In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 09-1675

LARRY D. STORIE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

RANDY’S AUTO SALES, LLC,

Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

ST. PAUL MERCURY INSURANCE COMPANY,

Third-Party Defendant/Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

 for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:07-cv-22-WTL-DML—William T. Lawrence, Judge.

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 16, 2009—DECIDED DECEMBER 17, 2009

Before CUDAHY, WOOD, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge. In 2004, Larry D. Storie bought a

truck that had been involved in a fatal accident the previ-
2 No. 09-1675

ous year. Claiming that he had been misled about the

truck’s history, he brought suit against a number of

companies that had owned the truck between the time of

the accident and his purchase of it. The present case

concerns Storie’s lawsuit against Randy’s Auto Sales, LLC.

He alleges that Randy’s failed to apply for a salvage title,

as it was required to do under Indiana law. The district

court granted summary judgment in favor of Randy’s,

finding that Ind. Code § 9-22-3-11(e) does not require

an entity that acquired a wrecked vehicle to apply for a

salvage title when it no longer owns the vehicle upon

the receipt of the certificate of title. Because this case

turns on the interpretation of an ambiguous state statute,

we certify the case to the Supreme Court of Indiana.

I. BACKGROUND

On November 17, 2003, the driver of a Western Star truck

was killed in Indiana when the freight he was carrying

shifted forward and pierced the cab. The truck was declared a total loss and purchased by its insurer, St. Paul

Mercury Insurance Company. St. Paul applied for a

Tennessee certificate of title as proof of its ownership, but

did not apply for a salvage title.

Before Tennessee issued the title to St. Paul, the truck

changed hands several times in quick succession. On

January 13, 2004, St. Paul sold the truck to Randy’s, an

Indiana-based car dealer, which in turn sold the vehicle

nine days later to West Side Auto Parts, Inc. West Side

brought the truck to its headquarters in Owensboro,

Kentucky. The next month, on February 26, 2004, West
No. 09-1675 3

Side sold the vehicle to Duckett Truck Center, Inc. in

Farmington, Missouri.

After these transactions, but before the truck was

finally sold to plaintiff Storie, Tennessee issued a

certificate of title to St. Paul on March 19, 2004. On or

about April 13, 2004, St. Paul sent the title to Randy’s,

which duly forwarded the title to West Side, which in

turn passed it over to Duckett. None of these entities

applied for a salvage title.

On June 11, 2004, Duckett sold the truck to Storie, an

Illinois resident, who applied for an Illinois title on the

truck. After driving the truck for more than eighteen

months and two-hundred thousand miles, Storie claims

that he learned of the vehicle’s involvement in a fatal

accident for the first time. On August 16, 2006, Storie

brought suit against St. Paul, Randy’s, West Side and

Duckett in the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Missouri. Storie voluntarily dismissed

his claims against Randy’s and West Side for lack of

personal jurisdiction. He then refiled his claims against

Randy’s and West Side in the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Indiana.

The present case concerns Storie’s action against Randy’s

only. He contends that Randy’s violated Ind. Code § 9-22-

3-11(e), which provides:

Any other person acquiring a wrecked or damaged

motor vehicle, motorcycle, semitrailer, or recreational vehicle that meets at least one (1) of the

criteria set forth in section 3 of this chapter, which

acquisition is not evidenced by a certificate of

salvage title, shall apply to the bureau within
4 No. 09-1675

Storie’s complaint alleges a violation of Ind. Code § 9-22-3- 1

11(d) (2004). The statute was amended in 2006, with the result

that the old subsection (d) became the new subsection (e).

The amendment had no substantive effect.

thirty-one (31) days after receipt of the certificate

of title for a certificate of salvage title.1

Storie argues that Randy’s “acquired” the truck on January 13, 2004, when it purchased the vehicle from St. Paul.

He submits further that Randy’s lack of continuing ownership at the time it received the certificate of title is of no

moment. Storie thus contends that the provisions of

Ind. Code § 9-22-3-11(e) were triggered and that Randy’s

failure to apply for a salvage title violated the statute.

The district court was not convinced. It held that

Randy’s had no obligation under Indiana law to obtain a

salvage title, opining that “[b]y the time it received the

title from St. Paul, it no longer owned the Truck, and

therefore could not have obtained any Indiana title for it.”

Storie v. Randy’s Auto Sales, LLC, 2009 WL 348751, at *2 (S.D.

Ind. Feb. 6, 2009). It thus granted summary judgment in

favor of Randy’s. Id. In doing so, however, the court noted

that its “holding is not necessarily consistent with the

presumed purpose of the salvage title requirement, which

is to protect consumers against the risks associated with

purchasing previously wrecked vehicles without knowledge of their history.” Id. at n.4. Nevertheless, the court

felt unable to “impose a statutory duty where none

exists.” Id.

In its opinion, the district court omitted reference to

four arguments advanced by Randy’s in its motion for
No. 09-1675 5

summary judgment, namely that Indiana’s salvage title

applies only to vehicles that will be owned and operated

within Indiana, that Indiana law would follow the law

of the titling state, that insurance companies are gatekeepers upon whom dealers can legally rely and that Ind.

Code § 9-22-3-11(e) does not apply to dealers.

Storie now appeals from the entry of summary judgment

against him.

II. DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is proper only if “there is no genuine

issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We

review the district court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo. See Petts v. Rockledge Furniture LLC, 534 F.3d 715,

720 (7th Cir. 2008). To the extent we are called upon to

review the district court’s interpretation of a statute, the

standard of review is likewise de novo. See Boyd v.

Illinois State Police, 384 F.3d 888, 896 (7th Cir. 2004).

A. The Application of Ind. Code § 9-22-3-11(e) to

Randy’s

Does Ind. Code § 9-22-3-11(e)’s reference to “any other

person” capture a former owner that sells a salvage vehicle

before it receives the certificate of title? According to

Storie, it is immaterial whether an entity that acquired a

wrecked vehicle actually owns it upon receipt of the title.

Its obligation to apply for a certificate of salvage title

remains unaffected. The district court, in contrast, found
6 No. 09-1675

that a lack of continuing ownership absolves an acquiring

person of any obligation to apply for a salvage title when

it receives the certificate of title.

Ind. Code § 9-22-3-11(e) is not a model of clarity. Literally, its command that “[a]ny other person acquiring a

wrecked or damaged motor vehicle . . . shall apply to the

bureau . . . after receipt of the certificate of title for a

certificate of salvage title” might capture current and

former owners alike, as long as they once “acquired” the

vehicle. Section 11 makes no explicit reference to an

ongoing requirement of ownership. Yet, a variety of

arguments suggests that former owners might nevertheless be exempt.

Competing interpretations of the statute lead us to

conclude that it is ambiguous and that it should be certified to the Indiana Supreme Court pursuant to our Circuit

Rule 52. We consider the reasoning that supports the

district court’s conclusion before considering that which

opposes it.

There are a number of reasonable arguments that the

obligations imposed by Ind. Code § 9-22-3-11(e) are limited

to current owners. 

First, Ind. Code § 9-22-3-4 states that the bureau will

issue a certificate of salvage title as “proof of ownership.”

This might suggest that an entity cannot or should not

apply for such a certificate if it no longer owns the salvage

vehicle when it receives the certificate of title. Indeed,

Section 4 only allows “the acquiring insurance company,

disposal facility, or person” to apply for a certificate

of salvage title. If the vehicle has been subsequently sold
No. 09-1675 7

Although “acquiring” is a somewhat ambiguous term, it does 2

seem to require some change in ownership or that the wrecked

vehicle change hands in some respect. The Indiana Court of

Appeals has clarified that an owner whose car is totaled, but

who receives a settlement from an insurer and decides to

maintain possession of the wrecked vehicle, does not “acquire”

it. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Larkin’s Body Shop & Auto Care, 673 N.E.2d

846 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). Such an owner therefore is not

required to apply for a salvage title. Id.

to a new party, it is not entirely clear how the former

owner can then be characterized as “the acquiring” party.

Second, being a present participle, “acquiring” implies

that the legislature envisioned some form of simultaneity

between the act of acquiring a salvage vehicle and receiving the certificate of title. This might suggest that 2

Indiana never intended for companies that acquire salvage

vehicles to be bound by § 9-22-3-11(e) if they receive

the certificates of title after they have sold the vehicles.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, the Indiana Court

of Appeals has held that acquisition denotes ownership.

See Larkin’s Body Shop, 673 N.E.2d at 849. If these terms

are in fact synonymous, then Ind. Code § 9-22-3-11(e)

requires “any other person” owning a wrecked or

damaged motor vehicle to apply for a salvage title within

thirty-one days of receiving the certificate of title. If a

person does not own the vehicle when she receives the

title, then she would not be obliged to apply for a salvage

title.

Before proceeding, a few words of caution are in order.

One might be tempted to look to the section’s purported
8 No. 09-1675

Nevertheless, such a heading is only “a short-hand reference

3

to the general subject matter involved” and is “not meant to take

the place of the detailed provisions of the text.” Trainmen v.

Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 331 U.S. 519, 528 (1947). Moreover, a

heading cannot limit the plain meaning of the text. See Intel Corp.

v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 256 (2004). Although

the “official” title (as indicated in the forthcoming text) suggests

that Section 11 does not apply to entities that no longer own

wrecked vehicles when they receive the certificates of title, it

does not demand that conclusion. Arguably, Subsection (e)’s

reference to “any other person” is sufficiently broad to capture

former owners. In any event, we decline to place weight on

this title.

At first blush, there would appear to be a tension between 4

West’s annotated title of Ind. Code § 9-22-3-11, which provides:

“Salvage titles; applications by insurers, self-insurers or other

parties; owner surrenders certificate of title; Class D infraction,”

and the “official” title on the http://www.in.gov website, which

simply states: “Application by insurer or owner for certificate of

salvage title.” It would seem that the official title is to be

preferred. See Neidow v. Cash in a Flash, Inc., 841 N.E.2d 649, 654

(Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

title for guidance. After all, the U.S. Supreme Court has

observed that the title of a section can clarify ambiguities

in the legislation’s text. See INS v. National Center for Immigrants’ Rights, 502 U.S. 183, 189-09 (1991). The “official” 3

title on the http://www.in.gov website is “Application by

insurer or owner for certificate of salvage title.” This title 4

makes no reference to former owners and might thus

suggest that its reach be limited to current owners. But it

appears that there is in fact no official title. The enacting
No. 09-1675 9

legislation does not contain headings for the sections. See

Ind. Pub. L. No. 2-1991, amended by Ind. Pub. L. No. 268-

2003 & Ind. Pub. L. No. 110-2006. The section titles would

seem to have been added later for purposes of clarity.

This being the case, we decline to place weight on the

heading to Ind. Code § 9-22-3-11, which is available at

the http://www.in.gov website.

Despite the preceding bases for inferring that the reach

of Ind. Code § 9-22-3-11(e) is limited to current owners,

there are some respectable arguments that suggest the

opposite conclusion.

First, the preceding arguments have important limitations. In Larkin’s Body Shop, for instance, the Indiana

Court of Appeals did not hold that acquisition is synonymous with ownership for all purposes. Larkin’s Body

Shop, 673 N.E.2d at 849. Indeed, the court noted that its

holding was specific to the circumstances of the case. Id.

In addition, although certificates of salvage title operate

as “proof of ownership,” so too do certificates of title. Yet,

it is clear that an entity can assign its ownership interest in

a vehicle without immediately providing a certificate of

title. See Ind. Code § 9-17-3-3; Madrid v. Bloomington Auto

Co., Inc., 782 N.E.2d 386, 395 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding

that, under Indiana law, ownership can be transferred

consistent with the UCC irrespective of whether the

certificate of title has been delivered). Thus, dealers can

and, accordingly to Randy’s, regularly do sell vehicles
10 No. 09-1675

Randy’s asserts in its brief that it is customary for dealers to 5

sell vehicles before receiving the certificate of title because

they “may be waiting weeks or months” before the title

arrives. We direct Randy’s to Ind. Code § 9-17-3-3(b), which

allows a licensed dealer who does not yet possess a certificate

of title to sell a vehicle to another licensed dealer only if the

seller can deliver that title within twenty-one days of the sale.

before they receive the associated certificates of title. This 5

means that certificates of title, which ostensibly act as proof

of ownership, are routinely issued to former owners.

Second, § 9-22-3-11(a) limits the section’s application to

“persons,” who are defined as certain insurance companies. However, the remainder of Section 11 also refers to,

and imposes obligations upon, “owners,” “lien-holders”

and “self-insured entities.” These appear to be distinct

from the “persons” (i.e., insurance companies) defined in

subsection (a). Thus, when subsection (e) makes reference

to “any other person,” it would seem to refer to more

than the “persons” (insurance companies), owners, lienholders and self-insured entities referenced above. Such

all-encompassing language could reasonably be considered to capture former owners who subsequently

receive certificates of title.

Third, a literal reading of subsection (e) might encompass

Appellee’s acquisition in this case. The company could

surely be characterized as “acquiring” the truck when

purchasing it. Randy’s also received the certificate of title.

Pursuant to the literal command of the subsection, it was

arguably required to apply for a salvage title. This conclu-
No. 09-1675 11

sion is bolstered by the purpose underlying the

statute, which is presumably to protect consumers from

innocently purchasing wrecked vehicles. See generally

Lewis v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 410 F. Supp. 2d 640, 659 (N.D.

Ohio 2005) (characterizing another state’s salvage title law

in this way); O’Brien v. B.L.C. Ins. Co., 768 S.W.2d 64, 70

(Mo. 1989) (same). If car dealers or other sellers can evade

the command of the statute by simply selling a salvage

vehicle before the certificate of title arrives, the entire

purpose of the legislation can be readily defeated. The

Indiana Supreme Court has held that ambiguous statutes

should be construed “so as to arrive at the apparent

intention of the legislature.” Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,

418 N.E.2d 207, 210 (Ind. 1981). Notably, the district court

indicated that its interpretation was in some tension with

the underlying purpose of the statute. Storie, 2009 WL

348751, at *2 n.4.

Given these difficulties, we find Ind. Code § 9-22-3-11(e)

to be ambiguous. We conclude that the question raised by

the present case may best be answered by the Indiana

Supreme Court. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Laird, 622 N.E.2d

912, 915 (Ind. 1993) (holding that Indiana courts will only

engage in statutory interpretation if the language of the

statute is ambiguous); see also Arizonans for Official English

v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 79 (1997); Transamerica Ins. Co. v.

Henry, 904 F.2d 387, 390 (7th Cir. 1990). Before we certify

this question, however, we must first ascertain whether the

issue is outcome-determinative. See Shirley v. Russell, 69

F.3d 839, 844 (7th Cir. 1995).
12 No. 09-1675

B. The Interpretation of Ind. Code § 9-22-3-11(e) Is

Outcome-Determinative

Although we conclude that Ind. Code § 9-22-3-11(e) is

ambiguous and best interpreted by the Supreme Court of

Indiana, we can only certify the question if the present

case turns on the meaning of this statute. See Shirley,

69 F.3d at 844; Henry, 904 F.2d at 390.

In its response brief, Randy’s presented a number of

additional arguments in favor of its position. Although

the district court did not consider these arguments in

its summary judgment ruling, we may consider them

because our review is de novo. See Stutler v. Illinois Dept.

of Corrections, 263 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2001).

The first, and foundational, question is whether Ind.

Code § 9-22-3-11(e) in fact applies to Randy’s in the

present case. There seems little question that it does.

Because the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction

was based on diversity, the forum state’s choice of law

rules determine the applicable substantive law. See

Sound of Music Co. v. 3M, 477 F.3d 910, 915 (7th Cir.

2007). Here, the choice of law analysis is straightforward. Storie brought the present action in the Southern

District of Indiana, alleging a violation of an Indiana

statute. It is well-established “that Indiana law applies

to a claim under an Indiana statute.” Allen v. Great Am.

Reserve Ins. Co., 766 N.E.2d 1157, 1166 (Ind. 2002). The

only question is whether the Indiana statute applies to

the facts alleged in the complaint. Id. Ind. Code § 9-22-3-

11(e) clearly applies to the facts of the present case.

Randy’s—an Indiana resident—purchased and sold the

salvage vehicle in Indiana, thus conducting activities in
No. 09-1675 13

Indiana that are directly regulated under the Indiana

statute.

Storie submits that the Indiana savage title law only

applies to vehicles that are to be owned and operated

within Indiana, citing a decision of the United States

District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. See Riha

v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 2007 WL 42976

(S.D. Ind. Jan. 3, 2007).

Riha placed determinative weight on Ind. Code § 9-17-2-

1(a). This provision, which appears in a separate Chapter

from the one that governs salvage vehicles, requires every

person who both becomes an Indiana resident and owns a

vehicle that will be operated in Indiana to obtain a certificate of title within sixty days. It is not at all clear how this

provision can be read to relieve “any other person acquiring” a wrecked vehicle in Indiana of the responsibility to

apply for a salvage title when that vehicle will not be used

in-state. Ind. Code § 9-17-2-1(a) simply requires new

Indiana residents to obtain Indiana certificates of title for

their vehicles. It says nothing about the situation of an

entity that acquires a wrecked vehicle for the purpose of

Ind. Code § 9-22-3-11(e).

Storie next urges this court to rely on and follow a

decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Missouri, which held that Indiana law would

require the application of the law of the titling state. See

Storie v. Duckett Truck Center, Inc., 2007 WL 4379174 (E.D.

Mo. Dec. 13, 2007). Duckett—a case brought by Appellant

against the company that sold him the truck—focused on

Ind. Code § 26-1-9.1-316. The Duckett court concluded from

this provision that Indiana would look to Tennessee’s
14 No. 09-1675

The Eastern District of Missouri observed that “[m]otor 6

vehicles . . . may be bought in one state, sold in another, regis-

(continued...)

salvage title statutes, given that the latter jurisdiction

issued the vehicle’s certificate of title.

Ind. Code § 26-1-9.1-316 provides that the local law of the

jurisdiction “under whose certificate of title the goods are

covered governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in goods

covered by a certificate of title.” Id. The Duckett court thus

inferred that, under Indiana law, the titling state’s law

similarly governs the obligation to apply for a salvage title.

We are not convinced that the Missouri federal court’s

inference in Duckett was correct. Although the statute

specifies that the titling state’s law governs perfection and

priority of a security interest in a vehicle, nowhere does

the statute indicate that the titling state’s law covers

anything more than that. Neither the Uniform Commercial

Code nor the Indiana Code provides that an entity that

acquires a salvage vehicle in Indiana is subject to the

salvage title laws of the titling state. Indeed, and quite to

the contrary, Ind. Code § 9-22-3-11(e) explicitly demands

that “[a]ny other person acquiring a wrecked or damaged

motor vehicle . . . shall apply to the bureau . . . after receipt

of the certificate of title for a certificate of salvage title.” In

the absence of a provision that suggests otherwise, it

would seem odd to read the statute in a way that would

absolve an Indiana dealer of its obligations to abide

by Indiana salvage title laws when it happens to purchase a vehicle that is titled by another state.6
No. 09-1675 15

(...continued) 6

tered in a third, and damaged in a fourth, creating a myriad of

choice of law issues.” Duckett, 2007 WL 4379174, at *6. In

concluding that the law of the titling state applies, the court was

presumably trying to inject some certainty into an otherwise

nebulous body of conflicting state law. However, the proffered

solution would be effective only if all states applied the

salvage laws of the titling state. In any event, we find § 26-1-9.1-

316 to have only a tenuous relationship with § 9-22-3-11(e).

Randy’s finally argues that insurance companies are

gatekeepers upon whom dealers can legally rely and that

Ind. Code § 9-22-3-11(e) does not apply to dealers. Neither

of these contentions has merit.

First, no statutory provision that we can find suggests

that Ind. Code § 9-22-3-11(e) applies only to dealers.

Indeed, the literal language of that provision, which speaks

to “any other person,” suggests quite the opposite. Second,

Indiana can legitimately require those operating within its

jurisdiction to comply with its salvage title laws. Depending on the relevant state’s law, an out-of-state insurance company may be able to acquire a wrecked vehicle

without having to apply for a salvage title. But “any other

person acquiring” that vehicle in Indiana is required by

Ind. Code § 9-22-3-11(e) to apply for a salvage title once

it receives the certificate of title (subject only, of course,

to the question whether ongoing ownership is required).

Since we decline to follow Riha and Duckett, and because

we conclude that Randy’s was properly subject to the

provisions of the Indiana salvage title, the interpretation of
16 No. 09-1675

Ind. Code § 9-22-3-11(e) is determinative of the present

case. Since there is no clear controlling Indiana precedent,

it is appropriate to certify this issue to the Supreme Court

of Indiana under both Indiana Rule of Appellate Procedure

64 and our Circuit Rule 52.

III. CONCLUSION

We certify to the Indiana Supreme Court the question

whether an entity that purchases and later sells a wrecked

vehicle is required to apply for a salvage title under Ind.

Code § 9-22-3-11(e) when it no longer owns the vehicle

upon receipt of the certificate of title.

The clerk of this Court shall transmit the briefs and

appendices in this case as well as a copy of this opinion to

the Supreme Court of Indiana.

QUESTION CERTIFIED.

12-17-09