The Honorable Byron R. White, Associate Justice of the *

United States Supreme Court, (Ret.), sitting by

designation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 294(a).

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_________________

No. 95-1574

_________________

David Habiger, *

 *

Plaintiff - Appellant *

 * Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for North Dakota.

 *

City of Fargo; Ann Alzheimer, *

in her official capacity and *

as an individual; Mike Kjera, *

in his official capacity and *

as an individual; Scott *

Stenerson, in his official *

capacity and as an individual; *

Don Lawyer, in his official *

capacity and as an individual; *

Mark Lykken, in his official *

capacity and as an individual, *

 *

Defendants - Appellees. *

_________________

Submitted: October 18, 1995

Filed: April 4, 1996

_________________

Before WHITE, Associate Justice (Ret.), McMILLIAN and LOKEN, Circuit

*

Judges.

_________________

WHITE, Associate Justice (Ret.).
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I. INTRODUCTION

 Plaintiff-Appellant David A. Habiger ("Habiger") appeals from the

district court's entry of partial summary judgment and a jury verdict

against him in his Section 1983 action brought in the wake of his arrest

for violating a temporary restraining order ("TRO"). The district court

rejected his unlawful arrest claim, ruling for the police officers on

qualified immunity grounds and dismissing the claim against the City of

Fargo ("the City") based on its alleged failure to train its police

officers. Habiger v. City of Fargo, No. A3-93-81 (D.N.D. filed Jan. 23,

1995). A jury then found that neither the City nor its officers were

liable for using excessive force in arresting Habiger. Habiger now

appeals, complaining that the district court erred in (1) granting summary

judgment to the officers on qualified immunity grounds; (2) dismissing the

illegal arrest/failure to train claim against the City; and (3) refusing

to instruct the jury that it should consider the legality of the arrest in

determining whether the officers' use of force in arresting Habiger was

objectively reasonable. For the reasons stated below, we reject each of

these claims of error, and AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

II. BACKGROUND

A.

 On October 28, 1991, a North Dakota state trial court issued a TRO

restricting the protesting activity of pro-life demonstrators in the

immediate vicinity of the Fargo Women's Health Organization, Inc. ("FWHO"

or "the clinic"). Fargo Women's Health Organization, Inc. v. Lambs of

Christ, No. 91-1953 (Cass County Dist. Ct. filed Oct. 28, 1991). The

operative provisions of the TRO enjoined the pro-life protestors from:
 More precisely, the North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the 1

preliminary injunction that superseded the TRO and that contained

the identical provisions. See Fargo Women's Health Org., 488

N.W. 2d at 405. For the sake of convenience, we shall refer to

the injunction as a TRO.

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(a). trespassing on, sitting in, blocking, impeding or

obstructing ingress or egress from FWHO facilities and the

homes and residences of Plaintiffs Miks, Wicklund, and Bovard,

as well as the homes and residences of any staff (paid or

volunteer) or patients of FWHO.

(b). harassing, intimidating or physically abusing

persons entering, leaving or working at FWHO facilities;

(c). obstructing the work of the persons located at FWHO

facilities by any means -- including singing, chanting,

yelling, shouting, or screaming -- that substantially

interferes with the provision of medical services including

counseling, with[in] such facility;

(d). going within 100 feet of the property line of FWHO

during such times as they are open for business, except that

one person may quietly and peacefully picket such facility, so

long as that person does not interfere with the operations of

said facility as provided herein.

(e). following, harassing, photographing, videotaping,

and intimidating, or speaking to staff and patients of FWHO who

have indicated that they do not wish to be spoken to.

(f). distributing leaflets or brochures to any person who

has indicated orally or by gesture that such person does not

wish to receive such literature.

(g). inducing, encouraging, or directing others to take

any of the actions described in paragraphs (a). - (f). above.

. . .

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THE Cass County Sheriff, Fargo

Police Department, and any other Law Enforcement Authority may

enforce this order and may make arrests for the violation of

this order.

Id. at 2-4.

 The pro-life protestors challenged the constitutionality of the TRO,

but the North Dakota Supreme Court, ten months after the arrest challenged

in this case, upheld those provisions of the TRO that are directly involved

in this case. See Fargo Women's Health Organization, Inc. v. Lambs of

Christ, 488 N.W.2d 401 (N.D. 1992). Specifically, 1
 As for the other provisions of the TRO, the North Dakota 2

Supreme Court upheld paragraph (b), as well as paragraph (e) as

construed, except for its "speaking" prohibition, which was

stricken. Fargo Women's Health Org., 488 N.W.2d at 410-11. The

court also determined that the 100-foot place restriction in

paragraph (d) was content neutral and served a "significant

governmental interest." Id. at 407-09. However, the court

concluded that paragraph (d) was not narrowly tailored as

required by the First Amendment, and thus, remanded that

provision for sufficient narrowing. Id. at 409. In any event,

the area restriction is not involved in this appeal. Finally,

the court invalidated paragraph (f) in its entirety. Id. at 411. 

Paragraphs (a) and (g) were apparently not challenged.

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the court upheld the excessive noise restriction contained in paragraph

(c), supra, which is involved here, on the ground that the noise created

by the protestors had been so loud and invasive as to substantially

interfere with the provision of medical services. Id. at 409-10. On this

appeal, Habiger does not challenge this judgment and does not contest the

facial validity of paragraph (c) or any other provision of the TRO.2

 In its opinion, the North Dakota Supreme Court described the events

leading up to the issuance of the TRO:

Since 1981, the Fargo Women's Health Organization has

operated a clinic which provides a full range of gynecological

medical services including first trimester abortions.

Approximately 75 demonstrations by anti-abortion protestors

have been held in the vicinity of the clinic. It appears that

most of these demonstrations were peaceful, consisting of

picketing, leafleting, and speaking to people in the area near

the clinic. Beginning March 29, 1991, the character of the

protests changed. On that day, 26 people stormed the clinic,

broke down a door, occupied its rooms, and locked themselves

together using bicycle locks. The demonstrators refused to

leave, were arrested, and were removed by Fargo police after

their locks were removed by a locksmith.

On nine other occasions in the ensuing seven months,

demonstrators were arrested for criminal acts committed in

conjunction with anti-abortion protests. As a result of these

actions, patients were confronted and jostled as they attempted

to walk to the clinic. Some patients were able to reach the

clinic only with the assistance of
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volunteer "escorts" or professional security officers who

walked them through groups of hostile, screaming protestors

that surrounded them, stood in their way, forced leaflets into

patients' hands and otherwise impeded patients' access to the

clinic. Protestors struck, pushed, and threatened escorts and

guards with physical harm. One protestor was arrested trying

to climb the clinic's fence in order to reach a patient using

the clinic's rear entrance.

Patients who attempted to drive to the clinic were

confronted at the entrance to the clinic parking lot.

Protestors stood in the way of the cars, climbed onto the

vehicles' hoods or under the cars. Some protestors attempted

to fasten themselves to the frames of cars in order to delay

their removal from the site. On one occasion, protestors

placed blocks against the tires and attempted to cut a cable in

order to disable a car after they succeeded in stopping it in

the clinic's driveway. On another occasion, protestors waited

across the street from the clinic for a car to approach the

parking lot at which point they rushed into the street, stopped

the car, and blocked the public road. As a result of these

tactics, the clinic was effectively blockaded; patients and

staff could not enter or leave the clinic for hours at a time.

The protestors called these blockades "rescues." At

anti-abortion rallies held after the "rescues" began, spokesmen

for the associations asked volunteers to participate by being

jailed for rescuing babies. The rescues were to be part of a

two-year campaign to force the clinic to close.

Away from the clinic, protestors followed clinic staff

members in cars, and into grocery stores, airports, and other

public buildings. Their activities were particularly intense

against one of the clinic's doctors. During a five month

period, groups as large as 30 demonstrated at the gate of her

home, congregating in predawn hours, shouting and honking car

horns, and attempting to block the departure of the doctor and

her family members. Some protestors roamed on the doctor's

property, leaving a banner draped over a car, a baby stroller

and basket on her porch. During times when the protestors were

near the site, the doctor's house and garage were vandalized.

Protestors followed the doctor in cars as she drove to Fargo or

to the airport. Groups waited for the doctor in airport

parking ramps and rushed at her, yelling and flashing cameras.

They leafleted cars at the school of the doctor's daughter, and

two protestors were asked to leave the school building when

they attempted to obtain a photo of her daughter. A car full

of protestors also followed the daughter of one of the clinic's

volunteers.
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Id. at 404-05.

B.

On the morning of October 31, 1991, Habiger and approximately

seventy-five other individuals participated in a protest near the clinic

to protest the issuance of the TRO. During the protest, several police

officers, including Sergeant Don Lawyer ("Lawyer") were in front of the

clinic to enforce the TRO. After Habiger walked over to Lawyer, Lawyer

told him that he could not cross the red-line marking the 100 foot radius

around the clinic. Habiger responded that, "this is quite a country we got

here. We're living on the edge of socialism. It's more like a communist

regime." Habiger, slip op. at 5.

 After several of the protestors refused to stand behind the line,

approached within 80 feet of the clinic property, sat down, and refused to

move, the police officers began arresting them for violating the terms of

the TRO. About the time that the officers began arresting the protestors,

Habiger, from behind the line, began to criticize loudly the officers'

conduct. Lawyer repeatedly asked Habiger to quiet down. Despite Lawyer's

requests, Habiger continued to condemn the police officers in loud tones:

This is a dictatorship in this town. An evil city. You work

for evil people that are killing human beings in there. You

don't care. If you had any guts, you'd get out of that uniform

and take a stand for life. What's that job mean to you? It

ain't gonna mean nothing when your life is over. Take a stand

for Jesus Christ. They're killin' human beings in there and

nobody cares. And you stand there with that smirk on your

face. When you stand before God, you're going to answer for

it.

Id. at 6. Lawyer again asked him to quiet down. This provoked an even

more emphatic response from Habiger:

I can talk all I want. It's a free country. I'm behind the

line. If you guys had any guts, you'd take them
-7-

uniforms off and we'd all storm that place and close it down.

They're killing children in there. Yet nobody does nothin'.

Everybody stands back. They're killing children. This town's

a dictatorship. Its a communistic-it's communistic. You're

evil. You're all evil. They're standing up for murderers.

They're killing children that have a right to live. We had, we

got a right to our lives. I don't care.

Id. at 6-7. Finally, Lawyer told Habiger that he was under arrest.

Habiger asked "For what?, " and Lawyer responded, "Court order." Habiger

then stated, "For what? I'm just talking." Lawyer replied, "You're yelling

too loud." Id. at 7. Habiger resisted the arrest, and several other

officers (Lawyer's co-defendants in this action) came to assist Lawyer in

restraining Habiger.

 After the police brought Habiger to the ground and completed the

arrest, he complained of pain in his arm, and the police called an

ambulance to assist him. After he was treated at a local hospital, police

officers brought Habiger to jail. The following day, Habiger was charged

with disorderly conduct and preventing arrest. Habiger posted the

necessary bond, but as a condition of his release, he was ordered to stay

away from the clinic. On or about March 25, 1992, the Cass County State

Attorney's Office dismissed the charges on First Amendment and

insufficiency of the evidence grounds.

 On May 7, 1993, Habiger filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, claiming

that several of the City's police officers and the City violated his First

and Fourth Amendment rights. As to the officers, Habiger alleged that they

arrested him for violating the noise restriction contained in paragraph (c)

of the TRO without probable cause and that they used excessive force in

arresting him. As to the City, Habiger charged that its failure to train

the defendant officers led to his unconstitutional arrest. Habiger's

complaint also alleged state law claims of false arrest, false imprisonment
 This case was tried to a magistrate judge by consent of the 3

parties.

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and assault and battery. Magistrate Judge Klein, on summary judgment,

3

concluded that the officers were protected by qualified immunity on the

probable cause and First Amendment issues and dismissed the claim against

the City for its alleged failure to train the officers. Similarly, Judge

Klein ruled that the state law claims of false arrest and false

imprisonment were barred under North Dakota's immunity doctrine.

 The court, however, denied the summary judgment motion on Habiger's

excessive force and state law assault and battery claims, ruling that these

claims should be tried to a jury, which then occurred. The jury found for

the officers and the City. Habiger then filed this appeal. He argues that

the district court erred in (1) granting summary judgment to the officers

on the unconstitutional arrest claims; (2) granting summary judgment to the

City on the alleged failure to train its officers; and (3) not instructing

the jury to consider the lawfulness of the arrest in determining whether

the officers, use of force was objectively reasonable. We exercise

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we now AFFIRM.

III. DISCUSSION

 We begin by setting out the legal propositions that are not in

dispute. First, to withstand a motion for summary judgment on qualified

immunity grounds, a civil rights plaintiff must (1) assert a violation of

a constitutional right; (2) demonstrate that the alleged right is clearly

established; and (3) raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the

official would have known that his alleged conduct would have violated

plaintiff's clearly established right. Foulks v. Cole County, Mo., 991

F.2d 454, 456 (8th Cir. 1993). Second, Habiger had a clearly established

right under the Fourth Amendment not to be arrested unless there was

probable cause for his arrest.
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Third, Habiger also had a clearly established right to express his views

about abortion in a public forum; but this right is not absolute since it

is subject to proper time, place and manner regulations, such as the

excessive noise prohibition contained in paragraph (c) of the TRO. Fourth,

the validity of the TRO, of which Habiger had notice, is not in dispute;

hence, if the police officers had probable cause to believe that Habiger

was violating the TRO by yelling or screaming so as to substantially

interfere with the provision of medical services (e.g., counseling), his

arrest was valid and would not violate either the Fourth or the First

Amendment. Fifth, "[t]he issue for immunity purposes is not probable cause

in fact but arguable probable cause," Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1455

(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828 (1987), that is, whether the officer

should have known that the arrest violated plaintiff's clearly established

right, Foulks v. Cole County, Mo., 991 F.2d at 456. Sixth, in granting

summary judgment in favor of defendant officers on immunity grounds, the

court did not need to rule on whether there was actual probable cause to

arrest Habiger. Seventh, although the City may not be held liable for the

mistakes of its officers on a respondeat superior basis, it is not entitled

to the shield of qualified immunity afforded to its officers. See Owen v.

City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980). Thus, if there was not

actual probable cause to arrest Habiger, the City could be held liable on

a failure to train theory unless its failure to train its officer did not

lead to Habiger's unlawful arrest, which the district court held was the

case and which is an issue in this appeal.

A. THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY ISSUE

 We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo.

Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Thien, 8 F.3d 1307, 1310 (8th Cir. 1993). We

address first whether a reasonably competent officer could believe there

was probable cause to arrest Habiger. As the district court recounted,

when officer Lawyer arrested Habiger, he stated that Habiger was violating

the court order by "yelling too loud." Thus, Lawyer
 We have previously explained that: 4

Law enforcement officers should not, on pain of having

to pay damages out of their own pockets, be required to

anticipate how appellate judges will apply maxims of

constitutional adjudication about which even those

judges sometimes disagree [-] it would be unworkable

for the officers to await interpretations from federal

appellate judges rendered long after the orders were

executed to learn whether they will be civilly liable

for performing an assigned duty.

McCurry v. Tesch, 824 F.2d 638, 642 (8th Cir. 1987) (internal

quotation omitted).

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must have thought that Habiger's repeated yelling substantially interfered

with the clinic's operation and violated the noise restriction contained

in paragraph (c) of the TRO. The court posed the issue as whether " a

reasonable police officer could have believed that Habiger's yelling was

substantially interfering with the operation of the clinic." Habiger, slip

op. at 21. The court concluded that "[a] reasonable police officer fearing

a magnification of the volatile situation could have believed that

Habiger's speech, delivered while many of his fellow demonstrators were

being arrested for violating the court order, substantially interfered with

clinic operations." Id. at 22. Thus, the court ruled that the officers

were immune from suit.

 We agree with the district court. Habiger was screaming at the top

of his voice from a point some thirty-three yards from the clinic property.

Whether Habiger could be heard inside the clinic or by patients seeking to

enter the clinic was a judgment call on Lawyer's part, the kind of a

decision that police officers must repeatedly make. The qualified immunity

doctrine allows officers to make reasonable errors so that they do not

always "err on the side of caution." Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229

(1991) (per curiam) (internal quotation omitted). Furthermore, the

4

"substantial interference" standard had yet to be interpreted, and an

officer on duty in the field is entitled to make a reasonable

interpretation
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of the law he is obligated to enforce. See Gorra v. Hanson, 880 F. 2d 95,

97-98 (8th Cir. 1989). Thus, given Habiger's loud and repeated yelling,

we conclude that the district court correctly held that the officers

arguably had probable cause for Habiger's arrest and were immune from suit.

In doing so, we reject three First Amendment arguments that Habiger claims

foreclose or fatally infect the district court's judgment.

 First, Habiger contends that the district court failed to consider the

import of paragraph (i) of the TRO, which cautions that nothing in the TRO

should be construed to abridge the lawful exercise of one's First Amendment

rights. But Habiger does not challenge the constitutionality of the noise

restriction. An arrest for violating that provision is not barred by the

First Amendment, nor does an officer's reasonable mistake about the

legality of the arrest disentitle the officer to qualified immunity.

 Second, Habiger asserts that the arrest was pretextual; that is, he

argues that the officers arrested him not to enforce the TRO, but because

of their disagreement with his views on abortion. This matter of intent,

it is submitted, should not have been disposed of on summary judgment. On

the facts of this case, however, we seriously doubt that this claim of

pretext, even if proved, would nullify the finding of probable cause to

believe that Habiger was violating the TRO; nor would it disentitle the

officers to qualified immunity. See U.S. v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 915

(8th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied., 115 S. Ct. 1970 (1995) ; Foster

v. Metropolitan Airports Comm 'n. , 914 F. 2d 1076, 1081 (8th Cir. 1990).

In any event, we need not consider this issue since Habiger has plainly

failed to support his claim of pretext by demonstrating a genuine issue of

material fact on this question.

Third, Habiger points to the district court's conclusion that "a

reasonable police officer fearing a magnification of the volatile situation

could have believed that Habiger's speech, delivered while
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many of his fellow demonstrators were being arrested for violating the

Order, substantially interfered with clinic operations." He asserts that

this conclusion disregards the First Amendment by considering the emotive

effect his speech might have on his fellow demonstrators. In similar vein,

Habiger points to what Officer Lawyer said in his affidavit: Habiger was

"very emotional and disruptive" and "made it much more difficult to control

the crowd." App. 105-106, 110. Habiger supports his legal argument by

quoting from Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989).

we have not permitted the government to assume that every

expression of a provocative idea will incite a riot, but have

instead required careful consideration of the actual

circumstances surrounding such expression, asking whether the

expression "is directed to inciting, or producing imminent

lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).

See Reply Br. at 5.

 We do not belittle this basic constitutional principle. As we see it,

this principle was not violated either by the officers' conduct or by the

district court's opinion and judgment. The circumstances faced by the

officers and leading to Habiger's arrest are adequately clear. Habiger was

one of 75 or so protestors gathered in front of the clinic. Some of the

demonstrators crossed the red line to within 80 feet of the clinic, sat

down and refused to move, asserting that they had a constitutional right

to be where they were. At this point, Habiger, from behind the line but

in the midst of the protestors, began screaming invectives at the police

at the top of his voice. He refused to quiet down. In these

circumstances, Lawyer and his fellow officers could reasonably believe that

Habiger's extremely loud and emotional shouting was directed at inciting

imminent conduct expressly barred by the TRO and that his shouting was

substantially interfering with the business of the clinic. The officers

surely thought that they had probable cause to arrest Habiger. Even if

this
 The essence of Habiger's argument that the district court 5

ruled on immunity grounds and did not hold that the officers had

actual probable cause to arrest Habiger-is that "[i]f probable

cause was indeed present, it is not necessary to consider an

immunity defense." Foster v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 914 F.

2d 1076, 1079 (8th Cir. 1990).

 While this discussion of the jury instructions represents 6

Judge Klein's interpretation of her own order, the order itself

also appears to conclude that the police officers had arguable,

not actual, probable cause to make the arrest. See, e.g. , slip

op at 22 ("whether Habiger's passionate speech substantially

interfered with clinic operations is subject to debate"); id. at

23 ("[A] reasonable police officer 

could have believed that Habiger's arrest was lawful.").

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was a mistake, the purpose of the qualified immunity doctrine is to provide

ample room for mistaken judgments and to protect "all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475

U.S. 335, 341 (1986). In our view, the officers' judgment was not "plainly

incompetent," and the district court did not err in referring to the

probable impact of Habiger's screaming on the other demonstrators and in

concluding that there was arguable probable cause to believe that Habiger

was substantially interfering with the business of the clinic.

B. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

 Habiger also argues that, if the officers arrested Habiger without

actual probable cause (even if there was arguable probable cause so as to

clothe them with qualified immunity), the City is liable for the illegal

arrest on a failure to train theory. See Medina v. City of Denver, 960

F.2d 1493, 1499-1500 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting that there is no

inconsistency between granting qualified immunity to City officials and

holding the City liable). First, Habiger claims that the district court

never addressed the question of actual probable cause because it did not

analyze the underlying constitutional violation (which it assumed) , but

merely focused on the presence of arguable probable cause. See Discussion 5

of Jury Instructions, App. at 172 ("I don't want to create the impression

that the Court has ruled that the arrest was valid because I've not ruled

either way.").6
 Specifically, Habiger challenges Jury Instruction No. 8. 7

That instruction provided:

You will not be asked to decide whether plaintiff's

arrest was valid or not, or whether he was legitimately

exercising his right to free speech at the time of his

arrest. The court has already resolved these issues

and you should not consider them.

App. at 199.

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In effect, Habiger continues, the district court wrongly applied the shield

of qualified immunity to the City. See Owen, 445 U.S. at 657.

 This argument, even if sound, does not require us to reverse the

district court, for it also rejected Habiger's failure to train theory on

the ground that "[a] dditional specialized training on First Amendment

protections would not have influenced a reasonable police officer's

decision to arrest plaintiff for violating the [TRO]." Habiger slip op. at

39-40; id. at 39 ("inadequate training was not the proximate cause of

plaintiff's alleged constitutional injury."). Moreover, with specific

reference to the TRO, the district court explained that, since the TRO only

went into effect three days before Habiger's arrest, the Department did not

have time to train its officers how to handle these specific protests. Id.

at 40. Thus, because Habiger has failed to demonstrate how the City's

failure to train its officer caused the violation of his constitutional

rights, we affirm the district court's judgment that the City cannot be

held liable on a failure to train theory.

C. JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON EXCESSIVE FORCE

 Finally, Habiger argues that the district court erred by instructing

the jury that the objective reasonableness of the force

used in arresting him did not turn, at least in part, on whether the

arrest was legal. In support of this contention, Habiger suggests 7
 Indeed, we are inclined to believe that the presence of 8

actual or arguable probable cause is irrelevant to the objective

reasonableness of the force used to effect an arrest. That is,

if the identical force is used to arrest two defendants suspected

of committing the identical crime, the objective reasonableness

of the use of force does not depend on whether the arrest was

based on actual or arguable probable cause.

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that Graham v. Connors focus on "the severity of the crime" as a factor

justifying the use of force suggests that the legality of the arrest can

make the use of force unreasonable. 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). We reject

this argument because the "severity of the crime" does not necessarily

encompass whether there was actual probable cause to arrest the defendant

for that alleged crime. The touchstone of Graham is objective

reasonableness, and the force used to effect a good faith, though false,

arrest is not necessarily more likely to be unreasonable than a good faith,

though legal, arrest. The jury instructions reflected this essence of

8

Graham and the jury correctly focused on the severity of alleged crime and

the other factors outlined in Graham. Therefore, we affirm the jury

instructions on the excessive force count.

IV. CONCLUSION

 For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district

court.

A true copy.

 Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT