[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 21-10594

Non-Argument Calendar

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JAMES LEONARD HINES, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

REGIONS BANK, 

f.k.a. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 

Defendant-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 5:19-cv-01819-LCB

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-10594

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM:

James Hines appeals pro se the dismissal of his amended 

complaint against Regions Bank. Hines complained that Regions 

violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The district court 

ruled that Hines failed to state a plausible claim against Regions, 

see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and that it would be futile to allow 

Hines to further amend his complaint. Later, the district court denied Hines’s motions to alter, amend, or vacate, Fed. R. Civ. P. 

59(e), and for leave to file a surreply. We affirm. 

Two standards of review govern this appeal. “We review de 

novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to 

state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff.” Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 872 

(11th Cir. 2008). We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a 

postjudgment motion. See Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Crum & Forster Specialty Ins. Co., 828 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 2016).

The district court did not err by dismissing Hines’s amended 

complaint. Hines failed to “plead factual content that allow[ed] the 

[district] court to draw the reasonable inference that [Regions] is a 

‘debt collector’ under the [Collection Practices Act] and therefore 

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Davidson v. Cap. One Bank 

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21-10594 Opinion of the Court 3

(USA), N.A., 797 F.3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Hines’s conclusory allegation that Regions is 

a debt collector did “not prevent dismissal.” Oxford Asset Mgmt., 

Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002). And Hines alleged no facts that Regions was a debt collector by being a business 

“the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts” or 

by “regularly collect[ing] or attempt[ing] to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 

See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Nor did Hines allege that Regions or its 

attorney engaged in “conduct . . . related to debt collection.” See 

Reese v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree & Adams, LLP, 678 F.3d 1211, 

1216 (11th Cir. 2012). That Regions, as a creditor, mailed Hines an 

acceleration letter and advertised the foreclosure sale in the newspaper, as required by Hines’s mortgage, see Ex parte Turner, 254 

So. 3d 207, 210 (Ala. 2017), to “engage in . . . nonjudicial foreclosure 

proceedings . . . [did] not [make Regions or its counsel] debt collectors within the meaning of the [Act],” Obduskey v. McCarthy & 

Holthus LLP, 139 S. Ct. 1029, 1038 (2019). Regions never demanded a payment of a debt from Hines.

Hines’s bankruptcy did not bar Regions from initiating a 

nonjudicial foreclosure on Hines’s property. A discharge of personal debt in a Chapter 7 proceeding does not prohibit a secured 

creditor from enforcing a valid, preexisting mortgage lien so long 

as the creditor does not seek to hold the debtor personally liable. 

In re Wrenn, 40 F.3d 1162, 1164 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[D]ischarge does 

not affect liability in rem, and prepetition liens remain enforceable 

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4 Opinion of the Court 21-10594

after discharge.”). Regions informed Hines in the acceleration letter that “this notice is not intended and does not constitute an attempt to collect a debt against you personally” and “this is not an 

attempt to assert that you have any personal liability for this debt.” 

And Hines alleged that he was “not obligated on the indebtedness 

since his personal liability was discharged in bankruptcy in 2014.” 

So Regions could foreclose on Hines’s property.

Hines argues that Regions violated the discharge order entered in his Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, see 11 U.S.C. 

§ 524(a)(2), but this argument is not properly before us. As the district court stated, Hines “presented [the] argument for the first time 

in his motion to alter, amend, or vacate” the order that dismissed 

his complaint. Hines was not allowed to “raise [an] argument . . . 

[in his postjudgment motion] that could have been raised prior to 

the entry of judgment.” Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th 

Cir. 2007).

Hines argues that the district court violated his right to a trial 

by jury under the Seventh Amendment, but the district court correctly dismissed Hines’s complaint for failure to state a claim for 

relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Hines had no right to a jury trial 

when no factual dispute existed for a jury to resolve. See Garvie v. 

City of Fort Walton Beach, Fla., 366 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir. 

2004).

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 

Hines’s motion for leave to file a surreply. The Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure do not provide for surreplies. See generally Fed. R. 

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21-10594 Opinion of the Court 5

Civ. P. 7(a). And Hines was not entitled to submit a filing in which 

he repeated arguments he had already made opposing the dismissal 

of his complaint.

We AFFIRM the dismissal of Hines’s amended complaint.

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