Opinion filed September 30 , 20 2 1



### In The 

# Eleventh Court of Appeals

__________ No s . 11

- 1 9

- 00 347

- C R & 11

- 19

- 00348

- CR

__________
JOSHUA TAYLOR WEEDON , Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 35 th District Court Brown County , Texas Trial Court Cause No s . CR 25997 & CR 25998

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N A jury convicted Appellant, Joshua Taylor Weedon , of the offense of tampering with physical evidence , a third

- degree felony, and the offense of possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, also a third

- degree felony.
See T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN . § 37.09 (a)(1), (c), (d)(1) (West 2016 ) (tampering); T EX

. H EALTH & S AFETY C ODE A NN . § 481.115(a), (c) (West 2017 ) (possession). In each

cause, Appellant pled “True” to one enhancement allegation , and the trial court2 foun d the enhancement to be true. The trial court assessed A ppellant ’s punishment at imprisonment for fif teen years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for each conviction, set to run concurrently. In each appeal, Appellant challenges his conviction on three grounds: (1) that the evidence was legally insufficient to sust ain his conviction s , (2) that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant his motion for a mistrial after the prosecutor asked an improper question, and (3) that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting physical evidence because the chain of custody was compromised. We affirm. Background Facts Investigator Carlyle Gover had been investigating A ppellant for about a year before a reliable, confidential informant told Investigator Gover that A ppellant had been routinely borrowing a car belonging to Tina Powell, a known associate of drug dealers in Brown County, to transport methamphetamine from the Dallas

– Fort Worth Metroplex to Brown County about once per month. Investigator Gover sought and obtained a search warrant authorizing the installation of a tracking device
on Powell’s 2010 s ilver Cadillac, in order to be alerted when it travel ed from
A pp ellant’s residence to the Dallas

– Fort Worth metro area. On December 12, 2017,
Powell’s vehicle left A ppellant’s residence at 2:20 a

. m

. , arriving just outside Fort
Worth in Kennedale at 6:22 a

. m

. , where it stayed for about five or six hours before heading back toward Brown County

. Investigator Gover contacted Investigator
Robert Ramirez and Deputy Jose Rodriguez of the Brown County Sheriff’s Office, and Sergeant Brandon McMillian from the K

- 9 unit of the Early , Texas Police Department, for assistance in stopping the vehicle

. Deputy Rodriguez stopped
Powell’s vehicle and discovered A ppellant sitting in the driver ’s seat and a woman, Melody Luann Sims , sitting in the front passenger seat of the vehicle. When Sergeant McMillian arrived on the scene, he escorted the police canine around the vehicle, at which point the dog gave a positive alert indicating the3 presence of a controlled substance. At that point, Investigator Gover and Investigator Ramirez, began conducting a search of the vehicle for contraband. During that search , they found the following items: (1) a camouflage bag behind the
driver’s seat, which contained four unused “ meth pipes ” and a can of butane fuel ; (2) a small, zippered bag in the driver ’s side floorboard that was open and had clear plastic tubing protruding from it ; (3) a purple “dope kit” containing a used meth pipe
and a syringe preloaded with methamphetamine in Sims’ s purse ; (4) a second used meth pipe with usable methamphetamine still stuck to the bowl in Sims’ s purse but outside the “dope kit” ; and (5) a small glass jar containing two baggies of methamphetamine , which was also found in Sims’ s purse but outside the “d ope kit.”
Sims told the officers that the glass jar containing the baggies of methamphetamine belonged to A ppellant and that he had handed it to her before being stopp ed by Deputy Rodriguez. Both Appellant and Sims were arrested.
Discussion
I. Issue One

– The evidence of care, custody, control, or management and of concealment is sufficient to sustain A ppellant’s convictions

. A. Standard of Review We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, regardless of whether it is framed as a legal or factual sufficiency challenge, under the standard of
review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State , 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State , 337 S.W.3d 286, 288

– 89 (Tex. App.

— Eastland 2010, pet. ref ’ d). Under the Jackson standard, we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319; Zuniga v. State , 551 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Isassi v. State , 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).4 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict requires that we consider all the evidence admitted at trial, including improperly admitted
evidence. Winfrey v. State , 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Clayton v. State , 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 ( Tex. Crim. App. 2007). As such, we defer to the
factfinder ’ s credibility and weight determinations because the factfinder is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight their testimony is to be afforded. Winfrey , 393 S.W.3d at 768; Brooks , 323 S.W.3d at 899. The Jackson standard is
deferential and accounts for the factfinder ’ s duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from the facts.
Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319; Zuniga , 551 S.W.3d a t 732; Clayton , 235 S.W.3d at 778. We may not reevaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence to substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Dewberry v. State , 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Therefore, if the record supports con flicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer
to that determination. Jackson , 443 U.S. at 326; Merritt v. State , 368 S.W.3d 516,
525

– 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Clayton , 235 S.W.3d at 778. Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Johnson v. State , 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1993)

. Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Guevara v. State , 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)

. In short, “courts of appeals should

. . . determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. ” Hooper v. State , 214 S.W.3d 9,
16

– 17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)

.5 B. Analysis
A ppellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to show possession by him of methamphetamine because the State only showed that he was in close proximity
to the methamphetamine . A lthough Sims claimed that Appellant had handed her the drugs prior to the stop, Sims did not testify at trial . Appellant therefore contends
that Sims’s out

- of

- court statements given through the testimony of Sergeant McMillian cannot be used substantively to support th e allegation that the drugs were Appellant’s nor to buttress his convictions for possession and tampering. Appellant argues that Sims ’s statements were hearsay that did not fall within the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule and that beyond Sims’s out

- of

- court statements, no other corroborating evidence linked him to the methamphetamine that the officers discovered in Sims’s purse

. Appellant , therefore, attacks Sims’s statement as unconfronted hearsay that should not have been admitted by the tria l court and should not be considered by this court in conducting our review . Appellant did not, however, object to the introduction of Sims’s out

- of

- court statement at trial and th us failed to preserve that issue for appeal. 1 But more importantly, we co nsider all evidence admitted at trial for the purpose of a sufficiency review under Jackson v. Virginia

. Thus, evidence that is offered and admitted from any party, even over Appellant’s proper objection, would still be considered in our review of the
suf ficiency of the evidence , including Sims’ s hearsay statements. See Moff v. State , 131 S.W.3d 485, 488 n.11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (citing Thomas v. State , 753 S.W.2d 688, 695 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)).

1 The record indicates that it was actually Appellant who initially introduced Sims’s out

- of

- court statement into evidence during cross

- examination of Sergeant McMillian. Q: Well, what did Ms. Sims tell you? I want to hear this.
A: Ms. Sims told me that the container that contained methamphetamine belonged to Mr. Weedon, and that he handed it to her prior to

– prior to them being stopped by the sheriff’s office, and she didn’t know what to do with it, so she put it in her purse.6 A s to his tampering conviction, A ppellant contends that he could not have tampered with the contraband if he never possessed it in the first place. Consequently , resolvi ng A ppellant’s argument s regarding his possession conviction
is dispositive of the contention assert ed by Appellant as to his tampering conviction

. In our sufficiency of the evidence review of the entire record , we note that
evi d ence corroborating possession and tampering included the testimony of Investigator Gover , who had been investigating A ppellant for a bout a year regarding methamphetamine distribution. He received a tip from a reliable, confidential
informant that A ppellant had been using Tina Powell’s vehicle to retrieve methamphetamine from the Dallas

– Fort Worth metro area and transport it back to Brown County

. Investigator Gover testified that Dallas

– Fort Worth is a hub for

m ethamphetamine distribution in Texas. H e was familiar with Powell through previous work, as she associate d with known drug dealers. B ased on th e reliable, confidential informant’s tip, Investigator Gover applied for and received a search warrant to place a tracking device on Powell’s 2010 s ilver Cadillac. Investigator
Gover testified that the vehicle left A ppellant’s house on December 12, at 2:2 0 a

. m

. , briefly stopped in Ranger, Texas, and arrived in Kennedale, Texas, just outside of Fort Worth, at 6:22 a

. m

. , where it remained for only five to six hours before heading
back toward Brown County , where it was pulled over

. Investigator Gover testified
that “drug runs” are commonly executed in the early morning hours when few
motorists are on the roads. Importantly, it was A ppellant that was driving Powell’s
vehicle , consistent with the confidential tip that the police had received

. Appellan t had a female passenger with him, Sims, which Investigator Gover explained is a common occurrence with male drug dealers as a security measure for hiding evidence in the event that they are stopped by police. Further, Sergeant McMillian, the K

- 9 officer on the scene, testified that his canine alerted to the vehicle, indicating that drugs were present

. Investigator7 Ramirez testified that he found four unused meth pipes and a can of butane fuel in
A ppellant’s own bag and that A ppellant acknowledged that the pipes were his but
characterized them as “ornaments.” W hen A ppellant exited the vehicle at Deputy Rodriguez’s request, Investigator Ramirez observed, in plain view, a partially open bag in the floorboard of the driver’s side of the vehicle, with clear plastic tubing sticking out. T he location and state of the bag were highly unusual, according to Investigator Gover

— as if the bag had been placed in the floorboard to facilitate a hurried removal of evidence, which would explai n why the bag would be situated by the gas and brake pedals, wide open, with some of its other contents protruding.
Further , t he location of one pipe in Sims’ s purse inside the “dope kit” and one inside her purse but outside the “dope kit” was unusual , Investigator Gover testified , because the very purpose of a “dope kit” is to keep all contraband in a single location
so that it is easier to abandon incriminatin g evidence in a moment’s notice

. Appellant also admitted that he owned some of the drug paraphernalia, though he
did not characterize it as such. Even if we were to ignore Sims’ s statements, the jury could have rationally found that the other corroborati ng evidence detailed above sufficiently connect ed Appellant to the possession of the methamphetamine. In cases involving unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must prove that the accused exercised care, custody, control, or management over the substance and that the accused knew that the matter possessed was contraband.
Brown v. State , 911 S.W.2d 744, 747 (T e x. Crim. App. 1995); Ibarra , 479 S.W.3d 481, 487 (Tex. App.

— Eastland 2015, pet. ref’d)

. When the accused is no t shown to have had exclusive possession of the place where the contraband was found, the
evidence must link the accused to the contraband and establish that the accused’s connection with the drug was more than fortuitous. Evans v. State , 202 S.W.3d 158,
1 61

– 62 (T e x. Crim. App. 2006). In such cases, a ppellate courts apply the well

-8 accept ed “affirmative links” rule. Id. at 161

. As the Court of Criminal Appeals has explain ed : M ere presence at the location where drugs are found i s thus insufficient, by its elf, to establish actual care, custody, or control of

. . . drugs. However, presence or proximity, when combined with other evidence, either direct or circumstantial (e.g., “links”), may well be sufficient to establish that element beyond a reasonable dou bt. It is

. . . not the number of links that is dispositive, but rather the logical force of all of the evidence, direct and circumstantial.
Id. at 162 (footnotes omitted)

. Thus, “[w]hen the contraband is not in the exclusive possession of the defendant,” as is the case here, “a fact finder may nonetheless infer that the defendant intentionally or knowingly possessed the contraband if there are sufficient independent facts and circumstances justifying such an inference.” Tate v. State , 500 S.W. 3d 410, 413

– 14 (T e x. Crim. App. 2016). The Court of Criminal Appeals has specifically endorsed fourteen factors that this court may consider in determining whether there are sufficient “links” to connect

an a ccused to the drugs. Id. at 414. The se fourte en factors include: (1) the accused ’ s presence when the search was executed; (2) whether the contraband was in plain view; (3) the accused ’ s proximity to and the accessibility of the contraband; (4) whether the accused was under the influence of a controlled substance when he was arrested; (5) whether the accused possessed other contraband when he was arrested; (6) whether the accused made incriminating statements; (7) whether the accused attempted to flee; (8) whether he made furtive gestures; (9) whether there was an odor of contraband; (10) whether other contraband or drug paraphernalia was present; (11) whether the accused owned or had the right to possess the place where the drugs were found; (12) whether the place the drugs were found was enclo sed; (13) whether the accused was found with a large amount of cash; and (14) whether the conduct of the accused indicated a consciousness of guilt.

Ibarra , 479 S.W.3d at 488 (citing Evans , 202 S.W.3d at 162 n.12)

. These factors

are non
- exhaustive and non e are to be mechanically considered in isolation

. See9 Evans , 202 S.W.3d at 164

– 66

. W hile they can help guide a court’s analysis,

“ ultimately the inquiry remains that set forth in Jackson : B ased on the combined and
cumulative force of the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?” Tate , 500
S.W.3d at 41 4 (citing Jackson , 443 U.S. at 318

– 19)

. C onsidering the factors listed above , and the totality of the cir cumstances previously recounted , we find in the record evidence that shows : (1) that A ppellant was present when the search was executed, (2) that he was in close proximity to and had access to the methamphetamine, (3) that t he place in which the drugs were found was enclosed, (4) that other contraband or drug paraphernalia 2 was present and in plain view , (5) that he admitted that the four unus ed meth pipes were his (though he characterized them as ornaments), (6) that he had the keys to and operated the car , (7) that he had the right to possess the vehicle in which the drugs were discovered,
and (8) that his phone contained a photograph depicti ng what appeared to be
A ppellant’s penis on top of a large pile of cash

. Moreover, Sims told the arresting
officers that the “dope kit” in her purse, which contained methamphetamine and a used pipe, was hers, but that the other used pipe discovered on top of the rest of the contents of her purse and the glass jar containing the baggies of methamphetamine , which were not containe d within her “dope kit,” belonged to A ppellant and were given to her for purposes of concealment

. The jury, as the trier of fact, was the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weigh t to be given to their testimony. C RIM

. P RO C

. a rt. 36. 13

2 In this case , the evidence suggests that the four unused meth pipes, the can of butane, and the clear plastic tubing found in the driver’s

- side floorboard were “intended for use

. . . to contain, ingest, or inhale a controlled substance.” See Nichols v. State , 886 S.W.2d 3 24, 326 (T e x. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 1994 , pet. ref’d ) ; see also H EALTH & S AFETY § 481.002(17) (definition of drug paraphernalia), § 481.183 ( requiring courts to consider “all . . . logically relevant factors” to discern whether an item is drug paraphern alia)

.10 (West 2007), art. 38.04 (West 1979). As such, the jury was entitled to accept or reject any or all of the testimony of any witnesses. Adelman v. State , 828 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tx. Crim. App. 1992). The jury was also entitled to draw reasonable
inferences from the evidence and resolve any evidentiary conflicts

. Jackson , 443
U.S. at 319. We have reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and we hold that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable
doubt t hat A ppellant intentionally or knowingly possessed methamphetamine. Because the evidence is sufficient to show that Appellant possessed the methamphetamine found in Sims’s purse, we overrule Appellant’s first issue in each appeal

. II. Issue two

– The tri al court did not abuse its discretion by denying A

ppellant’s motion for a mistrial ; the trial court promptly instructed the jury to disregard the objectionable question

. A. Standard of Review A mistrial is only appropriate “when error is so prejudicial that expenditure of further time and expense would be wasteful and futile.” Ladd v. State , 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (T e x. Crim. App. 1999). Indeed, a trial court may only exercise its discretion and grant a party’s motion for a mistrial “if an impar tial verdict cannot be reached, or if a verdict of conviction could be reached but would have to be reversed on appeal due to an obvious procedural error.” Id. The decision to deny a motion
for a mistrial “rests within the sound discretion of the trial c ourt” and will only be
disturbed if the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Gonzalez , 855 S.W.2d 692 , 696 (T e x. Crim. App. 1993).
M erely asking an improper question, without more, will rarely warrant a mistrial. Hernandez v. State , 805 S.W.2d 409, 413 (T e x. Crim. App. 1990). Furthermore, “any harm from such a question may be cured by an instruction to disregard the question.” Id. at 414. Indeed , the curative effect of an instruction to11 the jury will suffice “except in extreme cases wh ere it appears that the question or evidence is clearly calculated to inflame the minds of the jury and is of such character as to suggest the impossibility of withdrawing the impression produced on their
minds.” Gonzales v. State , 685 S.W.2d 47, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Clark v.
State , 500 S.W.2d 469, 470 (T e x. Crim. App. 1973) accord Hernandez , 805 S.W.2d at 414; Huffman v. State , 746 S.W.2d 212, 218 (T e x. Crim. App. 1988)

. I n order to determine whether we are dealing with one of the rare ly encountered “extreme cases,” the crucial question is “whether the jury was so affected by the question that they were unable to disregard it in their deliberations as instructed.” Huffman , 746
S.W.2 d at 218. The answer to this question will depend upon an examination of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. Hernandez , 805 S.W.2d at 414.
B. Analysis
A ppellant did not testify and his trial counsel only called a single defense
witness at trial : Patrick Tharp. A ppellant manag ed to use Tharp’s testimony to argue the plausibility that the tub ing found in the bag in the driver’s

- side floorboard was
related to A ppellant’s livelihood as a tree cutter and lawn mower, rather than for use as smoking paraphernalia. This was ostensibly A ppellant’s sole purpose in calling Tharp as a witness , as no other matters were inquired of during his direct
examination. Five questions into its cross

- examination, the State aske d: “ [D] o you currently have felony charges pending?” Appellant immediately objected

. T he trial court sustained the objection and instruct ed the jury to disregard the question, but it
denied A ppellant’s motion for a mistrial.
To warrant a reversal for the trial court’s refusal to grant A ppellant’s request
for a mistrial, it must “appear[] that the question

. . . [wa]s clearly calculated to inflame the minds of the jury,” and “the question must [have] be[en] obviously
harmful to the defendant .” Gonzales , 685 S.W.2d at 49. With respect to the first question , it is difficult to see any proper purpose the State had for asking the12 question. As a general rule, “the fact that a witness, an accused or otherwise, has been charged with an offense is ina dmissible for the purpose of impeaching him as to his credibility unless the charge has resulted in a final conviction for a felony or an offense involving mor al turpitude.” Alexander v. State , 740 S.W.2d 749 , 763 (T e x. Crim. App. 1987).
There is an exce ption to the rule against asking about pending charges , however, when the proffering party makes “a s h owing that such evidence tends to establish prejudice, interest, bias[,] or motive of the witness in testifying as he has.”
Id. This exception is usually afforded to criminal defendants in particular. See, e.g. , Simmons v. State , 548 S.W.2d 386 , 388 (T e x. Crim. App. 1977) (“[G]reat latitude is allowed the accused in showing any fact, including pending charges, which would
tend to establish ill feeling, bias, motive, and animus on the part of any witness testifying against him.”)

. However, it has also been afforded to the State in some
instances

. See, e.g. , Massengale v. State , 653 S.W.2d 20, 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) ( holding tha t, where the defense w itness had been charged with threatening State’s witnesses in the very same trial , State was permitted to impeach the witness about the charge to demonstrate her “bias, prejudice, and interest in testifying for appellant”). The excep tion to the general rule prohibiting the questioning of a witness about pending charges is limited. Evidence of pending charges is only admissible if the charges are “relevant to a material issue in the case and the probative value of
the evidence outweighs its inflammatory or prejudicial potential.” Alexander , 740
S.W.2d at 763 n.6

. Whether Tharp ha d pending felony charges of some kind wa s not relevant to a material issue in A ppellant’s case, so its potential prejudicial e ffect outweigh ed any pro bative value it might have had

. However, the State asserted in its brief that it sought to impeach Tharp with evidence of his own pending charge for felony possession in order to demonstrate that Tharp had a n ulterior motive to13 testify other than to simpl y offer a neutral opinion as a “quasi

- expert on types of tubing .” T he prosecutor may have believed Tharp’s pending charges were relevant
under the circumstances. The trial court disagreed, and it was well within its
discretion to do so. However, we cannot say that the State’s purpose in asking the question was indisputably calculated to inflame the jury and prejudice A ppellant. Finally, regardless of w hether the question was calculated to inflame the jury, under these facts, we cannot c onclude that the State’s question in this case was

“ obviously harmful ” to A ppellant. During its subsequent cross
- examination, after
the trial court sustained A ppellant’s objection and instructed the jury to disregard the improper question , the State inqui red as to whether the tub ing could also be
contraband : Q : Can that tubing also be used for the consumption of meth?
A : No, sir, not that

-- not that tubing, no. Q : Why not?
A : Because it puts off a harsh, toxic taste through the hose. Q : Okay. And h ow do you know that?
A : Well, I’m a mechanic. We have to know those kinds of things

. . . . Q : It can’t be used to make a smoking device?
A : No, sir. Q : It can’t because it tastes bad?
A : I don’t think anybody would ever want to taste that. Q : And it can’t because it’s not flexible?
A : It’s

-- it’s flexible, yes, but there’s no elasticity in it

. . . Q : Why would you need an elastic tube to make a meth smoking device?
A : That’s

-- I have

-- I have no clue, sir.14 Q : You have no clue?
A : I’m just saying t hat

-- that is a fuel line. A jury observing this cross

- examination might be justified in inferring that Tharp ha d some firsthand experience with the foul taste produced from smoking with the tubing in question. If the jury had reached such a conclusion, it could have impeach ed Tharp’s character to some degree, but it c ould also have lent credence to his testimony re garding the unsuitability of the tubing for use as paraphernalia.
Further , the jury may have reasonably concluded that Tharpe was not personally familiar with the taste but, rather, reached his conclusion deductively from specialized knowledge as a mechan ic.
In any case, Appellant’s argument as to how or why the State’s improper question should be construed as “obviously harmful” to A ppellant is not clear

. The
trial court instructed the jury to disregard the State’s improper question , and a jury is pres umed to obey a trial court’s instructions. Thrift v. State , 176 S.W.3d 221, 224 (T e x. Crim. App. 2005). Such presumption is rebuttable, “but the appellant must rebut the presumption by pointing to evidence that the jury failed to follow the trial
court’s instruction.” Id. Appellant here has pointed to no evidence to rebut the presumption in this case , and we are unpersuaded that the prosecutor’s improper question resulted in any incurable impression on the jury.
E ven had the jury failed to disre gard the question as instructed , we cannot conclude that t he result would be “obviously harmful” to A ppellant. Tharp did not answer the question

. The State gave no indicat ion of the kind of felony that it was suggesting when it asked whether Tharp had charges pending

. T he possibility that Tharp had been charged with something in no way contradicts his technical claim about the use of the tubing in question or his claim that smoking from such tubing
would taste bad.15 In short, we conclude that the State’s question was not so inflammatory that it could not be cured by an instruction from the trial court to disregard it , which the
trial court did in this case

. We hold that t he trial court did not abuse its discretion in
de nying A ppellant’s motion for mistrial. We overrule Appellant’s second issue in each appeal

. III. Issue Thre e

– The police’s evidentiary chain of custody was sufficiently demonstrated

. A. Standard of Review
A ppellate courts review a trial court’s decision regarding the admi ssibility of
evidence for abuse of discretion. de la Luz Torres v. State , 570 S.W.3d 874, 878 (T e x. App.

— Houston [1 st Dist.] 2018 , pet. ref’d ). Indeed, “[a] trial judge has great
discretion in the admission of evidence at trial.” Druery v. State , 225 S.W.3d 491 , 503 (T e x. Crim. App. 20 0 7). When reviewing a trial court’s decision to admit evidence over an attack on the chain of custody in particular , we bear in mind that “[p]roof of the beginning and end of the chain will support admission of the narcotics into evidence barring any showing of tampering or alteration.” Mello v. State , 806
S.W.2d 875 , 878 (Tex. App.

— Eastland 1991 , pet. ref’d ). Hence, so long as the State
accounts f or the beginning and end of the chain of custody, and absent evidence of
actual tampering, infirmities in a chain of custody do not affect the admissibility of
the evidence but , rather , affect only “the weight that the fact

- finder should give the evidence, which may be brought out and argued by the parties.” Druery , 225 S.W.3d
at 504

– 05.
B. Analysis Appellant does not dispute that an infirmity in the chain of custody only goes to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility, so long as the beginning and end are accounted for and there is no evidence of actual tampering. Nor, for that matter, does A ppellant challenge that the State did account for the beginning and16 end of the chain of custody. Indeed, the State did adequately prove the beginning
and end of the chain of custody in this case. Investigator Gover testified that he personally took possession of all of the items of physical evidence seized from the

v ehicle that A ppellant was driving. Thus, the beginning of the chain of custody is
accounted for here. The S tate further established, through Investigator Gover’s testimony, that he personally retrieved those same items of evidence from his own
evidence l ocker, to which he has the only key, and delivered them to court for
A ppellant’s trial. As such, the end of the chain of custody has also been adequately
established. Thus, absent actual evidence of tampering, the bar for admissibility has
been satisfied here.
A ppellant concedes that “there was no specific evidence that anyone had tampered with the evidence at issue.” Rather, the entirety of A ppellant’s argument
is that Investigator Gover “simply placed the methamphetamine and other evidence
sei zed from the vehicle on an open, accessible table in the evidence room ,” at least for a period of time, and that such “handling of the evidence raises serious concerns of tampering, serious enough to require exclusion of the evidence.” This is a novel

arg ument without precedent in Texas law. We decline to adopt such a rule here. Therefore, any concern regarding accessibility of the methamphetamine in the evidence room goes to the weight of that evidence, not its admissibility. The fact that, for a single evening, the evidence was left on a table in the evidence room, and not within Investigator Gover’s own personal evidence locker within that larger evidence room, goes to the weight and credibility of the physical
evidence admitted

. Indeed, A ppellant’s t rial counsel spent ample time attacking the midsection of the chain of custody for this reason. The jury was entitled to place as much, or as little, weight on this physical evidence as it saw fit. Hence, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in a dmitting the State’s proffer of17 methamphetamine and other evidence seized from the vehicle A ppellant was driving when the police stopped him. We overrule Appellant’s third issue in each appeal. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court in each cause

.

W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
JUSTICE

September 30 , 20 2 1 Do not publish. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey , C.J., Trotter , J

. , a nd Williams , J.