NOT RECOMMENDED F OR FUL L -TEXT PUB L I CATI ON File Na me: 10a0195n.06 No. 09-1471 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
WI L L I AM NA GL ER, Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. DR. J AY GARCI A and DR. JAY GARCI A, M.D., P.C., De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE U NI TED ST ATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

B e fo re : ME RRI TT , CO OK , a nd KE TH L ED GE , Ci rc uit

Judg e s. KETHL EDGE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Willi am Nag ler, M.D., sue d d ef en d an ts Dr. J ay Ga rc ia and Dr . J ay Ga

rc ia , M.D ., P.C. , for tr a de mark inf ri ng e me nt an d a

nu mbe r o f s ta te -l aw c la ims , all arising out of an a

borted business re lationship. Nag ler make s a ra ft of ar g uments in oppositi on to t he dis tr ic t court ’s g ra

nt of su mma

ry jud g me nt in favo r of Ga rc ia on a ll o f t he c la ims . We a ff

ir m. I. Nag ler is a doc tor with a we ight- loss clinic in Michiga n. He c alls his weig ht-loss sy stem “Diet Results,” whic h h e has trademar ked. The sy stem appea

rs to rely heavily on injections of well-known a

ppetite suppressa

nts. J ay Gar cia is a phy sician prac ticing in the Tampa, F lorida ar ea, wi th a pr of e ssi on a l c or

po ratio n in

his name . In 2 00 3, a

mut ua l f ri e nd of the tw o d oc tor s to ld G a rc ia
a bo ut D ie t Re su lts and

sa id t hat N a g le r w a s in te re ste d in lice ns ing the sy ste m to oth e r p hy sic ians .No. 09-1471

Nag le r v . G ar c ia

-2- Th e fr ie n d

t h e ni n t r o d

u c e d N a g l e r an d G ar c i a , an d

t h e p art i e s b e g ann e g o t i a t i o n s o v e r a b u s i n e ss
arr ang e me nt. Th e pa rt ie s r e a c he d a

te ntativ e a g re e me nt o n th e e c on omi c te rm s of t he arr ang e me nt i n De c e mbe r 2 00 3, bu t ot he r m a te ri a l te rm s r e ma ine d unr e so lve d. Duri ngthe ne g oti a tio ns , G a rc ia asked to visit Nag ler’s c linic. Nag ler wa s willing to l et Ga rc i a d o so if Gar cia sig ned a Confidentiality

Ag reem en t
. Ga rcia

trave led to Michig an in J anuar y 2004, and upon his arr ival signe d a Confidentiality

Ag ree ment stating that h e w o u ld k e e p c o nfidential “a

ny and all” inf

ormation he lea rned a bout Diet Results. R. 26 Ex h. J at 2. During the visit, Garcia

observe d h o w Nagle r ra n his office and re ceive d a pac kag e of information about Diet Results from Na g ler. The packa g e included adver tising mater ial that Nag ler told Gar cia he could use. Na g ler a lso recommende d that Gar cia pur chase a softwa re pa ckag e that
wo rk e d w ithDi e t Re su lts
. Ga rc ia re tur ne d to F lor ida

wi th t he inf or ma tio n a nd be g an in te g ra

tin g Di e t Re su lts int o h is
me dic a l pr a c tic e . T hin g s de te ri or a te d fr om the re . I n Ma rc h 20 04 , the F lor ida

De pa rtme nt o f H e a lth informed Ga

rcia that his advertiseme nts for Diet Results violated Florida regulations. In addition, the so ft wa re pa c ka g e that N a g le r h a d r e c omm e nd e d w a s n ot w or kin g we ll. Meanw hile, the par

ties continued neg otiating, thoug h by Dec ember

2004 they

still lacke d a f i n a l a g r e e m e n t
. O nD e c e mb e r 2 1 , 2 0 0 4 , G ar c i a

s e n tN a g l e r

ane - m a i l s t a t i n g t h a t“ [ u ] n f o rtu n a t e l y, we have fa iled to come to t erms on the details of t h[e] business arr ang ement” a nd that he “the ref

ore pla n[ne d] to g o [hi s] ow n w ay [.]” R. 3 6 E xh. K . T he pa rt ie s a g re e th at th is e -m a il e nd e d th e ir business relationship.No. 09-1471

Nag le r v . G ar c ia

-3- Nag ler a sserts that Gar cia the re af t er conti nued to use Die t Results and beg an selling the sy ste m to oth e r d oc tor s in F lor ida . H e a lso sa

y s G arc ia c on tin ue d a dv e rt isi ngus ingthe Di e t Re su lts trade mark. Nag ler filed suit ag ainst Garc ia base d on these a lleg ations, ass er t i n g claims for tra demar k inf r in g e me n t, f

r a u d , a n d b r e a c h o f

th e Co n f

id e n ti a li ty A g r e e me n t. G ar c ia

f il e d a mo ti o nf

or summary judgme nt on all claims, which the district cour t gr anted. This appea l followed. II. We reviewthe district court’s g rant of summar y judgme nt de novo. Ciminil lo v. Streiche r , 434 F.3d 461, 464 ( 6th Cir. 2006). Summ ary judgme nt is appropriate when “ there is no ge nuine issue as to any

materia l fac t[ .]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (2 ). A def endant is entitled to summary judgme nt if the plaintiff “fa ils to m ake a showing sufficie nt to establish the exi stence of an e lement essential to that par

ty ’s ca se, and on w hich that par ty will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Cor p. v . Ca tre tt , 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A. Nag ler a lleg ed a va

riety of trade mark-r ela t ed cl ai m s in his complaint, but t he only one he purs u e s o n a

p p e a l is h is tr a d e ma

r k

- in f r in g e me n t c la im u n d e r 1 5 U
. S. C. § 1 1 1 4 ( 1 )
. T o p reva il on such a claim, the plaintiff must prove that: ( 1) the plaintiff owns the reg istered tradem ar k ; (2 ) t he de fe nd ant u se d th e mark

in c omm e rc e wi tho ut the pla int if f’ s c on se nt; and (3 ) the us e wa s li ke ly to
cause confusion. Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, I

nc. , 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009). The third fa ctor is t he mos t im

po rt ant, and

a sk s “w he the r the de fe nd ant’ s use of the dis pu te d ma

rk is l ike ly to c a us eNo. 09-1471

Nag le r v . G ar c ia

-4- confusion amongconsumers r eg ardingthe orig in of t h e go o d s o ffe red by the par ties.” Daddy’

s J un k yMu sic Sto re

s, In c . v . B ig D ad

dy ’s Fa mi ly

Mu sic Ctr

. , 109 F.3d 275, 280 ( 6th Cir. 1997). Both pa rties ag ree that Nag ler c onsented to Ga rcia ’s use of the Diet Results trademar k during the pa rt ie s’ ne g oti a tio ns , b ut t

hat N a g le r’ s c on se nt w a s w ith dr awn on De c e mbe r 2 1, 20 04 . G a rc ia
asser ts that he stopped using the t rade mark on that date, but Nag ler points to a printout of Gar cia’ s websi te f r o m Ju n e 2 8 , 2 0 0 5
. T h e w e b s it e it s e lf d o e s n o t me n ti o n D ie t Re s u lt s , b u t those words
a pp e ar i n th e we bs ite ’s UR L : http: //w ww .b e a uty ina fl a sh .c om/ die tr e su lts .h tml
. That usag e ca

nnot support a claim for

trade mark infr inge ment. See I nteractive Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile OfficeSolutions, Inc. , 326 F.3d 687, 698 (6 t h C i r. 2003) ( “[I ]t is unlikely that the prese nce of

another ’s trade mark in a post-domain path of a URL would ever violate trade mark law ”). Nag ler prese nts no evidenc e supporting a depar ture from the rule state d in In te ra c tiv e Pr od uc ts . The dis tr ic t c ourt

pr op e rl y g ra nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt o n th e tr a de mark -i nf ri ng e me nt c la im. B. Nag ler a lso challeng es the gra nt of sum mary

judgme nt on his fraud c laim. He alleg es that Gar cia f raudule ntly

“misrepr esente d that he would .
. . abide by a conf identiality

ag ree ment[,] and that he would execute a

licensing ag ree ment[.] ” Na g ler B r. at 32. Under Michig an law, the plaintiff must prove a claim for fra ud by clea

r and c onvincing evidenc e. Foodland Distribs. v. Al-Naimi , 5 5 9 N
. W
. 2 d 3 7 9 , 3 8 1 ( M i c h
. C t
. A p p . 1 9 9 6 )
. G e n e r a l l y,
a fr a ud c la im “ mus t be pr e dic ate d upo n a sta te me nt re la tin g to a pa st or an e xistin g fa c t[,]” be c a

us e “[f]ut ure promises are contra ctual and do not constitute fra ud.” Hi-W

ay Motor Co. v. Int’ l Harvester Co. , 247 N.W.2d 813, 816 (Mich. 1976). Michig an re cog nizes an exception to that rule, howeve r,No. 09-1471

Nag le r v . G ar c ia

-5- when the f

uture promise w as “ma de in bad f aith without intention of performa nce.” Id. Nag ler a dmits t hat his claim is based on a future pr omise—namely , Gar cia’ s promise to enter into a final contra ct—but argues that his claim fa lls withi n the ex ce p t i o n . Specifica lly , Nag ler
asser ts that Garc ia’s fr audulent int en t can be inferr ed fr om various statements that Ga rcia made during neg otiations. But Nag ler ha s not produced a ny evidenc e that Ga

rcia ’ s s ta te ments were untrue. Meanw hile, the re cord c ontai n s n u merous e- mails and corr espondenc e that, on their f ace , de mon str a te Ga

rc ia ’s g oo d f

a ith . T he di stric t c ourt

pr op e rl y g ra nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt o n th is
c la im. C. Nag ler ne x t cha l l eng es the district cour t’s g rant of summar

y judgme nt on his claims for mis a pp ro pr ia tio n of tr ade se c re ts a nd fo r b re a c h o f t

he Con fi de nti a lity

Ag re e me nt. Ea c h o f t

he se
c la ims is b a sed on N a g le r’ s a sse rt ion that, a ft e r t

he pa rt ie s’ bu sin e ss r e la tio ns hip e nd e d, Ga rc ia continued using the Diet Results sy stem in his own pra ctice a nd sold the sy stem to other doctors. For the misappropriation claim, we must first deter mine whether

Nag ler possesse d a tra de
secr et. Under

Michig an law, a

trade secr et is defined a s information that: “(i) [ d]erives independe nt
e c on omi c va lue , a c tua l or po te nti a l, f

ro m no t be ingg e nerall y

kn ow n to , a

nd no t be ingre a dil y
asce rtainable by

proper means by , other pe rsons who ca n obtain economic va lue from its disclosure
or us e ” ; and “ (i i) [i]s th e su

bje c t of e ff or ts that are re a so na

ble un de r the c ir c ums tanc e s to ma int a in its secre cy .” Mich. Comp. L aws § 445.1902(d) . These pr ovisions emphasiz e that “the essenc e of a tra de sec ret is that it derives its v al u e fr o m secre cy .” Stromback v . New Line Ci nema , 384 F.3d 283, 305 (6th Cir. 2004).No. 09-1471

Nag le r v . G ar c ia

-6- Her e, Na g ler doe s not contend that the medical advice embodied in Diet Results constitutes a tra de sec ret. Instead, he asser ts that the “business end of the pra ctice” —“how to start up a weig ht loss practice , how to catc h the attention of prospec tive patients in adver tising,” a nd so on—is a trade
secr et. Nag ler B r. at 38-39. We are unpersua ded. Na g ler ha s n o t p ro du ced a ny evidenc e that he posse sses secr et knowledg e about how to o p er at e a profitable weig ht-loss clinic. For instanc e, he r efe rs to a

“ bu sin e ss p lan c ha

rt ” he c re a te d, bu t the c ha rt is sim ply a se t of pr of

it pr oje c tio ns . M or e ov e r, it i s undisputed that all of the mater ials actua lly relatin g to the business operation—Nag ler’s pr ior adver tisements, his pricing inf

ormation, and the sof

tware he used—were available to the public, and thus are not tra de sec rets. Cf. Hayes-Albion v. Kube rski , 364 N.W.2d 609, 615 (Mich. 1984) (holding that a tra de sec ret is not cre ated by “the mere privac y with w hich an ordinary commerc ial business is carr ied on” ( internal quotation marks omitted))
. Nag ler’s c laim for bre ach of the Confidentiality

Ag ree ment likewise re quires proof that Garcia a c tua lly re c e ive d so me c on fi de nti a l inf or ma tio n. Na g le r ha s no su c h pr oo f. He c ite s a p r o v is io nin

th e Co n f id e n ti a li ty

A g r e e me n t t o th e e f

f e c t t h a t a ll in f o r mati o nw o u ld

be co n s i dered confide ntial “eve n if it could also have b een acquire d in a non-c onfidential manne r.” B ut that provisi o n i s unenfor cea

ble under Michig an law. See F

ollmer, Rudzewicz &Co. v. Kosco , 362 N.W.2d 676, 683 ( Mich. 1984) (r efusingto enforc e a c lause that would make someone pa y damag es “for using infor

mation labeled c onfidential which is not in fac t confidential” ). T h e d i s t rict cour t proper l y gra n t ed summary judgme nt on Nag ler’s c laims for misappropriation of trade se cre ts and brea ch of the Confidentiality Ag ree ment.No. 09-1471

Nag le r v . G ar c ia

-7- D. Na g le r f ina lly c ha lle ng e s th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s den ial of his mo tio n to a me nd his c omp la int
. We reviewthat d ec i s i o n fo r an a buse of discr etion. Parry v. M ohawk Motors of Mich., Inc

. , 236 F.3d 299, 306 ( 6th Cir. 2000). Nag ler ne ver a ctually

fi l ed a m o t i on to amend. Instead, he argued in his brief opposing summary judgme nt that he should be allowed to r ecove r on two claims that wer e not included in the
c omp la int —a qu a ntum me ru it ( un

jus t e nr ic hm e nt ) c l a i m

a n d a n u n s p e c i f i e d b r e a c h o f c on tr a c t c la im. The district cour

t rather g ener ously

construed this ar g ument as an implicit motion to amend. See Niemi v. NHK Spring Co. , 543 F.3d 294, 307 (6 t h C i r. 2008). The court then de nied the motion,
c on c lud ingthat N a g le r’ s ame ndme nts “ wo uld ve ry lik e ly be futil e ” and

that Ga rc ia “ wo uld

c le a rl y b e prejudice d by

the addition of newclaims afte r the c lose of discove ry and af ter a motion for summary judgme nt ha[d] been f

iled.” Dist. Ct. Op. at 28 n.19. That d en i al fell within the district court’s c ore pow er to mana g e the c ase. N ag ler did not
ma k e h is r e qu e s t to a me n d “ u n ti l a f te r d is c o v e r

y h a d p a s s e d , th e d is p o s it iv e mo ti o n d e a d li ne had passed, a nd a mot ion for summary judgme nt had bee n filed.” Duggins v. Steak ’N Shake, I

nc. , 195 F .3 d 8 28 , 8 34 (6 th C ir . 1 99 9) ; see also Niemi , 543 F.3d at 307 (holding that the district court did not abuse its discre tion in deny ing a n “ele venth hour” amendment to add a quantum meruit claim). A pa rt y c ann ot a wa it a su mma ry -j ud g me nt m oti on

to d e te rm ine ho w b e st t o c on fi g ur e its ple a din g s. Na g le r’ s argume nt i s me ri tle ss. The district cour

t’s judgme nt is affirmed.