alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 32.2**

**Written StatementPursuant To18 U.S.C. Section 1350**

The undersigned,Paul E. Ross, the Chief Financial Officer of Meade Instruments Corp. (the “Company”),pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, hereby certifies that:

           (i)  the Form 10-K for the fiscal yearended February 28, 2006 of the Company (the “Report”) fully complies withthe requirements of section 13(a) and 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

         (ii)  the information contained in the Report fairlypresents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results ofoperations of the Company.

Date: June1, 2007
| By:                                          | /s/ PAUL E.  ROSS |   |
|----------------------------------------------|-------------------|--------|
| *Senior Vice President—Finance and CFO* |

 

----
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-89,425-01

IN RE LISA FINEBERG, Relator

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS

CAUSE NO. WX:16-90016 IN THE 204 DISTRICT COURT TH

FROM DALLAS COUNTY

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Relator has filed an application for a writ of mandamus pursuant to the original jurisdiction

of this Court. In it, she contends that the Respondent has not complied with this Court’s opinion in

Relator’s Article 11.072 habeas corpus appeal. Ex parte Fineberg, Nos. PD-1024-17 & PD-1025-17

(Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 3, 2018) (not designated for publication). 

Respondent, the Judge of the 204 District Court of Dallas County, shall file a response with th

this Court by certifying what action, if any, has been taken with respect to the terms of Relator’s

community supervision since this Court’s opinion was handed down. Respondent’s answer shall be

submitted within 30 days of the date of this order. This application for leave to file a writ of
2

mandamus will be held in abeyance until Respondent has submitted her response.

Filed: February 13, 2019

Do not publish
#### Michael E. OLIVE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D10-2102.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Jan. 28, 2011.

Michael E. Olive, Florida City, pro se.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Carmen F. Corrente, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

COHEN, J.

Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his postconviction motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) and its order denying his motion for rehearing. The trial court correctly denied relief on Appellant’s argument that his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum. *See Monroe v. State,*36 So.3d 930 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (holding sentence of thirty-five years in prison with ten years’ probation for second-degree murder is within the statutory maximum under 1997 statutes). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s ruling on this ground.

The trial court erred, however, by summarily denying Appellant’s claim that his sentence exceeded the sentencing guidelines in effect prior to the Criminal Punishment Code’s effective date. Taking judicial notice of this court’s records of Appellant’s direct appeal, we conclude that Appellant has stated a facially sufficient claim for relief. Therefore, the trial court was required to attach supporting documents to its order that summarily denied his claim for relief. *See Friss v. State,*881 So.2d 38 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).

Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the trial court to attach additional portions of the record, including the sentencing guidelines scoresheet, which conclusively refute Appellant’s claim, or to resentence Appellant in accordance with the standards set forth in *Brooks v. State,*969 So.2d 238 (Fla.2007).

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

MONACO, C.J., and SAWAYA, J., concur.
#### STATE ex rel. LAN TRAN v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-1078.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 6, 2011.

In re Tran, Lan; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 01-37931; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 09-01431.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; *State ex rel. Glover v. State,*93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; *123
      *State ex rel. Melinie v. State,*93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.
Letter Agreement


 Exhibit 10.1 
 

 
 December 16, 2008 
 Via Federal Express 
 Mr. Robert Kaiser 
 SSL Americas, Inc. 
 3585 Engineering Drive, Suite 200 
 Norcross, GA 30092 
  

			
	Re:	 	Distribution Agreement, dated as of June 1, 2005, as
		 	amended (the “Agreement”), between OraSure Technologies,
		 	Inc. (“OraSure”) and SSL International plc
(“SSL”)                                      
  

 Dear Mr. Kaiser: 
 Reference is made to Amendment No. 2 to Distribution Agreement, dated as of November 30, 2007, as amended by letter agreement, dated October 31, 2008 (collectively, “Amendment No. 2”), between OraSure and SSL.
The purpose of this letter is to acknowledge the parties’ agreement that the reference to December 19, 2008 in Section 10 of Amendment No. 2 (as amended) is hereby changed to January 9, 2009. Unless otherwise specified by
the parties, any Additional Modifications agreed to by the parties pursuant to Section 10 of Amendment No. 2 shall take effect on January 1, 2009. Except as amended by this letter, the above-referenced Distribution Agreement
(including Amendment No.2 thereto) shall remain in full force and effect. 
 If the foregoing correctly sets forth our agreement, please indicate that by
signing the duplicate copy of this letter in the space provided below and returning it to the undersigned. Thank you. 
  

			
	Sincerely,
	
	OraSure Technologies, Inc.
	
	 /s/ Douglas A. Michels

	By:	 	Douglas A. Michels
	Title:	 	President and CEO
	
	Agreed to and accepted:
	
	SSL International plc
	
	 /s/ Robert Kaiser

	By:	 	Robert Kaiser
	Title:	 	Attorney

 220 East First Street, Bethlehem, PA 18015-1360 
 Phone: 610.882.1820 
 www.orasure.com
No. 87-6394.

#### Auriemma *v.*United States.

C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under

the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-10331

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

KEITH FIELDS, also known as James Johnson,

also know as Keith Green, also known as Greasie,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division

District Court No. 3:99-CR-74-2-G

January 2, 2001

Before EMILIO M. GARZA, STEWART and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Keith Fields appeals his sentence for conspiracy to distribute

cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. We modify his sentence,

and, as modified, affirm.

Fields was charged in a one-count indictment with conspiracy2

to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine. Fields pleaded

guilty and the district court sentenced him to 10 8 months’

imprisonment, followed by a five year term of supervised release.

On appeal, Fields challenges only the five-year supervised release

term. Because Fields made no objection in district court to his

term of supervised release, we revi ew his present challenge for

plain error. U

nited States v. Meshack

, 225 F.3d 556, 575 (5th Cir.

2000).

A five-year term o f supervised release is required in cases

involving in excess of five kilograms of cocaine. 21 U.S.C. §

841(b)(1)(B). However, the statutory maximum term for cocaine

possession which does not require some showing of drug amounts is

three years of supervised release

. See 1 8 U.S.C. §

3583(b)(2)(providing for a term of supervised release of “not more

than three years”); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C)(providing for a “term

of supervised release of at least 3 years”); United States v.

Kelly

, 974 F.2d 22, 24-25 (5th Cir. 1992)(reducing a term of

supervis ed release to three years by harmonizing the three-year

minimum in § 841(b) (1)(C) with the three-year maximum in §

3583(b)). In Apprendi v. New Jersey , 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), the

Supreme Court held that any fact, other than a prior conviction,

which increases the penalty for a crime, m ust be submitted t o a

jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the government

did not prove quanti ty beyond a reasonable doubt at the plea or3

sentencing hearing, we find plain error in Fields’s sentence. S ee

Meshack

, 225 F.3d at 578. The government concedes that the term of

supervised release is incorrect and should be adjusted.

Because the only authorized term of supervised release for the

offense of conviction is three years, there is no need for a

remand. S ee United States v. Vasquez

, 504 F.2d 555, 556 (5th Cir.

1974). We therefore vacate Fields’s five-year term of supervised

release and impose a three-year term of supervised release. As

modified, Fields’s sentence is affirmed.

SENTENCE MODIFIED and, as modified, AFFIRMED.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT

DUAN E. ROBINSON, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D17-2887 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) ) Opinion filed February 14, 2018. Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Nancy Moate Ley, Judge. Duan E. Robinson, pro se.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
CASANUEVA, SLEET, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.
exv10w6






Exhibit 10.6




FIRST AMENDMENT TO

BAKER HUGHES INCORPORATED SUPPLEMENTAL RETIREMENT PLAN

(As Amended and Restated Effective January 1, 2009)




     THIS AGREEMENT by Baker Hughes Incorporated (the “Company”),



W I T N E S S E T H:




     WHEREAS, the Company sponsors the Baker Hughes Incorporated Supplemental Retirement Plan (the
“Plan”); and



     WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 14.04 of the Plan, the Company has the right to amend the Plan;
and



     WHEREAS, the Company desires to amend the Plan;



     NOW, THEREFORE, the Company agrees that, effective January 1, 2009, Section 8.02 of the Plan
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following sentences:




A distribution under this Section 8.02 shall in any event be made within 90 days
after the Participant incurs an Unforeseeable Financial Emergency. The Participant
shall not be permitted to elect the taxable year in which any payment under this
Section 8.02 shall be made.



     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Agreement to be executed on the 18th day of
December, 2008.



	 	 	 	 	 
	 	BAKER HUGHES INCORPORATED

 	 
	 	By:  	/s/ Didier Charreton
 	 
	 	Title: 	Vice President, Human Resources
#### In re Todd J. WIMBERLEY.

No. 2011-OB-0326.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 17, 2011.

In re Wimberiey, Todd J.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Permission to Take Bar Examination.

Denied. See Supreme Court Rule XVII, Section 4(C). Moreover, should petitioner timely file an application to sit for a future bar examination, he remains subject to all conditions set forth in our July 21, 2010 order in *In re: Wimberley,*10-1691 (La.7/21/10), 39 So.3d 595.

WEIMER, J., would grant.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>           5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL CONDITION AND THE CONSOLIDATED
STATEMENTS OF OPERATION OF UNIFIED FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. FILED AS A
PART OF THE COMPANY'S ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-KSB AND IS QUALIFIED IN
ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH REPORT.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                         605,654
<SECURITIES>                                 1,666,541
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,562,143
<ALLOWANCES>                                     2,041
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             3,014,738
<PP&E>                                       1,311,173
<DEPRECIATION>                                 646,352
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,933,344
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,893,875
<BONDS>                                              0
<COMMON>                                        14,778
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     17,069
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,933,344
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             6,767,208
<CGS>                                        1,862,328
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,862,328
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             4,414,176
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               9,963
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                312,225
<INCOME-TAX>                                    53,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            259,225
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   259,225
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.17
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.12


</TABLE>
#### Maureen FAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D10-796.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

April 8, 2011.

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Christopher S. Quarles and Colby Nicole Ferris, Assistant Public Defenders, Dayto-na Beach, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kristen L. Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

GRIFFIN, J.

Maureen Fay [“Fay”] appeals her judgments and sentences for trafficking in twenty-eight grams or more of oxycodone and possession of drug paraphernalia. Fay argues that the trial court erred by denying her motions for judgment of acquittal based upon entrapment.

We conclude that the trial court did not err by denying the motions for judgment of acquittal based upon entrapment. First, with respect to objective entrapment, the evidence presented at trial does not establish the outrageous conduct on the part of law enforcement or the confidential informant that would render the prosecution of Fay for having sold the pills a due process violation. Second, because there existed a dispute of facts regarding the issues of inducement and predisposition, the trial court properly submitted the evaluation of subjective entrapment to the jury.

AFFIRMED.

MONACO, C.J. and TORPY, J., concur.
090916-F-JZ029-381.JPG
            LIEUTENANT GENERAL K.L. TALLMANLieutenant General K.L. Tallman is superintendent of the U.S. Air Force Academy. General Tallman was born in 1925, in Omaha, Neb. He graduated from Cheyenne, Wyo., High School in 1942, and from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., in 1946. He received a master's degree in international affairs from The George Washington University in 1967 and an honorary doctor of laws degree from the University of Wyoming in 1978. General Tallman earned his pilot wings at Stewart Field, N.Y., in 1946, and then served in a succession of fighter unit assignments, including aircraft carrier duty with the Navy. In 1956, General Tallman became a training officer at the U.S. Air Force Academy, eventually assuming the duties of cadet group air officer commanding. AOCs assist and advise cadet commanders in the operation of their units. Three years later he was transferred to Headquarters U.S. Air Forces in Europe as an operations staff officer. Returning from Europe in 1962, he entered the Marine Corps Senior Staff School, Quantico, Va., completing it a year later. He then had a series of operational duties in the United States until 1965 when he become executive assistant to the commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, in Saigon. He completed the National War College in 1967 and was assigned to Headquarters U.S. Air Force as assistant for colonel assignments under the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel. In 1970 he become commander, 836th Air Division, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. The next year he was named deputy commander, Air Force Military Personnel Center, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, and in 1972 assumed command of the center. In June 1973, he moved to Headquarters U.S. Air Force to serve as director of personnel plans, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel. He became deputy chief of staff, personnel, Headquarters U.S. Air Force in August 1975. General Tallman became the eighth U.S. Air Force Academy Superintendent on June 27, 1977. His military decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster, Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster, Air Medal, and Air Force Commendation Medal with two oak leaf clusters. General Tallman was promoted to lieutenant general Sept. 1, 1975, with date of rank Aug. 27, 1975. (Current as of August 1978)
#### Jonathon GUILLORY v. PROGRESSIVE SECURITY INS. CO., et al.

No. 2010-C-2519.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 17, 2010.

In re Guillory, Dana; Guillory, Jonathon et al.; —Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calca-sieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 2006-1743; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. CA 09-1056, CA 09-1508.

Denied.
** **

** **

**EXHIBIT 32**

                                                            

**Certification Pursuantto**

**18 U.S.C. Section 1350**

**as Adopted Pursuant to**

**Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

** **

** **

Thiscertification is provided pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,18 U.S.C. § 1350, and accompanies the Annual Report on Form 10-Q for the periodended June 30, 2007 of Tripos, Inc. (the "Company") as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report").

** **

The undersigned, theChief Executive Officer and the Chief Financial Officer of the Company,  herebycertifies that, to his knowledge on the date hereof:

(a)        the Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and 

(b)        information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company.  

                                                            /s/John P. McAlister

                                                            JohnP. McAlister

                                                            ChiefExecutive Officer

                                                            &Chief Financial Officer

                                                            August20, 2007

----
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack

, Chief Justice

David F. Viviano,

Chief Justice Pro Tem

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

July 30 , 2020 

# Order

Clerk July 30 , 2020

159 384 ( 53 ) (55)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appell ant

, SC: 159 384

v COA: 342953

M uskegon CC: 17

- 000174

- FC

DANIEL RAY BEAN

, Defendant

- Appell ee

.

_____________________________________ ____ /

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of plaintiff

- appellant to extend the time

for filing its brief on appeal is GRANTED. The brief submitted on July 27, 2020, is

accepted as timely filed. The motion of defendant

- appell ee to dismiss the appeal due to

plaintiff

- appellant’s failure to timely fil e its brief is DENIED

.
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 144 Introduced in House (IH)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 144

       To amend the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
 Reconciliation Act of 1996 to allow States and localities to provide 
            primary and preventive care to all individuals.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 4, 2007

   Mr. Gene Green of Texas introduced the following bill; which was 
            referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
       To amend the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
 Reconciliation Act of 1996 to allow States and localities to provide 
            primary and preventive care to all individuals.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PERMITTING STATES AND LOCALITIES TO PROVIDE PRIMARY AND 
              PREVENTIVE CARE TO ALL INDIVIDUALS.

    (a) In General.--Section 411(b)(1) of the Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (8 U.S.C. 1621(b)(1)) 
is amended by inserting ``or for primary and preventive care'' after 
``Act)''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply to primary and preventive care furnished before, on, or after the 
date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM SUPERGEN
INC. SEPTEMBER 30, 1996 CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                      16,657,028
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                  1,935,516
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            19,093,344
<PP&E>                                         585,794
<DEPRECIATION>                                 193,027
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              20,803,913
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,557,176
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                    39,983,126
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                20,803,913
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                37,715
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             6,265,984
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (6,228,269)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (5,674,311)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.36)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>