United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 23, 2024 Decided July 16, 2024

No. 22-5231

BARBARA KOWAL,

APPELLANT

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:18-cv-02798)

Matthew E. Kelley argued the cause for appellant. On the 

briefs was D. Todd Doss, Assistant Federal Defender.

Jeremy S. Simon, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Brian P. Hudak 

and Jane M. Lyons, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.
2

No. 22-5287

BARBARA KOWAL,

APPELLANT

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND DRUG 

ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 

REQUEST/PA UNIT,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:18-cv-00938)

Matthew E. Kelley argued the cause for appellant. On the 

briefs was D. Todd Doss, Assistant Federal Defender.

Jeremy S. Simon, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Brian P. Hudak 

and Jane M. Lyons, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. Douglas C. 

Dreier, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: HENDERSON, PILLARD, and RAO, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RAO.

RAO, Circuit Judge: Barbara Kowal filed Freedom of 

Information Act (“FOIA”) requests with several law 

enforcement agencies. Unsatisfied by the agencies’ 

disclosures, Kowal brought two suits claiming that the 
3

agencies failed to make adequate searches and that they 

wrongfully withheld records. The district court granted 

summary judgment for the agencies in both cases. We affirm

because the searches were adequate and the records were 

exempted from disclosure under FOIA. 

I.

Kowal is a paralegal for a federal public defender

representing Daniel Troya. Troya was sentenced to death for 

the “gangland-style” murder of a family of four on a highway 

roadside. See United States v. Troya, 733 F.3d 1125, 1136–37

(11th Cir. 2013). The murder was committed “to protect a 

large-scale drug trafficking ring involving drugs, guns and 

extensive violence.” Id. at 1129. In his habeas proceedings, 

Troya asserted the government failed to disclose exculpatory 

material at his trial. 

Seeking evidence to support Troya’s claim, Kowal

submitted identical FOIA requests to the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”), the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), and the Drug Enforcement 

Administration (“DEA”), asking for “all documents, files, 

records, etc. pertaining to any investigation, arrest, indictment, 

conviction, sentencing, incarceration, and/or parole 

of ... Daniel Troya (a/k/a ‘Homer’).” Kowal’s requests 

included Troya’s date of birth and information identifying his 

federal charges and criminal proceedings.

In response to Kowal’s request, the agencies searched for 

responsive records. The DEA searched its centralized records 

system using Troya’s name and date of birth and identified 418 

responsive pages. The DEA produced 14 pages in full, 133 in 

part, and withheld 271. The ATF searched two of its internal 

records systems, using the keyword “Daniel Troya,” and

identified 480 responsive pages. The ATF produced 63 pages 
4

in full, 223 in part, and withheld 194. The FBI searched its 

Central Records System using the terms “Daniel Anthony 

Troya” and “Homer Troya.” The FBI identified 275 responsive 

pages, produced 134 pages (with some redactions), and 

withheld 141. In their Vaughn indices,

1

the agencies explained 

that they withheld information pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 

3, 6, 7(C), 7(D), 7(E), and 7(F). See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), (6), 

(7)(C)–(F). 

Dissatisfied with the responses, Kowal challenged the 

adequacy of the agencies’ searches and alleged the agencies 

impermissibly withheld documents. After she exhausted her 

administrative remedies, Kowal filed two suits in federal court

against components of the Department of Justice: one primarily 

against the FBI and the ATF, and another against the DEA. The

district court granted summary judgment to the agencies. See 

Kowal v. Dep’t of Justice, 2022 WL 2315535 (D.D.C. June 27, 

2022); Kowal v. Dep’t of Justice, 2022 WL 4016582 (D.D.C. 

Sept. 2, 2022). Kowal timely appealed. Because the legal and 

factual issues substantially overlap, we decide both appeals in 

a single opinion. 

II.

FOIA requires federal agencies, when requested, to 

disclose certain agency records unless an exemption applies. 

Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended 

at 5 U.S.C. §§ 552–59). Kowal challenges both the adequacy 

1 When relying on a FOIA exemption to withhold records, an agency 

must “provide a relatively detailed justification, specifically 

identifying the reasons why a particular exemption is relevant and 

correlating those claims with the particular part of a withheld 

document to which they apply.” Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Dep’t of 

Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also Vaughn v. 

Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
5

of the agencies’ searches and their withholding of some 

records. We review the district court’s grants of summary 

judgment de novo. 

A.

Kowal first challenges the adequacy of the searches made 

by the FBI, ATF, and DEA. An agency must demonstrate it 

“made a good faith effort to conduct a search for the requested 

records, using methods which can be reasonably expected to 

produce the information requested.” Watkins Law & Advoc., 

PLLC v. Dep’t of Justice, 78 F.4th 436, 442 (D.C. Cir. 2023)

(cleaned up). The adequacy of a search is “determined not by 

the fruits of the search, but by the appropriateness of the 

methods used to carry out the search.” Ancient Coin Collectors 

Guild v. Dep’t of State, 641 F.3d 504, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2011)

(cleaned up). We consider whether the agency’s search was

reasonable based on the specific information requested and the 

agency’s efforts to produce that information. 

To facilitate judicial review, an agency usually provides 

an “affidavit, setting forth the search terms and the type of 

search performed, and averring that all files likely to contain 

responsive materials ... were searched.” Oglesby v. Dep’t of 

Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990). “Agency affidavits are 

accorded a presumption of good faith,” and we will not credit

“[m]ere speculation that ... uncovered documents may exist” 

as a basis for finding an agency’s search inadequate. SafeCard 

Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200–01 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

1.

Kowal first argues she presented evidence the FBI, ATF, 

and DEA overlooked responsive records. Kowal possesses

over 200 multimedia items from Troya’s trial, some of which, 

for instance, explicitly mention the DEA in the file name. The 
6

agencies did not disclose these records in response to her FOIA 

request. Kowal maintains these omissions are sufficient 

evidence to preclude summary judgment because she has 

raised a factual dispute about the adequacy of the agencies’ 

searches. 

We disagree. At best, Kowal has established the agencies 

may have missed some records in their searches. But a 

“reasonable and thorough search” may still miss records. 

Iturralde v. Comptroller of Currency, 315 F.3d 311, 315 (D.C. 

Cir. 2003); see also Nation Magazine v. U.S. Customs Serv., 71 

F.3d 885, 892 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[T]here is no requirement 

that an agency produce all responsive documents.”). Agencies 

are not required “to examine virtually every document in [their]

files” or “follow[] an interminable trail of cross-referenced 

documents.” Steinberg v. Dep’t of Justice, 23 F.3d 548, 552 

(D.C. Cir. 1994). We focus on the process, not the results, when 

determining the adequacy of a FOIA search. See, e.g.,

Safecard, 926 F.2d at 1201.

We hold the agencies’ searches were reasonable in light of 

Kowal’s particular requests. In identical requests to the FBI, 

ATF, and DEA, Kowal asked for “all ... records ... pertaining 

to any investigation, arrest, indictment, conviction, sentencing, 

incarceration, and/or parole” of Troya. Kowal specified 

Troya’s criminal proceeding and federal charges and

represented that she was requesting the information for Troya’s 

habeas proceedings. The framing of Kowal’s requests directed 

the agencies toward their criminal investigation databases. The 

FBI searched its Central Records System, which “spans the 

entire FBI organization and encompasses the records of FBI 

Headquarters ... , FBI Field Offices, and FBI Legal Attaché 

Offices ... worldwide.” The ATF similarly searched its NForce database and Treasury Enforcement Communications 

System, which are “the two systems of records where ATF 
7

records of criminal investigations are housed.” The DEA 

searched its Investigative Reporting and Filing System, which 

included a “worldwide search for DEA records, including 

records maintained at field offices.” 

Troya was a criminal defendant, and Kowal sought 

materials about his criminal investigation. The FBI, ATF, and 

DEA each searched their criminal investigation databases

based on Kowal’s specific records request. They were not 

required to do more. “The agency is not required to speculate 

about potential leads.” Kowalczyk v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d

386, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (cleaned up). 

Moreover, Kowal contends the agencies’ searches were 

inadequate because they failed to uncover additional trial 

records in her possession that she surmises the agencies should 

have produced. But given that entities not subject to these 

FOIA requests—including local law enforcement and the U.S.

Attorney’s office in Florida—were involved in investigating 

and trying Troya, Kowal has not supported her inference. Our 

review of the record and the omitted materials does not “raise[] 

substantial doubt” about the reasonableness of the searches.

Valencia–Lucena v. U.S. Coast Guard, 180 F.3d 321, 326

(D.C. Cir. 1999) (cleaned up). If Kowal believes the agencies 

failed to turn over specific records from Troya’s trial and wants 

the agencies to pursue records related to her trial exhibits, she 

can submit a second, more specific FOIA request. See 

Kowalczyk, 73 F.3d at 389. But she fails to demonstrate the 

agencies’ searches were inadequate.

2.

Second, Kowal challenges the scope of the agencies’ 

searches, asserting that the agencies narrowly construed her 

requests, failed to use all relevant keywords, and failed to 

search all appropriate databases. 
8

Kowal first contends the FBI and ATF failed to construe 

her search requests accurately, both by not searching for all 

records mentioning Troya and by improperly limiting searches 

to only certain records systems.

2 Yet Kowal specifically 

requested records pertaining to the federal criminal 

investigation and prosecution of Troya and detailed his federal 

charges and criminal proceedings in the subject line of her 

request.

As explained in the previous section, the FBI and ATF

properly explained that they searched all relevant databases for 

investigation files related to the criminal matter Kowal 

referenced in her FOIA request. The ATF explained it 

construed Kowal’s request as one for “records of ATF’s role in 

the federal criminal investigation of Daniel Troya” and 

accordingly searched its only two databases with records on 

criminal investigations. For similar reasons, the FBI clarified it 

did not need to search beyond its Central Records System

because any information related to Troya’s criminal 

prosecution would be indexed there.

Agencies have the discretion to construe requests 

reasonably and conduct flexible and targeted searches within 

their internal records systems. Agencies do not need to honor 

unreasonably burdensome requests, boiling the ocean in search 

of responsive records. See, e.g., Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at 

891–92. 

Kowal does not rebut the agency affidavits or provide any 

“evidence of agency bad faith.” See Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 

144, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Rather, she only speculates that the 

FBI and ATF possess other records about Troya. But “[m]ere 

2 Kowal does not appeal the district court’s conclusion that the DEA 

properly searched its databases. 
9

speculation” is insufficient to demonstrate the agencies’ 

searches were inadequate. See Safecard, 926 F.2d at 1201. 

Second, Kowal maintains the FBI, ATF, and DEA did not

conduct adequate searches because they failed to search for 

records mentioning Troya’s alias or to search using phonetic 

variations of Troya’s name. Agencies have flexibility when 

searching for responsive records and so may conduct phonetic 

or alias searches when these searches are likely to produce 

additional, responsive records. Such variant searches, however,

are not always required. Maynard v. CIA, 986 F.2d 547, 560 

(1st Cir. 1993). We review only whether the methods used “can 

be reasonably expected to produce the information requested,” 

Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68, and whether the agency’s search was 

“tailored to the nature” of the FOIA request, Campbell v. Dep’t 

of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

Given the parameters of Kowal’s request and because the 

agencies located Troya’s criminal investigation files, it was 

reasonable for them not to search using Troya’s alias. Kowal

only requested records “pertaining to any investigation, arrest, 

indictment, conviction, sentencing, incarceration, and/or 

parole of Daniel Troya.” The DEA explained that it maintains 

records related to criminal investigations in its Investigative 

Reporting and Filing System, which is indexed by name and 

date of birth. The DEA searched the system and found five 

criminal investigative files for Troya. Because the DEA 

located the files mentioned in Kowal’s request, there was no 

need to separately search for additional records indexed under 

Troya’s alias. Similarly, the ATF and FBI also detailed how 

they maintain criminal and investigatory files indexed by 

name, social security number, or date of birth, and found 

responsive investigative files concerning Troya’s prosecution 

with searches tailored for their databases. Any mention of the 

alias “Homer” that Kowal believes could be found through an 
10

alternative search is not responsive to her request for records 

related to the investigation and trial “of Daniel Troya.” Nor is 

it “obvious” that Troya would be referenced only by his alias 

in any agency database. See Am. Oversight v. Dep’t of Health 

& Hum. Servs., 101 F.4th 909, 923–24 (D.C. Cir. 2024). Once 

the agencies found their criminal investigative files pertaining 

to Troya’s capital case, it was reasonable not to search further.

Kowal merely speculates the agencies possess additional 

records in which Troya was identified only by his street name.

But that is insufficient to demonstrate the agencies’ searches 

were unreasonable or performed in bad faith.

* * *

In sum, the FBI, ATF, and DEA followed Kowal’s specific 

requests to locate records relevant to Troya’s criminal case and 

demonstrated that their search methods were reasonable.

B.

Kowal also challenges the agencies’ reliance on FOIA 

Exemptions 3, 6, 7(C), 7(D), and 7(E) to withhold records.

3

Agencies may demonstrate the applicability of an exemption 

by affidavit. And “an agency’s justification for invoking a 

FOIA exemption is sufficient if it appears ‘logical’ or 

‘plausible.’” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Defense, 715 F.3d 

937, 941 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (cleaned up). We hold 

3 The FBI and DEA also withheld records pursuant to FOIA 

Exemption 7(F), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F). The district court did not 

rule on the applicability of this exemption because all records

withheld under 7(F) were also withheld under 7(C). We agree the 

records are exempt under Exemption 7(C), so it is unnecessary to 

determine whether Exemption 7(F) also justifies withholding these 

records. 
11

the agencies were justified in withholding certain records under 

these exemptions. 

1.

Exemption 3 protects records “specifically exempted from 

disclosure by statute.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). The FBI invoked 

this exemption to withhold a narrative summary of a wiretap 

conversation, as required by the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 2510–12. Kowal does not dispute the record is subject to 

Exemption 3’s protections. She claims instead that the record 

should be released under the public domain doctrine because it 

summarizes wiretaps introduced at Troya’s trial. 

The public domain doctrine provides that “materials 

normally immunized from disclosure under FOIA lose their 

protective cloak once disclosed and preserved in a permanent 

public record.” Cottone v. Reno, 193 F.3d 550, 554 (D.C. Cir. 

1999). But this exception is “narrow” and entitles “the 

requester [to] receive no more than what is publicly available.”

See id. at 553–55. Courts are forbidden “from prying loose 

from the government even the smallest bit of information that 

is properly” withheld. Afshar v. Dep’t of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 

1130 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

Kowal alleges only that the wiretapped conversations were 

made public at Troya’s trial, not that the FBI’s narrative

summary of those conversations was made public. An agency’s 

summary is not the same as the conversation itself. Kowal has 

not shown “there is a permanent public record of the exact” 

record she seeks. Davis v. Dep’t of Justice, 968 F.2d 1276, 

1280 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The public domain doctrine does not 

defeat the FBI’s withholding under Exemption 3. 
12

2.

The FBI, ATF, and DEA invoked FOIA Exemptions 6 and 

7(C) to withhold the names and other identifying information, 

including addresses and phone numbers, of witnesses and law 

enforcement personnel involved in Troya’s investigation. 

FOIA Exemption 6 protects “personnel ... and similar files the 

disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted 

invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). FOIA 

Exemption 7(C) protects “records or information compiled for 

law enforcement purposes ... [that] could reasonably be 

expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal 

privacy.” Id. § 552(b)(7)(C). When, as here, the request is for 

records compiled for law enforcement purposes, the 

information protected by Exemption 6 is a subset of that 

protected by Exemption 7(C), so we need only analyze the 

latter. Roth v. Dep’t of Justice, 642 F.3d 1161, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 

2011).

When reviewing an agency’s reliance on Exemption 7(C), 

we “must balance the privacy interests involved against the 

public interest in disclosure.” SafeCard, 926 F.2d at 1205. 

There must be “substantial probability that the disclosure [of 

information] will lead to the threatened invasion [of privacy].”

Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Emps. v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873, 878 

(D.C. Cir. 1989). We “apply a more deferential attitude toward 

the claims of ‘law enforcement purpose’ made by a criminal 

law enforcement agency” because “inadvertent disclosure of 

criminal investigations, information sources, or enforcement 

techniques might cause serious harm to the legitimate interests 

of law enforcement agencies.” Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408,

418 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 

Kowal argues that the agencies failed to justify their

withholdings. We disagree. The FBI, ATF, and DEA explained 
13

that they redacted names and other personal information, such 

as telephone numbers, addresses, and confidential source 

numbers, to prevent “possible harassment” or “derogatory 

inferences and suspicion” against the personnel and witnesses 

for their involvement in a gang murder investigation. These 

explanations are sufficient to demonstrate that the disclosure of 

the withheld information would threaten privacy interests.

Schrecker v. Dep’t of Justice, 349 F.3d 657, 666 (D.C. Cir. 

2003). 

Moreover, Kowal fails to establish any cognizable public 

interest in disclosure. There is no public interest in disclosure 

“unless there is compelling evidence that the agency denying 

the FOIA request is engaged in illegal activity, and access to 

the [requested information] ... is necessary in order to confirm 

or refute that evidence.” Safecard, 926 F.2d at 1205–06. Kowal

provides no evidence of agency misconduct. Instead, she 

merely speculates that the government may have exculpatory 

evidence in Troya’s capital case and that this implicates the 

public interest. Our caselaw is clear that “the requester must 

establish more than a bare suspicion in order to obtain 

disclosure.” CREW v. Dep’t of Justice, 746 F.3d 1082, 1094

(D.C. Cir. 2014) (cleaned up); see also Roth, 642 F.3d at 1178 

(same). Where there is no identifiable public interest, the 

privacy interest protected by Exemption 7(C) prevails because 

“something, even a modest privacy interest, outweighs nothing 

every time.” Horner, 879 F.2d at 879.

Kowal also argues the public domain doctrine should 

overcome the agencies’ reliance on Exemption 7(C) for some 

withheld trial records and witness names. Although she 

provided the district court with a list of testifying witnesses and 

transcripts of their testimony, these trial records demonstrate 

only that those specific witnesses testified at trial. The records 

do not link witnesses to particular documents or to the 
14

information provided by that source. Because the specific 

information Kowal seeks has not been publicly disclosed, she 

cannot benefit from the public domain doctrine. See Afshar, 

702 F.2d at 1130.

Kowal also specifically challenges the FBI’s withholding 

of a testifying witness’s plea agreement because the agreement 

was admitted into evidence at trial and discussed in open court.

Trial records are generally considered public; however, to 

satisfy the public domain doctrine, they must be “preserved in 

a permanent public record.” Cottone, 193 F.3d at 554. Records 

are no longer public when “destroyed, placed under seal, or 

otherwise removed from the public domain.” Id. at 556. And 

our circuit has cast doubt on the proposition that “practically

obscure” material remains public. Davis, 968 F.2d at 1279

(cleaned up). Here, the FBI has provided evidence that Troya’s

trial records, including the specified plea agreement, were not 

filed with the court and preserved. Because these records are 

not accessible on the public or electronic docket, the plea 

agreement does not fit within the public domain doctrine. 

We hold that the FBI, ATF, and DEA properly justified 

their withholding of records under Exemption 7(C). 

3.

The FBI and DEA also relied on Exemption 7(D) to 

withhold information that “could reasonably be expected to 

disclose the identity of a confidential source ... [or] 

information furnished by a confidential source.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(b)(7)(D). Kowal argues this exemption is inapplicable 

because the agencies failed to demonstrate that each source 

testified with an assurance of confidentiality and provided no 

“particularized findings for each source.”
15

A source is “confidential” if he “provided information 

under an express assurance of confidentiality or in 

circumstances from which such an assurance could be 

reasonably inferred.” Dep’t of Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S.

165, 172 (1993). For example, in the context of a serious or 

violent crime we may infer an assurance of confidentiality 

because of the risks of exposing a “criminal 

enterprise ... inclined toward violent retaliation.” Mays v. 

DEA, 234 F.3d 1324, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Of course, we

cannot “cloak in confidentiality anything anyone ever tells a 

law enforcement officer about any ... crime.” Id. Nonetheless,

the government may invoke Exemption 7(D) if the 

circumstances, such as the nature of the crime investigated and 

the informant’s relation to it, support an inference of 

confidentiality. Id. at 1329.

The circumstances here easily support an inference of 

confidentiality for each source in Troya’s murder

investigation.

4 The FBI plausibly asserted it was “especially 

important” to withhold information about sources in this 

context “given the subject matter ... involves [the] murder of a 

family on a roadside, [and Troya] was convicted for such 

murder.” Similarly, the DEA explained the sources provided

information about an extensive drug trafficking operation and 

therefore faced a threat of violent reprisal. We have recognized

implied assurances of confidentiality in similar circumstances. 

See id. (informants to a conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine); 

Hodge v. FBI, 703 F.3d 575, 578, 581–82 (D.C. Cir. 2013)

(informants in a triple murder investigation). The grisly nature 

of Troya’s crime, committed to further a drug trafficking 

4 Because the information was provided by sources with an implied 

assurance of confidentiality, we need not address whether some 

information was also provided pursuant to an express assurance of 

confidentiality.
16

operation, permits a fair inference of confidentiality for the 

sources in Troya’s investigation. 

Kowal also maintains that any source who expected to

testify at trial cannot be considered confidential and is not 

protected by Exemption 7(D). But our circuit has long rejected 

this argument. “It would defeat the purpose of FOIA 

[E]xemption 7(D) to hold that the possibility of trial testimony 

to some or all of the substance of an FBI interview establishes 

that the source had no expectation that his identity would 

remain undisclosed.” Schmerler v. FBI, 900 F.2d 333, 339 

(D.C. Cir. 1990).

We note that Exemption 7(D) has no balancing test. If 

“production of criminal investigative records could reasonably 

be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source or 

information furnished by such a source, that ends the matter.” 

Roth, 642 F.3d at 1184–85 (cleaned up). The FBI and DEA

demonstrated the sources here were confidential and 

reasonably justified withholding the information they provided

in Troya’s investigation.

4.

Kowal also challenges the FBI’s and DEA’s Exemption 

7(E) withholdings. Exemption 7(E) allows agencies to 

withhold records when release would “disclose techniques and 

procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, 

or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement 

investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could 

reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.” 5 

U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E). The FBI and DEA invoked Exemption 

7(E) to withhold records detailing investigative techniques, 

including technical information about computer databases and 

internal systems.
17

To justify withholding under Exemption 7(E), an agency 

must clear only a “low bar” by “demonstrat[ing] logically how 

the release of the requested information might create a risk of 

circumvention of the law.” Blackwell v. FBI, 646 F.3d 37, 42 

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). 

This low bar is easily cleared here. The agencies provided 

well-supported affidavits explaining how the information 

withheld could aid criminal elements. For example, the DEA’s 

declarant explained the withheld information could provide 

drug traffickers information on how the agency prioritized its 

investigations, permitting would-be criminals to change their 

behaviors to avoid detection. Similarly, the FBI’s affidavit 

explained that providing information on internal databases and 

file paths could aid in the commission of cyberattacks against 

the agency. The agencies logically connected withholding with 

preventing circumvention of the law. 

Kowal also claims this withheld information is publicly 

available, but her evidence fails to support this contention. For 

example, she asserts that a requested DEA manual is public, 

providing an Amazon.com link. But this link is for an outdated 

manual, and Kowal does not allege the DEA officially released 

this manual. See, e.g., Medina-Hincapie v. Dep’t of State, 700 

F.2d 737, 742 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (observing an 

unauthorized disclosure does not waive a FOIA exemption).

Nor does Kowal demonstrate the agencies merely withheld 

information on ordinary law enforcement tactics already 

known to the public. Instead, the agencies’ affidavits detail 

how the agencies were protecting “methods ... [the agency] 

considers meaningful ... [which] can reveal law enforcement 

techniques and procedures.” Shapiro v. Dep’t of Justice, 893 

F.3d 796, 800 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
18

The FBI and DEA met their burden to explain how 

disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to 

risk circumvention of the law under Exemption 7(E).

5

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, the agencies properly 

responded to Kowal’s FOIA requests. We therefore affirm the 

grants of summary judgment to the FBI, ATF, and DEA.

So ordered.

5 Kowal also challenges the adequacy of the agencies’ Vaughn

indices and the appropriateness of redactions. Her arguments largely 

mirror those made against the FOIA exemptions, and they similarly 

fail.