I 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1183 

To require the President to transmit to Congress a report on contingency 

plans regarding possible developments in Iraq. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 16, 2007 

Mr. UDALL of Colorado introduced the following bill; which was referred to 

the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on 

Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To require the President to transmit to Congress a report 

on contingency plans regarding possible developments in 

Iraq. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND PURPOSE. 

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 

5 ‘‘Iraq Contingency Planning Act’’. 

6 (b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this Act is to require 

7 the President to promptly inform Congress regarding what 

8 contingency plans are or will be in place to respond to 


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1 three scenarios regarding future developments in Iraq as 

2 identified by the most recent National Intelligence Esti3 mate on Iraq. 

4 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

5 Congress finds as follows: 

6 (1) The United States initiated combat oper7 ations against the Saddam Hussein regime on 

8 March 19, 2003, and concluded those operations in 

9 April 2004 with the defeat of the Iraqi military and 

10 the collapse of the Hussein regime. 

11 (2) The Bush Administration had been warned 

12 that while military action against the Hussein re13 gime would likely succeed, rebuilding Iraq and win14 ning the peace would be more difficult. In particular, 

15 intelligence reports from the Defense Intelligence 

16 Agency, the Pentagon’s Joint Staff, the Department 

17 of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and 

18 the Central Intelligence Agency’s National Intel19 ligence Council warned that United States troops 

20 could face significant postwar resistance. An Army 

21 War College report from February 2003 warned that 

22 without an ‘‘overwhelming’’ effort to prepare for the 

23 United States occupation of Iraq, ‘‘The United 

24 States may find itself in a radically different world 

25 over the next few years, a world in which the threat 


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1 of Saddam Hussein seems like a pale shadow of new 

2 problems of America’s own making.’’. 

3 (3) Despite these warnings, the Bush Adminis4 tration invaded Iraq without a comprehensive plan 

5 in place to secure and rebuild the country. 

6 (4) United States Armed Forces personnel have 

7 remained in Iraq since the beginning of combat op8 erations, and in over nearly four years of war, hun9 dreds of thousands of members of the Armed Forces 

10 have served with honor and distinction in Iraq, over 

11 3,100 members of the Armed Forces have died, and 

12 over 22,500 members of the Armed Forces have 

13 been wounded. 

14 (5) On January 10, 2007, after years of grow15 ing sectarian violence in Iraq, President George W. 

16 Bush addressed the American people to announce a 

17 plan entitled ‘‘The New Way Forward in Iraq’’, con18 sisting of the additional deployments of at least 

19 21,500 United States troops in Iraq. 

20 (6) On January 16, 2007, the Secretary of De21 fense said that ‘‘we expect in certain areas to be able 

22 to see whether the Iraqi government is carrying out 

23 the commitments that it has made and that are so 

24 critical to the success of this strategy . . . within two 

25 or three months.’’. 


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1 (7) On February 5, 2007, the President sub2 mitted a request for supplemental appropriations for 

3 fiscal year 2007, including $5,600,000,000 to in4 crease United States forces in the Iraqi theater of 

5 operations to support the Government of Iraq with 

6 21,500 United States ground forces and an ex7 panded Naval presence. At the same time, the Presi8 dent also submitted a proposed budget for fiscal 

9 year 2008 which did not request funding for these 

10 additional troops in Iraq. 

11 (8) On February 1, 2007, the intelligence com12 munity presented to the President the first National 

13 Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq in nearly four 

14 years. 

15 (9) The NIE, the most authoritative written 

16 judgment of the Director of National Intelligence 

17 with respect to Iraq, states that ‘‘Iraqi society’s 

18 growing polarization, the persistent weakness of the 

19 security forces and the state in general, and all 

20 sides’ ready recourse to violence are collectively driv21 ing an increase in communal and insurgent violence 

22 and political extremism. Unless efforts to reverse 

23 these conditions show measurable progress during 

24 . . . the coming 12 to 18 months, we assess that the 


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1 overall security situation will continue to deterio2 rate.’’. 

3 (10) The NIE states that as Iraq’s security en4 vironment worsens, three prospective security paths 

5 could emerge— 

6 (A) chaos leading to partition; 

7 (B) emergence of a Shia strongman; or 

8 (C) anarchic fragmentation of power. 

9 (11) Congress needs to know how the Adminis10 tration expects to respond to each of those possibili11 ties, and what specific plans are being taken and 

12 what specific plans are being developed to be able to 

13 respond to such possibilities. 

14 SEC. 3. REPORT ON CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR IRAQ. 

15 (a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than June 30, 

16 2007, the President shall transmit to the Committees on 

17 Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the 

18 Senate a report detailing contingency plans for how the 

19 Department of Defense and other departments and agen20 cies of the Federal Government will respond to the fol21 lowing three prospective security paths in Iraq, as outlined 

22 in the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq: 

23 (1) CHAOS LEADING TO PARTITION.—Described 

24 by the NIE as follows: ‘‘A rapid deterioration in the 

25 capacity of Iraq’s central government to function, 


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1 security services and other aspects of sovereignty 

2 would collapse. Resulting widespread fighting could 

3 produce de facto partition, dividing Iraq into three 

4 mutually antagonistic parts. Collapse of this mag5 nitude would generate fierce violence for at least sev6 eral years, ranging well beyond the time frame of 

7 this estimate, before settling into a partially stable 

8 end-state.’’. 

9 (2) EMERGENCE OF A SHIA STRONGMAN.—De10 scribed by the NIE as follows: ‘‘Instead of a disinte11 grating central government producing partition, a 

12 security implosion could lead Iraq’s potentially most 

13 powerful group, the Shia, to assert its latent 

14 strength.’’. 

15 (3) ANARCHIC FRAGMENTATION OF POWER.— 

16 Described by the NIE as follows: ‘‘The emergence of 

17 a checkered pattern of local control would present 

18 the greatest potential for instability, mixing extreme 

19 ethno-sectarian violence with debilitating intra-group 

20 clashes.’’. 

21 (b) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.—The report shall in22 clude detailed information regarding the proposed role of 

23 the United States Armed Forces under each of the three 

24 prospective security paths referred to in subsection (a), in25 cluding a comprehensive analysis to identify and justify 


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1 the number of United States troops needed in each case, 

2 and the proposed roles of other departments and agencies 

3 of the Federal Government. 

Æ 


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