NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 19-3070

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ELECTRA REALTY COMPANY INC.;

LEBO REALTY, L.P.,

 Appellants

v.

KAPLAN HIGHER EDUCATION CORPORATION

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

D.C. Civil No. 1-19-cv-00977

District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones, III

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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

on April 17, 2020

Before: CHAGARES, SCIRICA, and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Filed: August 28, 2020)

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OPINION*

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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

SCIRICA, Circuit Judge

Appellants Electra Realty Company, Inc., and Lebo Realty, L.P., seek review of the 

trial court’s order dismissing their complaint alleging that appellee Kaplan Higher 

Education Corporation violated contractual agreements with them. We will affirm.1

I.

Electra and Lebo separately entered into lease agreements with one of Kaplan’s 

subsidiary companies, Thompson Education, LLC. Each lease agreement contained a tenyear term starting in 2006. Under each lease, Kaplan was the guarantor.

The parties’ contractual relationships operated without controversy until 2015, 

when Thompson, through Kaplan, informed Electra and Lebo by letter that it was 

assigning its leases to Virginia College, LLC, which was a wholly owned subsidiary of 

Education Corporation of America (ECA). Kaplan’s letters contained acknowledgement 

sections that it asked Electra and Lebo to sign. Kaplan also sent contracts to Electra and 

Lebo that would release Kaplan as the guarantor, and those documents indicated that 

ECA would execute a substitute guarantee. The pertinent language stated: 

WHEREAS, in connection with the closing of the Transaction, Guarantor has 

requested that it be released and discharged from the obligations under the 

Guaranty at which time Education Corporation of America will execute a 

substitute guarantee in favor of Landlord.

NOW, THEREFORE, for valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of 

which are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto hereby agree as follows:

1 Because the parties are diverse, the District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1332(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
3

1. Release of Guarantor. Effective upon the closing of the Transaction, Guarantor 

shall be and hereby is unconditionally, irrevocably and forever released and 

discharged from any and all present, previously existing and hereafter arising 

obligations, duties or liabilities of any type or nature which are evidenced by or 

arise under or in respect of the Guaranty, whether any such obligations, duties or 

liabilities are known or unknown as of the date hereof and the Guaranty is hereby 

terminated and of no further force or effect, and Landlord represents and warrants 

to Guarantor that Landlord is the sole owner of, and has not assigned, sold, 

transferred or otherwise disposed of, any such claim.

App’x 76, 81. Electra and Lebo signed the acknowledgments and the contracts releasing 

Kaplan as a guarantor. The relationship soured when ECA failed to execute a substitute 

guarantee and Virginia College stopped paying rent. 

Electra and Lebo filed this breach-of-contract action in June 2019, alleging that 

Kaplan remained liable as the guarantor of their leases with Virginia College. The 

District Court granted Kaplan’s motion to dismiss, holding that Electra and Lebo had 

each unconditionally released Kaplan as a guarantor, and that Kaplan had no contractual 

obligation to ensure that ECA would execute a substitute guarantee. Electra and Lebo 

timely appealed. 

II.

Electra and Lebo argue that the District Court misread the parties’ contracts, and 

that the contracts conditioned Kaplan’s release as guarantor on its obligation to secure a 

substitute guarantor. Because Kaplan failed to do this, they argue, it was not actually 

released as the guarantor, and it is liable for the rent Virginia College did not pay. 

Because the parties’ contracts unconditionally released Kaplan as guarantor and did not 
4

condition that release on securing a substitute guarantor, we will affirm the District 

Court.

2

Under the Pennsylvania law applied in this diversity suit, a claim for breach of 

contract has three elements: “(1) the existence of a contract, including its essential terms, 

(2) a breach of a duty imposed by the contract and (3) resultant damages.” Kaymark v. 

Bank of Am., 783 F.3d 168, 182 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Omicron Sys., Inc. v. Weiner, 

860 A.2d 554, 564 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004)). “When a written contract is clear and 

unequivocal, its meaning must be determined by its contents alone.” Robert F. Felte, Inc. 

v. White, 302 A.2d 347, 351 (Pa. 1973) (internal quotations omitted).

The language of the parties’ contracts makes clear that Electra and Lebo 

unconditionally released Kaplan as a guarantor, stating:

Release of Guarantor. Effective upon the closing of the Transaction, Guarantor 

shall be and hereby is unconditionally, irrevocably and forever released and 

discharged from any and all present, previously existing and hereafter arising 

obligations, duties or liabilities of any type or nature which are evidenced by or 

arise under or in respect of the Guaranty, whether any such obligations, duties or 

liabilities are known or unknown as of the date hereof and the Guaranty is hereby 

terminated and of no further force or effect . . . . 

App’x 76, 81. This language is unconditional, stating that Kaplan’s guarantee is 

“unconditionally, irrevocably and forever released and discharged.” There are no 

qualifications to this broad and absolute release. 

2 We review a grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim de novo. Fleisher v. 

Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012). 
5

Electra and Lebo argue that this release was conditioned on Kaplan’s allegedly 

unfulfilled obligation to secure a substitute guarantee. The only language in the contract 

referring to a substitute guarantee is in the recitals section of the contracts: 

WHEREAS, in connection with the closing of the Transaction, Guarantor has 

requested that it be released and discharged from the obligations under the 

Guaranty at which time Education Corporation of America will execute a 

substitute guarantee in favor of Landlord.

App’x 76. 

But this recital does not alter the parties’ agreement to release Kaplan. First, the 

recital does not mention that Kaplan will execute a substitute guarantee, only that 

Education Corporation of America, a non-party to this action, will. And even if the recital

did mention Kaplan, it would have no legal effect here. A recital provision, though it may 

provide background information or serve as an interpretative aid, does not control over 

the operative terms of a contract. See Neal D. Ivey Co. v. Franklin Assoc., 87 A.2d 236, 

239 (Pa. 1952) (stating that “[t]he specific terms in the body of the contract control” over 

recitals, such as whereas clauses); Wyeth Pharm., Inc. v. Borough of West Chester, 126 

A.3d 1055, 1062 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015) (“A background recital may not contradict a 

substantive provision of the contract, but it nevertheless will be looked to in construing 

the contract.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Gyrnberg v. 

F.E.R.C., 71 F.3d 413, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[I]t is standard contract law that a Whereas 

clause, while sometimes useful as an aid to interpretation, cannot create any right beyond 

those arising from the operative terms of the document.” (citations and internal quotation 
6

marks omitted)). Thus, whatever the import of this language, we do not read it to supplant 

the unconditional release. 

Electra and Lebo nonetheless argue that through the contracts’ invocation of 

“valuable consideration,” the unconditional release incorporates the substitute guarantee 

recital. Because Electra and Lebo didn’t receive anything else that was “valuable,” they 

reason, the substitute guarantee must have been what the contracts meant by “valuable 

consideration.” But this argument fails. A contract that contains “an express statement, in 

any form of language, that the signer intends to be legally bound” cannot be “invalid or 

unenforceable” for lack of consideration. See 33 P.S. § 6; Socko v. Mid-Atl. Sys. of CPA, 

Inc., 126 A.3d 1266, 1277 (Pa. 2015) (“[A] contract containing a written express 

statement of intent to be ‘legally bound’ supplies the necessary consideration to support 

the enforceability of an agreement.”).

Moreover, we cannot read “valuable consideration” to refer to the substitute 

guarantee because the contracts contain other language that forecloses that reading. See 

Lesko v. Frankford Hosp.-Bucks Cty., 15 A.3d 337, 342 (Pa. 2011) (“[A]n act or event 

designated in a contract will not be construed as a condition unless that clearly appears to 

be the intention of the parties.”). The terms of the contracts are clear: Kaplan was 

“unconditionally, irrevocably and forever released and discharged from any and all 

present, previously existing and hereafter arising obligations” under the two leases.

App’x 76, 81. None of the contracts’ terms qualify or limit that absolute language. 

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.