1

Filed 2/1/22 P. v. Nwuzi CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not 

certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not 

been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CHINEDU NWUZI,

Defendant and 

Appellant.

 A159805

 (Contra Costa County

Super. Ct. No. 5-191645-1)

Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) and 

Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 (Edwards) require police 

to cease custodial interrogation after a suspect unambiguously 

invokes his or her right to counsel. In this appeal, defendant 

argues the trial court erroneously admitted statements that the 

police obtained in violation of Miranda and Edwards. We agree 

that the trial court erred in admitting these statements, and we 

find that the error was not harmless (Chapman v. California

(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman)). Accordingly, we reverse. 

BACKGROUND

On the morning of March 27, 2019, between 10:45 a.m. and 

10:49 a.m., two people called 911 to report an incident involving a 

man and a woman fighting. One caller was in her apartment 

when she heard a commotion and went out to her balcony. She 
2

saw a man in a dark sweatshirt and sweatpants get out of a gold 

sedan, walk around to the passenger side, return to the driver’s 

seat, and drive away. She estimated the man was approximately 

six feet tall. She testified at trial that she heard a woman 

screaming, but she conceded that when she called 911, she said 

the passenger was screaming at the top of “his or her” lungs. She 

could not tell the race or ethnicity of the driver or the passenger. 

The man drove away recklessly toward the nearby Walgreens.

The second 911 caller, Samantha Watt, saw a man driving 

erratically in the parking lot of Walgreens. A woman was 

hanging out of the partially-opened car door, screaming as the 

driver pulled her long, brown hair. Watt did not get a good look 

at the driver or describe him, the passenger, or the car during her 

911 call.

At approximately 10:45 a.m. that day, Officer Chris Bruce 

was on patrol in the Windemere area of San Ramon when he 

received a dispatch notice to look for a gold-colored, four-door 

sedan driving recklessly. The dispatch notice described a male 

wearing dark clothing and a female in the car, but did not advise 

who was driving. Bruce drove northbound on a four-lane divided 

highway in the Windemere area and saw a gold-colored, four-door 

sedan heading southbound with a Black male driver in dark 

clothing and a female passenger. The two appeared to be 

arguing. Bruce made a U-turn at the next intersection and 

followed the sedan. He informed dispatch that he believed he 

had spotted the vehicle they were looking for heading towards 

Dublin and gave the car’s license plate number. 
3

Bruce initiated a traffic stop. The car pulled over, and 

Bruce gave dispatch his location. Bruce testified that the female 

passenger’s hair was disheveled and she and the male were still 

arguing. The male driver appeared to be Black, wore a black 

jacket, and had dreadlocks. While Bruce waited for another 

officer to arrive, the sedan sped away. Bruce followed. When the 

car did not pull over, Bruce turned on his sirens. In his pursuit, 

Bruce observed the car speed at as much as 100 miles per hour, 

make unsafe lane changes, and turn into oncoming traffic. Bruce 

ended the chase for safety reasons, and the car headed south 

towards Interstate 580. 

At approximately 11:00 a.m., a man and a woman came 

into a Dublin dog grooming store, Paws About Town, through the 

back door. The woman was screaming that they had been in a 

car crash and needed to use the phone. Approximately five 

minutes prior, Diego Plata, an employee who was working that 

day, heard “a big bang” from behind the shop that he thought was 

a car accident. Plata testified that the man who entered the shop 

was Black, about six feet one or two inches tall, and in dark 

clothing. He had dreadlocks and an odd scar on his forehead. 

Plata testified that the woman had lighter skin and that she was

maybe Latina or mixed race. She was larger than the man and 

about the same height, and she had her hair up. She was 

wearing a dirty white shirt and tight pants, and she was carrying 

a jacket. Both acted distressed. Another employee, Lindsay 

Decker, allowed the woman to use the store phone. After the 

woman used the phone, the pair left and headed towards the 
4

West Dublin BART station. Decker went out the back door of the 

store, which backs up to Interstate 680, and saw a light-colored 

sedan motionless on the freeway. California Highway Patrol (CHP) 

located the gold-colored sedan abandoned on the freeway, and 

Bruce went and identified the car as the one he had pursued. 

Officer Kevan Lopez was on patrol when he received a 

dispatch to go to Dublin for a vehicle pursuit that had ended in a 

crash on the freeway with suspects seen running in the area. 

Lopez went to the West Dublin BART station to look for the 

suspects. There, he saw a Black man about six feet tall, around 

225 to 275 pounds, wearing dark clothing and a backpack, who 

appeared to match the description of the man police were looking 

for. Lopez contacted the man with another officer. The man, 

later identified as defendant, was cooperative. In searching him, 

the officers removed a wallet and, Lopez believed, a cell phone. 

Police later located the female suspect not far from the BART 

station. She was upset, irate, crying, and appeared intoxicated. 

She gave a false name, but police eventually determined she was 

Devon McNary.

Officer Lopez and another officer, Matt Scully, transported 

defendant to Paws About Town for an in-field identification. 

Plata and Decker identified defendant as the man who had come 

into the store. Officer Lopez then drove defendant directly to the 

police station where he was later questioned by Bruce. Officer 

Scully drove Plata to where McNary was being detained, 

approximately five to 10 minutes from the pet store. When 

Scully and Plata arrived, McNary stood on the street with other 
5

police officers, and Plata remained in Scully’s car. At trial, Plata 

testified that he identified the person who was standing and 

speaking with the officers in the street as the man who had come 

into the store. Scully testified that the person Plata had 

identified was actually McNary. 

Defendant was charged by information with one count of 

evading a peace officer with wanton disregard for the safety of 

others (Veh. Code, § 2800.2) (count 1) and one count of evading a 

peace officer while driving against traffic (Veh. Code, § 2800.4) 

(count 2). The information also alleged that defendant had 

suffered a prior strike for a serious or violent felony conviction 

(Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (d), (e), 1170.12, subds. (b), (c)), and 

had served several prior prison terms within the meaning of 

Penal Code sections 667.5, subdivision (b), and 1203, 

subdivision (e)(4). 

A jury found defendant guilty of both counts. Defendant 

waived his right to a jury trial on his prior convictions, and the 

trial court found true the allegations as to defendant’s prior 

convictions. At sentencing, the trial court struck the Penal Code 

section 667.5, subdivision (b) priors, but declined defense 

counsel’s request to dismiss the prior strike conviction pursuant 

to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. The 

court sentenced defendant to the midterm of two years on each 

count, doubled under the Three Strikes Law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, 

subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)), with the sentence on count 

2 stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654. Defendant timely 

appealed.
6

DISCUSSION

I. Additional Background Regarding the Interview

After arrest, police put defendant in the “intoxilyzer” room 

at the police station. The room was being recorded by a video 

camera. Defendant asked the desk officer questions about why 

he was being held and whether he was charged with a felony that 

would “fuck up his parole,” but the officer told him he did not 

know. 

Officer Bruce then entered the room and confirmed that 

defendant had been told he was under arrest. Bruce read 

defendant his Miranda rights while defendant sat on a bench in 

handcuffs. Defendant responded “mhm” when Bruce asked him if 

he understood his rights. Bruce told defendant that he was being 

charged with felony evading arrest; he further informed 

defendant that police had found defendant’s vehicle, a gold 

Maxima defendant had bought the day before, abandoned on the 

freeway, and he (Bruce) was the officer who originally tried to

pull defendant over. Bruce asked defendant, “Do you wanna tell 

me anything about that?” Defendant asked who was driving the 

car, and Bruce responded, “Well, you tell me. It’s your car.” 

Defendant said he had reported the car stolen. Bruce asked a 

couple of follow-up questions about this alleged theft, including 

where defendant’s car had been stolen from. At that point, 

defendant said, “I wanna talk to my attorney.” Bruce said, “Ok. 

Alright. I’m done [inaudible].” 

Approximately five seconds later, a CHP officer said to 

defendant, “Hey, there’s an accident involving your vehicle. You 
7

mind if I ask you some questions or you just want to invoke your 

right to remain silent?” Bruce interjected, “For a separate 

incident involving your car.” The CHP officer stated, “Right, for a 

separate incident involving a traffic collision, about 30 minutes 

ago.” Defendant responded, “What happened? [inaudible] Tell 

me about the situation.” The CHP officer said, “No. You tell us. 

You were in a vehicle. We’ve got witnesses you were involved in 

a traffic collision and they gave a general description fitting your, 

you know, physical characteristics. So, do you deny that you 

were in there or you just don’t want to talk about it? [Pause] 

Just a traffic collision.” Defendant replied, “I want to talk to my -

cause I want to get more input about it.” The CHP officer asked, 

“So you don’t want to answer any questions?” Defendant replied, 

“I don’t want to answer any questions.” The CHP officer 

responded, “Alright, fair enough. Okay.” 

Approximately nine seconds after the CHP officer stopped 

talking, defendant said, “Hey, Officer.” Defendant then said, 

“Like,” while gesturing with his head a couple of times, followed 

by, “Come over here, man,” or, “Come on man.” Bruce testified 

that, when defendant did this, he looked at Bruce and made the 

“international sign of hey, come here, kind of thing.” Before 

defendant began speaking, Bruce was at the entrance of the room 

talking to CHP officers, who were leaving. Bruce approached 

defendant, chuckling while responding, “Okay, alright. Well. 

You got something to say? What?” Defendant, shaking his head, 

looked up at Bruce and said, “Man. I fucked up bad. I fucked 

up.” Bruce said, “How so?” Defendant explained he was two 
8

months away from completing parole, and he was worried that 

new felony charges would jeopardize his status. Defendant 

begged Bruce not to charge him with a felony because he was 

trying to get off parole. He said to Bruce that he “[did not] want 

to be an asshole,” and, “It’s nothing personal. You’re just doing 

your job.” Bruce responded, “I’m not mad at you[,] man. 

[Defendant talking] It’s been a long time since I’ve been in 

pursuit. [Defendant talking] I gotta keep up my skills.” Bruce 

explained that defendant’s parole officer was aware of the 

charges, and Bruce then explained why he had stopped 

defendant, referring to defendant as the driver. 

A bit later, defendant inquired what made the charge a 

felony, and Bruce explained that driving against traffic elevated 

the charge. Defendant said he was sorry, and Bruce explained 

the charge was out of his hands, and “[e]verything is on film now. 

You know that, they film everything we do.” Defendant 

responded, “I know.” When Bruce mentioned his dash and body 

cameras, defendant said, “But it don’t show me going the wrong 

way of traffic.” After several minutes of further discussion, the 

following exchange occurred:

Defendant: I wish, I just feel like, I was doing stupid 

shit, I didn’t have nothing, I didn’t have nothing on 

me to run for. I was clean and shit. No guns no 

nothing. It was just like the hassle, get out of the 

car.

Officer Bruce: Yeah, at that point, we were just 

investigating. At that point nobody was in trouble 

nobody was going to jail. We were just stopping you 

because, domestic violence it’s pretty gruesome, we 
9

have to investigate that. We were just making sure 

nothing was going on. People call, we have to come.

[¶] . . . [¶]

Officer Bruce: . . . so like the only reason that you’ve

going right now is the evading. That’s it. That’s all 

we’re charging. Ok?

Defendant: [unintelligible] I wanted to stop[.]

Officer Bruce: You wanted to stop? But you just 

couldn’t?

Defendant: She was like “Go, go, go[.]”

Officer Bruce: Oh, she was telling you to go? You see 

that’s bad on her. You know what I mean? Let me 

ask you this, did you at least hear my sirens? Were 

they loud enough?

Defendant: I just saw the colors.

Officer Bruce: The red and blue?

Defendant: [unintelligible]

[¶] . . . [¶]

Defendant: What’s your name Bruce? My bad, Bruce. 

I really fucked up. I really wish—I wish I would’ve 

stopped. I just wish everybody else [unintelligible]

Officer Bruce: Well, it happens bro. Like I said, I’m 

not mad at you. 

Defense counsel moved in limine to exclude these 

statements as violative of defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights 

and Miranda.

1

 After hearing brief testimony from Bruce, the 

1 The only written support for the motion was two 

sentences seeking to exclude statements “made by defendant in 

violation of his Fifth Amendment rights,” and requesting an 

Evidence Code section 402 hearing. At that hearing, the court 

framed the issue as follows: “Looks like what we have is a case in 

which a person was arrested, was -- looks like Miranda
10

trial court invited argument. The prosecution argued that police 

had ceased the questioning when defendant voluntarily 

summoned Bruce back and began discussing the case, thus 

waiving his Miranda rights. Defendant’s counsel argued that 

defendant invoked his rights, then he did call Bruce over, but 

Bruce continued to question defendant without re-Mirandizing 

him. That, defense counsel claimed, constituted the Miranda 

violation. The court asked questions about whether more was 

required for a valid waiver when the right to counsel had been 

invoked as compared to the right to remain silent. Then, after 

additional argument, the court made a lengthy oral ruling. 

The court began, “Once a Miranda right to counsel has 

been invoked, no valid waiver of the right to silence and counsel 

may be found absent [the] necessary fact that the accused and 

not the police re-open the dialogue with the authorities.” The 

court commented that, while “it would be a nice rule to have a 

minimum in order to find a re-initiation that the police readmonish a defendant[,] [i]t doesn’t appear that that has become 

a bright-line rule.” The court continued, “[W]hat is required is 

that the People carry the burden of proving to the Court and the 

Court finding that it was the defendant or the accused who 

initiates the dialogue and not the police. And the Court is aware 

advisements were given, and it appears on the record that the --

there was an invocation. [¶] And then it appears -- at least what 

the issue is to decide -- whether there was a reinitiation of the 

conversation by the defendant and whether or not that was 

actually reinitiation or not and [if it] was reinitiation whether or 

not the rest of what’s being summoned by the People should be 

introduced into evidence.” 
11

that the law says that the police cannot design the way of their 

interview to make it look like it’s the defendant who reinitiates. 

It cannot lay a reinitiate trap. It cannot soften him up to hope 

that he reinitiates. They must -- the police must scrupulously 

obey the invocation of their rights. And if they do that and the 

accused then is the one who reinitiates the conversation, then 

there’s no violation of the Miranda rights.” (Italics added.)

“Case law also suggests that voluntarily and spontaneously 

talking about the crime after a prior invocation is not in and of 

itself a reinitiation of questioning, but the Court is to look to all 

of the factors to determine whether or not it is the defendant or 

the accused who is the one who reinitiates and intends to 

reinitiate the conversation. [¶] [. . .] [¶] I have to look at this and 

assess whether or not there was a re-initiation by the defendant 

and that was his intent to -- while he understood his rights and 

he had been properly advised of his rights whether he on his own 

without any effort or work on the part of the officers reinitiated 

the conversation and, as part of that re-initiation, began to talk 

about the case. And reviewing the entire portions that have been 

submitted to me at least – that’s all I can do is evaluate this 

record -- is that I am finding that the defendant did reinitiate the 

interview. [¶] It was his desire . . . .” The court further observed 

that “the officer throughout the interview is not one of those 

officers that was overbearing or creating these circumstances.” 

And, if “that was the tone and tenor of the interview from that 

point on, then that helps the Court decide that it was a valid 

reinitiation of the conversation and therefore the defendant had 
12

reconsidered his invocation and decided to waive his rights and 

speak to the officers.” 

The jury saw the videotaped interview, and the prosecutor 

argued that defendant’s statements therein established his guilt. 

II. Governing Legal Principles

Miranda “and its progeny protect the privilege against selfincrimination by precluding suspects from being subjected to 

custodial interrogation unless and until they have knowingly and 

voluntarily waived their rights to remain silent, to have an 

attorney present, and, if indigent, to have counsel appointed.” 

(People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 384 (Gamache).) If a 

suspect expresses a desire to deal with law enforcement only 

through counsel, police questioning must cease until counsel has 

been made available, “unless the accused himself initiates further 

communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” 

(Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at pp. 484–485.) This is a “ ‘ “ ‘brightline rule.’ ” ’ ” (Smith v. Illinois (1984) 469 U.S. 91, 98.) If the 

defendant’s statements are made in response to discussion 

reinitiated by police after the defendant’s invocation of the right 

to counsel without an appropriate break in custody, the 

defendant’s statements are presumed involuntary and are 

inadmissible. (Gamache, at p. 385.) The Miranda-Edwards rule 

applies during a continuous period of custody even where 

different officers seek to interrogate a suspect regarding different 

offenses after the suspect invokes the right to counsel. (Arizona 

v. Roberson (1988) 486 U.S. 675, 682.) An officer interviewing a 

suspect in custody has a duty to ascertain whether there has 
13

been a previous request for counsel. (Id. at p. 687.) After a 

suspect has invoked the right to counsel, police officers may 

nonetheless resume their interrogation if the suspect (a) initiated 

further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and 

intelligently waived the right he had invoked. (Gamache, at p. 

385.) 

As our Supreme Court has recently made clear, where a 

Miranda-Edwards violation has occurred and the state contends 

that the defendant subsequently initiated further discussions 

with the police, the court must assess whether the defendant 

initiated further communication as a matter of fact. (People v. 

Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544 [2022 Cal. LEXIS 2, *62–*64] 

(Johnson).) A defendant “ ‘ “initiates” ’ further communication, 

exchanges, or conversations of the requisite nature 

[by] . . . ‘speak[ing] words or engag[ing] in conduct that can be 

“fairly said to represent a desire” on his part “to open up a more 

generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the 

investigation.” ’ ” (People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 

642; Johnson, at *63.) 

Where the defendant does initiate further communication 

after a Miranda-Edwards violation, the court “must next resolve 

whether [the] defendant’s renewed contact with [police] should be 

deemed effective or instead the tainted product of the earlier 

Miranda violations, considering all the relevant surrounding 

circumstances.” (Johnson, supra, 2022 Cal. LEXIS at *64.) 

“ ‘[W]here law enforcement officers have disregarded a suspect’s 

previously-invoked rights by continuing to interrogate him, a 
14

renewal of contact by the defendant will be considered an 

“initiation” only if the decision to renew contact was not a 

“response to” or “ ‘product of’ the prior unlawful interrogation.” 

(Id. at *65.) “ ‘[A] defendant’s decision to talk with police cannot 

be a product of police interrogation, “badgering,” or 

“overreaching,” whether “explicit or subtle, deliberate or 

unintentional.” ’ ” (Ibid., citing People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 

539, 596 (Davis).) “Without this limitation, police ‘might 

otherwise wear down the accused and persuade him to 

incriminate himself notwithstanding his earlier request for 

counsel’s assistance.’ ” (Davis, at p. 5962; People v. Boyer (1989) 

48 Cal.3d 247, 272–275 (Boyer) [rejecting argument that 

defendant initiated further conversation after invoking right to 

counsel where he called out to detective and spoke immediately 

following detective’s interrogative statement]), overruled on other 

grounds in People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 84, 830, fn. 1.)3

2 In Davis, the defendant invoked his right to counsel and 

police later encouraged him to talk, saying they had enough 

evidence to make a case without a confession. (Davis, supra, 

46 Cal.4th at pp. 589, 591.) Our Supreme Court observed that 

the defendant’s statements to police after he requested to speak 

with them, approximately 15 minutes after they had encouraged 

him to speak, would have been inadmissible but for the rescue 

doctrine exception to the Miranda-Edwards rule, which applied 

because the kidnapping victim might still have been alive. (Id. at 

pp. 596–599.)

3 In other jurisdictions, in circumstances where there was 

an Edwards violation followed by a brief break in questioning 

and a defendant’s request to speak to police, courts have found 

the defendant’s subsequent statements to be the inadmissible 

product of the Edwards violation. (United States v. Walker 

(D.Md. 1985) 624 F.Supp. 103, 104–106 [suppressing brief 
15

Additionally, even when a defendant effectively initiates 

further discussion, where reinterrogation follows, “ ‘ “the burden 

remains upon the prosecution to show that subsequent events 

indicated a waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to have counsel 

present during the interrogation.” ’ ” (Gamache, supra, 

48 Cal.4th at p. 385.) Whether the defendant made a valid 

waiver is “ ‘ “a matter which depends in each case ‘upon the 

particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, 

including the background, experience, and conduct of the 

accused.’ ” ’ [Citation.] The state must demonstrate that the 

suspect knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel 

‘under the totality of the circumstances, including the necessary 

fact that the accused, not the police, reopened the dialogue with 

the authorities.’ [Citation.] . . . . ‘[T]he waiver must have been 

made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being 

abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.’ ” 

(People v. Hensley (2014) 59 Cal.4th 788, 810.) Although a 

defendant’s initiation of a conversation with officers “ ‘is strong 

and essential evidence of a knowing and intelligent waiver,’ ” it is 

not dispositive. (Ibid.) Rather, the initiation of further dialogue 

by a defendant “does not in itself justify reinterrogation.” 

statement made in “response” to an Edwards violation 

approximately an hour after violation]; Wainwright v. State 

(Del. 1986) 504 A.2d 1096, 1102–1103 [responsive statement 

made 45 minutes after improper interrogation inadmissible]; 

United States v. Thomas (11th Cir. 2013) 521 Fed.Appx. 878, 883 

[“statement made ‘no more than a few minutes’ after an Edwards

violation does not meet the legal standard for voluntariness”].) 
16

(People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 440, citing Oregon v. 

Bradshaw (1983) 462 U.S. 1039, 1044.) 

In evaluating a claim that a statement or confession is 

inadmissible because it was obtained in violation of a defendant’s 

rights under Miranda, “ ‘we accept the trial court’s determination 

of disputed facts if supported by substantial evidence, but we 

independently decide whether the challenged statements were 

obtained in violation of Miranda.’ ” (People v. Molano (2019) 

7 Cal.5th 620, 633.)

III. Analysis

Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting his 

post-arrest statements because police obtained them in violation 

of the Miranda-Edwards rule. More specifically, he claims that: 

1) officers impermissibly continued to question him after he 

invoked his right to counsel, rendering anything he said 

thereafter inadmissible; 2) his words when calling Bruce over 

could not be fairly said to represent a desire “ ‘ “ ‘to open up a 

more generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the 

investigation’ ” ’ ” (Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 384–385); 

and 3) even if defendant reinitiated conversation, the prosecution 

did not establish that he made a valid voluntary, knowing and 

intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. The Attorney General 

counters that police asked a couple of clarifying questions, then 

“scrupulously” honored defendant’s invocation of his rights, 

defendant reinitiated conversation about the case, and he 

impliedly waived his right to counsel. As set forth below, we find 

that defendant’s statements were the inadmissible product of 
17

police interrogation following defendant’s clear invocation of his 

right to counsel.

First, we address whether the officers “scrupulously” 

honored defendant’s invocation of his right to counsel. After an 

unambiguous invocation of this right, police must cease 

interrogation. (People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 

645–646 (Cunningham).) Interrogation “refers not only to 

express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part 

of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely 

to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” (Rhode 

Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 301, fn. omitted.) “The 

standard is whether ‘under all the circumstances involved in a 

given case, the questions are “reasonably likely to elicit an 

incriminating response from the suspect.” ’ [Citation.] This is an 

objective standard. ‘The subjective intent of the [officer] is 

relevant but not conclusive. [Citation.] The relationship of the 

question asked to the crime suspected is highly relevant.’ ” 

(People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 637.) This inquiry focuses 

on the perceptions of the suspect. (Boyer, supra, 48 Cal.3d at 

p. 275.)

The trial court’s ruling was premised on the implied finding 

that police scrupulously obeyed defendant’s invocation of his 

right to counsel, but the record does not support this finding. 

(See People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 985 [a finding of 

whether interrogation occurred is reviewed for substantial 

evidence], overruled in part on other grounds in People v. Doolin

(2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.) 
18

It is undisputed that, about five seconds after defendant 

invoked his right to counsel, the CHP officer spoke to defendant 

about what he called a “separate” traffic collision involving 

defendant’s vehicle.4 When defendant said, “[T]ell me about the 

situation,” the CHP officer responded, “No. You tell us,” clearly 

inviting defendant to talk. The officer continued, “You were in a 

vehicle. We’ve got witnesses you were involved in a traffic 

collision and they gave a general description fitting your, you 

know, physical characteristics. So, do you deny that you were in 

there or you just don’t want to talk about it?” The officer paused 

briefly, then emphasized, “Just a traffic collision.” The accident 

at issue occurred shortly after Bruce terminated pursuit. It was 

CHP that located defendant’s car, and the CHP officer was 

present during at least part of Bruce’s interrogation of defendant. 

Viewed objectively, the CHP officer’s mix of statements and 

express questioning was reasonably likely to elicit an 

incriminating response. It therefore constituted continued 

interrogation, not scrupulous honoring of defendant’s invocation 

of his right to counsel. 

We reject the Attorney General’s contention that the CHP 

officer merely asked clarifying questions in the face of an 

ambiguous assertion of the right to counsel. Where there is an 

ambiguous invocation of a suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights 

before a Miranda waiver occurs, officers may clarify the 

4 The prosecution described this traffic collision to the court 

as “a separate hit and run, somewhat related to this case as it 

relates to the crash in this case.”
19

invocation. (People v. Sauceda-Contreras (2012) 55 Cal.4th 203, 

217–218.) But “ ‘an unambiguous request for counsel or refusal 

to talk bars further questioning.’ ” (Id. at p. 219) After a 

Miranda waiver, questioning must cease when the suspect 

changes his or her mind and unambiguously invokes the right to 

counsel. (Cunningham, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 645–646.) Here,

there was no room for clarifying questions where defendant 

unequivocally invoked his right to counsel by stating, “I wanna 

talk to my attorney.”

Having found that police did not properly cease 

interrogation when defendant requested counsel, we will accept 

for purposes of this opinion that defendant initiated further 

discussions of the requisite nature as a matter of fact because, as 

explained in more depth below, we find dispositive the question of 

whether defendant’s “ ‘decision to talk’ ” was “ ‘a product of police 

interrogation, “badgering,” or “overreaching,” whether “explicit or 

subtle, deliberate or unintentional.” ’ ” (Johnson, supra, 

2022 Cal. LEXIS at *65.)

In Johnson, police failed to honor the defendant’s 

invocations of his rights to remain silent and to counsel four 

times during a three-hour period while the defendant was being 

treated for gunshot wounds after shooting and killing one of four 

police officers who responded to a domestic violence call. 

(Johnson, supra, 2022 Cal. LEXIS at *52–*53.) The last Miranda 

violation occurred when Patterson, a psychiatrist sent by the

district attorney, attempted to interview the defendant. (Id. at 

*53.) The defendant invoked his right to counsel, Patterson 
20

stepped out of the defendant’s hospital observation room to speak 

with police, and then Patterson followed the defendant to the Xray room and back to the observation room. (Id. at *39–*40.) 

Approximately 20 minutes after invoking his right to counsel to 

Patterson, the defendant turned to Patterson and asked, “Still 

here, huh?” (Id. at *40–*41.) The defendant then spoke to 

Patterson about his mental health history and eventually began 

speaking about the shooting. (Id. at *41–*42.) The majority 

found that the defendant’s decision to speak was not the product 

of police coercion or interrogation because the police did not 

badger the defendant; Patterson stepped out of the room after the 

defendant’s invocation of his right to counsel and did not ask 

questions for approximately twenty minutes; the defendant led 

the conversation about his mental health and the events under 

investigation; and the defendant said he spoke because he had 

determined “it was ‘best to be honest.’ ” (Id. at *68–*74.) The 

majority recognized that the defendant’s contention that he did 

not “initiate the communication with Patterson is not without 

force,” but found, after listening to the defendant’s interview and 

considering the totality of the circumstances, that the defendant 

had freely initiated the conversation. (Id. at *62, *66, *80.) 

In Boyer, by contrast, the defendant clearly invoked his 

right to counsel; improper and coercive interrogation ensued and 

then ceased; and, sometime later (after the defendant 

participated in allegedly voluntary fingerprinting), an 

investigator called the defendant back into the interrogation 

room and “launched into a monologue on the status of the 
21

investigation,” including an assertion that a new witness had 

directly contradicted some of the defendant’s previous 

statements. (Boyer, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 264–267, 274.) As 

the investigator turned to leave the room, the defendant called 

him back and said, “Hey, wait a minute. Come back here and sit 

down. You’re right, I can’t live with it. I did it. I didn’t mean to 

do it. But I did it.” (Id. at p. 267.) Our Supreme Court found 

that the investigator’s remarks were clearly renewed 

interrogation initiated by the police, and the defendant’s 

statements were the result of improper interrogation, not the 

defendant’s voluntary initiation of discussion with police. (Id. at 

pp. 274–275.) 

Upon independent review, we find that defendant’s 

statements to Bruce were illegally obtained because they were 

the result of the authorities’ improper continuation of 

questioning.5 (See People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 267–268 

[independently determining defendant’s decision to summon 

investigators and resulting statements were voluntary and not 

result of coercion or Miranda violation]; People v. Neal (2003) 

31 Cal.4th 63, 80, 85 [finding defendant’s initiation of contact 

with police after Edwards violation involuntary on independent 

review, stating subsequent confessions obtained in violation of 

5 The trial court concluded that defendant spoke of his own 

volition, but, as set forth above, this conclusion appeared to be 

premised on the erroneous implied finding that police 

scrupulously honored defendant’s invocation of his right to 

counsel. 
22

Edwards were inadmissible in case-in-chief, and holding them 

inadmissible for impeachment].)

Here, the circumstances show that the CHP officer engaged 

in questioning that was reasonably likely to elicit incriminating 

information after defendant clearly invoked his right to counsel, 

and the questioning had the direct effect of eliciting 

incriminating information. Importantly, prior to the 

impermissible questioning, Bruce told defendant that his car was 

found abandoned on the freeway, and defendant maintained it 

had been stolen. The CHP officer then invited defendant to 

explain what happened with the accident, relayed that a witness 

had linked defendant to the crash scene, and inquired whether 

defendant denied being there. Although defendant invoked his 

Fifth Amendment rights in immediate response and the CHP 

officer ceased his questioning, a mere nine seconds passed 

between the time the CHP officer stopped speaking and the time 

defendant called Bruce over to say, “Man. I fucked up bad.” The 

impermissible interrogation was not overtly badgering, but the 

nine seconds that elapsed in this case are a far cry from the 20

minutes of silence between the Miranda violation and the 

defendant’s ensuing initiation in Johnson. (Johnson, supra,

2022 Cal. LEXIS at *70.) In further contrast to Johnson, 

defendant’s interview does not suggest that he spoke out of an 

independent desire to be honest. (Id. at *74.) Rather, the record 

shows that defendant changed his mind and spoke as a direct 

result of the CHP officer’s improper questioning, in that he 

summoned Bruce over only seconds after the CHP officer’s 
23

questions made clear that defendant was unlikely to persuade 

law enforcement that his car had been stolen and driven by 

someone else. (Cf. Boyer, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 274 [statement 

“was the result” of an Edwards violation where defendant called 

officer back and confessed immediately after officer confronted 

defendant with a witness who “disputed defendant’s claim as to 

the last time defendant had visited the victims’ residence”].) 

The bright-line rule of Edwards ensures that police do not, 

through impermissible interrogation, badgering, or overreaching, 

“explicit or subtle, deliberate or unintentional,” persuade a 

defendant to incriminate himself notwithstanding an earlier 

request for counsel. (Smith v. Illinois, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 98; 

Davis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 596.) On this record, we find that 

defendant’s decision to speak to Bruce and his ensuing 

statements were the “tainted product” of the Edwards violation.6 

(Johnson, supra, 2022 Cal. LEXIS at *64.) As such, the 

statements were subject to the Edwards presumption of 

involuntariness (Maryland v. Shatzer (2010) 559 U.S. 98, 106 

[describing the presumption]), and they should have been 

suppressed.

6 With respect to the CHP officer’s questions, the Attorney 

General argues only that these were permissible clarifying 

questions after an ambiguous invocation of the right to counsel, a 

position we have rejected. The Attorney General does not argue 

in briefing that, even if police violated Edwards by failing to

scrupulously honor the defendant’s invocation of his right to 

counsel, defendant’s ensuing statements to police were

nonetheless admissible. 
24

We turn next to the question of whether the erroneous 

admission of defendant’s statements was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt. (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24; People v. 

Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 994.) Under Chapman, the 

inquiry “is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, 

a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether 

the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely 

unattributable to the error.” (Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 

508 U.S. 275, 279.) Keeping in mind that “ ‘the defendant’s own 

confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence 

that can be admitted against him’ ” (Arizona v. Fulminante 

(1991) 499 U.S. 279, 296), the admission of defendant’s 

statements in this case was not harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt. The prosecution’s evidence was largely circumstantial. 

Before the chase, the 911 callers described a man driving the car 

they observed, but they did not provide much detail about the 

driver, the passenger, or the car. Neither of the employees from 

Paws About Town testified to seeing the crash behind the store. 

Defendant and McNary were both about six feet tall and 

apparently resembled each other enough that, at trial, one 

employee testified that he identified defendant at an in-field line 

up away from the store when police testified this identification 

was in fact of McNary. 

Bruce provided the strongest evidence of guilt with his 

testimony that the driver of the car he pulled over appeared to be 

a Black man who had dreadlocks similar to those that defendant 

had in court. But, as defense counsel pointed out, Bruce first saw 
25

the car from across the divided four-lane highway, and Bruce was 

pulled over behind the car for less than ten seconds before it 

drove off. Bruce conceded that the car’s back windshield had 

some tint, and he could not identify the passenger’s race. Bruce 

did not approach the car before it took off. In court, he identified 

defendant as the man he interviewed at the station, but Bruce 

testified that he “did not see the driver until he was back at the 

station.”

Finally, the prosecutor’s closing argument emphasized 

defendant’s statements to the police as evidence of his guilt, and 

the jury twice asked to review the videotaped statements during 

deliberations. Approximately 11 minutes after seeing the 

videotape for the second time with enhanced audio, the jury 

reached a guilty verdict. On these facts, we cannot conclude that 

“the verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely 

unattributable to the error” in admitting defendant’s statements. 

(Sullivan v. Louisiana, supra, 508 U.S. at p. 279.) His 

convictions must therefore be reversed.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed. 

BROWN, J.

WE CONCUR:

POLLAK, P. J.

STREETER, J.

People v. Nwuzi (A159805)