T he H onorabl e T homas W
. P hi l l i ps, U ni t ed St at es D i s t r i ct Ju dge f or t he E as t er n D i s t r i ct of T enn es s ee, * si t t i ng by desi gnat i o n.

NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0653n.06 F iled: Septem ber 5, 2007 Case No. 06- 1751 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,
v. BRIAN COURTNEY JOHNSON, Defendan t-Appellant.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE E ASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIG AN AT DE TR OIT

BEFORE: BATCHE L DE R and COL E, Circuit Judges, and P HILL IP S, District Judge. * THOMAS W. P HILL IP S, District Judge. The matter befor e the Court involves an appe al of a criminal judg ment enter ed followingthe def endant- appellant' s conditional g uilty plea of firea rm po sse ssi on . De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla nt' s app e a l is ba se d on ess e nti a lly tw o g ro un ds : ( 1) the of fi c e rs did not have r e a s o n a

b le s u s p ic io nth a t d e f

e n d an t w a s e n g a g e d

in c r im in a l a c ti v it

y to w ar r an t a n investigatory detention in violation of defe ndant' s rig hts unde r the Four th A mendment, and (2) the
o ff i ce rs we re n o t j u s t i fi ed i n s ea rc h i n g d ef en d an t fo r we ap o n s , t h u s v i o l at i n g d e fe n d an t 's constitutional rights g uara nteed unde r th e Fo u rt h Amendment. B ased on the totality of the circ umstances, we find that the off icer s were justified i n t h ei r actions involvi ng both the stop and pat down of the defe ndant. Acc ording ly , we find that the m otion to suppress was c orre ctly denied,2

and we a ff ir m th e de c isi on

of the dis tr ic t c ourt
. I. Bac kgr ound On t he morningof June 15, 2003, at 1:25 a.m., Detroit Police Off icer s Khistopher Ric ha rd so n a nd Jevo n Joh ns on

we re dis patc he d to 43 88 Cle me nts Str e e t, in the City of De tr oit , w ith
re sp e c t to a

re po rt of g un sh ots be ingfi re d. Th e of fi c e rs arr ive d o n Cl e me nts Str e e t at 1: 35 a .m. to inv e sti g a te the matte r. Th e of fi c e rs did no t spe a k to anyon e a t the a dd re ss g ive n, a s it

did no t e xist; howeve r, the off

icer s spoke to a nea

rby resident, Anita Robe rtson, who denied that shots were f ired. Whil e the de fenda

nt asserts that the of

fice rs had c onclude d t h at no shots had bee n fired, the go v ern m en tas s er t s t h at t h e o ff i ce rs co n t i nu edt o i n v es t i gat e t h e s h o o t i n g. At 1:50 a.m., Offic ers Richa rdson and Johnson were c alled to a "hit and run" acc ident scene at the interse ction of De x ter a nd West Davison t o assist police offic ers who ha d previously arr ived. Parame dics from De troit Emerg ency Medi c a l S e r

v ic e s ( " E M S" ) h a d

been c alled to the ac cident sce ne
a pp ro xima te ly tw o m in ut es af

ter Offi cers Ri char ds on andJ oh ns on hadbeen di sp atc hedfor th e " sh ots fi re d" c a ll. Whe n Of

fi c e rs Ric ha

rd so n and John so n arr ive d a t the a c c ide nt s c e ne , th e y fo un d o nly
one seve rely

damag ed and inope rable vehicle a n d no driver or

passeng ers. The office rs then fo llo we d th e tr a il o f a

uto fl uid s to the oth e r c ar i nv olv e d in the ac c ide nt, wh ic h w a s lo c a te d ju st a few blocks awa

y . This vehicle was a lso severe ly damag ed with a de ploy ed air bag , a smashed windshield in a spiderwe b pattern a s if the driver had hit it, front end dama g e, and blood c overing t h e i n t e r i o r . F u rt h e r , t h e i g n i t i o nh a d b e e nt o r no u ts o t h a ti tc o u l d

b e o p e r a t e d

w i t h o u ta

k e y, indicating to the office rs that the vehic le had be en stolen. No drive r or pa sseng ers we re pr esent. The office rs wer e aided by information from a caller that the driver had "ba iled out" o f t h e vehicle,3

abandoningit. Unfortunately , no descr iption of the driver w as provided. Offic ers Richardson and J ohnson then went to a nea rby liquor store, D& LParty

Store, locate d at the cor ner of Davison and L iv er n o i s Av en ues, which w as about one block awa y from the abandone d vehicle, to f

ind leads as to the whe rea b o uts of the driver . At the store, a n anony mous
source claimed to have observe d a black male wea ring dark clothes, bleedingfrom the he ad, wa lking east on Davison awa

y from the D& L Party

Store, that is, in the direction lea ding ba ck to the sce ne of the hit and run a ccide nt. The off icer s proce eded back to D avison wher e they saw a black male , who was ble eding from the he ad and w alking east, two-te nths of a mile from the ac cident sce ne. The office rs testified that the male, who in f act was defe ndant Br ian J ohnson, appea red to be intox icated, injured, and disorie nted. Off icer J ohnson asked de fenda

nt J ohns o n if he wa s "oka y ." Johnson replied that "some guy s jumped me." Acc ording to the g overnmen t , since Johnson had injuries
c on sis te nt w iththe e vid e nc e fo un d in the a ba nd on e d ve hic le , wa s wa lki ngin a hig h- c ri me are a

late at nig ht in the vicinity of the acc ident, and appe are d disoriented as w ell as intox icated, the office rs believed Johnson was the driver o f the a bandoned ve hicle and de cided to tempora rily detain and question him reg ardingthe h i t an d run incident involving a stolen vehic le. Moreve r, the off icer s de ta ine d th e de fe nd ant f

or purp os e s o f p ro vid ingme dic a l tr e a tme nt. The de fenda

nt w as then subjected to a pat-down befor e being place d in the squad ca r to be transporte d back to the a ccide nt scene for investig ati o n and medica l treatment. Ac cordingto the g overnme nt, all suspects to be place d in the back of a patrol ca r ar e fr isked for w eapons in a n eff ort to ensure of

fice r saf ety pursuant to De t ro it Pol ice De partment policy . When the defe ndant was frisked, O ffice r Richar dson felt a he avy , hard obje ct that he be lieved to be a g un. I ndeed, de fenda

nt4

wa s in the po sse ssi on

of a fi re arm loc a te d in

his ri g ht f

ro nt p ant p oc ke t. A f te r th e d e f

e n d an t w a s tr an s p o rte d to th e a c c id e n t s c e n e , O f f ic e r Jo h n s o n frisked the defe ndant ag ain and f

ound another

firea rm conc eale d in his waistband. After the defendant re fused treatment, the office rs transpor ted him to the prec inct for booking . Detroit Police L ieutenant Wil liam Brown was the de sk supervisor at the Tenth Prec inct when the de fenda nt ar ri v ed for booking a nd observe d that the def

endant ha d sustained head lace rations. After noting the injuries in t he da ily de ta il b lotte r, L ie ute na

nt B ro wn se nt t he de fe nd ant t o th e ho sp ita l. Th e de fe nd ant la te r co nf

e sse d to bei ngin a

n a uto a c c ide nt, su sta ini nga

he a d in jur y a s a re su lt of the a ccide n t , an d ca rr y i ng two firea rms. Howeve r, the de fenda nt was not the driver

of the abandone d stolen vehicle; ra ther, he was the dr iver of the vehicle that was found at the scene of the hit and ru n a c c ide nt. On J un e 27 , 20 03 , Joh ns on wa s c ha rg e d in a c ri min a l c omp la int

wi th b e inga

fe lon in possession of a firea

rm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g )(1)
. A one-c ount indictment wa s returne d for the sa me offe nse on J uly 10, 2003. There afte r, J ohnson was charg ed in a superce ding indictment with being an Armed Caree r C riminal in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) , as we ll as possession of a fire arm by

a convic ted fe lon in violation of 18 U.S.C . § 922(g )(1)
. I n the cour se of the pr ocee dings, Johnson filed a motion to suppress the firea rms that formed the basis of the c harg e ag ainst him. After e videntiary hear ings, a ddit ional briefing , and ora l arguments, the district court ente red a n o rd er d en ying the motion to s uppress. Johnson t here afte r enter ed a c onditional plea pursuant to Fe d. R. Crim. P . 11(a) (2), r eser ving the rig ht to challeng e the
s u p p re s s i o ni s s u e. J o h n s o nre ce i v ed1 8 0 m o n t h s ’ i mp ri s o n m en tas p u n i s h m en tat s en t en ci n g.5

John so n th e n f

ile d th is t ime ly

a pp e a l. II. Ana lys is The fac tual deter

minations in a district court' s suppression order are revie wed for clear e rror while the application of the law to those fac ts is revie wed de novo. United States v. Townsend , 330 F .3 d 4 38 , 4 39 (6 th C ir . 2 00 3) . F ur the r, thi s c ourt

wi ll c on sid e r t

he " e vid e nc e in t

he lig ht m os t li ke ly to supp ort th e di st ri ct cou rt 's deci si on ." United States v. Marx en , 410 F.3d 326, 328 (6th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted) (punctuation altered) , cert. de nied , 410 F.3d 326 ( 2006). On appe a l, Jo h n s o nr e a s s e rts th e ar g u me n ts th a t h e r a is e d b e lo w . H e ma in ta in s th a t the of fi c e rs did no t hav e a wa

rr ant, pr ob a

ble c a us e to a rr e st o r s e arc h, or

re a so na ble su sp ic ion

to d e ta in or fr isk him, and that all evidenc e, obtained afte r the encounte r with the police, was the fruit of the "poisonous tre e," that is, an unconstitutional searc h and seizure. Ac cording ly , J ohnson urg es the Court to rever se the district cour t's de nial of his motion to s uppress. A. The stop Consist ent with the Four

th Amendment, any

office r may

temporar ily

detain an ind ividual whom he or she has rea sonable suspicion, ba sed on specific and articula ble fac ts, to believe that the individual is, wa s, or is a

bout to be, eng ag ed in cr iminal activity
. Se e Te rry v . O hio , 392 U.S. 1, 21 (18 68 ); United States v. Cortez , 4 4 9 U
. S. 4 1 1 , 4 1 7 ( 1 9 8 1 )
. Re v ie w in g c o u rts " mu s t lo o k at the ‘totality of the c ircumstance s' of eac h case to se e whether the detaining office r has a ‘ particula rized and ob jec ti ve bas is ' for s us pect in g legal w ron gdoi ng." Un ite d S tates v . A rv izu , 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) ( quoting Cort ez , 4 49 U. S. at 41 7) ; see Un i t ed States v. Sok olow , 490 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989) (finding that althoug h the fa cts may be co n s i s t en t with innocence , all that is require d to justi fy an6

investigatory stop is that the offic er' s suspicion be " rea sonable" and " articula ble" as dete rmined by the totality

of the c ircumstance s). Obser vat i o n s leadingto an " inarticulate hunch" that criminal
a c tiv ity is a fo ot a re ins uf fi c ie nt t o ju sti fy a de te nti on , b ut r e a so na ble su sp ic ion

re qu ir e s c on sid e ra

bly less than proof of wrong doing by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. Te rry , 3 92 U. S. at 22 ; United Sta te s v . H ur st , 228 F.3d 751, 757 ( 6th Cir.2000) ( citing Sokolow , 49 0 U. S. at 7) ; Ho us ton v . Clar k County Sheriff Deputy John D oes 1-5 , 17 4 F .3 d 80 9, 81 3 (6 th Cir .1 99 9)
. Re g ardin g reaso nable suspicion as requir ed for

Terr y stops, the Six th Circuit has s t at ed t hat " the district court is at an instit utional a dvantag e, having observe d the testimony of the witnesses and understandi n g local condition s , i nm ak i n g t h i s d et erm i n at i o n , " an d t h er ef o re , " ‘ d u e w ei gh t ’ s h o u l d

b e gi v en t o i n fe rences draw n fr om fact s b y

‘res id ent ju dges. ’ " Un ited St ate s v . Ca ru the rs , 458 F.3d 459, 464 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (c itations omi tted). The "totality of the c ircum s ta n c e s " in th is c a s e c o n s is ts o f s e v e r a l separa te piece s of information. When the offic ers ar ri v ed at the sc ene of the ac cident, only

one seve rely

damag ed
ve hic le wa s p re se nt, and the re wa s no sig n of any dr ive r o r p a sse ng e rs . T he of fi c e rs ha d r e a so na

ble suspicion that persons in the ac cident had violate d Michig an Compiled L aw ( "MCL ") § 257.617a, which, at the time of

the ac cident, stated:
Sec. 617a. The driver of a vehic le who knows or who has re ason to believe that he ha s be e n inv olv e d in an a c c ide nt u po n p ub lic or

pr ivate pr op e rt

y , w he n th e pr op e rt

y is open to trave l by the publ ic, resulting i n injury to a per son shall immediately stop his vehicle at the scene of the a ccide nt and shall rema in there[.]
Af t er l o ca t i n g t h e s ec o n d v e h i c l e afe w b l o ck s aw ay , t h e o ff i ce rs o b s erv edt h e v eh i cl e's damag e and c ondition, which indicated that the driver' s head was t hrust into the windshield resulting7

in open head lace rations, as we ll as indicating from the punc hed ig nition that the vehicle wa s stolen. Fur ther, off icer s had re ceive d an an o n y m o u s call that someone ha d "ba iled out" of the sec ond
ve hic le . A t th is p oin t, t

he off ice rs we re loo kin g fo r a

po te nti a lly

da ng e ro us ind ivi du a l on

fo ot, in
near proxi mity

to the abandone d vehicle, who had open head lacer ations, and possibly disoriented from the impac t of the collision. Th e of fi c e rs then recei ve d a

n in -p e rs on

re po rt fr om a c iti zen ou tsi de a ne arb y sto re tha t a black male in dark c lothes, who was blee ding f rom the hea d, was wa lking e ast on West Davison. The off icer s located the descr ibed i ndividual, defe ndant J ohnson, and initiated conve rsation. Afte r observingthe disorientation of J o h n s o n , the sig ns of intox ication, the open he ad lac erations, the closene ss of Johns on in both tim e and loc ation to the events, a s well as eva luating Johnson to be ly ing a s to the cause of his injuries, the offic ers be lieved Johnson t o be: (1) the driver of the stolen
c ar, (2 ) i nv olv e d in

the hit and ru n a c c ide nt, (3 ) whil e dr ivi ngint ox ica te d, and (4 ) m a kin g a

fa lse repor t as to the commission of a cr ime, all of which a re in violation of the law, nece ssitating the nee d to drive Johns on back to the sc ene of the ac cident. The specific , articula ble fa cts in d i ca t ed that John so n h a d c omm itt e d at le a st o ne of the a bo ve c ri me s. Mo re ov e r, the tim e of da y , th e hig h- c ri me
are a, and the suspicious a ctions and condition of J ohnson, support the finding that the offic ers ha d
rea sonable suspicion that cr iminal activity had occ urre d. United States v. W right , No. 06-5164, 2007 WL 1026668, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 3, 2007) (Slip copy). I n s um, we c on c ur

wi th t he dis tr ic t c ourt ' s r e a so nin g , w hic h in re le va nt p art is a s f oll ow s: I n the instant c ase, the Court f inds that g iven the totality of fa cts ava ilable to the two of fi c e rs , c omb ine d w iththe ir sp e c ia lize d tr a ini ngand

e xpe ri e nc e in d e a lin g wi th a uto a c c ide nts and

blo od ie d in div idu a ls w a lki ngdo wn the str e e t a t 1 a .m. , and

g ive n th e ir in ves ti gati on regardi ng th e sec on d car whi ch h ad a pun ched igni ti on , an d at th e D&L8

Part y S t o re, permitted them "to make infere nces f rom and de ductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained pe rson." R. 40: Opinion at 6/J A 84, citing Marxen , 410 F.3d at 331-32). Acco rd i n gly , the offic ers we re justified under the totality of the c ircumstance s to stop J ohnson. B. Th e pa t - do wn Whe n a n in div idu a l is su

bje c t to a lawf

ul i nv e sti g a tiv e de te nti on , a n o ff ic e r m ay c on du c t a limit ed fr isk or pat-down of that person f

or we apons if the of

fice r has a

rea sonable be lief that the suspect is arme d and dang erous . S e e Te rry , 39 2 U. S. a t 30 ; see also United States v . Strahan , 984 F .2 d 1 55 , 15 8 (6 th Cir
. 19 93 ) (a po lic e of fi c e r may c on du c t a lim ite d se arc h fo r c on c e a le d w e a po ns , if the of fi c e r b e lie ve s th a t a

su sp e c t may be da

ng e ro us ). Th e purp os e of thi s li mit e d s e arc h is no t to discover e vi d en ce o f a cr ime, but to allow the office r to pursue his investig ation without fear of violence. Adams v. W

illiams , 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972). I n an examination of the rec ord, the office rs did not merely suspect the de fenda

nt of flee ing the sce ne of the hit-and-r

un acc ident, the offic ers r easona bly suspected the defe ndant of be ing the dr ive r o f a

sto le n a uto mob ile inv olved in a hi t-and -r un a c c ide nt. Th e re a so na

ble ne ss o f t

his suspicion is sup p o rt ed by the following fac ts: (1) the off icer s observe d that the def endant’ s head injuries wer e consistent with hitting one’s h ea d against a w indshield (as found in the stolen automobile); (2) the defe ndant aske d for a ri d e at a l i quor store a cross the stre et from the stolen vehicle; a nd (3) the of

fice rs stopped the de fenda nt just t wo-tenths of a mile f rom the stolen vehicle
. The off icer s’ re asonable suspicion that the defendant was driving a stolen vehic le and that he fled the sc e ne - c omb ine d wi th the of fi c e rs ’ b e lie f t

hat th e de fe nd ant w a s ly

inga bo ut t he so ur c e of

his9

injuries, and the f

act that the of

fice rs found the de fenda

nt at 2:00 a .m., in a high crime ne ighbor hood, in close proxi mity in time and location to the unconfirme d (but not dismis sed) shots-fir ed alleg ations - per mitted the office rs to infer that the defe ndant was arme d and dang erous. Thus, the of fice rs wer e justified in submitt ing J ohnson to a pat- down sea rch f or we apons prior to plac ing him in the re ar of the vehicle to be transpor

ted to the acc ident scene for investiga tory and tre atment purposes. It is of no conseque nce to our analy sis that the office rs later lear ned that the de fenda

nt was not, in fac t, the dr ive r of the sto le n ve hic le be c a us e the re a so na

ble su sp ic ion

inq uir y c on sid e rs on ly

fa c ts k no wn to the of fi c e rs at the time of the detention
. Se e Te rry , 39 2 U .S. a t 21 (a sk ingwh e the r “ the fa c ts available to the office r at the moment of the seizure . .
. [would] war rant a man of reasona

ble ca ution in the belief that the action take n was a ppropriate ”). The g overnme nt presents a second justification for the pat- down of the defendant, that is, that a pat- down of suspec ts for dang erous objec ts before transportingthem in the back se at of a patrol
car was a part of pr oper pr ocedur e under the depa rtment' s policy . For

thi s p ro p o s i t i on, the g ov e rnme nt c la ims that at le a st two oth e r c ir c uit s h a ve up he ld a n a dmi nis tr a tiv e se arc h, wh ic h is applie d u n if o r ml y an d in d e p e n d e n t o f

w h e th e r th e r e is r e a s o n a

b le s u s p ic io nth a t a

p articular transporte e is arme d and dang erous. See U nited States v. Mc Cargo , 464 F.3d 192 (2nd Cir. 2006); United States v. Abok

hai , 829 F.2d 666 ( 8th Cir. 1987). Since the court finds that the totality of the circ umstances justified the pat-down in that the of fi c e rs ha d a

re a so na ble be lie f t

hat th e de fe nd ant w a s a

rm e d a nd da ng e ro us , th e c ourt

de c lin e s to dis c us s th e jus tif

ic a tio n f or a pat- do wn

purs ua nt t o a de pa rtme nt p ol icy st andinga lon e fo r a ll individuals placed i n a police ve hicle. Althoug h it does not appea r that the Six th Circuit has10

specific ally

addre ssed the constitutionality of a de partment policy requiringpat-downs f

or transporte es plac ed in the bac k of a patrol vehicle, the Six th Circuit has previously indicated that the ri g hts of c iti zen s are to b e c are fu lly c on sid e re d in

de ta inm e nt s itu a tio ns : Counsel may

shout "off

icer safe ty " until blue-in-the -fa ce, but the Fourth Ame ndment does not toler ate, nor has the Supreme Court or this Court ever condone d, pat-down sear ches w ithout som e spec ific and a rticulable f

acts to war

rant a rea sonable off

icer in the belief that the person detained was arme d and dang erous. The Supreme Court ha s, in i nte rp re tin g the F ourt h Am e ndme nt, str

uc k a ba lanc e be tw e e n th e jus tif ia ble conce rn for

office r saf

ety when co n fronting an individual and the substantial individual interest in being fre e from unrea sonable int rusion. The F rame rs' conce rns and cle ar intent to protec t i n d i viduals from ar bitrary g overnme nt intrusion was ens h ri n ed in the Four

th Amendment to preve nt situations s uch as those a lleg ed he re -o ff icers, h a vin g no re a so n to fe ar f or the ir sa fe ty , ma

y no t r e qu ir e c iti zen s, whom they

have not arr ested, to stand up ag ainst g ates or place their hands on police car s, and submit to searche s. This has long be en the law
. Be nn e tt v . Ci ty

of E as tpo inte , 410 F.3d 810, 841 ( 6th Cir. 2005).

III. Conclusi on As both the stop and pat-dow n wer e justified under the totality o f t h e ci rc umstances, the district court' s ruling to de ny the motion to suppress is affirmed.11

R. GUY COL E, JR., Circuit Judge, concurring. I a g re e wi th t he ma jor ity that w e sh ou ld aff irm the dec ision of the district court. I write sepa

rate ly beca use I disag ree wi t h P ar t I I
. B of the majority ’s o p i n i on. That is, Ido not believe the of fice rs had a

rea sonable ba sis to believe that John so n w a s arm e d and da ng e ro us . A we a

po ns fr isk un su

pp or te d b y thi s r e a so na

ble ba sis ty

pic a lly violates the F ourth Amendment. See, e .g. , Be nn e tt v . Ci ty of E as tpo inte , 410 F.3d 810, 836 ( 6th Cir. 2005) (“ To justify a p at -d own sea rch dur ing a Terry sto p th e F ourt h A me ndme nt r e qu ir e s a
rea sonable be lief that the suspect is armed a nd dang erous . . . .” ). None theless, I believe the limit ed
wea pons frisk of J ohnson, prior to pla cing him in the rear of the police car

for law ful transportation,
was c onstitut ionally permissible beca use t he officer s had a leg itimate law-e nforc ement purpose for placingJ ohnson in the police ca r, and the wea

pons frisk was e ffe ctuated in a ccor dance with a policedepar tment policy desig ned to ensure office r saf ety when tra nsporting suspe cts. See U nited States v. Mc Cargo , 464 F.3d 192, 1999 ( 2d Cir. 2006). A. Re as ona ble , I ndiv idua liz e d Suspi c ion th atJo hnso n Wa s A r m e d and D ang e r ous I n Te rry v . O hio , 3 92 U.S. 1 ( 19 68 ), the Sup re me Court did no t a do pt a

br ig ht- lin e ru le authorizing we apons fris k s i nal l o n -t h e- s t re et co n fr o n t at i o n al en co u n t er s , d es p i t e t h e o bvious dang er to police offic ers that inher es in these e ncounter s. Id . at 27 ; se e als o Ma ry lan d v . B uie , 494 U.S. 325, 334 n.2 (1990). That is, before an off icer eff ectuates a limited frisk for w eapons inc ident to a lawf ul Terry sto p, the of

fi c e r mus t have a re a so na ble be lie f that t he s us pect is both (1) a rmed, a nd (2) dang erous. Te rry , 39 2 U. S. a t 30
. Simp ly be lie vin g a su sp e c t is da ng e ro us , wi tho ut mo re, is ins uf fi c ie nt. “ Ev e n in

hig h c ri me are a s, wh e re the po ssi bil ity that any g ive n in div idu a l is arm e d is signific ant, Terry requir es re asonable , individualiz ed suspicion bef ore a frisk for wea pons can be12

conducte d.” Bu ie , 4 94 U. S. at 33 4 n .2 ; accord, e .g. , Be nn e tt , 410 F.3d at 841. The majority

contends that the of

fice rs had a

rea sonable, i n d i v i d ualized suspicion that J ohnson was armed because (1) J ohnson was found in a high-c rime ar ea; ( 2) off icer s suspected that J ohnson had fled the scene of a hit-a nd-run c ar a ccide nt; (3) J ohnson’s condition w as “suspicious,” namely , he wa s bloodied and disoriented; (4) office rs found J ohnson just two-te nths of a mile from a stolen vehic le; and (5) office rs believe d that there was a “possible link” betwe en Johnson and the
e arl ie r s ho ts- fi re d c a ll. (M a j. O p. 8– 9. ) I

c ann ot s e e ho w the fi rs t fo ur re a so ns in any wa y su pp or t a
rea soned basis for

believing that J ohnson was ar med. To my

mind, a bloodied, disoriented man found in a hig h-cr ime are a and be lieved to have been involved in an car accide nt, even if one of the
car s was possibly

stolen, does not provide off icer s with a rea sonable, individualiz ed suspicion that the man is armed
. Cf

. , e.g. , United States v. Lane , 909 F.2d 895, 900 (6th Cir. 1990) (concluding that of fi c e rs re a so na

bly be lie ve d s us pe c t w a s arm e d a nd da ng e ro us a ft e r h e “ t

w i c e a tt e m pte d to re a c h in to his c oat po c ke t” ); U

n ite d S ta te s v . M cKoy , 4 2 8 F.3d 38, 40–41 ( 1st. Cir. 2005) (“I t is sim ply not
rea sonable to infer

that a driver i s arme d and dange rous because the office rs believe that he appe ars
ne rv o u s an d

r e a c h e s t o w ar d

t h e c ar ’ s c o n s o l e w h e na p p r o a c h e d

b y p o l i c e , e v e ni na

h i g h- c ri me
ne ig hb or ho od .” ); Un ite d States v. S c ott , 2 70 F .3 d 3 0, 42 (1 st C ir . 2 00 1) (h old ingtha t a re a so na ble
su sp ic ion tha t a su sp e c t wa s invo lve d in a no nv iol e nt c ri me (f

ra ud ) d id n ot p ro vid e a

re a so ne d b a sis fo r b e lie vin g the su sp e c t w a s arm e d b e c a us e “ [t]his log ic wo uld

se e m to pe rm it a f

ri sk on re a so na ble
su sp ic ion of a lmo st a ny fe lony ” ); United States v. Thomas , 863 F.2d 622, 629 ( 9th Cir. 1998) (“An office r ca nnot simpl y

frisk all ‘pr etty

b i g’ gu y s wi thout more specif ic objective r easons why

the suspect posed a

risk to the safe ty

of the off icer .”).13

As fo r t he fi ft h r e a so n, if

in f a c t th e re wa s a

pla us ibl e lin k b e tw e e n Joh ns on and the sh ots
fired c all, then I

would ag ree that the offic ers had a reasonable , individualiz ed suspi cion t hat J ohnson
was a rmed. The office rs’ be lief, howe ver, that J ohnson was invol ved in the nearby shooting stra ins
cre dulity . The off

icer s orig inally

responde d to a repor

t of shots f

ired at 4388 Clements Stre et. They
arr ived at the sc ene at 1:35 a m. T he office rs’ investigation of the shots f ired be g an and e nded whe n they rea liz ed that the a ddress did not exist and spoke to a neighbor hood resident who de nied hea ring any g unshots. Fiftee n m i n u t es l ater , at 1:50 am, the off icer s left Clements Street af ter the police dispatcher

sent them, as bac kup, to the scene of a c ar a ccide nt a half mile a way . The off

icer s cannot plausibly maintain that they wer e still investigating the shots-fired c all when they arr ived at the sc ene of a w hol l y u n re l at ed car a ccide nt, where they wer e to ac t as bac kup to the primary unit that had alre ady arr ived, and whe re e merg ency medical pe rsonnel we re a lrea dy prese nt. Absent any

evidenc e
or a r easona

ble infer ence that the shots-fire d call and the hit-and-r un acc ident wer e re lated, the majority ’s ana ly sis would permit office rs t o presume that any one found w ithin som e time per iod and some distance of

a shots-fire d call is arme d and dang erous. This is too wide-swe epinga pre sumption. There is simpl y

nothing he re, ba sed on spec ific, ar ticulable fa cts, that an en co u n t er with J ohnson would lead “ a re asonably prudent [office r under ] t he cir cumstance s” to beli ev e t hat J ohnson was
arme d and “that [ the offic er’ s] s afe ty or that of other s was in dang er.” Te rry , 392 U.S. at 27. B. Weapons Fr isk Pursuant to P olice-D epartm ent P olicy As a thre shold matter, the officer s wer e jus tified in placingJ ohnson in the back of the police
c ar a nd tr ans po rt inghim

ba c k to the sc e ne of the a c c ide nt. Th e Sup re me Court ha s r e c og nize d th a t, in some circumstanc es, police ma y transport a

suspect a shor

t distance in aid of a Terry stop, s ee14

United States v. Place , 462 U.S. 696, 706 (1983), so long as the transpor t is reasona

ble, see U nited States v. Sharpe , 470 U.S. 675, 686– 8 7 (1 9 85) (“ The que stion is not simply whether some other alternative was available, but whe ther the police act unr easona bly in failing to rec og nize or pursue it. ” ). I n a dd iti on , fou r of

our s ist e r c ir c uit s, have sp e c if ic a lly he ld t hat th e po lic e may

tr ans po rt a suspect for identification purpose s as par t of a Te rry

stop. See U

nited States v. Mc Cargo , 464 F.3d 19 2, 19 9 (2 d Cir . 2 00 6) ; United States v. Mc Carthy , 7 7 F .3 d 5 22 , 5 31 (1 st C ir . 1 99 6) ; United States v. Dick son , 5 8 F .3 d 1 25 8, 12 63 -6 4 ( 8th Cir . 1 99 5) ; U

n i t e d S t a t es v . S ho rt , 5 7 0 F.2d 1051, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1978). He re, tra nsporting Johnson two- tenths of a mile bac k to the scene of the a ccide nt further ed the leg itimate law-e nforc ement purpose of confirming or dispelling whe ther Johnson was involved in the hit-and-r

un acc ident—no doubt, witnesses at the sce ne could identify J ohnson as an
oc c up ant o f o ne of

the tot a le d c ars , o r whe the r h e wa s in vo lve d in the a c c ide nt at a ll. The only question rema ining then is w hether the Four th A mendment prohibits police from conducting a we apons fr isk of a suspec t, pursuant to depar tmental policy , prior to placingthe suspect in the back of

a police c ar f

or lawf ul tran s port, wher e the police lack a rea sonable be lief that the suspect is arme d. Ibelieve that the frisk her e wa s permitted by the Four th Amendment. Al tho ug h th e Sixth Cir c uit ha s n ot y e t a dd

re sse d th e iss ue , th e Se c on d Ci rc uit re c e ntl y he ld “that in ca ses wher e the police may lawfully transport a suspect to the scene of the c rime in the re ar
o f a p o l i c e c ar , t h e p o l i c e m ay c ar r y o u ta d e p art m e n t a l p o l i c y, i mp o s e d f o r r e a s o n s o f

o f f i c e r s a f e t y, by patting dow n the per son.” McCargo , 4 64 F .3 d at 20 1; cf. United States v. Abok hai , 829 F.3d 666, 67 0– 71 (8 th C ir . 1 98 7) (h old ingthat “ the c los e pr oximi ty and lim ite d o bs e rv a tio n o f t

he su sp e c t in the bac k seat of the patrol ca r,” in a ddition to ot her “s p ec ific and a rticulable ha zards,” provide d15

sufficie nt justi fication for the wea pons frisk). He re, a s mentioned, the off icer s had a le g itimate lawenfor ceme nt purpose for placing J ohnson in the pol ice car. Prior to placing J ohnson in the police ca r, the offic ers fri s k ed Johnson for weapons in a ccor dance with Detroit Police Depa rtment policy
r e qu i r i n g w e a

p o n s f r i s k s b e f o r e t r an s p o rt i n g an y p e r s o n i na p o l i c e c ar

t o e n s u r e o f

f i c e r s a f e t y. Under these narrow circumstanc es, I believe the office rs’ a dminist rative w eapons f risk of Johns on
wa s c on sti tut ion a lly

pe rm iss ibl e . T his is n ot t o s ay that suc h sea rc he s wou ld be re a so na

ble un de r a ll circ umstances. See U

nited States v. $53,082.00 in United States Currency , 9 85 F .2 d 2 45 , 2 48 (6 th Cir . 1 99 3) (“ F ourt

h A me ndme nt inq

uir ie s a re fa c t- sp e c if

ic and e a c h c a se mus t be e va luate d o n it s own fa cts.”). I t is thi s rationale that Iwould employ to uphold the office rs’ fr i s k of Johns on and not the g r o u n d s r e l i e d

u p o nb y t h e m a

j o r i t y.