alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM PROFESSIONAL
TRANSPORTATION GROUP LTD., INC. AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE TWELVE
MONTHS ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO
SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                         199,803
<SECURITIES>                                   268,734
<RECEIVABLES>                                6,032,975
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (634,765)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             7,634,059
<PP&E>                                       9,012,327
<DEPRECIATION>                              (2,704,102)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              17,485,916
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       13,825,813
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          325,000
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                    (742,939)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                17,485,916
<SALES>                                     41,356,478
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            41,356,478
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               43,491,845
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              (307,438)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                             1,677,715
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           1,066,708
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             (2,894,637)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         (2,894,637)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                (2,894,637)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (0.67)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.67)


</TABLE>
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-12-00461-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF C.A.F. and M.A.F., Children

From the 111th Judicial District Court, Webb County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2012CVL00082-D2

Honorable Monica Z. Notzon, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Delivered and Filed: November 14, 2012

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION

Appellant’s brief, which was due on October 1, 2012, has not been filed. On October 16, 

2012, this court ordered appellant to show cause in writing by October 30, 2012, why this appeal 

should not be dismissed for want of prosecution. Appellant did not respond. The appeal is 

dismissed for want of prosecution. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(a)(1), 42.3(b). Costs of appeal are 

taxed against appellant.

PER CURIAM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN RE:

APPOINTMENT TO THE CRIMINAL 

PROCEDURAL RULES COMMITTEE

:

:

:

:

: 

No. 495

CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL RULES 

DOCKET

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 6

th day of October, 2017, Kristen M. Gibbons Feden, Esquire, 

Philadelphia, is hereby appointed as a member of the Criminal Procedural Rules 

Committee for a term expiring October 1, 2020.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

    In connection with the Quarterly Report of First Virtual Communications,
Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2003, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on or about the date hereof
(the "Report"), I, Truman Cole, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge, that:

    (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) and
Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

    (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at
the end of the period covered by the Report and results of operations of the
Company for the period covered by the Report.

         Date: November 14, 2003                         /s/ Truman Cole
                                                   -----------------------------
                                                           Truman Cole
                                                     Chief Financial Officer

    This certification shall not be deemed "filed" for purposes of Section 18 of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, or the Exchange Act, or otherwise
subject to the liability of Section 18 of the Exchange Act. Such certification
shall not be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing under the
Securities Act of 1933 or the Exchange Act, except to the extent that the
Company specifically incorporates it by reference.
#### Teresa ANKNEY; Richard Gorby, Plaintiffs-Appellants, and Cameron Gorby, a minor by his parents and next friend, Dr. Teresa Ankney and Richard Gorby, Plaintiff, v. Jack DALE; Board of Education of Frederick County, Defendants-Appellees, and Nancy S. Grasmick, officially as State Superintendent of Schools, Maryland Department of Education; Maryland State Department of Education, Defendants.

No. 00-1961.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 30, 2000.

Decided Jan. 5, 2001.

Teresa Ankney, Richard Gorby, pro se. Jeffrey Alan Krew, Columbia, MD, for ap-pellees.

Before WILKINS, LUTTIG, and KING, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Teresa Ankney and Richard Gorby, parents of Cameron Gorby, appeal the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the Defendants in this action brought pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (West 2000), § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 1999) , and 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 2000) . The Appellants sought Cameron’s placement in a private school at public expense. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s memorandum and order and find no reversible error. *See Florence County School Dist. Four v. Carter,*510 U.S. 7, 15, 114 S.Ct. 361, 126 L.Ed.2d 284 (1993); *Hall v. Vance County Bd. of Educ.,*774 F.2d 629, 635 (4th Cir. 1985). Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. *See Gorby v. Grasmick,*No. CA-00-71-MJG (D. Md. June 20, 2000).

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
#### W. A. Carroll v. J. S. Gilbert.

(No. 3871.)

Appeal from Navarro County.

Frost & Etheridge, counsel for appellant.

McClellan & Prince, counsel for appellee.

Opinion by

Davidson, J.

§ 266. *Certiorari; petition for writ of, held sufficient.*This cause of action was instituted by appellant in the justice court to recover a bale of cotton, where appellee recovered judgment therefor. Appellant filed his petition for a writ of *certiorari,*and it was, on motion of appellee, dismissed from the county court. Various errors were assigned to the action of the court in sustaining said motion. We will not discuss the assigned errors in detail. The petition alleged substantially that, upon the trial before the justice of the peace for the recovery of the bale of cotton involved, appellant, who was the plaintiff in that court, proved by testimony alleged to be true, that he had had ginned at the gin-house of one D. D. Burleson, a bale of cotton which was raised by himself on his farm; that he was present, and packed and branded the bale, took possession thereof, and rolled it out to a particular place in the gin yard; and that while said bale was at this place, appellee took charge of and carried away this said bale of cotton without his (appellant’s) consent, and that the justice refused to give judgment for him upon the sole ground that, as a question of law, he was not entitled to recover, not for want of sufficient evidence to establish his right to the *462cotton, but because the ginner, D. D. Burleson, was the bailee of the cotton, and was therefore alone entitled to the possession thereof, and for that reason only it gave judgment against appellant. We are of the opinion that the petition for *certiorari*states sufficient grounds for granting same and that the court erred in dismissing it. [Seeligson v. Wilson, 58 Tex. 369; Bollison v. Hope, 18 Tex. 446.] It may be remarked that the justice of the peace was clearly erroneous in holding that appellant could not maintain his suit, because the bailee, Burleson, was the only party who could maintain the action for the property in controversy, who alone was entitled to its possession. The owner could alone maintain the suit for the property. Judgment of dismissal reversed and cause remanded for a trial upon the merits of the case.

December 9, 1891.

Reversed and remanded.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 4.11

                     BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY FINANCE CORPORATION

                                OFFER TO EXCHANGE

        $750,000,000 PRINCIPAL AMOUNT OF ITS 3.375% SENIOR NOTES DUE 2008
     UNCONDITIONALLY GUARANTEED BY BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., WHICH HAVE BEEN
   REGISTERED UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, FOR ANY AND ALL 3.375% SENIOR
      NOTES DUE 2008, UNCONDITIONALLY GUARANTEED BY BERKSHIRE HATHWAY INC.

Instructions from Beneficial Owner

         The undersigned acknowledge(s) receipt of your letter and the enclosed
Prospectus and the related Letter of Transmittal in connection with the offer by
the Company to exchange the Exchange Notes for Outstanding Notes.

         This will instruct you to tender the principal amount of Outstanding
Notes indicated below held by you for the account of the undersigned, upon the
terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Prospectus and the related
Letter of Transmittal.

         The undersigned represents that (i) the Exchange Notes acquired
pursuant to the Exchange Offer are being obtained in the ordinary course of the
undersigned's business, (ii) the undersigned is not engaging, does not intend to
engage, and has no arrangement or understanding with any person to participate
in the distribution of such Exchange Notes, (iii) the undersigned is not an
"affiliate," as defined under Rule 405 of the Securities Act, of the Company and
(iv) the undersigned is not acting on behalf of any person or entity that could
not truthfully make these statements. If the undersigned is a broker-dealer, it
acknowledges that it will deliver a copy of the Prospectus in connection with
any resale of the Exchange Notes.

                                                         Sign Here

                                           _____________________________________
                                                       Signatures(s)

<PAGE>

Securities which are to be tendered:

Tender all of the Outstanding Notes

        Aggregate Principal Amount*

[ ]     Outstanding Notes ____________

________________________________________________
             Name(s) (Please Print)

________________________________________________
                    Address

________________________________________________
                    Zip Code

________________________________________________
          Area Code and Telephone No.

Dated:__________________, 2004

______________
* Unless otherwise indicated, it will be assumed that all of the Outstanding
Notes listed are to be tendered.

                                       2
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

      Schedule of Year-To-Date Principal and Interest Distributions
                                  to 
                         Certificate Holders

                                                       Ending
Class         Interest       Principal    Losses       Balance
<S>           <C>             <C>         <C>          <C> 
A1              1494350.37      7448655.48        0.00    20765344.51 
A2              1309403.37            0.00        0.00    21976000.00 
A3              1656774.13            0.00        0.00    27806000.00 
A4              1370343.37            0.00        0.00    21356000.00 
A5               563617.15            0.00        0.00           0.00 
A6              2675890.38     13945515.78        0.00    31888484.22 
A7               790590.35      (790590.35)       0.00    12331590.35 
A8              1274928.83       684001.73        0.00    18805998.27 
ALR                 114.55            0.00        0.00          25.00 
APO                   0.00       138696.22        0.00     1734465.81 
AR                    1.65            0.00        0.00          25.00 
B1               121016.84        64925.77        0.00     1785074.23 
B2                60508.43        32462.88        0.00      892537.12 
B3                36305.06        19477.74        0.00      535522.27 
B4                18185.23         9756.42        0.00      268243.59 
B5                36321.44        14470.43     5016.09      535763.96 
M                181590.69        97423.73        0.00     2678576.25 





</TABLE>
<PAGE>   1

                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1

                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

        We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statements on Form S-8 (File Nos.333-30122 and 333-43958) and on Form S-3 (File
No. 333-58726) of WebMethods, Inc. of our report dated April 25, 2001, except
for Notes 8 and 10, as to which the date is June 22, 2001 relating to the
Financial Statements, and our report dated April 25, 2001 relating to the
Financial Statement Schedules which appears in this Form 10-K. We also consent
to the reference to us under the heading "Selected Financial Data" which appears
in this Form 10-K.



/s/ PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP


McLean, Virginia
June 28, 2001
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack

, Chief Justice

David F. Viviano,

Chief Justice Pro Tem

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

April 2, 2019

t0325 

# Order

Clerk April 2, 2019

157349 & (60)(61)(62)(64)(66)(70)( 75)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 157349

COA: 335045

Muskegon CC: 15

- 000244

- FH

DEMARIO ROBEHIER WADE

- BEY,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_____________________________________/

On order of the Court, the motions for supplemental authorities are GRANTED in

part, to the extent that the authorities referenced in the motions are considered to be

support for the defendant’s arguments. The application for leave to appeal the January

1 1, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we

are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. The

motions for judgment of acquittal, for bond, for immediate consideration, to expand t he

record, and to amend the record are DENIED.
```

[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 79 (Friday, May 12, 1995)]
[House]
[Page H4901]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

                ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair will entertain 1-minute speeches.

                          ____________________
```
EXHIBIT 32


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of Heritage Worldwide, Inc.
(the "Company") for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2007, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), each of
the undersigned hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.


Date:  December 11, 2007                      /s/ Jean-Claude Mas
                                                     ---------------------------
                                                     Jean-Claude Mas
                                                     Chief Executive Officer and
                                                     Chairman

Date:  December 11, 2007                     /s/ Claude Couty
                                                     ---------------------------
                                                     Claude Couty
                                                     Director, Chief Financial
                                                     Officer and General Manager
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Donald JONES.

No. 2011-KK-1845.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Aug. 23, 2011.

In re Jones, Donald; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 505-784; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-1114.

Stay denied; writ denied.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

JUDGMENT

No. 04-15-00313-CR

The STATE of Texas,

Appellant

v.

James Burke JARREAU,

Appellee

From the 216th Judicial District Court, Gillespie County, Texas

Trial Court No. 5552

Honorable N. Keith Williams, Judge Presiding

BEFORE JUSTICE ANGELINI, JUSTICE BARNARD, AND JUSTICE CHAPA

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, appellant State of Texas’s motion to 

dismiss appellee James Burke Jarreau’s cross appeal is DENIED AS MOOT and the trial court’s 

order granting the motion to quash is AFFIRMED. 

SIGNED June 22, 2016.

_____________________________

Marialyn Barnard, Justice
#### G., C. & S. F. R’y Co. v. M. K. Lott.

(No. 1539.)

Appeal from Milam County.

Opinion by

White, P. J.

§ 63. *Repeal of statute; effect of, upon case pending on appeal.*Lott brought this suit, under article 4258 of the Revised Statutes, to recover the penalty of $500 for an • overcharge of passenger fare. He recovered judgment *before*the passage of the act of April 10, 1883, which repealed said article, as held in Etter v. R. R. Co., *ante,*p. 48. *Held,*that the repeal of article 4258, pending the *52appeal of the case in this court, must terminate the suit. That article denounced a penalty, and it was within the power of the legislature to repeal it, and thereby remit any forfeiture incurred thereunder that had not been recovered and actually paid. If the law which creates a penalty is repealed, after the repealing law takes effect, no further proceedings can be taken to enforce the penalty. A penal action cannot be maintained after the repeal of the statute creating the penalty sought to be recovered. And, if a case is appealed, and, pending the appeal, the law is changed, the appellate court must dispose of the case under the law in force when its decision is rendered. [Etter v. R. R. Co. ante, p. 48; Cooley on Const. Lim. 477; Wade on Retroactive Laws, § 301; Wall v. The State, 18 Tex. 683; Sheppard v. The State, 1 Tex. Ct. App. 522; Hubbard v. The State, 2 Tex. Ct. App. 506; Halpin v. The State, 5 Tex. Ct. App. 212.]

December 8, 1883.

Reversed and dismissed.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1356 

KA 10-00460 

PRESENT: FAHEY, J.P., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, GREEN, AND GORSKI, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MICKEY WILLIAMS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (ROBERT L. KEMP OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

FRANK A. SEDITA, III, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BUFFALO (MATTHEW B. POWERS OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Richard

C. Kloch, Sr., A.J.), entered March 17, 2010 pursuant to the 2009 Drug

Law Reform Act. The order denied defendant’s application to be

resentenced upon defendant’s 1995 conviction of criminal sale of a

controlled substance in the third degree (three counts) and criminal

possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (three

counts). 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously reversed as a matter of discretion in the interest of

justice and on the law and the matter is remitted to Supreme Court,

Erie County, for further proceedings in accordance with the following

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from an order denying his application

for resentencing pursuant to CPL 440.46, the 2009 Drug Law Reform Act. 

We conclude that the record is insufficient to support the

determination of Supreme Court that defendant was ineligible for

resentencing on the ground that his 1976 conviction of robbery in the

second degree (Penal Law § 160.10) constituted an “exclusion offense”

as defined in CPL 440.46 (5) (a) (i). We agree with defendant that

the record fails to establish “the time of commission of the previous

felony” and whether the court properly calculated the look-back period

of 10 years as tolled by defendant’s periods of incarceration (CPL

440.46 [5] [a]). Although defendant failed to preserve those

contentions for our review (see CPL 470.05 [2]), we nevertheless

exercise our power to review them as a matter of discretion in the

interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [a]). Further, we are unable

to conclude on the record before us whether defendant’s prior

conviction of robbery in the second degree was a second violent felony

offense rendering him ineligible for resentencing pursuant to CPL

440.46 (5) (b). We therefore reverse the order, and we remit the

matter to Supreme Court to determine the date on which defendant

committed the prior offense of robbery in the second degree and to
-2- 1356 

KA 10-00460 

calculate the periods for which defendant was incarcerated after that

offense in order to determine if that offense constituted an exclusion

offense pursuant to CPL 440.46 (5) (a) (i). Upon remittal, the court

must also determine whether that offense was a second violent felony

offense that constitutes an exclusion offense pursuant to CPL 440.46

(5) (b). 

Entered: December 23, 2011 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court