IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-20630

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

ANGEL MORENO SALAZAR

Defendant-Appellant

[Consolidated with No. 06-20775]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JUAN CARLOS SALAZAR

Defendant-Appellant

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:05-CR-371-3

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

July 17, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 06-20630 c/w

No. 06-20775

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

2

Before WIENER, GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Angel Moreno Salazar (“Angel”) and Juan Carlos Salazar (“Juan”) pleaded

guilty to conspiracy to commit sex trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371,

1591(a). At rearraignment, each defendant admitted to trafficking girls under

the age of 18 for the purpose of forcing them into prostitution. The statutory

maximum term of imprisonment as to each defendant was sixty months. § 371.

Angel Salazar

Angel contends that the district court erred in applying U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3,

which applies to sex trafficking offenses involving minors, rather than U.S.S.G.

§ 2G1.1, which applies to sex trafficking offenses involving non-minors.

Specifically, Angel contends that the court clearly erred in finding that (1) he

knew the sex trafficking operation involved minors, and, alternatively, that (2)

it was reasonably foreseeable that the victims would include minors.

Angel was sentenced after the Supreme Court issued its decision in United

States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). While after Booker, a district court’s

ultimate sentencing decision is reviewed for reasonableness, this court continues

to review a district court’s interpretation and application of the Sentencing

Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v.

Caldwell, 448 F.3d 287, 290 (5th Cir. 2006). In determining a defendant’s

sentence, “the district court may consider any relevant evidence that has

sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.” United States

v. Angeles-Mendoza, 407 F.3d 742, 750 (5th Cir. 2005). Generally, a pre-sentence

report (“PSR”) bears sufficient indicia of reliability to be considered as evidence

by the sentencing judge when making factual determinations. United States v.
No. 06-20630 c/w

No. 06-20775

3

Alfaro, 919 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir. 1990). The record reflects that Angel knew

that the victims of the sex trafficking operation involved minors. The

indictment, to which Angel pleaded guilty, charged him with participating in a

sex trafficking conspiracy involving “young Mexican girls . . . [who] had not

attained the age of 18 years.” At his rearraignment, Angel indicated that he

understood the crime with which he was charged -- including the fact that the

trafficked person was under 18 years of age -- and admitted that he had

committed the crime. Finally, the PSR indicates that Angel, on at least one

occasion, drove a minor to a bar so that she could work as a prostitute. Angel

has not established that the information relied upon by the district court was

“materially untrue,” see United States v. Davis, 76 F.3d 82, 84 (5th Cir. 1996) or

that the district court clearly erred in reaching its determination. See Caldwell,

448 F.3d at 290.

Finally, Angel’s argument that the district court should have applied §

2G1.1 rather than applying § 2G1.3 because it was not reasonably foreseeable

to him that minors would be involved in the sex trafficking operation fails

because the record reflects that he knew minors were involved.

Juan Salazar

Juan first argues that the district court erred in enhancing his sentence

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(1)(B) and (2)(B) because the fact that (1) he

participated in the smuggling of a minor into the United States, and that (2) he

unduly influenced a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct were neither

admitted by him nor found by a jury. 

To the extent that Juan is arguing that the district court violated his

rights under the Sixth Amendment when it sentenced him, his argument is

without merit. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000), the

Supreme Court held that any fact that increases the maximum sentence

authorized by a jury must be admitted by the defendant or found by a jury
No. 06-20630 c/w

No. 06-20775

4

beyond a reasonable doubt. In 2005, the Supreme Court applied Apprendito the

Sentencing Guidelines requiring that any fact, other than the fact of a prior

conviction, that increases a sentence beyond the maximum authorized by the

facts established by a guilty plea or jury verdict must be admitted by the

defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Booker, 554 U.S. at

244. Here, the district court did not err in enhancing Juan’s sentence pursuant

to § 2G1.3(b)(1)(B) and (2)(B) because the enhancements were based upon Juan’s

admissions that he (1) participated in a sex trafficking conspiracy which involved

minors, and (2) smuggled one of the minors into the United States.

Juan also argues that his sentence is unreasonable because the district

court failed to consider the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in

determining his sentence. After Booker, we review sentences for

“reasonableness.” UnitedStates v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 520 (5th Cir. 2005). The

sentencing court has a duty to consider the § 3553(a) factors and to correctly

determine the applicable guideline range. Mares, 402 F.3d at 518-19. “[A]

sentence within a properly calculated Guideline range is entitled to a nonbinding presumption of reasonableness. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456,

2462 (2007).

In Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007), the Supreme Court

held that “[r]egardless of whether the sentence imposed is inside or outside the

Guidelines range, the appellate court must review [a district court] sentence

under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Under Gall, the appellate court must

first consider whether the district court committed a significant procedural

error, such as miscalculating the Guidelines, treating the Guidelines as

mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, or failing to explain the

reasons for the sentence. Id. If the decision is procedurally sound, the appellate

court considers the “substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under

an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Id.
No. 06-20630 c/w

No. 06-20775

5

In the instant case, the district court’s sentencing decision was

procedurally sound. Although Juan complains that the district court failed to

consider the § 3553(a) factors, the record reflects that the district court noted

that he “dedicated himself to putting females into prostitution,” and that he

assisted his father “by providing girls and women from Mexico to work as

prostitutes.” Given the nature and circumstances of the crime of conviction, the

district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Juan to the statutory

maximum term of imprisonment. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597.

Accordingly:

We AFFIRM the district court sentence with respect to Angel Salazar; and 

We AFFIRM the district court sentence with respect to Juan Salazar.