UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-6657

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TORRANCE JONES, a/k/a Tube,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at 

Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, Chief District Judge. (5:96-cr-00079-BO-1)

Submitted: March 26, 2019 Decided: April 24, 2019

Before AGEE and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

William M. Norris, WILLIAM M. NORRIS, P.A., Miami, Florida, for Appellant. 

Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Torrance Jones appeals from the district court’s order denying relief on Jones’ 18 

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2012) motion for reduction of his sentence under Amendment 782 

to the Sentencing Guidelines. The district court ruled that it implicitly found at Jones’ 

initial sentencing that that Jones was accountable for 26.3 kilograms of crack cocaine. It 

is undisputed that, if indeed Jones was accountable for 26.3 kilograms of crack cocaine, 

he was ineligible for a reduction of his sentence because Amendment 782 did not lower 

his Guidelines range. On appeal, Jones challenges the district court’s ruling on the 

applicable drug amount. We affirm.

In a § 3582 proceeding, we review “factual determinations, including the 

attributable drug quantity, for clear error.” United States v. Peters, 843 F.3d 572, 577 

(4th Cir. 2016). “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to 

support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 

U.S. 564, 573 (1985). A reviewing court cannot reverse the finding of the trier of fact 

simply because it is convinced that it would have decided the case differently. In fact, a 

reviewing court “oversteps the bounds of its duty . . . if it undertakes to duplicate the role 

of the lower court.” Id. “Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the 

factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Id. at 574. Further, this 

is so even when the district court’s findings are based on inferences from other facts. Id.

Moreover, in this case, the doctrine of the law of the case is also relevant. “The 

mandate rule is a specific application of the law of the case doctrine that prohibits a lower 
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court from reconsidering on remand issues laid to rest by a mandate of the higher court.” 

United States v. Alston, 722 F.3d 603, 606 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). The mandate rule “forecloses relitigation of issues expressly or impliedly 

decided by the appellate court,” as well as “issues decided by the district court but 

foregone on appeal or otherwise waived.” United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 283 (4th 

Cir. 2012). The district court is bound to “implement both the letter and spirit of the 

mandate, taking into account [this court’s] opinion and the circumstances it embraces.” 

United States v. Pileggi, 703 F.3d 675, 679 (4th Cir. 2013) (alterations and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

Here, the district court and this court decided, in Jones’ previous § 3582 

proceeding, that the district court adopted the findings in the PSR at Jones’ original 

sentencing and implicitly found Jones responsible for 26.3 kilograms of crack cocaine. 

Thus, Jones is barred under the “law of the case” doctrine from challenging this ruling in 

the instant § 3582 proceeding. In addition, even if the district court’s determination that 

Jones was responsible for 26.3 kilograms of crack cocaine was a “new” ruling by the 

district court, we find that it is not clearly erroneous. 

Jones also presents new evidence challenging the accuracy of a coconspirator’s 

statement used in calculation of the applicable drug quantity. However, § 3582 is not the 

appropriate proceeding in which to challenge sentencing findings based on new evidence. 

Instead, Jones should raise his new evidence in a collateral proceeding.

Finally, Jones asserts that he is entitled to relief under the First Step Act. To seek 

retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 
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2372, under the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018), a 

motion may be filed in the sentencing court under Section 404 of the First Step Act. We 

express no opinion as to the merits of any such motion or any collateral action.

Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in 

the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED