### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A PR IL22, 200 9 S es sio n COR INE B ROA DN AX , In dividually and as heir and on beh alf of the Estate of Mary A lice Johnson v. QUIN CE NU RS ING A ND RE HAB ILITAT ION CENTER, LL C, ET AL 

### . Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court forShelb y County No. CT-004880-05 R ita Stotts, Judge

No. W2008-02130-C OA-R3-C V - Filed August 10, 2009

The pa rties to a nursinghome Admission Agr eeme nt dispute t he enf orce ability

of its arbitration provision. T he trial court ref used to enfor ce the arbitration provision. The nursing home appe aled. For the f o ll o w in g r e a s o n s , w e r e v e r s e th e d e c is io n o f th e c ir c u it c o u rt an d r e ma n d f o r e n tr y o f an order compelling arbitration.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; A ppe al a s o f R igh t; Judg me nt of th e Ci r c uit

Co ur t R e ve r se d and Rem anded

A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J.,W.S., delivere d the opi nion of the court, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER , J., and J. S TE VE N S TA FF O RD , J., joined.

Re be c c a Ad e lma n, Cha se Pitt ma n, Pe te r B . W int e rb ur n, Me mph is, TN , f or Ap pe lla nts
Michae l C. S kouteris, Russell W. Lewis, IV , Memphis, TN, for A ppellee

OP IN IONI n he r de pos i t i on, M s
. Br oadna x di s cus s ed a di f f er ent s i t uat i on t hat s he c l ai m s gave r i s e t o he r s i gni ng t he 1 A dm i s s i on A gr ee m ent a nd A r bi t r at i on A gr ee m ent

. She s t at ed t hat a t s om e poi nt D ec ede nt w as t r ans f er r ed f r om N ur s i ng H om e t o t he ho s pi t al

. A ft er her r el eas e f r om th e h o sp i t al, D ece dent r et urned t o t he N urs i ng H om e. M s
. Broadn ax cl ai m s t hat a r epre s ent at i ve of t he N urs i ng H om e t el epho ned her s t at i ng t hat D ece dent had been at t he ho s pi t al “l on ger t han t hey w ou l d ho l d a b ed f or her[ , ] ” and t here f ore D ece dent h ad t o be “r eadm i t [ t ed. ] ” W hat ever t he ci r cum s t ances s ur r oundi ng D ec ede nt ’ s hos pi t al s t ay, i t i s c l ea r t hat D ec ede nt ’ s r e- adm i s s i on w as not pre condi t i oned on t he s i gni ng of t he A dm i s s i on A gr ee m ent

. I ns t ea d, D ec ede nt w as re adm i t t ed t o N ur s i ng H om e pr i or t o M s
. Br oadna x s i gni ng t he A d m issio n A g re e m e n t an d A rb itra tio n A g re e m e n t at issu e
. -2- I. F A C TS & P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY On May 12, 2000, Mary

Alice Johnson ( “D ecedent”) was a dmitted to Beve rly Hea lth and Re h a b il it a ti o nCe n te r

. A t t

h e ti me o f

h e r a dmi s s ion, Dec e d e n t’ s g r e a t- n ie c e , Co r in e B r o a dn a x, a c tin g in h e r f

idu c iary c a pa c ity a s D e c e de nt’ s a g e nt a

nd a tto rn e y -i n- fa c t pu

rs ua nt t o tw o D ur a

ble Powers of A ttor n ey

– o n e g ener al and one for he althcar e–executed a n Admission Agr eeme nt (“Bever ly Ag re e me nt” ). Ms. B ro a dn a x ha s f a ile d to pr od

uc e a c op y of the B e ve rl y

Ag re e me nt; howeve r, she maintains that it did not include an a rbitration ag ree ment.
On J uly 1, 2003, Be verly

Hea lth and Rehabil itation Center was pur chase d by Quince Nursing and Reha bilitation C enter

(“A ppellant” or “Nur sing Home”)

. I n her a ffidavit, Ms. B roadnax stated that “a repre sentative of the nursing home conta cted me by telephone. . . .[and] stated that Quince Nursing and Reha

bilitation had taken over

the fa cility , and that [she] was re quired to sig n rene wal
a dmi ssi on pa

pe rs .” Th e re a ft e r, on

F ri da y , O c tob e r 3 1, 20 03 , at a pp ro xima te ly

5:1 5 PM , M s. 1 Br oadnax arrive d at the Nur sing H ome to visit with Dec edent. Upon ar rival, Ms. Br oadnax visit ed the nurses’ station, as she claims she wa s instructed, to sign the forms. Ms. Br oadnax testified that
s h e s ig n e d th e f

o r ms in “ p r o b a

b ly le s s th an a mi nu te b e c a u s e e v e r y w h e r e it w a s f

or me to sig n, instead of

re a din g Ijus t si g ne d. ” She fu rt he r s tate d th a t “ [a]s sumin g [she ] wa s r e a din g the old [Bever ly ] [ A]gre ement and ba sed on the re prese ntation that the packe t included standa rd admissions fo rm s, Iqu ic kly

sig ne d th e pa

pe rs .” Contai ned wi thi n th e Ad mis sio n A g re e me nt s ig ne d b y Ms. Br oadnax was an A rbitration Ag ree ment. The pa rties do not dispute that Ms. B roadnax signe d the Arbitration Ag ree ment or that she ha d authority to do so. On September

12, 2005, Ms. B roadnax filed a Complaint in the Shelby County Circuit Court
asser ting numer ous cause s of ac tion ag ainst Nursing Home, including brea ch of c ontrac t, for injuries alleg edly cause d by defic ient car e rendere d by Nursing Home. I n response , Nursing Home filed a Motion to C ompel Arbitration. The Circuit Court held a hea ring on Nursing Home’s moti on, but
re se rv e d r

uli ngin o rd e r t o h old

an e vid e nti ary

he ari ngand

to he ar t e sti mony

a bo ut “ wh a t [Ms

. Br oadnax] kne w an d

w h e ns h e kn e w it [. ]” O nA u g u s t 2 0 , 2 0 0 8 , th e tr ia l c o u rt e n te r e d anO r d er De nyingMo tio n to Com

pe l A rb itr a tio n. Th e tr ia l c ourt fo un d a s f

oll ow s:
1. Def endants lef

t paper work, including a n ad m issions agr eeme nt containing the
arb itr a tio n a g re e me nt at is su e , at th e nurs ingstatio n f or Pla int if f t o Si g n; 2. Def endants did not go throug h the pape rwork w ith Pl aintiff, did not explain the paper work to Plaintiff, or inform he r of what she was sig ning; a nd-3-

3. De fe nd ants ’ f

a ilure to p re se nt the a

rb itr a tio n a g re e me nt t o Pl a int if f r e su lte d in Plaintiff not knowing a

nd understandingthe conse quence s of sig ning suc h.
The Court has undertake n an exhaustive revie w of Te nnessee law in this area and is of the opinion that the fa cts of this case do not warr ant the enf orce ment of an arbitration a g ree ment. Fr om the fore g oing f indings of f

act, the Court c oncludes ther e was no mee ting of

the minds betwee n the parties as t o whether claims on beha lf of [Decede nt] should be subject to ar bitration. Nursing Home appe als from that orde r.

II. I SSU ES P R ESENTED Appellant has timely

filed its notice of appe al and pr esents the f ollowing issue f

or re view,
summa ri zed a s f oll ow s:
1. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in deny ing A ppellant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration: a. by applying a

subjective “ meeting of t he mi nds” standar d rathe r than a n objective standa

rd to d e te rm ine mut

ua l a sse nt t o th e c on tr a c t;
b. by failing to rule that Appellee was estopped to deny the Arbitration Agr eeme nt contained in t he Ad mis sio n Ag re e me nt af

te r s he fa ile d to re a d it

and su e d f or br e a c h o f t

hat c on tr a c t;

c . b y imp lic itl y

ru lin g that T e nn e sse e imp os e s an a ff ir mativ e du ty on a

nurs ingfa c ili ty

to explain the terms of an Arbitration Ag ree ment befor e the par ties thereto sig n the same; a nd d. by violating the F ede ra l Arbitration Ac t by imposing additional re quirements upon the Ar bit ratio n A g re e me nt n ot g e ne ra lly imp os e d u

po n a ll c on tr a c ts.

For the following rea sons, we re verse the dec ision of t h e ci rcuit cour t and re mand for e ntry

of an order compelling arbitration.

III
. S TA N D A R D O F REVIEW On appe al, this Court revie ws a gra nt or denial of a

motion to compel arbitration under the same standa

rds that ap p l y t o bench tr ials. Cab any v . M ay fi e ld R e hab . & S

pe c ial CareCtr
. , No. M2 00 6- 00 59 4- CO A- R3- CV , 2 00 7 WL 34 45 55 0, a t *3 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. No v. 15 , 2 00 7) ; Hubert v. T ur nb e r r y Ho me s, LLC, No

. M 2 0 0 5 -0 0 9 5 5 -C OA -R 3 -C V, 2 0 0 6 W L2 8 4 3 4 4 9 , at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2006). A trial court’s fac tual finding s are presumed to be corr ect, a nd we will not overturn those fac tual finding s u n l es s the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst them. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d) (2 00 8) ; Bogan v. Bogan , 6 0 S. W.3 d 7 21 , 7 27 (Ten n. 20 01 ). F or the e vid e nc e to p re po nd e rate-4-

ag ainst a trial cour

t’s finding of fa ct, it must support another finding of fact wit h g reater c onvincing eff ect. W a ts o n v . Watson , 1 9 6 S

. W

. 3 d

6 9 5 , 7 0 1 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g W alker v . Sidney Gi lre ath & As so c s. , 40 S.W. 3d 66 , 71 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. 20 00); The Realty Shop, Inc . v. RR W estminster Holding, Inc. , 7 S.W .3d 581, 596 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)) . When the trial court make s no specific finding s of fa ct, we r eview the rec ord to deter mine wher e the pr eponder ance of the evidenc e lies. Ga nze v oo rt v . Rus se ll , 9 4 9 S

. W

. 2 d

2 9 3 , 2 9 6 (T en n

. 1 9 9 7 ) ( ci t i n g Kemp v. Thurmond , 521 S.W .2d 806, 808 (Tenn. 1975)). We a ccor d g reat de fer ence to a trial cour t’s deter minations on matters of w itness cre dibilit y and will not re-e valuate suc h deter minations absent clea

r and convinci n g ev i d en ce to the contra ry

. We lls v

. T e nn. B d. of

Re ge nts , 9 S.W .3d 779, 783 (Tenn. 1999) (c itations omi tted). W e re v i ew a trial court’s conc lusions of law under a de novo standard upon the re cord w i t h n o p re s u mption of corre ctness. Union C arbide Corp. v. Huddleston , 854 S

. W

. 2 d 8 7 , 9 1 (T en n

. 1 9 9 3 ) ( ci t i n g Estate of Adkins v. W hite Consol. Indus., Inc. , 788 S.W .2d 815, 817 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989))

. IV. D I S CUS S I ON
A. Su bje c tiv ev

. O bje c tiv eSta nda rd On appeal, Appellant asser ts that the circuit court err ed in applying a subjective “ meeting
o f th e mi n d s ” s ta

n d ar d , r a th e r

th anth e o b

jective “re a s o n a

b le p e r s o n ” te s t f

o r mutu a l a s s e n t. We ag ree

. “I t is well established in Tennessee that, in order to be enfor cea ble, a c ontrac t must represe nt mutual assent to its terms, be supported by sufficie nt consideration, be fre e fr om fraud and undue in f lu e n c e , b e s u f

f ic ie n tl y d e f in it e , an d mu s t n o t b e c o n tr ar

y to p u b li c p o li cy .” T. R. M

ill s Cont ractors, Inc. v. WRH E nters., LLC, 9 3 S

. W

. 3 d 8 6 1 , 8 6 5 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 2 ) ( ci t i n g Johnson
v. C en t . Nat’l Ins. Co. , 3 5 6 S. W. 2 d 2 7 7 , 2 8 1 ( T e n n

. 1 9 6 2 ) )

. M u tu a l a s s e n t to b e b ound by the contra ct is critical. Id. at 866. To dete rmine the mutuality of asse n t , “c ourts use an obje ctive standard ba sed on the manife stations of the parties.” Id. (citing 11 Samuel Wil liston & Richard A

. L ord, A Tr e ati

se on theLaw o

f Co ntrac ts § 30 :6 (4 th e d. 19 99 ))

. “ I n other wor ds , we mus t de te rm ine wh e the r a

re a so na ble on loo ke r, ba se d u

po n th e pa

rt ie s’ ou tw ard

manif e statio ns , w ou ld conclude that [t he par

ties] ag ree d to be bound by the terms of the written contra ct.” Mo od y Re alt y Co. , I nc . v . Hu esti s , 2 3 7 S

. W

. 3 d

6 6 6 , 6 7 4 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g Staubach Retail Servs.- Se., LLC v. H.G. H

ill Realty Co. , 160 S.W .3d 521, 524 (Tenn. 2005) ).

Th is C ourt

re c e ntl y c ri tic ize d th e “ me e tin g of the min ds ” st and ard a s mi sle a din g fo r i ts association with subjectivity

. Rode Oil Co., In c v. L am ar Adver. Co. , No. W2007-02017-COA-R3- C V, 2 0 0 8 W L4 3 6 7 3 0 0 , at * 8 n

. 1 2 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g Colfax Envelope Corp. v. Local No. 458-3M

, 20 F.3d 750, 752 (7th Cir. 1994)) (“I t is often said that a contract requires a ‘mee ting of t he mi nds,’ but that phrase is now widely rec og nized as misleading.” ). F urthermor e, in Rob e rt J. Denley C

o., Inc. v. Ne al Sm ith C

onstr. C o., Inc. , N o

. W2 0 0 6

- 0 0 6 2 9

- CO A

- R3

- CV , 2 0 0 7 WL 1153121, at *4 (Te nn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2007), we explained-5-

A l t h o u g h w e a g r e e t h a tm u tu a l a s s e n ti s e s s e n t i a l t o t h e f o r m a t i o no f a c o n t r a c t, mutual assent is g ather ed fr om the lang uag e of the contra ct rat h er t h an the
un e xpre sse d o r u

nd isc los e d in te nti on s o f t

he pa rt ie s. Gates, Duncan &Vancamp Co. v. Levatino, 96 2 S. W.2 d 21 , 25 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 1 99 7) . “ Th e law c on c lus ive ly presumes that the parties to a contrac t understood it s obligations, and evidence is not admissible to show that their understandingwas in fa ct otherw ise.” Id.

I n response to Nursing Home’s arg ument that the trial cour t erre d in applying a

subjective,
rathe r t ha n an ob je c tiv e , sta

nd ard , Ms. B ro a dn a x c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt did no t, i n f a c t, a pp ly a subjec tive standard, a

nd she ar g ues that “the meeting of the minds lang u age refe renc ed by Appellant [ fr o m t h e t ri al court’s order ] i s superfluous.” Howeve r, she then g oes on to argue that there wa s no meeting of the minds in this case as “ Appellee believed that she was sig ning
rea dmission papers identical to those she ha d previously signe d which did not contain an a rbitration ag ree ment.”

As we note d above, the trial court, in its order , fo un d a s f oll ow s:

1. Def endants lef

t paper work, including an ad m i ssions ag ree ment containing the
arb itr a tio n a g re e me nt at is su e , at th e nurs ingstatio n f or Pla int if f t o Si g n; 2. Def endants did not g o throug h the pape rwork w ith Pl ai n tiff, did not expl ain the paper work to Plaintiff, or inform he r of what she was sig ning; a nd 3. De fe nd ants ’ f

a ilure to p re se nt t

he arb itr a tio n a g re e me nt t o Pl a int if f res ul ted in Plaintiff not knowing a

nd understandingthe conse quence s of sig ning suc h.

The Court has unde rtake n an ex haustive re view of Te nnessee law in this area and is of the opinion that the fa cts of this case do not w arr ant the enf orce ment of an arbitration ag ree ment. Fr om the fore g oing f indings of f

act, the Court c oncludes ther e was no mee ting of

the minds betwee n the parties as to whethe r cla ims on behalf of [Decede nt] should be subject to ar bitration.

Fr om the foreg oing lang uag e, it appea rs t hat t he trial court applied a subj ective me eting of the minds standard to dete rmine whe ther the parties mutually assented to be bound by the Arbitration Ag ree ment contained w ithin the Admissi on Ag ree ment. Such application wa s in error

.

B. L e ga l Ef fe c t of Ms. Bro ad

nax ’s Sig nat ure-6-

Having f o u n d t h at the trial c ourt err ed in applying a subjective, rather than a

n objective, standard to a scer

tain mutuality

of asse nt, we must determine whether , using the corr ect standa rd, Tenne ssee law

deems Ms. B roadnax to have a ssented to the Ar bitration Ag ree ment.

We b e g in w itha

de sc ri pti on

of the Ad mis sio n A g re e me nt a

nd Ar bit ra tio n A gr e e m e nt , a s w e ll
as a discussion of the circ umstances surrounding their execution. The Admissi o n Agr eement consisted of ninete en pag es, including a cove r shee t and a table of conte nts. Attached to the Ad mis sio n A g re e me nt w e re fi ve a pp e nd ic e s a

nd fo ur e xhibi ts, tot a lin g e ig hte e n p a g e s. Exhi bit B was titled “ RE SI D EN T A N D F A C I LI TY A RBI TR A TI ONA G R

EE M EN T ” and c onsisted of two pag es. Eac h of the topics cove red in the A rbitration Ag ree ment, as we ll as the title of eac h of the appendic es and e x hibits, was list ed in the table of contents.

Th e Ar bit ratio n A g re e me nt p ro vid e s, in p art :

I t is un de rs too d and a g re e d by the F a c ili ty a nd the Re sid e nt that a

ny and a ll c la ims , disputes, and controve rsies (he rea fter c ollectively ref err ed to as a

“cla im” or collectively

as “c laims”) ar ising out of, or in connec tion with, or relating in any way to t he Ad mis sio n Ag re e me nt or any se rv ic e or he a lth c are pr ov ide d b y the F a c ili ty

to the Resident shall be resolved ex clusively by binding arbitration t o be conduc ted at
a place ag ree d upon by the Parties, or in the absenc e of such an ag reem en t , at t he Fa cility , in acc ordanc e with the National Arbitration For um Code of Procedure, which is h e r eby

incorporated into this Agre ement. This Ag ree ment shall be g overne d by and interpr eted unde r the F eder al Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. S ections 1-6.

. . . .
The pa rties under stand an d ag ree that this contract c ontains a binding arbitration pr ov isi on wh ic h ma

y be e nf or c e d b y the pa rt ie s, and that

by e nte ri ngint o th is arbitration a g ree ment, the parties are g iving up and waiving their constitutional rig ht to have a ny claim dec ided in a cour

t of law be fore a judg e and a jury , as we ll as any
a pp e a l f ro m a de c isi on or awa rd of dama g e s.

The Resident unde rstands t h at: (a) he/she ha s the rig ht to seek leg al counse l
c on c e rn ingthi s A rb itr a tio n A g re e me nt; (b ) e xec uti on of thi s A g re e me nt i s n ot a prec ondition to admis sion or t o the furnishingof ser vices to the Resident by

the F a c ili t y ; an d

( c ) t h i s A g r e e m e n tm ay

b e r e s c i n d e d

b y w r i t t e nn o t i c e t o t h e F a c i l ity from the Resident within thirty day s of sig nature

.M s
. Br oadna x s i gned her nam e as D ec ede nt ’ s des i gnat ed r epr es ent at i ve at t he end o f t h e A d m i s s i on 2 A gr ee m ent , i t s el f , a s w el l a s a t t he end of A ppendi x 3 ( Pr i vac y) ; A ppendi x 4 ( Fi nanc i al A gr eem ent ) ; A ppendi x 5 (M e d ic a id ); E x h ib it A (B e n e fits); E x h ib it B (A rb itra tio n ); a n d E x h ib it C (T ru st F u n d ).
-7- Th e u n d e r s i g n e d

c e rt i f i e s t h a th e / s h e r e a d

t h i s A g r e e m e n t , t h a ti th a s b e e nf u l ly explained to him/ her, that he/she understands its contents, that he/she has r ece ived a copy of t he provision and that he/she is the Resident, or a pe rson duly authorized by the Re sid e nt o r o the rw ise to e xec ute thi s A g re e me nt a nd a c c e pt i ts t e rm s.

M s

. Br o ad n ax s i gn ed h er n am e as De ce d en t ’s d es i gn at edre p re s en t at i v e a tt h e e n d o f t h e t wo -p age Arbitration Ag ree ment.

I n h e r d e po s i t i on , M s. B ro a dn a x sta te d th a t sh e arr ive d at th e Nurs ingHo me a t a pp ro xima te ly 5:1 5 on the a f

t e r n o o no f F r i d ay , O c t o b e r

3 1 , 2 0 0 3 , t o v i s i tD e c e d e n t

. S h e s t o p p e d a tt h e nu r s e s’ station to sign ce rtain docume nts, as she cla ims she was re quested to do i n a telephone conver sation. Ms. B ro a dn a x tes tif

ie d th a t nu

rs e s we re pr e se nt a t the nurs e s’ statio n, and that sh e “ kn e w the m a ll by fac e.” She the n stated that she sig ned all of the paper s in the Admission Agre ement, seve n signatures total, in “proba bly less than a minute bec ause e very wher e it was for

me to sign, instea d 2 of re ading I j ust signed.” Fur thermore , in her a ffidavit, she state d that “[a]ssum ing [she] was re

ne w in g th e o ld a g r e e me n t an d b a s e d o n th e r e p r e s e n tati o n th a t th e p a c k e t in c lu ded standa rd
a dm i s s i o nf

o r m s , I q u i c k l y s i g n e d

t h e p ap e r s

. ” M s

. B r o a dn a x c l a i m e d t h a tt h e “ o l d

[ B e v e r l y] [A] g ree ment” did not contain an a rbitration ag ree ment. Although Ms. B roadnax has no copy of the B e ve rl y Ag re e me nt, sh e c on te nd s th a t sh e kn ow s it did no t con ta in an arb itr a tio n a g re e me nt b e c a us e “[i] t’s something that Iwouldn’t sign.” Ms. Broa dnax testified that nothing pr evente d her f rom rea ding ove r the doc uments at issue.

Aft er sig ning the documents, Ms. Br oadnax visit ed with Dec edent f or “a half-hour to a[n] hour[.] ” Ms. B roadnax answe red “No” whe n asked if she was “ under a ny kind of pressing obligation . . . to leave the nur sing home at a pa rticular time a fter [she] finished signing the pape rs and visiting with [Dece dent.]” She also answe red “No” when aske d if she tried to find a nurse, a n administrator, or social worke r “to rea d throug h the paper s and explain them to [ her],” althoug h she admitted that nothing prevente d her from doing so. Although Ms. B roadnax ’s af fidavit stated that sh e “ wa s n e ve r g ive n a cop y of the AD R A g re e me nt t o ta ke ho me so that [sh e ] co uld re vie w i t without any

time constraints[,] ” she a cknowledg ed in her deposition that she did not ask for a copy of any of t he papers contained wit hin the Admi ssion Ag ree ment, either on O ctober 31, 2003, or at any time therea fter. Ms. Br oadnax also failed to seek the advice of an attorney following her sig ning of the Admission Ag ree ment and Ar bitration Ag ree ment, althoug h, ag ain, not h i n g preve nted her from doing so.-8-

As we n o ted above , the par ties do not dispute that Ms. Broadnax signe d the Arbitration Ag ree ment, or that she ha d the authority to do so. I nstead, Ms. B roadnax argues that the Ar bitration Ag ree ment should not be enforce d as “an arbitration ag ree ment, unknowing ly signe d by one per son for a nother, is [un] enfor cea

ble .

. . i n a hea lthcare setting.” Ms. Broa dnax cites two cases f or her
ar g u me n t th a t, in th e h e a lt h c ar e s e tt in g , a w a iv e r o f th e r ig h t to a tr ia l b y ju r y must be kn owing

. Fur thermore , she conte nds that “hea vy consideration must be g iven to Appellee ’s s i gnature being p ro cu re d b y A p p el l an t s ’ r ep re s en t at i v e c au s i n g h er t o b el i ev e s h e w as s i gn i n g renewal admission paper s.

I n support of her

argument ag ainst the Arbitration Agr eeme nt’s enfor ceme nt, Ms. B roadnax fi rs t c ite s Howell v. NHC Healthcare-Fort Sander s, Inc. , 109 S.W .3d 731 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) p e rm

. a p p

. d e n ie d (J u n e 3 0, 2003), whe rein the Ea stern Section of this Court aff irmed the trial court’s r efusa l to enforc e an a rbitration and media t ion ag ree ment. I n Ho we ll , a patient’ s husband was pre sented with, and si g ned, a nursing home admis sion ag ree ment upon the patient’s arr ival at the nursing home. Id. at 732. Signingthe contra ct wa s a p re -requisite to admissi on. Id. The hu sb and c ou ld n ot r e a d, and

the re fo re , a

nurs ingho me a dmi nis tr a tor e xpla ine d the a g re e me nt t o h im, rathe r than a sking the husband t o re ad i t. Id. The a dminist rator’ s “explanation did not mention, much less explain, that he was waiving a rig ht to a jury trial[.] ” Id. We held that “the de fenda nt who is s e e kin g to e nf

or c e the arb itr a tio n p ro vis ion ha s th e burd e n o f s ho wi ngthe pa rties ‘a c tua lly barg ained ove r the a

rbitration provision or that it was a r ea s onable ter m consideringthe circ umstances.’ ” Id. at 7 3 5 (q u o t i n g Brown v. K aremor Int’l Inc. , No. 01A01-9807- CH-00368,1999 WL 221799, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 1999)). We found t he agr eeme nt unenfor cea ble base d up on the fo llo wi ngfa c ts:

(1) the ag ree ment was eleven pag es l ong and the mediation and arbitration provisions
wer e on pag e ten; (2) the arbitration a nd mediation provisions w ere “‘bur ied’” in the larg er a dmission agr eeme nt, “[r] ather than beinga s t an d -a lone document” ; (3) the arbitration and mediation provisions wer e printed in the same font size as the other text in the ag ree ment; ( 4) “the arbitration pa rag raph does not a dequate ly explain how the ar b it r a ti o np r o c e d

u r e w o u ld

w o r k , e xc e p t a s w h o w o u ld

a dmi n is te r

it ” ; ( 5 ) the patient had to be a dmitted in a nursing home “expeditiously ” and the admiss i on ag ree ment had to be sig ned first; (6) the admission ag ree ment was presented to the patient’s husband on a “take -it-or-le ave- it” basis; ( 7) the patient’s husband “had no
rea l barg aining power ”; and ( 8) the patient’s husband could not re ad and the nursing h ome re prese ntative did not “ade quately” explain the provision that waived the patie nt’ s r ig ht t o a

jur y tr ia l.

Raiteri v. NHC Health care/Knoxville, Inc. , No. E2003-00068- COA-R9-CV, 2003 WL23094413, at *1 (Te nn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2003) (q u o t i n g Ho we ll , 109 S.W .3d at 734-35).-9-

Ne xt, Ms . B ro a dn a x cit e s Raiteri v. NHC Health care/Knoxville, Inc. , No. E2003-00068- COA-R9-CV, 2003 WL23094413, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec

. 30, 2003), in which we reve rsed the tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r g ra

nti ngthe de fe nd ant’ s mo tio n to c omp e l me diatio n and arb itr a tio n purs ua nt t o a nursinghome admission ag ree ment. I n Ra ite ri , we a g ain stated “ that the par ty seekingto enforc e an alter native dispute re solution agr eeme nt must show that the parties “‘ac tually ’ barg ained ove r the arbitration provision or that it was a re as o n ab l e ter m consideringthe circ umstances.” Id. at *7 (q u o t i n g Ho we ll , 109 S.W .3d at 734). Finding that the “pr ovisions, especially the waive r of the r ight to a jury trial”–c ontained within the contra ct of a dhesion–wer e “outside the rea sonable e x pectations of a r easona

ble consumer ,” we ref

used to enfor ce suc h. Id. at *9.

Rely ing on Ho we ll

and Ra ite ri , Ms. Broa dnax asserts that “in healthcare settings . . . more tha n a sig natur e on

a pie c e of pa

pe r” is re qu ir e d to enf

or c e an a rb itr a tio n a g re e me nt. She se e ms t o argue that the arbitration provision, in the i nstant case , was e ither not “ba rg ained ove r” or

was not “re asonable . . . consideringthe circ umstances.” Se eHow e ll , 109 S.W .3d at 735.

I n Est ate of Mo oring v . Ki ndre d N urs ing Ctr s. , N o

. W2 0 0 7

- 0 2 8 7 5

- CO A

- R3

- CV , 2 0 0 9 WL 130184, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. J an. 20, 2009), w e held that pr oof “‘ that the par ties actua lly

barg ained
o v e r [an ] ar b it r a ti o na g r e e me n t o r

th a t i t w a s a

r e a s o n a b le te r m c o n s id e r in g th e c ir c u ms ta n c e s [, ] .

. . ha s o nly

be e n r e qu ir e d in

c a se s d e a lin g wi th c on tr a c ts o f a dh e sio n. ’” (c itatio n o mitte d) ; se eals o Reagan v. Kindr ed Health care O perating, In c. , N o

. M 2 0 0 6

- 0 2 1 9 1

- CO A

- R3

- CV , 2 0 0 7 WL 4523092, at *13 n.11 (Tenn. Ct. App. De c. 20, 2007) perm. app. de nied (F e b. 17 , 2 00 9) ; Di

ag nos tic Ctr . v. Ste v e n B. S

tub ble fi e ld, M. D. , P

.C. , 215 S.W .3d 843, 847 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) perm. app. denied (F eb. 26, 2007). A “contrac t of adhesion” is defined a s “‘a standardized contr act f

orm offe red to consumers of g oods and ser vices on e ssentially

a ‘take it or leave it’ basis, without affor ding the
c on sume r a

re a lis tic op po rt

un ity to ba

rg a in u nd e r s uc h c on dit ion s th a t th e c on sume r c ann ot o bta in the desire d product or service except by acquie scing to the form of the contra ct.’” Id. at *4 (quoting Buraczynsk

i v. Eyring , 919 S.W .2d 314, 32 0 (Tenn. 1996) ). Contrac ts of adhesion a re not automatically

unenfor cea

ble. Id. To de te rm ine the e nf or c e a bil ity of a c on tr a c t of a dh e sio n, c ourt s g ener ally look to whether “ the terms of the contra ct ar e beyond the re asonable expectations of an ordinary person, or oppre ssive or unconsc ionable.” Id. (c i t i n g Taylor v. Butler , 142 S.W .3d 277, 285 (Tenn. 2004) ).

I n th e in s ta nt case , beca

use the Ar bitration Ag ree ment expli citly stated that neither

admission nor the fur

nishing of se rvice s was pre -conditioned upon signing such, and that it could be re scinded within thirty

day s, we find that the Arbitration Ag ree ment was not a contra ct of adhe sion; therefor e, Nursing Home wa s not require d to prove that the pa rties barg ained over the terms of the Ar bitration Ag ree ment or that its terms wer e re asonable . There fore , we must deter mine if Ms. Br oadnax ’s signingthe Arbitration Agr eeme nt, alone, evide nced he r asse nt to be bound by its terms.-10-

One wa y a p arty ma

y s h o w h is o r h e r a s s e n t to b e b o u n d b y th e te r ms o f a c o n trac t is by signingthe contra ct. Moody Realty Co., Inc. , 2 3 7 S

. W

. 3 d at 6 7 4 (c i t i n g Bu rto n v . W arre n F ar me rs Coop. , 129 S.W .3d 513, 521 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)) . “A pa rty is presumed to know the c ontents of
a contra ct he has sig ned.” Philpot v. Te nn. H

ealth Mgm t. Inc. , --- S.W .3d

--- -, 2007 WL 4340874, at *6 (Te nn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2007) per m. a pp. denied (F eb

. 1 7 , 2 0 0 9 ) ( ci t i n g Re no v . S un Tru st, Inc. , N o. E2 00 6- 01 64 1- CO A- R3- CV , 2 00 7 WL 90 72 56 , at *3 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. Mar. 26 , 2 00 7) ; Giles v. Allstate Ins. Co., Inc. , 871 S.W .2d 154, 157 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993)) . “The law imparts a duty on parties to a c ontrac t to learn the c ontents and stipulations of a contra ct bef ore sig ning it, and sig ning it without l ear

ning suc h information is at the par ty ’s own per il.” Id. (citations omitted). “[T] o allow a par ty to a contra ct to admit that the party signe d the contra ct but to deny th at t h e t er m s of the contra ct express the par

ty ’s ag ree ment would destroy the value of

contra cts.” Re no , 2007 WL 9 0 7 2 5 6 , at * 4 (c i t i n g Giles , 871 S.W. 2d a t 15 7) ; see also W

ebber v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. , 49 S.W .3d 265, 274 (Tenn. 2001) (“‘ I t will not do f o r a m an t o en ter into a c ontrac t, and, when called upon to r espond to its obligations, to say that he did not rea d it whe n he signe d it, or did not know what it containe d. I f this were permitted, contra cts would no t b e wo rt h the pape r on which t h ey ar e w ri t t en

. ’” ) ( qu o t i n g De Ford v

. Nat’l Li fe &Acc ident Ins. Co. , 185 S.W .2d 617, 621 (Tenn. 1945)).

I n Giles v. Allstate Ins. Co, Inc. , 871 S.W .2d 154 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993), the Eastern Sec tion of this Court considere d the eff ect of fa iling to re ad a doc ument befor e sig ning. I n Giles , the plaintiff filed a c omplaint ag ainst her insura nce c ompany , Allstate, afte r Allstate failed to pa y a cla im. Id. at 155. I n its answe r, All state st ated that it had refused to pay the pl aintiff’s claim beca use she ha d made materia l misreprese ntations in her policy ’s applica tion. Id. Specifica lly , Allstate alleg ed that the pla int if

f f a ile d to dis c los e that he r fo rm e r ins ur anc e c arr ie r ha d pa id h e r $ 10 0, 00 0 f or a fi re jus t six months prior to he r application with Allstate, and that her pre vious carr ier ha d ref used to rene w her policy

. Id. Pla int if

f c la ime d w he n sh e ini tia lly c on ta c te d Al lst a te c on c e rn ing c ov e ra g e , sh e tol d Allstate’s ag ent about the fire and the loss of cover ag e. Id. She further claimed that when Allstate’ s ag ent met with her in he r home, he asked he r the que stions from the application, and she answe red truthfully

. Id. After answe ring the questions, she signe d the application without reading it. Id. She
wa s g ive n a

c arb on c op y of the a pp lic a tio n, bu t fai led to re a d it , a nd thu s, did no t kn owthat it contained incorre ct i nformation unti l afte r her loss occurr ed. Id. Although the trial court a ffor ded
c re dib ili ty

to t he pla int if

f’ s te sti mony

that sh e re ve a le d th e inf or matio n c on c e rn ingthe fi re t o Alls t at e’ s age n t in the initial telephone conve rsation, it found that this was not controlling. Id. at 156. I n aff

irming the trial court’ s denial of r ecove ry under the policy , this Court st ated: This same issue has be en bef ore the courts in this jurisdiction in numerous ca ses and they have consistently held: “[T] hat i f, wit hout being the vi ctim of fraud [the insured] fa ils to r e a d th e c on tr a c t or oth e rw ise to l e a

rn its con te nts , h e sig ns the same a t hi s peril and is e stopped to deny his obligation, will be conc lusively presumed to know the conte n ts o f

th e c o n tr a c t, an d

mu s t s u f

f e r th e c o n s e qu e n c e s o f

h is own neg lige nce.”

Id. (citations omitted).-11-

On a pp e a l, M s. B ro a dn a x sta te s tha t Nur sin g Ho me re pr e se nte d to he r “ that th e do c ume nts to be si g ned were identical to previously signe d documents[,] ” and insists that “hea vy consideration
mus t be g ive n to Ap pe lle e ’s sig natur e be ingpr oc ur e d b y Ap pe lla nts ’ re pr e se ntativ e c a

us ing he r t o b el i ev e sh e wa s s i g n i n g re ne wal a dmi ssi on pa pe rw or k. ” We f

e e l th e ne e d to a dd

re ss M s. Br oadnax’s appar ent claim that she w as “tric ked” into sig ning the Arbitration Agr eeme nt. Nothing in t he re c or d, oth e r t

ha n Ms

. Broa dn a x’s o wn

te sti mony , s ug g e sts that N ur sin g Ho me ma de fa lse statements or re prese ntations to Ms. Br oadnax c oncer ning the terms of the Admission Agr eeme nt or Arbitration Agr eeme nt. Ms. Broa dnax claims that the Beve rly Ag ree ment did not contain an arbitration ag ree ment, and that any classification by Nursing Home of the Admission Agr eeme nt or Ar bit ratio n A g re e me nt a s a

“ re ne wa l” is s ome ho w i na c c ur a te , mi sle a din g , o r e ve n f raudu le nt. Be cause Ms. Broa dnax has failed to produce the Bever ly Ag ree ment, she ca nnot establish that such
a g re e me nt did no t con ta in a n a rb itr a tio n a g re e me nt. Th e on ly pr oo f i n th e re c or d th a t th e B e ve rl y Ag ree ment did not also contain an arbitration a g ree ment is Ms. Br oadnax’s deposi t i o n t es timony
c on c e rn inghe r a ff

ida vit , a s f oll ow s:

Q. At No. 5 [in y our af fidavit] y ou state t h at “Iwas pre sented a n Admissions Ag ree ment[, t he B ever ly Agre em ent,] which did not contain an A DR Ag ree ment.” Now, do you still have a copy today of the Admissions Ag ree ment to which y ou ref er in sente nce N o. 5? A. No. Q. Okay . Did y ou keep one at y our house? A. Itho ug ht I

did , b ut I c ou ldn ’t fi nd it. Q. So in parag raph 5 you say that there was no AD R agr ee m ent i n that Admissions A g r e e me n t. H o w d o y o uk n o w th a t t

h e r e w a s n o ADR Ag re e me nt? A. I t’s something that Iwouldn’t sign. Q. So on the basis of y our belief that y ou should not sign such an agr eeme nt, y ou kn o w t h a t yo u d i d n o t s i g n an a g r e e m e n t , an A D R a g r e e m e n t w i t h B e v e r l y; i s t h a tyo u r

t e s t i m o n y? A. Ye s.

Ms. Broa dnax’s reasoningis obviously flawe d. She claims that the B ever l y Agre ement did not contain an a

rbitra t i o n agr ee m ent, bec ause if it had, she would not have sig ned it; however , the Ad mis sio n A g re e me nt a

t issu e , whi c h M s. B ro a dn a x sig ne d, did c on ta in a n A rb itr a tio n A g re e me nt. Thus , w e fi nd that Ms. Br oa dn a x ha s f a ile d to pr ov e that N ur sin g Ho me mis re pr e se nte d th e te rm sW e not e t hat the t r i al c our t m ade no c r edi bi l i t y de t er m i nat i ons c once r ni ng M s
. Br oadna x or t he N ur s i ng 3 H om e.
-12- of the Ad mis sio n A g re e me nt o r A rb itr a tio n A g re e me nt, or that it perpe tr a te d a

fr a ud a g a ins t Ms

. Br oadnax in procuringher sig nature

. 3

Ba sed on the c ases c ited above, w e find it i n ap propriate to relieve Ms. Broa dnax from the op e ratio n o f t

he Ar bit ratio n A g re e me nt, du e to h e r f a ilure to r e a d th e do c ume nt b e fo re sig nin g it. I n s o r uli ng , w e no te that Ms . B ro a dn a x ha d th e a bil ity to as k que sti on s con c e rn ing the do c ume nts , was fr ee to se ek indepe ndent leg al advice, and wa s g iven ample time to re view the doc uments. Moreove r, the Ar

bitr ati on Ag ree ment expressly stated that by

signingsuch, Ms. Br oadnax was “g iving up a

nd waiving [her] constitutional rig ht to have any claim dec ided in a cour

t of law be fore
a jud g e and

a jur y ,” tha t e xec uti on

wa s n ot a pr e c on dit ion

to a dmi ssi on

or the fu rn ish ingof

se rv ic e s, and that it could be r escinde d withi n thirty day s. We further note that althoug h the Arbitration Ag ree ment was attached to a som ewhat leng thy document, the Admission Ag ree ment contained a table of c ontents, which should have dr awn Ms. B roadnax ’s attenti o n t o the inclusion of the Arbitration Ag ree ment, which was a separ ate exhibi t. Be cause Ms. B roadnax has failed to prove that Nurs ingHo me e ith e r misr e pr e se nte d the te rm s o f t he Ar bit ratio n A g re e me nt o r a c te d f ra ud ule ntl y in inducing he r to sig n such, we find that Ms. Br oadnax’s signature e vidence s her a ssent to be bound by the Arbitration Agr eeme nt’s terms.

V. C ONCL US I ON
For the af oreme ntioned rea sons, we re verse the dec ision of the circ uit court and re mand for furth e r p r o c e e d in g s

. H a v in g f

o u n d th a t t h e tr ia l c o u rt e r

r e d in r e f u s in g to e n f

o r c e th e A r

b it r a tion Ag ree ment, we ne ed not consider Nursing Home’s r emaining issues. Costs of t his appea l are taxed t o A p p e l l e e , C o r i n e B r o a dn a x , f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o nm ay i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ AL ANE. HI GH ERS , P. J. , W .S.