Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

TIA R. BREWER GREGORY F. ZOELLER 

Grant County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana 

Marion, Indiana 

MICHAEL GENE WORDEN

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

STEVEN S. SATTERLY, )

)

Appellant-Respondent, )

)

vs. ) No. 27A02-1305-CR-407

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Petitioner. )

APPEAL FROM THE GRANT SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Dana Kenworthy, Judge

Cause Nos. 27D02-0810-FD-167; 27D02-0811-FD-185

January 9, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BRADFORD, Judge
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CASE SUMMARY

As part of a plea agreement, Steven Satterly pled guilty to Class A misdemeanor 

battery in cause number 27D02-0810-FD-165 (“Cause No. FD-165”), Class D felony 

domestic battery in cause number 27D02-0810-FD-167 (“Cause No. FD-167”), and Class C 

misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated (“OWI”) in cause number 27D02-0811-

FD-185 (“Cause No. FD-185”). Satterly received a sentence of one year of incarceration in 

Cause No. FD-165, three years in Cause No. FD-167, and three years in Cause No. FD-185, 

all sentences to the served concurrently and suspended to probation. The State subsequently 

petitioned for the revocation of Satterly’s probation in Cause Nos. FD-167 and FD-185, and, 

following a hearing, the trial court ordered one year of Satterly’s suspended sentence in each 

cause number to be executed. Satterly contends that the trial court abused its discretion in 

ordering that he serve portions of his suspended sentences in Cause Nos. FD-167 and FD185. We affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 21, 2008, the State charged Satterly with Class C misdemeanor OWI, Class 

D felony OWI with a prior conviction, Class C misdemeanor operating a motor vehicle never 

having received a license, Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended with a prior 

conviction, and two infractions in Cause No. FD-185. On October 8, 2008, the State charged 

Satterly with two counts of Class D domestic battery and alleged him to be a habitual 

offender in Cause No. FD-167. On November 10, 2009, Satterly pled guilty to Class D 

felony domestic battery in Cause No. FD-167, Class C misdemeanor OWI in Cause No. FD-
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185, and Class A misdemeanor battery in Cause No. FD-165. Pursuant to the plea

agreement, Satterly received a sentence of one year of incarceration in Cause No. FD-165, 

three years in Cause No. FD-167, and three years in Cause No. FD-185, all sentences to the 

served concurrently and suspended to probation. 

On April 15, 2011, the State petitioned to revoke Satterly’s probation in Cause Nos. 

FD-167 and FD-185, alleging the commission of new criminal offenses in Wabash and Los 

Angeles County, California, including attempted murder in Wabash. On April 8, 2013, at a 

hearing on the revocation petition and in exchange for an executed sentence of no more than 

one year, Satterly admitted that he had committed the new offenses, had pled guilty and 

received a forty-five-year sentence in Wabash, and had received and discharged a three-year 

sentence in California. The trial court ordered that one year of the suspended sentence in 

Cause Nos. FD-167 and FD-185 be executed, to be served concurrently. 

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Probation is a “matter of grace” and a “conditional liberty that is a favor, not a right.” 

Marsh v. State, 818 N.E.2d 143, 146 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 

547, 549 (Ind. 1999)). We review a trial court’s probation revocation for an abuse of 

discretion. Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. If the 

trial court finds that the person violated a condition of probation, it may order the execution 

of any part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. Stephens v. 

State, 818 N.E.2d 936, 942 (Ind. 2004). Proof of a single violation of the conditions of 

probation is sufficient to support the decision to revoke probation. Bussberg v. State, 827 
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N.E.2d 37, 44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). 

Satterly contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering that he serve one 

year of his suspended sentences in incarceration. Indiana Code subsection 35-38-2-3(g)(3)

allows a trial court, in case of a violation of the terms of probation, to “order execution of all 

or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” The Indiana 

Supreme Court has held that “a trial court’s sentencing decisions for probation violations are 

reviewable using the abuse of discretion standard[,]” explaining:

Once a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than 

incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to 

proceed. If this discretion were not afforded to trial courts and sentences were 

scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges might be less inclined to order 

probation to future defendants.

Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 187 (Ind. 2007). An abuse of discretion occurs where the 

decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. As long as 

the proper procedures have been followed in conducting a probation revocation hearing, “the 

trial court may order execution of a suspended sentence upon a finding of a violation by a 

preponderance of the evidence.” Goonen v. State, 705 N.E.2d 209, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). 

The “[c]onsideration and imposition of any alternatives to incarceration is a ‘matter of grace’

left to the discretion of the trial court.” Monday v. State, 671 N.E.2d 467, 469 (Ind. Ct. App.

1996). 

Although Satterly argues that the trial court’s order is overly punitive, there is no 

indication, and Satterly does not claim, that the trial court failed to follow the proper 

procedures. Simply put, Satterly admitted that he violated the terms of his probation by 
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committing new crimes, at least one of which was quite serious, and the trial court was 

therefore authorized to order some, or all of his suspended sentences to be executed. Under 

the circumstances, and in light of the considerable leeway given the trial courts in probation 

matters, Satterly has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering 

that he serve one year of his suspended sentences. 

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

MATHIAS, J., and PYLE, J., concur.