alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 15, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 02-30846

Summary Calendar

 

ANTHONY W DOUGLAS, REGINA C DOUGLAS

Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

CITY OF BATON ROUGE, PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE,

DEPT OF PUBLIC WORKS, for the Parish of East Baton Rouge,

FRED RAIFORD, Director of Department of Public Works,

GERALD BOYKINS, IRYS ALLGOOD

Defendants - Appellees

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 02-CV-172-B-M1

--------------------

Before KING, Chief Judge, and EMILIO M. GARZA and BENAVIDES,

Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

In this civil rights case, plaintiffs challenge the district

court’s orders setting aside an entry of default and denying

their motion for appointment of counsel. Plaintiffs also

complain of a denial of their summary judgment motion, however,

no such motion was ever filed. Rather, it appears that
No. 02-30846

-2-

plaintiffs are challenging the order setting aside the entry of

default judgement.

We do not have jurisdiction to review the district court’s

order setting aside the entry of default or its order denying

plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment, First, plaintiffs’

notice of appeal did not evince an intent to appeal the denial of

their motion for default judgment. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a). 

Second, neither of these orders is a final order or an appealable

interlocutory or collateral order. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292;

see also Adult Film Ass’n of America, Inc. v. Thetford, 776 F.2d

113, 115 (5th Cir. 1985). Accordingly, plaintiffs’ appeal from

these orders are DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

An interlocutory order denying an application for the

appointment of counsel in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case is immediately

appealable. Robbins v. Maggio, 750 F.2d 405, 409-13 (5th Cir.

1985). However, a trial court is not required to appoint counsel

for an indigent plaintiff in a civil rights action unless there

are exceptional circumstances. Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d

209, 212 (5th Cir. 1982). This court will not reverse the

district court’s denial of such a motion unless the appellants

show that the ruling constituted a clear abuse of discretion. 

Cupit v. Jones, 835 F.2d 82, 86 (5th Cir. 1987). 

Plaintiffs have not shown that the district court’s order

denying appointed counsel was a clear abuse of discretion. 
No. 02-30846

-3-

Cupit, 835 F.2d at 86. The district court’s denial of their

motion for appointment of counsel is therefore AFFIRMED.
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, November 17, 2015. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. 

# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA, November 17, 2015 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A16I0058. TONYA TAPLEY SASSER v. MICHAEL BRACK BARNES. Upon consideration of the Application for Interlocutory Appeal, it is ordered that it be hereby DENIED.
LC NUMBERS: 2014CV341 2015CV21 2015CV26
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

DA 20-0609

_________________

ARIANE WITTMAN and JEREMY TAYLEN,

 Plaintiffs and Appellants,

 v.

CITY OF BILLINGS,

 Defendant and Appellee.

O R D E R

_________________

Counsel for Appellants Ariane Wittman and Jeremy Taylen have filed a motion for 

leave to grant Amicus Curiae Montana Trial Lawyers Association’s participation in the 

oral argument scheduled for September 10, 2021, in the captioned matter. Appellants’ 

counsel will cede whatever time Amicus uses from their argument time. There is no 

opposition to the motion. 

The Court takes no position on this motion. The parties are limited to 40 minutes 

for the Appellants and 30 minutes for the Appellee and may use that time at their discretion. 

The argument will be limited to two participants for each party.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

August 10 2021

08/10/2021

Case Number: DA 20-0609
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Carlos SANCHEZ-PEREZ, also known as Jesus Pereda-Lopez Appellant.

No. 00-1755.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 26, 2000.

Filed Jan. 10, 2001.

*576Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, HANSEN, and BYE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Carlos Sanchez-Perez pleaded guilty to illegally re-entering the United States, having previously been deported subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). The district court1 sentenced him to seventy-eight months imprisonment and three years supervised release.

Sanchez-Perez renews on appeal the argument he presented below, that the statute — which penalizes an alien “whose removal was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony,” *see 8*U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) — is ambiguous. “Subsequent to” could mean either “after” or “as a result of,” Sanchez-Perez argues, and he is entitled to the more lenient reading. He contends that, as his deportation resulted from illegally re-entering the United States in violation of a prior deportation order, not being convicted for an aggravated felony, his offense level should not have been enhanced by sixteen levels under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A).

Sanchez-Perez concedes in his brief that “nearly all dictionaries define the word ‘subsequent’ to connote ‘following in time’ or sequential.” We conclude that the word should be understood to carry its common meaning. *See Beef Nebraska, Inc. v. United States,*807 F.2d 712, 716 (8th Cir.1986) (fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1427 (6th ed.1990) (subsequent means following in time, coming or being later than something else, or succeeding).

This meaning is accurately reflected in the Guidelines commentary. *See*U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, comment, (n.l) (“ ‘Deported after a conviction’ means that the deportation was subsequent to the conviction, whether or not the deportation was in response to such conviction.”); *Stinson v. United States,*508 U.S. 36, 38, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993) (Guidelines commentary that interprets or explains particular Guideline is authoritative unless it violates Constitution or federal statute, or is inconsistent with or is plainly erroneous reading of, that Guideline).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

1

. The Honorable Susan Webber Wright, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.
**EXHIBIT31.1**

 

**Certificationof Principal Executive Officer**

**Pursuantto Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

I,John R. Lyon, certify that:

 

1.     Ihave reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Vista Medical TechnologiesInc.

 

2.     Basedon my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statementsmade, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report;

 

3.     Basedon my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects thefinancial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant asof, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;

 

4.     Theregistrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange ActRules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

 

a.     Designedsuch disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this annual report is being prepared;

 

b.     Evaluatedthe effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and

 

c.     Disclosedin this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

 

5.     Theregistrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on ourmost recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

 

a.     Allsignificant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial data; and

 

b.     Anyfraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.

 

Date:March  30, 2004

 
|                                      |
|-------------------------------------------|
| /s/ John R. Lyon                          |   |
| **John R. Lyon**                          |   |
| **President and Chief Executive Officer** |   |

 

----
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1349 Introduced in House (IH)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1349

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to repeal the 1993 increase 
              in income taxes on Social Security benefits.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 6, 2007

Mr. King of New York introduced the following bill; which was referred 
                   to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to repeal the 1993 increase 
              in income taxes on Social Security benefits.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REPEAL OF 1993 INCREASE IN TAX ON SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS.

    (a) In General.--Paragraph (2) of section 86(a) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to social security and tier 1 railroad 
retirement benefits) is amended by adding at the end the following: 
``This paragraph shall not apply to any taxable year beginning after 
December 31, 2006.''.
    (b) Conforming Amendments.--
            (1) Subparagraph (A) of section 871(a)(3) of such Code is 
        amended by striking ``85 percent'' and inserting ``50 
        percent''.
            (2)(A) Subparagraph (A) of section 121(e)(1) of the Social 
        Security Amendments of 1983 (Public Law 98-21) is amended--
                    (i) by striking ``(A) There'' and inserting 
                ``There'';
                    (ii) by striking ``(i)'' immediately following 
                ``amounts equivalent to''; and
                    (iii) by striking ``, less (ii)'' and all that 
                follows and inserting a period.
            (B) Paragraph (1) of section 121(e) of such Act is amended 
        by striking subparagraph (B).
            (C) Paragraph (3) of section 121(e) of such Act is amended 
        by striking subparagraph (B) and by redesignating subparagraph 
        (C) as subparagraph (B).
            (D) Paragraph (2) of section 121(e) of such Act is amended 
        in the first sentence by striking ``paragraph (1)(A)'' and 
        inserting ``paragraph (1)''.
    (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2006.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 32.1


                  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                     AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                           OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly report of Xynergy Corporation (the Company) on
Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I Edward Rose, Chief
Financial Officer, Secretary and Director of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbannes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:


      1.    The report fully complies with the requirements of section 13 (a) or
            15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      2.    The information contained in the report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and result of operations
            of the Company.


     Dated: January 6, 2005               By: /s/ Edward Rose
                                          ------------------------------------
                                          Chief Financial Officer, Secretary and
                                          Director
#### E. S. Jordan v. W. S. Jordan et al.

(No. 3424.)

June 10, 1885.

Appeal from Ellis County.

Opinion by

Watts, J.

§ 830. *Partition of personal property of an estate; suit for. maintainable when.*This was a suit for the partition between the heirs of Stacy Ann Jordan, deceased, mother of the parties, of the personal property of her estate, the suit being brought by appellants against appellee. Appellant claimed the property as his own by alleged gift from his mother. A partition of the property was awarded, in accordance with the statute. *Held:*The suit is maintainable. ,It is alleged in the petition that the estate was not indebted; that all the heirs are of age; that there was no administration . upon the estate, and no necessity for an administration.

§ 831. *Continuance; application for, held sufficient.*Appellant’s application for a continuance was in substantial compliance with the statute. Due diligence to obtain the testimony of the absent witness is shown, and the testimony of said witness was material.» In his application he also embraced another witness by whom he stated he expected to prove the same facts; this witness was present and testified on the trial, but appellant failed to prove said facts by him. This did not warrant the assumption that said facts could not be proved by the absent witness, and did not justify the refusal of the continuance.

Eeversed and remanded.
Exhibit 11.1

                       BROADVISION, INC AND SUBSIDIARIES
               STATEMENT REGARDING COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE LOSS
                      (In thousands, except per share data)


                                                          March 31,    March 31,
                                                             1997        1996
                                                          ---------    ---------
Statement of operations data:
    Net Loss                                               $(2,487)    $(1,698)
    Weighted average number of common and dilutive
       equivalent shares used in computations:    
    Common stock                                            20,002       6,409
    Preferred stock (as if converted)                            -       5,600
                                                           -------     -------

          Subtotal                                          20,002      12,009
                                                        
Pursuant to Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 83:           
    Preferred stock converted on as-if basis at exercise
       prices less than the anticipated initial public  
       offering price                                            -       3,916
    Stock options                                                -       2,651
                                                           -------     -------

Shares used in computing net loss per share                 20,002      18,576
                                                           -------     -------

Net loss per share                                         $ (0.12)    $ (0.09)
                                                           =======     =======
#### Deborah MAYO, et al. v. CLECO CORPORATION and Cleco Power, L.L.C.

No. 2011-CC-2216.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 23, 2011.

In re Louisiana Public Service Commission; — Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 10-C-2379; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 11-00391.

Granted and remanded to court of appeal for briefing, argument and opinion.

KNOLL, J., would deny.
857 A.2d 1292

#### COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. DeWayne JACKSON, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Sept. 22, 2004.

Decided Oct. 7, 2004.

*561William C. Kaczynski, Pittsburgh, for DeWayne Jackson.

Sandra Preuhs, Pittsburgh, for Com. of Pa.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed as having been improvidently granted.

Chief Justice CAPPY and Justice NIGRO dissent.
EX-4.11






Exhibit 4.11



The following is a summary of amendments to the Ford Motor Company Tax-Efficient Savings Plan for
Hourly Employees, effective January 23, 2009:





	 	•	 	The Fidelity Freedom Funds will be replaced with Barclays Global Investors (BGI)
LifePath® Index Funds as the target-date fund option.
	 
	 	•	 	The following BGI LifePath® Index Funds, rather than the Fidelity Freedom
Funds® will become the designated default investment options.




BGI LifePath® Index Retirement Fund

BGI LifePath® Index 2015 Fund

BGI LifePath® Index 2020 Fund

BGI LifePath® Index 2025 Fund

BGI LifePath® Index 2030 Fund

BGI LifePath® Index 2035 Fund

BGI LifePath® Index 2040 Fund

BGI LifePath® Index 2045 Fund

BGI LifePath® Index 2050 Fund
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-20967 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus GAYLAN LAVAN, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. H-02-CR-141-1

-------------------- February 20, 2003 Before WIENER, EMILIO M. GARZA, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Gaylan Lavan appeals his guilty-plea conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He argues that the factual basis for his guilty plea, which showed his intrastate possession of firearms manufactured outside the state, was insufficient to establish the nexus with interstate commerce required by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He acknowledges that his claim is foreclosed by Fifth CircuitNo. 02-20967 -2- precedent and states that he raises the claim to preserve it for possible Supreme Court review. Lavan’s claim is foreclosed by circuit precedent. See United States v. Cavazos , 288 F.3d 706, 712-13 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 123 S. Ct. 253 (2002); United States v. Daugherty , 264 F.3d 513, 518 & n.12 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied , 534 U.S. 1150 (2002). Accordingly, the district court's judgment is
AFFIRMED.
Helvetia Asset Recovery



# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

February 24, 2014

N o. 04

- 14

- 00012

- CV

Burton KAHN, Appellant

v.

HELVETIA ASSET RECOVERY INC.,

Appellee

From the 407th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2013

- CI

- 18355 Honorable Karen H. Pozza, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

In this interlocutory appeal, Appellant Burton Kahn filed a notice of appeal stating the following:

Defendant Burton Kahn desires to appeal from the cause number 2013CI18355.

The Court did not rule on Plaintiff being a Foreign Corporation and is Maintaining Suit Without a Certificate of Authority by the court 407th Judicial District Bexar County, Texas on December 11, 2013.

In an order dated January 23, 2014, we explained that it appeared from his noti ce of appeal that Kahn is complaining the trial court did not rule on his Motion to Show Authority at a hearing held on December 11, 2013. Thus, Kahn’s notice of appeal d id not point to an appealable interlocutory order, but instead complain ed of a trial c ourt’s failure to rule on a motion. We explained that we have no jurisdiction over a trial court’s failure to rule on a motion in an interlocutory appeal.

This court has jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments or orders. A judgment or

order is fin al for purposes of appeal if it actually disposes of all pending parties and claims

before the court. Lehmann v. Har

- Con Corp. , 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Here, there is no final judgment or order. Interlocutory orders may be appealed only if a specif ic statute authorizes such an interlocutory appeal. In Kahn’s response to our show cause order, he states that he is appealing from the trial court’s temporary injunction. Section 51.014 (a)(4) of the Texas Civil

Practice and Remedies Code states that a per son may appeal from an interlocutory order that“grants or refuses a temporary injunction or grants or overrules a motion to dissolve a temporary

injunction as provide by Chapter 65.” See T EX

. C IV

. P RAC

. & R EM

. C ODE A NN

. ' 51.014 (a)(4)

. Because the tempora ry injunction granted in this case is an appealable interlocutory order, we

retain this ca se on the docket of this court and reinstate appellate deadlines.

Because the clerk’s and reporter’s records have been filed, we ORDER appellant to file

his brief on or before March 17, 2014

.

_________________________________ Karen Angelini, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 24th day of February, 2014

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court