alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Louis NETTINA, Appellant, v. CITY OF PEMBROKE PINES (FIRE DEPARTMENT), Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc., Appellees.

No. 1D09-6463.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Nov. 30, 2010.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 26, 2011.

Kelli Biferie Hastings of Bichler & Kelley, P.A., Maitland, and Robert S. Winess of Bichler & Kelley, P.A., West Palm Beach, for Appellant.

Edward D. Schuster and Gregory G. Coican of Massey, Coican, Schuster, Ried-hammer & King, LLC, Fort Lauderdale, for Appellees.

PER CURIAM.

We affirm the Judge of Compensation Claims’ (JCC’s) denial of all benefits requested by Claimant. The JCC properly denied the request for authorization of a cardiologist to treat Claimant’s hypertension on the basis that Claimant failed to prove further evaluation and treatment by a cardiologist was medically necessary. We note, however, that the JCC’s alternative basis for denying the benefits claimed is contrary to *City of Pembroke Pines v. Ortagus,*50 So.3d 31 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), holding that once compensability is established, entitlement to medical benefits is not limited to the period of disability.

AFFIRMED.

DAVIS, HAWKES, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
#### Doris Kay HENRY v. Marlan W. ANDERSON.

No. 2011-C-1294.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 23, 2011.

In re Henry, Doris Kay; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Natchitoches, 10th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. C-82,374; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-941.

Denied.
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Northfield Laboratories Inc. on Form
10-Q for the period ended February 28, 2005 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Jack J. Kogut, Chief
Financial Officer of Northfield Laboratories Inc., certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 that:

      (1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of Northfield Laboratories Inc.

Date: April 11, 2005

/s/ Jack J. Kogut
-----------------------
Jack J. Kogut
Chief Financial Officer
#### Malvin D. BENOIT, et al. v. INTRACOSTAL TUBULAR SERVICES, INC., et al.

No. 2011-CC-0748.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 27, 2011.

In re Bass Enterprises Production Co.; BEPCO L.P.; —Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. B, No. 03-14235; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-0247.

Denied.
##### 



EXHIBIT 10.24 Plumtree Software,
Inc.Independent Director Cash Compensation Plan Annual Retainer
Schedule CategoryBoard Retainer
Chairman Retainer
Audit Committee Chairman
Audit Committee Member
Compensation Committee Chairman
Compensation Committee Member
Nominating Committee Chairman
Nominating Committee Member
    
    $30,000
25,000
25,000
10,000
15,000
10,000
10,000
7,500
 All fees are paid quarterly in arrears. In addition, Plumtree reimburses directors for reasonable
travel and other expenses incurred in attending meetings or participating in professional development and education activities. All changes to the 2005 Directors Compensation Plan are effective
April 1, 2005.
EXHIBIT 32



                                CERTIFICATION OF
                           PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                                       AND
                          PRINCIPAL ACCOUNTING OFFICER

            PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the accompanying Annual Report on Form 10-KSB (the
"Report") of CIMNET(R), Inc. (the "Company") for the year ended December 31,
2004, I, John D. Richardson, Chief Executive Officer and Principal Accounting
Officer of the Company, hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best
of my knowledge and belief, that:

         (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)  The information contained in the Report, fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.


                                        /s/ John D. Richardson
                                        --------------------------------
                                            John D. Richardson
                                            Chief Executive Officer and
                                            Principal Accounting Officer


March 30, 2005
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                    Three months ended        Nine months ended
                                        December 31,             December 31,    
                                      1998        1997        1998         1997   
                                   ---------   ---------   ----------   ----------
<S>                             <C>         <C>         <C>          <C>   
Net income as reported . . . . .   $ 836,000    $644,000   $2,896,000   $2,414,000
                                   =========   =========   ==========   ==========
                                  

BASIC:
    Weighted average number of 
      common shares outstanding.   3,229,979   3,241,025    3,253,060    3,216,937
                                   =========   =========   ==========   ==========

  Basic net income per share . .       $0.26       $0.20        $0.89       $0.75
                                   =========   =========   ==========   ==========


DILUTED: 
  Common and common equivalent shares
  outstanding:
    Weighted average number of 
      common shares outstanding.   3,229,979   3,241,025    3,253,060    3,216,937
    Common stock equivalents from 
      options computed on the 
      treasury-stock method using 
      the average fair market 
      value of common stock 
      outstanding during the 
      period . . . . . . . . . .      92,533     176,414      120,630      163,897
                                   ---------   ---------   ----------   ----------
    Shares used in the 
      computation. . . . . . . .   3,322,512   3,417,439   3,373,690     3,380,834
                                   =========   =========   ==========   ==========

  Diluted net income per share .       $0.25       $0.19        $0.86        $0.71
                                   =========   =========   ==========   ==========

</TABLE>
NOTE: This order is nonprecedential. 

# Wniteb**~tate~** 

# qcourtof**§ppeaI~** 

# fortbejfeberal qcircuit

AMERICAN PATENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, 

### v. MOVIELINK, LLC AND 

### BLOCKBUSTER, INC., Defendants-Appellees.

2010-1554 Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware in case no. 07-CV-0605, Judge Leonard P. Stark.


### ORDER The court notes that the appellees have not filed a status report within the time set by the court's October 29, 2010 order. Upon consideration thereof IT Is ORDERED THAT: Movielink, LLC and Blockbuster, Inc. are directed to file a status report within 30 days ofthe date ofthis order and every 90 days thereafter concerning the status ofthe bankruptcy proceedings and whether the automatic stayAMERICAN PATENT v. MOVIELINK 2

is lifted. Any other party may fue a status report or respond to a status report. FOR THE COURT 

## DEC 19 2012 Date

cc: Theodore M. Sabety, Esq. Scott W. Breedlove, Esq. 

### s21 /s/ Jan Horbaly Jan Horbaly Clerk

FILED U.s.COURTOFAPPEALS FOR THEFEDEf!!'J. r.!RCUIT



## DEC "/ 9lOll JANHORBALY 

### CLERK
**Exhibit 32.2**CERTIFICATION PURSUANTSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002In connection with the Quarterly Report of MakeMusic, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-QSB forthe three months ended March 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the“Report”), I, Karen L. VanDerBosch, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.        May 3, 2007    /s/ Karen L. VanDerBosch   Karen L. VanDerBosch, Chief Financial Officer
#### Dennis T. HUTTO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D11-1063.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 9, 2011.

Dennis T. Hutto, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant argues that the trial court erred in summarily denying his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We agree and reverse and remand for an evi-dentiary hearing or for record attachments conclusively refuting the appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The appellant’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and determine that his prior DUI convictions were uncounseled and thus improperly used to enhance his current DUI conviction is cognizable in a rule 3.850 motion. *See Hutto v. State,*981 So.2d 1236 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). His claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to explain the critical elements of the charged crime is similarly cognizable in a rule 3.850 motion. *See Pitts v. State,*855 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).

REVERSED and REMANDED.

HAWKES, THOMAS, and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 98-6220

ERIC ARTHUR WALTON,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Wheeling.

Frederick P. Stamp, Jr., Chief District Judge.

(CR-94-21)

Submitted: April 28, 1998

Decided: May 19, 1998

Before WIDENER and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and

PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Jay Thornton McCamic, MCCAMIC & MCCAMIC, Wheeling, West

Virginia, for Appellant. Paul Thomas Camilletti, OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Wheeling, West Virginia, for

Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Eric Walton appeals the district court order denying his motion for

a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Walton was convicted of drug charges in 1994. During his trial he and another individual attempted to bribe one of the jurors. The improper contact

resulted in Walton's 1997 conviction for jury tampering. Walton now

alleges that during the course of his jury tampering trial he learned

new information about the activities of the jury that convicted him in

his 1994 trial. Because we find that Walton fails to show that this new

information calls into question the actual fairness of his trial, we

affirm.

A district court's denial of a motion for a new trial will not be set

aside absent an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Campbell,

977 F.2d 854, 860 (4th Cir. 1992). Generally, a defendant seeking a

new trial based on newly discovered evidence must show that the evidence is such that, on a new trial, it would probably produce an

acquittal. United States v. Chavis, 880 F.2d 788, 793 (4th Cir. 1989)

(citing United States v. Bales, 813 F.2d 1289, 1295 (4th Cir. 1987)).

While we recognize that the type of newly discovered evidence Walton has uncovered does not fit squarely with this requirement, see

United States v. Smith, 62 F.3d 641, 650 (4th Cir. 1995), we find that

Walton still must make a showing that the "newly discovered evidence" undermined the integrity and reliability of his conviction. See

United States v. Endicott, 869 F.2d 452, 457 (9th Cir. 1989) (requiring defendant to establish actual prejudice resulting from an improper

juror contact in order to receive a new trial). Due to the overwhelming

evidence of Walton's guilt at his 1994 trial we find that Walton has

failed to make such a showing.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order denying his

motion for a new trial. We dispense with oral argument because the

 2
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

 3
**EXHIBIT 23.1**
**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS**
 

American Champion Entertainment, Inc.:

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration StatementNumbers 333-60511, 333-67879, 333-72253, 333-82963, 333-90459 and 333-30626 onForms S-3, Registration Statement Numbers 333-60107, 333-80269, 333-95435,333-96419 and333-54144 (American Champion Entertainment, Inc. 1997 Stock Plan and1997 Non-Employee Directors Stock Option Plan of American ChampionEntertainment, Inc.) on Forms S-8 and Registration Statement Number 333-39206 onForm SB-2 of our report dated February 15, 2001 appearing in and incorporated byreference in this 10-KSB of American Champion Entertainment, Inc. for the yearended December 31, 2000.

 

/s/ Moss Adams LLP

Moss Adams LLP

San Francisco, CaliforniaApril 16, 2001
#### Brian DOYAL v. VERNON PARISH SCHOOL BOARD.

No. 2011-C-0305.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 8, 2011.

In re Vernon Parish School 'Board; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation, District 2, No. 04-05616; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-427.

Denied.
#### STATE ex rel. Gerald JOSEPH v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-0147.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 7, 2011.

In re Joseph, Gerald; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 352-452; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-K-1482.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; *State ex rel. Glover v. State,*93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.
#### S & I INVESTMENTS, Ilene Richmond, and Stepanie Richmond, Appellants, v. PAYLESS FLEA MARKET, INC., Appellee.

No. 4D08-4257.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

June 30, 2010.

Eric L. Stettin of Kuvin & Stettin, LLC, Weston, for appellant llene Richmond.

Robin Lea Hanger and C. Ryan Reetz of Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P. Miami, for appellant Stephanie Richmond.

Stephen Rakusin of The Rakusin Law Firm, A Professional Association, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

*49PER CURIAM.

In *S & I Investments v. Payless Flea Market, Inc.,*36 So.3d 909 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), involving a dispute between landlord and tenant, this Court reversed, directing entry of judgment in favor of landlord. Landlord now appeals the trial court’s order awarding attorney’s fees and costs to tenant, arguing this Court’s recent decision in the underlying appeal mandates reversal. We agree and reverse.

“Where a court awards prevailing party attorney’s fees and the underlying judgment is vacated, the attorney’s fee judgment must also be vacated.” *Viets v. Am. Recruiters Enters., Inc.,*922 So.2d 1090, 1096 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); *see also Marty v. Bainter,*727 So.2d 1124, 1125 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Because we reversed the final judgment in favor of tenant, we must also reverse the award of attorney’s fees and costs predicated thereon.

*Reversed.*

FARMER, DAMOORGIAN and LEVINE, JJ., concur.
Filed by Bowne Pure Compliance





Exhibit 10.1




SUMMARY OF 2008 BONUS AWARD SCHEDULE




The following summarizes the cash bonuses and bonuses awarded under the Deferred Bonus Plan of
Pinnacle Entertainment, Inc. (the “Company”), to the persons disclosed as named executive officers
in the Company’s 2008 proxy statement, other than Daniel R. Lee, the Company’s Chairman of the
Board and Chief Executive Officer:



	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	2008	 
	 	 	2008 Cash	 	 	Deferred	 
	Name and Title	 	Bonus	 	 	Bonus	 
	Stephen H. Capp
	 	$	262,500	 	 	$	112,500	 
	Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	John A. Godfrey
	 	$	210,000	 	 	$	90,000	 
	Executive Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Alain Uboldi
	 	$	231,000	 	 	$	99,000	 
	Chief Operating Officer
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 







Each person’s deferred bonus will be deferred and paid over three years, one-third on each
anniversary of such year’s bonus payment date.
#### STATE ex rel. Troy SHELVIN v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2011-KH-1696.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 20, 2012.

In re Shelvin, Troy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 88-CR-56962; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 10-01015.

Denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THE SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM TECHFORCE
CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AT SEPTEMBER 30, 1997
(IN THOUSAND AND TECHFORCE CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS
OF INCOME FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1997 (IN THOUSANDS, EXCEPT PER
SHARE DATA) AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997 
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                           2,619
<SECURITIES>                                     4,134
<RECEIVABLES>                                   12,322
<ALLOWANCES>                                       313
<INVENTORY>                                      3,480
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                26,144
<PP&E>                                          24,363
<DEPRECIATION>                                   9,603
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  52,031
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           13,875
<BONDS>                                          6,194
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            81
<OTHER-SE>                                      30,754
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    52,031
<SALES>                                         19,216
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                47,224
<CGS>                                           12,745
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   32,059
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                11,630
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                  (21)
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  3,486
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,261
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              2,225
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,225
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.27
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.27
        

</TABLE>
#### In re Robert C. BASINGER.

No. 2010-OB-2355.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 17, 2010.

ON APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR

PER CURIAM.*

| petitioner, Robert C. Basinger, sat for the February 2010 Louisiana bar examination. By letter dated February 17, 2010, the Committee on Bar Admissions (“Committee”) advised petitioner that it could not certify his character and fitness to this court, citing issues relating to his diagnosed alcohol dependency. Petitioner then applied to this court. We denied the application as premature, but provided “[u]pon satisfactorily passing the bar examination, petitioner may apply to this court for the appointment of a commissioner in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XVII, § 9, to take evidence and report to this court as to whether petitioner has the appropriate character and fitness to be admitted to the bar and allowed to practice law in the State of Louisiana.” *In re: Basinger,*10-0627 (La.5/4/10), 33 So.3d 893. Subsequently, petitioner successfully passed the bar examination and now applies to this court for appointment of a commissioner. The Committee opposed the petition, asserting that petitioner has not executed a recovery agreement with the Lawyers Assistance Program (LAP), nor has he demonstrated at least one year of sobriety.

Although our order of May 4, 2010 permitted petitioner to seek the appointment of a commissioner, we find no useful purpose would be served by appointing a commissioner under the facts of this case. Our jurisprudence holds that an applicant suffering from alcohol dependence will not be considered for admission [2until he or she has entered into a recovery contract with LAP and can demonstrate at least a one-year period of sobriety pursuant to the terms and conditions of that contract. *See, e.g., In re: Gulick,*09-0869 (La.5/15/09), 8 So.3d 555 (“[pjursuant to Supreme Court Rule XVII, § 9(D)(13), petitioner may not re-apply for admission until he can demonstrate at least a one-year period of sobriety and compliance with the terms and conditions of his contract with the Lawyers Assistance Pro*158gram, and in no event less than one year from the date of this judgment”). Because petitioner has not satisfied these requirements, he is not eligible for admission at this time.

Accordingly, it is ordered that the application for admission be and hereby is denied. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XVII, § 9(D)(13), petitioner may not reapply for admission until he has executed a recovery contract with LAP and can demonstrate at least a one-year period of sobriety pursuant to the terms and conditions of that contract.

ADMISSION DENIED.

*

 Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion.