COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Bumgardner and Senior Judge Overton 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

TONY P. MERRITT, S/K/A 

 TONY PATRICK MERRITT 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0487-99-2 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. 

 MAY 23, 2000 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUISA COUNTY 

Lloyd C. Sullenberger, Judge 

 John R. Maus for appellant. 

 Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 On appeal from his conviction of grand larceny by receiving 

stolen property, in violation of Code § 18.2-108, Tony P. 

Merritt contends that the trial court erred in denying his 

motion in limine to prohibit the Commonwealth from introducing 

at his sentencing hearing evidence of his prior probation 

violations. Because probation violations are a part of the 

sentencing process and, thus, are part of the record of criminal 

convictions, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

 A jury found Merritt guilty of grand larceny by receiving 

stolen property, in violation of Code § 18.2-108. Merritt moved 

the trial court to prohibit the Commonwealth from introducing 

evidence of his probation violations resulting from previous 
convictions. The trial court denied the motion, and the 

Commonwealth presented evidence that Merritt had violated the 

conditions of probation on four prior occasions. 

 Code § 19.2-295.1 provides, in relevant part: 

 In cases of trial by jury, upon a 

finding that the defendant is guilty of a 

felony, a separate proceeding limited to the 

ascertainment of punishment shall be held as 

soon as practicable before the same jury. 

At such proceeding, the Commonwealth shall 

present the defendant's prior criminal 

convictions by certified, attested or 

exemplified copies of the record of 

conviction, including adult convictions and 

juvenile convictions and adjudications of 

delinquency. Prior convictions shall 

include convictions and adjudications of 

delinquency under the laws of any state, the 

District of Columbia, the United States or 

its territories. 

 Merritt contends that probation violations are not 

"criminal convictions" and, therefore, evidence of such is 

inadmissible at the sentencing phase of trial. By statute, 

evidence of the defendant's record of prior criminal convictions 

is admissible at sentencing. Evidence of the sentences imposed 

on those convictions is also admissible. See Gilliam v. 

Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 519, 523-24, 465 S.E.2d 592, 594 

(1996). "The sentence reflects the gravity of the offense and 

the defendant's propensity for violence." Id. Revocation of 

probation is merely a modification of the sentence. See Ralston 

v. Robinson, 454 U.S. 201, 220 n.14 (1981). A probation 

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violation, therefore, is an aspect of the sentencing process 

imposed upon a criminal conviction. 

 This rationale serves the declared 

purposes of punishment for criminal conduct. 

"[T]he sentencing decision . . . is a quest 

for a sentence that best effectuates the 

criminal justice system's goals of 

deterrence (general and specific), 

incapacitation, retribution and 

rehabilitation." United States v. Morris, 

837 F. Supp. 726, 729 (E.D. Va. 1993); see

also Wilborn v. Saunders, 170 Va. 153, 160, 

195 S.E. 723, 726 (1938); Nuckoles v. 

Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1083, 1086, 407 

S.E.2d 355, 356 (1991). Manifestly, the 

prior criminal convictions of a felon, 

including previous efforts to punish and 

rehabilitate, "'bear upon a tendency to 

commit offenses, the probabilities of 

rehabilitation, and similar factors'" 

indispensable to the determination of an 

appropriate sentence. Thomas v. 

Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 656, 659, 446 

S.E.2d 469, 472 (1994) (quoting Eaton v. 

United States, 458 F.2d 704, 708 (7th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880, 93 S. Ct. 208, 

34 L.Ed.2d 135 (1972)). 

Gilliam, 21 Va. App. at 524, 465 S.E.2d at 594-95. 

 A probation violation is not itself a criminal conviction. 

It is, however, a continuation and part of the sentencing 

process imposed for a criminal conviction and is, thus, 

admissible as part of the sentence imposed for the prior 

conviction. Thus, the trial court correctly denied Merritt's 

motion in limine. 

 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed. 

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