alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### St. Louis, A. & T. R’y Co. v. S. O. Berry.

(No. 3463.)

Appeal from Tarrant County.

N. H. Lassiter and Perkins, Gilbert & Perkins, counsel for appellant.

Wynne, MoOart & Stedman, counsel for appellee.

Opinion by

Will-son, J.

§ 166. *Common carrier; failure to transport passenger and baggage; damages for may include mental suffering; damages held not excessive.*Appellee purchased tickets from appellant’s agent at Wolf City, for transportation on appellant’s line of railway to Pt. Worth, a distance of about one hundred miles, for himself, wife and two children, at the same time obtaining checks for his baggage from Wolf City to Pt. Worth. Appellant transported appellee and his family only a portion of the distance, and failed to complete the contract of transportation. Appellee was compelled to purchase tickets *236over another line of railway, and finally, after several days’ delay, he reached Ft. Worth with his family, where he was compelled to remain for some time, waiting to get his baggage, which was also delayed. His extra expenses, because of the failure of appellant to perform the contract of carriage, amounted to about $90. He alleged his damages to be $1,000, including in the estimate the mental suffering of himself and family occasioned by the breach of the contract of carriage. He recovered judgment for $500. There are but two questions necessary to be determined: (1) Is this a case in which damages for mental suffering are recoverable? (2) If so, is the verdict excessive? • We think the first question is answered affirmatively by the decision of our supreme court in Stuart v. Telegraph Co., 66 Tex. 580. See, particularly, opinion of Stayton, O. J., on motion for rehearing. As to the amount of damages awarded, we are not prepared to say it is excessive. Appellee and family were delayed on their journey several days; were deprived during such delay of their baggage, containing their personal apparel; were compelled to stay at hotels waiting for conveyance, and waiting for their baggage; and were, of course, greatly annoyed, vexed and troubled by reason of these things. There is no rule by which to measure injury to feelings, and, unless the amount allowed by a jury be so grossly excessive as to justify the conclusion that it is the result of prejudice or other improper influence, we do not think this court should set aside the verdict of the jury. While in this case the amount allowed appellee is certainly liberal, we cannot say that it is excessive. Being of the opinion that there is no error in the judgment it is

November 12, 1890.

Affirmed.
#### MOORE, THOMPSON, LEE & BROYLES v. CONTINENTAL CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Progressive Security Insurance Company, and Amy Porche, Individually and On Behalf of Her Minor Daughter, Emily Brossett.

No. 2011-CC-0618.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 20, 2011.

In re Progressive Security Insurance Company; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 580,171; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CW 2057.

Denied.
In the Missouri Court of Appeals

Eastern District

MAY 5, 2015

THE FOLLOWING CASES WERE AFFIRMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 

84.16(b) OR RULE 30.25(b).

1. ED100453 STATE OF MISSOURI, RES V RICO RICARDO PAUL, APP

2. ED101062 CHARMEN WARD, RES V OTIS WARD, APP

3. ED101203 TONY DEON EDMOND, APP V STATE OF MISSOURI, RES

4. ED101297 STATE OF MISSOURI, RES V DARRELL I. BOLDEN, APP

5. ED101353 JASON JAMES BARNES, APP V STATE OF MISSOURI, RES

6. ED101737 THOMAS M. HAMILTON, APP V STATE OF MISSOURI, RES

7. ED101907 EUGENE STUBBLEFIELD, APP V CITY OF STL ET AL, RES

8. ED101994 ANTOINETTE LONGSTREET-ALLEN, APP V DES, RES

9. ED102049 SHIRLEY BOWEN SMITH, APP V SIJ, RES
581 A.2d 507

#### IN THE MATTER OF JOHN L. DOWNER, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW.

November 7, 1990.

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed a report with the Court, recommending that JOHN L. DOWNER of ATLANTIC CITY, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1985, be suspended from the practice of law and sanctioned, and said JOHN L. DOWNER having been Ordered to Show Cause why he should not be so suspended and sanctioned;

And said JOHN L. DOWNER having informed the Court that he would pay the Fee Arbitration award by Thursday, November 8, 1990;

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that JOHN L. DOWNER shall be suspended from the practice of law pending the further Order of the Court, effective 1:00 p.m., Thursday, November 8,1990; provided, however, that the suspension shall not take effect if, prior *456to that time, respondent tenders to the Clerk of this Court a certified or bank check in the amount of $350.00, payable to Barbara Kohl; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent shall be restrained and enjoined from practicing law during the period of his suspension and that he shall comply with Regulation 23 of the Administrative Guidelines Governing Suspended Attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent shall reimburse the Ethics Financial Committee for appropriate administrative costs incurred in the prosecution of this matter, including the $500.00 sanction recommended by the Disciplinary Review Board.
#### STATE ex rel. Cleveland BELL v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-1863.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 16, 2011.

In re Bell, Cleveland; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 95-6518; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-WR-1051.

Denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF ESHARE TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1999
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                           3,558
<SECURITIES>                                    11,315
<RECEIVABLES>                                   35,877
<ALLOWANCES>                                    (3,014)
<INVENTORY>                                      1,967
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                55,236
<PP&E>                                          21,948
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (10,985)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  70,551
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           16,640
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            69
<OTHER-SE>                                      53,768
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    70,551
<SALES>                                         94,855
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                94,855
<CGS>                                           36,163
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   36,163
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                70,483
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 1,709
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  44
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (11,035)
<INCOME-TAX>                                    (1,077)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (9,958)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                 (5,850)
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (15,808)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (0.76)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.76)


</TABLE>
**Exhibit 23.1**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration StatementNo. 333-74784 and No. 333-53621 on Form S-8 and No. 333-68001, No. 333-114917 and No. 333-140330 on Form S-3 of our report dated March 15, 2007, relating to the financial statements and financial statement schedule of NobleInternational, Ltd. and management’s report on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, which report excludes from the scope of our audit management’s assessment of the internal control over financial reporting atPullman Industries and the effectiveness thereof for 2006, appearing in the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Noble International, Ltd. for the year ended December 31, 2006. 

Deloitte & Touche LLP 

Detroit, Michigan 

March 28, 2007
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Errol FALCON, Jr.

No. 2011-KK-0625.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 25, 2011.

In re Falcon Jr., Errol; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedí*967al Writs, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 09-CR-722; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. ll-K-29.

Denied.
#### King, McRae & Co. v. G. B. Robinson & Bro.

(No. 1776.)

Appeal from Galveston County.

Opinion by

White, P. J.

§ 554. *Attachment; writ of, must run in the name of “The State of Texas.”*This was an attachment suit in which the writ of attachment that issued commenced as follows: “To the sheriff or any constable,” etc., omitting the words “'The State of Texas,” in the style of the writ. *Held:*It is provided by the constitution that the style of all writs and process shall be, “The State of Texas.” [Const, art. 5, sec. 12; R. S. arts. 162, 163, 1568.] No court has authority to dispense with that which the constitution requires. [State v. Durst, 7 Tex. 74; Cox v. State, 8 Tex. App. 254.] This objection to the writ having been made *in limine,*at the earliest practicable moment, was properly sustained. [Portis v. Parker, 8 Tex. 23.]

§ 555. *Same; writ of, must notissue until suit has been instituted.*This suit was brought in justice’s court. The writ of attachment issued on the 5th of June, and the citation did not issue until the 16th of same month. *Held:*It is expressly provided that “no such writ shall issue until the suit has been duly instituted.” [R. S. art. 154.] The suit was not instituted until the citation issued. [R. S. art. 1569.] Hence, the writ of attachment was issued without authority of law.

§ 556. *Jurisdiction of justice’s court; amount in controversy.*This suit was upon a promissory note for the *494sum of $198.40 with ten per cent, interest, and ten per cent, attorneys’ fees if collected by law. The writ of attachment commanded the seizure of property of value sufficient to make the sum of $225 and costs. The citation claimed the principal debt and interest, and also the ten per cent, attorneys’ fees stipulated for in the note. The principal debt and the ten per cent, attorneys’ fees aggregate more than $200. *Held:*The ten per cent, attorneys’ fees was a part of plaintiffs’ cause of action, was claimed as such in the suit, and constituted a part of the amount in controversy. *[Ante,*§ 352.] “ Such fees, though not an element of damages in an ordinary suit for the collection of money, can be made such by express contract.” [Roberts v. Palmore, 41 Tex. 617; Miner v. Paris Ex. Bank, 53 Tex. 559.] When expressly contracted for, and sought to be recovered in a suit on the contract, they are a part of the contract, and must be considered in estimating the amount in controversy in determining the jurisdiction of the court. The court did not err in quashing the attachment proceeding, nor in sustaining the plea to the jurisdiction' of the court.

February 21, 1885.

Affirmed.
Exhibit 99.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the Annual Report of Unified Financial Services,
Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2002 (the
"Report"), I, Thomas G. Napurano, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

                  (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of
                           section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
                           Act of 1934; and

                  (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly
                           presents, in all material respects, the financial
                           condition and results of operations of the Company.


                                  /s/ Thomas G. Napurano
                                  ----------------------------------------------
                                  Thomas G. Napurano, Chief Financial Officer of
                                  Unified Financial Services, Inc.

                                  April 8, 2003


         This certificate accompanies the Report pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
#### STATE ex rel. Howard COBB v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-0498.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 18, 2011.

In re Cobb, Howard; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Webster, 26th Judicial District Court Div. E, Nos. 76,112, 76,113, 76,115; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,338-KH.

Denied.
Exhibit 10.22
 
 RC2 Corporation
 1111 W. 22nd Street
 Suite 320
 Oak Brook, IL  60523
 Phone (630) 573-7200
 Fax (630) 573-7575





December 28, 2010







Peter A. Nicholson

10851 Glenlake Dr.

Orland Park, IL 60467


Dear Pete:
Re:
Amendment to Employment Agreement




The purpose of this letter is to make a technical amendment to the Employment Agreement between you and RC2 dated November 5, 2008 (your "Employment Agreement").  The following is hereby added to the end of section 6(d) of your Employment Agreement:




Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, any Change of Control Severance Payment in excess of the Severance Exception Limit shall be paid on the same schedule as Salary Continuation Severance Payments (in proportionate installments for amounts calculated with reference to Base Salary) and the Bonus Severance Payment (in proportionate installments for amounts calculated with reference to the Bonus Plan) unless the applicable Termination Date occurs within the two-year period following a "change in control event" (within the meaning of Treasury Regulation section 1.409A-3(i)(5)).




Undefined terms in this letter have the meaning provided in your Employment Agreement.  Please confirm your acceptance of this letter and the amendment to your Employment Agreement by signing and returning a copy of this letter to me.




Yours very truly,





RC2 CORPORATION





BY/s/  Linda A. Huett


Linda A. Huett


Compensation Committee Chairperson


Accepted and agreed to this


30th day of December, 2010





/s/  Peter A. Nicholson


Peter A. Nicholson
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Federal Reserve System

                    The companies listed in this notice have given notice under section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act (12 U.S.C. 1843) (BHC Act) and Regulation Y (12 CFR Part 225) to engage                     *de novo*, or to acquire or control voting securities or assets of a company, including the companies listed below, that engages either directly or through a subsidiary or other company, in a nonbanking activity that is listed in § 225.28 of Regulation Y (12 CFR 225.28) or that the Board has determined by Order to be closely related to banking and permissible for bank holding companies. Unless otherwise noted, these activities will be conducted throughout the United States.                

                    Each notice is available for inspection at the Federal Reserve Bank indicated. The notice also will be available for inspection at the offices of the Board of Governors. Interested persons may express their views in writing on the question whether the proposal complies with the standards of section 4 of the BHC Act. Additional information on all bank holding companies may be obtained from the National Information Center website at                     *www.ffiec.gov/​nic/​*.                

Unless otherwise noted, comments regarding the applications must be received at the Reserve Bank indicated or the offices of the Board of Governors not later than October 15, 2010.

**A. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago**                     (Colette A. Fried, Assistant Vice President) 230 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, Illinois 60690-1414:                

*1. Taylor Capital Group, Inc.*, Rosemont, Illinois; to engage                     *de novo*                     in extending credit and servicing loans, pursuant to section 225.28(b)(1) of Regulation Y.                

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, September 27, 2010.

Robert deV. Frierson,

Deputy Secretary of the Board.

[FR Doc. 2010-24546 Filed 9-29-10; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6210-01-S
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 99.1


                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Blue Rhino
Corporation (the "Company") for the period ending July 31, 2002 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Billy D. Prim, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.



                                            /s/ Billy D. Prim
                                            ------------------------------------
                                            Billy D. Prim
                                            Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
                                            October 3, 2002
47CCPA

#### UNITED STATES SAFETY SERVICE CO. v. Robert C. GRAHAM.

Patent Appeal No. 6539.

United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.

April 6, 1960.

Hovey, Schmidt, Johnson & Hovey, Robert D. Hovey, Kansas City, Mo., Beale & Jones, George R. Jones, Washington, D. C., for appellant.

W. D. Sellers, Pasadena, Cal., for appellee.

Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN and SMITH, Judges.

WORLEY, Chief Judge.

This appeal is from the decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board of the United States Patent Office dismissing an opposition by appellant to appellee’s application for registration of *181“Safelite” as a trademark for lenses for optical use. The opposition was based on appellant’s prior use and registration of the marks “Saf-I-Duo,” “Saf-I-Shield,” “Saf-I-Spec,” “Saf-I-Flex,” “Saf-IChem,” “Saf-I-Weld,” “Saf-I-Lens,” “Saf-I-Glare,” and “Saf-I-Spectacle,” primarily for use on industrial safety equipment to protect the head and eyes, such as face shields, goggles, welder’s helmets, etc.

Since priority is not disputed and the goods of the parties are quite similar, the issue is whether concurrent use of the marks by the respective parties would result in a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1052(d).

The board was of the opinion the marks differ substantially in sound, appearance, and significance; that in view of those differences coupled with its belief that the products of the parties would ordinarily be purchased with care, confusion would not be likely.

We agree with the board. “Safelite” differs substantially from each of appellant’s “Saf-I-” marks. Even if appellant’s marks be considered as a family, as appellant urges, there would be no reason to think that “Safelite” was a member of that family, since, as pointed out by the board, “The family characteristic of opposer’s marks is “Saf-I” and applicant’s mark does not involve an appropriation thereof.”

Appellant stresses in its brief here its “Optilite” mark, which was not mentioned by the board. That mark clearly is not confusingly similar to applicant’s “Safelite” mark, and the “lite” portion which is the only feature common to the two marks, is suggestive as applied to optical goods. We do not think the public would be likely to make any such association of the “lite” portion of “Optilite” with the “Saf-I” portion of appellant’s other marks as to result in confusion with “Safelite.”

The decision is affirmed.

Affirmed.