1 

### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE

AT JAC KSON N ove m be r 15, 200 6 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE V 

### . TEV IAS B LED SOE
App e al b y pe r m iss ion fro m th e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

Crim inal Cou rt of Shelb y County No. 03-05465 Joseph B. Dailey, Jud ge

No. W2004-01585-SC- R11-CD - F iled on Ap ril 26, 2007

The De fenda

nt, Tevias B ledsoe, wa s char g ed with preme ditated murder, mur der in the pe rpetration of a f elony , espec ially

ag g ravated robbe ry , and unla wf u l possession of a ha

ndg un by a convic ted felon, a ll in connection with the shooting de ath of Na t h an Marone y . Appar ently acc eptingthe Def endant’ s theory

that t h e s h o o t i n g was a ccide ntal, the jury acquitted him of a ll charg es except felonious possession of a handgun. On direc t a ppeal, the Def

endant challeng ed for the first time the trial court’ s jury

instructions, claiming that the court should have char g ed the jury on the def

ense of duress. The Court of Criminal Appe als found that the tria l court’s fa ilure to instruct the jury on the defe nse of dur ess was pla in error and g rante d the Def

endant a new tria l. The State soug ht, and we g ra nte d, pe rm iss ion

to a pp e a l. We ho ld that the De fe nd ant is no t e nti tle d to a ne w tri a l on

the ba sis of pla in e rr or

. Ac c or din g ly , w e re ve rs e the jud g me nt o f t he Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls a

nd re ins tate the judg ment of the trial c ourt.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 1 1 A ppe al b y P e r m iss ion ; Judg m e ntof t he Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als Re ve r se d; Judgme nt of th e Trial Court Re instated

C OR NE L I A A. C LARK , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which W I L L I AM M. B AR KE R , C.J ., J ANI CE M. H O LDER and G AR Y R. W ADE , J J ., and D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , S P .J ., joined. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral & R ep o rt er ; Michae l E. Moore, Solicitor Gene ral; David H. Findley , Asst

. At t o rn ey

Gene ral; Will iam L . Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; Steve Jones and Amy Weirich, Asst. District Attorney s Gene ral; for the appe llant, State of Tenne ssee.
Wil liam C. Anderson, Jr., Memphis, Tennessee, f or the a ppellee, T evias B ledsoe.2 OP IN ION

F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND

Th i s case arises out of the shooting de ath of Nathan Marone y duringan ea

rly morning encounte r with the Defenda nt, Tevias Bledsoe, in Memphis, Tennesse e, on September 9, 2001. The fac ts included in the rec ord for our dete rmination of the issue bef ore us include the testimonies of the De fe nd ant a

nd an e y e wi tne ss.
Alonzo Holt t estified that he w as sitting on his car in his drivewa y during the early

morning h o urs wh en h e h ea rdtwo p eo p l e ar gu i n g. He wa l k ed t o wa rd th e no i s e to i n v es t i gat e. Ne ar a h i gh school, he saw

a beig e SUV next t o which two men we re standingand ar g uing. H olt stopped about forty y ards a way . Although it wa s betwee n two and three o’clock i n the m orning , a stree t light made the ar g uing me n visible. Holt hear d one of the m en tell the ot her one to g ive him something. The man who made the demand ha d a gun pointed at t he other man and “wa s talking about killing him.” Holt did not recog nize the man holding the gun.
Ho lt ye lle d at th e man h old ingthe g un , “I f y ou sh oo t that guy , ma n, tha t c ame ra is g oin gto see you,” ref

err ing to a secur ity came ra at the school. Holt testified that he hoped this announc ement would aver

t a shooting. Upon hear ing Holt’s war ning, the man being thre atene d said, “Man, I don’t know why he want to do this, I thought we were friends.” Holt testified t hat bot h men looked over ath i man d h e b ega n b ac k i n g u p

. He turn edt o l ea v e a n d

th en turn edb ac k

t o s ee wh atwa s h ap p en i n g. Holt testified that he sawthe two men strug g ling with one a nother a nd “then [he] heard a

g unshot and the guy went down.” Desc ribing the strug g le, Holt stated that “[t] he victim g rabbe d at the shooter, y ou know, as if they wer e wrestling for t he gun.” Acc ording to Holt, “[t] he gun went off one time.”

Ho lt s tate d th at, a ft e r t

he vic timwe nt d own, the sh oo te r we nt t hr ou g h th e vic tim ’s po c ke ts, then went to the ve hicle and beg an looki ng for something inside the SUV, re turned to the victim, then returne d to the vehicle. A t that point, Holt returned home an d h i d

. He s aw the shooter g et in the SUV and then lea

ve “at a hig h rate of spee d.” Holt called the police. Holt was unable to identify the shooter either

to the police or at trial.

The De fenda

nt also testifie d

. He ex p l ained that he and the victim, Natha n Marone y , had sp e nt t he e ve nin g tog e the r p art

ying . M aro ne y

pr ov ide d th e ir

tr ans po rt atio n w ithhis SUV . O n th e ir way home, they

stopped and the D efe ndant purc hased some ma rijuana f or Mar oney

. The De fenda nt g ot back in the SUV a

nd beg an re moving some of the marijuana

fo r h i m s el f, a portion t hat he descr i b ed as a b o n u s from the se ller for bring ing the seller a

new c ustomer. Acc ordingto the De fe nd ant, Maro ne y

vie we d th e Defe nd ant’ s a c tio n a s a the ft and pu lle d a g un on the De fe nd ant. Maro ne y c on tin ue d d ri vin gthe SUV“ re a l sl ow .” Th e De fe nd ant s aw thr e e pe rs on s in the vic ini ty and dec ided that Marone y would not shoot him in front of witnesses, so the Def endant jumped out of the SUV.

The Def endant testified that Marone y slammed on the brake s, put the SUV into park, and g ot out of the vehic le with the gun. Acc ordingto the Def endant,T his t esti m o ny p ro vid ed t he juro rs wit h a visual de scrip t i o n o f ho w m uc h d i st an ce t he D efen d an t ha d t o t rav erse 1 in o rd e r to p o sse ss th e gu n . It give s a n a p p e llate c o u rt v e ry litt le fro m w h ic h to d ra w a n y c o n c lus io n s, ho w e v e r. W e
r emi nd at t orn ey s an d t r i al cour t s t hat s uch t es t i mo ny s houl d be cl ar i f i ed f or pot ent i al appel l at e r evi ew.

O ne o f t he p o l i ce o f

f i cers who res p o nd ed t o t he scene t est i f i ed t hat “when [t hey] were i ni t i al l y l o o ki ng at t he 2 bo dy , [ t hey ] di dn’ t s ee any appare nt f at al woun d. ” I t was not unti l j ust b efo r e t he vi ct i m’ s bod y was mo ved t hat t hey d i scovered “ a small wo und on t he up p er l ef t chest

. ” T he m ed i cal t est i m o ny at t ri al est ab l i shed t hat t he vi ct i m d i ed “ d ue to a gu n sh o t wo u n d o f t h e c h e st a n d a b d o m e n w h ic h inv o lve d m a jo r b lo o d ve sse ls p ro d u c ing b le e d ing a n d d e a th.”
3 The truc k w a s s ti ll r

un n in g , th e li g h ts w a s o n , an d [M ar o n e y ] w a s s ta n d in g in the back of the truck, a

nd he was telling me to c ome her e. And I was like, no – we ll, he
was a ctually

telling me to g et back in the truck. And I was like, “Man, look, I ain’t g e tti ngba c k in

that tr uc k. I ’m str a ight fr om h e re ; I ’l l w a lk. Just l e t me g e t my clothes out y our t runk, and I ’ll walk. My momma stay

rig ht around the c orner , and Itake it from he re.”

The De fenda

nt stated that he a

nd Marone y

wer e not y elling a

t eac h other “ at this point.”

The De fenda

nt testified that Marone y then “wa lked up on” him with the gun and “stre tched his arm out.” The Defenda nt stated t hat, at that point, he “slapped t he gun out [ of Mar oney ’s] hand.” Th e tw o me n th e n b e g an f ig hti ng . The De fe nd ant e xpla ine d th at he g ra bb e d th e g un , whic h h a d s lid a short distance awa

y . Specifica lly , the Def

endant testified,

Ig rabbe d the gun. Somehow Ig et control. B eca use whe nS like I ’m rig ht here

. The gun may

be sl id to like wher e that g arba g e can i s rig ht there

. One of these jurors
can se e it rig ht there. I t slid over there to whe re I am to wher e the g arba g e ca n at. . . . An d w e , you

kn ow , f ig hti nga ll the wa

y ov e r h e re , a

nd Ie nd e d u p g e tti ngit. 1

The De fenda

nt hit Maroney

in the head w ith the gun in a n attempt to “sca

re him aw ay .” Mar oney k e p tt e l l i n gth e D e f

e n d an tt o g i v e h i m th e g un

. T h e D e f e n d an t c o c k e d th e g un , p o i n t e d i tatM ar o n e y, and heard a voice call out, “He y , man, you’[a]l l stop that; i t’s a ca mera in front of that school.” The Def endant testified that this announcement c aug ht his “undivided attention” and when he looke d tow ard the vo ic e , M aro ne y

“ g ra bb e d th e g un .” As the De fe nd ant st rug g le d to ke e p th e g un , it discharg ed.

Acc ording to the Defenda nt, Marone y then “kind of knee led down” a nd fell bac k. Marone y ’s ey es re mained open. The Defenda nt beca me afraid that Marone y

had bee n shot, but he did not see any blood. The De fenda

nt stated t hat he sear ched Maroney to see if there was a g unshot wound, but did not see one. The Def

endant pa nicked, jumped in Mar oney ’s SUV, and dr ove off . About a block 2

awa y , th e De fe nd ant t

hr e w the g un

out th e wi nd ow . H e c on tin ue d o n a sh or t di sta nc e to h is g ir lf ri e nd ’s ho us e , whe re he pa rk e d th e SUV and sp e nt the night. Th e De fe nd ant ins ist e d that he did not rea ch into Marone y ’s pocke ts, did not take any thing from him, a

nd did not touch him other than to d e te rm ine wh e the r h e ha d b e e n s ho t.T he D ef end ant ’ s reque st t hat t he jur y not b e charged on sel f

- d ef ense was co nsi st ent wi t h hi s t h e o ry that t he 3 vi ct i m was s ho t acci d ent al l y rat her t han t hrough a d el i b erat e act of t he D ef end ant d ef

end i ng himsel f

. S ee general l y T enn. C o d e A n n . § 3 9 -1 1 -6 1 1 (1 9 9 7 ) (s e tti n g fo rth the p ro v isio n s o f self-d e fen se ).
4 After his arre st, the Defe ndant was c harg ed with premeditated murder , murder in the p e r p e tr at i o n o f a f

e l o n y, e s p e c i a l l y a g g r av at e d r o b b e r y, an d un l aw f

u l p o s s e s s i o n o f a

h an d g unb y a convicted f

elon. The Def

endant contended at trial that the shooting wa s acc idental. Def ense c ounsel told the trial court specific ally that he wa s not asking that the jury be instructed on se lf-def ense. 3 De fe ns e c ouns e l a lso did no t r e quest a

c ha rg e on dure ss. Th e jur

y a c qu itt e d th e De fe nd ant o f a ll char g es other tha

n unlawful possession of a handgun by a felon. In his moti on for ne w trial, the Def endan t ch al l enged only

the suffic iency

of the e vidence . On direc t appea l, the Def endant acknow ledg ed his failure to raise previously any issue reg ardingthe jury

instructions but asked the Court of Criminal Appeals to re cognize as plain er ror the tr ial court’s f

ailure to c harg e the jury

on the def ense of duress. The Court of Criminal Appe als conclude d that the Def endant’ s argument had merit and g rante d a new

trial.

Th e State a

pp lie d to thi s Co ur

t f or , a nd the Court

g ra nte d, pe rm iss ion

to a pp e a l. T he State argues that the Court of Criminal Appe als err ed in findingplain err or. Its positi on is that first, the evidenc e at tria l did not support a duress instruction, and sec ond, even if it did, not all of the fac tors
nece ssary for the a pplication of plain-e rror

revie w ar e satisfied in this case

. Th e De fe nd ant c on tin

ue s to a lle g e that th e tr ia l c ourt c omm itt e d plai n erro r b y fa ili ngto ins tr uc t th e jur y on the de fe ns e of dure ss. He a sse rt s th at th e e vid e nc e at tr ia l w a s su ff ic ie nt t o f a ir ly raise the defe nse of duress; there fore , the trial court should ha ve submitt ed the defe nse to the jury and ins tr uc te d th at th e pr os e c uti on wa s b ound

to p ro ve be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t that the de fe ns e did
no t app ly . F a ilure to d o s o, he a lle g e s, de nie d h im h is c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht t o tr ia l by jur y . B e c a us e we fi nd th at th e De fe nd ant h a s f a ile d to e sta

bli shthe pr e re qu isi te s n e c e ssa ry to a fi nd ingof

pla in
err or, we reve rse the judg ment o f the Court of Criminal Appea ls and reinstate the trial cour t’s judgme nt of conviction on the sing le cha rg e.
STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW

Th is c a se re qu ir e s u s to de te rm ine wh e the r the tr ia l court c omm itt e d pla in er ro r in f a ili ngto char g e the jury

with a theo ry o f d ef

en se. As this Court has observe d rec ently , “issues conc erning incomplete [

jury ] instructions are deeme d waived in the a bsence of an obje ction or spec ial reque st.” State v. Pag e, 184 S.W.3d 223, 2 3 0 (T en n

. 2 006) (c iting State v. Crave ns, 764 S.W .2d 754, 757 (Tenn. 1989) ); see a lso St ate v. Hay nes, 720 S.W.2d 76, 85 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986) (re cog nizi ng that “all eged omissi ons in the char g e must be ca lled to the trial judg e’s attention at trial or be reg arde d as wa ived”) ; Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e). It is undisput ed that the De fenda nt’s asser tion of err or re g ard ingthe jur

y ins tr uc tio ns in t

his case wa s n ot r a ise d at tr ia l or in h is m oti on

fo r n e w tri a l. Acc ording ly , we are lim ited to revie wing the Defenda nt’s asser tion of error under the “ plain err or” doctrine. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(b).5 AN AL YSI S

I. P lain E rror
Gene rally , appellate revie w is limi ted to issues that are (a) prese rved f or re view in the trial court; (b) included in the m otion for a new trial afte r a jury verdic t; or (c) presented a s an issue on appea l. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e ), 13(b), 27(a) (4), 36(a); S tate v. Yore ck 133 S.W .3d 606, 610-11 (Tenn. 2004) . Under

Rule 13(b) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Appellate Procedur e and Rule 52(b) of the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ri min a l Pr oc e dure , h ow e ve r, a pp e llate c ourt s may , in the e xer c ise of the ir discretionar

y authority , consider issues not other wise pre serve d for r eview.

Rul e 13 (b ) o f t

he Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f A

pp e llate Pr oc e dure pr ov ide s a s f oll ow s:
Re vie w g e ne ra lly

wi ll e xten d on ly to tho se iss ue s pr e se nte d fo r re vie w. Th e a pp e llate court shall also consider whether the trial and appe llate cour t have jurisdiction over the subject matter , whether or not prese nted for r eview, a nd may in its di scre tion consider othe r issues i n order , amongother re asons: (1) to pre vent nee dless litigation, (2) to pre vent injury

to the interests of the public, a nd (3) to preve nt prejudice to the jud ic ia l pr oc e ss. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(b). Rule 52(b) of the Te nnessee Rules of Criminal Proced u re p ro v i d es as follows: “When necessar y to do substantial justice, an appellate cour t may consider a

n err or that has aff ecte d the substantial rig hts of an ac cused at any time, even thoug h the er

ror wa s not raised in the motion for a new

trial or assig ned as e rror

on appea l.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(b).

Rul e 52 (b ), a

re state me nt of common

law, c on te mpl ate s th at any c on sid e ra

tio n o f a “ pla in
err or” r ests within the discretion of the court. United S tates v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993) (d isc us s i n g F e d e r a l R

u l e o f C r i m i n a l P r o c e d

ur e 5 2 )

. T h e A dv i s o r

y C o m m i s s i o n C o m m e n t s to Tenne ssee Rul e of Criminal Procedur e 52 provide that “[p] lain err or m ay , not must, be noticed by the appellate court, even where substantial justice is involved.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(b), Advisory Comm’n Com ments. In Olano, the Unit ed S t at es Supreme Court desc ribed the w ord “pla in” as sy nony mous with “clea

r” or “obvious,” a ffe ctinga “substantial r ight.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. Tr a dit ion a lly , c ourt s h ave ru le d th at t he n atur e of the ri g ht a ff

e c te d mu st b e so fu

nd ame nta l a s to ref lect upon “the fairne ss, integr ity or public reputation of judicial proce eding s.” I d. at 736 (c itation
and int e rn a l qu otatio n ma

rk s o mitte d) ; se e a lso State v. Woo de n, 65 8 S. W.2 d 5 53 , 5 59 (T e nn . Cr im. App. 1983).

In State v. Adkis s o n , 899 S.W .2d 626 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) , the Court of Criminal Appea ls perfor

med an e x tensive ana ly sis of the plain-er ror doc trine, and, a fter a

car eful c onsideration of the state a

nd fede ral c ases a ddressingthis iss ue, e s t ab l i shed the followingfive fa ctors for deter mining whe ther a

n err or in the abse nce of

an objec tion qualifies as “pla in”:W hi l e t he t ri al c o urt ’ s charge as r ead t o t he jur y was not t rans cri b ed , t he wri t t en charge i s co nt ai ned wi t hi n t he 4
t ech ni cal r ecor d as r equi r ed by T enn es s ee R ul e of C r i mi nal P r ocedur e 3 0(c)

. W e n ot e t hat an appel l at e c our t ’ s r evi ew of i s s ues r ega r di ng jur y i ns t r uct i ons i s f aci l i t at ed by a t r ans cr i pt o f t he act ual char ge as d el i ver ed oral l y by t he t r i al j udge.
6 a ) t he re c or d mu st c le arl y

e sta bli shwh at oc c ur

re d in the tr ia l c ourt ; b) a c le ar a nd un e qu ivo c a l r

ule of law mus t ha

ve be e n b re a c he d;
c ) a su bs tanti a l r ig ht o f t

he a c c us e d mu st h ave be e n a dv e rs e ly a ff e c te d; d) the a ccuse d did not waive the issue f or tac tical re asons; and e) c onsideration of the err or is “nec essar y to do substantial just ice.”

I d. at 642 (footnotes omitted).

In State v. Smit h, this Court formally adopted the Adkisson test as “a c lear and mea ningf ul standard f or consider ing whether

a trial e rror

ris es t o t h e l ev el of plain error in the a bsence of an ob je c tio n. ” 24 S.W. 3d

27 4, 28 2- 83 (T e nn

. 20 00 ). Our C ourt sp e c if ic a lly ru le d th at th e re c or d mu st establish all of the five fac tors as pre sent for a decla ration of plain e rror . I d. The Advisory

Commi ssion Com ments to Tennessee Rule of Appel late Proce dure 13( b) sug g est that the discre tionary authorit y for the de clar ation of plain er ror “ be spar ingly

exercised.” Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( b) , Adv iso ry Comm’ n Comme nts

. Mo re ov e r, an er ro r “m ay be so pla in a s to be re viewable

. . . , y et t he error may be harmless and therefor e not justify a reversa l.” United States v. L opez, 575 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1978); see Adkisson, 899 S.W .2d at 642. The magnitude of the er ror must have been so sig nificant “ ‘th at i t p robably chang ed the outcome of the trial.’ ” Adkisson, 899 S.W .2d at 642 (quotingUnited States v. Ker ley , 838 F.2d 932, 937 (7th Cir. 1988));
see a lso United States v. Doug las, 818 F.2d 1317, 1320 ( 7th Cir. 1987).

I t is the a c c us e d’ s b ur de n to per su a de an ap pe llate c ourt that th e tr ia l c ourt c omm itt e d p la in
e rr or . Se e Ol ano , 5 07 U. S. at 73 4. F ur the r, our co mpl e te c on sid e ra tio n o f a ll f

ive of the fa c tor s is not nece ssary

when it is clea

r fr om the rec ord that at least one of them ca nnot be satisfied. Smith, 24 S.W .3d at 283.

In r e vie wing th e Defendant’ s c la im o f p la in e rr or , th e Cou rt of Cr imi na l App e a ls f

ir st conclude d that “the r ecor d is fairly clea r as to what happene d in the trial court,” thus satisfying the first Adkisson fac tor. The c ourt based thi s fi n d i n g solely on the fa ct that the trial c ourt’s written char g e to th e ju

r y c o n ta in s n o in s tr

u c ti o no nan y

s p e c if ic d e f e n s e

. Wh il e th e Co urt o f Cr im inal 4 Appea ls did not ex pressly state so, it implicitly found that the second and third Adkisson f actor s, (a
c le ar a nd un e qu ivo c a l r

ule of law w a s b re a c he d, and

a su bs tanti a l ri g ht of the a c c us e d w a s a dv e rs e ly aff ecte d), we re satisfied beca use it de termined that the def endant’ s trial testimony

fairly raised the d e f e n s e o f d ur e s s , an d th e r e f

o r e th e f a i l ur e t o i n s tr

u c t th e d e f

e n s e v i o l at e d

h i s r i g h tt o tr i a l b y j ur

y. Th e c ourt c on c lud e d th at “ c on sid e ratio n o f the iss ue is ne c e ssa ry to do sub sta

nti a l justi c e ” (t

he fi ft h Adkisson fac tor). In rea chingthis conclusion, the Court of Criminal Appeals took into consideration the jury ’s dec ision to acquit the Defe ndant of the murde r and r obbery char g es, which, in the view of the cour t, acc redited the Def

endant’ s theory

of def ense. Due t o omissions of key parts of the rec ord and the r esulting unc erta inties a s to whether the failure to reque st a duress instruction wa s a tac ticalA cl os el y r el at ed def en s e i s t h at of

“ n ec es s i t y ” wh i ch i s c odi f i ed at T en n es s ee Code Ann ot at ed s ec t i on 39- 11- 5 60 9 as a “

j us t i f i cat i on. ” N ece s s i t y i s a def ens e t o pros ecu t i on wh er e t he def endan t r eas onabl y bel i eve d h i s or her cr i mi nal

con du ct t o h av e bee n “ i m m edi at el y n ec es s ar y t o a v oi d i mmi n en t h ar m, ” an d w h er e t h e “ des i r abi l i t y a n d u r g en cy of

a v o id ing the ha rm c le a rl y o u tw e ig h t h e ha rm so u g h t t o b e p re v e n te d b y the law p ro sc rib ing the c o n d u c t, a c c o rd ing to ordi nar y s t andar ds of

r eas onabl ene s s

. ” T enn

. Co de A nn . § 3 9

- 1 1

- 6 09 ( 20 06 )

. O ur Co ur t of Cri mi nal Ap peal s ha s
re c o g n iz e d the c o m m o n law d istinc tio n b e tw e e n the d e fen se o f d u re ss a n d the d e fen se o f ne c e ssity:

7 de c isi on on the part of de fe ns e c ouns e l, w e ho ld t hat th e Court

of Cr imi na l App e a ls e rr e d in concludingthat considerations of “substan t i al j u s t i ce” entitle the Def endant to a ne w trial on the
wea pons char g e.

II. Dur e ss The statutory

defe nse of dur ess is codified in our c riminal code a s a “ge nera l defe nse.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-504 (1997). Since it is not a n aff irmative def

ense, a defe ndant nee d not prove duress by a prepondera nce of the evidence in order to merit a jury instruction. State v. Culp, 90 0 S. W.2 d 7 07 , 710 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ). Rathe r, if a dmi ssi ble e vid e nc e fa ir ly ra ise s it s applicability , the trial cour t is required to submit the defe nse to the jury

. I d.; see a lso Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-203( c) ( 1997). To determine i f a defe nse has been f airly raised by the proof, a

court
mus t c on sid e r t

he e vid e nc e in t

he light m os t f

avo ra ble to t he de fe nd ant, inc lud inga ll r e a so na ble infere nces that may

be dra wn there from. State v

. Bu l t , 9 8 9 S.W .2d 730, 733 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). Once proof of a defe nse is suf ficient to me rit a jury instruction, the burden shif t s t o the prosec ution to “prove be y ond a re asonable doubt that the defe nse does not apply .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-11-203 Sentencing Comm’n Comments (1997); see also Culp, 900 S.W .2d at 710. I f the jury reta ins any

rea sonable doubt about the applicability of t he defense, it must acquit the acc used of the rele vant cha

rg e. See T enn. Code Ann. § 39- 11-203(d) (1997).

Our c riminal code pr ovides that the g ener al def ense of duress is a de fense to prosecution

wh e re th e perso n o r a

thi rd pe rs on is t hr e ate ne d w ithha

rm wh ic h is pr e se nt, imminent, im pendingand of suc h a nature to induc e a well-g rounded a pprehe nsion of death or serious bodily injury if the [criminal] act [ beingprosec uted] is not done. Th e thr e ate ne d h arm

mus t be c on tin

uo us thr ou g ho ut t

he tim e the [c ri min a l] a c t is b e i n gc o m m i t t e d , an d mu s t b e o n e f r o m w h i c h th e p e r s o n c an n o t w i th dr aw i ns a f e ty. F urth e r , th e d e s ir a

b il it y an d ur g e n c y o f av o id in gth e h ar

m m u s t c le ar ly

o u tw e ig h,
acc ordingto ordinary

standards of

rea sonablene ss, the harm soug ht to be preve nted by the law p ro sc ri bin gthe [cr imi na l] c on du c t. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 11-504(a ) (1997) . The de fense of dure ss is not available “to a person who intentionally , knowing ly , or re cklessly become s involved in a situation in which it was probable that the pe rs on

wo uld be su bje c te d to c omp uls ion .” I d. at ( b) . T he Se nte nc ingCommis sio n Co mme nts to s e c tio n 5 04 a dv ise tha t “ [t]his ra

re de fe ns e is presen t whe n a de fe nd ant c omm its an o ff e ns e beca use anothe r per son threate ns death or se rious bodily injury if the off ense is not committed.” The 5“ W h i l e t h e def en s e of du r es s c ov er ed t h e s i t u at i on w h er e t h e coe r ci on h ad i t s s ou r ce i n t h e ac t i on s of ot h er h u m a n b e i n g s , t h e d e f e n s e o f n e c e s s i t y , o r c h o i c e o f e v i l s , t r a d i t i o n a l l y c o v e r e d t h e s i t u a t i on
w he re p hysi ca l f

o rce s b eyo nd t he ac t o r’ s c o ntro l re nd ere d i l l eg al co nd uc t t he l esse r o f t w o ev i l s. T hu s, whe r e A des t r oy ed a di ke becau s e B t hr eat ene d t o ki l l hi m i f he di d not , A woul d ar gu e t hat he ac t ed und er d ures s, w hereas i f A d est royed t he d i ke i n o rder t o p rotect m o re val uab l e p rop ert y f rom f l o o d i ng, A coul d cl ai m a def

ens e of ne ces s i t y

. ”

St at e v

. G r ee n , 995 S. W

. 2d 591, 606 ( T en n

. C r i m. A pp. 1998) ( qu ot i n g U n i t ed St at es v

. B ai l ey , 444 U

. S. 394, 409- 10 ( 19 80 ) ) ; s ee al s o St at e v. D ave nport , 97 3 S. W

. 2d 28 3, 28 7 ( T enn

. C r i m. A pp

. 19 98 ) ( “ N ece s s i t y ha s t r adi t i onal l y been

use d ap p ro p riat ely w he n the e xtrem e situ a tion i s b ro ug ht o n b y s o m ething o t he r t ha n a hum an ac t .”). M o d ern ca ses, h o w e v e r, h a v e ten d e d to b lur this t ra d iti o n a l d istinc tio n b e tw e e n d u re ss an d n e c e ssity. B a iley, 4 4 4 U .S

. a t 4 1 0 ; se e , e.g ., Stat e v. G re e n , 9 1 5 S.W

. 2 d 82 7 , 83 2 (T enn. C ri m

. A p p

. 19 9 5 ) ( st at i ng t hat cl ai m of al l eged acco m p l i ce t hat he p art i ci p at ed i n aggravat ed burgl ary due t o t hreat by d ef end ant t o harm hi s son wo ul d have rai sed d ef enses of d ures s and

n e c e ssity); C u lp , 9 0 0 S .W .2 d a t 7 0 9 ( sta ting th a t d e fen se r a ise d b y p riso n e r’s a sse rtio n tha t he e sc a p e d fro m ja il d u e to t h r ea t s of

h ar m by s h er i f

f a n d de pu t i es w as mor e ak i n t o n ec es s i t y t h an du r es s )

. I n T en n es s ee , t h e s t at u t or y de f en s es of d u re ss an d n e c e ssity a re n o t lim ited to a n y p a rtic u la r so u rc e o f h a rm , fo llo w ing the M o d e l P e n a l C o d e in th is r e sp e c t. Se e M o d el P enal C o d e § § 2.09 , 3.02 (cat ego ri zi ng duress as a l i m i t at i o n on t he d ef end ant ’ s ab i l i t y t o act volunt ari l y and necessi t y as a jus t i f

i cat i o n d ef

ense). In t hi s case, the D ef end ant has no t chal l enged t he t ri al co urt ’ s f ai l ure t o i nst ruct t he jury on t he d ef

ense of necess i t y

. T heref

o re, w e n eed not d et erm i ne t he ap p l i cab i l i t y of necessi t y as a d ef ense t o t he

c h a rg e o f un la w ful p o sse ssio n o f a ha n d g u n b y a c o n v ic te d felo n

. C f. C u lp , 9 0 0 S .W .2 d a t 7 1 0 (h o ld ing tha t ne c e ssity and duress are avai l ab l e as def enses t o escape ).

O ur cr i mi nal code provi des t hat a pers on who has b een “c onvi ct ed of a f el ony i nv ol vi ng t he us e o r at t emp t ed 6

u s e of f or ce , vi ol en ce or a dea dl y wea pon ” c ommi t s a f el on y i f t h e pe r s on t h er ea f

t er pos s es s es a ha n dg u n

. T en n

. Code A nn

. § 39

- 17

- 13 07 ( b)( 1)( A ) ( 19 97 )

. T he St at e a nd t he D ef endan t s t i pul at ed at t r i al t hat t he D ef endan t ha d been convi ct ed i n 2001 of

“ A gg r ava t ed Ass aul t , a f el ony i nv ol vi ng t he us e of a dea dl y wea po n. ”
8 Comments further point o u t t hat, in order for the de fense of dure ss to be available , “ther e must be
no rea sonable opportunity to esca pe the compulsion without committing an offe nse.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-11-504 Sente ncing Comm’n Comments; see a lso St ate v. Robinson, 622 S.W .2d 62, 73 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981)

.

III. Failure t o Instruct on Duress as P lain E rror

In th is c a se , th e c ri min a l a c t th e Defen dan t c on te nd s h e c omm itt e d und e r d ur e ss w a s h is takingpossession of the handgun duringhis strugg le with the victim. After examining the fa cts and 6 circ umstances of

this case, we concur

that the e v idence –in particular the Def endant’ s own testimony –may have been sufficient t o war rant a duress inst ruction. Neverthele ss, under the unique fac ts and circ umstances of this case , we conclude that the trial court’s f ailure to instruct the jury

on the def ense of duress with re spect to the we apons cha rg e wa s not an err or so egreg ious a s to require the Def endant be aff

orded a new tria l in order to “do substantial justice.” Our primar

y conce rn is the abse nce of any indication in the appellate rec ord that dure ss was a theor y of the de fense . We note that neither the openingstatements nor the c losing a rguments are included in the re cord on a ppeal. The se mig ht h ave pr ovided more insig ht into the theory of the defe nse. It is the responsibility of the party raising an issue on appea l (in this case, the D efe ndant), to furnish the appe l late cour t with a rec ord that will enable that court to dec ide the issues ra ised. Tenn. R. App. Proc. 24; State v. Ta ylor, 992 S.W .2d 941, 944 (Tenn. 1999)

.B ot h du r ess a nd s el f

- def en s e ar e “ def

en s es , ” as de f

i n ed by T en n es s ee Code An n ot at ed s ec t i on 39- 11- 203 7 (1 9 9 7 ), w h e n th e p r o o f fa irly ra ise s a n issu e c o n c e rn ing w h e the r th e d e fen d a n t wa s ju stif ie d in a c ting in re sp o n se to i mpen di n g h ar m or u n l aw f u l f or ce w h i ch i n v ol v ed an i mmi n en t da n g er of de at h or s er i ou s bodi l y i n j u r y

. Se e T en n

. Code A nn. §§ 39

- 1 1

- 5 0 4 (19 9 7 ) (duress) & 39

- 1 1

- 6 1 1 (19 9 7 ) ( sel f

- d ef ense). A cl o se parsi ng of t he st at ut e set t i ng f o rt h t he def ens e of dur es s r eve al s t hat i t en com pas s es f our el ement s

. In t he cont ext of t hi s ca s e, t hos e f

our el ement s ar e ( 1) t hat the vic tim thr e a te n e d the D e fen d a n t with a d ra w n gu n so a s to c a u se the D e fen d a n t to fea r his o w n d e a th o r ser io u s b o d ily i nj ur y i f t he D ef endan t di d not obt ai n pos s es s i on of t he gu n; ( 2) t he vi ct i m’ s t hr eat of s hoot i ng t he D ef

endan t was
co nt i nuo us t hrougho ut t he D ef end ant ’ s p o ss ess i o n of t he gun; (3) t he D ef end ant co ul d not saf

el y wi t hd raw f

rom t he vi ct i m’ s t hr eat of

s hoot i ng hi m; an d (4) t he des i r abi l i t y and ur gen cy o f t he D ef endan t t aki ng p oss es s i on o f t he gu n i n or der t o avoi d bei ng s hot by t he vi ct i m cl ear l y out wei gh ed t he har m soug ht t o be avoi ded b y t he law p r osc r i bi ng conv i ct ed f el o ns f rom po ss ess i ng guns

. T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 9

- 1 1

- 5 0 4 (19 9 7 ).
9 Fr om the rec ord provide d , it is clear that the de fense focuse d on the more se rious crimes char g ed: pre meditated murde r, fe lony murder, a nd espec ially

ag g r a v ated r obbery . The tac tical theory of the de fe ns e wa s th at th e vic timwa s sh ot a c c ide nta lly , and the De fe nd ant d id n ot r ob him . In f a c t, wh e n th e tr ia l c ourt

sp e c if ic a lly a sk e d whe the r h e de sir e d an ins tr uc tio n o n s e lf

-d e fe ns e , a

de fe ns e closely akin to duress, the Def

endant e x pressly

declined suc h an instruction. Instead, the D efe ndant 7
conce ntrated on a

theory of “a ccide nt,” which, a

ppare ntly , the jury

was will i n g t o ad opt as to the
mur de r a nd ro bb e ry of

fe ns e s. No t on ly did the De fe nd a nt n ot r e qu e st a

jur y ins tr uc tio n o n d

ur e ss, but th e re is n o ind ic atio n in the re c or d pr ov ide d th at su c h a the or y wa s e ve n c on te mpl ate d. In f a c t, the Def endant’ s express rejec tion of an instruction on self-de fense sug g ests otherwise.

As set forth above, the test for plain e rror includes five pr ere quisites, each of which must be satisfied before the trial court’s judgment may be overturned. The party advocating plain err or bea rs the burde n of establishingsuch cla ims. Olano, 507 U.S. a t 734. Arevie wingcourt must there fore
un de rt ake a clo se and car e fu l ana ly sis of e a c h p re re qu isi te in t

ur n b e fo re de te rm ini ngthat a pla in
err o r h as b een committed. Only when the r eviewingcourt ha s satisfied itself that all five prer equisites have be en met should it consider g rantingrelief on the basis of “ plain err or.”

Where a defe ndant fa ils to carry

his burden of es t ab l i s h i n geven one of the five plain err or prer equ i s i t es , the re viewingcourt may discontinue its analy sis and reje ct the def endant’ s claim of plain err or. In this case , the Defenda nt failed to submit a record that included opening state ments and
c los ingargume nts . B y

thi s o mis sio n, he ha s c lou de d th e iss ue of wh e the r t

he fa ilu re to reque st a duress instruction wa s a tac tical decision. I t is difficult t o fault t he trial court and find “plain er ror” for not char g ing duress when, based on the record provided, it was neve r discussed a s a theory of the de fe ns e , a nd the De fe nd ant a ff

ir mativ e ly wa ive d a n in str uc tio n o n s e lf

-d e fe ns e wh ic h, un de r t

he fa c ts of thi s ca se , wa s an an a log ou s def e ns e to dur e ss. We d isa g re e wi th t he Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls that the j ury ’s apparent accr editation of t he defenda nt’s acc ident defe nse on the m urder and robbe ry char g es nec essar ily

indicates that the jury

would likewise have acc epted a duress de fense on the
wea pon char g e. We there fore conclude that the Def endant ha s failed to ca

rry his burden of establishing a ll five Adkisson fac tors, and thus, that consider ation of the a lleg ed er ror is not nec essar

y to do substantial just ice. Tenn. R. Crim. Proc. 52( b). F or that re ason, the c laim that the trial court
err ed in fa iling to instruct on dure ss on the weapons char g e shoul d not be noti ced as plain err or and the Def endant is not entitled to relief

.10 CO NC LU SION

We reve rse the judg ment of the Court of Criminal Appea ls and reinstat e t h e trial c ourt’s j u d g m e n to f

c o n v i c t i o nf

o r o n e c o un to f

un l aw f u l p o s s e s s i o n o f a w e a

p o n b y a c o n v i c t e d f

e l o n

. It
a pp e ari ngthat th e De fe nd ant, Te via s B le ds oe , is ind ig e nt, the c os ts o f thi s ca us e are taxed

to t he State
o f T e n n e s s e e , f

o r w h i c he x e c u t i o nm ay i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

________________________________ CO RN EL I A A . CLARK, JUSTI CE