2020 IL App (1st) 180707-U

No. 1-18-0707 

Order filed December 7, 2020 

First Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as 

precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

CHRISTIAN PLUMMER, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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) 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Cook County. 

No. 16 CR 8913 

Honorable 

Brian K. Flaherty, 

Judge, presiding. 

JUSTICE COGHLAN delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Hyman and Pierce concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: We affirm defendant’s conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, 

concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding another person’s 

declaration against interest.

¶ 2 Following a bench trial, defendant Christian Plummer (defendant) was found guilty of 

aggravated unlawful use of weapon (AUUW) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (3)(I) (West 2016)) and 

sentenced to one year in prison. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred when it denied 
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his pretrial motion to introduce hearsay testimony that another person admitted to possessing the 

firearm. We affirm. 

¶ 3 After a May 10, 2016, traffic stop, the State charged defendant by indictment with eight 

counts of AUUW, alleging that he carried on or about his person or in a vehicle a handgun while 

not having been issued a currently valid license under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act (720 ILCS 

5/24-1.6(a)(1), (3)(A-5) (West 2016)) (counts I and II); while not having been issued a currently 

valid firearm owner’s identification (FOID) card (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (3)(C) (West 2016)) 

(counts III and IV); while also in possession of cannabis (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (3)(E) (West 

2016)) (counts V and VI); and while under 21 years of age (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (3)(I) (West 

2016)) (counts VII and VIII). 

¶ 4 Before trial, a hearing was held on a motion filed pursuant to Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 

U.S. 284 (1973), and Illinois Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011), which sought 

admission of hearsay statements made to the police by DeJahn Witcher (Witcher).

1 The defense 

alleged that, around 5 p.m. on May 10, 2016, police stopped a vehicle in which defendant was the 

front seat passenger. Police recovered a gun from under defendant’s seat and a bullet from the rear 

passenger-side floorboard. Witcher was the rear passenger in the vehicle and was taken into 

custody with defendant. Defendant alleged that, around 8:30 p.m., Witcher told Sergeant Deshon 

Walker (Walker) and Officer John Borgen (Borgen) that the handgun belonged to him, he had 

purchased it from someone named Shaq for $450, and he needed the gun for protection because 

his brother had recently been attacked. 

1 DeJahn Witcher is referred to throughout the record as “DeJahn Witcher,” “DeJahn Wichter,” 

and “Deshawn Richards.” We will refer to him as “Witcher” to be consistent with the parties.
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¶ 5 Defendant also alleged that Witcher told the police the handgun was in his possession when 

the vehicle was stopped by Borgen and he kicked the handgun under the seat while defendant was 

being removed from the vehicle. Defendant conceded that Witcher later recanted his statement and 

was released without being charged. Defendant argued Witcher’s statement showed sufficient 

indicia of trustworthiness under Chambers where the statement was (1) made shortly after the 

crime; (2) corroborated by the evidence; (3) detailed with respect to when he purchased the 

handgun, why he purchased it, and what he did with it during the traffic stop; and (4) selfincriminating and against Witcher’s penal interest.

¶ 6 In response, the State asserted that Walker observed defendant making furtive movements 

on the right side of his seat during the traffic stop and recovered the handgun from where he 

observed defendant making those movements. The State further alleged that, around 10:20 p.m., 

Witcher recanted his statement that the gun belonged to him, claiming he had been trying to “help 

out defendant” who “had been in trouble with the police before.” Witcher also told police that 

defendant had “told him that he would post his bail money if he took the rap for him and that 

because he did not have background the police wouldn’t charge him with the gun.” 

¶ 7 The State argued Witcher’s statement should be barred under Chambers because (1) it was 

not made spontaneously to a close acquaintance but rather during a formal police interview after 

Witcher had been read and waived his Miranda rights; (2) there was no corroboration for the 

statement other than the presence of the gun; (3) Witcher’s access to the area in which the gun was 

recovered was blocked by a metal baseball bat and hoverboard; and (4) Witcher recanted his 

statement shortly after making it, at which time he alleged the first statement was the product of 

the promises made by the defendant. 
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¶ 8 The court denied defendant’s motion, finding, under the totality of the circumstances, 

Witcher’s statement was not trustworthy, especially where he gave “two completely opposite 

statements within a short period of time, and he explain[ed] in statement [n]umber 2 the reasons 

why he gave statement [n]umber 1. In other words why he admitted to the ownership of the gun 

based on promises made by [defendant].” 

¶ 9 At trial, Walker testified that, on May 10, 2016, Borgen was conducting a traffic stop of a 

vehicle containing three occupants in the area of 161st Street and Sawyer Avenue. When Walker 

arrived at the scene to assist, he observed Borgen speaking with the driver of the vehicle. Walker 

approached the passenger side of the vehicle and, through an open window, spoke with Witcher, 

who was seated in the back passenger-side seat. Walker smelled both fresh and burnt cannabis 

emanating from the vehicle. He observed defendant, who was seated in the front passenger seat, 

make several “movements from his waistband area to the -- between the passengers seat and the 

passenger door area,” to the “floorboard area, between the seat and the door,” but never actually 

saw defendant in possession of the gun. 

¶ 10 Walker directed defendant to roll his window down, and asked whether there were any 

illegal drugs in the vehicle. Defendant told him “no.” Walker observed traces of suspected cannabis 

on defendant’s lap and on the face of his cell phone, which was “positioned partially off of his left 

leg and [on] the center console.” Walker also observed a knotted plastic sandwich bag containing 

suspected cannabis protruding from defendant’s right-front pocket. Walker again asked defendant 

whether there were any illegal drugs in the vehicle and defendant again said, “no.” Walker then 

reached inside the vehicle, pulled the bag from defendant’s pocket, and asked, “well, what about 

this?” Defendant replied, “Oh, shoot. I forgot about that; I’m a smoker.” 
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¶ 11 Walker asked defendant to exit the vehicle, patted him down, placed him in handcuffs, and 

escorted him to the back seat of his squad car. By the time Walker returned to the vehicle to 

perform an inventory search, Borgen had removed Witcher and the driver. 

¶ 12 Before Walker began his search, Borgen “advised [him] that there was a projectile on the 

rear floor board of the vehicle.” Initially, he saw only a baseball bat protruding from the rear of 

the front passenger seat and a hoverboard behind the bat but, “once [he] looked over, [he] could 

see the projectile on the floor.” After recovering the bullet, Walker searched the area where he saw 

defendant “making his motions.” He saw “the butt of a [handgun] protruding from underneath the 

seat where [defendant’s] hand had been moving.” The handgun was under the seat as if it had been 

slid under on an angle. Walker removed the handgun and determined it was loaded with 10 live 

rounds. 

¶ 13 Defendant was transported to the police station separately from Witcher and the driver and 

the three men were secured in separate holding cells. Around 8:38 p.m., with defendant’s attorney 

present, Walker read defendant his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)) and 

interviewed him. Defendant told Walker “that the person who initially possessed the gun was 

named John Adams, AKA Joe Joe.” He also stated his fingerprints would be on it because he had 

touched it two days before on 158th Street in Harvey and that the occupants of the vehicle “were 

not really familiar” with the owner of the handgun. Walker also spoke with Witcher and the driver. 

After the interviews, defendant was charged and Witcher and the driver were released from 

custody. 

¶ 14 After the State rested, the defendant elected not to present any evidence. The trial court 

found defendant guilty of AUUW counts V through VIII, and not guilty of AUUW counts I
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through IV. Defendant filed an amended motion for new trial, arguing, in part, the court (1) should 

vacate its findings of guilt on counts V and VI because the State failed to prove the suspect 

cannabis recovered by Walker was, in fact, cannabis, and (2) erroneously denied his Chambers

motion. The court vacated the findings of guilt on counts V and VI and denied the motion in all 

other respects. After a subsequent sentencing hearing, defendant was sentenced to one year in the 

Illinois Department of Corrections. 

¶ 15 On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his Chambers motion. 

Specifically, he argues the court abused its discretion in barring admission of Witcher’s statement 

against penal interest because it bore sufficient indicia of reliability and was crucial to his defense. 

Defendant further argues that this was not harmless error. 

¶ 16 Hearsay evidence is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter 

asserted and is generally inadmissible unless it falls within a recognized exception to the hearsay 

rule. People v. Tenney, 205 Ill. 2d 411, 432-33 (2002). One such exception applies to declarations 

against interest, and is founded on the assumption that a person is unlikely to fabricate a statement 

against his or her own interest. Id. at 433 (citing Chambers, 410 U.S. at 299). Because confessions 

of criminal activity are often motivated by extraneous considerations and are not as inherently 

reliable as statements against pecuniary or proprietary interest (Chambers, 410 U.S. at 299-300), 

an “unsworn, out-of-court declaration that the declarant committed the crime, and not the 

defendant on trial, is generally inadmissible, even though the declaration is against the declarant’s 

penal interest.” Tenney, 205 Ill. 2d at 433. However, declarations against penal interest will be 

admitted where justice requires. Id.
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¶ 17 In Chambers, the Supreme Court identified four factors to help determine the reliability of 

a hearsay statement: “(1) the statement was spontaneously made to a close acquaintance shortly 

after the crime occurred; (2) the statement is corroborated by some other evidence; (3) the 

statement is self-incriminating and against the declarant’s interests; and (4) there was adequate 

opportunity for cross-examination of the declarant.” Id. at 435 (citing Chambers, 410 U.S. at 300-

301). “The four Chambers factors are merely guidelines to determining admissibility rather than 

hard and fast requirements; the presence of all four factors is not a condition of admissibility.” Id.

The ultimate question is whether the extrajudicialstatement “was made under circumstances which 

provide considerable assurance of its reliability by objective indicia of trustworthiness.” (Internal 

quotation marks omitted.) People v. Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d 207, 216 (1996). 

¶ 18 By the same token, the presence of one or more factors does not make a statement 

necessarily trustworthy. People v. Gallano, 354 Ill. App. 3d 941, 957 (2004). Ultimately, the trial 

court must evaluate the totality of the circumstances and determine whether the statement is 

trustworthy enough to warrant admission. Id. 

¶ 19 The trial court retains considerable discretion to exclude unreliable declarations against 

penal interest, and “its ruling should not be reversed absent a clear showing of abuse of that 

discretion.” Tenney, 205 Ill. 2d at 436. An abuse of discretion will only be found “where the court’s 

ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the position 

adopted by the trial court.” People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 89 (2001). In this case, the trial court 

found Witcher’s statement lacked sufficient indicia of reliability “[c]onsidering the four

[Chambers] factors and the totality of the circumstances.”
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¶ 20 As an initial matter, the parties agree that the third Chambers factor—whether Witcher’s 

statement was incriminating and against his penal interest—weighed in favor of admission. The 

parties also agree that the State had no prior opportunity to cross-examine Witcher, and he was an 

unavailable witness because he could assert his fifth-amendment privilege against selfincrimination. Thus, the fourth factor weighed against admission. See id. at 101 (witness asserting 

fifth-amendment privilege is an unavailable witness not subject to cross-examination, and the 

fourth Chambers factor weighs against admission). Defendant argues that failure to satisfy the 

fourth factor does not bar admission where the statement is otherwise reliable, but, as discussed

below, the statement was not otherwise reliable.

¶ 21 With respect to the first Chambers factor, the record shows the crime occurred around 5:30 

p.m. and Witcher gave his first statement around 8:30 p.m. Thus, it was made shortly after the 

crime occurred, weighing in favor of its admission. See People v. Swaggirt, 282 Ill. App. 3d 692, 

698, 701 (1996) (statements made within 24 hours were made “shortly after the crime occurred” 

for purposes of the first Chambers factor). However, the record also shows the statement was not

made spontaneously or to a close acquaintance but rather during a police interrogation, which 

weighs against its admission. See Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d at 216, 218; accord Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d at 96-

97 (finding statement to police in response to questioning did not satisfy first Chambers factor 

where it was made neither spontaneously nor to a close acquaintance). 

¶ 22 Defendant, relying primarily on People v. Kokoraleis, 149 Ill. App. 3d 1000, 1020-21 

(1986), argues that, even though Witcher’s statement was not made spontaneously to a close 

acquaintance, the first Chambers factor weighs in favor of admission because Witcher’s statement 

was likely to intensify efforts to prosecute him. In Kokoraleis, the trial court excluded custodial 
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statements made by two men confessing to murder and rape, crimes with which the defendant was 

ultimately charged. Id. at 1017. Kokoraleis found that, although the first Chambers factor was not 

met as the statements were made “some time after the crime” to law enforcement personnel rather 

than spontaneously soon after the crime occurred to close friends, this alone did not raise a 

presumption of untrustworthiness. Id. at 1020. Instead, given the “obvious inculpatory character” 

of the statements made while in custody to law enforcement personnel, where neither declarant 

“stood to benefit by disclosing his role in the offenses,” neither implicated the defendant, and both 

“must have been aware of the possibility that disclosure would lead to criminal prosecution,” these 

statements were more likely than not trustworthy. Id. at 1021. 

¶ 23 Like the declarants in Kokoraleis, Witcher made an inculpatory statement to law 

enforcement personnel, confessing to the offense with which defendant was ultimately charged 

but without implicating defendant. However, unlike in Kokoraleis, Witcher almost immediately 

recanted his confession, explaining that he had only agreed to take the blame for the gun because 

of certain promises made by defendant. We agree with the trial court that Witcher’s statement was

unreliable given that he recanted within two hours of giving the statement and provided a 

reasonable explanation why he had initially confessed. 

¶ 24 Defendant, relying on Chambers, argues Witcher’s recantation “did not strip Witcher’s 

initial, inculpatory statement of its considerable indicia of reliability.” According to defendant, in 

Chambers, the third-party declarant also recanted his confession and, despite the recantation, the 

Supreme Court found the declarant’s statement sufficiently reliable for admission where the parties 

would be free to argue its credibility before the trier of fact. 
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¶ 25 In Chambers, a declarant recanted his prior, sworn confession one month after he made it. 

Chambers, 410 U.S. at 288. The declarant testified at trial, his prior confession was admitted into 

evidence, and, on cross-examination by the State, he testified he had recanted his confession and 

explained why he did so. Id. at 291. Thus, unlike the case at bar, there was no immediate 

recantation or hearsay issue regarding the declarant’s recanted confession. The hearsay issue in 

Chambers arose from the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to present hearsay 

testimony from three close acquaintances of the declarant to whom he allegedly made three 

separate, inculpatory statements the night of or day after the murder, which he did not recant. Id.

at 291-93. Thus, Chambersis inapposite to the case at bar. In sum, the first Chambers factor weighs 

against admissibility. 

¶ 26 With respect to the second Chambers factor, we find Witcher’s statement was not 

sufficiently corroborated by the available evidence. The record in this case shows the gun was 

recovered from the floorboard area where Walker observed defendant making furtive movements 

during the stop. The record also shows a baseball bat was protruding from beneath the front 

passenger seat into the area in which Witcher was seated and behind it was a hover board. These 

facts refute Witcher’s statement that he was able to kick the handgun under the front passenger 

seat after defendant had exited the vehicle. Further, Witcher’s statement regarding how he 

procured the firearm—that he purchased it just prior to the stop for $450 from a man named Shaq 

because he needed it for protection—is not corroborated by any other evidence in the record. 

Notably, Witcher’s statement was inconsistent with defendant’s statement, which was that the gun 

belonged to “John Adams AKA Joe Joe,” that defendant had last seen it two days before the stop 

in Harvey, and that defendant’s fingerprints would be on the gun because he handled it at that time. 
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Under these circumstances, we conclude Witcher’s statement was not sufficiently corroborated so 

as to weigh in favor of admission under Chambers. See People v. McAllister, 193 Ill. 2d 63, 102-

03 (2000) (finding trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding a declaration against penal 

interest where the statement was only minimally corroborated by the evidence). 

¶ 27 Defendant argues that the State could have investigated Witcher’s statement further to 

disprove the details therein but failed to do so. However, as the proponent of the evidence sought 

to be admitted, defendant bore the burden of establishing its admissibility. People v. Torres, 2012 

IL 111302, ¶ 53. Therefore, the second Chambers factor weighs against admissibility of Witcher’s 

recanted confession.

¶ 28 In sum, we find that the trial court reasonably concluded that Witcher’s statement was 

unreliable and therefore inadmissible. Witcher’s statement was not made spontaneously to a close 

friend, he recanted it with a reasonable explanation shortly after he made it, it completely 

contradicts defendant’s statement regarding acquiring the firearm, and is, at best, minimally

corroborated by the evidence. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

by excluding admission of Witcher’s declaration against penal interest.

¶ 29 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 30 Affirmed.