alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Tuesday 5th 

 March, 1996. 

Kimberly Rose O'Toole, Appellant, 

 against Record No. 2347-93-1 

 Circuit Court No. 93-421 

Commonwealth of Virginia, Appellee. 

Upon Rehearing En Banc 

 Before Chief Judge Moon, Judges Baker, Benton, Coleman, 

 Willis, Elder, Bray, Fitzpatrick, Annunziata and Overton 

 Andrew G. Wiggin, Assistant Public Defender 

 (Office of the Public Defender, on brief), 

 for appellant. 

 Grace DiLiberto, Assistant Attorney General 

 (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, 

 on brief), for appellee. 

By opinion dated June 27, 1995, a majority of a panel of 

this Court affirmed Kimberly Rose O'Toole's conviction for possession 

of cocaine. O'Toole v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 540, 458 S.E.2d 595 

(1995). Upon O'Toole's motion, we stayed the mandate of that decision 

and granted a rehearing en banc. Upon such rehearing, the judgment of 

the trial court is affirmed for those reasons set forth in the panel's 

majority opinion. Accordingly, the stay of this Court's June 27, 1995 

mandate hereby is lifted and its directives reinstated. 

Judges Benton and Elder would reverse the judgment of the 

trial court for those reasons set forth in the panel's dissenting 

opinion. See id. at 544-46, 458 S.E.2d at 597-98 (Benton, J., 

dissenting). 
The Commonwealth shall recover of the appellant an 

additional $200 for services rendered the appellant by the Public 

Defender on the rehearing portion of this appeal, in addition to 

counsel's costs and necessary direct out-of-pocket expenses. This 

amount shall be added to the costs due the Commonwealth in the 

June 27, 1995 mandate. 

This order shall be published and certified to the trial 

court. 

 A Copy, 

 Teste: 

 Clerk
#### B.F., Appellant, v. AMS STAFF LEASING and Aspen Administrators, Appellees.

No. 1D10-2688.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Oct. 29, 2010.

*503Mark L. Zientz of the Law Offices of Mark L. Zientz, P.A., Miami, for Appellant.

William E. Gregory of William E. Gregory & Associates, P.A., Miami, for Appel-lees.

*ORDER ON APPELLANTS MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE*

PER CURIAM.

Claimant filed a Motion to Transfer Venue of this underlying workers’ compensation appeal to the Third District Court of Appeal citing Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.040(b)(1), which authorizes a transfer of venue “[i]f a proceeding is commenced in an inappropriate court.” Because Florida law requires that appellate review of workers’ compensation cases shall be by this court, we deny the motion.

Specifically, section 440.271, Florida Statutes (2010) requires that “[r]eview of any order of a judge of compensation claims entered pursuant to this chapter shall be by appeal to the District Court of Appeal, First District.” In addition, the supreme court, in *Rollins v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.,*384 So.2d 650 (Fla.1980), held this court is a constitutionally permissible venue for workers’ compensation appeals because the agency charged with monitoring and supervising workers’ compensation claims is headquartered in Tallahassee.

Currently, the workers’ compensation law is administered by the Department of Financial Services, the Agency for Health Care Administration, the Office of Insurance Regulation, the Department of Education, and the Division of Administrative Hearings, all of which are headquartered in Tallahassee. § 440.015, Fla. Stat. (2010). Accordingly, we find no basis to grant Claimant’s request to change venue as the appeal has been filed in the appropriate court.

DENIED.

WOLF, ROBERTS, and WETHERELL, JJ., concur.
#### Andre PAYNE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D09-5289.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

April 27, 2011.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Ellen Griffin, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and James J. Carney, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Andre Payne, appeals the trial court’s oral revocation of his community control due to a new offense in violation thereof. We find that the trial court erred when it failed to reduce the oral pronouncement to a written order.

Payne was on probation which was modified to include six months of community control. Upon being charged with aggravated battery with a deadly weapon in violation of his community control, the trial court orally pronounced the revocation of the community control. However, the trial court failed to enter a written order for the same.

This court remands the case for entry of a written order which conforms with the oral pronouncement by the trial court. This act is ministerial for future reference, is not a resentencing, and does not require the presence of the defendant.

*Remanded.*

GROSS, C.J., POLEN and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.
#### Gloria M. NED, Individually, et al. v. UNION PACIFIC CORPORATION, et al. Retha Herbert, et al. v. Union Pacific Corporation, et al. Edward Aaron, Individually, et al. v. Union Pacific Corporation, et al. James Adams Beloney, et al. v. Union Pacific Corporation, et al. Lionel Thibodeaux, et al. v. Union Pacific Corporation, et al.

No. 2011-CC-0055.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 25, 2011.

In re A.L. Greathouse; Brown, Tommy G.; Dallas States; PPG Industries Inc.; Union Pacific Corp. et al.; Union Pacific Railroad Corp.; W.J. Peard; —Defendants); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. D, Nos. 2003-001100, 2003-001101, 2003-001102, 2003-001106, 2003-001107; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 10-01179;

Denied. Given the current procedural posture of the case, we decline to exercise our supervisory jurisdiction at this time. Defendants will have an adequate opportunity to re-urge their exception at a later stage of the proceeding, or on appeal in the event of an adverse judgment.

VICTORY and GUIDRY, JJ., would grant.
Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO RULE 13a-14 OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE
ACT OF 1934

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, David J. Fallon, certify that:

1. I have
reviewed this Annual report on Form 10-K of Noble International, Ltd.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



|                     |  |        |  |                                                                                   
|-------------------- |  | ------ |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: April 30, 2007 |  | By:    |  | /s/    DAVID J.
FALLON                                                            
|                     |  | Name:  |  | David J. Fallon                                                                   
|                     |  | Title: |  | Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial Officer) of Noble International, Ltd.
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION OF VERSATA, INC.

PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

REGARDING ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K FOR
THE YEAR ENDED OCTOBER 31, 2004



Pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), I, William Frederick, Chief Financial Officer, Secretary and Vice President of Versata, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the
Company), do hereby certify that:



1. The Companys Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended October 31, 2004 (the Form 10-K) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and



2. Information contained in the Form 10-K
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



By:

/S/    WILLIAM
FREDERICKWilliam Frederick Chief Financial Officer, Secretary and Vice President




Date: January 28, 2005
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-6364

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

KEVIN HOWELL, a/k/a William Anthony Johnson,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Frank W. Bullock, Jr.,

Chief District Judge. (CR-94-20, CA-96-406-2)

Submitted: July 24, 1997 Decided: August 6, 1997

Before HAMILTON, LUTTIG, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Kevin Howell, Appellant Pro Se. Douglas Cannon, Assistant United

States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court's order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994) (West 1994 & Supp. 1997).

We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion

accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find no

reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court.

United States v. Howell, Nos. CR-94-20, CA-96-406-2 (M.D.N.C. Mar.

5, 1997). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
```

[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 93 (Thursday, June 8, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E1202]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

                          KEEP ACDA INDEPENDENT

                                 ______

                          HON. DAVID E. BONIOR

                              of michigan

                    in the house of representatives

                         Thursday, June 8, 1995
  Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, now is not the time to be dismantling the 
one agency whose sole mandate is to formulate, negotiate, implement, 
and verify arms control and nonproliferation agreements.
  The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA] should remain an 
independent agency with the goal of strengthening U.S. national 
security through effective arms control agreements. President 
Eisenhower, who first proposed the agency, and President Kennedy, who 
founded it, both recognized the need for an independent voice on arms 
control matters within the Federal Government.
  The United States is pursuing the biggest, broadest arms control and 
nonproliferation agenda in history. With the end of the cold war and 
the rising threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, we 
need a clear focus on resolving outstanding arms control issues.
  Now is not the time to abolish ACDA. Yet that is exactly what the 
Republicans are doing in H.R. 1561, the American Overseas Interests 
Act.
  The American people want a world that is safer for their children 
than the one in which they grew up. Let us hope we can avoid the days 
when school children learned to duck and cover under their desks at the 
same time they were learning their ABCs. An independent ACDA provides 
an assurance that our Nation will continue to maintain the proper focus 
on arms control and nonproliferation agreements.
  I urge my colleagues to vote against H.R. 1561.
  

                          ____________________
```
Exhibit 10(b) 



CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM 



We hereby consent to the
incorporation by reference in this Amendment No. 26 to the BlackRock Fundamental Growth
Principal Protected Fund of BlackRock Principal Protected Trust’s Registration Statement
on Form N-1A, of our report dated March 31, 2008, relating to the financial statements of
Main Place Funding, LLC, which appears in Main Place Funding, LLC’s Annual Report on Form
10-K for the year ended December 31, 2007. 



/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 



Charlotte, North Carolina 

  December
23, 2008
#### S. A. Wilkinson v. Rowland & Patty.

(No. 3589.)

Appeal from Hill County.

*C Transferred from Austin. J*

A. P. McKinnon, counsel for appellant.

S. C. Upshaw and Tom Ivy, counsel for appellees.

Opinion by

Willson,. J.

§ 11. *Married woman; may bind her separate.personal property for husband’s debt by mortgage; such mortgage need not be acknowledged by her to render it valid; case stated.*D. C. Wilkinson, the husband of appellant, executed his promissory note, with appellees as his sureties thereon, to one.Phillips for the sum of $600. To indemnify said sureties, he, joined by appellant, his wife, executed to them a chattel mortgage upon certain cattle. Appellees were .compelled to pay said note, and they brought this suit to recover the money so paid by them, and .also to foreclose said mortgage upon said cattle. The suit was against appellant and her husband jointly. The husband made no defense. Appellant pleaded her coverture at the time of the execution of the .mortgage; that she never acknowledged said mortgage,; that the cattle were her separate property; and that the debt which said *31mortgage was given to secure was not incurred for necessaries for herself or family, or for the benefit of her separate property; wherefore she claimed that said mortgage was not valid to bind her separate property. Judgment was rendered in favor of appellees against D. C. Wilkinson, the husband, for the amount of the debt claimed, and for costs and foreclosure of the mortgage against both defendants, from which judgment the wife alone prosecutes this appeal. *Held:*The only question to be determined is the validity of the mortgage to bind the separate personal property of the wife. It is admitted that the cattle were her separate property, and that said mortgage was not acknowledged by her, or in any manner authenticated for registration. It is well settled that the wife may, by mortgage, legally incumber her separate estate to secure the debt or liability of her husband. [Hollis v. Francois, 5 Tex. 195; Wiley v. Prince, 21 Tex. 637; Hall v. Dotson, 55 Tex. 520.] Prior to the adoption of the Revised Statutes all conveyances by the wife of her separate property, whether real or personal, to be valid, were required to be acknowledged by her in the manner prescribed by statute. [Hollis v. Francois, *supra;*Cartwright v. Hollis, 5 Tex. 166; Berry v. Donley, 26 Tex. 144; Pas. Dig. art. 1003.] But such is not now the statute except as to real estate. [R. S. art. 559.] There no longer exists any statutory provision prescribing the mode by which a married woman may convey or incumber her separate personal property. In the absence of such a provision, her right of disposition is as unrestricted as if she were a *feme sole.*As to real property there is such a provision, and she can only convey or incumber her real property in the manner prescribed by such provision. We hold the mortgage in this case to be valid against appellant’s separate property.

October 31, 1885.

Affirmed.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Lydell MARSHALL.

No. 2009-KK-2557.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 25, 2009.

In re Marshall, Lydell;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or RemedIal Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal DistriCt Court Div. A, No. 478-448; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-K-1502.

Denied.
#### STATE ex rel. Kaih JACKSON v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-0753.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 8, 2011.

In re Jackson, Kaih; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 472-099; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-0162.

Denied.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Brock Anthony LAFITTE.

No. 2011-K-1230.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 2, 2011.

In re Lafitte, Brock Anthony; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 289,655; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-1253.

Denied.
#### Mathew BAKALA, Appellant, v. Dorothy BAKALA, Appellee.

No. 2D10-4381.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

April 15, 2011.

Douglas R. Bald of Fergeson, Skipper, Shaw, Keyser, Baron *&*Tirabassi, P.A., Sarasota, for Appellant.

Walter E. Smith of Meros, Smith, Laz-zara *&*Olney, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellee.

KELLY, Judge.

Mathew Bakala appeals from the order dismissing his lawsuit for failure to prosecute. We reverse because record activity occurred in the case within sixty days after the notice of lack of prosecution was served, thus precluding dismissal under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(e).

On September 16, 2005, Mathew filed an action to set aside a quitclaim deed that transferred real property owned solely by his brother, Lawrence Bakala, to joint ownership with his sister, Dorothy Bakala. Mathew also sought to have Lawrence’s will set aside, alleging that Lawrence was not mentally competent to transfer property or to execute a will. The case proceeded with various filings, and trial was eventually set for March 10, 2008. On January 23, 2008, counsel for Mathew and Dorothy entered into a stipulation to continue trial, and on that same date, the trial court entered an order continuing trial. No further activity occurred in the case until May 28, 2010, when the trial court entered a “Motion and Notice and Judgment of Dismissal” requiring Mathew to show good cause at least five days before the hearing date of July 30, 2010, why the action should not be dismissed for lack of prosecution.

On July 22, 2010, eight days before the scheduled hearing, Mathew filed his showing of good cause in which he stated that Dorothy had died on May 30, 2010, that her estate had been opened in the probate court, and that he intended to file a sug-*424gestión of death and to request the substitution of the personal representative of the estate as party respondent in this action. On July 26, 2010, as promised in the showing of good cause, Mathew filed a suggestion of death and a motion for substitution of party. Following the hearing on July 30, 2010, on the trial court’s notice of potential dismissal, the trial court dismissed the case with prejudice. This was error. Mathew acted within the sixty-day period after the court’s notice of potential dismissal by filing the suggestion of death and motion for substitution, thus precluding dismissal for failure to prosecute. *See*Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e); *Mickens v. Damron,*1 So.3d 1160 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); *Edwards v. City of St. Petersburg,*961 So.2d 1048 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

WHATLEY and DAVIS, JJ., Concur.
IB 

Union Calendar No. 66 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1124 

[Report No. 110–112] 

To extend the District of Columbia College Access Act of 1999. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 16, 2007 

Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia (for himself, Ms. NORTON, and Mr. DAVIS of Illinois) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Oversight and Government Reform 

APRIL 30, 2007 

Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union 

and ordered to be printed 

A BILL 

To extend the District of Columbia College Access Act of 

1999. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. 5–YEAR REAUTHORIZATION OF TUITION AS4 SISTANCE PROGRAMS. 

5 (a) PUBLIC SCHOOL PROGRAM.—Section 3(i) of the 

6 District of Columbia College Access Act of 1999 (sec. 38– 

mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with BILLS

2 

•HR 1124 RH

1 2702(i), DC Official Code) is amended by striking ‘‘each 

2 of the 7 succeeding fiscal years’’ and inserting ‘‘each of 

3 the 12 succeeding fiscal years’’. 

4 (b) PRIVATE SCHOOL PROGRAM.—Section 5(f) of 

5 such Act (sec. 38–2704(f), DC Official Code) is amended 

6 by striking ‘‘each of the 7 succeeding fiscal years’’ and 

7 inserting ‘‘each of the 12 succeeding fiscal years’’. 

mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with BILLS

mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with BILLS

Union Calendar No. 66 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1124 

[Report No. 110

–112] 

A BILL 

To extend the District of Columbia College Access 

Act of 1999. 

APRIL 30, 2007 

Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 

State of the Union and ordered to be printed 

mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with BILLS
Exhibit 12.2



CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC FINANCIAL REPORT

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350



In
connection with the Annual Report of United Microelectronics Corporation (the Company) on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, Stan Hung, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge, that:



| | 1. |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Date:  June 25, 2003



By: /s/ Stan HungName: Stan HungTitle: Chief Financial Officer




|* |  | A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
|- |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, James S.J. Manuso, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of SuperGen, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2010 fully complies with the requirements
of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Form 10-Q fairly presents in all material respects the financial
condition and results of operations of SuperGen, Inc.

By:

/s/ JAMES S.J. MANUSOName:

James S.J. ManusoTitle:

President and Chief Executive Officer
(Principal Executive Officer)


I,
Michael Molkentin, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of
SuperGen, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2010 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Form 10-Q fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of
SuperGen, Inc.

By:

/s/ MICHAEL MOLKENTINName:

Michael MolkentinTitle:

Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)


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