alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### James SIMS v. USAGENCIES CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and McHenry Jackson.

No. 2011-C-1927.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 14, 2011.

In re Sims, James; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 567,414; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA1120.

Denied.
#### Texas & Pacific R’y Co. v J. Z. Wheat.

(No. 2970.)

April 23, 1884.

Appeal from Tarrant County.

Opinion by

Hurt, J.

§ 165. *Petition founded on bill of lading.*The petition in substance alleged that plaintiff shipped cattle from Memphis, Tennessee, to Port Worth, Texas, over several lines of connecting railroad, one of which was defendant’s line; that said shipment was made “on through bills of lading, and at agreed and through rates for the whole route, the contracts and bills of lading of each of said railroads in regard to the shipment of cattle being recognized and carried out by the others;” that the cattle were damaged by the negligence of defendant, etc. Held, that the petition was founded upon the special contract evidenced by the bill of lading, and was not an action founded on the liability of the carrier at common law.

§ 166. *Proof must correspond with allegation.*The suit being upon the bill of lading, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover without introducing the same in evidence, or accounting for its non-production, and then establishing its substance as alleged.

§ 167. *Common carrier; warehouseman; when their liability attaches.*Article 283 of the Revised Statutes declares when the liability of warehousemen ceases, and that of common carriers attaches! Liability as a common carrier does not attach until a bill of lading is given, or until the goods have been delivered to, and received by, the carrier.

Reversed and remanded.
#### STATE ex rel. Jason C. WALSTRUM v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-1137.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 20, 2011.

In re Walstrum, Jason C; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 452818; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KA 18 94.

Denied.
#### James TULLIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D09-2786.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

June 15, 2010.

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Rebecca M. Becker, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

James Tullís, Jasper, pro se.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Mary G. Jolley, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appel-lee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. *See LeGrand v. State,*81 So.3d 924, 926 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

MONACO, C.J., TORPY and COHEN, JJ., concur.
#### STATE ex rel. Erran G. EVANS v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2011-KH-0344.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 16, 2011.

In re Evans, Erran G.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial *1198Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, Nos. 94-7025, 95-467; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-WR-1037.

Denied.
#### STATE ex rel. Dominic LEBOUEF v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-0746.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 8, 2011.

In re LeBouef, Dominic; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 301884; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KW 2311.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.
Exhibit 31.2
**CERTIFICATIONS**
     I, Brent W. Christensen, certify that:
     1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Meade InstrumentsCorp.;
     2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to makethe statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statementswere made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;
     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all material respectsthe financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrantas of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
     4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined inExchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or causedsuch disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made knownto us by others within those entities, particularly during theperiod in which this report is being prepared; b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosurecontrols and procedures and presented in this report our conclusionsabout the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures asof the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourthfiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and
     5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, basedon our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, tothe registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in thedesign or operation of internal control over financial reportingwhich are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves managementor other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting
Date: May 28, 2004   By: /s/ **Brent W. Christensen,** **Senior VicePresident — Finance and CFO**
#### Ashley TRUITT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D08-5170.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Nov. 24, 2010.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 5, 2011.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and David John McPherrin, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Myra J. Fried, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for ap-pellee.

PER CURIAM.

*Dismissed. See Marshall v. State,*978 So.2d 279 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

HAZOURI, CIKLIN and LEVINE, JJ., concur.
#### John Clyde DEVILLE, Sr. v. Warren W. FREY, et al.

No. 2011-C-1157.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 23, 2011.

In re Frey, Warren W. et ah; Progressive Security Insurance Company; Savoy, James; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certioraii and/or Review, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 09-C-1341-A,; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-1290.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Monica M. ROMERO.

No. 2011-KK-0004.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 18, 2011.

In re Romero, Monica M.; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 09-MISD-094414, 09-FELN-024578; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 1931.

Denied.
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 188 (Wednesday, September 29, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 60125]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-24412]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION


Ocean Transportation Intermediary License Reissuance

    Notice is hereby given that the following Ocean Transportation 
Intermediary licenses have been reissued by the Federal Maritime 
Commission pursuant to section 19 of the Shipping Act of 1984 (46 
U.S.C. Chapter 409) and the regulations of the Commission pertaining to 
the licensing of Ocean Transportation Intermediaries, 46 CFR Part 515.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
       License No.             Name/address           Date reissued
------------------------------------------------------------------------
4002F...................  Ocean Trade            July 22, 2010.
                           International, Inc.,
                           16517 SW 52nd
                           Street, Miami, FL
                           33185.
004553F.................  Marianas Steamship     August 15, 2010.
                           Agencies, Inc. dba
                           MSA Logistics,
                           Commercial Port
                           Annex, 2nd Floor,
                           1010 Cabras Highway,
                           Piti, Guam 96915.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


Sandra L. Kusumoto,
Director, Bureau of Certification and Licensing.
[FR Doc. 2010-24412 Filed 9-28-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
Seventeenth Amndmnt to Master Subscriber Agreement



 Exhibit 10.22E 
 SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT 
 TO 
 CSG MASTER SUBSCRIBER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AGREEMENT 
 BETWEEN 
 CSG SYSTEMS, INC. 
 AND

 DISH NETWORK, L.L.C. 
 This
Seventeenth Amendment (the “Amendment”) is made by and between CSG Systems, Inc., a Delaware corporation (“CSG”) and DISH Network, L.L.C., formerly known as EchoStar Satellite L.L.C., a Colorado limited liability
company (“Customer”). CSG and Customer entered into a certain CSG Master Subscriber Management System Agreement (Document #2151185) dated December 1, 2005, as amended (the “Agreement”), and now desire to amend the Agreement
in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in this Amendment. If the terms and conditions set forth in this Amendment shall be in conflict with the Agreement, the terms and conditions of this Amendment shall control. Any terms in initial
capital letters or all capital letters used as a defined term but not defined in this Amendment shall have the meaning set forth in the Agreement. Upon execution of this Amendment by the parties, any subsequent reference to the Agreement between the
parties shall mean the Agreement as amended by this Amendment. Except as amended by this Amendment, the terms and conditions set forth in the Agreement shall continue in full force and effect according to their terms. 
 CSG and Customer agree to the following as of the Effective Date: 
 Customer desires and CSG hereby agrees to extend the Term of the Agreement for an Additional one year period beginning on January 1, 2009 and expiring on December 31, 2009 at the rates provided in the Agreement for 2009 in
accordance with the Agreement. Pursuant to the foregoing the parties agree to amend the Agreement as provided herein. 
  

	1.	Delete Section 18 Term in its entirety and replace with the following: 

  

	 	“18.	Term. This Agreement shall remain in effect until December 31, 2009 unless earlier terminated pursuant to Section 19. The term of any specific license for the Products
and the term for any specific Services to be provided shall be set forth in the Schedules attached hereto and shall be effective from the date set forth therein and continue as provided for therein, unless terminated pursuant to Section 19 of
this Agreement.” 

 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties execute this Amendment on the date last signed below (“Effective
Date”). 
  

									
	DISH NETWORK, L.L.C. (“CUSTOMER”)	 		 	CSG SYSTEMS, INC. (“CSG”)
					
	By:	 	 /s/ Michael McClaskey
	 		 	By:	 	 /s/ Robert M. Scott

	Name:	 	Michael McClaskey	 		 	Name:	 	Robert M. Scott
	Title:	 	CIO	 		 	Title:	 	EVP & Chief Operating Officer
	Date:	 	12-31-08	 		 	Date:	 	12-31-08

 CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY INFORMATION - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED EMPLOYEES OF THE PARTIES HERETO
ONLY AND IS NOT FOR GENERAL DISTRIBUTION WITHIN OR OUTSIDE THEIR RESPECTIVE COMPANIES 
  


					
		  	Page 1 of 1	  	12/24/08
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________ )

RYAN NOAH SHAPIRO, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 13

- 0729 (PLF)

)

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, )

)

Defendant. )

__________________________________________)

ORDER

For the reasons set forth in the Opinion issued this same day, it is hereby

ORDERED that the government’s renewed motion for summary judgment [ Dkt.

No. 53 ] is GRANTED; it is

FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Shapiro’s renewed cross

- motion for summary

judgment [Dkt. No. 5 5 ] is DENIED ; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that judgment shall be entered for the defendant.

This is a final appealable order. See F ED

. R. A PP

. P . 4(a).

SO ORDERED.

________________________ PAUL L. FRIEDMAN

DAT E: July 24, 2019 United States D istrict Judge
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
consolidated statement of operations and consolidated balance sheet and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000919957
<NAME> COMCAST UK CABLE PARTNERS LTD
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> U. K. POUNDS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
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<CASH>                                          92,315
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    6,870
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (3,065)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               102,918
<PP&E>                                         348,960
<DEPRECIATION>                                (44,506)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 513,521
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           28,637
<BONDS>                                        330,695
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<COMMON>                                           501
<OTHER-SE>                                     139,398
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   513,521
<SALES>                                         36,027
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                36,588
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                 (45,112)
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              (10,335)
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            (17,407)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (31,777)
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<NET-INCOME>                                  (31,777)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.63)
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</TABLE>
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Doylestown Hospital, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 2524 C.D. 2015

: Workers’ Compensation Appeal : Board (Kulak), :

Respondent :

Nancy Kulak, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 2 C.D. 2016

: Workers’ Compensation Appeal : Board (Doylestown Hospital), :

Respondent :

AMENDING ORDER

AND NOW, this 15 th day of August , 2016, the date on line three of

the second page of the Memorandum Opinion filed August 9, 2016, is amended to

read July 29, 2014

.

_______________________________ DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge
#### City Sign Service, Inc. *v.*Tansy et al.

[No. 19,545.

Filed May 11, 1961.]

*649
      *Harry Riddell,*of Indianapolis, for appellant.

*Robert A. Parsons, Robert H. Orbison*and *Baker & Orbison,*all of Indianapolis, for appellees.

Ax, C. J.

The transcript and assignment of errors filed in this Court and this cause was submitted on January 20, 1961. Within time appellant prayed for an extension of time to file appellant’s brief, and this Court granted this extension of time to and including March 22, 1961.

Appellant failed to file his brief within said time. Thereafter, on April 5, 1961, appellant, by attorney, filed in this Court a verified petition which he called a petition for reinstatement of this appeal and a petition for extension of thirty days’ time within which to file appellant’s brief. Attached to this verified petition was an acknowledgment of the petition signed by the attorney for appellees wherein he also stated that “he has no objection to such reinstatement.”

Appellant’s attorney, by his petition, in substance alleged that because he was engaged in trial work and out of his office for a great period of time since the granting of his first extension of time, he failed to file his brief in time.

Rule 2-15 of the Supreme Court requires that “the appellant shall have 30' days after submission in which to file his brief, and if the brief is not filed within the time limited the clerk shall enter an order dismissing the appeal, unless a petition for extension of time is on file.”

We fail to understand why appellant has asked in his petition for a “reinstatement” of this appeal be*650cause no action of dismissal had been taken either by the Clerk of this Court or by this Court.

In this case, inasmuch as a petition for extension of time had previously been granted, it was proper for the clerk to take no action on dismissal, for after the court has once granted an extension of time, and the brief is not filed within the time granted, the court, and not the clerk, should dismiss the appeal. *Rooney*v. *City of Chicago, et al.*(1958), 129 Ind. App. 128, 148 N. E. 2d 842 (Rehearing denied May 13, 1958) (Transfer denied September 9, 1958).

. By reason of our holdings in the *Rooney*case, and the case of *Winn*v. *O’Neal*(1957), 236 Ind. 264, 139 N. E. 2d 536, cited therein, we are powerless under Supreme Court Rule 2-16 to grant appellant additional time to file his brief, and there remains nothing for us to do but dismiss this, appeal. The verified petition filed by appellant in this case at bar reveals that there was no reason why appellant failed to properly apply for an extension of time except that counsel, to whom the duty, had been delegated, was too busy elsewhere.

Appeal dismissed.

Pfaff, P. J., Cooper, Bierly, Myers, Gonas, Ryan, Kelley, JJ., concur.

Note. — Reported in 174 N. E. 2d 418.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

March 8, 2011 

0228 

Order 

 

March 8, 2011 

141751 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 141751 

 COA: 297380 

Wayne CC: 92-000779-FC 

SHAUN SCOTT, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 22, 2010 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has 

failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
#### Justin Lee KIRBY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D10-2762.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Aug. 12, 2011.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 8, 2011.

*933Loren D. Rhoton, of Loren Rhoton, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and L. Charlene Matthews, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

EVANDER, J.

Kirby was convicted of burglary of a conveyance with an assault1 and sentenced to life imprisonment as a prison releasee reoffender.2 He contends that although the State’s evidence might have been sufficient to establish the commission of a battery during the course of the burglary, it was insufficient to prove an assault. We affirm.

We recognize that Kirby’s argument is motivated by the fact that he could not be sentenced as a prison releasee reof-fender if convicted of burglary of a conveyance with a battery, but was eligible to be so sentenced upon his conviction of burglary of a conveyance with an assault. *See Shaw v. State,*26 So.3d 51 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (recognizing irony that burglary with assault is qualifying offense under PRR statute, but burglary with battery is not); *but see State v. Hockley,*— So.3d -, 2010 WL 4273625 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (holding that burglary with assault is not qualifying offense under PRR statute; certifying conflict with *Shaw), rev. granted,*55 So.3d 1288 (Fla.2011). However, in the instant case, the State charged Kirby with burglary of an occupied conveyance with an assault only. He was not charged with the commission of a battery during the course of a burglary. Thus, the issue presented is whether the State’s evidence is legally sufficient to support Kirby’s conviction.

Assault and battery are separate and distinct offenses because they proscribe different acts. *Casselman v. State,*761 So.2d 482, 484 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). An “assault” is “an intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some act *934which creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is imminent.” § 784.011(1), Fla. Stat. (2009). The offense of battery occurs when a person intentionally touches or strikes another person against that person’s will, or intentionally causes bodily harm to another. § 784.03(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009). Accordingly, one can commit both an assault and a battery in a single criminal episode. *See, e.g., Casselman*(defendant could be convicted of both battery and assault where after punching victim, defendant attempted to strike victim again).

Here, the evidence established that during the course of the burglary of the victim’s motor vehicle, Kirby committed both a battery and an assault. He entered the victim’s vehicle without her consent, punched her, and then threatened (by act) to strike her again — creating a well-founded fear in the victim that additional violence was imminent.

AFFIRMED.

PALMER and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

1

. § 810.02(l)(b),(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009).

2

. § 775.082(9)(a)l.o„ Fla. Stat. (2009).
#### Ronald PALMER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D10-4589.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Nov. 10, 2010.

Ronald Palmer, pro se, Petitioner.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner Ronald Palmer seeks belated appeal from an order denying his motion to withdraw plea made pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(£). However, that motion postponed rendition of the judgment and sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(h). The order denying the motion is not separately appealable. Palmer is currently seeking belated appeal from judgment and sentence in this court’s case number 1D10-3036. We therefore deny the instant petition without prejudice to Palmer’s right to pursue belated appeal in 1D10-3036. Petitioner may challenge the order denying motion to withdraw plea in the direct appeal that will follow if belated appeal is granted in 1D10-3036.

PETITION DENIED.

BENTON, PADOVANO, and CLARK, JJ., concur.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. John NARDI.

No. 2010-KK-2573.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 7, 2011.

In re Nardi, John; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial *476Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. 0, No. 497-072; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1342.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant the writ.