[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 19-13238

____________________

TIMOTHY HOWARD SPRIGGS,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Respondent-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket Nos. 2:13-cv-14189-JEM,

2:10-cr-14013-JFM-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 19-13238

Before NEWSOM, MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and STORY, District 

Judge.

STORY, District Judge:

Timothy Howard Spriggs (“Spriggs”) appeals the district 

court’s denial of his Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct 

Sentence (“Motion to Vacate”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

Spriggs alleges ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial 

attorney’s decision not to pursue a motion to suppress “core 

evidence” against him, specifically, statements Spriggs made to law 

enforcement and evidence of child pornography obtained from his 

laptop computer. The district court held that Spriggs failed to 

demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel and denied relief. 

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I. 

In January 2010, while conducting an internet investigation, 

Det. Brian Broughton of the Martin County Sheriff’s Department 

identified an Internet Protocol (“IP”) address from Hobe Sound, 

Florida flagged as a device involved in the transmission of child 

pornography on numerous occasions in December 2009. Det. 

Broughton matched the IP address to an internet subscriber 

account for Charlotte Roseman and subsequently confirmed that 

Roseman owned the real property associated with the suspect IP 

address—11501 Southeast Ella Avenue (“11501” or the “11501 

property”). 

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In preparation for applying for a search warrant, Det.

Broughton visited 11501 to obtain pictures. While there, he 

discovered and photographed a Bounder recreational vehicle 

(“RV”) parked “adjacent to the residence of 11501.” 

It is undisputed that the RV was, in fact, parked on a separate 

property from 11501 and had a street address of 11491. Following 

the post-remand hearing in this case, the district court found “no 

evidence that law enforcement knew the RV was located on a lot 

with a different lot number” at the time the warrant was executed. 

Det. Broughton subsequently applied for and secured a 

search warrant authorizing a search of the 11501 property. The 

search warrant defined the “premise[] to be searched” as “11501 SE 

Ella Ave, Hobe Sound, FL 33450” and described the “residence” as 

a “single family home” with the number 11501 “affixed to the 

house.” The warrant did not mention the RV, and the pictures 

attached to the application and warrant likewise did not depict the 

RV. In the affidavit accompanying the application for the warrant, 

which the warrant incorporated, Det. Broughton stated his belief 

that “the Premises and the curtilage thereof” were being used for 

the possession of child pornography. 

On January 13, 2010, Det. Broughton and his partner, Det. 

Patrick Colasuonno, executed the search warrant. Det. Broughton 

wore an audio recording device, which he activated when they 

arrived. Det. Broughton did not record the entire time, but only 

recorded his exchanges with witnesses. 

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Upon their arrival at 11501, the detectives encountered 

Garry Spriggs and Junice Spriggs, the parents of 

Defendant/Appellant Timothy Spriggs (“Spriggs”); Phillip Spriggs, 

the brother of Spriggs; and Spriggs himself in the front yard 

(together, the “Spriggs family”). The Spriggs family advised Det. 

Broughton that the property owners were not home. In response 

to an inquiry from Det. Broughton whether the RV was 

“associated with the residence,” Garry Spriggs answered in the 

affirmative and explained, “Yes, we park it in [Charlotte 

Roseman’s] yard.” 

Det. Broughton explained the reason for his visit and that his 

investigation concerned “inappropriate material” such as “images 

of young children” being distributed from the IP address associated 

with the 11501 property. He asked if the property owners had WiFi and learned that they had an available wireless internet 

connection but did not have a computer. Garry Spriggs explained 

that the Spriggs family purchased internet service from the 

property owners when in town. Det. Broughton explained to the 

Spriggs family that he was looking for a computer with peer-topeer file sharing software on it that would allow for downloading 

materials from the internet.

At Det. Broughton’s request, the Spriggs family contacted 

Ms. Roseman, and she was asked to return home for execution of 

the warrant. While awaiting Ms. Roseman’s arrival, the detectives 

questioned the Spriggs family further about the presence of 

computers on the property. Spriggs said that he possessed a Dell 

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laptop computer that was in the RV, that he normally lived in 

Valdosta, Georgia, and that he used 11501 Ella Avenue as his 

address. Spriggs admitted that his laptop computer had file-sharing 

software on it and that his computer “[p]robably” had all three 

types of software Det. Broughton mentioned. After learning that 

there were computers in the RV, Det. Broughton advised the 

Spriggs family that because their computers were “on the 

property,” they would also be subject to examination.

At some point after Det. Broughton explained with more 

specificity what he hoped to discover in the search, Spriggs asked 

to speak with the detectives privately, away from his family 

members. Spriggs told the detectives he was aware that there was 

“inappropriate” material on his laptop. Spriggs stated that the 

detectives needed only his computer and not the computers of his 

family members. When asked whether there was “a lot” on his 

computer, Spriggs stated that “it’s going to look worse than it is.” 

Spriggs was advised by both detectives several times that he was 

not under arrest but that they intended to collect and analyze all of 

the computers.

When Ms. Roseman arrived, Det. Broughton ended the 

conversation with Spriggs to speak with Ms. Roseman inside her 

house. Det. Colasuonno stayed outside with the Spriggs family, 

and Spriggs said he told his family that he had downloaded child 

pornography.

The detectives first conducted the search of the 11501 house 

and then the RV. Following remand, members of the Spriggs 

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family supplied affidavits describing what occurred the day of the 

search. In the Spriggs family affidavits, they state that a deputy 

accompanying Det. Broughton placed his hand on his firearm in 

the “ready” position, which they perceived as a show of authority 

and coercion. The Spriggs family was asked to wait outside the RV 

during the search. According to Spriggs and the Spriggs family, 

when asked about the ability to search the RV and seize the 

computers from the RV, Det. Broughton indicated that he had a 

warrant and that the Spriggs’ RV “was included as ‘curtilage’ on 

the 11501 property Warrant.” Det. Broughton reportedly advised 

the Spriggs family that he could search “anything on th[e]

property” while simultaneously motioning with his arms to 

encompass the RV and a storage shed. The Spriggs family averred 

that they did not believe they had any choice but to allow the 

detectives to search the RV.

Approximately ten minutes into the search of the RV, a 

deputy told Spriggs that Det. Broughton needed him inside. Det. 

Broughton recorded his communications with Spriggs inside the 

RV. Det. Broughton asked Spriggs to identify his laptop. 

According to Spriggs’ post-remand declaration, Spriggs initially 

refused to answer, but eventually confirmed which laptop 

belonged to him and also confirmed that the files containing child 

pornography were downloaded to a separate hard drive. Spriggs 

identified his computer, various hard drives, and the computers of 

family members. The detectives seized the computers and hard 

drives. 

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Before examining the computers and hard drives seized 

from the RV, Det. Broughton obtained a separate search warrant 

authorizing a search of the contents and extraction of child 

pornography from the devices. From Spriggs’ Dell computer, Det. 

Broughton extracted 120 video files that contained child 

pornography. 

On February 25, 2010, Spriggs was indicted by a federal 

grand jury in the Southern District of Florida and charged with a 

single count of knowingly receiving, by means of a computer, 

visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2).

On March 30, 2010, without the benefit of a negotiated plea 

agreement, Spriggs entered a plea of guilty to count one of the 

Indictment. Spriggs also signed and agreed to a Stipulated Factual 

Basis in Support of Guilty Plea admitting to knowingly receiving 

child pornography. He faced a statutory penalty range of five to 

twenty years in prison. On October 18, 2010, Spriggs was 

sentenced to 180 months of imprisonment, which was below the 

applicable guideline range. 

Spriggs exercised his right to direct appeal and successfully 

challenged an enhancement to his sentence under the Sentencing 

Guidelines based on distribution of child pornography. United 

States v. Spriggs (Spriggs I), 666 F.3d 1284, 1289 (11th Cir. 2012). 

On April 13, 2012, Spriggs was resentenced to 126 months of 

imprisonment, with all other aspects of his original sentence 

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8 Opinion of the Court 19-13238

remaining intact. Spriggs has since completed his custodial 

sentence. 

In May 2013, with the aid of counsel, Spriggs filed his 

original Motion to Vacate under § 2255, alleging ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Specifically, Spriggs asserted that law 

enforcement violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights by 

“improperly obtaining access to him” in order to record him 

illegally and search areas outside the scope of the search warrant, 

that law enforcement violated Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 

(1966), by obtaining involuntary statements from him without 

consent, and that trial counsel should have known that the search 

warrant was falsely obtained and did not cover the RV where his 

computer and other media were seized. 

Without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate 

judge issued a report and recommendation opining that trial 

counsel’s failure to move to suppress would not have affected 

Spriggs’ decision to plead guilty. The district court adopted the 

report and recommendation in its entirety and denied Spriggs’ 

motion to vacate. Spriggs appealed. 

On August 9, 2017, a panel of this Court reversed the denial 

of Spriggs’ original Motion to Vacate and remanded the case for 

additional proceedings. Spriggs v. United States (Spriggs II), 703 F. 

App’x 888, 892 (11th Cir. 2017). The Court observed that the 

merits of Spriggs’ Fourth Amendment challenge were not fully 

explored and that the “inquiry into trial counsel’s performance in 

advising a client to plead guilty cannot be unmoored from the 

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merits of an alleged Fourth Amendment violation, particularly 

when, as here, [1] the defendant claims he is innocent of the offense 

he pled guilty to and [2] when a motion to suppress may have been 

outcome-determinative.” Id. at 891. The Court explained as 

follows:

The Supreme Court has said that, as far as 

performance goes, “[n]o reasonable lawyer would 

forgo competent litigation of meritorious, possibly

decisive claims.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 

365, 382 n.7, 106 S. Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) 

(emphasis added). And it recently clarified that to 

establish prejudice when the “decision about going to 

trial turns on [a defendant’s] prospects of success and 

those are affected by the attorney’s error—for 

instance, where a defendant alleges that his lawyer 

should have but did not seek to suppress 

[evidence]”—the defendant must show that “he 

would have been better off going to trial,” a showing 

that unquestionably implicates (at least to some 

degree) the merits of the alleged Fourth Amendment 

violation. Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1965

(2017).

Id. at 891–92 (alterations in original). The Court continued, “[i]n 

cases like this one, where a [defendant] faults his lawyer for failing 

to pursue a motion to suppress prior to entering a plea, both the 

deficient performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland turn on 

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10 Opinion of the Court 19-13238

the viability of the motion to suppress.” Id. at 892 (alteration in 

original) (quoting Arvelo v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 788 F.3d 

1345, 1348 (11th Cir. 2015)). 

On remand, the district judge referred the case to a 

magistrate judge for an evidentiary hearing. Consistent with the 

instructions on remand, evidence was received at the hearing 

addressing the merits of the hypothetical motion to suppress. Det. 

Broughton, Spriggs’ trial counsel, Robin Rosen-Evans, the 

Assistant Federal Public Defender who originally represented 

Spriggs, and Spriggs testified at the hearing. Ms. Roseman and 

members of the Spriggs family provided affidavits in support of 

Spriggs’ renewed Section 2255 motion.

Ms. Roseman, among others, supplied an affidavit averring 

that the 11501 and 11491 lots were separate and distinct, that she 

rented the property to the Spriggs family, that it was “common 

knowledge” there was no room on 11501 for a motor home given 

the narrow lots, that it was also known that she was trying to sell 

the 11491 lot, and that “For Sale” signs were posted.

As relevant to the issues presented, Det. Broughton testified 

that he believed the RV was parked on the same 11501 property or 

within the curtilage of 11501. He also testified about the voluntary, 

incriminating statements made by Spriggs.

In her testimony, Rosen-Evans explained her thought 

process and reasoning concerning the advice provided to Spriggs. 

She testified that her notes reflected that Spriggs admitted to her 

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he had downloaded child pornography and intended to enter a 

guilty plea. Rosen-Evans explained that she had discussed whether 

to file a motion to suppress with Spriggs before his guilty plea. But 

she “determined that it would not be in his best interest to file” the 

motion. From her investigation, Rosen-Evans found that there 

was a “contradiction between the police and the [Spriggs family]” 

as to whether the officers were granted permission to search the 

RV. She was concerned that if she filed a motion to suppress, then 

the court would have to take testimony, which could result in an 

adverse credibility determination against her client or his family. 

She believed that such a determination could hurt Spriggs at the 

sentencing phase. Not only could the pursuit of a suppression 

motion weaken Spriggs’ chances of obtaining a downward 

variance, it could also result in him losing the benefit of an 

acceptance-of-responsibility reduction or exposing himself to an 

obstruction-of-justice enhancement. Rosen-Evans explained that 

her primary goal was to obtain the lowest sentence for her client, 

who was facing up to 20 years in prison. And she knew that Spriggs 

“need[ed] every break, every reduction [she] could get him.” 

Moreover, Rosen-Evans thought that even if the officers did not 

have consent to search the RV, the suppression motion would have 

failed based on her belief that “there was probable cause for the 

issuance of a search warrant for the RV and that the evidence 

would have been inevitably discovered.” In the end, Rosen-Evans 

determined that, because she thought a suppression motion would 

be unlikely to succeed and because there was significant downside 

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risk, filing the motion would not be “consistent with getting [her 

client] the best possible resolution.” 

Spriggs testified that, had he been properly advised, he 

would not have pled guilty. Spriggs stated that Rosen-Evans had 

discussed her reasoning for not filing a motion to suppress with 

him prior to his plea and that her explanation was consistent with 

her hearing testimony. On cross-examination, Spriggs identified a 

letter he wrote for purposes of his sentencing hearing 

corroborating Det. Broughton’s testimony that Spriggs’ statements 

to him on January 13, 2010 were voluntary and expressly stating 

that he “came forward to [Det. Broughton] willingly and of [his]

own volition.” 

On February 28, 2019, the magistrate judge issued a report 

and recommendation that Spriggs’ renewed Section 2255 Motion 

to Vacate be denied. The magistrate judge rejected Spriggs’ 

contention that he need only show that a motion to suppress 

would have been “potentially meritorious.” The magistrate judge 

noted that Spriggs had “the burden to show that his motion to 

suppress would have succeeded and that no competent attorney 

would have advised him otherwise.” The magistrate judge agreed 

that Rosen-Evans had “erred in concluding that the inevitable 

discovery doctrine applied,” because the police were “not in active 

pursuit of alternative legal means to obtain the evidence.” See 

United States v. Delancy, 502 F.3d 1297, 1315 (11th Cir. 2007)

(“[T]he prosecution must demonstrate that the lawful means 

which made discovery inevitable were being actively pursued prior 

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to the occurrence of the illegal conduct.” (citations and quotation 

marks omitted)). However, the magistrate judge explained that 

counsel’s error was not dispositive and that, “[a]lthough [counsel] 

erred in the specific basis for her belief,” she was “correct in 

believing and advising [Spriggs] that a motion to suppress could 

fail” and reasonably considered the downside risk to filing such a 

motion. 

The magistrate judge deemed Rosen-Evans’ testimony 

credible. He further found that her testimony was supported by 

contemporaneous and “detailed notes and documentation” in her 

case file. The magistrate judge acknowledged that Rosen-Evans 

met with Spriggs numerous times, met with and interviewed 

Spriggs’ family as well as Ms. Roseman, investigated and 

researched potential defenses, and twice convinced the sentencing 

judge to vary below the guidelines based on mitigating 

circumstances.

The magistrate judge reasoned that the law was sufficiently 

unclear as to whether the curtilage doctrine, the automobile 

exception, or the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement 

would apply to these facts. Accordingly, the magistrate judge 

concluded that:

An attorney cannot be deemed ineffective for failing 

to pursue a motion to suppress for which viable 

arguments existed on both sides, particularly 

where—as here—that attorney must balance 

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14 Opinion of the Court 19-13238

important countervailing considerations about the 

potential impact of losing the motion. 

The magistrate judge distinguished Lee by pointing out that “Lee 

did not have to establish deficient performance.” 

In the alternative, the magistrate judge recommended that 

Spriggs’ motion could also be denied based on a failure to 

demonstrate prejudice from his counsel’s alleged deficient 

performance. The magistrate judge found that Spriggs failed to 

show that, but for counsel’s error, he would not have pleaded 

guilty and would have elected to proceed to trial. 

Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the factual 

findings in the report and recommendation are not clearly 

erroneous and incorporate them herein as necessary. See 

Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (“Findings 

of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due 

regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge 

the credibility of the witnesses.” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a))).

Over Spriggs’ objection, on June 21, 2019, the district court 

adopted the report and recommendation. Spriggs appealed and 

moved for a certificate of appealability (“COA”), which was denied 

by the district court.

Spriggs then filed a motion for COA with this Court. This 

Court granted the motion on the following issue: “Whether trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the 

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statements made by Spriggs to law enforcement and the evidence 

of child pornography obtained from Spriggs’s laptop computer.” 

II. 

We evaluate the district court’s denial of a motion to vacate 

under § 2255 by exercising de novo review over legal conclusions 

and reviewing factual findings for clear error. Osley v. United 

States, 751 F.3d 1214, 1222 (11th Cir. 2014). A claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel presents “mixed questions of law and fact” 

and, therefore, warrants de novo review. Id. The resolution of the 

issue in the present case turns on two questions: (1) Did Lee 

establish a different standard to be applied for the performance 

prong in a Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), analysis

in the context of giving advice concerning a plea? and (2) To prevail 

on a Sixth Amendment claim, must a defendant prove that a 

forgone motion to suppress would have been successful?

Spriggs urges the Court to find that, at the plea phase of a 

case, analysis of the performance prong under Strickland requires 

the Court to focus on whether there is a reasonable probability that 

the defendant would not have pled guilty based on the actual

advice given by counsel, as opposed to viewing the issue from the 

perspective of a reasonably competent counsel. Spriggs asserts that 

the district court failed to limit its consideration to “counsel’s actual

decisionmaking and advice process,” as required by Kimmelman v. 

Morrison. Appellant’s Initial Br. at 44 (emphasis in original).

Spriggs further asserts that the district court misinterpreted 

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16 Opinion of the Court 19-13238

Kimmelman and Zakrzewski v. McDonough, 455 F.3d 1254 (11th 

Cir. 2006), by not focusing its inquiry on “whether there is a 

reasonable probability that the defendant would not have pled 

guilty, not whether the defendant would have won the case.” 

Appellant’s Reply Br. at 6. A review of the relevant cases shows 

that the district court properly applied the standards enunciated in 

Strickland and elucidated by this Court in Chandler v. United 

States, 218 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc), to evaluate the 

performance prong of counsel’s representation of the defendant.

A. 

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the 

right to counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Gideon v. Wainwright, 

372 U.S. 335, 339–40, 343 (1963). As the Supreme Court has 

explained, “the right to counsel is the right to the effective 

assistance of counsel.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (quoting 

McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)). This right 

attaches not only during a criminal trial, but also when a criminal 

defendant is deciding whether to plead guilty. See Lafler v. 

Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57

(1985).

To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

defendant must establish both that (1) his attorney’s “performance 

was deficient” and (2) his attorney’s “deficient performance 

prejudiced the defense.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Knowles v. 

Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009). This Court has previously 

observed that cases in which a criminal defendant can satisfy both 

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parts of the Strickland test “are few and far between.” Chandler,

218 F.3d at 1313 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Under Strickland’s performance prong, deficient 

performance requires a showing that “counsel’s representation fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness” given the 

“prevailing professional norms.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. A 

court’s review of an attorney’s performance is “highly deferential.” 

Id. at 689. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that 

every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, 

to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, 

and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the 

time.” Id. Because this is no easy task, a court considering a claim 

of ineffective assistance must apply a “strong presumption” that 

counsel’s representation was within the “wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance.” Id. “And because counsel’s conduct is 

presumed reasonable, for a petitioner to show that the conduct was 

unreasonable, [he] must establish that no competent counsel 

would have taken the action that his counsel did take.” Chandler, 

218 F.3d at 1315 (citation omitted). 

It is well established that counsel’s performance and 

professional advice informs the voluntariness (and intelligence) of 

a defendant’s decision to enter a guilty plea. See McMann, 397 U.S. 

at 770 (“a defendant’s plea of guilty based on reasonably competent 

advice is an intelligent plea not open to attack on the ground that 

counsel may have misjudged the admissibility [of evidence]”); see 

also McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969). “[T]he 

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voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice was 

within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal 

cases[,]” Hill, 474 U.S. at 56 (citation and quotation marks omitted), 

because, in addition to constituting a waiver of certain 

constitutional rights, “a guilty plea is an admission of all the 

elements of a formal criminal charge” and “cannot be truly 

voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the 

law in relation to the facts.” McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466; see also

Wofford v. Wainwright, 748 F.2d 1505, 1508 (11th Cir. 1984).

As a result, when a defendant alleges that his counsel’s 

“deficient performance led him to accept a guilty plea rather than 

go to trial, . . . we [ ] consider whether the defendant was prejudiced 

by the ‘denial of the entire judicial proceeding . . . to which he had 

a right.’” Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1965 (last alteration in original) (quoting 

Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 483 (2000)); Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. 

The prejudice inquiry contemplates whether there is a “reasonable 

probability that but for counsel’s errors, [the defendant] would not 

have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Lee, 

137 S. Ct. at 1965 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59).

B. 

Spriggs contends that the district court failed to focus its 

inquiry on whether there is a reasonable probability that the 

defendant would not have pled guilty. However, the report and 

recommendation adopted by the district court specifically found 

“Defendant has not shown a reasonable probability that but for 

Rosen-Evans’ error he would not have pleaded guilty and would 

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have insisted on going to trial.” We agree with Spriggs that under 

Lee this is the proper prejudice standard, and we find that the 

district court did, in fact, apply that standard. 

Spriggs next contends that counsel’s performance must be 

judged by counsel’s actual decision-making and advice rather than 

what a reasonably competent attorney would have done, but the 

cases do not support that position. Kimmelman does not hold that 

the performance prong is to be decided based solely on 

consideration of counsel’s actual decision-making and advice. In 

Kimmelman, the petitioner asserted ineffective assistance of 

counsel premised on failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim 

competently. 477 U.S. at 368–73. The lack of diligence in 

Kimmelman was blatant; trial counsel failed to conduct any 

discovery, failed to thoroughly investigate, was unaware that a 

search was conducted, and was unaware of evidence seized that the 

government sought to introduce at trial. Id. Kimmelman clarified 

the distinct interests protected by the Fourth and Sixth 

Amendments and identified the nature of the constitutional values 

reflected in each amendment, as well as the elements of proof. Id. 

at 374–75. Evaluating performance under Strickland, the Supreme 

Court stated, “[n]o reasonable lawyer would forgo competent 

litigation of meritorious, possibly decisive claims,” at least not “on 

the remote chance that his deliberate dereliction might ultimately 

result in federal habeas review.” Id. at 382 n.7 (emphasis added). 

The Supreme Court explained further that, “[a]lthough a 

meritorious Fourth Amendment issue is necessary to the success of 

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20 Opinion of the Court 19-13238

a Sixth Amendment claim . . . , a good Fourth Amendment claim 

alone will not earn a prisoner federal habeas relief.” Id. at 382.

The Supreme Court indicated approval of the “no 

competent lawyer” standard in a more analogous case, albeit 

before Lee was decided. Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 124 (2011).

In Premo v. Moore, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit 

for failing to properly apply Strickland within the context of § 2254 

and specifically for failing to afford sufficient deference not only to 

the state court but also to trial counsel’s advice concerning a guilty 

plea. 562 U.S. at 126. Premo relied, in part, on Kimmelman and 

considered the reasonableness of trial counsel’s decision to seek out 

and recommend a guilty plea at an early stage of the case rather 

than move to suppress defendant’s confession. Id. at 124. Premo

framed the relevant question under the Strickland performance 

prong as whether “no competent attorney would think a motion 

to suppress would have failed.” Id.. In doing so, the Supreme 

Court cited Kimmelman. 

We find Premo instructive because the Court discussed the 

importance of “strict adherence” to the Strickland performance 

standard “when reviewing the choices an attorney made at the plea 

bargain stage” and the challenges unique to plea negotiations. Id. 

at 125. Premo acknowledged “certain differences between 

inadequate-assistance-of-counsel claims in cases where there was a 

full trial on the merits and those . . . where a plea was entered.” Id. 

at 132. The Court suggested that the measure of deference might 

change at various stages of a criminal prosecution and discussed 

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the uncertainties posed to both sides in an early plea scenario, 

suggesting that the “added uncertainty that results when there is 

no extended, formal record and no actual history to show how the 

charges have played out at trial works against the party alleging 

inadequate assistance.” Id. at 132.

Lee does not alter these holdings. Lee’s teachings inform 

the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis, as opposed to the 

performance prong. While the two Strickland inquiries overlap to 

a degree, as we read Lee, its holding does not alter the Strickland 

performance analysis. In Lee, the government “concede[d] that 

Lee’s plea-stage counsel provided inadequate representation” 

when he assured Lee that he would not be deported if he entered 

a guilty plea. 137 S. Ct. at 1964. The only issue for resolution was 

whether Lee could satisfy his burden to demonstrate prejudice. Id.

at 1967. Regarding prejudice, the Court expressly noted the 

“unusual circumstances” presented in that both the defendant and 

trial counsel testified that “deportation was the determinative

issue” to Lee, and there was undisputed evidence that, had Lee 

known that he could be deported if convicted, his attorney’s advice 

would have been to run the risk of going to trial even if an acquittal 

was a long shot. Id. at 1967–68 (“But for his attorney’s 

incompetence, Lee would have known that accepting the plea 

agreement would certainly lead to deportation” (emphasis in 

original) (quotation marks omitted)). But again, the performance 

prong wasn’t at issue because it was conceded by the government. 

Id. at 1964. 

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22 Opinion of the Court 19-13238

The principles stated in Chandler hold true today. In 

Chandler, we found defense counsel’s sentencing strategy 

objectively reasonable. Counsel chose to focus on lingering doubt 

at sentencing and did not actively pursue character witnesses for 

mitigation, other than defendant’s wife and mother, out of fear of 

damaging cross-examination and rebuttal. 281 F.3d at 1320–21. 

Our language in Chandler is broad, and we discussed performance 

in two parts, both generally and relative to the specific facts. Id. at 

1313–27. The “principles governing performance,” see id. at 1313,

are just that, overarching principles; and there is no indication that 

they vary when applied to a plea setting or that the Strickland

performance standards depend on the stage of a case. Chandler is 

the preeminent authority in our circuit concerning the meaning 

and application of Strickland. And, since Chandler, we have

continued to apply this standard, emphasizing that the Strickland 

performance prong sets “a high bar.” Butts v. GDCP Warden, 850 

F.3d 1201, 1207 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 

759, 775 (2017)) (Section 2254).

Accordingly, Spriggs bears the burden to show that his 

attorney “made errors so serious that [she] was not functioning as 

the ‘counsel’ guaranteed [him] by the Sixth Amendment.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. He must show “that no competent 

counsel” would have given advice consistent with Rosen-Evans’ 

advice or adopted the same defense strategy. Chandler, 218 F.3d 

at 1315. And we consider whether counsel’s advice was objectively 

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19-13238 Opinion of the Court 23

reasonable at the time it was given to Spriggs—not in hindsight. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1316. 

C. 

In this case, counsel’s professional advice to Spriggs was to 

forgo a motion to suppress and to tender a guilty plea. Spriggs 

contends that his attorney’s performance fell below objectively 

reasonable standards because she misapplied the law to the facts in 

evaluating the merits of a potential suppression motion and gave 

unsound legal advice, which led Spriggs to enter a guilty plea. 

Specifically, counsel advised Spriggs that pursuing a motion to 

suppress evidence would not be in his best interest, that the

inevitable discovery doctrine applied and any attempt to exclude 

the government from introducing Spriggs’ laptop was likely to fail, 

and that she would not be filing a motion to suppress. The decision 

to move to suppress was for Spriggs’ attorney to make. See Jones 

v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).

Having reviewed the evidentiary record developed 

following Spriggs II, we find that counsel’s performance did not fall 

below the applicable standard. We first note that Spriggs’ trial 

counsel has served as a federal defender for more than thirty years. 

Her experience is a factor in determining the deference a court may 

give to her strategic decision and advice to her client. Indeed, with 

experienced trial counsel, “the presumption that [counsel’s 

performance] was reasonable is even stronger.” Chandler, 218 F.3d 

at 1316; accord Zakrzewski, 455 F.3d at 1258. 

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24 Opinion of the Court 19-13238

In addition, Rosen-Evans’ knowledge of Spriggs’ admission 

and indication that he wished to enter a guilty plea influenced her 

defense strategy. Keep in mind that Spriggs volunteered to law 

enforcement that the offending laptop (the one containing child 

pornography flagged in Det. Broughton’s investigation) was his 

and then made additional statements concerning his conduct and 

specifics of the underlying offense. According to Rosen-Evans’ case 

file, Spriggs admitted downloading child pornography to her as 

well. The Supreme Court recognized in Strickland that “[t]he 

reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined or 

substantially influenced by the defendant’s own statements or 

actions.” 466 U.S. at 691 (“Counsel’s actions are usually based, 

quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the 

defendant and on information supplied by the defendant.”). 

“[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of 

law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually 

unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Here, Spriggs argues 

that Rosen-Evans did not make a strategic decision, but rather 

provided advice based on a “misunderstanding of the law” or her 

“mistaken beliefs.” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 4, 13. It is undisputed 

that Rosen-Evans was mistaken about the inevitable discovery 

doctrine. Again, though, because the test we apply in evaluating 

counsel’s performance is an objective test, see Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 688, her error is not determinative in this case. As explained in 

Gordon v. United States,

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19-13238 Opinion of the Court 25

[I]t matters not whether the challenged actions of 

counsel were the product of a deliberate strategy or 

mere oversight. The relevant question is not what 

actually motivated counsel, but what reasonably 

could have motivated counsel. 

518 F.3d 1291, 1301 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Roe, 528 U.S. at 481); 

see also Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1314 (performance is reasonable “as 

long as the approach taken might be considered sound trial 

strategy” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). The district 

court found that, despite the error “in the specific basis for her 

belief, AFPD Rosen Evans was correct in believing and advising 

[Spriggs] that a motion to suppress could fail.” As we consider 

what “reasonably could have motivated counsel[,]” see Gordon, 

518 F.3d at 1301, given the particulars of this case, we turn next to 

the potential merits of the forgone motion to suppress and the 

potential risks to Spriggs should the motion have failed. 

1. Merits of Forgone Motion to Suppress 

Spriggs contends that his hypothetical motion was “very 

likely to succeed.” Oral Arg. at 34:51-53. We disagree. Although 

the police did not possess a warrant for the RV specifically, the 

district court, like Rosen-Evans, determined that probable cause to 

search the RV existed before execution of the warrant. Spriggs’ 

trial attorney testified that she believed law enforcement had 

probable cause to search the RV before Det. Broughton’s 

erroneous statement that the warrant encompassed the RV. 

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26 Opinion of the Court 19-13238

In addition, three Fourth Amendment doctrines—curtilage, 

the automobile exception, and the good-faith exception—all cast 

doubt on the viability of a suppression motion.1 Ultimately, 

though, the district court was correct that we need not definitively 

resolve these Fourth Amendment issues. 

As suggested in Chandler, in nearly every case, there is 

something that a trial lawyer might have done differently. 218 F.3d 

at 1313. “But, the issue is not what is possible or ‘what is prudent 

or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally compelled.’” Id. 

(quoting Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987)). And we 

conclude that an objectively reasonable defense lawyer would have 

recognized the obstacles to succeeding on a suppression motion 

and having the evidence excluded and could very well have offered 

Spriggs the same advice. Here is why. 

The Fourth Amendment prohibits law enforcement from 

conducting “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const.

amend. IV. A warrant is generally required before law 

1 Spriggs has abandoned any claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing 

to move to suppress voluntary statements he made to law enforcement prior 

to the search of the RV. Appellant’s Reply Br. at 4 n.1. Spriggs clarifies that 

pre-search statements “would not be part of the relief resulting from 

suppression of the search itself.” Id. He also points out that his statements 

concerning “ownership of the offending computer” occurred during the 

search of the RV. Id. It is also undisputed that Spriggs was not in custody at 

the time he made the incriminating statements to the detectives and was not 

subject to “custodial interrogation” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment and 

Miranda. 

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19-13238 Opinion of the Court 27

enforcement is authorized to conduct a search of “persons, houses, 

papers, and effects.” See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176–

78 (1984) (citations omitted). The government bears the burden to 

establish the reasonableness of a warrantless search and the 

application of “one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant 

requirement, thereby rendering it reasonable within the meaning 

of the fourth amendment.” United States v. Freire, 710 F.2d 1515, 

1519 (11th Cir. 1983). 

Following remand, the government asserted that the 

warrantless search of the RV could have been upheld on multiple 

grounds and that a motion to suppress would have failed. As 

discussed below, the district court subsequently determined that 

there were viable arguments both for and against application of 

exceptions to the warrant requirement. We agree with the district 

court and conclude that Spriggs has failed to demonstrate that “no 

competent attorney would think a motion to suppress would have 

failed.” Premo, 562 U.S. at 124. We reach this conclusion primarily 

due to the good faith exception and law enforcement’s reasonable 

belief that the search warrant for 11501 authorized the search of 

the RV.

a. Good Faith Exception 

We find good faith to be the most compelling argument as 

to why a motion to suppress would have failed. The Supreme 

Court has repeatedly emphasized that the “use of evidence 

obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment does not itself 

violate the Constitution.” Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 

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28 Opinion of the Court 19-13238

U.S. 357, 362 (1998). Rather, the exclusionary rule is a “prudential” 

judge-made doctrine, id. at 363, and its “sole purpose . . . is to deter 

future Fourth Amendment violations,” Davis v. United States, 564 

U.S. 229, 236–37 (2011) (citations omitted). Thus, when 

considering whether to apply the exclusionary rule, courts must 

keep in mind that it is a rule of “last resort, justified only where the 

deterrence benefits of suppression outweigh the substantial social 

costs of ignoring the reliable, trustworthy evidence bearing on guilt 

or innocence.” United States v. Green, 981 F.3d 945, 957 (11th Cir. 

2020) (cleaned up); see Davis, 564 U.S. at 237.

The good faith exception takes “the culpability of the law 

enforcement conduct” into account and the level of culpability 

factors into the exclusionary rule analysis. Davis, 564 U.S. at 238

(quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 143 (2009)). There 

is a strong argument that the good-faith exception would have 

applied here when we consider Det. Broughton’s culpability and 

what was known to law enforcement the day of the search. In 

short, it is a tough sell to say that a “reasonably well trained officer 

would have known that the search was illegal in light of all of the 

circumstances.” United States v. Taylor, 935 F.3d 1279, 1289 (11th 

Cir. 2019) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Det. Broughton 

obtained a warrant based upon probable cause developed through 

a lawful investigation. With the benefit of live testimony from Det. 

Broughton, the district court found that “there is no evidence that 

law enforcement knew the RV was located on a lot with a different 

lot number.” We credit this factual finding. See Anderson, 470 

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19-13238 Opinion of the Court 29

U.S. at 573. For as the district court explained, “[t]here was no sign 

with a different lot number, no fence between the two lots, and no 

one at the scene told the officers that the RV was on a different lot 

number.” Therefore, in executing that warrant, “the officers made, 

at most, an ‘honest mistake’ in interpreting the warrant to include 

the RV.” United States v. Houck, 888 F.3d 957, 960 (8th Cir. 2018) 

(quoting Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 87 (1987)).

We agree with the district court that, at best, Det.

Broughton was mistaken in concluding that the search warrant for 

11501 authorized a search of the RV. See, e.g., Utah v. Strieff, 579 

U.S. 232, 241 (2016). As a result, it would have been reasonable for 

competent counsel to doubt that the evidence would be excluded. 

See Herring, 555 U.S. at 146; see also Davis, 564 U.S. at 239

(“Isolated, nonrecurring police negligence . . . lacks the culpability 

required to justify the harsh sanction of exclusion.” (cleaned up)).

For these reasons, we conclude that an objectively 

reasonable competent lawyer could have determined that it was 

likely that a suppression motion challenging the warrantless search 

of the RV would be defeated pursuant to the good faith exception.

b. Curtilage 

The district court found that although the language in the 

original search warrant did not expressly authorize a search “of 

anything other than the house designated as 11501[,]” the warrant 

“implicitly” authorized a search of the “curtilage” at the 11501 

property. Notwithstanding that the RV sat on a separate lot with 

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30 Opinion of the Court 19-13238

a different street address, the district court found there was a viable 

argument that the curtilage doctrine applied, bringing the Spriggs’ 

RV within the scope of the search warrant for 11501. 

On the day of the search, there were no statements made to 

law enforcement by Spriggs, his family members, or the property 

owners indicating that the RV was, in fact, sitting on a separate lot 

with a separate street address. After the fact, Ms. Roseman 

supplied an affidavit averring that the 11501 and 11491 lots were 

separate and distinct, and that a “For Sale” sign was on the 11491 

lot, and implying that it was “common knowledge” there was no 

room on 11501 for a motor home given the narrow lots in the 

community, etc. Det. Broughton denied seeing a “For Sale” sign. 

This Court has yet to address in a published opinion whether 

a search warrant that does not explicitly authorize a search of the 

curtilage of a residence subject to a search warrant implicitly does 

so. However, the majority of courts to decide the issue have held 

that, when a warrant authorizes the search of a particular 

residence, the authorization to search also extends to the curtilage 

of the residence.2 We are guided and bound by United States v. 

2 See, e.g., United States v. Asselin, 775 F.2d 445, 446–47 (1st Cir. 1985) 

(warrant that authorized search of “single family trailer” found to include 

vehicle parked next to trailer and birdhouse hanging from tree fifteen feet 

from trailer); United States v. Gottschalk, 915 F.2d 1459, 1461 (10th Cir. 1990)

(collecting cases holding that “[a] search warrant authorizing a search of a 

certain premises generally includes any vehicles located within its curtilage if 

the objects of the search might be located therein”).

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19-13238 Opinion of the Court 31

Napoli, 530 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1976).3 The Fifth Circuit held in 

Napoli that a warrant authorizing the search of the premises of a 

single-family dwelling was sufficient to encompass a camper 

parked in the driveway of the dwelling. Id. at 1200.

“[A]lthough the private property immediately adjacent to a 

home is treated as the home itself, this area is not unlimited.” 

United States v. Taylor, 458 F.3d 1201, 1206 (11th Cir. 2006). 

Instead, curtilage “is limited to that property that the individual 

should reasonably expect to be treated as the home itself.” Id.

(citing United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987)). When 

resolving questions concerning curtilage, the Supreme Court has 

identified four factors to consider: 

the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to 

the home, whether the area is included within an 

enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the 

uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by

the resident to protect the area from observation by 

people passing by. 

Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301 (citations omitted).

Considering the United States v. Dunn factors, a motion to

suppress evidence seized from the RV may have been defeated 

3 See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) 

(“We hold that the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 

Circuit . . . handed down by that court prior to the close of business on [September 30, 1981], shall be binding as precedent in the Eleventh Circuit.”).

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32 Opinion of the Court 19-13238

pursuant to the curtilage doctrine. As revealed by the photographs, 

the RV was parked within three or four yards of the 11501 

residence. Det. Broughton testified that the RV was so close to the 

11501 residence that he did not question whether it was parked on 

a different lot. The close proximity of the RV to the 11501 

residence is the strongest evidence in favor of finding that the RV 

was within the 11501 curtilage. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301. Also, the 

Spriggs family advised Det. Broughton that they were staying in 

the RV—which was situated on the 11501 owner’s yard—and that 

they were using the Wi-Fi from 11501. So too was one member of 

the Spriggs family staying in a bedroom at 11501. And so too was 

an electrical power cable connecting the RV directly to the house. 

We agree with the district court that while numerous factual 

issues existed concerning potential application of the curtilage 

doctrine, under these circumstances, consideration of the doctrine

by counsel in deciding to forgo a suppression motion would be 

reasonable.

c. Automobile Exception 

The district court found it “very likely that law 

enforcement’s search of the Spriggs’ RV would have been justified 

under the automobile exception” and agreed with the assessment 

of Rosen-Evans that probable cause to search the RV existed before 

the search occurred.

The automobile exception permits law enforcement to 

conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if “(1) the vehicle is readily 

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19-13238 Opinion of the Court 33

mobile; and (2) the [law enforcement officers] have probable cause 

for the search.” United States v. Lindsey, 482 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th 

Cir. 2007). Other exigent circumstances are not required for the 

exception to apply. Id. (citing United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 

484 (1985)).

In California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985), the Supreme 

Court considered application of the automobile exception to 

motor homes. Id. at 387, 393–94. Acknowledging that a motor 

home “possessed some, if not many of the attributes of a home,” 

the Supreme Court recognized that the justifications for the 

automobile exception, namely, being “readily mobile” and “a 

reduced expectation of privacy stemming from its use as a licensed 

motor vehicle subject to a range of police regulation inapplicable 

to a fixed dwelling,” could also apply to a motor home depending 

on the circumstances. Id. at 393. In so ruling, the Supreme Court 

stated that if a motor home “is found stationary in a place not 

regularly used for residential purposes[,] temporary or otherwise,” 

the automobile exception applies. Id. at 392–93. But the Court 

declined to decide whether that holds true where a motor home “is 

situated in a way or place that objectively indicates that it is being 

used as a residence.” Id. at 394 n.3; cf. also United States v. Adams, 

46 F.3d 1080, 1081 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (“The law 

regarding whether to apply to motor homes the established search 

and seizure principles applicable to motor vehicles, or those 

applicable to fixed places of residence has not been developed.”).

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34 Opinion of the Court 19-13238

In determining whether the automobile exception has 

application to a motor home, the Supreme Court considered the 

following facts potentially relevant: the vehicle’s “location, 

whether the vehicle is readily mobile or instead, for instance, 

elevated on blocks, whether the vehicle is licensed, whether it is 

connected to utilities, and whether it has convenient access to a 

public road.” Carney, 471 U.S. at 394 n.3; see also Lindsey, 482 F.3d 

at 1293 (explaining that a vehicle is “readily mobile” if it is 

“operational” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).

We find it less likely that the automobile exception would 

have applied here, particularly in light of the evidence that the 

Spriggs family was using the RV as a residence at that time. See 

Carney, 471 U.S. at 394 n.3. The Spriggs family was paying 

monthly rent to the property owners to park the RV on private 

property in a residential community. The RV was parked adjacent 

to the 11501 property—not in a driveway or on the street (though 

it did have ready access to the street). The photos reflect that an 

awning was extended on the RV as well. The fact that the Spriggs 

family was using the internet connection from the 11501 property

likewise supports Spriggs’ claim that the RV was being lived in and 

more akin to a home than a motor vehicle for purposes of Fourth 

Amendment analysis. 

At minimum, factual questions existed concerning how 

“readily mobile” the RV was. The RV was not elevated on blocks, 

yet it was reportedly “chocked” to prevent accidental movement. 

The RV was also connected to utilities and cable. There is no 

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19-13238 Opinion of the Court 35

record evidence explicitly addressing whether the RV was licensed 

to operate and subject to regulation, registration, and inspection, 

though Garry had told officers that he and his wife had driven the 

RV down from Ohio a month or two prior. See Oral Arg. at 15:30-

16:04. 

More importantly, we agree with Spriggs that the cases 

relied upon by the government, referred to by Spriggs as “driveway 

cases,” are inapposite because they involve instances where law 

enforcement either observed and/or could confirm mobility and 

the vehicle was not a fixed residence or being lived in. Appellant’s 

Reply Br. at 11. As observed during oral argument, several of the 

factors that tend to support the government’s curtilage argument 

tend to undermine the government’s claim that the automobile 

exception would have applied. See Oral Arg. at 9:40-10:10. 

While we find the applicability of this exception to be 

questionable, the fact that the district court found it to be 

potentially viable supports the conclusion that reasonably 

competent counsel could reach the same conclusion.

***

In conclusion, we need not decide, in hindsight, whether the 

exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement 

discussed by the district court would have applied here. For 

purposes of our analysis, the salient point is that it would have been 

objectively reasonable for competent counsel to decide that the 

existence of factual questions and the uncertainty surrounding the 

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36 Opinion of the Court 19-13238

availability of one or more exceptions to the warrant requirement 

weighed against filing a motion to suppress.

2. Trial Counsel’s Risk Analysis 

In reaching a decision whether to pursue a motion to 

suppress, Spriggs’ trial counsel had to weigh against the possibilities 

that the motion would fail, the consequences to her client if the 

motion did, in fact, fail. Specifically, counsel considered the impact 

of an adverse credibility finding in the suppression hearing if the 

witness later testified at the sentencing hearing and the effect of 

filing a suppression motion on acceptance of responsibility and 

obstruction of justice at sentencing. We turn now to consideration 

of those potential consequences. 

a. Likelihood of Adverse Credibility Finding 

Rosen-Evans feared that filing a suppression motion could 

result in an “adverse determination” by the judge as to the 

“credibility or honesty” of Spriggs or his family members. 

In the event a motion to suppress had been pursued, the 

parties disagree about the need for live-witness testimony from 

Spriggs and/orfamily members to supplement the audio recording 

provided by Det. Broughton. While the need for testimony is 

debatable, one need only review the affidavits of members of the 

Spriggs family submitted for the remand hearing to see significant 

conflicts in the testimony of the family and the detectives. It was 

not unreasonable for Rosen-Evans to believe she would need to use 

testimony from Spriggs and/or his family to counter testimony of 

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19-13238 Opinion of the Court 37

the detectives. The magistrate judge found as a factual matter that 

the interactions between Det. Broughton and the Spriggs family 

after the search of the RV began were not recorded and that “[t]he 

only source of evidence about the conversation during [the search 

of the RV] comes from the Spriggs’ Family members’ affidavits.” 

Rosen-Evans reasonably weighed the danger of such testimony in 

her analysis. She was concerned about the repercussions of 

suggesting that the detectives were not credible. She was also 

hoping to preserve the Spriggs’ family members’ testimony (i.e., 

credibility) in an attempt to secure mitigating factors at sentencing. 

 Attempting to avoid or minimize the risks associated with 

having to offer live witness testimony and preserve untainted 

witness testimony for mitigation at sentencing is a strategy that an 

objectively reasonable trial attorney could have chosen. 

 

b. Likelihood of Adversely Affecting Guidelines 

Calculations 

Rosen-Evans also testified that pursuing a motion to 

suppress could have cost Spriggs the benefit of receiving an 

adjustment to his offense level for acceptance of responsibility. See

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. She was concerned that filing the proposed 

suppression motion would have put Spriggs at risk of not getting 

credit for acceptance of responsibility and conceivably receiving an 

obstruction-of-justice enhancement at sentencing. See id. § 3E1.1, 

n.4 (conduct supporting obstruction-of-justice enhancement under 

§ 3C1.1 “ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not accepted 

responsibility for his criminal conduct”). If both risks materialized

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38 Opinion of the Court 19-13238

and Spriggs was ineligible for acceptance and received an 

obstruction enhancement, Spriggs could have faced a 5-level 

increase in his offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines. 

We highlight two points. First, the burden belonged to 

Spriggs to “clearly demonstrat[e] acceptance of responsibility and 

[a defendant] must present more than just a guilty plea.” United 

States v. Sawyer, 180 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 1999); accord

United States v. Wright, 862 F.3d 1265, 1279 (11th Cir. 2017). 

Second, “[t]he determination of whether a defendant has 

adequately manifested acceptance of responsibility is a flexible, fact 

sensitive inquiry.” United States v. Smith, 127 F.3d 987, 989 (11th 

Cir. 1997) (en banc). 

Spriggs argues that the guidelines risks were not real and 

that he would not have jeopardized an acceptance-of-responsibility 

reduction by electing to exercise his constitutional right to 

challenge the search. He correctly characterizes some of our 

precedent as holding, generally, that the mere exercise of 

constitutional rights by an accused is not a basis for denying a 

reduction for acceptance of responsibility. United States v. 

Rodriguez, 959 F.2d 193, 197 (11th Cir. 1992). But see Smith, 127 

F.3d at 989 (“Our case law permits a district court to deny a 

defendant a reduction under § 3E1.1 based on conduct inconsistent 

with acceptance of responsibility, even when that conduct includes 

the assertion of a constitutional right.”) (citing United States v. 

Jones, 934 F.2d 1199, 1200 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Henry,

883 F.2d 1010, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989)). Still, Spriggs cannot deny that 

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19-13238 Opinion of the Court 39

pursuing a suppression motion and losing—whether he 

subsequently entered a plea or proceeded to trial—would have 

placed him at risk of losing at least one of the three potential 

reduction points for acceptance of responsibility, which are 

recommended by the government. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b), n.6 

(explaining that the government is “in the best position to 

determine” eligibility for additional one-point reduction). The 

guidelines recognize that both timeliness of a plea and the 

conservation of resources—government resources and the 

court’s—may be considered by the prosecution in deciding 

whether to award the additional one-point reduction. Id. In sum, 

this was an objectively reasonable consideration and certainly a 

matter that could affect the sentencing court’s view of Spriggs’ case 

in fashioning a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

With respect to § 3553(a) factors, Rosen-Evans requested a 

variance below the sentencing guideline range, and her argument 

highlighted Spriggs’ admission, voluntary cooperation with law 

enforcement (alleviating the need for law enforcement to obtain a 

second search warrant for the RV), post-arrest statement, and 

efforts towards rehabilitation. Trial counsel’s strategy to mitigate 

sentencing exposure on Spriggs’ behalf was successful in obtaining 

a custodial sentence below the applicable guideline range. 

Finally, the mitigation letter Spriggs proffered at his original 

sentencing tells a different story than his post-conviction filings and 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. In 2010, which is the 

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40 Opinion of the Court 19-13238

relevant period of time for purposes of our Strickland analysis, 

Spriggs asserted (consistent with his inclination to plead guilty) that 

his cooperation with law enforcement early on was both 

intentional and redemptive. Spriggs represented that coming 

forward and volunteering the information to Det. Broughton 

about his laptop being in the RV and having child pornography on 

it was a step towards his recovery and rehabilitation. The same is 

true regarding Spriggs’ contemporaneous statements at his original 

sentencing concerning satisfaction with trial counsel’s 

representation. 

In sum, Spriggs’ trial counsel formulated a defense strategy 

that aligned with Spriggs’ admission and voluntary statements to 

law enforcement, an evaluation of the merits of a potential motion 

to suppress, and an analysis of the attendant risks. Spriggs is unable 

to persuade this Court that “no competent counsel” could have 

decided to forego moving to suppress the evidence seized from the 

RV. Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1315; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

Having concluded that Spriggs’ counsel’s performance was 

not constitutionally deficient, we need not reach the question of 

prejudice. See Brown v. United States, 720 F.3d 1316, 1326 (11th 

Cir. 2013) (“If a defendant fails to satisfy either Strickland prong, we 

need not address both.”); accord Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 

1248 (11th Cir. 2000).

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19-13238 Opinion of the Court 41

IV. 

Given that Spriggs is before us on a § 2255 Motion to Vacate, 

we are required to view his Fourth and Fifth Amendment 

arguments through an ineffective-assistance lens. The magistrate 

judge’s opinion adopted by the district court correctly points out 

that this distinction is significant. As is borne out by our analysis, 

the difficulty in seeking to determine whether trial counsel’s 

performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard, even in 

hindsight, is a valid reason for the stringent Strickland standard. 

Here, we do not find that counsel’s advice was constitutionally 

deficient.

AFFIRMED.

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