alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### St. Louis, A. & T. R’y Co. v. J. N. McKee.

(No. 3158.)

Appeal from Cherokee County.

C. D. Mimms, counsel for appellant.

Frank Templeton, counsel for appellee.

Opinion by

Will-son, J.

§ 8. *Common carriers; penalty against for failure to deliver goods recoverable; case stated.*Appellant, a merchant at Mt. Selman, a station on appellant’s line of railway in Cherokee county, shipped from Galveston, Texas, to said station certain packages of merchandise, prepaying the freight charges thereon, and receiving from appellant’s connecting line of railway at Galveston a through bill of lading for said goods. When the goods reached Tyler *en route*to Mt. Selman, appellant refused to deliver the same to appellee unless he would pay additional freight charges. Appellee refused to pay such additional charges, and demanded that the goods be delivered to him, informing the agent- of appellant at Tyler that he had prepaid the freight charges at Galveston, and exhibiting to said agent his receipted freight bill. Said agent still refused to deliver said goods, and continued to so refuse for seventeen days after said demand. Appellee brought this suit under article 4258a, *29Sayles’ Civil Statutes, to recover the penalty prescribed thereby, and recovered judgment for said penalty and costs. It is contended by appellant that the above-cited statute was repealed by the act of April 2,1887. [Sayles’ Civil St., art. 4227.] In support of this proposition we are referred to 1 Civil Cas. Ct. App., § 933. That decision is not in point and is not applicable to the statute in question. The act of April 2, 1887, does not, by implication, repeal article'4258a, but relates to different matters, and does not comprehend the entire subject embraced in said article 4258a. Article 4258a prescribes a penalty for the specific act of refusing to deliver goods upon the payment, or tender of payment, of the freight charges due, as shown by the bill of lading; while article 4227 prescribes a penalty for a failure to deliver property at the regular or appointed time, without reference to the payment, or tender of payment, of freight charges. We are of the opinion that article 4258a, under which this judgment was obtained, is in force, and that this suit is maintainable thereunder. [Railway Co. v. Harry, 63 Tex. 256.]

October 26, 1889.

Appellant had no depot or station agent at Mt. Selman, and its custom was to deliver freight destined for that place from its depot at Tyler, the conductors on its trains from Tyler to Mt. Selman performing the functions of freight agents at Mt. Selman. It was proper, therefore, we think, for appellee to demand his goods of appellant’s agent at Tyler, where said goods were being detained. Believing that therefis no error in the judgment, it is

Affirmed.
**AMERICAN REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ANDSUBSIDIARIES****REAL ESTATE OWNED AND REVENUESEARNED — (Continued)****Year Ended December 31, 2002 (in $000’s)****EXHIBIT 32.2****CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER****Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350****Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**     I, John P. Saldarelli, Vice President and Chief FinancialOfficer (Principal Financial Officer) of American PropertyInvestors, Inc., the General Partner of American Real EstateHoldings Limited Partnership (the “Registrant”),certify that to the best of my knowledge, based upon a review ofthe Registrant’s annual report on Form 10-K for theperiod ended December 31, 2004 (the “Report”):          (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of    Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of    1934, as amended; and           (2) The information contained in the Report fairly    presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and    results of operations of the Registrant.     /s/ John P. Saldarelli       **John P. Saldarelli** **Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of** **American Property Investors, Inc.,** **the General Partner of** **American Real Estate Holdings Limited Partnership**Date: March 31, 2005
#### Billings v. Gross

[No. 19,338.

Filed November 17, 1960.]

*Edward L. Burke,*of Gary, for appellant.

*Gavit & Eiehhorn,*of Gary, for appellee.

Bierly, C. J.

This cause was filed in this Court on June 5, 1959. On June 19, 1959' Appellant’s Brief was filed and thereafter appellee filed her Answer Brief on July 17, 1959. Subsequently thereto appellant filed her Reply Brief under date of July 31, 1959.

On October 5, 1960 appellant filed a Motion To Dismiss Appeal alleging that “all matters in controversy *257in this appeal have been compromised, and settled.” On said date appellant also filed a written acknowledgment of service of a copy of said Motion To Dismiss by appellee.

No assignment of cross-errors has been filed by appellee.

Said Motion To Dismiss now being before the Court, and appelle having failed to interpose any objections thereto, the Court having examined said Motion, and being duly advised, now finds that said Motion should be granted.

It is Therefore Ordered and Decreed that the appeal herein be and the same is, hereby dismissed.

Note. — Reported in 170 N. E. 2d 251.
<PAGE>

                                                               Exhibit 23.1


            CONSENT OF ERNST & YOUNG LLP, INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement
(Form S-8) pertaining to the 1997 Stock Option Plan/Stock Issuance Plan and
the Employee Stock Purchase Plan of Vista Medical Technologies, Inc. of our
report dated January 29, 2001, with respect to the consolidated financial
statements and schedule of Vista Medical Technologies, Inc. included in its
Annual report (Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31, 2000.


ERNST & YOUNG LLP


San Diego, California
March 30, 2001
#### Roy BORGES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D10-2851.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Feb. 9, 2011.

Roy Borges, in proper person.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.

Before CORTIÑAS, ROTHENBERG, and SALTER, JJ.

. PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

SALTER, J.

(concurring).

The record regarding Roy Borges’s appeal from the denial of his motion for post-conviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 demonstrates no error, and thus I concur in the decision to affirm that denial. The legal theories set forth in Borges’s motion and brief, and the published articles and awards described in his attachments to the motion, are not matters that are relevant to a claim for relief under Rule 3.850.

The record does not disclose whether Borges has also sought relief from the executive branch under Chapters 940 and 947, Florida Statutes (2010). In the event he has not done so, this concurrence identifies those provisions to Borges for his further research, while expressing no position regarding the availability or merits of any such application.
No. 84786 

i< • ILE 

UN 2 4 2022 

A. BROWN 

UPRENE 

DE aEw 

BY 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

MICHAEL TRACY MCLAUGHLIN, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 

CLARK, 

Respondent, 

and 

THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

Real Party in Interest. 

ORDER DENYING PETITION 

This original pro se petition for a writ of mandamus, or 

prohibition, seeks a writ directing the district court to vacate petitioner's 

sentence and hold a new sentencing hearing, due to alleged errors in 

petitioner's judgment of conviction. 

The decision to entertain a petition for extraordinary writ relief 

lies within the discretion of this court. Smith v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 

107 Nev. 674, 677, 679, 818 P.2d 849, 851, 853 (1991) (recognizing that writ 

relief is an extraordinary remedy and that this court has sole discretion in 

determining whether to entertain a writ petition). It is petitioner's burden 

to demonstrate that extraordinary relief is warranted. Pan v. Eighth 

Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004). 

Problematically, petitioner has not provided this court with 

exhibits or other documentation that would support his claims for relief. 

See NRAP 21(a)(4) (providing the petitioner shall submit an appendix 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A agOr. 2,0°Vf 
,C.J. 

Parraguirre 

containing all documents "essential to understand the matters set forth in 

the petition). Accordingly, we 

ORDER the petition DENIED. 

J. 

Hardesty 

J. 

Stiglich 

cc: Michael Tracy McLaughlin 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(01 I )47A ASP 2
627 A.2d 1126

#### SOUTHERN NEW JERSEY NEWSPAPERS, INC. v. THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR OF CAMDEN COUNTY, AND THE CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS FOR THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR OF CAMDEN COUNTY.

February 11, 1993.

ORDER

The parties having stipulated to a dismissal of this matter,- it is ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed.
EXHIBTI 24.1
                                POWER OF ATTORNEY

     WHEREAS, the undersigned  officers and directors of Vestcom  International,
Inc.  desire  to  authorize  Joel  Cartun  and  Harvey  Goldman  to act as their
attorneys-in-fact  and  agents,  for the  purpose  of  executing  and filing the
registrant's  Annual  Report on Form 10-K for the year ended  December 31, 1997,
including all amendments thereto,

     NOW, THEREFORE,

     KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS,  that each person whose  signature  appears
below constitutes and appoints Joel Cartun and Harvey Goldman, and each of them,
his true and lawful  attorney-in-fact and agent, with full power of substitution
and resubstitution,  to sign the registrant's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the
year ended December 31, 1997,  including any and all amendments thereto,  and to
file the same,  with all exhibits  thereto,  and other  documents in  connection
therewith,  with the  Securities  and Exchange  Commission,  granting  unto said
attorneys-in-fact  and agents,  and each of them, full power and authority to do
and perform each and every act and thing  requisite  and necessary to be done in
and about the premises,  as fully and to all intents and purposes as he might or
could  do  in  person,   hereby   ratifying   and   confirming   all  that  said
attorneys-in-fact  and agents,  or any of them,  or their or his  substitute  or
substitutes, may lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue hereof.

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this power of attorney in
the following capacities on this 30th day of March, 1998.

         Signatures                                       Title

/s/Joel Cartun
______________________________               President, Chief Executive Officer
Joel Cartun                                  and Director

/s/Howard April
______________________________               Director
Howard April

/s/Gary J. Marcello
______________________________               Director
Gary J. Marcello

/s/Stephen R. Bova
______________________________               Director
Stephen R. Bova

______________________________               Director
Leonard J. Fassler

/s/Fred S. Lafer
______________________________               Director
Fred S. Lafer

/s/Richard D. White
______________________________               Director
Richard D. White

/s/Harvey Goldman
______________________________               Executive Vice President, Chief
Harvey Goldman                               Financial Officer and Treasurer
                                             (Principal Financial and Accounting
                                              Officer)
855 A.2d 763

#### COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. James M. FRANCIS, III, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted Jan. 13, 2004.

Decided Aug. 18, 2004.

Donald R. Totaro, Janna Rae Steinruck, for Com. of Pa.

James Jude Karl, for James M. Francis, III.

Before CAPPY, C.J., and CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, SAYLOR, BAER, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 18th day of August, 2004, the order of the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas is reversed insofar as it declared the Registration of Sexual Offenders Act unconstitutional, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. *See Commonwealth v. Williams,*574 Pa. 487, 832 A.2d 962 (2003); *Commonwealth v. Maldonado,*576 Pa. 101, 838 A.2d 710 (2003).

Justice EAKIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
1 

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS 

Gayla Adkins, 

Claimant Below, Petitioner 

v.) No. 23-609 (JCN: 2020009859) 

 (ICA No. 23-ICA-197) 

 

Brightspring Healthcare Services, 

Employer Below, Respondent 

MEMORANDUM DECISION

 

Petitioner Gayla Adkins appeals the September 5, 2023, memorandum decision of the 

Intermediate Court of Appeals (“ICA”). See Adkins v. Brightspring Healthcare Servs., No. 23-

ICA-197, 2023 WL 5695520 (W. Va. Ct. App. Sep. 5, 2023) (memorandum decision). Respondent 

Brightspring Healthcare Services filed a timely response.1 The issue on appeal is whether the ICA 

erred in affirming the Board of Review’s order, which affirmed the claim administrator’s order 

granting Ms. Adkins a 7% permanent partial disability award. 

On appeal, the petitioner argues that the ICA’s decision is clearly wrong in light of the 

substantial evidence in the record as a whole, and should be reversed because the preponderance 

of the evidence establishes that she sustained more than 7% whole person impairment as a result 

of her compensable injury. The respondent counters by arguing that the petitioner points to no 

erroneous procedure, no arbitrary or capricious conclusions, no abuse of discretion or jurisdictional 

error by the lower tribunals. Rather, she simply disagrees with the ICA’s decision, which does not 

constitute reversible error under the applicable standard of review. 

This Court reviews questions of law de novo, while we accord deference to the Board of 

Review’s findings of fact unless the findings are clearly wrong. Syl. Pt. 3, Duff v. Kanawha Cnty. 

Comm’n, No. 23-43, 2024 WL 1715166 (W. Va. April 22, 2024). Upon consideration of the record 

and briefs, we find no reversible error and therefore summarily affirm. See W. Va. R. App. P. 

21(c). 

Affirmed. 

ISSUED: August 27, 2024 

1

 The petitioner is represented by counsel Reginald D. Henry and Lori J. Withrow, and the 

respondent is represented by counsel Steven K. Wellman and James W. Heslep. 

FILED 

August 27, 2024 

C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS 

OF WEST VIRGINIA 
2 

CONCURRED IN BY: 

Chief Justice Tim Armstead 

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker 

Justice John A. Hutchison 

Justice William R. Wooton 

Justice C. Haley Bunn
#### Steven GLANZ, Petitioner, v. Catherine Irene GLANZ, Respondent.

No. 4D11-499.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

June 29, 2011.

Amy D. Shield of Amy D. Shield, P.A., Boca Raton, for petitioner.

Mark A. Levy and Kenneth A. Gordon of Brinkley Morgan, Fort Lauderdale, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner and respondent were involved in a bitter divorce. After the petitioner failed to pay sums due by the final judgment, the respondent moved for an order to permit her to file a notice of lis pendens against the former husband’s office condominium, which was owned by a separate corporation, Glanz Real Estate Holdings, LLC, which was not a party to the proceedings. The court granted the motion, and the notice of lis pendens was filed. Petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari to review that order and filing of the notice. Based upon the controlling authority of *Marbin v. Cohen,*789 So.2d 1193 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), we grant the petition. Without the titleholder of the subject property being made a party to the proceedings, the *937lis pendens is “entirely without legal basis.” We quash the order. The lis pen-dens is discharged.

WARNER, DAMOORGIAN and LEVINE, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 99.2  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)  In connection
with the accompanying Annual Report of Brigham Exploration Company (the
Company) on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2002 (the Report),
I, Eugene B. Shepherd, Jr., Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby
certify that:  (1)           The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or
78o(d)); and  (2)           The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Company.  Dated: March
  31, 2003/s/ Eugene
  B. Shepherd, Jr.Eugene B.
  Shepherd, Jr.Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit 99.1

CONTIMORTGAGE
One Contipark
338 Warminster Road
Hatboro, PA 19040-3430
(215) 347-3000

March 17, 1998

ContiSecurities Asset Funding Corporation
277 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10172

RE: CMC Home Equity Loan Trust 1997-1

Dear Sirs:

In accordance with Section 8.16 of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement,
ContiMortgage Corporation, as Servicer, confirms that as of December 31, 1997:

      (i)   we have completed a review of the activities of the Servicer during
            the year ended December 31, 1997, and of performance under the
            Pooling and Servicing Agreement has been made under my supervision;

      (ii)  to the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has
            fulfilled all its obligations under the Pooling and Servicing
            Agreement for the year ended December 31, 1997.


                                             Sincerely yours,


                                             /s/ Margaret M. Curry
                                             ------------------------------
                                             Margaret M. Curry
                                             Sr. Vice President - Servicing
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-11368

DALE R. TEMPLIN, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SOURCECORP, INC.; ED H. BOWMAN, JR.; BARRY EDWARDS; IMAGE ENTRY, INC., Defendants-Appellees.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * DALE R. TEMPLIN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. SOURCECORP, INC.; ED H. BOWMAN, JR.,BARRY L. EDWARDS, Defendants-Appellees.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D November 12, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III ClerkNo. 06-11368

2 GEORGE REICHL, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, DALE R. TEMPLIN, Appellant, v. SOURCECORP, INC.; ED H. BOWMAN, JR.; BARRY EDWARDS, Defendants-Appellees.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
DALE R. TEMPLIN, Appellant,

v. SOURCECORP, INC.; ED H. BOWMAN, JR.; BARRY EDWARDS, Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas No. 3:04-CV-2387No. 06-11368

* Pursuant to 5

TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH CIR
. R. 47.5.4. 3 Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and GARZA, Circuit Judges.. PER CURIAM: *

We have reviewed the briefs and applicable law, have consulted pertinent portions ofthe record, and have heard oral argument. We conclude that the district court properly dismissed for failure tostate a claim under § 10(b) ofthe Securities and ExchangeAct of1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), against SourceCorp, Inc., E d Bowman, or Barry Edwards. Plaintiffs also have failed to state a claim against Image Entry, Inc., because plaintiffs did not adequately plead that Bill Deaton’s alleged fraud should be imputed to it. See Kaplan v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 9 F.3d 405, 407 (5th Cir. 1993). Because plaintiffs’ claims under § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a), were against SourceCorp, Inc., for controlling Image Entry, Inc., and against Bowman and Edwards for controlling SourceCorp, Inc., and Image Entry, Inc., all ofwhom have committed no “predicate securities fraud offense under § 10(b),” the plaintiffs “have necessarily failed tostate a claim

. . . for ‘controlling person’ liability under § 20(a).” Lovelace v. Software Spectrum Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1021 n.8 (5th Cir. 1996). Thejudgment isAFFIRMED, essentially for the reasons given by the district court.
COURT OF APPEALS

	SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	FORT WORTH

	NO. 2-07-029-CV

IN RE JEFFREY TOD HOLDEN	RELATOR

	------------

	ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

	------------

	MEMORANDUM OPINION1 AND JUDGMENT

	------------

	On January 29, 2007, we issued an opinion and order that dismissed as moot Relator Jeffrey Tod Holden’s petition for writ of mandamus, ordered that Relator’s supplemental petition for writ of mandamus be filed under the separate cause number 2-07-029-CV, and ordered Relator to pay the $75 mandamus filing fee.  Relator complied with our order and paid the $75 mandamus filing fee.

	While Relator’s supplemental petition for writ of mandamus was pending, the Honorable Nancy Berger took office and is now presiding over the 322nd District Court in Tarrant County, the trial court in which the underlying case is still pending.  Consequently, pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 7.2(b), we abated and remanded this proceeding to allow her to reconsider the December 18, 2006 rulings made by the original Respondent, the Honorable Frank Sullivan.  See Tex. R. App. P. 7.2(b).  	

	The Honorable Nancy Berger has complied with our order.  She submitted a letter to this court stating that it is her opinion “that the evidence presented at the December 18, 2006 hearing was sufficient for the trial judge, Honorable Frank Sullivan, to have made the rulings that he made” and that she concurred with the rulings. Consequently, we may now consider Relator’s supplemental petition for writ of mandamus.  

	Mandamus relief is proper only to correct a clear abuse of discretion when there is no adequate remedy by appeal.  In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).  Having reviewed Relator’s supplemental petition for writ of mandamus, we hold that Relator has not demonstrated that mandamus relief is proper.  See id.  Therefore, the court is of the opinion that relief should be denied.  Accordingly, Relator’s supplemental petition for writ of mandamus is denied.  

	Real Party in Interest Bobbie McGehee has filed a “Motion to Dismiss Supplemental Petition for Writ of Mandamus Or Alternatively, Motion to Abate Proceedings.”  Because we have denied Relator’s supplemental petition for writ of mandamus, we deny Real Party In Interest Bobbie McGehee’s request to dismiss or abate that supplemental petition. 

	Relator shall pay all costs of this original proceeding, for which let execution issue.

								PER CURIAM

PANEL A:  WALKER, J.; CAYCE, C.J.; and MCCOY, J.

DELIVERED: April 30, 2007