alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
No. 13,154.

#### Johnson *v.*The State, for Use of Davidson, Drainage Commissioner.

*Drainage.*— Enforcement *of Assessment.*— Complaint.—Sufficiency *of Petition in Drainage Proceeding.*— It is not necessary that a complaint to enforce a drainage assessment should aver that the persons named in the petition were land-owners at the time it was signed, as the judgment in the proceeding establishing the drain is conclusive as to the sufficiency of the petition. It is enough for the complaint to show the petition, notice and judgment thereon. It is also not necessary that the record should affirmatively show that assessments were made from time to time.

From the Benton Circuit Court.

*D. E. Straight, U. Z. Wiley*and *S. F. Carter,*for appellant.

*A. W. Reynolds*and *E. B. Sellers,*for appellee.

Elliott, J.

This action is prosecuted by the relator to *375recover an assessment levied under the drainage law of 1881.

The appellant assails the complaint, but, as we think, without success. It is not, as counsel assume, necessary that a complaint to enforce a drainage assessment should aver that the persons named in the petition were land-owners at the time it was signed. It is enough for the complaint to show the petition, notice and judgment thereon. The judgment of the court settled the question of the sufficiency of the petition and all kindred,questions. R. S. 1881, section 4280. Having once adjudged the petition sufficient, the court was not bound to again adjudicate upon it. Indeed, it had no right to do so in a collateral proceeding like this. The section of the statute to which we have referred makes the judgment conclusive, but it would be so in such a case as this without the statute. *Montgomery*v. *Wasem, ante,*p. 343.

The complaint shows that notices were posted and that the court in the original proceedings adjudged the notice sufficient, and this judgment can not be collaterally questioned. *Prezinger*v. *Harness,*114 Ind. 491.

There are very many cases declaring this doctrine. We do not deem it necessary to cite them all, but content ourselves with referring to a few of the many. *Pickering*v. *State, etc.,*106 Ind. 228; *Kleyla*v. *Haskett,*112 Ind. 515, and cases cited; *Hackett*v. *State, etc.,*113 Ind. 532; *Montgomery*v. *Wasem, supra.*

Other objections urged to the complaint are, as we are satisfied from a careful examination of it, founded upon a misapprehension of its allegations.

What we have said upon the subject of a collateral attack, in disposing of the objections to the complaint, applies to the questions made upon the admissibility of the proceedings in the Stamford ditch case.

We do not think it necessary that the record should affirmatively show that assessments were made from time to time, for we are of the opinion that where it appears that an *376assessment was made upon petition and notice, and that it was adjudged regular and proper in the original proceedings, it constitutes a valid and enforceable assessment.

Filed Dec 22, 1888.

Judgment affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
   
<CIK>                         920707                         
<NAME>                        CODA MUSIC TECHNOLOGY, INC.
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1
<CURRENCY>                                     U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                  JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                    SEP-30-1996
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                           1
<CASH>                            1,232,811
<SECURITIES>                              0
<RECEIVABLES>                       552,033
<ALLOWANCES>                              0
<INVENTORY>                         999,003
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                  2,953,770
<PP&E>                              516,137
<DEPRECIATION>                            0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                    4,083,733
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>               933,792
<BONDS>                                   0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                     0
<PREFERRED>                               0
<COMMON>                         11,453,467
<OTHER-SE>                       (8,303,526)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>      4,083,733
<SALES>                           3,756,532
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                  3,756,532
<CGS>                             1,335,433
<TOTAL-COSTS>                     1,335,433
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                  4,141,094
<LOSS-PROVISION>                          0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                        0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                  (1,618,595)
<INCOME-TAX>                              0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>              (1,618,595)
<DISCONTINUED>                            0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                           0
<CHANGES>                                 0
<NET-INCOME>                     (1,618,595)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                          (.38)
<EPS-DILUTED>                          (.38)
        



</TABLE>
626 A.2d 1090

#### NANCY STRUMPH, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. SCHERING CORPORATION, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Argued March 2, 1993

Decided July 13, 1993.

*34
      *Russell L. Hewit*argued the cause for appellant *(Dughi and Hewit,*attorneys; *Mr. Hewit, Christopher J. Christie,*and *Mary Elizabeth Gazi,*on the briefs).

*Earl G. Kauffman,*a member of the Pennsylvania bar, argued the cause for respondent *(Jack E. Milkis,*attorney; *Mr. Kauffman*and *Mr. Milkis,*on the brief).

*John B. Kearney*submitted a brief on behalf of *amicus curiae*Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association *(Kenney & Kearney,*attorneys).

PER CURIAM.

The judgment is reversed, substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Skillman’s dissenting opinion for the Appellate Division, reported at 256 *N.J.Super.*309, 323, 606 A.2d 1140 (1992).

O’HERN, J.,

dissenting.

I would affirm the judgment below substantially for the reasons stated by the majority of the Appellate Division, 256 *N.J.Super.*309, 606 A.2d 1140 (1992). I write only to emphasize the special significance of the learned-intermediary doctrine in this case. The theory of that doctrine is that a pharmaceutical manufacturer has no independent duty to warn patients of the side effects of medication. The manufacturer’s duty is to warn the physician, the learned intermediary, who in turn is presumed by the law to have informed the patient of the side effects. *Niemiera v. Schnieder,*114 *N.J.*550, 555 A.2d 1112 (1989). Just as we apply an “objective test” to evaluate the informed-consent rights of the patient in terms of what a prudent person in the patient’s position would have done if suitably informed of the risks of treatment, *Largey v. Rothman,*110 *N.J.*204, 216, 540 A.2d 504 (1988), we should apply an objective test to evaluate what a prudent physician would have done if informed of the risks of this medication. This case presents a factual issue on whether a prudent physician would have informed plaintiff of the side effects of her medication. See *35
      *Bravman v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,*984 F.2d 71, 75 (2nd Cir. 1993) (holding that a question on proximate cause remained for resolution despite testimony by doctor that if he had been informed by healthcare company of defect in mechanical heart valve he still would not have warned patient).

*For reversal*— Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER and STEIN — 4.

*For affirmance*— Justice O’HERN — 1.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-6314

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

DOUGLAS L. MCLAURIN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior

District Judge. (CR-03-46; CA-04-228-7)

Submitted: November 17, 2005 Decided: November 23, 2005

Before WILKINSON, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Douglas L. McLaurin, Appellant Pro Se. Clay Campbell Wheeler,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Douglas L. McLaurin, a federal prisoner, seeks to appeal

the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255

(2000) motion. An appeal may not be taken from the final order in

a § 2255 proceeding unless a circuit justice or judge issues a

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A

certificate of appealability will not issue for claims addressed by

a district court absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner

satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists

would find both that the district court’s assessment of his

constitutional claims is debatable or wrong and that any

dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also

debatable or wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336

(2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee,

252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed

the record and conclude that McLaurin has not made the requisite

showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and

dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process. 

DISMISSED
EXHIBIT 31.1
**CERTIFICATIONS FOR QUARTERLY REPORT ON FORM 10-Q**
I, John W. Raisbeck certify that:
1) I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Western OhioFinancial Corporation; 2) Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statementof a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make thestatements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statementswere made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport; 3) Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows ofthe registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4) The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (asdefined in Exchange Act Rules 13(a)-15(e) and 15(d)-15(e)) for theregistrant and have:
a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known tous by others within those entities, particularly during the period inwhich this report is being prepared; b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controlsand procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the endof the period covered by this report based on such evaluations; and c) Disclosed in this report any changes in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’smost recent fiscal quarter, that has materially affected, or isreasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting; and
5) The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, basedon our most recent evaluation of internal control over financialreporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee ofregistrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions):
a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the designor operation of internal control over financial reporting which arereasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability torecord, process, summarize and report financial information; and b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management orother employees who have a significant role in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting.
Date: May 15, 2004         /s/ John W. Raisbeck   John W. Raisbeck, Chief Executive Officer     
23.
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA
F OURTH D ISTRICT

OLEN PROPERTIES CORP. ,

Appellant,

v.

REBECCA CANCEL , Appellee

.

No. 4D 14

- 1180

[ October 7, 2015 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County ; Carol Lisa

- Phillips , Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE 05

- 011951 (25)

.

Rober t Rivas of Sachs Sax Caplan, P.L., Tallahassee, for appellant.

Julie H. Littky

- Rubin of Clark, Fountain, La Vista, Prather, Keen & Littky

- Rubin, LLP, West Palm Beach, and Marlowe J. Blak e of Marlowe J. Blake, P.A., Boca Raton

, for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

In this sex discrimination and retaliation case, w e reverse the $700,00 0 award of non

- economic damages as excessive. See City of Hollywood v. Hogan , 986 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008 ); see also § 768.74 (5) , Fl a. Stat. (2013). We remand for the trial court to determine a remittitur amount

, or to order a new trial on non

- economic damages if the party adversely affected by the remittitur does not agree to the remitted amount. See § 768.74 (4), Fla. Stat. (2013).

We affirm on all other issues raised in this appeal.

Affirmed in part

, R eversed in part, and R emanded for further proceedings.

G ROSS and T

AYLOR , JJ, and S HEPHERD , C AROLINE , Associate Judge, concur.

* * *2

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
Exhibit 10.2


 


Exhibit
10.2 Form of Waiver Executed by Senior Executive Officers


 


FORM OF
WAIVER


 


In consideration for the benefits I will receive as
a result of my employer’s participation in the United States Department of the
Treasury’s TARP Capital Purchase Program, I hereby voluntarily waive any claim
against the United States or my employer for any changes to my compensation or
benefits that are required to comply with the regulation issued by the
Department of the Treasury as published in the Federal Register on October 20,
2008.


 


I acknowledge that this regulation may require
modification of the compensation, bonus, incentive and other benefit plans,
arrangements, policies and agreements (including so-called “golden parachute”
agreements) that I have with my employer or in which I participate as they
relate to the period the United States holds any equity or debt securities of
my employer acquired through the TARP Capital Purchase Program.


 


This
waiver includes all claims I may have under the laws of the United States or
any state related to the requirements imposed by the aforementioned regulation,
including without limitation a claim for any compensation or other payments I
would otherwise receive, any challenge to the process by which this regulation
was adopted and any tort or constitutional claim about the effect of these
regulations on my employment relationship.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                                            9


<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              jun-30-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   dec-31-1998
<CASH>                                         214
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                         3,905
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                               0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    58
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                         2455
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                           2476
<LOANS>                                        38223
<ALLOWANCE>                                    293
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 45570
<DEPOSITS>                                     35538
<SHORT-TERM>                                   0
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                            513
<LONG-TERM>                                    0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          8
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       0
<OTHER-SE>                                     9511
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 45570
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                1529
<INTEREST-INVEST>                              89
<INTEREST-OTHER>                               112
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                               1730
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                             855
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             855
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                          875
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                  0
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                             0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                582
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                356
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                     356
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                  217
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  .40
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  .39
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                 3.97
<LOANS-NON>                                    838
<LOANS-PAST>                                   0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                               0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                               293
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                  0
<RECOVERIES>                                   0
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                              293
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                           293
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                            0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                        0
        


</TABLE>
IA 

110TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. J. RES. 98 

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to limit 

the number of times Senators and Representatives may be elected. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 18, 2008 

Mr. KUHL of New York introduced the following joint resolution; which was 

referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

JOINT RESOLUTION 

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United 

States to limit the number of times Senators and Representatives may be elected. 

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives 

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled

3 (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the fol4 lowing article is proposed as an amendment to the Con5 stitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all 

6 intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when 

7 ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several 

8 States within seven years after the date of its submission 

9 for ratification: 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with BILLS
2 

•HJ 98 IH 

1 ‘‘ARTICLE— 

2 ‘‘SECTION 1. No person shall be elected as a Rep3 resentative more than six times. An election to any part 

4 of a term for which some other person was elected shall 

5 not count in determining the number of times a person 

6 is elected. 

7 ‘‘SECTION 2. No person shall be elected or appointed 

8 as a Senator more than twice. An election or appointment 

9 to any part of a term for which some other person was 

10 elected shall not count in determining the number of times 

11 a person is elected or appointed. 

12 ‘‘SECTION 3. Only elections or appointments which 

13 occur after the date of ratification of this article shall 

14 count in determining the number of times a person is 

15 elected or appointed.’’. 

Æ 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with BILLS
##### 



Exhibit 32
 CERTIFICATION OF QUARTERLY REPORT ON FORM 10-Q
OF ADVOCAT INC.
FOR THE QUARTER ENDED MARCH 31, 2007
  (a)
    
    fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(b)
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.
  /s/ William R. Council, IIIWilliam R. Council, IIIChief Executive Officer/s/ L. Glynn Riddle, Jr.L. Glynn Riddle, Jr.Chief Financial Officer
  33
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Alfred DECLOUET.

No. 2010-K-2556.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 8, 2011.

In re Declouet, Alfred; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial *682District Court Div. H, No. 07-1540; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 09-KA-1046.

Denied.
#### W. D. Cleveland v. Duggan Bros.

(No. 1538.)

Error from Guadalupe County.

Opinion by

Will-son, J.

§ 82. *Pleading; denial of partnership must he sworn to.*An answer denying a partnership, alleged in plaintiff’s petition, is entitled to no consideration, unless it be verified by the affidavit of the defendant, his agent or attorney, and, upon exceptions taken to it upon this ground, should be stricken out. [R S. art. 1265, sub. 6; W. & W. Con. Bep. § 506.]

§ 84. *Examination of witness; leading question; witness must state facts.*The issue was whether or not a mortgage was fraudulent. A witness was asked the following question: “Was the execution of the mortgage in fraud of the creditors of Duggan Bros. ? State if such was the fact or not?” This question was objected to, 1. Because it was leading; and 2. Because it called for a conclusion of the witness, instead of for facts within his knowledge. *Held,*that although the question might be answered.“yes” or “no,” still it did not suggest to the witness the answer desired by the party propounding it, and was therefore not leading. [1 Greenl. Ev. § 434; Abel v. Sparks, 6 Tex. 349; Trammel v. McDade, 29 Tex. 361.] But the second objection to the question was well taken. It is a general rule of law that witnesses must only state facts, and that the jury are to draw the inferences and conclusions from the facts given in evidence. [McKnight v. The State, 6 Tex. Ct. App. 158; Clardy v. Calicote, 24 Tex. 170; Turner v. Strange, 56 Tex. 141; W. & W. Con. Rep. § 1109.] Fraud, like malice or any other intent, is proved or inferred by showing the existence of certain external facts and circumstances. These external facts and circumstances should be proved, leaving the jury to draw their own inferences and conclusions therefrom.

*66December 12, 1883.

§ 85. *Evidence; hearsay.*Declarations made by A. that B. was his partner, and not made in the presence of B., are hearsay, and not admissible against B. to prove a partnership between A. and B.

§86. *Partnership; cannot be proved by reputation, etc.*It is not competent to prove a partnership by general reputation, common rumor, or the opinion or belief of a witness founded on such hearsay testimony. [W. & W. Con. Rep. § 103.]

Reversed and remanded.