alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7187 Enrolled Bill (ENR)]

        H.R.7187

                     One Hundred Fifteenth Congress

                                 of the

                        United States of America

                          AT THE SECOND SESSION

         Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday,
           the third day of January, two thousand and eighteen

                                 An Act

 
 To extend the National Flood Insurance Program until December 7, 2018.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
    This Act may be cited as the ``National Flood Insurance Program 
Further Extension Act of 2018''.
SEC. 2. PROGRAM EXTENSION.
    (a) Financing.--Section 1309(a) of the National Flood Insurance Act 
of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 4016(a)) is amended by striking ``November 30, 
2018'' and inserting ``December 7, 2018''.
    (b) Program Expiration.--Section 1319 of the National Flood 
Insurance Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 4026) is amended by striking 
``November 30, 2018'' and inserting ``December 7, 2018''.

                               Speaker of the House of Representatives.

                            Vice President of the United States and    
                                               President of the Senate.
```
#### Conaway et al. *v.*Conaway et al.

[No. 19,309.

Filed March 20, 1963.

Rehearing denied April 8, 1963.]

*Floyd E. Harper,*of Tipton, *Albert W. Ewbank,*of Indianapolis, and *Salyer & Mattingly*of Anderson, for appellants.

*430*Troy Hutto, Hutto & Regnier,*of Tipton, *Christian, Waltz, White & Klotz*and *Ralph Waltz,*of Nobles-ville, for appellees.

Carson, J.

This matter is now before the court on the appellees’ motion to dismiss as to the appellant Oliver Conaway and the appellees’ supplemental motion to dismiss as to the appellant Herbert Salsbery.

It appears from the verified motion to dismiss filed with reference to the appellant Oliver Conaway that the original judgment of the court was for appointment of a guardian for the person and estate of the appellant Oliver Conaway; that the appellant Oliver Conaway died on the 31st day of January, 1960. It is well settled in this state that the death of a ward following a judgment for the appointment of a guardian, presents only a moot question and will be dismissed by this court. *Powell*v. *Powell*(1939), 107 Ind. App. 396, 22 N. E. 2d 896; *Bell*v. *McCain et al.*(1934), 98 Ind. App. 68, 188 N. E. 378; Flanagan, Wiltrout and Hamilton’s, *Indiana Trial and Appellate Practice,*§2129; and cases therein cited.

It appears from the verified supplemental motion to dismiss as to the appellant Herbert Salsbery that judgment was rendered in favor of Herbert Salsbery in the amount of Three thousand seven hundred and fifty-two dollars and eithty-nine cents ($3,752.89) for which amount the appellant Herbert Salsbery accepted in payment a cashiers check issued by the Farmers Loan and Trust Company of Tipton, Indiana.

In the recent case, *City of Indianapolis, etc.*v. *Bates et al.*(1963), 134 Ind. App. 343, 188 N. E. 2d 114, handed down by this court on the 25th day of February, 1963, a settlement of a judgment was involved and certain of the parties to the *431appeal drew down the money paid into the Clerk of the Shelby Circuit Court. It is well settled law in this state that a party accepting the benefits of a judgment below recognizes the validity of the judgment and waives any further right on appeal. Falanagan, Wiltrout and Hamilton’s, *Indiana Trial and Appellate Practice,*§2128, citing with approval *Wyncoop, Administrator, et al.*v. *Laughner et al.*(1939), 106 Ind. App. 457, 19 N. E. 2d 486, and also §2-3201, Burns’ 1946 Replacement, which provides in part:

> “The party obtaining judgment should not take an appeal after receiving any money paid or collected thereon.”

For the reasons herein stated the appeal as to both appellants, Oliver Conaway and Herbert Salsbery, is dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.

Cooper, C. J., and Clements and Ryan, JJ., Concur.

Note. — Reported in 188 N. E. 2d 846.
V 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1704 

For the relief of Robert and Verda Shatusky. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 26, 2007 

Mr. STUPAK introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

For the relief of Robert and Verda Shatusky. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. ENTITLEMENT TO SUPPLEMENTAL ANNUITY, 

4 SURVIVOR BENEFITS, AND OTHER PAYMENTS 

5 UNDER RAILROAD RETIREMENT ACT OF 1974. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of the Railroad Re7 tirement Act of 1974 (45 U.S.C. 231 et seq.), Robert 

8 Shatusky, of Menominee, Michigan, shall be deemed to 

9 have had a current connection with the railroad industry 

10 at the time that his annuity under section 2(a)(1) of such 

11 Act began to accrue. 


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1 (b) APPLICABILITY.—Subsection (a) shall apply to 

2 any month that begins more than 30 days after the date 

3 of the enactment of this Act. 

4 SEC. 2. PAYMENT OF PAST SUPPLEMENTAL ANNUITY BENE5 FITS. 

6 The Secretary of the Treasury shall pay, out of any 

7 money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to 

8 Robert Shatusky of Menominee, Michigan, a sum that 

9 equals the total amount of any supplemental annuity pay10 ments to which Robert Shatusky would have been entitled 

11 under section 2(b) of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 

12 (45 U.S.C. 231a(b)) if section 1(a) of this Act applied to 

13 the period beginning on the date on which his annuity 

14 under section 2(a)(1) of the Railroad Retirement Act of 

15 1974 (45 U.S.C. 231a(a)(1)) began to accrue and ending 

16 on the last day of the month preceding the 1st month to 

17 which section 1(a) of this Act applies. 

18 SEC. 3. LIMITATION ON AGENT AND ATTORNEY FEES. 

19 It shall be unlawful for an amount exceeding 10 per20 cent of the payment required by section 2 to be paid to 

21 or received by any agent or attorney for any service ren22 dered in connection with the payment. Any person who 

23 violates this section shall be guilty of an infraction and 


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•HR 1704 IH

1 shall be subject to a fine in the amount provided in title 

2 18, United States Code. 

Æ 


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#### A. Blumer *v.*Tena Jones.

Interlocutory Orders — Appeals from — How Granted.

Appeals from interlocutory orders can be granted only by the chancellor, and when not so granted, are void and will be dismissed.1

Appellant, Blumer, instituted an action of unlawful entry and detainer against appellee, Tena Jones, to recover possession of certain land and improvements in Jackson county. Tena Jones filed tbe bill in tbis case in tbe Obancery Court of said county to enjoin tbe prosecution of said suit. Blumer made a motion to dissolve tbe injunction, which has been granted. Tbe motion was beard in vacation and was overruled. Appellant filed bis petition for an • appeal; it was addressed to tbe clerk and tbe appeal was granted by tbe clerk.

Appealed from Obancery Court, Jackson county, George Wood, Chancellor.

Dismissed,

February 28, 1881.

*Attorney for*appellant, *B. Seal.*

*Attorney for appellee, O. H. Wood.*

Briefs of counsel were submitted on tbe merits of tbe case, and not pertinent to tbe opinion of the court.

1

The clerk of the Chancery Court has no authority to grant an appeal from interlocutory orders or decrees. Holliman *v.*Dibrell, 51 Miss. 96.

*Opinion.*

Per *curiam:*

Tbis is an appeal from an order in vacation overruling a motion to dissolve an injunction. It was not granted by tbe chancellor, but by tbe clerk upon petition addressed to him. Appeals from interlocutory orders can be granted only by tbe chancellor, and when not so granted are void.

*Appeal dismissed.*
I 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 115 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow a credit against 

tax for expenses related to the collection and storage of umbilical cord blood. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 4, 2007 

Mrs. JO ANN DAVIS of Virginia introduced the following bill; which was 

referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow a 

credit against tax for expenses related to the collection 

and storage of umbilical cord blood. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. CREDIT FOR COLLECTION AND STORAGE OF 

4 UMBILICAL CORD BLOOD. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subpart A of part IV of sub6 chapter A of chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code of 

7 1986 (relating to nonrefundable personal credits) is 

8 amended by inserting after section 25D the following new 

9 credit: 


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1 ‘‘SEC. 25E. CREDIT FOR COLLECTION AND STORAGE OF UM2 BILICAL CORD BLOOD. 

3 ‘‘(a) ALLOWANCE OF CREDIT.—In the case of an eli4 gible individual, there shall be allowed as a credit against 

5 the tax imposed by this chapter an amount equal to 50 

6 percent of the qualified umbilical cord blood collection and 

7 storage expenses paid or incurred by the taxpayer during 

8 the taxable year. 

9 ‘‘(b) LIMITATION.—The credit allowed under sub10 section (a) for any taxable year shall not exceed $2,000. 

11 ‘‘(c) QUALIFIED UMBILICAL CORD BLOOD COLLEC12 TION AND STORAGE EXPENSES.—For purposes of this 

13 section— 

14 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘qualified umbil15 ical cord blood collection and storage expenses’ 

16 means expenses directly related to the collection, 

17 storage, and maintenance of umbilical cord blood 

18 that is collected on the occasion of the birth of a 

19 child of the taxpayer. 

20 ‘‘(2) UMBILICAL CORD BLOOD.—The term ‘um21 bilical cord blood’ means— 

22 ‘‘(A) the neonatal blood remaining in the 

23 placenta and umbilical cord after separation of 

24 the mother from the newborn baby, or 

25 ‘‘(B) any other part of the umbilical cord. 


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1 ‘‘(d) ELIGIBLE INDIVIDUAL.—For purposes of this 

2 section, the term ‘eligible individual’ means the mother of 

3 the child referred to in subsection (c)(1). In the case of 

4 a joint return, the taxpayer shall be treated as an eligible 

5 individual if either spouse is an eligible individual.’’. 

6 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections 

7 for subpart A of part IV of subchapter A of chapter 1 

8 of such Code is amended by inserting after the item relat9 ing to section 25D the following new item: 

‘‘Sec. 25E. Credit for collection and storage of umbilical cord blood.’’. 

10 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

11 this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after 

12 December 31, 2006. 

Æ 


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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 07-4477
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JOHN ELLERBE, JR., Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge. (4:06-cr-00685-TLW) Submitted: August 8, 2008 Decided: August 27, 2008 Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. James T. McBratney, Jr., MCBRATNEY LAW FIRM, P.A., Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. Reginald I. Lloyd, United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina; William E. Day, II, Carrie A. Fisher, Assistant United States Attorneys, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: John Ellerbe pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to theft by aiding and abetting a bank employee, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 656 (2000), and knowingly making a false statement to a bank in connection with an application for an automobile loan, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (2000). The district court sentenced Ellerbe to twenty-eight months imprisonment and ordered him to pay $70,798.94 in restitution, payable in monthly payments of $1200, beginning upon his release from prison. Ellerbe appeals, claiming that the district court failed to adequately consider his ability to pay when it determined the restitution payment schedule, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2) (2000). Because he did not object at sentencing, Ellerbe’s claim is reviewed for plain error. See United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 732-34 (1993); United States v. Hughes , 401 F.3d 540, 547 (4th Cir. 2005). Because the record establishes that the district court adequately considered the factors as required under § 3664(f)(2), we conclude that Ellerbe cannot show error, let alone plain error, in the district court’s restitution order. See United States v. Karam , 201 F.3d 320, 330 (4th Cir. 2000) (district court’s adoption of presentence report that contained sufficient facts to support restitution order avoided plain error). Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal3 contentions are adequately addressed in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED
#### Genna GARDNER, Appellant, v. MOVING COST, INC., a Florida corporation, Nationwide Relocation Services, Inc., a Florida corporation, Nationwide Auto Transporters, Inc., a Florida corporation, and We Haul International, Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellees.

No. 4D09-4648.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

June 1, 2011.

*1188Genna Gardner, Plantation, pro se.

Neil Flaxman of Neil Flaxman, Professional Association, Miami, for appellees.

*ON MOTION FOR REHEARING*

PER CURIAM.

We grant appellees’ motion for rehearing, withdraw our opinion of April 6, 2011, and substitute the following.

The circuit court dismissed appellant’s complaint without prejudice after she failed to file an amended complaint. On July 1, 2009, appellant’s attorney withdrew and the court gave her 20 days to retain new counsel and file an amended complaint. On August 17, 2009, appellees moved to dismiss with prejudice. The court entered a final order of dismissal with prejudice on September 11, 2009. Six days later, appellant filed a pro se motion to set aside the final order of dismissal; she said that she had not received notice of the hearing on the motion and had not been able to acquire new counsel. The court denied the motion.

“Dismissal of the [amended] complaint was too severe a sanction in this matter because the record does not show “willful or intentional disregard of the trial court’s order.” *Garland v. Dixie Ins. Co.,*495 So.2d 785, 785 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). The trial court’s order “did not make an explicit finding of willful noncompliance or deliberate disregard in its order.” *Adlington v. Fla. Parole Comm’n,*824 So.2d 256, 257 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); *see also State of Fla. Dep’t of Envt’l Reg. v. Chemairspray, Inc.,*520 So.2d 96 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988).

The reversal in this case is without prejudice to the entry of a lesser sanction against plaintiff. *See Garland,*495 So.2d at 785.

*Reversed.*

GROSS, C.J., STEVENSON and GERBER, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 24


                            SOUTH JERSEY GAS COMPANY
                               POWER OF ATTORNEY


     Each of the undersigned, in his capacity as an officer or director, or
both, as the case may be, of South Jersey Gas Company, a New Jersey
corporation, does hereby appoint Charles Biscieglia, David A. Kindlick and
George L. Baulig, and each of them, severally, as his or her true and lawful
attorneys or attorney to execute in his or her name, place and stead, in his or
her capacity as a director or officer, or both, as the case may be, of said
corporation, its Annual Report for the fiscal year ended December 31, 1999 on
Form 10-K, pursuant to Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
any and all amendments thereto and instruments necessary or incidental in
connection therewith, and to file the same with the Securities and Exchange
Commission; and does hereby provide that each of said attorneys shall have
power to act hereunder with or without the other said attorneys, and shall have
full power of substitution and resubstitution and that each of said attorneys
shall have full power and authority to do and perform in the name and on behalf
of the undersigned in any and all capacities every act whatsoever required to
be done in the premises, as fully and to all intents and purposes as he or she
might or could do in person, hereby ratifying and approving the acts of said
attorneys and each of them.

        IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this instrument, this
30th day of March 2000.



                                  /s/ Charles Biscieglia
                                  Charles Biscieglia, President and CEO



                                  /s/ Shirli M. Billings
                                  Shirli M. Billings, Director



                                  /s/ Sheila H. Coco
                                  Sheila H. Coco, Director



                                  /s/ Richard L. Dunahm
                                  Richard L. Dunham, Director



                                  /s/ Clarence D. McCormick
                                  Clarence D. McCormick, Director




                                                                    Exhibit 24


Power of Attorney -- 10-K                                          Page 2 of 2




                                  /s/ Frederick R. Raring
                                  Frederick R. Raring, Director



                                  /s/ George L. Baulig
                                  George L. Baulig, Senior Vice President &
                                  Corporate Secretary



                                  /s/ David A. Kindlick
                                  David A. Kindlick, Senior Vice President
The notice of appeal states that judgment was “granted” on October 5, 2007, which is the 1

date listed as the Date of Judgment in the District Clerk’s Notice of Appeal Information Sheet. For

purposes of this opinion we will use the October 6, 2007 date listed in the docketing statement as

the date the judgment was signed.

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-08-00002-CV

Jennifer Helm, Appellant

v.

Daveta Haffner, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY, 274TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. C2006-0605C, HONORABLE DIB WALDRIP, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The record in this cause is overdue because appellant has not filed the documentation

necessary to show herself entitled to a free record, paid, or made arrangements to pay for the record.

The trial court clerk becomes responsible for filing the record only if a notice of

appeal has been filed and “the party responsible for paying for the preparation of the clerk’s record

has paid the clerk’s fee, has made satisfactory arrangements with the clerk to pay the fee, or is

entitled to appeal without paying the fee.” Tex. R. App. P. 35.3.

According to the docketing statement, the judgment was signed October 6, 2007.1

Appellant Jennifer Helm filed a motion for rehearing on November 2, 2007. The extended appellate
2

timetables are thus applicable. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(a)(1), 35.1(a). Accordingly, the record was

due to be filed on February 4, 2008. The record has not been filed.

In a letter dated February 1, 2008, the trial court’s clerk reported to this Court’s clerk

that appellant had not designated the record on appeal. The clerk also requested that this Court

extend the deadline for filing the clerk’s record until March 5, 2008. In a separate letter dated

February 1, 2008, the court reporter stated that, because Helm had not made a downpayment on

the reporter’s record, the reporter had not begun to prepare the record. In a letter dated

February 25, 2008, and addressed to Helm’s attorney, this Court wrote:

Notice was received from the district clerk’s office of Comal County, Texas, on

February 22, 2008, that appellant has neither paid, nor made arrangements for

payment, for the clerk’s record. Accordingly, the clerk’s record will not be timely

filed.

Appellant’s attorney is requested to submit a status report regarding this appeal.

A response regarding this matter is requested by this Court by March 06, 2008.

Failure to do so will result in the dismissal of this appeal for want of prosecution.

See Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(b).

Appellant has not responded to this request. On March 19, 2008, the trial court clerk confirmed that

appellant still had not made arrangements to pay for the record.

This appeal is dismissed for want of prosecution.

 

G. Alan Waldrop, Justice

Before Chief Justice Law, Justices Pemberton and Waldrop

Dismissed for Want of Prosecution

Filed: April 24, 2008
#### STATE ex rel. Gerard SENEGAR v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2011-KH-1409.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 23, 2011.

In re Senegar, Gerard; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 10-237788; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 11-00667.

Denied.
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                  Three months ended       Six months ended
                                     September 30,           September 30,    
                                    1997        1996       1997        1996   
                                 ---------   ---------  ----------  ----------
<S>                              <C>         <C>        <C>         <C>
Net income as reported . . . . .  $984,000    $672,000  $1,770,000  $1,257,000
                                 =========   =========  ==========  ==========
Primary:
  Common and common equivalent shares
  outstanding:
    Weighted average number of 
      common shares outstanding. 3,219,591   3,104,188   3,204,895   3,102,998
    Common stock equivalents 
      from options computed on 
      the treasury-stock method 
      using the average fair 
      market value of common 
      stock during the period. .   165,299     144,671     157,639     142,934
                                 ---------   ---------  ----------  ----------
    Shares used in the 
      computation. . . . . . . . 3,384,890   3,248,859   3,362,534   3,245,932
                                 =========   =========  ==========  ==========
  Primary net income per share .     $0.29       $0.21       $0.53       $0.39
                                 =========   =========  ==========  ==========

Fully Diluted: 
  Common and common equivalent shares
  outstanding:
    Weighted average number of 
      common shares outstanding. 3,219,591   3,104,188   3,204,895   3,102,998
    Common stock equivalents from 
      options computed on the 
      treasury-stock method using 
      the higher of the average 
      fair market value of common 
      stock during the period or 
      at the end of the period .   184,075     163,454     169,526     152,326
                                 ---------   ---------  ----------  ----------
    Shares used in the 
      computation. . . . . . . . 3,403,666   3,267,642   3,374,421   3,255,324
                                 =========   =========  ==========  ==========
  Fully diluted net income per 
    share. . . . . . . . . . . .     $0.29       $0.21       $0.52       $0.39
                                 =========   =========  ==========  ==========
</TABLE>
<PAGE>