J-S11033-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: J.R.S.

APPEAL OF: J.S., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1224 WDA 2021

Appeal from the Decree Entered September 16, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County 

Orphans' Court at No(s): 32A-2021 O.C.

IN RE: J.D.S.

APPEAL OF: J.S., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1226 WDA 2021

Appeal from the Decree Entered September 16, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County 

Orphans’ Court at No(s): 33A-2021 O.C.

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED: June 29, 2022

J.S. (“Father”) appeals from the decrees granting the petitions filed by 

the Jefferson County Children & Youth Services (“CYS” or the “Agency”) to 

involuntarily terminate his parental rights to his daughter, J.R.S., born in 

December 2003, and son, J.D.S., born in July 2007 (collectively, “the 

Children”), pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), 

(11), and (b). We affirm.
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This Court previously set forth the factual and procedural background of 

this case as follows:

As a matter of background, [CYS] has been involved with 

this family since 2017. On July 13, 2017, CYS filed dependency 

petitions and alleged that the Children were without proper 

parental care or control. [See] 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6302(1). 

Specifically, CYS received a report that indicated that the Children 

were physically fighting with one another, throwing things, and 

not listening to Mother. Mother stated several times to a service 

provider that she could not handle the Children any longer and 

she wanted them out of her home. On August 30, 2017, the trial 

court held a hearing on the dependency petitions. In orders dated 

August 30, 2017, and entered on September 6, 2017, the trial 

court adjudicated the Children dependent. The orders directed 

that the Children remain in their separate foster care placements. 

On June 27, 2018, the trial court ordered termination of court 

supervision, and reunified the Children with Mother and Father. 

However, CYS continued to receive multiple referrals regarding 

the family.

On November 10, 2019, CYS received a report that J.[R.]S. 

returned home from the Meadows Psychiatric Center and resumed 

her previous behaviors of screaming, not listening, and refusing 

to follow instructions. Mother and J.[R.]S. engaged in a verbal 

altercation that prompted the caseworker to call the police. On 

November 12, 2019, the trial court granted CYS emergency 

protective custody of J.[R.]S., and she was placed in foster care.

On December 5, 2019, J.[R.]S. was placed in a Group Home at 

Pathways Adolescent Center because her foster care placement 

was not able to manage [her] behaviors. Mother and Father 

eventually ended their tumultuous relationship, and J.D.S. 

remained in Father’s home. On July 24, 2020, J.[R.]S. moved to 

a Group Home at Bethesda Lutheran Services because her 

previous placement did not believe that J.[R.]S. would make any 

more progress with them. On September 17, 2020, J.[R.]S. 

moved to a Residential Treatment Facility at Perseus HouseAndromeda House for her to receive the mental health services 

she requires.

On or about July 31, 2020, the trial court granted CYS 

emergency custody of J.D.S. due to lack of parental care and 

control in Father’s home. [See] N.T., 9/23/20, at 5. At that time, 
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Mother was incarcerated because she violated a [Protection From 

Abuse (“PFA”)] order that Father filed against her. Id. at 20[,] 

25. [Mother remained incarcerated until October 2020.] J.D.S. 

was placed in the same foster care home where he previously 

resided. On August 4, 2020, the trial court adjudicated J.D.S. 

dependent. On September 2, 2020, the trial court entered a nocontact order between Father and CYS because Father was 

continuously verbally abusive, harassing, and behaved 

inappropriately to all personnel assigned to assist the family in the 

home.

The trial court held an adjudication hearing on September 

23, 2020. Rebecca Sallack, a caseworker for CYS, testified that 

the underlying basis for emergency custody of J.D.S. was due to 

the “continuous trauma that this child has dealt with over the 

course of his life.” Id. at 29. More specifically, she testified that 

Father constantly “badmouthed” and made “inappropriate 

comments” about Mother, in front of J.D.S., to the home health 

nurse, to CYS and to service providers. Id. at 7. Ms. Sallack 

stated that Father was argumentative when asked if pest 

management could perform an evaluation after reports of a bed 

bug infestation of the home. Id. at 8. Ms. Sallack explained that 

Father “fought” CYS until “after multiple attempts he eventually 

gave in and said, Whatever, with an attitude, to have the home 

looked at . . .. [W]hen pest management did the evaluation, they 

found bed bugs in the home. [Father] then stated that [CYS] 

asked pest management to say there was [sic] bed bugs in the 

home.” Id. Father was also argumentative regarding counseling 

for J.D.S. Id. at 9. Ms. Sallack stated that multiple service 

providers indicated that Father behaved inappropriately, was 

aggressive, and made them feel uncomfortable. Id. at 10-11. 

Ms. Sallack explained that Father was “constantly argumentative, 

belligerent, verbally aggressive, takes very little responsibility for 

his part of the kids being removed, [and] blames [Mother] for the 

majority of the issues.” Id. at 12. Ms. Sallack recounted an 

incident where Father choked J.[R.]S. and admitted that he told 

J.[R.]S. “she will have to be a little [f------] whore to keep a roof 

over her head.” Id. at 13-14.

With regard to Mother, Ms. Sallack testified that there was 

an extensive history of Mother’s aggressive behavior towards 

Father and the Children. Id. at 27. Notably, Ms. Sallack testified 

that a no-contact order was put in place between J.[R.]S. and 

Mother because “the phone calls [between them] were getting 
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aggressive, and J.[R.]S.’s behaviors were increasing . . . she was 

fighting with peers, fighting with staff, threatening to harm 

herself, [and] threatening suicide.” Id. at 17[,] 26. Ms. Sallack 

testified that chaos, noise, and arguments exacerbate symptoms 

of anxiety for J.[R.]S. Id. at 34. Ms. Sallack explained that 

J.[R.]S. should avoid conflicts and interactions with people who 

cannot manage their behaviors, and recommended a goal change 

for J.[R.]S. Id.

Ms. Sallack opined that the Children need a plan for 

permanency. Id. at 27. She explained, “[t]his has gone on 

entirely too long, and it’s- - like I said, this is not something that’s 

new. If you go back through the case record, and this fighting 

and this bickering and the police [being] called, this is years and 

years and years on these kids.” Id. at 27.

On the record, at the conclusion of the September 23, 2020 

hearing, the trial court stated it would change the Children’s goals 

to adoption, and enter its orders on that same date. . . . Father 

and Mother filed timely notices of appeal . . ..

In re J.S., 260 A.3d 102 (Pa. Super. 2021) (unpublished memorandum at 

**1-6). This Court affirmed the goal change orders. See id. (unpublished 

memorandum at *18). 

Thereafter, the Agency filed petitions for the involuntary termination of 

Father’s and Mother’s parental rights to Children. The trial court conducted a 

hearing on September 2, 2021. Father participated via telephone from 

Florida, where he had relocated, and was represented by counsel. Mother was 

present and represented by counsel. Further, the Children were represented 

by a guardian ad litem and court-appointed legal counsel. During the hearing, 

the Agency presented the testimony of Ms. Sallack. Mother and Father each 

testified on their own behalf. The guardian ad litem and legal counsel for the 
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Children argued in favor of termination of parental rights. See N.T., 9/2/21,

at 84-86.1 

On September 16, 2021, the trial court entered decrees terminating

Father’s parental rights.2 Father filed timely notices of appeal, as well as 

concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). This Court sua sponte consolidated Father’s appeals. 

The trial court complied with Rule 1925(a).3

Father raises the following issues for our review:

[1.] Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt made an error of law or abused 

its discretion in terminating [Father’s] parental rights under 

23 Pa C.S.[A. § 2511](a)(2)?

[2.] Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt made an error law or abused its 

discretion in terminating [Father’s] parental rights under 23 

Pa.C.S.A. [§ 2511](b)?

Father’s Brief at 6.

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1 Although the trial court incorporated the dependency records into the 

termination proceedings, see N.T., 9/2/21, at 56-57, those records are not 

included in the certified record. However, this omission does not impair our 

review. Additionally, the trial court admitted Exhibit CYS 1, which consists of 

documentation regarding Father’s status as a registered sexual offender in 

Florida. See id. at 14. However, this exhibit is not included in the certified 

record. Nevertheless, given Father’s admission that he is a registered sexual 

offender, the omission of the exhibit does not impair our review. See id. at 

82. 

2 The trial court also involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights to J.R.S. 

and J.D.S. Mother’s appeals are pending at separate docket numbers, and we 

address her appeals in a separate memorandum.

3

In lieu of authoring a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court relied on its 

September 16, 2021 opinion explaining the basis for its decrees. 
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Our standard of review of a decree involuntarily terminating parental 

rights is as follows:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights 

cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. [A] decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings. 

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (internal citations and quotation 

marks omitted). “The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the 

evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations 

and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f competent evidence supports the 

court’s findings, we will affirm even if the record could also support the 

opposite result.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. Super. 

2003) (citation omitted). 

The termination of parental rights is governed by section 2511 and 

requires the trial court to conduct a bifurcated analysis of the grounds for 

termination under subsection (a) followed by the consideration of the needs 

and welfare of the child under subsection (b). The initial focus is on the 

conduct of the parent. See In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007). 

The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 
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that the parent’s conduct satisfies one of the statutory grounds for termination 

delineated in section 2511(a). Id. Only if the court determines that the 

parent’s conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the 

court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to section 2511(b), 

relating to the needs and welfare of the child. Id. We have defined clear and 

convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing 

as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, 

of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201

(Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (citation omitted). 

In the case sub judice, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to sections 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), (11), and (b).

4

 Where, as here, the 

trial court determines that there are grounds for termination under more than 

one subsection of section 2511(a), we need only agree with the trial court’s 

determination as to any one subsection in order to affirm the termination of 

parental rights. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004). 

Given this latitude, we analyze the court’s termination decrees pursuant to 

subsections (a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows: 

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4 Notably, Father has not raised any challenge related to the trial court’s 

determinations under subsections 2511(5), (8), and (11) in either his concise 

statement or in his statement of questions presented. As such, Father has 

waived any claim of error related to these subsections. See In re 

M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super. 2017) (reiterating that issues not 

raised in the concise statement or in the statement of questions presented are 

waived). It follows that we may affirm the decrees on the basis of subsections

2511(5), (8), and (11).
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(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

. . .

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

* * * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b). In order to affirm a termination of parental 

rights, we need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of 

section 2511(a), as well as section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 

380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004).5 

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5 We are mindful that, because J.R.S. is now eighteen years old, Father’s 

appeal of the decree terminating his parental rights to J.R.S. may be moot. 

As a general rule, an actual case or controversy must exist at all stages of the 

judicial process, or a case will be dismissed as moot. In re D.A., 801 A.2d 

614, 616 (Pa. Super. 2002) (holding that an issue before a court is moot if in 

ruling upon the issue the court cannot enter an order that has any legal force 

or effect). Although J.R.S. is no longer a child, this Court will decide questions 
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In Father’s first issue, he challenges the trial court’s determination that 

the Agency established grounds for termination under section 2511(a)(2). 

With regard to section 2511(a)(2), this Court has explained:

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be 

met: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused 

the child to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and 

(3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot 

or will not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation

omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot 

be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those 

grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental 

duties.” In re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citations

omitted). “Parents are required to make diligent efforts towards the 

reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities.” Matter of 

Adoption of M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). 

As such, “[a] parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of 

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that otherwise have been rendered moot when one or more of the following 

exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply: (1) the case involves a question 

of great public importance; (2) the question presented is capable of repetition 

and apt to elude appellate review; or (3) a party to the controversy will suffer 

some detriment due to the decision of the trial court. Id. Here, Father will 

clearly suffer detriment as a result of the termination of his parental rights to 

J.R.S. Accordingly, we find the doctrine of mootness is overcome and continue 

with our analysis.
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uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of services, may 

properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.” In re S.C., 247 A.3d at 

1105 (citation omitted).

With respect to section 2511(a)(2), Father argues that any incapacity 

or refusal resulting in a lack of parental care and control no longer exists. 

Father claims that marital and family discord was the essential concern in this 

matter and that it was not always deemed to be a challenge unable to be 

overcome. Further, he asserts that he has remedied the situation by obtaining 

a PFA order against Mother and relocating to Florida. Father maintains that

“[b]y taking these actions, and putting a huge distance between himself and 

[Mother], . . . he has remedied the conditions and causes underlying any 

incapacity.” Father’s Brief at 8. 

In finding grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant 

to section 2511(a)(2), the trial court reasoned:

[J.R.S.] was removed from her parents’ care on November 

10, 2019. [J.D.S.] followed on July 31, 2020. Neither parent was 

able to provide appropriate care and control in either instance. 

Both individually and as a couple, their lives were defined by anger 

and hostility. Unable to control even themselves, they were 

certainly incapable of controlling their children, who quite 

naturally absorbed and regurgitated the ugliness surrounding 

them.

Since the beginning of the [C]hildren’s dependency, Mother 

and Father have sought to blame one another for the conditions 

that led to their removal and prevented their return. . ..

* * * *

Like Mother, Father underwent extensive therapy in relation 

to the dependency proceedings, and the only thing it seemed to 
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teach him was which phrases and buzz words to use while trying 

to convince the [c]ourt that he was learning and making progress 

toward his treatment goals. In doggedly refusing to cooperate 

with CYS except on his own terms; in becoming so aggressive with 

Pathways’ [staff] that he was cut off from further communication

while [J.R.S.] resided there; and in engaging with Agency staff 

and third-party providers in such a manner as to warrant a 

comprehensive no-contact order, moreover, he proved that all the

therapy and other services he had received made no difference 

whatsoever. If anything, he was worse at the end than he had 

been at the beginning. At the height of his abrasiveness, 

moreover, Mother was out of the house. More specifically, Mother 

was in jail. Unquestionably, then, even were the [c]ourt to 

entertain the idea that one competent adult can “make” another 

competent adult behave badly, it can say unequivocally that 

Mother bore no responsibility for Father’s behavior after she was 

arrested for violating the temporary PFA order. There being no 

evidence that Father has rectified the conditions that led to [the

C]hildren’s removal and ultimately to the goal change, therefore, 

the [c]ourt wholly rejects the idea that he would be able to 

immediately care for the [C]hildren should they be remanded to 

his custody in Florida.

Additionally, Father did not articulate even a generic plan 

for how he might address his own deficiencies, reengage with [the 

Children], and thus arrive at the place where the here [sic] could 

safely be reunited as a family, and considering his dependency 

history, the [c]ourt is certainly unwilling to assume he would take 

any meaningful steps to make that happen should it decline to 

terminate his parental rights. Regardless of what he might be 

willing to do to alleviate the other issues that have kept him and 

[the C]hildren apart, moreover, Father cannot undo the fact that 

he is a convicted sex offender under a perpetual duty to register 

in his jurisdiction of residence.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/16/21, at 6-8 (footnotes omitted, emphasis in original).

Our review of the record supports the trial court’s factual findings and 

credibility determinations underlying its decision to involuntarily terminate 

Father’s parental rights under section 2511(a)(2). While Ms. Sallack testified 

that Father was initially compliant with the family service plan goals, she 
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subsequently indicated noncompliance and a lack of progress. See N.T., 

9/2/21, at 20-21. Ms. Sallack described minimal compliance by Father at the 

time of the goal change in September 2020. Id. at 20. She similarly stated 

that, subsequent to the June 2020 review hearing, Father was not compliant 

with the child permanency plans. Id. at 27. She likewise noted no progress 

since July 2020, which continued after the goal change in September 2020. 

Id. at 39-40. Importantly, Ms. Sallack noted that services were stopped on 

September 2, 2020, because the Agency obtained a no-contact order as a 

result of Father’s aggressive and inappropriate behavior, which continued 

even after Mother was no longer in Father’s home. Id. at 31, 40, 43. For 

these reasons, Ms. Sallack explained that “[i]t is the [A]gency’s position that 

the parental rights of . . . [Father] be terminated and the [C]hildren be free 

for adoption.” Id. at 36.

As the record substantiates the trial court’s finding under section 

2511(a)(2) that Father’s repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, 

or refusal has caused the Children to be without essential parental control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical and mental well-being, and that Father 

cannot or will not remedy this situation, Father’s first issue merits no relief. 

We next determine whether termination was proper under section 

2511(b). Where the grounds for termination under subsection 2511(a) are 

met, the trial court shall then give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child under 

subsection 2511(b). See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. The emotional needs 
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and welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to include intangibles 

such as love, comfort, security, and stability. Id. The determination of the 

child’s needs and welfare requires consideration of the emotional bonds 

between the parent and child. Id. The utmost attention should be paid to 

discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond. 

Id. 

The evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an easy task. “In cases 

where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent and child, it is 

reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of any bond analysis, 

therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.” 

In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). 

When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use expert 

testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as well. 

Additionally, section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding evaluation.” 

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal citations 

omitted). Moreover, 

While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major 

aspect of the [s]ection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is 

nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and 

should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, 

comfort, security, and stability the child might have 

with the foster parent. . .. 
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In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quotation 

marks and citations omitted). 

While a parent may profess to love the child, a parent’s own feelings of 

love and affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental 

rights. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. A child’s life “simply cannot be put on 

hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the 

responsibilities of parenting.” Id. at 1125 (citation omitted). Rather, “a 

parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his child is 

converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s 

right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a 

permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 

(Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).

Father challenges the trial court’s finding that his bonds with the 

Children were not sufficient to warrant preservation and claims that the court 

failed to evaluate those bonds and to adequately weigh the effects of their 

severance. Father asserts that J.R.S. has significant emotional ties to her 

parents and was begging the trial court to permit her to return to them as late 

as June 2020. Father argues that the Agency never completed an updated

bonding assessment, and instead relied on a 2017 assessment. According to 

Father, for reasons out of the parents’ control, the assessments scheduled in 

2020 were cancelled and rescheduled, but ultimately never completed. Father 

maintains that, unless his rights are reinstated, the Children will lose out on 
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the paternal support provided to date, and the opportunity to rebuild their 

relationship in a new environment away from the previous domestic problems.

The trial court determined that the involuntary termination of Father’s 

parental rights was in the best interests of the Children’s needs and welfare 

under section 2511(b). The trial court explained its findings, as follows:

[J.D.S.] is in a good home with a family that has loved him 

and met his needs for two of the last three years. Physically and 

emotionally, his foster parents have engaged with him as though 

he were their own son and hope they will have the opportunity to 

do just that for the rest of their lives. Perpetually in conflict with 

his natural parents, [J.D.S.] has also responded well to his foster 

family and shown commendable progress, both academic and 

psychological, under their care. Fully reciprocating their love, he, 

too, wants his place in the family to become permanent—to have 

his foster parents adopt him and give him their last name.

Without a prospective adoptive family, [J.R.S.]’s future is 

less certain. Odd though it may sound to someone unfamiliar with 

[her] family history, however, the [c]ourt concludes without 

hesitation that being a legal orphan will better serve the girl’s 

interests than being forced to return to the destructive impact of 

one or both of her highly dysfunctional parents. Less equipped 

than her brother to process and outwardly manage the emotional 

turmoil that has accompanied her interactions with Mother and 

Father both before and after she was removed from their home, 

[J.R.S.] has only been able to achieve lasting stability since the 

[c]ourt severed all communication between them. All past 

attempts to reunify the family have resulted in [J.R.S.]’s 

regression, and whereas neither Father nor Mother has alleviated 

the internal conditions that led to the girl’s removal in the first 

place, the [c]ourt has zero expectation that another attempt at 

this point will be successful. On the contrary, forcing [J.R.S.] back 

into a toxic relationship with either or both of them could prove 

even more harmful now, as she will soon be an adult without a 

statutory right to the stabilizing services available to her through 

CYS and the [c]ourt. While terminating Mother[’s] and Father’s 

parental rights may not achieve for [J.R.S.] the same happy 

ending available to [J.D.S.], therefore, it is no less what is in her 

best interests as she nears the age of majority and independence. 
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Counterintuitive as it may seem, it is in her best interests to sever

the parental bonds that have been nothing but distressing even

though she does not now have another family waiting to adopt

her.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/16/21, at 8-9.

Our review of the record supports the trial court’s finding that the 

Children’s developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare favor 

termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to section 2511(b). 

Significantly, a no-contact order went into place in July 2020 and phone calls 

and visits with J.R.S. stopped due to their negative impact on her. See N.T., 

9/2/21, at 21, 29-30, 39. Ms. Sallack described the situation as follows:

So while [J.R.S.] was at Pathways Adolescent Center, 

[Mother] was going to visit [J.R.S.] on grounds. She was being 

taken up by family members to visit with [J.R.S.] [Father] was 

making phone calls. The phone calls and the visits were stopped 

on July 8, 2020, [and] that was when the no contact order went 

in . . . because Pathways had called and said that after phone calls 

and visits between the parents and [J.R.S.], there were major 

behavior issues. [J.R.S.] would fight with other students.

[J.R.S.] would scream. [J.R.S.] was verbally aggressive. 

She would threaten to kill herself, and her mental health declined 

after those visits. And [Father] got verbally aggressive with the 

staff at Pathways. And Pathways had asked to not be able to have 

contact with him because they could not reason with him on the 

phone.

Id. at 29-30.

Further, while J.R.S. remained in a residential treatment facility at the 

time of the termination hearing, the Agency was exploring potential foster 

home placements. Id. at 35, 42. Ms. Sallack noted that J.R.S. reported that 

she is “ready to be with a family where she’s loved and accepted.” Id. at 50. 
J-S11033-22

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Acknowledging the stability J.R.S. had achieved, Ms. Sallack confirmed that 

not only had J.R.S. been in her current residential treatment facility placement 

for almost one year, but she had learned to manage stress and anxiety. Id.

at 17, 19, 52-54. Ms. Sallack observed, “I had done a visit between [the 

Children] three weeks ago, and that interaction between [the Children] was 

talking about this day, talking about adoptions coming up, talking about 

[J.D.S.] changing his name and [J.R.S.] wanting to find a family where she 

could go and change her name as well.” Id. at 50-51. 

Moreover, J.D.S. was placed with a pre-adoptive foster family with 

whom he had resided for over a year at the time of the hearing, as well as 

almost a year when placed previously, and with whom he was bonded and 

doing well. Id. at 17, 35-36, 43, 49, 55. As such, he desired to be adopted 

and change his name. Id. at 36, 51. Ms. Sallack testified that “[J.D.S.] is 

happy where he is and ready to be adopted. . ..” Id. at 51. 

While Father may profess to love the Children, his feelings of love and 

affection for them will not preclude termination of his parental rights. See In 

re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. The Children are entitled to permanency and 

stability, and their lives cannot be put on hold in the hope that Father will one

day summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting. Id. at 

1125. Accordingly, we conclude that the record supports the court’s factual 

findings and credibility determinations that grounds existed for the 

termination of Father’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and 
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(b). As we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court, we affirm the 

decrees involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights to J.R.S. and J.D.S. 

Decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/29/2022