[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 12-13973

Non-Argument Calendar

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Agency No. A096-012-323

HENRY VARGAS PERDOMO,

 Petitioner,

versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

 Respondent.

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Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

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(March 14, 2013)

Before CARNES, BARKETT and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Henry Vargas-Perdomo seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 

(“BIA”) dismissal of his appeal from the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his 

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application for special rule cancellation of removal based on the determination that 

he was never the spouse to a lawful permanent resident. On appeal, VargasPerdomo argues that, in denying his application for special rule cancellation of 

removal, the IJ erred by determining that his prior marriage never existed and that 

he was not a spouse of a lawful permanent resident because a Florida court had 

annulled his marriage. After careful review, we deny the petition.

We review only the BIA’s decision, except to the extent that it expressly 

adopts the IJ’s opinion. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 

2001). To the extent that the BIA’s determination was based on a legal 

determination, we review de novo. Delgado v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 487 F.3d 855, 860 

(11th Cir. 2007). In a case like this one, where the BIA issues a single-judge, nonprecedential decision and does not rely on any precedent in reaching its decision, 

we do not give the decision any deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 

Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See Quinchia v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 

552 F.3d 1255, 1258 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that a single-judge, nonprecedential BIA opinion is not entitled to Chevron deference where it does not 

rely on existing BIA or federal court precedent). 

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2), which provides a “special rule for battered 

spouse or child” aliens, the Attorney General has discretion to cancel the removal 

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of an alien who demonstrates: (1) the alien has been battered or subjected to 

extreme cruelty by a spouse or parent who is or was a lawful permanent resident; 

(2) continuous physical presence in the United States for at least three years 

preceding the date of the application; (3) good moral character during that period; 

(4) a lack of certain criminal convictions; and (5) that removal would result in 

extreme hardship to the alien, the alien’s child, or the alien’s parent. 8 U.S.C. § 

1229b(b)(2)(A). 

In Florida, a marriage may be annulled by a party who was the victim of a 

marriage ceremony procured by fraud and deception of the other party, and when 

the marriage had not been consummated. Cooper v. Cooper, 163 So. 35, 37 (Fla. 

1935). A marriage procured by fraud generally is voidable only, and thus, is valid 

and binding on the parties until annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction. 

Tyson v. State, 90 So. 622, 623 (Fla. 1922). However, when a marriage is void, it 

is treated as if no marriage had ever taken place. See Kuehmsted v. Turnwall, 138 

So. 775, 777 (Fla. 1932). Regardless of whether state law indicates that an 

annulment rendered a marriage void or voidable, the BIA has provided that in 

some cases, under the relation back doctrine, the annulment of a voidable marriage 

may be treated as if the marriage never existed if “the purposes of justice are 

deemed to require.” See Matter of T—, 8 I. & N. Dec. 493, 496 (BIA 1959). 

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As an initial matter, we are only reviewing the BIA’s final decision in this 

case since the BIA did not expressly adopt the IJ’s decision. See Al Najjar, 257 

F.3d at 1284. Further, because the BIA’s decision is a single-judge, nonprecedential opinion, and the BIA did not rely upon a precedential opinion, we do 

not owe the BIA’s opinion Chevron deference. See Quinchia, 552 F.3d at 1258. 

Regardless, the BIA did not err in denying Vargas-Perdomo’s application for 

special rule cancellation of removal. We recognize that under Florida law, a 

marriage procured by fraud is generally voidable, and thus, is valid until the time it 

is annulled. Tyson, 90 So. at 623. Despite this general rule, however, a Florida 

state court declared in a Final Judgment of Annulment that upon the annulment of 

Vargas-Perdomo’s marriage his status was restored to “never married.” Since the 

Florida court specifically declared that Vargas-Perdomo was “never married,” as a 

legal matter, there never was any marriage in existence between Vargas-Perdomo 

and his now annulled former spouse. Kuehmsted, 138 So. at 777. It therefore 

follows that Vargas-Perdomo was never the spouse of a lawful permanent resident, 

which is one of the requirements for special cancellation of removal under the 

statute. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A). Because he does not meet this 

requirement, the BIA did not err in finding him statutorily ineligible for special 

rule cancellation of removal. 

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PETITION DENIED. 

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