alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF WINSTON HOTELS, INC. FOR THE PERIOD ENDED SEPTEMBER 30,
1996, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                              79
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    6,276
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 6,355
<PP&E>                                         196,923
<DEPRECIATION>                                   9,705
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 195,033
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            8,689
<BONDS>                                         32,600
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           158
<OTHER-SE>                                     142,524
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   195,033
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                19,805
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 7,165
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,026
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 10,047
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             10,047
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    10,047
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .84
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
I 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1574 

To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to preserve State authority 

to ensure the security of chemical facilities. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 19, 2007 

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey introduced the following bill; which was referred 

to the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to preserve 

State authority to ensure the security of chemical facilities. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Safe Facilities Act’’. 

5 SEC. 2. PRESERVATION OF STATE AUTHORITY TO ENSURE 

6 SECURITY OF CHEMICAL FACILITIES. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Title II of the Homeland Security 

8 Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.) is amended by adding 

9 at the end the following: 


ccoleman on PROD1PC60 with BILLS
2 

•HR 1574 IH

1 ‘‘Subtitle E—Chemical Facility 

2 Security 

3 ‘‘SEC. 241. PRESERVATION OF STATE LAWS AND REGULA4 TIONS. 

5 ‘‘Nothing in Federal law or regulation, and no Fed6 eral agency action, preempts any State law or regulation 

7 relating to security of chemical facilities that is more strin8 gent than such Federal law, regulation, or agency action, 

9 including any such State law or regulation that takes ef10 fect after the date of the enactment of the Safe Facilities 

11 Act.’’. 

12 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents 

13 in section 1(b) of such Act is amended by adding at the 

14 end of the items relating to title II the following: 

‘‘Subtitle E—Chemical Facility Security 

‘‘Sec. 241. Preservation of State laws and regulations.’’. 

Æ 


ccoleman on PROD1PC60 with BILLS
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

IN RE: MVT SERVICES, L.L.C.,

Relator. '

'

'

'

' No. 08

- 15

- 00175

- CV

AN ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

IN MANDAMUS

J U D G M E N T

The court has considered this cause on the Relator = s petition for writ of mandamus

against the Honorable Francisco X. Dominguez, Judge of the 205th District Court of El Paso,

Texas, and concludes that Relator = s emergency motion for sta y and the petition for writ of

mandamus should be denied. We therefore deny the motion and the petition for writ of

mandamus, in accordance with the opinion of this court.

All costs herein having been paid, no further order is made with respect thereto.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 5 TH DAY OF JUNE , 2015.

ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, Chief Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Hughes, JJ.

Hughes, J., not participating
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of MakeMusic, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the three months ended June 30,
2012 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), I, Karen L. VanDerBosch, principal executive officer and principal financial officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant
to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                |  |  |  |  |  |                                                                                                                                        
|--------------- |  |  |  |  |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|August 10, 2012 |  |  |  |  |  |                                                                                                                                        
|                |  |  |  |  |  | /s/ Karen L. VanDerBosch                                                                                                               
|                |  |  |  |  |  | Karen L. VanDerBosch, Chief Financial Officer and Chief Operating Officer (Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer)
#### Jerry M. SANNER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D09-2179.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

June 29, 2011.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and David John McPherrin, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Katherine Y. Mclntire, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

*On Motion fob Rehearing*

PER CURIAM.

We grant appellant’s motion for rehearing, withdraw our previously issued opinion and substitute the following in its place.

Appellant challenges his conviction for fleeing and eluding a law enforcement officer under section 316.1935(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2006), claiming that the state failed to prove an essential element of the crime, namely that a patrol vehicle in the chase had “agency insignia and other jurisdictional markings prominently displayed on the vehicle.... ” We agree that the state failed to put on proof of this statutory element, requiring reversal. *See Ers*
      *935
      *kine v. State,*23 So.3d 1207, 1208-09 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); *Jackson v. State,*818 So.2d 539, 542 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); *Gorsuch v. State,*797 So.2d 649, 650-51 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). We therefore reverse with directions to reduce the conviction to a third degree felony under 316.1935(1).

We affirm as to appellant’s challenge to his habitual offender qualification offenses, finding that the state sufficiently proved them and that appellant’s attorney conceded that appellant qualified for habitual offender status.

*Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.*

WARNER, LEVINE and CONNER, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                                           <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                         166,485
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,765,344
<ALLOWANCES>                                   706,237
<INVENTORY>                                  1,194,261
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,537,505
<PP&E>                                       1,495,529
<DEPRECIATION>                                 320,454
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               3,712,580
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        4,353,038
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     9,851,687
<OTHER-SE>                                 (10,492,145)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,353,038
<SALES>                                     10,368,300
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            10,368,300
<CGS>                                        9,176,881
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                9,176,801
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                22,919
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             181,336
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             (4,516,860)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       800
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         (4,517,660)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                (4,517,660)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (.62)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     (.62)



</TABLE>
#### Thomas H. Millington v. Texas & Pacific R’y Co.

(No. 3006.)

Appeal from Tarrant County.

Opinion by

Willson, J.

§ 171. *Limitation; action for damages for breach of contract, when barred,.*M. sued the railroad company to recover damages for failing to deliver certain household goods shipped by him over its line of road. The contract of shipment was evidenced by writing signed by the company’s agent. The goods were received by the company July 10, 1879. This suit was filed September 1, 1882. The company pleaded the statute of limitations of two years in bar of the action. *Held,*1. The cause of action arises *ex contractu.*The suit is one to recover damages resulting from the breach of a contract, and is not one founded upon tort. 2. The limitation applicable to such an action is that prescribed by article 3207 of the Revised Statutes, viz.: “ Every action, other than for the recovery of real estate, for which no limitation is prescribed, shall be brought within four years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued.” 3. There is no limitation “ otherwise prescribed ” for actions to recover damages for the breach of a coiitract, except for *debt*or bond to convey real estate. [R. S. art. 3203.] “Debt ” does not mean “ damages,” and an action to recover *damages*is not an action to recover a *debt.*[1 Bouvier Law Die., words “Damages” and *149“Debt.” 4. The two years’ statute of limitations was not applicable in this case, and the cause of action was not barred.

April 26, 1884.

§172. *Same; amended petition.*An amended petition' which did not set up a new cause of action, but merely averred more specifically the written contract sued upon, and claimed larger damages, was not affected by the statute of limitations. [W..& W. Con. Rep. §§ 428, 475, 610, 693; Killebrand v. Stockdale, 51 Tex. 529; Thompson v. Swearengen, 48 Tex. 555; Lee v. Boutwell, 44 Tex. 151.

Reversed and remanded.
Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO RULE 13a-14 OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE
ACT OF 1934

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, David J. Fallon, certify that:

1. I have
reviewed this Annual report on Form 10-K of Noble International, Ltd.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



|                     |  |        |  |                                                                                   
|-------------------- |  | ------ |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: April 29, 2008 |  | By:    |  | /s/    DAVID J.
FALLON                                                            
|                     |  | Name:  |  | David J. Fallon                                                                   
|                     |  | Title: |  | Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial Officer) of Noble International, Ltd.
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1


                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Waypoint Financial Corp.
(the "Company") for the period ending December 31, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, David
E. Zuern, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
          the Company.



/s/ David E. Zuern
------------------
David E. Zuern,
President and Chief Executive Officer


March 12, 2004
#### Jeffrey H. GALPERN, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE o/b/o Gina Marie GALPERN, Appellees.

No. 4D10-993.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

April 20, 2011.

Benjamin T. Hodas of Law Office of Benjamin T. Hodas, LLC, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and William H. Branch, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for appel-lee Department of Revenue.

PER CURIAM.

A father appeals an order holding him in contempt for failure to pay child support, claiming that the order is facially deficient in its findings that he has the ability to pay the purge amount set. The court found that he made $400 per week plus commissions but found that he was on food stamps and had not made a mortgage payment in 18 months. Nevertheless, the court set the purge amount at $700 to be paid immediately and $20,000 every sixty days thereafter until the entire $92,000 arrearage is paid. The Department concedes that the order is facially defective. We reverse and remand for the court to make sufficient findings to support its order, or to revise the purge amount. The court, or child support hearing officer, may take additional evidence on the issue.

WARNER, LEVINE and CONNER, JJ., concur.
759 A.2d 912

#### COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. John Edward HILL, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued May 2, 2000.

Decided Oct. 17, 2000.

*237James J. Karl, Chief Public Defender, Public Defender’s Office, for John Edward Hill.

James C. Madenspacher, Dist. Atty., Susan E. Moyer, District Attorney’s Office, for Com.

Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN and SAYLOR, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM:

The appeal is dismissed as having been improvidently granted.
#### Alfred J. FABRE, Jr. v. APEX MARITIME CO., INC., Maersk Line, Limited, Waterman Steamship Corporation, and Crowley Marine Service, Inc., f/k/a Crowley Maritime Corporation.

No. 2011-CC-0575.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 29, 2011.

In re Burleigh Linda, Fabre; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th *117Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 41358; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CW 1942.

Denied.
#### Janet Sue MULLER. v. COLONY INSURANCE COMPANY and William H. Muller.

No. 2011-C-0092.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 25, 2011.

In re Colony Insurance Company; —. Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 545,576; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 0688.

Denied.
#### In re Gary E. HARVEY.

No. 2009-OB-2231.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 20, 2009.

ORDER

Considering the Joint Petition for Transfer to Disability Inactive Status,

IT IS ORDERED that Gary E. Harvey, Louisiana Bar Roll number 24005, be and he hereby is transferred to disability inactive status. All disciplinary proceedings against respondent shall be deferred until such time as he resumes active status.

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order shall be effective immediately.

/s/ Catherine D. Kimball

Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1191 Referred in Senate (RFS)]

  1st Session
                                H. R. 1191

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 18, 2007

    Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and 
                           Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
To authorize the National Park Service to pay for services rendered by 
   subcontractors under a General Services Administration Indefinite 
Deliver/Indefinite Quantity Contract issued for work to be completed at 
                    the Grand Canyon National Park.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DEFINITIONS.

    As used in this Act, the following definitions apply:
            (1) IDIQ.--The term ``IDIQ'' means an Indefinite Deliver/
        Indefinite Quantity contract.
            (2) Park.--The term ``park'' means Grand Canyon National 
        Park.
            (3) PGI.--The term ``PGI'' means Pacific General, Inc.
            (4) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
        of the Interior, acting through the Director of the National 
        Park Service.

SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION.

    The Secretary is authorized, subject to the appropriation of such 
funds as may be necessary, to pay the amount owed to the subcontractors 
of PGI for work performed at the park under an IDIQ with PGI between 
fiscal years 2002 and 2003, provided that--
            (1) the primary contract between PGI and the National Park 
        Service is terminated;
            (2) the amount owed to the subcontractors is verified;
            (3) all reasonable legal avenues or recourse have been 
        exhausted by the subcontractors to recoup amounts owed directly 
        from PGI; and
            (4) the subcontractors provide a written statement that 
        payment of the amount verified in paragraph (2) represents 
        payment in full by the United States for all work performed at 
        the park under the IDIQ with PGI between fiscal years 2002 and 
        2003.

            Passed the House of Representatives April 17, 2007.

            Attest:

                                            LORRAINE C. MILLER,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-18-00438-CV 

IN RE EVANGELOS PAGONIS, RELATOR 

 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING 

 

January 9, 2019 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before CAMPBELL and PIRTLE and PARKER, JJ. 

Relator Evangelos Pagonis, a Texas inmate proceeding pro se, filed a petition for 

writ of mandamus,

1 but did not accompany his petition with the required filing fee. By

letter dated December 18, 2018, we directed Pagonis to pay the filing fee of $155 or, in 

lieu thereof, to comply with chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code by 

filing an affidavit of indigence, an affidavit relating to previous filings, and a certified copy 

of his inmate trust account statement. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 

§§ 14.002(a), 14.004 (West 2017). We advised Pagonis that if he did not comply by 

December 28, this proceeding was subject to dismissal without further notice.

 

1 Pagonis filed documents with this Court on October 15 and December 11, 2018, which we have 

construed as a single petition for writ of mandamus.
2

On January 2, 2019, Pagonis filed an affidavit of indigence and a certified copy of 

his inmate trust account statement. However, Pagonis did not file an affidavit or 

declaration describing his previous filings. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 

§ 14.004(a), (b) (requiring an affidavit or a declaration stating the operative facts, case 

name, cause number, court, parties named, and the result of each action previously 

brought).

Unless a party is excused from paying a filing fee, the Clerk of this Court is required 

to collect filing fees set by statute or the Supreme Court when an item is presented for 

filing. See TEX. R. APP. P. 5, 12.1(b). An inmate who files an affidavit or a declaration of 

inability to pay costs in an appeal or original proceeding must also comply with chapter 

14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 

ANN. § 14.002(a). An inmate’s failure to comply with chapter 14 is grounds for dismissal 

of the appeal or original proceeding. See In re Johnson, No. 07-16-00354-CV, 2016 Tex. 

App. LEXIS 11841, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Nov. 1, 2016, orig. proceeding) (per 

curiam) (mem. op.) (dismissing inmate’s petition for writ of mandamus for failure to pay 

the filing fee or submit the materials required to proceed under chapter 14).

Because Pagonis has failed to pay the filing fee or comply with chapter 14 of the 

Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code within the time provided by this Court for 

compliance, his original proceeding is dismissed.

Per Curiam