Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1609-CR-2156 | May 17, 2017 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Susan D. Rayl

Smith Rayl Law Office, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Ellen H. Meilaender

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jefferick Majors,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

May 17, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1609-CR-2156

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Sheila A. Carlisle, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49G03-1512-F1-44240

Barnes, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1609-CR-2156 | May 17, 2017 Page 2 of 11

Case Summary

[1] Jefferick Majors appeals his Level 1 felony convictions for attempted murder. 

We affirm.

Issue

[2] Majors raises two issues, which we restate as:

I. whether the trial court properly admitted evidence of a 

threat Majors made against the victim; and

II. whether there is sufficient evidence to support Majors’ 

conviction of the attempted murder of Chelsey Gosman.

Facts

[3] In 2015, Ryan Byrd was living in a house located in Marion County, Indiana. 

In October or November of 2015, Byrd allowed his friend Kaylyn Kallenbach 

and her then-boyfriend Jefferick Majors to move into the house. In late 

November, Byrd asked the couple to move out for reasons including 

nonpayment of rent. Majors, upset that he had been asked to move, told Ryan, 

“I’m going to come back and shoot you and your house, fat boy.” Tr. Vol. II p. 

38. Majors called Byrd “fat boy” whenever he was angry with him. After

Majors and Kallenbach moved out, Ryan’s girlfriend, Chelsey Gosman, and 

her two children moved into Byrd’s house. 

[4] Approximately three weeks later, on December 10, 2015, Kallenbach contacted 

Byrd and asked to return to the house to retrieve personal belongings she and 
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Majors had left behind. Byrd agreed, but told Kallenbach not to bring Majors 

with her. 

[5] Majors drove Kallenbach to Byrd’s house in his Mercury Milan. They arrived 

around 10:45 p.m. Majors stayed in the car. Kallenbach met Gosman at the 

garage, and the two women began carrying items to the car. Byrd was standing 

in the garage, holding a shotgun in his hand and carrying a 9-millimeter

handgun on his hip. 

[6] Byrd and Majors began to argue. Byrd told Majors that he “shouldn’t be 

there.” Id. at 42. Majors replied, “I don’t care. I’m here anyway. What are 

you going to do about it, fat boy?” Id. Majors repeated his prior threat and 

again told Byrd, “I’m going to come back, and I’m going to shoot you and your 

house, fat boy.” Id. at 43. Majors told Gosman that she should “gets [sic] [her] 

kids out of the house.” Id. at 141. 

[7] Majors and Kallenbach left Byrd’s house and drove to the parking lot of a 

nearby apartment complex. When they arrived, Majors told Kallenbach to 

“stay put.” Id. at 105. He got out of the Mercury, and got into the passenger 

seat of a friend’s silver Chevrolet Impala. The car drove away. Majors

returned approximately twenty minutes later.

[8] After Majors and Kallenbach left, Byrd and Gosman called 911. A police 

officer responded, and the couple told the officer about Majors and the threat he

made. 
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[9] When the officer drove away, Gosman took her children to a restaurant, then 

returned to the house hoping to convince Byrd to leave. Gosman pulled her 

sport utility vehicle (SUV) into the driveway facing the garage, and parked next 

to Byrd’s sedan. Gosman remained in the driver’s seat. She did not turn off the 

ignition and her vehicle’s headlights and taillights were illuminated. Byrd stood 

outside her driver’s-side window, talking with her. The children were in their 

seatbelts in the backseat. 

[10] As Byrd and Gosman were talking, they both noticed a silver Impala driving 

toward the house. The Impala’s windows were down and Byrd recognized 

Majors as the driver. An unidentified man was seated in the driver’s-side back 

passenger seat. Both Majors and the passenger were holding guns. Byrd heard 

someone yell, “fat boy.” Id. at 71. He then heard multiple gunshots and saw 

flashes of light coming from the Impala. Byrd was shot seven times. Gosman 

and her children were not injured.

[11] When the gunfire stopped, Gosman called 911 and ran with her children to a

neighbor’s house. The police responded, and Byrd told them that he believed it 

was Majors who shot him. Byrd was transported by ambulance to the hospital, 

where he was treated for his gunshot wounds and released three days later. 

[12] The police recovered from the scene twenty shell casings and eight bullets or 

bullet fragments that were fired by two different guns, a 9-millimeter handgun 

and a rifle. There were three bullet holes in Gosman’s vehicle and eight to nine 
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bullet holes in the garage door directly in front of where Gosman’s and Byrd’s 

vehicles were parked.

[13] Majors was arrested on December 11, 2015. He was charged with four counts 

of Level 1 felony attempted murder for the attempted murders of Byrd, 

Gosman, and Gosman’s two minor children. The two attempted murder 

counts related to Gosman’s minor children were dismissed. 

[14] On July 29, 2016, Majors filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of his 

alleged marijuana use, and testimony concerning the threat he made against 

Byrd three weeks prior to the shooting. He did not seek to exclude evidence of 

the threat he made an hour before committing the crimes. Following a hearing, 

the trial court granted the motion in limine as to the marijuana use, but denied 

it as to the threat. 

[15] After a two-day jury trial, Majors was found guilty of two counts of Level 1 

felony attempted murder. He was sentenced to thirty years in the Indiana 

Department of Correction on each count, with the sentences to run 

consecutively. 

Analysis

I. Admission of Evidence

[16] Majors argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of 

his prior threat against Byrd. Because the trial court is best able to weigh the 

evidence and assess witness credibility, we review its rulings on admissibility for 
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abuse of discretion. Hall v. State, 36 N.E.3d 459, 466 (Ind. 2015). We will 

reverse only if a ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances and the error affects a party’s substantial rights. Id.

[17] According to Majors, the evidence of his prior threat against Byrd was 

inadmissible under Indiana Evidence Rules 404(b) and 403 because the threat’s 

probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Majors’ arguments, 

specifically, are that the threat was admitted to show he acted in conformity 

with the threat, was too remote in time to be relevant, was of little probative 

value to show hostility between Majors and Byrd, and was needlessly 

cumulative because the same threat was made on the day the attempted murder 

occurred. The State contends that the evidence was properly admitted to show 

Majors’ motive for committing the crimes and the hostility between Majors and 

Byrd. 

[18] Evidence Rule 404(b) provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is 

not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 

conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such 

as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 

or absence of mistake or accident. Id. Evidence that would otherwise be 

excluded by Evidence Rule 404(b) is admissible if the court determines that: (1) 

the evidence is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant’s 

propensity to commit the charged act; (2) there is sufficient proof that the 

defendant in fact committed the act; and (3) the probative value of the evidence 
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is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Camm v. 

State, 908 N.E.2d 215, 223 (Ind. 2009); see also Ind. Evidence Rule 403.

[19] Evidence Rule 403 provides that trial courts “may exclude relevant evidence if 

its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the 

following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue 

delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Because all relevant 

evidence tends to be inherently prejudicial, the proper inquiry under Evidence 

Rule 403 requires balancing the probative value of proffered evidence against 

the likely unfair prejudicial impact of that evidence. Fuentes v. State, 10 N.E.3d 

68, 73 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. “When determining the likely unfair 

prejudicial impact, courts will look for the dangers that the jury will 

substantially overestimate the value of the evidence or that the evidence will 

arouse or inflame the passions or sympathies of the jury.” Id.

[20] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence Majors’ 

prior threat. Majors’ threat against Byrd, that he would return and shoot Byrd 

and Byrd’s house, indicated that relations between Majors and Byrd were 

strained, and demonstrated Majors’ motive and intent to commit the attempted 

murder. Evidence of motive is always relevant in the proof of a crime. Ross v. 

State, 676 N.E.2d 339, 346 (Ind. 1996). The probative value of the evidence 

was not substantially outweighed by the possible prejudicial effect. 

[21] The threat was not remote in time. It was made three weeks prior to the 

attempted murder and immediately after Byrd told Majors to leave his house. 
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See id. (trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that threats made two 

months before the murder by defendant against victim were admissible). 

Although Majors made the same threat approximately one hour before 

committing the attempted murder, evidence of the prior threat was not 

needlessly cumulative. The mere fact that the jury hears the same evidence 

more than once does not render the evidence prejudicial. See Gaines v. State, 999 

N.E.2d 999, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (admission of evidence is harmless and 

not grounds for reversal where the evidence is merely cumulative of other 

evidence properly admitted). No error occurred here.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Intent to Kill

[22] Majors next contends that insufficient evidence was presented by the State to 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to kill Chelsey Gosman. 

When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we neither reweigh the 

evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Suggs v. State, 51 N.E.3d 

1190, 1193 (Ind. 2016). We will consider only the evidence and reasonable 

inferences therefrom that support the conviction. Id. We will affirm if there is 

probative evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could have found the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[23] Majors specifically contends there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that he had specific intent to kill Gosman. Majors argues that 

his threats were directed toward Byrd and that prior to the shooting, he warned 

Gosman to remove her children from Byrd’s home. 
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[24] Majors was charged with: 

[A]ttempt[ing] to commit the crime of Murder, which is to 

intentionally kill another human being, namely: Chelsey 

Gosman, by engaging in conduct, that is: intentionally shooting 

a deadly weapon at and against . . . Chelsey Gosman with the 

intent to kill, which constituted a substantial step toward the 

commission of said crime of Murder.” 

[25] Appellant’s App. pp. 26-27. To convict Majors of attempted murder, the State 

was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he engaged in conduct 

that constituted a substantial step toward intentionally killing another human 

being. Ind. Code §§ 35-41-5-1 (2014) (attempt); 35-42-1-1 (2014) (murder). “A 

person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it 

is his conscious objective to do so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(a) (1977). 

[26] A factfinder may infer specific intent to kill from the nature of an attack and the 

circumstances surrounding the crime. Kiefer v. State, 761 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ind.

2002). Such intent may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a 

manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm. Id. Discharging a weapon 

in the direction of a victim is substantial evidence from which a factfinder could 

infer intent to kill. Corbin v. State, 840 N.E.2d 424, 429 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 

[27] The evidence presented was sufficient to prove Majors fired a deadly weapon at 

Gosman with intent to kill. The evening before the shooting occurred, Majors 

drove Kallenbach to Byrd’s house so that Kallenbach could retrieve items she 

and Majors left at Byrd’s house. Before leaving, Majors threaten to return and 

shoot Byrd and his house. Gosman heard the threat. She asked Majors not to 
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follow through with the threat because she had children in the house. Majors 

told Gosman that she should remove her children from the home.

[28] During the time Majors lived in Byrd’s house and at the time of the shooting, 

Gosman drove a blue SUV. Testimony was presented that Majors was familiar 

with Gosman’s vehicle. At the time of the shooting, Gosman’s SUV and Byrd’s

sedan were parked in Byrd’s driveway, facing the garage. Byrd was standing 

next to the driver’s-side window of the SUV. The driver’s-side window was 

down. Gosman was seated in the driver’s seat, talking with Byrd, and the 

headlights and taillights on her vehicle were illuminated. Gosman looked out 

of the driver’s side window and saw the Chevrolet Impala driving along the 

street toward Byrd’s house. She saw “side-by-side sparks coming from the guns 

[in the vehicle] and then heard the gunshots.” Tr. Vol. II p. 144.

[29] As Majors drove by Byrd’s house, he and his passenger fired at least twenty 

rounds from a handgun and a rifle in the direction of Gosman. Bullets flattened 

a tire on Gosman’s SUV and ruptured the gasoline tank. Bullet holes were 

found in the trunk of the SUV, the rear passenger-side door, and the front 

passenger-side door. Eight or nine bullet holes were found in the garage door. 

[30] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that sufficient evidence was provided from 

which the jury could have inferred beyond a reasonable doubt that Majors 

specifically intended to kill Gosman. 
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Conclusion

[31] The trial court properly admitted evidence of Majors’ prior threat against Byrd, 

and there was sufficient evidence to support Majors’ conviction for the 

attempted murder of Chelsey Gosman. We affirm.

[32] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Robb, J., concur.