Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the P ACIFIC R EPORTER

. Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email corrections@akcourts.gov.

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

MARIANNE E. BURKE, Personal Representative of the Estate of

ABIGAIL CAUDLE,

Appellant,

v.

CRITERION GENERAL, INC.;

ALASKA USA FEDERAL CREDIT UNION; and STATE OF ALASKA,

Appellees. ) ) Supreme Court No. S-17766

Superior Court No. 3AN-18-09109 CI

O P I N I O N

No. 7564

– November 5, 2021 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

A

ppeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Andrew Guidi, Judge.

Appearances: MarianneE. Burke,pro se, Wasilla, Appellant. John B. Thorsness, Clapp, Peterson, Tiemessen, Thorsness LLC, Anchorage, for Appellee Criterion General, Inc. Jahna M. Lindemuth and Samuel G. Gottstein, Holmes Weddle&Barcott, PC, Anchorage, for AppelleeAlaskaUSA Federal Credit Union. Laura Wolff, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and Clyde “Ed” Sniffen, Jr., Acting Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee State of Alaska.Before: Bolger, Chief Justice, Winfree, Maassen, and Carney, Justices, and Eastaugh, Senior Justice. * [Borghesan, Justice, not participating.]

WINFREE, Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

An apprentice electrician, who was unmarried and had no dependents, was

working for a construction project subcontractor when she died in an accident. Her

direct employer paid funeral benefits required by the Alaska Workers’ Compensation

Act; no other benefits were required under the Act. The employee’s estate brought a

wrongful death action against the general contractor and the building owner; they asked

the superior court to dismiss the action based on the Act’s exclusive liability provisions,

which were expanded in 2004 to include contractors and project owners. The estate

moved for summary judgment, arguing that the 2004 exclusive liability expansion

violated due process because it left the estate without an effective remedy. The court

rejected the estate’s argument and dismissed the wrongful death action, entering

judgment against the estate. We affirm the superior court’s judgment.

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

This is the second appeal involving Abigail Caudle’s work-related death;

we derive the facts from our opinion in Burke v. Raven Electric, Inc. 1 Caudle was

working as an apprentice electrician for Raven Electric, Inc. in connection with

* * Sitting by assignment made under article IV, section 11 of the Alaska

Constitution and Alaska Administrative Rule 23(a).

1 420 P.3d 1196 (Alaska 2018).

-2- 7564remodeling an Alaska USA Federal Credit Union building; it was her first day on that

particular job. 2

Thegeneral contractor, Criterion General, Inc., “changedthescopeofwork

after Raven Electric’s crew arrived”; rather than roughing in three offices as originally

planned, the Raven workers were told to remove existing light fixtures. 3 No one

disconnected the power to the lights that were being removed, although the light switch

of the fixture Caudle worked on was turned off and “a noncontact voltage meter” she was

using did not indicate the fixture was energized. 4 Caudle nevertheless was electrocuted

and died; electricians interviewed during the subsequent occupational safety

investigation suggested that the circuit had been wired incorrectly in the past. 5

After Alaska’s Occupational Safety and Health Division investigated the

incident, it cited Raven “for several safety violations and ultimately agreed through an

informal settlement to fine [Raven] a total of $11,200.” 6 Raven also paid $10,000 for

Caudle’s funeral expenses, 7 the only workers’ compensation death benefit available to

the estate of an employee who dies without a spouse or other dependents. 8

2 Id. at 1199 & n.2.

3 Id.

4 Id. at 1199.

5 Id.

6 Id.

7 Id. at 1200.

8 See AS 23.30.215.

-3- 7564Caudle’s mother, Marianne Burke, filed a claim with the Alaska Workers’

Compensation Board. 9 After a hearing at which the Board clarified that Burke was not

the personal representative of Caudle’s estate, the Board rejected Burke’s claim because

Burke had not shown she met the eligibility requirements for dependent benefits under

the Act. 10 Burke appealed to the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission,

which affirmed the Board’s decision; she then appealed to this court. 11 We declined to

address any arguments Burke made on behalf of Caudle’s estate because Burke had not

been appointed personal representative. 12 Considering Burke’s possible claim as a

parent, we decided that the Act did not violate her rights to due process or equal

protection. 13 The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 14

Burke was appointed personal representative of Caudle’s estate (Estate) in

August 2018, and in September the Estate filed a wrongful death action against Criterion

and Alaska USA. The Estate alleged that the 2004 amendments to the Act violated the

Estate’s constitutional right to due process, citing both a footnote from Schiel v. Union

Oil Co. of California 15 regarding the possibility that very low workers’ compensation for

9 Burke

, 420 P.3d at 1200.

10 Id. at 1201.

11 Id. at 1201-02.

12 Id. at 1203.

13 Id. at 1203-06.

14 Burke v. Raven Elec., Inc.

, 140 S. Ct. 135 (2019).

15 219 P.3d 1025, 1036 n.63 (Alaska 2009) (noting employer’s agreement to question whether inadequate benefits might violate due process), overruled on other grounds by Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp.

, 487 P.3d 595, 598 & n.4 (Alaska 2021). (continued...)

-4- 7564an injury might violate an employee’s due process rights and the “inadequate benefits

of zero compensation and a funeral expense” for the death.

Relyingon Schiel theEstatemoved for summary judgment, focusing on the

right to procedural due process in light of our prior decisions and arguing that the lack

of an adequate remedy deprived the Estate of its due process rights. 16 The Estate

distinguished Schiel because the worker in Schiel received workers’ compensation

benefits and therefore still had a “substantial and efficient remedy” for his loss. 17 The

Estate argued that the low level of funeral benefit compensation from Raven coupled

with the inability to bring a wrongful death action against Criterion and Alaska USA

effectively deprived the Estate of any remedy, violating the right to due process under

the Alaska and United States Constitutions. The Estate contended that legislative

policies underlying the 2004 amendments “wholly fail[ed] to apply” as there was no risk

of “double-dipping” because no workers’ compensation benefits had been paid, yet the

Estate was unable “to access the courts for any compensatory damages whatsoever

15 (...continued)

Schiel involved a certified question fromfederal districtcourtasking uswhether the2004 amendments violated due process or equal protection under the Alaska Constitution. Id. at 1029. We held that the amendments did not violate the employee’s rights under those Alaska Constitution provisions. Id. at 1037.

16 See Alaska R. Civ. P. 56(c) (setting out summary judgment procedure and providing that judgment may be entered for a party if undisputed facts demonstrate that party is entitled to judgment as matter of law). In its summary judgment motion the Estate expressly said it was not raising an equal protection argument, so any equal protection argument the Estate may be making on appeal is waived. Brandon v. Corr. Corp. of Am. , 28 P.3d 269, 280 (Alaska 2001) (“A party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal.”).

17 See Schiel , 219 P.3d at 1035 (holding that claimant “still has a substantial and efficient remedy available”).

-5- 7564concerning other responsible tortfeasors.” The Estate also contended the 2004

amendments undercut the policy we recognized in Parker Drilling Co. v. O’Neill

favoring workplace safety. 18

AlaskaUSAresponded that theEstatewas raisingasubstantivedueprocess

challenge rather than a procedural due process challenge and that there was no

substantive due process violation because a fair and substantial relationship existed

between the 2004 amendments and a legitimate government purpose. 19 Alaska USA

asserted theEstatehad notmetits burden, required in substantive dueprocess challenges,

of showing there was no rational basis for the law. It also argued that the Estate’s

inability to bring a wrongful death action “does not constitute a deprivation of property

that would trigger a procedural due process analysis under the Takings Clause” because

the Estate’s claim accrued after the 2004 amendments. Alaska USA asked the court to

notify the State that the Estate had challenged the 2004 amendments’ constitutionality. 20

The court provided notice to the State and gave it 60 days to intervene.

After intervening, the State asked the court to determine that the 2004 amendments did

not violate due process. The State agreed with Alaska USA’s argument that the Estate

had “no separate legal right to sue in tort because the legislature eliminated and replaced

the wrongful death statute with the Workers’ Compensation Act.” Consequently, the

State argued, there could be no procedural due process violation. The State maintained

18 674 P.2d 770, 775-76 (Alaska1983) (affirming “thatthereis acommon law duty to provide a safe worksite . . . . [and] protect[] all workers on the site” and that “[t]he duty is not dependent upon the existence of any particular combination of contractual relationships”).

19 See Schiel , 219 P.3d at 1034-36 (holding 2004 amendments did not violate equal protection and thus did not violate substantive due process).

20 See Alaska R. Civ. P. 24.

-6- 7564that the amendments did not violate the Estate’s substantive due process rights because

the compensation, while limited to a “modest sum of burial costs,” was rationally related

to the purpose of the Act, identified as “to provide relatively quick compensation

regardless of fault such that a person and her dependents will not be impoverished by a

workplace injury.”

Criterion raised arguments similar to those made by the State and Alaska

USA about the Estate’s due process rights. It additionally argued that Burke was not a

“statutorily defined dependent” of the decedent and thus the Estate had suffered no

pecuniary loss.

Alaska USA filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, asking the court

to determine that it was a “project owner” as defined in the Act and thus protected by the

exclusive liability provision. The Estate opposed, arguing that material factual disputes

precluded summary judgment.

The court held argument on the summary judgment motions and denied the

Estate’s motion “for the reasons stated in the State’s briefing.” The court invited the

parties to submit additional briefing addressing whether there were material factual

disputes about the applicability of the 2004 amendments to both Criterion and Alaska

USA. The Estate identified two possible factual disputes.

The court ultimately decided no material factual disputes existed and that

both Alaska USA and Criterion “qualif[ied] as ‘employers’ under the statute as the

project owner and general contractor, respectively.” The court granted Alaska USA’s

cross-motion for summary judgment and “applie[d] the same reasoning to . . . Criterion.”

It dismissed the Estate’s case and later entered final judgment against the Estate. The

Estate appeals.

-7- 7564III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. 21 “We apply our

independent judgment to questions of constitutional law as well as ‘to questions of

“statutory interpretation requiring the application and analysis of various canons of

statutory construction.” ’ ” 22

IV. DISCUSSION

In Burke we set out the general terms of the “grand bargain” underlying the

workers’ compensation system: Employees give up their right to sue in tort for workrelated injuries and death in exchange for certain but limited compensation without

regard to fault; employers give up the right to raise certain defenses in exchange for

limited liability for work-related injuries. 23 This basic bargain is set out in AS 23.30.045

and .055. Alaska Statute 23.30.045 requires an employer to “secure the payment” of

compensation under the Act, and AS 23.30.055 makes the compensation set out in

section .045 the exclusive liability of an employer for a work-related injury or death.

In 2004 the legislature amended the Act, extending “up the chain of

contracts” the mandate to secure payment of compensation for work injuries and

expanding the exclusive liability provision to those contracting entities now potentially

liable for payment of compensation. 24 Under the amendments a project owner is

21 Christensen v. Alaska Sales & Serv., Inc.

, 335 P.3d 514, 516 (Alaska 2014).

22 Murphy v. Fairbanks North Star Borough

, 494 P.3d 556, 562 (Alaska 2021) (quoting Burke v. Raven Elec., Inc.

, 420 P.3d 1196, 1202 (Alaska 2018)).

23 420 P.3d at 1202-03.

24 See Lovely v. Baker Hughes, Inc.

, 459 P.3d 1162, 1169 (Alaska 2020) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Minutes, Sen. Labor & Commerce Comm., Hearing on S.B. 323, 23d Leg., 2d Sess., 20-21 (Mar. 4, 2004) (statement of Sen. Ralph Seekins, Sponsor (continued...)

-8- 7564potentially liable for compensation for the work-related injuries of its contractor’s and

any subcontractor’s employees and also is protected from tort liability for those workrelated injuries if compensation is paid. 25 In Schiel we considered the constitutionality

of the amendments in the context of a personal injury suit against a contractor and held

that the amendments did not violate the employee’s equal protection or due process

rights. 26 We noted that, in response to questioning at oral argument before us, the

contractor had “agreed . . . that at a certain level, inadequate benefits could violate a

worker’s due process rights.” 27 The Estate cited this footnote as the basis for its lawsuit

against Criterion and Alaska USA, contending that the limited amount of funeral

expenses paid under the Act coupled with the Estate’s inability to sue others it

considered liable for Caudle’s death effectively left it with no compensation.

A. Procedural Due Process

Wefirst consider whether theproject owner amendmentsdeprivetheEstate

of due process by denying it access to the court. We previously have related the right of

access to the court to procedural due process, recognizing in Bush v. Reid that a claim

for personal injuries is a form of property subject to due process protection. 28 The State

argues that the project owner amendments had no effect on the Estate’s procedural due

process rights because the Estate had no property interest. After observing that wrongful

24 (...continued) of S.B. 323)).

25 AS 23.30.045, .055.

26 219 P.3d 1025, 1028-29, 1034-36 (Alaska 2009), overruled on other grounds by Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp. , 487 P.3d 595, 598 &n.4 (Alaska 2021).

27 Id. at 1036 n.63.

28 516 P.2d 1215, 1219 (Alaska 1973).

-9- 7564death actions are creatures of statute and did not exist at common law, and noting that

the legislature can modify or eliminate unaccrued property interests that it has created,

the State maintains that the legislature did precisely that with the 2004 amendments: it

“abrogated [the Estate’s] right to sue for workplace injuries and death.” The State

concludes that the Estate had no “property interest in a wrongful death suit to which

procedural due process attaches.”

But the legislature did not abrogate an employee’s right to sue for

workplace injuries and death when it enacted either the Alaska Workers’ Compensation

Act or the 2004 amendments to the Act. To the contrary, the Act explicitly permits

lawsuits against uninsured employers 29 and any third party who may be liable for a

compensable injury or death. 30 Rather than extinguishing an employee’s right to bring

suit, the Act’s exclusive liability provision creates an affirmative defense that shields an

employer complying with the Act from further liability. And when an employer does not

comply with the Act, it loses not only the exclusive liability defense but also several

other defenses that employers relied on before workers’ compensation programs existed

— the fellow-servant rule, assumption of risk, and contributory negligence of the

employee. 31 Exclusive liability thus is one way to ensure compliance with the Act’s

29 AS 23.30.055; Seal v. Welty , 477 P.3d 613, 618-19 (Alaska 2020) (observing that AS 23.30.055 allows suits against uninsured employers).

30 AS 23.30.015. An employee who recovers damages from a third party must reimburse the employer for any compensation received. AS 23.30.015(g).

31 AS 23.30.055; see 1 A RTHUR L ARSON ET AL ., L ARSON ’ S W ORKERS ’

C OMPENSATION L AW § 2.03 (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed. 2015) (describing limitations on employee’s common law remedies through use of these three defenses); cf. N.Y. Cent.

R.R. Co. v. White , 243 U.S. 188, 198-200 (1917) (discussing history of these three defenses).

-10- 7564grand bargain; employers who do not keep their end of the bargain lose common law

defenses in addition to the Act’s protection against limited damages.

Similarly, the project owner amendments did not abrogate an employee’s

right to bring a personal injury or wrongful death action; they instead expanded the

applicability of both AS 23.30.045 and AS 23.30.055, extending the grand bargain to

general contractors and project owners by redefining “employer” in those sections to

encompass them in the statutorily defined chain of contracts with a direct employer. 32

The exclusive liability defense is now available to project owners and contractors when

they or the direct employers comply with the grand bargain by securing compensation

coverage. But the amendments did not extinguish an estate’s right to bring a wrongful

death action for a work-related death.

In arguing that the Estate’s rights had been extinguished, the State relies on

two takings cases. But we have distinguished property for purposes of due process

protection from property for a takings analysis. 33 In Vanek v. State, Board of Fisheries

we recognized that a commercial fishing permit may be property subject to due process

protections but that it does “not necessarily follow that a [fishing] permit is property that

requires just compensation when its value decreases due to a valid state regulation.” 34

32 Ch. 80, SLA 2004; Lovely v. Baker Hughes, Inc. , 459 P.3d 1162, 1169 (Alaska 2020).

33 Vanek v. State, Bd. of Fisheries , 193 P.3d 283, 289, 293 (Alaska 2008). The U.S. Supreme Court has also distinguished takings analysis from due process analysis. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. , 544 U.S. 528, 540-43 (2005).

34 193 P.3d at 293.

-11- 7564The question presented here is not unlike the one raised in Arctic

Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore

. 35 In Wedmore a subcontractor’s injured employee sued

companies that were not his direct employers but were involved in the construction

project. 36 As in the appeal before us, a change in the law altered the defenses available

in litigation stemming from a work injury: The companies argued they had been

deprived of access to the courts “to raise the defense of the employer’s negligence”

because of the combination of several doctrines, including exclusive liability. 37 We

rejected their procedural due process argument after first determining the companies had

“not been deprived of any ‘available’ defenses.” 38 In this context we said: “While it is

manifest that no one has a vested right in any particular mode of procedure such that

legislative change is prohibited, due process does require that a substantial and efficient

remedy remains available or that one be provided when a preexisting defense is

statutorily limited.” 39 We recognized that rejecting the companies’ argument might

produce inequities because a direct employer whose negligence contributed to the harm

would be protected by exclusive liability yet be reimbursed for compensation payments

35 605 P.2d 426 (Alaska 1979).

36 Id. at 427-28.

37 Id. at 435-37.

38 Id. at 437.

39 Id. at 436.

-12- 7564under a different section of the Act. 40 We nonetheless determined that the legislature and

not this court needed to address the issue. 41

The State questions the applicability of our Wedmore statement that due

process requires “that a substantial and efficient remedy remain[] available or that one

be provided.” 42 Yet New York Central Railroad Co. v. White , the U.S. Supreme Court’s

1917 decision upholding New York’s workers’ compensation statute against a

constitutional challenge, acknowledged a similar concern. 43 White involved a due

process challenge to New York’s workers’ compensation law, including an argument

that the statute deprived employers of due process by imposing liability without regard

to fault. 44 The Court observed that it did not need to consider “whether the state could

abolish all rights of action, on the one hand, or all defenses on the other, without setting

upsomethingadequateintheir stead”becausetheworkers’ compensation systemat issue

“set[] aside one body of rules only to establish another system in its place.” 45 The Court

looked at the nature of the system as a whole to consider whether it was a “just

settlement” of the problemthe legislature sought to address in adopting a no-fault system

of compensation with limited recovery for work-related injuries. 46 The Court expressly

40 See id. at 438-40; see also id. at 441-42 (Boochever, C.J., dissenting) (setting out example of application and calling result of holding “glaringly inequitable”).

41 Id. at 440 (majority opinion).

42 Id. at 436.

43 243 U.S. 188 (1917).

44 Id. at 196.

45 Id. at 201.

46 Id. at 202.

-13- 7564left for future adjudication whether “the compensation prescribed by the statute in

question is unreasonable in amount, either in general or in the particular case.” 47

Although decided many years ago, White has never been overruled. As

reflected by our decisions and by federal law, whether and to what extent the constitution

protects common law rights is not settled. 48 The U.S. Supreme Court has long held the

view that “[n]o person has a vested interest in any rule of law, entitling him to insist that

it shall remain unchanged for his benefit.” 49 But the Court has not decided whether due

process places limits on the legislature’s power to modify or eliminate common law

rights, as demonstrated by the questions expressly left open in White

. 50 In Duke Power

Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc. the Court more recently said it was

“not at all clear” that due process “requires that a legislatively enacted compensation

47 Id. at 205-06.

48 See Fein v. Permanente Med. Grp.

, 474 U.S. 892, 894-85 (1985) (White,
J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari) (questioning whether due process requires compensation scheme with adequate remedy as quid pro quo “for the common-law or state-law remedy it replaces”); Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State

, 56 P.3d 1046, 1057 (Alaska 2002) (plurality opinion) (“Moreover, the damages caps do not violate the right of access because they are not so drastic so as to eliminate the tort remedies that they modify.”); cf. Estate of Kim ex rel. Alexander v. Coxe

, 295 P.3d 380, 391 (Alaska 2013) (explaining

that Fein dissent noted constitutional protection of common law rights was unsettled and

that federal cases considering challenges to Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act interpreted it as limiting common law remedies, not “depriv[ing] injured persons of all potential remedies” (quoting District of Columbia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.

, 940 A.2d 163,

177 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2008))).

49 White

, 243 U.S. at 198 (citing Munn v. Illinois

, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876)).

50 Id. at 201; cf. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins

, 447 U.S. 74, 93-94 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“Quite serious constitutional questions might be raised

if a legislature attempted to abolish certain categories of common-law rights in some general way.”).

-14- 7564scheme either duplicate the recovery at common law or provide a reasonable substitute

remedy.” 51 The Court cited White and upheld the Price-Anderson Act, which provided

limited compensation in the event of a nuclear accident, because that statute “provide[s]

a reasonably just substitute for the common-law or state tort law remedies it replaces.” 52

We thus reject the State’s contention that Wedmore introduced a courtaccess right into the workers’ compensation framework “seemingly by error.” Limits on

the right to bring actions and assert defenses have been an underlying question in

workers’ compensation since its inception, and the balance of the benefits and burdens

of the grand bargain remains an issue subject to our review. But White also shows that

consideration of the entire system, not simply the result in one case, is important when

evaluatingchanges to theworkers’compensation scheme. Considering theActas whole,

we hold that the 2004 amendments do not violate the Estate’s procedural due process

rights because the remedy the Act provides, while small, is consistent with the purpose

of workers’ compensation and affords the Estate some remedy.

The purpose of the Act is to provide employees and their dependents

adequate income to replace that lost through a work-related injury or death while

encouraging a return to work. 53 We have previously recognized that the Act provides

51 438 U.S. 59, 88 (1978).

52 Id. at 64, 88 (citing White

, 243 U.S. 188; Crowell v. Benson

, 285 U.S. 22 (1932)).

53 See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Darrow

, 403 P.3d 1116, 1124-25 (Alaska 2017) (interpreting statute consistently with balancing goals of providing both adequate replacement income and incentive to return to work); see also AS 23.30.001(1) (requiring Act to “be interpreted so as to ensure the quick, efficient, fair, and predictable delivery of

. . . benefits

. . . at a reasonable cost”); Burke v. Raven Elec., Inc.

, 420 P.3d 1196, 1202-03 (Alaska 2018) (summarizing purposes of workers’ compensation).

-15- 7564uneven benefits. 54 Caudle had no dependents suffering economic loss by her death;

providing funeral expenses as workers’ compensation — thus eliminating the Estate’s

potential economic loss for Caudle’s death — and allowing Criterion and Alaska USA

to use exclusive liability as an affirmative defense does not deprive the Estate of all

remedies or all possible access to courts. Caudle’s family members may feel they have

been wronged by a system that, in this particular case, provided minimal compensation,

imposed only a small work-safety-violation fine, and offered no other means to hold

accountable those whomthe Estate considers responsible for her death. But considering

the Act as a whole, extension of the exclusive remedy defense does not so diminish the

Estate’s economic recovery as to deprive it of all access to the courts.

C. Substantive Due Process

The Estate also raises a substantive due process challenge to the Act.

Relying on the substantive due process goal we have identified — “guard[ing] against

unfair, irrational, or arbitrary state conduct that ‘shock[s] the universal sense of

justice’ ” 55 — the Estate contends that the limited recovery available to it under the 2004

amendments fails to meet this substantive due process standard because the remedy

available to it “is the exact definition” (emphasis omitted) of unfair and arbitrary state

conduct.

Relying on our precedent, Alaska USA asserts that the Estate received a

substantial remedy because Raven paid funeral expenses and that in a similar case we

54 See C.J. v. State, Dep’t of Corr. , 151 P.3d 373, 381 (Alaska 2006) (“Workers whose wages are low, who have been the victims of blatantly negligent conduct, or who suffer exceptional noneconomic injuries bear the brunt of a system that may benefit their co-workers or employers but certainly does not benefit them.”).

55 Doe v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety , 444 P.3d 116, 125 (Alaska 2019) (second alteration in original) (quoting Church v. State, Dep’t of Revenue , 973 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Alaska 1999)).

-16- 7564decided payment of funeral expenses as the sole workers’ compensation remedy did not

violate equal protection. 56 The State contends that the Estate’s substantive due process

claim is controlled by Schiel . The State acknowledges that the compensation afforded

the Estate was “modest” and that “$10,000 in burial expenses is nowhere near

proportionate to the loss of a life.” But the State points out, as does Criterion, that the

purpose of workers’ compensation is not the same as that of tort law, even though the

workers’ compensation system replaces that system for many work-related injuries.

Criterion also argues that the Estate failed to make the showing required under our test

for substantive due process: A person challenging a statute on substantive due process

grounds must show that the statute bears “no reasonable relationship to a legitimate

governmental purpose.” 57

Our “inquiry into arbitrariness” starts with the presumption that the

legislative action is proper, and the party challenging the statute on substantive due

process grounds must “demonstrat[e] that no rational basis for the challenged legislation

exists.” 58 “If any conceivable legitimate public policy for the enactment is either

apparent or offered by those defending the enactment, the party challenging it must

disprove the factual basis for the justification.” 59 In Schiel we identified the following

legitimate purposes of the 2004 amendments: “to ensure or expand workers’

56 Taylor v. Se.-Harrison W. Corp.

, 694 P.2d 1160, 1162-63 (Alaska 1985).

57 Schiel v. Union Oil Co. of Cal.

, 219 P.3d 1025, 1036 (Alaska 2009) (quoting Premera Blue Cross v. State, Dep’t of Com., Cmty. & Econ. Dev., Div. of Ins.

, 171 P.3d 1110, 1124 (Alaska 2007)), overruled on other grounds by Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp.

, 487 P.3d 595, 598 & n.4 (Alaska 2021).

58 Concerned Citizens of S. Kenai Peninsula v. Kenai Peninsula Borough

, 527

P.2d 447, 452 (Alaska 1974).

59 Keyes v. Humana Hosp. Alaska, Inc.

, 750 P.2d 343, 352 (Alaska 1988).

-17- 7564compensation coverage for workers, to increase workplace safety, to prevent ‘double

dipping,’ and to provide protection from tort liability to those who are potentially liable

for securing workers’ compensation coverage.” 60

To succeed on its claim the Estate was required to provide factual

information that generally disproved thejustificationsfor theamendments. The standard

does not require that the legislation meet its stated goals or objectives in every individual

case. For example, the Estate argues that the 2004 amendments did not fulfill their

purpose of increasing workplace safety because safety violations, for which the State

fined Raven, caused Caudle’s death. 61 We recognize that work-safety violations

contributed to her death, but Raven’s failure to follow safety standards in this instance

does not demonstrate that the legislature’s expansion of the exclusive liability defense

will not further workplace safety more generally. The Estate also argues that “doubledipping” was not an issue because of the minimal compensation the Estate received, but

this argument does not address the overall costs of a business paying for both workers’

compensation and (through indemnification agreements) tort damages for the same

injury, which was the problem the legislature sought to address. 62

The Estate’s arguments misapprehend the heavy burden a party bears when

challenging a statute on substantive due process grounds. The Estate did not and does

not argue that the 2004 amendments’ purposes were not legitimate, and it provided no

evidence that would disprove the factual basis for the legislature’s justifications. In

addition to the stated purpose of enhancing workplace safety, the legislature enacted the

amendments for the asserted purposes of increasing access to compensation coverage for

60 219 P.3d at 1032.

61 Burke v. Raven Elec., Inc. , 420 P.3d 1196, 1999 (Alaska 2018).

62 Schiel , 219 P.3d at 1032-33.

-18- 7564workers and preventing some employers or contractors from having to pay both

compensation and damages because of indemnity agreements. 63 In light of these

purposes and the lack of evidence undercutting the legislative justifications for them, the

Estate has not shown that the 2004 amendments violate substantive due process.

We again acknowledge that the result in this case will seem harsh to

Caudle’s family. Some courts have expressed concern with similarly low levels of

compensation for the estates of workers who die without dependents. 64 As the Montana

Supreme Court wrote: “It is easy to opine that the Legislature could have done better in

providing for family members after a worker’s death, even those who are

non-dependents of the worker. Work-related death is traumatic, final, and adversely

impacts a family forever.” 65 But we agree with that court that the appropriate amount of

compensation is subject to debate and that the legislature could rationally decide to

provide a minimal payment to the estates of employees who die without dependents

while providing more to injured employees and the dependent survivors of employees

who die in work-related accidents. 66

63 Id.

64 Walters v. Flathead Concrete Prods., Inc.

, 249 P.3d 913, 921 (Mont. 2011);

Park v. Rockwell Int’l Corp.

, 436 A.2d 1136, 1139 (N.H. 1981), overruled by Alonzi v. Ne. Generation Servs. Co.

, 940 A.2d 1153, 1162-63 (N.H. 2008).

65 Walters

, 249 P.3d at 921.

66 Id. at 921-22.

-19- 7564Considering the entire Act, including the 2004 amendments, we conclude,

consistent with Schiel , that the Act does not violate the Estate’s substantive due process

rights. 67

V. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the superior court’s judgment.

We agreewith thesuperior courtthatno material factual disputes precluded summary judgment.

-20- 7564 67