Barreto v Board of Mgrs. of 545 W. 110th St.

Condominium

2024 NY Slip Op 30489(U)

February 14, 2024

Supreme Court, New York County

Docket Number: Index No. 160421/2017

Judge: Louis L. Nock

Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip

Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York

State and local government sources, including the New

York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service.

This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official

publication.
160421/2017 BARRETO, EDUARDO vs. BOARD OF MANAGERS OF 545

Motion No. 003 004 005

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The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document numbers (Motion 003) 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 

101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 113, 143, 144, 145, 146, 149, 150, 153, 154, 155, 156, 

157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 174, 175, 179, 180, 183, 184, and 190

were read on this motion for SUMMARY JUDGMENT .

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document numbers (Motion 004) 115, 116, 117, 118, 

119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 147, 151, 168, 169, 

170, 176, 181, 185, and 186

were read on this motion for SUMMARY JUDGMENT .

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document numbers (Motion 005) 136, 137, 138, 139, 

140, 141, 142, 148, 152, 164, 165, 166, 167, 171, 172, 173, 177, 178, 182, 187, and 188

were read on this motion for SUMMARY JUDGMENT .

LOUIS L. NOCK, J.

Upon the foregoing documents, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on its claims 

under Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) (Mot. Seq. No. 003); the motion by defendants Board of 

Managers of 545 West 110th Street Condominium (the “Board”), 545 West 110th Street 

Condominium (the “Owner”), and Residential Management Group, LLC (the “Manager,” and 

collectively, the “Board defendants”) for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all 

cross-claims (Mot. Seq. No. 004); and the motion of defendant Chelsea Cleaning Services, Inc. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

NEW YORK COUNTY

PRESENT: HON. LOUIS L. NOCK PART 38M

Justice 

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X INDEX NO. 160421/2017

 MOTION DATE

08/19/2022, 

10/14/2022, 

10/14/2022

 MOTION SEQ. NO. 003 004 005

DECISION + ORDER ON 

MOTION

EDUARDO BARRETO,

 Plaintiff, 

- v -

THE BOARD OF MANAGERS OF 545 WEST 110TH 

STREET CONDOMINIUM, 545 WEST 110TH STREET 

CONDOMINIUM, RESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT GROUP, 

LLC, CHELSEA CLEANING SERVICES, INC., and

CHELSEA WINDOW CLEANING, INC.,

 Defendants. 

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d/b/a Chelsea Window Cleaning, incorrectly sued hereunder as Chelsea Window Cleaning, Inc. 

(“Chelsea”), for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross-claims (Mot. Seq. 

No. 005), are consolidated for disposition in accordance with the following memorandum.

Background

Plaintiff is a window washer, employed by nonparty Mark Prince LLC (Barreto 2018 

EBT tr, NYSCEF Doc. No. 102 at 71). On the day of the accident, plaintiff was dispatched to 

the building located at 545 West 110th Street, New York, New York, to wash the exterior 

windows (id.). Plaintiff was to rappel down the side of the building, for which he was given a 

rope main line and a boatswain’s chair (Barreto 2019 EBT tr, NYSCEF Doc. No. 103 at 21, 27, 

69-70). Additionally, plaintiff had a safety line, which was anchored to the roof to prevent him 

from falling in the event of a break or other problem with the main line (Barreto 2018 EBT tr, 

NYSCEF Doc. No. 102 at 57; Barreto 2019 EBT tr, NYSCEF Doc. No. 103 at 21). The safety 

line was attached to plaintiff’s harness with a lanyard, and a rope grab between the safety line 

and the lan1yard was meant to lock in place and arrest any potential fall (Barreto 2018 EBT tr, 

NYSCEF Doc. No. 102 at 56-5§7; Barreto 2019 EBT tr, NYSCEF Doc. No. 103 at 21). The 

ropes were tied off at iron anchors on the roof of the building (Barreto 2018 EBT tr, NYSCEF 

Doc No. 102 at 66, 75, 101). The balconies of the buildings were surrounded by smooth railings, 

under which were stainless steel mesh panels (balcony photographs, NYSCEF Doc. No. 127). 

While cleaning the upper windows of the building, plaintiff’s main rope parted and he 

fell approximately 12-15 feet to a terrace below (Barreto 2018 EBT tr, NYSCEF Doc. No. 102 at 

92; Barreto 2019 EBT tr, NYSCEF Doc. No. 103 at 42). Plaintiff testified that the lanyard did 

not grab the safety line and arrest his fall, even though the rope grab was positioned above his 

head (Barreto 2018 EBT tr, NYSCEF Doc. No. 102 at 144; Barreto 2019 EBT tr, NYSCEF Doc. 

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No. 103 at 57-58). While he testified that he had not encountered anything sharp while cleaning, 

he confirmed that the ropes had been touching metal, which he observed from his boatswain’s 

chair (Barreto 2018 EBT tr, NYSCEF Doc. No. 102 at 135, 151-153, 156). He also testified that 

he had with him a rope guard, used to protect the ropes from rubbing on metal surfaces, but had 

not been using it when he fell (Barreto 2019 EBT tr, NYSCEF Doc. No. 103 at 45-48). 

Johnny Guevara, the building’s resident manager, testified on behalf of Owner. After 

plaintiff fell, Guevara went to the eleventh floor of the building with plaintiff’s employer Mark 

Prince. Upon arriving at the balcony on the eleventh floor, he saw two ropes, one of which had 

been severed (Guevara EBT tr, NYSCEF Doc. No. 104 at 102; photo marked Def.’s exhibit J, 

NYSCEF Doc. No. 109). Prince testified that he inspected plaintiff’s rope at the point where it 

was cut on the eleventh floor, and noticed fragments of cut rope on the stainless steel panel, from 

which he deduced that the rope was cut from rubbing back and forth on the steel panel (Prince 

EBT tr, NYSCEF Doc. No. 123 at 88-91, 94-97). In addition, Prince stated that he was told by 

plaintiff’s coworker that plaintiff’s rope grab was in fact positioned by his hip, and, therefore,

could not arrest his fall (id. at 101-102). Further, he observed in a video recording taken of the 

scene that the size of the safety line did not match the rope grab, meaning that the rope grab 

might not have functioned correctly even if it had been above plaintiff’s head (id. at 152-154). 

Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no disputed material facts (Andre v 

Pomeroy, 35 NY2d 361, 364 [1974]). The moving party must tender sufficient evidentiary proof 

to warrant judgment as a matter of law (Zuckerman v City of N.Y., 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). 

“Failure to make such prima facie showing requires denial of the motion, regardless of the 

sufficiency of the opposing papers” (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986] 

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[internal citations omitted]). Once a movant has met this burden, “the burden shifts to the 

opposing party to submit proof in admissible form sufficient to create a question of fact requiring 

a trial” (Kershaw v Hospital for Special Surgery, 114 AD3d 75, 82 [1st Dept 2013]). “[I]t is 

insufficient to merely set forth averments of factual or legal conclusions” (Genger v Genger, 123 

AD3d 445, 447 [1st Dept 2014] [internal citation omitted]). Moreover, the reviewing court 

should accept the opposing party's evidence as true (Hotopp Assocs. v Victoria's Secret Stores, 

256 AD2d 285, 286-287 [1st Dept 1998]), and give the opposing party the benefit of all 

reasonable inferences (Negri v Stop & Shop, 65 NY2d 625, 626 [1985]). Therefore, if there is 

any doubt as to the existence of a triable fact, the motion for summary judgment must be denied 

(Rotuba Extruders v Ceppos, 46 NY2d 223, 231 [1978]).

Discussion

Common Law Negligence and Labor Law § 200

Labor Law § 200 “is a codification of the common-law duty imposed upon an owner or 

general contractor to provide construction site workers with a safe place to work” (Singh v Black 

Diamonds LLC, 24 AD3d 138, 139 [1st Dept 2005], citing Comes v New York State Elec. & Gas 

Corp., 82 NY2d 876, 877 [1993]). Labor Law § 200 (1) states, in pertinent part, as follows:

All places to which this chapter applies shall be so constructed, 

equipped, arranged, operated and conducted as to provide 

reasonable and adequate protection to the lives, health and safety of 

all persons employed therein or lawfully frequenting such places. 

All machinery, equipment, and devices in such places shall be so 

placed, operated, guarded, and lighted as to provide reasonable and 

adequate protection to all such persons.

There are two distinct standards applicable to section 200 cases, depending on the kind of 

situation involved: (1) when the accident is the result of the means and methods used by a

contractor to do its work, and (2) when the accident is the result of a dangerous condition that is 

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inherent in the premises (see McLeod v Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus 

Christ of Latter Day Sts., 41 AD3d 796, 797-798 [2d Dept 2007]; see also Griffin v New York

City Tr. Auth., 16 AD3d 202, 202 [1st Dept 2005]).

“Where a plaintiff's claims implicate the means and methods of the work, an owner or a 

contractor will not be held liable under Labor Law § 200 unless it had the authority to supervise 

or control the performance of the work” (LaRosa v Internap Network Servs. Corp., 83 AD3d 

905, 909 [2d Dept 2011]). Specifically, “liability can only be imposed against a party who 

exercises actual supervision of the injury-producing work” (Naughton v City of New York, 94 

AD3d 1, 11 [1st Dept 2012]). However, where an injury stems from a dangerous condition 

inherent in the premises, an owner or contractor may be liable in common-law negligence and 

under Labor Law § 200 when the owner or contractor “‘created the dangerous condition causing 

an injury or when the owner failed to remedy a dangerous or defective condition of which he or 

she had actual or constructive notice’” (Mendoza v Highpoint Assoc., IX, LLC, 83 AD3d 1, 9 [1st 

Dept 2011], quoting Chowdhury v Rodriguez, 57 AD3d 121, 128 [2d Dept 2008]).

Here, neither theory of liability avails plaintiff. It is undisputed in the record that none of 

the defendants actually supervised plaintiff’s work. Indeed, plaintiff raises only a dangerous 

condition theory of liability, specifically, with regard to the steel panel that severed the rope. 

The court is skeptical that the steel panel constitutes an inherently dangerous condition on the 

premises. Assuming arguendo that it does, however, defendants adequately establish that they 

had no actual or constructive notice of the alleged defect, and plaintiff does not raise a material 

issue of fact requiring trial. As to actual notice, ne one discovered the severed rope, or that that 

the rope had been severed by repeated contact with the panel, until after plaintiff fell, which is 

undisputed. As to constructive notice, “[t]o constitute constructive notice, a defect must be 

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visible and apparent, and it must exist for a sufficient length of time prior to the accident to 

permit defendant's employees to discover and remedy it” (Gordon v American Museum of 

Natural History, 67 NY2d 836, 837 [1986]). Guevara, the resident manager, testified that the 

panel was in the condition it was supposed to be in at the time of the accident (Guevara EBT tr, 

NYSCEF Doc. No. 104 at 107). Moreover, there had never been any prior complaints regarding 

the panel by any of the window washers (id. at 122-23). Finally, it is largely undisputed that the 

rope severed due to the repeated contact of the rope with the panel and the commensurate friction 

caused by the two objects rubbing together as plaintiff rappelled down the building. “W here the 

alleged defect or dangerous condition arises from the contractor's methods and the owner 

exercises no supervisory control over the operation, no liability attaches to the owner under the 

common law or under Labor Law § 200” (Comes v New York State Elec. and Gas Corp., 82 

NY2d 876, 877 [1993]). Based upon the foregoing, so much of defendants’ motions as seek 

summary judgment dismissing this claim are granted.

Labor Law § 202

Labor Law § 202 provides, in relevant part:

The owner, lessee, agent and manager of every public building and every 

contractor involved shall provide such safe means for the cleaning of the windows 

and of exterior surfaces of such building as may be required and approved by the 

[industrial board of appeals] . . . [and] shall not require, permit, suffer or allow 

any window or exterior surface of such building to be cleaned unless such means 

are provided to enable such work to be done in a safe manner for the prevention 

of accidents and for the protection of the public and of persons engaged in such 

work in conformity with the requirements of this chapter and the rules of the 

board of standards and appeals. A person engaged at cleaning windows or 

exterior surfaces of a public building shall use the safety devices provided for his 

protection. Every employer and contractor involved shall comply with this 

section and the rules of the board and shall require his employee, while engaged 

in cleaning any window or exterior surface of a public building, to use the 

equipment and safety devices required by this chapter and rules of the [industrial 

board of appeals].

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By its terms, Labor Law § 202 “protects the cleaning of only windows and exterior surfaces” 

(Bataraga v Burdick, 261 AD2d 106, 107 [1st Dept 1999]). “Labor Law § 202 requires the 

application of comparative negligence principles because statutory liability is predicated on a 

violation of the Industrial Code” (Brown v Christopher St. Owners Corp., 2 AD3d 172, 173 [1st 

Dept 2003]). The rules promulgated by the Industrial Board of Appeals are set forth at 12 

NYCRR 21” (Padovano v Teddy's Realty Assoc., Ltd., 56 AD3d 444, 446 [2d Dept 2008]). 

Here, 12 NYCRR 21.3 provides that “[n]o owner shall suffer or permit a cleaner to clean 

a window of his building unless it has the structural features and the anchors or other fixed 

devices required by this Part in respect to the authorized means and methods of cleaning used by 

the cleaner” (12 NYCRR 21.3[b][1]). As set forth above, the anchors were present and utilized 

by plaintiff (Barreto 2018 EBT tr, NYSCEF Doc No. 102 at 66, 75, 101). The statute does not 

impose further requirements on Owner (Berrios v 1115 Fifth Ave. Corp., 160 AD2d 655, 656 

[1st Dept 1990] [“The Legislature did not impose a coextensive responsibility on owners to 

require and ensure the use of safety devices. If it had intended to make owners and their agents 

responsible for a window cleaner's failure to use the safety devices provided, it would have so 

provided”]). Plaintiff makes no argument in opposition to defendants’ motions for summary 

judgment dismissing this claim. Accordingly, so much of defendants’ motions for summary 

judgment seeking dismissal of this claim are granted.

Labor Law § 240(1)1

Labor Law § 240 (1), also known as the Scaffold Law, provides, as relevant:

1 Plaintiff also alleges a cause of action pursuant to Labor Law § 240(2), but makes no argument in opposition to 

defendants’ motions for summary judgment dismissing said claim. The statute also has no relevance to this action

(see Gaffney v BFP 300 Madison II, LLC, 18 AD3d 403, 404 [1st Dept 2005] [“Summary judgment was also 

appropriate under § 240(2), as the float scaffold was elevated more than 20 feet and lacked guardrails”]).

Accordingly, so much of defendants’ motions seeking dismissal of the claim are granted.

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All contractors and owners and their agents . . . in the erection, demolition, 

repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure shall 

furnish or erect, or cause to be furnished or erected for the performance of such 

labor, scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, 

irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated 

as to give proper protection to a person so employed.

“Labor Law § 240 (1) was designed to prevent those types of accidents in which the scaffold . . . 

or other protective device proved inadequate to shield the injured worker from harm directly 

flowing from the application of the force of gravity to an object or person” (Ross v CurtisPalmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 501 [1993]). Importantly, Labor Law § 240 (1) “is 

designed to protect workers from gravity-related hazards . . . and must be liberally construed to 

accomplish the purpose for which it was framed” (Valensisi v Greens at Half Hollow, LLC, 33 

AD3d 693, 695 [2d Dept 2006] [internal citations omitted]). 

Not every worker who falls or is struck by a falling object at a construction site is 

afforded the protections of Labor Law § 240(1), and “a distinction must be made between those 

accidents caused by the failure to provide a safety device . . . and those caused by general 

hazards specific to a workplace” (Makarius v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N. J., 76 AD3d 805, 807 [1st 

Dept 2010]). Instead, liability “is contingent upon the existence of a hazard contemplated in 

section 240(1) and the failure to use, or the inadequacy of, a safety device of the kind 

enumerated therein” (Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 NY2d 259, 267 [2001]). 

Therefore, to prevail on a section 240 (1) claim, a plaintiff must show that the statute was 

violated, and that this violation was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries (Cahill v 

Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 4 NY3d 35, 39 [2004]).

As an initial matter, Chelsea argues that this claim should be dismissed against it because 

it is not a proper Labor Law defendant. “When the work giving rise to [the duty to conform to 

the requirements of section 240 (1)] has been delegated to a third party, that third party then 

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obtains the concomitant authority to supervise and control that work and becomes a statutory 

‘agent’ of the owner or general contractor” (Walls v Turner Const. Co., 4 NY3d 861, 864 

[2005]). “Thus, unless a defendant has supervisory control and authority over the work being 

done when the plaintiff is injured, there is no statutory agency conferring liability under the 

Labor Law” (id.). 

Here, Chelsea had no supervisory authority over plaintiff’s work. Chelsea was not the 

“coordinator and overall supervisor for all the work being performed on the job site” (id.). No 

written contract providing that Chelsea retained supervisory authority over plaintiff’s employer’s 

work exists (cf. Rooney v D.P. Consulting Corp., 204 AD3d 428, 429 [1st Dept 2022]

[“Although no documentary evidence of Edge's subcontract with DP was submitted, there is 

testimonial evidence that the subcontract made Edge responsible for performing all aspects of the 

sidewalk excavation, including safety procedures”]). There is no meaningful dispute in the 

record as to the fact that Chelsea had no employees at the building and did not direct plaintiff’s 

work or provide materials and safety devices for it. Plaintiff and the Board defendants argue in 

opposition that Chelsea may not delegate its potential liability away, but the cases they cite are 

distinguishable. In Nascimento v Bridgehampton Const. Corp. (86 AD3d 189, 194 [1st Dept 

2011]), the contractor specifically retained the authority to direct the work in its contract with the 

subcontractor. A similar provision existed in White v 31-01 Steinway, LLC (165 AD3d 449, 450-

51 [1st Dept 2018]). The decision in Timmons v Lynx Contr. Corp. (49 AD3d 382 [1st Dept 

2008]) is light on detail, but enough is set forth to suggest that the contractor seeking to evade 

liability had also retained some level of responsibility for the injury causing work. Since Chelsea 

did not retain such responsibility or supervision, this claim must be dismissed against it.2

2 Plaintiff and the Board defendants argue that the Workers’ Compensation Board has already deemed Chelsea a 

general contractor, but “here is no indication in the record that this was a disputed issue at the Workers' 

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As to the merits of this claim, there are three points of dispute regarding the happening of 

plaintiff’s accident: his failure to use a rope guard to prevent the steel panel from severing the 

rope; his use of a different size safety rope than the rope grab; and the positioning of the rope 

grab. Plaintiff argues that these issues are essentially irrelevant, as they at most establish 

comparative negligence on plaintiff’s part, which is not a defense to a claim under Section 

240(1). In this regard, comparative negligence is not available as a defense to such a claim 

because the statute holds responsible persons or entities strictly liable; allowing such persons to 

avoid liability because the injured worker was to some degree also negligence is contrary to the 

statutes purpose (Blake v Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of New York City, Inc., 1 NY3d 280, 289 

[2003]). Nevertheless, where adequate safety devices were provided and the fault lies entirely 

with plaintiff’s use, misuse, or lack of use thereof, a defendant may establish that plaintiff should 

be barred from recovering as the “sole proximate cause of the accident” (id. at 290). 

Here, issues of fact preclude summary judgment. With respect to the rope guard, which 

all agree plaintiff did not use, plaintiff and his coworker testified that the rope guard was not 

needed because of the smooth railing above the steel panel (Barreto 2018 EBT tr, NYSCEF Doc. 

No. 102 at 135, 151-53; Barreto 2019 EBT tr, NYSCEF Doc. No. 103 at 45-47; Cardenas EBT 

tr, NYSCEF Doc. No. 128 at 54, 141). While hindsight may indicate that plaintiff perhaps 

should have used the rope guard, the Board defendants offer only speculation that the rope guard 

would have prevented the severing of the rappelling line (Zuckerman, 49 NY2d at 562 [“mere 

conclusions, expressions of hope or unsubstantiated allegations or assertions are insufficient”]). 

In this regard, the court notes the testimony of Cardenas, plaintiff’s coworker, that the rope 

guards were made of nylon or hose (Cardenas EBT tr, NYSCEF Doc. No. 128 at 26, 45-46). 

Compensation proceeding or that the WCB specifically adjudicated this issue (Torres v Perry St. Dev. Corp., 104 

AD3d 672, 674-75 [2d Dept 2013])

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With respect to whether the rope grab was appropriately matched to the safety line, the sole 

support for that argument is Prince’s testimony that an inappropriately sized rope grab “might 

not have done anything anyway” (Prince EBT tr, NYSCEF Doc. No. 123 at 152). Such 

testimony is too speculative to create a triable issue of fact.

There is, however, a dispute in the testimony regarding the rope grab and how plaintiff 

had positioned it. Contrary to the Board defendants’ argument, plaintiff did not offer conflicting 

testimony as to the location of the rope grab, having testified that it was positioned properly 

above his head (Barreto 2019 EBT tr, NYSCEF Doc. No. 103 at 57-58). At an earlier 

deposition, he had testified that the lanyard which connected his harness to the safety line was 

located at his shoulders, which the Board defendants interpret to mean his rope grab was placed 

there as well (Barreto 2018 EBT tr, NYSCEF Doc. No. 102 at 144). There is no basis in the 

record for the court to make such an interpretation. Cardenas testified that he did not know 

where the rope grab had been positioned, but did testify that the rope grab was in good working 

order prior to the accident, and should have caught plaintiff if it were correctly positioned

(Cardenas EBT tr, NYSCEF Doc. No. 128 at 67-68). Such a dispute must be resolved by the 

jury. Accordingly, the motions related to this claim are both denied. 

Labor Law § 241(6)

Labor Law § 241 (6) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

All contractors and owners and their agents, . . . when constructing or demolishing 

buildings or doing any excavating in connection therewith, shall comply with the 

following requirements:

* * *

(6) All areas in which construction, excavation or demolition work is being 

performed shall be so constructed, shored, [and] equipped . . . as to provide 

reasonable and adequate protection and safety to the persons employed 

therein or lawfully frequenting such places.

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Labor Law § 241(6) imposes a nondelegable duty of reasonable care upon owners and 

contractors “‘to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety’ to persons employed in, 

or lawfully frequenting, all areas in which construction, excavation or demolition work is being 

performed” (Rizzuto v L.A. Wenger Contr. Co., 91 NY2d 343, 348 [1998]). However, cases 

where the work performed was “routine exterior window washing” are not within the ambit of 

Section 241(6) (Wowk v Broadway 280 Park Fee, LLC, 94 AD3d 669, 671 [1st Dept 2012]). 

Thus, plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on this claim is denied, defendants’ 

motions for summary judgment dismissing the claim are granted, and the claim is dismissed.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment (Mot. Seq. No. 003) is 

denied; and it is further

ORDERED that the Board defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the 

complaint and cross-claims (Mot. Seq. No. 004) is granted to the extent that the first, second, 

third, fifth, and so much of the fourth cause of action as relates to Labor Law § 240(2), as well as 

Chelsea’s cross-claims, are severed and dismissed, and the motion is otherwise denied; and it is 

further

ORDERED that Chelsea’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and 

cross-claims (Mot. Seq. No. 005) is granted in its entirety, the complaint and cross-claims against 

Chelsea severed and dismissed, and the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor 

Chelsea dismissing the action against it; and it is further

ORDERED that the action shall continue as to plaintiff’s claim against the Board 

defendants for violation of Labor Law § 240(1); and it is further

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ORDERED that this matter is respectfully referred to the Clerk of the Trial Assignment 

Part to be scheduled for trial.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court. 

ENTER:

2/14/2024 $SIG$

DATE LOUIS L. NOCK, J.S.C.

CHECK ONE: CASE DISPOSED X NON-FINAL DISPOSITION

GRANTED DENIED X GRANTED IN PART OTHER

APPLICATION: SETTLE ORDER SUBMIT ORDER

CHECK IF APPROPRIATE: INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT REFERENCE

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