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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED

In re DEAN/FOSSETT, Minors. October 13, 2015

No. 326210 Wayne Circuit Court Family Division

LC No. 12-507836-NA

Before: B ORRELLO , P.J., and J ANSEN and O WENS , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

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Respondent appeals as of right the order terminating her paren tal rights to MAD under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)( i ) (parent caused physical injury to child), (b)( ii ) (parent had the opportunity to prevent physical i njury to child), (g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), and (j) (reasonable likelihood th at child will be harmed if ret urned to parent), and the orders terminating her parental rights to AJD, DMJF, DF, DDF, DAMD, an d ZID, as well as the parental rights of the putative fathers of DF, ZID, and DAMD, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)( i ) (parent is unidentifiable), (a)( ii ) (parent has deserted the child), (c)( i ) (condition that led to adjudication continues to exist), (c)( ii ) (other conditions causing the child to come within the court’s jurisdiction exist and ha ve not been rectified), (g), a nd (j). We affirm.

I. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PARENT CHILDREN

Respondent argues that the trial court violated her constituti onal right to parent her children when it terminated her parental rights since all that the trial court was required to do was to provide the biological fathers of the children with physical and legal custody of the children. We disagree.

Respondent was not required to take exception to the trial court’s findings or decision. See MCR 2.517(A)(7). However, respondent was required to raise the issue of constitutional
error in the trial court. See In re Williams , 286 Mich App 253, 273-274; 779 NW2d 286 (2009). Respondent failed to argue that her constitutional right to par ent her children was violated when
the trial court terminated her parental rights . Therefore, the issue is unpreserved. See id

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This Court reviews the trial court’s factual findings and deci sion regarding the statutory grounds for termination for clear error. In re White , 303 Mich App 701, 709; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). “The trial court’s fact ual findings are clearly errone ous if the evidence supports them, but [this Court is] definitely and firmly convinced that it mad e a mistake.” Id . at 709-710. This
Court also reviews for clear error the trial court’s decision r egarding the best interests of the-2- children. Id . at 713. This Court reviews an unpreserved claim of constitut ional error when the
error could have dictated the outcome in the case. In re Williams , 286 Mich App at 274. This Court reviews an unpreserved constitutional issue for plain err or affecting the respondent’s substantial rights. Id

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A natural parent to a child has a protected liberty interest “ ‘in the care, custody, and management’ ” of her child. In re Rood , 483 Mich 73, 91; 763 NW2d 587 (2009) (citation omitted). The termination procedures are designed to ensure th at the parent facing termination of her parental rights receives due process. See id . at 93. In In re Trejo , 462 Mich 341, 355; 612 NW2d 407 (2000), abrogated in part by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Moss , 301 Mich App 76; 836 NW2d 182 (2013), the Michigan Supreme Court he ld that “[o]nce the petitioner has presented clear and convincing evidence that per suades the court that at least one ground for termination is established under [MCL 712A.19b(5)], the liberty interest of the parent no longer includes the right to custody and control of the chil dren.” Therefore, respondent’s constitutional right to parent h er children was not violated if the trial court correctly found by clear and convincing evidence thatthere was a statutory ground for termination. See id

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II. STATUTORY GROUNDS

Respondent abandons the issue whether there were statutory gro unds for termination since she fails to argue that the trial court erred in finding that there were statutory grounds to terminate her parental rights. See Berger v Berger , 277 Mich App 700, 712; 747 NW2d 336 (2008) (“A party abandons a claim when it fails to make a meani ngful argument in support of its position.”). Therefore, respondent’s argument fails since she does not contend that the court erred in finding statutory grounds to terminate her parental ri ghts, and respondent’s liberty interest no longer included the right to custody and control of her children once the court found statutory grounds to terminate her parental rights. See In re Trejo , 462 Mich at 355. However, even assuming that respondent contended that the trial court er red when it determined that there were statutory grounds to terminate her parental rights, the tr ial court did not err in finding that there were statutory grounds to t erminate respondent’s parental rights.

Although it is not clear from the referee recommendation and r eport which statutory grounds applied to respondent and which applied to the putative fathers, there were statutory grounds to terminate respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712 A.19b(3)(b)( i ), (b)( ii ), (c)( i ), (c)( ii ), (g), and (j). The trial court did not err in finding clear and convincing evidence that MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)( i ) and (b)( ii ) provided statutory grounds to terminate respondent’s parental rights to MAD. MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)( i ) provides that the court may terminate a respondent’s parental rights if it finds by clear and convincing evidence th at the child suffered a physical injury and “[t]he parent’s act caused the physical injury or physical or sexual abuse and the court
finds that there is a reasonabl e likelihood that the child will suffer from injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent’s home.” MCL 712A.1 9b(3)(b)( ii ) provides that the court may terminate a respondent’s parental rights if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the child suffered a physical injury and “[t]he parent who had the opportunity to prevent the physical injury or physical or se xual abuse failed to do so and the court finds that there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer injury or abus e in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent’s home.”-3- There was evidence presented at the termination hearing that M AD tested positive at birth for morphine, codeine, oxycodone, and hydrocodone. Respo ndent explained that she took pain medication in her ninth month of pregnancy. Respondent di d not have a prescription for any of the drugs that were in MAD’s system. Respondent also fa iled to provide documentation that she received prenatal care when she was pregnant with MAD. Thus, there was clear and convincing evidence that responde nt caused physical injury to M AD by consuming medicine that was not prescribed to her during her pregnancy and by failing t o receive prenatal care. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)( i ). Respondent had the opportunity to preven t physical injury b y refraining from taking drugs during her pregnancy and by receiving prenatal car e, which she failed to do so. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)( ii ). Furthermore, there was a reasonable likelihood that MAD wou ld suffer from injury or abuse in the foreseeable future since res pondent failed to seek treatment for a substance abuse problem and failed to comply with her service plan for the other children. Therefore, MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)( i ) and (b)( ii ) provided statutory grounds for termination.

The court also did not err in finding by clear and convincing evidence that MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ) and (c)( ii ) provided statutory bases for termination of respondent’s pare ntal rights to AJD, DMJF , DF, DDF, DAMD, and ZID. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c )( i ) provides that a court may terminate a respondent’s par ental rights if the court decid es by clear and convincing evidence that 182 days or more elapsed after the court issued t he first dispositional order in the case and the court finds that “[t]he conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and
there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be r ectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.”

More than 182 days elapsed since the court issued the first di spositional order in the case. Additionally, the condition thatled to adjudication continued to exist, and there was no
reasonable likelihood that the condition would be rectified wit hin a reasonable time. The condition that led to adjudicati on was the fact that respondent ’s home was in a deplorable condition. Marie Parker, a foster-care worker with Homes for B lack Children, testified during the termination hearing that r espondent failed to obtain suitab le housing and was evicted from her residence in September 2014. Although respondent testifiedthat she was living in a fourbedroom house, she failed to inform Parker of where she was liv ing. Thus, respondent failed to adequately address the housing issue. Furthermore, there was n o indication that respondent would rectify the condition within a reasonable time. DDF, DMJ F, DF, DAMD, and ZID were removed from respondent on June 8, 2012. The termination heari ng took place on December 9, 2014. Thus, respondent had approximately 2 1⁄2 years to obtain s uitable housing, and she failed
to do so. There was no indicati on that respondent would find s uitable housing within a reasonable time after the hearing since she failed to inform Pa rker of her current living situation. Therefore, termination was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ).

In addition, there were other conditions that caused the child ren to come within the court’s jurisdiction. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( ii ) provides that a court may terminate a respondent’s parental rights if the court de cides by clear and convincing ev idence that 182 days or more elapsed after the court issued t he first dispositional order inthe case and the court finds that

[o]ther conditions exist that cause the child to come within th e court’s jurisdiction, the parent has re ceived recommendations to rectif y those conditions,
the conditions have not been rectif ied by the parent after the parent has received-4- notice and a hearing and has be en given a reasonable opportunity to rectify the conditions, and there is no reas onable likelihood that the cond itions will be
rectified within a reasonable ti me considering the child’s age.

Respondent’s treatment plan sought to address other conditions that also caused the
children to come within the c ourt’s jurisdiction. Respondent w as required to attend parenting classes, undergo a psychologica l evaluation, attend individual and family classes, obtain a source of income, maintain regular contact with petitioner, attend reg ular supervised visits with the children, and maintain suitable housing in order to address the income, parenting, and mental health conditions. See MCL 712A.2(b) (describing conditions th at cause a child to come within the trial court’s jurisdiction based on the conduct of the chil d’s parent). Respondent failed to comply with her treatment plan after receiving the recommendati on to rectify the conditions during the initial dispositional hearing on September 25, 2012. Respondent failed to provide documentation that she sought treat ment for depression and took her prescribed medication. Respondent was withdrawn from parenting classes on two occasion s for failing to participate. Respondent’s parenting coach reported that respondent made impr ovements, but had problems redirecting the children during visitations and managing all of the children by herself. Respondent also failed to provide p roof that she had a legal so urce of income. Respondent failed to maintain contact with Parker on a regular basis. Instead, r espondent called Parker approximately once per week. R espondent also visited the children regularly onl y once per week out of the two scheduled visits per week. Thus, respondent fai led to rectify the other conditions. As discussed above, there was not a reasonable likelihood that the conditions would be rectified
within a reasonable time consider ing the children’s ages since respondent was given more than two years to rectify the conditions, and she failed to show tha t she rectified the other conditions. Therefore, termination was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( ii ).

MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) also provided a statutory basis for termina tion of respondent’s parental rights to all of her children. MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) pro vides that the trial court may terminate a respondent’s parental rights if the court determine s by clear and convincing evidence that “[t]he parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expect ation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.” There was clear and convincing evidence that respondent failed to provide proper care and cust ody for her children. As discussed above, respondent fai led to secure housing and a lega l source of income. Respondent failed to visit the children during scheduled visits. MAD was born with morphine, codeine, oxycodone, and hydrocodone in her system. Thus, respondent fai led to provide proper care and custody of the children. In addition, there was no indication that respondent would be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time consid ering the children’s ages since respondent had over two years to provide proper care and custod y, and she failed to do so. Furthermore, respondent’s parenting coach indicated that respon dent would be unable to care for all of her children at one time, which further indicates that s he could not provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time. Therefore, the trial court d id not err in finding by clear and convincing evidence that MCL 712A .19b(3)(g) provided a statutory basis for termination.

Finally, there was clear and c onvincing evidence that MCL 712A .19b(3)(j) applies in this case. MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) provides that the trial court may ter minate a respondent’s parental rights if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that “[t]here is a reasonable-5- likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s par ent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.” As discussed above, respondent failed to secure a legal source of income and adequate housing, which indicates that the children will be harmed if returned to her. Respondent also failed to provide proof th at she attended mental health services, and she failed to take her prescribed medication for depression. MAD was born with morphine, codeine, oxycodone, and hydrocodone in her system, an d there is no indication that respondent took steps to address an y substance abuse issue. Th erefore, there was a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of respondent, tha t the children would be harmed if returned to respondent’s home. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). For al l of the reasons discussed above, the trial court did not err in finding that there were s tatutory grounds to terminate respondent’s parental rights. Acc ordingly, the trial court did not violate respondent’s constitutional right t o parent her children. See In re Trejo , 462 Mich at 355.

III. BEST INTERESTS

“The trial court must order the parent’s rights terminated if the Department has established a statutory ground fo r termination by clear and con vincing evidence and it finds from a preponderance of the evidence on the whole record that termin ation is in the children’s best
interests.” In re White , 303 Mich App at 713. The trial court weighs all of the evide nce in the
case to determine whether termination is in the best interests of the children. Id . “To determine whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s best int erests, the court should consider a wide variety of factors that may include ‘the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finali ty, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.’ ” Id . (citation omitted). “The trial court may also consider a parent’s history of domestic violence, the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption.” Id . at 714.

The trial court did not err in making its best-interest determ ination. First, there was testimony presented at the termination hearing that respondent did not have a strong bond with her children. Parker opined that respondent was bonded with he r children, but the bond was more of a friendship than a parent-child relationship. DMJF ex pressed that he would be sad if respondent’s parental rights were terminated, but that he under stood. DF no longer wished to visit with respondent, and Parker did not believe that she was bonded with respondent. Although Parker opined that DAMD is bonded with respondent, she explaine d that he uses visiting time to play videogames on respondent’s cell phone. See In re White , 303 Mich App at 713. Second, respondent’s parenting ability ind icates that termination of he r parental rights was in the best interests of the children since her parenting coach stated that respondent would not be able to parent all of her children at once. See id

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Third, there was testimony that termination would provide the children with permanency, stability, and finality. Respondent failed to take the necessa ry steps to regain custody of her children in spite of the fact that she had over two years to do so. As discussed above, there was no indication that respondent woul d be able to regain custody o f her children within a reasonable
time. See In re White , 303 Mich App at 713. Thus, termination would provide the chi ldren with permanency, stability, and finality. See id

.-6- In addition, there was testimony that there were advantages of the placements over respondent’s home and that the c hildren were doing well in care . Parker testified that DDF no longer has anxiety and sleep problems now that she is living wi th her father, and her grades have improved. DMJF was also doing well in school while living with his father after a brief period in which he enrolled in online high school. AJD was also doing well in her placement, and she appeared to be bonded with her father. DF was doing well in he r placement with a fictive kin. Furthermore, respondent failed to comply with her service plan and did not have a strong visitation history with the children. Instead, respondent onlyvisited the children approximately one time per week out of two scheduled visitation periods per w eek. See In re White , 303 Mich App at 713-714.

Finally, there was testimony that the children in foster care were bonded with their foster families and that the foster families were willing to adopt. P arker opined that it was in DAMD’s best interests for respondent’s parental rights to be terminate d since DAMD is bonded with his foster parent, and the foster parent would adopt him if respond ent’s parental rights were
terminated. Parker also believed that it was in ZID’s best int erests to terminate respondent’s parental rights since the child i s bonded with his foster paren t, and the foster parent would adopt him. DF was doing well in her placement with a fictive kin, an d the fictive kin expressed that she would adopt DF. See In re White , 303 Mich App at 714.

Respondent argues in her brief on appeal that transferring cus tody to the fathers of the
children would allow the children to live in a safe and secure environment and allow respondent to continue to visit with the children. However, the failure t o terminate respondent’s parental rights could have harmed the stability, permanency, and emotion al well-being of the children for
the reasons discussed above. In addition, respondent overlooks the fact that the fathers of DF, DAMD, and ZID were either unknown or could not be found, and th e rights of the fathers of DF, DAMD, and ZID were also terminated. For the reasons stated abo ve, respondent’s argument
fails. See In re White , 303 Mich App at 713.

Affirmed.

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Donald S. Owens