Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PL-1764 | February 25, 2020 Page 1 of 3

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Terry K. Hiestand

Hiestand Law Office, LLC

Chesterson, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Property MD’s Home 

Improvement, LLC, 

Appellant-Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 

v. 

Anthony Grayson, 

Appellee-Defendant/Counterclaimant, 

and

Horizon Bank, N.A., 

Appellee-Defendant 

February 25, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-PL-1764 

Appeal from the Porter Superior 

Court 

The Honorable Jeffrey W. Clymer, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

64D02-1509-PL-7829 

Crone, Judge. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PL-1764 | February 25, 2020 Page 2 of 3

[1] Property MD’s Home Improvement, LLC (“Property MD”), contracted with 

Anthony Grayson to perform some home repairs. Disputes arose, and Property 

MD filed a complaint against Grayson and his lender, Horizon Bank, N.A.

(“Horizon”), to foreclose on a mechanic’s lien and for unjust enrichment. 

Grayson filed a counterclaim alleging that Property MD had failed to comply 

with the Indiana Home Improvement Act (“the Act”). Pursuant to a joint 

stipulation, Horizon deposited $28,936 with the trial court clerk. After a bench 

trial, the court issued an eight-page order ruling that Grayson owed Property 

MD $13,297.62, to be paid from Horizon’s deposit, under an unjust enrichment 

theory; that Property MD had violated the Act; that Property MD’s lien was 

invalid; and that neither side was entitled to attorney’s fees. Property MD filed 

a motion to correct error, which was denied.

[2] Property MD now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in calculating 

damages and in failing to award it “the interest and attorney fees to which it 

was clearly entitled as the holder of a valid Mechanic’s Lien.” Appellant’s Br. 

at 10. Because Grayson did not submit an appellee’s brief, we may reverse the 

trial court’s judgment if Property MD’s brief presents a case of prima facie 

error. Blankenship v. Duke, 132 N.E.3d 410, 412-13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). It 

does not.1

 Property MD cites no legal authority in its disjointed argument

1 Each of the paragraphs in Property MD’s statement of the case and inappropriately argumentative 

statement of facts is numbered, and most of them contain only one sentence, all of which makes for tedious 

reading. They are substantially similar to the proposed findings that Property MD submitted to the trial 

court, which serve a different purpose than an appellate brief.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PL-1764 | February 25, 2020 Page 3 of 3

regarding damages, which improperly second-guesses the trial court’s weighing 

of evidence and assessment of witness credibility. See Keith v. State, 127 N.E.3d 

1221, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“[I]t is an appellant’s burden to develop his 

argument on the issues he presents and to support his argument with cogent 

reasoning, legal authority, and citations to the record on appeal.”) (citing Ind. 

Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a)); Estate of Henry v. Woods, 77 N.E.3d 1200, 1204 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (“We do not reweigh the evidence nor do we assess 

witness credibility.”). And Property MD’s argument regarding interest and 

attorney’s fees wholly fails to establish that its lien was valid.2

 Accordingly, we 

affirm.

[3] Affirmed.

May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

2 Property MD quotes from a statute and cites legal principles from several opinions but fails to actually

apply any relevant law to the facts of this case.