alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### John Pishkos v. Joseph Wortek.

(No. 3366.)

Appeal from Lavaca County.

Ellis & Allen and A. P. Bagby, counsel for appellant.

S. C. Patton, counsel for appellee.

Opinion by

White, P. J.

§ 802. *Written contract; contemporaneous oral agreement; parol testimony admissible to prove.*Appellant *525brought this suit in the county court for eighty cords of wood or its value, alleged at $3 per cord, claiming that he had purchased the wood for a valuable consideration from appellee. It appears from the evidence that these parties had engaged in a trade for land, appellee selling the place upon which he lived to appellant for the sum of $3,500. Appellant claimed that in this sale and purchase of the land, in consideration of the fact that appellee desired to reserve forty acres of the tract, he (appellee) agreed to let the appellant have instead of said forty acres, eighty or eighty-five cords of wood, which had been cut and corded on land belonging to appellant. After the contract had been made as above set out they sent for a third party, to reduce the contract to writing. The contract for the land was put in writing by the third party, but nothing was said about the wood, as above set out. At the trial of the cause appellant proposed by his own testimony, that of his wife, and one John Dross, to prove the understanding and agreement with regard to the eighty or eighty-five cords of wood. This testimony was objected to by the appellee upon the ground that it tended to contradict the written contract, and that parol evidence was inadmissible for that purpose. The court sustained the objection, and excluded the evidence. In this the court erred. “There is no rule of evidence which precludes a party from asserting and proving by oral testimony a distinct and valid parol contract, made at the same time, and not reduced to writing, which is not in conflict with the provisions of the written contract, and which operated as an inducement to the party to enter into it.” [1 Civil Cas. Ct. App., § 1306, and authorities cited; 2 Civil Cas. Ct. App., §544, and authorities cited.] Because the court erred in excluding the evidence of appellant as above stated, the judgment is .reversed and the cause remanded.

March 19, 1892.

Eeversed and remanded.
NO. 12-21-00008-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

D&G DIRECTIONAL DRILLING, 

INC., 

APPELLANT

V.

WYATT CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 

INC.,

APPELLEE

§

§

§

APPEAL FROM THE 402ND 

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

WOOD COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM

Appellant, D&G Directional Drilling, Inc., filed a motion to dismiss this appeal. The 

motion states that the parties reached a settlement agreement. No decision has been delivered in 

this appeal. Accordingly, Appellant’s motion to dismiss is granted, and the appeal is dismissed.

See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(a).

Opinion delivered June 30, 2021.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

JUNE 30, 2021

NO. 12-21-00008-CV

D&G DIRECTIONAL DRILLING, INC.,

Appellant

V.

WYATT CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.,

Appellee

Appeal from the 402nd District Court

of Wood County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 2020-464)

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the motion of the Appellant to dismiss 

the appeal herein, and the same being considered, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and 

DECREED by this Court that the motion to dismiss be granted and the appeal be dismissed, and 

that the decision be certified to the court below for observance.

By per curiam opinion. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J. and Neeley, J.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 02-50060

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

LAURA MARQUEZ DE ALVAREZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. EP-01-CR-521-ALL-DB

- - - - - - - - - -

September 10, 2002

Before REAVLEY, BARKSDALE and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Laura Marquez de Alvarez (Marquez) appeals her conviction

for making a false statement regarding a matter within the

jurisdiction of a government agency in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1001. While attempting to cross the border from Mexico,

Marquez informed a United States Customs Service inspector that

she owned the vehicle she was driving. She later admitted that

this statement was false. Marquez contends that the evidence is
No. 02-50060 

-2-

insufficient to support her conviction because this statement was

not material given that the customs inspector had already decided

to conduct an intensive inspection of her vehicle prior to

speaking with her. 

The customs inspector testified that he questions drivers

and passengers at the border regarding the ownership of the

vehicle they are in to determine whether they are familiar with

the vehicle and its contents. When the owner is not present,

this raises his suspicions and influences his decision whether to

inspect the vehicle, as well as the scrutiny with which he

inspects a vehicle. This evidence is sufficient to support the

jury’s determination that the false statement regarding ownership

of the vehicle was capable of influencing a decision within the

jurisdiction of the United States Customs Service. See United

States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995); United States v. Puente,

982 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1993). 

AFFIRMED.
**EXHIBIT 31.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC REPORT UNDER SECTION 302 OF**

**THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I, Umang Gupta, certify that: 

 

1.  I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Keynote Systems, Inc.; 

 

2.  Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material factnecessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

 

3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this annualreport, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

 

4.  The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintainingdisclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

 

a)  Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

 

b)  Evaluated the effectiveness ofthe registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

 

c)  Disclosed in this report anychange in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal year that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting; and 

 

5.  Theregistrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors:

 

a)  All significant deficienciesand material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

 

b)  Any fraud, whether or notmaterial, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 

Date:    December 15, 2004
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 186 (Monday, September 27, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 59258]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-24079]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. ER10-2568-000]


Chestnut Flats Wind, LLC; Supplemental Notice That Initial 
Market-Based Rate Filing Includes Request for Blanket Section 204 
Authorization

September 16, 2010.
    This is a supplemental notice in the above-referenced proceeding of 
Chestnut Flats Wind, LLC's application for market-based rate authority, 
with an accompanying rate tariff, noting that such application includes 
a request for blanket authorization, under 18 CFR part 34, of future 
issuances of securities and assumptions of liability.
    Any person desiring to intervene or to protest should file with the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., 
Washington, DC 20426, in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the 
Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and 
385.214). Anyone filing a motion to intervene or protest must serve a 
copy of that document on the Applicant.
    Notice is hereby given that the deadline for filing protests with 
regard to the applicant's request for blanket authorization, under 18 
CFR part 34, of future issuances of securities and assumptions of 
liability, is October 6, 2010.
    The Commission encourages electronic submission of protests and 
interventions in lieu of paper, using the FERC Online links at http://www.ferc.gov. To facilitate electronic service, persons with Internet 
access who will eFile a document and/or be listed as a contact for an 
intervenor must create and validate an eRegistration account using the 
eRegistration link. Select the eFiling link to log on and submit the 
intervention or protests.
    Persons unable to file electronically should submit an original and 
14 copies of the intervention or protest to the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426.
    The filings in the above-referenced proceeding are accessible in 
the Commission's eLibrary system by clicking on the appropriate link in 
the above list. They are also available for review in the Commission's 
Public Reference Room in Washington, DC. There is an eSubscription link 
on the Web site that enables subscribers to receive e-mail notification 
when a document is added to a subscribed dockets(s). For assistance 
with any FERC Online service, please e-mail <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#b1f7f4e3f2fedfddd8dfd4e2c4c1c1dec3c5f1d7d4c3d29fd6dec7"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="0b4d4e594844656762656e587e7b7b64797f4b6d6e7968256c647d">[email protected]</span></a>. 
or call (866) 208-3676 (toll free). For TTY, call (202) 502-8659.

Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2010-24079 Filed 9-24-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


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</html>
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-41488 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus DANIEL JONES, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 1:98-CR-70-2

-------------------- November 18, 1999 Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: * Daniel Jones has appealed the sentence he received upon his guilty plea of assaulting a postal employee with intent to rob her, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2114. We AFFIRM. Jones contends, first, that the district court erred by increasing his offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(3)(B), arguing that the injury inflicted upon the postal employee during the robbery was not serious. There was reliable evidence in the presentence report and the record that the post traumatic stress disorder which the postal employeeNo. 98-41488 -2- suffered was a serious bodily injury within the meaning of § 2B3.1(b)(3)(B). United States v. Reed , 26 F.3d 523, 530-31 (5th Cir. 1994). Thus, this contention lacks merit. Jones also contends that the district court reversibly misapplied U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(7)(D) in finding that the resultant monetary loss exceeded $250,000. This finding was based on a determination that the 600 blank money orders stolen in the robbery were worth $700 each, that being the maximum amount for which they could legally be filled in and cashed. As a result, the court increased Jones’s offense level by three levels. We review this factual finding for clear error. See United States v. Wimbish , 980 F.2d 312, 313 (5th Cir. 1992). Guideline § 2B3.1, comment. (n.3) provides that valuation of loss under that section is determined by reference to the Commentary to § 2B1.1. Note 3 of the latter section states in part that “[t]he court need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss, given the available information.” The presentence report states, without contradiction, that prior to Jones’s agreeing to participate in the robbery, he was aware that Knott had stolen blank money orders from other post officers and had cashed them for significant amounts. Knott confessed to having cashed stolen money orders for $900, even though the legal limit is $700. These findings support the district court’s calculation of the value of the stolen blank money orders. See United States v. Oates , 122 F.3d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1997).

AFFIRMED.
#### REDAR, LLC, et al v. Warren D. RUSH, et al.

No. 2010-C-2869.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 25, 2011.

In re Rush Rush & Calogero; Rush, Warren D. et al.; —Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. D, Nos. 109,644, 108,435; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. 09-1417, 10-46, 10-308.

Denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDED JANUARY 31, 1998 AND
IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          APR-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             MAY-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JAN-31-1999
<CASH>                                             696
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    4,098
<ALLOWANCES>                                       411
<INVENTORY>                                    110,052
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0<F1>
<PP&E>                                          86,376
<DEPRECIATION>                                  19,238
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 274,232
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0<F1>
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           293
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   274,232
<SALES>                                         24,962
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               194,569
<CGS>                                           16,340
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  207,072
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 (227)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   411
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               8,954
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (21,230)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (21,230)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (21,230)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.73)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.73)
<FN>
<F1>The Company utilizes an unclassified balance sheet presentation. This format
was followed based on the premise that the videocassette rental inventory
represents assets used by the Company to generate current operating income, and
management believes that to classify all of these costs non-current would be
misleading to the readers of the financial statements because it would not
indicate the level of assets expected to be converted into cash in the next
year as a result of the rentals of videocassettes.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### STATE ex rel. James T. PRYOR v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-1082.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 6, 2011.

In re Pryor, James T.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial *122Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. I, Nos. 93-CR1-55035, 93-CR9-55035; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 0268.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; *State ex rel. Glover v. State,*93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



I, Peter J. Maloney, Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Keynote Systems, Inc. (the Company), do hereby certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| |  |  | the Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the year ended September 30, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on December 15, 2004 (the
Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | - |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| |  |  | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company for the periods presented
therein.
| | - |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Date:    December 15, 2004



|                                                                                         
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/    PETER J.
MALONEY                                                                  
|Peter J. Maloney Vice President and Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial Officer)



A signed original of
this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Keynote Systems, Inc. and will be retained by it and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
583 A.2d 315

#### MARION GIBSON, ETC. v. JOSE SOSA, M.D.

January 29, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Thomas Payne HORN.

No. 2010-KO-2721.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 6, 2011.

In re Horn, Thomas Payne; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 1, No. 256,905; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,706-KA.

Denied.
```

[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 92 (Wednesday, June 7, 1995)]
[House]
[Page H5686]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

                LIFE EXTENDING AND LIFE SAVING DRUG ACT

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Fox] is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. FOX of Pennsylvania. Madam Speaker, as was aptly described by 
Carl B. Feldbaum, president of the BioTech Industry Organization, 
``Life-saving new drugs do take too long to reach the people who need 
them.''
  From my district in Montgomery County, PA, I have heard many a 
compelling story from constituents with cancer, Lou Gehrig's Disease, 
epilepsy, or AIDS who speak of the difficulties in accessing the 
medicines they need because the approval process in our country is so 
prolonged and, in effect, they have to turn to other countries where 
the products are available.
  Don't get me wrong. The Food and Drug Administration serves a 
valuable purpose in maintaining

 high safety and efficacy standards. However, it is important to note 
that the FDA's actions directly affect the lives of patients and the 
ability of physicians to provide state-of-the-art care for their 
patients.

  In addition, the FDA regulates businesses that produce 25 percent of 
America's gross national product, so the Agency's actions also impact 
our country's economic well-being. The pharmaceutical industry is an 
excellent example. The United States leads the world in discovering new 
drugs yet, all too often, these drugs are available overseas first. The 
United States is far and away the world leader in biotechnology, but 
many biotechnology firms are moving clinical trials overseas because of 
red tape imposed on them by the FDA. These are very troubling trends 
that do not bode well for the economic future of the United States, or 
for the economic future of Pennsylvania.
  In my 13th Congressional District of Pennsylvania alone, we have 10 
facilities of 4 major pharmaceutical companies. Together, these 
facilities employ more than 11,000 people. I would not want to see any 
of these constituents lose their jobs because FDA regulation is 
prompting companies to conduct some of their work overseas.
  Americans want safe medicines. They want a strong FDA that will keep 
unsafe products off the market but, I believe, they want to see more 
emphasis on the value of giving patients quicker access to safe and 
effective new medicines. That is why, today, I am introducing the Life 
Extending and Life Saving Drug Act. We need to take action as soon as 
possible for the great benefit of this Nation's patients, physicians, 
and our emerging industry. I look forward to working with my colleagues 
to act quickly on this critical piece of legislation.

                          ____________________
```
#### In re Appeal of Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 11-PDB-015.

No. 2011-OB-1980.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 4, 2011.

In re Garner, Dianne B.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board No. ll-PDB-015 Office of Disciplinary Board, No. ll-PDB-015.

Leave to appeal denied.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. James L. CASS.

No. 2011-K-1006.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 4, 2011.

In re Cass, James L.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 5, No. 260683; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,228-KA.

Denied.