alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit (4)(p)



 Exhibit 4(p) 
 Form of Policy Endorsement (Fund Facilitation Fee) 








			
	

	  	Home Office located at:
	  	4 Manhattanville Road, Purchase, New York 10577
	  	Adm. Office located at:
	  	4333 Edgewood Road N.E. Cedar Rapids, Iowa 52499
	  	 (319) 355-8511


 AMENDATORY ENDORSEMENT 
 The policy to which this Amendatory Endorsement is attached is amended to include the addition of the following Subaccounts: 
  

				
	  	  	Fund Facilitation Fee	 
	 AllianceBernstein VPS Balanced Wealth Strategy Portfolio
	  	0.20	%
	 Franklin Templeton VIP Founding Funds Allocation Fund
	  	0.15	%

 If any of the above Subaccounts are elected, a Fund Facilitation Fee would be charged in addition to any policy
fees and charges, and will be used in the calculation of net investment factor as described in the Accumulation Units and Variable Annuity Units provisions of the policy. The Fund Facilitation Fee will only be charged when money is allocated to one
of the above Subaccounts and is guaranteed not to change during the life of the policy. The Fund Facilitation Fee is an annualized percentage taken from the daily net asset values of a fund share held in that Subaccount. 
 This endorsement takes effect and expires concurrently with the policy to which it is attached and is subject to all the terms and conditions of the policy not
inconsistent herewith. 
 Signed for us at our home office. 
  

									
		 	 /s/ Craig D. Vermie
	 		  	 /s/ Peter G. Kunkel
	  	
		 	SECRETARY	 		  	PRESIDENT	  	

 AE 1288 0608 (NY)
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Patrick J. HAIGHT, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 99-36225.

D.C. Nos. CV-99-00049-WFN, CR-98-00026-WFN.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Oct. 16, 2000.1

Decided Jan. 5, 2001.

Before CHOY, WALLACE, and FARRIS, Circuit Judges.

1

. The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM2

Patrick J. Haight (“Haight”), a federal prisoner, appeals pro se the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his ninety-two month sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(e). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2253, and 2255. We review a district court’s decision to either deny or grant a federal prisoner’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion de novo, *see United States v. Chacon-Palomares,*208 F.3d 1157, 1158 (9th Cir.2000), and we review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo, *see United States v. Span,*75 F.3d 1383 (9th Cir.1996) (evaluating claim raised in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion). For the reasons below, we vacate and remand.

We granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether Haight’s counsel was ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal. A defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must show both that counsel’s representation, “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that the attorney’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. *Strickland v. Washington,*466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In *Roe v. Flores-Ortega,*528 U.S. 470, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000), the Supreme Court identified factors courts are to con*637sider in determining whether the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel failed to file notice of appeal on the defendant’s behalf. *See id.*at 1035-38 (concluding that district court must determine whether counsel had a duty to consult with defendant; if so, whether that duty was met; and whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, defendant would have timely appealed).

Because the district court did not make findings regarding these particular factors, and because the record is not sufficient to allow us to do so, we vacate the denial of Haight’s motion solely on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file an appeal and remand for further proceeding consistent with *Flores-Ortega. See id.*at 1040.

VACATED and REMANDED.

2

. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
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<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
#### Durley MEJIA, Appellant, v. CHEVRON and Broadspire, Appellees.

No. 1D09-5368.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Oct. 15, 2010.

Mark L. Zientz of the Law Offices of Mark L. Zientz, P.A., Miami, and Kevin R. Gallagher, Fort Lauderdale, for Appellant.

Sharon C. Degnan of Kubicki Draper, Fort Lauderdale, for Appellees.

PER CURIAM.

In this workers’ compensation appeal, claimant asserts that the “major contributing cause” standard violates her right to access to courts under the Florida Constitution insofar as she is barred from bringing a civil cause of action for negligently *122inflicted injuries in a work-related accident where those injuries are not compensable under Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Law because the work-related accident is not the “major contributing cause” of the injuries. We decline to address the merits of this claim as it is premature and speculative at this point because claimant has not attempted to file a civil action for negligence against her employer in circuit court nor has the employer raised the affirmative defense of workers’ compensation immunity/exclusivity. As to the claimant’s remaining issue on appeal, we affirm without discussion.

AFFIRMED.

WEBSTER, LEWIS, and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.
#### Dewayne ELTER and Danielle M. Elter v. GILES AUTOMOTIVE, INC., d/b/a Nissan of Opelousas.

No. 2011-CC-1231.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 23, 2011.

In re Giles Automotive, Inc., d/b/a; Nissan of Opelousas; — Defendant (s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 10-C-5575-C; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 11-00155.

Denied.
News United States Air Force
 US, Russia sign memorandum on air safety in SyriaPublished Oct. 21, 2015
                        
                        By Lisa Ferdinando
                        
                        
                        DoD News, Defense Media Activity
                **WASHINGTON (AFNS) --**
                Senior U.S. and Russian defense officials signed a memorandum of understanding Oct. 20 on air safety in Syria, the Pentagon's press secretary said.
The MOU is aimed at minimizing the risk of in-flight incidents among coalition and Russian aircraft operating in Syrian airspace, Peter Cook said at a Pentagon's news conference.
The MOU went into effect with the signing, he said.
Cook said the MOU includes specific safety protocols for aircrews to follow, including maintaining professional airmanship at all times, the use of specific communication frequencies and the establishment of a communication line on the ground.**Working group for implementation issues**
The U.S. and Russia will form a working group to discuss any implementation issues that follow, he added.
The MOU does not establish zones of cooperation, intelligence sharing or any sharing of target information in Syria, Cook said.
"The discussions through which this MOU was developed do not constitute U.S. cooperation or support for Russia's policy or actions in Syria," he said. "We continue to believe that Russia's strategy in Syria is counterproductive and their support for the Assad regime will only make Syria's civil war worse."
The U.S., Cook said, will continue to focus on advancing its interests in Syria, which include fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and supporting a moderate opposition. The moderate opposition is essential for a political resolution in Syria, he said.
The U.S. will continue to be the "single largest donor in addressing the humanitarian catastrophe in Syria and beyond its borders," he said.
Cook said that unlike Russia, the U.S. is supported by a coalition of 65 partners in its efforts.Russia 



Syria 



ISIL 



AFCENT
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Winston Jerald CRADDOCK.

No. 2010-KP-1672.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 4, 2011.

In re Craddock, Winston Jerald; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 326256; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 0425.

Denied.
#### McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. I. S. Slover.

(No. 6955.)

Appeal from Wise County.

Soward & Martin, counsel for appellant.

Fuller & Terrell, counsel for appellee.

Opinion by

Davidson, J.

§ 236. *Failure of consideration; non est factum; pleas in nature of must be sworn to; cannot be urged for first time in county court on appeal.*Suit was instituted by the appellant against the appellee in justice’s court upon the following written instrument: “ Boon-ville, Texas, May 19th, ’86. Wm. Chenowith — Sir: In regard to the Woodale reaper. I will keep the reaper, and will pay all on it I agreed to pay, which is $120. I will not go back on a fair trade on account of the weather. I want you to come Monday and set it up for me. Yours respectfully, I. S. Slover.” Appellee obtained judgment in the justice’s court, and again, on appeal thereto, in the county court. Appellee furnished no pleadings in the justice’s court, and none were noted on the docket of that court. He filed no written pleadings in the county court. Appellant’s bill of exceptions No. 1 recites that defendant “denies his liability in this cause, and says that he never made an absolute and complete contract with plaintiff to purchase the property mentioned in plaintiff’s pleadings, but says that he only agreed to take and pay for same when it was made to run by plaintiff, and did not agree to pay for it November 1, 1887, but when made to run; ■ and that plaintiff had failed to make it run.” This plea was oral and not sworn to, and was *398not made in the justice’s court. This plea seems to partake of the nature of a plea of *non est factum,*as well as of the nature of a plea of failure of consideration. By the terms of our laws such pleas must be sworn to, unless the truth thereof appear of record. The record in this case does not show the truth of the plea, and the same is not sworn to. [R. S., art. 1265, subds. 8, 10; 2 Civil Cas. Ct. App., § 498; Railway v. Tisdale, 74 Tex. 8.] Appellant excepted to this plea because it was not sworn to as required by law, and the .court overruled the exception. In this ruling there was error. [Authorities above cited.] Appellant also excepted to said plea because it, not having been made in the justice’s court, could not be urged for the first time in the county court by appellee. This exception was also overruled. In this ruling the court also erred. [2 Civil Cas. Ct. App., §§ 457, 442, 625; White & W. Oond. Civil Cas., § 239.] Both exceptions were well taken and should have been sustained. It is believed that the disposition of the above complained of errors will dispose of the other questions raised by the brief on another trial in the court below, and they are not noticed here further than to say that they are well taken.

April 22, 1891.

Reversed and remanded.
H. R. 1384 

One Hundred Tenth Congress 

of the 

United States of America 

AT THE FIRST SESSION 

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Thursday, 

the fourth day of January, two thousand and seven 

An Act 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 118 Minner 

Avenue in Bakersfield, California, as the ‘‘Buck Owens Post Office’’. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 

the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. BUCK OWENS POST OFFICE. 

(a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States Postal 

Service located at 118 Minner Avenue in Bakersfield, California, 

shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Buck Owens Post Office’’. 

(b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, regulation, 

document, paper, or other record of the United States to the facility 

referred to in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference 

to the ‘‘Buck Owens Post Office’’. 

Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
No. 87-6220.

#### Williams *v.*California.

Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.
#### Jesse Lee STONE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D09-4882.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Nov. 3, 2010.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 21, 2010.

Jesse Lee Stone, Okeechobee, pro se.

No appearance required for appellee.

WARNER, J.

In denying appellant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence, which alleged that he *99was improperly sentenced as a habitual offender, the trial court found: “Contrary to the defendant’s allegations, he was clearly sentenced as a habitual offender and given minimum mandatory sentences. This motion is frivolous and abusive. *See State v. Spencer,*751 So.2d 47, 48 (Fla.1999).” The court further ordered that a certified copy of the order be forwarded to appellant’s warden “for consideration of sanctions under Florida Statute sections 944.279(1), 944.28, and 944.09.”

On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in imposing sanctions without affording him an evidentiary hearing. We affirm, as the trial court did not impose sanctions but referred the case to the Department of Corrections to consider statutory sanctions. The DOC, not the circuit court, holds a due process hearing, prior to the imposition of sanctions. *See Spencer v. Fla. Dep’t of Corrections,*828 So.2d 752, 754 (Fla.2002) (“The department’s rules specifically provide for discipline when a court finds that an inmate has filed a frivolous lawsuit. The rules also provide that an inmate charged with such a rule violation is entitled to a due process hearing before discipline is imposed. These rules specify how the due process hearing should be conducted, how the findings of fact should be determined, how the discipline should be determined, and how to appeal that decision.”) (internal citations omitted). The trial court is not required to provide an additional hearing to appellant prior to making its finding of frivolousness, which can be made strictly from the filings in the case.

*Affirmed.*

POLEN and LEVINE, JJ., concur.
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<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the Balance
Sheet and Statement of Operations filed as part of the report on Form 10-QSB for
the quarter ended October 31, 1999 and is qualified in its entirety by reference
to such report on Form 10-QSB.
</LEGEND>

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</TABLE>
**Exhibit 31.1**
**Certification Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**
     I, Philip Sean Lafleur, Chief Executive Officer, certify that:
1.     I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of MakeMusic! Inc.;
2.     Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement ofa material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make thestatements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements weremade, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;
3.     Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all material respectsthe financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the smallbusiness issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
4.     The small business issuer’s other certifying officer and I are responsiblefor establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as definedin Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuerand have:
     (a)  Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, toensure that material information relating to the small business issuer,including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others withinthose entities, particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared;
     (b)  Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer’s disclosurecontrols and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of theperiod covered by this report based on such evaluation; and
     (c)  Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer’sinternal control over financial reporting that occurred during the smallbusiness issuer’s most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuer’sfourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small businessissuer’s internal control over financial reporting; and
5.     The small business issuer’s other certifying officer(s) and I havedisclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control overfinancial reporting, to the small business issuer’s auditors and the auditcommittee of the small business issuer’s board of directors (or personsperforming the equivalent functions):
     (a)  All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonablylikely to adversely affect the small business issuer’s ability to record,process, summarize and report financial information; and
     (b)  Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the small business issuer’s internalcontrol over financial reporting.     Date: August 13, 2003 By: /s/ Philip Sean Lafleur        Chief Executive Officer
17