## IN TH E C OU RT OF C RI MIN A L A PP EA LS O F T E XAS

PD-0961-07
ORLANDO SANCHEZ , Appellant

v. TH E ST AT E O F TE XA S
On Discre tionary

Review of Ca se 13-03- 698-CR of the Th ir te e nth Court of Ap pe a ls, Hi da lg o Co unty
W O M ACK , J., delive red the opinion of the Court, in w hich P RICE , J OHN S ON , K EAS L ER , H ERV EY , H O L C O MB , and C OCHRAN

, JJ., joined. K

EL L ER , P.J., c oncurred in the judgment. M

EYERS , J., did not participate.
The issues in this case a

rise fr om an indictment’s alleg ation that a murde r wa s committed by a “ma nner a nd means to the grand jury unknown.” One issue is whe ther the c ourt’s cha rg e that conta ined such languag e wa s in error when the re wa s a

qu e sti on wh e the r t he mann e r a

nd me ans wa s a c tua lly

unkn own. In d e c idi ngthi s( Sanc hez - 2)

H ic k s v . S ta te , 86 0 S.W
. 2 d 41 9 , 42 4 (T ex. C r. A p p . 19 9 3 ). 1 issue, we must addre ss whether Hi c k s v . S tate , the ca se upon which the Court of Appea ls relied, 1 is both applicable a

nd controllingfor “ unknown” a lleg ations. We decide that the Hicks rule is no longe r viable. Another issue is whe ther a n err or involving suc h a “ma nner a nd means to the grand jury unknown” a lleg ation require s reve rsal whe n it affe cted two of four a lternative the ories pre sented in the jury

char g e. We find err or in the jury char g e, which w e hold to have be en har mless. We rever se the jud g me nt o f t

he Court of Ap pe a ls a

nd a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt . I . Ba ckground A. Summary

of F a c ts Two guests in a motel room hea rd a w oman scre amingin an adjoiningroom and c alled the police. When two police of fice rs ar rived on the sc ene, the y

hear d a stun gun g o off inside the room in which the woma

n had scr eame d. The off

icer s immediately

enter ed the r oom and discovere d the appe llant, Orlando Sanc hez, lying ne x t to the dead body of his g irlfriend. She w as
nake d. He r n e c k a

nd fa c e we re br

uis e d, and

the re we redis tin c tiv e mark s o f a stun gun on the sk in of her neck a nd chest. Police found a

stun gun in the r oom and re cover ed its box from inside a cowboy hat in the appe llant’s truck, whic h was pa rked in fr ont of the room. The windows in the
room wer e painted shut, a nd the only

door to the room wa s barr icade d by a piec e of f

urniture. Both the r oom and the truc k wer e re g istered in the a ppellant’s name
.( Sanc hez - 3) B. Indictment The a ppellant was indicte d for murde r. In four disjunctive pa ragraphs, the indictment alleg ed the a

ppellant did then and ther e: (1 ) “ int e nti on a lly

and kn ow ing ly

c a us e the de ath o f [the vic tim ] by c ho kin ghe r w ithhis ha nd ;” (2 ) “ int e nti on a lly

and kn ow ing ly

c a us e the de ath o f [the vic tim ] by mann e r a nd me ans to the Gr and Juro rs unkn own;” (3 ) “ wi th i nte nt t o c a

us e se ri ou s b od ily

inj ur y to a n in div idu a l . . . c omm it a n a c t c le arl y d an g e r o u s to huma

nli f e , to - w it : b y

p la c in ga s tu nguno nth e p e r s o no f

th e s a id [v ic ti m] , that cause d the death of said [victim ]; ” and (4 ) “ wi th i nte nt t o c a

us e se ri ou s b od ily

inj ur y to [the vic tim ], c omm it a n a c t c le arl y dang erous to human life , to-wit: by manner and mea ns to the Grand Juror[s] unknown, that cause d the death of said [victim ].”

C. Evidence of

Manner and Mea ns At trial, Dr. F ulge ncio Salinas was the only medical e x pert to testify . He ha d written “asphy x ia by strangulation” on the autopsy repor t under c ause of

death, a nd he testified that the
cause of the victim’s death was asphy x ia – the lac k of oxyg en to the bra in. There was some c onfusion in terminology . Dr. Salinas re peate dly stated that the c ause of death wa s “asphy

x ia.” How ever , he also noted that he could not conc lusively deter mine what
cause d that asphy

x ia: manual strangulation or the stun gun. Th e a pp e lla nt a rgue d th at D r. Sa lin a s c ou ld n ot d e te rm ine the c a us e of de ath. Th e State argued that he c ould determine the cause of death – simpl y not what ca

used that ca

use of de ath.( Sanc hez - 4)

There was much disagree ment about whethe r Dr. Salinas kne w or did not know what “killed” the victim. Instead of dif

fer entiating“ca

use of de ath” f

rom “manne r and me ans” of death, both sides focuse d on what “a ctually kill[ ed]” the victim and how she die d, makingit unclear whether they
wer e pointing to a

medical r eason or

a murde r we apon. Dr. Salinas testified: The c ause of

death in this individual is asphy x ia. And I think it’s asphy

x ia by strangulation. * * * So any time you apply

pressure here in this particular re g ion and squee ze – that’s all you need to do. Just s queeze in this are a bec ause the vessels that take blood up [ to] the br a in a re loc ate d r ight t

he re . T he y

are ve ry su pe rf ic ia l and ra the r e a sy to s qu e e ze a

nd to block the oxyg en g oing to the br ain. You ca n also do another

thing. You c an also c over their mouth and their nose . It happens in babie s a lot. And that’s anothe r wa y you can cause asphy

x ia. So there [are ] several mec hanisms – in fact seve ral wa y s of doing asphy x ia strangulation. Those ar e the main one s . . . . But all the thing s Ifound we re consistent with an asphy

x ia by strangulation. Ok ay . F ir st o f a ll, the c a

us e of de ath i s b y

a sp hy xia .
. . the str angulatio n c ome s in later. [ S T AT E ] : Yo um eanb y h an d – s tran gu l at i o nb y

h an d – o r b y ch o k i n g? [ W IT N E S S ] : B y h an d

o r b y th e ar m . . . . S o m e t i m e s yo uc and o i tth i s w ay. S o m e t i m e s yo uc and o i tb y p utt i n gth i s ar o un d th e ml i k e th i s . S o th e r e [ ar e ] s e v e r a l w ays of strang ling somebody . . . . Isaid by the hand be cause that’s usually the most common thi ngthat ha

pp e ns . My conclusion, once ag ain, is asphy x ia. That’s the main thing, a sphy x ia. The la ck of oxy g en to the bra in that kills the per son. Whether it was ca used by strangulation or c a us e d b y stun gun I ’m no t 10 0 p e rc e nt s ur e wh ic h o ne did it b ut t he c a us e of de ath i s asphy x ia. She probably

died of a sphy

x ia. She died of a sphy

x ia and I think it was by strangulation. . . . And may be the stun gun had somethingto do with it. . . . I ’m not sure if the stun gun actua lly

killed her. . . . B ut Iknow she died of asphy x ia by strangulation and the stun gun was used.”( Sanc hez - 5)

S a n c h e z v . S ta te , 2 2 1 S .W .3 d 7 6 9 , 7 7 4 (T e x . A p p .– C o rp u s C h risti 2 0 0 7 ). 2 I d. , at 77 4 , ci t i ng G r i

f f i n v Uni t ed St at es , 50 2 U
. S. 46 , 59
- 6 0 (19 9 1 ). 3 D. J ury C h ar ge The jury was c harg ed in the disjunctive, with the same f our alter native methods of murde r that the indictment alleg ed. The appellant objec ted to the two “manne r and me ans unknown” theories be cause the alleg ations were unsupported by the evidenc e pre sented at trial and we re thus based on insuffic ient evidenc e to convict. The trial court ove rruled the objection. The a ppellant was c onvicted of murde r and se ntence d to six ty -eight y ear s in prison. I I . Co ur t of Ap pe a ls On appe al to the Thirtee nth Court of Appea ls, the appellant ra ised four points of e rror . The fir st two challeng ed the leg al and f actua l sufficienc y

of the e vidence to support the jury ’s
ve rd ic t of guil ty . T he Court

of Ap pe a ls h e ld t

hat, a s to the fi rs t of

the fo ur a lte rn ativ e the or ie s, the evidenc e wa s “both leg ally and fa ctually

sufficie nt to prove appe llant had the spec ific intent to cause the dec edent’ s death a nd that she met her

death by chokingat the hands of

appellant.” 2 The suff iciency of evide nce to c onvict has not bee n made a n issue for discr etionary

revie w. Th e a pp e lla nt a rgue d, in h is f

ourt h p oint of e rr or , th at th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in su bmi tti ngto the jury the alleg ations in the second a nd fourth par agraphs of

the indictment – the “unknown”
manner and mea ns para g raphs. In its discussion on j ury -cha rg e er ror, the Court of

Appea ls stated, “T h er e are two b ro ads ce n ar i o s i nwh i cha t ri al j u d ge c o m m i t s ch ar ge e rr o r w h enau th o ri z i n g a conviction base d upon multipl e theor ies of committing the sa me offe nse.” It cited Gr iff in for the 3 rule that c harg e er

ror e x ists when “the tria l judge authorizes the jury to convict on a theor

y of conviction that is leg ally

permissible, but

there is insufficient evidenc e to support a c onviction( Sanc hez - 6)

I d. , at 77 5 , ci t i ng G riffi n , 50 2 U
. S., at 60 (emp hasi s i n ori gi nal ). 4 H i cks , 86 0 S.W
. 2 d , at 42 4 (“ W hen an i nd i ct m ent al l eges t hat t he m anner or m eans of i nf l i ct i ng t he i njury 5 i s un kn own an d t he evi dence at t r i al does not es t abl i s h t he t y pe of wea po n u s ed, a pr i ma f aci e s howi ng i s made t hat the w e a p o n w a s u n k n o w n to the gr a n d ju ry. M ats on v St at e, 8 1 9 S .W .2 d 8 3 9 , 8 4 7 (T e x . C r. A p p . 1 9 9 1 ). H o w e v e r, if t he evi d ence at t ri al s ho ws what ob ject was us ed t o i nf l i ct t he i njury , t hen t he Stat e m ust pro ve t hat t he grand jury used d ue d i l i gence i n at t em p t i ng t o ascert ai n t he weap o n us ed
. ”). un d er th atth eo ry . ” Ind et erm i n i n g wh et h er th e t ri al ev i d en ce wa s s u ff i ci en tt o warr an ta c h ar ge 4 on the “unknown” theories, the Court r elied on the r ule stated in Hi c k

s v . S tatethat when a

n
unkn own a lle g atio n is ma de in a n in dic tme nt, the burd e n f a lls to t he State e ith e r t o p re se nt a prima facie c a se at tr ia l th at th e mann e r a nd me ans we re a c tua lly

unkn own, or

to p ro ve (u su a lly by testimony) that the grand jury used due dilig ence to asce rtain the manne r and me ans of de ath. 5 Th e a pp e lla nt a rgue d th at th e mann e r a

nd me ans the a

pp e lla nt e mpl oye d w e re no t a c tua lly unknown, and that the jur y char g e wa s err oneous in authorizing c onviction on such a theor y . The State, howeve r, ar gued that a prima facie case was made that the manner and mea ns were indeed unknown – since only

the ca use of de ath was known – and thus the cha rg e wa s not errone ous. The Court of Appe als agree d with the appellant a nd found that the trial c ourt err ed whe n it submi tted the alter

native methods of murde r to the jury . The Court held that the ma nner a nd
me ans of de ath h a d b e e n e sta

bli sh e d at tr ia l, a

nd thu s, the tw o “ mann e r a

nd me ans unkn own to the grand jury” par agraphs we re e rrone ously included. Relying on Hi c k s, the Court held that since the State f

ailed to prove either pr ongof the Hi c k s test, then there was insuffic ient evidenc e t o s u b m i tth e “ m ann e r

an d m e an s unkn o w nt o th e g r an d j ur y” th e o r i e s t o th e j ur

y.( Sanc hez - 7)

See A lm a n za v . S ta te , 68 6 S.W
. 2 d 15 7 , 17 1 (T ex. C r. A p p . 19 8 4 ). 6 H ut ch v. St at e, 92 2 S.W
. 2 d 16 6 , 17 0
- 7 1 (T ex. C r. A p p . 19 9 6 ), ci t i ng A rlin e v . S ta te , 721 S. W
. 2d 348, 351 7 (T ex. C r. A p p . 19 8 6 ).

H ut ch, 922 S. W
. 2d, a t 171. 8 “ ( 1) D oes a t r i al c ou r t c ommi t e r r or by i n s t r u ct i n g t h e j u r y on t h e St at e’ s a l t er n at [ i v ] e t h eor y of mu r der by 9 a ‘ man n er a n d me an s t o t h e g r an d j u r y u n k n own ’ w h er e t h e s ol e medi ca l e x per t t es t i f i ed r epe at edl y t h at h e cou l d n ot det er mi n e t h e ex ac t ma n n er a n d me an s of de at h by a s ph y x i at i on ? ( 2) W h en a s s es s i n g c h ar g e er r or , i s a c ou r t of appeal s f r ee t o re wei gh an d re i nt er pret t he evi dence adduced at t r i al ? (3) M ay an appel l at e c our t us e t he H i cks ru le to e v a lua te w h e the r a ‘m a n n e r a n d m e a n s u n k n o w n to the gr a n d ju ry’ the o ry w a s p ro p e rly su b m itt e d to the ju ry a n d , i f so , ha s the T h irte e n th C o u rt o f A p p e a ls a p p lied the ru le c o rr e c tly? (4 ) In the a lter n a tive , ca n a n e rr o n e o u sly subm i t t ed al t ernat [i v]e t heo ry be harmf ul when t he revi ewing co urt f i nd s t he evi d ence suf

f i ci ent t o s up p o rt t he c on v i c t i on u n de r a n ot h e r s u bm i t t e d t h e or y ?” The Court found that the a ppellant suffe red “ some harm” as a r esult and re verse d the 6 conviction. The Court re lied on Hu tc h v . S tatein assessingwhether

“any harm” had bee n

7 suffe red, a

nd considere d “1) the char g e itself; 2) the state of the e vidence , including c ontested issues and the we ight of

the probative evidenc e; 3) a rguments of counse l; and, 4) any other rele vant information re veale d by the re cord of

the trial as a

whole.” 8 The c ommon denominator in applying the four Hutch fac tors to the fac ts was the ca use of death. The State stressed that while una nimity is require d to prove that the a ppellant murder ed the victim, howhe did so nee d not require unanimity . The de fense protested that Dr . Salinas was unsure of the ca use of de ath and wa s “spec ulating by saying she was stra

ng led.” We gr anted the State’ s petition for revie w on four grounds. The fir st three pe rtain to the 9 “manne r and me ans unknown” char g e and its applica ble law, que stioning the e ffica cy of Hicks
. The four th pertains to har

m suffer ed by

the appe llant as a re sult of the err oneous jury charg e.( Sanc hez - 8)

H i cks , 8 6 0 S .W .2 d , at 4 2 4 ; s ee al s o M ats on , 819 S. W
. 2d, a t 847. 10 Ex par t e Col eman , 94 0 S.W
. 2 d 96 , 98 n. 1 (T ex. C r. A p p . 19 9 6 ). 11 R osal es , 4 S. W
. 3d, a t 231. 12 M a lik v . S ta te , 95 3 S.W
. 2 d , 23 4 , 24 0 (T ex. C r. A p p . 19 9 7 ). 13 S e e g e n e ra lly B e rm u d e z v . S ta te , N o . 13
- 0 5
- 2 4 6
- C R , 20 0 7 T ex. A p p . LE X IS 2 8 0 9 (T ex. A p p . – C o rpus 14 Chr i s t i 2007) ( “ T h e cou r t of c r i mi n al a ppea l s , h owe v er , h as e x pr es s l y di s av owe d t h e ‘ du e di l i g en ce ’ r u l e ci t ed by a p p e llan t” ); F a g a n v . S ta te , 89 S.W
. 3 d 24 5 , 24 9 (T ex. A p p . – T exarkana 2 0 0 2 ) ( “[ T ]he r ul e has l o st i t s und erpinni ng I I I . The Hicks Rul e We beg in with the third gr ound for r eview to de termine whe ther Hicks is the controlling
case in dealingwith char g e er rors that stem fr om indictments which alleg e “unknown” manne r and mea ns. The State questions both the use of the Hicks rule to eva luate unknown manne r and means, a nd the Court of Appe als’ application of it. The appellant a rgues that the Hicks ru le is still viable. A. Hicks and its prog eny In Hicks , this Court held that “when a n indictment alleg es that the manne r or mea ns of inflicting the injury

is unknown” the burde n falls to the State either to present a pr im a fa c ie 10
case that the evidenc e wa s unknown to the g rand jury , or to “incur ... the additional burde n of showingthat the grand jury used due dilig ence in trying to de termine same .” 11 In Ro sa le s v . S tate , this Court declare d that “the r ule in case s like Hicks is no longe r viable in light of

our dec ision in Ma lik,” a ca se in which we held that “suff iciency of the 12
e vid e nc e sh ou ld b e me a sure d b y the e le me nts of

the of fe ns e a s d e fi ne d b y

the hy po the tic a lly
corr ect jury

char g e for

the ca se.” 13 Whil e the major ity

of the c ourts of appe als follow Rosales and Ma lik i nci t i n g Hicks as the forme r, “disavow ed” r ule, others do not have such cle ar holding s. Even a fewopinions 14 15( Sanc hez - 9)

as wel l as an y r eas on f

or i t s ex i s t enc e”)
. W hi l e s eve r al of t hes e c as es ar e u npubl i s hed, we ci t e B erm u d ez f o r t he l i mi t ed pur po s e of

i l l us t r at i ng t hat mo s t cour t s of appeal s t hat ci t e H i cks a r e u n pu bl i s h ed opi n i on s , bu t do s t i l l f ol l ow t he R osal es a n d M a lik

l i ne of ca s es wh i ch decl ar e H i cks a s “n o lo n g e r v ia b le .” C o mp a r e I

n r e A
. J
. G. , 13 1 S.W
. 3 d 68 7 , 69 4 (T ex. A p p . – C o rpus C hri st i 20 0 4 ) ( whi ch ho l d s t hat t he 15 “d u e d ili g e n c e ” sta n d a rd o f H i ck s w a s re p la c e d b y the “h yp o the tica lly c o rr e c t ju ry c h a rg e ” sta n d a rd o f M a lik ), w ith A llen v . S ta te , 14 9 S.W
. 3 d 25 4 , 25 7 (T ex. A p p . – Fo rt W o rt h 20 0 4 ), R o se v . S ta te , 7 6 S.W
. 3 d 57 3 , 57 5 (T ex. App. –Cor pu s Chr i s t i 2002) , and R ic h a rd s v . S ta te , 54 S.W
. 3 d 34 8 , 35 0 (T ex. A p p . – H o ust o n 20 0 1 ).

P la n te r v . S ta te , 9 S .W .3 d 1 5 6 , 1 6 1 (T e x . C r. A p p . 1 9 9 9 )( M c C o rm ic k , J., d isse n ting ); G o lli h a r v . S ta te , 16 4 6 S.W
. 3 d 24 3 , 25 2
- 5 3 (T ex. C r. A p p . 20 0 1 ).

P l an t er , 9 S. W
. 3d, a t 161. 17 G ol l i har , 46 S. W
. 3d, a t 252- 53. 18 J u dg e M ey er s poi n t s ou t i n h i s c on cu r r i n g opi n i on t o R osal es t hat t he s t at ement r ega r di ng t he H i cks ru le 19 as bei ng “ no l o nger vi ab l e i n l i ght of o ur decis i o n i n M a lik ” i s m ere dict a b ecause t he i ss ue i n M a lik w as r es ol v ed on e a rlie r g ro u n d s. R osal es , 4 S .W .3 d , at 2 3 4 (M e ye rs , J., c o n c u rr ing ), c iti n g B ra b so n v . S ta te , 976 S. W
. 2d 182, 186 (T ex. C r. A p p . 19 9 8 ).

“T h e gr a n d ju ry’s fa ilure to d e te rm ine the m a n n e r a n d m e a n s m u st b e p le d in the ind ic tm e n t i n o rd e r to 20 gi ve not i ce t o t he def

endan t . ” G a rre tt v . S ta te , 68 2 S.W
. 2 d 30 1 , 30 8 (T ex. C r. A p p . 19 8 4 ). fr om t his Court have c ontin

ue d to dis c us s Ma lik

and Hicks tog e the r, su g g e sti ngthat Ma lik might take the pla ce of Hicks
. Plan te r v . S tate discussed both ca ses when a naly zing var iance s 16 17 be tw e e n in dic tme nts and

jur y c ha rg e s, wh ile Gollihar expressly modified Malik’s h o l d i n g, 18 ci t i n g Hicks in i ts a

na ly sis . Wh ile ne ith e r c a se e xpre ssl y ov e rr ule s Hicks on

its fa c e a s Rosales do e s, the y bo th d e fe r t o c a se law s tatin gtha t Hicks i s i n d ee d

o ut d at edwi th o uts p ec i fyi n g a
rea son. Although w e said in Rosales tha t Hi c k s is no longe r viable be cause of Ma lik, w e c an a lso say that it is no l ong er via

ble for r easons not stated in Ma lik
. Hi c k s and its prog eny

are not 19 sim ply a bo ut s uf fi c ie nc y of thee vid e nc e ; th e y

are a bo ut notice
. Their ba sis is t he pre mise that

20 de fe nd ants sh ou ld n ot b e surp ri se d at tr ia l by e vid e nc e wi tho ut h avin gha d th e tim e to p ro pe rl y pr e pa re a de fe ns e , n or

sh ou ld “ unkn own” a lle g atio ns be us e d b y the State a s a

su bs tit ute fo r f ull( Sanc hez - 10)

See T EX . C O N ST . ar t . I , § 10 ( “ [ N ] o pers on s hal l be he l d t o ans wer f or a cr i mi nal of

f ens e u nl es s on an 21 i nd i ct m ent of a grand jury , excep t i n cases i n whi ch t he p uni shment i s b y f i ne o r i m p ri sonm ent , other wi se t han i n t he p eni t ent i ary ... ”).

O n dir ect ap p eal , t he ap p el l ant did rai se s ep arat e suf f i ci ency o f

evi d ence p o i nt s o f

err o r, whi ch were 22 reje c te d b y the T h irte e n th C o u rt o f A p p e a ls.

S a n ch ez, 221 S. W
. 3d, a t 776. 23 investigation, or as an a dversa rial ploy , or to avoid the re quirement of indictment by a grand j ur y. 21 Ho we ve r, thi s r

ule , whic h b e g an a s a

guid e fo r “ unkn own” mann e r a nd me ans in indictments, has morphed into a rule that can a ffe ct jury charg es and a ssessments of suffic iency of evide nce ( including va rianc es and hy

pothetically

corr ect jury

charg es). The rule see ms to have lost both i ts intent and its focus, and as a result it easily

can be misunderstood and misapplied. B. A pplication In this case, the point of e rror at the appe llate level wa s jury -cha rg e er ror a nd not
su ff ic ie nc y of e vid e nc e . Whil e the Court of Ap pe a ls w a s c or

re c t in atte mpt ingto d ist inguis h 22 Hicks based on suf

ficienc y of evide nce, Hicks and its prog eny have pr ovided such ne bulous guidance that the Court misplaced its relianc e on the r ule. Even if the Court ha d proper ly relied on Hicks , it mis applied the r ule. When the Court of Appea ls stated that the State must prove the “ unknown” a lleg ation by makinga pr im a fa c ie showingthat “the c ause of death wa s unknown to the g rand jury ,” it analy zed the wrong evidenc e. 23 In Hicks , the appe llant was indicted for capital murde r for

causingthe death of the dece dent by

beatingand strikingher w ith a blunt inst rument in the cour se of c ommitt ing a sexual( Sanc hez - 11)

H ic k s, 860 S. W
. 2d, a t 421. 24 I d. , a t 424. 25 I d. , a t 425. 26 R o sa l es, 4 S. W
. 3d, a t 236 ( W omac k , J
. , c on cu r r i n g ) ( “ O u r pa s t r equ i r eme n t t h at t h i s a l l eg at i on be 27 pr ov ed at t r i al i s n ot j u s t i f i ed. T h e on l y s u bs t an t i al r i g h t s of t h e def en dan t t h at c ou l d be de n i ed by s u ch a n a l l eg at i on are t he ri ght s t o i nd i ct m ent by a gr and jur y i n a f el o ny case and t o noti ce o f t he nat ure and cause o f t he accusat i o n. T h es e ar e r equ i r eme n t f or t h e St at e’ s pl ea di n g , w h i ch a r e appr opr i at el y r ai s ed an d de ci ded bef or e t r i al
. T h e r eme dy fo r th e gr a n d ju ry’s la c k o f d ili g e n c e in d isc o v e rin g a n d a lleg ing the m e a n s o f co m m itt ing the o ff e n se w o u ld b e to s us t ai n a n e xce pt i on t o t he i ndi ct ment . T he not i on t hat t hi s al l ega t i on cr eat es an i s s ue of f act t o be proved t o t he t r i al jury i s cl o se t o bizarr e. ”).

J u dg e M ey er s poi n t ed ou t i n h i s c on cu r r i n g opi n i on t o R osal es t hat t he s t at ement r ega r di ng t he H i cks ru le 28 as bei ng “ no l o nger vi ab l e i n l i ght of o ur decis i o n i n M a lik ” was me re di ct a b ecause t he i ss ue i n M a lik was r es ol ved o n e a rlie r g ro u n d s. R osal es , 4 S .W .3 d , at 2 3 4 (M e ye rs , J., c o n c u rr ing ), c iti n g B ra b so n v . S ta te , 976 S. W
. 2d 182, 186 (T ex. C r. A p p . 19 9 8 ). assault. What was “unknown” in that case was the a ctual murde r we apon, or the “instrument of

24 death,” which wa s the “manne r and me ans.” The medical e x pert in Hicks t es t i fi edth at , al th o u gh

25 the vic tim ’s inj ur ie s w e re c on sis te nt w ithhe r b e ingstr uc k w itha

hamme r, the re wa s n o w ay to say conclusively

that the hammer

was the murde r we apon. 26 In the instant case , the Court of Appe als, perha ps observingfac tual simil arities betwe en the two ca ses, inappropr iately applied Hicks to the “ca

use of de ath.” B eca

use the “ unknown”
a lle g atio n w a s th e “ mann e r a nd me ans ” and

no t th e “ c a

us e of de ath, ” the Court

e rr e d in its
ana ly sis
. Hi c k s’ require ment of proving“unknownne ss” of a n alleg ation achie ves nothing . I f one purpose of

the rule is truly

to give the def

endant notice befor e trial, re quiringproof of the “unknownne ss” of a

n alleg ation afte r the trial ha s begun – and it no longe r possible to g ive timely notice – is “c lose to biz arr e.” 27 Whil e Rosales do e s in fo rm us that Hicks is no longe r viable be cause of Ma lik, w e a lso have f ound that it is no l ong er via ble for r easons not expressly stated in Ma lik
. 28( Sanc hez - 12)

S e e n. 2 1 , s upr a. 29 We also observe that, if another purpose of

the rule is obedie nce to the T exas Constitution’s require ment that “no per son shall be held to answe r” a charg e of f

elony without ind ic tme nt b y

a g ra nd jur y , a ru le that po stp on e s th e “ unkn owne ss” inq uir y until the tr ia l is 29 ineffe ctive. Thus, we ove rrule the two-prong ed rule in Hicks and announc e a ne w standar d for indictments with “unknown” a lleg ations to the g rand jury that are subsequently

used as the jur

y
c ha rg e at tr ia l: Where the State ha s alleg ed “unknown” manne r and me ans in the indictment and/or jury char g e, the de fenda

nt may challeng e the pr opriety

of the “ unknown” a lleg ation befor e trial a nd (if the e vidence at trial has made a sec ond inquiry nece ssary

)at the c onclusion of evidenc e, but b e f o r e th e c h ar g e i s s u

b m i tt e d t o th e j ur y. The fir st question (whether raised be fore or duringthe trial) is whe ther the de fenda nt was g iven prope r notice so that he could prope rly prepa re f or trial. The second que stion is whether an “unknown” alleg ation in the indictment should be replac ed by languag e in the cha

rg e that
re qu ir e s a pa rt ic ula r f a c t to be fo un d in

or de r t o c onvic t. The pre -trial hea

ringwill ensure that the “ unknown” a lleg ation was truly unknown to the g rand jury

and is not beingused to surprise or manipulate the de fenda

nt at trial. This hearing repla ces the Hicks te st, but do e s n ot r e qu ir e pr oo f o f “ unkn ownn e ss” at tr ia l. I ns te a d, it p e rm its hearings that will, at the very least, elicit all evide nce that is now known so that the “unknown” aspec t of the ca se ca

n be minimiz ed or e liminated by amendment of

the indictment or the pr e se ntatio n o f a

su pe rs e din gind ic tme nt.( Sanc hez - 13)

M a lik, 9 5 3 S .W .2 d , at 2 4 0 . (“[A ] j u d g m e n t o f ac q u itt a l i s re se rv e d fo r th o se situa tio n s in w h ic h the re is 30 a n a c tua l f

a ilure in the S ta te ’s p ro o f o f t h e c rim e ra the r th a n a m e re e rr o r in the ju ry c h a rg e su b m itt e d .” ). Simi larly , a post-evide ntiary hearing is available to the de fenda nt by reque st after

the evidenc e has be en pre sented a nd both sides have r ested, but bef ore the jury

is charg ed. I f the

“ unkn own” a lle g atio n h a s b e c ome kn own thro ugh th e e vid e nc e pr e se nte d at tria l, i t mi g ht s til l have be en unknown to the grand jury as stated in the indictment. I f this is the case, the n the

“ unkn own” a lle g atio n h a s si nc e be e n d isc ov e re d a nd ma de kn own. Th is a dd iti on a l he ari ngwi ll fo rc e bo th s ide s to re vis it the “ unkn own” a lle g atio n f ro m th e ind ic tme nt, and

c lari fy tha t it is
e i th e r kn o w n , “ unkn o w n , ” o r

unkn o w a b l e , b e f o r e th e c o urtc o m

p l e t e s i t s c h ar g e t o th e j ur y. Our o pin ion

sh ou ld n ot b e re a d to re str ic t or a lte r t he us e of the “ unkn own” a lle g atio n in
an in dic tme nt. Th is n e w s tand ard me re ly pr ov ide s th e op po rt

un ity to a vo id c on fu sio n a

nd e rr or in the jur y c ha rg e wi th r e sp e c t to unkn own a lle g atio ns . We wish to note that an err or or f ailure to provide a hea

ringwill not entitl e the a

ppellant to a n a c qu itt a l. Th e re me dy wo uld be a ne w tri a l. 30 IV. Di s cu s s i o no f J ury C h ar ge A. Was There Error ? In it s f ir st gro un d f

or re vie w, the State argue s th at th e tr ia l c ourt did no t e rr wh e n it instructed the jury

on the State’s alter

native theor

y of murder

by a “ma nner a nd means to the g rand jury

unknown,” be cause the medica l expert testified that he could not dete rmine the e x act
manner and mea ns of dea th by asphy x iation. The appe llant argues that bec ause the expert testified that the dec edent died f rom asphy

x ia by either the stun gun or

strangulation, then the
cause of death was known a nd that submitt ing the charg e to the jury was in er ror. In its second( Sanc hez - 14)

H a rr is C o u n ty M e d ic a l E x a m ine r’s O ff ic e , “In fo rm a tio n : M a n n e r o f D e a th” (u n d a te d ). See N at i onal 31 As s oci at i on of

M edi ca l Exa mi n er s a n d T h e Col l eg e of Amer i ca n Pat h ol og i s t s , “ M edi ca l
- Le g al D ea t h I n v es t i g at i on a n d A u to p sy” (2 0 0 3 ) (d e fining “M a n n e r o f D e a th” a s “T h e c irc u m sta n c e su rr o u n d ing a d e a th, su c h a s: na tur a l, a c c id e n t, su ic id e , ho m ic id e , un d e te rm ine d , o r p e n d ing .” ).

See i d. 32 gro un d fo r r ev i ew , th e S t at e qu es t i o n s th e ab i l i ty an d au th o ri ty o f aco urto f ap p ea l s t o “r ew ei gh and re interpre t the evidenc e adduc ed at tria l.” In another g round for

revie w, the State argues that
an er roneously submitt ed alter

nate theor y is not harmful when the revie wingcourt finds the
e v i d e n c e s u f

f i c i e n tt o s u

p p o rta c o nv i c t i o nun d e r

an o th e r s u b m i tt e d th e o r y. In the trial cour

t and the Court of Appe als, the terms “ cause of death” and “ manner and means” of death were sometimes used intercha ng eably in discussions of how the victim was killed. This can conf

use the issues. F urther c onfusion can r esult from the ter ms’ differ ent meaning s in medicine and la w. In medicine, e very

death is in one of f

our “ma nners” : natural, a ccide ntal, homicidal, or suicidal. Only

in deaths that ar e not natura l – that is, accide nts, homicides, and suicides – is the 31 “mea ns” of de ath an issue. 32 These te rms may

appea r in law. F or example, Article 49.04( a) of the Code of Criminal Procedur e re quires a justice of the pe ace to conduct an inque st into a death if:

(2) the pe rson dies an unnatural death f rom a c au seoth e r t

ha n a le g a l e xec uti on ; (3) the body

or a body part of a person is found [and] the c au seor circ umstances of death are unknown ...; (4) the c ircumstance s of the death indicate that the de ath may have be en caused

by un lawf ul means ; (5 ) t he pe rs on c omm its suicideor the c ircumstance s of the death indicate that the d e athm ay h av e b e e nc a

u s e d b y suicide ; [ or]

... (6) the pe rson dies while attended by a phy sician who is unable to c ertify the c au seof death and who re quests the justice of the pe ace to conduct an inque st ....”( Sanc hez - 15)

P E N A L C ODE § 6
. 0 1 (a). 33 J e ffers o n v . S ta te , 18 9 S.W
. 3 d 30 5 , 31 5 (T ex. C r. A p p . 20 0 6 ) ( C o chran, J. co ncurri ng) ( em p hasi s ad d ed ). 34 I d. , a t 316. 35 H i cks, 860 S. W
. 2d, a t 425. 36 Id ., at 424. 37 See Sc had v

. Ar iz ona, 501 U
. S. 624, 111 ( 1991) ; J e ffers o n , 189 S. W
. 3d, a t 315; Ng o v. St at e, 175 38 S .W .3 d 7 3 8 , 7 4 6 (T e x . C r. A p p . 2 0 0 5 ); K itch e n s v . S ta te , 82 3 S.W
. 2 d 25 6 , 25 8 (T ex. C r. A p p . 19 9 1 ). Th e us e of

the te rm “ mann e r o f d e ath” is n ot t he same in t

he c ri min a l pr oc e dure of

thi s state as it is in medicine. 1. “ Ma nn e r a nd Me ans ” In the cr iminal law, the term “ manner and mea ns” re fer s to the actus reus – the voluntary eng ag ing in c onduct – “includingan ac t, or omission, or possession.” “The use of the 33 prepositional word ‘ by ’ in either a statute or an indictment is a tip-of f that proba

bly . . . the phrase will be a desc ription of ho w the offe nse wa s committed.” In other wor ds, the “manne r 34
and me ans ” is the a c t th at le a ds to t he me dic a l de te rm inatio n o f “ c a us e of de ath. ” Thus , “[g]ener ally , adver

bial phrase s, introduced by the pre position ‘by ,’ desc ribe the ma nner a nd means of c ommitt ing the offe nse. They are not the g rava

men of the of

fense , nor ele ments on which the jury

must be unanimous.” 35 T h e m ann e r

an d m e an s o f d e athm ay a l s o i n c l u d e th e w e a p o nth ati s “ th e i n s tr

um e n t a l i ty . . . responsible for

the dec ease d’s death.” Neither the manner

– the actus reus – n or

the me ans – 36 th e “ i n s tr um e n to f d e ath ” –

n e e d b e f o un d un an i m o u s l y b y a

j ur y. 37 38( Sanc hez - 16)

S e e g e n e ra lly S a n c h e z, 2 2 1 S .W .3 d 7 6 9 (T e x . A p p . - C o rp u s C h risti 2 0 0 7 , p e t. d ism ’d ). T h is c o u rt’s 39 u n p u b lishe d o p inio n in B arbee v. St at e, 20 0 8 T ex. C ri m . A p p . LE X IS 9 0 0 (s l i p op . at 15 ) i s an exam p l e o f t he t erm “unk no w n” b eing i nterp reted i n d i f f ere nt wa ys. 2. “Unknown” Alleg ations Indictments may

alleg e that a f

act is “unknown.” The fac t may later be come known, which mig ht require an indictment to be ame nded. Howe ver, in a jury charg e, “ma

nner a nd means to the grand jury

unknown” may

be either un k

no wn evidenc e, or un k

no wab leevidenc e. Some opinions have bee n unclea r in how to approa ch these case s.” 39

“ Unkn own” e vid e nc e is e vid e nc e tha t c ann ot b e or

ha s n ot ye t be e n a sc e rt a ine d, su c h a s a murder w eapon or

perha ps even the cause of death. “Unknowa ble” e vidence , howeve r, diffe rs from the f ailure to find e vidence . It is evidence that has bee n asce rtained, but c annot be compre hensively

known. In essenc e, it is the differ ence betwee n an open- ended que stion and a multipl e-c hoice que stion which g ives sever al options to the finder of f act. When all evide nce that can be produce d is produced, but it is impossi ble to deter mine manner

and mea ns, then the
manner and mea ns is “unknowable.” 3. Application In this case, we have both a n indictment and a jury

charg e with “manne r and me ans
unkn own” a lle g atio ns . A t tr ia l, t he State and

the a pp e lla nt a rgue d o ve r “ wh at ki lle d” the vic tim : asphy x ia, strangulation, choking , or the stun gun. The State a rgued that the c ause of

death wa s asphy x ia, through the testimony of Dr. Salinas, while the appe llant argued that it was strangulation or the stun gun. B a se d o n D r. Sa lin a s’ s te sti mony and the a fo re me nti on e d d e fi nit ion s, the c a us e of de ath is k no wn a s a sp hy xia, but th e “ mann e r a

nd me ans ” that c a

us e d th e a sp hy

xia a pp e ars to b e wh at is( Sanc hez - 17)

It i s o f co ncern t o t he C o urt t hat nei t her t he i nd i ct m ent nor t he jur y charge l i st s m anual s t rangul at i o n, 40 l i gat ure s t rangul at i o n, us e o f a s t un gun, or a co m b i nat i o n of st rangul at i o n and t he us e of a s t un gu n a s pot ent i al m an ne r an d m ea ns o f

d ea t h. Sinc e these are t he o nly o p t i o ns b y which t he asp hyxia co uld ha ve o cc urre d und er these fac ts, t h e ju ry c h a rg e c o u ld ha v e b e e n a m e n d e d a n d no e rr o r w o u ld ha v e re su lted
.

See J ef f ers on , 189 S. W
. 3d, a t 316. 41 “unknown.” Where the Court of A ppeals e rre d in this case wa s in its i nterpre tations of the “unknown” alleg ations: “ca use of de ath” or

“manne r and me ans” of

death. We believethat Dr. Salinas’s testimony

expressly said that the ca

use of de ath was a sphy

x ia, but what ca

used the asphy x ia was at issue. I t could have be en manua l strangulation, ligatur e strangulation, blocking the air pa ssag es, or the use of the stun gun, or eve n any combination of these me thods. The evidenc e does not show de finitely that the victim died either by chokingor by

stun gun, a s the Court of Appea ls found. Instead, the e vidence shows that the victim died by asphy x ia (loss of
ox yg en to the bra in) and that the c ause of that asphy

x ia was “ unknown.” Since “ cause of death” is a medica l term, the State nee d not prove that the a ppellant “a sphy

x iated” the victim. Rather, the State mus t pr ov e the le g a l e le me nt o f t he c ri me , whic h is tha

t th e a pp e lla nt c a us e d th e de ath of the victim. And whe n Dr. Salinas testified, “ Iknow she died of asphy x ia by strangulation and the stun gun was used,” he conf irmed that ca

use of de ath. He did not conf irm the “manne r and
me ans ” of

de ath, or in o the r w or ds , what caused the c a us e of de ath. Th e “ mann e r a

nd me ans ”
was e ither bystrangulation or bythe stun gun, or eve n bya c omb inatio n o f t

he tw o. B oth

40 “strangulation” and “ the stun gun” ar e mentioned a fter the preposition “by ,” which indicates that th e y ar e th e m ann e r

an d m e an s th ati s th e i s s u e f

o r th e j ur y. 41 H av in gd e c id e d

th at i t i s th e ma

nn e r an d me an s o f d e ath th at i s in qu e s ti o n , w e mu s t n e xt de te rm ine if

the mann e r a

nd me ans we re unkn own o r u nk no wa ble . T he re wo uld

be an inhe re ntl y unknowable a spect to this case if all the re levant evide nce w as pre sented. B ased on the rec ord( Sanc hez - 18)

and the testimony

of Dr. Salinas, w e under stand that it is not pos sible to conclusively deter mine the manner

and mea ns of the asphy

x ia. Acc ordingto the testimony , it is poss ible that strangulation alone, the stun gun alone, or the combination of the two w ere sufficie nt to kill an ind ivi du a l. Dr. Salinas testified: Th e ma in t

hin gwi th t

he se stun gun s –

the the or y be hin d th e m is that th e y

wi ll re l ea s e av ery

p o we rf u l am o un to f e l ec tri ci ty

i nv o l t age an d

th i s ty p e o f v o l t age wi ll c a us e pa ra ly sis of the mus c le s a

nd you c an’ t mo ve . In th e or

y it s ound s gre at. There is one problem with voltag e and – it ca n stop your hea

rt and it ca

n stop your br e athi ng , you

kn ow , if that ha pp e ns and

su c h v olt a g e is k ind

of high. Th e re is something that is very

important as fa

r as e lectric ity

and that’s ampera g e. And amper ag e and voltag e g o alongtoge ther. You se e, if you have ve ry high voltag e – like this one is 200,000 volts acc ordingto the thing he re. And yet you have a very low ampe ra g e – ampe ra g e is c ur re nt p a ssi ngthr ou g h –

tha t’ s a llo we d to pa ss thr ou g h. An d what st op s and wh at g ive s you

g oo d ampe ra g e is your s kin . So any time you have skin that is nice a nd flat and dr

y , you have ve ry

low amper ag e. But if you place one of the se thing s with very high voltag e and a

n individual who is s tand ingin w ate r o r h a s w ate r o r h a s a br e ak in the sk in b y

wh ate ve r m e c ha

nis m, the n th at g ive s you

a ve ry high ampe ra g e . So if

you br e ak th e sk in, you ’v e g ot a problem with elec tricity . It’s g oing to pa ss throug h and it’s g oing to kill you. There is a possibili ty

that this may

have ha ppened in this particula

r ca se. It might be a pr ob le m – i f i t st op s your h e art and lun g s th e n you

e nd up wi th a sp hy

xia. So re g ard le ss you ’r e g oin gto d ie of a sp hy xia whe the r i t’ s b y

str angulatio n o r b y

thi s – by this apparatus. I t’s still asphy x ia. There was no lac k of evide nce pr esente d at trial, nor a lack of diligenc e on the pa

rt of the g rand jury

to asce rtain the e vidence . All evidence was pre sented that c ould have be en pre sented. We a re no t sa yingthat th e mann e r a

nd me ans we re kn own; r athe r t hat th e y we re no t e nti re ly unknown. Thus, we do not ha ve unknown manne r and me ans. Rather , we have un k no wab le
manner and mea ns – a known c hoice of

sever al options as opposed to no evidenc e and no op tio ns .( Sanc hez - 19)

A l m a n za , 686 S. W
. 2d, a t 171. 42 I d. ; see a lso C O D E C R IM . P R OC . ar t. 3 6 .1 9
. 43 Ar l i ne , 721 S. W
. 2d, a t 352. 44 A l m a n za , 686 S. W
. 2d, a t 171. 45 Since there was no fa ilure to find evidenc e, and sinc e the e vidence prese nted a c hoice of
se ve ra l op tio ns to p ro ve mann e r a nd me ans , th e n th e c a

us e of de ath w a s, at w or st, me re ly “unknowa

ble,” a nd the jury

char g e should have been a mended to g ive the jury

a choic e to find
on e or se ve ra l of

the po ssi ble c a

us e s – or , o f c ours e , to fi nd

that th e e vid e nc e wa s in su ff ic ie nt t o prove the cause of death. The jury char g e wa s err oneous bec ause the indictment contained a n alleg ation of “ma

nner and mea ns to the g rand jury

unknown,” whe n the manner and mea ns were not truly

unknown. We n e xt mus t de te rm ine wh e the r t he e rror ha rm e d th e a

pp e lla nt. 4. Ha rm le ss E rr or

An a ly sis A. Settled L aw Unobjecte d-to err or in the cha rg e will not result in a re versa l “unless it was so egreg ious and cr eate d such har

m that [ the] appellant was de nied a f air trial.” “The actua l degree of har m 42 must be assayed in light of the entire jury

charg e, the state of the e vidence , including the contested issues a

nd the weight of probative e vidence , the ar gument of counse l and any other rele vant information re veale d by the re cord of

the trial as a

whole.” The a

ppellant must have 43 suffe red a ctual, rather than the oretica l, harm. I f an e rror is preser ved with a timely

objection, 44 then the re sult would be a re versa l if the appe llant suffer ed “some harm” as a r esult of the er ror. 45( Sanc hez - 20)

I d. 46 A tk in so n v . S ta te , 9 2 3 S .W .2 d 2 1 , 2 7 (T e x . C r. A p p . 1 9 9 6 ), o v e rr u le d o n o the r g ro u n d s b y M ot i l l a v 47 St at e, 78 S.W
. 3 d 35 2 (T ex. C r. A p p . 20 0 2 ).

Ha rris v . S ta te , 79 0 S.W
. 2 d 58 5 , 58 7 (T ex. C r. A p p . 19 8 9 ). 48 K itch e n s v . S ta te , 8 2 3 S .W .2 d 2 5 6 , 2 5 8 -5 9 (T e x . C r. A p p . 1 9 9 1 ). 49 R o sa le s v . S ta te , 4 S .W .3 d 2 2 8 , 2 3 1 (T e x . C r. A p p . 1 9 9 9 ); Ki t che ns , 8 2 3 S .W .2 d , at 2 5 8 -5 9
. 50 I f n o o bje c tio n w a s ti me ly ma de at tr ia l, t

he n a n a pp e lla nt m us t c la im that th e e rr or

ro se to

“ e g re g iou s h arm ,” in o rd e r t o o bta in a re ve rs a l. 46 Whe n lo ok ingat ha

rm le ss e rr or

in a jur y c ha rg e wi th a lte rn ativ e the or ie s, we a lso loo k to Atkinson v. State, wh i chm ea s ure s th e h arm“a tl ea s ti np art , aga i n s tth e l i k el i h o o d th atth e j ury 's verdic t was ac tually

based upon a

n alternative available theory of culpa bility not affe cted by
e rr on e ou s p or

tio ns of the c ha rg e .” “ [T]he pr e se nc e of ov e rwhe lmi nge vid e nc e of guil t pl ay s a 47 deter minative role in re solving the issue,” and is indeed a fac tor that ca

n be conside red when looking at jury

char g e er ror. 48 When a jury

returns a g ener al guilty

verdic t on an indictment charg ing a lternate methods of c omm itt ingthe same of

fe ns e , th e ve rd ic t st and s “ if the e vid e nc e is s uf

fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

a findingunder a

ny of the theor ies submitted.” I f the e vidence is sufficient to support a f inding of 49 guilt based on at lea st one of the a lternative the ories, the ve rdict stands. Thus, even if one of the 50 alternative theories wa s err oneously submitt ed to the jury , a convic tion may still stand if found
un d e r an o th e r s u b m i tt e d th e o r y. B. A

pplication The Court of Appe als did not analy ze harm under Almanza and Atkinson and thu s e rr e d in its a na ly sis
.( Sanc hez - 21)

H u tc h , 922 S. W
. 2d, a t 172. 51 I d. , a t 169. 52 I d. 53 Id ., at 174, e mph as i s a dded. 54 S e e R o sa le s v . S ta te , 4 S .W .3 d 2 2 8 , 2 3 1 (T e x . C r. A p p . 1 9 9 9 ); Ki t che ns , 8 2 3 S .W .2 d , at 2 5 8 -5 9
. 55 The Court re lied on Hu tc h v . S tate , which did not addre ss a situation in which alternative theories of

culpability

wer e submitted. Rather, Hutch applied an Al ma nz a harm a

naly sis to a jury instruction reg ardingpolice testimony in an illeg al sea

rch a nd seizure ca se. In Hutch, a police 51 office r stopped a ve hicle bec ause he claimed ne ither the drive r nor the pa sseng er w ere wea ring seatbe lts. W hen the pa sseng er le aned f orwa rd, droppingan objec t on the floor, the of fice r discovere d coca ine. Applying Article 38.23 of the Code of Criminal Procedur e, the tria l court 52 ins tr uc te d th e jur

y that if the y be lie ve d th at th e a

pp e lla nt w a s no t wea

ringa seatbelt, then the de te nti on wa s unla wf ul, and the n th e y mus t di sr e g ard

the of fi c e r’ s te sti mony . Th is C ourt he ld 53 that “a de fenda

nt is entitl ed to be c onvicted upon a c orre ct statement of the law. In the instant
case , the er

roneous instructions had the eff ect of instructing the jury

on the opposite of what the law ac tually

is.” 54 Hutch is d ist inguis ha

ble fr om t he c a se at ba

r f or se ve ra l r e a so ns . F ir st, the c ha rg e in t his
case did not inst ruct the jury on the “opposite” of what the law is; it should have simply been omitted or clarif

ied. Additionally , in Hutch , the er roneous c harg e instructed the jury on law that
wa s s i mp l y

wr o n g. In th is c a se , th e e rr on e ou s jury c ha rg e ha s n o im

pa c t on the outc ome be c a

us e the re is sufficie nt evidence based on one of the theor ies to allow the ver dict to stand. Secondly , the 55( Sanc hez - 22)

H u tc h , 922 S. W
. 2d, a t 172. 56 A l m a n za , 686 S. W
. 2d, a t , 171 57 R osal es , 4 S .W .3 d , at 2 3 1 ; Ki t che ns , 8 2 3 S .W .2 d , at 2 5 8 -5 9
. 58 Sa nchez , 221 S. W
. 3d, a t 779. 59 Ar l i ne , 721 S. W
. 2d, a t 348. 60 Hutch jury

char g e instructed the jury to “ig nore the police off

icer ’s testimony .” In the ca se at 56 bar, the re is no cha

rg e to ig nore a

ny testimony . Third, the standa rds in analy

zing har mless error
are differ ent. Hutch was usingan “e g reg ious harm” standa rd for err ors that have not been proper ly prese rved at trial, while in the ca se at ba r, we apply

the Al ma nz a sta nd ard of “ so me harm” for pr eser

ved er ror. And f ourth, and most importantly , the cha rg e in Hutch did not deal 57 wi th a lte rn ate the or ie s o f p ro se c uti on , whe re at le a st o ne the or y pr ov ide s su ff

ic ie nt e vid e nc e to convict, which is true in the instant case. 58 In the instant case , the Court of Appe als err oneously applied a Hutch ha

rm ana ly sis , considering“other

rele vant information re veale d by the re cord,” and foc used on the theor y that “the c harg e er

ror wholly

undermined the defe nsive theory , i.e . th e State ’s fa ilure to p ro ve c a us e of death.” This is another ar ea where the Court of Appe als err ed. The State did prove c ause of

59 death, but not “manne r and me ans” of death, a nd thus the Court of Appea ls misi nterpre ted the
e vid e nc e , n ot o nly

in i ts c ha rg e ana ly sis , b ut a lso in i ts h arm a na ly sis
. Ba sed on the re cord a

nd the rules dictated in Al ma nz a and Atkinson , we be lieve that the evidenc e pre sented did not result in “a ctual har m” to the appe llant. The e vidence was suff icient 60 to convict base d on one of the alternate theorie s in the jury charg e other

than “unknown” manner and mea ns. The medica l expert testified that he wa s 95 perc ent sure that the asphy x ia was the( Sanc hez - 23)

R osal es , 4 S .W .3 d , at 2 3 1 ; Ki t che ns , 823 S. W
. 2d, a t 258- 59. 61 result of manua l strangulation. Be cause the appe llant was found lying ne x t to the dece dent in a motel room reg istered unde r his name, with his truck pa rked in fr ont of the room, and the re w ere no alternative means of e nteringor exiti ngthe room, the e vidence is overwhe lmingly in support of a c onviction – reg ardle ss of the cha rg e expressingsome “manne r and me ans unknown to the g rand jury .” Counsel did not focus on the “ manner and mea ns unknown” a

rgument duringthe trial, thus diffusingits impact on this revie w. Instead, c ounsel confuse d the evidenc e with re spect to “ca use of de ath” a

nd “manne r and me ans” of death, thus ar guing that “ca use of de ath” wa s the unknown aspe ct of the c ase. A s previously stated, this is a misint erpr etation of the e vidence
. Ba sed on the jury

char g e, it was the ma

nner a nd means that we re unknown – not the cause of death. Since w e have alre ady held that the manne r and me ans we re “ unknowable,” then the jury
c ha rg e wa s in

e rr or . Si nc e the e vid e nc e is s uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

a fi nd ingof

guil t ba se d o n at le a st
on e of the a lte rn ate the or ie s, the ve rd ic t st and s. 61 V. Conclusion In v ie wi ngthere c or d a s a wh ole , w e fi nd

the c ha rg e e rr or ha rm le ss i n n atur e . We va c ate the jud g me nt o f t

he Court of Ap pe a ls a

nd a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt . Deliver ed Oc tober 6, 2010. Publis h.