SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5702-17T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SEA SHELL RESORT AND

BEACH CLUB,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________

Argued May 16, 2019 – Decided May 30, 2019

Before Judges Simonelli, Whipple and Firko.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Ocean County, Municipal Appeal No. 17-28.

Joseph Anthony Martin argued the cause for appellant 

(Martin Law Firm, LLC, attorneys; Joseph Anthony

Martin, on the brief).

Micci J. Weiss argued the cause for respondent (Cleary 

Giacobbe Alfieri Jacobs, LLC, attorneys; Bruce 

William Padula and Micci J. Weiss, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-5702-17T4

Defendant Sea Shell Resort and Beach Club appeals from the June 26, 

2018 Law Division order denying its appeal from the municipal court's denial 

of its motion to dismiss complaints alleging violations of the Borough of Beach 

Haven's sign ordinance. On appeal, defendant contends the Law Division judge 

erred in finding the sign ordinance applied to the two light-emitting diode (LED) 

panels defendant installed on its building and the Borough did not selectively 

enforce the sign ordinance against defendant. Defendant also contends the judge 

erred in denying discovery. We reject these contentions and affirm.

I.

The Borough's sign ordinance provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o signs, 

billboards, advertising structures or similar items are permitted except as" set 

forth in the ordinance. Beach Haven, N.J., Ordinances, Zoning-Signs, 

Ordinance § 212-16A (1979). Ordinance §121-16B provides, in pertinent part:

B. Signs in the RC [Multifamily Residential] District:

. . . . 

(3) One lighted sign not to exceed [thirty-five] 

square feet in area for each motel or hotel is 

permitted. Such sign shall be attached to the 

building, but, if erected on or above the roof of the 

building, such sign shall be set back a minimum 

distance of five feet from the property line. Flashing 

signs are not permitted. . . . 
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(4) No sign authorized herein shall be erected 

without first obtaining a permit therefor from the 

Building Administrator, who shall issue the same 

upon being satisfied that such sign will not violate 

this chapter and upon payment to him of the 

appropriate review fee; provided, however, that this 

subsection shall not apply to those signs allowed by 

[Ordinance § 212-16A(4)].[1]

Ordinance § 212-16D provides, in pertinent part:

D. Prohibited features.

. . . . 

(2) No neon sign or similar illuminated 

advertisements shall be of such color or located in 

such a fashion as to diminish or detract in any way 

from the effectiveness of any traffic signal or similar 

safety or warning device.

. . . . 

(4) No sign shall have flashing lights or exposed 

high-intensity illumination.

Ordinance § 212E provides:

E. Permit fee. No sign shall be erected pursuant to the

terms of this section before paying a zoning fee of $25 

to the Borough of Beach Haven.

[Added 2-9-2009 by Ord. No. 2009-6]. 

(1) No sign board shall be displayed before paying a

zoning fee of $50 annually, to coincide with 

mercantile license renewals, to the Borough of 

Beach Haven. . . .

 

1

 Ordinance § 212-16A(4) does not apply here.
4

A-5702-17T4

Beach Haven, N.J., Ordinances, Zoning-Definitions and Word Usage, § 

212-3 defines "sign," in pertinent part, as "[a]ny device designated to inform or 

attract the attention of persons not on the premises on which the sign is 

located[.]"

Defendant is a family-owned and operated beach resort and facility 

located on Atlantic Avenue in the Borough's RC district. Superstorm Sandy 

destroyed the property. As part of rebuilding, defendant installed two LED

panels on the exterior of the building, one located on the southwest corner of the 

building and the other on the northwest corner. Defendant referred to the LED 

panels as low density LED informational panels. Defendant also installed nine 

other lighted signs on the building.

Defendant claimed that prior to purchasing and installing the LED panels, 

its owner, Thomas Hughes, spoke to Borough zoning officer William Greer, who 

confirmed the LED panels would be permissible and "would not be a problem[.]" 

Defendant further alleged that it purchased and installed the LED panels, at a 

cost of more than $20,000, in reliance on Greer's representation.

Greer certified he never spoke to Hughes prior to defendant installing the 

LED panels; Hughes never consulted with or advised him of his plan to install 

LED panels; and Greer did not confirm the LED panels would be permissible. 
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A-5702-17T4

Greer also certified he did not become aware defendant had installed the LED

panels until he received the first of twenty-one complaints from adjacent 

residents on June 9, 2017. The residents complained about the deleterious effect 

of the brightly lit LED panels on the value and enjoyment of their properties and 

on the nature of the historic district in which the properties were located. One 

resident complained that the lighted LED panels changed colors and messages 

repeatedly, often announcing the availability of beer and happy hour specials in 

the resort. A picture of the LED panel on the front of the resort advertised: "Raw 

Bar Happy Hour Open Daily."

On June 9, 2017 and June 12, 2017, Greer issued the following complaints 

against defendant:

1. Complaint No. 1503-SC-000066: failure to obtain a 

sign permit in violation of Ordinance § 212-16B(4);

2. Complaint No. 1503-SC-000067 and Complaint No. 

1503-SC-000070: installing more than one lighted 

sign in violation of Ordinance § 212-16B(3); and

3. Complaint No. 1503-SC-00069: failure to pay a sign 

permit fee in violation of Ordinance § 212-16E.

On June 28, 2017 defendant applied for a sign permit for the LED panels. 

On July 5, 2017, Greer denied the application, finding the LED panels violated
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A-5702-17T4

the sign ordinance. Thereafter, Greer issued Complaint No. 1503-SC-011161: 

installing more than one lighted sign in violation of Ordinance § 212-16B(3).2

On July 31, 2017, defendant filed a motion in the municipal court to 

dismiss the complaints, arguing the sign ordinance did not apply to its LED 

informational panels. Defendant posited that LED panels did not exist when the

Borough passed the sign ordinance in 1979, and thus, the Borough could not 

have contemplated or intended to regulate LED panels at the time.

Defendant also argued the sign ordinance clearly and unambiguously 

prohibited only neon, flashing, and exposed high-intensity illumination signs, 

the LED panels did not fall within these categories, and the sign ordinance did 

not specifically include or prohibit LED panels. Defendant further argued that 

reference to "lighted signs" in Ordinance § 212-16B(3) suggested the sign 

ordinance was written for traditional wood signs or banners that are backlighted 

or illuminated with directional lighting, and the LED panels do not fit within 

this category of "signs." Defendant concluded that because the sign ordinance, 

on its face, did not apply to or regulate the LED panels, defendant was not 

 

2

 Greer issued other complaints that the municipal court dismissed and are not 

pertinent to this appeal.
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A-5702-17T4

required to obtain a sign permit and pay a sign permit fee and did not violate the 

sign ordinance.

Defendant also argued the Borough selectively enforced the sign 

ordinance against it, but not against two businesses in the Borough, Bay Village 

and the Volunteer Fire Department (VFD), who defendant claimed installed and 

were using similar LED panels without applying for or receiving a sign permit. 

However, Greer certified that the two businesses had applied for and obtained 

sign permits, and submitted documents showing they did so in 2006 and 2014, 

respectively. Defendant raised no other argument regarding selective 

enforcement.

In opposition, the State argued the sign ordinance regulates all signs and 

a LED panel is a "sign," as defined in Ordinance § 212-3 because it is a device

designated to inform or attract the attention of persons not on the premises on 

which the sign is located. The State also argued that defendant never obtained 

a sign permit or paid a sign permit fee and installed more than one lighted sign.

The State denied it had selectively enforced the sign ordinance against 

defendant, noting that Bay Village and the VFD had applied for and received 

permits for their LED panels and each installed only one LED panel on their 

building.
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A-5702-17T4

In reply, defendant reiterated its arguments and added that the State should 

be compelled to provide discovery requested on July 5, 2017, including a 

proposed amendment to the sign and nuisance ordinances to include LED panels, 

and the court should dismiss the complaints if the State failed to comply.

On September 25, 2017, municipal court Judge Stacey Kerr denied 

defendant's motion, finding Ordinance § 212-3 and Ordinance § 212-16 clearly 

encompassed defendant's LED informational panels. The judge determined the 

LED panels are "signs" within the meaning of Ordinance § 212-3, as they are

devices designated to inform and attract attention. The judge also found 

defendant did not apply for a sign permit or pay the sign permit fee and had 

installed two LED panels and other lighted signs on the property. The judge

also held there was no selective enforcement of the sign ordinance, as Bay 

Village and the VFD had applied for and obtained permits, the two businesses 

were located in a different zone, and the Borough had not received complaints 

about their LED panels.

Following Judge Kerr's decision, defendant sought to compel the State to 

comply with its July 5, 2017 and September 21, 2017 discovery requests. Judge 

Kerr denied defendant's request, holding as follows:

I found that the [sign] ordinance applies to the sign. So 

the fact that that's happened . . . I don't find that any of 
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A-5702-17T4

these things are relevant. Again, I don't find selective 

enforcement. I don't think there's a difference between 

LED applications and sign applications. I'm not sure 

how that's relevant to whether [defendant] has violated 

the [sign] ordinance as it was written.

Defendant then pled guilty to all five complaints preserving its right to 

appeal Judge Kerr's rulings. The judge imposed an $830 fine and $165 for court 

costs. Defendant agreed to cease using the LED panels pending appeal.

On appeal to the Law Division, defendant reiterated the arguments made 

to Judge Kerr. For the first time on appeal, defendant argued that the Mayor's 

personal animus toward defendant and its owner, and the fact that the Borough 

issued sign permits to Bay Village and the VFD but not defendant, was further 

evidence of selective enforcement.

Judge Michael T. Collins denied defendant's appeal. The judge found the 

definition of "sign" was clear and unambiguous and the sign ordinance governed 

the LED panels. The judge stated:

I find it significant in part the arguments made by 

the State[] . . . with respect to the fact that as long ago 

as 2006, that Bay Village had applied for and been 

granted a permit for the LED [panel]. That leads me to 

believe that this [is] not something that is a recent 

vintage and/or was the product of some type of 

selective enforcement whereby Bay Village and/or the 

[VFD] were the beneficiaries of an indulgent Borough 

where [defendant] was not. So in this regard with 

respect to whether or not I find that the LED panels are 
10 A-5702-17T4

governed by the Borough ordinance, I find that the 

answer to that is yes.

Judge Collins rejected defendant's selective enforcement argument, 

finding as follows:

[As] to the other issue which is that of selective 

enforcement, as pointed out by the State, the burden of 

proof there is fairly high, at least at the threshold level. 

And the question is whether or not the scenario 

presented with respect to Bay Village and the [VFD]

constitutes favorable treatment to those entities and to 

the disadvantage of [defendant], and I do not find that 

there has been a colorable claim articulated by the 

defendant. As pointed out earlier, counsel told me this 

2006 for Bay Village and I guess 2014 for the [VFD]. 

So not only was there that type of vintage of age that is 

attributed to the Borough's position with respect to LED

[panels], but the fact that I just don't find any selective 

enforcement having been borne out under these

circumstances.

Judge Collins declined to consider defendant's animus argument, as defendant 

did not raise this argument before Judge Kerr.3 This appeal followed.

 

3

 Judge Collins properly declined to address this issue, as his review was limited 

to the record below and there was no legal error that permitted him to 

supplement the record. R. 3:23-8(a)(2); see also State v. Loce, 267 N.J. Super. 

102, 104 (Law Div. 1991), aff'd o.b., 267 N.J. Super. 10 (App. Div. 1993) (the 

Law Division is bound by the evidentiary record of the municipal court).
11 A-5702-17T4

II.

On appeal, defendant first contends that Judge Collins erred in finding the 

sign ordinance applied to LED panels. Defendant reiterates the arguments made 

to Judge Collins as to why the sign ordinance, on its face, does not apply to LED 

panels, and also argues the judge erred in failing or refusing to consider extrinsic 

evidence that would have shown the sign ordinance did not apply to LED panels.

On appeal from a municipal court to the Law Division, the review is de 

novo on the record. R. 3:23-8(a). "At a trial de novo, the court makes its own 

findings of fact and conclusions of law but defers to the municipal court's 

credibility findings." State v. Robertson, 228 N.J. 138, 147 (2017).

In our review of the Law Division's decision on a municipal appeal, "[w]e 

'consider only the action of the Law Division and not that of the municipal 

court.'" State v. Adubato, 420 N.J. Super. 167, 175-76 (App. Div. 2011)

(quoting State v. Oliveri, 336 N.J. Super. 244, 251 (App. Div. 2001)). We 

consider "whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on 

sufficient credible evidence present in the record." State v. Stas, 212 N.J. 37, 

49 (2012) (quoting State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999)).

Unlike the Law Division, we do not independently assess the evidence. 

Locurto, 157 N.J. at 471. The rule of deference is more compelling where, such 
12 A-5702-17T4

as here, the municipal and Law Division judges made concurrent findings. Id.

at 474. "Under the two-court rule, appellate courts ordinarily should not 

undertake to alter concurrent findings of facts and credibility determinations 

made by two lower courts absent a very obvious and exceptional showing of 

error." Ibid. "Therefore, appellate review of the factual and credibility findings 

of the municipal court and the Law Division 'is exceedingly narrow.'" State v. 

Reece, 222 N.J. 154, 167 (2015) (quoting Locurto, 157 N.J. at 470).

However, we afford no special deference to a trial court's interpretation of 

the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts. Manalapan 

Realty, LP v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). Because 

Judge Collins's judgment as to the applicability of the sign ordinance to LED 

panels rested on his statutory interpretation, our scope of review is de novo, 

without affording such judgment any special deference. State ex rel. K.O., 217 

N.J. 83, 91 (2014). Applying the above standards, we discern no reason the 

reverse.

"The established rules of statutory construction govern the interpretation 

of a municipal ordinance." Twp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 170 

(1999). As our Supreme Court has held:

When interpreting a statute, our main objective is to 

further the Legislature's intent. To discern the 
13 A-5702-17T4

Legislature's intent, courts first turn to the plain 

language of the statute in question. In reading the 

language used by the Legislature, the court will give 

words their ordinary meaning absent any direction from 

the Legislature to the contrary. "If the plain language 

leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then [the] 

interpretative process is over."

Where the plain meaning does not point the court to a 

"clear and unambiguous result," it then considers 

extrinsic evidence from which it hopes to glean the 

Legislature's intent. Included within the extrinsic 

evidence rubric are legislative history and statutory 

context, which may shed light on the drafter's motives. 

Likewise, interpretations of the statute and cognate 

enactments by agencies empowered to enforce them are 

given substantial deference in the context of statutory 

interpretation.

[TAC Assocs. v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 202 N.J. 

533, 540-41 (2010) (alteration in original) (citations 

omitted) (first quoting Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police 

& Fireman's Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 195 (2007); and 

then quoting Bedford v. Riello, 195 N.J. 210, 222 

(2008)).]

Courts "will only resort to extrinsic aids . . . if the plain language of the statute 

yields 'more than one plausible interpretation.'" State v. Williams, 218 N.J. 576, 

586 (2014) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)).

In considering a statute's language, we are guided by the legislative 

directive that:

[W]ords and phrases shall be read and construed with

their context, and shall, unless inconsistent with the 
14 A-5702-17T4

manifest intent of the legislature or unless another or 

different meaning is expressly indicated, be given their 

generally accepted meaning, according to the approved 

usage of the language. Technical words and phrases, 

and words and phrases having a special or accepted 

meaning in the law, shall be construed in accordance 

with such technical or special and accepted meaning.

[N.J.S.A. 1:1-1.]

It has been long held that when construing a statute in which "the Legislature 

has clearly defined a term, the courts are bound by that definition." Febbi v. Bd. 

of Review, Div. of Emp't Sec., Dep't of Labor & Indus., 35 N.J. 601, 606 (1961).

There was no need for extrinsic evidence in this case. The plain language 

of Ordinance § 212-16 leads to a clear and unambiguous result that, except for 

one lighted sign, the Borough intended to prohibit all "signs, billboards, 

advertising structures or similar items" in the RC district.

The plain language of Ordinance § 212-3 leads to the clear and 

unambiguous result that LED panels are "signs." The ordinance defines "sign" 

as "[a]ny device designated to inform or attract the attention of persons not on 

the premises on which the sign is located[.]" Although the ordinance does not 

define the word "device," that word is commonly defined as "a piece of 

equipment or a mechanism designed to serve a special purpose or perform a 

special function." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, "device," 
15 A-5702-17T4

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/device. The LED panels clearly 

are devices designed to inform or attract attention of persons not on defendant's 

premises. In fact, defendant referred to the LED panels as "LED informational

panels," and there is no dispute that the LED panels displayed information to the 

public, such as the availability of beer and happy hour specials within the resort. 

(Emphasis added). Accordingly, the LED panels are "signs" within the meaning 

of Ordinance § 212-3.

Lastly, we reject defendant's argument that the LED panels are not 

"lighted signs" and that "lighted signs" means only traditional wood signs or 

banners that are backlighted or illuminated with directional lighting. LED

means "light-emitting diode," and the term "LED" is commonly defined as "a 

semiconductor diode that emits light when a voltage is applied to it and that is 

used in electronic devices[.]" Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, "LED," 

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/LED. Accordingly, the LED 

panels are "lighted signs" governed by Ordinance § 212-16B(3).

We conclude the LED panels are signs governed by the sign ordinance. 

The fact that Bay Village and the VFD applied for an obtained a sign permit for 

their LED panels in 2006 and 2014, respectively, supports this conclusion. 

Defendant violated the sign ordinance by installing the LED panels on its 
16 A-5702-17T4

building without obtaining a sign permit (Ordinance § 212-16B(4)); without 

paying the sign permit fee (Ordinance § 212-16(E)); and installing more than 

one lighted sign (Ordinance § 212-16B(3)). Discovery and any ordinance 

amendments will not change this result.

III.

Defendant next argues that Judge Collins erred in finding, as a matter of 

law and without the benefit of discovery and a factual record, that the Borough 

did not selectively enforce the sign ordinance against defendant. Our review of 

this issue is limited to whether the judge's findings "could reasonably have been 

reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record." Stas, 212 N.J. at

49. Defendant also argues the judge erred in denying discovery on the selective 

enforcement issue.

As an initial matter, defendant is incorrect that selective enforcement 

would render the Borough's action arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, thus 

warranting reversal. Rather, the selective enforcement of ordinances, like 

statutes, is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment of the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; 

see Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (explaining that the Equal 
17 A-5702-17T4

Protection Clause "prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on 

considerations such as race").

"Discriminatory enforcement of an otherwise impartial law by state and 

local officials is unconstitutional." Pennsauken, 160 N.J. at 183. However, 

"[t]he conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not a 

constitutional violation unless the decision to prosecute is based upon an 

unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." 

Ibid.

A party asserting selective enforcement has a "heavy" burden of proof. 

State v. Di Frisco, 118 N.J. 253, 266 (1990). As our Supreme Court has held:

In order to prevail on a claim of discriminatory 

enforcement, the defendant must plead and prove 

intentional selectivity as well as an unjustifiable basis 

for the discrimination. "[The] standards require [the 

defendant] to show both that the . . . enforcement 

system had a discriminatory effect and that it was 

motivated by a discriminatory purpose."

[Ibid. (first alteration in original) (quoting Wayte v. 

United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)).]

"[A] defendant establishes his right to discovery if he can show that he 

has a 'colorable basis' for a selective prosecution claim." State v. Kennedy, 247 

N.J. Super. 21, 31 (App. Div. 1991). "A more lenient standard would encourage 

the assertion of spurious claims of selective enforcement as a means of 
18 A-5702-17T4

burdening criminal trials with massive discovery of material completely 

irrelevant to the defendant's case." Id. at 32. "[A] defendant must also establish 

that the materials he seeks are in some way probative of the elements of selective 

enforcement." Id. at 34-35.

Defendant failed to demonstrate that the Borough selectively enforced the 

sign ordinance against it. Defendant did not claim the Borough's enforcement 

of the sign ordinance against defendant was based on an unjustifiable standard 

such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. Rather, defendant

grounded its selective enforcement argument on its mistaken belief that Bay 

Village and the VFD did not apply for and obtain a sign permit for their LED 

panels. When that argument failed, defendant then grounded its selective 

enforcement on the Borough issuing sign permits to these two businesses, but 

not to defendant. Neither of these grounds proves the Borough's enforcement 

of the sign ordinance against defendant was based on an unjustifiable standard, 

had a discriminatory effect, and was motivated by a discriminatory purpose, let 

alone make a "colorable claim" of selective enforcement which would have 

entitled it to discovery. For this reason, defendant's selective enforcement 

argument fails.
19 A-5702-17T4

In any event, defendant ignores the clear distinction between it and Bay 

Village and the VFD. Both businesses applied for and received sign permits 

prior to installing their LED signs, whereas defendant did not apply for a sign

permit or pay the sign permit fee prior to installing its LED panels. Both 

businesses installed one LED panel, whereas defendant installed two LED 

panels. Both businesses are located in the business district that did not abut

residential neighborhoods, whereas defendant's resort is located in the RC 

multifamily residential district. In addition, residents had complained about

defendant's LED panels, whereas there were no complaints against Bay Village 

or the VFD. Thus, to the extent the Borough treated defendant different than 

Bay Village or the VFD, that disparate treatment was entirely justifiable, as the 

Borough based its actions on defendant's violation of the sign ordinance and the 

numerous residents' complaints about the LED panels. Simply put, defendant 

failed meet its "heavy" burden to establish a colorable claim of selective 

enforcement, and thus, was not entitled to discovery.

Affirmed.