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FILED

OCT 3 2013

SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK

U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: ) BAP No. NC-12-1263-JuPaD

)

JACK KLEIN, ) Bk. No. NC-11-31873-TEC

)

Debtor. ) Adv. No. NC-11-3171-TEC

______________________________)

DOUGLAS CARAWAY, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) M E M O R A N D U M*

)

JACK KLEIN, )

)

Appellee. )

______________________________)

Argued and Submitted on September 20, 2013

at San Francisco, California

Filed - October 3, 2013

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Northern District of California

Honorable Thomas E. Carlson, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding _______________________

Appearances: Joseph Bochner, Esq. argued for appellant Douglas

Caraway; Howard L. Hibbard, Esq., argued for

appellee Jack Klein _________________________

Before: JURY, PAPPAS, and DUNN, Bankruptcy Judges.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication.

Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may

have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value. 

See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8013-1.

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Appellant, Douglas Caraway, appeals from the bankruptcy

court’s judgment in an adversary proceeding in favor of

chapter 71

 debtor, Jack Klein. 

In granting judgment on the pleadings for debtor, the

bankruptcy court found that Caraway’s state court judgment debt

against debtor was dischargeable on the grounds that (1) Caraway

had assigned his judgment debt to Sandra Williams dba Capital

Judgment Recovery (Williams) prepetition and thus Williams was

the real party in interest under Civil Rule 17(a); and

(2) Caraway’s complaint failed to state a claim against debtor

as a matter of law due to Williams’ postpetition filing of an

acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment (SOJ) in the state

court. The court also found that Williams did not violate the

automatic stay by filing the SOJ postpetition and dismissed

Caraway’s claims against Williams without prejudice for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. We AFFIRM. 

I. FACTS

A. The State Court Judgment

In March 1993, Caraway, dba as Caraway Audio, entered into

an agreement with George Silva, Prompt Rewire and debtor to

supply and install a public address system in and around the San

Mateo County Exposition Center. Caraway was not paid and in

September 1993, Caraway filed a complaint in the Superior Court

of California, San Mateo County, against Silva, Prompt Rewire,

1

 Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter and section

references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532. 

“Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy

Procedure and “Civil Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.

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debtor and the County of San Mateo alleging causes of action for

breach of contract and fraud.

Debtor answered the complaint, asserting as an affirmative

defense, among others, that he was not a party to the contract. 

Debtor also filed a cross-complaint against Silva, Prompt Rewire

and the County of San Mateo seeking indemnification and

apportionment of fault. 

At some point, Caraway settled with Silva, Prompt Rewire

and the County of San Mateo. 

On December 1, 1997, the state court held a bench trial. 

Debtor did not appear. After hearing testimony, the state court

found for Caraway, awarding him $23,259 in damages, which

included principal of $18,125 and interest, $5,000 in punitive

damages and $9,960 in attorneys’ fees. 

On April 14, 1998, the state court entered a default

judgment against debtor. The judgment was renewed.2

B. The Assignment of the State Court Judgment

On January 11, 2010, Caraway entered into an Assignment and

Acceptance Agreement with Williams. The assignment shows, among

other things, that it was an “absolute assignment” of the full

amount of the judgment which at that time was $75,308.33, and

that Williams was to pay fifty percent of the net revenue

collected to Caraway after paying costs for collection. In

addition, Caraway as the assignor acknowledged that as of the

date the assignment was executed, “[a]ssignee has the exclusive

2

 Under California law, the judgment is enforceable for a

period of 10 years, and longer if renewed. See Cal. Code Civ.

Proc. §§ 683.020, 683.120(b).

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right to satisfy, settle, compromise and collect the judgment at

[a]ssignee’s sole discretion.” 

C. The Bankruptcy Proceedings

On May 13, 2011, debtor filed a chapter 13 petition.3

 

On August 22, 2011, Caraway filed the instant adversary

proceeding against debtor seeking to have the state court

judgment debt declared nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2).

On October 22, 2011, debtor filed a motion for summary

judgment (MSJ) on the ground that Caraway had assigned all

right, title and interest in the underlying judgment to Williams

and, as a result, Caraway lacked standing to assert the action. 

On December 8, 2011, Caraway filed an opposition to

debtor’s motion, asserting that he retained a beneficial

interest in the judgment because Williams was required to pay

him fifty percent of the net recovery if, and only if, she

collected on the judgment. Caraway further maintained that the

sole purpose of the assignment was to permit a third-party,

non-lawyer — Williams — to collect the judgment for Caraway’s

benefit in return for a contingency fee, which arrangement was

illegal. 

On the same date, Caraway filed a declaration attaching the

pleadings from the state court lawsuit and an unsigned copy of

the assignment. Caraway declared Williams never gave him any

3 On February 13, 2012, on the motion of the chapter 13

trustee, the bankruptcy court converted debtor’s case to one

under chapter 7 because his unsecured debt, which included the

state court judgment debt at issue in this appeal, exceeded the

statutory limit under § 109(e). Therefore, he did not qualify

for relief under chapter 13.

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monies in return for the assignment. 

On December 22, 2011, the bankruptcy court entered a

Tentative Ruling on the MSJ. The court ruled that at most

debtor’s motion would determine that Caraway was not the

plaintiff real party in interest. Relying on Civil

Rule 17(a)(3),4 incorporated by Rule 7017, the bankruptcy court

gave Caraway time to obtain Williams’ ratification, joinder, or

substitution. 

On January 6, 2012, the bankruptcy court entered an order

denying debtor’s MSJ and giving Caraway forty-five days to

obtain Williams’ ratification, joinder or substitution. The

court’s order further stated that, if Caraway failed to comply

fully and timely with the court’s order, the court may dismiss

the proceeding without further notice or hearing. The record

shows that Caraway never obtained Williams’ ratification,

joinder or substitution in the adversary proceeding.

On January 14, 2012, debtor filed a Notice of Filing of

Satisfaction of Judgment. Attached as Exhibit “A” was a

certified copy of the SOJ signed by Williams and filed in the

San Mateo County Superior Court on January 13, 2012. 

4

 Civil Rule 17(a)(3) entitled Joinder of the Real Party in

Interest provides:

The court may not dismiss an action for failure to

prosecute in the name of the real party in interest

until, after an objection, a reasonable time has been

allowed for the real party in interest to ratify, join,

or be substituted into the action. After ratification,

joinder, or substitution, the action proceeds as if it

had been originally commenced by the real party in

interest.

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On February 15, 2012, Caraway filed his first amended

complaint joining Williams not as a plaintiff, but as a

defendant. Caraway alleged generally that Williams took a

contingency fee in return for her collection efforts under the

assignment, but that she was not a member of the California

State Bar. Caraway then alleged claims for relief against

Williams for fraud and deceit, constructive fraud, and unfair

business practices. He also sought injunctive relief against

her under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act based on consumer

fraud. Finally, in his prayer for relief, Caraway requested the

imposition of a constructive trust upon Williams and an order

commanding Williams to relinquish her purported interest in his

judgment. 

On February 22, 2012, debtor filed an answer to Caraway’s 

FAC. Debtor asserted Caraway filed the FAC without leave from

the bankruptcy court and also sought to join Williams, a third

party, which was unnecessary when the judgment debt had been

satisfied. 

On March 5, 2012, the bankruptcy court held a hearing, the

transcript of which is not included in the record. At that

hearing, Caraway evidently acknowledged that he had executed an

assignment of the state court judgment to Williams. 

 On March 9, 2012, the bankruptcy court entered an Order to

Show Cause re Judgment on the Pleadings for Defendant (OSC). 

Based on Caraway’s admission regarding the assignment and the

SOJ signed by Williams and filed in the state court, the court

required Caraway to file a brief by April 2, 2012, showing cause

why the court should not enter judgment on the pleadings for

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debtor. The court stated that if Caraway did not timely comply,

it may, without further notice or hearing, enter judgment for

debtor. 

On April 2, 2012, Caraway’s counsel filed a request for a

seventy-two-hour extension to respond. 

On April 13, 2012, Caraway filed his response to the OSC

seeking to have the bankruptcy court issue an order commanding

Williams to appear. Caraway argued that he retained an

equitable interest in the judgment because the assignment was

merely one for collection, that the filing of the purported SOJ

in the underlying action violated the automatic stay, and that

Williams had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. 

On April 16, 2012, the bankruptcy court entered its

Memorandum Decision and Order. The court denied Caraway’s

request for an extension of time to respond to the OSC. The

court found that upon its review of the assignment, Caraway had

assigned all rights, title, and interest in the state court

judgment to Williams and that Williams had full authority to

recover, compromise, settle, and enforce the state court

judgment. The bankruptcy court further found that although

Caraway was given the opportunity to present evidence

controverting the absolute assignment or SOJ, he did not do so. 

Finally, the court decided that the filing of the SOJ by

Williams was not an action taken against debtor in violation of

§ 362. 

On April 18, 2012, the bankruptcy court entered judgment

for debtor and dismissed all claims against Williams without

prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or in the

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alternative, permissive abstention under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1). 

On April 27, 2012, Caraway filed a timely notice of appeal. 

 II. JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over this proceeding

under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(I). We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 158. 

III. ISSUES 

A. Whether the bankruptcy court erred in granting

judgment on the pleadings in favor of debtor based on the

assignment and SOJ; 

B. Whether the bankruptcy court erred in finding that

Williams’ filing of the SOJ in the state court did not violate

the automatic stay under § 362; and 

C. Whether the bankruptcy court erred in dismissing

Caraway’s claims against Williams for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

IV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review de novo (1) judgments on the pleadings granted

under Civil Rule 12(c); (2) the bankruptcy court’s decision on

the applicability of the automatic stay under § 362; and (3) the

bankruptcy court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Lyon v. Chase

Bank USA, N.A., 656 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2011) (judgments on the

pleadings); McCarthy, Johnson & Miller v. N. Bay Plumbing, Inc.

(In re Pettit), 217 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000) (scope or

applicability of the automatic stay under § 362 is a question of

law); Battle Ground Plaza, LLC v. Ray (In re Ray), 624 F.3d

1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 2010) (subject matter jurisdiction). 

De novo review is independent, with no deference given to

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the trial court’s conclusion. See First Ave. W. Bldg., LLC v.

James (In re Onecast Media, Inc.), 439 F.3d 558, 561 (9th Cir.

2006).

V. DISCUSSION

A. The Bankruptcy Court Did Not Err in Granting Judgment on 

the Pleadings for Debtor

A bankruptcy court may sua sponte dismiss claims by

granting judgment on the pleadings. See Jackson v. E. Bay

Hosp., 980 F.Supp. 1341, 1358 (N.D. Cal. 1997). The court must

give notice of its sua sponte intention to dismiss the claims

and afford plaintiffs “an opportunity to at least submit a

written memorandum in opposition to such motion.” Wong v. Bell,

642 F.2d 359, 361-62 (9th Cir. 1981). Here, the bankruptcy

court complied with this procedure. Caraway had notice and was

given the opportunity to file a brief in response to the

bankruptcy court’s OSC re judgment on the pleadings. Indeed,

Caraway submitted a brief in response to the OSC, albeit an

untimely one.5

“Judgment on the pleadings is proper when, taking all

allegations in the pleadings as true and construed in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party, the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Living Designs, Inc.

v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 431 F.3d 353, 360 (9th Cir.

2005). In other words, a motion for judgment on the pleadings

is evaluated under the same standards as a motion to dismiss for

5 Although Caraway’s brief was late, the record shows that

the bankruptcy court did not dismiss his claims on this ground.

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failure to state a claim under Civil Rule 12(b)(6), and

dismissal pursuant to Civil Rule 12(c) is inappropriate if the

facts as pled would entitle the plaintiff to a remedy. Merchs.

Home Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Hall & Co., 50 F.3d 1486, 1488 (9th

Cir. 1995). 

In ruling on a motion for a judgment on the pleadings, the

bankruptcy court need not accept as true unreasonable inferences

or conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual

allegations. See W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624

(9th Cir. 1981). In addition, the court does not have to accept

as true conclusory allegations that contradict facts that may be

judicially noticed or that are contradicted by documents

referred to in the complaint. See, e.g., Steckman v. Hart

Brewing Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295–96 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The bankruptcy court may dispose of a case under Civil

Rule 12 by reference to documents “whose contents are alleged in

a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions” without

treating the motion as one for summary judgment. Parrino v.

FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 705-06 (9th Cir. 1998). Caraway

referenced the assignment in his FAC and no party has questioned

its authenticity. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court properly

considered the content of the assignment when ruling. 

Finally, when considering a motion for judgment on the

pleadings, the bankruptcy court “may consider facts that ‘are

contained in materials of which the court may take judicial

notice.’” Heliotrope Gen., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.3d

971, 981 n.18 (9th Cir. 1999); see also MGIC Indem. Corp. v.

Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986) (court may take

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judicial notice of “matters of public record” without converting

a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment). 

Accordingly, the bankruptcy court could take judicial notice of

the SOJ because it was a matter of public record. Mack v.

S. Bay Beer Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986).

We apply these legal standards to the facts of this case. 

Analysis 

Civil Rule 17(a)(1) provides, in relevant part, that “[a]n

action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in

interest.” “‘This rule requires that the party who brings an

action actually possess, under the substantive law, the right

sought to be enforced. Such a requirement is in place ‘to

protect the defendant against a subsequent action by the party

actually entitled to recover, and to insure generally that the

judgment will have its proper effect as res judicata.’” Sung Ho

Cha v. Rappaport (In re Sung Ho Cha), 483 B.R. 547, 551 (9th

Cir. BAP 2012).

In Carter v. Brooms (In re Brooms), 447 B.R. 258 (9th Cir.

BAP 2011), the Panel considered the application of the real

party in interest rule to assignments. Unlike here, in Brooms,

the assignee of the judgment sought to have the prepetition

judgment debt declared nondischargeable. Concerned that the

assignee was not the real party in interest, the bankruptcy

court required the assignee to produce evidence regarding the

assignment. After assignee failed to produce the evidence, the

bankruptcy court entered judgment in favor of debtor.

“‘In an action involving an assignment, a court must ensure

that the plaintiff-[assignor] is the real party in interest with

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regard to the particular claim involved by determining: (1) what

has been assigned; and (2) whether a valid assignment has been

made.’” Id. at 265 (quoting 6A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.

Miller, Mary Kay Kane & Richard L. Marcus, Fed. Practice and

Proc. § 1545 (3d ed. 2010)). The Panel noted:

Under California law,6

 a judgment creditor may assign

a judgment to a third person. Cal. Civ. Code § 954. 

‘In doing so, the judgment creditor assigns the debt

upon which the judgment is based. . . . Through such

an assignment, the assignee ordinarily acquires all

the rights and remedies possessed by the assignor for

the enforcement of the debt, subject, however, to the

defenses that the judgment debtor had against the

assignor.’ Great W. Bank v. Kong, 90 Cal.App.4th 28,

108 Cal.Rptr.2d 266, 268 (2001) (internal citations

omitted). An assignment carries the legal title to

the judgment; ‘the transfer of the title does not

depend upon the fact of there being a valuable

consideration.’ Curtin v. Kowalsky, 145 Cal. 431,

78 P. 962, 963 (1904). 

Furthermore, under federal law, assignees of claims

generally have standing to prosecute objections to the

dischargeability of particular debts. Boyajian v. New

Falls Corp. (In re Boyajian), 564 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th

Cir.2009). And for collection purposes, the assignee

who holds legal title to the debt according to

substantive law is the real party in interest, even

though the assignee must account to the assignor for

whatever is recovered in the action. Sprint Commc’ns

Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 284–85

(2008).

In re Brooms, 447 B.R. at 265. 

Furthermore, under California law, “[i]n determining what

rights or interests pass under an assignment, the intention of

the parties as manifested in the instrument is controlling.” 

Nat’l Reserve Co. of Am. v. Metro. Trust Co. of Cal., 17 Cal.2d

827, 832 (Cal. 1941); Cambridge Co. v. City of Elsinore,

6 The assignment states that it is governed and construed in

accordance with California law.

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57 Cal.App. 245, 249 (Cal. 1922) (“As with contracts generally,

the nature of an assignment is determined by ascertaining the

intent of the parties.”). 

On appeal, Caraway asserts that the bankruptcy court erred

in entering judgment for debtor because the assignment was

partial, not absolute. According to Caraway, the assignment was

only for collection, and since he was entitled to fifty percent

of any recovery, he retained an equitable interest in the

judgment and thus qualified as a real party in interest. There

is authority for the proposition that where there has been only

a partial assignment, as in an assignment for collection, both

the assignor and the assignee have an interest in the claim and

both are real parties in interest. In re Hooker Inves., Inc.,

116 B.R. 375, 382 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“[I]n the case of a

partial assignment, the assignee owns the part assigned to him,

the assignor the balance; each is a real party in interest as to

his part of the claim.”) (citing 3 Williston on Contracts § 443

n.14 (3d ed. 1960)); see also 6A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.

Miller, Mary Kay Kane & Richard L. Marcus, Fed. Practice and

Proc. § 1545 (3d ed. 2013) (“[W]hen there has been only a

partial assignment the assignor and the assignee each retain an

interest in the claim and are both real parties in interest. . .

in an action involving an assignment for collection, . . . the

assignor retains a sufficient interest in the property to be a

real party in interest, and under Rule 17(a) either party may

sue to protect those rights.”).

However, the plain terms of the assignment show that

Caraway gave up his right to enforce the judgment when he

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acknowledged that Williams held the exclusive right to satisfy,

settle, compromise and collect the judgment at her sole

discretion. Such an assignment of rights is valid under

California law. Cal. Civ. Code § 954. Additionally,

In re Brooms holds that under California and federal law,

Williams became a real party in interest whether or not Caraway

retained an interest in any potential recovery. 447 B.R. at

265. That Williams agreed to split with Caraway any recovery

she obtained does not undermine the assignment’s effect to

vesting legal title of the judgment in Williams. See Nat’l

Reserve Co., 17 Cal.2d at 831. For these reasons, Williams was

the real party in interest under Civil Rule 17(a).

Unable to obtain Williams’ joinder or ratification under

Civil Rule 17(a)(3), Caraway sought her involuntary joinder in 

the FAC and requested the bankruptcy court to compel her

appearance. While Civil Rule 17(a) governs only the right of

Caraway to bring the suit, Civil Rule 19 tells us whether the

appropriate parties are before the court. U-Haul Int’l v.

Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 1986). Civil

Rule 19 provides in relevant part: 

(a) Persons Required to Be Joined if Feasible.

(1) Required Party. A person who is subject to

service of process and whose joinder will not deprive

the court of subject-matter jurisdiction must be

joined as a party if: 

(A) in that person’s absence, the court

cannot accord complete relief among existing

parties; or 

(B) that person claims an interest relating

to the subject of the action and is so

situated that disposing of the action in the

person’s absence may: 

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(i) as a practical matter impair

or impede the person’s ability to

protect the interest; or 

(ii) leave an existing party

subject to a substantial risk of

incurring double, multiple, or

otherwise inconsistent obligations

because of the interest. 

(2) Joinder by Court Order. If a person has not been

joined as required, the court must order that the

person be made a party. A person who refuses to join

as a plaintiff may be made either a defendant or, in a

proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. 

By its terms, Civil Rule 19 limits the power of plaintiffs

to determine who shall be parties in lawsuits they institute. 

U-Haul, 793 F.2d at 1039. It does so in order to serve three

sets of interests: “‘(1) the interests of the present

defendant; (2) the interests of the potential but absent

plaintiffs and defendants; and (3) the social interest in the

orderly, expeditious administration of judgment.’ In keeping

with these ends, both [Civil] Rules 17(a) and 19 have been

construed so as to further the fair and prompt disposition of

litigation.” Id. 

In this case, the assignment shows that Williams possessed

the sole right to enforce the judgment against debtor and she

exercised that right postpetition by filing the SOJ in the state

court. By doing so, Williams no longer claimed an interest in

the action. As a result, any concern that debtor would face the

risk of incurring double or otherwise inconsistent obligations

was alleviated. Accordingly, as debtor argued in the bankruptcy

court, it was unnecessary to join Williams in the adversary

proceeding after she filed the SOJ.

In sum, taken together, the assignment and the filing of

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the SOJ effectively determined that under the facts alleged in

his FAC, Caraway failed to state a claim against debtor for

which relief could be granted. Caraway had the opportunity to

present controverting evidence regarding the assignment and SOJ

but did not do so. As a result, the bankruptcy court properly

granted judgment on the pleadings for debtor.

B. The Bankruptcy Court Properly Found That Williams’ 

Filing of the SOJ Did Not Violate the Automatic Stay

Caraway contends that the bankruptcy court erred when it

found that Williams’ filing of the SOJ did not violate 

§ 362(a)(1). Generally, actions taken in violation of the

automatic stay are void. Schwartz v. United States

(In re Schwartz), 954 F.2d 569, 571–72 (9th Cir. 1992).

 In support of his argument that a stay violation occurred,

Caraway relies heavily on Dean v. Trans World Airlines, 72 F.3d

754 (9th Cir. 1995). Dean addressed the issue of whether the

postpetition dismissal of a lawsuit filed prepetition by an

airline pilot (Dean) against the debtor/defendant (TWA) violated

the automatic stay. 72 F.3d at 755. The court held that

“post-filing dismissal in favor of the bankrupt of an action

that falls within the purview of the automatic stay violates the

stay where the decision to dismiss first requires the court to

consider other issues presented by or related to the underlying

case.” Id. at 756. Because the dismissal of Dean’s action

against TWA required the court to decide whether the

law-of-the-case precluded finding TWA liable to Dean, the court

found that the dismissal violated the automatic stay.

Dean does not provide support for Caraway’s assertion that

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Williams’ conduct violated the automatic stay in this case. 

While the scope of the automatic stay is broad, Williams’ filing

of the SOJ did not require the court to consider issues

presented by or related to the underlying bankruptcy case. 

Rather, the issues Caraway raised regarding the validity of the

assignment and SOJ were between Williams and Caraway — two

nondebtor parties. 

Moreover, the plain terms of § 362(a)(1) do not apply to

these facts. Under § 362(a)(1), the filing of debtor’s petition

operated as a stay of the “continuation . . . of a judicial

. . . or other action or proceeding against the debtor . . . .” 

The filing of the SOJ did not constitute a “continuation” of a

judicial or other action or proceeding against the debtor. It

officially recognized the conclusion of the state court

proceeding based on satisfaction of the judgment against the

debtor. See In re Pettit, 217 F.3d at 1080. 

Further, the filing of the SOJ conceivably falls under the

Ministerial Act exception to the automatic bankruptcy stay which

has been recognized by the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 1076

(adopting the Ministerial Act exception to the automatic stay). 

“Ministerial acts or automatic occurrences that entail no

deliberation, discretion, or judicial involvement do not

constitute continuations of such a proceeding.” Id. Williams’

filing of the SOJ is similar to the entry of judgment by a court

clerk. See Rexnord Holdings, Inc. v. Bidermann, 21 F.3d 522,

527 (2nd Cir. 1994) (finding an act of entry of judgment by

court clerk was ministerial act that did not violate the stay). 

Neither act entails deliberation, discretion, or judicial

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involvement. Therefore, the bankruptcy court properly found

that Williams’ filing of the SOJ was not a violation of the

automatic stay.

C. The Bankruptcy Court Did Not Err By Dismissing Caraway’s 

Claims Against Williams

 Finally, Caraway makes vague assertions regarding the

prejudice he will suffer if Williams is not joined in the

adversary proceeding and he is not allowed to proceed in the

bankruptcy court. Caraway attacks the validity of the

assignment itself, alleging that it was illegal. In this

regard, Caraway contends that Williams’ business is collecting

judgments in return for a contingency fee which is a sham or

which constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. Caraway

fills an entire page of his opening brief with citations to

cases from across the country to support his position that he

has been the victim of a species of fraud that is widespread. 

However, these arguments have little relevance to Civil

Rules 17(a) and 19 which apply to the joinder of parties. Here, 

the bankruptcy court dismissed Caraway’s claims against Williams

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or in the alternative

permissive abstention, but nowhere does Caraway argue on appeal 

why the bankruptcy court’s dismissal of Caraway’s claims against

Williams was in error for either of these reasons. Accordingly,

Caraway has waived those arguments on appeal. Wake v. Sedona

Inst. (In re Sedona Inst.), 220 B.R. 74, 76 (9th Cir. BAP 1998).

Even if we were to consider the bankruptcy court’s decision

to dismiss Caraway’s claims against Williams for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, we summarily conclude that such dismissal

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was proper. Caraway’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty,

fraud and the unauthorized practice of law against Williams all

arose under California state law, independent of and prior to

debtor’s bankruptcy filing.7

 These state law claims between two

nondebtor parties could have existed entirely apart from

debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding and did not depend upon

resolution of a substantial question of bankruptcy law.8 See

generally In re Ray, 624 F.3d at 1124. Therefore, the

bankruptcy court properly dismissed these claims and was

compelled to do so under Ray for lack of jurisdiction.9 As the

dismissal was without prejudice, Caraway may proceed against

7 Although bankruptcy courts “enjoy broad discretion to

determine who shall practice before them and to monitor the

conduct of those who do,” In re Brooms, 447 B.R. at 267, Williams

never appeared in the bankruptcy court.

8

 Contrary to Caraway’s assertion at oral argument, the

bankruptcy court was not called upon to decide which creditor had

the right to assert a competing claim against a bankruptcy

estate. No bankruptcy estate issues, such as allowance of

claims, were presented in the nondischargeability action against

debtor.

9

 In the alternative, the bankruptcy court relied upon the

doctrine of permissive abstention under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) to

dismiss the claims. Abstention can exist only where there is a

parallel proceeding in state court. Christensen v. Tucson

Estates, Inc. (In re Tucson Estates), 912 F.2d 1162, 1167 (9th

Cir. 1990) (recognizing as a factor for permissive abstention the

presence of a related proceeding commenced in state court or

other nonbankruptcy court). The abstention provision is

inapplicable to this case because there was no parallel state

court proceeding. However, since this was an alternative ground

for dismissal, the court’s reliance on permissive abstention was

harmless error. See Rule 9005 (“Harmless Error”) (Civil Rule 61

provides: “At every stage of the proceeding, the court must

disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party's

substantial rights.”).

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Williams in the state court. 

 VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we AFFIRM.

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