SIXTH DIVISION Septembe

r 28, 2007
No. 1-06- 3069 In re GUARDIA

NSHIP OF J.D. ) ) (Glen E. Dresher, ) Appeal from the ) Cir cu it Co ur t o f Co- Gu ardi

an -A pp el l an t; ) Co o k C o un t y, I llino is

) Rosan ne C. Dre sher, ) No. 89 P 10253 ) Co-Guardian/A

ppelle e; ) Ho no r ab le

) Mau

reen Conn ors Jean Adam

s, ) Judge Presidin g. ) Gua rd ian Ad Litem -Ap

pel l ee). )

) JU STI CEJO SEP H G OR DO N del i v ered th e op i n i on of th e c our t: Gl en E. D res he r ap pe als f rom the ci rcu i t cou rt' s orders tem

pora ril y rem ovi ng hi m ascogua rdi an of hi s adul t di sa bl ed ch i l d, J .D. For

the rea sons th

at f ol l ow, w e di sm

i ss the appe al f or lack o f jurisdict ion. I. BACKG ROUND On Dece m ber 6, 198 9, Gl

en Dresher and hi

s f orme r wif e Rosa nn e C. D resh

er were appoi nte d c o-guard

i ans of the pers on a nd es tateof the i r disa bl ed son, J. D. J .D. turn

ed 18 on Fe b ru ar y 17 , 19 90 . J .D . i s dev

el opm en tal l y di sa b l ed an d a utisti c a n d h as b een l i v i n g a t St. Coll ett a's, a residential

faci li ty in Wi sconsin, for o ver 20 years. Glen wa s co nvicte d o f at t empt ed mur der and a ggr avat ed d omes t ic bat t er y for s t riking Ros an ne wi th h i s c ar s evera

l ti mesi n 2 001 . Th

i s c ourt af f i rm ed the atte m pte d m urder c onv

i cti on and a 10-y

ear sentence , but vacated the aggravated domestic ba tt ery conv

iction i n our March 24,No. 1-06- 3069

2

200 6, op inion in People v . Dresher , 364 Il l . Ap p. 3d 84 7, 847 N .E.2d 662(2006 ). On A ugust 10, 2006, Ro sann

e fi le d a pro se mo t io n t o r ele as e G len fr o m his g ua r dia nsh ip right s. C ou nsel for Glen ap pea re d o n Augu st 28, 200 6, and t he co ur t issued an o rd er gr ant ing Glen 21 days t o r esp ond or ot her wise p lead t o R os anne's mot ion, set a st at us d at e, and "te m porari l y su sp en de d w i th out pre j udi ce " Gl en

as gu ardi an . G l en su b se qu en tl y b rough t a
se cti on 2- 61 5 ( 73 5 I LC S 5 /2 -6 15 (West 20 04 )) m oti on to dism i ss Ros an n e' s m oti on f or f ai l ur e to
co mply with t he r equ irement of se ct ion 2 -6 03( a) , t hat "[a ]ll plead ings shall co nt ain a plain and conci se statemen

t o f the pl eader's ca use of action." (735 ILCS 5/2-603(a) (West 2004)). Glen al so br ought a motion f or recon siderati

on of the c ourt's A

ugust 28, 2006 , order. On October 16, 2006, the court is sued two o rders. In the fi rst or der it stated: "1. The af oresaid m ot ions for reconsideration and f or dism is sal are granted; 2. The court, sua sp onte , moves f or t he rem

oval of Glen Dresh

er as guardian of [J.D.], and Gl en Dresh er is temporaril

y rem oved as guardian, over
o bje ct io n o f his c o un se l; 3. As to p ara

gra ph 2 of thi s order, a nd con cu rrent or der f or i ss ua nc e of cit at io n, t he r e is no jus t ca us e o rr ea so n t o de lay e nfo r ce men t o rap pe al o f t his order." The second order stated:

"It is h ereby ordered t hat 1. The authority of

the co-guardian, Gl

en Dresh er, be suspen

ded pendi ng a hear ing o n a cit at ion t o r emove gua rd ian;No. 1-06- 3069

1 Gle n does not purpor t t o rely upon Supreme C ourt Rul e 307 as a basi s f or o ur jurisdi ction, apparentl

y recogni zi ng that the rule i

s i nappl ic abl e. Rule 307(a)(6) stat es that an inter locu t or y appe al may be ta ken fr om an o rd er "t er minating p ar ent al right s o r g ra nt ing, d enying
or re v oki n g tem porar y com m i tmen t i n adopti on ca se s. " 1 88 Il

l . 2d R. 30 7( a) (6 ). P aren

tal ri gh ts are not at issue i

n thi s case, but onl

y those ri ghts af forded to Glen b

y v irtue of h is appoin tment as co-guardian pursua

nt to the provis ions

of articl e 11a of the Probate Act. 755 ILCS 5/11a-1 et seq . (We st 2004 ). 3

2. Jea n Adams, GAL [ gua rd ian ad litem ], b e di rected to f i l e a pe ti ti on f or ci tation to remove c o-guardi

an Glen Dresher; 3. Retur n da te on ci tation be set f or Dec. 1 3, 2006 , at 10:00 a.m ." On Oc t o be r25 , 20 06 , Gle n file d a no t ice o f ap pe al. On ap pe al h e a r gu es t ha t t he cir cu it
cou rt er red i n i ss ui ng i ts O ctob er 1 6, 2 006 , ord ers be ca us e the Pr oba te Act of 197 5 doe s n

ot pr ovid e fo r "t empo ra ry" r emova l of a g uar dian and beca use t he co ur t failed t o iss ue a cita t ion and af f ord hi m the opp ortuni

ty to res pond pri or to hi s rem

oval as re qui red b y sections 23- 2 an

d 23-3 of the Probate Act. 755 ILCS 5/23-2, 23-3 ( West 2004). Gle n cl ai ms that t hi s court has j uri sdi cti on to he ar h

i s ap peal ba sed on Suprem

e Court Ru

l es, 3 01, 303 , 304 a

nd 3 06(a)( 5). 1 155 Ill. 2d Rs. 301 , 3 03, 304 ; 16 6 I ll. 2d R . 3 06( a) (5 ). Jea n Adams, t he Gu ar dian ad litem (GAL) app oint ed by t he co ur t aft er Ro sanne bro ught her mot ion t o r emove Glen, has filed an a ppe llee's brief co nt est ing bo t h t he jur isdict ional bas is for and t he merit s o f Glen's ap pea l. Add itio nally, the GAL br ou ght a mot ion befo re t his co ur t t o d ismi ss Glen's app eal for lack o f jurisdict ion. The parties sub

mi tt ed m em oranda on the GAL' s m

ot ion, an d this court deni

ed the m ot ion wi thoutNo. 1-06- 3069

4

prej udi ce. II. AN AL YSIS Appe llate jur isdict ion is limi t ed t o r eview o f fi

nal judgment s unless an o rd er falls within a statutory or supre me court ex

cepti on. Pek i n I ns ura nc e C o. v . Be

ns on , 306 Ill . App. 3d 367, 375, 714 N.E .2d 559, 565 (199 9). We have defi ned what constitut es a "fi nal ord er" as foll

ows: " 'A n or de r of cou rt wh i ch l ea ve s a ca us e s ti l l pend i ng an d un de ci de d i s n ot a final or der . [ Cita t ion. ]S uch a n or der is neithe r final nor app ealable, des pit e t he court's spe cial f i ndi ng th at the orde

r i s f i na l f or purpose

of a ppea l . [Ci tation .] Thus , the test of f

i na l i ty l i es i n the su bstanc e an

d not the f orm of the orde r. [Ci tations.] To be final and ap pea lable, a n or der must dispo se o f the right s o f the parties, e i ther u pon the en

tire controv ersy

or upon s ome

def i ni te and se parate part of it . [ Cita t ions. ] A final or der for t he pu rp os es o f app eal must t er minate t he l i ti ga ti on b etw een th e p ar ti es so t h at, i f af f i rm ed , the tr i al cou rt has onl y to proceed with the ex

ecution of the judgme

nt. [Citations.] Such an

order, t heref

ore, will f inally det er mine, fix, and dispo se o f the par t ies' right s as t o t he issue s made by the suit.' " Lubb en v . Lubbe n , 135 Ill . App. 3d 302, 305, 481 N.E. 2d 856, 858 (1985), quo ting Oa

k B rook B an

k v . Ci tati on C y cl e C o. , 45 Ill . App. 3d 1053, 1057, 3 60 N.E.2 d 458, 4 60-61 (1977 ). Gle n, apparentl

y c ontendin

g that t he orders he appeal s f rom were f

in al orders, inv

okes Supreme C ourt Rul es 301, 303 and 304 as b ases f or o ur juri sdi ction over thi s appeal . These rulesNo. 1-06- 3069

5

are applic abl

e onl y to fi nal judgm ents. See Gutenkauf v . Gutenkauf , 69 Ill . App. 3d 871, 873, 38 7 N
. E
. 2d 91 8, 92 0 ( 19 79 )
. S up r eme Co ur t Ru le 3 01 st at es in p ar t , "[ e] ve ry final judgment of
a c irc uit co ur t in a ca se is a pp ea lab le a s o f r igh t . " ( E mph as is a dd ed
. ) 15 5 I ll. 2 d R
. 30 1. Su pr eme Co ur t Ru le 3 03 , en t it led "Ap pe als fr o m Final Judgmen ts of the Circuit Court in Civ il Cases" ( emp ha sis ad de d) ( 15 5 I ll. 2 d R
. 30 3) , de sc r ibe s s o me o f t he pr o ce du r al r ule s in filin g a n app ea ls fr o m fina l o r de r s. Simila r ly, S up r eme Co ur t rule 30 4 d ea ls w it h app ea ls fr o m final judgments that do not dis

pose of an en

tire proceedin

g. 155 Ill . 2d R. 304. Subsection (a) of Rul e 304
re quir es t he t rial co ur t t o mak e a finding t hat its final judg ment a s t o o ne pa rt y or claim shou ld be appealabl e bef ore issues as to o ther parties or clai ms are fi nal ly adj udic ated: "If m ulti ple parties or mul

tiple cl ai ms for reli ef are i nvol ved i n an action, an appeal ma y b e taken f

rom a final judgment asto one or m ore b ut f ew er th an al l of the parties or cl ai

ms only if the trial court has m

ade an ex press wri tt en f in din g that there i s n o ju st reas on f

or delay i ng e i ther e nf orcem en t of ap peal or both. ** * In t he abs ence of su ch a finding, any judgment t hat adjud icat es few er t han all the cl ai m s or the righ ts a nd l i ab i l i ti esof f ew er th an al l the pa rti esi s n ot enf orce ab l e or app ealable a nd is su bject t o r evision a t any time befo re t he ent ry o f a judg ment ad jud ica t ing all t he cla ims, r igh t s, an d lia bilit ies o f all t he pa r t ies
. " ( E mph as is adde d.) 155 Ill

2d R. 3 04(a). Ru l e 3 04 (b ) s ets

out th at, i n certai n si tua ti on s, an appe al ca n b e ta ken f rom a f i n al j udgm en t as to one party or cla i m eve n wi thout a speci

al fi ndi ng f rom the trial court: "The follow ing judg ments and o rd er s ar e ap pea lable witho ut t he findingNo. 1-06- 3069

6

required f or appeals un

der paragraph (a) of thi s rule : (1) A j udgme

nt or o rder entered in

the adm in is trat ion of an estate, gua rd ianship, o r similar pr oc eed ing which fina lly determines a r ight o r s t at us o f a party ." (Em

phasi s ad ded.) 1 55 Il

l 2d R. 3 04(b ). I t is c lea rt ha t t he se rule s a r e in ap plic ab le in t his c as e b ec au se t he o r de r s G len ap pe als fro m wer e no t final ord er s. T he first Oct obe r 1 6, 200 6, or der explicitly st at ed t hat , u po n t he
co ur t 's o wn mot ion, Glen wa s "t empo ra rily remove d" fr om his gu ar dianship p os itio n. T he se co nd
or der simi larly sta t ed t hat t he au t hor ity o f Glen as c o- gua rd ian was sus pend ed p ending a hear ing on the ci tation. Thus, there is

no question that the trial

court 's orders di d not " 'fi nal ly determi ne, fi x and di spose o f the parties' rights' " ( Lubb en , 135 Ill . App. 3d at 305, 481 N.E .2d at 858, quot in g Oak Bro ok Bank , 4 5 I ll. App. 3d a t 105 7, 360 N. E. 2d a t 460 -6 1) as t o t he issue of G len's gua rdi ansh i p b ec au se tha t i ss uewa s to b e addr

es se d a nd f i na l l y ad j udi ca ted at a he ari ng set f or Dece m ber 13, 20 06. It is l i kewi se c l ear that the c i

rcui t court'sorders d

i d not f al l wi thi n the am bi t of Ru l e 304
. T his c as e d id n o t invo lve a fin al ju dg men t as t o o ne o f mult iple pa r t ies o ro ne o f mult iple cla ims for reli ef. Rather, the sole i ssue pen din g bef ore t he court was Glen

's status as guardian, and that st at us w as o nly tempo ra rily revo ked unt il a fi nal adjud icat ion co uld be mad e aft er a hea ring o n t he citation to remove hi

m. Al thou gh the cour t st ated in one of its orders t hat there w as "no just
cau se o r r eas on t o d elay enfor cement or app eal, " t he ad dit ion o f tha t langua ge d id no t alte r t he f ac t th at th

e c our t' s or dersweren ot f

i n al as to an y cl ai m or p ar ty an d w ere, th us , not s ub

j ect to Rul e 3 04( a). Suc

h a f i nd i ng by a tri al cou rt i s n ot ef f ec ti ve to transf orm a di sp osi ti on th at i s n otNo. 1-06- 3069

7

fi nal in its own ri

ght in to a fi nal judgm ent. See Lubb en , 135 Ill . App. 3d at 305, 481 N.E .2d at 858 ; Gutenkauf

, 6 9 I ll. App. 3d a t 873 , 3 87 N .E .2 d at 920 ("Whe re an o rd er is not app ealable t he tri al cou rt ca nn ot conf er a ppe l l atej urisd

i cti on b y sta ti ng i n s uc h or der th at there

i s n o j us t rea son for d elayi ng enfor cement or appe al"); Fl ige lm an v . City of Chi cago , 264 Ill . App. 3d 1035, 1038, 63 7 N .E. 2d

11 95 , 11 97 (1 99 4) (" To d ete rm i n e th e f i n al i ty of an ord er , the c our

t m us t ex am i n e i ts subs t ance as o ppo sed t o it s for m"). In t his case , t he co ur t 's o rd er s we re not final becaus e Glen's
re m ov al wa s on l y tem porar y an d th e rel i ef to wh i ch h e w oul d b e en ti tl ed i f cor re ct on th e m eri ts
co uld st ill be fo r t hc o ming up o n t he t r ial c o ur t 's h ea r ing in t he mat t er . Simila r ly, a lt ho ug h R ule 304(b)(1) refers to judgm ents or or ders entered i

n the adm in is trat ion of a guardia nsh ip, that
se cti on a l so exp l i ci tl y req ui res tha t such j udg men t or ord er " f

i na l l y de term i ne [] a righ t or sta tusof a party" – a

requi rem en t that i s cl earl y not m et he re. 155 Ill . 2d R. 3 04(b ). Glen addi tion al l y i nv okes Su prem e Court Ru

l e 306 (a)(5) as a b asis of

our j uri sdi

cti on. That rule al

lows appeal

s by petition i n certain in stances ev

en wh ere there has n

ot been a fi nal j udgm en t an d s tate s i n re l ev an t pa rt: "A pa rt y may

pet itio n for leave t o a ppe al to t he App ellate Co ur t fro m the f oll owi n g ordersof

th e tr i al cou rt: * * * (5) f rom i nte rlocu tory orde rs af f ec ti ng the ca re a nd cu stod y of unemancipa ted minors , if t he ap pe al o f su ch o r de r s is no t o t he rwis e s pe cific ally provi ded f or el sew here i n these rules." (Em

phasi s ad ded.) 1 66 Il

l . 2d R. 3 06(a)( 5). T he r e is no qu es t io n a nd Gle n c o nc ed es t ha t J. D. is c ur r en t ly 35 yea r s o f ag e, wh ich isNo. 1-06- 3069

8

well b ey ond the age of m

aj ority. In that regard we note that "mi nor" has al

ways been

defi ned chronologically

. Blac k's La w Di ctionary

defi nes "m in or" as "[a] term deriv

ed from the ci vi l l aw, which describ ed a perso n under a certain age as less than so m an y yea rs . In most state s, a

pers on is no longe r a mi nor after reachi

ng the age of

18 ***." (Emphasi s origi nal .) Black' s Law Dic tionary at 997 (6t h ed. 1990). The Men tal Heal th and Dev

el opmen tal Di sabi li ties Code defines " minor" as "a per so n unde r 1 8 year s o f age. " 40 5 I LCS 5/ 1- 117 (Wes t 200 4) . T he Ju ve ni l e C ourt A

ct of 198 7 de f i ne s m i nor i n two dif f ere nt s ec ti ons

as "a pers on u nd er th e ageof 21 ye ars subj ect to this

Act." 705 ILCS 405/1-3(10), 5-105(10) (West 2004); accord I n r e J aime P. , 223 Ill . 2d 526, 534 (2006); accord Pe o ple v. Williams , 358 I ll . App. 3d 36 3 (2005) ; see al so People v . Mendoza , 34 2 Il l . A pp. 3d 1 95, 198 -99(20 03)(ci ti ng Ju ve ni l e C ourt A

ct' s def i ni ti on of "minor " and st at ing, " Bec oming 2 1 year s o ld is a significant mil est one in ou r so ciet y, and Illinois's le gis la tive s chem

e refl ects this" ); 750 ILCS 30/3-1 (West 2004) (Eman ci pation of Min

ors Act defini ng "minor" as "a pe rso n 16 year s of ag e o r o ver, and und er t he age of 18 years") ; St at e v. Tay l or , 15 3 C onn . 72 , 82 , 21 4 A .2d 362 , 36 8 (1 962 ) (" Ou

r com mon l aw *** consi

ders a m i nor to be any perso n under the age o f twe nty-o ne"); Ga mble v
. Da vis , 98 Ga. App. 470, 472, 106 S.E.2d 89 , 90 (19 58) (" A m i nor i s one l ess than twen ty-on e y ears of a ge" ). Neverthel ess, despi te the fact that mi

nority is al ways def in ed i n terms of person's

age
r at he rt ha n me nt al c o nd it io n, Gle n c o nt en de d in his o pp o sit io n t o t he GA L's mo t io n be fo r e t his court to dis

mi ss the appeal

for l ack of j urisdi

ction that J.D. can be

considered an "un

em anci pated minor" beca use "pr ior t o t he ag e o f 18 year s he be came d isabled a nd [ was ] r equ ired t o be put in a care facili ty in Wi sconsin

where he remai

ns to t hi s date. " Accordingl y, Glen m ain tained, "[J.D.'s]No. 1-06- 3069

9

age is not t he cr iter ia to det er mine whet her or not he is a minor , bu t his failure t o be able t o be leg ally e man cip at ed fr o m his p ar en t s is t he t es t . " We find t his a r gu men t wh o lly uns up po r t ab le
un der the c l ea

r lan gu ag e of Ru l e 3 06 (a)(5 ) l

i m i ti n g th e a pp l i ca ti on of th at prov i si on to "une mancipat ed minor s." 166 Ill. 2d R. 306 (a )( 5) . At best , G len's co nt ent ions invo lve the defi ni tion of the term

"unem anci pated" but ign

ore t he f urther requirem

ent of Rul e 306(a)(5) t hat the p erson

who is une manci pated a l so be a m i nor. The cas es Gl en

ha s ci ted i n s upport of his posi tion , St at e F ar m Mu t ua l Au t o mo bile Insu ra nce C o. v. D iff

er ding , 46 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 15 , 360 N .E.2d 522(1977 ), rev'd on othe r grounds, 69 Ill . 2d 103 (1977), and Cincinnat i Insur ance Co . v. Arg ubr ight , 151 Ill . App. 3d 324, 502 N.E.2d 8 68 (19 86), do n

ot i n a ny wa y pur port to a ss ert or

i m pl y tha t a p ers on ov

er th e ageof majo r it y ca n be co nsid er ed a mino r . Ra t he r , t ho se ca se s d ea lt wit h t he iss ue o f wh et he rt he ch ild of an i nsuran ce poli cy holde r who was over the age of m aj ority could be consi

dered an
em anci pated child

for purposes of i

nsuran ce coverage. In thi s context, the dif feren ce between "child" and "minor " is significant – t he fo rmer merely indicat es t he famili al relat ionship be t wee n a paren t and her off spri ng w hi l e the l atter i s de f

i ne d by a cl earl y quan tif i ab l e ch ronology of y ears . In p oin t of f act, Differding and Arg ubr ight highligh t t he f act t hat whether a per son is a mi nor and whe

ther a person has b een em anci pated are two dis

tinct questi ons subj ect to dis tinct considerations. See Differding , 46 Ill. App. 3d at 19, 360 N.E .2d at 525 ; Arg ubr ight , 15 1 I ll. App. 3d a t 330 , 5 02 N .E .2 d at 872 . Fo r inst ance , in Differding , the iss ue was whe

ther an in surance pol

ic y h older's daughter was a resi

dent of the househ

old whe re "resident" was def

in ed as in cludi ng " 'unm arried and unem

anci pated children.' " Differding , 46 Ill . App. 3d at 19, 360No. 1-06- 3069

10

N.E.2d at 525. The appella te court noted: "[I]t is

a general rule, an d al ways has been so, t hat attai ni ng th e age of 2 1 y ears i s n ot ips o fa cto em anci pation of the chi l d f rom h i s or h er f athe r, although at t hat age a chil d may eman cipate hi msel f b y separating f

rom hi s father." Differding , 46 Ill. App . 3 d at 19, 360 N. E. 2d a t 525 . T he co ur t furt her cite d t he ho lding in W al dron v. W al dron, 13 I ll. A pp . 3d 96 4, 96 8, 30 1 N
. E
. 2d 16 7, 17 1 ( 19 73 ) , t ha t alt ho ug h t he ag e o f majo r it y in I llino is is 18 ye ars of age, an 18-y

ear-old chi

ld was not eman

ci pated and the f

ather's obl

iga tion to pay supp ort unde

r a di vorce decre e the

ref ore did not en

d. Differding , 46 Ill . App. 3d at 19, 360 N.E. 2d at 5 25. The co urt then concluded that t he term "unem anci pated" co uld i

ncl ude tho se pers ons w

ho hav e attai

ne d the age of maj ority
. Differding , 46 Ill . App. 3d at 19, 360 N.E .2d at 525 . S imi

larly, in Arg ubr ight , t he co ur t st at ed: "The t est for emancipa t ion is no t t he ag e o f the chi ld b ut whether there is

an en tire surrender to the right to care, custo dy, an d earni ngs of such child as wel

l as renun ciation of parental duties." Arg ubr ight , 151 Ill . App. 3d at 330, 502 N.E .2d at 872. Rule 3 06( a) (5 ) d oe s no t merely re quir e t hat t he o rd er app ealed fro m affect t he ca re and
cus tody of

a pers on wh

o is une manci pated;i t addi tion al l y requi res th at the p erson

be a m i nor. See 166 Ill. 2d R. 306 (a )( 5) . I t is clear t hat re gar dless o f whet her J.D . w as e ver emancipa t ed, he is not a mi nor. Thus, consi derin

g, as we m

ust, t he pl ai n an d ordinary

me ani ng of the l

anguage used i n Rul e 306(a)(5) (see In re Estate o f Re nni ck , 181 Ill . 2d 395, 404-05, 692 N. E.2d 1150, 115 5 ( 198 8) ), we c anno t expa nd o ur jurisd ictio n beyond t he bo unda ries o f the ru le. E ven if the rati ona l e f or al l owi ng i nte rlocu tory appe als wi

th res pe ct to the c are

an d cus tody of
unem anci pated mi nors mi ght als o be applie d with res pect to the care and custo dy of dis abl edNo. 1-06- 3069

11

adu lts, we c anno t , o n ou r o wn initiat ive, e xt end o ur jurisd ictio n t o e nco mpass d isabled p er so ns pa st th e a ge of maj ori ty wh ere S up re me C our

t Ru l e 3 06 (a)(5 ) l

i m i ts s uch j uri sd i cti on to
un ema nc ipa t ed mino r s, a c las s t o wh ich J. D. do es no t be lo ng . T he lan gu ag e o f Ru le 3 06 ( a) ( 5) is cl ear and spec if

ic and m ust be abi ded as i t has been written. See In re Estate o f Re nni ck , 18 1 I ll. 2d at 40 4- 05 , 69 2 N
. E
. 2d at 11 55 ( "I n int er pr et ing a s up r eme co ur t rule , we ap ply t he sa me pri nc i plesof constru cti on th at a ppl y to a s tatute . [C i

tati on. ] ** * Th

e m ost re l i ab l e i

nd i ca tor of i nten t is the l anguag e us ed, wh

i ch shoul d be

gi ven i ts plai n a nd ord i na ry mean i ng. [ Ci tation .] Wh ere the la nguage is clear and un

am bi guous, we must appl

y the la nguage used w

ithout further aids of constructi on. [Ci

tation .]"). III. CONCLUSION Accordin gly , for all the foregoin

g reasons, thi s m

atter is dis mi ssed. Dis mi ssed. McN ULTY and O' MA

LL EY, JJ ., conc

ur.