J-S29045-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

STEVEN MARGRETTA, 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2451 EDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order July 6, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-000086-1995

BEFORE: LAZARUS, SOLANO, JJ., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED May 19, 2017

Appellant, Steven Margretta, appeals from the order of the Monroe 

County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed as untimely his serial 

petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), at 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

Appellant pled guilty to homicide and was sentenced to life 

imprisonment on February 21, 1996. Appellant did not file a direct appeal. 

On March 1, 2002, he filed his first PCRA petition. The PCRA court denied 

Appellant’s counseled petition on July 10, 2002, and, on July 10, 2002, this 

Court entered a judgment order affirming the PCRA court’s order, as 

Appellant had filed his petition over five years after his judgment of sentence 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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became final, making it patently untimely. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on February 20, 2004. 

See Commonwealth v. Margretta, 830 A.2d 1049 (Pa.Super. 2003), 

appeal denied, 844 A.2d 552 (Pa. 2004).

On April 24, 2007, Appellant filed his second pro se PCRA petition, 

which the PCRA court dismissed as untimely on May 30, 2007. On appeal, 

we affirmed the PCRA court’s order. Commonwealth v. Margretta, No. 

1485 EDA 2007, unpublished memorandum at *1-2, 8 (Pa.Super. filed April 

22, 2008). Appellant did not seek review in our Supreme Court.

On April 30, 2012, Appellant filed his third pro se PCRA petition and an 

accompanying “Nunc Pro Tunc Motion in Support of (PCRA) Time/Bar Issue,” 

which the PCRA court denied as untimely after issuing Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 

notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s requests for relief without a 

hearing. This Court treated Appellant’s filings as two PCRA petitions and 

affirmed the lower court’s order dismissing both as untimely. See 

Commonwealth v. Margretta, No. 2212 EDA 2012, unpublished 

memorandum, (Pa.Super. filed April 11, 2013).

Appellant filed this pro se PCRA petition, his fourth, on March 21, 

2016, seeking relief under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 

2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) and Montgomery v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. 

___, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016). The PCRA court issued a Rule 

907 notice on April 25, 2016. Among the court’s reasons supporting its 

intent to dismiss was that Miller applies only to juvenile offenders, whereas 
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Appellant was an adult at the time he killed his victim. Appellant could not, 

therefore, avail himself of Section 9545(b)(1)(iii)’s after-recognized 

constitutional right exception to the PCRA time bar, the court concluded. By 

its Order of July 6, 2016, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant fourth petition 

for relief under the PCRA. On August 5, 2016, Appellant filed this pro se

appeal. 

On August 11, 2016, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a concise 

statement per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and it thereafter granted Appellant’s 

motion for an extension of time in which to file the concise statement. 

However, Appellant never complied with the court’s order.

On appeal, Appellant does not address the PCRA court's Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a) Opinion that his failure to file a court-ordered 1925(b) statement 

resulted in waiver of his eligibility for appellate review of any issues raised in 

his petition. Rule 1925 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, in 

pertinent part:

(b) Direction to file statement of errors complained of on 

appeal; instructions to the appellant and the trial court.—

If the judge entering the order giving rise to the notice of appeal 

(“judge”) desires clarification of the errors complained of on 

appeal, the judge may enter an order directing the appellant to 

file of record in the trial court and serve on the judge a concise 

statement of the errors complained of on appeal (“Statement”).

...

(3) Contents of order.—The judge's order directing the filing and 

service of a Statement shall specify:

...

(iv) that any issue not properly included in the Statement timely 

filed and served pursuant to subdivision (b) shall be deemed 

waived.
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...

(4) Requirements; waiver.

...

(vii) Issues not included in the Statement and/or not raised in 

accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are 

waived.

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3)(iv), (4)(vii).

Rule 1925’s mandate is reflected in interpretative decisional law of the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which has held that “in order to preserve their 

claims for appellate review, appellants must comply whenever the trial court 

orders them to file a Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Any issues not raised in a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement will be deemed waived.” Commonwealth v. Castillo, 888 A.2d 

775, 780 (Pa. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306 (Pa. 

1998)). This bright line rule applies to pro se appellants. See, e.g., 

Commonwealth v. Schofield, 888 A.2d 771, 774 (Pa. 2005).

Our review of the record confirms that Appellant failed to file a courtordered Rule 1925(b) Statement. Accordingly, we agree with the PCRA 

court's opinion that Appellant has waived his eligibility for appellate review. 

See Commonwealth v. Freeland, 106 A.3d 768, 776 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(“A pro se litigant must comply with the procedural rules set forth in the 

Pennsylvania Rules of the Court [and] [t]his Court may quash or dismiss an 

appeal if an appellant fails to conform with the requirements set forth in the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure”).
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Even if we were to review Appellant’s briefed claims, we would 

conclude we lack jurisdiction to address them on the merits because 

Appellant’s present PCRA petition was patently untimely.

The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional requisite. 

Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 148 A.3d 849 (Pa.Super. 2016). A PCRA 

petition, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one 

year of the date the underlying judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence is deemed final “at the 

conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme 

Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the 

expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). The 

statutory exceptions to the PCRA time-bar excuse the late filing of a petition 

under very limited circumstances; a petitioner asserting a timeliness 

exception must file a petition within 60 days of when the claim could have 

been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1-2).

Instantly, Appellant's judgment of sentence became final on or about 

May 20, 2004, upon the expiration of 90 days allowed for filing a petition for 

certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. See U.S.Sup.Ct. Rule 13. 

Appellant filed the current pro se PCRA petition on August 5, 2016, more 

than 12 years after his judgment of sentence became final, which is patently 

untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant attempts to invoke the 

“new constitutional right” exception at Section 9545(b)(1)(iii), insisting 

Miller/Montgomery affords him relief, but he admits he was 21 years old, 
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and no longer a juvenile, at the time of his offenses. Thus, 

Miller/Montgomery relief does not apply to Appellant. 

Moreover, this Court has rejected Appellant's argument that courts 

should extend Miller/Montgomery relief to those under 25 years old 

because the brain is not developed fully until that age. See 

Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d 90 (Pa.Super. 2016) (holding 19-

year-old appellant was not entitled to relief under Miller/Montgomery on 

collateral review; rejecting argument that he should be considered “technical 

juvenile”). Thus, Appellant's current petition remains untimely. Accordingly, 

we affirm.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/19/2017