alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1 The Honorable Dean Whipple, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 01-3470

___________ Ivron G. Butler; Steve G. Jimerson, * * Appellants, * * Christopher L. Carroll, * * Appeal from the United States Plaintiff, * District Court for the * Western District of Missouri. v. * * [UNPUBLISHED] Mike Kemna, Superintendent; * William Wayne; Marvin Kelman; * Elijah Nagbe, * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: May 7, 2002 Filed: June 12, 2002

___________ Before McMILLIAN, BOWMAN, and BYE, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Missouri inmates Ivron G. Butler and Steve G. Jimerson appeal the District Court’s 1 adverse grant of summary judgment in their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit.-2- Having carefully reviewed the record, see Thomas v. Gunter , 103 F.3d 700, 702 (8th Cir. 1997) (standard of review), we affirm. Butler and Jimerson, who are Southern Baptists, and others who are not parties to this appeal, sued Crossroads Correctional Center administrators and chaplains, and a Missouri Department of Corrections director, claiming equal protection and First Amendment free-exercise violations. They alleged that defendants determined when and how inmates could convert to other religions through a “declaration” policy; and refused to provide separate meetings for Baptists, to offer baptism and communion, and to allot time for choir practice and prayer. Initially we conclude, contrary to appellants’ contentions, that the District Court’s summary judgment ruling was not premature, as appellants did not seek a continuance under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), see Dulany v. Carnahan , 132 F.3d 1234, 1238 (8th Cir. 1997), and that the Court did not abuse its discretion in denying their motions to compel discovery, see Lee v. Armontrout , 991 F.2d 487, 489 (8th Cir.) (per curiam) (standard of review for gross abuse of discretion), cert. denied , 510 U.S. 875 (1993), and to appoint counsel, see Abdullah v. Gunter , 949 F.2d 1032, 1035 (8th Cir. 1991) (listing factors), cert. denied , 504 U.S. 930 (1992).

Turning to the merits, we conclude that summary judgment was proper. As to the free-exercise claims, the evidence showed that the challenged policies and practices were logically related to legitimate penological interests, seeThomas v. Gunter , 32 F.3d 1258, 1259-60 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying factors enumerated in Turner v. Safley , 482 U.S. 78 (1987) to restrictions placed on inmates’ religious practices), and that the free exercise of appellants’ sincerely held religious beliefs was not substantially burdened, seeWeir v. Nix , 114 F.3d 817, 820 (8th Cir. 1997). As to the equal-protection claims, for each challenged policy or practice, appellants either failed to show dissimilar treatment, or failed to show they were similarly-3- situated to other religious groups. See Rouse v. Benson , 193 F.3d 936, 942-43 (8th Cir. 1999) (describing the equal protection analysis). Appellants’ remaining arguments provide no basis for reversal. Accordingly, we affirm. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
<PAGE>


                                                                    EXHIBIT 10.4

$3,000,000                                                              4/6/2001

                            UNSECURED PROMISSORY NOTE

Pursuant to the terms of that certain Employment Term Sheet (the "Employment
Term Sheet") dated as of 2/27/2001, by and between Jose Antonio Rios
("Employee") and Global Crossing Development Co. ("Employer"), Employer has
agreed to make an interest-free loan to Employee.

NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency
of which is hereby acknowledged, Employee agrees as follows:

1.   Employee hereby promises to pay to Employer or order, at 360 North Crescent
Drive, Beverly Hills, California 90210, or at such other place as the Employer
may, from time to time, designate in writing, the principal amount of Three
Million Dollars ($3,000,000).

2.   The principal amount shall be due and payable in full at the earlier of (i)
termination for Cause (as defined in the Employment Term Sheet) (ii)
resignation, or (iii) three years. Notwithstanding the foregoing, provided that
on February 28, 2002, Employee is employed by Employer, or any other subsidiary
Global Crossing Ltd., the sum of One Million Dollars ($1,000,000) shall be
forgiven on February 28, 2002. Provided that on February 28, 2003, Employee is
employed by Employer, or any other subsidiary Global Crossing Ltd., the sum of
One Million Dollars ($1,000,000) shall be forgiven on February 28, 2003.
Provided that on February 28, 2004, Employee is employed by Employer, or any
other subsidiary Global Crossing Ltd., the remaining principal balance shall be
forgiven on February 23, 2004.

3.   This Promissory Note shall be interest-free. This Promissory Note may be
prepaid in whole or in part at any time. Employee shall be responsible for
payment of any and all tax related to the Promissory Note, including but not
limited to, tax on imputed interest income and tax on forgiveness of debt.

4.   This Promissory Note shall be governed by the laws of the State of New
York. In the event of default in the payment of any sums due hereunder, Employer
shall be entitled to reimbursement from Employee for all costs of collections,
including reasonable attorney's fees and costs. In the event of default in the
payment of any sums due hereunder, to the extent permitted by law, Employer
shall have the right to offset sums due hereunder against any other sums which
may be owed by Employer to Employee.

/s/ Jose Antonio Rios.
---------------------
Jose Antonio Rios
#### STATE ex rel. Rodney FORTENBERRY v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-0600.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 4, 2011.

In re Fortenberry, Rodney; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 94,157; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 CA 0822.

Writ granted in part; otherwise denied. The Franklinton Police Department is ordered to provide relator with an estimate of the costs of reproducing public records relator has requested and to which relator is entitled. La. Const, art. XII, section 3; R.S. 44:31; R.S. 44:31.1; *State ex rel. Barbee v. State,*10-0275 (La.2/4/11), 57 So.3d 318; *State ex rel Leonard v. State,*96-1889 (La.6/13/97), 695 So.2d 1325; *State ex rel. Level v. State,*99-2266 (La.12/17/99), 751 So.2d 869; *Range v. Moreau,*96-1607 (La.9/3/96), 678 So.2d 537. In all other respects, the application is denied.

CLARK, J., would deny.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                               18 U.S.C. ss. 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In  connection  with the  Quarterly  Report on Form 10-Q for the  quarter  ended
September 30, 2002 (the "Report") of TF Financial Corporation (the "Company") as
filed with the Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof,  we, John
R.  Stranford,  President and Chief  Executive  Officer,  and Dennis R. Stewart,
Senior  Vice  President  and  Chief  Financial  Officer  (Principal   Accounting
Officer),  hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to
ss.906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.


                                      /s/ John R. Stranford
                                      ---------------------
Date:      November 13, 2002          John R. Stranford
                                      President and Chief Executive Officer
                                      (Principal Executive Officer)


                                      /s/ Dennis R. Stewart
                                      ---------------------
Date:      November 13, 2002          Dennis R. Stewart
                                      Senior Vice President and
                                      Chief Financial Officer
                                      (Principal Financial & Accounting Officer)
Exhibit 13.2

CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC FINANCIAL REPORT

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350

In connection with the Annual Report of United Microelectronics Corporation, or the Company, on Form
20-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2012 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, or the Report, I, Chitung Liu, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 1350,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge, that:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: April 26, 2013

|    |  |                 |  |                        
|--- |  | --------------- |  | -----------------------
|    | 
|By: |  | /s/ Chitung Liu
|    |  | Name:           |  | Chitung Liu            
|    |  | Title:          |  | Chief Financial Officer





|* | A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to us and will be retained by us and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
|- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#### Gwendolyn JONES and Sandra Durbin v. RUSTON LOUISIANA HOSPITAL COMPANY, LLC d/b/a Northern Louisiana Medical Center a/k/a Lincoln General Hospital, et al.

No. 2011-OC-0117.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 4, 2011.

In re Northern Louisiana Medical Center a/k/a; Ruston Louisiana Hospital Com*465pany LLC d/b/a et al.; —Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lincoln, 3rd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 54,465; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,-202-CW.

Granted. Based on the transcript, we find the trial court and the parties contemplated that a written judgment would be signed, making the October 21, 2010 judgment the “ruling” at issue for purposes of Rule 4-3. *See Kosmitis v. Bailey,*96-1573 (La.10/4/96), 680 So.2d 1167. Accordingly, the case is remanded to the court of appeal to rule on the merits of the application.
#### Linda LEE, Roy Lee, Sandra Ketchum, Louis Ketchum, Jr., Linda Giddens, Lee Giddens, Peggy McCain and Tom McCain, d/b/a Shreveport Salvage Pool v. CITY OF SHREVEPORT.

No. 2011-C-0607.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 29, 2011.

In re Giddens, Lee; Giddens, Linda; Ketchum Jr., Louis; Ketchum, Sandra; Lee, Linda et al.; Lee, Roy; McCain, Peggy; McCain, Tom; Shreveport Salvage Pool; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 471,992; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,146-CA.

Denied.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Health and Human Services

###### National Institutes of Health

Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. App.), notice is hereby given of the following meeting.

The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 U.S.C., as amended. The contract proposals and the discussions could disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals associated with the contract proposals, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

*Name of Committee:*                         National Institute on Drug Abuse Special Emphasis Panel, Rapid Assessments Tools of Sexual and Drug Use Risk Behaviors (5555).                    

*Date:*                         February 11, 2010.                    

*Time:*                         1 p.m. to 4 p.m.                    

*Agenda:*                         To review and evaluate contract proposals.                    

*Place:*                         National Institutes of Health,  6101 Executive Boulevard,  Rockville, MD 20852,  (Telephone Conference Call)                    

*Contact Person:*                         Gerald L. McLaughlin, PhD,  Scientific Review Administrator, Office of Extramural Affairs,  National Institute on Drug Abuse, NIH, DHHS,  Room 220, MSC 8401, 6101 Executive Blvd.,  Bethesda, MD 20892-8401,  301-402-6626,                         *gm145a@nih.gov.*

This notice is being published less than 15 days prior to the meeting due to the timing limitations imposed by the review and funding cycle.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.279, Drug Abuse and Addiction Research Programs, National Institutes of Health, HHS)

Dated: January 28, 2010.

Jennifer Spaeth,

Director, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.

[FR Doc. 2010-2430 Filed 2-4-10; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4140-01-M
Exhibit 32.2
 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and
 (2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 Dated: March 12, 2009
    /s/ EUGENE B. SHEPHERD, JR.Eugene B. Shepherd, Jr.Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
#### STATE ex rel. Percy M. TAYLOR v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2011-KH-1743.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 20, 2012.

In re Taylor, Percy M.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 88-4180; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KH-385.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; *State ex rel. Glover v. State,*93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; *State ex rel. Melinie v. State,*93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.
#### James Keith LEIGHTON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 5D10-3013.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Feb. 23, 2011.

*676Terry L. Locy of the Law Firm of Terry L. Locy, P.A., Cocoa, for Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee and Carmen F. Corrente, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

James Keith Leighton (Petitioner) filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with this court asserting that the pretrial bail set in his criminal case in the amount of 1.6 million dollars was tantamount to no bond at all and the trial court’s refusal to reduce excessive bond was an abuse of discretion. We grant the petition and order the trial court to either set a reasonable bond or detain the petitioner without bond and set forth the reasons therefor.

Petitioner was originally arrested for the offenses of attempted first degree murder (count one), shooting a missile into a structure or vehicle (count two) and the use of a weapon in the commission of a felony (count three). A cumulative bond amount was set at 1.6 million dollars.

At no time did the State request detention pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.132, even though the petitioner was charged with a first degree felony punishable by up to life imprisonment. *See*Art. 1, Sec. 14, Fla. Const. In fact, the record reveals that defense counsel initially and incorrectly stated that the trial court could not detain the petitioner without the setting of bond, because none of the charges filed constituted a capital offense. Neither the State nor the trial judge questioned this assertion, and no request was made to deny bond. Testimony and evidence were then taken regarding the factors set forth in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.131(b)(3) and Florida Statute Section 903.046(2). Significantly, the petitioner is a 23 year old with no assets and he earns approximately $400 per week. Therefore, although the trial court found that the crimes charged are particularly egregious and the petitioner “continues to represent a potential danger to the community,” the bond amount set is excessive based on the petitioner’s financial situation and cannot stand. *See Best v. State,*28 So.3d 134 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). The petitioner is entitled to a new bond hearing wherein the lower court must either set a reasonable bond or detain the petitioner without bond, supported by appropriate findings.

PETITION GRANTED; REMANDED.

SAWAYA, PALMER, and JACOBUS, JJ. concur.
<PAGE>
                                                                      EXHIBIT 23

                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS


We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statements on Form S-3 (File No. 333-57992) and Form S-4 (File No. 333-63052) of
First Industrial, L.P. of our report dated February 4, 2002 relating to the
consolidated financial statements and of our report dated February 4, 2002
relating to the combined statements of the Other Real Estate Partnerships, which
appear in this Annual Report on Form 10-K. We also consent to the incorporation
by reference of our report dated February 4, 2002 relating to the financial
statement schedule of First Industrial, L.P., which appears in this Form 10-K.





                                          PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Chicago, Illinois
March 8, 2002
758 A.2d 1167

#### William G. McANDREW, Appellant, v. STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT), Appellee.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued May 1, 2000.

Decided Sept. 28, 2000.

Reconsideration Denied Jan. 3, 2001.

William T. Jones, Robert A. Preate, Levy & Preate, Scranton, Richard DiSalle, Rose, Schmidt, Hasley & DiSalle, PC, Pittsburgh, for appellant, William G. McAndrew.

George A. Michak, Acting Chief Counsel, Community & Economic Development, Nancy J. Kippenhan, Annville, for appellee, State Civil Service, et al.

*169Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN and SAYLOR, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM:

Appeal dismissed as having been improvidently granted.

Justice CAPPY files a dissenting statement in which Justice NIGRO joins.

CAPPY, Justice,

dissenting.

The majority has chosen to dismiss this matter as improvidently granted. I respectfully dissent from that decision.

Our system of dispute resolution rests upon the bedrock foundation that due process of law requires, *inter alia,*meaningful notice. One reason for this elementary requirement of meaningful notice is that justice is best served when both parties are apprised of the issues involved in a case so that they may be fully prepared to advocate their side of the dispute and to educate the tribunal about the matter. Without meaningful notice of the points at issue, an adjudication would devolve into nothing more than trial by ambush.

Appellant William McAndrew was denied meaningful notice in this case. Mr. McAndrew, a fourteen-year civil servant, received a furlough notice from the Department of Community Affairs advising him that he was being dismissed because his “position will not be funded.” At the hearing before the State Civil Service Commission, Mr. McAndrew was prepared to contest his furlough on the Department’s stated reason of a lack of funding. However, without amending its reason for furlough prior to the hearing, the Department proceeded on a different basis for dismissal before the Commission. Specifically, at the hearing the Department contended that Mr. McAndrew was furloughed due to lack of work.

This “switch in time” deprived Mr. McAndrew of the opportunity to challenge the Department’s actions and provide the *170Commission with relevant evidence regarding his furlough for lack of work. Of greater import, the notice was in violation of the clear and unambiguous terms of the Commission’s own Policy Management Directive that requires a notice to a furloughed employee to include, *inter alia,*the reason for the furlough. Policy Directive 580.11; *cf. Housing Authority of the County of Chester v. State Civil Service Commission,*556 Pa. 621, 730 A.2d 935 (1999)(policy directive has same force of law as regulation).

As Mr. McAndrew was denied an opportunity to refute the Department’s newly offered reason for furlough and because the Commission disregarded its own legally binding directive, I respectfully dissent and would reverse the order of the Commonwealth Court.

Justice NIGRO joins this dissenting statement.
EXHIBIT 32.2  CFO Certification  NEW COLOMBIA RESOURCES INC  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002   In connection with the Quarterly Report of New Colombia Resources, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2013 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, John Campo, CFO of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.ss. 1350, as added by ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for the period covered by the Report.  /s/ John Campo John Campo, CFO May 20, 2013      A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Section 906"), or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to New Colombia Resources, Inc., and will be retained by New Colombia Resources, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.