United States Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit 

No. 19-60342 

Vu Quang Nguyen, also known as Vi Quang Nguyen, also 

known as Vu Hguyen, 

Petitioner, 

versus

Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General, 

Respondent. 

Petition for Review of an Order of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals 

BIA No. A057 359 272 

Before Jones, Clement, and Graves, Circuit Judges.

James E. Graves, Jr., Circuit Judge:

Vu Quang Nguyen, a Vietnam native, asks the court to reevaluate a 

Board of Immigration Appeals decision that affirmed the ruling of an 

immigration judge who had found that Mr. Nguyen was subject to removal 

from the United States because he had been convicted of a crime involving 

moral turpitude. Though Mr. Nguyen has had a few run-ins with the law, the 

immigration judge based the removal order on his California forgery 

conviction. 

United States Court of Appeals 

Fifth Circuit 

FILED 

May 12, 2021 

Lyle W. Cayce 

Clerk 

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No. 19-60342 

2 

To prove the conviction’s existence, the Department of Homeland 

Security submitted a plea agreement and terms of probation form. The form 

shows that Mr. Nguyen pleaded guilty to forgery, details the facts, and shows 

that he received a sentence of 240 days in jail and three years of probation. 

Mr. Nguyen, his lawyer, the prosecutor, interpreter, and the deputy clerk of 

court all signed the plea agreement. The deputy clerk stamped the agreement 

as filed. Though this signed, stamped, and filed document lacks a judge’s 

signature, we hold that it can serve as clear and convincing evidence of a 

conviction and therefore deny Mr. Nguyen’s petition for review. 

I. 

Mr. Nguyen was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident 

in 2004. California authorities arrested him multiple times between 2010 and 

2011. Records show that he entered guilty pleas for three counts of burglary, 

three counts of false presentation of identifying information, and one count 

of forgery. 

In 2018, authorities apprehended Mr. Nguyen at George Bush 

Intercontinental Airport where he applied for admission to the U.S. as a 

lawful permanent resident. DHS served him with a Notice to Appear and 

charged him with removability pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) as 

an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. 

Mr. Nguyen appeared before the immigration judge and admitted the 

allegations regarding his nationality but denied the charges related to his 

forgery conviction. He did not file an application for relief from removal but 

instead challenged the grounds for removal. He argued that the document 

presented, the “Advisement and Waiver of Rights for a Felony Guilty Plea” 

that includes a “Terms and Conditions of Felony Probation” page, was 

insufficient to establish the existence of a conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 

1101(a)(48)(A) by clear and convincing evidence. Mr. Nguyen admitted that 

he signed the plea agreement form and accepted that forgery is a crime 

involving moral turpitude. But he instead argued that the form did not show 

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an adjudication of guilt because it lacked a judge’s signature and failed to 

show that a judge or jury had imposed a sentence. 

The immigration judge rejected these arguments because the plea 

agreement was signed by Mr. Nguyen, his defense counsel, and the 

prosecutor and was stamped as filed and signed by the deputy clerk. The form 

showed that Mr. Nguyen pleaded guilty to the charged offenses and specified 

the agreed disposition of 240 days in jail with credit for time served and three 

years of probation. Accordingly, the immigration judge found that the form 

was clear and convincing evidence of a criminal conviction because it 

contained an indication of guilt and the sentence imposed. Based on the clear 

and convincing evidence of a forgery conviction, the immigration judge 

ordered that Mr. Nguyen be removed. 

Mr. Nguyen appealed and raised the same arguments before the Board 

of Immigration Appeals. But it too found that the form was clear and 

convincing proof of a forgery conviction and concluded that the signed and 

stamped plea agreement constituted an “official record of plea, verdict, and 

sentence” for Mr. Nguyen’s forgery offense. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B)(ii). 

Mr. Nguyen filed a timely petition for review. 

II. 

Due to a jurisdiction-stripping provision, this court generally lacks 

jurisdiction to review removal orders of aliens convicted of a crime involving 

moral turpitude. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(C), 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). But the 

provision creates an exception that allows us to review constitutional claims 

and questions of law. § 1252(a)(2)(D); see Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. 

Ct. 1062 (2020). We conclude we can address a legal question like whether 

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) requires DHS to produce a document bearing a 

judge’s signature to prove the existence of a conviction. While such questions 

of law are reviewed de novo, we give “deference to the BIA’s interpretation 

of immigration statutes unless the record reveals compelling evidence that 

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the BIA’s interpretation is incorrect.” Mikhael v. INS, 115 F.3d 299, 302 (5th 

Cir. 1997). 

III. 

Section 1101(a)(48)(A) defines “conviction” as a “formal judgment 

of guilt.” Mr. Nguyen takes the idea that a formal judgment of guilt requires 

a judge’s signature from Singh v. Holder, 568 F.3d 525 (5th Cir. 2009). In that 

case, the panel was trying to determine whether the date of conviction was 

the date the jury entered a verdict or the date a judge imposed a sentence. Id.

at 526-27. 

Singh had fled after a jury found him guilty of unlawful wounding in 

1987 but before sentencing. Id. His flight resulted in over a ten-year gap 

between the jury’s verdict and the imposition of a sentence, which was finally 

imposed in 1998. Id. To deny him naturalization rights, INS had to show that 

the conviction occurred after 1990. Id. at 527. The panel looked to section 

1101’s definition of conviction for guidance and concluded that the 

conviction occurred at the time of sentencing. Id. at 530-31. 

When interpreting section 1101, the panel followed the lead of both 

the Second and Third Circuits, which had defined “judgment of guilt” by 

reference to the analogous term “judgment of conviction” found in Federal 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(k)(1). Id. (citing Puello v. Bureau of Citizenship 

and Immigr. Servs., 511 F.3d 324, 329 (2d Cir. 2007); Perez v. Elwood, 294 F.3d 

552, 562 (3d Cir. 2002)).1

 The rule provides that “[i]n the judgment of 

conviction, the court must set forth the plea, the jury verdict or the court’s 

findings, the adjudication, and the sentence.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(k) 

1

 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(k)(1) reads: 

In General. In the judgment of conviction, the court must set forth the 

plea, the jury verdict or the court’s findings, the adjudication, and the 

sentence. If the defendant is found not guilty or is otherwise entitled 

to be discharged, the court must so order. The judge must sign the 

judgment, and the clerk must enter it. 

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(emphasis added). The panel took this to mean that without a sentence there 

is no judgment of guilt or judgment of conviction and thus no conviction. The 

Singh panel remarked that such an understanding aligns with the Supreme 

Court’s pronouncement that “‘[f]inal judgment in a criminal case . . . means 

sentence. The sentence is the judgment.’” 568 F.3d at 530 (quoting Corey v. 

United States, 375 U.S. 169, 174 (1963)). 

While the Singh panel relied on part of Rule 32(k) as one piece of an 

argument to establish that a conviction occurs when the court imposes a 

sentence, Mr. Nguyen insists we should adopt all of Rule 32(k)’s 

requirements into section 1101’s definition of conviction, in particular the 

one that the “Judge must sign the judgment, and the clerk must enter it.” 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(k). 

But no court has imported all of Rule 32(k)’s requirements into 

section 1101’s definition of conviction and found that the documents offered 

as proof must include a judge’s signature. The Second Circuit dispelled the 

notion that section 1101’s definition of conviction includes all of Rule 

32(k)(1)’s requirements in Singh v. Department of Homeland Security, 526 

F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2008). There the court found that a Conditions of Probation 

document signed only by Singh and the clerk of court could serve as proof of 

a conviction because it was an official record of a sentence. Id. at 79. 

Mr. Nguyen’s signature argument also runs headlong into problems 

with another portion of the Immigration and Nationality Act, specifically, 

section 1229a(c)(3)(B). That section offers a list of documents that “shall 

constitute proof of a criminal conviction.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B). The 

list includes not only documents like an official record of plea, verdict, and 

sentence but also documents like a docket entry from court records that 

indicates the existence of a conviction; official minutes of a court proceeding 

or a transcript of a court hearing in which the court takes notice of a 

conviction; and an abstract of conviction prepared by the court in which a 

conviction was entered. § 1229a(c)(3)(B)(ii)–(v). Not all of these documents 

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would be expected to bear a judge’s signature. For instance, finding a judge’s 

signature on a docket entry or transcript would be a surprise. 

The BIA concluded that the plea agreement at issue here constituted 

an official record of plea, verdict, and sentence under 1229a(c)(3)(B)(ii) and 

could thus serve as evidence of a conviction. But if it were not to count as an 

official record of plea, verdict, and sentence, because it lacks a judge’s 

signature, a different provision of 1229a(c)(3)(B) would cover it. Part (vi) 

discusses records “prepared by, or under the direction of, the court in which 

the conviction was entered that indicate[] the existence of a conviction.” 

§ 1229a(c)(3)(B)(vi). This plea agreement form shows the imposition of a 

sentence, and the form is specific to Orange County and the deputy clerk of 

court for Orange County signed it and stamped it as filed. So alternatively, 

the form would fall within the scope of 1229a(c)(3)(B)(vi) as a document 

prepared under the direction of the court in which the conviction was 

entered. 

IV. 

Consequently, Mr. Nguyen has failed to show that the immigration 

judge or BIA violated a statutorily imposed evidentiary requirement by 

finding that the plea agreement at issue proved the existence of a forgery 

conviction by clear and convincing evidence. It is not, as a matter of law, 

deficient or inadmissible. Petition for review DENIED. 

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