alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Shawn M. CONNORS v. James M. LEBLANC, Secretary Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections and Alvin Jones, Warden River Bend Detention Center.

No. 2011-CC-1081.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 23, 2011.

In re Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections; State of Louisiana; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of East Carroll, 6th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 21,426; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46579-CW.

Denied.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Jerome WHITE.

No. 2010-KK-2442.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 17, 2010.

In re White, Jerome; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 494-998; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1112.

Denied.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Stephen J. Markman

, Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen

Kurtis T. Wilder,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster , Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

May 31, 2017

a0522 

# Order

Clerk May 31, 2017

153924(136)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 153924

COA: 320773

Berrien CC: 2013

- 000303

- FC

JOVON CHARLES DAVIS,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s January 31,

2017 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not ap pear that the order was

entered erroneously.
#### Tyler C. HALE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D10-5376.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Feb. 16, 2011.

Tyler C. Hale, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Brooke Poland, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant challenges the denial of a motion for posteonviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing.

In his motion, Appellant alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to convey a plea offer of three years’ imprisonment. In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to convey a plea offer, a defendant must prove “(1) counsel failed to communicate a plea offer or misinformed defendant concerning the penalty faced, (2) defendant would have accepted the plea offer but for the inadequate notice, and (3) acceptance of the State’s plea offer would have resulted in a lesser sentence.” *Cottle v. State,*733 So.2d 963, 967 (Fla.1999).

Here, Appellant made all the required allegations. The trial court denied the claim on the basis of a statement made by Appellant during the plea colloquy. The following exchange occurred after Appellant apparently learned of the three-year offer for the first time:

> APPELLANT: Yeah. I mean, I just haven’t heard any — I mean, I hear the State saying that they offered me something. I haven’t heard of that. They said that I denied something in open court? I never denied any — any offer that they had given me. And I’ve — you know, I admit to the violation, but, I mean, *I would be willing to get this off the docket today with six to nine months’ county jail time.*

> COURT: Okay. Is there any offer from the State at this point?

> PROSECUTOR: No, Judge. It’s a plea straight up.

(Emphasis added.)

The trial court held that the highlighted language indicates that “[Appellant] in fact *593would not have accepted a three-year offer, but would have accepted an offer of six to nine months in the county jail.” We would conclude that the highlighted language is insufficient to conclusively refute Appellant’s assertion that he would have accepted a three-year plea offer. The highlighted language merely indicates an offer that Appellant was making to the State; it was not a declaration that a sentence of six to nine months was the only offer he was willing to accept.

Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND for the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to convey a plea offer.

VAN NORTWICK, THOMAS, and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.
540 A.2d 343

#### Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, Appellant *v.*John F. Gross, Appellee.

Submitted on briefs January 5, 1988,

to President Judge Crumlish, Jr., Judge Colins, and Senior Judge Blatt, sitting as a panel of three.

*385
      *Harold H. Cramer,.*Assistant , Counsel, with him, *Spencer A. Manthorpe,-.*Chief Counsel, and *Henry. G. Barr,*General Counsel, for appellant.

No appearance for appellee.

April 18, 1988:

Opinion by

Judge Blatt,

The Department of Transportation (DOT) appeals an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) which: reversed DOTs order suspending the operating- privileges of John F. Gross (driver) for a period of six months.

On January 21, 1983, the driver was cited for a violation of Section 1543 of the Vehicle Code (Code), 75 Pa. C. S. §1543.(driving while;his operating privileges were suspended),1 and, on December 29, 1983, he pled guilty to that offense by paying a fine. Section 6501(b) of the Code, '75 Pa. C. S.-' §6501(b) (payment of fine for Vehicle Code violation constitutes plea of guilty). On that same day, by coincidence, his operating privileges were' restored by DOT. He then applied for a new license, which he subsequently obtained. However] when DOT received the certified record of conviction for the Section 1543 violation (i.e., notice of payment of the fine), it mailed him a notice of suspension on March 27, 1984. He appealed this suspension to the trial court on September 6, 1984. The trial court denied DOTs motion to quash his appeal as untimely and then sustained the appeal. DOTs Appeal here then followed.

*386DOT contends that the trial court erred in foiling to quash the drivers appeal as untimely, noting that it was filed more than thirty days after the entry of DOTs suspension order. We must agree.

Sections 5571(b) and 5572 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C. S. §§5571(b)-5572 provide that appeals from a government unit to a court must be commenced within thirty days after entry of the order and that the date of mailing, if service is made by mail, shall be deemed to be the date of entry of the order. In the case *sub judice,*DOT mailed the notice of suspension to the driver on March 27, 1984, and the record indicates that he filed his appeal on. September 6, 1984, which is clearly beyond' the 30-day. statutory limit. *See Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Bower,*48 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 379, 410 A.2d 91 (1980).

Accordingly, we believe that the trial court was without jurisdiction to reverse DOTs suspension order. We shall, therefore, reinstate DOTs order suspending the drivers operating privileges for six months.

Order

And Now, this 18th day of April, 1988, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in the above-captioned matter is hereby reversed and the order of the Department of Transportation suspending the operating privileges of John F. Gross is hereby reinstated. , .

DOT suspended the drivers operating privileges on May 5, 1981 because of his failure to respond to a Maryland citation.
exv10w1






Exhibit 10.1




December 31, 2008




Stephen Hamilton

Vice-President – Finance

Lighting Science Group Corporation

2100 McKinney Avenue, Suite 1555

Dallas, TX 75201




Re: Satisfaction of our outstanding invoices




Dear Mr. Hamilton:



This letter sets forth our understanding of the terms upon which Lighting Science Group Corporation
(“LSG”) has agreed to satisfy payment of our outstanding invoices in the amount of $2,799,665.18
(the “Amount Due”) for services rendered to LSG during August–December, 2008, pursuant to the
invoices itemized in Exhibit A attached hereto.



You have advised us that LSG has through action of its board of directors authorized creation of a
series C preferred stock (the “Preferred Stock”) having the rights and preferences set forth in
Exhibit B attached hereto, and a warrant to purchase shares of common stock of LSG (the “Warrant”)
in the form set forth in Exhibit C attached hereto. The Preferred Stock and Warrant will be issued
today and we will be the record holder of the Preferred Stock and Warrant effective today. On or
about January 5, 2009 LSG will deliver to our firm a stock certificate representing 219,582 shares
of the Preferred Stock (the “Preferred Shares”) and the Warrant. You will cause Haynes and Boone,
LLP, counsel for LSG, to deliver to our firm at the time of the issuance of the Preferred Shares
and Warrant its opinion (subject to customary qualifications and assumptions), addressed to our
Firm and dated the date hereof, that LSG is validly existing as a Delaware corporation, the
Preferred Shares have been duly authorized and issued, and are fully paid and non-assessable, and
the Warrant has been duly authorized.



LSG confirms that (1) it will not register the Preferred Stock under section 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and (2) it has received independent counsel with respect to the transaction
contemplated by this letter. We confirm that we are acquiring the Preferred Stock and Warrant for
our own account for investment only and not with a view towards, or for resale in connection with,
the public sale or distribution of the Preferred Stock or Warrant (including the shares of Common
stock underlying the Warrant), except pursuant to sales registered or exempted under the Securities
Act of 1933, as amended.



 









 





Stephen Hamilton, Vice-President – Finance

December 31, 2008

Page Two




Please sign in the place set forth below a copy of this letter, and it will then become an
agreement between us on the terms set forth above. Signatures may be on separate counterparts.



Sincerely,




/s/ Peter J. Pfister




Peter J. Pfister

For Morrison & Foerster LLP




Accepted and agreed to this 31st day of December, 2008




Lighting Science Group Corporation




	 	 	 	 	 
	By: 

Name:

	 	/s/ Stephen Hamilton
 

Stephen Hamilton
	 	 
	Title:

	 	Vice-President – Finance