alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Craig Lydell LEE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D10-0173.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Feb. 7, 2011.

Gerard M. Virga, Panama City, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Charlie McCoy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

WOLF, J.

Appellant challenges the trial court’s dismissal of his motion for postconvietion DNA testing which he filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853 and section 925.11, Florida Statutes. Appellant raises several issues but we address only one: whether the trial court erred in finding appellant was precluded from seeking postconvietion DNA testing because he was resentenced after violating probation. We find the trial court erred and reverse and remand for consideration of the motion on the merits.

In its order denying appellant’s motion for postconvietion DNA testing, the court noted on August 22, 2005, appellant entered a no contest plea to one count of lewd and lascivious battery and was sentenced to 15 years’ probation. On October 18, 2005, the court found appellant violated the terms of his probation, but his sentence was reinstated. On January 24, 2006, the court again found appellant violated probation and his probation was revoked and he was sentenced to 15 years in prison.

In denying his motion for postconvietion DNA testing, the trial court found appellant was precluded from challenging the evidence relevant to the lewd and lascivious battery charge because appellant’s current sentence was entered as a result of his violation of probation. The court reasoned this challenge would have the effect of “undermining the finality of a VOP judgment and sentence.”

However, “[a] ‘violation of probation is not itself an independent offense punishable at law in Florida.’ ” *Cozza v. State,*756 So.2d 272, 273 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (quoting *Lambert v. State,*545 So.2d 838, 841 (Fla.1989)). “Instead, once the court revokes probation or community control, the court resentences the offender on the original charge, and may ‘impose any sen*574tence which it *might have*originally imposed before placing the probationer or offender on probation or into community control.’ ” *Cozza,*756 So.2d at 273 (quoting § 948.06(1), Fla. Stat. (1995), now codified at § 948.06(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2009)).

When appellant’s probation was revoked, he was sentenced for lewd and lascivious battery, not violation of probation. Therefore, the fact appellant’s sentence for lewd and lascivious battery was entered after violation of probation does not preclude him from seeking postconviction DNA testing of physical evidence relevant to the lewd and lascivious battery charge. Thus, we reverse and remand for the trial court to consider appellant’s motion on the merits.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

KAHN and WEBSTER, JJ„ concur.
Department of the United States Air Force LogoBiography
                  United States Air ForceBG Robert Ignico
            BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT VICTOR IGNICORobert Victor Ignico was born in Boston, Mass., in 1895. He attended Washington and Lee University for three years, and in May 1917, enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps, with which he served until September 1917. A month later he enlisted in the Aviation Section of the Signal Reserve. In January 1918, he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps Reserve. He received his regular commission as a second lieutenant of Air Service July 1, 1920, and was promoted immediately to first lieutenant.
After serving with the American Expeditionary Forces in Europe, General Ignico entered the Airship School at Langley Field, Va. Upon graduation in 1921, he became chief of supply of the Field Service Section at Patterson Field, Ohio. He graduated from the Air Service Advanced Flying School in 1923 and was assigned to the Philippine Islands.
In 1924 General Ignite was appointed supply officer for the Second Wing at Langley Field and in 1929 became assistant executive officer there. In June 1932, he graduated from the Army Industrial College and was named supply officer for the San Antonio, Texas depot. In October 1936 he entered the Air Corps Tactical School, and upon graduation in June 1937, became supply and maintenance officer at Mitchel Field, N.Y.
General Ignico was assigned to Borinquen Field, Puerto Rico in February l940, as materiel officer and chief of staff of the 15th Composite Wing. He assumed command of the 13th Composite Wing at Borinquen Field in May 1941. The following October he was assigned to the Air Service Command at Wright Field, Ohio, and in February 1942, became chief of staff of the command.
In July 1942, General Ignico assumed command of the 11th Air Force Service Command operating in the Aleutians, and during the same period was deputy commander of the 11th Air Force. In August 1944, he became commander of the Spokane Wash., Air Service Command. In December 1945, he assumed command of the Warner Robins Air Materiel Area at Warner Robins Air Force Base, Ga.
General Ignico became a patient at the station hospital at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio on April 23, 1952.
General Ignico has been awarded the Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster, Air Medal, and Army Commendation Ribbon. He is rated a balloon pilot, combat observer, balloon observer and aircraft observer.
(Up to date as of April 28, 1952)Department of the Air Force Logo
CC Filed by Filing Services Canada Inc. 403-717-3898


Exhibit 10.70




LETTER AGREEMENT




September 15, 2008




BY AND BETWEEN




HARVEY SMITH




AND




VALOR ENERGY CORP







This agreement made by and between Harvey Smith, a Canadian citizen residing in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada (“Smith”), and VALOR ENERGY CORP, a Nevada corporation (“Valor”).




The parties hereby agree to the following; 




(a)

Valor will forward a check by mail, in the amount of $13,000 dollars (the “final payment”) within 24 hours of receiving an original signed by Smith and a Notary Public registered in the province of British Columbia.

(b)

Upon Smith cashing the check, he agrees that this “final payment” represents the full settlement of all amounts owed to him, in either cash or stock.

(c)

This agreement signed by Smith will thereby constitute a complete release and relinquishment of any and all claims to Valor cash and/or assets including common and preferred stock.




IN WITNESS WHEREOF, THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE EFFECTIVE AS OF September 15, 2008.













 \s\Harvey Smith                    

\S\Sheridan Westgarde___

Harvey Smith

Sheridan Westgarde, CEO







Notary




Signature__(notary signature)__       Seal _(seal)______

Endnotes

HARVEY SMITH




VALOR ENEGY CORP









Letter Agreement Harvey Smith September 15, 2008
IIB 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1470 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 24, 2007 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 

AN ACT 

To amend the Department of Veterans Affairs Health Care 

Programs Enhancement Act of 2001 to require the provision of chiropractic care and services to veterans at all 

Department of Veterans Affairs medical centers. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


ccoleman on PRODPC75 with BILLS
2 

HR 1470 RFS

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Chiropractic Care 

3 Available to All Veterans Act’’. 

4 SEC. 2. PROGRAM FOR PROVISION OF CHIROPRACTIC 

5 CARE AND SERVICES TO VETERANS. 

6 Section 204(c) of the Department of Veterans Affairs 

7 Health Care Programs Enhancement Act of 2001 (38 

8 U.S.C. 1710 note) is amended— 

9 (1) by inserting ‘‘(1)’’ before ‘‘The program’’; 

10 and 

11 (2) by adding at the end the following new 

12 paragraph: 

13 ‘‘(2) The program shall be carried out at not fewer 

14 than 75 medical centers by not later than December 31, 

15 2009, and at all medical centers by not later than Decem16 ber 31, 2011.’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives May 23, 2007. 

Attest: LORRAINE C. MILLER, 

Clerk. 


ccoleman on PRODPC75 with BILLS
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Cody BOURG.

No. 2011-KD-2685.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 6, 2011.

In re Bourg, Cody; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 10-FELY-586808; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 11 KW 2250.

Writ denied; stay denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.
#### Juan JENKINS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D11-3918.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Aug. 31, 2011.

Juan Jenkins, pro se, Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

DENIED. *See Lambrix v. State,*698 So.2d 247 (Fla.1996); *see also*Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(b)(2)(C).

BENTON, C.J., LEWIS and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 99.2

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with the Annual Report of Globus International Resources Corp.(the
Company)on Form 10KSB for the period ended September 30, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof of February 13, 2004, I,
Herman Roth, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify pursuant to
18 U.S.C. ss.1350 as adopted pursuant to ss.906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

(1) the report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and

(2) the information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

/s/ HERMAN ROTH
-----------------------------
Herman Roth
Chief Financial Officer
February 13, 2004
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-20947

Summary Calendar

DONNIE D. SMITH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

BAKER GLASS COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Southern District of Texas

(CA H 96-565)

July 1, 1997

Before JONES, DeMOSS and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Donnie D. Smith (“Smith”) appeals the district court’s order

granting summary judgment to the appellee, contending that the

district court erred in granting summary judgment on his claim

under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C.

§ 621 et al. After having reviewed the parties’ arguments and the
2

record, we conclude that the district court committed no reversible

error. Smith did not present, as required under the familiar

burden-shifting framework outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973),

Atkinson v. Denton Publishing Co., 84 F.3d 144, 148 (5th Cir.

1996), evidence that would support a reasonable inference that the

appellee-employer’s proffered reasons for Smith’s discharge were

pretext or that age actually motivated the discharge. See Hall v.

Gillman Inc., 81 F.3d 35, 36 (5th Cir. 1996); Rhodes v. Guiberson

Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1996). The correctness of

the decision resulting in the adverse employment action is not

relevant to the demonstration of a discriminatory motive, Jeffries

v. Harris County Community Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1036 (5th

Cir. 1980); Pesterfield v. Tenn. Valley Authority, 941 F.2d 437,

443 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing cases), and Smith failed to demonstrate

that age discrimination, rather than the employer-appellee’s belief

that Smith had violated company policy, was the basis of his

discharge.
#### Atchison, T. & S. F. R’y Co. v. D. B. Adams.

(No. 3167.)

Appeal from Tarrant County.

J. W. Terry, counsel for appellant.

No counsel appeared for appellee.

Opinion by

Willson, J.

§ 12. *Plea to jurisdiction; when not too late.*Appellee sued appellant in the county court of Tarrant county, and had citation served upon one Mullane as agent of appellant. Judgment by default was rendered against *34appellant at the January term, 1889, of said court. Appellant moved at the same term to have said judgment by default set aside, showing in support of said motion that said Mullane was not its agent. This motion was sustained, and no further action was taken in the cause at that term of said court. At the ensuing March term of said court, appellant filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the court, alleging, in substance, that plaintiff’s cause of action, if any he had, did -not arise in Tarrant county; that appellant did not operate its line of railway in said county; that it had an agent in El Paso, Texas, etc. This plea was in due form and properly verified. Upon motion of appellee, said plea was stricken out because it came too late and after the court had obtained jurisdiction over appellant by its appearance at the preceding term of the court. We think the court erred in striking out said plea. Appellant’s appearance at the preceding term of the court was for the purpose only of moving to set aside the judgment by default, for the reason that said judgment had been rendered without service upon it of citation. This motion having been sustained, appellant was not required to answer further until the next term of said court, at which term it did answer, and inteijposed promptly its said plea to the jurisdiction of the court.■ Its plea to the jurisdiction was filed at the appearance term of the court, and was filed in due order of pleading, and should have been entertained. [Sayles’ Civil St., art. 1243; Railway Co. v. Gage, 63 Tex. 573.]

October 26, 1889.

Reversed and remanded.
**EXHIBIT31.1**

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TOSECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

I, Gordon McGilton,certify that:

1.                 I have reviewedthis amended annual report of Force Protection, Inc.;

2.                 Based on myknowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.                 Based on my knowledge,the financial statements, and other financial information included in thisreport, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, theperiods presented in this report;

4.                 The registrant’sother certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a)          Designed such disclosurecontrols and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures tobe designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relatingto the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to usby others within those entities, particularly during the period in which thisreport is being prepared;

(b)         Evaluated theeffectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and

(c)          Disclosed in this reportany change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting thatoccurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’sfourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting; and

5.                 The registrant’sother certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’sauditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors:

(a)          All significant deficienciesand material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control overfinancial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect theregistrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and

(b)         Anyfraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.
| Date: June 11, 2007 |
|---------------------|
| By:                 | /s/ GORDON MCGILTON |   |
|                | Gordon McGilton |
|                | *Chief Executive Officer* |

 

----
___________ No. 95-1861

___________ Bill Herron, * * Appellant, * * v. * * Macarthur Woodruff; Bill * Armontrout; Donald Cline; Henry * Jackson; Dale Riley; Dick Moore; * George Lombardi; Bobby Whiteside;* William L. Webster; John * Ashcroft; Cavanaugh, Sgt., C.O. * I; Arthur W. Dearixon, * * Appeal from the United States Appellees. * District Court for the * Western District of Missouri.

-------------------- * * [UNPUBLISHED] Bill Herron, * * Appellant, * * v. * * Bill Armontrout; Donald Cline; * Henry Jackson; Macarthur * Woodruff; Dick Moore; George * Lombardi; Dale Riley; Bobby * Whiteside; William Webster; * John Ashcroft; COI Cavanaugh; * Arthur W. Dearixon, * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: April 19, 1996 Filed: May 2, 1996

___________ Before BEAM, LOKEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________

### The Honorable Scott O. Wright, United States District Judge 1 

### for the Western District of Missouri.
-2- PER CURIAM.

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Mis souri inmate Bill Herron appeals the d istrict court's rulings on his motions for relief from certai n 1 judgments, and his motion to disqualify the district court judge. W e affirm.

We do not believe the district court judge abused his discretion in declining to recuse himself on grounds that he d isplayed hostility towards Herron and entered rulings adverse to Herron. S ee A.J. v. Kierst , 56 F.3d 849, 861-62 (8th Cir. 1995). We further conclude that the district court properly denied Herro n's motions for relief from the July 1989 and August 1991 judgments dismis sing his wrongful-transfer, retaliation, failure-toinvestigate, and medi cal-needs claims. We note that the grounds asserted in these motions were merely a restatement of those asserted in an April 1992 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion, which the district cour t denied. See Latham v. Wells Fargo Bank , 987 F.2d 1199, 1204 (5th Cir

. 1993) (per curiam) (absent truly extraordinary circumstances, basis fo r second Rule 60(b) motion must be something other than that offered in firs t such motion). Although Herron complains that th e district court failed to docket and consider a Rule 60(b) motion tendered in June 1990, we note tha t this motion also advanced the same unsuccessful grounds for relief from th e July 1989 judgment as Herron raised in the April 1992 motion.

Appellees note Herron has repeatedly --and unsuccessfully--challenged his December 10, 1986 transfer to a more restrictive level o f administrative segregation, and move this court to impose sanctions agains t him pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Proced ure 38. Based on Herron's repeated attempts to relitigate an

### -3-

issue tha t has already been decided against him, we agree his appeal i s frivolo us. Thus, we grant appellees' motion for sanctions and asses s $3,190 against Herron , representing attorney's fees and double costs. We also e njoin Herron from filing any further pleadings concerning hi s December 10, 1986 transfer.
Accordingly, we affirm and impose the sanctions detailed above.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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#### Earnest Lee MILLS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D09-2489.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

April 21, 2011.

Joseph C. Bodiford, of Bodiford Law, PA.., Tampa, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kristen L. Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. *See Ray v. State,*755 So.2d 604 (Fla.2000) (where defendant charged with felony murder was willing participant in underlying felony and murder resulted from forces that co-felons set in motion, independent act instruction was *1070not appropriate); *see also Roberts v. State,*4 So.3d 1261 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009).

GRIFFIN, EVANDER, and JACOBUS, JJ., concur.
#### Thomas W. MARTIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D11-2879.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Oct. 12, 2011.

Matt Shirk, Public Defender, and Richard B. Gordon, Assistant Public Defender, Jacksonville, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

*931PER CURIAM.

Upon consideration of the appellant’s response to the Court’s order of August 17, 2011, the Court has determined that the notice of appeal failed to invoke its jurisdiction in a timely manner. The corrected judgment and sentence was rendered on April 14, 2011. The notice of appeal was filed more than BO days later on May 20, 2011. The lower tribunal’s April 26, 2011, amended order is a republication of the February 14, 2011, Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part the Defendant’s Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, and therefore, failed to restart the time within which to seek appellate review. *See St. Moritz Hotel v. Daughtry,*249 So.2d 27 (Fla.1971); *Churchville v. Ocean Grove R.V. Sales, Inc.,*876 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); *Maxfly Aviation Inc. v. Capital Airlines Ltd.,*843 So.2d 973 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed as untimely. The dismissal is without prejudice to the appellant’s right to seek a belated appeal pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(c).

DISMISSED.

DAVIS, VAN NORTWICK, and CLARK, JJ., concur.