alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant v. Petia Dimitrova KNOWLES, Respondent.

No. SC09-403.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 28, 2011.

Rehearing Denied June 13, 2011.

*1196PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ„ concur.

CANADY, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.

CANADY, C.J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur in the approval of the referee’s recommendation that the respondent be found guilty, but I dissent from the sanction imposed by the Court.

In addition to other misconduct, the respondent was guilty of threatening to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter, conduct which is expressly prohibited by Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-3.4(g). Such misconduct by its very nature causes harm to the legal system. The respondent was chargeable with knowledge of the rule prohibiting this misconduct. Florida Standard for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 7.2 provides that “[s]uspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to ... the legal system.” Given all of the relevant circumstances, the misconduct here warrants a ninety-day suspension.
Exhibit
10.4

    Form of
Waiver

    


    BRIDGE
CAPITAL HOLDINGS

    WAIVER

     

    In
consideration for the benefits I will receive as a result of my employer’s
participation in the United States Department of the Treasury’s TARP Capital
Purchase Program, I hereby voluntarily waive any claim against the United States
or my employer for any changes to my compensation or benefits that are required
to comply with the regulation issued by the Department of the Treasury as
published in the Federal Register on October 20, 2008.

     

    I
acknowledge that this regulation may require modification of the compensation,
bonus, incentive and other benefit plans, arrangements, policies and agreements
(including so-called “golden parachute” agreements) that I have with my employer
or in which I participate as they relate to the period the United States holds
any equity or debt securities of my employer acquired through the TARP Capital
Purchase Program.

     

    This
waiver includes all claims I may have under the laws of the United States or any
state related to the requirements imposed by the aforementioned regulation,
including without limitation a claim for any compensation or other payments I
would otherwise receive, any challenge to the process by which this regulation
was adopted and any tort or constitutional claim about the effect of these
regulations on my employment relationship.

     

    IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I,
__________________________, intending to be legally bound hereby, and for full
consideration, have executed this Waiver this     
day of December, 2008.

    


    
      
        	 
      
	
                Name:
#### Jason LESTAGE v. NABORS DRILLING COMPANY.

No. 2011-C-0088.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 25, 2011.

In re Lestage, Jason; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation, District 04, No. 06-04387; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCA 10-728.

Denied.
#### Roosevelt LINDSAY, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D10-1565.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Feb. 28, 2011.

*639Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Joel Arnold, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Brooke Poland, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

BENTON, C.J.

Roosevelt Lindsay, Jr., appeals a judgment adjudicating him guilty of two third-degree felonies (forgery of a written instrument and uttering a forged instrument) following a violation of probation hearing. Originally the trial court had withheld adjudication of guilt. After hearing the evidence at the probation hearing, the trial court found that he had violated a term of his probation, but also found that the violation was not willful and substantial. The state concedes that finding a violation was error.

While “[t]he trial court is vested with broad discretion to determine whether a probationer has violated a condition of probation,” *Williamson v. State,*43 So.3d 843, 845 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), “[t]o establish a violation of probation, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a probationer willfully violated a substantial condition of probation.” *Van Wagner v. State,*677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (citing *Salzano v. State,*664 So.2d 23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); *Thorpe v. State,*642 So.2d 629, 629 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)). Whether conduct which could constitute a violation of probation was willful is a question of fact. *See Riggins v. State,*830 So.2d 920, 921 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). The trial court’s determination that appellant was not guilty of a willful and substantial violation of probation is amply supported by the record.

Because the trial court did not find Mr. Lindsay’s violation willful and substantial, it was without authority to revoke his probation or to adjudicate him guilty. *See*§ 948.06(2)(e), Fla. Stat. (2009) (“If such probation or community control is revoked, the court shall adjudge the probationer or offender guilty of the offense charged and proven or admitted, unless he or she has previously been adjudged guilty....”). *See also Lippman v. State,*633 So.2d 1061, 1064 (Fla.1994).

> Section 948.06, Florida Statutes (1987), “provides the sole means by which the court may place additional terms on a previously entered order of probation or community control.” *Clark v. State,*579 So.2d 109, 110 (Fla.1991). Before probation may be enhanced, a violation of probation must be formally charged and the probationer must be brought before the court and advised of the charge. *Id.*at 110-11; § 948.06(1), Fla.Stat. (1987). Absent proof of a violation, the court cannot change an order of probation by enhancing the terms. *Clark,*579 So.2d at 110-11.

*Id.*In fact, as the trial court noted in ordering termination of probation, by the time of the revocation hearing, the probationary term had expired. Accordingly, we reverse the adjudication of guilt as to *640both offenses, forgery of a written instrument and uttering a forged instrument.

Reversed.

DAVIS and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Jamal L. LEWIS.

No. 2011-KO-0459.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 23, 2011.

In re Lewis, Jamal L.; — Defendapt; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 06-3453; to the *1157Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KA-386.

Denied.
# Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas October 19, 2020 No. 04-20-00202-CV MUSCULOSKELETAL IMAGING CONSULTANTS, LLC Appellant
v. JAR ENTERPRISES, INC. d/b/a Premier Medical Imaging, Appellee From the 166th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2019-CI-12957 Honorable Cynthia Marie Chapa, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R The Appellee's Second Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief is hereby GRANTED. Appellee's Brief is due October 23, 2020.

_________________________________ Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on this 19th day of October, 2020.

___________________________________ MICHAEL A. CRUZ, Clerk of Court
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                          41,375
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                43,561
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     48,385
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                          68,835
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                           117,182
<LOANS>                                        245,542
<ALLOWANCE>                                      4,203
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 454,165
<DEPOSITS>                                     406,968
<SHORT-TERM>                                     5,198
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              2,306
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        31,115
<OTHER-SE>                                       8,578
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 454,165
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                 12,256
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                2,623
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                 1,307
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                16,186
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               5,539
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               5,611
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           10,575
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                        0
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  6,193
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  5,188
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       5,188
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     3,059
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.63
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.62
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    5.60
<LOANS-NON>                                        741
<LOANS-PAST>                                       500
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<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 4,313
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                      155
<RECOVERIES>                                        45
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                4,203
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                             4,203
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
#### Douglas N. BURNETT, Appellant, v. Jenny R. BURNETT, Appellee.

No. 5D10-2160.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Aug. 19, 2011.

William S. Graessle of William S. Graes-sle, P.A., Jacksonville, and Carol A. Caldwell, St. Augustine, for Appellant.

Samuel S. Jacobson and Stephanie Suss-man Eubanks of Bledsoe, Jacobsen, Schmidt, Wright, Lang & Wilkinson, Jacksonville, and Judith G. Shine of Miller, Shine & Bryan, St. Augustine, for Appel-lee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant challenges the orders setting temporary support, possession of the marital residence, and temporary attorney’s fees. We find no error in the imputation of income to Appellant in the amount of $12,786 per month. However, the court erroneously ordered temporary support payments in excess of the imputed income. On remand, the trial court is directed to address all of the support orders with due consideration to Appellant’s ability to pay. *See Squindo v. Osuna-Squindo,*943 So.2d 282, 234 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (finding alimony award excessive where it consumed 70% of husband’s net income); *Ziajka v. Knight,*767 So.2d 572, 573 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (reversing all awards of support, including award of attorney’s fees, for reconsideration of entire distribution scheme where financial obligations imposed exceeded husband’s ability to pay).

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

TORPY, LAWSON and COHEN, JJ„ concur.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

Pursuant to the provisions of the “Government in the Sunshine Act” (5 U.S.C. 552b), notice is hereby given that at 11:37 a.m. on Monday, September 27, 2010, the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation met in closed session to consider matters related to the Corporation's supervision, corporate and resolution activities.

                    In calling the meeting, the Board determined, on motion of Vice Chairman Martin J. Gruenberg, seconded by Director John E. Bowman (Acting Director, Office of Thrift Supervision), concurred in by Director John G. Walsh (Acting Comptroller of the Currency), Director Thomas J. Curry (Appointive), and Chairman Sheila C. Bair, that Corporation business required its consideration of the matters which were to be the subject of this meeting on                           ( print page 60459)                        less than seven days' notice to the public; that no earlier notice of the meeting was practicable; that the public interest did not require consideration of the matters in a meeting open to public observation; and that the matters could be considered in a closed meeting by authority of subsections (c)(2), (c)(4), (c)(6), (c)(8), (c)(9)(A)(ii), (c)(9)(B), and (c)(10) of the “Government in the Sunshine Act” (5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(2), (c)(4), (c)(6), (c)(8), (c)(9)(A)(ii), (c)(9)(B), and (c)(10)).                

The meeting was held in the Board Room of the FDIC Building located at 550-17th Street, NW., Washington, DC.

Dated: September 27, 2010.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

Robert E. Feldman,

Executive Secretary.

[FR Doc. 2010-24621 Filed 9-28-10; 11:15 am]

BILLING CODE P
#### SUCCESSION OF HARRELL v. ERRIS-OMEGA PLANTATION, et al.

No. 2010-C-2059.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 17, 2010.

In re Harrell, Simon Succ. of et al.;— Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court, Div. G, No. 222,091; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-138.

WRIT GRANTED. The courts have recognized that a judgment may be annulled for fraud and ill practices when (1) the circumstances under which the judgment was rendered show the deprivation of legal rights of the litigant who seeks relief and (2) enforcement of the judgment would be unconscionable or inequitable. *Calcasieu Parish School Board v. Parker,*02-0339 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/2/02), 827 So.2d 543, *writ denied,*02-2719 (La.1/10/03), 834 So.2d 440. Plaintiffs’ Petition to Annul, which must be considered on the face of the pleading in ruling on an exception of no cause of action, alleges sufficient facts to assert a cause of action under La. C.C.P. art. 2004 to annul the April 20, 2009, judgment for fraud and ill practices. Not only was the judgment rendered in plaintiffs’ and counsel’s absence, due in part to confusion over a continuance request, but it goes well beyond the initial pleadings by granting relief not prayed for. In addition, the record does not support the defendant’s assertion that a settlement of the claims was reached by the parties. In fact, price was still at issue and the succession representative had not yet obtained court approval. Accordingly, the judgments of the court of appeal and the trial court are reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on plaintiffs’ petition to annul the April 20, 2009, judgment of the trial court.

KNOLL and CLARK, JJ., would deny.
#### BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY and Agricultural and Mechanical College v. 201 SOUTH MIRO STREET, L.L.C., et al.

No. 2011-CC-0743.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 20, 2011.

In re Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. K, No. 2010-7576; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-0119.

Denied.
##### 



Exhibit 32.2 Written Statement
Pursuant To
18 U.S.C. Section 1350 The undersigned, Brent W. Christensen, the Chief Financial Officer of
Meade Instruments Corp. (the Company), pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, hereby
certifies that: (i) the Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended February 29, 2004 of the
Company (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company. Date: May 28, 2004 By: /s/ Brent W. Christensen This certification accompanies this Report on Form 10-K pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required
by such Act, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the
Security Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
Amendment to Employment Agreement



 Exhibit 10.1 
 Amendment No. 1 To 
 Amended and Restated Employment Agreement 
 This Amendment No. 1 (the “Amendment”) to that certain amended and restated employment agreement (the “Agreement”), dated as of December 3,
2007, by and between, Domino’s Pizza, Inc., Domino’s, Inc. and Domino’s Pizza LLC (collectively, the “Company”) and David A. Brandon (the “Executive”) is dated as of December 23, 2008. 
 WHEREAS, the parties wish to amend the Agreement as set forth herein. 
 NOW
THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and mutual agreements set forth herein and in the Agreement, the parties here to agree as follows. 
 1. Effective as of January 1, 2009, and pursuant to Section 13.3 of the Employment Agreement, Section 4.1 of the Employment Agreement is hereby amended by deleting said Section in its entirety and substituting the following
therefore: 
 “4.1 Base Salary. During the term hereof, the Company shall pay the Executive a base salary at the
rate of Eight Hundred Eighty-Five Thousand Dollars ($885,000) per year, payable in accordance with the payroll practices of the Company for its executives and subject to such increases as the Board in its sole discretion. Such base salary, as from
time to time increased, is hereafter referred to as the “Base Salary”. 
 2. Effective immediately, and pursuant to
Section 13.3 of the Employment Agreement, Section 4.3.2(b) of the Employment Agreement is hereby amended by deleting said Section in its entirety and substituting the following therefore: 
 “(b) Effective as of the first business day of 2009, the Company shall grant
to the Executive, pursuant to the Company’s Stock Plan, 75,000 restricted shares of the Company’s Common Stock (“2009 Restricted Stock”), subject to a two (2) year graded vesting schedule, where one-half ( 1/2) of the Restricted Stock vests on the anniversary date of the grant. The Restricted Stock shall be granted pursuant to a
restricted stock agreement substantially in the form of Exhibit A-3 hereof.” 
 3. Effective immediately, and pursuant to
Section 13.3 of the Employment Agreement, Section 5.1 of the Employment Agreement is hereby amended by replacing the word “calendar” with “fiscal.” 
 4. The Employment Agreement as otherwise amended is in all other respects confirmed. 
 5. This Amendment shall be effective as of the dates provided herein. 
 [Remainder of Page Left Intentionally Blank] 







 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this amendment has been duly
executed this 23rd day of December, 2008 and is effective as described in Paragraph 5 hereof. 
  

							
	THE COMPANY:	 		  	DOMINO’S PIZZA, INC.
				
		 		  	By:	 	 /s/ Robert M. Rosenberg

		 		  	Name:	 	Robert M. Rosenberg
		 		  	Title:	 	Director
			
	PRINCIPAL SUBSIDIARIES:	 		  	DOMINO’S, INC.
				
		 		  	By:	 	 /s/ Wendy A. Beck

		 		  	Name:	 	Wendy A. Beck
		 		  	Title:	 	Vice President
			
		 		  	DOMINO’S PIZZA LLC
				
		 		  	By:	 	 /s/ Wendy A. Beck

		 		  	Name:	 	Wendy A. Beck
		 		  	Title:	 	Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
			
	THE EXECUTIVE:	 		  	 /s/ David A. Brandon

		 		  	Name:	 	David A. Brandon
#### M.J.I., Appellant, v. A.J.K., Appellee.

No. 2D10-2134.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 9, 2011.

Joseph C. Hood, Tampa, for Appellant.

Frank G. Fernandez of Fernandez, Lar-kin & Garcia, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

*733WHATLEY and NORTHCUTT, JJ., Concur.

ALTENBERND, J., Concurs specially with opinion.

ALTENBERND, Judge,

Concurring.

I fully concur in this decision that affirms a final judgment of paternity in an action filed by the father, A.J.K. The primary issue in this ease concerns child custody. I write only to explain that my vote to deny attorney’s fees to the father is not based on the reasoning in *Starkey v. Linn,*727 So.2d 386 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), and *Gilbertson v. Boggs,*743 So.2d 123 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Both of those cases hold that attorney’s fees cannot be awarded on appeal in a paternity action because section 742.045, Florida Statutes (2008), does not expressly authorize fees on appeal.

It is true that both section 742.045 and section 742.031 authorize an award of attorney’s fees in paternity actions but make no reference to fees for an appeal. Neither statute limits attorney’s fees to a prevailing party and, thus, the provision in section 59.46, Florida Statutes (2008), interpreting statutes that award prevailing party attorney’s fees to include an award of appellate attorney’s fees does not apply in this case.

My concern is that section 61.16, Florida Statutes (2008), would allow for an award of fees in this type of custody dispute if the child were legitimate. Statutes that do not provide rights and remedies to illegitimate children and their parents that are comparable to the rights and remedies given to legitimate children and their parents can violate Equal Protection. *See Brown v. Dykes,*601 So.2d 568, 570 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (holding section 742.031 unconstitutional to the extent that it prohibited attorney’s fees to a father in a paternity action). Under any level of scrutiny, it is not obvious to me that parents of illegitimate children should be treated differently than parents of legitimate children when it comes to the rules for awarding attorney’s fees on appeal in custody disputes.

The parties have not briefed the constitutional issue, and I conclude that attorney’s fees would be inappropriate under the circumstances of this case even if section 61.16 were the applicable law. Accordingly, I join in the order denying fees.