alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### D. A. Akin v. E. C. Horn, Adm’r, etc.

(No. 1519.)

Appeal from Anderson County.

Opinion by

White, P. J.

§ 8. *Caveat emptor; quere as to application of rule of, to administrator’s deed.*Whether or not the doctrine of *caveat emptor*applies to an administrator’s deed to land, which is so imperfect in its description of the land sold as that it may be said to convey nothing, or which is so uncertain in its description as that it cannot be brought within the maxim, *“id cerium est quod cerium reddi potest,”*is a question presented in this case, but not determined. As bearing upon the subject, the following cases are cited in the opinion: Lynch v. Baxter, 4 Tex. 431; Edmundson v. Hart, 9 Tex. 554; Williams v. McDonald, 13 Tex. 322; Thompson v. Hunger, 15 Tex. 523; Walton v. Eeagan, 20 Tex. 103; Hawpe v. Smith, 25 Tex. Sup. 448; Ward v. Williams, 45 Tex. 617.

§ 9. *Administrator; duty of, in giving deed.*An administrator, in conveying land, should always give as good and perfect a description of the premises intended *20to be conveyed as he reasonably can, and when the purchaser is in a condition to demand this duty of him, doubtless the law will afford him an ample remedy to enforce it. •

October 13, 1883.

§ 10. *Purchaser of land at administrator’s sale; rules as to rights of. A*purchaser of land at an administrator’s sale is in no condition to demand a deed to the land until he has complied with the terms of the sale; nor can the administrator execute to him a valid deed until such compliance. A compliance with the terms of the sale is a condition precedent to the purchaser’s right to a deed. [R. S. art. 2091a.]

§ 11. *Same; liability of, for failure to comply.*At a sale of lands belonging to an estate, Akin purchased two tracts. The administrator tendered Akin a deed to the same, which Akin refused to accept, upon the ground that the land was not sufficiently described therein, and he refused to comply with the terms of the sale. The administrator resold the land, and failing to get as much for it on the second sale as Akin had bid for it on the first sale, he sued and obtained judgment against Akin for the difference, etc., and for ten per cent, damages. *Held,*that the judgment was correct.

Affirmed,
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Marvin ROBINSON.

No. 2010-K-0924.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 17, 2010.

PER CURIAM.*

GRANTED. The judgment of the court of appeal vacating the defendant’s conviction, habitual offender adjudication, and sentence is reversed. The State concedes *157the trial court failed to determine whether the defendant was competent to proceed prior to commencing jury trial; however, the State contends the matter should be remanded to the trial court for a determination of whether a nunc pro tunc finding of competency remains possible. We agree. Per *State v. Snyder,*98-1078 (La.4/14/99), 750 So.2d 882, we remand the matter to the trial court to determine whether a meaningful inquiry can be had regarding defendant’s competency. If it is found that a meaningful retrospective competency hearing is possible, we order the hearing to be conducted and the issue to be determined.

JOHNSON, J., would deny the writ application.

*

 Chief Justice Catherine D. Kimball not participating.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Willie JOSEPH.

No. 2011-KO-0445.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 23, 2011.

In re Joseph, Willie; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 09-K-0550-D; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-800.

Denied.
```

[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 93 (Thursday, June 8, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1207-E1208]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

                     BUILDING DEMOCRACY IN UKRAINE

                                 ______

                          HON. DAVID E. BONIOR

                              of michigan

                    in the house of representatives

                         Thursday, June 8, 1995
  Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, the American Overseas Interests Act, H.R. 
1561, does not encourage economic and democratic reforms in the New 
Independent States.
  The bill cuts aid to Ukraine and other New Independent States by 
nearly $100 million.
  At a time when Ukraine is receiving a more significant share of 
United States assistance to the NIS, this bill negates the gains that 
have been made.
  However, one positive step in the bill in the increase of our 
assistance to the victims of Chernobyl.
  This bill provides a $10 million commitment to help the victims of 
the Chernobyl disaster, especially the children.
  Thyroid cancer is plaguing the children in the region.
  There are hundreds of thousands of people with severe health 
problems.
  And the worst is yet to come, because many of the effects of the 
Chernobyl nuclear disaster will not be known until later this decade.
  There is a desperate need for this aid.
  Ukraine faces a severe shortage of medical supplies and effective 
health care.
  Our aid to Ukraine and other New Independent States is less than 10 
percent of the foreign aid budget, which is less than 2 percent of our 
Federal budget.
  Mr. Speaker, I'm pleased we were able to help the victims of 
Chernobyl. [[Page E1208]] 
  But the bill on balance will not provide much help to Ukraine.
  We must do better than this to build democracy and continue economic 
reforms in Ukraine.

                          ____________________
```
#### STATE ex rel. Ronnell WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2011-KH-0348.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 2, 2011.

In re Williams, Ronnell; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 99-7942; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Nos. 09-WR-1117,10-KH-28.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D); La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; *State ex rel. Glover v. State,*93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; *State ex rel. Melinie v. State,*93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.
#### Scott Anthony PLAISANCE, et al. v. OUR LADY OF LOURDES REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., et al.

No. 09-1502.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

Oct. 6, 2010.

Patrick M. Wartelle, Leake & Anders-son, L.L.P., Lafayette, LA, for Defendant/Respondent, Our Lady of Lourdes Regional Medical Center, Inc.

Ronald C. Richard, Richard Law Firm, L.L.C., Lake Charles, LA, for Plaintiffs/Applieants, Scott Anthony Plaisance, et al.

Court composed of JOHN D. SAUNDERS, MARC T. AMY, and ELIZABETH A. PICKETT, Judges.

AMY, Judge.

For disposition of this consolidated matter, *see Scott Anthony Plaisance, et. al. v. Our Lady of Lourdes Regional Medical Center, et. al.,*10-348 (La.App. 3 Cir.10/6/10), 47 So.3d 17. All costs of these proceedings are assessed to the plaintiffs-relators.

AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 31.2

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO

SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, B. James Rubin, certify that:

1.	I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Tripos, Inc.;

2.	Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.	Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.	The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

	a)	designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

	b)	evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

	c)	disclosed in this quarterly report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5.	The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

	a)	all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

	b)	any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.

Date:  November 9, 2004

 

     /s/ B. James Rubin
     B. James Rubin
<PAGE>

                                                                Exhibit No. 21.1

                          Fisher Communications, Inc.
                                 Subsidiaries


Subsidiary                                        State of Incorporation
----------                                        ----------------------

Fisher Broadcasting Co. /(1)/                     Washington

Fisher Mills Inc.                                 Washington

Fisher Properties Inc.                            Washington

Fisher Pathways, Inc. /(2)(3)/                    Washington

Fisher Radio Regional Group Inc. /(3)/            Washington

Sam Wylde Flour Co., Inc. /(4)/                   Washington

Valley Milling Co. /(4)/                          Washington

Fisher Baking Supply Limited /(4)/                Canada

Trotwood Inc. /(5)/                               Washington

Fisher Mills L.L.C. /(6)/                         Washington

Fisher Broadcasting - Georgia, L.L.C. /(3)/       Delaware


_____________________________

(1) Formerly Fisher Broadcasting Inc., renamed March 2001
(2) Formerly Fisher Communications Inc., renamed March 2001
(3) Wholly owned by Fisher Broadcasting Co.
(4) Wholly owned by Fisher Mills Inc.
(5) Wholly owned by Fisher Properties Inc.
(6) Owned 99% by Fisher Mills Inc. and 1% by Fisher Communications, Inc.
#### Charles Brown v. E. Engel.

(No. 1550.)

Appeal from Eayette County.

Opinion by

Hurt, J.

§ 103. *Bent; suit for, not maintainable when.*Engel sued Brown for rent of land. The facts were, that Engel had sold land to Brown on time. Brown was unable to pay for the land, and the contract of sale was canceled by agreement of the parties, Engel taking back the land. This suit was to recover of Brown the rent of the land *84for the time he occupied the same under the contract of sale, and Engel recovered judgment for said rent, and a foreclosure of landlord’s lien upon property which had been levied upon under a distress warrant issued in the suit. *Held,*that the relation of landlord and tenant did not exist between Engel and Brown, and that Engel could not maintain a suit for the rent of the land.

January 30, 1884.

Reversed and dismissed.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Wayne DELAGARDELLE, Jr.

No. 2010-KP-1485.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 18, 2011.

In re Delagarclelle Jr., Wayne; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 04-8168; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KH-282.

Denied.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-60358

Summary Calendar

JOHN DA SILVA PAZ, also known as John Paz,

Petitioner

v.

LORETTA LYNCH, U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent

Petitions for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A057 077 516

Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

John Da Silva Paz (Paz) is a native and citizen of the Philippines who 

was admitted to the United States in 2004 on an immigrant visa. In March 

2012, a federal court convicted Paz on his guilty plea to conspiring to commit 

bank fraud as charged in an indictment asserting a loss amount of more than

$400,000. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1349. Concluding that Paz was removable 

based on his conviction for an aggravated felony in which the loss exceeded 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 23, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 15-60358 Document: 00513517846 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/23/2016
No. 15-60358

2

$10,000, an immigration judge ordered him removed to the Philippines. See 8 

U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), (U), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The Board of Immigration 

Appeals (BIA) dismissed Paz’s appeal. He petitions for review.

We lack jurisdiction to review a final order removing an alien based on 

his conviction for an aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C); Nehme v. 

INS, 252 F.3d 415, 420 (5th Cir. 2001). But we may examine “whether the 

specific conditions exist that bar [our] jurisdiction over the merits,” i.e., 

whether the petitioner is an alien removable for “committing the type of crime 

that” precludes our review. Nehme, 252 F.3d at 420. We examine that question 

de novo. Id. at 421; see Rodriguez v. Holder, 705 F.3d 207, 210 (5th Cir. 2013).

The BIA relied on record evidence of the fraud count of Paz’s indictment 

and of Paz’s plea of guilty as charged in that count to conclude that Paz had 

committed an aggravated felony. See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 42-43 

(2009). This evidence showed that his victims’ losses resulted from his crime. 

See id. 

We conclude that the record furnishes clear and convincing evidence 

supporting the determination of the amount of loss caused by Paz and the BIA’s 

conclusion that he is removable as an aggravated felon and conclude further 

that this evidence was “reasonable, substantial, and probative.” ArguellesOlivares v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 171, 179-80 (5th Cir. 2008); see also Nijhawan, 

557 U.S. at 42. Consequently, we leave the BIA’s ruling undisturbed and deny

the petition for review. See Arguelles-Olivares, 526 F.3d at 179. 

PETITION DENIED.

 Case: 15-60358 Document: 00513517846 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/23/2016
**Exhibit 32**

 

CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. § 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

Inconnection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March31, 2005 (the “Report”) of TF Financial Corporation (the “Company”) as filedwith the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, we, Kent C.Lufkin, President and Chief Executive Officer, and Dennis R. Stewart, ExecutiveVice President and Chief Financial Officer (Principal Accounting Officer),hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial position and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
|   | /s/  Kent C. Lufkin                             |   |
|--------|-------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Date:  | May 13, 2005                                    |   | Kent C. Lufkin |
|   | President and CEO                               |
|   | (Principal  Executive Officer)                  |
|   |                                            |
|   |                                            |
|   | /s/  Dennis R. Stewart                          |   |
| Date:  | May  13, 2005                                   |   | Dennis  R. Stewart |
|   | Executive  Vice President and                   |
|   | Chief  Financial Officer                        |
|   | (Principal Financial &  Accounting Officer) |
|        |                                                 |        |  |  |  |  |

 

----
#### Martin-Brown Co. v. A. J. Milburn.

(No. 2999.)

Appeal from Montague County.

Opinion by

White, P. J.

§ 214. *Amendment.*Amendments of writs and pleadings have always been liberally allowed in our practice, *167when they could not operate to the material injury of parties in interest. [Roberson v. McIlhenny, 59 Tex. 615; Ryan v. Goldfrank, Frank & Co. 58 Tex. 356; Porter v. Miller, *1*Tex. 468.]

May 31, 1884.

§ 215. *Same; of attachment writ.*An attachment writ may be amended, so as to make it conform to the petition, etc., where the defect is merely clerical, and where no third party is^ interested, or could likely be affected by the amendment. [Drake on Attach. (5th ed.) § 282; Porter v. Miller, 7 Tex. 468.] In this case, plaintiff described itself in its petition as the “Martin-Brown Company.” In the writ of attachment the clerk described the plaintiff as “Martin, Brown & Co.”’ Defendant moved to quash the writ because of this variance. Plaintiff asked leave to amend the writ, so as to make it conform to its petition in this particular. The court refused to permit the amendment, sustained the motion to quash the writ, and rendered judgment releasing the property attached. *Held,*error; that the court should have allowed the writ to be amended as asked, the defect being a clerical one, and there being no third party to be affected by such amendment.

Eeversed and remanded.
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

December 27, 2005 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice
129261 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan WILLIE WRIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices

v SC: 129261 COA: 252790 Oakland CC: 2003-050906-NO MICRO ELECTRONICS, INC., Defendant-Appellant,

and

TONY NUNEZ and FR ANK ANGELUCCI, Defendants.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, th e application for leave to appeal the June 30, 2005 judgment of the Court of Appeals is cons idered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

l1219 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

December 27, 2005

Clerk
EXHIBIT 12.1





SECTION 302 CERTIFICATION





I, Alejandro G. Elsztain, certify that:





1.
 I have reviewed
this amendment to the annual report on Form 20-F of Cresud
S.A.C.I.F. y A (the “Company”) for the fiscal year
ended June 30, 2019;





2.
 Based on my
knowledge, this amendment to the annual report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state material fact
necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading
with respect to the period covered by this report;





3.
 The Company’s
other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15(d)-15(e)) and internal control
over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules
13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the Company and have:





a.
 Designed such
disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervisions, to
ensure that material information relating to the Company, including
its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within
those entities, particularly during the period in which this report
is being prepared;





b.
 Designed such
internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal
control over financial reporting to be designed under our
supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the
reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial
statements for external purposes in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles;





c.
 Evaluated the
effectiveness of the Company’s disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the
end of the period covered by this report based on such
evaluation;





d.
 Disclosed in this
report any change in the Company’s internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by the
annual report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely
to materially affect, the Company’s internal control over
financial reporting; and





4.
 The Company’s
other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most
recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to
the Company’s auditors and the audit committee of the
Company’s board of directors (or persons performing the
equivalent functions):





a.
 All significant
deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the Company’s ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial information;
and





b.
 Any fraud, whether
or not material, that involves management or other employees who
have a significant role in the Company’s internal control
over financial reporting.








Cresud S.A.C.I.F. y ADate:
January 6, 2020
By:
/s/ Alejandro
G. ElsztainAlejandro G.
ElsztainChief
Executive Officer
#### CATERING CONSULTANTS OF LOUISIANA, L.L.C. v. FIRST AMERICAN INSURANCE AGENCY, LLC.

No. 2011-CC-0384.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 8, 2011.

In re First American Insurance Agency, LLC; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. James, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 33,278; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-C-950.

Denied.

CLARK, J., would grant.