alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### J. C. B. Dunn v. A. L. Cole.

(No. 3396.)

Appeal from Collin County.

Opinion by

Watts, J.

§ 821. *Malicious prosecution; evidence of bad character- of plaintiff in such suit, admissible in mitigation of damages; case stated.*Dunn sued Cole for damages for false imprisonment, alleging that Cole had caused him to be arrested and imprisoned on charges of theft, adultery and fornication. Cole was permitted on the trial to introduce evidence of the plaintiff’s bad character. The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for Cole, the defendant. *Held:*There were no allegations in plaintiff’s petition of damage to his character, and no recovery upon that ground was sought by him; therefore it was not permissible to show his bad character as proof of probable cause. However, it seems to be settled that such evidence is admissible in mitigation of damages. [1 Whart. Ev. §§ *47,*54.] But such evidence must be as to his bad reputation in general, and not as to such reputation among persons of a particular class. [Erchbach v. Applegarth, *47*Md. 61.]

*726May 29, 1885.

§ 822. *Malice; evidence to show absence of, held admissible.*It was iiot error to admit the evidence of the county attorney as to appellee’s statements to him of the supposed violations of the penal laws of the state by appellant. The question whether appellee made to the county attorney a full and fair statement, and acted *bona fide*and without malice in instituting the prosecutions against appellant, was for the determination of the jury, and this evidence was relevant and admissible to show that appellee acted in the matter without malice. [Cooley on Torts, § 183; 3 Sutherland on Dam. 708; 4 Wait’s Act. & Def. 339.]

§ 823. *Same; evidence not admissible; defendant not permitted to testify that he acted without malice.*Appellee, while testifying in the case in his own behalf, was asked by his counsel: *“*Were you actuated by malicious motives in making the affidavits? ” alluding to the affidavits made by appellee charging appellant with said offenses. Appellant objected to this question upon the ground that it called for the conclusions of the witness. The objection was overruled, and the witness answered “none whatever.” The ruling of the court admitting this evidence is presented by bill of exception and assignment of error. The evidence was clearly inadmissible. As remarked in Gabel v. Weisman, 49 Tex. 142: “Very evidently, the question asked was not to any distinct intelligible fact, but sought to elicit from the witness his •inference or conclusion involving his correct understanding of the meaning of the word malice in such a connection.” [See, also, *ante,*§ 84.] It cannot be determined that no injury resulted to appellant from the admission of this improper evidence.

Reversed and remanded.
#### Kelly E. McGEE v. Julian MUTTER, Jr.; Julian Mutter; 511, L.L.C.; Raven Hinojosa, individually and d/b/a Aurora Aerials; and the Black Forest Fancies; as well as their Unknown Liability Insurers.

No. 2011-C-1240.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 23, 2011.

In re McGee, Kelly E.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District *1163Court Div. E, No. 2009-2273; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-CA-1334.

Denied.
#### J. S. McLendon v. King, McRea & Co.

(No. 3118.)

Appeal from Robertson County.

Opinion by

Will-son, J.

*(Transferred from Austin. J*

§'310. *Garnishment; deed of assignment not void because it reserves surplus to assignor.*Appellant was garnished upon a judgment obtained by appellees against McCall & Hicks. He answered, that prior to the service of the garnishment upon him, McCall & Hicks had assigned to him all their property which was subject to execution, for the benefit of consenting creditors; that he had accepted the trust, had executed, etc., the required bond as assignee, and had taken possession of the property assigned; that there was in his hands $2,849.22, the proceeds of said property; that the aggregate of the claims of the consenting creditors amounted to $3,120. The deed of assignment was made a part of his answer. *268It contained a provision as follows: “When said assignee has thus paid off and discharged all of such claims of such creditors for the benefit of whom this assignment is made, he shall pay over to us whatever surplus or money remains in his hands, if any. ” Appellees demurred specially to appellant’s answer, upon the ground that the deed. of assignment was fraudulent and void upon its face, because of the above quoted provision. The demurrer was sustained and judgment rendered against the garnishee. The deed of assignment was executed under the third section of the act of March 24, 1879 [it. S. Appendix, p. 5]. No other objection except the one presented by the special demurrer is urged against the deed, and it appears to be, in all respects, in accordance with the statute. The question presented by the special demurrer has been decided by our supreme court in the case of Keating v. Vaughn [Austin Term, 1884], In that case it was held that such a provision in a deed of assignment as the one above quoted did not render the deed void, or in any way affect its validity or operation, but that the provisions of the statute under which the deed was made controlled the matter. The case of Lawrence v. Norton, decided by the circuit court of the United States at Dallas, December, 1883, cited by counsel for appellees, holds a contrary doctrine, but. this court wifi follow the decision in Keating v. Vaughn, *supra,*regarding it as higher authority upon this question, and because we fully concur in its correctness.

October 11, 1884.

Reversed and remanded.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    Exhibit 23.1

                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS
                       ----------------------------------

     We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration 
Statement on Form S-8 (File Nos. 333-39261, 333-39263, and 333-70113) of CMP
Media Inc. of our report dated February 10, 1999, except for note 15, as to
which the date is March 30, 1999, relating to the financial statements and
financial statement schedule, which appears in this Form 10-K.

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

New York, New York
March 30, 1999


                                       53
Exhibit 10.2


 


Form of Termination Letter for Supplemental Executive Retirement
Agreements for Robert R. Hill, Jr.


 and John C. Pollok and Joe. E.
Burns


 


[to be printed on SCBT, N.A. letterhead]


 


December 30, 2008


 


[insert
executive’s name]


c/o
SCBT, N.A.


520
Gervais Street


Columbia,
South Carolina  29201


 


	
  Re:

  	
  Termination
  of the South Carolina Bank and Trust, National Association 

  Amended and Restated Supplemental Executive Retirement Agreement

  



 


Dear Mr.               ,


 


This
letter is to serve as notice (as required by Section 9.13 of the
Agreement) of the termination of the South Carolina Bank and Trust, National
Association Amended and Restated Supplemental Executive Retirement Agreement
(the “Agreement”) pursuant to Section 8.2 of the Agreement.  Termination of the Agreement will be
effective as of December 31, 2008. 
The balance of any accrued benefits owed under the Agreement will be
distributed to you within thirty (30) days of termination.  Following the receipt of this notice of termination,
all provisions of the Agreement shall have no further force or effect.


 


	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  SCBT,
  N.A.

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  By:

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  Title:
  Secretary
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### National Aeronautics and Space Administration

          - [Notice: (10-113)]

# AGENCY:

National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

# ACTION:

Notice of meeting.

# SUMMARY:

In accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act, Public Law 92-463, as amended, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration announces a meeting of the NASA Advisory Council.

# DATES:

Wednesday, October 6, 2010, 8 a.m.-5 p.m. (local time). Thursday, October 7, 2010, 8 a.m.-12 noon (local time).

# ADDRESSES:

The AERO Institute, 38256 Sierra Highway, Palmdale, CA 93550.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Ms. Marla King, NAC Administrative Officer, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Headquarters, Washington, DC 20546, (202) 358-1148.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

The agenda for the meeting will include reports from the NAC Committees:

—Aeronautics.

—Audit, Finance, and Analysis.

—Commercial Space.

—Education and Public Outreach.

—Exploration.

—Information Technology Infrastructure.

—Science.

—Space Operations.

—Technology and Innovation. 

The meeting will be open to the public up to the seating capacity of the room. It is imperative that the meeting be held on this date to accommodate the scheduling priorities of the key participants. Due to technical problems associated with original publication, this meeting notice is being re-submitted for publication less than 15 days in advance.

Dated: September 23, 2010.

P. Diane Rausch,

Advisory Committee Management Officer, National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

[FR Doc. 2010-24348 Filed 9-23-10; 4:15 pm]

BILLING CODE P
#### STATE ex rel. Joseph Thomas SAVOIE v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-1178.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 20, 2011.

In re Savoie, Joseph Thomas; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 98-CR-189632; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 10-00015.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; *State ex rel. Glover v. State,*93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189. Cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).
#### A. P. Moore v. J. D. Gore et al.

(No. 1624.)

Error from Smith County.

Opinion by

Hurt, J.

§ 75. *Appeal bond; liability of sureties on.*A. sues B. and 0. jointly, and recovers judgment against- both in justice’s court. They jointly appeal to the county court, M. and R. being sureties upon their appeal bond. Upon *62trial *de novo*in the county court A. recovers judgment against B. alone. *Held,*that the sureties, M. andR, were-liable for the judgment recovered against B. The case of McCoy v. Jones, 9 Tex. 363, is not in point upon this question.

December 12, 1883.

§ 76. *Costs; judgment for; on appeal to county court.*Where, on appeal to the county court, the judgment of the justice is reduced, but the county court adjudged all the costs against appellants and their sureties on the appeal bond, and the sureties prosecute a writ of error to the court of appeals, the judgment of the county court was reversed and reformed so as to adjudge that the plaintiffs in error, the sureties, recover all their costs against defendant in error.

Reversed and reformed.
Exhibit 99.2





                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF
                         THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the filing of the Annual Report on Form 10-K of
South Jersey Gas Company (the "Company") for the period ended December 31, 2002
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, David A. Kindlick, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby
certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.





/s/ David A. Kindlick
Name: David A. Kindlick
Title: Chief Financial Officer
March 13, 2003
#### Hicks *v.*The State.

Hill, J.

1. The evidence authorized the verdict finding the defendant guilty of the crime of murder.

2. Ground 3 of the amended motion for new trial complains that the court “did not fully and fairly charge the jury with reference to his defense, insanity.” There was no request for any additional charge on the subject, and it is not pointed out in this ground of the motion for new trial wherein the charge as given on the subject was not “full” and “fair.” The criticism upon the charge was too indefinite, and fails to allege cause for a reversal. *Groover*v. *Inman,*60 *Ga.*406 (5) ; *Hart*v. *Phenix Ins. Co.,*113 *Ga.*859 (4) (39 S. E. 304); *Patterson*v. *Beck,*133 *Ga.*701, 703 (66 S. E. 911).

3. Ground 4 of the amended motion for new trial complains that the court “did not fully and fairly charge the jury in reference to the law regarding admissions or confessions.” This criticism upon the charge is also too indefinite, and fails to allege cause for a reversal.

*201No. 6312.

April 11, 1928.

Rehearing denied May 19, 1928.

Murder. Before Judge Howard. Fulton superior court. October 15, 1927.

*Charles W. Anderson*and *Judson Andrews,*for plaintiff in error.

*George M. Napier, attorney-general, John A. Boykin, soliciiorgenerad, T. R. Gress, assistant attorney-general,*and *J. Walter LeCraw,*contra.

4. In so far as any of the assignments of error were sufficient to raise a question for decision, the judge did not err in overruling the defendant’s motion for new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
EXHIBIT 31.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, CORNELIS WIT, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this
annual report on Form 10-KSB of OmniComm Systems, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report;



|             |  |                        
|------------ |  | -----------------------
|By:          |  | /s/ Cornelis Wit       
|             |  | Cornelis Wit           
|             |  | Chief Executive Officer
|            
|May 15, 2008
855 A.2d 761

#### COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Richard David WAGNER, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted Jan. 13, 2004.

Decided Aug. 18, 2004.

Donald R. Totaro, Janna Rae Steinruck, for Com. of Pa.

James Jude Karl, for Richard David Wagner.

Before CAPPY, C.J., and CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, SAYLOR, BAER, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 18th day of August, 2004, the order of the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas is reversed insofar as it declared the Registration of Sexual Offenders Act unconstitutional, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. *See Commonwealth v. Williams,*574 Pa. 487, 832 A.2d 962 (2003); *Commonwealth v. Maldonado,*576 Pa. 101, 838 A.2d 710 (2003).

Justice EAKIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1607 Introduced in House (IH)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1607

    To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to provide for the 
  automatic acquisition of citizenship by certain individuals born in 
             Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, or Thailand.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 20, 2007

 Mr. Michaud introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                       Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to provide for the 
  automatic acquisition of citizenship by certain individuals born in 
             Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, or Thailand.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. AUTOMATIC ACQUISITION OF CITIZENSHIP FOR CERTAIN IMMIGRANTS 
              BORN IN KOREA, VIETNAM, LAOS, KAMPUCHEA, OR THAILAND.

    (a) In General.--Title III of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
is amended by inserting after section 320 (8 U.S.C. 1431) the following 
new section:

   ``certain immigrants born in korea, vietnam, laos, kampuchea, or 
  thailand; conditions under which citizenship automatically acquired

    ``Sec. 321.  A person automatically becomes a citizen of the United 
States when the person is residing in the United States and has been 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States pursuant 
to a classification petition approved under section 204(f).''.
    (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to 
section 320 the following new item:

``Sec. 321. Certain immigrants born in Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, 
                            or Thailand; conditions under which 
                            citizenship is automatically acquired''.
    (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall take 
effect 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
Form of Waiver



 EXHIBIT 10.2 
 December 31, 2008 
 United States Department of the Treasury 
 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 
 Washington, D.C. 20220 
 Fifth Third Bancorp 
 38 Fountain Square Plaza 
 Cincinnati, Ohio 45263 
 In consideration for the benefits I
will receive as a result of my employer’s participation in the United States Department of the Treasury’s TARP Capital Purchase Program, I hereby voluntarily waive any claim against the United States or my employer for any changes to my
compensation or benefits that are required to comply with the regulation issued by the Department of the Treasury as published in the Federal Register on October 20, 2008. 
 I acknowledge that this regulation may require modification of the compensation, bonus, incentive and other benefit plans, arrangements, policies and
agreements (including so-called “golden parachute” agreements) that I have with my employer or in which I participate as they relate to the period the United States holds any equity or debt securities of my employer acquired through the
TARP Capital Purchase Program. 
 This waiver includes all claims I may have under the laws of the United States or any state related to the
requirements imposed by the aforementioned regulation, including without limitation a claim for any compensation or other payments I would otherwise receive, any challenge to the process by which this regulation was adopted and any tort or
constitutional claim about the effect of these regulations on my employment relationship. 
  

			
	Very truly yours,
		
	By:	 	 
		 	Name:
		 	Title:
I 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1676 

To reauthorize the program of the Secretary of Housing and Urban 

Development for loan guarantees for Indian housing. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 26, 2007 

Mr. BOREN (for himself, Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts, Mr. RENZI, and Mr. 

KILDEE) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Financial Services 

A BILL 

To reauthorize the program of the Secretary of Housing 

and Urban Development for loan guarantees for Indian 

housing. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Native American Home 

5 Ownership Opportunity Act of 2007’’. 


jcorcoran on PROD1PC62 with HEARING
2 

•HR 1676 IH

1 SEC. 2. LOAN GUARANTEES FOR NATIVE AMERICAN HOUS2 ING. 

3 Section 184(i) of the Housing and Community Devel4 opment Act of 1992 (12 U.S.C. 1715z–13a(i)) is amended 

5 as follows: 

6 (1) OUTSTANDING AGGREGATE LIMITATION.— 

7 In paragraph (5)(C), by striking ‘‘fiscal years 1997 

8 through 2007’’ and inserting ‘‘fiscal years 2008 

9 through 2012’’. 

10 (2) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—In 

11 paragraph (7), by striking ‘‘fiscal years 1997 

12 through 2007’’ and inserting ‘‘fiscal years 2008 

13 through 2012’’. 

Æ 


jcorcoran on PROD1PC62 with HEARING
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

JUSTIN MICHAEL HICKOX,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 525 MAL 2017

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 23rd day of January, 2018, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gerald Dewayne NAHA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 00-10051.

D.C. No. CR-99-00206-RCB.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Dec. 15, 2000.

Decided Jan. 3, 2001.

*629Before SCHROEDER, Chief Judge, NOONAN and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM1

Gerald Dewayne Naha was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2243(a). He appeals both his conviction and sentence.

He challenges his conviction on the ground that the district court erred in admitting a statement that Naha volunteered after being advised of his Miranda rights. The evidence that was admitted apparently was a statement made immediately after Naha said that he was going to get a lawyer. The comment concerning the lawyer was not admitted, because it was properly held inadmissible as an invocation of the right to counsel. Statements that follow such invocation, however, may be admitted; *see United States v. Valencia,*773 F.2d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir.1985). We find no error in the district court’s conclusion that the statements admitted were not part of the invocation of the right to counsel. Moreover, the statements admitted did not share the same indicia of culpability that renders a request for counsel inadmissible. *See U.S. v. Kallin,*50 F.3d 689, 693 (9th Cir.1995) (as amended).

Naha challenges his sentence on the ground that the district court engaged in impermissible double counting under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines by looking to the same conduct to increase the base offense level for use of force and also to enhance the sentence for having the victim under his “care, custody and control.”

The district court’s decision was not in error. The district court determined Naha’s sentence by applying different portions of the guidelines to different aspects of Naha’s conduct, which created independent harms. *See U.S. v. Parker,*136 F.3d 653, 654 (9th Cir.1998) (per curiam) (holding that a court may apply different portions of the Guidelines to the same course *630of conduct when such conduct creates different harms).

AFFIRMED.

1

. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.