In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ROD HUNT,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Wisconsin.

Nos. 0758 3:15CR00079-001 & 0758 3:17CR00046-001

William M. Conley, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED APRIL 24, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019

____________________

Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. While on supervised release for 

failing to register as a sex offender, Rod Hunt robbed a bank 

in Madison, Wisconsin. He pleaded guilty to bank robbery 

and brandishing a gun during a crime of violence. 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 2113(a), 924(c). The district judge revoked his term of supervised release and sentenced him to 172 months in prison 

followed by three years of supervised release for the new 
2 Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198

crimes. Hunt has appealed both the revocation (No. 18-1197) 

and the new sentence (No. 18-1198), and we have consolidated the appeals. His brief on appeal challenges only two 

conditions of his new term of supervised release. We affirm

on those points in No. 18-1198 because in the district court 

Hunt waived those two challenges. His brief says nothing 

about the revocation of his earlier term of supervised release, 

and at oral argument counsel told us that Hunt has no quarrel 

with the revocation itself. We therefore dismiss No. 18-1197. 

I. Background

Hunt’s supervised release began in 2016. He had pleaded 

guilty to failing to update his sex-offender registration. 

18 U.S.C. § 2250. His sentence was 30 days in prison and five

years of supervised release. As part of his supervised release, 

Hunt was prohibited from committing another federal crime.

The following year, Hunt was convicted of robbing a bank. 

During the robbery, he pointed a gun at people and threatened them verbally as well. He eventually pleaded guilty to 

the robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and to brandishing a firearm 

during a crime of violence, § 924(c). He told the judge that, 

because of his medical problems, the robbery had been an attempt to commit “suicide by cop.”

At sentencing, Hunt asked the judge to recall his age 

(which was 56) and to give him a chance to be released before 

he dies. The judge gave Hunt a prison sentence totaling 154 

months: 70 months for the robbery and 84 months for the 

§ 924(c) gun charge, to be served consecutively. The new 

prison sentence will be followed by concurrent three-year 

terms of supervised release. The district court also revoked 

Hunt’s supervised release (on the sex-offender registration
Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198 3

crime) because Hunt committed another federal offense while 

on supervision. On that revocation, the judge sentenced him 

to 18 months in prison (to be served consecutively to the sentence for his new crimes) with no additional supervised release.

The new three-year term of supervised release on the bank 

robbery and firearm convictions came with conditions. The 

two that Hunt challenges on appeal also were among the conditions of his original term of release that the judge revoked. 

Critical to our waiver finding, before sentencing, Hunt received in the presentence investigation report all the proposed conditions of supervision. Then, both before and at sentencing, Hunt did not object to any of the proposed conditions, including the two that he now challenges. When the 

judge noted on the record that Hunt had not objected to any 

proposed condition of supervised release, Hunt did not disagree. Consistent with this on-the-record acquiescence, when 

the judge asked Hunt whether he wanted the judge to read 

the conditions for the record or to justify the conditions individually, Hunt told the judge that he need not do so. Finally, 

Hunt told the judge at the end of the hearing that there were 

no other issues to address. 

The first challenged condition will prohibit Hunt from 

leaving “the judicial district in which defendant is being supervised without the permission of the Court or probation officer.” The other will require: “As directed by the probation 

officer, defendant shall notify third parties of risks that may 

be occasioned by defendant’s criminal record or personal history or characteristics. The probation officer may also take 

steps to confirm defendant’s compliance with this notification 

requirement or provide such notifications directly to third 
4 Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198

parties.” Hunt asks us to excuse his failure to object by finding 

that it was “plain error” to impose both conditions. The government responds that the first condition is error-free, and 

that on plain-error review this court should order the district 

court to clarify the condition requiring Hunt to “notify third 

parties of risks.” 

At oral argument, we expressed concern that Hunt seemed 

to have waived challenges to both conditions of supervised 

release. Counsel replied that Hunt’s failure to object to these 

conditions in the district court was a “miss” rather than an 

intentional waiver. Even if Hunt waived his challenges, counsel added, this case is similar to United States v. Adkins, 

743 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 2014), where we invalidated a condition 

of supervised release that was unconstitutionally vague despite the defendant’s written appeal waiver. 

II. Analysis

We begin by reviewing the difference between waived arguments and forfeited arguments. Waiver precludes appellate 

review. See United States v. Butler, 777 F.3d 382, 386–87 (7th 

Cir. 2015). Forfeited arguments may be reviewed for “plain 

error.” See United States v. Jenkins, 772 F.3d 1092, 1096 (7th Cir. 

2014).

Waiver occurs when a defendant intends (by words or actions) to relinquish a known right. See United States v. Waldrip, 

859 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Garcia, 580 

F.3d 528, 541–42 (7th Cir. 2009). In the supervised release context, a strategic choice provides strong evidence of waiver, but 

the key consideration is a knowing and intentional decision, 

whether motivated by strategy or not. See United States v. Flores, — F.3d —, —, 2019 WL 2847453, at *4 (7th Cir. July 3, 2019) 
Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198 5

(in supervised release case, “evidence of a strategic reason not 

to object in the district court is a sufficient, but not a necessary, 

ground on which to find waiver”). By contrast, a defendant 

only forfeits an argument when he fails to assert a right in a 

timely fashion because of accident or neglect. See United States 

v. Burns, 843 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2016).

In criminal cases, we ordinarily construe waiver principles 

liberally in favor of the defendant. See Butler, 777 F.3d at 387.

That is why, at times, we have interpreted a defendant’s silence in the face of objectionable conditions of supervised release as a forfeiture reviewable for plain error. See, e.g., United 

States v. Miller, 829 F.3d 519, 528–29 (7th Cir. 2016); United 

States v. Bickart, 825 F.3d 832, 839 (7th Cir. 2016). And that is 

also why, when a condition is so vague that it violates a defendant’s right to due process of law, as in Adkins, we have

been willing to overlook even a signed appellate waiver. See 

743 F.3d at 192–93. 

In Flores, we recently tried to clarify our approach to 

waiver and forfeiture in our recent wave of appeals challenging supervised release conditions for the first time on appeal.

We held:

We will find waiver, as we do here, when the 

defendant has notice of the proposed conditions, a meaningful opportunity to object, and 

she asserts (through counsel or directly) that she 

does not object to the proposed conditions, 

waives reading of those conditions and their 

justifications, challenges certain conditions but 

not the one(s) challenged on appeal, or otherwise evidences an intentional or strategic decision not to object.
6 Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198

— F.3d at —, 2019 WL 2847453, at *6. Our decision in Flores

took into account the fact that a defendant can always challenge a condition of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e)(2) at any time, unlike other terms of a sentence. Id. 

at —, *6. 

Those conditions of waiver are all satisfied here. And in 

addition to the advance notice and all of the opportunities 

Hunt had to raise these issues, Hunt was already subject to 

the same conditions that he now wishes to challenge. He 

knew that they could be imposed and how they were enforced. Hunt also wanted to focus the sentencing decision on 

his arguments based on his age and his request to have a 

chance to be released before he dies. It can make strategic 

sense to focus arguments on such an important issue and not 

to risk distracting or perhaps even antagonizing the judge by 

nitpicking supervised release conditions. By choosing to pursue one argument and forgoing others, Hunt waived those 

other possible challenges. See United States v. Kennedy, 726 

F.3d 968, 975 (7th Cir. 2013) (pursuit of one guideline objection amounted to waiver of other guideline issues), citing 

United States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2005).

In Flores, we also noted that we retain the discretion in 

compelling cases to overlook a party’s waiver of a challenge 

to a condition of supervised release, as with a wide range of 

other issues. — F.3d at —, 2019 WL 2847453 at *5, discussing 

Adkins, 743 F.3d at 193 (relieving defendant of appellate 

waiver where vague condition of supervised release would 

unconstitutionally burden First Amendment rights and “no 

reasonable person could know what conduct is or is not proscribed”); see also United States v. Campbell, 813 F.3d 1016, 

1019 (7th Cir. 2016) (distinguishing Adkins where defendant 
Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198 7

could have sought clarification in district court and challenged condition did not implicate First Amendment rights or 

“fundamental legitimacy of the judicial process”).

Even if we were to apply plain-error review to the conditions at issue here, we would not find plain error. We start 

with Hunt’s objections to the condition preventing him from 

leaving the “judicial district.” Hunt asserts that “judicial district” is vague, but that is not correct. Defendants can readily 

and “objectively verif[y]” the boundaries of judicial districts 

by, for example, consulting 28 U.S.C. § 130(b). United States 

v. Hudson, 908 F.3d 1083, 1085 & n.2, 1086 (7th Cir. 2018) (remanding with instructions that “judicial district” replace “jurisdiction” in written judgment). Moreover, Hunt argues that 

the lack of a scienter requirement renders the condition 

vague. But including a scienter requirement, while recommended, is not required, especially where, as here, the defendant does not say that he lives near a district’s boundary. 

See United States v. Givens, 875 F.3d 387, 390 (7th Cir. 2017); 

United States v. Poulin, 809 F.3d 924, 931 (7th Cir. 2016).

That leaves the condition requiring Hunt to notify “third 

parties” of “risks” “occasioned by [his] criminal record or personal history or characteristics.” We assume that the condition 

would benefit from further definition. See United States v. Canfield, 893 F.3d 491, 495 (7th Cir. 2018); Bickart, 825 F.3d at 841–

42. But Hunt has not established that any definitional problem, if uncorrected by us at this time, would jeopardize the 

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the criminal proceedings. See Miller, 829 F.3d at 530. Hunt retains the right to 

ask the district court to modify this condition under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e)(2), either before or during the term of supervised release. If he does so and is disappointed by the result, he may 
8 Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198

appeal to this court. In Flores, we did not abandon our responsibility to review conditions of supervised release. We instead 

restored the regular processes of appellate review to challenges to supervised release, which should be raised first in 

the district courts.

We AFFIRM the judgment in appeal No. 18-1198. We 

DISMISS appeal No. 18-1197.