alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4966

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus JEFFREY MARCELLOUS STEWART, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District ofMaryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge. (CR04-252-CCB) Submitted: July 21, 2006 Decided: August 8, 2006 Before WILLIAMS, MOTZ, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Jeffrey E. Risberg, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Gregory Welsh, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Jeffrey Marcellous Stewart entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000). He reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Following his conviction, Stewart timely appealed, challenging the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, this court reviews the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Jones , 356 F.3d 529, 533 (4th Cir. 2004). We review the facts in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed below. Id. Police officers discovered the incriminating evidence after being given consent to enter Stewart’s home by a third party. The government can justify a warrantless search by showing permission to search by “a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.” United States v. Matlock , 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). We have reviewed the record and the parties’ briefs and conclude that the authority of the third party here was apparent under the circumstances and the police acted reasonably in relying on her consent. See Illinois v. Rodriguez , 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990); United States v. Kinney , 953 F.2d 863, 866-67 (4th Cir.- 3 - 1992). Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Stewart’s motion to suppress. Therefore, we affirm Stewart’s conviction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
##### 



Exhibit 32 CERTIFICATION Accompanying Form 10-K Report
of First Industrial, L.P.
Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(Chapter 63, Title 18 U.S.C. §1350(a) and (b)) Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Chapter 63, Title 18 U.S.C.
§1350(a) and (b)), each of the undersigned hereby certifies, to his knowledge, that the Annual
Report on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2004 of First Industrial, L.P. (the
Company) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in such Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. Dated: March 28, 2005
    /s/ Michael W. BrennanMichael W. BrennanChief Executive Officer

(Principal Executive Officer)

First Industrial Realty Trust, Inc. Dated: March 28, 2005
    /s/ Michael J. HavalaMichael J. HavalaChief  Financial Officer

(Principal Financial Officer)

First Industrial Realty Trust, Inc. A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the
Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request. The information contained in this written statement shall not be deemed
filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, nor shall it be deemed
incorporated by reference in any filing under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, except as shall be expressly set forth by specific reference to such filing.
417 A.2d 702

#### COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. George W. SCHROECK, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted April 12, 1979.

Filed Jan. 4, 1980.

Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Aug. 27, 1980.

*387George W. Schroeck, in pro. per.

Robert H. Chase, District Attorney, Erie, for Commonwealth, appellee.

Before CERCONE, President Judge, and WIEAND and HOFFMAN, JJ.

WIEAND, Judge:

George W. Schroeck was bound over for court on charges of aggravated assault and recklessly endangering another *388person. He filed in the court below a petition to quash the magistrate’s transcript, alleging insufficient evidence at the preliminary hearing. The lower court dismissed the petition, and Schroeck appealed to this Court. We do not reach the merits of the issue raised by appellant. The order appealed from was interlocutory, and the appeal, therefore, must be quashed.

Although the petition filed by appellant was styled a petition to quash the magistrate’s transcript, it is apparent that the relief sought was a discharge and dismissal of criminal charges. Such relief is more properly pursued by a petition for habeas corpus. See *Commonwealth v. Hetherington,*460 Pa. 17, 23, 331 A.2d 205, 209 (1975); *Commonwealth*v. *Gordon,*254 Pa.Super. 267, 272, 385 A.2d 1013, 1015 (1978).

As a general rule, an order denying a pre-trial petition for habeas corpus is interlocutory. In the absence of exceptional circumstances, statutory authorization, or jurisdictional challenge, an order denying an application for discharge prior to trial, particularly where it is based upon the alleged insufficiency of evidence to establish a prima facie case before the magistrate, is unappealable. *Commonwealth ex rel. Austin v. Hendrick,*440 Pa. 236, 269 A.2d 750 (1970). See also: *Commonwealth ex rel. Riggins v. Supt. of Philadelphia Prisons,*438 Pa. 160, 263 A.2d 754 (1970) and *Commonwealth v. Lindsley,*241 Pa.Super. 522, 366 A.2d 310 (1976).

The instant case presents neither exceptional circumstances nor jurisdictional issue neither is there statutory authorization for an appeal from the interlocutory order entered herein. The appeal, therefore, must be quashed.

Appeal quashed.
Exhibit 10(a) 



CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM 




We consent to the incorporation by
reference in this Post-Effective Amendment No.26 to Registration Statement (Investment
Company Act File No.811-21162) on Form N-1A of our report dated October 27, 2008,
relating to the financial statements and financial highlights of BlackRock Fundamental
Growth Principal Protected Fund (the “Fund”) of BlackRock Principal Protected
Trust appearing in the Annual Report on Form N-CSR of the Fund for the year ended August
31, 2008. We also consent to the references to us under the headings “Independent
Registered Public Accounting Firm”and “Financial Statements” in the Part B
of this Registration Statement. 




/s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP 



Princeton, New Jersey 

December 22, 2008
#### GEORGE HAWKINS *v.*COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

(AC 22662)

SchaUer, West and Dupont, Js.

Submitted on briefs May 2

officially released May 20, 2003

Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed.
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In
connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB/A of OmniComm Systems, Inc. (the Company) for the year ended December 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the
undersigned, being, Cornelis F. Wit, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                               
|-----------------------------------------------
|/s/ Cornelis F. Wit                            
|Cornelis F. Wit                                
|President, Chief Executive Officer and Director
|                                               
|June 16, 2008
#### Joseph WILBUR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D09-4225.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

July 1, 2011.

*757Paula C. Coffman, Office of Criminal Conflict & Civil Regional Counsel Orlando, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and L. Charlene Matthews, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

JACOBUS, J.

The appellant, Joseph Wilbur, appeals the judgment and sentence entered after a jury found him guilty of the sale of cocaine. Wilbur contends that the court erred by allowing the State to present *Williams*Rule1 evidence concerning two other offenses at trial. We agree that it was improper to admit into evidence Wilbur’s prior drug offenses and reverse and remand for a new trial.

This court has previously discussed the admission of similar fact evidence at trial. We explained:

> Similar fact evidence is admissible if relevant to a fact in issue, even though it also points to the commission of a separate crime. Such evidence is inadmissible, however, if its sole relevancy is to establish bad character on the part of the accused. *Coler v. State,*418 So.2d 238 (Fla.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1127, 103 S.Ct. 763, 74 L.Ed.2d 978 (1983). A mere general similarity will not render the similar facts legally relevant to show identity. There must be identifiable points of similarity which pervade the compared factual situations. In order for the similar facts to be relevant, the points of similarity must have some special character or be so unusual as to point to the defendant. *Peek v. State,*488 So.2d 52 (Fla.1986); *Drake v. State,*400 So.2d 1217, 1219 (Fla.1981). The admission of improper collateral crime evidence is “presumed harmful error because of the danger that a jury will take the bad character or propensity to crime thus demonstrated as evidence of guilt of the crime charged.” *Peek,*488 So.2d at 55, quoting *Straight v. State,*397 So.2d 903, 908 (Fla.1981).

*Wilson v. State,*490 So.2d 1062, 1064 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).

There was nothing unique or of special character in the crime allegedly committed by Wilbur. It was nothing more than a simple sale of cocaine to a confidential informant. The fact that he made two earlier sales to the same confidential informant was not relevant to the case charged and was only admitted to show Wilbur’s propensity to sell cocaine. Therefore, the admission of this evidence for identity was error. *See id.*

Moreover, we conclude that the court’s error in admitting the *Williams*Rule evidence was not harmless. *See Bricker v. State,*462 So.2d 556, 559 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (admitting *Williams’*Rule evidence not harmless error where proof of guilt against appellant was not clear and convincing). Accordingly, this case is reversed and remanded for a new trial.

REVERSED and REMANDED for new trial.

MONACO and TORPY, Jj„ concur.

1

. *Williams v. State,*110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959).
#### S. H. Watson v. J. D. Cox.

(No. 3030.)

Appeal from Ellis County.

Opinion by

Willson, J.

§ 277. *Landlord and tenant; lien of landlord; right of landlord to sue out distress warrant.*The landlord has a preference lien upon *all*raised by th¿ tenant upon *210the rented premises during the period of the renting, to secure the payment of his rent. [R. S. art. 3107.} While the rent or any portion of it remains unpaid, it is not lawful for the tenant to remove, or permit to be removed from the rented premises, any portion of such crops, without the consent of the landlord. [R. S. art. 3108.] If the tenant, without the consent of the landlord, be about to remove his property from the rented premises, the rent being unpaid, it is lawful for the landlord to sue out a distress warrant against the property of the tenant, whether the rent be then due or not. [R. S. art. 3112; Acts 17th Leg. p. 98.] The fact that the tenant still had- enough of the crops on the premises set apart to pay the rent, could not defeat the landlord’s right to the distress warrant, the latter not having consented to such an arrangement, and not having consented to the removal of any of the crops from the rented premises.

June 27, 1884.

§ 278. *Same; landlord entitled, to judgment on replevy bond.*Where the property seized under the distress warrant has been replevied by the defendant, the landlord, upon recovery in the suit, is entitled to judgment upon the replevy bond for the amount of rent found to be due him, interest thereon and costs, or for the value of the property replevied, according to the terms of such bond. [R. S. art. 3117.]

Reversed and remanded.
Exhibit 31.2



Certifications



I, Edward Escudero, certify that:



1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Petro Stopping Centers, L.P.;



2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to
make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4. The registrants other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:



(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most
recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and



5. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over
financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial
reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control
over financial reporting.



Date: May 13, 2004



|                                     
|-------------------------------------
|/s/ Edward Escudero                  
|(Edward Escudero)                    
|Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer
#### STATE ex rel. Malcolm WINN v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-1291.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 18, 2011.

In re Winn, Malcolm; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 456-755; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-0569.

Denied.
Exhibit 31.2    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302  OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  I, Frank Dalene, certify that:  I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of Hamptons Luxury Homes, Inc.;  1. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report;  2. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;  3. I am the Companys certifying officer and am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Company and have:  a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under my supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the Company is made known to me, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;  b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and  c) Disclosed in this report any change in the Company's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the Company's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.  4. I have disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Company's auditors:  a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the Company's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and  b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the Company's internal control over financial reporting.   Date: March 29, 2007        By: /s/   Frank Dalene Name:  Frank Dalene Title: Chief Financial Officer
**Exhibit 32**

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. § 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarterended September 30, 2007 (the “Report”) of TF Financial Corporation (the “Company”)as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, we,Kent C. Lufkin, President and Chief Executive Officer, and Dennis R. Stewart,Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer (Principal Accounting Officer),hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial position and results of operations of theCompany.

 

 
|        | /s/ Kent C. Lufkin                             |   |
|--------|------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Date:  | November 13, 2007                              |   | Kent C. Lufkin |
|   | President and CEO                              |
|   | (Principal Executive Officer)                  |
|   |                                           |
|   |                                           |
|   | /s/ Dennis R. Stewart                          |   |
| Date:  | November 13, 2007                              |   | Dennis R. Stewart |
|   | Executive Vice President and                   |
|   | Chief Financial Officer                        |
|   | (Principal Financial & Accounting Officer) |
|        |                                                |        |  |  |  |

 

----
#### Crystal BITON, a/k/a Saphyre Redford, f/k/a Marcelle Biton, Appellant, v. Jacob BITON, Appellee.

Nos. 3D10-2920, 3D10-3054.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

April 20, 2011.

*325Crystal Biton a/k/a Saphyre Redford f/k/a Marcelle Biton, in proper person.

Jacob Biton, in proper person.

Before, SALTER and EMAS, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.315(a).
Exhibit 23.1A

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We have issued our report dated April 14,
2005 on the consolidated balance sheets of WidePoint Corporation as of December 31, 2004
and 2003, and the related consolidated statements of operations, changes in
stockholders equity, and cash flows of WidePoint Corporation for the years ended
December 31, 2004, 2003 and 2002, included in its Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year
ended December 31, 2004, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. We hereby
consent to the incorporation by reference of our report in Form S-8 in the companys
previously filed Registration Statement No. 333-55993.

/s/ Grant Thornton LLP

GRANT THORNTON LLP
                                                                                                  Chicago,
Illinois
                                                                                                      June
17, 2005
<PAGE>   1

                                                                     EXHIBIT 3.3

                                    AMENDMENT
                       TO THE AMENDED AND RESTATED BY-LAWS
                                       OF
                               MRO SOFTWARE, INC.


Article III, Section 3.1 of the Amended and Restated By-Laws of MRO Software,
Inc. is deleted and replaced by the following:


         SECTION 3.1.  ANNUAL MEETINGS.

         The annual meeting of Stockholders shall be held on the first Tuesday
in March of each year (or if that be a legal holiday in the place where the
meeting is to be held, on the next succeeding full business day) at 10:00 a.m.
unless a different hour is fixed by the Board of Directors or the President. The
purposes for which the annual meeting is to be held, in addition to those
prescribed by law, by the Articles of Organization or these By-Laws, may be
specified by the Board of Directors or the President. If no annual meeting has
been held on the date fixed above, or by adjournment there from, a special
meeting in lieu thereof may be held and any action taken at such special meeting
shall have the same force and effect as if taken at the annual meeting.

         Notwithstanding any other provision in these By-Laws, the Board of
Directors may change the date, time and location of any annual or special
meeting of the Stockholders (other than a special meeting called upon the
written application of Stockholders (a "Meeting Requested by Stockholders"))
prior to the time for such meeting, including, without limitation, by postponing
or deferring the date of any such annual or special meeting (other than a
Meeting Requested by Stockholders) previously called or by canceling any special
meeting previously called (other than a Meeting Requested by Stockholders).

Adopted by the Board of Directors on February 1, 2001.

                                       34