alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>
                                                               EXHIBIT 32.1

                         Certification Pursuant to
                          18 U.S.C. Section 1350
                          As Adopted Pursuant to
               Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

    Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections
(a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code),
each of the undersigned officers of Cenveo, Inc., a Colorado corporation
(the "Company"), does hereby certify, to the best of such officer's
knowledge, that:

    The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the three month period ended
March 31, 2007 (the "Form 10-Q") of the Company fully complies with the
requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

Date: May 9, 2007

                                          /s/  ROBERT G. BURTON, SR.
                                          ------------------------------------
                                          Robert G. Burton, Sr.
                                          Chairman and Chief Executive Officer

Date: May 9, 2007

                                          /s/  SEAN S. SULLIVAN
                                          ------------------------------------
                                          Sean S. Sullivan
                                          Chief Financial Officer

    A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or
other document authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting the
signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this
written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Cenveo,
Inc. and will be retained by Cenveo, Inc. and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

    The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to
section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of
section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code) and is not being
filed as part of the Form 10-Q or as a separate disclosure document.
I 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1473 

To amend the Child Care and Development Block Grant Act of 1990 to 

require child care providers to provide to parents information regarding 

whether such providers carry current liability insurance. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 12, 2007 

Mr. BARROW (for himself, Mr. BISHOP of Georgia, Ms. JACKSON-LEE of 

Texas, Mr. LEWIS of Georgia, Mr. BOREN, and Mr. COURTNEY) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Education and Labor 

A BILL 

To amend the Child Care and Development Block Grant 

Act of 1990 to require child care providers to provide 

to parents information regarding whether such providers 

carry current liability insurance. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Anthony DeJuan 

5 Boatwright Act’’. 


bajohnson on PROD1PC60 with BILLS
2 

•HR 1473 IH

1 SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS. 

2 Section 658e(c)(2) of the Child Care and Develop3 ment Block Grant Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 9858c(c)(2)) 

4 is amended— 

5 (1) in subparagraph (E)(i) by adding at the end 

6 the following: ‘‘The State shall include as part of its 

7 regulatory process for issuance and renewal of li8 censes to providers of child care services, a rec9 ommendation to each provider that it carry current 

10 liability insurance.’’, and 

11 (2) in subparagraph (F)— 

12 (A) in clause (ii) by striking ‘‘and’’ at the 

13 end, 

14 (B) in clause (iii) by striking the period at 

15 the end and inserting a semicolon, 

16 (C) by inserting after clause (iii) the fol17 lowing: 

18 ‘‘(iv) a requirement that each child 

19 care provider post publicly and conspicu20 ously in the service area of its premises a 

21 notice specifying whether or not such pro22 vider carries current liability insurance ap23 plicable to its premises and its services; 

24 and 

25 ‘‘(v) requirements that each child care 

26 provider— 


bajohnson on PROD1PC60 with BILLS
3 

•HR 1473 IH

1 ‘‘(I) provide to parents of chil2 dren to whom it provides child care 

3 services a written notice stating 

4 whether or not such provider carries 

5 such insurance; 

6 ‘‘(II) obtain the signature of at 

7 least 1 parent of each such child on 

8 such written notice acknowledging 

9 that such parent has received such no10 tice; and 

11 ‘‘(III) maintain such notice (or a 

12 copy of such notice) as signed by such 

13 parents (or a copy of the signed no14 tice) in such provider’s records during 

15 the period in which the child receives 

16 such services and during the 1-year 

17 period beginning on the date the child 

18 ceases to receive such services.’’, and 

19 (D) in the last sentence by inserting 

20 ‘‘clauses (i), (ii), or (iii) of’’ after ‘‘Nothing in’’. 

21 SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE. 

22 This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall 

23 take effect on October 1 of the 1st fiscal year that begins 


bajohnson on PROD1PC60 with BILLS
4 

•HR 1473 IH

1 more than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this 

2 Act. 

Æ 


bajohnson on PROD1PC60 with BILLS
#### Howeth Bros. v. J. L. Clark.

(No. 7213.)

Appeal from Cooke County.

Martin & Lewis, counsel for appellants.

No counsel appeared for appellee.

Opinion by

Sbieins, J.

§ 31 *á. Continuance does not operate as a waiver of a plea in abatement, when.*Howeth Bros, sued Clark on balance of account in precinct 3, justice court, Cooke county. Defendant filed a plea in abatement, setting up his residence in precinct 1, and no other defense. The justice sustained the plea, and dismissed the suit, and plaintiffs appealed. In the county court defendant amended his plea in abatement, but on motion the court dismissed the case on the ground that no final judgment had been entered in the justice court. Plaintiffs appealed to this court, and the judgment of the county court was reversed and remanded. The mandate being sent down during the term of the county court, this case was continued by counsel. When called for trial at the succeeding term, plaintiffs objected to a consideration of the plea in abatement on the ground that a continuance by consent waived and abandoned the plea, which objection was overruled by the court. The appellants then demanded a jury. The court denied the jury, tried the cause himself, and rendered judgment sustaining the plea and dismissing the suit. Prom this judgment appellants again prosecute their appeal to this court, and assign as error the overruling of their objection to the plea in abatement and the refusal of the court to allow them a jury. The court did not err in overruling appellants’ objection to the plea in abatement. This plea was the only defense filed in the cause: there was none to the ■merits. It was filed at the proper time in the justice *550court, and there sustained. It was amended in the county court, and, when the cause was continued by counsel, it was for the purpose of trying this issue, and none other; and to hold that defendant, by agreeing to try his cause at a later term, lost the right to try at all, is carrying the rule of practice to an extent unauthorized by any decision of this court or the supreme court.

May 11, 1892.

§315. *Plea in abatement; should be submitted to jury when.*But the court erred in refusing appellants’ demand for a jury. The appellants demanded a jury at the proper time, and paid the jury fee. The plea in abatement was the sole defense, and was purely an issue of fact, and the very circumstances of this case should have led the trial judge himself to insist on the impaneling of a jury to try the cause. "While there has been some question as to the practice of submitting pleas in abatement and pleas upon the merits together to a jury, it has never been held that a defendant could not have a jury to pass upon his plea of abatement. For this error the judgment is reversed and remanded. [Robertson v. Ephraim, 18 Tex. 118.]

Reversed and remanded.
#### Farmers Mutual Hail Insurance Company of Iowa *v.*Squires.

[No. 19,379.

Filed January 24, 1962.]

*Lynn A. Ford,*of Wabash, for appellant.

*Plummer <& Plummer,*of Wabash, for appellee.

Gonas, J.

Appellant brought this action to recover allegedly unpaid balance on a certain hail insurance *634policy. Appellant alleged in its complaint that appellee is indebted to appellant in the sum of One Hundred Seventy Eight and 48/100 ($178.48) Dollars, plus legal interest thereon from December 1, 1948, upon said hail insurance policy issued to appellant by appellee. That the policy was in full force and effect during the crop season of 1948, and that the premium on the policy for the crop season of 1948, remains past due and unpaid.

The appellee agreed by his note to pay appellant a reasonable attorney fee in case it became necessary for appellant to employ an attorney to enforce collection on said note.

The issues were properly formed. Trial to the court resulted in a finding and judgment against the appellant on its complaint. The trial court overruled appellants’ motion for a new trial. Appellant has asisgned the ruling by the trial court on its motion for a new trial as error. Appellants’ case depends entirely on certain documents, namely, an alleged insurance policy, the application for the insurance policy and that part of the application which is referred to in appellants’ brief as a promissory note. Appellants’ brief in its condensed recital of the evidence contains no showing at all that any of the said documents were ever introduced and received in evidence, and the same are not set forth either verbatim or in sufficient substance to permit a full understanding of their pertinent contents. Under a heading of “Appellants’ Exhibits,” following the condensed recital of the evidence, there appears a copy of what is designated, “Pertinent Parts of Amended Policy,” “Pertinent Parts of Application and Amended Application,” “Third Notice,” and “Post Office Receipt,” but none of these items are identified with any exhibit or that they were ever offered and received in evidence.

*635Consequently, this court would be required to resort to the record in order to ascertain and identify these items and to what evidentiary purpose, and find the reasons and grounds for the reversal of the judgment from which this appeal was taken.

It has been many times decided in Indiana, that this court will not search the record to find cause for the reversal of a judgment from which an appeal has been taken. *Nicolai*v. *Blickenstaff*(1960), 130 Ind. App. 321, 164 N. E. 2d 364; *Appelby*v. *State*(1943), 221 Ind. 544, 48 N. E. 2d 646 (Re-Hearing Den.), 221 Ind. 544, 49 N. E. 2d 533.

Judgment affirmed.

Kelley, P. J., Bierly and Pfaff, JJ., concur.

Note. — Reported in 179 N. E. 2d 311.
#### T. T. Gammage v. J. M. Silliman.

(No. 1520.)

October 13, 1883.

Error from Anderson County.

Opinion by

White, P. J.

§ 14. *Mortgagee; cannot maintain action of trover, etc., against purchaser of mortgaged property, when.*Goods or chattels mortgaged as security for a debt may be levied on and sold under execution, subject to such mortgage. [R. S. art. 2296.] A mortgage is simply a lien incident to the debt intended to be secured ; the legal title remains in the mortgagor until the lien is foreclosed. If the mortgaged property be sold under execution against the mortgagor, when the same is in the possession of the mortgagee, the purchaser would not be entitled to the possession of the property without discharging the mortgage. [R. S. art. '2296.] But if the mortgagee be not in possession, the purchaáer is entitled to possession without discharging the mortgage, and such purchaser cannot be held liable in damages to the mortgagee for taking possession of the property, and disposing of his legal title thereto by sale. In such case the mortgagee cannot maintain against the purchaser an action of trover and conversion; nor can he claim the property under the statute for the trial of the right of property. The proper remedy for such mortgagee to pursue is to foreclose his mortgage.

Reversed and remanded.
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1617 Reported in Senate (RS)]

                                                       Calendar No. 306
110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1617

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 15, 2007

     Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland 
                   Security and Governmental Affairs

                             August 1, 2007

              Reported by Mr. Lieberman, without amendment

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 561 Kingsland Avenue in University City, Missouri, as the ``Harriett 
                    F. Woods Post Office Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. HARRIETT F. WOODS POST OFFICE BUILDING.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 561 Kingsland Avenue in University City, Missouri, shall be 
known and designated as the ``Harriett F. Woods Post Office Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Harriett 
F. Woods Post Office Building''.
                                                       Calendar No. 306

110th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                               H. R. 1617

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 561 Kingsland Avenue in University City, Missouri, as the ``Harriett 
                    F. Woods Post Office Building''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                             August 1, 2007

                       Reported without amendment
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     Financial Data Schedule for USOL Holdings, Inc.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0001035271
<NAME>                        USOL Holdings, Inc.
<MULTIPLIER>                  1
<CURRENCY>                    U.S. Dollars

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                  JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                    DEC-31-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                 1.00
<CASH>                          13,637,511
<SECURITIES>                    0
<RECEIVABLES>                   681,983
<ALLOWANCES>                    (146,721)
<INVENTORY>                     818,837
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                15,315,961
<PP&E>                          17,287,093
<DEPRECIATION>                  (828,357)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  72,925,473
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           7,075,111
<BONDS>                         0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>           0
<PREFERRED>                     34,263,800
<COMMON>                        36,735,911
<OTHER-SE>                      (344,201)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    72,925,473
<SALES>                         3,140,163
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                3,140,163
<CGS>                           0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                   8,005,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                231,026
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>              0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                 (4,688,803)
<INCOME-TAX>                    0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>             (4,688,803)
<DISCONTINUED>                  0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                 0
<CHANGES>                       0
<NET-INCOME>                    (4,688,803)
<EPS-BASIC>                     (2.67)
<EPS-DILUTED>                   (2.67)



</TABLE>
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 95-10913

Conference Calendar

__________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ROSENDO MORENO LOPEZ,

 Defendant-Appellant.

---------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 7:95-CR-006-X(2)

---------------------

June 25, 1996

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

This case is here before us on the Government's motion to

dismiss Lopez' appeal based on a waiver-of-appeal provision in

Lopez' plea agreement. Appellant Lopez has also filed a motion

to remand this case to the district court to determine whether he

knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal.
No. 95-10913

-2-

Our review of the record shows that Lopez knowingly and

voluntarily waived his right to appeal the sentence imposed by

the district court. United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 568

(5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Portillo, 18 F.3d 290, 293 (5th

Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 244 (1994). The Government's

motion to dismiss is GRANTED, Lopez' motion to remand is DENIED,

and this APPEAL IS DISMISSED.
#### STATE ex rel. Bernard CAUSEY v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2011-KH-0350.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 25, 2011.

In re Causey, Bernard; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 495-985; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0018.

Denied.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Tremayne Edward JACKSON, Appellant.

No. 99-4048.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 10, 2001.

Filed Jan. 23, 2001.

*618Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, BRIGHT, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Tremayne E. Jackson pleaded guilty to bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § *2*and 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d), and to carrying and using a firearm during and in relation to the robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The District Court1 sentenced him to 248 months (20 years and 8 months) imprisonment and five years supervised release. On appeal, Jackson’s counsel has filed a brief and has moved to withdraw pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Jackson has not filed a pro se supplemental brief, but he has moved to strike counsel’s *Anders*brief and for appointment of new counsel.

Upon a thorough review of the record, we conclude Jackson knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his sentence in his plea agreement. See *United States v. Morrison,*171 F.3d 567, 568 (8th Cir.1999); *United States v. Michelsen,*141 F.3d 867, 871-72 (8th Cir.), *cert. denied,*525 U.S. 942, 119 S.Ct. 363, 142 L.Ed.2d 299 (1998). Accordingly, we enforce the appeal waiver, dismiss the appeal, and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. We deny Jackson’s motions to strike and for new counsel.

1

. The Honorable D. Brook Bartlett, late a United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.
#### STATE ex rel. Glenn A. BRUMFIELD v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-0154.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 8, 2011.

In re Brumfield, Glenn A.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 00-5362; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-WR-973.

Denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                              <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                    9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                           FEB-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                NOV-02-1996
<CASH>                                              263
<SECURITIES>                                          0
<RECEIVABLES>                                     5,770
<ALLOWANCES>                                          0
<INVENTORY>                                      43,757
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 56,804
<PP&E>                                           47,835
<DEPRECIATION>                                   25,340
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   85,702
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            25,065
<BONDS>                                               0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                 0
<PREFERRED>                                           0
<COMMON>                                             70
<OTHER-SE>                                       35,153
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     85,702
<SALES>                                          36,817
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 36,817
<CGS>                                            19,542
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    16,435
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                      0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                      0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  662
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                     178
<INCOME-TAX>                                         69
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                 109
<DISCONTINUED>                                        0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                       0
<CHANGES>                                             0
<NET-INCOME>                                        109
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      0.02
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      0.02
        

</TABLE>
#### Lillian MIRE, Wayne Mire and Suzie O’Keeffe, Individually and on Behalf of their Deceased Spouse and Father, Louis Joseph Mire v. REGENCY PLACE NURSING & REHABILITATION CENTER.

No. 2011-CC-0439.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 20, 2011.

In re Regency Place Nursing & Rehabilitation Center; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 589,485; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CW 1625.

Denied.

JOHNSON, VICTORY and KNOLL, JJ., would grant.
Exhibit 32.1







CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO



SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the annual report of Hamptons Luxury Homes, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Roy Dalene, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify that:



1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2)

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date: September 13, 2005       /s/ Roy Dalene

Roy Dalene

Chief Executive Officer
#### Staci KLANSKY, et al. v. HOTARD COACHES, INC., et al.

No. 2011-CC-1827.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 4, 2011.

In re Hotard Coaches Inc. d/b/a Hotard Destination Services; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. L, No. 04-1153; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-0489.

Denied. Adequate remedy on appeal