Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 33A04-1604-PL-771 | February 16, 2017 Page 1 of 18

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

James S. Stephenson

Joseph M. Hendel

Stephenson Morow & Semler

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Frederick D. Emhardt

Josh S. Tatum

Colin E. Conner

Plews Shadley Racher & 

 Braun, LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Town of Knightstown,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

Dudley Wainscott,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

February 16, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

33A04-1604-PL-771

Appeal from the Henry Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Mary G. Willis, 

Judge

The Honorable Jack A. Tandy, 

Judge Pro Tempore

Trial Court Cause No.

33C01-1502-PL-10

Barnes, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] In this interlocutory appeal, the Town of Knightstown (“Town”) appeals the 

trial court’s partial denial of its motion for summary judgment regarding a 
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claim by Dudley Wainscott (“Wainscott”). On cross-appeal, Wainscott appeals 

the trial court’s partial grant of the Town’s motion for summary judgment. We 

affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Issues

[2] The parties present several issues for our review, which we restate as:

I. whether the trial court properly found that 

Wainscott failed to file a timely tort claim 

notice;

II. whether the trial court properly granted 

summary judgment on Wainscott’s negligence 

and equity claims and denied summary 

judgment on Wainscott’s nuisance claim; and

III. whether the trial court properly denied 

summary judgment on Wainscott’s breach of 

contract claim.

Facts

[3] Wainscott owns a historic building called the “Old Lodge” in Knightstown. A 

building called the “Bullet Hole” was adjacent to the Old Lodge, and the 

buildings shared a wall. In February 2013, the Town contracted with Shroyer 

Brothers, Inc. (“Shroyer”) to demolish the Bullet Hole, and Shroyer began 

demolition on April 1, 2013. According to Wainscott, the demolition left “161 

holes above ground and 240 holes below ground in the shared, load-bearing 

wall . . . .” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 120. Wainscott also alleges that an 

unknown amount of vacuum tubes that were not removed from the building 
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were crushed during demolition, “potentially causing mercury to leak into the 

soil and groundwater.” Id. at 119. 

[4] On April 14, 2013, Wainscott sent the following letter to the Town:

I write to you as a concerned citizen of Knightstown, as well as a 

property owner directly impacted by the destruction of the Bullet 

Hole Building at 32 Main St. Despite the fact that I have 

repeatedly requested to be kept informed, destruction of the 

building began without my knowledge, and without notification 

to the citizens of Knightstown. The building at 32 Main Street 

was destroyed in an unsafe manner leaving the community 

exposed to construction debris and hazardous waste such as lead, 

mercury, mold, and lead based paint. The long term impact of 

this exposure to the children of Knightstown remains to be seen. 

The fact that no one was injured during the destruction is, 

indeed, fortunate for the city. A structural engineer MUST be 

consulted for the remainder of the project to ensure the safety of 

the citizens of Knightstown. 

I am the owner of the Old Lodge Building at 34-38 Main Street. 

My west wall was shared with the Bullet Hole building. This is a 

load bearing wall critical to the structural integrity of my building 

and the doctor’s building to the rear. Without proper repair that 

entire corner of downtown Knightstown is likely to crumble 

leaving the citizens of Knightstown with an even more dangerous 

situation. The wall is now exposed to the elements with holes in 

the 8’ x 80’ basement wall, major cracks in the 50’ x 80’ side wall 

and an exposed roof area shared with the doctor’s office. 

At a minimum:

1. All hazardous waste must be removed.
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2. Holes in the basement wall need to be repaired, bricked and 

tucked. My basement is currently exposed to hazardous waste 

which remains at the construction site.

3. Cracks in the main wall need to be repaired, all plaster needs 

to be removed, and the wall needs to be resealed to ensure that it 

is water tight. I repeat this is a LOAD BEARING wall. Without 

proper repairs, supervised by a structural engineer, that entire 

corner of Knightstown is in danger of crumbling.

4. The roof towards the rear of the building which is shared with 

the doctor’s office needs to be recapped to prevent water damage 

to the load bearing wall.

What is the city’s plan for the open space? If it is to be a parking 

lot, then all necessary precautions must be taken to protect the 

west wall of 34-38 Main St. A two foot steal [sic] reinforced 

concrete barrier should be erected the length of the wall to protect 

the wall from damage due to compacting, and, to keep a driver 

from hitting the wall with a car.

Because my previous attempts to work with the City of 

Knightstown and to be kept informed were essentially ignored, I 

request your signature to acknowledge receipt of this letter. You 

are welcome to contact me at any time by phone, ***-***- , 

or by email at ** ***.

Regards,

D.A. Wainscott

Id. at 24-25. 
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[5] Wainscott then attended the April 18, 2013 meeting of the Town Council. The 

minutes of the meeting indicate that Clyde South, the Town Council president, 

stated: “the town intends to obey the law and if IDEM requires anything of the 

town, the town will comply. . . . [H]e also told Mr. Wainscott that if the town 

did anything to cause damage to his building, that we would fix the problem.” 

Id. at 27. The Town hired an engineer to make recommendations. According 

to Wainscott, the Town “failed to follow any of its engineer’s recommendations 

to repair the problems caused by its demolition.” Id. at 120. Because the 

“shared wall was not designed to be exposed to the elements,” water has leaked 

through the wall, leading to standing water and extensive mold in Wainscott’s 

building. Id. 

[6] In December 2014, Wainscott’s counsel sent a letter to the Town Council

noting that Wainscott’s building was, and continued to be, damaged by the 

demolition and that he would be forced to bring litigation against the Town if it 

did not stop further damage to the building, repair the damage already done, 

and compensate Wainscott for his losses. 

[7] In February 2015, Wainscott filed a complaint against the Town and Shroyer 

and alleged the following counts: Count I, an equitable claim against the Town; 

Count II, a breach of contract claim against the Town; Count III, a nuisance 

claim against the Town and Shroyer; Count IV, a negligence claim against the 

Town and Shroyer; and Count V, a violation of Indiana’s Access to Public 

Records law against the Town. The Town filed a motion for summary 

judgment. The Town argued that it was entitled to summary judgment on 
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Counts I, III, and IV because Wainscott had failed to file a timely tort claims 

notice under the Indiana Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”). It also argued that it was 

entitled to summary judgment on Count II because Wainscott could not show 

the existence of a binding contract. As for Count V, the Town alleged that the 

claim was moot because Wainscott’s public records requests had been satisfied. 

Wainscott responded that his April 2013 letter qualified as a proper tort claims 

notice. Alternatively, Wainscott argued that his equitable, nuisance, and 

breach of contract claims were not subject to the ITCA. 

[8] After a hearing, the trial court entered an order granting in part and denying in 

part the Town’s motion for summary judgment. The trial court found:

[T]he only notice Wainscott gave to [the Town] is the letter of 

April 14, 2013. If the letter does not comply with the 

requirements of the ITCA, Wainscott is barred from bringing suit 

against [the Town] for all causes of action covered by the ITCA. 

In the letter, Wainscott addresses the Knightstown City Council 

and complains about how the demolition of the Bullet Hole 

Building has impacted his building, and also poses a danger in 

general to the residents of [the Town]. It refers to the 

circumstances of the demolition with sufficient clarity as to 

location and date as to alert the town to the events of which 

Wainscott complains. The letter states the town’s actions may 

pose a threat to the general population and refers to potential 

long term danger to the children of Knightstown. However, the 

letter is missing a crucial element required by the ITCA.

The Court finds the fatal flaw with Wainscott’s letter is that it 

does not state that Wainscott intends to bring legal action against 

[the Town]. Case law has held this to be a requirement. See

Collier v. Prater, 544 N.E.2d 497 (Ind. 1989), Bienz v. Bloom, 674 
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N.E.2d 998 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), [trans. denied,] and the very 

recent case of Kerr v. City of South Bend, [48 N.E.3d 348 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2015),] decided by the Indiana Court of Appeals on 

December 23, 2015.

Actual knowledge or action taken to cure a problem has been 

held not to obviate the requirement that an aggrieved party notify 

a governmental entity of its intent to pursue a legal claim. In the 

case at bar, [the Town] did respond to Wainscott’s concerns by 

hiring an engineering firm. Kerr held that actual knowledge of 

the event and investigation steps do not relieve an aggrieved 

party of the ITCA requirement to state an intent to pursue legal 

action.

Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 9-10. The trial court noted that the ITCA clearly 

applied to Count IV, the negligence claim, and clearly did not apply to Count 

II, the breach of contract claim. As for Count I, the equitable duty claim, the 

trial court found that it was “in essence a negligence claim,” and was subject to 

the ITCA. Id. at 10. As for Count III, the nuisance claim, the trial court found

“that there is not a clear answer in the law as to whether a nuisance action . . . 

is governed by the ITCA requirements” and found that the nuisance claim was 

“not a tort for purposes of the ITCA.” Id. at 11. Finally, with respect to Count 

IV, the breach of contract claim, the trial court found that “there are questions 

of fact as to whether South did have authority to bind the town by his 

comments,” that the town council did not oppose South’s statements, and that 

“disputed legal inferences” could be drawn from South’s statements such that 

summary judgment for the Town on the breach of contract claim was 

inappropriate. Id. at 12. The trial court also noted that Wainscott 
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acknowledged the Town did not violate the Open Records Law as alleged in 

Count V and that the Town was entitled to summary judgment regarding Count 

V.1 Ultimately, the trial court granted summary judgment to the Town on 

Count I (equity), Count IV (negligence), Count V (Open Records) but denied 

the Town’s motion for summary judgment regarding Count II (nuisance) and 

Count III (breach of contract). At the Town’s request, the trial court certified 

the order for interlocutory appeal, and we accepted the interlocutory appeal 

pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 14.

Analysis

[9] The parties’ arguments concern the trial court’s partial grant and partial denial 

of the Town’s motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is 

appropriate only when the moving party shows there are no genuine issues of 

material fact for trial and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law. Schoettmer v. Wright, 992 N.E.2d 702, 705 (Ind. 2013); see also Ind. Trial 

Rule 56(C). Once that showing is made, the burden shifts to the non-moving 

party to rebut. Schoettmer, 992 N.E.2d at 705-06. When ruling on the motion, 

the trial court construes all evidence and resolves all doubts in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. at 706. We review the trial court’s grant of summary 

 

1

In one location, the trial court’s order states that “Wainscott was entitled to summary judgment on Count 

5.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 13. However, this is clearly a typographical error. The order states that 

“Wainscott acknowledges that Knightstown did not violate the Open Records Law as alleged in Count 5”

and later grants summary judgment in the Town’s favor regarding Count V. Id.
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judgment de novo, and we take “care to ensure that no party is denied his day 

in court.” Id.

I. Tort Claims Notice

[10] The first issue is whether the trial court properly found that Wainscott failed to 

file a timely tort claim notice. The ITCA provides that a tort claim against a 

government entity is barred unless the claimant provides the entity with notice 

of the claim within 180 days of the loss.2Ind. Code § 34-13-3-8; I.C. § 34-13-3-

1. The notice “must describe in a short and plain statement the facts on which 

the claim is based,” including “the circumstances which brought about the loss, 

the extent of the loss, the time and place the loss occurred, the names of all 

persons involved if known, the amount of the damages sought, and the 

residence of the person making the claim at the time of the loss and at the time 

of filing the notice.” I.C. § 34-13-3-10. The notice must be in writing and 

delivered in person or by registered or certified mail. I.C. § 34-13-3-12.

 

2

Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-8(a) also requires the notice to be filed with the Indiana political subdivision 

risk management commission. Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-8(b) notes:

A claim against a political subdivision is not barred for failure to file 

notice with the Indiana political subdivision risk management 

commission created under IC 27-1-29-5 if the political subdivision was 

not a member of the political subdivision risk management fund 

established under IC 27-1-29-10 at the time the act or omission took 

place.

The Town made no argument concerning this provision in its motion for summary judgment or on appeal. 

Consequently, we do not address this requirement.
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[11] Our courts have held that a liberal application of the requirements of the ITCA 

notice statute is proper in order to avoid denying plaintiffs an opportunity to 

bring a claim where the purpose of the statute has been satisfied. Brown v. 

Alexander, 876 N.E.2d 376, 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. The notice 

requirement “is intended to ensure that government entities have the 

opportunity to investigate the incident giving rise to the claim and prepare a 

defense.” Schoettmer, 992 N.E.2d at 706 (citing Galbreath v. City of Indianapolis, 

253 Ind. 472, 477, 255 N.E.2d 225, 228 (1970)). “Like any statute in 

derogation of the common law, the ITCA ‘must be strictly construed against 

limitations on the claimant’s right to bring suit.’” Id. (quoting City of 

Indianapolis v. Buschman, 988 N.E.2d 791, 794 (Ind. 2013)). So long as its 

essential purpose has been satisfied, the notice requirement “should not 

function as ‘a trap for the unwary.’” Id. (quoting Galbreath, 253 Ind. at 480, 255 

N.E.2d at 229). “The question of compliance is not a question of fact for the 

jury but ultimately a legal determination to be made by the court.” Indiana State 

Highway Comm’n v. Morris, 528 N.E.2d 468, 471 (Ind. 1988). 

[12] “Our courts have found that not all technical violations of this statute are fatal 

to a claim.” Brown, 876 N.E.2d at 381. “Non-compliance has been excused in 

certain cases based on the theories of substantial compliance, waiver, and 

estoppel.” Id. Substantial compliance is at issue here.3 “In general, a notice 

 

3 The parties do not argue waiver or estoppel.
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that is filed within the 180 day period, informs the municipality of the 

claimant’s intent to make a claim and contains sufficient information which 

reasonably affords the municipality an opportunity to promptly investigate the 

claim satisfies the purpose of the statute and will be held to substantially comply 

with it.” Collier v. Prater, 544 N.E.2d 497, 499 (Ind. 1989). “However, where a 

plaintiff, within the 180 day period, fails to file any notice of an intent to make a 

claim, actual knowledge of the occurrence on the part of the city, even when 

coupled with an investigation of the occurrence, will not suffice to prove 

substantial compliance.” Id. 

[13] “Substantial compliance with the statutory notice requirements is sufficient 

when the purpose of the notice requirement is satisfied.” Schoettmer, 992 

N.E.2d at 707. “The purpose of the ITCA’s notice requirements is to provide 

the political subdivision the opportunity to investigate the facts surrounding an 

accident so that it may determine its liability and prepare a defense.” Porter v. 

Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 743 N.E.2d 341, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. 

“When deciding whether there has been substantial compliance, this court 

reviews whether the notice given was, in fact, sufficiently definite as to time, 

place, and nature of the injury.” Id. “‘What constitutes substantial compliance, 

while not a question of fact but one of law, is a fact-sensitive determination.’”

Schoettmer, 992 N.E.2d 707 (quoting Collier, 544 N.E.2d at 499).

[14] The trial court found that Wainscott’s April 14, 2013 letter did not comply with 

the ITCA because it did not state that Wainscott intended to bring legal action 

against the Town. There is no argument regarding the fact that the letter was 
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sent within 180 days of the loss, the letter described the facts on which the claim 

is based, the circumstances which brought about the loss, the extent of the loss, 

the time and place the loss occurred, the names of all persons involved if 

known, the amount of the damages sought, and the residence of the person 

making the claim at the time of the loss and at the time of filing the notice, and 

that it was either hand delivered or sent by registered or certified mail.4 The 

sole issue on appeal is whether the letter included Wainscott’s intent to assert a 

claim.

[15] In support of its argument, the Town cites several cases in support of its 

assertion that the notice must specifically inform the political subdivision of the 

injured party’s intent to assert a tort claim. However, we addressed a similar 

issue in Porter v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 743 N.E.2d 341 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001),

trans. denied, which we find persuasive here. In Porter, the plaintiff was injured 

when his vehicle collided with a school bus. A couple weeks after the accident, 

his attorney sent the following letter to school officials:

Re: My Client: Thomas Porter

Your Insured: Fort Wayne Community Schools

 

4

In its motion for summary judgment, the Town challenged whether the letter contained some of these 

items. On appeal, however, the Town makes no argument concerning them except to very briefly claim in its 

reply brief that the letter failed to include the amount of damages sought. To the extent that the Town’s 

argument is cogent, we note that the failure to include a dollar amount of damages does not render a notice 

insufficient. Scott v. Gatson, 492 N.E.2d 337, 341 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). The letter detailed the specific 

damages resulting from the demolition and requested specific relief. We conclude that the letter substantially 

complied with the requirement to include the amount of damages sought. 
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Date of Accident: September 29, 1997

Dear Ms. Mihavics[:]

Please be advised that I represent the interests of Thomas Porter 

as it relates to a collision which occurred on September 29, 1997, 

on Cook Road in Allen County. Fort Wayne Community School 

bus number 352, driven by Elizabeth Wesner, was exiting 

Northrup High School’s parking lot and struck Mr. Porter’s 

vehicle in the right front corner, causing significant damage to his 

truck as well as physical injuries to himself. From our initial 

investigation, it appears as though Fort Wayne Community 

Schools was the direct and proximate cause of the accident and, 

therefore, this letter is to inform you of our representation of Mr. 

Porter. It would be appreciated if you would communicate 

directly with me regarding this matter.

We will forward all information to support his claim upon receipt 

of the same.

Porter, 743 N.E.2d at 343. The plaintiff eventually filed a complaint against the 

school corporation, and the school corporation filed a motion for summary 

judgment arguing that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the notice 

requirements of the ITCA. The trial court granted summary judgment to the 

school corporation, and on appeal, we reversed. 

[16] The plaintiff argued that his notice substantially complied with the ITCA, and 

the school corporation argued that the notice “did not contain an affirmative 

statement of intent to pursue a tort claim and did not otherwise satisfy the 

purpose of the notice requirements under the ITCA.” Id. at 344. We held:
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[The attorney’s] letter was timely filed and included specific 

details regarding the collision. And although [the attorney] did 

not expressly state that [plaintiff] intended to file a claim against 

Fort Wayne and Wesner, [the attorney] stated his representation 

of [plaintiff’s] “interests” and that additional information would 

be forwarded “to support his claim[.]” Record at 71. We 

conclude that [the attorney’s] letter adequately informed Fort 

Wayne of [plaintiff’s] intent to make a claim and provided 

sufficient information about the collision to facilitate Fort 

Wayne’s investigation. 

Indeed, the record shows that Fort Wayne considered [plaintiff’s] 

letter to be notice of a tort claim. Fort Wayne’s insurance 

company assigned a “claim number” to [plaintiff’s] claim and 

maintained a file “reflective of [plaintiff’s] condition.” Record at 

77. The insurance adjuster had “a general idea of [plaintiff’s] 

injuries and initial treatment,” sought to update her file, and 

made reference to settling his claim. Record at 77. Fort Wayne’s 

conduct, then, was inconsistent with its position that [the 

attorney’s] October 16, 1997 letter did not satisfy the purpose of 

the ITCA notice requirements. We conclude that [the attorney’s] 

letter was sufficiently definite as to time, place, and nature of 

[plaintiff’s] injuries and, thus, substantially complied with the 

notice requirements of the ITCA. The trial court erred when it 

granted Fort Wayne and Wesner’s motion for summary 

judgment.

Id. at 344-45. 

[17] Similarly, here, Wainscott’s April 2013 letter made the Town aware that its

demolition of the adjacent building had significantly damaged his property and 

specifically demanded repairs that the Town needed to perform. The matter 

was also discussed at the Town Council meeting, where the Town Council 
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president stated that “if the town did anything to cause damage to his building, 

that we would fix the problem.” Appellant’s App. p. 27. In response, the 

Town hired an engineer to evaluate the issues. The letter gave the Town an 

opportunity to promptly investigate the issues, determine its liability, and 

prepare a defense. Although the letter did not specifically state that it was a tort 

claims notice or state that Wainscott would be filing legal action, it clearly 

stated that the Town had damaged Wainscott’s property and set out the items 

that the Town needed to correct. We conclude that, as in Porter, Wainscott 

substantially complied with the ITCA because the April 2013 letter adequately 

informed the Town of Wainscott’s intent to make a claim. As a result, the trial 

court erred when it concluded that the April 2013 letter did not substantially 

comply with the ITCA. 

II. Negligence, Equity, and Nuisance Claims

[18] The Town challenges the trial court’s failure to grant summary judgment in its 

favor on the nuisance claim, and Wainscott challenges the trial court’s grant of 

summary judgment to the Town on the equity and negligence claims. The trial 

court granted summary judgment to the Town on Wainscott’s negligence and 

equity claims because it found Wainscott failed to comply with the notice 

requirements of the ITCA. We have concluded that Wainscott’s April 2013 

letter substantially complied with the ITCA requirements. Consequently, the 

trial court erred by granting summary judgment on the negligence and equity 

claims.
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[19] As for the nuisance claim, the trial court concluded that the claim was not 

subject to the ITCA, and on appeal, the Town challenges this determination

and argues that the claim is subject to the ITCA and to summary judgment 

because Wainscott failed to file a timely notice. We need not address whether 

the nuisance claim is subject to the ITCA. Even if the nuisance claim is subject 

to the ITCA, our holding that Wainscott substantially complied with the notice 

requirements means that the claim is not subject to summary judgment on this 

basis.

III. Breach of Contract

[20] The Town argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion for summary 

judgment on Wainscott’s breach of contract claim. Wainscott’s breach of 

contract claim is based on the Town Council president’s statements to 

Wainscott at the April 2013 Town Council meeting. The minutes of the 

meeting indicate that the president stated: “the town intends to obey the law 

and if IDEM requires anything of the town, the town will comply. . . . [H]e also 

told Mr. Wainscott that if the town did anything to cause damage to his 

building, that we would fix the problem.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 27. 

[21] In his complaint, Wainscott alleged that the Town had agreed to repair the 

common wall, that the Town was in breach of its oral contract by failing to 

repair the wall, and that Wainscott had suffered damages as a result of the 

breach. The Town sought summary judgment on the claim, and the trial court 

found that “there are questions of fact as to whether South did have authority to 

bind the town by his comments,” that the town council did not oppose South’s 
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statements, and that “disputed legal inferences” could be drawn from South’s 

statements such that summary judgment for the Town on the breach of contract 

claim was inappropriate. Id. at 12. 

[22] On appeal, the Town argues that there was no evidence of an offer, evidence 

that Wainscott accepted the offer, evidence of a meeting of the minds, or 

evidence of consideration.5 The existence of a contract is a question of law. 

Morris v. Crain, 969 N.E.2d 119, 123 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). “The basic 

requirements are offer, acceptance, consideration, and ‘a meeting of the minds 

of the contracting parties.’” Id. (quoting Batchelor v. Batchelor, 853 N.E.2d 162, 

165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)). “For an oral contract to exist, parties have to agree 

to all terms of the contract.” Kelly v. Levandoski, 825 N.E.2d 850, 857 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2005), trans. denied. To be valid and enforceable, a contract must be 

reasonably definite and certain. Allen v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc., 980 N.E.2d 

306, 309 (Ind. 2012). 

[23] The only evidence of an alleged contract is South’s statement, which is 

memorialized in the minutes of the town council meeting, that “if the town did 

anything to cause damage to his building, that we would fix the problem.” 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 27. This vague statement simply cannot establish 

the necessary elements of a contract. There is no indication that Wainscott 

 

5 The Town also argues that South did not have the authority to “unilaterally bind” the Town to a contract 

with Wainscott. Appellant’s Br. p. 25. Because we conclude that no contract was formed, we need not 

address this argument.
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accepted the alleged offer, no evidence of a meeting of the minds of the terms of 

the contract, and no evidence of consideration. As a result, we conclude that 

the trial court erred when it denied the Town’s motion for summary judgment 

on Wainscott’s breach of contract claim. 

Conclusion

[24] Wainscott substantially complied with the ITCA notice requirements, and the 

trial court erred when it granted the Town’s motion for summary judgment on 

his negligence and equity claims. The trial court properly denied summary 

judgment on Wainscott’s nuisance claim, but it erred when it denied summary 

judgment on Wainscott’s breach of contract claim. We affirm in part, reverse 

in part, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

[25] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 

[26] Riley, J., and Bailey, J., concur.