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Filed 6/14/22 In re G.P. CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re G.P., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

G.P.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 

 A162942

 

 (Napa County

 Super Ct. No. 20213632005)

This case requires us to consider the reasonableness of a 

probation condition authorizing warrantless searches of G.P.’s 

electronic devices. The juvenile court imposed the electronic 

search condition after G.P. admitted violating several conditions 

of his probation. G.P. appeals, asserting that the electronic 

search condition is invalid under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 

481 (Lent) because it lacks a sufficient nexus to his future 

criminality. He also contends the condition is overbroad under 

the United States Constitution. Because G.P. used social media 

in connection with some of his probation violations, we conclude 

the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in imposing an 

electronic search condition, but we remand the matter to the trial 

court to tailor the condition in accordance with In re Ricardo P. 

(2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 (Ricardo P.).
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BACKGROUND

A.

G.P. pled no contest to second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 

211)1 and attempted second degree robbery (§§ 211, 664). The 

juvenile court adjudged him a ward of the court, placed him on 

probation, and imposed numerous probation conditions. Those 

conditions include a curfew and requirements to attend school 

regularly; maintain passing grades; report to the probation officer 

as directed; stay in his parent’s home; obey all reasonable 

directives of his parents and the probation officer; and avoid all 

contact and communication with I.S.--G.P.’s accomplice in the 

robbery. 

A few months later, G.P.’s mother reported to the Napa 

Police Department that G.P. ran away from home and failed to 

report to his probation officer. Around that time, G.P. asked for a 

place to stay by posting on the social media app Snapchat. 

A detective from the Napa Police Department located G.P. 

at his place of work and attempted to place him under arrest. 

G.P. broke free from the detective’s grip and ran through a 

parking lot and across a highway. Officers eventually took G.P. 

into custody, but only after he continued to try to evade them. 

G.P. had also violated several other probation conditions in 

the three months between the court’s imposition of probation and 

his arrest. G.P. was still associating with I.S. G.P. was present 

when the police conducted a search of I.S.’s home, and one of 

G.P.’s Snapchat posts showed him smoking with I.S. G.P. also 

missed 46 out of 117 school days, was failing all but one of his 

classes, and had left his parent’s home and failed to return after 

curfew on at least three prior occasions. 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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B.

The Napa County district attorney filed an amended 

supplemental juvenile wardship petition charging G.P. with 

resisting arrest (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)) and failure to obey 

a juvenile court order (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 777, subd. (a)(1)). At 

an uncontested detention hearing, G.P. admitted the violations, 

and the juvenile court sustained the petition. 

G.P.’s probation officer filed a dispositional report that 

described G.P.’s numerous probation violations and his comments 

indicating that he did not appreciate the consequences of his 

actions. The probation officer recommended continued 

supervision with additional probation conditions, including an 

electronic search condition, noting that G.P. uses his cell phone to 

“further his high-risk behaviors, and [the electronic search 

condition] may assist in preventing future criminal conduct.” 

C.

At the dispositional hearing, G.P.’s counsel asked the court 

to strike the electronic search condition, arguing that under 

Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th 1113, G.P.’s use of a phone to 

communicate while on the run does not justify the burden the 

condition imposes on his privacy interests. 

The juvenile court adopted the probation department’s 

recommendations and imposed the electronic search condition. 

DISCUSSION

G.P. contends the electronic search condition is invalid 

under Lent. Applying the abuse of discretion standard (In re P.A.

(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 23, 33), we agree the condition imposes a 

burden on G.P. disproportionate to the legitimate interests it 

serves. (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1122.) 
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A.

The electronic search condition requires G.P. to submit “all” 

electronic devices under his control to search and seizure “at any 

time of the day or night with or without a search warrant, arrest 

warrant, or reasonable suspicion” and to also provide all 

passcodes and other information required to gain access into the 

electronic devices and their applications. The condition is limited 

to “areas of the electronic devices where evidence likely to reveal 

criminal activity or probation violations may be found.” 

B.

A juvenile court has broad discretion to fashion conditions 

of probation for the purpose of rehabilitation and may impose a 

probation condition that would otherwise be unconstitutional if it 

is tailored to meet the needs of the juvenile. (In re Josh W. (1997) 

55 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.) However, the juvenile court’s discretion has 

limits. (In re Alonzo M. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 156, 164 (Alonzo 

M.).) Probation conditions must be reasonable. (Welf. & Inst. 

Code, § 730, subd. (b).) The reasonableness of a probation 

condition is measured by the circumstances of the minor’s offense 

and social history. (In re Walter P. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 95, 

100.) 

Under Lent, a probation condition is invalid if it “ ‘(1) has 

no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, 

(2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) 

requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to 

future criminality. ’ ” (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) All three 

Lent prongs must be satisfied to invalidate a probation condition. 

(People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379.) 

The parties appear to agree that the first two prongs of 

Lent are satisfied. The question then is whether the electronic 

search condition also satisfies Lent’s third prong. 
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To demonstrate that a probation condition is “ ‘reasonably 

related to future criminality’ ” under Lent’s third prong, the 

record must establish a connection between the condition and the 

probationer’s criminal conduct or personal history. (Ricardo P., 

supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1119–1121.) There must be more than an 

“abstract or hypothetical” relationship between the probation 

condition and preventing future criminality. (Id. at p. 1121.) 

However, the probation condition need not be tied to the 

probationer’s crimes if the conditions are “ ‘reasonably’ ” directed 

at curbing the probationer’s future criminality. (Id. at p. 1122.) 

Lent’s third prong also requires a “degree of 

proportionality” between the burden imposed by the probation 

condition and the legitimate interests it serves. (Ricardo P., 

supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1122.) Ricardo P. held that a “burdensome 

and intrusive” electronic search condition requires “a 

correspondingly substantial and particularized justification.” (Id.

at p. 1126.) 

C.

G.P.’s main argument is that the electronic search 

condition is not proportionate to the legitimate interests it serves. 

Here, the legitimate interest served by the electronic search 

condition is the government’s interest in monitoring G.P.’s 

compliance with the stay-away order and the probation 

conditions requiring G.P. to remain in his parent’s home and 

abide by a curfew. Because the record demonstrates that G.P. 

used Snapchat to facilitate (or flaunt) his violation of those 

probation conditions, there is more than an “abstract or 

hypothetical” connection between the electronic search condition 

and the government’s legitimate interest. (Ricardo P., supra, 7 

Cal.5th at pp. 1121–1122.) 

However, G.P. argues that the electronic search condition is 

disproportionate to the legitimate interest in ensuring his 
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adherence to those terms of probation. In Alonzo M., the court of 

appeal concluded that a juvenile court’s decision to impose an 

electronic search condition was not an abuse of discretion where 

the minor and his mother attributed his criminal conduct to the 

people he socialized with, and the record showed that the minor 

spent a significant amount of his time using electronic devices. 

(Alonzo M., supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at pp. 166–167.) But the court 

also found that the language of the electronic search condition 

was too broad and remanded the case to allow the juvenile court 

to tailor the condition to the probation department’s legitimate 

interest in preventing the minor from communicating with his 

accomplices. (Id. at pp. 167–168.) 

In re Amber K. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 559 is similar. The 

court concluded that a broad electronic search condition imposed 

a burden disproportionate to the legitimate interest of ensuring 

the minor was complying with a no-contact order. (Id. at p. 567.) 

Likewise, here, the electronic search condition imposes a 

greater burden on G.P. than the circumstances warrant. The 

condition permits searches of social media accounts, emails, 

texts, search histories, digital photos and videos (In re David C.

(2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 657, 664), and any digital information that 

may contain evidence of criminal activity, even if unrelated to the 

probation conditions at issue here. The search condition also 

lacks temporal limitations, allowing officers to access information 

that predates the imposition of G.P.’s probation. (Ricardo P., 

supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1127.) The record does not reveal a 

“substantial and particularized justification” for such an 

expansive search condition. (Id. at p. 1126.) 

We remand the matter to the juvenile court to consider 

whether to impose a narrower electronic search condition, the 

burden of which should be proportionate to the state’s interest in 

ensuring G.P.’s compliance with the stay-away order and the 

probation conditions requiring G.P. to remain in his parent’s 
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home and abide by a curfew. We do not reach G.P.’s 

constitutional argument.

D.

G.P. has forfeited his argument that the electronic search 

condition is unreasonable because it may discourage him from 

accessing digital services and programs to support his 

rehabilitation. He fails to support this argument with citation to 

legal authority or to the record. (WFG National Title Ins. Co. v. 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 894.)

DISPOSITION 

The electronic search condition is stricken. The matter is 

remanded to the juvenile court to consider whether to impose a 

revised condition tailored to the relevant state interests. The 

disposition order is otherwise affirmed.
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______________________

BURNS, J. 

We concur:

____________________________

SIMONS, ACTING P.J.

____________________________

WISEMAN, J.*

A162942

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth 

Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.