J-S28015-19

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RONNIE JOHNSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1326 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 26, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-21-CR-0002195-1998

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 16, 2019

Ronnie Johnson appeals pro se1from the April 26, 2018 judgment of 

sentence of thirty years to life imprisonment that was imposed after he was 

resentenced on a 1999 conviction for first-degree murder. We affirm in part, 

vacate in part, and remand with instructions.

The conviction arose out of events that transpired on May 25, 1998, 

when Appellant was seventeen years old. Appellant and his co-defendant, 

Jermaine Watkins (“Co-defendant”), entered Memorial Park in Carlisle, 

Pennsylvania, in search of Robert “Rocky” Anderson. Co-defendant 

approached Anderson and they began to argue. Appellant was carrying a .22 

caliber revolver and Co-defendant had a .380 caliber semi-automatic 

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1 After a brief Grazier colloquy, Appellant chose to proceed pro se at the 

resentencing hearing with stand-by counsel, and has continued to represent 

himself on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998); 

N.T. Resentencing Hearing, 4/26/18, at 3-4.
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handgun. During the argument, Appellant and Co-defendant fired their 

weapons. Anthony Shannon Banks (“victim”), a bystander, was struck by a 

stray bullet and fell to the ground. Appellant approached the victim and shot 

him multiple times, killing him. At autopsy, a .22 caliber bullet was removed 

from the victim’s brain.

On July 9, 1999, Appellant pled guilty to first-degree murder. In 

exchange for his guilty plea, the Commonwealth agreed not to seek the death 

penalty.2 On the same day, he was sentenced to the mandatory sentence of 

life in prison without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”). 

After the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller v. 

Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. 

___, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016), Appellant received a resentencing hearing wherein 

he was ordered to serve thirty years to life imprisonment. Appellant filed a 

post-sentence motion which was denied. He filed a timely notice of appeal 

and was not ordered to file a concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal. The resentencing court filed its opinion, and the matter is now ripe 

for our review. 

Appellant raises the following issues on appeal, which we have reordered 

for ease of disposition:

I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying Appellant’s 

post-sentencing motion despite his request to supplement 

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2 The imposition of the death penalty on juveniles between the ages of sixteen 

and seventeen who had been convicted of homicide was not rendered

unconstitutional until 2005. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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such after receipt of his sentencing transcripts to challenge 

the language of the sentencing statute under the void for 

vagueness doctrine (due process) since a life sentence has 

not been clearly defined under title 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102?

II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by failing to hold a 

hearing on Appellant’s writ of habeas corpus ad 

subjiciendum being as though it took over 240 days after 

the U.S. middle district court of Pennsylvania granted his 

federal habeas corpus ordering a prompt resentencing 

hearing when all similarly situated litigants was given 

120/180 days of unconditional release was ordered?

III. Did trial court abuse its discretion by imposing a sentence 

based on the crime alone despite underdeveloped sense of 

responsibility of a minor/child?

IV. Did the trial court [err] by imposing a [thirty] to life 

sentence under title 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102 in violation of the 

separation of powers doctrine when no legislation exists to 

confer a minimum term?

V. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it failed to 

identify the statute which allowed a sentence to be imposed 

and gave [it] jurisdiction to enforce a penalty not clearly 

defined by statute (legislation) ultimately depriving [it] of 

subject matter jurisdiction?

VI. Did the trial court [err] in denying Appellant’s postsentencing motion by utilizing title 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1 as 

guidance in violation of the equal protection clause of the 

U.S. Const. when a sub-class was created for sentencing via 

Commonwealth v. Batts, [163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017)

(“Batts II”)] when a 14 year old is given a lesser sentence 

than a 15 year old due to legislation?

[VII. Did the trial court commit an error by failing to issue a 

opinion addressing Appellant’s claims within his postsentencing motion.]3

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3 Although, included in his brief as its own argument section, we note with 

displeasure that Appellant failed to include this issue in his statement of 

questions section.
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VIII. Did the trial court commit error by increasing Appellant’s 

court cost[s] at a resentencing hearing which violated the 

double [jeopardy] clause when the penalty was more severe 

because transportation cost[s] are illegal?

Appellant’s brief at 7, 21.

In his first claim, Appellant alleges that 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 should be 

declared void for vagueness because the statute does not define “life.” 

Appellant’s brief at 15. The Commonwealth responds that this claim is waived 

because Appellant is raising it for the first time on appeal. Commonwealth’s 

brief at 16. Appellant acknowledges the Commonwealth’s argument, and 

concedes his failure to preserve this issue below, but explains that his failure 

to do so was the result of trial court error. The trial court denied his postsentence motion without first ruling on his request to supplement his filing 

once he received the resentencing hearing transcript. Appellant alleges that 

he could not raise this challenge to the statutory definition of “life” without 

first reading the sentencing transcript. Appellant’s brief at 15. We disagree.

“It is a bedrock appellate principle that ‘issues not raised in the lower 

court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.’” 

Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 82 A.3d 943, 978 (Pa. 2013). Notably, “if the 

grounds asserted in the post-sentence motion do not require a transcript, 

neither the briefs nor hearing nor argument on the post-sentence motion shall 

be delayed for transcript preparation.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(2)(c). 

While Appellant is correct that the resentencing court never issued an 

order responding to Appellant’s request to supplement his post-sentence 
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motion upon receipt of the resentencing transcript, he has offered no 

explanation or legal authority in order to support his contention that the 

resentencing transcript was necessary in order for him to be able to properly 

plead his claim, such that his failure to preserve this issue should be 

overlooked. Importantly, Appellant’s substantive analysis is purely legal. 

While he has included citations to the sentencing hearing transcript, such 

excerpts do not enhance the strength of his argument. Accordingly, since we 

conclude that the transcript was not necessary for Appellant to preserve this 

issue in his post-sentence motion, and Appellant failed to include it in his postsentence motion, it is waived.

In his second issue, Appellant attacks the timeliness of his resentencing 

hearing. This issue is similarly waived due to Appellant’s failure to litigate it 

below. A review of the record reveals that this action began when his attorney 

filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and amended PCRA petition on 

December 26, 2013. In that filing, counsel preserved Appellant’s resentencing 

claim based on Miller and requested that his case be stayed pending the 

outcome of a petition for allowance of appeal in Commonwealth v. 

Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2013). The PCRA court granted Appellant’s 

request for a stay. Notably, if it had not done so, Appellant’s PCRA petition 

would have been dismissed as untimely, because Miller had not yet been 

found to apply retroactively. 
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In 2016, counsel filed a second amended PCRA petition, following the 

United States Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery, wherein the Court 

found that Miller should be applied retroactively. Montgomery, supra at 

736-37. The PCRA court granted Appellant’s second amended PCRA petition 

and scheduled a resentencing hearing for June 14, 2016. This initial date was 

continued twice by the parties while they awaited the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court’s decision in Batts II. Following the issuance of Batts II, the final 

continuance was granted after both sides agreed that they needed more time 

to acquire necessary witnesses for the resentencing hearing. At no time did 

defense counsel challenge the timeliness of the resentencing hearing, and in 

fact, all of the continuances were requested by the defense. 

Appellant began representing himself at his resentencing hearing, with 

stand-by counsel. However, Appellant never challenged the speediness of his 

resentencing hearing either orally or in a post-sentence motion. Because

there is no evidence in the record that Appellant ever challenged the delay in 

his resentencing hearing until he filed his appellate brief, we find this claim to 

be waived. 

In his third issue, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence. Specifically, he alleges that the resentencing court improperly 

relied on his misconduct record in prison and the nature of the underlying 

crime itself, without placing enough emphasis on the fact that Appellant was 

young when he committed his crime, had to exist within a hostile prison 
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environment amongst substantially older inmates, and has since been 

rehabilitated. See Appellant’s brief at 12, 20. The following principles apply 

to our consideration of whether review of the merits of his claim is warranted. 

“An appellant is not entitled to the review of challenges to the discretionary 

aspects of a sentence as of right. Rather, an appellant challenging the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction.” 

Commonwealth v. Samuel, 102 A.3d 1001, 1006-07 (Pa.Super. 2014). In 

determining whether an appellant has invoked our jurisdiction, we consider 

four factors:

(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal; (2) 

whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a 

motion to reconsider and modify sentence; (3) whether 

appellant’s brief has a fatal defect; and (4) whether there is a 

substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not 

appropriate under the Sentencing Code.

Id.

Appellant filed both a timely post-sentence motion and a notice of 

appeal. However, in his motion, Appellant did not challenge the court’s failure 

to consider mitigating factors or alleged reliance on improper facts when it 

fashioned his sentence. See Post-Sentence Motion, 3/8/18, at unnumbered 

1-2. Also, a review of the resentencing transcript reveals that Appellant did 

not raise either of these claims at the resentencing hearing. Therefore, 

Appellant did not preserve this issue and his discretionary aspects of sentence 

claim is waived. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 858 A.2d 1198, 1204 
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(Pa.Super. 2004) (holding that a discretionary aspects issue was waived 

because it was not raised at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion). 

In his fourth and fifth claims, Appellant attacks the court’s authority to 

follow Batts II, and resentence him under 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1, as an abuse 

of discretion, because no legislation exits to “confer a minimum term” on 

Appellant.4 Appellant’s brief at 14, 19. Specifically, Appellant points to the 

text of § 1102.1, which states that it applies only to offenders who are 

sentenced after June 24, 2012, as support for his argument that the 

legislature did not intend for it to apply retroactively. Id. at 19. Therefore, 

when the resentencing court utilized § 1102.1 as guidance, it was 

“legislat[ing] from the bench.” Id. at 14. Appellant mischaracterizes the 

Miller and Batts II holdings in order to reach the conclusion that the 

resentencing court was not required to impose a minimum term of 

imprisonment at resentencing. 

In Batts II, our Supreme Court interpreted Miller and found that, 

pursuant to Commonwealth v. Batts, 66 A.3d 286, 297 (Pa. 2013) (“Batts 

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4 While Appellant also includes certain constitutional “buzz words” in his 

analysis, he fails to offer a coherent analysis in support of his allegations. We 

could find waiver on that basis. See Commonwealth v. Perez, 93 A.3d 829, 

841 (Pa. 2014) (holding that a “failure to provide any developed argument or 

legal citation results in waiver of this issue”). However, because Appellant 

does advance similar arguments in both claims against the utilization of 42 

Pa.C.S. § 1102.1 as a guideline in the absence of a legislative mandate, we 

decline to find waiver and will instead analyze those portions of his claims 

together on their merits. 
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I”), once a resentencing court evaluates the criteria identified in Miller and 

determines a life without the possibility of parole sentence is inappropriate, it 

must impose a “mandatory maximum sentence of life imprisonment as 

required by Section 1102(a), accompanied by a minimum sentence 

determined by the common pleas court upon resentencing.” The Batts II 

court instructed resentencing courts to look to mandatory minimum sentences 

set forth in § 1102.1(a) as guidance for setting a minimum sentence for a 

juvenile convicted of first-degree murder prior to Miller. Importantly, our 

Supreme Court explained that § 1102 was still valid when applied to juveniles 

who were convicted of first or second degree murder prior to June 25, 2012, 

since the unconstitutional part of Pennsylvania’s sentencing scheme, the lack 

of parole eligibility pursuant to § 6137(a)(1), was severable. In doing so, it 

also considered the legislature’s inaction in this area:

Despite the passage of four years since we issued our decision in 

Batts I, the General Assembly has not passed a statute 

addressing the sentencing of juveniles convicted of first-degree 

murder pre-Miller,

5 nor has it amended the pertinent provisions 

that were severed in Batts I. As we have previously stated, the 

General Assembly is quite able to address what it believes is a 

judicial misinterpretation of a statute, and its failure to do so in 

the years following the Batts I decision gives rise to the 

presumption that the General Assembly is in agreement with our 

interpretation.

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5 The legislature did eventually respond to Miller by enacting 18 Pa.C.S. § 

1102.1, which provides that individuals between the ages of fifteen and 

seventeen convicted of first-degree murder must be sentenced to a maximum 

of life imprisonment and a minimum term set anywhere from thirty-five years 

to life. However, this statute only applies to those individuals sentenced after 

June 24, 2012. 
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Batts II, supra at 445 (internal quotation marks, citations, and footnote 

omitted). 

Subsequent case law has relied on the holding of Batts II and 

repeatedly rejected claims that such a sentencing scheme is unconstitutional 

as applied to juvenile offenders convicted of murder prior to Miller. Although 

these cases have largely focused on challenges to the life maximum tail

instead of the minimum range sentence, those holdings are still instructive 

here. See Commonwealth v. Blount, 207 A.3d 925 (Pa.Super. 2019); 

Commonwealth v. Olds, 192 A.3d 1188 (Pa.Super. 2018) (holding 

imposition of mandatory maximum sentence of life imprisonment for juvenile 

defendant convicted of second-degree murder prior to Miller was 

constitutional); Commonwealth v. Seskey, 170 A.3d 1105 (Pa.Super. 2017) 

(finding that the resentencing court was required to impose a mandatory 

maximum sentence of life imprisonment when it resentenced a juvenile 

defendant convicted of first-degree murder prior to Miller). 

Based on a review of the above-precedent and statutory authority, it is 

clear that Appellant’s argument, pertaining to the application of § 1102.1 to 

those sentenced after June 24, 2012 is incorrect. Just as we have previously 

found with regard to the maximum life tail, the resentencing court was 

statutorily required to start its analysis of the appropriate minimum range 

sentence for Appellant by looking to § 1102.1, as Batts II required. We also 

are bound to follow the mandate of stare decisis.
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In his sixth issue, Appellant challenges the constitutionality of 18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 1102.1, which the legislature enacted in response to the High Court’s 

decision in Miller.

6

 “We note that duly enacted legislation carries with it a 

strong presumption of constitutionality.” Commonwealth v. Turner, 80 

A.3d 754, 759 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). “A presumption exists ‘[t]hat 

the General Assembly does not intend to violate the Constitution of the United 

States or of this Commonwealth’ when promulgating legislation.” 

Commonwealth v. Baker, 78 A.3d 1044, 1050 (Pa. 2013).

In conducting our review, we are guided by the principle that acts 

passed by the General Assembly are strongly presumed to be 

constitutional, including the manner in which they were passed. 

Thus, a statute will not be found unconstitutional unless it clearly, 

palpably, and plainly violates the Constitution. If there is any 

doubt as to whether a challenger has met this high burden, then 

we will resolve that doubt in favor of the statute’s constitutionality. 

Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603, 611 (Pa. 2013) (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted). Constitutional challenges present pure 

questions of law; therefore, our standard of review is de novo and our scope 

of review is plenary. Turner, supra.

Appellant argues that § 1102.1 violates the Equal Protection Clause of 

the 14th Amendment because it treats juveniles under the age of fifteen 

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6 While Appellant was not subject to § 1102.1, as it only applies to defendants 

sentenced after June 24, 2012, the Court used it as a guideline. Trial Court 

Opinion, 12/11/18, at 2. Additionally, Appellant orally preserved his equal 

protection challenge to § 1102.1 at the resentencing hearing. N.T. 

Resentencing Hearing, 4/26/18, at 34-35. Therefore, this claim is properly 

before us and we proceed to review it on the merits.
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differently than it treats juveniles between the ages of fifteen and eighteen

when fashioning the minimum range of a sentence for the same crime. 

Appellant’s brief at 13. This disparity in treatment on the basis of age, alone,

appellant alleges, is unconstitutional because the statute fails to account for 

the individual circumstances of each case, such as the “horrific” nature of the 

offense, as required by Miller. Id. We disagree.

The statute provides, in relevant part, as follows:

Sentence of persons under the age of 18 for murder, murder of 

an unborn child and murder of a law enforcement officer

(a) First degree murder.—A person who has been convicted 

after June 24, 2012, of a murder of the first degree, first degree 

murder of an unborn child or murder of a law enforcement officer 

of the first degree and who was under the age of 18 at the time 

of the commission of the offense shall be sentenced as follows:

(1) A person who at the time of the commission of the 

offense was 15 years of age or older shall be 

sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without 

parole, or a term of imprisonment, the minimum of 

which shall be at least 35 years to life.

(2) A person who at the time of the commission of the 

offense was under 15 years of age shall be sentenced 

to a term of life imprisonment without parole, or a 

term of imprisonment, the minimum of which shall be 

at least 25 years to life.

18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1(a). When determining whether to impose a sentence of 

life without parole on a juvenile convicted of murder, § 1102.1 requires a court 

to consider and make findings on the record regarding the following individual 

factors:
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(1) The impact of the offense on each victim, including oral and 

written victim impact statements made or submitted by family 

members of the victim detailing the physical, psychological and 

economic effect of the crime on the victim and the victim’s family.

(2) The impact of the offense on the community.

(3) The threat to the safety of the public or any individual posed 

by the defendant.

(4) The nature and circumstances of the offense committed by the 

defendant.

(5) The degree of the defendant’s culpability.

(6) Guidelines for sentencing and resentencing adopted by the 

Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing.

(7) Age-related characteristics of the defendant, including:

(i) Age.

(ii) Mental capacity.

(iii) Maturity.

(iv) The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the 

defendant.

(v) The nature and extent of any prior delinquent or criminal 

history, including the success or failure of any previous 

attempts by the court to rehabilitate the defendant.

(vi) Probation or institutional reports.

(vii) Other relevant factors.

18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1(d). 

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that 

no State shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 

of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “The starting point of [an] equal 
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protection analysis [of a statute] is a determination of whether the State has 

created a classification for the unequal distribution of benefits or imposition of 

burdens.” Commonwealth v. Parker White Metal Co., 515 A.2d 1358, 

1363 (Pa. 1986). Section 1102.1 differentiates between offenders based upon 

their age, and other age related factors. “It is well-settled that age 

classifications do not implicate suspect classes, and therefore, do not trigger 

strict scrutiny review.” Commonwealth v. Albert, 758 A.2d 1149, 1152 (Pa. 

2000) (citing Gondelman v. Commonwealth, 554 A.2d 896, 899 (Pa. 

1989)). When fundamental rights or suspect classifications are not implicated, 

we apply the rational basis test. Commonwealth v. Lark, 504 A.2d 1291, 

1298 (Pa.Super. 1986). 

In applying the rational basis test, we follow a two-step analysis: “First, 

[a court] must determine whether the challenged statue seeks to promote any 

legitimate state interest or public value. If so, [the court] must next 

determine whether the classification adopted in the legislature is reasonably 

related to accomplishing that articulated state interest or interests.” Albert, 

supra at 1152. We also note that, “[i]n undertaking [our] analysis, [we are]

free to hypothesize reasons the legislature might have had for the 

classification. If [we determine] that the classifications are genuine, [we]

cannot declare the classification void even if it might question the soundness 

or wisdom of the distinction.” Id. 
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As noted above, § 1102.1 was created in response to the Miller

decision, wherein the United States Supreme Court held that children must be 

treated differently than adults for purposes of sentencing even when they 

commit terrible crimes, because juveniles have “diminished culpability and 

greater prospects for reform,” since their brains are not fully developed. 

Miller, supra at 469. Therefore, the mandatory penalty scheme that 

prevented the sentencing court from exercising its discretion to sentence a 

juvenile offender to anything other than life without the possibility of parole, 

without first considering socioscientific factors, was found to be 

unconstitutional. Id. at 474. Thus, our legislature passed § 1102.1, 

differentiating between offenders based on age, in order to ensure that 

juvenile offenders were given individualized sentences that took into 

consideration their unique backgrounds. 

We find that the legislation serves a legitimate state interest, to ensure 

that society is protected from criminal offenders who commit heinous crimes, 

while guaranteeing that juvenile offenders are given the opportunity to reform

in conformance with Miller’s mandate. A distinction between juveniles, under 

the age of eighteen and under the age of fifteen, recognizes that as juveniles 

age and get closer to adulthood, the starting point for assessing a degree of 

culpability and potential for reform must also evolve. Thus, the legislation 

meets the rational basis test. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that 

§ 1102.1 does not run afoul of the United States Equal Protection Clause.
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In his seventh issue, Appellant attacks the content of the resentencing 

court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion and its failure to order him to file a Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. He alleges that 

both issues led to a record so deficient that proper appellate review is 

impossible. Appellant’s brief at 21. We disagree with Appellant’s 

characterization of the record and that any Pa.R.A.P. 1925 error occurred.

Once Appellant filed a notice of appeal, the resentencing court was 

required to do the following:

Except as otherwise prescribed by this rule, upon receipt of the 

notice of appeal, the judge who entered the order giving rise to 

the notice of appeal, if the reasons for the order do not already 

appear of record, shall forthwith file of record at least a brief 

opinion of the reasons for the order, or for the rulings or other 

errors complained of, or shall specify in writing the place in the 

record where such reasons may be found.

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(1). A plain reading of Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(1) reveals that 

the resentencing court was not required to respond individually to each of 

Appellant’s claims in his post-sentence motion. Instead, all it was required to 

do was to issue “a brief opinion of the reasons for [its sentencing order]” and 

it did that. Id.; see also Trial Court Opinion, 12/11/18, at 1-3. Therefore, 

Appellant is entitled to no relief on the first portion of his claim. 

Appellant also alleges that the resentencing court erred when it did not 

order him to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement. The relevant 

subsection of the rule provides that:

If the judge entering the order giving rise to the notice of appeal 

(“judge”) desires clarification of the errors complained of on 
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appeal, the judge may enter an order directing the appellant to 

file of record in the trial court and serve on the judge a concise 

statement of the errors complained of on appeal (“Statement”).

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) (emphasis added). The plain text of the rule indicates that 

the resentencing court had the discretion to decide if a concise statement was 

needed and should have only ordered Appellant to file one if it felt that the 

record was inadequate or that it needed Appellant to clarify which issues he 

intended to raise on appeal. Since the resentencing court proceeded to file its 

Rule 1925(a) opinion without ordering Appellant to file a Rule 1925(b) 

statement, it follows that the court determined that a Rule 1925(b) statement 

was unnecessary. Therefore, Appellant’s claim fails on both accounts.

In his final issue, Appellant challenges the resentencing court’s order 

requiring him to pay the costs of prosecution, because it violated the Double 

Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution. Appellant’s brief at 17. 

While pointing out the incoherence of Appellant’s constitutional analysis, the 

Commonwealth nevertheless concedes that Appellant should not have been 

ordered to pay the costs of his resentencing on different grounds. 

Commonwealth’s brief at 17. We appreciate the Commonwealth’s candor and 

agree with its assessment. 

Because Appellant’s claim challenges the resentencing court’s authority 

to impose costs as part of its resentencing order, it implicates the legality of 

his sentence. Commonwealth v. Lehman, 201 A.3d 1279, 1283 (Pa.Super. 

2019). “Our standard of review over such questions is de novo and our scope 
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of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. White, 193 A.3d 977, 985 

(Pa.Super. 2018) (citing to Commonwealth v. Cardwell, 105 A.3d 748, 750 

(Pa.Super. 2014)). 

We find instructive this court’s recent decision in Lehman. In that case, 

the defendant, like Appellant, was convicted of a murder he committed when 

he was a juvenile and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. After 

obtaining relief pursuant to Miller and Montgomery, the defendant was 

resentenced to thirty-years to life for his first-degree murder conviction and 

ordered to pay the costs of prosecution, which included costs accrued during 

his resentencing hearing. Among other issues, on appeal the defendant 

challenged the resentencing court’s imposition of prosecution costs for the 

resentencing hearing. Although we upheld the sentencing court’s authority to 

impose the thirty-years to life sentence, we also agreed with the defendant

that he should not have been charged with the costs associated with the 

resentencing, as that “would punish him for exercising his constitutional right 

to receive a sentence that comports with the Eight Amendment of the United 

States Constitution.” Lehman, supra at 1286. We remanded the case so 

that the defendant’s costs could be recalculated. The same is true here. 

Appellant should not have been assessed costs which were accrued as a result 

of changes in the law. Id. Therefore, we vacate the portion of the 

resentencing court’s order requiring Appellant to pay the costs of his 
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resentencing and remand for a recalculation of his costs in conformance with 

our holding in Lehman. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed in part and vacated in part. Case 

remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judge Strassburger joins the memorandum.

Judge McLaughlin concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/16/2019