alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Daniel M. BEAM, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D11-899.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

April 15, 2011.

Rehearing Denied May 18, 2011.

Daniel M. Beam, Jasper, pro se.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Bonnie Jean Parrish, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Daniel Beam appeals the dismissal of his motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. While the trial court erroneously believed it did not have jurisdiction to consider Beam’s motion, *see Gawronski v. State,*801 So.2d 211 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2001), we nonetheless affirm, concluding Beam’s second rule 3.850 motion to be procedurally barred as an abusive, successive motion. *See Owen v. Crosby,*854 So.2d 182 (Fla.2003); *Christopher v. State,*489 So.2d 22 (Fla.1986).

AFFIRMED.

MONACO, C.J., GRIFFIN and COHEN, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 31.2





CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER


PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








I, Peter A. Nicholson, certify that:





1.   I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K/A (Amendment No. 2) of RC2 Corporation;





2.   Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; and





3.   Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report.








Date:  April 8, 2011


By: /s/ Peter A. Nicholson


Peter A. Nicholson


Chief Financial Officer
#### D. A. Shaline & Co. v. C. Q. Goodman.

(No. 3052.)

Appeal from Mitchell County.

Opinion by

White, P. J.

§ 267. *Limitation; computation of time.*The account sued on in this case was for goods sold and delivered to Goodman, on the 28th day of August, 1880, and the evidence of Goodman himself shows that the goods were sold on six months’ time; that is, that the money would hot be payable until six months after purchase, or until the 28 Lh of February, 1881. This suit was brought on the 28th of February, 1883, two years to a day from the accrual of the cause of action. Was the action barred by the .statute of limitation of two years? The statute provides that actions to recover debts, not evidenced by a contract in writidg, must be brought *within*two years. [E. S. art. 3203.] . The principles involved in the settlement of this question have been so fully discussed in cases heretofore decided in this state, that it is only necessary to refer to them to show that to this question an *203affirmative answer must be given. [State v. Asbury, 26 Tex. 82; R. R. Co. v. Goodson, *ante,*§ 27.]

June 21, 1884.

Affirmed.
1 The Honorable Ronald E. Longstaff, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 08-3509

___________ Paris Marshall Wheeler, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Southern District of Iowa. Iowa State Penitentiary; Warden Burt; * Debbie Nichols; Pradeep Sarswat; * [UNPUBLISHED] John Ault; Dr. Raymond Jones; * Dr. Noli Mendoza; Dr. Snow; Jerry * Commelly; Dr. Satyalu Durga, * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: December 1, 2009 Filed: December 29, 2009

___________ Before MURPHY, COLLOTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Iowa inmate Paris Wheeler brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against the Iowa State Penitentiary (ISP) and several of its staff members, as well as several staff members at the Anamosa State Penitentiary (ASP) in Iowa. The district court 1 granted summary judgment for defendants. Wheeler appeals the grant of summary judgment,-2- as well as the denial of his motion for an extension of time to respond to the summary judgment motion. We deny Wheeler’s motion to supplement the record and affirm the judgment of the district court.
After careful de novo review, we concludethat the grant of summary judgment was proper. As to the ISP defendants, Wheeler failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing the instant suit. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (prisoner may not bring § 1983 action with respect to prison c onditions before exhausting all available administrative remedies); Jones v. Bock , 549 U.S. 199, 219-20 (2007) (courts may not consider any unexhausted claim). As to the ASP defendants, we conclude that Wheeler’s suit included only o fficial-capacity claims, see Egerdahl v. Hibbing Cmty. Coll. , 72 F.3d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1995) (when complaint is silent about capacity, court interprets complaint as including only offici al-capacity claims), that any claim for damages was barred by the El eventh Amendment, see Kentucky v. Graham , 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (plaintiff seeking damages in official-capacity suit must look to government entity as real party in interest); Brandon v. Holt , 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985) (suit against government official in his official capacity is in essence suit against employing government entity); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police , 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (neither state nor its o fficials acting in their official capacities are persons under § 1983); Montano v. Hedgepeth , 120 F.3d 844, 849-50 (8th Cir. 1997) (physicians working in state prisons are state actors), and that any claim for injunctive relief was moot, because Wheelerwas no longer incarcerated at ASP, see Martin v. Sargent , 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985). We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying an extension to respond to the summary judgment motion. See Soliman v. Johanns , 412 F.3d 920, 921-22 (8th Cir. 2005) (standard of review).
Accordingly, we affirm.

______________________________
#### Michael HINDELANG, III v. Regina Louviere HINDELANG.

No. 2010-C-2701.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 4, 2011.

In re Hindelang III, Michael; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 2008-1114; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-397.

Writ Granted in Part; denied in Part. We reinstate the portion of the trial court’s judgment that awarded final periodic spousal support for twelve months. However, we affirm the portion of the court of appeal’s judgment that orders the award to be paid retroactive to the date of judgment. See La.R.S. 9:321(B).
**EXHIBIT 23.1****CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**     We consent to the incorporation by reference in RegistrationStatement Nos.333-68929,333-64242,333-109332 and333-125245 onForm S-8 of ourreports dated March 1, 2006, relating to the consolidatedfinancial statements and financial statement schedule of GevityHR, Inc. (the “Company”), and management’s reporton the effectiveness of internal control over financialreporting appearing in this Annual Report onForm 10-K of theCompany for the year ended December 31, 2005./s/ Deloitte &Touche LLPTampa, FloridaMarch 1, 2006
#### Fatima TALBI, Appellant, v. Tarik ESSOUFI, Appellee.

No. 2D09-4153.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

July 29, 2011.

Genevieve H. Torres, Tampa, for Appellant.

Virginia R. Vetter, Tampa, for Appellee.

DAVIS, Judge.

Fatima Talbi, the Former Wife, appeals from the final judgment of dissolution of marriage. We affirm the final judgment of dissolution without further comment. We note that the portion of the final judgment related to custody and visitation includes language setting forth the custody modifications that the trial court will consider making if the Former Wife shows that she has completed a list of specific tasks outlined in the order. Any trial court considering a future motion to modify custody or visitation should not consider this language to be a limitation on the type of changes in circumstance the trial court should consider as a basis for modification or on the scope of any such modification and should apply the appropriate standard for modification as commonly set forth in case law. *Cf. Henderson v. Henderson,*905 So.2d 901, 904-05 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (finding erroneous the portion of a “ruling which attempts to prospectively modify the appropriate standard to be applied to any future modification of visitation”).

Affirmed.

VILLANTI and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.
[No. C035569.

Third Dist.

May 14, 2001.]

#### ERNESTO LOPEZ et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. LORI KATHERINE JARRETT et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Counsel

Pacheco & Jo, S. Alexandria Jo and Charles A. Pacheco for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

*1299Hardy, Erich, Brown & Wilson and David S. Worthington for Defendant and Respondent Lori Katherine Jarrett.

Hansen, Boyd, Culhane & Watson, Daniel V. Kohls and Betsy S. Kimball for Defendant and Respondent Hardy, Erich, Brown & Wilson.

Carroll, Burdick & McDonough and Angela M. Bradstreet for Defendants and Respondents Stanley J. Bell, Sally Bechthold and Kirk Musacchio.

Opinion

THE COURT.*

Plaintiffs and appellants, Ernesto Lopez and Aristeo Solorio, and defendants and respondents, Law Offices of Stanley J. Bell, Stanley J. Bell, Sally Bechthold and Kirk Musacchio, have applied to this court for determination of good faith settlement.

Such a determination is governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6. The aforementioned parties have cited no authority indicating the provisions of section 877.6 apply to the Court of Appeal. Reading section 877.6 in its entirety, it is apparent the statute applies only to the trial court and not to the Court of Appeal.

The application for determination of good faith settlement is denied.

On June 14, 2001, the opinion was modified to read as printed above.

*

Before Sims, Acting P. J., Nicholson, J., and Kolkey, J.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                          11,668
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                         504,900
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                69,600
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    811,453
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                          22,834
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                            23,213
<LOANS>                                        494,569
<ALLOWANCE>                                      4,095
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,469,598
<DEPOSITS>                                     504,900
<SHORT-TERM>                                   581,100
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              7,863
<LONG-TERM>                                     30,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           364
<OTHER-SE>                                     339,870
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>               1,469,598
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                 34,158
<INTEREST-INVEST>                               24,245
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                     0
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                58,403
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                              20,326
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              24,980
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           33,423
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                    2,155
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                 541
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                 15,781
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 19,670
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                      19,670
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    12,069
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .34
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .34
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    6.90
<LOANS-NON>                                      3,645
<LOANS-PAST>                                       478
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                   102
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                  3,082
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 3,415
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                    1,721
<RECOVERIES>                                       246
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                4,095
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                             4,095
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
**Exhibit 23.1**

 

**Consent of RegisteredIndependent Public Accounting Firm**

 

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in theRegistration Statements on Form S-3 (Number 333-116940, as amended) and FormS-8 (Number 333-123060) previously filed by iVow, Inc. (formerly Vista MedicalTechnologies Inc.) of our report on the consolidated financial statements ofthe Company as of December 31, 2004 and for the year then ended, which reportappears in this annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31,2004.

 
| /s/ J. H. COHN LLP |
|--------------------|

San Diego, California

March 31, 2005

 

----
**EXHIBIT31.2**

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

I, Michael S. Durski, Chief Financial Officer, certifythat: 

1.      I havereviewed this amended annual report of Force Protection, Inc.;

2.      Based onmy knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a materialfact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.      Based onmy knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this report;

4.      Theregistrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined inExchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant andhave:

(a)    Designedsuch disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b)    Evaluatedthe effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and

(c)    Disclosedin this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

5.      Theregistrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based onour most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board ofdirectors:

(a)    Allsignificant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and

(b)    Any fraud,whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.

Date: June 27, 2007 
| By:    | /s/ MICHAEL S. DURSKI     |   |
|--------|---------------------------|--------|
|   | Michael S. Durski         |
|   | *Chief Financial Officer* |

 

----
Exhibit 10.7


 


Safety
Insurance Group, Inc.


2002
Management Omnibus Incentive Plan, as Amended


 


This Amendment
(this “Amendment”) to the 2002 Management Omnibus Incentive Plan, as
amended (the “Plan”) is adopted as of December 31, 2008 by the
Board of Directors of Safety Insurance Group, Inc. (the “Company”).


 


WHEREAS, the Company maintains the Plan, and pursuant to Article 15
of the Plan, the Board of Directors of the Company may alter, amend, suspend or
terminate the Plan at any time; and


 


WHEREAS, the Board of Directors of the
Company desires to amend the Plan.


 


NOW,
THEREFORE, the Plan is hereby amended by this Amendment, effective as of
December 31, 2008, as follows:


 


1.               Section 2.16
shall be deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following:


 


“Fair Market Value” shall mean (i) if
the Shares are traded on any established stock exchange or traded on a national
market system, the closing price on the trading day of the grant of the Awards
or (ii) if the Shares are not traded on any established stock exchange or
traded on a national market system, in accordance with a valuation methodology
approved in good faith by the Committee and in compliance with Section 409A
of the Code and the regulations issued thereunder.


 


2.               Section 19.5
shall be deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following:


 


“Code Section 409A Compliance.  To the extent applicable, it is intended that
this Plan and any Awards granted hereunder comply with, and should be
interpreted consistent with, the requirements of Section 409A of the Code
and any related regulations or other guidance promulgated thereunder by the
U.S. Department of the Treasury or the Internal Revenue Service.”


 


3.               Except
as expressly set forth in this Amendment, the Plan shall remain unchanged and
in full force and effect.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-6633

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

HARRY RONALD RICE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert D. Potter, Senior

District Judge. (CR-90-114-C-P, CA-94-52-3-P)

Submitted: January 9, 1997 Decided: January 21, 1997

Before HALL and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Harry Ronald Rice, Appellant Pro Se. James Michael Sullivan, Assistant United States Attorney, Gretchen C. F. Shappert, Assistant

United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant filed an untimely notice of appeal. We dismiss for

lack of jurisdiction. The time periods for filing notices of appeal

are governed by Fed. R. App. P. 4. These periods are "mandatory and

jurisdictional." Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections, 434

U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S.

220, 229 (1960)). Parties to civil actions have sixty days within

which to file in the district court notices of appeal from judgments or final orders. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). The only exceptions

to the appeal period are when the district court extends the time

to appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal

period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6).

The district court entered its order on November 17, 1994; Appellant's notice of appeal was filed on April 15, 1996. Appellant's

failure to note a timely appeal or obtain either an extension or a

reopening of the appeal period leaves this court without jurisdiction to consider the merits of Appellant's appeal. We therefore

dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

DISMISSED
#### LEDELL JEFFERSON *v.*COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

(AC 22932)

Lavery, C. J., and Dranginis and Flynn, Js.

Submitted on briefs March 21

officially released April 8, 2003

Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                                 18 U.S.C. 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Boyd Bros. Transportation
Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2002, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Gail B. Cooper, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1)    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
                U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d); and

         (2)    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
                material respects, the financial condition and results of
                operations of the Company.

By:     /s/  GAIL B. COOPER
    -----------------------------

Gail B. Cooper
Chief Executive Officer
November 13, 2002
#### STATE ex rel. Leonard PERKINS v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-2847.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 16, 2011.

In re Perkins, Leonard; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 91-1188; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KH-89.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; *State ex rel. Glover v. State,*93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

GUIDRY, J., recused.