J. S73015/16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: C.F., A/K/A C.F., A MINOR :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: D.F., FATHER : No. 674 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered April 15, 2016,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Orphans’ Court Division at No. CP-02-AP-0000075-2015

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., LAZARUS AND JENKINS, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 14, 2016

D.F. (“Father”) appeals from the order dated April 6, 2016, and 

entered April 15, 2016,1in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, 

Orphans’ Court Division, granting the petition of the Allegheny County Office 

of Children, Youth and Families (“CYF”) and involuntarily terminating his 

parental rights to his dependent, male child, C.F. (“Child”), born in March of 

2013, pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), 

and (b).

2

 After review, we affirm.

 

1 While the order was dated April 6, 2016, notice pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 236 

was not provided until April 15, 2016. See Frazier v. City of 

Philadelphia, 735 A.2d 113, 115 (Pa. 1999) (holding that “an order is not 

appealable until it is entered on the docket with the required notation that 

appropriate notice has been given”).

2

In the same order, the trial court terminated the parental rights of Child’s 

mother, J.B. (“Mother”), also pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and 

(b). Mother has filed an appeal at Superior Court Docket No. 609 WDA 

2016.
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The trial court summarized the relevant procedural and factual history 

as follows:

The family came to the attention of CYF on the 

day of the child’s birth – [in] March [of] 2013 – when 

Mother and the infant tested positive for cocaine and 

methadone. CYF did not remove the child at that 

time. The child remained with Mother until they

were discharged on April 1, 2013. Father was at the 

hospital when the child was born. He was listed as 

the Father on the birth certificate and acknowledged 

paternity at a later time. CYF installed in-home 

services in weeks after Mother’s discharge. CYF 

offered similar services to Father, but soon after the 

birth, Father was incarcerated. Only a couple weeks 

later, on April 18, 2013, CYF removed the child after 

allegations of further drug use. Following a shelter 

hearing, the child was returned to Mother’s care so 

long as she resided with her step-sister. The child 

remained in Mother’s care until June 6, 2013, when 

he was removed following another Emergency 

Custody Authorization. Mother had tested positive 

for cocaine, opiates, and benzodiazepines; the 

caseworker had witnessed Mother “manipulate” –

i.e., tamper – with the urine screen. On June 12, 

2013, the child was adjudicated dependent, and 

ultimately never returned to either parent’s care. 

The child has been placed in the foster home of C.D. 

and R.M. R.M. is Mother’s step[-]sister.

CYF established a Family Service Plan (“FSP”) 

to aid in reunification of the parents with their child. 

FSPs are comprised of goals. The goals are designed 

to address and resolve the conditions that led to the 

child’s removal from parental care. . . . 

. . . .

Meanwhile, Father was largely non-compliant 

with his goals. Of course, this is in large part due to 

his repeated incarceration. He was incarcerated 

soon after the child’s birth in March 2013. He was 

released in February 2014, but was incarcerated 
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again from June 2014 until October 2015; his second 

release came nearly seven months after the TPR 

petition was filed. Father purportedly took some 

parenting classes while incarcerated and participated 

in a program during the brief window he was 

released. He did not address his drug and alcohol 

goal until his latest release in October 2015, after 

the TPR was filed. And his visits were only 

semi-consistent at best. Father has visited with the 

child, by the Court’s count, perhaps as few as 

17 times over the entirety of the child’s three[-]year 

life. He was entitled to one visit per month while 

incarcerated at the Allegheny County Jail. Upon his 

release, he could visit with the child four times per 

month. Yet there were months at a time where 

Father did not visit with the child. During the life of 

this case, Father has either failed to comply with the 

court-ordered FSP goals, or he has been 

incarcerated. . . .

Trial court opinion, 6/10/16 at 1-3 (citations to record omitted).

On April 5, 2015, CYF filed a petition to terminate parental rights. 

Thereafter, the trial court conducted a hearing on April 6, 2016. At the 

hearing, CYF presented the testimony of CYF caseworker, Darlene Lewis, and 

Family Resources prevention services specialist (also referred to as a 

parenting specialist), Mary Safrin. Father additionally testified on his own 

behalf. Counsel further stipulated to the submission of the psychological 

evaluations of Neil Rosenblum, Ph.D., clinical psychologist.3 (Notes of 

testimony, 4/6/16 at 130-132.) While Mother was present, she did not 

 

3 Dr. Rosenblum’s evaluations, which included individual evaluations of 

Mother and foster parents and interactional evaluations of Child with Mother 

and foster parents, were marked as Exhibit CYF 5. Father failed to appear 

for his scheduled evaluations. (See Exhibit CYF 5, Psychological Evaluation, 

Dates of Evaluation: 11/24/15, 12/4/15.)
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testify and was absent from the courtroom for a lengthy portion of the 

hearing.

By order dated April 6, 2016, and entered April 15, 2016, the trial 

court involuntarily terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Child. 

On May 10, 2016,4Father, through appointed counsel, filed a timely notice 

of appeal, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

On appeal, Father raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the Trial Court commit fatal and reversible 

error in finding that [CYF] met [sic] their 

burden of proof and proved by clear and 

convincing evidence that CYF provided 

reasonable efforts to Father, D.F. to reunify 

Father with his child, C.F.?

2. Did the Trial Court commit fatal and reversible 

error in allowing testimony from the 

caseworker regarding father’s understanding of 

his goals in being reunified with his child C.F.?

3. Did the Trial Court commit fatal and reversible 

error in finding that [CYF] met their burden of 

proof and proved by clear and convincing 

evidence that terminating the parental rights of 

D.F. will best meet the needs and welfare of 

C.F., pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§ 2511(b)]?

Father’s brief at 1.

In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our 

standard of review is as follows:

 

4 While Father’ notice of appeal is stamped as filed May 11, 2016, it is 

docketed May 10, 2016.
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The standard of review in termination of parental 

rights cases requires appellate courts “to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the 

trial court if they are supported by the record.” 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 

2012). “If the factual findings are supported, 

appellate courts review to determine if the trial court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion.” Id. 

“[A] decision may be reversed for an abuse of 

discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or 

ill-will.” Id. The trial court’s decision, however, 

should not be reversed merely because the record 

would support a different result. Id. at 827. We 

have previously emphasized our deference to trial 

courts that often have first-hand observations of the 

parties spanning multiple hearings. See In re 

R.J.T., 9 A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)].

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “The trial court is free to 

believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to 

make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” 

In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f 

competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if 

the record could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of 

T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).

The termination of parental rights is guided by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis of the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of 

the child.

Our case law has made clear that under 

Section 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated 

process prior to terminating parental rights. Initially, 
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the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct 

satisfies the statutory grounds for termination 

delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the 

court engage in the second part of the analysis 

pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of 

best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and 

status of the emotional bond between parent and 

child, with close attention paid to the effect on the 

child of permanently severing any such bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We 

have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct, 

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc), quoting 

Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M. II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998).

In this case, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8), as well as (b). We 

have long held that, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we 

need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of 

Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 

384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). As Father does not raise a challenge to a 

finding of grounds for termination under Section 2511(a) in his statement of 

questions involved section of his brief, we find the issue is waived. Krebs v. 
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United Refining Company of Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797 

(Pa.Super. 2006) (stating that, a failure to preserve issues by raising them 

both in the concise statement of errors complained of on appeal and 

statement of questions involved portion of the brief on appeal results in a 

waiver of those issues). We, therefore, analyze the court’s termination 

pursuant to Section 2511(b) only, which provides as follows: 

(b) Other considerations.--The court in 

terminating the rights of a parent shall give 

primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of 

the child. The rights of a parent shall not be 

terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate 

housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control 

of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), 

the court shall not consider any efforts by the 

parent to remedy the conditions described 

therein which are first initiated subsequent to 

the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(b).

With regard to Section 2511(b), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 

stated as follows:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) 

are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to 

the developmental, physical and emotional needs 

and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The 

emotional needs and welfare of the child have been 

properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as 

love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 

53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa.Super. 2012). In In re E.M., 

620 A.2d [481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that 

the determination of the child’s “needs and welfare” 
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requires consideration of the emotional bonds 

between the parent and child. The “utmost 

attention” should be paid to discerning the effect on 

the child of permanently severing the parental bond. 

In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. However, as discussed 

below, evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an 

easy task.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “[I]n cases where there is no evidence of a 

bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond 

exists. Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis necessarily 

depends on the circumstances of the particular case.” In re Adoption of 

J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citations omitted).

When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use 

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as 

well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding 

evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010), citing 

In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations 

omitted).

Instantly, in examining Section 2511(b) and finding sufficient grounds 

for termination, the trial court concluded:

According to Dr. Neil Rosenblum’s 

psychological evaluation, the child is thriving with his 

pre-adoptive foster parents C.D. and C.D.’s mother 

R.M. He calls C.D. “Mom” and R.M. “Mimi.” The 

child enjoys attention from R.M.’s paramour who he 

calls “poppy” as well as R.M.’s younger children. The 

child’s speech and attention span [have] improved 

while in the foster parent’s care. Dr. Rosenblum 

found that the foster parents are strongly attached 

to the child, who is the center of attention in the 
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home. He has lived with the family essentially his 

entire life. Critically, Dr. Rosenblum found that 

“removing C.F. from his present family environment 

would be not only highly disruptive to his 

developmental progress and attachment, but would 

be traumatic and likely cause severe emotional 

distress for this child.”

Meanwhile, Father outwardly refused to attend 

his scheduled evaluation appointments, even though 

it was clear he was aware of the dates and even 

though he had visited the child in the morning of one 

of the scheduled sessions. Dr. Rosenblum could not 

speculate as to the interaction between Father and 

child. However, it is obvious to this Court that 

Father – who has had even less contact than Mother 

– could not have such an impact on the child’s life 

that it would cause this Court to disagree with 

Dr. Rosenblum’s ultimate conclusion. Because the 

child is placed with kin, it is this Court’s hope that 

positive, healthy contact will remain between the 

child and his biological parents. But it is crystal clear 

that termination serves the child’s best needs and 

welfare. The Court feels strongly that the child’s 

pre-adoptive foster parents are the best judges of 

whether future contact is in the child’s best interests.

Trial court opinion, 6/10/16 at 8 (citations to record omitted).

Father, however, argues that, despite his incarceration, he has made 

efforts at completion of his goals, including drug and alcohol treatment and 

visitation with Child. (Father’s brief at 13.) Likewise, Father emphasizes his 

bond with Child and ability to provide for Child. (Id. at 13.) Father asserts:

Although [Father] was incarcerated for 

seven (7) months, he worked on his goals. 

Specifically he attended a drug and alcohol 

treatment center in Pyramid, in Wilkinsburg, PA; he 

has been free from all substances for several years 

and has not tested positive from any random drug 

screens; and most importantly maintained contact 
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with his son. [Father] . . . visited with his child at 

least once monthly when [Father] was incarcerated 

and two (2) times per month when he was released 

from incarceration. Testimony from persons who 

supervised the visits on a regular basis stated 

[Father] was very appropriate during the visits. 

When asked what Father did while visiting his son, 

[Father] replied we: read books, crawl under the 

table and play peek-a-boo, played with toys and 

gave him all of his attention during the visits “and 

whatever toys he wants to play with or whatever he 

likes to do, that’s what I will do.” [Father] believes 

he has a real bond with his son and is capable of 

providing him with safe and appropriate housing, 

meeting his physical and emotional needs. Father 

stated visits with his son are important to him.

[Father] is currently employed and capable of 

providing a home for his son with his parents. 

Unfortunately, the caseworker stated she did not 

have time to investigate the home or further explore 

the concerns Father expressed “could” be a barrier.

Id. (citations to record omitted).

This court finds that Father’s argument regarding Section 2511(b) 

lacks merit. Upon review, as the trial court’s factual findings are supported 

by the record, and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of error of 

law or abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s order with regard to 

Subsection (b). In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

Next, we turn to whether reasonable efforts were made at reunification 

of Father and Child. Father argues that CYF failed to conduct Family 

Findings “to assure [Child] maintained contact with his family of origin while 

Father was incarcerated” and “failed to investigate a home where [Child] 
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could have resided with his Father once Father had been released from 

incarceration.” (Father’s brief at 10.)

We note that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that 

Section 2511 does not require reasonable efforts as it relates to termination 

of parental rights. In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 673-674 (Pa. 2014).

[W]hile reasonable efforts should be considered and 

indeed, in the appropriate case, a trial court could 

insist upon their provision, we hold that nothing in 

the language or the purpose of Section 6351(f)(9) 

forbids the granting of a petition to terminate 

parental rights, under Section 2511, as a 

consequence of the agency’s failure to provide 

reasonable efforts to a parent.

Id. at 675. Thus, we also find this claim to be without merit.

Lastly, we review Father’s claim of error in allowing the testimony of 

the CYF caseworker regarding his understanding of his goals in being 

reunified with Child. Specifically, the CYF caseworker was asked, “Did you 

have any doubt whether [Father] or [Mother] understood what CYF was 

expecting from them?” to which Father objected as speculative. (Notes of 

testimony, 4/6/16 at 22.) Father argues that the trial court incorrectly 

overruled his objection to the caseworker’s testimony that she believed he 

understood his goal requirements as speculative. (Father’s brief at 11.) The 

trial court, however, explained that the question was not calling for 

speculation, as it was seeking the caseworker’s thoughts. Further, the court 

reasoned, “Father did not testify that he was confused by CYF’s requests, or 

that he did not know how to contact his caseworker, or any other hallmark 
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of misunderstanding. . . . His argument was never that he misunderstood 

what he was asked to do.” (Trial court opinion, 6/10/16 at 6.) With this, we 

agree.

The decision of whether to admit or exclude evidence is committed to 

the sound discretion of the trial court. Buchhalter v. Buchhalter, 959 

A.2d 1260, 1263 (Pa.Super. 2008). See also Schuenemann v. Dreemz, 

LLC, 34 A.3d 94, 100-101 (Pa.Super. 2011); Jacobs v. Chatwani, 922 

A.2d 950 (Pa.Super. 2007). This court may only reverse upon a finding of a 

clear abuse of discretion. Id.

Here, as we agree with the trial court, we find that the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion by admitting the testimony of the caseworker into 

evidence. Hence, this claim fails, as well.

Based on the foregoing analysis, we affirm the order of the trial court 

terminating Father’s parental rights to Child.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/14/2016