[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-11104

____________________

HAL JENKINS, 

assignee of CLJ Healthcare, LLC,

CLJ HEALTHCARE, LLC, 

as to certain non-assigned claims,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

PRIME INSURANCE COMPANY, 

PRIME HOLDINGS INSURANCE SERVICES, INC.,

d/b/a Claims Direct Access,

DAVID MCBRIDE, ESQ.,

EVOLUTION INSURANCE BROKERS, LC, 

Defendants-Appellees.

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-11104

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-01263-JPB

____________________

Before JILL PRYOR, GRANT, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge:

The appellants1 seek review of the district court’s order and 

judgment dismissing their claims against two of four defendants2

in this lawsuit. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the district court 

transferred the claims against the remaining defendants to the 

United States District Court for the District of Utah. The appellants

assert that the order dismissing the claims against the two defendants is a final decision over which our Court has appellate 

1 The appellants, plaintiffs below, are Hal Jenkins as assignee of CLJ 

Healthcare, LLC, and CLJ Healthcare, LLC, as to its non-assigned claims. 

2 The appellees, defendants below, are Prime Insurance Company; Prime 

Holdings Insurance Services, Inc., d/b/a Claims Direct Access; David 

McBride, Esq.; and Evolution Insurance Brokers, LC. The defendants

against whom the claims were dismissed are McBride and Evolution. 

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21-11104 Opinion of the Court 3

jurisdiction.3 We disagree that we have jurisdiction and thus dismiss the appeal.

As a court of limited jurisdiction, we may exercise appellate 

jurisdiction only where “authorized by Constitution and statute.” 

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 

By statute, Congress has authorized us to review “final decisions of 

the district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A final decision “is one that 

ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to 

do but execute the judgment.” Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 

3.921 Acres of Land in Lake Cnty., 947 F.3d 1362, 1370 (11th Cir. 

2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To constitute a final decision, the district court’s order generally must adjudicate all claims 

against all parties. . . .” Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 276 F.3d 1229, 1230 

(11th Cir. 2001). 

Aside from final decisions, we have appellate jurisdiction 

over interlocutory orders through a limited number of pathways. 

One such pathway is when a district court certifies the order 

for immediate appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). To certify an 

3 The appellants assert that they appeal only the part of the district court’s

order and judgment dismissing McBride and Evolution from the lawsuit, 

not the part transferring the remaining claims to the district court in Utah. 

At the same time, they argue that the district court’s decision to transfer the 

action is central to the jurisdictional analysis. Whether we view the district 

court’s order and judgment in whole or in part makes no difference to our 

analysis or the result we reach. 

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interlocutory order for appeal, a district court must “state in writing” that its “order involves a controlling question of law as to 

which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that 

an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the 

ultimate termination of the litigation.” Id.; see McFarlin v. Conseco 

Servs., LLC, 381 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2004) (observing that 

orders certified under § 1292(b) provide appellate courts with “discretion to exercise appellate jurisdiction”).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) offers another pathway. Under Rule 54(b), a district court may enter an appealable 

judgment as to fewer than all claims or parties if the district court 

“expressly” determines that there is “no just reason for delay.” Id.; 

see Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1288–89 (11th Cir. 2010) 

(delineating the parameters of our appellate jurisdiction over judgments entered under Rule 54(b)). 

The collateral order doctrine provides another pathway to 

appeal, in limited circumstances. See SmileDirectClub, LLC v. Battle, 4 F.4th 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2021) (en banc). Under the collateral order doctrine, we have appellate jurisdiction over non-final 

orders that (1) “conclusively determine” a disputed question, (2) 

“resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of 

the action,” and (3) present a question that would “be effectively 

unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “[N]on-final denials of immunity—e.g., 

qualified immunity, absolute immunity, and Eleventh Amendment immunity” are examples of the kind of orders we review 

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under the collateral order doctrine. Id. at 1282 (citing Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350 (2006)).

The district court’s decision qualifies under no jurisdictionconferring statute, rule, or doctrine. The district court dismissed 

the claims against two of four defendants and then transferred the 

remaining claims against the remaining defendants to another federal district. The district court issued no final decision within the 

meaning of § 1291 because it did not resolve all claims against all 

parties. Corsello, 276 F.3d at 1230. Nor did the district court certify 

its decision for appeal under § 1292(b) or enter a judgment “expressly” determining that there was “no just reason for delay” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). And the collateral order 

doctrine does not apply because the district court’s order and judgment determined the merits of the dismissed claims. See Battle, 4 

F.4th at 1278.

The appellants implicitly acknowledge that orders transferring claims to another federal district under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) are 

non-appealable interlocutory orders. See Middlebrooks v. Smith, 

735 F.2d 431, 432 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[T]ransfers under §§1404(a) and 

1406(a) are non-appealable interlocutory orders.”). But they argue 

that, combined with the dismissal of the claims against some defendants, the district court’s decision to transfer the remainder of 

the action confers appellate jurisdiction because nothing remains 

for the transferring court to do.

The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Reuber v. United States, 773 

F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1985) provides some support for the 

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appellant’s position. In Reuber, the plaintiff sued three defendants. 

Id. at 1368. The district court dismissed the action as to one defendant, concluding that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over that 

defendant, and transferred the case as to the remaining defendants 

to another federal district. Id. The plaintiff appealed the dismissal 

based on lack of personal jurisdiction. See id. In a three-paragraph 

opinion, the D.C. Circuit concluded that it had appellate jurisdiction, reasoning that the district court had “thoroughly disengaged 

itself from th[e] case” and nothing was “left over for [the] district 

court to rethink or revise.” Id. Under those circumstances, the Reuber court concluded, the district court had rendered a “final” decision for the purposes of appellate jurisdiction. Id.

Like other courts since Reuber was decided, we do not find 

it persuasive. The Second Circuit disagreed with Reuber’s reasoning in Chapple v. Levinsky, 961 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1992). There, the 

Second Circuit confronted the same question—whether it had appellate jurisdiction over a district court’s partial dismissal and transfer order. The Second Circuit expressly “decline[d] to follow” Reuber, observing that “[t]he stated rational of Reuber . . . would permit any simple order of transfer to another district or order of remand to a state court to be appealed immediately.” Id. at 374. The 

panel concluded that it had no appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s order because the district court entered no final judgment resolving all the claims against all the parties, nor any certification for appeal. See id; see also Carteret Sav. Bank, F.A. v. Shushan, 919 F.2d 225, 229–30 (3d Cir. 1990) (declaring that “we cannot 

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accept the reasoning in Reuber” and distinguishing the case). Even

the D.C. Circuit has since found “gaps in [Reuber’s] reasoning” and 

declined to extend its holding to analogous cases. See Hill v. Henderson, 195 F.3d 671, 674, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding no appellate 

jurisdiction over district court’s order that dismissed one claim and 

transferred remaining claims to another federal district court).

We agree with the Second Circuit’s analysis in Chapple. We 

have no jurisdiction unless it is conferred on us; “Congress has not 

given us the power to review interlocutory orders at will.” Corley 

v. Long-Lewis, Inc., 965 F.3d 1222, 1231 (11th Cir. 2020). Without 

a final judgment, an interlocutory order certified for appeal, a Rule 

54(b) order, or any other applicable pathway for review, we are 

without jurisdiction to consider this appeal and must grant the motion to dismiss it. 

The appellants urge us to consider the likelihood that they

will lose their right to appeal altogether because of our dismissal. 

Most circuits have concluded that litigants in the appellants’ position could appeal the relevant interlocutory order to the court of 

appeals in the circuit with jurisdiction over transferee court once 

the transferee court issues an appealable order. See id. (“Most circuits to reach the question have concluded that they can review an 

out-of-circuit interlocutory decision so long as they have jurisdiction over the district court that issued the appealable decision.” 

(collecting cases)). But, unlike other circuits, “the Tenth Circuit has 

held that it lacks jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders issued 

by an out-of-circuit district court, even when the appealable 

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decision comes from within its boundaries.” Id. (citing McGeorge 

v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 871 F.2d 952, 954 (10th Cir. 1989)). The appellants contend that if we dismiss their appeal here, they will lose 

their chance to appeal the dismissal of the claims against McBride 

and Evolution because of the Tenth Circuit’s rule. Notwithstanding the appellants’ predicament,4 we have no authority to create 

exceptions to the limits of our appellate jurisdiction.5 We therefore 

must dismiss the appeal.

DISMISSED.

4 The appellants concede that they failed to request a Rule 54(b) judgment 

from the district court, an available pathway to appellate jurisdiction. See Edwards, 602 F.3d at 1288–89.

5 At oral argument, the Court explored with both parties whether the appellants could render the dismissal order appealable in the Tenth Circuit by moving in the transferee court for reconsideration or for certification of the order 

under Rule 54(b). The parties agreed that either of these options would likely 

result in an appealable order that would allow the Tenth Circuit to review the 

issues first decided by the district court in Georgia and urged again in the district court in Utah. We express no view on the merits of this approach. We 

note, however, that the appellees represented they would “not present the argument” that either the district court in Utah or the Tenth Circuit lacked the 

authority to consider the dismissed claims. Oral Argument at 20:26–20:50.

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