NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

HAROLD B., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, C.B., L.B., R.B., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 20-0088

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. B8015JD201804060

The Honorable Rick A. Williams, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

The Stavris Law Firm PLLC, Scottsdale

By Alison Stavris

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa

By Amanda Adams

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 11-19-2020
HAROLD B. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 Harold B. (Father) appeals from an order terminating his 

parental rights to his three children. Because Father has shown no error, the 

order is affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Father and Tara S. (Mother) are the parents of C.B., L.B. and 

R.B.1 Mother has significant cognitive deficiencies, functional limitations 

and behavioral health issues. She also was abused physically and 

emotionally and, as an adult, her father sexually abused her, with her 

mother’s (maternal grandmother) facilitating that abuse. 

¶3 Mother has been determined to be seriously mentally ill and 

has been diagnosed with depression and anxiety. Mother lacks selfawareness, and her conditions often make her aggressive, irrational and 

erratic. Mother’s parental rights to two other children were terminated

previously. After Mother’s father died in June 2017, Mother began a 

relationship with Father.

¶4 In May 2018, Mother gave birth prematurely to twins, C.B. 

and L.B., who spent the next month in the neonatal intensive care unit. The 

Department of Child Safety (DCS) investigated after Mother became 

aggressive with hospital staff and tried to remove medical equipment from 

one of the babies. DCS found that the parents were unprepared for the 

children’s release from the hospital and their home was unfit for premature 

twin babies. Moreover, maternal grandmother was living in the home.

¶5 Father agreed the parents’ home was not appropriate for the 

children. He also acknowledged suffering from post-traumatic stress 

disorder but denied needing treatment. The next month, when the twins 

were released from the hospital, the parents still lacked adequate housing 

1 Mother’s parental rights were terminated, and she is not part of this 

appeal. 
HAROLD B. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

so DCS took the twins into care and filed a dependency petition. The court 

later adjudicated the twins dependent and adopted a case plan of family 

reunification.

¶6 DCS provided the parents with rule-out substance abuse 

testing (substance abuse is not an issue in this case), a psychological 

evaluation and bonding assessment, parenting classes, a parent aide with 

visitation and housing resources. DCS also asked the parents to self-refer to 

Southwest Behavioral Health Services for mental health services, including 

individual therapy. The parents received additional parenting instruction 

and therapeutic visits through Mohave Mental Health Clinic and support 

services through another provider. Mother generally participated in 

services; Father refused behavioral health services but participated in the 

remaining services. Service providers noted ongoing concerns with 

Mother’s ability to safely parent the children and Father’s ability to 

recognize Mother’s limitations and protect the children from her.

¶7 In August 2018, Mother completed a neuropsychological 

evaluation with Doctor Kelly Rodriguez. Dr. Rodriguez diagnosed Mother 

with a neurocognitive disorder after her testing revealed impairments in 

several areas. Dr. Rodriguez also noted that Mother did not have the coping 

skills to manage her impulsivity and turbulent emotions, which could put 

the children at risk of harm. Dr. Rodriguez stated that Mother needed to 

address her history of incest in counseling, but opined that even with 

counseling, “there [was] the possibility [that Mother] may not be able to 

develop the skills and support system needed to care for her children.” Dr. 

Rodriguez concluded that the twins could not safely return home at that 

time.

¶8 Mother completed a psychiatric evaluation and participated 

in counseling through Southwest Behavioral Health, though her 

participation was inconsistent. During various sessions, Mother’s 

counselors described her as unfocused, confused, agitated, tired, and as 

having “difficulty comprehending what is said.” Although Mother 

participated in therapy, she refused to address her past trauma, or 

acknowledge that her father had sexually abused her.

¶9 In November 2018, Father completed bonding assessments 

through Mohave Mental Health. The therapist found that Father had a 

healthy attachment with the twins but noted he would “benefit from 

learning some additional parenting skills.” In March 2019, Mother 

completed bonding assessments through Mohave Mental Health. The 

therapist found that Mother shared an unhealthy attachment with the 
HAROLD B. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

4

twins. The therapist noted that Mother was very inconsistent in her 

parenting skills, as she only sometimes responded to the children’s cues, 

soothed them, or provided appropriate toys.

¶10 As the dependency progressed, Mother and Father obtained 

adequate housing but made only minimal behavioral improvements 

through the parent-aide services. By February 2019, the parents had 

progressed to in-home visits. Even so, the parent aide noted continual

concerns about Mother’s ability to safely parent the children and Father’s 

ability to keep the children safe from Mother. The parent aide had to 

intervene or redirect the parents at almost every visit.

¶11 In April 2019—after a year of services—the parent aide noted 

that Mother “is still demonstrating a lack of skill in responding 

appropriately and identifying safety concerns” and she “is often redirected 

by Parent Aide and [Father] and has to be told multiple times how and why 

something is a safety concern.” The parent aide also noted that Mother 

“does not always appear self-aware” and “becomes easily distracted and 

leave[s] the [girls] unattended.” The parent aide reported that although 

Father was active in redirecting Mother, he “has not recognized why [she] 

poses a safety concern in caring for the girls.” That same month, after a 

change in case plan to severance and adoption, DCS moved to terminate 

the parents’ rights to the twins under the neglect ground, and the other 

grounds of mental illness and mental deficiency as to Mother.

¶12 In July 2019, Mother gave birth to R.B., who remained in the 

intensive care unit for three weeks for respiratory issues. In August 2019, 

when R.B. was released from the hospital, DCS took her into care and filed 

a dependency petition. The next month, DCS moved to terminate Mother 

and Father’s parental rights to R.B. under the neglect ground and 

additionally as to Mother under the mental illness and mental deficiency 

grounds.

¶13 Concerns about the parents’ ability to safely parent the 

children persisted. By October 2019, the parent aide reported that she still 

had to intervene often to prevent injuries to the children because Mother 

“continues to lack self-awareness, which leads to unsafe situations,” and 

that Father still had not recognized why Mother poses a safety concern for 

the children. Once the parent-aide service closed, the DCS visitation officer 

reported similar concerns. Meanwhile, the parents moved back into an 

unsafe home for the children and allowed maternal grandmother to live in 

a recreational vehicle on the property.
HAROLD B. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

5

¶14 The superior court held a contested termination adjudication

in January 2020. After DCS rested in its case in chief, Father moved for a 

“directed verdict,” which the court denied. After the trial, the superior court 

issued a ruling terminating the parents’ rights. This court has jurisdiction 

over Father’s timely appeal pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona 

Constitution, Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A) 

and 12-2101(A) and Arizona Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court 103

and 104 (2020).

2

DISCUSSION

¶15 As applicable here, to terminate parental rights, a court must 

find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground 

articulated in A.R.S. § 8-533(B) has been proven and must find by a 

preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the 

child. See Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288 ¶ 41 (2005); Michael J. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249 ¶ 12 (2000). Because the superior court 

“is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the 

credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts,” this court will affirm 

an order terminating parental rights so long as it is supported by reasonable 

evidence. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93 ¶ 18 (App. 

2009) (citation omitted).

¶16 On appeal, Father argues that DCS failed to make a diligent 

effort to provide Mother with appropriate services, which “directly 

affected” him. He further asserts that no reasonable evidence supports the 

termination order, and the superior court erred in finding that Father was 

“unable to protect the children from mother’s deficits.”

¶17 As part of the order terminating Mother’s parental rights, the 

superior court found that DCS made reasonable efforts to provide her with 

adequate reunification services. Father argues that DCS’s “failure to offer 

Mother . . . the specified services to address her cognitive deficits . . . directly 

affected” him, but he does not address whether he can raise this claim on 

appeal. See A.R.S. § 8-235(A) (only aggrieved parties may appeal from a 

final order); In re Pima Cty. Juv. Action No. B-9385, 138 Ariz. 291, 293 (1983) 

(“To qualify as an aggrieved party, the judgment must operate to deny the 

party some personal or property right or to impose a substantial burden on 

the party.”). Because the finding pertains only to Mother’s parental rights, 

it does not act to deny Father a personal right or bear directly upon his 

2 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited 

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
HAROLD B. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

6

personal interest in the children. See In re Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS5894, 145 Ariz. 405, 408 (App. 1985) (mother lacked standing to challenge 

termination order pertaining to father).

¶18 On the merits, the superior court found that Father was 

unable to provide the children with appropriate housing or supervision 

from Mother who posed a significant risk to their health and welfare. The 

court noted the issues Mother presented, including that she was “unable to 

recognize threats and safety risks for the children” and that she has 

“significant aggression and impulsivity issues,” “is quick to anger” and 

“does not take redirection from either service providers or the father.” The 

court found Father “is unable to protect the children from [M]other’s 

deficits,” that he “will rely on the mother to care for the children,” and that 

grandmother would have access to the children if in the parent’s care. The 

record supports these findings. The record also highlights how Mother’s

deficiencies place the children at risk of harm during normal daily

interactions with her — in turn necessitating a second caregiver who must

provide constant oversight of Mother and the children — which Father 

could not do.

¶19 Although Dr. Rodriguez concluded that Mother needed to 

address her past trauma, Mother refused to do so. The case manager 

testified that Mother continues to assert that she had carried on a sexual 

relationship with her stepfather and therefore “doesn’t recognize [her past 

incest] as abuse.” Dr. Rodriguez voiced concern that Mother’s denial

nullifies her ability to protect the children from grandmother. Indeed, 

Mother stated she did not want to force grandmother to leave the property.

¶20 Father likewise failed to show that he would protect the 

children from Mother or from grandmother. At trial, Father testified that he 

and Mother “spent much time going over [Mother’s past trauma] and 

working through it.” Moreover, when asked whether he believed that 

grandmother had acted inappropriately with Mother, Father testified, “I 

don’t believe that.” Nor did either parent articulate a plan to protect the 

children from grandmother. The parents also knew that DCS required safe 

housing, but Father testified that the home was still not ready for the 

children, and grandmother was still living on the parents’ property.

¶21 As noted above, Mother was unable to show minimally 

adequate parenting skills during the dependency, and the parent aide 

reported safety concerns on most visits. The visitation notes support the 

case manager’s testimony that without continual oversight and 

intervention, the children would be at significant risk in Mother’s care.
HAROLD B. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

7

Despite Mother’s inability to safely care for the children, Father only 

minimally enhanced his protective capacities during the case. Indeed, the 

case manager testified that at the time of the termination hearing, the 

parents’ parenting skills had not significantly improved, and they were still 

receiving redirection for the same issues during visits. The DCS visitation 

supervisor reported that Mother still did not understand how to properly 

feed R.B. and picked her up incorrectly; Mother also became 

“overwhelmed,” “emotional” and “cri[ed] with the children if they are 

upset.” She further testified that although Father tries to redirect Mother, 

he is only successful “sometimes,” and “becomes overwhelmed and doesn’t 

know what to do.”

¶22 The case manager expressed ongoing concern that Father did 

not fully recognize the risks Mother posed to the children. The parent aide 

similarly noted concern that Father minimized or failed to recognize 

Mother’s issues. For example, at a visit in October 2019, Father left Mother 

to supervise the girls while he cleaned up, and the parent aide had to 

intervene to prevent serious injury as L.B. began falling from a slide. Mother 

appeared “completely unaware” and told the parent aide the child was 

“fine.” Yet Father continued to express his reliance on Mother. He

repeatedly told the parent aide that he could not handle the children on his

own and needed to rely on Mother for help. He also maintained that he 

“does not have the equipment to raise the girls without” Mother.

¶23 At trial, Father testified that he would leave Mother if needed 

to protect the children. But he also testified that he and Mother were 

engaged, and he minimized her parenting deficits. Father testified that he 

felt Mother had made “major progress,” that she “could do this” and that 

“it wasn’t as bad as these people are making it out to be.” Reasonable trial 

evidence supports the court’s finding that Father is unable to provide the 

children with proper supervision and housing, causing unreasonable risk 

of harm to their health or welfare.

¶24 Father next argues that the superior court erred in finding that 

severance was in the children’s best interests. To support his argument, 

Father points to testimony in the record favorable to his position. But the 

superior court considered the totality of the evidence, and this court will 

not reweigh it on appeal. Instead, this court looks to determine whether

reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s order. Jesus M. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 282 ¶ 12 (App. 2002). “[A] determination 

of the child’s best interest must include a finding as to how the child would 

benefit from a severance or be harmed by the continuation of the 

relationship.” Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5 (1990).
HAROLD B. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

8

¶25 The court found that continuing the parent-child relationship 

would be detrimental because “it would delay permanency, leaving the 

children to linger in care for an indeterminate period.” Indeed, after 20 

months of services, Father had made only minimal improvements and was 

still unable to protect the children from Mother’s mental-health and 

cognitive limitations. The case manager testified that the children would 

linger in foster care, until such time (if ever) the parents could reach an 

appropriate parenting level.

¶26 The court also found that severance would benefit the 

children because “it would further the plan of adoption, which would 

provide the children with permanency and stability,” the children are in 

adoptive placements who are meeting their needs and the children are 

otherwise adoptable. The record supports these findings.3

CONCLUSION

¶27 The order terminating Father’s parental rights is affirmed. 

3 Father also challenges the denial of his motion for a directed verdict, or 

judgment as a matter of law. The Juvenile Court Rules do not recognize 

such a motion and, even if they did, the court did not err in finding DCS’s 

evidence was legally sufficient to withstand the motion. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 

50(a)(1) (denial proper when court finds a jury would have a “legally 

sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue”).