alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-1403

ALBERT JAMES GOMES; ARLENE MARIA GOMES,

Petitioners,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals.

Submitted: November 19, 2013 Decided: December 16, 2013

Before SHEDD, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Rishi P. Oza, ROBERT BROWN LLC, Cleveland, Ohio, for 

Petitioners. Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, 

William C. Peachey, Assistant Director, Lindsay Corliss, Office 

of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 

Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Albert James Gomes and his wife, Arlene Maria Gomes, 

natives and citizens of Bangladesh, petition for review of an 

order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) denying 

their motion to reconsider. We have reviewed the record and the 

Board’s order and conclude that the Board did not abuse its 

discretion in denying the motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), (b) 

(2013). We therefore deny the petition for review. See In re: 

Gomes (B.I.A. Feb. 27, 2013). We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before this court and argument would not aid 

the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
#### Paul BRANCH, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D12-4077.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Oct. 22, 2012.

Paul Branch, pro se, Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

DENIED. *See Ward v. State,*875 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

BENTON, C.J., THOMAS and ROWE, JJ., concur.
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#### Clarence SAMUELS v. Brenda ACKLIN, et al.

No. 2010-CI-0613.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 4, 2011.

In re Samuels, Clarence; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 571,614; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 CA 1279.

Denied.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BALJIT KAUR,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 10-70512

Agency No. A098-176-995

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 17, 2012** 

Before: SCHROEDER, THOMAS, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges

Baljit Kaur, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the Board of

Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s

decision denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and

protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We review for

FILED

JUL 27 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 10-70512

substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, applying the new standards

governing adverse credibility determinations created by the Real ID Act. Shrestha

v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010). We have jurisdiction under 8

U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition for review.

We reject Kaur’s challenge to the agency’s adverse credibility determination

because the record does not compel a finding of credibility given the many

discrepancies between her testimony and supporting documents. See id. at 1048

(adverse credibility finding reasonable under the totality of the circumstances);

Don v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 738, 741-45 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding adverse

credibility finding where “a reasonable factfinder could have reached this result”);

Wang v. INS, 352 F.3d 1250, 1257-58 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding adverse

credibility finding based in part on inconsistencies between testimonial and

documentary evidence and concluding evidence presented did not compel contrary

result). Accordingly, in the absence of credible testimony, we deny the petition as

to Kaur’s asylum and withholding of removal claims. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348

F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).

Finally, because Kaur’s CAT claim is based on the same statements the

agency found not credible, and she does not point to any other evidence in the

record that compels the conclusion that it is more likely than not she would be
3 10-70512

tortured by or with the acquiescence of the government if returned to India, her

CAT claim fails. See id. at 1156-57.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
#### Wheeler & Dabney et al. v. Samuel Roberts.

(No. 1622.)

Error from Waller County.

Opinion by

Hurt, J.

§127. *Answer is equivalent to citation.*Where a defendant answers in a suit, it is equivalent to service of citation upon him, although he afterwards withdraws his answer.

§ 128. *Payee of note, who is not the legal owner of it, cannot maintain suit thereon in his own name.*It is settled in this state, that the payee of a note will not be permitted to sue for the use of the assignee and real owner of the note, when the petition alleges the legal ownership and possession of the note to be in the parties for whose use he sues. If, however, he have the legal title to the note, he may maintain a suit upon it for the use of the equitable owner thereof. [Anderson v. Shaw, Opinion of Commissioners of Appeal, adopted by Supreme Court, 8 Tex. Law Review, 171.]

§ 129. *Judgment nil dicit; construction and effect of.*A judgment *nil dicit*is construed even inore liberally than a judgment by default. It is a waiver of all errors that can be waived, unless it exceeds the amount claimed in the petition. It is tantamount to a confession of judgment for the amount which is made certain by the petition, but, if it be in excess of that amount, it will be set aside as to the excess. [Wheeler v. Page, 5 Tex. 202; Gilder v. McIntyre, 29 Tex. 89; Goodlet v. Sparks, 2 Tex. 121; Winfried v. Yates, Dallam, 304; Wescott v. Menard, id. 503; Wheeler v. Pope, 5 Tex. 262; Grier v. Powell, 14 Tex. 320; Strong v. Nichols, 22 Tex. 87; W. & W. Con. Rep. §11.] Thus, where a rate of exchange was *125alleged in the petition, the judgment *nil elicit*admitted the allegation, and there was no necessity to prove the rate. In this case the judgment *nil elicit*was rendered for a larger amount than was claimed in the petition, and the judgment was reversed and reformed as to the excess, adjudging the costs of the writ of error against plaintiffs in error, because it was the duty of plaintiffs in error to have had this error corrected in the court below. [Green v. Powell, 14 Tex. 320.]

March 12, 1884.

Reversed and reformed.
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AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
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#### Debbie SPOONER, Appellant, v. POMPYS TYPESETTING & PRINT & RISK ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT, Appellees.

No. 1D10-1535.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Oct. 25, 2010.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 23, 2010.

Kimberly A. Hill of Kimberly A. Hill, P.L., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellant.

Henry J. Roman of Vernis & Bowling of Broward, P.A., Hollywood, for Appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Claimant, Debbie Spooner, challenges an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) which provided alternative grounds for denying her claims for disability benefits. In the order on appeal, the JCC determined that Claimant was not entitled to permanent total disability benefits because Claimant failed to prove that her injury was catastrophic under the definition provided by section 440.02(34)(f), Florida Statutes (1997). The JCC also determined that Claimant was not entitled to temporary disability benefits because Claimant reached maximum medical improvement prior to the periods for which *93benefits were sought. Because these findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence, we affirm the denial of Claimant’s request for benefits. However, the JCC’s alternative findings that Claimant failed to establish major contributing cause were an improper application of the law. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the denial of the claim for benefits and REMAND with directions to strike the findings concerning major contributing cause in the order.

WOLF, DAVIS, and WETHERELL, JJ., concur.
I 

★

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1425 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 

4551 East 52nd Street in Odessa, Texas, as the ‘‘Staff Sergeant Marvin 

‘Rex’ Young Post Office Building’’. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 9, 2007 

Mr. CONAWAY (for himself, Mr. BARTON of Texas, Mr. BRADY of Texas, Mr. 

BURGESS, Mr. CARTER, Mr. CUELLAR, Mr. CULBERSON, Mr. DOGGETT, 

Mr. EDWARDS, Mr. GOHMERT, Mr. GONZALEZ, Ms. GRANGER, Mr. AL

GREEN of Texas, Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas, Mr. HALL of Texas, Mr. 

HENSARLING, Mr. HINOJOSA, Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas, Mr. SAM

JOHNSON of Texas, Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas, Mr. 

LAMPSON, Mr. MARCHANT, Mr. MCCAUL of Texas, Mr. NEUGEBAUER, 

Mr. ORTIZ, Mr. PAUL, Mr. POE, Mr. REYES, Mr. RODRIGUEZ, Mr. SESSIONS, Mr. SMITH of Texas, and Mr. THORNBERRY) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

A BILL 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 4551 East 52nd Street in Odessa, Texas, 

as the ‘‘Staff Sergeant Marvin ‘Rex’ Young Post Office 

Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


pwalker on PROD1PC71 with BILLS
2 

HR 1425 IH1S 

1 SECTION 1. STAFF SERGEANT MARVIN ‘‘REX’’ YOUNG POST 

2 OFFICE BUILDING. 

3 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

4 Postal Service located at 4551 East 52nd Street in Odes5 sa, Texas, shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Staff 

6 Sergeant Marvin ‘Rex’ Young Post Office Building’’. 

7 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg8 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

9 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

10 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Staff Sergeant Marvin 

11 ‘Rex’ Young Post Office Building’’. 

Æ 


pwalker on PROD1PC71 with BILLS
#### Stratton, etc. et al. *v.*Jarvis d/b/a Jarvis Construction Company.

[No. 19,323.

Filed September 21, 1961.]

*221
      *Wilbur F. Dassel,*of Evansville, for appellant.

*Bamberger, Foreman, Oswald & Hahn,*of Evansville, for appellee.

Kelley, J.

The trial court, after a hearing on the issues presented by appellee's complaint, entered its findings of fact, stated its conclusion of law thereon, and decreed a temporary injunction, enjoining and restraining the appellants from certain particularized actions and activities relating to alleged interference and obstruction of certain construction work then being performed by appellee and its employees.

Appellants brought up this appeal from said decree assigning as the sole error that the' court “erred in granting a temporary injunction” against them.

After the cause was fully briefed, the appellee filed on May 29, 1961, a verified motion to dismiss this appeal on the alleged ground that the question presented by said assignment of error has become moot, in that after the issuance of said temporary injunction appellants ceased the enjoined actions and appellee thereafter, on January 21, 1960, completed the performance of his said construction work and the causes for the issuance of said temporary injunction no longer exist.

Appellee has made due proof of the service on appellants’ counsel of a copy of appellee’s said motion to dismiss this appeal and, also, a copy of his brief in support thereof. Appellants have not controverted nor made any objection or opposition to appellee’s said motion to dismiss their appeal. The allegations of appellee’s said verified motion to dismiss this appeal were of such nature, we think, as to cast *222upon appellants the duty, as an aid to this court, of responding thereto if any of said allegations were deemed by appellants to be untrue or to warrant explanation. It follows, therefore, in the absence of any objection, response, or opposition thereto by appellants, that the latters’ non-action is tantamount to their consent that this appeal should be dismissed.

It appears from the record herein that events subsequent to the appeal of this case and the briefing thereof have caused the question involved herein to become moot. In such circumstances, a motion to dismiss is proper. *Buck*v. *K. G. Schmidt Brewing Co.*(1952), 123 Ind. App. 217, 105 N. E. 2d 823. We do not find that the question sought to be presented involves any matter of great public interest or that the same affects the public generally. And it now appears that there is no longer any actual justiciable controversy between these parties. Appellee’s work has been completed and the temporary injunction enjoining appellants interference therewith has fully served its function. Any order, decision or opinion we could or might now make or render would be futile and incapable of any derivative benefit to either party.

This appeal is dismissed.

Pfaff, C. J., Bierly, Gonas, JJ., concur.

Note. — Reported in 177 N. E. 2d 42.
Exhibit
32.1





Certification
of Periodic Financial Report


Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350





Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, each of the undersigned officers of RC2 Corporation
(the "Company") certifies that the Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for
the year ended December 31, 2009 fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in that
Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company.





Dated:  March 1,
2010                                                                         /s/ Curtis W.
Stoelting


Curtis W. Stoelting


Chief Executive Officer








Dated:  March 1,
2010                                                                         
/s/ Peter A.
Nicholson


Peter A. Nicholson


Chief Financial Officer





This certification is made solely for purpose of 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, subject to the knowledge standard contained therein, and not for
any other purpose.
#### Pamela SKINNER, et al. v. CHRISTUS ST. FRANCES CABRINI HOSPITAL, et al.

No. 2011-C-0045.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 18, 2011.

In re Skinner, Estate of, Robert W.; Skinner, Pamela et al.; —Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 220,689; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-817.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.
#### Whiting etc., et al. *v.*Evansville-Vanderburgh Regional Plan Commission.

[No. 19,662.

Filed November 6, 1961.]

*438*Johnson & Carroll,*ox Evansville, for appellants. *Jerome L. Salm,*of Evansville, for appellee.

Pfaff, C. J.

It appears from the record that this appeal was submitted September 26, 1961, and notice issued to the parties. On October 30, 1961, appellants filed with the clerk a petition for extension of time to file brief and to authorize late filing thereof. This petition contained an acknowledgment of receipt of this petition by appellee and appellee’s consent to the extension of time and the late filing of appellants’ brief.

Under Rule 2-15 of the Supreme Court, 1958 Revision, appellant is required to file his brief before the expiration of thirty days after submission of the appeal, and this rule further provides that if the brief is not filed within the time limited the clerk shall enter an order dismissing the appeal, unless a petition for extension of time is on file.

> “It is the duty of the clerk to examine the record and ascertain if appellant has timely filed a brief. The court writes no opinion in these cases, although where the clerk overlooks the late filing and neglects to enter the order, the court may order him to do so, or may itself make the order. Smith v. Wells Mfg. Co. (1896), 144 Ind. 266, 43 N. E. 131; Leatherman v. Board of Comrs. (1897), 148 *439Ind. 282, 47 N. E. 458; Manns Boot etc. Co. v. Templeton (1896), 149 Ind. 708, 44 N. E. 1108.” Flanagan, Wiltrout & Hamilton’s Indiana Trial & Appellate Practice, §2666, ch. 52, Comment 4, p. 283.

In the cases of *Leatherman*v. *Board of Comrs., supra,*and *Manns Boot etc. Co.*v. *Templeton, supra,*it was also held that an agreement by the parties that the appeal shall not be dismissed for late filing of appellants’ brief will not save it from dismissal, for the rule of the court cannot be waived by the parties.

In accordance with this view, we must conclude that appellee’s consent in the case before us is inoperative since Rule 2-15 cannot be waived by the parties.

Our Supreme Court, in the case of *Winn*v. *O’Neal, Sheriff, etc. et al.*(1957), 236 Ind. 264, 267, 139 N. E. 2d 536, stated:

> “Thereafter, on September 17, 1956, appellant filed a second petition for extension of time in this case, which petition was granted. However, such extension of time by this court was inoperative since it was obtained after the time fixed for filing the brief had already expired and the filing of briefs within the time fixed by rule (except for recognized cause) is jurisdictional with this court. Rule 2-16.”

In accordance with the above authorities, appellants’ petition for extension, of time to file brief and to authorize late filing thereof is hereby denied and for the reason that appellants’ brief was not filed in time, this appeal is dismissed.

Ax, Bierly, Cooper, Kelley, Myers, JJ., and Ryan, P. J., concur.

Note. — Reported in 177 N. E. 2d 758.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Paul LeBLANC.

No. 2010-KP-1282.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 4, 2011.

In re LeBlanc, Paul; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 357107; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 0186.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant and assigns reasons.