T he H onorabl e W i l l i am W Schw ar zer , U ni t ed St at es D i s t r i ct Ju dge f or t he N ort he rn D i s t r i ct of Cal i f orn i a, * si t t i ng by desi gnat i o n.

NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 08a0513n.06 Filed: August 20, 2008 No. 06-4437
UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT AL EX AN DE R G ON Z AL ES, P etitioner -Appellant,
v. JEF F RE Y W OLF E, W ar de n, Respondent-Appellee. / ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE SOU THER

N D ISTRIC T OF OHI O

BEFORE: MOORE and CLAY, Circ uit Jud ges; and SCHWARZER, Distr ict Judge. * C LAY, Circ uit Jud ge. Alexander Gonzales a ppeals the district c ourt’s denia l of his petition fo r w ri t of

ha be a s c or pu s f ile d p ur su ant t o 28 U.S .C
. § 2254 in w hic h h e se e ks re lie f f ro m hi s conviction and se ntence for possessi n g and tra ffickingin coca ine in violation of sections 2925.03(A)( 1) and 2925.11( A) of the Ohio Revised C ode. For the reasons g iven below, this Court AF F IRMS the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of Go nza le s’ pe tit ion

fo r w ri t of

ha be a s c or pu s.No. 06-4437

2 BACK GR OUND A. Sub stantive F acts I n 1 99 6, Al e xan de r G on zal e s b e g an tr ans po rt ingc oc a ine fr om N e w Yo rk City to C inc inn a ti, Ohio, conce aling the drug s in a hidden compa rtment in Manuel Rodrig uez’s car
. State v. Gonzales , 783 N.E.2d 903, 907 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002). Gonzales would purchase coca ine in New Y ork, drive to Cincinnati, and give the drug s to a local distributor to sell. Id. Rodrigue z would often a ccompa ny Gonzales on his trips to and from New York. Id. Although the local distributor cha ng ed over the y e ars , M os s Samake wa s a c tin g in t his c a pa c ity by the e nd of the dr ugtr affi cki ng schem e in November

1998. Id. On Novembe r 22, 1998, Rodrig uez and his g irlfriend picked up Gonzales at a Rama da Inn in Cincinnati and took Gonzales to their apar tment. Id. Gon z al es t o l d R o drig uez that he was pla nn ingon de liv e ri ngdr

ug s to Sa make and

a sk e d Ro dr ig ue z to ke e p two kil og ra ms of c oc a ine in his apartment. Id. at 908. Afte r Gonzales spent the da y in Rodrigue z ’s apartment, Rodrigue z’s g irlfriend dr ove Gonzales ba ck to his hotel. Id. The next day , Gonzales retur ned to Rodrig uez’s apar

tment and g ave a

portion of the coc aine that he had br oug ht the previous d ay t o S am ake. Gonzales , 7 8 3 N
. E
. 2 d a t9 0 8
. L a t e r

t h a td a y, Gonzales discover ed that the police had surr ounded Rodrig uez’s apar tment. Id. Gonzales then left the coc aine with R o d ri gu ez and his g irlfriend a nd exit ed the a

partment. Id. Rod

ri g ue z an d h is g irlfriend hid the c ocaine in the apar tment building and attempted to leave, b u t af t er l eavingthe building Rodrig uez wa s ar re s t ed and c onsented to a se arc h of the a partment. Id. After

an initial
unsucce ssful search , p o l i ce t h re at en edt o ch ar ge R o dri gu ez ’s gi rl fr i en d wi t h m o n ey

l au n d er i n g basedNo. 06-4437

3 on rec eipts that were found in the sea rch. Id. Rodrigue z then revea led the location of the drug s, and police found two sc ales, 400.6 g rams of pow der c ocaine and 164.2 g rams of cra ck co ca i n e. Id. Samake wa s also arr ested a fter le aving Rodrigue z’s apartment. Id. a t 909. Pol ic e fo un d $ 5, 00 0 in
c a s h in Sa ma k e ’ s c ar an d 4 0 0
. 1 g r a ms o f

c r a c k c o c a in e in

h is residenc e. Id. Gonzales was subsequently

arr ested; howe ver, no c ocaine was discove red on his per son. Id. at 908. B. P roce dural Fac ts On Dec ember

3, 1998, Gonzales was indicted in the Ha m i l ton County , Ohio Court of Com mon Ple a s o n tw o c ounts of po sse ssi ng a t le a st 10 0 g ra ms of c ra c k c oc a ine in v iol a tio n o f O hio Revised Code § 2925.11(A) and one c ount of possessing at least 1,000 g rams of non-cr ack c ocaine with a Major Dr

ug Offe nder (“MDO” ) specification on eac h count. At t rial Gonzales’ a ccomplice , Rodrigue z, was called to testify ag ainst him. However , Rodr i gu ez invoked his Fifth Amendme nt rig ht ag ainst self-incr i m i n at i o n, and instead of prese nting his live testimony , the prosec ution prese nted Rodrigue z’s r ecor ded statement to police office rs. Gonzales , 783 N.E.2d at 906. At the close of tr ial, Gonzales was acquitted of one of the cra ck-posse ssion c harg es and found g uilty of the
re ma ini ngc ha

rg e s and the ir a c c omp anyingMD O s pe c if ic a tio ns . Id. Go nza les was sen te nc e d to twenty y ear s imprisonment. State v. Gonzalez , 742 N.E.2d 710, 713-14 (Ohio C t. App. 2000). The Ohio Court of Appea ls rever sed Gonzales’ c onviction and remanded f or a ne w trial, holding that the admission of Rodrigue z’s recor ded stateme nts constituted prejudicial er ror. Id. Go nza le s w a s r e tr ie d o n the po sse ssi on c ounts and

a c c omp anyingMD O s pe c if ic a tio ns . Gonzales , 7 83 N. E. 2d

a t 90 6. At

the e nd of his se c on d tr ia l, t

he jud g e de c lare d a mistr ia l du e to alleg ations that one of Gonzales’ family members threatene d a juror in a n attempt to influence theNo. 06-4437

4 verdic t. Id. Following Gonzales’ sec ond t ri al i n 2 001, the State filed a n additional indictment ag ainst Gonzales char g ing him with two counts of traf ficking in at least 100 g rams of c rac k coca ine in v iol a tio n o f O hio Re vis e d Co de § 2 92 5. 03 (A ) a nd on e c ount o f t

ra ff ic kin g in at le a st 1 ,0 00 g ra ms of non-c rac k coca ine in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2925.03(A) with an MDO spec ification
acc ompanying e ach c ount. Id. at 906-07. These new charg es were c onsolidated with the rema ining two possession counts with MDO specifications from the 1998 indictment. Id. The c rac k coca ine po sse ssi on

c ha rg e of wh ic h Go nza le s ha d be e n a c qu itt e d w a s n ot i nc lud e d in the 20 01 ind ic tme nt. Gonzale s f

il e d a mo ti o n to d is mi s s th e in d ic tm e n ts b a s e d o n d o u b le je o p ar dy . T h e tr ia l ju d g e, a differ ent judg e than ha d presided ove r Gonzales’ e arlier trials, dismiss ed this motion. Go nza le s w a s c on vic te d o f a ll f ive po sse ssi on

and tr a ff ic kin g c ounts a s w e ll a s th e ir
acc ompanying spe cifications. Gonzales , 7 83 N. E. 2d a t 90 6. Th e tr ia l c ourt

se nte nc e d G on zal e s to 10 y ear s of impri sonment on the count of possessingat least 100 g rams of c rac k coca ine and a
consec utive 10-y ear

sentenc e on the M DO spec ification ac company ing this cha

rg e. Id. Gonzales
was a lso sentence d to 10 y ear s of imprisonment for possessing at least 1,000 g rams of non- cra ck
coca ine to be ser

ved conse cutivel y to the other possession count a long w ith 10 y ear s of imp ri so nme nt f

or the MD O s pe c if

ic a tio n a c c omp anyingthe c ha rg e to b e se rv e d c on c ur

re ntl y wi th all counts. Id. For the t hree drug traff icking counts and their a ccompa ny ing MD Os, Gonzales was sentenc ed to 10 y ear s eac h to be serve d concur rently wi t h the possession counts. Id. I n to ta l, Go nza le s w a s se nte nc e d to 30 y e ars imp ri so nme nt. On a pp e a l, t he Oh io Court of Ap pe a ls a ff ir me d G on zal e s’ c on vic tio n, and the Oh io S up re me Court declined to exerc ise its jurisdiction t o revie w the case . Gonzales subsequently filed a motionNo. 06-4437

5 for new trial and a pe tition for post-conviction relief based upon ne wly

discovere d information about the sentenc e reduc tion Rodrig uez r ece ived for testify ing ag ainst Gonzales. The tri al co u rt d enied both the motion and the petition f or post-conviction relief

. Gonzales appea led this de nial, and the Oh io Court

of Ap pe a ls a ff

ir me d th e tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on . G on zal e s f ur the r a pp e a le d, bu t th e Oh io Supreme Court dec lined to exercise its discretionar y jurisdiction. Gonzales subsequently

filed a petition for writ of ha beas c orpus in the United States District Court f o r th e So u th e r

n D is tr ic t o f O h io in w h ic h h e r a is e d e ig h t g r o u n d s f o r r e li e f
. The c ase w as ref err ed to a mag istrate judg e wh o issued a re port that rec ommended deny ing G onzales’ petition. Gonzales filed objec tions to t he report and rec ommendations, and the magistrate judg e re sponded to the objections in a supplemental r eport a nd rec ommendations, treating the objections as a motion for r econside ration. Despite Gonz ales’ objections to both the mag istrate’s initial and supplementa l repor ts and recom mendations, the district court a dopted both repor ts and rec ommendations as written, dismissing with prejudice Gonzales’ habe as petition on September 26, 2006. Gonzales
re qu e ste d a

c e rt if ic a te of a pp e a la bil ity fr om the dis tr ic t c ourt and fi le d a no tic e of a pp e a l to the thi s Court on October 20, 2006. The district cour t issued a ce rtificate of appe alability on the six issues raised in Gonzales’ reque st. This Court construed Gonzales’ n o t i ce o f appe al as a reque st for a partial c ertificate of a

ppeala bility on the re maining issues c ontained in his petition f or writ of ha

beas
c or pu s and de c lin e d to iss ue a

c e rt if ic a te of a pp e a la bil ity on the re ma ini ngiss ue s.

DI SCU SSIO N St a nd a r d o f R e v ie wNo. 06-4437

6 This Court’s reviewof the leg al conc lusions underly ing a d i strict court’s de nial of habe as corpus relief is conducted de novo
. Lorra inev . Co y le , 2 91 F .3 d 4 16 , 4 22 (6 th C ir . 2 00 2) . B e c a us e the dis tr ic t c ourt c on du c te d no ev ide nti ary he ari ng , we re vie w the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fa c tua l f ind ing s de

novo . Nor thr op v . Tr ipp e tt , 265 F.3d 372, 377 ( 6th Cir. 2001). Gonzales petitions for habe as cor pus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which allows a per son in state custody

“in violation of the Constitut i o n or laws or treaties of the United States” to be g rante d relief

. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Sec tion 2254 allows t h i s Court to gr ant habe as cor pus relief only when the adjudication of the claim-- ( 1 ) resulted in a de cision tha t w a s c o n tr ary to, or involved an unrea sonable a

pplication of, cle arly

established Fe dera l law, as deter mined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or ( 2 ) re su lte d in a de c isi on tha t w a s b a se d o n a n un re a so nable deter mination of the fac ts in li g ht of the evi d en ce p rese nted in the S t at e c o u rt p ro ce ed i n g. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Supre me Court has made a d i s t i n cti on betwee n the “c ontrary to” and “unre asonable application of” provisions of § 2254(d)( 1): Un de r t he “ c on tr ary to” c la

us e , a fe de ra l hab e a s cou

rt may g ra

nt the wr it if the state court a rrives at a conc lusion opposit e to that re ache d by this Court on a question of law or if th e s t at e court de cides a case differ ently

than this Court has on a set of materia lly

in d i s t i n g uishable fa cts. Under the “unr easona

ble application” clause , a fede ral ha

beas c ourt may

g rant the w ri t i f the state c ourt identifies the c orre ct g overningleg al principle f rom this Court’s decisions but unrea sonably applies that principle to the fa cts of the pr isoner’s c ase. W illiams v. Taylor , 5 29 U. S. 362 , 412 -1 3 ( 20 00 ). Th e fa c tua l de te rm inatio ns of the state c ourt

wi ll be pre sumed to be cor

rec t unless the petitioner ca n show by

“cle ar a n d co nvincing evidenc e” that the fa ctual dete rmination was er roneous. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (1).No. 06-4437

7 I. DOUBLE JE OP ARDY C LAIMS A. P r e se r va ti on o f the Iss ue Go nza le s argue s th a t th e Do ub le Jeop ard y Cla us e barr e d h is c on vic tio n f or thr e e re a so ns ; Gonzales claims that his retria l followed a m i s t ri al that was not manife stly nece ssary , that he wa s g iven multiple punishm ents for the same offense, and t hat he wa s prosec uted for a crime of which he had be en ac quitted. Be fore rea ching the merits of Gonzales’ c laims, this C ourt must determine whether they wer e proc edura lly

defa ulted. I n d isp os ingof

a ha be a s p e tit ion

fr om a state pr iso ne r, thi s Co ur

t ma y no t e xami ne c la ims that wer e denied by the state courts based upon the prisoner’ s failure to a bide by a state pr ocedur al rule. Coleman v. Thompson , 5 01 U. S. 7 22 , 729 -3 0 (19 91 ). I n ord e r to de te rm ine wh e the r a c la im has bee n proce durally

defa ulted, this Court applies the four-pa rt test set fo rth in Ma up in v . S mi th , 785 F.2d 135 ( 6th Cir. 1986). This Court must first deter mine whether “ther e is a state proc edura l rule that is applicable to the petit ioner' s claim and that the petitioner fa iled to comply with the rule.” Id. a t 13 8. Th is C ourt

mus t th e n “ de c ide wh e the r t he state c ourt s a ctu all y e nf or c e d th e state proce dural sanction.” Id. Next, this Court must deter mine “whe ther the state proce dural for feiture is an ‘ade quate a

nd independe nt’ state g round on which the state ca n rely to forec lose revie w of a fede ral c onstitut ional claim.” Id. Fin all y , if we fi nd that r e vie w o f t

he pe tit ion e r’ s c la im i n s ta te
c ourt wa s p re ve nte d b y

the pe tit ion e r’ s f

a ilure to c om pl y

wi th a n a de qu a te and

ind e pe nd e nt s ta te proce dural rule, this Court must deter mine whether

the petitioner ha s shown “that ther e wa s ‘ca use’ for him to not fo l l ow the proc edura l rule and that he was a ctually prejudice d by

the alleg ed constitutional error.” Id.No. 06-4437

8 Th e re is n o q

ue sti on tha t G on zal e s c omp lie d w itha ll p ro c e dura l r e qu ir e me nts to b ri nghis claims that he was prosec uted for a crime of which he had been acquitted and that he w as sentenc ed twice f o r th e s a me c r im e . T h e s a me c an n o t b e s a id f o r G o n za le s ’ c la im th a t th e d o u b le jeopar dy clause was violated be cause he wa s retrie d following the dec laration of a mistrial. The district court fo un d tha t this cl a im ha d be e n pro c e dura lly de fa ult e d due to Go nza le s’ fa ilure to p ro vid e a c omp le te
re c or d to the Oh io Court of Ap pe a ls an d G on zal e s’ fa ilu re to m a ke a

c on te mpo ra

ne ou s o bje c tio n to the mis tr ia l. F or the re a so ns that fo llo w, we a g re e that th is c la im w a s p ro c e dura lly de fa ult e d b e c a us e of Gonzales’ f

ailure to provide the Ohio Court of Appe als with an ade quate r ecor d. On appe al to the Ohio Court of Appe als, Gonzales claimed that the mistrial of his second trial was not base d upon manifest nec essity and that as a

result hi s third trial violated t he Double Jeopardy Clause of the U nited States Const itution. State v. Gonzales , 783 N.E.2d 903, 909 (Ohio Ct. App. 20 02 ). Ho we ve r, Go nza le s f a ile d to ins ur e that th e tr ans c ri pt o f t he tr ia l pr oc e e din g s th a t e nd e d in a mistrial and a le tter to a jury member that prec ipitated the mistrial were included in the re cord on appea l. Id. Under

Ohio law, the a

ppellant has the burden to provide “ the appe llate cour t with the
rec ord and e x hibi t s t h at demonstrate the assig ned er rors.” Id. at 9 1 0 (q u o t i n g State v. Israe l , No. C-961006, 1997 WL 598396, at *6 (Ohio C t
. Ap p . Sept. 26, 1997)). See Ohio App. R. 9(B ). B e c a us e of Go nza le s’ fa ilure to co mpl y wi th thi s rul e , th e Oh io C ourt of Ap pe a ls r e

je c te d G on zal e s’ arguments reg arding his retria l following the mistrial. State v. Gonzales , 7 83 N. E. 2d 90 3, 91 0 ( Oh io Ct. App. 2002). The a pplication of the Ma up in analy sis to the Ohio courts’ reje ction of Gonzales’ cla im due to h is f a ilure to p re se nt a

n a de qu a te re c or d o n a

pp e a l r e veal s that

thi s c la im w a s p ro c e dura llyNo. 06-4437

9 de fa ult e d. Oh io h a s a

pr oc e dura l r

ule that re qu ir e s app e lla

nts to inc lud e ma te ri a ls r e le va nt t o th e ir assig ned er

rors in the re cord on a

ppeal. Ohio App. R. 9(B ). In Gonzales’ ca se, the Ohio Court of Ap pe a ls e nf

or c e d th e pr oc e dura l r

ule by re je c tin g Go nza le s’ c la im du e to his fa ilure to f oll owthi s rule. Thus, the f

irst and sec ond Ma up in fac tors are met. As for the third fac tor, a state pr ocedur al bar must be “ firmly

es tablished and re g ularly followed” to be consider ed “a dequate and independe nt.” Fo rd

v . G e or gia , 4 9 8 U. S
. 4 1 1 , 4 2 3 -2 4 (1 9 9 1 ) ( qu o t i n g Jame s v. Kentuck

y , 4 66 U. S. 341, 348-51 (1984) ). Oh i o has re g ularly reje cted c laims due to appellants’ f ailure to pre sent an adequate re cord. Volodkev ich v. Volodk evic h , 549 N. E
. 2 d 1237, 1237 (Ohio 1989); State v. Davidson , N o. 20 05 -P -0 03 8, 20 06 WL76 30 82 , a t *4 (O hio Ct. Ap p. Ma

rc h 2 4, 20 06 ); State v. Estrada , 710 N.E.2d 1168, 1170 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998). F inally , Gonzales has made no argument that c a us e and prej ud ic e e xiste d f or his fa ilure to i nc lud e re le va nt p art s o f t

he re c or d o n a

pp e a l. Thus, Gonzales has proc edura lly defa ulted his claim that the Double Jeopardy Clause was violate d beca use he w as re tried af

ter a mistrial that was not manifestly nece ssary , and t h is Court may not
rea ch the mer its of this i ssue. The district court also found that this c laim ha d been pr ocedur ally defa ulted as the re sult of Ohio’s contemp o ra n eo u s objection rule. Unde r Ohio law, if a n appellant c ould have made an objection to a ruling at trial but failed to do so, the a ppellant has wa ived appe llate rev i ew of the challeng e. State v. Murphy , 747 N. E. 2d 76 5, 78 8 (O hio 20 01 ). I ssu e s tha t hav e be e n wa ive d in th is
manner are only subject to plain err or re view. Id. at 789; O hio Crim. Proc. R. 52. The district cour t found that Gonzales had pr ocedur ally defa ulted his double jeopardy argument beca

use he did not ob je c t to the de c laratio n o f a mis tr ia l a t th e e nd

of his se c on d tr ia l. T his c on c lus ion wa s e rr on e ou s.No. 06-4437

10 Oh i o courts have held that defe ndants waive double jeopar dy challeng es to a retria l f oll o wi n g a mistrial by

failing to obje ct bef

ore r etrial, not at the time the mistrial wa s decla red. State v. Gaines , No. 82301, 2003 WL 22966190, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec
. 18, 2003) (“D ouble jeopar dy rig hts are persona l rig hts that can be waived when the acc used does not raise the issue of double jeopar dy

prior to a re tr ia l.” ). I n th is c a se , Gonz ale s mad e a tim e ly ob je c tio n to his re tr ia l by

fi lin g a mot ion to dismiss the indictment bas ed on double jeopar dy g rounds bef

ore his third trial. I t would be
no ns e ns ic a l to re quir e a de fe nd ant t o o bje c t on do ub le je op ard

y g ro un ds a t th e tim e a

mis tr ia l is decla red be fore the State has de termined that it will seek a r etrial. The district cour

t’s conclusion that the contempor aneous obje ction rule a cted a s a proc edura l ba r to Go nza le s’ do ub le je op ard y c la ims wa s b a se d o n la

ngua g e fr om t

he Oh io C ourt

of Ap pe a ls’ opinion. The Ohio Court of Appea ls stated that even if it w er e t o analy

ze Gonzales’ ar g ument reg ardingthe mistrial, in light of Gonzales' s failure to object on the recor d, we would not have conclude d that a re trial would have been barr ed. I n deter mining whether

a trial c ourt has abuse d its discretion in su a s

po ntede c lari nga

mis tr ia l, a

n a c c us e d’ s rig ht t o h a ve his c a se dec id e d b y a p arti c u la r ju r y is w e ig h e d

a g a in s t s o c ie ty ’ s in te r e s t i nane f f ic ient dispatch of justice, a

nd, depending on the circ umstances, the a ccuse d’s rig ht can be s ubordinated to the public’ s interest in a fa ir trial. See State v . Glover (1988), 35 Ohio St
. 3 d 1 8 , 1 9 , 5 1 7 N
. E
. 2 d 9 0 0
. T h u s , “ [w ]h e r e th e f a c ts o f th e c a s e do not ref lect unfa irness to the ac cused, the public interest in insuring that justice is served may take pr ece dence .” See id. He re , G on zal e s d id n ot o bje c t to the mis tr ia l. I f the fa cts wer e such that the mistrial had not been prompted by the state’s misconduct, the m istrial was not inhere ntly unfair to Gonzales, a

nd no objection was made, ther e would ce rtainly have be en no abuse of discre tion. S e e id. at 20, 517 N.E.2d 900. Gonzales , 783 N.E.2 d at 910 (for matting a ltered) . Although the Ohio Court of Appea ls noted Gonzales’ fa ilure to object, it applied the standa rd of revie w applied to all ca ses in which the c ourtNo. 06-4437

11 su a s po ntedecla

res a mistrial. S

ta te v . Glover , 517 N.E.2d 900, 903 (Ohio 1988) (“We hold, there fore , that wher e the tria l judge su a s po ntedecla

res a mistrial, double jeopard y d o es n o t bar retria l unless the judge 's ac t ion was instigated by prosec utorial misconduct desig ned to provoke a mistrial, or the dec laration of a mistrial constituted an abuse of di scre tion.”). From the structure of the op ini on , it a

pp e ars that Go nza le s’ fa ilure to o bje c t w a s ju st o ne of the c ir c ums tanc e s ta

ke n in to
acc ount by

the cour t in rejec ting Gonzales’ claim. See G lover , 517 N.E.2d at 903 (noting defe ndant’s fa ilure to object to the de clar ation of a mist ri al i n examining whethe r this action was inhere ntly unfair to the de fen d ant). Theref ore, G onzales’ fa ilure to provide a n adequa te re cord on appea l is the s ole basis for the proce dural de fault of Gonzales’ claim that his retria l was bar red by d o u b l e j e o p ar dy b e c a

u s e o f a p r i o r m i s t r i a l t h a tw a s n o tm an i f e s t l y n e c e s s ar

y. Go nza le s h a s n ot p ro c e dura lly de fa ult e d his cl a ims that he w a s p un ish e d tw ic e fo r t he same
cr i m e a n d t h at h e w as p ro s ec u t ed fo r a cri m e of wh i ch h e h adb ee nac qu i t t edi nan ea rl i er p ro ce ed i n g. There fore , we a ddress the me rits of these c laims below. B. Ana lys is Gonzales claims that his conviction for the Major Dr ug Offe nd er (“MDO” ) sentenc ing specific ati ons violates the Double Jeopardy Clause bec ause the MDO spec ifications allow cumulative punishment for the same c rime as the posse ssion and traff icking convict i o n s. The Do ub le Jeop ard

y Cla us e pr ote c ts a

de fe nd ant “ a g a ins t a

se c on d p ro se c uti on for th e same of fe ns e afte r ac quittal. I t protects ag ainst a sec ond prosec ution for the same offe nse af ter c onviction. And it protects ag ainst multi ple punishments for the same offe nse.” Ohio v. Johnson , 467 U.S. 493, 498 (1984). The Supreme Court has inter prete d the multiple punishm ents aspec t of the Double JeopardyNo. 06-4437

12 Clause as prote cting defe ndants from be in g p u n ished more than onc e for a sing le ac t when the legi s lature doe s not intend for the punishments to be cumulative. Albernaz v. United States , 450 U.S. 3 3 3 , 3 44 (1981) How ever , when the le g islature author izes a defe ndant to be punished cumulatively

for the sa me ac t, the Double J eopar dy Clause i s not violated. Id. The Supreme Court d ev el oped the “ same e lements” test in Blockburge r v. United States , 2 84 U. S. 2 99 (1 93 2) , to de te rm ine wh e the r c umu la tiv e punis hme nt h a s b e e n a uth or ize d, ho ldi ng

that: The a pplicable r

ule is that, wher e the same act or transac tion c onstitut es a violation of two distinct statutory

provisions, the test to be applied to dete rmine whe ther ther e are two offe nses or only one, is whether eac h provision require s proof of a fact which the other doe s not. Id. at 304. The Blockburge r same e le me nts te st i s a

g e ne ra l r ule of statut or y c on str uc tio n, and

a s a
re su lt, wh e n “ a

le g isl a tur e sp e c if

ica lly a uth or ize s c umu la tiv e punis hme nt u nd e r t wo statut e s, reg ardle ss of whether those two statutes proscr ibe the ‘same’ c onduct under Blockburge r , a cour t’s task of statutory

construction is at an end and the pr osecutor ma y seek a nd the trial cour

t or jury may impose cumulative punis hment under such statutes in a sing le trial.” Missouri v. Hunter , 4 59 U. S. 359, 368-69 (1983)
. At his third trial, Gonzales was convicted of three counts of t raf ficking in coca ine and two counts of possessing coca ine. He was also convicted of the MDO spe cifications that accompa nied
eac h of these c ounts. His conv iction on the MDO spec ifications adde d ten y ear s to his sentence. Gonzales notes that once the fac ts w ere established to c onvict him of traff icking in and possession of coc ai n e t h ere was no ne ed to prove additional fac ts in order to convic t him of the MDONo. 06-4437

R. C. 2 92 5. 03 (C )( 4) (g ) p ro vid e s th a t w ho e ve r v iol a te s R. C. 1 2925.03(A), dr

ug traff icking , wher e the amount of pow d er c ocaine exceeds 1,000 g rams or the amount of cr ack c ocaine ex cee ds 100 g rams, is a major dr

ug offe nder by

operation of law, and the court mu s t i mp o s e th e maxim

u m t e n - y e ar

p r is o ns e n te n c e f

o r th e f e lony violation. R.C . 2925.11(C)(3) (f) provides that a pe rson possessing such amounts of cra ck and powder coca ine is a major dr ug offe nder and provide s the same manda tory ten-y ear sentenc e. Gonzales , 783 N.E.2d at 915. 13 specific ations. As a re sult, he claims that his convictions fail the Blockburge r same e le me nts te st

1 and ar e thus violative of the Double J eopar dy clause
. The Ohio Court of Appe als deter mined that the leg islature cle arly

intended to i mpose cumulative punis hment when a person se lls or possesses a lar g e quantity

of drug s. Gonzales , 783 N.E.2d at 915. This Court must a cce pt the Ohi o court’s interpre tation of the intent of the Ohio leg islature. See O hio v. Johnson , 467 U.S. 493, 499 (1984) (“We a cce pt, as we must, the Ohio Supreme Court’s deter mination that the Ohio L eg islature did not int e nd c umu la tiv e punis hme nt f or the tw o p a ir s o f c ri me s in vo lve d h e re .” ). Beca us e the Oh io le g isl a tur e ha s a

uth or ize d c umu la tiv e punis hme nt i n a uth or izin g MD O c on vic tio ns , G on zal e s’ conviction did not violate the Double Jeopardy clause
. Gonzales also claims that since he was acquitted in his first trial of one c ount of possessing
coca ine, he c annot subsequently be prose cuted f

or traf ficking the coca ine that he had bee n acquitted of possessing . Courts also apply the Blockburge r

same e lement s t es t t o evaluate whethe r the
succe ssive prosec ution as p ec t of the Double Jeopardy clause has bee n violated. United States v. Dixon , 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993). Apply ing the Blockburge r

te st, the Oh io C ourt

of Ap pe a ls h e ld that tr a ff ic kin g c oc a ine is no t the same of fe ns e a s po sse ssi ng c oc a ine fo r d ou ble je op ard

y purp os e s. Gonzales , 7 8 3 N. E
. 2 d

at 9 1 3 -1 4
. T h e s t at u t o ry p ro v i s i o nd ef

i n i n g t h e c ri m e o f p o s s es s i n g aNo. 06-4437

14 controlled substanc e, sec tion 2925.11(A) of the Ohio Revi sed Code, “pr ohibits a person fr om knowing ly

obtaining, posse ssing, or

using a controlled substanc e,” w here as the cr ime of traf ficking in a controlled substanc e involves “knowing ly selling or offe ring to se ll a controlled substanc e.” Id.
a t 91 3 ( c iti ngOh io R e v. Cod e 29 25 .0 3( A) ). Th e Oh io C ourt of Ap pe a ls f

ound that ea c h o ff

e ns e
re qu ir e s p ro of

of an a dd iti on a l f

a c t tha t the oth e r doe s n ot. 78 3 N .E .2 d at 91 3- 14 . T he c ourt he ld that it is p os sib le to p os se ss a

c on tr oll e d s ub sta

nc e wi tho ut s e lli ng or of

fe ri ng to s e ll i t, a

nd it i s a lso possible to sell or offer to sell a controlled substance w ithout possessing it. Id. at 914. For the latter conclusion, t he court cited Sta te v . S c ott , 4 32 N. E. 2d

79 8 ( Oh io 1 98 2) , in

wh ic h th e Oh io S up re me Court he ld t hat a de fe nd ant w ho ha d o ff

e re d to se ll e c sta sy

pil ls b ut h a d a c tua lly

so ld p ill s th a t di d not contain a c ontrolled substance could be c onv i ct ed fo r o ffering to sell a controlled substanc e under O hio Revised Code 2925.03(A)
. Id. Gonzales admits that pursuant to the holding in Sc ott it is sometimes possible to be convicte d of traf ficking in coca ine without the possibili ty of beingconvicted fo r possession of coc aine. Howeve r, Gonzales conte nds that as applied to the fac ts of his c ase, the statutory provisions do not satisfy the Blockburge r

same e le me nts te st. Ev e n if thi s is the c ase, Gon zal e s’ argume nt f a ils beca use the United States Supre me Court itself has appli ed the Blockburge r te st i n th e a

bs tr a c t to the eleme nts as descr ibed i n a st atute instead of to the fac ts of a par

ticular c ase. Albernaz , 4 50 U. S.
a t 339. Thus , the Oh io C ourt of Ap pe a ls’ de te rm inatio n th a t do ub le je op ard y did no t ba r G on zal e s’
re tr ia l is no t an unr e a so na ble a pp lic a tio n o f S up re me Court pr e c e de nt. II. CO NF RO NT AT ION CL AU SE C LA IM A. P r e se r va ti on o f the Iss ueNo. 06-4437

Go nza le s a lso argue s th a t th e Stat e’s wi thh old ingof e vid e nc e hin de re d h im f ro m c ro ss- 2 examining Rodrigue z. This a rg ument is c o-extensive with Gonzales’ Bradyclaim and is discussed in Section VIbelow. 15 Al tho ug h G on zal e s c la ims that th e dis tr ic t c o u r t d e n ie d G on zal e s’ c on fr on ta tio n c la us e c la im beca use he f ailed to p re s er v e the claim for fe dera l habea s review , Gonzales’ pre servation of the Con fr on ta tio n Cla

us e iss ue ha s no t be e n qu e sti on e d. Th e c la im wa s a dd re sse d on the me ri ts i n b oth state cour t and fe dera l district court. Thus, whethe r Gonzales’ c onviction violate d the Confrontation Cla us e is p ro pe rl y

be fo re thi s Co ur

t. B. Ana lys is Go nza le s argue s th a t th e Co nfr on tation C la us e wa s v iol a te d b e c a

us e he wa s una

ble to
m ea n i n gfu l l y

cr o s s -e x am i n e R o dri gu ez b ec au s e o f t h e t ri al co u rt ’s l i m i t at i o n s o nh i s qu es t i o n i n g. 2 The Confrontation Cl ause of the Six th Amendment provides that “[i] n all criminal prose cutions, the
a c c us e d s ha ll e njo y

the ri g ht .
. . to b e c on fr on te d w iththe wi tne sse s agains t hi m.” U. S. Co ns t. amend. VI . The rig ht to cross-examination is the primary rig ht secur ed by this clause and “ is critical for ensuringthe integ rity

of the fa ct finding proce ss.” Kentucky v. Stincer , 482 U.S. 730, 736 (1987). The Supreme Court has held that “the exposure of a witness’ motivation in testify ing is a proper and important function of the c onstitut ionally protec ted rig ht of cross-e x amination.” Davis v. Alask a , 4 1 5 U. S
. 3 0 8 , 3 1 6 -1 7 (1 9 7 4 ) ( ci t i n g Gree ne v. M cElroy , 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959)). Ac c or d Pe nn sy lv an ia v . R itc hie , 480 U.S. 39, 51-52 (1987) ( “[T] he rig ht to cros s -e x amine includes the opportunity

to show that a witness is biased, or that the testimony is ex ag g erated or unbe lievable.” ). Howeve r, trial cour

ts retain broa d discretion re g ardin g t he conduc t of cross e x amination and may

“ imp os e re a so na

ble lim its on su c h c ro ss- e xami natio n b a se d o n c on c e rn s a bo ut, a mon g oth e r t

hin g s,No. 06-4437

16 hara ssment, prejudice , confusion of the issues, the witness’ saf ety , or interr og ation that is repetitive
or only marg inally rele vant.” De law ar e v . V an Ar sd all , 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). The Court has cautioned that “[g]ener ally speaking , the Confrontatio n C l ause gua rante es an op

po rtu nit yfor eff ective c ross-examination, notcr o s s -e x am i n at i o nt h at i s ef fe ct i v e i nwh at ev er

wa y , an d t o wh at ev er extent, the defense might wish.” Delaware v. F ensterer , 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985). T hus, a trial
c ourt ’s lim itatio n on cr os s- e xami natio n re g ard ing a wi tne ss’ bia s viol a te s th e Con fr on ta tio n Cl a us e when “ [a] rea sonable jury might have r ece ived a sig nificantly differ ent impression of [the witness’]
cre dibilit y

had . . . counse l been permitted to pursue his proposed line of cross-e x amination.” Van Ar sd all , 475 U.S. at 680. At trial, the cour

t limi ted Gonzales’ que stioning re g ardingthe illeg ality of Rodrig uez’s sentenc e. Gonzales t ri ed to establish during cross-e x amination that Rodrigue z had rec eived a n illega lly short s en t en ce in exchang e for his testimony . Gonzales’ questioning was ba sed upon Rodrigue z’s rece ipt o f a five-y ear sentenc e for

possessing at least 100 g rams of c rac k coca ine pursuant to a plea

barg ai n when the ma

ndatory minimum sentenc e for

this offense w as ten y ear s imprisonment. The trial court allowed Gonzales to inquire i nto whether Rodrigue z enter ed int o a plea ba rg ain, the leng th of his curre nt sentence , and whe ther he could re ceive a sentenc e re duction fo r his te sti mony . H ow e ve r, the tr ia l c ourt did no t a llo w G on zal e s to inq uir e int o th e sp e c if

ic le ng th of imp ri so nme nt R od

ri g ue z fa c e d in the a

bs e nc e of a ple a ba rg a in n or int o th e purp or

te d il le g a lity of his shortened se ntence . The Ohio Court of Appe als held th at the trial cour t’s limit ation on qu es t i o n s re gar d i n g R o dri gu ez ’s u n d er s t an d i n g o f t h e m an d at o ry m i n i m u m s en t en ce al t h o u ghNo. 06-4437

17 “ te c hn ic a lly

e rr on e ou s” wa s “ no t an a bu se o f dis c re tio n” and

did no t vi olate Go nza le s’ Sixth Amendment rig hts. Gonzales , 783 N.E.2d at 916. Gonzales claims that the trial c ourt’s dec ision viol ated his Confrontation C l ause r ights by inh ibi tin g his a

bil ity to c a st d ou

bt u po n Ro dr ig ue z’s mot ive s and inc e nti ve s f

or te sti fy ing . F or thi s proposition, Go n z al es ci t es extensively to Banks v. D retke , 540 U.S. 668 (2004). In Banks the Supreme Court deter

mined that the prosec ution violated Brady v. M aryland , 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by fa ili ngto d isc los e a key wi tn e ss’ status a s a pa id p oli c e inf

or mant. Th e Court

fo un d a wi tne ss’ informant status to be mater ial due to the proba bility that the j u ry

would have disc ounted the witness’ testimony

if the jury

knew of the witness’ a dded ince ntive to cooper ate at trial. Banks v. Dretke , 540 U.S. at 701. The Court also noted that the jur y was further put at a disadva ntag e by the inability of the de fenda

nt to effe ct i v el y cr oss-examine the witness reg ardinghis credibility
. Id. at 701-02. Banks did not expli citly

involve the Confrontation Clause a nd made no pr onounceme nts on the c on sti tut ion a lly -m and a te d s c op e of c ro ss- e xami natio n. Ho we ve r, to t he e xten t th a t Banks highlig hted the importanc e of the opportunity to cross-e x amine re g ardinga witness’ bia s, the trial
c ourt did no t ac t con tr ary to thi s pri nc ipl e and de pr ive Go nza le s of the op po rt un ity to m e anin g fu lly
cross-e x amine Rodrig uez. Gonzales’ counse l en gag ed in extensive cross-e x amination reg arding Rodrigue z’s truthfulness, the exis tence of a ple a bar g ain, the bar g ained-fo r sentence, a nd the possibili ty

of a se ntence reduc tion as a result of his testimony
. The trial court only restric ted counse l from questioning Rodrigue z reg ardingthe potential leng th of his se ntence absent a plea barg ain and th e le g a li ty

h is s e n te n c e . G o n za le s h a s n o t s h o w n th a t i n f o r mati o nr e g ar d in g th e a ll e g e d ly il leg alNo. 06-4437

18 duration of Rodrig uez’s sentenc e would hav e added to the jury ’s under standing of Rodrig uez’s potential bias. See United States v. Nelson , 39 F .3 d 70 5, 70 9 (7 th Cir
. 19 94 ) (C on fr on ta tio n Cl a us e was not violated whe re the defe ndant was not pe rmitted to que stion a g overnme nt w itness a bout the leng th of the prison sentence he would have fac ed absent a plea barg ain); Br own v . P owe ll , 975 F.2d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1992) (sa

me). III . JU RYIN STR UC TIO NS C LA IM A. P r e se r va ti on o f the Iss ue The district cour

t determined that Gonzales had failed to preser ve his fede ral c onstitut ional challeng e to the jury

instructions give n by

the trial court beca

use his arguments in state court we re ba se d s ole ly

up on state law. A ha

be a s pe tit ion e r mus t e xha us t “ the re me die s ava ila

ble in t he c ourt s of the State.” 28 U.S.C . 2 25 4( b) (1 )( A) . T o f ulf ill thi s e xha

us tio n r e qu ir e me nt, a

pe tit ion e r m

us t fa ir l y p r e s e n t t h e f

a c tu a l an d l e g a l b a s i s f

o r h i s c l a i m s i n o r d e r t o g i v e s t a t e c o u rt s a f ull a ndfa ir opportunity

to adjudi ca t e s u ch claims. An de rso n v . H ar le ss , 4 59 U. S. 4 , 6 -7 (1 98 2) ; Picard v. Connor , 4 04 U. S. 2 70 , 2 75 (19 71 ). The Sup re me Court ha s h e ld t

hat th is r e qu ir e me nt o f f

a ir ly prese nting a

fede ral c laim to state courts does not re quire e x tensive ela boration: A litigant wishing to raise a fede ral issue c an ea sily

indicate the fede ral lawbasis for his c la im i n a

state -c ourt

pe tit ion or br ie f, fo r exampl e , by

c iti ngin c on

jun c tio n w ith the c la im the fe de ra l so ur c e of law o n w hic h he re lie s or a c a se de c idi ngsu c h a c la im on fede ral g rounds, or by

simply labeling the claim “f

eder al.” Ba ld wi n v. Reese , 5 41 U. S. 2 7, 32 (2 00 4) . T he Sup re me Court re c e ntl y e xami ne d th e sp e c if

ic ity
ne c e ssa ry to f a ir ly pres ent a fe de ra l c la im t o s ta te c ourt s w he n it re ve rs e d th is C ourt ’s de c isi on in D y e v. Hofbauer , 1 1 1 F
. A p p ’ x 3 6 3 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 4 )
. InDyev. Hofbauer , 546 U.S. 1 (2005), the Court held that a petitioner fairly prese nted hi s fede ral claims when he a rg ued in a state court brie fNo. 06-4437

19 that he wa s denied due pro ce s s o f l aw and a fair tria l, linked his arg ument to constituti onal amendments, a

nd cited fe dera l case s. Id. at 3-4. I n order to determine w hether

a cla im has been f

airly prese nted to state co u rt s , this Court
e xami ne s w he the r t

he pe tit ion e r p re se nte d h is c la im i n o ne of fo ur wa y s in state c ourt : (1) r el[y ing] upon fede ral c ases employ ing constituti onal ana ly sis; (2) rel[y ing] upon state c a se s emp loy

ing fe de ra l c on sti tut ion a l ana ly sis ; ( 3) ph ra sin g the c la im i n te rm s of c on sti tut ion a l la

w o r i n te rm s suf

fi c ie ntl y pa

rt ic ula r to all e g e a

de nia l of a sp e c if ic constitutional right; or (4) alleg ing f acts we ll within the mainstream of constitutional law. W hit ing v . B ur t , 3 9 5 F. 3 d 6 0 2 , 6 1 3 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( qu o t i n g McM eans v. Brigano , 228 F.3d 674, 681 (6 th C ir .2 00 0) ). Ap ply

ingthi s te st to Go nza le s’ c a se le a ds to t he c on c lus ion

that G on zal e s f

a ir ly pr e se nte d h is f

e de ra l c la ims to t

he state c ourt s. I n h is br ie f t o th e Oh io C ourt of Ap pe a ls, Go nza le s st a te d: “ Th e Sixth A me ndme nt r ig ht t o j u ry trial includes the r ight to a jur y that is fairly

and prope rly

instructed. Ch e e k v . U

nited States (1991), 498 U.S. 192, 111 S.Ct. 604.” (J .A. 930.) He then proc eede d to argue that his rig ht to a jury trial was de nied. On the f ace of the brie f, it is clear that Gonzales both relied “ upon fede ral c ases employ ing c onstitut ional analy sis” and phra sed “the claim in te rms of constitutional law.” W hiting , 395 F.3d a t 6 1 3
. T h e d istrict court disreg arde d this portion of Gonzales’ brief , noting that the analy sis of jury instructions conducted in Cheek wa s not r e le va nt t o th e jur

y ins tr uc tio ns a t is su e in this case. Whil e the dis tr ic t c ourt

is c or re c t th a t Cheek do e s no t le nd muc h su pp or t to Go nza le s’ c la im, this observation is larg ely beside the point. The Cheek court he ld that it was error for a tr ial court to instruct the jury

to disreg ard e vidence that could have be en interpr eted to neg ate the g overnme nt’sNo. 06-4437

20 proof of an ele ment of the c rime cha rg ed and that such err o r ra ised serious Six th Amendment
conce rns. Cheek

v. United States , 4 98 U.S
. 19 2, 20 3 (199 1) . D e sp ite the we a kn e ss o f h is c la im
u n d er t h i s p re ce d en t , b y

ci t i n g Cheek, Gonzal es m ad e cle ar “ the fe dera l law basis for his c laim,” Ba ldw in , 541 at 32, in this case the jury trial rig ht e mbodied in the Six th Amendment. See F ulcher v. Motley , 444 F.3d 791, 798 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (holding that petitioner who discussed f eder al
c on sti tut ion a l vi olations b ut “ c ite d th e wr on g c a se s in su pp or t of his c on sti tut ion a l c la im” fa ir ly pr e se nte d his fe de ra l c la im)
. B e c a us e Go nza le s fa ir ly pr e se nte d his jur y ins tr uc tio ns cla im , t his
c la im c ann ot b e dis mis se d o n e xha us tio n g ro un ds
. Th e Sta te a tte mpt s to jus tif y the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de te rm inatio n th a t G on zal e s’ Sixth Am en d m en tj u ry

i n s t ru ct i o nar gu m en twa s n o tfa i rl y p re s en t edt o t h e s t at e c o u rt s b y ci t i n g Slaughter v. Parke r , 450 F.3d 224 ( 6th Cir. 2006). I n Slaughter this Court determined that a c laim was not fa ir ly pr e se nte d w he re the pe tit ion e r m a de a g e ne ra l r e fe rence to th e F ourt e e nth and Sixth Amendments. S

la ug h te r , 4 5 0 F. 3 d at 236. This Court found that one g ener al re fer ence to the Constit ution was insufficient to fa irly prese nt a fede ral c laim to state courts. Id. Although Slaughter is a rg uably inconsistent w ith the Supre me Court prec edent discusse d above, see id. at 251-52 (Cole, J ., d i s s en ting) , Gonzales’ has f airly prese nted his claims to the state cour ts even unde r the strict i n t e r p r e t a t i o no f

t h i s r e q u i r e m e n te s p o u s e d b y Slaughter . G on zal e s’ pr e se ntatio n to the state appellate courts wa s more deta iled than Slaug hter’s ina smuch as Go n z ales c ited not only the constitutional amendment rele vant to his claim, but also a fede ral c ase spe cifica lly addre ssing de nial of the Six th Am en d m ent right to jury trial. See Slaughter , 450 F.3d at 236 (distinguishing the Supreme Court’s de cision in Dye from Slaughte r’s case beca use Dy e had “explicitly

ref ere nced f ourNo. 06-4437

21 fe de ra l c a se s, a ll of wh ic h a dd re sse d du e pr oc e ss v iol a tio ns ” ); see also Scuba v. Brigano , 527 F.3d 479, 486 (6th Cir. 2007) (r emar king tha t a fe dera l issue is fairly

prese nted wher e petitioner c ites the applicable fede ral c onstitut ional amendment a nd a ca se applying the constitutional pr i n ci p l e at iss ue ). As a

re su lt, Go nza le s f

a ir ly pr e se nte d h is Si xth A me ndme nt j ur y ins tr uc tio ns argum ent t o the state c ourt s and

ha s th us pr e se rv e d th is i ssu e fo r r e vie w b e fo re thi s Co ur t. B. Ana lys is Go nza le s c la ims that th e tr ia l c ourt ’s e rr on e ou s jur y ins tr uc tio ns de pr ive d h im o f h is Si xth Amendment rig ht to trial by jury . Gene rally , the constitutionali t y o f jury instructions is gover

ned by the Due Process clause of the Fifth and F ourtee nth Amendments. Se e e .g ., Es te llev . M c Gu ire , 502 U.S. 62 (1991) (due proce ss is violated w here a def ective instruc tion “infec ted the entire trial”). Howeve r, the Six th Amendment is impli cate d if defe ct i v e i n s t ructions re move from the jur y ’s consideration a nece ssary element of

the prosec utor’s ca se. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 203. Go nza le s h a s p re se nte d no pr oo f that su c h a sit uatio n e xiste d at hi s tr ia l. G on zal e s c la ims that th e jud g e sh ou ld n ot have g ive n a c omp lic ity

ins tr uc tio n a nd sh ou ld h a ve g ive n G on zal e s’ proposed instructi o n reg ardingthe cr edibility of a c o-def

endant’ s testimony . Gonzales does not claim that the judg e’s inst ructions us urped the jury ’s factfinding role in any way . Gonzales instead argues that the jury

instructions violated Ohio law. These a rg uments are irrele vant to this Court’s analy sis inasmuch as “the f act that the instruction[ s] w[ ere ] allege dly incorre ct under

state law is not
a b as i s fo r h abeas relief

.” Es te llev . M

c Gu ire , 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991). B eca use there is no ind ic a tio n th a t th e jur

y ins tr uc tio ns g ive n in thi s c a se vio la te fe de ra l c on sti tut ion a l la w, Go nza le s’ jur y ins tr uc tio ns c la im l a c ks me ri t.No. 06-4437

I t is undisput ed that Gonzales ha s prese rved this issue and a ll that follow. 3 22 IV. APPRENDI

CL AI M 3 Gonzales’ cla im that Ohio’s MDO specif ication statute is unconstituti onal is based upon the Supreme Court’s de cision in Apprendi v. New Je rsey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The Apprendic ourt he ld that “[o] ther than the fac t of a prior conviction, any fac t that increa ses the pena lty for a crime be y ond the pr e sc ri be d s ta tut or

y ma ximummus t be su

bmi tte d to a

jur y , a nd prove d b e y on d a

re a so na ble doubt.” Apprendi , 5 3 0 U
. S
. a t4 9 0
. T h e S i xth A m e n d m e n ti s v i o l a t e d “ [w ]h e na

j u d g e i n f lic ts p unishment that the jury ’s ver dict alone doe s not allow.” Rita v. United States , 1 2 7 S. Ct . 2456, 2 4 6 6 (2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Blakely v. W ashington , 542 U.S. 296, 303-04 (2004)) . Gonzales claims that the MDO spec ification statute violates the Six th Amendment by requiring the trial cour

t to make a finding that a def

endant is a major drug offe nder. This argument is meritless beca use t he trial c ourt is not required to make an additional fa ctual finding in order to a pply the MDO spec ification. I ncluded in Ohio’s de finition of a major drug offe nder is “ an offe nder who is convicted of or plea ds g uilty

to the possession of, sale of , or off er to sell any d rug , compound, mix ture, prepa ration, or substanc e that consists of or contains . . . at least one hundre d g rams of c rac k coca ine; at least one thousand g rams of c ocaine that is not c rac k coca ine.
. .” Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.01(X)
. Gonzales objects to the statutory require ment that “[t] he court shall deter mine the i ssue of whe ther an off ender is a major drugoffe nder.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2941.1410(B ). Howe ver, the desig nation of Gonzales as a

major drug offe nder require d no additional finding s of fact t o be made by the trial court. Gonzales wa s char g ed and c onvicted by a jury of possessing and tra ffic k i n g in at least one hund re d g ra ms of c ra c k co c a ine and a t lea st one tho us and g ra ms of no n- c ra c k c oc a ine . A s a re su lt,No. 06-4437

23 he met the statutory

definition of a major

drug offe nder, a

nd the t rial court desig nated him as such and imposed the mandatory ten-y ear sentenc e re sulting fr om a MDO spec ification. Ohio R ev. Code § 2925.14(D) (3 )( a)
. Thus, the Ohio Court of Appe als did not unreasona bly apply fede ral lawby de te rm ini ng that the tr ia l court ’s de sig natio n of Go nza le s as a maj or dr ugof fe nd e r d id n ot v iol a te the Six th Amendment. Se e Ri ta , 127 S. Ct. at 2466; In re Ohio Criminal Sentencing Statutes Cases , 84 5 N .E .2 d 4 70 , 4 94 (O hio 20 06 ) (h old ingthat im po sin g punis hme nt f

or MD O s ta tus c omp lie d w ith Six th Amendment as long as the judge did not impose additional punishment a bove the mandator

y ten-y ear sentenc e). V. VI ND IC TIV E SEN TEN CI NG CL AI M Gonzales claims that the thirty -y ear sentenc e im posed as the result of his third trial violated his du e pr oc e ss ri g hts be c a us e it exc e e de d the tw e nty -y e ar s e nte nc e imp os e d f oll ow inghis fi rs t tr ia l. The Due Process c lause of the Four teenth Amendme nt prohibits a co u rt from imposing a harshe r sentenc e on a defenda

nt to punish him for ex erc ising his right to appea l. North C arolina v. Pearce , 395 U.S. 711 (1969). I n order to protect this rig ht, appellate c ourts must apply a pre sumption t hat the trial court acte d vindictively when a harshe r sentenc e is imposed following appea l. Id. at 726. When this presumption applies, rever sal is require d unl es s the rea sons for the long er se ntence are appar ent from the rec ord. Id. The Supreme Court ha s rec og nized some exceptions to thi s rule for situa t i o n s i n wh i ch such a presumption is not warra nted. One suc h exception is made wher e a differ ent judg e imposes sentenc e af ter a ppeal. Texas v. M

cCullough , 4 75 U. S. 1 34 , 1 40 (1 98 6) . T his exception arises fr om the rec og nition that a sentencingjudge uninvolved in the i m p o s i t i o n of theNo. 06-4437

24 ear lier sentenc e would lac k a “pe rsonal stake ” in the out come of later procee dings a nd would thus have little motive to act vindictively
. Id. at 140 n.3. The judg e that sente nced G onzales after his first trial was not the same as t h e o n e who sentenc ed him at his third trial. As a re sult, no presumption of vindictiveness a pplies, and Gonzales must demonstrate ac tual vindictiveness on the par t of the sentenc ing judg e. Since Go n z ales ha s offe red no such proof, the s tate court’s holding that Gonzales’ sentenc e did not violate Pearcewas not an unre asonable application of f eder al law. VI . BR

AD Y CL AI M Gonzales claims that t he State violated Brady v. M aryland , 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose the exist ence of a se ntence reduc tion a g ree ment betwee n Rodrigue z and the State. After his third trial, Gonzales learne d that Rodrigue z had rec eived a re duction in his sentence f ollowing his te stimony ag ainst Gonzales. Gonzales also procur ed from the State a n interview ta

pe-r ecor ded be fo re Go nza le s’ thi rd

tr ia l in wh ic h Ro dr ig ue z state d th a t hi s la wy er had ma de a

de a l w ith prosec utors to reduc e his sentenc e in exchang e for his testimony . As a result of thi s evidenc e, Go nza le s f

ile d a pet iti on fo r pos t- c on vic tio n r e lie f, a mot ion fo r l e a ve to f

ile a mot ion fo r n e w tri a l, and a motion for ne w trial, all of whic h wer e denie d by the state trial c ourt. This denial wa s aff irmed by the Oh io Court of Ap pe a ls, wh ic h he ld that th e ne wl y -d isc ov e re d e vid e nc e wa s n ot m a te ri a l to Gonzales’ ca se. Th e Du e Pr oc e ss Cla

us e of the F ourt e e nth Am e ndme nt r e qu ir e s th e pr os e c uti on to r e ve a l a ll evidenc e that is favor able to the defendant’s case and “material t o either guilt or punishment.” Brady v. Mary land , 3 73 U. S. at 8 7. Un de r t his sta nd ard , th e pr os e c uti on

is o bli g ate d to tur

n o ve r n ot j us tNo. 06-4437

25 e xcu lpator

y e vid e nc e bu t a lso e vid e nc e that wo uld imp e a c h th e c re dib ili ty of pr os e c uti on

wi tne sse s. Kyles v. W

hitley , 5 1 4 U. S
. 4 1 9 , 4 3 3 (1 9 9 5 ) ( qu o t i n g United S t a t es v. Bagley , 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)) . Evidence is material for Bradypurposes if “ the favorabl e evide nce c ould rea sonably be tak e n to p u t th e w h o le c a s e in s u c h a d if f e r e n t li g h t a s to u n d e r

mi n e c o n f

id e n c e in th e ver dict.” Banks v. D retke , 5 4 0 U. S
. 6 6 8 , 6 9 (2 0 0 4 ) ( qu o t i n g Kyles , 514 U.S. at 435). The mate riality

of the e vidence that Gonzales discovere d afte r trial must be examined in light of t he evidence adduce d at trial. Duringdirec t examination, R odrig uez stated that no promises had be e n ma de to h im i n e xch ang e fo r h is t est im on y . O n c ro ss- e xami natio n Ro dr ig ue z co nti nu e d to cl ai m t h at n o p ro m i s es h adb ee nm ad e b u tad m i t t edt h at h e h adt al k edt o p o l i ce ab o u tget t i n g a reduc tion in his sentenc e in ex ch an ge for his testimony ag ainst Gonzales. Although Rodriguez’s initial st atement that no promises wer e made to him in ex chang e for his testimony

was misleading at best, his testimony

during cross- ex am i nation g ave the jury an under standing of the be nefits he could der ive from testify

ing f or the prose cution. The ne wly discovere d eviden ce of the re duction of Rod ri g ue z’s se nte nc e a nd

his state me nt r e g ard inga

de a l w ithpr os e c uto rs re ma ins c on sis te nt w ith his testimony

that he hoped to r ece ive a se ntence reduc tion as a re s u l t o f his testimony and that police had sa id they

would help him seek a

sentenc e re duction. As a re sult, Gonz ales ha s not shown that th e re e xists a

re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity that kn ow le dg e of

Rod ri g ue z’s se nte nc ingre du c tio n w ou ld have r esulted in a diff

ere nt outc ome. There fore , the state cour t did not unreasonably

apply fede ral law in holding that the prosec ution did not vi olate Brady b y fa i l ing to disclose e vidence of Rodrigue z’s probable sente ncing reduc tion. VI I. CH AL LEN G E TO T HE M AG ISTR AT E JU DG E’ S AU THORITYNo. 06-4437

26 I n addition to his c laims r eg arding state court proce eding s, Gonzales cha lleng es the c onduct of the pr oc e e din g s in

dis tr ic t c ourt
. Go nza le s ar g ue s th a t th e ma g ist rate jud g e e xce e de d h is a

uth or ity by re sp on din g to G on zal e s’ ob je c tio ns to t

he ma g istra

te jud g e ’s re po rt

and re c omm e nd a tio ns . S ec t i o n6 3 6 o f T i t l e 2 8 o f t h e U n i t edS t at es C o d e a l l o ws a j u d ge t o “d es i gn at e am agi s t r a t e j u d ge to conduct hea

ring s, including e videntiary hear ings, a

nd to submit to a judg e of the court propose d finding s of fa ct and r ecommenda tions for dispositi on by

a judg e of the cour

t, . . . of applications for posttrial [ sic] relief made by individuals con v i ct ed o f cr i minal offense s . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)( 1)(B ). This statute further provides that parties may file objections to the mag istrate judg e’s repor t or rec ommendations and that “[a] judge of the court shall make a de novo deter mination of those portions of t he report or specifie d proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judg e of the court may acc ept, re

ject, o r m o dify , in whole or in par t, the finding s or
rec ommendation s m ad e b y the mag istrate judg e.” 28 U .S.C. § 636(b)(1). See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District C ourts 8(b) (“The judg e must determine de novo any proposed f

inding or rec ommendation to which objection is made. The judge may acc ept, re ject, or mod if y any pr op os e d f

ind ingor re c omm e nd a tio n. ” ). Di str ic t c ourt s ma y a lso assi g n ma g istrate judge s “additional duties as a re not inconsistent with the Constitut ion and laws of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(3). Gonzales filed objec tions to t he mag istrate judg e’s initial repor t and re commendations, and the mag istrate judge responde d to these objec tions by issuing a supple mental re port and
rec ommendations. The district cour t subsequently adopted both the initial and supplemental re port and rec ommendations, stating that “ [t ]he Court has review ed the c omprehe nsive finding s of theNo. 06-4437

27 Mag istrate Judge a

nd considere d de novo all of the filings in this matter. Upon consideration of the fore g oing, the Court does deter mine that such Recommenda tions should be ado p t ed.” (J .A. 14.) Gonzales claims that the district court e rre d in adopting the mag istrate judg e’s suppleme ntal
re c omm e nd a tions sin c e the dis tr ic t c ourt and no t th e ma g istra

te jud g e ha d th e du ty

to r e sp on d to objections. Gonzales’ c laim lacks merit bec ause the district court fulfilled its s tatutory duty by
c on du c tin g its ow n in de pe nd e nt r e vie w o f t he fi lin g s and

c on sid e ri ngGo nza le s’ ob je c tio ns de novo.

CO NC LU SION F or the re a so ns state d a

bo ve , th is C ourt AF F IRMS the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of Go nza le s’ pe tit ion fo r w ri t of

ha be a s c or pu s.