alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996             DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996             DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                       3,530,600               3,619,500
<SECURITIES>                                 2,002,900              36,425,900
<RECEIVABLES>                               12,365,300              13,756,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (383,700)               (427,800)
<INVENTORY>                                          0                       0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            21,696,000              59,164,500
<PP&E>                                      12,594,900              16,261,000
<DEPRECIATION>                              (4,718,000)             (7,785,300)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              29,858,400              67,886,600
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        9,642,600               9,784,300
<BONDS>                                              0                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                       0
<PREFERRED>                                          0                       0
<COMMON>                                       486,000               1,442,400
<OTHER-SE>                                  19,646,400              53,520,800
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                29,858,400              67,886,600
<SALES>                                     65,005,500              85,670,500
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            65,005,500              85,670,500
<CGS>                                                0                       0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               48,131,300              60,785,400
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             8,137,500              11,141,200
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             388,600                 190,700
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              8,613,600              14,725,800
<INCOME-TAX>                                   364,900               8,053,300
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          8,248,700               6,672,500<F1>
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                       0
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                 8,248,700               6,672,500
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.76                    0.53<F1>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.63                    0.46<F1>
<FN>
<F1>Including $4.5 million deferred tax liability related to C-Corporation
conversion.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### Legg *v.*Legg.

No. 6231.

May 16, 1928.

Fees in divorce suit. Before Judge Pittman. Gordon superior court. June 13, 1927.

*M. B.*Eubanlcs, for plaintiff in error. *A. L. Henson,*contra.

Atkinson, J.

1. Where a husband files a petition for divorce and causes the wife to be duly served with the petition and process, the defendant may file an answer denying the allegations of the petition or setting up such defense as she may have, and in her answer may make claim, for alimony and attorney’s fees to enable her to defend the suit instituted by the husband. *Luke*v. *Luke,*154 *Ga.*800 (115 S. E. 666), and cit.; *Lee*v. *Lee,*154 *Ga.*820 (115 S. E. 493), and cit.; *Banks*v. *Banks,*149 *Ga.*517 (101 S. E. 114); *Shorter*v. *Shorter,*150 *Ga.*109 (102 S. E. 863). In such an action the plaintiff submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court for determining all questions relating to divorce and allowance of attorney’s fees to enable the wife to defend the action.

2. At the hearing of the application for allowance of attorney’s fees it appeared that the defendant had filed a demurrer to the petition for divorce, an answer, and a plea in abatement. The plaintiff moved to dismiss the plea in abatement, and the motion ivas overruled. Whereupon the attorney for the plaintiff announced that he would withdraw the petition for divorce; but before a written order of withdrawal the court announced that he would allow the defendant’s attorney a fee for the services rendered up to that time, and evidence was introduced tending to show that the services were of the reasonable value of $50, and the court entered judgment ordering the plaintiff to pay that amount. *Held: (a)*The exception to the order overruling the motion to dismiss the plea in abatement is premature, because that ruling did not purport to be a final disposition of the divorce suit. (6) The judge had jurisdiction to entertain the defendant’s motion for the allowance of attorney’s fees, and the evidence authorized the award of $50.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
#### Gerald GRIMM, Former Husband, Appellant, v. Sheila H. GRIMM, Former Wife, Appellee.

No. 1D10-5176.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 15, 2011.

Brian P. North, Fleming Island; Nick James, Jacksonville, for Appellant.

James G. Roberts of Roberts & Reiter, Jacksonville; Michael J. Korn and Mary C. Coxe of Korn & Zehmer, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Gerald Grimm appeals the lower court’s final judgment of dissolution, challenging four aspects of the equitable distribution scheme. We affirm the court’s determination that (I) the funds used to pay the down payment on the marital home, and (II) the remaining funds that were jointly titled, were nonmarital assets belonging to the wife. The court erred, however, by (III) failing to consider the wife’s nonmari-tal assets when determining the issue of alimony, and (IV) dividing the husband’s Social Security benefits as a marital asset.

The lower court considered each of the economic factors listed in section 61.08(2), Florida Statutes (2007), when deciding whether to award alimony to the husband. Factor (2)(d) directs the court to consider the “financial resources of each party, the nonmarital and the marital assets and liabilities distributed to each,” and factor (2)(g) directs the court to consider “[a]ll sources of income available to either party.” The court, however, evaluated only the monthly income from the parties’ retirement plans and their marital assets, omitting any consideration of the wife’s nonmarital assets. This was error. *See, e.g., Beck v. Beck,*852 So.2d 934 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); *O’Connor v. O’Connor,*782 So.2d 502 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), *Sasnett v.*
      *429
      *Sasnett,*679 So.2d 1265 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); *Kendall v. Kendall,*677 So.2d 48 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); *White v. White,*617 So.2d 732, 733 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); *Green v. Green,*542 So.2d 466 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).

The lower court also awarded a percentage of the husband’s Social Security benefits to the wife.1 This court held in *Johnson v. Johnson,*726 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), that benefits from a Social Security replacement plan, like the wife’s in the case at bar, is a marital asset subject to distribution, but that Social Security benefits are not, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 407(a). Moreover, the lower court is not permitted to award the nonparticipating spouse other marital property as an offset to counterbalance the participating spouse’s Social Security benefits. *Id.*at 395-96. *Accord Stanley v. Stanley,*956 A.2d 1 (Del.2008); *In re Marriage of Crook,*211 Ill.2d 437, 286 Ill.Dec. 141, 813 N.E.2d 198 (2004).

Because we reverse on Issues III and IV, the trial court must revisit its plan of equitable distribution on remand, and we express no opinion as to how the lower court should divide the eligible assets to achieve a just result.

WOLF, DAVIS, and PADOVANO, JJ., concur.

. The court did not expressly state this in the final order but the wife candidly acknowledged it in her answer brief.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Fernand Paul AUTERY.

No. 2011-KO-1077.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 14, 2011.

In re Autery, Fernand Paul; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 03-1561; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-0886.

Denied.
Exhibit 32 to Form 10-KSB

Certification of Chief Executive Officer
Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

Cecil a.  Brooks  does  hereby  certify  that the Annual  Report of  Cornerstone
Ministries Investments, Inc. on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2003
(the "Report")  fully complies with the  requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d),
as  applicable,  of the  Securities  Exchange  Act of 1934  and the  information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date: March 28, 2004.
/s/ Cecil A. Brooks, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer
-------------------


Certification of Chief Financial Officer
Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

John T.  Ottinger,  does hereby  certify that the Annual  Report of  Cornerstone
Ministries Investments, Inc. on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2003
(the "Report")  fully complies with the  requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d),
as  applicable,  of the  Securities  Exchange  Act of 1934  and the  information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date: March 28, 2004.
/s/ John T. Ottinger, Vice President, Chief Operating Officer
                                      and Chief Financial Officer
--------------------
exv10w1wi






Exhibit 10.1(i)




NINTH AMENDMENT

OF

U.S. BANK NON-QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLAN




WRITTEN ACTION AND PLAN AMENDMENT




     I, Jennie Carlson, certify that I am the Executive Vice President, Human Resources of U.S.
Bancorp, a Delaware corporation, and that, pursuant to authority granted to me by the Benefits
Administration Committee, I take the following actions:




     U.S. Bancorp sponsors a nonqualified deferred compensation plan, the U.S. Bank
Non-Qualified Retirement Plan (the “Plan”), most recently set forth in a document
entitled “U.S. Bank Non-Qualified Retirement Plan (2002 Statement).”




     The Benefits Administration Committee has determined that the Plan should be
amended to permit division of vested benefits under the Plan for the Participant
named in Appendix B-4 under a court-approved domestic relations order that is also
approved by the plan administrator.




     Therefore, by this amendment (which is the Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Bank
Non-Qualified Retirement Plan), effective as of February 1, 2008, the Plan is
amended to permit division of vested benefits under the Plan for the Participant
named in Appendix B-4 under a court-approved domestic relations order that is also
approved by the plan administrator.



	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 
	Dated:  December 31, 2008 	/s/ Jennie Carlson
 	 
	 	Jennie Carlson 	 
	 	Executive Vice President, Human Resources
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1468 Engrossed in House (EH)]

  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1468

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
   To ensure that, for each small business participating in the 8(a) 
business development program that was affected by Hurricane Katrina of 
 2005, the period in which it can participate is extended by 18 months.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Disadvantaged Business Disaster 
Eligibility Act''.

SEC. 2. EXTENSION OF PARTICIPATION TERM FOR VICTIMS OF HURRICANE 
              KATRINA.

    (a) Retroactivity.--If a small business concern, while 
participating in any program or activity under the authority of 
paragraph (10) of section 7(j) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 
636(j)), was located in a parish or county described in subsection (b) 
and was affected by Hurricane Katrina of 2005, the period during which 
the small business concern is permitted continuing participation and 
eligibility in such program or activity shall be extended for an 
additional 18 months.
    (b) Parishes and Counties Covered.--Subsection (a) applies to any 
parish in the State of Louisiana, or any county in the State of 
Mississippi or in the State of Alabama, that has been designated by the 
Administrator of the Small Business Administration as a disaster area 
by reason of Hurricane Katrina under disaster declaration 10176, 10177, 
10178, 10179, 10180, or 10181.
    (c) Review and Compliance.--The Administrator of the Small Business 
Administration shall ensure that the case of every small business 
concern participating before the date of the enactment of this Act in a 
program or activity covered by subsection (a) is reviewed and brought 
into compliance with this section.

            Passed the House of Representatives March 26, 2007.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
110th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                               H. R. 1468

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

   To ensure that, for each small business participating in the 8(a) 
business development program that was affected by Hurricane Katrina of 
 2005, the period in which it can participate is extended by 18 months.
```
Exhibit 10.1


 





6350
S 3000 E


Salt
Lake City, UT 84121


 


Mr. Stephen
Chesnut


3936
Blustery Way


Marietta.
Georgia 30066


Email:
schesnut@bellsouth.net


 


Dear
Steve,


 


I am pleased to offer you the position of Senior
Vice President, Finance (principal financial officer) with Overstock.com,
conditioned upon our satisfaction with the results of a background check.  Overstock.com will secure its future success
by continuing to attract talented and dedicated employees such as you.


 


The
following is a summary of the terms of our employment offer:


 


Start
Date: January 5,
2009


Employment
Status: Full-Time,
Exempt


Compensation: $200,000
per year


One-Time Signing Bonus: $30,000 (to be paid within 10 days of the beginning employment). Full
amount must be returned to Overstock.com if you choose to leave or are
terminated for cause before completing six months of employment.


Performance Bonus: Participation in 2009 bonus plan based on performance.


Paid Time Off: 15
days per year accrued at 5 hours per pay period (with an additional and
immediate 5 days in 2009 to be use for relocation activities).


Restricted Stock Unit Grant: At least 10,000 shares pending board approval and with standard
three-year vesting and other terms.


Relocation: Direct
payment to relocation companies of up to $20,000 in reimbursable relocation
costs — to be used within nine months of first day of employment.  You must reimburse Overstock.com the full
amount if you choose to leave or are terminated for cause before completing
nine months of employment.


COBRA Reimbursement: Up to $1,000 per month for one month.


Report to:
Jonathan Johnson


 


You
will also be eligible to receive the following benefits effective the first of
the month following your first full month of employment.


 


	
  Medical

  	
  Dependent
  Care Reimbursement Account

  
	
  Dental
  with Orthodontia

  	
  Health
  Care Reimbursement Account

  
	
  Vision

  	
  Pre-Paid
  Legal

  
	
  Supplemental Life

  	
  Life Insurance

  
	
  Supplemental
  Disability, Accident/Sickness,  Cancer

  



 


You
will be eligible to participate in the Overstock.com 401(k) plan beginning
the first of the quarter following 6 months of service. This plan matches 50%
of your pre-tax contributions up to 6% of your salary.


 


Overstock.com
is an at-will employer. Nothing in this offer shall limit the right of
Overstock.com or yourself to terminate the employment relationship.


 


Please
sign below and return this document via fax to 801-947-3144, signifying
acceptance of this offer. If you have any questions, please feel free to
contact me at 801-947-3114.  I look
forward to working with you.


 


	
  Sincerely,

  	
  I
  accept the above terms of employment.

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Jonathan
  E. Johnson III

  	
  Stephen
  Chesnut

  	
  December     ,
  2008

  
	
  President

  	
   

  	
   

  



 


CONFIDENTIAL
– PROPERTY OF OVERSTOCK.COM: the existence and terms of this letter and all related communications
are confidential and intended only for your personal and family consideration.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Lance WOODWARD.

No. 2009-KH-2498.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 10, 2010.

PER CURIAM.1

Writ granted in part; otherwise denied. The record shows that the contempt adjudication did not comply with La.C.Cr.P. art. 22, which provides: “A person who has committed a direct contempt of court may be found guilty and punished therefor by the court without any trial, after affording him an opportunity to be heard orally by way of defense or mitigation.” *See also In re Judge Sassone,*2007-0651 (La.6/29/07), 959 So.2d 859; *State v. Williams,*97-1135 (La.App. 5th Cir.5/27/98), 714 So.2d 258. Here, relator was not afforded an opportunity to be heard orally by way of defense or mitigation. Therefore, the finding of direct contempt is reversed, and relator’s sentence of six months imprisonment for contempt is vacated. Relator’s request for a stay is rendered moot.

VICTORY and CLARK, JJ., would deny.

1

. Kimball, C.J., not participating.
#### CITY OF BATON ROUGE, Parish of East Baton Rouge, and the Department of Baton Rouge City Court v. Jennifer BETHLEY and the Personnel Board of the City of Baton Rouge, Parish of East Baton Rouge.

No. 2011-OC-1884.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 4, 2011.

In re City of Baton Rouge et al.; Department of Baton Rouge City Court; Parish of East Baton Rouge; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 575,406; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 CA 1840.

Denied.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PETRA MARTINEZ; STANLEY ATKINSON,

Plaintiffs

- Appellants,

v.

AMERICA ’ S WHOLESALE LENDER,

Defendant

- Appellee. No. 19

- 16268

D.C. No. 5:18

- cv

- 02869

- LHK

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Lucy H. Koh, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 2, 2020 * *

Before: LEAVY, PAEZ, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
Petra Martinez and Stanley Atkinson appeal pro se from the district court’s

judgment dismissing their diversity action alleging state law claims arising out of

foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

review de novo a dist rict court’s dismissal based on res judicata. Stewart v. U.S.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)

. 

# FILED

JUN 9 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 19

- 16268

Bancorp , 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002). We affirm.

The district court properly determined that the requirements for diversity

jurisdiction were met, as the amount in controversy was over $75,000.00 and all

parties were citizens of different states

. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332( a) , (c)(1) ( setting

forth requirements of diversity jurisdiction and explaining that for purposes of

diversity jurisdiction , “a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of every State

. . . by which it has been incorporated and of the State

. . . where it has its

principal place of business ”); Hertz Corp. v. Friend , 559 U.S. 77, 80 (2010)

( explaining that a corporation’s “principal place of business” is “the place where
the corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the
corporation’s activities” ).
The district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ action as barred by the

doctrine of r es judicata. See Giles v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp ., 494 F.3d 865,

884 (9th Cir. 2007) (in diversity cases where only substantive state law is at issue
“we apply the preclusion law that the [state court which issued the first judgment]
would apply”) ; M

ycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co.
, 51 P.3d 297, 306

- 07 ( Cal. 2002)
(California’s doctrine of res judicata )

. We reject as meritless plaintiffs’ contention that defendants committed
“fraud upon the court.”

We do not consider matters not specifically and distin ctly raised and argued3 19

- 16268

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

All pending requests are denied.

AFFIRMED

.
EXHIBIT 32.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION
1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002



In connection with
the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of Senesco Technologies, Inc. for the year ended June 30, 2013 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof, the undersigned, Joel Brooks, Chief Financial Officer, Secretary and Treasurer, hereby
certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

(1)	The Annual Report fully complies
with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)	The information contained in
the Annual Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Senesco Technologies,
Inc.







|Date: September 25, 2013 |  |                                                 
|------------------------ |  | ------------------------------------------------
|                         |  | /s/ Joel Brooks *                               
|                         |  | Joel Brooks                                     
|                         |  | Chief Financial Officer, Secretary and Treasurer
|                         |  | (principal financial and accounting officer)    





* A signed original of this written statement
required by Section 906 has been provided to us and will be retained by us and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request.
#### Howeth Bros. v. J. L. Clarke.

(No. 6235.)

Appeal from Cooke County.

Mathis & Lewis, counsel for appellants.

No counsel appeared for appellee.

' Opinion by

Willson, J.

§ 72. *Judgment dismissing a suit is a final judgment.*Suit in justice’s court by appellants against appellee upon *113an open account for $39.50. Appellee pleaded that he was not sued in the precinct of his residence. The judgment in the justice’s court was as follows: “Said plea is sustained and this cause dismissed from the docket. It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed by the court that the defendant, J. L. Clark, go hence without day, and recover all costs in this behalf incurred, for which let execution issue.” Appellants appealed to the county court, in which court, upon motion of appellee, the appeal was dismissed upon the ground that said judgment was not a final one. We are of opinion that said judgment is a final one, and that the county court erred in dismissing the appeal. It is well settled that a judgment dismissing a suit is a final judgment from which an appeal can be prosecuted. [Parker v. Spencer, 61 Tex. 155; Hagood v. Grimes, 24 Tex. 16; West v. Bagby, 12 Tex. 34; Hanks v. Thompson, 5 Tex. 6; 1 Civil Cas. Ct. App., § 467.] The judgment dismissing the appeal is reversed and the cause is remanded for a trial *de novo*in the county court.

April 12, 1890.

Reversed and remanded.