J-S07006-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

KEVIN MICHAEL MOTTER,

Appellant No. 1101 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 25, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-38-CR-0000780-2013

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and OTT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 20, 2015

Appellant, Kevin Michael Motter, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence of 30 days’ incarceration, followed by 60 days’ house arrest, 

imposed after he was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol 

(DUI) and the summary offense of careless driving. Appellant challenges the 

trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion to suppress. We affirm.

On March 1, 2013, Pennsylvania State Trooper John Huffstutler 

stopped Appellant’s vehicle for the summary offense of following too closely, 

75 Pa.C.S. § 3310(a). When the trooper approached Appellant’s vehicle, he 

smelled a strong odor of alcohol on Appellant’s breath, and observed that 

Appellant’s eyes were bloodshot and glassy. See Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 

8/15/14, at 4. After having Appellant perform several field sobriety tests, 

Trooper Huffstutler placed him under arrest for suspicion of DUI. Id. A 
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sample of Appellant’s blood was subsequently taken, confirming that he had 

a blood alcohol content of .169 percent. Id. 

Based on these facts, Appellant was charged with DUI, as well as the 

summary offenses of following too closely and careless driving. Prior to trial, 

he filed a motion to suppress, arguing that Trooper Huffstutler did not 

possess probable cause to stop Appellant’s vehicle for following too closely, a 

violation of the Motor Vehicle Code (MVC). A suppression hearing was 

conducted on November 6, 2013, after which the trial court denied 

Appellant’s motion to suppress. Appellant proceeded to a jury trial on April 

7, 2014, and was convicted of DUI and careless driving. The jury acquitted 

him of the charge of following too closely. Appellant was subsequently 

sentenced to a term of 30 days’ incarceration, followed by 60 days’ house 

arrest.1 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, as well as a timely Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Herein, he 

raises two issues for our review:

I. Did the suppression court err in denying Appellant’s motion to 

suppress evidence when the police officer failed to articulate 

specific facts that would provide that he had probable cause to 

believe Appellant was in violation of section 3310 of the [MVC]?

____________________________________________

1 The trial court notes in its opinion that Appellant received a sentence of 

incarceration because this was Appellant’s second DUI conviction. See TCO 

at 5.
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II. Did the police officer fail to articulate specific facts that would 

provide that he had probable cause to believe Appellant was in 

violation of section 3310 of the [MVC]? 

Appellant’s Brief at 6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 

Initially, we note that Appellant’s two issues differ in only one regard. 

In Appellant’s first claim, he alleges that Trooper Huffstatler’s suppression 

hearing testimony was insufficient to demonstrate that the trooper had 

probable cause to stop his vehicle. In Appellant’s second issue, he argues 

that the trooper’s trial testimony was also insufficient to prove probable 

cause. However, in reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we only 

assess whether the court’s decision is supported by the evidence presented 

at the suppression hearing. See In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1084 (Pa. 2013) 

(concluding that the language of Pa.R.Crim.P. 581 (governing the 

suppression of evidence) “strongly suggests that the record of the 

suppression hearing is intended to be the complete record for suppression 

issues, and those issues are to be finally determined before trial, not during 

trial or after trial”). Consequently, we will not consider Appellant’s argument 

regarding Trooper Huffstatler’s trial testimony in assessing the court’s denial 

of his pretrial motion to suppress.

Our standard of review for denial of a suppression motion is as follows:

In reviewing an order from a suppression court, we consider the 

Commonwealth’s evidence, and only so much of the defendant’s 

evidence as remains uncontradicted. We accept the suppression 

court’s factual findings which are supported by the evidence and 

reverse only when the court draws erroneous conclusions from 

those facts.

Commonwealth v. Hoopes, 722 A.2d 172, 174-75 (Pa. Super. 1998). 
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We begin our assessment of the suppression court’s decision by noting 

that it properly concluded that Trooper Huffstatler was required to possess 

probable cause to justify the stop of Appellant’s vehicle for a violation of 75 

Pa.C.S. § 3310(a), as the stop did not “serve a stated investigatory 

purpose.” Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa. Super. 

2010). In Feczko, this Court held that “[m]ere reasonable suspicion will not 

justify a vehicle stop when the driver’s detention cannot serve an 

investigatory purpose relevant to the suspected violation. In such an 

instance, it is encumbent [sic] upon the officer to articulate specific facts 

possessed by him, at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide 

probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of 

some provision of the [MVC].” Id. at 1291 (citations, internal quotation 

marks, and emphasis omitted).

Appellant contends that Trooper Huffstatler failed to articulate 

sufficient facts to prove that he had probable cause that Appellant’s vehicle 

was following too closely in violation of section 3310(a) of the MVC. That 

statute states:

(a) General rule.--The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow 

another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, 

having due regard for the speed of the vehicles and the traffic 

upon and the condition of the highway.

75 Pa.C.S. § 3310(a). Appellant primarily avers that Trooper Huffstatler 

failed to proffer any testimony regarding the speed at which the vehicles 

were traveling. He maintains that “[w]ithout any evidence of speed, there 
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can be no probable cause to stop Appellant’s vehicle.” Appellant’s Brief at 

15. In support, Appellant relies on this Court’s decision in Commonwealth 

v. Phinn, 761 A.2d 176 (Pa. Super. 2000). There, we found that an officer’s 

observation of the defendant’s vehicle “traveling less than a motorcyclelength distance behind a tractor-trailer on Interstate 80 where the vehicles’ 

respective rates of speed were at or near the speed limit for that highway[,]” 

was sufficient to justify the stop of the defendant’s vehicle for a violation of 

section 3310(a). Id. at 180 (emphasis added).

While in Phinn, we considered the officer’s testimony regarding the 

speed of the defendant’s vehicle in assessing the legality of the stop, we did 

not hold that there must be evidence regarding speed in order to prove that 

a stop under section 3310(a) is valid. In any event, Trooper Huffstatler did 

offer testimony regarding Appellant’s speed. At the suppression hearing, he 

stated that he observed Appellant’s vehicle “pull[] out from a stop sign while 

accelerating at an unreasonably high rate of speed....” N.T., 11/6/13, at 4 

(emphasis added). Trooper Huffstatler went on to state:

[Trooper Huffstatler:] [Appellant’s] vehicle then continued to 

travel east onto Market Street in the borough of Jonestown, 

approached the rear of another vehicle traveling the same 

direction ahead of [Appellant’s] vehicle, and then began to follow 

that vehicle at the intersection of Mulberry Street and Market 

Street at a distance not reasonable. Based on the speeds of 

these vehicles and the roadway conditions, it is an urban area, if 

there had been an application of the brakes by the lead driver 

for any reason, abruptly or otherwise, it would have caused 

[Appellant’s] vehicle to essentially rear-end the lead vehicle.
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Id. at 5 (emphasis added). The trooper later elaborated that Appellant’s 

vehicle was within five feet of the vehicle in front of him. Id. at 5-6. He 

also added that Appellant’s vehicle was traveling in this manner at 

approximately 4:30 p.m. on a weekday. Id. at 4. When asked why he 

ultimately decided to stop Appellant’s vehicle, the trooper stated: “Based on 

[] what I observed, the speed [at] which the vehicles were traveling, I 

immediately observed that it wasn’t reasonable[,] that the distance would 

have constituted a hazard so I did initiate a traffic stop.” Id. at 7 (emphasis 

added).

In sum, Trooper Hoffstatler’s testimony indicated that he considered 

Appellant’s speed in assessing whether Appellant was following the lead car 

“more closely than is reasonable and prudent....” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3310(a). The 

trooper ultimately determined that, based on the speed at which Appellant’s 

vehicle and the lead car were traveling, the distance between them was 

unreasonable and hazardous, as Appellant’s vehicle would have collided with 

the lead vehicle had that car applied its brakes. We conclude that this 

“evidence clearly bespeaks a hazard within the contemplation of [s]ection 

3310.” Phinn, 761 A.2d at 180. Therefore, the record supports the 

suppression court’s legal determination that Trooper Huffstatler had 

probable cause to stop Appellant’s vehicle for a violation of section 3310(a). 
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/20/2015