Constitutionality of Vesting Magistrate Judges with

Jurisdiction Over Asset Forfeiture Cases

A statute vesting m agistrate judges with jurisdiction over asset forfeiture cases would violate Article 111 

o f the C onstitution

December 6, 1993

M e m o r a n d u m O p in io n f o r t h e

D e p u t y D i r e c t o r , P o l ic y a n d L it ig a t io n

A s s e t F o r f e it u r e O f f ic e

You have asked whether Congress may constitutionally enact a statute requiring 

that asset forfeiture cases involving property valued below a certain level be heard 

by a United States Magistrate Judge rather than a United States District Judge. 

The limitations imposed by Article III forbid Congress to assign jurisdiction over 

such cases to a Magistrate Judge without the assent of the parties. Therefore, we 

must advise you that the provision you have described would be unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court has explained that the power to adjudicate private rights 

must be vested in an Article III court. See Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. M arathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 63-76 (1982) (plurality opinion). Although the 

adjudication of public rights need not be assigned to an Article III court, both civil 

and criminal forfeiture cases involve disputes over private, not public, rights. The 

Court has held that no criminal case can be conceptualized as a public rights dispute even though the United States is a party to all criminal proceedings. Id. at 70 

n.24 (citing United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955)). Similarly, 

the Court has ruled that Congress generally “cannot ‘withdraw from [Art. Ill] judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the 

common law, or in equity, or admiralty,’” id. at 69 n.23 (quoting M urray’s Lessee

v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856)), and 

every civil forfeiture action indubitably constitutes a matter that is the subject of a 

suit at the common law or in equity. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing

Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-83 (1974) (tracing history of forfeiture).

Congress has the authority in some situations to “fashion causes of action that 

are closely analogous to common-law claims and place them beyond the ambit o f’ 

Article III, see Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 52 (1989) 

(discussing congressional authority to abrogate Seventh Amendment right to trial 

by jury), but the Supreme Court has only sustained the exercise of this authority 

when Congress creates a regulatory framework that includes administrative adjudication of such claims. See Atlas Roofing v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 450-61 (1977) (collecting cases); see also

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Constitutionality o f Vesting M agistrate Judges with Jurisdiction Over Asset Forfeiture Cases

Granfinaneiera, 492 U.S. at 51-52; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50-51 (1932). 

Absent the creation of a separate administrative mechanism for administration and 

adjudication of civil forfeitures, such cases must be assigned in the first instance to 

Article III judges. Assignment of such cases to Magistrate Judges, who are mere 

adjuncts to United States District Judges, see Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 

858, 872 (1989), cannot satisfy the Article III requirement.

In upholding 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), which authorizes Magistrate Judges to conduct civil trials with the consent of the parties, the en banc Ninth Circuit stated 

“that parties to a case or controversy in a federal forum are entitled to have the 

cause determined by Article III judges.” Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic o f America,

Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 541 (9th Cir. 1984) (Kennedy, J.), cert,

denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984). Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a 

“mandatory provision for trial of an unrestricted class of civil cases by a magistrate 

and not by Article 111 judges would violate the constitutional rights of the litigants.” Id. at 542. Based upon this rule, any statute vesting jurisdiction over federal forfeiture cases — even a limited class of civil forfeiture cases involving small 

amounts of money — in federal Magistrate Judges would almost certainly be constitutionally infirm.

WALTER DELLINGER 

Assistant Attorney General

Office o f Legal Counsel

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