would not permit it to 

reach land in the event of engine failure 

must be equipped with approved 

flotation gear for each passenger and, 

unless it is a multiengine helicopter that 

meets certain performance 

requirements, helicopter floatation 

devices. Additionally, a helicopter 

engaged in extended over-water 

operations (currently defined as more 

than 50 NM from the nearest shoreline 

or offshore heliport structure) is 

required to carry the equipment listed in 

§ 135.167. 

Under proposed § 1.1, the reference to 

offshore heliport structures would be 

removed from the definition of 

‘‘extended over-water operation’’ for 

helicopters. As a result, any operation 

conducted more than 50 NM from the 

nearest shoreline would be an extended 

over-water operation, regardless of 

proximity to offshore heliport 

structures. The FAA recognizes that the 

current rule permits helicopters to travel 

long distances from shore without 

carrying safety equipment other than 

floatation devices and life preservers, as 

long as they remain within 50 miles of 

an offshore heliport. In the Gulf of 

Mexico, for example, some offshore oil 

platforms are located 150 NM from the 

shoreline. The FAA is concerned that 

offshore heliports may not provide the 

same search and rescue capabilities as 

are available on shore, such as Coast 

Guard patrols and a greater number of 

vessels in the vicinity. Accordingly, the 

FAA believes that this change would 

increase safety by eliminating the ability 

to hopscotch from heliport to heliport at 

great distances from shore without 

carrying water survival safety 

equipment. 

Under proposed rule § 135.168, a 

helicopter operating over water beyond 

autorotational distance from the 

shoreline but within 50 NM of the 

shoreline would be required to carry, 

among other equipment—life 

preservers; a 406 megahertz (MHz) 

emergency locator transmitter that 

meets the requirements of TSO–C126a, 

406 MHz Emergency Locator 

Transmitter (ELT), a pyrotechnic 

signaling device; and electronically 

deployable or externally mounted life 

rafts. For extended over-water 

operations, a helicopter would need to 

be equipped with the equipment 

required for over water operations, as 

well as additional survival equipment 

prescribed in proposed § 135.168. 

The FAA is proposing to require a 406 

MHz ELT for several reasons. As 

indicated in previous rulemakings, the 

406 MHz ELT provides an enhancement 

and more life-saving benefits, especially 

for over-water operations, than the 

121.5/243 MHz ELT. See 65 FR 81316 

(Dec. 22, 2000); 59 FR 32050 (Jun. 21, 

1994). These benefits include a 

narrower search area, a stronger signal 

resulting in less interference, and the 

ability to code the transmitter with the 

owner’s or aircraft’s identification. 

Further, as of February 1, 2009, the 

international search-and-rescue satellite 

system, known as COSPAS–SARSAT, 

ceased monitoring 121.5 MHz ELTs in 


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42FAA–S–8081–16A. 

response to guidance from the 

International Civil Aviation 

Organization (ICAO) and the 

International Maritime Organization 

(IMO). These organizations mandate 

safety requirements for aircraft and 

maritime vessels and have recognized 

the limitations of the 121.5 MHz 

beacons and the superior capabilities of 

the 406 MHz alerting system. 

Among the equipment that would be 

required under proposed § 135.168 for 

operations conducted beyond 

autorotational distance from shore are 

electronically deployable or externally 

mounted life rafts. The FAA believes 

that life rafts, in addition to life 

preservers, are necessary safety 

equipment in the event of ditching. 

Passengers and crewmembers who are 

forced to exit a helicopter in water may 

be subject to strong currents and waves, 

making it difficult to swim or float with 

a life preserver for long periods of time. 

In addition, a person in a life raft is not 

as affected by cold water temperatures 

and is more visible to rescuers than if 

he or she is in the water. In accidents 

involving over-water operations, rescue 

aircraft can experience difficulty 

locating and reaching a downed 

helicopter because of the strength of the 

currents in which a ditching occurred 

and inaccurate coordinates provided by 

the pilot experiencing the emergency. 

Passenger access to emergency 

equipment sufficient to remain afloat for 

the period of time it is likely to take a 

rescue mission to reach the site 

enhances survivability. 

The proposed requirement for 

electronically deployable or externally 

mounted life rafts would increase the 

likelihood that these items would be 

available during an emergency. In two 

accidents investigated by the NTSB, 

helicopters sank before passengers 

could deploy the life rafts that were on 

board. 

One accident cited by NTSB occurred 

off the coast of Texas in 2005 following 

an in-flight fire and eventual dualengine power loss. When the helicopter, 

which was operating under part 135, hit 

the water, it sank so rapidly that neither 

of the two life rafts stored under the 

cabin seats were retrieved before the 

helicopter sank. The occupants, all of 

whom were wearing personal flotation 

devices, survived; however, some 

occupants suffered hypothermia during 

the 71⁄2 hours that elapsed before they 

were rescued. The NTSB noted that, 

although the survivors’ personal 

flotation devices were equipped with 

locator lights, the U.S. Coast Guard 

search and rescue crews, using nightvision goggles, reported that the lights 

were barely visible at night in the waters 

of the Gulf of Mexico. NTSB Accident 

Report DFW05MA230 (Apr. 28, 2009). 

In another accident, which occurred 

in 2003, a helicopter operating under 

part 135 experienced engine failure over 

the Gulf of Mexico and ditched. The 

pilot and four passengers evacuated and 

inflated their personal flotation devices; 

however, the pilot and one passenger 

died and the other passengers were 

seriously injured before the rescue team 

arrived. The helicopter was equipped 

with a life raft located under the cabin 

seats, but it was not deployed. Surviving 

passengers indicated that they were not 

briefed about the location of the life raft. 

The NTSB noted ‘‘[w]ith better access to 

life rafts stored on board the aircraft and 

better signaling devices, occupants 

would have had a greater chance of 

surviving.’’ NTSB Accident Report 

FTW03FA097 (Apr. 28, 2005). 

The FAA notes that these proposals 

address NTSB Safety Recommendation 

A–07–87 that recommends all existing 

and new turbine-powered helicopters 

operating in the Gulf of Mexico and 

certificated with five or more seats be 

equipped with externally mounted life 

rafts large enough to accommodate all 

occupants. Additionally, they address 

NTSB Safety Recommendation A–07–88 

that recommends all offshore helicopter 

operators in the Gulf of Mexico provide 

their flight crews with personal flotation 

devices equipped with a waterproof, 

global-positioning-system-enabled 406 

megahertz personal locater beacon, as 

well as one other signaling device, such 

as a signaling mirror or strobe light. 

Additionally, the Part 125/135 ARC 

recommended that the FAA amend its 

regulations to base emergency 

equipment requirements on the distance 

a helicopter operates from the shoreline. 

The FAA agrees with the Part 125/135 

ARC’s recommendation, and believes its 

proposed changes would result in a 

higher level of safety because of the 

enhanced safety equipment carried by 

helicopters operating over water. 

The FAA points out that the proposed 

safety equipment requirements for 

helicopters differ from those for 

airplanes. This distinction is made for 

two reasons. First, helicopters generally 

operate at lower altitudes than 

passenger-carrying aircraft. In the Gulf 

of Mexico, helicopters serving oil rigs 

typically operate at altitudes below 

10,000 feet. These lower altitudes leave 

little power-off glide capability. Second, 

airplanes are designed with certain 

features that enable them to float for a 

period of time after ditching, such as 

doors above the waterline, closeable 

outflow valves in the wings, and, in 

some airplanes, pressurized cabins. 

Helicopters do not incorporate these 

design features and behave less 

predictably when ditched. Therefore, 

the FAA believes that helicopter 

passengers should have additional 

protections for survival in water if they 

need to exit the helicopter after 

ditching. 

3. Training—Recovery From Inadvertent 

Flight Into IMC (§ 135.293) 

The FAA is proposing to amend 

§ 135.293 to require helicopter pilots to 

demonstrate recovery from an 

inadvertent IMC encounter and 

understand procedures for aircraft 

handling in flat-light, whiteout, and 

brownout conditions. 

The current regulations do not require 

a pilot to demonstrate safely 

maneuvering an aircraft back into VMC 

following an inadvertent flight into IMC 

during a § 135.293 competency check. 

Pilots seeking a commercial or airline 

transport pilot (ATP) certificate are not 

required to demonstrate an IMC 

recovery during the initial examination. 

A demonstration of IMC recovery is not 

included in the currency requirements 

for any pilot certificate. However, the 

FAA requires demonstration of Lost 

Procedures and Radio Navigation and 

Radar Services, which contain 

components similar to IMC recovery 

procedures under, the Commercial Pilot 

Practical Test Standards for 

Rotorcraft.42 In AC 135–14A, the FAA 

also recommends that helicopter air 

ambulance pilots obtain training in 

basic instrument flying skills to assist in 

recovery from inadvertent flight into 

IMC. 

Under this proposal, § 135.293 would 

require a pilot to demonstrate a realistic 

course of action that he or she might 

take to escape from inadvertent IMC 

during a competency check. The FAA 

understands that aircraft are configured 

differently and instrument approaches 

may not be readily available in all 

places where helicopters operate. 

Therefore, the FAA would permit 

flexibility in the method by which a 

pilot meets the demonstration 

requirement and expects that inspectors 

would approve methods appropriate to 

the aircraft, equipment, and facilities 

available. 

The proposal would require that the 

demonstration be scenario-based and 

include attitude instrument flying, 

recovery from unusual attitudes, 

navigation, ATC communications, and 

at least one instrument approach. The 

check-pilot should coordinate with 

ATC, if available, before the execution 

of the scenario to inform ATC that 

exercises will be performed with VFRVerDate Mar<15>2010 15:04 Oct 08, 2010 Jkt 223001 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4702 E:\FR\FM\12OCP2.SGM 12OCP2

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43Legal Interpretation to Stanley L. Bernstein, 

from Rebecca B. MacPherson, Assistant Chief 

Counsel for Regulations (Nov. 11, 2009), available 

at http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/ 

headquarters_offices/agc/pol_adjudication/agc200/ 

Interpretations/. 

equipped helicopter and that radar 

vectors and directional turns will be 

requested. If the aircraft is appropriately 

equipped and the check is conducted at 

a location where an ILS is operational, 

the pilot should demonstrate an ILS 

approach. If the pilot is unable to 

conduct an ILS approach, he or she 

should demonstrate a GPS approach if 

the aircraft is equipped to do so and the 

pilot is properly trained. If neither an 

ILS nor GPS procedure can be 

performed, the pilot should perform 

another instrument approach. Partial 

panel operations, during which 

instrument failure or loss of 

instrumentation is simulated, should be 

considered if sufficient instruments are 

available from single sources. 

The proposal also would require a 

pilot to demonstrate knowledge of the 

methods for avoiding the conditions 

described above and the proper aircraft 

handling on a written or oral test. To 

satisfy these requirements, the FAA 

anticipates that pilots would receive 

training on items such as landing zone 

reconnaissance, risk mitigation, 

maintaining situational awareness and 

decision-making on whether to land or 

choose an alternate landing site. 

This provision would take effect on 

the effective date of the final rule. 

In 2002, the NTSB issued Safety 

Recommendations A–02–33 and A–02– 

34 after investigating five commercial 

helicopter accidents in Alaska in which 

flat-light or whiteout conditions were 

thought to be the probable cause of the 

accidents. In its recommendations, the 

NTSB expressed concern that 

commercial helicopter operators who 

operate in such conditions are not 

required to be instrument-rated or to 

demonstrate instrument competency, 

and that those pilots are not provided 

with the training necessary to operate 

safely in such conditions. The NTSB 

therefore recommended in Safety 

Recommendation A–02–33 that the FAA 

require all helicopter pilots who 

conduct commercial, passenger-carrying 

flights in areas where flat light or 

whiteout conditions routinely occur to 

possess a helicopter-specific instrument 

rating and to demonstrate their 

instrument competency during initial 

and recurrent pilot testing required 

under 14 CFR 135.293. In addition, in 

Safety Recommendation A–02–34, the 

NTSB recommended requiring all 

commercial helicopter operators 

conducting passenger-carrying flights in 

areas where flat light or whiteout 

conditions routinely occur to include 

safe practices for operating in flat light 

or whiteout conditions in their 

approved training programs. 

This proposed rule also would 

address NTSB Safety Recommendation 

A–09–87 that calls for development of 

scenario-based pilot training for 

helicopter air ambulance pilots that 

included inadvertent flight into IMC 

and hazards unique to helicopter air 

ambulance operations, and determine 

how frequently this training is required 

to ensure proficiency. 

C. Miscellaneous 

1. Part 91 Weather Minima (§ 91.155) 

The FAA is proposing to revise 

§ 91.155 to prescribe visibility minima 

for helicopters operating under part 91 

in Class G airspace. Section 91.155(b)(1) 

currently requires helicopters operating 

under VFR, at 1,200 feet or less above 

the surface, to remain clear of clouds 

and operate at a speed that permits the 

pilot adequate opportunity to see any air 

traffic or obstruction in time to avoid a 

collision. The FAA is concerned that the 

current standard does not provide an 

adequate margin of safety for pilots who 

may suddenly encounter IMC because of 

rapidly changing weather. The FAA is 

also concerned that the ‘‘clear of clouds’’ 

standard, without an associated 

minimum visibility, may encourage 

‘‘scud running’’ in which pilots fly at a 

continually decreasing altitude to 

remain clear of lowering clouds in an 

attempt to stay in VFR conditions. 

Consequently, the FAA is proposing a 

minimum visibility standard of 1⁄2

statute mile during the day, and 1 

statute mile at night, for helicopters 

operating under VFR at 1,200 feet or less 

above the surface in Class G airspace. 

This proposal would provide a greater 

margin of safety for operators because 

pilots would be required to maintain a 

fixed amount of visibility, and would be 

less likely to suddenly encounter IMC. 

In addition to the proposed visibility 

minima, the proposed rule would retain 

the current requirement to remain clear 

of clouds. 

This provision would take effect on 

the effective date of the final rule. 

2. Load Manifest Requirements for All 

Part 135 Aircraft (§ 135.63) 

The FAA is proposing to revise the 

requirements of § 135.63 to apply to all 

aircraft operated under part 135 and to 

permit electronic transmission of 

manifest copies. In considering this 

proposal for commercial operations, the 

FAA determined this requirement 

would be beneficial for all part 135 

operations. Currently, § 135.63 requires 

the preparation of a load manifest 

detailing information such as aircraft 

weight, center of gravity, crewmember 

identification, and other aircraft 

information before a flight involving a 

multiengine aircraft. The load manifest 

must be prepared in duplicate, and one 

copy must be carried on board the 

aircraft to its destination. Section 135.63 

currently does not prescribe any specific 

action for the copy of the load manifest 

not carried on board the aircraft. 

However, the FAA has advised 

certificate holders to incorporate 

procedures in their operations manuals 

for the disposition of the duplicate 

copy.43

In the past, multiengine airplanes 

were the predominant means of 

transportation under part 135. Recently, 

single-engine passenger carrying aircraft 

have increased in size and capacity and, 

therefore their use in on-demand 

operations has increased. In 2005, the 

125/135 ARC recommended that the 

FAA amend load manifest requirements 

to include all part 135 aircraft. The FAA 

finds that all operators carrying 

passengers for hire must generate a 

manifest, regardless of the type of 

aircraft operated. In the event of an 

emergency, the operator must be able to 

account for aircraft occupants and, in 

the case of a fatal or serious accident, 

contact next of kin. Additionally, the 

FAA believes that, in the event of an 

accident, load manifest information 

pertaining to the aircraft’s weight and 

balance would be useful in determining 

whether the aircraft was loaded within 

the aircraft’s center-of-gravity limits and 

maximum allowable takeoff weight. 

Therefore a copy of the load manifest 

should be available if the copy on the 

aircraft is destroyed. 

This proposal would respond to 

NTSB Safety Recommendation A–99– 

61. That recommendation followed a 

1997 accident in which a single-engine 

aircraft operating under part 135 and 

not equipped with an FDR collided with 

terrain, killing the pilot and all eight 

passengers. The NTSB determined that 

weight and balance may have played a 

role. The NTSB expressed concern that 

‘‘single-engine operators may not 

consistently give weight and balance 

calculations the attention necessary to 

ensure safe flight,’’ and noted that 

§ 135.63(c) currently requires only 

operators of multiengine aircraft to 

prepare an accurate load manifest in 

duplicate before each take off. The 

NTSB therefore recommended that the 

FAA amend the regulation ‘‘to apply to 

single-engine as well as multiengine 

aircraft.’’ 


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In addition, the FAA is proposing to 

eliminate the requirement that the load 

manifest be prepared in duplicate for 

certificate holders who elect to 

electronically transmit the information 

contained in the load manifest to their 

operations base before take off. A 

certificate holder electing this option 

would be permitted to transmit the 

information by facsimile, e-mail, online 

form, or other electronic means and the 

information must be received by the 

certificate holder’s base of operations or 

other approved location before take off. 

This would ensure that the load 

manifest information is available in the 

event that the copy carried on board the 

aircraft is destroyed. If a certificate 

holder does not elect to transmit load 

manifest information electronically, it 

would be required to prepare the load 

manifest in duplicate. Additionally, the 

proposed rule would require the pilot in 

command to arrange for a copy of the 

load manifest to be sent to the certificate 

holder, retained in a suitable place at 

the takeoff location, or retained in 

another location approved by the FAA. 

The FAA notes that the proposed 

regulation would not alter the 

requirement that a copy of the load 

manifest must be carried on board the 

aircraft to its final destination, although 

that copy may be in an electronic 

format. In addition, the proposal would 

not change the required content of the 

load manifest. 

Certificate holders would be required 

to comply with this provision by the 

effective date of the final rule. 

While the FAA believes that proposed 

change could improve safety by 

enhancing pre-flight planning by pilots 

conducting part 135 operations, in its 

full Regulatory Evaluation (in the public 

docket for this rulemaking) the agency 

estimates it could impose costs of $134 

million or $82 million present value. 

The FAA estimates that the present 

value benefits at 7% over 10 years 

would be $20 million. The FAA seeks 

comments, accompanied by data, on 

how these costs could be reduced and 

how benefits could be increased while 

maintaining an equivalent level of 

safety. 

IV. Paperwork Reduction Act 

This proposal contains the following 

new information collection 

requirements. As required by the 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 

U.S.C. 3507(d)), the FAA has submitted 

the information requirements associated 

with this proposal to the Office of 

Management and Budget for its review. 

Use: The information collection 

would enable helicopter air ambulance 

operators to verify that risk analyses are 

being performed and that safety 

procedures and training requirements 

are being followed. In the event of an 

accident, the FAA and other entities 

could examine these records. 

Number of Respondents: 17,237. 

Estimate of Annual Burdens: The 

following proposals would result in 

recordkeeping burdens. 

(1) Require certificate holders 

performing helicopter air ambulance 

operators to implement pre-flight riskanalysis programs (§ 135.615): This 

proposal would require that certificate 

holders outline procedures for 

conducting pre-flight risk-analysis 

programs in their operations manuals. 

The following estimate corresponds to 

section A.1.d. of the economic 

evaluation. 

Cost to Helicopter Air Ambulance 

Operators To Develop a Pre-Flight Risk 

Analysis Program 

Air ambulance operators = 73 

Time needed to develop risk analysis 

program = 60 hours 

Salary of helicopter pilot = $48 per hour 

First-Year Cost 

Cost: 73 × 60 × $48 = $210,240 

Time: 73 × 60 = 4,380 hours 

Subsequent Years: Per-Year Costs 

Cost: $0 

Time: 0 hours 

Total Over 10 Years 

Cost: $210,240 

Time: 4,380 hours 

Average per Year 

Cost: $210,240/10 = $21,024 

Time: 4,380 hours/10 = 438 hours 

Cost for Pilots To Perform a Pre-Flight 

Risk Analysis Before Each Flight 

Air ambulance Helicopters = 989 

Operations per year per aircraft = 367 

Time needed for risk analysis = 10/60 

hour 

Salary of helicopter pilot = $48 per hour 

First-Year Cost 

Cost: 989 × 367 × (10/60) × $48 = 

$2,903,704 

Time: 989 × 367 × (10/60) = 60,494 

hours 

Subsequent Years: Per-Year Costs 

Cost: 989 × 367 × (10/60) × $48 = 

$2,903,704 

Time: 989 × 367 × (10/60) = 60,494 

hours 

Total Over 10 Years 

Cost: $2,903,704 × 10 = $29,037,040 

Time: 60,494 hours × 10 = 604,940 

hours 

Average per Year 

Cost: $29,037,040/10 = $2,903,704 

Time: 604,940 hours/10 = 60,494 hours 

(2) Require air ambulance operators 

with 10 or more helicopters to have an 

operations control center to 

communicate with pilots, advise pilots 

of weather conditions, and provide 

flight-following services (§ 135.617): 

This proposal would require certificate 

holders to train and test operations 

control specialists and retain records on 

those employees. 

The following estimate corresponds to 

section A.1.b. of the economic 

evaluation. 

Cost of Maintaining Records for the 

Operations Control Specialists’ Training 

and Examinations 

Operations control specialists = 288 

Time needed for a clerical person to 

maintain records of the training and 

examinations = 5/60 hour 

Salary of clerical person = $26 per hour 

First-Year Cost 

Cost: 288 × (5/60) × $26 = $624 

Time: 288 × (5/60) = 24 hours 

Subsequent Years: Per-Year Costs 

Cost: 288 × (5/60) × $26 = $624 

Time: 288 × (5/60) = 24 hours 

Total Over 10 Years 

Cost: $624 × 10 = $6,240 

Time: 24 hours × 10 = 240 hours 

Average per Year 

Cost: $6,240/10 = $624 

Time: 240 hours/10 = 24 hours 

(3) Require additional VFR flight 

planning (§ 135.613): This proposal 

would require helicopter air ambulance 

pilots to perform pre-flight planning. 

Certificate holders would need to 

outline procedures for pre-flight 

planning in their operations manuals. 

The following estimate corresponds to 

section A.1.c. of the economic 

evaluation. 

Cost To Helicopter Air Ambulance 

Operators To Establish Procedures To 

Evaluate, Analyze, and Use Additional 

VFR Flight Planning in Their Operations 

Manuals 

Air ambulance helicopters = 989 

Operations per year per aircraft = 367 

Time needed for the flight planning = 5/ 

60 hour 

Salary of helicopter pilot = $48 per hour 

First-Year Cost 

Cost: 989 × 367 × (5/60) × $48 = 

$1,451,852 

Time: 989 × 367 × (5/60) = 30,247 hours 


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Subsequent Years: Per-Year Costs 

Cost: 989 × 367 × (5/60) × $48 = 

$1,451,852 

Time: 989 × 367 × (5/60) = 30,247 hours 

Total Over 10 Years 

Cost: $1,451,852 × 10 = $14,518,520 

Time: 30,247 hours × 10 = 302,470 

hours 

Average per Year 

Cost: $14,518,520/10 = $1,451,852 

Time: 302,470 hours/10 = 30,247 hours 

(4) Light-weight aircraft recording 

system (LARS) on helicopter air 

ambulances: The FAA is seeking 

comment on whether to require that 

certificate holders install LARS on their 

helicopter air ambulances and outline 

procedures for evaluating and using 

LARS data in their operations manuals. 

The following estimate corresponds to 

section A.2.b. of the economic 

evaluation. 

One-Time Cost to Helicopter Air 

Ambulance Operators To Install LARS 

Helicopter air ambulances = 989 

Unit cost to equip with LARS = $6,450 

First-Year Cost 

Cost: 989/3 × $6,450 = $2,126,350 

Subsequent 2 Years: Per-Year Costs 

Cost: 989/3 × $6,450 = $2,126,350 

Total Over 10 years 

Cost: $2,126,250 × 3 = $6,379,050 

Average per Year 

Cost: $6,349,050/10 = $637,905 

Cost for LARS Software 

Helicopter air ambulances = 989 

Cost for LARS software = $750 

First-Year Cost 

Cost: 989/3 × $750 = $247,250 

Second-Year Cost 

Cost: 989 × (2⁄3) × $750 = $494,500 

Subsequent Years: Per-Year Costs 

Cost: 989 × $750 = $741,750 

Total Over 10 Years 

Cost: $247,250 + $494,500 + $741,750 × 

8 = $6,675,750 

Average per Year 

Cost: $6,675,750/10 = $667,575 

Cost to Helicopter Air Ambulance 

Operators To Establish Procedures To 

Evaluate, Analyze, and Use LARS Data 

in Their Operations Manuals 

Air ambulance operators = 73 

Time needed for chief pilot = 2 hours 

Time needed for a clerical person = 6 

hours 

Salary of chief pilot = $53 per hour 

Salary of clerical person = $26 per hour 

First-Year Cost 

Cost: [73 × 2 × $53] + [73 × 6 × $26] = 

$19,126 

Time: [73 × 2] + [73 × 6] = 584 hours 

Subsequent Years: Per-Year Costs 

Cost: $0 

Time: 0 hours 

Total Over 10 Years 

Cost: $19,126 

Time: 584 hours 

Average per Year 

Cost: $19,126/10 = $1,913 

Time: 584 hours/10 = 58.4 hours 

(5) Require that medical personnel on 

board helicopter air ambulance flights 

either receive a supplemental safety 

briefing or safety training in lieu of a 

pre-flight briefing (§ 135.619): Certificate 

holders choosing the option to provide 

safety training would be required to 

retain training records on those 

employees. 

The following estimate corresponds to 

section A.1.e. of the economic 

evaluation. 

Cost to Certificate Holder for 

Documenting the Training Provided to 

Medical Personnel 

Medical personnel = 10,965 

Time needed for a clerical person to 

document the training = 5/60 hour 

Salary of Clerical Person = $26 per hour 

First-Year Cost 

Cost: 10,965 × (5/60) × $26 = $23,758 

Time: 10,965 × (5/60) = 914 hours 

Subsequent Years: Per-Year Costs 

Cost: 10,965 × (5/60) × $26 = $23,758 

Time: 10,965 × (5/60) = 914 hours 

Total Over 10 Years 

Cost: $23,758 × 10 = $237,580 

Time: 914 hours × 10 = 9,140 hours 

Average per year. 

Cost: $237,580/10 = $23,758 

Time: 9,140 hours/10 = 914 hours 

(6) Require preparation of a load 

manifest by operators of all aircraft (not 

limited to multiengine aircraft) operated 

under part 135 (§ 135.63): This would 

amend existing OMB Control Number 

2120–0039 by expanding the 

applicability from multiengine aircraft 

to all aircraft. The following, therefore, 

addresses single-engine aircraft only. 

The following estimate corresponds to 

section C.2. of the economic evaluation. 

Air ambulance aircraft (single-engine) = 

108 

Commercial aircraft (single-engine) = 

3,752 

Average number of takeoffs daily = 3 

Technical time per takeoff = 5/60 hour 

Salary of single-engine pilot = $38 per 

hour 

First-Year Cost 

Cost = [(108) × (3) × (365) × (5/60) × 

($38)] + [(3,752) × (3) × (365) × (5/60) 

× ($38)] = $13,384,550 

Time = [(108) × (3) × (365) × (5/60)] + 

[(3,752) × (3) × (365) × (5/60)] = 

352,225 hours 

Subsequent Years: Per-Year Costs 

Cost = [(108) × (3) × (365) × (5/60) × 

($38)] + [(3,752) × (3) × (365) × (5/60) 

× ($38)] = $13,384,550 

Time = [(108) × (3) × (365) × (5/60)] + 

[(3,752) × (3) × (365) × (5/60)] = 

352,225 hours 

Total Over 10 Years 

Cost = $13,384,550 × 10 = $133,845,500 

Time = 352,225 hours × 10 = 3,522,250 

hours 

Average Per Year 

Cost = $133,845,500/10 = $13,384,550 

Time = 3,522,250 hours/10 = 352,225 

hours 

(7) Require that operations control 

specialists would be subject to 

certificate holders’ drug and alcohol 

testing programs (§§ 120.105 and 

120.215): The FAA believes that, 

because certificate holders currently 

administer and maintain records for 

drug and alcohol testing for other 

employees (approved under OMB 

Control Number 2120–0535), the cost 

for a clerical person to maintain these 

records would be negligible. 

Summary of all Burden Hours and 

Costs: 


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The agency is soliciting comments 

to— 

(1) Evaluate whether the proposed 

information requirement is necessary for 

the proper performance of the functions 

of the agency, including whether the 

information will have practical utility; 

(2) Evaluate the accuracy of the 

agency’s estimate of the burden; 

(3) Enhance the quality, utility, and 

clarity of the information to be 

collected; and 

(4) Minimize the burden of collecting 

information on those who are to 

respond, including by using appropriate 

automated, electronic, mechanical, or 

other technological collection 

techniques or other forms of information 

technology. 

Individuals and organizations may 

send comments on the information 

collection requirement by January 10, 

2011, and should direct them to the 

address listed in the ADDRESSES section 

at the beginning of this preamble. 

Comments also should be submitted to 

the Office of Management and Budget, 

Office of Information and Regulatory 

Affairs, Attention: Desk Officer for FAA, 

New Executive Building, Room 10202, 

725 17th Street, NW., Washington, DC 

20053. 

According to the 1995 amendments to 

the Paperwork Reduction Act (5 CFR 

1320.8(b)(2)(vi)), an agency may not 

collect or sponsor the collection of 

information, nor may it impose an 

information collection requirement 

unless it displays a currently valid OMB 

control number. The OMB control 

number for this information collection 

will be published in the Federal 

Register, after the Office of Management 

and Budget approves it. 

V. International Compatibility 

In keeping with U.S. obligations 

under the Convention on International 

Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to 

conform to International Civil Aviation 

Organization (ICAO) Standards and 

Recommended Practices to the 

maximum extent practicable. The FAA 

has reviewed the corresponding ICAO 

Standards and Recommended Practices 

and has identified no differences with 

these proposed regulations. 

VI. Regulatory Evaluation, Regulatory 

Flexibility Determination, International 

Trade Assessment, and Unfunded 

Mandates Assessment 

Regulatory Evaluation 

Changes to Federal regulations must 

undergo several economic analyses. 

First, Executive Order 12866 directs that 

each Federal agency shall propose or 

adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned 

determination that the benefits of the 

intended regulation justify its costs. 

Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act 

of 1980 (Pub. L. 96–354) requires 

agencies to analyze the economic 

impact of regulatory changes on small 

entities. Third, the Trade Agreements 

Act (Pub. L. 96–39) prohibits agencies 

from setting standards that create 

unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 

commerce of the United States. In 

developing U.S. standards, this Trade 

Act requires agencies to consider 

international standards and, where 

appropriate, that they be the basis of 

U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded 

Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 

104–4) requires agencies to prepare a 

written assessment of the costs, benefits, 

and other effects of proposed or final 

rules that include a Federal mandate 

likely to result in the expenditure by 

State, local, or tribal governments, in the 

aggregate, or by the private sector, of 

$100 million or more annually (adjusted 

for inflation with base year of 1995). 

This portion of the preamble 

summarizes the FAA’s analysis of the 

economic impacts of this proposed rule. 

Readers seeking greater detail should 

read the full regulatory evaluation, a 

copy of which is in the docket for this 

rulemaking. 

In conducting these analyses, FAA 

has determined that this proposed rule: 

(1) Has benefits that justify its costs; (2) 

is not an economically ‘‘significant 

regulatory action’’ as defined in section 

3(f) of Executive Order 12866; (3) would 

be otherwise ‘‘significant’’ as defined in 

Executive Order 12866 and DOT’s 

Regulatory Policies and Procedures; (4) 

would have a significant economic 

impact on a substantial number of small 

entities; (5) would not create 

unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 

commerce of the United States; and (6) 

would not impose an unfunded 

mandate on state, local, tribal 

governments, or on the private sector by 

exceeding the threshold identified 

above. These analyses are summarized 

below. 

The estimated mean benefit value for 

the air ambulance provisions is $270 

million or $160 million present value 

over the next 10 years. The estimated 

mean benefit value for the commercial 

provisions is $193 million or $115 

million present value over the next 10 

years. The FAA estimates the cost of 

this proposed rule for the air ambulance 

provisions would be approximately 

$210 million ($136 million, present 

value) over the next 10 years. The 


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44Annualized cost per operation equals total 

annualized costs divided by number of helicopter 

air ambulance operations per year. Total annualized 

cost equals present value cost over 10 years times 

capital recovery factor. 

45This is a lower bound estimate because the 

FAA was unable to estimate the costs of several 

requirements. 

estimated cost of the proposed rule for 

the commercial provisions would be 

approximately $145 million ($89 

million, present value) over the next 10 

years. 

As noted in the full regulatory 

evaluation, the FAA is unable to 

estimate the costs of provisions A.1.a, 

A.3.b, and B.2.a. The FAA calls for 

comments from affected entities 

requesting that all comments be 

accompanied by clear and detailed 

supporting economic documentation. 

Regulatory Flexibility Determination 

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 

(RFA) establishes ‘‘as a principle of 

regulatory issuance that agencies shall 

endeavor, consistent with the objective 

of the rule and of applicable statutes, to 

fit regulatory and informational 

requirements to the scale of the 

business, organizations, and 

governmental jurisdictions subject to 

regulation.’’ To achieve that principle, 

the RFA requires agencies to solicit and 

consider flexible regulatory proposals 

and to explain the rationale for their 

actions. The RFA covers a wide-range of 

small entities, including small 

businesses, not-for-profit organizations 

and small governmental jurisdictions. 

The FAA invites public comment on its 

RFA analysis, as detailed below, 

particularly with respect to the number 

of small entities impacted, the costs for 

small entities, and alternatives to the 

proposed rule that would meeting the 

agency’s statutory objectives in a less 

burdensome manner. 

Agencies must perform a review to 

determine whether a proposed or final 

rule will have a significant economic 

impact on a substantial number of small 

entities. If the agency determines that it 

will, the agency must prepare a 

regulatory flexibility analysis as 

described in the Act. 

This proposed rule would impact air 

ambulance, air tour, and on demand 

operators. The U.S. Small Business 

Administration (SBA) classifies 

businesses as small based on size 

standards, typically expressed in terms 

of annual revenue or number of 

employees. SBA publishes a table of 

small business size standards matched 

to North American Industry 

Classification System (NAICS) codes. 

Table 1 shows the size standards for the 

entities that would be affected by this 

rule. 

Because the FAA did not have actual 

annual revenues for air ambulance 

operators, the agency estimated them 

using helicopter counts as a revenue 

driver. The FAA assumed an average of 

367 operations per year for each 

helicopter and a revenue charge of 

$7,000 per operation. As such, the FAA 

estimated that 28 small air ambulance 

operators (with estimated revenues 

lower than $7 million) out of the 73 air 

ambulance operators would be affected 

by this proposed regulation. Their 

annualized cost per operation 44 ranges 

between $123 and $131. Their ratio of 

annualized cost to annual revenue 

ranges between 1.76% and 1.88%, 

which is significant.45 This proposal 

would impact approximately 18 not-forprofit air ambulance operators. 

Accordingly, the FAA prepared a 

regulatory flexibility analysis for small 

air ambulance operators, as described in 

the next section. 

For air tour operators, the FAA 

assumed an average of 747 operations 

per year for each helicopter and a 

revenue charge of $1,700 per operation. 

As such, the FAA identified 31 small air 

tour operators (with estimated revenues 

lower than $7 million) out of the 43 air 

tour operators that would be affected by 

this regulation. Their annualized cost 

per operation ranges between $10 and 

$24. Their ratio of annualized cost to 

annual revenue ranges between 0.58% 

and 1.42%, which may be significant. 

Accordingly, the FAA prepared a 

regulatory flexibility analysis for small 

air tour operators, as described in the 

next section. 

The FAA identified 379 small on 

demand operators (with 1,500 or fewer 

employees) out of the 380 on demand 

operators that would be affected by this 

proposed regulation. Although their 

annualized compliance costs ranges 

between $6,752 and $642,020, the 

agency is unable to estimate their 

annual revenues because average 

revenue per operation for these entities 

is not meaningful. There are a number 

of factors (e.g., length of flight, type of 

helicopter) that determine the revenue 

for an individual operation. These 

factors are not likely to result in a 

distribution around a meaningful 

average revenue. The FAA seeks 

comment on the impact to on demand 

operators as a result of this proposal. 

Regulatory Flexibility Analysis 

Under section 603(b) of the RFA (as 

amended), each regulatory flexibility 

analysis is required to address the 

following points: (1) Reasons the agency 

considered the proposed rule, (2) the 

objectives and legal basis for the 

proposed rule, (3) the kind and number 

of small entities to which the proposed 

rule would apply, (4) the reporting, 

recordkeeping, and other compliance 

requirements of the proposed rule, 

(5) all Federal rules that may duplicate, 

overlap, or conflict with the proposed 

rule, and (6) alternatives to the proposed 

rule. 

Reasons the FAA Considered the Rule 

See section II. Background. 

The Objectives and Legal Basis for the 

Rule 

The FAA’s authority to issue rules on 

aviation safety is found in Title 49 of the 

United States Code. This rulemaking is 

promulgated under the authority 

described in 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(4), 

which requires the Administrator to 

promulgate regulations in the interest of 

safety for the maximum hours or 

periods of service of airmen and other 

employees of air carriers, and 49 U.S.C. 

44701(a)(5), which requires the 

Administrator to promulgate regulations 

and minimum standards for other 

practices, methods, and procedures 

necessary for safety in air commerce and 

national security. As discussed 

throughout this document, the proposal 

aims to improve safety for air 

ambulance operations and other 

commercial helicopter operations. 


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46Aviation Week, World Aerospace Database, 

Winter, 2009. 

The Kind and Number of Small Entities 

to Which the Proposed Rule Would 

Apply 

Based on a review of part 135 

certificates and operations 

specifications, the FAA estimates 28 

small air ambulance operators and 31 

air tour operators that the proposed rule 

would impact. The agency estimates 

that these operators have annual 

revenues between $1.3 million to 

$6.3 million.46

Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other 

Compliance Requirements of the 

Proposed Rule 

Reporting, recordkeeping, and other 

compliance requirements are outlined 

in section IV. Paperwork Reduction Act. 

The FAA seeks comment on whether 

reporting, recordkeeping, and 

compliance costs vary from small to 

large entities. 

All Federal Rules that May Duplicate, 

Overlap, or Conflict With the Proposed 

Rule 

The FAA is unaware of any Federal 

rules that duplicate, overlap, or conflict 

with the proposed rule. 

Other Considerations 

Affordability Analysis 

For the purpose of this analysis, the 

degree to which small entities can afford 

the cost of the proposed rule is 

predicated on the availability of 

financial resources. Costs can be paid 

from existing assets such as cash, by 

borrowing, through the provision of 

additional equity capital, by accepting 

reduced profits, by raising prices, or by 

finding other ways of offsetting costs. 

One means of assessing the 

affordability is the ability of each of the 

small entities to meet its short-term 

obligations, such as looking at net 

income, working capital and financial 

strength ratios. According to financial 

literature, a company’s short-run 

financial strength is substantially 

influenced by its working capital 

position and its ability to pay short-term 

liabilities, among other things. However, 

the FAA was unable to find this type of 

financial information for the affected 

entities, and so used an alternative way 

of analyzing affordability. The approach 

used by the FAA was to compare 

estimated revenues with the annualized 

compliance costs. 

Small air ambulance operators and air 

tour operators may have trouble 

absorbing the costs of complying with 

the proposed rule if their annualized 

costs exceed 5 percent of their estimated 

revenues. The idea is that if a business 

has such a high cost, percentage-wise, it 

would likely have trouble absorbing the 

costs of complying with the proposed 

rule. The average ratio of annualized 

cost to estimated annual revenue for 

small air ambulance operators and air 

tour operators ranges between 0.58% 

and 1.88%. Thus, the FAA expects that 

small air ambulances and air tour 

operators would not have trouble 

absorbing the costs of complying with 

this rule. 

Related to this analysis, the FAA 

seeks comment on whether the 

economic impact on small entities is 

significant. 

Competitiveness Analysis 

For small air ambulance and air tour 

operators, the ratio of annualized cost to 

estimated annual revenue ranges 

between 0.58% and 1.88%. For large air 

ambulance and air tour operators, it 

ranges between 0.62% and 2.4%. The 

FAA expects that based on these results, 

there would be little change in the 

competitiveness of small air ambulance 

and air tour operators relative to large 

operators. 

Alternatives 

Alternative One—The current 

proposal would give certificate holders 

three years from the effective date to 

install all required pieces of equipment. 

This alternative would change the 

compliance date to four years after the 

effective rule date. This would help 

small business owners cope with the 

burden of the expenses because they 

would be able to integrate these pieces 

of equipment over a longer period of 

time. 

Conclusion—This alternative is not 

preferred because it would delay safety 

enhancements. Thus, the FAA does not 

consider this to be an acceptable 

alternative in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 

603(c). 

Alternative Two—This alternative 

would exclude the HTAWS unit from 

the rulemaking proposal. Although this 

alternative would reduce annualized 

costs to small air ambulance operators 

by approximately 12% and the ratio of 

annualized cost to annual revenue 

would decrease from a range of between 

1.76% and 1.88% to a range of between 

1.55% and 1.65%, the annualized cost 

of the proposed rule would still be 

significant for all 35 small air 

ambulance operators. Since all 35 small 

air ambulance operators would still be 

significantly impacted by this 

alternative, the alternative not only does 

not eliminate the problem for a 

substantial number of small entities, but 

also it would reduce safety. 

Conclusion—The HTAWS is an 

outstanding tool for situational 

awareness and to help helicopter air 

ambulance pilots during nighttime 

operations. This equipment is a great 

enhancement for situational awareness 

in all aspects of flying including day, 

night, and instrument meteorological 

conditions. Therefore the FAA believes 

that this equipment is a significant 

enhancement for safety throughout all 

aspects of helicopter operations. The 

accident data shows that the HTAWS 

provision could have prevented many 

air ambulance accidents if this equipage 

was available at the time of the accident. 

Thus the FAA does not consider this to 

be an acceptable alternative in 

accordance with 5 U.S.C. 603(c). 

Alternative Three—The alternative 

would increase the requirement of 

certificate holders from 10 to 15 

helicopters or more that are engaged in 

helicopter air ambulance operations to 

have an Operations Control Center. 

Conclusion—The FAA believes that 

operators with 10 or more helicopters 

engaged in air ambulance operations 

would cover 66% of the total population 

of the air ambulance fleet in the U.S. 

The FAA believes that operators with 15 

or more helicopters would decrease the 

coverage of the population to 50%. 

Furthermore, complexity issues arise 

and considerably increase with 

operators of more than 10 helicopters. 

Thus the FAA does not consider this to 

be an acceptable alternative in 

accordance with 5 U.S.C. 603(c). 

The FAA invites public comment on 

the conclusions reached with regard to 

the alternatives outlined above. 

Conclusion 

The FAA has determined that this 

proposed rule would have a significant 

impact on a substantial number of small 

helicopter air ambulance and air tour 

operators. Because the agency is unable 

to estimate annual revenues for ondemand operators, the FAA cannot 

determine whether the proposed rule 

would have a significant impact on a 

substantial number of on-demand 

operators. The FAA believes that small 

helicopter air ambulance and air tour 

operators would be able to afford the 

proposed rule and would remain 

competitive. While small entities would 

likely be able to afford the proposal, the 

FAA seeks comment on whether small 

entities will be able to remain 

competitive under the proposal. 

International Trade Impact Assessment 

The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 

(Pub. L. 96–39), as amended by the 


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Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. 

L. 103–465), prohibits Federal agencies 

from establishing standards or engaging 

in related activities that create 

unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 

commerce of the United States. 

Pursuant to these Acts, the 

establishment of standards is not 

considered an unnecessary obstacle to 

the foreign commerce of the United 

States, so long as the standard has a 

legitimate domestic objective, such as 

the protection of safety, and does not 

operate in a manner that excludes 

imports that meet this objective. The 

statute also requires consideration of 

international standards and, where 

appropriate, that they be the basis for 

U.S. standards. The FAA has assessed 

the potential effect of this proposed rule 

and determined that it would have only 

a domestic impact and therefore will not 

create unnecessary obstacles to the 

foreign commerce of the United States. 

Unfunded Mandates Assessment 

Title II of the Unfunded Mandates 

Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–4) 

requires each Federal agency to prepare 

a written statement assessing the effects 

of any Federal mandate in a proposed or 

final agency rule that may result in an 

expenditure of $100 million or more (in 

1995 dollars) in any one year by State, 

local, and tribal governments, in the 

aggregate, or by the private sector; such 

a mandate is deemed to be a ‘‘significant 

regulatory action.’’ The FAA currently 

uses an inflation-adjusted value of 

$136.1 million in lieu of $100 million. 

This proposed rule does not contain 

such a mandate; therefore, the 

requirements of Title II of the Act do not 

apply. 

VII. Executive Order 13132, Federalism 

The FAA has analyzed this proposed 

rule under the principles and criteria of 

Executive Order 13132, Federalism. The 

agency determined that this action 

would not have a substantial direct 

effect on the States, on the relationship 

between the national Government and 

the States, or on the distribution of 

power and responsibilities among the 

various levels of government, and, 

therefore, would not have federalism 

implications. 

VIII. Regulations Affecting Intrastate 

Aviation in Alaska 

Section 1205 of the FAA 

Reauthorization Act of 1996 (110 Stat. 

3213) requires the Administrator, when 

modifying regulations in title 14 of the 

CFR in a manner affecting intrastate 

aviation in Alaska, to consider the 

extent to which Alaska is not served by 

transportation modes other than 

aviation, and to establish appropriate 

regulatory distinctions. Because this 

proposed rule would apply to helicopter 

air ambulance, commercial helicopter, 

and general aviation operations, the 

FAA specifically requests comments on 

whether there is justification for 

applying the proposed rule differently 

in intrastate operations in Alaska. 

IX. Environmental Analysis 

FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA 

actions that are categorically excluded 

from preparation of an environmental 

assessment or environmental impact 

statement under the National 

Environmental Policy Act in the 

absence of extraordinary circumstances. 

The FAA has determined this proposed 

rulemaking action qualifies for the 

categorical exclusion identified in 

paragraph 312f. Additionally, the FAA 

reviewed paragraph 304 of Order 

1050.1E and determined that this 

rulemaking involves no extraordinary 

circumstances. 

X. Regulations That Significantly Affect 

Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use 

The FAA has analyzed this NPRM 

under Executive Order 13211, Actions 

Concerning Regulations That 

Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 

Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). The 

agency has determined that it is not a 

‘‘significant regulatory action’’ under 

Executive Order 13211 because it is not 

likely to have a significant adverse effect 

on the supply, distribution, or use of 

energy. The NPRM is, however, 

‘‘significant’’ under DOT’s Regulatory 

Policies and Procedures. 

XI. Availability of Rulemaking 

Documents 

You can get an electronic copy of 

rulemaking documents using the 

Internet by— 

1. Searching the Federal eRulemaking 

Portal (http://www.regulations.gov); 

2. Visiting the FAA’s Regulations and 

Policies web page at http:// 

www.faa.gov/regulations_policies or 

3. Accessing the Government Printing 

Office’s Web page at http:// 

www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html. 

You can also get a copy by sending a 

request to the Federal Aviation 

Administration, Office of Rulemaking, 

ARM–1, 800 Independence Avenue 

SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by 

calling (202) 267–9680. Make sure to 

identify the docket number, notice 

number, or amendment number of this 

rulemaking. 

You may access all documents the 

FAA considered in developing this 

proposed rule, including economic 

analyses and technical reports, from the 

Internet through the Federal 

eRulemaking Portal referenced in 

paragraph (1). 

XI. Additional Information 

Comments Invited 

The FAA invites interested persons to 

participate in this rulemaking by 

submitting written comments, data, or 

views. We also invite comments relating 

to the economic, environmental, energy, 

or federalism impacts that might result 

from adopting the proposals in this 

document. The most helpful comments 

reference a specific portion of the 

proposal, explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. To ensure the docket 

does not contain duplicate comments, 

please send only one copy of written 

comments, or if you are filing comments 

electronically, please submit your 

comments only one time. 

We will file in the docket all 

comments we receive, as well as a 

report summarizing each substantive 

public contact with FAA personnel 

concerning this proposed rulemaking. 

Before acting on this proposal, we will 

consider all comments we receive on or 

before the closing date for comments. 

We will consider comments filed after 

the comment period has closed if it is 

possible to do so without incurring 

expense or delay. We may change this 

proposal in light of the comments we 

receive. 

Proprietary or Confidential Business 

Information 

Do not file in the docket information 

that you consider to be proprietary or 

confidential business information. Send 

or deliver this information directly to 

the person identified in the FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT section of this 

document. You must mark the 

information that you consider 

proprietary or confidential. If you send 

the information on a disk or CD ROM, 

mark the outside of the disk or CD ROM 

and also identify electronically within 

the disk or CD ROM the specific 

information that is proprietary or 

confidential. 

Under 14 CFR 11.35(b), when we are 

aware of proprietary information filed 

with a comment, we do not place it in 

the docket. We hold it in a separate file 

to which the public does not have 

access, and we place a note in the 

docket that we have received it. If we 

receive a request to examine or copy 

this information, we treat it as any other 

request under the Freedom of 

Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). We 

process such a request under the DOT 

procedures found in 49 CFR part 7. 


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Appendix to the Preamble—Additional 

Accidents Discussions 

The following is a list of accidents 

(listed with reference to the associated 

preamble discussions) illustrative of the 

type that the FAA believes this proposal 

may have prevented. 

A. Helicopter Air Ambulance 

Operations 

1. Operational Procedures 

b. Operational Control Center 

On July 13, 2004, a Bell 407 

helicopter, operating under 14 CFR part 

135, collided with trees resulting in fatal 

injuries to the pilot, medical personnel 

and patient on board. The pilot 

performed a weather check before 

accepting the flight and was provided 

flight monitoring by the Spartanburg 

County Communications 911 

Department of the Spartanburg County 

Office of Emergency Services. The flight 

was conducted in night visual, 

meteorological conditions were present, 

with mist and light fog prevailing in the 

area of the accident site. The accident 

pilot was not informed that other pilots 

had declined this mission due to fog. 

The NTSB cited the pilot’s failure to 

maintain terrain clearance as the cause 

of the accident, and contributing factors 

included ‘‘inadequate weather and 

dispatch information relayed to the 

pilot.’’ See NTSB Accident Report 

CHI04MA182 (Jan. 26, 2006). 

d. Preflight Risk Analysis 

On August 21, 2004, a Bell 407 

helicopter, operating under 14 CFR part 

135 and en route to Washoe Medical 

Center in Reno, Nevada, collided with 

mountainous terrain resulting in fatal 

injuries to the pilot, two medical 

personnel, the patient’s mother, and the 

infant patient. The pilot had a choice of 

two routes, and he chose the direct 

route over mountainous terrain instead 

of the route following the I–80 which 

was 10 minutes longer. The pilot chose 

the route through mountainous terrain. 

The NTSB noted that there was no 

indication that the pilot obtained a 

weather briefing before departure and 

that if he had ‘‘he would have likely 

learned of the cloud cover and light 

precipitation present along his planned 

route of flight.’’ The NTSB cited the 

pilot’s lack of maintaining sufficient 

clearance of mountainous terrain as the 

cause of this accident, and other 

contributing factors such as the pilot’s 

improper decision to take the direct 

route over mountainous terrain in dark 

night conditions. See NTSB Accident 

Report SEA04MA167 (Jan. 26, 2006). 

On November 29, 1998, a McDonnell 

Douglas MD–900 helicopter, en route to 

St. Alphonsus hospital heliport in 

Boise, ID, and operating under 14 CFR 

part 135, struck unmarked transmission 

wires when departing from a car 

accident site resulting in major damage 

to four of the five main rotor blades. No 

injuries were sustained by the flight 

crew, medical personnel, or patient on 

board. The NTSB cited the pilot and 

ground crew’s failure to identify the 

existence of the wires as factors 

contributing to this accident. The FAA 

believes that a pre-flight review of the 

proposed landing site may have 

prevented this accident. See NTSB 

Accident Report SEA99LA016 (Jan. 11, 

2000). 

On November 19, 1993, a Bell 206L 

helicopter, operating under part 135 

rules landed hard in the Atlantic Ocean 

resulting in fatal injuries to all three 

passengers and serious injuries to the 

pilot during nighttime conditions. The 

pilot, operating at night under VFR, 

encountered inadvertent IMC and 

crashed. The NTSB determined the 

cause of the accident was the pilot’s 

continued VFR flight into IMC, and 

contributing factors included weather, 

dark night, and rough sea conditions. 

See NTSB Accident Report 

BFO94FA013 (Nov. 1, 1994). 

2. Equipment Requirements 

a. Helicopter Terrain Awareness and 

Warning Systems 

On December 12, 1996, a 

Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohn BO– 

105CBS helicopter, operating under part 

135, collided with terrain at night in 

instrument conditions while 

transporting a patient to a hospital in 

Rochester, NY. Witnesses observed that 

cloud cover and the isolated area made 

for a dark night with no discernable 

horizon. About two minutes after the 

pilot’s departure for the hospital, the 

helicopter collided with terrain 

resulting in fatal injuries to all on board. 

The NTSB stated the cause for this 

accident was ‘‘the pilot’s failure to 

maintain altitude/clearance from the 

terrain,’’ and other factors relating to the 

accident included ‘‘darkness, low 

ceiling, rising terrain, and high wind 

condition.’’ See NTSB Accident Report 

IAD97FA032 (Jul. 31, 2008). 

b. Light-Weight Aircraft Recording 

System (LARS) 

On June 29, 2008, two Bell 407 

helicopters collided in midair while 

approaching the Flagstaff Medical 

Center helipad. Both helicopters were 

destroyed, and all seven persons aboard 

the two aircraft were fatally injured. Day 

VMC prevailed. The NTSB determined 

that the probable cause of this accident 

was both helicopter pilots’ failure to see 

and avoid the other helicopter on 

approach to the helipad. Contributing to 

the accident were the failure of the pilot 

of one of the helicopters to follow 

arrival and noise abatement guidelines 

and the failure of the pilot of the other 

helicopter to follow communications 

guidelines. The NTSB noted that ‘‘had 

either operator established a formal 

flight-monitoring program, the use of 

non-standard procedures might have led 

the operators to take corrective action 

that could have prevented the two 

helicopters from arriving at the same 

helipad on different approach angles 

that particular day.’’ See NTSB Accident 

Report DEN08MA116A/B (May 7, 2009). 

On May 27, 1993, an Aerospatiale AS 

350B helicopter, operating under 14 

CFR part 135, crashed into terrain near 

Cameron, MO, resulting in fatal injuries 

to the pilot and patient and serious 

injuries to medical personnel. The 

NTSB found that the accident was a 

result of loss of engine power due to the 

failure of the second state turbine 

labyrinth seal. In its factual report, the 

NTSB noted that aircraft manufacturer 

representatives described that a crack 

could develop under thermal low cycle 

fatigue, then develop as ‘‘ ‘subsequent 

distortion leads to rub between the 

inner diameter of the hub and the inner 

turbine labyrinth lips.’ ’’ An 

appropriately equipped LARS could 

capture audio files for acoustic analysis 

of dynamic components in the event of 

an accident or incident. Such 

mechanical failures could be detectable 

by LARS equipped to record ambient 

audio files. See NTSB Accident Report 

CHI93FA182 (Jun. 24, 1994). 

B. Commercial Helicopter Operations 

(Including Air Ambulance Operations) 

2. Equipment Requirements 

a. Radar Altimeter 

On July 23, 2003, a Bell 206B 

helicopter, operating under 14 CFR part 

135, crashed into the inside wall of the 

Waialeale Crater, Kauai, HI, fatally 

injuring the pilot and all four 

passengers. This sightseeing tour 

originated at the Lihue Airport in Kauai 

under VFR conditions. During the flight, 

the pilot encountered clouds and a low 

ceiling. The pilot descended into the 

mountain side. The NTSB determined 

the probable cause of this accident was 

the pilot’s failure to maintain ‘‘adequate 

terrain clearance/altitude while 

descending over mountainous terrain’’ 

and continued flight into adverse 

weather. The contributing factors were 

clouds and a low ceiling. See NTSB 


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Accident Report LAX03FA241 (Sept. 14, 

2007). 

On January 10, 2005, a Eurocopter 

Deutschland GmbH EC–135 P2 

helicopter, operating under part 91, 

crashed in the Potomac River, fatally 

injuring the pilot and paramedic and 

seriously injuring the flight nurse. 

During low-altitude cruise flight, the 

helicopter impacted water without any 

distress warning from the pilot. The 

NTSB noted the cause of this accident 

was ‘‘the pilot’s failure to identify and 

arrest the helicopter’s descent, which 

resulted in controlled flight into 

terrain.’’ Other factors identified by the 

NTSB included the dark night 

conditions and a lack of an operable 

radio altimeter. NTSB Accident Report 

NYC05MA039 (Dec. 20, 2007). 

3. Training—Recovery From Inadvertent 

Flight Into IMC 

On September 20, 1995, a Bell 206L 

helicopter, operating under 14 CFR part 

91, was substantially damaged after the 

pilot inadvertently encountered IMC 

and lost control. The NTSB found that 

the pilot’s failure to maintain control of 

the helicopter was the cause of this 

accident. It cited the pilot’s inadvertent 

VFR flight into IMC conditions as a 

factor contributing to the accident. See 

NTSB Accident ID #CHI95LA327. 

On December 23, 2003, an Augusta 

A109A helicopter, operated under part 

91 en route to pick up a patient during 

a helicopter air ambulance operation, 

collided with mountainous terrain near 

Redwood Valley, CA, while trying to 

reverse course following an encounter 

with night IMC. The crash fatally 

injured all on board and destroyed the 

helicopter. The NTSB determined the 

cause of the accident was the pilot’s 

improper in-flight planning and 

decision to continue flight under visual 

flight rules into deteriorating weather 

conditions which resulted in an 

inadvertent in-flight encounter with 

IMC. See NTSB Accident ID 

#LAX04FA076. 

List of Subjects 

14 CFR Part 1 

Air transportation. 

14 CFR Part 91 

Aircraft, Airmen, Aviation safety, 

Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements. 

14 CFR Part 120 

Airmen, Alcohol abuse, Alcoholism, 

Alcohol testing, Aviation safety, Drug 

abuse, Drug testing, Operators, 

Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements, Safety, Safety-sensitive, 

Transportation. 

14 CFR Part 135 

Air taxis, Aircraft, Airmen, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements. 

The Proposed Amendment 

In consideration of the foregoing, the 

Federal Aviation Administration 

proposes to amend chapter I of title 14, 

Code of Federal Regulations, as follows: 

PART 1—DEFINITIONS AND 

ABBREVIATIONS 

1. The authority citation for part 1 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

2. Amend § 1.1 by revising the 

definition of ‘‘Extended over-water 

operation’’ to read as follows: 

§ 1.1 General definitions. 

* * * * * 

Extended over-water operation means 

an operation over water at a horizontal 

distance of more than 50 nautical miles 

from the nearest shoreline. 

* * * * * 

PART 91—GENERAL OPERATING AND 

FLIGHT RULES 

3. The authority citation for part 91 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 1155, 40103, 

40113, 40120, 44101, 44111, 44701, 44704, 

44709, 44711, 44712, 44715, 44716, 44717, 

44722, 46306, 46315, 46316, 46504, 46506– 

46507, 47122, 47508, 47528–47531, articles 

12 and 29 of the Convention on International 

Civil Aviation (61 Stat. 1180). 

4. Amend § 91.155 by revising 

paragraph (b)(1) to read as follows: 

§ 91.155 Basic VFR weather minimums. 

* * * * * 

(b) * * * 

(1) Helicopter. A helicopter may be 

operated clear of clouds if operated at a 

speed that allows the pilot adequate 

opportunity to see and avoid other air 

traffic or obstruction in time to avoid a 

collision, provided the visibility is at 

least— 

(i) One half statute mile during the 

day; or 

(ii) One statute mile at night. 

* * * * * 

PART 120—DRUG AND ALCOHOL 

TESTING PROGRAM 

5. The authority citation for part 120 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40101–40103, 

40113, 40120, 41706, 41721, 44106, 44701, 

44702, 44703, 44709, 44710, 44711, 45101– 

45105, 46105, 46306. 

6. Amend § 120.105 by adding 

paragraph (i) to read as follows: 

§ 120.105 Employees who must be tested. 

* * * * * 

(i) Operations control specialist 

duties. 

7. Amend § 120.215 by adding 

paragraph (a)(9) to read as follows: 

§ 120.215 Covered employees. 

(a) * * * 

(9) Operations control specialist 

duties. 

* * * * * 

PART 135—OPERATING 

REQUIREMENTS: COMMUTER AND 

ON DEMAND OPERATIONS AND 

RULES GOVERNING PERSONS ON 

BOARD SUCH AIRCRAFT 

8. The authority citation for part 135 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 41706, 40113, 

44701–44702, 44705, 44709, 44711–44713, 

44715–44717, 44722, 45101–45105. 

9. Amend § 135.1 by adding 

paragraph (a)(9) to read as follows: 

§ 135.1 Applicability. 

(a) * * * 

(9) Helicopter air ambulance 

operations with medical personnel, as 

defined in § 135.601(b)(4), on board the 

aircraft. 

* * * * * 

10. Amend § 135.63 by revising the 

introductory text of paragraph (c) and 

revising paragraph (d) to read as 

follows: 

§ 135.63 Recordkeeping requirements. 

* * * * * 

(c) Each certificate holder is 

responsible for the preparation and 

accuracy of a load manifest containing 

information concerning the loading of 

the aircraft. The manifest must be 

prepared in duplicate unless the 

certificate holder receives a copy of the 

load manifest, by electronic or other 

means, at its principal operations base 

or at another location used by it and 

approved by the FAA prior to the 

aircraft’s take off. The load manifest 

must be prepared before each take off 

and must include: 

* * * * * 

(d) The pilot in command of an 

aircraft for which a load manifest must 

be prepared must carry a copy of the 

completed load manifest in the aircraft 

to its destination and, unless the 

certificate holder receives a copy of the 

load manifest prior to take off as 

provided for in paragraph (c) of this 

section, arrange at the takeoff location 

for a copy to be sent to the certificate 


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holder, retained in a suitable place at 

the takeoff location, or retained in 

another location approved by the FAA 

until the flight is complete. The 

certificate holder shall keep copies of 

completed load manifests for at least 30 

days at its principal operations base, or 

at another location used by it and 

approved by the FAA. 

11. Add § 135.160 to read as follows: 

§ 135.160 Radio altimeters for rotorcraft 

operations. 

After [DATE 3 YEARS AFTER 

EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL 

RULE], no person may operate a 

rotorcraft unless that rotorcraft is 

equipped with an operable FAAapproved radio altimeter, or an FAAapproved device that incorporates a 

radio altimeter, unless otherwise 

authorized in the certificate holder’s 

approved minimum equipment list. 

12. Amend § 135.167 by revising the 

section heading and the introductory 

text of paragraph (a) to read as follows: 

§ 135.167 Emergency equipment: 

Extended over-water operations—Aircraft 

other than rotorcraft. 

(a) Except where the FAA amends the 

operations specifications of the 

certificate holder to require the carriage 

of any or all specific items of the 

equipment listed below for any overwater operation, or allows a deviation 

for a particular extended over-water 

operation in response to an application 

by a certificate holder, no person may 

operate an aircraft other than a rotorcraft 

in extended over-water operations 

unless it carries, installed in 

conspicuously marked locations easily 

accessible to the occupants if a ditching 

occurs, the following equipment: 

* * * * * 

13. Add § 135.168 to read as follows: 

§ 135.168 Emergency equipment: Overwater and extended over-water 

operations—Rotorcraft. 

(a) For purposes of this section, the 

following definitions apply— 

(1) Over-water operation: A flight 

beyond autorotational distance from the 

shoreline. 

(2) Shoreline means that area of the 

land adjacent to the water of an ocean, 

sea, lake, pond, river, or tidal basin that 

is above the high-water mark at which 

a rotorcraft could be landed safely. This 

does not include land areas which are 

unsuitable for landing such as vertical 

cliffs or land intermittently under water. 

(b) Over-water operations. After 

[DATE 3 YEARS AFTER EFFECTIVE 

DATE OF THE FINAL RULE], except 

where the FAA amends the operations 

specifications of the certificate holder to 

require the carriage of all or any specific 

items of the equipment listed below, 

allows a deviation for a particular 

operation, or the over-water operation is 

necessary only for takeoff or landing, no 

person may operate a rotorcraft in overwater operations unless it carries, 

installed in conspicuously marked 

locations easily accessible to the 

occupants in the event of an emergency 

water landing, the following equipment: 

(1) Approved life preservers equipped 

with an approved survivor locator light, 

which must be worn by each occupant 

of the rotorcraft from take off until the 

flight is no longer over water; 

(2) One approved pyrotechnic 

signaling device; 

(3) Enough life rafts of a rated 

capacity and buoyancy to accommodate 

the maximum number of occupants the 

rotorcraft is certificated to carry; 

(4) An approved, automatically 

deployable, survival-type emergency 

locator transmitter (ELT) in each life 

raft. Batteries used in ELTs must be 

maintained in accordance with the 

following — 

(i) Non-rechargeable batteries must be 

replaced when the transmitter has been 

in use for more than 1 cumulative hour 

or when 50 percent of their useful lives 

have expired, as established by the 

transmitter manufacturer under its 

approval. The new expiration date for 

replacing the batteries must be legibly 

marked on the outside of the 

transmitter. The battery useful life 

requirements of this paragraph do not 

apply to batteries (such as wateractivated batteries) that are essentially 

unaffected during probable storage 

intervals; or 

(ii) Rechargeable batteries used in the 

transmitter must be recharged when the 

transmitter has been in use for more 

than 1 cumulative hour or when 50 

percent of their useful-life-of-charge has 

expired, as established by the 

transmitter manufacturer under its 

approval. The new expiration date for 

recharging the batteries must be legibly 

marked on the outside of the 

transmitter. The battery useful-life-ofcharge requirements of this paragraph 

do not apply to batteries (such as wateractivated batteries) that are essentially 

unaffected during probable storage 

intervals; 

(5) Each life raft required under this 

paragraph must be electronically 

deployable, or externally mounted and 

accessible, and equipped with— 

(i) One survival kit, appropriate for 

the route to be flown, or 

(ii) Contain at least the following— 

(A) One approved day/night signaling 

device; 

(B) One life raft repair kit; 

(C) One bailing bucket; 

(D) One signaling mirror; 

(E) One police whistle; 

(F) One raft knife; 

(G) One inflation pump; 

(H) One 75-foot retaining line; 

(I) One magnetic compass; 

(J) One dye marker or equivalent; and 

(K) One fishing kit. 

(c) Extended over-water operations. 

After [DATE 3 YEARS AFTER 

EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL 

RULE], except where the FAA amends 

the operations specifications of the 

certificate holder to require the carriage 

of all or any specific items of the 

equipment listed below or allows a 

deviation for a particular operation, no 

person may operate a rotorcraft in 

extended over-water operations unless it 

carries, installed in conspicuously 

marked locations easily accessible to the 

occupants in the event of an emergency 

water landing, the following equipment: 

(1) Approved life preservers equipped 

with an approved survivor locator light, 

which must be worn by each occupant 

of the rotorcraft during the duration of 

the flight 

(2) The equipment listed in 

paragraphs (b)(2) through (b)(4) of this 

section; 

(3) One flashlight having at least two 

operable size ‘‘D’’ cell or equivalent 

batteries; and 

(4) Each life raft required under this 

paragraph must be electronically 

deployable or externally mounted and 

accessible, and equipped with or 

contain at least the following— 

(i) The equipment listed in paragraph 

(b)(5) of this section; 

(ii) One radar reflector; 

(iii) One canopy (for sail, sunshade, or 

rain catcher); 

(iv) Two pints of water per each 

person the life raft is rated to carry, or 

one sea water desalting kit for each two 

persons the life raft is rated to carry; and 

(v) One book on survival appropriate 

for the area in which the rotorcraft is 

operated. 

(d) Passenger Briefing. Passengers 

carried in over-water or extended overwater operations must be briefed on the 

following: 

(1) Procedures for fastening and 

unfastening seatbelts; 

(2) Procedures for opening exits and 

exiting the rotorcraft; 

(3) Procedures for water ditching; 

(4) Requirements for the use of life 

preservers; 

(5) Procedures for emergency exit 

from the rotorcraft in the event of a 

water landing; and 

(6) The location and use of life rafts 

and other floatation devices prior to 

flight. 

(e) Maintenance. The equipment 

required by this section must be 


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maintained in accordance with 

§ 135.419. 

(f) ELT Standards. The ELT required 

by paragraph (b)(4) of this section must 

meet the requirements in Technical 

Standard Order (TSO)-C126a. Technical 

Standard Order C126a, 406 MHz 

Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT), 

December 17, 2008, is incorporated by 

reference into this section with the 

approval of the Director of the Office of 

the Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 

552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may 

be obtained from the U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Subsequent Distribution 

Office, DOT Warehouse M30, Ardmore 

East Business Center, 3341 Q 75th 

Avenue, Landover, MD 20785; 

telephone (301) 322–5377. Copies are 

also available on the FAA’s Web site. 

Use the following link: http:// 

www.airweb.faa.gov/ 

Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/ 

rgTSO.nsf/0/ 

0ac772bbed9b95a586257523007629b3/ 

$FILE/TSO-C126a.pdf. All approved 

material is available for inspection at 

the National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For 

information on the availability of this 

material at NARA, call 202–741–6030 or 

go to http://www.archives.gov/ 

federal_register/ 

code_of_federal_regulations/ 

ibr_locations.html. 

(g) ELT Alternative Compliance. 

Operators with an ELT required by 

paragraph (b)(4) of this section that 

meets a later version of TSO–C126a, or 

an ELT with an approved deviation 

under § 21.609 of this chapter, also are 

in compliance with this section. 

14. Revise § 135.221 to read as 

follows: 

§ 135.221 IFR: Alternate airport weather 

minima. 

(a) Aircraft other than rotorcraft. No 

person may designate an alternate 

airport unless the weather reports or 

forecasts, or any combination of them, 

indicate that the weather conditions 

will be at or above authorized alternate 

airport landing minima for that airport 

at the estimated time of arrival. 

(b) Rotorcraft. Unless otherwise 

authorized by the FAA, no person may 

include an alternate airport or heliport 

in an IFR flight plan unless appropriate 

weather reports or weather forecasts, or 

a combination of them, indicate that, at 

the estimated time of arrival at the 

alternate airport or heliport, the ceiling 

and visibility at that airport or heliport 

will be at or above the following 

weather minima – 

(1) If, for that airport or heliport, an 

instrument approach procedure has 

been published in part 97 of this 

chapter, or a special instrument 

approach procedure has been issued by 

the FAA to the operator, the ceiling is 

200 feet above the minimum for the 

approach to be flown, and visibility is 

at least 1 statute mile but never less than 

the minimum visibility for the approach 

to be flown. 

(2) If, for the alternate airport or 

heliport, no instrument approach 

procedure has been published in part 97 

of this chapter and no special 

instrument approach procedure has 

been issued by the FAA to the operator, 

the ceiling and visibility minima are 

those allowing descent from the MEA, 

approach, and landing under basic VFR. 

15. Amend § 135.267 by adding 

paragraph (g) to read as follows: 

§ 135.267 Flight time limitations and rest 

requirements: Unscheduled one- and twopilot crews. 

* * * * * 

(g) For purposes of this section the 

term ‘‘flight time’’ includes any 

helicopter air ambulance operation with 

medical personnel, as defined in 

§ 135.601, on board the helicopter. 

16. Amend § 135.271 by adding 

paragraph (j) to read as follows: 

§ 135.271 Helicopter hospital emergency 

medical evacuation service (HEMES). 

* * * * * 

(j) For purposes of this section the 

term ‘‘flight time’’ includes any HEMES 

operations with medical personnel, as 

defined in § 135.601, on board the 

helicopter. 

17. Amend § 135.293 by— 

a. Removing the word ‘‘and’’ from the 

end of paragraph (a)(7)(iii); 

b. Removing the period and adding ‘‘; 

and’’ in its place at the end of paragraph 

(a)(8); 

c. Adding paragraph (a)(9); 

d. Redesignating paragraphs (c) 

through (f) as paragraphs (d) through (g) 

respectively; and 

e. Adding new paragraph (c). 

The additions read as follows: 

§ 135.293 Initial and recurrent pilot testing 

requirements. 

(a) * * * 

(9) For rotorcraft pilots, procedures 

for aircraft handling in flat-light, 

whiteout, and brownout conditions, 

including methods for recognizing and 

avoiding those conditions. 

* * * * * 

(c) Each competency check for a 

rotorcraft pilot must include a 

demonstration of the pilot’s ability to 

maneuver the rotorcraft solely by 

reference to instruments. The check 

must determine the pilot’s ability to 

safely maneuver the rotorcraft into 

visual meteorological conditions 

following an inadvertent encounter with 

instrument meteorological conditions. 

For competency checks in non-IFRcertified rotorcraft, the pilot must 

perform such maneuvers as are 

appropriate to the rotorcraft’s installed 

equipment, the certificate holder’s 

operations specifications, and the 

operating environment. 

* * * * * 

§ 135.297 [Amended] 

18. Amend § 135.297 by removing the 

reference to ‘‘§ 135.293 (d)’’ and adding 

‘‘§ 135.293 (e)’’ in its place in the last 

sentence of paragraph (c) introductory 

text. 

19. Add subpart L to part 135 to read 

as follows: 

Subpart L—Helicopter Air Ambulance 

Equipment, Operations, and Training 

Requirements 

Sec. 

135.601 Applicability and definitions. 

135.603 Pilot-in-command qualifications. 

135.605 Helicopter terrain awareness and 

warning system (HTAWS). 

135.607 VFR minimum altitudes and 

visibility requirements. 

135.609 IFR operations at locations without 

weather reporting. 

135.611 VFR/visual transitions from 

instrument approaches. 

135.613 VFR flight planning. 

135.615 Pre-flight risk analysis. 

135.617 Operations control centers. 

135.619 Medical personnel briefing 

requirements. 

Subpart L—Helicopter Air Ambulance 

Equipment, Operation, and Training 

Requirements 

§ 135.601 Applicability and definitions. 

(a) Applicability. This subpart 

prescribes the requirements applicable 

to each certificate holder conducting 

helicopter air ambulance operations. 

(b) Definitions. For purposes of this 

subpart, the following definitions apply. 

(1) Helicopter air ambulance means a 

helicopter used in helicopter air 

ambulance operations by a part 135 

certificate holder authorized by the FAA 

to conduct helicopter air ambulance 

operations. 

(2) Helicopter air ambulance 

operation means a flight, or sequence of 

flights, conducted for the purpose of 

transporting a person in need of medical 

care, or a donor organ, by helicopter air 

ambulance. This includes, but is not 

limited to— 

(i) Flights conducted to position the 

helicopter at the site at which a patient 

or donor organ will be picked up; 

(ii) Flights conducted to reposition 

the helicopter after completing the 

patient, or donor organ transport; and 


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(iii) Flights initiated for the transport 

of a patient or donor organ that are 

terminated due to weather or other 

reasons. 

(3) Medical personnel means persons 

with medical training, including but not 

limited to a flight physician, a flight 

nurse, or a flight paramedic, who are 

carried aboard a helicopter during 

helicopter air ambulance operations in 

order to provide medical care. 

(4) Mountainous means designated 

mountainous areas as defined in part 95 

of this chapter. 

(5) Non-mountainous means areas 

other than mountainous areas as defined 

in part 95 of this chapter. 

§ 135.603 Pilot-in-command qualifications. 

After [DATE 3 YEARS AFTER 

EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL 

RULE], no certificate holder may use, 

nor may any person serve as, a pilot in 

command of a helicopter air ambulance 

operation unless that person meets the 

requirements of § 135.243 and holds a 

helicopter instrument rating or an 

airline transport pilot certificate with a 

category and class rating for that 

aircraft, that is not limited to VFR. 

§ 135.605 Helicopter terrain awareness 

and warning system (HTAWS). 

(a) No person may operate a 

helicopter in helicopter air ambulance 

operations after [DATE 3 YEARS AFTER 

EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL 

RULE], unless that helicopter is 

equipped with a helicopter terrain 

awareness and warning system 

(HTAWS) that meets the requirements 

in Technical Standard Order (TSO)– 

C194. Technical Standard Order (TSO)– 

C194 Helicopter Terrain Awareness and 

Warning System, December 17, 2008, is 

incorporated by reference into this 

section with the approval of the Director 

of the Office of the Federal Register 

under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

Copies may be obtained from the U.S. 

Department of Transportation, 

Subsequent Distribution Office, DOT 

Warehouse M30, Ardmore East Business 

Center, 3341 Q 75th Avenue, Landover, 

MD 20785; telephone (301) 322–5377. 

Copies are also available on the FAA’s 

Web site. Use the following link: 

http://www.airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory_

and_Guidance_Library/rgTSO.nsf/0/

532109AB059EC23

D8625762000573A1E?OpenDocument. 

All approved material is available for 

inspection at the National Archives and 

Records Administration (NARA). For 

information on the availability of this 

material at NARA, call 202–741–6030 or 

go to http://www.archives.gov/

federal_register/code_of_federal_

regulations/ibr_locations.html. 

(b) Operators with HTAWS required 

by this section that meets a later version 

of TSO–C194, or HTAWS with an 

approved deviation under § 21.609 of 

this chapter, also are in compliance 

with this section. 

(c) The certificate holder’s Rotorcraft 

Flight Manual must contain appropriate 

procedures for— 

(1) The use of the HTAWS; and 

(2) Proper flight crew response to 

HTAWS audio and visual warnings. 

§ 135.607 VFR minimum altitudes and 

visibility requirements. 

Unless specified in the certificate 

holder’s operations specifications, when 

conducting helicopter air ambulance 

operations in Class G airspace with 

medical personnel on board, the 

following weather minima and visibility 

requirements apply— 

(a) In non-mountainous local flying 

areas— 

(1) During the day, 800-foot ceiling 

and 2 statute miles visibility. 

(2) At night— 

(i) When equipped with an FAAapproved night-vision imaging system 

(NVIS) or an FAA-approved HTAWS, 

800-foot ceiling and 3 statute miles 

visibility; or 

(ii) When not equipped with an FAAapproved NVIS or an FAA-approved 

HTAWS, 1,000-foot ceiling and 3 statute 

miles visibility. 

(b) In non-mountainous cross-country 

flying areas— 

(1) During the day, 800-foot ceiling 

and 3 statute miles visibility. 

(2) At night— 

(i) When equipped with an FAAapproved NVIS or an FAA-approved 

HTAWS, 1,000-foot ceiling and 3 statute 

miles visibility; or 

(ii) When not equipped with an FAAapproved NVIS or an FAA-approved 

HTAWS, 1,000-foot ceiling and 5 statute 

miles visibility. 

(c) In mountainous local flying 

areas— 

(1) During the day, 800-foot ceiling 

and 3 statute miles visibility. 

(2) At night— 

(i) When equipped with an FAAapproved NVIS or an FAA-approved 

HTAWS, 1,000-foot ceiling and 3 statute 

miles visibility; or 

(ii) When not equipped with an FAAapproved NVIS or an FAA-approved 

HTAWS, 1,500-foot ceiling and 3 statute 

miles visibility. 

(d) In mountainous cross-country 

flying areas— 

(1) During the day, 1,000-foot ceiling 

and 3 statute miles visibility. 

(2) At night— 

(i) When equipped with an FAAapproved NVIS or an FAA-approved 

HTAWS, 1,000-foot ceiling and 5 statute 

miles visibility; or 

(ii) When not equipped with an FAAapproved NVIS or an FAA-approved 

HTAWS, 1,500-foot ceiling and 5 statute 

miles visibility. 

(e) Each certificate holder must 

designate a local flying area for each 

base of operations at which helicopter 

air ambulance services are conducted, 

in a manner acceptable to the FAA, that 

must— 

(1) Not exceed 50 nautical miles in 

any direction from the helicopter’s base 

of operations; 

(2) Take into account man-made and 

natural geographic terrain features that 

are easily identifiable by the pilot in 

command and from which the pilot in 

command may visually determine a 

position at all times; and 

(3) Take into account the operating 

environment and capabilities of the 

certificate holder’s aircraft. 

§ 135.609 IFR operations at locations 

without weather reporting. 

(a) If a certificate holder is authorized 

to conduct helicopter IFR operations, 

the FAA may issue operations 

specifications to allow that certificate 

holder to conduct IFR operations at 

airports or heliports with an instrument 

approach procedure and at which a 

weather report is not available from the 

U.S. National Weather Service (NWS), a 

source approved by the NWS, or a 

source approved by the FAA, subject to 

the following limitations: 

(1) In Class G airspace, IFR departures 

are authorized only after the pilot in 

command of the affected flight 

determines that the weather conditions 

at the departure point are at or above 

VFR minima in accordance with 

§ 135.607; 

(2) The certificate holder must obtain 

a weather report from a weather 

reporting facility operated by the NWS, 

a source approved by the NWS, or a 

source approved by the FAA, that is 

located within 15 nautical miles of the 

destination landing area. In addition, 

the certificate holder must obtain the 

area forecast from the NWS, a source 

approved by the NWS, or a source 

approved by the FAA, for information 

regarding the weather observed in the 

vicinity of the destination landing area; 

(3) Flight planning for IFR flights 

conducted under this paragraph must 

include selection of an alternate airport 

that meets the requirements of 

§§ 135.221 and 135.223; and 

(4) All approaches must be at 

Category A approach speeds or those 

required for the type of approach being 

used. 


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(b) Each helicopter air ambulance 

operated under this section must be— 

(1) Fully equipped and certified to 

conduct IFR operations under this part; 

(2) Equipped with functioning severe 

weather-detection equipment, such as 

airborne weather radar or lightning 

detection; 

(3) Equipped with an operable 

autopilot, if used in lieu of the second 

in command required by § 135.101; and 

(4) Equipped with navigation 

equipment appropriate to the approach 

to be flown. 

(c) Each pilot in command who 

conducts operations under this section 

must— 

(1) Have a current § 135.297 pilot-incommand instrument proficiency check; 

(2) Be certificated to conduct the 

permitted IFR operations; 

(3) Be trained in accordance with the 

certificate holder’s approved training 

program and annually complete an 

approved course that includes, but is 

not limited to— 

(i) A review of IFR regulations found 

in this part and parts 1, 61, and 91 of 

this chapter, and IFR operations found 

in the Aeronautical Information Manual; 

(ii) Interpreting weather, weather 

reports, and weather forecasts; 

(iii) Reviewing instrument charts; 

(iv) Crew resource management; 

(v) Methods for determining weather 

observations by the pilot in command, 

including present visibility and ceilings; 

and 

(vi) Approaches authorized under this 

section; 

(4) Be qualified in accordance with 

the requirements of this part; 

(5) Be current in all requirements to 

perform operations under IFR in the 

make or model of helicopter being used; 

and 

(6) Be tested and checked on IFR 

operations at uncontrolled airports. 

(d) Pilots conducting operations 

pursuant to this section may use the 

weather information obtained in 

paragraph (a) to satisfy the weather 

report and forecast requirements of 

§ 135.213 and § 135.225(a). 

(e) After completing a landing at the 

destination airport or heliport at which 

a weather report is not available, the 

pilot in command is authorized to 

determine if the weather meets the 

takeoff requirements of part 97 of this 

chapter or the certificate holder’s 

operations specification, as applicable. 

§ 135.611 VFR/visual transitions from 

instrument approaches. 

(a) Transitions from IFR flight to VFR 

flight on approach to a heliport or 

landing area— 

(1) If an approved visual segment 

exists as part of an approved instrument 

approach procedure, the appropriate 

associated minima on the approach 

chart apply. 

(2) Unless authorized by the FAA, the 

following VFR weather minima apply 

when conducting an authorized IFR 

Point in Space (PinS) Copter Special 

Instrument Approach Procedure— 

(i) If the proceed-VFR segment to the 

heliport of intended landing is within 1 

nautical mile of the missed approach 

point, and is within the obstacle 

evaluation area, visibility must be at 

least 1 statute mile. 

(ii) If the proceed-VFR segment is 3 

nautical miles or less from the heliport 

or landing area and does not meet the 

requirements of paragraph (a)(1)(i) of 

this section, then— 

(A) Day Operations: 600-foot ceiling/ 

2 statute miles visibility. 

(B) Night Operations: 600-foot ceiling/ 

3 statute miles visibility. 

(3) Unless authorized by the FAA, the 

following VFR weather minima apply 

when conducting an authorized IFR 

Standard or Special Instrument 

Approach Procedure and transitions to 

VFR at the missed approach point that 

is 3 nautical miles or less from the 

heliport or landing area— 

(i) Day Operations: 600-foot ceiling/2 

statute miles visibility. 

(ii) Night Operations: 600-foot ceiling/ 

3 statute miles visibility. 

(4) If the distance from the missed 

approach point to the heliport or 

landing area exceeds 3 nautical miles, 

the minimum altitudes and visibility 

requirements of § 135.607 apply. 

(b) Transitions from VFR to IFR upon 

departure from a heliport or landing 

area— 

(1) A pilot may use the VFR weather 

minima of paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2) of 

this section to depart a heliport or 

landing area if— 

(i) The operator follows an FAAapproved obstacle departure procedure; 

(ii) The operator has filed an IFR 

flight plan and obtains an IFR clearance 

upon reaching a predetermined 

location; and 

(iii) The distance from the departure 

location to the point at which IFR 

clearance will be obtained does not 

exceed 3 nautical miles. 

(2) If the operator cannot meet the 

departure requirements of paragraph 

(b)(1) of this section then the minimum 

altitudes and visibility requirements of 

§ 135.607 apply. 

§ 135.613 VFR flight planning. 

(a) Pre-flight: Prior to conducting VFR 

operations, the pilot in command 

must— 

(1) Determine the minimum safe 

cruise altitude by evaluating the terrain 

and obstacles along the planned route of 

flight; 

(2) Identify and document the highest 

obstacle along the planned route of 

flight; and 

(3) Using the minimum safe cruise 

altitudes, determine the minimum 

required ceiling and visibility to 

conduct the planned flight by applying 

the weather minima appropriate to the 

conditions of the planned flight, 

including the requirements of this 

subpart and the visibility and cloud 

clearance requirements of § 91.155(a) of 

this chapter, as applicable to the class 

of airspace for the planned flight. 

(b) During flight: While conducting 

VFR operations, the pilot in command 

must ensure that all terrain and 

obstacles along the route of flight, 

except for takeoff and landing, can be 

cleared vertically by no less than the 

following: 

(1) 300 feet for day operations. 

(2) 500 feet for night operations. 

(c) Re-routing the planned flight path: 

A pilot in command may deviate from 

the planned flight path as required by 

conditions or operational 

considerations. During such deviations, 

the pilot in command is not relieved 

from the weather or terrain/obstruction 

clearance requirements of this part and 

part 91 of this chapter. Re-routing, 

change in destination, or other changes 

to the planned flight that occur while 

the aircraft is on the ground at an 

intermediate stop require evaluation of 

the new route in accordance with 

paragraph (a) of this section. 

(d) Operations manual: Each 

certificate holder must document its 

VFR flight planning procedures in its 

operations manual. 

§ 135.615 Pre-flight risk analysis. 

(a) Each certificate holder conducting 

helicopter air ambulance operations 

must establish, and document in its 

operations manual, an FAA-approved 

procedure for conducting pre-flight risk 

analyses that include at least the 

following items— 

(1) Flight considerations, to include 

obstacles and terrain along the planned 

route of flight, landing zone conditions, 

and fuel requirements; 

(2) Human factors, such as crew 

fatigue, life events, and other stressors; 

(3) Weather, including departure, en 

route, destination, and forecasted; 

(4) Whether another helicopter air 

ambulance operator has refused or 

rejected a flight request; and 

(5) Strategies and procedures for 

mitigating identified risks, including 

procedures for obtaining and 

documenting approval of the certificate 

holder’s management personnel to 


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release a flight when a risk exceeds a 

level predetermined by the certificate 

holder. 

(b) Each certificate holder must 

develop a pre-flight risk analysis 

worksheet to include, at a minimum, the 

items in paragraph (a) of this section. 

(c) Prior to the first leg of each 

helicopter air ambulance operation, the 

pilot in command must conduct and 

document on the risk analysis 

worksheet a pre-flight risk analysis in 

accordance with the certificate holder’s 

FAA-approved procedures. The pilot in 

command must sign the risk analysis 

worksheet and specify the date and time 

it was completed. 

(d) The certificate holder must retain 

the original or a copy of each completed 

pre-flight risk analysis worksheet at a 

location specified in its operations 

manual for at least 90 days from the date 

of the operation. 

§ 135.617 Operations control centers. 

(a) After [DATE 2 YEARS AFTER THE 

EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL 

RULE] certificate holders authorized to 

conduct helicopter air ambulance 

operations, with 10 or more helicopter 

air ambulances assigned to the 

certificate holder’s operations 

specifications, must have an operations 

control center, staffed by operations 

control specialists who, at a minimum— 

(1) Provide two-way communications 

with pilots; 

(2) Provide pilots with weather 

briefings, to include current and 

forecasted weather along the planned 

route of flight; 

(3) Monitor the progress of the flight; 

and 

(4) Participate in the pre-flight risk 

analysis required under § 135.615 to 

include the following: 

(i) Ensure pilot has completed all 

required items on the FAA-approved 

pre-flight risk analysis form; 

(ii) Confirm and verify all entries on 

pre-flight risk analysis form; 

(iii) Assist the pilot in mitigating any 

identified risk prior to takeoff; and 

(iv) Acknowledge in writing, 

specifying the date and time, that the 

risk analysis worksheet has been 

accurately completed and that, 

according to their professional 

judgment, the flight can be conducted 

safely. 

(b) Each certificate holder conducting 

helicopter air ambulance operations 

must provide enough operations control 

specialists at each operations control 

center to ensure proper operational 

control of each flight. 

(c) Each certificate holder must 

describe in its operations manual the 

duties and responsibilities of operations 

control specialists, including pre-flight 

risk mitigation strategies and control 

measures, shift change checklist, and its 

training and testing procedures to hold 

the position, including procedures for 

retesting. 

(d) No certificate holder may use, nor 

may any person serve as, an operations 

control specialist unless that person has 

satisfactorily completed the training 

required by paragraph (e) of this section. 

(e) No person may perform the duties 

of an operations control specialist before 

completing the certificate holder’s FAAapproved operations control specialist 

training program and passing an FAAapproved written knowledge and a 

practical test given by the certificate 

holder as required by this paragraph. No 

person may continue performing the 

duties of an operations control specialist 

unless that person has completed the 

certificate holder’s FAA-approved 

recurrent training program and passed 

an FAA-approved written knowledge 

test and a practical test given by the 

certificate holder as required by this 

paragraph. 

(1) Initial training must include a 

minimum of 80 hours of training on the 

topics listed in paragraph (g) of this 

section. A certificate holder may reduce 

the number of hours of initial training 

to a minimum of 40 hours for persons 

who have obtained, at the time of 

beginning initial training, a total of at 

least 2 years of experience during the 

last 5 years in any one or in any 

combination of the following areas— 

(i) In military aircraft operations as a 

pilot, flight navigator, or meteorologist; 

(ii) In air carrier operations as a pilot, 

flight engineer, certified aircraft 

dispatcher, or meteorologist; or 

(iii) In aircraft operations as an air 

traffic controller or a flight service 

specialist. 

(2) Each operations control specialist 

must receive a minimum of 40 hours of 

recurrent training on the topics listed in 

paragraph (g) of this section and pass an 

FAA approved written knowledge test 

and practical test given by the certificate 

holder on those topics within the 

calendar month of the anniversary of 

passing the initial practical test. 

Recurrent training and examinations 

may be completed in the calendar 

month before, the calendar month of, or 

the calendar month after they are due. 

(f) The certificate holder must 

maintain a training record for each 

operations control specialist employed 

by the certificate holder for the duration 

of that individual’s employment and for 

90 days thereafter. Each training record 

must include a chronological log of all 

instructors, subjects covered, and course 

examinations and results. 

(g) Each certificate holder must have 

an FAA-approved operations control 

specialist training program that covers 

at least the following topics— 

(1) Aviation weather, to include: 

(i) General meteorology; 

(ii) Prevailing weather; 

(iii) Adverse and deteriorating 

weather; 

(iv) Windshear; 

(v) Icing conditions; 

(vi) Use of aviation weather products; 

(vii) Available sources of information; 

and 

(viii) Weather minima; 

(2) Navigation, to include: 

(i) Navigation aids; 

(ii) Instrument approach procedures; 

(iii) Navigational publications; and 

(iv) Navigation techniques; 

(3) Flight monitoring, to include: 

(i) Available flight-monitoring 

procedures; and 

(ii) Alternate flight-monitoring 

procedures; 

(4) Air traffic control, to include: 

(i) Airspace; 

(ii) Air traffic control procedures; 

(iii) Aeronautical charts; and 

(iv) Aeronautical data sources; 

(5) Aviation communication, to 

include: 

(i) Available aircraft communications 

systems; 

(ii) Normal communication 

procedures; 

(iii) Abnormal communication 

procedures; and 

(iv) Emergency communication 

procedures; 

(6) Aircraft systems, to include: 

(i) Communications systems; 

(ii) Navigation systems; 

(iii) Surveillance systems; 

(iv) Fueling systems; 

(v) Specialized systems; 

(vi) General maintenance 

requirements; and 

(vii) Minimum equipment lists; 

(7) Aircraft limitations and 

performance, to include: 

(i) Aircraft operational limitations; 

(ii) Aircraft performance; 

(iii) Weight and balance procedures 

and limitations; and 

(iv) Landing zone and landing facility 

requirements; 

(8) Aviation policy and regulations, to 

include: 

(i) 14 CFR parts 1, 27, 29, 61, 71, 91, 

and 135; 

(ii) 49 CFR part 830; 

(iii) Company operations 

specifications; 

(iv) Company general operations 

policies; 

(v) Enhanced operational control 

policies; 

(vi) Aeronautical decisionmaking and 

risk management; 


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(vii) Lost procedures; and 

(viii) Emergency and search and 

rescue procedures, including plotting 

coordinates in degrees, minutes, 

seconds format, and degrees, decimal 

minutes format; 

(9) Crew resource management, to 

include: 

(i) Concepts and practical application; 

(ii) Risk management and risk 

mitigation; and 

(iii) Pre-flight risk analysis procedures 

required under § 135.615; 

(10) Local flying area orientation, to 

include: 

(i) Terrain features; 

(ii) Obstructions; 

(iii) Weather phenomena for local 

area; 

(iv) Airspace and air traffic control 

facilities; 

(v) Heliports, airports, landing zones, 

and fuel facilities; 

(vi) Instrument approaches; 

(vii) Predominant air traffic flow; 

(viii) Landmarks and cultural features, 

including areas prone to white out or 

brown out conditions; and 

(ix) Local aviation and safety 

resources and contact information; and 

(11) Any other requirements as 

determined by the FAA to ensure safe 

operations. 

(h) Operations control specialist duty 

time limitations. 

(1) Each certificate holder must 

establish the daily duty period for an 

operations control specialist so that it 

begins at a time that allows that person 

to become thoroughly familiar with 

operational considerations, including 

existing and anticipated weather 

conditions in the area of operations, 

helicopter operations in progress, and 

helicopter maintenance status, before 

performing duties associated with any 

helicopter air ambulance operation. The 

operations control specialist must 

remain on duty until each helicopter air 

ambulance monitored by that person 

has completed its flight, has gone 

beyond that person’s jurisdiction, or the 

operations control specialist is relieved 

by another qualified operations control 

specialist. 

(2) Except in cases where 

circumstances or emergency conditions 

beyond the control of the certificate 

holder require otherwise— 

(i) No certificate holder may schedule 

an operations control specialist for more 

than 10 consecutive hours of duty; 

(ii) If an operations control specialist 

is scheduled for more than 10 hours of 

duty in 24 consecutive hours, the 

certificate holder must provide that 

person a rest period of at least 8 hours 

at or before the end of 10 hours of duty; 

(iii) If an operations control specialist 

is on duty for more than 10 consecutive 

hours, the certificate holder must 

provide that person a rest period of at 

least 8 hours before that person’s next 

duty period; 

(iii) Each operations control specialist 

must be relieved of all duty with the 

certificate holder for at least 24 

consecutive hours during any 7 

consecutive days. 

(i) Drug and Alcohol Testing. 

Operations control specialists must be 

tested for drugs and alcohol according 

to the certificate holder’s Drug and 

Alcohol Testing Program administered 

under part 120 of this chapter. 

§ 135.619 Medical personnel briefing 

requirements. 

(a) Except as provided in paragraph 

(b) of this section, prior to each 

helicopter air ambulance operation, 

each pilot in command, or other flight 

crewmember designated by the 

certificate holder, must ensure that all 

medical personnel have been— 

(1) Briefed on the topics included in 

§ 135.117(a) and (b); and 

(2) Briefed on the following topics— 

(i) Physiological aspects of flight; 

(ii) Patient loading and unloading; 

(iii) Safety in and around the aircraft; 

(iv) In-flight emergency procedures; 

(v) Emergency landing procedures; 

(vi) Emergency evacuation 

procedures; 

(vii) Efficient and safe 

communications with the pilot; and 

(viii) Operational differences between 

day and night operations, if appropriate. 

(b) The briefing required in paragraph 

(a)(2) of this section may be omitted if 

all medical personnel on board have 

satisfactorily completed the certificate 

holder’s FAA-approved medical 

personnel training program within the 

preceding 24 calendar months. Each 

training program must include a 

minimum of 4 hours of ground training, 

and 4 hours of training in and around 

an air ambulance helicopter, on the 

topics set forth in paragraph (a)(2) of 

this section. 

(c) Each certificate holder must 

maintain a record for each person 

trained under this section that— 

(1) Contains the individual’s name, 

the most recent training completion 

date, and a description, copy, or 

reference to training materials used to 

meet the training requirement; and 

(2) Is maintained for 24 calendar 

months following the individual’s 

completion of training, and for 60 days 

thereafter. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on September 

28, 2010. 

Raymond Towles, 

Acting Director, Flight Standards Service. 

[FR Doc. 2010–24862 Filed 10–7–10; 11:15 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 


wwoods2 on DSK1DXX6B1PROD with PROPOSALS-PART 2