alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of Fisher Communications, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Form 10-K), I, Robert C. Bateman, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:



| | (1) | The Form 10-K fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Dated: March 25, 2005



/s/ Robert C. BatemanRobert C. BatemanSenior Vice PresidentChief Financial Officer
EXHIBIT 99.2





CERTIFICATION OF VERSATA, INC.


PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


REGARDING ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K FOR THE YEAR ENDED OCTOBER 31, 2002





Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), I, James Doehrman, Executive Vice President, Chief
Operating and Financial Officer of Versata, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the Company), do hereby certify that:





1. The Companys Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended October 31, 2002 (the Form 10-K) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





2. Information contained in the Form 10-K fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





By:

/s/    JAMES
DOEHRMANJames Doehrman Executive Vice
President, Chief Operating Officer and Chief Financial
Officer





Date:  January 28, 2003
#### Greg MITCHELL, Clodine M. Gordon, Linda Brown, Bertha Oxly, Janice Bell, et al. v. EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH, et al.

No. 2010-C-2075.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 17, 2010.

In re Bell, Janice; Brown, Linda; Gordon, Clodine M.; Mitchell et al., Greg; Oxly, Bertha; —Plaintiffs); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District *16Court Div. M, No. 432,169; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 CA 1076.

Denied.

JOHNSON, VICTORY and KNOLL, JJ., would grant.
EXHIBIT 99.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In  connection  with  the  Annual  Report  of Heritage Worldwide, Inc. (the
"Company")  on Form 10-KSB for the period ending December 31, 2002 as filed with
the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Fabrice Viguier, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C.  section  1350,  as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act  of  2002,  that;

     (1)  The  Report  fully  complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d)  of  the  Securities  Exchange  Act  of  1934;  and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in  the  Report  fairly  presents, in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and  result of operations of the
Company.

     A  signed  original  of  this written statement required by Section 906 has
been  provided  to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished
to  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  or  its  staff  upon  request.

/s/  Fabrice  Viguier
---------------------
Chief  Executive  Officer

March  25,  2003





                                       23
<PAGE>
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Homeland Security

###### Federal Emergency Management Agency

          - [Internal Agency Docket No. FEMA-1935-DR; Docket ID FEMA-2010-0002]

# AGENCY:

Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS.

# ACTION:

Notice.

# SUMMARY:

This notice amends the notice of a major disaster for the State of Illinois (FEMA-1935-DR), dated August 19, 2010, and related determinations.

      ( print page 57811)    

# DATES:

*Effective Date:*                         September 13, 2010.                    

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Peggy Miller, Office of Response and Recovery, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street, SW., Washington, DC 20472, (202) 646-3886.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Notice is hereby given that the incident period for this declared disaster is now July 19, 2010, through and including August 7, 2010.

(The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund; 97.032, Crisis Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services; 97.034, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance Grant; 97.048, Disaster Housing Assistance to Individuals and Households in Presidentially Declared Disaster Areas; 97.049, Presidentially Declared Disaster Assistance—Disaster Housing Operations for Individuals and Households; 97.050, Presidentially Declared Disaster Assistance to Individuals and Households—Other Needs; 97.036, Disaster Grants—Public Assistance (Presidentially Declared Disasters); 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant.)

W. Craig Fugate,

Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

[FR Doc. 2010-23709 Filed 9-21-10; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 9111-23-P
#### In re Jane DOE.

No. 4D11-919.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

March 24, 2011.

Ana Gomez-Mallada, Fort Lauderdale, for petitioner.

PER CURIAM.

The minor appeals the trial court’s order deferring her petition for a judicial waiver of parental notice for termination of pregnancy, pending completion of a court-ordered mental health exam. Because no final order has been rendered, we treat the notice of appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus, and the statute compels the automatic granting of the petition.

Pursuant to section 390.01114(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2010), the trial court “shall rule, and issue written findings of fact and conclusions of law, within 48 hours after the petition is filed, except that the 48-hour limitation may be extended at the request of the minor.” If the court does not rule within 48 hours, the petition is automatically granted, and the clerk must issue the minor a certificate indicating that the notice requirement is waived. Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.820(d)(3).

In this case, the trial court did not rule within 48 hours, and the record does not indicate that the minor consented to the extension of time. Neither the Rules of Juvenile Procedure nor section 390.01114 permits the trial court to defer ruling on a petition for judicial waiver pending a psychological evaluation of the minor. As such, the petition was automatically granted after the expiration of the initial 48-hour window. *See In re*A.S., 909 So.2d 524, 525 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). Accordingly, we remand with instructions for the trial court to enter an order granting petitioner’s petition and for the clerk of the circuit court to issue a certificate of judicial waiver of notice to petitioner.

The record also reflects that petitioner is a resident of Miami-Dade County. Section 390.01114(4)(a) states that a minor may seek a judicial waiver in “any circuit court in a judicial circuit within the jurisdiction of the District Court of Appeal in which she resides.” The statute establishes the proper venue for these kinds of cases and is not jurisdictional. *In re Doe 07-B,*973 So.2d 627, 629 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). Because petitioner resides in the jurisdiction of the Third District Court of Appeal, venue in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit was not proper, and the trial court should have transferred the case to a circuit court within the proper appellate district. However, as the statute is not jurisdictional, and as expeditious review is required, we do not believe that transfer at this date is required or warranted.

*Petition granted with instructions.*

WARNER, CIKLIN and LEVINE, JJ„ concur.
**Exhibit 32.1**CERTIFICATION PURSUANTSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002In connection with the Quarterly Report of MakeMusic, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-QSB forthe three months ended September 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the“Report”), I, John W. Paulson, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.        Date:  November 9, 2007 /s/ John W. Paulson   John W. Paulson, Chief Executive Officer
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

**PENNSYLVANIA SERVICES CORPORATION, TRADING AS**  **EMERALD COAL RESOURCES, LP,**

**AND PENNSYLVANIA LAND HOLDINGS COMPANY, LLC** 

**v.**

**TEXAS EASTERN TRANSMISSION, LP**

**PETITION OF: AMICUS CURIAE**

**INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS**

**ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA :** 

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**: No. 78 WM 2014** 

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW **, this 24 th**  **day of November, 2014, the Application for Leave to File** 

**Amicus Curiae Statement in Support of Petition for Al lowance of Appeal is**  DENIED

**.**
#### Strole et al. *v.*McCleary, Executrix etc.

[No. 19,497.

Filed September 21, 1960.]

*54
      *Charles W. Vincent, William R. Johnson*and *Buena Chaney,*all of Terre Haute, for appellants.

*Dix, Dix, Patrick, Ratcliffe & Hicks,*of Terre Haute, for appellee.

Bierly, C. J.

Appellants filed transcript and assignment of errors on July 25, 1960. Appellants’ brief was due on or before August 24, 1960. No brief was filed on said date.

On September 6,1960, appellants presented a “Motion for Reinstatement of their Appeal,” charging the secretary of their attorney with failure to follow instructions to file appellants’ brief on August 24, 1960. Appellants acknowledged said date of August 24, 1960 was the 30th day following the filing of transcript and assignment of errors.

*55Appellee filed on September 8, 1960 her “Verified Objections to Appellants’ Motion for Reinstatement of their Appeal.”

It is not necessary to consider appellee’s verified objection in order to pass on appellants’ “Motion for Reinstatement of their Appeal.”

> “Appeals are frequently dismissed by an order entered by the clerk because of the failure of appellant to file his brief within the time limited.” Flanagan, Wiltrout and Hamilton, §2666, Comment 4.

“Should the clerk overlook the late filing and make no dismissal of the appeal, this court may order the clerk to enter such dismissal or the court may itself make such order.” Flanagan, Wiltrout and Hamilton, *supra.*

The Supreme Court further has held that an agreement by the parties that the appeal be not dismissed for late filing of appellant’s brief is unavailing, as the rule of the court cannot be waived by the parties. *Leatherman et al.*v. *Board of Commissioners of Orange County*(1897), 148 Ind. 282, 47 N. E. 458.

This court has held that an appeal will not be reinstated on motion of appellant on the ground that his attorney was sick and unable to prepare the brief, it not being shown why no extension of time for filing the brief was requested. *Cline*v. *Gould*(1897), 17 Ind. App. 647, 47 N. E. 237. The court in conclusion in said case said:

> “It is a practice of both this court and the Supreme Court to strictly enforce the rule dismissing appeals for a failure upon the part of counsel to file a brief within the time allowed therein. It is absolutely necessary, to insure the speedy determination of causes, that this be done.”

*56While this court may perceive that through an Act of God or due to some extreme casualty or accident, it may be impossible for an appellant to file a motion for an extension of time as provided by statute, nevertheless, we do not conclude that the case at bar falls within such condition. This court has no alternative other than to dismiss this cause of action with costs, if any, assessed against appellants.

Appellants’ motion to reinstate is overruled.

Note. — Reported in 169 N. E. 2d 206.
ex10_2.htm


  
    Exhibit
10.2

     

    FORM
OF WAIVER

     

    In
consideration for the benefits I will receive as a result of my employer’s
participation in the United States Department of the Treasury’s TARP Capital
Purchase Program, I hereby voluntarily waive any claim against the United States
or my employer for any changes to my compensation or benefits that are required
to comply with the regulation issued by the Department of the Treasury as
published in the Federal Register on October 20, 2008.

     

    I
acknowledge that this regulation may require modification of the compensation,
bonus, incentive and other benefit plans, arrangements, policies and agreements
(including so-called “golden parachute” agreements) that I have with my employer
or in which I participate as they relate to the period the United States holds
any equity or debt securities of my employer acquired through the TARP Capital
Purchase Program.

     

    This
waiver includes all claims I may have under the laws of the United States or any
state related to the requirements imposed by the aforementioned regulation,
including without limitation a claim for any compensation or other payments I
would otherwise receive, any challenge to the process by which this regulation
was adopted and any tort or constitutional claim about the effect of these
regulations on my employment relationship.

     

    IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto signed my name this ____ day of December,
2008.

    
 

     

    
      	 	 	 
	 	Name:
#### Christopher GREEN v. NATIONAL OILWELL VARCO.

No. 2011-C-1102.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 16, 2011.

In re National Oilwell Vareo; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 04, No. 09-01933; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-1041.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.
#### STATE ex rel. Dennis Ray WASHINGTON v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-0108.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 17, 2010.

In re Washington, Dennis Ray; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lincoln, 3rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 1976-F-24138.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; *State ex rel. Glover v. State,*93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.
UN PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23

- 6591

KHAMMESHERMA SMITH
,
Plaintiff

- Appellant
,

v.
LIEUTENANT SIMON; OFFICER ISSACS
,
Defendants

- Appellees,

and
UNKNOWN INMATE 1; UNKNOWN INMATE 2 (FI:B),

Defendants

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Greenville

. Richard Mark Gergel , District Judge. ( 6:22

- cv

- 02592

- RMG )

Submitted : September 28 , 2023 Decided: October 3, 2023

Before NIEMEYER, THACKER , and R USHING
, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Khammesherma Smith, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-6591 Doc: 13 Filed: 10/03/2023 Pg: 1 of 22 PER CURIAM:

Khammesherma Smith seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing his 42

U.S.C. § 1983 action . We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of
appeal was not timely filed.
In civil cases, p arties have 30 days after the entry of the district court’s final
judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court
extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period under
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely fili ng of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a
jurisdictional requirement.” Bowles v. Russell , 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).

The district court entered its order on February 24, 2023

. Smith filed t he notice of
appeal on June 9, 2023

. * Because Smith failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain
an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this cour t and argument would not aid the
decisional process.

DISMISSED

* For the purpose of this appeal, we assume that the date appearing on the notice of appeal is the earliest date Smith could have delivered the notice to prison officials for mailing to the court. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c) (1) ; Houston v. Lack , 487 U.S. 266 , 276 (1988). USCA4 Appeal: 23-6591 Doc: 13 Filed: 10/03/2023 Pg: 2 of 2
#### F. A. Mohrhardt v. S. P. & T. N. R’y Co.

(No. 1760.)

Appeal from Harrison County.

Opinion by

Hurt, J.

§ 322. *Distinct causes of action arising upon the same contract may he sued upon separately.*Appellee contracted to pay appellant for his services at the rate of $75 per month, the pay to be due at the end of each month. *Held:*Under this contract appellant had the right to sue appellee, if not paid, at the end of each month, or he might join in one suit a part of the time, two or more months, or the whole time. Each month’s service gave to appellant a separate and distinct cause of action upon which he could have sued in justice’s court. The fact that his wages were all due at the time of the institution of his suits would not abridge his right to *279bring separate suits. [Lander v. Rounsaville, 12 Tex. 195; Ferguson v. Culton, 8 Tex. 283; W. & W. Con. Rep. § 290.]

October 15, 1884.

§ 323. *Consolidation of suits; jurisdiction.*Appellant instituted two suits in tbe county court, to recover for services alleged to be due him, under a contract such as is stated in the preceding section. The amount claimed in each suit was within the jurisdiction of the county court, but the aggregate amount claimed in both suits exceeded the jurisdiction of that court. Appellee moved to consolidate the two suits, which motion was granted. Appellant then moved to dismiss the consolidated suit because the amount in controversy exceeded $1,000, and was not, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the court. This motion was also sustained and the suits dismissed. *Held,*error. The suits were properly brought, and should not have been consolidated to defeat the jurisdiction of the court.

Reversed and remanded.
#### Pam SOLIS v. NPK, L.L.C. and Parish Partners Company, L.L.C.

No. 2011-C-1094.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 16, 2011.

In re NPK L.L.C. et al.; Parish Partners Company L.L.C.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 660-979; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-CA-465.

Denied.
#### Brian DOYAL v. VERNON PARISH SCHOOL BOARD.

No. 2011-C-0400.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 8, 2011.

In re Doyal, Brian; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation, District 2, No. 04-05616; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10^127.

Denied.
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

DAVID HESSELTINE,

Appellant,

v.

JODY ELLEN SHERMAN,

Appellee.

No. 4D2023-2532

[July 11, 2024]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm 

Beach County; James Laird Martz, II, Judge; L.T. Case No. 

502022DR003878.

David L. Hesseltine, Delray Beach, pro se.

Nancy A. Hass of Nancy A. Hass, P.A., Ft. Lauderdale, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KLINGENSMITH, C.J., MAY and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
#### KITTLE v. MARTIN *et al.*

On tlie hearing of habeas corpus issued on application of the father of a minor prisoner under arrest and held by officers under an extradition warrant, it was error to reject evidence material to the issue whether the prisoner was a fugitive from justice.

No. 6238.

April 14, 1928.

Habeas corpus. Before Judge Bradwell. City court of Athens. September 10, 1927.

*Claud Mdhaffey*and *Shackelford & Shackelford,*for plaintiff.

Beck, P. J.

Under an extradition warrant issued by the Governor of this State upon a requisition of the Governor of South Carolina, J. K. Kittle was arrested and turned over to Martin, as agent for the State of South Carolina, to receive the prisoner and take him back to that State. The requisition was based on a warrant issued by a magistrate of the State of South Carolina upon an affidavit made before him. Carl Kittle, the father of the defendant in the criminal proceeding, brought his petition for a writ of habeas corpus against the officers holding his son. Answer to this petition was filed. Upon the trial the applicant showed that J. K. Kittle was a minor; that he had bought a phonograph from the prosecutors for $200; that the property had been tendered back to the vendors; that considerable payments upon it had been made; that J. K. Kittle was quite sick, having contracted tuberculosis; and that petitioner took him out of the mill where he was working and brought him to Clarke County, Georgia. This evidence, after it had been introduced, was rejected by the court, and that ruling is excepted to.

The court erred in rejecting this evidence. It was material upon the question as to whether or not the person arrested and held in custody was a fugitive from justice. If he was a minor, his people had the right to bring him to Georgia, and it was his duty to come with them. While the guilt or innocence of one charged with an offense against the law can not be inquired into in habeas-corpus *251proceedings, whether he is a fugitive from justice is a material question; and the evidence submitted by the applicant for habeas corpus in this case was uncontroverted. The rejection of the evidence was error. *Dawson*v. *Smith,*150 *Ga.*350 (103 S. E. 846). See also cases collected in 7 Mich. Enc. Dig. 15.

*Judgment reversed.*

*All the Justices concur.*