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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 23-CV-0281

LOUISE E. GANT, APPELLANT,

V.

SIXTEENTH STREET HEIGHTS DEVELOPMENT, LLC, et al., APPELLEES.

Appeal from the Superior Court 

of the District of Columbia 

Civil Division

(2019-CA-002031-R(RP))

(Hon. John M. Campbell, Trial Judge)

(Submitted March 12, 2024 Decided June 6, 2024)

Radi Dennis was on the brief for appellant.

Anthony D. Dwyer was on the brief for appellee Council of Co-Owners of 

Condominium 4600 Connecticut Avenue.

Stephen O. Hessler was on the brief for appellee Sixteenth Street Heights 

Development, LLC.

Before MCLEESE and DEAHL, Associate Judges, and WASHINGTON, Senior 

Judge. 

WASHINGTON, Senior Judge: Appellant Louise Gant (“Appellant”) claims the 

trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for leave to amend and 

reinstate her claims and to add a third-party defendant, the law firm of Whiteford, 
2

Taylor & Preston LLP (“WTP”). Appellant further argues that the trial court abused 

its discretion in granting attorney fees to Appellee, the Condominium Association, 

for work associated with defending against claims in the underlying quiet-title 

action. We affirm. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal emanates from an April 2, 2014, action to quiet title brought by 

the purchaser of appellant’s condominium, the Sixteenth Street Heights 

Development, LLC (“SSHD”), after a valid foreclosure sale. The foreclosure 

resulted from Appellant’s failure to pay assessments on her condominium located at 

4600 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Unit 211, Washington, DC 20008. The foreclosure 

action resulted in a default judgment being entered against Appellant. See Gant v. 

4600 Conn. Ave. Condo., No. 14-CV-941, Judgment at 1-2 (D.C. Feb. 25, 2015).

On May 10, 2014, in response to a quiet-title action filed by SSHD, Appellant 

asserted numerous counterclaims against SSHD and cross-claims against the 

Council of Condominium Owners (“Council”). On June 4, 2014, the Council filed 

a motion to dismiss Appellant’s cross claims. The trial court dismissed Counts I, II, 

and VIII but held Appellant’s remaining claims in abeyance pending resolution of 

Appellant’s motion to vacate or set aside both the default judgment and the 

subsequent foreclosure order and sale in the separate action. The trial court in the 

foreclosure action denied the motion to vacate. 
3

Ms. Gant appealed the judgment in the foreclosure action and, on February 

25, 2015, this court affirmed the trial court’s decision. SSHD and the Council then 

moved for summary judgment in the quiet-title action on Appellant’s remaining 

cross claims and counterclaims. The trial court granted their motions for summary 

judgment on February 6, 2017,

1 noting that any claims related to the default 

judgment or the foreclosure sale could not survive summary judgment in the Action 

to Quiet Title.

In affirming the trial court’s order in the quiet title action, we concluded that

all of Ms. Gant’s cross-claims “could have and should have been raised in the 2011 

action,” and thus, any cross-claims in the quiet-title action were foreclosed by the 

doctrine of claim preclusion. Gant v. Sixteenth St. Heights Dev. LLC, Nos. 17-CV199, 17-CV-473, and 17-CV-715, Mem. Op. & J. at 5 (D.C. June 11, 2019). Despite 

the Court’s holding that res judicata applied to any challenge that Appellant might 

raise to the foreclosure action and sale of her condominium, Appellant filed a Motion 

to Reinstate and Add Claims Against Council and “To Add Whiteford, Taylor, & 

Preston” as a Third-Party Defendant while the case was on remand to address 

attorney fees. The motion asked the trial court to: (1) reinstate a cross claim for 

 1 The Court issued an amended order on February 7, 2017, making the 

“housekeeping correction suggested by counsel’s email,” noting that counts I, II, and 

VIII had already been dismissed, and confirming that summary judgment was being 

entered in favor of Council and against Ms. Gant on all remaining counts.
4

injurious falsehood/slander; and (2) permit Appellant to add claims of breach of 

fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, fraud, breach of good faith and fair dealing, and 

conversion against the Council and WTP. 

On December 20, 2022, the trial court denied Appellant’s motions. With 

regard to the cross claim alleging injurious falsehood/slander of title or Count XV,

Judge Campbell found no legal basis to reinstate. Additionally, Judge Campbell 

found that Appellant’s assertion was “wrong on the facts” because the email that 

Appellant referenced as allegedly misleading the court was actually an accurate 

reminder about the court’s prior dismissal of Count VIII, which alleged a failure to 

make an accounting. 

As for Appellant’s motion to add claims from a proposed “Second Amended 

Answer, Cross- and Third-Party Claims,” Judge Campbell denied the motion after 

finding that it was untimely under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 15 since that rule only permits 

the amendment of existing complaints. 

Finally, the trial court granted the Council’s Amended Motion for the Award 

of Legal Fees and Costs. After reviewing the detailed work logs submitted by WTP 

and a memorandum submitted by the Council, the trial court found that the requested

fees—incurred in response to the quiet-title action only—fully complied with our
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remand order. Finally, the trial court found the amount reasonable “especially 

considering [Appellant’s] demonstrated litigiousness throughout this controversy.” 

This appeal followed. 

III. Analysis

Our court has already weighed in on this controversy twice. Those prior 

decisions provide substantial support for the trial court’s judgment in this case that 

Appellant’s claims are without merit. Appellant alleges three main errors on appeal: 

(1) that it was an abuse of discretion to deny the reinstatement of Appellant’s claims, 

(2) the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion for leave to add claims and a 

third-party defendant, and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in granting 

Council’s amended motion for attorneys’ fees.2

As to the first claim, that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 

reinstatement of some of appellant’s prior claims, we reiterate our prior ruling where 

 2 We recognize this is not exactly the framing presented to the trial court (see 

above). However, we address Appellant’s claims through the broad framing 

presented on appeal because they include the more narrow claims presented to the 

trial court. In her appeal, Appellant requests that we consider (1) whether the trial 

court abused its discretion in denying her motion for leave to amend and reinstate 

her claims and add a third-party defendant, (2) whether res judicata applies to her 

claims, (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees, 

and (4) whether equal protection of the laws, equity in their administration, and 

manifest injustice require revisiting our decisions in 2015 and 2019. AT Br. 1.
6

we held that any claim relating to the foreclosure action is barred by the doctrine of 

claim preclusion or res judicata. See Sixteenth St. Heights, Mem. Op. & J. at 5.

While we appreciate that Appellant feels aggrieved by the manner in which her 

original foreclosure case was handled, Appellant has failed to provide us with any 

legal support for her contention that the doctrine of claim preclusion does not bar 

her claims in this case, and we know of none. Thus, we discern no legal basis on 

which to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s 

motion to reinstate her prior claims after a final judgment was rendered and affirmed 

on appeal.

Similarly, we are satisfied that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Appellant’s motion for leave to amend her complaint to add new claims and 

parties. While Super. Ct. Civ. R. 15 permits amendments of existing complaints, 

Appellant’s motion was denied because she failed to first seek to reopen the 

judgment in the foreclosure or quiet-title actions pursuant to Rule 59(e) or 60(b). 

Because of that failure, there was no existing complaint to amend and Appellant’s 

motion was therefore moot. See Ciralsky v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 355 F.3d 661, 673 

(D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[A] court cannot permit an amendment [of a complaint in a case 

that has been tried to judgment] unless the plaintiff ‘first satisf[ies] Rule 59(e)’s 

more stringent standard’ for setting aside that judgment”); see also Outterbridge v. 

Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 292 F. Supp. 3d 330, 333 (D.D.C. 2018) (explaining that 
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when considering whether to grant leave to amend a pleading after judgment has 

been entered under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2)’s liberal standard, a 

court must first reopen the judgment pursuant to the more stringent Rule 59(e) or 

60(b) standard for setting aside the judgment). Because Rule 15 does not permit the 

amendment of a complaint after final judgment without first setting aside the 

judgment under the more stringent standard of Rules 59(e) or 60(b), the trial court 

did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to amend.

Finally, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in 

awarding the Council attorney fees because WTP is requesting fees not permitted by 

this Court’s remand order and because the remand order instructed Council to 

subtract and not add fees. Reply 6, 20.3 We disagree. First, this Court remanded 

this case to deny fees for all work done in connection with the foreclosure action.4

Appellant does not challenge the trial court’s compliance with that remand order 

regarding whether the requested fees were incurred in connection with the 

 3 Appellant also appears to again argue that the fee award is improper because 

it does not take into consideration her claim that no one has filed an accounting while 

holding an alleged surplus and thus, ignores her contention that the Council is 

somehow being unjustly enriched. AT Br. 36-7; AT Reply 20. This argument was 

pressed in our prior MOJ and rejected. 

4 “We . . . remand for the trial court to deny fees for all work done in 

connection with the foreclosure action (2011 CA 8023), including the motion to 

vacate and the appeal.” Sixteenth St. Heights, Mem. Op. & J. at 6.
8

appropriate action. Instead, she contends that the fees were not permitted because 

Appellees have “unclean hands” and because some of the fees are new. Reply 20. 

To the extent that Appellant is claiming that the new attorney fee award is 

unreasonable, our review is limited, because such awards are “firmly committed to 

the informed discretion of the trial court.” Watkins v. District of Columbia, 944 A.2d 

1077, 1084 (D.C. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

5 Absent any claims to 

us that a specific charge was unreasonable, we defer to the lower court in finding 

that the ledgers were “more than adequate to support the request.”6 While the amount 

granted ($39,072.33) may seem excessive given the original fee petition, as noted 

by the lower court, this was a direct consequence of Appellant’s litigiousness, rather 

than proof of the fees being unreasonable. We therefore see no basis for reversal. 

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is

Affirmed.

 5 See In re Smith, 305 A.3d 826, 841 (D.C. 2023) (“[I]t requires a very strong 

showing of abuse of discretion to set aside the decision of the trial court . . . to 

prevent squabbles over attorneys’ fees from blossoming into a second major 

litigation.” (internal citations omitted)).

6 We also note that this court found the previous fee motion for a comparable 

amount ($39,554.52) adequately supported via affidavit and an itemized, detailed 

bill.