Opinion issued February 25, 2020

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01 - 19 - 00692 - CV

——————————— IN THE INTEREST OF H. M ., A CHIL D
On Appeal from the 306th District Court Galveston County, Texas Trial Court Ca se No. 1 8 - CP - 0127
MEMORANDUM OPINION This is an appeal from the trial court’s final decree of termination in a suit brought by the Department of Family and Protect i ve Services (DFPS) to terminate the parent

- child relationship between N.M. (father) and S.G. (moth er) and their child, H.M. In its decree, the trial court terminated both parents ’ parental rights and appointed DFPS as sole managing conservator of the chil d
. N.M. and S.G. filed2

notice s of appeal, and the trial court appointed each party a n attorney to p ros ecute each party ’ s appeal
. Both court
- appointed appellate attorneys moved to withdraw and filed Anders brief s , stating that, in each attorney ’ s professional opinion, t he ir client ’ s appeal is without merit and there are no arguable grounds for reversal. See Anders v. Califo rnia , 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Anders procedures are appropriate in an appeal from a trial court’s final order in a parental

- rights termination suit. I n re K.D. , 127 S.W.3d 66, 67 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). Appellat e c ounsel for each paren t has certified that they ha ve delivered a copy of the Anders brief to their client and informed their client of their right to examine the appell at e record and to file a response. See In re Schulman , 252 S.W.3d 403, 408 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Neither parent has filed a response, and DFPS has waived its right to respond. The brief submitted by N.M. ’ s appointed appellate counsel states her professio na l opinio n that no arguable grounds for reversal exist and that any appeal would ther efore lack merit. See Anders , 386 U.S. at 744. Counsel’s brief meet s the minimum Anders requirements by presenting a professional evaluation of the record and stating why t here are no arguable grounds for reversal on appeal. See id. ; In re Schulman , 252 S. W.3d at 406

– 07. The brief submitted by S.G. ’s appointed appellate counsel states her professional opinion that no arguable grounds for reversal exist and that any ap peal3

wou ld therefore lack merit. See Anders , 386 U.S. at 744. Counsel’s brief meet s the min imum Anders requirements by presenting a professional evaluation of the record and stating why there are no arguable grounds for reversal on appeal. See id. ; In re Sc hulman , 252 S.W.3d at 406

– 07. When we receive an Anders brief from an appo inted attorney w ho asserts that no arguable grounds for appeal exist, we independently determine whether arguable grounds exist by conducting our own review of the entire r ec ord. Joh nson v. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs. , No. 01

- 08

- 00749

- CV, 2010 WL 5 186806, at *1 (T ex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 23, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.); see In re D.E.S. , 135 S.W.3d 326, 330 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14t h Dist.] 2 004, no pet.). If our independent review of the record leads us to conclud e that the appeal is frivolous, we may affirm the trial court’s judgment by issuing an opinion in which we explain that we have reviewed the record and find no reversible e rr or. See Johnson , 2010 WL 5186806, at *2. We independently reviewed the recor d and have conclude d there are no arguable grounds for review, no reversible error exists, and N.M. ’s appeal is frivolous. See Anders , 386 U.S. at 744 (emphas iz ing that reviewing court

— and not counsel

— determines, after full examination of p roceedings, whether appeal is wholly frivolous); see also In re A.M
. , 495 S.W.3d 573, 582 (Tex. App.

— Houston4

[1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s t er mination decree as to N.M
. We have independently reviewed the recor d and have conclude there are no arguable grounds for review, no revers ible error exists, and S.G. ’s appeal is frivolous. See Anders , 386 U.S. at 744 (emphasizing that revi ew ing cour t

— and not counsel

— determines, after full examination of p roceedings, whether appeal is wholly frivolous); see In re A.M. , 495 S.W.3d at 582 . Acco rdingly, we affirm the trial court’s termination decr ee as to S.G
. However, we deny both counsel’s motion s to withdraw because this is a parental termination case. See In re P.M. , 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (holding that Anders brief in parental termina tion case is not alone “good cause” sufficient to justify c ou nsel’s w ithdrawal); In re A.M. , 495 S.W.3d at 582

– 83 . A counsel’s duties to her clie nts extend through the exhaustion or waiver of “all appeals.” In re A.M. , 495 S.W.3d at 583 (citing T EX . F AM . C ODE § 107.016). If either N.M. o r S.G. chooses to pursue a pet it ion for review to the Supreme Court of Texas, that party ’ s “appointed counsel’s obligations can be sati sfied by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” In re P.M. , 520 S.W.3d at 27

– 28.5 Conclusion We affirm.

Sarah Beth La ndau Justice Panel consists of Justices Lloyd , Landau, and Countiss.