J-S66015-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court

T.B. AND S.E., IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellants

v.

S.H. AND K.W.,

Appellees No. 840 WDA 2015

Appeal from the Order entered April 27, 2015, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, 

Family Court at No(s): 12-000134-001

BEFORE: OLSON, STABILE, and STRASSBURGER*, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JANUARY 06, 2016

T.B. (“Father”) and S.E. (“Paternal Grandmother”) (collectively, 

“Appellants”) appeal from the order entered April 27, 2015, that awarded 

shared legal custody of Father’s female child, T.B. (“Child”), who was born in 

October of 2009, to Father and K.W., the third-party custodian of Child, 

(“Custodian”). The order also awarded primary physical custody of Child to 

Father and partial physical custody to Custodian. Finally, the order awarded 

partial physical custody to Paternal Grandmother, as arranged with Father, 

and partial physical custody to S.H. (“Mother”), as arranged with Custodian. 

Although we agree with Appellants that the trial court should have 

characterized the type of physical custody awarded to Custodian as 

“shared,” and not “partial,” we affirm in all other respects the factual and 
J-S66015-15

- 2 -

legal determinations made by the trial court with respect to the custody 

awards (both legal and physical) entered in this case.

The trial court made the following findings of fact:

Much of the testimony at the hearing focused on establishing the 

history of Child’s custody arrangements between her birth in 

2009 and the initiation of litigation, approximately four years 

later. Although it is undisputed that Child eventually came to 

live exclusively with Custodian, the parties and witnesses 

differed considerably in their accounts of how and when this 

occurred. On balance, both at the time of the hearing itself[,] 

and[,] after careful review of the transcripts, the [trial court 

found] the history provided by Custodian and her witnesses 

credible and more persuasive than Father’s version of events. 

The [trial court] reconcile[d] the various versions of events as 

follows:

At the time of Child’s birth and for a few months thereafter, 

[Mother, Father,] and Child lived together in Paternal 

Grandmother’s home. When Paternal Grandmother requested 

that they leave her home, they moved as a family to the home 

of [J.E., who is Child’s paternal great-aunt (“Paternal GreatAunt”)] for a few months. Father and Mother then lived together 

in an apartment in the Carrick neighborhood of Pittsburgh until 

[] 2011, when they separated. Mother next moved to an 

apartment on Brownsville Road. Although Father did not live 

with Mother there, he did spend time with Mother at that 

address. In April 2012, Father got involved in a physical 

altercation with Mother and her boyfriend at the Brownsville 

Road apartment. Father was convicted of several charges 

related to that incident and did not involve himself with Mother 

after that [incident].

Custodian’s son, P.W., has been a close friend of Mother’s since 

they were in high school[,] and was well-known to Father. P.W. 

lives in Custodian’s household and served as a frequent 

babysitter for Child. Starting in the summer of 2010, when Child 

was approximately nine months old, Custodian also started to 

provide care for Child in Custodian’s home. By the fall of 2010, 

even though Mother and Father were still residing together, Child 

was spending the majority of her time in Custodian’s care.
J-S66015-15

- 3 -

Father was aware of these arrangements. Although Father’s 

communications were always with P.W., he knew where 

Custodian lived. He both picked up and returned Child to 

Custodian’s home when Child was still quite young. He first met 

Custodian when Custodian dropped off Child for a visit with him 

at an address on Jucunda Street in Mt. Oliver.

Father occasionally arranged with P.W. to have visits, including 

some overnights, with Child. Custodian arranged for Child to 

visit Mother [when] Mother requested it. Because Father 

remained in some form of relationship with Mother on and off 

until spring of 2012, Father spent time with Child and provided 

care for Child when Child was visiting Mother. Although none of 

the witnesses provided specific dates for Father’s visits with 

Child, Father had the opportunity to bring Child with him to 

various family events during any of his visits. By Father’s own 

account, he did not see Child at all for approximately [18 

months] - from the spring 2012 altercation at the Brownsville 

Road apartment to the initiation of court proceedings in the fall 

of 2013.

In or around May 2013, Father, Paternal Grandmother, and the 

police arrived at Custodian’s home. Father was seeking to take 

custody of Child and may have obtained an emergency PFA order 

authorizing this [action].1 Custodian explained to the police that 

Child resided with her through an informal custody arrangement. 

The police declined to remove Child from Custodian[,] and 

informed Father that he should take appropriate action through 

[the court system]. Paternal Grandmother first became aware of 

Custodian as a result of this incident.

Following Custodian’s initial [c]omplaint for [c]onfirmation of 

[c]ustody[,] and leading up to the hearing in this matter, the 

[trial court] ordered Father to participate in reunification 

counseling with Child[,] and granted Father and Paternal 

Grandmother increasing periods of partial physical custody with 

Child. On November 25, 2014, the parties consented to Father 

exercising two weekly overnight visits and every other weekend 

 

1

Father and Paternal Grandmother referred in their testimony to Father 

obtaining a PFA [order]. They did not introduce any exhibit to document 

this, and the [trial court] docket does not reflect the filing of any PFA action 

by Father.
J-S66015-15

- 4 -

partial physical custody of Child. That interim order also granted 

Custodian primary physical custody of Child[,] and granted 

shared legal custody to Father and Custodian. That custody 

arrangement remained in effect until the [trial court] issued its 

final order on April 27, 2015.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/24/15, at 4-7 (certain footnotes omitted).

The trial court set forth the procedural history of this case as follows:

On September 17, 2013, [Custodian] signed and verified a pro 

se [c]omplaint for [c]onfirmation of [c]ustody/[c]omplaint for 

[c]ustody in which she alleged [] Child had resided with her for 

three years[,] and that she needed a custody order to establish 

her authority to get Child vaccinated and enroll Child in preschool. . . .

On October 17, 2013, the day before Custodian was to present 

her pleading in motions court, Father filed a complaint seeking 

custody of [] Child. At motions court on October 18, 2013, the 

presiding judge denied Custodian’s request to confirm custody, 

granted Custodian in loco parentis standing, granted Custodian 

interim primary physical custody and Father interim partial 

physical custody, and ordered the matter to proceed through the 

[trial court’s g]enerations custody program.2 The parties could 

not reach an agreement through mediation[,] and proceeded to 

a series of judicial conciliations.

On July 17, 2014, the [trial court] granted a motion allowing 

[ ]Paternal Grandmother[] to intervene as a party and file a 

complaint for partial physical custody of Child. Per that order, 

Paternal Grandmother filed her complaint on July 31, 2014, and 

the [trial c]ourt consolidated that action with Father’s and 

Custodian’s complaints. Given the advanced stage of litigation, 

the [trial c]ourt excused Paternal Grandmother from 

participation in [g]enerations[,] and formally included her in the 

parties’ ongoing judicial conciliations.

 

2 This matter was assigned to [Judge Eleanor L. Bush] in 2014, after the 

previous judge completed his appointed term and [Judge Bush] began [her 

judicial service]. 
J-S66015-15

- 5 -

The parties could not reach an agreement on a final custody 

arrangement through judicial conciliations, and the [trial court] 

scheduled the matter for a hearing.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/24/15, at 1-3.

A custody hearing was held on February 5 and March 30, 2015. At 

that hearing, the following individuals testified: Father; Custodian; Paternal 

Great-Aunt; Paternal Grandmother; Custodian’s friend, V.S; Custodian’s 

mother, B.W.; Mother; Custodian’s son, P.W.; and the executive director of 

Anchorpoint Counseling Ministry, Ron Barnes. On April 10, 2015, the trial 

court issued oral findings of fact and conclusions of law related to the 16 

custody factors set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. §5328(a). On April 27, 2015, the 

trial court awarded shared legal custody of Child to Father and Custodian. 

The trial court also awarded primary physical custody of Child to Father, 

partial physical custody to Custodian, and partial physical custody to Mother 

and Paternal Grandmother. The order established a schedule for Father and 

Custodian to exercise their periods of physical custody. The order further 

provided for Mother to arrange her periods of partial physical custody with 

Custodian, and for Paternal Grandmother to arrange her periods of partial 

physical custody with Father. This timely appeal followed.3

Appellants present two issues for our review:

 

3 Appellants filed a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

contemporaneously with their notice of appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). 

On July 24, 2015, the trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion. Both 

issues raised on appeal were included in their concise statement. 
J-S66015-15

- 6 -

1. Did the trial court commit an error of law and/or abuse its 

discretion by granting a non-biological third-party shared 

legal and physical custody of [C]hild?

2. Did the trial court commit an error in not fashioning separate 

[custody] time for Paternal Grandmother in the final [o]rder? 

Appellants’ Brief at 2.

In custody cases, our standard and scope of review are as follows:

In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest type 

and our standard [of review] is abuse of discretion. We must 

accept findings of the trial court that are supported by 

competent evidence of record, as our role does not include 

making independent factual determinations. In addition, with 

regard to issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we 

must defer to the presiding trial judge who viewed and assessed 

the witnesses first-hand. However, we are not bound by the trial 

court’s deductions or inferences from its factual findings. 

Ultimately, the test is whether the trial court’s conclusions are 

unreasonable as shown by the evidence of record. We may 

reject the conclusions of the trial court only if they involve an 

error of law, or are unreasonable in light of the sustainable 

findings of the trial court.

R.S. v. T.T., 113 A.3d 1254, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal denied, 117 

A.3d 298 (Pa. 2015) (citation omitted).

We have stated: 

the discretion that a trial court employs in custody matters 

should be accorded the utmost respect, given the special nature 

of the proceeding and the lasting impact the result will have on 

the lives of the parties concerned. Indeed, the knowledge 

gained by a trial court in observing witnesses in a custody 

proceeding cannot adequately be imparted to an appellate court 

by a printed record. 

R.L.P. v. R.F.M., 110 A.3d 201, 208 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).
J-S66015-15

- 7 -

With any custody case, the paramount concern is the best interest of 

the child. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5328, 5338. Upon petition, a trial court may 

modify a custody order if it serves the best interest of the child. 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 5338. Section 5328(a) sets forth the best interest factors that 

the trial court must consider. See S.W.D. v. S.A.R., 96 A.3d 396, 400 (Pa. 

Super. 2014). Section 5323 provides for the following types of custody 

awards:

(a) Types of award.—After considering the factors set forth in 

section 5328 (relating to factors to consider when awarding 

custody), the court may award any of the following types of 

custody if it in the best interest of the child:

(1) Shared physical custody.

(2) Primary physical custody.

(3) Partial physical custody.

(4) Sole physical custody.

(5) Supervised physical custody.

(6) Shared legal custody.

(7) Sole legal custody.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5323(a).

Section 5322 defines the relevant forms of custody as follows:

“Legal custody.” The right to make major decisions on behalf 

of the child, including, but not limited to, medical, religious[,] 

and educational decisions.

* * *
J-S66015-15

- 8 -

“Partial physical custody.” The right to assume physical 

custody of the child for less than a majority of the time.

“Physical custody.” The actual physical possession and 

control of a child.

“Primary physical custody.” The right to assume physical 

custody of the child for the majority of time.

* * *

“Shared legal custody.” The right of more than one individual 

to legal custody of the child.

“Shared physical custody.” The right of more than one 

individual to assume physical custody of the child, each having 

significant periods of physical custodial time with the child.

“Sole legal custody.” The right of one individual to exclusive 

legal custody of the child.

“Sole physical custody.” The right of one individual to 

exclusive physical custody of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322.

Section 5328(a) outlines the following best interest factors:

(1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit frequent 

and continuing contact between the child and another party. 

(2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or 

member of the party’s household, whether there is a continued 

risk of harm to the child or an abused party and which party can 

better provide adequate physical safeguards and supervision of 

the child. 

(2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a)(1) and (2) 

(relating to consideration of child abuse and involvement with

protective services). 

(3) The parental duties performed by each party on behalf of the 

child. 
J-S66015-15

- 9 -

(4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s education, 

family life and community life.

(5) The availability of extended family.

(6) The child’s sibling relationships.

(7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the 

child’s maturity and judgment.

(8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the other 

parent, except in cases of domestic violence where reasonable 

safety measures are necessary to protect the child from harm.

(9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable, 

consistent[,] and nurturing relationship with the child adequate 

for the child’s emotional needs.

(10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily physical, 

emotional, developmental, educational[,] and special needs of 

the child.

(11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.

(12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or ability to 

make appropriate child-care arrangements.

(13) The level of conflict between the parties and the willingness 

and ability of the parties to cooperate with one another. A 

party’s effort to protect a child from abuse by another party is 

not evidence of unwillingness or inability to cooperate with that 

party.

(14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or member 

of a party’s household.

(15) The mental and physical condition of a party or member of 

a party’s household.

(16) Any other relevant factor.
J-S66015-15

- 10 -

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a). Although a trial court must consider all of these 

factors, “there is no required amount of detail for the trial court’s 

explanation; all that is required is that the enumerated factors are 

considered and that the custody decision is based on those considerations.” 

M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 336 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 68 

A.3d 909 (Pa. 2013).

Appellants first contend that the trial court committed an error of law 

and/or abused its discretion by effectively granting Custodian shared legal 

and physical custody of Child. Section 5327(b) provides:

In any action regarding the custody of the child between a 

parent of the child and a nonparent, there shall be a 

presumption that custody shall be awarded to the parent. The 

presumption in favor of the parent may be rebutted by clear and 

convincing evidence.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5327(b). 

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court discussed the section 

5327(b) presumption in depth. It held that Custodian failed to prove by 

clear and convincing evidence that she should receive primary physical 

custody. For that reason, the trial court granted primary physical custody to 

Father. On the other hand, the trial court found that Custodian proved by 

clear and convincing evidence that she should have partial physical custody 

of Child. 

Appellants concede that the trial court recited the proper legal 

standard, including the statutory presumption. Appellants’ Brief at 7. They 
J-S66015-15

- 11 -

take issue, however, with the trial court’s characterization of the type of 

physical custody awarded to Custodian. Appellants contend that the trial 

court, in effect, awarded Custodian “shared” (not “partial”) physical custody. 

They assert that the schedule in the order reflects a standard week on/week 

off shared physical custody schedule as between Father and Custodian. Id. 

Furthermore, they contend that although the trial court recited the correct 

legal standard, it in fact applied a less stringent standard when awarding 

Custodian custody.

Although we conclude that the trial court erred in characterizing the 

nature of the physical custody awarded to Custodian, we conclude that this 

error was harmless and had no impact upon the presumption that favors 

parents over third parties in custody disputes or the court’s analysis of 

Child’s best interest. While the trial court awarded Custodian “partial” 

physical custody of Child, the record reveals that Custodian was granted 

custody of Child for approximately 24 weeks a year, or 46% of the year. 

“[S]hared custody does not necessarily mean equal time.” V.B. v. M.L.T.B., 

467 A.2d 880, 883 (Pa. Super. 1983).4 Instead, all that is necessary for 

shared legal custody is for more than one person to enjoy “significant 

periods of physical custodial time with the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322(a). 

 

4 We recognize that the statute in effect at the time of V.B. differs from the 

statute currently in effect. Nonetheless, the plain language of section 5322 

indicates that the General Assembly codified the rule set forth in V.B. when 

it passed section 5322(a)’s definition of shared legal custody. 
J-S66015-15

- 12 -

Custody of Child for 46% of the year is a significant period. The trial court is 

correct that it awarded primary physical custody to Father; however, that 

does not foreclose the possibility of shared physical custody also being 

awarded to another party. That is what occurred in this case. The trial 

court awarded shared physical custody to Custodian while awarding primary 

physical custody to Father. Nonetheless, we conclude that careful review of 

the trial court’s consideration of the section 5328(a) factors supports the 

trial court’s decision to award Custodian shared physical custody. 

As to the first factor, the trial court found that “Custodian 

acknowledges the importance of encouraging Child’s relationships with 

Mother, Father, and Paternal Grandmother.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/24/15, 

at 10. On the other hand, the trial court found that “Father and Paternal 

Grandmother profess to recognize Child’s love for and attachment to 

Custodian, yet deny the importance to Child of maintaining her relationship

with Custodian.” Id. at 11. Thus, the trial court concluded that the first 

factor weighed heavily in favor of Custodian. The trial court found that 

factors two and 2.1 were not applicable in this case. As to the third factor, 

the trial court found that since “Father was re-introduced to Child in fall 

2013, he has performed a typical range of parental duties during the time 

Child spends with him.” Id. at 9. 

As to the fourth factor, the trial court found:

Child has lived [] with Custodian for most of her life. Custodian 

and her household represent the main source of stability that 
J-S66015-15

- 13 -

Child has experienced. During Child’s lifetime Father has moved 

numerous times, changed jobs frequently, engaged in physical 

violence in his relationship with Mother, and admitted to being 

entirely absent from Child's life for [one and one-half] years.

Id. at 10. Therefore, the trial court found that the fourth factor weighed 

heavily in favor of Custodian. As to the fifth factor, the trial court noted that 

Father has extended family in the area, e.g., Paternal Grandmother, who 

would be able to help when necessary. 

 The trial court weighed factor six in favor of Father because Child has an 

older half-sibling, who is Father’s daughter. As to the seventh factor, the 

trial court found Child too young for it to consider her preference. The trial 

court also found that there was no evidence that the parties had attempted 

to turn Child against another party, so factor eight was neutral. Regarding 

“factors nine and ten . . . the evidence did not establish that Father is more 

likely to meet Child’s needs. However, the evidence did not establish that 

he cannot meet these needs.” Id. (emphasis removed). With regard to 

factor 11, the trial court found that the parties lived in very close proximity, 

which is positive for Child. The trial court found that “regarding factor 12, 

. . . Father’s family members can assist him by providing care for Child if 

Father is at work or unavailable.” Id. 

With regard to factor 13, the trial court found that Custodian showed a 

slightly more positive attitude toward cooperation than Father. With regard 

to factor 14, the trial court found that there is a history of drug use on both 

Father’s and Custodian’s sides. The trial court found that P.W., who lives 
J-S66015-15

- 14 -

with Custodian, is in recovery and that he has been “clean” of drug use for a 

few years. The trial court also noted that Father has a history of marijuana 

use, which may have included the sale of drugs. Accordingly, the trial court 

did not weigh the factor against either Father or Custodian. The trial court 

found factor 15 neutral. Finally, the trial court did not find any other 

relevant factors. 

Appellants first dispute the trial court’s evaluation of factors 2 and 14. 

Specifically, Appellants argue that, because Child shares a room with P.W. at 

Custodian’s residence, she is vulnerable to abuse. The trial court, however, 

carefully considered this issue and found that the current arrangement was 

temporary and that Child would have her own bedroom shortly. It further 

found that Child was not vulnerable to abuse because of the current 

arrangement. Our review of the record indicates that the trial court’s 

findings were supported by the record. Children and Youth Services 

examined the arrangement (with Child and P.W. sharing a bedroom) and 

determined that it did not pose a threat to Child.5 

With respect to factor 14, Appellants argue that P.W.’s past drug use 

was overlooked by the trial court. The trial court, however, fully discussed 

P.W.’s past drug use. It found P.W.’s testimony regarding his sobriety to be 

 

5

In their brief, Appellants argue that Children and Youth Services’ review 

occurred before the current arrangement; however, we find that the trial 

court’s evaluation of the testimony regarding the Children and Youth 

Services’ review is consistent with the testimony given at the hearing. 
J-S66015-15

- 15 -

credible. Furthermore, the trial court found that Father had drug problems 

that were at least as serious as P.W.’s. The trial court noted that Father 

may have been involved in the illegal sale of drugs. Thus, it found that 

factor 14 was neutral because both Father and P.W. had past drug problems. 

As the record supports the trial court’s evaluation of the second and 

fourteenth factors, we may not make our own credibility determinations and 

reach different conclusions as to those factors. 

When weighing the section 5328(a) factors, the trial court found the 

factors that weighed in favor of Father were far less important than the 

factors that weighed in favor of Custodian. Specifically, as mentioned 

above, the trial court found the first and fourth factors to be the most 

important in its best interest determination and both of those factors 

weighed in favor of Custodian. The trial court’s decision to award Father 

primary physical custody of Child was based on a combination of the section 

5327(b) presumption and the section 5328(a) factors. 

Appellants rely on Jordan v. Jackson, 876 A.2d 443 (Pa. Super. 

2005), in support of their argument that the trial court abused its discretion 

in awarding Custodian shared physical custody. Jordan, however, is easily 

distinguishable from the case at bar. Specifically, in Jordan there was “a 

dearth of evidence” that the child’s interests were best served in the thirdparty’s custody. Id. at 452. As noted above, in this case there was 
J-S66015-15

- 16 -

significant evidence, specifically with respect to the first and fourth factors, 

that Child’s interests were best served in Custodian’s care. 

The trial court’s weighing of the section 5328(a) factors was not 

unreasonable. Instead, the trial court’s findings are well-supported by the 

record and indicate a great deal of consideration of Child’s best interests. As 

noted above, the trial court’s characterization of its physical custody award 

was legally incorrect. Nonetheless, notwithstanding the terminology used by 

the trial court, it determined, after careful consideration of the section 

5328(a) factors, that Custodian should have physical custody for a 

significant portion of time and Father should have physical custody of Child 

for a majority of the year. Thus, the terminology used by the trial court did 

not impact its award of shared physical custody to Custodian. Therefore, the 

trial court’s legal error in characterizing the type of physical custody 

awarded to Custodian was harmless.

Appellants also challenge the award of shared legal custody to 

Custodian. We conclude that the trial court’s decision is supported by the 

record and free of legal error. As noted by the trial court, Custodian “has 

taken primary responsibility for ensuring Child’s safety and well-being, 

including such matters as enrolling Child in pre-school and ensuring that 

Child received needed immunizations.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/24/15, at 12. 

Father, on the other hand, has undertaken none of these responsibilities. 

The trial court determined that having Custodian, who is familiar with Child’s 
J-S66015-15

- 17 -

needs, should share legal custody with Father to ensure that Child’s needs 

are satisfied. Partial legal custody is not an option in Pennsylvania. See 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 5323(a). Instead, the trial court determined that shared legal

custody was better for Child’s best interest than awarding Father sole legal 

custody. 

The trial court’s decision to award Custodian shared legal custody is 

also supported by prior decisions of this Court. In McDonel v. Sohn, 762 

A.2d 1101 (Pa. Super. 2000), third-party custodians were responsible for the 

care of the child for most of the child’s life. Id. at 1103. The father was not 

involved in the child’s life for an extended period of time until he opted to 

exercise partial physical custody of child. Id. When the third-party 

custodians filed suit to confirm custody, the father filed preliminary 

objections. The trial court ultimately overruled the preliminary objections 

and awarded the third-party custodians shared legal custody of the child. 

This Court affirmed the trial court’s award of custody to the third-parties. 

Critical to this determination was the fact that the father had not been 

involved in the child’s life for an extended period of time and that the thirdparty custodians had “historical involvement and participation in [the child’s] 

life since birth.” Id. at 1108. The same situation is present in the case at 

bar. Father was absent from Child’s life for an extended period of time and 

only decided to take an active role in her life after the commencement of 
J-S66015-15

- 18 -

this action. On the other hand, Custodian has assisted Child for most of her 

life. 

 Similarly, in Jones v. Jones, 884 A.2d 915, 918 (Pa. Super. 2005), this 

Court affirmed the award of shared legal custody to a third-party and the 

children’s mother. Critical in our decision was the fact that the “children’s 

relationship with both parties would be better fostered if custody were 

awarded to [the third-party].” Id. at 918. The trial court in the case sub 

judice likewise found that Father was attempting to exclude Custodian from 

Child’s life while Custodian wanted to develop a bond between Child and 

Father. Therefore, based upon a careful review of the section 5328(a) 

factors, we ascertain no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination 

to award Custodian shared legal custody. Accordingly, Appellant’s first issue 

on appeal is without merit. 

In their second issue, Appellants contend that the trial court erred by 

effectively ignoring Paternal Grandmother’s petition for partial physical 

custody. Appellants acknowledge that the final custody order awards 

Paternal Grandmother partial physical custody as arranged with Father. 

They argue, however, that the order does not address Paternal 

Grandmother’s rights, nor does it address Paternal Grandmother’s petition 

for separate time with Child. 

We find this issue waived. “Issues not raised in the lower court are 

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). 
J-S66015-15

- 19 -

In her complaint, Paternal Grandmother only requested that Father be 

awarded primary physical custody of Child and that she be awarded 

“reasonable partial physical custody with [Child].” Paternal Grandmother 

Custody Complaint, 7/31/14, at 3. At the custody hearing, she elaborated 

that the only reason she filed her custody complaint was to speed up the 

process and assist Father in obtaining primary physical custody. See N.T., 

2/5/15, at 150. She further testified that she did not want to take over 

parenting duties from Father. Id. As the trial court noted, the award of 

partial physical custody to Paternal Grandmother, to be arranged with 

Father, “essentially adopts Paternal Grandmother’s proposal and honors 

Paternal Grandmother’s expressed intentions and wishes to support Father’s 

position and defer to his role in Child’s life.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/24/15, at 

14. As Paternal Grandmother did not seek time in the custody schedule at 

the trial court level, this issue is waived on appeal.

Furthermore, even if this issue were not waived, we would find it to be 

without merit. Trial courts possess wide latitude in fashioning a custody 

schedule that is in a child’s best interest. In this case, the trial court 

determined that minimizing changes in Child’s custody, and having a steady 

schedule of custody for Father and Custodian, was in Child’s best interest. 

Nonetheless, the trial court determined that Mother and Paternal 

Grandmother should also have partial physical custody of Child but believed 
J-S66015-15

- 20 -

that time should be arranged through Custodian and Father, respectively. 

We ascertain no abuse of discretion or error of law in this determination. 

In sum, the trial court carefully considered Child’s best interest in 

fashioning its custody award and schedule. The trial court properly and 

thoroughly considered the presumption set forth in section 5327(b), and the 

16 best interest factors set forth in section 5328(a). Although the trial court 

mischaracterized the type of physical custody it awarded Custodian, that 

error was harmless. Finally, Appellants waived their argument that Paternal 

Grandmother should have been included in the custody schedule instead of 

arranging her partial custody with Father. Accordingly, we modify the trial 

court’s order to reflect that Custodian was awarded “shared” physical 

custody instead of “partial” physical custody. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 706 (“An 

appellate court may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside[,] or reverse any order 

brought before it for review[.]”). We affirm in all other respects. 

Order affirmed as modified.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/6/2016