J-S37021-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ISAIAH FREEMAN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2364 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 10, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division 

at No(s): CP-46-CR-0006135-2017

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 22, 2020

Appellant Isaiah Freeman appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed after a jury convicted him of first-degree murder, conspiracy, two 

counts of aggravated assault, and possession of an instrument of crime.

1

 

Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that 

Appellant’s sister violated the trial court’s sequestration order and precluding

her from testifying. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the underlying facts of this matter as follows:

On July 6, 2017, at approximately 6:30pm [Appellant] stalked 

and, as he admitted when he took the stand at trial, fatally shot 

16-year old, Jordan Scott (“Scott,”) [as Scott and his friend Taye 

Wynder (“Wynder”)] walked along Chain Street toward Blackberry 

Alley in Norristown, Montgomery County. Wynder was also shot 

but survived. Minutes before the shooting, Appellant was the front 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(a), 903(a)(1), 2702(a)(1), 2702(a)(4), and 907(a), 

respectively.
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seat passenger in a dark grey 2013 Dodge Charger . . . owned 

and operated by Appellant’s 30-year[-]old co-defendant, William 

Wilson (“Wilson” or co-[d]efendant). . . . While driving, Wilson 

caught sight of Scott and Wynder walking along the sidewalk. 

Wilson and [Appellant] decided that [Appellant] would shoot 

them.

* * *

Seconds before the shooting . . . surveillance video captured 

Wilson parking his Charger surreptitiously along Blackberry Alley 

so that [Appellant], who Wilson had armed with a black handgun 

drawn from beneath his driver’s seat, could exit the vehicle quickly 

without notice and ambush the two unsuspecting victims as they 

walked along Chain Street. [Appellant] can then be seen sneaking 

up to the corner, with a dark hoody drawn over his head to conceal 

his identity, jumping out from around the building’s corner, and 

repeatedly firing . . . fatally wounding Scott . . . and seriously 

injuring Wynder[.]

When Norristown Police officers responded to 623 Chain Street 

minutes later, they located Scott lying on the sidewalk bleeding to 

death, with Wynder nearby having fled to safety to a rear yard 

west of Chain Street. Scott, [] was immediately transported to 

the hospital, [where he] was pronounced dead . . . .

Trial Ct. Op., 10/25/19, at 1-3 (footnotes omitted). 

Before opening arguments, the Commonwealth made the following 

request:

[The Commonwealth]: Your Honor, the Commonwealth would be 

asking for a sequestration. I’m not sure if any of these individuals 

are under subpoena.

THE COURT: [Counsel]?

[Appellant’s Trial Counsel]: I don’t know that [sic], Judge. I have 

no objection to the gallery being asked that, if anybody has been 

subpoenaed, that they should wait outside.

THE COURT: Is there anybody here who has received a subpoena 

to testify? If so, please raise your hand or stand up.
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Nobody is responding, so I guess there’s no issue with 

sequestration.

Anything else before I bring the jury in? [Counsel]?

[Appellant’s Trial Counsel]: One moment, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

[Appellant’s Trial Counsel]: We’re ready, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay. Bring the jury in, please.

N.T. Trial, 4/17/18, at 131. Co-defendant’s counsel did not object to the 

Commonwealth’s request for the sequestration of witnesses. Id. Several 

times during the trial, co-defendant’s counsel referred to sequestration being 

in effect. N.T. Trial, 4/18/18, at 90-91; N.T. Trial, 4/20/18, at 24-25. 

Appellant testified in his own defense and he, in the words of the trial 

court, “present[ed] the jury with what can at best be characterized as a 

distorted imperfect self-defense; namely, that he preemptively hunted down 

Scott and Wynder to ‘get them,’ before they ‘got him.’” Trial Ct. Op. at 4 

(footnotes omitted).

We add that Appellant described how he and Scott used to be friends 

when they were in middle school, before Scott moved away. N.T. Trial, 

4/20/18, at 209-12. On the date of the shooting, Appellant and his sister, 

Aniyah Evans (“Evans” or “sister”), were residing with their aunt after their 

mother kicked them out of her house. Id. at 213-14. Appellant further

testified that on the day of the shooting, he had several phone calls with 

Evans. Id. at 242, 249-50; Ex. D-7. During those phone calls, Evans told

Appellant that Scott and another man had come by their residence looking for 
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Appellant. N.T. Trial, 4/20/18, at 242-44. Appellant indicated that Evans was 

sitting in the courtroom during his testimony. Id. at 214, 242. 

After Appellant finished testifying, the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: Any additional evidence, [Counsel]?

[Appellant’s Trial Counsel]: We have the sister’s evidence.

[The Commonwealth]: Your Honor, I object. She’s been sitting 

here the whole time. There was a sequestration order.

THE COURT: She was certainly sitting in during the testimony, and 

we did have a sequestration order, as far as I knew.

[Appellant’s Trial Counsel]: Okay.

THE COURT: Any additional evidence?

[Appellant’s Trial Counsel]: Your Honor, I would just move for my 

exhibits, and the defense would rest.

Id. at 317. 

During closing arguments, Appellant’s trial counsel argued that 

Appellant committed the shooting under serious provocation, and the jury 

should find Appellant guilty of voluntary manslaughter instead of first-degree 

or third-degree murder. N.T. Trial, 4/23/18, at 63-94.

On April 23, 2018, the jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder, 

conspiracy, two counts of aggravated assault, and possession of an instrument 

of crime. Trial Ct. Op. at 5; see also N.T. Trial, 4/23/18, at 218-19. 
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The trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of lifetime 

imprisonment without the possibility of parole on July 10, 2018. See Trial Ct. 

Op. at 5-6. Appellant’s trial counsel did not file any post-sentence motions.2

On August 8, 2018, Appellant filed a counseled timely notice of appeal. 

Appellant subsequently filed a timely court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement. On October 9, 2018, Appellant’s trial counsel filed a petition to 

withdraw as counsel. The trial court granted the petition on November 14, 

2018, and appointed new counsel to represent Appellant. The trial court 

issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion on December 19, 2018. 

On March 29, 2019, Appellant filed an application for relief in this Court 

seeking a remand to the trial court for the filing of a supplemental Rule 

1925(b) statement. We granted Appellant’s request for a remand on April 16, 

2019. Appellant timely filed his supplemental Rule 1925(b) statement on May 

6, 2019. The trial court issued a supplemental Rule 1925(a) opinion on 

October 25, 2019.

Appellant raises a single issue on appeal:

Did the trial court err in preventing [Appellant] from presenting 

the testimony of his sister[, Aniyah Evans], where that testimony 

was admissible and proper?

____________________________________________

2 Appellant filed several untimely pro se post-sentence motions with the trial 

court. However, Appellant was still represented by counsel. Accordingly, 

Appellant’s pro se filings constituted hybrid representation and were legal 

nullities. See Commonwealth v. Nischan, 928 A.2d 349, 355 (Pa. Super. 

2007). These motions were sent to Appellant’s trial counsel pursuant to 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 576(A)(4). 
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Appellant’s Brief at 6. Appellant divides his claim into three sub-issues: (1) 

the trial court did not order the sequestration of witnesses; (2) even if the 

court ordered the sequestration of witnesses and Evans violated that order, 

excluding her testimony was too severe a sanction; and (3) the exclusion of 

Evans’s testimony was not harmless. Id. at 15-21.

The Trial Court’s Sequestration Order

First, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding Evans 

violated sequestration because the trial court never ordered that witnesses be 

sequestered. Id. at 17. According to Appellant, at the start of the trial, the 

trial court inquired if anyone in the gallery had received a subpoena, and when 

no one replied, the trial court instructed the jury to be brought in. Id. at 17-

18 (citing N.T. Trial, 4/17/18, at 131). Appellant notes that the trial court did 

not give “a typical instruction to the gallery that anyone who might be a 

witness had to step outside.” Id. at 18. Appellant argues that because the 

trial court never ordered sequestration, Evans was permitted to remain in the 

courtroom during the trial. Id. Appellant concludes the trial court committed 

an error of law by precluding Evans’s testimony. Id.

The Commonwealth responds that the record is clear that trial court did 

order sequestration. Commonwealth’s Brief at 14-16 (citing N.T. Trial, 

4/17/18, at 131). The Commonwealth also argues that Appellant waived this 

issue because Appellant did not argue to the trial court that sequestration was 

not in effect. Id. at 16, 18 (citing N.T. Trial, 4/20/18, at 317).

This Court has previously held:
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[o]ur Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure and our case law 

set forth the well-established requirements for preserving a claim 

for appellate review. “Issues not raised in the lower court are 

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” 

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

Commonwealth v. Phillips, 141 A.3d 512, 522 (Pa. Super. 2016) (some 

citations omitted and some formatting altered); see also Commonwealth v. 

Smith, 213 A.3d 307, 309 (Pa. Super. 2019) (stating “it is axiomatic that 

issues are preserved when objections are made timely to the error or offense.” 

(citation omitted and some formatting altered)), appeal denied, 223 A.3d 

1286 (Pa. 2020).

Here, Appellant did not claim that the sequestration was not in effect 

after the Commonwealth objected to Ms. Evans testifying on the grounds that

she had violated sequestration. See N.T. Trial, 4/20/18, at 317. As set forth 

above, Appellant simply responded, “okay” and moved on. See id. Therefore, 

Appellant did not raise any argument that sequestration was not in effect

during the trial and this claim is waived. See Appellant’s Brief at 17 (arguing 

for first time on appeal that trial court never ordered sequestration of 

witnesses); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); Smith, 213 A.3d at 309; Phillips, 141 A.3d at 

522.

Even if Appellant had not waived this argument, the record establishes 

the trial court ordered sequestration of witnesses at the start of the trial. See

N.T. Trial, 4/17/18, at 131; see also Trial Ct. Op. at 16. Furthermore, as we 

noted above, counsel for co-defendant referred to sequestration being in effect 

during the presentation of Commonwealth’s evidence. See N.T. Trial, 
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4/18/18, at 90-91; N.T. Trial, 4/20/18, at 24-25. Therefore, even if Appellant 

had properly preserved his claim that the trial court never ordered 

sequestration, Appellant is not entitled to relief. 

Preservation of Appellant’s Claim That the Trial Court Erred in 

Excluding Ms. Evans’s Testimony

Appellant next argues that in response to the Commonwealth’s 

objection, he did not have to make an offer of proof regarding his sister’s 

proposed testimony because the substance of that testimony was clear from 

context. Appellant’s Brief at 20-21. According to Appellant, because he had 

just testified about the phone conversation he had with his sister on the day 

of the shooting, it was clear to the Commonwealth and the trial court that 

Appellant was calling Evans to testify about that conversation. Id.

As stated above, the failure to raise a timely objection to an alleged trial 

court error waives that claim for appellate review. See Smith, 213 A.3d at 

309; Phillips, 141 A.3d at 522. When the trial court ruled that Evans could 

not testify because she violated sequestration, Appellant’s trial counsel simply 

responded “Okay.” See N.T. Trial, 4/20/18, at 317. Appellant did not lodge 

any objection to the trial court’s ruling excluding his witness. See id.; 

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). As a result, Appellant has waived this claim but as we 
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explain below, his claim lacks substantive merit. See Smith, 213 A.3d at 

309; Phillips, 141 A.3d at 522.3

The Trial Court’s Exclusion of Evans’s Testimony

Appellant argues, in the alternative, that if the trial court had “properly 

ordered the sequestration of witnesses and Ms. Evans defied that order,” the 

trial court violated Appellant’s right to obtain witnesses in his favor by 

precluding Evans from testifying. Appellant’s Brief at 18-19 (citing 

Commonwealth v. Scott, 436 A.2d 161, 163 (Pa. 1981)). Appellant claims 

that the trial court abused its discretion by precluding the witness instead of 

imposing a less severe sanction at its disposal, such as declaring a mistrial or 

allowing Evans to testify and issuing a cautionary instruction to the jury about 

the sequestration violation. Id. at 16, 19. Appellant contends that Evans’s 

testimony would have corroborated his account of “the events which put him 

in the emotional state he was trying to prove in order to mitigate the case 

from murder to manslaughter.” Id. at 19; see also id. at 21 (arguing 

“[Appellant] had every right to present a witness who could corroborate his 

story in order to convince the jury that this was a case of manslaughter, not 

____________________________________________

3 Regardless, even if we construed “okay” as an objection, Rule of Evidence 

103 requires a party to preserve a claim of error for the exclusion of evidence 

by informing “the court of its substance by an offer of proof, unless the 

substance is apparent from the context.” Commonwealth v. Pacheco, 227 

A.3d 358, 373 (Pa. Super. 2020). Appellant did not place an offer of proof on 

the record after the Commonwealth objected to his sister testifying. See N.T. 

Trial, 4/20/18, at 317. In any event, as we explain below, the trial court did 

not err in excluding Evans’s testimony.
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murder” and “Ms. Evans is the only one who could confirm when those 

conversations happened.”). 

The Commonwealth responds that preclusion of a defense witness’s 

testimony is a permissible sanction for a witness’s violation of a sequestration 

order when a defendant or defense counsel cooperated in the violation. 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 19-20 (citing Scott, 436 A.2d at 163). According to 

the Commonwealth, Appellant’s trial counsel was aware that Evans was 

present in the courtroom while Appellant was testifying. Id. at 20 (citing N.T. 

Trial, 4/20/18, at 242). The Commonwealth argues that because Appellant 

and his counsel were “at fault for, and complicit in, the sequestration 

violation[]” the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Evans as a 

witness. Id.

This Court has explained:

[i]t is well established in this Commonwealth that the decision to 

admit or to exclude evidence lies within the sound discretion of 

the trial court. Moreover, our standard of review is very narrow; 

we may only reverse upon a showing that the trial court clearly 

abused its discretion or committed an error of law. To constitute 

reversible error, an evidentiary ruling must not only be erroneous, 

but also harmful or prejudicial to the complaining party.

Commonwealth v. Robertson, 874 A.2d 1200, 1209 (Pa. Super. 2005) 

(citations and some formatting omitted). 

The Robertson Court explained when a trial court finds that a 

sequestration order has been violated:

[t]he selection of a remedy for the violation . . . is within the 

discretion of the trial court. However, to deny a criminal 
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defendant the opportunity to present relevant and competent 

evidence in his defense would constitute a violation of his 

fundamental constitutional rights to compulsory process for 

obtaining witnesses in his favor and to a fair trial. 

Commonwealth v. Scott, 496 Pa. 78, 436 A.2d 161, 163 (1981).

. . . Absent a showing of fault on the part of the party or counsel 

who called a witness, an exclusion of a criminal defendant’s 

witness’ testimony solely because the witness violated a 

sequestration order is an abuse of discretion. Scott, 436 A.2d at 

163.

Id. at 1209-10 (some citations omitted). In Robertson, the defendant’s trial 

counsel explained that that the witness’s violation of the sequestration order 

was inadvertent. Id. at 1210. The Robertson Court concluded it was not 

appropriate to exclude the witness’s testimony on the basis of the violation of 

the sequestration order, but the trial court properly excluded the witness’s 

proposed testimony as inadmissible hearsay. Id. at 1210-11.

Here, based on our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the 

well-reasoned opinion of the trial court, we discern no abuse of discretion or 

error of law by the trial court in excluding Evans’s testimony. See Trial Ct. 

Op. at 17-18; Robertson, 874 A.2d at 1209-10; see also Scott, 436 A.2d 

at 163. Therefore, even if Appellant had properly preserved this claim, 

Appellant is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, we affirm.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/22/2020
Supplemental Opinion

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

CRIMINAL DIVISION 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA: NO. 6135-17 

2364 EDA 2018 

v. 

ISAIAH FREEMAN 

SUPPLEMENT AL OPINION 

Branca, J. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

w 

October 25, ~9 

Isaiah Freeman ("Defendant" or "Freeman") appeals to the Superior Court from the 

sentence imposed by this Court on July 10, 2018, by virtue of the jury's verdict of Guilty 

rendered on April 23, 2018. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's appeal is without merit. 

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

A. Factual History 

On July 6, 2017, at approximately 6:30pm Defendant stalked and, as he admitted when 

he took the stand at trial, fatally shot 16-year old, Jordan Scott ("Scott,") and his juvenile friend 

Taye Wynder ("Wynder,") as the boys walked along Chain Street toward Blackberry Alley in 

Norristown, Montgomery County. 1 Wynder was also shot but survived. Minutes before the 

shooting, Defendant was the front seat passenger in a dark grey 2013 Dodge Charger (PA 

registration KKG-5913) owned and operated by Defendant's 30-years old co-Defendant, 

William Wilson ("Wilson" or co-Defendant). They were accompanied by another juvenile 

identified herein as B.B. in the backseat. While driving, Wilson caught sight of Scott and 

JD 

1 [N.T. 4/20/18, at 254-55 ("I ran to where they were going to come from .... when they was getting closer, I jumped out, 

and I shot in their direction.") at 259 ("I knew I was guilty.")]. 

Circulated 11/30/2020 11:20 AM
Wynder walking along the sidewalk. Wilson and Freeman decided that Freeman would shoot 

them. 

By way of background, Defendant's attack on Scott and Wynder arose out of an 

escalating feud between what the parties called the "the Norristown boys" of which Defendant 

and co-Defendant Wilson were members and another faction, "the Pottstown boys" of which 

Scott and Wynder were members. That feud began a few days earlier on July 1, 2017, with a fist 

fight between two juveniles members of each respective group; Elijah Jones (Norristown boys) 

and Jamir Harris (Pottstown boys). 2 The derisive division was further exacerbated by a shooting 

which occurred on July 5, 2017, at approximately 12:40am, when multiple witnesses reported 

hearing shots ring out near the corner of Green and Marshall Streets in Norristown. Evidence at 

trial suggested that Scott received a single non-lethal gunshot wound in that July 5th incident 

which Scott believed was at the hands of Defendant as the shooter. Additionally, the 

Commonwealth presented evidence of a Face book call to Defendant wherein Scott bragged that 

he was still alive, and Defendant retorted that he was going to kill Scott. 

Seconds before the shooting the very next day, on July 6th, surveillance video captured 

Wilson parking his Charger surreptitiously along Blackberry Alley so that Defendant, who 

Wilson had armed with a black handgun drawn from beneath his driver's seat, could exit the 

vehicle quickly without notice and ambush the two unsuspecting victims as they walked along 

Chain Street.3 Defendant can then be seen sneaking up to the corner, with a dark hoody drawn 

over his head to conceal his identity, jumping out from around the building's comer, and 

repeatedly firing the black handgun Wilson handed him in the car minutes before, fatally 

wounding Scott, as he had vowed to do on Facebook, and seriously injuring Wynder 

2 [N.T. 4/20/18, at 220-22). 3 [N.T. 4/19/ I 8, at 247-67]. 

2 
When Norristown Police officers responded to 623 Chain Street minutes later, they 

located Scott lying on the sidewalk bleeding to death, with Wynder nearby having fled to safety 

in a rear yard west of Chain Street. Scott, who was immediately transported to the hospital, was 

pronounced dead at 7:28pm. The investigation conducted by police resulted in the issuance of an 

arrest warrant for Defendant for First Degree Murder, Criminal Conspiracy to Commit First 

Degree Murder, and related offenses. On August 30, 2017, U.S. Marshals located and 

apprehended Defendant at 5506 North 3rd Street in Philadelphia.4 At trial, the Commonwealth 

presented overwhelming credible evidence to support Defendant's conviction, including but not 

limited to the aforesaid Facebook call where Defendant vowed to kill Scott, seamless 

surveillance footage capturing the entirety of the episode leading up to the shooting, the 

shooting, as well as Defendants' fleeing from the scene in the Dodge Charger and the testimony 

of the other passenger in Wilson's car, B.B., who related that Defendant took the black handgun 

Wilson provided him, ambushed Scott and Wynder, firing approximately six( 6) shots, raced 

back to Wilson's car, and in response to Wilson's inquiry if he had shot them, gestured excitedly 

waving his hand about his chest, saying he "got" Scott "all in here. " 5 As damning as that 

evidence was, most damning was Defendant's testimony at trial. 

Despite the Court's repeated admonition to the jury and Defendant that defendants have 

no obligation to testify and any such decision cannot be held against them, Defendant took the 

stand. 6 The first part of Defendant's testimony was dedicated to rebutting the testimony of the 

Commonwealth's final witness, Detective Gregory Henry ("Det. Henry") of the Montgomery 

County Detective Bureau. The sole purpose for which the Commonwealth called Det. Henry 

N.T. 3/22/18, at 149, Ex. CS-10 ("Montgomery County Detectives Homicide Supplemental Report")] .. .. 

N.T. 4/19/18, at 247- 68 (referencing the black Cobra FS380 Model pistol)]; [N.T, 4/18/18, at 35-147] .. . . 

[N.T. 4/20/18, at 202-203]. ]. 

3 
was to recount his personal in-court observations of Defendant from earlier that day. Det. Henry 

testified that, during a break in the trial and outside of the presence of the jury, defense counsel, 

and the undersigned, he observed Defendant gesturing and signaling (with his finger up to his 

mouth) to the Commonwealth's witness, Nathaniel Howard, seated on the witness stand 

preparing to testify, to keep his mouth shut. 7 Det. Henry testified as follows: 

I saw Mr. Howard's attention draw to his left towards the defense table, which 

caused me to look over that way. At that point, I saw the defendant, Mr. 

Freeman, lean forward and go (indicating). And then he mouthed, don't say 

anything, by turning his head slightly, like don't say anything. 8 

As such, when Defendant took the stand he preliminarily attempted to rationalize and 

account for the intimidating gestures that Det. Henry had caught him making to silence the 

Commonwealth's witness; with the dubious explanation that he was merely pointing his finger 

up, admittedly "near ... [his] ... mouth" to indicate that he anticipated seeing the witness "up 

top" or "upstate;" in state prison. 9 In addition, Defendant used his time on the stand to present 

the jury with what can at best be characterized as a distorted imperfect self-defense; namely, that 

he preemptively hunted down Scott and Wynder to 'get them,' before they 'got him.' 10 Despite 

his attempts, and it light of its verdict, the jury obviously did not accept Defendant's strained 

attempt at justification; a finding wholly within its province, and clearly within the evidence. 

B. Procedural History 

The Commonwealth ultimately charged Defendant with the following on Bill of 

Information 6135-17: Count One (First Degree Murder of Jordan Scott,) Count Two (Criminal 

Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Murder of Wynder,) Count Three (Third Degree Murder of 

Jordan Scott,) Count Four (Criminal Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Murder of Jordan Scott 

7 [N.T. 4/20/18, at 195-99]. 8 [N.T. 4/20/18, at 198]. 9 [N .T. 4/20/18, at 206-207]. 10 [N.T. 4/20/18, at 239-61, at 252 ("I believe they was going to come and get me.")]. 

4 
and/or Wynder,) Count Five (Criminal Attempt to Commit First Degree Murder of Wynder,) 

Count Six (Aggravated Assault of Wynder,) Count Seven (Aggravated Assault of T. W.,) and 

Count Eight (Unlawful Possession of a Firearm). 11 

Thereafter, the Commonwealth moved and was granted leave to consolidate Defendant's 

case with that of his co-Defendant, William Wilson (6125-17); in response to which Defendant 

filed a Motion to Sever, which the Court denied by Order dated April 12, 2018. 12 In addition, the 

Commonwealth filed a Motion to Admit Defendant's Prior Bad Acts, which the Court granted, 

as uncontested. 13 The disposition of both Motions forms a significant part of the basis of 

Defendant's instant appeal, as addressed hereinafter. 

On April 16, 2018, the case proceeded to a 6-day trial after which the jury found 

Defendant guilty of Counts: One (First Degree Murder of Jordan Scott,) Two (Criminal 

Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Murder of Wynder,) Six (Aggravated Assault of Wynder,) 

Seven (Aggravated Assault of Wynder,) and Eight (Unlawful Possession of a Firearm). 14 

On July 10, 2018, after reviewing the Presentence Investigation report, the undersigned 

conducted a sentencing hearing at which it heard testimony from Jordan Scott's mother, Denise 

Scott; and, Darren Evans, who characterized himself as Defendant's "uncle/father," and stood 

spontaneously at sentencing requesting permission to speak on Defendant's behalf. 15 Defendant 

declined to exercise his right of allocution. 16 In accordance with the applicable mandatory 

sentencing scheme, the Court sentenced Defendant as follows: on Counts One (First Degree 

11 18 Pa. C.S. §§ 2502(a); 903(a)(l ), 2502(c), 903(a)(l ), 901 (a), 2702(a)(l ), 2702(a)( 4), and 907(a). 12 [Order, dated 4/12/18, (4/13/18)]. 13 [Order, (3/20/18)]. 14 By virtue of its verdict on Counts One (First Degree Murder of Jordan Scott) and Two (Criminal Conspiracy to Commit 

First Degree Murder of Wynder,) the jury was precluded by law from rendering verdicts on either Counts Three (Third 

Degree Murder of Jordan Scott) or Four (Criminal Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Murder of Jordan Scott and/or 

Wynder); and it found Defendant not guilty of Count Five (Criminal Attempt to Commit First Degree Murder of Wynder). 

[N .T. 4/23/ l 8, at 218-19]; [Disposition (4/23/18)]. 15 [N.T. 7/10/18, at4-9, 12-18]. 16 [N.T. 7/10/18, at 10]. 

5 
Murder of Jordan Scott) and Two (Criminal Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Murder of 

Wynder,) concurrent terms of lifetime imprisonment without the possibility of parole, Count Six 

(Aggravated Assault of Wynder,) imprisonment of not less than four ( 4) years, nor more than 

eight (8) years, to run concurrent to Counts One and Two, followed by ten ( 10) years of 

consecutive probation, Count Seven (Aggravated Assault of Wynder,) imprisonment of not less 

than sixteen ( 16) months, nor more than thirty-two (32) months, to run concurrent to Count Six, 

followed by six (6) years of consecutive probation, and Count Eight (Unlawful Possession of a 

Firearm,) imprisonment of one (1) to five (5) years, to run concurrently to all other counts. After 

informing Defendant of his full panoply of post-sentence and appellate rights, the Court 

addressed and denied Defendant's request for the appointment of new counsel which came to 

light during the hearing. 17 Mindful of the applicable imperative temporal parameters, the Court 

ordered previously appointed trial counsel to continue his representation of Defendant, to "file 

any post-sentence motions that ... [he] ... deem[ed] appropriate, and file the appeal so as not to 

jeopardize any of the Defendant's appellate rights;" with the caveat that counsel could move to 

withdraw thereafter. 18 The record reflects Defendant filed several prose documents after 

sentencing and appeal which the Court deems nullities. 19 

On August 8, 2018, Defendant timely filed, and served upon the undersigned, a Notice of 

Appeal challenging the imposition of his sentence. In response to the Court's request, and 

pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925(6), Defendant timely filed and served a Concise Statement of 

17 [N.T. 7/10/18, at 26, 12]; [Post Sentencing Procedures (7/12/18)]. 18 [N.T. 7/10/18, at 28]. Upon trial counsel's withdraw, the undersigned appointed appellate counsel to represent Defendant 

by Order dated November 14, 2018. [Order, (11/16/18)]. 19 See Commonwealth v. Faulk, 21 A.3d 1196, 1202 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) (No constitutional right to hybrid representation 

exists.) (internal citation omitted). Moreover, while the Court is aware of Defendant's prose post-sentence motion, filed on 

July 27, 2018, asserting that the Commonwealth committed a Brady violation with regard to the alleged "downloaded 

contents," no indication of when Defendant mailed it is readily apparent, and thus, the 'prisoner mailbox' rule is not feasible; 

and, as discussed infra, is meritless in any event. 

6 
Matters Complained on Appeal (" 1925(b) Statement"). 20 Thereafter, this Court submitted an 

Opinion. On April 16, 2019, however, upon consideration of Defendant's Petition For Remand, 

the Superior Court remanded the record, directing Defendant to file a supplemental 1925(b) 

Statement, and this Court to file a supplemental opinion. 

III. ISSUES PRESENTED 

Defendant's Supplemental I 925(b) Statement asserts the following issues for review: 21 

l. Did the trial court err in denying Mr. Freeman's Motion for Severance? 

2. Did the trial court err in denying Mr. Freeman's Motion to Suppress 

regarding Mr. Freeman's statements made to police? 

3. Did the trial court err in permitting the jury to hear redacted statements 

from Mr. Freeman's co-defendant, when Mr. Freeman could not crossexamine the co-defendant? 

4. Did the trial court err in denying Mr. Freeman's Motion to Suppress 

regarding the search of 5505 North Third Street Norristown, PA? 

5. Did the trial court err in preventing Defendant from calling his sister as a 

witness? 

6. Did the Commonwealth violate its duty pursuant to Brady v. Maryland by 

refusing to disclose the contents of Bryce Byrd's phone records? 

IV. DISCUSSION 

The standard of review applied to claims raised on appeal is limited to determining 

whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. See Commonwealth v. 

West, 937 A.2d 516,521 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007); Pa. R. Crim. P. 720. In evaluating a trial court's 

decision, an "abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court might have 

reached a different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, 

20 [Def. 's I 925(b) Statement, (9/10/18)) (Asserting that the trial court erred in denying appellant's Motion for Severance 

based on Bruton and its progeny, and, in granting the Commonwealth's Motion to Admit Prior Bad Act Evidence, where the 

probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its unfair prejudicial impact under Pa. R.Crim.P. 404(b)). 21 [Def. 's Supp. l925(b) (5/6/19)). 

7 
prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous." Commonwealth 

v. Greer, 951 A.2d 346, 3 5 5 (Pa. 2008) (internal quotation omitted). 

A. The Court Properly Denied Defendant's Motion To Sever & Admitted CoDefendant Wilson's Redacted Statement. 

On appeal, Defendant asserts that the Court erred both in denying his Motion to Sever 

based on Bruton_and its progeny, and concomitantly in admitting Wilson's redacted statement. 22 

Contrary to Defendant's assertions, the Court took great care to ensure that Wilson's statements 

were, with counsels' input, and consistent with applicable legal authority, effectively redacted to 

eliminate any indicia of Defendant's identity as participant; thereby nullifying any potential for 

impermissible prejudice. As.such, Defendant's instant claims fail. 23 

Given the inextricably intertwined nature of the underlying criminal episode and related 

charges, including conspiracy, as well as the overlapping documentary, audiovisual, and 

testimonial evidence supporting Defendants' criminal culpability, the Court granted the 

Commonwealth's pretrial request for consolidation. 24 In response, Defendant moved for 

severance on the basis that the Court's anticipated admission of Wilson's statement, implicating 

Defendant, would violate Defendant's 6th Amendment right under the Confrontation Clause. 

After careful consideration and redaction of Wilson's statements, the Court denied Defendant's 

Motion. At trial, consistent with the Court's pretrial disposition of Defendant's Motion to Sever, 

the Commonwealth introduced several redacted statements made by co-Defendant, Wilson. 25 On 

the whole, the Commonwealth's redactions substituted the noun "guy," or a masculine pronoun, 

22 [See Def.' s Supp. l 925(b ), at ~1 1,3 (5/6/ l 9)]. The Bruton rule is not violated by the introduction, at a joint trial, of a codefendant's confession, redacted to remove any reference to particular defendant. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 378 A.2d 859 

(Pa. 1977). 23 [Order, attaching Ex. B ("Final Reacted Statement" (4/13/18))]. 24 See Commonwealth v. Brown, 925 A.2d 147, 161 (Pa. 2007) ("When conspiracy is charged, a joint trial generally is 

advisable.") 

25 [N.T. 4/18/18, at 228-48, Ex. C-44 ("Statement of W. Wilson"); at 248, Ex. C-45 ("Police report dated 7/26/17)); [N.T. 

4/19/18, at 26-28, Ex. C-49 ("Unsigned statement of W. Wilson); at 42-43, Ex. C-50 ("Signed statement of W. Wilson")]. 

8 
for Defendant's name; redactions particularly non-prejudicial to Defendant considering the 

undisputed physical presence of another male passenger (B.B.) in Wilson's vehicle. Moreover, 

while Wilson's redacted statements were read to the jury, !.hey were never visually or physically 

published to the jury such that it would observe that they had, in fact, been redacted specifically 

and narrowly to remove only certain identifying words. 

In Commonwealth v. Travers, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the trial court's 

admission of co-defendant's confession, redacted to replace direct references to defendant with 

the words "the other man," coupled with appropriate cautionary instructions, sufficiently 

protected defendant's 6th Amendment confrontation clause rights. Commonweallh v. Travers, 

768 A.2d 845 (Pa. 2001). In reaching its decision, the Court noted as follows: 

The decision of whether to sever trials of co-defendants is within the sound 

discretion of the trial court. Both this Court and the United States Supreme Court 

have recognized that joint trials of co-defendants play a crucial role in the 

criminal justice system. 

It would impair both the efficiency and the fairness of the criminal justice system 

to require ... that prosecutors bring separate proceedings, presenting the same 

evidence again and again, requiring victims and witnesses to repeat the 

inconvenience (and sometimes trauma) of testifying, and randomly favoring the 

last tried defendants who have the advantage of knowing the prosecution's case 

beforehand. Joint trials generally serve the interests of justice by avoiding 

inconsistent verdicts and enabling more accurate assessment of relative 

culpability. 

Id. at 846-4 7 (internal citations omitted). "[E]ven were the confession the very first item 

introduced at trial," the Court opined the vagary and generality of the phrase "other man" was 

certainly not of the sort which obviously referred to the defendant so as to inform the jury of the 

redaction. Id. at 85 l (internal citations omitted). Significantly, in upholding the trial court's 

evidentiary admission, the Travers Court determined that co-defendant's redacted statement had 

only become incriminating through the introduction of other independent evidence at trial which 

9 
established defendant's culpability; and even then, defendant could only be prejudiced if it is 

assumed that the jury ignored the court's explicit cautionary instructions. Id. at 851. The Court, 

thus, concluded that, "[i]n light of the governing principles in this area, ... the redaction here, 

combined with the trial court's accurate and repeated cautionary charge, sufficed to protect 

appellant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation." Id.; see also, Commonwealth v. Cannon, 

22 A.3d 210 (Pa. 2011); Commonwealth v. James, 66 A.3d 771 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013); 

Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 878 A.2d 914 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005). 

In this case, any potential for impermissible prejudice to Defendant was ameliorated, 

particularly as noted given the undisputed physical presence of two male passengers in the car, 

by redaction of co-Defendant Wilson's statements with varying innocuous, anonymous 

terminology, including "guy," "the guy," "this guy," "the other guy," "him," and "he." See 

Travers, 768 A.2d 851 (Pa. 2001) (Holding that substituting the neutral phrase "the guy" or "the 

other guy" for defendant's name is an appropriate ameliorative redaction); see also 

Commonwealth v. McGlone, 716 A.2d 1280 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) ("The powerfully 

incriminating nature of an obvious and glaring 'hole' in the statement simply is not present when 

a generic term like 'other man' is used."). In addition, in this case, the implications, import, and 

impact of intertwining indicia of other related criminal conduct cannot be understated. For the 

majority of statements provided by Defendant and his co-defendant were obfuscated in their 

original form by their vague and/or anonymous references to a variety of unnamed or nicknamed 

participants; such that substitution of the word "guy" for Defendant's name did not stand out as 

an alteration. 

Moreover, contrary to Defendant's assertion, the statements in this case were carefully 

redacted so as not to alert the jury to any alteration. As such, the cases relied upon by Defendant 
in support of severance are distinguishable. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Markman, 916 A.2d 586, 

600 (Pa. 2007) (Bruton violated when jury was permitted to hear co-defendant's obviously 

redacted audiotaped confession, dubbing over defendant's name with the phrase "the other 

person" in a distinct voice, and court further compounded error by affirmatively informing jury 

tape had been so altered.); Commonwealth v. Oliver, 635 A.2d 1042 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) 

(Bruton violated where demands of judicial economy and verdict consistency did not outweigh 

prejudice to defendant, tried jointly with three co-defendants and error not harmless where 

properly admitted evidence could have been enough to sustain guilty verdict against defendant, 

in absence of admission of co-defendant's confession.); Commonwealth v. Gray, 523 U.S. 185 

(1998) (Bruton violated when jury was aware confession had been redacted in that a blank space 

and the word "deleted" were substituted for defendant's name.) 

Furthermore, as in Travers, the careful nature of the redactions coupled with the ample 

prophylactic guidance provided by the Court throughout the trial, as well as part of its 

concluding instructions sufficed to protect Defendant's 6th Amendment rights, and any 

impermissible prejudice to Defendant was outweighed by the benefits, addressed previously, 

accompanied by a joint trial. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 668 A.2d 491, 501-502 (Pa. Super. 

Ct. 1995) (Holding that court's cautionary instructions cured prejudice to defendant allegedly 

attributable to admission of co-defendant's confession.) 

During the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, and before its introduction and admission of 

co-Defendant Wilson's statement, the Court peremptorily gave the jury the following cautionary 

instruction: 26 

26 (N.T. 4/18/18, at 208-209]. 

11 
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, you're about to hear from Detective 

Richard that the Commonwealth is going to introduce evidence of 

statements that were made by Defendant Wilson. 

There is also a further rule that restricts use by you of the evidence 

offered to show that Defendant Wilson made statements 

concerning the crimes that were charged. A statement purportedly 

made before trial by Defendant Wilson may ... be considered 

only as evidence against Defendant Wilson who made the 

statement. 

You must not, however, consider the statement as evidence against 

Defendant Freeman. You must not use the statement in any way 

against Defendant Freeman. 

Likewise, at close of all of the evidence, the Court again reminded the jury of the limited 

purpose for which co-Defendant Wilson's earlier statements could be used with the following 

cautionary instructions; eliminating any potential for unfair prejudice: 27 

THE COURT: Now, there is a further rule that restricts use by you of the evidence 

offered to show that a Defendant made the statement concerning 

the crime charged. Generally, a statement made before trial may 

be considered as evidence only against the Defendant who made 

that statement. Thus, you may consider the statement as evidence 

against that Defendant, who made it, if you believe he made the 

statement voluntarily. You must not, however, consider the 

statement as evidence against the other Defendant. I'm going to 

clarify that a little bit in this case. 

You must not use the statement in any way against the other 

Defendant. So, in this case, in short, you cannot consider any 

statements purportedly made by Wilson against Freeman. 

However, as Defendant Freeman testified, you can consider his 

pretrial statement, as well as his trial testimony, not only against 

him, but against Wilson. Subject, of course, to your determination 

as to its credibility and his credibility on the stand. 

Notably, as in Travers, supra, Wilson's statement only became incriminating of 

Defendant through the introduction of other independent and devastating evidence that 

27 [N. T. 4/23/18, at 146]. 

12 
Defendant was the shooter including of course the video of the entire shooting episode and 

Defendant's own admission that he was the shooter captured in the video surveillance. 

In the final analysis, even if the admission of Wilson's statement was error, the fact that 

Defendant took the stand and admitted that he shot Scott and Wynder as depicted in the video 

surveillance which captured Defendant armed, stalking Scott and Wynder, jumping out, and 

shooting both of them, renders any alleged prejudice harmless. It is well-settled that not all 

alleged errors at trial entitle a defendant to a new trial, and instead, Pennsylvania's harmless 

error doctrine reflects the reality that an accused is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect trial." 

Commonwealth v. West, 834 A.2d 625, 634 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). An error is harmless where: 

(I) the error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de minimis,· or 

(2) the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other untainted 

evidence which was substantially similar to the erroneously admitted evidence; or 

(3) the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so 

overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error so insignificant by 

comparison that the error could not have contributed to the verdict." 

Commonwealth v. Passmore, 857 A.2d 697, 711 (Pa. 2004). 

Given Defendant's own admissions on the stand, and the overwhelming evidence 

presented by the Commonwealth, the Court's decision denying severance, was unquestionably 

harmless. 

B. The Court Properly Denied Defendant's Motion To Suppress. 

Next, Defendant claims that the Court erred in denying his Motion to suppress statements 

he made to police, as well as the related search of 5506 North Third Street. 28 As addressed 

hereinafter, Defendant's instant claims are unavailing. 

28 While Defendant's Supplemental I 925(b) Statement references "5506 North Third Street Norristown, PA," the Court takes 

judicial notice that the address at issue is located in Philadelphia. 

13 
Initially, the Court's April 12, 2018 Order, denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress, and 

its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are attached hereto. 29 In claiming his statements 

were entitled to suppression, Defendant argued that his Miranda waiver was not knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary. Contrary to his contention and as delineated at length in the Court's 

April 12, 2018 Order, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the record aptly demonstrates 

that police properly advised Defendant of all of his attendant Constitutional rights and he 

thereafter memorialized his knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of those rights by 

executing the waiver form, as witnessed by Det. Crescitelli. 30 Likewise, Defendant's claim that 

the Court erred in denying suppression of the 5 506 North Third Street search is equally 

unavailing. The record reflects that he abandoned his pursuit of that claim at the time of the 

suppression hearing, and it is thus deemed waived: 31 

The Commonwealth: Your Honor, before we begin with the suppression motions for 

defendant Freeman, I just want to be clear. The only thing that Mr. 

McMahon [Defense Counsel] is contesting is the statement - -

Miranda on the statement. 

Mr. McMahon: Right. 

The Commonwealth: Ok. So you're not going to be contesting the call detail records or 

the searches or any of that stuff? 

Mr. McMahon: No. Just the statements. 

As such, and in light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding Defendant's 

Miranda waiver, the Court's denial of Defendant's Motion was appropriate. 

29 See Pa. R.A.P. I 925(b)(a)( I )("[U]pon receipt of the notice of appeal, the judge who entered the order giving rise to the 

notice of appeal ... shall specify in writing the place in the record where such reasons may be found."); [see Order, Findings 

of Fact & Conclusions of Law (4/13/18)). 

30 [N.T. 3/22/18, at 156-57, at Ex. CS- IO ("Montgomery County Detectives Homicide Supplemental Report,") at p. 5 of 5). 31 [N.T. 3/22/18, at 148). 

14 
C. Defendant Failed To Preserve Any Claim As To Ms. Evans, And In Any 

Event, Such A Claim Is Substantively Unavailing. 

Next, Defendant asserts that the Court erred "in preventing Defendant from calling his 

sister (Iniyah Evans) as a witness."32 Having failed to properly preserve this claim at trial, it is 

deemed waived. Moreover, the Court, in any event, properly precluded Defendant's sister from 

testifying as both Defendant and Defense Counsel were aware of her presence throughout the 

trial despite the sequestration order and the defense did not proffer any evidence or explanation 

that her presence was inadvertent. Compare, Commonwealth v. Robertson, 874 a.2d 1200 (Pa. 

Super. Ct. 2005) (Witness permitted to testify where defense asserted, and the Commonwealth 

did not dispute, that sequestration violation was inadvertent.) 

Finally, any alleged harm resulting therefrom was either nonexistent or de minimis, in 

light of the Court's admission of Defendant's testimony that he was provoked by his sister's call 

and the Court's provision of voluntary manslaughter instructions to the jury. As such 

Defendant's claim merits no relief. 

Initially, Defendant failed to pursue, and thus, preserve a claim as to preclusion of his 

sister, Ms. Iniyah Evans as a witness, as he abandoned his request upon the Commonwealth's 

objection. See Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b)(4). To preserve an evidentiary l im, a party must make a 

timely objection. Pa. R.E. 103(a). More specifically, "(a] party may claim error in a ruling to 

admit or exclude evidence only if the ruling excludes evidence, a party informs the court of its 

substance by an offer of proof, unless the substance was apparent from the context." Pa. R.E. 

103(a)(2). Moreover, it is well-settled that "issues, even those of constitutional dimension, are 

waived if not raised in the trial court. A new and different theory of relief may not be 

successfully advanced for the first time on appeal." Commonwealth v. Cline, 177 A.3d 922, 927 

32 [Def.'s Supp. 1925(b), at 15 (5/6/19)]. 

15 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2017) appeal denied, 187 A.3d 210 (Pa. 2018) (internal citations omitted); see Pa. 

R.A.P. 302(a) ("Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first 

time on appeal"). 

Before trial commenced in this case, the Commonwealth requested sequestration and 

there was no objection. Then, after Defendant concluded his testimony, the underlying exchange 

occurred: 33 

The Court: Any additional evidence, Mr. McMahon? 

Mr. McMahon: We have the sister's evidence. 

The C mm nw hl-1: Your Honor, I object. She's been sitting here the whole time. 

The Court: 

Mr. McMahon: 

The Court: 

Mr. McMahon: 

There was a sequestration order. 

She was certainly sitting in during the testimony, and we did have 

a sequestration order, as far as I know. 

Okay. 

Any additional evidence? 

Your Honor, I would just move for my exhibits, and the defense 

would rest. 

As demonstrated, upon objection by the Commonwealth, Defense Counsel readily 

acknowledged that in light of the sequestration order, Ms. Evans's presence throughout the trial 

precluded her from testifying; thereby abandoning his request that she take the stand. 

Similarly, having failed to make any offer of proof so as to preserve the instant claim, 

Defendant abandoned pursuit of his sister's testimony. Likewise, at the con cl us ion of the trial, 

Defense Counsel again acknowledged the preclusive import of the sequestration order, and 

affirmed his prior abandonment of his request for her to take the stand, as follows: 34 

33 [N. T. 4/20/ l 8, at 317). 34 [N.T. 4/23/18, at 20-25) (emphasis added). 

16 
Mr. McMahon: Judge, just one other thing, I had submitted Defendant's Motions 

in Limine relative to the prosecution's closing statement. I don't 

know if you had a chance --

Two things, Judge .... Okay. Second one. Judge, the defense 

attempted to call Ayeda (ph) Evans in its case, the Commonwealth 

objected, based on a violation of sequestration. I understand 

that. 

Nonetheless, I do not think it would be appropriate and proper for 

the Commonwealth -- and I'm not saying Ms. Cauffman would do 

this, but this is all in an abundance of caution -- to get up and argue 

something to the effect that the defense never called Ms. Evans, 

Mr. Freeman's testimony was not corroborated by his sister. In 

some way pointing that out, which under normal circumstances, 

might be appropriate. But she was precluded from testifying over 

the Commonwealth's objection. So I don't think that they can 

object to the witness testifying and then hail the defense by saying, 

well, they didn't call her. 

The Commonwealth: I'm not going to do that. 

The Court: 

Mr. McMahon: 

I didn't think so. Anything else? 

No. 

As demonstrated above, Defense Counsel affirmatively acknowledged that the 

sequestration order barred Ms. Evans from testifying based on her presence in the courtroom 

throughout the entirety of the trial up to that point, and thereby waived any alleged evidentiary 

error arising therefrom. 

In any event, if not waived, the Court was correct in precluding her testimony. Absent a 

showing of fault on the party calling the witness, the trial court should not disqualify a witness 

for a sequestration violation. A witness should, however, be disqualified when his sequestration 

violation occurs with "the consent, connivance, procurement or knowledge of the (accused) or 

his counsel." See Commonwealth v. Scott, 436 A.2d 161, 163 (Pa. 1981) (internal citations 

omitted) (emphasis added). Here, no evidence or explanation was put forth that Ms. Evans's 

17 
presence was inadvertent, and to the contrary, both Defendant and Defense Counsel were well 

aware of her presence, as was the Court. Defense acknowledged as much by conceding to the 

Commonwealth's objection that Ms. Evans had been present 'the whole time.' Defendant and 

Defense Counsel having known of Ms. Evans' s presence in the courtroom throughout the trial, 

despite the sequestration order, the Court properly precluded her testimony as her unexplained 

presence is deemed not to be inadvertent. See Scott, supra. 

Finally, even if Defendant had properly preserved his instant claim, he is entitled to no 

relief. Defendant's bald assertion that the Court erred in 'preventing' Ms. Evans from testifying 

neglects to articulate the manner in which the proffered testimony would have altered the case's 

outcome. In the absence of such clarification and/or a contemporaneous offer of proof, the 

testimony sought to be elicited from Ms. Evans was irrelevant. See Pa. R.E. 401. For while not 

explicitly stated, as far as can be gleaned from the record, Defendant's instant claim specifically 

relates to his claim that he was provoked by his victims and acted under a heat of passion, such 

that the evidence required that the Court charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter.35 Given the 

objective evidence ofrecord, however, which unequivocally negated Defendant's claim that his 

sister's had called him tlte day of the murder, and that call had incited and provoked him, any 

potentially corroborative testimony by Ms. Evans could not have rendered Defendant's 

provocation claim anymore (or less) probable. 36 See Pa. R.E. 401(a). Instead, the call records 

admitted by the Commonwealth confirmed that the call Defendant received from his sister, Ms. 

Evans, and which he asserted had provoked him, actually occurred at 10:36pm tlte night before 

35 Even if Ms. Evans had been permitted to take the stand, while completely hypothetically in light of Defendant's 

failure to make the requisite offer of proof, any claim that her testimony may have altered the landscape of this trial 

to the extent it might have mitigated the severity of the jury's verdict is completely unsupported; especially, because 

the objective evidence of record expressly contradicted Defendant's claim that Ms. Evans called him on the day of 

the murder, which presumably is what he sought to elicit from her. See Pa. R.E. 615. 36 [N.T. 4/20/18, at 248, 317, Ex. D-7 (Phone Records of I. Freeman)]; [4/23/18, at 118, Ex. D- 7]. 

18 
the murder; some twenty (20) hours before video surveillance captured Defendant gunning down 

his victims. 37 More specifically, and as summarized below in the Commonwealth's closing 

argument, the objective evidence rendered any attempted corroboration by Ms. Evans 

impracticable:38 

The Commonwealth: And counsel talked about provocation. And he really, really went 

into that provocation. The phone calls from the sister, which he 

told you, and he asked Freeman on the stand about these phone 

calls that -- did they happen here at 2:30 in the afternoon? 

Yeah, yeah. Remember that's when my sister called me, called me 

a dickhead, that two people would come and threaten, it's why she 

had to leave, that's why he couldn't be at the house he was staying 

at. 

Remember all of that? Yeah. Those contacts, they certainly 

happened. But not when, not how Freeman told you they did. 

So when Freeman sat in that stand, under oath, and told you, oh, 

yeah, yeah, when my sister called me at 2:30 in the afternoon, her 

voice all upset, and she told me that these guys were 

threatening me, total lie, never happened. There was no 

provocation. These are text messages from I 0:30 at night the day 

before. 

In light of the Court's provision of the mitigating charge on provocation and voluntary 

manslaughter sought by Defendant, to which the Commonwealth repeatedly and vigorously 

objected, any alleged error which might have arisen from precluding Ms. Evans from testifying 

was ameliorated, if not nullified completely.39 As demonstrated below, by virtue of the Court's 

provision of the requested voluntary manslaughter charge, and Defendant Counsel's zealous 

advocacy in his closing argument that Defendant's conduct fell within the ambit of voluntary 

37 (N.T. 4/20/18, at 248, 317, Ex. D-7 (Phone Records of I. Freeman)]; (4/23/18, at 118, Ex. D- 7]. (All of the times 

reflected are in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC time)). [N.T. 4/20/18, at 254-55 ("I ran to where they were going 

to come from .... when they was getting closer, I jumped out, and I shot in their direction.") at 259 ("I knew I was 

guilty.")]. 

38 [N.T. 4/23/18, at 116-219]. 39 [N.T. 4/23/18, at 5, 63, 75] 

19 
manslaughter, and not homicide, the jury had more than adequate opportunity to consider, and 

ultimately reject, Defendant's proffered, though completely unsupportable, claim:40 

Defense Counsel: Now this is important, the next thing I am going to tell you about. 

We have testimony from Mr. Freeman -- and I know the DA is 

going to tell you just don't believe anything he says. I'll address 

that. But you have testimony from Freeman, corroborated by the 

phone records. And, you know, the prosecution spent a lot of time 

on phone records. We, on July 6th, between I 0:36am and 11 :07, 

the window of time that we know Scott and Wynder are in 

Norristown, we know they're there from the phone records, that is 

when Mr. Freeman gets the call from the sister. 

And he testified that his sister was upset, she was yelling at him, 

she was calling him a dickhead multiple times. And she was upset 

because two guys could come to the place where they were 

staying, and as a result they were not going to be able to live there 

anymore. 

So he hears this. He knows who it is. What other two people 

would it be? 

Second piece of serious provocation. Scott and Wynder went to 

where he lays his head down to sleep at night at that time, and 

where his sister lays her head down to sleep at night. And he's still 

either about to come back or leaving Jersey, whatever, when he 

gets that phone call. And this is ... uncontradicted testimony. 

It's uncontradicted in any way. The Commonwealth did not 

dispute that this phone number, (484)557-1344, they didn't dispute 

that that phone number was the phone number of his sister. 

I mean, believe me, if that wasn't the phone number, you'd hear it 

from the Commonwealth. 

So these calls from his sister to him, this is a fact. And he told you 

what was going on, one those calls. 

Are these first two things -- first two items of provocation the type 

of provocation that would reasonably be expected to cause 

emotions to arise in an individual? 

What kind of emotions would you think that he was having when 

he knows that these two guys, the very next morning, are no longer 

40 [N .T. 4/23/18, at 69- 70, 71, 74-75, 85, 87, 91]. 

20 
in Pottstown, they're in Norristown, and they just went to his crib, 

where he lays his head down at night, and he's got his sister 

freaking out on him? 

I emphasize this point because what I'm suggesting to you is, these 

first two events are the type of events that constitute legitimate 

serious provocation and the type of things that would cause a 

reasonable person -- anybody - to experience high emotions. Fear, 

anger, worry. They went to the house where my sister is with 

allegedly [sic] guns. 

But the point is, the point is, and you cannot be lost on this, this 

fact cannot be lost on you, these two guys, Scott and Wynder, 

they're walking to back in the direction where his place of 

residence was at the time. So Freeman already knows that Scott 

has threatened that he's going to kill him. He already knows that 

Scott -- you might not have known him as Wynder, but Scott and 

another guy are back in Norristown and were looking for him at his 

place. He knows that from his sister. And then he gets back. And lo 

and behold, who does he see? And they're walking in this direction 

where he resides. 

Now, I submit to you that the totality of those circumstances 

absolutely is the type of serious provocation and the type of 

circumstances that would cause high emotion consisting of fear, 

anger, worry for his sister. And that's exactly what his state of 

mind is. And that's why this was heat of passion. That's why those 

reducing circumstances make this killing a voluntary manslaughter 

and not murder. 

And that those emotions continued to arise [sic] and increase when 

he got the call from his sister that same morning, that same day of 

the incident. 

If you have a reasonable doubt -- because, remember, the 

prosecution has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt -- that there 

were no reducing circumstances, that he was not acting in the 

heat of passion, and that there was no serious provocation, if they 

don't do that -- l don't know how they can, because I would submit 

this is a classic voluntary manslaughter heat of passion, based on 

the evidence they have, but that's not for me to decide, that's for 

you to decide. 

The other phone records that I referred to demonstrate the timing 

of the call from lsaiah's sister to him, which was later in the 

morning, late morning. You can look at that. And remember, 

21 
you've got to go back four hours earlier because of the way they 

do it. 

Nonetheless, notwithstanding the dearth of support for Defendant's provocation claim, and as 

stated, in an abundance of caution, the Court granted Defendant's request that it charge the jury 

on voluntary manslaughter. The jury acted well within its province in weighing the evidence 

before it and rendering its verdict. 

Even assuming his sister called him the morning and/or afternoon of the murder with 

information that Scott and Wynder were at his house earlier that day, the jury vested with the 

discretion to weigh the evidence, factually and legally, could reject the assertion that provocation 

existed justifying the murder hours later at approximately 6:30pm. See e.g. Commonwealth v. 

Walker, 656 A.2d 90, 97 (Pa.1995) (Weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact 

who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the 

witnesses.);Commonwealth v. Gibson, 688 A.2d 1152, 1158 (Pa. 1997) (Specific intent to kill 

can be inferred by the use of a deadly weapon upon a vital part of the body.); Commonwealth v. 

Walker, 656 A.2d 90, (Pa. 1995) (Evidence sufficient to support first degree murder conviction, 

contrary to defense of provocation.); Commonwealth v. Mccusker, 292 A.2d 286, 290 (Pa. 1972) 

(Trier of fact must consider whether there was insufficient cooling time which would prevent a 

reasonable man from using his reasoning faculties); Commonwealth v. Butler, 288 A.2d 800, 802 

(Pa. 1972) (Jury rejected defendant's provocation defense where evidence established sufficient 

cooling off period.) As noted, despite ample opportunity to flee, and/or call the police, 

Defendant determined that he was going 'to get them before they got him.' Additionally, 

Defendant's actions are appropriately viewed against the backdrop of his threats to Scott just 

days prior that Defendant was going to kill him. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 284 A.2d 739, 

740 (Pa. 1971) 

22 
(Record demonstrated ample bases supporting jury's murder conviction where defendant 

previously threatened victim, and ultimately used a lethal weapon on a vital portion of victim's 

body.) 

Thus, based on Defendant's failure to pursue and preserve his claim in the first instance, 

and even if preserved, any alleged error was de minimis, as the Court obliged Defendant's 

voluntary manslaughter instruction request, thereby properly equipping the jury with the legal 

rubric to render its verdict accordingly. As such, Defendant's claim merits no relief. 

D. Defendant's Brady Claim Is Waived And/Or Meritless. 

Defendant also asserts that the Commonwealth violated its duty under Brady v. Maryland 

by allegedly "refusing to disclose the contents of Bryce Byrd's phone records."41 As with 

Defendant's previous claim, his failure here to identify either the location of, and/or manner in 

which, he preserved his instant claim hinders the Court's review. Moreover, even if properly 

preserved, as demonstrated hereinafter, Defendant's Brady claim is substantively meritless. 

lt is well-settled that to preserve a claim n appeal, an appellant must identify each ruling 

or error with sufficient detail so as to identify the issue for the Court. See Pa. R.A.P. 

l 925(b)(4)(ii). More specifically, Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure l 925(b) provides: 

(v) Each error identified in the Statement will be deemed to include every 

subsidiary issue contained therein which was raised in the trial court; this 

provision does not in any way limit the obligation of a criminal appellant to 

delineate clearly the scope of claimed constitutional errors on appeal. 

(vii) Issues not included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the 

provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived. 

Additionally, the interpretive guidance accompanying Rule 1925(b) readily acknowledges that 

when appellate courts have been critical of sparse or vague Statements, their focus is not on the 

41 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 

23 
number of issues raised, but rather "the paucity of useful information contained in the 

Statement." See Pa. R.A.P. 1925, Note, 1 (b)(4). 

In this case, not only does Defendant fail to provide the Court as to where in the record 

he raised and/or preserved any alleged issue as to the contents of the phone records at issue, but 

the Court was, likewise, unable to locate any such reference in the evidentiary record on review. 

As such, Defendant failed in the first instance to provide the Court with the requisite specificity 

to identify his claim. 

Even if Defendant had properly preserved his instant claim, he is entitled no relief as he 

has failed to meet his burden under Brady. In Brady, the Supreme Court held that the 

suppression of "evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the 

evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of 

the prosecution." 373 U.S. 83 at 87 (1963); Commonwealth v. Wallace, 455 A.2d 1187, 1190 

(Pa. 1983). The burden rests with the defendant to "prove, by reference to the record, that 

evidence was withheld or suppressed by the prosecution." Commonwealth v. Haskins, 60 A. 3d 

538, 547 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) 

To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate the following three 

components: 1.) the evidence at issue must have been suppressed by the State; (2) that evidence 

must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; 

and (3) prejudice must have ensued." Commonwealth v. Weiss, 81 A.3d 767, 783 (Pa. 2013); 

Commonwealth v. Haskins 60 A.3d 538, 545 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (internal citation omitted). To 

determine whether a defendant has been prejudiced the court must analyze the materiality of the 

information at issue. "In engaging in this analysis, a reviewing court is not to review the 

undisclosed evidence in isolation, but, rather, the omission is to be evaluated in the context of the 

24 
entire record." Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 30 A.3d 381,410 (Pa. 2011). Further, the "mere 

possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have 

affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense." 

United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, at 109-110 (1976). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 

reaffirmed that the concept of m t ri li ty goes beyond the idea that the disputed material might 

have made a difference at trial. 

"The law governing alleged Brady violations is well-settled. In Brady, the United 

States Supreme Court held that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence 

favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is 

material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of 

the prosecution. 

On the question of materiality, the Court has noted that such evidence is material 

if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 

defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The materiality 

inquiry is not just a matter of determining whether, after discounting the 

inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, the remaining evidence 

is sufficient to support the jury's conclusions. Rather the question is whether the 

favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a 

different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. 

Commonwealth v. Lambert, 884 A.2d 848, 853-55 (Pa. 2005) (internal citations omitted); see 

also Commonwealth v. Willis, 46 A.3d 648 at 670 (Pa. 2012) ("The touchstone of materiality is 

whether there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different.") 

As a threshold matter, Defendant failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the 

Commonwealth withheld Byrd's phone records. See Weiss, 81 A.3d at 783. To the contrary, the 

record reflects that it provided Defendant with the records at issue. Furthermore, and as 

demonstrated below, Defense Counsel's closing argument was not that the Commonwealth 

25 
'refused to disclose' Byrd's phone records, but rather that the Commonwealth did not analyze 

Byrd's phone records which he should not have to spend the time to do:42 

Mr. McMahon: Bryce Byrd ... this business that he couldn't get out of the car, 

come on .... So they get out of there, and William Wilson drops 

Bryce Byrd off. Doesn't threaten him. Doesn't say shut your 

m uth. What could he say William Wilson did do? He decides to 

exaggerate the story because he gets a deal. But even in his 

exaggeration, with getting a lawyer, not saying anything for a 

month, not saying anything about William Wilson hyping him up 

until the second statement, even with all of that, why doesn't the 

district attorney present Bryce Byrd's phone records? Why was no 

analysis done of that? 

When I asked him on cross-examination will your phone records 

indicate where you were the night before? Not that it matters. It 

doesn't matter if he slept at WillJ.am Wilson's house, whether he 

did or didn't. But you don't have his phone records. Why would 

they do an analysis of his records when all it could do is hurt and 

not help? They have his testimony. Am I going to do an analysis 

of his phone records? Why was 14 hours of prep necessary? I ask 

you to ask yourselves, why doesn't he call the police after? 

The argument waives any Brady claim. First, it acknowledges that Defense Counsel had the 

records to analyze if he wanted to spend the time to do so (which he did not); and second, 

because he concedes the records were not material, as he was not going to spend the time to 

analyze them since it did not matter what the records would reveal as to Byrd's whereabouts the 

night before the murder. Finally, (though not actually raised) Defense Counsel's argument, 

while striving zealously to create reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors, completely ignores 

that, once produced, the onus to conduct any analysis of Byrd's phone records was on Defendant, 

not the Commonwealth. It cannot be a Brady violation for the Commonwealth not to have 

conducted an analysis of Byrd's phone records; no such obligation exists. 

42 [N.T. 4/23/18, at 53-55). 

26 
In light of Defendant's failure to preserve any claim as to Brady and/or the 

Commonwealth's alleged failure to 'disclose Byrd's phone records,' Defendant's claim fails. 

Moreover, even if preserved, Defendant has failed to demonstrate the requisite suppression of 

that evidence by the Commonwealth, let alone its favorable nature, and/or any ensuing prejudice. 

As such, Defendant's claim fails. 

E. Harmless Error. 

Finally, and as addressed supra, Defendant's contentions on appeal, if deemed preserved, 

amount to no more than harmless error in light of the abundant credible evidence put forth by the 

Commonwealth, and thus, merit no relief. 43 

As previously discussed, not all alleged errors entitle a defendant to a new trial, as "an 

accused is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect trial." See West, 834 A.2d at 634. The Court need 

not belabor its prior harmless error discussion as it relates to Defendant's Bruton claim, supra., 

Defendant's claims as to the phone records of Bryce Byrd, and Defendant's claim that he was 

'prevented' from calling his sister, Ms. Evans, as a witness. Based on Defendant's failure to 

preserve these claims, the Court's review is constrained. Nonetheless, the record aptly 

demonstrates that the properly admitted and uncontroverted evidence of guilt, including 

Defendant's admission that he stalked and lay in wait to murder Scott, extensive video 

surveillance capturing Defendant doing so, and Defendant's prior vow to murder Scott, is 

evidence so overwhelming that any alleged prejudice by the claimed errors, individually and 

43 An error is harmless where: "(I) the error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de minimis; or (2) the erroneously 

admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other untainted evidence which was substantially similar to the erroneously admitted 

evidence; or (3) the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error 

so insignificant by comparison that the error could not have contributed to the verdict." Passmore, 857 A.2d at 711. 

27 
collectively, was so insignificant by comparison that the asserted errors could not have 

contributed to the verdict. See Passmore, supra. 

V. CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, the trial court requests that the judgment of sentence imposed on 

Defendant, Isaiah Freeman, on July 10, 2018, be AFFIRMED. 

Copies of the above Opinion 

Mailed on: 1ob15719 

By First Class Mail: 

Joshua H. Camson, Esquire 

By Interoffice Mail: 

BY THE COURT: 

~~ 

Montgomery County District Attorney - Appellate Division 

Court Administration-Criminal 

28 
CL ERK OF COURTS 

GrFICE 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY~~i~~iWt~Y 

CRIMINAL DIVISION 

2018 APR 13 AM IJ: 21 

COMMONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA: NO. 6135-17 

v. 

ISAIAH FREEMAN 

ORDERS SUR: SUPPRESSION 

Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Suppress his statements made on August 30, 

2017, based on his assertion that he did not knowingly, intelligently and volW1tarily waive his Miranda 

rights. After hearing, and review of the applicable case law and the evidence presented, the Court enters 

the following: 

.FINDINGS OF FACT 

August 30, 2017 Statement 

1. On August 30, 2017, at approximately 2:00 p.m., U.S. Marshals located and apprehended 

Defendant at 5506 North 3rd Street, in Philadelphia, on an outstanding arrest warrant for First Degree 

Murder, Criminal Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Murder, and related offense, issued by 

Montgomery CoWlty law enforcement. [N.T. 3/22/18, at 149, Ex. CS-10 (''Montgomery CoWlty 

Detectives Homicide Supplemental Report,") 

2. Defendant was already in custody in handcuffs when Detectives Michael Crescitelli ("Det. 

Crescitelli,") Todd Richard ("Det. Richard,") Greg Henry ("Det. Henry,") and William Mitchel ("Det. 

Mitchell") arrived at the scene at approximately 2:35 p.m. [N.T. 3/22/18, at 170]. 

3. Det. Crescitelli and Det. Richard prepared to transport Defendant, who was in shackles 

and a handcuff belt, to the Montgomery CoWlty Detective Bureau ("the Bureau") in Det. Crescitelli's 

coW1ty assigned vehicle. [N.T. 3/22/18, at 150-52]. 
4. Both detectives were wearing suits and armed at the time. [N.T. 3/22/18, at 150]. 

5. Once Defendant was buckled into the car, Det. Richard explained to Defendant that he had 

the right to be arraigned in Philadelphia County prior to returning to Montgomery County; to which 

Defendant responded that he wanted to waive his right to be arraigned in Philadelphia County, and go 

straight to Montgomery County. 

6. Defendant immediately began speaking gratuitously adding, without any prompting by 

detectives, that he wanted to "tell his side of the story." [N.T. 3/22/18, at 150-51, 172]. 

7. The detectives stopped Defendant, and told him that paperwork needed to be completed 

back at the Bureau before Defendant spoke, but that he would have an opportunity to speak once they 

were back at the Bureau; so Defendant stopped speaking. [N.T. 3/22/18, at 152]. 

8. · The three men made small talk for the 30 minute ride in which Defendant told detectives 

where he grew up, how long he had lived in Norristown, and that he had just graduated from high school. 

[N.T. 3/22/18, at 152, 175]. 

9. There was no conversation about the murder until the detectives got Defendant back to the 

Bureau conference room at approximately 3:02 p.m. [N.T. 3/22/18, at 153]. 

10. Per protocol, detectives locked their weapons up in the gun locker before they met with 

Defendant. [N.T. 3/22/18, at 153]. 

11. Det. Richard asked Defendant if he still wanted to waive his Philadelphia arraignment and 

read him the waiver fonn, which Defendant executed while Det. Crescitelli witnessed his signature. 

[N.T. 3/22/18, at 153-54, at Ex.CS-9 (Voluntary Waiver, Isaiah Freeman," 8/30/17, at 3:05 p.m.)]. 

12. Defendant was then offered food and beverage and he requested both. It was soon 

provided. [N.T. 3/22/18, at 154-55]. 

2 
13. Before proceeding further, Det. Crescitelli, as is second nature for him, confirmed that 

Defendant was not under the influence of any drugs or alcohol, nor was his comprehension impeded by 

any physical or mental issues. [N.T. 3/22/18, at 157, 17-76]. 

14. Det. Crescitelli read and explained to Defendant his constitutional rights and witnessed 

Defendant complete and execute a form waiving those rights at 3:08 p.m. ("Miranda Warnings.") [N.T. 

3/22/18, at 155-56, at p. 5 of 5, Ex. CS-IO ("Montgomery County Detectives Homicide Supplemental 

Report,") 166, Ex. CS-11 ("Criminal History oflsaiah Freeman")]. 

15. At 3 :08 p.m., Det. Crescitelli witnessed Defendant's signature. 

16. Det. Crescitelli told Defendant he wanted to speak about the murder investigation, as 

stated on the Miranda Warnings. 

17, With regard to Defendant's execution of his Miranda Warnings, Det. Crescitelli never 

threatened him to sign, or waive those rights, never made any promises, and never did anything to 

indicate to Defendant that he had to talk to him. [N.T. 3/22/18, at156-57]. 

18. Only after Defendant had received his Miranda Warnings and executed the waiver of his 

constitutional rights, did he proceed to make a statement. 

19. Defendant was talkative, friendly, and pretty relaxed. [N.T. 3/22/18, at 157]. 

20. Once the food arrived, Defendant's hand restrains were removed so that he could eat, and 

he was told he could begin to make his statement. [N.T. 3/22/18, at 158]. 

21. Det. Crescitellli listened as Defendant told his story, interjecting questions from time to 

time. Once Defendant concluded, Det. Crescitelli confronted him, in a very professional, very calm, and 

very relaxed tone, with the inconsistencies. [N.T. 3/22/18, at 158-59]. 

3 
22. Defendant relented on details surrounding two other individuals that detectives knew had 

been in the Dodge Charger that afternoon, and during the murder; and Defendant explained that he was 

trying to protect those two individuals. [N.T. 3/22/18, at 159-60]. 

23. Defendant admitted that Defendant William Wilson's "god brother" had been in the 

backseat of the car when the murder took place. [N.T. 3/22/18, at 160]. 

24. The detective's demeanor remained calm, relaxed, and professional throughout 

Defendant's statement. [N.T. 3/22/18, at 160]. 

25. Even when the detectives confronted Defendant with inconsistencies, his demeanor was 

pretty relaxed; and then Defendant told the truth. [N.T. 3/22/18, at 160]. 

26. But when they told him they had information that he had exited the front passenger seat of 

the car, he became upset, and said ·that Defendant William Wilson and his 'God brother' were trying to 

frame him. [N.T. 3/22/18, at 161]. Det. Crescitelli had reviewed surveillance footage of the murder 

- sceneandhesawthepassengerexitthecar. -[N.T.3/22/18,at170]. ~ ~- ~ - - -

27. Detectives stopped the interview because Defendant was getting upset, and told Defendant 

to finish his sandwich. [N. T. 3/22/18, at 161]. 

28. Defendant calmed down, took a few sips of his water, and while Det. Crescitelli was 

setting up his laptop to put their discussion into a question-and-answer format, Defendant asked the 

detective if he was "going to get life for this?" [N. T. 3/22/18, at 161]. To which Det. Crescitelli told 

Defendant it "wasn't up to" him and "his best option right now was to tell the truth." [N.T. 3/22/18, at 

161]. 

29. Det. Crescitelli told Defendant that, contrary to his statement that the driver had exited the 

car and shot the victim, the detectives had information that it was actually the front passenger that had 

exited the car and committed the murder. [N.T. 3/22/18, at 162]. 

4 
30. Defendant was "very surprised" and "in shock" when he heard this, and immediately put 

his head down, his hands up to his face, and even started to tear up and cry. After a few minutes, he said 

he was "going to jail forever." [N.T. 3/22/18, at 162]. 

31. Det. Crescitelli tried speaking with Defendant again, and he asked for an attorney for the 

first and only time since being apprehended earlier. [N.T. 3/22/18, at 162, 164]. 

32. Defendant was asked no further questions after that and detectives called the public 

defender; who had a conflict. [N.T. 3/22/18, at 163]. 

33. Other counsel was sought, but after more than 30 minutes passed, detectives told 

Defendant that he would be transported to Montgomery County Correctional Facility (MCCF). 

Defendant had no response, but as he was moved from the conference room, Defendant said that he 

wanted to talk, and tell his side of the story; to which Det: Richard told him it was too late given his 

invocation of his rights, and that he now needed to be transported to MCCF. [N.T. 3/22/18, at 163-64]. 

34. During the entire meeting with Defendant he was never threatened, never made any 

promises, and nothing was ever done to make Defendant think he had to speak with detectives. 

Defendant was treated respectfully and professional throughout his meeting. [N.T. 3/22/18, at 165]. 

35. Later that day, Det. Crescitelli prepare a detailed police report on the meeting with 

Defendant. [N.T. 3/22/18, at 165, 168, at Ex. CS-10 ("Montgomery County Detectives Homicide 

Supplemental Report,'') 177]. 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

1. Suspects in custody are not entitled to the same considerations that apply to citizens under 

the Fourth Amendment. However, it is not our intent to diminish the rights afforded prisoners during 

custodial interrogation. See Commonwealth v. Watkins, 750 A.2d 308,313 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (citing 

Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1503, 20 L.Ed.2d 381 (1968)(an inmate who is questioned 

5 
by government agents in connection with a case for which he or she is not in custody is still entitled to 

Miranda warnings). 

2. "The United States Supreme Court has held that, before law enforcement officers 

question an individual who has been in taken into custody or has been deprived of his freedom in any 

significant way, the officers must first warn the individual that he has the right to remain silent, that 

anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an 

attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed." Commorrwealth v. Yandamuri, 

159 A.3d 503, 519-20 (Pa. 2017) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 

694 (1966)). 

3. To establish that a defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary, knowing, and 

intelligent, the Court must conduct the following two inquiries: 

"First the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the 

product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception. 

Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the 

right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the 

"totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation" reveal both an uncoerced 

choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that 

Miranda rights have been waived. 

Commorrwealth v. Cephas, 522 A.2d 63, 65 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). 

4. In all cases, including in the context of suppression, the burden of production is on the 

Commonwealth. Pa. R. Crim. P. 581 cmt. See Commorrwealth v. Enimpah, 106 A.3d 695, 697 (Pa. 

2014). The Commonwealth must 

5. Further, "[i]t is for the suppression court as the trier of fact, rather than the reviewing 

court, to determine credibility." In Interest of Parks, 536 A.2d 440, 443 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). 

6. Contrary to Defendant's assertion his waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary, 

knowing, and intelligent. 

6 
7. The record aptly demonstrates that after being advised verbally of his rights, Defendant 

also read and reviewed his rights, and memorialized his voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver in 

writing. 

8. In addition, this was not the Defendant's first brush with the law, as reflected by the 

Commonwealth's admission of his criminal history, going back to 2012 when he was apparently 

charged with Aggravate Assault. Defendant was also charged with Simple Assault in March 2013, and 

the following December; Theft By Unlawful Taking, in December 2014; and Robbery, Terroristic 

Threats, Criminal Conspiracy, Receiving Stolen Property, and other related charges in December 2015. 

9. As such, Defendant was well-acquainted with Miranda rights. 

10. Defendant was not subject to any threats or promises, nor was anything else done to 

induce Defendant's waiver of rights. 

11. The totality of the circumstances surrounding Defendant's interrogation demonstrate both 

an uncoerced choice and that Defendant possessed requisite level of comprehension of the consequences 

attendant to his waiver. As such, Defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary, knowing, and 

intelligent; and his statement legally obtained. 

10. Accordingly, the following Order is entered: 

7 
ORDER 

~ AND NOW, this /ti" day of April 2018, after hearing it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's 

Motion to Suppress is DENIED. 

Copies of the above Order 

Mailed on 4/\~18 

By First Class Mail to: 

John I. McMahon, Jr., Esquire 

A. Charles Peruto, Esquire 

By Interoffice Mail to: 

BY THE COURT: 

~~- THOMAS C. BRANCA, J. 

Samantha L.R. Cauffinan, Esquire-Office of the District Attorney 

Court Administration 

0 ~ r(A()J\AfA 

Secretary ~ ~ 

8