alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>   1



(a)   Exhibit 11 -   COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE AND EARNINGS PER 
                         COMMON SHARE ASSUMING DILUTION



<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                                 Three Months Ended             Nine Months Ended
                                                                                 September 30, 1998            September 30, 1998
                                                                                 ------------------            ------------------
                                                                                   (Dollars in thousands, except per share data)
<S>                                                                                  <C>                             <C>  
Earnings per common share

Net income available to common shareholders                                                $2,205                         $6,263
                                                                                           ======                         ======

Weighted average common shares outstanding                                              5,411,587                      5,498,631
                                                                                        =========                      =========

Earnings per common share                                                                    $.41                          $1.14
                                                                                             ====                          =====


Earnings per common share assuming dilution

Net income available to common shareholders                                                $2,205                         $6,263
                                                                                           ======                         ======

Weighted average common shares outstanding                                              5,411,587                      5,498,631

Add:  Dilutive effects of assumed exercises of
       stock options and warrants                                                         561,650                        626,264

Weighted average common and dilutive potential
       Common shares outstanding                                                        5,973,237                      6,124,895
                                                                                        =========                      =========

Earnings per common share assuming dilution                                                  $.37                          $1.02
                                                                                             ====                          =====

</TABLE>


Note:    The share and per share information disclosed above have been
         retroactively adjusted to reflect the 10% stock dividends paid on
         August 31, 1998 and September 30, 1997.
#### Emily Richey THOMPSON v. Kristopher Eric RICHEY.

2070305.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

May 28, 2010.

Joan-Marie Kettell Dean, Huntsville, for appellant.

Submitted on appellant’s brief only.

*After Remand from the Alabama Supreme Court*

BRYAN, Judge.

The prior judgment of this court has been reversed and the cause remanded by the Supreme Court of Alabama. *Ex parte Thompson,*51 So.3d 265 (Ala.2010). On remand to this court and in compliance with the supreme court’s opinion, we reverse the trial court’s order granting Kristopher Eric Richey unsupervised visitation with the parties’ minor child, and we remand the cause to the trial court to issue an order consistent with the supreme court’s opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

THOMPSON, P.J., and PITTMAN, THOMAS, and MOORE, JJ., concur.
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT UNITED STATES OF AM ERIC A, Plaintiff - Appe lle e , v. C HRISTOPHER

C . PRESTON, De fe nda

nt - Appe lla

nt. No. 12-30295

D.C . No. 3:11-c r-05537-B HS M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the W e ste rn Distric t of W a shington B e nja m in H. Se ttle , Distric t Judge , Pre siding Subm itte d

Nove m b e r 18, 2014 ** B e fore : LEAVY, FISHER , a nd N.R . SM ITH, C irc uit Judge s. C hristophe r C . Pre ston a

ppe a ls from

the distric t c ourt’ s judgm e nt a nd c ha lle nge s his guilty-ple a c onvic tion for fa ilure to re giste r and upda t e his se x offe nde r re gistra

tion under the Se x Offe nde r R e gistra t ion a nd Notific ation Ac t (“ SOR NA” or “ t he Ac t ” ), in viola

tion of 18 U.S.C . § 2250(a). W e have 

# FIL ED NOV 24 2014 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S . CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3. ** The pa

ne l una nim ously c onc lude s this c a se is suita ble for de c ision without oral a

rgum e nt. Se eFe d. R . App. P. 34(a)(2).jurisdic tion under 28 U.S.C . § 1291. W e re vie w Pre s ton’ s c ha lle nge to the distric t

c ourt’ s de nia l of his motion to dism iss the indic tm e nt de novo, se eUnite d State s v . C abre ra-Gutie rre

z , 756 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th C i r. 2014), c e rt. de nie d, 135 S. C t. 124 (2014), a

nd we a ffirm . Pre ston first c onte nds tha t C ongre ss viola

te d the non-de le gat ion doc t rine be c a use it a llows the Attorne y Ge ne ra l to le gisla

te SOR NA’ s re troa c tive a pplic ation. This c onte ntion is fore c lose d. S e eUnite d State

s v . Ric h ardson , 754 F.3d 1143, 1146 (9th C ir. 2014) (pe r c uriam ) (“ SOR NA’ s de le g ation of a

uthority to theAttorne y

Ge ne ra l to de te rm ine the a pplic a bility of SOR NA’ s re g i stration re quire m e nts to pre -SOR

NA se x offe nde rs is c onsistent with the re quire m e nts of the n on-de le gation doc trine .” ). Pre ston ne xt c onte nds tha t C ongre ss la c ke d the a

uthority unde r the C om m e rc e C la

use to e na c t SOR

NA a n d to c om p e l his re gistra

tion under the Ac t. This c onte ntion is also fore c lose d. Se e C abre ra-Gutie rre

z , 756 F.3d a

t 1129-32 (C ongre ss ha d

the powe r unde r the C om m e rc e C la

u se to e na c t SOR

NA a nd its re gistra tion re quire m e nts). La stly , a s Pre ston c onc e de s, thea pplic ation of SOR

NA’ s re g istra

tion re quire m e nts to pre -Ac t offe nde rs doe s not viola te the Ex Post Fa c to C la

use . Se e Unite d State s v . Elk ins , 683 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th C ir. 2012). AFFIRM E D. 1 2 - 3 0 2 9 5 2
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 165 Introduced in House (IH)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 165

 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to reduce the depreciation 
                   recovery period for roof systems.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 4, 2007

  Mr. Jindal introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to reduce the depreciation 
                   recovery period for roof systems.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Realistic Roofing Tax Treatment Act 
of 2007''.

SEC. 2. DEPRECIATION RECOVERY PERIOD FOR ROOF SYSTEMS.

    (a) 20-Year Recovery Period.--Subparagraph (F) of section 168(e)(3) 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to classification of 
certain property) is amended to read as follows:
                    ``(F) 20-year property.--The term `20-year 
                property' means--
                            ``(i) initial clearing and grading land 
                        improvements with respect to any electric 
                        utility transmission and distribution plant, 
                        and
                            ``(ii) any roof system.''.
    (b) Requirement to Use Straight Line Method.--Paragraph (3) of 
section 168(b) of such Code is amended by adding at the end the 
following new subparagraph:
                    ``(I) Any roof system.''.
    (c) Alternative System.--The table contained in section 
168(g)(3)(B) of such Code is amended by striking the last item and 
inserting the following new items:

``(F)(i).............................................               25 
(F)(ii)..............................................             20''.
    (d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to property placed in service after the date of the enactment of 
this Act.
                                 <all>
```
#### Clouse, by Next Friend, etc. *v.*Peden.

[No. 19,453.

Filed January 25, 1962.]

*650*John F. Toivnsend, Earl C. Townsend, Jr., Townsend & Toionsend,*of Indianapolis, and *Wernle & Ristine,*of Crawfordsville, for appellant.

*Edgar W. Bayliff, Cook, Cook, Bayliff*<6 *Mahoney,*of Kokomo, *John R. Berry*and *Foley & Berry,*of Crawfordsville, for appellee.

Bierly, J.

This is an action for damages instituted in the Montgomery Circuit Court by the appellant against the appellee. Trial was had by a jury and after appellant had submitted his case, appellee moved the court to direct the jury to return a verdict for appellee. The court sustained this motion and directed the jury to return a verdict for the appellee which verdict the jury duly returned.

Appellant thence filed a motion for a new trial which was overruled by the court. In due course this appeal was perfected.

The transcript discloses no judgment on the verdict even though a motion by appellee so requested. Said transcript is certified as being a true and correct copy of the record, hence we assume no judgment was entered.

The 1958 Revision of the Supreme Court, Rule 2-8 provides:

> “No appeal will be dismissed as of right because the case was not finally disposed of in the court below as to all issues and parties, but upon suggestion or discovery of such a situation the appellate tribunal may, in its discretion, suspend consideration until disposition is made of such issue.

Taking cognizance of this ruling, we, at our discretion, now suspend consideration of this appeal until such time as the Montgomery Circuit Court finally dis*651poses of the issues involved in this cause by the entry of an appropriate judgment on the verdict of the jury.

The Clerk of the Montgomery Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Indiana, is hereby ordered to certify a copy of such judgment when entered, to the Clerk of this Court, and the same is hereby ordered thereupon to become a part of the transcript of the record heretofore hied in this appeal. *Lawrence*v. *Pennsylvania Railroad Company*(1960), 130 Ind. App. 18, 168 N. E. 2d 74.

Kelley, P. J., Gonas and Pfaff, J.J., concur.

Note. — Reported in 179 N. E. 2d 586.
#### Janis STRONG v. ELDORADO CASINO SHREVEPORT JOINT VENTURE; Eldorado Shreveport No. 1; Eldorado Shreveport No. 2.

No. 2011-C-1975.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 14, 2011.

In re Strong, Janis; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 537,602-C; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,464-CA.

Denied.
| Date:      February 29, 2008 |  /s/      Edward J. Graham                                 |
|------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   |   |   |   |   | Edward J.      Graham President & Chief Executive Officer |   |     |
|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------------------|

----
**EXHIBIT 31.1**

 

**Certification of Principal ExecutiveOfficer**

**Pursuant to Section 302 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

I, John R. Lyon, certify that:

 

1.     I have reviewed this annual report onForm 10-K/A of Vista Medical Technologies Inc.

 

2.     Based on my knowledge, this annualreport does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit tostate a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading withrespect to the period covered by this annual report;

 

3.     Based on my knowledge, the financialstatements, and other financial information included in this annual report,fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periodspresented in this annual report;

 

4.     The registrant’s other certifyingofficer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosurecontrols and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

 

a.     Designed such disclosure controls andprocedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designedunder our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us byothers within those entities, particularly during the period in which thisannual report is being prepared;

 

b.     Evaluated the effectiveness of theregistrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this reportour conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and

 

c.     Disclosed in this report any change inthe registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred duringthe registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscalquarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or isreasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting; and

 

5.     The registrant’s other certifyingofficer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation ofinternal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performingthe equivalent functions):

 

a.     All significant deficiencies andmaterial weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control overfinancial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect theregistrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial data;and

 

b.     Any fraud, whether or not material,that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting.

 

Date: August 6,2004

 
|                                       |
|--------------------------------------------|
| /s/ John R. Lyon                           |   |
| **John R. Lyon**                           |   |
| **President and Chief  Executive Officer** |   |

 

----
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

CLIVENS and ANDREA GOLDMAN
,

Appellant s ,

v.

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY as Trustee of the Indymac IMJA Mortgage Trust 2007

- A1 Mortgage Pass

- Through Certificates Series 2007

- A1

, Appellee

.

No. 4D 15

- 967

[ September 24, 2015 ]

Appeal of a non

- final order from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County ; Eli Breger

, Senior Judge; L.T. Case

No. 2008CA016116XXXXMB

.

Andrea and Clivens Goldman, Lake Worth, pr o se.

Joshua B. Alper and Nicole R. Topper of Blank Rome LLP, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee s

.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed. See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee , 377 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 1979).

W ARNER
, G ERBER and F ORST
, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Frank DANIELS.

No. 2011-KK-0327.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 16, 2011.

In re Daniels, Frank; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 492-208; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0222.

Stay denied; writ denied.
EX-10.2






Exhibit 10.2




FORM OF TREASURY DEPARTMENT WAIVER




STERLING BANCORP




UST Sequence No. 299



I, [Insert Name], an executive of Sterling Bancorp, hereby agree as follows:





In consideration for the benefits I will receive as a result of my employer’s participation
in the United States Department of the Treasury’s TARP Capital Purchase Program, I hereby
voluntarily waive any claim against the United States or my employer for any changes to my
compensation or benefits that are required to comply with the regulation issued by the
Department of the Treasury as published in the Federal Register on October 20, 2008.




I acknowledge that this regulation may require modification of the compensation, bonus,
incentive and other benefit plans, arrangements, policies and agreements (including
so-called “golden parachute” agreements) that I have with my employer or in which I
participate as they relate to the period the United States holds any equity or debt
securities of my employer acquired through the TARP Capital Purchase Program.




This waiver includes all claims I may have under the laws of the United States or any state
related to the requirements imposed by the aforementioned regulation, including without
limitation a claim for any compensation or other payments I would otherwise receive, any
challenge to the process by which this regulation was adopted and any tort or constitutional
claim about the effect of these regulations on my employment relationship.



Agreed and acknowledged as of December __, 2008




 

[Insert Name]
#### Dunbar & Parchman v. C. R Tirey.

(No. 3935.)

Appeal from Ellis County.

J. E. Lancaster and M. B. Templeton, counsel for appellant.

E. P. Anderson, counsel for appellee.

Opinion by

Davidson, J.

§ 378. *Contract made to avoid a lawsuit; fraud or mistake in should he cdleged and proven.*This suit was brought in justice court on a note for $105 bearing twelve per cent, interest from maturity and ten per cent, attorney’s fees. Some time after the original contract had been entered into the parties entered into a new one to the following effect, as shown by the evidence of appellee: “ The original note given by me to plaintiffs, and the one hundred dollars for the mule, became due in the latter part of 1888. I saw Mr. Dunbar about the matter, and offered him fifty dollars to give up the original note, and the bill of sale to the mule. This he refused to accept, and insisted upon a full settlement in accordance with the original contract. I told him I was dissatisfied with the machine, because it would not do work. Dunbar insisted the machine would work, and fixed the subsequent day in which to test it.” On the day agreed upon the parties met in Waxahachie, and Mr. Dunbar showed appellee all about the machine, and how it worked, and how to replace ties on a bale of cotton, and, after doing so, demanded payment of appellee of the whole amount, threatening suit if he failed to pay. Appellee told Dunbar he did not wish to be sued, and if he would extend the time of payment of the note, as-he did not have the money to pay it off, that he would pay it when it became due, and, if Dunbar would not sue, he would turn him over the mule, and give him a new note for the balance. To this Dunbar agreed. The note sued upon now was *478then executed, and the said note and the mule were delivered to Dunbar, and he returned to appellee his original note and bill of sale. This was all done with the full knowledge on the part of appellee of the failure of the machine to do good work. At that time appellee had not consulted his attorney about the matter, but gave up the mule, and executed the note now sued on, because he did not have evidence enough to beat his case. On the trial of the case appellee recovered a judgment for $115.10 under his plea in reconvention, and a cancellation of the note in controversy. The judgment was clearly erroneous. There was no fraud or mistake alleged or proven. There was no contradiction as to the testimony. The new contract was made to avoid a lawsuit, all the facts being within the knowledge of appellee at the time the new contract' was entered into. On the record as it is made to appear before us, the appellant was entitled to his judgment on the note, and because the court below erred in refusing to grant a new trial the judgment is reversed, and is here rendered for appellants for the full amount of the note and interest, as well as all costs incurred, for which execution may issue.

December *22,*1891.

Eeversed and rendered.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. John Edward MARSHALL.

No. 2010-K-2411.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 25, 2011.

In re Marshall, John Edward; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 5, No. 274,768; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,567-KA.

Denied.
#### STATE ex rel. Alexander HYMES v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-0788.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 8, 2011.

In re Hymes, Alexander; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedí*680al Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 00-5096; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-WR-970.

Denied.
Filed by Bowne Pure Compliance





Exhibit 10.3




December 22, 2008




Mr. Bill Bromiley

c/o Image Entertainment, Inc.

20525 Nordhoff Street, Suite 200

Chatsworth, CA 91311




Re: Amendment to Employment Letter Agreement




Dear Bill:



This amendment letter shall confirm that the Term of your Employment Letter Agreement with
Image Entertainment, Inc. (“Image”) will be extended by ninety (90) days. Accordingly, the “Term”
of the Employment Letter Agreement will now expire on June 29, 2009 and any notice for extending
the Term in the future shall be communicated to you in writing by no later than March 31, 2009
(three months prior to the expiration of this extended Term).



All other terms of the Employment Letter Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.
This amendment letter contains the entire agreement of the parties with respect to the subject
matter herein. This amendment letter may only be modified in writing, signed by you and a duly
authorized representative of Image’s Board of Directors.



If you wish to accept this extension of the Term of your Employment Letter Agreement, please
so indicate by signing below.



Sincerely,




/s/ ROBERT MCCLOSKEY




Robert McCloskey

Director and Chairman of the

Compensation Committee of

the Board of Directors




THE ABOVE IS ACCEPTED AND AGREED.



	 	 	 
	/s/ BILL BROMILEY

	 	12/22/08
	 
	BILL BROMILEY

	 	DATE