Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1927 | May 22, 2020 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Valerie K. Boots

Megan Shipley

Marion County Public Defender Agency 

– Appellate Division

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Josiah Swinney

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

James A. Holder, Sr.,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

May 22, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-1927

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable James K. Snyder, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49G02-1708-F3-32259

Mathias, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1927 | May 22, 2020 Page 2 of 11

[1] James Holder (“Holder”) appeals the Marion Superior Court’s order revoking 

his probation. He argues that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily waive his right to counsel.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On February 22, 2018, Holder was convicted of Level 5 felony carrying a 

handgun without a license. He was ordered to serve four years with two years 

executed in the Department of Correction, one year executed in Community 

Corrections, and one year suspended to probation. Holder represented himself 

at trial, and prior to making the decision to proceed pro se, he was given the 

appropriate advisements about the dangers of self-representation. See

Appellant’s Br. Addendum pp. 10–19. 

[4] Holder completed his two-year executed sentence on December 29, 2018, and 

he began to serve his one-year executed sentence in Community Corrections. 

On June 14, 2019, Community Corrections filed a notice of community 

corrections violation. Shortly thereafter, the probation department filed a notice 

of probation violation alleging that Holder failed to comply with the terms of 

his home detention.

[5] At the initial hearing, Holder was asked whether he had the funds to hire 

private counsel or whether he was requesting a public defender. Holder 

informed the trial court that he planned to represent himself. The trial court 

advised Holder as follows:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1927 | May 22, 2020 Page 3 of 11

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Holder how old are you today.

THE DEFENDANT: . . . But I’m 36.

THE COURT: Ok. Are you under the influence of any alcohol 

or drugs today?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: Do you suffer from any emotional or mental 

disabilities?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: Mr. Holder it is my understanding based on what 

you have said to me that you wish to represent yourself. Is that 

true?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Did you graduate High School Sir?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Did you graduate college?

THE DEFENDANT: ... [N]o I didn’t graduate college.

THE COURT: And what about Law School then?

THE DEFENDANT: I, no I didn’t graduate Law School.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1927 | May 22, 2020 Page 4 of 11

THE COURT: Do you have any formal legal training Sir?

THE DEFENDANT: Um, I took as far as Federal Aviation 

Regulations in AIM and I’ve, well I represented myself in this 

trial. I was my own lawyer and proper persona in the trial.

THE COURT: So you were convicted?

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, well yeah.

THE COURT: Ok. So how did you think your performance was 

during that trial Sir?

THE DEFENDANT: Based on the unconstitutional things that 

happened at trial, I mean and everything else, I think I did very 

good.

THE COURT: Ok. So you feel convertible [sic] representing 

yourself in a violation case as well?

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. Well as far as...

THE COURT: Have you read the Indiana code related to 

probation and or community corrections violations?

THE DEFENDANT: Actually I had it with me when I got 

locked up. It, because I was prepared for this but... told me I 

couldn’t bring none of my law, my ID or nothing with me when I 

got locked up so.

THE COURT: Ok.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1927 | May 22, 2020 Page 5 of 11

THE DEFENDANT: I mean. I’m prepared enough compared.

THE COURT: Do you understand that you are facing potential 

prison time for this violation?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And you understand that as a result of that you 

have an absolute right to an attorney to represent you during all 

of those proceedings?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes Sir.

THE COURT: And it is your desire to waive that right?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you feel like you are doing so freely and 

voluntarily?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Has anyone forced you, promised you anything 

of value given you anything? Threatened you in any way in order 

to make you waive your right to counsel?

THE DEFENDANT. No.

THE COURT: So you are doing so of your own free will?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1927 | May 22, 2020 Page 6 of 11

June 20, 2019 Tr. pp. 2–4. The trial court accepted Holder’s waiver of counsel. 

After Holder requested a contested hearing on the community corrections and 

probation violations, the court set the revocation hearing for July 18, 2019.

[6] Throughout the initial hearing and the July 18, 2019 revocation hearing, Holder 

challenged the trial court’s jurisdiction over him. He requested a ruling on his 

“Averment of Jurisdiction Quo Warranto,” which was filed on December 10, 

2018, approximately two weeks before he was released from the Department of 

Correction and well before the notice of violations were filed by the probation 

department at issue in this appeal. Appellant’s App. pp. 97–106. The trial court 

repeatedly informed Holder that he was not entitled to relief on his filing and 

that the trial court’s jurisdiction over him could not be contested. See e.g. June 

20, 2019 Tr. pp. 7–8; July 18, 2019 Tr. p. 4.

[7] At the July 18, 2019 revocation hearing, the State presented evidence from 

Holder’s tracking device that he had violated the terms of his home detention. 

The trial court found that the State had proved ten of the fourteen alleged 

community corrections violations. The court revoked Holder’s community 

corrections placement and probation and ordered him to serve the balance of 

his original four-year sentence in the Department of Correction. Holder now 

appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Holder argues that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive 

his right to counsel in the probation revocation proceedings. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1927 | May 22, 2020 Page 7 of 11

Probation is a favor granted by the State, not a right to which a 

criminal defendant is entitled. However, once the State grants 

that favor, it cannot simply revoke the privilege at its discretion. 

Probation revocation implicates a defendant’s liberty interest, 

which entitles him to some procedural due process. Because 

probation revocation does not deprive a defendant of his absolute 

liberty, but only his conditional liberty, he is not entitled to the 

full due process rights afforded a defendant in a criminal 

proceeding. 

Eaton v. State, 894 N.E.2d 213, 216 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied (internal 

citations omitted).

[9] A defendant in a probation revocation hearing is entitled to representation by 

counsel. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(f) (2019); see also Hodges v. State, 997 N.E.2d 419, 

421 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (“[A] person serving a community corrections 

placement is entitled to certain due process protections before the placement is 

revoked, including the right to counsel.”). However, a defendant may waive his 

right to counsel and proceed pro se. Cooper v. State, 900 N.E.2d 64, 66 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2009). When he does so, “the record must reflect that the right to counsel 

was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived.” Silvers v. State, 945 

N.E.2d 1274, 1276 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). That is, “[t]he record must show that 

the probationer was made aware of the nature, extent, and importance of the 

right to counsel as well as the necessary consequences of waiving such a right.” 

Id. We review de novo whether a probationer validly waived his right to 

counsel. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1927 | May 22, 2020 Page 8 of 11

[10] There are no specific words or phrases that a trial court must utter to produce a 

valid waiver of counsel by a defendant. Hammerlund v. State, 967 N.E.2d 525, 

527–28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Rather, “determining if a defendant's waiver was 

knowing and intelligent depends on the particular facts and circumstances 

surrounding [the] case, including the background, experience, and conduct of 

the accused.” Eaton, 894 N.E.2d at 218 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

[11] Holder argues that we should apply the factors enumerated in Poynter v. State, 

749 N.E.2d 1122 (Ind. 2001) to determine whether his waiver of counsel was 

knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. But the Poynter factors apply to waiver of 

counsel for a criminal defendant entitled to the Sixth Amendment right to 

counsel at trial. See Poynter, 749 N.E.2d at 1125–28. An individual serving a 

sentence in community corrections or on probation is not entitled to the full 

array of constitutional rights afforded to defendants at trial, including the Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel. Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind. 1999)

(discussing due process rights for a hearing on a petition to revoke placement in 

community corrections). The United States Supreme Court has held that there 

is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel with respect to a probation revocation 

proceeding. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781–82 (1973) (explaining that 

“[p]robation revocation . . . is not a stage of criminal prosecution” and holding 

that a probationer, who has already been sentenced, does not have a 

constitutional right to appointed counsel). 

[12] Holder’s right to counsel at a revocation hearing is bestowed by statute rather 

than by constitution. See I.C. § 35-38-2-3(f). The State concedes that the Poynter 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1927 | May 22, 2020 Page 9 of 11

factors are relevant to waiver of counsel in a probation revocation proceeding,

but a waiver of a statutory right requires less inquiry than a waiver of a 

constitutional right. See Appellee’s Br. at 16 n.4.

[13] Holder voluntarily waived his right to counsel at his criminal trial and 

represented himself. He did not challenge that waiver on appeal. The trial court 

gave the appropriate advisements required by Poynter.

1 See Appellant’s Br. 

Addendum pp. 10–19. 

[14] The colloquy quoted above established that Holder was informed that he had a 

right to an attorney, that he understood that right, and that the trial court 

sufficiently inquired whether Holder’s decision to represent himself was 

knowing and voluntary. The trial court inquired into Holder’s educational 

background and his mental state. Holder’s familiarity with the criminal justice 

system is apparent given that he represented himself in his criminal trial. At the 

revocation hearing, he cross-examined the State’s witnesses and objected to the 

admission of evidence. He also presented argument in his defense of the 

allegations.

[15] Moreover, although the trial court did not specifically advise Holder of the 

dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, the trial court advised Holder 

1

In Poynter, our supreme court adopted four factors to consider when determining whether a defendant has 

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel: (1) the extent of the court's inquiry into 

the defendant’s decision, (2) other evidence in the record that establishes whether the defendant understood 

the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, (3) the background and experience of the defendant, 

and (4) the context of the defendant’s decision to proceed pro se. 749 N.E.2d at 1127–28). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1927 | May 22, 2020 Page 10 of 11

that if the violations were proven, he would be facing prison time. The court 

also noted Holder’s self-representation at his criminal trial, and Holder stated 

that he felt he represented himself well.

[16] In his brief, Holder cites to his statement at the revocation hearing that he was 

not prepared. July 18, 2019 Tr. p. 12. Holder’s statement must be considered in 

the context that it was made. Holder refused to abandon his claim that the trial 

court lacked jurisdiction over him. Even though Holder was advised that the 

revocation hearing would be a contested fact-finding hearing on the community 

corrections and probation violation allegations, he argued that the trial court 

could not proceed on those allegations until it addressed his jurisdictional 

arguments. See July 18, 2019 Tr. pp. 12–14, 18, 20, 32–34. His lack of 

preparedness stemmed from his unwavering, erroneous belief that the trial court 

lacked jurisdiction over him despite having received numerous advisements to 

the contrary.

Conclusion

[17] Having received more than adequate warnings concerning the dangers and 

disadvantages of self-representation prior to his waiver of counsel during his 

criminal proceedings, and having proceeded pro se during those proceedings, 

we conclude that Holder was aware of the danger of representing himself. 

Given the totality of the circumstances in this case, we conclude that Holder 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel in these 

probation revocation proceedings.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1927 | May 22, 2020 Page 11 of 11

[18] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.