### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON Ja nuary 24, 200 8 S es sio n
TAM MY KEY MON AD AM S

v. AN THON Y D . A DA MS
App e al f r om th e Cha nc e r y C our t f orGibs on C ount y ( Tr e nt on) No. 17957 George R. Ellis, Ch ancellor

No. W2007-00915-C OA-R3-C V - Filed June 30, 2008

Th is i s a div or c e c a se . The pa

rt ie s beg a n livi ng tog e the r in 199 8, a nd marrie d in 2004 . Some tim e befor e the mar

riage , the parties purcha sed a r esidential lot on which they c onstructed a ho m e, financ ing the construction with a cre dit c ard in the wife’ s name. Title to the home was in the wife’ s
name a lone. The husba n d p erf ormed manua l labor on the lot and the home during and a fter the constru ction. During the mar riage , the parties operated a business that prove d unsucce ssful. The wife e ventually left to start he r own business in a diffe rent fie ld. At approximately the sa me time, the wife filed for divorce

. A trial ensued. The pa rties introduce d evidenc e on the va lue of the home , various items of per sonal proper ty, and a significa nt amount of cre dit car d debt. After the close of the evidenc e, the tria l court gra nted a divorc e to t h e wi fe, and awa rded the home and the de bt associate d with the hom e to her. It order ed the sale of some property and application of the proce eds to the parties’ debt. The r emaining debt wa s n o t cl as s i fi ed as marital or separ ate a nd was not div ide d. Th e pa

rt ie s a pp e al. Th e hu sb and arg ue s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in no t a wa

rd ing him a share of the pa

rties’ business and the incre ase in va lue of the marital home. The w ife a rgues that the trial court e rre d in failing to designate the a ssets and debts as ma rital or sepa

rate and to divide them betwee n the parties. We a ffirm the tria l court’s de cision not to award the Hus b and a share of the failed business or

a shar e of the incre ase in va lue of the parties’ home. We va cate the re mainder of the jud gme nt a ndre ma ndfo r a llo c a tio n o f the pe rs on a l pr op e rt y a ndthe de bt.
Tenn. R. App . P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Cir cuit Court Af firme d in Part; Vacat ed in Part; and Remanded

H OL LY M. K I RBY , J., delivere d the opinion of the Court, in which A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J., W.S., and D AVI D R. F ARMER , J., joined.
Lisa Armstrong Houston and T ere sa A. Luna , Jacks o n , T en n es see, f or the a ppellant, Anthony D. Ad a ms Cyn thi a Cha nd le r-Sn e ll a ndBarb ara Ho bo c k, Hu mbo ldt , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lle e , T a mmy Ke ymo n A da msW i f e t es t i f i ed at t r i al t hat A dam s & A s s oci at es w as i ncor por at ed, but t he r ec or d cont ai ns no evi denc e of t he 1

ow ner s hi p of

t he cor por at i on.

T he R ozel l e St r eet propert y w as t he s ub j ect of a l aw s ui t , al s o i n t he G i bson C ou nt y C hancer y C ou r t , t hat w as 2

unr el at ed t o t he di vor ce proc ee di ngs

. A t hi r d par t y fi l ed a l aws ui t as s er t i ng a l i en on t he pr oper t y. A t t he t i m e of t he di vor ce t r i al , t hat l i t i gat i on w as s t i l l pe ndi ng.
-2- OP IN ION
Plaintiff/Appellee Ta mmy (Keymon) Ada ms (“Wif e”) and De fenda nt/Appellant Anthony D. Adams (“ Husband” ) met some time bef ore 1998. They be gan living together in late 1998, a nd beca me enga ged in 1999. On July 31, 2004, the y wer e mar ried. This wa s Wife’ s second mar riage and Husba nd’s third. No childre n wer e born of the marriage.
At some point during the marria ge or shortly before , the parties started a corpor ation called Adams & Associate s, which did business as Delta Investigations and provided private inve stigation service s. Both Husband and Wif e participated in its operation, and pur chase d computers, of fice 1 fu rn itu re , c a me ra s, a ndoth e r s ur ve ill a nc e e qu ipm e nt fo r us e in the b us ine ss. Mo st o f the se purcha ses wer e fina nced by using c redit ca rds in b o t h parties’ names. Ada ms & Associates was

app are ntl y n ot s uc c e ssf

ul.

The home in whic h the parties live d d uring their long enga gement and brief mar riage was loc a te d o n A tki ns Str e e t, G ibs on , T e nn e sse e (“ Atkin s Str e e t pr op e rt y” ). Th e de ed of t ru st o n th is pr op e rt y is da te d M a y 6 , 2 00 2. Hu sb a nd ’s na me wa s not list e d on eithe r the tit le or the de e d o f t

ru st. The pa rties jointly o wn ed another piece of re al prope rty on Rozelle Stree t in Gibson, Tennessee (“Roze lle Street prope rty”). 2
In September

2005, Wife started a

sole proprie torship known as Ke ymon Manage ment Gr ou p. W if

e ’s ne w ve ntu re did no t invo lve pr ivate inv e sti ga tio ns a nd Hu sb a nd did no t pa rt ic ipate in i t.

On Ap ri l 4, 20 06 , W if e fi le d a c omp la int fo r div or c e in the Gi bs on Cou nty Cha nc e ry Cou rt , alleging irre concilable differ ence s and inappropriate marital conduct. In her complaint, she listed only the Rozelle Street property a s jointly-owned rea l pr operty. Husband answe red a nd denied a ny fault. He asserted in his answer that the Atkins Street prope rty was a lso joint ly owned.

On Novembe r 7, 2006, a be nch trial wa s held befor e Chanc ellor Ge o rg e R . Ellis. The witnesses we re W ife, Husba nd, Husband’s mother , and a r eal e state appr aiser.

Wife was the f

irst witness, testifying initially about t he parties’ re al prope rty. She stated that the parties purcha sed the Roze lle Street prope rty for $1,300, a nd said that the value at t h e time of trial was be tween $4,500 a nd $7,500. Wife testified that the title and the deed of trust to the marital home on Atkins Street wer e in her name a lone. She explaine d that, at the time t he lot was purc hased, Husband’s c redit rating was poor. Wife said that she owe d approximate ly $280,000 on the home, comprised of the initial debt ref lected in the deed of

trust and a home e quity line of cre dit that was-3-

also solely in her na me. Wife ass er t ed that Husband ha d contributed nothing to the Atkins Street property that could have c aused a n incre ase in its value.

Wife also testified about the parties’ debt. Appr oximately $78,731.31 worth of c redit ca rd debt was in W ife’s na me alone, incurre d primarily to ma ke improveme nts to the home, as well as to purcha se surve illance e quipment for the pa rties’ private investigation business and mee t everyday

e xp e ns e s. Som e of

the e qu ipm e nt w a s su bs e qu e ntl y u se d in he r s ole pr op rieto rsh ip , andso me
rema ined in Husband’s possession. A campe r and a trac tor wer e also purcha sed on cre dit in Wife’s name only.

After Wife ’s testimony, St eve Shelton (“ Shelton”), a r eal e state appr aiser, tes t i fi ed as a n expert witness about the Atkins Street hom e. Af ter e xplaining the basis for his opinion, Shelton valued the pr operty a t $390,000.

Husband’s mother , Pauline Adams, testified next. She asserted that Wife was in possession of seve ral items of he r per sonal property, including a lawn mower, a grass c atche r, a w eed e ater , a tiller, and a va cuum clea ner.

After that, Husband testified, f

ocusing primarily on the Atkins S tree t property. He testified that the parties purcha sed the lot prior to the m arriage, and described the wor k that he per formed on the lot and on the home. Husba nd said that he he lped clea r the lot in prepa

ration for construction of the home, and assisted in the i nstallation of sheetrock and the hom e security system, as we ll as wiring and pa inting. He testified that he dug the hol e for the i n-ground swimm ing pool. Husband said that he wa s not paid for a ny of t his work, and asserted t hat i t contributed to the i ncre ase in the
va lue of the ho me . H e op ine d th a t th e ho us e wa s worth $2 40 ,0 00 wh e n b uil t, a nda gr e e d w ith Shelton’s appra isal of the home’ s value a s of the tim e o f t rial at $390,000. Husba nd asked f or an awa rd of se venty per cent of

the incre ase in the va lue of the home

.
Husband testified tha t he helped sta rt Wife ’s new busine ss, Key m o n M an ageme nt Group. He a lso a lle ge d th a t, w he n s he le ft , W if e int e rf e re d wi th the e xis tin g pr ivate inv e sti ga tio n b us ine ss by cutting off the f

ax mac hines, email addr ess, and c ell phone ser vice.
Husband prof

fer ed an itemized l ist detailing the parties’ per sonal property and proposing a division of the property that he considere d to be marital. The list was introduced a s an ex h ibit at trial. The list included estimated va lues of ea ch article of a lleged marital property, but no value s for alleged se parate prope rty. Husband a ls o t est ified that the c redit ca rd debt in his name totaled approximate ly $12,600.

After the conc lusion of the evidenc e, the tria l court issued an or al ruling. After granting a divorce to Wife on the grounds of inappr opriate ma rital conduc t, the trial court state d:

The Court further finds that these parties mar ried on 7/31 of 2004 but have liv e d to ge the r sin c e 19 99

. An d du ri ng thi s tim e , the pa rt ie s h a ve c omm ing le d th e ir

a sse ts a ndde bts to a n e xte nt tha t ne ith e r the pa rt ie s n or the ir a tto rn e ys ha ve be e n a bleThe Banc or pSout h de bt w as t he debt a s s oci at ed w i t h t he A t ki ns St r ee t pr oper t y. 3

-4- to d e c iph e r w ha t w as a deb t or an a sse t prior to m arria ge or

prior to the ir cohabitation. Mr. Adams ha s asked f

or part of t he existi ng – of the e quity in a home at 723 Adkins [sic] St ree t in Gibson, Tenne ssee, that is i n the name of Tammy Keymon, a nd Tammy Keymon owe s a debt in her name only on the property in the amount of two hundred an d eighty thousand four hundr ed and f orty-five dollars and se venty-nine

c e nts . A nth on y D

. Ad a ms te sti fi e d that he ha s e njo ye d the be ne fi t of thi s r e a l e state from its being built unti l the date of the sepa ration. The Court finds that the re al estate is the property of Tammy Keymon Ad a ms, a ndsh e is o rd e re d to sti ll p a y th e indeb ted nes s o n th e sa me a ndho ld An tho ny Ad a ms h arm le ss. Parties ca n n o t ag ree on the per sonal property, and the Court finds that the pr oo f s ho ws that the pe rs on a l pro pe rt y o f the hu sb a ndprior to t he ir marria ge wa s a ll the property listed on page 3 that he submitt ed as an exhibit, de leting a ll items t hat he testified that he did not bring into t he re lationship. Th e Cou rt fu rthe r fi nd s tha t the wi fe ’s ind ivi du a l pr op e rt y s ha ll b e a ll i te ms on page 4 of

the same e xhibit with t he addition of any items w hich she should show proof that she had purc hased prior to the marria ge on 7/31/04 which wer e made part of Collective Exhibit 11. All othe r items of per sonal property shall be sold with the

exce ption of the John Dee re lawn mower, the Stihl wee d eate r, t he garden tiller, the John Dee re swe eper, and the Rainbow va cuum clea ner w hich ar e the pr operty of [Husband’ s mother].

Sub se qu e ntl y, the tr ia l c ou rt ’s or a l rul ing wa s put into a writt e n o rd e r, statin g e sse nti a lly the sa me as the ora l ru l i n g. In the written order, the proce eds fr om the sale of “ all other items of pe rsonal property” wer e to be a

pplied “to t h e parties[ ’] de bts as listed on Exhibit 9 wit h exce ption of BancorpSouth debt.” 3
Thus, the trial court awar ded Wif e the Atkins Street prope rty as we ll as the ac companying debt. It made no findi n g o n t h e o wn ership of the Rozelle Stree t property. As to the pe rsonal property, it awarde d Husband “ all property listed on page 3 de leting all items that he testified wer e purcha sed af

ter mar riage .” The trial court awarde d Wife “all it ems on page 4 with addition of any ite ms wh ich sh e sh ow s p ro of that sh e bo ug ht p ri or

to J uly 31 , 2 00 4 ma de c oll e c tiv e e xh ibi t 1 through 7.” Any othe r prope rty was neither de scribed nor delineate d, but was neve rtheless orde red sold. Aside from the de bt on the Atkins St ree t property, ther e we re no findings on how much of the parties’ considera

ble debt was sepa

rate or marital, a nd no allocation of r esponsibility for payment of the de bt. Husband and W ife both appe al the trial c ourt’s orde r. On appe al, Husband a

rgues that the trial court erre d in not awar ding him an equitable shar e of the va lue of the private investigation business, Adams & Associate s, in disti nguishing between

se pa rate a ndma

ri ta l ass e ts, a nd in div idi ng the mari ta l est a te

. Hu sb a nd take s partic ula r i ssu e wi th the trial court’s ruling on the Atkins Street property. Wife asserts on appea l that the trial court erre dH us band appa r ent l y doe s not a ppea l t he t r i al c our t ’ s a l l oca t i on t o W i f e of t he de bt as s oci at ed w i t h t he A t ki ns 4
St r ee t pr oper t y.
-5- in failing to de signate the parties’ debts and a ssets as either marital or se parate prope rty and to divide the de bts a nda sse ts b e tw e e n th e pa rt ie s.

As the pr oc e e din g belo w was a be nc h tria l, w e re vie w the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s o f f a c t de

novo , with a pre sumption of corre ctness, “unless the prepondera nce of the evidence is otherw ise.” Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; see also Campbell v. Fla. Steel Corp. , 919 S.W.2d 26, 28-29 (Te nn. 1996). We r eview the trial court’ s conclusions of law de novo with no suc h presumption. Cam pb e ll , 919 S.W.2d at 28-29. The trial court’s findings with regard to sepa rate and marital property in a divor ce
case will be revie wed a s any other f inding. Ow e ns v . O we ns , 241 S.W.3d 478, 485 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007), perm. app. de nied (S e pt. 17 , 2 00 7) . H ow e ve r, the tr ia l cou rt is a ff or de d w ide dis c re tio n in its equitable division of the marital prope rt y , an d i t s distribution wil l be given “gr eat we ight” on appea l. For

d v . Fo rd
, 952 S.W.2d 824, 825 (Tenn. App. 1997). The trial court’ s division of marital propert y wi l l n o t be disturbed on appe al unless we f ind “that the distribution lacked pr oper evidentiary support or re sults fro m either a n err or of law or a misapplication of the statutory require ments.” Id. (citing Thompson v. Thompson
, 797 S.W.2d 599, 604 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990)).

We first addre ss Husband’s c ontention that he should have be en aw arde d an equitable share in the pa rt ie s’ pr ivate inv e sti ga tiv e bu sin e ss, Ad a ms & As so c ia te s. Hu sb a ndarg ue s th a t th e bu sin e ss was a partne rship, and maintains that he should have r ece ived an a war d compensa ting him for Wife’ s “usurpation” of his partne rship interest. Howe ver, he points to no evidence in the r ec o rd on the value of Adams & Associate s as a going concern, and we have f ound no such evide nce. T here fore , we de cline to modify the trial cour t’s implicit ruli ng that t h e b u s i n es s h ad no value as a going
conce rn. Items of pe rsonal prope rty assoc i at ed wi t h the business, including office furniture and surveillance equipment, ar e addr essed be low in this Opini on.

Husband a

rgues that the trial court e rre d in awar ding the Atkins Street property to Wife, a nd in failing to awar d him a portion of its increa se in value. H e ar gues t h at t h e property should be

c on sid e re d ma

ri ta l or , in the a lte rn a tiv e , tha t th e inc re a se in v a lue of the Atkin s Str e e t pr op e rt y should have be en considere d marital property, that his manual labor substantially contributed to the incre ase in va lue, and, a ccor dingly, that he should have be en aw arde d an eq u i t able share of the incre ase. 4

In Tenne ssee, marital and sepa rate property are define d by statute. T.C.A. § 36-4-121( b)(1) , (b) ( 2 ) ( 2 0 0 5 )

. M ar it a l p r o p e r ty is “ a ll r e a l a n d p e r s o n a l p r o p e r ty , b o thta n g ib le a n d in ta ngible, acquir ed by either

o r b o t h spouses during the cour se of the ma rriage up to the date of

the final div o r c e h e ar in g a n d o w n e d b y e ith e r o r b o ths p o u s e s a s o f

th e d a te o f

f il in g o f a c o mp la in t f

or divorce

. . . .” Id. § 36-4-121( b)(1) (A). Marital property also includes “any incre ase in va lue during the marriage of [] property dete rmined to be sepa rate property in accor dance with subdivisi on (b)( 2) if ea ch par

ty substantially contributed to its preserva tion and appre ciation . . . .” Id. § 36-4- 121( b ) ( 1 ) ( B)

. Se p ar a te p r o p e r ty , o n th e o th e r h a n d , is “ [ a ] ll r e a l a n d p e r s o n a l p r o p e r ty o w n e d by a spouse befor e marriage .

. . .” Id. § 3 6- 4- 12 1( b) (2 )( A) . I t a lso inc lud e s “ app re c ia tio n o f p ro pe rt yW e as s um e t hat “ page 3” r efer s t o t he i t em i ze d l i s t of t he par t i es ’ pe r s onal pr oper t y, pr of f er ed by H us band 5

a t t ria l, in d ic a tin g H u sb a n d ’s v ie w o f w h ic h it e m s w e re se p a ra te p ro p e rty a n d w h ic h w e re m a rita l.

W e a ssu m e th a t “p a g e 4 ” a g a in re fe rs to th e li st o f p e rs o n a l p ro p e rty p ro ff e re d b y H u sb a n d a t t ria l. 6

-6- owned by a

spouse before marriage exce pt when cha rac terize d as marital pr operty unde r subdivision (b)( 1).” Id. § 36-4-121( b)(2) (C).

In a wa rd ing the Atkin s Str e e t pr op e rt y, a lon g w ith the de bt a sso c ia te d w ith the pr op e rt y, to Wife , the trial court made an implicit finding that Husband did not substantially contribute to the incre ase i n v al u e of the property. See T.C.A. § 36-4-121( b)(1) (B), (b) (2)( C). While Husba nd testified a b o u t his considera ble contributions, Wife disputed this testi mony. The trial court appar ently cre dited Wife ’s testimony on this issue. “[B]e cause there is no require ment that a trial court make expre ss findings of fact regarding a w itness’s cre dibilit y, the abse nce of such findings does not a lter the applicable standard of revie w.” Richards v. Liberty Mut. In s. Co. , 70 S.W.3d 729, 733-34 (Te nn. 2002). We give “c onsiderable defe renc e” to a trial court’s determination with regard to witness cre dibilit y. Id. Based on the r ecor d befor e us, we do not see a basis for ove rturning the trial court’ s impli cit cre dibilit y determination on this issue. The trial c ourt’s aw ard of the Atkins Street prope rty to Wife is a ffirme d.

W if e arg ue s o n a

pp e a l that the tr ia l c ou rt e rr on e ou sly faile d to de sig na te muc h o f the pa rt ie s’ property and debts as e ither marital or separ ate, and failed to allocate the property and debts to either party. W e agr ee.

“The dissoluti on of a marriage require s the courts to engage in the or derly disentangle ment of the pa rties’ pe rsonal and f

inancial a ffa irs.” Anderton v. Anderton , 988 S.W.2d 675, 679 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). After

resolving that the parties should be divorce d, “[t]he trial court’ s first task . . . is to i de nti fy a nd dis tr ibu te the pa rt ie s’ se pa

rate pr op e rt y an d the n to divi de the ir mari ta l pr op e rt y in an equitable ma nner. A s part of this proc ess, the trial court should also identify and a llocate the parties’ separ ate a nd m ar i t al d eb t s.” Id. (interna l citations omit ted). “ Trial courts have not completely divided a ma

rital estate until they have allocate d both the marital property and the marital debt.” Ow e ns , 2 41 S.W .3 d a t 49 0 ( c itatio ns omi tte d) ; se e als o T. C. A. § 36-4-121( a).

In t his case, at the outset of its decision, the trial court corre ctly observe d that the parties comingled essentially all of the ir assets and debts prior to the marria ge. It then c lear ly designated the Atkins Street prope rty as Wife ’s property, w hether as her separ ate pr operty or a s a division of marital prop er t y , and allocated the debt a ssociated with the pr operty to Wife . After that, the trial court’s or der be comes less c lear

. Hu sb a nd ’s pr op e rt y (e ith e r se pa rate or a s a di vis ion of

mari ta l pr op e rt y) wa s d e sc ri be d a s “ a ll property list ed on page 3 deleting all items tha t he testified we re pur chase d afte r marriage.” Wife ’s 5 property (either separate or as a division of m arital property) was described as “all it ems on page 4 with ad d i t ion of any items which she shows proof that she bought prior to July 31, 2004 made collective e xhibit 1 through 7.” The items be longing to Husband’s mother we re na med spec ifically. 6 Beyond that, no property w as designated either marital or per sonal; it was simply ordered sold. TheA fte r c la ssify in g th e p a rtie s’ p ro p e rty a s e ith e r m a rita l o r se p a ra te , th e tr ia l c o u rt sh o u ld p la c e a re a so n a b le 7

v a lu e o n e a c h p ie c e o f p ro p e rty

. O wens , 2 4 1 S .W .3 d a t 4 8 6

. H o w e v e r, th e p a rtie s a re o b lig a te d to c o m e fo rw a rd w ith

c o m p e te n t v a lu a tio n e v id e n c e

. I d. I n t hi s ca s e, H us band as s i gned val ues t o t he i t em s of per s onal p rop ert y t h at he

as s er t ed w er e m ar i t al ; i t em s t hat he consi dere d t o be s epar at e pr op er t y w er e l i s t ed bu t not val ued. W i f e s ub m i t t ed vi r t ual l y no evi dence as t o t he val ue of t he part i es ’ m ar i t al p ro p erty , l eavi ng H usband’s val ues of cl ai m ed m ar i t al pr oper t y unc ont es t ed.

-7- pr oc e e ds fr om the sa le of the se un na me d it e ms o f p ro pe rt y w e re the n to be app lie d to “ the pa rt ie s’ debts as listed on Exhibit 9” exce pt fo r t h e debt associated with the Atkins Street prope rty. The parties’ debts wer e not designate d as ei ther marital or separ ate, nor wer e they a llocated to either party. A c ursory re view of the persona l property at issue, compare d to the s u b s t an t i al debt

a c c umu la te d b y th e pa

rt ie s, le a ds to the ine vit able c on c lus ion that th e pr oc e e ds of a ny sale w ou ld
no t ne arl y pa y of

f the de bt. Th e or de r make s no pr ov isi on fo r thi s po ssi bil ity

. Fin a ll y, th e on ly mention of the Rozelle Street rea l pr operty is the trial c ourt’s obser vation in its oral ruling that it was “not re ally anxious to make a decision on prope rty that subject t o a d i s p u t e in the court without information of what’s going on” in the pending lien litigation.
Without a designation of pr operty a nd debt as e ither marital or separ at e, o r division of property an d debt betwe en the pa rties, it is not poss ible for this Court to evaluate the trial court’s de c isi on in l igh t of

app lic able le ga l st a nd ard s. Se e Ow e ns , 241 S.W.3d at 485-86. 7
More importantly, t he absence of findings and conc lusions on the nature of the property and its allocation leave s t h e p ar t i es without the thing they most need: a dec ision. Certainly the proof proff ere d by the par

ties in this case wa s no model of clarity and completeness. This is often the c ase, for myria d rea sons. Neve rtheless, the trial court in a divorce case must divi de the pa rties’ a ssets and obligations in a manner that re solves their diffe renc es and a llows them to move forwa rd sepa rate ly. This is the court’s privilege and its responsi b i l i t y

. The orde r in this case f ails in that essential function.

There fore , we must rema nd the ca se to the trial court for further proc eedings. On re mand, the trial court should classify the parties’ property a nd the parties’ debts as either marital or se parate. The marital property should be va lued wher e the e vidence p er m i t s s uch valuation. The marital property and debts should then be divided be tween H usband and W ife. On re ma nd , the tria l c ou rt ma y, in i ts d isc re tio n, or de r m ari ta l pr op e rt y s old , e ith e r t o fac ilitate its di vision between the parties or to satisfy marital debt. T.C.A. § 36-4-121(a) (3). Such discretion, howe ver, should be e xerc ised with wisdom. It makes little sense, for example, to order the sale of

items whose value is lar gely sentimental, or whe re the sal e o f t hings such as minor household items would result in negligible p ro cee ds while nec essitating that the parties spe nd

su bs ta nti a l mo nie s to re pla c e the ite ms.
In sum, the trial court’s grant of divorce to Wife a nd the re storation of her former name wa s
no t app e a le d. Th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing that ce rt a in ite ms be lon ge d to Hus ba nd ’s mothe r w a s li ke wi se
no t app e a le d. Th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s a llo c a tio n o f the Atkin s Str e e t pr op e rt y a ndits a sso c ia te d d e bt t o W if e is a ff ir me d. Th e re fu sa l to a wa rd Hu sb a nd a n eq uit able sh are of Ad a ms & As so c ia te s is a lso aff irmed. The r emainder

of the trial c ourt’s orde r i s vacated and the c ase is re manded to the tria l-8-

c ou rt fo r a ny fu rthe r n e c e ssa

ry pr oc e e din gs , a nd fo r fi nd ing s a nd c on c lus ion s in a c c or da nc e wi th this Opinion.

The de cision of the trial court is affirmed in part, vacated in part, a nd rema nded for further proce edings not inconsistent with this Opinion. Costs on appea l are taxed to Appellant Anthony D. Adams, and his sure ty, for which e xecution may issue if ne cessa ry.

___________________________________ HOLLY M. K IRBY, JUDGE