Filed 1/5/21 Flores v. Linares CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

ALMA MARIA FLORES,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

GUADALUPE LINARES,

Defendant and Respondent.

B298528

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 19STRO02002

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Alexander C.D. Giza, Judge. Affirmed.

Donald A. Hilland for Plaintiff and Appellant.

No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.

_________________________
2

Alma Maria Flores appeals from the trial court’s order 

denying her request for a civil harassment restraining order 

against her landlord, Guadalupe Linares.1 We affirm.

BACKGROUND2

On March 27, 2019, Flores filed a form request for a civil 

harassment restraining order against Linares under Code of Civil 

Procedure section 527.6 (section 527.6).

3 She asserted Linares 

has harassed her, her husband, and her three children daily since 

March 1, 2019. Flores’s application included her declaration, 

dated March 12, 2019.

At the time, Flores and her family lived in a duplex they 

had been renting from Linares for the past three years.

4 They 

usually paid their rent in cash. Flores declared that their roof 

had been leaking severely for months, but Linares and her son 

refused to repair it and would not let the family repair it 

themselves. Flores filed a formal code enforcement complaint 

with the City of Los Angeles in late February 2019.

1 Linares did not file a respondent’s brief, so we “decide the 

appeal on the record, the opening brief, and any oral argument 

by the appellant.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a)(2).)

2 “We summarize the facts in the light most favorable to the 

judgment.” (Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1405

(Brekke).)

3 On March 12, 2019, Flores apparently asked the court 

to enter a temporary restraining order until the scheduled 

April 17, 2019 hearing. That request was denied because the 

facts in Flores’s application did not sufficiently show harassment,

as defined by section 527.6, had occurred.

4 Linares and her son apparently lived in a separate part 

of the duplex.
3

Flores stated that, after she complained to the City,

Linares threatened to call ICE—Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement—if her family did not leave. Flores said that on 

March 9, 2019, Linares offered to pay her $3,000 if the family

would leave by the next day. She also declared Linares’s son 

threatens the family daily and that her children are scared.

She stated, “We have nowhere to go if [Linares] makes us leave[,] 

and she keeps threatening us with ICE and with physical force.”

Linares filed a response and supporting declaration dated 

April 12, 2019, denying she threatened Flores or her family.

Linares asserted the leaking roof was due to improperly installed 

solar panels. She acknowledged Flores had complained, and said 

she had contacted the solar panel installer to repair the roof. The 

installer delayed in responding, but eventually began repairs.

Linares also stated she and Flores did not have a lease.

She said Flores began insisting on paying by check.5 Linares

declared she was “fearful” that “accepting checks from these 

tenants would make me liable for harboring undocumented 

immigrants.” After consulting an attorney and learning she 

could not refuse payment by check, however, Linares asserted

she told Flores she would accept her checks. Linares also 

declared she told Flores she would pay her family to relocate, 

“so I would not be in this predicament between state and federal 

law,” but they refused.

Linares stated Flores’s attorney began sending her and her 

son “threatening legal documents demanding $1 million.” She 

admitted “[t]hat’s when [she] called Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE) and sought to report their unlawful presence.” 

She declared she informed Flores and her family that she had 

5 Flores also had asserted Linares would not accept a check 

for their March rent.
4

reported them to ICE, but did not threaten them. Linares 

attached the statement of damages she received. It is dated 

March 13, 2019, and signed by Flores’s attorney, but the case 

number is blank.

Flores filed a reply declaration. She confirmed Linares 

finally deposited the March rent check after Flores’s attorney 

mailed it. Flores also declared Linares came to her home on 

April 13, 2019, to tell Flores she did not have that month’s rent 

check. According to Flores, that Saturday a realtor came to her 

door, told her she had to move out, served her with a notice to 

move in 60 days, and told Flores to be at the property at 5:00 p.m. 

on Monday so the realtor could show her unit. Linares told 

Flores the complex was being sold and they would have to move, 

but Flores declared Linares did not tell the other immigrant 

families in the complex this same information. Flores stated

Linares asked the other undocumented immigrant family tenants 

if they knew where Flores’s husband worked. Flores also claimed

Linares spit on her on March 7, 2019, the day after Flores 

retained an attorney.

Both Flores and Linares appeared at the April 17, 2019 

hearing, and each was represented by counsel. Only Flores 

testified. She elaborated on points made in her declarations. She 

testified that “once” Linares told her if she “wasn’t comfortable, to 

leave.” Flores continued, “[S]he told me to look for another place. 

There [were] threats. And she told me to keep [the] check for the 

rent, to find another place, but I didn’t find anywhere else to go. 

Ever since I received threats.” When asked what kind of threats

she received, Flores responded, “She [Linares] threatened to 

deport me with ICE. She calls my daughters stupid, crazy. . . . 

And finally[,] she spit on me. She came and spit on me.”

Flores produced two video recordings her husband took

on March 7, 2019, that she said showed Linares threatening her 
5

with ICE and spitting on her. Flores also produced uncertified 

transcripts of the videos, in the original Spanish and translated 

into English. The court played one of the videos in open court 

while reading the transcript. The people were not visible in the

video because it was made around 8 p.m. The court stated it did 

not see “anything that looked like” spitting on the video. Flores 

indicated the point in the video where she said she could hear 

Linares spitting.

Flores testified that during the recorded discussion, she 

and her husband were standing in their doorway, and Linares

and her son were standing outside. The transcript begins with 

Linares stating, “Another thing, my brother, the one that’s in 

Norwalk, you know him, I told him about the problem, and he 

asked me if you were legal. I said no. Then he said if you all 

started problems, he would call immigration services.” After 

the parties accuse each other of acting illegally, the transcript

ends with, “[Linares] spits on [Flores].”

A second video of the same date captures the apparent 

continuation of the parties’ discussion. According to that

transcript,6 Flores asks Linares if she wants the rent check, 

“or no?” Linares replies, “No, no, I don’t want it. Because you 

know what I was going to tell you, to not pay this month, I was 

going to give you this month[,] so you look for another place.” 

Flores responds, “No, I’m not going to look for another place until 

you give me something written, I’m serious.” Linares’s son then 

states, “If we don’t do it the good way, we’ll do it the bad way.” 

6 Although the trial court did not view this second video 

in open court, the transcripts from both videos were filed with 

Flores’s reply, and the court confirmed it had read all of the 

papers. Flores’s attorney also referred to its contents during 

the hearing.
6

Flores responds, “Ok. However you want, because that’s a 

threat.” Linares’s son denied he had made a threat, saying, 

“[W]e didn’t say what was going to be done specifically.” Flores

then states, “Ok[,] but you said you [referring to Linares] were 

going to call ICE on me. Do it.” Linares replied, “I didn’t’ say 

I would, I said my brother.”

Flores’s attorney asked her if Linares threatened her in 

other ways. She responded that Linares said if she didn’t leave 

willingly, Linares would report her to the immigration services. 

Flores testified her family had not been living at home because 

they learned Linares had reported them to ICE. She said Linares 

“knocks on the door,” and the kids are afraid.

Linares’s attorney cross-examined Flores. When 

questioned, Flores testified her last contact with Linares had 

been the week before the hearing when Linares came to pick up 

the check, “and she was angry.” Flores said she shut the door, 

and Linares knocked on it three more times and yelled. She 

testified Linares did not make any threats of physical harm 

against her.

Linares’s attorney pressed Flores to recall a date of a 

specific threat Linares made and what she said. Flores again 

referred to the March 7, 2019 incident and described Linares

as threatening to report Flores to immigration services. When 

asked if Linares made that threat again, Flores responded

that Linares would always say the same thing, that Flores had 

“no papers, and she was going to report [her] to . . . immigration, 

and they were going to throw [her] out of the country.”

On cross-examination, Flores admitted she had filed a civil

lawsuit against Linares alleging she violated certain Civil Code 

sections and seeking $1 million. Her attorney also confirmed

they had filed a civil case.
7

After cross-examining Flores, Linares’s attorney moved to 

dismiss the request for a restraining order on the ground there

was no clear and convincing evidence of a threat of irreparable 

harm. He argued there were allegations Linares violated the 

Civil Code and those would be addressed in Flores’s lawsuit, 

but there was “no credible objective ongoing threat that needs 

to be enjoined,” even if the court accepted the allegations as true.

The court expressed its concern about the Civil Code 

provisions prohibiting landlords from threatening to disclose 

or disclosing a tenant’s immigration status. Flores’s attorney

directed the court to Linares’s admission that she had called ICE. 

He argued the call only could have been in retaliation for Flores 

and her husband complaining about the roof. Linares’s attorney

confirmed Linares called ICE, but reiterated no threats had been 

made.

After hearing the evidence and counsel’s arguments, the 

trial court ruled it did not find clear and convincing evidence of 

harassment. The court noted “there are separate procedures 

for redress” for the dispute between the parties concerning the 

rental property and payment of rent, and it understood “from 

the testimony that those are being looked into.” The court 

then indicated it was “troubled by the testimony” it had heard 

concerning the violation of the Civil Code sections preventing 

the use of or threat of disclosing the immigration or citizenship 

status of a tenant.

Nevertheless the court concluded the evidence, including 

the video transcripts, did not provide sufficient evidence of 

a threat to disclose Flores’s immigration or citizenship status. 

In response to Flores’s attorney’s further argument, the court 

stated, “I don’t find it to be clear and convincing evidence of 

a threat. It may be a preponderance. And I think there are other 

avenues for relief of that burden of proof.” The court continued, 
8

“Although I’m moved by the situation, I did not find there was 

clear and convincing evidence. And so there’s not going to be 

a civil harassment restraining order in this case. Again, this 

looks largely as landlord/tenant. It looks largely related to 

the Civil Code issues. And there’s a legal proceeding that is 

the appropriate procedural path.”

DISCUSSION

1. Applicable law and standard of review

The Legislature enacted section 527.6 “ ‘to protect the 

individual’s right to pursue safety, happiness and privacy 

as guaranteed by the California Constitution.’ [Citations.] 

It does so by providing expedited injunctive relief to victims 

of harassment.” (Brekke, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1412.) 

Harassment is defined as (1) “unlawful violence,” (2) “a credible 

threat of violence,” or (3) “a knowing and willful course of conduct 

directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or 

harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The 

course of conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable

person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually 

cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.” (§ 527.6, 

subd. (b)(3); Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484.) 

A “ ‘[c]ourse of conduct’ is a pattern of conduct composed of 

a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing 

a continuity of purpose,” not including constitutionally protected 

activity. (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1).)

To obtain a restraining order under section 527.6, the 

petitioner must show by “clear and convincing evidence that 

unlawful harassment exists.” (§ 527.6, subd. (i).) The clear 

and convincing evidence standard requires a finding of “ ‘high 

probability.’ ” (Russell v. Douvan (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 399, 

401 (Russell).) Moreover, because “an injunction serves to 

prevent future injury and is not applicable to wrongs that have 
9

been completed,” the petitioner also must show a high probability 

of future harm. (Id. at pp. 400, 402; Scripps Health v. Marin

(1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 324, 332-333 (Scripps Health) [interpreting 

similar statute relating to workplace violence to require court 

to find petitioner at risk of further unlawful conduct by clear 

and convincing evidence].)

We review a trial court’s denial of a request for a 

restraining order for abuse of discretion (Salazar v. Eastin (1995) 

9 Cal.4th 836, 849-850), and the trial court’s factual findings—

express and implied—for substantial evidence (R.D. v. P.M. 

(2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 181, 188 (R.D.)). In so doing, “[w]e 

resolve all factual conflicts and questions of credibility in favor of 

the prevailing party and indulge in all legitimate and reasonable 

inferences to uphold the finding of the trial court if it is supported 

by substantial evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid 

value.” (Schild v. Rubin (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 755, 762.) The 

issue is not whether evidence in the record supports a contrary 

conclusion, but whether substantial evidence, contradicted 

or uncontradicted, supports the trial court’s determination. 

(Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873-874; 

Rupf v. Yan (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 411, 429, fn. 5.)

2. Flores’s contentions of error

Flores based her restraining order request primarily on 

Linares’s purported threat to call ICE and report Flores and 

her family’s immigration status after Flores complained about 

the leaking roof and refused to relocate.7 In her opening brief, 

Flores contends the trial court confused civil harassment under 

section 527.6 with harassment under the Civil Code sections 

7 Flores even titled her declaration in support of her petition, 

“Declaration of Alma Maria Flores re: Threats of Calling ICE 

re Immigration Status.”
10

prohibiting landlords from reporting their tenants’ immigration 

status for improper purposes.8 Flores does not explain how this 

purported “confusion” resulted in error, however, other than to 

state the court “fail[ed] to recognize” those Civil Code sections. In 

fact, during the hearing, the trial court not only referred to these 

Civil Code sections, it quoted text from Civil Code section 1940.2.

From what we can discern from Flores’s brief, she seems to 

argue that Linares’s violation of one of these Civil Code sections

is sufficient to require a civil harassment restraining order under 

section 527.6.9 But a landlord’s unlawful act under the Civil 

8 For example, Civil Code section 1940.2 provides, in part, 

that it is unlawful for a landlord to “[t]hreaten to disclose 

information regarding or relating to the immigration or 

citizenship status of a tenant” to influence her “to vacate 

a dwelling.” (Civ. Code, § 1940.2, subd. (a)(5).) Section 1940.3, 

subdivision (b)(3) prohibits a landlord from disclosing a tenant’s 

immigration or citizenship status to harass or intimidate the 

tenant, retaliate against the tenant, or influence the tenant 

“to vacate a dwelling.” Section 1942.5, on which Flores relies

heavily in her brief, prohibits a landlord from reporting 

or threatening to report a tenant to immigration authorities 

in retaliation for the tenant’s complaint to housing authorities. 

(Id., § 1942.5, subds. (a), (c).)

9 Flores’s opening brief on this point is unhelpful to say the 

least. It recites the requirements for showing retaliatory eviction

under Civil Code Section 1942.5 and argues Linares violated that 

section. The brief then discusses retaliatory eviction under that 

section in a first person, narrative form that Flores’s attorney

appears to have copied directly from an uncited blog-post—

including the original writer’s advice and personal experiences. 

The brief also mentions the California Constitution’s due process 

clause, but does not state how the issue of due process is relevant 

here.
11

Code does not automatically entitle a wronged tenant to

expedited injunctive relief under section 527.6. A civil 

harassment restraining order will issue only upon a showing of 

clear and convincing evidence of harassment that is reasonably 

certain to recur. (R.D., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 189 [§ 527.6 

injunction “authorized . . . only when it appears from the evidence 

that the harassment is likely to recur in the future”].)

And, because the issue on review turns on the appellant’s

failure of proof, the question for us “ ‘becomes whether the 

evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of 

law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the 

appellant’s evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” 

and (2) “of such a character and weight as to leave no room 

for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support 

a finding.” ’ ” (Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE 

Systems, Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 466.) We thus examine 

the evidence to determine whether it compelled the trial court 

to issue a restraining order against Linares under section 527.6. 

We conclude it did not.

3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion

To establish Linares harassed her under section 527.6, 

Flores testified that Linares threatened her repeatedly.10 The 

evidence of repeated threats was not uncontradicted, however. 

The only threat that Flores could testify to with any specificity

was Linares’s threat to report Flores and her family to ICE. 

10 We presume Flores contends Linares’s “threats” fall under 

the “course of conduct” definition of harassment. At the hearing, 

Flores never testified Linares engaged in violence or threatened 

her with violence, other than spitting on her. As we discuss, the 

court did not err in finding the evidence of the spitting incident 

insufficient.
12

As to that threat, Flores could recall specifically only the

March 7, 2019 date. According to the March 7, 2019 video

transcript, Linares repeated her brother’s statement that he 

would call immigration if Flores and her husband “started 

problems.” In both the transcript and her declaration, Linares 

denied having threatened Flores. Instead, Linares admitted both 

that she had offered to pay Flores to relocate and that she had 

reported Flores’s “unlawful presence” to ICE and informed Flores 

that she had done so.

The trial court was “troubled” by the testimony, but did not 

find clear and convincing evidence of harassment under section 

527.6. The court did not find the video or its transcript to provide 

clear and convincing evidence of a threat to disclose immigration

status. The court also found Flores’s testimony about the threats 

by Linares to call ICE were not corroborated by the other 

evidence, implicitly rejecting Flores’s testimony that Linares 

repeatedly threatened Flores with reporting her to ICE.

11 We 

did not hear the parties’ tone in the video, as the trial court did, 

and will not reweigh the evidence nor reassess the trial court’s 

credibility determinations. (Pope v. Babick (2014) 229 

Cal.App.4th 1238, 1246 [reviewing court is not a second trier of 

fact].) Moreover, the court also noted the testimony that there 

had been actual reporting to ICE in concluding there was no clear 

and convincing evidence of a threat. Given it found insufficient

evidence of a threat, we can infer the court also concluded Flores 

failed to meet her burden of proof to demonstrate she was at risk 

of future harm—in other words, that Linares’s wrongful conduct 

11 We also can infer the trial court rejected Flores’s 

characterization of Linares’s statement in the transcript offering 

Flores to skip that month’s rent to look for a new place, as a 

threat.
13

likely would continue—a requirement to enjoin future conduct. 

(Russell, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at pp. 401-402.)

We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s 

implied finding that it was not likely Linares would continue to 

harass Flores by threatening to report her to ICE. By Linares’s

own admission, the deed already had been done. Thus, a

restraining order would serve only to punish Linares’s completed

wrongful act. (Russell, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 402; Scripps 

Health, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 332.) Accordingly, even 

presuming, without deciding, that Linares’s statements to Flores 

reflected in the March 7, 2019 video transcripts and her actual 

reporting of Flores to ICE constitute harassment under section 

527.6, the court did not err in refusing to issue a restraining 

order against Linares.

Flores’s attorney argued Flores faced a continuing risk 

of harm if Linares was not restrained because Flores could not 

return home. He asserted that they “believe[ed]” Linares had 

ICE waiting for Flores at her home when Flores was told to be 

there to show the property. That argument was based on Flores’s 

speculation, however. It did not demonstrate a high probability

that Linares, going forward, would call ICE to come to the 

property. Moreover, no restraining order could prevent ICE 

from coming to Flores’s home. Thus, injunctive relief would 

not prevent the potential harm Flores feared would result from 

Linares’s earlier report to ICE. And, as Linares’s attorney 

argued, it would not be reasonable to conclude Linares would 

threaten Flores with new calls to ICE when Flores had a 

pending lawsuit that sought damages against her.

Besides the threats to call ICE, Flores’s attorney also 

argued Flores was under “constant harassment” by Linares 

“coming around to her door and things, telling her that she 

hasn’t paid the rent when she has, when she’s offered the rent 
14

and she won’t accept it.” In her brief, Flores asserts that Linares 

spit on her, Linares and her son “repeatedly threatened her,” 

and Linares harassed her “on a daily basis, knocking on her door 

while her husband was at work and telling her she had to get out, 

move, leave the unit.” The court found no evidence of spitting 

on the video, however. The video itself is not part of the record. 

We presume the court’s finding is correct. (Haywood v. Superior 

Court (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 949, 955 [reviewing court will infer 

substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings where 

record on appeal does not contain all of the evidence submitted 

to the trial court].) 

The court also reasonably could conclude Flores’s testimony

of one instance where Linares continued to knock on Flores’s door 

while shouting was insufficient to constitute clear and convincing 

evidence of a “credible threat of violence” or “a knowing and 

willful course of conduct that seriously alarms, annoys, or 

harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.”12

(§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3); see Leydon v. Alexander (1989) 212 

Cal.App.3d 1, 4-5 [single incident, although deplorable, 

insufficient to obtain injunctive relief under § 527.6].) Nor does 

the evidence compel a finding that this behavior would continue.

Again, the trial court could infer it was improbable Linares would 

continue to engage in such tactics in the face of Flores’s pending

lawsuit. 

Linares may very well have called ICE in retaliation for 

Flores having complained about the roof, but without clear and 

convincing evidence that Linares would continue to harass Flores 

12 Although Flores argues she was harassed on a daily basis 

by Linares knocking on her door, she only testified in any detail 

about the one incident. She also admitted Linares never 

threatened her with physical harm.
15

by making those or other threats, a civil harassment restraining 

order could not be issued. The trial court, therefore, did not 

abuse its discretion in denying Flores’s request. And, by the 

time of the April 17, 2019 hearing, there already was a legal 

proceeding underway—requiring a lesser standard of proof13—

that would provide, as the trial court put it, “the appropriate 

procedural path” to address Flores’s claims against Linares 

for violating the Civil Code.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Because respondent did not 

participate in the appeal, no costs are awarded to her.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

LAVIN, Acting P. J. DHANIDINA, J.

13 Unless otherwise provided, the burden of proof in civil 

cases requires “proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” 

(Evid. Code, § 115; Estate of Ford (2004) 32 Cal.4th 160, 173.)