### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ja nuary 26, 200 5

STATE OF TENNESS EE v . WI LLI E BOB KI NG

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Warre n Coun ty No. F -9178 Larry B. Stanley, Jr., Judge

No. M2004- 00548-CCA -R3-C D - F iled May 25, 2005

The De fenda nt was convic ted by jury verdic t of two counts of a g g ravated burg lary , two counts of

a g g ra va te d a ssa

ult , a ndmis de me a no r r e sis tin g arr e st. Th e tr ia l c ou rt se nte nc e d the De fe nd a nt a s a Rang e I I offe nder to te n y ear s for eac h felony conviction and six months for t h e m i s demea nor convic ti o n , w ith th e f

ir s t th r e e f

e lo n y c o n v ic ti o n s e n te n c e s to b e s e r v e d c o n s e c u ti v e ly and the

rema ining se ntence s to be serve d concur rently
, resulting in an eff

ective sentenc e of thirty

y ear s. On appea l, the Def

endant r aises four

issues: 1) the evidenc e wa s insufficient to support his two

a g g ra va te d b ur g lary

c on vic tio ns a ndon e a g gravat ed ass a ult c on vic tio n; 2 ) the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in failing to allow the def

ense to impea ch the testimony of one of the S tate’s witnesses by means of a prior juvenile c onviction; 3) the trial cour t er red in im posing e x cessive se ntence s in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.
___, 124 S.Ct . 2531 (2004); and 4) the trial court erre d in imposi ng
c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s. We a ff ir m th e jud g me nts of

the tr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Circ uit Court Aff

irm ed

D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J
., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J ER R Y L. S MI TH and R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined.

Da n Br y an t , P u b l i c D ef

en d er , M cM i n n v i l l e, T en n es s ee , fo r t h e a p p el l an t , W i l l i e B o b Ki n g.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral and Reporter ; Br ent C

. Cherry , Assistant Attorney Gene ral; and Dale Potter, D istrict Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.
OP IN ION

F AC TS The c onvictions at issue in this appea l stem from an inc ident which occ urre d at the Country Pla c e Ap art me nts in M c Min nv ill e du ri ng the e arl y mornin g ho ur s of July 25 , 2 00 2. Th e De fe nd a nt, Willi e B ob Ki ng , bro ke int o h is w if e ’s apa rt me nt anda ssa

ult e d b othhe r anda

ne ig hb or wh o c a me to her a id, and then broke into a neig hboring apartment where his wi fe soug ht refug e. When the police ar rived a t the scene , the Def endant f irst fled and the n foug ht with the office rs as they place d him under ar

rest. A Warr en C o u n t y

g rand jury

returne d an indictment ag ainst the Def endantSe veral d ays p ri o r t o t hi s i nci d ent , t he vi ct i m was grant ed an O rder o f P rotect i o n pro hi b i t i ng t he D efend ant 1

f rom “ co m m i t t i ng f

urt her act s o f

ab use or t hreat s o f

a b use” aga i nst the vi ct i m , and res t rai ni ng t he D efend ant f rom “ any

con t ac t ” wi t h h er , i n cl u di n g “ commu n i ca t i n g wi t h [t h e v i ct i m]
, di r ec t l y or i n di r ec t l y , or comi n g abou t [ t h e v i ct i m] for

a n y p u rp o se .” T h is p ro te c tio n o rd e r w a s in e ff e c t wh e n the c rim e s a t i ssu e in this c a se w e re c o m m itt e d

.
-2- char g ing him with two counts of a g g ravated burg lary , two counts of ag g rava t ed as s au lt, and one count of re sisting ar

rest. The Def

endant wa s tried by

a jury

.

At tr ia l, Ms. Ki ng (the vic tim ) t e sti fi e d th a t sh e he arda kn oc k at he r f

ro nt d oo r s ome tim e around 3:00 on the morning of J uly 25, 2002. She went to the window, sa w it was her husband, and told him t o leave

. She then testified that the De fenda nt “busted in like a fool,” d i v i n g t h ro u g h a 1
g lass window into he r apartment. The victim state d she then “hit [the Defe ndant] with [ a] hickory stick” until he overpow ere d her a nd beg an to choke her. The victim testified t hat at some point the Def endant dr ug her outside the a

partment a nd threw he r ag ainst a “big old concr ete thing,” a nd she br ok e thr e e ri bs . H ow e ve r, th e vi ctim al so state d th a t th e De fe nd a nt j a mme d th e fr on t do or so it would not open, and she scre amed for help from ins ide her apartment until her neig hbor’s son kicke d in the front door to he r apa rtment and c onfronted the Def endant.

The victim furthe r testified that whe n her ne ighbor ’s son, Mr. Knowle s, came i n to her

apa rt me nt, he “ pu lle d” he r aw a y fr om the De fe nd a nt, a ndthe tw o me n b e g a n to sc uf fl e . D uring thi s
a lte rc a tio n, the De fe nd a nt p ull e d o ut a kn if e a ndc ut M r. Kno wl e s. Th e vic tim ’s ne ig hb or , M s. Stewart, then came in and ushere d the victim next door to her ow n apartment, and, ac cording to the vict im’s testimony , hid the victim in a closet. The victim testified that a short time later the Def endant br oke into he r neig hbor’s a partment a nd “tried to g et me, but he didn’t know w here I was at in the ir house.” At the Def endant’ s sentenc ing hearing, the victim ag ain stated that the D efe ndant

ne ve r f ou ndhe r h idi ng in the c los e t, a ndne ve r d ir e c tly thr e a te ne d o r a ssa

ult e d h e r wh ile sh e wa s in he r n e ig hb or ’s apa

rt me nt.

Mr. Knowles, the fiftee n-y ear -old son of Ms. Stewart, testified that he was w atching TV the morning of the incide nt when he he ard a woman scr eaming . He we nt outside and d i s cover ed the

sc re a ms w e re c omi ng fr om i ns ide the vic tim ’s apa rt me nt. Th e do or to the vic tim ’s apa rt me nt w ou ld not open, so he kicked it in and obse rved the Def endant on top of the victim, hitt ing he r. When Mr. Kn ow le s e nte re d t he apar tm e nt, the De fe nd a nt g ot o ff the vic tim

a ndve rb a lly

c on fr on te d h im, to which he r esponded: “ I

don’t appre ciate y ou jumping on no woman.” At this point t he two beg an to scuffle and the Defe ndant pul led out a butt erf ly knife. Mr. Knowles stated that he “thoug ht [ the De fe nd a nt] w a s g oin g to kill me ,” bu t adm itt e d the De fe nd a nt a c tua lly “ ba re ly tou c he d” him

wi th the knife, be cause he quickly moved away

.

Mr. Knowles f

urther te stified that while the two we re involved in this alter cation, his mother

c a me in to th e v ic ti m’ s ap ar tm e n t a n d to o k th e v ic ti m a w a y

. A f te r th e D e f

e n d a n t pulled out the kn if e , Mr

. Kn ow le s state d that he le ft the apa rt me nt. Th e De fe nd a nt f

oll ow e d h im o uts ide , b ut d id
not pursue him. M r

. K n o w le s f u r th e r te s ti f ie d th a t a s h o r t t im e late r

h e r e tu r n e d to th e ap ar tm e nt complex and found t h e De fe n dant in the par king lot, and the two became involved in a sec ond alterc ation. This se cond fig ht had just concluded w hen the police arrived and the D efe ndant fled.-3-

Whil e Mr. Know les was only fiftee n at the time of the incident, t he record refle cts that he wa s about 6’1” a nd weig hed appr ox imately 220 pounds. On cross- examination, Mr. Knowles stated he did not

“ pu ll” the vic tim

a way fr om the De fe nd a nt.

Ms. Stewart testifi ed that she lived next door to the victim. The night of the incident she wi tne sse d h e r s on a ndthe De fe nd a nt i n a n a lte rc a tio n, a ssi ste d the inj ur e d vic tim to he r a pa rt me nt, and locke d h er d o o r. Shortlythere afte r the De fenda nt broke into her a partment looking for the victim. Ms. S tewart testified at trial t hat t he De fenda nt found the victim in her apa rtment, “provoke d her and started hitt ing her,” and she called 911 to report the incident. Howe ver, at the Def endant’ s sentenc ing he aring , Ms. Stewart denie d she stated at trial that the Def endant hit t he victim in her apartment, and testified: “[ w] hether [t he De fenda nt] was g oing to hit [the victim] or not, I don’t know. He w as mad a nd he wa s sear ching for he r.”

On cross-e x amination, Ms. Stewa rt admitted she was once convicted of theft. She also stated that th e De fe n d ant di d not harm her , her se ven childre n, one g randc hild, or her ba by sitter, all of whom wer e inside her

apartment at t he ti me of the i ncident. Ms. Stewart further testified tha t she and her baby sitter manag ed to g et the Def endant out of her apartment the night of the incident, but he ling ere d in the parking lot until the police a rrived.

Offic er Robert Hutchins of the McMinnville Ci ty Po li c eD e p a

r tm e n t t e s ti fied that he rec eived a 91 1 d is p a tc h c a ll th e mo r n in g o f th e in c id e n t r e p o r ti n g a s u s p e c t w a s b e a ti n g h is w ife a nd a juvenile had be en cut with a knif e. Of fice r Hutchins stated that upon arriving at the apartments, he observe d a g roup of pe ople in the par king lot and he ard someone say “police.” The De fenda nt then turned, looked at Office r Hutchins, droppe d something on the gro u n d and ra n. Offic er H utchins shou te d “ Po li c e , s to p ” th r e e ti me s , b u t th e D e f e n d a n t d id n o t s to p u n ti l h e h a d b e e n run down. Offic er H utchins test i fi ed t h at t he De fenda nt had to be tac kled, and f oug ht with him and another office r until they

manag ed to handc uff him. Off icer L isa Norris of the McMinnville police testified that when she arrived at the sc ene, O ffice r Hutchins wa s pursuing the Def endant. She obse rved the Def endan t “ tu r n ” o n O f

f ic e r H u tc h in s , a n d s h e ru s h e d to a s s is t in th e arr e s t. Sh e s tate d that the De fe nd a nt “ fo ug ht” the tw o o ff ic e rs a ndhe sme lle d o f a lc oh ol.

Offic er H utchins further

testified that he recove red the object the Def endant dropped i n the parking lot, which turned out to be a b u t t erfly knife. He also observe d that the window to the victim’s apartment was broke n. The majority of t h e gl as s wa s on the inside, indicating that the window was pushe d in by someone on the outside. Offic er H utchins also stated that the victim was visiblyinjured, explaining she w as “ble eding from the mouth” a nd had “c ontusions about her fa ce.”

At trial, the De fenda nt, informed of his rig hts by the court, declined to take the witness stand. The de fense offe red no proof, but submit ted a motion for a direc ted ver dict, which the c ourt denied. The jury returne d a verdict of guilty on all five offenses a s char g ed in the indictment. The D efe ndant tim e ly fi le d a mot ion fo r a

new tr ia l, w hic h w a s d e nie d f oll ow ing a n e vid e nti ary

he ari ng . T his appea l followed.T h e D e fen d a n t d o e s n o t ch a llen g e his c o n v ic tio n fo r re s is ti n g a r r e s t o r th e su ff ic ie n c y o f ev id e n c e o f his 2

co nv i cti o n for a gg rav ated assau l t ag ainst M r. K no w l es.

T h e D e fen d a n t co n c e d e s tha t he e n te re d b o th a p a rtm e n ts un la w fully. 3

-4- AN AL YSI S I. Su ff iciency I n his fi rs t iss ue on app e a l, the De fe nd a nt c la ims the e vid e nc e is i ns uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

bo th of his ag g ravated burg lary convictions and one ag g ravated assault convic tion. As to the burg lary 2

c on vic tio ns , th e De fe nd a nt a sse rt s th a t th e Sta te faile d to pr ov e he e nte re d bo th the vic tim ’s a ndMs. Ste wa rt ’s apa rt me nts wi th the “ int e nt” to c omm it a n a ssa ult the re in a s c ha

rg e d in the ind ic tme nt. 3 Also, the Def

endant claims that the defe nse of self-de fense should ha ve neg ated a ny evidenc e that he assaulted the victim as cha rge d i n count t hree , and ther efor e this conviction should also be

reve rsed. We disag ree

.
A. Standard of

Review Tenne ssee Rule of Appellate Procedur e 13(e) presc ribes that “[f]i ndings of g uilt in criminal actions whe ther by

the trial court or jury

shall be set aside if the evide nce is insuffic ient to support the finding s by

the trier of fac t of g uilt bey ond a re asonable doubt.” A convic ted criminal defenda nt who cha lleng es the suff

iciency of t he evidence on a ppeal be ars the bur den of de monstrating w hy the evidenc e is insufficient to support the ve rdict, bec ause a verdict o f g uilt destroy s the presumption of innoce nce a nd imposes a presumption of g uilt. See State v. Evans, 108 S.W .3d 231, 237 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Carruthe rs, 35 S.W.3d 516, 557-58 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982) . This Court must reje ct a c onvicted cr i m i nal def endant’ s challeng e to the sufficie ncy

of the e vi dence if, afte r considering the evidenc e in a lig ht most favorable to the prosec ution, we determine that any rational trier of fact could have found the e ssential elements of the crime bey ond a reasonable doubt. See J ackson v. Virg inia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); State v. Hall, 8 S.W.3d 593, 599 (Tenn. 1999).

On app e a l, the Sta te is e nti tle d t o th e str on g e st l e g iti ma te vie w o f the e vid e nc e a nda ll

rea sonable a nd leg itimate inf ere nces which may be draw n there from. See Carruthe rs, 35 S.W.3d at 558; Hall, 8 S.W .3d at 599. A g uilty verdic t by the trier of fac t a ccr edits the testimony of the State’s wi tne sse s a nd re so lve s a ll c on fl ic ts i n th e e vid e nc e in f a vo r o f the pr os e c uti on ’s the ory . Se e Sta te

v. Bla nd, 958 S.W .2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997). Questions about the cre dibilit y of witness es , the weig ht a nd value of the evidenc e, as well as all fa ctual issues ra ised by the evidenc e ar e re solved by the trier of

fac t, and this Court will not re- weig h or re -eva luate the e vidence . See Eva ns, 108 S.W .3d at 236; Bla nd
, 9 5 8 S

. W.2d at 659. Nor will this C ourt substitut e its own infer ence s drawn f rom circ umstantial evidence for those draw n by the trier of

fac t. See Evans, 108 S.W.3d at 236-37; Carruthe rs, 35 S.W.3d at 557.

B. A gg r av at e d Bur gla r y C onv ic ti ons Th e De fe nd a nt w a s c on vic te d o f t wo c ou nts of a g g ra vate d b ur g lary for

br e akin g int o b oth the vic tim ’s a ndMs. Ste wa rt ’s apa rt me nts

. Te nn e sse e de fi ne s bu rg lary , in re le vant p art , a s f oll ow s: A per son commits burgla

ry who, without the eff

ective consent of the prope rty owner :-5-

Enters a building other

than a ha

bitation (or any

portion thereof) not open to the public, with the intent to commit a felony , theft or a ssault[ .]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 14-402(a )(1) , (3). The offense of burg lary is elevated t o ag g ravated burg lary when the building unlawfully enter ed is a “ habitation.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-14- 403.

The Defe nd a nt c on c e de s th a t in bo th i ns ta nc e s h e un la wf ull y e nte re d th e tw o a

pa rt me nts

. He ne ve rthe le ss a sse rt s th a t th e e vid e nc e pr e se nte d a t tr ia l wa s ins uf fi c ie nt fo r a re a so na

ble jury to

c on c lud e that he ha d th e int e nt to co mmi t ass a ult ins ide e ith e r ap art me nt. F ir st, the De fe nd a nt c la ims that his intent upon breaking int o the victim’s apartment was mere ly to “speak with his wife,” a s verifie d by

the fa ct that he f

irst knocked on the door

and attempted to g ain lawf ul entry . He f

urther claims that “[i] t is uncontra verte d that [t he Def endant] only g rabbe d [t he victim] afte r she started beating him,” thus, the Defe ndant ar g ues, any actua l assault of the victim was se lf-def ense.

The De fenda nt also arg ues that the Stat e fa iled to prove he broke into Ms. Stewart’ s apartment with the intent to assault his wife. Moreove r, t h e De fendant arg ues, the c ontradictory testimonyof Ms. Stewart a nd the victim as to whether he ac tually

hit the victi m i n Ms. Stewart’s

apa rt me nt w ou ld p re ve nt a j ury fro m fi nd ing “ be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t th a t [th e De fe nd a nt]

e nte re d M s. Ste wa

rt ’s apa rt me nt w ith the int e nt t o a ssa ult Ms. Ki ng .” Th us , the De fe nd a nt a rg ue s, the fa cts an d circ umstances pr esente d at trial we re not “ so strong and cog ent as to exclude eve ry other re asonable hypothesis” as to the De fenda nt’s intent, and there fore the evidenc ew a s in s ufficie nt to support bo t h o f h i s ag g ravated burg lary convictions. State v. Boha nan, 745 S.W.2d 892, 895 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)

.

I t is well es ta

b li s h e d th a t “ [i ]n te n t i s r ar e ly p r o v e n b y

d ir e c t e v id e n c e , a n d th e trie r o f f a ct may deduce or infer

intent from the cha

rac ter a nd nature of t h e o ff ense a nd the circ umstances surrounding the offe nse.” State v. J. D. Jones, No. E2003-01565-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 1541309, at *8 (Te nn. Cri m

. Ap p

. , Knoxvi lle, J uly 9, 2004) (c iting State v. I nlow, 52 S.W .3d 101,104-105 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) ); see a lso S t at e v

. L o wery , 667 S.W .2d 52, 57 (Tenn. 1984)

. Circumstantial evi d en ce al one may be suff icient to support a convic tion. St ate v. Tha rpe, 726 S.W. 2d 89 6, 89 9- 90 0 (T e nn . 198 7)

. Ho we ve r, the c ir c ums ta nti a l evi de nc e mus t be c on sis te nt w ith the g uilt of the acc used, inconsistent with innocenc e, and must exclude every other re asonable theory except that of g uilt. Tharpe, 726 S.W.2d at 900. Moreover , if a c onvict ion is based entire ly on circ umstantial evidence , the fa cts must be “‘so c lear ly interwove n and connec ted that the fing er of g uilt is pointed unerringly at t he Defenda nt and the Def endant alone.’” State v. Reid, 91 S.W .3d 247, 277 (Tenn. 2002) (quoting S t ate v. Sm ith, 868 S.W .2d 561, 569 (Tenn. 1993) ). F urthermor e, defe renc e clea

rly lies with the jury
, as the weig ht of circ umstantial evidence is a matter f or the jury to determine. State v. Coury , 697 S.W .2d 373, 377 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985). Additionally , whether all other re asonable theories ha ve been excluded by the evidenc e is also a que stion of fac t for the jury . Pruitt v. S tate, 460 S.W.2d 385, 390-91 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).

The re cord on a

ppeal e stablishes that the Def endant made a particularly violent unlawful

e ntry int o th e vic tim ’s ho me by div ing thr ou g h a

g la ss win do w. Af

te r g a ini ng e ntry , th e De fe nd a nt,

acc ording to the victim’s testimony , resisted he r efforts t o ejec t him, overpow ere d her, pushe d herT he D efend ant d o es no t chal l enge, o n suf f i ci ency ground s, hi s co nvi ct i o n f o r aggravat ed ass aul t agai nst M r. 4

K no w l es.

-6- to the g r o u n d a n d b e g a n h it ti n g a n d c h o k in g h e r

. M r

. K n o w le s te s ti f ie d th a t h e w it n e ssed the De fe nd a nt a ssa

ult ing the vic tim in he r ow n a pa rt me nt, a ndOf

fi c e r H utc hin s te sti fi e d to the vis ibl e injuries of the victim when he a rrived at the scene . As to the second a g g ravated burg lary conviction, the re cord r evea ls that shortlyafte r his first assault on t he victim
, the Defenda nt kicked in the locked door to Ms. Stewart’s a

partment, e ntere d “in an upr oar . . . cussing real bad,” and was “mad” as he

sear ched f

or the victim.

This Cour t has pre viouslynoted, in the context of review ing a burg lary conviction, that “[o] ne’s a ctions are circ umstantial evidence of his intent.” State v. B arke r, 642 S.W.2d 735, 737 (Tenn. C ri m. App. 1982). We have further held that in addition to a defe ndant’s ac tions, “the circ umstances surr ounding the entry must also be viewed in determining int ent.” State v. Holland, 86 0 S. W.2 d 5 3, 59 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 93 ). He re , th e De fe nd a nt’ s v iolent e ntry of bo th apartments--diving throug h a g lass window and kicking in a locked door

-- am o u n t to strong circ umstantial e vidence of an intent to commit a ssault inside. I n addition, the Def endant’ s actions of striki ng a nd c ho kin g the vic tim du ri ng the fi rs t a g g ra vate d bu rg lary sp e ak vo lum e s a s to h is i nte nt. L ikewise, the D efe ndant’s deme anor a s he stormed a bout Ms. Stewart’s apartment in a ra g e, cussing profuse ly while l ooking f

or the victim, along with his previous history of violence , also support the jury ’s c on c lus ion that th e De fe nd a nt i nte nd e d to c omm it a n ass a ult ins ide Ms. Ste wa rt ’s apa rt me nt. B a se d o n th e se c ir c ums ta nc e s, we fi ndthe jury pr op e rl y inf e rr e d the De fe nd a nt int e nd e d to c omm it

an assault ag ainst the victim in both apartments. Ther efor e, we conclude the evidenc e wa s sufficient to convict the De fenda nt of ag g ravated burg lary on both counts. This issue has no merit.

C. Aggravat ed Assault Conviction The Def endant also challeng es the sufficie ncy of the e vidence perta ining to his ag g ravated

a ssa ult c on vic tio n f

or a ssa ult ing the vic tim

. Spe c if ic a lly , th e De fe nd a nt c la ims that be c a us e “ Ms. 4 Ki ng wa s c le arl y

the a g g re sso r .

. . the we ig ht o f the e vid e nc e su pp orts a fi nd ing that [th e De fe nd a nt] acte d in self-de fense and that his conviction of a g g ravated assault should be re verse d.”

Ag g ravated assault, as c harg ed ag ainst the Def endant, is committed when:

A per son . . . after

having been e njoined or re strained b y an order, diver sion or probation ag ree ment of a court of competent jurisdiction from in any way causing or
a tte mpt ing to c a us e bo dil y inj ury or in a ny way c omm itt ing or a tte mpt ing to c omm it

a n a ssa ult a g a ins t a n in div idu a l or

ind ivi du a ls, int e nti on a lly or kn ow ing ly

a tte mpt s to c a us e or

c a us e s b od ily

inj ury or c omm its or a tte mpt s to c omm it a n a ssa ult a g a ins t

su c h in div idu a l or

ind ivi du a ls.

Te nn . Code An n. § 39- 13 -1 02 (c ). Th us , at tri a l, the Sta te bo re the bu rd e n of pr ov ing that th e vic tim had a pr otection orde r ag ainst the Def endant, a nd the Def

endant none theless i n tentionally or knowing ly

either caused the victim bodilyinjury , assaulted he r, or attempted to do either of the-7-

same. The Def

endant d o es n o t al leg e that the State f ailed to prove all the nec essary elements for

a g g ra va te d a ssa

ult a s re qu ir e d by

statut e , r a the r, the De fe nd a nt a sse rt s th a t he is e nti tle d to ne g a te any criminal re sponsibili ty

attache d to his ag g ravated assault of the victim because he ac ted in selfdefe nse.

The De fenda nt failed to raise the defe nse of self-de fense at the trial leve l, and has ther efor e
wa ive d th is i ssu e on app e a l. T he Sta te is r e qu ir e d to pr ov e the ne g a tio n o f a de fen se on ly

“ if admissibl e ev i d en ce is introduce d supporting the defe nse.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-11- 201. Ad dit ion a lly , “ [t]he iss ue of the e xiste nc e of

a de fe ns e is n ot s ub mit te d to the jury un le ss i t is fa ir ly

ra ise d b y the pr oo f. ” Te nn . Co de Ann

. § 39 -11- 20 3( c ). Mo re ov e r, thi s Co urt is ins truc te d to interpre t the above sta tute to rea d that “[t] he def endant has the burden of i ntroducing evidenc e that a def ense is applica

ble.” I d., Sentencing Commi ssion Com ments. See also State v. L eapha rt, 673 S.W. 2d87 0, 87 3 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 84 ) (h old ing “ [a]ltho ug h it is w e ll- se ttl e d th a t a n a c c us e d is entitled to an af

firmative instruction on every i s s u e fairly raised by

the evidenc e, ther e is no require ment that the court char g e on matter s not raised by the proof” ).

I n the ca se at ha nd, the Def endant did not meet his burde n of fa irly i n t ro d u cing evidenc e supporting the statutory

defe nse of se lf-def

ense at trial. Moreove r, he fa i l ed t o reque st jury instructions on self-def

ense, a nd failed to a lleg e in hi s motion for a new trial that the t rial court erre d in no t c ha rg ing the jury on se lf

-d e fe ns e . H ow e ve r, the De fe nd a nt n ow a sk s th is C ou rt to r e ve rs e his ag g ravated assault convic tion based on a the ory of self- defe nse.

Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Ap pe llate Pr oc e du re 36 (a ) i ns truc ts this Cou rt that it is no t r e qu ir e d to g ra nt r e lie f “ to a

pa rt y re sp on sib le fo r an e rr or

or wh o f a ile d to take wh a te ve r a c tio n w a s r e a so na bly available to preve nt or nullify the harmful eff

ect of an error.” Additionally , Tenne ssee Rule of Ap pe llate Pr oc e du re 3( e ) s ta te s in re le va nt p art :

in all case s tried by

a jury
, n o issue prese nted for r eview sha ll be predic ated upon

err or in the admission or exclusion of e vidence , jury instructions gr anted or

ref used, misconduct of jurors, pa

rties or c ounsel, or other action co m m i t t ed or occurring du ri ng the tr ia l of the c a se , or oth e r g ro un d upo n whi c h a new tr ia l is so ug ht, un le ss the same w as spec ifically s t ated in a motion for a new tria l; otherwise such issues will be trea ted as wa ived.

See also State v. Martin, 940 S.W .2d 567, 569 (Tenn. 1997) (holding that a def endant r elinquishes the rig ht to arg ue on appea l any issue that should have be en pre sented in the motion for a new tria l). Th e se p r o c e d u r a l ru l e s s u p p o r to u r l o n g

- s t a n d i n g p o l i c y

o f r e f r a i n i n g f r o mf i n d i n g a t r i a l c o u r tto h a v e e rr e d in matt e r s n o t b r o u g h t t o it s a tt e n ti o n a t t r ia l o r in a mo ti o n f o r a n e w tria l. T h e r e fore
, any claim to the statutory defe nse of self-de fense outlined in Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39- 11-611 has be en proc edura lly waived. T hus, the Def

endant c an ar g ue onlythat the evidenc e wa s i n s u ff i ci en t as a matter of law to find him guilty of ag g ravated assault bec ause he assaulted the victim onlyafte r he ha d been struc k by her.-8-

Th e e vid e nc e pr e se nte d in the re c or d r e ve a ls that th e De fe nd a nt v iol e ntl y a tta c ke d th e vic tim : he thre w her

to the g round, choke d her, hi t h er , and thre w her ag ainst a conc rete protrusion. The evidenc e also e stablishes that the victim r ece ived substantial phy sical injuries from the a ssault. The fa c t th a t th e vic tim

str uc k the De fe nd a nt af

te r he do ve thr ou g h a win do w an d into he r ap art me nt i s of no conse quence considering the ample e vidence supporti n g t h e j u ry ’s conc lusion that the Def endant a ssaulted the victim.

Moreove r, the c ircumstance s surrounding this incide n t a ls o s u g g e s t the Def

endant wa s where he had no la wful rig ht to be when the a ssault occur red, he provoked the confr ontation, and he used forc e we l l b ey ond that nece ssary to protect himself a g ainst the forc e used by the victim. The

e vid e nc e re ve a ls tha t th e vic tim ha d a n o rd e r o f pr ote c tio n out ag a ins t the De fe nd a nt fo rb idd ing him to have a ny

contac t with her. The e vidence further shows that the Def endant ig nored this orde r and broke into the victim ’s apa rtment–arriving at a place wher e he ha d no lawful rig ht to be--a nd subsequently

provoked the alterc ation that left the victim injured.

The e vidence also reve als that the De fenda nt was a phy sically imposing man

. I t t o o k two McMinnville Poli ce of

fice rs to ta

ke the Def

endant down and ha ndcuff him. Quite the opposite of the Def endant, the vic tim was described by the trial court as “a

litt l e b ittylady . For

the Court of Appea ls, she probably

doesn’t we igh 90 pounds a nd about 5’3” or 4” if she ’s t h at tall.” Acc ording ly
, we find the evidenc e, when viewed in the lig ht most favorable to the State, was indee d

su ff ic ie nt to su sta in the De fe nd a nt’ s c on vic tio n fo r a g g ra vate d a ssa ult . T his iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t.

II. Im peaching a Witn ess Based on Hi s Juvenil e Re cord I n his second issue on appe al, the De fenda nt claims the trial court err ed by failing to allow him to impeac h the testimonyof Mr. Know les by means of introduc ing a

prior juvenile c onviction. Th e re c or d r e ve a ls tha t a t tria l, d e fe ns e c ou ns e l a tte mpt e d to a tta c k the c re dib ili ty of Mr . K no wl e s’
te sti mo n y o nc r o s s

- e xa

m i n at i o nb y

q u e sti on ing him

abo ut a prior juv e nil e a dju dic a tio n f

or va nd a lis m when the State objected. After a brief disc ussion, the trial court sustained the State’ s objection and prohibited the def

ense f rom pursuing its im peac hment line of questioning beca use it de termined that the conviction at issue, va ndalism, was not a crime of dishonesty

. Now, on appe al, t he Defenda nt infers that Mr. Knowles’s juvenile vanda lism adjudication may have be en the e quivalent of a felony , and ther efor e it need not bea crime of dishonesty to be admitted for impeachment purposes. Thus, the Defenda nt arg ues, the trial c ourt err ed in pre venting the Def endant f rom impeac hing Mr . Knowles’ testimonythroug h use of his prior juve nile rec ord. The State e lected not to addr ess this particular claim on the merits, but rather a rg ues that bec ause the De fe nd a nt n e ve r c ha lle ng e d th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s ru lin g to p ro hib it the imp e a c hme nt e vid e nc e o nth eb a sis that it was a fe lony

conviction either

at trial or at the hearing on his motion for a new tria l, he has

wa ive d th e ri g ht t o ra ise thi s iss ue on app e a l. Whil e a re vie w o f this iss ue su g g e sts it h a s n o me ri t,

we a g ree with the State and find the D efe ndant has wa ived t his claim by failing to raise it at the trial le ve l.

Te nn e sse e Rul e of Ev ide nc e 60 9, in p e rt ine nt p art , pe rm its a pa rt y to atta c k “ the c re dib ili ty of a wi tne ss” by

int ro du c ing “ e vid e nc e that th e wi tne ss h a s b e e n co nv ic te d of a crime ” bu t only if-9-

the crime was “punishable by death or imprisonment in ex cess of one y ear ,” i.e., a

felony , or if it was

a crime that “involved dishonesty or false statement.” Te nn. R. Evid. 609(a)( 2). The sa me rule of evidenc e also g ener ally prohibits the i ntroduction of “[e]vidence of juvenile adjudications” for the purpose of impeac hment. Tenn. R. Evid. 609(d). H oweve r, a tria l court may allow such e vidence if: 1) the “c onviction of the [juvenile] offe nse would be a dmissibl e t o at t ack the cre dibilit y of an adult,” and 2) “the c ourt is satisfied that admission in evidenc e is nece ssary for a fair de termination in a civil action or c riminal proce eding .” I d.

We beg in our analy sis by

first noting tha t nowhere in the rec ord does the D efe ndant provide evidenc e that Mr. Know les’ juveni l e ad j u d i cation for

vandalism was a

felony conviction or the eq u i v al en t

. T h e De fe n d an t s i m p l y s t at es i n h i s ap p el l at e b ri ef : “E x ce p t i n ca s es wh er e t h e d am age is less than $500.00, all vandalism convictions are felony offe nses that are punishable by death or imprisonment in ex cess of one y ear or more.” The D ef

en d an t has failed to de monstrate that the witness’ juvenile va ndalism adjudication “would be admissible to attack the cr edibilityof an a dult,” I d. Howeve r, we need not a ddress the me rits of the De fenda nt’s claim at leng th because we find the Def endant ha s waived this issue.

Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Ap pe llate P roce dure 36 (a ) i ns truc ts this Cou rt that it is n ot r e qu ir e d to g ra nt re lie f “ to a

pa rt y re sp on sib le fo r an e rr or

or wh o f a ile d to take wh a te ve r a c tio n w a s r e a so na bly available to preve nt or nullify the harmful eff

ect of an err or.” Additionally , this Court has held that

a de fe nd a nt c a nn ot c ha ng e the or ie s f ro m th e tr ia l c ou rt to the app e llate c ou rt , a nddo ing so g e ne ra lly waives a ppellate r eview of

th e i s s ue. See State v. A lder, 71 S.W. 3d 299, 303 (Tenn. Crim. App. 20 01 ) ( ho ldi ng that “ [i]t is we ll- se ttl e d that a n app e lla nt is b ou ndby the e vid e nti ary

the ory se t f orth at trial, and ma y

not chang e theories on appe al”) . These pr ocedur al rules support our long -standing policy of ref

raining from finding a trial court to ha ve err ed in matters not br oug ht to i t s att ention thr ou g h p ro pe r o bje c tio ns a t tria l.

I n the ca se at ha nd, the Def endant failed to inform the trial c ourt of a pr oper ba sis for

a llo wi ng the imp e a c hme nt te sti mon y , an d the tr ia l c ou rt wa s le ft to r ule on the Sta te ’s ob

je c tio n w ith the information pre sented by the def ense at that time. Whil e the Def endant r aised the g ener al issue of the c ou rt ’s ru lin g on the imp e a c hme nt e vid e nc e in his mot ion fo r a ne w t ri a l, at th e he ari ng on thi s motion the Def

endant ag ain, t hroug h counsel, challeng ed only the t rial court’s determination that the juvenile vanda lism adjudication was not “a c harg e of dishonesty .” However, on a ppeal, the Def endant ha s changed h i s evidentiary theory , arg uing that the vandalism adjudication may have been a felony and ther efor e admissible. B eca use the De fenda nt failed to proper ly prese nt the issue at trial and now wishes to chang e his theory on appea l, we find the issue ha s been w aived.

III. Excessive Sentence s The De fenda nt claims the trial court im posed ex cessive sentence s for all four of his fe lony convictions. Specifica lly , the Def endant a sserts that B lakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct . 2531 (2004), require s a sentenc ing reduc tion be cause the trial court err oneously enhanc ed his felony

conviction
sentenc es base d on facts not submi tted to a jury . The De fenda nt also claims that the trial court violated B lakely

when it “e nhance d” his ag g reg at e s entenc e by running three of his four f elony conviction sentenc es conse cutively . We disag ree

.-10-

A. Standard of

Review Be fore a trial c ourt imposes a sentence upon a convicted criminal defe ndant, i t must consider (a) the evidenc e adduc ed at the trial and the sentencing hearing; ( b) the pre -sentenc e re port; (c) the principles of se ntencing and ar g uments as to sentenc ing a lternatives; (d) the nature and char acte ristics of the criminal conduct involved; (e) evidenc e and inf ormation offe red by the parties on the enha nceme nt and mitigating fac tors set forth in Tenne ssee Code Annotated sections 40-35- 113 and 40-35- 114; and (f) any statement the de fenda nt wishes to make in t h e d ef en dant’s own behalf about s entenc ing. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(b); State v. I mfeld, 70 S.W.3d 698, 704 (T e nn . 2 00 2) . T o faci litat e app e llate re vie w, the tr ia l c ou rt is r e qu ir e d to pla c e on the re c or d it s
rea sons fo r imposing the spec ific sentenc e, including the identifica tion of the mitigating and enhance m en t fa ctors found, the specific fac ts supporting e ach e nhance ment fac tor found, and the

me tho d b y

wh ic h th e mit ig a tin g a nde nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s h a vebe e n e va luated and bal a nc e d in determining the se ntence . See State v. Samuels, 44 S.W.3d 489, 492 (Tenn. 2001).

Upon a c halleng e to the sentence imposed, this court ha s a duty to conduct a de novo revie w of the sente nce w ith a presumption that the determinations made by the trial court are corr ect. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401(d) . Howeve r, this presumption “is conditioned upon the af firmative sh ow ing in the re c or d th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt c on sid e re d th e se nte nc ing princ ipl e s a nda ll r e le va nt f a c ts and cir cumstance s.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) . I f our r eview r efle cts that the trial court followed the statutory sentenc ing pr ocedur e, that the court imposed a lawf ul sentence afte r having g iven due c onsid er ati on and prope r we ight to the f actor s and principles se t out under the sentenc ing la w, and that the trial court’s findings of fac t are adequately supported by

the re cord, then the pre sumption i s appl i ca b l e, an d we may not modify

the sentenc e eve n if we w ould have pref err ed a dif

fer ent re sult. S ee State v. F letcher , 805 S.W . 2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)

. We will uphold t he sente nce imposed by the t rial court if (1) the sentence complies with the purposes and principles of t he 1989 Sentencing Act, and (2) the trial court’s findings are adequate ly supported by the re cord. See State v. Arne tt, 49 S.W .3d 250, 257 (Tenn. 2001). The burde n of showing that

a sentenc e is imprope r is upon the appea ling party

. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401 Sentenc ing Commi ssion Com ments; Arnett, 49 S.W.3d at 257.

B. Im proper Enhan cem ents Th e De fe nd a nt a sse rt s the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in imp os ing e xce ssi ve se nte nc e s fo r a ll f ou r o f h is Class C fel o n y co n v i ct ions by enhanc ing the m bey ond the statutory minimum based on f

acts not submitt ed to the jury : a Blakely violation. In calc ulating a sentenc e for

a Class C felony

conviction, the “pr esumptive sentenc e . . . shall be the minimum sentenc e in the ra ng e if ther e ar e no
e nh a nc e me nt or

mit ig a tin g fa c tor s. ” Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -2 10 (c ). I f the re are e nh a nc e me nt, bu t no m i t i g a t i n g f

a c t o r s , t h e tr i a l c o u r tm a y s e tt h e s e n t e n c e ab o v e t h e m i n i m u m , b u ts t i l l w i t h in the ra ng e. See T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-210(d) . A sentenc e involving both e nhancem ent and mitigating fac tors for a

Class C felo n y re q u i re s the court to start at the minimum, nex t assign the proper weig ht for any

applicable enhanc eme n t fac tor(s), a nd finally apply a re duction within the rang e as a ppropriate for a ny

mitigating fac tor(s). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-210(e ).

The sente nce f

or a Class C f

elony
, wher e the defe ndant is a Rang e I I offe nder is “not less than six (6) nor

more than te n (10) y ear s.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112( b)(3) . Thus, the pre sumptiveT he D ef endan t do es not cha l l eng e t he f act t hat hi s cr i mi nal r ecor d re qui r es t hat he be s ent enc ed as a mul t i pl e, 5

R a n g e II o ff

e n d e r.

-11- sentenc e for

eac h of the De fenda nt’s Class C felony convictions is six y ear s. Howeve r, the we ight to b e a ff or de d e nh a nc e me nt fa c tor s is le ft to the tr ia l c ou rt ’s dis c re tio n s o lo ng a s it c omp lie s w ith the pr inc ipl e s o f the se nte nc ing ac t a ndthe c ou rt ’s fi nd ing aresu pp orte d b y the re c or d. Se e Sta te v. Palmer, 10 S.W.3d 638, 646 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

I n this case, the trial co u rt determined the Def endant to be a

multipl e, Rang e I I

offe nder. 5 The c ourt furthe r dete rmined that six separ ate e nhance ment fac tors applied to e ither some or all of the Def endant’ s four fe lony

conv i ct i on sentenc es. See Te nn Code Ann. § 40-35- 114(2), ( 7), (9)
, (10), ( 12), and ( 14). The c ourt found no mitigating f actor s applicable in the Def endant’ s case . Ba sed on these finding s, the trial court enhanc ed eac h of the Def endant’ s four fe lony

sentenc es bey ond the pr e su mpt ive sta

rt ing po int

by fo ur y e ars , u p to the statut ory ma ximum

of te n y e ars

.

The De fenda nt now claims that his Six th Amendment rig ht to a trial by jury was impug ned when the trial court made determinations of fac t for sente nce e nhance ment purposes that we re not

su bmi tte d to a jury , c iti ng B lake ly v. Was hin g ton , 1 24 S.Ct . 2 53 1 ( 20 04 ). Ho we ve r, ou r s up re me court ha s rec ently

held that t he enhance ment component of Te nnessee ’s sentenc ing struc ture doe s not violate a def

endant’ s Six th Amendment rig ht to a trial by jury

. See S tate v. Gomez, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. M2002-01209-SC-R11-CD, 2005 WL 856848 (Tenn. 2005) . Our supreme court stated that Tenne ssee’ s sentencing structure “me relyrequire s judge s to consider e nhance ment fac tors,” and unlike the sentenc ing g uidelines struck down in Blakely
, “does not mandate an incr ease d sentenc e upon a judg e’s f

inding of an enhanceme nt fac tor.” Gome z,

___ S.W .3d at___, 2005 WL 856848, at *26. Thus, rely ing on Blakely as clarified by United S tates v. B ooker, __ U .S. ___, 125 S.C t. 738 (2005), our

supreme court has determined that Tenne ssee’ s sentencing structure provides the ty pe of “ ‘i nte rm e diate ,’ no n- ma nd a tory , a dv iso ry se nte nc ing sc he me” th a t th e Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Court has ex pressly ruled acce ptable, permitti ng judge s to ex erc ise the ty pe of se ntencing discretion applied in the c as e at hand. I d. There fore , the Def endant’ s claim of a Sixt h Amendment rig ht vio la tio n b a se d o n th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s e nh a nc e me nt o f h is s e nte nc e s is wi tho ut m e ri t.

C. Co nse c ut ive Se nt e nc e s a nd Bla ke ly The De fenda nt also claims that the t rial court committed a Blakely err or whe n it increa sed the Def endant’ s ag gre g ate se ntence bey ond the possible minimum by imposing conse cutive
sentenc ing. A s stated ab o v e, o u r s upreme court ha s rec ently held that Tenne ssee’ s sentencing

s tr u c tu r e d o e s n o t t

r ig g e r a B la k e ly v io lati o n , th e r e f

o r e th is c laim

is a ls o w ith o u t me r it

. Se e G o me z,

__ _ S. W.3 d _

__ (T e nn . 2 00 5)

. We a lso no te that e ve n prior to o ur su pr e me c ou rt ’s re c e nt r

uli ng in Gomez, this C ourt has consiste ntly held that B lakely

does not aff

ect c onsecutive se ntencing d e te r mi n a ti o n s

. Se e St a te v

. Ro s e M ar ie H e r n a n d e z, N o

. M 2 0 0 3

- 0 1 7 5 6

- CC A

- R3

- CD
, 2 0 0 4 WL 2984844, at * 4 (Te nn. Crim. App., N ashville, Dec . 16, 2004); State v. Earice Roberts, No. W2003- 02 66 8- CCA -R 3- CD , 2 00 4 WL 27 15 31 6, a t * 15 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. , Jac ks on , No v. 23 , 2 00 4) ; State

v. L awr e n c e Wa

rr e n Pi e r c e , N o

. M 2 0 0 3

- 0 1 9 2 4

- CC A

- R3

- CD
, 2 0 0 4 WL 2 5 3 3 7 9 4
, a t * 1 6 ( T e n n. Crim. App., Nashville, Nov. 9, 2004).T he t rial co urt als o co nsid ere d ap p l yi ng co nse cu t i ve senten cing crite r io n (4 ), t ha t t he D efen d an t wa s a 6

“ dan g er ou s of

fen der

. ” H owe v er , t h e cou r t f i r s t de t er mi n ed t h i s f ac t or “ may be” a ppl i ed, t h en s t at ed i t “ pr obabl y ” appl i ed, b u t i n it s fina l an a lysis c o n c lud e d tha t i t d id no t attrib u te “m u c h w e igh t” to c rite rio n (4 ).

-12- IV . C ons e c ut ive Se nt e nc ing I n his last issue on a

ppeal, the Def

endant claims that the trial court err ed in ma ndating that three of his four ten- y ear felony conviction sentenc es be se rv ed co nsecutively . Specifica lly , the Def endant a rg ues that this consec utive sentenc ing, r esulting in a thirty y ear eff ective se ntence , was not rea sonably

rela ted to the seve rity

of the offe nses involved, and was not the least seve re me asure
nece ssary to protect the public f

rom his future c riminal conduct. We disag ree

.

We b e g in b y

no tin g that it

is w ith in the so un d disc re tio n of the tr ia l c ou rt wh e the r t o impo se
c on se c uti ve or

c on c ur re nt s e ntences. Se e Sta te v. Ad a ms, 97 3 S. W.2 d 2 24 , 2 30 -3 1( Te nn . Crim. App. 1997). A Te nnessee court may order consec utive sentenc es in case s wher e it f inds a ny of seve n statutorily enumer ated c riteria to be applicable “by a preponderance of the evidenc e.” T enn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115( b). I n addition to these cri t er i a, consec utive sentenc ing is a lso subject to the g ener al sentenc ing principles that the over all sentenc e imposed “should be no g reater than tha t deser ved for

the offense commit ted,” that it “should be the least severe me asure nece ssary to achieve the p u rp o s e s f

o r w h ic h th e s e n te n c e is imp o s e d
, ” a n d th a t a d e f e n d a n t’ s “ p o tential” for “re habilitation” be conside red. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-103(2) , (4) a nd (5). Additionally , we a re remindedth a t “ th e a g g r e g a te ma xim u m o f c o n s e c u ti v e te r ms mu s t b e r e a s o n ab ly r e late d to the

severity of the off

enses involved.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-115 Sentenc ing Commission Com me nts

.

I n the ca se at ha nd, the trial court found two consec utive sentenc i n g criter a applied: the 6 Def endant is “a n offe nder w hose re cord of cr i m inal activity is ex tensive,” a nd he wa s being “sente nced f

or an of fense committed while on probation.” Tenn. C ode Ann. § 40-35-115( b)(2) , (6). The trial c ourt also stated for the re cord that it im posed conse cutive sente nces be cause the “cir cumstance s surrounding the commission of the [Defenda nt’s] offense” wer e such tha t “conf inement is nece ssary

to protect socie ty

from the [Defend an t’s] unwil lingne ss to lead a pr od uc tiv e lif

e

. . . . ” Th e c ou rt fu rthe r fo un d that the “ a g g re g a te le ng th o f the se nte nc e re a so na bly relates to the offe nse[s] [of] which the [Defe ndant] stands convicted.”

We find that the rec ord conta ins sufficient evide nce to support c onsecutive se ntence s. The trial court noted that it had “re ad contr act books that we re shorter” than the De fen d ant’s criminal

re c or d. I nd e e d, the pr e -s e nte nc e re po rt , c on ta ine d in the re c or d on app e a l, l ist s n o le ss tha n f orty -s ix char g es, with at lea st twenty -five e nding in c onvictions. The re port also noted t h at, whil e not verifie d due to the abse nce of computer r ecor ds, a pre vious case f ile for the D efe ndant listed an additional thirty -two cha rges be tween the y ear s of 1966 and 1979. The Def endant’ s prior convictions include multipl e DUI s, multi ple assaults, theft, r obbery and ag g ravated robbe ry . When asked a bout his ex tensive criminal recor d at his sentenc i n g h ea ring , the Def endant r eplied that he “pled g uiltyto a lot of stuff [he] didn’t do.” W e concl u d e t h e t rial court properly found the Def endant “ is an offe nder whose rec ord of c riminal activity is ex tensive.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 115(b)( 2).-13-

A ce rtified judg ment form indicating the Def endant wa s on probation when he committed the instant crimes wa s admitted into evidence at the sente ncing heari n g. Ad d i t i onally , Mr. Ear l Bloodworth of the De partment of Probation and Parole testified at the sentenc ing he aring that the Def endant was place d on probation for two separ ate felony offe nses in May and June of 2002, and was on probation for these of fense s when he committed the instant of fense s. There fore , we f

ind that the trial court properly

found that the De fenda nt was “se ntence d for an offe nse committed while on probation.” I d. at § 40-35-115( b)(6)

.

Ad dit ion a lly , th e vio le nt n a tur e of the of fe ns e s the De fe nd a nt c omm itt e d a g a ins t th e vic tim

a ndhe r j uv e nil e ne ig hb or ind ic a te s tha t the e ff

e c tiv e se nte nc e is r e a so na bly re la te d to the se ve ri ty of these c rimes. The D efe ndant’s extensive criminal history reve als that he has littl e potential for

re ha bil itatio n, a ndhis blata nt d isr e g ardfo r l e g a l c on se qu e nc e s le ss severe th an impriso nme nt i s obvious. W hile on probation for two other prior assaults, the De fenda nt committed the ag g ravated

a ssa ult s a nda g g ra va te d b ur g lari e s a t is su e in this c a se . Fu rthe rm or e , a cou rt or de r o f p ro te c tio n d id nothing to prevent t he Defenda nt from divi ng throug h the victim’s window and violently assaulting her, a nd then turning a knife on those rushing to he r assistance

. An extended sentenc e is war rante d i n t h i s c a s e t o p r o t e c tt h e p u b l i c f r o m a n y f u r t h e r c r i m i n a l c o n d u c t b y t h e D e f e n d a n t

. A c c o r d i n g l y,
we a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s imp os iti on of c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s. Th is i ssu e ha s n o me ri t.

CO NC LU SION

B a se d on the fo re g oin g re a so nin g a nd a uth oriti e s, we a ff ir m th e jud g me nts of

the tr ia l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, J UDGE