IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

In re the Matter of the Marriage of: No. 58189-2-II

LAURIE ANN STIGEN,

Respondent,

v.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

GENE KEITH STIGEN, 

Appellant.

PRICE, J. — Gene Stigen appeals the final orders entered in the dissolution of his marriage 

to Laurie Stigen.1 Because Gene failed to designate the trial record on appeal, the record is 

insufficient to review his assignments of errors. Accordingly, we affirm the superior court’s final 

orders. We also deny Gene’s request for attorney fees on appeal and grant Laurie’s request for 

attorney fees on appeal as sanctions under RAP 18.9.

FACTS

Gene and Laurie were married in 1989. In 2021, Laurie petitioned for dissolution of the 

marriage. 

Following a trial, the superior court found that the marriage was irretrievably broken and

entered final orders in the dissolution. The superior court entered findings identifying community 

personal property, separate personal property, community debts, and separate debts. The superior 

 

1 We refer to the parties by their first names to avoid confusion. We mean no disrespect. 

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

May 29, 2024
No. 58189-2-II

2

court found the parties’ real property in Spanaway was community property. The superior court 

awarded this Spanaway property to Gene but ordered that Gene pay Laurie a $245,459 equalization 

payment. The superior court also distributed the remaining personal property and debts. The 

superior court’s final orders did not explicitly assign valuations to any of the personal property or 

debts. 

The superior court also found that Laurie had need for spousal maintenance and Gene had 

the ability to pay, awarding Laurie $587 per month in spousal maintenance for the remainder of 

Gene’s lifetime. 

Finally, the superior court entered detailed written findings supporting its determination 

that Gene was not credible at trial. The superior court also found that Gene was intransigent based 

on specific conduct leading up to and during the trial. The superior court awarded Laurie $20,000 

in attorney fees for Gene’s intransigence and an additional $3,000 in attorney fees related to an 

order granting a motion to compel. 

Gene filed a motion for reconsideration of the superior court’s final orders. The superior 

court made an agreed modification to the final orders but otherwise denied the motion for 

reconsideration. Gene appeals. 

On appeal, Gene provided the superior court’s written orders, but he did not designate a 

verbatim report of proceedings of the dissolution trial. 

ANALYSIS

I. FAILURE TO DESIGNATE RECORD

Gene raises numerous assignments of error challenging the superior court’s 

characterization of certain property and the superior court’s final orders distributing property. 
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However, because Gene has failed to provide a complete record of the trial, the record is 

insufficient for us to review his assignments of error. Accordingly, we affirm the superior court’s 

final orders.

RCW 26.09.080 states that “[i]n a proceeding for dissolution of the marriage . . . the court 

shall . . . make such disposition of the property and the liabilities of the parties, either community 

or separate, as shall appear just and equitable after considering all relevant factors. . . .” Relevant 

factors include, but are not limited to, the nature and extent of community or separate property, 

the duration of the marriage, and the economic circumstances of each spouse. RCW 26.09.080(1)-

(4). The superior court is in the best position to assess the assets and liabilities of the parties and 

determine what is just and equitable. In re Marriage of Brewer, 137 Wn.2d 756, 769, 976 P.2d 

102 (1999).

The superior court’s property division in a dissolution proceeding will only be reversed for 

a manifest abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Muhammad, 153 Wn.2d 795, 803, 108 P.3d 779 

(2005). “ ‘A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on 

untenable grounds or untenable reasons.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 

39, 46-47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997)). Further, the superior court’s findings will not be disturbed on 

appeal so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. In re Marriage of Rockwell, 141 

Wn. App. 235, 242, 170 P.3d 572 (2007), review denied, 163 Wn.2d 1055 (2008). “ ‘Substantial 

evidence exists if the record contains evidence of sufficient quantity to persuade a fair-minded, 

rational person of the truth of the declared premise.’ ” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(quoting In re Marriage of Griswold, 112 Wn. App. 333, 339, 48 P.3d 1018 (2002)). 
No. 58189-2-II

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“The appellant has the burden of perfecting the record so that the court has before it all the 

evidence relevant to the issue.” In re Marriage of Haugh, 58 Wn. App. 1, 6, 790 P.2d 1266 (1990); 

RAP 9.2(b). If the appellant fails to provide us with a record sufficient for review, we cannot reach 

the merits of the appellant’s arguments. See Olmsted v. Mulder, 72 Wn. App. 169, 183, 863 P.2d 

1355 (1993) (“We cannot reach the merits of [Appellant’s] arguments because he has failed to 

provide us with a sufficient trial record.”), review denied, 123 Wn.2d 1025 (1994).

First, Gene assigns error to the final orders arguing that the superior court erred in its 

characterization of property as community or separate and by awarding property that did not 

belong to either party. Gene concedes he failed to supply a transcript of the proceedings, but he 

claims he “is not challenging what was said during the trial, but rather, what was reduced to writing 

after the trial . . . .” Reply Br. of Appellant at 29. But that does not work. Without a full record 

of the evidence presented to the superior court during the trial, we cannot accurately determine 

whether the superior court’s findings regarding the characterization of property or ownership of 

the property are supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the record designated for review 

is insufficient to allow us to review this assignment of error.

Second, Gene argues the superior court erred by failing to list valuations of all property, 

assets, and liabilities in its final orders. The superior court is required to value the property at issue 

to create a record for appellate review. In re Marriage of Greene, 97 Wn. App. 708, 712, 986 P.2d 

144 (1999). However, “[i]nadequate written findings may be supplemented by the trial court’s 

oral decision or statements in the record.” In re Marriage of Lawrence, 105 Wn. App. 683, 686, 

20 P.3d 972 (2001). Again, because Gene has failed to designate a verbatim report of proceedings 

documenting the trial and any of the superior court’s oral rulings, we do not have an adequate 
No. 58189-2-II

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record to determine whether or not the superior court actually valued the property described in the 

final orders. 

Third, Gene assigns error to the superior court’s decision to award Laurie a $245,459.00 

equalization payment for awarding Gene the Spanaway property. Yet again, because Gene has 

failed to designate a verbatim report of proceedings of the trial record, we have no record available 

to evaluate the superior court’s reasons for awarding the equalization payment or the evidence it 

relied on when determining the appropriate amount of the equalization payment. Accordingly, the 

record is insufficient to allow us to review this assignment of error.

Fourth, Gene assigns error to the superior court’s award of spousal support to Laurie. The 

superior court explicitly found that Laurie had need and Gene had the ability to pay and, therefore, 

awarded Laurie spousal support. Again, without a verbatim report of proceedings of the trial, we 

do not have a complete record of the evidence presented regarding the financial circumstances of 

the parties which is necessary to determine whether the superior court’s findings of fact regarding 

spousal support are supported by substantial evidence. 

Fifth, Gene assigns error to the superior court’s award of $20,000.00 in attorney fees to 

Laurie for Gene’s intransigence. The superior court’s final orders contain detailed findings of fact 

related to Gene’s credibility and intransigence. But without a record, we cannot determine whether 

the superior court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence or whether the superior court 

abused its discretion in awarding Laurie attorney fees for Gene’s intransigence. 
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II. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Both parties request attorney fees on appeal. Gene requests attorney fees on appeal under 

RAP 18.1 and RCW 26.09.140. Laurie requests attorney fees as sanctions under RAP 18.9. We 

deny Gene’s request for attorney fees on appeal and grant Laurie’s request for attorney fees.

RAP 18.1(a) allows us to award attorney fees on appeal if applicable law grants a party the 

right to recover attorney fees. RCW 26.09.140 provides that in dissolution proceedings,

Upon any appeal, the appellate court may, in its discretion, order a party to pay for 

the cost to the other party of maintaining the appeal and attorneys’ fees in addition 

to statutory costs. 

We exercise our discretion to deny Gene’s request for attorney fees under RCW 26.09.140.

Under RAP 18.9(a), we may award attorney fees as sanctions against a party who filed a 

frivolous appeal. “An appeal is frivolous when the appeal presents no debatable issues on which 

reasonable minds could differ and is so lacking in merit that there is no possibility of reversal.” 

Stiles v. Kearney, 168 Wn. App. 250, 267, 277 P.3d 9, review denied, 175 Wn.2d 1016 (2012).

Gene filed this appeal challenging the superior court’s findings and decisions in final orders 

without designating the trial record on appeal. Without designating a complete record on appeal, 

there is no reasonable possibility of reversing the superior court’s final orders. Therefore, this 

appeal was frivolous. Accordingly, we grant Laurie’s request for attorney fees as sanctions under 

RAP 18.9. 

CONCLUSION

Gene has failed to designate a record on appeal that is sufficient to allow us to review his 

assignments of error on the merits. Accordingly, we affirm the superior court’s final orders in the 
No. 58189-2-II

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dissolution proceeding. We also deny Gene’s request for attorney fees on appeal and grant 

Laurie’s request for attorney fees on appeal as sanctions under RAP 18.9.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, 

it is so ordered.

PRICE, J.

We concur:

CRUSER, C.J.

LEE, J.