Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-981 | November 8, 2018 Page 1 of 22

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Donald J. Frew

Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

Patricia C. McMath

Deputy Attorneys General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of the Parent-Child Relationship 

of J.W., Mother, and T.W. and 

L.W., Minor Children:

1

J.W.,

Appellant-Respondent,

November 8, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-JT-981

Appeal from the

Allen Superior Court

The Honorable 

Charles F. Pratt, Judge 

 

1 The Indiana Department of Child Services filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to each of 

her four children—I.W. (Cause No. 02D08-1701-JT-17); G.W. (Cause No. 02D08-1701-JT-18); T.W. (Cause 

No. 02D08-1701-JT-19); and L.W. (Cause No. 02D08-1701-JT-20). The juvenile court heard all four cases 

simultaneously and terminated Mother’s rights to her daughters, T.W. and L.W., but declined to terminate

Mother’s rights to her sons, I.W. and G.W. Accordingly, Mother does not appeal the part of the juvenile 

court’s order pertaining to I.W. and G.W. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-981 | November 8, 2018 Page 2 of 22

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

Trial Court Cause Nos..

02D08-1701-JT-19

02D08-1701-JT-20

Kirsch, Judge.

[1] J.W. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental 

rights to her minor daughters, T.W. and L.W.2 Following various hearings, the 

juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights to her daughters but did not

terminate her parental rights to her two minor sons, I.W. and G.W. This case 

presents a most unusual circumstance, albeit not without precedent,

3 where, in 

the same proceeding, the juvenile court terminated a mother’s rights to some 

but not all of her children. Mother raises the following restated issue for our 

review: whether the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights to just 

two of her four children was clearly erroneous because it was not supported by 

 

2 The juvenile court’s order is dated March 16, 2016; however, the CCS for T.W. and L.W. includes the 

correct date of March 16, 2018. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 2, 11, 28. 

3

See In re I.A., 903 N.E.2d 146 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (affirming juvenile court’s termination of mother’s 

parental rights to one of her five children in the same proceeding during which the juvenile court did not

terminate the mother’s parental rights to her remaining four children). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-981 | November 8, 2018 Page 3 of 22

sufficient evidence that the termination was in the best interests of her 

daughters.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Mother has two biological sons, I.W., born June 6, 2008, and G.W., born May 

18, 2009 (together, “Sons”), and two biological daughters, T.W., born May 6, 

2011, and L.W., born March 2, 2012 (together, “Daughters”) (collectively, 

“Children”). The Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) became 

involved with Mother in January 2014 when L.W. almost drowned in the 

family’s bathtub while Sons were giving her a bath. At that time, Mother lived 

with Children and T.E.W. (“Father”), her then-husband and Children’s 

biological father, in their home in New Haven, Allen County.

4

 Mother, who 

worked the third shift, returned home from work one morning and, believing 

that Father had taken Children to the babysitter, she fell asleep around 9:00 

a.m., leaving Children unsupervised. Later, I.W. woke up Mother saying that 

G.W. had L.W. in the bathtub, and that she was going to die. In the bathroom, 

Mother found L.W. on her back, purple in color, and cold to the touch; 

fortunately, L.W. survived.

 

4 T.E.W., the father of the four siblings, signed a “Voluntary Relinquishment of Parental Rights” for each 

child on September 27, 2017, and he does not take part in this appeal. Respondent’s Exs. A, B, C, and D. 

Accordingly, we include facts about Father only as they are relevant to the termination of Mother’s parental 

rights.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-981 | November 8, 2018 Page 4 of 22

[4] DCS filed a petition claiming that each child was a Child in Need of Services 

(“CHINS”). On January 14, 2014, a preliminary inquiry on the CHINS 

allegations was held. Children were adjudicated CHINS and placed in 

relative care. A dispositional order, including a “20-point Parent 

Participation Plan,” was entered on February 11, 2014. Appellant’s Br. at 7. 

The participation plan required Mother to abide by the standard nine

participation plan requirements, i.e.: (1) refrain from criminal activity; (2) 

maintain clean, safe, appropriate, and sustainable housing; (3) notify DCS

within forty-eight hours of changes in household composition, housing, and 

employment; (4) cooperate with caseworkers, the court-appointed special 

advocate (“CASA”), and the guardian ad litem (“GAL”); (5) attend case 

conferences as directed, maintain contact, and accept announced and 

unannounced home visits by caseworkers and the GAL; (6) provide 

caseworkers with accurate information regarding paternity, finances, insurance, 

and family history; (7) provide caseworkers and the GAL with signed and 

current consents of release and exchange of information; (8) provide each child 

with clean, appropriate clothing; and (9) cooperate with rules of each child’s 

placement. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 24. Mother was also required to: submit 

to and follow directions of a “Diagnostic evaluation”; obtain and keep 

employment; enroll in home-based services; visit Children; refrain from 

smoking in the presence of Children; participate in family therapy; follow 

recommendations of the Three Wishes program for G.W.; and follow 

recommendations of the First Steps developmental program for Daughters. Id. 

Through her participation, Mother earned unsupervised visits with Children. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-981 | November 8, 2018 Page 5 of 22

[5] At some point during the case, Mother was fired from her job when she arrived 

at work drunk. In December 2015, a second incident occurred when, during an 

unsupervised visit with Mother, L.W. spilled hot cocoa on herself; the cocoa

ran down L.W.’s leg and into her boot, resulting in a burn. Tr. Vol. 2 at 41-42. 

Mother took L.W. to the emergency room. Id. L.W. made a full recovery;

however, this incident resulted in Mother being returned to supervised visitation

with Children. Id. 

[6] A permanency hearing was held on February 23, 2017, and the juvenile court 

adopted a plan for the termination of parental rights for each child. Children 

continued in licensed foster care, with Daughters together in the home of 

Stephanie Long (“Long”) and Sons together in a separate home. Id. Hearings

on the termination of parental rights were conducted in 2017 on August 7, 8, 

14, and 29, and December 4 and 6. Id. at 2-3, 11-12. During the hearings, the 

transcription of which consisted of more than 550 pages, the juvenile court 

heard testimony from, among others, Mother; Father; Rachel Morrison with

Children First Center; Kimberly Griffith with Functional Oral Motor and 

Feeding Concepts; Daughters’ foster mother Stephanie Long; Sons’ foster 

mother Tyra Watson; CASA volunteer Jo Willer; Rachel Schwieterman,

5 who 

oversaw Children’s supervised visitation for DCS; Teresa Jones, an employee 

with Charis House at the Rescue Mission; Denise Wells, a licensed social 

 

5 While the transcript also includes the spelling “Schweiterman,” Tr. Vol. 4 at 26, 61, the correct spelling is 

“Schwieterman.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 210.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-981 | November 8, 2018 Page 6 of 22

worker for Northeastern Center; Stephanie Adams, a DCS team leader at 

Northeastern Center; Laura Swanson (“Swanson”), a therapist at Park Center

who worked with G.W.; Julia McIntosh (“CASA McIntosh”), Director of the 

Allen County CASA; Marla Souder (“Dr. Souder”), clinical psychologist with 

ICAN and Payton Place; and Jenelle Vanderpool (“FCM Vanderpool”), family 

case manager for DCS.

[7] Regarding special needs, Dr. Souder testified that I.W. has been diagnosed 

with: Schizoaffective Disorder; Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder 

(“ADHD”); Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (“OCD”); Sensory Integration 

Disorder; and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”). Tr. Vol. 3 at 222; State’s 

Ex. 20 at 16. Dr. Souder and Swanson testified that I.W.’s behavior reflects a 

departure from reality; he sometimes barks like a dog when he is anxious or 

uncomfortable. Tr. Vol. 3 at 95, 222. Regarding G.W., Dr. Souder testified that 

he suffers from ADHD, OCD, Sensory Integration Disorder, and PTSD. State’s 

Ex. 19 at 13; Tr. Vol. 3 at 232-33. Swanson testified that G.W. has Generalized 

Anxiety Disorder and “Disruptive Behavior Disorder NOS.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 80. 

T.W. has vision problems and needs glasses, she suffers from “geographical 

tongue,”6 and has Attention Deficit symptoms, which interfere with her ability 

to concentrate. Tr. Vol. 2 at 29. L.W. has scoliosis and must wear braces on 

her legs to walk and attend physical therapy. Michelle Berry, an occupational 

 

6 Mother described that with “geographical tongue,” T.W. has “white spots that move around in her mouth 

and anything citrusy burns it so like she will tell you she cannot have pineapple because it catches her mouth 

on fire.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 28. Mother explained that this condition affects T.W.’s eating. Id. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-981 | November 8, 2018 Page 7 of 22

therapist, testified that L.W. “looks like to me that she’s got symptoms, um, 

Fetal Alcohol Syndrome. . . . [S]he has difficulty staying on task. She has 

difficulty problem solving. She has poor carryover from week to week with 

different things.” Id. at 78. Berry testified that L.W. trips and falls, and in the 

beginning, she would walk into the walls. Id. “I give them a task and they 

carry it through and she cannot. You have to que her up on a task to complete. 

Her – she just has a variety of challenges.” Id. 

[8] Swanson testified that “[G.W.] has affection towards [I.W.] and can also be 

frustrated by I think normal sibling differences that come up. [I.W.] is more 

indifferent to [G.W.] but does verbalize loving his brother.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 93. 

Swanson also testified that G.W. loves his parents and talked about “wanting to 

see his mom” and “be able to live with her.” Id. at 84. Regarding T.W., 

Mother testified that “lately she’s been basically telling me that she hates me, 

that she doesn’t love me.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 29. Foster mother Long testified that 

she takes Daughters to about six appointments a month for issues of mental 

health and occupational therapy. Id. at 105-06. Long also testified that she has

a good relationship with Daughters and is interested in adopting them. Id. at 

111. During the more than three years that Children were out of Mother’s care, 

both Sons lived together in a separate home from Daughters, who also lived 

together. Tr. Vol. 2 at 171-72. CASA McIntosh testified that it was in the best 

interest for Mother’s rights to be terminated as to Children. CASA McIntosh

also testified that the case has been open since 2014, and Children have needs 

and require supervision. Tr. Vol. 3 at 149-50. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-981 | November 8, 2018 Page 8 of 22

[9] On March 16, 2018, the juvenile court entered its order and made the following 

findings, none of which Mother challenges on appeal:

8. In the present underlying CHINS cases, the [C]hildren have 

been placed outside the care of the [M]other for a period of more 

than six (6) months since the entry of the Dispositional Decree. 

The two brothers have lived separately from their sisters since 

2014.

9. Early in the case the Mother [voluntarily] entered into a 

residential treatment program through the Charis House. She 

did not complete the program because, as she testified, she did 

not believe in God and [did] not feel that the Charis House was a 

“good fit” for her.

10. From the testimony of Teresa Jones of the Charis House, the 

Court finds that the [M]other resided in the residential program 

from April 22, 2015 until February 3, 2016. A goal of 

reunification was established. Therapies to address alcohol 

dependency, sexual addictions, and the impact of the [M]other’s

childhood were recommended. The Court finds from Ms. 

Jones[’s] testimony that the Mother voluntarily chose to leave the 

Charis House Program because she was asked to participate in 

therapies designed to address her sexual addiction and past 

trauma (fears).

11. The Mother testified that on August 7, 2017[,] she had 

completed nine parenting classes at Children’s First Care in 

Auburn, Indiana. From the testimony of Rachel Morrison of the 

Children’s First Center, the Court finds that the Mother 

completed the ten-week parenting program on June 16, 2016. 

However, the counseling services recommended additional 

services for the Mother. The Mother’s evaluation scoring 

declined after the course completion, a circumstance only seen 

one other time by the therapist.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-981 | November 8, 2018 Page 9 of 22

12. The Mother also testified that she had completed drug 

counseling but was still in individual therapy.

13. Beginning on May 28, 2016, the Mother participated in 

individual therapy. From the testimony of therapist Denise 

Wells the Court finds that the Mother participated in weekly 

sessions for about six to seven months. She now attends on an 

every-other week basis. Issues of trauma are explored in therapy. 

The therapist believes that the Mother has an understanding of 

the trauma issues. She believes that the Mother will require 

additional support to aid in the transition should the children be 

returned to her care. As of August 8, 2017, the therapist found 

no reason to withhold reunification of the children with their 

mother. However, if reunited, the [M]other would benefit from

and need home based services.

14. The Mother testified that she completed a violence abatement

program. From the testimony of Stephanie Adams, a therapist 

with the Northeastern Center, the Court finds that additional 

services were not needed for the [M]other. The Mother has 

completed anger management therapy.

15. The Mother continues to visit[] the children under the 

supervision of SCAN, a local agency contracted by the [DCS] for

that service. From the testimony of Rachel Schwieterman of

SCAN, the court finds that she has supervised the Mother’s visits 

since September 19, 2016. The Mother demonstrates appropriate 

discipline methods and applies the “123 Magic” technique. Ms.

Schwieterman reserved judgment on the expansion of the 

Mother’s visits until such time as she could observe the 

[M]other’s interaction with them in a less structured 

environment. She communicates appropriately with the 

[C]hildren. The [C]hildren love her.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-981 | November 8, 2018 Page 10 of 22

16. The Mother is employed and works third shift. She has 

transportation and has a home.

17. The children each have special needs.

18. From the testimony of licensed clinical psychologist Marla 

Souder the Court finds that the child, [G.W.], carries a diagnosis 

of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Obsessive 

Compulsive Disorder, sensory degeneration and post-traumatic 

stress disorder. That said, [G.W.] has a lot of positive strengths.

The child, [I.W.], has low muscle tone and is within the low-level 

autism spectrum that includes a sensory integration disorder. He 

exhibits a schizoaffective disorder that manifests with behaviors 

that depart from reality, including barking like dog. He requires 

therapy, school supports, and serious stability. He needs a safe 

space that limits exposure to trauma.

19. Speech pathologist and feeding therapist Kimberly Griffith 

has provided treatment for the [C]hildren. From her testimony 

the court finds that [I.W.] has made significant improvement.

[G.W.] is also ready for discharge. [T.W.] and [L.W.] have been 

discharged successfully but have recently been referred for 

therapy to address emotional issues.

20. Park Center therapist Laura Swanson provided therapeutic 

services to [G.W.] beginning in May or June [of] 2014 to address 

anxiety and disruptive behaviors. She testified (August 2017) 

that his anxiety comes in waves and he is anxious about his 

future and permanent living situation. [G.W.] loves his parents 

and brother but is disconnected from his sisters. He wants to live 

with his [M]other. He is not able to properly interact with 

animals. [I.W.] also suffers from anxiety. He demonstrates odd 

behaviors including outbursts of growling and barking. She 

opined that reunification will come as a “shock” and transitional 

services will be required.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-981 | November 8, 2018 Page 11 of 22

21. [G.W.] was in foster care with Tyra Watson from October 

2014 until July 2016. [I.W.] was in her care from July 2015 until 

July 2016. They were returned to her care in July 2017. When 

first in her care [G.W.] struggled academically. [I.W.] did not 

start therapy until after his placement. She believes that both 

children lie. The boys get along well together. She has observed 

that the [M]other has been appropriate with the children.

22. Since 2014, foster parent Stephanie Long, has cared for the 

daughters, [L.W.] and [T.W.]. When first in her care [L.W.]

could barely walk. She has had to have braces on her feet. The 

girls would hoard food. They receive occupational therapy and 

have made improvements.

23. The two daughters are in therapy with Three Wishes once a 

week, individual therapy at Park [C]enter once a week, and 

occupational therapy twice a week. [L.W.] needs to be seen at 

Riley Children Hospital to address her scoliosis. [T.W.] has 

expressed to her foster mother that she wants to remain with her.

24. Should parental rights be terminated, [DCS] has an 

appropriate plan for two of the children, that being adoption. 

Foster parent Stephanie Long has expressed an interest to adopt 

the two daughters. No adoptive home has yet been located for 

the boys.

25. From the testimony of Janelle Vanderpool,7the [DCS]’s case 

manager, the Court finds that the Mother has become more selfaware and has made progress. However, the case manager 

believes the Mother requires additional services before 

 

7

In the record before us, FCM Vanderpool’s name is also spelled, “Jenelle.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 244. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-981 | November 8, 2018 Page 12 of 22

reunification can be achieved and asserts that the Mother has 

progressed as far as her cognitive abilities will allow.

26. The Court finds from the children’s Court Appointed Special 

Advocate volunteer, Jo [W]iller,8that [T.W.] and [L.W.] have 

improved since being in foster care. She asserts that the [M]other 

is able to meet the [C]hildren’s needs in a structured 

environment. She observed the [M]other applying ‘canned’

responses for discipline that were lacking a nurturing component. 

Particularly the nurturance was absence [sic] with regard to 

[T.W.] The CASA Staff representative, Julia McIntosh[,]

testified that there has been provision of extensive services over a 

long period of time and the Mother has not yet demonstrated a 

full range of benefits sufficient to meet the level of need required 

for the [C]hildren. Thus, CASA has concluded that the 

[C]hildren’s. best interests are served by the termination of 

parental rights.

Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 24-26. 

[10] Based on the above findings, the juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental 

rights to Daughters but not to Sons. The juvenile court reasoned:

1. For parental rights to be involuntarily terminated the [S]tate 

must prove by the clear [sic] and convincing evidence that the 

children have been removed from the parent for at least six (6) 

months under a dispositional decree . . . . In the present case the 

children have been placed outside the care of [Mother] under a 

Dispositional Decree for more than six (6) months prior to the 

filing of the petition to terminate parental rights.

 

8 The juvenile court used the name Jo “Miller”; however, the CASA’s name is Jo “Willer.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 144.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-981 | November 8, 2018 Page 13 of 22

2. . . . . By the clear and convincing evidence, the court 

determines that there is a reasonable probability that reasons that 

brought about the children’s placement outside the home will not 

be remedied for the two daughters [T.W. and L.W.]. In this 

present case, the children have significant chronic conditions that 

require on-going services. The immediate reunification of four 

such children into the care of a mother, who has not yet 

demonstrated an ability to meet such needs outside of a 

professionally structured environment, cannot safely be 

accomplished. The two younger daughters are bonded to their 

foster mother where they have prospered. The elder boys are not 

significantly bonded to their sisters but love and desire 

reunification with [Mother]. Because of the [M]other’s 

limitations (see the testimony of the CASA volunteer, the foster 

mother, and Denise Wells’ testimony), the Mother is not likely to 

gain the ability to meet the extraordinary therapeutic and 

treatment schedule required for the four children, meet their 

individual behavioral and emotional demands, and maintain a 

household.

3. . . . . In this case the [CASA] has concluded that termination 

of parental rights is in the children’s best interests. The children 

need a safe stable and nurturing home environment. If parental 

rights are terminated with regard to [T.W.] and [L.W.], they 

would be provided, through adoption, with a parent who has 

demonstrated the present ability and means to meet their special 

needs on a sustainable, permanent basis. In contrast, [I.W.] and 

[G.W.] do not have a present home in which permanency could 

be established excepting the home of their mother. The Court 

finds from the totality of the evidence that the Mother is readily 

able to meet the emotional and behavioral needs of the boys. 

Separation of the siblings, while generally not a tenable position, 

is appropriate in this case. Therapist Laura Swanson testified 

and the Court found that the boys are detached from their sisters 

but are bonded to one another. Similarly, the girls are bonded to 

each other and their foster parents. Termination of parental 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-981 | November 8, 2018 Page 14 of 22

rights with regard to [T.W.] and [L.W.] serves their best interest. 

The best interests of [G.W.] and [I.W.] are not so served.

Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 27. Mother now appeals the termination of her 

parental rights to Daughters.

Discussion and Decision

[11] “Decisions to terminate parental rights are among the most difficult our trial 

courts are called upon to make. They are also among the most fact-sensitive—

so we review them with great deference to the trial courts[.]” E.M. v. Ind. Dep’t 

of Child Servs., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014). While the Fourteenth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of a 

parent to establish a home and raise her children, the law allows for the 

termination of those rights when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet her 

responsibility as a parent. Bester v. Lake Cty. Office of Family & Children, 839 

N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ind. 2005); In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2001), trans. denied. That is, parental rights are not absolute and must be 

subordinated to the child’s interests in determining the appropriate disposition 

of a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. In re J.C., 994 N.E.2d 

278, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The purpose of terminating parental rights is not 

to punish the parent but to protect the child. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d at 773. 

Termination of parental rights is proper where the child’s emotional and 

physical development is threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until 

the child is irreversibly harmed such that her physical, mental, and social 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-981 | November 8, 2018 Page 15 of 22

development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child 

relationship. Id. 

[12] When reviewing a termination of parental rights case, we will not reweigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 

149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Instead, we consider only the evidence and 

reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, 

in deference to the trial court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will 

set aside the court’s judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is 

clearly erroneous. Id. at 148-49. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the 

legal conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of 

fact, or the conclusions do not support the judgment. In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 

874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). 

[13] When, as here, a judgment contains specific findings of fact and conclusions 

thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Matter of G.M., 71 N.E.3d 

898, 904-05 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 147). We 

determine whether the evidence supports the findings and whether the findings 

support the judgment. Id. at 905. “‘Findings are clearly erroneous only when 

the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.’” 

Id. (quoting Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996)). “If the evidence 

and inferences support the juvenile court’s decision, we must affirm.” Id. 

[14] To terminate a parent-child relationship, DCS must file a petition that alleges 

and proves:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-981 | November 8, 2018 Page 16 of 22

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least 

six (6) months under a dispositional decree.

(ii) A court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6 

that reasonable efforts for family preservation or 

reunification are not required, including a description of 

the court’s finding, the date of the finding, and the manner 

in which the finding was made.

(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has

been under the supervision of a county office of family and 

children or probation department for at least fifteen (15) 

months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, 

beginning with the date the child is removed from the 

home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in 

need of services or a delinquent child;

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for 

placement outside the home of the parents will not be 

remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation 

of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-981 | November 8, 2018 Page 17 of 22

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS must provide clear and convincing proof of 

these allegations. Matter of G.M., 71 N.E.3d at 903. “Because parents have a 

constitutionally protected right to establish a home and raise their children, the 

State ‘must strictly comply with the statute terminating parental rights.’” Id.

(quoting Platz v. Elkhart Cty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 631 N.E.2d 16, 18 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1994)).

[15] Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s factual findings. As such, she

has waived any argument relating to these unchallenged findings and, therefore, 

they stand as proven. See In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) 

(providing that failure to challenge findings resulted in waiver of argument that 

findings were clearly erroneous), trans. denied. Likewise, Mother does not 

dispute the juvenile court’s conclusions that: (1) prior to termination, 

Daughters had been removed from Mother’s care for at least six months under 

a dispositional decree; (2) there is a reasonable probability that reasons that 

brought about Daughters’ placement outside the home will not be remedied;

and (3) there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Daughters. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 27. Instead, Mother’s sole argument is that the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights is not in Daughters’ best interests. 

[16] Mother argues that she made continuous, dedicated efforts to cooperate and 

comply with the juvenile court and DCS in order to have Daughters returned to 

her care. She notes that she “did such a good job that the court determined that 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-981 | November 8, 2018 Page 18 of 22

[she] was readily able to meet the emotional and behavioral needs of the 

[Sons].” Appellant’s Br. at 13 (citing Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 27). This is why 

Mother contends she is capable of caring for Daughters. Tr. Vol. 2 at 44-45. 

Mother’s assurances notwithstanding, Mother does not dispute the juvenile 

court’s conclusion that, 

The immediate reunification of four such children into the care of 

a mother, who has not yet demonstrated an ability to meet such 

needs outside of a professionally structured environment, cannot 

safely be accomplished. [Daughters] are bonded to their foster 

mother [Long] where they have prospered. [Boys] are not 

significantly bonded to their sisters but love and desire 

reunification with [Mother]. Because of the [M]other’s 

limitations (see the testimony of the CASA volunteer, the foster 

mother, and Denise Wells’ testimony), the Mother is not likely to 

gain the ability to meet the extraordinary therapeutic and 

treatment schedule required for the four children, meet their 

individual behavioral and emotional demands, and maintain a 

household.

Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 27. 

[17] Mother also does not challenge the juvenile court’s conclusion that Daughters

need a safe, stable, and nurturing home environment. 

If parental rights are terminated with regard to [T.W.] and 

[L.W.], they would be provided, through adoption, with a parent 

who has demonstrated the present ability and means to meet 

their special needs on a sustainable, permanent basis. In 

contrast, [I.W.] and [G.W.] do not have a present home in which 

permanency could be established excepting the home of their 

mother. The Court finds from the totality of the evidence that 

the Mother is readily able to meet the emotional and behavioral 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-981 | November 8, 2018 Page 19 of 22

needs of the boys. Separation of the siblings, while generally not 

a tenable position, is appropriate in this case. Therapist Laura 

Swanson testified and the Court found that the boys are detached 

from their sisters but are bonded to one another. Similarly, the 

girls are bonded to each other and their foster parents. 

Termination of parental rights with regard to [T.W.] and [L.W.] 

serves their best interest. The best interests of [G.W.] and [I.W.] 

are not so served.

Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 27. Long testified that it was her desire to adopt the 

Daughters and that she had already completed all of her adoption classes to do 

so.9 Tr. Vol. 2 at 111.

[18] Mother reiterates that the involuntary termination of parental rights is an 

extreme measure, designed to be used only as a last resort when all other 

reasonable efforts have failed. We agree. Here, the near-drowning of L.W.

prompted DCS to remove Children from Mother’s care. Once removed, DCS 

determined that Children had special needs, which required counseling and ongoing services. Mother cooperated with DCS, she completed parenting classes, 

and participated in, among other activities, an anger management class, an 

alcohol treatment program, individual therapy, and visitation with Children. 

However, while the juvenile court concluded that Mother had improved 

 

9 Mother argues that Long had no interest in the goal of reunification for Daughters. Appellant’s Br. at 14. 

Assuming without deciding that this was true, Mother’s rights were terminated not because of Long’s 

position on reunification, but because it was determined that Daughters had been out of Mother’s care for 

more than six months, the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied, 

removal of Children was in their best interests, and the State had a satisfactory plan for their care and 

treatment. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-981 | November 8, 2018 Page 20 of 22

enough to care for two children, it determined that she could not address the 

needs of and care for four special needs children. Accordingly, the juvenile 

court was faced with the difficult question of whether Mother’s inability to care 

for two of her children meant that her rights would have to be terminated as to 

all four children. 

[19] In determining what is in the best interests of a child, the juvenile court is 

required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality 

of the evidence. In re J.S., 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). In 

making this determination, the juvenile court must subordinate the interests of 

the parent to that of the child involved. Matter of G.M., 71 N.E.3d at 903. The 

court need not wait until a child is harmed irreversibly before terminating the 

parent-child relationship. In re J.S., 906 N.E.2d at 236. The recommendation 

of a DCS case manager and CASA to terminate parental rights, in addition to 

evidence the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient 

to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in a child’s best 

interests. Id.

[20] Mother challenges the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental rights to 

Daughters while not terminating her rights to Sons, suggesting that if the 

evidence is not sufficient to terminate as to Sons, it cannot be sufficient to 

terminate Mother’s rights as to Daughters. Noting that Sons’ and Daughters’ 

situations were not the same, we disagree. Here, the trial court did not 

conclude that DCS failed to prove all the elements required to terminate 

Mother’s rights to Sons; rather, the trial court specifically found that DCS had 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-981 | November 8, 2018 Page 21 of 22

not proven an adequate plan of permanency for Sons. That finding alone 

precluded termination of Mother’s parental rights to Sons because it also served 

as the basis for the juvenile court’s conclusion that termination was not in Sons’

best interests.

[21] While such a disposition is rare, in In re I.A., 903 N.E.2d 146 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2009), we affirmed a juvenile court’s determination to terminate a mother’s 

parental right to one of her five children, while not terminating her parental 

rights to her other four children. We found the following evidence was 

sufficient to support the trial court’s determination that termination of mother’s 

parental rights as to the one child was in child’s best interests: (1) child had 

never been in his mother’s care and he had never been with his siblings on a 

day-to-day basis; (2) child had been in the care of the same licensed foster 

parents with whom he had forged a strong bond and who were responsible for 

taking him to his doctor and therapy appointments; and mother had shown 

indifference to child since before he was even born. Like the child in I.A., T.W. 

was in Mother’s care for two and a half years, and L.W. was in Mother’s care 

for twenty-two months. At the time of the final termination hearing, Daughters 

had lived together in Long’s care for more than three years, which was at least

half their lives. Long and Daughters were bonded, and Long provided 

Daughters with the necessary treatment for their special needs. Therapist Laura 

Swanson testified, and the Court found, that Sons are bonded to each other but 

detached from Daughters. Tr. Vol. 3 at 85. Similarly, Daughters are bonded to 

each other and their foster mother. Long expressed a desire to adopt Daughters 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-981 | November 8, 2018 Page 22 of 22

and T.W. expressed a desire to remain with Long. Tr. Vol. 2 at 111, 117. The 

juvenile court recognized that “[s]eparation of the siblings, while generally not a 

tenable position, is appropriate in this case.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 27. It 

was not clearly erroneous for the juvenile court to determine that termination of 

Mother’s parental rights to Daughters was in their best interests. 

[22] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.