J-A23008-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ERIK BURNELL WILLIAMS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1533 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 10, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-01-CR-0000851-2020

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: MARCH 21, 2023

Erik Burnell Williams appeals from the judgment of sentence of two 

years of probation, which was imposed after the trial court convicted him of 

driving under the influence (“DUI”) of a schedule I controlled substance and 

DUI of a metabolite of a schedule I controlled substance. We affirm.

At approximately two a.m. on February 3, 2020, Pennsylvania State 

Police (“PSP”) Troopers Matthew Kile and Justin Horan were patrolling in a 

marked SUV in Adams County, Pennsylvania, when they observed a Chevrolet 

Avalanche vehicle traveling approximately one-half mile ahead of them. See 

N.T. Suppression Hearing, 3/18/21, at 7. The troopers increased their speed 

to ten miles per hour above the posted speed limit until they reduced the 

distance between their vehicle and the Avalanche to approximately two or 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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three car lengths, allowing them to read the other automobile’s license plate. 

The officers continued to follow the Avalanche while they submitted the tag to 

their database to ensure the vehicle was properly registered and that there 

were no outstanding warrants or other issues with the owner. Once the 

Avalanche came into view, what happened subsequent was captured by the 

mobile vehicle recorder (“MVR”) on the PSP vehicle. See Commonwealth 

Exhibit 1 (capturing the initial driving portion of the interaction); see also 

Commonwealth Exhibit 2 (audio and video recording containing sound and 

video of the remainder of the encounter between the troopers and Appellant). 

Approximately one-tenth of a mile later, the Avalanche signaled and 

pulled over to the side of the road. The troopers continued driving a short 

distance before stopping their vehicle to await completion of their database 

search. Seconds later, the troopers observed the Avalanche proceed past 

them. Since their inquiry was still in progress, the troopers reentered the 

highway and continued to follow the Avalanche, though this time at a greater 

distance. Almost immediately, the vehicle signaled and pulled into the parking 

lot of the Oxford Township municipal building. Finding it “highly unusual” that 

a vehicle would pull over twice in such a short period of time without being 

directed to do so, the officers also entered the parking lot. N.T. Suppression 

Hearing, 3/18/21, at 11. The troopers parked their SUV to the left rear of the 

Avalanche without activating their lights or sirens. This positioning allowed 

the Avalanche multiple points of egress from the parking lot. 
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The troopers approached the vehicle in a marked uniform with a 

flashlight. Id. at 13. Upon reaching the driver’s side window, the troopers 

observed Appellant yelling into his cellular telephone that he had pulled into 

the municipal parking lot of his own volition because the police were 

“harassing” him. See Commonwealth Exhibit 2 (“So I pulled over and then 

they pulled over and then I pulled into the municipal building . . . well they 

didn’t pull me over. They don’t have their lights on. They are just fucking 

here harassing me pretty much.”). Noticing that Appellant’s speech was 

slurred, Trooper Kile asked Appellant if he had his license on him and if 

“everything was alright.” Id. Appellant confirmed that he had his license and

explained that he had pulled over because the officers were “flying up on 

[him.]” Id. Recognizing Appellant’s constricted pupils, Trooper Kile asked 

whether Appellant had recently imbibed any drugs or alcohol. Appellant 

denied ingesting any such substances and, again, accused the troopers of 

harassing him. The troopers briefly returned to their vehicle with Appellant’s 

license. 

When Trooper Kile reapproached the Avalanche, he observed Appellant 

still on his cellular phone reiterating that the police had not pulled him over. 

Id. Realizing that Trooper Kile was standing next to him, Appellant stated,

for the first time, that he would like to go home. Trooper Kile responded that 

he would need to check Appellant’s pupils before he could allow him to leave,

since his speech was slurred. After unsuccessfully attempting to complete 

field sobriety testing with Appellant still seated in the vehicle, Trooper Kile 
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asked Appellant to exit the vehicle. Appellant asked the person on the other 

end of the phone to come to the municipal building immediately because he 

was being harassed. Appellant then exited the vehicle and engaged in a brief 

scuffle with the troopers. Afterwards, Appellant remained agitated but 

complied with their requests to complete multiple field sobriety tests. The 

scene further devolved when Appellant’s brother appeared. Once additional 

troopers arrived on scene, Appellant was placed under arrest and transported 

to Hanover Hospital where he consented to a blood draw. The results revealed 

that Appellant’s blood contained the active component and the metabolites of 

marijuana, a schedule I substance. Appellant produced a valid Pennsylvania 

medical marijuana card. Based on the foregoing, Appellant was charged with

DUI of a schedule I controlled substance and DUI of the metabolites of a 

controlled substance. 

On October 16, 2020, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion seeking 

suppression of the evidence. Appellant argued that the initial parking lot 

interaction was not a mere encounter because the troopers initiated the stop 

by following Appellant’s vehicle at a high rate of speed. See Omnibus Pretrial 

Motion, 10/16/20, at ¶ 37. Since the police had forced him off the road,

Appellant contended that he did not feel free to leave the parking lot or decline 

their requests for his identification. Id. at ¶¶ 38-39. Accordingly, Appellant 

averred that he was subjected to an investigatory detention without the 

requisite reasonable suspicion and all evidence derived from the stop should 

be suppressed. Id.
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On March 18, 2021, the suppression court held a hearing on the 

suppression motion. After confirming that Appellant only wished to challenge 

the legality of the initial encounter in the municipal building parking lot, the 

court allowed the Commonwealth to present the testimony of the troopers, 

who detailed their interaction with Appellant as described above. See N.T. 

Suppression Hearing, 3/18/21, at 4. The Commonwealth also submitted the 

MVR recordings which captured the entire event. Appellant testified in 

contrast to the troopers, claiming that he was forced to pull over the first time 

because the officers were travelling at a high rate of speed and had nearly 

collided with his rear bumper. Id. at 34-35. While Appellant conceded that 

the police never employed their lights or sirens to initiate a stop, he contended 

that his second roadway exit was, again, due to the police “forc[ing] me off 

the road because they were driving too fast.” Id. at 41. At the conclusion of 

the hearing, the suppression court took the matter under advisement so that 

it could review the MVR recordings and the parties could provide memoranda 

of law supporting their positions.

After receiving post-hearing briefs from Appellant and the 

Commonwealth, the suppression court issued an order denying the motion

and authored an opinion in which it rendered the necessary findings of fact 

and conclusions of law. Specifically, the suppression court credited the 

troopers’ testimony, while rejecting Appellant’s claims that the officers 

initiated a de facto traffic stop by forcing him off the road. The suppression

court reasoned that Appellant’s testimony was not corroborated by the MVR 
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recordings, which demonstrated that the officers never came within two car 

lengths of Appellant’s vehicle and had not attempted to initiate a traffic stop 

of Appellant. See Suppression Court Opinion, 3/30/21, at 4. Since the 

troopers did not activate emergency lights to stop the vehicle, position their

vehicle in a manner that blocked Appellant’s exit, brandish weapons, display 

a show of force, or make any threats or commands, the court concluded that 

the troopers’ initial interaction with Appellant was a mere encounter which did 

not implicate any federal or state constitutional consequences. Id. at 5-6. 

Relying on the testimony from the suppression hearing, Appellant 

proceeded to a stipulated non-jury trial before a different judge. Appellant 

sought dismissal of both DUI charges due to his possession of a valid 

prescription for a medical marijuana card. See N.T. Non-Jury Trial, 4/26/21, 

at 2. The court denied the motion, explaining that having a medical marijuana

card is not a valid defense to metabolite DUI since the subsections charged 

prohibited operating a vehicle with any amount of a schedule I controlled 

substance in the driver’s blood and marijuana was listed as a schedule I 

controlled substance. Id. at 3. Afterwards, the court found Appellant guilty 

of both DUI charges. 

On February 26, 2021, Appellant proceeded to sentencing. The trial 

court sentenced Appellant for DUI of a schedule I controlled substance to 

twenty-four months of probation with one hundred eight days of restrictive 

DUI conditions. The court also ordered Appellant to pay a $1,500 mandatory 

fine and court costs. Finally, Appellant received a mandatory license 
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suspension of sixty days. The DUI charge pertaining to the marijuana 

metabolites merged for sentencing purposes. Appellant did not pursue postsentence motions. Instead, this timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and 

the trial court complied with the mandates of Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the [suppression] court erred in its order of March 

30, 2021 denying Appellant’s pretrial motion to suppress 

evidence due to lack of reasonable suspicion to effectuate a 

stop of Appellant’s vehicle?

2. Whether the evidence was insufficient to support a 

conviction under 75 [Pa.C.S.] § 3802 §§ D1 DUI: Controlled 

Substance – Schedule I when Appellant is a lawful user of 

medical marijuana, no marijuana was found on Appellant’s 

person or vehicle and there was no evidence presented at 

trial that Appellant was impaired?

Appellant’s brief at 4 (cleaned up).

In his first claim, Appellant argues that the court erred when it denied 

his suppression motion due to a lack of reasonable suspicion to effectuate a 

stop of his vehicle. See Appellant’s brief at 7. Preliminarily, we note that,

[a]n appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a challenge 

to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining 

whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by 

the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those 

facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before 

the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as 

a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by those 

findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are 

erroneous. Where the appeal of the determination of the 

suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the 
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suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an 

appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression 

court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions 

of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 164 A.3d 1255, 1257 (Pa.Super. 2017) (cleaned 

up).

Both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions provide 

coterminous protections against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” See 

Interest of T.W., 261 A.3d 409, 418 (Pa. 2021). The law recognizes three 

distinct levels of interaction between police officers and citizens: (1) a mere 

encounter, (2) an investigative detention, and (3) a custodial detention. See 

Commonwealth v. Mackey, 177 A.3d 221, 227 (Pa.Super. 2017). Our 

Supreme Court has reiterated the requirements that distinguish the 

classifications of contacts between the police and the citizenry as follows:

The first is a mere encounter, sometimes referred to as a 

consensual encounter, which does not require the officer to have 

any suspicion that the citizen is or has been engaged in criminal 

activity. This interaction also does not compel the citizen to stop 

or respond to the officer. A mere encounter does not constitute a 

seizure, as the citizen is free to choose whether to engage with 

the officer and comply with any requests made or, conversely, to 

ignore the officer and continue on his or her way. The second 

type of interaction, an investigative detention, is a temporary 

detention of a citizen. This interaction constitutes a seizure of a 

person, and to be constitutionally valid police must have a 

reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. The third, a 

custodial detention, is the functional equivalent of an arrest and 

must be supported by probable cause. A custodial detention also 

constitutes a seizure.

No bright lines separate these types of [interactions], but the 

United States Supreme Court has established an objective test by 

which courts may ascertain whether a seizure has occurred to 
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elevate the interaction beyond a mere encounter. The test, often 

referred to as the “free to leave test,” requires the court to 

determine whether, taking into account all of the circumstances 

surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would have 

communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty 

to ignore the police presence and go about his business. 

[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his 

freedom to walk away, [the officer] has “seized” that person.

Commonwealth v. Adams, 205 A.3d 1195, 1199-1200 (Pa. 2019). Whether 

a seizure has occurred is a question of law involving a plenary scope of review. 

See Commonwealth v. Au, 42 A.3d 1002, 1006 (Pa. 2012). 

When initially evaluating the level of interaction between law 

enforcement and a citizen to determine whether, and at what point, a seizure 

may have occurred, “courts conduct an objective examination of the totality 

of the surrounding circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Lyles, 97 A.3d 298, 

302 (Pa. 2014). Relevant factors of that analysis include, but are not limited 

to: “the number of officers present during the interaction; whether the officer 

informs the citizen they are suspected of criminal activity; the officer’s 

demeanor and tone of voice; the location and timing of the interaction; the 

visible presence of weapons on the officer; and the questions asked.” 

Commonwealth v. Luczki, 212 A.3d 530, 543 (Pa.Super. 2019) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Importantly, a seizure does not occur when officers 

“merely approach a person in public and question the individual or request to 

see identification” so long as the officer does not imply that the citizen is 

required to comply with their request. See Lyles, supra at 303. 
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Appellant contends that the troopers had no legal authority to approach 

his parked vehicle and ask for identification because there was no evidence 

that he needed assistance or had violated any traffic laws. See Appellant’s 

brief at 9. In his view, the troopers forced a traffic stop when they twice 

approached his vehicle at a high rate of speed. Thus, the troopers needed 

reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot before approaching the 

vehicle and requesting his identification. Id. at 9-10. We disagree. 

We find our Supreme Court’s decision in Au, supra instructive. In Au, 

a police officer was conducting a routine patrol in the early morning hours 

when he observed a vehicle parked at a closed business establishment. Id. 

at 1003. Finding this occurrence unusual, the officer pulled into the parking 

lot and positioned his vehicle at an angle relative to the parked vehicle to 

illuminate the passenger side without blocking the vehicle’s ability to exit or 

activating his emergency lights. Id. The officer approached on foot with a 

flashlight, observed six occupants, and watched the defendant roll down his 

window. The officer asked the defendant “what’s going on[?]” and the 

defendant responded we are just “hanging out.” Id. After asking whether 

the occupants were eighteen years of age and receiving a negative response, 

the officer asked the defendant for his identification. The defendant opened 

the glove compartment, revealing two baggies of marijuana. There was no 

evidence of any criminal activity or a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code prior 
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to the defendant opening the glove compartment. A subsequent search of the 

vehicle uncovered additional illegal drugs. 

Following the defendant’s arrest, he sought to suppress the drug 

evidence, alleging that the interaction amounted to an investigative detention 

unsupported by reasonable suspicion. The trial court suppressed the evidence 

and an en banc panel of this Court affirmed that ruling. See Commonwealth 

v. Au, 986 A.2d 864 (Pa.Super. 2009) (en banc). However, our Supreme 

Court reversed, holding that the police officer’s interaction with the defendant 

amounted to a mere encounter, explaining as follows: 

In the present case, the arresting officer’s unrebutted testimony 

indicates that he did not: activate the emergency lights on his 

vehicle[;] position his vehicle so as to block the car that [the 

defendant] was seated in from exiting the parking lot[;] brandish 

his weapon; make intimidating movement or overwhelming show 

of force; make a threat or a command; or speak in an 

authoritative tone. . . . In terms of the use of the arresting officer’s 

headlights and flashlight this was in furtherance of the officer’s 

safety, and we conclude it was within the ambit of acceptable, 

non-escalatory factors. . . . 

Pursuant to governing Fourth Amendment law, we hold that the 

arresting officer’s request for identification did not transform his 

encounter with [the defendant] into an unconstitutional 

investigatory detention.

Id. at 1008-09.

Our own review of the MVR recordings reveals the similarities between 

Au and this case. Herein, the troopers did not travel at an extraordinary 

speed, tailgate Appellant, activate their emergency lights and sirens, or make 

any other show of force that would convey to a reasonable person in 
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Appellant’s position that he needed to exit the roadway. Instead, the troopers

maintained a safe distance during the short time that they were behind 

Appellant’s vehicle on a public roadway. See also Suppression Court Opinion, 

3/30/21, at 2-4. Since Appellant exited and parked in the municipal building 

lot of his own volition, his decision to do so did not create a traffic stop that 

required reasonable suspicion. Critically, as in Au, the troopers parked their 

vehicle perpendicular to Appellant’s vehicle without blocking his ability to exit 

the lot and approached to ask questions targeting Appellant’s well-being and 

identification. Although Appellant repeatedly accused the troopers of 

harassing him, he acknowledged that he pulled over without being stopped 

and provided his license without evincing a desire to terminate the interaction. 

Given the totality of the circumstances in this case, Appellant’s initial

interaction with the troopers constituted a mere encounter. We cannot 

conclude that a reasonable person would have thought they were being 

restrained when a police vehicle drove behind them on a roadway or when 

two officers approached that vehicle, which was parked at a closed 

establishment, to inquire about the operator’s well-being. Thus, consistent 

with Au, Appellant was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article 1, Section 8 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution when he pulled into the municipal parking lot or 
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during the initial interaction that occurred there. Therefore, Appellant is not 

entitled to any relief on his first issue.1

In his second claim, Appellant contends that the Commonwealth 

presented insufficient evidence to establish that he had a Schedule I substance 

or the metabolite of Schedule I substance in his blood, because “medical 

marijuana” is not a Schedule I controlled substance in Pennsylvania. See 

Appellant’s brief at 10-14. 

Our scope and standard of review when considering challenges to the 

sufficiency of the evidence are well settled:

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1 To the extent Appellant’s argument that he “did not engage in any conduct 

that would suggest to the police that he needed assistance” can be construed 

as an assertion that the community caretaking exception to the warrant 

requirement does not apply, we note that this claim is waived due to 

Appellant’s failure to raise it before the suppression court. See Appellant’s 

brief at 9; see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are 

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). However, even if 

properly preserved, Appellant would not be entitled to relief. The community 

caretaking exception applies only where a seizure has occurred, providing 

police with the necessary reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative 

detention. See, e.g. Commonwealth v. Schneider, 239 A.3d 161, 170-71 

(Pa.Super. 2020) (finding the community caretaking exception did not allow 

the police to enter a home without a warrant to further investigate whether 

assistance was required where nothing in the defendant’s demeanor, 

statements, outward appearance, or condition indicated that he needed police 

assistance); see also, e.g. Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 174 A.3d 609,

637 (Pa. 2017) (finding that the trooper’s warrantless seizure of the defendant 

to ascertain if she needed help was not permitted under the community 

caretaking doctrine because the facts did not establish that the defendant 

actually needed assistance). Herein, the only portion of the interaction that 

Appellant challenged amounted to a mere encounter. Thus, the troopers did 

not need to possess reasonable suspicion and the community caretaking 

exception is inapplicable. 
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Because a determination of evidentiary sufficiency presents a 

question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope 

of review is plenary. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, 

we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all 

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient 

to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 

[T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth 

need not preclude every possibility of innocence. It is within the 

province of the fact-finder to determine the weight to be accorded 

to each witness’s testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the 

evidence. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving 

every element of the crime by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, as an appellate court, we may not re-weigh 

the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 176 A.3d 298, 305–06 (Pa.Super. 2017) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

The Medical Marijuana Act (“MMA”) permits qualifying individuals to 

lawfully consume marijuana. See 35 P.S. §§ 10231.101–10231.2110. 

Notwithstanding this, the list of Schedule I controlled substances set forth in 

the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) currently includes marijuana. See 35 

P.S. § 780-104(1)(iv). Critically, the applicable portion of the DUI statute 

states:

(d) Controlled Substances. – An individual may not drive, 

operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a 

vehicle under any of the following circumstances:

(1) there is in the individual’s blood any amount of a:

(i) Schedule I controlled substance, as defined in the 

act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64), known as the 

[CSA].

. . .
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(iii) metabolite of a substance under subparagraph (i) 

or (ii).

75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(1)(i), (iii). Thus, § 3802(d)(1) does not require that a 

driver be impaired; rather, it prohibits the operation of a motor vehicle by any 

driver who has any amount of a Schedule I controlled substance in his blood. 

See Commonwealth v. Etchison, 916 A.2d 1169, 1174 (Pa.Super. 2007); 

see also 75 Pa.C.S. § 3810 (stating that “[t]he fact that a person charged 

with violating this chapter is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or 

controlled substances is not a defense to a charge of violating his chapter.”). 

With regard to the significance of Appellant’s medical marijuana card, during 

the pendency of this appeal, this Court found that the Schedule I designation 

for marijuana pertinent to § 3802(d)(1) includes medical marijuana. See 

Commonwealth v. Stone, 273 A.3d 1163, 1174 (Pa.Super. 2022) (en banc); 

see also Commonwealth v. Dabney, 274 A.3d 1283, 1291 (Pa.Super. 

2022) (“[M]edical marijuana remains a Schedule I controlled substance for 

purposes of Section 3802(d)(1).”) In so holding, we noted that while “[t]he 

[MMA] anticipates the removal of marijuana from Schedule I. . ., the General 

Assembly has not enacted legislation amending the MMA, CSA, or the DUI 

statutes to remove marijuana from its Schedule I designation under state 

law.” Stone, supra at 1172. Since the issuance of Stone, neither 75 Pa.C.S. 

§ 3802(d)(1) nor 35 P.S. § 780-104(1)(iv) have been amended to distinguish 

between medical and non-medical marijuana. Accordingly, pursuant to our 
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holding in Stone, § 3802(d)(1)(i) specifically prohibits driving with any 

amount of medical or non-medical marijuana in the driver’s blood.

Herein, it is undisputed that Appellant was driving a motor vehicle at a 

time when detectable amounts of marijuana and its metabolites were 

discovered in his blood stream. Accordingly, the Commonwealth presented 

sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s DUI conviction for imbibing a 

Schedule I controlled substance and its metabolites pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. 

§ 3802(d)(1)(i) and (iii). 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/21/2023