Filed 2/20/14 Desmet v. Martindale CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION THREE 

VICKI M. BROWN DESMET, 

 Plaintiff and Appellant, 

 v. 

JAMES H. MARTINDALE et al., 

 Defendants and Respondents. 

 B240472 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. KC054535) 

 APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

Salvatore Sirna, Judge. Modified and affirmed. 

 J. Cranor Richter for Plaintiff and Appellant. 

Sloan Law and James D. Sloan for Defendants and Respondents. 

_________________________
2 

 Plaintiff Vicki M. Brown Desmet (Desmet) appeals from a judgment in favor of 

defendants James H. Martindale and Lynette A. Martindale in which the trial court 

determined that an easement running over the Martindales’ property does not benefit real 

property owned by Desmet. Desmet also challenges the trial court’s determination that 

the easement was extinguished. We affirm the judgment as to Desmet. We modify as 

overbroad the portions of the judgment that determine the easement in question is 

extinguished, and the Martindales’ property is no longer burdened by the easement 

because a necessary and indispensable party was not a party to this action. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

 Desmet’s property is at 442 Oak Knoll (Lot 14 of Tract No. 24024) in the City of 

Glendora and also includes the east 70 feet of Lot 13 of Tract No. 24024, which is the 

adjacent property. In June 1964, the owner of Lot 13 (Sierra Jose, Inc.) subdivided the 

lot without approval from the City of Glendora and sold Lot 13 “excepting therefrom the 

Easterly seventy (70) feet thereof.” The Martindales’ property at 502 Oak Knoll (Lot 11) 

is adjacent to Lot 13. The easement in question is for “ingress and egress,” over the 

southwest portion of 502 Oak Knoll along the southern border of Lot 13. 

 Desmet filed a declaratory relief action against the Martindales, alleging the 

easement benefited the east 70 feet of Lot 13 and sought to establish an easement by 

express grant, implication, operation of law, or prescription. She also stated a cause of 

action to quiet title and sought injunctive relief. The Martindales responded with a crosscomplaint for statutory abandonment of easement (Civ. Code, § 887.040), declaratory 

relief seeking a judicial determination of the rights and duties of Desmet and “any 

unknown cross-defendants’ assertion of an interest” in the easement, and injunctive 

relief. By the time of trial, the Martindales’ second amended cross-complaint did not 

assert a cause of action for statutory abandonment. 

 During the four-day bench trial, several witnesses testified. 

 

1 When the challenge is to the sufficiency of the evidence, we recite the facts in the 

light most favorable to the prevailing party. (Greenwich S.F., LLC v. Wong (2010) 

190 Cal.App.4th 739, 747.) 
3 

1. History of the Haubrock Easement 

 In June 1964, following the subdivision of Lot 13, A. Charles Haubrock and 

Phyllis Noreen Haubrock purchased Lot 13, with the exception of the east 70 feet, 

commonly referred to as 450 Oak Knoll.2

 In November 1964, Martin C. Bonar and 

Rosebud E. Bonar, owners of 442 Oak Knoll (Lot 14), bought the east 70 feet of Lot 13, 

creating a flag lot. The east 70 feet of Lot 13 and the eastern portion of Lot 14 include a 

steep slope and flat plateau. 442 Oak Knoll (Lot 14) is accessible by common driveway 

from Oak Knoll Drive. The east 70 feet of Lot 13 is accessible from stairs located on 

442 Oak Knoll (Lot 14). 

 In December 1964, the owner of 502 Oak Knoll granted the Haubrocks an 

easement over the southern portion of the property. The “Haubrock Easement” reads: 

“For a valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, [¶] Willis E. 

McKnight and Dorothy G. McKnight, husband & wife, [¶] hereby grants to [¶] A. 

Charles Haubrock and Phyllis Noreen Haubrock . . . [¶] . . . [a]n easement for ingress and 

egress” over the southwestern portion of 502 Oak Knoll. (Capitalization omitted.) The 

location of the easement and extent of the easement is described by reference to a 

recorded subdivision map. The easement runs the entire length of Lot 13, including the 

east 70 feet. The Haubrocks, however, did not own the east 70 feet of Lot 13. 

 The Haubrock Easement appears in the chain of title to 450 Oak Knoll as it was 

transferred by mesne conveyance from the Haubrocks to the present owner, Lee Charles 

Garver, who acquired the property in 1997. Since 1980, 442 Oak Knoll and the east 70 

feet of Lot 13 have been sold as a single parcel.3

 The Haubrock Easement does not 

appear in the chain of title to 442 Oak Knoll. 

 

2

 For a period of time, the Bonars also owned 450 Oak Knoll. In 1972, the Bonars 

conveyed 450 Oak Knoll to their son and his wife. 

3

 In 1970, the Bonars conveyed 442 Oak Knoll to their son, Ryan Bonar. In 1979, 

Ryan Bonar executed a deed conveying title to 442 Oak Knoll, but not the east 70 feet of 

Lot 13. Litigation ensued over the east 70 feet of Lot 13. Ryan Bonar, thereafter, 

conveyed the east 70 feet of Lot 13 to the buyers of 442 Oak Knoll. 
4 

 The Martindales were aware of the Haubrock Easement when they purchased 

502 Oak Knoll. 

2. Use of the Haubrock Easement 

 Ryan Bonar, the Bonars’ son, testified there was a dirt road on the Haubrock 

Easement that reached the east 70 feet of Lot 13. For several years, he drove “100 loads” 

of horse manure up to his mother’s garden on a plateau portion of the east 70 feet of Lot 

13. Sometime in 1985 or 1986, he constructed a fence around 450 Oak Knoll that had a 

gate to access the east 70 feet of Lot 13 from the Haubrock Easement on 502 Oak Knoll.

He testified that in 1986 there was no fence on 502 Oak Knoll separating the properties. 

This testimony, however, was controverted by the former owner of 502 Oak Knoll. 

 Geraldine Atchley owned 502 Oak Knoll from 1972 through 1998. She testified 

there was no dirt road or dirt path on her property that could have been used to access the 

east 70 feet of Lot 13. Atchley installed an electric gate across her driveway that would 

not permit any access. She also testified that a chain link fence, running east and west 

along the southern border of 502 Oak Knoll, with no access to the east 70 feet of Lot 13, 

already was in place when she bought the property in 1972. The Bonars’ fence ran 

parallel to her fence along the southern property line. 

 By 1999, when the Martindales bought 502 Oak Knoll, the southern border of the 

property encompassing the Haubrock Easement was densely landscaped with trees and 

shrubs. The chain link fence remained in place on the Martindales’ property and there 

was no gate that permitted access to the east 70 feet of Lot 13. There also was no access 

road to the east 70 feet of Lot 13. 

 Garver, the current owner of 450 Oak Knoll, bought the property in 1997 and 

testified there is no road on 502 Oak Knoll. He also testified there is a fence between his 

property and 502 Oak Knoll. 

3. Desmet Attempts to Use the Haubrock Easement 

 In 2002, Desmet first approached the Martindales about an easement through their 

property to access the east 70 feet of Lot 13. She engaged a title company to investigate 

the accessibility of her property through easements on the adjoining properties. The title 
5 

company representative came to the conclusion that the Haubrock Easement benefited the 

east 70 feet of Lot 13. Desmet wrote a letter to the Martindales in which she asked the 

Martindales to “remove the portion of the fence at the old gate access so [she could] start 

removing the debris, grade a road to the property, and start accessing the property.” 

4. Experts’ Opinions on the Haubrock Easement 

 The parties’ experts presented differing opinions as to whether the Haubrock 

Easement benefited the east 70 feet of Lot 13. Desmet’s expert opined that because the 

Haubrock Easement extended the length of Lot 13 and was not necessary to access the 

front half of the property, its sole purpose was to access the east 70 feet of Lot 13. The 

expert testified that based upon the topography map he prepared, an existing graded road 

indicated the easement “was basically there to serve the upper portion of Lot 13.” 

 The Martindales’ expert disagreed with testimony that a road existed on 502 Oak 

Knoll to access the east 70 feet of Lot 13. The expert also questioned the reliability of 

the contours on the topography map prepared by Desmet’s expert that indicated an access 

road existed. The Martindales’ expert compared the topography map with his 

measurements and concluded there had never been a road to access the east 70 feet of Lot 

13. 

5. The Statement of Decision, Judgment, Appeal 

 In its final statement of decision, the trial court concluded the Haubrock Easement 

was created by express grant deed. “The operative words of conveyance are clear and 

unambiguous, creating a right of access in favor of the Haubrocks over a specific portion 

of 502 Oak Knoll, at the time owned by the McKnights.” The Haubrocks owned Lot 13, 

with the exclusion of the east 70 feet of Lot 13. The court also concluded that the 

Haubrock Easement is appurtenant to the land. “In other words, the Haubrock 

[E]asement attaches to and runs with (passes with) the easement holder’s land, in this 

case, Lot 13 (450 Oak Knoll); not the east 70 feet of Lot 13.”4 

 

4 The statement of decision concluded Desmet did not have an easement by 

implication, easement by prescription, or easement by necessity. Desmet does not 

challenge these conclusions on appeal. 
6 

 In ruling on the Martindales’ declaratory relief action, the trial court concluded 

that the Haubrock Easement was extinguished by prescription. 

 The court entered an amended judgment (judgment) against Desmet. The 

judgment states: 

 “Defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor and against Plaintiff on their 

cross-claim for declaratory relief, the Court finding as follows: 

“1. The Haubrock Easement, as identified in the grant deed recorded in the 

official records of Los Angeles County December 29, 1964 [Instrument No. 

4339] is extinguished and of no further effect; 

“2. The Haubrock Easement never attached or became appurtenant to the east 

70 of Lot 13 of Tract No. 24024, City of Glendora, California; 

“3. The property owned by Defendants, commonly known as 502 Oak Knoll 

Drive, Glendora, California, is free of the burden of the Haubrock 

Easement; and 

“4. No easement has been created by implication, necessity and/or prescription 

in favor of Plaintiff and/or the property commonly known as 442 Oak Knoll 

Drive, Glendora, California (consisting of Lot 14 and the east 70 feet of Lot 

13 of Tract No. 24024, Glendora, California), and against Defendants 

and/or the property commonly known as 502 Oak Knoll Drive, Glendora, 

California.” 

 Desmet timely appealed. 

CONTENTIONS 

 Desmet challenges the judgment and raises the following three contentions: 

(1) the statement of decision is inadequate because the trial court “failed to properly 

consider appellant’s legal argument that an illegal subdivision of the property resulted in 

the owner of the east 70 feet of Lot 13 having a sufficient legal and/or equitable interest 

in the property for the Haubrock Easement to attach and run with the land to successive 

purchasers”; (2) the judgment improperly extinguished the Haubrock Easement because 

the Martindales’ amended cross-complaint did not include a cause of action for statutory 
7 

abandonment of easement; and (3) insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s 

conclusion that the Haubrock Easement has been extinguished. 

DISCUSSION 

1. Adequacy of Statement of Decision 

 Desmet challenges the adequacy of the statement of decision, arguing that the trial 

court was obligated to address her legal arguments regarding the effect of the illegal 

subdivision of Lot 13. On appeal, as in the trial court, Desmet argues that because of the 

illegal subdivision of Lot 13 in 1964, the purchaser of the east 70 feet of Lot 13 (the 

Bonars) had “a sufficient legal and/or equitable interest in the property for the Haubrock 

Easement to attach and run with the land to successive purchasers.” Stated another way, 

in 1964 when the Haubrocks and the Bonars each acquired a portion of Lot 13, the seller 

(Sierra Jose) “retained equitable title to the east 70 feet of Lot 13 until such time as 

compliance with the Subdivision Map Act and/or local regulations of the City of 

Glendora is obtained.” Desmet raised these same arguments in her closing argument 

briefs and in her objections and reply to the proposed statement of decision. 

 The trial court does not have to address all the legal issues raised by the parties. 

(Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 547, 559.) Code of 

Civil Procedure section 632 provides that at the request of any party, a court must issue a 

statement of decision explaining “the factual and legal basis for its decision as to each of 

the principal controverted issues at trial.” 

 The 25-page statement of decision sets forth the factual and legal basis for the 

court’s conclusion that the operative words in the Haubrock Easement were “clear and 

unambiguous, creating a right of access in favor of the Haubrocks over a specific portion 

of 502 Oak Knoll.” Because the court concluded the Haubrock Easement is an easement 

appurtenant to the land, it attaches and runs with the easement holder’s land, which 

excluded the east 70 feet of Lot 13. The statement of decision also addressed and 

rejected Desmet’s expert testimony that the Haubrock Easement was intended to benefit 
8 

the east 70 feet of Lot 13. The trial court’s determination on this issue satisfied its 

statutory obligation.5

 Moreover, the statement of decision actually did address the subdivision of Lot 13. 

The trial court determined that no easement was created by implication to which Desmet 

may claim a benefit to the east 70 feet of Lot 13. In reaching this conclusion, the trial 

court analyzed the significance of the subdivision of Lot 13. “When Sierra Jose split Lot 

13 without City of Glendora approval on June 17, 1964 and sold Lot 13, except the east 

70 feet, to the Haubrocks, and [sold] the east 70 feet of Lot 13 to the Bonars, a potential 

easement by implication was created. However, Plaintiff does not seek such relief from 

the owner of 450 Oak Knoll (Lot 13, except the east 70 feet), and the requirement cannot 

be satisfied as to Defendant Martindale.” 

 Desmet’s contention is not that the statement of decision is inadequate, but that the 

trial court legally erred in concluding the Haubrock Easement did not benefit her 

property. Although the Haubrock Easement does not specifically identify Lot 13, with 

the exception of the east 70 feet, the trial court relied on the well-settled legal principle 

that the benefit of an appurtenant easement attaches only to the land of the easement 

holder; it cannot be extended to benefit additional property that was not part of the 

dominant tenement at the time the easement was created. (Buehler v. OregonWashington Plywood Corp. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 520, 527; see Civ. Code, § 1104; 6 Miller 

& Starr, Cal. Real Estate (3d ed. 2006) Easements, § 15:6, p. 15-25.) The evidence 

presented at trial established the Haubrocks owned 450 Oak Knoll, with the exception of 

 

5 As the Martindales point out, the statement of decision also reads: “The court has 

read and considered the objections to the Proposed Statement of Decision Filed by 

Plaintiff VICKI M. BROWN DESMET and by Defendants JAMES H. MARTINDALE 

and LYNETTE A. MARTINDALE, including each parties’ respective replies thereto.” 

The trial court overruled Desmet’s objection that the conclusions of law “fail to address 

the issues raised by Plaintiff that the illegal subdivision caused by the conveyance by 

Sierra Jose to Haubrock (as to Lot 13, excepting the east 70 feet of Lot 13) and the 

conveyance by Sierra Jose to Bonar (as to the east 70 feet of Lot 13) created legal title in 

Haubrock as to Lot 13, and an equitable title in Bonar as to the easterly 70 feet of Lot 

13.” 
9 

the east 70 feet of Lot 13, at the time the Haubrock Easement was created. Thus, the trial 

court did not err. 

 Desmet repeats the argument that because Lot 13 was not legally separated in 

compliance with the Subdivision Map Act (Gov. Code, § 66410 et seq.) and approved by 

the City of Glendora, the Haubrocks actually held legal title to all of Lot 13 at the time 

the Haubrock Easement was created, and the Bonars held equitable title to the east 70 feet 

of Lot 13. Alternatively, Desmet argues equitable title remained in the name of Sierra 

Jose, the company that subdivided Lot 13. These arguments are buttressed by the 

testimony of the City of Glendora planning manager who stated the city considers Lot 13 

as a whole. Thus, it is Desmet’s position that until Lot 13 is subdivided in compliance 

with the Subdivision Map Act and the local regulations of the City of Glendora, the 

Haubrock Easement benefits all of Lot 13. 

 Desmet has no legal support for her position.6 The remedy for a violation of the 

Subdivision Map Act is against the grantor of the illegally subdivided property, not to 

further burden the servient tenement. Any deed of conveyance, sale or contract to sell 

real property that has been divided, or has resulted from a division, in violation of the 

Subdivision Map Act or local ordinances enacted pursuant to the Subdivision Map Act is 

voidable at the sole option of the grantee, buyer or person contracting to purchase, heirs, 

personal representatives, or trustees in insolvency or bankruptcy within one year after the 

 

6 Desmet relies on cases that discuss equitable remedies and equitable title but not 

in the context of failure to comply with statutory requirements to subdivide properties 

(e.g., O’Keefe v. Aptos Land & Water Co. (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 772, 780-782), or she 

relies on cases in which the purchaser, upon discovery that the seller illegally subdivided 

property, can either affirm the agreement or disaffirm the agreement and recover the 

sums paid less any offsets (Perkins v. Sommers (1953) 117 Cal.App.2d 32, 34). (See also 

Wilson v. Anderson (1930) 109 Cal.App. 467, 473-475 [in complaint seeking quiet title, 

the court may enter such judgment as equities of the case may require].) Desmet also 

cites Moylan v. Dykes (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 561, 571-572. Moylan is inapposite 

because it holds the conveyance of the dominant tenement transfers all appurtenant 

easements to the grantee, even though the easements are not specifically mentioned in the 

deeds. Moylan further concludes that an easement for ingress and egress reserved in a 

deed may be appurtenant to a parcel it does not touch. (Id. at p. 573.) 
10 

date of discovery of the violation. (Gov. Code, § 66499.32, subd. (a).) Any grantee may 

within one year of the date of discovery of such violation, bring an action against the 

person who illegally subdivided the property or successors who have actual or 

constructive knowledge of the division. (Gov. Code, § 66499.32, subd. (b).) The 

additional remedy of injunctive relief is available to enjoin any attempted or proposed 

subdivision that does not comply with the Subdivision Map Act or local ordinances. 

(Gov. Code, § 66499.33.) Thus, the failure to comply with the statutory requirements to 

subdivide Lot 13 does not burden the servient tenement (the Martindales’ property) 

beyond the express grant in the Haubrock Easement. 

2. Statutory Abandonment Was Not Addressed in the Statement of Decision 

 Desmet next contends the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction because the 

statement of decision effectively rules on the Martindales’ statutory abandonment of the 

easement (Civ. Code, § 887.040), even though that claim had been dismissed before trial. 

The proposed statement of decision incorrectly referred to the first amended crosscomplaint and addressed the statutory abandonment cause of action. Desmet objected. 

The trial court corrected the error. The statement of decision and judgment supersede 

any tentative decision. (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 268.) 

The statement of decision addresses the Martindales’ declaratory relief action, which was 

properly before the court. 

3. Judgment Extinguishing the Haubrock Easement is Overbroad 

 Desmet also contends the evidence does not support the trial court’s conclusion 

that the Haubrock Easement has been extinguished by prescription because the statement 

of decision contains no findings of hostile use, citing only evidence of nonuse by the 

owners of 450 Oak Knoll. “An easement obtained by grant . . . may indeed be lost by 

prescription, e.g., when the owner of the servient tenement makes a use of his or her own 

land in a manner which is adverse to the rights represented by the easement.” (Tract 

Development Services, Inc. v. Kepler (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1374, 1386; see also Sevier 

v. Locher (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1082, 1084-1085.) 
11 

 In light of our conclusion that the Haubrock Easement did not benefit Desmet’s 

property, we need not address Desmet’s argument that there is insufficient evidence to 

support the judgment in favor of the Martindales as it pertains to extinguishing Desmet’s 

rights to the Haubrock Easement. 

 Desmet acknowledges that the Martindales could seek a declaration extinguishing 

any rights she might have with respect to the Haubrock Easement. But, she challenges 

the judgment insofar as the trial court extinguished the Haubrock Easement and declared 

the Martindale property no longer burdened by the Haubrock Easement because it affects 

the rights of others, including Garver, the current owner of 450 Oak Knoll and successor 

in interest to the Haubrocks, who is not a party to the action.7 

 In this case, Garver is a necessary and indispensable party to a determination that 

the Haubrock Easement is extinguished. A necessary party is one who claims an interest 

relating to the subject matter of the litigation. (Code Civ. Proc., § 389, subd. (a).) Such a 

party is indispensable if a ruling may impair the ability to protect his interest and leaves a 

party to the action subject to a substantial risk of multiple or inconsistent obligations by 

reason of his claimed interest. (Ibid.) 

 Garver is a successor in interest to the Haubrocks, and he has an interest in the 

adjudication of the Martindales’ claim to extinguish the Haubrock Easement. He is an 

indispensable party because his absence impairs his ability to protect that interest, and 

subjects the Martindales to a substantial risk of otherwise inconsistent obligations by 

reason of Garver’s interest. Thus, to the extent the court limited its adjudication to the 

interests of parties participating in this action – the Martindales and Desmet – its 

judgment is not overbroad. Because the judgment on the cross-complaint appears to go 

beyond the parties to the action and extinguish the Haubrock Easement as to all parties, it 

 

7 Garver testified he was not aware of any easement that would give him the right of 

ingress and egress over the Martindale property. “Q Now, are you aware of an easement 

to the North of your property that’s on the Martindale’s property that would give you a 

right of ingress and egress over to their property? [¶] A No, I have no right other than 

Martindale’s permission, but no legal right, to trespass onto his driveway.” 
12 

is overbroad. The court could not adjudicate the easement rights, if any, of Garver, the 

current owner of 450 Oak Knoll. 

DISPOSITION 

 The judgment on the Martindales’ cross-complaint for declaratory relief is 

modified as follows: Finding 1 is modified to read: “The Haubrock Easement, as 

identified in the grant deed recorded in official records of Los Angeles County 

December 29, 1964 [Instrument No. 4339] is extinguished only as against Desmet.” 

Finding 3 is deleted as overbroad as stated in the opinion. In all other respects, the 

judgment is affirmed. 

 The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

 ALDRICH, J. 

We concur: 

 KLEIN, P. J. 

 KITCHING, J.