alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Myron A. HAMILTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shane A. SMITH, Tina Foster, Gary Cox, Gene Wallace, N.D. Pete Hayward, Grant English, Barbara Byrne, Officer Does 1-100, Judicial & Executive Officers 1-100, Keith Stephens, Rob Kolkman, Richard A. Dorrans, Tom Wayman, John Merrick, Charles Shepherd, Bailey Sainsbury, and Howard Lemke, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 84-1797.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Jan. 3, 1986.

*37Myron A. Hamilton, pro se.

Jody K. Burnett of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, Salt Lake City, Utah, for defendants-appellees Smith, Foster, Cox, and Wallace.

Roger A. Livingston, Salt Lake Co. Attys.’ Office, Salt Lake City, Utah, for defendants-appellees Hayward, English, Byrne, Stephens, Kolkman, Dorrans, Way-man, Merrick, Shepherd, and Lemke.

Before BARRETT, McKAY, and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

This three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. *See*Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 10th Cir.R. 10(e). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

This matter comes on appeal from an order of the district court granting a preliminary injunction restraining the plaintiff from filing a notice of lis pendens against any real property of the defendants. (See the order of April 15, 1985.) Upon consideration of the arguments made in the briefs and the record, we affirm the district court’s judgment in this matter.

The underlying action was a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in which the plaintiff sought money damages. The propriety of filing a notice of lis pendens from a federal lawsuit is a matter governed by state law. *See Winkler v. Andrus,*614 F.2d 707 (10th Cir.1980). The district court issued the injunctive order based on its ruling that under Utah law a notice of lis pendens may not be filed in anticipation of a money judgment.

In Utah, a lis pendens may be filed “[i]n any action affecting the title to, or the right of possession of, real property....” Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2 (1953). Similar statutes have been construed to prohibit the filing of a notice of lis pendens in anticipation of a money judgment. *Bramall v. Wales,*29 Wash.App. 390, 628 P.2d 511, 514 (Wash.1981); *Cutter v. Cutter Realty Co.,*265 N.C. 664, 144 S.E.2d 882, 885 (N.C.1965). *See generally*51 Am. Jur.2d Lis Pendens § 21 (1970).

We agree with the district court and defendants. Although there are no state cases on point, there is no reason in either precedent or logic to assume that Utah would depart from this general rule. The injunction was properly granted. The appeal manifestly presents no substantial question. *See*10th Cir.R. 9(c).

Lastly, plaintiff has requested that we certify to the attorney general of the United States and the attorney general of the State of Utah that this case draws into question the constitutionality of state and federal laws. *See*28 U.S.C. § 2403. Upon consideration of the issue on appeal and in view of our disposition thereof, the request is denied.

AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
EXHIBIT 32.1


Certification Pursuant


to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350


As Adopted Pursuant to


Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), each of the undersigned officers of Cenveo, Inc., a Colorado corporation (the ‘‘Company’’), does hereby certify, to the best of such officer’s knowledge, that:









The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the three and nine month periods ended October 2, 2010 (the ‘‘Form 10-Q’’) of the Company fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.







Date: November 12, 2010


/s/ ROBERTG.BURTON, SR.


Robert G. Burton, Sr.


Chairman and Chief Executive Officer





Date: November 12, 2010


/s/ Mark S. Hiltwein


Mark S. Hiltwein


Chief Financial Officer







A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Cenveo, Inc. and will be retained by Cenveo, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.





The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code) and is not being filed as part of the Form 10-Q or as a separate disclosure document.
#### STATE ex rel. Derrick WYATT v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-0532.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 4, 2011.

In re Wyatt, Derrick; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial *466Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 388-725; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-0081.

Denied. See *State ex rel. McKnight v. State,*98-2258 (La. App 1st Cir. 12/3/98), 742 So.2d 894.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

March 4, 2020

No. 04-18-00917-CV

Ziaunnisa K. LODHI,

Appellant

v.

Shah A. HAQUE,

Appellee

From the 166th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2017CI04290

Honorable Rosie Alvarado, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Irene Rios, Justice

Beth Watkins, Justice

Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

The panel has considered the appellant’s motion for en banc reconsideration, and the

motion is hereby DENIED.

_________________________________

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 4th day of March, 2020.

___________________________________

MICHAEL A. CRUZ,

Clerk of Court
#### Roger C. PRICE v. Venetia MICHAELS, Warden; et al.

No. 2010-CI-0502.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 18, 2011.

In re Price, Roger C.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 558,433; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 CA 1401.

Denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from 10QSB for
second QTR 1999 and is qualified in it's entirety by reference to such financial
statements.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                  6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                             159,195
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        4,067
<ALLOWANCES>                                             0
<INVENTORY>                                         67,892
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   231,155
<PP&E>                                              47,722
<DEPRECIATION>                                     (32,628)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                     246,249
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                  337
<BONDS>                                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                             2,730
<OTHER-SE>                                       1,374,444
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     1,378,174
<SALES>                                              3,879
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     3,879
<CGS>                                                1,125
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        1,125
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   101,962
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                       0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    (94,754)
<INCOME-TAX>                                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                      0
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                       (94,754)
<EPS-BASIC>                                         (.01)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                         (.01)



</TABLE>
#### STATE ex rel. Kelvin P. WISE v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-2055.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 16, 2011.

In re Wise, Kelvin P.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 04F1911; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-370-KA.

Denied.
I 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1365 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to repeal the alternative 

minimum tax on corporations. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 7, 2007 

Mr. ENGLISH of Pennsylvania (for himself, Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas, Mr. 

SESSIONS, Mr. DAVIS of Kentucky, Mr. BISHOP of Utah, Mr. GARY G. 

MILLER of California, Mr. JORDAN of Ohio, Mr. SIMPSON, Mrs. 

MUSGRAVE, Mr. CONAWAY, and Mr. DOOLITTLE) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to repeal 

the alternative minimum tax on corporations. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Corporate AMT Re5 peal’’. 

6 SEC. 2. REPEAL OF ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX ON COR7 PORATIONS. 

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (a) of section 55 of the 

9 Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to alternative 


jcorcoran on PROD1PC65 with BILLS
2 

•HR 1365 IH

1 minimum tax imposed) is amended by adding at the end 

2 the following new flush sentence: 

3 ‘‘Except in the case of a corporation, no tax shall be im4 posed by this section for any taxable year beginning after 

5 December 31, 2006, and the tentative minimum tax for 

6 any such taxable year of any taxpayer which is a corpora7 tion shall be zero for purposes of this title.’’. 

8 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

9 this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after 

10 December 31, 2006. 

Æ 


jcorcoran on PROD1PC65 with BILLS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Nos. 11

- 3440/12

- 1027/12

- 1936

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

Petitioner

1199 SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST, N.J. REGION,

Intervenor

v.

NEW VISTA NURSING AND REHABILITATION,

Respondent

SUR PETITION FOR PANEL REHEARING

_______________________

Before: S MITH

, G REENAWAY , Jr., and V AN A NTWERPEN

, C ircuit Judges

________________________

AND NOW, upon consideratio n of the petition for rehearing , the supplement to the

petition, and the answer filed by New Vista , it is hereby ORDERED that the NLRB’s

petition for rehearing before the original panel is G RANTED.

By the Court,

s/ D. Brooks Smith

Circuit Judge

Dated: August 11, 2014

T mk/ cc: all counsel of record
Exhibit 32.1
 CERTIFICATION
 
 Pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pehong Chen, Chief Executive
Officer of BroadVision, Inc. (the "Company"), and Shin-Yuan Tzou, Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, each hereby certifies that, to the best of his
knowledge:
  1. The
Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2008, and
to which this Certification is attached as Exhibit 32.1 (the "Periodic Report"),
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the
Exchange Act; and
 
 2. The
information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 /s/  Pehong
      ChenPehong
      Chen
                  Chief
      Executive Officer
  /s/  Shin-Yuan
      TzouShin-Yuan
      Tzou
                  Chief
      Financial Officer


IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have set their hands hereto as of the
7th   day of
May, 2008.
 This
certification accompanies the Form 10-Q to which it relates, is not deemed filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is not to be incorporated by
reference into any filing of BroadVision, Inc. under the Securities Act of 1933,
as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (whether made
before or after the date of the Form 10-Q), irrespective of any general
incorporation language contained in such filing.
#### W. H. McDonald v. E. A. Blount.

(No. 3163.)

Appeal from Hill County.

Opinion by

Hurt, J.

*(Transferred from Austin.J*

§ 844. *Plea of privilege to be sued in precinct or county of residence, comes too late when the cause has been continued by consent.*McDonald sued Blount in justice’s court. At the first term of the court after service had upon defendant, the cause was continued by consent of parties. At the next term of the court thereafter Blount pleaded that at the time of the institution of the suit he was a resident, and was still a resident, of San Augustine county, and was not subject to be sued in Hill county. This plea was excepted to by McDonald, and the exceptions were sustained and judgment rendered against Blount. He appealed to the county court, and in that court his plea of privilege was sustained, and the suit was dismissed. *Held,*that the county court erred in sustaining the plea. In Brumley v. Cooke, 13 Tex. 586, it was held that a motion to change the venue by defendant, and the same being changed by consent, operated to give jurisdiction over *the person*by consent. [See, also, Stephenson *299v. R. R. Co. 42 Tex. 162; Womack v. Shelton, 31 Tex. 592; *ante,*§ 237.] When a party appears in court and agrees that the cause may be continued, and in pursuance of such agreement the cause is continued, such appearance •will operate to give the court jurisdiction over the party so appearing. Suppose that, before the next term of the court, limitation would bar the cause of action, will the defendant be permitted to join in a continuance of the cause, and at the next term of the court be allowed to deny the jurisdiction of the court over his person, plead successfully his privilege, defeat the suit, and thus rid himself of the cause of action? We think not.

October 18, 1884.

Reversed and remanded.
#### Bradley WOMACK, Appellant, v. Dawn LARUE, individually, and as parent and natural guardian of Devan J. Larue, a minor, Appellee.

No. 2D10-1502.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

May 13, 2011.

Shea T. Moxon of Swope Rodante, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.

Stuart J. Freeman of Brasfield, Freeman, Goldis & Cash, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellee.

KELLY, Judge.

Bradley Womack appeals a final summary judgment entered in favor of Dawn Larue, individually and as parent and natural guardian of Devan Larue. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues of material fact to be determined and that Ms. Larue was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, we affirm.

DAVIS and BLACK, JJ., Concur.
News United States Air Force
 Dudette passes 1,000 combat flight hoursPublished Feb. 23, 2016
                        
                        By Tech. Sgt. Frank W. Miller III
                        
                        
                        380th Air Expeditionary Wing Public Affairs
                **SOUTHWEST ASIA (AFNS) --**
                Maj. Jennifer received a hero’s welcome from members of the 380th Air Expeditionary Wing as she surpassed the 1,000 combat-hour milestone in the F-15E Strike Eagle at an undisclosed location in Southwest Asia, Feb. 13.
Jennifer, a weapon systems officer assigned to the 391st Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, achieved the milestone during a mission in support of Operation Inherent Resolve.
“The hour milestones in the jet are big deals,” said Capt. Kevin, a 391st EFS pilot, who accompanied Jennifer on the mission. “Our opportunity to accrue hours is finite, and every one of them is special. To reach 1,000 hours in a category as unique as combat time is pretty special; it means someone has invested a lot of time and effort into their job.”
Achieving this milestone is a career defining moment for any F-15E aircrew member, even more so for females, which make up approximately 10 percent of Strike Eagle pilots and the WSO community.
“With so much time as a close air support subject matter expert, she is well versed in integrating with the joint terminal attack controllers,” said Kevin, who has been flying with Jennifer since 2010. “She can take broken and barely intelligible communications on a secure radio and efficiently turn it in to mission success for the ground forces.”
Jennifer logged her first combat sortie in 2009, during the first of her two tours in Afghanistan, and has compiled more than 1600 flying hours and 220 combat sorties during her career.
“Reaching this milestone to me represents my willingness to serve and protect Americans in a flying capacity each time I go out and fly,” Jennifer said. “I’m very proud to serve and keep the enemy here instead of being back at home.”
She was also a member of the historic Dudette 07 mission in 2011, which was the first F-15E Air Force combat mission comprised entirely of female aircrew members. 
“You can count on Jennifer to be thorough and reliable in her job,” Kevin said. “Her performance is nothing short of what you would expect from an experienced and professional aviator; it goes to show it doesn't matter what your gender is - the girls can hang with the best of them, and are capable of being the best themselves.”**(Editor's note: Last names were not included due to security and safety reasons.)**AFCENT 



southwest asia 



F-15E Strike Eagle 



F-15 



deployed 



combat 



sortie
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT

 

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEYACT OF 2002

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report of MakeMusic! Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-QSB for thequarter ended September 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission (the “Report”), I, Michael L. Liston, Acting Principal Accountingand Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, asadopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1) The Report fully complies withthe requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of1934; and

 

(2) The information containedin the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financialcondition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 

November 4, 2004

 

 
|   | /s/ Michael L. Liston |                                                |
|--------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
|   |                  | Corporate Controller                                |
|   |                  | (Acting Principal Financial and Accounting Officer) |

 

----
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk's Office, Atlanta, February 01, 2017.

I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes 

of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto 

affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

Court of Appeals 

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, February 01, 2017

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order

A17D0247. LAUREN SYDNEY FILSON v. RICHARD FILSON.

Upon consideration of the Application for Discretionary Appeal, it is ordered that it be 

hereby GRANTED. The Appellant may file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the date of 

this order. The Clerk of Superior Court is directed to include a copy of this order in the record 

transmitted to the Court of Appeals.

LC NUMBERS:

CE1300051C063
#### Richard H. CLINTON, Appellant, v. JOSHUA HENDY CORPORATION, Appellee.

No. 16592.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

March 29, 1960.

Rehearing Denied April 13, 1960.

Richard H. Clinton, Los Angeles, Cal., in pro. per.

Robert Sikes, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee.

Before BARNES, HAMLIN and JERTBERG, Circuit Judges.

*451PER CURIAM.

On January 11,1956, the district court entered its orders dismissing appellant’s first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth causes of action asserted in his libel in admiralty. The order of dismissal of the eighth cause of action was based on the ground “that the tort upon which the eighth cause of action is based is not a maritime tort” and thus “not within the admiralty jurisdiction of this Court.”

The appellant appealed to this Court from said order of dismissal in respect to the first, second, third and eighth causes of action. The trial court’s order of dismissal was affirmed March 24, 1958, and rehearing was denied April 21, 1958. Clinton v. International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots of America, Inc., 9 Cir., 254 F.2d 370. In connection with the eighth cause of action, this Court stated at page 372:

> “The eighth cause of action, against Joshua Hendy and Pacific Far East Lines, alleges the initiation of a potential tort — that of interference with appellant’s contractual relation with Local 90. There is no allegation that the tort was *committed*upon navigable waters, therefore, no maritime tort sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the admiralty court is alleged.

> “The court below did not have jurisdiction of the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1333.”

After the lapse of more than one year, and on July 29, 1959, appellant moved the district court to amend the order dismissing the eighth cause of action “to allow an Second Amended Libel of the Eighth Cause of Action which will be properly alleged as a maritime tort under the Admiralty Extension Act, ‘46 U.S.C.A. 740’.” [sic] On July 30, 1959 appellant lodged with the clerk of the District Court proposed second amended libel. The District Court denied appellant’s motion for amendment to the order dismissing the eighth cause of action, and ordered stricken from the files the proposed second amended libel. This appeal followed.

The matter of amending a pleading in admiralty as to substance is within the discretion of the district court. Admiralty Rule No. 23, 28 U.S. C.A. We find no abuse of discretion by the district court. The orders appealed from are affirmed.