alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 99-6892

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus BASHAWN LEE HANBERRY, a/k/a Bo, Defendant - Appellant.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham. Russell A. Eliason, Magistrate Judge. (CR-94-185, CA-99-13-1) Submitted: September 30, 1999 Decided: October 7, 1999 Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Bashawn Lee Hanberry, Appellant Pro Se. David Bernard Smith, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Bashawn Lee Hanberry appeals a district court order denying his motion (1) to amend his motion filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 1999); (2) to expand discovery; and (3) to serve newly discovered evidence. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the order is not appealable. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, see 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1994); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The order here appealed is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. We deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal as interlocutory. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### STATE ex rel. Chris PHILLIPS v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2011-KH-0012.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 4, 2011.

In re Phillips, Chris; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 07-93-0031; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 1540.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; *State ex rel. Glover v. State,*93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

WEIMER, J., recused.
##### 



Exhibit 31.1
 Section 302 Certification
Annual Report on Form 10-K
      a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and
procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to
the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within
those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;b) Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over
financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance
regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for
external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and
presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and
procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; andd) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial
reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants
fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is
reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial
reporting; and
 5. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit
committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
 a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal
control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the
registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; andb) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a
significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.
  /s/ Colleen B. BrownColleen B. BrownPresident and Chief Executive Officer
I 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1434 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 

896 Pittsburgh Street in Springdale, Pennsylvania, as the ‘‘Rachel Carson Post Office Building’’. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 9, 2007 

Mr. ALTMIRE (for himself, Mr. BRADY of Pennsylvania, Mr. CARNEY, Mr. 

DENT, Mr. DOYLE, Mr. ENGLISH of Pennsylvania, Mr. FATTAH, Mr. 

GERLACH, Mr. HOLDEN, Mr. KANJORSKI, Mr. PATRICK J. MURPHY of 

Pennsylvania, Mr. TIM MURPHY of Pennsylvania, Mr. MURTHA, Mr. PETERSON of Pennsylvania, Mr. PITTS, Mr. PLATTS, Ms. SCHWARTZ, Mr. 

SESTAK, and Mr. SHUSTER) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

A BILL 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 896 Pittsburgh Street in Springdale, Pennsylvania, as the ‘‘Rachel Carson Post Office Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. RACHEL CARSON POST OFFICE BUILDING. 

4 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

5 Postal Service located at 896 Pittsburgh Street in Spring6 dale, Pennsylvania, shall be known and designated as the 

7 ‘‘Rachel Carson Post Office Building’’. 


ycherry on PROD1PC64 with BILLS
2 

•HR 1434 IH

1 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg2 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

3 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

4 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Rachel Carson Post 

5 Office Building’’. 

Æ 


ycherry on PROD1PC64 with BILLS
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

**Certification Pursuant to**

**18 U.S.C. Section1350,**

**as****Adopted Pursuant to**

**Section 906 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Qof McLeodUSA Incorporated (the “Company”) for the quarterly period ended March31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the datehereof (the “Report”), I, G. Kenneth Burckhardt, as Chief Financial Officer ofthe Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuantto § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

 

(1)The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| /s/ G. Kenneth Burckhardt      |   |
|--------------------------------|--------|
| Name: G. Kenneth Burckhardt    |
| Title: Chief Financial Officer |
| Date: May 10, 2005             |

 

This certification accompanies the Report pursuant to § 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of §18of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.  A signed original of this written statementrequired by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retainedby the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or itsstaff upon request.

 

----
No. 87-747.

#### Duffy et ux. *v.*City of Arcadia.

Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.
<PAGE>

                                                                      Exhibit 23


                          INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' REPORT

Eggleston Smith P.C.
603 Pilot House Drive, Suite 400
Newport News, Virginia  23606

To the Board of Directors
Bay Banks of Virginia, Inc.
Kilmarnock, Virginia

We have audited the accompanying consolidated balance sheets of Bay Banks of
Virginia, Inc. and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2001 and 2000, and the
related consolidated statements of income, cash flows and changes in
shareholders' equity for each of the years in the three-year period ended
December 31, 2001. These financial statements are the responsibility of the
Company's management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on these
financial statements based on our audits.

We conducted our audits in accordance with auditing standards generally accepted
in the United States of America. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audits to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial
statements are free of material misstatement. An audit includes examining, on a
test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial
statements. An audit also includes assessing the accounting principles used and
significant estimates made by management, as well as evaluating the overall
financial statement presentation. We believe that our audits provide a
reasonable basis for our opinion.

In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly, in
all material respects, the consolidated financial position of Bay Banks of
Virginia, Inc. and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2001 and 2000, and the
consolidated results of their operations and their cash flows for each of the
years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2001, in conformity with
accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America.

EGGLESTON SMITH P.C.

January 31, 2002

Newport News, Virginia
Exhibit 23.1

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-148132), pertaining to the 2000
Equity Incentive Plan, the 2000 Employee Stock Purchase Plan and the 2000 Non-Employee Directors' Stock Option Plan of Rigel Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; the Registration Statement
(Form S-8 Nos. 333-51184, 333-106532, 333-125895 and 333-134622), pertaining to the 2000 Equity Incentive Plan, the 2000
Employee Stock Purchase Plan and the 2000 Non-Employee Directors' Stock Option Plan of Rigel Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; the Registration Statement (Form S-8
No. 333-72492) pertaining to the 2001 Non-Officer Equity Incentive Plan of Rigel Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; the Registration Statement (Form S-8
No. 333-107062 and 333-139516) pertaining to the 2000 Employee Stock Purchase Plan of Rigel Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; the Registration Statement
(Form S-8 No. 333-111782) pertaining to the 2000 Equity Incentive Plan of Rigel Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; and in the Registration Statements
(Form S-3 Nos. 333-148838, 333-74906, 333-87276, 333-105431, 333-106942, 333-111777,
333-112746, 333-119785 and 333-129650) and the related Prospectuses, respectively, of our reports dated March 6, 2008, with respect to the financial
statements of Rigel Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of Rigel Pharmaceuticals, Inc. included in this Annual Report
(Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31, 2007.



Palo
Alto, California
March 6, 2008

---



QuickLinks
February 25, 2014



### JUDGMENT 

## The Fourteenth Court of Appeals IN THE INTEREST OF T .T.A. AKA T.T.A . ; D.T.S.A., JR. AKA D.T.S.A . ;

D.M.D.A . AKA D.D.A . , Children NO. 14 - 13 - 00951 - CV

________________________________ This cause, an appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights signed October 2, 2013, 2012, was heard on the transcript of the record. We have inspected the record and find no error in the judgment. We o rder the judgment of the court below AFFIRMED . We further order this decision certified below for observance. We further order the mandate be issued immediately.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

626.1 

CAF 16-00999 

PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., SMITH, CENTRA, PERADOTTO, AND SCUDDER, JJ. 

 

IN THE MATTER OF MARC D. GSCHWEND, 

PETITIONER-APPELLANT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LAUREN N. DAVILA, RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT. 

 

BENNETT SCHECHTER ARCURI & WILL LLP, BUFFALO (CAROL A. CONDON OF

COUNSEL), PETITIONER-APPELLANT.

COHEN & LOMBARDO, P.C., BUFFALO (MICHELLE M. SCHWACH OF COUNSEL), FOR

RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT. 

LEIGH E. ANDERSON, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD, BUFFALO. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Niagara County (John F.

Batt, J.), dated August 21, 2015 in a proceeding pursuant to Family

Court Act article 6. The order, among other things, denied the

petition of petitioner seeking modification of a prior order of

custody by awarding him sole custody of the subject child. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: By order entered in 2008, Family Court awarded sole

custody of the parties’ child to respondent mother. Petitioner father

now appeals from an order that, inter alia, denied his petition

seeking modification of the 2008 order by awarding sole custody of the

child to him. Contrary to the father’s contention, the court’s

determination is entitled to great deference (see Eschbach v Eschbach,

56 NY2d 167, 173-174), and it will not be disturbed where, as here, it

is based upon a comprehensive weighing of the appropriate factors and

is supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record (see

Matter of Blair v DiGregorio, 132 AD3d 1375, 1376, lv denied 26 NY3d

914). We see no reason to remit the matter for an expedited hearing,

as requested by the Attorney for the Child, based upon allegations of

a change of circumstances subsequent to the entry of the order on

appeal. We instead conclude that the contentions raised in that

regard are more properly considered by the court in a petition to

modify its order (see Matter of Mayes v Laplatney, 125 AD3d 1488,

1489-1490; cf. Matter of Kennedy v Kennedy, 107 AD3d 1625, 1626). 

Entered: April 28, 2017 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
#### Jamel Ra Shaud WESCOTT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D10-1827.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Oct. 19, 2011.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Edgar Lee Elzie, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Donna A. Gerace, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Jamel Ra Shaud Wescott, challenges his convictions and sentences for grand theft, burglary of a structure, and criminal mischief on multiple grounds. As properly conceded by the State, the trial court reversibly erred in failing to conduct a Richardson1 hearing when the State failed to disclose relevant evidence until the second day of the trial, in denying Appellant’s request to recall two witnesses *950to question them about this new evidence, and in questioning the jury about whether Appellant’s booking sheet, which was located in the jury room without being admitted into evidence, influenced its verdict in this case. Accordingly, we reverse Appellant’s convictions and remand for a new trial. We affirm all other issues raised on appeal without further discussion.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

DAVIS, PADOVANO, and ROWE, JJ., concur.

1

. *Richardson v. State,*246 So.2d 771 (Fla.1971).
#### James Johnston v. W. Y. Price.

(No. 3480.)

Appeal from Callahan County.

Opinion by

Will-son, J.

§ 7 5 6. *Venue; want of jurisdiction of person may be presented by special exception, when; case stated.*Appellee sued appellant in the county court of Callahan *663to recover damages for an alleged breach of a written contract, alleging in the petition that appellant resided in Brown county, but that the contract, by its tertiis, was to be wholly performed by appellant in Callahan county. The petition sets out the written contract *in hcec verba,*and it does not show by its terms, as alleged, that it was to be performed in Callahan county. There is no stipulation whatever in the contract as to the place of its performance. Appellant excepted specially to the petition, because it showed upon its face that the county court of Callahan county did not have jurisdiction of his person, which exception was overruled, and appellee recovered judgment for damages claimed. *Held:*It is manifest from the petition that the special exception was well taken. [B. S. art. 1198.] The want of jurisdiction over the defendant’s person being thus apparent of record, could be reached by special demurrer, and was not required to be presented by a verified plea. [R. S. art. 1265; Bigham v. Talbot, 51 Tex. 450.] The court erred in overruling appellant’s special exception to the petition.

June 13, 1885.

Beversed and remanded.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED August 15, 2003 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-30846 Summary Calendar

ANTHONY W DOUGLAS, REGINA C DOUGLAS Plaintiffs - Appellants

v. CITY OF BATON ROUGE, PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE, DEPT OF PUBLIC WORKS, for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, FRED RAIFORD, Director of Department of Public Works, GERALD BOYKINS, IRYS ALLGOOD Defendants - Appellees

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana USDC No. 02-CV-172-B-M1

-------------------- Before KING, Chief Judge, and EMILIO M. GARZA and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: * In this civil rights case, plaintiffs challenge the district court’s orders setting aside an entry of default and denying their motion for appointment of counsel. Plaintiffs also complain of a denial of their summary judgment motion, however, no such motion was ever filed. Rather, it appears thatNo. 02-30846 -2- plaintiffs are challenging the order setting aside the entry of default judgement. We do not have jurisdiction to review the district court’s order setting aside the entry of default or its order denying plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment, First, plaintiffs’ notice of appeal did not evince an intent to appeal the denial of their motion for default judgment. See F ED . R. A PP . P. 4(a). Second, neither of these orders is a final order or an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292;

see also Adult Film Ass’n of America, Inc. v. Thetford , 776 F.2d 113, 115 (5th Cir. 1985). Accordingly, plaintiffs’ appeal from these orders are DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. An interlocutory order denying an application for the appointment of counsel in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case is immediately appealable. Robbins v. Maggio , 750 F.2d 405, 409-13 (5th Cir. 1985). However, a trial court is not required to appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff in a civil rights action unless there are exceptional circumstances. Ulmer v. Chancellor , 691 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 1982). This court will not reverse the district court’s denial of such a motion unless the appellants show that the ruling constituted a clear abuse of discretion. Cupit v. Jones , 835 F.2d 82, 86 (5th Cir. 1987). Plaintiffs have not shown that the district court’s order denying appointed counsel was a clear abuse of discretion.No. 02-30846 -3- Cupit , 835 F.2d at 86. The district court’s denial of their motion for appointment of counsel is therefore AFFIRMED.
#### Joseph Flower vs Sloop *L’Amiable De Cap*

Before Sam1 Pemberton D Judge

The Court being Opened Samuel Wickham Esqr was Sworn Interpreter in this Case and then Peter Simon late Master of the sa Sloop entered his Claim as on file and made Oath to it Whereupon the Attornies for the Captors insisted upon Security to be given According to Act for Double Costs, the said Peter Simon not being ready to give Security the Court is adjourned until Thursday the 9th instant at 9 a Clock A. M
#### 4140 CANAL STREET, L.L.C v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS and the New Orleans Historic Landmarks Commission.

No. 2011-C-0210.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 25, 2011.

*670In re 4140 Canal Street, L.L.C; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. K, No. 2010-3435; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-CA-1038.

Denied.
#### Jane L. Turner v. J. W. Gibson, Adm’r.

(No. 3302.)

Appeal from Parker County.

Opinion by

Hurt, J.

§ 714. *Illegality of contract cannot be inquired into unless pleaded; case stated.*E. D. Sykes, deceased, and appellant, were husband and wife, and there was pending between them a suit for divorce. They entered into a written agreement partitioning their property, and in consideration of certain of the property received by appellant she executed her notes to her husband'for $400. It was stipulated in the agreement that the husband, E. D. Sykes, the defendant in the divorce suit, would not resist the granting of the divorce. This agreement was filed in the divorce suit, and was made the decree of the court, and the divorce was granted. E. D. Sykes afterwards died, and this suit was brought by appellee, his administrator, to recover the amount of said notes, and judgment was rendered for appellee. It is insisted by the appellant that the consideration for said notes was illegal, the same *628being contrary to public policy, in that it was for the purpose of obtaining a divorce. There is no plea setting up the illegality of the contract, and hence this question cannot be considered. If appellant desired to attack the notes because the consideration for the same was illegal, the facts showing the illegality should have been set forth in her answer, it- not appearing from the petition that the contract was illegal.

May 20, 1885.

§ 715. *Res adjudicata.*The agreement in pursuance of which the notes were executed by appellant, having been made the decree of the court in the divorce suit, the validity of the contract is *res adjudicata.*Whether the stipulation that the husband would not resist the wife’s suit for divorce rendered the contract illegal, cannot now be inquired into, because that contract has been merged into a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction. It is not pretended that the judgment was obtained by fraud.

Affirmed.
#### C. L. Caspary v. Greely-Burnham Grocer Co.

(No. 2314.)

October 27, 1886.

Error from Smith County.

H. Chilton, counsel for plaintiff in error.

No .counsel appeared for defendant in error.

Opinion by

White, P. J.

§175. *Garnishment; insufficient writ of, to support judgment by defaidt.*Defendants in error having a judgment against Owens & Arthur, garnished plaintiff in error. Plaintiff in error failing to answer the writ of garnishment, judgment by default was rendered against him January 6, 1886. The writ of garnishment was dated November 19, 1885, and required the garnishee to answer on January 4, 18.85. *Held,*the writ is fatally defective because it requires the garnishee to answer on an impossible date, a date that had elapsed prior to the issuance of the writ. The judgment by default is not supported by the service of such writ. [R. S. arts. 188, 189; Wright v. Wilmot, 22 Tex. 398; Covington v. Burleson, 28 Tex. 370; W. & W. Con. Rep. §§ 83, 89, 520, 841.]

Reversed and remanded.
609 A.2d 431

#### IN THE MATTER OF LEAH D. DADE, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW.

July 30, 1992.

*323ORDER

LEAH D. DADE of PISCATAWAY, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1990, having pleaded guilty to second-degree theft by deception in violation of *N.J.S.A.*2C:20-4, and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that pursuant to *Rule*l:20-6(b), LEAH D. DADE is temporarily suspended from the practice of law pending the final resolution of ethics proceedings against her, effective immediately and until the further order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that LEAH D. DADE be restrained and enjoined from practicing law during the period of her suspension; and it is further

ORDERED that LEAH D. DADE comply with Administrative Guideline No. 23 of the Office of Attorney Ethics dealing with suspended attorneys.