J-A12016-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ADRIAN J. STONES 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 957 WDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 22, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-SA-0001370-2020

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED: MAY 20, 2022

Adrian J. Stones (Appellant) appeals, pro se, from the judgment of 

sentence of a $25 fine, plus costs, imposed in the Allegheny County Court of 

Common Pleas, following his summary conviction of trespass by motor 

vehicle.1 On appeal, Appellant argues: (1) his actions were insufficient to 

establish a violation of the summary offense; (2) the police officer who issued 

the citation acted outside his jurisdiction, and (3) the officer had no probable 

cause or reasonable suspicion to stop him. For the reasons below, we affirm.

On September 26, 2020, Appellant was issued a citation for trespass by 

motor vehicle. After he was found guilty in magisterial district court, Appellant 

filed an appeal for a trial de novo in the Allegheny Court of Common Pleas. 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 3717(a).
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The trial court summarized the testimony presented at Appellant’s July 21, 

2021, trial de novo as follows:

Officer Mark Slivka, of the North Versailles Police Department, 

testified that on the afternoon of September 26, 2020, he was 

patrolling property owned by the Norfolk Southern Railroad 

Company [(the Railroad)], when he saw [Appellant’s box] truck 

drive into the railroad yard, past secured and gated areas, to an 

area where there are only railroad tracks and a roadway to the 

tracks. He issued [Appellant] a citation after learning from 

railroad personnel that [Appellant] was not authorized to be on 

the property. Special Agent Gabe Pediconi, a railroad police officer

. . ., testified that only railroad-owned vehicles are permitted on 

railroad property, unless there is permission from a supervisor or 

manager, which had not been given to [Appellant]. [He further 

explained that because he was “quite a distance away” at the time 

Officer Slivka called him, he told the officer to “just cite [Appellant] 

for vehicle trespassing.” N.T., 7/21/21, at 11-12).]

[Appellant] testified that his property abuts the railroad 

property and is thirty yards from where he was stopped. He 

explained that he uses the railroad property to get in and out of 

South Trafford, as do many other residents, as it is the only 

available route for oversized trucks.

Trial Ct. Op., 12/1/21, at 1-2. At the conclusion of trial, the court found 

Appellant guilty and imposed a $25 fine, plus costs. See N.T., 7/21/21, at 

24. This timely appeal follows.2 

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2 On September 3, 2021, Appellant filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal in compliance with the trial 

court’s prior directive. See Order, 8/18/21. We note, however, that the court 

issued an amended order that same day, September 3rd, providing Appellant 

with 21 days to file a Rule 1925(b) statement “after the transcripts are filed 

with the Department of Court Records.” Amended Order, 9/3/21 (emphasis 

omitted). Appellant did not file a supplemental Rule 1925(b) statement. 

Thus, he is bound by the claims raised in his September 3rd statement. 
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Appellant purports to raise five issues on appeal:

1) Did the [trial court] base its order and finding of guilt for 

vehicular trespass on sufficient evidence that [Appellant] 

knowingly operated a motor vehicle on private real property in 

violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3717?

2) Did the [trial court] have sufficient evidence to find Appellant 

guilty of vehicular trespass under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3717(a) 

where the road or pathway in dispute is a public right-of-way 

provided for decades by [the Railroad] and otherwise has been 

used as an easement by necessity by residents living in South 

Trafford because a Railroad Company bridge prevents 

deliveries by oversized trucks from entering into and out of 

South Trafford?

3) Did the [trial court] err in finding [Appellant] guilty even though 

he did not operate a motor vehicle on clearly marked, barred 

or secured property when he was ticketed for vehicular 

trespass?

4) Did North Versailles police officer, Mark Slivka, act outside his 

jurisdiction by ticketing Appellant for vehicular trespass?

5) Was [Appellant] subject to [an] unconstitutional search and 

seizure, or otherwise did the Commonwealth prosecute

[Appellant] for vagrancy or other laws that have been deemed 

unconstitutional?

Appellant’s Brief at 3-6.

Appellant’s first three issues — which he addresses together in his brief 

— challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction of 

trespass by motor vehicle. Appellant maintains the Railroad does not dispute 

the fact that “the roadway in question . . . has been used by the public for 

decades as a public right-of-way,” and Special Agent Pediconi admitted he 

“would not be aware of all the deeds and rights-of-way that the Railroad . . .

has made with other parties[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 12, 14. Moreover, 
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Appellants insists that Stewart Street — which provides the “only means of 

ingress and egress into South Trafford” — passes under a “Railway bridge” 

that has a 12-foot clearance. Id. at 12. Thus, Appellant maintains, the height 

clearance of the bridge “prevent[s] deliveries and other commerce to the 

residents and public who live or work in South Trafford.” Id. at 13. He argues

that the Railroad has permitted use of the right-of-way because it would be

“very costly” to rebuild the bridge. Id. Appellant further emphasizes as

“significant” the fact that the roadway where he was ticketed is “not secured, 

gated or identified as a private road” and that he “posed no threat of criminal 

activity.” Id. at 14.

Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction of 

a summary traffic offense is well-settled:

We view [the] evidence in a light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

Commonwealth. The evidence need not preclude every possibility 

of innocence and the fact-finder is free to believe all, part, or none 

of the evidence presented. Only where the evidence is so weak 

and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact 

can be drawn from the combined circumstances[,] is a defendant 

entitled to relief. We do not re-weigh the evidence and substitute 

our judgment for that of the fact-finder. As the question of the 

sufficiency of the evidence is one of law, we consider the evidence 

de novo. 

Commonwealth v. Ford, 141 A.3d 547, 552–53 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations 

and quotation marks omitted).

Appellant was convicted of violating Section 3717 of the Motor Vehicle 

Code, which provides, in relevant part:
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It is unlawful for a person to knowingly operate a motor vehicle 

on private real property other than a private road or driveway 

without consent of the owner or lessor of the real property.

75 Pa.C.S. § 3717(a). Here, there is no dispute that Appellant was operating 

his motor vehicle on the day in question. What he challenges, however, is the 

court’s determination that he knowingly did so without the consent of the 

owner. 

In rejecting Appellant’s claim, the trial court emphasized that Appellant 

presented no documentation supporting his averment that the roadway is 

“titled as a right-of-way in public records[.]” Trial Ct. Op. at 2-3. 

Furthermore, the court found that the fact Appellant, and purportedly other 

South Trafford residents, regularly use the road was not a defense. Id. at 3. 

Nor did the court find significant the fact that the road contained no signage 

designating it as a private roadway, or any barriers blocking public access. 

Id. Indeed, the trial court concluded: 

[Appellant] did not have the consent of [the Railroad] to drive on 

its property. Further, he knew he was driving on railroad property, 

and admitted doing so regularly.

Id. The court found these facts sufficient to support the verdict. We agree.

Special Agent Pediconi testified that “[o]nly railroad-owned vehicles are 

allowed to be on railroad property unless there’s permission from a supervisor 

or manager[.]” N.T. at 12. He testified that Appellant was not a railroad 

employee and had no permission to drive on the roadway. Id. Further, 

Special Agent Pediconi specifically denied Appellant’s claim that the residents 

of South Trafford had an agreement with the Railroad to use the roadway:
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[T]here are no agreements. It does not exist. It doesn’t stand. 

That’s the wishes of the community to use it as an egress. They 

have their own driveway to their house. The property abuts up 

against many properties across the three states I work in. If they 

choose to use it, that’s their risk of getting caught. . . .

Id. at 23.

Appellant conceded he had no explicit agreement with the Railroad

permitting him to use the roadway in question. Indeed, when asked if he had 

any “type of easement agreement[,]” Appellant replied, “I don’t think anyone 

has one” and confirmed he had no “legal documents from the railroad[.]” N.T. 

at 18-19. Further, when confronted with the fact that he had no “agreement” 

with the Railroad to drive on its private roadway, Appellant simply stated, 

“Neither do any of the other residents of South Trafford.” Id. at 20. Thus, 

Appellant rests his argument on the fact that South Trafford residents have 

used the roadway in the past, and not upon any consent provided by the 

Railroad. Accordingly, we agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the 

evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant “knowingly 

operate[d] a motor vehicle on private real property [owned by the Railroad] 

without consent” of the Railroad.” See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3717(a). Thus, his first 

claim fails. 

Next, Appellant contends North Versailles Police Officer Slivka “acted 

outside his jurisdiction by ticketing [Appellant] for vehicular trespass.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 15. He maintains the trial transcript clearly demonstrates 

Officer Slivka was “policing on behalf of the Railway Company” when he issued 

the citation at the directive of Special Agent Pediconi. Id. at 15-16.
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The trial court found this claim waived because Appellant did not raise 

it below. Trial Ct. Op. at 3 n.2. We agree. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not 

raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on 

appeal.”). 

Nevertheless, we note that Appellant’s jurisdictional argument misses 

the mark. Officer Slivka testified that the railroad police — particularly Special 

Agent Pediconi — have the “same jurisdiction in [their] town.” N.T. at 6. 

Appellant does not dispute the fact that the roadway is located within North 

Versailles Township. Rather, he asserts the officer was “policing on behalf” of 

the Railroad. Appellant’s Brief at 15. He misconstrues the testimony. Officer

Slivka explained he was patrolling the Railroad property because they “have 

problems” with illegal dumping in that area. N.T. at 5, 9. After observing 

Appellant’s truck on the private roadway, he contacted Special Agent Pediconi 

to determine whether Appellant had permission to use the roadway. When 

the agent confirmed Appellant did not have such permission, Officer Slivka 

acted within his proper authority by citing Appellant for a summary offense 

that he witnessed within North Versailles Township.

Lastly, Appellant argues Officer Slivka did not have “probable cause or 

reasonable suspicion to detain” him. Appellant’s Brief at 17. He emphasizes 

that the officer observed him drive his truck past the secured area, and “made 

no effort to determine if [the] area along the railroad tracks was subject to a 

right-of-way.” Id. Moreover, Appellant insists a reasonable person would not 

believe he “had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime.” 
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Id. Thus, he contends he was subject to an unlawful Terry3 stop. Id. at 16-

17.

Appellant misunderstands the law surrounding traffic stops.4 As our 

Supreme Court explained in Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108 (Pa. 

2008):

The Fourth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution protects the people from unreasonable searches and 

seizures. A vehicle stop constitutes a seizure under the Fourth 

Amendment. The key question in determining if a seizure is 

constitutional under the Fourth Amendment is if it is reasonable.

A warrantless seizure is presumptively unreasonable under 

the Fourth Amendment, subject to a few specifically established, 

well-delineated exceptions. One exception allows police to briefly 

detain individuals for an investigation, maintain the status

quo, and if appropriate, conduct a frisk for weapons when there is 

reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. The Fourth 

Amendment does not prevent police from stopping and 

questioning motorists when they witness or suspect a 

violation of traffic laws, even if it is a minor offense.

Id. at 112–13 (citations and footnote omitted). 

Here, Officer Slivka testified that before he stopped Appellant’s truck —

which he suspected was not a Railroad-owned vehicle — he “ran the 

registration plates, which came back as a Trafford address.” N.T. at 6. He 

then stopped Appellant, who was unable to provide the officer with any 

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3 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

4 The fact that Appellant is proceeding pro se “confers [upon him] no special 

benefit[.]” Commonwealth v. Vurimindi, 200 A.3d 1031, 1037 (Pa. Super. 

2018) (citation omitted). “To the contrary, any person choosing to represent 

himself in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, assume that his 

lack of expertise and legal training will be his undoing.” Id. (citation omitted). 
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authority permitting him to drive on the private roadway. After confirming 

this information with Special Agent Pediconi, Officer Slivka properly cited 

Appellant for trespass by motor vehicle. Under these facts, Appellant was not 

subject to an unlawful search or seizure.

Thus, concluding there is no merit to any of Appellant’s claims on appeal, 

we affirm the judgment of sentence.5

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judge Murray joins the Memorandum.

Judge Colins Concurs in the Result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 05/20/2022

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5 As the trial court commented at the conclusion of the trial de novo, 

Appellant’s best recourse may be to “get together with the rest of the 

neighbors and try to work something out with the railroad” to obtain some 

type of “civil recourse.” N.T. at 25. However, continuing to trespass without 

permission will result in additional fines.