IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-31251

ANTHONY MINNIS, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY AND 

AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL COLLEGE, 

 Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:13-CV-5

Before WIENER, SOUTHWICK, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Anthony Minnis, former head coach of the Louisiana State University 

women’s tennis team, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

dismissing his Title VII, Title IX, and state-law claims against the University’s 

Board of Supervisors (“LSU”). We AFFIRM. 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 29, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

LSU hired Anthony Minnis as head coach of its women’s tennis team in 

1991, making him the first black head coach of any sport in the school’s history. 

Minnis remained as head coach for 21 years until LSU elected not to renew his 

contract in June 2012. 

During his time at LSU, Minnis received various awards, including being 

chosen as the Southwest Regional Women’s Tennis Coach of the Year five 

times and the Southeastern Conference (“SEC”) Coach of the Year once. 

During that same time, though, the women’s tennis team struggled. In the 

course of his 21 years as head coach, Minnis’s teams achieved a winning record 

in the SEC on only three occasions. His overall SEC win-loss record was 86-

146. During his last four years at LSU, Minnis’s total SEC win-loss record was 

16-27. Minnis’s teams competed in the NCAA tournament in 15 out of his 21

years, but in his last 12 years, none advanced past the second round. In the 

year preceding Minnis’s termination, his team did not reach the NCAA 

tournament and the team had losing seasons in each of the three years 

preceding his termination. 

LSU hired Jeff Brown, who is white, as head coach of its men’s tennis 

team in 1998. In the five years preceding Minnis’s termination, the men’s and 

women’s tennis teams had nearly identical records. But in the 15 years during 

which both coaches were at LSU, the men’s team finished with a higher 

national ranking than the women’s team every year except one. During 

Brown’s most successful season, the men’s team was ranked second in the 

nation; the highest ranking achieved by the women’s team during Minnis’s 

tenure was eighteenth. Brown’s overall record for the 15 years that his time 

at LSU overlapped with Minnis’s was 237-142 and his SEC record was 89-76. 

Minnis’s overall record for that same time was 191-174 and his SEC record was 

61-104. 

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Throughout his employment, Minnis received written performance 

evaluations. Minnis’s last evaluation was in June 2009. LSU evaluated him 

based on a wide range of factors, including planning and organization, 

leadership, and sports knowledge. The results of Minnis’s evaluations were 

generally mixed. 

In February 2008, Judy Southard, one of Minnis’s supervisors, issued 

him a written reprimand expressing “general displeasure” with Minnis’s 

management of the program. Southard identified three particular incidents: 

(1) making inappropriate comments about a team member, (2) failing to 

properly account for expenses, and (3) a secondary NCAA violation pertaining 

to Minnis’s purchase of motivational books for team members. In response to 

Southard’s reprimand, Minnis complained to administrators that he believed 

Southard to be a racist. The administrators told Minnis that they disagreed 

and asked why he reached that conclusion. Minnis offered no facts to support 

his contention and made no further allegations of racial discrimination. 

In February 2012, Minnis was reprimanded for a serious incident 

involving a team member. As punishment for showing up late to a charity 

event, Minnis ordered the team member to run laps. There is evidence that 

Minnis was aware that the student had been drinking the night before. The 

student collapsed while running and had to be resuscitated twice. In March 

2012, Minnis brought in Tiffany Jones, a sports psychology consultant, to meet 

with team members. During Jones’s meetings, students expressed various 

complaints about Minnis’s coaching style and techniques. 

Throughout his time at LSU, Minnis regularly complained to 

administrators about what he perceived to be inadequate practice facilities, 

particularly the lack of an indoor facility. Brown also complained about the 

lack of an indoor facility. The men’s and women’s teams used the same oncampus outdoor facilities. Though both teams had access to the same off-

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campus practice facility owned by the Baton Rouge Recreation and Parks 

Commission, Minnis chose to have his team practice at the Country Club of 

Louisiana.

At some point during his employment, Minnis questioned whether he 

was being adequately compensated. LSU responded that it set Minnis’s salary 

in accordance with his team’s ranking and on par with other SEC women’s 

tennis coaches. Minnis never indicated to LSU that he believed that he was 

being inadequately compensated because of his race and he conceded that he 

did not know how his salary was calculated. 

LSU publicly announced on June 30, 2012 that it would not renew 

Minnis’s contract. At that time, Minnis was earning $85,000 per year. Minnis 

was replaced by Julia Sell, a white female. Sell signed a four-year contract 

with a base salary of $110,000 per year. Sell had no prior head coaching 

experience, but had some assistant coaching experience. LSU contends that 

Sell received a higher salary both because it was competing with the University 

of South Carolina (“USC”) to hire her and as a result of the challenges 

associated with attracting a coach to a team with a losing record and morale 

issues. 

Minnis filed this suit in Louisiana state court in November 2012. He

named LSU and several former supervisors as defendants. The defendants 

removed the case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of 

Louisiana in January 2013. Minnis filed an amended complaint in May, 

alleging a variety of state and federal claims. In September, the district court 

dismissed all defendants other than LSU. The district court also dismissed all 

of Minnis’s claims except those for racial discrimination, harassment, and 

retaliation under Title VII; retaliation under Title IX; and discrimination and 

retaliation under state law. In October 2014, the district court granted LSU’s 

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motion for summary judgment, dismissing all of Minnis’s remaining claims 

with prejudice. 

DISCUSSION

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same 

standards as the district court. E.E.O.C. v. LHC Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 694 

(5th Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). There is no genuine 

factual dispute “[i]f the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier 

of fact to find for the nonmoving party . . . .” Dediol v. Best Chevrolet, Inc., 655 

F.3d 435, 439 (5th Cir. 2011). We consider the facts and evidence in the light 

most favorable to the non-moving party. Jackson v. Watkins, 619 F.3d 463, 

466 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 

I. Title VII discrimination claims 

First, Minnis appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment on 

his Title VII disparate compensation and discriminatory discharge claims. A 

Title VII discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence is analyzed 

using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Davis v. Dall. Area 

Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309, 316 (5th Cir. 2004). To survive summary 

judgment, a plaintiff must first present a prima facie case of discrimination. 

Id. at 317. Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, an inference of 

discrimination is established. Id. The burden then shifts to the employer to 

rebut the claim with a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the 

employment action. Id. If the employer meets this burden, the inference of 

discrimination disappears and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to 

establish that the employer’s proffered reason is pretextual. Id. 

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A. Disparate compensation

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, to succeed on his disparate 

compensation claim, Minnis must first present a prima facie case of 

discrimination. To do so, he must show that: (1) “he was a member of a 

protected class,” and (2) “he was paid less than a non-member for work 

requiring substantially the same responsibility.” Taylor v. United Parcel Serv., 

Inc., 554 F.3d 510, 522 (5th Cir. 2008). “An individual plaintiff claiming 

disparate treatment in pay under Title VII must show that his circumstances 

are nearly identical to those of a better-paid employee who is not a member of 

the protected class.” Id. at 523 (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). 

No one disputes that Minnis is a member of a protected class. Thus, as 

the district court correctly noted, the only issue at the prima facie stage is 

whether Minnis was paid less than white employees for substantially the same 

job responsibilities. The district court concluded that none of the other head 

coaches, including Minnis’s replacement, were proper comparators. The court 

then held that even assuming, arguendo, that Minnis could establish that the 

other coaches were proper comparators, Minnis was still unable to rebut LSU’s 

legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the disparity in pay. LSU asserted 

the following reasons for the pay disparity: (1) Minnis did not have a 

competitive record that would justify merit increases, (2) Minnis’s salary was 

set by comparing his performance to that of other women’s tennis coaches in 

the SEC, and (3) Minnis’s salary was calculated based on the market for the 

position at the time of hiring. In response, Minnis disputed that his salary was 

determined based on the salaries of other SEC women’s tennis coaches. He 

also asserted that the disparity between his salary and those of the other 

coaches “was so glaring” that others “took notice.” The district court 

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determined that Minnis’s self-serving conclusions and subjective beliefs were 

insufficient to establish pretext. 

Minnis appeals the district court’s conclusion that the other head coaches 

were not proper comparators. We need not consider this argument because 

even if Minnis was able to establish a prima facie case, his claim still fails at 

the pretext stage. 

“Once a Title VII case reaches the pretext stage, the only question on 

summary judgment is whether there is a conflict in substantial evidence to 

create a jury question regarding discrimination.” Shackelford v. Deloitte & 

Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 404 (5th Cir. 1999). A plaintiff “must put forward 

evidence rebutting each of the nondiscriminatory reasons the employer 

articulates” and must show “that a discriminatory motive more likely 

motivated [the] employer’s decision . . . or that [the] employer’s explanation is 

unworthy of credence.” Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 220 (5th 

Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Once LSU articulated non-discriminatory reasons for the pay disparity, 

the burden shifted to Minnis to rebut each of those reasons. He has not offered 

any evidence beyond his subjective beliefs to meet his burden. Thus, the 

district court correctly concluded that there was no genuine dispute of material 

fact regarding pretext and, accordingly, Minnis’s disparate compensation claim 

fails.1

 

1 Minnis also argues that the district court erred in holding that his disparate 

compensation claims, as they relate to his salary prior to 2011, are time-barred. Minnis 

contends that the district court’s holding is incorrect in light of recent amendments made to 

Title VII following the Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,

550 U.S. 618 (2007). Though raised below, this argument was not addressed by the district 

court. We have already determined that Minnis’s disparate compensation claim fails. 

Consideration of this additional argument would not affect the outcome of this case. 

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B. Discriminatory discharge

Minnis’s discriminatory discharge claim is similarly analyzed using the 

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Lee v. Kan. City S. Ry. 

Co., 574 F.3d 253, 259 (5th Cir. 2009). This requires Minnis to establish first 

a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating that: 

(1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the 

position at issue, (3) he was the subject of an adverse employment 

action, and (4) he was treated less favorably because of his 

membership in that protected class than were other similarly 

situated employees who were not members of the protected class,

under nearly identical circumstances.

Id. 

The district court discussed the fourth element as the only one in dispute. 

The court held that Minnis had failed to provide sufficient evidence to evaluate 

whether the head coaches of other sports were similarly situated to him, but 

that there was sufficient evidence to analyze whether Minnis was similarly 

situated to Brown, the men’s tennis coach. The court determined that Brown 

and Minnis were treated differently because Brown had a superior win-loss 

record, and therefore the two could not be considered similarly situated. 

The court then held that even assuming Minnis had established a prima 

facie case, his claim still failed because he could not rebut LSU’s nondiscriminatory reasons for termination. It accepted LSU’s three proffered 

reasons for terminating Minnis: (1) his failure to meet established goals, (2) 

his losing record, and (3) morale issues. In response, Minnis offered evidence 

of LSU’s “shifting reasons” for terminating him as supposed proof of pretext. 

Minnis explained that LSU first said, without further elaboration, that he was 

being fired because the school had decided to go in another direction. After 

Minnis filed his Charge of Discrimination, however, LSU said that he was 

being fired because of his poor performance. In addition, LSU maintained that 

Minnis’s NCAA violations and the team’s morale problems also contributed to 

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its decision to terminate Minnis. The district court held that pointing to these

“shifting reasons” did not prove pretext. 

On appeal, Minnis does not address the district court’s ruling about the 

comparators and instead focuses on the district court’s alternative reasoning 

that he failed to show pretext. He again argues that LSU’s allegedly shifting

reasons provide evidence of pretext. We have held that inconsistent reasons 

offered at different times can create a fact issue of pretext. Gee v. Principi, 289 

F.3d 342, 347–48 (5th Cir. 2002). We conclude, though, that proof of an 

employer’s reasons becoming more detailed as the dispute moves beyond the 

initial notice to an employee and enters into adversarial proceedings, is 

insufficient to create a jury question regarding pretext absent an actual 

inconsistency. In an unpublished opinion with which we agree, we clarified 

that explanations whose only difference lay in their level of generality were not 

inconsistent. Hamilton v. AVPM Corp., 593 F. App’x 314, 322 (5th Cir. 2014)

(per curiam). That characterization equally applies here.2

II. Title VII hostile work environment

Next, Minnis appeals the district court’s dismissal of his hostile work 

environment claim. To establish a race-based hostile work environment claim 

under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that he: 

 

2 Minnis relies on a Seventh Circuit case to support his pretext argument. See Peirick 

v. Ind. Univ.-Purdue Univ. Indianapolis Athletics Dep’t, 510 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2007). There, 

a female coach sued her former university employer after she was terminated, alleging sex 

discrimination. Id. at 684. Based on the university’s “suspect” reasons for terminating the 

coach, the court held that the coach had sufficiently shown that there was a question of fact 

as to pretext. Id. at 692–94. The court emphasized that the coach had never been disciplined 

prior to termination, had never been cited for an NCAA violation, and had outperformed her 

colleagues. Id. Minnis argues that LSU, similarly, did not discipline him until after he was 

terminated and that his colleagues, like those in Peirick, were baffled by his termination. 

Contrary to Minnis’s arguments, Peirick is factually distinct. Minnis was reprimanded on 

several occasions, received negative feedback in several performance evaluations, had a poor 

performance record, and had several NCAA violations. 

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(1) belongs to a protected group; (2) was subjected to unwelcome 

harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based on race; 

(4) the harassment complained of affected a term, condition, or 

privilege of employment; [and] (5) the employer knew or should 

have known of the harassment in question and failed to take 

prompt remedial action. 

Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 651 (5th Cir. 2012). For 

purposes of the fourth element, “[h]arassment affects a term, condition, or 

privilege of employment if it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 

conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working 

environment.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In 

considering whether a workplace constitutes an abusive work environment, 

this court must look at the totality of the circumstances, including the following 

relevant factors: “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; 

whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive 

utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work 

performance.” Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, “the conduct must be 

both objectively offensive, meaning that a reasonable person would find it 

hostile and abusive, and subjectively offensive, meaning that the victim 

perceived it to be so.” Stewart v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 586 F.3d 321, 330 (5th 

Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court determined that Minnis failed to establish a hostile

work environment claim because he failed to show conduct that affected a 

term, condition, or privilege of employment. In analyzing the claim, the court 

considered only Minnis’s 2012 reprimand, which was issued in response to the 

events involving the intoxicated student who collapsed at a charity event. The 

court refused to consider Minnis’s evaluations or the 2008 reprimand, 

explaining that they were time-barred. The court concluded that the 2012 

reprimand, on its own, was insufficient to create a hostile work environment. 

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On appeal, Minnis argues that the district court erred in refusing to 

consider the evaluations and 2008 reprimand. Minnis notes that the Supreme 

Court has “rejected a notion of parsing incidents, one from another, for 

purposes of a hostile environment claim.” See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & 

Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 638 (2007). LSU responds that the district court 

correctly excluded the evaluations and 2008 reprimand, but even if they had 

been considered, Minnis’s hostile work environment claim would still fail

because the combination of acts about which Minnis complains is neither 

severe nor pervasive enough to have created a hostile work environment. 

It is unnecessary for us to decide whether the district court erred in 

refusing to consider the additional evidence because even with the evaluations 

and 2008 reprimand, Minnis still has not shown a race-based hostile work 

environment. First, Minnis has not shown that any of the evaluations or 

reprimands constitute harassment based on race. See Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 

651; Ramsey, 286 F.3d at 268. He also has not shown that the conduct “affected 

a term, condition, or privilege of employment . . . .” See Ramsey, 286 F.3d at 

268. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the combination of alleged acts 

does not constitute a hostile work environment because he has not shown that 

the acts were “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [his] 

employment and create an abusive working environment.” Id. (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, Minnis’s claim fails 

regardless of whether the additional evaluations and reprimand are 

considered. 

III. Title IX retaliation 

Minnis also contends that the district court applied the wrong legal 

standard in analyzing his Title IX retaliation claim. In setting out the legal 

standard, the district court explained: “To establish a prima facie case of Title 

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IX retaliation, a plaintiff must show that he or she participated in activity 

protected by Title IX and that the defendant took an adverse action against 

him or her because of that activity.” The district court then stated that 

although this court has not “directly addressed” whether the Title VII burdenshifting framework should be utilized in Title IX cases, many other circuits 

“have looked to Title VII as the appropriate analog for the legal standards in

Title IX claims.” The court then applied the Title VII burden-shifting 

framework to Minnis’s Title IX retaliation claim. 

Minnis now contends that the Title VII standard should not have been 

applied to his Title IX claim. In particular, the “because” standard should not 

have been applied. According to Minnis, instead of being required to show that 

he was retaliated against because he complained of sex discrimination, he 

should only be required to show that the complaint was “a motivating factor,”

potentially among others, in the retaliation. He asserts that this is an issue of 

first impression for this court. 

What the district court stated was that the applicability of the Title VII 

burden-shifting framework to Title IX claims is unsettled. The court never 

suggested that what is required to establish a prima facie case of Title IX 

retaliation is uncertain. The argument that the district court erred in applying 

the “because” causation standard goes to Minnis’s prima facie case. The 

Supreme Court has held that the “because” standard applies at the prima facie 

stage. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 174 (2005) 

(“[W]hen a funding recipient retaliates against a person because he complains 

of sex discrimination, this constitutes intentional ‘discrimination’ ‘on the basis 

of sex,’ in violation of Title IX”).

Moreover, Minnis’s claim fails regardless of what standard is applied. 

The district court held that Minnis had failed to show that he had made any 

Title IX complaints. The court explained that Minnis’s complaints about LSU’s 

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on-campus facilities were not Title IX complaints because both the men’s and 

women’s coaches complained about the facilities and, although Minnis also 

complained about the off-campus facility, he is the one who selected it, and he 

had access to the same off-campus facility as the men’s team. On appeal, 

Minnis contends that his complaints differed from Brown’s complaints because 

Minnis is the only one who put his complaints in writing. Minnis’s argument 

is unconvincing. He has not shown that his complaints were related to gender 

inequality and thus has not shown that he engaged in activity protected by 

Title IX. Thus, regardless of what standard is applied, Minnis’s claim fails 

because he cannot establish a key element of his prima facie case.

IV. Title VII retaliation and state-law claims

Throughout his brief, Minnis asserts that he is appealing the district 

court’s holding on his Title VII retaliation claim. The district court determined 

that Minnis had failed to demonstrate that he engaged in any activity 

protected by Title VII, and even if he had, there was no evidence of a causal 

link between that activity and his termination. The court went on to explain 

that even if Minnis had established a prima facie case of retaliation, he still 

could not rebut LSU’s legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for its 

employment decision. Minnis makes no argument with respect to the district 

court’s holding that he failed to establish a prima facie case of Title VII 

retaliation and has therefore waived review of this issue. “A party that asserts 

an argument on appeal, but fails to adequately brief it, is deemed to have 

waived it. It is not enough to merely mention or allude to a legal theory.” 

United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 446 (5th Cir. 2010) (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). The same is true with respect to Minnis’s 

state-law claims. Though Minnis contends that he is appealing the district 

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court’s holding on those claims, he advances no legal argument. They are 

likewise waived.

AFFIRMED. 

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