### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE Se pte m be r 17, 200 3 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. LER OY NEV ILS

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Willi am son Coun ty No. I-115-701 D onald P . Harris, Judge

No. M2003- 00520-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Fe bruary 26, 2004

J OS EP H M. T I PTON , J

. , co n cu rr i n g.
Iconcur in the resul t s re ac h ed in t he majority opinion. However , Iquestion whether a “re asonable cer

tainty ” equates to a “mora l cer tainty ” re lative t o the def

inition of reasona

ble doubt in Tennesse e. Also, I believe that trial courts in this state shoul d not be usingvary ing de finitions of
re a so na ble do ub t.

T. P.I .– Cr im. 2. 03 (7 th e d. 20 02 ) p ro vid e s:

Reasonable doubt is that doubt e n g e n d e r e d b y a n in v estig ation of all the proof in the case and an inability , afte r such investig ation, to let the mind rest easily to the cer tainty of g uilt. R easona

ble doubt do e s n ot m ean

a do ub t th a t ma

y ari se fr om p os sib ili ty . Abs olute cer tainty of g uilt i s n o t demande d by the law to convic t of any
c ri min a l c ha

rg e , b ut m or a l ce rt a int

y is re qu ir e d, and thi s c e rt a int y is require d as to eve ry

proposi tion of proof re quisite to constitut e the offe nse. This description of re asonable doubt is the one that ha s historically been g iven in Tenne ssee. See , e.g ., Har din v. State, 210 Tenn. 116, 122, 355 S.W.2d 105, 108 (1962); W are v. State, 108 Tenn. 466, 470-71, 67 S.W. 853, 854 (1902).

Th e ma jor ity op ini on qu ote s f ro m th e de fe nd ant’ s p ri or DUI c a se in w hic h a pa ne l of thi s court, including my

colleagues in t h i s ca se, also conc luded that using “re asonable cer tainty ” as opposed to “mora l cer

tai n t y ” d i d n ot violate due proc ess. I t rec og nized that T.P.I .–Crim. 2.03 included the language “m o ra l cer tainty ” in the conte x t of rea sonable doubt, but it stated that T.P.I .–Crim. 2.03(a) “ provides alter native languag e” that has “c ontinuously withstood challeng es to its constit utionality .”-2-

The opinion’s re fer ence to T.P.I .–C ri m

. 2.03(a) relates to an alter native re asonable doubt instruction placed into the fourth edition of the pattern instructions in 1995 beca use of the c oncer

n of the Committee on Pattern Jury I nstructions (Criminal) of the Tenne ssee Judicial Conferenc e “that the use of the term of ‘ moral ce rtainty ’ in the jury char g e on rea sonable doubt may be re versible e rror un de r C a g e v. L ou isi ana , 498 U. S. 39, 11 1 S. Ct. 32 8, 11 2 L . Ed. 2d 33 9 (19 90 ). ” Se e T. P.I .– Cr im. 2.03 Comments. I n pertinent pa rt, T.P.I .–Crim. 2.03(a) pr ovided:

A rea sonable doubt is a doubt ba sed upon re ason and c ommon se ns e a ft e r c a

re fu l and imp art ia l con sid e ra tio n of al l the e vid e nc e in this case.

I t is not necessar

y that the def

endant’ s g uilt be proved be y ond all p o s s ib le d o u

b t, a s a b s o lute c e rta in ty

o f g u il t i s n o t d e ma

n d e d by the law to convic t of any

criminal cha

rg e.
A re asonable doubt is just that–a doubt that is rea sonable a fter an examination of all the fa cts of this case

. Howeve r, the United States Supre me Court did not condemn “mora l ce rt ai nty .” In Victor
v. Nebr aska, 511 U.S. 1, 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994), the Supre me Court explained the relationship of
re a so na ble do ub t to the “ mor a l c e rt a int y ” ph ra se . It st a te d th a t m oral cert ainty wa s th e hig he st de g re e of c e rt itu de ba se d u

po n mo ra l e vid e nc e , a s o pp os e d to de mon str a tiv e or “ ma the ma tic a l” evidenc e, such a s scientific truths. 511 U.S. at 10-11, 114 S. Ct. at 1245-46. I n other wor ds, “moral
cer tainty ” is that level of c erta i n t y humanly attainable in matter s relatingto human aff airs and observation. The court r ecog nized that a m o d er n j ury , unawa re of the historical mea

ning, mig ht
un de rs tand

the ph ra se , in

the a bs tr a c t, t o me an s ome thi ngle ss t ha n th e le ve l of

c e rt a int y constitutionally

require d in criminal ca ses. 511 U. S

. at 13-14, 114 S. Ct. at 1247. However , the Court did not hold that the phra se wa s constitutionally inappropriate when the full char g e to the jury place d the phra se in such a c ontext that a jury would understand that it mean cer tainty with respec t to human aff

airs. 511 U.S. at 15-16, 114 S. Ct. at 1247-48. I n this respec t, Ibelieve the context of T.P.I .–Crim. 2.03 describes the high le vel of c erta inty require d in criminal ca ses. As for the alternative instruction, T.P.I .–Crim. 2.03(a), the Comm ittee removed it in the 2000 fifth editi on of the patter n jury instructions.

I reco gn ize that va

ri ou s p ane ls o f t

his c ourt have a pp ro ve d th e wo rd ingof

T. P.I .– Cr im. 2. 03 (a ). Se e , e .g ., Sta

te v. Me lvi n E dw ard

He nn ing , N o. 02 C01 -9 70 3- CC- 00 12 6, Ma dis on County (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 24, 1997). Howeve r, as I maintained in State v. Der ek De nton, No. 02C01- 94 09 -C R- 00 18 6, She lby

County (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. Au g . 2 , 1 99 6) , th e c ourt s in Te nn e sse e sh ou ld
us e the his tor ic a l de fi nit ion . T o me , d if fe re nt w or ds hav e di fferen t me anin g and Ido no t e qu a te “r ea s o n ab l e c er t ai n t y ” t o “mora l cer tai n t y
. ” I do n o tb el i ev e “ re as o n ab l e c er t ai n t y ” e n gen d er s as h i gh a state of ce rtainty . I n any event, we should not be fac ed with an issue r eg ardinginstructions that differ from the pattern jury

instruction. That is, all the courts in this state should use the instruction prese nted in T.P.I .–Crim. 2.03 (7th ed. 2002).-3-

Iconcur in the results rea ched in the m ajority opinion beca use t he record refle cts that the trial court e ssentially instructed the jury as provided in T.P.I .–Crim. 2.03 but subst ituted “re asonable ” for “mora l.” To me, the sur

rounding instructions reg ardingrea sonable doubt sufficie ntly explain to the jur y the le ve l of

c e rt a int y that du e pr oc e ss r e qu ir e s.

____________________________________ J OSEPH M. TI PTON, J UDGE