J & J SP ORTS PR ODUCTI ONS, I NC., Plaintiff,
v. ROSE’S DREAM, I

NC., Def endant. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT

F OR THE DIS TRICT OF COLUM BIA

Civil Action No. 09–1533 (CKK)

MEMORAN DUM OP INION (June 25, 2010) Plaintiff J & J Sports P roductions, Inc. bring s this action ag ainst Defe ndant Rose’s Dre am, Inc. for

alleg edly interfe ringwith Plainti ff’ s contrac tual rig ht to dist ribute the live broadc ast of the 2007 B erna rd Hopkins vs. Ronald Wright cha mpionship box ing match. Plaintiff alleg es that De fenda

nt interce pted the sate llite or cable fee d of the matc h and exhibited it t o patrons at Rose’ s Drea

m Ba r & L oung e at 1370 H Stre et, NE in Washington, D.C., in violation of 47 U.S.C. §§ 553, 605(a), a nd 605(e) (4). Pre sently

pendingbefor e the Court is Def endant’ s Motion to Dism iss Pursuant to Feder al Rule of Civil P roce dure 12( b)(1) . Def endant a rgues that Plaintiff has failed to a ssert a pr oper ba sis for subject matter jurisdiction in the complaint and that Plaintiff lacks standingto file suit in the District of Columbi a bec ause it is an unre g istered fore ign c orporation. For the r easons e x plained below, the Court shall DENY De fenda nt’s Motion to Dism iss. I. BACKG ROUND Plaintiff is a corpor ation involved in sports production. See Compl. ¶ 5. Pl aintiff acquir ed the r ight to distribute the live broa dcast of the Be rnar d Hopkins vs. Ronald W rig htchampionship box ing match, which took plac e on Jul y 21, 2007. Id. ¶ 8. The br oadca st was transmitted via closed c ircuit television and/or via e ncry pted satellite sig nal and wa s subsequently

re- transmitted to cable sy stems and satellite compa nies via satellite sig nal. Id. Plaintiff incurre d signific ant costs in secur ing the contra ct to license the broadc ast to various entities within the District of Columbi a, who made ag ree ments with Pl aintiff to publicly exhibi t the match to their patrons and to not sub-license transmission of the broadc ast fee d. Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff alleg es that De fenda nt knew or should have known that the broa dcast wa s not to be re ceive d and exhibited by entities unauthorized to do so. Compl . ¶ 10. Plaintiff alleg es that Def endant violated Plaintiff’ s rig hts by unlawfully

interce pting, r ece iving, a nd/or descr ambling the satellite or c able sig nal and willfully exhibi ting the br oadca st for commer cial adva ntag e or private f inancial g ain to patrons at Rose’ s Drea m Ba r & L oung e, located at 1370 H Stree t, NE, Washington, D.C. Id. Plaintiff alleg es that De fenda nt used an illeg al satellite re ceive r and interce pted Plaintiff’s sig nal and r e-tra nsmitt ed via satellite or microwave sig nal to various ca ble and sate llite sy stems. Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiff furthe r alleg es that De fenda nt knowingly

modified or used equipment or a

device which it knew ( or had r eason to know) would be used pr imarily in the assistance of the una

uthorized decry

ption of satellite cable prog ramming
. Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff alleg es that De fenda

nts’ conduct violates 47 U .S.C. §§ 553, 605(a), and 605( e)( 4). Plaintiff seeks statutory

damag es, injunctive re lief, and attorney s’ fe es and c osts.

II. LEGAL STANDARD Def endant ha s moved for dismissal of the Complaint pursuant to Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 12(b) (1). A c ourt must dism iss a case pursuant to Rule 12(b)( 1) whe n it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. In deter mining whe ther ther e is jurisdiction, the Court may “conside r the
2complaint supplemented by undisputed fac ts evidence d in the rec ord, or the c omplaint supplemented by

undisputed fac ts plus the court’s re solution of disput ed fa cts.” Coalit ion for Underground Ex

pansion , 333 F.3d at 198 (citations omitted); see also Jerom e Stev ens Pharm., Inc. v . Food &Drug Admin. , 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 ( D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he district court may consider materials outside the plea dings in de cidingwhether to gr ant a motion to dismi ss for lac k of jurisdiction.”). “ At the motion to dis miss st ag e, counse led complaints, as we ll as pro se complaints, are to be construe d with sufficient libera lity to affor d all possible infere nces favor able to the plea der on a lleg ations of fa ct.” Settles v. U.S. ParoleComm’n , 429 F.3d 1098, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In spite of the fa vorable infere nces that a plaintiff re ceive s on a motion to dismiss , it remains the plaintiff’ s burden to prove subject matter jur isdiction by a pre pondera

nce of the e vidence
. Am. Farm Bure au v. Env tl. Prot. Agency , 121 F. Supp. 2d 84, 90 (D.D .C. 2000). “Althoug h a cour

t must acce pt as true a ll factua l alleg ations contained in the c omplaint when revie winga motion to dism iss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) , [a] plaintiff[’s] fac tual alleg ations in the complaint . . . will bear c loser scr utiny in resolvinga 12(b) (1) motion than in resolvinga 12(b) (6) motion for failure to state a c laim.” W right v. Foreign Serv. Grievanc e Bd. , 503 F. Supp. 2d 163, 170 (D.D.C. 2007) ( internal c itations and quotation marks omitted). III. DISCUSS ION Def endant r aises two ar g uments why Plaintiff’s Complaint shoul d be dismissed for lac k of subject matter

jurisdiction. First, Def

endant a rgues that Plaintiff failed to pr operly alleg e a basis for f

eder al jurisdiction in the Compl aint. Second, De fenda nt argues that Plaintiff is barre d from bring ing this ac tion because it has failed to re g ister as a fore ign c orporation as require d by D.C. law. The Court sha ll address e ach of these issues in turn.
3A. Alleging a Proper Basis for Federal Jurisdiction

Def endant a rgues that the jurisdictional alleg ations in the Complaint do notstate a ba sis for f eder al jurisdiction beca

use they state only

that the amount in controve rsy exceeds $100,000 and that De fenda

nt’s principal plac e of business is in the District of Columbia, and those f acts
are insufficient to establish either diversity or fe dera l question jurisdiction. Defenda nt does not dispute that subject matter jurisdiction may exis t but contends that Plaintiff is required to a mend its Com plaint to include a prope r jurisdictional alleg ation. See Fe d. R. Civ. P . 8(a) (“A pleading that states a c laim for re lief must contain: (a) a short and pla in statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction . . . .”) Howeve r, De fenda nt’s argument is overly

technica l; courts will not dismiss a complaint for

lack of subject matter jur isdiction where the basis for jurisdiction is clea r from the f ace of the c omplaint. See Nat’l Air Traffi c Controllers Ass’n v. Fed. Se rv. Impasse s Panel , No. 08-5479, 2010 WL2160832, at *6 (D.C. Cir. J une 1, 2010) ( holding that c ourts are not restricte d to the asser

ted basis for jur isdiction if the fac tual alleg ations support an alter native basis for jurisdiction); In re M ailman Steam Carpet Cleaning Corp. , 196 F.3d 1, 5 ( 1st Cir. 1999) (“A ffirmative pleadingof the pre cise statutory basis for f

eder al subject matter

jurisdiction is not require d as longas a c omplaint alleg es suffic ient fac ts to establish jurisdi ction.”) I t is clear f

rom the fa ce of

the Complaint that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this ca se. Plaintiff’s ca uses of a ction arise unde r a f eder al statute and the ref

ore f all within the g rant of jur isdiction in 28 U.S .C. § 1331, the so-ca lled “fe dera l question” jurisdiction statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district c ourts shall have or igina l jurisdiction of all civil actions arisingunder the Constit ution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” ) Ther efor e, dismissal for lack of subject matter jur isdiction is i nappropr iate.
4B. Standing to Sue Under D.C. Law

Def endant c ontends that Plaintiff lacks standingto bring this action beca use Plaintiff is not authorized to do business in the District of Columbi a and D .C. law prohibits unreg istered corpor ations from filing suit in t he District of Columbia cour ts. Defe ndant’s ar g ument is based on two statutory

provisions in the D.C. Code. First, D.C. Code § 29-101.99 re quires that “[a] fore ign c orporation shall procure a ce rtificate of authority from the Ma

y or bef ore it transa cts business in the District . . . .” D.C. Code § 101.99(a ). Second, D .C. Code § 29-101.119 provides that “[n] o fore ign c orporation which is subject to the provisions of this chapter a nd which transac ts business in the District without a certificate of a uthority shall be per

mitted to maintain
an ac tion at law or in equity in any court of the District until such corporation shall have obtained
a ce rtificate of authority . . . .” D.C. Code § 101.119(a ). De fenda nt argues that Plaintiff is a fore ign c orporation transactingbusiness in the District of Columbia without a certific ate of authority and ther efor e is barr ed by these statutes fr om bring ing this ac tion. Whether or not J & J Sports Production, I nc. has tra nsacte d business in the District of Columbi a without a ce rtificate of authority , the D.C. Code provisions relied upon by Def endant do not control this Court’s feder al jurisdiction over this case . As J udg e Ellen S. Huvelle r ece ntly explained in a simil ar c ase involvingthe same Plaintiff, these statutes “ar e not trig g ere d in this
case beca use plaintiff’s c ause of

action is not derivative of , and ther efor e is not prec luded by , District of Columbia law.” J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v . Humphries Enters., LLC , No. 10-c v-266, 2010 WL2222395, at *2 (D.D .C. J une 4, 2010). Plaintiff’s c laims are ba sed on fe dera l statutes, and District of Columbia law c annot limit t he jurisdiction of fe dera l courts to hear such fe dera l claims. Id. ; Jane Lyons Adv ertising, Inc. v. Cook, Civ. A. No. 97-01069, 1998 WL164775, at *
54 (D.D.C. Mar . 31, 1998) (holdingthat such “door closing statutes” do not re strict fede ral c ourts exercisingfede ral que stion jurisdi ction). F or the same rea son, Plainti ff’ s claims are not barre d by Truit t v. Miller , 407 A.2d 1073 (D.C. 1979), which states that “a contra ct made in violation of a licensingstatute that is desig ned to protec t the public will usually be conside red void a

nd unenfor cea

ble.” 407 A.2d at 1079. Plaintiff’s claims in this case a re tha t Defe ndant has 1 violated 47 U.S.C. §§ 553 and 605, and those statutes pr ovide that “[a]ny person a g g rieve d by any violation of [t hese se ctions] m ay bringa civil ac tion in a United States district court . . . .” 47 U.S.C. §§ 553(c)(1) , 605(e) (3)( A). The ref ore, Plaintiff ha s standing unde r fe dera l law to bringhis claims. IV. CONCLUSION For the fore g oing r easons, the Court sha ll DENY De fenda nt’s [8] Motion to Dism iss Pursuant to Fede ral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)( 1). The Court sha ll hold an initi al sche duling confe renc e with the par

ties to set a sche dule for pr ocee ding w ith discovery . An appr opriate Orde r ac companies this Memora ndum Opinion.

Date: J une 25, 2010 /s/ COL L EEN KOL L AR-KOTELL Y United States District J udg e

Def endant’ s relianc e on A. Tasker, Inc . v. Amse llem , 315 A.2d 178 (D.C. 1974), a nd 1 BDC Capital

Properties, LLC

v. Trinh , 307 F. Supp. 2d 12 (D.D .C. 2004), is simi larly inapposite, as those c ases involved the a pplication of D.C. law, not fe dera l law. 6