Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC REPORTER. 

Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 

303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email 

corrections@akcourts.gov. 

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

MARIANNE E. BURKE, Personal 

Representative of the Estate of 

ABIGAIL CAUDLE, 

Appellant, 

v. 

CRITERION GENERAL, INC.; 

ALASKA USA FEDERAL CREDIT 

UNION; and STATE OF ALASKA, 

Appellees. 

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) Supreme Court No. S-17766 

Superior Court No. 3AN-18-09109 CI 

O P I N I O N 

No. 7564 – November 5, 2021 

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Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third 

Judicial District, Anchorage, Andrew Guidi, Judge. 

Appearances: MarianneE. Burke,pro se, Wasilla, Appellant. 

John B. Thorsness, Clapp, Peterson, Tiemessen, Thorsness 

LLC, Anchorage, for Appellee Criterion General, Inc. 

Jahna M. Lindemuth and Samuel G. Gottstein, Holmes 

Weddle&Barcott, PC, Anchorage, for AppelleeAlaskaUSA 

Federal Credit Union. Laura Wolff, Assistant Attorney 

General, Anchorage, and Clyde “Ed” Sniffen, Jr., Acting 

Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee State of Alaska. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Before: Bolger, Chief Justice, Winfree, Maassen, and 

Carney, Justices, and Eastaugh, Senior Justice.* [Borghesan, 

Justice, not participating.] 

WINFREE, Justice. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

An apprentice electrician, who was unmarried and had no dependents, was 

working for a construction project subcontractor when she died in an accident. Her 

direct employer paid funeral benefits required by the Alaska Workers’ Compensation 

Act; no other benefits were required under the Act. The employee’s estate brought a 

wrongful death action against the general contractor and the building owner; they asked 

the superior court to dismiss the action based on the Act’s exclusive liability provisions, 

which were expanded in 2004 to include contractors and project owners. The estate 

moved for summary judgment, arguing that the 2004 exclusive liability expansion 

violated due process because it left the estate without an effective remedy. The court 

rejected the estate’s argument and dismissed the wrongful death action, entering 

judgment against the estate. We affirm the superior court’s judgment. 

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 

This is the second appeal involving Abigail Caudle’s work-related death; 

we derive the facts from our opinion in Burke v. Raven Electric, Inc.1 Caudle was 

working as an apprentice electrician for Raven Electric, Inc. in connection with 

** Sitting by assignment made under article IV, section 11 of the Alaska 

Constitution and Alaska Administrative Rule 23(a). 

1 420 P.3d 1196 (Alaska 2018). 

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remodeling an Alaska USA Federal Credit Union building; it was her first day on that 

particular job.2 

Thegeneral contractor, Criterion General, Inc., “changedthescopeofwork 

after Raven Electric’s crew arrived”; rather than roughing in three offices as originally 

planned, the Raven workers were told to remove existing light fixtures.3 No one 

disconnected the power to the lights that were being removed, although the light switch 

of the fixture Caudle worked on was turned off and “a noncontact voltage meter” she was 

using did not indicate the fixture was energized.4 Caudle nevertheless was electrocuted 

and died; electricians interviewed during the subsequent occupational safety 

investigation suggested that the circuit had been wired incorrectly in the past.5 

After Alaska’s Occupational Safety and Health Division investigated the 

incident, it cited Raven “for several safety violations and ultimately agreed through an 

informal settlement to fine [Raven] a total of $11,200.”6 Raven also paid $10,000 for 

Caudle’s funeral expenses,7 the only workers’ compensation death benefit available to 

the estate of an employee who dies without a spouse or other dependents.8 

2 Id. at 1199 & n.2.
 

3 Id.
 

4 Id. at 1199.
 

5 Id.
 

6 Id.
 

7 Id. at 1200. 

8 See AS 23.30.215. 

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Caudle’s mother, Marianne Burke, filed a claim with the Alaska Workers’ 

Compensation Board.9 After a hearing at which the Board clarified that Burke was not 

the personal representative of Caudle’s estate, the Board rejected Burke’s claim because 

Burke had not shown she met the eligibility requirements for dependent benefits under 

the Act.10 Burke appealed to the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission, 

which affirmed the Board’s decision; she then appealed to this court.11 We declined to 

address any arguments Burke made on behalf of Caudle’s estate because Burke had not 

been appointed personal representative.12 Considering Burke’s possible claim as a 

parent, we decided that the Act did not violate her rights to due process or equal 

protection.13 The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.14 

Burke was appointed personal representative of Caudle’s estate (Estate) in 

August 2018, and in September the Estate filed a wrongful death action against Criterion 

and Alaska USA. The Estate alleged that the 2004 amendments to the Act violated the 

Estate’s constitutional right to due process, citing both a footnote from Schiel v. Union 

Oil Co. of California15 regarding the possibility that very low workers’ compensation for 

9 Burke, 420 P.3d at 1200. 

10 Id. at 1201. 

11 Id. at 1201-02. 

12 Id. at 1203. 

13 Id. at 1203-06. 

14 Burke v. Raven Elec., Inc., 140 S. Ct. 135 (2019). 

15 219 P.3d 1025, 1036 n.63 (Alaska 2009) (noting employer’s agreement to 

question whether inadequate benefits might violate due process), overruled on other 

grounds by Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 487 P.3d 595, 598 & n.4 (Alaska 2021). 

(continued...) 

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an injury might violate an employee’s due process rights and the “inadequate benefits 

of zero compensation and a funeral expense” for the death. 

Relyingon Schiel theEstatemoved for summary judgment, focusing on the 

right to procedural due process in light of our prior decisions and arguing that the lack 

of an adequate remedy deprived the Estate of its due process rights.16 The Estate 

distinguished Schiel because the worker in Schiel received workers’ compensation 

benefits and therefore still had a “substantial and efficient remedy” for his loss.17 The 

Estate argued that the low level of funeral benefit compensation from Raven coupled 

with the inability to bring a wrongful death action against Criterion and Alaska USA 

effectively deprived the Estate of any remedy, violating the right to due process under 

the Alaska and United States Constitutions. The Estate contended that legislative 

policies underlying the 2004 amendments “wholly fail[ed] to apply” as there was no risk 

of “double-dipping” because no workers’ compensation benefits had been paid, yet the 

Estate was unable “to access the courts for any compensatory damages whatsoever 

15 (...continued) 

Schiel involved a certified question fromfederal districtcourtasking uswhether the2004 

amendments violated due process or equal protection under the Alaska Constitution. Id. 

at 1029. We held that the amendments did not violate the employee’s rights under those 

Alaska Constitution provisions. Id. at 1037. 

16 See Alaska R. Civ. P. 56(c) (setting out summary judgment procedure and 

providing that judgment may be entered for a party if undisputed facts demonstrate that 

party is entitled to judgment as matter of law). In its summary judgment motion the 

Estate expressly said it was not raising an equal protection argument, so any equal 

protection argument the Estate may be making on appeal is waived. Brandon v. Corr. 

Corp. of Am., 28 P.3d 269, 280 (Alaska 2001) (“A party may not raise an issue for the 

first time on appeal.”). 

17 See Schiel, 219 P.3d at 1035 (holding that claimant “still has a substantial 

and efficient remedy available”). 

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concerning other responsible tortfeasors.” The Estate also contended the 2004 

amendments undercut the policy we recognized in Parker Drilling Co. v. O’Neill 

favoring workplace safety.18 

AlaskaUSAresponded that theEstatewas raisingasubstantivedueprocess 

challenge rather than a procedural due process challenge and that there was no 

substantive due process violation because a fair and substantial relationship existed 

between the 2004 amendments and a legitimate government purpose.19 Alaska USA 

asserted theEstatehad notmetits burden, required in substantive dueprocess challenges, 

of showing there was no rational basis for the law. It also argued that the Estate’s 

inability to bring a wrongful death action “does not constitute a deprivation of property 

that would trigger a procedural due process analysis under the Takings Clause” because 

the Estate’s claim accrued after the 2004 amendments. Alaska USA asked the court to 

notify the State that the Estate had challenged the 2004 amendments’ constitutionality.20 

The court provided notice to the State and gave it 60 days to intervene. 

After intervening, the State asked the court to determine that the 2004 amendments did 

not violate due process. The State agreed with Alaska USA’s argument that the Estate 

had “no separate legal right to sue in tort because the legislature eliminated and replaced 

the wrongful death statute with the Workers’ Compensation Act.” Consequently, the 

State argued, there could be no procedural due process violation. The State maintained 

18 674 P.2d 770, 775-76 (Alaska1983) (affirming “thatthereis acommon law 

duty to provide a safe worksite . . . . [and] protect[] all workers on the site” and that 

“[t]he duty is not dependent upon the existence of any particular combination of 

contractual relationships”). 

19 See Schiel, 219 P.3d at 1034-36 (holding 2004 amendments did not violate 

equal protection and thus did not violate substantive due process). 

20 See Alaska R. Civ. P. 24. 

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that the amendments did not violate the Estate’s substantive due process rights because 

the compensation, while limited to a “modest sum of burial costs,” was rationally related 

to the purpose of the Act, identified as “to provide relatively quick compensation 

regardless of fault such that a person and her dependents will not be impoverished by a 

workplace injury.” 

Criterion raised arguments similar to those made by the State and Alaska 

USA about the Estate’s due process rights. It additionally argued that Burke was not a 

“statutorily defined dependent” of the decedent and thus the Estate had suffered no 

pecuniary loss. 

Alaska USA filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, asking the court 

to determine that it was a “project owner” as defined in the Act and thus protected by the 

exclusive liability provision. The Estate opposed, arguing that material factual disputes 

precluded summary judgment. 

The court held argument on the summary judgment motions and denied the 

Estate’s motion “for the reasons stated in the State’s briefing.” The court invited the 

parties to submit additional briefing addressing whether there were material factual 

disputes about the applicability of the 2004 amendments to both Criterion and Alaska 

USA. The Estate identified two possible factual disputes. 

The court ultimately decided no material factual disputes existed and that 

both Alaska USA and Criterion “qualif[ied] as ‘employers’ under the statute as the 

project owner and general contractor, respectively.” The court granted Alaska USA’s 

cross-motion for summary judgment and “applie[d] the same reasoning to . . . Criterion.” 

It dismissed the Estate’s case and later entered final judgment against the Estate. The 

Estate appeals. 

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo.21 “We apply our 

independent judgment to questions of constitutional law as well as ‘to questions of 

“statutory interpretation requiring the application and analysis of various canons of 

statutory construction.” ’ ”22 

IV. DISCUSSION 

In Burke we set out the general terms of the “grand bargain” underlying the 

workers’ compensation system: Employees give up their right to sue in tort for workrelated injuries and death in exchange for certain but limited compensation without 

regard to fault; employers give up the right to raise certain defenses in exchange for 

limited liability for work-related injuries.23 This basic bargain is set out in AS 23.30.045 

and .055. Alaska Statute 23.30.045 requires an employer to “secure the payment” of 

compensation under the Act, and AS 23.30.055 makes the compensation set out in 

section .045 the exclusive liability of an employer for a work-related injury or death. 

In 2004 the legislature amended the Act, extending “up the chain of 

contracts” the mandate to secure payment of compensation for work injuries and 

expanding the exclusive liability provision to those contracting entities now potentially 

liable for payment of compensation.24 Under the amendments a project owner is 

21 Christensen v. Alaska Sales &Serv., Inc., 335P.3d 514, 516 (Alaska 2014). 

22 Murphy v. Fairbanks North Star Borough, 494 P.3d 556, 562 (Alaska 

2021) (quoting Burke v. Raven Elec., Inc., 420 P.3d 1196, 1202 (Alaska 2018)). 

23 420 P.3d at 1202-03. 

24 See Lovely v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 459 P.3d 1162, 1169 (Alaska 2020) 

(emphasis omitted) (quoting Minutes, Sen. Labor &Commerce Comm., Hearing on S.B. 

323, 23d Leg., 2d Sess., 20-21 (Mar. 4, 2004) (statement of Sen. Ralph Seekins, Sponsor 

(continued...) 

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potentially liable for compensation for the work-related injuries of its contractor’s and 

any subcontractor’s employees and also is protected from tort liability for those workrelated injuries if compensation is paid.25 In Schiel we considered the constitutionality 

of the amendments in the context of a personal injury suit against a contractor and held 

that the amendments did not violate the employee’s equal protection or due process 

rights.26 We noted that, in response to questioning at oral argument before us, the 

contractor had “agreed . . . that at a certain level, inadequate benefits could violate a 

worker’s due process rights.”27 The Estate cited this footnote as the basis for its lawsuit 

against Criterion and Alaska USA, contending that the limited amount of funeral 

expenses paid under the Act coupled with the Estate’s inability to sue others it 

considered liable for Caudle’s death effectively left it with no compensation. 

A. Procedural Due Process 

Wefirst consider whether theproject owner amendmentsdeprivetheEstate 

of due process by denying it access to the court. We previously have related the right of 

access to the court to procedural due process, recognizing in Bush v. Reid that a claim 

for personal injuries is a form of property subject to due process protection.28 The State 

argues that the project owner amendments had no effect on the Estate’s procedural due 

process rights because the Estate had no property interest. After observing that wrongful 

24 (...continued) 

of S.B. 323)). 

25 AS 23.30.045, .055. 

26 219 P.3d 1025, 1028-29, 1034-36 (Alaska 2009), overruled on other 

grounds by Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 487 P.3d 595, 598 &n.4 (Alaska 2021). 

27 Id. at 1036 n.63. 

28 516 P.2d 1215, 1219 (Alaska 1973). 

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death actions are creatures of statute and did not exist at common law, and noting that 

the legislature can modify or eliminate unaccrued property interests that it has created, 

the State maintains that the legislature did precisely that with the 2004 amendments: it 

“abrogated [the Estate’s] right to sue for workplace injuries and death.” The State 

concludes that the Estate had no “property interest in a wrongful death suit to which 

procedural due process attaches.” 

But the legislature did not abrogate an employee’s right to sue for 

workplace injuries and death when it enacted either the Alaska Workers’ Compensation 

Act or the 2004 amendments to the Act. To the contrary, the Act explicitly permits 

lawsuits against uninsured employers29 and any third party who may be liable for a 

compensable injury or death.30 Rather than extinguishing an employee’s right to bring 

suit, the Act’s exclusive liability provision creates an affirmative defense that shields an 

employer complyingwith the Actfromfurtherliability. Andwhen an employer does not 

comply with the Act, it loses not only the exclusive liability defense but also several 

other defenses that employers relied on before workers’ compensation programs existed 

— the fellow-servant rule, assumption of risk, and contributory negligence of the 

employee.31 Exclusive liability thus is one way to ensure compliance with the Act’s 

29 AS 23.30.055; Seal v. Welty, 477 P.3d 613, 618-19 (Alaska 2020) 

(observing that AS 23.30.055 allows suits against uninsured employers). 

30 AS 23.30.015. An employee who recovers damages from a third party 

must reimburse the employer for any compensation received. AS 23.30.015(g). 

31 AS 23.30.055; see 1 ARTHUR LARSON ET AL., LARSON’S WORKERS’ 

COMPENSATION LAW § 2.03 (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed. 2015) (describing limitations 

on employee’s common law remedies through use of these three defenses); cf. N.Y. Cent. 

R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 198-200 (1917) (discussing history of these three 

defenses). 

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grand bargain; employers who do not keep their end of the bargain lose common law 

defenses in addition to the Act’s protection against limited damages. 

Similarly, the project owner amendments did not abrogate an employee’s 

right to bring a personal injury or wrongful death action; they instead expanded the 

applicability of both AS 23.30.045 and AS 23.30.055, extending the grand bargain to 

general contractors and project owners by redefining “employer” in those sections to 

encompass them in the statutorily defined chain of contracts with a direct employer.32 

The exclusive liability defense is now available to project owners and contractors when 

they or the direct employers comply with the grand bargain by securing compensation 

coverage. But the amendments did not extinguish an estate’s right to bring a wrongful 

death action for a work-related death. 

In arguing that the Estate’s rights had been extinguished, the State relies on 

two takings cases. But we have distinguished property for purposes of due process 

protection from property for a takings analysis.33 In Vanek v. State, Board of Fisheries 

we recognized that a commercial fishing permit may be property subject to due process 

protections but that it does “not necessarily follow that a [fishing] permit is property that 

requires just compensation when its value decreases due to a valid state regulation.”34 

32 Ch. 80, SLA 2004; Lovely v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 459 P.3d 1162, 1169 

(Alaska 2020). 

33 Vanek v. State, Bd. of Fisheries, 193 P.3d 283, 289, 293 (Alaska 2008). 

The U.S. Supreme Court has also distinguished takings analysis from due process 

analysis. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540-43 (2005). 

34 193 P.3d at 293. 

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The question presented here is not unlike the one raised in Arctic 

Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore. 

35 In Wedmore a subcontractor’s injured employee sued 

companies that were not his direct employers but were involved in the construction 

project.36 As in the appeal before us, a change in the law altered the defenses available 

in litigation stemming from a work injury: The companies argued they had been 

deprived of access to the courts “to raise the defense of the employer’s negligence” 

because of the combination of several doctrines, including exclusive liability.37 We 

rejected their procedural due process argument after first determining the companies had 

“not been deprived of any ‘available’ defenses.”38 In this context we said: “While it is 

manifest that no one has a vested right in any particular mode of procedure such that 

legislative change is prohibited, due process does require that a substantial and efficient 

remedy remains available or that one be provided when a preexisting defense is 

statutorily limited.”39 We recognized that rejecting the companies’ argument might 

produce inequities because a direct employer whose negligence contributed to the harm 

would be protected by exclusive liability yet be reimbursed for compensation payments 

35 605 P.2d 426 (Alaska 1979). 

36 Id. at 427-28. 

37 Id. at 435-37. 

38 Id. at 437. 

39 Id. at 436. 

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under a different section of the Act.40 We nonetheless determined that the legislature and 

not this court needed to address the issue.41 

The State questions the applicability of our Wedmore statement that due 

process requires “that a substantial and efficient remedy remain[] available or that one 

be provided.”42 Yet New York Central Railroad Co. v. White, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 

1917 decision upholding New York’s workers’ compensation statute against a 

constitutional challenge, acknowledged a similar concern.43 White involved a due 

process challenge to New York’s workers’ compensation law, including an argument 

that the statute deprived employers of due process by imposing liability without regard 

to fault.44 The Court observed that it did not need to consider “whether the state could 

abolish all rights of action, on the one hand, or all defenses on the other, without setting 

upsomethingadequateintheir stead”becausetheworkers’ compensation systemat issue 

“set[] aside one body of rules only to establish another system in its place.”45 The Court 

looked at the nature of the system as a whole to consider whether it was a “just 

settlement” of the problemthe legislature sought to address in adopting a no-fault system 

of compensation with limited recovery for work-related injuries.46 The Court expressly 

40 See id. at 438-40; see also id. at 441-42 (Boochever, C.J., dissenting) 

(setting out example of application and calling result of holding “glaringly inequitable”). 

41 Id. at 440 (majority opinion). 

42 Id. at 436. 

43 243 U.S. 188 (1917). 

44 Id. at 196. 

45 Id. at 201. 

46 Id. at 202. 

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left for future adjudication whether “the compensation prescribed by the statute in 

question is unreasonable in amount, either in general or in the particular case.”47 

Although decided many years ago, White has never been overruled. As 

reflected by our decisions and by federal law, whether and to what extent the constitution 

protects common law rights is not settled.48 The U.S. Supreme Court has long held the 

view that “[n]o person has a vested interest in any rule of law, entitling him to insist that 

it shall remain unchanged for his benefit.”49 But the Court has not decided whether due 

process places limits on the legislature’s power to modify or eliminate common law 

rights, as demonstrated by the questions expressly left open in White. 

50 In Duke Power 

Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc. the Court more recently said it was 

“not at all clear” that due process “requires that a legislatively enacted compensation 

47 Id. at 205-06. 

48 See Fein v. Permanente Med. Grp., 474 U.S. 892, 894-85 (1985) (White, 

J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari) (questioning whether due process requires 

compensation scheme with adequate remedy as quid pro quo “for the common-law or 

state-law remedy it replaces”); Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State, 56 P.3d 1046, 1057 (Alaska 

2002) (plurality opinion) (“Moreover, the damages caps do not violate the right of access 

because they are not so drastic so as to eliminate the tort remedies that they modify.”); 

cf. Estate of Kim ex rel. Alexander v. Coxe, 295 P.3d 380, 391 (Alaska 2013) (explaining 

that Fein dissent noted constitutional protection of common law rights was unsettled and 

that federal cases considering challenges to Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act 

interpreted it as limiting common law remedies, not “depriv[ing] injured persons of all 

potentialremedies” (quoting District ofColumbia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 940 A.2d 163, 

177 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2008))). 

49 White, 243 U.S. at 198 (citing Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876)). 

50 Id. at 201; cf. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93-94 

(1980)(Marshall, J., concurring) (“Quite serious constitutional questions might be raised 

if a legislature attempted to abolish certain categories of common-law rights in some 

general way.”). 

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scheme either duplicate the recovery at common law or provide a reasonable substitute 

remedy.”51 The Court cited White and upheld the Price-Anderson Act, which provided 

limited compensation in the event of a nuclear accident, because that statute “provide[s] 

a reasonably just substitute for the common-law or state tort law remedies it replaces.”52 

We thus reject the State’s contention that Wedmore introduced a courtaccess right into the workers’ compensation framework “seemingly by error.” Limits on 

the right to bring actions and assert defenses have been an underlying question in 

workers’ compensation since its inception, and the balance of the benefits and burdens 

of the grand bargain remains an issue subject to our review. But White also shows that 

consideration of the entire system, not simply the result in one case, is important when 

evaluatingchanges to theworkers’compensation scheme. Considering theActas whole, 

we hold that the 2004 amendments do not violate the Estate’s procedural due process 

rights because the remedy the Act provides, while small, is consistent with the purpose 

of workers’ compensation and affords the Estate some remedy. 

The purpose of the Act is to provide employees and their dependents 

adequate income to replace that lost through a work-related injury or death while 

encouraging a return to work.53 We have previously recognized that the Act provides 

51 438 U.S. 59, 88 (1978). 

52 Id. at 64, 88 (citing White, 243 U.S. 188; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 

(1932)). 

53 See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Darrow, 403 P.3d 1116, 1124-25 (Alaska 2017) 

(interpreting statute consistently with balancing goals of providing both adequate 

replacement income and incentive to return to work); see also AS 23.30.001(1) 

(requiring Act to “be interpreted so as to ensure the quick, efficient, fair, and predictable 

delivery of . . . benefits . . . at a reasonable cost”); Burke v. Raven Elec., Inc., 420 P.3d 

1196, 1202-03 (Alaska 2018) (summarizing purposes of workers’ compensation). 

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uneven benefits.54 Caudle had no dependents suffering economic loss by her death; 

providing funeral expenses as workers’ compensation — thus eliminating the Estate’s 

potential economic loss for Caudle’s death — and allowing Criterion and Alaska USA 

to use exclusive liability as an affirmative defense does not deprive the Estate of all 

remedies or all possible access to courts. Caudle’s family members may feel they have 

been wronged by a system that, in this particular case, provided minimal compensation, 

imposed only a small work-safety-violation fine, and offered no other means to hold 

accountable those whomthe Estate considers responsible for her death. But considering 

the Act as a whole, extension of the exclusive remedy defense does not so diminish the 

Estate’s economic recovery as to deprive it of all access to the courts. 

C. Substantive Due Process 

The Estate also raises a substantive due process challenge to the Act. 

Relying on the substantive due process goal we have identified — “guard[ing] against 

unfair, irrational, or arbitrary state conduct that ‘shock[s] the universal sense of 

justice’ ”55 — the Estate contends that the limited recovery available to it under the 2004 

amendments fails to meet this substantive due process standard because the remedy 

available to it “is the exact definition” (emphasis omitted) of unfair and arbitrary state 

conduct. 

Relying on our precedent, Alaska USA asserts that the Estate received a 

substantial remedy because Raven paid funeral expenses and that in a similar case we 

54 See C.J. v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 151 P.3d 373, 381 (Alaska 2006) 

(“Workers whose wages are low, who have been the victims of blatantly negligent 

conduct, or who suffer exceptional noneconomic injuries bear the brunt of a system that 

may benefit their co-workers or employers but certainly does not benefit them.”). 

55 Doe v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 444 P.3d 116, 125 (Alaska 2019) 

(second alteration in original) (quoting Church v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 973 P.2d 

1125, 1130 (Alaska 1999)). 

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decided payment of funeral expenses as the sole workers’ compensation remedy did not 

violate equal protection.56 The State contends that the Estate’s substantive due process 

claim is controlled by Schiel. The State acknowledges that the compensation afforded 

the Estate was “modest” and that “$10,000 in burial expenses is nowhere near 

proportionate to the loss of a life.” But the State points out, as does Criterion, that the 

purpose of workers’ compensation is not the same as that of tort law, even though the 

workers’ compensation system replaces that system for many work-related injuries. 

Criterion also argues that the Estate failed to make the showing required under our test 

for substantive due process: A person challenging a statute on substantive due process 

grounds must show that the statute bears “no reasonable relationship to a legitimate 

governmental purpose.”57 

Our “inquiry into arbitrariness” starts with the presumption that the 

legislative action is proper, and the party challenging the statute on substantive due 

process grounds must “demonstrat[e] that no rational basis for the challenged legislation 

exists.”58 “If any conceivable legitimate public policy for the enactment is either 

apparent or offered by those defending the enactment, the party challenging it must 

disprove the factual basis for the justification.”59 In Schiel we identified the following 

legitimate purposes of the 2004 amendments: “to ensure or expand workers’ 

56 Taylor v. Se.-Harrison W. Corp., 694 P.2d 1160, 1162-63 (Alaska 1985). 

57 Schiel v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 219 P.3d 1025, 1036 (Alaska 2009) 

(quoting Premera Blue Cross v. State, Dep’t of Com., Cmty. & Econ. Dev., Div. of Ins., 

171 P.3d 1110, 1124 (Alaska 2007)), overruled on other grounds by Buntin v. 

Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 487 P.3d 595, 598 & n.4 (Alaska 2021). 

58 ConcernedCitizens ofS. KenaiPeninsula v.KenaiPeninsula Borough, 527 

P.2d 447, 452 (Alaska 1974). 

59 Keyes v. Humana Hosp. Alaska, Inc., 750 P.2d 343, 352 (Alaska 1988). 

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compensation coverage for workers, to increase workplace safety, to prevent ‘double 

dipping,’ and to provide protection from tort liability to those who are potentially liable 

for securing workers’ compensation coverage.”60 

To succeed on its claim the Estate was required to provide factual 

information that generally disproved thejustificationsfor theamendments. The standard 

does not require that the legislation meet its stated goals or objectives in every individual 

case. For example, the Estate argues that the 2004 amendments did not fulfill their 

purpose of increasing workplace safety because safety violations, for which the State 

fined Raven, caused Caudle’s death.61 We recognize that work-safety violations 

contributed to her death, but Raven’s failure to follow safety standards in this instance 

does not demonstrate that the legislature’s expansion of the exclusive liability defense 

will not further workplace safety more generally. The Estate also argues that “doubledipping” was not an issue because of the minimal compensation the Estate received, but 

this argument does not address the overall costs of a business paying for both workers’ 

compensation and (through indemnification agreements) tort damages for the same 

injury, which was the problem the legislature sought to address.62 

The Estate’s arguments misapprehend the heavy burden a party bears when 

challenging a statute on substantive due process grounds. The Estate did not and does 

not argue that the 2004 amendments’ purposes were not legitimate, and it provided no 

evidence that would disprove the factual basis for the legislature’s justifications. In 

addition to the stated purpose of enhancing workplace safety, the legislature enacted the 

amendments for the asserted purposes of increasing access to compensation coverage for 

60 219 P.3d at 1032. 

61 Burke v. Raven Elec., Inc., 420 P.3d 1196, 1999 (Alaska 2018). 

62 Schiel, 219 P.3d at 1032-33. 

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workers and preventing some employers or contractors from having to pay both 

compensation and damages because of indemnity agreements.63 In light of these 

purposes and the lack of evidence undercutting the legislative justifications for them, the 

Estate has not shown that the 2004 amendments violate substantive due process. 

We again acknowledge that the result in this case will seem harsh to 

Caudle’s family. Some courts have expressed concern with similarly low levels of 

compensation for the estates of workers who die without dependents.64 As the Montana 

Supreme Court wrote: “It is easy to opine that the Legislature could have done better in 

providing for family members after a worker’s death, even those who are 

non-dependents of the worker. Work-related death is traumatic, final, and adversely 

impacts a family forever.”65 But we agree with that court that the appropriate amount of 

compensation is subject to debate and that the legislature could rationally decide to 

provide a minimal payment to the estates of employees who die without dependents 

while providing more to injured employees and the dependent survivors of employees 

who die in work-related accidents.66 

63 Id. 

64 Walters v.Flathead ConcreteProds., Inc.,249 P.3d913,921(Mont. 2011); 

Park v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 436 A.2d 1136, 1139 (N.H. 1981), overruled by Alonzi v. 

Ne. Generation Servs. Co., 940 A.2d 1153, 1162-63 (N.H. 2008). 

65 Walters, 249 P.3d at 921. 

66 Id. at 921-22. 

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Considering the entire Act, including the 2004 amendments, we conclude, 

consistent with Schiel, that the Act does not violate the Estate’s substantive due process 

rights.67 

V. CONCLUSION 

We AFFIRM the superior court’s judgment. 

We agreewith thesuperior courtthatno material factual disputes precluded 

summary judgment. 

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67