NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-517

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

DAVID M. STRACHAN.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a police officer found the defendant, David Strachan, 

unresponsive from an apparent drug overdose, the officer 

requested emergency medical assistance; the defendant recovered 

and thereafter was charged with possession. A District Court 

judge dismissed the charges, concluding that G. L. c. 94C, 

§ 34A (b), immunized the defendant from prosecution. We affirm.

1. Background. We briefly recite the undisputed facts. 

In the early morning hours of October 17, 2021, Officer Michael 

Ramsey of the Pembroke Police Department was on routine patrol 

when he observed a vehicle with its lights on and the driver,

later identified as the defendant, slumped over the steering 

wheel. Officer Ramsey noticed that drool was coming out of the 

defendant's mouth. Although the defendant was still breathing,

Officer Ramsey's multiple attempts to wake him up were 
2

unsuccessful. Officer Ramsey saw what he believed to be drug 

residue and paraphernalia in the defendant's car and, believing 

that the defendant was overdosing, called dispatch for 

assistance. Several other police officers arrived at the scene

and attempted unsuccessfully to wake up the defendant. Officer 

Ramsey broke the car window and administered Narcan to the 

defendant. Emergency responders with the Pembroke Fire 

Department, who soon appeared on the scene, twice more 

administered Narcan to the defendant.1

After the defendant was transported to the hospital, police 

conducted an inventory search of the vehicle, which resulted in 

the seizure of drugs found in the center console. The defendant 

was charged with one count of possession of a class A substance

(heroin), in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 34, and one count of 

possession of a class B substance (crack cocaine), also in 

violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 34.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that

because he was suffering from a drug-related overdose, and 

because the drugs were found as a result of a call for medical 

attention, he was immune from prosecution under G. L. c. 94C,

§ 34A (b). The Commonwealth argued that the defendant was not 

1 While en route to the hospital, the defendant was revived.
3

immune because the call for medical assistance was initiated by 

a police officer.

2. Discussion. As it presents a question of statutory 

construction, we review the judge's decision to dismiss the 

criminal charges under G. L. c. 94C, § 34A (b), de novo. 

Commonwealth v. Wade, 475 Mass. 54, 60 (2016).

"[T]he meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be 

sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that 

is plain, . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it 

according to its terms." Commonwealth v. Soto, 476 Mass. 436, 

438 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Dalton, 467 Mass. 555, 557 

(2014). If a statute's language is clear and unambiguous, and 

if its application does not lead to an absurd result, that 

language is conclusive of legislative intent. Commonwealth v. 

Wassilie, 482 Mass. 562, 573 (2019). We look at the language of 

the entire statute, "not just a single sentence," so as to 

interpret all of its terms "harmoniously to effectuate the 

intent of the Legislature" (quotation omitted). Phillips v. 

Equity Residential Mgt., L.L.C., 478 Mass. 251, 257 (2017). 

Finally, if there is any ambiguity in the statute, the rule of 

lenity requires that criminal statutes be strictly construed 

against the Commonwealth and that any ambiguity be resolved in 

favor of the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Wotan, 422 Mass. 

740, 742 (1996).
4

With this backdrop in mind, we begin our analysis by 

reading the plain language of the statute. Commonwealth v. 

Rossetti, 489 Mass. 589, 593 (2022). Relevant here, G. L. 

c. 94C, § 34A (b), provides immunity from prosecution to a

person suffering from a drug overdose if that person, as a 

result of receiving medical assistance, is found to be in 

possession of drugs.2 This subsection states:

"A person who experiences a drug-related overdose and is in 

need of medical assistance and, in good faith, seeks such 

medical assistance, or is the subject of such a good faith 

request for medical assistance, shall not be charged or 

prosecuted for possession of a controlled substance under 

said section 34 . . . if the evidence for the charge of 

possession of a controlled substance or violation was 

gained as a result of the overdose and the need for medical 

assistance."

G. L. c. 94C, § 34A (b). Under the plain words of the statute,

if a person experienced a drug overdose and made a good faith 

request for medical assistance and, as a result, the police 

found the person to be in possession of drugs, immunity would 

apply. That same person would also be entitled to immunity if

they were in possession of drugs, experienced a drug overdose,

2 Subsection (a) provides immunity from prosecution to a person 

who seeks medical assistance for someone experiencing a drugrelated overdose. G. L. c. 94C, § 34A (a). So, under this 

subsection, a person who calls for help for someone overdosing, 

but in the course of the incident is found to be in possession 

of drugs, would be immune from prosecution. The Commonwealth 

asks that we analyze G. L. c. 94C, § 34A (a), to give context to 

specific language in G. L. c. 94C, § 34A (b). Because, as 

discussed below, we find G. L. c. 94C, § 34A (b), to be 

unambiguous, we do not examine G. L. c. 94C, § 34A (a).
5

and did not seek medical assistance themselves but were instead 

the subject of a good faith request by someone else for medical 

assistance.

Turning to the facts of this case, the defendant was 

undoubtedly experiencing a drug-related overdose when police 

encountered him. The defendant, unresponsive and slumped over 

the steering wheel, was in no condition to call for medical 

assistance. He became the subject of a good faith request for 

medical assistance when Officer Ramsey called dispatch for 

assistance after numerous attempts to wake him were 

unsuccessful. See Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/good%20faith ("good 

faith" means "honesty or lawfulness of purpose"). Emergency 

responders were called and administered additional doses of 

Narcan as a life-saving measure. Finally, while on the scene,

and after the defendant was being transported to the hospital,

drugs were found as a result of an inventory search. In other 

words, drugs were discovered by police because the defendant's 

overdose caused Officer Ramsey to seek medical assistance, which

caused the defendant to be transported to the hospital and 

resulted in the need for his car to be towed and an inventory 

search to be completed.

Based on the plain language of the statute, we conclude

that the defendant was immune from prosecution for possession 
6

under § 34 since the drugs were found as a result of his being 

the subject of a good faith call for medical assistance while he 

was experiencing a drug overdose. We are not persuaded by the 

Commonwealth's argument that § 34A (b), when read as a whole,

does not apply when police officers request medical assistance

for an overdose victim. Nothing in the statute differentiates a 

citizen seeking medical assistance for someone experiencing a 

drug-related overdose from a police officer making that same 

request. Contrary to the Commonwealth's position, it is not an 

absurd or illogical result that the defendant in this case has

immunity. The Legislature unambiguously expressed its intent to 

encourage people, whether it be the person suffering from an 

overdose or someone witnessing said overdose, to call for 

medical assistance in order to obtain lifesaving treatment. The 

Legislative intent, to save the lives of individuals 

experiencing a life threatening drug overdose, is accomplished 

whether an ordinary citizen, a paramedic, or a police officer

calls for medical assistance to prevent death by overdose.

The Commonwealth asks us to interpret the language of the 

statute to exclude police officers from the scope of § 34A (b). 

However, as noted above, when the language of the statute is 

clear and unambiguous, and when the result is not illogical, we 

must apply the plain language of the statute. Our role 

prohibits judicial construction when the language is clear. 
7

Nothing in the plain language of G. L. c. 94C, § 34A (b),

requires that a person who calls for help for someone 

experiencing a drug overdose be a nonpolice officer. Without 

any ambiguity, we are prohibited from adding language to the 

statute in order to effectuate what the Commonwealth argues is a 

commonsense reading of the statute. Had the Legislature 

intended to narrow the scope of immunity so that it did not 

apply when law enforcement seeks medical assistance, it could 

have specifically included such language. It did not do so. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Rubin, Neyman & 

Walsh, JJ.3),

Clerk

Entered: October 20, 2023.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.