alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# Exhibit 32.2

# CERTIFICATION PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, David M. Bronson, Executive Vice
President and Chief Financial Officer of PSS World Medical, Inc. (the
Company), hereby certify that the Companys Quarterly Report on
Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended December 31, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report) fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)) and that the information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Company.

/s/ David M. Bronson David M. Bronson Executive Vice President
and Chief Financial Officer

February 16, 2004
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1652 Introduced in House (IH)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1652

To amend the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act 
    to authorize the Federal Trade Commission to issue new rules to 
establish a requirement to prohibit any telemarketing calls during the 
                    hours of 5:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 22, 2007

Mr. King of New York introduced the following bill; which was referred 
                to the Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act 
    to authorize the Federal Trade Commission to issue new rules to 
establish a requirement to prohibit any telemarketing calls during the 
                    hours of 5:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Protection From Telemarketers Act''.

SEC. 2. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION RULES.

    Section 3(a) of the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse 
Prevention Act (15 U.S.C. 6102) is amended by adding at the end the 
following:
            ``(4) The Commission shall include in such rules respecting 
        other abusive telemarketing acts or practices a requirement 
        that telemarketers shall not initiate any outbound telephone 
        calls to any person during the hours of 5:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. 
        in the locality of the person called.''.
                                 <all>
```
#### STATE ex rel. James STEPHON v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-0137.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 17, 2010.

In re James, Stephon; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. J, Nos. 343846, 394007; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KW 1523.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; *State ex rel. Glover v. State,*93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h Marilyn Kell y Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathawa y Mary Beth Kell y Brian K. Zahra,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk March 30, 2011

p0323 

# Order

March 30, 2011

141956

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 141956 COA: 292280 St. Clair CC: 08-002522-FH ALAN GEORGE THOMPSON, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application fo r leave to appeal the September 28, 2010 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, it appearing to this Court that the

cases of People v Pullen (Docket No. 142751) and People v Watkins (Docket No. 142031) are pending on appeal before this C ourt and that the decisions in those cases may resolve an issue raised in the present application for le ave to appeal, we ORDER that the application be held in ABEYANCE pending the decisions in those cases.
#### E. M. Tillman & Co. v. R. B. Adams & Co.

(No. 3120.)

Appeal from Hill County.

Opinion by

Willson, J.

*(Transferred from Austin.)*

§ 308. *Attachment; liability of plaintiff in, for act of agent in suing out writ of.*Appellants, by their agent, sued out a writ of attachment against appellees, and had their property seized thereunder. Appellees pleaded in reconvention, claiming actual damages, alleging that the writ was wrongfully sued out, and also claiming exemplary damages, alleging that the writ was sued out maliciously and without probable cause. The judgment of the court awarded appellees $400 exemplary damages, but found no actual damage. Appellants contend that they are not liable for exemplary damages, the writ having been sued out by their agent. *Held:*In Wallace v. Finberg, 4G Tex. 3G, it is said, “If the agent who makes the affidavit and bond acted maliciously in doing it, he is responsible; but his malice would not be imputed by ¡iresumption to his principal, while his bad judgment in wrongfully suing out the writ would be.” In Willis & Bro. v. McNeill, *57*Tex. 465, it was held that “to make the principal liable for exemplary damages because of the malice of his agent, the evidence must show that he had knowledge of, and participated in, the malice, or afterwards ratified, adopted or approved the malicious acts.” [Citing Wallace v. Finberg, *supra,*and Hays v. R. R. Co. 46 Tex. 2†2.] We deduce from the cases above cited, and other authorities we have examined, the following conclusions: 1. If the principal authorized and directed the agent to sue out the attachment, or, knowing his purpose to do so, sanctioned his action, he is liable for the malice of the agent. 2. If the principal, although he did not in any manner participate in the malicious acts of the agent, yet, if he afterwards ratified, adopted or approved the same, he is liable for the malice of the *267agent. [Drake on Attach. § 182; Cooley on Torts, 534; Story on Agency, § 455; Kirksey v. Jones, 7 Ala. 622; McCulloch v. Walton, 11 Ala. 492; Wood v. Weir, 5 B. Monroe (Ky.), 544; Marshall v. Betner, 17 Ala. 832.] In this case, the evidence warranted the court in finding that appellants not only authorized and directed their agent to sue out the attachment, but also that, they ratified, adopted and approved his acts in the premises.

October 11, 1884.

§309. *Want of probable cause; malice may be inferred from.*It was satisfactorily shown that the attachment was sued out without probable cause, but there was no evidence of malice, further than that showing a want of probable cause. But it is well settled, that, when a want of probable cause is shown, malice may be inferred, and this inference may supply proof thereof. [Willis & Bro. v. McNeill, 57 Tex. 465; Culberson v. Cabeen, 29 Tex. 255; W. & W. Con. Rep. § 38.]

Affirmed.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Kashie FERNANDEZ.

No. 2010-KO-2536.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 8, 2011.

In re Fernandez, Kashie; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 480-784; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-KA-1727.

Denied.
#### BAY PARK TOWERS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellant, v. TRIPLE M. ROOFING, CORP., Appellee.

No. 3D09-3004.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 16, 2011.

*593Cuevas, Ortiz & Cubas and Andrew Cuevas, Miami, for appellant.

Derrevere, Hawkes, Black & Cozad and Bryan W. Black and Shirley Jean McEac-hern, West Palm Beach, for appellee Triple M. Roofing Corp.; Perez & Rodriguez, and Luis N. Perez, for appellee IRT Ar-con, Inc., for appellee.

Before RAMIREZ, C.J., and SHEPHERD, J., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.

PER CURIAM.

ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Upon consideration of the responses to this Court’s December 22, 2010, order to show cause, including the response filed by former counsel, Berk, Merchant & Sims, PLC, and finding all of the responses to be insufficient, the Court awards, as a sanction, a reasonable attorney fee to Appellant for the prosecution of the appeal, to be assessed against both Triple M. Roofing Corporation and IRT-Arcon, Inc., to be paid in equal amounts by each party and their counsel, pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2009) (stating an award of reasonable attorney fees is to be paid to the prevailing party “in equal amounts by the losing party and the losing party’s attorney”). The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance herewith.
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1402 Enrolled Bill (ENR)]

        H.R.1402

                       One Hundred Tenth Congress

                                 of the

                        United States of America

                          AT THE FIRST SESSION

          Begun and held at the City of Washington on Thursday,
            the fourth day of January, two thousand and seven

                                 An Act

 
To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 
320 South Lecanto Highway in Lecanto, Florida, as the ``Sergeant Dennis 
               J. Flanagan Lecanto Post Office Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SERGEANT DENNIS J. FLANAGAN LECANTO POST OFFICE BUILDING.
    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 320 South Lecanto Highway in Lecanto, Florida, shall be 
known and designated as the ``Sergeant Dennis J. Flanagan Lecanto Post 
Office Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Sergeant 
Dennis J. Flanagan Lecanto Post Office Building''.

                               Speaker of the House of Representatives.

                            Vice President of the United States and    
                                               President of the Senate.
```
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Marlon FIALLOS.

No. 2012-KK-0483.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 13, 2012.

In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 11-0317; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-K-61.

Denied.

CLARK, J., would grant.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
          18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
          SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Annual Report of Xvariant, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-KSB for the period ending September 30, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Reed
L. Benson, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant of Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and
belief:

     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
         of the Company.



Date:  August 25, 2004          /s/ Reed L. Benson
                                --------------------------------------
                                Reed L. Benson
                                Chief Executive Officer and
                                Chief Financial Officer
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-6797

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

BOBBY WAYNE WILKINS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Dever III, 

Chief District Judge. (7:09-cr-00058-D-1; 7:11-cv-00139-D)

Submitted: September 25, 2013 Decided: October 2, 2013

Before GREGORY, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Bobby Wayne Wilkins, Appellant Pro Se. Ethan A. Ontjes, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Seth Morgan Wood, OFFICE OF 

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Bobby Wayne Wilkins seeks to appeal the district 

court’s orders denying relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 

Supp. 2013) motion and denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion. 

The district court’s orders are not appealable unless a circuit 

justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2006). A certificate of appealability 

will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the 

district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies 

this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would 

find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 

claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 

484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 

(2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural 

grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive 

procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a 

debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 

529 U.S. at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude 

that Wilkins has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, 

we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 
3

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### UNITED STATES of America v. Farris Egbert MORRIS, Alias Buck Wilkins, Appellant.

No. 13188.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Argued May 13, 1960.

Decided May 24, 1960.

Farris E. Morris, pro se.

Walter E. Alessandroni, James J. Phelan, Jr., Philadelphia, Pa. (James J. Phelan, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.

Before GOODRICH, McLAUGHLIN and STALEY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from an order of the district court denying the appellant’s motion to vacate a sentence imposed upon him on September 29, 1954. The appellant had been convicted upon trial in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sentenced and confined to a federal penitentiary. He brought this action to vacate the sentence alleging grounds which, if proved, would have perhaps constituted an invasion of his constitutional rights. He also made serious charges about the conduct of the original trial in the hands of Herman Pollock, Esquire, for many years head of the Voluntary Defender Association in the City of Philadelphia.1 Judge Clary, before whom the matter was brought, appointed Jacob Kossman, Esquire, of the Philadelphia Bar, to represent the appellant in the proceeding and had the prisoner brought back from his place of confinement with every opportunity to> testify on his own behalf.

At the conclusion of the hearing Judge Clary wrote a painstakingly careful opinion analyzing both the facts and the law applicable to the case. He concluded that the appellant had proved no basis in law or fact for the relief he sought. D.C.E.D.Pa.1959, 178 F.Supp. 694.

We can add nothing to the thorough consideration of this case by Judge Clary.

The decision of the district court will be affirmed.

1

. For a study of the organization and operations of the Defender Association see Note, Legal Aid to Indigent Criminal Defendants in Philadelphia and New Jersey, 107 U.Pa.L.Rev. 812, 836-43, 851-54 (1959).
**EXHIBIT 32.2****CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER****PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTEDPURSUANT TO****SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**     The undersigned, Mark L. Wabschall, Executive VicePresident and Chief Financial Officer of webMethods, Inc. (the“Company”), has executed this certification inconnection with the filing with the Securities and ExchangeCommission of the Company’s annual report onForm 10-K for thefiscal year ended March 31, 2006 (the “Report”).The undersigned hereby certifies that: (1) the Report fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results ofoperations of the Company.       Date: June 22, 2006     /s/ Mark L. Wabschall             Name: Mark L. Wabschall      Title:   Executive Vice President and Chief    Financial Officer
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order
Lansing, Michigan

December 28, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice 134222 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan BEST CARE REHABI LITATION, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices

v SC: 134222 COA: 272395 Wayne CC: 05-527836-NO ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the applicati on for leave to appeal the March 20, 2007 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, it appearing to this Court that the case of Miller v Allstate (Docket Nos. 134393, 134406) is pending on appeal before this Court and that the decision in that case ma y resolve an issue ra ised in the present application for leave to app eal, we ORDER that the applic ation be held in ABEYANCE pending the decision in that case.

t1217 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

December 28, 2007

Clerk
#### Patrick WACTOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D10-2412.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

July 20, 2011.

Patrick Wactor, Daytona Beach, pro se.

No appearance for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

*Affirmed.*The trial court correctly denied appellant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, as it was in actuality an untimely motion for postconviction relief from his conviction and sentence, which were final in 1996. It is also without merit. *See Howell v. State,*45 So.3d 527 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); *Early v. State,*678 So.2d 901 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).

WARNER, POLEN and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 10.6


 


Safety
Insurance Group, Inc.


Annual
Performance Incentive Plan


Amendment


 


This Amendment
(this “Amendment”) to the Safety Insurance Group, Inc. Annual
Performance Incentive Plan (the “Plan”) is adopted as of December 31,
2008 by the Board of Directors of Safety Insurance Group, Inc. (the “Company”).


 


WHEREAS, the Company maintains the Plan, and pursuant to Section 8
of the Plan, the Board of Directors of the Company may amend, suspend,
discontinue or terminate the Plan at any time; and


 


WHEREAS, the Board of Directors of the
Company desires to amend the Plan.


 


NOW,
THEREFORE, the Plan is hereby amended by this Amendment, effective as of December 31,
2008, as follows:


 


1.               The
following shall be added to the end of Section 6(a):


 


“Notwithstanding
the foregoing, any payment under the Plan shall be made no later than March 15
of the calendar year following the calendar year in which the Committee
certifies that one or more of the applicable performance objectives have been
attained.”


 


2.               Except
as expressly set forth in this Amendment, the Plan shall remain unchanged and
in full force and effect.
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

626.1 CAF 16-00999 PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., SMITH, CENTRA, PERADOTTO, AND SCUDDER, JJ.

IN THE MATTER OF MARC D. GSCHWEND, PETITIONER-APPELLANT,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LAUREN N. DAVILA, RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT.

BENNETT SCHECHTER ARCURI & WILL LLP, BUFFALO (CAROL A. CONDON OF COUNSEL), PETITIONER-APPELLANT.

COHEN & LOMBARDO, P.C., BUFFALO (MICHELLE M. SCHWACH OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT.

LEIGH E. ANDERSON, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD, BUFFALO.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Niagara County (John F. Batt, J.), dated August 21, 2015 in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6. The order, among other things, denied the petition of petitioner seeking modification of a prior order of custody by awarding him sole custody of the subject child.
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: By order entered in 2008, Family Court awarded sole custody of the parties’ child to respondent mother. Petitioner father now appeals from an order that, inter alia, denied his petition seeking modification of the 2008 order by awarding sole custody of the child to him. Contrary to the father’s contention, the court’s determination is entitled to great deference ( see Eschbach v Eschbach , 56 NY2d 167, 173-174), and it will not be disturbed where, as here, it is based upon a comprehensive weighing of the appropriate factors and is supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record ( see Matter of Blair v DiGregorio , 132 AD3d 1375, 1376, lv denied 26 NY3d 914). We see no reason to remit the matter for an expedited hearing, as requested by the Attorney for the Child, based upon allegations of a change of circumstances subsequent to the entry of the order on appeal. We instead conclude that the contentions raised in that regard are more properly considered by the court in a petition to modify its order ( see Matter of Mayes v Laplatney , 125 AD3d 1488, 1489-1490; cf. Matter of Kennedy v Kennedy , 107 AD3d 1625, 1626).
Entered: April 28, 2017 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
#### Cynthia BRIDGES, Secretary, Louisiana Department of Revenue v. HERTZ EQUIPMENT RENTAL CORPORATION.

No. 2010-C-2328.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 17, 2010.

In re Bridges, Cynthia Sec. et al.; Louisiana, State of; Revenue, Department of; —Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 639-878; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,647-CA.

Granted.