alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 12.1
                                        
                              FIRST INDUSTRIAL, L.P.
               COMPUTATION OF RATIOS OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES
                        AND PREFERRED UNIT DISTRIBUTIONS
                             (DOLLARS IN THOUSANDS)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                     1998           1997           1996             1995               1994
                                                ------------    ------------   -------------    -------------      -------------
<S>                                             <C>             <C>            <C>              <C>                <C>
Income from Operations Before
Disposition of Interest Rate
Protection Agreements and
Restructuring Charge...................         $     98,400     $    53,519    $     32,577     $     12,123       $      8,823

Plus:  Interest Expense and
Amortization of Interest Rate
Protection Agreements and Deferred
Financing Costs........................               69,713          25,468           4,881            6,803             13,625
                                                ------------    ------------    ------------     ------------       ------------
Earnings Before Disposition of
Interest Rate Protection
Agreements, Restructuring Charge
and Fixed Charges......................         $    168,113     $    78,987    $     37,458     $     18,926       $     22,448
                                                ============    ============    ============     ============       ============
Fixed Charges and Preferred Unit
Distributions (a)......................         $    100,047     $    34,555    $      5,382     $      7,069       $     13,645
                                                ============    ============    ============     ============       ============
Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges
and Preferred Unit Distributions(b)....                1.68x           2.29x           6.96x            2.68x              1.65x
                                                ============    ============    ============     ============       ============
</TABLE>

(a)  There were no preferred limited partnership distributions in
     respect of any period prior to the fiscal quarter ended June 30, 1997

(b)  For purposes of computing the ratios of earnings to fixed charges and
     preferred unit distributions, earnings have been calculated by adding fixed
     charges (excluding capitalized interest) to income from operations before
     disposition of interest rate protection agreements and restructuring
     charge.  Fixed charges consist of interest costs, whether expensed or
     capitalized and amortization of interest rate protection agreements and
     deferred financing charges.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Karim J. FORD.

No. 2012-KO-0064.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 20, 2012.

*1270In re Ford, Karim J.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 08-3084; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KA-91.

Denied.
##### 



EXHIBIT 31.2

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

I, Truman Cole, certify that:

1.     I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of First Virtual
Communications, Inc.;

2.     Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly
report;

3.     Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

4.     The registrants other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;

b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) disclosed in this quarterly report any change in the registrants
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants
most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably
likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial
reporting; and

5.     The registrants other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based
on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to
the registrants auditors and the audit committee of registrants board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal control
over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the
registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial data
and information; and

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrants
internal control over financial reporting.

|                       |  |                                    
|---------------------- |  | -----------------------------------
|Dated: August 14, 2003 |  | /s/ Truman Cole                    
|                       |  |                                    
|                       |  | Truman Cole
Chief Financial Officer

32
**Exhibit 32**

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. § 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for thequarter ended March 31, 2008 (the “Report”) of TF Financial Corporation(the “Company”) as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on thedate hereof, we, Kent C. Lufkin, President and Chief Executive Officer, andDennis R. Stewart, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer(Principal Accounting Officer), hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, asadopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, inall material respects, the financial position and results of operations of theCompany.

 

 
|   |              |   | /s/ Kent C. Lufkin                                   |
|--------|-------------------|--------|------------------------------------------------------|
| Date:  | May 14, 2008 |   | Kent C. Lufkin                                       |
|   |              |   | President and CEO                                    |
|   |              |   | (Principal Executive Officer)                        |
|   |              |   |                                                 |
|   |              |   |                                                 |
|   |              |   | /s/ Dennis R. Stewart                                |
| Date:  | May 14, 2008 |   | Dennis R. Stewart                                    |
|   |              |   | Executive Vice President and                         |
|   |              |   | Chief Financial Officer                              |
|   |              |   | (Principal Financial & Accounting  Officer) |

 

----
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster , Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

May 29, 2015

a0526 

# Order

Clerk May 29, 2015

149536

DAVID ABBO, COLORADO TOYZ,

INC., and WIRELESS PHONES, LLC,

Plaintiffs

- Appellees,

v SC: 149536

COA: 304185

Oakland CC: 2007

- 082804

- CK

WIRELESS TOYZ FRANCHISE, LLC,

JOE BARBAT, RICHARD SIMTOB,

JSB ENTERPRIZES, INC., and JACK

BARBAT,

Defendants

- Appellants.

____________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 13, 2014

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered. We direct the Clerk to schedule oral

argument on whether to grant the application or take other action. MCR 7.302(H)(1).

The parties shall file supplemental briefs within 42 days of the date of this order

addressing whether the Court of Appeals erred by reversing the Oakland Circuit Court

order granting the defendants’ motion for judgment not withstanding the verdict.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. John M. BALLARD.

No. 2011-KO-0447.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 23, 2011.

In re Ballard, John M.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Corn-t Div. H, No. 21072; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KA 1026.

Denied.
Order filed November 5, 2013

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________ NO. 14

- 13

- 00693

- CV

____________ DEVONIA T. GEORGE SL ATER , Appellant

V.

CHRISTOPHER LANE SL ATER , Appellee

On Appeal from the 246th District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2012

- 66462



### ORDER
No reporter’s record has been filed in this case. The official court reporter for the Court informed this court that appellant had not made arrangements for payment for the reporter’s record. On August 26, 2013
, the clerk of this court notified appellant that we would consider and decide those issues that do not require a reporter ’ s record unless appellant, within 15 days of notice, provided this court with proof of payment for the record. See Tex. R. App. P. 37 .3(c). Appellant filed no reply.Accordingly, we order appellant to file a brief in this appeal within thirty

days of the date of this order. If appellant fails to comply with this order, the court will dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(b).

PER CURIAM
#### Robert E. NELSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 00-2720.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 6, 2000.1

Decided Jan. 10, 2001.

*520Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, BAUER, WOOD, Jr., Circuit Judges.

1

. We consider this appeal, No. 00-2720, as successive to No. 97-3141. Accordingly, this matter has been submitted to the same panel under Internal Operating Procedure 6(b). After an examination of the briefs and the record in No. 00-2720, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

ORDER

We previously considered an appeal from Robert Nelson related to his conviction for two counts of theft of firearms, stemming from two burglaries. *See United States v. Nelson,*143 F.3d 373 (7th Cir.1998). Nelson was sentenced to 140 months on each count, to run concurrently. In his first appeal, Nelson objected to sentencing enhancements, and we affirmed the district court’s decision. Nelson later filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition, claiming that the imposition of concurrent sentences was beyond the statutory maximum for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(u). The district court agreed that the sentence was illegal. To correct the problem, the court restructured the sentence, to produce a combined sentence equal to 140 months. Specifically, the court sentenced Nelson to 120 months on Count 1 and 20 months on Count 2, to run consecutively. Nelson also claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on sentencing issues. The district court found that his attorney’s performance was not unreasonable, and that Nelson had not carried his burden of showing prejudice. Nelson appeals this decision.

Nelson first argues that the consecutive sentence violates due process because it represents an upward departure which lacked prior notice. We find, however, that the district court’s imposition of consecutive sentences was not an upward departure requiring notice. Instead, the district court engaged in application of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d), and did so appropriately. *See United States v. Polichemi,*219 F.3d 698, 714 (7th Cir.2000).

Nelson also appeals the district court’s decision on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Nelson’s claim is based on his attorney’s failure to argue that his sentence was in excess of the *521statutory minimum and his failure to argue that the government breached the plea agreement. We agree with the decision of the district court that his attorney’s decisions were not unreasonable, and that Nelson has not shown that the outcome would have been different save these decisions.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Nelson’s appeal is summarily AFFIRMED.
#### Tenesha SMITH, Melvin Porter, Sr. and Wallace Dixon v. TRANSPORT SERVICES COMPANY, Protective Insurance Company and Dan Davis.

No. 2011-C-1147.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 16, 2011.

In re Davis, Dan; Protective Insurance Company; Transport Services Co. of Illinois; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 2004-8425; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-CA-1238.

Denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-30-1997
<CASH>                                              54
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    7,936
<ALLOWANCES>                                       204
<INVENTORY>                                     18,970
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                28,792
<PP&E>                                           9,264
<DEPRECIATION>                                   3,538
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  35,875
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           16,017
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            41
<OTHER-SE>                                      16,707
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    35,875
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                15,016
<CGS>                                           13,328
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    2,304
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 423
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  (616)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     (242)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              (374)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     (374)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.09)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### Texas & Pacific R’y Co. v. L. D. Mays.

(No. 3453.)

Appeal from Tarrant County.

Finch & Thompson, counsel for appellant.

Parker & Gillespie, counsel for appellee.

Opinion by

Will-son, J.

§ 159. *Common carriers; duty of to Jceep depots warm and comfortable; damages recoverable for failure so to Jceep depot to injury of passenger.*Appellee purchased at Arlington, at appellant’s depot, a ticket to Fort Worth. He purchased said ticket about 6 o’clock P. M. The passenger train going to Fort Worth was due at 6:05 P. M., but did not arrive at Arlington until about 9:30 P. M. It was cold weather. Appellee was a cripple. There was no fire in the waiting-room at the depot. Appellee requested the porter and the agent of appellant at the depot to have the waiting-room warmed by fire. His request was not complied with. He was exposed to the cold while waiting at the depot, which exposure caused him to contract a severe cold and a fever. He brought this suit to recover damages, and recovered judgment for $250. It is the duty of a railroad company to keep its passenger depots lighted and warm, and open to the ingress and egress of all passengers a reasonable time before the arrival and after the departure of passenger trains. [Acts 1889, ch. 23, p. 19.] The statute cited is not violative of section 35, article 3, of the constitution. [Tadlock v. Eccles, 20 Tex. 782; *4*Sayles’ Civil St., p. 516; notes to sec. 35, art. 3, Const.] Said statute, as to the *226provision above cited, is applicable to all passenger depots, and is not to be restricted in its application to such depots at the junction of railroads. Independent of the statute, it is the duty of railway companies to provide reasonable accommodations at their passenger depots for persons desiring to take passage on their trains, and to keep said depots in a safe condition. [Hamilton v. Railway C*o.,*61 Tex. 251; Railway Co. v. Best, 66 Tex. 116; Stewart v. Railway Co., 53 Tex. 289; 2 Wood, R’y Law, p. 1165, § 310.] We are of the opinion that appellee in his petition alleged facts which entitled him to recover damages of appellant, and the damages claimed in the petition are such as the law recognizes as legal, and are alleged with sufficient certainty. We think the evidence supports the verdict and judgment, and that the'amount of damages awarded is not excessive.

October 25, 1890.

Affirmed.
Exhibit 32.2

# CERTIFICATION PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002

I, David M. Bronson, Executive Vice
President and Chief Financial Officer of PSS World Medical, Inc. (the
Company), hereby certify that the Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q
for the quarterly period ended October 3, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the Report) fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
78m or 78o(d)) and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

/s/ David M. Bronson
David M. Bronson Executive Vice President
and Chief Financial Officer

November 13, 2003
#### Darrell JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D11-1500.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 15, 2011.

Darrell Johnson, pro se, Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of mandamus is denied on the merits.

WEBSTER, ROBERTS, and WETHERELL, JJ., concur.
*Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________ No. 95-10913 Conference Calendar

__________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus ROSENDO MORENO LOPEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 7:95-CR-006-X(2)

--------------------- June 25, 1996 Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * This case is here before us on the Government's motion to dismiss Lopez' appeal based on a waiver-of-appeal provision in Lopez' plea agreement. Appellant Lopez has also filed a motion to remand this case to the district court to determine whether he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal.No. 95-10913 -2- Our review of the record shows that Lopez knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal the sentence imposed by the district court. United States v. Melancon , 972 F.2d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Portillo , 18 F.3d 290, 293 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 115 S. Ct. 244 (1994). The Government's motion to dismiss is GRANTED, Lopez' motion to remand is DENIED, and this APPEAL IS DISMISSED.
#### Lola Gibbs GROSJEAN v. Robert E. GROSJEAN And Palmetto Farms, L.L.C. formerly known as Palmetto Farms, an Ordinary Partnership.

No. 2010-C-2623.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 4, 2011.

In re Palmetto Farms L.L.C. f/k/a; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 124,502; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,529-CA.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant.
EX-10.2






Exhibit 10.2




WAIVER




     In consideration for the benefits I will receive as a result of my employer’s participation in
the United States Department of the Treasury’s TARP Capital Purchase Program, I hereby voluntarily
waive any claim against the United States or my employer for any changes to my compensation or
benefits that are required to comply with the regulation issued by the Department of the Treasury
as published in the Federal Register on October 20, 2008.



     I acknowledge that this regulation may require modification of the compensation, bonus,
incentive and other benefit plans, arrangements, policies and agreements (including so-called
“golden parachute” agreements) that I have with my employer or in which I participate as they
relate to the period the United States holds any equity or debt securities of my employer acquired
through the TARP Capital Purchase Program.



     This waiver includes all claims I may have under the laws of the United States or any state
related to the requirements imposed by the aforementioned regulation, including without limitation
a claim for any compensation or other payments I would otherwise receive, any challenge to the
process by which this regulation was adopted and any tort or constitutional claim about the effect
of these regulations on my employment relationship.



	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Dated: December 16, 2008
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	 	 	[Senior Executive Officer]
#### Michael HINES, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D10-4303.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 14, 2011.

Michael Hines, pro se, Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner is granted a belated appeal of the August 13, 2008, order denying in part and granting in part defendant’s motion for postconviction relief and granting re-sentencing in Escambia County Circuit Court case number 2001-2327-CFA. Upon issuance of mandate in this cause, a copy of this opinion shall be provided to the clerk of the circuit court for treatment as the notice of appeal. Fla. RApp. P. 9.141(c)(5)(D).

WOLF, DAVIS, and PADOVANO, JJ., concur.