COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Humphreys, McClanahan and Senior Judge Willis 

Argued by teleconference 

ERIC D. WARD 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY 

v. Record No. 2079-08-1 JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS 

DECEMBER 29, 2009 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SUFFOLK 

Westbrook J. Parker, Judge 

 Jean Veness, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 

 Robert H. Anderson, III, Senior Assistant Attorney General 

(William C. Mims, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

Eric D. Ward (“Ward”) appeals his conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to 

distribute, in violation of Code § 18.2-248. On appeal, Ward contends that the trial court erred in 

denying his motion to suppress evidence of a crack cocaine cookie block found beneath his seat 

and his subsequent confession at the police precinct. Ward argues that his seizure was invalid 

under the Fourth Amendment because the police lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to 

believe he was engaged in criminal activity, rendering the evidence obtained as a result of that 

seizure inadmissible at trial. For the following reasons, we disagree and affirm. 

Ward argues that, at the time he was asked to place his hands on the dashboard of the 

vehicle, the police lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe he was engaged in 

criminal activity. Thus, Ward contends that this seizure was invalid under the Fourth 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 
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Amendment and that the trial court erred by not suppressing both the cocaine found in the 

vehicle and Ward’s subsequent confession. We disagree. 

“When reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress, ‘we are bound by the trial 

court’s findings of historical fact unless ‘plainly wrong’ or without evidence to support them and 

we give due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law 

enforcement officers.’” Thompson v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 1, 5, 675 S.E.2d 832, 834 

(2009) (quoting McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 198, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) 

(en banc)). The burden is on the defendant to show that the denial of his suppression motion, 

when the evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was 

reversible error. McCain v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 489-90, 545 S.E.2d 541, 545 (2001) 

(citing Fore v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 1010, 265 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1980)). “‘Ultimate 

questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make a warrantless search’ involve 

questions of both law and fact and are reviewed de novo on appeal.” Thompson, 54 Va. App. at 

6, 675 S.E.2d at 834 (quoting McGee, 25 Va. App. at 198, 487 S.E.2d at 261). “‘Similarly, the 

question whether a person has been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment is reviewed 

de novo on appeal.’” Andrews v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 479, 488, 559 S.E.2d 401, 406 

(2002) (quoting Reittinger v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 232, 236, 532 S.E.2d 25, 27 (2000)). 

“The Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches and seizures.” Thompson, 

54 Va. App. at 7, 675 S.E.2d at 834. “The validity of a seizure ‘turns on an objective assessment 

of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time, and 

not on the officer’s actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.’” Welshman 

v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 20, 30, 502 S.E.2d 122, 127 (1998) (quoting Maryland v. 

Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985)). “[P]olice officers may stop a person for the purpose of 

investigating possible criminal behavior even though no probable cause exists for an arrest.” 
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McCain v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 546, 552, 659 S.E.2d 512, 516 (2008) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 

392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968)). Such a stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment, provided “the officer 

has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot.” Id. (citing United 

States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). “‘Reasonable suspicion is more than a mere hunch but 

less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.’” Middlebrooks v. 

Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 469, 479, 664 S.E.2d 499, 504 (2008) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Thomas, 23 Va. App. 598, 610-11, 478 S.E.2d 715, 721 (1996)). 

In determining whether or not reasonable suspicion exists, “‘a court must consider the 

totality of the circumstances,’” id. (quoting Whitfield v. Commonwealth, 265 Va. 358, 361, 576 

S.E.2d 463, 464 (2003)), including “‘the ‘characteristics of the area’ where the stops occurs, the 

time of the stop, whether late at night or not, as well as any suspicious conduct of the person 

accosted,’” Thomas, 23 Va. App. at 611, 478 S.E.2d at 721 (emphasis added) (quoting Smith v. 

Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1100, 1103, 407 S.E.2d 49, 51-52 (1991)). Viewing the totality of 

the circumstances in this case, we hold that Officer Aaron Huddleseon (“Huddleseon”) had a 

reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe that criminal activity was afoot and, therefore, 

Huddleseon’s seizure of Ward was valid. 

“‘A police officer may stop the driver or occupants of an automobile for investigatory 

purposes if the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the 

individual is involved in criminal activity.’” Harris v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 554, 562, 

500 S.E.2d 257, 261 (1998) (emphasis added) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 

519, 522, 484 S.E.2d 125, 126 (1997)). Here, Huddleseon received a report that a vehicle with 

expired Alabama tags was driving recklessly up and down the 6200 block of Freeman Avenue, a 

high-crime, high-drug area of the City of Suffolk. Shortly after receiving the report, Huddleseon 

observed a vehicle matching the description, parked illegally on the left side of the road. Ward 
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was a passenger in the vehicle. Huddleseon also observed two men crouched by the passenger 

window of the vehicle. Huddleseon testified that, based on his training and experience, this sort 

of behavior was consistent with “drug transactions, open market drug transactions.” The vehicle 

had four occupants who were dressed in red clothing, indicating their affiliation with the Bloods 

street gang. None of the occupants, including Ward, had a driver’s license, and the vehicle was 

registered to a woman in Alabama. When Huddleseon asked the men if they had driven the 

vehicle that evening, they “just started laughing.” Viewed objectively, these facts are sufficient 

to support Huddleseon’s detention of the vehicle and its occupants. 

Huddleseon further testified that, as he questioned the occupants, all four men repeatedly 

made furtive movements with their hands, reaching underneath their seats where Huddleseon 

could not see. In addition, a group of approximately fifteen to twenty people began to gather on 

the passenger side of the vehicle. As time passed, the group became increasingly hostile towards 

the officers. Concerned for his safety, Huddleseon ordered the occupants to put their hands 

where he could see them, instructing the occupants in the back of the vehicle to put their hands 

on the headrests and the occupants in the front of the vehicle to put their hands on the dashboard. 

“‘Under settled principles, once an officer has lawfully detained an individual, ‘he is authorized 

to take such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to protect [his and others’] personal safety and to 

maintain the status quo during the course of the stop.’” Welshman, 28 Va. App. at 34, 502 

S.E.2d at 128-29 (quoting Servis v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 507, 519, 371 S.E.2d 156, 162 

(1988)). Furthermore, “[a]n officer may preserve the status quo by ordering the person detained 

to place his hands where the officer can see them.” Id. Contrary to Ward’s contention, 

Huddleseon’s command was valid under the circumstances. Thus, Ward’s Fourth Amendment 

rights were not violated, and the trial court did not err in denying his motion to suppress. 

Affirmed.