* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5.4.

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-40044 Summary Calendar

MARK ANTHONY BAXTER Petitioner-Appellant

v. NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION Respondent-Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 6:05-CV-448
Before WIENER, GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Peti tioner-Appellant Mark Anthony Baxter, Texas prisoner # 1155779,
was convicted by a jury ofaggravated assault against a publicservant for which he was sentenced to 50 years imprisonment. His conviction was affirmed on appeal and he was denied state habeas rel ief. Baxter filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 application, which the district court denied. After denying Baxter’s § 2254 application, the district court granted Baxter a certificate ofappealability on the United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D March 18, 2008 Charles R. Fulbruge III ClerkNo. 07-40044

2 questions whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied a mandatory evidentiary presumption in a way that violates the Constitution and whether Baxter suffered prejudicefrom his trial counsel’sfailure toobject tojury instructions containing a mandatory evidentiary presumption. Regarding the jury instruction i ssue, Baxter contends that his constitutional rights were violated when the trial court failed togive a charge on the presumption that, he insists, was mandated by Texas Penal Code § 2.05(a)(2) (Vernon 2005) after the court gave the jury a Texas Penal Code § 22.02(c) (Vernon 2005) instruction on a presumed fact. His argument consists of generalized legal boilerplate regarding jury instructions and due process. He asserts in a concl usional fashion that there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the presumption in a way that violated the Constitution. In light of the record and the detailed analyses of the state appel late court and the district court, we conclude that Baxter has failed to establish that the district court erred in denying habeas reliefon this issue. See Ortiz v. Quarterman, 504 F.3d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 2007); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Baxter also asserts a claim of ineffective assistance ofcounsel. Although Baxter insists that there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have returned a different verdict if it had been properly instructed, he does not address the detailed analysis performed by the di strict court regarding this issue. His argument is conclusional, at best. Conclusional allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel are insufficient to establish the petitioner’s right to habeas relief. Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 282 (5th Cir. 2000). Moreover, Baxter’s argument does not amount to the affirmative showing ofprejudice that is required under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693-94 (1984). His argument thus fails to establish that the district court erred in denying habeas relief on this ground. See Ortiz, 504 F.3d at 496; § 2254(d). The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.