alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit
10.2

     

    WAIVER

    


    In
consideration for the benefits I will receive as a result of my employer’s
participation in the United States Department of the Treasury’s TARP Capital
Purchase Program, I hereby voluntarily waive any claim against the United States
or my employer for any changes to my compensation or benefits that are required
to comply with the regulation issued by the Department of the Treasury as
published in the Federal Register on

    October
20, 2008.

    


    I
acknowledge that this regulation may require modification of the compensation,
bonus, incentive and other benefit plans, arrangements, policies and agreements
(including so-called “golden parachute” agreements) that I have with my employer
or in which I participate as they relate to the period the United States holds
any equity or debt securities of my employer acquired through the TARP Capital
Purchase Program.

    


    This
waiver includes all claims I may have under the laws of the United States or any
state related to the requirements imposed by the aforementioned regulation,
including without limitation a claim for any compensation or other payments I
would otherwise receive, any challenge to the process by which this regulation
was adopted and any tort or constitutional claim about the effect of these
regulations on my employment relationship.

    


    Effective
December 31, 2008.

    


    
      
        
          
            
              
                
                  
                    
                      
                        	
                                Name:

                              
	
                                Title:
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Jeffery Paul DENBY.

No. 2010-OK-0014.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 13, 2010.

On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Beauregard.

The district court is ordered to provide the applicant with a copy of the transcript of the July 16, 2009 preliminary examination no later than May 17, 2010. The cover sheet identifying the names referred to in the transcript need not be provided. The district court’s order closing the courtroom and/or sealing all pre-trial proceed*757ings is reversed.1
      *See*La. Const. art. I, § 22.

. The writ application in this case was filed in this Court on January 5, 2010. The information on the application sheet filled out by applicant’s counsel stated that it was not a "priority.” For this reason, the writ application was not handled as a priority and was not directed to the proper office until May 10, 2010, after receipt of counsel's letter stating that the matter was set for trial on May 17, 2010.
#### JULIA E. REYES *v.*COMMISSIONER OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES ET AL.

(AC 22620)

Dranginis, Bishop and Hennessy, Js.

Submitted on briefs May 2

officially released May 20, 2003

Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.
#### STATE ex rel. Van HUDSON v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2011-KH-0301.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 16, 2011.

In re Hudson, Van; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 86-2187; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-WR-988.

Denied.
#### FOUR BROTHERS CORPORATION et al., Defendants, Appellants, v. Rosa Maria CORDERO, Plaintiff, Appellee.

No. 5649.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Submitted April 4, 1960.

Decided April 26, 1960.

*778Rafael Pastor, Santurce, P. R., and M. Acosta Velarde, San Juan, P. R., on brief for appellants in opposition to motion to dismiss or affirm.

A. Mieres Calimano, Rio Piedras, P. R., and A. Torres Braschi, San Juan, P. R., on brief for appellee in support of motion to dismiss or affirm.

Before WOODBURY, Chief Judge, and HARTIGAN and ALDRICH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal under Title 28 U.S.C. § 1293 from a decision of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico summarily dismissing an appeal from a judgment entered by the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, San Juan Part, for the plaintiff in an action for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident which the plaintiff-appellee has moved to dismiss under Rule 39 of this court. The value of the amount in controversy is substantially less than $5,000 and it is abundantly clear that the federal constitutional question seasonably raised below is wholly without any substance whatever and is utterly frivolous. See Romero v. People of Puerto Rico, 1 Cir., 1950, 182 F.2d 864, 867, and cases cited, and see also Figueroa v. People of Puerto Rico, 1 Cir., 1956, 232 F.2d 615, 617, 618. The trial court issued a pretrial order and notified the parties thereof requiring them to serve each other fifteen days before the date set for trial with a list containing the documentary and oral evidence they would submit at the hearing and warned them “that in default thereof, they will be unable to introduce said evidence.” The plaintiff-appellee complied with the order; the defendant-appellant, it says by inadvertence, did not. No argument is necessary to show that the defendant-appellant was not deprived of his day in court by the trial court’s insistence that its pretrial order be obeyed. At the most all that is presented is a question of local law.

An order will be entered dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-60545 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. CALVIN PARNELL, Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi

(3:96-CV-97-D)

_________________________________________________________________ February 27, 1997 Before KING, JOLLY, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Calvin Parnell appeals from the denial of his successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Parnell argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that he actively used a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) in light of United States v. Bailey , 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995), and that his firearm conviction must be reversed because the jury was instructed as to the liberal pre- Bailey definition of use, and2

they were not instructed as to the meaning of “carrying” under § 924(c). To the extent that Parnell is required to file a certificate of appealability (COA) in order to appeal the district court’s order, we conclude that Parnell has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Without deciding whether a COA is required, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to prove that Parnell both actively used and carried the firearm under Bailey : Parnell carried the rifle to the motel; it was not concealed in his clothing but displayed because the surveillance officers saw the
weapon. See Bailey , 116 S. Ct. at 508. Because the trial evidence demonstrated that Parnell used the rifle as defined by Bailey and also carried it, any error from the giving of preBailey jury instructions did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceeding, or amount to a due process violation. United States v. Anderson , 987 F.2d 251, 259 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 510 U.S. 853 (1993).
AFFIRMED. COA DENIED.
Exhibit 10.5


Stereoscopic Imaging ASIC Patent


Name of Patent
: Stereoscopic Image Generation Chip for Mobile Equipment, and Method For
Generating Stereoscopic Image Using the Same


Patent
Application Number : 10 – 2008 – 0054215 

Patent Application Date : June 10, 2008

Patent Applicant : Praotech Co. Ltd., Master Image Co. Ltd.

Patent Filing Location : Korean Intellectual Property Office, Korea


Summary


          This
invention is related to the stereoscopic imaging chip for mobile devices and
method for displaying stereoscopic image using this technology. In other words,
even though stereoscopic images are displayed utilizing the stereoscopic
imaging chip integrated within the mobile device, the captured images are not
saved/processed by compiling together alternately the left and right images,
but a side-by-side process, which then the display unit takes the left and
right images from the stereoscopic imaging chip, and recombines them
alternately which has the effect of raising the quality of the displayed stereoscopic
image. In addition, it is possible 2D content to be displayed in 3D using the
aforementioned stereoscopic imaging chip.
#### STATE ex rel. Duong CAO v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-0731.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 8, 2011.

In re Cao, Duong; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 292,445; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009-KW-2366.

Denied.
#### Antonio Lamar GRIFFIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D09-5986.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

July 26, 2011.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Kathleen Stover, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Therese A. Savona, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

*1184PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Antonio Lamar Griffin, appeals his judgment and sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon entered after he pled nolo contendere to that charge. We reverse.

After a search of his residence, appellant was charged with a trafficking offense and two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The jury convicted him of the lesser included offense of possession, acquitted him of one of the firearms offenses and failed to reach a decision on the other. With respect to the latter, he subsequently pled nolo contendere and was given a concurrent sentence. The State concedes that it erred in charging appellant with two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. *Hill v. State,*711 So.2d 1221, 1224-25 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (finding that double jeopardy precludes “more than one conviction for the possession at the same time of multiple firearms by a convicted felon.”). Although not raised below, appellant’s double jeopardy claim may be raised for the first time on appeal even though the conviction is the result of a plea. *State v. Johnson,*483 So.2d 420, 422 (Fla.1986). Because only one conviction was permitted, and only one acquittal required, the acceptance of the plea to the second charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon violated double jeopardy.

REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

VAN NORTWTCK, WETHERELL, and ROWE, JJ., concur.
627 A.2d 1129

#### NEW JERSEY STATE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, ETC., ET AL. v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY.

April 20, 1993.

ORDER

ORDERED that the appeal in the above matter is dismissed.
EXHIBIT 99



CERTIFICATION



---

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C.  1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the year ended March 31, 2003 (the Report) of Sistersville Bancorp, Inc., the
(Company) as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Stanley M. Kiser, President and Chief Executive Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1) The Report fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|June 25, 2003 |  | /s/    Stanley M. Kiser                                                                                                            
|------------- |  | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|              |  | Stanley M. Kiser President and Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer and Principal Accounting and Financial Officer)
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jeffrey Wayne STURGIS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 00-6234.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 14, 2000.

Decided Jan. 9, 2001.

Jeffrey Wayne Sturgis, pro se.

Before WIDENER, WILKINS, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Jeffrey Wayne Sturgis seeks to appeal the district court’s orders denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.2000) and denying his motion for reconsideration. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. *See United States v. Sturgis,*No. CR-93-373-A (E.D. Va. Nov. 24 *&*Dec. 20, 1999).* We also deny Sturgis’ *173motion to have a copy of a transcript prepared at government expense. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*

Although the district court’s order denying the § 2255 motion is marked as "filed” on November 23, 1999, the district court’s records show that it was entered on the docket sheet on November 24, 1999. Pursuant to Rules 58 and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the date that the order was entered on the docket sheet that we take as the effective date of the district court’s decision. *See*
        *173
        *Wilson v. Murray,*806 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (4th Cir.1986).
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-2119

In Re: ESTATE OF SHARON VAN PUTTEN; ALLEN VAN PUTTEN, 

Executor of the Estate of Sharon Van Putten; DEBRA VAN 

PUTTEN, Alternate Executor of the Estate of Sharon Van 

Putten,

Petitioners.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. 

(1:13-cv-01124-CMH-IDD)

Submitted: January 28, 2014 Decided: January 31, 2014

Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Petition dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Allen Van Putten, Debra Van Putten, Petitioners Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Allen Van Putten and Debra Van Putten, the executor 

and alternate executor of the estate of Sharon Van Putten, 

respectively, petition this court for a writ of mandamus 

directing the district court to accept the estate’s complaint, 

grant the estate leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), and 

appoint the estate counsel. The executors have also applied to 

proceed IFP in this court, representing that the estate is 

without funds to pay the filing fee. We deny the estate’s 

request to proceed IFP, as “only a natural person may qualify 

for treatment in forma pauperis under [28 U.S.C.] § 1915 

[(2012)],” Rowland v. Calif. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 196 

(1993), and accordingly dismiss the estate’s petition for a writ 

of mandamus.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

PETITION DISMISSED
EX-10.1






Exhibit 10.1




AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT




THIS AMENDMENT, dated as of December 30, 2008, is between TOUSA, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the
“Employer”), and Tommy McAden, an individual (the “Employee”).



     WHEREAS, the Employer and Employee are parties to that certain Employment Agreement and the
exhibits attached thereto, entered into on January 13, 2006, with an effective date of January 1,
2006 (as amended from time to time in accordance with its terms, the “Employment Agreement”); and



     WHEREAS, the parties hereto desire to amend the Employment Agreement on the terms and
conditions set forth herein.



NOW, THEREFORE:




1.     Unless otherwise defined herein, all capitalized terms used herein shall have the meanings given
them in the Employment Agreement.



2.     Paragraph 1 of Exhibit B to the Employment Agreement is amended in its entirety and replaced
with the following:




          “1.     Employment Period. Notwithstanding anything to the
contrary contained in Section 4.2, the Employment Period referenced in
Section 2.1 of the Agreement shall begin on the Effective Date and end on
December 31, 2008, and thereafter shall be automatically extended for
additional one month periods (the first day of each such one-month period an
“Anniversary Date”), unless and until the Employer or the Employee provides
written notice to the other party not less than 10 days before the next
applicable Anniversary Date that such party is electing not to extend the
term of employment under this Agreement, or unless terminated earlier in
accordance with the provisions of Section 4. Notwithstanding the foregoing,
Employer expressly reserves the right to assume or reject this Agreement at
any time in connection with Employer’s petition for relief under Chapter 11
of Title 11 of the United States Code.”



3.     In all other respects the parties reaffirm the Employment Agreement without change.



[Signatures Appear on Next Page]




 









 








IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have signed this Amendment to Employment
Agreement on the date first specified above.



	 	 	 	 	 
	TOUSA, INC.

 	 
	By:  	/s/ George Yeonas
 	 
	 	Name:  	George Yeonas 	 
	 	Title:  	Executive Vice President, COO 	 
	 
	EMPLOYEE

 	 
	/s/ Tommy McAden
 	 
	Tommy McAden
#### H. & T. C. R’y Co. v. H. V. Hollingsworth.

(No. 3008.)

April 30, 1884.

Appeal from Grayson County.

Opinion by

Hurt, J.

§ 173. *Parties; who are necessary.*Appellee sued appellant to recover damages alleged to have been done to his crops of corn, grass, etc., and to his fence, by fire communicated thereto through the negligence of appellant’s employees in operating its trains. It appeared in evidence that another person was a joint owner with appellee of some of the crops destroyed. *Held,*that appellee could not maintain the suit alone, without joining therein the other joint owner of the property. In an action to recover property, in case of a joint bailment, all of the joint owners must join as plaintiffs. Joint creditors must all join in an action to recover the debt. Joint owners of property destroyed or injured by a wrong-doer must join in an action to recover damages therefor. Those refusing to join in the action as plaintiffs should he made parties defendant. [Stachely v. Pierce, 28 Tex. 328; 6 Wait’s Act. & Def. p. 53, § 2; Bucknam v. Brett, 35 Barb. 596.]

Reversed and remanded.
**Exhibit 32.1****CERTIFICATION**Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pehong Chen, the Chief Executive Officerand Chief Financial Officer of BroadVision, Inc. (the “Company”), hereby certifies that, to thebest of his knowledge:**1.**The Company’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2006, and to whichthis Certification is attached as Exhibit 32.1 (the “Periodic Report”), fully complies with therequirements of section 13(a) or section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and**2.**The information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.IN WITNESSWHEREOF, the undersigned has set his hands hereto as of the 9th day ofAugust 2006./s/ Pehong Chen
EXHIBIT 31.1
 
 CERTIFICATION
 
 
 I, Steven R. LeBlanc, President and Chief Executive Officer of Summit Properties Inc., the general partner of Summit Properties Partnership, L.P., certify that:
 
 1.
I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Summit Properties Partnership, L.P.;2.
Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;3.
Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;4.
The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:(a)

Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;(b)

[Omitted pursuant to SEC Release Nos. 33-8238 and 34-47986];(c)

Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and(d)

Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and5.
The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):(a)

All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and(b)

Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.
 
 Date:

March 12, 2004/S/ Steven R. LeBlancName:

Steven R. LeBlancTitle:

President and Chief Executive Officer
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                                 18 U.S.C. 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Boyd Bros. Transportation
Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2003, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Richard C. Bailey, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (3)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
                  U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d); and

         (4)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.



By:  /s/  RICHARD C. BAILEY
   -----------------------------------
Richard C. Bailey
Chief Financial Officer
November 14, 2003

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Boyd Bros. Transportation Inc. and will be retained by Boyd Bros.
Transportation Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or
its staff upon request.


                                       28