J-S08038-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: A.M.H., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: M.H., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1450 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Decree Entered October 11, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 2021-6749

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED: MARCH 10, 2022

M.H. (Father) appeals from the decree entered in the Lycoming County 

Orphans’ Court involuntarily terminating his parental rights to his son, A.M.H. 

(Child) born in January of 2018. Because we discern no error or abuse of 

discretion in the orphans’ court ruling, we affirm.

The orphans’ court provided the following findings of fact in its opinion 

accompanying the order terminating Father’s parental rights:

1. [Child] was born [in] January [of] 2018[, and] currently resides 

with . . . Mother . . . and Mother’s Husband, [C.G. (Husband) in] 

Jersey Shore, Pennsylvania. Mother and Husband have been 

married since September 4, 2021.

2. [ ]Child’s biological Father is [Father]. Father resides [in] 

Millville, Pennsylvania.

3. At the time of [ ] Child’s birth, Mother and Father were 

unmarried, but in a relationship.

4. When Mother returned to work after giving birth, Father stayed 

at home with [ ] Child.
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5. Mother and Father began having issues in their relationship 

when [ ] Child was approximately 6 months old. The last time 

Mother and Father lived together was in July of 2019.

6. Father attended the Child’s doctor appointments until he was a 

year [and a half] old.

7. Mother and Husband started dating in September 2019, and 

began residing together in November of 2019.

8. When Mother and Father separated, Father did not have 

transportation[, or a driver’s license,] and would see the Child 

when Mother would pick him up or when his cousin would take 

him to Mother’s house.

9. Father had the Child for one overnight after the parties 

separated in 2019.

10. When Mother and Father first separated, they agreed that 

Father would pay Mother $150 per month to help with day care 

expenses. Father testified that he stopped making this payment 

after a few months because Mother stopped allowing him to see [ 

] Child.

11. Father saw [ ] Child around Easter of 2020. Father’s cousin 

made the arrangements with Mother for the visit.

12. Father brought [ ] Child gifts for Easter but had minimal other 

interactions with the Child during the visit.

13. Father next saw [ ] Child in November of 2020, when Mother 

visited Father’s cousin and Father was living there. Father did not 

request this visit, and Mother testified that he was more interested 

in his phone than interacting with [ ] Child.

14. November 2020 was the last in-person contact Father had with 

[ ] Child.

15. On February 2, 2021, Father sent Mother $150, which Mother 

said would go towards [ ] Child’s insurance. 

16. Father testified that he made payments of $150 in January, 

February, and March of 2021.

17. In May of 2021, Mother attempted to notify Father about [ ]

Child’s potential exposure to Covid. Mother testified that Father 

and his girlfriend reported her to the police and accused her of 

harassment. Mother further testified that upon the advice of the 
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police, she blocked Father from her social media at that time, but 

that she did not block him from calling or texting her.

18. On May 27, 2021, Mother filed the Petition for Involuntary 

Termination of Parental Rights and Petition for Adoption.

19. Also on May 27, 2021, Mother filed a Complaint for Custody 

and Petition for Special Relief at Lycoming County docket #21-

20467.

20. A custody conference was held on June 16, 2021. Mother 

attended and was represented by Sharon McLaughlin, Esquire. 

Father attended and was represented by John Gummo, Esquire.

21. Following the conference, a custody Order was entered on 

June 16, 2021, which granted Mother sole legal and physical 

custody. A pre-trial conference was scheduled for August 5, 2021, 

and subsequently continued until September 8, 2021.

22. However, on July 19, 2021, counsel for Mother and Father filed 

a Joint Stipulation to Stay Proceedings, and the pre-trial 

conference was canceled pending the outcome of the hearing on 

the Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights.

23. Mother and Father had multiple previous conversations about 

the possibility of Mother’s Husband adopting [ ] Child, with the 

last one occurring in August of 2020.

24. On August 5, 2021, Father texted Mother to ask about [ ] 

Child. Mother responded that Father had the wrong number, 

despite the fact that the number Father texted was still her phone 

number.

25. [ ] Child has not asked about Father since their last contact in 

November of 2020.

26. Father has not provided [ ] Child with gifts or cards for 

Christmas or his birthday since [ ] Mother and Father separated.

27. The Child refers to Mother’s Husband as “Daddy.” They have 

a very close relationship.

28. The Child refers to Father [by his first name]. Father testified 

that he corrected [ ] Child one time. Mother testified that Father 

refers to Mother's Husband as “Daddy” when speaking to the Child 

about him.
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29. Mother’s Husband desires to proceed with adopting the Child 

if the Petition for Involuntary Termination of Father’s Parental 

Rights is granted.

Orphans’ Ct. Op. and Order, 10/11/21, at 2-5 (record citation omitted). 

As noted above, Child has lived with Mother since she and Father 

separated in July of 2019. Mother began living with her now Husband in 

November of 2019, and they later married in September of 2021. Thus, Child 

has lived with Mother and Husband since November of 2019, when he was 23 

months old. 

On May 27, 2021, Mother filed both a petition seeking to involuntarily 

terminate Father’s parental rights and a complaint for custody. 

Concomitantly, Husband filed a petition seeking to adopt Child. As the 

orphans’ court explained, Mother was awarded sole legal and physical custody 

of Child at a conference held on June 16, 2021.1 Although a pre-trial 

conference was scheduled for September 2021, on July 19, 2021, counsel for 

both parties filed a joint stipulation to stay the custody proceedings pending 

the outcome of the termination proceedings. The orphans’ court conducted 

the termination hearing on October 5, 2021, at which time Mother, Husband 

and Father testified. Thereafter, on October 11, 2021, the court entered an 

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1 The record of the custody matter is not included in the certified record on 

appeal.
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opinion and decree involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant 

to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) and (b). This timely appeal follows.2 

Father presents one issue on appeal:

Whether the [orphans’] court erred in terminating the parental 

rights of [Father] pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) when, in 

the six months preceding the filing of the petition, [Father] offered 

support within his limited means and has not shown an intent to 

lose his place in [Child’s] life[?]

Father’s Brief at 6.

Our review in termination cases is well-settled:

Appellate review in cases involving involuntary termination of 

parental rights is limited to determining whether the trial court’s 

determination is supported by competent evidence. When 

applying this standard of review, an appellate court must accept 

the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court 

if they are supported by evidence of record. Where the trial 

court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an 

appellate court may not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it 

has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion. An abuse of 

discretion is found where there is a demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will. It matters 

not that an appellate court might have reached a different 

conclusion, as it is well-established that absent an abuse of 

discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for 

the trial court’s decision, the decree must stand.

In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 2021) (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has emphasized that

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2 Father properly filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of 

on appeal with his notice of appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) (requiring a 

concise statement be filed with notice of appeal in children’s fast track 

appeals).
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“in termination cases involving close calls, deference to the trial court’s

determination is particularly crucial.” Id. at 597. Further,

even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often 

the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court 

must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose 

its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must 

defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are 

supported by the record and the court’s legal conclusions are not 

the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion.

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–27 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explicitly acknowledged the 

“significant gravity of a termination of parental rights, which has far-reaching 

and intentionally irreversible consequences for the parents and the child.” In 

re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021). Thus, with this in mind, 

the burden of proof is upon the party seeking termination to 

establish by clear and convincing evidence the existence of the 

statutory grounds for doing so. [C]lear and convincing evidence 

is defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and 

convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in 

issue. Because of this serious impact attending the termination 

of parental rights, it is important that a judicial decree 

extinguishing such rights be based solely on competent evidence. 

Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Section 2511 of the Adoption Code3 sets forth the proper grounds for

the involuntary termination of parental rights. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1)-

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3 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938.
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(11). Here, the orphans’ court found there was clear and convincing evidence

to terminate Father’s parental rights under subsection (a)(1):

The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six 

months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has 

evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a 

child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1). In determining whether grounds for termination 

exist under subsection 2511(a)(1), we must bear in mind:

Although the six month period immediately preceding the filing of 

the petition is most critical to the analysis, the court must consider 

the whole history of the case and not mechanically apply the sixmonth statutory provision. The trial court must examine the 

individual circumstances of each case and consider all of the 

explanations of the parent to decide if the evidence, under the 

totality of the circumstances, requires involuntary termination.

In re S.S.W., 125 A.3d 413, 416 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). 

With regard to the determination of whether a parent has failed to 

perform parental duties, the Supreme Court has explained:

“Parental duties” are not defined in the Adoption Act, but our 

courts long have interpreted parental duties “in relation to the 

needs of a child[,]” such as “love, protection, guidance and 

support.” Parental duties are carried out through 

affirmative actions that develop and maintain the parentchild relationship. The roster of such positive actions 

undoubtedly includes communication and association. The 

performance of parental duties “requires that a parent exert 

himself to take and maintain a place of importance in the child’s 

life.” Fortitude is required, as a parent must act with “reasonable 

firmness” to overcome obstacles that stand in the way of 

preserving a parent-child relationship and may not wait for a more 

suitable time to perform parental responsibilities. . . . 

L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 592 (emphases added). “This affirmative duty 

encompasses more than a financial obligation; it requires continuing interest 
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in the child and a genuine effort to maintain communication and association 

with the child.” In re Adoption of N.N.H., 197 A.3d 777, 784 (Pa. Super. 

2018) (citation omitted). Further, a court may not predicate “a finding of 

abandonment . . . upon parental conduct which is reasonably explained or 

which resulted from circumstances beyond the parent’s control[; rather, i]t 

may only result when a parent has failed to utilize all available resources to 

preserve the parental relationship.” L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 592 (citation 

omitted).

If the evidence establishes that a parent failed to perform parental 

duties or demonstrated a settled purpose to relinquishing parental rights 

under subsection 2511(a)(1), 

the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s

explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment 

contact between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the 

effect of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant 

to Section 2511(b).

In re J.R.E., 218 A.3d 920, 925 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). 

Pursuant to Section 2511(b), the trial court must 

give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent 

shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental 

factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing 

and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), . 

. . the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy 

the conditions described therein which are first initiated 

subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).
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The subsection 2511(b) analysis — which is required only if the court 

determines there are grounds for termination under subsection 2511(a) —

includes consideration of “the emotional bond, if any, between parent and 

child[.]” In re G.M.S., 193 A.3d 395, 401 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation 

omitted). Moreover: 

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally 

emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider 

the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability[.] 

Additionally, . . . the trial court should consider the importance of 

continuity of relationships and whether any existing parent-child 

bond can be severed without detrimental effects on the child.

Id. (citation omitted).

With this background in mind, we turn to Father’s argument on appeal. 

Father contends the orphans’ court erred in involuntarily terminating his 

parental rights to Child when he “offered support within his limited means and 

has not shown an intent to lose his place in [Child’s] life.” Father’s Brief at 

12. He maintains he has “made reasonable efforts to overcome obstacles” to 

preserve their relationship, and that Mother’s evidence consisted of a “mere 

showing that he could have or should have done more.” Id. at 13. However, 

Father insists that “is not enough to terminate [his] parental rights.” Id.

Father emphasizes that he has “limited means” — he does not work, he 

receives Social Security, and he has struggled “to find a long-term residence.” 

Id. at 12-13. He acknowledges that he stopped sending Mother money for 

Child when “he believed [Child] was being kept from him,” but that he 

resumed doing so within the requisite six-month period prior to the filing of 
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the petition. Id. at 13. Father contends that the testimony at the termination 

hearing established that although he believed Child should “remain in Mother’s 

care, [he] never had the purpose or intent to sever his ties” with Child, and 

that his “decision not to ask [Child] to call him ‘Dad’” did not evidence his 

disinterest in their relationship. Id. at 14. Indeed, he insists that his “initial 

receptiveness” to Mother’s discussions regarding termination and custody 

“was because he did not think that he would be losing his parental rights.” 

Id. Thus, Father requests that we vacate the trial court’s order and remand 

for further proceedings.

Upon our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the relevant 

statutory and case law, we detect no error or abuse of discretion in the 

orphans’ court ruling. In concluding termination of Father’s parental rights 

was warranted under Subsection 2511(a)(1), the orphans’ court opined:

Father has evidenced both a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to [ ] Child and has failed to perform his parental 

duties in excess of six (6) months. Father’s last in-person contact 

with [ ] Child was approximately 10 months ago, and that contact 

was neither requested nor arranged by Father.

A parent has an affirmative duty [to] maintain a place of 

importance in a child’s life and Father has clearly not met this 

affirmative duty. Although Father stayed home with [ ] Child when 

Mother returned to work after his birth, Father has shown — at 

most — a passive interest in [ ] Child for most of the Child’s life. 

This Court is cognizant of the fact that Father has limited financial 

means, and transportation is an issue for him. However, Father 

saw [ ] Child only two times in 2020, and neither visit was initiated 

by him. Father’s one and only overnight with [ ] Child occurred in 

2019. Despite testifying that he made attempts to see [ ] Child 

and was denied by Mother, Father never filed a Complaint for 

Custody to establish or enforce his custodial rights. Father was 
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content to depend on Mother and/or his cousin to make

arrangements for him to see [ ] Child. Other than an occasional 

monetary contribution, Father has failed to perform any basic

parental duties for [ ] Child such as feeding, bathing, and 

providing a safe and secure residence since the parties separated.

During this time, Father was content to have someone else be 

responsible for attending the child’s medical appointments, 

tucking him into bed each night, and comforting him when he was 

scared or hurt.

Orphans’ Ct. Op. at 6-7. The court also noted that while it did not “condone 

Mother’s actions” in responding to Father’s text message inquiries about Child 

that Father had the wrong number, it emphasized that this incident occurred 

in August of 2021 — “well after the filing of the Petition for Involuntary 

Termination of Parental Rights and at a time when Mother has sole legal and 

sole physical custody of the Child[.]” Id. at 7. 

We conclude the record supports the orphans’ court’s findings. Mother 

testified that Father’s involvement with Child from July until December of 2019 

was “[v]ery hit or miss.” N.T., 10/5/21, at 7. She stated that he asked to 

“come see” Child “once or twice” in 2020. Id. at 8. Mother testified Father 

visited with Child “a little after Easter” that year, but had “[v]ery minimal” 

interaction with Child at that time, and then saw him again in November of 

2020 when Mother visited Father’s cousin, and Father was present. Id. at 9-

10. She emphasized that Father “had not asked” for that visit, and “was more 

interested with what was going on with his phone” than playing with Child. 

Id. at 9. 

Father’s testimony confirmed that he has not seen Child since November 

of 2020 — six months prior to Mother’s filing to the termination petition — and 
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that his cousin had arranged that visit. N.T. Termination H’rg, 10/5/21, at 40. 

He claimed he asked to see Child “a couple of times” in 2020, but that Mother 

“said [Child] was busy doing something.” Id. at 37. When asked if he was 

“trying to see” Child between November of 2020 and May of 2021, Father 

replied, “I asked about him.” Id. at 41. He did not provide any further 

specifics. See In re Adoption of C.J.A., 204 A.3d 496, 503-04 (Pa. Super. 

2019) (“A parent does not perform parental duties by displaying a merely 

passive interest in the development of his or her child.”) (citation omitted).

Thus, we are compelled to conclude the record supports the trial court’s 

findings that Father “evidenced both a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to [ ] Child and has failed to perform his parental duties in 

excess of six (6) months.” See Orphans’ Ct. Op. at 6. Father’s only effort to 

maintain his relationship with Child since November of 2020 was to send three 

payments of $150, and “ask[ ] about” Child. See N.T., Termination H’rg, at 

41. We reiterate that his affirmative duty to maintain his relationship with 

child “encompasses more than a financial obligation[.]” N.N.H., 197 A.3d at 

784 (citation omitted). Recognizing Father’s limited finances and 

transportation difficulties, we point out that Father had a cell phone, but there 

was no testimony he attempted to call or video chat with Child during the 

relevant 6-month period, or, for that matter, at any time during the prior year. 

Simply put, the record supports the trial court’s determination that Father 

failed to demonstrate a “continuing interest in [C]hild and a genuine effort to 

maintain communication and association with” him, and that Father “failed to 
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utilize all available resources to preserve the parental relationship.” Id.

(citation omitted); L.A.K., 256 A.3d at 592 (citation omitted). Thus, Father’s 

challenge to the involuntary termination of his parental rights under 

subsection 2511(a)(1) fails.4

Once a trial court determines that termination is warranted under 

subsection 2511(a), it must then proceed to consider the needs and welfare 

of the child under subsection (b). In re D.W., 856 A.2d 1231, 1234 (Pa. 

Super. 2004). Although the orphans’ court properly did so in the present case, 

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4 Although we conclude the trial court’s decision is supported by the record, 

we acknowledge the comments of Child’s attorney — Jennifer Ayers, Esquire 

— at the conclusion of the termination hearing. When the court asked her 

position on the termination proceedings, Attorney Ayers responded:

[M]y concern is it’s obvious that [Child] has three people who love 

him very much sitting in this room. . . . [Father] is on SSI. He 

has demonstrated complete . . . difficulties for him personally to 

make [visits] happen with his son, but I don’t think he’s 

demonstrated a settle[d] pattern of not pursing or trying to pursue 

his parental rights. . . . I think that he has done the best that he 

can in this situation that he finds himself in.

I am troubled and concerned that Mom is purposefully trying 

to dissuade him from contacting her by telling him that he no 

longer has the correct number after these proceedings have been 

filed.

So . . . I am of the opinion that this may be best suited for 

custody court and not termination at this point.

N.T., Termination H’rg, at 55. Nonetheless, the orphans’ court specifically 

considered Attorney Ayers’ argument in its opinion, before noting that “a 

parent’s love for the child is not the statutory standard . . . when determining 

whether to terminate that parent’s right.” Orphans’ Ct. Op. at 8. We are 

constrained to agree.
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Father did not challenge the court’s subsection 2511(b) determination in 

either his Pa.R.A.P. 1925 concise statement5 or his brief. For that reason, this 

issue is waived.6 See In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super. 

2017) (waiving Mother’s argument regarding Section 2511(b) when she failed 

to include it in her statement of questions involved or concise statement).

Thus, because we conclude the orphans’ court’s findings are supported 

by the record, we affirm the decree involuntarily terminating Father’s parental 

rights.

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5 Father’s Rule 1925(b) statement raised the following two claims:

1. The Court’s ruling was against the weight of the evidence 

because insufficient evidence was presented to establish that 

[Father] demonstrated a settled purpose to relinquish his 

parental claim over the prior six months.

2. The Court’s ruling was against the weight of the evidence 

because insufficient evidence was presented to establish that 

[Father] refused to perform parental duties over the prior six 

months.

Father’s Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal Pursuant to 

Rule 1925(b), 11/10/21.

6 Nevertheless, we note that even if we were to review the orphans’ court’s 

subsection 2511(b) analysis, Father would be entitled to no relief. See

Orphans’ Ct. Op. at 9 (finding Father has no bond with less than four-year-old 

Child he has seen “only a handful of times since Mother and Father separated 

approximately two years ago[;]” Child has not asked about Father since his 

last visit in November of 2020; Child calls Husband “Daddy[;]” Husband, “who 

has been in Child’s life since he was 1.5 years old, . . . is the only father-figure 

the Child knows.”).
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Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/10/2022