IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA23-141

Filed 4 June 2024

Cumberland County, Nos. 16 CRS 53838-39

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

JEANIE KASSANDRA DITTY, Defendant.

Appeal by the State from order entered 20 June 2022 by Judge James Floyd 

Ammons, Jr., in Cumberland County Superior Court and conditional appeal by 

Defendant from order rendered 29 November 2018 by Judge Claire Hill in 

Cumberland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 September 

2023.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Robert C. 

Ennis, for the State.

Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender John F. 

Carella, for defendant.

MURPHY, Judge.

The trial court properly concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear Defendant’s 

18 November 2021 Motion to Enforce Plea Agreement because the 29 November 2018

order on Defendant’s previous motion was never entered. However, we reverse the 

trial court’s order granting Defendant specific performance of the plea agreement for 
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Opinion of the Court

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accessory after the fact to first-degree murder because she did not change her position 

in detrimental reliance upon the plea agreement prior to the State’s withdrawal.

BACKGROUND

On 2 December 2015, Defendant Jeanie Kassandra Ditty’s two-year-old 

daughter died as the result of a combination of head injuries, soft tissue injuries, and 

internal injuries, including a lacerated liver. On 24 March 2016, Defendant was 

charged with felony child abuse inflicting serious bodily injury and first-degree 

murder in connection with her daughter’s death, and she was arrested and held on 

these charges without bond. Two days later, Zachary Keefer—Defendant’s romantic 

partner at the time—was arrested on the same charges. 

Defendant offered to plead guilty to felony child abuse because “she knew or 

should have known that she was leaving her child [in the care of Keefer,] somebody 

who had issues with rage[]” on the day of her daughter’s death. The State declined 

to accept this plea offer. Defendant responded by offering to plead guilty to accessory 

after the fact to first-degree murder, and, in support of this offer, provided the State 

with a polygraph that she had independently sought out, which “came back 

favorably.” The State asked if Defendant would be willing to submit to a new 

polygraph administered by a State Bureau of Investigation polygrapher, and 

Defendant agreed. In July 2016, Defendant submitted to the State’s polygraph. The 

results of the State’s polygraph were consistent with those of Defendant’s 

independently-sought polygraph: Defendant “passed” all questions except the one 
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Opinion of the Court

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regarding whether she felt responsible for her daughter’s death, which had 

inconclusive results. 

During the next several months, the State requested that Defendant not move 

for bond reduction, push for an indictment, or request a probable cause hearing while 

the State continued its investigation and the parties continued their plea 

negotiations. The State ultimately requested that Defendant submit to a second 

interview by the Fayetteville Police Department or with Charlie Disponzio, the 

State’s investigator; and Defendant voluntarily submitted to an interview with Mr. 

Disponzio on 16 November 2017. 

On or about 7 January 2018, the State provided Defendant with a plea 

transcript and memorandum of agreement for accessory after the fact to first-degree 

murder; and, on 8 January 2018, Defendant signed and returned the documents. The 

State never signed the plea agreement. The agreement required, in pertinent part:

1. [Defendant] will enter a plea of GUILTY to [Accessory 

After the Fact to First-Degree Murder] . . . .

2. [Defendant] will use her best efforts to do the following:

a. Submit to interviews and debriefings with 

investigative agents and prosecuting attorneys for 

the State and the United States of America;

b. Fully and truthfully disclose her involvement and 

the involvement of others in criminal activity, 

including her involvement in the cases in which she 

is charged;
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c. Submit to polygraph examinations of other similar 

investigative tools at the request of the State and the 

United States of America;

d. Actively assist law enforcement by participating 

in law enforcement controlled conversations and 

meetings with co-conspirators or co-defendants;

e. Testify fully and truthfully in any proceeding, 

State or Federal, including but not limited to, grand 

jury proceedings and trials, regarding her and 

others’ knowledge and participation in criminal 

activity and crimes of violence;

f. Comply with all laws of the State and the United 

States of America; and,

g. Waive all rights to any item seized by law 

enforcement in these matters and agrees that same 

may be disposed of as by law provided without 

further notice to [Defendant]. 

The agreement did not require Defendant “to forego requesting a bondreduction hearing, a probable cause hearing, or an indictment.” Pursuant to the plea 

agreement, Defendant was to provide “substantial assistance and cooperation[]” and, 

upon delivering such assistance, would “receive an active sentence of 44 months 

minimum, 65 months maximum.” However, if Defendant violated the terms of the 

agreement, the parties would be free to argue as to sentencing, with that sentencing 

left to the discretion of the trial court. The agreement further provided that the State 

would not use “statements made by [Defendant] regarding the cases in which she is 

currently charged in prosecutions against her[]” unless Defendant withdrew from the 

plea and that the State may void the agreement “in its sole discretion[] [if it] 
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Opinion of the Court

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determines that [Defendant] has given false information or false testimony pursuant 

to this agreement[.]” 

The State scheduled a plea hearing for 7 March 2018, though it canceled this 

hearing on its scheduled date. Due to a conflict, the Cumberland County District 

Attorney’s office withdrew as counsel for the State on 28 March 2018, and Special 

Prosecutor Julia Hejazi took over the State’s prosecution of Defendant’s case. See 

generally N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-413(a)(2) and 7A-415 (2023). The State informed Special 

Prosecutor Hejazi that Defendant had signed the plea agreement but that the State 

had canceled Defendant’s plea hearing and, therefore, Defendant had not yet entered 

a guilty plea. 

In April 2018, Special Prosecutor Hejazi advised Defendant that—based on her 

independent review of new and existing evidence—she would extend a new plea offer 

of second-degree murder to both Defendant and Keefer. Defendant rejected Special 

Prosecutor Hejazi’s new offer; and, on 11 September 2018, was indicted for felony 

child abuse and first-degree murder. Shortly after her indictment, Defendant filed a

motion seeking to enforce and compel specific performance of the State’s initial plea 

offer for accessory after the fact to first-degree murder. The trial court, by Judge 

Claire Hill, rendered an oral denial of Defendant’s motion on 29 November 2018. 

On the same day, the State moved, and was permitted, to join Defendant and 

Keefer for trial. A joint trial was scheduled for 19 August 2019 but was ultimately 

continued until 12 November 2019. However, in November 2019, the State dropped 
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Opinion of the Court

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its charges against Keefer. Defendant’s case proceeded to trial on the charges of firstdegree murder and felony child abuse on 9 March 2020. On 20 March 2020, the trial 

court declared a mistrial due to a hung jury, and a new trial was scheduled. 

On 12 August 2020, Defendant’s court-appointed counsel, Chief Public 

Defender Bernard P. Condlin, who had represented Defendant in all proceedings 

since March 2016, withdrew as counsel, and the trial court ordered that new counsel 

be assigned by the Capital Defender. On 11 September 2020, the Capital Defender 

appointed Meleaha Machelle Kimrey to represent Defendant. 

Prior to the new trial date, Defendant filed a new Motion to Enforce Plea 

Agreement, seeking specific performance of the State’s previous plea agreement for 

accessory after the fact to first-degree murder. In this motion, Defendant again 

argued that she relied to her detriment on the State’s January 2018 plea agreement

and, consequently, did not file for a new bond hearing; did not push for an indictment;

submitted to the State’s polygraph and interview; and—as a result of the late 

indictment—had less time than her co-defendant to review discovery materials. 

On 22 November 2021, the trial court, by Judge James F. Ammons, Jr., heard 

and rendered its order granting Defendant’s motion to enforce. Special Prosecutors 

Whitney Belich and Lisa Coltrain appeared as counsel for the State at the hearing.

1 

1 The record makes no specific reference to Special Prosecutor Hejazi’s withdrawal as counsel 

for the State. However, the record contains no documents signed by Special Prosecutor Hejazi on 

behalf of the State after 20 March 2020. On 17 November 2021, Defendant’s trial counsel certified 
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Opinion of the Court

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As of the hearing date, Defendant had been incarcerated pending trial for 69 months, 

a period of time more than the maximum sentence—65 months—that she would have 

received pursuant to the aborted plea agreement. On 22 November 2021, Defendant 

was released on a combined $50,000.00 unsecured bond and directed to return to 

court on 2 December 2021.

At the December appearance, the parties entered into a Consent Order

whereby the trial court, inter alia, stayed further proceedings until after entry of its 

written order. On 10 February 2022, the State moved for reconsideration of the 

orally-rendered order. The trial court heard arguments on the State’s motion on 24 

March 2022 and ultimately entered its written order granting Defendant’s motion to 

enforce on 20 June 2022. 

On 20 July 2022, the State petitioned our review of the trial court’s Order to 

Enforce Plea Agreement. On 2 September 2022, Defendant filed her response and a 

conditional petition for review of Judge Hill’s earlier order denying Defendant’s 

motion to enforce the plea agreement. We allowed both petitions; and, on 5 

September 2023, a panel consisting of (now-Chief) Judge Chris Dillon, Judge Hunter 

Murphy, and Judge (now-Justice) Allison Riggs heard oral arguments in this matter. 

On 13 September 2023, Judge Riggs assumed a new position as Associate Justice of 

that she served a copy of Defendant’s motion upon Special Prosecutor Lisa Coltrain; and, at the 22 

November 2021 hearing on this motion, Special Prosecutors Lisa Coltrain and Whitney Belich 

appeared as counsel for the State.
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Opinion of the Court

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the North Carolina Supreme Court. Following Justice Riggs’s appointment, on 3 

November 2023, we ordered that this case shall be decided by a panel consisting of 

(now-Chief) Judge Dillon, Judge Murphy, and Judge Carolyn Thompson, who was not 

present for oral arguments. On 13 November 2023, Defendant filed a Motion for New 

Panel to Consider Oral Argument. We denied this motion on 19 December 2023 and 

took judicial notice of the prior oral argument conducted and recorded on 5 September 

2023.

ANALYSIS

No judgment has been entered against Defendant. This case is before us on 

appeal from an interlocutory order not otherwise authorized by N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b) 

or N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-1444−1445; however, this Court—by a panel consisting of Judge 

(now-Justice) Richard Dietz, Judge April Wood, and Judge John Tyson (dissenting)—

allowed the State’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Defendant’s Conditional 

Petition for Writ of Certiorari by majority vote on 19 October 2022. See N.C. R. App. 

P. 21(a)(1) (2023) (empowering appellate courts to issue writ of certiorari to review 

orders by trial court “when no right of appeal from an interlocutory order exists”); see

generally N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b) (2023) (dictating cases in which appeal from trial court 

“lies of right directly to the Court of Appeals”), N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-1444−1445 (2023) 

(governing statutory bases for appeal by criminal defendant and appeal by the State, 

respectively). 
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Opinion of the Court

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On appeal from the trial court’s Order to Enforce Plea Agreement, the State

argues that “the trial court[,] [by Judge Ammons,] lacked authority to overrule Judge 

Hill’s prior denial order by granting Defendant’s second motion to enforce the same 

plea agreement, and its 22 June 2022 order therefore should be vacated.” In the 

alternative, the State argues that the trial court erred in granting Defendant’s motion 

to enforce the withdrawn plea agreement on the merits. 

In response to the State’s appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court 

correctly concluded that it was not bound by Judge Hill’s previous ruling and that 

Defendant’s detrimental reliance on the plea agreement necessitated its enforcement. 

In the alternative, if we conclude that Judge Ammons lacked authority to overrule 

Judge Hill’s previous ruling, Defendant challenges the trial court’s order denying her 

motion to enforce on the merits.

A. Trial Court’s Jurisdiction

As a preliminary matter, we address whether the trial court’s initial ruling by 

Judge Hill was properly entered, such that it may support both Defendant’s 

conditional appeal and the State’s argument that the trial court, by Judge Ammons, 

lacked jurisdiction to reconsider Defendant’s motion to enforce. See generally State 

v. Woolridge, 357 N.C. 544, 549-50 (2003) (noting the “well[-]established” principle 

that “ordinarily one judge may not modify, overrule, or change the judgment of 

another Superior Court judge previously made in the same action[]” absent “a 

substantial change in circumstances . . . warrant[ing] a different or new disposition 
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Opinion of the Court

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of the matter[]”). We review de novo whether Judge Hill’s denial of Defendant’s 

motion was entered, as an order “must be entered of record, and[,] until this shall be 

done, there is nothing to appeal from[,]” and no order exists to confer appellate 

jurisdiction. State v. Mangum, 270 N.C. App. 327, 331 (2020) (quoting Logan v. 

Harris, 90 N.C. 7, 7 (1884)). 

During the 22 November 2021 hearing on Defendant’s motion to enforce, 

Defendant’s former trial counsel, Chief Public Defender Condlin, testified, in 

pertinent part, as follows:

[THE STATE:] So Judge Hill denied this exact same 

motion to enforce this plea agreement that we’re speaking 

about today?

[CONDLIN] That is correct.

[THE STATE:] Okay. And to your knowledge, was an order 

to that effect put into place?

[CONDLIN:] I know she didn’t ask me to draft the order.

The trial court then inquired further into Judge Hill’s previous order:

THE COURT: Anybody ever seen Judge Hill’s order?

[THE STATE]: Your Honor, in our file we have a drafted 

proposed order but it’s not signed or dated . . . . [B]ut . . .

we don’t have any drafted -- or any signed order from Judge 

Hill on this motion.

THE COURT: . . . . [T]he fact that there is no order that we 

can find probably indicates that the order was never 

entered.
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Opinion of the Court

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[THE STATE]: I can’t speak to that, Your Honor. I mean 

that is possible. It’s also possible that a copy of the signed 

order never made it back to the [S]tate to go into the file 

but that it does exist somewhere else[,] but I can’t make 

any representation one way or the other to that.

THE COURT: Now, I’m the first one to admit I have a hard 

time seeing things in the file and that’s why I never say it’s 

not in the file. I say I can’t find it. But I’ve looked and I’ve 

asked the [C]lerk to look and I’m asking y’all and what you 

say you got is a draft unsigned. You got one?

[TRIAL COUNSEL]: Do not, Judge. The only thing that I 

had was the -- a copy of the motion that had been filed and 

. . . written at the top “denied” but that’s all that . . . [I’ve 

seen.]

. . . .

THE COURT: All right . . . . The clerk found the original 

motion to enforce the plea agreement that was denied by 

Judge Claire Hill [on 29 November 2018,] and it’s denied 

in her writing “denied” and the date and signing it so she 

may not have even asked anybody [to draft] a written order 

. . . .

The trial court, by Judge Ammons, found that “a proper order was never 

entered” by Judge Hill on Defendant’s motion to enforce because “there was no 

written order making findings of fact or conclusions of law ever included in the file.” 

Therefore, the trial court did not purport to review Judge Hill’s prior ruling on 

Defendant’s motion to enforce; instead, it concluded—as if reviewing Defendant’s 

motion for the first time—“that it ha[d] jurisdiction to hear this motion . . . on the 

basis of detrimental reliance.” 
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Opinion of the Court

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In the civil context, “a judgment is entered when it is reduced to writing, signed 

by the judge, and filed with the clerk of court pursuant to Rule 5 [of the North 

Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure].” N.C. R. Civ. P. 58 (2023). However, our Supreme 

Court has articulated different requirements for entry of a judgment or order in the 

criminal context:

Rule 4 [of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure] 

treats order and judgments in criminal cases identically. 

Rendering a judgment or an order means to pronounce, 

state, declare, or announce the judgment or order, and is 

the judicial act of the court in pronouncing the sentence of 

the law upon the facts in controversy. Entering a judgment 

or an order is a ministerial act which consists in spreading 

it upon the record. For the purposes of entering notice of 

appeal in a criminal case under Rule 4(a), a judgment or an 

order is rendered when the judge decides the issue before 

him or her and advises the necessary individuals of the 

decision; a judgment or an order is entered under that Rule 

when the clerk of court records or files the judge’s decision 

regarding the judgment or order.

State v. Oates, 366 N.C. 264, 266 (2012) (cleaned up) (emphasis in original). Our 

Supreme Court has further clarified “that a trial court has entered a judgment or 

order in a criminal case in the event that it announces its ruling in open court and 

the courtroom clerk makes a notation of its ruling in the minutes being kept for that 

session.” State v. Miller, 368 N.C. 729, 738 (2016). 

Here, Judge Hill rendered her denial of Defendant’s motion to enforce by 

announcing, in open court, “In my discretion I’m denying the defense motion to 

enforce a plea agreement after considering the case law and arguments of counsel.” 
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Opinion of the Court

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At some time after rendering her decision, Judge Hill signed Defendant’s motion to 

enforce—file-stamped on 19 November 2018—next to a notation of “Denied 11-29-

18[.]” After extensive discussion amongst the parties and the trial court, the Clerk of 

Court located this motion; however, no marking or file stamp by the Clerk on the 

notated motion, nor any other entry in the record before us, indicates Judge Hill’s 

order was “spread[] [] upon the record” by the Clerk of Court through the ministerial 

act of filing or recording. Oates, 366 N.C. at 266; see also McKinney v. Duncan, 256 

N.C. App. 717, 721 (2017) (holding that the “record fail[ed] to establish that the orders 

were entered” because they “[did] not bear a file stamp or other indication that they 

were ever filed with the clerk of court”). 

We conclude that Judge Hill’s order denying Defendant’s motion to enforce was 

never entered; and, therefore, the trial court, by Judge Ammons, was free to consider 

Defendant’s motion to enforce. While “a trial court’s ruling must be upheld if it is 

correct upon any theory of law, and thus it should not be set aside merely because the 

court gives a wrong or insufficient reason for it[,]” we note that, in reaching the same 

conclusion, the trial court relied on a misapprehension of law. Bracey v. Murdock, 

286 N.C. App. 191, 195 (2022), disc. rev. denied, __ N.C. __ (2023) (citations and marks 

omitted). As discussed above, an order or judgment in a criminal case is entered when 

the clerk of court records or files the judge’s decision, and Judge Hill’s order need not 

have been reduced to writing with findings of fact and conclusions of law to be 

properly entered.
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Opinion of the Court

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B. Defendant’s Motion to Enforce

Next, we consider the State’s argument on the merits that the trial court erred

in granting Defendant’s motion to enforce the plea agreement. The State contends 

that the trial court erred by concluding (1) that Defendant had a federal due process 

right to enforcement of the aborted plea agreement, despite never having pled guilty 

pursuant to that agreement, and (2) that Defendant detrimentally relied on—and 

was therefore prejudiced by—the plea agreement.

1. Enforceability of Plea Agreement without Guilty Plea

The State first challenges the trial court’s conclusion that Defendant had a 

federal due process right to enforcement of the aborted plea agreement, despite never 

having pled guilty pursuant to that agreement. In support of its argument, the State 

cites the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Mabry v. Johnson that

[a] plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional 

significance; in itself it is a mere executory agreement 

which, until embodied in the judgment of a court, does not 

deprive an accused of liberty or any other constitutionally 

protected interest. It is the ensuing guilty plea that 

implicates the Constitution.

Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507-08 (1984). The undisputed facts indicate that 

Defendant never entered—and the trial court never approved or accepted—a guilty 

plea pursuant to the plea agreement. Thus, the State argues under Mabry that 

Defendant was not “deprive[d] . . . of liberty or any other constitutionally protected 

interest” absent “judgment of a court[.]” Id. at 507.
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Opinion of the Court

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However, our Supreme Court has interpreted the United States Supreme 

Court’s holdings in Santobello v. New York and its progeny as providing that, even 

when a defendant does “not enter a guilty plea pursuant to the purported [plea] 

agreement,” she may still demonstrate that “[her] federal due process rights were 

violated” if “the facts reveal that [the] defendant relied to [her] detriment on the 

[aborted plea] agreement.” State v. Hudson, 331 N.C. 122, 148 (1992), cert. denied, 

Hudson v. North Carolina, 506 U.S. 1055 (1993) (citing State v. Collins, 300 N.C. 142 

(1980)); see Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (“[W]hen a plea rests in 

any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be 

said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.”). 

Here, the trial court found that Defendant took several actions in detrimental 

reliance upon the aborted plea agreement, including “debriefing the State through 

Mr. Disponzio,” “[n]ot requesting a bond hearing[,]” “remaining in custody since the 

day of her arrest for a total of 69 months as of . . . [22 November] 2021[,]” “[n]ot asking 

for a probable cause hearing, nor pushing for an indictment[,]” and “chang[ing] [her] 

strategy from trial preparation to preparing to testify against [Keefer].” The trial 

court then concluded that, under Defendant’s right to due process, the State was 

bound by its agreement to accessory after the fact to first-degree murder when 

Defendant “detrimentally relied through her attorney on the plea bargain that was 

offered by the State of North Carolina[,]” and Defendant was therefore entitled to 
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Opinion of the Court

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enforcement of that agreement. In reaching these conclusions, the trial court cited 

our decision in State v. Sturgill, 121 N.C. App. 629 (1996).

In Sturgill, we held that the defendant, who detrimentally relied on a law 

enforcement officer’s promise that the State would not charge him as a habitual felon 

if he provided incriminating statements, was entitled under “notions of substantial 

justice and fair play, as well as [the] defendant’s substantive due process rights,” to 

a new trial and suppression of his confession, even though the law enforcement officer 

never had authority to make such a promise. Id. at 631. When analyzing the facts 

in Sturgill, we noted that 

[o]ur Supreme Court addressed a somewhat similar issue 

in State v. Collins. In Collins, the defendant moved to 

dismiss . . . charges because the State failed to honor a plea 

arrangement reached between the defendant’s attorney, a 

police officer, and an assistant district attorney. The 

negotiations resulted in a written plea agreement . . . . 

Later the same day, at a probable cause hearing on the 

felony charges, a different assistant district attorney 

refused to honor the existing plea agreement, based on his 

opinion that the plea bargain was inappropriate, and he 

had not been consulted.

Id. at 633 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 

Ultimately, we held in Sturgill that 

[t]he principles set forth in Collins and its progeny are 

equally applicable to the instant case. However, we note 

two distinguishing factors: (1) the promise made to [the] 

defendant was not in the context of plea negotiations, but 

rather was made during police interrogation; and (2) a 

police detective, rather than the prosecutor, made the so-
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Opinion of the Court

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called “nonprosecution agreement” with [the] defendant . . 

. .

Id. at 635. We then characterized “[t]he Collins decision [as] an affirmation that, 

when a defendant ‘takes action constituting detrimental reliance upon an agreement,’

the Constitution requires courts to ‘[ensure] the defendant what is reasonably due in 

the circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Collins, 300 N.C. at 145) (cleaned up). We further 

reasoned that

[t]he change of position contemplated in Collins is a 

defendant’s detrimental reliance on a governmental 

promise, which results in a derogation of his constitutional 

rights. Such agreements may not be avoided to the 

prejudice of defendants as those “defendants have a 

constitutional right to be treated with ‘fairness’ throughout 

the [prosecutorial] process.” 

Id. at 639 (quoting Collins, 300 N.C. at 148). 

Although our discussion and application of the principles in Collins were

relevant to our reasoning in Sturgill, they did not serve to expand or modify our 

Supreme Court’s holding in Collins, nor do they have any precedential value in the 

context of enforcing plea agreements without judicial approval. The trial court 

improperly relied on Sturgill to support its conclusion that the State violated 

Defendant’s constitutional right to due process. However, if we conclude that the 

trial court nevertheless reached the correct result under the applicable law of Collins

and its progeny, we must uphold the trial court’s ruling. See Bracey, 286 N.C. App. 

at 195.
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In Collins, our Supreme Court interpreted the Santobello court’s holding that 

“when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the 

prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such 

promise must be fulfilled.” Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262. The Collins court noted it

addressed “a case of first impression[,]” as—unlike in Santobello, where the 

defendant had already entered, and the trial court had accepted, a guilty plea—the 

defendant in Collins had never actually pled guilty. Collins, 300 N.C. at 145 (“[The] 

[d]efendant contends that he was deprived of . . . his fourteenth amendment right to 

due process of law by the judge’s refusal to enforce the plea arrangement between

[the] defendant and Assistant District Attorney Cole.”). In Collins, as in this case, 

the State withdrew from the plea agreement before the defendant had fulfilled the

obligation of pleading guilty. 

In its interpretation of Santobello, the Collins court rejected the holding of the 

Fourth Circuit in Cooper v. United States that “under appropriate circumstances . . . 

a constitutional right to enforcement of plea proposals may arise before any technical 

‘contract’ has been formed, and on the basis alone of expectations reasonably formed 

in reliance upon the honor of the government in making and abiding by its proposals.” 

Id. at 147 (quoting Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1979)). Our 

Supreme Court instead held, in pertinent part,

that there is no absolute right to have a guilty plea 

accepted. The State may withdraw from a plea bargain 

arrangement at any time prior to, but not after, the actual 
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Opinion of the Court

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entry of the guilty plea by [the] defendant or any other 

change of position by him constituting detrimental reliance 

upon the arrangement. The rationale behind these 

decisions is that plea bargain arrangements

are not binding upon the prosecutor, in the absence 

of prejudice to a defendant resulting from reliance 

thereon, until they receive judicial sanction, 

anymore than they are binding upon defendants 

(who are always free to withdraw from plea 

agreements prior to entry of their guilty plea 

regardless of any prejudice to the prosecution that 

may result from a breach).

When viewed in light of the analogous law of contracts, it 

is clear that plea agreements normally arise in the form of 

unilateral contracts. The consideration given for the 

prosecutor’s promise is not [the] defendant’s corresponding 

promise to plead guilty, but rather is [the] defendant’s 

actual performance by so pleading. Thus, the prosecutor 

agrees to perform if and when [the] defendant performs but 

has no right to compel [the] defendant’s performance. 

Similarly, the prosecutor may rescind his offer of a 

proposed plea arrangement before [the] defendant 

consummates the contract by pleading guilty or takes other 

action constituting detrimental reliance upon the 

agreement. 

In the instant case, [the] defendant had neither entered a 

guilty plea nor in any way relied on the plea agreement to 

his detriment. After the rescission of the agreement, the 

State’s motion for a continuance was granted and [the] 

defendant was thereafter afforded a fair trial. [The] 

[d]efendant has not been prejudiced by the disavowal of his 

plea arrangement, and we find no violation of his 

constitutional rights.

Id. at 148-49 (citations and marks omitted). 
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Our Supreme Court’s holding in Collins established that the State has an 

absolute right to withdraw from a plea agreement unless and until, “but not after, 

the actual entry of the guilty plea by [the] defendant or any other change of position 

by [her] constituting detrimental reliance upon the arrangement.” Id. at 148. Though 

the State may not withdraw to the prejudice of the defendant, its right to withdraw

remains equal in force to that of the defendant’s right “to withdraw from plea 

agreements prior to entry of their guilty plea regardless of any prejudice to the 

prosecution that may result from a breach.” Id. at 149. The State may be bound to 

an offer which has not resulted in the actual entry and acceptance of the defendant’s 

guilty plea only when the defendant is necessarily prejudiced by changing her 

position in detrimental reliance upon that agreement prior to judicial sanction or the 

State’s withdrawal.

Under Collins, we treat the aborted plea agreement as a unilateral contract 

between the parties, where the consideration given in exchange for the State’s 

promises outlined in the agreement is Defendant’s performance of the terms of that 

agreement, including the entry of a guilty plea. Id. (“The consideration given for the 

prosecutor’s promise is not [the] defendant’s corresponding promise to plead guilty, 

but rather is [the] defendant’s actual performance by so pleading.”). In contract law, 

a party may be bound by its promise in absence of consideration under the doctrine 

of equitable estoppel:
STATE V. DITTY

Opinion of the Court

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The essentials of equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais are 

a representation, either by words or conduct, made to 

another, who reasonably believing the representation to be 

true, relies upon it, with the result that he changes his 

position to his detriment. It is essential that the party 

estopped shall have made a representation by words or acts 

and that someone shall have acted on the faith of this 

representation in such a way that he cannot without 

damage withdraw from the transaction.

Wiggs v. Peedin, 194 N.C. App. 481, 488 (2008) (quoting Volkman v. DP Associates, 

48 N.C. App. 155, 158 (1980)). Similarly, in the absence of Defendant’s actual entry 

of a guilty plea in exchange for the State’s promise, the State may still be bound to 

that promise by Defendant’s detrimental reliance. 

2. Defendant’s Detrimental Reliance

In the instant case, the trial court concluded that, even though Defendant 

never entered a guilty plea, she had changed her position in detrimental reliance 

upon the State’s plea offer before it was withdrawn. See State v. King, 218 N.C. App. 

384, 388 (2012) (marks omitted) (“Once [a] defendant begins performance of the 

contract by pleading guilty or takes other action constituting detrimental reliance 

upon the agreement[,] the prosecutor can no longer rescind his offer.”). The State 

challenges this conclusion, arguing that it withdrew the plea agreement prior to “any 

. . . change of position by [Defendant] constituting detrimental reliance upon the 

arrangement.” Collins, 300 N.C. at 148.

The trial court found that 
STATE V. DITTY

Opinion of the Court

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Defendant detrimentally relied on the State’s plea offer in 

the following ways:

a. Debriefing the State through Mr. Disponzio, in 

which she gave incriminating statements related to 

a crime with which she has not been charged.

b. Not requesting a bond hearing.

c. Remaining in custody since the day of her arrest 

for a total of 69 months as of the date of the hearing 

on [22 November] 2021.

d. Not asking for a probable cause hearing, nor 

pushing for an indictment, thereby not receiving 

discovery in the same manner and the same time 

frame as her co-defendant, Zachary Keefer, who was 

indicted approximately 9 months before the 

Defendant.

e. The defense team changed their strategy from 

trial preparation to preparing to testify against Mr. 

Keefer.

Whether Defendant debriefed the State in her interview with Mr. Disponzio; 

abstained from requesting a bond hearing, pushing for an indictment, or asking for a 

probable cause hearing; remained in custody for 69 months as of the hearing date; 

and changed her trial strategy are findings of fact. As in other motions implicating a 

defendant’s due process rights, such as motions to suppress, our review of these 

findings of fact is limited to determining whether they are supported by competent 

evidence. See, e.g., State v. Parisi, 372 N.C. 639, 649 (2019) (cleaned up) (“As we have 

stated on many occasions, this Court reviews a trial court’s order granting or denying 

a defendant’s suppression motion by determining whether the trial court’s underlying 
STATE V. DITTY

Opinion of the Court

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findings of fact are supported by competent evidence and whether those factual 

findings in turn support the trial court’s ultimate conclusions of law.”). However, 

whether Defendant took these actions in detrimental reliance upon—and was 

therefore prejudiced by—the withdrawn plea agreement is an issue of law which we 

review de novo. See Hudson, 331 N.C. at 148 (emphasis added) (“Because defendant 

did not enter a guilty plea pursuant to the purported agreement, whether defendant’s 

federal due process rights were violated turns on whether the facts reveal that 

defendant relied to his detriment on the agreement. We agree with the trial court’s 

conclusion that no such reliance is evident.”); see also Parisi, 372 N.C. at 655 (cleaned 

up) (italics omitted) (“Although the issue of whether an officer had probable cause to 

support a defendant’s arrest for impaired driving exists certainly contains a factual 

component, the proper resolution of that issue inherently requires the exercise of 

judgment or the application of legal principles, and constitutes a conclusion of law 

subject to de novo review rather than a finding of fact . . . .”).

As the trial court found, “[t]he terms of the Memorandum of Agreement . . . did 

not require [] Defendant to forego requesting a bond-reduction hearing, a probable 

cause hearing, or an indictment.” As a matter of law, any such forbearance by 

Defendant was not induced by—and could therefore not be in reliance upon—the 

State’s plea agreement. Furthermore, although plea negotiations began in early 

2016, the State did not present Defendant with any plea offer until 7 January 2018. 

The trial court found that Defendant submitted to the “debriefing/interview” with Mr. 
STATE V. DITTY

Opinion of the Court

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Disponzio on 16 November 2017. Defendant could not “detrimentally [rely] on the 

State’s plea offer” in making any statements during this interview, as it occurred

nearly two months before she received any offer from the State. See State v. Tyson, 

189 N.C. App. 408, 416 (2008) (“While the government must be held to the promises 

it made, it will not be bound to those it did not make.”). Similarly, the trial court 

found that “by roughly sixty days into the charges being filed, [the State] was leaning 

towards [Keefer] being the principal[;] and, therefore, that is the direction that [trial 

counsel], the Defendant, and the defense team’s focus went in everything they did.” 

This finding reflects that Defendant changed her focus from trial preparation to 

preparing to testify against Keefer roughly sixty days after 24 March 2016—around 

or about 20 months before the State’s presentation of the plea agreement to 

Defendant. 

The trial court found that the State scheduled Defendant’s case for plea 

“[d]uring the January 2018 Administrative week,” and, “[a]t the time the plea was 

scheduled, following the signing of the plea transcript and [m]emorandum of 

[a]greement, Defendant had completed all conditions of the plea, except for testifying 

in [Keefer’s] trial.” The trial court made no finding—nor does Defendant raise any 

argument alleging—that Defendant took any action in detrimental reliance upon the 

agreement during the sixty-day period between its presentation on 7 January 2018 

and the cancellation of the plea hearing on 7 March 2018, except for “continu[ing] to 

comply with the State’s requests that she not seek a probable cause hearing, 
STATE V. DITTY

Opinion of the Court

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indictment, or bond hearing[,]” which were not part of nor induced by the plea 

agreement. Accordingly, the trial court’s findings of fact do not support its conclusion 

that Defendant changed her position in detrimental reliance upon the State’s plea 

agreement.

We return to our Supreme Court’s holding in Collins that “there is no absolute 

right to have a guilty plea accepted. The State may withdraw from a plea bargain 

arrangement at any time prior to, but not after, the actual entry of the guilty plea by 

[the] defendant or any other change of position by [her] constituting detrimental 

reliance upon the arrangement.” Collins, 300 N.C. at 148. The State was free to 

withdraw from the agreement, as Defendant did not change her position in 

detrimental reliance upon it. The trial court erred in concluding that Defendant was 

entitled to enforcement and specific performance of the State’s initial plea agreement 

for accessory after the fact to first-degree murder. 

CONCLUSION

The trial court, by Judge Ammons, had jurisdiction to enter the 20 June 2022 

order, and we dismiss the arguments in Defendant’s conditional appeal as moot. The 

record does not reveal any change of position by Defendant in detrimental reliance 

upon the plea agreement, and the State remained free to withdraw the agreement. 
STATE V. DITTY

Opinion of the Court

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We reverse the trial court’s order granting Defendant’s motion to enforce the State’s 

plea agreement and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.2

DISMISSED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.

Chief Judge DILLON and Judge THOMPSON concur.

2 We note that the State did not seek review of Judge Ammons’s 22 November 2021 Temporary 

Commitment Order, and the same is not disturbed by this opinion.