alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### STATE ex rel. Keith MESSIAH v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-0550.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 4, 2011.

In re Messiah, Keith; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 295-139; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-K-1641.

Denied.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-12-00549-CV

In re Honorable Jennifer Tharp, Criminal District Attorney of Comal County, Texas

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FROM COMAL COUNTY

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The State’s application for emergency temporary stay and petition for writ of

mandamus are denied. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a).

__________________________________________

J. Woodfin Jones, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Jones, Justices Pemberton and Rose

Filed: August 16, 2012
#### COMMUNITY PRESS, LLC d/b/a Central City News v. CH2M HILL, INC.

No. 2012-C-0572.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 20, 2012.

In re CH2M Hill, Inc.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 589-971; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CA 0682.

Denied.
### IN THE UNI TED STAT ES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCU IT

No. 11-30002 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee

v. HERMAN TURLICH, JR., Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana USDC No. 2:02-CR-212-1

Before BENAVIDES, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Herman Turlich, Jr., appeals from t h e j udgment of the district court revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to 24 months of i mprisonment. He argues that the district court erred by revoking hi s supervised release instead of ordering him into a drug treatment program. The district court permissibly found that Turlich possessed and used controlled substances. See United States v. Smith , 978 F.2d 181, 182 (5th Cir. 1992). Unless the di s t ri c t c o urt found that he was eligible to be ordered into U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s

F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D Sep tem ber 1 , 20 11 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk

Purs uant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5 , the cour t hasd ete rm inedt hat this op inion sho uld not * be publ ish ed and is not pr ece dent excep t unde r the lim ite d cir cum st ance s se t forth in 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5 .4. Case: 11-30002 Document: 00511590279 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/01/2011No. 11-30002

drug treatment under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), revocation of supervised release was mandatory. § 3583(g)(1). Turlich committed numerous violations of the terms of his supervised release, t w i c e t e s t ing positive for drug use, twice failing to report to his probation officer, and inc u r ri n g a state court conviction of simple criminal damage to property. He did no t m e rely fail a drug test. The district court did not err by finding that no exc e p t i o n w a s warranted pursuant to § 3583(d). Because the district court did not apply the exception, the mandatory revocation of supervised release was not an abuse of discretion. United States v. Grandlund , 71 F.3d 507, 509 (5th Cir. 1995). AFFIRMED.

2 Case: 11-30002 Document: 00511590279 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/01/2011
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1505 Referred in Senate (RFS)]

  1st Session
                                H. R. 1505

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 16, 2007

 Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Environment and 
                              Public Works

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
   To designate the United States courthouse located at 131 East 4th 
   Street in Davenport, Iowa, as the ``James A. Leach United States 
                             Courthouse''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DESIGNATION.

    The United States courthouse located at 131 East 4th Street in 
Davenport, Iowa, shall be known and designated as the ``James A. Leach 
United States Courthouse''.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

    Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other 
record of the United States to the United States courthouse referred to 
in section 1 shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``James A. Leach 
United States Courthouse''.

            Passed the House of Representatives May 15, 2007.

            Attest:

                                            LORRAINE C. MILLER,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
exhibit_10-4.htm


    EXHIBIT
10.4

     


    AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO
AGREEMENT

    


    This Amendment No. 2 (the “Amendment”)
to the Agreement, by and between Walco International, Inc., a Delaware
corporation (the “Company”) and Kathy C. Hassenpflug (the “Executive”) is
entered into as of the 31st day of December, 2008 (“Effective
Date”).

    


    WHEREAS, the Company and Executive
previously entered into that certain Agreement dated March 10, 2000 (the
“Agreement”), as amended by that certain Non-Competition Addendum dated as of
September 30, 2005, wherein Employee agreed to certain confidentiality,
non-solicitation, and non-compete obligations contained therein;
and

    


    WHEREAS,
the Company and the Executive desire to amend certain terms of the Agreement as
set forth herein;

    


    NOW THEREFORE, for good and valuable
consideration the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the
parties hereto agree as follows:

    


    1.           Capitalized
Terms.  All capitalized terms used, but not defined herein,
shall have the same meaning as prescribed in the Employment
Agreement.

    


    2.           Amendment to Severance
Benefits Sections of the Agreement.  The last paragraph of the
Severance Benefits section of the Agreement is hereby deleted and replaced in
its entirety by the following:

    


    The
following shall constitute Good Reason for termination by the Executive: (i) a
material diminution in the nature or scope of the Executive's powers, duties or
responsibilities without the Executive's prior consent; provided, however, that
any diminution of the business of the Company or any of its Affiliates,
including without limitation the sale or transfer of any or all of the assets of
the Company or any of its Affiliates, shall not constitute "Good Reason", or
(ii) any other material breach of this Agreement.  If the Executive
believes Good Reason exists for terminating this Agreement, she shall give the
Company written notice of the acts or omissions constituting Good Reason within
90 days of the initial existence of such acts or omissions, and no termination
of this Agreement shall be effective unless and until the Company fails to cure
such acts or omissions within 30 days after receiving the written notice and the
Executive separates from service within two years following the initial
existence of the acts or omissions giving rise to Good Reason.

    


    3.           Entire
Agreement.  This Amendment constitutes the sole and entire
agreement of the parties with respect to the amendment of the Agreement;
supersedes all prior verbal and written understandings and agreements between
the parties relating to its subject matter; and may not be modified except in a
writing signed by both parties.

    


    IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned
have executed this Amendment as of the Effective Date.



    
      	 EXECUTIVE  	 	 WALCO
      INTERNATIONAL, INC.
	 	 	 	 
	/s/
      Kathy C. Hassenpflug	 	 By:	
              /s James C.
      Robison

            
	Kathy C.
      Hassenpflug	 	Name:	   James C.
      Robison
	 	 	Title:	  President and
    C.E.O.
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1631 Introduced in House (IH)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1631

   To amend section 245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act to 
     eliminate the deadline for classification petition and labor 
                         certification filings.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 21, 2007

  Mr. Rangel introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                       Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend section 245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act to 
     eliminate the deadline for classification petition and labor 
                         certification filings.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ELIMINATION OF DEADLINE.

    (a) In General.--Section 245(i)(1) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1255(i)(1)) is amended--
            (1) in subparagraph (A), by adding ``and'' at the end;
            (2) in subparagraph (B)--
                    (A) in clause (i), by striking ``204 that'' and all 
                that follows through the semicolon and inserting 
                ``204;''; and
                    (B) in clause (ii), by striking ``212(a)(5)(A) 
                that'' and all that follows through ``and'' at the end 
                and inserting ``212(a)(5)(A);''; and
            (3) by striking subparagraph (C).
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
take effect as if included in the enactment of the Legal Immigration 
Family Equity Act (as enacted into law by Public Law 106-553).
                                 <all>
```
#### Geo. L. Porter v. Henry Heath.

(No. 1650.)

Appeal from Gonzales County.

Opinion by

Hurt, J.

§ 124. *Evidence; must be objected to in trial court.*A claim verified by affidavit as an account under article 2266, Revised Statutes, but which claim was not an account within the meaning’ of that article, was read in evidence, without objection, on the trial. *Held,*that,, although it was incompetent evidence, objection to it cannot be entertained in this court, it not having been objected to in the court below.

§ 125. *Cotton factor; contract by agent of; rules in relation to sales by; liability of.*/ Porter was a cotton factor in Houston. ) Walker, his drummer and agent for soliciting cotton, contracted with Heath that,, if Heath would ship his cotton to Porter, he, Porter, would advance $45 per bale thereon, and would hold the cotton until Heath ordered it sold. \ Under this contract, Heath shipped his cotton to Porter, and received the advance *115upon it. Portei- sold the cotton without any order to do go from Heath, and for less than the same grade of cotton sold for that season. This suit was brought by Porter against Heath upon an account for goods and money advanced. Heath pleaded in reconvention for damages sustained by reason of the sale of his cotton without his orders. Heath recovered judgment. *Held,*1. Walker, under his general powers as agent of Porter, had authority to bind Porter by the contract made with Heath. 2. Custom and usage will not control the express stipulations of a contract. Heath was entitled to recover the highest price that cotton sold for that season, at any time after Porter sold the cotton. 4. Porter was not entitled to storage for the cotton, nor to interest on the money he advanced upon it. When the contract is that the goods are not to be sold until ordered by the consignor, the factor cannot sell without orders, and if he sells without being ordered, at a loss, he is liable to an action for breach of contract.' If he has made advances on the goods, he has no right to sell without- notice to the consignor, and calling on him for reimbursement of such advances, and the existence of a usage to sell to pay advances, will not control an express contract to not sell until orders received from the consignor. Porter should have notified Heath that he intended to sell the cotton. Notifying Heath that he had overdrawn on the cotton, and requesting him to refund the amount overdrawn, was not sufficient notice of intention to sell. [Parker v. Patterson, 15 Penn. St. 229; Bell v. Palmer, 6 Conn. 128.]

March 12, 1884.

Affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-6163

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

ARTHUR LEE TILLMAN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen, District

Judge. (CR-92-270, CA-95-398-3-MU)

Submitted: June 20, 1996 Decided: July 1, 1996

Before HALL, WILKINS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Arthur Lee Tillman, Appellant Pro Se. Robert Jack Higdon, Jr.,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina,

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court's order granting the

Government's motion for an extension of time in which to respond to

Appellant's 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988) motion. We deny a certificate

of appealability and dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction

because the order is not appealable. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1988);

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337

U.S. 541 (1949). The order here appealed is neither a final order

nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order.

We deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal

as interlocutory. We deny Appellant's motion for the preparation of

transcripts at the Government's expense and dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011) 1 

Statement of ALITO, J. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

ROBERT HUBER ET UX. v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPERIOR 

COURT OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE DIVISION

No. 10–388. Decided March 21, 2011 

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. 

 Statement of JUSTICE ALITO, with whom THE CHIEF 

JUSTICE, JUSTICE SCALIA, and JUSTICE THOMAS join,

respecting the denial of certiorari. 

Our cases recognize a limited exception to the Fourth

Amendment’s warrant requirement for searches of businesses in “closely regulated industries.” See, e.g., New 

York v. Burger, 482 U. S. 691, 699–703 (1987) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The thinking is that, other

things being equal, the “expectation of privacy in commercial premises” is significantly less than the “expectation in

an individual’s home.” Id., at 700. And where a business 

operates in an industry with a “long tradition of close 

government supervision”—liquor dealers and pawnbrokers 

are classic examples—the expectation of privacy becomes 

“particularly attenuated.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks

omitted).

In this case, a New Jersey appellate court applied this 

doctrine to uphold a warrantless search by a state environmental official of Robert and Michelle Huber’s backyard. No. A–5874–07T3, 2010 WL 173533, *9–*10 (Super.

Ct. N. J., App. Div., Jan. 20, 2010) (per curiam). The 

Hubers’ residential property contains wetlands protected 

by a New Jersey environmental statute. See N. J. Stat. 

Ann. §13:9B–1 et seq. (West 2003 and Supp. 2010). According to the court below, the presence of these wetlands 

brought the Hubers’ yard “directly under the regulatory

arm” of the State “just as much” as if the yard had been 
2 HUBER v. NEW JERSEY DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL 

 PROTECTION 

Statement of ALITO, J. 

involved in a “regulated industry.” 2010 WL 173533, *10. 

This Court has not suggested that a State, by imposing

heavy regulations on the use of privately owned residential property, may escape the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. But because this case comes to us on 

review of a decision by a state intermediate appellate 

court, I agree that today’s denial of certiorari is appropriate. See this Court’s Rule 10. It does bear mentioning,

however, that “denial of certiorari does not constitute an 

expression of any opinion on the merits.” Boumediene v. 

Bush, 549 U. S. 1328, 1329 (2007) (Stevens and KENNEDY, 

JJ., statement respecting denial of certiorari).
<PAGE>
 
                                   EXHIBIT 23

                               CONSENT OF KPMG LLP
<PAGE>
 
                         INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT


The Board of Directors
Peoples Bancorp, Inc.


We consent to incorporation by reference in the registration statement no.
333-29971 on Form S-8 of Peoples Bancorp, Inc. of our report dated January 25,
1999, relating to the consolidated statements of condition of Peoples Bancorp,
Inc. and subsidiaries as of December 31, 1998, and 1997, and the related
consolidated statements of income, stockholders' equity and cash flows for each
of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 1998, which report
appears in the December 31, 1998 Form 10-K of Peoples Bancorp, Inc.



/s/ KPMG LLP

Short Hills, New Jersey
March 25, 1999
#### Lewis BROWN v. James LEBLANC, Secretary of Department of Corrections, and Burl Cain, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.

No. 2011-CI-0096.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 14, 2011.

In re Brown, Lewis; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 566,387; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 CA 1602.

Denied.
IIB 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1617 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 15, 2007 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 561 Kingsland Avenue in University City, 

Missouri, as the ‘‘Harriett F. Woods Post Office Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with BILLS

2 

HR 1617 RFS

1 SECTION 1. HARRIETT F. WOODS POST OFFICE BUILDING. 

2 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

3 Postal Service located at 561 Kingsland Avenue in Univer4 sity City, Missouri, shall be known and designated as the 

5 ‘‘Harriett F. Woods Post Office Building’’. 

6 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg7 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

8 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

9 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Harriett F. Woods 

10 Post Office Building’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives May 14, 2007. 

Attest: LORRAINE C. MILLER, 

Clerk. 

mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with BILLS
No. 87-655.

#### Goldberg *v.*United States Department of State.

C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.
#### In re Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 2012-ADMIN-0157.

No. 2012-OB-0716.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 27, 2012.

In re Goldston, Kevin; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of the Disciplinary Board, No. 2012-ADMIN-0157.

Not considered. See Supreme Court Rule XIX, Section 11(A).
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 01-30528

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ISAAC KNAPPER, also known as Jerry,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 99-CR-252-K

--------------------

December 12, 2001

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Isaac Knapper appeals his conviction following a guilty plea

for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine

hydrochloride in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1) and

money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956. He also

challenges the sentence imposed by the district court following

his conviction. 

Knapper argues that the district court abused its discretion

in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. As Knapper

concedes, a defendant has no absolute right to unilaterally
No. 01-30528

-2-

withdraw a previously entered guilty plea. United States v.

Brewster, 137 F.3d 853, 857 (5th Cir. 1998). Knapper has never

asserted his innocence as to the underlying offenses of

conviction. Rather, he asserts that he is innocent of the facts

which form the basis for the district court’s enhancement of his

base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines due to his

leadership role in the offense. Based on a totality of the

circumstances, United States v. Badger, 925 F.2d 101, 104 (5th

Cir. 1991), the district court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Knapper’s motion. See United States v. Grant, 117 F.3d

788, 789 (5th Cir. 1997).

Knapper also challenges the district court’s application of

the Sentencing Guidelines and the resultant sentence. Knapper

made an informed and knowing waiver of his right to appeal except

in the case where the sentence imposed exceeded the statutory

maximum or where the sentence constituted an upward departure

from the guideline range. Because neither of those conditions

are implicated by the sentence imposed by the district court,

this court is precluded from reviewing this issue. See United

States v. Gonzalez, 259 F.3d 355, 358 (5th Cir. 2001).

AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> UT
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                              <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                    12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                     DEC-31-1998
<BOOK-VALUE>                     PER-BOOK
<TOTAL-NET-UTILITY-PLANT>         502,243
<OTHER-PROPERTY-AND-INVEST>             0
<TOTAL-CURRENT-ASSETS>             97,020
<TOTAL-DEFERRED-CHARGES>          118,997
<OTHER-ASSETS>                      1,876
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                    720,136
<COMMON>                            5,848
<CAPITAL-SURPLUS-PAID-IN>         102,817
<RETAINED-EARNINGS>                54,275
<TOTAL-COMMON-STOCKHOLDERS-EQ>    162,940
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>              35,000
<PREFERRED>                         2,134
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-NET>              194,710
<SHORT-TERM-NOTES>                 97,000
<LONG-TERM-NOTES-PAYABLE>               0
<COMMERCIAL-PAPER-OBLIGATIONS>          0
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-CURRENT-PORT>       8,876
<PREFERRED-STOCK-CURRENT>               0
<CAPITAL-LEASE-OBLIGATIONS>             0
<LEASES-CURRENT>                        0
<OTHER-ITEMS-CAPITAL-AND-LIAB>    219,476
<TOT-CAPITALIZATION-AND-LIAB>     720,136
<GROSS-OPERATING-REVENUE>         299,070
<INCOME-TAX-EXPENSE>               12,256
<OTHER-OPERATING-EXPENSES>        249,836
<TOTAL-OPERATING-EXPENSES>        262,092
<OPERATING-INCOME-LOSS>            36,978
<OTHER-INCOME-NET>                      0
<INCOME-BEFORE-INTEREST-EXPEN>     36,978
<TOTAL-INTEREST-EXPENSE>           19,067
<NET-INCOME>                       17,911
<PREFERRED-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>         3,089
<EARNINGS-AVAILABLE-FOR-COMM>      14,822
<COMMON-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>           16,667
<TOTAL-INTEREST-ON-BONDS>          15,218
<CASH-FLOW-OPERATIONS>             11,858
<EPS-PRIMARY>                        6.34
<EPS-DILUTED>                        6.34