Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell, and 

Keenan, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, 

 VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, 

 DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, 

 EX REL. JANET MAY 

OPINION BY JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 

v. Record No. 961377 

 April 18, 1997 

RAYMOND M. WALKER 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 The issue in this appeal is whether a circuit court had 

jurisdiction to entertain an appeal of a judgment of a juvenile 

and domestic relations district court when the appealing party 

failed to post an appeal bond. 

 In May 1986, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District 

Court of Hanover County (the District Court) ordered Raymond M. 

Walker to pay Janet May $100 per week for the support of his two 

children. In March 1994, the Division of Child Support 

Enforcement (the Division) sought and obtained a show cause 

order, claiming that Walker was in arrears in his support 

payments. On September 9, 1994, following a hearing on the show 

cause order, the District Court found Walker in contempt of court 

for his failure to pay support in the amount of $2,395. The 

court sentenced Walker to six months in jail, but suspended the 

sentence on the condition that Walker pay the arrearage and 

continue to pay support. 

 On September 12, 1994, Walker noted an appeal to the Circuit 

Court of Hanover County (the Circuit Court). No appeal bond was 

set by the District Court or its clerk, and Walker posted no 
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appeal bond. 

 On April 4, 1995, Walker and the Division appeared before 

the Circuit Court. The Division claimed that the Circuit Court 

did not have jurisdiction to hear the case because Walker had not 

posted the appeal bond required by Code § 16.1-296(H). The 

Circuit Court ruled that it had jurisdiction, heard the case on 

its merits, and found that Walker was not in arrears. 

 The Division appealed the jurisdictional issue to the Court 

of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court's 

judgment, concluding that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction even 

though Walker had not posted an appeal bond. Commonwealth Ex 

Rel. May v. Walker, 22 Va. App. 230, 468 S.E.2d 695 (1996). The 

Court of Appeals held that, "where a [district] court fails to 

require an appeal bond as required by statute, the circuit court 

is not deprived of its jurisdiction." Id. at 233, 468 S.E.2d at 

697. We awarded the Division an appeal. 

 At the time the present case was before both the District 

Court and the Circuit Court, Code § 16.1-296(H) provided, in 

pertinent part, the following: 

 No appeal bond shall be required of a party 

appealing from an order of a juvenile and domestic 

relations district court except for that portion of any 

order or judgment establishing a support arrearage 

. . . . In cases involving support, no appeal shall be 

allowed unless and until the party applying for the 

same or someone for him shall give bond, in an amount 

and with sufficient surety approved by the judge or by 

his clerk if there is one, to abide by such judgment as 

may be rendered on appeal if the appeal is perfected 

or, if not perfected, then to satisfy the judgment of 

the court in which it was rendered. 
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 Code § 16.1-296(H) could not be more clear: "no appeal 

shall be allowed" unless and until a bond is given by the party 

applying for the appeal. The statutory requirements for appeal 

bonds always have been construed as mandatory, and the exercise 

of appellate jurisdiction has been confined to the provisions of 

the written law. The Covington Virginian v. Woods, 182 Va. 538, 

543, 29 S.E.2d 406, 408 (1944). We repeatedly have held that 

"[the] failure to substantially comply with the statutory 

requirements applicable to appeal bonds constitutes a 

jurisdictional defect which cannot be corrected after the 

expiration of the time within which an appeal may be taken." 

Parker v. Prince William County, 198 Va. 231, 235, 93 S.E.2d 136, 

139 (1956); accord Ness v. Manuel, 187 Va. 209, 212, 46 S.E.2d 

331, 332 (1948); Woods, 182 Va. at 548, 29 S.E.2d at 411; 

Southern Ry. Co. v. Thomas, 182 Va. 788, 795, 30 S.E.2d 575, 578 

(1944); Forrest v. Hawkins, 169 Va. 470, 477, 194 S.E. 721, 723 

(1938); Clinch Valley Lumber Corp. v. Hagan Estates, 167 Va. 1, 

4-5, 187 S.E. 440, 441-42 (1936); Brooks v. Epperson, 164 Va. 37, 

43, 178 S.E. 787, 789 (1935). 

 In the present case, Code § 16.1-296(H) mandated an appeal 

bond, and the posting of such bond was required within 30 days 

from the date of judgment. Godlewski v. Gray, 221 Va. 1092, 

1096-97, 277 S.E.2d 213, 216 (1981).*

 However, no bond was 

 

 *In 1995, the General Assembly amended Code § 16.1-296(H), 

consistent with Godlewski, by adding the following: "An appeal 

will not be perfected unless such appeal bond as may be required 

is filed within thirty days from the entry of the final judgment 
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posted within the 30-day period. We hold, therefore, that the 

Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 

 In so holding, we reject the Court of Appeals' ruling that, 

because the District Court failed to require a bond, the Circuit 

Court was not deprived of its jurisdiction. We conclude that 

Code § 16.1-296(H) places the burden on the party applying for 

the appeal to ask for and to have the district court set the bond 

and approve the surety. It is fundamental that the appealing 

party has the burden of perfecting his appeal. See, e.g., White

v. Morano, 249 Va. 27, 30, 452 S.E.2d 856, 858 (1995) (onus is 

upon appellant to provide reviewing court with sufficient 

record). 

 We also reject the Court of Appeals' conclusion that, based 

upon Code § 16.1-114.1, "equitable considerations" dictated that, 

 under the facts of the present case, the Circuit Court obtained 

jurisdiction. 22 Va. App. at 235, 468 S.E.2d at 697. Code 

§ 16.1-114.1 provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o warrant, 

motion or other pleading shall be dismissed by reason of a mere 

defect, irregularity or omission in the proceedings in the 

district court." In the present case, the failure to post an 

appeal bond is not a "mere defect, irregularity or omission in 

the proceedings;" rather, it is a fatal jurisdictional defect 

that cannot be cured. See Hurst v. Ballard, 230 Va. 365, 367, 

(..continued) 

or order [of a juvenile and domestic relations district court]." 

 1995 Va. Acts ch. 517. The amendment became effective on July 

1, 1995, after the Circuit Court's ruling in the present case. 
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337 S.E.2d 284, 285 (1985) (decided under former Code § 16.1-

114); cf. Burks v. Three Hills Corp., 214 Va. 322, 323-24, 200 

S.E.2d 521, 522 (1973) (appeal bond in deficient amount held 

curable). 

 Finally, we also reject the Court of Appeals' ruling that 

Walker's failure to post an appeal bond was harmless error 

because he prevailed on the merits in the Circuit Court. As 

previously noted, the Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction; 

therefore, its purported judgment on the merits is void. See

Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 787, 793, 284 S.E.2d 824, 827 

(1981). 

 Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals and reinstate the District Court's judgment which became 

final when Walker failed to perfect his appeal. 

Reversed and final judgment.