J-S69034-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

PAUL SEAN JONES

Appellant No. 564 EDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order entered January 29, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County

Criminal Division at No: CP-39-CR-0000885-2010

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED DECEMBER 08, 2014

Paul Sean Jones, who is serving 20 to 40 years in prison for murder, 

appeals from an order dismissing his petition under the Post Conviction 

Relief Act (PCRA).1 Jones’s court-appointed attorney has filed a 

Turner/Finley2 no-merit letter and petitioned to withdraw as counsel. We 

find the PCRA petition to be meritless; therefore, we affirm and grant the 

petition to withdraw.

On June 11, 1998, Jones and Andy Lovell Reese, then members of the 

Nine Trey Gangster Bloods, murdered Maurice Williams in a revenge killing. 

____________________________________________

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. 

2 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth 

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
J-S69034-14

- 2 -

Jones pistol-whipped and held another person at bay while Reese fired the 

fatal gunshot. In 2009, an investigating grand jury issued a presentment 

recommending charges against Reese and Jones, and each was charged with 

criminal homicide and conspiracy. While a petit jury was waiting to be 

sworn to start the trial, Jones and Reese pled guilty to third-degree murder.3 

Reese’s plea agreement capped his minimum sentence at 10 years. Even 

though Jones was not the shooter, his minimum sentence was capped at 20 

years because of his extensive criminal history. Jones’s agreement also 

made his sentence concurrent to a 15-year federal sentence Jones was then 

serving.4 Jones waived his right to a presentence investigation report (PSI). 

According to the terms of the plea agreements, the court immediately 

sentenced Reese to 10 to 20 years in prison, and Jones to 20 to 40 years in 

prison. The court later denied Jones’s post-sentence motion.

Jones filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition, and the PCRA court 

appointed counsel. PCRA counsel filed a Turner/Finley no-merit letter, and 

the PCRA court granted counsel’s petition to withdraw as counsel and 

notified Jones of its intention to dismiss his PCRA petition without a hearing. 

____________________________________________

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c).

4 See United States v. Jones, 526 F. App’x 186 (3d Cir. 2013). Jones pled 

guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and 

was sentenced to a mandatory 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal 

Act, id § 924(e). Jones, 526 F. App’x at 187. Jones had the same plea 

counsel in both of his cases. 
J-S69034-14

- 3 -

After reviewing Jones’s pro se response, the PCRA court scheduled a hearing 

and ordered PCRA counsel to be present at the hearing. PCRA counsel filed 

an amended PCRA petition, and the PCRA court vacated its order granting 

PCRA counsel’s petition to withdraw. The amended PCRA petition raises two 

claims of ineffective assistance of plea counsel: (1) inducing Jones to plead 

guilty by promising that he would receive a minimum sentence of no more 

than ten years (like Reese); and (2) waiving Jones’s right to a PSI. After a 

second hearing at which Jones’s plea counsel testified, the PCRA court 

denied relief. This appeal followed.

Before we consider the merits, we must address whether counsel has 

complied with the requirements to withdraw from representation under 

Turner/Finley. See Commonwealth v. Doty, 48 A.3d 451, 454 (Pa. 

Super. 2012). To withdraw under Turner/Finley in this Court, PCRA 

counsel must (1) petition this Court for leave to withdraw after certifying 

that a zealous review of the record indicates the appeal is meritless; (2) file 

a no-merit letter listing the issues the PCRA petitioner raised and why they 

are meritless; and (3) give the petitioner a copy of the no-merit letter and 

advise the petitioner of the right to obtain new counsel or proceed pro se. 

Doty, 48 A.3d at 454 (quoting Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 

721 (Pa. Super. 2007)).

We find that counsel has complied with Turner/Finley. Counsel has 

petitioned for leave to withdraw, filed a no-merit letter that explains why 
J-S69034-14

- 4 -

Jones’s claims are meritless, and informed Jones of his right to hire a new 

lawyer or file a pro se response.5

We now conduct an independent review of the record to determine 

whether Jones’s claims are indeed meritless. Doty, 48 A.3d at 454. On an 

appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, we apply a mixed standard of review. 

See Commonwealth v. Medina, 92 A.3d 1210, 1214 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(en banc). “The PCRA court’s credibility determinations, when supported by 

the record, are binding on this Court.” Id. (quotation omitted). We, 

however, review the PCRA court’s legal conclusions de novo. Id. Finally, 

the scope of review encompasses “the findings of the PCRA court and the 

evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party 

at the PCRA court level.” Id.

For both of his claims, Jones contends plea counsel misadvised him 

about the terms of his plea bargain. Allegations that counsel misadvised a 

defendant in the plea process fall under the ineffective assistance of counsel 

provision of the PCRA, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). See Commonwealth 

v. Lynch, 820 A.2d 728, 730 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2003). The PCRA also allows 

relief for “[a] plea of guilty unlawfully induced where the circumstances 

make it likely that the inducement caused the petitioner to plead guilty and 

the petitioner is innocent.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(iii). However, the 

____________________________________________

5

Jones has not filed a response.
J-S69034-14

- 5 -

plain language of that section requires the PCRA petitioner to allege 

innocence. Lynch, 820 A.2d at 732; see also Commonwealth v. Barndt, 

74 A.3d 185, 191 n.9 (Pa. Super. 2013). Here, Appellant does not contest 

his guilt, but rather requests modification of his sentence to 10 – 20 years. 

See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 1/24/14, at 5-7. Therefore, we will review 

Appellant’s claim as one of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Thus, for Jones to prevail, he must plead and prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence the three-part test for ineffective assistance 

of counsel. See Commonwealth v. Baumhammers, 92 A.3d 708, 719 

(Pa. 2014) (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii)). Jones must show that (1) 

the claims have arguable merit; (2) there was no reasonable basis for 

counsel’s actions or inaction; and (3) counsel’s deficient performance 

prejudiced him. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975-

76 (Pa. 1987)). “Because all three ‘Pierce factors’ must be demonstrated, 

the claim fails if any one of them is not proved.” Id.

Jones first claims that plea counsel induced him to plead guilty with 

the promise that his minimum sentence would be no more than ten years. 

We agree with PCRA counsel’s assessment that this claim is meritless. The 

PCRA court found that Jones admitted plea counsel never promised him 

that his minimum sentence would be no more than ten years:

With respect to his minimum sentence, [Appellant] admitted on 

the record during the PCRA hearing that [plea counsel] never 

promised him he would receive a ten to twenty year sentence. 

[Plea counsel] testified that he told [Appellant] he would argue 

for that sentence, but never gave [Appellant] any guarantees he 
J-S69034-14

- 6 -

would receive it. Furthermore, the terms of [Appellant’s] plea 

agreement were explained very clearly on the record at the time 

he entered his guilty plea. [Appellant] pled guilty to [t]hird[-

d]egree [m]urder with an agreement on concurrency, and he 

received a sentence of twenty to forty years concurrent with his 

federal sentence in compliance with his plea agreement.

PCRA Court Opinion, 1/29/14, at 7. The record supports the PCRA court’s 

findings, meaning they bind this Court. No factual basis supports Jones’s 

first claim, meaning that it lacks arguable merit and therefore fails. 

Appellant’s claim regarding plea counsel’s decision to forgo a PSI is 

also meritless. As the PCRA court found:

With respect to the P.S.I., [plea counsel] testified credibly that 

he reviewed the general contents of a P.S.I. with [Appellant]. 

He further testified that he felt there was no benefit to obtaining 

a P.S.I., as there was a possibility that [Appellant] had an 

additional criminal record of which neither [plea counsel] nor the 

Commonwealth was aware. [Plea counsel] was also uncertain as 

to whether [Appellant] was on probation at the time of the 

offense, so the preparation of a P.S.I. could in fact be damaging 

for sentencing purposes. Based on these factors, [plea counsel] 

advised [Appellant] to waive the preparation of a P.S.I. [Plea 

counsel] further confirmed that immediate sentencing was a 

component of [Appellant’s] plea agreement, which is also 

reflected in the [n]otes of [t]estimony from that day

Id. at 8 (citing N.T. Guilty Plea Hearing, 12/6/11, at 22). Plea counsel had a 

reasonable basis—indeed, reasonable bases—for forgoing a PSI. If there is a 

reasonable basis for counsel’s actions, an ineffectiveness claim fails.

In sum, Jones’s PCRA petition is meritless, and Jones is not entitled to 

post-conviction relief. PCRA counsel has met the requirements under 

Turner/Finley to withdraw as PCRA counsel. Therefore, we affirm the 

denial of relief and grant the petition to withdraw.
J-S69034-14

- 7 -

Order affirmed. Petition to withdraw as counsel granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/8/2014