UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT

MILTON VERAN WILLIAMS, Plaintiff

 Appellant,

v. DR. STEWARD; LT. RUTH MARTIN; NIAMYRA RIDDELL; BEATRICE GLOVER, Defendants

 Appellees. No. 12-7022 (D.C. No. 6:10-CV-00093-FHS-SPS) (E.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before LUCERO , O’BRIEN , and MATHESON , Circuit Judges.

Milton Veran Williams, an Oklahoma state prisoner, sued prison officials for an

* After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument wo uld not materially assi st the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a )(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34 .1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argu ment. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctri nes of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### July 11, 2012
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2 - alleged violation of his constitu tional rights. The district c ourt dismissed Williams’ case as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Exercising ju risdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we dismiss the appeal and a ssess two strikes under § 1915(g).
I Williams, a prolific litigant, alleges that he was assaulted by his cellmate, “an unruly inmate with a long history of mental and bad behavior histor y,” on or about March 25, 2008. Williams argues that he was placed with this allegedly violent individual in retaliation for filing inmate grievances. He fu rther claims that, following the assault, he was denied medical treatment in vi olation of the Eighth Amendment. Williams sued under 42 U. S.C § 1983, naming seve ral prison officials as defendants. The district court dismissed the claims against certain defendants for failure of service—a ruling that Williams does not a ppeal. Evaluating the record, the district court found no evidence that Williams was as saulted on the alleged date and concluded that Williams’ claims lacked “a n arguable basis either in la w or fact.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B). Accordingly, it dismissed his complaint as frivolous.
II As an initial matter, the remaining defe ndants on appeal—case manager Niamyra Riddell and Lieutenant Beatrice Glover—claim that we lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s dismissal. We disagree. The district court dismissed the complaint on March 8, 2012, and Williams filed a notice of appeal on March 26. The defendants claim- 3 - that this notice of appeal only sought review of certain procedural orders issued shortly before the dismissal, and not the dismissal itself. 1 Although the notice of appeal is not a model of clarity, in a heading it lists th e document number of the district court’s dismissal. We conclude that the notice of appeal was a legally sufficient advisement of Williams’ intent to appeal the dismissal. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B) (requiring a notice of appeal to “designate the judgment , order, or part thereof being appealed”); Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992) (“Courts will liberally construe the requirements of Rule 3.”). Turning to the merits, we note that we generally review a district court’s dismissal for frivolousness under § 1915(e) for abuse of di scretion. Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1259 (10th Cir. 2006). However, if the “determination turns on an issue of law,” our review is de novo. Id. Courts are not re quired to accept all factual allegations as true in reviewing a complaint unde r § 1915, but our assessment of the allegations “must be weighted in favor of the plaintiff.” See Dent on v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). We construe Williams’ pro se filings libera lly. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94

1 Although the notice of appeal names se veral procedural orders, Williams does not address them in his opening brief. Thus , we deem any appeal from those rulings waived and do not address them. See United St ates v. Redcorn, 52 8 F.3d 727, 737 n.4 (10th Cir. 2008).- 4 - (2007) (per curiam). We see no error in the district cour t’s finding of frivolous ness. Williams’ complaint contains no mention of how defendant Glover was involved in either alleged constitutional violation. As for Riddle, th e complaint contains only the conclusory assertion that she made the cell assignment “k nowing full well” his cellmate’s violent and disruptive past behavior. Denuded of any fa cts to make the allegations of retaliatory motive plausible, the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability , it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” (quotation omitted)). Moreover, after careful review of the record, we agr ee with the district court that there is no evidence that meaningfully suggests Williams was assaulte d on the date alleged. Therefore, for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court, we conclude that Williams’ claims, as well as this appeal, are pr operly dismissed under § 1915(e)(2)(B).
III
We DISMISS this appeal and assess two strike s under § 1915(g). See Jennings v. Natrona Cty. Det. Ctr. Med. Facility, 175 F.3d 775, 778 (10th Cir. 1999). We remind Williams that if he accrues three strikes, he may no longer proceed in forma pauperis in any civil action filed in federal court unless he is in imminent danger of physical injury. § 1915(g). We DENY Williams’ motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, see- 5 - McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Commission, 115 F. 3d 809, 812 (10th Cir. 1997), and direct him to make full payment of the appellate filing fee immediately. All other pending motions

are DENIED

.

Entered for the Court

Carlos F. Lucero Circuit Judge