alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIAN G. PHILLIPS,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

SALT RIVER POLICE DEPARTMENT;

et al.,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 13-16158

D.C. No. 2:13-cv-00798-ROS

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Roslyn O. Silver, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 18, 2014** 

Before: LEAVY, FISHER, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Brian G. Phillips appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his 42

U.S.C. § 1983 action arising out of an allegedly illegal seizure of his vehicle and

personal property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for

FILED

DEC 04 2014

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
an abuse of discretion a district court’s dismissal of a later-filed action as

duplicative. Adams v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir.

2007), overruled on other grounds by Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 904 (2008). 

We affirm. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Phillips’s action

as duplicative of an earlier-filed action, Phillips v. Salt River Police Dep’t, et al.,

No. 2:13-cv-00758-DGC, because the causes of action, relief sought, and parties

are the same in both actions. See Adams, 487 F.3d at 689 (in determining whether

a later-filed action is duplicative, this court examines “whether the causes of action

and relief sought, as well as the parties or privities to the action, are the same”). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Phillips’s request

for extension of time to file his First Amended Complaint because he did not

demonstrate good cause. See Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253,

1258 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review and discussing the

requirements for an extension of time under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)). 

AFFIRMED.

2 13-16158
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Annual Report of Silverleaf Resorts, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-K/A for the year ended December 31, 2002 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Harry
J. White, Jr., Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and result of
                  operations of the Company.

Dated: June 19, 2003                                /s/ HARRY J. WHITE, JR.
                                                 -------------------------------
                                                        Harry J. White, Jr.

         A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to Silverleaf Resorts, Inc. and will be retained by Silverleaf
Resorts, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its
staff upon request.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Michael ANDERSON.

No. 2011-KK-0189.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 4, 2011.

PER CURIAM.

|, Granted. With the present case still in its pre-trial stages, the Fourth Circuit erred in ordering an evidentiary hearing in the district court “on the limited issue of whether evidence that [the state’s witness] asked for money in exchange for her testimony is discoverable under *Brady [v. Maryland,*373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) ].” *State v. Anderson,*10-1557, p. 2 (La.App. 4th Cir.1/13/11). A trial court must hold a contradictory hearing to resolve a dispute over the scope of pre-trial discovery unless “it appears on the face of the motion that, as a matter of law, the moving party is not entitled to the relief sought.” La.C.Cr.P. art. 729.1(A). Because *Brady*did not establish a general rule of criminal discov*237ery, “the Constitution is not violated every time the government fails or chooses not to disclose evidence that might prove helpful to the defense.” *Kyles v. Whitley,*514 U.S. 419, 436-37, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1567, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (citation omitted). For constitutional purposes, it does not matter whether a defendant makes a specific request for favorable evidence, a general request, or no request at all. *United States v. Bagley,*473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). The present system “does not tax the prosecutor with error for any failure to disclose, absent a further showing of materiality,” *Kyles,*514 U.S. at 439, 115 S.Ct. at 1568, and materiality requires a “showing that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” *Id.,*514 U.S. at 435, 115 S.Ct. at 1566 (footnote omitted). To the extent that “a showing that the prosecution knew of an item of favorable evidence unknown to the defense does not amount to a *Brady*violation, without more,” *Kyles,*514 U.S. at 437, 115 S.Ct. at 1567, a prosecutor is accorded “a degree of discretion,” *id.,*514 U.S. at 437, 115 S.Ct. at 1567, in making the determination during the pretrial stages of a case, in which “the character of a piece of evidence as favorable will often turn on the context of the existing of potential evidentiary record.” *Id.,*514 U.S. at 439, 115 S.Ct. at 1568. Although “[t]he prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure,” *United States v. Agurs,*427 U.S. 97, 108, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2399-2400, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), in the present case, defendant has not shown that by failing to make disclosure, the prosecutor has “tackfed] too close to the wind,” *Kyles,*514 U.S. at 439, 115 S.Ct. at 1568, and that a miscarriage of justice is bound to occur. *Bagley,*473 U.S. at 675,105 S.Ct. at 3379-80 (“[The purpose of *Brady*] is not to displace the adversary system as the primary means by which truth is uncovered but to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not occur.”).

The Fourth Circuit’s order is therefore vacated and this case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
```

[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 90 (Monday, June 5, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Page S7696]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

                      EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

  As in executive session, the Presiding Officer laid before the Senate 
messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry 
nominations which were referred to the appropriate committees.
  (The nominations received today are printed at the end of the Senate 
proceedings.)

                          ____________________
```
Exhibit 23.1

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We have issued our report dated April
11, 2008 on the consolidated balance sheets of WidePoint Corporation as of December 31,
2007 and 2006 and the related consolidated statements of operations, changes in
stockholders equity and cash flows for the years then ended which report appears in
WidePoint Corporations Annual Report on Form 10-K filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. We consent to the incorporation by reference of our report in the
previously filed registration statements of WidePoint Corporation on Forms S-8 (File Nos.
333-55993 and 333-124897) and Form S-3 (File No. 333-121858).

/s/ Moss Adams, LLP

Scottsdale, ArizonaApril 11, 2008

F - 28
11TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Nasser Shafipour, * From the 96th District

 Court of Tarrant County,

 Trial Court No. 096-236499-09.

Vs. No. 11-13-00212-CV * May 29, 2015

Rischon Development Corporation, * Memorandum Opinion by Willson, J.

 (Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

 Willson, J., and Bailey, J.)

 This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there is 

error in the judgment below. Therefore, in accordance with this court’s opinion, 

the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and judgment is rendered that Rischon 

Development Corporation take nothing. The costs incurred by reason of this 

appeal are taxed against Rischon Development Corporation.
#### J. H. Nolan v. A. Stauffacher.

(No. *5774.)*

April 25, 1888.

Appeal from Grayson County.

Hare, Elmundson & Hare, counsel for appellant.

Brown, Gunter & Bliss, counsel for appellee.

Opinion by

Hurt, J.

§ 372. *Landlord, after evicting tenant, is not entitled to recover rent for unexpired term; case stated.*Appellant sued appellee upon a written contract of the lease of certain premises. The lease was for the period of five years. Appellee paid $1,000 rent in advance, and obligated himself to pay $1,100 on the 1st of March next thereafter. He failed to pay the $1,100, which was advance rent, and appellant evicted him from the premises by an action of forcible detainer, and brought this suit to recover the advance rent — that is, the rent for the future occupation of the premises. This was the case as made by the petition, to which petition the court sustaiiled exceptions, and the suit was dismissed. *Held:*When a landlord evicts his tenant, whether rightfully or not, and resumes possession of the premises, the rental contract is at an end, and the landlord cannot then claim rents for any length of time beyond the date of the eviction, though the rent is made payable in advance. [Taylor’s Landlord & Tenant, § 379; Suth. on Dam. 114; Day v. Watson, 8 Mich. 538; Zulev. Zule, 24 Wend. 76.] The petition did not show a cause of action.

Affirmed.
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 187 (Tuesday, September 28, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 59707]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-24232]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. PR10-111-000]


Public Service Company of Colorado; Notice of Rate Election

September 21, 2010.
    Take notice that on September 17, 2010, Public Service Company of 
Colorado (PSCo) filed a Rate Election pursuant to section 
284.123(b)(1)(ii) of the Commission's regulations. PSCo proposes to 
utilize rates that are the same as those contained in PSCo's 
transportation rate schedules for comparable intrastate service on file 
with the Colorado Public Utilities Commission (Colorado PUC).
    Any person desiring to participate in this rate filing must file in 
accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's Rules of Practice 
and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and 385.214). Protests will be considered 
by the Commission in determining the appropriate action to be taken, 
but will not serve to make protestants parties to the proceeding. Any 
person wishing to become a party must file a notice of intervention or 
motion to intervene, as appropriate. Such notices, motions, or protests 
must be filed on or before the date as indicated below. Anyone filing 
an intervention or protest must serve a copy of that document on the 
Applicant. Anyone filing an intervention or protest on or before the 
intervention or protest date need not serve motions to intervene or 
protests on persons other than the Applicant.
    The Commission encourages electronic submission of protests and 
interventions in lieu of paper using the ``eFiling'' link at http://www.ferc.gov. Persons unable to file electronically should submit an 
original and 7 copies of the protest or intervention to the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 
20426.
    This filing is accessible on-line at http://www.ferc.gov, using the 
``eLibrary'' link and is available for review in the Commission's 
Public Reference Room in Washington, DC. There is an ``eSubscription'' 
link on the web site that enables subscribers to receive e-mail 
notification when a document is added to a subscribed docket(s). For 
assistance with any FERC Online service, please e-mail 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#64222136272b0a080d0a01371114140b161024020116074a030b12"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="42040710010d2c2e2b2c27113732322d303602242730216c252d34">[email protected]</span></a>, or call (866) 208-3676 (toll free). For 
TTY, call (202) 502-8659.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. Eastern time on Monday, October 4, 2010.

Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2010-24232 Filed 9-27-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


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AMEND #5 TO MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT



 Exhibit 10.8 
  
 AMENDMENT NUMBER 5 TO MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT 
  
 THIS AMENDMENT NUMBER 5 TO MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT (“the Amendment”) is made and entered into as of December 31,
2002, by and between Perini Corporation, a Massachusetts corporation (“Perini”), Tutor-Saliba Corporation, a California corporation (“Tutor-Saliba”) and Ronald N. Tutor (“Tutor”), an individual and President of
Tutor-Saliba (Perini, Tutor-Saliba and Tutor collectively, the “Parties”). 
  
 RECITALS 
  
 WHEREAS, Perini,
Tutor-Saliba and Tutor entered into Management Agreement as of January 17, 1997 (the “Management Agreement”), whereby, among other things, Tutor-Saliba agreed to provide certain services of Tutor to Perini; 
  
 WHEREAS, on or by December 31, 2001, by Amendment No. 4 to that Management
Agreement it was extended so that it would terminate, if not earlier, on December 31, 2002; 
  
 WHEREAS, the Parties desire again to extend the termination date of the Management Agreement. 
  
 NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and of the mutual covenants herein contained, the Parties hereby agree as follows: 
  

	1.	Paragraph 6 of the Management Agreement, as amended, shall be amended in its entirety to read as follows: 

  

	 	6.	Termination. Unless earlier terminated by the parties, this Agreement shall terminate upon the earliest to occur of (i) December 31, 2003, (ii) Tutor’s inability to perform the
services comtemplated hereby, whether because of death, disability or otherwise, (iii) written notice from Perini to Tutor after, in the determination of a majority of the Board of Directors of Perini, Tutor has failed to perform his obligations
under this Agreement, and (iv) the reasonable determination by the Board of Directors of Perini, and written notice thereof to Tutor, that it would be inadvisable for Tutor to continue performing the services contemplated by this Agreement, of (v)
the consummation of a sale of Perini to a party other than Tutor or his affiliates. 

  

	2.	Except as specifically amended herein, all other provisions of the Management Agreement as amended shall remain unchanged and in full force and effect. 

  

	3.	This Amendment may be executed in several counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original but all of which shall constitute one and the same instrument.









 IN WITNESS HEREOF, each of the parties hereto have caused a counterpart of this Amendment to be executed
and delivered as of the date above written by their duly authorized representatives. 
  

	PERINI CORPORATION
		
	 By:
	 	 /s/    Robert Band        


	Title:	 	President & Chief Operating Officer


  

	TUTOR-SALIBA CORPORATION
		
	 By:
	 	 /s/    Ronald Tutor        


	Title:	 	 


  

	RONALD N. TUTOR
		
	 By:
	 	 /s/    Ronald Tutor        


	Title:
*

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally

disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may

be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered

submitted without oral argument.

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

JUN 9 1997

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

 

ROBERT EARNEST WILSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 96-6274

JACK COWLEY, ROBERT BERNARD,

DR. SKYAMKANT S. KALKARNI,

M.D., and GEORGE ROACH,

Defendants-Appellees.

(D.C. No. CIV-96-288-T)

(W.D. Okla.)

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 

Before TACHA, BALDOCK, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.**

 

Robert Earnest Wilson, an inmate at the Oklahoma State Reformatory, filed this

§ 1983 action pro se against prison officials alleging that the officials failed to provide

him adequate medical treatment following an injury to his ankle in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. Defendants submitted a Martinez report, see Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d
2

317 (10th Cir. 1978) (en banc), and moved for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P.

56. A magistrate judge thoroughly reviewed the facts and recommended the Defendants’

motion be granted. The district court adopted the recommendation over Plaintiff’s

objection. Plaintiff appeals. Our jurisdicton arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review

de novo, Hayes v. Marriott, 70 F.3d 1144, 1146 (10th Cir. 1995), and affirm.

We have reviewed the parties’ briefs, pleadings, affidavits, and the entire record

before us. We agree with the district court substantially for the reasons set forth in its

order adopting the magistrate’s recommendation and granting Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment. Vol. I, docs. 10, 14.

AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court,

Bobby R. Baldock

Circuit Judge
##### 



Exhibit 32.2
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (1)
    
    The Form 10-K fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
  /s/ S. Mae Fujita NumataS. Mae Fujita NumataSenior Vice President
Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit 35.1







Statement of Compliance of The Bank of New York Mellon,
as Trustee.



I, James Hall, Vice President of The Bank of New York
Mellon, a New York corporation (the Trustee), states:



| | (a) | A review of the
    Trustees activities for the period of January 1, 2014 through December 31, 2014 (the Reporting Period)
    and of the Trustees performance under the Trust Agreement dated October 14, 2011 between Fixed lncome Client Solutions
    LLC as depositor (the Depositor) and the Trustee, as the trustee and securities intermediary, in each case
    amended by a series supplement between the Depositor and the Trustee (as amended in each such case, the Trust
    agreement), has been made under my supervision.
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
| | (b) | To the best of my
    knowledge     and based on such review, the Trustee has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Trust Agreement in all
    material respects     throughout the Reporting Period for Fixed lncome Trust for Goldman Sachs Subordinated Notes, Series
    2011-1                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          



|                        | The Bank of New York Mellon, as Trustee
|----------------------- | ---------------------------------------
|                        |                                        
|Date:
    March 9, 2015 |                                        
|                        | James Hall                             
|                        | Vice President
#### STATE ex rel. Robert GRAHAM v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-2102.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 16, 2011.

In re Graham, Robert; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of East Carroll, 6th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 22,984.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; *State ex rel. Glover v. State,*93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.
exv4w9



 




Exhibit 4.9








December 23, 2003



Securities and Exchange Commission

450 Fifth Street, N.W.

Judiciary Plaza

Washington, D.C. 20549



	RE:	 	MeriStar Hospitality Corporation

Commission File No. 1-11903




Gentlemen:



Pursuant to Item 601 (b) (4) (iii) of Regulation S-K
promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended, MeriStar Hospitality Corporation (the “Company”)
hereby agrees to furnish copies of certain credit agreements
to the Securities and Exchange Commission upon the request of
the Commission, and, in accordance with such regulation, such
instruments are not being filed as part of the current report
on Form 8-K dated December 23, 2003.




Very truly yours,




MERISTAR HOSPITALITY CORPORATION




	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	By:	 	
/s/Jerome J. Kraisinger



Jerome J. Kraisinger

Executive Vice President, Secretary and General Counsel
	 	 





 


 


 








MeriStar Hospitality
Corporation  •  4501 North Fairfax Drive   •   Suite 500   •  Arlington, VA 22203  •  703/812-7200  •  Fax 703/812-7255
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________ No. 95-20886 Summary Calendar

__________________ DANIEL JOSEPH LUKEN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus DAVID STILES ET AL., Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. H-95-CV-1287
- - - - - - - - - - February 22, 1996 Before JOHNSON, WIENER, and STEWART, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Daniel Joseph Luken argues that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing as frivolous his complaint against David Stiles that Stiles filed an appellate brief on Luken's behalf although he had not been appointed to represent Luken. We have reviewed the record, the opinion of the district court, and the brief, and find that the dismissal of the complaint as frivolous should be affirmed for reasons other than those stated by the district court. See Heck v. Humphrey , 114 S.No. 95-20886 -2- Ct. 2364, 2371-73 (1994); Boyd v. Bigger , 31 F.3d 279, 282-84 (5th Cir. 1994). AFFIRMED.