Sadie M. Castruccio v. Peter A. Castruccio, et al., No. 2431, September Term 2016. 

Opinion by Arthur, J.

WILL CONSTRUCTION — CONSIDERATION OF SURROUNDING

CIRCUMSTANCES

Ordinarily, courts may not consider extrinsic evidence of a testator’s intentions when

construing a will. Nevertheless, the court may consider evidence relating to the situation

of the testator, the testator’s relationships with beneficiaries, and the circumstances

surrounding the execution of the will. 

In this case, to determine the meaning of clauses appearing to limit the right of the

testator’s wife to recover under the will, the circuit court properly considered undisputed

evidence about the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will. Those

circumstances included: the testator’s antipathy towards his wife’s nephews, the testator’s

desire that his wife’s nephews not receive any portion of his estate, and the testator’s

efforts to engage in joint estate planning with his wife in order to prevent or persuade her

from leaving the testator’s assets to the nephews if the testator predeceased her.

WILL CONSTRUCTION — PLAIN MEANING

One unnamed item of a testator’s will purported to give the remainder of his estate to his

wife “should she one, survive [the testator], and two provided that she [had] made and

executed a [w]ill prior to [the testator’s] death.” Another item stated that if, at the time of

the testator’s death, the testator’s wife did “not have a valid will filed with the Register of

Wills in Anne Arundel County dated prior thereto these [sic],” then the testator would

give the remainder of the estate to a certain long-time employee of the testator.

Under the most natural reading of this will, these items imposed three conditions to the

wife’s recovery under her husband’s will: (1) she had to survive him; (2) she had to have

made and executed a will prior to the husband’s death; and (3) she had to have a valid

will filed with the Register of Wills for Anne Arundel County dated prior to the testator’s

death (or, possibly, dated prior to the execution of the testator’s will). Because the wife

had failed to meet the third condition, she was not entitled to receive the residue of the

estate.
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County

Case No. 02-C-14-184865 DJ

REPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 2431

September Term, 2016

______________________________________

SADIE M. CASTRUCCIO

v.

PETER A. CASTRUCCIO, et al.

______________________________________

Wright,

Arthur,

Salmon, James P.

 (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), 

JJ.*

______________________________________

Opinion by Arthur, J.

______________________________________

Filed: August 31, 2018

* Judge Timothy E. Meredith did not participate 

in the Court’s decision to designate this opinion 

for publication pursuant to Md. Rule 8-605.1.
After mounting an unsuccessful challenge to the validity of her late husband’s

will, a widow contended that, as a matter of law, she was nonetheless entitled to receive

virtually all of his estate under that same will. The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel

County disagreed and declared that the estate should pass to an alternate residuary

beneficiary. The widow appealed, principally arguing that the circuit court erroneously

relied on evidence other than the literal language of the will itself. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Dr. Peter Castruccio died on February 19, 2013. He was survived by his wife of 

62 years, appellant Sadie Castruccio. John Greiber, Jr., the Castruccios’ lawyer for more 

than 20 years, was appointed personal representative under the terms of Dr. Castruccio’s

will. At Mr. Greiber’s request, the will was admitted to administrative probate on 

February 27, 2013.

Dr. Castruccio’s will was a six-page document with one codicil. The will began 

with two, brief introductory paragraphs, which were followed by 11 “items,” most of 

which are not in dispute.

Item 7, labeled “Cash Bequests,” consisted of three general legacies, to be 

distributed “prior to any bequest to [Dr. Castruccio’s] beloved wife.” The bequests 

consisted of $800,000.00 for appellee Darlene Barclay, Dr. Castruccio’s long-time 

employee; $100,000.00 for Adriana Lanata, Dr. Castruccio’s niece, who lives in Italy; 

and $100,000.00 for Ernest Stinchcomb, Jr., the Castruccios’ handyman. In the codicil, 

Dr. Castruccio increased the amount of the bequest to Mr. Stinchcomb to $200,000.00.

Item 8 was unlabeled and read as follows:
2

To my loving wife, Sadie, excluding the individual bequest [sic]

made in Item 7, I leave the rest and remainder of my Estate to her should 

she one, survive me and two provided she has made and executed a Will 

prior to my death.

Item 10, labeled “Residuary Clause,” stated:

Should, at the time of my death, my beloved wife not have a valid 

Will filed with the Register of Wills in Anne Arundel County dated prior 

thereto these [sic], I hereby give, devise and bequeath all the rest and 

residue of my Estate and property, whether imposition, expectancy will 

remainder [sic], including all property over which I may have Power of 

Appointment to the following individuals share and share alike per stirpes 

and not per capita to DARLENE BARCLAY, [at Ms. Barclay’s street 

address].

On March 12, 2013, an attorney for Dr. Castruccio’s personal representative told

Mrs. Castruccio that, according to the will, any bequest to her was contingent upon her 

having a “valid Will filed with the Register of Wills in Anne Arundel County dated prior 

thereto these [sic].” In the same communication, the attorney requested that Mrs. 

Castruccio supply a copy of any valid will that she had filed with the Register of Wills of 

Anne Arundel County before Dr. Castruccio executed his will. Mrs. Castruccio had not 

filed (or deposited) any will with the Register of Wills of Anne Arundel County. 

Mrs. Castruccio responded by filing a caveat petition in the Orphans’ Court of 

Anne Arundel County, wherein she challenged the validity of the will. As a defendant, 

Mrs. Castruccio named her late husband’s Estate.1 Ms. Barclay intervened as a codefendant.

 

1

“Because an estate is a collection of assets and liabilities rather than a juridical

entity like a corporation or an LLC, the defendant in the caveat proceedings was, 

technically, Mr. Greiber in his capacity as personal representative.” Castruccio v. Estate 
3

The caveat proceeding moved to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County 

because Mrs. Castruccio petitioned to transmit issues to that court for trial. See Md. Code 

(1974, 2011 Repl. Vol.), § 2-105(b) of the Estates and Trusts Article. 

After discovery, both sides moved for summary judgment in the caveat 

proceeding. On September 23, 2014, the circuit court granted summary judgment in 

favor of the Estate and Ms. Barclay and denied Mrs. Castruccio’s cross-motion for 

summary judgment. Mrs. Castruccio appealed. We affirmed (see Castruccio v. Estate of 

Castruccio, 230 Md. App. 118 (2016)), as did the Court of Appeals. See Castruccio v. 

Estate of Castruccio, 456 Md. 1 (2017).

Meanwhile, on January 16, 2014, while the caveat petition was pending, Mrs. 

Castruccio filed this case in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. In brief, in this 

case, Mrs. Castruccio requested a declaration that she was the rightful beneficiary of her 

husband’s residuary estate under the will. 

At the parties’ request, the circuit court stayed this case pending the resolution of 

the caveat case, but it lifted the stay at Mrs. Castruccio’s request once it had rendered its 

ruling in the caveat case. 

After the court lifted the stay, Ms. Barclay filed a counterclaim, in which she 

requested a declaration that under the will she, and not Mrs. Castruccio, was entitled to 

receive the residuary estate. In addition, Ms. Barclay invoked Item 6 of the 2010 will, an 

“in terrorem” or “no contest” clause, which states: “In the event that any party, whether 

 

of Castruccio, 230 Md. App. 118, 124 n.3 (2016), aff’d, 456 Md. 1 (2017). “For ease of 

reference, however, we shall refer to the defendant as the ‘Estate.’” Id.
4

they are a beneficiary or not, shall file any proceeding in an attempt to void any and all 

provisions of this instrument, in that event, such party shall receive no benefits 

whatsoever from my Estate, in the event that such proceedings are unsuccessful.” Ms. 

Barclay requested a declaration that, because Mrs. Castruccio had challenged the 2010 

will in the caveat proceedings, she could take nothing under that will.

The parties presented conflicting interpretations of Dr. Castruccio’s will. The 

conflict centered on whether Item 10 should or should not be read in conjunction with 

Item 8.

According to the Estate and Ms. Barclay, Items 8 and 10 should be read together 

to impose three conditions precedent to Mrs. Castruccio’s right to recover under the will 

as a residuary beneficiary: (1) she had to survive her husband (as stated in Item 8), (2) she 

had to have made a will (as also stated in item 8), and (3) she had to file a valid will with 

the Register of Wills for Anne Arundel County before her husband’s death (as stated in 

Item 10). Because it was undisputed that Mrs. Castruccio had not filed (or deposited) a 

will with the Register of Wills for Anne Arundel County before her husband’s death, the 

Estate and Ms. Barclay argued that Mrs. Castruccio had not satisfied the third condition 

and, hence, could recover nothing. In that event, they said, Ms. Barclay would receive 

the balance of the estate under Item 10.2

 

2

Initially, the Estate took the position that the phrase “dated prior thereto these” in 

Item 10 meant that Mrs. Castruccio had to have filed a valid will with the register of wills 

that was dated before the date of Dr. Castruccio’s 2010 will. See supra p. 2. During the 

litigation, the Estate modified its position to assert that under Item 10 Mrs. Castruccio 

had to have filed a valid will with the register of wills before Dr. Castruccio’s death. 

Because neither party makes an issue of the correct interpretation of the garbled phrase 
5

Mrs. Castruccio argued that Items 8 and 10 addressed different scenarios and that 

they should not be read together. In Mrs. Castruccio’s view, Item 8 addressed what 

should happen if she survived her husband, while Item 10 addressed what should happen 

if she did not. According to Mrs. Castruccio, under Item 8, she would receive her 

husband’s entire estate (minus the $1.1 million in specific bequests in Item 7 and the 

codicil) if she survived him and had made and executed a will before his death. On the 

other hand, she said, if she did not survive her husband, Item 10 dictated that his estate 

(minus the specific bequests) would go to the beneficiaries whom she had named in her

will, provided that her will was valid and that it had been filed with the Register of Wills 

for Anne Arundel County in a probate proceeding. In Mrs. Castruccio’s interpretation, if 

she predeceased her husband and did not leave a will, his estate (minus the specific 

bequests) would go to Ms. Barclay.

On October 15, 2015, the Estate moved for summary judgment on all of the claims 

alleged in Mrs. Castruccio’s complaint. The Estate specifically sought an order declaring 

that, because Mrs. Castruccio did not file a valid will with the Register of Wills at any 

time before Dr. Castruccio’s death, she did not meet the requirements of Item 8 and Item

10 of the will. The Estate also sought a declaration that under Item 6 Mrs. Castruccio 

was precluded from receiving any benefit because of her attempt to invalidate the will.

 

“dated prior thereto these,” we, fortunately, are not in the position of “the perhaps not 

wholly apocryphal English chancellor who said: ‘This will has no meaning but it is my 

plain duty to give it one.’” Marty v. First Nat’l Bank of Baltimore, 209 Md. 210, 221 

(1956). 
6

On that same day, Ms. Barclay moved for summary judgment on her counterclaim 

for declaratory relief. On the following day, Mrs. Castruccio filed a cross-motion for 

summary judgment, claiming that she was the residuary beneficiary under the 2010 will 

and requesting a declaration to that effect.

On November 10, 2015, the circuit court held a hearing on the summary judgment 

motions, but it waited to rule while Mrs. Castruccio’s appeal in the caveat case was 

pending in this Court. After this Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision in the caveat 

case in 2016, the court requested re-argument in this case. 

In connection with a hearing on November 7, 2016, all parties submitted 

supplemental exhibits and briefing. Much of the debate concerned the extent to which 

the court could consider information other than the language of the 2010 will itself. Most 

notably, that information included evidence of Dr. Castruccio’s antipathy toward Mrs. 

Castruccio’s nephews, his desire that the nephews receive none of his assets, and his 

unsuccessful attempts to involve his wife in joint estate-planning activities.

On January 6, 2017, the circuit court ruled that the interpretation advanced by the 

Estate and Ms. Barclay was correct. The court issued a declaratory judgment in which it 

based its decision both on the language of the will itself and on the circumstances 

surrounding Dr. Castruccio’s execution of the will. 

Specifically, in paragraph 4 of its declaratory judgment, the court wrote:

That this Court declares that when construed by their plain and 

ordinary meaning [sic] and upon reading together Items 8 and 10 of the 

Will, Plaintiff Sadie M. Castruccio may only take as a residuary beneficiary 

under the Will if she satisfied three requirements prior to Peter A. 

Castruccio’s death on February 19, 2013: (a) that she survived Peter A. 
7

Castruccio; (b) that she made and executed a will; and (c) that Plaintiff 

Sadie M. Castruccio filed her valid will with the Register of Wills for Anne 

Arundel County[.]

In addition, in paragraph 5 of its declaratory judgment, the court wrote:

That in light of undisputed competent evidence of the background to 

the execution of the Will by Peter A. Castruccio as well as the relevant 

events that transpired after its execution, this Court declares that Peter A. 

Castruccio expressed in Items 8 and 10 of the Will that Plaintiff Sadie M. 

Castruccio may only take as a residuary beneficiary under the will if she 

satisfied three requirements prior to his death on February 19, 2013: (a) that 

she survived Peter A. Castruccio; (b) that she made and executed a will; 

and (c) that Plaintiff Sadie M. Castruccio filed her valid will with the 

Register of Wills for Anne Arundel County[.]

Because Mrs. Castruccio had not filed a will with the Register of Wills for Anne 

Arundel County before her husband’s death, the circuit court concluded that she had no 

right to recover under the will. Instead, the court concluded that Ms. Barclay was the 

sole residuary beneficiary.

In addition to addressing the interpretation of Items 8 and 10, the court considered 

the contention that, under the “in terrorem” or “no contest” clause in Item 6, Mrs. 

Castruccio had no right to recover under the will because she had unsuccessfully 

challenged its validity in the caveat case. The court rejected that contention, because it 

believed that Mrs. Castruccio had had probable cause to commence the caveat case.

The court issued a memorandum and order in accordance with its decision. In that 

order, the court denied Mrs. Castruccio’s motion for summary judgment; granted the 

Estate’s motion for summary judgment; granted Ms. Barclay’s motion for summary 

judgment on the interpretation of Items 8 and 10; but denied Ms. Barclay’s motion for 

summary judgment as to the effect of Item 6. 
8

Mrs. Castruccio noted a timely appeal. 

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Mrs. Castruccio presents two questions, which we quote:

1. Did the trial court err by basing its construction of the will in whole or in part 

on extrinsic evidence as to what [Dr. Castruccio] intended the words of his will 

to mean, instead of determining his intent solely from words he actually used 

in the four corners of the will?

2. Did the trial court err by denying [Mrs. Castruccio’s] motion for summary 

judgment that pursuant to Item 8 of the Will, she is the beneficiary of [Dr. 

Castruccio’s] residual estate?

We answer “no” to both questions. Hence, we affirm.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Both sides agree that this was a proper case for summary judgment. Both sides 

also agree that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. They disagree, 

however, about which of them was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. “The 

standard of review for a declaratory judgment entered as a result of the grant of a motion 

for summary judgment is ‘whether that declaration was correct as a matter of law.’” 

Catalyst Health Solutions, Inc. v. Magill, 414 Md. 457, 471 (2010) (quoting Olde 

Severna Park Improvement Ass’n, Inc. v. Gunby, 402 Md. 317, 329 (2007)).

DISCUSSION

I. The General Rules of Will Construction

The general principles for construing a will are well established. “[T]he intention 

of the testator is the polar star, and must prevail, if consistent with the rules of law[.]” 

Walters v. Walters, 3 H. & J. 201, 205 (1811). “When construing a will, the ‘paramount 

concern of the court is to ascertain and effectuate the testator’s expressed intent.’” 
9

Pfeufer v. Cyphers, 397 Md. 643, 649 (2007) (quoting Emmert v. Hearn, 309 Md. 19, 23 

(1987)); accord Friedman v. Hannan, 412 Md. 328, 339 (2010). “[T]he search is not for 

the testator’s ‘presumed [intention] but for his [or her] expressed intention.’” Pfeufer v. 

Cyphers, 397 Md. at 649 (quoting LeRoy v. Kirk, 262 Md. 276, 279 (1971)). “Generally, 

that intent is ‘gathered from the four corners of the will,’” id. (quoting Reedy v. Barber, 

253 Md. 141, 148 (1969)), “with the words of the will given their ‘plain meaning and 

import.’” Id. (quoting Emmert v. Hearn, 309 Md. at 23); accord Friedman v. Hannan, 

412 Md. at 339-40. “‘Th[e] expressed intention of a testator must be gathered from the 

language of the entire will, particularly from the clause in dispute, read in the light of the 

surrounding circumstances at the time the will was made.’” Vito v. Grueff, 453 Md. 88, 

110 (2017) (quoting Marty v. First Nat’l Bank of Baltimore, 209 Md. 210, 217 (1956)). 

The testator’s intention must be gathered from “a consideration of all the 

provisions contained in [the will], without regard to the order in which those provisions 

occur.” Smithers v. Hooper, 23 Md. 273, 285 (1865). In keeping with that principle, “‘a 

will and codicil are to be construed together as one instrument and reconciled as far as 

practicable.’” In the Matter of the Albert G. Aaron Living Trust, 457 Md. 699, 719

(2018) (quoting Jones v. Holloway, 183 Md. 40, 45 (1944)) (emphasis added in In the 

Matter of the Albert G. Aaron Living Trust).

“[W]hen recognized legal terms are used, the testator is presumed to have used 

such terms with the knowledge of their technical meaning, and with the purpose of 

employing that meaning in the disposition of his property.” Rowe v. Rowe, 124 Md. App. 

89, 97 (1998) (quoting Patchell v. Groom, 185 Md. 10, 15 (1945)). On the other hand, 
10

“where a will is drawn by a lay[person], ‘the language used may be given the meaning it 

would commonly have to a person in his [or her] situation[.]’” Shriners Hosps. for 

Crippled Children v. Maryland Nat’l Bank, 270 Md. 564, 570 (1973) (quoting Buchwald 

v. Buchwald, 175 Md. 103, 111 (1938)).

II. Surrounding Circumstances

The principal issue in this appeal is whether the circuit court erred when it 

considered evidence besides the language of the will itself. Mrs. Castruccio argues that it 

did; the Estate and Ms. Barclay argue that it did not.

At page 14 of her brief, Mrs. Castruccio asserts that, “based on dubious, 

unspecified evidence, the trial court concluded that [Dr. Castruccio] wanted to prevent 

[her] from leaving assets to people he did not like, and intended his will to provide 

leverage to get [her] to cooperate in his estate planning goals.” (Footnote omitted.) She 

contends that the court committed reversible error by considering anything other than the 

language of the will itself. Her position is untenable.

From the court’s opinion, it is quite clear that the court did not base that 

declaration on “dubious, unspecified evidence.” Rather, over the course of three pages in 

the opinion, the court detailed the undisputed evidence of circumstances that it 

considered “relevant to this inquiry”: 

• Dr. Castruccio was born on January 11, 1925, and died on February 19, 

2013. He was 88 years old at the time of his death and 85 years old when the 2010 

will was drafted. 
11

• Dr. Castruccio was survived by his wife, with whom he was residing at the 

time of his death. Mrs. Castruccio was 92 years old at the time of her husband’s 

death.

• Dr. and Mrs. Castruccio were married in 1950. They had been married for 

62 years at the time of his death.3

• Dr. Castruccio had a Ph.D. in electrical engineering. He had worked in 

national defense and in the space program before his retirement.

• For several decades, Dr. and Mrs. Castruccio had jointly run and managed a 

successful real estate investment and real estate management business. Both 

participated in the operation of the business, and both were knowledgeable about 

the assets of the business and transactions in which the business had engaged.

• Dr. Castruccio had no children, and his parents had predeceased him.

• Mrs. Castruccio had a child from a prior marriage, but that child had died in 

1985.

• Dr. Castruccio’s will was admitted to probate on February 27, 2013.

• Mrs. Castruccio had made and executed a will before her husband’s death. 

 

3

In the opinion in which it rejected Mrs. Castruccio’s challenge to the validity of 

the 2010 will, the Court of Appeals also mentioned Dr. Castruccio’s date of death, his age 

at the time of his death, the fact that his wife survived him, her age at the time of his 

death, and the number of years that they had been married. Castruccio v. Estate of 

Castruccio, 456 Md. at 9.
12

• Mrs. Castruccio had not filed or deposited her will with the register of wills 

before Dr. Castruccio’s death.

• Dr. Castruccio had executed an earlier will in 2008 and had filed or 

deposited it with the register of wills at that time.

• On June 29, 2009, Dr. Castruccio told Mr. Greiber to retrieve the 2008 will. 

• Dr. Castruccio had known Mr. Greiber for 20 years. Mr. Greiber had 

represented Dr. Castruccio and his wife for 15 years before Dr. Castruccio’s death. 

He had an office in the location where the Castruccios conducted their real estate 

business. He was paid a monthly fee of about $3,500 to $4,000 from the 

Castruccios’ joint funds. 

• Dr. Castruccio marked up the 2008 will with handwritten interlineations or 

made additions on a separate sheet. The mark-ups included changes to Items 8 

and 10 of the 2008 will.

• On September 28, 2010, Dr. Castruccio and Mr. Greiber met to finalize the 

changes to the will. The changes were transcribed by Darlene Barclay, who had 

been employed by the Castruccios’ real estate business since 1984 as an office 

manager and, later, as a property manager. Dr. Castruccio viewed Ms. Barclay 

with affection because of her long service. 
13

• On September 29, 2010, Dr. Castruccio signed the will in the presence of 

Mr. Greiber; Mr. Greiber’s daughter; and Ms. Barclay’s daughter, Kim, who 

worked in the office.4

• Dr. Castruccio’s 2010 will was filed or deposited with the register of wills.

• In the summer of 2012, Dr. Castruccio had Mr. Greiber prepare a codicil, 

which is dated July 13, 2012. Dr. Castruccio executed the codicil, and Mr. 

Greiber filed it with the register of wills on July 19, 2012.

• At least since 2008, Dr. and Mrs. Castruccio had been engaged in an effort 

to divide up their assets for tax and estate planning purposes. Dr. Castruccio had 

tried to persuade Mrs. Castruccio to “engage in a joint will-drafting effort.” Mrs. 

Castruccio “was not always cooperative” with her husband “in this joint effort.”

• Dr. Castruccio “had a distaste” for three of Mrs. Castruccio’s nephews, who 

had obtained loans from the Castruccios and who had involved them in a federal 

criminal investigation and other litigation. 

 

4

In the opinion in which it rejected Mrs. Castruccio’s challenge to the validity of 

the 2010 will, the Court of Appeals also discussed the sequence of events in which Dr. 

Castruccio signed the 2008 will, asked his attorney to retrieve it from safekeeping so that 

he could revise it, marked up the document in the presence of Mr. Greiber, asked Ms. 

Barclay to make the changes, reviewed the draft with Mr. Greiber on September 28, 

2010, and signed the new will on the following day in the presence of Mr. Greiber, Mr. 

Greiber’s daughter, and Ms. Barclay’s daughter. Castruccio v. Estate of Castruccio, 456 

Md. at 9.
14

In light of the court’s detailed accounting of the factual bases for its decision, there 

is no merit to Mrs. Castruccio’s contention that the decision rests on some “unspecified” 

evidence.5

In fact, in her brief, Mrs. Castruccio herself refers to much of the same 

background information about Dr. Castruccio and the circumstances surrounding the 

execution of his will. At page 11 of her brief, Mrs. Castruccio writes that she survived 

her husband; that he had no other heirs; that she and Dr. Castruccio had been married for 

62 years; that they had no children; that she had a child from a previous marriage, who 

had died in 1985; and that she had a sister and a number of nieces and nephews. On the 

same page, Mrs. Castruccio also writes that she and her late husband were partners in 

their real estate business ventures; that Mr. Greiber had represented them for more than 

20 years; that both she and Dr. Castruccio had numerous wills and draft wills that left 

their estates to the surviving spouse; that Mr. Greiber had drafted a will for Dr. 

Castruccio in 2008; that he had drafted a revised will for Dr. Castruccio in 2010; and that, 

at the time of her husband’s death, she had made and executed a will, but had not 

deposited it for safekeeping with the register of wills. Having referred to this information 

 

5 At page 14 n.4 of her brief, Mrs. Castruccio complains that the court never ruled 

on her objection to the admissibility of the larger volume of evidence that the Estate and 

Ms. Barclay sought to introduce. She also complains that the court gave no indication of 

what evidence it admitted and what it did not. To the contrary, over the course of three 

pages of its opinion, the court clearly delineated the evidence that it considered. By 

implication, it considered nothing else.
15

in the apparent belief that it was relevant background for the interpretation of the will, 

Mrs. Castruccio cannot plausibly fault the circuit court for referring to it as well.6

Mrs. Castruccio’s central complaint is that, on the basis of the evidence beyond 

the language of the will itself, the circuit court concluded that Dr. Castruccio “wanted to 

prevent” her “from leaving assets to people he did not like” and that he “intended the will 

to provide leverage to get [her] to cooperate in his estate planning goals.” The source of 

this information was not only very well known to the litigants, but was detailed in both of 

the published appellate opinions that rejected Mrs. Castruccio’s challenge to the 2010 

will. As the Court of Appeals wrote: 

According to Mr. Greiber, [Dr. Castruccio] was concerned that [Mrs. 

Castruccio] would leave her estate to certain family members of whom he 

did not approve. He sought assurances that [Mrs. Castruccio] would not 

leave her assets, or at least the assets that she would receive from him, to 

those family members. Thus, he conditioned [Mrs. Castruccio’s] bequests 

under the 2010 Will upon her having made and filed a will that disclosed 

whether she intended to make testamentary gifts to those family members.

Castruccio v. Estate of Castruccio, 456 Md. at 10 n.2; accord Castruccio v. Estate of 

Castruccio, 230 Md. App. at 123 n.2.

 

6 Mrs. Castruccio’s brief refers to additional background information that the court 

did not discuss. On page 5 of her brief, she writes that Dr. Castruccio’s eyesight was 

extremely poor because of his advanced macular degeneration; that he could not read 

without the aid of a magnifier and lamps, which were present only in his residence (and 

apparently not in Mr. Greiber’s office); and that “virtually every day he got so drunk in 

the office, on wine supplied by [Ms. Barclay and Mr.] Greiber, that he slurred his words, 

fell down, and lost his ability to make sense.” She adds that if Dr. Castruccio was 

“highly intoxicated” and “unable to see clearly,” he “could have signed anything put in 

front of him.” Suffice it to say that Mrs. Castruccio’s reference to these facts and 

allegations is in some tension with her contention that the court could not consider any 

evidence other than the words of the will itself.
16

The question before us is whether the circuit court erred in considering that 

evidence in construing Dr. Castruccio’s will.

As a general rule, Maryland courts do not allow “extrinsic evidence” of a testator’s 

wishes or intentions. The courts have expressed two reasons for that rule. The first 

reason parallels the concerns underlying the parol evidence rule in the law of contracts: 

“an extrinsic statement may not be received to modify or nullify the words of a 

document.” Darden v. Bright, 173 Md. 563, 568 (1938); accord Emmert v. Hearn, 309 

Md. at 23 (quoting Fersinger v. Martin, 183 Md. 135, 138 (1944), for the proposition that 

“‘[e]xtrinsic evidence should not be admitted to show that the testator meant something 

different from what his language imports’”). The second reason relates more directly to 

the law of wills and other testamentary instruments: “an oral utterance would not be a 

compliance with the statutory requirement that a will be in writing.” Darden v. Bright, 

173 Md. at 568.

Mrs. Castruccio argues that under Maryland law a court may consider extrinsic 

evidence only to resolve a “latent ambiguity,” which is “an ambiguity that is not apparent 

merely from reading the text of the donative document but becomes apparent from 

extrinsic evidence.” Restatement (Third) of Property (Wills and Other Donative 

Transfers) § 11.1 cmt. c (2001). “Language in a will, for example, that devises property 

‘to my cousin John,’ contains a latent ambiguity if evidence extrinsic to the document 

reveals that the testator had no cousin named John when he executed his will but did then 

have a nephew named John and a cousin named James.” Id. A latent ambiguity is to be 

contrasted with a patent ambiguity, which “is apparent on the face of the will itself, as, 
17

for example, when different clauses of a will dispose of the same plot of land to different 

devisees.” Emmert v. Hearn, 309 Md. at 27 n.4. No one contends that this case involves 

a latent ambiguity.

In defense of her contention that a court may not consider extrinsic evidence in the 

absence of a latent ambiguity, Mrs. Castruccio cites this Court’s broad and categorical 

statement in Click v. Click, 204 Md. App. 349, 366 (2012): “It is well-settled in Maryland 

that extrinsic evidence of the circumstances surrounding execution of a will is admissible 

in construing a will only if the will contains a latent ambiguity.” (Emphasis in original.)

Mrs. Castruccio recognizes, however, that in Click this Court supported its broad 

and categorical statement with a quotation from a recent Court of Appeals decision that is 

decidedly more limited and more qualified than the statement in Click itself: 

“‘Ordinarily, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove the testator’s intent unless 

there is a latent ambiguity.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Friedman v. Hannan, 412 

Md. at 340). Quoting the Court of Appeals, this Court went on to say: 

Yet, when ascertaining that intent, the court may consider “the situation of 

the testator and his relations with the parties to whom he has devised or 

bequeathed his property[.]” In that regard, the will must be “read in the 

light of the surrounding circumstances existing at the time of its execution.” 

Id. (quoting Friedman v. Hannan, 412 Md. at 340) (internal citations omitted).

In other words, despite the general prohibition on the consideration of extrinsic 

evidence, both this Court and the Court of Appeals have made it clear that a court may 

still consider “the situation of the testator,” his or her “relations with” the beneficiaries 
18

under the will, and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will. Tellingly, 

Mrs. Castruccio omits that portion of the quotation from her brief. 

Many, many Maryland cases have stated or applied the proposition that, to 

understand or explain the words that a testator has written, a court may consider evidence 

of the circumstances that surrounded the execution of the will. See, e.g., Vito v. Grueff, 

453 Md. at 107 (quoting Banghart v. Vieweg, 261 Md. 214, 218 (1971), which quoted 

Walston v. White, 5 Md. 297, 304 (1853)) (“‘any evidence is admissible, which, in its 

nature and effect, simply explains what the testator has written’”); id. at 110 (quoting 

Marty v. First Nat’l Bank of Baltimore, 209 Md. at 217 (“‘[t]h[e] expressed intention of a 

testator must be gathered from the language of the entire will, particularly from the clause 

in dispute, read in the light of the surrounding circumstances at the time the will was 

made’”); see also Veditz v. Athey, 239 Md. 435, 441 (1965) (affirming the admission of 

“extrinsic evidence pertaining to the circumstances of the testatrix, the objects of her 

bounty and the nature of the property involved”); Hebden v. Keim, 196 Md. 45, 50 (1950) 

(“[o]ne of the familiar rules for the construction of wills is that the Court should consider 

not only the actual words used in the will but also the situation of the testator and his 

relations with the objects of his bounty”); Jones v. Holloway, 183 Md. 40, 47 (1944) 

(stating that “the rule excluding extrinsic evidence does not prevent admission of 

evidence which simply explains what the testator has written for the purpose of 

determining the subject of disposition, the objects of his bounty, or the quantity of 

interest intended to be given by his will”); Robinson v. Mercantile Trust Co. of 

Baltimore, 180 Md. 336, 339 (1942) (“[i]n ascertaining [the intention of the testator], not 
19

only the actual words used in the will, but also the situation of the testator and his 

relations with the parties to whom he has devised or bequeathed his property are 

important elements”); id. (quoting Henderson v. Henderson, 64 Md. 185, 188-89 (1885)) 

(“‘[t]he peculiar situation of this testatrix, and the relations subsisting between her and 

the recipients of her bounty, must therefore be considered in connection with the 

language of the document itself, in order that we may be fully enlightened in regard to the 

real motives and intent by which she was controlled in the execution of this will’”); 

Emory v. Emory, 91 Md. 531, 532 (1900) (“intention is not, of course, to be made out or 

arrived at by mere surmise, but must be found in the words of the will as they are read in 

the light of the circumstances which surrounded the person who used them at the time he 

executed the instrument”); Taylor v. Watson, 35 Md. 519, 524 (1872) (“[t]he intention of 

the testator is to be gathered from all its provisions, developed by the light of surrounding 

circumstances”); I Philip L. Sykes, Probate Law and Practice § 51 (1956) (“[t]he 

intention of the testator must be gathered from the four corners of the instrument and 

from the pertinent circumstances surrounding the testator at the time of its execution”).

Similarly, in discussing the consideration of surrounding circumstances, the courts 

sometimes talk of placing themselves, “in the traditional place, behind the armchair of the 

testator as he contemplated the disposition he wished to be made to the objects of his 

bounty[.]” Marty v. First Nat’l Bank of Baltimore, 209 Md. at 218; see also Monmonier 

v. Monmonier, 258 Md. 387, 388 (1970) (referring to “[t]estimony that put the Court in 

the armchair of the testatrix”); Grace v. Thompson, 169 Md. 653, 657 (1936) (quoting 

Edgar G. Miller, The Construction of Wills in Maryland § 12 (1919) (“‘the court will put 
20

itself in the testator’s place, in his armchair; will see the circumstances that he saw; 

appreciate his surroundings as he appreciated them; and then give to the language he has 

used in his will the meaning which these circumstances and these surroundings indicate 

he intended that language to have’”); Falconer v. Kirby, 90 Md. 594, 596 (1900) (“[w]e 

must put ourselves, as nearly as we can, in the testator’s arm-chair; see the circumstances 

that he saw; appreciate his surroundings as he appreciated them; and then give to the 

language he has used in his will the meaning which these circumstances and these 

surroundings indicate he intended that language to have”); Littig v. Hance, 81 Md. 416, 

425 (1895) (quoting Boyes v. Cook, 14 Ch. Div. 56 (1880)) (“[f]or the purpose of 

ascertaining the testator’s intention, as expressed in his words and not as an independent 

fact, ‘you may,’ as remarked by Lord Justice James, ‘place yourself, so to speak, in his 

armchair, and consider the circumstances by which he was surrounded when he made his 

will, to assist you in arriving at his intention’”); Hammond v. Hammond, 55 Md. 575, 580

(1881) (“[i]n order to discover the intention of the testator, it is the duty of the Court to 

put themselves in the place of the testator, and then see how the terms of the will affect 

the property or the subject-matter”); Taylor v. Watson, 35 Md. at 524 (“[t]he Court must 

put themselves in the place of the party making the instrument”).

Because “[a]djudicated cases are helpful almost solely as illustrations” in the field 

of will construction (Payne v. Payne, 136 Md. 551, 555 (1920)), we offer the following 

illustrations from cases, in which the Court of Appeals has approved the consideration of 

evidence of circumstances surrounding the execution of a will in order to explain or 

understand the decedent’s intentions:
21

Jones v. Holloway

In Jones v. Holloway, 183 Md. at 42, the testator’s first codicil had placed his 

“brick bungalow home” in the residuary estate, but a second codicil conveyed it to his 

second wife for life. The Court was required to decide, first, whether the “home” 

included a filling station, a weatherboard shop, and other land that was separated from the 

house itself by a drainage ditch and a row of evergreens, or whether the testator had 

intended to divide his property into separate parts when he built the shop, dug the ditch,

and planted the trees. Id. In deciding that the “home” included the land on the other side 

of the ditch and the trees, the Court cited authorities that hold that “the word ‘home’ has a 

much broader meaning than ‘house.’” Id. at 43 (quoting Willett v. Carroll, 13 Md. 459, 

468 (1859)). But the Court also referred to the widow’s testimony “that her husband built 

the shop at her request, and that he planted the evergreens merely for the purpose of 

beautifying their home.” Id. at 44.

In addition to deciding what the testator meant when he referred to the “brick 

bungalow home,” the Court was required to decide whether a devise of “the farm known 

as the Palmer Farm” included 160 acres of forest adjacent to the farmland itself. In 

holding that the term “the Palmer Farm” included the forest, the Court explicitly referred 

to “extrinsic evidence” that “explains what the testator has written” (id. at 47) – i.e., to 

evidence of surrounding circumstances. In particular, the Court referred to testimony that 

both tracts were known as “the Palmer Farm,” as well as testimony that the testator had 

referred to the wooded tract as “the Palmer Farm” and not by another name. Id. On the 
22

basis of that testimony, the Court affirmed the lower court’s decision that the term “the 

Palmer Farm” referred to both tracts.

Hebden v. Keim

In Hebden v. Keim, 196 Md. at 47, the testatrix made a gift to her husband for life. 

“[F]rom and after” the husband’s death, the testatrix’s brother was to receive the 

remainder, unless he died before both the testatrix and her husband. Id. If the brother 

died before both the testatrix and her husband, the gift would go to the residuary estate 

(id.), whose beneficiaries were the testatrix’s cousins. Id. at 48, 50-51.

The brother survived the testatrix, but predeceased her husband. Id. at 47. The 

Court was required to decide whether the testatrix would have intended the gift to go to 

her brother’s heirs if he did not survive her husband. 

In resolving the question against the brother’s heirs, the Court explicitly discussed 

evidence of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will. Id. at 50-51. It 

referred to the brother’s will, which predated the testatrix’s will, and in which he 

emphatically declared that he wanted her and her husband to receive nothing. Id. at 50. 

It also referred to suggestions that the animosity of the brother’s heirs had led to the 

brother’s estrangement from his sister. Id. It concluded that the testatrix had probably 

been “more desirous” to give the bequest to her cousins, the residuary beneficiaries, than 

to the brother’s heirs, “who were not related to her and who even then may have been 

alienating the affection of her brother.” Id. at 50-51. 
23

Marty v. First National Bank of Baltimore

In Marty v. First National Bank of Baltimore, 209 Md. at 213-15, the testator had 

drafted an excruciatingly complicated will that was clearly designed to delay the 

distribution of the corpus of various trusts – the question was how long the distribution

was to be delayed. See id. at 216. To answer that question, the Court envisioned what it 

would see if it put itself, “in the traditional place, behind the armchair of the testator[,] as 

he contemplated the disposition he wished to be made to the objects of his bounty[.]” Id. 

at 218. From that standpoint, the Court wrote, “we would be standing behind a man who 

was not unaware of the problems and methods of early, as contrasted with late, vesting of 

trust estates and one upon whom had been urged the desirability of continuing property in 

trust.” Id. As the basis for that statement, the Court cited its earlier opinion in a dispute 

concerning the estate of the testator’s mother. Id. (citing Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. 

Bouse, 181 Md. 351 (1943)).

Veditz v. Athey

In Veditz v. Athey, 239 Md. at 441, the Court illustrated the difference between 

extrinsic evidence, which is not admissible, and evidence of surrounding circumstances, 

which is. 

In Item Second of her will, the testatrix gave most of her furniture, silver, china, 

jewelry, linens, and other personal and household effects to a niece. Id. at 438. In a 

second codicil, the testatrix reported that she had purchased a house after she had 

executed the will, and she modified Item Second of the will to give her interest in the 

house to a second niece, Veditz. Id. at 439. In yet a third codicil, the testatrix revoked 
24

Item Second altogether and substituted a provision that gave most of her furniture, silver, 

china, jewelry, linens, and other personal and household effects to Veditz rather than the 

other niece. Id. at 440. The question before the Court was whether the third codicil 

implicitly revoked the second, in which the testatrix had given her interest in the house to 

Veditz, or whether the second codicil and the gift of the interest in the house remained in 

effect. See id. at 441-42.

A majority of the Court held that the third codicil revoked each prior codicil that 

had modified Item Second, including the second codicil by which the testatrix had given 

her interest in the house to Veditz. In reaching that decision, the Court approved the 

admission of evidence showing that before the testatrix executed the second codicil, she 

had executed a strawman deed by which she conveyed half of her interest in the house to 

herself for life, with the remainder going to Veditz. Id. at 439, 441. (Thus, Veditz would 

receive at least a half interest in the house upon the testatrix’s death even if the third 

codicil revoked the second.) The Court explained that “[t]he evidence as to the 

relationship of the two nieces, the acquisition of the real estate, and the strawman deed in 

connection therewith, was admissible as extrinsic evidence pertaining to the 

circumstances of the testatrix, the objects of her bounty and the nature of the property 

involved.” Id. at 441.

On the other hand, the Veditz Court observed that the trial court had excluded 

testimony to the effect that the testatrix had expressed an intention to leave the entire 

property to Veditz and testimony that testatrix had said that she was buying the house “so 

that [Veditz] would have something in her old age.” Id. The trial court also excluded 
25

testimony from the testatrix’s lawyer about “what took place in his office between the 

testatrix and himself when the Third Codicil was prepared and executed.” Id. This 

testimony was the impermissible strain of extrinsic evidence that would attempt to vary, 

modify, or contradict the testatrix’s expression of her intentions in the will and the codicil 

themselves. 

Stinchcomb v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit and Trust Co.

In Stinchcomb v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 257 Md. 482, 484-85 

(1970), the testator and a business partner had established two prosperous companies. In 

his will, the testator directed that his shares (or the proceeds from the sale of the shares) 

be held in trust for his wife during her life and that they be distributed in various 

quantities to his partner and two key employees upon her death. Id. at 486-88. The 

testator’s widow survived him by more than 40 years (id. at 484, 490), during which the 

shares were sold (id. at 488), and the value of the sale proceeds appreciated considerably. 

The question before the Court was whether the capital appreciation would go to the 

business partner and the employees or to the residuary beneficiary. See id. at 490. 

Early in its opinion, the Court touched upon the close relationship between the 

testator and his former partner, and between the testator and the two employees. Id. at 

485. “It is against such a background,” the Court wrote, that “the actions of the testator 

in making his will must be viewed.” Id. (citing Hebden v. Keim, 196 Md. at 48, 50). 

When it turned to the substance of the case, the Court referred to the testator as 

“an eminently successful businessman.” Id. at 496. It surmised that the testator would 

have anticipated appreciation in the value of his stock. It inferred that he “was perfectly 
26

willing that the objects of his bounty, the friends who had worked with him in making his 

business a success, share in such capital appreciation.” Id. at 497. Referring back to the 

language of the will, it observed that the testator did not limit the partner and the 

employees to a share of the appraised value of the stock at the time of his death, but 

bequeathed them a percentage of the net proceeds from a sale. The testator, the court 

said, would have recognized that his wife’s life tenancy “might well continue for some 

years” (id.), which made it “logical” to conclude that he wanted his business associates to 

receive a portion of the “the corpus created by the investment of the proceeds of the sale 

of the stocks.” Id. In the end, “[v]iewing the will in its entirety and the totality of 

circumstances surrounding its execution,” the Court determined that the testator intended 

the capital appreciation to go to his former partner and the key employees. Id. at 498. 

Friedman v. Hannan

In Friedman v. Hannan, 412 Md. at 333-34, the testator’s will contained bequests 

to his wife and to his wife’s family members. After he made the will, the testator and his 

wife were divorced. Id. at 332. Under § 4-105(4) of the Estates and Trusts Article, the 

divorce resulted in the revocation of the bequests “relating to [his] spouse.” The question 

before the Court was whether a trial court erred in finding that the testator’s divorce 

resulted in the revocation of the bequests to his ex-wife’s family members, as well as the 

bequests as to the ex-wife herself. Id. at 340; see id. at 332, 336. 

In framing the issue at the outset of the opinion, the Court wrote that “[a] court 

should utilize the terms of the will and circumstances surrounding its execution to 

determine whether a bequest ‘relat[es] to the spouse’ within the meaning of Section 4-
27

105(4).” Friedman v. Hannan, 412 Md. at 332. In the body of its opinion, the Court 

reiterated that proposition when it wrote that “the will must be ‘read in the light of the 

surrounding circumstances existing at the time of its execution.’” Id. at 340 (quoting 

Hebden v. Keim, 196 Md. at 48). In the same vein, the Court added later that “a court 

may consider the relationships between the testator and his beneficiaries when 

investigating intent.” Id. at 344. 

As recounted by the Court, the evidence reflected that the testator did not know his 

wife’s family before the marriage and that “during a large portion of the marriage he was 

employed at sea.” Id. at 345. The Court concluded that “the trial court did not err in 

considering the tenuous nature of [the testator’s] relationship to his spouse’s family in 

concluding that [he] would not have intended that bequest to survive a divorce.” Id. at 

344-45.

* * * * *

In view of these authorities, it is beyond any serious dispute that the circuit court 

could properly consider the circumstances surrounding the execution of Dr. Castruccio’s 

will for the purpose of understanding or explaining what he had done. Those 

circumstances included Dr. Castruccio’s antipathy toward Mrs. Castruccio’s nephews, his 

desire that they not receive any portion of his estate, and his efforts to engage her in a 

discussion of estate planning in order to prevent or persuade her from leaving his assets 

to her nephews if he predeceased her. The evidence explained why Dr. Castruccio had 

revised his will in 2010 to add an additional condition to his wife’s ability to recover –

the condition in Item 10 that required her not only to have made a will, but also to have 
28

filed a valid will with the register of wills. That evidence is not entirely different from 

the dispositive evidence in Hebden v. Keim, 196 Md. at 47, that the testatrix would not 

have wanted her brother’s heirs to inherit part of her estate, because they had turned him 

against her. Finally, it is not evidence that Dr. Castruccio intended to make a gift that the 

will does not contain, or that he did not intend to make a gift that the will does contain: in 

other words, it is not the sort of extrinsic evidence that would be inadmissible on the 

ground that it varies, modifies, or contradicts the literal language of the will.

7

 

In a final assault, Mrs. Castruccio argues that the key evidence of surrounding 

circumstances was inadmissible, because it depended on the testimony of Ms. Barclay 

and Mr. Greiber, who had an interest in the outcome. To the contrary, it is an elementary 

principle of the law of evidence that, while a witness’s interest or bias may affect the 

weight that a factfinder assigns to the testimony, it does not determine the admissibility 

of the witness’s testimony. 

 

7 As the circuit court observed, Dr. Castruccio’s will would not have been 

particularly effective in achieving his goals. Even if he had succeeded in motivating Mrs. 

Castruccio to file (or deposit) a will with the register of wills, he would have had no way 

of knowing what the will said unless she chose to tell him. Furthermore, even if Mrs. 

Castruccio made and filed a valid will that satisfied her husband because it left nothing to 

her nephews, she could change it as soon as he died, when she would have satisfied all of 

the conditions to recover under his will. Dr. Castruccio could have employed other 

means, short of disinheriting his widow, to prevent her from passing his assets to her 

nephews. He could, for example, have created a testamentary trust, under which she 

would receive the income from the assets during her life, with the remainder going 

somewhere else. As the circuit court remarked, however, it appears that Dr. Castruccio 

either did not receive or did not heed competent estate-planning advice.
29

In this case, the testimony, interested or not, was undisputed. Under Rule 2-

501(f), a court shall enter judgment in favor of the moving parties if the motion and 

response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving 

parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court, therefore, did not err in 

directing the entry of summary judgment in favor of the Estate and Ms. Barclay.8

III. Literal Language

As an additional ground for the declaratory judgment, the circuit court concluded, 

on the basis of the literal language of the will itself, that Mrs. Castruccio had to meet 

three conditions to recover under her late husband’s will: she had to survive him (as 

required by Item 8), she had to have made a will (as required by Item 8), and she had to 

have filed a valid will with the Register of Wills of Anne Arundel County (as required by 

Item 10). Because Mrs. Castruccio had indisputably failed to meet the third condition, 

the court declared that she was not entitled to recover. If that ruling was correct, we can 

uphold the judgment on that ground even if the court erred in considering the 

circumstances surrounding the execution of the will.

In concluding that Item 10 imposed a third, unmet condition to Mrs. Castruccio’s 

recovery, the court rejected her contrary interpretation of Items 8 and 10. Under that 

 

8 Mrs. Castruccio observes that, in the declaratory judgment, the circuit court 

referred to the background to the execution of the will as well as “the relevant events that 

transpired after its execution.” She complains that the court could not properly rely on 

events that occurred after the execution of the will. We disagree, because it is apparent 

from the court’s opinion that it was referring only to Dr. Castruccio’s death and to Mrs. 

Castruccio’s undisputed failure to file (or deposit) a valid will with the register of wills 

before his death. 
30

interpretation, Item 8 would give Dr. Castruccio’s entire estate to Mrs. Castruccio, 

provided that she survived him and had made a will, both of which conditions she 

satisfied. Item 10, in Mrs. Castruccio’s interpretation, would come into play only if she 

did not survive her husband. In that event, she argued, Dr. Castruccio’s estate would go 

to whomever she had designated as the beneficiaries of her estate if she had “a valid Will 

filed with the Register of Wills of Anne Arundel County.” She likens Item 10 to an 

“anti-lapse statute” like § 4-403 of the Estates and Trusts Article, under which a gift in a 

will may be redirected to a beneficiary’s heirs if the beneficiary predeceases the testator. 

A central problem with Mrs. Castruccio’s interpretation is that Item 10 does not 

actually say anything about her predeceasing her husband. Under the caption “Residuary 

Clause,” Item 10 states, in pertinent part: “Should, at the time of my death, my beloved 

wife not have a valid Will filed with the Register of Wills in Anne Arundel County dated 

prior thereto these [sic], I hereby give, devise and bequeath all the rest and residue of my 

Estate and property . . . to DARLENE BARCLAY . . . .” Item 10 talks about where the 

residuary estate should go if Mrs. Castruccio did not have a valid will filed with the 

register of wills; it does not say that her estate plan becomes his. If we were to interpret 

this language to mean that Dr. Castruccio had incorporated his wife’s estate plan into his 

own will in the event that she predeceased him and left a will, we would have to rewrite 

his will, which we cannot do. See, e.g., Frank v. Frank, 253 Md. 413, 420 (1969); 

Gaither v. Fidelity-Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 208 Md. 8, 14 (1955).
31

Both sides claim to find support in the changes that Dr. Castruccio made to his 

previous will, from 2008. In the 2008 will, Item 10, which was also captioned 

“Residuary Clause,” stated in pertinent part:

Should my beloved wife predecrease [sic] me, I hereby give, devise, and 

bequeath all the rest and residue of my Estate and property . . . to 

DARLENE BARCLAY . . . .

The changes that Dr. Castruccio made to Item 10 in the 2010 will are illustrated 

below:

Should, at the time of my death, my beloved wife predecrease me not have 

a valid Will filed with the Register of Wills in Anne Arundel County dated 

prior thereto these, I hereby give, devise, and bequeath all the rest and 

residue of my Estate and property . . . to DARLENE BARCLAY . . . .

In our view, these changes emphatically refute Mrs. Castruccio’s contention that 

her husband intended Item 10 to apply in case she predeceased him: Item 10 of the 2008

will would certainly have applied in that event, but Dr. Castruccio deleted the language 

about his wife predeceasing him from the 2010 will. As the Estate argues on page 6 of its 

brief, “Mrs. Castruccio now seeks to revise the Will under the guise of construction by 

re-inserting a key provision from the 2008 Will which Dr. Castruccio specifically 

removed (‘should . . . [my wife] pre-decease me’).”

Mrs. Castruccio focuses on the word “filed” in Item 10 (“Should, at the time of my 

death, my beloved wife not have a valid Will filed with the Register of Wills in Anne 

Arundel County . . .”). In the circuit court, she argued that “filed” does not mean 

“deposited for safekeeping before the testator’s death,” as the Estate and Ms. Barclay 

claimed. Instead, she argued that “filed” has a technical, legal meaning, which is that the 
32

will had been filed in a probate proceeding after the testator’s death. Employing the 

technical meaning of “filed,” she said, would support her interpretation of Item 10 as a 

kind of anti-lapse provision, because she could not “have a valid Will filed with the 

Register of Wills in Anne Arundel County” until after she was dead.

The circuit court correctly rejected that contention. It recognized that the will was 

drafted largely by Dr. Castruccio, a layperson. Accordingly, the court gave the word 

“filed” “‘the meaning it would commonly have to a person in his situation.’” Shriners 

Hosps. for Crippled Children v. Maryland Nat’l Bank, 270 Md. at 570 (quoting 

Buchwald v. Buchwald, 175 Md. at 111). 

In the codicil to his will, Dr. Castruccio himself referred to the 2010 will as his 

“Will on file with the Register of Wills for Anne Arundel County for safekeeping.” 

(Emphasis added.) Dr. Castruccio’s use of the words “on file” confirms the circuit 

court’s conclusion that, in requiring his wife to “have a valid Will filed with the Register 

of Wills in Anne Arundel County,” he did not use the word “filed” in a technical, legal 

sense, but in the less formal sense of having it filed or deposited for safekeeping. See

Jones v. Holloway, 183 Md. at 45 (“[i]f the testator has used words in one part of his will 

in a way that clearly indicates his own understanding of their import, whether or not it 

differs from their ordinary or legal meaning, there can be no safer way to ascertain his 

purpose than to give to the same words when they appear elsewhere in the will the same 
33

meaning that he attached to them in the instance where his understanding of them is 

apparent, except when a different purpose in their use is disclosed”).

9

Mrs. Castruccio argues that if Item 10 means what the circuit court said it means, 

her husband would have been intestate had she predeceased him. She invokes the 

presumption against intestacy (see, e.g., McElroy v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 

229 Md. 276, 283 (1962)) in support of her interpretation. The circuit court was 

unimpressed with her contention, as are we. The fact is that, under Mrs. Castruccio’s 

interpretation of her husband’s sloppily drafted will,10 he would arguably have been 

 

9 Even the State’s appellate courts have sometimes used the verb “to file” when 

discussing the act of depositing a will for safekeeping with the register of wills. See, e.g., 

Castruccio v. Estate of Castruccio, 456 Md. at 9 (“Peter signed a last will and testament 

on September 28, 2008, which he filed with the Register of Wills for Anne Arundel 

County for safekeeping”); In re Estate of Vess, 234 Md. App. 173, 181 (2017) (“the 

Register docketed the two prior wills and two prior codicils, each of which had been filed 

with the Register for safekeeping”); see also Green v. Nelson, 227 Md. App. 698, 710 

(2016) (“[a]ccording to Green, because he filed the 2009 Will for the register’s 

safekeeping, the existence of the 2009 Will should have automatically triggered a judicial 

probate when the 2003 Will was offered”). These cases demonstrate that the term “filed” 

differs considerably from the legal terms of art that must be read in accordance with their 

technical, legal meaning. See, e.g., Emmert v. Hearn, 309 Md. at 23-24 (“personal 

property”); Patchell v. Groom, 185 Md. at 15-16 (“per stirpes”); Mazziotte v. Safe 

Deposit & Trust Co., 180 Md. 48, 50-51 (1942) (“per capita”); Cowman v. Classen, 156 

Md. 428, 446 (1929) (“children”); Lobe v. Goldheim, 153 Md. 248, 251 (1927) (“heirs”); 

Stahl v. Emery, 147 Md. 123, 132 (1925) (“share and share alike”); Shipley v. Mercantile 

Trust & Deposit Co., 102 Md. 649, 660 (1906) (“dower and thirds”); Hill v. Safe Deposit 

& Trust. Co. of Balt., 101 Md. 60, 63 (1905) (“survive” and “survivor”); State to Use of 

Dittman v. Robinson, 57 Md. 486, 500-01 (1882) (“bills receivable”); Estep v. Mackey, 

52 Md. 592, 600 (1879) (“without issue” and “without heirs”); Clarke v. Smith, 49 Md. 

106, 120 (1878) (“heirs” and “heirs lawfully begotten”). 

10 For a summary of the many errors in the 2010 will, see Castruccio v. Estate of 

Castruccio, 230 Md. App. at 144 & n.14. The 2008 will contained some of the same 

errors (see id. at 144 & n.14), as well as another (the misspelling of “predecease”) that 

was deleted from Item 10 of the 2008 will.
34

intestate if she survived him, but failed to satisfy the condition of Item 8 that required her 

to make and execute a will. In the circumstances of this case, the presumption against 

intestacy counts for little. 

In summary, it is natural to read Item 10 as a third condition, in addition to the two 

conditions previously enumerated a few lines above in Item 8, to Mrs. Castruccio’s right 

to recover under the will. See Holmes v. Mitchell, 4 Md. 532, 535-36 (1853) (“[t]he 

words are the means to ascertain [the intention of the testator], and, however scattered, if 

they explain it, they are to be collected and put together, that the will may have the effect 

intended”). It is not at all natural to read Item 10 as the wholesale incorporation of Mrs. 

Castruccio’s estate plan if she died before her husband. For that reason and the other 

reasons discussed above, we agree with the circuit court’s conclusion that, under the 

literal language of the will, Mrs. Castruccio had to meet three conditions to recover under 

the will: she had to survive her husband, she had to make and execute a will, and she had 

to file her will with the Register of Wills of Anne Arundel County. Because she 

indisputably failed to meet the third condition, the court correctly entered summary 

judgment against her and in favor of Ms. Barclay and the Estate.11

 

11 This ruling does not leave Mrs. Castruccio with no assets. In the several years 

before her husband’s death, they divided a multi-million dollar investment account 

between themselves. In addition, Dr. Castruccio conveyed his interest in millions of 

dollars of jointly-owned real estate to her during that time. Finally, Mrs. Castruccio has 

preserved her right to an elective share of her late husband’s estate under Title 3, Subtitle 

2, of the Estates and Trusts Article. Under § 3-203(b) of the Estates and Trusts Article, 

she would be entitled to half of his net estate, because they have no surviving children.
35

IV. Probable Cause for Caveat

As an additional basis to affirm the judgment below, the Estate argues that under 

Item 6, the in terrorem or no-contest clause, Mrs. Castruccio could receive no benefits 

under the will, because she had unsuccessfully challenged it in the caveat case. The 

circuit court rejected that argument. So do we.12 

The circuit court recognized that “Item 6 cannot be read in isolation.” Under § 4-

413 of the Estates and Trusts Article, “[i]f probable cause exists for instituting 

proceedings, a provision in a will purporting to penalize an interested person for 

contesting the will or instituting other proceedings relating to the estate is void.”

Section 4-413 does not define “probable cause,” but the circuit court observed that 

in other civil contexts Maryland courts have defined it to mean “‘a reasonable ground for 

belief in the existence of such state of facts as would warrant institution of the suit or 

proceeding complained of.’” One Thousand Fleet Ltd. P’ship v. Guerriero, 346 Md. 29, 

37 (1997) (quoting North Point Constr. Co. v. Sanger, 346 Md. 200, 208-09 (1945)); 

Havilah Real Prop. Servs., LLC v. Early, 216 Md. App. 613, 624 (2014). Applying that 

 

12 The Estate was not required to file a cross-appeal in order to contest this aspect 

of the circuit court’s decision. In fact, because the judgment below was wholly in the 

Estate’s favor, the Estate would not have been permitted to take a cross-appeal. Paolino 

v. McCormick & Co., 314 Md. 575, 579 (1989); Offutt v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 

285 Md. 557, 564 n.4 (1979). Nonetheless, “[w]here a party has an issue resolved 

adversely in the trial court, but like the [Estate] here receives a wholly favorable 

judgment on another ground, that party may, as an appellee and without taking a crossappeal, argue as a ground for affirmance the matter that was resolved against it at trial.” 

Offutt v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 285 Md. at 564 n.4; accord Paolino v. 

McCormick & Co., 314 Md. at 579. “This is merely an aspect of the principle that an 

appellate court may affirm a trial court’s decision on any ground adequately shown by the 

record.” Offutt v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 285 Md. at 579 n.4.
36

standard, the circuit court concluded that Mrs. Castruccio had probable cause to institute 

the caveat proceeding. The court reasoned that under Shane v. Wooley, 138 Md. 75 

(1921), Mrs. Castruccio had a colorable argument that the will was invalid, because the 

witnesses did not sign on the same page as Dr. Castruccio or on a page that was 

physically connected to it. Mrs. Castruccio’s argument was not foreclosed until the Court 

of Appeals held that Shane v. Wooley applies only when the witnesses sign a document 

that is not a part of the will itself and that it does not apply when the witnesses and the 

testator sign different pages of a multi-page will, as happened in this case. See 

Castruccio v. Estate of Castruccio, 456 Md. at 29. 

The Estate contends the circuit court employed too forgiving a definition of 

probable cause. It advocates for the definition of “probable cause” in comment c to § 8.5 

of the Restatement (Third) of Property (Wills and Other Donative Transfers) (2001): 

“Probable cause exists when, at the time of instituting the proceeding, there was evidence 

that would lead a reasonable person, properly informed and advised, to conclude that 

there was a substantial likelihood that the challenge would be successful.” 

In our view, Mrs. Castruccio had probable cause for instituting the proceeding 

under either standard. When she instituted the proceeding, she was armed with a decision 

from the State’s highest court that, on its face, raised serious questions about whether the 

will satisfied the technical requirements for attestation. A treatise, of which Ms. 

Barclay’s lawyer was one of the co-authors, contained language that appeared to support 

Mrs. Castruccio’s central contention: “It is generally considered that a witness must sign 

on the same sheet of paper as the testator or on some sheet physically connected with it.” 
37

Cristin C. Lambros et al., Will Drafting in Maryland § 3.2.1.5 (MICPEL 2007). In 

addition, on at least two occasions, Maryland’s appellate courts had reiterated, if they had 

not reaffirmed, the ruling on which Mrs. Castruccio relied. See Castruccio v. Estate of 

Castruccio, 230 Md. App. at 139-41 (citing Casson v. Swogell, 304 Md. 641 (1985);

Goroum v. Rynarzewski, 89 Md. App. 676 (1991)). 

When Mrs. Castruccio instituted the caveat proceeding, it is difficult to say that 

she was required to foresee how her adversaries would ultimately succeed in persuading 

the courts to distinguish those cases. Moreover, she relied “upon the advice of 

independent legal counsel sought in good faith after” what appears to have been “a full 

disclosure of the facts,” which is “[a] factor that bears on the existence of probable 

cause[.]” Restatement (Third) of Property (Wills and Other Donative Transfers), supra, § 

8.5 cmt. c. She had “probable cause” under any reasonable definition of that term.

CONCLUSION

The circuit court correctly concluded that Ms. Barclay is entitled to receive Dr. 

Castruccio’s residuary estate and that Mrs. Castruccio is not. We affirm the circuit 

court’s decision in its entirety.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT

FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY

AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY

APPELLANT.