alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
610 A.2d 874

#### IN THE MATTER OF JOHN F. COFFEY, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW.

August 27, 1992.

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

The Supreme Court having ordered on July 27, 1992, that JOHN F. COFFEY of BAYONNE appear at the Office of Attorney Ethics for an audit of his attorney books and records and having further ordered that should respondent fail to appear for said audit or otherwise fail to cooperate with the Office of Attorney Ethics, respondent be immediately temporarily suspended from the practice of law without further notice;

And respondent, without explanation, having failed to appear for the audit scheduled by the Office of Attorney Ethics on August 24, 1992;

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that JOHN F. COFFEY is hereby immediately temporarily suspended from the practice of law pending final disposition of ethics proceedings against him, and until the further Order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that the Office of Attorney Ethics take such protective action, pursuant to *Rule*l:20-ll(c), as may be appropriate to gain possession and control of the legal files, records, practice and trust assets of JOHN F. COFFEY, wherever situate, pending further Order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that JOHN F. COFFEY show cause before this Court on September 30, 1992, at 2:00 p.m., Supreme Court Courtroom, Hughes Justice Complex, Trenton, New Jersey, why his temporary suspension and the restraints herein should not continue pending final disposition of any ethics proceedings pending against him and further why the funds restrained from disbursement should not be transmitted by the financial institu*674tions who are the present custodians to the Clerk of the Superior Court for deposit in the Superior Court Trust Fund, pending the further Order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that David E. Johnson, Jr., Esquire, or his designee, present this matter to the Court; and it is further

ORDERED that JOHN F. COFFEY be restrained and enjoined from practicing law during the period of his suspension and that he comply with Administrative Guideline No. 23 of the Office of Attorney Ethics dealing with suspended attorneys;

WITNESS, the Honorable Robert N. Wilentz, Chief Justice, at Trenton, this 26th day of August, 1992.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Water Polo I, L.P., :

Appellant : CASES CONSOLIDATED

:

v. : No. 360 C.D. 2022

:

West Hanover Township :

Sewer Authority :

Water Polo I, L.P. :

:

v. : No. 392 C.D. 2022

:

West Hanover Township :

Sewer Authority, :

Appellant :

PER CURIAM O R D E R

NOW, September 26, 2023, having considered Designated Appellant’s

application for reargument and Designated Appellee’s answer in response thereto,

the application is DENIED.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NOS. WR-82,566-01; WR-82,566-02; WR-82,566-03; WR-82,566-04;

 WR-82,566-06; WR-82,566-07

EX PARTE ISAIAS LUJAN PALACIOS, Applicant

ON APPLICATIONS FOR WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NOS. CR36475A; CR36477A; CR26475B; CR26477B; CR36475C; CR36477C

IN THE 142 DISTRICT COURT FROM MIDLAND COUNTY ND

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Applicant was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment

in both of these cause numbers. The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. Parks v.

State, Nos. 11-11-00084-CR & 11-11-000850CR (Tex. App.—Eastland April 11, 2013)(not

designated for publication). Applicant filed these applications for writs of habeas corpus in the

county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded them to this Court. See TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. art. 11.07.

On January 28, 2015, this Court denied application numbers WR-82,566-01 & WR-82,566-

02 based on the findings of the trial court without a hearing. On February 18, 2015, this Court
2

denied application numbers WR-82,566-03 & WR-82,566-04 based on the findings of the trial court

without a hearing. On February23, 2022, this Court received a third set of applications, WR-82,566-

06 & WR-82,566-07 in the same trial court cause numbers alleging that there was prosecutorial

misconduct in the review of his initial two sets of habeas applications in Midland County. It has

been determined that former assistant district attorneyRalph Petty was paid by the district judges to

work on Applicant’s earlier 11.07 applications at the same time as he was employed as an appellate

prosecutor by the Midland County District Attorney’s office. That dual employment was not

disclosed to this Court or Applicant at the time his earlier applications were under consideration.

While it does not appear that Petty’s dual employment affected the pre-trial, trial, or appellate

proceedings in Applicant’s case, the undisclosed employment relationship between the District 

Judge who presided over the initial habeas proceedings in this case and the prosecutor who

simultaneouslyrepresented the State in the same proceeding leads us to conclude that Applicant was

deprived of his due process rights to fair consideration of his claims in the first two sets of habeas

applications. Therefore, this Court now reconsiders on its own motion the denials without written

order on the findings of the trial court of application numbers WR-82,566-01; WR-82,566-02; WR82,566-03 & WR-82,566-04. 

However, after an independent review of the records in these cases without consideration of

the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, this Court believes that Applicant’s claims

are refuted by those records. Therefore, after reconsideration on the Court’s own motion, relief is

again denied in cause numbers WR-82,566-01; WR-82,566-02; WR-82,566-03 & WR-82,566-04.

Applicant’s third set of applications, cause numbers WR-82,566-06 & WR-82,566-07 are

dismissed as moot. 
3

Filed: March 30, 2022

Do not publish
#### J.H., a Child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D10-779.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

March 2, 2011.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Patrick B. Burke, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Heidi L. Bettendorf, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

*Affirmed. See J.D. v. State,*920 So.2d 117 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

POLEN, HAZOURI and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.
#### Clara HARRELL v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS, OFFICE FOR CITIZENS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, Pinecrest Supports and Services Center C/W Brenda Prater v. Department of Health and Hospitals, Office for Citizens With Developmental Disabilities, Pinecrest Supports and Services Center.

No. 2010-C-2310.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 25, 2011.

*455In re Harrell, Clara et al.; Prater, Brenda; —Plaintiff (s); Applying for Reconsideration of this Courts action dated December 10, 2010; Parish of Rapides, State Civil Service Commission, Nos. S-16498, S — 16499; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 2010 CA 0281, 2010 CA 0282.

Reconsideration denied. See Louisiana R.S. 1:55(E)(8).

WEIMER, J., would grant.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

JUDGMENT

No. 04

- 22

- 00349

- CV

Scott Ralph WHEELOCK aka Scott Wheelock,

Appellant

v.

KERR COUNTY , Headwaters Groundwater Conservation District, Kerr County Emergency

Services District #2, Kerr County Lateral Roads, Upper Guadalupe River Authority, Harper

Independent School District,

Appellees

From the County Court at Law

, Kerr County, Texas

Trial Court No. 21317A

Honorable Rex Emerson , Judge Presiding

BEFORE JUSTICE CHAPA

, JUSTICE WATKINS , AND JUSTIC E RODRIGUEZ

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s May 24, 2022 judgment

is AFFIRMED. Appellant’s December 28, 2022 Motion for Attorneys to Show Authority is

DENIED. We order appellant to pay the costs of this appeal.

SIGNED February 22, 2023.

_ ____________________________ Beth Watkins, Justice
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

JUDGMENT

No. 04

- 13

- 00072

- CV

Edwin NOLAN and Joel Loehman,

Appellants

v.

William Henry HUNTER , Jr. and Rhonda Hunter,

Appellees

From the 433rd District Court, Comal County, Texas

Trial Court No. C2011

- 715D

Honorable Dib Waldrup, Judge Presiding

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE STONE

, JUSTICE ANGELINI , AND JUSTICE MARTINEZ

In accordanc e with this c ourt’s memorandum opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial

court is AFFIRMED. It is ORDERED that Appelle es William Henry Hunter, Jr. and Rhonda

Hunter r ecover their costs of this appeal from Appellant s Edwin Nolan and Joel Loehman.

SIGNED September 25, 2013.

_____________________________ Karen Angelini, Justice
#### Fela LEWIS, Appellant, v. FLORIDA UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION and City of Pensacola, Appellees.

No. 1D10-1142.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 15, 2011.

*430Felá Lewis, pro se, Appellant.

Louis A. Gutierrez, Senior Attorney, Unemployment Appeals Commission, Tallahassee, for Appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Fela Lewis, challenges the Unemployment Appeals Commission’s af-firmance of the appeals referee’s determination that Appellant was not entitled to unemployment benefits because he was discharged for misconduct connected with work. Absenteeism can rise to the level of misconduct where there is evidence of excessive and unauthorized absenteeism. *Mason v. Load King Mfg. Co.,*758 So.2d 649, 654 (Fla.2000). In order for an employer to prove excessive, unauthorized absenteeism, the employer must establish a serious and identifiable pattern of absenteeism that is willful. *Hamilton v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n,*880 So.2d 1284, 1286 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). The employer failed to meet this burden in the instant case because it only established that Appellant had two unauthorized absences during the nearly two years he was employed. We, therefore, REVERSE and REMAND.

DAVIS and HAWKES, JJ., concur; WOLF, J., concurs in result.
#### Quiana A. FELDERS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 5D10-4142.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

March 4, 2011.

Quiana A. Felders, Quincy, pro se.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Douglas T. Squire, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner seeks a belated appeal based on ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. We deny the Petition in all respects except for Petitioner’s claim that counsel should have challenged the minimum mandatory component of her sentence on double jeopardy grounds. Petitioner was initially sentenced for conspiracy to traffic in cocaine without imposition of the minimum mandatory penalty. The State did not object. The court later resentenced Petitioner at *725the behest of the State to impose the minimum mandatory penalty. This aspect of Petitioner’s sentence was not challenged on direct appeal as a double jeopardy violation. The State concedes that Petitioner is entitled to relief from the minimum mandatory. *See Gray v. State,*915 So.2d 254 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (because minimum mandatory for drug trafficking may be waived, sentence not illegal where State fails to object to omission of minimum mandatory at initial sentencing; resen-tencing to impose minimum mandatory under such circumstances violates double jeopardy); *see also Delemos v. State,*969 So.2d 544, 551 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

Accordingly, we grant the Petition for the limited purpose of challenging the minimum mandatory sentence and consider the appeal without further briefing. Based upon the State’s proper concession, we reverse the sentence and remand with directions to strike the minimum mandatory term, effectively reinstating the sentence originally orally pronounced and imposed.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part and REMANDED.

PALMER, TORPY and EVANDER, JJ., concur.
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**Exhibit32**

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. § 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection withthe Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2007 (the “Report”)of TF Financial Corporation (the “Company”) as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof, we, Kent C. Lufkin, President and ChiefExecutive Officer, and Dennis R. Stewart, Executive Vice President and ChiefFinancial Officer (Principal Accounting Officer), hereby certify, pursuant to18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,that:

(1) The Reportfully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

(2) Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial position and results of operations of the Company.
|        | /s/ Kent C. Lufkin                             |   |
|--------|------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Date:  | August 13, 2007                                |   | Kent C. Lufkin |
|   | President and CEO                              |
|   | (Principal Executive  Officer)                 |
|   |                                           |
|   |                                           |
|   | /s/ Dennis R. Stewart                          |   |
| Date:  | August 13, 2007                                |   | Dennis R. Stewart |
|   | Executive Vice  President and                  |
|   | Chief Financial Officer                        |
|   | (Principal Financial & Accounting Officer) |
|        |                                                |        |  |  |  |  |

 

----
#### 800 CANAL STREET LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. STORYVILLE DISTRICT NEW ORLEANS, L.L.C., Bourbon Street Management, LLC, Jazz Parlor, LLC, and Zydeque, L.L.C. Storyville District New Orleans, LLC v. 800 Canal Street Limited Partnership. Jazz Parlor, LLC v. Canal Street Development Corporation and Cynthia Connick in her Capacity as Executive Director of the Canal Street Development Corporation.

No. 2011-C-2337.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 16, 2011.

In re 800 Canal Street Limited Partnership; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, Nos. 09-12788, 09-12867; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Nos. 2010-CA-0942, 2010-CA-0943, 2010-CA-0944, 2010-CA-0979, *11872010-CA-0980, 2010-CA-0981, 2010-CA-0982.

Granted.
#### Joseph C. TRASCHER, et al. v. Peter TERRITO, et al.

No. 2011-CC-2093.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 16, 2011.

In re Commercial Union Insurance Company; Commercial Union Insurance Company — EO; Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding Inc. n/k/a Huntington Ingalls Incorporated; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 2007-8026; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-0891.

Granted.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

JUDGMENT

No. 04-13-00072-CV

Edwin NOLAN and Joel Loehman,

Appellants

v.

William Henry HUNTER, Jr. and Rhonda Hunter,

Appellees

From the 433rd District Court, Comal County, Texas

Trial Court No. C2011-715D

Honorable Dib Waldrup, Judge Presiding

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE STONE, JUSTICE ANGELINI, AND JUSTICE MARTINEZ

In accordance with this court’s memorandum opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial 

court is AFFIRMED. It is ORDERED that Appellees William Henry Hunter, Jr. and Rhonda 

Hunter recover their costs of this appeal from Appellants Edwin Nolan and Joel Loehman.

SIGNED September 25, 2013.

_____________________________

Karen Angelini, Justice
#### STATE ex rel. Rashad POCHE v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-0876.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 8, 2011.

In re Poche, Rashad; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 21510, 21509; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009-KA-0007.

Denied.
#### Dennis T. HUTTO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D11-3328.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Oct. 11, 2011.

Dennis T. Hutto, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. *See Miller v. State,*996 So.2d 954 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

BENTON, C.J., VAN NORTWICK, and SWANSON, JJ., concur.
#### J. M. Silliman v. T. T. Gammage.

(No. 1764.)

Appeal from Anderson County.

Opinion by

Hurt, J.

§ 499. *Conversion of property; facts which are held do not constitute a conversion.*Silliman held a deed of trust on a certain iron safe to secure a debt due him by one Martin, said deed dated February*22, 1876. On July 12, 1877, the safe was sold under this deed of trust, and Silliman purchased it. Prior to this, on June 25, 1877, the safe had been sold under an execution against Martin, and at that sale Gammage purchased it, having actual knowledge at the time of Silliman’s deed of trust thereon. At the times of these sales, one Shumate had possession of the safe, holding it as the agent of Martin. When the safe was sold under execution, it was pointed *445out to Gam mage’s agent, and he was told by the constable selling it, that he then delivered the same to him as Gammage’s property. In the latter part of June, 1877, Gammage sold the safe to Nathan for $75. Shumate refused to deliver the safe to Nathan or to Gammage. On July 2, 1877, Gammage sequestered it,— Silliman sought to intervene in the sequestration suit, but was not allowed to do so. Gammage recovered judgment against Shumate for the safe, or its value, $75, and also against Silliman, the surety upon Shumate’s replevy bond. On November 22, 1877, Shumate delivered the safe to Gammage, and Gammage thereupon receipted the judgment which he had against Shumate and Silliman. Shumate delivered the safe, to Gammage without the knowledge or consent of Silliman. The trial judge concluded, upon this state of facts, that Silliman had no cause of action against Gammage, but should have followed the safe, it having all the time remained where he could have reached it. *Held:*The judgment in favor of Gammage against Shumate was a valid and subsisting judgment, and was discharged by the delivery of the safe to Gammage. And whether the delivery of the safe was with, or without, the consent of appellant, its effect was to discharge a legal judgment against appellant, and though the legal title to the safe was in appellant, the reception by Gammage, of the safe, in discharge of his judgment, did not constitute a conversion of the property by him. There was no such conversion of the property by Gammage as renders him liable to Silliman for the conversion of it.

December 6, 1884

Affirmed.
#### STATE ex rel. Charles E. COLEMAN v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2011-KH-1722.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 20, 2012.

In re Charles E. Coleman; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 325312; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 0635.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; *State ex rel. Glover v. State,*93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; *State v. Parker,*98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; *State ex rel. Melinie v. State,*93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.
#### Samuel C. GOLDEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D10-2059.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Feb. 7, 2011.

Samuel C. Golden, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Brooke Poland, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion for relief from judgment filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b). In this motion, the appellant claimed that he did not receive a copy of the trial court’s order denying his motions for declaratory judgment until after the time for initiating an appeal had expired. The appellant requested that the trial court vacate and then reenter the prior order so as to preserve his right to appeal. Cases such as *Griffin v. Florida Parole Commission,*727 So.2d 1092 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), and *Gibson v. Buice,*381 So.2d 349 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), suggest that such relief should be afforded under rule 1.540(b) when a party does not receive a copy of the order as entered by the court. The appellant’s motion is thus facially sufficient and may warrant relief if the allegations therein are established as accurate and true. The appealed order is therefore reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court. On remand, the trial court is directed to conduct an evidentiary hearing as to whether the appellant received the prior order before the time to initiate an appeal expired or, in the alternative, to reenter the prior order so that the appellant may appeal that order.

VAN NORTWICK, LEWIS, and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. 1

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-41202 Summary Calendar

RICHARD LEO BOOSH, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

J. ZELLER, ET AL., Defendants, J. ZELLER, B. PEOPLES, Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. C-96-CV-643

June 2, 1998 Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Richard Leo Boosh, Texas prisoner #710426, appeals from the grant of summary judgment for the defendants in his prisoner civil rights action alleging that prison officials were2

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs when they denied him access to tennis shoes for which he had a pass from a medical doctor. We have reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties and find no reversible error. To prevail on a claim of inadequate medical care, “a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); see Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Reeves v. Collins , 27 F.3d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying Farmer to medical claims). “The legal conclusion of ‘deliberate indifference[]’ . . . must rest on facts clearly evincing ‘wanton’ actions on the part of the defendants.” Johnson v. Treen , 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985). “Unsuccessful medical treatment does not give rise to a § 1983 cause of action. Nor does ‘[m]ere negligence, neglect or medical malpractice.’” Varnado v. Lynaugh , 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). In this case, Dr. W. Long swore that Boosh’s foot pain was not a critical or dangerous medical condition; that his back pain was not a result of his footwear; and that the tennis-shoe pass of June 4, 1996, was issued out of concern that Boosh have properly fitting footwear. The sick-call requests and clinic notes indicate that Boosh was seen by a physician at least three times and that he received medication and arch supports to treat3

his foot pain. In addition, he received properly fitting boots on May 16, 1996. Boosh does not contest the validity of this evidence, rather, he questions the magistrate judge’s interpretation of this evidence. We are certain that Boosh’s foot and back pain did not constitute a serious medical need. Even if they did constitute such a need, prison officials were not deliberately indifferent since they provided Boosh with medication and arch supports. Boosh’s allegations raise, at most, a disagreement with the treatment he received. In sum, the evidence on record does not demonstrate any violation of a constitutional right. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants.
AFFIRMED.