alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.1
                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
                              AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of MITY Enterprises, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2006, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Bradley T Nielson, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     1.  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
         of the Company.


Date: August 1, 2006                    /s/ Bradley T Nielson
                                        -----------------------------------
                                        Bradley T Nielson
                                        Chief Executive Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER>    1000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          OCT-30-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               APR-30-2000
<CASH>                                             374
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   22,151
<ALLOWANCES>                                       560
<INVENTORY>                                     19,726
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                44,588
<PP&E>                                          71,281
<DEPRECIATION>                                  36,245
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 116,228
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           25,974
<BONDS>                                         55,220
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     14,811
<COMMON>                                            59
<OTHER-SE>                                      18,337
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   116,228
<SALES>                                         83,117
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                83,117
<CGS>                                           68,882
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   68,882
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                11,209
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,568
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    545
<INCOME-TAX>                                       254
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                291
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       291
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.05)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.05)


</TABLE>
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1



                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                                 18 U.S.C. 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


        In connection with the Quarterly Report of Boyd Bros. Transportation
Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2002, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, Gail B. Cooper, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

        (1)     The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
                or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m
                or 78o(d); and

        (2)     The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
                material respects, the financial condition and results of
                operations of the Company.


By:     /s/  GAIL B. COOPER
    -----------------------

Gail B. Cooper
Chief Executive Officer
August 14, 2002
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-2712
ESTELLA PRADE; JAMES JACKSON, Plaintiffs - Appellants, versus JACKSON AND KELLY, Attorneys at Law, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. Robert Earl Maxwell, Senior District Judge. (CA-94-18-3) Submitted: January 27, 1998 Decided: February 24, 1998 Before WIDENER, HAMILTON, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Estella Prade, James Jackson, Appellants Pro Se. Richard D. Owen, Thomas Ryan Goodwin, GOODWIN & GOODWIN, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellants appeal the district court's order denying relief in this civil action. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Prade v. Jackson & Kelly , No. CA94-18-3 (N.D.W. Va. Oct. 18, 1996). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented inthe materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
## Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

In the Interest of N.C., a Child

No. 06

- 21

- 00064

- CV Appeal from the 71st District Court of

Harrison County, Texas (Tr. Ct

. No. 19

- 1019 ). Memorandum Opinion delivered by

Chief Justice Morriss

, Justice Burgess and Justice Stevens participating

.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find that the appeal should be dismissed

for want of jurisdiction . Therefore, we dismiss the appeal.

We note that the appellant has adequately indicated his inability to pay costs of appeal.

Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

REND ERED SEPTEMBER 2, 2021

BY ORDER OF THE COURT JOSH R. MORRISS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST: Debra K. Autrey , Clerk
#### ARMANDO CAMPOS v. THE FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY.

March 27, 1984.

Petition for certification granted. (See 192 *N.J.Super.*251)
#### Diana DANHAUER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JK TOOLING AND MACHINE, INC., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 00-1736.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 14, 2000.

Filed Jan. 23, 2001.

Before McMILLIAN and MURPHY, Circuit Judges, and BOGUE,1 District Judge.

1

. The Honorable Andrew W. Bogue, Senior United States District Judge for the District of South Dakota, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM.

JK Tooling, Inc., appeals from the judgment in favor of Diana Danhauer on her Title VII claim and supplemental state law discrimination claim alleging insufficient evidence and error in denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law.

After a careful examination of the record and with due deference given in favor of the verdict, this Court finds there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. The district court, therefore, properly denied JK Tooling’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. Under Eighth Circuit Rule 47B, no further commentary is warranted.

Accordingly, we affirm.
#### Albert H. Petrie v. Albert Dickerman, Circuit Judge of Muskegon County.

[See 88 Mich. 43.]

*Accounting*— Hearing—Examination *of books.*

The order of respondent denying the application of relator, in whose favor a decree for an accounting had been made, for an order requiring the defendant to deposit with the register of the court the books in which the transactions in controversy were entered, and which were in defendant’s possession, to enable the complainant to prepare for a hearing on such accounting, is vacated, and respondent is directed to hear the application, and make such order as will give the relator a full and fair opportunity to examine said books of account before said hearing, in order to prepare himself therefor.

*Mandamus.*

Argued February 9, 1892.

Granted in part February 10, 1892.

Eelator is complainant in *Petrie v. Torrent,*88 Mich. 43, in which case an accounting was ordered on the sale by the defendant of pine lands, of which complainant held a verbal option, and which were deeded to defendant, who furnished the purchase money, under an agree•ment to give complainant one-third of the net profits resulting from the transaction.

In pursuance of the decree, respondent assigned March *26621, 1892, as the time for hearing the accounting therein provided for; whereupon, on January 30, 1892, relator applied to respondent for an order requiring the defendant, in whose custody were the books in which the transactions in controversy were entered, to produce the same, and to deposit them with the register of the court, in order that relator could have opportunity to prepare for a hearing on such accounting, which application was denied.

Relator applies .for a *mandamus*requiring respondent to vacate to his order denying said application, and to grant the same.

*Bunker & Carpenter,*for relator.

*Smith, Nims, Hoyt & Erwin,*for respondent.

Per Curiam.

The writ will be granted vacating the order of the circuit judge, denying the application of relator to have the books containing the account of the ¡umbér transactions deposited in the court; and, while the writ will not issue to the full extent as prayed, the court below is directed to hear the application, and to make such order as will give relator a full and fair opportunity to examine such books of account before the hearing of the accounting, so that he can prepare himself therefor.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> US DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUL-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             AUG-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               APR-30-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                      43,482,875
<SECURITIES>                                50,131,892
<RECEIVABLES>                               19,939,684
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                           116,786,014
<PP&E>                                      60,016,839
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             280,860,265
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       37,500,726
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       287,630
<OTHER-SE>                                 200,478,266
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               280,860,265
<SALES>                                     82,181,757
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                       44,994,030
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            15,940,736
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                          (3,180,627)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             10,810,648
<INCOME-TAX>                                 3,806,600
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          7,004,048
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 7,004,048
<EPS-BASIC>                                      .24
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .24


</TABLE>
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Cedrick HAWKINS.

No. 2010-KK-2602.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 24, 2010.

In re State of Louisiana; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 454-388; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1395.

Stay denied; writ denied.

VICTORY and KNOLL, JJ., would grant.
#### MIDWAY MINI-STORAGE, LLC, and William Todd Overcash, Appellant, v. Jennifer L. MOBLEY, f/k/a Jennifer Overcash, Appellee.

No. 5D10-2831.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Feb. 18, 2011.

Chester Trow, of Trow & Dobbins, P.A., Ocala, for Appellant.

Lawrence C. Callaway, III, of Klein & Klein, LLC, Ocala, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. *See Ashemimry v. Ba Nafa,*778 So.2d 495, 498 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (“where a fiduciary or trust relationship exists, an action for accounting is considered equitable in nature without regard to other considerations.”).

LAWSON, EVANDER and COHEN, JJ., concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Keith MARTIN, Defendant-Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Samuel Avant Hamilton, a/k/a Samuel Brown, a/k/a Little Sam, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 99-4295, 99-4328.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Sept. 29, 2000.

Decided Jan. 10, 2001.

John D. Elliott, Columbia, SC; Mark C. Brandenburg, Barnwell, Whaley, Patterson *&*Helms, L.L.C., Dale T. Cobb, Jr., *175Belk, Cobb, Chandler & Goldstein, Charleston, SC, for appellants. J. Rene Josey, United States Attorney, Miller W. Shealy, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, SC, for appellee.

Before WILKINS, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Keith Martin and Samuel Avant Hamilton appeal from sentences of 865 months and life, respectively, following their convictions for conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994), and possession with the intent to distribute crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1994). Hamilton also appeals from his life sentence for conspiracy to launder money, 21 U.S.C.A. § 1956(h) (West Supp.2000), and Martin appeals from his conviction and consecutive twelve month sentence for summary criminal contempt. We affirm in part, vacate Martin’s contempt conviction, and remand this case for further proceedings.

Martin and Hamilton claim on appeal that they were entitled to examine the specific sentences that the Government’s cooperating witnesses hoped to avoid and the specific benefits that they sought to receive as a result of their substantial assistance to the Government; they also contend that the Government’s witnesses should not have been permitted to testify in return for the potential reduction in their sentences under Fed. R.Crim.P. 35. This court has previously rejected both claims in *United States v. Cropp,*127 F.3d 354 (4th Cir.1997), and *United States v. Richardson,*195 F.3d 192, 196-97 (4th Cir.1999), *cert. denied,*528 U.S. 1096, 120 S.Ct. 837, 145 L.Ed.2d 704 (2000). Because a panel of this court cannot depart from Circuit precedent, *see United States v. Burgos,*94 F.3d 849, 860 n. 1 (4th Cir.1996) (en banc), we conclude that these claims lack merit. Thus, we affirm Hamilton’s money laundering conviction, as well as Hamilton’s and Martin’s drug-related convictions.

Martin also challenges the validity of his summary criminal contempt conviction. We have reviewed the record and find no certification or other indication that the contumacious conduct occurred in the actual presence of the judge. *See*Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(a). Accordingly, we vacate Martin’s contempt conviction and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(b). *See Groppi v. Leslie,*404 U.S. 496, 504 n. 8, 92 S.Ct. 582, 30 L.Ed.2d 632 (1972); *United States v. Neal,*101 F.3d 993, 997 (4th Cir.1996).

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.*
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-6314

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus DOUGLAS L. MCLAURIN, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior District Judge. (CR-03-46; CA-04-228-7) Submitted: November 17, 2005 Decided: November 23, 2005 Before WILKINSON, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Douglas L. McLaurin, Appellant Pro Se. Clay Campbell Wheeler, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Douglas L. McLaurin, a federal prisoner, seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. An appeal may not be taken from the final order in a § 2255 proceeding unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue for claims addressed by a district court absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find both that the district court’s assessment of his constitutional claims is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. SeeMiller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that McLaurin has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1555 Introduced in House (IH)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1555

To impose a two year moratorium on the approval by the Secretary of the 
   Interior of new Tribal-State compacts for gaming under the Indian 
                         Gaming Regulatory Act.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 15, 2007

  Mr. Rogers of Michigan (for himself, Mr. Ehlers, and Mr. Aderholt) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
                           Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To impose a two year moratorium on the approval by the Secretary of the 
   Interior of new Tribal-State compacts for gaming under the Indian 
                         Gaming Regulatory Act.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. TWO YEAR MORATORIUM ON NEW INDIAN CASINOS.

    The Secretary of the Interior shall not approve any new Tribal-
State compacts for gaming under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (25 
U.S.C. 2701 et seq.) until after the date that is 2 years after the 
date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Stephen J. Markman, Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen

Kurtis T. Wilder,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 May 31, 2017

a0522

Order 

Clerk

May 31, 2017

153924(136)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 153924

COA: 320773 

Berrien CC: 2013-000303-FC

JOVON CHARLES DAVIS,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s January 31, 

2017 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was 

entered erroneously.
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

March 27, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 130229 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Justices 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 130229 

 COA: 257546 

Kent CC: 04-000426-FC 

ELMER GARCIA-MEDINA,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 17, 2005 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

d0320 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

March 27, 2006 

Clerk
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03
- 20
- 00459
- CV

In re Garland Wayne Scroggins

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FROM TRAVIS COUNTY

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Relator Garland Wayne Scroggins f iled a pro se petition for writ of mandamus. However, he f

ailed to provide a record demonstrating h is entitlement to mandamus relief

. See Tex. R. App. P. 5 2.3(k)(1)(A) (requiring appendix to mandamus petition to contain “a certified or sworn copy of any order complained of, or any other d ocument showing the matter complained of”) ; In re Blakeney , 254 S.W.3d 659, 66 1

- 6 2 (Tex. App.

— Texar kana 2008, orig. proceeding) ; In re Villarreal , 96 S.W.3d 708, 710 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo 2003, orig. proceeding )

. Accordingly, t he petition for writ of mandam us is denied. See Tex. R. App. P.
52 .8(a)

.

_______________________ ___________________ Jeff Rose, Chief Justice
Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Baker and Kelly
Filed: October 6, 2020