alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### E. C. Stirman v. F. M. Turner.

(No. 6715.)

Appeal from Lamar County.

Wooldridge & Fagan, counsel for appellant.

No counsel appeared for appellee.

Opinion by

Willson, J.

§ 140. *Minors; illegal restraint of; habeas corpus; jurisdiction of county court to issue writ of.*Appellant applied to and obtained from the county judge of Lamar county the writ of *habeas corpus*for his minor child, five years old, who, he alleged, was illegally restrained of his liberty by the appellee. Upon a hearing of the writ, the proceeding was dismissed because, in the opinion of the county judge, he was without jurisdiction to issue said writ. • We are of the opinion that the judge erred in dismissing the proceeding. County courts, or the judges thereof, are empowered to issue the writ of *habeas corpus*in cases when the offense charged is within the jurisdiction of the county court, etc. [Cohst., art. 5, § 16.] They have such power in all cases in which the constitution has not conferred the power on the district courts, or the judges thereof. [Code Crim. Proc., arts. 74, 135.] In a case like the one before us, the constitution has not conferred the power to issue the writ upon the district courts or the judges thereof. [Const., *202art. 5, § 8.] Even if the power to issue the writ must be limited to cases in which that process is necessary to enforce the jurisdiction of the court, we think this case would come within the scope of such power. County courts have general jurisdiction over the persons and estates of minors, and the father is the natural guardian of his minor child, and has the right, we think, to invoke by *habeas corpus*the enforcement of his authority as such guardian by the county court, or a judge thereof, when the minor is held in custody by a person not entitled to the guardianship of his person. [Sayles’ Civil St., arts. 2469, 2494.] The judgment dismissing the *habeas corpus*is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a heaving upon said writ, and the costs of this ''appeal are adjudged against the appellee.

June 18, 1890.

Reversed and remanded.
S96A1239.

#### TUTT v. THE STATE.

(472 SE2d 306)

Hunstein, Justice.

Darreyl Tutt was arrested on April 23, 1991, following a series of crimes committed with Jamie Kenmont Kerien Brown. See *Brown v. State,*264 Ga. 803 (450 SE2d 821) (1994). Tutt was indicted in Richmond County on July 9, 1991 for murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, and other offenses. The State filed its notice of intent to seek the death penalty on July 11, 1991, and Tutt filed a demand for trial on July 12, 1991, in accordance with OCGA § 17-7-171 (a). Pretrial proceedings under the Unified Appeal Procedure, OCGA § 17-10-35.1, were certified as complete on October 22, 1993. On November 8, 1993, Tutt entered into a plea agreement and was sentenced to life *50without parole. He filed a motion for discharge and acquittal on January 25, 1996, contending that delays in the handling of his case constituted a violation of OCGA § 17-7-171, as well as due process and equal protection. Tutt now appeals the denial of that motion.

Decided July 15, 1996.

Darreyl L. Tutt, *pro se.*

*Daniel J. Craig, District Attorney, Charles R. Sheppard, Assistant District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Caroline W. Donaldson, Assistant Attorney General,*for appellee.

OCGA § 17-7-171 (b) provides for discharge and acquittal in capital cases if a defendant is not given a trial within two regular terms of court following the filing of a demand for trial, assuming jury availability and the defendant’s readiness. OCGA § 17-7-171 (c), which applies to cases for which the death penalty is sought, provides that the counting of the two terms does not begin until the first term following the completion of pretrial proceedings pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-35.1. Thus, Tutt would not have been entitled to discharge and acquittal until March 1994, see OCGA § 15-6-3 (5) (C), the third term following completion of pretrial proceedings; he pled guilty in November 1993.

Moreover, having voluntarily entered a plea of guilty, Tutt cannot raise as a defense his right to a speedy trial. *Mason v. Banks,*242 Ga. 292 (2) (248 SE2d 664) (1978). Once a defendant solemnly admits in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. *Addison v. State,*239 Ga. 622 (238 SE2d 411) (1977). An exception will only be made if the error gees, to the very power of the State to bring the defendant into court. Id. at 624. See also *Blackledge v. Perry,*417 U. S. 21 (94 SC 2098, 40 LE2d 628) (1974). No such situation is presented here.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LaCarlos Quanique DAVID, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 00-7489.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 15, 2000.

Decided Jan. 5, 2001.

LaCarlos Quanique David, pro se. Janet S. Reinke, Office of the United States Attorney, Norfolk, VA, for appellee.

Before WILKINS, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

LaCarlos Quanique David seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.2000). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. *United States v. David,*Nos. CR-95-9; CA-00-97-4 (E.D.Va. Oct. 5, 2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
ex10-2.htm


    EXHIBIT
10.2

    


     

    


     

    WAIVER

     

    In consideration for the benefits I
will receive as a result of my employer’s participation in the United States
Department of the Treasury’s TARP Capital Purchase Program, I hereby voluntarily
waive any claim against the United States or my employer for any changes to my
compensation or benefits that are required to comply with the regulation issued
by the Department of the Treasury as published in the Federal Register on
October 20, 2008.

     

    I acknowledge that this regulation may
require modification of the compensation, bonus, incentive and other benefit
plans, arrangements, policies and agreements (including so-called “golden
parachute” agreements) that I have with my employer or in which I participate as
they relate to the period the United States holds any equity or debt securities
of my employer acquired through the TARP Capital Purchase Program.

     

    This waiver includes all claims I may
have under the laws of the United States or any state related to the
requirements imposed by the aforementioned regulation, including without
limitation a claim for any compensation or other payments I would otherwise
receive, any challenge to the process by which this regulation was adopted and
any tort or constitutional claim about the effect of these regulations on my
employment relationship.

     

    IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto
signed my name this 23rd day of December, 2008.

     

    


     

    
      
        
          
            
              
                	 
      	
                        /s/ James S. Vaccaro

                      
	 
      	
                        James
      S. Vaccaro
**EXHIBIT 23.1**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on FormS-1 (Registration No. 333-20277), Form S-1 (Registration No. 333-87218), Form S-1 (Registration No. 333-132399) and Form S-1 (Registration No. 333-137802) of PHL Variable Insurance Company of our report dated March 7, 2008relating to the financial statements which appear in this Form 10-K. 

/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 

Hartford, Connecticut 

March 18, 2008
#### Dan VEULEMAN and Jody Veuleman v. MUSTANG HOMES, LLC.

No. 2010-CC-2492.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 7, 2011.

In re Veuleman, Dan et al.; Veuleman, Jody; —Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lasalle, 28th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 37,199; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 10-00985.

Denied.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Undre H. MARTIN.

No. 2010-KO-2315.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 4, 2011.

*470In re Martin, Undre H.; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court- Div. G, No. 703173; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KA 0101.

Denied.
#### STATE ex rel. George JONES v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2011-KH-2505.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 14, 2011.

In re Jones, George; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 245-982; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-1337.

The application is transferred to the district court with instructions to the district judge to act on relator’s motion or order for probation and imposition of a suspended sentence as relator shows by Inmates’ Request for Legal/Indigent Mail receipt that the application was submitted on or about June 17, 2011. The district court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of its judgment.
#### Jonathan Miles v. Mays & Wright.

(No. 6389.)

Appeal from Tom Green County.

T. C. Wynn and Cochean & PIill, counsel for appellants.

No counsel appeared for appellee.

Opinion by

White, P. J.'

§ 110. *Pleading; office of exhibits attached to.*Plaintiffs sued for a balance due them by defendant for services rendered by them in their professional capacity as lawyers, which said services and the time, date, items and amounts and sums due therefor they allege are fully stated in Exhibit A, attached to their petition. No other allegation is made in the petition as to what services were rendered, the character of services rendered, the time, dates, items and amounts due therefor, or where or in what manner rendered. The exhibit referred to and made a part of the petition does not allege any services rendered, or show any liability on the part of defendant. Defendant pleaded a general demurrer and special exceptions: (1) because the petition showed no cause of action; (2) because the allegations were too vague, indefinite and uncertain to inform defendant of the plaintiffs’ demand, and the character of proof which would be made thereunder. When an exhibit is made part of a petition the petition must contain such specific averments of facts as to show a cause of action independent of the exhibit. “Exhibits will not relieve the pleader from making the proper allegations, of which the said exhibits may be the evidence in whole or in part. ” [Rule 19, Dist. Ot.] The petition should refer to the exhibit only to aid, elucidate and explain the specific allegations made in the pleadings. [1 Civil Cas. Ct. App., § 752; Burks v. Watson, 48 Tex. 107; Pool v. Sanford, 52 Tex. *171621; Macdonell v. Railway Co., 60 Tex. 590.] The petition did not allege a good cause of action, and the special exceptions of defendant were well taken, and it w7as error for the court to overrule them.

May 10, 1890.

Reversed and remanded.
#### Megan Maynard KIRBY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Nos. 5D11-695, 5D11-696, 5D11-697.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Sept. 2, 2011.

*993James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and David S. Morgan, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kellie A. Nielan, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.

PER CURIAM.

Pursuant to a plea agreement to resolve several cases, Kirby entered a no contest plea in Case 2010-00685-CFFA to the charge of sale of oxycodone. Unfortunately, the trial court pronounced that it was adjudicating Kirby guilty of sale of cocaine, rather than sale of oxycodone. The error was compounded in that the sentencing order also reflected an adjudication for sale of cocaine. As Kirby suggests, it appears that the trial judge simply misspoke. We remand for entry of an amended sentencing order to correctly reflect that Kirby’s conviction was for sale of oxy-codone.

REMANDED FOR CORRECTION OF FINAL JUDGMENT.

TORPY, EVANDER and JACOBUS, JJ., concur.
#### STATE ex rel. Rony O. ARIAS-CHAVARRIA v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KO-2432.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 25, 2011.

In re Arias-Chavarria, Rony O.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 08-189; *461to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KA-116.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.
#### STATE ex rel. Frederic Lubron BIRGANS v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-2561.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 4, 2011.

*918In re Birgans, Frederic Lubron; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 09-F0298-3; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,982-KA.

Denied.
Exhibit 21.1



LIST OF SUBSIDIARIES



|                   |  |                                  |  |               
|------------------ |  | -------------------------------- |  | --------------
|NAME OF SUBSIDIARY |  | JURISDICTION OF INCORPORATION   
|1.                 |  | Versata (Europe) Limited         |  | United Kingdom
|2.                 |  | Versata Europe BVBA              |  | Belgium       
|3.                 |  | Versata GmbH                     |  | Germany       
|4.                 |  | Versata France, SA               |  | France        
|5.                 |  | Versata (Australia) Pty. Limited |  | Australia     
|6.                 |  | Versata (Canada) Limited         |  | Canada        
|7.                 |  | Versata (India) Private Limited  |  | India
#### S. J. ANGLAND, Appellant, v. John DOE et al., and The University Club, Appellees.

Nos. 15206, 15413.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued March 2,1960.

Decided March 17, 1960.

Mr. S. J. Angland, appellant, Washington, D. C., pro se.

Mr. Walter J. Murphy, Jr., Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. H. Mason Welch, J. Harry Welch, J. Joseph Barse, Arthur V. Butler and James A. Welch, Washington, D. C., were on the briefs, for appellees.

Before Mr. Justice Burton, retired,* and Edgerton and Danaher, Circuit. J udges.

*

 Sitting by designation pursuant to § 294 (a), Title 28 U.S.C.

PER CURIAM.

A principal issue between the parties was considered by this court and disposed of in Angland v. Doe.1 Subsequently appellant moved further in the District Court with adverse results of which he now complains.2 We perceive no basis upon which we should disturb the action taken by the District Court.

Affirmed.

1

. 1958, 105 U.S.App.D.C. 16, 263 F.2d 266.

2

. We consolidated the present appeals for the purpose of briefing and argument.
Exhibit
4.1.1





English Summary of the Amendment to the Consulting Agreement by and
among Cresud and Consultores Assets Management S.A.





On
September 8, 2017, Cresud and Consultores Assets Management S.A.
(“Consultores”) entered into an amendment of the
Consulting Services Agreement by which the parties agreed (i)
considering the significant expansion and diversification of the
activities developed by Cresud, that Consultores will advise Cresud
on any type of business and/or investment which Cresud may request
and implement, with any opinions given by Consultores qualifying as
non-binding on Cresud and (ii) to contemplate the possibility of
implementing partial assignments, subject to Cresud’s consent
pursuant to the applicable laws, of the services rendered and
rights conferred under the agreement to the various third parties
who have assisted or may assist Consultores in the
future.
#### Benjamin CROSBY, et al. v. SAHUQUE REALTY COMPANY, INC., et al.

No. 2011-CC-1163.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 16, 2011.

In re Bentex Associates Inc.; Crosby, Benjamin et al.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. H, No. 09-11421; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-0332.

Denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                            3725
<SECURITIES>                                      3432
<RECEIVABLES>                                     7700
<ALLOWANCES>                                       100
<INVENTORY>                                         54
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 15792
<PP&E>                                            6141
<DEPRECIATION>                                    5034
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   20271
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                             6897
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            30
<OTHER-SE>                                       12544
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     20271
<SALES>                                          19159
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 19159
<CGS>                                             6482
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                     6482
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 11688
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               (288)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   1163
<INCOME-TAX>                                       302
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                861
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       861
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .28
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .26
        

</TABLE>
#### STATE ex rel. Josh BAUMAN v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2011-KH-1667.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 13, 2012.

In re Bauman, Josh; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 04-7266; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KH-443.

Denied.
Exhibit 99.1





                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF
                         THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the filing of the Annual Report on Form 10-K of
South Jersey Gas Company (the "Company") for the period ended December 31, 2002
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Charles Biscieglia, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby
certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.





/s/ Charles Biscieglia
Name:  Charles Biscieglia
Title: Chief Executive Officer
March 13, 2003
No. 87-6516.

#### Pritchett *v.*Boutwell, Acting Warden, et al.

C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
#### Joshua MARKS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D11-3588.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Oct. 19, 2011.

Glenn M. Swiatek, Shalimar, Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition seeking belated appeal of the order rendered on or about November 4, 2010, denying petitioner’s motion for postconviction relief in Okaloosa County Circuit Court case numbers 08-88-CFA and 08-320-CFA, is granted. Upon issuance of mandate, a copy of this opinion shall be furnished to the clerk of the lower tribunal for treatment as a notice of appeal.

BENTON, C.J., VAN NORTWICK and SWANSON, JJ., concur.
Exhibit
10.23

    


    Summary of Loan
Agreement

     

    Loan from Hanting Rural Credit
Cooperative

     

    On
November 10, 2006, PRC Yuhe entered into a loan agreement with Hanting Rural
Credit Cooperative, for a loan in the principal amount of $396,962. The interest
rate for this loan is 8.19% per annum and the loan has a maturity date of
November 8, 2009. PRC Yuhe plans to use the loan to finance the working capital.
There are no material covenants, conditions or restrictions on the loans from
Hanting Rural Credit Cooperative.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                       1,789,639
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   75,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     40,270
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,829,909
<PP&E>                                       8,281,506
<DEPRECIATION>                               (479,132)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               9,974,995
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          419,841
<BONDS>                                      2,206,874
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        63,568
<OTHER-SE>                                   6,998,512
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 9,974,995
<SALES>                                      1,740,854
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,030,533
<CGS>                                          473,611
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  977,884
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              77,734
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                501,304
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            501,304
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   501,304
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     .079
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     .079
        

</TABLE>