June 8, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — Extensions of Remarks E 1177

United States, boosting productivity and

economic welfare. New research from the

Census Bureau shows, for example, that foreign-owned plants are more productive, more

technology-intensive and pay higher wages

than the average U.S.-owned plant. Developing countries are also moving at a record

pace to emulate America’s successful opendoor investment policy. More than 40 nations

moved in this direction in 1992 alone. Indeed,

attitudes have shifted from deep suspicion of

multinational investors to active solicitation.

Foreign direct investment, or FDI, is now

the most important source of external finance for developing countries, which attracted a record 40 percent of global FDI

flows in 1994. A lack of modern infrastructure that threatens future growth is further

driving FDI liberalization in areas still restricted in many nations. Countries such as

India and Indonesia, for example, are breaking down telecommunication monopolies and

encouraging increased foreign participation.

The irony is that the United States is moving in the opposite direction. In contrast to

the unilateral opening now occurring in developing countries, the United States has

started to experiment with a new generation

of laws and regulations that promote the discriminatory treatment of foreign investors.

Since 1988 substantial machinery has been

put in place to block FDI deals and to penalize foreign-owned firms for the offensive

practices of their home-country governments. First popular in the area of research

and development policy, these tit-for-tat

tactics are now being used against foreign

investors through the deregulation of U.S. financial services and communications sectors. In both cases, pending legislation would

condition the access of foreign investors—

such as banks and telecommunication

firms—on comparable market-opening measures in their home countries. U.S. negotiators have further indicated their intention to link the two during the investment

negotiations, which are being held under the

auspices of the Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development.

Caught in the cross-fire are deals like the

proposal by Deutsche Telekom and France

Telecom to buy a 20 percent stake in Sprint;

rival AT&T wants the deal blocked until

equal access is secured in the German and

French markets. Also caught are proposals

to unconditionally eliminate the existing 25

percent restriction on foreign ownership of

media and telephone companies. These proposals don’t have a chance until the tactic of

using investors as a trade tool is rejected as

economic nonsense.

For starters this approach treats liberalization as a concession and discounts the intrinsic value of foreign investment to the

U.S. economy. Opening financial services

and telecommunications more to competition and foreign participation will generate

benefits for the U.S. economy that do not depend on more open rules abroad. Sir James

Graham, a 19th century British statesman,

said it best: to create a link between the two

is to ‘‘make the folly of others the limit of

our wisdom.’’

As San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank

President Robert T. Parry put it, the ‘‘hammer of reciprocity’’ is a crude policy tool

that misses the fundamental point: Competition is America’s secret economic weapon,

not reciprocity.

Take the case of the auto industry. Foreign-owned car plants in this country—socalled transplants—have brought key technology and management practices to the

United States, strengthening the domestic

industry and transforming the nation’s Rust

Belt into an export belt. By contrast, consider the sheltered telecommunications industry in Germany and the slow pace of deregulation, which have kept costs high and

hurt firms within the industry as well as

downstream users.

Further, if the United States hopes to secure an investment agreement—either

through the OECD or an expanded World

Trade Organization—that is based on the

principles of nondiscrimination, then approving the use of foreign investors as a

crowbar is hardly an auspicious start. Is this

really the precedent the United States wants

to set for other countries, especially the dynamic developing economies? Just as the

OECD is trying to narrow the scope of investment restrictions, Washington is carving

out a new category of exceptions to the principle of nondiscrimination, with potentially

damming consequences.

The hazard of being a leader is that others

watch and follow. The anti-dumping laws

provide an unfortunate case in point. Initially promoted as a ‘‘trade remedy,’’ antidumping laws have spread around the world,

to the detriment of U.S.-owned multinationals. More than 40 nations—half of them developing countries—have adopted anti-dumping laws. Indeed, there has been a sharp increase in cases since 1990, and U.S. exporters

are now the target of these laws more often

than any other country. What seemed to

help in the short term instead has worked to

reduce corporate flexibility and hurt the efficiency of the global economy.

If other countries follow the U.S. lead in

investment and use FDI as a trade tool, we

will have created an administrative nightmare. We also will have squandered a rare

opportunity to develop a comprehensive,

nondiscriminatory investment regime.

Rather than take this troubled path, the

United States should lead by example and resist the tit-for-tat approach to investment

challenges. Competing for, not restricting,

investor dollars—domestic or foreign—drives

the economy forward. Let’s stick with the

program that works.

Cynthia Beltz, a research fellow at The

American Enterprise Institute in Washington, is editor of the forthcoming, ‘‘The Foreign Investment Debate’’ (AEI, 1995).

SUPPORT THE NAVY’S SUBMARINE

MODERNIZATION PLAN

f

HON. SAM GEJDENSON OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 7, 1995

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to read the article below

from this month’s issue of Sea Power Magazine, which underscores the need for Congress to support the Navy’s submarine modernization plan. The article was written by

James Courter, former Congressman and

chairman of the BRAC Commission, and

Loren Thompson, executive director of the

Alexis de Tocqueville Institution.

The timing of this article could not be better

as Congress debates the Navy’s plan to complete the third Seawolf and continue design

work on the follow-on less expensive new attack submarine. I urge all my colleagues to

read this informative article and to support the

Navy’s submarine plan.

The article follows:

THE NEXT SUBMARINE—AND THE ONE AFTER

THAT

(By James Courter and Loren Thompson)

In the years since the fall of the Berlin

Wall, the future of the Navy’s submarine

construction program has become somewhat

uncertain. The service has taken several

steps to adjust to the diminished threat, including scaling back the program to build

Seawolf-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). In the late 1989s the Navy

was planning to build as many as 29

Seawolfs; the program now has been cut

back to a mere three boats. Meanwhile, the

Navy has initiated the design of a less expensive follow-on attack submarine, and has

concentrated its new submarine construction

work at the General Dynamics Electric Boat

(GD/EB) shipyard in Groton, Conn.

Despite these efforts, critics in Congress

and elsewhere have urged that additional

changes are needed. Some favor termination

of the third ship of the Seawolf class. Others

believe that all construction of nuclear-powered ships, aircraft carriers as well as submarines, should be carried out at one location. And still others argue that the Navy

should build at least some diesel-powered

submarines rather than the more expensive

nuclear boats.

Despite the critics, a careful examination

of recent history, current technological

trends, and prospective geopolitical developments builds a compelling case for the continued production of SSNs as a reasonable

trade-off between future military requirements, current geopolitical uncertainties,

and continuing constraints on resources.

BACK TO THE FUTURE

Although the United States fought two

world wars prior to the full emergence of Soviet military power in the late 1940s, many

policy-makers apparently believe the earlier

threats of this century—including the Soviet

threat—have no relevance to current or future U.S. security needs. But there is, in

fact, a common thread that links all the

great military threats of the twentieth century to all of the others, and to the equally

imposing challenges that America may face

in the foreseeable future.

That common thread is geopolitical uncertainty. Three times in the twentieth century, anti-democratic coalitions sought to

dominate Eurasia. The imperialist threat

posed by Germany and Austria Hungary was

followed by fascist aggression mounted by

Germany and Japan, which gave way to communist-sponsored subversion and political

upheaval emanating from the USSR and

Communist China. These three challenges

largely defined U.S. defense policy and

spending patterns in the twentieth century.

Such threats were not unanticipated in the

nineteenth century. Geopolitical theorists

such as Halford Mackinder and Alfred

Thayer Mahan had noted the disproportionate concentration of people and material resources in Eurasia, and correctly concluded

that insular powers such as the United

States must possess the political, economic,

and military strength needed to ensure their

access to what Mackinder called the ‘‘world

island.’’ To allow one power, or a coalition of

powers, the theorists argued, to control the

Eurasian landmass might set the stage for

domination of the whole world. During the

Cold War, the strategy of assuring access to

Eurasia—and of preventing Soviet and Chinese control of it—was christened ‘‘containment’’ by George Kennan. But the basic geopolitical roots of the Cold War containment

policy differed little from the strategic considerations that in earlier times had drawn

the United States into global conflicts

against imperialism and fascism.

American seapower played a central role in

enabling the United States to execute its

containment strategy, just as it played an

important part in the efforts of U.S. foes—

Germany and Japan in World War II and the
E 1178 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — Extensions of Remarks June 8, 1995

USSR in the Cold War—to defeat that strategy. Even after the advent of intercontinental aircraft, control of the sea lanes remained essential to U.S. economic prosperity and national security. In fact, the relevance of seapower has increased dramatically as the U.S. economy has become increasingly linked to the economies of Europe

and Asia—and, not incidentally, also has become more and more dependent on energy resources, such as Middle East oil, and other

vital raw materials available only, or primarily, from foreign suppliers. The breakup

of the Soviet Union into numerous republics—four of them armed with nuclear weapons—has not significantly altered this reality.

What it has altered, though, is the sense of

urgency among U.S. decision-makers about

the need to preserve naval forces adequate to

safeguard freedom of the seas and to protect

U.S. interests overseas. The United States is

currently engaged in its third great demobilization of the twentieth century—and, although this one has been more gradual than

those following the world wars, it seems to

be based on the same assumption that greatpower threats to U.S. national security are a

thing of the past. The current U.S. defense

posture thus is predicated in large part on

the expectation that U.S. forces will face no

future military challenge more imposing

than regional conflict. The budgetary result

has been a massive demobilization and

downsizing of the force structure. As an ancillary consequence, the U.S. defense production base, including the shipbuilding and

aerospace industries, and their suppliers,

also has been seriously weakened.

THE RELEVANCE OF SUBMARINES

Nowhere is this fact more apparent than in

the building of nuclear submarines. Thirty

years ago, there were half a dozen public and

private shipyards in the United States capable of building submarines. Today, there are

two—and soon there may only be one. The

Navy’s current submarine construction plan

calls for building a single nuclear-powered

attack submarine at General Dynamics Electric Boat every other year into the next decade.

This minimal production rate, combined

with the accelerated retirement of boats now

in the active fleet, will, by the turn of the

century, reduce the Navy’s SSN fleet to a

force of only 45 to 55 ships. (The Clinton administration’s Nuclear Posture Review also

has recommended retention of 14 Trident

ballistic missile submarines (SSBN’s) to

serve as the core of the nation’s nuclear deterrent.)

Many defense analysts have pointed out

that the presently contemplated rate of submarine construction is not sufficient to sustain even the much-reduced operational now

force planned. Assuming a service life of 30

years for each boat, a build rate of one new

submarine every other year would eventually produce a fleet of only 15 submarines.

However, because the current inventory of

operational SSNs exceeds the established requirement, the Navy does not plan to address

the production-rate issue until early in the

next century. For the time being, its main

concern is simply to ensure that a submarine

design and production base is preserved. And

concern is warranted: If even one submarine

is dropped from the current minimal-construction plan for replacement SSNs, the

production base for nuclear-powered submarines may indeed collapse.

The relevance of attack submarines to future U.S. national security requirements is

based primarily on the continuing requirement to guarantee U.S. access to Eurasia,

and recent history suggests that major new

threats to the stability of the world island

could emerge in the relatively near future—

initially, perhaps, in the form of regional aggression. The question that arises in that

context concerns the future role of nuclearpowered attack submarines.

INSTABILITY AND PERSISTENCE

The most obvious such role revolves

around the traditional mission of maintaining control of the world’s sea lanes. By countering enemy submarines and surface combatants, attack submarines assure the safe

ocean transit of U.S. and allied naval and

merchant vessels. Because of the general decline in Russian military power, that mission may seem to be perhaps less critical in

the mid-1900s than it was during the Cold

War. But U.S. naval intelligence officials

have warned that ‘‘the bear still swims’’—

and have backed up that statement with

hard evidence. The Russians continue to

build several new submarines per year, and

they have made significant progress in

matching—in some cases surpassing—the

stealthiness of U.S. submarines, even while

they cut back drastically on many other

components of their military power. The

present instability of the Russian regime,

and the persistence of anti-Western, antidemocratic political attitudes in Russia,

both strongly suggest that the United States

should not allow itself to fall behind Russia’s

technological achievements in the underwater arena.

A related and potentially more ominous

development to which the Russians—and several U.S. allies—have contributed is the

rapid proliferation of non-nuclear submarine

technologies to developing countries. There

are now over 600 submarines deployed around

the world, operational in the navies of more

than 40 countries. Not all of those submarines pose a direct threat to U.S. use of

the sea lanes, but a growing number do. In

recent years, Russia and various Western nations have agreed to sell diesel-electric submarines to, among other countries—not all

of them friendly to the United States—

China, Egypt, India, Iran, Pakistan, and

Syria. In addition, several of the more developed nations of the Third World have begun

or are beginning to develop an indigenous capacity to produce diesel-electric or even nuclear-powered submarines.

The problem posed by the proliferation of

submarine technology is today more embryonic than urgent, but the pace of proliferation, combined with the strategic location of

several recent purchasers of modern submarines, is worrisome. It would require only

a few submarines to close the Straits of Gibraltar or the Straits of Hormuz—which

would be likely targets of Libya and Iran, respectively, in the event of future conflict.

Continued U.S. access to Middle East oil, and

to Asian and European markets, demands

that the U.S. Navy be prepared to deter or

counter major new submarine threats. The

current U.S. submarine program is for that

reason aimed primarily at developing and

building the submarine platforms, sensors,

and weapons needed to track and destroy

submarines that in the future will be faster,

more lethal, and, above all, increasingly

stealthy.

LAND-ATTACK SSNs

A second key role that attack submarines

will in all likelihood be assigned in the future is the delivery of precision firepower

against land targets ashore. The precedent

for this mission is well-established in the

fleet of SSBNs, which have for so long been

the most survivable ‘‘leg’’ of the U.S. strategic nuclear triad, and which have as their

primary if not exclusive mission the destruction of enemy ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) silos, air bases, and other strategic land targets. In the future, though, the

parallel capability of SSNs to launch conventional cruise missiles against land targets may play a greater role in U.S. naval

strategy and tactics. Because of the loss of

U.S. bases overseas and the need in recent

years, as a result of budget cuts, to ‘‘gap’’

forward-deployed Navy battle groups in waters adjacent to areas of potential crisis, it

may become increasingly necessary for the

Navy to rely on submarines to compensate

for the absence of surface combatants and

tactical naval aviation.

The vulnerability of surface ships to the

increasingly sophisticated cruise missiles,

land-based as well as sea-based, possessed by

so many Third World nations and regional

powers also will require submarines to play a

growing role in the land-attack mission. A

recent war game at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, R.I., demonstrated that a

U.S. surface fleet could suffer severe losses

to land-based cruise missiles.

There is nothing hypothetical about this

threat; it is already a very real and increasingly difficult problem. A long-time U.S.

ally, France, currently is developing a

stealthy, long-range cruise missile called the

Apache that will be able to use a direct link

to reconnaissance satellites for guidance.

While the French have no plans to export the

new missile, it is clearly only a matter of

time before all of the key technologies—

stealth, cruise missiles, realtime satellite reconnaissance—are available to other industrialized countries and, probably, to some

lesser-developed nations as well.

Such trends in the capabilities of weapons

will require parallel changes in the operating

tactics and battle doctrines of all the world’s

navies. As it becomes increasingly necessary

for major surface combantants and auxiliaries to remain further offshore, the ability

of submarines to elude detection will enhance their usefulness in the land-attack

role. Indeed, some observers already believe

that the capacity of submarines to remain

stealthy will make the attack submarine the

true capital ship of the next century.

Submarines probably also will retain the

various ancillary missions, such as reconnaissance and the insertion of special-operations forces, that they assumed—or that

were thrust upon them—during the Cold

War. While such roles may not in themselves

justify spending a billion dollars or more for

a nuclear-powered attack submarine, they

are a useful complement to the submarine’s

primary mission and thus, by helping to amortize the SSN’s operating as well as initialconstruction costs, would be a key factor in

the overall cost/benefit equation.

MAINTAINING AN ADEQUATE FORCE

Despite recurrent reports throughout the

Cold War that new technology was about to

render the oceans transparent, U.S. submarines have remained exceedingly difficult,

if not impossible, for adversaries to track

and target, thanks primarily to the Navy’s

long-term and continuing effort to improve

the stealthiness of its submarines. Although

the sensitivity and signal-processing capabilities of potential adversaries’ sonar systems have improved significantly, they have

not managed to match the pace of ‘‘quieting’’ U.S. submarines. Experts are nearly

unanimous in believing that American submarines can remain ahead in the survivability race—but only for as long as the

Navy continues a reasonably vigorous technology program to maintain—or, preferably,

enhance—the stealth of its own submarines.

Unfortunately, the survivability of U.S.

submarines is only half of the combat equation. The other half is the survivability of

enemy submarines, a matter about which the

U.S. Navy has good reason to be worried. The

newest Russian submarines have actually
June 8, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — Extensions of Remarks E 1179

surpassed the quietness of the most advanced, quietest, and most survivable

boats—the Los Angeles-class SSNs—now in

the U.S. active fleet. The threat posed by

Russia’s stealthy Akula-class SSNs imposes

new and unprecedented demands on U.S. sensors and weapons. Thus, despite its temporary surplus of nuclear-powered attack

submarines, the United States has two compelling reasons to build new and even more

advanced SSNs: (a) it must preserve the

stealthiness of its own submarines; and (b) it

must overcome the stealthiness of the most

advanced foreign-built submarines.

The Seawolf SSN program, and the followon new attack submarine (NSSN)—scheduled

to begin construction in 1998—are intended

to meet both of these needs. The NSSN will

incorporate the advanced quieting, sensor,

and weapons technology of the Seawolf in a

less expensive hull that is more compatible

with anticipated future budgetary limitations. Although it will cost considerably less

than the Seawolf, it will be able to accomplish all of the post-Cold War missions, including the land-attack mission, envisioned

for U.S. attack submarines.

The pace of development for the NSSN will

not allow construction of the first of the

class to begin any earlier than 1998, however.

The Navy already has committed $900 million to the construction of a third Seawolf

submarine, and in the fiscal year 1996 defense

budget is seeking the remaining $1.5 billion

needed to complete it. That common-sense

economic rationale is not, of course, the only

reason the Navy wants to complete construction: The third Seawolf will contribute significantly to future seapower capabilities,

and will help satisfy a Joint Chiefs of Staff

requirement for at least 10 to 12 submarines

with Seawolf-quality stealthiness by 2012.

THE BUDGETARY/RISK TRADEOFF

A recent study of the U.S. submarine production base by the Rand Corporation concluded that little money would be saved by

allowing a production gap to develop in the

construction of new submarines. The risks,

though, would be considerable. The third

Seawolf illustrates this finding clearly. The

cost of the boat will be $2.4 billion, of which

$900 million is already obligated. Since it

will cost at least that much more to terminate contracts and shut down production of

the third boat, the Navy faces the choice of

spending: (a) nearly $2 billion, with nothing

to show for it; or (b) $2.4 billion, to get a very

capable submarine.

Its decision to embrace the latter option is

driven, though, not only by the budgetary

arithmetic, but also by the urgent need to

preserve the nation’s ability to build submarines. Consolidation of all nuclear-ship

production at Newport News Shipbuilding—

builder of the Navy’s nuclear-powered carriers and other surface combatants, as well

as more than three dozen SSNs and SSBNs—

would not only reduce the U.S. nuclear shipbuilding industrial base to one yard, but also

would deprive the nation of the pre-eminent

submarine integration facility at Electric

Boat, and of a highly skilled work force as

well.

It might at some future date be considered

necessary, for strictly budgetary reasons, to

consolidate all nuclear construction at one

yard—but to do so would mean a loss of flexibility and of surge capacity, and would entail some serious national security risks as

well.

Fortunately, that decision does not have

to be made this year. The overwhelming case

for completing the SSN–23 gives the Navy,

and Congress, the time needed for a detailed

and much more comprehensive study of the

cost/benefit tradeoffs involved in making

what would be an irreversible change in the

long-term U.S. submarine construction program. For at least the time being, though,

the Navy itself apparently has concluded

that it makes more sense to keep nuclear

submarine production at its preferred source,

Electric boat, while maintaining the construction of nuclear-powered surface ships at

Newport News Ship-building.

The near-term costs of such an approach

are outweighed, the Navy says, by the overriding national security need to ensure the

preservation of an adequate industrial base.

The Navy’s industrial plans for submarines

are in that respect similar to its military

plans. Both focus on the long term, because

it is assumed that the long term is when

major new threats to national security may

arise. A long-term approach may, of course,

create certain near-term budgetary pressures, but those pressures reflect the service’s unwillingness to sacrifice its enduring

requirements in order to address the more

transitory concerns of the moment. Considering the evidence of the recent past and the

global trends evident today in technology

and politics, it is hard to argue with such an

approach.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST TIMOR

fHON. JOHN EDWARD PORTER OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 7, 1995

Mr. PORTER. Mr. Speaker, as cochairman

of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus, I

rise today to speak out about human rights

conditions in Indonesia, and specifically, on

the island of East Timor. Home to nearly 200

million people, Indonesia is the fourth most

populous nation in the world. Congress has already pressed the Government of Indonesia to

give the people of East Timor greater freedom

and to ensure the protection of their fundamental human rights. I am disheartened,

however, by the lack of progress on ending

abuses being committed by Indonesian military forces and the frequent reports of torture

and other serious abuses being committed in

East Timor. This year, the State Department’s

‘‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices

for 1994’’ states:

The [Indonesian] Government continued to

commit serious human rights abuses and in

some areas, notably freedom of expression, it

became markedly more repressive, departing

from a long-term trend towards greater

openness. The most serious included the continuing inability of the people to change

their government and harsh repression of

East Timorese dissidents.

In November 1994, the U.N. Special

Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, and Arbitrary Executions reported that the atmosphere in East Timor continues to be oppressive and resembles the conditions that

precipitated the mass killings by Indonesian

forces in November 1991. The rapporteur’s report serves as a warning to the world and

should be a call to action for the international

community to prevent a repetition of severe

human rights violations.

In addition, I remain concerned about the

large Indonesian military presence on the island and about reports indicating that one of

the Indonesian army battalions that was responsible for the Santa Cruz massacre recently returned to the region. I also oppose

the mistreatment of Timorese political prisoners, the heightened migration of Indonesian

settlers to East Timor, and the obstruction of

international observers who are working to

monitor trials of dissidents and report on conditions in East Timor. I firmly believe that

these developments demand a strong response by the international community.

Indonesian President Suharto has recently

cracked down on free press, causing the firing

of journalists who voice their dissent. This

campaign to intimidate journalists is not the

only repression that has intensified. There are

frequent cases of Christians being arrested,

beaten, and intimidated. There is little freedom

of association, assembly or expression, and

members of the security forces responsible for

these human rights violations enjoy virtual impunity. Assistant Secretary of State John

Shattuck recently reported to Congress that

the human rights situation ‘‘Which began

worsening in late 1994, worsened further in

January of this year.’’ I call on Members to put

pressure on the Indonesian Government to

end their pattern of abuses in East Timor. I

call on my colleagues to join me in my efforts

to remain vocal and keep a bad situation from

further deteriorating

I also commend to Members the following

article, from the Boston Globe dated April 3,

1995, which explains United States shortcomings in promoting human rights in Indonesia.

One way to continue to keep pressure on

the Indonesian Government is to continue the

ban on International Military Education and

Training [IMET] funds to them. I applaud Representative REED of Rhode Island for the

amendment he intends to offer to the American Overseas Interest Act to cut all IMET

funds to Indonesia for fiscal year 1996 and fiscal year 1997. I urge Members to support this

amendment, which is a strong and clear message to the Indonesian Government that their

disregard for human rights will not be tolerated

by the United States.

[From the Boston Globe, April 3, 1995]

COMPROMISING HUMAN RIGHTS

The most generous way to describe the

Clinton administration’s approach to human

rights is to call it ambivalent.

John Shattuck, assistant secretary of

state for human rights, has said all the right

things and produced candid reports on

human rights around the world. But President Clinton ignored Beijing’s abuses for the

sake of trade, subordinated human rights to

strategic concerns when Boris Yeltsin assaulted Chechnya and made the fatal mistake of refusing to classify the mass murders

in Rwanda as genocide when to do so might

have enabled UN forces to stop the slaughter.

Recently there has been an unusually

overt demonstration of the administration’s

ambivalence on human rights. Speaking in

the Indonesian capital, Jakarta, the vice

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm.

William Owens, said the Pentagon wants to

resume a US program for the military and

educational training of the Indonesian army,

a program that Congress suspended in 1992

because of Indonesia’s flagrant abuse of

human rights on the conquered territory of

East Timor.

The same day, Shattuck was telling Congress that the human right situation on East

Timor, ‘‘which began worsening in late 1994,

worsened further in January this year.’’

Shattuck’s testimony replicated a report by

the organization Human Rights Watch/Asia

on ‘‘Deteriorating Human Rights in East

Timor.’’ The report describes ‘‘extrajudicial