This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. NO. A-1-CA-35265 4 CARLSON JONES, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 7 Briana H. Zamora, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Maris Veidemanis, Assistant Attorney General 10 Santa Fe, NM 11 for Appellee 12 Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender 13 Kathleen T. Baldridge, Appellate Defender 14 Santa Fe, NM 15 for Appellant 16 MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 VIGIL, Judge. 182 {1} Defendant Carlson Jones appeals from a jury verdict convicting him of one 1 count of aggravated battery with a d eadly weapon, in violation of NMSA 1978, 2 Section 30-3-5(A), (C) (1969); one count of leaving the scene of an accident with no 3 great bodily harm or death, in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 66-7-202 (1978); one 4 count of criminal damage to property over $1000, in violation of NMSA 1978, 5 Section 30-15-1 (1963); one count of criminal damage to property less than $1000, 6 in violation of Section 30-15-1; and one c ount of reckless driving, in violation of 7 NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-113 (1987). Defendant argues: (1) trial counsel was 8 ineffective in failing to argueand request that the jury be instructed on self-defense 9 and duress as affirmative defe nses to aggravated battery; and (2) the State’s evidence 10 was insufficient to support convicting Defe ndant on any of the counts charged. For 11 the reasons that follow, we affirm Defe ndant’s convictions. Because this is a 12 memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural 13 posture of the case, we set forth only such f acts and law as are necessary to decide the 14 merits. 15 BACKGROUND 16
{2} Defendant’s convictions stem from anincident in which a group of bail 17 bondsmen attempted to arrest him for failing to appear incourt. New Mexico Bonding 18 posted a bond for Defendant in association w ith a charge against him for driving with 193 a revoked license. Defendant failed to showup for court appearances. As of March 1 2015, New Mexico Bonding had been attempting to locate Defendant for 2 approximately six months, without success. 3
{3} Aaron Alberti (Victim), a bail bondsman for New Mexico Bonding, eventually 4 received a tip about Defendant’s whereabouts and that his vehicle was parked in the 5 carport of an apartment complex in Albuquerque. Based on this tip, Victim, four other 6 bail bondsmen (Richard Montoya , Gabriel Diaz, Joe Nash, and Felipe Tapia), and Joe 7 Nash’s fiancee, Crystal Baca we nt to the apartment comple x to arrest Defendant, but 8 when they arrived, Defendant’s vehicle was gone. While theywaited for Defendant 9 to return, Victim and the other bail bondsmen discussed the layout of the apartment 10 complex and how best to position themselves and their cars so that when Defendant 11 returned, he would not be able to get away. All of the bail bondsmen had a badge or 12 logo on their vest identifying themselves as such. They were also carrying equipment, 13 including firearms, tasers, mace, handcuffs, and flashlights. 14
{4} Defendant returned to the apartment complex a couple of hours later, around 15 midnight, and backed his vehicle into a parking space in the carport. The bail 16 bondsmen approached Defendant’s vehicl e. Victim was positioned in front of 17 Defendant’s vehicle nearone of the headlights and the other bondsmen were 18 positioned on the sides of the vehicle. Th e bondsmen identified themselves, yelled at 194 Defendant to get out of the car, and bange d on the Defendant’s driver’s side window. 1 In response, Defendant, who had met Victim before, looke d directly at Victim with 2 a “blank stare” and did not say anything. There was testimony that the 3

carport had sufficient lighting to allow Defendant to see who the bondsmen were. 4
{5} Defendant’s vehicle started “going b ack and forth like he was putting it in 5 gear,” and then “took off at a real high rate of speed out of that spot[,]” turning toward 6 the exit of the carport, which put Victim ri ght “in the center of the car[’s]” trajectory. 7 This acceleration caused Victim to be stru ck by the vehicle and to fall onto the hood. 8 After Defendant had already started to leave, Richard Montoya broke the Defendant’s 9 driver’s side window “to neutralize” Defe ndant from running anyoneover and so that 10 Defendant would not smash Victim into a nearby wall. After rolling off the hood after 11 the first hit, Victim was struck by Defendant ’s vehicle again. Victim drew his firearm 12 and fired seven or eight shots at Defendant ’s vehicle as he was being pushed back by 13 Defendant’s vehicle during the second hit. As a result of these hits, Victim suffered 14 sore knees, a sore back, and a headache. There was testimony that Defendant could 15 have exited the parking space without hitting Victim if he had been driving slower. 16
{6} The carport was located in a narrow alleyway with one entrance and exit. 17 Victim and Joe Nash (who was driving Crys tal Baca’s vehicle) had parked their cars 185 between where Defendant was parked and th e exit of the carport. As Defendant exited 1 the alley, he collided “head-on” with Crystal Baca’s vehicle. Defendant then “backed 2 it up and ran over the driver’s side porti on of the car[.]” Crystal Baca was in the 3 vehicle during this collision. Joe Nash te stified that there was about $9000 in damage 4 to Crystal Baca’s car. Defendant also hit Victim’s vehicle, causing minor damage. 5 After a short chase, the bondsmen chose notto continue pursuing Defendant. There 6 was testimony that De fendant could have exited the carport without hitting Crystal 7 Baca and Victim’s vehicles. 8 DISCUSSION 9 I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 10
{7} Defendant argues that his trial counsel wa s ineffective in failing to request that 11 the jury be instructed on the affirmative de fenses of self-defense and duress to the 12 charge of aggravated battery. We disagree. 13
{8} “We review de novo the legal issues involved with claims of ineffective 14 assistance of counsel and defer to the findings of fact of the district court if substantial 15 evidence supports the court’s findings.” State v. Lopez , 2018-NMCA-002, ¶ 17, 410 16 P.3d 226 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). “A prima facie 17 case of ineffective assistance of counsel is made where: (1) it appears from the record 18 that counsel acted unreasonably; (2) the appellate court cannot think of a plausible, 196 rational strategy or tactic toexplain counsel’s conduct; and (3) the actions of counsel 1 are prejudicial.” Id. ¶ 18 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2
{9} “We indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide 3 range of reasonable professional assist ance” and “we do not second guess defense 4 counsel’s strategic decisions when applying the deficient performance prong.” State 5 v. Morgan , 2016-NMCA-089, ¶ 14, 382 P.3d 981 (alteration, internal quotation marks, 6 and citation omitted); see State v. Baca , 1993-NMCA-051, ¶ 34, 115 N.M. 536, 854 7 P.2d 363 (“Counsel’s choice of defenses will not be disturbe d unless the choice 8 appears wholly unreasoned or deprives the de fendant of his only defense.”). “The use 9 of a particular jury instruction that comports with the law and use notes is a tactical 10 decision on the part of trial counsel that this Court will not disturb.” State v. Perea , 11 2001-NMCA-002, ¶ 25, 130 N.M. 46, 16 P.3d 1105, aff’d in part, vacated in part , 12 2001-NMSC-026, ¶ 6, 130 N.M. 732, 31 P.3d 1006. 13
{10} We begin by placing Defendant’s claim in context. Defendant’s theory of the 14 case was that his actions hitting Victim with his vehicle werereactions to the “[c]haos, 15 confusion, and gunshots” he encounteredwhen Victim and the other bondsmen 16 attempted to arrest him. Inopening statement, defense c ounsel explained to the jury 17 that: 18 This night was chaotic and it was confusing. Even to the people 19 experiencing it, especially to [Def endant], who had no idea the stakeout 207 was taking place in the first place. . . . [N]o one can testify that 1 [Defendant] intended to hit [Victim] w ith his vehicle; that he intended to 2 injure him[.] . . . No one can testify that he was not just reacting to the 3 chaos and the confusion caused by the bail bondsmen. 4 At the close of the State’s evidence, Defendant moved for a directed verdict on the 5 State’s count of aggravated battery, which the district court denied, arguing that the 6 State failed to establish that Defendant inte nded to injure Victim when he struck him 7 with his vehicle. And during closing argument, defense counsel argued that: 8 All we know about [Defendant’s] intent is that he wanted to get out of 9 there, that he was surrounded, being yelled at, his windows were 10 breaking. It’s a chaotic situation. A nd his instinct was to flee, and that’s 11 what he did. 12 And we know from [Richard] Montoya that [Defendant] couldn’t 13 have fled without tapping [Victim] with his car because of where he was 14 positioned, that there was no way out . But simply hitting [Victim] with 15 his car is not enough. That’s not anaggravated battery. [Defendant] 16 needed to do that with the intent to injure [Victim]. But what we have 17 here is somebody trying to get away. 18

. . . . 19 People react to situations. Accidents happen. But not all accidents are 20 criminal. 21
{11} Under these facts, we conclude that de fense counsel’s choice to not request jury 22 instructions on the affirmative defenses of self-defense and duress was part of a 23 plausible, rational trial strategy. Defense counsel’s strategy for defending the 24 aggravated battery count was that Defendant lacked the requisite intent to injure 258 Victim when he struck him with his vehi cle, arguing that Defendant’s acts of hitting 1 Victim were merely reactions to the “[c] haos, confusion, and gunshots” that he faced 2 when the bail agents attempted to arre st him. This strategy was not wholly 3 unreasonable in light of the fact that Defendant did not testify and the State was forced 4 to rely heavily upon circumstantial evidence to prove Defendant’s intent to injure 5 Victim. 6
{12} Additionally, even if the ev idence at trial was suffici ent to warrant giving the 7 instructions on self-defense and duress, pursuing these defenses would have been 8 inconsistent with defense counsel’s theorythat Defendant lacked intent to injure 9 Victim. In pursuing self-defense or duress defenses, Defendant w ould have effectively 10 conceded that he intended to hurt Victim wh en he hit Victim with his vehicle—either 11 on grounds of “necessary defense of self against any unlawful action; reasonable 12 grounds to believe a design exists to commit a felony; or reasonable grounds to 13 believe a design exists to do some great bodily harm[,]” UJI 14-5183 NMRA, Use 14 Note 1; or because “defendant was forced” to injure Victim “under threats or out of 15 necessity.” UJI 14-5130 NMRA (alterations omitted). 16
{13} We conclude that Defendant failed to es tablish a claim of in effective assistance 17 of counsel. See Baca ,1993-NMCA-051, ¶¶ 2-5, 36 (holdi ng that defense counsel was 18 not ineffective in failing to request a duress jury instruction in aggravated battery case 199 in part because it would have been inconsistent with the defendants’ theory of the case 1 that no conspiracy to stab the victim had occurred and that they acted in self-defense 2 to an incident initiated by the victim); State v. Gonzales , 2007-NMSC-059, ¶¶ 2-4, 15, 3 143 N.M. 25, 172 P.3d 162 (holding that defense counsel was not ineffective in failing 4 to request an imperfect self-defense jury instruction in homicide case; defense 5 counsel’s choice was reasonable trial strategy where the defendant’s theory of the case 6 was to maintain his factual innocence). 7 II. Sufficiency of the Evidence 8
{14} Defendant also claims that the State’ s evidence was insufficient to support his 9 convictions “because it failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Defendant] 10 acted with the requisite intent under the circumstances.” 11
{15} In reviewing a defendant’s challenge to the sufficien cy of evidence, we view 12 “the evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, indulging all reasonable 13 inferences and resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the verdict.” State v. 14 Carrillo , 2017-NMSC-023, ¶ 42, 399 P.3d 367 (internal quotation marks and citation 15 omitted). The central consideration in a suffi ciency of the evidence review is “whether 16 substantial evidence of either a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support a 17 verdict of guilty beyond a reas onable doubt with respect to every element essential to 18 a conviction.” State v. Suazo , 2017-NMSC-011, ¶ 32, 390 P. 3d 674 (internal quotation 1910 marks and citation omitted). In jury trials, “thejury instructions are the law of the case 1 against which the sufficiency of the evid ence supporting the jury’s verdict is to be 2 measured.” State v. Duttle , 2017-NMCA-001, ¶ 18, 387 P.3d 885, cert. denied , ___- 3 NMCERT-___, (No. S-1-SC-35993, Aug. 8, 2016). 4 A. Aggravated Battery With a Deadly Weapon 5
{16} The jury was instructed, according to UJI 14-322 NMRA, that in order to find 6 Defendant guilty of aggravated battery w ith a deadly weapon that the State was 7 required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements: 8 1. . . . Defendant, touched or app lied force to [Victim] by hitting him 9 with a vehicle. [Defendant] used a vehicle. A vehicle is a deadly 10 weapon only if you find that a vehicle when used as a weapon, 11 could cause death or great bodily harm; 12 2. . . . Defendant, intended to injure [Victim]; 13 3. [Defendant’s] act was unlawful; 14 4. This happened in New Mexico on or about the 3rd day of 15 March, 2015. 16 “Intent to injure need not be establishe d by direct evidence but may be inferred from 17 conduct and the surrounding circumstances.” State v. Valles , 1972-NMCA-076, ¶ 4, 18 84 N.M. 1, 498 P.2d 693. 19
{17} In their attempt to arre st Defendant, the bondsmen identified themselves, yelled 20 at Defendant to get out of the car, and banged on the Defendant’s driver’s side 2111 window. The lighting was sufficient to allow Defendant to see who the bondsmen 1 were. In response, Defendant , who had met Victim before , looked directly at Victim 2 with a “blank stare” and did not say anything. Defendant nevertheless proceeded to 3 accelerate out of the parking space, and hit Victim with his vehicle twice, despite 4 evidence that he could have left the parking space and carport without hitting Victim 5 had he been driving slower. Based on the evidence presented at trial, we conclude, in 6 addition to proving the other elements of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, 7 that the State presented sufficient eviden ce to establish that Defendant acted with 8 intent to injure Victim when he hit him with his vehicle. 9 B. Leaving the Scene of an Accident 10
{18} The jury was instructed, consistent withSection 66-7-202, that in order to find 11 Defendant guilty of leaving the scene of an accident with no great bodily harm or 12 death, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the 13 following elements: 14 1. . . . Defendant, operated a motor vehicle; 15 2. . . . Defendant, was involved in an accident which resulted in 16 injury but not great bodily harm to [Victim]; 17 3. . . . Defendant, failed to stop and give his name, address, and 18 registration number of the vehicle he was driving. 19 4. This happened in New Mexico on or about the 3rd day of March, 20 2015. 2112 In addition to the other elements of leavi ng the scene of an accide nt, the State was also 1 required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt th at Defendant “acted intentionally when 2 he committed the crime. A person acts intentionally when he purposely does an act 3 which the law declares to bea crime. Whether . . . Defe ndant, acted intentionally may 4 be inferred from all of the surrounding circumstances, such as the manner in which 5 he acts, the means used, and his conduct.” 6
{19} Defendant was undisputably involved in an accident resulting in injury to 7 Victim when he hit him twice with his vehicle. Defendant did not stop after hitting 8 Victim and he did not give his name, address, and registration number of the vehicle 9 he was driving to Victim or to any of the other bail agents present at the scene. Rather, 10 Defendant ran from the scene of the accident . Based on the evidence presented at trial, 11 we conclude, in addition to proving the other elements of leaving the scene of an 12 accident, that the State presented sufficient evidence to establish that Defendant acted 13 intentionally when he failed to stop and give his name, a ddress, and the registration 14 of the vehicle he was driving after he wa s involved in an accident that resulted in 15 injury to Victim. 16 C. Criminal Damage to Property 17
{20} The jury was instructed, according to UJI 14-1501 NMRA, that in order to find 1813 Defendant guilty of criminal damage to property in excess of $1000, the State was 1 required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements: 2 1. [D]efendant intentionally damaged property of Crystal Baca; 3 2. [D]efendant did not have the ow ner’s permission to damage the 4 property; 5 3. The amount of the damage to the property was more than $1000[]; 6 4. This happened in New Mexico on or about the 3rd day of March, 7 2015. 8 The jury was also instructed, according to UJI 14-1501, that in order to find Defendant 9 guilty of criminal damage to property le ss than $1000, the State was required to prove 10 beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements: 11 1. [D]efendant intentionally damaged property of [Victim]; 12 2. [D]efendant did not have the ow ner’s permission to damage the 13 property; 14 3. This happened in New Mexico on or about the 3rd day of March, 15 2015. 16 In addition to the other elements of criminal damage to property, the State was also 17 required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt th at Defendant “acted intentionally when 18 he committed the crime[s]. A person acts intentionally when he purposely does an act 19 which the law declares to bea crime. Whether . . . Defendant acted intentionally may 2014 be inferred from all of the surrounding circ umstances, such as the manner in which 1 he acts, the means used, and his conduct.” 2
{21} As Defendant exited the carport, he co llided “head-on” with Crystal Baca’s 3 vehicle. Defendant then “backed it up and ran over the driver’s side portion of the 4 car[.]” Joe Nash testified that there wa s about $9000 in damage to Crystal Baca’s car. 5 Defendant also hit Victim’s vehicle, causi ng minor damage. Defendant then exited the 6 carport and left the scene. There was tes timony that Defendant c ould have exited the 7 carport without hitting Crystal Baca and Victim’s vehicles. Based on the evidence 8 presented at trial, in addition to proving the other elements of the two counts of 9 criminal damage to property, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence 10 to establish that Defendant acted intentionally when he damaged the property of 11 Crystal Baca and Victim without their permission. 12 D. Reckless Driving 13
{22} The jury was instructed, according to UJI 14-4504 NMRA, that in order to find 14 Defendant guilty of reckless driving, the State was required to prove beyond a 15 reasonable doubt each of the following elements: 16 1. . . . Defendant, operated a motor vehicle; 17 2. . . . Defendant, drove carelessly and heedlessly in willful or 18 wanton disregard of the rights or safety of others and without due 19 caution and circumspection and at a speed or in a manner so as to 20 endanger or be likely to e ndanger any person or property; 2115 3. This happened in New Mexico on or about the 3rd day of March, 1 2015. 2
{23} Under the facts already desc ribed, and in addition to proving the other elements 3 of reckless driving, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to 4 establish that Defendant drove recklessly. Defendant, in operating his vehicle, hit 5 Victim with his vehicle twice, crashed into both Victim’s and Crystal Baca’s vehicles, 6 and sped away from the scene of the acci dent. Defendant committed these acts despite 7 evidence that he could have left the carport without hitting Victim or crashing into 8 Victim and Crystal Baca’s vehicles. 9 CONCLUSION 10
{24} The judgment and sentence is affirmed. 11
{25} IT IS SO ORDERED. 12

_______________________________ 13 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 14

WE CONCUR: 15

_________________________ 16 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 1716 ___________________________ 1 STEPHEN G. FRENCH, Judge 2