2013 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

1-23-2013

USA v. Edmund Fields

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 11-4561

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Recommended Citation

"USA v. Edmund Fields" (2013). 2013 Decisions. Paper 1343.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 11-4561

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

EDMUND BRUCE FIELDS, 

 Appellant

______________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

(D.C. Action No. 2:03-cr-00289-001)

District Judge: Honorable David S. Cercone

______________

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

October 24, 2012

______________

Before: HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges.

(Opinion Filed: January 23, 2013)

______________

OPINION

______________

GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.

The instant appeal arises from the District Court’s denial of Appellant Edmund 

Bruce Fields’ (“Appellant”) 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his sentence. As grounds 

for relief, Appellant had argued ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging that his 
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attorney failed to procure certain documents and testimony that would have altered the 

outcome of a suppression hearing. For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm the 

District Court’s denial of Appellant’s motion.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the facts 

essential to our discussion. In March 2003, Canonsburg Police Department Detective 

Charles Tenney (“Detective Tenney”) effectuated an investigatory stop of a pickup truck 

in which the Appellant was a passenger. Detective Tenney had stopped the truck because 

he recognized another passenger, Anthony “Crazy Boy” Hutchinson, from his work with 

the Washington County Drug Task Force (the “Task Force”). Not only was Detective 

Tenney familiar with Hutchinson’s prior illicit activities but, a month before the stop, 

another Task Force agent had mentioned the existence of an outstanding warrant for 

Hutchinson’s arrest. Following the stop, the police conducted a pat-down search of 

Appellant’s person and discovered that he was in possession of ammunition for a 

revolver that was located inside the truck, roughly $1300 in cash, and a razor blade with 

white powdery residue. Another search, this time at the police station, revealed heroin in 

Appellant’s shoe.

Appellant was subsequently indicted and charged with (1) possession with intent 

to distribute less than 100 grams of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); (2) 

carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 
3

U.S.C. § 924(c); and (3) possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Prior to his trial, Appellant moved to suppress the evidence against him, arguing 

that the investigatory stop violated the Fourth Amendment.1

 At the suppression hearing, 

Detective Tenney testified regarding his familiarity with Hutchinson and about the 

warrant for his arrest.2

 1 In point of fact, the suppression hearing focused not only on the investigatory stop, but 

on the subsequent searches. (See App. at 46-47.) However, because Appellant’s § 2255 

motion concerned only the investigatory stop aspect, (see id. at 33-39), we will confine 

our discussion to that specific issue.

 When pressed on cross-examination, the detective noted that, 

while he could not remember specifically who had informed him of the warrant, it may 

have been an “Agent Sepic.” (App. at 134.) The detective also stated that he had radioed 

2 In relevant part, Detective Tenney testified as follows:

A. Hutchinson is known to me from calls within our jurisdiction and 

has been known to sell — allegedly sells heroin and is involved in gang 

activity in the City of Pittsburgh.

Q. And did you know anything about whether Mr. Hutchinson was 

wanted on any outstanding warrants at the time this car drove through the 

headlights of your vehicle?

. . . 

A. I was — I worked on an Attorney General’s Task Force also at 

the time. One of the agents advised me, “Hey, we’re looking for Crazy 

Boy. There’s warrants for him now,” for unrelated charges in another 

county, I believe, I’m not sure; and he was entered into NCIC.

Q. Okay. How long before — approximately how long before this 

incident on March 7th, 2003, had you been advised by someone on the 

Attorney General’s Task Force that Hutchinson was wanted?

A. It was over a period of several months that I talked to them. I 

think it dates back to January, and then we obviously worked cases together 

the whole time, so I really couldn’t tell you. Maybe a month; I couldn’t tell 

you. It could have been three weeks, a month.

(App. at 117-18.)
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dispatch to confirm the existence of the warrant prior to stopping the truck. Based on this 

testimony, the District Court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress. 

Appellant was subsequently tried and convicted as to Count One and Count Three 

(though only insofar as it related to possession of ammunition). After the trial, Appellant 

filed a supplemental motion to suppress the evidence against him. This time, however, 

Appellant attached documents that had been produced after the suppression hearing 

reflecting the radio communications between Detective Tenney and the police dispatchers 

(the “dispatch records”). The dispatch records indicated that, contrary to Detective 

Tenney’s testimony during the hearing, he had not received confirmation of the 

outstanding warrant until after he effectuated the investigatory stop. Nonetheless, the 

District Court denied the supplemental motion, holding that the investigatory stop was 

proper.

We affirmed Appellant’s conviction in a 2006 not precedential opinion and held, 

among other things, that the District Court had not erred in denying the motions to 

suppress. See United States v. Fields, 176 F. App’x 327, 329-30 (3d Cir. 2006). While 

we noted the existence of ambiguity as to whether Detective Tenney in fact received 

confirmation prior to stopping the truck, we deemed the matter irrelevant “in light of our 

conclusion that Tenney’s personal knowledge [of Hutchinson and the outstanding 

warrant] was sufficient” to justify the investigatory stop. Id. at 328 n.2. We remanded 

the case for resentencing in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
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Appellant was subsequently sentenced to a term of 210 months’ imprisonment and 

several years of supervised release.

In July 2008, Appellant filed a motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255. In this motion, Appellant argued that his counsel was ineffective in (1) failing to 

obtain and introduce the dispatch records during the suppression hearing and (2) failing 

to challenge Detective Tenney’s testimony that another Task Force member informed 

him of the outstanding warrant on Hutchinson. (Appellant Br. at 18-20.) The District 

Court disagreed, finding that the “[t]rial counsel’s failure to obtain the [dispatch records

was] irrelevant. Both this Court and the Court of Appeals found that Tenney’s reliance 

on his personal knowledge was sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that 

Hutchinson was involved in criminal activity” and thus justified the investigatory stop. 

(App. at 5.) Consequently, the District Court denied Appellant’s § 2255 motion and 

granted a certificate of appealability.

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The District Court had jurisdiction to rule on Appellant’s motion pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2255. We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 

and 2253. Given that the District Court denied Appellant’s § 2255 motion without 

holding a hearing, our review is plenary. United States v. Eakman, 378 F.3d 294, 297 (3d 

Cir. 2004).
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III. Analysis

To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant must satisfy 

a two-prong inquiry. United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). Specifically, Appellant must 

demonstrate that “(1) his or her attorney’s performance was, under all the circumstances, 

unreasonable under prevailing professional norms . . . and (2) [that] there is a ‘reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would have been 

different.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). “A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694.

This is no easy task. As the Supreme Court of the United States recognized, 

“scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential,” and we must therefore 

“indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. It thus falls to Appellant to “overcome 

the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered 

sound trial strategy.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Since it is not the role of 

this Court to heedlessly cast aspersions on Appellant’s counsel, “[i]f it is easier to dispose 

of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course 

should be followed.” Id. at 697. Therefore, we will consider whether Appellant was 

prejudiced due to his attorney’s allegedly unreasonable actions in handling the motion to 

suppress. See Day, 969 F.2d at 42.
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As discussed above, the suppression hearing concerned, among other things, the 

admissibility of evidence gathered as a result of an investigatory stop. Since “stopping a 

car and detaining its occupants constitute[s] a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 

Amendment,” United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226 (1985), the effectuating police 

officer must have a “reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts,” that 

the vehicle’s occupants are involved in criminal activity. Id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 

440 U.S. 648, 653-55 (1979)). “To determine whether reasonable suspicion exists, [the 

court] must consider the ‘totality of the circumstances — the whole picture.’” United 

States v. Robertson, 305 F.3d 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 

490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989)). 

The District Court held that one basis for Detective Tenney’s reasonable suspicion 

was his confirmation “that a passenger in the vehicle, Hutchinson, had a warrant out for 

his arrest.” (App. at 63.) Since the dispatch records seem to indicate that this 

confirmation came only after Detective Tenney had already stopped the car, introducing 

them at trial could have undermined Detective Tenney’s testimony and could have 

undermined this particular basis for a finding of “reasonable suspicion.” Nonetheless, we 

find that this would not have resulted in a different outcome in the suppression hearing.

As we noted in our 2006 decision, “the District Court also found that ‘because 

Tenney worked on the [Task Force],’ he had personal knowledge ‘that there was an 

active bench warrant for Hutchinson.’ This knowledge is itself sufficient to establish 

reasonable suspicion.” Fields, 176 F. App’x at 330 (quoting the District Court’s
8

suppression hearing opinion). Indeed, in dismissing the § 2255 motion, the District Court 

reaffirmed its holding by noting that it had “found the stop reasonable because 

[Detective] Tenney was personally aware of Hutchinson’s gang activity, as well as 

allegations of his involvement in drug trafficking.” (App. at 5.) The dispatch records do 

nothing to undercut this basis for finding that Detective Tenney had a reasonable 

suspicion. To the contrary, as Appellee rightly points out in its Opposition Brief, the 

dispatch records would have “confirmed [Detective Tenney’s] personal prior knowledge 

about the outstanding arrest warrant for Hutchinson.” (Appellee Br. at 19.)

Appellant responds that his attorney could have challenged this secondary basis 

for finding reasonable suspicion by subpoenaing Agent Sepic to testify at the suppression 

hearing.3

 3 Appellant also argues that his counsel “failed to otherwise hold the Government to its 

burden on this issue by producing the officer who allegedly provided the information to” 

Detective Tenney. (Appellant Br. at 19-20.) We see no merit in this argument given our 

2006 holding that Detective Tenney’s testimony as to personal knowledge, standing 

alone, was sufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion. See Fields, 176 F. App’x at 330.

 (Appellant Br. at 19-20.) We do not agree. After testifying that “one of the 

agents” on the Task Force informed him of the existing warrant, (App. at 118), Detective

Tenney offered during cross-examination that “it may have been Attorney General Agent 

Sepic; I’m not sure . . . Maybe Attorney General Agent Sepic; I’m not sure which agent. 

We worked with a lot of agents,” (id. at 134 (emphasis added)). At most, Agent Sepic 

could have testified that he was not the agent who had informed Detective Tenney of the 

outstanding warrant on Hutchinson. However, given Detective Tenney’s equivocation, 

this testimony would have done little to undercut his assertion that some agent had 
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informed him of the outstanding warrant, and, in light of our 2006 holding, does little to 

“undermine confidence in the outcome” of the suppression hearing. Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 694.4

Appellant has failed to demonstrate that there was a “reasonable probability” of a 

contrary outcome had his attorney introduced the dispatch records and Agent Sepic’s 

testimony during the suppression hearing. 

IV. Conclusion

For the aforementioned reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of 

Appellant’s § 2255 motion.

 4 We are cognizant of the note in our 2006 opinion that Appellant “does not contest 

Detective Tenney’s testimony that another Task Force agent informed Tenney of the 

existence of an active warrant for Hutchinson.” Fields, 176 F. App’x at 330 n.3. 

However, on the facts of the instant case, we see no reason why the kind of token 

resistance suggested by Appellant would sway our decision — or influence the outcome 

of the suppression hearing. This is particularly true if Appellant also argues that his 

counsel should have submitted the dispatch records. As noted above, these records 

would have only served to support Detective Tenney’s testimony.