## I N THE UNI TED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FI F TH CI RCUI T

No. 12-50839

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff—Appellee,

v. JUVENAL AMBRIZ, Defendant—Appellant.

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas

Before REAVLEY, ELROD, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges. JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge: Defendant-Appellant Juvenal Ambriz appeals hi s c onviction o f a single
count of distribution of a controlled substa n c e i n violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). For the following reasons, we AFFIRM. I. On t he evening of J anuary 5, 2 0 1 2 , Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Agent Jason Cloutier went to Jaguars Gold C l u b in an undercover capacity. 1 

### At about 2:00 a.m., Agent Cloutier a pproached a male patron in the club and indicated that he was looking for some cocaine. The patron s old Agent U n i t e d S t a te s C o u r t o f A p p e al s

F i f t h C i rc u i t 

## F I L E D Aug ust 16, 2013 Ly l e W . Cay ce Clerk

1 We d es cribe the f

acts as p res ented at A m briz’s trial, view ing them

— as w e m us t— in the light m os t f

avorable to the verd ict. U ni ted Sta tes v
. Turner , 319 F. 3d 716, 720 ( 5th Cir. 2003)

. 

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### No. 12-50839

Clouti e r t w o small b aggies of cocaine i n exchange for $40.00. A gent Cloutier noted that the patron w a s w e a r i n g a white h ooded sweatshirt and had a thin goatee a nd smal l t e ardrop tattoo o n his face. About an hour later, Agent Cloutier and his partner s aw the patron get i n to the passenger seat of a white Chevy Blazer. Agent Cloutier relayed this information to other officers, who initiated a
tr a f f i c stop shortly after the Blazer left Jaguars. The officers observed a man with a thin goatee, teardrop t a t t o o , and w hite hooded sweatshirt in the
passenge r s eat. Upon inspecting the m an’s driver’s license, the officers identified him a s J u v enal Ambriz. 2 

### A consensual search of Ambriz’s person yielded six baggies of similar m anufacture, c o ntents, and quantity t o the baggies Agent Cloutier had purchased. The deputies seized the cocaine a n d r e l e a s e d Ambriz to preserve the integrity of the undercover operation. A grand jury indicted Ambriz w ith a single count o f distribution of a controlled substance in violation of § 841(a)(1). T he case pro c eeded to trial on May 16, 2012. T wo of the district court’s rulings are relevant h e re. First, the district court d enied A m b r i z’s request f or a jury instruction that simple possession of a controlled substance in v iolation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) is a lesserincluded offense of distribution of a controlled substan c e in violation of § 841(a)(1). Second, t he district court denied A m briz’s motion in l imine to exclude evidence regarding the six baggies of cocaine f ound on Ambriz’s person at the time of h is a rrest. U ltimately, the jury found Ambriz guilty of distribution of a controlled substance. The district court sentenced A mbriz to 18 months in prison and a three-year term of supervised release. Ambriz timely appealed. I I.

2 A t trial, Cloutier id entif ied Am briz as the m an w ho s o l d h i m cocaine in Jaguars

. Cloutier als o tes tif

ied that A m briz’s d river’s licens e, w hich d ep icted Am briz with a thin beard and teard rop tattoo, wa s a n accurate rep res entation of what he look ed lik e on the night in ques tion.


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On appeal, Ambriz argues that (1) the district court erred when it denied him a lesser-included-offense instruction; and (2) the district court’s admission into e vidence of the baggies of cocaine violated Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. We address each argument in turn. A. Ambriz must satisfy a t wo-pronged inquiry to demonstrate t hat he was entitled t o a l esser-included-offense instruction. 3 

### Se e U n i ted States v. Cooper , 714 F.3d 873, 879 (5th C i r
. 2013); see also United States v
. Browner , 889 F.2d 549, 550–51 (5th C i r
. 1989) ( Browner I

) ( citing S chmuck v. United States , 489 U.S. 705, 716 (1989)). First, he m ust s how that t h e elements o f si m p l e possession are a “su b s e t ” o f t h e elements of d istribution. Cooper , 714 F.3d at 879. Second, he must show t h a t , b a sed on the e vidence presented a t trial, a rational jury could have acquitted h im o f d istribution and convicted him of simple possession. Id. We r eview the first prong de novo and the second under

an a buse-of-discretion s tandard. United States v. F i nley , 77 F.3d 250, 256 (5th Cir. 2007). Our analysis starts a nd ends with the f irst prong. I n accordance with the Supreme Court’s g uidance in Schmuck , we employ an elements-based test to determine whether the elements of on e o f f e n s e a re a subset of the e lements of another. S ee United S tates v. Browner , 937 F .2d 165, 168, 1 72 ( 5th Cir. 1991) ( Browner II

) ( i nterpreting Schmuck to adopt a “strict statutory e lements test”). Thu s , w e c o m pare “the s tatutory elements of the offenses in question, and not

. . . [the] conduct p roved a t trial” to determine whether one offense is a subset of the other. 4 

### U

nited States v. Estrada-Fernandez , 150 F.3d 491, 494 (5th Cir.

3 Fed eral Rule of Crim inal Proced ure 31( c) provid es that a d ef end ant “m ay be f

ound guilty of

. . . an of

f en s e n e c e s s a r i l

y i ncl uded in the of

f ens e charged , ” otherw is e k now n as a les s er- includ ed of

f ens e. Fed

. R

. Crim

. P. 31( c) (em p has is ad d ed ).

4 For exam p le, w e have conclud ed that s im p le p os s es s ion in violation of § 844( a) is a les s er- includ ed of

f ens e o f p os s es s ion w ith intent to d is tribute und er § 841( a) ( 1) , in p art becaus e both counts d ep end o n t h e s a m e term : p os s es s ion. See U ni ted Sta tes v
. D ei sch , 20


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1 9 98) ( quoting S chmuck , 489 U.S. a t 7 16–17). In performing this te s t , w e construe the relevant criminal statutes in accordance w ith ordinary principles of statutory interpretation. See Carter v. U nite d S t a t e s , 5 30 U.S. 255, 260–61 (2000). For the elements of the lesser offense to b e a s u b set of the charged offense, it must be “impossible t o c ommit the [charged offense] without first having committed the lesser.” Schmuck , 489 U.S. at 719 (citations omitted). Here, the offenses at issue are identical except i n the obvious respect: one requires possession and t he other requires distribution. Compare U nited States

v. Krout , 66 F.3d 142 0 , 1 4 3 1 (5th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the elements of simple possession of a controlled substance are “(1) the knowing possession (2) of a controlled substance”), with United States v. Sotelo , 9 7 F. 3 d 7 8 2, 789 (5th Cir. 1996) ( recognizing t hat the elements of distribution of a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n ce

are “that the defendant (1) knowingl y ( 2 ) distributed (3) the c o ntrolled substance”). Thus, the central issue is whether one must necessarily possess a controlled substance in order to distribute it. The answer is no. Our precedent demonstrates that “possession” and “distribution,” though over l a p p i n g, are distinct concepts. 5 

### “Possession” can be

F. 3d 139, 152 ( 5th Cir. 1994) , a broga ted on other grounds by A p p rendi v
. N

ew Jersey , 530 U

. S. 466 (2000) ( hold ing that “s im p le p os s es s ion of cocaine, [ in violation of ] th e f i r s t s entence of
s ection 844( a) , m ay be a les s er includ ed of f ens e und er a charge of p os s e s s i n g cocaine w ith intent to d is tribute it [ in violation of ] s ection 841( a) ( 1) ”) ; see a l so F inl ey , 477 F

. 3d at 256–57 ( ack now led ging that p os s es s ion is a les s er- includ e d of f ens e of p os s es s ion with intent to d is tribute, but hold ing that a d is trict court d id not err in ref us ing to give a les s er- includ ed of f ens e ins truction becaus e “[ t] he ad d itional elem ent required f or a conviction on the greater of f ens e
. . . w as not in d is p ute”) ; U ni ted Sta tes v
. Luci en , 61 F. 3d 366, 372–74 ( 5th C ir. 1995) ( hold ing that “und er D ei sch and the s tatutory elem ents tes t, p os s es s ion of a controlled
s ubs tance ( cocaine, here in the f orm of cocaine bas e) in violation of the f irs t s entence of s ection 844( a) is a les s er- includ ed of f ens e und er the s up ers ed ing ind ictm ent in this cas e”)

. I n D ei sch , the court em p has ized that the of f ens e d enounced by the f irs t s entence of § 844( a) includ es “the
v ery s a m e w ords ” as ap p ear in the p os s es s ion w ith intent to d is tribute claus e of § 841( a) (1) ;
n a t u r a l l y, then, it held that s im p le p os s es s ion is a s ubs et of pos s es s ion w ith intent t o d is tribute and , theref

ore, a les s er- includ ed of f ens e. D ei sch , 20 F. 3d at 152 ( em p has is ad d ed )

.

5 Am briz m ak es an interes ting argum ent that relying on our p rior cons truction of the
s tatut o r y term “d is tribution, ” rather than the text of the s tatute alone, s trays f rom the
s tatutory- elem ents tes t. While his argum ent is w ell- tak en, it ultim ately fails

. Firs t, w e ap p ly


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either a ctual o r constructive. See United States v. Galvan-Garcia , 872 F.2d 638, 640 (5th Cir. 1989)

. Constructive possession is t h e “ownership, d ominion, or control over
. . . c ontraband, or
. . . dominion o v e r the premises i n which the contraband is found.” United States v. Hinojosa , 3 4 9 F.3d 2 00, 203 (5th Cir. 2003) (citations om i t t e d )

. “Distribution,” on the other hand, includes acts “in furtherance of transfer or sale, such as arranging or supervising the delivery.” United States v. Suarez , 155 F.3d 5 21, 525 (5th Cir. 1998) ( citing United States

v. Lechuga , 888 F.2d 1472, 1478 (5th C i r
. 1 9 8 9 ) ). 6 

### We have held that distribution “is broad enough to include acts that traditionally p e rhaps would have been defined as mere aiding and abetting.” United S tates v. Oquendo , 505 F.2d 1307, 1310 n.1 ( 5th C i r
. 1 9 7 5 ). Thus, a defendant c an engage i n acts of distribution w ithout actually or c o n s tructively possessing the relevant contraband. Our holding in U

n i t ed States v
. G lenn illustrates t h is point. There, we

u pheld a § 841(a) distribution conviction against a d efendant who did not p o s s e s s the contraband at issue: As discussed above, the testimony of the undercover officer, Delco,

ord inary p rincip les of cons truction in evaluating the s tatutory elem ents at is sue, Ca rter , 530 U

. S. at 260–61, and , theref ore, look to our p reced ent regard ing the p lain m eaning of the text, U ni ted Sta tes v
. V

arga s- D ura n , 3 5 6 F. 3d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 2004)

. Second , the rule of ord erlines s requires us to ap p ly our p reced ent interp reting the statutory langu a g e a t is s ue. G ochi coa v
. Johnson , 238 F. 3d 278, 286 n. 11 ( 5th Cir. 2000) ( “When conf ronting d ecis ions of p rior p anels [ , ] w e are bound by not only the res u l t but als o thos e p ortions of the op inion
neces s ary to that res ult. ” ( internal quotation mark s and citation om itted ) )

.

6 See a l so U

ni ted S ta tes v
. Ol

gui n , 643 F

. 3d 384, 394 ( 5th Cir. 2011) , cert. deni ed , 132 S. Ct. 432; U

ni ted S ta tes v
. Brow n , 217 F. 3d 247, 255 ( 5th Cir. 2000) , judgm ent v a ca ted sub
nom
. , Ra ndl e v
. U

ni ted Sta tes , 531 U

. S. 1136 ( 2001) ; Pattern Crim

. Jury Ins tr. 5th Cir. 2. 87 ( 2012) (“The term d is tribute is broad er in s cop e than the term sale, and m ea n s t o d eliver, other than by ad m inis tering or d is p ens ing. ” ( citation and internal quotation m ark s om itted )) ; cf

. U ni ted Sta tes v
. Ja ckson, 526 F .2d 1236, 1238 ( 5th Cir. 1976) ( noting that “p os ses s ion is an elem ent in the s ubs tantive charge of either d is tribution or s ale, ” s uch that “conviction of s ale
or d is tribution would neces s arily im p ly that a d ef end ant could als o have been convicted on a p os ses s ion count, ” yet conclud ing that the evid ence w as s uf f icient to show d is tribution becaus e the d ef end ant as sis ted in arranging the crim inal tran s a c t i o n , but ins uf f icient to s how p os ses s ion becaus e the d ef end ant d id not help obtain or exercis e control over the contraband )

.



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### No. 12-50839

combined with the t ape recording of the March 18th sale of seven rocks of crack, sufficiently supports that T erry constructively delivered t he crac k t hrough Glenn by instructing him t o sell to D e l c o
. D elco also testified that she paged Terry several times o n March 22, 1991, and that she spoke w ith Anthony Moore and Terry about purchasing another $100 worth of crack. From the l ast recorded t elephone call between Terry and Delco, Delco interpreted Terry’s statements to mean that Terry h ad arranged f or s omeone to sell her the crack beca u s e he was very busy a t the time. He then put s omeone else, Byro n Rice, o n the telephone to speak with her. Rice actually sold D elco the crack later that night and indicated to her that h e worked for Terry. This evidence was s ufficient to show the constructive d elivery of crac k b y T erry through R i c e, thus supporting Terry’s distribution conviction. No. 93-4311, 1994 WL 24871, at * 2 ( 5 t h C ir. Jan. 1 0, 1994) (unpublished but persuasive). 7 

### Similarly, this court has upheld § 841(a) distribution convictions against physic i a n s who h ave prescribed, but not actually or constructively possessed, the controlled substance at issue. S e e , e
. g. , United S tates v
. Rosen , 582 F.2d 1032, 1034–36 (5th Cir. 1978) (upholding a distr i b ution conviction against a physician who a dvised his patients to fi l l p r e s c r iptions at different drug stores); cf. United States v. Harrison , 6 51 F.2d 353, 354–55 ( 5th Cir. 1981) (upholding a distribution conviction against a physician who “would make up fictitious names for p rescriptions, or ask the ‘patient’ t o supply h im with names to be used” at the pharmacy). Moreover, we recently r eached t he same conclusion in a different context. In United States v
. W oerner , we evaluated whether possessi o n of child pornography is a lesser-included offense of distributi o n of child pornography.
709 F.3 d 5 2 7 ( 5 t h Cir. 2013). As here, the central question was whether distribution necessarily required possession. We said no:

7 In G l enn , the g overnm ent charged the d ef end ant w ith d is tribution regard ing s om e crim inal trans actions a n d p o s s e s s ion w ith intent to dis tribute regard ing others

. Id. at *1. That the governm ent charged the d ef end an t w i t h d is tribution, and not w ith a p os s es s ionrelated of

f ens e, regard ing the above- d es cribed trans action f ur t her reinf

orces the dif

f erence betw een the tw o counts

. Id.


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### No. 12-50839

A d efendant n eed not possess child pornography to distribute it, [ United States v. C hiaradio , 684 F.3d 265, 2 80 (1st Cir. 2012)] (“One
can envision circumstances in w h i c h a n individual c ould be guilty of d istribution without ever obtaining possession of (or even coming into contact with) the contraband. For example, the broker of a deal between a person w ho has child pornography a n d a person who wishes t o procure it may be guilty o f distribution but not guilty of possession.”), and, vice versa , a defendant need not distribute child pornography t o p ossess it, United S tates v
. Goluba , 672 F.3d 304, 307 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he forensic analysis of [t h e defendant]’s computers ‘ revealed that [he] did not distribute h i s c ollection of child p ornography.’”). For tha t r eason, we j oin the First and Seventh C ircuits in holding that possession of child p o rnography is not t h e l e s s e r
- i n c l u d e d o ffense of distribution of child pornography . . . . Id. a t 539 (internal citations omitted). For all o f these reasons, we j oin the Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits in concluding that simple poss e ssion of a controlled substance in violation of § 8 44(a) is not a lesser-included offense of d istribution of a controlled s ubstance in violation of § 841(a)(1). See United States v. Colon , 268 F.3d 3 67, 377 (6th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the reasoning of [other c ircuit] courts and now join them in holding that simple possession is not a l esser-included o ffense o f distribution of a controlled su b s t a n c e
. . . . [I]t is possible to commit the “distribution” element of the crime without possessing the drugs t hemselves.”); United States

v. Barrientos , 758 F .2d 1152, 1 158 (7th Cir. 1985) (“The judge in this c a se found
t hat there w as insufficient evidence o n w hich to base an instru c t i o n o n possession. This f

inding a ccords with the g eneral understanding that possession is not a necessary element of a distribution charge.”); United States v
. J ackson , 213 F.3d 1269, 1296–97 (10th Cir. 2000), j udgment vacated on o t h e r g r o u nds , 531 U.S. 1033 (2000) (“[I]t doe s n o t follow that simple possession is a lesser included offense of distribution under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

. . . Although it m ay be unusual for a person to dist r i b u t e a controlled substance without at least

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### No. 12-50839

momentarily possessing the controlled s ubstance, it is not impossible.”). 8 

### Accordingly, the district c ourt did not err i n d e n ying Ambriz’s request for a lesser-included offense jury instruction. 9


### B. Ambriz next challe n g e s the district c ourt’s admission of six baggies of cocaine into evidence under Federal R ule o f E vidence 403. 1 0 

### We review alleged

8 The Fourth Circuit reached the s am e conclus ion in a cas e that w as vacated f or other

r eas ons
. S ee a l so U

ni ted Sta tes v
. Ri deout , 80 F. Ap p’x 836, 841 ( 4th Cir. 20 0 3 ) , j u d g m e n t
v a ca t ed on other g rounds , 543 U

. S. 1116 ( 2005) ( unp ublis hed but p ers uas ive) ( “As m any courts have held , the elem ents of s im ple p os s es s ion are not a s ubs et of the elem ents of d is tribution

. . . . We agree w ith this analys is and hold that the d is trict court correctl y c o n c l u d e d t h a t
s im ple p os s es s ion is not a les s er includ ed of f ens e of d is tribution. ”)

. M oreover, other circuits

— s p ecif ically the Firs t, Second , and Ninth— have held that the governm ent need not d em ons trate p os s es s ion to s ucceed o n a d is tribution claim

. See, e. g. , U ni ted Sta tes v
. Sep ul veda , 102 F. 3d 1313, 1317 (1s t Cir. 1996) ( “While ‘p os s es s ion’ is certainly help f ul in p roving d is tribution, it is technically not a neces sary elem ent

. . . . ”) ; U ni ted Sta tes
v
. G ore , 154 F. 3d 34, 44–45 ( 2d Cir. 1998) ( “Som eone who particip ates in a d r u g trans action— e. g. , as a brok er or arm ed guard

— c a n b e l i able f or d is tribution w ithout ever p os ses s ing the d rugs
. . . . While ‘p os s es sion’ is certainly help f ul in proving d is tribution, it is technically not a neces s ary elem ent. ”) ; U ni ted Sta tes v
. A rm strong , 138 F. Ap p ’x 953, 955 ( 9th Cir. 2005) ( unp ublis hed but pers uas ive) ( “The d is trict court correctly c o n c l ud ed that the of f ens e of d is tribution d oes not includ e the elem e nt of p os ses s ion. One can d is tribute a controlled s ubs tance w ithout being in p os s es s ion of it. ” ( citing U ni ted S t a tes v
. D a v i s , 564 F

. 2d 840, 845 ( 9th C ir. 1977) ) )

. We note that the Eighth Circuit tak es the op p os ite ap p roach regard ing w hether s im p le p os ses s ion is a les ser- includ ed of f ens e of d is tribution. See U ni ted Sta tes v
. Kl ugm a n , 506 F

. 2d 1378, 1380–81 ( 8th Cir. 1974) ( conclud ing t h a t si mp l e p o s ses s ion is “p res um p tively neces s arily includ ed w ithin” d i s tribution, but af f irm ing the d is trict court’s d enial of a les s er- includ ed ins truction becaus e “f or the jury to convict of the les s er of f ens e, p os s es sion, it w ould have to ignore the und is puted evid ence of actual d is tribution”)

. The Third Circuit may als o tak e the op p os ite ap p roach, but this is les s clear. A com m ent in the T hird Circuit’s p attern crim inal jury ins tructions s ugges ts that p os s es s ion is a les s er- includ ed of f ens e of dis tribution, but the
cas e cited in s up p ort of the p rop os ition ad d res s es a dif ferent is sue: w hether s im ple pos s es s ion in v iolation of § 844( a) is a les s er- includ ed of f e n s e of p os s es s ion w ith intent to dis tribute in violation of § 841( a) ( 1)

. See T hird Circuit Pattern Jury Ins truction 6. 21. 841B ( citing U ni ted Sta tes v
. La cy , 446 F. 3d 448 ( 3d Cir. 2006) )

.

9 T his hold ing squares w ith our d oub le- jeop ard y p reced ent. S ee U ni t ed Sta tes v
. Costel lo , 483 F

. 2d 1366, 1368 ( 5th Cir. 1973)

.

1 0 O n ap p eal, Am briz als o as s erted that the ad mis s ion of this evid ence violated Fed eral Rule of Evid ence 404( b)

. At oral argum ent, how ever, Am briz conced ed that the evid ence w as intrins ic to the alleged crim inal cond uct and , theref ore, Rule 4 0 4 ( b ) d id not ap p ly. U ni ted Sta tes v
. Freem a n , 434 F. 3d 369, 374 ( 5th Cir. 2005) (noting that evid ence is intr i n s ic w hen


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### No. 12-50839

Rule 403 violations for c lear abuses of discretion. United States v. Williams , 620 F.3d 483, 4 92 (5th Cir. 2010). A district c ourt may “excl u d e r e l e v ant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger o f

. . . unfair preju d i c e
. ” F ed. R. Evid. 403. The standard of review for a n alleged Rule 403 violation is “especially high a nd requires a clear abuse of d iscretion f or reversal.” Williams , 620 F.3d at 492 (internal quotation marks and c itation o mitted). “Any

error in admitting such evidence is s ubject to harmless error r e v i e w , and reversal is not r equired unless there is a ‘ r e a s o n a b le possibility that the improperly admitted evidence contributed to the conviction.’” Id. at 4 92 (quoting United States v. Mendoza-Medina , 346 F.3d 121, 127 (5th Cir. 2003)). In the instant case, t wo deputies found s ix baggies of cocaine on Ambriz’s
person. Both the b aggies themselves and their contents were s i m i l ar to those Agent Cloutier p urchased from Ambriz o n that same evening. C onsidering that Ambriz’s identit y w as at issue, a ny prejudice attributable to these b aggies is outweighed by their probative ability to l i nk Ambriz to Agen t C loutier’s purchase. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discre t i o n when it admitted them into evidence. III. For the above-stated reasons, we AFFIRM.

it i s “ i n e x t r i c ably intertw ined ” w ith the crim e charged , or “both acts are p art of a s ingle crim inal ep is od e or the other acts w ere neces sary p relim inaries to the cr im e charged ” and ind icating that “[ i] ntrins ic evid ence is generally ad m is s ible, and its ad m is s ion is not s ubject to rule 404( b) ”)

. 

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