alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Ellsworth, Appellee, *v.*Hale et al., Appellants, et al.

(Decided December 27, 1939.)

*109
      *Mr. Harold D. Parker*and *Mr. R. B. Meade,*for appellee.

*Messrs. Musser, Kimber S Huffman*and *Messrs. Burroughs é Burroughs,*for appellants.

Washburn, P. J.

This cause is before the court upon an appeal on questions of law.

The facts are not in dispute. Elziver L. Hale, the husband of Caroline C. Hale, died June 8, 1937, she surviving him; four children of Mr. Hale by a former wife also survived him. Mr. Hale died testate, and his widow elected not to take under his will but to take under the law, and she then died intestate before receiving her share under the law of the estate of Mr. Hale.

The claim made in this case is that the one-third interest in certain real property which Mrs. Hale became entitled to receive under the law from the estate of her husband was property that she received by “descent,” and that, she having died intestate and without issue, said property, under Section 10503-5, General Code, passed to and vested in the children of the husband from whom such property came.

In opposition to that contention, it is claimed that Mrs. Hale did not receive said property by “descent” from her husband, and that therefore Section 10503-5, General Code, is not controlling, and that said property passed from her to her heirs.

The trial court agreed with the latter contention and entered judgment accordingly.

It is settled in this state that, where property passes from the husband to the wife under the provisions of Section 10503-4, General Code, where the husband dies intestate, it passes to her by “descent,” and, under *110the conditions set forth in Section 10503-5, General Code, said property descends as therein provided.

The Supreme Court has also determined that, where the husband dies testate, and property passes from him to his widow by virtue of her election under Section 10504-55, General Code, not to take under the will but to take “under the statute of descent and distribution,” such property does not pass to the wife by “descent,” and therefore, upon her decease intestate, passes from her as .her property under Section 10503-4, General Code. *Miller*v. *Miller, Admr.,*129 Ohio St., 230, 194 N. E., 450.

That decision is in no wise changed by the case of *Holt*v. *Miller,*133 Ohio St., 418, 14 N. E. (2d), 409, or by any other decision of the Supreme Court that we know of, and is binding upon this court.

The widow in this case did not receive said property by “descent,” and therefore the descent of this property from the widow is not governed by the provisions of Section 10503-5, General Code.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Doyhe and Stevens, JJ., concur.
#### UNITED STATES v. KELLERT.

Civ. A. No. 2882.

United States District Court D. Connecticut.

Sept. 24, 1951.

*699Edmund M. 'Sweeney, Boston, Mass., for •plaintiff.

Louis Shafer, New Haven, Conn., for •defendant.

HINCKS, Chief Judge.

This is an action brought by the plaintiff under Section 206(b) of the Housing .and Rent Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S. C.A. § 1896(b), seeking restitution to a tenant of alleged excess rent demanded and received by defendant’s testate. On August 21, 1950, plaintiff served on the defendant *a*series of requests for admissions, under Federal Rule 36, 28 U.S.C.A. Eight days later, defendant moved to “dismiss” the plaintiff’s request for admissions. He did not accompany his motion with a notice of hearing nor did he request a hearing on his motion at any later time. Defendant has ■since filed a motion to dismiss the action and plaintiff has moved for summary judgment.

Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint is based on its contention that any right otf action against defendant’s testate did not survive against defendant, because the action is based on a penalty statute. It has been established that an action for restitution may be brought under the Housing and Rent Act and that such an action invokes the equity powers of the court. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 1946, 328 U.S. 395, 66 S.Ct. 1086, 90 L.Ed. 1332. An equitable action for restitution survives the death of the defendant. The defendant’s claim that the action did not survive is without merit; his motion to dismiss the action on this ground should be denied.

 Plaintiff may prevail on its motion for summary judgment only if its request for admissions stands admitted by the defendant. As to this, Rule 36(a) of the Federal Rules provides that “Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted” unless the party to whom the request is addressed serves on the requesting party either (1) a denial or averment of lack of knowledge or (2) “written objections * * * , together with a notice otf hearing the objections at the earliest practicable time.” Defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s request for admissions must be construed as a memorandum of objections within the second alternative in 36(a). As such it tfails to meet the requirements of the Rule because it was not accompanied by a notice of hearing. At no time in the intervening year did the defendant attempt to obtain a hearing on his motion. The objections are of no effect, therefore, and defendant must be deemed to have admitted all the matters on which plaintiff requested admissions. Defendant concedes that these requests for admissions cover all of plaintiff’s case. No issue of fact remaining, plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment.

It is ordered that defendant’s motion to dismiss be denied 'and that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be allowed.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 2002
 
 In connection with the Quarterly Report of Trans Energy, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, John G. Corp, Principal Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Sec. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:
 
 (1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 (2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
 
 /S/  JOHN G. CORP
 John G. Corp
 Principal Executive Officer
 August 16, 2010
 
 A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
030428-F-JZ509-864.JPG
            BRIGADIER GENERAL OLAN  G. WALDROP JR.Brigadier General Olan G. Waldrop Jr. is the staff judge advocate, Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.  He is responsible for all legal services provided to an organization with more than 100,000 personnel and an annual budget exceeding $30 billion.  He oversees more than 300 attorneys and 200 paralegals at 22 locations across the country.  His responsibilities include all Air Force litigation before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, currently having a case value approaching $2 billion. The general received his commission through the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps program in May 1966, and entered active duty in January 1968 after completing law school.  He has served as the staff judge advocate at Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii; Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.; and McConnell Air Force Base, Kan. He has also served as commander of the Air Force Legal Services Agency and as a military judge.EDUCATION1966  Bachelor of arts degree in pre-law, University of Alabama 1967  Juris doctor degree, University of Alabama 1976   Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. 1978   Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. 1984  National Security Management Course, by correspondence 1987  National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.ASSIGNMENTS1.  January 1968 - January 1971, assistant staff judge advocate, Offutt Air Force Base, Neb. 2.  February 1971 - July 1974, assistant staff judge advocate, 81st Tactical Fighter Wing, Royal Air Force Bentwaters, England 3.  August 1974 - July 1977, military judge, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas 4.  August 1977 - May 1978, student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. 5.  June 1978 - July 1981, staff judge advocate, 381st Strategic Missile Wing, McConnell Air Force Base, Kan. 6.  August 1981- June 1984, legal adviser to the special assistant for ICBM modernization, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. 7.  July 1984 - July 1986, staff judge advocate, Tactical Fighter Weapons Center, Nellis Air Force Base, Nev. 8.  August 1986 - May 1987, student, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.  9.  June 1987 - May 1991, executive to the judge advocate general, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. 10.  June 1991- June 1994, staff judge advocate, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii 11.  July 1994 - May 1995, commander, Air Force Legal Services Agency, Washington, D.C. 12.  May 1995 - present, staff judge advocate, Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OhioMAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONSLegion of MeritMeritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clustersAir Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf clusterBAR ADMISSIONSU.S. Supreme CourtSupreme Court of AlabamaU.S. Court of Military AppealsEFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTIONFirst Lieutenant  Jan 1, 1968Captain  May 12, 1968Major  Jun 1, 1976Lieutenant Colonel  Sep 1, 1980Colonel  Dec 1, 1985Brigadier General  May 25, 1995 (Current as of September 1998)
News United States Air Force
 Eglin responds to aircraft recoveryPublished March 11, 2015
                        
                        By Eglin Air Force Base Public Affairs
                **EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, Fla. (AFNS) --**
                One UH-60 Black Hawk with four aircrew and seven Marines assigned to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, was involved in an incident near Eglin Air Force Base range site A-17, east of the Navarre Bridge.The helicopter was reported missing at about 8:30 p.m. EDT, March 10. Debris from the aircraft was located by a search and rescue team at about 2 a.m. this morning. Search and rescue efforts are underway at the accident site currently.Two UH-60s, assigned to the Hammond, Louisiana Army National Guard, were participating in a training exercise overnight.The second helicopter and its personnel on board have returned and are accounted for at this time. The aircraft are assigned to the 1-244th Assault Helicopter Battalion in Hammond, Louisiana. They were participating in a routine training mission involving the Marine Special Operations Regiment from Camp Lejeune.Names of the aircrew and Marines on board are being withheld pending next-of-kin notification. The accident is under investigation. Additional details will be provided as they become available.helicopter 



crash 



accident 



Louisiana National Guard 



ANG 



Eglin AFB 



AFMC 



Black Hawk
##### 



Exhibit 32.2 Certification of Chief Financial Officer pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 In connection with this annual report on Form 10-K of Eclipsys Corporation (the Company) for
the period ended December 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the Report), the undersigned, Robert J. Colletti, Senior Vice President and Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:  (1)
    the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company. Dated: March 16, 2005 /S/ Robert J. CollettiRobert J. Colletti
Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
#### Bobby JONES a/k/a Robert Jones, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D10-3321.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Jan. 26, 2011.

Bobby Jones a/k/a Robert Jones, in proper person.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General.

Before CORTINAS, ROTHENBERG, and SALTER, JJ.

*368PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal of an order summarily denying a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). On appeal from a summary denial, this Court must reverse unless the postconviction record, *see*Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(b)(2)(A), shows conclusively that the appellant is entitled to no relief. *See*Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(b)(2)(D).

Because the record now before us fails to make the required showing, we reverse the order and remand for further proceedings. If the trial court again enters an order summarily denying the postconviction motion, the court shall attach record excerpts conclusively showing that the appellant is not entitled to any relief.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
#### STATE ex rel. Joseph MARTIN v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-2797.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 4, 2011.

In re Martin, Joseph; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 422046; to *920the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 1371.

Denied.
#### Bruce D. BELL, Appellant, v. JM FAMILY ENTERPRISES and Glen McClary, Appellees.

No. 1D11-0255.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

June 21, 2011.

*910Bruce D. Bell, pro se, Appellant.

Glen A. McClary and Kansas R. Gooden of Boyd & Jenerette, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Upon review of Appellant’s timely response to the show cause order, we DISMISS this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

DISMISSED.

DAVIS, ROBERTS, and ROWE, JJ., concur.
EX-10.2






Exhibit 10.2




SCHEDULE IDENTIFYING MATERIAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN

EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS

BETWEEN NEOPROBE CORPORATION AND

THE INDIVIDUALS LISTED BELOW




	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	Commencement	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Amount of Severance
	 	 	Date	 	Term	 	2008 Base Salary	 	Amount of Severance	 	upon change of control
	David C. Bupp
	 	 	1/1/2009	 	 	12 months	 	$	335,000	 	 	$	406,250	 	 	Greater of: (a) 30 months salary; or (b)$762,500
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Brent L. Larson
	 	 	1/1/2009	 	 	24 months	 	$	184,000	 	 	$	184,000	 	 	$	360,000	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Anthony K. Blair
	 	 	1/1/2009	 	 	24 months	 	$	157,000	 	 	$	157,000	 	 	$	310,000	 






	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	Continuation of Benefits	 	 
	 	 	Continuation of Benefits	 	Upon Termination	 	Continuation of Benefits
	 	 	Upon Disability	 	Without Cause	 	Upon Change of Control
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	David C. Bupp

	 	Longer of 24 months or
the full unexpired Term
of the Agreement
	 	Longer of 36 months or
the full unexpired Term
of the Agreement
	 	Longer of 36 months or
the full unexpired Term
of the Agreement
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Brent L. Larson

	 	Longer of 12 months or
the full unexpired Term
of the Agreement
	 	12 months or the full
unexpired Term of the
Agreement
	 	Longer of 12 months or
the full unexpired Term
of the Agreement
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Anthony K. Blair

	 	Longer of 12 months or
the full unexpired Term
of the Agreement
	 	Longer of 12 months or
the full unexpired Term
of the Agreement
	 	Longer of 12 months or
the full unexpired Term
of the Agreement
#### Joel JEAN-LOUIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D11-1848.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Aug. 3, 2011.

Joel Jean-Louis, in proper person.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.

Before ROTHENBERG, LAGOA and EMAS, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. *See Hernandez v. State,*61 So.3d 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011).
#### STATE ex rel. Carlton PARKS v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-1527.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 16, 2011.

In re Parks, Carlton; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 06-3486; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KH-358.

Denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF DISH, LTD. AS OF AND FOR THE QUARTER ENDED
JUNE 30, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO THOSE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                          19,750
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   98,344
<ALLOWANCES>                                     3,272
<INVENTORY>                                     53,540
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               178,788
<PP&E>                                         646,801
<DEPRECIATION>                                 112,609
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 795,082
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          554,939
<BONDS>                                        567,367
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   (352,884)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   795,082
<SALES>                                        449,819<F1>
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               460,188
<CGS>                                          280,235<F2>
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  488,956
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                36,152
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 4,900
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              37,300<F3>
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (64,920)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       283
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (65,203)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (65,203)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                 (65,203)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                 (65,203)
<FN>
<F1>Includes sales of programming.
<F2>Includes costs of programming.
<F3>Net of amounts capitalized.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In  connection  with the Quarterly  Report of Trans  Energy,  Inc. (the
"Company")  on Form 10-QSB for the period  ending  September  30, 2005, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),
I, Clarence E. Smith , Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C.  Sec. 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Sec. 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:

     (1) The Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
     15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
     material respects,  the financial condition and result of operations of the
     Company.


/s/   Clarence E. Smith
-----------------------------
Clarence E. Smith
Chief Executive Officer
November 25, 2005

     A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906, or
     other document  authenticating,  acknowledging,  or otherwise  adopting the
     signature that appears in typed form within the electronic  version of this
     written  statement has been provided to the Company and will be retained by
     the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange  Commission or its
     staff upon  request.  The foregoing  certifications  are  accompanying  the
     Company's Form 10-QSB solely pursuant to section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley
     Act of 2002  (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350,  chapter 63 of title
     18,  United  States Code) and is not being filed as part of the Form 10-QSB
     or as a separate disclosure document.
#### St. Louis, Ark. & Tex. R’y Co. v. John Holden.

(No. 2603.)

Appeal from Bowie County.

Todd & Hudgins, counsel for appellant.

Vaughan & Leary, counsel for appellee.

Opinion by

Hurt, J.

§ 323. *Disqualification of judge; fees of office do not disqualify; case stated.*Appellee instituted this suit against appellant to recover $200 damages for killing his dog by running over it with its engine and train of cars. He recovered judgment for $100 and costs, from which judgment appellant appealed to the county court. Pend*392ing the appeal the justice of the peace who tried the case and rendered said judgment was elected county judge and qualified as such. When the case was called for trial in the county court, appellant moved to transfer the same to the district court upon the ground that the county judge was disqualified from trying it, because he was interested to the extent of the costs due him as justice of the peace in the case, said costs not having been paid. Said motion was overruled, and judgment was again rendered for $100 and costs. *Held,*the county judge was not disqualified to try the cause, and the motion was properly overruled. [1 App. C. C. § 1068; Taylor v. Williams, 26 Tex. 505; Chambers v. Harper, 23 Tex. 112.]

December 16, 1887.

§ 324. *Wrongfully hilling a dog in another state is actionable in this state, token.*At common law the owner of a dog may maintain an action against one who wrongfully kills or injures it. [Brunt v. Kemble, 60 Ill. 211; Uhlmer v. Cronack, 109 Mass. 273; Perry v. Phipps, 10 Iredell, 259; Parker v. Amse, 27 Ala. 480.] This is an action at common law, and is maintainable in any court in this state having jurisdiction of the amount in controversy, and of the person of the wrong-doer, although the wrong was committed in another state, as it was in this case, the dog having been killed in the state of Arkansas. If A.’s property is destroyed or injured by B. in a foreign country, and A. has a common-law action against B. for such destruction or injury, he can maintain his action in this state, if service upon B. is legally had here.

Affirmed.