UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

 

MYOUN L. SAWYER, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

SHAWN SULLIVAN; THOMAS 

KINLEN; RICKY GOULD; LESLEY 

ADAMS; VERONIQUE A.; MARK K., 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 13-3331 

(D.C. No. 5:13-CV-03201-SAC) 

(D. Kan.)

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 

Before LUCERO and McKAY, Circuit Judges, and BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge. 

 

 Myoun L. Sawyer, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of 

his civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1

 Mr. Sawyer, who also seeks 

leave to proceed on appeal without prepayment of his appellate costs and fees (IFP), 

 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

1

 We liberally construe Mr. Sawyer’s pro se materials but do not act as his 

advocate. See United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 2009). 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

May 20, 2014

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
- 2 - 

was civilly committed at Larned State Hospital when he filed this appeal.2

 In his 

complaint, Mr. Sawyer alleged that another patient at the hospital assaulted him with 

a padlock that staff members had inadequately secured. Mr. Sawyer asserted his 

Eighth Amendment rights were violated because staff members “were responsible for 

unlocking the padlock from off [a] refrigerator door and allowing the other patient 

access to the padlock.” Aplt. App., Vol. 1 at 4. 

On its initial screening review, the district court dismissed the case, ruling that 

Mr. Sawyer’s allegations failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim. The court 

explained that an Eighth Amendment claim must satisfy both objective and 

subjective components: the objective element requires a sufficiently serious 

deprivation, while the subjective component requires the defendant-official to “be 

‘aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of 

serious harm exists[,] and . . . also draw the inference.’” Id. at 12 (quoting Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). The district court concluded that Mr. Sawyer 

failed to satisfy the subjective prong because his allegations suggested, at most, mere 

negligence, which “is insufficient to state a claim for relief under § 1983.” Id. at 13 

(citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998) (“liability for 

 

2

 The district court granted Mr. Sawyer IFP status, and on March 6, 2014, we 

entered a preliminary order assessing partial fee payments. At the time he filed this 

appeal, however, Mr. Sawyer was not a prisoner, so this appeal is not subject to the 

fee payment provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) or the three-strikes provision of 

§ 1915(g). See Merryfield v. Jordan, 584 F.3d 923, 927 (10th Cir. 2009). We 

therefore vacate our March 6, 2014 order assessing partial fee payments. 
- 3 - 

negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due 

process”)). 

We review the district court’s dismissal de novo, McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 

1287, 1289 (10th Cir. 2001), and agree that Mr. Sawyer failed to satisfy the 

subjective component of his deliberate indifference claim, see Blackmon v. Sutton, 

734 F.3d 1237, 1244 (10th Cir. 2013) (“the defendant-official must know of and 

disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety” (internal quotation marks and 

brackets omitted)). Mr. Sawyer’s allegations do not indicate that hospital staff knew 

of and disregarded any risk of harm; instead, they indicate, at most, that staff 

members were negligent in securing the lock. But as the district court recognized, 

mere negligence is not enough to establish deliberate indifference. See Farmer, 

511 U.S. at 835. 

Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is affirmed. Mr. Sawyer is granted 

leave to proceed on appeal IFP, and our order dated March 6, 2014 assessing partial 

fee payments is vacated. 

 Entered for the Court 

 Monroe G. McKay 

 Circuit Judge