alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### STATE ex rel. Sidney GILLS v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-0637.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 4, 2011.

In re Gills, Sidney; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 390-925; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-0100.

Denied.
#### Freiberg, Klein & Co. v. T. S. Greenlay & Co.

(No. 1741.)

Appeal from Colorado County.

Opinion by

Hurt, J.

§ 547. *Plea of privilege to be sued in county of residence; sufficiency of; case stated.*Appellants sued appellees to recover a debt, in the county court of Colorado county, alleging that appellees, under the firm name of T. S. Greenlay & Co., were doing a mercantile business in said Colorado county, said firm being composed of T. S. Greenlay and W. O. Langdon, and that both of said defendants resided in Bexar county. Appellants further alleged in an amended petition, that appellees’ firm constituted an association of persons doing business as retail merchants in said Colorado county. Appellees pleaded their privilege to be sued in Bexar county, the county of their residence. Exceptions to this plea were overruled, and the jilea was sustained and the suit dis*491missed. The plea alleged that defendants, at the time of the institution of the suit, were residents of Bexar county, and that they had not promised in writing to pay the debt sued for in Colorado county. Held, this plea was sufficient. It was not necessary that the plea should anticipate and exclude all the exceptions named in article 1198, Revised Statutes. It anticipated and negatived the exception mentioned in subdivision 5 of that article, which is the only one that could have been applicable in this case, and this being done, the plea was sufficient. Subdivision 21 of said article is not applicable, because both the petition and plea show that the firm of T. S. G-reenlay & Co. was not an association of persons within the meaning of the statute, because it was composed of but *two*persons, whereas it requires at least *three*persons to constitute an association. [R. S. art. 565.]

February 18, 1885.

Affirmed.
1177 Avenue of the Americas             Telephone 212-596-7000
                  NEW York, NY 10036                      Facsimile 212-596-8910


PRICE WATERHOUSE LLP                                                      (LOGO)

                        REPORT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS
March 28, 1997

To the Stockholder and Board of Directors
of Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation

We  have  examined   management's   assertion  about  Chase  Manhattan  Mortgage
Corporation's  (the   "Corporation")   compliance  with  the  minimum  servicing
standards  identified in the Mortgage Bankers  Association of America's  UNIFORM
SINGLE  ATTESTATION  PROGRAM FOR MORTGAGE  BANKERS (USAP) as of and for the year
ended December 31, 1996 included in the accompanying  management  assertion (see
Exhibit  1).  The  Corporation  performs  loan  subservicing  functions  for the
residential  loan  servicing  portfolios of Chase  Mortgage  Services,  Inc. and
Chemical  Mortgage  Company.  Management is  responsible  for the  Corporation's
compliance  with the  minimum  servicing  standards.  Our  responsibility  is to
express an opinion on management's assertion about the entity's compliance based
on our examination.

Our  examination  was  made in  accordance  with  standards  established  by the
American  Institute of Certified Public Accountants and,  accordingly,  included
examining, on a test basis, evidence about the Corporation's compliance with the
minimum  servicing   standards  and  performing  such  other  procedures  as  we
considered  necessary  in the  circumstances.  We believe  that our  examination
provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.  Our examination does not provide a
legal  determination on the Corporation's  compliance with the minimum servicing
standards.

In  our  opinion,   management's   assertion  that,   except  for  instances  of
noncompliance described in management's assertion, the Corporation complied with
the  aforementioned  minimum  servicing  standards  as of and for the year ended
December 31, 1996 is fairly stated, in all material respects.

Instances of  noncompliance  which occurred during 1996 are more fully discussed
in management's assertion which is set forth in Exhibit I.


/s/ Price Waterhouse LLP
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

PHYLLIS A. ACORD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

No. 95-3040

SHIRLEY S. CHATER, COMMISSIONER OF

SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Beckley.

Elizabeth V. Hallanan, District Judge.

(CA-94-713-5)

Submitted: November 5, 1996

Decided: January 30, 1997

Before WILKINS and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and

BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Belinda S. Morton, Fayetteville, West Virginia, for Appellant. Charlotte Hardnett, Chief Counsel, Region III, Victor Jerry Pane, Assistant

Regional Counsel, Office of the General Counsel, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Rebecca A.

Betts, United States Attorney, Carol A. Casto, Assistant United States

Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Phyllis Acord appeals the district court's decision accepting the

report of the magistrate judge and finding that Acord was not entitled

to social security disability benefits from January 23, 1990, until

March 31, 1990, the date her insured status expired. We have carefully reviewed the briefs and other material before us. We conclude

that substantial evidence supports the Secretary's decision that Acord

did not meet her burden of showing that her condition worsened after

January 22, the date of a previous final disability adjudication adverse

to Acord, to the point that she was unable to return to her past work

as a police dispatcher.

Further, to the extent that Acord requested reopening of the prior

adjudication, the refusal to reopen that decision is not reviewable

under either the Administrative Procedure Act or 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

(1994). Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104-109 (1977). Additionally, the questions of reopening and the res judicata effect of the prior

decision were not raised before the Appeals Council or in the district

court, and we will therefore not consider them here. Pleasant Valley

Hosp., Inc. v. Shalala, 32 F.3d 67, 70 (4th Cir. 1994). Finally,

Acord's failure to object to the magistrate judge's refusal to consider

the period through January 22, 1990, waives her right to appellate

review of the matter. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147-48

(1985).

We dispense with argument because our review of the material

before us reveals that argument would not aid the decisional process.

The judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

 2
(LOGO)

PeatMarwick LLP
700 Louisiana
Houston, TX 77002
Telephone 713 319 2000
Telex 286705 PMMT UR (RCA)
Fax 713 319 2041

Independent Auditors' Report

The Board of Directors
Mellon Mortgage Company:

We have examined  management's  assertion about Mellon  Mortgage  Company's (the
Company)  compliance  with the  minimum  servicing  standards  set  forth in the
Mortgage Bankers Association of America's Uniform Single Attestation Program for
Mortgage Bankers as of and for the year ended December 31, 1997, included in the
accompanying  management assertion.  Management is responsible for the Company's
compliance with those minimum  servicing  standards.  Our  responsibility  is to
express an opinion on  management's  assertion  about the  Company's  compliance
based on our examination.

Our  examination  was  made in  accordance  with  standards  established  by the
American  Institute of Certified Public Accountants and,  accordingly,  included
examining,  on a test basis,  evidence about the Company's  compliance  with the
minimum  servicing   standards  and  performing  such  other  procedures  as  we
considered  necessary  in the  circumstances.  We believe  that our  examination
provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.  Our examination does not provide a
legal  determination  on the  Company's  compliance  with the minimum  servicing
standards.

In our opinion, management's assertion that Mellon Mortgage Company has complied
in all material respects with the  aforementioned  minimum servicing  standards,
except minimum  servicing  standard I.1.  related to ensuring that all custodial
and clearing  accounts are reconciled on a monthly basis and  reconciling  items
are cleared in a timely manner,  as of and for the year ended December 31, 1997,
is fairly stated, in all material respects.

KPMG Peat Marwick LLP


January 23,1998
#### HOTEL & RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES UNION, LOCAL 25, et al. v. U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al.

No. 84-5859.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Jan. 12, 1987.

Before WALD, Chief Judge, and ROBINSON, MIKVA, EDWARDS, RUTH B. GINSBURG, BORK, STARR, SILBERMAN, BUCKLEY, WILLIAMS and DOUGLAS GINSBURG, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Appellee’s suggestion for rehearing *en banc*was circulated to the full Court and the taking of a vote thereon was requested. Thereafter, a majority of the judges of the Court in regular active service voted in favor of the suggestion. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED, by the Court *en banc,*that appellee’s suggestion is granted and this matter will be reheard by the Court sitting *en banc.*It is

FURTHER ORDERED, by the Court *en banc,*that the opinion and judgment of October 31, 1986, be, and the same hereby are, vacated.

A future order will govern further proceedings in this matter.

Circuit Judge RUTH B. GINSBURG did not participate in this order.
#### LONGLEAF C & D DISPOSAL FACILITY, INC., Appellant, v. GREEN’S FILL DIRT, INC., A Dissolved Florida Corporation, Anthony J. Green, An Individual, Anthony J. Green, III, An Individual, Gregory B. Green, An Individual, and GFD Construction, Inc., A Florida Corporation, Appellees.

No. 1D12-3102.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Oct. 10, 2012.

C. Jeffrey Mclnnis and Jeffrey L. Burns, Anchors Smith Grimsley, Fort Walton Beach, for Appellant.

Frederick J. Gant, Allbritton *&*Gant, Pensacola, for Appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant seeks review of a Final Judgment in Favor of Plaintiff, entered May 4, 2012 (“Final Judgment”), and an Order Denying Motion for Rehearing and Motion to Set Aside Final Judgment, entered May 21, 2012 (“Order on Motions”). The notice of appeal, filed June 18, 2012, was filed within 30 days of the Order on Motions but not within 30 days of the Final Judgment. In the Final Judgment, the trial court reserved jurisdiction to enter a judgment for nominal damages on appellant’s trespass claim, contemplating that a future evidentiary hearing to determine the amount may be required. Otherwise, the Final Judgment appears to resolve the claims raised in the proceedings below, all of which arose from a boundary dispute and appellees’ excavation and use of portions of appellant’s land to dump debris. However, the Court lacks jurisdiction to review the orders at this time because no final order has been entered in this case and, to the extent that the Final Judgment determined the right to immediate possession of property, appellant’s notice of appeal failed to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction.

An order is reviewable as a partial final judgment when it resolves a separate and distinct cause of action. *See*Fla. R.App. P. 9.110(k). However, an order is not reviewable as final under this rule where there is a factual overlap between the pending claims and the claims resolved by the order. *Jensen v. Whetstine,*985 So.2d *12511218, 1220 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). Contrary to appellant’s position on appeal, for purposes of bringing this appeal, the Final Judgment does not finally resolve appellant’s ejectment claim irrespective of the trial court’s reservation of jurisdiction because the ejectment claim and the trespass claim both arise out of a common set of facts. Therefore, the order is not an ap-pealable partial final judgment. To the extent that the Final Judgment was immediately reviewable as a nonfinal order under rule 9.130, appellant’s notice of appeal failed to timely invoke the Court’s jurisdiction. *See*Fla. R.App. P. 9.110(b). Rendition of a nonfinal order is not delayed by a motion for rehearing. *Ward v. Bragg,*957 So.2d 670, 671 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). Therefore, the Final Judgment was rendered when it was filed, *see*Fla. R.App. P. 9.020(h), and appellant’s notice of appeal filed more than 30 days after rendition was untimely. Finally, the Order on Motions is neither a final order nor an appealable nonfinal order entered after final judgment. *See Bennett’s Leasing, Inc. v. First Street Mortgage Corp.,*870 So.2d 93, 98 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).

DISMISSED.

CLARK, MARSTILLER, and MAKAR, JJ., concur.
Filed by sedaredgar.com - Clyvia Inc. - Exhibit 10.22






Loan Agreement

Between

Clyvia Technology GmbH 
Friedrich-List-Allee 10 
D-41844
Wegberg-Wildenrath

- In the following referred to as “Clyvia” -

and

BTec Holding AG 
Rheinweg 1 
CH – 8200 Schaffhausen

- In the following referred to as “BTec” -

Preamble

Clyvia has developed a depolymerization system. In light of the
capital required by Clyvia, the parties enter into the following contract.

1.

BTec shall grant to Clyvia a loan in the amount of EURO
15,000.00 (in words: fifteen thousand EURO). Clyvia hereby acknowledges
receipt.

2.

The loan shall be paid out into the account of Clyvia
Technology GmbH, Wegberg-Wildenrath.

3.

The interest payable on the loan amount shall be 10% p.a. 

Page 1 of 2




4.

The loan may be canceled by giving one months notice at the end
of a month, however, not before end of the 90th calendar day
following the receipt of the full loan amount in the account specified under
item 2.

5.

Clyvia is entitled to pay back the loan amount including
interest at any time into the account of BTec. This does not require
cancellation.

6.

As collateral for the loan, Inventa shall assign to BTec
112,500 (in words: one hundred and twelve thousand five hundred) shares of
Clyvia Inc., USA. BTec is entitled to freely sell the shares in whole or in
part, if Inventa does not or does not fully pay back the loan amount plus
interest after the due date; otherwise, BTec is obligated to return them to
Inventa.

7.

This contract shall exclusively be governed by the laws of the
Federal Republic of Germany with the exception of the United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.

8.

Any disputes arising under or in connection with this agreement
shall be conclusively resolved according to the rules of arbitration of the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in the current version at the time of
the arbitration proceeding by one or several arbitrators appointed according to
these rules of arbitration with under preclusion of the due process of law The
court of arbitration may also make a binding decision regarding the validity of
this arbitration process.

The place of arbitration shall be Zurich.

Additionally to the ICC rules and regulations, as well as any
other binding rules the arbitration proceeding shall be governed by German
law.

The parties agree that German shall be the language utilized in
any arbitration proceeding.

Wegberg, August 28, 2008

	[Signature] 	 	[Signature] 	 
	Clyvia Technology GmbH 	 	BTec Holding AG 	 
	Dieter Wagels 	 	C. Stampfli Dr. Niederbacher 	 


Page 2 of 2
#### Lassie King HINES, as an Individual and as Curator of her Interdicted Spouse, Reddin Larry Hines v. BROWNING-FERRIS, INC., and Scott Construction Equipment Company of Louisiana, LLC.

No. 2011-CC-2340.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 2, 2011.

In re Hines, Lassie King et al.; Hines, Reddin Larry; — Plaintiffs); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 1, No. 525,746; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,577-CW.

Denied.
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1594 Received in Senate (RDS)]

  2d Session
                                H. R. 1594

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

           September 18 (legislative day, September 17), 2008

                                Received

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To designate the Department of Veterans Affairs Outpatient Clinic in 
   Hermitage, Pennsylvania, as the Michael A. Marzano Department of 
                  Veterans Affairs Outpatient Clinic.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DESIGNATION OF MICHAEL A. MARZANO DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS 
              AFFAIRS OUTPATIENT CLINIC.

    (a) Designation.--The Department of Veterans Affairs Outpatient 
Clinic in Hermitage, Pennsylvania, shall after the date of the 
enactment of this Act be known and designated as the ``Michael A. 
Marzano Department of Veterans Affairs Outpatient Clinic''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in any law, regulation, map, 
document, record, or other paper of the United States to the outpatient 
clinic referred to in subsection (a) shall be considered to be a 
reference to the Michael A. Marzano Department of Veterans Affairs 
Outpatient Clinic.

            Passed the House of Representatives September 17, 2008.

            Attest:

                                            LORRAINE C. MILLER,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
EXHIBIT 23





CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM





We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements filed by Shore Bancshares, Inc. on Form S-8 (333-64319, 333-105159 and 333-134955) and on Form S-3 (333-143002, 333-157141 and 333-167762) of our report dated March 15, 2011 with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Shore Bancshares, Inc. and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, which appears in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Shore Bancshares, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2010.










Baltimore, Maryland


March 15, 2011
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                            18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-0XLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of MRO Software, Inc., (the
"Company") for the quarter ended December 31, 2005, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), each of the
undersigned President & Chief Executive Officer, and Executive Vice President of
Finance & Administration, CFO & Treasurer of the Company, certifies, to the best
knowledge and belief of the signatory, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

/s/ Norman E. Drapeau                       /s/ Peter J. Rice
------------------------------------        ---------------------
Norman E. Drapeau, Jr.                      Peter J. Rice
President & Chief Executive Officer         Executive Vice President, Finance &
Date: February 9, 2006                      Administration, CFO & Treasurer
                                            Date: February 9, 2006
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 16**  **- 2073** 

L. RUTHER , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v.

MATT BEVIN , Defendant

- Appellee

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Alexandria

. Leonie M. Brinkema , District Judge. ( 1:16

- cv - 01045

- LO

- MSN )

Submitted : January 31, 2017 Decided: February 2, 2017

Before WILKINSON, KEENAN , and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

.

L. Ruther , Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:
L. Ruther appeals the district court ’ s order summarily dismissing his incomprehensible civil action. We have reviewed
the record and find no reversible e rror. Accordingly, we deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the appeal for the reasons stated by the district court. Ruther v. Bevin , No.
1:16

- cv - 01045

- LO

- MSN (E.D. Va. Aug. 22, 2016) . We dispense with oral argument because the facts and l egal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
REGISTRANTS CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF AND FOR THE YEAR ENDED
DECEMBER 31, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                       7,625,804
<SECURITIES>                                 1,176,800
<RECEIVABLES>                                  752,232
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                  4,354,338
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            14,066,618
<PP&E>                                       5,905,636
<DEPRECIATION>                               3,849,101
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              16,604,747
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,938,257
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       135,721
<OTHER-SE>                                  14,530,769
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                16,604,747
<SALES>                                      6,107,973
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             7,472,852
<CGS>                                        6,119,108
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                6,119,108
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            18,074,082
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           (16,720,338)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                       (16,720,338)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                              (16,720,338)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.26)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.26)
        

</TABLE>