J-S58030-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.F., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.F., NATURAL MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 884 WDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Dated May 16, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): CP-02-AP-067-2019

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 30, 2019

T.F. (Mother) appeals from the order dated May 15, 2019, involuntarily 

terminating her parental rights to her son, D.F. (Child), born in August of 

2017. We affirm. 

On appeal, Mother’s brief provides the following question for our review:

Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of 

law in concluding that termination of [n]atural Mother’s parental 

rights would serve the needs and welfare of the Child, pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)? 

Mother’s brief at 6. 

We review an order terminating parental rights in accordance with the 

following standard:

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating 

parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the 

decision of the trial court is supported by competent evidence. 

Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient 

evidentiary support for the trial court’s decision, the decree must 
J-S58030-19

- 2 -

stand. Where a trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily 

terminate parental rights, this Court must accord the hearing 

judge’s decision the same deference that we would give to a jury 

verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the 

record in order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is 

supported by competent evidence.

In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting In re S.H., 879 

A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005)). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove 

by clear and convincing evidence that its asserted grounds for seeking the 

termination of parental rights are valid. R.N.J., 985 A.2d at 276. Moreover, 

we have explained that:

The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as 

testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

Id. (quoting In re J.L.C. & J.R.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)). 

The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented 

and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts 

in the evidence. In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004). If 

competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if 

the record could also support the opposite result. In re Adoption of T.B.B.,

835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

We have reviewed the certified record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the comprehensive opinion authored by the Honorable 

Cathleen Bubash of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, filed on 

August 1, 2019. We conclude that Judge Bubash’s well-reasoned opinion 
J-S58030-19

- 3 -

properly disposes of the issue raised by Mother. In particular, Judge Bubash 

recognized that no bond existed between Mother and Child in that Child has 

lived with foster parents almost exclusively for nearly his entire life and that 

foster parents are the people that Child has relied upon to fulfill his daily 

needs. The court noted that Mother has not provided any care of Child and 

has not attempted to maintain any contact with Child. The court also relied 

on the testimony of Dr. Patricia Pepe, who performed numerous psychological 

evaluations of Child and foster parents, and concluded that termination of 

Mother’s parental rights and adoption by foster parents would best serve the 

needs and welfare of Child. See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 269 (Pa. 2013) 

(stating that in cases dealing with termination of parental rights, the law 

should be applied “with an eye to the best interests and the needs and welfare 

of the particular children involved”). Thus, we conclude that Judge Bubash’s 

opinion properly disposes of the issue Mother raises in this appeal. 

Accordingly, we adopt Judge Bubash’s opinion as our own and affirm the order 

appealed from on that basis. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/30/2019
Circulated 12/09/2019 03:42 PM

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

ORPHAN'S COURT DIVISION 

INRE: 

D.F., a minor child 

APPEAL OF: 

CHILDREN'S FAST TRACK OPINION 

TPR CP-02-DP-000106� 2019 

CP-02-AP-067-2019 

Sup. Ct. No.: 884 WDA 2019 

T.F., 

Natural Mother 

OPINION 

0 � m 

,-n ·. 

·,.D 

.. -<--f 

n..:: :r:,., 

,;1 (""" U c= .::.: :;; '•i G") 

.·,, ):> ,... -n 

;,-; 3:: . ' 

) 

..- f.,,_ '11:- 

')-< �;-! 

·:>o-· ,:,,,, n1 

,:.:<·::: ::JC 

z

0 

._r,, t..O "-i(l)c, 

-<50 

.,, z·::D 

> 0 ..:::- 

-{,/) 

July 31, 2019 Judge Cathleen Bubash 

On April 4, 2019, the Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families 

("CYF") filed a petition for involuntary termination of the parental rights ("TPR") of the 

natural parents- of D.F, born August 30, 2017 {"Child

11). Appellant, T.F. ("Mother"), is 

Child's natural mother.

1 

At the conclusion of the May 16, 2019 TPR hearing, I found CYF had proven by 

clear and convincing evidence that grounds for termination existed and that it best served 

the needs and welfare of Child. I issued Orders terminating the parental rights of the 

natural parents to the Child. Mother timely appealed and filed her 1925(b) Statement. For 

the reasons set forth below, my Orders should be affirmed. 

1 The first three men named by Mother as Child's natural father were disestablished-by paternity testing. 

The fourth man named by Mother has not been located nor has he stepped forward. 
Statement of Facts 

Child was born August 30th 2017, 5 weeks premature. He was in the hospital's 

NICU until his release on September 8th, 2017. On September 7, 2017, CYF began crisis 

services due to concerns about Mother's mental health. (fR. p. 11). On September Bth, 

the Child was released to the care of the mother and D.H., one of the men alleged to be 

Child's father. On that same day, Child was returned to the hospital after he was attacked 

by Mother within three hours of his release. (TR. p. 39). Mother had attacked Child and 

D.H with a knife, stabbing Child immediately next to his eye. Mother claimed to have 

heard voices which told her to kill the baby and to kill D.H. if he interfered with the killing 

because Child wasra devil baby." Child incurred injury as a result of the incident, which 

has required �umerous treatments and has impacted his vision, likely permanently. (fR. 

p. 20·25, 50). 

Mother was arrested and charged with attempted homicide in relation to this 

incident and a No Contact Order was issued. From September 8 to September 13, 2017, 

Child·was kept in the hospital for treatment of the injury (TR. p. 17), after which he was 

released to CYF and placed in foster care. All told, Child was in Mother's care for less 

than one day and in that day, he was seriously injured at Mother's hand. Child was placed 

in a pre-adoptive foster family on September 13, 2017. He remained with that family at 

the date of hearing. 

Child's maternal aunt, K. F. was not initially considered as a family placement, but 

then had fairly regular visitation with Child and was considered. Due to concerns raised 

by her background, work schedule and psychological evaluation, K.F. was ruled out as a 

placement.2 

On September 28, 2017, CYF filed a dependency petition, (TR. p. 12-13), and 

Child was adjudicated dependent on November 21 2017. Permanency hearings were 

held and, ultimately, the TPR was scheduled for May 16, 2019. 

2 Dr. Pepe evaluated Child with K.F on·July 24, 20�8 and performed a psychological evaluation of K.F. on 

August 2, 2018 and concluded, for reasons which are not relevant to Mother's appeal, that K. F. should 

not be considered for Child's placement and that Child's best interests would be served by remaining with 

his foster parents 

2 
Evidence presented at the May 16th hearing demonstrated that Mother has not 

been able to comply with the goals established for her in Family Plans and ordered. 

Mother has an extensive mental health history. (TR. p. 38). Mother was to get treatment 

for her mental illness as well as resolve her criminal charges. (TR. p. 45-47). Mother was 

arrested for the attempted murder of Child and has had no contact with Child since 

September 8th. {TR. p. 47). Mother is unable to have her No Contact Order lifted, and is 

still incarcerated. Evidence was also presented regarding the seriousness of Child's 

injuries, as well as the close bond Child has with his foster parents. 

I granted CYF's petition and terminated the rights of Child's natural parents. 

Mother filed the instant appeal and averred as follows in her 1925(b) Statement: 

"The trial court abused its discretion and/or erred as a matter of law in concluding 

that termination of Natural Mother's parental rights would serve the needs and 

welfare of the child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. 2511 (b)." 

For the reasons set forth below, my Order to terminate Mother's parental rights to 

the Child serve the needs and welfare of Child and should be affirmed. 

Discussion 

Mother does not contest that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights. 

Instead, she contests only my decision that termination of her parental rights serves the 

best interest of Child under §2511 (b). Because Mother does not contest that grounds 

exist for termination, the reviewing court need only consider whether my decision that 

termination best serves Child's developmental I physical and emotional needs and welfare 

was supported by competent evidence. See In re J.F.M.1 71 A.3d 989 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

CYF sought to terminate Mother's parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S. §2511 (a)(2), 

(5), and (8). The statute provides for the involuntary termination of parental rights if the 

petitioner can establish any one of the following grounds: 

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination. 

(a) General Rule.-·The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a 

.petition filed on any of the following grounds: 

****** 

3 
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity1 abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has 

caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary 

for his physical or mental well�being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent. 

****** 

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a 

voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions 

which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or 

will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or 

assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which 

led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and 

termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. 

****** 

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a 

voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of 

removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child 

continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and wettare 

of the child." 23 Pa.C.S. §2511, /n re Adoption of R.J.S .• 901 A.2d 502, (Pa. Super. 2006) 

Once the statutory grounds for termination have been shown by clear and 

convincing evidence. the Court then looks to the best interest of the Child as provided by 

§2511 (b): 

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give 

primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the 

basis of enVironmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income. 

clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With 

respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1 ), (6) or (8), the court shall 

not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 

23 Pa.C.S. §2511. 

As discussed in In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95 (Pa. Super. 2011 ), the inquiry into whether 

terminating a parent's rights serves the child's needs and welfare necessarily includes 

inquiry into the nature and status of any bond between the parent and child and the effect 

on the child of severing that bond, if it exists. In this case, Mother and Child spent mere 

hours together after release from the hospital and during that short time, Mother severely 

injured Child. Child has been removed from Mother's care for over 20 months at the time 

of hearing and Mother has not seen child since the No Contact Order was issued. At the 

4 
. 

to severe abuse at Mother's hand, Mother had been with her child for less than one day, 

which provides for no time or circumstance for Child to have formed a bond with Mother. 

Conversely, Child has formed a loving, primary attachment to his two foster parents who 

are the only parents he has known. 

In In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273 (Pa.Super. 2009), the Superior Court found it was 

proper to terminate parental rights under §2511 {b) when there was no evidence that there 

was a bond between a child and his natural parent but clear evidence of a bond with preadoptive foster parents. Those same facts regarding bonding present themselves here. 

In d�termining that termination of Mother's parental rights best served the needs 

and welfare of Child in the instant matter, I considered the history of the case presented 

by her caseworkers, and I gave special weight to the findings and recommendations of 

Dr. Patricia Pepe, who completed numerous psychological evaluations in this case, as 

well as interactional observations with Child, including with the foster parents and Child's 

maternal aunt, K.F. 

The CYF caseworker testified that Child had a strong bond with the foster parents, 

whom he calls "Mama and Dada" and that he was happy and active {TR. p. 49-50). In 

her October 01, 2018 evaluation, Dr. Pepe found Child to be thriving in his present 

placement, and primarily attached with his pre-adoptive foster parents. who Dr. Pepe 

found to be "extremely invested" in Child . 

. Importantly, Dr. Pepe found that a "primary attachment" had been formed between 

Child and his foster parents and that Child viewed them as his "primary and psychological 

parents." (Dr. Pepe's report; p. 2, 7). Dr. Pepe found that removing Child from his foster 

parents would put him "at a very high risk for developing Reactive Attachment Disorder." 

(Dr. Pepe's report p. 8). She registered significant concerns regarding placing Child with 

K. F. She concluded that termination of Mother's parental rights and adoption by the foster 

parents was in the best interest of the Child. I agreed, based on both the results of Dr. 

Pepe's evaluations and observations and the evidence presented, that CYF had met its 

burden under §2511 (a)(2)(5) and (8} and that termination of Mother's rights to the Child 

best served his needs and welfare pursuat to §2511 (b). 

Almost two years have passed since this young Child was placed in care. Since 

his removal, Child has thrived in the care of his foster parents, who have been diligent in 

5 
• I 

getting him the medical attention he needs to recover from Mother's attack. Under the 

totality of the circumstances, I found CYF had met their burden for termination and that it 

was in Child's best interest to remain with his foster parents and change the permanency 

goal to that of adoption. 

Viewing the lack of any parent-child bond between Child and Mother, Mother's 

psychological condition, and her inability to care for Child at any time in the near future, I 

determined that termination of her parental rights was not only warranted but is also in 

the best interest of the Child pursuant to §2511 (b). Moreover, Child had a strong bond 

and primary attachment to his foster parents. The severing of that strongly established 

bond would lik_ely cause far reaching negative consequences to Child's psychological and 

emotional _wellbeing and continued development. 

Prior to filing for termination, CYF made reasonable efforts to find the Child's 

biological Father and investigation was also made regarding placing Child in a kinship 

home. The Commonwealth has an interest not only in family reunification but also in each 

child's right to a stable, safe and healthy environment, and the two interests must both be 

considered. In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266 (Pa.Super. 2003). In the instant 

case, the evidence demonstrated that Child is in a healthy, stable environment with foster 

parents who are devoted to him. Remaining with those parents is in his best interest as 

is terminating the parental rights of his Mother, with whom he has no bond whatsoever. 

Conclusion 

After a careful review of the evidence; I found that termination of Mother's parental 

rights best serves the needs and welfare of Child pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S.A. §2511 (b) and 

that. Accordingly, my Orders should be affirmed. 

Date: 7 /J I / I 9 I .�/ I 

e