alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### CAIRO AMMAN BANK, Petitioner-Defendant-Appellee, v. Bernard J. BUCHEIT, Jr., Kurt B. Bu-cheit, Leisel M. Bucheit, Erich J. Bu-cheit, Respondents-Plaintiffs-Appellants.

No. 00-7074.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Jan. 17, 2001.

Bernard J. Bucheit, Jr., Kurt B. Bu-cheit, Leisel M. Bucheit, Erich J. Bucheit, Youngstown, OH, pro se.

Charles G. Berry, Shaw Pittman, N.Y., NY, for appellee.

Present KEARSE, JACOBS, and JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judges.

*SUMMARY ORDER*

This cause came on to be heard on the record from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and was argued by respondent-plaintiff *pro se*Bernard J. Bucheit, Jr., and by counsel for petitioner-defendant, and was submitted by respondents-plaintiffs *pro se*Kurt B. Bucheit, Leisel M. Bucheit, Erich J. Bucheit.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the order of said District Court be and it hereby is affirmed substantially for the reasons stated by Judge Preska on the record on October 15, 1999. Respondents-plaintiffs’ contention that the district court for the Southern District of New York should not have resolved the issue of whether the Ohio federal court, which entered a default judgment against petitioner-defendant, had personal jurisdiction over petitioner-defendant is without merit. When, as here, a plaintiff seeks to enforce a default judgment, and the defendant moves pursuant to Rule 60(b) to vacate the judgment as void on the ground that the court that entered the judgment lacked jurisdiction, “the enforcing court has the inherent power to void the judgment whether the judgment was issued by a tribunal within the enforcing court’s domain or by a court of foreign jurisdiction, unless inquiry into the matter is barred by the principles of res judicata.” *Covington Industries, Inc. v. Resintex A.G.,*629 F.2d *99730, 732 (2d Cir.1980). The issue of jurisdiction, if not litigated in the issuing court, may be raised in the enforcing court. *See id.*In the present matter, the Ohio federal court did not address the question of personal jurisdiction; and for the reasons stated by Judge Preska, we see no error in the ruling of the district court for the Southern District of New York that the Ohio federal court lacked personal jurisdiction over petitioner-defendant. *See also International Shoe Co. v. Washington,*326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (If the defendant is not present within the forum territory, due process prevents suit against him unless he has some “minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

We have considered all of respondents-plaintiffs’ contentions on this appeal and have found in them no basis for reversal. The order of the district court is affirmed.
#### Donald R. SHULTZ, Trustee in Bankruptcy of the Estate of Halford Wheaton, Bankrupt, Appellant, v. Halford WHEATON, Bankrupt.

No. 16435.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

March 24, 1960.

Blaine Simons, Sioux Falls, S. D., for appellant.

Francis J. Parker, Deadwood, S. D., and John G. Potter, Rapid City, S. D., for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal from District Court dismissed, on motion of appellant.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
          18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
          SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Reed L. Benson, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of Xvariant, Inc.;

2.  Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to
make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by
this annual report;

3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
Registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;

4.  As the certifying officer of the Registrant, I am responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the Registrant and have:

    a. designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that
material information relating to the Registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this annual report is being prepared;

    b. evaluated the effectiveness of the Registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this annual
report (the "Evaluation Date"); and

    c. presented in this annual report Registrant's conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our
evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;

5.  I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the Registrant's
auditors and the audit committee of Registrant's board of directors (or
persons performing the equivalent functions):

    a. all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal
controls which could adversely affect the Registrant's ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the
Registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and

    b. any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the Registrant's internal controls;
and

6.  I have indicated in this annual report whether there were significant
changes in internal controls or in other factors that could significantly
affect internal controls subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation,
including any corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies and
material weaknesses.

Date: August 25, 2004              /s/ Reed L. Benson
                                   Reed L. Benson
                                   Chief Executive Officer and
                                   Chief Financial Officer
#### STATE ex rel. Francis LONCAR v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-1160.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 20, 2011.

In re Loncar, Francis; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Concordia, 7th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 05-0837; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 09-01415.

Denied.
#### Lorraine LE BEAU, et al., Plaintiffs, and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellant, v. LIBBEY-OWENS-FORD COMPANY, An Ohio Corporation, and Local 19, United Glass and Ceramic Workers, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 85-1242.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Jan. 7, 1987.

Before BAUER, Chief Judge and CUMMINGS, HARLINGTON WOOD, Jr., CUDAHY, POSNER, COFFEY, FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, RIPPLE and MANION, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

This case is before the court on petitions for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing *en banc*filed by Libbey-Owens-Ford Company and Local 19, United Glass and Ceramic Workers. On consideration of the petitions for rehearing, the court on its own motion modifies the opinion as follows:

> *1273On page 1159, line 5 of footnote nine, delete the sentence beginning “The first mention____”

On page 1160, 2d col. line 15, the citation to the “1982 District Court Opinion at 27 n. 5” is modified to “1982 District Court Opinion at 6 n. 2 11 (5).”

On further consideration of the petitions for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing *en banc,*a vote of the active members of the court was requested and less than a majority * of the members of the court have voted to grant a rehearing *en banc.*A majority of the judges on the original panel have voted to deny the petitions for rehearing. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the aforesaid petitions for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing *en banc*be, and the same are, hereby DENIED.

*

 Chief Judge Bauer, and Circuit Judges Posner, Coffey and Easterbrook voted to grant petitions for rehearing *en banc.*Senior Circuit Judge Eschbach was a member of the original panel, but did not participate in the vote on suggestion for rehearing *en banc.*
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Christopher CALENDER.

No. 2011-KP-0928.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 6, 2011.

In re State of Louisiana; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 432-327; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0461.

Stay denied; writ denied.
#### Marcus STEINFELDS v. David VILLARUBIA and Degas House.

No. 2011-C-0137.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 4, 2011.

In re House, Degas; Villarubia, David; —Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation, District #8, No. 08-20337; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-CA-0975.

Not considered; not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, Election 5.
#### STATE ex rel. Darrel HUDSON, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2009-KH-1477.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 20, 2011.

In re Hudson Jr., Darrel; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. D, Nos. 14,234, 14,235, 14,239; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KW 0224.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.
Exhibit 23.1




               Consent of Independent Certified Public Accountants


We have issued our report dated February 18, 2000 accompanying the consolidated
financial statements of Noble International, Ltd. and subsidiaries appearing in
the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 1999. We consent
to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements of the Company
on Form S-3 (Registration No. 333-68001) and Form S-8 (Registration No.
333-53621) of the aforementioned report and the use of our name as it appears
under the caption "Experts."


GRANT THORNTON LLP



Detroit, Michigan
March 29, 2000
<PAGE>

                                                               EXHIBIT 32.1

                          Certification Pursuant to
                           18 U.S.C. Section 1350
                           As Adopted Pursuant to
                Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

    Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections
(a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code),
each of the undersigned officers of Cenveo, Inc., a Colorado corporation
(the "Company"), does hereby certify, to the best of such officer's
knowledge, that:

    The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the three and nine month periods
ended September 30, 2006 (the "Form 10-Q") of the Company fully complies
with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Company.

Date: November 8, 2006

                                          /s/ ROBERT G. BURTON, SR.
                                          ----------------------------
                                          Robert G. Burton, Sr.
                                          Chairman and Chief Executive Officer

Date: November 8, 2006

                                          /s/ SEAN S. SULLIVAN
                                          ----------------------------
                                          Sean S. Sullivan
                                          Chief Financial Officer

    A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or
other document authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting the
signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this
written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Cenveo,
Inc. and will be retained by Cenveo, Inc. and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

    The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to
section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of
section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code) and is not being
filed as part of the Form 10-Q or as a separate disclosure document.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Viewpoint Corporation (the Company) on Form
10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
date hereof (the Report), we, Jay S. Amato and William H. Mitchell, Chief Executive Officer
and Chief Financial Officer, respectively, of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to our knowledge:

|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934; and                               
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|    |                                                                                                                                                     
|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
and results of operations of the Company.
|    |                                                                                                                                                     

|                      |  |     |                                                         
|--------------------- |  | --- | --------------------------------------------------------
|                      |  |     |                                                         
|Dated: August 9, 2005 |  | By: | /s/ JAY S. AMATO                                        
|                      |  |     | Jay S. Amato
      President and Chief Executive Officer
|                      |  |     |                                                         
|                      |  |     |                                                         
|                      |  |     |                                                         
|Dated: August 9, 2005 |  | By: | /s/ WILLIAM H. MITCHELL                                 
|                      |  |     | William H. Mitchell
      Chief Financial Officer       
|                      |  |     |                                                         

---
Exhibit 32.1

WRITTEN STATEMENT

OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER (PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER)

AND THE CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER (PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER)

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. 1350

Solely for the purpose of complying with 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, we, the undersigned Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer) and Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial Officer) of Noble International Ltd. (the Company), hereby
certify that to the best of our knowledge the Annual Report of the Company on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2006 (Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated: March 28, 2007



By:

/s/    THOMAS L.
SAELIName:

Thomas L. SaeliTitle:

Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer) of Noble International, Ltd.By:

/s/    DAVID J.
FALLONName:

David J. FallonTitle:

Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial Officer) of Noble International, Ltd.
**Exhibit32.1**

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANTSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report ofMakeMusic! Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended June 30,2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I,William R. Wolff, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,that:

 

(1)          TheReport fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)          Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 

August 4, 2004

 
|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | /s/ William R. Wolff    |   |
|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------------------------|--------|
|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | Chief Executive Officer |

 

----
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#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Justin HAWKINS, a/k/a Main, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 00-7132.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 8, 2000.

Decided Jan. 5, 2001.

Justin Hawkins, pro se.

Before WIDENER, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Justin Hawkins appeals the district court’s order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.2000). We have reviewed the record, the district court’s opinion, and Hawkins’ informal appellate brief. Because Hawkins failed to challenge on appeal the bases for the district court’s denial of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, he has not preserved any issue for our review. 4th Cir.R. 34(b). With regard to the issues Hawkins raises for the first time on appeal, we generally do not consider such issues, except under narrow circumstances not present here.*
      *See Muth v. United States,*1 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir.1993) (holding that issues raised for first time on appeal generally will not be considered absent exceptional circumstances of plain error or fundamental miscarriage of justice).

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. *United States v.. Hawkins,*Nos. CR-98-16-BO; CA-99-704-5-BO (E.D.N.C. July 6, 2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*

Even if Hawkins’ claim under *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), were properly before the court, Hawkins was not sentenced above the statutory maximum for the offense of conviction. *See United States v. Angle,*230 F.3d 113 (4th Cir.2000), *petition for reh'g filed,*Oct. 26, 2000 (No. 96-4662).
#### Andres PAVON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D11-2069.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Aug. 31, 2011.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 21, 2011.

Andres Pavón, in proper person.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.

Before ROTHENBERG, LAGOA and EMAS, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. *See Minor v. State,*780 So.2d 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).
#### Huffman Implement Co. v. C. M. Templeton.

(No. 3162.)

Appeal from Tarrant County.

Wallace Hendricks, counsel for appellant.

Templeton & Kern, counsel for appellees.

Opinion by

Willson, J.

*35§ 13. *Failure of trial judge to file Ms conclusions of law and fact; when not a ground for reversal.*Appellant’s first assignment of error is the failure of the trial judge to file his conclusions of facts and law, the cause having been tried by the judge, and appellant haying demanded, in due time, that such conclusions be filed. It is not always that the failure of the judge to perform this duty will be ground for reversing the judgment, and we do not think it constitutes ground for reversal in this instance. There is a full statement of facts in the record, and it does not appear that appellant has been injured, or could be injured, by reason of the non-performance of such duty by the judge. [Bank v. Stout, 61 Tex. 571; 2 Civil Cas. Ct. App., § 224; 3 Civil Cas. Ct. App., § 359.]

§ 14. *Sale by partner to his copartner; when property in hands of assignee of the latter is not subject to garnishment by creditor of firm; case stated.*Appellant, having a judgment against the firm of Towle & Adams, garnished appellee, who answered that he was not indebted, etc. Appellant controverted said answer, and upon a trial of the issues judgment was rendered for said garnishee. In substance the facts are that Towle & Adams were partners in business, and owed several partnership debts, among which was the debt due appellant. Adams sold his interest in the business to Towle, and the latter obligated himself to the former to pay all the debts of the firm. After this sale by Adams to Towle, the latter made an assignment for the benefit of his consenting creditors, and appellee was named and duly qualified as assignee, and proceeded to execute said assignment. It is admitted in the agreed" statement of facts that said assignment, was in accordance with the statute and valid upon its face. It was made by Towle after the dissolution of the firm of Towle & Adams, and was not the assignment of that firm. Towle had become the owner of Adams’ interest in the firm, and the as*36signment conveyed and passed to the assignee all the property then owned and claimed by Towle. This property was of course subject to the partnership debts existing against that firm, but subject only in the manner prescribed by the statute governing such assignments. In the hands of the assignee the property assigned was not subject to attachment or garnishment by a non-consenting 'creditor, except as to any excess which might remain in the hands of the assignee after the payment of the claims of the consenting creditors and of costs and expenses. [Sayles’ Civil St., art. *65h;*Schoolher v. Hutchins, 66 Tex. 324.]

October 26, 1889.

Affirmed.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Mary LACOUR.

No. 2011-KK-2255.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 2, 2011.

In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 507-360; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-1422.

Denied.