IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-50248

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

PATRICK G. MIRE,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 5:11-CR-62

Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Patrick G. Mire was convicted of one count of conspiring to commit mail 

fraud and one count of conspiring to commit money laundering and was 

sentenced to serve 36 months in prison and a three-year term of supervised 

release. The district court also ordered him to pay $10,000,000 in restitution 

and ordered forfeiture of this same amount. 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 3, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 14-50248

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Now, Mire argues that his conviction for conspiracy to launder money 

cannot stand because the factual basis offered in support of it is insufficient. 

Because Mire did not object in the district court to the sufficiency of the factual 

basis underlying his plea, plain error review applies. See United States v. 

Palmer, 456 F.3d 484, 489 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 

59 (2002). 

To establish plain error, Mire must show a forfeited error that is clear or 

obvious and that affects his substantial rights. Puckett v. United States, 556 

U.S. 129, 135 (2009). To show that his substantial rights were affected, Mire 

must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would 

not have entered the plea.” United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 

83 (2004). If Mire shows a clear or obvious error that infringed his substantial 

rights, we have the discretion to correct it but will do so only if it “seriously 

affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 

Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135 (internal brackets, quotation marks and citation 

omitted). “Obtaining relief for Rule 11 violations on plain error review ‘will be 

difficult to get, as it should be.’” United States v. Hughes, 726 F.3d 656, 660 

(5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83 n.9).

When using the plain error standard to determine if a factual basis is 

sufficient to uphold a plea, we may “look beyond those facts admitted by the 

defendant during the plea colloquy and scan the entire record for facts 

supporting his conviction.” United States v. Broussard, 669 F.3d 537, 546 (5th 

Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We may also make 

inferences from the facts contained in the record. Id.

Mire has not shown plain error in connection with his claim that the 

factual basis offered in support of his money laundering charge is insufficient 

to support it. The record facts suffice to permit the district court to conclude 

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that Mire knowingly and intentionally joined an agreement to launder money 

and thus provide a sufficient factual basis to uphold his money laundering 

conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h); Broussard, 669 F.3d at 546. The record 

also undermines Mire’s claim that plain error resulted when the district court 

neglected to advise him of the nature of the charge in accordance with Federal 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(G). Additionally, the record does not 

support a conclusion that Mire would have insisted on going to trial absent 

these alleged errors. See Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83. Mire has not 

shown that his conviction for conspiring to launder money should be vacated. 

Next, Mire argues that the Government breached the plea agreement 

with respect to its obligations concerning his restitution, thus permitting him 

to challenge this part of his sentence despite the appellate waiver clause in his 

plea agreement. Because Mire did not raise this claim in the district court, it 

is reviewed for plain error. See United States v. Hebron, 684 F.3d 554, 557-58 

(5th Cir. 2012). Our review of the record controverts Mire’s argument that the 

Government shirked its obligation to recommend that Mire’s restitution be 

calculated according to his involvement in and enrichment from the underlying 

scheme. Accordingly, Mire’s claim concerning a breach of his plea agreement 

is unavailing. 

Despite his waiver of his appellate rights with respect to his sentence, 

Mire seeks to challenge his restitution order. He argues that he should be 

permitted to do so because the district court neglected to bring the waiver to 

his attention at rearraignment in accordance with Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 11(b)(1)(N). Because Mire’s argument that his waiver should be 

vitiated is grounded in a Rule 11 omission, the plain error standard applies. 

See United States v. Oliver, 630 F.3d 397, 411 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. 

Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 539 n.9 (5th Cir. 2008). He has not met this standard 

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because he has not shown a reasonable probability that he would have declined 

to enter his plea absent the error. See Oliver, 630 F.3d at 412. Likewise 

unavailing are Mire’s arguments that the waiver does not cover his restitution 

order because the order is not part of his sentence and because he is arguing 

that it is illegal. See United States v. Keele, 755 F.3d 752, 756-57 (5th Cir. 

2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1174 (2015). The waiver is valid and precludes 

consideration of Mire’s challenge to his restitution order. See United States v. 

Bond, 414 F.3d 542, 544 (5th Cir. 2005). We thus decline to consider this claim.

Finally, Mire argues, and the government agrees, that the forfeiture 

order in his judgment is invalid because the procedures outlined in Federal 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2 were ignored. We agree. Accordingly, Mire’s 

convictions and sentences, including the district court’s restitution order, are 

AFFIRMED, and the order of forfeiture is REVERSED.

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