UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FRANK KONARSKI et al., : 

:

Petitioners, : Civil Action No.: 10-1733 (RMU)

:

v. : Re Document Nos.: 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,

: 12, 13, 14, 15, 18

SHAUN DONOVAN et al., :

:

Respondents. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DENYING THE PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; GRANTING THE 

PETITIONERS’ MOTION TO JOIN A PARTY1; DENYING THE PETITIONERS’ MOTIONS FOR 

RECUSAL2; DENYING THE PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR RELIEF UPON RECONSIDERATION3;

DENYING THE PETITIONERS’ MOTION TO DISQUALIFY RESPONDENTS’ COUNSEL; DENYING 

THE PETITIONERS’ MOTION TO STRIKE THE MOTION TO DISMISS; DENYING THE 

PETITIONERS’ MOTIONS FOR TELEVISED PROCEEDINGS4

; DENYING THE PETITIONERS’

MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE COPIES OF THE TRANSCRIPT AND VIDEOTAPE; DENYING THE 

PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR EXPEDITED MEDIATION

 1 During the October 15, 2010 hearing, petitioner Frank Konarski appeared and sought leave to add 

his son as a petitioner; the government did not object and the court grants this request. See Hr’g 

Tr. at 2; see also Pet’rs’ Mot. to Join Party, Ex. 1. 

2 The petitioners have filed three motions all of which request that the undersigned judge 

recuse himself from this case. See Pet’rs’ Expedited Mot. for Immediate Change of Judge & to 

Vacate the 10/15/10 Ruling; Pet’rs’ Emergency Mot. to Assign a New Judge; Pet’rs’ Emergency 

Mot. for a Neutral Judge. The court refers to these motions as the petitioners’ motions for 

recusal.

3 One of the petitioners’ motions asks the court to vacate its October 15, 2010 ruling denying the 

petitioners’ motion for a temporary restraining order. See Pet’rs’ Expedited Mot. for Immediate 

Change of Judge & to Vacate the 10/15/10 Ruling. The court treats that part of the motion as a 

motion for relief upon reconsideration of the court’s interlocutory order pursuant to Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 54(b).

4 The petitioners have filed two motions seeking nearly identical relief, i.e., the televising of future 

court proceedings. See Pet’rs’ Mot. for Televised Proceedings; Pet’rs’ Mot. for the Videotaping 

of All Future Court Hearings. 
2

I. INTRODUCTION

The petitioners are the owners of an apartment building who allege that the respondents

have unlawfully obstructed their ability to rent to tenants receiving federal housing assistance. 

On October 15, 2010, the court held a hearing on the petitioners’ motion for a temporary 

restraining order. After hearing argument from both sides, the court denied the petitioners’

motion. This matter now comes before the court on a multitude of motions filed by the 

petitioners following the denial of their motion. For the reasons discussed below, with the 

exception of the petitioners’ motion to join a party, the court denies the petitioners’ motions.

II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The petitioners are the owners of an apartment building in Tucson, Arizona (“the City”). 

Pet. ¶ 3. They allege that certain City officials working under the authority of the Department of 

Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) have conspired to keep them from renting to tenants 

receiving federal assistance through the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f 

(“Section 8”). See generally id. 

The respondents aver that in 2001, the City advised petitioner Frank Konarski5

 5 The petitioners are Frank Konarski and his son, Frank E. Konarski. See Pet.; Pet’rs’ Mot. to Join 

that it 

would no longer approve new Section 8 housing contracts with him due to “numerous 

complaints expressed by the tenants and the continuing problems imposed on [its] staff.” 

Respts’ Mot. to Dismiss & Opp’n to Pet’rs’ Mot. for a TRO (“Respts’ 1st Opp’n”) at 3, Ex. 1. 

Since that time, the petitioners have engaged in near constant – though unsuccessful – litigation 

with the City. See Respts’ 1st Opp’n, Exs. 1-3; see generally Konarksi v. Valfire, 2003 WL 

21421731 (9th Cir. June 13, 2003); Konarski v. City of Tucson, 2008 WL 3850510 (9th Cir. Aug. 

a Party.
3

18, 2008). Nevertheless, the petitioners continued to submit Section 8 contracts to the City and, 

on May 25, 2010, the City approved two of these contracts. Pet. ¶ 20; Respts’ 1st Opp’n at 4. 

Eight days later, the City sent a letter to the petitioners explaining that “[t]he two contracts for 

the above properties were improvidently signed and will not be processed.” Pet. ¶ 22; Respts’ 

1st Opp’n at 4. 

On October 13, 2010, petitioner Frank Konarksi filed a petition for a writ of mandamus 

against the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) and HUD Secretary, 

Shaun Donovan,6 seeking an order compelling the respondents to intercede in his Section 8 

dealings with the City and alleging that that a “select-few highly corrupt city administrative 

officials under Respondent HUD’s control” harbor a “personal vendetta” against them. Pet. ¶ 7. 

As part of this vendetta, the petitioners contend that the officials have undermined the free choice 

given to Section 8 tenants by steering potential and current tenants living in the petitioners’

building elsewhere. Id. ¶¶ 10-39. The petitioners ask the court to order the respondents to “rid 

the Section 8 Housing/Housing Choice Voucher program of the personal vendetta of its city 

administrative officials.” Id. ¶ B.

7

Contemporaneously with the petition, petitioner Frank Konarski filed a motion for a 

temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. See generally Pet’rs’ Mot. for a TRO

& Prelim. Inj. (“Pet’rs’ TRO Mot.”). The respondents filed a combined motion to dismiss and 

opposition to the petitioners’ motion. See generally Respts’ 1st Opp’n.

 

On October 15, 2010, the court held a hearing on the petitioners’ motion for a temporary 

restraining order, at the conclusion of which the court denied the petitioners’ request for 

 6 The petitioners also list as respondents Does one through ten. Id. ¶ 6.

7 The paragraphs containing the allegations in the petition are numbered numerically and the 

paragraphs in the prayer for relief is numbered alphabetically. See generally Pet.
4

injunctive relief. See generally Hr’g Tr. Subsequently, the petitioners have filed a myriad of 

motions seeking a variety of relief. See Pet’rs’ Expedited Mot. for Immediate Change of Judge 

(“Pet’rs’ 1st Recusal Mot.”) & to Vacate the 10/15/10 Ruling (“Pet’rs’ Mot for Relief Upon 

Recons.”); Pet’rs’ Emergency Mot. to Assign a New Judge (“Pet’rs’ 2d Recusal Mot.”); Pet’rs’

Mot. for a Neutral Judge (“Pet’rs’ 3d Recusal Mot.”); Pet’rs’ Mot. to Assign a New Attorney for 

HUD (“Pet’rs’ Mot. to Disqualify Respts’ Counsel”); Pet’rs’ Mot. to Strike Mot. to Dismiss 

(“Pet’rs’ Mot. to Strike”); Pet’rs’ Mot. for Televised Proceedings (“Pet’rs’ 1st Mot. for Recorded 

Hearings”); Pet’rs’ Mot. for the Videotaping of All Future Court Hearings (“Pet’rs’ 2d Mot. for 

Recorded Hearings”); Pl.s’ Mot for the Tr. & Videotape (“Pet’rs’ Mot. for Tr.”); Pet’rs’ Mot. for 

Expedited Mediation (“Pet’rs’ Mot. to Compel Mediation”). 

The respondents filed a consolidated response, see generally Respts’ Omnibus Response 

to Pet’rs’ Mots. (“Respts’ 2d Opp’n”), and the petitioners filed a consolidated reply, see 

generally Pet’rs’ Reply in Support of Motions (“Pet’rs’ Reply”). With those motions fully 

briefed, the court turns to the parties’ arguments and the applicable legal standards..

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Court Denies the Petitioners’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction

1. Legal Standard for Injunctive Relief

This court may issue interim injunctive relief only when the movant demonstrates “[1] 

that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the 

absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an 

injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 

374 (2008) (citing Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2218-19 (2008)). It is particularly important 
5

for the movant to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. Cf. Benten v. Kessler, 505 

U.S. 1084, 1085 (1992) (per curiam). Indeed, absent a “substantial indication” of likely success 

on the merits, “there would be no justification for the court’s intrusion into the ordinary 

processes of administration and judicial review.” Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Nat’l Credit Union 

Admin., 38 F. Supp. 2d 114, 140 (D.D.C. 1999) (internal quotation omitted).

As an extraordinary remedy, courts should grant such relief sparingly. Mazurek v. 

Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). The Supreme Court has observed “that a preliminary 

injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the 

movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Id. Therefore, although the trial 

court has the discretion to issue or deny a preliminary injunction, it is not a form of relief granted 

lightly. In addition, any injunction that the court issues must be carefully circumscribed and 

“tailored to remedy the harm shown.” Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Yeutter, 918 F.2d 968, 

977 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

A. The Petitioners Have Failed to Demonstrate a 

Likelihood of Succeeding on the Merits of Their Claims

The petitioners have moved for a preliminary injunction requiring the respondents “to 

have its city administrative officials to comply with applicable polic[i]es, [the] federal code of 

regulations, and other program requirements – to take affirmative action grounded in statute and 

codes to immediately restrain the federal-code-defiant activities of its city administrative 

officials.” Pet’rs’ TRO Mot. at 14. The respondents opposed the motion arguing that they are 

not parties to the contracts between the petitioners and the City and that the petitioners are not 

“entitled to an order compelling compliance with the broad statutory mandate that HUD 

affirmatively further the goals of fair housing.” Respts’ Opp’n at 10-11.
6

The petitioners contend that a “select-few highly corrupt [Tucson] city administrative 

officials” are engaging in the “retaliatory administration of the Section 8 Housing [] Choice 

Voucher program,” Pet’rs’ TRO Mot. at 7, and that HUD has the authority and duty to require 

that these officials comply with HUD regulations, id. at 9-10. Ultimately, the petitioners’ seek a 

writ of mandamus compelling the respondents to intervene in the local administration of the 

Section 8 program in the City of Tucson. See generally Pet. The respondents maintain that the 

actions the petitioners want them to perform are purely discretionary, thus precluding mandamus 

relief, see Respts’ Opp’n at 10; Hr’g Tr. at 17-20, and that the petitioners’ claims otherwise fail 

on res judicata grounds, Respts’ Opp’n at 14.

The Mandamus Act authorizes district courts to issue mandamus orders compelling 

federal officials to perform ministerial or non-discretionary duties. 28 U.S.C. § 1361. A writ of 

mandamus is “an extraordinary [remedy] . . . to be utilized only under exceptional 

circumstances.” Haneke v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 535 F.2d 1291, 1296 (D.C. Cir.

1976). “The necessary prerequisites for this court to exercise its mandamus jurisdiction are that 

(1) the plaintiff has a clear right to relief; (2) the defendant has a clear duty to act; and (3) there is 

no other adequate remedy available to the plaintiff.” Swan v. Clinton, 100 F.3d 973, 977 n.1 

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted). The plaintiff bears the “heavy burden” of 

showing that its right to issuance of the writ is “clear and indisputable.” In re Cheney, 334 F.3d 

1096, 1102, 1107 (D.C.Cir.2003) (internal quotations omitted).

Here, the petitioners have submitted a lengthy account of the ways in which they believe 

they have been wronged by City officials and how those officials have violated HUD 

regulations. See generally Pet.; Pet’rs’ TRO Mot. They have not, however, offered any support 

for their contention that the respondents have a “clear duty to act” in connection with their 
7

dispute. See generally Pet.; Pet’rs’ TRO Mot. Although the petitioners list instances in which 

HUD has allegedly intervened with the local administration of Section 8 programs in other cities,

Hr’g Tr. at 22, they have not explained why this compels HUD to do the same here. Likewise, 

although the petitioners invoke the policy declaration in the Public Health and Welfare statute, 

42 U.S.C. § 1437, and HUD regulations governing the administrative fees associated with 

Section 8, 24 C.F.R. § 982.152, and the rights of Section 8 beneficiaries with respect to the 

contracts between landlords and the local housing authorities, 24 C.F.R. § 982.456, they do not 

explain how these statutes and regulations impose a “clear duty” on the respondents to act. 

Pet’rs’ TRO Mot. at 10. Thus, the court is unable to conclude that there is a “substantial 

indication” that the petitioners will ultimately be successful in obtaining the extraordinary 

remedy of a writ of mandamus. Accordingly, the court denies their motion for a preliminary 

injunction. See Demjanjuk v. Meese, 784 F.2d 1114, 1117-18 (D.C. Cir.1986) (declining to 

reach the issue of irreparable injury and denying the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief 

because he had failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits).

B. The Court Denies the Petitioners’ Motions for Recusal

The petitioners argue that the undersigned judge harbors a bias against Konarski Sr. and 

ask that a different judge be assigned to adjudicate their case. See generally Pet’rs’ 1st Recusal 

Mot.; Pet’rs’ 2d Recusal Mot.; Pet’rs’ 3d Recusal Mot. The respondents, however, point out that 

unfavorable judicial rulings do not constitute evidence of bias or impartiality for the purpose of 

recusal. See Respts’ Opp’n at 4-5.

Federal law provides that “[any] justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States 

shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be 

questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). “The question is whether a reasonable and informed observer 
8

would question the judge’s impartiality.” United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 114 (D.C. Cir. 

2001)). The party seeking recusal must “show a true personal bias [] and must allege specific 

facts and not mere conclusions or generalities.” Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, et 

al. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., et al., 380 F.2d 570, 576-77 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (citations 

omitted). “[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or impartiality 

motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (citing United States v. Grinnell 

Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966)).

During the October 15, 2010 hearing, the court had to call upon the U.S. Marshals posted 

in the courtroom to maintain order, Hr’g Tr. at 32-34, due to the petitioners’ persistent and 

escalating interruptions of the in-court proceedings, see generally id.; see also Chambers v. 

NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (recognizing that “[c]ourts of justice are universally 

acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and 

decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates” (quoting Anderson v. 

Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 228 (1821))). Until that point, however, the undersigned judge had 

persistently attempted to help the petitioners narrow their arguments and address the relevant 

issues. Hr’g Tr. at 5-6, 26-27, 29-30.

Here, the petitioners appear to conclude that, because the undersigned judge exercised his 

authority to maintain order and, ultimately, denied the petitioners’ motion, the undersigned judge 

harbors some bias against them. See generally Pet’rs’ 1st Recusal Mot.; Pet’rs’ 2d Recusal Mot.; 

Pet’rs’ 3d Recusal Mot. Neither the court’s actions during the hearing nor an unfavorable ruling, 

however, are grounds for recusal. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555; see also United States v. Holland, 519 

F.3d 909, 915 (9th Cir. 2008) (observing that “the judge’s conduct during proceedings should 
9

not, except in the ‘rarest of circumstances’ form the sole basis for recusal” (quoting Liteky, 510 

U.S. 555)). Accordingly, the court denies the petitioners’ motions for recusal.

C. The Court Denies the Petitioners’ Motion for Relief Upon Reconsideration

One of the petitioners’ motions seeks, in title only, vacatur of the court’s October 15, 

2010 order. See Pet’rs’ Mot. for Recons. Mindful that a pro se litigant is afforded more latitude 

than litigants represented by counsel, Moore v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 994 F.2d 874, 876 (D.C. 

Cir. 1993), the court construes this motion as seeking relief upon reconsideration of the court’s 

order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).

A district court may revise its own interlocutory decisions “at any time before the entry 

of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.” FED. R.

CIV. P. 54(b); see also Childers v. Slater, 197 F.R.D. 185, 190 (D.D.C. 2000) (citing the 

Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)). Relief upon 

reconsideration of an interlocutory decision pursuant to Rule 54(b) is available “as justice 

requires.” Childers, 197 F.R.D. at 190. “As justice requires” indicates concrete considerations 

of whether the court “has patently misunderstood a party, has made a decision outside the 

adversarial issues presented to the [c]ourt by the parties, has made an error not of reasoning, but 

of apprehension, or where a controlling or significant change in the law or facts [has occurred] 

since the submission of the issue to the court.” Cobell v. Norton, 224 F.R.D. 266, 272 (D.D.C. 

2004) (internal citation omitted). 

Even read broadly, however, the petitioners’ motion does not address the factors 

governing the relief sought. See generally Pet’rs’ Mot. for Relief Upon Recons. Instead, the 

petitioners’ motion simply repeats the allegations made in their petition, their motion for 

injunctive relief and their motions for recusal. See generally id.; Pet.; Pet’rs’ 1st Recusal Mot.; 
10

Pet’rs’ 2d Recusal Mot.; Pet’rs’ 3d Recusal Mot. Accordingly, the court denies the motion for 

relief upon reconsideration. 

D. The Court Denies the Petitioners’ Motion to Disqualify Respondents’ Counsel

The petitioners ask the court to assign a new attorney to represent the respondents. See 

generally Pet’rs’ Mot. to Disqualify. The respondents conclude, without discussion, that the 

petitioners’ motion has no merit. Respts’ Opp’n at 5.

The court has authority to disqualify an attorney from participating in a case before it if 

there is a conflict of interest or if the attorney has committed ethical violations. See United 

States v. Wunsch, 84 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 266 (5th Cir. 

1976); Tucker v. Shaw, 378 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1967). Disqualification, however, “is a 

drastic measure that is disfavored” by the courts, Crenshaw v. MONY Life Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp.

2d 1015, 1020 (S.D. Cal. 2004), and “disqualification motions should be subject to ‘particularly 

strict judicial scrutiny,’” Optyl Eyewear Fashion Int’l Corp. v. Style Cos., Ltd., 760 F.2d 1045, 

1050 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting Rice v. Baron, 456 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).

In this case, the petitioners allege that the respondents’ attorney made 

“misrepresentations and false statements,” Pet’rs’ Mot. to Disqualify at 2, but never specify what 

counsel said or did that amounted to such misrepresentations and false statements, see generally 

id. Given the strict scrutiny with which the court must assess this motion, see Optyl Eyewear, 

760 F.2d at 1050, and the lack of specific allegations by the petitioners, see generally Pet’rs’

Mot. to Disqualify, the court denies the motion.

E. The Court Denies the Petitioners’ Motion to Strike the Motion to Dismiss

The petitioners ask the court to strike the respondents’ motion to dismiss because the 

respondents’ attorney has made “false and misrepresentative statements” to the court. Pet’rs’
11

Mot. to Strike at 1. The petitioners, however, do not explain what misrepresentations and 

falsehoods the respondents allegedly made to the court, nor do they provide any evidence that 

such misrepresentations were actually made. See generally id.; see also generally Pet’rs’ Mot. to 

Disqualify. Moreover, the petitioners have filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss, see 

generally Pet’rs’ Opp’n to Respts’ Mot. to Dismiss, and have sought leave to file a surreply in 

support of their opposition, see generally Pet’rs’ Mot. for Leave to File a Surreply. Accordingly, 

the court denies the petitioners’ motion to strike.

F. The Court Denies the Petitioners’ Motion for Televised Proceedings

& Motion for the Videotaping of Future Court Proceedings

The petitioners’ seek to position fixed tripod cameras in the courtroom “to register every 

proceeding.” Pet’rs’ 2d Mot. for Recorded Hearings at 1-2. Local Civil Rule 83.1 prohibits 

“television broadcasting from inside the courthouse during the progress of or in connection with 

judicial proceedings.” LCvR 83.1. The petitioners have provided no authority for the court to 

disregard this rule. Accordingly, the court denies the petitioners’ motions for televised 

proceedings.

G. The Court Denies the Petitioners’ Motion for Copies of the Transcript and Videotape

The petitioners seek copies of any transcript or videotape of the October 15, 2010 

hearing. See Pet’rs’ Mot. for Tr. The court, however, does not maintain a video record of any 

hearings and, as noted, the local rules prohibit televising court proceedings. Furthermore, the 

court reporter recently notified the parties that the transcript is available for them to view (at a 

public terminal in the courthouse) or purchase. See Notice Re Tr. of Proceedings (Dec. 21, 

2010).

To the extent the petitioners are asking the court to waive the fee for obtaining the 

transcript, the court notes that the petitioners paid the filing fee in this case and have not sought 
12

leave to proceed without prepayment of costs. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (granting the court the 

authority to allow a litigant to proceed without prepayment of fees upon the submission of an 

affidavit from the litigant listing the litigant’s assets and the reasons the litigant is unable to pay 

the fees). The court, thus, denies this request.

H. The Court Denies the Petitioners’ Motion to Compel Mediation

The petitioners seek an order from the court requiring the parties to engage in immediate 

mediation. See generally Pls. Mot. to Compel Mediation. The respondents respond that 

mediation would not be productive at this point in the litigation. Respts’ Opp’n at 4. Although 

the court may, in its discretion, require the parties to participate in mediation, see LCvR 

84.4(a)(2), it declines to do so at this juncture in the proceedings. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the petitioners’ motion for a preliminary 

injunction, grants the petitioners’ motion to add a party, denies the petitioners’ motions for 

recusal, denies the petitioners’ motion for relief upon reconsideration, denies the petitioners’ 

motion to disqualify respondents’ counsel, denies the petitioners’ motion to strike the motion to 

dismiss, denies the petitioners’ motions for televised proceedings, denies the petitioners’ motion 

for immediate copies of the transcript and videotape and denies the petitioners’ motion for 

expedited mediation. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and 

contemporaneously issued this 7th day of February 2011. 

RICARDO M. URBINA

United States District Judge