alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 13.1

CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC FINANCIAL REPORT

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350

In connection with the Annual Report of United Microelectronics Corporation, or the Company, on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2013 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, or the Report, I, Po-Wen Yen, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge, that:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: April 18, 2014



|    |  |                                                
|--- |  | -----------------------------------------------
|By: |  | /s/ Po-Wen Yen                                 
|    |  | Name: Po-Wen Yen Title: Chief Executive
Officer



|* | A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to us and will be retained by us and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or
its staff upon request.
|- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



1
# News

## U.S. Air Force LogoUnited States Air Force

# February issue of Airman magazine now available

              - Published  Feb. 4, 2016
              -                             By Airman Magazine Staff                                                    

**FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, Md. (AFNS) --  **
The February issue of Airman magazine is now available to download and is viewable through a Web browser.In the cover story, “Missing in America,” you’ll read about a group of former service members who walk the streets of Los Angeles searching for homeless veterans to help.In the next feature, you will read about an original Rosie the Riveter from World War II, who worked on airplanes for almost 50 years.Lastly, you’ll learn about the sacrifices involved in being a part of the U.S. Air Force Drill Team.You can download Airman magazine’s February issue for your tablet here:• Apple version• Android versionAirman magazine provides an interactive experience for tablet readers and a limited interactive version is viewable in Web browser format. Click here to read this issue on your PC/Mac.  For more stories, visit Airman Online, the website for the official magazine of the U.S. Air Force.

Airman magaineU.S. Air Force Drill TeamRosie the Riveterveterans
#### Claywell *v.*Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division et al.

[No. 19,772.

Filed May 23, 1962.]

*Rocap, Rocap & Reese*and *James W. Treacy,*both of Indianapolis, for appellant.

*Edwin K. Steers,*Attorney General, and *Keith Campbell,*Deputy Attorney General, for appellee, Review Board.

*Leland B. Cross, Jr.,*and *Ross, McCord, Ice & Miller,*of counsel, both of Indianapolis, for appellee, Adams Division, LeTourneau-Westinghouse Company.

*411Ryan, C. J.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division. A confession of error has been filed by the Attorney General of Indiana through one of his duly appointed deputies, admitting that the Review Board committed error.

The cause is therefore reversed with instructions to the Review Board to enter its decision in favor of the appellant.

Ax, Cooper, and Myers, JJ., concur.

Note. — Reported in 182 N. E. 2d 594.
762 A.2d 1083

#### In the Matter of David E. WASSERSTROM.

No. 612 Disciplinary Docket No. 3.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Nov. 17, 2000.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM:

AND NOW, this 17th day of November, 2000, a Rule having been entered by this Court on September 14, 2000, pursuant to Rule 214(d)(1), Pa.R.D.E.; directing David E. Wasserstrom to show cause why he should not be placed on temporary suspension and, upon consideration of the responses filed, it is hereby

ORDERED that the Rule is made absolute; David E. Wasserstrom is placed on temporary suspension and he shall comply with all the provisions of Rule 217, Pa.R.D.E.; and the matter is referred to the Disciplinary Board pursuant to Rule 214(f)(1), Pa.R.D.E.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

MEMORANDUM OPINION

N o. 04

- 12

- 00452

- CR

Hector Augusto GRAMAJO

, Appellant

v. The ST

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 175th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2009CR9359 Honorable Mary D. Roman, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Delivered and Filed: December 11, 2013

MOTION TO WITHDRAW GRANTED; AFFIRMED

Hector Augusto Gramajo was convicted by a jury of intoxication manslaughter. The jury

found Gramajo used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense and

assessed punishment at nine years’ imprisonment

. The trial court ordered the sentence to run

consecutively with the sentence imposed for an intoxication assault conviction tried at the same

time. G ramajo timely appealed the trial court’s judgment.

Gramajo ’s court

- appointed appellate att orney filed a motion to withdraw and a brief in

which s he concluded this appeal is frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the requirements04

- 12

- 00452

- CR

of Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), High v. State , 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App.

1978), and Gainou s v. State , 436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). Gramajo was provided a

copy of the brief and motion to withdraw and was further informed of his right to review the record

and file his own brief. Gramajo did not file a pro se brief.

After reviewing the record and counsel’s brief, we find no reversible error and agree with

counsel the appeal is wholly frivolous. See Bledsoe v. State , 178 S.W.3d 824, 826

- 27 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2005). We therefore grant the motion to withdraw filed by Gramajo’s counsel a nd affirm the

trial court’s judgment. See id .; Nichols v. State , 954 S.W.2d 83, 86 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio

1997, no pet.); Bruns v. State , 924 S.W.2d 176, 177 n.1 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 1996, no pet.). 1

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Do not publish

1 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should Gramajo wish to seek further review of this case by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for di scretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed within thirty days after either this opinion is rendered or the last timely motion for rehearing or motion for en banc reconsiderati on is overruled by this court.

See Tex. R. App. P. 68.2. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed with the clerk of the Court of Criminal Appeals. See id. R. 68.3. Any petition for discretionary review must comply with the requirements of rul e 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See id. R. 68.4.

- 2

-
# Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas

March 3, 2017

No. 04

- 17

- 00061

- CV

Carlos Antonio RAYMOND

, Appellants

v.

Martin Joseph ROY and Pizza Ventrue of San Antonio, LLC d/b/a Papa Johns Pizza, App ellees

From the County Court At Law No. 10, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2015CV00935 Honorable David J. Rodriguez, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

On February 27, 2017, in this appeal from a jury trial in a civil suit, Appellant Carlos Antonio Raymond moved this court to appoint counsel to represent him on appeal

. A court may appoint counsel for a pro se civil litigant “under exceptional circumstances.”

See Gibson v. Tolbert , 102 S.W.3d 710, 712 (Tex. 2003) (citing Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn

. v. Mayfield , 923 S.W.2d 590, 594 (Tex. 1996) ); see also T EX

. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN

. § 24.016 (West 2004). Exceptional circumstances are “rare and unusual,” and Appellant’s motion presents no

such circumstances. See Gibson , 102 S.W.3d at 713.

Appellant’s motion for court

- appointed appellate counsel is DENIED.

_________________________________ Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on this 3rd day of March, 2017

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle Clerk of Court
#### Donald E. WALKER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D10-6827.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Jan. 28, 2011.

Rehearing Denied March 8, 2011.

Donald E. Walker, pro se, Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

DENIED. *Baker v. State,*878 So.2d 1236 (Fla.2004).

BENTON, C.J., DAVIS and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
#### Melvin PEREZ, Petitioner, v. Walter A. McNEIL, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Respondent.

No. 1D10-1200.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Nov. 10, 2010.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 16, 2010.

Melvin Perez, pro se, Petitioner.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Joe Belitzky, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The circuit court dismissed petitioner’s complaint for declaratory judgment without prejudice. Accordingly, this petition for writ of certiorari is dismissed because petitioner will have an adequate remedy on final appeal. See *South Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Dupont,*683 So.2d 1135 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).

DISMISSED.

WEBSTER, LEWIS, and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-41202

Summary Calendar

 

RICHARD LEO BOOSH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

J. ZELLER, ET AL.,

Defendants,

J. ZELLER, B. PEOPLES,

Defendants-Appellees.

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. C-96-CV-643

 

June 2, 1998

Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Richard Leo Boosh, Texas prisoner #710426, appeals from the

grant of summary judgment for the defendants in his prisoner

civil rights action alleging that prison officials were
2

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs when they

denied him access to tennis shoes for which he had a pass from a

medical doctor. 

We have reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties

and find no reversible error. To prevail on a claim of

inadequate medical care, “a prisoner must allege acts or

omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 106 (1976); see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837

(1994); Reeves v. Collins, 27 F.3d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1994)

(applying Farmer to medical claims). “The legal conclusion of

‘deliberate indifference[]’ . . . must rest on facts clearly

evincing ‘wanton’ actions on the part of the defendants.” 

Johnson v. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985). 

“Unsuccessful medical treatment does not give rise to a § 1983

cause of action. Nor does ‘[m]ere negligence, neglect or medical

malpractice.’” Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir.

1991) (citations omitted).

In this case, Dr. W. Long swore that Boosh’s foot pain was

not a critical or dangerous medical condition; that his back pain

was not a result of his footwear; and that the tennis-shoe pass

of June 4, 1996, was issued out of concern that Boosh have

properly fitting footwear. The sick-call requests and clinic

notes indicate that Boosh was seen by a physician at least three

times and that he received medication and arch supports to treat
3

his foot pain. In addition, he received properly fitting boots

on May 16, 1996.

Boosh does not contest the validity of this evidence,

rather, he questions the magistrate judge’s interpretation of

this evidence. We are certain that Boosh’s foot and back pain

did not constitute a serious medical need. Even if they did

constitute such a need, prison officials were not deliberately

indifferent since they provided Boosh with medication and arch

supports. Boosh’s allegations raise, at most, a disagreement

with the treatment he received.

In sum, the evidence on record does not demonstrate any

violation of a constitutional right. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the

district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants.

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 23.01





CONSENT OF KPMG LLP, INDEPENDENT AUDITORS





The Board of Directors


Keynote Systems, Inc.:





We consent to incorporation by reference in the registration statements on Form S-8 (Nos. 333-85242, 333-73244, 333-47980, and 333-87791) of Keynote Systems, Inc. of our report dated October 28, 2002, with respect to the
consolidated balance sheets of Keynote Systems, Inc. and subsidiaries as of September 30, 2002 and 2001 and the related consolidated statements of operations, stockholders equity and comprehensive income (loss) and cash flows for each of the
years in the three-year period ended September 30, 2002, and the related financial statement schedule, which report appears in the September 30, 2002 annual report on Form 10-K of Keynote Systems, Inc. and subsidiaries.





/S/    KPMG LLP





Mountain View, California


December 20,
2002
#### Texas & Pacific R’y Co. v. Robert Cockrell.

(No. 3361.)

Appeal from Dallas County.

Opinion by

Hurt, J.

§717. *Negligence per se; what constitutes in the operation of a railroad train; case stated.*Appellee recovered a judgment against appellant for $125, the value of a cow. The cow was killed by appellant’s train in the city of Dallas, in appellant’s road yard, while she was attempting to cross the railroad track. There was an ordinance of the city of Dallas in force at the time, which made it a misdemeanor for any one to run a railway engine or car at a greater rate of speed than four miles per hour. The evidence shows that the train which struck *630and killed the cow was at the time running at a much greater rate of speed than four miles an hour. *Held:*Running the train at a greater rate of speed than four miles an hour inside the corporate limits was a violation of the ordinance of the city, and was negligence *per se.*[R. R. Co. v. Murphy, 46 Tex. 306; Renford v. Johnson, *22*Am. Law Reg. 50.]

May 23, 1885.

§ 718. *Contributory negligence; permitting animal to run at large is not, when.*The fact that appellee permitted his cow to run at large in the city of Dallas did not constitute contributory negligence on his part. There was no ordinance of the city prohibiting the running at large of such animals within the city limits, but, on the contrary, there was an ordinance of said city expressly authorizing it.

Affirmed.
FILED U.S. COURT OF AP P EALS E LEVEN T HC IRC U IT MAY 22, 2007 THOMAS K. KAH

N CLERK

Honora ble Arthur L . Alarc on, United States Circuit Judg e for the Ninth Circuit, sitt ing by * designation. [ DO NO T P UB L I S H]

I N THE UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS F O R T H E E L E V E N T H C IR C U IT

________________________ N o. 06- 11580

_______________________ D . C . D ocketN o. 03 -031 78 -C V -J O F -1 J O H N S A M , J R ., A L L A B O U T L E A RN I N G A F T E R S C H O O L , I N C ., P la in tif f s - A p p e lla n ts , v ersu s L O R R A I N E B . R E I C H , B O A R D O F E D U C A T I O N O F T H E C I T Y O F A T L A N T A , A T L A N T A I N D E P E N D E N T S C H O O L S Y S T E M , D e f e n d a n ts - A p p e lle e s .

________________________ A pp ea l fr om the U ni t ed S t at es D i stri ctC ou rt f o rth e N o r th e rn D is tr ic t o f G e o r g ia

_________________________ ( M ay 22, 2007) B e f o r e P R YO R , KR AV I T C H an d AL AR C ON , C i rcu i tJu d g es. *2

P E R C U R I A M: A f te rc a r e f u l c o n s id e r a tio n o f

th e r e c o r d a n d th e w r itte n a n d o r a l a r g u m e n ts o f th e p art i es, w e co n cl u d e th atth e d i stri ctco u rtp ro p erl y d i sm i ssed th e p l ai n t i ffs’ cl ai m s of F i rs tA m endm entand D ue P roce ss vi ol at i on s and prop er l y grant ed sum m ary j ud gm enti n favor of the defendant s a s t o the pl ai nt i ff s’ cl ai m s of bre ac h o f c o n tr a c ta n d t o r t i o u s i n t e r f e r e n c e w i th c o n tr a c t . W e a f f i rm. AF F I RME D.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Draymond Paul COMPTON.

No. 2011-K-1362.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 2, 2011.

In re Compton, Draymond Paul; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. CR114695; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-68.

Denied.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    Exhibit 11.1


                              INFOSEEK CORPORATION
                 STATEMENT OF COMPUTATION OF NET LOSS PER SHARE
                                   (UNAUDITED)
                    (In thousands, except per share amounts)


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                Three Months Ended
                                                    March 31,
                                               1997           1996
                                             --------       --------
<S>                                          <C>            <C>      
Net Loss                                     $ (4,106)      $ (3,568)
Weighted average common shares
outstanding during the period                  26,127          3,731

Shares related to SAB No. 55, 64
and 83                                          ---           12,483

Conversion of preferred stock not
included in shares related to SAB
No. 55, 64, and 83                              ---            9,700
                                             --------       --------

Total shares used in net loss per share        26,127         25,914

Net loss per share (Pro forma in 1996)       $  (0.16)      $  (0.14)
                                             ========       ========
</TABLE>
#### Tex. & Pac. R’y Co. v. Weakly & Gooch.

(No. 3404.)

Appeal from Tarrant County.

Opinion by

Walker, P. J.

§ 827. *Opinion of witness as evidence; expert ivitness; rule as to; case stated.*Appellee recovered of appellant a judgment for $600, the value of a jack alleged to have *729been, killed through the negligence of appellant while transporting the same under contract. The first error assigned is, permitting the witness Knight to state his opinion or conclusion as to the effect of the injury to the jack which he saw. He testified that, in his opinion, the injury caused the death of the animal. It was the province of the jury to deduce from all the evidence what it was that caused the animal’s death; and it was competent for the plaintiff to prove facts and circumstances from which they might determine that question, and also to show, as evidence to establish the' cause of the death, what persons skilled as experts thought to be the cause of the animal’s death, they having before them the proper data upon which to form an opinion. This witness' did not disclose from his examination that he was qualified, under the rules of law, to give an opinion on that subject, entitled to be considered as evidence. He stated, “ he had handled jacks for twenty or thirty years, and was well acquainted with their propensities and dispositions.” It does not appear from this that he was better acquainted than ordinary men, or men of ordinary experience or knowledge of jacks, in respect to the cause of the death of this particular jack. It cannot be inferred that because he may have handled jacks for h great many years, and knew well their dispositions and propensities, that he would, more than another, be able, on examining the hurt received by the jack,' to determine whether it was dangerous or not, or whether it would or did result in the animal’s death. The testimony of experts is admitted because of their peculiar skill and knowledge with respect to the subject concerning which their opinion is desired, as being relevant to the matter to be ascertained and determined. The dispositions and propensities of jacks are perhaps matters of common knowledge; certainly in some particulars; but neither a knowledge of the one, nor the other, could afford any aid in determining why this animal languished and finally died. [1 Greenl. Ev. § 440, and note 4.] This evi*730dence was calculated to influence the jury on a very material issue in the case, and its admission is, therefore, good ground for a reversal of the judgment.

May 29, 1885.

Reversed and remanded.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. James JONES.

No. 2010-KO-2132.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 18, 2011.

*331In re Jones, James; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 8302-05; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 09-1453.

Denied.
#### N.H., Appellant, v. J.E.T., Appellee.

No. 2D10-4367.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Aug. 3, 2011.

*1057Mark G. Rodriguez of Mark G. Rodriguez, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.

Mark A. Sessums and Lacy J. Littlejohn of Sessums Law Group, P.A., Lakeland, for Appellee.

LaROSE, Judge.

N.H., the mother, appeals a final judgment establishing paternity. She argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering weekly rotating custody for her son with the father, J.E.T., without providing her a right of first refusal to have custody should the father encounter work schedule conflicts. She also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for relief from judgment where the judgment specified an incorrect residential address where the parties would exchange custody of the child. That address also served as the center of the parents’ fifty-mile radius within which each could move without further court order. We affirm the final judgment in all respects, except for concluding that remand is necessary to correct N.H.’s address.

The trial court, in its discretion, found shared parental responsibility to be in the child’s best interest. *See*§ 61.13(2)(b), (3), Fla. Stat. (2010). Competent, substantial evidence supports that finding. *See Hudson-McCann v. McCann,*8 So.3d 1228, 1229 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009). N.H. argues that the trial court failed to give her a right of first refusal to custody in those instances where the father’s work schedule might affect his time with the son. We see no abuse of discretion by the trial court. The parenting plan allows for modification on a temporary basis when both parents agree in writing; when they do not agree, the parenting plan remains in effect. The child’s best interests will be served by shared parental responsibility and the trial court’s parenting plan.

N.H. also argues that the trial court erred in designating her former Winter Haven residence in the parenting plan. The unrefuted evidence before the trial court showed Lakeland as N.H.’s residence. Thus, we reverse and remand for the trial court to make the necessary correction to N.H.’s address.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.

SILBERMAN, C.J., and CRENSHAW, J., Concur.