alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-2796
YVONNE L. MURPHY, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, Commanding General INSCOM, Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District ofMaryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge. (CA96-1184-CCB) Submitted: February 13, 1997 Decided: February 25, 1997 Before WIDENER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Yvonne L. Murphy, Appellant Pro Se. Lynne Ann Battaglia, Unites States Attorney, Charles Joseph Peters, Sr., OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM:Appellant appeals the district court's order granting Defendant's motion to dismiss in Appellant's employment discrimination suit. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm substantially on the reasoning of the district court. Murphy v. Department of the Army , No. CA-96-1184-CCB (D. Md. Nov. 4, 1996). In addition, we have considered Appellant's allegations of error and find them to be without merit. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
ACCEPTED 04-15-00336-CV FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 7/2/2015 4:28:35 PM KEITH HOTTLE CLERK
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THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-6420
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus TRACY DEMONT HUMPHRIES, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham. James A. Beaty, Jr., District Judge. (2:91-cr-00153-UA-2; 1:05-cv-00359-JAB) Submitted: July 25, 2006 Decided: August 1, 2006 Before WILLIAMS, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Tracy Demont Humphries, Appellant Pro Se. Angela Hewlett Miller, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Tracy Demont Humphries seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his motion for modification of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2000), which the district court construed as a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Humphries has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the- 3 - facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 98-6043

LEVI BURGESS, Petitioner - Appellant, versus DANIEL T. MAHON, Warden, Respondent - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Albert V. Bryan, Jr., Senior District Judge. (CA-97-1100-AM) Submitted: August 11, 1998 Decided: September 17, 1998 Before WIDENER, ERVIN, and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Levi Burgess, Appellant Pro Se. Michael Thomas Judge, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Levi Burgess seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we denya certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. Burgess v. Mahon , No. CA-97-1100-AM (E.D. Va. Dec. 5, 1997). We find meritless Burgess’s claim that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel because hefailed to argue that the Kannapolis, North Carolina, police department did not have jurisdiction to serve the search warrant at his residence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### S. T. Coffield v. Joe N. Harris.

(No. 3123.)

Appeal from Milam County.

Opinion by

Hurt, J.

*(Transferred from, Austin.J*

§ 315. *Bailment for hire; liability of bailee; case stated.*Appellant placed horses in appellee’s pasture, paying appellee an agreed price for the pasturage. A part of appellee’s pasture fence was down at the time, and some of the horses escaped from the pasture and were never recovered. Appellant brought this suit to recover of appellee the value of the lost horses, alleging that said loss had been occasioned by the negligence of appellee in not having a secure fence around his pasture. Appellee’s defense was, that at the time he received the horses for pasture he informed appellant that the fence around the-pasture was incomplete and insecure, and that if he-placed his horses in said pasture he would do so at his; appellant’s, own risk. There was a conflict of evidence • upon this defense. Judgment was rendered for appellee-,-, the defendant in the court below. *Held:*One who agrees to take animals to pasture for pay is a bailee for hire, and contracts to bestow upon the keeping of such animals such care and attention as is commensurate with their value, and their liability to loss and injury. ■ He is bound to the exercise of ordinary diligence in taking care • of them, aiid is responsible for losses arising through ordinary negligence.

§ 316. *Same; bailee may, by special contract, limit . his liability.*A bailee who takes animals, to pasture • may, by special contract, limit' bis liability, and such, contract of limitation, when not contrary to public. *274policy *or*statute, will be respected and enforced by *the*courts. If he makes a valid special contract, his responsibility will be measured and determined by the terms of the contract. That the parties can engraft exceptions upon the general doctrine of bailments by special contract, there can be no doubt. “They are at liberty to fix the terms and mode of accomplishing the bailment purposes, and regulate the responsibilities of the relation; and if there be a special contract between the parties limiting tjbe general doctrine, this contract governs the case, unless it be against public policy or positive law.” Appellee was an agister for hire, and the principles stated apply to this character of bailment, but not to all bailments. [Schouler on Bailments, 21, 109; Story on Bailments, §§ 31, 182, 252.] In this case the alleged contract limiting the liability of the appellee was valid, being neither against public policy nor prohibited by positive law.

October 15, 1884.

§ 317. *Conflict of evidence; judgment of court will not be disturbed, when.*This case was tried by the judge. The evidence as to the contract limiting appellee’s liability was conflicting, but, in the opinion of this court, preponderated in favor of appellee. The judgment of the court upon the facts is tó be given the same weight as the verdict of the jury, and will not be set aside in an appellate court where there is evidence sufficient to support it, as there is in this case.

Affirmed.
#### STATE ex rel. Adam FRANK, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-1870.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 16, 2011.

In re Frank Jr., Adam; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 03K0233; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 10-00499.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; *State ex rel. Glover v. State,*93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(A), (D).
#### Anthony W. BROOM, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D11-3995.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Aug. 31, 2011.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 14, 2011.

Anthony W. Broom, pro se, Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

DENIED. *See Baker v. State,*878 So.2d 1236 (Fla.2004).

BENTON, C.J., LEWIS and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.
#### Richard H. CLINTON, Appellant, v. JOSHUA HENDY CORPORATION, Appellee.

No. 16723.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

March 29, 1960.

Richard H. Clinton, Los Angeles, Cal., in pro. per.

Robert Sikes, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee.

Before BARNES, HAMLIN and JERTBERG, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Title 46 U.S.C.A. § 596 provides in substance that every master or owner of any vessel who refuses or neglects, without sufficient cause, to pay wages due to seamen at the time and in the manner specified shall pay to the seamen a sum equal to two days pay for each and every day during which payment is delayed beyond the respective periods fixed in said section. Appellant instituted a libel in admiralty against the appellee to recover expenditures made for maintenance and cure following a shipboard accident. Appellant recovered a judgment, which said judgment was paid and satisfied. In his first amended libel appellant alleges that he became disabled as a result of an accident which occurred on September 18, 1954, and that appellee had the obligation to pay the libelant maintenance at the rate of $8.00 per day, totaling $56.00, and “on September 27, 1954 there arose a claim for double penalty of $16.00 per day for maintenance due at $8.00 per day” which continued “until said wages due are paid as is provided in 46 U.S.C.A. [§] 596”.

The only question presented to the district court, and to this Court, is whether maintenance payments are to be considered as wages under the provisions of Title 46 U.S.C.A. § 596, and therefore subject to the double penalty in the event of nonpayment.

The district court dismissed appellant’s action on the ground that maintenance is not wages and that non-payment thereof does not subject appellee to the penalty.

*448We agree. See Robinson v. Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd., D.C., 33 F.Supp. 93; Norris “The Law of Seamen,” Volume 2, section 574, page 198.

The order appealed from is affirmed.
#### Tex. & Pac. R’y Co. v. Daniel Wagner.

(No. 2899.)

Appeal from Dallas County.

Opinion by

Hurt, J.

*('Transferred from Austin.J*

§ 336. *Fellow-servants; who are, of a railroad company.*The following are some of the illustrations as to who constitute common or fellow-servants: “ A switch-tender and engineer, laborers and mechanics who work upon the road or machinery, conductors, brakemen, and other servants managing engines upon the track or turntables; a track-repairer and the fireman or engineer of a passing train. In this case, appellee Wagner was a section hand working on appellant’s road, and while engaged as such in repairing the road-track, he was knocked off the track and injured by a passing freight train. *Held,*that appellee and the engineer of said train were fellow-servants of appellant.

§ 337. *Liability of railroad company for injury caused one of its servants by another; rules as to.*In order, to hold the company liable for injury caused one of its servants by the negligence of another, it must be proved: 1, that the servant causing the injury was negligent or incompetent; and 2, that the company had not used reasonable care in selecting such servant, or that, after being informed of his incompetency, it still retained him in its service. [Pierce on Railroads, 361-365; 2 Thomp. on Neg. 1038; R. R. Co. v. Myers, 55 Tex. 110.]

§ 338. *Negligence; contributory negligence; case stated.*Appellee was engaged in the service of the company, as' a section hand, repairing the track. While thus engaged, he, in company with other track-repairers, were on a hand-car traveling along the line of the road. The handcar was passing over a trestle fourteen feet high. When1 he first saw the engine approaching it was between a half and a quarter of a mile away. He could have got off the car if we had stopped. The others on the car, *292some twelve in all, jumped off the car. He was in the middle of the car, and could not get off until they had all got off. He then jumped off the car and off the trestle to the ground and was injured. The engine was then right up to the hand-car. Train had a headlight, which threw the light about fifty feet. They all halloed for the train to stop. No one flagged the train. It was admitted by appellant that appellee was damaged in the sum of $150, and for this sum and costs he recovered judgment. *Held,*1. The evidence did not show any negligence on the part of appellant or its servants who were in charge of the train. 2. The evidence did show negligence on the part of appellee which contributed to his injury. When an impending danger is known to a person, and he fails to use ordinary care to prevent the injury which results from such danger, he cannot recover damages for such injury.

October 18, 1884.

Reversed and remanded.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 21.1

                       CENTENNIAL HEALTHCARE CORPORATION

               Subsidiaries of Centennial HealthCare Corporation
               -------------------------------------------------

CENTENNIAL HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
A Georgia corporation

CENTENNIAL HEALTHCARE PROPERTIES CORPORATION
A Georgia corporation

CENTENNIAL/ASHTON PROPERTIES CORPORATION
A Georgia corporation

CENTENNIAL PROFESSIONAL THERAPY SERVICES CORPORATION
A Georgia corporation

CENTENNIAL ACQUISITION CORPORATION
A Georgia corporation

TRANSITIONAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC.
A Delaware corporation


         Subsidiaries of Centennial HealthCare Properties Corporation
         ------------------------------------------------------------

CENTENNIAL HEALTHCARE INVESTMENT CORPORATION
A Georgia corporation


              Subsidiaries of Centennial Acquisition Corporation
              --------------------------------------------------

CENTENNIAL SERVICE CORPORATION - GRANT PARK
A Georgia corporation

CENTENNIAL SERVICE CORPORATION - MONTCLAIR
A Georgia corporation
<PAGE>

              Subsidiaries of Transitional Health Services, Inc.
              --------------------------------------------------


THS PARTNERS I, INC.
A Delaware corporation

THS PARTNERS II, INC.
A Delaware corporation

PARAGON REHABILITATION, INC.
A Delaware corporation

TRANSITIONAL FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.
A Delaware corporation



                 Subsidiaries of Paragon Rehabilitation, Inc.
                 --------------------------------------------

Total Care Consolidated, Inc.



                 Subsidiaries of Total Care Consolidated, Inc.
                 ---------------------------------------------

Total Care, Inc.
Total Health Care Services, Inc.
HCC Home Health of Louisiana, Inc.



                 Subsidiaries of Total Health Care Services, Inc.
                 ------------------------------------------------

Total Care of the Carolinas, Inc.
Exhibit 32.2







CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO



SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the annual report of Hamptons Luxury Homes, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Frank Dalene, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify that:



1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2)

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date: March 29, 2006        /s/ Frank Dalene

Frank Dalene

Chief Financial Officer
**Exhibit 31.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

I, Pehong Chen, Chief Executive Officer of BroadVision, Inc., certifythat:

 

1.               I have reviewed this quarterly report onForm 10-Q/A of BroadVision, Inc.;

 

2.               Based on my knowledge, this report doesnot contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a materialfact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances underwhich such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;

 

3.               [intentionally omitted]

 

4.               The registrant’s other certifyingofficer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosurecontrols and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

 

a)              Designedsuch disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;

 

b)             [intentionallyomitted]

 

c)              Evaluatedthe effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and

 

d)             Disclosedin this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

 

5.               Theregistrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on ourmost recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

 

a)              Allsignificant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and

 

b)             Anyfraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.

 
| Date: February 4, 2005 |                        |
|------------------------|-----------------------------|
|                   | /s/   PEHONG CHEN | * * |
|                   | Pehong Chen                 |
| * *               | *Chief Executive Officer*   |

 

----
#### In re Appeal of the Decisions of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NOS. 09-PDB-099 AND 09-PDB-100.

No. 2011-OB-0981.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Aug. 5, 2011.

*1028ORDER

Upon review of the record of this matter, we have determined the hearing committee was not provided with a complete record in support of the July 22, 2010 supplemental closure memorandum prepared by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that this matter be remanded to the disciplinary board for the compilation of a complete record. Thereafter, complainant’s request for review of the dismissal of her complaints shall be reconsidered by the hearing committee and the disciplinary board. If complainant is not satisfied with the disposition of the matter following review by the board, she may refile in this court a petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 30(C).

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ John L. Weimer

/s/ Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana
Exhibit 23.2 

 

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS 

 

Board of Directors 

Bay Banks of Virginia, Inc. 

 

We consent to theincorporation by reference in this Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2003 of our report dated January 31, 2002, relating to the consolidated financial statements of Bay Banks of Virginia, Inc. as of December 31, 2001 and2000, and for each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2001. 

 

/s/ WITT MARES EGGLESTON SMITH, PLC 

 

Newport News, Virginia 

March 26, 2004
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Lucien STEWART.

No. 2011-KD-0020.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 4, 2011.

In re State of Louisiana; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 498^475; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0005.

Writ granted; the trial court’s grant of the motion in limine to exclude testimony regarding other evidence is reversed.

JOHNSON, WEIMER, and GUIDRY, JJ., would deny.