NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 11-2580

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

SADIEL GONZALEZ,

Appellant

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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

(Crim. Action No. 09-cr-709)

District Judge: Honorable Katharine S. Hayden

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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

June 7, 2012

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Before: SCIRICA, GREENAWAY, JR., and COWEN, Circuit Judges.

(Opinion Filed: July 31, 2012)

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OPINION

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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.

Appellant Sadiel Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”) appeals the sentence imposed by the 

District Court following a guilty plea for possessing with intent to distribute 100 grams or 

more of heroin. Gonzalez argues that the District Court erred by not granting his motion 
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seeking a downward variance from the applicable career offender range called for by the 

Sentencing Guidelines. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court‟s 

sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the 

essential facts.

On October 18, 2010, Gonzalez pled guilty to one count of distributing and 

possessing with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a). Based on the circumstances of Gonzalez‟s crime and his status as a career 

offender, the Sentencing Guidelines suggested a range of 188 to 235 months of 

imprisonment. Gonzalez did not contest his designation as a career offender. Instead, 

Gonzalez requested that the District Court grant a downward variance from the career 

offender sentencing range.

On June 1, 2011, Gonzalez appeared before the District Court for sentencing. The 

District Court declined Gonzalez‟s request for a downward variance but sentenced 

Gonzalez to 188 months in prison—the bottom end of the career offender range. 

Gonzalez filed a timely appeal of his sentence.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review a sentence for substantive reasonableness under an abuse of discretion 

standard. United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567-68 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
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III. ANALYSIS

Gonzalez conceded that his criminal history placed him within the ambit of career 

offender status and that, as a result of this designation and the nature of his crime, the 

Sentencing Guidelines recommended a range of 188 to 235 months of imprisonment. 

The only issue on appeal is whether the District Court‟s sentence was rendered 

substantively unreasonable when the District Court denied Gonzalez‟s motion for a 

downward variance. We conclude that the District Court properly exercised its discretion 

in denying Gonzalez‟s motion.

An inquiry into the substantive reasonableness of a sentence asks “whether the 

final sentence, wherever it may lie within the permissible statutory range, was premised 

upon appropriate and judicious consideration of the relevant [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)] 

factors.” United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d 766, 770 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States 

v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2006)). “Absent procedural error, we will 

affirm the sentencing court „unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed 

the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court 

provided.‟” Id. (quoting Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568). The party challenging the sentence 

bears the burden of demonstrating unreasonableness. Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567.

Applying this standard, we discern no abuse of discretion in the sentence imposed. 

The sentencing colloquy evidences that the District Court was thorough in its 

consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. During the sentencing colloquy, the District Court 

took note of Gonzalez‟s lengthy criminal history:
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[H]e‟s kind of like a walking crime zone when he‟s in the 

neighborhoods that he‟s in . . . . He has a significant 

record. . . . So it‟s never really peaceful around Mr. Gonzalez 

when he‟s on the street.

. . . .

Mr. Gonzalez is not one of these Sad Sack‟s that very often 

the Court has before it, who is so low level and so muddled in 

his life that heavy street crimes are all of the kind the offender 

knows.

. . . .

Mr. Gonzalez is far more high functioning as a human 

being, as a drug seller, and as a criminal unfortunately. 

(App. 48.) The District Court found that it could not “in good conscience, given the 

responsibilities of sentencing[,] say that Mr. Gonzalez warrants a variance from the 

harshness of a career offender status designation.” (App. 49.) The District Court 

concluded that the bottom end of the sentencing range “is sufficient but not more than 

necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing, which is just punishment for a life spent 

committing crime after crime after crime, selling drugs, serious drugs and profiting from 

it.” (App. 49.)

We find no merit to Gonzalez‟s argument that the District Court failed to give

sufficient weight to certain mitigating factors in the § 3553(a) analysis—Gonzalez‟s 

learning disability, traumatic relocation to America from Cuba at a young age, medical 

ailments resulting from being shot, and the violent death of his uncle—warranting a 

downward variance. To the contrary, the District Court acknowledged Gonzalez‟s

troubled past and was candid about the difficulties he has faced obtaining gainful 
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employment given his extensive criminal history. But the District Court noted that 

Gonzalez was not merely a victim of circumstances beyond his control. Specifically, as 

the District Court determined, Gonzalez made a conscious decision to engage in “a life of 

persistent criminality on a fairly regular basis in spite of regular visits to state prisons and 

federal prison.” (App. 48.)

Because the District Court properly considered the § 3553(a) factors, the District 

Court did not abuse its discretion by declining to grant a downward variance from the 

career offender range.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s sentence.