alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 31.2****Certification Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**I, Karen L.VanDerBosch, Chief Financial Officer, certify that:1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-QSB of MakeMusic, Inc.;2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact oromit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstancesunder which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport;3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;4. The small business issuer’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and have:     (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating tothe small business issuer is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly duringthe period in which this report is being prepared;     (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosurecontrols and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and     (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the small business issuer’s most recent fiscal quarter(the small business issuer’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuer’sinternal control over financial reporting; and5. The small business issuer’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small business issuer’sauditors and the audit committee of the small business issuer’s board of directors (or personsperforming the equivalent functions):     (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the smallbusiness issuer’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and     (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the small business issuer’s internal control over financial reporting.       Date: May 3, 2007 By: /s/ Karen L. VanDerBosch           Karen L.VanDerBosch
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Thedrick EDWARDS.

No. 2009-K-1612.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 17, 2010.

In re Edwards, Thedrick; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 07-06-0032; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2008 KA 2011.

Denied.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Louis EARLYCUTT, et al.

No. 2011-KK-2633.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 5, 2011.

In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 501-945; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-1336.

Stay denied; writ denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.
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<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM 10K PERIOD
ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
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<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               8,658
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (17,437)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     6,800
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                    537
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (9,848)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     (.48)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     (.48)


</TABLE>
627 A.2d 1126

#### WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC. v. ROYAL INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL. AND ADMIRAL INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL.

February 25, 1993.

ORDER

Leave to appeal is granted.
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Exhibit 10(b)  


  
 

  Consent of Independent Accountants  
  


We hereby consent to the use, in this Registration Statement on Form N-4 (File No. 333-94047) of our report dated March 19, 2003, relating to the
consolidated financial statements and financial statement schedules of Protective Life Insurance Company and Subsidiaries, which appears in such Registration Statement. We also consent to the use in
this Registration Statement of our report dated March 17, 2003, on our audits of the financial statements of The Protective Variable Annuity Separate Account, which appears in such Registration
Statement. We also consent to the reference to us under the heading "Independent Accountants" in such Registration Statement. 


PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

Birmingham, Alabama

December 30, 2003 









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Consent of Independent Accountants
STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST CIRCUIT

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

JOSEPH PHILLIS

NO. 2022 KW 0123

MRex 28, 2022

In Re: Joseph Phillis, applying for supervisory writs, 21st

Judicial District Court, Parish of Tangipahoa, No. 

unknown. 

BEFORE: McDONALD, LANIER, AND WOLFE, JJ. 

WRIT DENIED. We are advised by the Office of the Clerk of

Court of Tangipahoa Parish that a Motion for Release and a

Motion and Order for Criminal Minutes are not of record. 

imm

WIL

EW

COURT APPEAL, FIRST CIRCUIT

PUTCLERK OF COURT

FOR THE COURT
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     This schedule  contains summary financial  information  extracted from
     the  consolidated  financial  statements of Grove Property Trust as of
     September 30, 1999 and for the nine months then ended and is qualified
     in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0000920776
<NAME>                        Grove Property Trust
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                              14,245
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                            0
<ALLOWANCES>                                             0
<INVENTORY>                                              0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                    27,464
<PP&E>                                             312,225
<DEPRECIATION>                                      15,158
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                     327,223
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                               18,804
<BONDS>                                            205,497
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                                84
<OTHER-SE>                                          70,043
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                       327,223
<SALES>                                                  0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                    47,959
<CGS>                                                    0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                            0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    32,692
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  10,473
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      3,235
<INCOME-TAX>                                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  3,235
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                        111
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                         3,346
<EPS-BASIC>                                          .39
<EPS-DILUTED>                                          .39



</TABLE>
#### Julie WINSLOW, Appellant, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF ALACHUA COUNTY, Appellee.

No. 1D10-1046.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Oct. 15, 2010.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 19, 2010.

Terence J. Kann, Gainesville, for Appellant.

David M. Delaney and Elizabeth M. Collins of Dell Graham, P.A., Gainesville, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Julie Winslow appeals a final order dismissing with prejudice her second amended complaint seeking damages from the School Board of Alachua County, appellee, for injuries suffered by her daughter, Tiffany Cháncey, when she walked into traffic at a school bus stop and was struck by a motor vehicle. Because the School Board did not have control over this student at the time of the accident, the School Board had no duty to the student. *Francis v. School Bd. of Palm Beach County,*29 So.3d 441, 444-45 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); *Harrison v. Escambia County School Bd.,*434 So.2d 316, 319-20 (Fla.1983). Accordingly, we affirm.

WEBSTER, DAVIS, and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.
#### SUCCESSION OF Eddie Lee MOORE a/k/a Phil Moore.

No. 2011-OC-2330.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 16, 2011.

In re Brenda Moore; — Other; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s Order dated November 2, 2011; Parish of More-house; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit No. 46,839-CW; 4th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 4274.

Reconsideration denied. Writ application was not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, Section 5(d).
#### Kenneth S. SATTERFIELD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William J. HENDERSON, U.S. Postal Service, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 00-2205.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 11, 2001.

Decided Jan. 17, 2001.

Kenneth S. Satterfield, pro se. Janice McKenzie Cole, United States Attorney, Fenita Morris Shepard, Office of the United States Attorney, Raleigh, NC, for ap-pellee.

Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and KING, Circuit JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Kenneth Satterfield appeals the district court’s order dismissing his civil action *247alleging employment discrimination. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. *Satterfield v. Henderson,*No. CA-99-719-5-BO(2) (E.D.N.C. Aug. 1, 2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
#### Lawrence W. DAVIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D10-2394.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

June 17, 2011.

*889Lawrence W. Davis, Raiford, pro se.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Allison Leigh Morris, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Lawrence Davis timely appeals the circuit court’s summary denial of his motion seeking return of property allegedly seized from him when he was arrested for sale and delivery of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school. Davis contends that his motion was in proper form and a summary denial without any record attachment was improper. We agree and reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Davis pled no contest to the sale of cocaine and was sentenced to ten years in prison. His judgment and sentence were entered on January 10, 2008. On May 27, 2010, Davis filed his motion for the return of $990 that was taken from him at the time of his arrest. Davis’ motion alleges that the cash was his, it was not being held as the fruit of any criminal activity, and it was not being held as evidence. The lower court summarily denied Davis’ motion without attaching any portions of the record showing that the property was seized pursuant to a lawful investigation or held as evidence. This was error. *See White v. State,*926 So.2d 473 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); *Burden v. State,*890 So.2d 566, 567 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); *see also Cloud v. State,*801 So.2d 964 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); *McKinnon v. State,*752 So.2d 134, 135 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). The lower court’s failure to attach portions of the record supporting its findings requires reversal and remand. *See Monserrate v. State,*25 So.3d 1292 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).

If the lower court again summarily denies Davis’ motion, it must attach portions of the record demonstrating the currency was seized and held as evidence by the law enforcement agency involved or that it was seized pursuant to an investigation and was in the custody of the court clerk. Otherwise, the court must hold an eviden-tiary hearing and entertain the motion on its merits. *See Cloud,*801 So.2d at 964.

REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings pursuant to this opinion.

MONACO, C.J., LAWSON and JACOBUS, JJ., concur.
#### STATE ex rel. Leonard E. BLACKBURN v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-2509.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 4, 2011.

In re Blackburn, Leonard E.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 08-CR-10-97839; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KA 1075.

Denied.
#### In re Eddie Douglas AUSTIN, Jr.

No. 2011-OB-0729.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 3, 2011.

ORDER

CLARK, J.

The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into numerous complaints of serious professional misconduct filed against respondent. These matters involve allegations that respondent converted client funds to his own use, failed to communicate with his clients and neglected them legal matters, and charged excessive fees. Respondent now seeks to permanently resign from the practice of law in lieu of discipline. The ODC has concurred in respondent’s petition.

Having considered the Petition for Permanent Resignation from the Practice of Law filed by Eddie Douglas Austin, Jr., Louisiana Bar Roll number 19877, and the concurrence thereto filed by the ODC,

IT IS ORDERED that the request of Eddie Douglas Austin, Jr. for permanent resignation in lieu of discipline be and is hereby granted, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 20.1 and Rule 5.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Eddie Douglas Austin, Jr. shall be permanently prohibited from practicing law in Louisiana or in any other jurisdiction in which he is admitted to the practice of law; shall be permanently prohibited from seeking readmission to the practice of law in this state or in any other jurisdiction in which he is admitted; and shall be permanently prohibited from seeking admission to the practice of law in any jurisdiction.
#### Tex. & Pac. R’y Co. v. Gill & Beauchamp.

(No. 2963.)

Appeal from. Fannin County.

Opinion by

Willson, J.

§ 175. *Parties plaintiff; joinder of.*It is well settled that if the right of action is in one person only, another cannot be joined with him as plaintiff. It is also settled, that one joint owner cannot alone maintain a suit to recover his individual interest in property destroyed. When the right of action'is joint, the suit must be brought by all who are entitled to redress. [Stachely v. Pierce, 28 Tex. 328; Sayles & Bassett’s Pl. & Pr. § 278; W. & W. Con. Rep. § 249; R'y Co. v. Hollingsworth, ante, p. 149.]

§ 17 0. *Joint owners of crops on land rented by one to the other, may join in suit to recover damages for injuries done to crops, etc.*G. rented land to B., the contract being that G. was to receive as rent a part of the crops raised on the land. B. had crops growing upon the land which were injured by the wrongful act of the defendant. By the wrongful act of the defendant, the land was also injured to the extent that it would be harder to cultivate the next year, and would be less productive for said year. B. had also rented the land for the next year. *Held,*that G. and B. were jointly interested in both the crops and the land, and were éntitled to maintain the suit jointly against' the defendant to recover damages for injury done to said crops and land. [Stewart v. Doughty, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 108; Moulton v. Robinson, 27 N. H. 550; Harris v. Frink, 49 N. Y. 24; 6 Wait’s Act. & Def. p. 53.]

§ 17 0a. *Excessive verdict.*Where the evidence is conflicting as to the amount of damage, a verdict which is within the limit of the evidence will not be set aside upon the ground that it is excessive.
#### STATE ex rel. Jerman JONES v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-1130.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 6, 2011.

In re Jones, Jerman; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 08-6355; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 09-KA-478.

Denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<CIK>                         0000921054
<NAME>                    WNC CALIFORNIA HOUSING TAX CREDITS IV, L.P., SERIES 4
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                       4.56
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</TABLE>
#### Eva POROPAT, Appellant, v. Mark POROPAT, Appellee.

No. 5D10-1003.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Dec. 3, 2010.

Jonathan P. Culver, of Jonathan P. Cul-ver, P.A., Ocala, for Appellant.

Michael Massey and Patricia Duffy of Massey & Duffy, LLC, Gainesville, for Ap-pellee.

PALMER, J.

Eva Poropat (wife) appeals the order entered by the trial court denying her motion for contempt against appellee, Mark Poropat (husband), and/or enforcement of the parties’ final dissolution judgment. Determining that the order, on its face, contains a calculation error, we reverse.1

In 2005, a final judgment was entered dissolving the parties’ marriage. The final judgment of dissolution incorporated the parties’ marital settlement agreement. In 2007, the wife filed a motion for contempt and/or enforcement, alleging that she had fully satisfied her financial obligations under the marital settlement agreement but that the husband had failed to satisfy his obligations under the agreement. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the wife’s motion and entered an order concluding that the wife was entitled to receive various credits against a $170,000.00 debt she owed the husband as a result of the marital settlement agreement. After *508applying those credits, the trial court found that the husband was entitled to a judgment against the wife in the amount of $15,000.00.

The wife contends that the trial court’s order contains a calculation error since applying the listed credits against the $170,000.00 debt would result in a net credit to her of $10,500.00, rather than a net credit to the husband of $15,000.00. Specifically, the order indicated that the wife was entitled to credits of $36,000.00, $32,000.00, $10,000.00, and $102,500.00.

Although we would normally remand to the trial court with directions to correct the order to reflect the wife’s credit of $10,500.00, we are hampered by the fact that no transcript of the proceedings below is included in the record. Because the wife failed to provide this court with a transcript of the hearing on her motions, it is not possible for us to definitively determine whether the order contains a simple mathematical or some other type of error, such as the exclusion of some credit for the husband which would explain the calculation arrived at by the trial court.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the trial court to correct the mathematical error which is reflected on the face of the order. *See Hindle v. Fuith,*33 So.3d 782 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).

REVERSED and REMANDED.

SAWAYA, J., and ROUSE, R„ Associate Judge, concur.

1

. This court possesses jurisdiction over the trial court’s non-final order pursuant to rule 9.130(a)(4) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.