alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
COMPANY'S FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF AND FOR THE THREE AND SIX MONTHS ENDED JUNE
30, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                      27,767,449
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   30,957
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            27,926,874
<PP&E>                                       6,719,000
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,162,235
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              34,034,259
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,541,816
<BONDS>                                      2,464,717
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        93,016
<OTHER-SE>                                  29,934,710
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                34,034,259
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             5,511,396
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           (312,927)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (4,985,230)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (4,985,230)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (4,985,230)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   ($.54)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   ($.54)
        

</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Sarah Joyce King COOPER, Sarah Joyce Smith and Mary Cooper Smith, as Executrices of the Will of M. A. Cooper, Deceased, et al., Appellees.

No. 17925.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

March 24, 1960.

A Donald Mileur, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Perry W. Morton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Roger P. Marquis, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellant.

John W. Maddox, Rome, Ga., for appellees.

Before RIVES, Chief Judge, and HUTCHESON and TUTTLE, Circuit Judges.

TUTTLE, Circuit Judge.

This is a companion case to 5 Cir., 277 F.2d 857. The judgment of the trial court in the condemnation suit referred to went against the government for a substantial sum. Thereafter the government sought to pay the amount into court in such manner as to end the running of interest, but at the same time reserving to itself the right to appeal, with which, it contended, would go with the right of recovery of the amount paid in the event its appeal was successful. Although the government contended then, and contends here, that it has the undoubted right to pay the full amount into court and stop the running of interest without jeopardizing its right of appeal and right to recover any amounts determined on appeal it did not owe, it was not willing to do this without an order of court.

The government therefore applied for an order by the trial court declaring its right to take the steps outlined. The trial court entered a *simple*order stating: “The said motion is denied.”

This order did not decide anything as to the correctness of the government’s contention that it could pay the amount into court, pursue its appeal, and thereafter seek repayment from the appellees. It merely declined to rule on the effect of such action. Whatever rights the *864government had as to such payment it still had after the trial court’s order was entered. Moreover, it still has such rights.

We do not now, nor was the district court required to, pass on the questions that would arise if the government had actually made such payment. However, we do note that this Court has entered an order refusing to dismiss an appeal in the case of Carmichall v. United States, 5 Cir., 273 F.2d 392, which motion to dismiss was based on the contention that the government’s payment into the registry of the court of the judgment destroyed its right of appeal.

We cannot hold that the trial court erred in refusing to enter the order requested.

The question as to the running of interest has not been decided by the trial court. It is not now before us and we do not pass on legal issues in such a vacuum.

Since it does not appear that the judgment of the trial court was an appealable order the appeal is Dismissed.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Eric BALLARD.

No. 2011-KK-0310.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 14, 2011.

In re Eric, Ballard; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 494-828; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0204.

Denied.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Grayland RHODES, et al.

No. 2011-KK-2655.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 5, 2011.

In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 506-692; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-1536.

Stay denied; writ denied.

VICTORY and GUIDRY, JJ., would grant.
#### Carlton E. ADDERLY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D09-1327.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Sept. 22, 2010.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 18, 2010.

Carlton E. Adderly, Miami, pro se.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Katherine Y. Mclntire, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

We affirm this appeal of an order dismissing the appellant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.

It is true, as he asserts with respect to his first ground for relief, that a petition for writ of habeas corpus is an appropriate vehicle in which to raise a claim that the charging document wholly omits to allege one or more of the essential elements of the crime and therefore fails to charge a crime. *See State v. Gray,*435 So.2d 816, 818 (Fla.1983) (“Since a conviction cannot rest upon such an indictment or information, the complete failure of an accusatory instrument to charge a crime is a defect that can be raised at any time-before trial, after trial, on appeal, or by habeas corpus.”). However, we conclude that the elements were sufficiently alleged, noting specifically that the intent element of conspiracy may be implied. *See State v. Adkins,*553 So.2d 294, 296-97 (Fla. 1st DCA *851989). The information in this case sufficiently tracked the statutory language to give defendant notice of the charged offense. *Compare Price v. State,*995 So.2d 401, 405-06 (Fla.2008); *Jacques v. State,*1 So.3d 1112 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).

While the trial court should have denied ground one of the petition rather than dismissing it, remand for such an order would be a waste of judicial resources. *See generally Thompson v. State,*945 So.2d 627 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (affirming dismissal of rule 8.800(a) motion that should have been denied on the merits); *Richardson v. State,*918 So.2d 999 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (refusing to remand for the entry of an order changing the disposition from denial to dismissal).

*Affirmed.*

GROSS, C.J., MAY and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.
#### Travis A. McKINNEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D11-0205.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Oct. 19, 2011.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Joel Arnold, Assistant Public Defender, Office of the Public Defender, Tallahassee; Daren L. Shippy, Assistant Regional Counsel, Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Ralph F. Guerra, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Travis A. McKinney challenges the trial court’s order revoking his community control and probation. We affirm the revocation but remand for entry of a written order conforming to the court’s oral pro*953nouncement. *See, e.g., Agar v. State,*833 So.2d 881 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).

DAVIS, PADOVANO, and ROWE, JJ., concur.
#### HCA HEALTH SERVICES OF FLORIDA, INC. d/b/a St. Lucie Medical Center, Petitioner, v. CYBERKNIFE CENTER OF the TREASURE COAST, LLC, Respondent.

No. 4D11-484.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

June 29, 2011.

Thomas E. Warner, Dean A. Morande and Elisabeth Amanda Romfh of Carlton Fields, P.A., West Palm Beach, for petitioner.

David Steinfeld and Richard H. Leven-stein of Kramer, Sopko & Levenstein, P.A., Stuart, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner HCA Health Services of Florida, Inc. (HCA) seeks certiorari relief from *936a Martin County Circuit Court order which granted a motion by respondent Cy-berknife Center of the Treasure Coast, LLC (Cyberknife) to amend its second amended complaint to add a claim of punitive damages in a count alleging fraudulent inducement to contract. We conclude that this order departs from the essential requirements of law resulting in material harm of an irreparable nature in that it subjects petitioner to financial worth discovery when a contract on which it was based expressly provided for waiver of punitive damages and where Cyberknife has not shown any other basis for entitlement to make such a claim. *Chemplex Fla. v. Norelli,*790 So.2d 547 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (entertaining certiorari review of order granting leave to amend to add punitive damages claim where there was no legal basis demonstrated for it).

Cyberknife sought damages for the fraudulent inducement, thereby affirming the contract including its provision for waiver of punitive damages. *Mazzoni Farms, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.,*761 So.2d 306, 313 (Fla.2000); *see also Kaplan v. Kimball Hill Homes Fla., Inc.,*915 So.2d 755 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).

Even if it should later elect the equitable remedy of rescission in the alternative on its count for fraudulent inducement to contract, Cyberknife still would not be entitled to claim punitive damages. *Hoppe v. Hoppe,*370 So.2d 374 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), *cert. denied,*379 So.2d 206 (Fla.1979).

Therefore, we quash the circuit court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

MAY, CIKLIN and LEVINE, JJ., concur.
#### Travious Demar NORRIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D10-5851.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Jan. 31, 2012.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Bryan Jordan, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. *Flagg v. State,*74 So.3d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

VAN NORTWICK, THOMAS, and ROWE, JJ., concur.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Paul LEBLANC.

No. 2010-KP-1282.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 8, 2011.

In re LeBlanc, Paul; —Defendant (s); Applying for Reconsideration of this Courts action dated February 4, 2011 Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court, Division B, No. 357107; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 0186.

Reconsideration denied.
Filed by Bowne Pure Compliance





Exhibit 10.4




December 22, 2008




Mr. Derek Eiberg

c/o Image Entertainment, Inc.

20525 Nordhoff Street, Suite 200

Chatsworth, CA 91311




Re: Amendment to Employment Letter Agreement




Dear Derek:



This amendment letter shall confirm that the Term of your Employment Letter Agreement with
Image Entertainment, Inc. (“Image”) will be extended by ninety (90) days. Accordingly, the “Term”
of the Employment Letter Agreement will now expire on June 29, 2009 and any notice for extending
the Term in the future shall be communicated to you in writing by no later than March 31, 2009
(three months prior to the expiration of this extended Term).



All other terms of the Employment Letter Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.
This amendment letter contains the entire agreement of the parties with respect to the subject
matter herein. This amendment letter may only be modified in writing, signed by you and a duly
authorized representative of Image’s Board of Directors.



If you wish to accept this extension of the Term of your Employment Letter Agreement, please
so indicate by signing below.



Sincerely,




/s/ ROBERT MCCLOSKEY




Robert McCloskey




Director and Chairman of the

Compensation Committee of

the Board of Directors




THE ABOVE IS ACCEPTED AND AGREED.



	 	 	 
	/s/ DEREK EIBERG

	 	12/22/08
	 
	DEREK EIBERG

	 	DATE
#### B.W. GREEMON v. CITY OF BOSSIER CITY, Louisiana and the Bossier City Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board.

No. 2011-C-0039.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 4, 2011.

In re Municipal Fire and Police Civil Ser. Bd., Bossier City; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 126,232; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-664-CA.

Granted.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                         124,352
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  521,080
<ALLOWANCES>                                    76,500
<INVENTORY>                                    302,312
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,088,123
<PP&E>                                       1,610,196
<DEPRECIATION>                                 912,418
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,683,964
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          417,290
<BONDS>                                      1,000,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         8,730
<OTHER-SE>                                   6,568,570
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,683,964
<SALES>                                      1,837,694
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,961,325
<CGS>                                        1,351,678
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,287,493
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              16,859
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                 (275,800)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (416,498)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (416,498)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.06)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.06)


</TABLE>
<PAGE>

Exhibit 31.1

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

I, JEFFREY I. DREBEN, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of CVF Technologies
Corporation;

2. Based on my knowledge, this Annual Report does not contain any untrue
statement of material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this Annual
Report.

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this Annual Report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, result of operation and cash flows of the
Registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this Annual Report.

4. The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and we have:

            a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that
   material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
   subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
   particularly during the period in which this Annual Report is being prepared;

            b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure
   controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about
   the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of
   the period covered by this Annual Report based on such evaluation.

            c) disclosed in this Annual Report any change in the registrant's
   internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the
   registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal
   quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is
   reasonable likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control
   over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of
registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function);

            a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of
   internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
   adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and
   report financial information; and

            b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
   other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal
   control over financial reporting.

Dated: April 8, 2005

                                                    CVF TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION

                                                    /s/  Jeffrey I. Dreben
                                                    ----------------------
                                                    JEFFREY I. DREBEN
                                                    Chief Executive Officer
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, PehongChen, the Chief Executive Officer of BroadVision, Inc. (the “Company”) andWilliam E. Meyer, the Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifythat, to the best of their knowledge:

 

1. The Company’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the periodended September 30, 2005, and to which this Certification is attached as Exhibit 32.1(the “Periodic Report”), fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) orsection 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and

 

2. The information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, inall material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of theCompany.

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have set their hands hereto as ofthe 14th day of November 2005.

 

 
| /s/ Pehong Chen         |   |
|-------------------------|--------|
| Pehong Chen             |
| Chief Executive Officer |
|                    |
| /s/ William E. Meyer    |   |
| William E. Meyer        |
| Chief Financial Officer |
|                         |        |  |

 

1

----
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION OF VERSATA, INC.

PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

REGARDING ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K FOR
THE YEAR ENDED OCTOBER 31, 2003



Pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), I, William Frederick, Executive Vice President, Chief Operating and Financial Officer of Versata, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the
Company), do hereby certify that:



1. The Companys Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended October 31, 2003 (the Form 10-K) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and



2. Information contained in the Form 10-K
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



By:

/s/    WILLIAM
FREDERICKWilliam Frederick Chief Financial Officer




Date: January 29, 2004
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Cody MINOR.

No. 2011-KO-2752.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 13, 2012.

In re Minor, Cody; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 08-09-0231; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KA 0530.

Denied.
Exhibit 13.1

CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC FINANCIAL REPORT

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350

In connection with the Annual Report of United Microelectronics Corporation (the Company) on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Jackson Hu, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge, that:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: June 26, 2006



By:

/s/ Jackson HuName:

Jackson HuTitle:

Chief Executive Officer




|* | A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to us and will be retained by us and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
|- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#### In re LOUISIANA JUDICIARY COMMISSION NO. 10-7539.

No. 2010-O-2583.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 7, 2011.

In re Johnson, Elfrida W.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory Review of Judiciary Commission Decision Judiciary Commission of Louisiana, No. 10-7539.

Denied. The decision of the Judiciary Commission is final. See Supreme Court Rule XXIII, Section 3 and Rule IV of the Rules of the Judiciary Commission.