### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Fe br ua ry 10, 200 5 S es sio n

C A R OL A N N P EL LE TT S M IT H v

. WI LL IA M A SH BY S M IT H, JR

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Willi am son Coun ty No. II-98078 Donald P. Harr is, Jud ge

No. M2003- 02033-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Jun e 10, 2005

I n this post-divorce proc eeding , Wife sought a n incre ase in c hild support based upon Husband’ s substantial inheritance from his mother. She also soug ht relief for Husband’s alleg ed bre ach of the Ma ri ta l D iss olu tio n A g re e me nt relative to the dis po sit ion of pr op e rt y . Sh e fu rthe r s ou g ht c hil d support based upon imputed income of H usband bec ause of voluntary undere mploy ment. Husband

app e a le d th e jud g me nt of the tr ia l c ou rt

. Wif e a ssi g ne d e rr or a s to c e rt a in fi nd ing s by the tr ia l c ou rt

. We a ff ir m a s mo dif

ie d h e re in the jud g me nt o f t he tr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed as Modif ied and Rem anded

W I L L I AM B. C A IN , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL and F R ANK G. C L EME NT , J R ., J J ., joined.

Wil liam Ashby

Smit h, J r., Na shville, Tennessee , pro se.

J ames Weathe rly , Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellee, Ca

rol Ann Pellett Smi th.

OP IN ION

Caro l A nn Pe lle tt Sm ith (“ Wif e ” ) a ndWilli a m A sh by

Smith, Jr. (“ Hu sb a nd ” ) h a d p re vio us ly been ma rried and divorce d without children prior to their se cond mar riag e to ea ch other

in March of 1995. The Parties’ only child, Patrick Smith, was born Fe bruary 21, 1996. These pa

rties wer e divorce d for the se cond time in Dec ember of 1998. Husband is an attorney having g raduated from law school in 1979, and, at the t ime of t he parties’ second marria g e, wa s employ ed by the State of Tenne ssee a s an assist ant s tate attorney g ener al. His income during this employ ment was $45,000 per y ear

.
At the tim e of

thi s se c on d marria g e of the pa rt ie s, the mothe r a nd fathe r o f H us ba ndliv e d in Shelby County , Tenne ssee, a nd wer e per sons of consider able f inan ci al means. The fathe r of Hu sb a nddie d o n D e c embe r 2 , 1 99 6. Sho rt ly be fo re that date , H us ba nda ndWif e de te rm ine d to-2-

purcha se re al estate in the Gre enbrie r communi ty of Will iamson Countyalong with a home in the

c it y o f F r a n k li n

. H u s b a n d h a d p la n n e d to o p e n a n d o p e r a te a la w p r a c ti c e f r o m h is home nea r the Fr anklin Courthouse. Be fore these plans c ould attain fruition, howeve r, oth er fa ct ors interve ned which ar e best de scribed in the te stimonyof Husband:

Q. So y ou left the a ttorn ey gen era l’s office befor e y ou wer e divorce d?

A. Oh , y e s.

Q. And why

did y ou leave ?

A. My fathe r had died in Dece mber of ‘ 96. Despite the f act that my fathe r and mother were divorced, they wer e still very

g ood friends. My

mother was the pa

rent that a ctually

was the one whose he alth conce rned me

.

M y f a t h e r , w h i l e h e h a d h a d q u a d ru p l e b yp a s s a n d w a s a diabetic a nd every thing, ha d actua lly
, y o u know, in the last, y ou know, couple of y ear s seemed like he had re cover ed and, y ou know, was pr etty hale a nd hearty

and he would, y ou know, help her , take he re to he r doctors’ appointments and thing s of that so rt

.

I t w a s , y o u kn o w , c o m m o nkn o w l e d g e e v e ry bo dy in the fa mil y kne w my mo th e r w a s te r mi n a ll y il l. So th a t p lu s th e f a c t th a t my f

a ther owne d a small business in Memphis, C asey ’s Cars, a used ca r dea ler.

And there was, y ou know, the prope rty on Monroe Road tha t by virtue of how it is, it’s the kind of plac e that y ou rea lly can’ t leave unattended very long. It require s a lot of maintenanc e. It’s basica lly in a clea ring of an oa

k tree fore st. About an ac re a nd a half that’s clea red a nd another

16 acr es or so surr ound that.

I

mean, the driveway g ets washe d out, big limbs fall down – – it’s a beautiful place, but it’s a lot of work. And my dad, y ou know, did a rea l good job de sp ite his a ilm e nts

. An d I thi nk it wa s a la bo r of lov e , him do ing that. An d s o

– – bu t a ll tho se re a so ns

.

And, y ou know, I

was a t the point i n t i m e d o i ng stuff like g oing home on the wee kend and I had bac k problems any way

. And when I say g oing home, I meant home to Memphis to chec k on mom and things of tha t sort. That had started r eally

with my dad’s de ath in Dec ember , ear ly Dec ember

of ‘96.-3- And I was doing stuff like getting up Monday morning at four a.m. to drive into, y ou know, t he attorney g ener al’s office in downtown Na shville and the n so me tim e s ha ve to do thi ng s lik e dr ive fr om the re to S mithv ill e , T e nn e sse e to take de position. And, quite fra nkly , with my , y ou know, bac k problems, I just wasn’t holding up to it. And it seemed to me that t h e gre at er dutylaid with, y ou know, winding up my

fathe r’s a ffa irs and attending to my dy ing mother

. Q. And s o then y ou moved to Shelby County , rig ht? That’s whe re the L ake la ndpr op e rt y

is?

A. Well, I

don’t k n o w wh at to say . That it was, y ou know, at that point in ti me in Fe bruary of ‘97. I don’t think that it was an intende d, y ou know, separ ation per se betwee n Carol Ann and I and ce rtainly

wasn’t, y ou know, discussed t h a tw a y.

Caro l A nn a ndI did dis c us s this fo r som e tim e , s ome we e ks

. An d d ur ing Janu ary

– – bu t e ve n b e fo re I

ha d a c tua lly re sig ne d –

– s he a ssi ste d me in ge tting a Y ellow Pag e ad in Summerv ille, Tennesse e whe re I used to do a lot of my bu sin e ss. I

wo rk e d a lot fr om B art le tt, Te nn e sse e , w hic h w a s a c tua lly on the e a st pa rt of She lby Cou nty a nd c on ve nie nt to Sum me rv ill e a nd so me of the ou tlying are a s.

An d s o w e sta

rt e d r un nin g a Ye llo w Pa g e a d o r at le a st contra cted to do that in, – – I ’m not rea l sure exactly when it was g oing to start

c omi ng ou t. B ut w e c on tr a c te d it in Ja nu ary a ndI g ue ss m a y

be it w a s g oin g to c ome out, y o u k n o w , li k e in A p r il o f ‘ 9 7

. So it

w a s , y o u k n o w , c o n te mp late d th a t I w as g oing to pr actice law there at least, y ou know, while I was tending to my

mother and

s o m e o t h e r

t h i n g s a n d d e c i d i n g w h a tt o d o w i t h t h e M o n r o e R o a d p r o p e r t y.
Q. S o when y ou left the AG ’s offic e and move d to Shelby C o u n t y i tw a s yo u r

i n t e n tt o s t ar ta

p r i v a t e l a w p r a c t i c e i n S h e l b y C o u n t y?

A. I g ue ss the be st w a y

to p ut i t is it w ou ld b e to r e viv e a pr ivate law pra ctice. I

had done that befor e there
, and, y ou know, that was the , y ou know, the thing it see med like for me to do.

So it is t hat from F ebrua

ry 1997, when he left the state attorney g ener al’s off

ice f or the stated p u rp o s e o f

s ta r ti n g a p r iv a te la w p r a c ti c e o u t o f th e p ar ti e s ’ h o me in F r a n k li n , u n ti l S e p te mb e r of 1 9 9 7 wh en Hu s b an d an n o u n ce d t h at h e wa s m o v i n g t o M em p h i s , h e s p en tl i t t l e t i m e d ev el o p i n g a F ra nk lin la w p ra c tic e a ndmos t of his tim e in M e mph is atten din g to h is f a the r’ s e state a ndto h is terminally

ill mot her.

F ro m F e br

ua ry 19 97 to the da te of div or c e in De c e mbe r 199 8, Pa tr ic k re sid e d w ith Wif e in Fr anklin with Husband paying nothing for support of the child or t o m ai n t ain the Gr eenbrier-4-

property . The pa

rties’ lea sed the Gr eenbrier property , but the rent per month f or the prope rty

was $450-$475 per

month less than the pay ment on the mortg ag e. More problems ensue d from the f act that Wife had paid the down pay ment for the G ree nbrier pr operty in the amount of $45,000 fr om her

ow n f un ds

.

Hu sb a nd su ff

e re d ph y sic a l pr ob le ms re su lti ng fr om a n a uto mob ile a c c ide nt in 19 94 a s w e ll

a s n e c k and low e r b a c k p ro ble ms a ndimp a ir e d v isi on . T he de g re e to w hic h h is m e dic a l pr ob le ms
wer e disabling is hotlycontested.
The pa rties neg otiated an extensive Ma rital Dissolution Agre ement which w as appr oved by the t ri al court in a Final De cre e of D ivorce enter ed De cembe r 8, 1998. This Ag ree ment provided in p e rt ine nt p art :

4. CH I L D SU PPO RT. Hu sb a ndsh a ll p a y dir e c tly to Wi fe un til the child re ache s the ag e of 18 or his class g radu at es fr o m h igh sc hool, whicheve r
e v e n to c c u r s l a t e r

. T h e P ar t i e s a l s o r e c o g n i z e t h a t H u s b a n d h a s r e c e n t l y h a d s u r g e r y, is recov er ing the ref

rom, and, since J anuary

1, 1998, has bee n attempting to r eestablish a private law prac tice which has been and is his sole source of ea rning s and principal sourc e of inc ome. U nder a ll of the attending circ umstances, the Parties ag ree that the prese nt le vel of support should be $200.00 per month, pay able on the fi rs t day of

e a c h mo nth , a ndis b a se d u po n H us ba ndha vin g inc ome of app ro xima te ly $12,000 per a nnum a nd complies with a pplicable child support g uidelines. Pay ment by wa g e a ssi g nme nt thr ou g h th e Cou rt Cle rk is u nn e c e ssa ry , w ou ld b e c os tly

a ndis

no t in the be st i nte re st o f the Chi ld. No a c tio n b y the Part ies w ill be e ff

e c tiv e to reduc e support af

ter the due date of

eac h pay ment and t h e P ar t i es understand that

c ou rt app ro va l must be ob ta ine d be fo re su pp ort ca n be re du c e d u nle ss s uc h p a y me nts

are a uto ma tic a lly

re du c e d or ter mi natedin a c c or da nc e wi th the te rm s o f this Ag ree ment. Husband’s c urre nt addre ss is 10 7 25 Monroe Road, L akela nd, Tenne ssee 38002 and Wife’s pre sent addre ss is 414 Bridge Street, F ranklin, Tenne ssee 37064.

5. M E D I C A L I N S U R A N C E

. W i f e s h a l l m a i n ta in h e a lth insurance for the c hild until the child attains the ag e of e ighte en y ear s or his class has g raduated from high school, whiche ver e vent occ urs later . The Parties sha ll each pay one hal f o f a ll me d ic a l, p r e s c r ip ti o n , d e n ta l a n d e y e c ar e e xp e n s e in c u rr e d bythe Child which are not c overe d by medical insura nce. Within 30 day s after the entry of a F inal Dec ree in this ca u s e, Hu sband shall apply for COB RA health insuranc e
cover ag e for

himself and shall be en t i tled to enjoy such rig hts thereunde r to which he may be entitled. Wife shall fully cooper ate in permit t ing H usband to apply for COBRA c overa g e.

. . . .-5- 11. REAL

PROP ERTY. The Parties own as tena nts by the entire ties

a ce rtain re sidence located at 414 Bridg e Stree t, Franklin, Tennessee . Wife has or sh a ll p la c e thi s p ro pe rt y

up on the mark e t and sh a ll se ll it. Wif e sh a ll be e nti tle d to

re ta in a ll p ro fi ts o f s uc h sa le a ft e r pa y me nt of mortg a g e de bt a ndtr a ns a c tio n c os ts. Hu sb a ndsh a ll j oin in the c on ve y a nc e a ndsh all e xec ute do c ume nts re a so na bly require d to effe ct the tra nsfer of this residenc e to the new owner

.
The Parties a lso own a parcel of rea l estate of approximately

65 acr es more or l e s s w ith a n e xis ti n g d w e ll in g h o u s e lo c a te d a t 5 9 5 7 G r e e n b r ie r Ro ad, Fr anklin, Tenne ssee ( here inafter “Gr eenbrier Road Real Estate”)

. I nsofar as it is the Parties’ be lief it wi l l b en ef i t their minor child in having a close and nurturing rela tionship wit h the ch i l d ’s fa ther, both Parties a re inter ested in ac commodating Hu sb a nd ’s mov ing his re sid e nc e to this Gr e e nb ri e r R oa d Re a l E state a ft e r the sa le of ce rtain other r eal e state loca ted at 10725 Monroe Road, in L akela nd, Shelby County , Tenne ssee ( here inafter “L akela nd Real Est ate ” ) which is Husband’ s sole and separ ate pr operty . Until such time as Husband is able to c omplete the sale of the L akela n d Real Estate a nd move his residenc e to the Gr eenbrier Road Rea l Estate, Wife shall pay

the mortg ag e, taxes, a nd ordinary maintenanc e expenses there of and shall be solely

respon s i b l e for

selec ting r enter s and shall be e ntitled to collect and

re ta in a s h e r s e pa

rat e prop e rt y

a ll r e nt, inc ome a ndoth e r p a y me nts a ttribu ta ble to such Gre enbrie r Road Real Estate and shall be entitled to a ny income tax deductions

ari sin g fr om s a me un til su c h ti me a s Wif e qu it c la ims he r i nte re st i n s uc h r e a l e state to Husband, as he reina fter de scribed. Husband shall, as soon as pra cticable , place the L akela nd Real Est ate on the ma rket for sale. Upon the sale of suc h L akela nd Real Estate, af ter the pay ment of mortg ag e debt and the costs of sale, H usband shall pay Wife the sum of

$45,000 in exchang e for

all of Wife’s rig ht, titl e and inter est in and to the Gr e e nb ri e r R oa d Re a l E state , a ndWif e sh a ll c on c ur

re ntl y e xec ute a

qu it c la im deed c onvey ing her int ere st to Husband. After the e x ecution of suc h quit claim deed, Hu sb a ndsh a ll h oldWif

e ha rm le ss f ro m a ll m ortg a g e de bt, c os ts and e xpe ns e s in

connec tion with the Gre enbrie r R oad R eal Estate, and he shall be entitl ed to re ceive all rent, income, and other pay ments, and income tax deductions attributable to such

rea l estate. Husba nd shall, insofar a s financia lly prac ticable, take s teps to secur e Wife’s rele ase f

rom the mortg ag e debt on suc h Gre enbrie r Road Rea l Estate; ho we ve r, the P art ie s a g re e a ndun de rs ta ndthat th is m a y no t be fi na nc ia lly prac ticable.

I n the eve nt Husband i s unable to secur e W ife’s relea se from all debt obliga tions secure d by

the Gre enbrier R o ad Rea l Estate, Husband sha ll ex ecute a de e d of t ru s ti n f a v o r o f W i f e c o n c u rr e n t l y

w i t h W i f

e ’ s e xe c u t i o n o f

a d e e d q u it claiming her inter est in the Gre enbrie r Road Rea l Estate t o Husband. The Deed of Trust shall be in a f

orm ac cepta

ble to counsel for

Wife and shall sec ure all of Husband’s oblig ations and the pe rform an ce of all of Husba nd’s duties under the

ex isting De ed of Tr

ust gr anted by

the Parties to sec ure pay ment of the mor t gage-6-

obliga tion curre ntly

in exi stence on t h e Gr ee nbrier Roa d Real Estate. The Parties shall direct that a

copy of any default notices or other communications re g arding the first mortg ag e be ma iled to Wi fe at an ad d ress de signated by her. F urther,

no tw it hsta nd ing the fo re g oin g , if Hu sb a nd ha s n ot s e c ur e d Wif

e ’s re le a se fr om a ll debt obligations secure d by the Gre enbrie r Road Rea l Estate within five (5) y ear s of the e ntry of a F ina l D e c re e of

Di vo rc e in this c a us e , th e Gr e e nb ri e r R oa d Re a l E state sh a ll i mme diate ly

be pla c e d u po n th e mark e t a ndso ld. Aft e r p a y me nt o f a ll

rema ining de bt and the cost of sale, Husband shall be entitl ed to reta in the proce eds as his sole and sepa

rate property , fre e and c lear of any claim by Wife.

12. RESOURCE P ACKAGING GROUP, LL C. W ife owns a n int e re st i n Re so ur c e Pa c ka g ing Gr ou p, LL C. Wi fe sh a ll r e tai n all of he r i nte re st there in as her sole and sepa rate property

fre e and c lear

of any claims by

Husband. Wife shall ho l d Husband ha rmless from a ny

debts, liabiliti es or oblig ations of any

na tur e wh a tso e ve r i n c on ne c tio n w ith Re so ur c e Pa c ka g ing Gr ou p, LL C.

13 . CA SEY ’S CA RS, L L C. Hu sb a nd is the ow ne r of a n in te re st i n Casey ’s Cars, L

L C. Husband shall reta in all of his interest there in as h i s sole and separ ate pr operty , fre e and c lear of any claims by

Wife. Husband shall hol d Wife ha r m l e s s f r o m a n y d e b t s , l i ab i l i t i e s , o r o b l i g a t i o n s o f a n y n a t u r e w h a t s o e v e r i n
c on ne c tio n w ith Ca se y ’s Cars , L L C.

14 . RE TI REM EN T A CCO UN TS. Hu sb a ndis the ow ne r o f a n I RA

a c c ou nt in the app ro xima te a mou nt o f T hirty Th ou sa nd($ 30 ,0 00 .0 0) Do lla rs . H e is also the owne r of a

401(k) a ccount a nd has vested pe n s ion rig hts in the Tennessee Consolidated Retirement S y stem. Husband shall re tain these re tirement ac counts as his sole and separ ate property , fre e and clea r of any claims by Wife. W i fe i s the

owner of an IRA acc ount at J aff

re- Auber che, I nc. in the appr ox imate amount of One Hundre d Thousand ($100,000.00) Dollars. Wife shall re tain this retirement a ccount as her sole and sepa

rate property , fre e and c lear of any claims by

Husband.

. . . .
18. FUL

L SETTLEMENT. This A g ree ment is intende d to be a fina l settlement of all prope rty

rig hts and support rig hts and obligations of the respe ctive Parties her eto and sha ll constitut e a discharg e from all claims of any nature arising out of t heir marital rela tionship except as provided he rein. Ea ch Party here by waives and re linquishes to the other all rig hts or claims which e ach ma y have or here afte r
a c q u i r e u n d e r

t h e l a w o f

a n y j u r i s d i c t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o th e o t h e r ’ s p r o p e r t y, in clu di ng wi th ou t l im it ati on , d owe r, co urt esy , s tat ut oryall owa nce, ho mes tea d r ig hts
, rig ht to take ag ainst the will of the other, inheritanc e, desce nt, or distribution, or right to act as a dminist rator or executor of the other’s e state except as pr ovided by the terms of this Ag ree ment. This Ag ree ment contains the e ntire understanding of the-7-

Part ie s. Th e re a

re no re pr e se ntatio ns , w arr a nti e s o r p ro mis e s o the r tha n th os e expressly set forth he rein.

. . . .
21. I N D E M N I F I CA T I O N

. Sh o u ld a n y te r m o f th is A g r e e me n t be violated and one Party

be re quired to pay , or re asonably pay in compromise of a ny
c la im, a de bt o f o bli g a tio n w hic h is the res po ns ibilit y of the oth e r P art y , th e Part y wh o mak e s suc h pa y me nt sha ll b e e nti tle d to ind e mni ty fr om the oth e r P art y

fo r a ll

su ms p a id, inc ludin g t he pr inc ipa l a mou nt, int e re st a c tua lly pa id a ndre a so na

ble attorney ’s fe es and c ourt costs. I n the eve nt it becomes re asonably nece ssary for either Party to institute or def end leg al proc eeding s reg arding the enf orce ment of any provision of this Agr eeme nt, the preva iling Party shall be entitled to a

judgme nt for

rea sonable e x penses, including rea sonable attorney ’s fees, incurr ed in prosec uting or defe nding the action.

Hu s b an d ’s mother died in Mar ch of 1999, a nd Husband re ceive d a substantial inheritanc e fr om h e r e state . T he re c or d s ho ws :

Q. I un de rs ta ndthat. L e t me jus t, i f I c a n, tr y to s ho rt -c ir c uit

thi s
an d m o v e th ro u gh i t

. I f y o u l o o k at p age t wo o f t h e es t at e ta x re t u r n , t h a t p age
su g g e sts that y ou re c e ive d a s a n in he ri ta nc e $1 ,4 70 ,7 53 , c or re c t?
A. Okay . Well, let’s turn there. I ’ll g et there . I may not be as quick as y ou, but I ’ll g et there . L et m e s u gges t – – and I don’t ac cept y our
c ha ra c te ri zat ion – –

is tha t on the da te of

thi s r e turn, ok a y , a ndda te of thi s r e turn is J une 26, 2000, that based upon what the acc ountants estimate my portion is worth, $1.470 milli on. That doesn’ t mean I rec eived $1.70 ( sic) million. W hat that means

on June 26 – –

e xcu se me , o n w ha t? th

Q. September

25, which is the date of the va luation.

A. Yes, okay . You’re talki n g about the valuation date. On

va luatio n d a te , th a t’ s r ig ht. Di d I a c tua lly re c e ive that, n o, I

did n’ t.

Q. I un de rs ta ndthat. Th a t’ s wh y I ’m try ing to r e fe r y ou ba c k to the deposition because that’s the point I was try ing to g et to. The re turn sug g ests that y our shar e of the estate a fter ta x es wa s $1,470,753?

A. W el l
, ag ain, that’s wha t y our cha rac terization sugg ests. I think if y ou rea lly know what y ou’re talking about when y ou look at this thi ng is as of the da te of

the va luatio n, wh ic h w a s Se pte mbe r o f ‘ 99 , I did n’ t r e c e ive a

lot of thi s-8-

stuff until October o f 2 0 0 1. And it was [sic] wasn’t worth near – – the sec urities particula rly . No, the Or iental rug s didn’t chang e much a nd the ca sh was the c ash.

Q. I understand what y ou’re say ing, but he re’ s the point I ’m try ing to ge t to with myquestions. I n the deposit ion when I ’m asking y ou questions, what is it t hat ac tually

g ot? You said $1,362,275.

A. I ’m not disputing that in the deposition that’s what I said. I ’m

no t di sp uti ng that.

On J anuary 2 1
, 2 000, counsel for Wife wrote to Husba nd asserting that his inheritanc e provided a

signific ant variance betwee n the $200 per mo n t h ch i l d support under the Dec ember 8, 1998, decr ee a nd the amount of c hild suppor t which would be r equire d under the child support g uid e lin e s. Th is le tte r lik e wi se c omp la ine d of Hu sb a nd ’s failu re to dis po se of the L a ke la ndpr op e rt y in Shelby Countyand fa ilure to pay the $45,000 due to Wife for the dow n pay ment on the Gre enbrie r Roa d p ro pe rt y

pu rs ua nt t o th e te rm s o f the Ma ri ta l D iss olu tio n A g re e me nt.

On Jul y 3
, 2 0 0 0
, W i f

e f i l e d h e r “ P e t i t i o n f

o r I n c r e a s e i n C h i l d S u p p o r t a n d P e t i t ion to Enforc e F inal De cr ee

. ” Aside fr om asserting a sig nificant va rianc e re sulting fr om Husband’s inheritanc e, Wife asse rted, “ . . . the Respondent has be en ca pable of earning signi fi cantly

more income than that earne d in the past t wo y ear s. Petiti oner submits that Respondent has bee n ‘under employ ed’ a nd has neg lected f ull-time employ ment as a r esult of his i n h er i t ance.” The Petition qu ote d th e pr ov isi on s of the Ma ri ta l D iss olu tio n A g re e me nt r e la tiv e to the Gr e e nb ri e r R oa d p ro pe rt y and asse rted:

4. The P etitioner would show the Court that the Respondent has br eac hed the contra ctual oblig ation assumed by him in parag raph eleve n (11) of the Fina l Decr ee of Divorc e. Respondent f ailed to place h i s L ak el an d property for sa le within a

rea sonable or pr actica

ble time and as of

the date of

t h e fi ling of

this P etition, the property rema ins unsold. Additionally
, as t he result of hi s financ ial windfall fr om the inheritanc e re fer

red to a bove, the Responde nt has bee n able to re locate to the Gr e e nb ri e r p ro pe rt y

wi tho ut the ne c e ssi ty

of ha vin g fi rs t so ld h is L a ke la ndpr op e rt y
a s a nti c ipate d b y

the pa rt ie s in the F ina l De c re e of Di vo rc e . T he Pe tit ion e r s ub mit s that the fa ilure of the Re spondent to place the L akela nd property for sa le within either

a pr a c tic able or re a so na

ble tim e c on sti tut e s a br e a c h of the pr omi se s c on ta ine d w ith in the Marital Dissolution Ag ree ment. Additionally , the P eti tioner submits that the reloc ation of the Responde nt to the Gree nbrier pr operty without having first sold the L akela nd property

and satisfy ing h i s financ ial obligation to the Petit ioner a s contained w ithin the Marital Dissolution Ag ree ment constitutes a further bre ach of the promises conta ined there in. WHEREFORE , th e Pe tit ion e r p ray s: 1. Th a t th e Re sp on de nt b e se rv e d w ith thi s Peti tio n an d be re qu ir e d to file his

answe r in the time provided by law.-9- 2. That upon the he aring of this Petiti on, thi s Court find that a sig nificant varia nce ha s occur

red in the income of the Respondent from the date of the e ntry of the Fina l Decr ee until the pre sent date or alternatively
, that the Respondent has be en voluntarily

under employ ed, and inc rea se the c hild support obligation in an amount

c on sis te nt w ith the c hil d s up po rt g uid e lin e s. 3. That the Court find the Responde nt to have breac hed the pr omises contained w ithin the Marital Dissolution Agre ement and g rant to t he Petitioner a judgme nt in the amount of $45,000.00. 4. Th a t the Pe tit ion e r be a wa rd e d he r re a so na

ble a tto rn e y ’s fe e s a ndthe c os t of this action.

H u s b a n d r e s p o n d e d w i t h g e n e r a l d e n i a l s a n d w i t h a c o u n t e r p e t i t i o n f o r c h a n g e o f

c u s t o d y. After much discovery

and leg al maneuve ring , an orde r wa s entere d on April 15, 2003, severing the Petition of W ife fr om the counter petition of Husband and se tting Wife’s Petition f or hearing on June 9, 2003.

The issues under

Wife’s Petition were tried befor e J udg e Don Har ris without the intervention of a jury on June 9 a ndJune 27 , 2 00 3. Th e tw o p ri mary wi tne sse s w e re Hu sb a nda ndWif e , a ndthe ir diverg ent testimony

made their

cre dibilit y

a pre dominant issue before the trial judg e.

On J u l y 1 5
, 2 0 0 3
, t h e t ri al co u rt en t er ed i t s fi n al j u d gm en th o l d i n g:

1. Child Sup port. Du ri ng the tim e that the De fe nd a nt ha s be e n un de r a c hil d support Orde r, he ha s rec eived by inheritanc e re al prope rty , persona l pr operty , cash, stocks and bonds. The Plaintiff ha s reque sted that the Court O rder an incr ease in the child support based on the Def endant’ s inheritance

. The P laintiff has further soug ht an incr ease in the child support based on he r asse rtion that the Def endant ha s been voluntarily

unemploy ed or unde remploy ed. The Court finds t h at the Mother’ s
re qu e st i s w e ll t ake n w ith re g ardto c a sha sse ts r e c e ive d b y the Fathe r i n h is inh e ri ta nc e a ndoth e rw ise ob ta ine d a s th e re su lt o f h is M oth e r’ s d e a th. Sin c e the tim e of thi s divo rc e a nd his inh e ri ta nc e , the F a the r h a s f a ile d to se ll r e a l pr op e rt y , th e sa le of which w as in the conte mplation of the parties at the time of the divorc e, and ha s further used the liquid assets of the inhe ri t an ce to pay mortg ag e indebtedne ss and pu rc ha se oth er a sse ts. Th e Cou rt fi nd s th a t th e F a the r’ s e xpe nd itu re of the liq uid assets of the inheritanc e for the pur pose of e liminating his debt, there by incre asing the net value of hi s rea l estate holdings, and his acts of purcha sing othe r asse ts does not remove those c ash asse ts from being subject to the child support orde r.

The Court finds that the re tained inheritance has a pre sent value of $764,322 and that prude ntly

investing those f

unds should earn inter est of at least five per cent (5 %) pe r a nn um. Th e Cou rt fi nd s that the se fu nd s so inv e ste d w ou ld p ro du c e inc ome to the Fa ther in the amount of $38,2 0 0 p er y ea r o r $3,182 per month. The Court-10-

finds th a t in c o me o f th is a mo u n t s h o u ld b e imp u te d to th e F a th e r f o r p u rp o ses of computing his c hild support obligation.

Whil e the Court finds that the e vidence has not bee n sufficie nt to pr ove that the Father has been voluntarily unemploy ed or undere mploy ed, the Court finds from the evidenc e submitted th at t h e Fa ther is ca pable a t the prese nt time of earning income of $45,000 per y ear as a prac ticing attorney

. The Court the ref ore de termines that the Father’s c hild support obligation should b e b as ed o n a g ross income of $83,200 per y ea r o r $6,933.33 per month. Apply ing the Child S upport Guidelines to this gross income, the Fa ther’s child support obliga tion is i ncre ased f rom $200 per month to $1,032 per month effe ctive Jul y 1, 2003.

2. P r iva te Sc hoo l Tui ti on. Ba sed on consider ation of the a ssets/liabili ty and income/expense statements pre sented by the parties, the Court finds that the parties shall be equa lly

liable for the costs of the child’s private school tuition. The Court further finds that the Father’s liability for one-ha lf of these costs is retroa ctive to the child’s enr ollment in W estminster School/C u rre y I ng ram Ac adamy . The total tuition expense throug h the date of this Order is $36,302

. T h e M o ther ha s paid tuition expens e s to th e s c h o o l t o ta li n g $ 3 1
, 6 1 2 a n d th e F a th e r h a s p a ide xp e n s e s to taling $4,690. The Mother

is awar ded a judg ment ag ainst the Father in th e am o u n t of $13,461 for tuit ion expenses paid by her throug h the date of

this Order. A ll future tui tio n e xpe ns e s sh a ll b e pa id e qu a lly by the pa rt ie s.

3. Gr eenbrierP ropert y. The Court finds that the De fenda nt has brea ched his d u t y of g ood faith in the marke ting of the L akela nd property

ref ere nced in the Final De cre e of D ivorce . The Court aw ards the P laintiff a judg ment ag ainst the Def endant in the amount of $54,000 re prese nting the D efe ndant’s oblig ation to repa y the Plaintiff $45,000 upon the sale of the L akela nd property

as set forth in the Fina l Dec ree and six per c ent (6%) interest per annum from Ma

rch 1, 2000 throug h J une 30, 2003.

4. Lien . The Court aw ards the Plaintiff a lien interest ag ainst the Gre enbrie r property to secur e all amounts owed by Def endant to Plaintiff in this Order inc luding the future child support obliga tion. The lien shall rema in in eff ect until such tim e as all obliga tions under th i s Orde r ar e paid by Def endant or until the child support obliga tion e nds by Orde r of this Court whicheve r occur s last. A copy of t h e l egal de sc ri pti on of

the Gr e e nb ri e r p ro pe rt y

is atta c he d to thi s O rd e r a s a n e xhibi t a ndis incorporated by

ref ere nce.

5. At to r ne y’ s F e e s a nd C os ts

. The Court aw ards the Plaintiff $30,115.00 as her rea sonable a ttorney ’s fe es and costs incurre d in the prosec ution of this action. This awar d is premised on the re asonable ch ar ge fo r such services not e x cee ding $150.00 per hour . The P l ai ntiff is theref ore a war ded a judg ment ag ainst the-11-

Def endant in the amount of $30,115.00. The Defenda nt’s reque st for attorney ’s fe es and costs is denied. The Cler k’s fe es ar e taxed to the Def endant f or which e x ecution may issue.

The Te nnessee Rule of Civil P roce dure 59 motion filed by Husband wa s overr

uled by the tr ia l c ou rt , a ndHu sb a nd

pe rf e c te d a tim e ly app e a l.

Two consider ations are controll in g o f a p p e ll ate revie w in a ca se tried without the interve ntion of a jury , and in which questions involving the c redibility of witnesses a

re de cisive: the pre sumption of fa c tua l c or

re c tne ss a ndthe app e lla te dis inc lin a tio n to se c on d- g ue ss c re dib ility de te rm inatio ns

. The fa ctual finding s of the trial c ourt are presumed to be corr ect unless the evidence pr eponder ates ag ainst them. Tenn.R.Civ.P. 13(d). Se e Pe rry v . P e rry , 114 S.W .3d 465, 467 (Tenn.2003)

.

One of the most tim e-honor ed princ iples of appe llate rev i ew is that trial courts ar e best si t u at ed to determine the cr edibilityof the witnesse s and to resolve fac tual disputes hinging on cre dibilit y deter m i n at i o ns. Se e Sta te v . P ru e tt , 788 S.W. 2d55 9, 56 1 ( Te nn .1 99 0) ; Tenn-Tex Properties v. Brownell–Elec tro, Inc. , 778 S.W. 2d 42 3, 42 5- 26 (T e nn .1 98 9)

. Ac c or din g ly
, app e llate c ou rt s ro uti ne ly de c lin e to second- g uess a tria l court’s c redibility determinations unless there is concr ete, c lear
, and convinc ing e vidence to the contra ry

. See B i n g h a m v. Dy ersburg Fabrics Co., Inc. , 5 67 S.W. 2d16 9, 17 0 ( Te nn .1 97 8) ; Thompson v

. Creswell I ndus. Supply, Inc.
, 936 S.W .2d 955, 957 (Tenn.Ct.App.1996).

The mo s t o ft en cited rea son for this principle c an be tr ace d to the fac t that trial judg es, unlike appellate j udg es, have an opportunit y to observe the manner and demea nor of the witnesses while they are testify ing. See B owman v. Bowman , 836 S.W. 2d56 3, 56 6 ( Te nn .Ct.A pp . 1 99 1) . T he re are , h ow e ve r, oth e r r e a so ns fo r this principle. As the U nited States Supreme Court has obser ved:

Th e tr ia l ju dg e ’s ma

jor ro le is the de te rm inatio n o f f a c t, a ndwi th experience in fulfilling that role c omes expertise. Duplication of the tr ia l ju dg e ’s e ff

orts i n th e c ou rt

of app e a ls w ou ld v e ry

lik e ly

c on tr ibu te only neg lig ibl y to the a c c ur a c y

of fa c t de te rm inatio n a t a hug e cost in diversion of judicia l reso u rces. I n addition, the parties to a c a se on app e a l ha ve a lr e a dy be e n f or c e d to c on c e ntr a te the ir

ener g ies and re source s on persua ding the trial judge that their ac count of the fa cts is the corr ect one; requiring them to persua de thre e more judge s at the appe llate level is re quiring too much.

An de rso n v. City of B e sse me r Ci ty , 470 U.S. 564, 574-75, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1512, 84 L .Ed.2d 518 (1985).

Mi tc he ll v . A rc hib ald , 971 S.W .2d 25, 29 (Tenn.Ct.App.1998).-12-

The fir st issue asserted by Husband is that the trial court err ed in failing to deviate downw ard from the g uidelines bec ause he had custody of the pa rties’ c hild for consider ably m o re t h an the minimum time contemplated by the g uidelines. Child Custody rema ins a s order ed in the De cembe r 8, 1998, divorce decr ee be cause Husband’s c ounter pe t ition for a cha ng e in custody was seve red from Wife’s Petition relative to child support and rema ins pe nding befor e the trial court. Setting of chil d s u pport and de viations from the g uidelines are matters re sting in the sound discre tion of the trial court a nd will not be disturbed on appea l in the absenc e of an a buse of discr etion. Sta te , e x re l. V a u g h n v. Kaatrude , 2 1 S. W.3 d 2 44 , 2 48 (T e nn .Ct .A pp . 2 00 0) ; Downing v. Downing W2003- 00561-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 1196100 **3-4 (Te nn.Ct.App. May 27, 2004).

Husband ne x t complains that the trial court erre d in imputi ng earnings to him witho u t m a king a prior f inding of voluntary undere mploy ment. Wife counter s with the i nsistence that the trial court

err ed in not finding that Wil liam Smit h was willfully and voluntarily

unemploy ed or unde remploy ed from Jul y of 2000 throug h the J une 2003 hea ri n g date, a nd in not making the r esulting portion of Husband’s c hild support retroac tive to the filing of the Petition on J uly

3, 2000.

The trial c ourt imputed earnings of $45,000 a y ear to H usband from and af ter the date of the hearing, June 27, 2003. The tria l c ourt did not make a f inding that Husba nd had bee n willfullyand voluntarily unemploy ed or underemploy ed prior to that da te. The only viable re ason for

Husband’s lack of employ ment out s ide of be ing e x ecutor of his mother’s e state involves his alleg ations of imp a ir e d h e a lth

. Ac c or din g to the su rg e on wh o ult imate ly pe rf or me d Hu sb a nd ’s be la te d s ur g e ry in Aug ust of 2002, this procedur e would have alleviated any such condition by the beg inning of 2003. The income imputed by

the trial court was the same income Husba nd was e arning as an assistant attorney g ener al prior to his rem o v al t o Memphis to look after his father’s e state and his ailing mother. The a mount of imputed inc ome is supported by the proof and is in the discretion of the trial judge . However
, we d et er m ine from the pr eponder ance of proof in the rec ord that Husband w as willfullyand voluntarily

undere mploy ed fr o m J an u ary 1, 2003. Child support based upon an imputed income of $45,000 pe r y ear should be assessed retroactively to J anuary 1, 2003. Ga rfi nk le

v

. G a r f i nk le
, 9 4 5 S.W .2d 744, 744 (Tenn.Ct.App.1996); see also Ralston v. Ralston
, 1 9 9 9 WL 562719. *3 (Tenn.Ct.App.).

Husband ne x t arg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in imputing investment income of $38,200 per annum since no e vidence exis ted in the rec ord that he should be earning f ive per cent ( 5%) pe r annum return o n h i s as s et s. Wi fe c ounters that the tria l court er red by failing to consider Husba nd’s inheritanc e as income under the guidelines for the purpose of computing child support and g iving

re tr oa c tiv e e ff

e c t to the da te of

fi lin g a s to thi s e le me nt o f i nc re a se d c hil d s up po rt

.
Wif e relies on Klemetsrud v. Kleme tsrud , 1994 WL 556365 (Tenn.Ct.App.) a nd Ford v. Fo rd , 1998 WL

730201(Tenn.Ct.App.) a s authorit y fo r requiring a court to consider an e ntire inheritanc e as inc ome for the purpose of the guidelines. Whil e thi s option was available to the trial court, nothing mandates a trial court to so hold. Fo rd v . F or d , 1988 WL

730201, * 4 (quoting from Te nn . Co mp. R. a ndRe g s. 12 40 -2 -4 -. 03 (3 )( a ), a s st a tin g that g ro ss i nc ome inc lud e s “ a ll i nc ome fr om a ny so ur c e

. . . wh e the r e arn e d o r u ne arn e d. ” ) T he tr ia l c ou rt c ho se , h ow e ve r, to c a lc ulate c hil d-13-

support by

using the net inheritanc e re maining as o f J une 30, 2003, ($764,322.00) as a ba sis for imputing future investment income and c alculating child support acc ord ingly . This discretionary decision is not contrary

to gove rning law, and w e will not substit ute our judg ment for that of the trial court mer ely b ecause we might have chosen a nother a lternative. See State e x rel. Vaughn v

. Kaatrude , 21 S.W .3d at 248. Since the inheritanc e of H usband occ urre d in 1999, and he ha s had the benef it of that inheritance since prior to the time the Petition was filed on J uly 3, 2000, we f ind that the trial court erre d in not making this eleme nt of the child support oblig ation retroa ctive to July3, 2000.

The ne x t issue involves Husband’s a ssertion that he should not bear the cost of private school tui tio n f or the min or c hil d of the pa

rt ie s equ a lly wi th Wife a ndWif e ’s a sse rt ion that H us ba ndsh ou ld have to pa y

more than f

ifty perc ent (50%) of such tuition and expense. The pr oof supports the view that Patrick Smith i s a spec ial needs child and that private school tuiti on is, thus, an ext raor dinary or additional ex p en s e within the meaning of the c hild support guidelines. Ba rn e tt v . B ar ne tt , 27 S. W

. 3 d 9 0 4
, 907 (Tenn.2000) . Whil e the income of the non-c ustodial parent is irre levant to the determination of ordinary perc en t age of income of the obligor spouse under

the g uidelines, a compar ison of incomes is pr oper in de termining which spouse will pay which par

t of private sc hool tuition and ex penses that qua lify as “ ex t ra o rd i nary ” expenses under the g uidelines. Ba rn e tt , 27 S.W .3d at 907. Under Ba rn e tt , th e e xtra or din ary e xpe ns e s o f p ri va te sc ho ol tuit ion wo uldor din ari ly be ad d ed to the oblig or’s ba sic child support obligation, but if strict application of the g uidelines resulted in an “ unjust or inappropriate imbalance in the obligatio n s o f t h e respective par ents, a downwar d devia t i o n may be conside red by

the court. Ba rn e tt , 275 S.W .3d at 908. This question is discussed at leng th in Earthman v. Mc Cray
, 20 03 WL 18 60 52 7 ( Te nn .Ct .A pp .) , a ndthat c a se is quite instructive in deter mining this issue on appea l. I n Earthman , the fa ther ha d sole custody of three minor children a nd decide d that the older c hild neede d to be enr olled at the Webb School, a private boa

rding school. Tuition and expenses amounted to a ne t cost of $16,650 per y ear

. Husband

earned $140,000 a y ear , while Wife ea rne d $49,000 a y ear . The trial c ourt order ed Wife to pay $6,000 of t he y ear ly private sc hool expenses, which amounted to appr ox imately thirty -five pe rce nt (35%) of the total cost. Direc t comparison of the two income s would have r esulted in Wife paying only twenty -six perc ent (26%) of the total of he r income or $ 4
, 3 0 0 per y ear . This Court affirme d the t rial cou r t a ll o c a ti o n h o ld in g th a t r e q u irin g th e mo th e r to p a y $ 6
, 0 0 0 a s n o t a n ab u s e of discretion.

Whil e the tr ia l c ou rt

ma de no sp e c if

ic fi nd ing s as to the c omp arativ e inc ome s of the pa rt ie s, the re cord c lear ly

shows that Wife is an acc omplished businesswomen who has a ccumulate d

c on sid e ra ble we a lth
, a nd pr ior to Hu sb a nd ’s inh e ri ta nc e , wi lli ng ly c arrie d p ra c tic a lly the e nti re c os t of supporting Patrick. The tr ial court made a determination that eac h party should be ar f ifty perc ent ( 5 0 % ) o f t h e e x t r a o r d i n ar y e x p e n s e s o f a p r i v a t e s c h o o l e d u c a t i o n f o r P a t r i c k
, a n d w e c a n n o ts a y,
o n t h i s rec ord, that the trial c ourt abused its discre tion in making such a llocations. B a r n e tt v

. Ba rn e tt , 2 7 S. W.3 d 9 04 ; Earthman v. Mc Cray , 2003 WL 1860527 (Tenn.Ct.App.).

Next, Husband claims that the trial court erre d in finding a b reach of g ood faith by the

app e lla nt r e la tin g to p ara g ra ph 11 of the Ma ri ta l D iss olu tio n A g re e me nt.-14-

Pa r a g r ap h 1 1 e n v is io n e d H u s b a n d ’ s s a le o f h is L a k e la n d r e a l e s tate in Sh e lb y County and afte r t h e s al e, his movement of his re sidence to the Gre enbrie r prope rty located in Williamson County . Two provisions of par ag raph 11 c ontrol the issue.

. . . Husband shall, as soon a s prac ticable, p l ac e t h e L akela nd Real Estate on the marke t for sale . Upon the sale of such L akela nd Real E s t at e, after the pay ment of

mortg a g e de bt a ndthe c os ts of sa le , Hus ba ndsh a ll p a y Wif e thesu m of

$4 5, 00 0 in exchang e for

all of Wife’s rig ht, title and inter est in and to the Gre enbrie r Road Rea l Es ta te , an d Wife sh a ll co nc ur re ntl y e xec ute a

qu it c la im d e e d c on ve y ing he r i nte re sts to Husband. Afte r the ex ecution of such qui t claim deed, Husband shall hold Wife harmless fr om all mortga g e debt, c ost s an d ex penses in conne ction with the Gre enbrie r Road Rea l Estate, and he shall be entitled to r ece ive all rent, income , and other pa y ments, and i ncome tax deductions attributable to such real estate. Husband shall, insofar a s financia lly prac ticable, take steps to secur e Wife’s re lease from the mortg ag e debt on suc h Gre enbrie r Road R eal Estate ; however , the Parties ag ree and understand tha t this m ay

not be financ ially

prac ticable.

I n the event Husband is una ble to secur e Wife’s re lease from all debt obligat i o n s secur ed by

the Gre enbrie r Road Rea l Estate, Husband sha ll ex ecute a de e d o f t ru s ti n f a v o r o f W i f e c o n c u rr e n t l y

w i t h W i f

e ’ s e xe c u t i o n o f

a d e e d qu it claiming her inter est in the Gre enbrie r Road R eal Estate to Husband. The Dee d of Trust shall be in a f

orm ac cepta

ble to counsel for Wife and shall sec ure a ll of Husband’s oblig ations and the pe rformance of all of Husban d ’s duties under the

ex i s t i n g De ed o f T ru s tgra n t ed b y t h e P ar t i e s t o s ec u re p ay m en to f t h e m o rt gage obliga tion c u rr e n tl y

in e xis te n c e o n th e G r e e n b r ie r Ro a d Re a l E s tate

. T h e Pa r ti es shall direct that a copy of any default notices or other c ommunications reg arding the first mortg age b e m ai l ed to Wi fe at an addr ess desig nated by her. F urther, notw ith sta nd ing the fo re g oin g , if Hu sb a nd ha s n ot s e c ur e d Wif

e ’s re le a se fr om a ll debt obligations secure d by the Gre enbrie r Road Rea l Estate wit hin five (5) y ear s of the e ntry of a F ina l D e c re e of Di vo rc e in this c a us e , th e Gr e e nb ri e r R oa d Re a l E state sh a ll i mme diate ly

be pla c e d u po n the m arke t a ndso ld. Af te r p a y me nt o f a ll

rema ining de bt and the cost of sale, Husband shall be entitled to re tain the proc eeds as his sole and sepa

rate property , fre e and c lear of any claim by Wife.

Husband, a

ppare ntly , has tak en t h e p osition t hat the five -y ear provision relative to the Gre enbrie r Road Real Estate is e ffe ctive to postpone for f ive y ear s his dutyto market the L akela nd Real Estate “ . . . as soon as pra cticable , . . . .” He is mist aken.
His duty under the Marital Dissol ution Ag ree ment is to marke t “as soon a s prac ticable” the L akela nd Real Estate a nd immediately pay the mortg ag e debt, the c osts of sale, and pay to Wi fe the

su m of $4 5, 00 0 a t w hic h ti me sh e wi ll qu it cla im a ll o f h e r i nte re st i n th e Gr e e nb ri e r p ro pe rt y to Husband.-15-

Th e se c on d p ara g ra

ph abo ve ha s on ly to d o w ith the Gr e e nb ri e r R e a l E state , a ndthe n o nly to do with debt obligations sec ured by the Gre enbrie r Real Estate . I t is the sale of the L akela nd Real Es ta te that trig g e rs Hu sb a nd ’s ob lig a tio n to pa y to Wi fe $4 5, 00 0 a ndthe de cisive qu e sti on is d id Husband bre ach the Marital Dissol ution Ag ree ment by failing to marke t for sa le the L akela nd Real Es ta te “ a s so on a s p ra c tic able .” Th e tr ia l c ou rt he ld tha t he failed to mak e a good fa ith e ff ort to marke t the L akela nd property in a ccor dance with the Marital Dissolution Ag ree ment, and the evidenc e in the rec ord cle arly supports this finding of the trial judge . Husband made prac tically no eff ort to marke t the L akela nd property

. When he rece ived hi s inheritanc e, he paid off the de bts on both the L akela nd and Gr eenbrier prope rties, thus, reduc ing his liquid assets, but ref used to pay

Wife the $45,000 due unde r the Marital Dissoluti on Ag ree ment, which in fa ct re prese nted h er dow n pay ment on the Gre enbrie r prope rty . The trial c ourt rende red a judgme nt fo r $ 5 4
, 0 0 0 i n favor of Wife and ag ainst Hu s b and, re prese nting the $45,000 pay ment due under the Marital Dissolution Ag ree ment plus interest at a r ate of six perc ent (6%) per a nnum from Marc h 1, 2000, throug h J une 30, 2003. I n th i s ac t i o n , t he trial judg e wa s clea rly corr ect, a nd we a ffirm this portion of the jud g me nt.

L a stl y , H us ba ndc omp la ins abo ut the tr ia l cou rt ’s a wa rdof a tto rn e y ’s fe e s to Wif

e . Wh ile Husband ha d an attorney of record in the trial court, he in fa ct re prese nted himself both in the trial court a nd in this C ourt, and he asserts this i ssue to be:

VI . THE TRI AL C OU R T ERRED I N AWARDI NG ATTO RNEYS FEES TO APP EL LEE AN D IN N OT AWA RD I NGAPP EL L AN T A TT OR NEY F EE S, PARTI CUL ARL Y, WHERE THE APPEL L ANT VO L UNTARIL Y I NCREASED SUPP ORT PRI OR TO THE PETI TI ON, ACKNO WL EDGED T HE CHI L D’S SPE CI A L N E E D S, A N D WH E RE

A PP E L L E EA N D H ER COUNSEL FOR THREE Y E A R S P U R S U E D A B A S E LE S S
, B U T C O S T LY
, C LA IM O FV O LU N T A R ILY UNDEREMP L OYMENT, UP TO AND THROUG H TRI AL , DESPI TE CONVINCI NG MEDI CAL PROOF TO TH E CONTRARY.

There wer e no post-divorc e proc eeding s in this ca se from the time of the Dec ember 8, 1998, Di vo rc e De c re e un til a ft e r H us ba nd ha d re c e ive d his inh e ri ta nc e fr om his mothe r’ s e state a ndun til

a ft e r h e ha d fa ile d in g oo d fa ith to mark e t the L a ke la nd pr op e rt y

. At torne y ’s fe e s a re jus tif ie d in thi s
case both under Te nnessee Code An n o t at ed 36-5-103( c) a nd under pa rag raph 21 of

the Marital Dissolution Agre ement. This e x tended litigation has been primarily the re sult of Husband’s fa ilure to f ulf ill his ob lig a tio ns un de r pa ra g ra ph 11 of the Ma

ri ta l Diss olu tio n Ag re e me nt a ndhis fa ilu re to

rec og nize that his i nheritanc e trig g ere d a subst antial incre ase in his child support obligation and that Appellee was for ced to r esort to court to delineate the s cope of such oblig ation. The judg ment of the trial court as to attorney ’s fe es will be af firmed.

Wife seeks a ttorney ’s fe es in th i s ap p ea l
, and we hold that under both Tenne ssee Code An no ta te d 3 6

- 5

- 1 0 3 ( c ) a n d p ar a g r ap h 2 1 o f t h e M ar i t a l D i s s o l u t i o n A g r e e m e n ts h e i s e n t i t l e d to

rec over he r re asonable attorney ’s fe es on appe al. See P arnham v. Parnham , 2001 W L120734 (Tenn.Ct.App.).-16- CONCL USI ON

I n this c ase, much of the rec ord is c onsumed in me dical testimony and m ed i ca l argume nt

conce rning the phy sical conditi on of Husband. Much of the relevanc e of this evidenc e is fore closed by the Dec ember

8, 1998, Divorce Dec ree wher ein the appe llant’s income wa s set at $12,000 per y ear wi t h a re s u l t i ng $200 per month child support oblig ation which Wife did not enfor ce. T he imputation of income bec ause of undere mploy ment is not assessed u nder this judg ment until J anuary 1, 2003, at which time, by the t estimony of hi s surg eon, he was re cover ed. Eve ry other issue in the

c a se inv olv e s H us ba nd ’s fa ilu re to a c t un de r the Ma ri ta l D iss olu tio n A g re e me nt rel ati ve to dispositi on of the L akela nd property and the e ffe cts of hi s inheritance on his child support ob li gati on s. Exc e pt a s mo dif ie d h e re in, we a ff

ir m in a ll r e sp e c ts the jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt , rema nd the ca se to the trial court for the a war d to Wi fe of attorney ’s fe es on appe al i n such

rea sonable a mount as the trial court may determine. The trial court may , likewise, take any further

a c tio n r e qu ir e d n ot i nc on sis te nt w ith thi s ju dg me nt.
Costs of appeal a

re a ssessed ag ainst Appellant, Will iam Ashby Smit h, J r.

___________________________________ WI LL I AM B. CAIN, J UDGE