[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Ohio 

High School Athletic Assn. v. Ruehlman, Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-2845.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2019-OHIO-2845

OHIO HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION v. RUEHLMAN, JUDGE. 

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as Ohio High School Athletic Assn. v. Ruehlman, Slip Opinion 

No. 2019-Ohio-2845.] 

Prohibition—Subject-matter jurisdiction—Common pleas court is a court of 

general jurisdiction with subject-matter jurisdiction that extends to all 

matters at law and equity that are not denied to it—No statute either 

withdraws jurisdiction from a common pleas court to hear claims 

challenging the rules adopted by a voluntary organization or vests exclusive 

jurisdiction over such claims in another court—Respondent properly 

exercised jurisdiction of the common pleas court—Writ denied. 

(No. 2018-1200—Submitted January 8, 2019—Decided July 16, 2019.) 

IN PROHIBITION. 

________________ 

 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2

DEWINE, J.

{¶ 1} This is an action for a writ of prohibition. The Ohio High School 

Athletic Association (“OHSAA”) seeks to prohibit Judge Robert Ruehlman from 

taking further action in a lawsuit that was filed against it in the Hamilton County 

Court of Common Pleas. Because Judge Ruehlman does not patently and 

unambiguously lack jurisdiction, we deny the writ. 

The OHSAA adopts new rules governing postseason competitions 

{¶ 2} The OHSAA regulates high-school sports competitions in Ohio. It is 

a voluntary, unincorporated, private organization whose members include more 

than 1,600 public and private junior and senior high schools. Its functions include 

the regulation of postseason competitions. 

{¶ 3} Traditionally, the OHSAA assigned schools to different divisions for 

postseason-competition purposes based on the number of boys or girls enrolled at 

each school. But some OHSAA members complained that private schools were 

winning state championships at a disproportionate rate. An OHSAA committee 

concluded that one reason for the success of the private schools was their ability to 

draw students from a wider geographic area than public schools, whose students 

generally come from their districts.

{¶ 4} In response to this concern, the OHSAA adopted “competitivebalance rules.” These new rules use a formula to create an “adjusted enrollment 

count” to determine the division in which a school will be placed for postseason 

play for 8 of the 26 sports regulated by the association. Under the formula, a private 

high school is allowed a limited number of “feeder schools.” The feeder schools 

are required to be from the same “system of education” (e.g., the Catholic 

Conference of Ohio or the Lutheran Schools of Ohio) and located within a single 

designated public-school-district attendance zone. If the private school enrolls a 

student-athlete who did not attend seventh and eighth grade in one of its designated 

feeder schools, then the school is penalized by having its adjusted enrollment count 
January Term, 2019 

3

increased. Thus, for example, if a Catholic high school enrolls a basketball player 

who, for seventh and eighth grades, attended a Catholic school that is not one of 

that high school’s designated feeder schools, one extra student is added to the 

school’s enrollment count for purposes of determining the division in which the 

school’s basketball team will compete. For public schools, the formula is based on 

whether the student and at least one of his parents reside within the school district. 

Judge Ruehlman grants a temporary restraining order

{¶ 5} Roger Bacon High School and the athletic conference of which it is a 

member, the Greater Catholic League Coed (“GCL Coed”), filed a lawsuit to enjoin 

application of the competitive-balance rules against GCL Coed schools. The 

plaintiffs’ worry was that the Catholic feeder schools from which they traditionally 

received students did not all fall within a single designated public school attendance 

zone, and hence, under the new rules they would be penalized for enrolling studentathletes from some of those schools. Judge Ruehlman held that the OHSAA had 

acted arbitrarily and capriciously by enforcing the rules against the GCL Coed 

“without ever considering whether a school’s team was competitive in the first 

place and then penalizing the GCL Coeds [sic] schools for enrolling students from 

Catholic Feeder Schools that have historically sent students to the GCL Coed 

schools.” And he issued a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) enjoining the 

application of the adjusted enrollment formula in cases where the high school 

enrolled a student who attended seventh and eighth grades at one of its traditional 

“Catholic Feeder Schools.” The OHSAA responded by filing an original action in 

this court seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Ruehlman from taking 

further action in the case and to order him to vacate the TRO. After the OHSAA 

filed its lawsuit, we stayed Judge Ruehlman’s TRO pending the resolution of this 

case. We now must decide whether to grant the writ. 

 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

4

We deny the OHSAA’s request for a writ of prohibition 

{¶ 6} We reserve the use of extraordinary writs for rare cases. A “writ of 

prohibition is an extraordinary remedy that is granted in limited circumstances with 

great caution and restraint.” State ex rel. Corn v. Russo, 90 Ohio St.3d 551, 554, 

740 N.E.2d 265 (2001). “In the absence of a patent and unambiguous lack of 

jurisdiction, a court having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its 

own jurisdiction, and a party contesting that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy 

by appeal.” State ex rel. Plant v. Cosgrove, 119 Ohio St.3d 264, 2008-Ohio-3838, 

893 N.E.2d 485, ¶ 5. The OHSAA does not contend that it lacks an adequate 

remedy at law but, rather, seeks to rely on the narrow exception that allows us to 

issue a writ of prohibition “where there is a patent and unambiguous lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction,” State ex rel. Ohio Edison Co. v. Parrott, 73 Ohio St.3d 705, 

707, 654 N.E.2d 106 (1995).

{¶ 7} Here, Judge Ruehlman plainly had subject-matter jurisdiction over the 

lawsuit filed against the OHSAA. Under our Constitution, a court of common pleas 

has “original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters and such powers of review of 

proceedings of administrative officers and agencies as may be provided by law.” 

Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 4(B). A common pleas court is a “court of 

general jurisdiction, with subject-matter jurisdiction that extends to ‘all matters at 

law and in equity that are not denied to it.’ ” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio 

St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 20, quoting Saxton v. Seiberling, 48 

Ohio St. 554, 558-559, 29 N.E. 179 (1891). And we have interpreted Article IV’s 

mandate that the courts of common pleas have jurisdiction “as may be provided by 

law” to mean that “[t]he general subject matter jurisdiction of Ohio courts of 

common pleas is defined entirely by statute” (emphasis added), State v. Wilson, 73 

Ohio St.3d 40, 42, 652 N.E.2d 196 (1995). 

{¶ 8} With limited exceptions, R.C. 2305.01 grants the courts of common 

pleas subject-matter jurisdiction over “all civil cases in which the sum or matter in 
January Term, 2019 

5

dispute exceeds the exclusive original jurisdiction of county courts.” This 

differentiates the courts of common pleas from other courts that (again, by statute) 

have more limited grants of jurisdiction. See, e.g., State ex rel. Goldberg v. 

Mahoning Cty. Probate Court, 93 Ohio St.3d 160, 162, 753 N.E.2d 192 (2001) 

(“Probate courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and probate proceedings are 

consequently restricted to actions permitted by statute and the Ohio Constitution”). 

{¶ 9} Because of R.C. 2305.01’s general grant of jurisdiction, a court of 

common pleas has jurisdiction over any case in which the matter in controversy 

exceeds the jurisdictional limit unless some statute takes that jurisdiction away. See 

State ex rel. Ohio Co. v. Maschari, 51 Ohio St.3d 18, 20, 553 N.E.2d 1356 (1990). 

Thus, when we have found that a court of common pleas patently and 

unambiguously lacks jurisdiction, it is almost always because a statute explicitly 

removed that jurisdiction.1

 See State ex rel. Albright v. Delaware Cty. Court of 

Common Pleas, 60 Ohio St.3d 40, 42, 572 N.E.2d 1387 (1991) (noting that under 

R.C. 709, exclusive jurisdiction to consider annexation matters rests with the court 

of common pleas in the county in which the hearing on the annexation petition takes 

place); State ex rel. Taft-O’Connor ’98 v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 

83 Ohio St.3d 487, 488-489, 700 N.E.2d 1232 (1998) (noting that under R.C. 

3517.151(A), the “Ohio Elections Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over the 

claims of fraudulent and false statements”); State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Reed, 99 Ohio 

St.3d 106, 2003-Ohio-2506, 789 N.E.2d 203, ¶ 16, 21 (noting that under R.C. 

Chapter 4117, the State Employment Relations Board has exclusive jurisdiction 

over charges of unfair labor practices); State ex rel. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Agriculture 

 

1

 The one notable exception is a couple of cases in which the court said that a patent and 

unambiguous lack of personal jurisdiction could justify granting a writ of prohibition. See State ex 

rel. Connor v. McGough, 46 Ohio St.3d 188, 192, 546 N.E.2d 407 (1989); Fraiberg v. Cuyahoga 

Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 76 Ohio St.3d 374, 378, 667 N.E.2d 1189 (1996) (noting that it is 

possible, yet still rare, for a patent and unambiguous lack of personal jurisdiction to warrant a writ 

of prohibition). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6

v. Forchione, 148 Ohio St.3d 105, 2016-Ohio-3049, 69 N.E.3d 636, ¶ 29 (holding 

that R.C. 935.20(A) gives the Ohio Department of Agriculture the exclusive 

authority to order the quarantine or transfer of dangerous wild animals). 

{¶ 10} The OHSAA asks us to depart from these principles. It points to no 

statute denying subject-matter jurisdiction to the court of common pleas but, 

instead, asks us to grant a writ of prohibition based on a few occurrences of the 

word “jurisdiction” in two of our previous decisions. See State ex rel. Ohio High 

School Athletic Assn. v. Judges of Stark Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 173 Ohio St. 

239, 250, 181 N.E.2d 261 (1962) (“Stark Cty. Judges”) (“Under these 

circumstances, a court has no jurisdiction to enjoin the association or its members 

from enforcing this lawfully imposed penalty”); Lough v. Varsity Bowl, Inc., 16 

Ohio St.2d 153, 154, 243 N.E.2d 61 (1968) (noting that the dispute “concerns the 

jurisdictional requirements for judicial review of the decision of a voluntary 

association”). 

{¶ 11} In relying on these cases, the OHSAA fails to account for the varying 

manners in which the word “jurisdiction” has been used. See Kuchta, 141 Ohio 

St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d 1040, at ¶ 18; Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio 

St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 33. “ ‘Jurisdiction,’ it has been 

observed, ‘is a word of many, too many, meanings.’ ” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 

Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 90, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998), 

quoting United States v. Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 (D.C.Cir.1996), fn. 2. The 

“unspecified use of this polysemic word” often “lead[s] to confusion and has 

repeatedly required clarification as to which type of ‘jurisdiction’ is applicable in 

various legal analyses.” Kuchta at ¶ 18. Thus, we have made clear, “There is a 

distinction between a court that lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a case and a 

court that improperly exercises that subject-matter jurisdiction once conferred upon 

it.” Pratts at ¶ 10. 
January Term, 2019 

7

{¶ 12} The cases relied upon by the OHSAA announced not a rule of 

subject-matter jurisdiction but, rather, a substantive legal rule of noninterference 

with the decisions of voluntary organizations absent special circumstances or a 

permissive statute. They are best understood as using the term “jurisdiction” in the 

loose sense of a court’s legal authority to grant the relief sought by the plaintiff 

based upon the conduct alleged. 

{¶ 13} The dissenting opinion disagrees with this characterization and reads 

Stark Cty. Judges, 173 Ohio St. 239, 181 N.E.2d 261, as making a claim about a 

court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Dissenting opinion at ¶ 36. We don’t read that 

case that way. Indeed, such a reading would require us to ignore the constitutional 

and statutory grant of jurisdiction to the common pleas courts as well as vast swaths 

of case law. But insofar as the court in Stark Cty. Judges might be understood to 

have been making such a claim, it was doing so in error. As the United States 

Supreme Court has noted, such “drive-by jurisdictional rulings” resulting from a 

lack of precision in distinguishing between substantive law that limits a court’s 

legal authority to grant the relief requested and a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction 

should be given “no precedential effect” on the question of subject-matter 

jurisdiction. Steel Co. at 91. 

{¶ 14} Indeed, there are many cases in which a court lacks the legal 

authority to grant the relief sought but nevertheless has subject-matter jurisdiction 

to hear the case. See State ex rel. Enyart v. O’Neill, 71 Ohio St.3d 655, 656, 646 

N.E.2d 1110 (1995) (“the fact that [a judge] may have exercised that jurisdiction 

erroneously does not give rise to extraordinary relief by prohibition”). For instance, 

we have held that a lack of standing is not a jurisdictional defect warranting 

prohibition, even when the lack of standing deprives the court of “its power to hear 

the claim as asserted by [a] particular party.” State ex rel. Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio 

St.3d 70, 77, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998). We have held that a judge’s lack of authority 

to join a party to a suit is not a basis for issuing a writ. State ex rel. Shumaker v. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8

Nichols, 137 Ohio St.3d 391, 2013-Ohio-4732, 999 N.E.2d 630, ¶ 31. And issuing 

a writ of prohibition is improper even if the statute of limitations has expired. See

State ex rel. Huntington Trust Co., N.A. v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 

10th Dist. Franklin No. 98AP-122, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 3465, *9 (July 28, 

1998). 

{¶ 15} Eager to decide the merits, the dissenting opinion proclaims that we 

need not reach the question whether the court of common pleas patently and 

unambiguously lacked jurisdiction, because the OHSAA has no adequate remedy 

at law. Dissenting opinion at ¶ 19. It reaches this conclusion based on a handful 

of opinions in which we suggested that even if a party can appeal, an appeal may 

be inadequate in certain “special circumstances” or under a “dramatic fact pattern.” 

E.g., State ex rel. Toledo Metro Fed. Credit Union v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm., 78 

Ohio St.3d 529, 531, 678 N.E.2d 1396 (1997). It is noteworthy that the dissent 

cites no cases in which we invoked this exception.2

 Nevertheless, the dissent asserts 

that this case merits unique treatment because of the “truly rare and extraordinary” 

effects it imagines Judge Ruehlman’s restraining order will have on third parties. 

Dissenting opinion at ¶ 31. But third parties are often affected by court orders—

frequently in ways that are more dramatic than what is presented here. Were we to 

adopt the dissent’s proposed “third party” exception, it would quickly swallow up 

the principle that absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a writ of 

prohibition should not be granted when a party can appeal the lower court’s order. 

{¶ 16} Further, what the dissent finds so dramatic here is simply the minor 

effect that the TRO may have on the calculations used for determining which teams 

make the postseason. Dissenting opinion at ¶ 24. But any effect on postseason 

assignments is speculative, at best, and there is no reason to think that the OHSAA 

 

2

 The only case noted by the dissent in which we granted a writ of prohibition involved a narrow 

First Amendment issue that is not applicable here. See State ex rel. News Herald v. Ottawa Cty. 

Court of Common Pleas, 77 Ohio St.3d 40, 44-45, 671 N.E.2d 5 (1996). 
January Term, 2019 

9

could not make adjustments, consistent with the TRO, that would prevent any 

unfairness. Moreover, the TRO will be in effect only until a ruling on the 

preliminary injunction, a hearing on which was originally scheduled for just 13 

days after the restraining order was put in place. There is little reason to think that 

in that short time frame the “turmoil” imagined by the dissent would come to pass. 

Dissenting opinion at ¶ 24. 

{¶ 17} The subject matter of this dispute falls squarely within the 

jurisdiction granted by the Ohio Constitution and Revised Code to the Hamilton 

County Court of Common Pleas. There is no statute that withdraws jurisdiction 

from common pleas courts to hear claims challenging the rules adopted by 

voluntary organizations or that vests exclusive jurisdiction over such claims in 

another court. Thus, Judge Ruehlman properly exercised the subject-matter 

jurisdiction of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas. Whether he ruled 

correctly in exercising the court’s jurisdiction is a matter that under our precedent 

must be left in the first instance to the court of appeals on direct review. For that 

reason, we deny the writ. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 18} For the above reasons, we deny the OHSAA’s request for a writ of 

prohibition. And finding oral argument to be unnecessary in this case, we deny the 

OHSAA’s motion for oral argument. 

Writ denied. 

KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, and STEWART, JJ., concur. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., dissents, with an opinion joined by DONNELLY, J. 

_________________ 

O’CONNOR, C.J., dissenting.

{¶ 19} To obtain a writ of prohibition, the relator must show “the exercise 

of judicial power, the lack of authority for the exercise of that power, and the lack 

of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” State ex rel. Ford v. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

10

Ruehlman, 149 Ohio St.3d 34, 2016-Ohio-3529, 73 N.E.3d 396, ¶ 61. At issue here 

is the adequate-remedy requirement, and an exception to that requirement 

providing that the relator need not show the lack of an adequate remedy when the 

trial court “patently and unambiguously” lacks jurisdiction, State ex rel. Doe v. 

Capper, 132 Ohio St.3d 365, 2012-Ohio-2686, 972 N.E.2d 553, ¶ 11. 

{¶ 20} Here, a writ prohibiting the enforcement of the temporary restraining 

order (“TRO”) issued by the trial court is proper because relator, the Ohio High 

School Athletic Association (“OHSAA”), has established the first two requirements 

and there is no adequate remedy at law. Furthermore, even if there were an 

adequate remedy at law, a writ would still be proper under the exception to the 

adequate-remedy requirement. I therefore respectfully dissent. 

I. NO ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW 

{¶ 21} To be an adequate remedy at law, an available remedy must be 

“ ‘adequate under the circumstances’ ” of the case. (Emphasis added in Butler.) 

State ex rel. Cody v. Toner, 8 Ohio St.3d 22, 23, 456 N.E.2d 813 (1983), quoting 

State ex rel. Butler v. Demis, 66 Ohio St.2d 123, 124, 420 N.E.2d 116 (1981). “An 

appeal is inadequate if not complete in nature, beneficial, and speedy.” State ex rel. 

Yeaples v. Gall, 141 Ohio St.3d 234, 2014-Ohio-4724, 23 N.E.3d 1077, ¶ 33. In 

this regard, we have held that an appeal is inadequate when there are “special 

circumstances or a ‘dramatic fact pattern.’ ” State ex rel. Toledo Metro Fed. Credit 

Union v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm., 78 Ohio St.3d 529, 531, 678 N.E.2d 1396 (1997), 

quoting Fraiberg v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 76 Ohio St.3d 374, 

379, 667 N.E.2d 1189 (1996). 

{¶ 22} The present case involves exactly the sort of special circumstances 

and dramatic fact pattern that warrant the conclusion that an appeal would not be 

an adequate remedy, thereby justifying this court’s intervention. A confluence of 

three factors supports this finding: (1) the TRO entered against the OHSAA by 

respondent, Judge Robert Ruehlman, will cause immediate harm to a large number 
January Term, 2019 

11 

of third parties across the state, namely many, if not all, of the 809 high schools that 

are members of the OHSAA but not the plaintiffs in the underlying action;3

 (2) the 

TRO was granted based on a misapplication of existing law; and (3) the availability 

of an appeal upon the issuance of a final order will not provide complete and speedy 

relief from the widespread harm inflicted on the affected third parties. Similar 

concerns have led us to grant a writ of prohibition in the past. For example, in State 

ex rel. News Herald v. Ottawa Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 77 Ohio St.3d 40, 42-

45, 671 N.E.2d 5 (1996), we granted a writ of prohibition dissolving a “patently 

unconstitutional” gag order that caused harm to a large number of third parties—

three Ohio newspapers and, by extension, their readers—that could not 

meaningfully be undone on appeal.4

A. Immediate and widespread harm to third-parties 

{¶ 23} The most notable aspect of the TRO is the immediate harm it will 

cause to a large number of third parties: the 809 public and private high schools 

around the state that are members of the OHSAA but not the Greater Catholic 

League Co-Ed, which includes eight private high schools (collectively, “the GCL 

Coed schools”). The TRO bars enforcement of the competitive-balance rules as to 

the GCL Coed schools, but it leaves the rules in place as to the other 809 member 

high schools. This court temporarily stayed the TRO upon the filing of this writ 

action, but if permitted to take effect, the TRO will throw many, if not all, of those 

809 third-party member schools’ schedules and postseason tournament assignments 

into disarray. 

 

3

 The plaintiffs in the underlying action are Roger Bacon High School and the Greater Catholic 

League Co-Ed, which includes Roger Bacon and seven other private high schools. 

4

 It was the third-party newspapers seeking the writ in News Herald, but that distinction matters 

little. The unique circumstances of this case are that the third parties are all members of the OHSAA, 

which is seeking to protect them from harm that will occur immediately upon the TRO’s taking 

effect. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

12

{¶ 24} Member schools set their schedules many months in advance of each 

season, based in part on their opponents’ postseason division assignments under the 

current OHSAA bylaws, including the competitive-balance rules. But as the 

OHSAA notes, if permitted to take effect, the TRO “would eliminate the current 

tournament assignments for the OHSAA’s member high schools, putting all fall 

sport post-seasons in complete disarray, requiring all to be re-worked on the fly and 

causing irreparable harm to those school[s] that scheduled regular season opponents 

based on an expected divisional assignment.” For example, a football team that 

scheduled a game against Roger Bacon High School believing that it would count 

as a Division IV opponent for postseason-tournament purposes would find that 

Roger Bacon now counts as only a Division V opponent—a change that could cause 

that high school to miss the football postseason tournament, for which qualification 

is limited and based largely on the division of a school’s opponents during the 

regular season. The TRO is therefore an extremely disruptive act that, if permitted 

to take effect, will upend the status quo and immediately cause turmoil in highschool sports across the state. The trial court completely failed to account for this 

harm to the third-party member high schools impacted by its order. The majority 

does the same in allowing the trial court’s TRO to take effect.5

 

5

 The majority asserts that any effect the TRO will have on postseason assignments is “speculative, 

at best.” Majority opinion at ¶ 16. The evidence shows otherwise. The competitive-balance rules 

were first implemented in the 2017-2018 school year. That year, according to figures provided by 

the OHSAA, the rules caused dozens of division changes in football (22 schools moved up a division 

and 16 moved down), volleyball (17 schools moved up a division and 13 moved down), boys 

basketball (23 schools moved up a division and 20 moved down), girls basketball (15 schools moved 

up a division and 13 moved down), and other affected sports. Whatever sport one considers, changes 

in one team’s division assignments will, by definition, impact the postseason tournament in that 

team’s new division and former division, as each division’s tournament will relate to a different set 

of teams. 

Perhaps recognizing that the impact of the TRO here is not speculative, the majority 

suggests that the OHSAA might avoid these harms because “there is no reason to think that the 

OHSAA could not make adjustments, consistent with the TRO, that would prevent any unfairness.” 

Majority opinion at ¶ 16. That is the very definition of speculation, and any such “adjustments” 

would only risk increasing the upheaval caused by the TRO. 
January Term, 2019 

13 

B. Clear misapplication of existing law 

{¶ 25} When considering whether to grant injunctive relief, a trial court 

should consider the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits, whether 

injunctive relief is necessary to prevent irreparable harm to the plaintiff, what 

injuries will be caused to third parties if the restraining order or injunction is 

granted, and whether the injunctive relief will serve the public interest. TGR Ents., 

Inc. v. Kozhev, 167 Ohio App.3d 29, 2006-Ohio-2915, 853 N.E.2d 739, ¶ 11 (2d 

Dist.); In re DeLorean Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1228 (6th Cir.1985). Here, all 

four factors weighed heavily against granting a TRO, and the trial court failed to 

properly assess each. 

1. Likelihood of success

{¶ 26} The trial court clearly erred in assessing the likelihood-of-success 

factor. The claim made by the GCL Coed schools against the OHSAA—a 

voluntary, nonprofit association—is unprecedented. The first flaw in their claim is 

their reliance on case law that is clearly inapplicable here. The GCL Coed schools 

asserted that the OHSAA was prohibited from acting in an “arbitrary and 

capricious” manner, but as authority, the schools cite opinions setting forth the rule 

that an arbitrary and capricious order or decision may not be issued by a board or 

agency of a political subdivision. See, e.g., Moore v. Union Twp. Bd. of Twp. 

Trustees, 152 Ohio App.3d 535, 2003-Ohio-2085, 789 N.E.2d 252 (2d Dist.). The 

OHSAA is obviously not a board or agency of a political subdivision. That case 

law has absolutely no application here. 

{¶ 27} Beyond that, every other decision the GCL Coed schools rely on is 

similarly inapplicable. As explained below, this court has held that “ ‘courts will 

not interfere with the internal affairs of voluntary associations’ ” like the OHSAA, 

except under certain circumstances not present here. State ex rel. Ohio High School 

Athletic Assn. v. Judges of Stark Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 173 Ohio St. 239, 

247, 181 N.E.2d 261 (1962) (hereinafter, “Stark Cty. Judges”), quoting 4 American 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

14

Jurisprudence, Associations and Clubs, Section 17, at 466 (1936). The cases cited 

by the GCL Coed schools in their pleadings before the trial court involve one of the 

exceptions set forth in Stark Cty. Judges regarding quasi-judicial decisions made 

by an OHSAA tribunal. See, e.g., Lewis v. Ohio High School Athletic Assn., 5th 

Dist. Stark No. 2015CA00009, 2015-Ohio-3459 (judicial review of the decision of 

an OHSAA appeals panel upholding the commissioner’s refusal to grant an 

eligibility waiver to a student athlete). But those cases are completely inapplicable 

to the GCL Coed schools’ claim here, which asserts that the competitive-balance 

rules themselves are arbitrary and capricious, notwithstanding the fact that they 

were duly enacted and have been applied consistently to all member schools. 

Indeed, the competitive-balance rules were adopted pursuant to the requirements of 

the OHSAA’s constitution, and they went through a lengthy and thorough process 

of consideration, in which GCL Coed schools actively participated.6

 The schools 

have not claimed that any of the OHSAA’s procedures were not followed as the 

rules were enacted, nor have they claimed that the OHSAA has failed to apply those 

rules to its members in an even and consistent manner. The GCL Coed schools 

simply object to the substance of the rules, arguing that the method the rules use to 

achieve competitive balance is unfair to the GCL Coed schools. This claim 

therefore falls under the prohibition against interfering with the internal affairs of a 

voluntary association stated in Stark Cty. Judges. The trial court failed to recognize 

this lack of a likelihood of success on the merits. 

 

 

6

 Among other things, the OHSAA formed the Competitive Balance Committee in 2010 to study 

competitive-balance concerns and propose rules to address those concerns. Two GCL Coed schools 

were represented on that committee. The committee proposed rules that were voted on by the 

OHSAA’s membership but rejected in 2011. In 2012 and 2013, the OHSAA members also voted 

down two other sets of proposed rules based on the committee’s work. It was only after these failed 

attempts and additional efforts by the committee to identify a solution that the committee proposed 

the competitive-balance rules ultimately adopted in 2014. 
January Term, 2019 

15 

2. Irreparable harm to the GCL Coed schools

{¶ 28} The trial court also erred in finding that the GCL Coed schools would 

suffer irreparable harm without a TRO. The GCL Coed schools claim that without 

a TRO, (1) their postseason division assignments will not be fair and equitable and 

(2) it will be “more difficult for the [GCL Coed schools] to schedule nonconference regular season games.” Those assertions are far too vague and 

speculative to constitute a clear and convincing showing of irreparable harm 

warranting a TRO during the pendency of the litigation before Judge Ruehlman. 

See Robert W. Clark, M.D., Inc. v. Mt. Carmel Health, 124 Ohio App.3d 308, 315, 

706 N.E.2d 336 (10th Dist.1997) (requiring that irreparable harm be shown by clear 

and convincing evidence).7

 

3. Harm to third parties and the public interest

{¶ 29} The harm-to-third-parties factor weighs heavily against granting a 

TRO for the reasons discussed above. So does the public-interest factor, which 

here, lies in preserving the status quo—specifically, preserving the schedules and 

postseason tournament assignments set across the state pursuant to the currentlyin-effect competitive-balance rules. 

C. Inadequacy of an appeal as a remedy for third-party harm 

{¶ 30} The OHSAA will not be able to appeal the TRO until a final order is 

issued. At the earliest, that will occur when Judge Ruehlman reaches a decision on 

a preliminary injunction. See R.C. 2505.02(B) (defining “final order”). But that 

appeal will take far too long to avoid the above-described substantial and 

widespread harm to third parties. Furthermore, compensatory damages could not 

make those third parties whole. Given the short duration of high-school sports 

 

7

 The GCL Coed schools also claim that Roger Bacon High School was forced “to give up a home 

football game in order to fill its regular season schedule.” Assuming that this is true, any lost 

revenue from ticket sales and concessions at a home game could be compensated by money 

damages. Beyond that, any claim of harm from playing an additional away game in one football 

season is vague and speculative. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

16

seasons and the unknown amount of time before a final order regarding a 

preliminary injunction will be issued, an appeal by the OHSAA at some point in 

the future would not be an adequate remedy for the third-party harms discussed 

above. 

{¶ 31} This case therefore presents special circumstances warranting the 

conclusion that the OHSAA lacks an adequate remedy at law. This case does not 

involve a TRO that preserves the status quo or that impacts only the relator or a 

small number of third parties. Rather, it presents the truly rare and extraordinary 

situation in which immediate harm, not compensable by money damages, will be 

caused to a large number of third parties across the entire state, based on a plainly 

erroneous application of the law. The trial court has clearly gone astray, and an 

appeal is not an adequate remedy under the circumstances of this case. This court 

should grant a writ of prohibition, and the trial court’s reckless order should be 

vacated.8

 

II. LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION 

{¶ 32} Even if an adequate remedy at law did exist, a writ prohibiting 

enforcement of the TRO would still be proper because the trial court patently and 

unambiguously lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under Stark Cty. Judges, 173 Ohio 

St. 239, 181 N.E.2d 261. The majority’s characterization of Stark Cty. Judges as a 

decision not relating to subject-matter jurisdiction is contradicted by our opinion in 

Stark Cty. Judges itself. 

{¶ 33} Stark Cty. Judges involved the OHSAA’s season-long suspension of 

a high-school football team for violating an OHSAA rule. A county prosecutor 

brought suit in the Stark County Court of Common Pleas seeking injunctive relief 

against nine individuals who served as officers and members of the board of the 

 

8

 With respect to the other two requirements for a writ of prohibition, the trial court has clearly 

exercised judicial power, and the lack of authority for its exercise of that power is shown by Stark 

Cty. Judges, 173 Ohio St. 239, 181 N.E.2d 261, the case discussed in the next section. 
January Term, 2019 

17 

OHSAA and 45 boards of education. On the same day the case was filed, the trial 

court issued a TRO prohibiting the defendants from taking any actions to enforce 

the OHSAA’s suspension of the high-school football team for the 1962-1963 

school year. The OHSAA then sought a writ of prohibition from this court that 

would bar the trial court from enforcing the TRO. 

{¶ 34} This court granted the writ. We reviewed the law concerning when 

a court may entertain suits against private, voluntary associations, including the “ 

‘well established’ ” rule that “ ‘courts will not interfere with the internal affairs of 

voluntary associations, except in such cases as fraud or lack of jurisdiction.’ ” Id.

at 247, quoting 4 American Jurisprudence at 466. A court may intervene in an 

association’s internal affairs only when the association’s “ ‘officers are acting in 

excess of their powers, or collusion or fraud is claimed to exist on the part of the 

officers or a majority of the members.’ ” Id., quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d, 

Associations, Section 7, at 440 (1954). We also recognized certain limited 

circumstances, such as the decision to discipline, suspend, or expel a member, in 

which a court may address decisions of a voluntary association’s tribunals.9

 

Accordingly, we granted the writ sought by the OHSAA because under the 

circumstances present in that case, “a court has no jurisdiction to enjoin the 

association or its members from enforcing [its] lawfully imposed penalty.” 

(Emphasis added.) Id. at 250. 

{¶ 35} The majority here believes that the holding of Stark Cty. Judges does 

not concern subject-matter jurisdiction, asserting that the decision uses the word 

“jurisdiction” in an “unspecified” manner, creating confusion regarding the type of 

jurisdiction at issue. Majority opinion at ¶ 11. Instead, the majority concludes that 

 

9

 Such actions are “quasi-judicial,” and a court may interfere with the decision of an association’s 

tribunal only “ ‘to ascertain whether or not the proceeding was pursuant to the rules and laws of the 

society, whether or not the proceeding was in good faith, and whether or not there was anything in 

the proceeding in violation of the laws of the land.’ ” Id., quoting 4 American Jurisprudence at 472. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

18

Stark Cty. Judges is “best understood as using the term ‘jurisdiction’ in the loose 

sense of a court’s legal authority to grant the relief sought by the plaintiff based 

upon the conduct alleged.” Majority opinion at ¶ 12. 

{¶ 36} The majority’s reading of Stark Cty. Judges is incorrect. In 

particular, concerns over the loose or unspecified use of the term “jurisdiction” are 

not present here, because our opinion in Stark Cty. Judges clearly specifies that it 

addresses the OHSAA’s claim that the trial court’s entry of the TRO was “without 

jurisdiction of the subject matter.” Stark Cty. Judges, 173 Ohio St. at 246-47, 181 

N.E.2d 261. It was with respect to that claim that this court analyzed the law on 

voluntary associations and held that the trial court had “no jurisdiction to enjoin the 

association.” Id. at 250. We therefore made it perfectly clear that we were issuing 

a holding on subject-matter jurisdiction. 

{¶ 37} Because Roger Bacon High School and the GCL Coed’s suit against 

the OHSAA that triggered the present action falls outside the narrow exceptions set 

forth in Stark Cty. Judges, the trial court patently and unambiguously lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction.10 

III. CONCLUSION 

{¶ 38} I believe that the requirements for a writ of prohibition have been 

met. The trial court has exercised judicial power without authority, and there is not 

an adequate remedy at law. Furthermore, the trial court’s actions were taken despite 

a patent and unambiguous lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. I would therefore 

grant the writ. I respectfully dissent. 

DONNELLY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 

_________________ 

 

10 The majority also takes the position that “when we have found that a court of common pleas 

patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction, it is almost always because a statute explicitly 

removed that jurisdiction.” Majority opinion at ¶ 9. That position similarly fails to support a denial 

of the writ in this case. To say that something is “almost always” the case does not establish the 

matter conclusively, particularly in light of well-settled precedent of this court holding otherwise. 
January Term, 2019 

19 

Keating, Muething & Klekamp, P.L.L., Joseph M. Callow Jr., Daniel E. 

Izenson, Bryce J. Yoder, and Taylor V. Trout; and Steven L. Craig, for relator. 

James W. Harper, Hamilton County Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 

and Andrea Neuwirth and Jay R. Wampler, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for 

respondent. 

Ennis Britton Co., L.P.A., and Hollie F. Reedy, urging granting of the writ 

for amici curiae, Ohio School Boards Association, Buckeye Association of School 

Administrators, Ohio Association of School Business Officials, Ohio 

Interscholastic Athletic Administrators Association, and Ohio Association of 

Secondary School Administrators. 

_________________