alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NO. 12-13-00021-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

FOUR THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED § APPEAL FROM THE 241ST

EIGHTY-FIVE DOLLARS ($4,485.00)

IN U.S. CURRENCY,

APPELLANT

V. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE § SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM

This pro se in forma pauperis appeal is being dismissed for failure to comply with the 

Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(c). The judgment in this case was 

signed on October 25, 2012. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal that failed to contain the 

information required by Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.5 and 25.1(e), i.e., a certificate of 

service showing service on all parties to the trial court's judgment.

On January 18, 2013, Appellant was notified pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 37.1 that the notice of appeal was defective for failure to comply with Rules 9.5 and 

25.1(e). He was further notified that unless he filed an amended notice of appeal on or before 

February 18, 2013, the appeal would be referred to the court for dismissal. See TEX. R. APP. P.

42.3(c). The deadline for filing an amended notice of appeal has passed, and Appellant has not 

corrected his defective notice of appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed for failure to 

comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(c); Feist v. Berg, 

No. 12-04-00004-CV, 2004 WL 252785, at *1 (Tex. App.-Tyler Feb. 11, 2004, pet. denied); 

Feist v. Hubert, No. 12-03-00442-CV, 2004 WL 252285, at *1 (Tex. App.-Tyler Feb. 11, 2004, 

pet. denied).
2

Opinion delivered February 28, 2013.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.

(PUBLISH)
3

COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

FEBRUARY 28, 2013

NO. 12-13-00021-CV

FOUR THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY-FIVE DOLLARS

($4,485.00) IN U.S. CURRENCY,

Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

 Appeal from the 241st Judicial District Court

 of Smith County, Texas. (Tr.Ct.No. 10-3109-C)

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record; and the same 

being considered, it is the opinion of this court that this appeal should be dismissed.

It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by this court that 

this appeal be, and the same is, hereby dismissed; and that this decision be certified to the court 

below for observance.

By per curiam opinion.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.
#### O’NEAL *v.*NEAL VENEERING COMPANY.

A petition filed in vacation, to set aside a decree rendered nearly three years previously, upon the ground that it had been obtaind by fraud and imposition, praying that the present proceeding be “filed as a part of the original case,” on which petition a rule nisi was issued in vacation, was not an independent equitable suit, but a motion to set aside a judgment, and was demurrable on the ground that it presented no *377cause of action, because a judge of tlie superior court has no authority to entertain a motion made in vacation to set aside a judgment of that court.

No. 6146.

May 17, 1928.

Equitable petition. Before Judge Yeomans. Seminole superior court. June 22, 1927.

*G. G. Bower, Hooper & Hooper, M. B. O’Neal,*and *W. I. Geer,*for plaintiff in error. ■

*J. T. Goree*and *R. L. Cox,*contra.

Bussell, C. J.

In this proceeding the plaintiff sought to set aside a consent decree which had been entered nearly three years previously' in the superior court of Seminole County, upon the ground that such decre.e had been obtained by fraud and imposition practiced upon its counsel at the time such decree was rendered. It was prayed that the present proceeding be “filed as a part of the original case,” and in the rule nisi issued upon the 'petition in the present instance the “within petition” was ordered “filed as a part of the pleadings referred to in said petition.”- The petition or motion to set aside the decree was filed in vacation, and the rule nisi thereon was issued in vacation. At the he.aring in term time the defendant demurred and moved to strike the petition, on the ground, among others, “that it presented no cause of action, because filed in vacation.” This motion was overruled.

The court erred in overruling the motion to dismiss. “A judge of the superior court has no authority to entertain a motion made in vacation to set aside a judgment of that court.” *Davis*v. *Bennett,*158 *Ga.*368 (123 S. E. 11), rind cit.; *Davis*v. *Bennett,*159 *Ga.*332 (125 S. E. 714). This petition is a motion to set aside - the judgment, and is not an independent plenary equitable petition. As ruled by Mr. Justice Evans, speaking for the court in *Malsby*v. *Studstill,*127 *Ga.*726, 728 (56 S. E. 988), “If it was begun in vacation, the proceeding is a nullity, because a judge of the superior court has no authority to entertain a motion made in vacation to set aside a judgment of that court. *Haskens*v. *State,*114 *Ga.*837 [40 S. E. 997]; *Chapman*v. *State,*116 *Ga.*598 [42 S. E. 999].” The error in overruling the motion to dismiss rendered further proceedings in the ease nugatory, and makes it unnecessary to rule upon the merits of the demurrers interposed by the defendant. *Judgment reversed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

EASTERN DISTRICT 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

 Respondent 

 v. 

ANTHONY JOHNSON, 

 Petitioner 

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 549 EAL 2015 

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court 

ORDER 

PER CURIAM 

AND NOW, this 22nd day of December, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of 

Appeal is DENIED.
#### SUCCESSION OF Eddie Lee MOORE a/k/a Phil Moore.

No. 2011-OC-2330.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 2, 2011.

In re Moore, Brenda; — Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Morehouse, 4th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 4274; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,893-CW.

Not considered, not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, Section 5.
#### GREEN TRAILS, LLC v. STEWART TITLE OF LOUISIANA, INC., Stewart Title Guaranty Company, and Baton Rouge Title Company, Inc.

No. 2011-CC-0919.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 11, 2011.

In re Baton Rouge Title Company Inc.; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 550461; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 0473.

Denied.
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 31.2

                                  CERTIFICATION

I, PETER J. RICE, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of MRO Software, Inc., a
Massachusetts Corporation;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control
over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent
fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual
report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.

Date: February 9, 2005


By: /s/ Peter J. Rice
--------------------------------------------------
Peter J. Rice
Executive Vice President, Finance & Administration
Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer
(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
Order entered October 6, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-15-00718-CV

RSL FUNDING, LLC, ET AL., Appellants

V.

RICKEY NEWSOME, Appellee

On Appeal from the 193rd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-14-14580-L

ORDER

We GRANT appellee’s October 5, 2015 unopposed second motion for an extension of 

time to file a brief. Appellee shall file a brief by OCTOBER 9, 2015. We caution appellee that 

no further extension of time will be granted in this accelerated appeal absent extraordinary 

circumstances.

/s/ ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS 

JUSTICE
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Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

May 8, 2015

No. 04-14-00558-CV

Edna A. MARTINEZ,

Appellant

v.

STATE OFFICE OF RISK MANAGEMENT,

Appellee

From the 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2001-CI-17102

Honorable Antonia Arteaga, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

Appellant’s motion for extension of time to file her reply brief is granted. Her reply brief 

is due May 20, 2015. NO FURTHER EXTENSIONS WILL BE GRANTED.

_________________________________

Karen Angelini, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 8th day of May, 2015.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
#### Gredy GARRIDO, Appellant, v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee for the C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-CB8, Appellee.

No. 3D10-2326.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

June 1, 2011.

Rehearing Denied July 7, 2011.

*723Korte & Wortman, and Brian Korte, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Akerman Senterfitt and Katherine E. Giddings, Nancy M. Wallace and Kristen M. Fiore, Tallahassee, and William P. Heller, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

Before RAMIREZ, C.J., and SUAREZ and LAGOA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. The motion to set aside the summary judgment pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540 was a fact-specific question, *see LPP Mortgage Ltd. v. Bank of America, N.A.,*826 So.2d 462, 463-64 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), which was resolved against the appellant, who has not provided us with a transcript. *Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee,*377 So.2d 1150, 1152 (Fla.1979).
##### 



Exhibit 32
 CERTIFICATION OF QUARTERLY REPORT ON FORM 10-Q
OF ADVOCAT INC.
FOR THE QUARTER ENDED MARCH 31, 2008
  (a)
    
    fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(b)
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.
  /s/ William R. Council, IIIWilliam R. Council, IIIChief Executive Officer /s/ L. Glynn Riddle, Jr.L. Glynn Riddle, Jr.Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit 13.1

CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC FINANCIAL REPORT

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350

In connection with the Annual Report of United Microelectronics Corporation, or the Company, on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2016 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, or the Report, I, Po-Wen Yen, Chief Executive
Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge, that:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: April 13, 2017



|    |  |                |  |                        
|--- |  | -------------- |  | -----------------------
|By: |  | /s/ Po-Wen Yen
|    |  | Name:          |  | Po-Wen Yen             
|    |  | Title:         |  | Chief Executive Officer



|* | A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to us and will be retained by us and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
|- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
##### 



Exhibit 10.10 ECLIPSYS CORPORATION FIRST AMENDMENT TO SECOND AMENDED AND RESTATED 1998
EMPLOYEE STOCK PURCHASE PLAN The purpose of this First Amendment to the Second Amended and Restated
1998 Employee Stock Purchase Plan (the First Amendment), is to add a
provision to the Second Amended and Restated 1998 Employee Stock Purchase Plan
(the Second Amended and Restated 1998 Plan), that will allow the Board of
Directors (the Board) of Eclipsys Corporation (Eclipsys) to suspend the
Second Amended and Restated 1998 Plan at any time and for any reason. NOW, THEREFORE, THE SECOND AMENDED AND RESTATED 1998 PLAN IS HEREBY
MODIFIED AND AMENDED AS FOLLOWS: 1. Paragraph 19 to the Second Amended and Restated 1998 Plan is amended
and restated to read as follows:  19.
    
    This Plan may be terminated or suspended at any
time by the Board. Upon termination of this Plan, all
amounts in the accounts of participating employees shall be
promptly refunded. Upon the announcement of a suspension, all
amounts in the accounts of participating employees may be
promptly refunded or may remain invested, depending upon
whether the announced suspension will take effect immediately
or prospectively, as the case may be. The Board may revoke
the suspension and reactivate the Plan at any time. Adopted by The Board of Directors on February 3, 2004.
```

[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 86 (Tuesday, May 23, 1995)]
[House]
[Page H5383]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

                          PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE

  The SPEAKER. Will the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey] come 
forward and lead the House in the Pledge of Allegiance.
  Mr. OBEY led the Pledge of Allegiance as follows:

       I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of 
     America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one nation, 
     under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.
     

                          ____________________
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THE SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE DSI TOYS,
INC. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF AND FOR THE TWELVE MONTHS ENDED JANUARY 31, 1999
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JAN-31-1999
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<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                2,984,619
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (123,458)
<INVENTORY>                                  4,207,704
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             8,286,596
<PP&E>                                       5,707,676
<DEPRECIATION>                               4,065,004
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              12,954,593
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        7,895,885
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<PREFERRED>                                          0
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<TOTAL-COSTS>                               10,967,001
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<INCOME-PRETAX>                             (1,071,429)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  (333,000)
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</TABLE>
#### City of McGregor v. C. C. Cook.

(No. 6564.)

Appeal from McLennan County.

W. O. O’Brien and Herring & Kelly, counsel for appellant.

L. L. Samuels, counsel for appellee.

Opinion by

Will-son, J.

§ 141. *Municipal corporations; judgment against cannot award execution; damages; not recoverable for suit instituted against party claiming.*Appellee sued the city of McGregor to recover the sum of $210, alleged to be due him for services rendered the city under a contract of employment, and for $90 damages for breach of said contract. The city answered by general denial and by plea in reconvention for $1,000 for preventing the negotiation of certain bonds issued by the city. Upon ex*203ceptions thereto by appellee, said plea in reconveiition was stricken out. Appellee recovered judgment for $150, said judgment ordering execution to issue against the city for said sum and costs. Exceptions to the plea in reconvention were properly sustained. Said plea sought to recover damages against appellee because of his suit against appellant to recover his claim. Such ground affords no legal cause of action for damages. [3 Civil Oas. Ct. App., § 248; Johnson v. King, 64 Tex. 226.] It was not error to permit appellee to read in evidence the proceedings of the city council objected to by appellant. There was no substantial variance between said proceedings and the allegations in relation thereto in the petition. Nor was it error to permit appellee to read in evidence the letter of O. B. Hall. Said Hall, as appears from the evidence, was acting by authority of the city council in writing said letter, and it was the act of the council. There is ample evidence, we think, to sustain the judgment, and the fact that appellee recovered a judgment for a less amount than he claimed, or than the evidence showed him to be entitled to, affords no ground of complaint on the part of appellant. We find but one error in the judgment; and that is that it awards execution against the appellant. As a general rule, execution cannot be awarded to enforce a judgment against a municipal corporation, and this general rule must obtain, as we have no statute providing otherwise. [1 Dill. Mun. Corp., § 516; Ereem. Ex’ns, § 22.] The judgment is reversed, and is here reformed and rendered so as to make it collectible by a due course of law, as in such cases provided, and the costs of this appeal are adjudged against the appellee.

June 18, 1890.

Beversed and rendered.