alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>

OWOSSO CORPORATION
EXHIBIT 11
COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                               Three Months Ended                      Six Months Ended
                                                        --------------------------------         ---------------------------------
                                                          April 26,        April 27,               April 26,            April 27,
                                                            1998              1997                   1998                 1997
<S>                                                     <C>                  <C>                  <C>                  <C>       
BASIC:

Net income available for common stockholders            $1,670,000           $  558,000           $1,411,000           $  243,000
                                                        ==========           ==========           ==========           ==========

Weighted average number of
          common shares outstanding                      5,814,000            5,809,000            5,811,000            5,809,000
                                                        ==========           ==========           ==========           ==========

Basic earnings per common share                         $     0.29           $     0.10           $     0.24           $     0.04
                                                        ==========           ==========           ==========           ==========


DILUTED:

Net income available for common stockholders            $1,670,000           $  558,000           $1,411,000           $  243,000
                                                        ==========           ==========           ==========           ==========

Weighted average number of
          common shares outstanding                      5,814,000            5,809,000            5,811,000            5,809,000

Dilutive effect of stock options                            24,000               20,000               24,000               15,000
                                                        ----------           ----------           ----------           ----------

Weighted average number of shares outstanding            5,838,000            5,829,000            5,835,000            5,824,000
                                                        ==========           ==========           ==========           ==========

Diluted earnings per common share                       $     0.29           $     0.10           $     0.24           $     0.04
                                                        ==========           ==========           ==========           ==========
</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32.1

                     Certification Pursuant to Exchange Act
                    Rule 15d-14(b) and 18 U.S.C. Section 1350

           In   connection   with  the   Quarterly   Report  of  First   Virtual
Communications,  Inc.  and  subsidiary  (the  "Company")  on Form 10-QSB for the
quarter  ended  September 30, 2005,  as filed with the  Securities  and Exchange
Commission  on the date  hereof  (the  "Report"),  I,  Gregory  Sterling,  Chief
Restructuring  Officer of the  Company,  certify,  to the best of my  knowledge,
pursuant to Exchange Act Rule  15d-14(b) and 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, that:

      i.    The Report fully complies with the  requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      ii.   The  information  contained in the Report  fairly  presents,  in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.

           A signed original of this written statement  required by Section 906,
or other  document  authenticating,  acknowledging,  or  otherwise  adopting the
signature  that  appears in typed form  within  the  electronic  version of this
written  statement  required by Section 906, has been  provided to First Virtual
Communications,  Inc. and will be retained by First Virtual Communications, Inc.
and  furnished  to the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  or its staff upon
request.

Date: December 23, 2005                    FIRST VIRTUAL COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

                                           By: /s/ Gregory Sterling
                                               ----------------------------
                                               Gregory Sterling
                                               Chief Restructuring Officer
                                               (Duly Authorized Officer and
                                               Principal Financial Officer)
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 13**  **- 2119** 

In R e: ESTATE OF SHARON VAN PUTTEN; ALLEN VAN PUTTEN, Executor of the Estate of Sharon Van Putten; DEBRA VAN PUTTEN, Alternate Executor of the Estate of Sharon Van Putten , Petitioner s .

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus

. ( 1:13

- cv - 01124

- CMH

- IDD )

Submitted : January 28, 2014 Decided: January 31, 2014

Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and WYNN , Circuit Judges.

Petition d ismissed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Allen Van Putten , Debra Van Putten, Petitioner s Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Allen Van Putten and Debra Van Putten, the executor and alternate executor of the estate of Sharon Van Putten , respect ively, petition this court for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to accept the e state’s complaint, grant the e state leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), and appoint the e state counsel. The executors have also applied to proceed IFP in this c ourt, representing that the e state is without funds to pay the filing fee. We deny the e state’s request to proceed IFP, as “only a natural person may qualify for treatment in forma pauperis under [28 U.S.C.] § 1915 [(2012)],” Rowland v. Cal if . Men’ s Colony , 506 U.S. 194, 196 (1993) , and accordingly dismiss the e state’s p etition for a writ of mandamus. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process. PETITION DISMISSED
Exhibit 99.1


     Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In  connection  with the filing of the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the Year
Ended  January  31,  2003  (the  "Report")  by Invu,  Inc.  ("Registrant"),  the
undersigned hereby certifies that:

1.       The Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and

2.       The  information  contained  in  the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         Registrant.


                                               /s/ David Morgan
                                             ---------------------------------
                                             David Morgan
                                             President and Chief Executive
                                             Officer
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Patrick Earl FRANCIS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 00-6491.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 29, 2000.

Decided Jan. 8, 2001.

Patrick Earl Francis, pro se. Ray B. Fitzgerald, Jr., Office of the United States Attorney, Charlottesville, VA, for appellee.

Before WIDENER, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Patrick Earl Francis appeals the denial of his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2000) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motions. Because Francis’ Rule 60(b) motion was tantamount to a successive § 2255 application, we conclude the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider it absent authorization from this Court. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(b) (West Supp.2000); *United States v. Rich,*
      *142141 F.Bd 550, 551 (5th Cir.1998), *cert, denied,*526 U.S. 1011, 119 S.Ct. 1156, 143 L.Ed.2d 221 (1999). Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the claims raised solely in that motion. As to claims raised in the original § 2255 motion and supplements submitted prior to the district court’s dismissal of the original motion, we find no reversible error. Therefore, we deny a certificate of appeal-ability and dismiss those claims on the reasoning of the district court. *United States v. Francis,*Nos. CR-94-106; CA-99^20-7 (W.D.Va. Feb. 18, 2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
#### Robert Lee WATKINS, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. CONTINENTAL CAN COMPANY, Inc., Appellee and Cross-Appellant.

No. 9338.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued April 29, 1964.

Decided May 1, 1964.

Norwood Robinson and G. D. Humphrey, Jr., Winston-Salem, N. C. (Hudson, Ferrell, Petree, Stockton, Stockton & Robinson, Winston-Salem, N. C., on th brief for appellant and cross-appellee.

Roy L. Deal, Winston Salem, N. C. Fred S. Hutchins and Deal, Hutchins & Minor, Winston-Salem, N. C., on the brief), for appellee and cross-appellant.

Before SOBELOFF, Chief Judge, and HAYNSWORTH and J. SPENCER BELL’ Circuit JudgeS‘

PER CURIAM.

This is an action for personal injuries incurred by the plaintiff while he was unloading a boxcar of paper shipped by the defendant. After the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff on the issues of negligence, contributory negligence and damages, the court entered judgment n. o. v. for the defendant on the grounds that the evidence showed contributory negligence as a matter of law. The court *424also conditionally granted the defendant’s motion for á new trial, if this court should set aside the judgment n. o. v. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(c) (1).

We cannot agree on this record that the evidence supports the court’s finding that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Nor can we say that the court abused its discretion in conditionally granting a new trial. The judgment is vacated and the case remanded.

Remanded.
#### Terrence HARRIS, Doc # 507723, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 2D09-1150.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

May 12, 2010.

*5James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Richard P. Albertine, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Marilyn Muir Beccue, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appel-lee.

KHOUZAM, Judge.

Terrence Harris appeals the trial court’s order striking his pro se motion to withdraw plea as a nullity. We reverse and remand for the court to reconsider Harris’s motion based on the procedures outlined in *Sheppard v. State,*17 So.3d 275 (Fla.2009).

Harris pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine and was placed on eighteen months’ drug offender probation. He filed a timely motion to withdraw his plea after sentencing, alleging that his trial counsel failed to inform him of the maximum sentence that he could receive if he violated his probation. Harris also alleged that his trial counsel misadvised him about the investigation of a defense witness. The trial court struck the motion as a nullity because Harris did not include an unequivocal request to discharge counsel.

While Harris’s case was pending on appeal, the supreme court decided *Sheppard,*in which the court recognized a limited exception to the rule of striking pro se pleadings as nullities where a defendant files a pro se motion to withdraw plea pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(() based on allegations giving rise to an adversarial relationship. 17 So.3d at 287. In such a case, the trial court should hold a limited hearing to determine whether an adversarial relationship between counsel and the defendant *6has arisen. *Id.*If the court finds that an adversarial relationship exists, it must then determine whether the defendant’s allegations are conclusively refuted by the record. *Id.*The court’s failure to hold a hearing may be considered harmless error if the allegations in the motion are conclusively refuted by the record. *See Johnson v. State,*22 So.3d 840, 844-45 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (finding harmless error in trial court’s failure to hold hearing where defendant’s claim was refuted by plea colloquy and plea agreement).

Because the brief plea colloquy in this case fails to conclusively refute Harris’s allegations, we reverse and remand for the trial court to reconsider Harris’s motion to withdraw plea based on the procedures outlined in *Sheppard.*

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

CASANUEVA, C.J., and KELLY, J., Concur.
#### Texas & Pacific R’y Co. v. N. B. Haney.

(No. 3364.)

Appeal from Palo Pinto County.

Opinion by

Will-son, J.

§ 709. *Jurisdiction of court of appeals as to amount; case stated.*Haney sued the railway company upon a verified account for $100 in justice’s court, and recovered judgment for that sum and costs. The company ap*622pealed to the county court, and there pleaded a counterclaim for $106, which plea, upon exception thereto, was stricken out, and Haney again recovered judgment for $100 and costs, from which judgment the company has appealed to this court, and appellee moves to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction in this court over the subject-matter in controversy. *Held:*This court cannot entertain jurisdiction of an appeal, unless either the amount of the judgment appealed from, or the amount in controversy in the suit, exceeds the sum of $100, *exclusive of interest and costs.*[Const. art. V, secs. 6, 16; R. S. arts. 1068, 1382; W. & W. Con. Rep. § 510.] Article 1068 of the Revised Statutes is the controlling provision upon this subject, and excludes *interest*and *costs.*Either the principal of the judgment, or the principal of the amount in controversy, must exceed $100, else the judgment of the county court is conclusive.

May 16, 1885.

§ 710. *Counterclaim not pleaded in justice's court cannot be pleaded in county court; such plea cannot be considered on question of jurisdiction.*The fact that appellant pleaded a counterclaim for more than $100 in the county court, which had not been pleaded in the justice’s court, cannot be considered in determining the jurisdiction of this court of this appeal. That plea was properly stricken out, because it had not been pleaded in the justice’s court. [W. & W.. Con. Rep. §§ 239, 240; ante, § 123.] It did not constitute a part of the amount in controversy in the suit.

Appeal dismissed.
----

|                         |   | Fiscal Year Ended December 31, |   |
|------------------------------|--------|--------------------------------|--------|
|                         |   |                           |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|                         |   | 2010                           |   |   | 2009 |   |   | 2008 |   |   | 2007 |   |   | 2006 |   |
|                         |   |                           |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Net Income                   |   |   $                       | 43,925 |   |   | $ | 39,195 |   |   |  $ | 39,431 |   |   | $ | 38,025 |   |   | $ | 35,779 |   |
|                         |   |                           |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Income Taxes, Net            |   |                           | 29,678 |   |   |   | 27,104 |   |   |   | 26,508 |   |   |   | 26,652 |   |   |   | 24,811 |   |
|                         |   |                           |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Fixed Charges*               |   |                           | 18,010 |   |   |   | 16,764 |   |   |   | 19,089 |   |   |   | 20,928 |   |   |   | 22,274 |   |
|                         |   |                           |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Capitalized Interest         |   |                           | (369   | ) |   |   | (322 | ) |   |   | (152 | ) |   |   | (151 | ) |   |   | (175 | ) |
|                         |   |                           |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|                         |   |                           |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Total Available for Coverage |   |   $                       | 91,244 |   |   | $ | 82,741 |   |   |   $ | 84,876 |   |   | $ | 85,454 |   |   | $ | 82,689 |   |
|                         |   |                           |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|                         |   |                           |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|                         |   |                           |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Total Available              |   |                           | 5.1    | x |   |   | 4.9 | x |   |   | 4.4 | x |   |   | 4.1 | x |   |   | 3.7 | x |
| Fixed Charges                |   |                           |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |

----
Exhibit 32



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND

CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER



Each of the
undersigned hereby certifies, for the purposes of Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, in his capacity as an officer of Petro Stopping Centers, L.P.
(the Company), that to his knowledge:



(1) The
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended March 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) on the date hereof (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



This written statement is being furnished to the SEC as an exhibit to the Report. A signed original of this statement has been provided to the Company and
will be retained by the Company and furnished to the SEC or its staff upon request.



|                   |  |                                      
|------------------ |  | -------------------------------------
|Date: May 20, 2005 |  | /s/ J.A. Cardwell, Sr.               
|                   |  | (J.A. Cardwell, Sr.)                 
|                   |  | Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 
|                   | 
|Date: May 20, 2005 |  | /s/ Edward Escudero                  
|                   |  | (Edward Escudero)                    
|                   |  | Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer
#### William C. COLEMAN v. STATE of Alabama.

CR-09-0088.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Nov. 5, 2010.

William C. Coleman, pro se.

Troy King, atty. gen., and Jean A. Ther-kelsen, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.

*637
      *After Remand from the Alabama Supreme Court*

KELLUM, Judge.

The appellant, William C. Coleman, appealed from the circuit court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., in which he challenged his April 7, 2008, guilty-plea convictions for first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, and two counts of first-degree sexual abuse. Specifically, Coleman alleged in his Rule 32 petition that his guilty plea was involuntary because, he says, he was denied effective assistance of counsel. This Court affirmed, without an opinion, the circuit court’s judgment denying Coleman’s petition for postconviction relief on the basis that Coleman’s petition was insufficiently pleaded under Rule 32.3, Ala. R.Crim. P., and Rule 32.6, Ala. R.Crim. P. See *Coleman v. State*(No. CR-09-0088, Feb. 19, 2010), - So.3d -(Ala.Crim.App.2010) (table).

Coleman then petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for certiorari review, arguing that he had met his burden of pleading in his Rule 32 petition and that, on that basis, he was entitled an opportunity to present evidence in order to satisfy his burden of proof. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review, and on August 27, 2010, reversed this Court’s judgment, holding that the circuit court erred in summarily denying Coleman’s petition without first conducting an evidentiary hearing because Coleman had alleged facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief and because his Rule 32 petition was “meritorious on its face.” *Ex parte*Coleman, 71 So.3d 627, 633 (Ala.2010).

In accordance with the Supreme Court’s opinion, we remand this case to the circuit court for that court to conduct an eviden-tiary hearing on Coleman’s allegation that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. In lieu of an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court may take evidence by affidavits, written interrogatories, or depositions, as provided in Rule 32.9, Ala. R.Crim. P. After receiving and considering the evidence presented, the circuit court shall issue specific written findings of fact regarding Coleman’s claim in accordance with Rule 32.9(d), Ala. R.Crim. P.

The circuit court shall take all necessary action to see that the circuit clerk makes due return to this Court at the earliest possible time and within 56 days of the release of this opinion. The return to remand shall include a transcript of the remand proceedings conducted by the circuit court, together with the circuit court’s written findings of fact.

REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

WISE, P.J., and WELCH, WINDOM, and MAIN, JJ., concur.
**Michigan Supreme Court** 

**Lansing, Michigan**

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster , Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

March 28, 2014

t0324 

# Order

Clerk March 28, 2014

148201

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 148201

COA: 316703

Menominee CC: 09

- 003280

- FC

GUY A. BUCK,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 30, 2013

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, becau se the defendant has

failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Robert CARLEY.

No. 2010-KD-2768.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 7, 2011.

PER CURIAM.

Writ granted. The trial judge is ordered to determine, in an *ex parte*hearing, whether the defendant would be prejudiced by a disclosure of his defense at a contradictory hearing. If so, then the hearing on expert funding should continue *ex parte.*If not, then the hearing should be held contradictorily with the District Attorney. At the hearing on expert funding, whether *ex parte*or contradictory, the defendant must first show a need for the funding. The defendant must show with a reasonable degree of specificity what type of expert is needed and for what purpose. In other words, the indigent defendant requesting governmental funding for the securing of expert assistance must show that it is more likely than not that the expert assistance will be required to answer a serious issue or question raised by the prosecution’s or defense’s theory of the case. If the defendant meets this burden, then the court is to order that the funds be provided by the state. If the funding hearing has proceeded *ex parte,*the trial court’s written reasons for a denial of the motions must remain under seal for any further appellate review. The request to seal the writ application is granted. The request for stay is denied.

JOHNSON and KNOLL, JJ„ would vote to deny.

KIMBALL, C.J., not signing.