In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 00-2959

Vickie R. Chapman,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Howard Keltner, Yoshida Williams 

and DuPage County, an Illinois municipal

corporation,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern

Division.

No. 98 C 6295--Joan B. Gottschall, Judge.

Argued January 26, 2001--Decided February 21,

2001

 Before Bauer, Manion, and Rovner, Circuit

Judges.

 Bauer, Circuit Judge. On October 8,

1997, DuPage County Deputy Sheriffs

Howard Keltner and Yoshida Williams

arrested Vickie Chapman, who was dressed

in a fuchsia bathrobe and slippers,

pursuant to a warrant upon her discharge

from Good Samaritan Hospital in Downers

Grove, Illinois. Chapman had been

hospitalized for about five days,

recovering from bowel resection surgery,

which entailed making a nine-inch

incision across her lower abdomen and

pelvic area. Prior to her discharge, Dr.

Bruce Dillon gave her instructions.

During this conversation, Chapman asked

if she could take the two stairs leading

to the front door of her house. She says

that Dr. Dillon okayed it so long as she

took them "one at a time." Dr. Dillon

does not specifically recall giving

Chapman this instruction, but says that

he probably would have. The only

instruction written on the discharge

record, however, was "no heavy lifting."
 Once inside the hospital, Keltner and

Williams showed the nurse the arrest

warrant. The nurse asked about the

conditions at the jail infirmary, and

called the infirmary nurse to inquire

further. The nurse then told the officers

that Chapman could be taken to jail

without any problems. Chapman was

arrested and handcuffed with her hands in

front of her body. Keltner and Williams

escorted her to a van, one of the types

of vehicles authorized by the DuPage

County Sheriff’s Office, along with squad

cars, to transport prisoners. As the van

door was opened, Chapman refused to get

in because her incision might rip open

and said, "the step is too high, the

doctor told me not to take stairs except

one at a time." Keltner told her that she

had to go to jail in the van. Chapman

asked if she could slide into the van

backwards and sit on the floor. Keltner

said no because she had to sit in the

seat. Keltner decided that he and

Williams would assist Chapman into the

van, with one on each side for support.

As Chapman stepped up, the incision

opened and began to bleed. During the

drive to jail, Chapman cried and

trembled, and although Keltner commented

on her crying, Chapman did not reveal

what had happened. Upon arriving at the

jail, the officers similarly assisted her

out of the van. Chapman was processed and

attended court. Her husband posted the

bond deposit. Chapman left jail with her

husband and headed to the emergency room

at Hinsdale Hospital. Her incision had

separated one centimeter and, according

to her expert, caused a hernia.

 Chapman filed a three-count complaint.

Count One, brought under 42 U.S.C. sec.

1983, claimed a Fourteenth Amendment

violation in that the officers were

deliberately indifferent to her serious

medical needs. Count Two, also arising

under sec. 1983, stated a Fourth

Amendment violation in that the officers

used excessive force during her arrest.

Count Three stated, in pertinent part, a

claim against the officers for willful

and wanton conduct under Illinois law.

Keltner and Williams moved for summary

judgment, which was granted in their

favor on all three counts. In so

granting, the district court determined

that Chapman’s allegations were "not

fully supported by the evidence obtained

through discovery." Chapman appealed. 
 We review a grant of summary judgment de

novo, construing all facts and drawing

all reasonable inferences from the record

in the light most favorable to the

nonmovant. Summary judgment is proper

when the record reveals no genuine issue

of material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The meat

of Chapman’s appeal is that by requiring

her to step up into the van, which was

more than twice as high as an ordinary

stair, after she told the officers that

the step was too high and that her doctor

instructed her not to take stairs except

one at a time, the officers (1) were

deliberately indifferent to her serious

medical needs by intentionally

interfering with her prescribed

treatment, (2) used excessive force

during her arrest, and (3) were willful

and wanton by showing a conscious

disregard for or an utter indifference to

her safety. We affirm the district

court’s decision as to each claim.

I. Count I: Fourteenth Amendment--

Deliberate Indifference

 The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners

from deliberate indifference to a serious

injury or medical need. See Zentmyer v.

Kendall County, 220 F.3d 805, 810 (7th

Cir. 2000) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,

429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). This protection

is extended to arrested persons and

pretrial detainees under the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See

id. To prevail the detainee must satisfy

an objective and a subjective element,

namely that: (1) an objectively serious

injury or medical need was deprived; and

(2) the official knew that the risk of

injury was substantial but nevertheless

failed to take reasonable measures to

prevent it. See Henderson v. Sheahan, 196

F.3d 839, 845 (7th Cir. 1999). Under the

first prong, an objectively serious

injury or medical need is "’one that has

been diagnosed by a physician as

mandating treatment or one that is so

obvious that even a lay person would

easily recognize the necessity for a

doctor’s attention.’" Zentmyer, 220 F.3d

at 810 (quoting Gutierrez v. Peters, 111

F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997)). The

parties do not dispute that Chapman’s

condition was serious. Under the second

prong, it must be shown "that the
official was aware of the risk and

consciously disregarded it nonetheless."

Mathis v. Fairman, 120 F.3d 88, 91 (7th

Cir. 1997) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 840-42 (1994)). Neither

negligence nor even gross negligence is a

sufficient basis for liability; rather,

liability attaches only if the conduct is

intentional or criminally reckless. See

Salazar v. City of Chicago, 940 F.2d 233,

238 (7th Cir. 1991). Deliberate

indifference can arise by a failure to

provide prompt treatment for serious

medical needs or by intentionally

interfering with treatment once

prescribed. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-

05.

 Chapman relies on Martin v. Board of

County Comm’rs, 909 F.2d 402 (10th Cir.

1990) to argue that the officers were

deliberately indifferent by intentionally

interfering with treatment prescribed by

her doctor. Chapman contends that her

doctor proscribed her from taking stairs,

that she told the officers of this

proscription, and that they interfered

with it by assisting her in doing exactly

what her doctor proscribed her from

doing. There is no evidence, however,

that the doctor totally prohibited

Chapman from taking stairs. As the

district court noted, the evidence

suggests "at most, that her physician

told her to avoid stairs in general, and

to climb stairs one at a time." Indeed,

Chapman’s own deposition testimony is

that the doctor told her that if she took

stairs to take them "one at a time."

Also, the written discharge record only

forbade "heavy lifting," not stair

climbing. The record, therefore, reflects

that the doctor’s "prescribed treatment"

was not to avoid stairs altogether. Based

on the record evidence, we cannot

conclude that the officers deliberately

disregarded the doctor’s prescribed

treatment for Chapman by assisting her in

stepping into the van.

 Further, even if the doctor had totally

prohibited Chapman from stair climbing,

there is no evidence that the officers

were aware of this blanket ban. True,

Chapman told the police of her doctor’s

orders when she said, "the step is too

high, the doctor told me not to take the

stairs except one at a time." However,

this statement did not convey to the

officers that she had to avoid steps
altogether. The district court correctly

reasoned:

The difference between the allegations in

Chapman’s complaint and the actual

evidence is critical on this point. If

defendants were informed that a physician

instructed Chapman not to climb any

stairs, that is a far different matter

than if they were informed that a

physician told Chapman to take stairs one

at a time. Requiring Chapman to climb

into the van represents a clear disregard

of the former, but only a potentially

negligent interpretation of the latter.

If defendants knew that Chapman was

permitted to climb stairs under limited

circumstances, they may have believed

that assisting her into the van would be

permissible under the physician’s

instructions.

The officers heeded the doctor’s

directive, precisely as Chapman told

them, by requiring Chapman to take only

one step. Chapman though makes much of

the fact that the step into the van was

twice the height of an ordinary stair,

arguing that the officers disregarded her

doctor’s orders by making her essentially

take two steps. This is of no matter

since the officers heeded Chapman’s

protestation that the step was too high

in assisting her into the van by support

ing her weight on each side.

 We agree with the district court that

the officers requiring Chapman to step up

so high, even with their assistance, may

well constitute some form of negligence,

but it does not constitute deliberate

indifference. If the officers were aware

that Chapman was prohibited from climbing

all stairs, disregarded this and required

her to step into the van, then perhaps

the officers’ conduct would constitute

deliberate indifference. See Zentmyer,

220 F.3d at 812 ("If a defendant

consciously chose to disregard a nurse or

doctor’s directions in the face of

medical risks, then he may well have

exhibited the necessary deliberate

indifference."). However, this was not

the case here because the officers did

not consciously disregard the doctor’s

order.

 The district court also found that the

officers were not deliberately

indifferent because there is no evidence
that the officers knew or reasonably

should have known that Chapman’s incision

had opened. Chapman did not tell the

officers and there was no evidence that

the officers saw any blood. The court

reasoned that the officers could have

reasonably believed that her sobbing and

shaking were "natural responses to being

placed under arrest," and not a sign that

she needed medical attention. On appeal

Chapman does not raise the question of

whether the officers were deliberately

indifferent after her incision had

opened; rather, she focuses solely on the

officers requiring her to step into the

van. Since her appellate brief does not

argue that the officers’ failure to get

her medical attention violated the

Fourteenth Amendment, we do not address

the issue.

II. Count II: Fourth Amendment--Excessive

Force

 The Fourth Amendment protects citizens

against the use of excessive force during

an arrest. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

386, 388 (1989). A seizure occurs if a

government actor "’by means of physical

force or show of authority, . . . in some

way restrain[s] the liberty of a citizen.’"

Id. at 395 n.10 (quoting Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)). Whether

excessive force was used is evaluated

under the "objective reasonableness"

standard, under which courts assess

whether the actor’s actions were

objectively reasonable "’in light of the

facts and circumstances confronting them,

without regard to their underlying intent

or motivation.’" Id. at 397. We agree

that the officers did not use excessive

force in arresting Chapman. As explained,

Chapman told the officers that the doctor

said she could only take stairs one at a

time, and the officers did not contravene

this order. Knowing just this

information, it was reasonable for the

officers to believe that assisting

Chapman into the van would not violate

the doctor’s order. In light of the facts

and circumstances, the officers were not

objectively unreasonable when they

required Chapman to step into the van and

assisted her in doing so.

III. Count III: Illinois Law--Willful and

Wanton Conduct

 Conduct is willful and wanton under
Illinois law if it constitutes "a course

of action which shows an actual or

deliberate intention to cause harm or

which, if not intentional, shows an utter

indifference to or conscious disregard

for the safety of others or their

property." 745 ILCS 10/1-210. Illinois

recognizes that negligence and willful

and wanton conduct are different, see

Burke v. 12 Rothschild’s Liquor Mart,

Inc., 593 N.E.2d 522, 531 (Ill. 1992);

Loitz v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 563

N.E.2d 397, 402 (Ill. 1990), because

"willful and wanton conduct carries a

degree of opprobrium not found in merely

negligent behavior . . . ." Burke, 593

N.E.2d at 532. Willful and wanton conduct

"’approaches the degree of moral blame

attached to intentional harm, since the

defendant deliberately inflicts a highly

unreasonable risk of harm upon others in

conscious disregard of it.’" Loitz, 593

N.E.2d at 402 (citation omitted). We have

found that the standard for assessing

whether conduct is willful and wonton is

"remarkably similar" to the

deliberateindifference standard. See

Payne for Hicks v. Churchich, 161 F.3d

1030, 1041 n.13 (7th Cir. 1998). Given

this similarity, summary judgment was

proper under Count Three just as under

Count One, and therefore, we AFFIRM the

grant of summary judgment in favor of

Keltner and Williams on all three counts.