UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

ROBERT J. HARPER, JR., 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS; CORIZON HEALTH, 

INC.; EDDIE WILSON, Warden, 

Wyoming State Penitentiary; ROBERT O. 

LAMPERT, Director, Wyoming 

Department of Corrections; ANNE 

CYBULSKI-SANDLIAN, Wyoming 

Department of Corrections Health Services 

Program Manager; ROBERT WHITE, 

M.D., Corizon Health, Inc.; S. LEVENE, 

M.D., Corizon Health, Inc.; CINDY 

ARCHULETTA, R.N., Corizon Health, 

Inc.; H. MASCARENA, L.P.N.; L. 

DEHERRERA, C.N., individually and in 

their official capacities, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 16-8082 

(D.C. No. 2:16-CV-00114-SWS) 

(D. Wyo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

March 16, 2017

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

Robert Harper, a Wyoming prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district 

court’s order dismissing his civil rights complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The 

court determined that the complaint did not contain enough factual matter to state a 

plausible claim. Mr. Harper filed a postjudgment motion seeking leave to file an 

amended complaint, which a magistrate judge denied. The magistrate judge also 

denied Mr. Harper’s motion to reconsider the denial of his postjudgment motion. It 

is undisputed that Mr. Harper did not consent to proceed before a magistrate judge. 

We conclude that the magistrate judge was without authority to enter the final order 

denying the motion to reconsider. Consequently, we dismiss this appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction. 

“Every federal appellate court has a special obligation to satisfy itself not only 

of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review, even 

[if] the parties are prepared to concede it.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 

523 U.S. 83, 95 (1998) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Federal magistrate judges are creatures of statute, and so is their 

jurisdiction. Unlike district judges, they are not Article III judicial officers, 

and they have only the jurisdiction or authority granted to them by 

Congress, which is set out in 28 U.S.C. § 636. As applicable here where 

the [plaintiff] did not consent to proceeding before the magistrate judge, see

§ 636(c)(1), the district court may designate a magistrate judge to consider 

various matters. See § 636(b). These matters are generally categorized as 

“dispositive” or “non-dispositive,” and a magistrate judge’s authority with 

respect to each category is different[.] 

First Union Mortg. Corp. v. Smith, 229 F.3d 992, 995 (10th Cir. 2000) (citations, 

alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] magistrate [judge] is not 

authorized to render final appealable decisions within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 
3 

absent both designation by the district court and consent of the parties under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(c) . . . .” Colo. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. B.B. Andersen Constr. Co., 

879 F.2d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1989). Moreover, “[s]ection 636 does not expressly 

authorize a district court to designate a magistrate [judge] to handle post-judgment 

matters.” Id. 

As for dispositive motions, magistrate judges “may only make proposed findings 

of fact and recommendations, and district courts must make de novo determinations as to 

those matters if a party objects to the magistrate’s recommendations.” First Union 

Mortg. Corp., 229 F.3d at 995 (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, when 

Mr. Harper sought reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s order denying his motion for 

leave to file an amended complaint, “the district court was obligated to review the basis 

for the order [denying reconsideration],” Phillips v. Beierwaltes, 466 F.3d 1217, 1222 

(10th Cir. 2006) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); accord First Union 

Mortg. Corp., 229 F.3d at 996.1

 

 1

 We express no opinion on whether the magistrate judge had authority to enter 

an order denying the postjudgment motion seeking leave to file an amended 

complaint. See Colo. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 879 F.2d at 811 (“Section 636 

does not expressly authorize a district court to designate a magistrate [judge] to 

handle post-judgment matters.”). Given the district court’s obligation to address 

Mr. Harper’s motion to reconsider, see Phillips, 466 F.3d at 1222, we dismiss the 

appeal on that ground.
4 

Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. There was not a 

final appealable order entered by the district court. The Notice of Non-Participation 

and Objection to being Named as Appellees filed by defendants-appellees Corizon 

Health, Inc., Archuletta, DeHerrera, Mascarenas, and White is denied as moot. 

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge