### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A pr il 4, 200 6 S es sio n EUGE NE L. LAMPLEY, ET AL 

### . v. MEL VIN D. ROMI NE, ET AL 

### .

Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for Dickson Coun ty No. 7792-02 Leonard W. Mar tin, Jud ge

No. M2005- 01726-COA-R 3-CV - F iled on Decem ber 15, 2006

I n a boundary

dispute, the trial court refuse d to find estoppel by deed sinc e the pa

rty raising the e sto pp e l ha d n ot r e lie d o n th e e rr on e ou s d e e ds . We a ff ir m. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Aff irm ed
P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J ., delivere d the opi nion of the court, in which W I L L I AM B. C A IN and F R ANK G. C L EME NT , J R ., J J ., joined.
Au br e y T. Gi ve ns , N a sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , fo r the app e llants , Me lvi n T. Rom ine a ndwi feMa xine M. Romine.
Henry F. Todd, Jr., Dickson, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellees, Eug ene L . L ampley and wife , Nanc y L a m p l e y. OP IN ION This boundary

dispute betwee n the L ampley s and Romines conce rns owner ship of a .07 acr e piece of land borde ring Turnbull Creek that was used as a swimming hol e. Mr. and Mrs. L ampley maintain that their prope rty line extends to t he c enter

of Turnbull Cree k thus including the swimming ho le . T he pr op e rty

ow ne d b y Mr . a nd Mr s. L a mpl e y ha s bee n in th e L a mpl e y famil y fo r g e ne ratio ns
. Mr. and Mrs. Romi n e p u rc h ased the adjoining tr act and commissioned a survey showing that the swimming hole was on their prope rty . After a disag ree ment betwee n the fa milies arose, Mr. and Mrs. L ampley

filed a c omplaint to bar any claims by

the Romines to the .07 acr e swimming hole

. At the trial of this matter, the c ourt was pr esente d with conflicting survey s and witnesses from the c ommunitywith y ear s of experienc e with the swimming hole. The trial court found that the dee ds to the parties we re ambiguous a nd that the Romines never exerted control ove r the property . Ba sed on numerous witnesses and particularly the cr edibilityof a 90 y ear old ge ntleman,W e mus t di s t i ng ui s h bet ween t wo po s s i bl e cons equen ces of t he Lamp l ey s ’ act s
. Fi r s t , i n t he t r i al cour t bel ow, 1
t he deeds wer e e vi dence s uppo r t i ng t he po s i t i on t hat t he Lamp l ey s ne ver cons i dere d t hi s par cel t o be t hei r s
. T he t r i al
co urt , how ever, co ncl ud ed o t herwi se, and t hat f i nd i ng i s no t ap p eal ed

. Sec o nd , t he R o m i nes ar gue o n ap p eal t hat t he L a m p le ys’ ac ts p re v e n t t h e m fro m c la im ing the p a rc e l. T h e se a re two (2 ) d istinc t c o n se q u e n c e s, a n d o n ly t h e latte r is
o n a p p e a l. -2- the trial court found the L ampley s owned the property

. The trial court found no merit to the Romines ar g u m e n tt h a tt h e L a m p l e ys w e r e e s t o p p e d f r o mc l a i m i n g t h e p r o p e r t y. The sole g round ra ised by the R omines on appea l is that the t rial court err ed in finding that the estoppel de fense was without merit. On appe al, the Romines do not dispute the trial court’s underlying f

inding that the L ampley s owned the parc el i n question. I nstead, the Romines ar g ue that t h e L a m p l e ys ar e e s t o p p e d f r o m n o w c l a i m i n g t h e p ar c e l b e c au s e t h e d e e d w h e r e b y t h e L a m p l e ys acquir ed ti tle and the quitclaim deed they executed to re desig nate title betwe en them both omitted the .07 ac re pa

rce l in their descriptions. Wit h reg ard to the Romines’ estoppel arg ument, the trial 1 court found:
I t appea rs to this Court t hat the def ense theory of estoppel does not apply beca use the [L ampley s’] subsequent signing of a de ed wa s to c onvert their tenanc y to a tenanc y in common and it did not create new or additional rig hts and it did not affec t any one else a dverse ly

or otherw ise.
There fore , the question prese nted on this appea l is whether the a cce ptance and subseque nt execution by

the L ampley s of dee ds containing descriptions t hat omitte d th ep a r cel in question estops the L ampley s from cla iming the pa rce l. Absent estoppel, for purposes of t his appea l, the Romines have not que stioned the L ampley s’ ownership of t he parce l. Consequently , we will not revie w the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s a

bo ut the L a mpl e y s’ ow ne rs hip of the pa rc e l.
The fa cts surrounding the estoppel a rg ument are not in question

. M r. L am p ley ’s mother, Mrs. Myrtle L ampley , deede d approximately 77 1/2 acr es t o her five (5) children in 1975. I n 1995, the he ir s o btaine d a

su rv e y to f ormul a te a

le g a l de sc ri pti on to b e us e d b y thehe ir s to div ide Mr s. My rt le L a mpl e y ’s pr op e rty . T he re a ft e r, in 1 99 5, the c hil dr e n divide d th e pr op e rty a mon g st t h e m s e l v e s , d e e d i n g ap p r o x i m a t e l y t w e n t y ( 2 0 ) a c r e s t o t h e p l a i n t i f f s h e r e i n , M r
. a n d M r s
. L a m p l e y. Th e de e d b y

wh ic h M r. a ndMr s. L a mpl e y too k ti tle didno t in c lud e th e .0 7 a c resw imm ing ho le parc el. Ther eaf

ter, in May

of 2001, th e L am p l ey s executed a quitcla im deed for estate pla nning purposes. The “express purpose ” of the quitclaim was to terminate t h e L ampley s’ owner ship as te na nts by the e nti re ty

a ndto c re a te ow ne rs hip in the L a mpl e y s a s te na nts in c omm on
. Th e qu itc la im deed pr ovided:
New le g al desc riptions were not pr epar ed for this transaction. The le g al desc riptions are the same a s the previous instruments of re cord.
The theory

relied upon by

the Romines is estoppel by deed. The Romines arg ue that since the L ampley s repr esente d that they did not own the .07 acr e par cel in the 1995 a nd 2001 deeds, the n-3-

they are es t o p p ed fr om taking a contra ry position and claiming ow nership of the parc el. Our S u p r e m e C o u r th a s d e s c r i b e d e s t o p p e l b y d e e d t h u s l y: [a] b ar w hic h p re c lud e s o ne pa rty to a de e d a ndhis privi e s fr om as se rt ing a s a g a ins t the other pa

rty and his privies any

rig ht or title in derog ation of the de ed or f rom de nying the truthof

a ny ma te ri a l f

a c ts a sse rt e d init. Denny v. W

ilson Cou nty , 198 Tenn. 677, 281 S.W .2d 671, 675 (1955); Smith v

. Sovran Bank Central So uth , 7 92 S.W. 2d92 8, 93 0 ( Te nn . Ct. App . 199 0)

. As the la ng ua g e su g g e sts , est op pe l is g e ne ra lly available only

to the other pa

rty to the deed or

transac tion.
B e f o r e e s t ab l i s h i n g e s t o p p e l b y d e e d , t h e p ar t i e s r e l yi n g o n t h e e s t o p p e l m u s tp r o v e t h a tt h e y: a. lac ked knowledg e of the true fa cts without fault of their own; b. relied upon the untrue fa cts; and c. took ac tion based on the untrue statement or misrepr esentation.
Sm ith , 792 S.W .2d at 931.
The trial court held that the deeds to the L ampley s “did not aff ect a ny one else adver sely or otherwise.” The de eds in question that the R omines claim estopped the L ampley s weredated 1995 a nd20 01 . T he re c or d s ho ws , h ow e ve r, that Mr . a ndMr s. Rom ine a c qu ir e d title to the ir pr op e rty in 1979. I n other words, the Romines owne d their property befor e the L ampley s’ dee ds exi sted. Ba sed on the se fact s, the tria l c ou rt c or re c tly he ld that th e Rom ine s d id n ot r e ly or a c t onthe L a mpl e y s’ 1995 or 2001 dee ds. Consequently , there can be no estoppel by deed.
The Romines cite Mix v . Miller , 27 S.W .3d 508 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), for the proposition that if a pa

rty adopts a surve y

he is bound by

its term. Appare ntly , they see a d i s tinction between e sto pp e l by

de e d a nde sto pp e l to c ha llenge a surv e y inc or po rate d ina

de e d a ndapp are ntl y

wo uld ar g u e t h a t w h i l e r e l i a n c e i s a n e l e m e n to f e s t o p p e l b y d e e d , i ti s n o tr e q u i r e d f o r e s t o p p e l b y s u r v e y. Ex amination of the c ourt’s dec ision in Mix does not, howeve r, support the Romines’ conc lusion. On appe al, the court in Mi x fo un d n o e sto pp e l e xiste d b e c aus e the rewa s n o p ro of thepa rty a g a ins t whom estoppel wa s asserte d ever rec og nized or adopted a ny survey
. Id

. at 514. Consequently , the Mix es, in that ca se, we re not e stopped from “cha lleng ing their own dee d.” Id . Since there was no a d o p t i o n o f

a s u r v e y, t h e c o u r tn e v e r

ru l e d o n w h e t h e r

r e l i a n c e w a s a

r e q u i r e d e l e m e n te i t h e r

w a y. Ver ye ar ly c a s e s ap p li e d e s to p p e l to d e n y a s u r v e y in c a s e s w h e r e r e li a n c e w a s ap p ar e n t, as in an ag ree d-upon mutual boundary or a r epre sentation from seller to buy er.
F urthe rm or e , try ing to d if fe re nti a te be tw e e n e sto pp e l by de e d a nde sto pp e l by

su rv eyis a d i s t i n c t i o n w i t h o u t a d i f

f e r e n c e
. S u r v e ys p r o v i d e t h e p r o p e r t y d e s c r i p t i o n s t h a t ar e i n d e e d s
. F i n a l l y, as a pr actica l matter, a bla nket re qu i rement binding a pa rty to a survey

or dee d that is errone ous wo uld , ine ff

e c t, p re ve nt p art ie s f

ro m c or re c tin g mis take s in re c or de d ins trume nts

. Re lianc e mus t-4-

be shown in orde r to cl ai m est oppel by deed or survey reg ardle ss of the labe l used to describe the e sto pp e l c la im.
The trial c ourt is affirmed. Costs of appea l are taxed to Mr. Melvin Rom ine and Mrs. Max ine R o m i n e f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

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PATRI CI A J . COTTRELL , J UDGE