Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-AD-2769 | June 10, 2024 Page 1 of 12

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana

In re the Adoption of M.J.H. (Minor Child)

S.R.,

Appellant-Respondent

v.

T.D.,

Appellee-Petitioner

June 10, 2024

Court of Appeals Case No.

23A-AD-2769

Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court

The Honorable David K. Najjar, Judge

The Honorable Erin M. Weaver, Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

29D05-2205-AD-657

Opinion by Judge Mathias
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-AD-2769 | June 10, 2024 Page 2 of 12

Judges Tavitas and Weissmann concur.

Mathias, Judge.

[1] S.R. (“Putative Father”) appeals the trial court’s grant of T.D.’s (“Adoptive 

Mother’s”) petition to adopt M.J.H. (“Child”). Putative Father presents one 

issue for review, namely, whether the trial court erred when it concluded that 

his consent to the adoption was irrevocably implied by his failure to register 

with the putative father registry.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On August 20, 2020, M.H. (“Biological Mother”)1 gave birth to Child. Shortly 

after his birth, Child was found to be a CHINS, and the Department of Child 

Services (“DCS”) placed Child with Adoptive Mother. Child has continuously 

lived with Adoptive Mother since that time.2

[4] Putative Father was incarcerated when Child was born. Putative Father was not 

married to Biological Mother, and he did not register with the putative father

registry. During the CHINS proceeding, Putative Father requested DNA 

1 Biological Mother does not participate in this appeal. In September 2023, the trial court found that her 

consent to the adoption was irrevocably implied.

2 Adoptive Mother’s boyfriend-turned-husband also provided care for Child, but the couple have since 

divorced.
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testing. That testing established that he is Child’s biological father in March 

2022.

[5] On May 2, Adoptive Mother filed her petition to adopt Child. While Adoptive 

Mother identified Putative Father as Child’s biological father in the petition, 

she did not serve him with notice of the petition. After learning about the 

petition, on September 9, Putative Father filed a motion to contest the 

adoption. On March 14, 2023, more than two years after Child was born, 

Putative Father filed a petition to establish his paternity of Child.3

[6] On April 5, 2023, Adoptive Mother filed a motion to dismiss Putative Father’s 

motion to contest the adoption, and she filed a “Motion to Confirm that 

Biological Father’s Consent is Irrevocably Implied.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 

53. Adoptive Mother argued in relevant part that Putative Father’s consent to 

the adoption was irrevocably implied because he had not timely registered with 

the putative father registry. In his response, Putative Father argued that he was 

not required to register with the putative father registry and that his consent to 

the adoption was not, therefore, irrevocably implied.4

[7] The trial court found in relevant part that Putative Father “was required to 

register with the putative father registry pursuant to IC [§] 31-19-5-12 by no later 

3 The paternity petition should have been consolidated with the adoption proceedings. See I.C. § 31-19-2-14. 

In any event, Putative Father does not raise any issues in this appeal related to his paternity petition.

4 We reject Adoptive Mother’s assertion that Putative Father has waived this argument. Our review of the 

record shows that he sufficiently raised this issue to the trial court.
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than the filing of a petition for adoption of the child on May 2, 2022.” Id. at 83. 

And the court concluded that Putative Father’s failure to register meant that his 

consent to the adoption had been irrevocably implied as a matter of law.

[8] On October 27, the trial court entered the adoption decree. This appeal ensued.5

Overview of the Putative Father Registry

[9] As this Court has explained,

Indiana established the Registry in 1994. In re Paternity of G.W., 

983 N.E.2d 1193, 1196 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), reh’g denied. The 

Registry is managed by the DOH. Ind. Code § 31-19-5-2. “The 

purpose of the registry is to provide notice to a putative father 

that a petition for adoption has been filed.” In re Adoption of 

J.D.C., 751 N.E.2d 747, 749 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (citing In re 

Paternity of Baby Doe, 734 N.E.2d 281, 284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)); 

see also Ind. Code § 31-19-5-3. The statutory authority governing 

the Registry

applies to a putative father whenever (1) an adoption 

under IC [§] 31-19-2 has been or may be filed 

regarding a child who may have been conceived by 

the putative father; and (2) on or before the date the 

child’s mother executes a consent to the child’s 

adoption, the child’s mother has not disclosed the 

name or address, or both, of the putative father to the 

5 In her motion to dismiss, Adoptive Mother argues that Putative Father “failed to appeal the Order on 

Consent” and that the issues he raises on appeal are, therefore, “moot.” Motion to Dismiss p. 4. It appears 

that Adoptive Mother’s argument turns on the fact that Putative Father attached only the adoption decree to 

his notice of appeal and not the court’s interlocutory order on his consent. Adoptive Mother acknowledges 

that Putative Father was required to wait until the decree was entered to file this appeal. And in his brief on 

appeal, Putative Father explicitly appeals the trial court’s order regarding consent. We reject Adoptive 

Mother’s argument and deny her motion to dismiss by separate order.
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attorney or agency that is arranging the child’s 

adoption.

Ind. Code § 31-19-5-1(a). However, the statutory authority 

governing the Registry “does not apply if, on or before the date 

the child’s mother executes a consent to the child’s adoption, the 

child’s mother discloses the name and address of the putative 

father to the attorney or agency that is arranging the child’s 

adoption.” Ind. Code § 31-19-5-1(b).

A putative father who registers with the Registry in accordance 

with Indiana Code chapter 31-19-5 “is entitled to notice of the 

child’s adoption. . . .” Ind. Code § 31-19-5-4. However,

[i]f, on or before the date the mother of a child 

executes a consent to the child’s adoption, the mother 

does not disclose to an attorney or agency that:

(1) is arranging; or

(2) may arrange;

an adoption of the child the name or address, or both, 

of the putative father of the child, the putative father 

must register under this [Indiana Code chapter 31-19-

5] to entitle the putative father to notice of the child’s 

adoption.

Ind. Code § 31-19-5-5 (emphasis added). Further, the filing of a 

paternity action by a putative father “does not relieve the putative 

father from the: (1) obligation of registering; or (2) consequences 

of failing to register; in accordance with [Indiana Code chapter 

31-19-5] unless paternity has been established before the filing of 

the petition for adoption of the child.” Ind. Code § 31-19-5-6.

In order to be entitled to notice of an adoption, a putative father 

must register with the DOH not later than “(1) thirty (30) days 
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after the child’s birth; or (2) the earlier of the date of the filing of 

a petition for the: (A) child’s adoption; or (B) termination of the 

parent-child relationship between the child and the child’s 

mother; whichever occurs later.” Ind. Code § 31-19-5-12(a). A 

putative father may also register with the DOH prior to the 

child’s birth. Ind. Code § 31-19-5-12(b). “A putative father who 

fails to register within the period specified by [Indiana Code 

section 31-19-5-12] waives notice of an adoption proceeding. The 

putative father’s waiver under this section constitutes an 

irrevocably implied consent to the child’s adoption.” Ind. Code § 

31-19-5-8 (emphasis added). “[A] putative father whose consent 

has been implied may not challenge the adoption or establish 

paternity.” In re Adoption of J.D.C., 751 N.E.2d at 750; see also In re 

Paternity of Baby Doe, 734 N.E.2d at 285; Indiana Code §§ 31-19-

9-13, 31-19-9-14.

E.S. v. T.B. (In re Adoption of K.G.B.), 18 N.E.3d 292, 296-97 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2014).

Discussion and Decision

[10] Putative Father presents an issue of first impression for our courts, namely, 

whether Indiana Code chapter 31-19-5 (“Chapter 5”), which governs the 

putative father registry, applies where a mother does not consent to an 

adoption. Initially, we note that, despite the DNA test showing that Putative 

Father is Child’s biological father, he qualifies as a “putative father” under 

Indiana Code section 31-9-2-100.

[11] Matters of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. City of New Albany v. 

Bd. of Comm’rs of Cnty. of Floyd, 141 N.E.3d 1220, 1223 (Ind. 2020). As our 

Supreme Court has explained:
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When interpreting a statute, we begin by reading its words in 

their plain and ordinary meaning, taking into account “the 

structure of the statute as a whole.” ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre 

Dame Police Dep’t, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind. 2016). Mindful of 

what the statute says and what it doesn’t say, we aim to “avoid 

interpretations that depend on selective reading of individual 

words that lead to irrational and disharmonizing results.” Id.

(quotation and citation omitted). Rather, we presume the 

“legislature intended for the statutory language to be applied in a 

logical manner consistent with the statute’s underlying policy and 

goals.” Rodriguez v. State, 129 N.E.3d 789, 793 (Ind. 2019)

(quotation and citation omitted). Ultimately, “our goal is to 

determine and give effect to” the legislature’s intent. State v. Int’l 

Bus. Machines Corp., 964 N.E.2d 206, 209 (Ind. 2012) (citation 

omitted).

Town of Linden v. Birge, 204 N.E.3d 229, 237 (Ind. 2023).

[12] Chapter 5 begins with Indiana Code section 31-19-5-1, which provides:

(a) This chapter applies to a putative father whenever:

(1) an adoption under IC 31-19-2 has been or may be 

filed regarding a child who may have been conceived 

by the putative father; and

(2) on or before the date the child’s mother executes a 

consent to the child’s adoption, the child’s mother has 

not disclosed the name or address, or both, of the 

putative father to the attorney or agency that is 

arranging the child’s adoption.

(b) This chapter does not apply if, on or before the date the 

child’s mother executes a consent to the child’s adoption, the 

child’s mother discloses the name and address of the putative 
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father to the attorney or agency that is arranging the child’s 

adoption.

(Emphases added.) Putative Father argues that the statute is written such that it 

“plainly requires the child’s mother to have executed a consent to the child’s 

adoption,” and, otherwise, the chapter does not apply. Appellant’s Br. at 12 

(emphasis added). We do not agree.

[13] Putative Father’s argument ignores the plain language of Indiana Code section 

31-19-5-1: a putative father is subject to Chapter 5 “on or before” a mother 

consents to an adoption. (Emphasis added.) The date of a mother’s consent is 

only relevant to the issue of whether she provides a putative father’s name 

and/or contact information to an agency or an attorney prior to the entry of the 

adoption decree, which, in turn, determines whether Chapter 5 applies to him.

There is no statutory requirement under Chapter 5 or elsewhere in the adoption 

statutes that a mother give her consent before a putative father is required to 

register with the putative father registry. Rather, the applicable statutes very 

clearly establish that, unless and until Indiana Code section 31-19-5-1(b)

applies, a putative father is required to register.

[14] Indiana Code section 31-19-5-12 imposes a deadline for registration with the 

putative father registry. That deadline does not refer to a requirement that the

mother give her “consent” to an adoption. Rather, the deadline for registration 

is not later than “(1) thirty (30) days after the child’s birth; or (2) the earlier of 

the date of the filing of a petition for the: (A) child’s adoption; or (B) 

termination of the parent-child relationship between the child and the child’s 
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mother; whichever occurs later.” I.C. § 31-19-5-12(a). The “termination” of a 

mother’s parental rights can be either voluntary (with her consent) or 

involuntary (without her consent). Id. If, as Putative Father contends, Chapter 5 

only applies where a mother consents to an adoption, section 12(a) would not 

refer only to the termination of a mother’s rights.

[15] Here, as the trial court found, and consistent with the statute cited above, the 

deadline for Putative Father’s registration was May 2, 2022, when Adoptive 

Mother filed her adoption petition. In contrast, there was no deadline for 

Biological Mother to give her consent to the adoption prior to the entry of the

adoption decree.6 And as of May 2, 2022, Biological Mother might still have 

executed her consent prior to the entry of the final decree on October 27, 2023. 

Indeed, it was not until September 19, 2023, that the trial court determined that 

her consent to the adoption had been irrevocably implied.

[16] In sum, unless he is exempt from registering under Indiana Code section 31-19-

5-1(b),

7 Chapter 5 explicitly applies to a putative father before a mother’s 

consent is or may be executed. The relevance of a mother’s execution of 

consent to an adoption is merely the timing for her to provide information 

about a putative father. And whether her consent is ultimately given or not, 

6 Indiana Code section 31-19-9-2 provides that a consent to adoption “may be executed or acknowledged at 

any time after the birth of the child.”

7 We note that Putative Father argued to the trial court that he was exempt from the registry under subsection 

(b), but he does not make that argument on appeal.
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unless Indiana Code section 31-19-5-1(b) is satisfied, a putative father is 

required to timely register with the putative father registry under section 31-19-

5-12.

[17] This interpretation of Indiana Code section 31-19-5-1 is consistent with the 

underlying policy and goals of the putative father registry, which were

explained by our Supreme Court as follows:

The Registry serves in part to preserve a father’s right to oppose 

an adoption while simultaneously assuring the biological mother and 

adoptive parents that, when a putative father fails to register after a set 

time, an adoption can proceed without apprehension that it might later 

be upended. Many state putative father registry laws were direct 

legislative responses to the circumstances surrounding the wellpublicized “Baby Jessica” and “Baby Richard” cases. See Mary 

Beck, Toward a National Putative Father Registry Database, 25 Harv. 

J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 1031, 1036 (2002); see generally Andrew S. 

Rosenman, Note, Babies Jessica, Richard, and Emily: The Need for 

Legislative Reform of Adoption Laws, 70 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1851 

(1995). . . .

In re B.W., 908 N.E.2d 586, 587 n.3 (Ind. 2009) (emphasis added). Clearly, 

requiring putative fathers to register both where a mother consents and where 

her rights are involuntarily terminated furthers the goal of finality in adoptions.

[18] Still, Putative Father argues that, because Adoptive Mother named him as the 

biological father in her adoption petition, the purpose of the putative father 

registry statutes was fulfilled despite his failure to register. But Putative Father 

conflates notice to him with statutory consent, which our Court has flatly 

rejected before. In J.R.C. v. J.C. (In re Adoption of K.A.W.), we explained that
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Putative Father makes a compelling argument that the purpose of 

the Putative Father Registry is to ensure that putative fathers 

have notice if someone is seeking to adopt their child(ren). I.C. § 

31-19-5-3. In this case, Putative Father not only had notice, he 

was an active participant; first, he took the initiative to file a pro 

se paternity action and then, he actively took part in the adoption 

proceedings. Here, therefore, there was no true reason that he had to 

register. Indeed, it feels as though this outcome is not only 

nonsensical, but unjust; it feels as though his action of filing the 

paternity cause should have been enough to preserve his right to 

object; it feels as though this is the ultimate “gotcha” outcome. In 

a perfect world, we would reverse. But this world is not perfect, 

and the statute says what it says, which is that the failure to 

register in a timely fashion leads to irrevocably implied consent.[]

We are compelled to affirm the trial court[’]s order finding that 

his consent to the adoption was irrevocably implied] given the 

plain language of the statute at issue.

99 N.E.3d 724, 727 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (emphasis added).

[19] Likewise, here, as the trial court found, Putative Father was required to register 

with the putative father registry by May 2, 2022, when the adoption petition 

was filed, at the latest. I.C. § 31-19-5-12(a). And Indiana Code section 31-19-5-

18 provides that “[a] putative father who fails to register within the period 

specified by section 12 of this chapter waives notice of an adoption proceeding. 

The putative father’s waiver under this section constitutes an irrevocably implied consent 

to the child’s adoption.” (Emphasis added.) In this case, Putative Father had 

approxiately one year and ten months after the birth of his child to register, but 

he did not.
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[20] Putative Father never registered with the putative father registry. Accordingly, 

the trial court did not err when it concluded that Putative Father’s consent to 

the adoption was irrevocably implied and granted the adoption petition.

[21] Affirmed.

Tavitas, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Dyllan M. Kemp

Dollard Whalin LLP

Noblesville, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Paul R. Sadler

Emswiller, Williams, Noland & Clarke, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana