alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1390 

To require Senate confirmation of an individual appointed to serve as the 

Director of the American Institute in Taiwan. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 7, 2007 

Mr. TANCREDO (for himself and Mr. ROHRABACHER) introduced the following 

bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

A BILL 

To require Senate confirmation of an individual appointed 

to serve as the Director of the American Institute in Taiwan. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SENATE CONFIRMATION REQUIRED OF AN IN4 DIVIDUAL APPOINTED TO SERVE AS DIREC5 TOR OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE IN TAI6 WAN. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provi8 sion of law, the President shall appoint, by and with the 

9 advice and consent of the Senate, an individual to serve 

10 as the Director of the American Institute in Taiwan. 


ycherry on PROD1PC64 with BILLS
2 

•HR 1390 IH

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section shall take effect 

2 beginning with the first appointment by the President of 

3 an individual to serve as the Director of the American In4 stitute in Taiwan that is made after the date of the enact5 ment of this Act. 

Æ 


ycherry on PROD1PC64 with BILLS
#### In the interest of D.H., a child, B.F., Appellant, v. Department of Children and Family Services, and Guardian Ad Litem Program, Appellees.

No. 2D09-1757.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Dec. 16, 2009.

*864Jackson S. Flyte, Regional Counsel, Second District, and Jeffrey Sullivan, Assistant Regional Counsel, Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel, Bar-tow, for Appellant.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and David J. Lopez, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee Department of Children and Family Services.

Jennifer S. Paullin, Orlando, for Appel-lee Guardian Ad Litem Program.

WHATLEY, Judge.

The Mother appeals the order terminating her rights to her daughter, D.H., based on section 39.806(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2008) (continuing involvement of parent threatens child irrespective of provision of services). The Department of Children and Family Services and the Guardian ad Litem concede that termination on this ground was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Our review of the evidence presented at the termination hearing leads us to concur.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

CRENSHAW and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.
News United States Air Force
 Around the Air Force: Nov. 1Published Nov. 1, 2016
                        
                        By Airman 1st Class Jasmin Vanderheyden
                        
                        
                        Air Force TV
                
                **FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, Md. (AFNS)** -- On this look around the Air Force a reduction in ancillary training is announced, cyberattacks are the leading strategic threat and a preview of the latest episode of BLUE features Air Force tankers. Hosted by Airman 1st Class Jasmin Vanderheyden. 
For previous episodes, click here.
Related links:
- AF takes initial steps to reduce training unrelated to primary missions
- BLUE: Fueling the futureATAF 



BLUE 



CBT 



training 



cyber 



cyberattack
Exhibit 31.1
**CERTIFICATIONS**
     I, Steven G. Murdock, certify that:
     1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K/A of Meade Instruments Corp.;
     2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;
     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
     4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 a)  designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controlsand procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material informationrelating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to usby others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report isbeing prepared;  b)  evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and proceduresand presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosurecontrols and procedures as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and  c)  disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting; and
     5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
 a)  all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;and  b)  any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting   Date: March 16, 2005  By: /s/ Steven G. Murdock     President, CEO and Secretary
#### Bonifacio SAEZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D11-1673.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Aug. 31, 2011.

Bonifacio Saez, in proper person.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.

Before WELLS, C.J., and SUAREZ and SALTER, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. *See Hernandez v. State,*61 So.3d 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011).
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1239 Reported in Senate (RS)]

                                                       Calendar No. 672
110th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 1239

                          [Report No. 110-320]

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             July 24, 2007

    Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and 
                           Natural Resources

                             April 10, 2008

              Reported by Mr. Bingaman, without amendment

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To amend the National Underground Railroad Network to Freedom Act of 
  1998 to authorize additional funding to carry out the Act, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``National Underground Railroad 
Network to Freedom Amendments Act of 2007''.

SEC. 2. AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSES.

    The National Underground Railroad Network to Freedom Act of 1998 
(16 U.S.C. 469l et seq.) is amended--
            (1) by striking section 3(d);
            (2) by striking section 4(d); and
            (3) by adding at the end the following new section:

``SEC. 5. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    ``(a) Amounts.--There are authorized to be appropriated to carry 
out this Act $2,500,000 for each fiscal year, to be allocated as 
follows:
            ``(1) $2,000,000 is to be used for the purposes of section 
        3.
            ``(2) $500,000 is to be used for the purposes of section 4.
    ``(b) Restrictions.--No amounts may be appropriated for the 
purposes of this Act except to the Secretary for carrying out the 
responsibilities of the Secretary as set forth in this Act.''.

SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE.

    The amendments made by section 2 shall take effect at the beginning 
of the fiscal year immediately following the date of the enactment of 
this Act.
                                                       Calendar No. 672

110th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                               H. R. 1239

                          [Report No. 110-320]

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 To amend the National Underground Railroad Network to Freedom Act of 
  1998 to authorize additional funding to carry out the Act, and for 
                            other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                             April 10, 2008

                       Reported without amendment
```
#### Robert Lee YOUNG, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D10-6410.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Aug. 9, 2011.

Robert Lee Young, pro se, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant is appealing an order in which the trial court struck the appellant’s postconviction claims as facially insufficient and, in accordance with *Spera v. State,*971 So.2d 754, 761 (Fla.2007), granted the appellant thirty days to amend. The order is a nonappealable, nonfinal order. *See Lee v. State,*939 So.2d 154, 155 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).

DISMISSED.

BENTON, C.J., HAWKES and CLARK, JJ., concur.
##### 



Exhibit 13.2 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. §SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the annual report of Envoy Communications Inc. (the Company) filed under
cover of a Form 20-F for the period ended September 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Linda Gilbert, Chief Financial Officer of
the Company, certify that: (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company. By:/s/ Linda GilbertDated: February 17, 2005
    
    Linda Gilbert
Chief Financial Officer
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-10198 Summary Calendar

DON VENABLE, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus KATHLEEN LEOS; ET AL., Defendants, CHAD WOOLERY; LARRY FRIEDMAN; FRIEDMAN & ASSOCIATED; ALAN B. RICH; DAVID REESE; SCHWARTZ & EICHELBAUM PC; DENNIS J. EICHELBAUM, Defendants-Appellees.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:97-CV-2187

-------------------- September 27, 2000 Before DAVIS, JONES and DEMOSS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Don Venable, a self-professed watchdog over the Dallas Independent School District (DISD), appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Chad Woolery, General Superintendent of the Dallas Independent School District, and the attorneys representing Woolery.No. 00-10198 -2- Venable contends that the trial court erred in requiring him to prove the elements of the allegedly analogous tort of malicious prosecution as part of his First Amendment retaliation claim. He also argues that the district court erred by requiring him to demonstrate an elevated degree of injury. In his single allegation of harm, that his access to his $1,000 bond was delayed, Venable has not crossed the threshold of actionable harm required under § 1983 on his claim for First Amendment retaliation. Colson v. Grohman , 174 F.3d 498 (5th Cir. 1999); Pierce v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, Inst. Div. , 37 F.3d 1146, 1150 (5th Cir. 1994). The district court did not err. We further find that Venable’s appeal is without arguable merit and is frivolous. See Howard v. King , 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983). Because the appeal is frivolous, it is DISMISSED. See 5 TH C IR . R. 42.2. Venable’s petition for en banc consideration and his motion to expedite such consideration are DENIED.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Joe POLK, Appellant.

No. 86-1850.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 5, 1986.

Decided Dec. 29, 1986.

David R. Freeman, Federal Public Defender, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant.

Dean Hoag, Asst. U.S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., for appellee.

Before ROSS, JOHN R. GIBSON, and FAGG, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Joe Polk appeals his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1) (1982). *34He argues the Government failed to prove that the gun presented at trial was a firearm within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(c)(3). We affirm.

At trial the Government introduced into evidence a Smith and Wesson, Model 60.38 caliber revolver. The arresting officer testified that he had removed the gun, which was loaded with five rounds of ammunition, from the defendant. No evidence was introduced concerning the condition of the gun or whether it had been test-fired.

Polk argues that the Government failed to prove the gun was a firearm within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(c)(3), which states in part: “ ‘[F] ire-arm’ means any weapon * * * which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive * * Polk contends thé Government failed to prove the gun was capable of firing because no evidence of test-firing was presented. Accordingly, he argues that his conviction must be overturned because the Government failed to prove every element of the offense. We disagree.

The statute does not require that the Government prove the gun was actually capable of firing. *See United States v. Samson,*533 F.2d 721, 723 (1st Cir.), *cert. denied,*429 U.S. 845, 97 S.Ct. 126, 50 L.Ed.2d 116 (1976). Rather, it is enough that the gun be “designed to” fire. Polk also stipulated that the “firearm named in the indictment” was shipped in interstate commerce. (Government Exhibit 9). In addition, the gun was admitted into evidence in plain view of the jury, and the jury could properly assess whether the gun could fire or was designed to fire. *See United States v. Liles,*432 F.2d 18, 19-20 (9th Cir.1970) (conviction upheld even though firearm not admitted into evidence). Further, Polk's postarrest statement, admitted into evidence, indicated that he was armed because he feared for his life. The jury thus could infer that Polk knew the gun was capable of firing.

Because we cannot say that the jury acted unreasonably in finding the gun to be a firearm, we affirm Polk’s conviction.
#### STATE ex rel. Marquis DALTON v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-1526.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 16, 2011.

In re Dalton, Marquis; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th *1135Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 03-00-0706; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 0764.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; *State ex rel. Glover v. State,*93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.
Tuesday 5th March, 1996.

Kimberly Rose O'Toole, Appellant, against Record No. 2347-93-1 Circuit Court No. 93-421 Commonwealth of Virginia, Appellee.

Upon Rehearing En Banc Before Chief Judge Moon, Judges Baker, Benton, Coleman, Willis, Elder, Bray, Fitzpatrick, Annunziata and Overton Andrew G. Wiggin, Assistant Public Defender (Office of the Public Defender, on brief), for appellant. Grace DiLiberto, Assistant Attorney General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

By opinion dated June 27, 1995, a majority of a panel of this Court affirmed Kimberly Rose O'Toole's conviction for possession

of cocaine. O'Toole v. Commonwealth , 20 Va. App. 540, 458 S.E.2d 595 (1995). Upon O'Toole's motion, we stayed the mandate of that decision and granted a rehearing en banc . Upon such rehearing, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed for those reasons set forth in the panel's majority opinion. Accordingly, the stay of this Court's June 27, 1995 mandate hereby is lifted and its directives reinstated. Judges Benton and Elder would reverse the judgment of the trial court for those reasons set forth in the panel's dissenting opinion. See id. at 544-46, 458 S.E.2d at 597-98 (Benton, J., dissenting).The Commonwealth shall recover of the appellant an additional $200 for services rendered the appellant by the Public Defender on the rehearing portion of this appeal, in addition to counsel's costs and necessary direct out-of-pocket expenses. This

amount shall be added to the costs due the Commonwealth in the June 27, 1995 mandate. This order shall be published and certified to the trial

court. A Copy,

Teste:

Clerk
Department of the United States Air Force LogoBiography
                  United States Air ForceThis is the official portrait of Maj. Gen. Lloyd W. Lamb.
            MAJOR GENERAL LLOYD W. LAMBBorn on March 24, 1924, in Spokane, Washington, Maj. Gen. Lloyd W. Lamb enlisted in the Army Air Corps on December 12, 1942. Following his enlistment, he attended basic and advanced pilot training. He graduated as second lieutenant at Luke Air Base, Arizona on February 8, 1944. He served with the 9th Air Force operating in the European Theater as a tactical reconnaissance pilot in P-51 aircraft. Upon his return to the United States, he was assigned to the 69th Tactical Reconnaissance Group at Brooks Air Force Base, Texas. He was discharged on April 21, 1946.
He was appointed as a first lieutenant in the Washington Air National Guard on May 1, 1950. He was assigned to a position of Controller in the 141st Aircraft Control Squadron. The unit was activated on May 1, 1951, and assigned to the Alaskan Air Command. Upon release from active duty on January 5, 1953, Maj. Gen. Lamb continued to participate as a member of the Washington Air National Guard, serving as a staff officer in a communications group and as Director of Operations for the 142nd Air Defense Wing.
On September 2, 1966, the general was assigned to the Headquarters Washington Air National Guard as Inspector General and later as Director of Operations. He was appointed as Chief of Staff for Air on March 1, 1973. He was reassigned as Commander of the 142nd Fighter Interceptor Wing on February 28, 1974. He is currently Commander of the 141st Air Refueling Wing after conversion of the 142nd Fighter Interceptor Wing. He was promoted and federally recognized as brigadier general on April 24, 1974. Maj. Gen. Lamb was a command pilot with more than 3,400 flying hours.
Schools: University of Washington, 1942-43; U.S. Army Air Corps Pilot Training, 1944; National Security Management (Corr), Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1973.
Civic Affiliations: Spokane Rotary Club; Masonic Lodge; Spokane Shrine Temple; Elder in the Presbyterian Church; Board of Directors; Aviation Committee, Spokane Chamber of Commerce; National Guard Association of the United States.
Decorations and Awards: Air Force Commendation Medal, American Campaign Medal, European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal, World War II Victory Medal, National Defense Service Medal, Air Force Longevity Service Award Ribbon, Armed Forces Reserve Medal.
Civilian Occupation: President and General Manager, Travel Service Company.
NOTE: He retired on March 31, 1983, as a major general and commander of the Washington Air National Guard.
Reference:
General Officers of the Army and Air National Guard, Office of Public Affairs, National Guard Bureau, January 1979.Department of the Air Force Logo
No. 11,337.

#### Jennings, Guardian, *v.*Durham et al.

*Pbactice.*— Bill *of Exceptions.*— Where it affirmatively appears in the body of a bill of exceptions that evidence was given on the trial which is not contained in the bill, the general recital that “ this was all the evidence given in the cause” will not control.

*Same.*— Equity *Gases.*— Effect *of Answers of Jury to Interrogatories.*— The court is not bound by the answers of the jury to interrogatories submitted to them in cases of equitable cognizance.

From the .Clay Circuit Court.

*D. R. Eckles, J. J. Smiley*and *W. G. Neff,*for appellant.

*D. E. Williamson*and *A. Daggy,*for appellees.

Elliott, J.

The appellees vigorously insist that the evidence is not all in the record, and upon an examination of, the bill of exceptions we find that they are correct in affirming that it does not contain all of the evidence. There are more than ten statements in the bill of exceptions, that items ■of evidence were introduced, followed by statements showing that these items are not contained in the bill of exceptions. We are compelled by the long settled rule of the court to hold that notwithstanding the general statement in the bill of exceptions, “ that this was all the evidence given in the cause,” the evidence is not all in the record. *Collins*v. *Collins,*100 Ind. *266; Fellenzer*v. *Van Valzah,*95 Ind. 128, and authorities cited.

The case before us is one requiring that all the evidence should be in the record, for, in the absence of the evidence, we can not determine that there was error in the decision of the trial court upon the appellant’s motion for a new trial, The presumption is in favor of the judgment of the lower court, and the party who alleges error must present süch a record as affirmatively shows that its rulings were wrong.

The only error properly assigned is that the court erred in overruling the motion for a new trial, and as the question whether the decision of the court was right or wrong de*392pends upon the evidence, we can not, in the absence of the evidence, review the ruling denying the motion.

Filed April 4, 1885.

The cause was one of equitable cognizance, and the court was not bound by the answers of the jury to the interrogatories submitted to them. In such cases the court has a l’ight to disregard the finding of the jury and determine for itself the case upon the evidence. *Israel*v. Jackson, 93 Ind. 543; *Pence*v. *Garrison,*93 Ind. 345; *Lake Erie, etc., R. W. Co.*v. *Griffin,*92 Ind. 487.

Parties can not make questions in this court respecting the procedure on the trial not made in the court below. As no question was there made upon the action of the court disregarding the finding of the jury, none can be made here.

Judgment affirmed.
```

[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 80 (Monday, May 15, 1995)]
[House]
[Page H4934]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

                              AFTER RECESS

  The recess having expired, the House was called to order by the 
Speaker pro tempore [Mr. Weller] at 6 o'clock and 3 minutes p.m.

                          ____________________
```