[Cite as State v. Gornall, 2019-Ohio-1579.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

ASHLAND COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO, : JUDGES: 

 : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

 Plaintiff - Appellee : Hon. John W. Wise, J. 

 : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

-vs- : 

 : 

ELLIOTT GORNALL, : Case No. 18-COA-034 

 : 

 Defendant - Appellant : O P I N I O N 

 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Ashland County 

Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 

15-CRI-084 

 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT: April 25, 2019 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

CHRISTOPHER R. TUNNELL KIMBERLY KENDALL CORRALL 

Ashland County Prosecuting Attorney 4403 St. Clair Avenue 

 Cleveland, Ohio 44103 

By: VICTOR R. PEREZ 

COLE F. OBERLI 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys 

110 Cottage Street 

Ashland, Ohio 44805 
Ashland County, Case No. 18-COA-034 2 

Baldwin, J.

{¶1} Elliot Gornall appeals the decision of the Ashland County Court of Common 

Pleas denying his motion to withdrawal his guilty plea. Appellee is the State of Ohio. 

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE 

{¶2} On January 6, 2016, appellant was sentenced to fifty-six years 

imprisonment after being found guilty of a long list of offenses. He filed an appeal of that 

decision and a subsequent motion to re-open his appeal and we denied both. He now 

claims that the trial court and his trial counsel provided incorrect information upon which 

he relied to enter a guilty plea and, for that reason, he should be permitted to withdraw 

his plea. 

{¶3} Appellant was indicted with sixty-six counts of illegal use of a minor in 

nudity-oriented material or performance (R.C. 2907.323(A)(1)), six counts of attempted 

illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material or performance (R.C. 2923.02(A)), (R.C. 

2907.323(A)(1)), fifty-five counts of pandering obscenity involving a minor (R.C. 

2907.321(A)(5)), forty-five counts of illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material or 

performance (R.C. 2907.323(A)(3)), two counts of aggravated possession of drugs (R.C. 

2925.11(A)), possession of marijuana (R.C. 2925.11(A)), and receiving stolen property 

(R.C. 2913.51(A)). 

{¶4} Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from the search of his 

computers. The trial court denied the motion after hearing, finding that evidence of 

pandering obscenity of minors would have been inevitably discovered during the search 

for evidence of narcotics activity. Appellant then pled no contest to all charges and was 
Ashland County, Case No. 18-COA-034 3 

sentenced to an aggregate prison term of fifty-six years, with an aggregate fine of 

$15,700.00. 

{¶5} Appellant appealed the decision of the trial court alleging the trial court erred 

in denying the motion to suppress, that the trial court’s imposition of consecutive 

sentences was unsupported and that the trial court erred in imposing a total fine of 

$15,700. We rejected the assignments of error and affirmed the trial court’s decision on 

November 2, 2016. Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio and the Court 

declined to accept jurisdiction on July 26, 2017. 

{¶6} On April 23, 2018, appellant filed an application for reopening of his appeal 

claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We denied the application based 

upon the fact it was untimely; however, in the interest of justice we considered the merits 

and arrived at the same conclusion, denying the application on May 29, 2018. 

{¶7} While the motion to re-open the appeal was pending, appellant filed a 

Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. Appellant’s motion states he filed a motion because he 

“was never informed of the maximum penalty involved under Crim.R. 11 (C)(2)(a).” 

Appellant’s memorandum in support of his motion does not offer any argument to 

corroborate his assertion that he was not informed of the maximum penalty, but instead 

claims that the trial court and his trial attorney inappropriately led him to believe that he 

could file for judicial release after he had been confined for 180 days. (The trial court did 

notify appellant that the maximum penalty was 675 years and 6 months in prison with a 

total fine of $1,448,600.00. Sentencing Transcript, page 15, lines 1-10.). Within his motion 

appellant admits “the court never made mention of when this eligibility date would come 

into effect. This raised the question to the counsel for the defendant, and counsel replied 
Ashland County, Case No. 18-COA-034 4 

to the defendant that he (defendant) could file for judicial after a period of 180 days of 

actual prison confinement.” (Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, May 9, 2018, 

Docket #47, page 2). Appellant’s affidavit, attached to his motion states that “the trial 

court, in accepting my pleas, led me to believe that I was eligible for judicial release but 

never told me when I would become eligible, leading me to be misinformed by my trial 

counsel.” According to the same affidavit, appellant became aware of this error on March 

28, 2018 when he approached a law clerk at the prison. 

{¶8} Appellee opposed the motion, contending that appellant was made aware 

of the maximum penalty for the offenses and that the alleged error did not rise to the level 

of manifest injustice. Appellee also argued that the two year delay in filing this motion 

undermined the appellant’s credibility. 

{¶9} The trial court denied the motion finding that “there is no manifest injustice, 

no fundamental flaw in the change of plea proceedings which results in a miscarriage of 

justice. The issues the defendant now raises were available to be raised as well during 

his initial appeal, which he neglected to assert.” (Judgment Entry, July 26, 2018, Docket 

#49, page 1). Further, the court found that because there is no new evidence or 

information asserted beyond the transcript of the change of plea hearing, no additional 

hearing was necessary to decide defendant’s motion. Defendant filed a notice of appeal 

and submitted two assignments of error: 

{¶10} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 

DENYING GORNALL'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA WHERE 

GORNALL CLAIMED THAT THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED GORNALL'S RIGHT TO 

DUE PROCESS IN FAILING IN ITS OBLIGATION TO ENSURE GORNALL WAS 
Ashland County, Case No. 18-COA-034 5 

MAKING A KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT PLEA, AND WHERE DEFENDANT RELIED 

ON INCORRECT INFORMATION FROM THE TRIAL COURT WITH REGARD TO 

DEFENDANT'S ACCESS TO JUDICIAL RELEASE.” 

{¶11} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 

DENYING GORNALL'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA WITHOUT A 

HEARING WHERE HE CLAIMED THAT HIS COUNSEL'S CONSTITUTIONALY 

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE REGARDING HIS INCORRECT COUNSEL WITH 

REGARD TO DEFENDANT'S ACCESS TO JUDICIAL RELEASE.” 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

{¶12} We review a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw guilty plea under an 

abuse of discretion standard. State v. Carabello, 17 Ohio St.3d 66, 477 N.E.2d 627 

(1985). “A motion made pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1 is addressed to the sound discretion of 

the trial court, and the good faith, credibility, and weight of the movant's assertions in 

support of the motion are matters to be resolved by that court.” State v. Smith, 49 Ohio 

St.2d 261, 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977) as quoted in State v. Hammock, 5th Dist. Richland 

No. 18CA104, 2019-Ohio-127, ¶ 22. 

{¶13} Crim.R. 32.1 provides that a trial court may grant a defendant's post 

sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea only to correct a manifest injustice. Therefore, 

“[a] defendant who seeks to withdraw a plea of guilty after the imposition of sentence has 

the burden of establishing the existence of manifest injustice.” State v. Smith, 49 Ohio 

St.2d 261,361 N.E.2d 1324(1977), paragraph one of the syllabus. Although no precise 

definition of “manifest injustice” exists, in general, “‘manifest injustice relates to some 

fundamental flaw in the proceedings which result[s] in a miscarriage of justice or is 
Ashland County, Case No. 18-COA-034 6 

inconsistent with the demands of due process.’ ” State v. Wooden, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 

03AP–368, 2004–Ohio–588, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Hall, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 03AP–

433, 2003–Ohio–6939. Under this standard, a post sentence withdrawal motion is 

allowable only in extraordinary cases. Smith, supra at 264. Thus, we review a trial court's 

denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard, and 

we reverse that denial only if it is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. 

{¶14} Appellant contends his change of plea was not made knowingly, intelligently 

and voluntarily in violation of the requirements of Crim. R. 11. Although literal compliance 

with Crim. R. 11 is preferred, the trial court need only “substantially comply” with the rule 

when dealing with the non-constitutional elements of Crim.R. 11(C). State v. Ballard, 66 

Ohio St.2d 473, 475, 423 N.E.2d 115(1981), citing State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 

364 N.E.2d 1163(1977). In State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004–Ohio–4415, 814 

N.E.2d 51, ¶ 12, the Ohio Supreme Court noted the following test for determining 

substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11: 

Though failure to adequately inform a defendant of his constitutional 

rights would invalidate a guilty plea under a presumption that it was entered 

involuntarily and unknowingly, failure to comply with non-constitutional 

rights will not invalidate a plea unless the defendant thereby suffered 

prejudice. [State v. Nero (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 106,] 108, 564 N.E.2d 474. 

The test for prejudice is ‘whether the plea would have otherwise been 

made.’ Id. Under the substantial-compliance standard, we review the totality 

of circumstances surrounding [the defendant's] plea and determine whether 
Ashland County, Case No. 18-COA-034 7 

he subjectively understood [the effect of his plea]. See, State v. Sarkozy,

117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008–Ohio–509 at ¶ 19–20. 

{¶15} In determining whether the trial court has satisfied its duties under Crim.R. 

11 in taking a plea, reviewing courts have distinguished between constitutional and nonconstitutional rights. State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 893 N.E.2d 462, 2008–Ohio–

3748, ¶ 32; State v. Aleshire, Licking App. No. 2007–CA–1, 2008–Ohio–5688 at ¶ 10. 

The trial court must strictly comply with those provisions of Crim.R. 11(C) that relate to 

the waiver of constitutional rights. State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d at 244, 893 N.E.2d at 

499, 2008–Ohio–3748, ¶ 31. 

{¶16} In Clark, a case decided after Sarkozy, the Supreme Court of Ohio 

concluded that “[i]f a trial judge, in conducting a plea colloquy, imperfectly explains nonconstitutional rights such as the right to be informed of the maximum possible penalty and 

the effect of the plea, a substantial-compliance rule applies on appellate review; under 

this standard, a slight deviation from the text of the governing rule is permissible, and so 

long as the totality of the circumstances indicates that the defendant subjectively 

understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving, the plea may be 

upheld.” Sarkozy, supra at ¶ 31. Thus, in Clark, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that 

the right to be informed of the maximum possible penalty and the effect of the plea are 

subject to the substantial compliance test. Clark, supra at ¶ 31. 

ANALYSIS 

{¶17} Appellant offers a lengthy analysis of the law regarding the state’s obligation 

to insure that a change of plea is made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. In his brief, 

appellant contends the trial court and his trial counsel misled him and provided erroneous 
Ashland County, Case No. 18-COA-034 8 

information regarding his ability to file a petition for early release and that, had he been 

given correct information, he would not have changed his plea. After a review of the 

record, we find that the appellant’s argument may be addressed by analyzing his 

characterization of the facts in his brief compared to the assertions in his motion 

presented to the trial court. With regard to the accusation against his trial counsel, we 

need only consider the matters previously filed in, and resolved by, this court. 

{¶18} In his first assignment of error, appellant contends the trial court provided 

incorrect information with regard to his access to judicial release. The allegedly incorrect 

information is described on page 8 of appellant’s brief: 

It is not argued here that Gornall was improperly advised by the court 

about the maximum sentence that can be imposed, but instead was misled 

by the court and counsel about whether he would have to serve prior to 

being eligible for relief.(sic) That improper information, given prior to the 

court handing down his sentence, unearthed the knowing nature of his plea. 

Gornall was informed by counsel that he was eligible for judicial 

release at 180 days. 

He then relied on the following exchange with the trial court; 

"The Court: ....at any point in your sentence for example, if you were 

initially sentenced to prison, but before completing the prison sentence you 

were released early but before completing the prison sentence you were 

released early " Tr. 18. 

The trial court does not say "if after serving half your sentence." That 

would be an accurate statement of the law. Rather, the court incorrectly 
Ashland County, Case No. 18-COA-034 9 

states that "at any point in your sentence.... you were released." This 

statement is not correct. It undercuts the Appellants(sic) understanding of 

the direct consequences of his plea. 

In so-stating the Court reinforced Gornall's incorrect "knowledge" 

that he would be eligible for judicial release in 180 days. 

(Emphasis Added.) 

{¶19} We disagree with appellant’s conclusion and find that it is a strained 

interpretation of the trial court’s statement. When read in the context of the remaining 

portion of the statement, we cannot find any language that would suggest to a reasonable 

person that a petition for release could be filed in 180 days: 

And do you understand, Mr. Cornell, if you find yourself subject to a 

community control supervision, at any point in your sentence, for example, 

if you were initially sentenced to prison, but before completing the prison 

sentence you were released early with the portion of your unserved 

sentence suspended, that you comply with certain community control 

sanctions in that event, if you violated the condition of community control, 

the court could impose greater restrictions and keep you on community 

control if not initially imposed for 5 years, the court could extend that 

supervision, so it would run a total of 5 years or again, it could be revoked 

if you violated the terms and the suspended portion of the prison term 

reinstated and you being sent back to prison at that point? 

(Sentencing Transcript, page 19, lines 2-19). 
Ashland County, Case No. 18-COA-034 10 

{¶20} We find that isolating the phrase “at any point in your sentence,” from the 

complete statement is an inaccurate interpretation of the information the trial court is 

conveying to the appellant and cannot be reasonably interpreted as suggesting that 

appellant would have the opportunity to file a petition for early release within 180 days. 

This paragraph warns appellant of the consequences of a violation of community control, 

and does not suggest a date for filing a petition for release. 

{¶21} Appellant makes statements within his motion to withdraw his plea and the 

attached affidavit that show that he was not mislead by the trial court’s statement and 

contradict his assertion that the trial court provided erroneous information. 

{¶22} In the brief appellant states that “Gornall was informed by counsel that he 

was eligible for judicial release at 180 days. He then relied on the following exchange with 

the trial court,” after which he describes the statement set out above. In his motion to 

withdraw his plea and in his affidavit attached to the motion, he described the events as 

follows: 

This was a clear indication that not only was the defendant eligible 

for Community Control Sanctions, the trial Court also informed the 

defendant that he could be released after he came to prison, back into 

society, but the Court never made mention of when this eligibility date would 

come into effect. This raised the question to the counsel for the defendant, 

and counsel replied to defendant that he (defendant) could file for judicial 

after a period of 180 days of actual prison confinement. 

Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, May, 9, 2018, Docket #47, page 2. 
Ashland County, Case No. 18-COA-034 11 

{¶23} He reiterated the statement in his affidavit, attached to the Motion as Exhibit 

B where he states: “That the trial Court, in accepting my pleas, led me to believe that I 

was eligible for judicial release but never told me WHEN (sic) I would become eligible, 

leading me to be misinformed by my trial counsel.” 

{¶24} Appellant’s motion and affidavit demonstrate that he was not confused or 

misled by the trial court’s comments regarding release. At most they prompted him to 

question his counsel regarding the issue and only then did he purportedly receive 

incorrect information. For those reasons, we find that the appellant’s assertion that the 

trial court misled him to believe he would be eligible for early release in 180 days is belied 

by a review of the trial court’s entire statement and the statements of appellant and does 

not warrant further analysis. 

{¶25} The accusation directed toward trial counsel for incorrect information suffers 

from a different but no less fatal defect that leads to a rejection appellant’s argument and 

undermines his credibility. 

{¶26} Appellant’s motion to withdraw a guilty plea as well as his affidavit discloses 

that he learned on March 28, 2018 that he would not be eligible to file for early release 

within 180 days. Consequently, appellant was well aware of his argument that his trial 

counsel provided him inaccurate information on that date and he had the opportunity to 

bring that to the attention of this court. On April 23, 2018 appellant filed a motion to reopen 

his appeal, alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to argue 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In that context appellant argued that his appellate 

counsel failed to “raise ineffectiveness of trial counsel for failure to include appellant’s 

childhood sexual abuse, as well as testimony from the treatment center that appellant 
Ashland County, Case No. 18-COA-034 12 

voluntarily admitted himself into for treatment.” Application for Re-Opening Appeal, April 

23, 2018, page 7. That motion was his opportunity to include the newly discovered 

information that his trial counsel allegedly provided him with seriously incorrect 

information regarding his ability to file a petition for early release, and that issue was 

overlooked by appellate counsel. Appellant had knowledge of the alleged error and the 

opportunity to present it to this court in the context of a motion to reopen his appeal but 

failed to do so. Under those circumstances, res judicata serves to bar any contention that 

his counsel was ineffective. Res judicata applies to bar raising piecemeal claims in 

successive postconviction relief petitions or motions to withdraw a guilty plea that could 

have been raised, but were not, in the first postconviction relief petition or motion to 

withdraw a guilty plea.” State v. Kent, Jackson App.No. 02CA21, 2003–Ohio–6156, ¶ 6. 

{¶27} Finally, appellant’s behavior under the circumstances strains credibility. 

Appellant was sentenced on January 6, 2016 to over five decades of imprisonment 

allegedly with the belief that he would be eligible for release within 180 days of his 

incarceration. Yet, inexplicably, he failed to take any effort or steps toward release until 

March 2018 nearly 2 years after he would have been allegedly eligible to file the petition. 

Under the circumstances it is difficult to accept appellant’s contention that he truly 

believed he would be eligible for early release within 180 days when he failed to take any 

action to take advantage of that opportunity for years after the trigger date. 

{¶28} The first assignment of error is denied. 

{¶29} In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court 

abused its discretion by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Our disposition of the 

first assignment of error reveals that the appellant’s petition to withdraw is resolved by a 
Ashland County, Case No. 18-COA-034 13 

review of the record of the proceedings before the trial court. “An evidentiary hearing is 

not required for deciding postsentence motions to withdraw a guilty plea where the record 

conclusively and irrefutably contradicts the allegations in the motion.” State v. Cassell, 

4th Dist. No. 16CA15, 2017-Ohio-769, 79 N.E.3d 588, ¶ 27 Unlike the case of State v. 

Milanovich, 42 Ohio St.2d 46, 49, 325 N.E.2d 540, 542 (1975), the appellant’s claims in 

this case can “be determined by an examination of the petition or the files and records of 

the case.” 

{¶30} We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to hold a 

hearing. Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶31} The decision of the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

By: Baldwin, J. 

Gwin, P.J. and 

Wise, John, J. concur.