alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1556 Introduced in House (IH)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1556

 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to eliminate the marriage 
        penalty on the deduction for interest on student loans.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 15, 2007

  Mr. Terry (for himself, Mr. Paul, Mr. Doolittle, Mr. Sessions, Mrs. 
Bono, Mr. McCotter, Mr. Franks of Arizona, Mrs. Blackburn, Mr. McHugh, 
  Mr. Regula, Mr. Simpson, Mrs. McMorris Rodgers, Mr. Garrett of New 
  Jersey, Mr. Cuellar, Mr. Fossella, Mr. Gohmert, Mrs. Musgrave, Mr. 
   Souder, Mr. Poe, Mrs. Myrick, Mr. McCaul of Texas, Mr. Mario Diaz-
Balart of Florida, Mr. Walberg, Mr. Patrick J. Murphy of Pennsylvania, 
  Mr. Jordan of Ohio, and Mr. Pearce) introduced the following bill; 
         which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to eliminate the marriage 
        penalty on the deduction for interest on student loans.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Married Student Debt Relief Act of 
2007''.

SEC. 2. ELIMINATION OF MARRIAGE PENALTY IN DEDUCTION FOR INTEREST ON 
              STUDENT LOANS.

    (a) In General.--Paragraph (1) of section 221 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to general rule for maximum deduction) 
is amended to read as follows:
            ``(1) In general.--
                    ``(A) General rule.--The amount allowed as a 
                deduction under subsection (a) shall not exceed $2,500.
                    ``(B) Special rule for joint return.--In the case 
                of a husband and wife--
                            ``(i) who make a joint return for the 
                        taxable year, and
                            ``(ii) each of whom is the obligor on a 
                        qualified education loan for the qualified 
                        education expenses of the husband or wife, as 
                        the case may be,
                subparagraph (A) shall be applied separately with 
                respect to the husband and the wife, except that not 
                more than $2,500 of interest expense may be taken into 
                account under this section with respect to each of the 
                husband, the wife, and all dependents.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2006.
                                 <all>
```
#### John Tyrone WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D10-2077.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Feb. 18, 2011.

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Nancy Ryan, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

John T. Williams, Carabelle, pro se.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Ann M. Phillips, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. We affirm Williams’ conviction and sentence, but remand for correction of a scrivener’s error in the written judgment, which mistakenly reflects a conviction for carjacking with a firearm rather than simple carjacking.

AFFIRMED; REMANDED for Correction of Scrivener’s Error.

GRIFFIN, EVANDER and COHEN, JJ., concur.
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#### JOHARY AVIATION, INC., Appellant, v. John TURAN and Mercedes Turan, Individually, Jordan Aero-Marine, Inc., and Jordan Klein, Sr., Individually, and as Trustee of the Jordan Klein Trust, Appellees.

No. 5D09-2794.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Oct. 15, 2010.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 18, 2010.

Shannon McLin Carlyle and Christopher V. Carlyle of The Carlyle Appellate Law Firm, The Villages, for Appellant.

R. Scott Cross of R. Scott Cross, P.A., Ocala, for Appellees, John Turan and Mercedes Turan.

Brian W. Warwick and Janet R. Varnell of Varnell *&*Warwick, P.A., The Villages, for Appellees, Jordan Aero-Marine, Inc., and Jordan Klein, Sr., Individually, and as Trustee of The Jordan Klein Trust.

COHEN, J.

Johary Aviation, Inc., appeals the denial of its motion to set aside default. We reverse. Initially, we reject the argument that Johary Aviation did not timely file its notice of appeal. *See BMW Fin. Servs. NA, LLC v. Alger,*834 So.2d 408, 409 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (holding that denial of a motion to set aside default is not an ap-pealable non-final order); *Shell v. Foulkes,*19 So.3d 438, 440 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (holding that “[a]n order merely entering a default without a consequent final judgment is not a final order.”); Trawick, Fla. Prac. & Proc., § 25:2 (2007 ed.) (default not a judgment). The notice of appeal was timely filed and this court has jurisdiction.

The trial court erred in denying the motion to set aside default because Johary Aviation filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for more definite statement before the default was entered. These motions precluded the entry of default.1
      *See Carder v. Pelican Cove West Homeowners Ass’n, Inc.,*595 So.2d 174 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); *Abelson v. First Nationwide Bank,*
      *334545 So.2d 414 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). Consequently, the order denying the motion to set aside default must be reversed and Johary Aviation given the chance to defend. *See Dawkins, Inc. v. Huff,*836 So.2d 1062 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (recognizing that policy in this state is to liberally vacate defaults so disputes can be reached on their merits).

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

LAWSON and EVANDER, JJ., concur.

. We also note that Johary Aviation appeared at the hearing on the motion for default through counsel and attempted to adopt a pleading filed by a co-defendant as its answer.
#### Jonathan SHAUDYS, Appellant, v. Kimberly DESHAW, Appellee.

No. 4D09-4945.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Dec. 22, 2010.

James R. Rich of the Law Office of James R. Rich, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Kimberly Deshaw, Lake Worth, pro se.

PER CURIAM.

*Affirmed. See McKay v. Haikey,*860 So.2d 1046 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).

WARNER, POLEN and STEVENSON, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 8.1



List of Significant Subsidiaries of United Microelectronics Corporation



|                                      |  |                               |  |                                                
|------------------------------------- |  | ----------------------------- |  | -----------------------------------------------
|Company                               |  | Jurisdiction of Incorporation |  | Percentage of Ownership as of December 31, 2004
|Fortune Venture Capital Corporation   |  | Taiwan, ROC                   |  | 99.99%                                         
|Hsun Chieh Investment Co., Ltd.       |  | Taiwan, ROC                   |  | 99.97%                                         
|UMC Capital Corporation               |  | Cayman Islands                |  | 100%                                           
|UMC Group (USA)                       |  | California, USA               |  | 100%                                           
|UMC Japan                             |  | Japan                         |  | 51.93%                                         
|UMCi Ltd.                             |  | Singapore                     |  | 100%                                           
|United Foundry Service, Inc.          |  | California, USA               |  | 100%                                           
|United Microdisplay Optronics Corp.   |  | Taiwan, ROC                   |  | 83.48%                                         
|United Microelectronics (Europe) B.V. |  | The Netherlands               |  | 100%                                           
|United Microelectronics Corp. (Samoa) |  | Samoa                         |  | 100%
(logo) Long Beach Mortgage
                                             Company



                              OFFICERS CERTIFICATE
                         ANNUAL STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE

                       MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES
                        RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LOANS SERIES
                      1996-LBl, 1996-LB2, 1996-LB3, 1997-LBl


IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPROPRIATE SECTION OF THE ABOVE CAPTIONED POOLING AND 
SERVICING AGREEMENTS, I, PATRICIA L. WAYMAN, AND SHAWNA R. OGILVIE OF LONG 
BEACH MORTGAGE COMPANY, (THE "SERVICER!') HEREBY CERTIFY:

(i) A REVIEW OF THE  ACTIVITIES OF THE SERVICER  DURING THE  PRECEDING  CALENDAR
YEAR,  AND OF  PERFORMANCE  UNDER  THESE  AGREEMENTS  HAVE BEEN  MADE  UNDER OUR
SUPERVISION.

(ii) TO THE  BEST OF OUR  KNOWLEDGE,  BASED ON SUCH  REVIEW,  THE  SERVICER  HAS
FULFILLED ALL ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THESE AGREEMENTS THROUGHOUT SUCH YEAR.

CERTIFIED THIS 18TH DAY OF MARCH, 1997.



BY: /s/ Patricia L. Wayman
        Patricia L. Wayman
        President


BY: /s/ Shawna R. Ogilvie
        Shawna R. Ogilvie
        Vice President

1068 TOWN & COUNTRY ROAD, ORANGE, CALIFORNIA 92868 (714) 543-5262
#### Daniel Edmond CZAJKOWSKI, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 17895.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

March 29, 1960.

Charles A. Bellows, Jason Ernest Bellows, Chicago, Ill, for appellant. Sherman C. Magidson, Chicago, Ill., of counsel.

W. L. Longshore, U. S. Atty., Birmingham, Ala., M. L. Tanner, Birmingham, Ala., John P. Maxwell, Asst. U. S. Attys., for appellee.

Before CAMERON, JONES and BROWN, Circuit Judges.

*9PER CURIAM.

The appellant was convicted of interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2312. He has appealed from his conviction and presents the single question as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction. The evidence was sufficient and the judgment of the district court is

Affirmed.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report of Targeted Genetics
Corporation on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, H.
Stewart Parker, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
     15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
     material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
     Company.

July 31, 2003                                         /s/ H. STEWART PARKER
Date                                                  --------------------------
                                                      H. Stewart Parker
                                                      President and
                                                      Chief Executive Officer
News United States Air Force
 New acquisition process awards contracts in weeksPublished June 17, 2015
                        
                        By Tech. Sgt. Candice Page
                        
                        
                        Headquarters Air Combat Command
                **JOINT BASE LANGLEY-EUSTIS, Va. (AFNS) --**
                A new government open architecture acquisition process that can award contracts in weeks instead of years was tested here June 8-11. 
The process, called PlugFest, is an interactive industry event where companies get to “plug-in” to a given open system architecture and test their products for government representatives. Open system architectures are products where multiple vendors can provide their capabilities using common interface. 
“This new acquisition process will shrink the acquisition timeline for open architecture systems from multiple years to a few weeks,” said Camron Gorguinpour, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisitions) director of transformational innovation.
“The Department of Defense is focused on transitioning its systems to open architectures to the greatest extent possible, because doing so reduces costs, expands competition and enables faster adoption of cutting-edge technologies.” Gorguinpour said.
The system for this test was the Distributed Common Ground Station trainer, which is the Air Force’s primary intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) collection, processing, exploitation, analysis and dissemination (CPAD) system. 
During the transition to open architectures, improving the current acquisitions systems will help the Air Force to take full advantage of all opportunities that the open architectures provide, Gorguinpour said.
Plugfest Plus allows the Air Force to make faster acquisitions while providing Airmen with the newest technologies from both traditional and nontraditional defense contractors, he added. 
In addition, the Open Acquisition System, using the Plugfest Plus framework, will allow Airmen to receive capabilities faster and allow them to operate systems that are suitable for the 21st century, Gorguinpour said.
“(The) Air Force Research (Laboratory) is working to develop a more permanent acquisition vehicle to take this process beyond the demonstration into regular use,” Gorguinpur said. “The permanent vehicle will be used to formally evolve PlugFest Plus into a more robust Open Acquisition System process.”PlugFest 



acquisitions 



Joint Base Langley-Eustis 



ACC
#### Marshall Fulton v. F. H. Thomas & Co.

(No. 2978.)

Appeal from Denton County.

Opinion by

Willson, J.

§ 243. *Answer; waives defects in*citation, *etc.*An answer to the merits, in justice’s court, is a waiver of, and cures whatever defects there may have been in the citation, or in the service thereof. [W. & W. Con. Rep. §§ 459, 685.]

§ 244. *Appeal from justice’s court; matters of defense on.*On appeal from justice’s court, the trial is *de*novo, and the defendant can only set up matters of defense which go to the merits of the action; that is, he cannot except to the citation, or the service thereof.

§ 245. *Names of plaintiffs may be entered on docket.*It was not error to permit the names of the individuals composing the plaintiff firm to be entered upon the docket in the county court, and to render the judgment in their favor. This was not pleading new matter in the suit, nor wag it adding new parties to the suit. The members of the firm were already parties plaintiff in the suit under their firm name, and no order of the court was required to make them such parties. The citation and judgment in the justice’s court described the plaintiffs by their firm name, F. H. Thomas & Co., without stating the names of the individuals who composed said firm. In the county court, appellant, for the first time, objected to the sufficiency of the citation upon this ground. The court permitted appellee’s counsel to state, and have entered upon the docket, the names of the individuals corn-*188posing said firm, and judgment was rendered and entered in their favor.

June 7, 1884.

§ 246. *Acceptor of draft; liability of.*Thomas & Oo. drew drafts upon Fulton in favor of a third party. Fulton accepted the drafts, but failed to pay them, and’ Thomas & Oo. paid them, and brought this suit against Fulton as acceptor. *Held,*that Fulton was liable.

Affirmed.
I 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1565 

To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to prohibit the 

conversion of leadership PAC funds to personal use. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 19, 2007 

Mr. CAPUANO introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on House Administration 

A BILL 

To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to 

prohibit the conversion of leadership PAC funds to personal use. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Leadership PAC Limi5 tation Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. PROHIBITING CONVERSION OF LEADERSHIP PAC 

7 FUNDS TO PERSONAL USE. 

8 (a) PROHIBITION.—Section 313(b)(2) of the Federal 

9 Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 439(b)(2)) is 

10 amended by inserting after ‘‘subsection (a)’’ the following: 


ccoleman on PROD1PC60 with BILLS
2 

•HR 1565 IH

1 ‘‘or funds of a leadership PAC described in paragraph 

2 (3)’’. 

3 (b) LEADERSHIP PAC DEFINED.—Section 313(b) of 

4 such Act (2 U.S.C. 439a(b)) is amended by adding at the 

5 end the following new paragraph: 

6 ‘‘(3) LEADERSHIP PAC DEFINED.—In this sub7 section, the term ‘leadership PAC’ means a political 

8 committee which is directly or indirectly established, 

9 maintained, or controlled by a candidate for election 

10 for Federal office or an individual holding Federal 

11 office but is not an authorized committee of the can12 didate or individual, except that such term does not 

13 include any political committee of a political party.’’. 

14 SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE. 

15 The amendments made by this Act shall apply with 

16 respect to elections occurring on or after the date of the 

17 enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


ccoleman on PROD1PC60 with BILLS
110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1402

AN ACT

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 320 South Lecanto Highway in Lecanto, Florida, as the ‘‘Sergeant Dennis J. Flanagan Lecanto Post 

Office Building’’.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

•HR 1402 EH

1 SECTION 1. SERGEANT DENNIS J. FLANAGAN LECANTO 

2 POST OFFICE BUILDING. 

3 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

4 Postal Service located at 320 South Lecanto Highway in 

5 Lecanto, Florida, shall be known and designated as the 

6 ‘‘Sergeant Dennis J. Flanagan Lecanto Post Office Build7 ing’’. 

8 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg9 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

10 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

11 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Sergeant Dennis J. 

12 Flanagan Lecanto Post Office Building’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives April 23, 2007. 

Attest:

Clerk. 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1402

AN ACT

To designate the facility of the United States PostFlanagan Lecanto Post Office Building’’. in Lecanto, Florida, as the ‘‘Sergeant Dennis J. al Service located at 320 South Lecanto Highway
No. 14,666.

#### Greenwood *v.*The State.

Special *Judge.*— Oral *Appointment.*— Where the appointment of an attorney as special judge is not in writing, an objection to his competency to act must be sustained if promptly made; if objection be not seasonably made, it will be deemed waived, and the acts of the *de facto*judge upheld.

From the Elkhart Circuit Court.

*L. J. Blair, H. D. Wilson*and *W. J. Davis,*for appellant.

*L. T. Michener,*Attorney General, and *L. W. Vail,*for the State.

Elliott, C. J.

This judgment must be reversed. Objection was duly made to the judge of the court, and he called a member of the bar to preside as judge, but made no written appointment, as the law requires. The appellant at once objected to the competency of the attorney called by the judge, and thus presented the question at the earliest opportunity. As there was no written appointment, and as-the objection was promptly interposed, the appeal must be sustained. Schl*ungger*v. *State,*113 Ind. 295; *Herbster*v. *State,*80 Ind. 484; *Evans*v. *State,*56 Ind. 459; *Kennedy*v. *State,*53 Ind. 542.

In sustaining this appeal we do not mean to hold that an oral appointment is absolutely void *;*on the contrary, we do hold, as we did in *Schlungger*v. *State, supra,*that it is not absolutely void, and that an objection to the method of appointment may be waived, and will be deemed waived unless seasonably made.

The person appointed is at least judge *defaeto,*and in order to make availing an objection to the competency of a judge *defaeto,*it must be promptly interposed, for the acts of such a judge may be valid, and so they will be regarded where *486there has been a waiver of objections. *Smurr*v. *State,*105 Ind. 125, and authorities cited.

Filed Jan. 8, 1889.

The term *“*void ” is improperly used in some of the cases, for the acts of a *defacto*judge are at most only voidable. We can not approve of some of the expressions found in the cases upon this question, for we are convinced that, upon principle and authority, the acts of a *de facto*judge will stand unless promptly and properly assailed.

Judgment reversed.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Norman Allen BYRD.

No. 2010-KO-2644.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 8, 2011.

In re Byrd, Norman Allen; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 443431; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KA 0822.

Denied.