IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE, )

)

)

v. ) I.D. No. 1804000397

)

) Cr. A. Nos. IN18-04-0406 – 0411,

CHAON CALHOUN, ) and IN18-07-1843 – 1845. 

 Defendant. )

Submitted: October 23, 2023

Decided: January 23, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Upon Defendant Chaon Calhoun’s Motion for Postconviction Relief,

DENIED.

Brian L. Arban, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 

Wilmington, Delaware, for the State of Delaware.

Herbert W. Mondros, Esquire, RIGRODSKY LAW, P.A., Wilmington Delaware, Karl 

Schwartz, Esquire, Catherine Trama, Esquire, WISEMAN &SCHWARTZ, Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania, for Chaon Calhoun.

WALLACE, J.
-2-

On Easter Sunday 2018, Chaon Calhoun—who had a history of drug use and 

mental health issues that had troubled him and his family for more than a decade—

went on a violent rampage at his mother’s home. In the end, one innocent person 

was dead, a toddler suffered life-threatening injuries, and two others had been 

stabbed or sliced to varying degrees. 

The trial for the Easter events was conducted before the Court without a jury. 

There was little contention over what happened and whether Mr. Calhoun had 

engaged in the brutality. But the parties hotly contested what spurred Mr. Calhoun 

to act as he did that night. As submitted to the Court for verdict, the questions were: 

(1) which offense fit the injury to each victim; and, (2) whether Mr. Calhoun could 

be held criminally responsible for them. The Court entered a verdict of guilty but 

mentally ill as to each conviction attained and later sentenced Mr. Calhoun 

accordingly. 

His convictions and sentence having been affirmed on direct appeal, 

Mr. Calhoun has returned here seeking postconviction relief under this Court’s 

Criminal Rule 61. According to Mr. Calhoun, his trial counsel was ineffective in 

her presentation of his insanity defense. She was not. And, for the reasons now 

explained, Mr. Calhoun is due no postconviction relief. 

 
-3-

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. THE TRAGEDY ON EASTER SUNDAY 2018. 

Mr. Calhoun was staying temporarily at his mother Wanda Berry’s home on 

April 1, 2018.

1 Living there too was Connie Saunders and her eighteen-month-old 

child, who was Mr. Calhoun’s niece.

2

 On that Easter Sunday, Ms. Saunders had 

invited a friend, Andrew Moore, over to the house as well.

3

After the three had been out earlier visiting family and friends, Mr. Moore and 

the baby were watching movies with Ms. Saunders in her bedroom at the Berry 

home.

4

 Mr. Calhoun came into the bedroom unexpectedly and told Ms. Saunders

that he wanted to keep her child safe by giving Ms. Saunders a knife for protection.5

He then left the bedroom to look for a knife.6 Fearful of Mr. Calhoun’s strange 

behavior, Mr. Moore closed and locked the bedroom door behind him.

7

Mr. Calhoun came back with a knife in hand.8 Realizing the door was locked, 

Mr. Calhoun started to break it open while Mr. Moore tried to barricade it.

9 Upon 

1 D.I. 49 (“Sept. 9, 2019 Trial Tr.”) at 28-30.

2

Id. at 26-28, 40.

3

Id. at 30-32.

4

Id. at 32.

5

Id. at 33.

6

Id. at 34.

7

Id.

8

Id. at 35.

9

Id.
-4-

gaining partial entry, Mr. Calhoun offered to give Ms. Saunders the knife. She told 

him to leave it in the hallway.

10 Mr. Calhoun responded that Ms. Saunders was 

“alright,” but that Mr. Moore had to die.11 He then broke the rest of the way in and 

stabbed Mr. Moore repeatedly.

12

 At some point, Mr. Calhoun also stabbed 

Ms. Saunders and the baby.

13 Ms. Saunders escaped with her daughter through a 

back door and flagged down a car that took them to a hospital.14

Ms. Berry had been outside of the house when the violence began but ran 

inside when she heard yelling from the bedroom.15 She saw what was happening

and implored Mr. Calhoun to stop.16 She, too, was stabbed in that exchange.17

Eventually, Mr. Moore was able to wrestle the knife away from Mr. Calhoun.18

The police arrived soon thereafter, finding Ms. Berry on the front porch, 

Mr. Moore near the doorway, and Mr. Calhoun in the living room.

19 According to 

10 Id. at 35-36.

11 Id.

12 Id. at 36-37.

13 Id.

14 Id. at 37-38.

15 Id. at 126.

16 Id. at 127. 

17 Id. at 128.

18 Id. at 129. Mr. Moore later died from his injuries.

19 Id. at 138.
-5-

police testimony, Mr. Calhoun appeared to be intoxicated and out of sorts.20 

Among other things, Mr. Calhoun told police that there were people “teleporting”

around the room.21

Mr. Calhoun was taken to a local hospital to receive treatment for an injury to

his hand.22 At the hospital, Mr. Calhoun said that everyone was dead because PCP 

was draining out of his body,23 that he killed his own family for PCP, and that he 

deserved to die.

24

B. THE TRIAL TESTIMONY KEY TO THE PRESENT CHALLENGE

During Mr. Calhoun’s six-day bench trial,25 the State presented numerous 

witnesses, including police officers, Ms. Saunders, Ms. Berry, and others. The

defense focused on Mr. Calhoun’s claims of mental illness, particularly his 

increasingly erratic behavior just before Easter. In short, the parties disagreed on 

what part Mr. Calhoun’s regular PCP use and purported mental illness played in his 

crimes. 

20 Id. at 71, 99, 140.

21 Id. at 106.

22 Id. at 99.

23 “PCP” is short for phencyclidine. Blood tests revealed that Mr. Calhoun did have some amount 

of that drug remaining in his system at the time of the crimes. D.I. 53 (“Sept. 10, 2019 Trial Tr.”)

at 153-77.

24 Sept. 9, 2019 Trial Tr. at 102. 

25 Mr. Calhoun’s trial took place in September 2019, after he had rejected a plea offer and waived 

his right to a jury trial. D.I. 28, 30-31. Mr. Calhoun stipulated that he was a person prohibited and 

pursued the affirmative defense to all charges of not guilty by reason of insanity. D.I. 38.
-6-

The Court need not further reconstitute the entirety of the detailed factual 

background and trial proceedings here; the parties and Court are well-acquainted 

with the record to this point.26 That said, a brief recounting of three witnesses key 

to the present claim is helpful. 

Ms. Berry explained that her son had been living with his girlfriend, Brittney

Hannah, at the time of the incident.27 According to Ms. Berry, Mr. Calhoun had 

been acting strangely in the days leading up to Easter, exhibiting paranoia and 

making statements about how he believed Brittany was trying to kill him.

28

 

Ms. Berry decided to let him stay at her home so that she could try to get him medical

help.29

Forensic and Clinical Psychologist Robert Thompson was called as the 

defense expert witness in support of Mr. Calhoun’s Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity

(“NGRI”) defense.

30 Dr. Thompson evaluated Mr. Calhoun following the crimes

26 See, e.g., Calhoun v. State, 2020 WL 5951370, at *1-3 (Del. Oct. 7, 2020) (direct appeal 

decision recounting the crimes and trial); First Amended Motion for Relief and Consolidated Brief 

In Support (“Am. Mot. for Postconviction Relief”), at 5-33 (D.I. 78) (same); State’s Rule 61 Resp., 

at 1-8, 13-38 (D.I. 84) (same). 

27 Sept. 9, 2019 Trial Tr. at 118-119. 

28 Id. at 120-121.

29 Id. 

30 Under Section 401(a) of Title 11: “In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense 

that, at the time of the conduct charged, as a result of mental illness or serious mental disorder, the 

accused lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the accused’s conduct. If 

the defendant prevails in establishing the affirmative defense provided in this subsection, the trier 

of fact shall return a verdict of ‘not guilty by reason of insanity.’” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 401(a) 

(2017).
-7-

and prepared an extensive report on his competency and mental state when the 

crimes occurred.31 Per Dr. Thompson’s report, Mr. Calhoun was diagnosed with 

Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder as a child and had taken medication for that

disorder, but he hadn’t received mental health care as an adult until his 

incarceration.32 Dr. Thompson diagnosed Mr. Calhoun with, inter alia, unspecified 

schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorders.

33

Dr. Thompson’s report detailed Mr. Calhoun’s version of events leading up 

to the stabbings.

34 The report recounted Mr. Calhoun’s psychotic incident with 

Brittany Hannah at a bus stop the day before, when Mr. Calhoun believed his life 

was in danger.35 Additionally, the report included Dr. Thompson’s interview with 

31 D.I. 44 (“Sept. 16, 2019 Trial Tr.”) at 4; Am. Mot. for Postconviction Relief Appendix (“PCR 

Appendix”) at A-001 (“Thompson Report”) (D.I. 80).

32 Thompson Report at 3.

33 Id. at 6.

34 Id. at 10-13.

35 Id. at 11-12:

On Saturday, March 31st, Mr. Calhoun started experiencing increased “paranoia.” 

He came to feel that Brittany was trying to have him “set up” and “murdered.” He 

recalled having that experience one or two times previously, although it had been 

relatively short-lived. He perceived Brittany to be “acting sluggish.” He felt that 

“something’s not right.” He indicated that the two of them got on a bus that day. 

He recalled seeing the driver of the bus another day, and the two of them had 

discussed truck driving. During the trip, the driver missed a stop; he had to go offroute due to construction. Mr. Calhoun “felt uneasy,” as if something bad was 

“going to happen.” To him, “nothing seemed right.” He saw a young man at a bus 

stop. He had the feeling that he was being “set up” in some way. He developed 

ideas of reference, believing that ladies where were standing on a corner were 

looking at him. He remembered feeling “real weird.” As his feelings increased, he 

began to feel panicky. He felt the urge to get off the bus immediately. Britany 

argued with him, tried to talk him into not getting off the bus. But he got off 
-8-

Ms. Berry, who also recalled the bus incident.36

During his trial testimony, Dr. Thompson opined that Mr. Calhoun lacked the 

substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the 

crimes.37 He agreed, too, that Mr. Calhoun suffered from a mental illness that 

sufficiently disturbed his thinking, feeling, or behavior, or that left him with 

insufficient willpower to choose whether to commit or refrain from committing the 

crimes.38

Dr. Thompson explained that Mr. Calhoun has a history of drug use and 

frequently used PCP and marijuana.39 Yet, the psychologist opined that Mr. Calhoun 

was not voluntarily under the influence of PCP or suffering PCP-induced psychosis 

when the crimes occurred.

40

 Dr. Thompson based this opinion on what he viewed 

as insufficient evidence of Mr. Calhoun’s most recent PCP use41 and also, 

anyway, leaving her on the bus alone at Rodney Square. He started to walk to his 

apartment. While he was walking, he saw police officers and “tried to get a ride to 

the hospital,” but they said no. They told him they were unable to provide a ride to 

the hospital. 

36 Id. at 13 (“[Ms. Berry] indicated that, on Saturday, something happened while Mr. Calhoun 

and his girlfriend, Brittany Hannah, were riding a bus. Apparently, Mr. Calhoun was ‘acting 

strange’ on the bus. This information was reported by Mr. Calhoun’s girlfriend to Ms. Berry.”)

37 Sept. 16, 2019 Trial Tr. at 63-65.

38 Id.

39 Id. at 30-32.

40 Id. at 33-35.

41 Id. at 65. At trial, the State contended that Mr. Calhoun used PCP sometime just prior to the 

incident. Sept. 9, 2019 Trial Tr. at 9-11. But Mr. Calhoun told Dr. Thompson that he last used 

PCP five days before the incident occurred. Thompson Report at 11.
-9-

importantly, because Mr. Calhoun continued to exude psychotic disorder behaviors 

while imprisoned—well after his PCP usage had stopped.42 Dr. Thompson’s 

conclusions regarding Mr. Calhoun’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his 

acts were unaffected by Mr. Calhoun’s immediate remorseful statements to police 

officers at the hospital. Because, said Dr. Thompson, a psychotic person could still 

express remorse.43

On cross-examination, the State asked Dr. Thompson about not having 

received certain police reports prior to authoring his pretrial report.44 Dr. Thompson 

confirmed that he was aware of Mr. Calhoun’s statements to police, but that he “still 

believe[d] there was sufficient information to form an opinion.”45 On redirect, 

Dr. Thompson confirmed that he knew about Mr. Calhoun’s various statements to 

others, that he had received copies of law enforcement’s recorded interviews with 

Ms. Saunders and Ms. Berry after he completed his report but prior to trial, and that 

he had reviewed witness statements before last meeting with Mr. Calhoun and 

testifying at trial.

46

The State called Clinical and Forensic Psychiatrist Stephen Mechanick as its 

42 Sept. 16, 2019 Trial Tr. at 96-98; D.I. 45 (“Sept. 17, 2019 Trial Tr.”) at 227.

43 See id. at 221.

44 Sept. 16, 2019 Trial Tr. at 81-83.

45 Id. at 81.

46 Id. at 137-139, 142-144, 150-154, 162-164, 179-180.
-10-

rebuttal expert witness. According to Dr. Mechanick, there was insufficient 

evidence that Mr. Calhoun suffered from a mental disorder that could cause 

psychotic symptoms.47 Instead, Dr. Mechanick opined, Mr. Calhoun’s behavior at 

the time of the crimes was explained by PCP intoxication.

48 Dr. Mechanick posited 

that Mr. Calhoun was under the influence of PCP when the incident occurred and 

explained that side effects of PCP use can include paranoia and aggression.49 

Dr. Mechanick also opined that Mr. Calhoun showed an appreciation for the 

wrongfulness of his actions based, in part, on his remorseful statements after the 

incident.50

C. THE VERDICT AND APPEAL

On September 20, 2019, the Court returned its verdict. Mr. Calhoun was 

found guilty but mentally ill (“GBMI”)51 of first-degree murder (Mr. Moore), 

attempted first-degree murder (the child), first-degree assault (Ms. Berry—as an 

47 Sept. 17, 2019 Trial Tr. at 16, 26-28.

48 Id. at 37-40.

49 Id.

50 Id at 54-55.

51 Under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 401(b) (2017),

Where the trier of fact determines that, at the time of the conduct charged, a 

defendant suffered from a mental illness or serious mental disorder which 

substantially disturbed such person’s thinking, feeling or behavior and/or that such 

mental illness or serious mental disorder left such person with insufficient will 

power to choose whether the person would do the act or refrain from doing it, 

although physically capable, the trier of fact shall return a verdict of “guilty, but 

mentally ill.”
-11-

included offense of attempted first-degree murder), first-degree assault 

(Ms. Saunders), and the related weapons counts.

52 Mr. Calhoun was later sentenced 

cumulatively to two life terms plus 20 years and a 3-year imprisonment term 

suspended for decreasing levels of supervision.53

Mr. Calhoun appealed his convictions and sentence.54 After his appellate 

counsel moved to withdraw her representation pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 

26(c),

55 Mr. Calhoun exercised his right to raise certain points for the Supreme 

Court’s consideration.56 The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court’s 

judgment.57

Mr. Calhoun, invoking Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, then filed pro se

motions for postconviction relief and appointment of counsel.

58

 The Court 

appointed counsel who is prosecuting Mr. Calhoun’s present amended 

postconviction motion.59

52 D.I. 40.

53 D.I. 43. He will serve that sentence under the conditions provided in 11 Del. C. § 408(b) and 

(c). Id.

54 Calhoun v. State, 2020 WL 5951370 (Del. Oct. 7, 2020).

55 Id. at *3 (citing Del. Supr. Ct. R. 26(c) (“If the trial attorney, after a conscientious examination 

of the record and the law, concludes that an appeal is wholly without merit, the attorney may file 

a motion to withdraw.”)).

56 Id. 

57 Id. at *7 (“This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that Calhoun’s 

appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable issue.”).

58 D.I. 57, 58.

59 D.I. 61; D.I. 78.
-12-

II. THE POSTCONVICTION MOTION

A. MR. CALHOUN’S MOTION CAN BE CONSIDERED ON ITS MERITS.

Delaware courts must consider Criminal Rule 61’s procedural requirements 

before addressing any substantive issues.60 The Rule 61 procedural bars are 

“timeliness, repetitiveness, procedural default, and former adjudication.”61

Less than a year after his judgment of conviction became final, Mr. Calhoun 

timely filed his Rule 61 motion.62 This is his first postconviction motion, so it is not 

repetitive. As Mr. Calhoun’s only claim for relief alleges ineffective assistance of 

counsel—which, except in the rarest of circumstances, cannot be raised on direct 

appeal—he is neither procedurally barred from raising it in this collateral 

proceeding, nor has it been formerly adjudicated.63

Accordingly, the Court will address the merits of Mr. Calhoun’s 

postconviction claim.

B. MR. CALHOUN’S POSTCONVICTION CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVENESS

Mr. Calhoun contends that the following “failure[s] by trial counsel” in 

executing his insanity defense constitute ineffective assistance violative of the Sixth 

60 Maxion v. State, 686 A.2d 148, 150 (Del. 1996); State v. Jones, 2002 WL 31028584, at *2 

(Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 10, 2002). 

61 State v. Stanford, 2017 WL 2484588, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. June 7, 2017) (citations omitted).

62 See Super Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) and (m)(2). 

63 Stanford, 2017 WL 2484588, at *3. 
-13-

Amendment:

(1) failure to elicit testimony supportive of Mr. Calhoun’s insanity 

defense from state’s witness Wanda Berry, and failure to ask 

Dr. Thompson to incorporate [Ms.] Berry’s statements to police 

into his opinion, report, and testimony regarding Mr. Calhoun’s

mental state;

64

(2) failure to call Brittney Hannah as a defense witness, and failure 

to ask Dr. Thompson to incorporate [Ms.] Hannah’s statement to 

police into his report and opinion regarding petitioner’s mental 

state;

65

(3) failure to present a toxicology expert to disprove Mr. Calhoun’s

statement that he used “Wet” on the day of the stabbing;

66

(4) failure to provide DOC records supportive of Mr. Calhoun’s

insanity defense to Dr. Thompson before trial;

67 and,

(5) failure to provide Dr. Thompson with any police reports related 

to Mr. Calhoun’s case.

68

In addition to pointing out what he deems these inexcusable individual defects in his 

trial defense, Mr. Calhoun says that the cumulative effect of two or more of the 

above-described alleged deficiencies should warrant relief.69

64 Am. Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 36-47.

65 Id. at 47-55.

66 Id. at 55-62.

67 Id. at 62-68.

68 Id. at 68-73.

69 Id. at 73-75. Mr. Calhoun also includes a cursory prayer for discovery and an evidentiary 

hearing. Id. at 76.
-14-

III. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

A movant who claims ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate that: 

(a) his defense counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness, and (b) there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different.70

There is a strong presumption that a criminal defense counsel’s representation 

was reasonable.

71 When assessing the reasonableness of counsel’s conduct, the 

Court considers “not what is possible or what is prudent or appropriate, but only 

what is constitutionally compelled.”72 The “[b]enchmark for judging any claim of 

ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper 

functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having 

produced a just result.”73

Too, one claiming ineffective assistance “must make specific allegations of 

how defense counsel’s conduct actually prejudiced the proceedings, rather than mere 

allegations of ineffectiveness.”74 

70 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); see also Alston v. State, 2015 WL 

5297709, at *2-3 (Del. Sept. 4, 2015).

71 Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160, 174 (Del. 2020) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689)). 

72 Id. (quoting Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987)).

73 Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 840 (Del. 2009) (internal quotations omitted).

74 Alston, 2015 WL 5297709, at *3 (citing Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996)); 

Monroe v. State, 2015 WL 1407856, at *5 (Del. Mar. 25, 2015) (citing Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 

1186, 1196 (Del. 1996)).
-15-

Last, a movant must demonstrate both deficient attorney performance and 

resulting prejudice to succeed on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.75 

Failure to do so on either will doom that claim and obviate any need for the Court to 

address the other.

IV. DISCUSSION

TRIAL COUNSEL’S PERFORMANCE WAS NOT OBJECTIVELY UNREASONABLE 

NOR IS THERE A REASONABLE PROBABILITY OF A DIFFERENT VERDICT 

A. TRIAL COUNSEL’S TACK ON CROSS-EXAMINATION OF 

MR. CALHOUN’S MOTHER WAS REASONABLE TRIAL STRATEGY.

Mr. Calhoun first contends that trial counsel should have cross-examined 

Ms. Berry in greater detail.76 Specifically, Mr. Calhoun says that trial counsel should 

have asked Ms. Berry more about Mr. Calhoun’s mental state leading up to the 

incident.

77 And Mr. Calhoun argues that Ms. Berry’s knowledge of an incident that 

occurred some years earlier should have been inquired into.

78 According to 

Mr. Calhoun, cross-examination about these prior events would have further 

supported his NGRI defense.79

75 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 825 (Del. 2013) (“Strickland is a twopronged test, and there is no need to examine whether an attorney performed deficiently if the 

deficiency did not prejudice the defendant.” (citation omitted)); State v. Hamby, 2005 WL 914462,

at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2005).

76 Am. Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 41-43.

77 Id. 

78 Id. at 37-38, 41-42.

79 Id. at 46-47.
-16-

Mr. Calhoun bears the burden ofshowing that his counsel’s conduct fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness, “i.e., that no reasonable lawyer would have 

conducted the defense as his lawyer did.”80 “A fair assessment of attorney 

performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to 

evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” 81

In her post-trial affidavit, trial counsel explained that Ms. Berry informed her

“[Mr. Calhoun] had been hospitalized previously for PCP drug-induced psychosis 

because of his heavy and extended use (15+ years) of PCP.”82 Ms. Berry also told 

trial counsel that Mr. Calhoun “had been physically violent . . . following a diagnosis 

of PCP drug-induced psychosis,” and that she “had been actively trying to get 

[Mr. Calhoun] into an in-patient drug rehabilitation program.”83

Mr. Calhoun has not shown that trial counsel’s examination of Ms. Berry was 

objectively unreasonable. A criminal defense attorney is given wide latitude in 

making strategic trial decisions; this extends to the conduct of cross-examination.84 

The questions to be asked and how a given cross-examination is conducted are 

80 Green, 238 A.3d at 174 (citing Burger, 483 U.S. at 791).

81 Taylor v. State, 32 A.3d 374, 381 (Del. 2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).

82 Affidavit in Response to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Motion (“Trial Counsel Affidavit”) 

¶ 2 (D.I. 83).

83 Id.

84 State v. Powell, 2016 WL 3023740, at *25 (Del. Super. Ct. May 24, 2016).
-17-

tactical decisions.85 And an attorney’s strategic or tactical choices made after 

thorough investigation of the relevant law and facts are virtually unchallengeable.86 

Still, the Court must “keep in mind . . . that although strategy satisfies the 

Strickland requirements, ‘[t]he relevant question is not whether counsel’s choices 

were strategic, but whether they were reasonable.’”87

At trial, the State attempted to pin Mr. Calhoun’s actions on voluntary 

intoxication of PCP. Were the State successful, Mr. Calhoun’s NGRI defense—

indeed any mental health-based defense—was in peril.88 Trial counsel was rightly 

concerned with just how much should be explored regarding Mr. Calhoun’s PCP use

and history. His mother knew of his prior episodes and diagnosis for PCP-induced 

psychosis. She knew of physical violence toward her that had been tied to his PCP 

use. And trial counsel knew of her own expert’s diagnoses that included, among 

other things, “History of PCP-Induced Psychotic Disorder; PCP Use Disorder, 

severe, in remission, in a controlled environment.”89 So trial counsel made a tactical 

85 Outten v. State, 720 A.2d 547, 557 (Del. 1998) (“[H]ow to cross-examine those [witnesses] 

who are called are tactical decisions.”).

86 Green, 238 A.3d at 174.

87 Id. (quoting Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 481 (2000)). 

88 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 401(c) (2017) (“It shall not be a defense under this section if the 

alleged insanity or mental illness was proximately caused by the voluntary ingestion, inhalation or 

injection of intoxicating liquor, any drug or other mentally debilitating substance, or any 

combination thereof.”).

89 Thompson Report at 6.
-18-

decision not to cross-examine Ms. Berry in further detail because Ms. Berry’s 

extensive knowledge of Mr. Calhoun’s PCP abuse may have led to more damaging 

testimony itself or opened her to redirect examination that counsel sought to avoid.

That was, no doubt, reasonable trial strategy. 

B. FAILURE TO CALL MR. CALHOUN’S GIRLFRIEND OR 

ENGAGE A TOXICOLOGIST WAS INFORMED AND REASONABLE.

Next, Mr. Calhoun argues that trial counsel’s failure to call two witnesses 

constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.90 First, Mr. Calhoun says that trial 

counsel should have presented Brittney Hannah as a defense witness.

91 According 

to Mr. Calhoun, Brittney Hannah would have testified about his “delusional state 

leading up to the stabbing” and how his behavior “was not consistent with 

intoxication but was something altogether different.”92 Mr. Calhoun says 

Ms. Hannah also could have testified about a 2016 incident that, in his view, 

demonstrated a prolonged mental illness unrelated to PCP.93

Again, “[t]he decision of a trial attorney to call or not to call potential 

witnesses is a part of trial strategy.”94 Per trial counsel’s affidavit, Ms. Hannah’s 

90 Am. Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 47-55, 55-62.

91 Id. at 47-55.

92 Id. at 50, 51.

93 Id. at 53.

94 Sierra v. State, 242 A.3d 563, 573-74 (Del. 2020) (quoting Baynum v. State, 1990 WL 

1098720, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. June 8, 1990)). 
-19-

testimony might have been less favorable to Mr. Calhoun than current counsel 

suggests.

95 Ms. Hannah was “aware that he had been a long-time and heavy PCP 

user who had been hospitalized previously with PCP-induced psychosis.”96 Trial 

counsel’s investigation revealed that Ms. Hannah would have testified about 

Mr. Calhoun’s “bad PCP trips in the past” and that Mr. Calhoun’s “behavior was 

becoming more concerning with each subsequent PCP use.”97 Such testimony 

would have been inapposite of trial counsel’s defense strategy, so the decision not 

to present it was reasonable.

98

Second, Mr. Calhoun insiststrial counsel’s failure to engage and call a defense 

toxicologist was a misstep.

99 Mr. Calhoun reports his now-employed toxicologist 

reviewed the State lab’s litigation packet and concluded that the lab results produced 

were, in his opinion, “inconsistent with Mr. Calhoun’s statement[s]” about his precrime drug usage.100 In Mr. Calhoun’s view, this would have proved that 

“[Mr. Calhoun’s] actions were related to mental illness and were not proximately 

95 Trial Counsel Affidavit ¶ 4.

96 Id. 

97 Id.

98 Outten, 720 A.2d at 557 (“Whether to call a witness . . . [is a] tactical decision.”); Sierra, 242 

A.3d at 574 (“The decision not to call a witness who defense counsel believes . . . will not help 

establish a viable defense is not objectively unreasonable.”). 

99 Am. Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 55-62.

100 Id. at 57.
-20-

caused by drug use.”101 Says Mr. Calhoun, trial counsel’s failure to further 

investigate whether his post-crime comments about his drug use were supported by 

additional toxicological evidence was unreasonable.102

Not so. Trial counsel had familiarized herself fully with the State’s toxicology 

evidence and meant to exploit it and adduce her defense-favorable information via 

cross-examination. In turn, she decided to “not call a[nother] toxicologist as a 

witness because such a witness would [also had to] have described how all the 

symptoms exhibited by Defendant at or near the time of his arrest were entirely 

consistent with someone who was using PCP or someone who had been using PCP 

over the course of 15+ years.”103 That is was a rational tactical decision. And trial 

counsel’s preparation and trial conduct can’t be deemed inadequate “merely because 

the defendant has now secured the testimony of a more favorable . . . expert.”104 

What’s more, given the GBMI verdict, it is clear that the Court had discounted 

the effect of any possible PCP use and its causal effect on Mr. Calhoun’s behavior 

at the time of the crimes.105 In other words, there is no reasonable probability that 

101 Id. 

102 Id. 

103 Trial Counsel Affidavit ¶ 5 (emphasis in original).

104 Taylor, 32 A.3d at 384 (quoting State v. Taylor, 2010 WL 3511272, at *20 (Del. Super. Ct. 

Aug. 6, 2010)). As well, given what the now-acquired expert has opined, the information added 

is only slightly more favorable—i.e., it is, at best, some further confirmation that Mr. Calhoun 

more likely had not used “Wet” just before the Easter night stabbings.

105 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 401(c) (2017) (“It shall not be a defense under this section if the 

alleged insanity or mental illness was proximately caused by the voluntary ingestion, inhalation or 
-21-

the Court’s verdict would have differed with the addition of this toxicology expert. 

C. TRIAL COUNSEL’S PREPARATION OF DR. THOMPSON WAS NOT DEFICIENT.

Finally, Mr. Calhoun calls out trial counsel’s preparation of Dr. Thompson as 

wanting. In support, Mr. Calhoun says that trial counsel failed to: (i) insist that 

Dr. Thompson incorporate Ms. Berry’s statements to police into his report and 

testimony;106 (ii) insist that Dr. Thompson incorporate Brittney Hannah’s statements 

into his report and testimony;107 (iii) provide Dr. Thompson with more extensive 

DOC records;

108 and, (iv) provide Dr. Thompson with certain police reports.109

Contrary to Mr. Calhoun’s contentions, trial counsel’s preparation of 

Dr. Thompson was not deficient or unreasonable. True, Dr. Thompson never

received the full set of police reports, or the statements by Ms. Berry and Brittney

Hannah until a month before trial. But Dr. Thompson was given multiple 

opportunities—both before and during trial—to incorporate Ms. Berry and 

injection of intoxicating liquor, any drug or other mentally debilitating substance, or any 

combination thereof.”).

106 Am. Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 43-45 (identifying omitted statements by Ms. Berry

about: (1) Mr. Calhoun’s belief that Brittney Hannah was a threat to him; (2) Mr. Calhoun’s fear 

that his family was at risk; (3) Mr. Calhoun’s purported hallucinations after the stabbing; and, 

(4) Mr. Calhoun saying to Ms. Berry just after the stabbing, “Mom, we okay now. We - we gonna 

be a’right. We gonna be in heaven. We gonna be a’right.”).

107 Id. at 52-54 (identifying omitted statements by Brittney Hannah about: (1) Mr. Calhoun’s 

paranoia about his own safety; (2) Mr. Calhoun’s fear of Brittney Hannah’s incarcerated exboyfriend; (3) the bus incident; and, (4) Mr. Calhoun’s physical state the morning before the 

stabbing occurred).

108 Id. at 62-68.

109 Id. at 68-73.
-22-

Ms. Hannah’s statements into his report, opinion, and, most importantly, his 

testimony. 

Dr. Thompson told the Court at trial that he did rely on summaries of witness 

statements when drafting his report. And many specific witness statements were

included in the report—while others were and are entirely duplicative of what 

Dr. Thompson already reported, testified to, or the Court received via other 

witnesses and documents. Dr. Thompson himself disclosed—then and now—that 

the diagnoses and conclusions in his expert report would not have changed even if 

the statements in question were provided.110 

Lastly, trial counsel explained that “Dr. Thompson was provided with DOC 

records that were current as of the time he authored his report.”111 Review of the 

records generated thereafter does little but buttress the conclusions already 

presented—that Mr. Calhoun’s psychotic episode was less likely the result of PCP 

use. So, Mr. Calhoun’s assertions about the inadequacy of Dr. Thompson’s 

preparation by counsel are unpersuasive.

D. MR. CALHOUN HAS NOT SHOWN THE REQUIRED PREJUDICE HERE.

“It is not the role of the Court to determine what the best lawyers would have 

done or even what most good lawyers would have done. Instead, the Court must 

110 Sept. 26, 2019 Trial Tr. at 141-144.

111 Trial Counsel Affidavit ¶ 6.
-23-

determine whether trial counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 

functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”112

By this measure, Mr. Calhoun has failed to satisfy Strickland’s counsel-deficiency 

showing. And while that itself is enough to doom Mr. Calhoun’s ineffective 

assistance claim, he also cannot satisfy Strickland’s prejudice requirement.

Even if any or all the above-listed actions by trial counsel did fall below the 

Strickland line of objectively reasonable conduct—they do not—Mr. Calhoun still 

would not meet the second requirement of his ineffective counsel claim. He must 

show a reasonable probability that trial counsel’s conduct caused a different negative 

outcome than would otherwise have been reached at trial.113 “[N]ot every error that 

conceivably could have influenced the outcome undermines the reliability of the 

result of the proceeding.”114 Instead, the postconviction movant “must make specific 

allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them.”115 Under Strickland and its 

progeny, “if the court finds that there is no possibility of prejudice even if a 

defendant’s allegations regarding counsel’s representation were true, the court may 

dispose of the claim on this basis alone.”116 

112

 State v. Peters, 283 A.3d 668, 686 (Del. Super. Ct. 2022) (cleaned up), aff’d, 299 A.3d 1 (Del. 

2023); Hoskins v. State, 102 A.3d 724, 730 (Del. 2014).

113 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990).

114 Sierra, 242 A.3d at 572 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).

115 Id. (quoting Outten, 720 A.2d at 552).

116 State v. Manley, 2014 WL 2621317, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. May 29, 2014).
-24-

Here, Mr. Calhoun cannot demonstrate the requisite prejudice from what he’s 

labeled as lacking performance by trial counsel. Simply put, here Mr. Calhoun has 

not shown “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s [supposed] 

unprofessional errors, the result of [his trial] would have been different.”117 

Recall, that Mr. Calhoun sought an NGRI verdict. That meant he had the 

burden of “establishing the affirmative defense” “that, at the time of the conduct 

charged, as a result of mental illness or serious mental disorder, [he] lacked 

substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of [his] conduct.”118 At bottom, 

his key contention—and that of Dr. Thompson’s declaration—is that the now-added 

information “would have substantially enhanced [Dr. Thompson’s] opinion.”119

This Court has previously observed that “[t]he law recognizes a distinction 

between ‘insanity’ and ‘mental illness.’”120 And the Delaware Supreme Court has 

explained the role of mental illness in assessing criminal culpability:

Insanity is a legal concept that comprises a narrow class of 

symptoms; mental illness is a medical concept that embraces a 

wide range of diseases. Thus, while both mild neuroses and

debilitating psychoses may be included under the heading of 

mental illness, legal insanity exists only if the defendant’s illness 

undermines his culpability to such an extent that punishment 

becomes inappropriate. In a psychiatrist’s eyes, a person may be 

117 Starling v. State, 130 A.3d 316, 325 (Del. 2015) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

118 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 401(c) (2017).

119 PCR Appendix at A-028.

120 State v. Wallace, 2007 WL 545563, at 11 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 2007).
-25-

ill in varying degrees, but in the law’s eyes, he is either sane or 

insane, either blameworthy or not blameworthy.121

As this Court has instructed in such cases:

The crux of the insanity test is whether a mental illness or defect 

has “deprive[d] the defendant of the ability to know that he is 

committing a wrongful act.” The use of terms like “capacity” 

and “ability” suggest that the question is not whether the 

defendant appreciated at the moment he committed a criminal act 

that the act was wrong, but rather whether he had the “capacity” 

or “ability” to do so if he had reflected on his conduct 

immediately prior to acting. In other words, the fact that 

someone acts intentionally but without thinking of the 

wrongfulness of his conduct, or acts out of uncontrolled impulse 

without a second thought, does not necessarily mean that the 

person “lacked the substantial capacity to appreciate the 

wrongfulness of [his] conduct.”122 

And no doubt, whether one lacked the substantial capacity to appreciate the 

wrongfulness of his conduct is a finding of fact the defendant must attain.

123

 It is 

against this legal backdrop that the Court evaluated Mr. Calhoun’s conduct at the 

time he killed Andrew Moore and stabbed and sliced three others. 

The Court found Mr. Calhoun was guilty but mentally ill.

124 So, 

121 Sanders v. State, 585 A.2d 117, 123 (Del. 1990).

122 Wallace, 2007 WL 545563, at *11 (internal citations omitted).

123 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 401(a) (2017) (“If the defendant prevails in establishing the 

affirmative defense provided in this subsection, the trier of fact shall return a verdict of ‘not guilty 

by reason of insanity.’”). 

124 That is the Court determined “at the time of the conduct charged, [Mr. Calhoun] suffered from 

a mental illness or serious mental disorder which substantially disturbed [his] thinking, feeling or 

behavior and/or that such mental illness or serious mental disorder left [him] with insufficient will 

power to choose whether [he] would do the act or refrain from doing it.” Id. at § 401(b). See 

Aizupitis v. State, 699 A.2d 1092, 1095-98 (Del. 1997) (explaining GBMI under Delaware law).
-26-

Mr. Calhoun’s only available prejudice argument is that trial counsel’s alleged 

deficiencies caused Mr. Calhoun to be found guilty but mentally ill instead of not 

guilty by reason of insanity. 

As his main support, Mr. Calhoun relies on Dr. Thompson’s recent 

declaration. There, Dr. Thompson says that if he had been provided with and 

included greater detail of certain witness statements or other evidence, it “would 

have supported and strengthened [his] conclusion that Mr. Calhoun was not guilty 

by reason of insanity.”125 But that’s it. Even if Dr. Thompson had been provided 

with all witness statements, police reports, and records, his final diagnoses and 

conclusion would remain the same. And Mr. Calhoun’s suggestion that had 

Dr. Thompson given his now-incrementally-enhanced opinion at trial he might have 

been found NGRI comes nowhere close to the reasonable probability Strickland 

requires.126 

E. THE CUMULATIVE PREJUDICE CLAIM FAILS.

Lastly, Mr. Calhoun contends that the effect of trial counsel’s purported errors 

so undermined the verdict that his constitutional right to due process was denied.127 

125 PCR Appendix at A-021-22.

126 Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011) (“The likelihood of a different result must be 

substantial, not just conceivable.” (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693)); Starling, 130 A.3d at 325

(same); Baynum v. State, 211 A.3d 1075, 1084 (Del. 2019) (Strickland-level prejudice requires 

that there is “a substantial likelihood—i.e., a meaningful chance—that a different outcome would 

have occurred but for counsel’s deficient performance.”). 

127 Am. Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 73-75.
-27-

But, this cumulative prejudice argument gains no more traction than the others did 

severally. More directly, because Mr. Calhoun has failed on each count to prove 

that his trial counsel was Strickland-level deficient128 and that, but for trial counsel’s 

performance, the outcome of his trial would have been different, he fails in the 

aggregate.

Our Supreme Court addressed a similar cumulative effect argument in 

Hoskins v. State.

129

 There, the high court engaged a plain error standard of review 

and looked for “material defects which are apparent on the face of the record; which 

are basic, serious and fundamental in their character, and which clearly deprive an 

accused of a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest injustice.”130 Under 

this analysis, the Court noted that “none of [the postconviction movant’s] individual 

claims of ineffective assistance have merit because of a failure to show prejudice,” 

and, consequently, found the movant’s “claim of cumulative error [to be] without 

merit.”131 As just explained, the most favorable gloss on Mr. Calhoun’s several 

complaints is that Dr. Thompson’s diagnoses and opinion would have been the same 

128 The Court knows that “it is important to remain cognizant that [trial counsel’s] 

performance, viewed as a whole, is what matters” under Strickland.” Green, 238 A.3d at 174

(quoting Atkins v. Zenk, 667 F.3d 939, 945 (7th Cir. 2012) (emphasis in the original)). And so, the 

Court has looked at the failures alleged both individually and as whole. In this particular

circumstance, they do by and large collapse into one complaint of error—presentation of almost 

immeasurably diminished trial testimony from the defendant’s mental health expert. 

129 102 A.3d 724 (Del. 2014).

130 Id. (citation omitted).

131 Id.
-28-

but the support for such, in the psychologist’s view, would have been stronger. Yet,

even with this added information and Dr. Thompson’s declaration as to its effect on 

his opinion, Mr. Calhoun has still failed to establish “a substantial likelihood—i.e., 

a meaningful chance”132 that this Court would have delivered an NGRI rather than a 

GBMI verdict.133

F. NO NEED FOR FURTHER DISCOVERY OR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING

The Court can’t discern that there is anything “discoverable under [the 

applicable] good cause standard because [Mr. Calhoun] has shown no compelling 

reason for [any further] discovery.”134 Indeed, Mr. Calhoun hasn’t identified the 

subject or scope of any “discovery” needed at this point. So, his perfunctory request 

for such is denied.

Finally, Mr. Calhoun requests an evidentiary hearing.135 Under Rule 61, this 

132 Baynum, 211 A.3d at 1084; Starling, 130 A.3d at 325 (“The likelihood of a different result 

must be substantial not just conceivable.”).

133 See Neal v. State, 80 A.3d 935, 942 (Del. 2013) (“Strickland requires more than a showing 

merely that the [attorney’s] conduct could have, or might have, or it is possible that it would have 

led to a different result.”) (cleaned up); Ploof, 75 A.3d at 826-28 (additional evidence or testimony 

proffered on postconviction that the Court finds “may have helped [movant’s] defense 

marginally,” “does not measurably alter th[e factfinder’s] analysis” of a defense claim at trial, that 

“would have made only a negligible difference,” or “would not have measurably altered the 

balance of the evidence” at trial, is not enough to establish prejudice under Strickland).

134 Dawson, 673 A.2d at 1197-98.

135 See DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(h)(1) (providing the Court, after reviewing the record 

developed in the postconviction proceedings, “shall determine whether an evidentiary hearing is 

desirable.”).
-29-

“Court has discretion to determine whether to hold an evidentiary hearing.”136 And 

where it is apparent on the face of a postconviction motion, the responses thereto, 

the record of prior proceedings, and any added materials, that a petitioner is not 

entitled to relief, there is no need for an evidentiary hearing.137 After consideration 

of the complete evidentiary record and the single legal issue raised, Mr. Calhoun’s 

request for an evidentiary hearing is denied.

V. CONCLUSION

Mr. Calhoun has proved neither the deficient performance by counsel nor the 

prejudice required for postconviction relief to be granted. His trial counsel made 

reasonable strategic decisions about whom to call, the required preparation, and how 

to cross-examine. And when considering the totality of the evidence presented at 

trial and in this proceeding, Mr. Calhoun has not proven there is a substantial 

likelihood that the Court would have returned an NGRI verdict but for the relatively 

minute differences he now suggests should have been made in the presentation of 

his insanity defense. Accordingly, Mr. Calhoun’s Rule 61 postconviction relief 

motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

Paul R. Wallace, Judge

136 Johnson v. State, 2015 WL 8528889, at *4 (Del. Dec. 10, 2015).

137 Id.; Hawkins v. State, 2003 WL 22957025, at *1 (Del. Dec. 10, 2003).