United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 20-2884

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Wilbert Glover

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Matt Bostrom; Dave Metusalem; Joe Paget; Sergeant Richard Rodriguez; Ramsey 

County Sheriff; Greg Croucher

 Defendants - Appellees

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota

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Submitted: December 16, 2021

Filed: April 12, 2022 

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Before SMITH, Chief Judge, GRUENDER and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

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KOBES, Circuit Judge.

Wilbert Glover filed a pro se lawsuit against several detention center officials, 

alleging that they subjected him to racially discriminatory treatment in violation of 
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his Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court1 granted the defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Glover appeals, 

arguing that the district court erred by granting summary judgment and not 

recognizing that he pleaded additional causes of action. We affirm in part and 

remand for further proceedings.

I. 

Wilbert Glover is a black man who was detained at the Ramsey County Adult 

Detention Center. Glover alleges that officers there subjected him to severe racial 

harassment, including use of racial epithets, multiple times per day. He filed several 

internal grievances, but each was rejected. Glover alleges the grievances were 

rejected because of his race.

Glover filed a pro se complaint against several detention center officials, the 

Ramsey County Sheriff, and a state employee, alleging racial discrimination. The 

defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The magistrate judge construed Glover’s

pleadings as a § 1983 lawsuit alleging a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection 

claim for racial discrimination, an Eighth Amendment claim challenging his 

conditions of confinement, and a Monell claim. The magistrate recommended that 

the Eighth Amendment and Monell claims be dismissed. The district court agreed. 

Glover’s Fourteenth Amendment claim moved to summary judgment. The 

magistrate recommended granting summary judgment to the remaining defendants 

because they were entitled to qualified immunity or, alternatively, because Glover’s 

lawsuit was barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The district court 

summarily accepted the recommendation and granted summary judgment to the 

remaining defendants. 

1

The Honorable Nancy E. Brasel, United States District Judge for the District 

of Minnesota, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable Becky R. 

Thorson, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota. 
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Glover appeals, challenging the district court’s grant of summary judgment to 

defendants Joe Paget and Richard Rodriguez, two of the detention center officials 

that Glover claims were personally involved in persistent racial harassment and the 

rejection of his grievances. He also argues that the court should have construed his 

pleadings to include claims for retaliation and violations of the Minnesota Human 

Rights Act.

II. 

We review grants of summary judgment de novo. Houston Cas. Co. v. Strata 

Corp., 915 F.3d 549, 551 (8th Cir. 2019). Summary judgment is appropriate when 

“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see also

id. The moving party bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine dispute. 

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). When summary judgment is based on qualified immunity, we 

conduct a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable 

to the plaintiff, demonstrate a constitutional or statutory deprivation; and (2) whether 

the right was clearly established at the time. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 786 

(8th Cir. 2015). We may choose which step to address first. Morgan v. Robinson, 

920 F.3d 521, 523 (8th Cir. 2019) (en banc).

Paget and Rodriguez moved for summary judgment and attached nearidentical affidavits detailing their investigation into Glover’s grievances. They 

claimed they met with Glover, reviewed relevant video footage, and either 

interviewed witnesses or reviewed witness statements. Both officers concluded that 

the available evidence didn’t support Glover’s claims. They also noted that, had 

such racially discriminatory behavior occurred, they wouldn’t have tolerated it. 

In his opposition to summary judgment, Glover attached copies of his internal 

grievance forms describing discriminatory behavior—including allegations that both 

Paget and Rodriguez used racial slurs against inmates. Glover also submitted

counter-affidavits stating that (1) Paget and Rodriguez’s affidavits are inaccurate;

(2) Paget never met with him about the grievances; (3) Paget rejected his grievances
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because of his race; and (4) Glover wrote to internal affairs and the Ramsey County 

manager’s office about the incidents but received no response because of his race. 

The district court concluded that Glover’s summary judgment evidence was 

insufficient to demonstrate that either defendant’s conduct violated his constitutional 

rights. And because there was no genuine dispute of material fact on whether 

Glover’s rights were violated, the court concluded that Paget and Rodriguez were 

entitled to qualified immunity.

Glover argues that his summary judgment evidence and other evidence 

available in the record was sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of material fact. 

Glover identifies three “buckets” of relevant evidence: (1) his counter-affidavits; 

(2) the internal grievance forms filed with the Ramsey County Adult Detention 

Center; and (3) other non-summary judgment evidence available in the record.

Glover’s counter-affidavits, standing alone, aren’t sufficient to create a 

genuine dispute of material fact. His counter-affidavit to Paget’s statement is only 

a brief and conclusory allegation that Paget’s statement was untrue. He claims that 

Paget never met with him about the internal complaints and instead rejected them 

because of Glover’s race. Glover’s response to Rodriguez’s affidavit contains a 

similarly brief claim that Rodriguez’s statements were false, but also alleges that he

wrote to the Ramsey County Manager’s Office about the harassment and received 

no response because of his race. 

These statements fail to raise a genuine dispute that either officer was

personally involved in racial harassment or discrimination at the detention center. 

Neither affidavit alleges that Paget or Rodriguez used racially abusive language 

directed at Glover or other black inmates. And while Glover did say that Paget 

denied his grievances because of race, that unsubstantiated allegation isn’t enough 

to raise a genuine dispute. See Forrest v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 285 F.3d 688, 691 (8th 

Cir. 2002) (“[A] nonmoving party may not rest upon mere denials or allegations, but 

must instead set forth specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial.”) 

(citation omitted). Glover lacks personal knowledge of Paget’s internal reasons for 
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rejecting his grievances. And his statement fails to identify any direct or 

circumstantial evidence that would demonstrate the denial was racially motivated. 

Nor do the internal grievance forms save Glover’s case. This “bucket”

contains four sets of documents that he and other inmates submitted to detention 

center officials. These documents directly allege that both Paget and Rodriguez used 

racially abusive language towards black inmates and rejected or ignored black 

inmates’ complaints because of their race. However, as the district court noted, 

“[t]he grievance forms in question actually contain three separate statements: one 

made by [Glover] himself, and two that were allegedly made to [Glover] by other 

ADC inmates.” The statements made to Glover by other inmates are unsworn and 

made out of court, so they’re inadmissible for summary judgment purposes. See 

Mays v. Rhodes, 255 F.3d 644, 648 (8th Cir. 2001) (“While we review the record in 

the light most favorable to Mays as the non-moving party, we do not stretch this 

favorable presumption so far as to consider as evidence statements found only in 

inadmissible hearsay.”); Cronquist v. City of Minneapolis, 237 F.3d 920, 927 (8th 

Cir. 2001) (holding that affidavits based on hearsay cannot defeat a summaryjudgment motion). 

That leaves only Glover’s statement, which alleges that Rodriguez used racial 

slurs when speaking to him. Assuming, without deciding, that the grievance form is 

not also inadmissible hearsay, this bare allegation that Rodriguez used racial slurs 

against Glover doesn’t establish a genuine dispute for trial. Glover failed to obtain 

sworn testimony or documentary evidence asserting specific facts to help prove his 

claim. Without support, Glover’s mere allegation isn’t enough to carry his burden 

to demonstrate a triable fact dispute. See Forrest, 285 F.3d at 691.

Nonetheless, Glover argues that other evidence available in the record, but not 

attached to or identified in his summary judgment responses, establishes a triable 

fact dispute. Even if that’s true, we have consistently held that district courts are not 

required to wade through the entire record of the case on a sua sponte hunt for facts 

that might support a party’s opposition to summary judgment. See, e.g., Rodgers v. 
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City of Des Moines, 435 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir. 2016) (“[W]e will not mine a 

summary judgment record searching for nuggets of factual disputes to gild a party’s 

arguments.”); Gilbert v. Des Moines Area Cmty. Coll., 495 F.3d 906, 915 (8th Cir. 

2007) (“A district court is not required to speculate on which portion of the record 

the nonmoving party relies, nor is it obligated to wade through and search the entire 

record for some specific facts that might support the nonmoving party’s claim.”) 

(citation omitted). Glover’s status as a pro se litigant does not change that

expectation. See Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Though pro se

complaints are to be construed liberally, they still must allege sufficient facts to 

support the claims advanced.”) (citation omitted); Burgs v. Sissel, 745 F.2d 526, 528 

(8th Cir. 1984) (“Although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, pro se

litigants are not excused from failing to comply with substantive and procedural 

law.”). Accordingly, the district court did not err in conducting its analysis based 

only on the materials referenced in or attached to Glover’s response.

Glover’s summary judgment evidence is insufficient to establish a genuine 

dispute of material fact that Paget or Rodriguez was personally involved in racial 

discrimination or harassment at the detention center. As a result, Glover cannot 

demonstrate that either officer’s conduct violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights, 

and both are entitled to qualified immunity. Because this is dispositive of the issue, 

we do not need to address the district court’s alternative basis for granting summary 

judgment. See Adam & Eve Jonesboro, LLC v. Perrin, 933 F.3d 951, 958 (8th Cir. 

2019) (“[W]e may affirm a judgment on any ground supported by the record.”).

III. 

Finally, Glover argues that his pro se complaint stated claims for retaliation 

and violations of the Minnesota Human Rights Act, and that the district court erred 

by not recognizing or addressing those claims. The defendants agree. Accordingly, 

we remand for further development of these claims.
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IV. 

For the forgoing reasons, we affirm in part and remand for further 

proceedings.

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