97-132

 No. 97-132

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

 1997

NANCY LURIE,

 Plaintiff/Respondent, 

 

 v.

 SHERIFF OF GALLATIN COUNTY, WILLIAM 

 SLAUGHTER, and GALLATIN COUNTY DEPUTY 

SHERIFF, ROBERT CHESTNUT,

 Defendants/Respondents,

 and

ROBERT J. BLACKWELL, 

 Intervenor/Defendant/Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Gallatin,

 The Honorable Larry W. Moran, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 Philip F. Walsh, Walsh & McKenna, Bozeman, Montana

 For Plaintiff/Respondent:

 Charles F. Angel, Angel Law Firm, Bozeman, Montana

 For Defendants/Respondents:

 Martin D. Lambert, Gallatin County Attorney, Bozeman, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: July 23, 1997

 Decided: August 14, 1997

Filed:

 __________________________________________

 Clerk

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Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

 This is an appeal by Robert J. Blackwell, Intervenor/Defendant/Appellant, from

the District Court's December 18, 1996 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and

Order and from its December 24, 1996 Judgment in favor of Nancy Lurie,

Plaintiff/Respondent, on her complaint for claim and delivery and conversion which 

she

filed against the Sheriff of Gallatin County and his deputy. We reverse and remand 

for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 Issues

 Robert J. Blackwell raises two issues on appeal:

 1. Whether the District Court erred in issuing a judgment on the merits of the

case.

 2. Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the property should be 

returned

to Nancy Lurie because she allegedly held the property in tenancy by the entirety 

with

her husband.

 Since we reverse and remand on the first issue, we decline to address the 

second.

 Background

 Because of the importance of the procedural posture of this case to our 

decision,

we set forth the background of this matter in some detail.

 Nancy Lurie (Nancy) is a resident of Bozeman, Gallatin County, Montana. Robert

J. Blackwell (Blackwell) is the Liquidating Trustee for the Popkin & Stern 

Liquidating

Trust. In October 1994, judgment was entered in favor of Blackwell and against 

Nancy's

husband, Ronald Lurie, in the United States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of

Missouri, Eastern Division, Case No. 92-42218-293. On November 9, 1994, this

judgment was filed as a foreign judgment in the Montana Eighteenth Judicial District

Court, Gallatin County, as Cause No. DV 94-770. A writ of execution was then issued

against Ronald Lurie on this judgment. On November 23, 1994, the Sheriff served the

writ on Nancy and took possession of certain itemized personal property (the 

property)

from Nancy's residence in Bozeman. Nancy, claiming ownership of the property, filed

suit against the Sheriff and his deputy (collectively referred to herein as the 

Sheriff), on

May 20, 1996, as Cause No. 96-179, alleging causes of action for claim and delivery 

and

for conversion.

 At the time of filing her complaint, Nancy also filed a petition for temporary

restraining order (TRO) requesting the District Court to

 issue a Temporary Restraining Order preventing the Sheriff from holding

 the Sale on said personal property May 28, 1996; that the Court issue its

 Order to Show Cause setting a hearing as soon as practicable to determine

 whether a preliminary Injunction should be issued preventing the sale or

 disposal of said personal property pending outcome of the litigation filed

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 herein.

Although the TRO is not actually included in the record before us in this appeal, it

appears from a minute entry in the court file dated May 30, 1996, that on the date 

Nancy

filed her complaint and petition, the District Court issued the requested TRO and an

Order to Show Cause. Moreover, and again while the actual supporting documentation

is not in the record, the May 30, 1996 minute entry indicates that Blackwell (though 

not

a party to Nancy's suit) and the Sheriff were served with the TRO and show-cause 

order

and, pursuant thereto, appeared before the District Court by counsel at a show-cause

hearing on May 30, 1996.

 The transcript of this proceeding indicates that the purpose of the hearing was 

to

allow the Sheriff to show cause why a TRO should not remain in effect "pending a

determination on the merits of who owns [the] property that is subject to the 

sheriff's

sale." In fact, at the outset of the hearing, Nancy's counsel acknowledged that her

position was that "the matter should be held in abeyance until there has been a

determination of who owns this property." While the court thereafter engaged counsel

in a general discussion related to the effect of the underlying bankruptcy, the 

subject

property being allegedly owned by Nancy and by her husband as tenants by the entirety

and the choice of law issues, no testimony or evidence was offered or received on the

merits of the allegations in Nancy's complaint regarding her acquisition or 

ownership of

the property. The show-cause hearing closed with the Sheriff agreeing to hold the

property without public sale pending further proceedings, with the court ordering 

further

briefs from the parties on their respective positions as to the issues mentioned 

above, with

the court continuing the TRO and with the court refusing to entertain Blackwell's

objection to the continuance of the TRO on the basis that, since he was not a party, 

he

lacked standing to object.

 On June 13, 1996, the Sheriff filed his answer to Nancy's complaint pleading

insufficient knowledge, and therefore a denial, as to her substantive factual 

allegations

concerning her acquisition and ownership of the property and her legal conclusions 

and

seeking guidance from the court as to how to dispose of the property. On July 9, 

1996,

Blackwell filed his motion to intervene to which was attached his proposed answer and

his objection to the TRO or preliminary injunction. At the same time he also filed a

supporting brief on the matter of intervention. On July 12, 1996, Nancy filed her

response to Blackwell's motion to intervene. In this response she agreed that 

Blackwell

should be allowed to intervene. Additionally, she offered comment on Blackwell's

proposed answer, noting that since he had stated in this document that he was without

sufficient information to admit or deny Nancy's verified claims as to her 

acquisition and

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ownership of the property, there were no facts before the court to rebut her 

allegations

in that respect. Nancy concluded her response with a request that the court grant 

her the

relief which she requested in her brief filed that same date in accordance with the 

court's

direction at the May 30, 1996 show-cause hearing.

 In this brief, Nancy set out her legal position on the issues discussed at the

hearing-- i.e., the nature of her ownership interest in the property and whether the

property could be levied upon to satisfy the judgment against her husband. Nancy 

argued

that the property was acquired by her and her husband as tenants by the entirety in

Missouri, that removal of the property to Montana did not change the nature of that

ownership, and that the property was not subject to execution. Consistent with her

comment on Blackwell's proposed answer, Nancy took the position in her brief that 

since

the Sheriff's answer had pled insufficient information to admit or deny her verified 

and

sworn claims as to her acquisition and ownership of the property that her factual

allegations and legal conclusions were, therefore "undisputed and uncontroverted" and

that she was entitled to the return of the property. She concluded her brief with a 

request

that the court allow oral argument in support of her position.

 On August 21, 1996, the court granted Blackwell's motion to intervene and also

granted him 20 days to further plead and to file a response brief regarding the 

issues

raised at the May 30, 1996 show-cause hearing. On September 10, 1996, Blackwell 

filed

his brief in opposition to Nancy's complaint and petition for TRO. In that document,

Blackwell addressed the issues discussed at the May 30, 1996 hearing, attaching 

various

copies of the underlying bankruptcy proceedings. Specifically, Blackwell argued 

that the

property was governed by Montana law, that Montana did not recognize tenancy by the

entirety and that the Montana Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act did not

mandate recognition of every foreign statute. Blackwell concluded that Nancy's legal

position was not supported and that the TRO was not properly issued and should be

dissolved. Blackwell's brief was supplemented three days later, on September 13, 

1996,

with certified copies of the bankruptcy documents that he had attached to his 

September

10, 1996 brief.

 On September 17, 1996, Nancy filed her reply brief declining to analyze

Blackwell's arguments, noting that in her opening brief she had requested that she be

allowed to present oral argument in support of her position and to comment on the

matters contained in Blackwell's filings, and, again, observing that "[t]he only 

facts

before the Court are those contained in the Verified Complaint filed herein and in 

the

affidavits by Plaintiff." Nancy also reiterated her position that since she claimed

ownership of the property as a tenant by the entirety, the property was not subject 

to

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execution sale.

 On December 18, 1996, the District Court entered its Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law and Order. The court noted that the "Defendants" (it is not clear

whether this reference is simply to the Sheriff or to the Sheriff and Blackwell) 

pleaded

insufficient information to admit or deny Nancy's sworn allegations and therefore 

denied

the same but had not filed any affidavits to contradict her pleadings. The court

acknowledged the parties' briefs and that no testimony had been taken. The court 

then

went on to find, among other things, as "undisputed" facts that many items of the

property in question were acquired by Nancy and her husband while domiciled in

Missouri, that many items of such property were acquired with separate funds of 

Nancy,

that when Nancy moved to Montana she brought with her from Missouri the property

seized by the Sheriff, and that some of the property seized by the Sheriff had 

previously

been given to Nancyþs sons. After discussing various legal authorities, the court 

then

concluded that based on the "undisputed" facts and Blackwell's and the Sheriff's 

failure

to "disprove" Nancy's assertions in her verified complaint regarding her acquisition 

of

the property, the law supported a ruling in her favor. The court then quashed the 

writ

of execution, enjoined the Sheriff from holding the execution sale and ordered the 

return

of all property seized by the Sheriff to Nancy without liability for storage costs. 

 On December 23, 1996, Blackwell moved for rescission or a stay of the court's

order arguing that the court had exceeded its authority by ruling on the merits of 

Nancy's

complaint when the only motion and issue before the court involved a request by Nancy

for an injunction preventing sale of the property pending trial. The following day,

December 24, 1996, the court entered judgment in favor of Nancy in accordance with 

its

Findings, Conclusions and Order without addressing Blackwell's motion for rescission

or stay. This appeal followed.

 Discussion

 Whether the District Court erred in issuing a judgment on the merits of the

case.

 Blackwell argues on appeal that the District Court manifestly exceeded its 

authority

in issuing its December 18, 1996 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order

and its December 24, 1996 Judgment disposing of Nancy's complaint on the merits when

the only motion or application pending before the court was her request for a 

preliminary

injunction prohibiting the Sheriff from selling the property pending trial on the 

allegations

in her complaint. Blackwell maintains that a trial court can reach the ultimate 

issues in

a case by only one of two methods--a motion for summary judgment or a motion for

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judgment on the pleadings, neither of which was filed by Nancy; or by a trial on the

merits, which was not had in the case at bar.

 Nancy contends that the trial court did not err in reaching the merits because 

the

court's decision was based on the sworn facts set out in her verified complaint and

affidavit which were uncontroverted by the Sheriff or Blackwell and were, therefore,

"undisputed." Nancy maintains that "[i]n essence, the Court was presented with an

agreed case and entered its order in accordance with the agreed upon facts." We

disagree.

 At the outset, we observe that, with the qualifications previously mentioned, 

the

only substantive documents in the District Court file are the pleadings, Nancy's 

petition

for TRO and supporting affidavit, the various briefs discussed above, the courtþs 

decision

and judgment from which this appeal is taken and Blackwellþs objections thereto. No

motion for summary judgment or motion for judgment on the pleadings was filed by

Nancy, no discovery was conducted by either party, and there has never been an

evidentiary hearing or trial on the matter of Nancy's acquisition and ownership of 

the

property. 

 Nancy and the court take the position that the sworn allegations in her 

complaint

and affidavit as to her acquisition and ownership of the property were undisputed and

uncontroverted by either Blackwell or the Sheriff and that, therefore, the court 

properly

disposed of the case on the merits. Unfortunately, the latter erroneous conclusion 

flows

from the former mistaken premise. As to the substantive allegations in Nancy's

complaint that she owned the property with her husband as tenants by the entirety 

having

acquired the property in Missouri and that she acquired many items of the property 

with

her separate funds, both the Sheriff and Blackwell pleaded that they were without

sufficient information to admit or deny such allegations and that, therefore, they 

denied

the same. Moreover, in his answer at paragraph IX, Blackwell additionally asserted 

that

he denied each and every allegation in Nancy's complaint not specifically admitted.

 Under Rule 8(b), M.R.Civ.P., the legal effect of pleading insufficient 

information

to admit or deny an asserted claim is a denial of the averment. Accordingly, 

Nancy's and

the court's conclusions that Nancyþs claims as to her acquisition and ownership of 

the

property were undisputed and uncontroverted were erroneous as a matter of law. The

Sheriff effectively denied such allegations in his answer and Blackwell denied such

allegations both effectively and unequivocally in his. Nancy's claims in this 

regard were

both disputed and controverted, and without further development of the factual basis 

for

her allegations as to her acquisition and ownership of the property by discovery, by 

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trial

or by a properly noticed and supported motion for summary judgment, the court was in

no position to rule on the merits of these issues. Contrary to Nancy's argument, 

this case

was not submitted to the court on agreed facts. Indeed, her factual allegations as 

to her

acquisition and ownership were very much disputed having been placed at issue by the

Sheriff's and Blackwell's answers.

 Moreover, it is clear from Nancy's petition for TRO and from the statements of

counsel at the show-cause hearing, that the only matter at issue there was whether 

the

Sheriff should be enjoined from selling the property at execution sale pending 

resolution

of the issue of the ownership of the property. This purpose was effectively 

accomplished

when the Sheriff agreed not to dispose of the property pending further order of the 

court

and when the court continued the injunctive relief initially granted via the TRO. 

Regardless of what facts concerning Nancy's acquisition and ownership of the property

were at issue and regardless of the legal questions raised by the court and briefed 

by

counsel concerning the effect of the underlying bankruptcy proceedings, choice of 

law,

and ownership by tenancy by the entirety, the only matter properly before the court 

was

Nancy's request for preliminary injunctive relief.

 In Knudson v. McDunn (1995), 271 Mont. 61, 894 P.2d 295, we held that it is

not the province of the district court to determine in proceedings for temporary or

preliminary injunctive relief matters that may arise during the trial on the 

merits. 

 During a show cause hearing on a preliminary injunction, the district court

 should restrict itself to determining whether the applicant has made a

 sufficient case to warrant preserving a right in status quo until a trial on the

 merits can be had.

Knudson, 894 P.2d at 298 (citing Porter v. K. & S. Partnership (1981), 192 Mont. 175,

183, 627 P.2d 836, 840). In Porter, we stated:

 In granting temporary relief by injunction, courts of equity should in no

 manner anticipate the ultimate determination of the questions of right

 involved. Rather, the court should decide merely whether a sufficient case

 has been made out to warrant the preservation of the property or rights in

 status quo until trial, without expressing a final opinion as to such rights.

 . . . Findings and conclusions directed toward the resolution of the ultimate

 issues are properly reserved for final trial on the merits.

Porter, 627 P.2d at 840.

 Similarly, in the case at bar, we hold that, as a matter of law, the District 

Court

erred by going beyond the petition and matter before it--i.e., that of preserving 

the status

quo and preventing the execution sale of the property via preliminary injunctive

proceedings--and by, instead, anticipating the ultimate issues to be resolved at 

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trial and

by disposing of the case on the merits. In doing so, the court negated Nancyþs 

burden

of proving her allegations concerning acquisition and ownership by a preponderance of

the evidence, and, without notice, effectively precluded discovery, deprived 

Blackwell

and the Sheriff of their opportunity to disprove Nancy's allegations concerning her

acquisition and ownership of the property and, thus, denied their right to 

procedural due

process in violation of Article II, Section 17 of Montana's Constitution.

 The District Court's December 18, 1996 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

and Order and its December 24, 1996, Judgment are reversed and this case is remanded

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 /S/ JAMES C. NELSON

We Concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

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