This memorandum opinion was not selected for publi cation in the New Mexico Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version file d by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 PATRICIO TORRES, individually 2 and derivatively on behalf of 3 MONTAÑO/TORRES, LLC, 4 Plaintiff-Appellant, 5

v. NO. 30,207 6 ISIDRO E. MONTAÑO and 7 EVELYN N. MONTAÑO, 8 Defendants-Appellees. 9 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF VALENCIA COUNTY 10 Camille Martinez Olguin, District Judge 11 Kelley Law Offices 12 Cody K. Kelley 13 Charlotte L. Itoh 14 Albuquerque, NM 15 for Appellant 16 James Lawrence Sánchez Trial Lawyer, P.C. 17 James Lawrence Sánchez 18 Belen, NM 19 for Appellees 202 MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 CASTILLO, Chief Judge. 2 This suit involves a dispute over a family carwash business in Los Lunas, New 3 Mexico. We must decide whether the ma jority owners properly dismissed their 4 former son-in-law from the limited liab ility company in which they were the 5 remaining members. We agree with the district court thatthe actions of the majority 6 owners were not in breach of their fiduciary responsibilities and that there was no 7 basis for the imposition of equitable reme dies. While we acknowledge that sixteen 8 months passed between trial and judgment, there is no basi s to overturn the verdict on 9 this ground. Accordingly, we affirm. 10 BACKGROUND 11 The following is a summary of the evid ence presented during the bench trial of 12 this case. In January 2003, Patricio To rres (Torres) and his wife, Cynthia Torres 13 (Cynthia), formed a limited liability company, Montaño/Torres, LLC (Company), with 14 Cynthia’s parents, Isidro and Evelyn M ontaño (the Montaños) for the purpose of 15 opening a carwash in Los Lunas. Each family member held a 25 percent interest in 16 the Company and agreed to contribute services toward its operation, though the 17 specific type of services and number of hours to be worked were not specified at first. 18 Patricio and Cynthia downloaded a standard business form from the Internet to guide 193 the functioning of the business. Cynthia tailored it to fit the Company, and all four 1 members signed the documents, including the operating agreement (Operating 2 Agreement). Each member contributed $25,000 in start-up capital. The Company 3 secured a bank loan, backed by the Montaños’ credit, with each member responsible 4 for one-quarter of that liability. At the time of Torres’s severance from the Company, 5 the loan balance was $440,000. When th e business first opened, the Montaños 6 combined to work in the carwash 100 hours per week, maintaining the carwash and 7 taking care of the bookkeeping. Torres, w ho had a full-time job outside the business, 8 averaged about 24 hours of work per month, usually coming in after work on 9 Mondays, Wednesdays, Fridays, and working every other weekend. He also was on 10 call around the clock, via cell phone, in case a machine malfunctioned. Nonetheless, 11 the Montaños urged Torres to improve his wo rk habits and put inmore hours in order 12 to balance the workload among members. 13 Patricio and Cynthia split up shortly after the business was launched and 14 divorced in August 2003. After the divorce, the Montaños sided at first with Torres 15 over their daughter and, at his request, would give him betw een $1,000 and $2,000 per 16 month on a quarterly basis, totali ng $18,336 in 2004 and $20,394 in 2005. The 17 Montaños claim that the money did not come from the proceeds of the carwash but 18 rather from their personal funds, eventhough the money would sometimes be 194 transferred in envelopes marked “distribution” or “distrib.” Torres said he considered 1 them distributions, but he never reported them as income. Torres also made capital 2 contributions of between $6,000 and $6,500 during that time, as did the Montaños. 3 In October 2004, Cynthia transferred her 25 percent interest in the Company to 4 the Montaños, giving them a 75 percent share of the business—or a super-majority 5 stake—and leaving Torres with the remaining 25 percent share of the Company. 6 Around June 2006, the parties began negotiating a buyout of Torres’s 25 percent share 7 by the Montaños. At one point, the parties agreed that the Montaños would pay 8 Torres $150,000 for his share, but the d eal fell through when Torres balked at 9 providing a receipt to the Montaños for the first $100,000 that was to be paid in cash. 10 As negotiations broke down, the Montaños grew frustrated withthe discrepancy in 11 work hours and sought to codify the work responsibilities of the Company members. 12 Using their majority voting power per th e original Operating Agreement, the 13 Montaños added an amendment specifying that each me mber was required to work 14 at the carwash 100 hours per month between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m. and 15 that each member was required to fill out daily time sheets; the amendment also 16 provided a detailed list of ta sks to be performed by all members on a regular basis. 17 A member could be expelled with 30 days’ notice for failure to perform the required 18 work hours. The Montaños notified Torre s of the amendment by letter on September 195 11, 2006. In the ensuing weeks, Torres refused to document his hours and failed to 1 work the required hours. The Montaños se nt Torres weekly accountings of his hours 2 worked and detailing the shortages. They then voted on October 11, 2006, to remove 3 Torres as a member of the Company. 4 Before that removal, Torres, on September 11, 2006, filed this action for 5 dissolution of the Company and an accounti ng; breach of duty of good faith and fair 6 dealing; and breach of fiduciary duty. Torres also sought the appointment of a 7 receiver for the Company. He later ame nded his complaint based on prima facie tort 8 and equitable relief for unjust enrichment. The Montaños counter-claimed alleging 9 malicious abuse of process. 10 The district court held the trial on April 8 and 9, 2008, and it issued findings of 11 fact and conclusions of law on July 30, 2009, and a final judgment on December 17, 12 2009. The district court found that the Montaños acted reasonably in amending the 13 Operating Agreement and in removing Torres as a member of th e Company, and the 14 court refused to consider an equitable remedy. The court denied the Montaños’ 15 counterclaim. The Montaños do not app eal. Torres appeals and argues that the 16 district court erred in finding that the Mont años acted reasonably and in rejecting his 17 equitable relief. He also cl aims that the district court abused its discretion in taking 18 almost 16 months between the end of the trial and the time it issued its findings of fact 196 and conclusions of law. 1

DISCUSSION 2 The Montaños Breached No Fiduciary D uty in Amending the Agreement and in 3 Voting to Remove Torres 4 Torres characterizes himself as an oppressed minority member of the Company 5 and accuses the Montaños of abusing thei r super-majority power and squeezing him 6 out of the business in violation of thei r duty of good faith and fair dealing under 7 contract law. 8 “We review district court determin ations for substantial evidence.” Garcia v. 9 Garcia , 2010-NMCA-014, ¶ 17, 1 47 N.M. 652, 227 P.3d 621, cert. quashed , 2010- 10 NMCERT-007, 148 N.M. 611, 241 P.3d 612. “It is not this [C]ourt’s task to reweigh 11 evidence. If substantial evidence supports a [district] court’s conclusion it will not be 12 disturbed on appeal.” Landavazo v. Sanchez , 111 N.M. 137, 138, 802 P.2d 1283, 13 1284 (1990). Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant evidence that a 14 reasonable mind would find adequate to support a conclusion. Evidence is substantial 15 even if it barely tips the scales in favor of the party bearing the burden of proof.” Id. 16 (citations omitted). We reviewde novo the district court’ s application of the law to 17 the facts at hand in reachi ng its legal conclusions. Ponder v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 187 Ins. Co. , 2000-NMSC-033, ¶ 7, 129 N.M. 698, 12 P.3d 960. 1 Torres concedes that the Montaños ab ided by the letter of the Operating 2 Agreement. He also admits that he wa s not coerced into signing the agreement and 3 that he was bound by its terms. Section 7. 4 of the Operating Agreement provided for 4 removal of a member by a super-majority vote if the member failed to substantially 5 perform service to the Company as requi red and, upon removal, members were to 6 receive their capital accounts. The Op erating Agreement also allowed for 7 amendments to be made in writing by a super majority. 8 The district court found that the amendment was made appropriately. The 9 Montaños abided by the terms of the Op erating Agreement by amending it to set out 10 in detail the responsibilities of all member s of the Company. After amending the 11 Operating Agreement, the Montaños then follo wed the letter of it. They alerted Torres 12 of the new requirements, gave him 30 days’ notice of hi s possible removal, and then 13 communicated to him in writi ng each week warning him of his failure to abide by the 14 new service requirements. Wh en he failed to fill out time sheets or in any other way 15 show that he worked 100 hours in a month, they used their super-majority voting bloc 16 to remove him. This was an Operating Agreement that Torres was familiar with, even 17 though he admitted that he did not read it be fore signing it. Torres helped choose the 18 format of the Operating Agreement from templates found on the Internet and was 198 reminded by the other members of the Comp any that service was required of each of 1 them in order to keep the business functioni ng. “Each party to a contract has a duty 2 to read and familiarize himself with its conten ts . . . , and if the contract is plain and 3 unequivocal in its terms, each is ordinarily bound thereby.” Smith v. Price’s 4 Creameries, Div. of Creamland Dairies, Inc. , 98 N.M. 541, 545, 650 P.2d 825, 829 5 (1982). The district court concluded that the Montaños’ actions in amending the 6 Operating Agreement and re moving Torres were not a breach of fiduciary duty owed 7 the Company or Torres. 8 As in Smith , Torres freely bargained for the terms of the Operating Agreement, 9 and he knew or should have known about all the ramifications of entering into such 10 a deal. We conclude that substantial evid ence supports the district court’s conclusion 11 that Torres is bound by the terms of the Op erating Agreement that were followed by 12 the Montaños. 13 Torres argues further, though, that despitefollowing the letter of the Operating 14 Agreement, the Montaños’ actions in ousting him were done with th e intent to remove 15 him from the Company, thus oppressing him as a minority shareholder in violation of 16 their fiduciary responsibilities. He claims that they removed him in order to avoid 17 paying him fair-market value for his 25 percent interest in the Company, and that they 18 kept two sets of books and dealt in cash transactions in order to keep him from 199 assessing the fair-market value of his share. Therefore, we must continue our inquiry 1 beyond standard contr act law, because the fiduciary responsibilities in a small 2 corporate setting are greater than in a typi cal commercial or business transaction. See 3 Walta v. Gallegos Law Firm, P.C. , 2002-NMCA-015, ¶ 40, 131 N.M. 544, 40 P.3d 4 449. Notions of honor raise the bar in a fi duciary setting, and the standard in that 5 context “is thus higher than the duty of good faith and fair dealing imposed on all 6 contractual relationships.” Id. 7 In the absence of extensive case law interpreting New Mexico’s statute 8 governing limited liability corporations (LLC or LLCs), we are assisted in our analysis 9 by drawing an analogy to close co rporations as analyzed in Walta . Limited liability 10 companies enjoy an arm’s-length relationship with legislatures and courts, because 11 LLCs “are primarily creatures of contract.” F. Hodge O’Neal & Robert B. Thompson, 12 O’Neal & Thompson’s Close Corporations & LLCs: Law & Practice § 5:2 (3d ed. 13 2004). The details of the functioning of a given LLC are grounded in the operating 14 agreement, and “LLC statute and judicial interpretations both typically defer to the 15 parties’ agreement.” Id. § 5:1. “Thus, courts have he ld that the LLC Act governs only 16 in the absence of terms in th e [Original] Agreement and that the statute fills gaps in 17 the [Original] Agreement.” Id. § 5:3 (footnotes omitted). 18 Still, as in close corporations, the oppr ession of a minority member of an LLC 1910 is a valid concern. Similar to LLCs, clos e corporations are marked by a small number 1 of stockholders, no willing market for the co rporation’s stock, and a significant role 2 of the majority stockholders in the day-to-day management of the operation. See 3 Walta , 2002-NMCA-015, ¶ 32. In Walta , which itself relied on partnership law to 4 develop the law of close corporations, we warned: “These characteristics of close 5 corporations may sometimes be abused to allow majority shareholders to take 6 advantage of minority shareholders. Minority shareholders are vulnerable to a variety 7 of oppressive devices.” Id. ¶ 33. 8 We have previously tried to defineoppressive treatment of a minority 9 shareholder in a close corporation: 10 The absence of a rigidly defined standard for determining what 11 constitutes oppressive behavior enab les courts to determine, on a 12 case-by-case basis, whether the acts comp lained of serve to frustrate the 13 legitimate expectations of minority sh areholders, or whether the acts are 14 of such severity as to warrant the requested relief. 15 McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc. , 104 N.M. 523, 527, 724 P.2d 232, 236 (Ct. 16 App. 1986). Specifically, we have looked fo r behavior by the majority that includes 17 “harsh, dishonest[,] or wrongful conduct and a visible departure from the standards 18 of fair[ ]dealing.” Id. at 528, 724 P.2d at 237 (internal quotation marks and citation 19 omitted). We also have warned that in sm all family operations, the court is to give 20 weight to hostility among family members. Id. at 529, 724 P.2d at 238. 2111 Continuing to analogize LLCs to close co rporations, a comparison of the facts 1 of our case to those in McCauleyshows that the behavior of the Montaños is not on 2 a par with the actions we found to be oppressive and unreasonable in McCauley . In 3 McCauley , a minority member was cast out by the majority after divorcing a member 4 of the dominant family. Id. at 526, 724 P.2d at 235. The facts revealed the following: 5 LaVerne was married to the son of the founding family, the McCauleys. Id. at 524, 6 724 P.2d at 233. After the couple divorced, LaVerne found herself cut off from the 7 basic essentials that had been previous ly provided to her—notably food and lodging 8 for her and her children, clothing, and transportation. Id. at 529-30, 724 P.2d at 238- 9 39. During and after the bitter divorce proceedings, LaVerne’s husband warned that 10 she “would never get a damned dime from the corporation” and then told the majority 11 stockholders, falsely, that she stol e and embezzled from the company. Id. at 530, 724 12 P.2d at 239. LaVerne was re moved from her seat on the board of directors, and her 13 first dividend after the divorce was $600, compared to her husband’s $6,000. Id. at 14 531, 724 P.2d at 240. The corporation al so failed to hold regular annual board 15 meetings and stockholder meetings. Id. In sum, the majority stockholders clearly 16 acted in a calculated way to punish LaVerne in the wake of her divorce from the 17 corporation’s principal member. We agreed with the district court in that case that 18 those actions—which thwarted LaVerne’s reasonable expectations of playing an 1912 active role in the management of the busin ess and sharing in its profits—thus rose to 1 the level of oppressive conduct. Id. 2 In our case, the Montaños’ actions do not rise to the level of oppression as those 3 in McCauley , and substantial evidence exists to show that the Montaños acted 4 reasonably in their relationship with To rres during his time as a member of the 5 Company. The evidence shows the follo wing. In 2004 and 2005, after he divorced 6 their daughter, rather than turn against hi m they provided him with quarterly payments 7 from their personal funds. They continued to work with Torres as an active member 8 of the business and reminded him of their desi re to have him contribute his fair share 9 of services to the Company, finally putting it in writing in the final months of their 10 business relationship. Before amending the Operating Agreement, they entered into 11 good-faith negotiations to buy his share of the business, agreeing to a deal for 12 $150,000 before Torres backed out at the last minute because he refused to recognize 13 the transaction by providing the Montaños with a receipt for the $150,000 payment. 14 And while Torres testified that the Montaños dealt only in cash and kept two sets of 15 books in order to limit his ability to participate in operations or calculate the true 16 market value of the busin ess, he never produced evidence of hiding assets or 17 unreported off-books income. The Montaños stated that they kept track of accounts 18 receivable and accounts payable in one book. The Montaños also stated that Torres 1913 never showed an interest in the financial operations of the business until the parties 1 began negotiating a buyout. Finally, Torres ad mitted that he was capable of working 2 the 100 hours of service required per month under the amendment to the Operating 3 Agreement, but he chose not to do so. 4 We agree with the district court that the Montaños’ actions cannot be 5 characterized as “harsh, dishonest[,] or wrongful” or as a clear violation of the duty 6 of fair dealing. Id. at 528, 724 P.2d at 237. Thei r actions were nothing like the 7 behavior of the majority stockholders in McCauleywho abused the minority member 8 who had divorced their family member. Insum, absent uncontroverted evidence of 9 coercion, fraud, or deceit on the part of th e Montaños, substantial evidence existed for 10 the district court here to have found that the Montaños acted reasonably in amending 11 the Operating Agreement and voting to remove Torres as a member of the Company. 12 District Court Properly Denied Equitable Relief 13 Torres next asks us to declare that the district court abused its discretion when 14 it declined to consider equitable relie f for his claim for accounting and unjust 15 enrichment. “The question of whether, on a particular set of facts, the district court 16 is permitted to exercise its equitable power s is a question of law, while the issue of 17 how the district court uses its equitable powers to provide an appropriate remedy is 18 reviewed only for abuse of discretion.” United Props. Ltd. v. Walgreen Props., Inc. , 1914 2003-NMCA-140, ¶ 7, 134 N.M. 725, 82 P.3d 535. Under the standard of abuse of 1 discretion, we will overturn a decision only where “the court’s ruling exceeds the 2 bounds of all reason” or is “arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable.” Edens v. Edens , 3 2005-NMCA-033, ¶ 13, 137 N.M. 207, 109 P.3d 295 (internal quotation marks and 4 citation omitted). 5 Courts tread carefully when deciding to venture into the realm of equitable 6 relief in the world of contracts and bus iness dealings. We have acknowledged a 7 “broad public interest in protecting the right of private parties to be secure in the 8 knowledge that their contracts will be enforced.” United Props. Ltd. , 9 2003-NMCA-140, ¶ 10. And wehave long relied on the proposition that “‘courts may 10 not rewrite obligations that the parties have freely bargained for themselves . . . [i]n 11 the absence of fraud, unconscionability, or other grossly inequitable conduct.’” Id. 12 (alterations in original) (quoting Smith , 98 N.M. at 545, 650 P.2d at 829, and Winrock 13 Inn Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co. , 1996-NMCA-113, ¶ 36, 122 N.M. 562, 928 P.2d 947). 14 “‘Equity jurisdiction has never given the judiciary a roving commission’ to do 15 whatever it wishes in the name of fairness or public welfare.” Id. ¶ 19 (quoting In re 16 Adoption of Francisco A. , 116 N.M. 708, 730, 866 P.2d 1175, 1197 (Ct. App. 1993) 17 (Hartz, J., concurring in part and dissen ting in part)). “A court should thus not 18 interfere with the bargain reached by the parties unless the court concludes that the 1915 policy favoring freedom of contract ought togive way to one of the well-defined 1 equitable exceptions, such as unconsci onability, mistake, fraud, or illegality.” 2 Nearburg v. Yates Petroleum Corp. , 1997-NMCA-069, ¶ 31, 123 N.M. 526, 943 P.2d 3 560. Thus, our analysis is made agains t the “long-standing backdrop of New Mexico 4 law enforcing contractual obligations as they are written.” United Props. Ltd. , 2003- 5 NMCA-140, ¶ 12. 6
In United Properties, Ltd. , we dealt with a lease ag reement that was “clear as 7 can be” and lacking in any ambiguity. Id. There, the tenant at a shopping center 8 absent-mindedly forgot to meet the deadline to renew the lease at least 90 days before 9 its expiration as required by the contract. Id. ¶ 4. When the tenant tried to renew the 10 lease 40 days past the deadline, the landlor d rejected the offer and refused to renew. 11 Id. Because the tenant made an innocent mistake and had put nearly $2 million into 12 the property, we were asked to offer th e tenant equitable relief and forgive the 13 technical oversight of a missed deadline. Id. ¶¶ 3, 26. We rejected that argument. Id. 14 ¶ 26. Instead, we relied on the reasoning of the Iowa Supreme Court that sought to 15 preserve “the sanctity and predictability of the written word [,]” and stated: “‘We will 16 not use equitable principles to save a party from the circumstances it created.’” Id. ¶ 17 31 (quoting SDG Macerich Props., L.P. v. Stanek Inc. , 648 N.W.2d 581, 587-88 (Iowa 18 2002)). Only when finding “fraud, real hardship, oppression, mistake, [or] 1916 unconscionable results” in a contractual trans action, the Iowa court concluded, should 1 a court exercise its equitable powers. SDG Macerich Props., L.P. , 648 N.W.2d at 588. 2
In United Properties, Ltd. , we concluded that the tenant had lacked vigilance and thus 3 should have been held to the written terms of the contract. 2003-NMCA-140, ¶ 31. 4 In our case, the district court decided that equitable relief was not available to 5 Torres. We agree. Here, like in United Properties , the contract was clear on its face, 6 and for the courts to step in would threatento upset the bargaining nature of business 7 dealings. A review of th e evidence shows the followi ng. Torres himself helped 8 choose the form of business for the carwa sh and worked with his then-wife to 9 download a form from the Internet and trus ted her to tailor it to the needs of the 10 Company. He was listed as a principal manager of the Company, along with Isidro 11 Montaño. The terms of the Operating Agreement that he signed were straightforward 12 and within the bounds of New Mexico statutes. The original document he signed 13 required each member to contribute serv ices to the operation, and it included 14 provisions for amending the Original Agreement. When, by a majority vote, the 15 service requirements were itemized and speci fied, he was made aware of them and 16 was regularly reminded of them. While hewas capable of meeting the requirements, 17 he chose not to do so. 18 We long ago stated that “conduct that does not produce an injury, even though 1917 objectionable to the protestants, does not call for judicial interference.” DiIaconi v. 1 New Cal Corp. , 97 N.M. 782, 788, 643 P.2d 1234, 1240 (Ct. App. 1982). Here, 2 Torres essentially got out of this business wh at he put in—two years of payments from 3 the Montaños and the return of his capital account. The contract is clear, and the 4 actions of the Montaños do not rise to the le vel of requiring the courts to step in and 5 provide equitable relief beyond standard legal remedies. We find no error in the 6 district court refusing to consider an equitable remedy in this case. 7 Torres complains that the district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law 8 suggest a rejection of equ itable relief based on a finding of unclean hands. We note 9 that the district court, in its findings of fact, stated that Torres failed to report his 10 income from the Montaños and was not ina position to receive equitable relief, 11 suggesting unclean hands on Torres’s part. Weagree with Torres that this is not an 12 adequate foundation for denying equitable relief in this cas e. Our Supreme Court has 13 previously stated that when misconduct is alleged under the unclean hands theory, that 14 misconduct “must be related to the transac tion giving rise to the claim involved.” 15 Mechem v. City of Santa Fe , 96 N.M. 668, 670, 634 P.2d 690, 692 (1981). In a 16 situation such as this where a business partner is alleging a breach of fiduciary duty, 17 the test is whether the one accused of unc lean hands “dirtied them in acquiring the 18 rights he now asserts[.]” Id . Here, Torres’s failure to report income from the proceeds 1918 of the carwash does not have “an immediate and necessary relation to the equity which 1 the complainant seek s to enforce.” Romero v. Bank of the Southwest , 2003-NMCA2 124, ¶ 38, 135 N.M. 1, 83 P.3d 288 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 3 However, the district court’s conclusions of law are all gr ounded in legal bases 4 and principles of contract and, as wehave shown above, th ere was substantial 5 evidence to support the district court’s determination that equitable relief was not 6 proper in this case, notwithstanding the reason suggested by the district court. An 7 appellate court may affirm a d ecision of the district court if it is right for any reason, 8 as long as it is supported by sufficient evidence. Meiboom v. Watson , 2000-NMSC9 004, ¶ 20, 128 N.M. 536, 994 P.2d 1154. Thus, it was not error for the district court 10 to deny equitable relief in this case. 11 The Almost Sixteen-Month Wait for a Ruling Did Not Harm or Prejudice Torres 12 Finally, Torres complains that while the trial was held in early April 2008, the 13 district court did not issue findings of factand conclusions of law until late July 2009, 14 and a judgment was not issued until December 2009. He argues that the trial judge, 15 over a stretch of time spanning nearly 16 m onths, could not be expected to accurately 16 recall and evaluate the evidence brought fo rward by both sides and would have trouble 17 weighing the credibility of witnesses. 18 Torres cites to no statute or case law that imposes a specific time limit on judges 1919 to dispose of cases. He grounds his argument in two portions of the New Mexico 1 Rules of Civil Procedure calling for “speedy” determinations and a resolution of cases 2 “promptly” and “efficiently.” Rule 1-001(A) NMRA; Rule 21-300(B)(8) NMRA. 3 Both rules are certainly open to interpre tation and judicial di scretion, depending on 4 context. Torres points to out-of-state authority—an Arkansas case in which the 5 opinion of a foot-dragging j udge was sent to the state’s disciplinary committee for 6 consideration and a West Virginia case in which a judge who had delayed a ruling for 7 33 months was ordered to issue one within30 days. A second West Virginia case 8 similarly resulted in a writ of mandamus ordering a decision to be rendered after a 9 delay of 17 months. None of the lower court decisions inthose cases were overturned. 10 If anything, Torres’s argument highlights the fact that at no time during the nearly 16 11 months between the end of trial and the issu ing of findings of fact and conclusions of 12 law did he file a motion with the district court seeking a resolution or a petition at the 13 appellate level seeking a writ of mandamus. In fact, for the first two months after the 14 trial, the district court had not even received Torres’s own proposed findings of fact 15 and conclusions of law. 16 Further, Torres provides no evidence of true prejudice that resulted from the 17 delay of more than a year. The only finding of fact he can challenge in the district 18 court’s ruling is that the court confused an exchange of small bills for large bills with 1920 an exchange of coins for bills. Thus, no material error was made by the district court 1 in rendering its findings of fact and conclu sions of law. Theref ore, we decline to 2 overturn the verdict in these circumstances. 3 CONCLUSION 4 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6

____________________________________ 7 CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Chief Judge 8

WE CONCUR: 9

________________________________ 10 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge 11

________________________________ 12 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 13